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MEET THE PRESS

**GARRICK UTLEY:** On "Meet the Press" this morning, old wounds and fresh prospects—the winds of change in South Africa, the gale of change blowing in Europe. Our guests are Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state, and Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and, here in Washington, Chester Crocker, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

**MR. UTLEY:** This morning we are witnessing one of those events of personal drama and political significance—the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in South Africa. This week we have witnessed major developments which will help shape the future of Europe—the latest chapter of Gorbachev's revolution, the Soviet-American talks on troop reductions and, this weekend, the visit of West German Chancellor Kohl to Moscow.

Events are, indeed, moving very quickly; and, at the center of them, is the future of Germany. Some people call it the "German question;" some are calling it the "German problem." That is one of the things we are focusing on this morning. Our guests are Henry Kissinger, who is at home in Kent, Connecticut. Later we'll be talking with Senator Sam Nunn in Atlanta. But, first, we want to start here in Washington with Chester Crocker, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs. And joining me on the panel are Elizabeth Drew of *The New Yorker* and Robert Kaiser of *The Washington Post*. Good morning, Mr. Crocker.

**MR. CROCKER:** Good morning.

**MR. UTLEY:** We've seen Mandela walk out a free man. The question now is, What should our nation's policy be toward South Africa, the white government there, sanctions? Is it time to look at that again?

**MR. CROCKER:** Well, there's no question that we should be doing everything we can to bring our influence to bear on all those involved in what now is a new era—a new era of negotiation and of reconciliation. This is a new chapter in the history of South Africa, in my judgment, and the politics of protest, the politics of struggle, the politics of repression and control are the politics of the past. So we have to be supporting negotiation in every way we can.

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**MR. UTLEY:** Is one way to support negotiation by easing sanctions or by keeping them on?

**MR. CROCKER:** I think it's very important that this bold step by President de Klerk be seen as one that pays off, be seen as one that produces recognition and support internationally.

**MR. UTLEY:** So that means we should ease sanctions, or consider that?

**MR. CROCKER:** There is no question that this issue must be looked at. I think so, yes. And I think that's the view of the administration and of many in this country. The precise timing and the tactics for doing that are for discussion between the executive and Congress. But, yes, this is a new era, and we've got to support that new era in a way that's balanced and that brings our influence to bear on all the parties.

**MRS. DREW:** Mr. Crocker, the Reagan administration opposed sanctions. A lot of people think that they did bring pressure on Mr. de Klerk. Do you now think maybe they did have an effect?

**MR. CROCKER:** I think this is very much to distort the picture, in fact. It is derogatory, in a sense, to the enormous efforts of the people of South Africa, and overwhelmingly of the black majority in South Africa who have made the point clear that there will always be frustration and anger and protest and mass mobilization until the day comes when the South African white population and its government face the facts.

So I give, obviously, principal credit right there in South Africa. This situation has been developing for decades. Apartheid has become a nightmare for all the people who must live with it; it's become an abyss of violence of fear. So that's, I think, what one should be focusing on.

As far as our role is concerned, we should, of course, be sending signals; we have sent signals, and that has played its part.

**MRS. DREW:** Do you think that the white minority in South Africa is ready to surrender the political majority to the blacks?

**MR. CROCKER:** What I hear the white government saying in South Africa is that the time has come to negotiate, and that means compromise, to build a democratic system in which everyone has equal rights of political participation and economic rights, social rights.

**MR. KAISER:** You called apartheid a nightmare. The nightmare is still going on. What's the big deal here? One guy's out of jail. The system is still in place. Blacks are still denied all political rights. Why are we getting so excited?

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**MR. CROCKER:** It seems to me the big deal is leadership. What that country has needed for so long is leadership. Its leaders have been imprisoned in various ways—mental prisons and physical prisons. South Africa's government now has a leader, and South Africa's unenfranchised majority has long had leaders and particularly one leader who is now a free man. And these two people symbolize the hope for reconciliation.

I grant you it's obviously at the stage of symbolism, in many ways. Now they have to get after the real business—the real business of reaching each other and creating new facts and creating new hopes.

**MR. KAISER:** Should the outside world therefore be continuing to put on pressure, even as it applauds these developments—continue to say, We see you're going in the right direction; we also see you're a long way from getting to the desired goal?

**MR. CROCKER:** It seems to me that we need to be giving reinforcement. Pressure implies that it's a one-sided situation. It's obvious that, for there to be a compromise, that everybody's going to have to take steps.

**MR. UTLEY:** But, Mr. Crocker, in the early 1980s when you were assistant secretary of state for African affairs, you were well-known for taking a more moderate approach—exactly the kind of approach you're articulating here—to cooperate with the South Africans, to oppose sanctions. Not all that much happened. When sanctions came on in the last few years, we start to get a reaction from South Africa. So isn't there a clearly demonstrable cause-and-effect relationship here that sanctions are important, and, therefore, they should be kept in place?

**MR. CROCKER:** I don't see it that way. I think the changes that we're seeing can be dated to the advent into power of Mr. de Klerk, and what does he represent? He represents a different political generation. He represents a generation that listens. He represents a leadership, if you will, that has learned from the experience of negotiations in the region—I'm talking about Angola and Namibia, recently settled problems; and has seen the real fact that you can gain—everybody can gain from negotiation.

Negotiation isn't a loser's game where one side's victory is the other side's defeat.

**MR. UTLEY:** Mr. Crocker, thank you very much for being with us this morning. We'll see how the negotiations progress now that Nelson Mandela is a free man.

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We'll continue here on "Meet the Press" in just a moment with Dr. Henry Kissinger.

(Announcements)

**MR. UTLEY:** Continuing here on "Meet the Press" this morning, we're going to be talking now about events in southern Africa and South Africa, as well as in Europe, our relationship with the Soviet Union, with Dr. Henry Kissinger.

**Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.**

**DR. KISSINGER:** Good morning.

**MR. UTLEY:** You've seen Nelson Mandela walk out of prison near Capetown a free man. Question—*the American policy toward South Africa—sanctions: Should they stay in place, or be eased?*

**DR. KISSINGER:** I would really like to hear what Mandela has to say on that subject. I believe that, at some point, there should be recognition for progress that the South Africans are making toward power-sharing; and I think that I would take very seriously what Mandela is saying on that subject.

**MR. UTLEY:** So you want to wait and hear and see what he has to say?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Yes.

**MR. UTLEY:** Let's go now to the situation in Central Europe —*American, German and Soviet relations. Yesterday, Chancellor Kohl was in Moscow meeting with Gorbachev. He came out of that meeting saying reunification will take place, could take place within the next two years. Do you agree?*

**DR. KISSINGER:** I agree. I think unification of Germany is now inevitable, and outside countries should concentrate on the framework within which it takes place. It can't be prevented, and nobody is attempting to prevent it.

**MRS. DREW:** The frameworks under discussion seem to be whether or not the Soviet Union—*excuse me, the Soviet Union will agree to Germany's being unified, but whether they will insist that it be neutral, or, as Mr. Baker, Secretary of State Baker and the German foreign minister are talking about, having it be part of or associated with NATO, with no troops in East Germany.*

**Do you think it makes much difference which form this takes?**

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, there are two problems. One is the problem of Germany's external frontiers. I think that both Germany and all out-

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side neighboring countries should guarantee the existing German frontiers, specifically the frontier between Poland and Germany, in order to remove any doubt about expansion or revanchist tendencies in Germany.

The second problem is the one that you've mentioned—what kind of security system should Germany belong to. I think a neutral Germany would actually be the most dangerous for everybody concerned because the definition of neutrality is very similar to that of a purely national policy. And I agree with the idea put forward by Secretary of State Baker and by German Foreign Minister Genscher that Germany should stay in NATO, but the NATO military deployment should not advance into the present territory of the German Democratic Republic—the East German state which will disappear with reunification.

And, secondly, I think there should be an arms control regime, even for the territory that is now the Federal Republic of Germany. And I believe that this would create the most secure situation for both Europe and the Soviet Union, and the United States.

**MRS. DREW:** Dr. Kissinger, given the fact that the Germans are defining their own future, no matter how many five-point programs our administration has, no matter what timing our administration and others would prefer, what makes you think that the outside countries can impose an arrangement on a unified Germany that would last?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, they can accept the international frontiers of Germany so that Germany could change them only by force. And I don't believe that Germany would attempt to change them by force; and if they did, it would then find—

**MRS. DREW:** But internally, the internal arrangements.

**DR. KISSINGER:** If Germany wants to be neutral, there is, in fact, nothing we can do about it. And I think it would be a disaster for Europe. It would be a disaster for Germany because the two world wars in this century were caused by Germany trying to conduct a totally isolated national policy in the center of Europe. And a country in the center of Europe that wants to be secure against everybody together, threatens everybody individually. So I hope that Germany will avoid that problem and will remain tied in some way to the western community of nations, with appropriate arms control arrangements to give reassurance to other countries.

Of course, if they in time want to break it, I suppose they can do it; but only at the cost of their ties to the West. And I think also that the

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United States should remain related to Europe through NATO. And if Germany—which I don't believe it will—should opt for neutrality, we should offer to maintain NATO with the rest of the other European countries.

**MR. KAISER:** Mr. Kissinger, you're a great promoter of the idea that the United States should have a diplomatic strategy. We now see a situation that's going on for months in which the United States seems to be only reacting to events, never ahead of them.

**Does this administration have a strategy? Are we just in a reactive posture now?**

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, of course, in fairness, things have happened so much faster than anybody could possibly have assumed that, in a way, we have been driven by events.

I have the impression from the remarks that the secretary of state and the White House are making that a strategy is emerging. In the first month or two, my impression is that the administration thought the process would be much slower than it turned out to be, and that they could wait on events. But I think they have overcome this, and I think they have a clear-cut strategy now.

**MR. KAISER:** Does adopting this Genscher idea that you'd keep some American troops only in the western part of a unified Germany—does that make any sense to you? Is that part of a strategy, or is that just a Genscher gimmick to get through this current period?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Everything is partly gimmick and partly strategy. I think it is a good idea. I think what—the basic problem is that the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated so that the traditional arms control arrangements where you count up forces on both sides of a dividing line doesn't work any more. I think the best solution would be to make Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—let them have a status like Austria; demilitarize eastern Germany; and then in western Germany, have delimitations of deployment along the lines that have been discussed. That would create a buffer for both sides, and it would combine political and military solutions. Purely military solutions, either of defense or of arms control, will no longer work in this environment.

**MR. UTLEY:** Dr. Kissinger, if, for a moment, we can step aside from grand strategy and international policy and ask you a personal question. You grew up in Germany. You left that country in the 1930s, came to America for obvious reasons. You know what happened there; you have personal memories of that.

**Policy aside—**inside you, are you, Henry Kissinger, worried about the prospect of a reunited Germany?

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**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, if the issue of reunification had not arisen in my lifetime, I would not have died unfulfilled.

On the other hand, it has arisen. I have confidence in the present West German government—and, indeed, in all the parties in government and in opposition. And I think the best way to keep Germany related to the West is to show some confidence in it, especially since they have, in any case, the means to act unilaterally. Certainly, all of us who've gone through this experience are concerned with what might happen. I believe that an understanding attitude and a cooperative attitude is more likely to keep Germany tied to the West than opposing a trend which, in any event, will prevail.

**MR. UTLEY:** Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much for being with us this morning, here on "Meet the Press."

In a moment, Senator San Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We'll talk about NATO, Germany and American forces there, as we continue.

(Announcements)

**MR. UTLEY:** On "Meet the Press" this morning, Elizabeth Drew, Bob Kaiser and I are talking now with Senator Sam Nunn who is in our bureau in Atlanta this morning. Good morning, Senator.

**SEN. NUNN:** Good morning.

**MR. UTLEY:** I'm sure you have watched, as we have this morning, the freeing of Nelson Mandela. The first question at the top of the list is our relationship with that country, the questions of sanctions which are in place. Should they be continued in place, or should they be looked at and perhaps modified?

**SEN. NUNN:** I think they ought to be continued for the time being. There were five conditions that were attached to the sanctions by the Congress. Those conditions have been partially met. This is a big day. In effect, the South African government is beginning to take down their own Berlin Wall. They are beginning to be willing to discuss with their black countrymen the future of South Africa is an atmosphere declared by their president as being one where no one group dominates another.

Interestingly enough, some of the statements that President de Klerk has made in recent days sound an awful lot like the speech that Mandela himself made in his 1964 trial. So it's time for us to begin discussing in our country between the president and the Congress as to when the sanctions would end and which ones would end.

We certainly need to acknowledge these events; we certainly need to encourage the South African government to go forward.

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MRS. DREW: Mr. Nunn, as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, perhaps you could tell us how much of a reduction in the defense budget the American people can expect—and maybe what would be some of the weapons that you would think would be cut.

SEN. NUNN: Elizabeth, I'd have to stay away from the specific weapons now. The defense budget that's now been presented is a 2-percent decrease in real growth—that is, 2 percent below the level of last year's budget plus inflation. Now that has also been projected out about five years by the secretary of defense, and he has projected $167 billion—billion dollars—over five years. And I think that's the way we have to look at these budgets—over a five-year period. It's awfully hard to make big changes in one year without doing real harm.

The secretary of defense has not yet identified, however, out of that $167 billion but about $80 billion. So he has about $75-100 billion more to identify. He also has a review under way of five major weapons systems that total over $200 billion over their lifetime. So we have about three months to go before we're able to answer these questions with a great deal of certainty.

MRS. DREW: But as chairman of the committee and as someone who knows about as much about the Pentagon as anybody, including the secretary of defense, you must have some of your own thoughts.

For example, in the hearings you've been holding, three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs first said we don't need either new mobile missile—we don't need to make the MX missile mobile; we don't need the Midgetman. Under questioning, in part by you, they backed—two of them backed off a bit and said, well, maybe we need the MX for negotiating purposes.

Given that, do you think it's at all possible Congress would give the president both of those weapons systems?

SEN. NUNN: There's been an awful lot of progress made in START. In fact, Secretary Baker made some more steps in START in this visit to Moscow. We have to interrelate our START negotiating position and the force modernization. And one thing that we've got to come to grips with—the administration has not yet—it's going to be awfully hard for this administration to say we've had a breakthrough in negotiating with the Soviets, we're going to reduce arms by about 30-40 percent—and then come up and say we want two missiles—two of them mobile; we want a new B-2 bomber; we want an SDI program to go forward full-steam—all of these things at one time. I don't think that's going to sell.

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Now, what is really bothering me right now is that our force modernization plans do not take into account some of the possibilities in arms control—for instance, getting rid of the MX rail mobile in exchange for the Soviet SS-24, which is also rail-mobile, and moving toward a de-MIRV regime. Our arms control position is really being done by carpenters rather than architects. They aren't looking to the broader vision of how we provide stability. And I don't think in Congress there's going to be a lot of receptivity to going forward with huge weapons systems, unless there is a strategic concept that fits into the arms control.

So this is President Bush's challenge. I have said this. I hope to be meeting with the administration. I think Brent Scowcroft thoroughly understands this. I believe the Defense Department, hopefully, is beginning to understand it. I'm afraid the State Department is in too big a hurry to get a START agreement without looking at some of the substance of the START agreement. It's fine to say, well, we'll come with START II—but that is a long time down the road, and I think we need to get START I right, rather than rushing through it, independent of the substance.

**MR. KAISER:** Senator Nunn, was President Bush showing broad vision last week when he was running around the country to various military bases and declaring that we needed SDI to protect against narco-terrorists, while in Moscow the Soviet Union was voting to take away the leading role of the Communist Party?

**SEN. NUNN:** Well, these military exercises have to go on, but I did think it was curious the president chose this moment in history to participate in a war game and give it tremendous visibility. I think that's somewhat out of synch with the events that are taking place.

**MR. KAISER:** What should we be doing to take advantage of the events that are taking place?

**SEN. NUNN:** That's a broad question, Bob. We're going to have to get out in front. The people are leading right now, and they're leading in the right direction in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. And, certainly, we want to do everything we can to encourage that process. But I believe that leadership has to have a vision of where we're going in terms of the future of NATO. There's a great deal of discussion, and I heard the dialogue with Secretary Kissinger; I agree with most of what he said. There's a great deal of discussion about whether Germany will remain in NATO. There's not much discussion about what NATO itself is going to be—what is the mission of NATO, once you have a reunified Germany, once you no longer have a forward battle

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area where it is now, and once you have most of the Soviet forces out
of Eastern Europe and a disintegrated Warsaw Pact.

This is what we've got to have some vision on. What is the future
of NATO? I agree completely that Germany must remain a part of the
Western alliance. I do not think that it would be in anyone's interest
for Germany to be neutral. But they are going to reunify; there is no
doubt about that. And I think that's good. We have to have some vi-
sion, though, of the Western structure, and particularly the NATO
structure, in this changing world.

MR. UTLEY: Well, Senator, let me interrupt here, and let's get
specific, rather than deal in generalities here.

This past week, Baker hinted that something which would have
been inconceivable a few weeks ago—a modified role for West
Germany in NATO as part of the reunification process. Now, isn't
that a step towards neutrality? Aren't you worried about that?

SEN. NUNN: I believe that the key is Germany remaining a vital part of the Western alliance. The European Community in '92 is going to be the dominant economic part, and increasingly the political part. The United States has got to have better links with that European Community.

So what is the Western alliance now? We've got to reexamine the
basics, and I think we're skipping over some of those basics.

MRS. DREW: I'm still puzzled by the question that I asked Dr. Kissinger. And that is: Are we really likely to be able to say to a unified Germany, you may not have troops or weapons in this part of the country—and make that stick?

SEN. NUNN: Elizabeth, I've just been told that a number of the East Germany army people are coming over and wanting to join the West German army. You're going to have a merged type army there over a period of time. I don't know how long; but you can't have a political and economic union and have two separate armies.

I believe we are going to have an evolution. The evolution, as I envision it best-case-wise, would be the armies beginning to be the front-line armies—in other words, the foreign forces, both Soviet, U.S. and others, moving back from the forward areas as they reduce. That's an interim step, but a very important step. It's going to be sort of messy here until we get down the road; and we've got to start thinking about this interim period and how we handle it. I think the Genscher proposal makes sense.

MR. UTLEY: Senator Nunn, thank you very much. This, of course,

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MEET THE PRESS - February 11, 1990

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GARRICK UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" this morning, old
wounds and fresh prospects--the winds of change in South Africa,
the gale of change blowing in Europe. Our guests are Henry Kissinger,
former secretary of state, and Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee; and, here in Washington, Chester
Crocker, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

MR. UTLEY: This morning we are witnessing one of those
events of personal drama and political significance--the release
of Nelson Mandela from prison in South Africa. This week we have
witnessed major developments which will help shape the future of
Europe--the latest chapter of Gorbachev's revolution, the Soviet-
American talks on troop reductions and, this weekend, the visit of
West German Chancellor Kohl to Moscow.

Events are, indeed, moving very quickly; and, at the
center of them, is the future of Germany. Some people call it the
"German question;" some are calling it the "German problem."
That is one of the things we are focusing on this morning. Our
guests are Henry Kissinger, who is at home in Kent, Connecticut.
Later we'll be talking with Senator Sam Nunn in Atlanta. But,
first, we want to start here in Washington with Chester Crocker,
former assistant secretary of state for African affairs. And
joining me on the panel are Elizabeth Drew of The New Yorker and
Robert Kaiser of The Washington Post. Good morning, Mr. Crocker.

MR. CROCKER: Good morning.

MR. UTLEY: We've seen Mandela walk out a free man. The
question now is, What should our nation's policy be toward South
Africa, the white government there, sanctions? Is it time to look
at that again?

MR. CROCKER: Well, there's no question that we should
be doing everything we can to bring our influence to bear on all
those involved in what now is a new era--a new era of negotiation
and of reconciliation. This is a new chapter in the history of
South Africa, in my judgment, and the politics of protest, the
politics of struggle, the politics of repression and control are

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MR. UTLEY: Is one way to support negotiation by easing
sanctions or by keeping them on?

MR. CROCKER: I think it's very important that this bold
step by President de Klerk be seen as one that pays off, be seen
as one that produces recognition and support internationally.

MR. UTLEY: So that means we should ease sanctions, or
consider that?

MR. CROCKER: There is no question that this issue must
be looked at. I think so, yes. And I think that's the view of the
administration and of many in this country. The precise timing and
the tactics for doing that are for discussion between the executive
and Congress. But, yes, this is a new era, and we've got to
support that new era in a way that's balanced and that brings our
influence to bear on all the parties.

MRS. DREW: Mr. Crocker, the Reagan administration opposed
sanctions. A lot of people think that they did bring pressure on
Mr. de Klerk. Do you now think maybe they did have an effect?

MR. CROCKER: I think this is very much to distort the
picture, in fact. It is derogatory, in a sense, to the enormous
efforts of the people of South Africa, and overwhelmingly of the
black majority in South Africa who have made the point clear that
there will always be frustration and anger and protest and mass
mobilization until the day comes when the South African white
population and its government face the facts.

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MRS. DREW: Do you think that the white minority in South Africa is ready to surrender the political majority to the blacks?

MR. CROCKER: What I hear the white government saying in South Africa is that the time has come to negotiate, and that means compromise, to build a democratic system in which everyone has equal rights of political participation and economic rights, social rights.

MR. KAISER: You called apartheid a nightmare. The nightmare is still going on. What's the big deal here? One guy's out of jail. The system is still in place. Blacks are still denied all political rights. Why are we getting so excited?

MR. CROCKER: It seems to me the big deal is leadership. What that country has needed for so long is leadership. Its leaders have been imprisoned in various ways--mental prisons and physical prisons. South Africa's government now has a leader, and South Africa's unenfranchised majority has long had leaders and particularly one leader who is now a free man. And these two people symbolize the hope for reconciliation.

I grant you it's obviously at the stage of symbolism, in many ways. Now they have to get after the real business--the real business of reaching each other and creating new facts and creating new hopes.

MR. KAISER: Should the outside world therefore be continuing to put on pressure, even as it applauds these developments-continue to say, We see you're going in the right direction, we also see you're a long way from getting to the desired goal?

MR. CROCKER: It seems to me that we need to be giving reinforcement. Pressure implies that it's a one-sided situation. It's obvious that, for there to be a compromise, that everybody's going to have to take steps.

MR. UTLEY: But, Mr. Crocker, in the early 1980s when you were assistant secretary of state for African affairs, you were well-known for taking a more moderate approach--exactly the kind of approach you're articulating here--to cooperate with the South

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MR. CROCKER: I don't see it that way. I think the changes that we're seeing can be dated to the advent into power of Mr. de Klerk, and what does he represent? He represents a different political generation. He represents a generation that listens. He represents a leadership, if you will, that has learned from the experience of negotiations in the region--I'm talking about Angola and Namibia, recently settled problems; and has seen the real fact that you can gain--everybody can gain from negotiation.

MR. UTLEY: Mr. Crocker, thank you very much for being with us this morning. We'll see how the negotiations progress now that Nelson Mandela is a free man.

(Announcements)

United States

MR. UTLEY: Continuing here on "Meet the Press" this morning, we're going to be talking now about events in southern Africa and South Africa, as well as in Europe, our relationship with the Soviet Union, with Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Good morning.

MR. UTLEY: You've seen Nelson Mandela walk out of prison near Capetown a free man. Question--the American policy toward South Africa--sanctions: Should they stay in place, or be eased?

DR. KISSINGER: I would really like to hear what Mandela has to say on that subject. I believe that, at some point, there should be recognition for progress that the South Africans are

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MR. UTLEY: So you want to wait and hear and see what he has to say?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. UTLEY: Let's go now to the situation in Central Europe--American, German and Soviet relations. Yesterday Chancellor Kohl was in Moscow meeting with Gorbachev. He came out of that meeting saying reunification will take place, could take place within the next two years. Do you agree?

DR. KISSINGER: I agree. I think unification of Germany is now inevitable, and outside countries should concentrate on the framework within which it takes place. It can't be prevented, and nobody is attempting to prevent it.

MRS. DREW: The frameworks under discussion seem to be whether or not the Soviet Union--excuse me, the Soviet Union will agree to Germany's being unified, but whether they will insist that it be neutral, or, as Mr. Baker, Secretary of State Baker and the German foreign minister talking about having it part of or associated with NATO, with no troops in East Germany.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, there are two problems. One is the problem of Germany's external frontiers. I think that both Germany and all outside neighboring countries should guarantee the existing German frontiers, specifically the frontier between Poland and Germany, in order to remove any doubt about expansion or revanchist tendencies in Germany.

The second problem is the one that you've mentioned--what kind of security system should Germany belong to. I think a neutral Germany would actually be the most dangerous for everybody concerned because the definition of neutrality is very similar to that of a purely national policy. And I agree with the idea put forward by Secretary of State Baker and by German Foreign Minister

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Genscher that Germany should stay in NATO, but the NATO military
deployment should not advance into the present territory of the
German Democratic Republic--the East German state which will
disappear with reunification.

MRS. DREW: Dr. Kissinger, given the fact that the Germans
are defining their own future, no matter how many five-point
programs our administration has, no matter what timing our admini-
stration and others would prefer, what makes you think that the
outside countries can impose an arrangement on a unified Germany
that would last?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, they can accept the international
frontiers of Germany so that Germany could change them only by
force. And I don't believe that Germany would attempt to change
them by force; and if they did, it would then find--

MRS. DREW: But internally, the internal arrangements.

DR. KISSINGER: If Germany wants to be neutral, there is,
in fact, nothing we can do about it. And I think it would be a
disaster for Europe. It would be a disaster for Germany because
the two world wars in this century were caused by Germany trying
to conduct a totally isolated national policy in the center of
Europe. And a country in the center of Europe that wants to be
secure against everybody together, threatens everybody individually.
So I hope that Germany will avoid that problem and will remain
tied in some way to the western community of nations, with appropriate
arms control arrangements to give reassurance to other countries.

Of course, if they in time want to break it, I suppose
they can do it; but only at the cost of their ties to the West.
And I think also that the United States should remain related to
NATO. And if Germany--which I don't believe it will--should opt

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MR. KAISER: Mr. Kissinger, you're a great promoter of the idea that the United States should have a diplomatic strategy. We now see a situation that's going on for months in which the United States seems to be only reacting to events, never ahead of them.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, of course, in fairness, things have happened so much faster than anybody could possibly have assumed that in a way we have been driven by events.

MR. KAISER: Does adopting this Genscher idea that you'd keep some American troops only in the western part of a unified Germany--does that make any sense to you? Is that part of a strategy, or is that just a Genscher gimmick to get through this current period?

DR. KISSINGER: Everything is partly gimmick and partly strategy. I think it is a good idea. I think what--the basic problem is that the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated so that the traditional arms control arrangements where you count up forces on both sides of a dividing line doesn't work any more. I think the best solution would be to make Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary-let them have a status like Austria; demilitarize eastern Germany; and then in western Germany, have delimitations of deployment along the lines that have been discussed. That would create a buffer for both sides, and it would combine political and military solutions. Purely military solutions, either of defense or of arms control,

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MR. UTLEY: Dr. Kissinger, if, for a moment, we can step aside from grand strategy and international policy and ask you a personal question. You grew up in Germany. You left that country in the 1930s, came to America for obvious reasons. You know what happened there; you have personal memories of that.

Policy aside--inside you, are you, Henry Kissinger, worried about the prospect of a reunited Germany?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, if the issue of reunification had not arisen in my lifetime, I would not have died unfulfilled.

On the other hand, it has arisen. I have confidence in the present West German government--and, indeed, in all the parties in government and in opposition. And I think the best way to keep Germany related to the West is to show some confidence in it, especially since they have, in any case, the means to act unilaterally. Certainly, all of us who've gone through this experience are concerned of what might happen. I believe that an understanding attitude and a cooperative attitude is more likely to keep Germany tied to the West than opposing a trend which, in any event, will prevail.

MR. UTLEY: Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much for being with us this morning here on "Meet the Press."

In a moment, Senator San Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. We'll talk about NATO, Germany and American forces there as we continue.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" this morning, Elizabeth Drew, Bob Kaiser and I are talking now with Senator Sam Nunn who is in our bureau in Atlanta this morning. Good morning, Senator.

SEN. NUNN: Good morning.

MR. UTLEY: I'm sure you have watched, as we have this morning, the freeing of Nelson Mandela. The first question at the top of the list is our relationship with that country, the questions of sanctions which are in place. Should they be continued in

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SEN. NUNN: I think they ought to be continued for the time being. There were five conditions that were attached to the sanctions by the Congress. Those conditions have been partially met. This is a big day. In effect, the South African government is beginning to take down their own Berlin Wall. They are beginning to be willing to discuss with their black countrymen the future of South Africa is an atmosphere declared by their president as being one where no one group dominates another.

We certainly need to acknowledge these events; we certainly need to encourage the South Africa to go forward.

MRS. DREW: Mr. Nunn, as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, perhaps you could tell us how much of a reduction in the defense budget the American people can expect--and maybe what would be some of the weapons that you would think would be cut.

SEN. NUNN: Elizabeth, I'd have to stay away from the specific weapons now. The defense budget that's now been presented is a 2-percent decrease in real growth--that is, 2 percent below the level of last year's budget plus inflation. Now that has also been projected out about five years by the secretary of defense, and he has projected $167 billion--billion dollars--over five years. And I think that's the way we have to look at these budgets-over a five-year period. It's awfully hard to make big changes in one year without doing real harm.

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For example, in the hearings you've been holding, three
former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs first said we don't need either
new mobile missile--we don't need to make the MX missile mobile;
we don't need the Midgetman. Under questioning, in part by you,
they backed--two of them backed off a bit and said, well, maybe we
need the MX for negotiating purposes.

SEN. NUNN: There's been an awful lot of progress made
in START. In fact, Secretary Baker made some more steps in START
in this visit to Moscow. We have to interrelate our START negotiating
position and the force modernization. And one thing that we've
got to come to grips with--the administration has not yet--it's
going to be awfully hard for this administration to say we've had
a breakthrough in negotiating with the Soviets, we're going to
reduce arms by about 30-40 percent--and then come up and say we
want two missiles--two of them mobile; we want a new B-2 bomber;
we want an SDI program to go forward full-steam--all of these at
one time. I don't think that's going to sell.

Now, what is really bothering me right now is that our
force modernization plans do not take into account some of the
possibilities in arms control--for instance, getting rid of the MX
rail mobile in exchange for the Soviet SS-24, which is also rail-
mobile, and moving toward a de-MIRV regime. Our arms control
position is really being done by carpenters rather than architects.
They aren't looking to the broader vision of how we provide stability.
And I don't think in Congress there's going to be a lot of receptivity
to going forward with huge weapons systems, unless there is a

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So this is President Bush's challenge. I have said this. I hope to be meeting with the administration. I think Brent Scowcroft thoroughly understands this. I believe the Defense Department, hopefully, is beginning to understand it. I'm afraid the State Department is in too big a hurry to get a START agreement without looking at some of the substance of the START agreement. It's fine to say, well, we'll come with START II--but that is a long time down the road, and I think we need to get START I right, rather than rushing through it, independent of the substance.

MR. KAISER: Senator Nunn, was President Bush showing broad vision last week when he was running around the country to various military bases and declaring that we needed SDI to protect against narco-terrorists, while in Moscow the Soviet Union was voting to take away the leading role of the Communist Party?

SEN. NUNN: Well, these military exercises have to go on, but I did think it was curious the president chose this moment in history to participate in a war game and give it tremendous visibility. I think that's somewhat out of synch with the events that are taking place.

MR. KAISER: What should we be doing to take advantage of the events that are taking place?

SEN. NUNN: That's a broad question, Bob. We're going to have to get out in front. The people are leading right now, and they're leading in the right direction in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. And, certainly, we want to do everything we can to encourage that process. But I believe that leadership has to have a vision of where we're going in terms of the future of NATO. There's a great deal of discussion, and I heard the dialogue with Secretary Kissinger; I agree with most of what he said. There's a great deal of discussion about whether Germany will remain in NATO. There's not much discussion about what NATO itself is going to be--what is the mission of NATO, once you have a reunified Germany, once you no longer have a forward battle area where it is

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This is what we've got to have some vision on. What is the future of NATO? I agree completely that Germany must remain a part of the Western alliance. I do not think that it would be in anyone's interest for Germany to be neutral. But they are going to reunify; there is no doubt about that. And I think that's good. We have to have some vision, though, of the Western structure, and particularly the NATO structure, in this changing world.

This past week, Baker hinted that something which would have been inconceivable a few weeks ago--a modified role for West Germany in NATO as part of the reunification process. Now, isn't that a step towards neutrality? Aren't you worried about that?

MRS. DREW: I'm still puzzled by the question that I asked Dr. Kissinger. And that is: Are we really likely to be able to say a unified Germany, you may not have troops or weapons in this part of the country--and make that stick?

SEN. NUNN: Elizabeth, I've just been told that a number of the East Germany army people are coming over and wanting to join the West German army. You're going to have a merged type army over a period of time. I don't know how long; but you can't have a political and economic union and have two separate armies.

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be the front-line armies--in other words, the foreign forces, both
Soviet, U.S. and others, moving back from the forward areas as
they reduce. That's an interim step, but a very important step.
It's going to be sort of messy here until we get down the road;
and we've got to start thinking about this interim period and how
we handle it. I think the Genscher proposal makes sense.

MR. UTLEY: Senator Nunn, thank you very much. This, of
course, will be continued on for some weeks, months, and perhaps
years to come. Thanks for being with us today.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you.

MR. UTLEY: My thanks also to Elizabeth Drew and Bob
Kaiser for joining me on the panel.