June 1, 1964

Reflections on Power and Diplomacy

by Henry A. Kissinger

The technical characteristics of modern weapons are well understood.

We know that humanity has the power to destroy itself in a matter of hours.

Any place on the earth can be reached from any other in a matter of minutes.

Offensive and defensive power no longer bear any relationship to each other.

Even a ninety percent effective defense may not be able to prevent catastrophic
damage.

All this is obvious. What is much less clear is the conclusion to
be drawn from this state of affairs. For some though the risks have become
incomparably greater, the essential principles of strategy have remained
unaltered. For others, war has become unthinkable, They ask of
diplomacy to settle contemporary conflicts.

Both views present difficulties. If ever a quantitative change has
brought about a qualitative one, then increase in destructiveness caused by
nuclear weapons must be considered as crucial. It must make a basic difference

## II. The Nature of Power in the Nuclear Age

A few definitions may be useful:

**Offensive power** is the ability of a political unit to impose its will on another.

**Defensive Power** is the ability to avoid coercion by another state. This has two modes: purely defensive policy and precautionary policy. Power is used purely defensively when a country waits for a threat to materialize and then deals with it. It is used in a precautionary manner when policy seeks to prevent the possibility of a challenge and not the actuality of it. United States policy prior to World War II is an example of purely defensive policy. The tendency was to wait for the threat to become unambiguous and then to bend all efforts to overcome it. We could afford to do so because our margin of survival was so wide that no conceivable initial set-back would be able to hazard our national existence.

Britain's policy in the 18th and 19th century is an example of the precautionary mode of action. It was an axiom of British policy that Antwerp could not be permitted to fall into the hands of a major power. The reason was not that Britain was certain such an acquisition would be used with hostile intent. It was rather that by the time the hostile intent was obvious it would be too late to do something about it.

**Deterring Power** is the ability to prevent certain threats or actions by the making of an adequate threat.

making of an adequate threat.

**Determining Power** is the ability to prevent certain threats or actions by the
power too late to do something about it.

intent. It was rather that by the time the power had done was obvious it would
not that Britain was certain such an acquisition would be used with power
could not be permitted to fall into the hands of a major power. That reason
precautionary mode of action. It was an axiom of British policy that Unwilling
Britain's policy in the 18th and 19th century is an example of the
conceivable initial set-pack would be able to shock our national existence.

attain to do so because our margin of survival was so wide that no
become unambiguous and then to pend all efforts to overcome it. We could
of barely tentative policy. The tendency was to wait for the threat to
actuality of it. United States policy prior to World War II is an example
when policy seeks to prevent the possibility of a challenge and not the
materialize and then deals with it. It is used in a precautionary manner
power is used barely deceptively when a country wants for a threat to
Type has two modes: barely tentative policy and precautionary policy.

will on another.

**Offensive Power** is the ability of a political unit to impose its
V few definitions may be useful:

## II. The Nature of Power in the Modern World

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Offensive and defensive power need bear no relation to each other.

Some states have had great defensive but little offensive power. They have managed to combine inaccessibility of terrain with an ability to mobilize considerable resources. Switzerland is a good example. States as these have been able to prevent other countries from imposing their will. They have not been very active factors in international affairs.

There is no absolute measurement of power. Power is always relative.

In the seventeenth century & it would have been meaningless to try to compare the power of China and Louis XIV since they possessed no means to bring their strength to bear on each other. The geographic separation of power was a fact until the middle of the 19th century. And afterwards one small continent was physically far superior to the rest. International affairs was the province of the major European power.

Finally, until power is in fact used, it is what people think it is.

It depends on psychological, as much as on "objective" factors.

These characteristics of power have been complicated in the modern period by several factors. For one thing, the impact of power is now world-wide. The major nuclear countries are now able to devastate any part of the globe from their own territories. The United States and Russia have become the chief opponents. Foreign policy has turned global at the precise moment that its risks have never been greater.

The magnitude of these risks is due to the fact that offensive power has far outstripped defensive power. Even a 90 percent effective air defense would still leave a residue of striking power incomparably more devastating than any society has ever experienced. As a result the distinction between precautionary and defensive foreign policy has eroded. Given the perils, foreign policy should be precautionary. It should strive to prevent potential enemies from acquiring the offensive capability which must prove disastrous. But the actual policy of the major powers--especially of the United States -- has turned defensive: it is directed not to prevent the capability but to retaliate against attack -- when from many points of view it may already be too late.

This is because power has become incommensurable to most of the objectives in dispute. Whatever the spectrum of power available for the major contenders, the spectre of escalation is inescapable. The major nuclear powers therefore recoil from the direct use of force against each other. And they are inhibited--in varying degrees--from using force against minor countries because the international consensus would exact an exorbitant price. We thus live in a paradoxical world. Power has never been greater but also never been less useful. The margin of superiority of the industrialized over the developing countries is vaster than in the heyday of colonialism. Yet the scope of action of the developing countries is greater than ever before. They are protected not by their strength but by the inhibitions of those whom they constantly attack and by the rivalry of the two great nuclear powers which puts a floor under their risks.

In these conditions, deterrent power has become the most significant aspect of power. But deterrence is above all a psychological problem. It depends on an assessment of risks which becomes ever more imprecise in the face of weapons of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty. For purposes of deterrence a threat intended as a bluff but taken seriously

is more useful than a serious threat interpreted as a bluff. Strategy henceforth requires expertise not only in the design of weapons systems as in understanding the opponent's calculations.

Moreover, deterrence is tested negatively by things which do not happen. However, it is never easy to prove why something has not occurred. Is it because we are following the best strategic theory or a barely tolerable one? Or maybe the aggressor never had any intention of attacking in the first place? Successful deterrence furnishes arguments for the persistence of obsolescent theories and designs and for neutralism. It does not provide an incentive for the innovation which a rapidly changing technology demands. The problem of change, of avoiding a Maginot line mentality, may be among the most serious problems posed by modern weapons technology.

in the West finally came it was not directed against the French
fortifications but turned their flank. In short, France strategic doctrine
in the inter-war period was an obstacle to effective policy.

By contrast, British policy for two centuries was designed to
prevent any country from dominating the European Continent. Aware that
Europe's resources were insufficient for hegemonic aspirations, Britain's
strategy emphasized its navy which could confine an aggressor to the
Continent. Britain's army was designed to intervene to tip the balance.
It was compact and small. For two centuries, Britain was able to act as
the balancer of the European equilibrium.

If a strategic doctrine is too rigid, it can absorb most energies
in the attempt to reconcile what happens with what is expected. If it is
too complex, it can break-down under the stress of decision-making. The
German war plans for World War I-- the Schlieffen plan-- provided for every
contingency except the psychological strain on the Commander. It failed
in large measure because the German commanders lost their nerve. If there
is no doctrine at all, if a society operates pragmatically, solving problems

"on their merits" as the saying goes, every event becomes a special case. More energy is spent deciding where one is than where one is going. Such a society runs a grave risk of treating each event as a "special case" without inward relationship to other occurrences. This is the risk U.S. policy has been running since our emergence as the dominant power in the free world.

Any strategy, to be effective, must overcome several hurdles. It must be able to win a consensus domestically, both among the technical and the political leadership. It must be understood by the opponent for deterrence to be effective. It must be agreed to by allies if alliances are to remain cohesive. It must be relevant to the problems in the uncommitted areas to prevent international anarchy. To reconcile these various levels is far from easy; indeed a perfect reconciliation is probably impossible. Some aspects of deterrence have already been discussed. The following sections will deal with the other aspects of developing a strategic doctrine.

doctrines.

following sections will deal with the other aspects of developing a strategic
unacceptable. Some aspects of deterrence have already been discussed. The
various levels is far from easy; indeed a perfect reconciliation is properly
uncommitted areas to prevent international anarchy. To reconcile these
are to remain conservative. It must be relevant to the problems in the
deterrence to be effective. It must be agreed to by allies in alliances
and the political leadership. It must be understood by the opponent for
must be able to win a consensus domestically, past among the technical
only strategy to be effective, must overcome several hurdles. It
free world.

belliger has been running since our emergence as the dominant power in the
without inward relationship to other occurrences. This is the risk U.S.
a society runs a grave risk of treating each event as a "special case."

More energy is spent deciding where one is than where one is going. Each
"on their merits," as the saying goes, every event becomes a special case.

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June 9, 1964

## IV. Power and Neutralism

Neutrality is not a new concept. It has been traditionally recognized that states should be able to give a formal or legal foundation to a decision to remain mon-belligerent in war. The decision to become neutral can be taken ad hoc. Thus Italy in two world wars remained initially neutral despite being formally allied with one of the belligerents. It can also be a deliberate act of national policy.

States have announced in advance their decision not to participate in a conflict regardless of the issues or the nature of the belligerents unless their own territory was attached. Neutrality in this sense can come about through a unilateral decision as in the case of Sweden or Switzerland. Or it can be given international status through formal agreement of the major contenders as was true of Belgium.

Whether a country will then be able to carry through its decision depends on the risks an attack on it entailed or on the assistance other countries are able to supply. The assessment of risks in turn depends on the advantage to be gained by violation of the neutrality. Belgium

IV. - 2

situated athwart the invasion routes into France has been less fortun-
ately situated than Sweden.

Countries aspiring to neutrality can rely for their defense on their
own strength or on the assistance other countries can furnish. If they
choose the former course they are likely to develop military forces
far in excess of those they would require if they were part of an Alliance
system. Sweden's military might is much greater than Norway's --even
making allowance for a difference in resources. If a neutral takes the
opposite course of remaining neutral but making itself dependant--either
because of insufficiency of resources or deliberate policy --on the assis-
tance of other countries may combine the disadvantages of alliance policy
with those of neutrality. The neutral by itself will not be strong
enough--or its position will be too vital--to deter aggression. At the
same time, its neutral position will prevent it from concerting prepara-
tions with its potential protector. This was the case with Belgium in
two World Wars. Whatever the military policy, neutrality has in the past
been associated with a deliberate decision to abstain from involvement
in the conflicts of day-to-day diplomacy.

IV. - 3

These traditional patterns of neutrality still exist. But they have been modified in significant ways. The advent of nuclear power has raised the question whether any non-nuclear country can by itself defend itself against an opponent armed with nuclear weapons. In other words, its capacity to impose military risks out of proportion to the objective to be achieved would disappear if an aggressor were prepared to resort to nuclear arms and if the neutral could not count on the protection of some nuclear country.

At the same time, the bi-polar nature of contemporary international affairs increases the probability of this protection far beyond what was traditional. Thus a country may forfeit little protection by being neutral and gain a degree of international stature through the attempt of the major contenders to prevent it from moving into the opposing camp.

And insofar as the threat is nuclear prior joint planning is not required for efficient defense. In the nuclear age the distinction between allies and neutrals is beginning to erode. India though neutral received much the same protection after China attacked as would have been extended in

IV. - 4

comparable circumstances to Pakistan though Pakistan was formally an
ally.

This accounts for the emergence of a new type of neutral in the
contemporary period: Countries which deliberately exploit the confron-
tation of the major powers not primarily to enhance the security of their
territories but to magnify their international role. Far from standing
apart from international conflicts they actively embroil themselves in
two ways: they attempt to act as mediators of big-power disputes and
they see in these disputes an opportunity to advance their own aspirations.

As for the mediator role, its impact is demoralizing on the stability
of the international system, in the big powers and in the uncommitted
themselves. It is destabilizing because it sets up a contest which
by its own ground rules cannot be won by either of the two big powers.
As the same time, it tempts adventures and produces opportunities for
producing chaos. As for the new neutrals, they will find it difficult
in the long run to combine neutrality with an attempt to judge all dis-
putes. To the degree that the uncommitted convince the major contestants

IV. - 5

that their support is important, they are either courted or pressured.

Neutrality ceases to be an attempt to remain but becomes an invitation to being wooed.

At the same time, the so-called uncommitted nations have felt free to practice in their relations with their own neighbors the kind of power politics which they urge the big powers to abjure. The United Arab Republic in Yemen or Indonesia in Borneo or India in Goa have hardly practiced the reliance on pure negotiations that they commend to the big powers.

Thus international affairs has an additional element of volatility.

Many of the neutrals have a stake both in the avoidance of war which is traditional, but also in the perpetuation of a degree of conflict which is not. For on this conflict depends not only the bargaining position but also the prospects of economic development of many of these countries.

And these conflicts are further exacerbated by the readiness to press for purely local advantage and the readiness of the Communist bloc to exploit their local rivalries for its own ends.

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countries. And these conflicts are further exacerbated and manifested by the readiness to press for purely local advantage and the readiness of the Communist bloc to exploit there local rivalries for its own ends.

The major powers in turn are haddicapped by a paradox: Their relative superiority has never been greater but it has also never been less relevant. They possess the capacity check the uncommitted but they are prevented from even threatening the use of nuclear weapons by the fear of the major antagonist and their own inhibitions. But their military forces are becoming even less suitable for the kind of warfare involved in most of the uncommitted countries, even if the world-wide nature of contemporary diplomacy did not raise major psychological obstacles.

The contemporary uncommitted is protected to some extent either by its strength nor by that of potential protocors but by an international consensus.

This has led to a diplomacy of weakness. The uncommitted nationa threaten the West: "If I go Communist it will be worse for you than for me." It creates a pttern for blackmail. It encourages many local conflicts which tend to draw the major powers into a confrontation often against their own wishes. It also means the major countries determined to upset the equilibrium can do so at little cost. The SALE of obsolescent Soivet

-6-

military equipment to the United Arab Republic or to Indonesia has
an impact on the West's position in these areas which would have been
unachievable by direct Soviet action. And even more or less autonomous
leaders

are not receiving any support
figures like Archbishop Markarios are able to strain the cohesion
of the Western Alliance by the ruthless pursuit of narrow objectives
and even to use the United Nations to protect them against the
consequences of their irresponsibility.

The unsolved problem for Western policy is how to bring
its
to power to bear in the uncommitted areas to enforce some standards of
international conduct. Whether this is achieved by self-restraint on the
part of the major powers or by sanctions against "neutralist" aggression
or by a combination of both requires the most careful study. It is likely
to be the big challenge to Western policy in the Sixties and Seventies.

But if the uncommitted nations have unprecedented scope for
pursuing their own interests, they are also subject to unprecedented pressures.
In the past, neutrality was usually the posture of very cohesive nations
certain of their identity and determined to defend it.
But many of the
newly independent nations are in search of identity. Often the only link

-7-

between their peoples is the common experience of colonial rule. Domestic cohesion is only precariously maintained.

Thus while the governments of many uncommitted nations are relatively safe from traditional military pressures they are extraordinarily subject to domestic subversion. Inevitably these south countries with a high potential for creating domestic discord can achieve a degree of influence unattainable by these possessing nuclear weapons or confined to what the recipient as well as the donor considers foreign aid. Chinese consulates in Africa capable of training saboteures or arranging guerrilla movements may be a source of pressure taken more seriously by many governments than the traditional power, including nuclear power, Similarly the Communist advances in South East Asia depend on the exploitation of domestic instability and are carried out in the first instance by indigenous forces. Stability depends on the capacity to slow up weak governments.

The kind of war which is most likely to be one for which we are least prepared militarily, politically, and psychologically. In guerilla war superior mobility and fire-power is not always relevant. For the guerillas need only fight where they are superior whereas the defending forces must be strong everywhere. Nor is the capacity to

[N]

-8-

occupy territory decisive. The real target is the morale of the
population and of the Civil Administration. If this can be undermined through
protracted struggle the insurgents prevail regardless of how
many battles the defending forces have won.

In these conflicts, moreover, the status quo powers are
at an inherent disadvantage. For they have to be successful at all times
while the Communists need win only once. The ground risks of this kind of
conflict have so far been unfavorable for the West.

What makes the challenge particularly complex is that
there is no purely military solution. A great deal depends on the ability to bring
stable governments fulfilling the aspirations of their people. Without
this military measures will only delay the inevitable. At the same time, we
cannot insist on perfection before coming to the assistance of hardpressed
governments for this too would seal their fate. How to relate political-

progress to military assistance is the unsolved problem of defense in

many of the new nations.

V. Conclusion

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[x]

IV. June 9, 1964

What makes the challenge particularly complex is that there is no
purely military solution. A great deal depends on the ability to bring
into being stable governments fulfilling the aspirations of their people.

Without this, military measures will only delay the inevitable. At the
same time, we cannot insist on perfection before coming to the assistance
of hard-pressed governments for this too would seal their fate. The
United States badly requires a clear notion of its national interest in
the defense of its allies in Asia and Africa and some concept of how to
bring about governments capable of rallying popular support. Otherwise
all policy is based on quicksand.

IV. <u>Domestic Tendencies: The Intangibility of Power</u>

The always difficult problem of assessing correctly the nature
of power is complicated in the nuclear age by the immense destructive-
ness of weapons and the rapidity with which technology changes. While
risks have grown enormous, power has become even more intangible.

Never before has so much depended on weapons so new, so
and so abstract. In the debate over the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a
great deal of attention was focused on the adequacy of our warheads.

In fact, the other components of our weapons systems contain many more
factors of uncertainty. The estimated of Minuteman silos
depends entirely on theoretical studies. Of the thousands of missiles
in one arsenal relatively few of each category have been proof-tested.

There is little experience with salvo firing. Air defense systems are
designed in the absence of any definite knowledge about the nature of
the "offense". A considerable number of phenomena discovered when nuclear
testing was still going on were "unexpected".

IV - 2

It is difficult enough to be certain about the technical charac-
teristics of weapons systems. Their use in cases is even more debatable.

How, for example, does on threat with solid fuel missiles ? When weapons are intrinsically in an extreme state of readiness, how does one demonstrate the increased preparedness that historically served as a warning ? From a technical point of view it is highly probable that missiles can perform most of the functions heretofore assigned to airplanes. The gradual planing out of bombers from the arsenal of our strategic forces therefore makes a great deal of sense technically.

But has adequate attention been given to the kind of diplomacy which results when the retaliatory threat depends largely on solid-fuel missiles in underground silos ? During the Cuban crisis of October, 1962, dispercing SAC airplanes to civilian airports proved an effective warming. What will be an equivalent when our strategic forces are com-posed entirely of missiles?

Questions such as these give a theoretical, almost metaphysical

IV - 3

cast to the contemporary strategic debate. Answers are even more
difficult because of the ever widening gap between the sophistication
of the technical studies and the capacity of an already overworked
political leadership group to absorb in the decade and a half since
the end of World War II, strategic studies have received increasing
attention. As first hesitantly, but then ever more intensively, both
academic and government sponsored research organizations have developed
strategic studies of very great sophistication. The theory of flexible
response which now dominates the Defense Department is based on studies
conducted by the Rand Corporation and brought from there to the Pentagon
by those who conducted them.

The difficulty arises when theories of very great complexity must
be implemented by overworked decision-makers. Even the most conscientious
President will in all likelihood not be able to devote as many hours to
the problem as the analyst had years to study it. He must of necessity
work with under approximations. His decisions will have to be made

work with under approximation. His decations will have to be made
the problem as the analyst had years to study it. He must of necessity
President will in all likelihood not be able to devote as many hours to
be implemented by overworked decision-makers. Even the most conscientious
The difficulty arises when theories of very great complexity must
by those who conducted them.

conducted by the Rand Corporation and brought from there to the Pentagon
reports which now dominates the Defense Department is based on studies
strategic studies of very great sophistication. The theory of flexible
academic and Government sponsored research organizations have developed
attention. As first practically, put them ever more intensively, possibly
the end of World War II, strategic studies have received increasing
political leadership group to appear in the decade and a half since
of the technical studies and the capacity of an already overworked
difficult because of the ever widening gap between the sophistication
cost to the contemporary strategic debate. Answers are even more

IV - 3

[4]

[Y]

IV - 4

under stress. He will be extremely conscious not only of the logical
symmetry of a strategic theory but also of the consequences of its
failure. In other words, there is a danger that a too complicated
strategic doctrine may bring about the kind of psychological break-
down that was partly responsible for the failure of the Schlieffen plan
in 1914.

The biggest hurdle strategic doctrine may have to overcome is be-
tween the technical and political level of domestic decision-making.
Those charged with developing strategy have to keep in mind that their
audience is not a group of similar competence but hard-pressed individuals
for whom strategy is only one of their concerns and because of its very
abstractness perhaps not the dominant one.

Excessive complexity may lead to paralysis. Those designing strategy
must at every stage ask themselves about the decision-maker. Does he
understand the doctrine? Does he believe in it? Will the doctrine

understand the doctrine ? Does he believe in it ? Will the doctrine
must at every stage ask themselves about the decision-maker. Does he
excessive complexity may lead to bartermate. Those designing strategy
apartness perhaps not the dominant one.

for whom strategy is only one of their concerns and because of its very
audience it is not a group of similar competence but barb-breasted individuals
Those charged with developing strategy have to keep in mind that their
tween the technical and political level of domestic decision-making.

The biggest hurdle strategic doctrine may have to overcome is the
to in 1914.

down that was partly reasonable for the failure of the Schliemann plan
strategic doctrine may bring about the kind of pedagogical press-
taken. In other words, there is a danger that a too complicated
symmetry of a strategic theory put also of the consequences of its
under-stress. He will be extremely conscious not only of the logical

A - 4

IV - 5

and the forces it produces be a spur to action or an excuse for inaction ?

Does strategy lead to a sense of mastery or does it produce a feeling of impotence ? What does acceptance by the decision-maker of a given strategic theory really mean ? Does he accept with the notion: If pressed this is what I will do ? Or does he have the arrière-pensée: if this is all I can do, I will do nothing ?

A wise strategy will take into account that technique, can never be an end in itself, that policy ultimately depends on intagibles of motivation and purpose and will.

## V. Strategic Doctrine and Alliances

The problems that occur *within* each government are even more complicated *within* an Alliance. For in an Alliance of sovereign states the strategic views of the dominant partner are an attribute of his sovereignty which means that he has the unchallengeable right to change them. Thus in any Alliance the weaker partners have a tendency to cling to the status quo. It has the advantage of familiarity. And it is also a guarantee of the senior partner. In European-American relations after

Guarantee of the senior partner. In European-American relations after
status quo. It has the advantage of familiarity. And it is also a
to and Alliance the weaker partners have a tendency to cling to the
which means that he has the unrelenting people right to change them. Thus
strategic areas of the dominant partner are an attribute of the sovereignty
bicated within an Alliance. For in an Alliance of sovereign states the
The problem that occur within each Government are even more com-

## V. Strategic Doctrine and Villesces

be an end in itself, that policy ultimately depends on intangibles of

is what I will do ? Or does he have the arrêté-besoin: it this is
certainly really mean ? Does he accept with the notion: It pressed this
indifference ? What does acceptance by the decalogue-maker of a given strategic
Does strategy lead to a sense of mastery or does it produce a feeling of
and the force it produces be a spur to action or an expense for action ?

IV - 2

IV - 6

the Europeans seemed at times more eager to extract American reassurance
than to conduct a constructive policy of their own. An when they did
develop autonomous political and strategic views they ran up against
the perplexities of the nuclear age.

From the strictly technical point of view, it is highly desirable
that all nuclear weapons in an alliance be under central control. But
central control of nuclear weapons is incompatible to some extent with
an Alliance of sovereign states. Part of the tension in the Atlantic
Alliance is caused by the clash of the American notion of the require-
ments of the nuclear age with the desire of some of our partners to keep
some control over their destiny.

The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of one country
poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises another.
In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or
surrendering. If it resisted, it had to be prepared to accept the con-
sequences in terms of physical damage of loss of life. A distant ally

seductions in terms of physical damage of loss of life. A distant ally
surrounding. It is related, it had to be prepared to accept the con-
In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or
bese one set of problems: the range of modern weapons increases another.

ments of the nuclear age with the theatre of some of our partners to keep
Villiance is caused by the class of the American nation of the redun-
an Villiance of sovereign states. Part of the tension in the Atlantic
central control of nuclear weapons is incompatible to some extent with
that all nuclear weapons in an alliance be under central control. But
From the strictly technical point of view, it is highly desirable

the herpetofauna of the nuclear age.

develop autonomous political and strategic areas they ran up against
than to conduct a constructive policy of their own. When they did
the Europeans seemed at times more eager to extract American reinsurance

IV - 6

IV - 7

could be effective only if it was able to bring its strength to bear in
the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants
from the Alliance is the assurance that an attack on it will be considered
a casus belli. It strives for deterrence by adding the threat of a dis-
tant ally to its own power. But, equally, each state has an incentive
to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The
range of modern weapons provides an unprecedented opportunity in this
respect. In 1914, Belgium could not base its defense on a strategy ac-
cording to which Britain ran the primary risks of devastation. In the
age of the intercontinental rockets this technical possibility exists.

Part of the strategic dispute within the Alliance, therefore, in-
volves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater
of war if deterrence fails (thought this obviously cannot be made explicit.)
A conventional war confined to Europe may appear relatively tolerable to
us. To Europeans, with their memory of conventional wars, this prospect
is not particularly inviting. A nuclear exchange which spares their

is not particularly inviting. A peculiar excuse which shares their
na. To Europeans, with their memory of conventional wars, this prospect
A conventional war confined to Europe may abate relatively tolerable to
of war if deterrence fails (thought this optionally cannot be made explicit.)
volves locking to determine which geographic area will be the theater
part of the strategic dispute within the Alliance, therefore, in-
age of the intercontinental rockets the technical belligerit exists.
cording to which Britain ran the primary risks of invasion. In the
respect. In 1914, Belgium could not pass its defense on a strategy ac-
range of modern weapons provides an unprecedented opportunity in this
to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The
tant ally to its own power. But, equally, each state has an incentive
a cause self.

It strives for deterrence by adding the threat of a die-
from the Alliance to the assurance that an attack on it will be considered
Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants
the area of conflict.

IV - 1

[A]

[Y]

IV - 8

territory may appear a more attractive strategy; and the threat of
nuclear retaliation is likely to seem to Europeans a more effective
deterrent. The interests of the Alliance may be indivisible in an
ultimate sense. But this does not guarantee the absence of conflict
or means to implement this objective.

The formal answer is to place greater reliance on the process of
consultation. An improvement in formal consultative processes is no
doubt desirable. But even within our own government, consultation
does not guarantee identity of views. At some point, a decision is
required which is bound to be more difficult where sovereign states
are involved.

The limitations of any consultative process its effectiveness
depends on the competence of the parties professing advice. In our
own bureaucracy, many departments have the right to offer their views.
Many fewer actually carry weight. The weight given to advice is in-
evitable related to the competence it reflects. This raises the question
whether it will be possible in the long run for our allies to consult

whether it will be possible in the long run for our allies to consent
eventually related to the competence it reflects. This raises the question
many fewer actually carry weight. The weight given to advice is in-
own purity, many departments have the right to offer their views,
debate on the competence of the particle processing advice. In our

The limitations of any consultative process
its effectiveness
are involved.

resulted which if found to be more difficult where sovereign states
does not guarantee identity of views. At some points, a decision is
guided حصitable. But even within our own Government, consultation
conclusion. An improvement in formal consultative processes is no
The formal answer is to place greater reliance on the process of
or means to implement this objective.

ultimate issue. But this does not guarantee the absence of conflict
deterrent. The interests of the Will are may be indissoluble in an
nuclear retaliation is likely to seem to Europe some more effective
territory may appear a more attractive strategy; and the threat of

IV - 9

[Y]

IV - 9

effectively while we possess all technical knowledge and possess all the weapons. It may be that the requirements of the political vitality of the Alliance point in the opposite direction from a purely technical consideration of the requirements of weapons systems.

Centralized control over strategy in any event requires much closer coordination of foreign policy. If (1) strategy is indivisible, foreign policy must be so as well. If the Alliance cannot develop procedures for a common diplomacy or at least an agreed range of divergence -- it seems contradictory to insist on a system of unitary strategic control. When NATO has proved unable to develop even a common trade policy toward the Communist world, it is not surprising that countries are reluctant to entrust their survival to an ally, however close. There have been sufficient disagreements over such issues as Suez, the Congo, negotiation tactics over Berlin or the defense of Southern Arabia to indicate that different policies are at least conceivable. The United States is

that different policies are at least conceivable. The United States in
tion tactics over Berlin or the defense of Southern Europe to indicate
sufficient agreements over such issues as Suez, the Convo, negotiations
to entice their survival to an ally, however close. There have been
the Communist world, it is not unabsenting that countries are relevant
when NATO has broken down to develop over a common trade policy toward
seems contradictory to inistit on a system of military strategic control.
for a common diplomacy or at least an agreed range of distance -- it
belligerent must be so as well. If the Vaffeance cannot develop procedures
coordination of foreign policy. It (1) strategy is inadvisable, foreign
coordinated control over strategy in and event requires much closer
consideration of the requirements of weapons systems.

of the Vaffeance bent in the objective direction from a briefly technical
the weapons. It may be that the requirements of the political vitality
effectively while we possess all technical knowledge and possess all

IV - 3

[N]

IV - 10

is now in the curious situation of staking a great deal of its prestige
on establishing the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary
strategic control while East-West negotiations or the war in Southeast
Asia are dealt with more less unilaterally.

In reassessing these priorities, it may be important to ask how
unitary a system of control for strategy and diplomacy is in fact de-
sirable. What kind of structure is more vital in the long run: an
Atlantic system that automatically involves all our partners or one
that permits some autonomy ? On many issues -- particularly East-West
relations -- united action is essential. With respect to others some
degree of flexibility may be desirable. Over the next decades the
United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far
East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will
probably not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas.
President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from unique in
Europe, even if his methods are.

President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from midwife in
propably not considering their vital interests at stake in these areas.
East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will
United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far
degree of flexibility may be desirable. Over the next decades the
relations -- united action is essential. With respect to others some
that 符合 some autonomy? On many issues -- particularly East-West
Atlantic states that automatically involves all our belligerents or one
struggle. What kind of structure is more vital in the long run: an
united a system of control for strategy and diplomacy is in fact de-
In recessing these priorities, it may be important to ask how

Asia are dealt with more less militarily.

strategic control while East-West negotiations or the war in Southeast
on accepting the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of military
is now in the course of arising a great deal of its breath

IV - 10

IV - 11

If the Atlantic system is absolutely centralized policy may be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe. This, combined with Westerners' lack of interest in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. On the other hand, if Europe has some capacity for autonomous action -- military and political -- European interest would be no greater, but the temptation for Soviet adventures may be reduced. Put positively, a structure which permits a variety of coordinated approaches toward the new nations could enhance the vigor of our policies, the self-confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.

Thus strategic doctrine and the basic goals of foreign policy merger. A purely technical consideration runs the risk of overlooking the psychological and political factors which ultimately determine the vitality of

oe

logical and political factors which ultimately determine the vitality of
A barely technical consideration runs the risk of overlooking the beyono-
time strategic doctrine and the past goals of foreign policy maker.

vitality of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.
Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the bor-
long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the
city of our cities, the self-confidence of our cities and the
a variety of coordinated approaches toward the new sections could enhance
adventures may be reduced. But positively, a structure which permits
European interest would be no greater, put the temptation for Soviet
some capacity for autonomous action -- military and political --
Villance beyond the pricking point. On the other hand, if Europe has
Europe's lack of interest in the issue involved, may strain the
our involvements elsewhere to placemail Europe. This, coupled with
be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use
If the Atlantic system is specifically centralised policy may

IA - II

IV - 12

the Alliance. The adequacy of a strategic doctrine as far as the Alliance
is concerned is tested finally by the political aims of the member states.

[Y]

V.

## V. Conclusion

It is no accident that a lecture in an academic setting on the relationship of power and diplomacy should raise more questions than than supply answers. Some years ago when strategy first attracted the attention of academic analysts the inconsistency between traditional modes of thought and the enormity of modern weapons was obvious. Almost any systematic analysis was likely to uncover discrepancies and weaknesses requiring remedial action.

Since then the situation has drastically changed. National security affairs are now administered by highly sophisticated men many of whom were closely involved in the early strategic studies. The academy is no longer in a position to try to shape current policy. The outsider does not possess enough relevant information and he runs the risk of always lagging behind events. Indeed, the attempt to be too current may make the academician the prisoner of the bureaucracy. His access to information may be regulated by his usefulness in pushing current policy.

But if the intellectual is no longer in a position to offer short-term

V. - 2

prescriptions, he has a perhaps more important role in challenging
deeply-felt assumptions. The more sophisticated the leadership group,
the greater the danger of a kind of infatuation with its intellectual
dexterity

**Dekkt** and of overlooking the purpose to which the effort must be
put. Skill in quantitative analysis may obscure factors that cannot
by quantified. Complex strategic theories may be so satisfying intel-
lectualy that it is overlooked that they may have to be employed
in moments of great tension and confusion. The temptation in alliance
policy is considerable to trust allies as factors in a security arrange-
ment and to overlook that their ultimate contribution depends on many
intangibles of political will. In many of the merging countries, no-
thing is more important than some criteria by which to measure political
progress.

In all these areas, the academician can play a useful role if he
defines it modestly. He must not pretend that he has panceas which
short-sighted men in office have failed to discover. The easy solutions
have all been found. The problems which remain abdurate are such because

V. - 3

they are complex. The contribution of the intellectual can be to pre-
vent the fragmentation of policy by calling attention to the inward
relationship of events. He can supply perspective to individuals in-
evitably overwhelmed by day-to-day details and perhaps more conscious than
of causes. Above all, he can constantly insist that no answer can be
better than the questions which elicit them. In a time dedicated to
answers, this is an important role indeed for any institution.

[Y]

June 9, 1964

#### IV. Power and Neutralism

Neutrality is not a new concept. It has been traditionally recognized that states should be able to give a formal or legal foundation to a decision to remain non-belligerent in war. The decision to become neutral can be taken _ad hoc_. Thus Italy in two world wars remained initially neutral despite being formally allied with one of the belligerents. It can also be a deliberate act of national policy.

on the advantage to be gained by violation of the neutrality. Belgium
countries are able to subdue. The assessment of risks in turn depends
depends on the risks an attack on it entailed or on the assistance other
Whether a country will then be able to carry through its decision

Switzerland. Or it can be given international status through formal
come about through a unilateral decision as in the case of Sweden or
unless their own territory was attached. Neutrality in this sense can
a conflict regardless of the issues or the nature of the pelligentent
States have announced in advance their decision not to participate in
pelligentent. It can also be a deliberate act of national policy.

made initially neutral despite being formally affiliated with one of the
become neutral can be taken ad hoc. True Italy in two world wars re-
tion to a decision to remain non-pelligent in war. The decision to
comprised that states should be able to give a formal or legal grounds-
neutrality is not a new concept. It has been traditionally re-

IV. Power and Neutrality

June 3, 1964

IV. - 2

Countries aspiring to neutrality can rely for their defense on their
own strength or on the assistance other countries can furnish. If they
choose the former course they are likely to develop military forces
far in excess of those they would require if they were part of an Alliance
system. Sweden's military might is much greater than Norway's --even
making allowance for a difference in resources. If a neutral takes the
opposite course of remaining neutral but making itself dependent--either
because of insufficiency of resources or deliberate policy --on the assis-
tance of other countries may combine the disadvantages of alliance policy
with those of neutrality. The neutral by itself will not be strong
enough--or its position will be too vital--to deter aggression. At the
same time, its neutral position will prevent it from concerting prepara-
tions with its potential protector. This was the case with Belgium in
two World Wars. Whatever the military policy, neutrality has in the past
been associated with a deliberate decision to abstain from involvement
in the conflicts of day-to-day diplomacy.

been associated with a deliberate decision to adopt from involvement
two World War. Whatever the military policy, neutrality has in the past
time with its potential protector. This was the case with Belgium in
same time, its neutral position will prevent it from concerting prepa-
renough--or its position will be too vital--to deter aggression. At the
with those of neutrality. The neutral by itself will not be strong
tance of other countries may complicate the dissadvantages of alliance policy
because of inefficiency of resources or deliberate policy --on theenda-
obvious course of remaining neutral but making itself dependent--either
making allowance for a difference in resources. If a neutral takes the
system. Sweden's military might is much greater than Norway's --even
far in excess of those they would require if they were part of an Alliance
choose the former course they are likely to develop military forces
own strength or on the assistance other countries can furnish. It they
Countries aspiring to neutrality can rely for their defense on their
ately situated than Sweden.

 situated athwart the invasion routes into France has been less fortunate

IV. - 2

IV. - 3

the same protection after China attacked as would have been extended in
and neutralize its beginning to Europe. India through neutral received much
for efficient defense. In the nuclear age the distinction between allies
and insofar as the threat is nuclear prior joint planning is not required
the major contenders to prevent it from moving into the obsolescing camp.
and gain a degree of international stature through the attempt of
traditional. Thus a country may forfeit little protection by being neu-
salities increases the propensity of this protection far beyond what was
At the same time, the di-polar nature of contemporary international
reaction of some nuclear country.

to resort to nuclear arms and if the neutral could not count on the bro-
jective to be achieved would dissuade it an aggressor were prepared
words, its capacity to impose military risks out of proportion to the
defend itself against an obnoxious armed with nuclear weapons. In other
has raised the question whether any non-nuclear country can by itself
have been modified in significant ways. The advent of nuclear power
These traditional patterns of neutrality still exist. But they

IV. - 3

IV. - 4

To the degree that the uncommitted convecue the major contemtable
in the long run to compine neutrality with an attempt to judge all di-
producing nation. Ve for the new neutralize, they will find it difficult
Ve the same time, it tempts adventures and produces opportunities for
by its own ground rules cannot be won by either of the two pig bowers.
themselves. It is desapitalizing because it sets up a contest which
of the international system, in the pig bowers and in the uncommitted
Ve for the mediator role, its aspect is demoralizing on the stability
they see in these disputes an opportunity to advance their own aspirations.

two ways: they attempt to act as mediators of pig-bower disputes and
abst from international conflicts they actively emproil themselves in
territories put to magnify their international role. Far from attempting
tation of the major bowers not primarily to enhance the security of their
contemporarly period: Countries which deliberately exploit the confron-
tation accounts for the emergence of a new type of neutral in the

comparable circumstances to Pakistan through Pakistan was formally an

IV. - 4

IV. - 5

burely local advantage and the readiness of the Communist bloc to exploit
And these conflicts are further exacerbated by the readiness to press for
but also the prospects of economic development of many of these countries.
but not. For on this conflict depends not only the pertaining position
traditional, but also in the perpetuation of a degree of conflict which
Many of the neutrals have a stake both in the avoidance of war which is
Thus international affairs has an additional element of volatility.

pig powers.

practiced the reliance on pure negotiations that they commend to the
Yap Republic in Yemen or Indonesia in Hongkong or India in Goa have largely
power politics which they urge the pig powers to adopt. The United
to practice in their relations with their own neighbors the kind of
At the same time, the so-called uncommitted nations have felt free
to being mowed.

Neutrality ceases to be an attempt to remain put because an invitation
that their support is important, they are either counted or blemished.

IV. - 2

military equipment to the United Arab Republic or to Indonesia has
an impact on the West's position in these areas which would have been
unachievable by direct Soviet action. And even more or less autonomous
leaders who is not receiving Communist military support, figures like Archbishop Markarios are able to strain the cohesion
of the Western Alliance by the ruthless pursuit of narrow objectives
and even to use the United Natine Nations to protect them against the
consequences of their irresponsibility.

But if the uncommitted nations have unprecedented scope for
pursuing their own interests, they are also subject to unprecedented pressures.
In the past, neutrality was usually the posture of very cohesive nations
certain of their identity and determined to defend it. But many of the
newly independent nations are in search of identity. Often the only ik

IV. June 9, 1964

Printing abroad Governments capable of relying upon popular support. Otherwise the defense of its allies in Asia and Africa and some concept of how to United States safely repatriate a clear notion of its national interest in of hard-breded governments for this too would seal their fate. The same time, we cannot instat on perfection before coming to the assistance Without this, military measures will only delay the inevitable. At the into being stable Governments fulfilling the aspirations of their peoples. briefly military solution. A great deal dependence the ability to print

IA. June 9, 1964

V.

[N]

## V. Conclusion

But if the intellectual is no longer in a position to offer short-term
to information may be regulated by his neatness in pushing current policy.
may make the academic an the prisoner of the bureaucracy. His access
always lagging behind events. Indeed, the attempt to be too current
does not bode enough relevant information and he runs the risk of
no longer in a position to try to shape current policy. The outflaor
more closely involved in the early strategic studies. The academy is
attains are now administered by highly sophisticated men many of whom
Since then the situation has drastically changed. National Security
a
reducing remedial action.

any systematic analysis was likely to uncover discrepancies and weaknesses
modes of thought and the enormity of modern weapons was obvious. Vicious
attention of academic analysts the inconsistency between traditional
than subtly answers. Some years ago when strategy first attracted the
relationship of power and diplomacy should raise more questions than
It is no accident that a lecture in an academic setting on the

A. Conclusion

A.

V. - 2

Diluted and of overlooking the purpose to which the effort must be
put. Skill in quantitative analysis may obscure factors that cannot
by quantified. Complex strategic theories may be so satisfying intel-
lectually that it is overlooked that they may have to be employed
in moments of great tension and confusion. The temptation in alliance
policy is considerable to trust allies as factors in a security arrange-
ment and to overlook that their ultimate contribution depends on many
intangibles of political will. In many of the merging countries, no-
thing is more important than some criteria by which to measure political
progress.

V. - 3