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in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a profoundly disruptive impact on the unity of the world Communist movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scientific truth supplied the inward assurance; the pre-eminence of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

The unity produced by these factors has been undermined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Soviet split and the manner in which Khrushchev has been overthrown. De-Stalinization raised the question of the relationship between the scientific truth of the dominant ideology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How could a system that was supposed to end forever man's oppression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be reconciled with slave labor camps and a police state? Even if the Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres must have been assailed by doubts which must have been reinforced when Khrushchev was overthrown in his turn and denounced for "hare-brained schemes."

The Soviet split was the catalyst for the overt fragmentation of the Communist world. The causes of this rift are many and complex. There is the rivalry of two empires along the most extended land frontier of the world. Competition for a dominant role in the underdeveloped countries plays a part. But what makes the dispute insoluble is the conflict over the leadership of the world Communist movement. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up from time to time, its underlying cause seems beyond repair. A movement that claims to represent a universal truth cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist—whatever temporary adjustments may be made.

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to complete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previous monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be moralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist

moralized by the display, technicians see in the disarray an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their attitudes toward Khrushchev, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics of their Soviet colleagues—including a highly developed sense for personal power—the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves by a measure of autonomy. They must try to protect their position against possible future upheavals in Moscow. The initial hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in endorsing Khrushchev's ouster can be partly explained by this.

Personal ambition thus reinforces the dominant trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have, if anything, intensified traditional nationalism. Communism has been able to gain a measure of popular acceptance only where its leaders emphasize national and not Communist concerns. The autarchic organization of Communist economies compounds these tendencies. It encapsulates each state in a system of total planning, which complicates relations even with Communist neighbors. A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension has been initiated by the Soviets not because a few individuals have overcome the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it. To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows: When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press for the settlement of issues that produced the tension in the first place?

Domestic considerations impel many Western leaders to present themselves to their electorate as the architects of a lasting peace. The temptation is, therefore, strong to treat a more conciliatory Communist tone as a permanent conversion to a peaceful course and to gear everything to personal diplomacy.

Such attitudes will cause the West to squander its opportunities, as has happened so often in the past. The prospects for peace are not served by leaving the Soviet leadership with the impression that any action, no matter how belligerent, can always be reversed by a change of tone. Negotiations will prove empty if they are confined to vague protestations of goodwill. If a detente is not to be part of another cycle leading to renewed tensions, it is essential that negotiations be concrete and programs specific.

Above all, the West must conduct its policy without illusions. The same pressures that have produced a relaxation of tensions can also tempt Soviet leaders to enter upon another period of hostility. There is always the danger that the Kremlin will try to restore the unity of Eastern Europe by fostering a crisis centered on Germany. Even as it is, the East European governments almost invariably support Soviet foreign

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policy, particularly in the underdeveloped world. Events in
other continents can have a backlash in Europe. The Soviets
could be drawn into an intransigent course as a result of
situations over which they have no direct control. The weak-
ening of central authority in the Soviet Union may enable
various bureaucracies to operate relatively autonomously, in-
cluding those with a vested interest in fomenting upheavals.
The spiritual malaise of Communism could be reversed if an
unchecked collapse of Western influence and power around
the world seems to demonstrate the validity of the basic
tenets of Leninism.

Even the split between the largest Communist countries
represents danger as well as opportunity. It means that
henceforth the West will confront not alternating periods of
hostility and conciliation but both at the same time. It can
also happen that the two Communist giants may try to outbid
each other in giving so-called liberation movements an anti-
Western cast—Society actions in the Congo are a good
example.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified
as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable"
form of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situa-
tion of several of our Allies. One of the major achievements
of the postwar period in Europe has been the isolation of the
Communist parties. Under the impact of many factors, this
isolation is beginning to break down. In Italy, for example,
the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new-found strength
for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of
the traditional parties by De Gaulle and the change in tactics
by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popu-
lar Front for the first time in thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in
the new countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders
were restrained from joining the Communist camp because
this action reduced them to the status of satellites. With the
growing disarray in the Communist world it will seem in-
creasingly possible to combine nationalism and Communism.
Many in the West draw a comfort from this. But it is impor-
tant to distinguish between a national Communist govern-
ment in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example,
Latin America or Africa. A national Communist regime in
Eastern Europe is an improvement over the previous condi-
tion of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin
America or Africa would inevitably become a center of anti-
Western policy.

If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it must
develop a common policy and a specific program. The temp-
tation for bilateral approaches is great. Each national leader,
depending on his temperament, has visions of appearing as
the arbiter of a final settlement or of adding Communist
pressures to his own as a bargaining device within the Alli-
ance. This sets up a vicious circle. Since leaders generally do
not reach eminence without a touch of vanity and since some
stake their prestige on their ability to woo the Soviet leaders,
they tend to present their contacts with the Soviets as a con-
siderable accomplishment. But the real issues have gone un-
resolved because they are genuinely difficult; hence they are
usually avoided during summit diplomacy in favor of showy
but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer the East-West
discourse, the more they will be the confusion in the West.

siderable accomplishment. But the real issues have gone un-
resolved because they are genuinely difficult; hence they are
usually avoided during summit diplomacy in favor of showy
but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer the East-West
discourse, the greater will be the confusion in the West.
Moreover, each leader faces two different audiences: toward
his own people he will be tempted to leave the impression
that he has made a unique contribution to peace; toward his
allies he will be forced to insist that he will make no settle-
ment in which they do not participate. Excessive claims are
coupled with reassurances to uneasy allies which are in turn
tempted to pursue bilateral diplomacy.

Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate
distrust within the Alliance. The traditional Western balance
of power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Krem-
lin. Any Soviet incentive to be responsible will vanish. The
Soviet leaders will be able to overcome their difficulties with
the assistance of the West and without settling any of the
outstanding issues. Since in the Kremlin—as in the West—
there must be many who consider the status quo preferable to
change, the result is likely to be diplomatic paralysis ob-
scured by abstract declarations about peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies:
(1) the willingness of the members of the Alliance to sub-
ordinate short-term advantages to a long-term conception
of the future and (2) their ability to develop a concrete and
common program. A united West would have unusual op-
portunities for negotiation. The disarray in Eastern Europe
should permit the West to adjust its policies to the degree of
autonomy shown by the various East European countries.
Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered in a
new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy
urgently requires a comprehensive solution. All these ap-
proaches presuppose some consensus in the West about the
shape of international affairs over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the
future of Germany. No other issue illustrates so dramatically
the need for unity and for purpose, for an agreed Allied
policy as well as for concrete proposals.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's
press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-
German Treaty of Collaboration has become increasingly
complicated. After the initial period of shock, the United
States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Repub-
lic. One motive behind the MLF was to prevent West Ger-
many from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear
cooperation—an offer which has not yet been made and,
given De Gaulle's awareness of the European equilibrium,
might never have been extended. In order to tie Germany to
us, successful efforts were made to have German arms pur-

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chases funneled to the United States. The culmination of this
process was an agreement between Secretary McNamara and
Defense Minister von Hassel signed on November 14, 1964,
which in effect made the German armed forces dependent on
the United States for their military equipment.

In the political field the United States, while welcoming
Franco-German rapprochement, has made clear that it does
so only as long as this does not lead to a new power grouping
—a condition inherently impossible of fulfillment. Thus,
George McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, has said:

... It is true that the signature of the Franco-German Treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been accomplished without a formal treaty. . . . Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle . . . for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.

✓ George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues." July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), pp. 140-141.

American pressure and high-handed French actions have placed the Federal Republic in an extremely uncomfortable position. Germany, though courted on all sides, runs the risk of finding itself isolated. The MLF has produced strains between France and the Federal Republic and misgivings in many other countries. The shift of United States tactics on the MLF just prior to Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Washington in December 1964 raised fears in Germany that major issues were once more being settled unilaterally. Because of its understandable insecurities, Germany requires, above all, a calm and steady senior partner. The constant changes in American policy on strategic doctrine, nuclear control and the emphasis on various partners must radicalize German political life, whatever the merit of individual United States positions. Franco-German rivalry threatens to split the pro-Western elements in Germany into pro-American and pro-French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists. Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry between France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations.

Thus Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet cajolery or Communist blackmail—a trend further magnified by American hints that Germany should be more flexible toward the East. As long as Germany could avoid a direct confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other relationship—the Western Alliance or the Franco-German Treaty—these dangers were minimized. The combination of De Gaulle's abruptness and America's short-sighted reaction to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly absorbed in its own unfulfilled national aims and aware of the bargaining position conferred on it by its central position and growing power.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The more exposed Western ally,

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, 17 million of whose people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the conflict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union, which largely forged the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies in the other parties that are now restrained by their desire to present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-established consensus. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-German Treaty by which it has sought to limit the Federal Republic's freedom of action has had the practical consequence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be tempted to seek reinsurance by improving its relations in Eastern Europe. Thus the current situation contains a series of time bombs.

The most serious potential conflict between the Federal Republic and its Allies—and the lever which the Communist countries may hope to use to pry Germany loose from its Atlantic ties—concerns reactions to the division of Germany. The problem is complicated by three factors: (1) NATO is an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal members seeks a basic change in the status quo. (2) None of Germany's allies shares her national aspirations with equal intensity. (3) Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust that creates special obstacles to its international role. These divergences would be difficult enough for a cohesive Alliance to reconcile; the rivalry between France and the United States threatens to make them insoluble.

These problems become particularly severe whenever there appears to be some relaxation in East-West tensions. To most of the members of NATO, detente comes as a welcome respite. To the Federal Republic, it implies the danger of a tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most of the Allies do not find the status quo intolerable, whereas the Federal Republic considers consolidation of the East German regime a sacrifice of basic national aspirations.

This is why German leaders are always extraordinarily ambivalent during periods of detente. They welcome relief from pressures against Berlin; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between “peripheral” settlements which they welcome and “central” agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. If this progress is delayed too long, there will be increasing pressures for purely German initiatives. The Alliance may soon have to choose between developing a common, active policy on German reunification or seeing the Federal Republic pursue the goal independently.

Many in the West find both possibilities disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy about the prospect of having interna-

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Every gesture by the Federal Republic toward one of the protagonists evokes so much pressure by the other that a compensatory move must then be made. In order to assuage American outrage over the Franco-German treaty, Chancellor Adenauer agreed in principle to the MLF. When the negotiations over the MLF threatened a Franco-German rift, Chancellor Erhard felt obliged to recement Franco-German ties. Because of its understandable insecurities, Germany requires, above all, a calm and steady senior partner. The frequent changes in American policy on strategic doctrine, nuclear control and the emphasis to be given to various partners must radicalize German political life, whatever the merit of individual United States positions. French policy has been consistent but it has confronted the Federal Republic with choices which it is unprepared to handle. As a result, the Franco-German rivalry threatens to split the pro-Western elements in Germany into pro-American and pro-French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists. Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry between France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations.