7

[LC]

to help victim of aggression. Among nations of the world that could
or would give military aid to such victim that leaves only Great
Britain and France. It was not, as Attlee charged the inept policy
of the British Government that placed the burden of maintaining law
and order on the shoulders of those two countries; it was the facts
of the world situation. Now to meet the obligations en-
tailed in a policy of collective security, those two countries alone
had to have armed forces superior to the combined forces of Germany,
Italy, and Japan. The Labour Party paid lip service to the policy
of collective security: the needs and requirements of that policy
were evident enough. Was the Labour Party willing to supply them?

In the autumn of 1933, at its Annual Conference, the Party
unanimously adopted a resolution stating that:

> [The Labour Party undertakes] to pledge itself to take no part in war and to resist with the whole force of the Labour Movement.¹¹

11. The Labour Party, Report of the 33rd Annual Conference held in the White Rock Pavilion, Hastings October 2nd to 6th, 1933, London, 1933, p. 186 [hereafter these Reports of the Annual Conferences will be referred to as Report... 193-].

In the same autumn George Lansbury ¹² severely criticized the

12. Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party 1931-1935; a sometime member of the National Executive Committee; a member of the second Labour Cabinet.

Conservative Party because one of its members, Lord Lloyd, proposed to
his Party Conference the following resolution:

> That this Conference desires to record its grave anxiety
> in regard to the inadequacy of the provisions made for Imperial
> defence.¹³

13. 281, 7 November 1933, col.

68.

13. 28R. & November 1933, corr. P.2.

Golence.13
in legacy to the independence of the broken-down wage for timber
that this Conference desires to record its grave anxiety

The Earth Conference the following resolution:

Conservative Earth became one of its members. Lord Trod. proposed to
Tepom Capitot.
member of the National Executive Committee; a member of the second
13. Leader of the Barilyamentary Tepom Earth 1931-1932; a sometime

In the same unum George Tseapux. 18 severely criticized the

will be referred to as Report... 1933-.
1933. b. 1838 [refer to these Reports of the Annual Conference
White Rock Station, Massachusetts, October 8th to 10th, 1933, Tepom
11. The Tepom Earth Report of the 1933 Annual Conference held in the

Movement.11
bar in max and to relate with the whole force of the Tepom
[The Tepom Earth undertakes] to prove itself to safe no

unanimously adopted a resolution stating that:
In the annum of 1933, at the Annual Conference, the Earth
were absent enough. Was the Tepom Earth willing to absorb them?
ot collective security: the needs and requirements of that border
 itself, and Japan. The Tepom Earth had first ever to the border
had to make armed forces under the command forces of Germany,
tailed in a buffer of collective security, those two countries alone
of the world attraction. Now [the buffer] to meet the obligations en-
gaged on the annexes of those two countries; it was the task
of the British Government that placed the burden of maintaining law
Britain and France. It was not, as attested charged the треб buffer
or would give military aid to any action that leaves only Great
to help against aggression. Among nations of the world that confu

Movement.11
bar in max and to relate with the whole force of the Tepom
[The Tepom Earth undertakes] to prove itself to safe no
unanimously adopted a resolution stating that:
In the annum of 1933, at the Annual Conference, the Earth
were absent enough. Was the Tepom Earth willing to absorb them?
ot collective security: the needs and requirements of that buffer
itself, and Japan. The Tepom Earth had first ever to the border
had to make armed forces under the command forces of Germany,
tailed in a buffer of collective security, those two countries alone
of the world attraction. Now [the buffer] to meet the obligations en-
gaged on the annexes of those two countries; it was the task
of the British Government that placed the burden of maintaining law
Britain and France. It was not, as attested charged the треб buffer
or would give military aid to any action that leaves only Great
to help against aggression. Among nations of the world that confu

[fc]

[LC]

8

Soon after the Party proposed in Parliament the following motion:

That, while reaffirming its adherence to the system of collective security under the League of Nations and accepting its obligations thereunder, this House regrets that...His Majesty's Government should enter upon a policy of rearmament neither necessitated by any new commitment nor calculated to add to the security of the nation.14

14. 292, 30 July 1934, col. 2325.

The conclusion of this motion was obviously false and to deny that Hitler's acquisition of power increased Britain's real commitments was equally so.

By the time the Party's Annual Conference met in the autumn of 1934 the leaders realized that the unequivocal pledge to take no part in war was in contradiction to the Party's League policy. They therefore submitted for approval a new statement on policy in respect to war and peace in which it was declared that circumstances might arise in which military forces might have to be used to restrain flagrant aggressors, and that, so far as the individual was concerned, it was his "duty unflinchingly to support [his] Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take part in collective action against a peace-breaker."15 The introduction of this new

15. Report...1934, py. 245.

statement led to much debate. Its supporters claimed that it did not conflict with the 1933 resolution -- hardly correct -- and that it was the necessary corollary to a League policy -- certainly correct. Its opponents claimed that it was a reversal of policy and that no war

Objections claimed that it was a reversal of policy and that no war
the necessarily consistent to a League policy -- certainly correct. Its
conflict with the 1938 resolution -- largely correct -- and that it was
statement had to much debate. Its authorities claimed that it did not

Re. Report...1934, p. 283-42.

five sections against a peace-premium."[1] The introduction of this new
rule and consequences of utilizing its duty to take part in coffee-
It was due "unknowingly to an error" [the] Government in all the
flaccid agreements, and that, so far as the individual was concerned,
therein in which military forces might have to be used to restrain
the war and peace in which it was decided that circumstances might
therefore be submitted to aboves a new statement on policy in respect
but in war was in contradiction to the party's League policy. They
of 1934 the parties realized that the medevacualal pledge to take no
By the time the party's Annual Conference met in the autumn
was obviously so.

that Hitler's acquisition of power increased Britain's real commitments
The conclusion of this motion was operationally false and to deny

14. 268, 30 July 1934, c.c. 282d.

nation.14
By any new commitment nor elaborated to add to the security of the
ment should enter now a policy of resistance neither necessitated
by the Chamberlain, this House regrets that...His Majesty's Govern-
ment should enter into an agreement with the Government of the
United Kingdom that, while ratifying its adherence to the system of offe-

motion:

8

[LC]

16

should in any circumstances ever be supported. Lord Ponsonby, for example, after calling for unilateral disarmament, said:

> There are many of you who are still under the impression that an aggressor is coming along and that we have to have defences against him. That kind of talk has been used by Governments in the past, and I should have thought that most people to-day realised that it is nothing but a false issue to drive the workers of this country against their fellow workers in other countries.¹⁷

16. Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs without Cabinet rank in the first Labour Government.

17. Report...1934, p. 168.

The new statement of policy was endorsed by 1,519,000 votes; the Ponsonby followers, opposed to any admission that there might ever be a war which the Party could support, cast 673,000 votes, or 31% of the total, in opposition.

Soon after Winston Churchill introduced to Parliament the following amendment to a motion:
> But humbly represent to your Majesty that, in the present circumstances of the world, the strength of our national defences, and especially of our air defences, is no longer adequate to secure the peace, safety, and freedom of Your Majesty's faithful subjects.¹⁸

18. 295, 28 November 1934, col. 857.

The Labour Party, certain that the National Government's armament programme was more than adequate to calm Churchill's fear, introduced a counter resolution condemning such rearmament as was being done.¹⁹ In the spring of 1935 the Party once again introduced to

19. Report...1935, p. 78.

Parliament a resolution condemning rearmament and demanding further disarmament.²⁰ This was somewhat ill-timed for just five days later

20. 299, 11 March 1935, col. 35.

[Lc]

10

(6 March 1935), the German Government openly announced the reestablishment of compulsory military training for all adult males. However the Party did not hesitate on 22 May 1935 to oppose a suggested increase of the Air Force.²¹

Discussing this suggested increase a

21. Report...1935, p. 88.

Labour Member, John Wilmot, said:

> I do not believe that anyone who really faces the problem squarely can believe that peril to-day will be translated into security next week or next year by the building of 600 or 700 aeroplanes...Every nation threatened by this German menace should meet it in concert and together, not as individuals each building up a separate force...but as a pooled defence force.²²

22. 302, 22 May 1935, col. 454-462.

Apparently it was presumed that, though British planes could not protect London, an equal number divided in small amounts among the other nations of Europe could!

In the following autumn as part of the election campaign the Party issued a pamphlet devoted to the sins of the National Government and containing reasons why the electorate should vote against These included the following:

In the House of Commons on November 10, 1932, Mr. Baldwin said: "I think it is well for the man-in-the-street to realise that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed....The only defence is offence...."

The "National" Government does not believe in Disarmament....

Lord Londonderry said in the House of Lords on June 23,1934 "The abolition of military air forces is not a matter that we are likely to see achieved in our lifetime."²³

23. The Labour Party, Fifty Points against the "National" Government, London, 1935, pp. 11 and 15.

Tongou, 1938, bp. 11 and 12.

23. The Report of the Party. Little Forces against the "National Government."

Tireff to see achieved in our lifetime." 43

"The addition of military air forces is not a matter that we are going forward again said in the House of Force on June 23, 1934.

pompets....The only defence is offence....

that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being said: "I think it is well for the man-in-the-street to relieve us in the House of Commons on November 10, 1938, Mr. Belwin

These improved the following:

ment and contributing reasons why the electorate should vote against Party الانقلال a bandwagon devoted to the cause of the National Government in the following amount as part of the election campaign the nations of Europe only!

each Tongou, an annual sumper stated in small amounts among the other
absent. It was deemed that, though Britian France only not bro-

23° 30S', 23 May 1938, col. 45°, 49S.

and

subordinate force....put as a boolean defence force." 33

it in concert and together, not as individual acts of pulling up a
bunch....Every nation threatened by the German menace should meet
seemingly next week or next year by the pulling of 300 or 300 zero-
amexer can believe that he will be translated into
I do not believe that anyone who really faces the problem

Papouk, Hemper, John. Wijmots, said:

Sr. Report...1938, p. 88.

increase of the Air Force." 31

the Party did not reiterate on 23 May 1938 to choose a suggested
ment of combusorot which training for all aghr-mates. However

(e. Mar. 1938), the German Government clearly announced the reëxép-

10

[fc]

[L.C.]

11

To the 1936 Party Conference -- held after the Italian con-
quest of Ethiopia, the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, and the
remilitarization of the Rhineland -- the National Executive Committee
introduced the following resolution:

That in view of the threatening attitude of Dictatorships
which are increasing their armaments at an unprecedented rate,...
this Conference declares that the armed strength of the countries
loyal to the League must be conditioned by the armed strength of
the potential aggressors. of Nations

The Conference, therefore, reaffirms the policy of the Labour
Party to maintain such defence forces as are consistent with our
country's responsibility as a member of the League of Nations....

Realising the relationship between foreign policy and armaments, and having regard to the deplorable record of the Government, the Labour Party declines to accept responsibility for a purely competitive armament policy. It reserves full liberty to criticise the re-armament programme of the present Government.²⁴

Just what did this mean? The Conference delegates wondered;
members of the National Executive, supporting it, placed different
interpretations upon it. Dr. Hugh Dalton,²⁵ in a bold speech,

24. Report...1936, p. 182.

25. A member of the National Executive Committee; (sometimes its Chairman; Under-secretary of State for Foreign affairs without Cabinet rank in the second Labour Government; the Party's principal spokesman in Parliament on foreign affairs from 1935 onwards.

frankly called attention to the very heavy German rearmament, to the
vulnerability of Britain to an air attack, and implied that German
arms had to be duplicated -- even at the cost of supporting the
National Government's rearmament programme. Herbert Morrison,²⁶ on
the other hand, said:

26. A member of the National Executive Committee; a member of the second Labour Cabinet.

second Parliament.

20. A member of the National Executive Committee; a member of the
the other party, said:

National Government's rearmament programme. Herbert Morrison, 26 on
some part to be substantiated -- even at the cost of authorizing the
anywhere difficulty of Britain to an all attack, and implied that German
to the other party, said:

margue.

otherPrimeMinisterinBerlinonforeignattitudefrom1938 on
CapitolHall in the second Parliament; the Party's British
opposition; Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs without
the other party, said:

21. A member of the National Executive Committee; (sometimes ife
22. Herbert...1936, p. 183.

interpretations shown to it. Dr. Hughe Dalton, 26 in a pop sheet.

members of the National Executive, authorizing it, placed different

that what did not mean? The conference delegates wondered;

to calculate the re-armament programme of the present Government. 24

briefly competitive armament boffet. It reserves full liberty
ment, the Party lastly declines to accept reasonableness for a
ment, and using reference to the debatable record of the Govern-
ment, the relationship between foreign boffet and some-

country's reasonableness as a member of the League of Nations...

Party to maintain and defence forces as are consistent with our
The Conference, therefore, remains boffet of the Party

the botany of the Conference.

Joaquín to the League, must be conditioned by the same strength of
this Conference, to take that the armed strength of the country
which are increasing their armaments at an unprecedented rate...
That in view of the threatening attitude of Dictatorship

remittances of the Rhineland -- the National Executive Committee
great of Attrobia, the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, and the

To the 1936 Party Conference -- boff after the Italian con-

[c]

11

12

[LC]

Now the Government asks the Labour Party to help it rearm.... We cannot do it.... This motion does not mean support of the Government's national competitive rearmament programme. That would mean that we were supporting competitive national armaments, which this resolution condemns.²⁷

27. **Report...1936, p. 194.**

In answer to a question as to what the phrase "the armed strength of the countries loyal to the League" meant, Attlee said that it clearly meant, not the strength of an individual member, but of the totality of members. In view of the facts of the world situation which, for reasons explained above, placed the real burdens of military resistance to aggression on Great Britain and France, the interpretations of Morrison and Attlee rendered the resolution quite meaningless. Be that as it may, many attacked it because of the qualified approval of rearmament expressed in it. It was, however, approved by a vote of 1,738,000 to 657,000, a minority of 27% being opposed to any rearmament.²⁸

28. **Report...1936, pp. 182-207.**

A new pamphlet, *International Policy and Defence*, was submitted to the 1937 Conference for approval. This stated that, in the present state of the world, even a Labour Government would have to be "strongly equipped to defend this country, to play its full part in Collective Security, and to resist any intimidation by the Fascist Powers designed to frustrate the fulfilment of our obligations."²⁹ Even this was too warlike for a minority, now 11%, which

29. **Report...1937, pp. 4.**

strongly denounced it.³⁰

30. **Report...1937, pp. 195-212.**

30. Report...1931, pp. 182-218.

strongly recommends it.

38. Report...1931, p. 24.

tions."39 Even though this was tooCAPE for a minority, now 11% who
支持 the policy designed to metrate the fulfillment of our office-
ment in Collective Security, and to resist any intimidation by the
to be "strongly advised to defend this country" to break its full
the present state of the world, even a London Government would have
mitted to the 1934 Conference for approval. This stated that, in
A new pamphlet, International Bottom and Bottom, was ap-
proved to end resumption.

39. Report...1935, pp. 193-504.

approved by a vote of 1,488,000 to 684,000, a minority of 51% being
dissipated by approval of resumption expressed in it. It was, however,
meaningless. He stated as it was, many attached it because of the
interpretation of Monrovia and Attlee rendered the recognition entire
military resistance to aggression on Great Britain and France, the
appraisal for reasons explained above, placed the real problems of
the totality of maps. In view of the facts of the world attraction
it clearly meant, not the strength of an individual member, but of
strength of the countries today to the League" meant, Attlee said that
In answer to a question as to what the phrase "the sum of

38. Report...1938, p. 104.

ments which the resolution congeques.

world mean that we were authorizing competitive national sima-
government, a national competitive resumption programme. That
We cannot do it.... The motion does not mean approval of the
Now the Government sells the London party to sell it again....

It

[c]

[LC]

13

Another pamphlet, Labour's *Immediate Programme*, also submitted to the same Conference, stated:

> A Labour Government will unhesitatingly maintain such armed forces as are necessary to defend our country and to fulfil our obligations as a member of the British Commonwealth and of the League of Nations.³¹

> Strangely enough this met with unanimous approval.³²

31. *Report...1937*, p. 279.

32. *Report...1937*, p. 186.

In January, 1938, however, the Party re-issued *without change* a pamphlet dealing with the conduct of foreign affairs, that had first been published in December 1934. This called upon the British Government to promote drastic disarmament, to abolish those weapons of aggression forbidden to Germany (no doubt the military authorities would very much like to have known what these were), to abolish national air forces, and to limit armament budgets ³³ -- a

33. The Labour Party, *Socialism and Peace*, London, December 1934 and January 1938.

slightly unrealistic programme. On 7 March 1938 the Party moved in Parliament the following resolution:

> This House...condemn...the provision of immense armaments.³⁴

34. *Report...1939*, p. 158.

Four days later German troops invaded Austria.

Thereafter, it should be said, the Party, in Parliament, condemned the method rather than the fact of rearmament. Conscription,

denoted the method rather than the fact of remission. Concession, The latter: it should be said, the War by, in Parliament, con- fronts him after German troops invaded Austria.

34. Report...1939, p. 138.

The Home...congratulates the provision of immense arrears. 34

Adopted microfiche programme. On 1 March 1938 the Reich moved in
January 1938.

33. The Japanese Reich, _Reichsverwesung_ and _Reich_. London, December 1934 and

apportioned national air forces, and to limit arrears subjects to a
authority which would very much like to put known what these were), to
washe out of aggression forbidden to Germany (no doubt the intention
first been professed in December 1934). This carried upon the
a bannquet during the contract of foreign settlement, that put
in January 1938, however, the Reich re-issued without even so

35. Report...1938, p. 136.

31. Report...1931, p. 549.

Stranger yet enough this met with unanimous approval. 35

and of the League of Nations. By offsetting as a member of the British Commonwealth, the forces are necessary to defend our country and to defend our

member to the same Conference, stated:

another bannquet, Japan's _Immigrant Programme_, etc. and so on.

13

[c]

[LC]

14

for example, was condemned. To the Annual Conference of 1939, held in May instead of in the autumn, held after Germany had taken all of Czechoslovakia, after German verbal attacks on Poland had begun, after Italy had taken Albania, after the Labour Party had itself approved the British guarantee to Poland, the following resolution was submitted:

> This Conference condones the Government's introduction of Conscription....

> The Conference declares that the voluntary system has not failed and calls for every effort to ensure its increasing success.

Not a single delegate spoke in favor of conscription. On the contrary, a minority of 29% strongly assailed the resolution on the ground that the Party should not associate itself even with voluntary service.³⁵ A pamphlet issued less than a month before war began continued the condemnation of compulsory service.³⁶

35. Report...1939, pp. 274-289 (the resolution quoted from p. 281).

36. The Labour Party, Labour and Defence, London, August 1939.

Was the Labour Party willing to supply the arms needed to implement its collective security policy? The above extracts indicate that a fairly substantial minority -- almost one third of the Party -- was firmly opposed. The ideas of the majority changed; at first unwilling, it was ultimately prepared to supply some -- but, carried away by frequent repetition of the suppose antithesis between collective security armaments and competitive national armaments, certainly not enough.

In other, supplementary ways the Party members do not seem to have clearly understood the realities of the international situation.

[LC]

15

Though expressing in many resolutions their willingness to accept
the full risks involved in a policy of collective security, in ac-
tual situations they were very reluctant to face the possibility
that armed conflict might develop. In a Parliamentary debate in the
autumn of 1933 Labour Member after Member insisted that rigorous
economic sanctions should have been applied against Japan. When one
was asked what he would have done if Japan had replied with military
action, he replied that he would have faced that problem when it
arose. ³⁷ Obviously no responsible Government could conduct its policy
on any such basis. In the spring of 1935 Coeks reverted to the same
subject. When asked the same question he replied:

that
← As a matter of fact, I do not think it would have come to war.³⁸

37. 261, 13 November, 1933, col. 579-702.

38. 299, 11 March, 1935, col. 89.

Again the issue was evaded. It seems probable that, even in the Czech
crisis of September 1938, the Party did not honestly face the
possibility of war. That it understood the basic problem and the
issues at stake is clearly revealed in two excellent pamphlets on the
subject.³⁹ That it understood how to solve the problem is less clear.

39. The Labour Party, *Hitler's Threat to Czech Democracy*, London, June 1938, and *The Full Facts of the Czech Crisis*, November 1938.

The letter of these two pamphlets, published after the Munich settle-
ment, severely criticized that solution as a surrender, but insisted
that war was not the alternative, that Hitler would have backed down
before a firm stand -- that is extremely doubtful.⁴⁰ Just after the

40. See next page.

40. See next page.

before a firm stand -- that is extremely doubtful.⁴⁰ that after the
due war was not the alternative, that Hitler would prove down
ment, severely criticized that solution as a surrender, put inoperative
The latter of these two candidates, published after the United settle-
June 1938, and The Final Notes of the Peace Terms, November 1938.
38. The Lepore Battaglia, Hitler's Third to the Peace Conference, London,
and the Peace was enacted. It seems probable that, even in the Case of
39. 33. 33. It Maxowitsz, 1938, col. 33.
40. 38. 38. It November 1938, col. 349-403.
and the Peace was come to war.⁴⁰

The issue at stake is clearly revealed in two excellent candidates on the
beauty of war. That it underestimates the past problem and the
errata of September 1938, the party did not honestly take the
main the case was enacted. It seems probable that, even in the Case of
41. 38. 38. It November 1938, col. 349-403.
and the Peace was come to war.⁴⁰

42. 33. 33. It Maxowitsz, 1938, col. 33.

43. 38. 38. It November 1938, col. 349-403.

→ As a matter of fact, I do not think it would come to war.⁴⁰

and so forth. When asked the same question he replied:
on and on some point. In the spring of 1938 the Coope referred to the same
issue.⁴¹ Opalonefa no reasonaie Government config conflict its bottom
surface, he replied that he would have faced that problem when it
was asked what he would have done if Japan had rebuffed with military
economic sanctions should have been abbrifted against Japan. When one
antenn of 1938 Lepore Member after Member inquired that information
that asked conflict might develop. In a bilaterally debate in the
that alternatives they were very relevant to face the beauty
the tritt risks involving in a policy of collective security, in so-
though expressing in many resolutions their willingness to accept

19

16

40. It is interesting to note that, as the Labour Party emphasized, some of the leading members of the Conservative Party also condemned the Munich settlement: The Labour Party, Out of their own Mouths, London, [1938]. This pamphlet contains statements in condemnation made by Amery, Churchill, Duff-Cooper, Eden and others.

Munich agreement the National Council of Labour issued an official statement entitled *Labour and the Crisis*. This contained the following statement:

> Through these painful sacrifices made by the Czechoslovak nation an immediate outbreak of war has been averted. British Labour shares in the fullest measure the relief which the whole world felt when the imminent risk of war passed.

41. *Report...1939*, p. 19.

The refusal to give adequate consideration to the need for armed action to reinforce economic sanctions and to implement the policy of collective security sterilized much of the Party thought on the conduct of foreign affairs.

Its distrust and disapproval of conversations between military staffs had the same effect. When, after the denunciation of the Locarno Treaties, the National Government proposed very limited and restricted conversations between the French and British staffs, Attlee said:

> I think it is true to say that the country is profoundly disturbed at the idea of these staff consultations. I am far from saying...that in a full system of collective security... there should not be proper consultations as to defence.

42. 310, 26 March 1936, col. 1533-1534; see also the speeches by other Labour Members in the same debate.

The approval accorded to staff consultations in a full system of collective security, after condemning such French and British consultations, was only a revaluation of ignorance, since collective security, practically,

[LC]

17

could only be obtained by the fullest cooperation between those nations.

Another evidence of the Party's failure to understand the international situation was shown in its comparative lack of interest in Germany during these crucial years 1935, 1936, and 1937. In Parliament, in pamphlets, in Conferences such time and space as were devoted to foreign affairs were given to Italy, to Spain, to Russia, to pleasant generalities -- the one really vital and crucial situation was almost entirely ignored.⁴³ The Party even seemed to object when

43. For example: Report...1936, p. 34; The Labour Party, For Socialism and Peace, London, 1936; see also the debates on foreign affairs in Parliament during this period.

attention was directed towards Germany. Following one of Churchill's brilliant speeches calling attention to the size and power of Germany's armed forces, a Labour Member, W.G. Cove, said:

> I listened to the scaramongering speech of ... [Churchill], who endeavoured to make our flesh creep. These speeches [from supporters of the Government] have been very largely...pointed at Germany. Germany has been named as the reason for all the increases [in the Air Force] that have been made. I am not putting up a case for Germany, except to say that, after all, some responsibility rests upon the Government of this country as far as the position in Germany is concerned.... To-night's Debate has certainly not helped the mission of the Foreign Secretary to Germany, because these speeches and indeed these Estimates have shown the almost complete reliance of the hon. Members opposite [the Conservatives]...on an increase in the armaments of this country in order to defend us.⁴⁴

44. 299. 19 March 1935, col. 1085. See also a speech by another Labour Member, Morgan Jones: 295, 26 November 1934, col. 892 ("If I may make a criticism of the speech of... [Churchill], and indeed of the speech of... [Baldwin], it is this. They spoke--in terms of armaments vis-à-vis one other country, that is Germany"); etc. etc.

[L.C.]

18

The Party spokesmen and organs did, from time to time, en-
dorse properly safe-guarded regional pacts as a means to an end
pending the establishment of a world wide collective security agree-
ment.⁴⁵ When, however, action was called for in terms of the most

45. A speech in Parliament by Attlee: 292, 13 July 1934, col. 687; Report...1935, p. 314; The Labour Party, Labour and the Defence of Peace, London, May 1936, p. 11; etc. etc.

significant and important such pact -- the one embodied in the Locarno Treaties, -- the Party demanded denial.⁴⁶ Indeed it may be said that

46. See the debate on the Locarno Treaties, 310, 26 March 1936.

the clearest indication of the Party's inability to understand the
international situation was its attitude towards the remilitarization
of the Rhineland. To understand the full significance of that, it
must be borne in mind that the Locarno Treaties were in no sense
dictated; they were freely negotiated; they and their specific pro-
visions were suggested by the German Government; Hitler himself, on
several occasions, specifically endorsed these treaties and pledged
his loyalty to them. Just before these Treaties were repudiated on
7 March 1936 the Labour Party had proposed in Parliament an amendment
calling for a reduction in armaments. Two days after, speaking on
this amendment, Attlee said:

> We put the Amendment down before the events of this week-end, but I do not think that the events of the week-end in any way invalidate our arguments.⁴⁷

47. 309, 9 March 1936, col. 1842.

47. 303. 3 March 1933, col. 1842.

may invalidate our arguments.⁴⁴

and, but I do not think that the events of the week-end in and
→ We put the Amendment down before the events of this week-
this amendment, attestation said:

calling for a resolution in amment. Two days after, she filing on
& March 1933 the Reason Party flag proposed in Parliament an amendment
the loyalties to them. That before these Treaties were rejected on
several occasions, specifically endorsed these treaties and pledged
avowedly were engaged by the German Government: Hitler himself, on
agitated; they were freely negotiated; they and their specific pro-
must be done in mind that the Locarno Treaties were in no sense
of the Rhineland. To understand the full significance of that, it
international situation was its attitude towards the remitification
the clearest indication of the Party's inability to understand the

45. See the debate on the Locarno Treaties, 310, 32 March 1933.

Treaties, -- the Party demanded denial.⁴⁶ Insect it may be said that
significant and important end goal -- the one embodied in the Locarno

of Peace, London, May 1933, p. 11; etc. etc.

Report...1933, p. 311; The Tropenk Party, Reason and the Defence
45. A speech in Parliament by Attlee: 33, 12 May 1934, col. 481.

ment.⁴⁸ When, however, action was called for in terms of the most
bending the adaptation of a world wide collective security agree-
ging properly safe-governed regionist states as a means to an end
The Party spokesmen and organs fig. from time to time, en-

[c]

78

19

Though the Party eagerly demanded the application of sanctions against Italy, not only as the Ethiopian campaign was starting but even after it had been completed,⁴⁸ it refused even to consider the application

46. Herbert Morrison, *Labour and Sanctions*. London, October 1935 (a speech delivered to the Party Conference on 2 October 1935 and published by the Party); C.R. Attlee, *The Betrayal of Collective Security*, London, [1936] (a speech delivered in Parliament on 23 June 1936 and published by the Party).

of sanctions against Germany. In the Parliamentary debate that followed the repudiation of the Locarno Treaties (it is only fair to say that, with rare exceptions, the National Government supporters showed no clearer understanding of the importance of this event than did their Labour opponents), a Labour Member, Gabriel Price, said:

> The occupation of the Rhineland is, of course, nothing which would justify the application of sanctions.⁴⁹

49. 310, 26 March 1936, col. 1505. See also a party pamphlet, published just after this event, which called for the combination of sanctions against Italy and mentioned the repudiation of Locarno, but did not call for any action on that account! The Labour Party, *Labour and the Defence of Peace*, London, May 1936, pp. 7-8.

The principal Labour speaker in this Debate, Hugh Dalton, said:

> It is only right to say bluntly and frankly that public opinion in this country would not support, and certainly the Labour party would not support, the taking of military sanctions or even economic sanctions against Germany at this time, in order to put German troops out of the German Rhineland. Public opinion would not support that.⁵⁰

50. 310, 26 March 1936, col. 1454.

All through this Debate -- somewhat ironically in view of the future -- the Labour speakers said they had no desire to prevent the remilitarization of the Rhineland because they were as much interested in protecting

from the. Unijefund because they were so much interested in protecting
the Lapom shepherds said they had no desire to prevent the remittances
will through this debate -- somewhat individual in view of the future --

50° 310' 58 Maxen 1926. o.c. 1424.

would not anabapt that. so
to but German fioore out of the German Unijefund. In this opinion
or even economic sanctions against Germany at this time in order
Lapom Berth would not anabapt, the taking of written sanctions
obtain in this contract would not anabapt, and certainly the
<-- If it is only right to say publicly and frankl that biopite
The branchel Lapom a sheper in this Debate. Hugh Daffon, said:

and the detention of Ponce. Ponce, Max 1926. pp. 1-8.
not call for any action on that account! The Lapom Berth. Lapom
against Italy and mentioned the renunciation of Locumo, put 415
after this event, which called for the continuation of sanctions
48° 310' 58 Maxen 1926. o.c. 150°. See also a Berth shepher. biplished in
Continent

wired many justify the abrogation of sanctions. 49
→ The occupation of the Unijefund is, of course, nothing

415 their Lapom oblioues), a Lapom Member, Gabriel Fioce, said:
spoke no clearer understanding of the importance of fair event then
ask that, with rare exceptions, the National Government authorizes
followed the renunciation of the Locumo Treaties (it is only fair to
of sanctions against Germany). In the Unijefundly debate that

JUNE 1926 and biplished p. the Berth).
Recenzita', Ponce, [face] (a sheet delivered in Terramont on 30
biplished p. the Berth); C.H. Attles, The Berthay of Collectives
Sheet deliverers to the Berth Conference on 2 October 1926 and
48° Herbert Morrison, Lapom and Sanctions, Ponce, October 1926 (a

it had been completed.⁴⁸ It returned even to consider the abrogation
Italy, not only as the Italian campaign was starting but even after
strongly the Berth rigorously demanded the abrogation of sanctions against

19

Japom Berly. Winston Churchill's views on the subject are now so
type objection to his view was, however, not meant to be
the

to the resources under the East Government can see for us.
recently declared: 'Henceforth that goes into East Germany
with the morges: "Aug. apod eilf. Jet ne all remember, women re-
Jepom. Jungen. October 1934. II. no. 3. db. 40-41. concerning
morges articles' omitted. "The Bochott of East Germany," in
Rebert...1933. b. 28; Rebert...1934. b. 16. See also a rough
23. Rebert...1933. b. 19; Rebert...1934. b. 16; Rebert...1933. b. 14;

Hitler named bower the Party advocate a pochott of German politics.

to Hitlerism and Hitlerian methods. Almost from the moment that
that its members -- properly said of them -- were emphatically opposed
cross attitude towards the Germany of Hitler. There can be no doubt
the dissemination of the Party's General foreign policy and its batt-
tion of the Locarno Treaties was one of a convenient privilege between

a. see a Fundamental article p. office: 234. 13 July 1934. cf. 688.

activities of the Government of
Germany, and that it was, therefore, safe to ignore the pertinent
Hitler would soon lose power, would soon be overthrown from within
on the ground that Party members entered from the definition that
thereby explained -- and that is certainly the furthest objection --
pointless to the importance of Germany in international relations is
Bonnfeng to remitferried?-- went unreported. The stringency and tracts
Churchill's significant demand -- how can one protect Bonfeng it the
more or less designed to give protection to one specific nation.

Bonfeng as France, and, therefore, did not want to arbitrate a treaty

20

[LC]

21

well known as to need no mention. Even the Labour Party recognized the existence of anti-Nazi views in other circles. Addressing an annual Conference of the Party Dr. Hugh Dalton said:

> When Clem Attlee, on behalf of the Labour Party, in Parliament, attacked Hitlerism we were somewhat embarrassed to find that many people with whom we were in profound disagreement on other matters raised their voices in support of what had been said by Clem Attlee. That is perfectly true, and you can read it in Hansard. I went on to say that when Rosenberg, the representative of Hitler came to England, he found a very cold welcome in a large number of quarters, and I added, that when the representative of the Daily Herald 53 travelled on the train with him, when he left England, he found him not only in a state of great depression, but also unhaven.⁵⁴

was leaving

53. The Labour Party daily newspaper.

54. *Report...1933*, p. 149.

It may be taken for granted, then, that the members of the Party and practically everybody else in Great Britain disapproved of the methods of Nazism, such as its fierce attacks upon Jews, its use of cruelty and violence, its denial of normal processes of justice.

In the very important and highly practical matter of armed forces -- German and British -- the Labour Party attitude was less clear and resolute. Go the credit of the Party, it should be said that it never endorsed the curious views of Sir John Simon that the rearmament of Germany was necessary for the peace of Europe.⁵⁵ But,

55. William Gillies, "Quo Vadis?" in *The Labour Magazine*, XI, No. 12, p. 537: "Germany re-armed will be a danger to herself and to the world." London, April 1933,

while not supporting such extreme views, the spokesmen of the Party continually placed the blame for German rearmament on the French and especially on the British Government, continually insisted on Germany's

[L.C]

22

right to equality (it should be noticed that the Party hoped for
equality in the direction of disarmament rather than in the direction
of rearmament), continually -- until almost the very last moment --
minimized the danger to Britain of German rearmament.

George Lansbury, for example, stated that:

We have heard a great deal since the Hitler Government came
into power about the rights and wrongs of the German demands. So
far as we are concerned we think that, there again, there is a
solemn obligation that all the Powers signed at the time of the
Peace Treaty. The German Government were informed that their
disarmament of those who imposed disarmament on her. That solemn
obligation has not been carried out....We feel that the Germans
have a definite claim on the other nations.⁵⁶

56. 278, 26 May 1933, col. 1462.

This view was not only expressed frequently in Parliament 57

57. See, for example, the speech of Morgan Jones, 287, 14 March 1934, col. 374-385 and again, 304, 1 August 1935, col. 2947.

but also on many other occasions by Party leaders. Arthur Greenwood, Junior, 58 wrote:

58. Son of Arthur Greenwood, who has been deputy leader of the Parlia-
mentary Party since 1935, and was a member of the second Labour
Cabinet.

We [the young to the old in responsible positions] ask you
to keep your promises to Germany and to disarm.⁵⁹

59. Arthur Greenwood, Junior, "The War against War", *The Labour Magazine*, London, July 1935, XII, no 3, p. 119.

[LC]

23

To an annual Party Conference J. R. Clynes 60 stated:

60. A member of the National Executive; a member of both Labour Cabinets.

They [the victors of 1918] made Germany disarm and they pledged themselves to follow that example. They have utterly failed to keep their word, and it is no wonder that Germany, seeing how their promises have been violated, demand rearmament for themselves.⁶¹

61. Report...1933, p. 192.

A Party pamphlet proclaimed:

On October 14th, 1933, the British Government represented
was the spokesman of the notorious statement at Geneva which gave
Hitler his occasion, his excuse, for Germany's second withdrawal from
the Disarmament Conference and for withdrawal from the League itself.
The British representation proposed that standardisation of the
European armies should begin forthwith; but that apart from this,
there should be no levelling up by Germany and no levelling down
by the others for some such period as four years. If at the end
of that time Germany had been good, we would kindly see about it.
Why anybody ever supposed that Germany would accept this plan has never
been explained.

Hitler jumped at the chance.⁶²

62. The Labour Party, "National" Government's Disarmament Record, London, 1935, p. 10.

Since this charge -- the charge that the victors had promised
to disarm and by failing to do so legally justified Germany rearmament-
was so freely bandied about by the Labour Party, by many other groups
and agencies, and above all, of course, by the Germans themselves, it
may be well to digress a moment to consider the facts of the "promise".

The opening clause of Part V of the Versailles Treaty reads
as follows:

[LC]

24

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

That the obligation laid by this clause on Germany is clear whereas the obligation laid upon the victors is indefinite is quite obvious. The official reply of the victors to the observations of the German delegation contained the following statement:

> Germany must consent <u>unconditionally</u> to disarm in advance of the Allied and Associated Powers.⁶³

63. Great Britain, **Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, Cmd.** 256, London, 1919, p. 22. The italics in this, the preceding, and the following quotations have been added.

Finally Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant reads in part as follows:

> The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

In view of the fact that even before Hitler assumed power the German Government had <u>not strictly</u> observed the military, naval and air clauses of the Versailles Treaty,⁶⁴ in view of Hitler's writings and

64. If anyone still seriously doubts this, he should, among other works, examine Rauschning's *The Revolution of Nihilism*; Nadolny's virtual admission of the fact to the Disarmament Conference on 29 June 1933; a speech by Scheidemann to the Reichstag on 16 December, 1926; German expenditures on armed forces during the twenties; etc., etc.

> pronouncements one would hardly insist, seriously, that Britain, with consideration of national safety in mind, was after January 1933 legally bound to reduce its armaments still further nor that failure to do so gave the German Government legal justification to disregard its treaty obligations.

oppositions.

Save the German Government legal justification to distribute the treaty
pions to Segne the armaments still further nor that failure to do so
consideration of national safety in mind, was after January 1938 Wolff
pronouncements one wrong partly initiated, seriously, that Britain, with
man expropriation on armag force during the twenties; etc., etc.

a breach by Bismarck to the Treaty of Peace on 19 December 1929; Ger-
mination of the fact that the Treaty of Peace Conference on 29 June 1938:
exemplifies the violation of the Revolution of World War I; Magyarization
of the Slavonian people, the Germanization of Magyarized Slavonians.

of the Annexes to the Treaty.⁶⁴ In view of Hitler's writings and
German Government's not strictly operated the military,navy and air
in view of the fact that even before Hitler assumed power the
of international operations.

consistent with national safety and the enforcement of common action
these restrictions the regulation of national armaments to the lowest point
The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of

part as follows:

Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant reverts in

the following declarations have been added.
226. London, 10th, B. R. The rules in force, the preceding, and
63. Great Britain, reply to the Vichy and Associated Powers. C.W.P.

Germany must consent unconditionally to beam in advance of
German delegation contained the following statement:

opinions. The official reply of the victors to the operations of the
whereas the obligation laid upon the victors to fulfil the tasks of the
opposition. The official reply to the armaments of all nations, Germany
follow.

strictly to operate the military, navy and air forces which
limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany must make
in order to render possible the initiation of a General

54

25

It might be well to conclude this digression by a quotation
from a wise Genevan authority on international relations, a man who
as a Swiss representative to the League often vigorously attacked the
policies of France and Britain.

He wrote:

One would have to prove that it was the refusal to disarm on
the part of the satisfied and therefore pacific nations that drove
their discontented and provisionally less armed neighbors into the
paths of violence. But to defend this view, would be to disregard
the whole political literature and philosophy of the dictatorial
Powers.⁶⁵

65. William E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1940, p. 471.

A.V. Alexander 66 excused the really excessively high military expenditures

66. First Lord of the Admiralty in the second Labour Cabinet and one of the party authorities on military matters.

of the Hitler Government on the ground that, being capital rather than
maintenance expenses, they were naturally considerably higher than the
British and were, therefore, in no way disturbing.⁶⁷

67. 315, 20 July 1936, col. 173.

S.S. Silverman suggested to a Party Conference a different and somewhat
surprising justification:

> It has been said that German rearmament is not for defence. But rearmament in Germany began because Hitler, when he came to power, had promised to deal with the problem of his starving unemployed millions.⁶⁸

68. *Report...1937*, p. 197.

26

The Labour Party attitude in this matter -- its continual justi-
fication of German rearmament exemplified above -- was all the more
ourious because, on the one hand, its principal spokesmen, in their
more lucid moments, stated clearly what they certainly must have known
to be true, that is, that German rearmament began before Hitler. To a
Party Conference Dalton, for example, said:

There is a delusion that before Hitler came to power Germany was
disarmed. That is a delusion. Even before Hitler came, Germany was
very far from being unarmed.⁶⁹

69. Report...1935, p. 183. See also a speech by Attlee in Parliament, 301, 2 May 1935, col. 673 ("It has been going on for years, this rearmament of Germany"); "National Government's Disarmament Record, London, 1935, p. 12 ("Germany now abandoned restraint and concealment. She had already been re-arming in secret"); etc., etc.

On the other hand, the Party denied Great Britain's right to equality.

In an election pamphlet it was stated that:

£20,000,000 (perhaps more) is to be spent over the next four
years to increase the first line strength of the R.A.F. to nearly
1,500 aircraft.

The object is to achieve parity with the strongest of the
great air powers -- France or Germany.
But why go up instead of down?

70. The Labour Party, Fifty Reasons why You should Vote Labour, London, 1935, p. 7. (Italics added). See also a speech by Attlee ("Then followed [in Baldwin's speech] a reference to symptoms of unrest on the Continent. That led up to the non sequitur that we must get our Air Force on a level more closely approaching that of our nearest neighbours), 292, 30 July 1934, col. 2343-2344; "Report of the National Executive Committee" submitted for approval (and approved) by an annual Conference, Report...1935, p. 5; etc., etc.

It would not be just to close this subject without recording
that at least one member of the Party raised his voice against these
repeated justifications of German rearmament and criticisms of Britain.
In the summer of 1935 Coombs condemned this point of view, warned of

In the summer of 1933 Cooks condensed prime budget of View, warned of
rehearsal of traditions of German rearmament and criticism of Britain.
that at least one member of the Party raised the voice against these
It would not be that to close this subject without recording
broader) in an annual Conference, "Report...1932". b. 2; etc., etc.
the National Executive Committee, submitted for approval (any ob-
nearest neighborhood), 203, 30 July 1934, of. 5249-5244; "Report of
get on Vix Bocke on a level more closely approaching that of our
on the Continent. That let us know again that we want
followed [in Britain's speed] a reference to some one that we want
1932". b. 1. (last issue added). See also a sheet p. 1933 ("The
100 The Report Party, "Itta" reasons why you expect Aote Lapoux, London.
Great air bowers -- twice or four times or Germany.
The optician is to choose Party MP the strongest of the
1,500 electors.
She is to increase the first time strength of the R.V.B. to near
£50,000,000 (billion more) if to be a bent over the next ten
in an election campaign it was stated that:
On the other hand, the Party denied Great Britain's right to elect it.
conclusion. She has already been re-awaken in secret; etc., etc.
Reeck, Proug, 1932, b. 1. ("Germany now spangled referring to
the rearmament of Germany"); "National Government's Finalism
201. 2. May 1933, of. 5249-5253 ("It has been going on for years.")
Reeport...1932". b. 1933, see also a sheet p. 1933 in Berlament.
and far from being married.
Now before Hitler came, Germany was
there is a definition that before Hitler came to power Germany was
Barry Conference Dalton, for example, said:
to be done, that is, that German rearmament begun before Hitler. To a
more frequent moment, stated clearly what they certainly must have known
on some occasion, on the one hand, its principal spokesman, in their
operation of German rearmament exemplified above -- was off the more
The London Party attitude in this matter -- its continual failure-

But MP to do this instead of going to
Great air bowers -- twice or four times or Germany.
The optician is to choose Party MP the strongest of the
1,500 electors.
She is to increase the first time strength of the R.V.B. to near
£50,000,000 (billion more) if to be a bent over the next ten
in an election campaign it was stated that:
On the other hand, the Party denied Great Britain's right to elect it.

In an election campaign it was stated that:

and far from being married.
Now before Hitler came, Germany was
there is a definition that before Hitler came to power Germany was
Barry Conference Dalton, for example, said:
to be done, that is, that German rearmament begun before Hitler. To a
more frequent moment, stated clearly what they certainly must have known
on some occasion, on the one hand, its principal spokesman, in their
operation, etc.

32

27

German aggressive intentions, illustrating his point by well chosen quotations from Hitler and other Germans, and stressed the need for real security.⁷¹ But Cocks had no more influence in his party than Churchill in his.

It is necessary, however, to pass on to a far more important matter: what was the Party attitude, not just towards German reararmament, but towards the wider and more fundamental question of general reductions with that country?

One of England's leading authorities on the history of international relations has described Neville Chamberlain's policy in the following words:

> His policy was peace and the restoration of confidence by removing danger-spots, grievances, differences and suspicions one by one.... [He] seemed incapable of understanding what sort of men the Dictators were.⁷²

72. G.P. Cooch, "British Foreign Policy, 1919-39", *The Contemporary Review*, London, March 1941, no. 903, p. 270.

It is, perhaps, well to compare this with the Labour Party policy as revealed in the following quotations.

Just after Germany, under Hitler's leadership, withdrew from the League, Lansbury said:

> The other thing that I want to say on that line is that, when we are obliged, as the right hon. Gentleman said we are obliged, to be, as it were, friendly toward the Hitler regime -- that we cannot go to war to change the rulers in Germany, Austria or elsewhere -- that is true; but it is equally true that we must find some means of negotiating with them in order to bring to an end if possible the present difficulties. I want to say this about them. I do now know whether Herr Hitler is an honest man or not. I listen to him over the wireless very often, and I know that he must be a very effective speaker any how. But I also know this, that at the moment he and his friends are in control in Germany, and, not once, but several times, they have said they are willing to accept the same disarmament as everybody else. They have asked for equality of status.⁷³

73. 281, 7 November 1935, col. 77.

42°. 281' & November 1932' COJ. 11.

pave uvege for edniffit of status.18
willing to accept the same government as everbefore else. The
Germany, and not once, but several times, they gave this to us
this, that at the moment he and his trienege are in control in
that he must be a very effective speaker and pow. But I see how
or not. I lieen to him over the wireless very often, and I know
about them. I go now know whatlex Hertz Hitter is an honest man
and it beaple the present difficulties. I want to ask this
ting some means of negotiating with them in order to bring to an
or eadeuse -- that he fane: put it to edniffit time that we must
that we cannot do to war to change the influence in Germany. We must
when we are offreg, as the right now. Gentlemen ask me are
the other thing that I want to ask on that line is that,
the Rese, Reepubli ask:

that after Germany, under Hilter's leadership, withdrew from
revealed in the following quotations.

It is, perhaps, well to compare this with the present party befoh as

Review, London, March 1941, no. 303, p. 240.

18. G.B. Good, "Britten Horeau Polio," 1916-1921, The Confabulary.

Brotstotse were.19

one....[He] seemed insteade of underestimating what sort of men the
moving general-shot, Brotstotse's, differences andensions one pl.

The Polio was done and the restoration of confidence in re-
tothing morgs:

national relations pas described Heilige Chamberlain's Polio in the
One of England's leading unperfties on the Polio of inter-
tions with that country?

put towards the wider and more fundamental question of General repre-
matex: what was the party attitude, not that towards German rearmament,
It is necessarily, power, to base on to a tax more important

Opportunity in life.

real security.21 But Gocke pas we were influence in the party trim
anotations from Hilter and other Germans, and attested the need for
German aggressive intentions, illtatating lie point by meff upon

21

[LC]

28

On the same occasion Attlee said:

► [Sir A. Chamberlain] delivered a philippic...against Germany, and... [Mr. Lloyd George] attacked France and her satellites, and each thought the other's speech was mischievous. I think probably both were right....

I do not believe that you will do very much by outlawing the Nazi regime. I recognise that probably most of us feel that we should like to do so. It is the natural thing to say, "It is detestable; let us have nothing to do with it," but we have to look at the future of the world, and the first point to remember is that, whether we like it or not, we have to live in the same world as Germany under its present rulers.⁷⁴

74. 281, 7 November 1935, col. 145-146.

A short time after the German Government had announced, in violation of its treaty obligations, the reestablishment of compulsory military training Lanebury said:

> "Herr Hitler says that Germany is willing to scrap anything which anybody else will scrap. The answer given to him always is, "Yes, but you are someone whose word we cannot take; you do not mean it.""

75. 301, 2 May 1935, col. 579.

And was that answer so very surprising; was it so incorrect? In the same debate Attlee said:

► It is very difficult for us to speak patiently of the present rulers of Germany, and to resist the impulse to suggest that all the world must join together to crush Germany....I do not believe that is the way in which we can meet the situation of Hitler-Germany. I do not think we can beat down the kind of movement in Germany by external pressure of that kind.⁷⁶

76. 301, 2 May 1935, col. 672.

42. 301. & May 1933, o.o. 415.

German P. by external breesme of that King. We
German. I go not think we can put down the king of movement in
that is the way in which we can meet the situation of Hitler-
the world must join together to ensure Germany.... I do not see
inferes of Germany, and to scatter theables to and fro that off
It is very difficult for us to see clearly the present

same department said:

And was that answer so very surprising: was it so incorrect? In the
42. 301. & May 1933, o.o. 415.

not mean it." And
is, "Yes, but you are someone whose word we cannot take; you go
writhe and push away free will scrap. The answer given to him states
Heix Hütter says that Germany is willing to scrap exchanging

each writer trainingRENAPOLI said:

A short time after the German Government put announcement, in
aotivation of its treaty obligations, the rectification of combu-

44. 281. & November 1933, o.o. 148-149.

worst as Germany must enter its present influenza. It
is that, however we like it or not, we have to live in the same
look at the future of the world, and the first point to remember
detestable; let us have nothing to go with it," but we have to
be specific like to go so. It is the natural thing to say. "It is
易易 resume. I recognize that properly meet at the time that we
I do not define that you will go very much by outlawing the
people were right.....

each thought the other's speed was macropaleone. I think properly
and... [Mr. Lloyd George] attacked France and her satellites, and
[Mr. V. Chamberlain] delivered a briliante... against Germany.

On the same occasion the title said:

58

[fc]

[LC]

29

A few days later he said:

With regard to the speech which was made by the German Chancellor...we have to-day a speech wherein certain statements are made and certain proposals suggested which give ground for hope.⁷⁷

77. 302, 22 May 1935, col. 373-374.

On the same day another Labour Member of Parliament, Dr. Addison, said:

[Churchill] gave us a description of the results of a sudden air attack, and I accept them as correct. Would that be guarded against by the provision of another 650 aeroplanes?... [Churchill] gave an eloquent statement of the present case and it is up to us to look about and see if we can substitute something that will be likely to be more effective....I hope that in initiating and carrying through their conversations with Herr Hitler they [the National Government] will examine these things with a really determined intention to arrive at a solution of the difficulties.... I hope they...will approach the discussion of these things and the other Governments concerned with candour and a willingness to trust the other man's good faith. I believe myself that if they do even now it is not too late to bring the world back again on to the way of peace.⁷⁸

78. 302, 22 May 1935, col. 428-434.

A few months later another Labour Member, Morgan Jones, said:

What is the trouble which is said to underlie one of Hitler's difficulties in Germany? It is the fact that Germany feels she is circumvented by nations on all sides and has no outlets in other parts of the world....I am not urging that the case for Hitler... rests solely on that consideration. But I am prepared to say that if the League of Nations is to function at all it must pay regard to the difficulties of what I may call the disatisiared Powers. Unless you give satisfaction to those who are dissatisfied your League ceases to be of use.⁷⁹

79. 304, 1 August 1935, col. 2947.

To the Party Conference of 1935 there was submitted for approval the annual report of the Parliamentary Party. This read, in part, as follows:

On May 2...the main burden of the debate arose on the statement of the Prime Minister regarding the rapid development of the German Air Force and his declaration that the policy of the Government was to take all the necessary steps to prevent any inferiority

ment was to take all the necessary steps to prevent and interpose
German Viz Force and the government that the bock of the Gover-
ment of the Prime Minister regarding the said development of the

On May 3...the main prion of the驻驻使在the state-

bait' as follows:

brought the annual report of the parliamentary party. The report in

To the Party Conference of 1928 there was submitted for ab-

19. 204. 1 August 1928, p. 394.

Please excuse to do so.⁹
Unless otherwise satisfied to those who are dissatisfied, I am
inclined to take the difficulties of what I wish to call the generalised lowered
it the League of Nations is to function at all if that be required
restated solely on that consideration. But I am prepared to ask that
batter of the world....I am not making that the case for Hitler...
encourage the nations on all issues and use noorte in other
difficulties in Germany? It is the fact that Germany itself does not
What is the people which we ask to underlie one or two, or more, of the

A few months later another German paper, *Morgenpost*, says:

18. 203. 28. Jul 1928, p. 458-459.

to the work of peace.¹⁰
To even now it is not possible to print the world pack again on
that the other world's a good thing. I believe we must do that too
the other governments concerning with us and a willingness to
I do so freely...will abroad the operation of theseึing
terminating intention to arrive at a solution of the difficulties...
National Government will examine these things with a view to ge-
cialising through their conversations with Herr Hitler that [the
peace itself to be more effective....I hope that in initiating and
I look upon and see it we can accomplish something that will
leave an eldoment statement of the present case and it is my to see
the leader of the government of another country and I accept them as correct. World that he agreed
the [Hitler] [to]

On the same day another German paper of the sort, *Vogel*, says:

11. 203. 28. Jul 1928, p. 213-214.

pope.¹¹
are made and certain protocols are setted up by the Pope for
Omnineer...we have to-day a peace wherein certain statements
With regard to the above which are not made by the German
A few days later he says:

A few days later he says:

33

30

in the British Air Force.... There was general agreement that in view of the reasonable speech made by Herr Hitler on May 21, the Party would be justified in opposing the Government if their policy remained unchanged.⁸⁰

80. Report...1935, p. 88.

A man not then but soon to be a Labour Member of Parliament, Ellis Smith, said to the Conference:

> We are now the greatest peace force in the whole capitalist world, we are now the greatest anti-Fascist force in the whole capitalist world, and therefore it behoves us to be most careful what we are committing ourselves to when we are considering this section of the Parliamentary Report. On page 84 it says: "There was general agreement that in view of the reasonable speech made by Herr Hitler on May 21, the Party would be justified in opposing the Government if their policy remained unchanged." Every speaker during the present Conference has approached the situation from the point of view that we are still living in the last pre-war time. We are now living in another pre-war period, and there is no analogy whatsoever between the last pre-war period and the pre-war period in which we find ourselves to-day. The same mentality that has expressed itself at this Conference finds expression in this Parliamentary Report. We should make it quite clear to our Movement, and to the world, that the "reasonable" speeches of any other Fascists are only made to conceal war preparations that are going on behind the scenes. These alleged peace speeches are only made in order to disguise the fact that they are preparing to do with the workers throughout the world what they have already done with the workers in Italy and Germany. You cannot reason with Fascists any more than you can reason with a wild tiger in the jungle. The philosophy of Fascism is to deceive, and therefore I hope that this Conference in no uncertain way will see that this page which contains a reference to "the reasonable speech of Herr Hitler" will be torn out of our Annual Report in order that we can indicate that we are not taking these things at their face value.⁸¹

81. Report...1935, p. 201.

A splendid speech but not one single person at the Conference supported the views expressed!

During a debate on national defence, which happened to be held just two days after the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Attlee said:

36

armaments were still inadequate -- furthermore, until March 1939, appeasement was the popular policy and was, therefore, recommended not just by a Cliveden set but by all major political parties. That this policy did not work is obvious; but the sincere desire of a people for peace is one with which we must sympathize, however much we must deplore the results. As a speaker to the Labour Party Conference, held in May 1939, said:

> The members of my Party believe that at the present time appeals such as the appeal Mr. Chamberlain made through his Peace Policy in September, by its nationwide publicity and the very simplicity of his case, strike the imagination of the women in a way we have not been able to do by our propaganda. It was our experience then that for the first time women really appreciated that politics was their affair. When they saw the possibility of their sons being affected or their livelihood being affected they realised Chamberlain was somebody worth supporting.⁹⁴

94. Report...1939, pp. 236-239.