PERIODICALS, NOVELS AND POETS. HOWEVER, DO NOT PUBLISH FOR PROFIT.

E/D

EACH OTHER, SYRIA AND ISRAEL WERE IN LEBANON FOR THE SAME
OBJECTIVE: TO PREVENT THE PLO FROM ELIMINATING THAT UNHAPPY COUNTRY.

## Long-term consequences

IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS REALITY IN MIND IN ASSESSING THE LONG-
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON. FOR IT OPENS UP
EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITIES FOR A DYNAMIC AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS NEITHER DESIRABLE NOR POSSIBLE
TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE IN LEBANON, BUT NEITHER IS IT
OR DESIRABLE NOR POSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN THE STATUS QUO IN THE WEST BANK. THE
SHOULD EVENTS IN LEBANON ENABLE US TO OVERCOME THE EXISTING FRAGMENTATION
OF OUR POLICY AND TO RELATE IN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THREE GREAT
ISSUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST: THE LEBANESE CRISIS, THE AUTONOMY TALKS AND
THE THREAT TO WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE GULF.

ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL CASULTIES OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS HAS BEEN THE
WESTERN ILLUSION-- ESPECIALLY PREVALENT IN EUROPE BUT RIFE IN THE
MIDDLE LEVELS IN OUR GOVERNMENT IN ALL ADMINISTRATIONS THAT
IS THE KEY TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE HAS TO BE FOUND IN A PLO-ISRAELI NEGOTIATION BASED ON VARIOUS FORMULAE TO MODERATE THE PLO. THIS WAS
ALWAYS A MIRAGE. THE EFFORT NECESSARY TO INDUCE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT COLOSSAL, NECESSARY, NEEDED.

3

LYJ

THE PLO.MS H NEGOCIATION PARTNER WOULD HAVE FORCED US TO SPEND ALL
OUR CAPITAL ON PROCEDURES BEFORE SUBSTANCE WAS REACHED - EVEN ON
THE HIGHLY DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT IT WAS ACHIEVABLE AT ALL. IT WOULD
HAVE GIVEN A VETO ON NEGOTIATIONS, TO THE MOST INTRUSIGENT ARAB GROUP.
NOR WAS IT DESIRABLE.
(Nor was it desirable.
~~pivotal role in~~
indeed a veto,
N
element in the Arab world, the
~~group most~~
hostile to peace process and
~~Lisbon, with its West Bank incursion and the most closely associated with Arab radicalism. NOR WOULD IT
~~NOR BE THE PLO THE BEST A SOITABLE INSTINCT TO~~
HAVE STABILIZED THE ARAB WORLD. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT ARAB SUPPORT FOR
a result would have destabilized, not stabilized,
The PLO'S
by
PREEMINENTLY.
In the recent crisis
CAPACITY FOR TERROR THAN COMMITMENT TO ITS PRE-EMINENCE
NO ARAB
rhetorical
GOVERNMENT GAVE MORE THAN VERBAL SUPPORT TO EMBATTLED PALESTINIANS, AND EVEN
~~THE~~
~~LACKED THE TRADITIONAL PASSION. EVEN SYRIA STOOD PASSIVELY UNTIL
ITS OWN FORCES WERE DIRECTLY ATTACKED AND MADE A SEPARATE CEASE-FIRE
WHILE THE PLO WAS BEING SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYED
~~THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET~~
was forced to the sidelines.
AN UNION WAS FORCED TO THE SIDE - LINES. WHEN THE PLO DESPERATELY NEEDED
A CEASE-FIRE, IT TURNED FOR HELP TO MODERATE EGYPT, WHOSE PEACE
~~SINCE THE PEACE PROCESS~~
IT HAD VILIFIED AND THAT AT THE DEATH OF WHOSE LEADER, PALESTINIANS
HAD DANCED IN THE STREET.
(BY
~~AND THE SWAP~~
~~FOR~~
~~PALESTINE~~)

AMERICAN POLICY MAKERS HAVE REASON TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT
THE ATTITUDE OF OUR ISRAELI FRIENDS, BEFACIO-ALLIES WHO USE AMERICAN
QUIPMENT AND MAKE AMERICAN INTERESTS FOR GRANTED WITHOUT PRIOR
ONSULTATION. THIS PRACTICE CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY. STILL, IN
HIS PARTICULAR CASE, THE RESULTS WERE CONGRUENT, NOT ONLY WITH ISRAEL'S

ISRAEL WILL BE TENDED TO DEFINE AUTONOMY IN TERMS CONTRARY
TO THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE WORD; EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES
WILL SEEK THROUGH INTRICATE FORMULAS A GOAL IN FACT
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE ISRAELI DOMESTIC STRUCTURE.

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES ARE NEEDED TO OVERCOME THIS DEADLOCK:

1. IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE DEADLOCK CANNOT BE BROKEN
UNLESS THE TERRITORIAL BASIS FOR AUTONOMY IS DEFINED.

2. THAT BASIS CANNOT BE THE BORDERS UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. THAT BASIS CANNOT BE INDUCED TO RETURN TO THESE BORDERS, NOR CAN THE ARABS ASK FOR LESS. ALL THAT IS POSSIBLE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IS AN INTERIM AGREEMENT APPLYING TO THE TERRITORY WHERE MOST OF THE ARAB POPULATION ON THE WEST BANK IS LOCATED.

4. SUCH A GOAL CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY IF THE UNITED STATES SPELLS OUT WHAT IT UNDERSTANDS BY AUTONOMY IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT.

5. JUST AS EGYPT CAN BE THE KEY ARAB COUNTRY WITH RESPECT
TO LEBANON, SO MUST JORDAN TAKE THE LEAD ON WEST BANK
NEGOTIATIONS.

SO FAR KING HUSSEIN HAS STOOD ASIDE, CONSCIOUS OF HIS VULNERABILITY,
RELUCTANT TO BEAR THE BRUNT OF FIGHTING THE PLO AND IF
RESISTING SYRIAN PRESSURES, FRANKLY DUBIOUS OF AMERICAN
OF THE PROBLEM.

**UNDERSTANDING TO RESOLVE** BUT HE IS MUCH TOO WISE TO WISH FOR

A PLO STATE ON THE WEST BANK WHOSE INITIAL OBJECTIVE MUST BE
HIS OVERTHROW. AND HE IS MUCH TOO SHREWD NOT TO RECOGNIZE
[THAT THE PLO DEFEAT IN LEBANON AND THE DEMONSTRAT;
(ON OF THE LIMITS OF SYRIAN HAVE GIVEN HIM A WINDOW OF

opportunity if the United States pursues
(6 SIX WORDS MISSING...) THE DIPLOMACY WITH DECISIVENESS AND
IMAGINATION. AND SINCE EGYPT NEEDS JURDANIAN GOODWILL IN

LEBANON JUST AS JORDAN REQUIRES EGYPTIAN SUPPORT ON THE WEST
BANK, THERE EXISTS THE MAKINGS OF A DE FACTO COALITION OF
MODERATE ARAB STATES (6) ALWAYS PROVIDED FIRFIRM AMERICAN

LEADERSHIP. THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN THUS
BE GIVEN A NEW IMPETUS (1) ESPECIALLY AS EVENTS IN THE GULF
CREATE INCENTIVES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AT LEAST TO TOLERATE AND
PERHAPS TACITLY TO SUPPORT IT.

## THE CRISIS IN THE GULF

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE GULF FACE TODAY A FOURFOLD THREAT:

WHITE RADICALISM, MOSLEM FUNDAMENTALISM, IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY
and
EGYPTIAN SOVIET IMPERIALISM. THE LAST HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL

FOCUS OF AMERICAN POLICY ALTHOUGH IT IS THE LOWEST
OF
PRIORITY FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. TO THEM THE LONG-

TERM DANGER FROM THE SOVIET UNION PALES BEFORE THE
IMMEDIATE DANGER FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. THE SOVIET

not only, but
(1) RELATIVELY FAR AWAY, AND IS IN ANY CASE CONSIDERED
(2) SOVIET UNION IS NOT A CAUSE FOR CONCERN

I PROBLEM ONLY AMERICA CAN SOLVE: PLEASE FOR ASSISTANCE AGAINST

IT TEND TO BE SEEN AS DEMONSTRATIONS OF AMERICAN
WEAKNESS. BUT IRAN IS CLOSE, AND IN ITS VARIOUS INCARNATIONS
FULFILLS ALL IMMEDIATE ARAB NIGHTMARES.

THE FOCUS OF IRANIAN PRESSURE AT THIS MOMENT IS IRAQ. THERE
ARE FEW GOVERNMENTS IN THE WORLD LESS DESERVING OF OUR
SUPPORT AND LESS CAPABLE OF USING IT. HAD IRAQ WON THE WAR,
THE FEAR IN THE GULF AND THE THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE
SCARCELY LESS THAN IT IS TODAY. STILL, GIVEN THE EXISTING
BALANCE OF POWER IN THE AREA, IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO
PROMOTE A CEASE-FIRE IN THAT CONFLICT, THOUGH NOT AT A
COST THAT WILL PRECLUDE AN EVENTUAL

L RAPPROACHMENT

WITH IRAN EITHER IF A MORE MODERATE REGIME REPLACES
KHOMEINISOR IF THE PRESENT RULES WAKE UP TO THE
GEOPOLITICAL REALITY THAT THE HISTORIC THREAT TO IRANS
INDEPENDENCE HAS ALWAYS COME FROM THE COUNTRY WITH WHICH IT

SHARES A BORDER OF 1,500 MILES: THE SOVIET UNION (LINE A) A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAN, OF COURSE, MUST BE AT A MINIMUM, IRAN'S MISSING FROM PHOTOCOPY) ABANDONMENT OF IRAN'S HEGEMONIC

ASPIRATIONS IN THE GULF. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A STRATEGIC CONSENSUS OF LIMITED OBJECTIVES WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER

GULF STATES IS CLEARLY AT HAND. IT MUST HAVE AS ITS PRINCIPAL
COMPONENTS, AN AMERICAN GUARANTEE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OF THE KINGDOM, AND, MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR ITS CURRENT DOMESTIC

EXERCISE OUR PENCHANTS FOR THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF SOCIETIES:

THE STRUCTURES ARE TOO FRAGILE. NOR SHOULD THESE DESIRES BE DRAMATIC OR EVEN PUBLIC. THEY MUST BE BASED IN THE REALIZATION THAT THE KINGDOM IS SUPPLE AS WELL AS SUBTLE; THAT WE DO IT NO FAVOUR TO INTERJECT IT INTO THE FOREFRONT OF EVERY CONTROVERSY, EXPOSING IT TO THE PRESSURES OF ALL CONTENDING FACTIONS.

an American

BUT SUCH A POLICY BASED ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF LEBANON, FULFILLMENT OF ATTAINABLE ARAB ASPIRATIONS ON THE WEST BANK, AND PROTECTION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, WOULD RECONCILE ALL OUR OBJECTIVES WITH THAT OF ALL OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA, ARAB AS WELL AS ISRAELI.

IT WOULD BE THE BEST BULWARK AGAINST ARAB RADICALISM AND反SoviET INTRUSION.

MORESSERTLESS. IT WILL REQUIRE A STRONG AMERICAN HAND.

BUT AS BISMARCK ONCE SAID, IN FOREIGN POLICY COURAGE AND SUCCESS DO NOT MERELY STAND IN A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP: THEY ARE IDENTICAL.

GERAL B 612718F