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December 31,1964

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Here is the edited version of your piece for
your approval. As I mentioned on the phone, the manuscript is
now about the right size and shape for Harper's. But if you
feel that amplification, or additional citations are needed, we
can accomodate some footnotes and inserts-- providing they are
not too lengthy. And, of course, if violence has been done to
your style or to the facts we count on you to make the necessary
corrections.

As we are aiming at March publication-- and are
in process of sending this issue to press-- we would be grateful
if you could return an approved manuscript to us promptly.

At the same time would you please send us a
brief biographical note, updated since December 1930 when you last
appeared in Harper's. This should include the title and publication
date of the book from which the article is drawn.

With thanks for your cooperation,

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
419 Beacon Street
Boston, Mass.

H. A. Kissinger

1/6/65

# The Illusionist: Reflections on de Gaulle

In recent years the Atlantic Alliance has been adjusting its internal arrangements through an increasingly acrimonious public debate. The chief protagonists have been France and the United States. French spokesmen have charged the United States with using high-sounding phrases such as Atlantic community to maintain its hegemony in the Alliance. Leading Americans have dismissed French policy as reflecting the illusion of grandeur of a bitter old man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied.

The almost absurd caricature of each other's views reflects above all the different perspective from which the United States and France have had to view contemporary affairs. Historically aloof and geographically isolated, the United States has treated coalition diplomacy in terms of coordinating the efforts of many geographically remote countries. Roles are assigned on the basis of a division of labor. Allies are supposed to find fulfillment as part of a Grand Design.

France's problem is more complex. A society which has undergone severe shocks cannot find fulfillment in the Grand Design of others. Before it can decide what it wishes to become, it has to rediscover what it is. Far from being based on an excessive estimate of France's strength, de Gaulle's policy reflects, above all, a deep awareness of the suffering of his country over the span of more than a generation.

Few countries have experienced the travail of France since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could

[N]

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not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its
youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its
allies, France experienced the inter-war period as an almost uninterrupted
succession of frustrations. Domestically, the Third Republic witnessed
mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy France was torn
between its premonitions and its sense of impotence. Nothing could have
expressed France's feeling of insecurity better than the fact that France
began to build the Maginot Line at a moment when its army was the largest
in Europe and Germany's was limited by treaty to 100,000 men. What made
the action all the more poignant was that the Treaty of Versailles had
specifically prohibited Germany from stationing military forces in the
Rhineland--the territory which had to be crossed before an attack on France
could be launched. In other words, at the height of its victory France
felt so unsure of itself that it did not think itself able to prevent a
flagrant breach of the peace treaty by its disarmed enemy and constructed
a defensive line inside its borders for that contingency.

As if paralyzed by seeing her fears come true, France stood by
while Germany rearmed and proceeded to abrogate one after another of the
restrictions put on it by the Treaty of Versailles. The French collapse
of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among
the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all rhetoric
and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the
efforts of others.

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic
experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition
it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in

[N]

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1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

This malaise must be understood as the essential background for President de Gaulle's policy. A certain egocentricity on our part causes us to see many of de Gaulle's actions as being primarily motivated by a desire to annoy or to humiliate us. In fact, the central concern of de Gaulle is likely to be quite different. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it. At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to re-establish the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the tangible goal of military victory. To De Gaulle, the war had an intangible purpose. Victory was empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of France. Churchill and Roosevelt understandably considered this quest peripheral to their central objective and treated De Gaulle's insistence as an irritating interruption of more important problems.

The same conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which started during the war has continued to this day. The United States, blessed with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its war experience, could pursue single-mindedly whatever technical schemes its bureaucracy thought up at any given moment. To de Gaulle, governing a country wracked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration, the mode of reaching a goal has been as important as the objective itself. He judges the merit of a policy not only by technical criteria but also by its contribution to

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Though de Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States policy were a goal in itself, his deeper objective is pedagogical: to teach his people and perhaps his Continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. The "folie de grandeur" of which de Gaulle is so often accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tied to a profound awareness of the suffering and disappointments of his country. In 1960 this caused him to speak as follows: "Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage, after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within itself. While other people were growing around it, it remained immobile."

De Gaulle has chosen to revitalize France by an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. The effort to achieve greatness required that France regain--wherever possible--the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others: but it had to make clear that this represented a voluntary act and not the abdication of the impotent.

Consequently, the dispute between France and the United States centers, in part, around the philosophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washington, basing its policy on a division of labor, relies on consultation as the principal means for solving disagreements. In its view influence is proportionate to a nation's contribution to a common effort somewhat like share-owning in a stock company. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the existence of consultative machinery but also on what options are available in case of disagreement. In its view each ally must--at least theoretically--be able to act autonomously.

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Where United States spokesmen stress the concept of partnership, de Gaulle tends to emphasize the idea of equilibrium. Many United States officials assert that all disputes can be settled by talking things over in a "community spirit." To de Gaulle, sound relationships depend less on a personal attitude than on a balance of pressures and an understanding of historical trends. A great leader is not so much clever as lucid and clear-sighted. Grandeur is not simply physical power but strength reinforced by moral purpose. Nor does competition inevitably involve physical conflict. On the contrary, a wise assessment of mutual interests should produce harmony: "Yes, international life, like life in general, is a battle. The battle which our country is waging tends to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful to its mission, which always was and which remains human and universal."

## Historical Humility

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who thought that nations which achieved their independence would respect the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence, restraint and moderation. His policy clashes with ours because he is operating in a different time-frame.

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The United States as the leader of the Alliance inevitably concentrates on solving immediate problems. De Gaulle is more concerned with the period ten or fifteen years hence. Precisely because he is sure that the United States will protect Europe in the immediate future, he wants to use this respite to establish insurance for the far future. He is looking ahead to a time when present leaders will have disappeared and American attention may be focused on other continents.

Certainly, no one could have predicted at the beginning of any decade of this century what the world would look like at its end. De Gaulle need not be able to describe the circumstances which might arise when the convictions of existing leaders are no longer relevant in order to wish to reserve some measure of control over the destiny of his country or his continent. However arrogant his style, de Gaulle's approach to history is relatively humble. He is the leader of a country grown cautious by many enthusiasms shattered; turned sceptical from many dreams proved fragile; a country to which the unforeseen is the most elemental fact of history. American leaders while personally humble are much more confident that they can chart the future. What cannot be described concretely has little reality for them. Involved, ultimately, are differing conceptions of truth. The United States, with its technical, pragmatic approach, often has analytical truth on its side. De Gaulle, with his consciousness of the trials of France for the past generation, is frequently closer to the historical truth.

Though most American leaders tend to ascribe Allied tensions to the obstinancy of one man, present disputes are not reminiscent of the impatience some of our leaders felt with Churchill during World War II. Committed

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to assumptions about Soviet good faith and a world-wide system of collective security they were irked by Churchill's attempt to set up some physical safeguards for peace. Churchill's views were then treated with the condescension now reserved for de Gaulle. His interest in the post-war European balance of power were considered short-sighted and a symptom of old-fashioned nationalism. However, a subtler style, the prestige of Great Britain's heroic wartime effort and a common language prevented the conflict from being so explicit. Now as before, in our impatience to realize Grand Designs we are often reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself with the worst--and not only the best--foreseeable contingency.

Anonymous, Stateless Committees

Whatever the deeper reasons for the disagreements, de Gaulle's belief in the continued role of the nation-state was bound to come into conflict with the American conviction of its obsolescence. The problem is not that de Gaulle wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of his American critics allege. On the contrary, he affirms the goal of unity for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But where the American and European "integrationists" insist that European unity requires that the role of the nation-state be diminished, de Gaulle argues that unity depends on the vitality of traditional Europe.

Thus de Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his press conference of September 5, 1960, he called for regular consultation between the European governments, for specialized subordinate agencies and

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for an assembly composed of delegates from the national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that is indispensable." He has opposed supranational institutions for Europe because as he told a press conference in 1963 such a Europe would be "governed in appearance by anonymous, technocratic, and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy, and a defense--the United States of America."

At the same time, de Gaulle wants Europe whatever its internal organization to be responsible for its own defense. He therefore resists organic links between the United States and individual European countries which would tie the defense of Europe to American weapons or American conceptions. In his view, Europe should concert its own policy and then deal with the United States as a unit. This is why de Gaulle has opposed both the Nassau Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed NATO multilateral force. Both programs, in his view, make Europe completely dependent on the United States. Europeans would be lobbyists and not partners. De Gaulle considers such a role demeaning for a great power, and he is convinced that it will destroy the moral substance of the "integrated" partner.

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How to Annoy Your Allies

Few of de Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force. He explained his position in 1962 in these words: "The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked . . . an attack was beyond all probability . . . It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America . . . . The new and gigantic fact is there."

Because of these views American spokesmen have lectured de Gaulle on his ignorance of nuclear strategy and ridiculed him for excessive pretensions. Actually, de Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities.

They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. From the point of view of division of labor, the United States considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle is not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. The

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United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; de Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.

Atlantic Policy and East-West Relations

Differences between France and the United States over the future of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over the scope of Atlantic policy. These date back to 1958 when de Gaulle proposed a global Directorate composed of the United States, Great Britain and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the others. No attempt was made to explore de Gaulle's reaction to the possibility of a wider forum.

In 1960, de Gaulle made yet another plea for a common Western world-wide policy particularly with respect to the Congo crisis.

When nothing came of these proposals, de Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partners' hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing from the United States or the U.S.S.R.

This is not to say that de Gaulle's policy was primarily a reaction to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the international situation caused him to consider American support less crucial and made independent action appear rewarding. When de Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global showdown seemed possible. The Lebanese crisis had just occurred;

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Soviet intransigence was at its height. This impelled de Gaulle to try
to insure American support in case war proved unavoidable. Since 1961
the Soviet military threat has seemed to recede, and the need for concerted
action has diminished proportionately. Indeed, with the growth of American
involvements in Asia and Latin America, the shoe is now somewhat on the
other foot. It is the United States which presses its European allies
to share its global responsibilities and the Europeans who are reluctant
to assume world-wide risks.

The reduction in the Soviet threat has brought to the surface
sharply conflicting views of East-West relations. As in most other
controversies, each side has accused the other of the same offense: of
planning a settlement, if not at the expense, at least to the exclusion
of the other. In the United States, de Gaulle's comment that Europe extends
from the Atlantic to the Urals is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled
desire to negotiate directly with Moscow. In France, United States bilateral
dealings with the Soviet Union are taken as an indication that the United
States is seeking a separate accommodation with the U.S.S.R.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned with scoring debating
points. De Gaulle's statement that one day Europe would again extend from
the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a deal with the Soviet Union:
he speaks of "a Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies,"
that would again be the "heart of civilization." But the reorganization of
Europe to which he refers is to take place _after_ Communist ideology no longer
dominates in the Soviet Union; that is, when Russia is once more a national,
and not an ideological, state pursuing a policy dictated by its national

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- 12 .

interests. This is the precise eventuality foreseen by four American
postwar Administrations as the precondition for a final settlement.

In fact, French and American analyses of Soviet trends are not so
different as the controversy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view
that at some point the Soviet system will be transformed. Both believe
that this transformation will mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations.
They disagree not over the fact of evolution but its nature, not over the
ultimate desirability of a diplomatic settlement but about who will be the
spokesman for the West when it takes place. Above all, they differ about
the nature of a stable international order and the role of personalities
in relation to it.

The United States tends to believe that peace and stability is
the "natural" condition. Crises must, therefore, be caused by personal
ill-will rather than by objective conditions. As a result, United States
policy toward the Soviet Union has oscillated between two opposite
approaches: During periods of tension, the United States assumes that
Soviet policy is conducted by highly purposeful, ideologically inspired
men operating according to careful, long-range plans. During periods
of detente, American leaders have often acted as if a settlement could
be achieved by good personal relations with their Communist counterparts.
Either approach leads to an avoidance of concreteness. When the Soviets
are aggressive, negotiations are believed to be useless, and when they
are conciliatory, there is a reluctance to disturb the favorable atmosphere.
In either case, American policy statements envisage a world where all conflict
has ended and nations live under "the rule of law."

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De Gaulle's view is more historical. Peace to him is not a final
settlement but a new, perhaps more stable, balance of forces. "Now, in
the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the world
will find peace." An equilibrium can never be permanent but must be
adjusted in constant struggles. Tension, according to de Gaulle, is not
caused so much by the personal attitudes of individual Communist leaders
as by the dynamics of the system which they represent. To him, Soviet
aggressiveness reflects not a real grievance but internal instability.
"... there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by
the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to
attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions,
or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties:
this second hypothesis seems ... the more plausible to me ..."

To yield to Soviet blackmail would not alleviate internal Soviet
stresses but only supply an incentive for further demands. Thus, during the
Berlin crisis de Gaulle spoke as follows: "... we do not allow ourselves
to be moved by all the tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifications,
of threats launched by certain countries against other lands and especially
against ours. . . We realize only too well that they indulge in virulent
utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead people astray--within
their own country and outside. . . ."

De Gaulle in 1962 rejected the "exploratory" conversations on Berlin urged by the United States and Britain because: "... so long as the Soviet Union does not put a stop to its threats and its injunctions and bring about an actual easing of the international situation, we believe that we have spared out allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic rupture, or

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tragi-comical engulfment, in which the conference would obviously have ended." And he did not participate in the Geneva disarmament conference, predicting that it would do nothing except present irreconcilable plans.

De Gaulle differs, finally, about the significance of the Sino-Soviet split and about policy toward Communist China. The United States, convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, is tempted to back the Communist power which professes the most peaceful goals.

De Gaulle, believing that an equilibrium is the only reliable basis for stability, is more concerned with weakening the stronger Communist partner.

He is prepared, if necessary, to play off its weaker Communist opponent against it. With its global responsibilites, the United States sees in Communist China an objective threat to its interests. Leading a country primarily concerned with European affairs, de Gaulle, considers a Russia extending its power into the center of Europe as the principal threat.

China to him is a distant state which could become useful in diverting Soviet energies. De Gaulle's analysis is far from unique in Europe, even if his methods of implementing it are.

In short, peace to de Gaulle results not from a personal reconciliation but from the establishment of a more stable equilibrium. France and Europe must contribute in bringing about this balance not as the objects of policy but as their author. De Gaulle is thus concerned not only with the fact of negotiations but also with France's role in them. He would object to any settlement which France did not help to formulate--regardless of his opinion of its substance. The major thrust of de Gaulle's policy is to make it impossible

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for the United States to deal with the Soviet Union over the heads of
France and Europe.

The Unassimilable Style

De Gaulle's thought is remarkably consistent. Convinced that
only those capable of assuming responsibility can form meaningful
associations, he can logically affirm his faith in the Atlantic Alliance
while insisting on the identity of Europe and the uniqueness of France.
To de Gaulle, the two notions are complementary--though this may seem
disingenuous or even cynical to many Americans.

De Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression
that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of
the post-war landscape. It is almost forgotten that between 1958 and
1962 France was on the verge of civil war three times. So well has
de Gaulle succeeded in his *tour de force* that even his critics act as if
the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness.
This notion would have been inconceivable three years ago when it was
expected that freeing Algeria would keep France in turmoil for a decade or
more.

If his critics have shown little compassion for his special
circumstances, de Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt
tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of
negotiations, he has moved through a series of *faits accomplis* to force his
allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views
were certain to prevail by virtue of their logical necessity and that the

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feelings of other statesmen were, therefore, irrelevant. A profound
believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the logic of events
would always override the sensibilities of others.

No doubt, this is a heroic posture. But, man is not governed
by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect; but
it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotions from their
analysis. The paradox of de Gaulle's position is that although he claims
to speak for Europe, no substantial following outside of France sees him
as a European statesman. He has alienated many potential supporters by
his excessive rationalism, his unilateral tactics, and his wounding insistence
on intellectual submission to his maxims.

De Gaulle's methods suggest that he will cooperate only if others
accept his unilateral pronouncements. Although France and the United States
seem to agree on the principle of a strong and autonomous Europe, de Gaulle's
tactics give rise to the impression that he desires autonomy, not to enhance
the unity of the West but to be free to pursue policies contradictory, if
not hostile, to those of the United States.

Ironically, de Gaulle has become a symbol on both sides of the
Atlantic of principles contrary to his pronouncements and probably to his
intentions. He has enabled many in Europe not heretofore noted for their
devotion either to European unity or to Atlantic partnership to advocate
some ideal model of either relationship in order to thwart whatever progress
is possible now. By evoking so many memories of authoritarian rule, he has
made it next to impossible to come to grips with the substance of his thought.
A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge to American leadership. But

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by couching this challenge so woundingly, de Gaulle has spurred American
self-righteousness rather than the objective reexamination of Atlantic
relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that de Gaulle's conceptions--
as distinct from his style--were greater than those of most of his critics.
But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the sweep of his
conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to absorb them, he will
fail regardless of the validity of his insights. If his style makes him
unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he is "right" or "wrong."

Though de Gaulle has performed enormous feats in lifting his
country's sights almost by an act of will, there are objective limits
which great and strong-willed statesmanship may extend but cannot change
altogether. De Gaulle's insistence that France and the United States are
equal is true in a moral sense but, if pushed too far, it must bring into the
open a permanent disparity of strength. In any collision the superiority of
American resources is likely to prevail regardless of the validity of the
competing views. By generating so much personal ill will among American
leaders, de Gaulle may rend the fabric of illusion on which his policy
depends. The irony of Franco-American rivalry is that de Gaulle has conceptions
greater than his strength, while United States power has been greater than
its conceptions.

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about the
dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor, following
the laws of his nature, is bringing about consequences quite different from
those intended. Either the "American" or the "French" concept of the Atlantic

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relationship might have succeeded. Competing as they do--with no
comprehension of the real intention of the other--they may bring on
what each side professes to fear most: a divided, suspicious Europe
absorbed once again in working out its ancient rivalries. Tragedy, to
many Americans at least, is to find oneself thwarted in what is ardently
desired. But there is another and perhaps more poignant tragedy, that
of fulfilling one's desires and then finding them empty.

# The Illusionist:
## Why We Misread de Gaulle

by Henry A. Kissinger

*And why his lofty schemes (which sometimes are better than the State Department admits) probably won't work out.*

In recent years the Atlantic Alliance has been adjusting its internal arrangements through an increasingly acrimonious public debate. The chief protagonists have been France and the United States. French spokesmen have charged the United States with using high-sounding phrases such as "Atlantic community" to maintain its hegemony in the Alliance. Leading Americans have dismissed French policy as reflecting the illusion of grandeur of a bitter old man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied.

The almost absurd caricature of each other's views reflects above all the different positions from which the United States and France have had to view contemporary affairs. Historically aloof and geographically isolated, the United States has treated coalition diplomacy in terms of coordinating the efforts of many geographically remote countries. Roles are assigned on the basis of a division of labor. Allies are supposed to find fulfillment as part of a Grand Design.

Few countries have experienced the travail of France since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced the interwar period as an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations.

In domestic affairs, the Third Republic witnessed mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy, France was torn between its premonitions and its sense of impotence. Nothing could have expressed France's feeling of insecurity better than the fact that France began to build the Maginot Line at a moment when its army was the largest in Europe and Germany's was limited by treaty to 100,000 men. What made the action all the more poignant was that the Treaty of Versailles had specifically prohibited Germany from stationing military forces in the Rhineland—the territory which had to be crossed before an attack on France could be launched. In other words, at the height of its victory France felt so unsure of itself that it did not think it could prevent a flagrant breach of the peace treaty by its disarmed enemy.

70 WHY WE MISREAD DE GAULLE

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

This malaise must be understood as the essential background for President de Gaulle's policy. A certain egocentricity on our part causes us to see many of de Gaulle's actions as being primarily motivated by a desire to annoy or to humiliate us. In fact, the central concern of de Gaulle is likely to be quite different. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it. At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to reestablish the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the tangible goal of military victory. To de Gaulle, the war had an intangible purpose. Victory was empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of France. Churchill and Roosevelt understandably considered this quest peripheral to their central objective and treated de Gaulle's insistence as an irritating interruption of more important problems.

The conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which started during the war has continued to this day. The United States, blessed with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its war experience, could pursue single-mindedly whatever technical schemes its

bureaucracy thought up at any given moment. To de Gaulle, governing a country racked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration, the mode of reaching a goal has been as important as the objective itself. He judges the merit of a policy not only by technical criteria but also by its contribution to France's sense of identity. More important than any specific policy issue is the rediscovery of a specifically French sense of purpose.

De Gaulle has chosen to revitalize France by an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. The effort to achieve greatness required that France regain—wherever possible—the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others; but it had to make clear that this represented a voluntary act and not the abdication of the impotent.

Consequently, the dispute between France and the United States centers, in part, around the philosophical issue of how nations cooperate. Washington, basing its policy on a division of labor, relies on consultation as the principal means for solving disagreements. In its view influence is proportionate to a nation's contribution to a common effort somewhat like share-owning in a stock company. Paris insists that influence depends not only on the existence of consultative machinery but also on what options are available in case of disagreement. In its view each ally must—at least theoretically—be able to act autonomously.

Henry A. Kissinger, author of "The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy" and other books, is professor of government, and a faculty member of the Center for International Affairs, at Harvard. His next book, "The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance," will be published soon by McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations.

by Henry A. Kissinger 73

## Historical Humility

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who thought that nations which achieved their independence would respect the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence, restraint, and moderation. His policy clashes with ours because he is operating in a different time-frame.

The United States as the leader of the Alliance inevitably concentrates on solving immediate problems. De Gaulle is more concerned with the period ten or fifteen years hence. Precisely because he is sure that the United States will protect Europe in the immediate future, he wants to use this respite to establish insurance for the far future. He is looking ahead to a time when present leaders will have disappeared and American attention may possibly be focused on other continents.

Certainly, no one could have predicted at the beginning of any decade of this century what the world would look like at its end. De Gaulle need not be able to describe the circumstances which might arise when the convictions of existing leaders are no longer relevant, in order to wish to reserve some measure of control over the destiny of his country or his Continent. However arrogant his style, de Gaulle's approach to history is relatively humble. He is the leader of a country grown cautious by many enthusiasms shattered; turned skeptical from many dreams proved fragile; a country to which the unforeseen is the most elemental fact of history. American leaders while personally humble are much more confident that they can chart the future. What cannot be described concretely has little reality for them. Involved, ultimately, are differing conceptions of

Most American leaders tend to ascribe Allied tensions to the obstinacy of one man. It is interesting to note that present disputes are reminiscent of the impatience some of our leaders felt with Churchill during World War II. Committed to assumptions about Soviet good faith and a worldwide system of collective security they were irked by Churchill's attempt to set up some physical safeguards for peace. Churchill's interest in the postwar European balance of power was considered shortsighted and a symptom of old-fashioned nationalism. However, a subtler style, the prestige of Great Britain's heroic wartime effort, and a common language prevented the conflict from being so explicit. Now as before, in our impatience to realize Grand Designs we are often reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself with the worst—and not only the best—foreseeable contingency.

## Europe Governed by Committees

Thus de Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his press conference of September 5, 1960, he called for regular consultation among the European governments, for specialized subordinate agencies and for an assembly composed of delegates from the national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that is indispensable." He has opposed supranational institutions for Europe because as he told a press conference in 1963 such a Europe would be "governed in appearance by anonymous

74 WHY WE MISREAD DE GAULLE

technocratic, and stateless committees; in other words, a Europe without political reality, without economic drive, without a capacity for defense, and therefore doomed, in the face of the Soviet bloc, to being nothing more than a dependent of that great Western power, which itself had a policy, an economy, and a defense—the United States of America."

At the same time, de Gaulle wants Europe, whatever its internal organization, to be responsible for its own defense. He therefore resists organic links between the United States and individual European countries which would tie the defense of Europe to American weapons or American conceptions. In his view, Europe should concert its own policy and then deal with the United States as a unit. This is why de Gaulle has opposed both the Nassau Agreement, which tied the British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed NATO multilateral force. Both programs, in his view, make Europe completely dependent on the United States. Europeans would be lobbyists and not partners. De Gaulle considers such a role demeaning for a great power, and he is convinced that it will destroy the moral substance of the "integrated" partner.

How to Annoy Your Allies

Few of de Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force. He explained his position in 1962 in these words: "The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked . . . an attack was beyond all probability. . . . It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

"Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America. . . . The new and gigantic fact is there."

NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities. They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. From the point of view of division of labor, the United States considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle is not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. The United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; de Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.

A Separate
Deal with the Soviets?

Differences between France and the United States over the future of Europe have been compounded by disagreements over the scope of Atlantic policy. These date back to 1958 when de Gaulle proposed a global Directorate composed of the United States, Great Britain, and France. The United States rejected this with the argument that it could not designate one of its European partners to speak for the others. No attempt was made to explore de Gaulle's reaction to the possibility of a wider forum. In 1960, de Gaulle made yet another plea for a common Western worldwide policy particularly with respect to the Congo crisis.

When nothing came of these proposals, de Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partner's hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing from the United States or the U. S. S. R.

This is not to say that de Gaulle's policy was primarily a reaction to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the international situation caused him to consider American support less crucial and made independent action appear rewarding. When de Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global showdown seemed possible. The Lebanese crisis had just occurred; Soviet intransigence was at its height. This impelled de Gaulle to try to insure American support in case war proved unavoidable. Since 1961 the Soviet military threat has seemed to recede, and the need for concerted action has diminished pro-

by Henry A. Kissinger

75

portionately. Indeed, with the growth of Ameri-
can involvements in Asia and Latin America, the
shoe is now somewhat on the other foot. It is the
United States which presses its European allies
to share its global responsibilities and the Euro-
peans who are reluctant to assume worldwide
risks.

The reduction in the Soviet threat has brought
to the surface sharply conflicting views of East-
West relations. As in most other controversies,
each side has accused the other of the same
offense: of planning a settlement, if not at the
expense, at least to the exclusion of the other. In
the United States, de Gaulle's comment that
Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals is
often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to
negotiate directly with Moscow. In France,
United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet
Union are taken as an indication that the United
States is seeking a separate accommodation with
the U. S. S. R.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned
with scoring debating points. De Gaulle's state-
ment that one day Europe would again extend
from the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a
deal with the Soviet Union. He spoke of "a
Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and
ideologies," that would again be the "heart of
civilization." But the reorganization of Europe to
which he referred is to take place after Commu-
nist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet
Union; that is, when Russia is once more a na-
tional, and not an ideological, state pursuing a
policy dictated by its national interests. This is
the precise eventuality foreseen by four Ameri-
can postwar Administrations as the precondition
for a final settlement.

In fact, French and American analyses of
Soviet trends are not so different as the contro-
versy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view
that at some point the Soviet system will be trans-
formed. Both believe that this transformation will
mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations.
They disagree not over the fact of evolution but
its nature, not over the ultimate desirability of a
diplomatic settlement but about who will be the
spokesman for the West when it takes place.
Above all, they differ about the nature of a stable
international order and the role of personalities
in relation to it.

The United States tends to believe that peace
and stability are "natural." Crises must, there-
fore, be caused by personal ill-will rather than
by objective conditions. As a result, United States
policy toward the Soviet Union has oscillated be-
tween two opposite approaches: During periods

of tension, the United States assumes that Soviet
policy is conducted by highly purposeful, ideologi-
cally inspired men operating according to careful,
long-range plans. During periods of détente,
American leaders have often acted as if a settle-
ment could be achieved by good personal relations
with their Communist counterparts. Either ap-
proach leads to an avoidance of concreteness.
When the Soviets are aggressive, negotiations
are believed to be useless, and when they are
conciliatory, there is a reluctance to disturb the
favorable atmosphere. In either case, American
policy statements envisage a world where all con-
flict has ended and nations live under "the rule
of law."

De Gaulle's view is more historical. Peace to
him is not a final settlement but a new, perhaps
more stable, balance of forces. "Now, in the last
analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium
that the world will find peace." An equilibrium
can never be permanent but must be adjusted in
constant struggles. Tension, according to de
Gaulle, is caused not so much by the personal
attitudes of individual Communist leaders as by
the dynamics of the system which they represent.
To him, Soviet aggressiveness reflects not a real
grievance but internal instability: "... there is in
this uproar of imprecations and demands or-
ganized by the Soviets something so arbitrary
and so artificial that one is led to attribute it
either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic
ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention
away from great difficulties: this second hy-
pothesis seems ... the more plausible to me."

To yield to Soviet blackmail would not alleviate
internal Soviet stresses but only supply an in-
centive for further demands. Thus, during the
Berlin crisis de Gaulle spoke as follows: "... we
do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the
tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifica-
tions, of threats launched by certain countries
against other lands and especially against ours.
... We realize only too well that they indulge in
virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in
order to lead people astray—within their own
country and outside. ..."

De Gaulle in 1962 rejected the "exploratory"
conversations on Berlin urged by the United States
and Britain because: "... so long as the Soviet
Union does not put a stop to its threats and its
injunctions and bring about an actual easing of
the international situation, we believe that we
have spared our allies and ourselves the cata-
strophic retreat, dramatic rupture, or tragi-
comical engulfment, in which the conference
would obviously have ended." And he did not

76 WHY WE MISREAD DE GAULLE

Views differ, finally, about the significance of the Sino-Soviet split and about policy toward Communist China. The United States, convinced of the importance of intentions in the conduct of foreign policy, is tempted to back the Communist power which professes the most peaceful goals. De Gaulle, believing that an equilibrium is the only reliable basis for stability, is more concerned with establishing a counterweight to the stronger Communist partner. He is prepared, if necessary, to play off its weaker Communist opponent against it. With its global responsibilities, the United States sees in Communist China an objective threat to its interests. Leading a country primarily concerned with European affairs, de Gaulle considers a Russia extending its power into the center of Europe as the principal threat. China to him is a distant state which could become useful in diverting Soviet energies. De Gaulle's analysis is far from unique in Europe, even if his methods of implementing it are.

In short, peace to de Gaulle results not from a personal reconciliation but from the establishment of a more stable equilibrium. France and Europe must contribute to bringing about this balance not as the objects of policy but as their author. De Gaulle is thus concerned not only with the fact of negotiations but also with France's role in them. He would object to *any* settlement which France did not help to formulate—regardless of his opinion of its substance. The major thrust of de Gaulle's policy is to make it impossible for the United States to deal with the Soviet Union over the heads of France and the rest of Europe.

The Unassimilable Style

De Gaulle's thought is remarkably consistent. Convinced that only those capable of assuming responsibility can form meaningful associations, he can logically affirm his faith in the Atlantic Alliance while insisting on the identity of Europe and the uniqueness of France. To de Gaulle, the two notions are complementary—though this may seem disingenuous or even cynical to many Americans.

De Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. It is almost forgotten that between 1958 and 1962 France was on the verge of civil war

three times. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his tour de force that even his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness. This notion would have been inconceivable three years ago when it was expected that freeing Algeria would keep France in turmoil for a decade or more. Difficult as the France of de Gaulle undoubtedly is, it is more in the interest of the West than a country torn by schisms or paralyzed by a sense of impotence.

If his critics have shown little compassion for his special circumstances, de Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of negotiations, he has moved through a series of faits accomplis to force his allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views were certain to prevail by virtue of their logical necessity and as if the feelings of other statesmen were, therefore, irrelevant. A profound believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the logic of events would always override the sensibilities of others.

No doubt, this is a heroic posture. But man is not governed by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect; but it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotions from their analysis. The paradox of de Gaulle's position is that although he claims to speak for Europe, no substantial following outside of France sees him as a European statesman. He has alienated many potential supporters by his excessive rationalism, his unilateral tactics, and his wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims.

by Henry A. Kissinger

77

A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge to American leadership. But by couching this challenge so woundingly, de Gaulle has spurred American self-righteousness rather than the objective reexamination of Atlantic relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that de Gaulle's conceptions—as distinct from his style—were greater than those of most of his critics. But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the sweep of his conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to absorb them, he will fail regardless of the validity of his insights. If his style makes him unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he is “right” or “wrong.” Great men build truly only if they remember that their achievement must be preserved by the less gifted individuals who are likely to follow them.

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about the dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor, following the laws of his nature, is bringing about consequences quite different from those intended. Either the “American” or the “French” concept of the Atlantic relationship might have succeeded. Competing as they do—with no comprehension of the real intention of the other—they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided, suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its ancient rivalries. Tragedy, to many Americans at least, is to find oneself thwarted in what is ardently desired. But there is another and perhaps more poignant tragedy, that of fulfilling one's desires and then finding them empty.

## Semblances

by Howard Moss

Here is the shadow circle of a tree.
It is more than tree. It is more than sun.
The darkness in it sheds its casualty
Of green, and what we see we do not see:
Its light-leaved tameness is the strength of wild
Embezzlements of flower, bird, and child.

The thinness, thickness of a thing is not
The thing itself. I watch the water change
From color into color, watch the tree
Transpose the rarest of transparencies
Into the heavy gravity of fall.
I see the golden pockets take their fill.

The world is stained by what is not the world.
Floating on the high relief of summer,
The clouds have flawed the mirror of the sea,
And beyond the clouds, what darkening of mind
Secretes the twilight as we turn around,
And, filtered out of vision, comb the wind?

Harper's Magazine, March 1965

# A Brotherly Cruise on the Black Sea

by George Feifer

A young American sailing from Yalta to Odessa discovers a Russia unmen tioned in the guidebooks and care fully ignored in official communiqués.

A white ship, oxidized white, with a gray- white stack trimmed in broad red stripes and small gold hammers and sickles. The Peter the Great, 8,209 tons, median in luxury among the Soviet Black Sea cruise fleet. A small old ship, respectfully worn, reasonably dirty. A cruise ship like other cruise ships, petit bourgeois.

She was built—said a deckhand on the fo'c'sle —in 1926 in Hamburg and sold to Italy in the 'thirties; Poland got her as reparations after the war and sold her later to Russia. No, built— declared the First Officer from the barber's chair—in 1937 by a German yard for Turkey and never delivered because of the war; England took her as reparations from Germany in 1946 and sold her to Poland, who traded her im- mediately to Russia in return for a tanker. No, built in 1939—the ship's electrician whispered, for some reason, in my ear—in Bremen for an English firm; Turkey bought her after the war and sold her later to Poland, who used her eight years as a transatlantic liner; Russia "got it" from the Poles. A mysterious ship; labels on the valves stamped in German, Turkish, Russian, and

English. Length 402 feet; beam 54 feet; 350 places in luxe, first, second, and third classes, plus deck space for a hundred in fourth—young workers taking in the palmy Crimean resorts as cheaply as possible.

We were churning on Odessa at thirteen knots from Yevpatoriya in the Crimea. Before that it had been Yalta, Novorossisk, Sochi, and Su- khumi: the traditional Black Sea route. The water was deep indigo, the sky was clear. The coast looked like Spain's from the Mediterranean.

Peter the Great rode steady on a steady sea; she might have been drifting except for the pleasant pulsing of old turbines. She was a friendly ship, not a smart ship, carelessly warm like a Russian sitting room. Breakfast was over —there had been no servings and no assigned tables. One ate where one chose, first class or second, and I had found myself next to an aero- nautical engineer returning slowly, sadly to Mos- cow from three weeks of swimming in Gagra. Now, on deck, newspapers were opened, letters started, and measured walks paced in everyday clothes along the once holystoned oak. A quiet ship, with no trace of Miami.

In the shade of the half-deck over the pool, three Ukrainian peasant girls sang sweet-sad peasant songs. They had been there since early morning, endlessly wailing, chanting, sighing melancholy folk melodies in that captivating Slavic dissonance, half-Oriental, repetitive, hyp-

March 9, 1965

Minot, North Dakota

Harper's Magazine
49 East 33 Street
New York, N.Y. 10016

Dear Editor:

Concerning your article in the March 1965 issue *THE ILLUSIONIST*: Why We Misread de Gaulle, by Henery A. Kissinger.-------

I'll agree that de Gaulle has given a few false impressions in his career, but I believe this has resulted from his unstableness and his deep phobia of failure, which probably originated when he was run out of France by the Germans in World War II. In England, also during the war, he failed to lead the Underground adequately. In his relations with the United States and the West, in general, I believe he has an attitude of an exhibitionist and is trying to put a niche in history for people to remember him. For example, his attempting to run the international gold dollar out of circulation. This, of course, would hurt the U.S. economy and many other Western Countries economy, thus de Gaulle could find himself in a more substantial plight than he is at present by the action the United States would be forced to carry out.

It is true that France has had a rough time of getting back on their feet since World War II, but instead of praising de Gaulle for his so called efforts of supporting his country and the Western World, I think he needs a little reprimanding and marshalling so he can look at the facts. I think the French people themselves should take it upon themselves to quell these false impressions or illusions.

I hope that you will print this letter so the people of the U.S. will not have a one sided view of the subject. Thank you, and I will be following your magazine closely for results.

Thank you again.

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Kaigai Hyoron Sha

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INFORMATION SHEET

June 5, 1965

1) Original Article

Title: The Illusionist: Why We Misread de Gaulle

Author: Henry A. Kissinger

Source: Harper's Magazine

Issue: March 1965

2) Distribution

Distributed in the Issue No. 253 (10/4/65) of Overseas Commentary Service

3) Publication Carrying Article

Name: Kahoku Shimpo

Issue: May 3, 1965 ---Morning Edition

Publisher:

4) Comment

Due credit is given the author, Harper's Magazine and OCS.

(401-50S)

MAIL ADDRESS:
C.P.O. BOX 1706. TOKYO

Kaigai Hyoron Sha

TOKYO, JAPAN

INFORMATION SHEET

June 3, 1965

1) Original Article

Author: Henry A. Kissinger

Source: Harper's Magazine

Issue: March 1965

2) Distribution

Distributed in the Issue No. 254 (17/4/65) of Overseas Commentary Service.

Name: Shikoku Shimbun

Issue: April 16, 1965 --- Morning Edition

Publisher:

4) Comment

Due credit is given the author, HARPER'S MAGAZINE and OCS (Overseas Commentary Service).

(401-50S)

(401-202)

MAGAZINE and OGB (Overaese Commentarly Service).
Due credit is given the author, HARPER'S

4) Comment

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Issue: April 1962 — Morning Edition

Name: Shirkocku Shrimp

of Overaese Commentary Service.

Distributed in the Issue No. 524 (17/4/62)

3) Distribution

Issue:

March 1962

Source:

Harper's Magazine

Author:

Henry V. Klaasinger

Title: The Illustrated Man: Why We Mieread de Gansle

1) Original Article

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MAIL ADDRESS:

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[L]C]

Kaigai Hyoron Sha

TOKYO, JAPAN

INFORMATION SHEET

1) Original Article

June 7, 1965

Author: Henry A. Kissinger

Source: Harper's Magazine

Issue: March 1965

2) Distribution

Distributed in the Issue No. 253(10/4/65)
of Overseas Commentary Service

Name: Shikoku Shimbun

Issue: April 20, 1965 ---Morning Edition

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4) Comment

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(401-50S)

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Magazine and OCS
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Distributed in the Issue No. 523(10/62)

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Issue: March 1962

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Author: Henry A. Klaasen

Title: The Illustration: Why We Read as We Read

1) Original Article

June 7, 1962

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[(c)]

THE PROVINCIAL PRESSES OF JAPAN

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Akita Sakigake in Akita (4)</td>
      <td>Nihonkai Shimbun in Tottori (27)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Chugoku Shimbun in Hiroshima (30)</td>
      <td>Niigata Nippo in Niigata (8)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td> Ehime Shimbun in Matsuyama (34)</td>
      <td>Nishinippon Shimbun in Fukuoka (36)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Fukui Shimbun in Fukui (21)</td>
      <td>Oitagoodo Shimbun in Oita (35)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Fukushima Mimpo in Fukushima (9)</td>
      <td>Osaka Shimbun in Osaka (25)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Gifu Nishinichi in Gifu (22)</td>
      <td>Saga Shimbun in Saga (37)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hokkai Times in Sapporo (1)</td>
      <td>Saitama Shimbun in Urawa (14)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hokkaido Shimbun in Sapporo (1)</td>
      <td>Sanyo Shimbun in Okayama (28)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hokkoku Shimbun in Kanazawa (20)</td>
      <td>Shikoku Shimbun in Takamatsu (31)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Ibaragi Shimbun in Mito (10)</td>
      <td>Shimane Shimbun in Matsue (29)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Iwate Nippo in Morioka (5)</td>
      <td>Shimotsuke Shimbun in Utsunomiya (11)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Kahoku Shimpo in Sendai (7)</td>
      <td>Shinano Mainichi in Nagano (12)</td>
    </tr>
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      <td>Kanagawa Shimbun in Yokohama (16)</td>
      <td>Shinyo Shimbun in Matsumoto (13)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Kitanihon Shimbun in Toyama (19)</td>
      <td>Shizuoka Shimbun in Shizuoka (18)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Kobe Shimbun in Kobe (26)</td>
      <td>Toyama Shimbun in Toyama (19)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Kochi Shimbun in Kochi (33)</td>
      <td>Tokushima Shimbun in Tokushima (32)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Kumamoto Nishinichi in Kumamoto (39)</td>
      <td>Tokyo (15)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Kyoto Shimbun in Kyoto (24)</td>
      <td>Too Nippo in Aomori (3)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Minami Nippon Shimbun in Kagoshima (40)</td>
      <td>Yamagata Shimbun in Yamagata (6)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Muroran Mimpo in Muroran (2)</td>
      <td>Yamanashi Nishinichi in Kofu (17)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nagasaki Shimbun in Nagasaki (38)</td>
      <td>Yukan Fukunichi in Fukuoka (36)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nagoya Times in Nagoya (23)</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

[LC]

FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS SERVICE
No. 3 N. Perry Street
Rockville, Maryland

Foreign Representatives of
KĀIGAI HYORON SHA
Tokyo, Japan

Columbia University in the City of New York

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE

Uris Hall
New York, N. Y. 10027

May 10, 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for sending me a copy of
"The Illusionist." This needs very much
to be said and I feel you have said it
with even more than usual strength of
thought and clarity of expression. I'm
also delighted to have your *Reporter*
article, with its sound sense on the
problem of German reunification.

With best wishes,

PEM/ws

The American Assembly

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10027

April 20, 1965

Dear Henry:

I am ever so grateful for your kindness in sending
me "The Illusionist."

It is my idea of an extraordinarily valuable piece,
one which does not repeat the cliches, but which shows
thought, imagination, and a reading of the documents
not in terms of the newspaper headlines but in terms
of the inner significance. You have let objective
thought overcome irritations that so often blind us.
I congratulate you warmly.

With best regards,

Henry M. Wriston

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

HENRY S. REUSS
5TH DISTRICT, WISCONSIN

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2159 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
PHONE 225-3571

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ROOM 416, 135 W. WELLS ST.
PHONE: 272-1226

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

April 29, 1965

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Harvard University Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for letting me see your
Harper's article. You say, more elegantly, what I
have been saying for some time: that we should not be
allowing De Gaulle's Olympian style to nettle us into
outraged reaction, but that instead we might inquire
whether he might not occasionally be right.

I hope you will have a chance to get down
here and see us some time soon.

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PROGRAMS

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE AND PAYMENTS
SUBCOMMITTEE

PAT MCNAMARA, MICH., CHAIRMAN

JENNINGS RANDOLPH, W. VA.
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, OHIO
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE
ERNEST GRUENING, ALASKA
FRANK E. MOSS, UTAH

LEE METCALF, MONT.
B. EVERETT JORDAN, N.C.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
BIRCH BAYH, IND.
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, N. MEX.
FRED R. HARRIS, OKLA.

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, KY.
HIRAM L. FONG, HAWAII
J. CALEB BOGGS, DEL.
JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
GEORGE MURPHY, CALIF.

RON M. LINTON, CHIEF CLERK AND STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS

April 29, 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I thank you for sending me a copy of your recent article, "The Illusionist: Why We Misread de Gaulle". I found it excellent, as well as timely. Also, I am currently reading your new book with great interest.

With kind regards, I am

jm

The RAND Corporation

1700 MAIN STREET
SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90406

April 21, 1965

L-8555

JOSEPH M. GOLDSEN
HEAD, SOCIAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending me your article from the March issue of *Harper's Magazine*. I am in complete agreement with your diagnosis and insights. I was quite impressed with Robert Murphy's account of de Gaulle in his book which I read only recently.

I will keep in mind your possible availability for spending a few days with us in July.

With best regards,

JMG:pp

CORNING GLASS INTERNATIONAL
CORNING

717 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK' 22, N.Y.

ROBERT D. MURPHY
Chairman of the Board

A Division of Corning Glass Works
Cable Address: "CORNGLASS"

April 19, 1965

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Thank you so much for sending me with your letter of
April 9 the copy of your article, "The Illusionist: Why we Mis-
read de Gaulle", which appeared in HARPER's. I have read it
with interest and find it penetrating and helpful to an under-
standing of, what shall I say, a rather complex personality.

One sentence especially stands out as a truism, --
your reference in the penultimate paragraph to de Gaulle's
conceptions greater than his strength, while our power has
been greater than our conceptions. Perhaps you should add --
a curious almost pathological reluctance on our part to invoke
power as something infra dig and reprehensible.

At any rate, I am grateful to you for a very inter-
esting analysis of an unhappy subject.

With warm regards,

RM:1b

LUCIUS D. CLAY

General, Retired
U. S. Army

One William Street
New York 4, New York

April 15, 1965

Dear Henry:

I have read "The Illusionist" and find it most interesting. In large part, I agree.

Most of us today tend to over-emphasize de Gaulle's importance in the early stage of World War II (after our entry) when, although self-acclaimed leader of the Free French, his real influence was nominal.

Still, at a time when many of our national leaders made firm friends with leaders of other countries, no one, no matter what they may say now, ever became a friend of de Gaulle's. Thus, he was never a party to the exchange of "off the record" views; never a member of the club; nor did his first government in France partake of greatness. In the difficult days of French recovery, he lived like "Achilles in his tent", and then when government after government failed, he finally emerged as the one Frenchman with a chance to create stable government.

His confidence in himself finally won him the confidence of his fellow citizen, but not of the world at large. To me, this does play some part in his thinking and in his decisions, although undoubtedly in the main you are right in your conclusions.

Mr. Henry A. Kisslinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

P. S. When coming this way, please let me know.

L.W. DOUGLAS

SOUTHERN ARIZONA BANK AND TRUST BUILDING
TUCSON, ARIZONA 85702

CABLE ADDRESS: DUGLEWIS, TUCSON

April 15, 1965

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Thank you a thousand times for sending me the article en-
titled "The Illusionist." I think it is superb. It is
the first objective and highly intelligent explanation of
some of our difficulties with France that has been written.

I wish that there were the same objectivity and the same
intelligence elsewhere. It does no good to blast a man.
It is far more productive to try to understand why he be-
haves as he behaves (especially if he is an intelligent man
and not a rabble-rouser like Hitler) and to attempt to de-
termine what kernels of truth there are in his bushel. The
great difficulty with DeGaulle is that there is a kernel of
truth in a great many of the things he says.

For example, there is no necessary incompatibility between
a strong Europe governed by Europeans and an Atlantic Alliance.
In fact, an Atlantic Alliance might be much better if it was
based upon a relationship between the western Atlantic coun-
tries and the European Atlantic countries.

Again, I am disposed to think that he is far wiser in seeking
a confederation at this stage of European development than in
seeking a federal system. I doubt that a federal system at
this juncture would last in Europe. It might breed a civil
war.

At any rate, these are just some of my thoughts and I wanted
hastily to tell you how much I enjoyed your article.

With kindest regards and the hopes that I do see you often,
I am,

Ever truly yours,

70 PINE STREET
NEW YORK 5

April 5, 1965

Dear Henry,

Thank you for sending me your Harper's article. You make a better case for DeGaulle than most DeGaullists. To be frank, I am a little weary of considering European problems in terms of DeGaulle, his psychology, his own attitudes. Better assume that for the moment his word controls French action for creating conditions. Those we have to meet as best we can. He is, after all, not eternal.

Meanwhile it is interesting to see you reverting to the style you used in your book, "Metternich".

All good fortune.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Ich bestätige mit bestem Dank den Erhalt von:

Datum des Poststempels

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

o. Prof. Dr. S. Sagoroff

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

19 April 1965

Dear Professor Kissinger:

It was thoughtful of you to send Professor Kennan your recent article in *Harper's*. I am sure he will be interested to see it when he returns from Europe next month.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 16, 1965

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for sending me that article -
I look forward to reading it.

I have had a gall bladder operation - it
worked out all right and I am now recuper-
ating at home.

Many things worry me about this world
and have for some time. Do you think
you might be down this way some time
after Easter and could come and see me -
I would appreciate it.

Stuart Symington

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts