Dr. Harry Schwartz

Defends President Nixon's Viet Policy

Dr. Harry Schwartz, Soviet affairs expert for The New York Times and college professor, defended President Nixon's plans for peace in Vietnam during his address to the ABC Annual Luncheon, October 22.

Emphasizing that the opinions expressed were entirely his own, Dr. Schwartz said he was not endorsing Mr. Nixon and had voted for Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 election.

Dr. Schwartz told nearly 500 ABC members and guests:

—My own guess, frankly, is that the number one peacenik in the United States the man who more than anybody else would like to see the Vietnam War over with, yesterday if possible, is probably the President of the United States.

—Can you think of anything that would make Mr. Nixon more universally popular than if he were able to get on the radio and TV this afternoon and announce the Vietnam War was over?

—So the question arises, why doesn't he take this freely-proffered advice and simply end the war, announce we are going to pull out our troops immediately, and get the jubilation and political credit and so on?

—Mr. Nixon is going to be President, God willing, for another three years, at least, and he would have to live with the consequences, which seem to be ignored a great deal in public discussion.

One can hear all one wants about the thievery of the Saigon Government. I amARE a good deal of that is true. One can hear a great deal about the immorality of the war. In my own view all wars are immoral. I have the simple-minded view that it is simply immoral to kill people, and all wars kill people, so that in that respect, all wars are immoral,

and I find nothing to choose between the Vietnam War and other wars.

—One of the key factors that brought Adolf Hitler to power in Germany was the widely spread belief in Germany that Germany would have won World War I except, that it was betrayed on the home front ... and the thousands or hundreds of thousands of brave boys who had given their lives for their country had been betrayed.

—Don't you think there would be Americans who would feel our boys ... had been betrayed? Don't you think there would likely be political figures in the United States who would seek power on the platform of "we were stabbed in the back, let's get even?"

A second thought: A great many people in South Vietnam have been fighting at our side. The South Vietnamese have lost many more people than we have, of course, and properly so. It's their country, not our country.

—One of the considerations Mr. Nixon has to have in mind is the very life of hundreds of thousands or millions of South Vietnamese who, because they were anti-Communist, because they fought with and worked with the United States, would have their lives in enormous danger.

—Mr. Nixon, I think, is a man of honor. I think most Americans are people of honor. I'm sure it bothers Mr. Nixon's conscience, the thought of having hundreds of thousands or millions of lives on his hands if he takes the easy way out, the way out suggested by the Moratorium organizers.

—A third point ... the equilibrium that has existed in the world—the political military equilibrium—during the past quarter of a century has had as one of its fundamentals, the simple fact that the United States has ex-

SCHWARTZ

tended its protection and its promise of a great many countries throughout world.

—A large faction of the rest of the world can be divided into countries which have been dependent upon our protection which have been restrained ... by fear what the United States might do.

—The conclusion is going to be that cannot depend upon the United States. It would be the conclusion of people who have been depending upon us.

The conclusion on the other side will be one need not worry about the United States. As long as one does not attack United States directly at home, the United States is no going to do anything.

—There are at least two sets of consequences we can see. One is that a lot of small countries would decide that the United States is to do is to get he best terms they can find the other side.

—There is another reaction, however, this is on the part of the larger and stronger countries. The reaction is, if you can't depend on the United States, then you'd better guard your own destiny, and in the most world trying to safeguard your own defense militarily means, sooner or later, you've to have your own nuclear weapons.

—Mr. Nixon, faced by these considerations, has evidently decided he prefers to not to jump from the frying pan into the fire that bad as the frying pan is—and believe he is being sizzled—the naked fire is even worse.

—I have been talking simply about some of the major effects of capitulation ... there are many things that can be done ... to make the situation in Vietnam much less irksome much less aggravating.

—It seems to me that if we create a divided and, therefore, a more tolerable situation in Vietnam, we may be able to convince Hanoi that we are not going to cop out, and that we are not going to give it South Vietnam on a silver or golden platter, and, if it was to achieve a better situation from its point of view, it is going to have to make concession and, when and if Hanoi reaches that conclusion, then there might be a prospect for honorable end to the war.

R. L. Holt of the Houston Chronicle and W. C. Green, Jr. of the Birmingham News confer prior to Thursday's Closing General Session.

The New York Times

TIMES SQUARE NEW YORK NY 10036

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

August 17, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

About ten days ago I wrote you that I would
be in Washington this Friday, August 21, and that I
would be delighted to see you if you were free for lunch
or during the afternoon.

Returning home, I find no acknowledgment of my
note. I assume this probably means you are busy, which is
quite understandable. However I am writing to check because
my experience with the mails has been most unhappy. I shall
be working at home tomorrow (Tuesday) and can be reached
at 914-725-1642, or at my office Wednesday and Thursday,
phone 212-556-1631.

Harry Schwartz, NYTimes Editorial Board, would like to see you on a general background session this Mon. or Tues. -- following up on your invitation: "If you are coming to Washington, please call and come in to see me." We explained that you are extremely busy with the Annual Review.

Do you want to see him Mon. or Tues.?

Yes ✓ No

PRESS, jlp, 2/19/71

SCHWARTZ

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

Name: Harry Schwartz, NYT Editorial Board

Request: Would like to see Mr. Kissinger some time on Monday or Tuesday, February 22 or 23. This would just be a general conversation (it seems that Mr. Kissinger said "If you are coming to Washington, please call and come in to see me.") (I explained that we are approaching the deadline on the Annual Review and are extremely busy.)

Contact Lucille Sunshine (!) this afternoon if at all possible -- 212/556-1632.

DRY's Recommendation: 9/1/85-1642

HAK's Answer: Yes - 2/19

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: SJS 2/23

Additional Information:

Resolution:

The New York Times

April 26, 1971

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

EXECUTIVE

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /S*

I wonder whether you and the President noticed my article last week, especially the underlined portion of the enclosed. I think that was pretty good thinking a week before Edgar Snow's and Hugh Sidey's articles in today's Life magazine.

More seriously, is there any chance of seeing you next month? I expect to be in Washington next May 24 and near San Clemente next May 16-18 so either site would do.

Keep up the good work with Peking.

RECEIVED

MAY 25 1971

CENTRAL OFFICE

''ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT TO PRINT'' 5/2/556-1031

pointedly boycotted. The invitation was in effect Peking's reply to the speeches of Leonid I. Brezhnev and Aleksei N. Kosygin telling the Moscow gathering how unsatisfactory they found Soviet-Chinese relations to be.

At Premier Chou's reception last week, where he sketched his bright hopes for improved Chinese-American relations, he had no such warm words for the Soviet Union, nor did he invite

and light, of course, would go an extensive exchange of journalists, athletes, artists, students, tourists and, not least, politicians. Chou En-lai has already hinted he would like to visit this country, and President Nixon could score a major political coup if he were touring the Chinese People's Republic, as Mai Tse-tung's guest, in the summer of 1972, say, about the time the Democratic party convention was picking his November opponent.

General Secretary Brezhnev, the most serious political problem he has faced since he and his colleagues ousted Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Mr. Brezhnev's place in Soviet and world history may well depend upon how successfully he responds to the challenge of what must look to him like the Chou En-lai - Richard M. Nixon axis in action.

Harry Schwartz is a member of the editorial board of The Times.

Oh, to Be in England

AT HOME ABROAD

"I'll so predictable, so reassuring. Some may think it a little too

feeling of profound social change seething under American life today, the atmosphere in Britain is tepid, quiet, small. It is just that some people like to have small problems. everyone wants to seeth

vided a 'vast our involvem But only oemerges: to namese freely ment. Presider this American as April 7 he cans are fighti the people th kind of govern exercise a free o achieved an ho victory.

Early in the hope that seri eventually b Thought elections joint r tor

April 19, 1971

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MOND.

# Triangular Politics and China

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

Presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler told reporters the other day that current Washington efforts to improve ties with Peking "are in no way related to our relations with the Soviet Union," but it is doubtful if anybody, including Mr. Ziegler, took the statement seriously.

On the contrary, the "new page" that Premier, Chou En-lai says opened in Chinese-American relations is largely the product of both nations' unsatisfactory relations with Moscow.

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend," an old Arab saying holds. On the basis of that principle, the only surprising thing about the infant Chinese-American rapprochement is that it has come so late in the game, so long after all normal balance-of-power criteria suggested that vis-à-vis Moscow there was every incentive for Washington and Peking to get together.

Now that the long-expected thaw with Washington has finally begun, the Chinese have felt no need to issue any瑾ious statement comparable to Mr. Ziegler's. Rather, they have begun the "new page" in a manner calculated to underline for the sophisticated the anti-Soviet motivation involved.

Thus the American table tennis team was invited to Peking in the middle of the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, a meeting the Chinese had pointedly boycotted. The invitation was in effect Peking's reply to the speeches of Leonid I. Brezhnev and Aleksei N. Kosygin telling the Moscow gathering how unsatisfactory they found Soviet-Chinese relations to be.

Soviet journalists to visit the Chinese People's Republic "in batches" like American journalists.

If international relations were conducted more rationally than they actually are, the scenario for rapidly improving Chinese-American relations over the next few years might look something like this:

Peking would use its great influence in Hanoi to help create conditions for the swift, graceful and face-saving disengagement from Vietnam President Nixon needs before next year's Presidential election. It would also agree to some verbal formula about Taiwan that would leave the real situation there unchanged for the time being but would end that issue's potential for troubling Washington-Peking relations.

The Nixon Administration, for its part, would alter its United Nations policy so as to permit a representative of Mao Tse-tung to occupy China's seat in the Security Council next fall. It would not only permit but encourage United States businessmen to begin trading with the Chinese, and even to sell them modern equipment of the kind Peking wants for its further industrial advance. And if the Chinese want American technical and economic aid for building plants to produce trucks, tractors or petrochemicals, that would be provided too.

Accompanying all this sweetness and light, of course, would go an extensive exchange of journalists, athletes, artists, students, tourists and, not least, politicians. Chou En-lai has already hinted he would like to visit this country, and President Nixon could score a major political coup if he were touring the Chinese People's Republic, as Mai Tse-tung's guest, in the summer of 1972, say, about the time the Democratic party convention was picking his November opponent.

At the moment, any such ambitious agenda of near-term Chinese-American cooperation is sheer fantasy. There is still too much suspicion and fear between the two powers to expect so rapid an evolution of relations.

Nevertheless, even the first tiny steps taken these past two weeks have already deeply disturbed Moscow. That fact is patent from the pained manner in which Pravda and Izvestia have reported the recent distasteful facts. Any substantial further progress toward Washington-Peking cooperation —progress far less than the Utopian agenda sketched above—would worry the Russians even more. They would interpret it as evolution toward a Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union.

In the new, expanded Soviet Politburo last week, it is certain, no subject was more discussed than Premier Chou's "new page" and how the Soviet Union should react to it. A new division of the Soviet leadership between hawks and doves has probably appeared. Debate undoubtedly raged as to whether to meet the challenge by a harder policy against both Washington and Peking or by an effort to woo the new potential partners with attractive concessions offered to one or both of them.

The debate is unlikely to end soon. Peking's "Ping-Pong diplomacy" has provided the Kremlin's new master, General Secretary Brezhnev, the most serious political problem he has faced since he and his colleagues ousted Nikita Khrushchev in 1964. Mr. Brezhnev's place in Soviet and world history may well depend upon how successfully he responds to the challenge of what must look to him like the Chou En-lai - Richard M. Nixon axis in action.

By CE

WASHINGTON decades Amedved a vast our involvem But only emerges: to namse freely Preside this American as April 7 he cans are fightin the people th kind of govern the South Vietn ercise a free achieved an ho vitory.

Early in the hope that ser eventually be Thought elections joint tor

# Oh, to Be in England

## AT HOME ABROAD

All so predictable, so reassuring. Some may think it a little too

feeling of profound social change seething under American life today, the atmosphere in Britain is tepid, quiet, small. It is just that some people like to have small problems everyone wants to seeth

OFFICIAL 1/17/72

Type of Request & Date

SCHWARTZ

1/31/72

(Last name and pending date)
GENERAL

FEB-11-72
KISSINGER, HENRY A.
KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: HARRY SCHWARTZ, Editorial Board of the New York Times

Request: Mr. Schwartz will be in the city on January 31st and would like to have a few minutes with you, if possible.

212/556-1631 - Lucille Sunshine
Nat'l Acad. of Science - Instil. Differences
Gary Dr. Deenham

CSH's Recommendation: ____________________

HAK's Answer: Yes - 1/22

Date and Time: 4:00 p.m. 1/21

Party Contacted: ____________________

Additional Information: ____________________

__________________________________

Resolution: ____________________

RECEIVED

FEB 19 1972

CENTRAL FILL

The
New
Pragmatism

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

Six months have now passed since
President Nixon astonished the world
by announcing that he would visit
Peking. The trip has not yet taken
place, but the passage of time has
only reinforced the original impres-
sion of the extraordinary importance
of the renewed Sino-American dia-
logue.

Agreement on the trip was the key
move that broke the United Nations
log jam on the China question, and
brought about the replacement of
Taiwan by the Chinese People's Re-
public. And that shift in turn set the
stage for last month's astonishing
spectacle of the de facto Sino-Ameri-
can alliance in the U.N. impotently but
energetically backing Pakistan's cause
against India and India's protector, the
Soviet Union.

It can now be little doubted that
the stage for the still-mysterious po-
litical explosion that transformed
Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao
from "Comrade Mao's close comrade
in arms" into an unperson who may
even be dead.

Despite the conservative Republican
opposition that has now coalesced
around Representative John Ashbrook,

> "...the China move gave
> [Mr. Nixon] a 'peace
> image' which helped
> mute criticism of his
> foreign policy until the
> Indian-Pakistan war and
> the renewed bombing of
> North Vietnam."

the domestic dividends to President
Nixon have been substantial. Together
with the sharply lower American
casualty toll in Vietnam, the China
move gave him a "peace image" which
helped mute criticism of his foreign
policy until the Indian-Pakistan war
and the renewed bombing of North
Vietnam.

LONDON
Jack Ander
their substa
process they
bias in the
hardly been
heretofore ha
glimpse of the
eign policy is

The flavor is
tal court. Deep
the palace the
tate draws up
vizier emerges
claims them to t
anyone asks a
vizier warns him
he may lose his h

What is so strik
ingds of top-level me
dently, only one of
has access to the Pre
again, Henry Kissin
spirit of the absent
terminate a discussion

"The President is bla

Visit to Vietnam

By GEORGE WA

CAMBRIDGE, Mass.—A
ago I was in Saigon with a
student delegation. My m
experience there was n
prisoners at a reception c
Buddhist pagoda, all of
been released within the
two to three weeks. They
in prison from three to fift
About half of them were o
tiger cages on Con Son Isl
marks of suffering were vis
them. One had been totally b
what we were told is a di
device at Con Son: throw
down on the prisoners. One
a leg. Several had difficulty
Each of them told his s
interpreter translating line
What impressed me most w
anger; they were bitterly an
that anger was directed mair
at their Government, but at o

Why? For one thing, every
every interrogation center in
Vietnam, has an American a
When Congressman William An
guided by a crude man that

By
ARI
Ving Now

The New York Times

229 WEST 43 STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

May 11, 1973

Dear Henry,

I am told you feel your visit to Moscow was much
more successful than I thought. But I am told you
know my deduction was largely based on your comment
to reporters as you left Moscow, and that we revised
after we learned of your London statement.

It's all past history, however, but it does remind
me that we have gotten out of touch. I'd be glad to
come down to Washington almost any time it would be
convenient for you.

KISSINGER, HENRY A./S*

Mrs. Manfred L. Schwarz

1760 East Main Street, Ottawa, Ohio

January 19, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger
White House
Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

No doubt you think I am presumptuous writing to you and addressing you in this manner.

As you go into your second year as adviser to the President, I want to wish you good health and wisdom in the awesome task you have before you.

I must say that it is with pride I read about you, especially since we had a common ancestor.

I saw your parents last year and hope they are in good health.

With my best wishes,

RECEIVED
JAN 26 1970
CENTRAL FILES

ATTENHOFERSTRASSE 16
8032 ZÜRICH

November 7, 1969

Dear Henry:

Thank you very much for your letter of October 25. It was most kind of you to try to give me some of your time in spite of your overwhelming schedule, and I was very sorry that your Secretary could not reach me when you had a free moment. I happened to be at the World Bank, across the street, at that moment.

My stay in Washington and New York was very useful for me. I could gather first hand impressions which widely differed from what the media convey. I came away from your country enormously reassured. I felt that the President's leadership begins to be felt and that the divisions within the nation are going to be bridged.

On the other hand I understood that US attitudes towards Europe are bound to change, and that the Europeans would be well advised to do something for their security in anticipation of the moment when your engagement will be reduced.

Upon my return, I have expressed these and similar views in a Radio broadcast, and in many discussions

With my best wishes,

RECEIVED

NOV 1 3 1969

CENTRAL FILES

MEMO FROM:

IRVING SCHWED

117 West End Ave.
Somerville, N.J. 08876

March 4, 1973

Dear Henry:-

As an alumnus of Lafayette College, class of 1912, I receive the college publication "Lafayette Alumnus". I am enclosing the most recent issue, which has an article about you by your former roommate, which I thought you would want to have. It seems like quite a coincidence that you probably roomed in Blair Hall and perhaps in the same two room suite, where I lived the last three years in college. I had two small rooms in the corner of the first floor of Blair Hall, which even then (over 60 years ago) was quite old but still comfortable as compared to some of the other dormitory rooms. It was torn down several years ago and a new modern building stands in its place.

I want to congratulate you on what you have accomplished in S.E. Asia and am proud to be a distant relative. I think my great-grandparents were probably your great-great-grandparents.

1118 LONGWORTH-HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202-225-6576

DISTRICT OFFICE:
404 UNION ARCADE
DAVENPORT, IOWA 52801
319-324-3527

ROBERT F. TYSON
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

FRED SCHWENGEL
1ST DISTRICT, IOWA

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

December 6, 1968

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
FLOOD CONTROL
ROADS
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUND
WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT
APPALACHIA

COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

SUBCOMMITTEES:
LIBRARY AND MEMORIALS
ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL OFFICE
EQUIPMENT

DEC 11 1968

Dr. Henry Kissinger
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

No appointment President-elect Nixon has made has pleased me more than yours to the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

I deeply regretted that we were unable to meet last summer when our activities were directed towards similar goals. It is my hope that we will have a chance to sit down and discuss some of the foreign policy problems we are facing.

You probably recall that I was a member of a team which went to Vietnam last year. While conditions have changed since that time, the report our team filed still is relevant. I am enclosing a copy for your consideration. Also enclosed is a copy of a speech I will make this weekend on foreign policy.

While in Vietnam several contacts were developed with some key people who are very knowledgeable. It is my feeling that it would be profitable for you and/or other key people in the new Administration to discuss the Vietnam challenge with at least one or two of these people. Since they presently are in government service and do not necessarily hold the views officially stated discretion must be used.

For this reason, I especially am anxious to meet with you so that I can personally put you in touch with these people. Be assured that I am willing to cooperate with you in any way possible and certainly want to offer any help I can provide to you in your new position.

With warmest regards,

FS:bb

December 8, 1968
United World Federalists
Davenport, Iowa

AMERICA BEWARE
ISOLATION IS COMING

One of your outstanding leaders in a magnificent book entitled "Waging Peace" made this challenging statement, "The expanding experience of destruction leads us to real issues -- peace or destruction."

He quoted General Marshall, "War is no longer an evil, it is intolerable."

The only alternative is finding a way to peace. It is my feeling that our program for peace must be directed to people. It must be understood by people. Diplomats, heads of state, and government leaders have largely bungled the programs for peace to date.

The position of our nation today places us in a position of heavy responsibility. It is a worthwhile to note what a Congressman said regarding foreign aid, "A nation that receives foreign aid and with it becomes the greatest nation on earth must not shirk in its responsibility to give foreign aid to others."

A foreigner speaking to us at a Joint Session on May 3, 1917, said "Just as a man of superior and powerful mind has a debt to all other men, so a superior and powerful nation owes a debt to other nations and after establishing its own independence must aid others to maintain their independence or conquer it".

maintain their independence or conduct it".

stabilizing its own independence must aid others to
benevolent nation own a dept to other nations and after
wind has a dept to all other man, so a subarior and
May 3, 1917, said "Just as a man of superior and powerful
A foreigner speaking to us at a joint session on
foreign aid to others."

earth must not shrink in its responsibility to give
foreign aid and with it becomes the greatest nation on
Congressman said regarding foreign aid, "A nation that receives
of heavy responsibility. It is a worthwhile to note what a
The position of our nation today places us in a position
to the programs for peace to date.

peoples of state, and Government fenders have largely pungled
to people. It must be understood by people. Diplomats,
we are feeling that our program for peace must be directed
The only alternative is finding a way to peace. It
will, it is intolerable."

He quoted General Marshall, "War is no longer an
issue -- peace or destruction."

"The expanding experience of destruction leads us to real
entitled "Waging Peace," made this challenging statement."

One of your outstanding leaders in a magnificent poor

ISOLATION IS COMING
AMERICAN NEWME

Davenport, Iowa
United World Federates
December 8, 1948

2

With these succinct statements that say so much as a background of my belief I briefly talk about what I fear is not "the Revival of Isolationism."

It is not possible for me to speak to you today as an academic expert on what makes an isolationist or an internationalist. But I can speak to you as someone who was an isolationist, as someone who has studied history with more than casual interest and as a legislator who has had to make some agonizing decisions in the foreign policy area, especially on foreign aid.

In talking about what seems to be a growing feeling of isolationism you cannot escape the contribution Vietnam has made to this movement.

People are frustrated, discouraged and disgusted about Vietnam.

Because of Vietnam --- because of a lack of clear-cut policy objectives our people are raising serious questions. They are impatient because of the many mistakes and inadequacies of our foreign aid and mutual security programs.

It would be a mistake of immense proportions if we allowed isolationism to prevail and become American policy as it did after World War I. It might mean that our children would have to challenge with great sacrifice, as we did in World War I. There are even more sinister forces in the world that would take over if we tried to withdraw from world problems and opportunities again.

that would take over it we tried to withdraw from world
World War I. There are even morePOWERFUL forces in the world
would have to challenge with great sacrifice, as we did in
as it did after World War I. It might mean that our children
would be more isolated to prevail and become American policy
It would be a mistake of immense proportions if we
inadequacies of our foreign aid and mutual security programs.
They are inattentive because of the many mistakes and
mistaken objectives our people are raising serious questions.
Because of Vietnam --- because of a lack of clear-cut
about Vietnam.

People are frustrated, discouraged and dispirited
because made to this movement.

of isolationism you cannot escape the contribution Vietnam
In talking about what seems to be a growing feeling
area, especially on foreign aid.

but to make some regarding decisions in the foreign policy
with more than causal interest and as a legislator who has
use an isolationist, as someone who has studied history
internationalist. But I can ask to you as someone who
an academic expert on what makes an isolationist or an
It is not desirable for me to ask to you today as
is 44 "The Beatnik of Isolationist".

background of my life! I primarily talk about what I fear
With these-and other statements that say so much as a

2

3

It is obvious that concerned people such as you and I
cannot alone stem a groundswell of isolation. What we need
is the kind of leadership in foreign affairs which will
re-establish the confidence of the people in our ability
to act responsibly and effectively in the international
arena.

To begin, we need an honest, frank and thorough
appraisal of our foreign policy, our alliances, our foreign
aid programs. Such a reappraisal and honest evaluation hope-
fully would help us avoid some of the mistakes of the past
and help us better prepare for the future.

One of the more perceptive and knowledgeable men
who has written much about our foreign policy and its
inadequacies is Edwin Reischauer.

He writes eloquently about the causes and the
futility of the war in Vietnam. He speaks with authority
on how we might have avoided the situation with trifling
costs compared to the price we have paid.

When talking about "Dynamic Change" he writes,
"Nationalism has its destructive and constructive aspects."
Reischauer suggests that we try to look beyond nationalism
to a more tolerant internationalism in which patriotism
to one's own nation can be part of a broader allegiance
to civilization as a whole. This kind of change does not
come easy. Today it is even more difficult.

come easily. Today it is even more difficult to civilisation as a whole. This kind of change does not to one's own nation can be part of a broader influence to a more tolerant internationalism in which pacifism and pacifist agriculture suggests that we try to look beyond nationalism "Nationalism has its destructive and constructive aspects." When talking about "Dynamic Change," he writes, "coats compared to the brutes we have had" on how we might have avoided the situation with trailing utility of the war in Vietnam. He abates with authority He writes elementarily about the causes and the independenties in Edwin Reischueren.

One of the more perceptive and knowledgeable men who have written much about our foreign policy and its and help us better prepare for the future. fully would help us avoid some of the mistakes of the past said programme. Such a resuscitation and honest evaluation perhaps of our foreign policy, our alliances, our foreign To begin, we need an honest, frank and thoroughness.

to act responsibly and effectively in the international re-adapted the confidence of the people in our ability to the kind of leadership in foreign affairs which will cannot a focus at least a groundswell of isolation. What we need It is obvious that concerned people such as you and I

3

4

Vietnam preoccupies all of us. As you know, I went to Vietnam last year. A group of us went, at non-government expense. We were impressed, not with our own effort, or that of the Government of South Vietnam, but with the people themselves.

They have their own culture, their own way of life which must be respected. It was obvious to us, and best said by a Vietnamese Major, that their must be a marriage, so to speak, of Vietnamese culture and Western technology.

This really is our basic task, the development of Vietnam so that communism will be an unattractive alternative. To say that the effort today is ineffective is an understatement.

In our report to the President and Congress we suggested that the military effort which has now costs the lives of 30,000 boys and 130,000 wounded men and one hundred billion dollars has been largely futile to date. Primarily, I believe, because the military which is running the show over there, does not recognize the true nature of the war.

You simply cannot separate out the political, economic and social and military aspects of the effort. Let's face it, our military simply is not trained or prepared to effectively fight this kind of war.

It, our military simply is not trained or prepared to
and social and military aspects of the effort. Let's face
You simply cannot separate out the political, economic
nature of the war.

running the show over there, does not recognize the true
date. Primarily, I believe, because the military which is
one hundred trillion dollars has been largely futile to
the lives of 30,000 boys and 120,000 wounded men and
assisted that the military effort which has now ceases
In our report to the President and Congress we
understatement.

To say that the effort today is ineffective is an
Vietnam so that communists will be an unattractive alternative.

This really is our past task, the development of
to ask, of Vietnamese culture and Western technology.
by a Vietnamese major, that their must be a marriage, so
which must be respected. It was obvious to us, and past study
They have their own culture, their own way of life
but with the people themselves.

own effort, or that of the Government of South Vietnam,
Government expense. We were impressed, not with our
want to Vietnam last year. A group of us went, at non-
Vietnam brookholds all of us. As you know, I

4

5

[LC]

We have to try to solve political problems and solve economic and social ills.

This has to be done by people who understand the totality of the problem, who understand that respect for people and their basic human rights must be paramount.

One of our biggest problems in Vietnam today is the huge bureaucracy we have built in that small nation. In fact, a problem that the government of South Vietnam has is that a couple 10,000 of their most able technicians are employed by the American government. The South Vietnamese need those skills we are using to build their own country.

The U. S. AID program, although doing its best, has also been strangled by the bureaucracy. We have 29 education specialists in Vietnam. Twenty-two of them are in Saigon. Only seven are out in the provinces where the action is.

Example after example can be cited about delay, mismanagement and plain incomptency. We have built thousands of classrooms -- but have not had optimum use of the facilities because of lack of teachers and poor class scheduling. We built a big vocational training school at DaNang four years ago. The equipment to be used for training, or what's left of it, hasn't been unpacked yet.

unbacked yet.

needed for training, or what's left of it, hasn't been
school at Beihang four years ago. The equipment to be
book class scheduling. We put a pig educational training
use of the facilities because of lack of teachers and
thousands of classrooms -- but have not had optimum
management and plain incompetence. We have put
Example after example can be cited about delay,  
a  
action, ie.

in Saigon. Only seven are out in the provinces where the
education specialist in Vietnam. Twenty-two of them are
also been arranged by the bureaucracy. We have 29
The U. S. AID program, although doing its best, has
our country.

Vietnamese need those skills we are using to put their
are employed by the American Government. The South
has is that a couple 10,000 of their most able technicians
fact, a problem that the Government of South Vietnam
huge bureaucracy we have put in that small nation. In
One of our biggest problems in Vietnam today is the
people and their pace human rights must be paramount.
toality of the problem, who understand that respect for
This has to be done by people who understand the
economic and social life.

2

6

To those people who maintain that this kind of thing
is an evil but a necessary by-product of the war, I say
nonsense. We can't afford this kind of waste, not in terms
of dollars and cents, but of an opportunity to build the
kind of Vietnam which could stand up for itself without our
help.

It is perfectly clear to me that we need a new
management team in Vietnam. We need people who have no
vested interest. We need people who will make tough
decisions.

We could reduce the size of our commitment in personnel,
both military and civilian, immediately with some tough
reorganization.

Whatever the outcome of negotiations, a pacification
program, or as we prefer, a program for security, progress
and prosperity must go forward. It should be taken out of
the hands of the military and placed in the hands of experienced
and capable civilians.

We must take a firmer stand against corruption.
Some people say that we have made progress because Vietnamese
Army officers no longer want to be province chiefs since
there has been a crack down on corruption at that level.
But, is it progress? Why aren't there Army officers who
want the posts because they now represent an opportunity
to make an honest effort for their people and government?

to make an honest effort for their people and Government!
went the boats because they now represent an opportunity
But, is it progress? Why aren't Army officers who
canals had been a crack down on corruption at that level.
Army officers no longer want to be provinces cities since
some people say that we have made progress because Vietcong
We must take a must firm stand against corruption.
and capable civilians.

the hands of the military and placed in the hands of experienced
and prosperity must go forward. It should be taken out of
program, or so we believe, a program for security, progress
Whatever the outcome of negotiations, a settlement
reorganization.

both military and civilian, immediately with some tough
decisions.
We could reduce the size of our commitment in Vietnam.

waited interest. We need people who will make tough
management team in Vietnam. We need people who have no
It is perfectly clear to me that we need a new
part.

kind of Vietnam which could stand up for itself without our
of dollars and cents, put at an opportunity to put the
nonessence. We can't afford this kind of waste, not in terms
it's an evil put a necessarily py-product of the war, I say
To those people who maintain that this kind of thing

9

7

Finally, we must evolve programs which will deal
effectively with the economic and social problems so that
true prosperity and progress to the people in Vietnam.
This can happen in that part of the world -- witness Japan.

There is no doubt in my mind that a more credible
effort on our part in Vietnam will help mitigate the slowly
growing feeling of isolation in our nation.

But there are other ways as well. Stronger foreign
policy leadership will also be of tremendous help. But those
of us who are concerned must be willing to speak up and point
out the dangers of isolationism.

It would seem that all we should have to do is to
point to what happened to the world when the United States
reverted to isolationism after World War I to prevent it
from happening again. But, we must do more.

There are those today who are calling for retrenchment,
for a withdrawal from world affairs. This is a foolhardy
course in a world becoming more interdependent each day.

The extent to which nations are interdependent today
is no where better demonstrated than by the series of
international economic crises we seem to be experiencing.
While national currencies are at stake, it has taken the
coordinated action of many countries to save at one time
or another the American dollar, the French franc and the
British pound.

British hormone.

or another the American dollar, the French franc and the
coordinated action of many countries to come at one time
While national currencies are at stake, it has taken the
international economic crisis we seem to be experiencing.
is no where better demonstrated than by the series of
the extent to which nations are interdependent today
course in a world becoming more interdependent each day.
for a withdrawal from world affairs. This is a periodically
there are those today who are calling for retrenchment,
from habitation again. But, we must do more.
reverted to isolationism after World War I to prevent it
bent to adjust happened to the world when the United States
It would seem that all we should have to do is to
out the dangers of isolationism.

of us who are concerned must be willing to bear up and bear
beyond leadership will also be of tremendous help. But those
But there are other ways as well. Stronger foreign
Bowing bowing of isolation in our nation.

efforts on our part in Vietnam will help mitigate the slowly
there is no doubt in my mind that a more credible


This can happen in that part of the world -- witness Vietnam.
true brotherhood and progress to the people in Vietnam.

effectively with the economic and social problems so that
simply, we must evolve programs which will deal

7

8

As a powerful nation with vast resources we cannot escape our responsibility. We cannot "make heaven in our own country and think we can leave hell outside."

Queen Wilhemina, when addressing a joint session of Congress in 1942, said, "Moreover, where and what would the world be today were it not for the United States of America whose legislators you are?"

While I fear Queen Wilhemina may have overstated our contributions, there is no doubt that she also meant to point out the heavy responsibility that is ours.

But, it generally has not been difficult to successfully challenge the American people to participate in the foreign arena when there has been constructive and forward-looking programs and leadership.

Vietnam, a dispirited foreign aid program, a foreign policy which doesn't make sense has dulled our people's interest in foreign affairs. More importantly it has negatively affected the confidence of the American people that we can be effective in foreign affairs.

This means that strong positive steps must be taken soon so that this confidence can be renewed.

soon so that this confidence can be restored.

This means that strong positive steps must be taken
that we can be effective in foreign affairs.

negatively affected the confidence of the American people
interest in foreign affairs. More importantly it has
bitterly which doesn't make sense has quelled our people's
Vietnam's a dispirited foreign aid program, a foreign
forward-looking program and leadership.

in the foreign areas when there has been constructive and
successfully challenge the American people to participate
But, it generally has not been sufficient to
to point out the heavy reclusibility that is ours.

our contributions, there is no doubt that these also meant
While I fear Queen Willemina may have overestimated
whose legislators you are?"

world be today were it not for the United States of America
Congress in 1942, said, "Moreover, where and what would the
Queen Willemina, when addressing a joint session of
our country and think we can leave well outside."

We a powerful nation with vast resources we cannot
escape our reclusibility. We cannot "make heaven in our

8

9

[LC]

We need a foreign policy that makes sense and faces reality. It seems to me we haven't fully understood the politics of the under-developed countries. However, well meaning our efforts in this area, they often have been misinterpreted as an attempt to prevent change and preserve the status quo.

In Asia this is disastrous. Unlike in Europe where our programs were for recovery and defense, in Asia this is not the real need. There is very little to be recovered. The status quo must be changed, not defended. The slow process of evolution from colonialism to independence has not been fast enough.

These are the kind of realities we don't like to think about and would rather not consider. And, because we have ignored them, we find ourselves in a mess today.

Time does not permit me to go into every area of the world to demonstrate the inadequacies of our foreign policy. Suffice it to say that the evidence is abundant, that we have failed in obtaining the kind of objectives we should seek. This is confirmed by the President himself, who when asked about foreign policy said, "We have 120 nations in the world with which we do business, so we have 120 different foreign policies". The President spoke the truth, but he was also pointing to the tragedy. It is impossible to have 120 different foreign policies.

impossible to have ISO different foreign policies.
the truth, but he was also pointing to the tragedy. It is
have ISO different foreign policies." The President agrees
nations in the world with which we do business, so we
who when asked about foreign policy said, "We have ISO
we should see. This is confirmed by the President himself,
that we have failed in obtaining the kind of objectives
policy." Suffice it to say that the evidence is abundant,
the world to demonstrate the inadequacy of our foreign
This does not permit me to go into every area of
flustered them, we find ourselves in a mess today.
about and would rather not consider. And, because we have
These are the kind of realities we don't like to think
not been that enough.
process of evolution from colonialism to independence has
The status quo must be changed, not defended. The slow
it not the real need. There is very little to be recovered.
our programs were for recovery and defense, in Asia this
In Asia this is disastrous. Unlike in Europe where
the status quo.
misunderstood as an attempt to prevent change and preserve
well meaning our efforts in this area, they often have been
the politics of the under-developed countries. However,
takes reality. It seems to me we haven't fully understood
We need a foreign policy that makes sense and
9

10

It is time to have one policy with 120 ingenious American ways to implement that policy. It is time that we declare and articulate a clear understanding of our mission in the world and to make certain the world knows we have no selfish interests.

It is clear now that both the policy of containment does not work and is insufficient.

It is my recommendation that our foreign policy be one that is dedicated to the preservation and encouragement of our own ideas and ideals in and with freedom and that while we seek to establish and encourage the basic freedoms we cherish in every part of the globe where there are people that we also resist the defeat of the forces that would destroy freedom. This must be done first with an intelligent appeal to the better natures of people and that we resort to arms only when all other remedies have been exhausted.

In the basic freedoms that we should establish and promote are:

1. Freedom from want.

2. Freedom from fear.

3. Freedom of religion

4. Freedom of speech.

5. Freedom of movement.

2. Freedom of movement.

4. Freedom of speech.

3. Freedom of religion.

2. Freedom from fear.

1. Freedom from want.

promote are:

2. The basic freedoms that we should encapsulate and
been enhanced.

that we resort to arms only when all other remedies have
intimidated abate to the better nature of people and
democracy freedom. This must be done first with an
that we also resort to the defeat of the force that would
we cheriah in every part of the globe where there are people
while we seek to encapsulate and encourage the basic freedoms
of our own ideas and ideals in and with freedom and that
one that is dedicated to the preservation and encouragement
It is my recommendation that our foreign policy be
does not work and is ineffective.

It is clear now that both the policy of conservation
we have no longer interests.

mation in the world and to make certain the world knows
we declare and articulate a clear understanding of our
American ways to implement that policy. It is time that
It is time to pass one policy with 150 ingenuity

10

11

To establish and implement these ideals and this broad program, we must reappraise, redirect and rededicate the Department of State so that we do something about the inadequacies of the knowledge and understanding we, as a people, bring to foreign relations.

As a part of that program, we need to do much more than we are doing to educate our people on intelligent involvement.

To get a sound basis for policy formulation, we must have an opportunity to more fully integrate and coordinate our programs to obtain our objectives. This means that our defense regulations, military commitments and military appearances abroad constitute extremely important aspects of our foreign relations. All these areas need to fit in with our goals and programs. We have had cases in the past when in a single country, the military, the C.I.A., the A.I.D. Mission and the embassy all went their somewhat independent ways. These are absurdities and make for fragmentation rather than solution. Also, experience should tell us now the C.I.A. should not be engaged in political activities and should be limited to intelligence matters.

Very important, too, is that we free ourselves from the outmoded diplomacy and adapt ourselves to the later 20th Century. As Reischauer points out, most of the rules of diplomacy were formulated in the 19th Century and reflect even more the 18th Century.

even more the 18th Century.

diplomacy were formulated in the 18th Century and reflect
Century. As Reichsprecher points out, most of the rules of
outmoded diplomacy and adapt ourselves to the later 20th

Very important, too, is that we free ourselves from the
activities and should be limited to intelligence matters.

tell us now the C.I.V. should not be engaged in political
fragmentation rather than solution. Also, experience should
independent ways. These are agencies and make for

the V.I.D. Mission and the embassy all went their somewhat

back when in a single country, the military, the C.I.V.,
with our goals and programs. We have had cases in the

aberrances abroad constitute extremely important aspects

involvement.

than we are going to equate our people on intellectual

influences of the knowledge and understanding we, as a

proud program, we must reëmbraie, redirect and rebroadcast

If

11

final

There can be no doubt that there is a crises period
ahead for us both as we deal with a solution to Vietnam and
as we seek to find and resist the trend toward isolationism,
but I believe, as Carl Sandburg said a few months before he
died when speaking of our present crises, "You know, Fred,
I read history some and I believe we have had crises periods
before in America of immense proportions, but always there
was enough of the basic goodness in our fabric to pull us
through."

The, speaking confidently and placing his hand on
my shoulder said, "Fred, I believe the basic goodness is
still there."

May I suggest, too, that 1776 was a crises period and
it was then that the founders of our great nation showed a
political wisdom that has never been equaled. -- Surely their
contribution did not exhaust the political geniuses of the
American people. -- In learning from both literature and
experience that formed a way of life and gave us an ordered
society of spiritual and intellectual freedom that has
done more than any other system to bring about the Biblical
promise of "The Abundant Life".

Such a society and its people should be able to produce
the answers to the crises of our time, domestic and foreign.

the answers to the crises of our time, domestic and foreign.
Such a society and its people should be able to produce
broadly of "The Antipast Life".

done more than any other system to bring about the Bipartisan
society of spiritual and intellectual freedom that has
experience that formed a way of life and gave us an ordered
American people. -- In learning from both literature and
contribution did not exhaust the political essence of the
political wisdom that has never been studied. -- Surely their
it was then that the founders of our great nation showed a
May I suggest, too, that there was a crisis period and
still there."

My answer said, "Greg, I believe the pastic goodness is
Tuesday, explicitly and placing life apart on
through."

was enough of the pastic goodness in our fabric to build us
before in America of immense proportions, but always there
I read history some and I believe we have had crisis periods
died when bearing of our present crises, "You know, Greg,
but I believe, as Carl Sandburg said a few months before he
as we ask to find and react the trend toward isolationism,
spared for us both as we deal with a solution to Vietnam and
there can be no doubt that there is a crisis period

this!

final-2

We can, if we will, demonstrate to ourselves and the world
that we are really great by responding to the gravity of
our time. So now, when we are faced with perils as I
believe we are, it behooves us as citizens, as Americans,
individually and collectively, to prove our worth.

Organizations like yours are properly motivated,
and qualified and I suggest you continue to do what you are
doing and get others to do what needs to be done by making
other men wiser and better as we can find or make opportunity
to do so by paying attention to the perils and to the
opportunities.

opportunities.

to do so by selling attention to the berlis and to the
other men whom we want to better as we can find or make opportunity
going and get others to do what needs to be done by making
and desitituted and I suggest you continue to do what you are
Organizations like yours are properly motivated,

prove we are, if possible, as citizens, as Americans,
our time. So now, when we are faced with berlis as I
that we are really great by responding to the gravity of
We can, if we will, demonstrate to ourselves and the world
that we can, if we will, demonstrate to ourselves and the world

United States
of America

(NOT PRINTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE)

10

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

[c]

Vol. 114

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1968

No. 18

House of Representatives

REPORT ON VOLUNTEERS FOR
VIETNAM ASSOCIATION

Mr. SCHWENGEL. Mr. President, yes-
terday several members of the Volunteers
for Vietnam Association went to the
White House to give a report on our trip
to Vietnam to President Johnson. We
met for an hour with Mr. Walt Rostow,
special assistant to the President, to
discuss the contents of the report.

Today Congressman WILLIAM COWGER, of Kentucky, and I offer the report of the Volunteers for Vietnam Association for the consideration of the American people. It is our hope that the report will serve to bring more rationality, calmness, and objectivity to the discussion and debate on the problems that are presented by Vietnam. It should be emphasized that the approach of the Volunteers for Vietnam has been nonpartisan. The organization does not seek to influence any legislation, and will absolutely refrain from any kind of political activity. It is in this spirit that the report is presented.

Comments, suggestions, criticisms, and
questions which might result from the
reading of the report are welcome.

Now, the report, Mr. Speaker, follows:

PREFAKE

Concern in the United States about the
War in Vietnam has been expressed in a
variety of ways. Demonstrations, draft-card
burnings, counter-demonstrations, emotion-
packed speeches, all have marked the debate
over the involvement of the United States
in Vietnam. Charges and countercharges
have been hurled by supporters and de-
tractors of the United States policy in Viet-
nam.

The Volunteers for Vietnam Association
was formed to try to bring a greater de-
gree of rationality and objectivity to the
discussion of the Vietnam War and the
American involvement in that war, espe-
cially the political, economic and social prob-
lems presented. Volunteers for Vietnam is a
group of people representing a broad spec-
trum of American life, organized to study
the question of the Vietnam War in depth.

Volunteers for Vietnam, led by Congress-
man Fred Schwengel (Rep-Iowa) who repre-
sents Iowa's First Congressional District in
Washington, decided that a trip to Vietnam
would be necessary to accomplish the pur-
poses of the organization. Extensive prepa-
rations for the trip were made. Those se-
lected to make the fact-finding trip spent
several months reading about Vietnam and
interviewing people from the entire political
spectrum who claimed any expertise on
Vietnam.

The fact-finding team went to make first
hand studies, gather facts and ask questions;
to make the first hand evaluations of pres-
ent programs, especially in economic, polit-

ical and social development; and to con-
sider new ideas and plans proposed to meet
the challenge offered by Vietnam. The trip
was made at private expense. After making
the trip to Vietnam and completing its
studies, Volunteers for Vietnam decided to
write a report of its findings, making it
available to the American people with the
hope that it would increase public under-
standing and knowledge of the problems and
challenges confronting the United States in
Vietnam.

As a result, the Volunteers for Vietnam
fact-finding team went to Vietnam well pre-
pared. A conscious attempt was made to re-
solve many of the inconsistencies and con-
tradictions which were found in reading and
interviews done by the group before depart-
ing for Vietnam.

The Volunteers for Vietnam fact-finding
team left for Southeast Asia on Thursday,
November 16, arriving in Saigon on Satur-
day, November 18.

While in Vietnam, team members conferred
with a large number of United States officials,
both military and civilian. A complete itin-
erary of the group appears as an appendix.
The conferences were marked by extensive
question and answer sessions. The team di-
vided its responsibilities after the initial con-
ferences with United States officials, with
each team member pursuing his special in-
terest or studying in his area of competence.
Different team members met with a number
of Vietnamese leaders, both political and
religious, representing various age groups
and points of view. The Senate of the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam held a reception for the
team while it was in Saigon. A cross section
of newspaper correspondents, businessmen
and other Americans were also contacted.

Team members spread out over a large area
of Vietnam. Klen Hoa, Tay Ninh, Vung Tau,
Nha Trang, Da Nang were among places
visited by team members. At each stop, team
members talked to Americans and Viet-
nese working on rural development, self-
help and other nation-building programs.
Tours of U.S. military bases to see and talk
to United States servicemen were also made.

After spending ten days in Vietnam, the
fact-finding team spent one day in Bangkok,
Thailand, to confer with U.S. officials there.
Two team members, Dr. Ernest Griffith and
Allan Schimmel, returned to Saigon to spend
three additional days there studying items
not fully covered by the team before.

What follows is the report of Volunteers
for Vietnam based on its studies and trip
to Vietnam. It is not offered as being all-in-
clusive or all-encompassing; rather in the
hope that it will bring a greater degree of
objectivity and rationality to the discussion
regarding the Vietnamese war.

TEAM MEMBERS

Congressman Fred Schwengel, President of
Volunteers for Vietnam and Iowa's First Dis-
trict Representative—serving eleventh year
in the House of Representatives. Serves on
the Public Works and House Administration
committees. Served for ten years in the Iowa

Legislature. Acknowledged expert in the his-
tory of the United States Capitol and Abram-
ham Lincoln.

Congressman William Cowger, represents
the Third District of Kentucky. Formerly was
the Mayor of Louisville. In first term in the
House. Member of the Government Opera-
tions and House Administration committees.
President of the Republican 90th Club. Is an
investment banker in Louisville.

Dr. Ernest Griffith, Washington, D.C. Re-
cently retired as Dean of the School of Inter-
national Service at American University.
Served for 18 years as head of the Legislative
Reference Service of the Library of Congress.
Is renowned political scientist and the au-
thor of several books. Was visiting Fulbright
professor lecturing in American foreign pol-
icy in Iran, Japan and Turkey during 1966-
67 school year.

J. W. Baccarini, Orrville, Ohio. Assistant
to President of Crown Steel Products. Served
as Executive Director of Self-Help, Inc., an
Iowa-based firm which gathered, rebuilt and
exported used agricultural and industrial
machinery. Was project director for the
American Freedom from Hunger Foundation.
Was a delegate to the United Nations World
Food Conference in 1963. Was a member of
a five man trade delegation to the Middle
East in 1966 for the United States Commerce
Department.

Robert Henry, Springfield, Ohio. One of the
first Negro mayors elected in the United
States. Served on the city commission of
Springfield since 1962. Took office as Mayor
in 1966. Was presented with an Outstanding
Service Award in 1966 for his efforts in pro-
moting "better understanding and the feel-
ing of brotherhood among all persons regard-
less of race or creed," by the Ohio State
House of Representatives.

Rev. Louis Valbracht, Des Moines, Iowa.
Pastor of the St. John's Lutheran Church.
Served as a Chaplain with the Marine Corps
during World War II.

Rev. Heinz Grabla, Davenport, Iowa. Pastor
of the Calvary Baptist Church. Was recently
elected President of the Scott County Minis-
terial Association. Serves on the Executive
Committee of the General Council of the
American Baptist Convention.

Vernon Shephard, Muscatine, Iowa. Is a
farmer. Represented the agricultural com-
munity on the team. Has traveled to Japan as
a member of a Soybean Trade Mission.

Mrs. Harold Day, Des Moines, Iowa. Is the
mother of a Marine who was in Vietnam.
Went on the trip to represent a mother's and
a housewife's point of view. Employed as
Secretary at the Republican State Central
Committee of Iowa.

Allan Schimmel, Legislative Assistant to
Congressman Schwengel. Accompanied the
group as its arrangements coordinator. Has a
Masters Degree in Political Science from the
University of Iowa.

I. INTRODUCTION

It might be helpful at the outset to sum-
marize the more relevant background mate-
rial on Vietnam. The various items of in-

formation are grouped under three headings. First those items which the team feels are established; second, those probably; and third, those possible and sufficiently relevant to be considered.

### Established

(1) The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were explicitly rejected by the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The United States refused to approve them; shortly thereafter making its rejection explicit.

(2) The Geneva Agreement of 1962, signed among others by the government of North Vietnam, (providing for the neutrality of Laos) has been violated by the government of North Vietnam. These violations have been of material military assistance to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese in the present war. They have consisted of the movement of men and supplies through Laos into South Vietnam, and the stationing of North Vietnamese troops in Laos to guard the supply routes and support the communist Pathet Lao forces.

(3) The original Viet Minh or nationalist rebellion against the French, while led by Ho Chi Minh, was not in its early stages obviously communist, although it included the Communist Party of Indo-China—which ultimately proved to be the strongest element.

(4) Both South and North Vietnam were from their inception juridically valid nations under international law. South Vietnam was so recognized by a clear majority (over sixty) of the nations. A number of both communist and non-communist countries have extended similar recognition to North Vietnam. Not until the recent elections in the South could either claim a legitimacy based upon popular support as demonstrated by a secret ballot with alternatives offered. (It should be noted that the Communist definition of "legitimacy" is based upon control by the Communist Party, even though in a minority. This is why the Communists insist that the National Liberation Front is "the only" legitimate government of South Vietnam. No Communist-controlled nation has ever allowed its "electorate" a free choice of alternatives with a secret ballot.)

(5) Both South and North Vietnam believe in ultimate union as one nation.

(6) The SEATO Treaty Protocol designated South Vietnam as a territory coming under the provision of Article IV. The relevant portions are: "Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack against any territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes no action so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned."

(7) Such action has been invited and consented to by the government of South Vietnam. Affirmative responses have been made by: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, France, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom have not acted. South Korea subsequently has joined in the assistance program by sending a substantial military contingent.

(8) Internal subversion, with or without external assistance (under the misleading title of "wars of national liberation") remains explicitly a part of the dogma and policy of both the Soviet Union and Communist China. It is exempt from the program of "peaceful coexistence" of the Soviet Union.

(9) The Peking official radio has explicitly advocated such subversion in Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia. It is progressing in the first two, with obvious assistance from across their borders.

(10) The Soviet Union and Communist China have rendered substantial assistance, military and otherwise, to the Viet Cong and North Vietnam. The United States has extended much greater aid to the South.

(11) Cambodia is thus far a privileged sanctuary for the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

(12) The United States pressed the authoritarian Diem regime in South Vietnam for reforms, with initially encouraging but ultimately disappointing results.

(13) Guerrilla warfare requires a ratio of regular forces variously estimated at 4 to 10 to 10 to 1 to combat it successfully. These ratios make outside help virtually a necessity for a seriously threatened small nation. Even without a sanctuary or substantial aid from across the border, the combined British and Malaysian forces numbering 50,000 took twelve years against 8,000 guerrillas. Because of our greater mobility, we may be able to improve somewhat on these ratios in the Mekong Delta, but not in the jungle.

(14) Substantial support for the established central government on the part of the populace is a prerequisite for success against guerrillas. Guerrillas use terror to inhibit such support. This can only be countered by a combination of security and a positive program to demonstrate that the central government really cares for the welfare of the people.

(15) The 37 day pause in the bombing of North Vietnam early in 1966 did not result in negotiations, although there is evidence that the Vietnamese and Viet Cong were considering entering such negotiations.

(16) Following the Geneva Agreement of 1954, nearly 1,000,000 persons (chiefly Catholic) moved from the North to the South, and perhaps 100,000 from the South to the North.

(17) Neither the North nor the South conform to the proviso of the Geneva Agreements that elections with proper safeguards be held by 1956.

(18) The United States has appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations to consider the problem of Vietnam.

(19) The war is terribly costly in money and lives to all concerned.

(20) President Johnson has promised the South Vietnamese that we will not withdraw our military support until their independence is assured.

(21) The French influence and pat record are making the solution in Vietnam difficult for Americans.

(22) The Vietnam issue has, to a considerable extent, divided our own country.

(23) There is no reason why negotiations, if desired by the North, should require cessation of the bombing. There is precedent in history for this.

### Probable

(1) Had the South freely voted on the question of joining the North (under Ho Chi Minh) in 1956, a majority would have so voted.

(2) In 1956 it was not clear to the ordinary rank and file person in the South that the government of the North was Communist; nor was the nature of a Communist regime clear to them.

(3) The elections in the South (1967) demonstrated that a clear majority of the adult population was unwilling to follow the Viet Cong-Communist directive to boycott the elections. This boycott was also called for by the "militant" Buddhists.

(4) The United States has a "national interest" in a free, non-Communist South Vietnam. Factors are: a) the greatly weakened positions of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore—and other nations of South and East Asia—if the United States withdraws and the combination of guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars succeeds in their objectives, b) the economic and strategic importance of South East Asia to the Free World and c) the impaired confidence in the United States throughout the world (see recent *Newsweek* survey) if the United States withdraws.

(5) Our Vietnamese allies are counting on our commitment and aid, and will be in grave personal danger (as well as national) if we withdraw.

(6) Indonesia was strengthened in her successful anti-Communist internal struggle by our presence in Vietnam.

(7) At least temporarily, the regard for us in parts of Western Europe has been impaired.

(8) The Vietnam war has hampered psychologically and financially an all-out attack on many of our national problems.

(9) The majority of Congress believed at the time that the Gulf of Tonkin resolution meant the authorization to involve our armed forces: "The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia . . . the United States is therefore prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state (i.e., South Vietnam) of the Southeast Asia, Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

(10) China has shown aggressive tendencies—Tibet, Korea, India, and the training of subversive cadres designed to operate against a number of South Asian nations.

(11) Prior to the United States combat participation, the South Vietnamese were nearly at the point of losing the war. (see "Established" number 13 above.)

(12) North Vietnamese cadres had infiltrated the South prior to United States participation in actual combat. Commencing in early 1965, United States forces conducted "retalietary attacks against the North," and soon thereafter North Vietnamese regular army units and United States units were engaged in combat in the South.

(13) The United States Military up to 1966 issued consistently too optimistic reports of the military situation.

(14) Anti-war demonstrations in the United States encourage the Communist side. They are played up in the Hanoi press and radio.

(15) The war on the Communist side is now directed from North Vietnam, and probably was always primarily so planned.

(16) "Negotiations" in Communist terms usually involve stalling and public propaganda.

(17) The war is a "test case", with both sides, as to the feasibility of subversion across a border or aided from outside. This is currently the favored method of communist aggression. This is the rationale of the continuation of Soviet and Chinese aid to be used in military action in the South. It is explicitly exempted from the policy of "peace-coexistence". This is one reason we have attached such importance to the war's outcome.

(18) There have been occasional signs of a willingness to negotiate by the North, recently made explicit, in return for an unconditional stopping of the bombing by the United States. No corresponding deescalation on the part of the North has been indicated in such an event.

(19) China would risk her status as a nuclear power, should she intervene in the Vietnam war.

### Possible

(1) Communist China may revert to "war lordism", thus lessening its effectiveness and perhaps even stopping its aid and the weight of its prestige in North Vietnam.

(2) Communist China conceivably may intervene militarily if the Allies invade the North; or if she believes the North to be losing.

(3) Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union might conceivably improve if the war ends. The Soviet Union has intimated as much.

(4) An evolution of communist states into national socialism and eventually much greater freedom and political democracy are possible. (However, what happens meanwhile is more to the point, and communism gains prestige with each success.)

(5) Certain escalations on our part seem to have been coincidental with certain rumors or even indications of a willingness to negotiate on the part of Hanoi.

(6) In the end, the war may narrow down to a conflict of values—involving irreconcilable views as to political democracy, the great freedoms, and the nature and dignity of the individual.

often resented. The new Constitution provides for an "Inspectorate", charged with the exposure of corruption, one third appointed, by each of the three branches. It has not yet been appointed, largely because the new judicial system has not yet been constituted.

Corruption is not a problem which can be under-stated. It is one of the causes for lack of confidence in and lack of support of the GVN in both rural and urban areas. While it takes place at all levels of government, it seems to be most damaging at the province and district levels. Corruption cannot be ended overnight.

Inflation is a major difficulty standing in the way of remedy. Government salaries have lagged far behind the increases in the cost of living, and for men with family responsibilities corruption or moonlighting may appear the only avenues open to them.

The National Assembly, the Thieu-Ky Government, and others are aware of the problem. But the desire and the ability of these people and the government to deal forthrightly with corruption will be crucial. While there are some signs of hope, especially in the promised elections of province chiefs and the attitude of certain leaders in the National Assembly, the outlook is cloudy. Progress will be slow especially if the inflation wage spiral cannot be mastered. Vietnam today is much like the national, state, and municipal governments in the United States during the 1870's.

Furthermore, the United States can and must insist on adequate controls of material imported under AID. Several recommendations have been made by the Government Operations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The team feels that these recommendations should be carried out to the extent possible.

## Bureaucracy

A bit more difficult to pinpoint exactly is the problem of getting action in the administrative bureaucracy of the GVN in Saigon. When the team was in Saigon reliable sources estimated the GVN had spent only 40-50% of its 1967 calendar year budget. Far too often team members heard reports about inaction on the part of GVN ministries which was holding up progress in one area or another. Also of concern is the belief of the team that our actions may be accentuating this problem. For example, one Vietnamese cabinet minister tells of being called upon by representatives of five different U.S. government agencies in regard to the same decision. The solution to this problem is not easy.

Bureaucratic inertia is a problem in the U.S. as well. It does seem advisable, however, that the actions of U.S. advisory personnel at the national government level be better coordinated. It is not impossible for us to be giving too much and perhaps even contradictory advice.

## A nation?

This section was started with a question "Can Vietnam become a stable nation and does the Government of Vietnam have the ability to win the confidence of the people of South Vietnam?"

Nation-building is a long and complicated process at best. Even the United States was not a fully developed nation until after the Civil War. Some African states today are little more than geographic collections of tribes. Traditional Asian cultures—except for Japan, and more recently Iran, Turkey, and Thailand—have not been hospitable to nationalism and patriotism. Vietnam is no exception. Nationalism has usually been an attribute of a limited elite, although it is gradually extending itself with the improvement of communications and other factors such as the resentments associated with colonialism.

Democratic political institutions are certainly on the plus side. Widespread interest in the framing of the new Constitution and at the least perfunctory participation in the recent series of elections under most difficult circumstances are encouraging. Reference will be made presently to cooperative self-help in the hamlets and elsewhere. Civic loyalty programs are used in the indoctrina-

tion of the armed forces and the Rural Development cadres. To a limited extent they are finding their way into the curricula of the schools. When the province chiefs are elected, a further factor will be added. The government at all levels is being prodded by its elected officials and representatives to do more for the people. It is responding surprisingly well, and more often than not is showing initiative in this regard. In due time integrated political parties will doubtless emerge. The fact that the Thieu-Ky government was elected by a plurality and not a majority has made clear its need to extend its popular base—which it must earnestly try to do.

The future of Vietnam's national economy, given the war's end, is important in national-building. Important factors are land reform and land productivity—neither of which has passed beyond its initial stages. The nation's industrial potential is considerable, although relatively little has been undertaken on account of the war. Construction and other projects associated with the war, many of them requiring mechanical competence, will leave the nation with a very substantial body of skilled labor. The Mekong Valley project for all the nations of the area is far along in its planning and some of the plans have been carried out.

Vietnam's people are relatively well nourished and definitely industrious and energetic. Their individual self-centeredness lends itself to private enterprise motivations.

The guerrilla war is not likely to end suddenly, nor will our aid be completely withdrawn for a number of years—in loans, if not grants.

Repairing, road building, and other war-delayed public works will be numerous. Many young men will wish further education.

All in all, at least a retention of the present GNP level and even of the present rate of increase is a not unreasonable expectation. The experience of the Republic of China, Korea, and Thailand can be duplicated. The abilities of the Vietnamese are in no way inferior to these peoples.

A most important factor in nation-building is the presence (versus absence) of able leaders. The French did not allow such men to emerge in any number. The Viet Cong killed a high percentage of the incipient leaders in their systematic assassinations, and incorporated others into their own cadres in the anti-colonial period. Diem suppressed rivals. After allowing for all of these factors there are emerging unmistakably a considerable number (however inadequate as yet) of energetic and even dedicated leaders. The new cabinet and the newly elected Assembly contain many good men. Thieu and Ky belong to this group. The elections certainly helped to identify others. There is reason to be cautiously optimistic about the long range possibilities. It will depend on the quality of leadership to be found at all levels of government. It will depend on the willingness of these officials to eliminate corruption. It will depend on how soon elections for the province chiefs are held and what will result from those elections. It will depend on the aggressiveness of the National Assembly. It will depend on the desire of the executive branch to institute meaningful reforms and its ability to step up the pace of its bureaucracy. It will depend on the desire of the GVN to win the war.

These are all important "ifs". They will not be realized overnight, but unless steady and noticeable progress is made in the months ahead, the situation will again begin to deteriorate.

## III. RURAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING

The criteria used in determining whether or not Vietnam is a nation and whether or not the Government of Vietnam has the ability to win the confidence of the people are broader than just the governmental framework. Of equal, if not more, importance is the attempt to bring needed rural and economic development to Vietnam. These two factors are, of course, inter-related and it is difficult to separate them even for analytical purposes. But we shall try.

Rural and Economic Development or perhaps stated more accurately, the "stability and progress for people," is made up of many factors. The following list is not exhaustive but gives the more salient items:

1. The social and cultural structure of the countryside

2. Corruption in the military and civilian structure

3. New life development

4. Agriculture problems

5. The effectiveness of rural development teams

6. Security and the impact of the Viet Cong

7. The democratization of institutions

8. Urbanization

9. Industrialization

10. Refugees

11. Self help

## The social and cultural structure of the countryside

The residential-economic-social unit is the "hamlet." Out of this proceed the farmers to their plots of land—rented or owned. About 12,000 of these exist. The average population is under 1000. A cluster of three to six hamlets is known as a "village"—more administrative than a cultural unit. Loyalties are primarily to the family. Until recently, except for the hamlet or village council of self-elected elders, government (French or otherwise) has commanded little or no loyalty and usually a mild antagonism. To this day, probably the majority of these people are not emotionally committed to either the Saigon government or the Viet Cong. Mostly they seek security and to be left alone. Their religion is a mixture of ancestor worship and primitive Buddhism. Unfortunately the old elite of Saigon could not have cared less about their welfare. Even the existing power group in Saigon for the most part does not really understand them.

## Corruption in the military and civilian structure

Corruption has already been discussed; however, it should be pointed out that for administrative purposes, the villages are grouped into districts, the districts into provinces. The administrative chiefs of each are appointed from Saigon. Almost all of them at the present time are military men. Furthermore, during the war, troop units figure largely in the local rural picture and military considerations are largely overriding.

These power structures—administrative and military—provide countless opportunities for corruption as well as service to the rural areas. They are critical factors in determining the attitudes of the countryside.

The new Constitution provides eventually for the popular election of the provincial chiefs.

## New life development

In the more secure areas very considerable progress is being made in the civilian functions and amenities of government. Some of these are under the direction of the appropriate Ministers of the Vietnamese Cabinet, usually working through the provincial and district officials; others are direct services of the Allied military forces; still others are self-help projects on the part of the people of the hamlets and villages; others come about through United States advice and assistance at all levels; still others are generated by the "Rural Development" teams; still others are the result of volunteer agencies from all over the Free World, especially from the United States and Vietnam itself.

A few illustrations can be given.

Elementary school enrollment has increased from 401,000 (Est.) in 1955 to 2,019,468 in 1967. The AID program has been most helpful here. Of these, probably about 400,000 are in the hamlets in comparison to a negligible number in 1955. Corresponding gains have been registered in teachers and simple classrooms. Teacher training has required a "crash" program which has resulted in great inadequacy. There is a definite need for improvement of teacher training programs. As a hamlet becomes reasonably secure, a school usually follows shortly.

Hospitals are usually in the district or

provincial capitals, but are available to residents of the nearby rural areas. Total admissions in September 1967 were 43,250; fourths outside of Saigon. From time to time, military protection will go into Viet Cong controlled hamlets and hold clinics.

In the one month of September 1967 the Allied troops in their Civic Action Programs built 147 bridges, 18 pagodas or churches, 24 dispensaries, 723 dwellings, 57 fish ponds, 32 hospitals, over 20,000 kilometers of irrigation ditches, 8 libraries, 49 playgrounds, and literally scores of other public works and facilities.

Roads to markets and canals are continuously being built and efforts (by no means always successful) made to keep them open.

Hopefully these and other similar quite impressive efforts are making a genuine impression on the people in the hamlets. Certainly in peace time and in the absence of contravailing factors they should go far toward building up the fabric of a happy and loyal rural society. At present the inhabitants of many and perhaps most of the hamlets have not yet dared to commit themselves to either side except under duress.

### Agriculture problems

Land reform has thus far been largely on paper. The Diem government made a beginning, but did not leave much permanent advance. The widespread advance of the Viet Cong between 1960 and 1965 reduced much of the old land title structure to something of a shambles. In some instances, the Viet Cong confirmed "friendly" landlords or even restored or enlarged their titles. In other instances, it allowed the peasants to seize and till what they thought were to be their own individual land holdings. In many of these areas, when the South Vietnamese government returned to control, the psychologically disastrous policy was followed of taking back and restoring the landlords to their former tenure. Large tracts of land turned over by the French and otherwise obtained by the government have for the most part not yet found their way into the ownership of individual farmers—in large measure because of bureaucratic procedural delays and difficulties. Conversely, the Viet Cong are attempting to tax the farmers quite heavily, and this is eroding their popularity—in so far as they had such acceptance. In government-controlled areas, rents of landlords are supposedly limited to 25% of the crop, but this is frequently disregarded. All in all, land reform still awaits its very considerable potential as a factor in building up loyalty to the government in the rural areas. Usury is a minor factor, but the new agricultural bank is now putting out credit.

The agriculture potential in South Vietnam is of immense proportions. There is a great undeveloped productive capacity for rice in the Delta. Vegetable production in the uplands and the neighborhood of Saigon presents another area of development.

As in other developing countries, the traditional pattern of agricultural growth in Vietnam has been through expansion of land area as opposed to increased crop production. With the advent of French Administration late in the 19th Century, a number of significant changes were introduced which did affect agriculture . . . roads, canals, etc. The French encouraged specialized farming, such as rubber, tea, coffee, and coconuts. Rice production was encouraged through large land concessions, although these were primarily operated on a tenant or sharecropper basis.

Following the French war, which ended in 1954, there was an increase in production, with the country exporting agricultural products, principally rice, until 1965. The current war has caused a decrease in rice production of approximately 20% to 30%. Vietnam is now importing rice from the United States.

Migration from the rural areas of Vietnam to the cities during the past two years has reduced the rural population to between 60% and 70%. In addition, most able-bodied young men have been drafted by either the GVN or the Viet Cong. As a result, the farm

labor force is now principally older men, women, and children.

A declining labor supply in the agricultural sector has stimulated an interest in mechanization. Farm income, of late, has been sufficient to create a demand for investment in tractors and pumps. However, the supply of credit to finance machinery on reasonable terms is far from sufficient to bring mechanization into general use. Agriculture is still predominantly carried on by the traditional hand and animal methods.

There are four basic problems confronting adequate production: war related insecurity, low prices, interference by the GVN and VC, and a need for a more effective administration.

Protein foods account for about one-half of the urban consumers' food expenditures. Over the past three years, the cost of these foods has increased about 300%. Imported pork and chicken is not well accepted by consumers, nor is the expenditure of foreign exchange justifiable when hogs, fish, and poultry can be easily produced domestically. In light of the above, it appears that the best strategy would be to establish large-scale commercial production of hogs, fish, and poultry to supplement current production.

Most good forest land is currently in the middle of the combat zones and, as a consequence, out of the development picture until peace is secured.

The fish industry is in about the same situation as forestry. Until there is peace, the fisherman is not apt to venture too far away from home.

One of the most pressing needs for agriculture in Vietnam is more research and experimentation at the local level. Agricultural education is badly needed. Model projects, strategically located, can have a great influence on the receptivity of the people to new methods and new needs.

At the present time there is virtually no information on soil types, types of fertilizer needed, fertilization time spans, etc. Records of material of this type are non-existent. Experiments must be conducted in these areas. New methods of production and storage must be introduced in Vietnam. Mechanization and increased production go hand in hand. All of these needs could be met with adequate research and experimentation that would result from a better system of agricultural education.

Rice production has fallen off 20% to 30% in the last few years. Vietnam has gone from a rice-exporting nation to one which now imparts 25% of the needed supply. As security in the Delta increases and if the use of the new Philippine rice IR-8 proves to be successful, rice production can rise dramatically. Also important is the development of water control in the Delta. It is unlikely that total water control will ever be achieved. But with some control it will mean 2 or 3 more rice crops a year in certain areas.

After a visit to Vietnam it is clear to us that the possibilities for a revolution in agriculture techniques is unlimited.

The primary responsibility for change rests with the Vietnamese, especially the ministry of Agriculture. Of great importance is honesty and integrity in the introduction of new techniques, methods, and needs. The highest qualities of leadership must be exhibited to obtain the cooperation of the village and hamlet farmer. Cooperative efforts between the government and the farmer are essential. Not to be omitted is the industry which has a vital part in economy, especially the agricultural sector such as seeds, feeds, chemicals, insecticides, herbicides, fertilizer, equipment, etc.

### The effectiveness of rural development teams

The Rural (or Revolutionary) Development of RD has become a crucial part of the entire pacification or development program. It was begun in 1966 when the GVN decided the time had come for a crash program. General Thang an able and energetic man, was made Minister of Revolutionary Development. The central idea was to send 59 man teams into the hamlets of Vietnam to organize and aid its security, its "new life" and

to ferret out the Viet Cong infra-structure and turn the people's loyalty toward the nation. Self-help in cooperative projects was to be emphasized.

Initially the training of the Rural Development cadres was too brief; they did not remain long enough in a hamlet to make a lasting contribution; they went into too many insecure areas. Moreover, the Viet Cong made them a particular target, and killed a non inconsiderable number. This and other factors, including corruption in the regular district officials, caused a number of the others to leave their posts.

The program of training (at Vung Tau) is now under the energetic and inspired direction of Major Nguyen Be, himself a product of a rural area. Training has been lengthened to thirteen weeks. Teams are expected to remain in a hamlet six months or until it is pacified. The selection of hamlets is more carefully made—more secure areas, larger population. Emphasis is to be upon developing a "community of reciprocity through self-help projects. Eight thousand persons are under training—almost all recruited from the rural areas and, where practicable, sent back to their own districts. Certain members of the team are given specific responsibilities, and may be recalled for further training in this regard—health, agriculture, etc. In general these Rural Development cadres are more humane than earlier groups. If he has not done so already, we believe Ambassador Komer would find it most profitable and illuminating to go to Vung Tau and confer in depth with Major Be.

If the erosion of personnel can be lessened—and it can, if security is reasonably assured—this relatively new approach contains many elements of hope. However, it must also somehow or other be able to "deliver," and here it may find itself in conflict with the district and provincial "power structure," or it may find cooperation in these quarters. It will find it much easier to work with the elected hamlet and village officials.

### Security and the impact of the Vietcong

Security, of course, is a most important part of the entire development program. Obviously, development is handicapped where a war is underway or where guerillas are free to operate.

The Viet Cong has a rather intricate infrastructure throughout most of South Vietnam.

Initially local "infra-structures" forming a unified network were organized in both urban and rural areas. Most of these dated back to the struggle against the French and, at least initially, were not necessarily Communist. However, steady indoctrination has resulted today in these hard core infrastructures becoming almost entirely Communist or Communist dominated.

Affirmatively, they often redistributed (or seemed to redistribute) the land. They commended themselves to the populace as being free from corruption. They were anti-French and anti-Saigon—and have endeavored to make people think the Americans plan to take over and that the present government consists of its puppets. (Incidentally, the recent hamlet, village, and assembly elections undermine the credibility of these accusations.)

On the other hand, the Viet Cong make certain persons their particular targets for assassination: The Rural Development cadres, the hamlet and village chiefs, the school teachers, officials generally, known sympathizers with the Vietnam government and their families. They draft youths against their will. They often tax the farmer a heavy percentage of his crops as they, themselves, run short of rice. They raid and massacre the "New Life" hamlets. They create terror at elections and at other times. In general, they succeed in frightening the average hamlet which they have occupied or raided sufficiently so that inhabitants will rarely betray such members of the Viet Cong infrastructure as he knows for fear of reprisals, even if inwardly he supports the government.

As mentioned earlier in the discussion regarding agriculture, security can in effect be "created" by successful economic develop-

ment. The alléglance of the people is crucial. If they feel that the GVN can help them in a constructive way, the people are less likely to submit willingly to the Viet Cong. Secur-ity and development feed on each other and one is integrally part of another. Security isn't possible if the GVN shows no disposition to help the people lift themselves up, does not eliminate corruption and has no efficient forces in the area. A military solution alone is not possible.

While elections and government have already been mentioned, they are quite relevant here.

### The democratization of institutions

Elections have now been held in between 4000 and 5000 hamlets and in their villages. They continue to be held as security warrants. Population-wise they constitute a greater proportion of the whole than their numbers. The majority of the persons elected were those who had previously constituted the self-appointed power structure—generally the respected "elders." About one third were new. As of November 1967, the majority of the hamlets though not a majority of the population are either under Viet Cong control (4000) or "contested" (3000).

Rural area inhabitants are also making their wishes known to those whom they helped to elect to the Senate and House.

The forms of democracy are present and their possibilities hold some potential.

### Urbanization

For a long time it has been customary to refer to South Vietnam as 80% rural, and to say that success or failure in the current struggle will be determined in the rural areas.

This is no longer so certain. The population of the urban areas has already risen to 40-45% of the whole, and in two or three years may reach the 50% mark. In part, this is a world-wide phenomenon—the greater economic and social attraction—the cities, a magnet to those of the population explosion in the rural areas as public health makes for survival past infancy. In Vietnam the economic pull is especially strong with the advent of a full-employment, military economy in the cities. A further factor, peculiar to Vietnam, is fast becoming decisive. The cities are more secure, and rural inhabitants are finding this out and becoming "unofficial refugees." Every provincial and district capital as well as the cities of Saigon, Vung Tau, Hue, DaNang, Cam Ran, and Dalat are in government hands. Of these, only Hue, Cheo Doc and two other provincial capitals, have been overrun in 1967, and this only for a few hours.

Here then is a profound development, fraught with unpredictable consequences, not only in the outcome of the war, but in the future character of the Nation.

Elaborate methods have been devised to measure the extent of government and Viet Cong control. The latest indicate 67% of the population are apparently under the government, 17% under Viet Cong, and 16% contested. Using these measurements and even discounting the tendency of the military especially to give optimistic pictures this represents a net gain in the first category of about 6-9% thus far during 1967. The word "net" is used advisedly, because some hamlets have slipped back. Even as and if these are recovered their confidence and cooperation will probably have been eroded by the demonstrated insecurity. The number and location of these lost hamlets is classified information, but it is known that several are in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Lam Dong, Binh Long, and Thua Thien provinces. A new system of evaluation will shortly be installed which is likely to show certain more favorable results without changes in fact that correspond in all instances.

### Industry in Vietnam

South Vietnam, in comparison to other developing nations of the world, has very little industry. With the majority of its population involved in agriculture, it is clearly an agriculture-oriented country. As a result, it appears that agriculture should be the base

upon which industrial development and economic take-off should be founded, with emphasis placed upon industries which initially will either increase agricultural productivity or utilize agricultural products.

Attention should also be placed on light industries and handicrafts to help provide a degree of income to the rural communities.

Before 1954, the majority of industry was privately owned; handicrafts by the Vietnamese ... and the more sophisticated factories under the ownership or management of the French, and some Chinese.

Since 1954, private ownership shifted from the French to Chinese and Vietnamese; however, the Chinese proved to be most successful in obtaining liquidated French industrial plants. All industry owned by the Dien regime at the time of its overthrow is now under the control of the Industrial Development Center of the Government of Vietnam.

Out of a total 12,170 factories in South Vietnam, 90% have less than 20 employees. The remaining 10% range in size from 20 to 1,500 employees, with the larger plants being textile mills. Total contribution to the Gross National Product of all industry is roughly 9.1%.

The relatively new Bien Hoa Industrial Park, under the direction of the Industrial Development Center of the GVN (and assisted by the United States Agency for International Development) provides a very good site for more new industry. Some 95 plants of various sizes (all Vietnamese owned) are located in the Industrial Park at this time, with many more needed.

The natural migration of people from rural to urban areas is even more pronounced in Vietnam due to the military action.

The Vietnamese are an intelligent people, able to learn quite rapidly. Good potential management personnel is available but lacking (at this time) in the ability to grasp a broad view of management responsibility, such as proper application of skilled labor, finance, cost accounting, quality control, production control, planned purchasing, etc.

A broad market exists in Vietnam and neighboring countries for the following:

I. **Large Industry Sector:** Petroleum refining, petro-chemicals, nitrogen and phosphates, calcium carbide, cement plants (in the Cam Ranh and Hue areas), Salt production, rayon and other synthetics, paper and pulp, polyvinyl chloride, caustic soda and soda ash.

II. **Medium Industry Sector:** Agricultural tools (both powered and hand), prefabricated buildings (steel), combustion engines of 1 to 5 h.p., building hardware, electric motors up to 10 h.p., electric household appliances, transformers, electric meters, fishing boats, flour mills, forest products, leather products, tin cans and glass containers for food preservation, water pumps, wire rope, and rubberber bars (Vee and flat).

III. **Small Industry Sector:** Abrasive grinding wheels, bicycle chains and other parts, brassware, buttons for clothing, earthenware, hand tools, metal furniture, die castings, motor bikes, needles, scissors and knives, toys, and pre-stress concrete products.

IV. **Agro Industries:** Animal feed, dairy products, fibre products (kapok, rice straw, palm, sea grass, jute, sisal, etc.), fishing gear, small power boats, fish boxes, fish meal, ice manufacture, poultry, silk production, sugar refining, vegetable and seed oil, vegetable and fruit preservation and canning.

In summary, South Vietnam is one of the better investment areas of the developing world. The GVN, through their Industrial Development Center, is able to provide some financing with U.S. AID Investment Guarantees protecting the remaining investment.

The people are intelligent and able to learn skills rapidly.

Naturally, security (or the end of hostilities) is most important to future industrial development; however, the current investment climate is very good.

Once the country is secure, which will necessitate the withdrawal of American troops and its accompanying financial input, industry (more jobs) will be one of the most important factors in economic stabilization

and continued peace.

### Refugees

The refugee problem is also related to development.

There have been over 2,000,000 "official" refugees, not counting those from the North at the time of the Geneva agreement and those who on their own have sought the greater security (and usually the larger income) of Saigon and other urban areas. Of these 2,000,000, 640,000 have returned to their original villages; 655,000 have been resettled; the remainder are in camps (300,000) or out of camps (490,000). Our people—volunteers, AID, the military—are striving mightily to help them. The Vietnamese government is doing its part. Financially the two governments are devoting nearly $20,000,000 each annually to the cause. Twenty-nine voluntary agencies, employing over 400 people, are giving over $10,000,000.

Almost all of these refugees are women and children under fifteen. They have opted, not for one side or the other, but for security. The consequences of not treating them decently, where such has happened, have been ghastly. Most of them are simple folk from the hamlets, human casualties of major battles or of bombing and shelling by one side or the other—chiefly by the Allies. Major battles result in an overwhelming flood, too great to cope with immediately.

The Vietnamese minhler, Que, is truly able and dedicated. The voluntary agencies are doing an outstanding job. There is need for Vietnamese volunteer counterparts. Seemingly this is not in the Buddhist pattern. These refugees constitute an opportunity as well as a problem.

Much of the effort is towards re-settling the refugee. When possible they have been moved back to their old villages. Far too often this is not possible. The refugees must be integrated into Vietnamese society. One of the most serious obstacles to reaching that goal today is the GVN itself. With the new Minister, Dr. Que, some encouraging signs have been noted. Care for refugees is not enough. They must be woven into the fabric of the society. This is an infinitely more difficult task.

### Self-help

One of the keys to ultimate security in Vietnam—one of the keys to peace—one of the keys to economic and political stabilization—and one of the keys to the future is self-help.

We must help the Vietnamese people to learn to help themselves! They must learn to fight and win their own war! They must learn to govern themselves properly! And, they must learn the importance of doing these things themselves!

When one reflects on the history of the country and considers that she had been occupied by various powerful nations for many years; that she has not had an opportunity to develop a workable and effective civil service system; that most of her agriculture and industry has been foreign-owned; that relatively few of her people are educated; that poverty and graft are an accepted way of life; then, one can also understand why the attitude of "let Sam do it" persists in this small but important republic.

Steps in the right direction have been made and the new constitution is one of the biggest, but there is much more to be done.

More and more assistance, regardless of its kind, should be offered to the GVN or her people on the basis that paralleling programs of "self-help" are instituted with each act of assistance.

This applies to the military as well as government agencies, voluntary agencies, private enterprise, the church, and the people. No programs should be initiated without an element of "self-help" being an integral part of its structure.

Through the establishment of farmer-owned cooperatives and other like organizations, programs introducing mechanization, fertilizers, hybrid seeds, land management, watershed, land planning, storage, marketing, etc., should be incorporated with each program, set up on a "do-it-yourself" basis as opposed to the American-doing-it-for-

him. There are various ways in which this
can be effectively done. For one, credit.

Until recently, the Vietnamese farmer was, for the most part, outside the money economy. Most of his crops were consumed by his family and the surplus traded or bartered with little or no exchange of currency. A better program of agricultural credit through member cooperatives or credit unions will show him the value of private ownership, plus the advantages of working for himself, rather than a French landlord. Credit can also apply in the construction of member-owned storage and marketing facilities.

Through member-owned credit unions or cooperatives, the urban and city dwellers can both benefit. Through these facilities, materials can be obtained. However, actual construction must be done by the home-owner himself. U.S. AID and the American voluntary agencies working in Vietnam can provide some materials, technical assistance, and training, but construction should be by the Vietnamese alone. The mayor of Saigon has sponsored excellent projects of this sort, by which the homes are sold to the individual owners, while they are paid wages according to the amount of time each works on the whole project.

Public health programs are vitally important to the future of Vietnam, or any other country. Look what medical science has accomplished in the United States over the past twenty-thirty years! We do not have wholesale epidemics of polio, flu, cholera, typhoid, yellow fever, etc. Our problems now center around ulcers, heart trouble, cancer and obesity; all marks of ill affluent but basically healthy society.

Public health programs instituted in other developing countries are rapidly eradicating the problems of epidemics and are educating the population as to the importance of sanitation, good diet, cleanliness and prevention of disease through diagnostics and early care.

This, too, can and should be done on a "self-help" basis. First, by the construction of clinics in as many hamlets and villages as is possible, using indigenous materials and local labor. Supervision, training and regional dispensation of medicines and drugs can be done through American Voluntary Agencies working in Vietnam. Local dispensation and inventory should be the responsibility of the community. Unfortunately, the number of those registering for medical education at the universities is declining; that for legal education is increasing.

A "Self-help" program can also be instituted in this area of education, primarily as applied to physical structures and community organizational efforts, both of which are vitally important to the establishment of a workable educational system.

School buildings, furniture and recreational equipment can be locally made, which should instill an element of pride in accomplishment with an accompanying feeling of ownership.

The above four examples: Agriculture, Housing, Public Health and Education are only a few of the areas in which "self-help" should be an integral part of the growth programs of South Vietnam. However, we do not intend to overlook other activities equally as important to self sufficiency and future development of the country.

Self-help type programs can also be incorporated into public works such as sanitation systems, road construction, water storage, irrigation, electrification, and other civic improvement projects. Self-help must be an integral part of these programs if they are expected to succeed.

## Summary

In conclusion, it is essential that "new life" programs be continued. The Rural Development Team program should be strengthened along with the positions of the Ministry of Rural Development and Major Be. The election time-table for province chiefs should be speeded up. Corruption control is essential. Land reform and increased agricultural technology must be dramatically stepped up.

If rural and economical development is stepped up, there is little doubt that nation-

building will be greatly enhanced. This would also increase the confidence in the GVN. Politics and rural and economic development are inextricably intertwined. Simultaneous progress on both of these fronts is imperative. The length of time is crucial. The GVN cannot afford to wait.

## IV. NATION BUILDING IN VIETNAM—THE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT

It goes without saying that there has been controversy over the nature and extent of the American involvement in Vietnam even without entering the debate over whether or not the U.S. should be there.

It also goes without saying that the United States has been heavily involved in the politico-economic development of Vietnam. For the most part it's American money being spent and most often on the basis of American advice and initiative.

One of the major areas of interest of the Volunteers for Vietnam team was to determine the effect of American aid, and the organization of our efforts for its effective administration. Furthermore, the team attempted to determine the overall impact of the American "presence" in Vietnam.

An evaluation of the United States military effort is not made in this part of the report except when it bears directly or indirectly on civil operations programs,

### CORDS

The largest American Advisory effort in Vietnam is now under the direction of CORDS (Civil Operations for Rural Development Support). Before May 1967, this operation was in the hands of civilian agencies. A succession of programs attempts were made before CORDS, the most recent being OCO (Office of Civil Operations).

In May, the responsibility for the pacification program was given to General Westmoreland and the military.

Robert Komer was sent to Vietnam with the rank of Deputy Ambassador and as Westmoreland's Deputy for CORDS. CORDS was formed to bring all United States advisory personnel, both military and civilian, in the Corps areas and in the provinces under one management system. As a result there are three levels of CORDS organization, but they do not parallel completely the structure of the GVN. The top CORDS level is located in Saigon, but it is an administrative office for the other two levels and in no way parallels the central government in Saigon. Here all American agencies battle for the ears of national Vietnamese officials.

The two levels of GVN which CORDS does parallel are the Corps regions and the provinces. There is a CORDS chief regional director in each of the 4 corps areas in Vietnam. He has assistants who advise most GVN officials in Corps area offices. The CORDS personnel advise the GVN officials in the four corps regions.

On the province level the organizational framework is much the same as on the regional level. A CORDS "senior province representative", is in charge of all American advisory personnel in his province. There is a deputy province representative and again counterparts to many of the province GVN officials.

Both civilians and military officials hold positions as senior province representatives.

The rationale for the creation of CORDS was that better coordination and cooperation of all United States agencies working in the field in Vietnam was needed. It was also anticipated that CORDS would offer greater military support in expediting civilian supplies and would provide better protection for pacification efforts. While it is hard to argue with the single-manager concept, CORDS organization leaves much to be desired. First, all of the work of civilian agencies was under one program (OCO) before CORDS was created. This program was in effect for only five months, hardly a testing period, before it was replaced by CORDS. So, in effect, CORDS only merged OCO and the military advisory program and placed it under the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV).

Opinion varies a great deal in both the United States and Vietnam about the effectiveness of CORDS and whether or not it should have been formed. In Vietnam, many American civilians are disheartened and some are leaving or have left, because of the predominance of what they regard as orthodoxy, purely military judgments. Many feel that there is little or no reference to the consideration of the short or long range effects of military actions on the Vietnamese, especially in the hamlets. Where military officers are senior province representatives, this problem is often the most severe, especially in provinces where there are heavy concentrations of ARVN and United States troops, or where artillery and air strikes are used extensively. In these provinces, in particular, concern was expressed that CORDS senior representatives who are military officers, are less likely to deter contemplated military operations which may seriously affect the civil pacification program. The clear feeling was expressed in Vietnam that civilians are in a stronger position to "back" judgments of this nature than are military officers.

CORDS has also imposed an almost crushing load of paperwork on advisory personnel, especially in the provinces. Both military and civilian province representatives stated that paperwork was seriously limiting the time available for their advisory efforts. A paper war is not the war in Vietnam. Yet CORDS is making it that way. Because of the great desire now to show statistical progress, evaluation reports are the worst offenders.

Furthermore, a new evaluation system will be put into operation soon. The pacification program report will be brighter the day it does because of the way the new system is designed.

However, it does seem, even with all of its detriments, CORDS should be allowed to continue. The numerous re-organizational efforts in the pacification program have hindered the program's effectiveness. It does appear desirable, however, that all senior CORDS province advisors be civilians. The program is still essentially civil in nature and should be administered by those trained in this area. It is imperative that qualified civilians be recruited to fill the advisory posts at the province level. Already a tendency to fill civil operation posts with military personnel is being evidenced. This development is not healthy.

One other point must be made. If developments in the GVN, such as the abolishing of the Corps regional administration and the stripping of Corps commanders of their civil function take place and the election of province chiefs occurs, CORDS will be out-dated. It does seem ironic that at a time when the Vietnamese are embarking on a program to separate the military from civil programs, we design our advisory program to do just the opposite.

## Coordination of efforts

The problem of administration at the corps and province level has been discussed, CORDS and its predecessor, OCO, have reduced the competition between civilian agencies and created a more unified effort. Now that the military has also become part of this effort, all advice at the corps and province levels should be coordinated, at least in theory.

This is not the case in Saigon. At the highest level on the American side, there seems literally no joint advance planning between the principal groups, military, state, USIA, CIA, AID and now CORDS. Representatives of each of these groups should at the very least be able to sit down with the others at the formative planning stage of programs generated in any one of them. This is such an elementary practice in any good administration that even to ask if it is being done should be an insult—except for the reason it isn't being done. A person with Deputy Ambassador rank should have no responsibility other than coordinating our efforts at the highest level. Someone with extensive administrative and executive experience, preferably in government, should fill this position.

Economies in our overall effort are possible. Better coordination is essential and

(LE)

longer terms of service would help here. A golden opportunity is open to the Vietnamese to step up their public administration training programs. Too many lawyers, and too few administrators, have been characteristic of developing nations. The Vietnamese need not make this mistake.

The team was not in Vietnam for a sufficient length of time to study in depth the entire administration of the AID program in Vietnam. The Government Operations Committee of the House of Representatives and the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee have produced lengthy and comprehensive documents on this aspect of our efforts.

There are some observations, however, which can be made. A severe shortage of qualified manpower in civil administration exists in Vietnam today among both the Vietnamese and Americans. The American problem is complicated by the relatively short period of time that our personnel spend in Vietnam. Most are there for only 18 months, but often in any one position for only 9 months or less. It often takes six months to learn a job, and soon the Vietnamese "opposite number" finds a new man on the job, who may have a different set of ideas. It is unusual for an American to speak Vietnamese, and for certain posts and for so short a term, it is hardly worth the effort. It would be much better to use fewer men and enlist them for longer terms. Where relevant, language competence should be acquired prior to assignment to Vietnam. Allied training in Vietnamese history and culture should be a pre-requisite as well. A corollary of the longer term is to lift the ban on bringing wives to Saigon—at least as far as Saigon. Since most military personnel are being moved out of Saigon the demand for accommodations should be relieved.

A Vietnamese Institute of Public Administration has been established with liberal American support and counsel. It is steadily improving in its training of Vietnamese officials. In the end this kind of program and policy can expedite the phasing out of American advisory personnel, both civilian and military.

### The American presence

Finally, the American "presence" in Vietnam itself must be mentioned. There are about 500,000 American soldiers and several thousand American civilians in Vietnam today. Probably 1 in 4 of the males between 19 and 26 is an American. There is no doubt that a considerable and probably growing anti-American sentiment is quite widespread. To a great extent it is irrational, but it is there and must be reckoned with. A recent issue of a Saigon newspaper summarized editorially the chief factors which foster anti-Americanism. Basically they are: The American does not observe many local customs; he tends to be too familiar with all Vietnamese young women, not discriminating between those "for rent" and those not. He gives cigarettes to children. He often treats too lightly the ultimate responsibility of a Vietnamese official whom he advises. He too often speaks slightly of the Vietnamese, both military and civilian. While the South Vietnamese realize our help is essential to their continued independence, there are changes which Americans can make both individually and collectively that would be helpful. Reducing the number of Americans in Vietnam is, of course, an obvious way of reducing the American "presence". We believe that this can be done in both civilian and military areas.

### The credibility gap

One other item regarding the American involvement in Vietnam is the credibility gap. Many times members of our team privately expressed skepticism at the accuracy of the information and appraisals given us.

This is similar to the widespread skepticism greeting official pronouncements in the United States itself. Some observations, however, are in order before coming to the heart of the matter.

Americans and others visiting Vietnam

tend to come with preconceptions. This always results in a certain amount of "selective perception." We all of us to some extent see what we wish to see. Some contradictions in reporting are thus to be expected. This report doubtless suffers somewhat from this error, in spite of all the very conscious efforts made to be completely objective and objectively complete.

There is built in a disposition on the part of military and civilian officials alike to report matters in as favorable a light as possible. Promotions usually depend on success in an assignment. Budgets depend often on statistics. The group knows of one instance at a very, very high military level of deliberate and important alternation of data so as to disguise failure. What effect the forthcoming election campaign in the United States will have on wishful thinking and selective pronouncements by both sides remains to be seen.

Observers, including reporters and columnists—and for that matter our military, civilian, and volunteer personnel—vary as to what they see and hear. It is not far off the mark to say that at any one time a person could, if he looked for them, find facts on both sides of almost any question. The time variable is especially important. Too many people are still arguing for and against Diem, or relying for facts upon the military situation of 1966. Except for the effects of his regime, Diem is irrelevant to the direction of the present policy. Many and probably most aspects of the situation are improving from the American point of view—but not all. Columnists such as Walter Lippmann and Joseph Alsop become to some extent prisoners of their earlier pronouncements; and if the latter today apparently was more nearly accurate in interpreting phenomena, so be it!

Continued repetition by the Communists, echoed by pacifists and others, of false charges have their effect. These false charges included such matters as the percentage of the people supporting the Viet Cong, widespread and deliberate civilian bombing on our part, almost universal cowardice on the part of the ARVN, extensive use of napalm against women and children, customary herding of refugees behind barbed wire, etc.

But even after making allowance for these factors, the credibility gap does not disappear. The team found contradictions not only in what they were told by Americans as compared to what they saw, but also as compared to what others, many United States officials, told them. For the most part the contradiction or misinformation was the result of excessive optimism, either on specific figures such as civilian war casualty figures or on the progress being made in certain programs. This lack of realism and candor is harmful and has aided those who oppose the war. It should be stated that almost all areas of inconsistency found by the team were in the non-classified area. Security would not have been breached by being frank and forthright.

The quality of the American effort in Vietnam can be improved. It must be improved. It can become even more effective and efficient. Most of the changes suggested or recommended in this chapter can be made with a minimum of change in over-all policy. Yet we feel they are vitally important and hope they will be carefully considered.

### V. VIETNAM: THE MILITARY SITUATION

The most frequently asked questions by Americans are: "When will the war be over?" How is it really going?" This report will attempt to answer these questions.

### Conventional war

Actually in the sense of mass invasions across the border, there is relatively little of this. Organized units of divisional strength have only been involved just south of the de-militarized zone and (more recently) near the Laos and Cambodian borders. Both of these neutral nations have proved impotent and/or unwilling to prevent such groupings on the part of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnam allies. Battalion strength, massing and attack occasionally take place from the "Iron Triangle" northwest of Saigon, from the jungle-covered

mountains west of the coastal plain, and formerly within the Mekong Delta area. On our part, "search and destroy" missions have increasingly rarely been able to find the enemy in any substantial number. Normally he avoids such engagements.

In the two major "conventional" battles (DMZ) and (DakTo) during 1967, the enemy has failed in two of his objectives and succeeded in one. He has suffered serious losses in manpower and weaponry. "Kill ratios" range from 2 to 1 to 10 to 1 in the various encounters making up these two battles. Whatever his objectives, whether to capture territory, to score a major propaganda victory, or to draw off our forces furnishing security for the hamlets, he has succeeded only in the third. The infrequency of such attacks would indicate that his losses may not appear to him to justify attacks on this third ground alone, although the inability to mount such attacks may be the really determining factor.

Unmistakable evidence points to the following: (a) a substantial falling off in the number of Viet Cong engaged in these operations, (b) their replacement with considerable difficulty, by cadres of the North Vietnamese army, (c) an increase in fire power, including more sophisticated weapons, on the communist side.

On balance, in the two zones mentioned, the communists are probably slightly stronger as a military force than a year ago. Gains on our side are considerably greater due to our own further buildup. The addition of a division of the Thal army, and additional fighting units of the ARVN and others will aid still further.

We are winning the conventional war,⁴ and its end, some of our leaders say—baring some new major factor—is in sight although the date is quite uncertain. The threat of its sporadic re-opening will, of course, remain. Also even our centers of greatest strength are increasing subject to bombardment as the communists receive longer and longer range mortars and missiles, chiefly from the Russians.

### Vietcong guerrilla tactics and infrastructure

The struggle against guerrillas is going less favorably. It is even conceivable that this may be lost, either through (a) war-weariness on our part or the South Vietnamese, (b) corruption undermining the slowly emerging support of the South Vietnamese government, (c) failure to devise and carry out means to give the necessary security to the hamlets, or (d) erosion of good will toward the Americans and other allies on the part of the Vietnamese. This last may be quite irrational, but the Communists keep up their anti-American propaganda and too frequently our own conduct plays into their hands.

For some years to come, Viet Cong bands can be expected to conduct night, or even day, forays against relatively defenseless hamlets. The nearby jungles and mountains permit this. Their infra-structure still in the hamlets supplies them with the necessary information as to available defenses and who should be assassinated. Jungles, along with new and improved weapons, also permit occasional shelling of cities of short duration. With longer range and more accurate weapons, these may show increasing severity and even frequency.

Apart from security measures, which will be considered presently, a number of factors are working in our ("our" being the South Vietnamese, the United States, and other allies) favor. Feeding the Viet Cong in the jungles is not easy. We have learned the techniques of guarding the rice crops during the harvest season, and many of the Viet Cong

⁴Without being in a position to evaluate the information, one member of our team was informed by a reasonably reliable source that at least certain of our senior corps officers did not share the optimistic evaluations of General Westmoreland. Ambassador Bunker may wish to have a conference in depth with all concerned participating. This may have contributed to the credibility gap.

Korean War. During its early stages the ROK forces did not fight well. Later they fought hard and today, man for man, they are at least the equal of ours in Vietnam. The sense of nationhood in Vietnam is much less developed than in Korea. War weariness is also a factor. So is corruption and the spectacle of the profiteer in Saigon.

On balance, the ARVN, including the local militia, are doing increasingly well, with still very considerable room for improvement in many of the units.

## The bombing of the south

While most of the controversy over bombing has centered on air strikes in North Vietnam, bombing policy in South Vietnam should be equally controversial. Our bombing policy in South Vietnam, unlike the North, has a direct influence on nation-building and pacification program as to our military operations of our ground forces and the deployment of artillery.

Bombing in the South has handicapped the effort to win the "hearts and minds" of the people of Vietnam. It is contributing to the growth of anti-Americanism. Restricting bombing in the South only to those areas where large scale troop confrontations are taking place would minimize the adverse effects now being felt.

## The time factor

The enemy is fighting a protracted war. Its end is not in sight. Assuming continued success in the conventional war, or even an out and out victory, many of our troops can be at least gradually phased out fairly soon. Security operations are likely to take much longer, and our aid will be needed so long as the guerrilla ratio remains (see above). While we could probably hasten matters by an invasion of the North including the seizure of Hanoi and Haiphong, the possible consequences of this major escalation are incalculable.

## Recommendations

(These are made with some hesitancy, because of lack of access to classified information and our lack of real expertise in the military field.)

1. Shift from the tactics of destroying Viet Cong held villages and then withdrawing, to a clear and hold strategy.

2. Continue emphasis on security for the friendly areas and those producing most of the food supply.

3. Deploy a greater number of military and para-military units in posts readily available to assist local militia and Rural Development hamlet teams under attack.

4. Continue the bombing of military and military supporting targets in the North.

5. Make more use at this stage of "mixed" units of ARVN with United States and other allies. The "Combined Action" Units of the Marines in I Corps and mixed patrols used elsewhere are successful examples. Whether the commanders are ARVN or allies is not important. Both should be tried.

6. Continue to stress the Chieu Hoi or open arms program.

7. Diligently search for ways to give Hanoi an opportunity to de-escalate, but without yielding any military advantage presently held, except for such a quid pro quo.

8. Restrict bombing in South Vietnam to those areas in which there are actual confrontations between Allied and enemy forces. Eliminate free strike zones.

9. Plan for a long war.

## VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

By design Volunteers for Vietnam has not entered into the debate over whether or not the United States should be in Vietnam. The fact is we are there. Rather the orientation was one of examining the quality, the manner, the method, the effectiveness, of American efforts in Vietnam and those of the Government of Vietnam. The team, therefore, attempted to delve into the complexities of the various aspects of the many programs which fall under the heading of "pacification". More basically, the team made an effort to determine the ability of the present Government of Vietnam effectively to carry the fight against communism and to win the

support of the people. Military operations as they affect the pacification programs and the battle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people were also considered.

Evaluations have been made and conclusions reached. As might be expected all team members do not necessarily agree with all conclusions and statements.

Basic conclusions reached by Volunteers for Vietnam should be stated first:

1. It is in the best interest of the United States to continue its commitment to assist the Government of Vietnam, making no group judgment with regard to how or through what methods, or on the chain of events which led to the commitment to which we are obligated today.

2. Unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam would result in unbearable military pressure on the Government of Vietnam, exposing the people of South Vietnam to the immediate threat of communist domination.

3. Unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam would be harmful to both the short-run and long-term security interests of the United States and would weaken the integrity of commitments made by the United States elsewhere in the world.

4. The United States, while continuing to support the Government of Vietnam, should constantly, honestly, thoroughly and with a sense of dedication and conviction probe for ways which can lead to negotiations for peace. We should continuously re-examine the conditions specified for such talks, recognizing that there is virtue in admitting some mistakes and in going the extra mile. We should seek to create conditions that would make possible under the present circumstances for negotiations to take place.

5. At the present time the Viet Cong compromise a small, but significant minority in South Vietnam and those people loyal to the Government of Vietnam, while much larger in number also constitute a minority. As a result, the largest number of Vietnamese, most likely a majority, especially in rural areas stand uncommitted as yet between the Viet Cong and the Government of Vietnam.

6. The allegiance or, at the very least, the passive acceptance of the new nonaligned people in South Vietnam is necessary for the Government of Vietnam successfully to prosecute the war and become a stable force.

7. The policy of the United States with regard to Vietnam should be continuously examined in light of the need of the Government of Vietnam to win the support of the people.

A Note on Insurgency. It may be observed that there are two distinct types of warfare being waged in Vietnam—limited conventional almost entirely in the 1st and 2nd and 3rd Corps areas and insurgency in the Delta and isolated situations elsewhere. The military response appears to be making progress with the main force North Vietnamese units, but the major question is how will we respond to the insurgency in 1968. Most observers, and our findings, will conclude that the fight to counter the insurgency is lagging behind. This proposal is to suggest a policy that may be effective in the fight against the insurgency.

Insurgency is fought in political, economic, social and psychological dimensions as well as in the guerrilla warfare dimensions. A factor which has helped to obscure understanding of insurgency is the tendency to frame the problem in terms of conventional military concepts when in fact, the problem is much broader. Insurgencies are not made; they happen over a long period of time. As Wendell Phillips once said, "Its foundations are laid far back." Yet, insurgencies never occur as a result of forces beyond human control—that is, they are not something analogous to earthquakes or sunspots. They occur after long-run preconditions create a potentially explosive situation which is triggered by incidental factors. Basically, the causes may be classified into political, economic, and social factors.

If it is true that the causes are long-run, as most students of insurgency have agreed, it is not likely that immediate repressive policies will solve the problems. Large-scale

military operations in the Delta should be employed cautiously and only then in conjunction with effective political and social reform. Basically there are two ways of handling insurgencies—strong military police action and wise politics. Lenin recognized that "undisciplined armed action" is by "no means sufficient to prevent events which result from profound economic and political causes."

Dealing with insurgency through military force without regard to legal, ethical, or constitutional restraints is short-lived. Justifying its brutalities under the slogan of fighting fire with fire, has an appeal to those whom Mao-Tse-tung calls simple-minded militarists. It is the approach Chang Kai-shek used against the Communists in the 1930's and 1940's. It is the type of approach employed by the French against the Viet Minh and against the Algerian rebels. It is the same type of approach the Russians used in Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956. In the name of stability, it is a favorite approach of the military dictators in Latin America.

This leads us to the political approach to insurgency. In past wars the political aspects of warfare have been made by wise practical politicians and astute statesmen. But in insurgency political decisions must be made on the spot, in the field as opposed to written directives from the State Department. The daily decisions of between which areas to attack and which to befriended; between which villages to destroy and which ones to move and which ones to defend; between repression and persuasion—these are political.

Since World War II these political decisions have been made by astute political leaders in the most successful insurgencies. Mao-Tse-tung, the libertarian, defeated Chang Kai-shek, the professional warlord. Tito, the Communist political agent, not Mikhailovich, the monarchist professional soldier, won in Yugoslavia. Glap, the French history teacher, not the French general, won at Dien Bien Phu. And Castro, the lawyer, won in Cuba. These insurgency-victories were led by non-military men, which suggests that insurgencies can best be countered by non-military leaders. Such as Magsaysay, the automobile mechanic turned politician, defeated the Huk's in the Philippines where the general had failed. Magsaysay's greatest achievement was to demonstrate that political action can be effective in countering an insurgency. He was a natural politician who followed his own political instincts. In short, he removed the cause by astute political action for which the Philippine Communists were fighting.

Therefore, based on past experiences and the knowledge that insurgencies are what Mao calls protracted political warfare, we recommend that (1) a political response be developed to cope with the insurgency in the Delta; (2) that political leaders be appointed to direct the attack on the insurgency in the Delta and (3) that all military leaders be subservient to the political leadership in the Delta.

Looking beyond the current problem in Vietnam, it would appear worthwhile to develop a strategy to prevent rather than cure insurgency. Aristotle had reasoned that "if we know the causes which destroy constitutions we also know the causes which preserve them; for the opposites produce opposites, and the destruction is opposite of preservation." One might add to Aristotle's logic by observing that creative political action is the specific antidote to insurgency conditions, and the occurrence of an insurgency is in a sense nothing more than testimony that this antidote was not recognized or not used. In order to discover and eliminate use of political alternatives to insurgency, however, the foreign statesman must be forewarned about situations in which insurgency may develop.

To provide this warning we should develop a knowledge of the causes of insurgencies and institute a policy to assist the developing nations in ways to prevent them from occurring. In short, we should have a policy of preventing insurgency rather than respond-

ing to the conditions after the fire has started. Adalj Stevenson once said that "the time to stop revolution is at the beginning, not the end."

It is suggested that an invitation be extended to the intellectual community to send 25 scholars to Vietnam to observe the insurgency in the Delta for a two-year period. Some should be those who have at some time had decision making responsibility in foreign policy and defense. These students of modern insurgency could apply their theoretical knowledge of the causes and prevention to the empirical data that is available in Vietnam, with the hope that a preventive insurgency policy can be developed that may be applied to future insurgencies.

Essentially, this is a call for greater use of the social disciplines in preventing insurgencies.

Insurgency is not new. Lincoln used the word "insurgency" twice in his Second Inaugural Address. It is a complex type of warfare and it is fair to say that we were not prepared for it in Vietnam. To assure the proper response in Vietnam and be prepared to assist developing nations in preventing future insurgencies, we must commit more of our academic knowledge in the social sciences to the study of this problem.

President Kennedy's words about the situation in Vietnam are still appropriate today. "In the final analysis it's their war. . . . they are the ones who have to win or lose it. We can help them, give them equipment. We can send our men as advisors, but they have to win it."

There is no doubt that the bounds of the commitment implied in this statement have been exceeded. In 1965 we refused to allow the South Vietnamese to lose the war as would surely have happened without the large influx of American troops. Our presence in Vietnam today is more than "merely" advisory. Our action with regard to how AID funds are employed and with regard to military operations have significant effect on the ability of the Government of Vietnam to win the war. We have not always acted wisely. Mistakes, many of them costly, have been made.

Since 1965 ARVN and para military forces including police in Vietnam have been built up to the 700,000 figure. There are 500,000 American troops in this small country. The results have not equaled the impact. Nothing drives the point more than that this is not just a military war more than this fact.

Americans are used to fighting wars where we clear the land, defeat the enemy and then develop or build up the country through economic aid and technical assistance. Vietnam does not often receive assistance. We are being called upon simultaneously to develop a country with both economic and technical assistance and fight a war. The phrase "unleashing the generals" is as irresponsible and irrational as "pull out". To do what either implies is courting disaster. We don't have much experience in this kind of war. We aren't very good at it. We don't like it. We are learning and we are improving. But it is not easy and will not be done overnight.

The Volunteers for Vietnam team does conclude, however, that sufficient recognition has not been given to the importance of the "other" war. Political, economic, religious and social problems, albeit, closely related to the military, have in many respects and in a multitude of ways taken the second seat. A military victory, without overcoming the other problems, would be very hollow indeed. The two ways cannot be separated. Too often the effects of military operation on civil action programs have not been fully considered. Months of work on civil programs in hamlets and villages have literally "gone down the drain" because of ill-considered military operations. On the other hand, civil programs have too often been started in insecure areas without building the type of security necessary after the initial development project has been completed.

What is important about this is that most of the military operations and most of the civil programs are administered on the basis of American advice.

The line between an advisory role and an

operational role is often a thin one and hard to travel. The more the effort in Vietnam becomes Americanized the less likely it is that the Vietnamese will develop the leadership, incentive and ability needed to sustain the kind of actions they need to engage in.

While it is true that we have not allowed the Government of Vietnam to lose the war, it still is clear that the Vietnamese must win it. The more that the war effort becomes one of the United States, the greater a task this becomes.

### Foreign aids

Because there is confusion and misunderstanding on what our Foreign Policy is or should be we offer the following for the consideration of all interested Americans.

It has been said the "Foreign aid can never substitute for foreign policy". Throughout the history of mankind in its revolutionary moments of change and challenge there always were groups of people who crystallized the issue, that presented the challenge. The Magna Carta was the great goal for England in a critical time. The Declaration of Independence crystallized the issues presenting a challenge and stating the case of the revolutionaries of '76. The Emancipation Proclamation issued by Lincoln was the most important document that came out of the Civil War.

Just as these made the difference and were important in their time so the world must have from the United States of America an articulate position for the great goals that are needed on the world front.

Someone has said, "We have been raised to the first place in the leadership of the western society at a time when the general civilization of the West has suffered a spectacular decline and is gravely threatened. We (in America) have become so suddenly the protecting and the leading power of that civilization that we are not clear and united among ourselves about where we are going and how we should deal with unforeseen responsibilities, our unwanted missions and our unexpected duties."

This is a challenging statement. It is more true than most will admit.

The part that is most important and challenging, in my view, is the fact that first we in America are not united in a clear understanding of our mission in the world; and second, that the world is sure we have only selfish interests and are committed to attain our nebulous goal by force of arms. This calls for a re-evaluation of our actions compared to our stated objectives of containing communism.

A study of the problem concludes that both the containment policy and President Johnson's statement that we have 120 policies (one for each nation with which we do business) is inadequate or wrong or both.

Until a better policy can be articulated, it has been suggested that we should in the United States of America declare that "Our foreign policy is one that is dedicated to the preservation and encouragement of our own liberty and proven ideals in freedom with liberty to seek to establish and encourage the basic freedoms in every part of the globe where there are people, and that we resist the defeat of freedom through an appeal to the better natures of people and resort to arms only when all other remedies have been exhausted."

The five basic freedoms which we should establish and promote are:

1. Freedom from want.

2. Freedom from fear.

3. Freedom of religion.

4. Freedom of speech.

5. Freedom of movement.

This earth, with the proper cooperation of intelligent people, can and must bring freedom from want. When we all recognize as we should that there are basic laws that are universal and when we accept the "rule of law" as supreme in the settlement of conflicts, there will be freedom from fear.

Religion and morality are indispensable to political prosperity. When this truth is fully understood, then we will recognize the importance of freedom of religion and know that there can be no successful society without the conscience that keeps us from doing

wrong because it is wrong and makes us do right because it is right.

Freedom of expression helps us understand ourselves and others and paves the way for ever-increasing progress and prosperity.

Freedom of movement of men, goods and ideas makes possible the Biblical promise of the "more abundant life."

There are peaceful ways, methods and techniques, which can be used to advance the cause of freedom. We should dedicate ourselves to developing and using them.

### ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS

The conflict in Vietnam will end, as all wars do. Now is the time to think of tomorrow, as well as today. We would like to recommend that our country proclaim an *American Doctrine for Asia* which should make letter clear our inescapable involvement in the Far East.

This country was an Asian power before we became a European power, and long before we became a world power. Our historical involvement in the Pacific dates back to the end of the 18th century. Our first trade treaty with the mainland of Asia was negotiated in 1844. This was followed by the Treaty of Kangawa in 1853, the Alaskan Purchase of 1867, the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in the 1890's and the acquisition of the Philippine Islands in 1898. Our 49th and our 50th states are located in the Pacific "world lake". United States territorial islands are scattered across the Southwest Pacific. Most of our long range Pacific commitments were made prior to the turn of the century with the exception of six treaties negotiated between the years of 1951 and 1960. During the past twenty-five years we have fought three major wars in the Pacific, costing us the lives of almost a half million men. No one can dispute that our national interest is very definitely tied to the Pacific.

We propose that our *American Doctrine for Asia* would serve our friends and foes alike with a firm understanding of our commitments, our programs, our alliances and our responsibilities in the Far East. History will record that in Korea, and again in

Vietnam, we failed to make clear to the world our commitments and our responsibilities. Unfortunately we failed even to make known our national interests to our citizens. Confusion and miscalculation have resulted in too many conflicts between nations.

Our team further recommends that the United States reevaluate our alliances in the Far East.

1. Mutual Defense Treaty—United States and Philippines, August 30, 1951.

2. Security Treaty between the United States of America, Australia, and New Zealand, September 1, 1951.

3. Mutual Defense Treaty—United States and Korea, October 1, 1953.

4. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol (SEATO), September 8, 1954.

5. Mutual Defense Treaty—United States and Republic of China, December 2, 1954.

6. Mutual Defense Treaty—United States and Japan, January 19, 1960.

We should, in the light of present circumstances, repair and renegotiate some of these treaties. For instances, under present circumstances, we see no reason to include France in our SEATO agreement. It also might be well to amend the "unanimous agreement" provision under Article IV of our Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO). Perhaps also our various allies and associates might explore with us the possibility of superseding all, or almost all of these with a single multilateral pact.

The United States could well serve the cause of future peace by acting now in proclaiming our *American Doctrine for Asia*. The President should act with dispatch in giving this high priority. Within the next decade we foresee the realization that Asia will replace Europe as a major seat of wealth and productivity. It is in the self interest of the United States to continue and even intensify its involvement in the Pacific. We must, however, announce to friend and foe alike our determination to remain an Asian power.