8. *New York Times*, *Editorial*, July 21, 1922.

9. *New York Herald Tribune*, *Editorial*, July 31, 1922.

With President Wilson (etc.). *Newspaper editor* ever conceived that his own
is indeed an intense sense of relief which unites President Wilson's
this past been removed at Geneva, an era of peace was beginning: "It
that the Cold War past been due largely to beneficial results. Since
The conviction was widespread on both sides of the Atlantic
from the other side of the Eiffel."

the attitudes it not the policies of the little band of visitors
will to draw others into the circle of his goodwill and to monthly
might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Wilson's
tact...The occasion was, in fact, made for Mr. Wilson. Other men
*New York Times*. He had done something to prevent penalties from pummel-
ing past been due assignment a decade ago," read an editorial in the
Mr. Wilson power had done even better than defeat an enemy in battle
sated the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace."

10. *New York Times*, July 22, 1922.

Wilson's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he
took, nothing would have been possible. But it remains President
III-4

III-6

this unofficial title, it has passed from Moscow to Washington."

Perhaps the most moving, if also fatuous, statement of the
philosophy of personal diplomacy was made by the then Foreign Minister
Macmillan. At the end of the Foreign Minister's conference in 1955,
in a statement which goes far to explain his later policy

10. *Life*, Editorial, August 1, 1955.

10. Life, Editorial, August 1, 1922.

in a statement which goes far to explain the further policy
Macmillan. At the end of the Foreign Minister's Conference in 1922,
philosophy of personal diplomacy was made by the then Foreign Minister
Perhaps the most moving, it also latently, statement of the
to this editorial title, it has based from Moscow to Washington.

10

III-8

whether the democracies' notion of normalcy is not their Achilles' heel. An atmosphere of confidence is undoubtedly helpful. It is less certain, however, whether the free countries render themselves or the cause of peace service by making a settlement seem so simple and by evading all difficult issues. Had the Cold War really resulted from personal mistrust or were the causes deeper? Was the tension caused by the intransigence of the Soviet tone or the intransigence of Soviet acts? Is it not possible that the yearning for agreement revealed in statements such as Mr. Macmillan's and the identification of a settlement with good personal relations are themselves obstacles to serious negotiation? What conceivable incentive could be left for the Soviet leaders to negotiate responsibility at a summit, when the mere fact of its being assembled plays so large a role in Western thinking?

the Hungarian rebellion of 1956,
Hardly a year after Hungary, many in the West again insisted on a summit conference and construed the attempt to define an agenda, as intransigence. At the time of the execution of

define an agenda for the conference. At the time of the execution of

instituted on a summit conference and conference of the Attorneys to

Hardly a year after Hungary, war in the West again

broke so far as a role in Western thinking?

reasonability at a summit, when the war was lost of its being accepted
incentive could be left for the Soviet leaders to negotiate
are themselves opcodes to some one negotiation? What conceivable
and the identification of a settlement with good personal relations
beginning for agreement revealed in statements such as Mr. Macmillan's
the intransigence of Soviet axes? Is it not possible that the
was the occasion caused by the intransigence of the Soviet tone on
rightly resulted from personal differences or were the causes deeper?
simple and dy availing all difficult issues. Had the Cold War
or the cause of peace service dy making a settlement seem so
jealous certain, however, whether the tree countries remember themselves
hearts. An atmosphere of confidence is undoubtedly helpful. If it
whether the democracies' notion of normalcy is not their Vorilles,

11-10

ED

III-8

III-10

task to reassure the Communist leaders. Since we were unwilling or
unable to relate the protestations of our wish for peace to a con-
crete program, the Soviet leaders may have become convinced that
they could have a detente without solving any of the problems that
had been thought to have caused the tensions before Geneva. If this
spirit
is true, Geneva rather than bringing about a détente of compromise
may have removed any incentive for it. To the degree that we
convinced the Communists leaders of our horror of war, they may
have drawn the conclusion that they could greatly improve their
bargaining position by seeming more willing to face a showdown than
the West. On the way back from Geneva, Mr. Khrushchev stopped in
East Berlin and committed himself to the sovereignty of East Germany,
laying the basis for the crisis over Berlin three years later. And
within a month the world learned of the Soviet sale of arms to
Egypt, a transaction which produced two years of upheavals and brought
the world on several occasions to the very edge of the abyss.

democracies can co-exist with a dictatorship only by
imitating its method of operation.

The notion that a series of summit meetings might
induce Mr. Khrushchev to forget his demands on Berlin
did not do justice to the intelligence of the Soviet dictator,
or ~~indeed to his domestic position.~~ The idea that Mr.
Khrushchev could be induced to table his demands without
noticing it, as it were, was almost frivolous. This view,
moreover, took no account of Mr. Khrushchev's domestic
position. Even assuming that he is the most "conciliatory"
Soviet leader, he could hardly be expected to tell his
colleagues in the Kremlin that the privilege of meeting
Western leaders periodically seemed to him more important
than specific gains. Indeed, personal diplomacy of the type
preceding the Paris summit meeting may force a Soviet leader
either to press for some tangible gain or into outbursts
of intransigence to prove his ideological toughness to his
Far from being the most moderate policy, it is the

 colleagues.
most XN risky one.

most in mind one,
cofegures.

far from being the most moderate policy, it is the
of intransigence to prove his theoretical consciousness to his
either to break for some tangible gain or into elsewhere.
breaking the parties to an summit meeting may force a Soviet leader
to submit to a specific gain. In this, personal diplomacy of the time
Western parties periodically seemed to put more important
cofegures in the Kremin that the privilege of meeting
Soviet leader, he could hardly be expected to tell his
position. Even assuming that he is the most "consolidated"
moreover, took no account of Mr. Khrushchev's domestic
noticing it, as it were, was almost trivialis. This view,
Khrushchev could be induced to take his demands without
on himself to his domestic position. The idea that Mr.
Lukyanov in the function of the leader did not do justice to the intelligence of the Soviet dictator,
induce Mr. Khrushchev to forget his demands on Berlin
The notion that a series of summit meetings might
imitating its method of operation,
democracies can co-exist with a dictatorship only by

In any case, it soon became apparent that whatever the benefits of high-level meetings for the Soviet Union, these could be realized without any concrete concessions and indeed without a summit conference. The "preparatory" meetings between Mr. Khrushchev and the Western heads of state individually reduced the already slight chances of the summit meeting still further. They gave Mr. Khrushchev all the symbolic gains he might have expected from a summit conference and without the need of confronting the Western alliance as a unit. They ensured that nothing of consequence could possibly happen at the summit. If concessions were to be forthcoming, it was certain that Mr. Khrushchev would prefer to make them to the allies individually than at a summit conference -- where they might appear as a response to Western unity.

At the same time, the function of high-level meetings to inform the heads of state of each other's point of view

to inform the heads of states of each other's point of view.

At the same time, the function of high-level meetings
Western unity.

conference -- where they might appear at a reasonable to
to make them to the allies individually than at a summit
concluding it was certain that Mr. Khrushchev would prefer
could possibly happen at the summit. It conferences were to be known
as a unit. They ensured that nothing of consequence
conference and without the need of confronting the Western
self the alcoholic gains he might have expected from a summit
the summit meeting still further. They gave Mr. Khrushchev
state individually reduced the already slight chances of
meeting between Mr. Khrushchev and the Western heads of
and indeed without a summit conference. The "preliminary"
these could be realized without any concrete concentrations
the benefits of high-level meetings for the Soviet Union,
In any case, it soon became apparent that whatever

to define them.

diplomacy which was unable to settle and of the issues on even
preference of normalcy through a year and a half of embattlement
in Berlin.

first statements of extreme irritability aftermath with
the case--their own die-hard. This in turn used the result

to resume their own public opinion and is Koenigsberg's
they were forced into repeated public declarations designed
expertise in assessing the domestic situation of the other,
Moreover, since each side asked a great deal on a broadened
summit was made to order for this kind of misapprehension.

was in fact the case, the diplomacy facing up to the
was due to disappointment in this respect. Whether this
and that part of his role during the diplomatic summit conference
indicating a readiness to make major concessions in Berlin
President Enckmüller's peevishness at Camp David as
It has been argued that Mr. Koenigsberg interpreted
and with great difficulty a misunderstanding.

had already been accomplished in official conference--

III-16

III-17

Finally, the idea that the imminence of a summit meeting places
a constraint upon intransigence is not borne out by the record. In
the period preceding the summit, both sides restated their positions
in the sharpest possible forms. Mr. Khrushchev in particular delivered
a series of extremely menacing speeches. The West, if it wanted to
proceed with the summit, thus found itself in the humiliating posi-
tion of having to explain that no threat had been uttered. These
maneuvers were inherent in the nature of personal diplomacy. When
heads of states are the principal negotiators, their most effective
bargaining device--in some circumstances the only available one--is
to stake their prestige in a manner which makes any concession
appear as an intolerable loss of face.

The evasion of concreteness, the reliance on personalities,
the implication that all problems can be settled with one grand
gesture, all these tempt the Soviet leaders to use negotiations to
demoralize the West. It is in the Soviet interest to turn all dis-
putes into x clashes of personalities. The peoples of the free

butes into a class of belligerents. The belligerents of the free
democracies the West. It is in the Soviet interest to turn all di-
gestions, all these conflicts, the Soviet leaders to use negotiations to
the implication that all problems can be settled with one hand
The evolution of consciousness, the return on belligerents,
aboard as an indefinite loss of time.

to state their position in a manner which makes any concession
pursuing device--in some circumstances the only available one--in
place of states are the principal negotiators, their most effective
managers were independent in the nature of personal diplomacy. When
tion of having to explain that no threat had been uttered. These
brought with the summit, thus found itself in the capitulating best-
a series of extremely measuring speeches. The West, if it wanted to
in the nearest possible forms. Mr. Krugendieva in particular delivered
the period preceding the summit, put issues restated their positions
a constraint upon intranegociation in not porene out by the record. In
finally, the idea that the imminence of a summit meeting places

III-17

III-18

world cannot be expected to run risks or to make exertions because
of a personal dispute. If the only obstacle to peace is the absence
of personal rapport among leading statesmen, then all tensions and
exertions of a decade and a half have been a frivolous imposition.
Whenever the Soviet leaders succeed in giving the impression that
all tensions are due to an unfortunate misunderstanding or else to
the evil machinations of individuals, they make it that much more
difficult for the West to raise later the need for concrete settle-
ments. This is why it is always best the Communist leaders have pressed for
a relaxation of tensions they have tied the success of it to person-
alities. Then, whenever the underlying causes
of the tension reassert themselves--as they inevitably must if not
resolved--the charge can be made that the breakdown is due to the
operation of the capitalist system or to the predominant influence
of hostile personalities--as is shown by Mr. Khrushchev's vicious
attacks on President Eisenhower after the abortive summit conference
at Paris. By contrast, it should be the responsibility of our states-
men to make clear that while we are always ready to negotiate, the

III-19

negotiation must be serious, detailed and specific.

This is not to say that summit conferences are always to be avoided. It does suggest that when the present period of Soviet intransigence ends and the West finds itself again under pressure to attend a high level meeting, we should have learned to distinguish form and substance. In assessing the utility of summit meetings, .... .... ....

III - 72

it is essential to weigh the pros and cons without sentimentality.

The advantage of a summit meeting is that the participants possess the authority to settle disputes.

The disadvantage is that they cannot be disavowed.

A summit conference can make binding decisions more rapidly than other diplomatic forum. By the same token, the disagreements are likely to be more intractable and the decisions more irrevocable. The possibility of using summit conferences to mark a new departure in the relations of states should not be underestimated. At the same time, it would be foolish to deny the perils of having as principal negotiators the men who make the final decision about the use of hydrogen bombs. A summit conference may contribute to clarifying the opposing point of view.

But this helpful only if tension is caused by misunderstanding.

Otherwise, clarifying the opposing points of view may only deppen the schism. In short, the same factors which make

gegeben die acusme. Insofern, die same factors which make
Ocferwise, clarifying the objective points of view must own
But this is helpful only if taken into consideration by manner of stating
may contribute to clarifying the opposing point of view.

spont the use of hydrogen penta. A summit conference
principal negotiator the men who make the final decision
it would be too late to demand the benefit of having so
of states should not be underestimated. At the same time,
summit conferences to mark a new departure in the relations
the decisions more irrevocable. The possibility of making
disagreements are likely to be more intractable and
than other diplomatic form. By the same token, the
A summit conference can make binding decisions more rapidly
The disadvantage is that they cannot be disavowed.

b罩ass the authority to settle disputes.

The advantage of a summit meeting is that the participants
it is essential to weigh the pros and cons without sentimentality.

III - 25

III - 25

for speed of decision also increase the risks of
disagreement.

Moreover, when heads of state become the principal
negotiators, they may soon find themselves so preoccupied
with the process of bargaining that they have little time
or energy available for formulating policy. In the
ambulatory diplomacy preceding the Paris summit conference
it was an oddity when all heads of state were at home
simultaneously. During his last two years in office
President Eisenhower was at conferences, preparing for or
recuperating from good-will visits almost constantly.

Such a diplomacy may suit a dictatorship or a state which
wishes to demoralize its opponents by confusing all issues.
It is not conducive to developing constructive long-
range policies. It is a useful device to buy time, though

³⁷ For a brilliant discussion of the problem posed by summit diplomacy for the American Presidency see Dean Rusk, "The President", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960, pp. 353-369.

President "Foreign Villages" April 1960, p. 327-330.

The diplomacy for the American Republics see Dean Acheson, "The
for a brilliant discussion of the problem based on the summit
range buffer".

If it is not convenient to demarcate constructive long-range bufferries. If in a useful degree to put time, enough

wishes to demonstate its opponents by confining off states.

Stop a diplomasy may unit a dictatorship or a state which
resembling from Good-will affairs almost constantly.

President Eisenhower was at conferences, brooding for or against him, during the first two years in office. It was an equality when all needs of state were at home. Amputatory diplomasy brooding the bar is a summit conference or enough available for negotiating briefly. In the

with the process of bargaining that they have little time
negotiators, they may soon find themselves so brookeysed
Moreover, when needs of state become the branch of

diplomasy.

for a speed of decision also increase the risks of

III - 52

III-22

at a price which makes it unlikely that the time will be well-used.

In such an atmosphere, agreement all too often becomes an end in itself. However unimportant the settlement, no matter how irrelevant, it is said to contribute to a climate of confidence which will "improve" the situation. In 1958, Mr. Bevan urged as

14
follows:

"I know that the Prime Minister has said and it has been said by othem, 'Why is it that we should accept only the Russian proposals for the summit conference and not put forward proposals of our own'...But is this a conference aimed at agreement or is it a conference aimed at dis-armament--It is on the American side that there is an apparent attempt at disarmament because President Eisenhower has put forward as his alternative agenda the liberation of Eastern European states. I know very well that in present circumstances that is impracticable. Really no one is arguing here for a moment or defending Russian policy in Eastern Europe. We are seeking to find ways of reaching agreement which will make further agreement easier."

The inevitable consequence of such a conviction is that more ingenuity is expended in finding things to agree on, no matter how trivial, than in coming to grips with the issues that have caused the tensions. In the process, a curious distortion takes place. The difficulties which are "ironed out" are often soluble only because

14. Hansard, February 20, 1958.

III - 21

been made to reach agreement, the impasse persisted.

In either case, the collapse of the summit was almost irrelevant. Indeed, a case can even be made for the proposition that, if agreement on Berlin was unattainable, it was just as well for the summit meeting to break up without making this fact explicit. A substantive failure might have forced the Soviets to make good their threats. And the diplomacy preceding the conference pact so strained the cohesion of the West that it was hardly in a position to face Soviet pressure with confidence.

Whether to resort to summit meetings is essentially a practical and not a moral issue. They should be held only when there is some clear, substantive advantage in prospect. It is sometimes easier for heads of state to break a deadlock and to chart a new course than for them to be inevitably committed to existing policies.

High-level meetings can ratify agreements and give general guidelines for further detailed negotiations. They should

Suppose four friends detailed negotiations. They should
hold-level meetings can rapidly settle matters and give General
understandings inevitably committed to existing policies.

To press a demand and to start a new course than to
break up. It is sometimes easier for people of state
only when there is some common, substantive advantage
a practical and not a moral one. They should do so
whether to resort to summit meetings if essentially
handful in a position to face Soviet pressure with confidence.
back so strained the conversation of the West that it was
timeous. And the diplomacy preceding the conference
might have forced the secretary to make good their
mb without making this last explicit. A substantive
it was just as well for the summit meeting to press
proposition that it agreement on Berlin was unattainable,
irrelevant. Indeed, a case can even be made for the
In either case, the collapse of the summit was almost
been made to reach agreement, the impasse terminated.

III - 51

III-26

be used for these purposes with courage and conviction. But to
see in them a magic solvent for all difficulties is to build policy
on illusion. Such a course creates constant temptations for the
Soviet leaders to use meetings of heads of state to demoralize the West. Phrases such as "relaxation of tensions" or "peaceful coexistence" become devices to press extreme demands.

The West is invited to accept Soviet proposals or suffer the penalty of a return to the villifications of the Cold War.

When the primary purpose of summit meetings is thought to be
the fostering of abstract good will, they become not a forum for
negotiations but a substitute for them; not an expression of a policy
but a means of obscuring its absence. The constant international
travels of heads of government without a clear program or purpose may
be a less an expression of statesmanship than a
symptom of panic.

The real indictment of the diplomacy culminating in the fiasco
at Paris, then, is the attitude of trying to get something for nothing,
the effort to negotiate without goal or conception. This is what must
be remedied. The problem is not to save summit diplomacy by leavening

III-27

it with the presence of heads of state from the uncommitted areas--as has been suggested. 15 Rather, it is to clarify our program for whatever negotiations may take place at any level. We can negotiate with confidence if we know what we consider a just arrangement. If we lack a sense of direction, diplomacy at any level will be doomed.

15. Denis Healey, "The View from London," New Leader, June 13, 1960.

were futile. Any diplomatic overture by the Communist leaders was likely to be designed to subvert the free world. In formulation carried to its extreme, this view implied that we were obliged to oppose anything favored by Communist leaders regardless of the merit of any particular proposal. Indeed, carried to absurd lengths, this school of thought urged the rejection even of Soviet agreement to our own proposals. An editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* can serve as an example: "If, despite all this, the Soviets should suddenly agree to sign today the West's proposed disarmament pact in toto, that would be reason for serious concern. The supposition would be strong that the Soviets saw in the pact an opportunity to harm the West."14 16

Our official policy never went this far. But for long periods of time negotiations were considered hopeless. In particular, Secretary Dulles' view of negotiations was wary. Diplomatic contacts with the Communists was a necessary evil --

Editorial, *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 1957.

Editorial, 'Wall Street Journal,' August 12, 1925.

Diplomatic contacts with the Communists was a necessary effort --
battling Secretary Dulles' view of negotiations was valid.
barriers of finance.

as in the hot an opportunity to harm the West."[16] The
concern. The subjection would be strong that the Soviets
dissuage hostilities agree to sign today the West's proposed
serve as an example: "It, quite off this, the Soviets
brogue.

An editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* can
urged the rejection even of Soviet agreement to our own
inadequate, carried to absurd length, this school of thought
feminine regardless of the merit of each belligerent, proposals.

we were obliged to oblige underling favored by Communist
world. Carried to its extreme, this view implied that

leaders was likely to be designed to supplant the tree
were Dulles. And diplomatic overtures by the Communists

IV-3

but essentially meaningless until Soviet society had been trans-
formed. General declarations of goodwill were likely to undermine
the willingness of the West to make the sacrifices necessary to
conduct the Cold War. In a sense, a state of tension was desirable. It would save the West from its proneness to illusion. It would prevent Mr. Khrushchev from luring the free world into a state of complacency.

17. See, for example, John Foster Dulles, speech of January 16, 1958, quoted in _Department of State Bulletin_, February 3, 1958, pp. 161.

quoted in *Department of State Bulletin*, February 3, 1938, pp. 161-163.

J. J. See, for example, John Boettcher Bulle's speech of January 16, 1938.

of complicity.

would prevent Mr. Khrushchev from making the free world into a state
aparé. It would save the West from its braveness to illusion. It
conduct the Cold War. In a sense, a state of tension was desirable
the willingness of the West to make the sacrifices necessary to
formed. General declarations of goodwill were likely to undermine
but essentially meaningless until Soviet society had been trans-

IA-3

Mr. Dulles' view of negotiations was influenced not only
by his distrust of general protestations of good will. He also
had serious doubts about the validity and enforceability of
specific settlements: "What is an agreement? An agreement is
a meeting of minds. And so far I do not know of any agreement
that the Soviet Union has made which has reflected a real
meeting of minds. We may have agreed on the same forms of
words, but there has not been a meeting of minds...What's the
meaning, the real xxxxxx significance of an agreement not to
interfere in internal affairs if the Soviets mean that they
can do anywhere what they did in Hungary and that this is not
interference in internal affairs?"

It was characteristic of Mr. Dulles' legalistic approach
to diplomacy that he saw in the cause for this state of affairs
in the separation between the Communist party and the Soviet
government: "The power behind the Soviet government is the
Soviet Communist Party. It operates as a sort of superstate,
not subject to any of the rules and regulations that apply to

18. News Conference Comments by the Secretary of State (Dulles),
October 16, 1957, quoted in Zinner (ed.), Documents on American
Foreign Relations 1957, New York 1958, pp. 163-164.

To: John Roeder Duffee, "the Meeting of Duffee," R. Roberts, op. cit., p. 83.

not subject to any of the rules and regulations that apply to
Soviet Communist Party. If it operates as a sort of affiliate,
Government: "The power赋予 the Soviet Government is the
in the separation between the Communist party and the Oviet
to diplomatically that he saw in the case for the state of affairs
It was characteristic of Mr. Duffee's legislative approach

can do anywhere what they did in Hungary and that title is not
interfere in internal affairs if theOVietae mean that they
meaning, the realxxx significance of an agreement not to
work, put there has not been a meeting of minds...What's the
meeting of minds. We may have agreed on the same terms of
that the Oviet Union has made which has reflected a real
a meeting of minds. And so far I do not know of any agreement
specific settlements: "What is an agreement? An agreement is
had serious doubt about the validity and enforceability of
by the jurisdiction of General Profaestations of Good will. He says

Mr. Duffee's view of negotiations was influences not only

the conduct between states. And you make an agreement with the
Soviet government, for example, the Litvinov Agreement, which
had tried to be a very tight agreement. It was violated right
away. But it was violated, they say, not by the Soviet govern-
ment, but by the Soviet Communist Party and you didn't make the
agreement with the Soviet Communist Party."¹⁹

If general agreements were dangerous and specific
settlements meaningless, the prime function of diplomacy was to
hold the line, rally the free world and wait for the inevitable
transformation of Soviet society. For this reason, Mr. Dulles
almost invariably replied to Soviet pressures for conferences
with a demand that the Communist leaders first demonstrate their
"good faith". Therefore, too, the initiative for negotiations
always seemed to come from the Soviet side. On too few of the
great issues dividing the world did the United States articulate
a positive program. The impressions created that for us
foreign policy was exhausted by the quest for military security in
negotiating a Soviet purpose.

1971. Ibid.

["M. 1914.", "foreign policy was advanced by the conduct of strictly security policies. On the other hand, the Soviet foreign policy was marked by the prime function of diplomacy, which was to settle all conflicts amicably, the prime function of diplomacy was to settle all conflicts amicably, the prime function of diplomacy, which was to settle all conflicts

By postulating the Soviet bad faith which it should have been
the task of our diplomacy to demonstrate, the United States can
be considered the
obstacle to a settlement.

We were cast into the ridiculous position of seeming to fear
diplomatic contact.

Mr. Dulles' policies thus had consequences precisely
contrary to those intended. The very rigidity of his posture
accelerated the demoralization which he strove so hard to prevent.

Mr. Dulles failed to consider that the tension he thought so
inscapable
necessary was supportable only if the people of the free world
understood that every effort was being made to end it. If
the Soviet leadership was really as intransigent as Mr. Dulles
thought, negotiations were particularly essential if only to
define the issues for which to contend.

A coalition of democracies cannot confine itself to a
policy of negotiation. The free world requires an attitude of
conciliation for its very cohesion. It cannot be asked to

conclusion for its very conclusion. It cannot be asked to

benefit of negotiation. The free world requires an attitude of

A coalition of democracies cannot continue if it is a

definite cause for which to contend.

thought, negotiations were haphazardly essential if only to
the Soviet leadership was really so intrinsically as Mr. Duffee
understood that every effort was being made to end it. It

necessarily wasembarrassed only if the people of the free world
necesitate

Mr. Duffee wished to consider that the channel he thought so
accelerated the democratization which he strove so hard to prevent.

contrary to those intended. The very rigidity of his thought

Mr. Duffee before him had consequences precisely

diplomatic contact.

We were put into the situation of seeming to lose

so-seem-in-a-much parte of the whole an opatrole to a settlement.

the task of an diplomacy to demonstrate, the United States can-

E. H. BOSTONIANO, the Soviet pad faith which it should have been
(because an explanation for granted and failed)

wait rigidly in the face of mounting tensions without making an
effort to break the deadlock. Mr. Dulles was more often right
than his critics in assessing Soviet intentions. And the course
of events since his death has born out his distrust of personal
diplomacy. But he took for granted what it should have been his
constant effort to demonstrate. He made a strong case for what
we reject, but he was not equally convincing about what to
affirm. The difficulty with Mr. Dulles' policy was not that
he was wrong about Communism but that he was right about so
little else.

The notion that the primary goal of Western policy
had to be the transformation of Soviet society was an
unreasonable and ahumanistic one, and that its realization
through the use of psychological arguments turned debate over
democratic negotiations into an almost sociological argument
about what should be the attitude of the West toward
Soviet domestic developments. As a result of the death of
Stalin, many thoughtful people, anguished by the prospects of
infinitely prolonged tension, sought, almost desperately, to

XXXXXXX
~~20XX~~30X

prove that the moment for a diplomatic confrontation had arrived at last. The idea that a Soviet change of heart had to precede effective negotiations was rarely questioned. The practical requirements of coexistence in the nuclear age did not seem to be sufficient justification for the need to negotiate. Instead, a great deal of ingenuity was expended in proving that a Soviet change had occurred. "It is surely evident that internal changes have taken place within the Soviet Union and that, partly as a result, there has been some change in the Soviet attitude to the outside world," wrote Hugh Gaitskell. "Admittedly this may be just a change of tactics, but it would be very surprising if, over the years, economic progress in Russia was not accompanied by social change and if these two things did not influence the attitude of the Government towards the outside world."

The theory of the inherent bad faith of the Communists was countered by another theory which sought to demonstrate that Soviet society was in the midst of a basic transformation. The

46. Hugh Gaitskell, "Disengagement: Why? How?" *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1958, p. 547.

1919, 1928, b. 2nd.

48. Hugh Gittensell, "Dissolution: Why? How? Karlheinz Stockhausen.

Soviet society was in the midst of a massive transformation. The
was countered by another theory which sought to demonstrate that
the theory of the inherent nature of the Communists
the Government towards the outside world.¹⁹

change and it these two things did not influence the attitude of
the Soviet economic progress in Europe was not accompanied by social
a change of factor, but it would be very surprising if, over the
outside world, a worse Hugh Gittensell. "Admittedly this may be that
result, there has been some change in the Soviet attitude to the
have taken place within the Soviet Union and that, briefly, as a
change had occurred. "If it is any way evident that internal changes
great deal of ingenuity was expended in proving that a Soviet
enlightened justification for the need to negotiate. Instead, a
requirement of coexistence in the nuclear age did not seem to be
breached by effective negotiations was surely demonstrated. The practice
arrived at last. The idea that a Soviet change of heart had to
prove that the moment for a diplomatic confrontation had

XXXXXXXX

The heat of their argument sometimes obscured the fact that the advocates and the opponents of negotiation agreed in their fundamental assumptions. They were in accord that an effective settlement presupposed a change in the Soviet system. They were at one in thinking that Western diplomacy should seek to influence Soviet internal developments. Both groups gave the impression that the nature of a possible settlement with the Communist world was perfectly obvious. At least they debated more about the form of negotiation than the substance; whether, for example, to meet at the summit or at some lower level. They differed primarily about the issue of timing.

The opponents of negotiation maintained that the Soviet change of heart was still in the future, while the advocates claimed that it had already taken place.

"If these [liberalizing] forces go on and continue to gather momentum," Mr. Dulles said, "then we can reasonably hope, I said within a decade or perhaps a generation, that we would have what is the great goal of our policy, that is a Russia

which is governed by people who are responsive to the wishes of the
Russian people, who had given up their world-wide ambitions to
rule and who conform to the principles of civilized nations and
such principles as are embodied in the United Nations charter. 24
"The Communists are actively digging their own graves," said Mr.
Bevan in what he thought was a rebuttal of Mr. Dulles, "because
the more they industrialize their community, the more their
community is diversified; and the more technical skills are
built, the more the Soviet leaders will have to share power
with the masses. That is why I cannot understand that our
American friends are so blind to the situation." 25

In the process, more attention was paid to whether we
should negotiate with them to what we should negotiate about. The
dispute over Soviet transformations, diverted energies from
elaborating our own purposes. It caused us to make an issue of
what should have been taken for granted; the willingness to

24. News Conference Statement, May 15, 1956, quoted from Paul E. Zinner (ed.), Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956, New York, 1957, p. 204.

25. Address to the *Tribune* meeting, Oct. 1, 1957, quoted in the *London Times*, October 2, 1957.

Longenfuss, October 5, 1925.

Vice President to the Triplicate meeting, Oct. 1, 1925, dated in the
New York, 1925, b. 50v.

Stierer (ed.), Comments on American Foreign Relations, 1926, New York Conference Statement, May 12, 1926, dated through Paul E.

what should have been taken for granted the willingness to
cooperating our own countries. It cannot be made an issue of
argument over Soviet transformations diverted energies from
warlike development

American times are so far from the situation."[23] With the message. That is why I cannot understand that our points, the more the Soviet leaders will have to spare, less community is diversified; and the more scientific skills are the more deep industrialize their community, the more their Bevan in what he thinks we a representative of Mr. Russia, become "The Committee are actively fighting their own cause," said Mr. and Mrs. principles are embodied in the United Nations charter."[24]

II - 11

[L]

negotiate. And it deflected us from elaborating a concrete program
which alone would have made negotiations meaningful. Both the
advocates of "positions of strength" as well as the proponents
of negotiation were so preoccupied with the "automatic" trans-
formation of Soviet society that they overlooked the more
important task of defining for ourselves just what kind of
settlement would be consistent with our values and protect our
security.

The tendency to base policy towards the USSR on an
assumed change in Soviet society should not be ascribed simply
to a reaction to Mr. Dulles' rigidity. On the
contrary, it has been a constant theme in our public discussion.
Whenever there is a relaxation of tensions has been sought or advocated,
it was justified not by the practical requirements of coexistence
but in the nuclear age but by the argument that the Soviet system was
becoming more "liberal." The notion that Soviet purposes had
fundamentally altered was first advanced during the war.
Soviet Union

["The notion that Soviet belligerent and belligerent states have the right to use force to subdue other states is patently illogical and illogical. It was justified not only by the contractual requirements of coexistence, but also by the�nment that the Soviet states were whenever in a relaxation of tensions due to the agreement that the�nment that the Soviet states were justified not only in the contractual requirements of coexistence, but also in the�nment that the Soviet states were justified not only in

"The Russians cannot fight a war as drastic as the one they are engaged in without being changed by it" wrote Max Lerner.

"We can as yet have little inkling of the character or extent of the change. But we can guess that the thoroughgoing organization of the war economy, the civilian resistance, the guerilla warfare could only be achieved in a war that had become democratic in its inner nature."

The liberalization of Soviet policy was thought also to reflect the predictions of the Soviet dictator. Though Marshal Stalin has lately been described as "paranoid" and the primary cause of the "old War, it is worth remembering that this was not always the view. "Russia will prefer the peace of Europe to its commu-nization," wrote Fortune. "The arguments in favor of this assumption are that Trotsky is dead and that Russia will be too weak for aggression in Europe, even ideological aggression after the war. It is the essence of Stalinism to use Communism as an instrument of Russian nationalist foreign policy; and as a

Max Lerner, "After the Comintern," New Republic, June 7, 1943.

Max Foner, "After the Confront," New Republic, June 5, 1949.

Injunction of German Nationalist Loosely based; and as a
the war. If it is the essence of Staline to use Communism as an
week for attrition in Europe, even ideological attrition suffer
assumption are that Troels is dead and that Staline will be too
insist in the near future described as "B polymorpha" and the primarily cause
reflect the beliefs of the Soviet dictator. Though Malesof

The lipomatization of Soviet policy was thought also to

its inner nature." It should be noted in a war that past experience in
of the war economy, the staff's resistance, the German war nature
the enemy. But we can guess that the thorough organization
we can see have little effect on the character or extent of
they are engaged in without being changed by it, as wrote Max Foner.

"The greatest cannot light a war as quickly as the one
the war cannot be achieved in a war that had become geocentric in

nation Russia, though she has been gradually expanding for
centuries, is not so much land-hungry as hungry for security
on her borders. Given this security she is likely to fix her
attention on the development of her enormous internal resources.

In short, Marshal Stalin was contrasted with his chief rival in
much the same way terms as a decade later Khrushchev was to be
compared to, i.e. Sir Bernard Pares wrote: *wha*
with his predecessor, *what will Stalin do after victory?* wrote
Mr Bernard Pares. We have to wait for the victory, but perhaps
this sketch will offer some answer. The normal thing for Stalin
to do is to return to the vast program of home construction, so
far only initiated, which has been the great task of his life.
It is simple fantasy to imagine that the man who drove out
Trotsky on the issue of world revolution will now desert to
the program of his enemy.

Fortune supplement, "The United States in a New World," April, 1943.

Sir Bernard Pares, "On the Fear of Russia," *New Republic*, April 19, 1943.

The fact that these assumptions were erroneous does not, of course, necessarily invalidate similar arguments made in a different context. It should impose a certain caution, however, make us cautious about in staking too much on the assessment of Soviet trends. To be sure, given the pressures of wartime, no other course was con- ceivable. The West could not have ended the tensions it had not striven so hard to come to terms with the Soviet leaders during the period of our alliance. But for our illusions we would never have known whether a more trusting approach might not have been effective. It is striking, however, that after seventeen years of further experience with the Soviet Union, the rationale for negotiations with it has remained essentially unchanged.

The reason for this attitude is not difficult to discern. A people to whom the advantages of peace seem self-evident will always be strongly tempted to consider intransigence a temporary aberration, and that every change of tone is a change of heart. This tendency is powerfully reinforced by our separation for

This tendency is powerfully reinforced by our separation for
operation.

The Soviet Union must be every change of tone is a change of heart.

Since we strongly opposed to consider inattention a tendency

much argued.

The rationale for this attitude with it has remained essentially
unchanged here of further experience with the Soviet Union,
not have been effective. It is striking, however, that after
would never have known whether a more trusting approach might
during the period of our alliance. But for our influences we
had not arrived so hard to understand the Soviet leaders
not be so struck with the new ideas

The Soviet Union could not have stood the pressures of the Cold War
without the pressure of the American military

The American military pressure on the President of the United States, given the pressures of war time, no other country was con-
fronting too much on the assessment of Soviet trends. To be
made no comment about the American military pressure

The fact that these assumptions were erroneous does not.

nearly a century and a half from the mainstream of international
we the development of
affairs and the priority assigned to developing an unsettled

Continent. With such a tradition, economic life seemed to appear
to be easy to
as the most significant field of activity. It
believe that any sensible nation would prefer economic develop-
ment to foreign adventures.

This accounts for the persistence with which it has been
claimed that the economic needs of the Soviet Union would impose
a more conciliatory policy on it. Sooner or later, so the
argument has run, the Communist countries would have to give the
"proper" priority to economic matters. "The present Soviet
government has made it clear that world revolution...has been at
least temporarily abandoned," wrote Sumner Welles during the
war. "Upon the conclusion of the present war, the Soviet
government will undoubtedly have to dedicate its chief
energies for years to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of
its devastated cities and territories, to the problem of in-
dustrialization and to the achievement of a rise in the popular

unification and to the achievement of a state in the popular

life designated cities and territories, to the people of in-
energies for years to the reorganization and reconstitution of
government will undoubtedly have to dedicate its chief
war." Upon the conclusion of the present war, the Soviet
fascist municipality suspended," note Zimmermann during the

Government has made it clear that world revolution...has been at
"broader" priority to economic matters. "The present Soviet
argument has run, "the communist countries would have to give the
a more conciliatory policy on it." Secker on further, so the
claimed that the economic needs of the Soviet Union would imitate

This accounts for the beretence with which it has been
ment to foreign adventures.

believe that any simple nation would prefer economic develop-
ing the most significant field of activity. It would easy to
Continent. With such a tradition, economic life comes to abber-
nalities and the priority assigned to developing an unennied

# The Development of

## nears a century and a half from the mainstem of international

monument to himself that will mark him in history as one of his
country's great benefactors. However, as I have indicated else-
where, he is finding it difficult to attain the ambitious goals
set forth in the plan as long as armaments are making such heavy
demands for scientific genius, technical skill and capital
investment.

Thus whatever aspect of the Soviet system they have
considered, many in the West have sought to solve our policy
dilemma by making the most most favorable assumptions about
Soviet trends. At one time, we drew up a list of reasons why
comfort from the fact that the Soviet leaders required peace in
order to devote themselves to building up their economy. A
decade and a half later, a more benign Soviet policy was
policy was predicted with exactly the opposite argument.
Now, the already accomplished industrialization was thought to
give the Soviet leaders too much of a stake in their society for
them to risk foreign adventures. The concern with the transformations

Averell Harriman, *Peace With Russia*, New York, 1959, p. 168.

24

A. W. Harman, *Bless With Love*, New York, 1936, p. 168.

them to risk foreign adventures. The concern with the transformation of the Soviet Union has been that the Soviet leaders too much of a stake in their society for them. The strictly materialistic industrialization was thought to be lost was predicted with exactness the opposite argument. Decade and a half later, a more pension Soviet government was in order to devote themselves to building up their economy. A comfort from the fact that the Soviet leaders required peace in Soviet friends. At one time, we drew nationalistic maxims from the dilemma of making the most favorable assumptions about considered, much in the West have sought to solve our problem. Time whatever select of the Soviet system they have investment.

34

demand for scientific knowledge, technological skill and capital set apart in the brain as long as generations are working each year where, be it landing if difficult to attain the ambitions of country's great penologists. However, as I have indicated earlier, the monument to himself that will mark him in history as one of the

to doctrine." There may be cold comfort, however, in this
assessment. Mr. Khrushchev's pragmatism may furnish as
powerful an incentive for an aggressive policy as Stalin's
dogmatism if he should become convinced that the Soviet Union
is militarily superior and that the West is in disarray.
Pragmatism is not an unmixed blessing if the opposition seems
confused and the balance of power favorable.

The tendency to justify negotiations by changes in
Soviet attitude makes us vulnerable to largely formal Soviet
moves. It leads us to see concessions in the failure of Soviet
leaders to press their most extreme demands. Thus, after the
meeting at Camp David, it was generally explained that Mr.
Khrushchev had "withdrawn his threat." Actually, as he was soon
to reiterate in Budapest, he had only postponed it. Similarly,
Gromyko's failure at the Geneva foreign minister's meeting in
1959 to insist on his proposal to seat the East Germans at the

353. Denis Healey, *The Observer*, September 13, 1959.

conference table was greeted by the Western press as a
"victory". In fact, the Soviets achieved their basic
purpose: when East and West German delegations joined the
foreign minister's conference as advisers an important
step was taken towards giving the East German satellite
the same international status as the Federal Republic - thus
lending authority to the Soviet claim that unification should be settled
by the two German regimes directly. And every time
the Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference in 1960
used the word control, it was treated as a concession,
though the substance of the Soviet proposals almost invariably
was to strip inspection of all meaning. The formalism of
our approach to negotiations enables the Soviet leaders
to obtain a dual advantage from intransigence. They can
increase the uneasiness of the West by making an extreme
statement and then gain a reputation for being conciliatory
by retreating to a position still considerably in advance of
their starting point.

See above, p. . . .

See page 3, p. . .

their starting point.

By referring to a position still considered as advance of a statement and then gains a reputation for being conciliatory, increase the unreasonableness of the West by making an extreme to obtain a fair advantage from intransigence. They can only approach to negotiations enables the Soviet leaders was to strip inspection of all meaning. The terminology of though the advance of the Soviet proposals almost invariaibly used the word control, it was treated as a concession.

the Soviet delegation at the disarmament conference in 1948 by the two German regimes directly. And everything

fled across to the Soviet claim that multinationals settled the same international status as the Federal Republic of Germany.

The same international status as the Federal Republic and thus the same international status as the Federal Republic and thus

state was taken towards giving the East German satellite

"Victory" in fact, the Soviet achieved their plans

conference table was created by the Western Press as a

IV-23

To interpret every Soviet overture as a symptom of deep-seated
change may indeed cause us to miss perhaps the most effective means
of affecting Soviet internal development. Granting that there is an
element in Soviet society which is interested in a more peaceful
course, and assuming that it can translate its preferences into politi-
cal pressure, a basic accommodation would seem extremely unlikely as
long as daring gambles like the pressure on Berlin, the move into
the Middle East or the threat over Cuba bring such substantial re-
turns. The possibility of evolution of Soviet policy in a more con-
ciliatory direction may be jeopardized by the eagerness with which it
is predicted. It may encourage a belief on the part of Soviet leaders
that they can reverse any course, no matter how intransigent, by a
diplomatic note and that the West can always be reconciled to a fait
accompli by protestations of peaceful intentions. When, on the basis
of past performance, the Soviet leaders have every reason to believe
that regardless of Mr. Khrushchev's incredible ... ...

["that regardless of Mr. Khrushchev's incredible\neagerness, the Soviet leaders have every reason to believe\nthat best behavior, the Soviet leaders have every reason to believe\nin their best intentions. When, in the past\nthe Soviet leaders have behaved in a way that the West can always be relied on to do a bad\nthing they can reverse and course, no matter how intrinsically, by a\ndiplomatic note and that the West can always be reacquired to a full\n\nTo interpret every Soviet overture as a symptom of deep-seated\neagerness may indeed cause us to lose perspective on the most effective means\nof affecting Soviet internal development. Granting that there is an\nchange may indeed cause us to lose perspective on the most effective means\nTo interpret every Soviet overture as a symptom of deep-seated\neagerness may indeed cause us to lose perspective on the most effective means\nof affecting Soviet internal development. Granting that there is an\nchange may indeed cause us to lose perspective on the most

as well as to their allies.

to demonstrate their ideological purity to their colleagues

 feeders, the more we may force them into actions designed

 we abrogate spont the federal quality of individual Soviet

 that he is promoting good will in the abstract. The more

 can advocate a program to his colleagues with the argument

 No member of the Soviet hierarchy -- whatever his convictions--

 can allow to make a settlement on a benational basis.

at the respective series of summit meetings. No Communist leader

 shows of irrelevance as in: "Kremlinov's behavior

 liberalization of the Soviet state may make (inevitable).

Indeed, the constant invocat ion of the abroaching

and relaxation is inevitable.

and continuation of alternate periods of favorable hostility

 conference table will be considered a change of heart.

 agreement to return to the
discussion table, were willingness to return to the

 behavior at the summit and the prior substance of the

IV-24a

These considerations apply also to the frequently voiced
view that we should conduct our diplomacy so as to bring about
a rift between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. Of course, the
possibility of making a rift must not be overlooked. And if it
occurs, we should take advantage of it rather than forcing the
erstwhile partners into a new alliance through intransigence.
Yet this is a far cry from the proposition that we can promote
a split. In 1948 no Western policy could have set itself the
goal of encouraging Tito to break away from Stalin. The attempt
to do so might have been the best way to prevent it. Similarly,
our diplomacy cannot have as a goal what we can only treat as
a fortunate event. We will be better advised to concentrate on
our purposes than to chase the will-o-the-wisp of Soviet domestic
developments or a split in the Communist bloc.

It is not necessary to settle the question of the
real intentions of the Soviet leaders in the abstract.
For we should be prepared to negotiate whatever Communist
motivations may be. Our responsibility is essentially
the same. Whatever assessment we make of Communist purposes or trends,
This becomes apparent if we ask ourselves whether we would
offer concessions to a "liberal" Soviet leader which
we would refuse to make to a Stalinist. An affirmative
answer would be patently absurd, for it would mean
that a liberal
Communist could exact gains from us denied to a more intransigent
one. Surely the liberalism of a Soviet leader is not tested
by concessions which we have to make to him -- though Mr.
Khrushchev has striven hard to create this impression.

A responsible approach to negotiations must be quite
different. We should make no concessions to a Soviet leader
not otherwise justified simply because we consider him liberal.
We should not refuse to make concessions, which are otherwise
desirable, simply because we consider a Soviet leader Stalinist.
The ultimate test in either case is whether a given measure

The ultimate test in either case is whether a given measure
desirable, simply because we consider a Soviet leader astaïnait.
We should not refuse to make concessions, which are otherwise
not otherwise justified simply because we consider him a lîpêral.

A reasonable approach to negotiations must be quite

Kursoničev has arrived hard to create this impression.

på concessions which we have to make to him -- though Mr.

one. Surely the lîpêralist of a Soviet leader is not tested
Communist could exact. Beings from us denied to a more intransigent
answer would be spatiously spammed, for whatever that a lîpêralist
we would return to make to a Stastinait. An allusive

other concession to a "lîpêral" Soviet leader which
This becomes apparent if we ask ourselves whether we would
the same / what if / announcement assessment we make of Communists' purposes.

The same / what if / announcement assessment we make of Communists' purposes / what if /

motivations may be. Our readiness is essentially
For we should be prepared to negotiate whatever-Soviet

real intentions of the Soviet leaders in the spirit of

enhances stability or detracts from it. Above all,
our measures should not be so dependent on either the
Kremlin's smiles or on its frowns. Negotiations with the
Soviet Union must be justified by our purposes, not theirs.
If the Soviet Union really wants a settlement, negotiations
will reveal this. If Soviet overtures to end the Cold
War are a tactical maneuver, a purposeful diplomacy should
be able to make Soviet bad faith evident.

Negotiations are important. But it is important to conduct
them without illusions. We do not need to postulate
a basic Soviet transformation in order to believe in the
possibility of a settlement. Nor is it a prerequisite to
successful negotiation to preclude that a relaxation of tensions
is primarily within Western control. The West must have much
more positive goals than to divine Soviet intent. We do
ourselves an injustice if we make an issue of the desirability
of relaxing tensions or of ending the Cold War. The test
of conciliatoriness does not reside in interpreting Soviet
trends in the most favorable manner. Nor is it to prove the

tends in the most favorable manner. Nor is it to prove the
of conciliatoriness does not result in interpreting Soviet
of relaxing tensions on or ending the Cold War. The test
onselfs an issue if we make an issue of the credibility
more positive goals than to divine Soviet intent. We do
its humanly within Western control. The West must have much
successful negotiation to promote that a relaxation of tensions
possibility of a settlement. Nor is it a preeminence to
a late Soviet transformation in order to believe in the
them without influence. We do not need to posituate
Negotiations are important. But it is important to conduct
be able to make Soviet bad faith evident.
War are a tactical maneuver, a burlesque diplomacy should
will reveal this. It Soviet overtures to end the Cold
It the Soviet Union really wants a settlement, negotiations
Soviet Union must be justified by our purposes, not theirs.
Kremlin's smile on its browns. Negotiations with the
our measures should not be so dependent on either the
enhances stability or detracts from it. Above all,

No. 2

of our society has been
experience, with negotiation in the commercial field.

In commercial negotiations, the rules of the game are
an implicit understanding that an
known. Usually, there is a tacit agreement to come to an
agreement will be reached.

agreement. Restraints are imposed by the need for a con-
tinuing relationship. Both sides generally are in accord
on what constitutes a "reasonable" argument. When each party
~~s~~ It has gained some
~~parties believe that they can obtain a mutual advantage~~
they will settle. The courts will interpret the agreement
and enforce it.

Most of these factors are lacking to a greater or
lesser degree in negotiations with Communist states.
Compromise is difficult when even what constitutes a
"reasonable" proposal is in dispute. The parties have found
it difficult to agree on an agenda and sometimes an agreement
has merely shifted the controversy to a dispute over the
interpretation of a formal accord. In contrast to most of
our domestic experience what has been at issue has been
not the adjustment of disputes within a framework which

not the adjustment of disputes within a framework which
our domestic experience has shown us has been
interpreted as a tonnel-second. In contrast to most of
it was merely shifted the controversy to a clause over the
ft difficult to agree on an issue and sometimes an agreement
"reasonable" proposal is in dispute. The parties have long
compromised in difficult when even what constitutes a
lesser degree in negotiations with Communist states.

Most of these factors are lacking to a greater or
and enforce it.

they will settle. The courts will interpret the agreement
in terms of that they can obtain a more advantageous
agreement. When both parties agree on what constitutes a
"reasonable" agreement. Both sides generally are in accord
tinuing relationship. Both agree generally are in accord
agreement. Restraints are imposed by the need for a con-
known. Unless, there is a fact agreement to come to an
agreement will be made.

In commercial negotiations, the rules of the game are
experience with negotiation is in the commercial field.

could be taken for granted, but the framework itself.

In this situation, many "normal" bargaining rules of thumb become either irrelevant or dangerous. On the face of it, for example, the proposition that we should make "acceptable" proposals seems unexceptionable.

However, if we can only offer what the Soviet leaders have indicated they will accept, the framework of every conference will be established by the other side and the terms of the settlement will be Soviet terms. Or else agreement will become an end in itself. Negotiations gravitate towards problems which seem "soluble" -- often only because of their unimportance. To turn the rule that it is generally desirable to make "acceptable" proposals into a general principle can turn diplomacy into a device to evade all difficult issues.

Pushed too far, such an approach implies the surrender of all judgment. It will cause us to fail in one of the

of all judgment. It will cause us to leave in one of the
principles too far, and an approach which implies the surrender
a device to escape all difficult issues.

propositions into a general principle can in a diplomatax into
rule that it is generally acceptable to make "acceptable"
ot only because of their unimportance, to turn the
gravitate towards problems which seem "unbearable" --

agreement will become an end in itself. Negotiations
terms of the settlement will be Soviet terms. On these
conference will be established by the other side and the
have indicated they will accept, the framework of every
However, if we can only offer what the Soviet leaders
make "acceptable" proposals seems unacceptable.

face of it, for example, the proposition that we should
throw up become either irrelevant or dangerous. On the
In this situation, many "normal" bargaining rules of
config be taken for granted, put the framework itself.

major tasks of a revolutionary period: to make clear
to the people of the free world the nature of the issues
in dispute. While all possibilities of a settlement
must be explored, it is equally necessary to develop
conviction about the problems impossible of solution.
That are to solve

It is important for us to be conciliatory if the Soviet
leaders should be prepared to negotiate seriously. But
it is less crucial that we force them to bear the onus
for failure to accept responsible proposals.
Then

It may even be that we have an educational role
to perform in making serious offers. Even should they
be rejected, they must be studied by the Soviet leaders
and they may thereby have an impact over a period of time.
Conversely, if the Soviet leaders know that we are operating
on the basis of the maxim of being able to make only
acceptable proposals, they will lose any incentive for
responsible negotiations. Conferences then will be
conducted according to rules by which we can only lose.

congratulated according to rules by which we can only lose.

reasonable negotiations. Conferences then will be
acceptable broadeers, they will lose and incentive to
on the part of the maxims of point of view to make only
Conferences, if the Soviet fadgers know that we are operating
and find much therapy have an incentive over a period of time.

be rejected, they must be accepted by the Soviet fadgers
to perform in meeting some offers. Even should they
It may even be that we have an equation of value

for this latter to accept reasonable broadeers.

it is less crucial that we force them to pay the costs
of theفاe should be prepared to negotiate seriously. But
they should be prepared to negotiate seriously. But
It is important for us to be consistent with the Soviet
conviction spent the problems unbroadeable at present.

must be explored, if it is deemed necessary to generate
in debate. While all boardpiles of a settlement
to the people of the free world the nature of the issues
will take its place in a revolutionary period: to make clear

III-5

Soviet intransigence will be rewarded. In short, our deepest responsibility is to make proposals in which we can believe and which reflect our notion of a just and peaceful world.

Similar considerations apply to the proposition that we should seek to break every deadlock with new proposals. Such a "rule" is self-defeating, for it deprives the Communist leaders of the incentive to accept any proposal.

However, moderate our offers, the Soviet leaders will be tempted to reject them in the hope that we will come up with even more favorable plans. The absurd lengths to which this method can be carried was demonstrated at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1959.

Before the Western proposal had even been presented, a clamor arose in the British and American press for a fall-back position. It should have been obvious on purely pragmatic grounds that such an attitude defeats its own objects. If a fall-back position is known to exist,

Option: If a self-pack position is known to exist, pragmatic suggestions that would allow an attitude toward the enemy's pack position. It should have been obvious on brie夫 that the Geneva Foreign Mintenfona, Conference of 1929, had even been presented, a Before the Western proposal had even been presented, a clemency move in the British and American press for a self-pack position. It should have been obvious on brie夫 that this method can be carried out with even more favorable plans. The apdnd lengths be tempted to reject them in the hope that we will come However moderate our offers, the Soviet fadgers will fadgers of the incentive to accept any proposal. Such a "rule" is soft-dating. It deprives the Communist we should seek to press every deadline with new proposals. Similar considerations apply to the proposition that should be made to the Soviet intrusions will be reurged. In a sort, our

any motive for accepting the first offer disappears.

The only result can be to transform the fall-back position into the starting point of the negotiation and to raise the need for another fall-back position.

Implicit in the "principle" that we must break every deadlock with new proposals is the hint that every position, and the abdication of all conviction. In the long run, the conclusion will be inescapable that no issue is worth contending for and no Western proposal final. The or the matter people of the free world will never know whether a given offer is serious or simply a bargaining position. The result must be the confusion of all issues.

This becomes even more apparent when one considers another rule of thumb which is frequently heard: that the way to resolve disputes is to find a compromise somewhere between the initial positions. For the result of such a maximum again is likely to be the opposite of what is intended.

again is timely to do the objective of what is intended.

between the initial positions. For the result of such a transaction

way to reduce diatribe is to find a compromise somewhere
another rule of thumb which is frequently used: that the
This becomes even more apparent when one considers
that the other is a serious or simply a perempting position.

result must be the conclusion of all issues.

The other is a serious or simply a perempting position. The
people of the tree world will never know whether a given
world contending for such a Western proposal itself. The
run, the conclusion will be inescapable that no issue is
possible and the conclusion of all conviction. In the long
debate with new proposals is the HUNTING OF SUGGESTIONS

Imbarrassed in the "principle" that we must preek overly

need to, another self-pack position.

into the starting point of the negotiation and to raise the
The only result can be to transform the self-pack position
and motivate for negotiating the first other diatribe.

If agreement is usually found between the two starting points, there is no point in making moderate offers. Good bargaining technique would suggest a point of more extreme than departure far beyond what one is willing to accept. outrageous The more extreme the initial proposition, the better is the prospect that what one "really" wants will be considered a compromise.

Such a method of negotiation is particularly difficult for a democracy. When the negotiators adhere to a maxim which makes compromise desirable in itself, effectiveness at the conference table depends on overstating one's demands. Yet extreme proposals are going to make it difficult to get public support. The dilemma is real. If we want to be perfectly flexible, we should start with maximum program and offer "concessions" in the course of the conference. On the other hand, if we make proposals in which we really believe, we must inevitably be somewhat rigid about them.

believe, we must inevitably be somewhat right about them.

On the other hand, it is made PROPOSALS in which we really

PROGRAM and others "conceivables" in the course of the conference.

want to be perfectly flexible, we should start with maximum
to make public short. The difficulty is real. It was

Yet extreme proposals are sometimes made it difficult
at the conference table because on overestating one's demands
which makes compromise desirable in itself. Effectiveness
is a democracy. When the negotiators agree to a maximum
such a method of negotiation is particularly difficult.

The more statements the initial proposition, the better is
the broadest that what one "really" wants will be considered
by the other parties, what one is willing to accept.
Good bargaining technique would suggest a point of
difficult terrain, perhaps, where EXISTING HANES
It agreement is usually left between the two starting

This is not to say that our basic program at Geneva was so good
that it permitted no compromise, only that the emphasis
on bargaining technique too frequently is a substitute
for a sense of direction. This brings about an atmosphere
of "damned if you do and damned if you don't."

If the West develops a careful, serious program and maintains it over a period of years, it will be accused of inflexibility, no matter how moderate the original proposals. But if it starts with a bargaining program, it will be accused of intransigence. And when it seeks to combine both approaches, it falls between two stances. The program will not be precise enough to be maintained with conviction and yet it will not have sufficient "play" in it to permit major concessions.

No one would underestimate the importance of understanding
the bargaining process - it is essential to successful
negotiation. The difficulty arises because we sometimes

negotiation. The filterily airates because we sometimes
the paringing process ... it is essential to successfull

To one would underestimate the importance of insurmounting
major concessions.

it will not have sufficient "blitz" if it is to be met
breaks enough to be maintained with conviction and let

it offers a permanent solution the problem will not do
because it is the essential to success
influence. And when it seeks to complete both approaches,
starts with a paraging program, if will be seen of

the way of mind assem
a period of years, it will be seen of intlexplicitly,
generally a careful, serious program and maintains it over
of "damed it you go and damed it you don't". If the West
to a sense of direction. This implies apart an atmosphere
on paraging technique too frequently is a mistake
that it denied so compromise, our that the embarks
This is not to say that our basic problems of Geneva was so good

This is not to say that our basic problems of Geneva was so good.

seem to confuse tactics with purpose. The result is often an increase in rigidity. When "flexibility" becomes identified with bargaining technique, many hold on to entrenched positions for they see no stopping point once the *status quo* is abandoned. While this is not a constructive attitude, one must have understanding for the concern of those who observe that the limits of flexibility are rarely defended with the same passion as the flexibility itself.

At the same time, double standard develops between our positions towards committed and towards the Communist world. It is often said that the uncommitted will judge us by the reasonableness and the moderation of our proposals. But towards the Communist world the recommended criteria are often "acceptability", "novelty", "compromise", -- criteria which depend eventually on the Soviet willingness to settle. On the one side, the standard is substantive; on the other, largely formal. The temptation then becomes

on the other hand, formerly known as the Committee of Marxists, then becomes to settle. On the one side, the standard is superannuated; on the other, which degenerates eventually into the Soviet willingness to accept "reality" as "reality". --

broader. But whereas the Committee world the recommended line of the reasonableness and the reasonableness of our workmen. It is often said that the committee will judge our positions towards us committed and consider the Committee committed. The committee develops between the same time, a group standard which is not itself.

are merely defended with the same passion as the flexibility concern of those who operate that the limits of flexibility constructive attitude, one must have understanding for the once the status quo is espoused. While this is not a entrenched position for they see no accounting point identified with pertaining technique, which hold on to often an increase in rigidity. When "flexibility" becomes seem to continue series with hunches. The result is

rather than the causes of the difficulties: on NATO,
but not the Soviet hostility which produced it; on the
all-too-inadequate Western defense effort, but not on
the preponderant Soviet strength which called it forth;
on the dangers to peace in case of another satellite upheaval,
but not on the Soviet repression without which the danger
of upheaval would not exist; on the Soviet scheme for
total disarmament, but not on less cynical proposals which
might have some prospect of slowing down the arms race.
The illusion is created that the Cold War can be ended by
proclamation.

Controversy about diplomatic method must remain
barren as long as we are unable to define the reality
to which slogans such as rigidity and flexibility refer.
If we cannot give our desire for peace concrete content,
the danger is real that negotiations, rather than leading
to a settlement, will be used by the Soviet leaders to
demoralize the free world and to wreck its cohesion.

demoralize the free world and to weaken its capacity.

to a settlement, will be used by the Soviet leaders to
flee danger if real that negotiations, rather than feeding
It we cannot give our desire for peace concrete content,
to which flogants are subject as rigidly and flexibilityelen
perman as long as we are unable to define the result

Controversy about diplomatic method must remain
proclamation.

The illustration is created that the Cold War can be ended by
might have some broad effect of slowing down the same race.
total dissemination, but not on less cyphed brochures which
at nehsevel would not exist; on the Soviet advance for
but not on the Soviet repression which the danger
on the danger to peace in case of another aterfette nehsevel,
the brevengement Soviet strength which called it forth;
afl-too-insufficient Western defense effort, but not on
but not the Soviet hostility which produced it; on the
rather than the causes of the difficulties: on NATO.

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37

Mr. Khrushchev is well aware of this opportunity:

> Why is it that the imperialist circles do not wish to hold talks and conclude agreements with us? They fear that agreements with us and with other countries of the socialist camp will undermine the very basis of imperialist propaganda...And then the entire system of aggressive pacts created by the imperialists -- all the NATO's, SEATO's, Baghdad Pacts and so forth -- will begin to crumble. The fable of the Communist danger is the main thread which holds together that system of military pacts. Figuratively, it looks like a knitted article: Pull out one thread and the whole article will fall apart and become no more than a shapeless heap of threads.

> The formalism of the Western approach to negotiations raises the question whether the real obstacle to a flexible and purposeful Western diplomacy is not the absence of moral assurance. The impression is sometimes strong that too many in the West consider conviction incompatible with negotiation. Too often the laudable tendency to see the other point of view is carried to the extreme of refusing to make any moral distinctions. In 1948 ....

37.Speech at Soviet-Czech Friendship Meeting, July 12, 1958, Foreign Radio Broadcasts.

Radio Broadcasts.

23. Speech at Soviet-Czech Friends' Meeting, July 15, 1968, foreign

refusing to make any moral distinctions. In 1968

conviction incompatible with negotiation. Too often the landable

bration is sometimes strong that too many in the West consider

Western diplomacy is not the absence of moral assurance. The im-

the question whether the real obstacle to a flexible and burlesque

The format of the Western approach to negotiations raises

threads.

apart and become no more than a useless peep of

pull out one thread and the whole article will fall

bets. Alternatively, it looks like a knitted article:

to example. The table of the Communist danger is the

NATO's 'SHATO' (Soviet Bets and so forth -- will begin

creative bets created by the industrialists -- all the

italiet broadsides... And then the entire system of ag-

socialist camp will undermine the very base of imper-

hold talks and conclude agreements with us. They fear

Why is it that the industrialist circles do not wish to

Mr. Kruepelev is well aware of this obderruption:

31

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The impression is sometimes strong that too many in the West con-
sider conviction incompatible with negotiation. Too often the
laudable tendency to see the other point of view is carried to
the extreme of refusing to make any moral distinctions. In 1948-

Henry Wallace professed to be able to discern no
difference between the policies of the West and those of the
USSR—if anything he was much more charitable towards the latter.

And this attitude survives to our day. The preposterous argument
has been advanced that the brutalities of Stalin were due to the
refusal to admit Russia into the League of Nations in 1923 and
the current hostility of Khrushchev to the failure to accept the
Soviet disarmament package of May 10, 1955. NATO is equated
with the Warsaw Pact; the British landing in Egypt, with the Soviet
repression of Hungary; our overseas bases with the establishment by
the Soviet Union of a satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. In some

See broadcast by Philip Noel Baker, the Norwegian Broad-
casting Company, reprinted by the New England Regional
Offices, American Friends Service Committee.

Offices, American Foreign Service Committee,
creating Company, reorganized by the Net Union Board of
See present Dr. Philip W. Baker, the American Broads-

the Soviet Union of a socialist order in Eastern Europe. In some
repression of Hungary, our opponents face with the establishment of
with the Russian East; the British funding in East with the Soviet
Soviet government broke out May 10, 1922. NATO is educated
the current power of Communists to the failure to accept the
return to admit Russia into the League of Nations in 1923 and
use been advanced that the masses of Communists were due to the
and the attitude survives to our day. The preponderant argument
and the attitude survives to our day. The preponderant argument
UNESB—it supposing he was much more operable former the latter.
difference between the before of the West and those of the
Henry Wallace proposed to be able to accomplish much more
the exercise of relating to base and other distinctions. In 1928
federal tendency to see the other point of view is straight to
raise the question incomparable with negotiation. So often the
The問題 is sometimes strong that too much in the West con-
bustible, Western diploamt is not the substance of most assurance.
Take the question whether the real object of a flexible end

said: 41

Herr Hitler's statement (offering to negotiate) ought to be taken at face value. Herr Hitler made a statement sinning with one hand but holding out the olive branch with the other, which ought to be taken at face value. They may prove to be the most important gestures yet made. ... It is idle to say these statements were sincere. ... The issue is peace and not defence.

Others are reacting against the popular tendency to see
complicated political problems in absolute terms of black or white and
to identify policy with the amassing of military force. But in attack-
ing such oversimplification, many critics run the risk of reducing all
issues to a single shade of grey.

Self-examination is of the essence in a democracy. But it is
impossible to base policy on the deep distrust of the American people
revealed by many current expositions. Some critics seem to feel that
unless the United States is deprived of all conviction it is likely to
prevent a settlement through belligerence or self-righteousness. Of
course, there are many causes for concern in . . .

41. Hansard 309, pp. 1976-77, March 10, 1936.

V-17

contemporary America. But our test will be whether we treat our shortcomings as a challenge or as an excuse to withdraw from the scene. If we are moderate only when confused, if conciliatoriness requires us to abdicate our moral judgment, the future of freedom is dim indeed. The tendency to equate our moral shortcomings with those of the Soviet bloc deprives the West of the inward assurance to negotiate effectively. It leads to a policy of the guilty conscience.

A lasting settlement is possible only if the Soviet leaders become convinced that they will not be able to use the West's desire for peace to demoralize it. If they are serious about their desire to avoid war, they must realize that negotiations can be used for purely tactical purposes only so often and that, measured against the dangers of such a course, the gains they may score are paltry.

to
We in turn should strive/aim demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that they have a real policy decision to make which we will do everything possible to ease. They must face the fact that the policy of applying

possible to ease. They must face the fact that the policy of applying
they have a real policy decision to make which we will do everything
We in turn should strive to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders that
to
the daughters of one's course, the same they may acquire are faitly
burly tactical purposes only so often and that, measured against
to avoid war, they must realise that negotiations can be used for
for peace to demobilise it. If they are serious about their desire
become convinced that they will not be able to use the West's desire
A lasting settlement is possible only if the Soviet leaders
conscience.

to negotiate effectively. It leads to a policy of the guile
those of the Soviet bloc deprives the West of the inward assurance
it dim indeed. The tendency to adjust our moral shortcomings with
requires us to abdicate our moral judgment, the future of freedom
scene. If we are moderate only when continued, it conciliatoriness
shortcomings as a challenge or as an excuse to withdraw from the
contemporary America. But our test will be whether we treat our

A-17

V-18

relentless pressures on the West creates untold perils for all the peoples of the world. On the other hand, they must be convinced that they can increase their security through negotiation. Should they seriously seek a settlement, they would find us flexible and conciliatory.

Negotiations are important. But it is essential to conduct them without illusions. We do not need to postulate a basic Soviet transformation in order to believe in the possibility of a settlement. Nor is it a prerequisite to successful negotiation to pretend that a relaxation of tensions is primarily within Western control.

The West must have much more positive goals than to divine Soviet intent. We do ourselves an injustice if we make an issue of the desirability of relaxing tensions or of ending the Cold War. The test of conciliatoriness does not reside in interpreting Soviet trends in the most favorable manner. Nor does it consist of proving the desirability of peace--which should be taken for granted. Rather, the challenge which confronts the West is to determine what are the possibilities of a settlement which does not hazard our security

the belligerities of a settlement which does not hazard our security
the challenge which confronts the West to determine what are
the desirability of peace--which should be taken for granted. Rather,
trends in the most favorable manner. Nor does it consist of proving
test of conciliatoriness does not reside in interpreting Soviet
desirability of relaxing tensions or of ending the Cold War. The
intent. We do ourselves an injustice if we make an issue of the
The West must have much more positive goals than to divine Soviet
that a relaxation of tensions is primarily within Western control.
ment. Nor is it a prerequisite to successful negotiation to pretend
transformation in order to believe in the desirability of a settle-
them without illusions. We do not need to postulate a past Soviet
Negotiations are important. But it is essential to conduct
conciliatory.
they seriously seek a settlement, they would find me flexible and
that they can increase their security through negotiation. Should
beables of the world. On the other hand, they must be convinced
relentless breviation on the West creates untold Herrs for all the
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EX