UNGARISCHES KULTURINSTITUT

Einladung

Johannes Graf
Esterházy de Galantha

Brückenbauer zwischen zwei Nationen

Ein Vortrag von Dr. Josef Makovitzky (Universität Rostock)

"...Er war der einzige Abgeordnete im slowakischen Parlament, der 1942 gegen die Deportierung der jüdischen Bevölkerung stimmte. Später wurde er von der Gestapo gejagt, Gustav Husak ließ ihn als Kriegsverbrecher und Faschisten in die Sowjetunion deportieren. 1947 wurde Esterházy in der Tschechoslowakei zum Tode verurteilt, 1949 von Klement Gottwald zu lebenslänglicher Haft begnadigt. Er starb 1957 als Kriegsverbrecher im Gefängnis-krankenhaus zu Mirov..." (Dr. J. Makovitzky)

Freitag, 8. Juni 2001, 19.00 Uhr, im Konferenzsaal des Collegium Hungaricum

anschließend Imbiss

Collegium Hungaricum Berlin
Haus Ungarn - Ungarisches Kulturinstitut
Karl-Liebknecht-Str. 9 • 10178 Berlin

Collegium
Hungaricum
Berlin

UNGARISCHES KULTURINSTITUT

J. Esterházy gehörte zu einer der ältesten ungarischen adeligen Familien. Er wurde am 14. März 1901 in Nyitraújlak (heute Slowakei) geboren. Seine ersten Lebensjahre wurden von seiner Mutter polnischer Herkunft bestimmt. Wie damals in adeligen Kreisen üblich, lernte er Ungarisch, Slowakisch und Deutsch (wie z.B. auch Kálmán Mikszáth, Imre Madách, Pál Szinyei de Merse, Pal „Hviezdoslav“ Országh). Er heiratete im Jahre 1924 Gräfin Lívia Serényi, mit der er während der ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik in Nyitraújlak lebte. Im Jahre 1932 wurde er zum Präsidenten der Christlich-Demokratischen Partei in der Slowakei gewählt. Er kämpfte konsequent für die Rechte der deutschen, ruthenischen und ungarischen Minderheit. Staatspräsident Beneš wollte ihm nach seinem Wahlsieg einen Ministerposten geben - Esterházy machte dies jedoch von der Minderheitenpolitik des neu gewählten Präsidenten abhängig.

Nach dem ersten Wiener Schiedsspruch begrüßte er als Abgeordneter der Stadt Kaschau (Košice/ Kassa) den Reichsverweser Horthy und appellierte an ihn, die Rechte der slowakischen Bevölkerung in Ungarn zu wahren, er selbst blieb jedoch in der Slowakei. Nach dem Ausbruch des zweiten Weltkrieges half er mit ganzer Kraft den „polnischen Flüchtlingen“ in Ungarn.

Am 12. Mai 1942 stimmte er als einziger Abgeordneter im slowakischen Parlament gegen die Deportation der jüdischen Bevölkerung, die als Unterstützer der sog. „Magyarisierung“ abgestempelt wurden. Später wurde er von der Gestapo verfolgt. Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg ließ ihn Gustav Husak als Kriegsverbrecher und Faschisten (besonders auch als Hauptverantwortlichen für die Auflösung der Tschechoslowakei) in die Sowjetunion deportieren, wo er zwei Jahre lang im Todeslager Workuta arbeitete. Gesundheitlich angeschlagen wurde er im September 1947 in der zweiten Tschechoslowakischen Republik zum Tode verurteilt, 1949 jedoch von Klement Gottwald zu lebenslänglicher Haft begnadigt. Er starb 1957 als „Kriegsverbrecher“ im Gefängniskrankenhaus zu Mirov.

Er wurde 1993 von der Russischen Föderation rehabilitiert. Für seine Rehabilitierung setzten sich in der Tschechischen und Slowakischen Republik zahlreiche von ihm gerettete Jüdische Mitbürger ein, so auch der legendäre „Nazijäger“ Simon Wiesenthal, zahlreiche linksgerichtete Intellektuelle und sogar der slowakische Patriot František Mikloško. Der berühmte Professor Ernő Lazarovits schrieb: „Das Weltjudentum trägt Esterházys Namen mit goldenen Buchstaben in die Geschichte des Holocaust ein“.

Er wurde anläßlich seines hundertjährigen Geburtstages in Ungarn und in Österreich als „slowakischer Wallenberg“ und unermüdlicher „Brückenbauer zwischen zwei Nationen“ geehrt.

Collegium Hungaricum Berlin - Ungarisches Kulturinstitut (ehem. Haus Ungarn) • Karl-Liebknecht-Str. 9,10178 Berlin
Tel.: 240 91 46 • Fax: 242 34 47 • E-Mail: collegium@hungaricum.de • http://www.hungaricum.de

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Dear Mrs. Masiarik -

Dr. Kissinger looks forward to lunch with Chancellor Schmidt on Monday, April 29th at 1:00 p.m. The location will be The Brook Club, 111 East 54th Street (between Park Avenue and Lexington Avenue). The telephone number is 212-753-7020.

May I ask you the name of the hotel where the Chancellor will be staying and if there is an aide who will be traveling with the Chancellor, should we need to reach the Chancellor while he is in New York.

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****************** -COMM.JOURNAL- ****************** DATE APR-17-2002 **** TIME 13:13 *** P.01

04-04-2002 18:54

Büro Drav Schmidt

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Büro Helmut Schmidt
- Bundeskanzler a.D. -

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May 30, 2001

On behalf of former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt I would like to inform you, that Mr. Schmidt will come to New York on Sunday, April 29 and will leave on May 1, 2002.

Mr. Schmidt would be glad to have a private meeting with Mr. Kissinger while he is staying in New York. Could you please let me know if there is any possibility for the meeting on April 29 (afternoon) or on April 30?

Thank you very much in advance.

With my best regards,

Marcela Masiarik

GESAMT SEITEN 01

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MAY 24 2002

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Schmidt, Helmut

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Helmut Schmidt

May 17, 2002

Dear Henry !

This letter is just to thank you for a valuable
conversation at the end of April. In the meantime I
have used the long air-trips to fully read the German
edition of your last book. I find myself to a really
very great deal in agreement. I am once again
astonished about your diligence and productivity.

I like to enclose a little lecture of mine which I gave
last year, a couple of days before September 11 - maybe
you find it worthwhile reading.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, personal
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

Postanschrift: Die ZEIT • 20079 Hamburg • Tel.: 040-3280 220, Fax: 040-3280 510

Helmut Schmidt

Who governs the world in the 21st century?

As regards the title-question in your program, let me try to be a bit more modest.
No professor nor even the most advanced computer can give you a prognosis
covering the globe over a full century. And I am neither a knowing-it-all-
professor nor a computer, but only an ordinary citizen, just a has-been political
leader and – even worse – a life-time economist. Therefore I will limit myself to
touch upon some of the phenomena which I do expect for the next couple of
decades.

I.

Because any forecast, be it related to the weather or the economy or the tennis-
tournament at Wimbledon, has to start from the facts and the tendencies of the
present. Let me start by hinting to ten of the factors that foreseeably enough will
have a major impact on the future:

1. You have to expect that the_global population_ will continue to grow at the present pace which has no precedent in the 19th or any earlier century. Mankind did number 1 1/2 billion people in the year 1900, a hundred years later by the year 2000 the figure had risen to beyond 6 billion. Within a few decades into the 21st century we will trespass 9 billion human beings. The space that is available per person will further shrink. This population explosion is in the main happening in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. We will therefore have to expect more local or regional wars, international as well as intrastate, so-called civil wars in these three continents.

2. Global warming is highly likely to continue, although we don't as yet have reliable forecasts as to the velocity of the increase of temperature. We do as well not have as yet reliable forecasts as to the climatic and physical living conditions in certain areas - for instance the rise of the level of the oceans or changes in the major oceanic currents. But we have to expect that global warming might in its effects intensify the afore mentioned conflicts.

3. Population growth plus climatic changes will cause <u>growing tendencies for migration.</u> Europe and North-America will ever more become attractive for potential immigration, whether legal or otherwise.

4. At the same time, <u>globalisation of information and of technology will continue.</u>
During the last two decades the number of human beings, whose lives directly
or indirectly are under strong influence of economic globalisation have doubled,
due to the opening of China and to the liberation of almost 30 states which
hitherto had been dominated by the Soviet leadership and had been closed off
from the global economy. It is unclear, whether and to what extent quite a few of

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the developing countries will as well open up to fuller participation in the global economy.

5. But recent experiences appear to suggest that only strictly organized developing countries can economically and socially benefit from globalisation. South-Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong-Kong and as well the People's Republic of China did well under strict one-party-rule. One might – with some reservation – call these examples economically enlightened dictatorships. On the other hand a greater number of developing countries tried to establish democracy, but failed economically or politically – or both at the same time. The collapse of the Soviet Union was in the main due to the abrupt introduction of both perestrojka and glasnost over night.

6. Clearly a number of relatively new, non-traditional security problems are looming large over the horizon, like international drug traffic, international organized crime and also terrorism, small arms traffic, Aids, BSE, foot and mouth and other diseases.

7. The emphasis of national governments on strong military capabilities is still uninterrupted. This goes as well for the developing countries, were on average the military expenditure is many times higher than the development aid (ODA), which they receive. It is also true in the field of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction; within the last 5 decades the number of nuclear weapons states has increased from one to presently eight – its further increase seems rather likely. The technologically far advanced countries are undertaking strong efforts to qualitatively improve most of their military capabilities.

8. At the demise of the Soviet Union some people, f.i. in the U.S., thought of a new era in the global power constellation; they foresaw an end of the balance of power-game, America remaining as the only superpower and even expected a so-called „peace dividend“. But today it is obvious China is to be respected as a worldpower, still Russia as well, maybe later on as well India and Brazil.

Japan will at least figure as an economic and financial world power. The same seems likely in regard of the European Union, although it will take at least all the three oncoming decades until we in the EU will truly arrive at one common foreign and security policy.

In other words: To maintain peace between the major powers of the world will as well in future necessitate the sense and will for balance and fair compromise – plus highly skilled diplomacy.

9. The globalisation of information will also need diligence. Beside its undeniable advantages we must as well expect new forms of crimes; also globally dominant or even monopolist networks are thinkable; they might become capable to originate worldwide political or ideological campaigns, also mass

3

psychoses. The Europe-wide emotions at the car accident and death of a hitherto disputed English princess, created by the electronic mass media, has given us a foretaste, as well as the TV-pictures of injured and dead humans in Kosovo, the latter were useful for stimulating public opinion to agree to military intervention against Serbia. The most recent and by far the most powerful mass emotion was triggered by the horrific crime of private warfare, transnationally organized, in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

10. This leads me to my last example of existing tendencies which will have an impact on our common future, namely the forecast of a clash between civilisations. Certainly the danger of a general clash between Islam and Western civilisation cannot be ruled out as unthinkable. But it would be an unexcusable mistake to think of such a clash as being unavoidable and thereby make the forecast of a possibility into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In other words: Under the circumstances of the ever higher density of the worlds population and ever higher interdependence, religious and ideological tolerance and respect for the others beliefs becomes an indispensable necessity.

## II.

If we compare the beginning of the new century with the beginning of the 20th century we can observe new chances and new challenges at the same time. Some of the old dangers will continue to exist, others may wither away - like the danger of global war. A couple of decades ago the Club of Rome has lamented loudly about future catastrophies, many young people professed their „Angst“ and somebody called the whole era the „Age of Anxiety“.

Today we find a much more positive mood, particularly in Europe, in the US and also f. i. in China. But the dream of one common world governance has outlived the end of the student revolt of 1968. Historically the dream is much older. After World War I the League of Nations was one first attempt. After 1945, again under American leadership, the UN and its Security Council was a new start. The UN and all its affiliate organisations over more than half a century have not done badly; but they are all together far from what could be called „global governance“. The criticisms of the UN, of the Worldbank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation or the G8 are manyfold. Some criticisms are perfectly legitimate. Some of the Non-Governmental-Organisations (NGO's) have good cases - like for instance Amnesty International.

But some NGO's and some of the organized international protesters at Seattle or Genoa tend to evolve from theoretical idealism into violence; some may in the end even become terrorists. They blame multinational corporations and economic globalisation for all severe shortcomings in the world. But they have

4

not so far come up with any realistic recipes. Their utopian proposals could only
be implemented by global dictates, not by democratic decisions within
sovereign states.

It must be understood, how difficult and delicate the task of democratic leaders
is, when they have to convince their national public and their electorate of the
necessity of transnational objectives, policies and institutions and entice
popular acceptance of the unavoidable losses of national autonomy and of the
necessary economic sacrifices. Take as an illustrative example the last Irish
referendum; the Irish gladly are receiving enormous financial help from the EU
but they have refused the further enlargement of EU because it would mean a
reduction of Irish net receipts.

Democratic leadership in the age of globalisation, particularly collective
international leadership towards Global Governance, is much more difficult
than democratic leadership has been in the age of the sovereign nation state.
For being successful as a collectively acting international leader in the era of
television, you may know your goal, you may know the necessary ways and
means, but you need to convince the majority of your national public, meaning
that you – on top of it all – have to be a fairly impressive television actor.

Often enough TV is enticing political leaders into opportunism. I was not
amused when I watched an American president siding with the protestors at
Seattle against WTO, an institution of global governance in which his own
country is exerting much of the leadership. And I as well think it was a bit more
of opportunism than realism when in September last year 187 heads of State
and of Government at the so-called UN-Millenium summit declared their
resolve „to halve by the year 2015 the proportion of the worlds people whose
income is less than one Dollar a day“.

High hopes at the beginning of a new century are quite normal. To achieve the
goals one will have to use the existing institutions and procedures plus their
improvement and reforms or replacement plus additional ones. So far the world
is governed in the main by national governments, only partially by global
institutions, partially by multilateral and also bilateral treaties. One might call it a
multi-level-governance or a governance of variable geometry.

### III.

The best working global institutions are still the international regulations of all
traffic in the air and on the high seas; they serve their limited purpose
outstandingly well.

The by far most important global institution is the UN, including its Security
Council and the General Secretary. It has endured the long decades of cold
war, serving peace reasonably well – despite and even with the help of the

5

inevitable right to Veto by a few big powers. But it has to be noted that not only
two powerful multilateral Alliance-Systems but also a great variety of bilateral
and multilateral treaties have served the abstention from hot warfare quite
successfully, for instance the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), also ABM (at least
so far), SALT, the Testban-Treaty and so on.

As yet there does not appear any necessity to change in principle the existing
system of the UN and of the global constellation of security institutions. But a
few recent events can lead to future complications. On the one hand the military
intervention by NATO against Milosevic's Serbia was a clear violation of the UN-
Charter. It was argued that for urgent and overwhelmingly imperative
humanitarian reasons one had to act, although the Security Council had not
taken a vote to do so. One can only hope that this action will not serve as a
precedent for the future; otherwise the Security Council may become obsolete
and the violation of international treaties may once again become fashionable.

On the other hand the US have announced their intention to build a National
Defense against Missiles (NMD). This requires either a re-negotiation of the
ABM-treaty or its termination. It will in any event change the security situation of
the world powers. It might contribute to a closer security cooperation between
China and Russia. In any event changes of the multifaceted global security
institutions seem inevitable.

It is forseeable that the US will for the next two or more decades have a
considerably greater weight in collective global governance than during the cold
war. It will require tact and skill to avoid the attitudes of hegemony. Most of the
existing global institutions stem from American initiatives and leadership (only
the OECD, the Helsinki final act plus OSCE and the G7/8 summits are
noteworthy exceptions). It could lead to a deplorable chaotic situation if the US
would choose to either abondon the institutions which they have instigated or
dominate them.

IV.

The World Bank has always been dominated by Washington, to a somewhat
lesser degree also the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the GATT
(nowadays called WTO). These three institutions of world governance have
great influence over developing countries and countries in financial crisis. A
redefinition of the tasks of the IMF - which has lost its original purpose to
maintain a global system of fixed exchange rates already 30 years ago - into
the direction of supervision of the globalized financial markets and the highly
speculative behaviour of some of its participants appears desirable. Until today
the IMF mainly acts as an ever ready lender of last resort for sovereign states,
but indirectly as well as a rescue for related loans and credits by private
Western financial corporations. Such rescues are advantageous for Zürich,
London, Frankfurt and Wallstreet, but by no means is it perfect global financial

6

governance. It seems likely to me that the IMF can and will be reformed within
the next 20 years.

I am much less confident about the World Trade Organisation. It has done
much to globally liberalize trade. But it has provoked also the creation of so-
called Free Trade areas, which have chosen to efficiently protect some of their
industries, particularly agricultural production. This is true for the USA, for the
EU and for Japan – much to the disadvantage of a number of developing
economies, which could offer cereals and other foodstuff at much lower prices.
The still very powerful OPEC-Cartel, in collusion with a small number of globally
active oil corporations, is another violation of the principle of free trade. On top of
it you have a number of unilaterally imposed trade sanctions.

All the offences against the enshrined principle of free trade are due to national
egoisms – committed either by national governments or by democratic
majorities inside sovereign countries. As I am fairly convinced that democracy
in the nations of Western civilisation will last in the 21st century, I cannot
nourish great hopes that national egoism will wither away. But I like to register
the fact that the Brussels Commission of the EU has recently been able to
prevent a giant merger in a foreign continent that was threatening to create a
market domination by one company. Nevertheless, there is no great hope for a
global governance over fair competition in global markets.

The G7 summits, nowadays G8, have never really been an institution of global
governance, although it may appear otherwise, which misconception is due to
their overloaded agendas, their pompous statements and their ridiculous
public relations- and TV-circus. They will also in oncoming decades not
become a powerful institution, unless they come back to the original practice,
namely meeting far away from press and television, at a secluded valley or
island, just the chiefs plus their foreign and finance ministers. Such rather
personal and intimate exchanges are indeed useful – because none of the
heads of government is a seasoned diplomat, all of them will speak plainly, all
will be left on their own. They will learn thereby and understand, especially
those who are new in office. Of course it is highly desirable to include China,
also India and as well Brazil.

V.

Summit-meetings do nowadays abound, whether as UN, G8 or WTO or NATO
or every six month EU, a waste of effort. Much greater is the waste, the gap
between costs and effectiveness, in most permanent global institutions. They
abound of bureaucrats and bureaucratic red tape and are characterized by the
absence of democratic control. *The democratic deficit of any global body is in
fact unavoidable*. Therefore anybody who favors more powerful institutions for
global governance, ought to be aware of the lurking Leviathan, namely the
evergrowing selfish and tyrannical but de facto uncontrollable bureaucracy. But

7

still, many people do believe in additional global controls lest otherwise
*globalized capitalism* will emerge as the ultimate regent of the whole world.

Such fear is indeed plausible. In my view there are three areas in which
*potentially dangerous effects of transnational capitalism* are obvious:

1. The spread of the *ridiculous ideology* that elevates „shareholder value“ into the one and only principle of entrepreneurial behaviour can lead to deep going cultural changes. Mergers and takeovers normally lead to cutting jobs. Raiders do not feel guilt to put off tens of thousands of employees. The ideology of a managements natural right to hire and fire is indeed spreading. It goes against ingrained cultural traditions in Europe, in Japan and elsewhere. In the end at least the European democracies will resist a de-routing of our inherited principles of social civilisation. But the results in parts of Asia and Latin America and in most of Africa may be quite different.

2. The global financial markets are an area in which private corporations may become too powerful at the expenses of democratically elected governments. We have already seen, about one decade ago, how a privately owned, highly leveraged speculative investment fund could force the British government to devalue sterling. We more recently have witnessed how another highly leveraged fund could force the U.S. Federal Reserve System to come to its rescue in order to avoid a domino effect of collapses. The financial markets and particularly the traffic in short term money do need globally applied regulations – otherwise some big private financial houses and corporations may acquire too much political power. The big banks do not presently govern the world, but they do have the potential to bring a heavy political weight to bear on their national governments.

3. As an European I am also worried about the present advances and spreading of influence *of privately owned and managed global information systems*, from TV to the internet. We have witnessed f.i. how they created the global psychosis that made millions of people to believe in the wrongly so-called „new economy“ and buy new technology stocks at ridiculous prices. We are also witnessing an owner of TV-channels becoming the political head of 60 million Italiens.

Global information and propaganda-systems are indeed capable to exert economic and political and cultural influences far beyond their home country. There is a looming potential for usurption of parts of global governance. Not so much capitalism as such but specifically TV- and information-capitalism may become a global challenge. It may even develop into a challenge to democracy.

VI.

One might ask: *What kind and what degree of global governance appears desirable?* The answers might differ due to ones national and cultural

8

background. As an European I would mention seven points:

1. The desirability to maintain any nations ability to determine its constitution and to decide its own affairs by themselves. Only so far as their national means are not sufficient to solve a problem, due to the transnational specifics of that problem, only in so far is *subsidiarily transnational or even global governance desirable*.

2. Any kind of international and of global authority *should be based on consensus and treaty between sovereign states*.

3. *The UN is to be maintained and also strengthened.* Its Security Council ought to be *the one and only authority that has the right to legitimate the use of military force outside national borders* – except in cases of self-defense.

4. Among the most urgent of new or improved treaties and agreements is a *new concept for the World Bank and Official Development Aid: O.D.A.* ought to be made conditional on a recipient countries efforts to efficiently establish planned parenthood and on the countries limitation of its military armaments and budget.

5. *A new concept for the IMF also is desirable; its main future task should be to maintain efficient rules of behaviour and fair order in global financial markets.*

6. *A global compact* is desirable in order to limit the *emittance of greenhouse gas* and also other human activities that contribute to global warming.

7. *A worldwide system of new or of improved treaties is desirable in order to limit armaments.* This ought to embrace nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, also means for warfare in outer space, also land mines, and – most important of all – curtail the export of weapons, particularly of small weapons etc. etc.

VII.

So far for the desirable goals. But what will happen in reality? It is an eternal problem of mankind that there always is a great gap between our wishes and hopes and on the other hand the ugly reality. Also in the oncoming decades will the desirable only to a very limited degree become reality. What is likely to, in reality, happen during the next 30 years?

My guess is, that we will see many geographically limited wars. Neither the UN nor NATO will be able to prevent them. In the contrary the charter of the U.N. will many times be violated by U.N.-member states. The afore mentioned desirable agreements will partially be realised but it will take long years, and several

9

crises will occur along the road. Any sweeping limitation of arms exports is
unlikely.

The population explosion will go on. Unsufficiently governed overpopulated
developing countries will suffer as hitherto. Well organized countries will gain
from globalization, as far as they enable themselves to adapt their economies
to new technologies and new competitors. The Americans will in effect
dominate in many fields.

America will for quite some time remain to be more equal than the other world powers. One cannot exclude the possibility that Americans willfully try to exert control over other countries. A cold war between the U.S. and China is becoming thinkable; in such case the EU would be faced with a difficult decision.

The EU has created one major crisis for itself by offering membership to a dozen countries without sufficient structural and financial preparation; disappointments are due to happen. It will probably take more than the next three decades until the EU develops into a world power – but this must not let the Europeans shrink back. After all the European integration process, starting with Jean Monnets Schuman-Plan, has so far taken 50 years – its completion might alltogether take 100 years. Don't be too impatient!

VIII.

My last remark is addressing you, the highly intelligent young women and men
at the Summer School. It is you, who will be faced with growing future problems
of global governance. Many of you will become leaders, be it in manufacturing
or commerce or financing, be it in academia or in the political arena. You will
need a good overview prior to make decisions which will affect others. They
may affect others even beyond your national borders. You may be confronted
with the tension between the interest of your corporation and on the other hand
the interest of the community or the society or country. You may even be
confronted with the dilemma of national sovereignty versus global governance.

Growing interdependance means a growing potential for conflict as well as for
compromise. Nobody is entitled to exclusively pursue his or her rights and
claims. Every human also does have responsibilities and moral duties. No
leadership without accountability!

And please, do not ever forget the ancient Roman wisdom which was relayed to
us by Cicero: Salus publica suprema lex.

JUL 01 2002

Helmut Schmidt

Berlin
Saturday, June 8, 2002
InterAction Council

A Global Tour d'Horizon

Let me start out by devoting two minutes to a purely artificial, theoretical scenario. Let us imagine that some foreign terrorists abduct two fully occupied wide-body-passenger aircraft and crash them into the banking center in Frankfurt and into the Parliament building in Berlin, thereby killing a thousand people. What in such case would be the psychological and political reaction in the German nation? Or if it happened in Paris and destroyed Tour d'Eiffel - or in London White Hall? Or in Tokyo or in Beijing? Or in Moscow? Or in Cairo or Mecca or Islamabad? Or in Lagos/Nigeria or in Rio de Janeiro? What in such theoretical case would be the reactions in those nations? And what would the respective governments do?

Once we try to imagine the impact of such a colossal crime on any of our own nations and try to imagine the reactions of our own governments, we will probably derive some understanding for the American nation's psychological and domestic political situation, which obviously does at present dominate the American foreign policy.

The strategies of the U.S. are criticized by quite a few (and I for one am among the critics). But among my worries there is also the concern that quite many people (and many Muslims in particular) are criticizing America blindfoldedly but nevertheless harshly. They are thereby contributing to the possibility of a so-called "clash of civilisations".

One cannot categorically exclude the globally dangerous possibility of such general clash, which is as well enhanced by quite a few Westerners and western mass media. One cannot exclude the possibility that such impact might cause a considerable negative change in the global political situation. Obviously all governments concerned are aware of the thinkable eventualities. In so far the global situation already has changed quite a bit.

But the job of a "global tour d'horizon", which the two chairmen of our council have imposed on me, ought not to exclusively concentrate on the consequences of September 11th last year, however grave they may turn out to be. Instead I will try to sketch out some of the other present factors which foreseeably will have a heavy bearing on global developments over the next one or two decades. Of course, I am speaking on an exclusively personal basis and on nobody else's behalf.

1)

At first there is the present population explosion in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which has no precedent in the 19th or any earlier century. One hundred years ago we numbered 1 1/2 billion human beings; we have since quadrupled our numbers up

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to more than 6 billions. And within a few decades we will reach 9 billions. Already today, there is only one quarter of the space left, that had been available per person a hundred years ago. The space per person will shrink further and the growing density of population in those three continents will make the maintenance of social order, justice and peace ever more difficult.

2) Secondly. Global warming will continue. The factor role of our burning coal, petrol and gas is indisputable; but as yet it is not quantity-wise calculable. Our globe has seen ice-periods and warm periods since millions of year. We do not as yet have reliable forecasts as to the climatic and physical living conditions in various parts of the globe. But we do know that they will change. We do know f.i. that the level of the oceans will rise and will force millions of humans to move who today live only a few feet above sea levels.

3) Population explosion plus climatic changes, the shrinking of space on the earth, will cause many more conflicts and wars - inside of states and between states in Africa and Asia, possibly also in Latin America. They will result in growing numbers of people killed and in growing pressure of migration. We have been witnessing the gruesome examples in Ruanda, in Somalia and in other African countries, in South-West Asia, also in the Middle East. In almost all such conflicts ethnic and religious and also ideological factors do and will play an instigating role.

Most of the attempts to quell these armed conflicts by military intervention from the outside will at best have a temporary effect – like the militarily underpinned western protectorates on the Balkans peninsula – but they cannot of course eliminate the underlying causes.

In regard of the underlying cause of globally too high birth rates, one could theoretically dampen the population explosion. But with the noteworthy exception of China and India, most governments do not pay much attention to that. The same goes for most spiritual leaders of the great religions of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Judaism. The same is true, more or less, of all official development aid (O.D.A.), whether by donor states or by the World Bank.

In regard of the underlying cause of global warming we cannot influence the physics of the earth; but we can diminish our additive human contribution to the foreseen greenhouse effect. Also in this field at present the perspectives are globally not encouraging, due to the recent repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol by Washington.

4) A global tour d'horizon must of course take account of the presently ongoing so-called economic globalization. It is in a way a misleading term and concept, because worldwide trade has been a part of human civilization already since centuries. The same goes of course for worldwide traffic – since the Chinese and the Arabs sailed across the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and since the Europeans sailed across the Atlantic and into the Pacific.

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What is really new? New is the number of participants. During the last two decades the number of those human beings has almost doubled, whose lives are, directly or indirectly, under strong influence of the global markets – in the main due to the opening of China and of almost 30 states which hitherto had been dominated by the Soviet Union and thereby closed off from the worldwide economy. Altogether a quantum leap.

5)

On top of that we are witnessing at least four major qualitative leaps. Satellites, computers, television and internet have brought about a globalization of instantaneous information (and also some desinformation). Secondly: This has led to the globalization of almost all technologies. Most advanced scientific and technological know-how nowadays is available all over the world. Thirdly: At the same time instantaneous information plus a rather rapid process of financial liberalization in many countries has led to a globalization of financial markets, including very short-term capital.

As a consequence of these three qualitative cataracts, a quickly growing number of private enterprises and corporations in the industries of banking, of information and of manufacturing, but also in commerce have globalized their activities, including the spreading of a rather ruthless and extremely greedy capitalist ideology. This qualitative phenomenon no. 4 is inviting the criticisms of the anti-globalization movement and its transnational non-governmental organisations. The NGO's do have a point here although they are not capable to offer recipes for a cure.

6)

When we ask ourselves: „Who is winning under globalization and who is losing?“, the answer is threefold.

First:

The winners so far are almost all of the highly developed industrialized countries and their populations, certainly including the U.S., Canada, the European Union, Japan and Australia. By the way: The rather high rates of unemployment in Europe and also the growing unemployment in Japan do have nothing to do with globalization, they are in the main home-made.

Second:

Among the developing countries mainly those are the winners, who have been or still are being governed by economically enlightened governments, but governed in a strictly authoritarian way. China is the outstanding example, also a few of the smaller oil-exporting countries. One might as well point to the formerly so-called four little tigers: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, all of which do not any longer fit into the category of developing countries. They have done well for their masses.

Thirdly:

4

On the other hand a great number of developing countries, trying to establish
democracy, are failing socio-economically - and therefore in many cases politically
as well. In my view it is a shameful mistake to urge them to open their borders for the
import of manufactured goods whilst withholding the chances to export their
agricultural products. The U.S., the European Union and as well Japan still today are
very egoistic sinners. They preach free trade but they never so far are obeying their
own sermon, instead they are indulging deeply as ever before in protecting their own
farmers, steel makers and so on. On top of that many developing countries have
been persuaded to open their economies for foreign short-term credits and short-
term money, to liberalize their current account, thereby open their country for all
kinds of speculations from the outside and also getting deeply into foreign
indebtedness.

7)

The South-East Asian credit and currency crisis five years ago should have taught a lesson - also for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Most of their rescue operations - from Indonesia to Mexico, including even Russia! - have to a lesser degree bailed out the recipient developing countries but to a greater degree they have benefitted private western financial institutes, which thereby received the backlog of interests due and of dividends and got most of their money back.

There is a parallel between NATO and the IMF: Since the Soviet threat has disappeared a decade ago NATO is searching for a new enemy. Likewise the IMF. Since the Bretton Woods System of fixed parities between currencies was abandoned three decades ago, the IMF has searched for a new mission, digressing deeply into the socio-economic policies of sovereign states and as well into the field of the World Bank.

It seems about time to redefine the tasks of the IMF (and for that purpose it would be
helpful if the 12 states of Euro-land would bundle their shares and their voting rights
in the IMF, because the influence of the largest shareholder hitherto has been far too
big). The enormous current volume of transnational flows of capital and of money,
the wave of psychotic speculationism, the spreading of the ridiculous ideology of
„shareholder value“ plus the manifold fraudulent manipulations to boost share prices,
also the mergermania in the fields of private financial institutes, all that calls for
better surveillance and regulation.

It might be a good idea to give the IMF the major mission to develop a new concept for fair order and stability in the globalized financial markets. Almost all of our states and economies do need better and internationally compatible standards for financial systems, for regulations and surveillance, and compatible codes for banks, fonds, insurances etc. The IMF ought not to be regarded as an ever ready lender of last resort all over the globe. Instead its major role should be in monitoring, in providing transparency and in stabilizing the globalized financial markets. It is my impression that the present management of the IMF is indeed moving in that direction.

8)

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Before I leave the financial field I do have to mention the fact that the two largest economies are not in good financial shape. The U.S. are sucking in foreign capital in the order of about 400 to 500 billion Dollars every year; that is the net amount by which capital imports overshoot American capital exports. Or in other words: The annual deficit in the American current account steadily increases the foreign indebtedness of the American economy. Or in yet other words: In the order of 400 to 500 billion Dollars annually the impressive growth rates of the American economy are financed by foreigners; this capital, owned by foreigners, is not available for their domestic economy. At present this situation is a great advantage for America; but it implies some dangers, f.i. a threat to future Dollar exchange rates and thereby to stable global currency relations and to the stability of all globalized financial markets.

The case of Japan is quite different. Japan is the greatest net exporter of capital. But the Japanese banking system is in a shaky situation. And the domestic debt of the government has reached such high a volume that – if Japan was a European country – Japan could not be admitted to participation in the common European currency.

In about three decades' time China will have reached a share in global trade that meets the order of magnitude of the share of foreign trade of the European Union or of the USA. By that time we will have three world currencies: The American Dollar, the Euro and the Chinese Yuan. There might then evolve sort of an triangular equilibrium. But for the time being the looming volatility of the Dollar does require attention. Both the American and the Japanese governments are not only burdened with financial responsibility vis-à-vis their own nation and economy but as well vis-à-vis the global economy.

9)

Regarding the World Bank and official development aid (O.D.A.) as a whole, financial transfers alone will never overcome poverty and misery in great parts of Africa, also in parts of Latin America and Asia, except under two conditions: Only if the governments make planned parenthood practicable – by enhancing the status of women and the education of girls, by making condoms and the pill available and so forth. Otherwise the growth of population in many places is outpacing the growth of the gross economic product. Particularly the standard of living of the masses will not essentially be improved in such areas. Most politicians in developing countries and also the spiritual leaders of the world's religions still do refuse to understand and accept that inevitability.

The other condition is the reduction of military expenditure. In many poor developing countries, the military's share of GNP is six, seven or even ten times greater than the total amount of O.D.A., that the country does receive. And in quite a few cases parts of the received development aid are only a disguise for the financing of the purchase of weapons from the donor country. There still is a lot of idealism on the side of many donor countries but also a lot of interference and selfish meddling.

There is a lot of energy on the side of leaders and politicians in the developing world. For them to overcome mass poverty the need for sound economic and social

6

concepts and activities is much more urgent than the effort to create a liberal
democracy.

The recently defined goal of the U.N., within the next 12 years to cut the percentage of mankind which lives in absolute poverty down to one half appears to me as a wishful declamation.

10)

All over the globe, including the developing countries, the emphasis of most
governments on strong military capabilities is still uninterrupted, despite the end of
the cold war. Arms trade and traffic, the proliferation of conventional means of
warfare, particularly of small firearms all over the globe, is going on as ever before. It
is today easier than ever for organized terrorism and for organized crime to get hold
of almost any kind of weapons.

It is true that we have seen reductions of forces and weapons in most parts of
Europe and in Russia – in most cases to the dismay of the respective military and of
their defense ministers. It is also true that a fortnight ago, at long last, Presidents
Bush and Putin have to some degree lived up to their obligations under the Non-
Proliferation-Treaty, which so far and since three decades their predecessors had
neglected, by agreeing to dismantle (not to destroy!) several thousands of their
superfluous nuclear weapons. This agreement has more of a psychological than of
factual importance.

But then the acute conflict in Cashmere reminds us of the fact that both India and
Pakistan do possess rockets with nuclear warheads. One can only hope that outside
mediation – possibly by Moscow and Beijing, despite their failure a few days ago, or
by Washington – will help to dampen the danger. And the fear!

The tensions across the *Taiwan-Strait* recently appear to have mellowed somewhat, due to prudence on either side. The *East-Timor* conflict appears to be solved for the time being. The danger of *North Korea* provoking a war does appear to me to have been overemphasized by *Washington*. Pyongyang does make threatening gestures from time to time, but quite obviously this utterly poor country has nothing to gain by war; the assistance by the Soviet Union has ended and the assistance by China is not much more than nominal.

By the way: Only few people outside the U.S. do accept the wisdom of the phrase of an „axis of evil", reaching from North Korea via Iran to Iraq. The three of them have little in common and have almost no connection between them.

11)

Apart from Cashmere the greatest dangers of war appear presently in the *Middle East*. The conflict between Israel and her immediate neighbours in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, with terrorist activities on all sides, has dangerously escalated in recent months. It can eventually burst into open warfare. Already since years is it fuelling anger and emotions in Israel and in many Arab countries, particularly among the younger generations. They understandably resent the

7

Israeli forces of occupation on the Westbank and in Gaza. And quite a few want to totally eliminate the state of Israel.

Of course, Israel does rely on the backing of the U.S. The U.S. has friendly relations with Israel and as well with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and some other Arab states. Therefore and also due to the American military and technological and financial leverage Washington is in a unique position to mediate. But since decades American policies in the Middle East are not very consistent, nor are they rigorous. The repetition of public threats against Iraq in the American media and the quest for a removal of Saddam by military force is not helpful either – except for the motivation of Islamist extremists and terrorists.

12)

It is noteworthy that the former war against Iraq, called Desert Storm, had been triggered by Saddam's attempt to conquer a neighbouring sovereign state, and that the war was authorized by a valid decision of the UN Security Council. Also the war in Afghanistan against El Qaida and their wilful Taliban-hosts is based on a Security Council decision.

But on the other hand the military intervention in Kosovo by NATO and the U.S.A. and the bombing of Belgrade was a clear violation of the UN's Charter. Such violation should not be repeated. The UN Charter permits the use of military force against another state in case of self-defense against attack – and otherwise only and exclusively in case of a valid decision by the Security Council.

After all it is the UN and its charter on which the rule of law in interstate conflicts is based – the world has no other globally binding constitution. Kosovo/Serbia was a dangereous precedent; it must never be repeated.

13)

Under this aspect the term „war against terrorism" can be misinterpreted. We will probably come back to that, when we tomorrow will discuss the subject of humanitarian interventions and international law.

Murder and other violent acts of terrorism for political purposes have been with us since millenniums. Terrorism has been carried out by legitimate princes or by their opponents, by tyrants and dictators, by guerillas and partisans, also by commanders of regular troops, by occupational forces as well as by resistance fighters against them, by revolutionaries and by suppressed minorities. Presently we are witness to several transnational terrorist activities across borders of sovereign states, from Manhattan and Washington D.C. to the Middle East, from the Basque region in Spain to Ireland, also in India, in some African regions and as well in Chechnya or on the Balkans peninsula. We Germans had to endure organized murderous terrorism, transnationally assisted, from the early seventies onwards, over almost two decades.

Most of all the various national, transnational and international terrorist activities are differing in their psychological and political origins. They differ in their motivations,

8

but as well in their organization and mode of operation. One therefore needs quite
different methods and means to fight terrorists, dependent on the specific
circumstances in each case. One can fight El Qaida and Taliban in Afghanistan by
military operations. But if for instance one would detect clandestine El Qaida-pockets
inside other states, the governments of which are not successful in eliminating it, you
will be utterly reluctant to interfere from the outside with military means or by
warfare. One as well cannot fight the IRA in London by military warfare against
Northern Ireland. One could not fight the RAF in Germany by warfare against a
country from whose soil they have been assisted.

In other words: Because there is no global conformity or homogeneity of terrorism, to
defeat terrorism no single general strategy can suffice. There is in particular no
general military strategy thinkable, that can hope to defeat all kinds of transnational
terrorism.

In the case of El Qaida the catchphrase „war against terrorism“ was to be
understood as an expression of the decisive will of the American government and
nation to use all of its capabilities and power in order to overcome the threat. It was
good that many leaders and the media in many other countries did express their
solidarity with America and in various ways are cooperating with Washington
(including NATO, when it declared the state of commitment to assist their alliance
partner U.S.A). But most of the members of this so-called anti-terrorist-coalition do
not have in mind to participate in military warfare.

I do know from my own experience that a government, which has to fight murderous
terrorists, must not lay open its plans, its preparations and all of its current activities,
because such openness would offer better calculability to the terrorists and thereby
would be self-defeating. But on the other hand one has to establish a high degree of
confidence between oneself and those whose active cooperation is indispensable.
Washington did so far not call up NATO, maybe to the dismay of NATO's general
secretary and of some military and diplomatic officers. I happen to think that this
American restraint was welcome! Because the text of NATO's underlying North
Atlantic Treaty does not extend the signatories' obligations into Central Asia.

Having said that I would add: The political and administrative cooperation of the
world powers China and Russia, of almost all the European states, of many states in
Asia and in the Middle East with America and its fight against El Qaida is in the
world's interest. But this so-called anti-terrorist-coalition will not be maintained for
ever; it will dwindle the earlier the longer America's further plans remain unclear. To
say that as an outsider is not too difficult for myself. But I understand quite well that
Washington's situation is indeed very difficult. And I remind this audience of my
hypothetical question in the beginning: What would our governments do in case that
the attack had not happened in Manhattan and Washington but instead in our own
capital? Would our leaders already have arrived on a grand strategy against this
monstrous case of terrorism? And how would they be able to succeed?

14)

9

A few weeks ago I have once again visited the U.S.A., east coast and west coast. Most of my partners in conversation said: „September 11th has changed the world." I don't think this to be correct, but obviously has it deeply changed the perspectives under which the Americans do perceive the world outside. They had been told and did believe their country to be the one and only superpower, but despite all their power for the first time in their national history had they to suffer from a violent attack on their own soil.

One cannot disregard the fact that the notion of being the singular superpower did play a political role in America already earlier on, already since quite some time. Some have even talked of the one and „indispensable superpower", which seems to offer unique opportunities and easily facilitates unilateralism. The tendency for unilateralism existed already before the present administration. President George W. Bush has reinforced the impression that America will not care too much about the U.N. or other institutions of global governance or about the obligations under treaties which the U.S. has ratified or about documents which do bear the American signature.

During the Clinton administration the term „rogue states" had become fashionable. Already then did a new defense agreement with Japan and in 1998 the solemn declaration of a „New NATO" convey the impression that people in Washington were eager to create instruments for policiing the globe. At that time one had to consider the possibilities of a new cold war, this time against China, and as well of a geographic extension of the military purpose of the formerly purely defensive Atlantic Alliance.

The recent visits which the American president has paid to various European capitals including Moscow were intended to assuage other nations' concerns, all of Bush's speeches were well done and also well received. But speeches are one thing, the reality today is: America is tending towards taking foreign political and strategic decisions unilaterally.

History tells us that unilateralism of a great power is by no means a new phenomenon. It also is not new in America; the isolationist Monroe Doctrine, which dominated America's foreign policy during the XIX. century, has in a way been a forerunner. The isolationist desire not be bothered by other states and by events outside one's borders is still strong today, in many quarters of America, also in the Congress. After World War I the nation rejected the League of Nations which had been created in the main by Wilson, who believed in an attitude of liberal and solicitous internationalism. By contrast this internationalism did prevail after the end of World War II. We do thankfully remember the creation of the U.N., the IMF, World Bank, development aid, the Marshall Plan etc., altogether an all embracing, well-meaning and relatively unselfish effort, aiming at a multilateral order of the world.

All these three basic trends, isolationism, internationalism and unilateralism have always co-existed in America, sometimes one of them, at other times another one did prevail. Most people in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe would of course prefer American internationalism or multilateralism. They will try to influence America

10

in that direction. My guess is that we will have to live with a considerable degree of American unilateralism for quite a while. But of course: Such situation must not entice other nations to voluntarily instrumentalize themselves.

15)

If one looks at the recent engagement between the U.S.A. and NATO on the one hand and Russia on the other it could appear as if America thereby was extending its strategic influence into the East. Together with new American military presence in some Central Asian states it could irritate the Chinese leadership. Therefore Putin will have to pay cautious and friendly attention to his Chinese neighbours. My impression is that Moscow understands its recent agreements as a medium-term move to gain some strategic alleviation and thereby increase the room for domestic changes. If that assumption is correct neither China nor India or Pakistan do need to worry.

Over the longer run, I still do expect three world powers: besides the U.S.A. also China and Russia. Perhaps in approaching the middle of this century as well India as no. 4 and possibly also Brazil. It is also thinkable that the European Union by that time has emerged as an operational entity and thereby as a world power.

As regards China, the economic and technological progress over the last twenty years is almost unbelievable. I have first been to China at the time of the horrible cultural revolution and if I compare my impressions in the middle 70's with what I see today, then the achievements appear as almost incredible. If we consider the dignified age of the Chinese civilization, about four millenniums of history, and as well China's weakness and humiliations in the XIX. century and until the middle of the XX. century, then the sudden burst of vitality is phenomenal. Of course China does still have enormous problems inside her borders. The government will have to concentrate on them - which fact in turn makes any kind of Chinese aggression across her borders rather unlikely. (I would like to insert one little side remark here. I think any Japanese fear of China has little rational legitimation. Japanese relations with China - and as well with Korea and other Asian nations - do in my view depend in the main on Japan herself and on how the nation lives up to a realistic evaluation of the imperialist part of Japan's recent history.)

As regards Russia, her domestic economic and social problems, inherited structural, constitutional and cultural problems, are not smaller than those of China. But the enormous territory will, differing from China or India and others, prevent any overpopulation. The modernization of Russia may take one or more generations. It seems though that in recent years there is more progress under way than ever during former decades. Today Russia's importance to the world is not so much a consequence of its military and spacefare and nuclear capabilities but more so of its long borders in Europe and in Asia, its vast territory - 10 or 11 time-zones - and of course the hitherto unexploited riches of minerals and fossile fuel in Siberia.

16)

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I will at the end of this very personal presentation offer a few thoughts on the peaceful co-existence on our globe between different religions, different civilizations and different ideologies.

Fifteen years ago, upon the initiative of our founder, my friend Takeo Fukuda, a group of high-ranking spiritual leaders from all the major religions of the world and a group of elderly politicians of the InterAction Council met in a place called Civittà Cattolica in Italy. We were able to find consensus on quite a few basic insights, moral, political and socio-economic truths, as well as on some basic recommendations. From then on we have jointly been working together, on our way resulting ten years later in a draft for a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities. I very clearly remember the thoughtful contributions by our deceased Canadian friend Pierre Trudeau and also by our American special guest Flora Lewis who passed away last Sunday. We have with great interest watched the efforts of Hans Küng and others in persuading personalities of all religions to establish a common or global code of ethics. One has to admit that all such efforts have not as yet reached the agenda of the actual political leaders.

When we were younger, some of us may have read Arnold Toynbee (or even Oswald Spengler's „Decline of the West“); rather recently many of us will have noticed Samuel Huntington's thesis on the „Clash of Civilizations“. But it seems to be a fact that only very, very few leaders do know about a religion other than his own and about other religiously moulded cultures or civilizations. This is at least true for Christians. I do not know about relations and tensions between Buddhism and Confucianism, or between Hinduism and Islam. But I do have understood that *there does exist a considerable, dangerous gap of knowledge and of understanding between Islam and the West as a whole* (whether western Christians or just nominal Christians or Jews or non-believers).

Given this western lack of knowledge in regard of the various Islamic civilizations and their different histories it is easy to mistake the activities of some islamistic extremists to be typical for the world religion of Islam. At least some important facts ought to be understood. Let me mention three facts:

First: The Quran and Islamic traditions do not distinguish between religious authority and political authority. The same is true of the Thora or the Old Testament, but in the course of more than a milliennium Christians and also Jews have come to accept a rather clear divide between the realm of the church or of the synagogue and on the other hand the realm of the political authority, be it formerly the hereditary emperor or king and nowadays the elected government. By contrast in many Islamic countries such divide is not established as yet; Iran is the outstanding example.

Second: Who is to blame in countries that do owe their borders only to the chances of western colonial conquest and do owe their existence as a state not to a long history of evolution but only to the fact that the colonial rule, two or three generations ago, was either voluntarily abandoned or – in most cases – was forced to leave by uprisings. That goes for Indonesia, for India or Pakistan, for Bangladesh, and for most states with Islamic majorities or considerable Islamic minorities. Never before

12

1945 existed for instance a Libyan or a Pakistani or an Indonesian nation (the same
by the way is true for almost all African states of today).

Thirdly: In many states of Arab islamic populations there does exist an Arab identity
but hardly a national one. There are great distinctions between an islamic state of
considerable historical legitimacy (like f.i. Iran) and on the other hand a state which
is the artificial creation of the victorious European powers who after World War I
divided the Ottoman empire between themselves - Iraq is one of those.

At present more than one billion Muslims are about one fifth or one sixth of mankind. They live in very different states and in areas that stretch from the Indian Ocean and the Pacific to the coasts of the Atlantic. It seems very unwise to me to urge all of them likewise to adopt western political and constitutional convictions and economic and social ideologies. After all the Quran, like the Bible, has in the main revealed and preached commandments and duties, but not basic rights of the individual.

The first democracy in Athens at the time of Perikles was based on slavery. Two thousand years later, the era of enlightenment led to the introduction of democracy, so in England and France, in the U.S.A. and in other western countries. But to abandon slavery in most western colonies did take the West even some more time! (For Thomas Jefferson f.i. slavery was obviously quite acceptable.) Given this western history it seems to me that the legitimation of the West to teach other civilizations and to push and thrust and force western basic values upon them is somewhat limited.

17)

My conclusion is this: Whilst the global shrinking of space per capita inevitably will go on, whilst the present globalization of information, knowledge and technology will go on, we have to expect growing frictions and growing interdependance almost all over the globe.

Growing interdependance means a growing potential for conflict. But it also means a
growing necessity for compromise. I do believe that the conscientious will for
compromise and for tolerance becomes much more decisive in the future. That
means: Nobody is entitled to exclusively pursue his or her rights, claims or interests
- anybody does as well have duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis others.

No leadership is legitimate without accountability. Whether one is a leader in a
globally operating bank or in an electronic or television network, whether he is
spiritually leading masses of religious believers or politically leading the government
of a sovereign state: In all cases one's responsibility reaches further out than just the
realm of one's corporation and its shareholders or one's church and its believers or
one's state and its electorate.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

November 13, 2002

Dear Helmut:

Your letter brought the very welcome news that you are back at your desk. It is not necessary to tell you how extremely delighted I am. I hope we can get together on my next trip to Germany and will be very interested to have your views on the present Germany-U.S. situation, which gravely concerns me. Although you will probably already have seen it, I am enclosing my latest article on the subject.

Take the advice of an old friend and do not jump back too quickly to a full schedule. It will be hard to resist, as I discovered, but both our countries need your experience and good judgment, now and in the future.

His Excellency
Helmut Schmidt
Die Zeit
20079 Hamburg
Germany

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

Henry A. Kissinger

# The ‘Made In Berlin’ Generation

## Germany's rift with the United States goes deeper than American unilateralism and disagreement over Iraq policy.

REUTERS

The Washington Post

Wednesday,

October 30, 2002

German-American relations have been thrown into crisis by the way Germany's election campaign was conducted by its governing party. Other allies have had reservations about American policy on Iraq. None has chosen the road of confrontation.

The cause for this sudden deterioration is complex. Some ascribe the quite unexpected shift of German policy to electoral opportunism. But Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's motives are not the issue. For the anti-American campaign clearly appealed to a constituency large enough to transform Schroeder's expected defeat into victory. Hence a kind of anti-Americanism may have become a permanent temptation of German politics.

This is especially painful for those of us who actively nurtured what we consider one of the proudest achievements of American postwar foreign policy: the return of Germany to the community of nations as an equal, respected and indispensable member. It was a journey marked by the Berlin airlift; the Marshall Plan; support for Germany's membership in NATO and the European Community; close cooperation in two further Berlin crises; American support (overcoming initial doubts) for German reconciliation with the East; American leadership in negotiating a final agreement on access to Berlin; and, finally, unconditional American support for German unification despite the hesitations of other allies, not to speak of the Soviet Union. Germany's contribution was the courageous decision to postpone unification, when Stalin offered it in return for Germany's rejection of NATO, and its decision instead to tie its future to European unity and Atlantic partnership.

The forging of a common destiny did not prevent occasional disagreements regarding specific policies. But up to now they were based on differing interpretations of, and responses to, unchallenged common interests. This explains the shock when, without warning or consultation, an election issue was made of American policy on Iraq. German participation in a military conflict with Iraq was rejected and the use of German bases proscribed, even if action is backed by a U.N. vote and whatever the other members of the European Union or NATO might decide—despite the fact that no request for a German military contribution had been made or was likely to be made. This dramatic gesture was proclaimed in behalf of a so-called German way, explicitly defined as being “made in Berlin,” challenging the twin pillars of Germany's postwar foreign policy: the Atlantic alliance and European unity.

This was accompanied by sharp official criticism of a speech by Vice President Cheney and of the alleged unilateral tactics of President Bush. The comparison of President Bush's domestic methods to those of Hitler by a cabinet minister was an aberration, but it grew out of a mood that had been deliberately fostered. A leading official of the Social Democratic Party compared the American ambassador to the Soviet special representative to East Germany, Pyotr Abrasimov; others described American policies as Caesarean. And the tone deafness vis-à-vis American sensitivities continued after the election when the newly designated state secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, Klaus Schärioth, described the new American strategic doctrine released by the White House as reminiscent of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The impact of this campaign on the German electorate is shown by the fact that Schroeder's opposition, the historically pro-American Christian Democratic Union, went reluctantly along with the refusal of military cooperation and of the use of NATO military bases located in Germany. This suggests that the causes of the existing rift go deeper than electoral opportunism, American unilateralism and disagreement over Iraq policy.

The end of the Cold War has removed the fear of a common danger. For four decades, German governments treated the American alliance as the key to German security and to the political legitimacy of the new Germany. Today there is no sense of overriding danger, and Germany rightly no longer feels the need to pay a price to vindicate its legitimacy. Thus the issue of Iraq has become a pretext for a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction.

The generation that created the German-American relationship is passing from the scene. On the American side, its members came from the Eastern Establishment, leavened by some émigrés. On the German side, the postwar leaders had decisively turned away from a past in which Germany had overreached, partly as a result of totalitarianism but even before that because of an inability to establish national priorities that related Germany's aims to its capabilities.

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The new leadership groups that have emerged on both sides of the Atlantic have not shared the experience of the war and of postwar reconstruction. They are either not preoccupied with foreign dangers or, to the extent that they are, believe themselves capable of dealing with them unilaterally. The Atlantic Alliance, once the centerpiece of policymaking, now concentrates on expanding its membership and thus on extending its reach without redefining its purpose. In the United States, the political center of gravity has shifted to regions whose representatives have fewer personal connections with Europe and less experience with its challenges than their predecessors, who created the postwar structure. And they govern in a United States that enjoys unquestionable military supremacy and has reinterpreted its approach to alliances.

As the victim of 9/11 and as the dominant military power, America feels itself responsible for global security. But in Europe, the focus is on domestic politics rather than on international affairs. European leaders spend an enormous amount of their time on the technicalities of European unification—an arcane subject for most American leaders. This emphasis on bureaucratic, constitutional and legalistic arrangements contrasts with a United States that emphasizes its exceptional character and the applicability of its institutions to the rest of the world.

Germany is challenged by these realities in an especially acute fashion. It achieved national unity later than any European country and acquired its present dimensions and structure only a little more than 10 years ago. It therefore has less of a tradition of global foreign policy than the other major countries of Western Europe. Its domestic problems are more severe. It is governed by a coalition whose leaders had their formative experience in the protest against American policy on Vietnam, even participating in some of its more violent phases. In the early post-World War II period, Germany's governing party, the SPD, advocated unity over NATO and overthrew one of its chancellors, Helmut Schmidt, because he was willing to place NATO missiles on German soil. And its coalition partner, the Greens, opposed all military ties to the West until it entered office. To be sure, farsighted leadership in both coalition parties enabled them to govern with programs sustaining Atlantic ties, if not with passion at least on the basis of realistic assessment. But it did leave a residue on the left wing of each governing party, which could be mobilized by appeals to traditional anti-Americanism.

This situation is compounded by the special psychological condition of the eastern part of Germany. East Germany was liberated as much by Western pressure as by the actions of its own internal resistance. And its economic and political reconstruction has taken place under West German aegis. As a result, the East German population takes less pride in economic accomplishments, is more conscious of lingering unemployment and is less tied to the Atlantic Alliance than the populations of, say, Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, which, also being more afraid of Russia, veer more toward the United States. East Germany went from Nazism to communism without any experience of democracy. Its population tends to view itself as victims of history and, to some extent, of Western globalism. It is not familiar with Western strategic or geopolitical views and seeks its security in an abstract moralism veering toward pacifism, which enables it to feel superior to its powerful ally.

Foreign policy expert Karsten Voigt, in charge of American relations in Germany's foreign office, summed up this new attitude: "We do what makes sense to us; we do nothing with whose substance we disagree." Foreign policy rarely permits such absolute distinctions, however. No country should be asked to act against its interests or its notions of common sense. But Germany, located in the center of the continent, cannot afford a foreign policy that makes no allowance for the views of other societies—and especially of close allies. At the end of the German election campaign, the margin of victory may well have been supplied by a combination of pacifism, left and right nationalism, and an evocation of a specifically German way reminiscent of Wilhelmine Germany. For if Germany can affront the United States, reject U.N. views and act without consultations with the other nations of Europe in the name of a "German way"—"made in Berlin," in the chancellor's words—self-righteous isolation beckons for Germany and a return to pre-World War I conditions for Europe.

The experience of recent months has shaken the nations of Europe almost as much as the United States—though for reasons of geographic proximity they are less ready to say so openly. The nations of Eastern Europe in need of finding a home in a united Europe reemphasize ties to America as the ultimate safety anchor. The nations of Western Europe are taking another look at the previous tendency to seek Europe's identity in distinction from the United States. There is therefore wide scope for a creative American diplomacy. This must include a serious commitment to the rebuilding of the relationship with Germany. Germany is too important to Europe and the Atlantic relationship to let policy be based on recrimination.

The issue is not to bridge differences over Iraq—Germany should find its own approach with respect to this issue without American pressure or persuasion. Clearly some confidence has been lost. Still, the environment will produce enough situations in which both sides can test their ability to develop common approaches, and not only in the Middle East—especially as Germany assumes the chairmanship of the U.N. Security Council in February. A sober, realistic approach on both sides is indicated. A major effort should be made to deal with the conditions from which the explosive mix of the German electoral period emerged. Both sides should take seriously the other's concern regarding unilateralism. They should try to answer together the basic issues of the direction of the Atlantic alliance, the relations of Europe and America, the rebuilding of a united Europe, and a definition of the German way that draws the appropriate lessons from history.

During the 20th century, the West tore itself apart over problems importantly revolving around Germany. The United States, its allies and the new German government have an obligation to dedicate themselves to making sure that history does not repeat itself.

*The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.*

© 2002 Tribune Media Services International

Helmut Schmidt

NOV 22 2002

November 19, 2002

Gradually I resume to working again and get the
possibility to answer the numerous letters and calls
that had reached me during my absence. I thank my staff
who had kindly read them to me and answered them on my
behalf. However, I would like to take this opportunity
to thank you personally from the bottom of my heart.
Especially for Loki your support has been a great
source of strength.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.