J. GLENN BEALL, JR.
MARYLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 1, 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
2201 "C" Street
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On Wednesday, May 14th between 6 and 8 p.m. a group of friends are holding a reception in my honor at the Capitol Hill Club.

It would be extremely helpful to me if you could take time out of your busy schedule to attend this reception as our guest. I do hope you will find it possible to be with us.

With best wishes, I am

JGB/emw

ROBIN BEARD
6TH DISTRICT, TENNESSEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
124 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2811

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

DISTRICT OFFICES:
SUITE 401
FIRST AMERICAN BANK BUILDING
5384 POPLAR AVENUE
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38117
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710 NORTH GARDEN STREET
COLUMBIA, TENNESSEE 38401
(615) 388-2133

February 5, 1976

Ms. Suzanne McFarlane
Room 7226
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ms. McFarlane:

It would be greatly appreciated if you would make
arrangements for Secretary Kissinger to autograph a picture
for Ricky Perry, of Columbia, Tennessee.

Thank you for your courtesies with my request in
behalf of Ricky.

RLB/jhw

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1975

Dear Friends:

I have read your letters and listened
to the song you recorded for me -- and I
am totally charmed. If I were the judge,
Mrs. Ehrig's Second Grade students would
win first prize for singing the best song of
the year. It was very nice of you to think
of me this way.

I am only sorry that I did not receive
your notes and the tape of the song until
after I returned to Washington. Perhaps
if I visit Jacksonville again I will be able to
accept your kind invitation.

Best regards,

Beauclerc Elementary School Students,
Beauclerc School No. 230,
4555 Craven Road,
Jacksonville, Florida.

REDING 1970.11.400

Gavin de Becker
Beverly Hills, California

November 5, 1976

Mrs. Nancy Kissinger
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Kissinger,

There is a saying about the
virtues of persistence that I can't recall now,
and I am writing under its influence. The unfor-
tunate loss to President Ford last week, and Gov-
ernor Carter's newness to world affairs indicate
that the Secretary will probably resign along with
most of the current administration.

Again, I am writing to let you
know that I would very much appreciate considera-
tion for a position on your staff after the Secretary
leaves State. I am well qualified through my exper-
ience as Chief of Staff for the Burtons, and I am
registered by the State of California for my Govern-
ment training in Protective work.

As I mentioned in my previous
letter, I want to work for no salary, just expenses.
This, because of my great admiration for you and
Secretary Kissinger. I will be glad to make availa-
ble all records pertaining to me on file with the Bur-
ton Office in New York, as well as references from
other employers and colleagues.

Hoping that my primary ambi-
tion will become a reality, I remain,

RALPH E. BECKER
2916 THIRTY-SECOND STREET N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

April 1, 1975

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We listened with interest to your very candid press conference. It is only natural and human to have disappointments, but it cannot be denied that in contemporary times there has been no Secretary of State who has served with greater distinction, dedication, loyalty and success. Your name has become a byword in this country and throughout the world as a wise leader, talented negotiator, and a courageous diplomat in international affairs. There is no one who could have done more to resolve the complex problems in the Middle East than you. There would be no successes in this world if one did not have to overcome difficult obstacles and disappointments.

The news media indicate that the recent assassination of King Faisel adds to the problems that have confronted you as our Secretary of State. However, as you well know, if you can keep the interested parties "talking", the tensions will ultimately reduce and, hopefully, there will be peace in the Middle East. There are many who feel as I do, that the setbacks that may take place prior to a solution will in no way diminish your distinguished record, notwithstanding the Vietnam status and the Middle East deadlock. Peace has been your goal, and I am confident you will achieve it.

Our best wishes and prayers are with you in your continued untiring efforts to resolve the complex problems in the Middle East.

The
Economist

Registered Office
25 ST JAMES'S STREET
LONDON SW1A 1HG

TELEPHONE: 01-930 5155
TELEX: 24344

Dr Henry Kissinger,
Department of State,
2201 C Street, N.W.,
Washington DC 20520,
U.S.A.

28th April, 1976

Dear Dr Kissinger,

It is flattering and salutary to receive a five-page letter
from you in reply to an article in The Economist. Thank
you; and I will do my best to answer it. Let me say at
once, though I will come back to the point later, that no
part of the article was intended as an *ad hominem* argument.
I take it that an *ad hominem* argument is one directed at
the personal qualities, and conduct, of the man in question.
To say that a Secretary of State appears to have come to
certain general conclusions about the course of certain
events may be accurate or inaccurate, but was meant as a
legitimate comment on the conduct of public policy. What
we do regret is the reference to "German-born" and so on in
the last sentence. It was unnecessary, and I wish I had
not written it.

To take your points in order:

1. The relationship between "incentives and penalties" and the other parts of the policy towards the Soviet Union. It would indeed be absurd to suggest that your policy rested solely on the "Gulliverisation" idea; but I think it is safe to say that the readers of The Economist will not have thought we were suggesting anything so absurd. We have written regularly about the other two elements in the policy you mention -- maintenance of the military balance, and resistance to Soviet assertion -- and have almost always, I think, taken positions that agree with yours. This article was about the elements of the policy we have disagreed with. We have felt for some time, and have argued before, that "Gulliverisation" was unlikely to realise the hopes attached to it, either in the short run or the longer run; was, in fact, unlikely to sustain the weight put on this particular part of the policy, especially in circumstances when events beyond your control -- notably, action by Congress -- limited the effectiveness of the other parts. It was of course weakened by the Jackson amendment, but even minus the Jackson amendment we find it hard to see how the tool would actually have been made to work.

..2/..

THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LIMITED Registered in London Number 236383

- 2 -

Dr Henry Kissinger

28th April, 1976

2. Angola was cited as a case in point. I agree that there was probably no other policy that could have been brought to bear to frustrate the Soviet/Cuban move in Angola once Congress had decided not to support the action you recommended. (I confess that we should have referred much more clearly to Congress's responsibility at this stage of the argument, though we did mention it later.) But this simply draws attention to the ineffectualness of "incentives and penalties" in such situations. I accept your argument that it would have been politically very difficult to renew the grain embargo. I wonder whether something might not have been done by way of cancelling, or threatening to cancel, a wider range of proceedings under other bilateral American-Soviet agreements; but if you tell me that would not have worked, I accept your judgment. You will say that the Gulliverisation process needs more time to become effective, and you may be right, though for the reasons we have given I doubt its effectiveness even in the long run; but our point in the Angola reference was merely to say that it proved irrelevant there. I do not think you disagree.

3. As for western Europe, we didn't suggest that the United States could " invite " the Russians to look forward to radical political change in western Europe. But in fact they are, up to a point, looking forward to it (although the prospect certainly includes problems for them as well as benefits). Since a process may be under way in parts of western Europe which holds out the prospects of certain benefits for Soviet policy, we argued that it was time for the question of the possibility of change in eastern Europe to be put rather more prominently on the agenda of discussions with the Russians. (I have just come back from a conference in Poland which spent some time on this issue, I must admit without instant capitulation by the other side to our argument.)

I do not know to what extent communist gains in western Europe can be explained as a consequence of detente -- we confined ourselves to saying "partly" -- but it does seem that the prospect of these gains raises, as one of its consequences, the question of the western interest in what the prospects of change are to be on the other side of the Elbe. If I read one sentence in Hal Sonnenfeldt's statement to those ambassadors in London correctly, he indeed dropped a delicate hint in that direction.

..3/..

- 3 -

Dr Henry Kissinger

28th April, 1976

4. This is why I do not think that your passage on eastern Europe points to any serious difference between us. We recognise what the Administration has done to encourage east European autonomy in the past. We offered a couple of formulations of ways in which we thought this encouragement might usefully be extended, observing that in our view this would probably not break the limits of Soviet tolerance. You say that perhaps we are right. If we are, our suggestions amount to advising the east Europeans to look the Russians a bit more "boldly in the eye" -- one of those phrases, I admit, that leap more easily to a journalist's typewriter than they can to a Secretary of State's speeches.

5. Lastly, the question of your reaction to the recent course of events and the conclusions we said you appeared to draw from them. I ought to say, in passing, that we did not suggest that you are resigned to America "accepting second place"; the second part of that sentence dissociated us from that Zumwalt interpretation, while observing that it was probably truer to say that you feared American opinion might be so resigned.

The evidence on which we based this last part of the article does not come, in the nature of things, from your public statements; although I remember passages in one or two press conferences in Washington last year which suggested the same point. It comes from accounts of what you have said in background discussions, and the way you have said it, including a discussion with some of my colleagues in London towards the end of last year when I was out of the country. In that discussion, and others, you were described as laying heavy emphasis on precisely the things you mention towards the end of your letter -- "the nihilism of too many intellectuals, the self-indulgence of Congress and the demoralisation ... of so much of our establishment" -- and the limitations these placed on your ability to conduct the sort of policy you would like to conduct.

Amen: I agree with most of what you say, and feel, about the causes of those limitations. The question is whether those limitations are as severe, and long-lasting, as the accounts of some of those background discussions have suggested you thought they were. My own view is that they are probably not, for the reason we mentioned near the end of the article: the means may be available in America to outflank the demoralisation of part of the intellectual class. One or two of your latest public statements suggest that you agree; I think the passages about America's capacity

..4/..

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Dr Henry Kissinger

28th April, 1976

for action in, for instance, your statement to the Foreign
Relations Committee on March 16th and your speech to the
Rotary people at Phoenix on April 16th put more emphasis
on this aspect of things than many of your earlier comments.

As for that confounded last sentence: I think it can be
argued that temperament and disposition are not unconnected
with place of origin -- I am partly Italian, my wife is
German-Swiss, and I think I can see the difference -- but
that is a subject it would have been better to exclude from
this argument. Apologies.

This is too long, and I am taking too much of your time.
I write with best wishes for your present ventures, not
least in Africa.

Actual freedom cannot be achieved unless free expression is well recognized.

November 18, 1975

Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger
State Department
2201 C Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The enclosed book, I believe, pays special tribute
to your political philosophy and achievement,
especially in the Middle East.

I can think of no greater reward than the receipt
of your comments as to the viability of my
approach to the Middle East crisis as formulated
in this book.

I also want to take this opportunity to express
my deepest gratitude for the inspiration your
many writings have given me.

ABM:sl
Enclosure

8147 Delmar Boulevard

St. Louis, Mo. 63130

Evan Bennett

San Miguel de Allende, Gto.
Mexico (Apdo 195)

September 6, 1973

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

PERSONAL

Dear Henry:

I am enclosing an article in VISION, July 14, 1973, which I have translated and sent on to Robert Bartley of the Wall Street Journal, as something especially suited to his Editorial Page, "The Intelligence Factor."

The author is an Argentine who contributes regularly to Vision- thoughtful, philosophical studies. I read Vision mainly to get them. In this one, he did not name anyone as the principal, but he might well have named Henry Kissinger. You will find it amusing at least, and I hope interesting.

My compliments on your recent elevation.

encl: Copy of article in reference.
copy: Mariano Grondona
Luis Agote 2455
Buenos Aires, Argentina

THE INTELLIGENCE FACTOR

by Mariano Grondona, VISION 14 July 1973

(translated by Evan Bennett)

In national affairs, we tend to "objectify" our view of reality. One speaks of "Gross National Product" as a number, an object from which we unconsciously omit all the effort, attitudes, convictions, human capabilities and defects which go into its accomplishment. One speaks of "technique" as if it, and not human beings, is the reality of the scientific and organizational revolution of our time. One even mentions the "logic" and "memory" of computers, ignoring that those who program and operate them are human beings with their sentiments, convictions, and prejudices.

The same thing occurs in the field of politics. One thinks in "systems" and forgets their creators and even their subjects. Themes such as movement, revolution, socialism, the state, tend more and more to omit the prime movers, the revolutionaries, the democrats, the socialists, the functionaries who give them life and meaning. This in spite of the fact that some regimes are really centered on a person- Franco, Tito, Mao, Peron- while others are inconceivable without some kind of human involvement; like capitalism without the profit motive, communism without ideological conformity, any form of totalitarianism without fear. These attributes of each system are in turn concrete states of consciousness which exist in very real individuals. But we habitually ignore them in favor of dehumanized abstractions.

No political system can function unless the people who administer it, and the people who are subject to it, possess certain political virtues, like eloquence in the leader and discipline in the citizens; like perseverance in spite of objective limitations and good sense in practical decisions; mutual tolerance, and a certain intransigence in fundamentals. Each system demands its peculiar virtues. But all demand a high degree of intelligence.

What is political intelligence? This is one of those slippery concepts that St.Augustine described: "When I think of them, I know what they are. When I try to describe them, I no longer know." We say that he is politically intelligent who can look into the future and be on his guard for what it may bring, who knows people and can lead them, who sees opportunities where others despair, and danger where others are confident. Who accepts a high cost for an accomplishment which in the end proves to be justified. Or who may allow a threatening situation to ripen unchecked until it becomes intolerable and therefore more easily managed.

The Intelligence Factor-2

The concept is so intangible that many confuse it with
others deceptively similar. The most common, for example, is
to confuse political intelligence with political brilliance,
when in fact they are almost opposites. The brilliant man may
be a great orator, a convincing writer, a fervent ideologist.
But trapped by the need to be brilliant, he finally neglects
the essential, that his thesis, his proposals, be practical and
soundly adapted to the immediate situation. This political
capability is more often found in the quiet, unobtrusive man
who, operating behind the scene, never loses sight of the basic
problem, nor the solution it demands taking realities into
account. Thus it happens that the followers of an outstanding
politician are so often disappointed. Where they expected a
sort of lay Messiah, they find a man who is meticulous, retiring,
a man who would rather listen than speak. But this man is prob-
ably a redoubtable politician. Because the wisdom of a polit-
ian is not typically intellectual, it is peculiarly generic.
Good politician is he who knows what to do here and now, not he
who can prescribe for always and everywhere. Oratorical talent
blooms in the tribune. Political talent, in the informal group.
Sometimes these talents are combined in one person, and then one
witnesses cataclysms.

But history is full, all the same, of frustrated Demosthenes,
of triumphant Phillips. When a capable politician attains the
level of a talented intellectual, on the contrary, he is trans-
formed into a true creator because his general knowledge is
illuminated by the concept of the essence of each situation
which is his special gift. Lenin, de Gaulle, and Mao, among others
tower from this summit.

The special intelligence of the politician consists, in brief,
in perceiving the limits of a given action at the moment.
This is extremely difficult. To know the limits, at times, is to
advise resignation in place of enthusiasm; at other times, the
contrary, that daring should displace caution. In the life of
great statesmen there are instances when, to the consternation of
others, he withdraws before a minor obstacle. Here is the mark
of genius. Against the prevailing opinion, he has glimpsed the
exact area of a wide or narrow limit to the possibilities of
action.

Intelligence, as we have seen, is not the only political
virtue. Others such as courage, perserverance, eloquence, flex-
ibility, diligence, accompany it to form the consummate politician.
But in any case it is the key to political action. With it, the
other attributes are complementary. Without it, failure is
almost inevitable.

almost inevitable.

other attributes are complementary. Without it, failure is
but in any case it is the key to political action. With it, the
ipility, intelligence, Accompany it to form the consummate politician.
Others such as courage, perseverance, endurance, flexibility.

action.
exact area of a wide or narrow limit to the capabilities of
the mind. Vain at the prevailing opinion, he has climbed the
others, he withdraws before a minor obstacle. Here is the mark
Great statements there are instances when to the consideration of
contrary, that during should face him. In the title of
advisable reformation in place of enthusiasm at other times, the
This is extremely difficult. To know the limit at times, is to
in perceiving the limits of a given action at the moment.
The special intelligence of the politician consists, in brief,

power from this summit.
His special gift. Lenin, de Galle, and Mac, among others
influenced by the concept of the essence of each situation
formed into a true creator because his general knowledge is
level of a talented intellectual on the contrary, he is trans-
formant, intelligent. When a capable politician attains the

influenced by the concept of the essence of each situation
formed into a true creator because his general knowledge is
level of a talented intellectual on the contrary, he is trans-
formant, intelligent. When a capable politician attains the
But history is full of the same or the same type of intelligence.

mistrust of intelligence.

Sometimes these talents are confined in one person, and then one
proves in the tripune. Political talent in the intellectual branch,
who can prescribe for always and everywhere. Oratorical talent
Good politician is he who knows what to do here and now, not be
but is not fabulously intellectual, it is beneficial, generic.

apply a regognitable politician.
Because the wisdom of a polit-
a man who would rather threaten than break. But this man is prop-
port of Jay Measal, they find a man who is methodical, retentive,
politician are so often misclassified. Where they expect a
account. Thus it happens that the followers of an outstanding
problem, nor the solution it demands taking resents into

who, observing behind the scene, never loses sight of the past
capability is more often found in the ducit, neopromethean man
consequently adapted to the immediate situation. The political
critical, that lift the spectra, lift probabilities, be breakfast and
But trapped in the need to be brilliant, he finally neglects
as a great orator, a convincing writer, a fervent ideologist.
when in fact they are almost omnibaiters. The brilliant man who
to comprise political intelligence with political brilliance,
others deceptively similar. The most common, for example, is
The concept is so intangible that many confuse it with

The Intelligence Factor-S

The Intelligence Factor-3

Also, one may speak of the "power" of intelligence.
There are many situations where a leader, an enterprise,
a party, find themselves apparently defeated. Their weapons
are few and their possible objectives minimum. But if there
is added to them the formidable, subjective power of a skilful
political intelligence, precise, sharpened, capable of making
the maximum use of limited advantages and of reducing obstacles
to a minimum, one may still fight and perhaps overcome.

In contrary case, take a man who is learned, perhaps brilliant,
perhaps honest and straightforward but lacking political intell-
igence, in the most favorable situation. Soon it slips out of
his hands. Who doesn't recall fantastic possibilities lost, in
a highly favorable conjunction of circumstances? At the recoll-
ection, one should add the diagnosis: political intelligence was
lacking in those who had the responsability for decisions.

When one starts to analyze a political situation or problem,
there are many questions to ask. No aspect should be neglected,
from things purely material to matters as intangible as passions
or beliefs. One question is of primary importance. How intell-
igent, politically, are the leaders?

If one correctly understands the leader, one understands the leader.

One question is of primary importance. How intelligent should a person be? What material to matter? What kind of background there are? Many questions to ask. No subject should be neglected. When one starts to analyze a political situation or problem, he finds who had the reasonableness for decisions. One should add the diagnosis: political intelligence must be highly favorable condition of circumstances? At the recall-time, who doesn't recall favorable conditions for intelligence? In the most favorable situation, soon it aliba out of her head. Who doesn't recall favorable conditions for intelligence? In the most unfavorable situation, then it becomes and straightforward pulling political intelligence in contrary case, take a man who is learned, perhaps brilliant, to a minimum, one may still find and perhaps overcome.

In contrary case, take a man who is learned, perhaps brilliant, to a minimum, one may still find and perhaps overcome. The maximum use of limited advantages and of reducing opportunities political intelligence, because, as shown, capable of making it added to them the favorable, and, as far as I know, are few and their possible objectives minimum. But it there is plenty of themselves abnormally deleted. Their reasons There are many situations where a leader, an enterprise, via one may ask of the "power" of intelligence.

The Intelligence Factor-3

Seaford, New York.
Seaford Jewish Center.
Rappi Eor Ben-Gorek

Personal Assistant
Suzanne S. McFarlane

Sincerely,

him.

and he thanks you for your kindness in sending it to
will be a cherished addition to his personal library.
Haggadah" with your very thoughtful inscription. It
how pleased he was to receive a copy of the "Fuerth
Secretary Kissinger asked me to let you know

Dear Rappi Ben-Gorek:

May 3, 1976