Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KHC NARA, Dato_5/12/04

Telecon
Gerard Smith
12/29/69 9:20 a.m.

K: The P thought it might be a good idea if you stepped out and answered a few questions for the press after you saw him.

S: Very vague.

K: That's what I'm calling about. Promise nothing and keep nothing that you promise. No, seriously, say the talks have been constructive and not push any particular line.

S: I don't have any particular line to push.

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Gerard Smith
12/29/69 4:25 p.m.

S: Is there any [x] objection if I asked for an intelligence analysis of the ______ of Soviet motivation as seen through Helsinki?

K: No, if you let us have a copy.

S: Oh sure. The people on the delegation are so close to it, we may be losing some insights.

K: Yes, I think that's a good idea.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/94

TELECON
Mr. Kissinger
Elliot Richardson
12/29/69; 7:00 p.m.

K said basically I only called you to see if you were still at your office. I am keeping a log for the President of who is still at his desk. R said yes, I am here and I have been diligent. K said I have something important to ask you. K said the President wants to get Annenberg out of Palm Springs as early as possibly -- preferably by January 2. K said I wonder whether you can invent something for him to do in London. R said he has never done anything like this -- okay I am sure we can think of something. K said maybe to prepare for the Wilson visit. K said I would appreciate it if you would emphasize to him that he is needed at his post. R said I will let you know what we do just for curiosity sake.

K said secondly I wanted you to know that Murray Marder and Chalmers Roberts were in to ask questions about the Middle East. K said they had heard there was White House and State Department disagreement on it. K said I said that every step of it had been not only approved by the White House but worked out in cooperation with the White House. K said I told them it was done in total harmony with the White House. K said you might tell that to Bill.

R said one thing I might mention to you -- you are going to California tomorrow? R said I am going to New Hampshire Wednesday. R asked when K was returning from California. K said it would probably be around the 8th or 9th. R said I probably won't see you then. R said as you know, I have been working through various channels with the help of Bill Brubeck and Newsom to see what might be done to initiate some sort of discussion with Nigeria and Biafra. R said we have discussed this with the British, French and the Emperor to identify some individual who can be trusted by both sides. We came up with Sir Arthur Lewis. R said we would put him in touch with McNamara with the idea that he, with the backing and encouragement of the World Bank, would write letters to leading economist on each side suggesting that they get together and discuss the post-hostilities economic development, reconstruction, etc. R said Bill Rogers did not want to get too directly involved in this so R got him to agree to have the British follow up on this with McNamara. R said the next step depends on McNamara. R said I think this is sensible. K said I think it sounds alright to me

R asked K if he knew about the problems they had in New York -- demonstrations at the Aeroflot. K said what were they Jewish? R said yes, protesting against the Soviets. K said the Soviets want to break off four-power talks scheduled for tomorrow because they cannot continue them

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

with all the noise outside the Embassy. K said I don't think the Jewish
groups in this country should do this. K said if we stop know I think we
have positioned ourselves rather well. R said the trick now is how to
stop. R said I thought Kraft was right for once. K said I essentially
agree with him. K said we talked about this before and I think we ought
to get out of it.

R said Ghorbal(?) was in to see him. R asked K if he saw him. K said when is he leaving town. R said I thought tomorrow. K said I will try to seehim if only to prove that I am not against the Israelis(?) -- Arabs??? R said it wasn't necessary for K to see him. K said if I see him I will send you a MemCon. R said Okay.

K said I saw the German Ambassador for about one-half an hour. K
said he is thin-skinned and I don't really like him. R said I had a prickly
conversation with him at one time. R said he said he would
arrange for me to meet Duckwitz(?). R said I told him we could make
such arrangements. R said he called me later and said he had never been
treated that way before. K said he once said the same thing to him.

R said have a good trip and Happy New Year. K said thanks, and the
same to you.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK/Secy Packard

30Dec69: 9:20 a.m.

Packard: Are you leaving today? I wanted to chat about Safeguard. We have got things worked out here so there are two courses we can go. Wanted to get your advice which way the President wants to go. One, is to take the next step with two additional sites going toward full 12 deployment with some emphasis on the area defense capability. Also going to include some money for R&D to upgrade Minuteman defense in case we need it. Involves $1-1/2 billion in authorization and about $900 million in expenditures. The other course would be to simply go ahead with phase 1 but put R&D toward area defense.

K: I am practically certain he wants the first course you mentioned. He wants to get into phase 2 if only for bargaining effect. We had a talk about that yesterday after Jerry Smith made his report. He definitely wants to do that. We were wondering we could start surveying some additional sites just to show we are moving.

P: We will do that. I think I have a pretty good interpretation of the conversation last week. If you are sure the President wants to go that way, I will go ahead.

K: I am not sure which two sites he would pick -- I would guess Whiteman and the Northwest. P: It is perfectly --

K: I think he would prefer that to the National Command Authority.

P: I think it would save us an argument. K: I am sure I speak for him on this. P: I will have it set up that way. We have got to get it in the budget. I will get things moving ahead on that basis.

K: Could you send over a piece of paper? P: Yes. K: I am sure I speak for him on this because we have talked on the budget review so we will do two sites and preserve some other ones.

P: The ultimate 12 sites so we have the whole picture and going ahead on the whole program.

ms

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
HAK/Bill Moyers
30 Dec 69: 10:00 a.m.

M: I want to report a couple of things, just between us. Not serious at the moment. A friend of mine at dinner in Washington last week told me he had been at a dinner where Clark Clifford was also present. Sometimes Clark can act on misinformation. Clark got him in the corner and told him the real surprise in this Administration is Mel Laird fighting hard for de-escalation, but can't penetrate Kissinger and Nixon. I think the way to handle Clark is have lunch with him some day and straighten him out.

K: That Laird is the champion rascal. Never once has Laird made a proposal in either of these directions to us. It seems he goes all over town saying he does, but never once in any sense at all, written, oral or by indirection has he made such a proposal.

M: I would urge you to take that into consideration sometime with him and -- The second comes from a member of the faculty and a friend of mine at Harvard at dinner. He had dinner with Stan Hoffman and the same kind of line was being taken by Stanley, not in reference to Laird but in reference to thinking that Kissinger is being taken over by Nixon's view of the world. He said 'the prolongation of disengagement by Henry surprises me. I think he is getting into the same trap that Walt Rostow got into.' I think you can pull Stanley back. I hope you don't think I am passing on petty gossip. I thought, these are not columnists -- they are men that know and respect Henry and he would want to know about it.

K: Isn't that amazing about Stanley? I saw him about 4 weeks ago and asked him to have lunch with me sometime. What these people can't understand is that it is impossible to set a quick timetable and speed up negotiations.

M: I just wanted to pass this on so that in your own due time if you have the same discussion with both of these men that you had with me --
K: I was much more frank with you. To both of these people I said, you are really wrong about that. Because I am sure that if there is any one man prudently pushing the disengagement processes it is Henry. I think if you can have the same kind of discussion with them.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

-2-

K: That's a very good idea. I appreciate that very much. This is the sort of comfort one doesn't often get here. Will you let me know when you are next down here?

M: Don Marron told me he was giving a dinner for you. I told him I would join him as a sponsor but there shouldn't be a tie to Mitchell Hudgins.

K: Do you really think he should do that? I am not getting anything out of that and the President is getting nothing from that. I just did that out of old friendship.

M: I feel uneasy about that because it is not the reality the press jumps on -- it is the impression of things. It may be too late to embarrass Don if it is already laid on, but I would stress it to Don that nobody from Mitchell Hudgins plays a vital role at the dinner.

K: The only thing I can do is if the President's trip stretches on I can cancel it on those grounds. M: I would be dishonest if I don't express to you that I am queasy about it. They would be people from mutual funds from all over. The common thread would be their clients. I am still with him although I am cutting out after this year because I just don't have the time. A lot of people would like to lay the tie on to the Nixon Administration. The oil industry - the mutual fund industry.

K: Let me take another look at it. The Clifford thing is essential -- more important than Stanley. M: More important in the sense that the mills of Washington grind more rapidly than the mills of the universities.

K: Sooner or later my colleagues are going to turn on me.

M: Not necessarily. K: Well, some of them are. You know, disengage fast -- we would certainly love to do it. It sounds good.

M: No question about it.

By KLC W NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK/Secy Richardson

30Dec69: 10:20 a.m.

K: That request I made to you yesterday should be between you and
me.

R: I understand. Yes. It is going to be difficult. I haven't figured
out what to do. But I haven't given up. K: Right. I will take
credit if it works and blame you if it fails. R: All right - that is a
way of getting even. Go ahead and issue the license I was talking to
you about. The truck plant or some part thereof for the Soviet Union.
It has come up again because the Soviet have been approaching Ford
and Chrysler.

K: But we turned it down once. R: I know we did. There is also
an issue involving an outside one -- Gleason. K: That also was
turned down. Wait a minute -- what was that about?

R: We'd like to build a gear cutting plant. The question is whether any
would

of these issues ought to be re-examined in the light of what such
circumstances may have affected our attitude generally toward East-
West trade in the light of the new Act. K: Yes.

R: I don't know whether this is anything that ought to be made a formal
issue at this juncture. I thought maybe you would have the opportunity
to raise the issue with the President while in California.

K: I would like to do that because he has a number of things in mind
with the Soviet Union next year and it may fit in better if it isn't
in the eyes of the great linkage.

R: I doubt whether in terms of the Vietnam situation our present policy
is doing us any good. I don't believe they care that much. In the case
of this truck plant or the gears if they don't buy them from us there
are plenty of people willing to sell them.

K: I have a hunch that he would be more responsive to approving it
now than he was six months ago. R: That is why I thought I would call
you now so that you might bring up this whole business of East-West
trade. It would be good to do a little more with the Roumanians, the
Hungarians and the Poles. K: Your memo showed up here under a
different signature so there wasn't the problem you mentioned.

R: You mean my actual one? K: The extended version.

R: There was one that was not mine. K: I will have to compare them.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

- 2 -

There were two that came over. How can we move this East-West issue to a more formal situation? You think I should feel out the President informally first? R: I think you should feel him out informally first to see whether he wants to. There are some things we could do without formal consideration. We are actually doing less than I interpreted the NSC decision originally to permit. If he now wants to do -- you don't need an NSC decision to move somewhat more liberally in relations with the Warsaw Pact or East European countries than we are doing now.

K: But that's not the gear thing.

R: The gear and the truck thing he could decide without reconvening.

K: I could raise the gear and truck thing. Could you at the same time see what slightly more liberal steps we can take -- in other words go up to the decision? R: If I can. I had planned to have a meeting of my own in this building to ask the question anyway. If you could get his thinking we can get together after he gets back.

K: We may be more flexible in going up to what is implied by the decision but probably even going beyond it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Packard

11:55 a.m., December 30, 1969

Secretary Packard said he had a problem on the reductions worked out at the White House with BOB. The specific request to reduce naval forces by $75 million will get DOD in a hell of a mess with the number of ships that would have to be stood down. DOD would come out a lot better if DOD had some flexibility in achieving the reduction. P said they would like to be able to do this: they already have scheduled in the 71 budget a reduction of 36 ships and an air wing amounting to 44,000 people coming out of the Navy. This amounts to $50 million reduction. If they could include that in terms of ship reductions, adding an additional 13-15 ships to bring it up to the full $75 million and take an equivalent amount otherwise, it will leave the Navy in a better position than if the full $75 million were taken out of the budget.

K said this had been worked out with Mel Laird who seemed to think he could handle the $75 million. P said they would have to take 63 more ships out, and explained it further. K said what Packard said sounded reasonable -- as long as DOD doesn't hit the Army again. P said they wouldn't do that. They will get the full $75 million out of the Navy, including some of the ships already earmarked and taking some savings elsewhere. Packard said he hoped this would be acceptable to the President.

K said he was sure it will be acceptable, but asked Packard to put it on a piece of paper for the record. K repeated that he could tell P now that it will be acceptable. Packard they would proceed.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

TELECON

Secretary Laird

1:20 p.m., December 30, 1969

K said it was raining here and L was on the golf course, but he had something that would becloud L's day. The President is very eager to show a total decline -- at least not a rise-- in civilian employment next year. K said this is not really budgetary -- and it would be a tremendous help -- if there is some chance of reducing DOD civilian personnel by 30,000. K said L could keep half of the savings. L said he had gone farther than that. K said this would be 30,000 more on top of that. L said he already had programmed a reduction of 130,000. K repeated this was an additional 30,000; the President could live with 25,000, but 30,000 would enable him to show a slight decrease. L asked again, "25,000 to 30,000 more civilians?" K said again, the reason is not budgetary, and of the $300 million savings figured, L could keep $150 million.

L said with the present plans for a 130,000 reduction, another 25,000 would mean base closings of 10 major bases, and he would also have to cut down a couple of shipyards. K said he hadn't realized that many bases would be involved. L said it would take that many to get that many civilian employees -- they figure 2,500 civilians per base. He said he already has figured in a 10 - 15% cut in Washington bases to get the 130,000. He asked if he could look at this request and give K a call. K said he was leaving momentarily for the plane. L agreed to call K in California on Wednesday morning. L repeated that he would like to look at a couple of ways to accomplish this. He said other agencies more than ate up the 70,000. He said hell is really being cut out of Defense, and he hates to do this. K said if he can't do it, then he can't do it. K said if he could do it, L would have $150,000 to play with elsewhere.

L said he would call K on Wednesday morning.

lds

By: KH V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Director Mayo

1:25 p.m., December 30, 1969

K said he had talked to Mel Laird about the additional 30,000 cut in civilian personnel. Laird would like to think it over until Wednesday, Dec 31st, in detail. K said he thought we would get the additional cut. However, he thought we would have to take 25,000 rather than the 30,000. Mayo said he thought Laird was taking temporary as well as permanent civilian personnel. K told him Laird said this means closing 10 more bases. Mayo said he didn't think Laird understood. He said he would provide K with the precise figures. K said he was catching a plane. Mayo should give it to the Situation Room which would teletype it to the plane.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
10:10 a.m., 12-31-69

L asked if K had received his memorandum. L said we spent quite a bit of time going over this - three people sat in on this. We should only go for 25,000. K said you are mixing up the two figures. They say you only reduced 38,000 permanent people. L said I sent you a rundown and a table which I think will explain it fully to you. We are going down to fulltime permanent figure of 1.9 and total of 1.50. The table explains that. I spent quite a bit of time with Packard and my Comptroller and they think the budget people understand it. K said Mayo does not understand it. L said will make an effort to reduce further. We would have to go to contract employment and would cost us more. It would cost us more dollars. K said intent is to show no increase in federal payroll.

L said what I would like you to do is look over the material and Dave and I and our Comptrollerspent most of the night going over this. I think it is a mistake because it will add costs rather than subtract. It should be there no (the memo). It goes into detail. The three people working from the Bureau of the Budget, I am sure, understand these figures. If you go over this memorandum, I think it will take care of it. K said OK, if the President asks me, you think it is basically a mistake to do it. L said yes. K said let me raise another point on the toxin issue. We want to move it into the NSC so that the President can get credit for it. L said, well of course. K said will you make sure there is no decision until the President gets a crack at it. All we want is the various departments to put the various options before the President. K said then you and I and the President can decide how we can move it. L said Henry, you know since I have been here we have produced none. The thing about it is the President should get credit for it when he needs it. K said exactly. L said what they are trying to do is take credit as an agency. K said an agency that does not have to carry the burden should not take credit for it. L said we will not even say we are not producing it. K said just emphasize the options. L said they are even calling me up saying they will take my language on the oil thing. I am doing nothing on it until next week. I told them I would have to read it over next Tuesday or Wednesday. I wonder if someone couldn't talk to Lincoln and see if he would change the date. Lincoln, Schultz, etc., are all going for six months. If I could get one more person to not go immediately, I would be in good shape. K said let me tell you now, I will do what I can to see that you are not pushed any further. I hope you feel I have been helpful on the budget thing. I talked to Dave about this thing and he is quite upset about it. May I talk to Dave about it so that I won't have to bother you about it. L said yes, fine. L said I will get on the toxin thing right away. I will be back in the office on Saturday. K said fine.

mlh

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
12/31/69 a.m.

K: I talked to the P. He's not going to ask you to do anything on the personnel issue.

L: Did you get my memo?

K: Yes. We worked through it carefully and presented it to the President. We agreed with your statement on a rational basis if it is pretty conclusive.

XH

L: Well I appreciate it.

K: The BOB keeps coming back to us on this F-111 thing. They say McClellan is going to hold hearings if we get that wing (?), which would make it our airplane. I said it wouldn't be. I wonder if you could handle the hearings.

K: This involves no new contract?

L: no Well, on the problem of the F-111, we are not going to cancel that. We are going to cancel it at the end of FY 71. Froty planes are coming. We may cancel them, but I don't like to make that possibility public till we do more work. There are 40 more planes on that contract. We plan to cancel at the end of this. But we can't do it on the 20th of January. Without preparatory work with the Australians, we can't do it.

K: Okay, can you handle the McCarthy hearings if it comes to that?

L: I've already met him 3 times on this.

K: And he's got no problems?

L: Yes. I think we oughtn't to do that on the 20th or the 23rd of January if we do decide to cancel. The money will be saved anyway. If the plane is no good, we ought to cancel.

K: Well, if you have it under control, we are not concerned.

L: We do.

K: I will tell the P right away.

L: I will send you the memo I sent to the Air Force just a week ago. We are on top of it.

K: We'll let you handle it.