TELCORN

Governor Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 a.m., November 8, 1972

R: H-e-n-r-y

K: Nelson, how nice to hear from you. Congratulations.

R: Listen, Henry, I want to tell you that was a huge victory last night. What you and the President have done on this international scene -- and I called the President after we had our final round with everybody down . . . . . . Roosevelt and he called back about 2 o'clock.

K: Oh, yes.

R: And said that you had had word.

K: Oh, yes.

R: For a meeting.

K: Oh, yes.

R: And I think it's fantastic that you kept it.

K: We got it Saturday.

R: You got it Saturday.

K: We got it Saturday morning. But we don't want to rush into it until we get Saigon lined up so I'm sending Haig to Saigon today.

R: Oh, you are.

K: And then next week we're going to meet.

R: Isn't that marvelous, Henry; next week you're going to meet. Now when are you going to get some time to take a little rest?

K: Well, I've got to get this agreement done. Maybe early in December.

R: Now remember that any place you want to go -- that we've got from Venezuela to Washington house or Maine or Albany or New York out in Pocantico.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: Your sons are with you but --

CLASSIFIED

Author: E012958-

Date: 11/01/91

TELCOM

9:45 a.m., November 8, 1972

- 2 -

K: Aren't you nice. You've been such a great friend.

R: Well, we missed you last night but we --

K: Well, we first of all didn't get back until about 6:30 and then given the
general paranoia here, it wasn't the right place.

R: Well, I understood that. You mentioned that, and I understood that
but believe me our thoughts were with you and all your friends were there

K: Well, they sure as hell weren't here.

R: They what?

K: They sure as hell aren't here!

R: Oh, boy.

K: But I really would have loved to be there and I want you to know how
much your friendship has meant to me, and to all of us.

R: Well, we had even a little bi-partisan flavor there last night. Jackie
and Ari Onassis came.

K: Oh, great, yeah.

R: And I told her that you were coming and that had you come that we'd
have gotten you together -- you know, sitting on the other side of her.
She's another one of your great admirers.

K: I'd love to talk to her sometime.

R: A great person. And I'll tell you who would like to have dinner sometime
with the six of us and that's Bill Paley (sp?).

K: Oh, yes, that would be nice.

R: He's very anxious to have a quiet evening and get you and Nancy to come.

K: That would be nice. I've never really talked to him; I've sat next to his
wife once.

R: Well, that's what he said he hadn't, see.

TELCONE

Gov. Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 a.m., November 8, 1972

K: At a White House dinner. Well, any time you want to arrange that I'll --

R: Well, we'll work on it. We're going to take the rest of this week off.

K: Out in Pocantico?

R: Yeah, we'll be out there. So if anything comes up, give me a ring.
If you want to come up there, we'd love to have you come up.

K: I don't think I'm going to be able to leave here now. I'm going with the
President to Miami for a couple of days.

R: When are you all leaving?

K: We're leaving about 5:00 this afternoon.

R: 5:00 this afternoon.

K: And then next week I have to go on the road again.

R: Oh, my. Well, Henry, I just think it's fantastic.

K: And I think this time we're going to make it.

R: You do?

K: Oh, yeah.

R: That is marvelous.

K: The minute they step into the room, they've lost their negotiating
position because if they come into the room, they're admitting that
October 31st was their deadline and not an agreed deadline.

R: Marvelous.

K: And after that the only thing left to negotiate is the extent of their
concession because if they don't want to make changes, why do they
come?

R: Exactly. Listen, Henry, who is making out best during this interim
period? Which side?

K: Oh, we are.

TELCONE

9:45 a.m., November 8, 1972

- 4 -

R: You are?

K: We're getting over a billion dollars worth of equipment in there. We're sending in 280 jet planes, 400 helicopters.

R: Boy!

K: We're sending in all the military equipment that was programmed into 1975 in one month.

R: No kidding.

K: Two years worth of military equipment.

R: How can you keep the North Vietnamese from blowing that up with rockets?

K: We have put a provision in the agreement that any equipment that is destroyed, used up or worn out can be replaced.

R: No kidding.

K: No. They actually would do us a favor to destroy some of it, we could put in more modern equipment.

R: I'll be damned. Well, you're fantastic, Henry.

K: We're just going to park these planes wing tip to wing tip in Cam Ranh Bay and the more they destroy, the better we like it.

R: No kidding. Well, all I can say is that if you'd been running, we'd have had an even bigger sweep.

K: (laughter) And if you'd been running, it would have been out of sight.

R: Listen, I want to tell you, I'm happy just the way things came out. And New York did very well.

K: New York did beautifully.

R: Which is wonderful.

K: And that's a great tribute to you.

TELCONE

9:45 a.m., November 8, 1972

- 5 -

R: Well, it's a great tribute to him. But it's a very exciting thing and I'm just thrilled. And I want very much sometime if you're coming up to New York -- I'm coming down to Washington. . . . December -- but sometime we need to talk a little bit about the future.

K: Yes. Well, any time. I'll tell you when I come to New York, if I should come before you come down here, I'll let you know.

R: Will you let me know?

K: Absolutely!

R:: Good. Because I want to talk to you about it and I don't like to talk on the phone.

K: No, no.

R: You know, the dinner with our mutual friends -- or your friends that got cancelled?

K: Well, that was because we were locked -- we had a rough period there.

R: Yeah, I know. But they didn't walk away from it.

K: Oh, yes.

R: But they didn't walk away from the dinner.

K: They walked away from the dinner.

R: I think they did.

K: Yeah.

R: Oh-h.

K: No, no; we were locking horns there for a while.

R: I see.

K: And I finally came up to New York and I said to them -- I've been reading what your press has been saying. I'll give you one more explanation of our policy. After that, I have to assume that you're wrecking our relationship.

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:55 a.m., November 8, 1972

D: Good morning, Henry.

K: We didn't carry Siberia.

D: Oh. My impression on the contrary, it carried all my country because even now in my Embassy I am listening "Four more years, four more years."

K: Is that what you're saying?

D:q Exactly. In my Embassy everybody is shouting with beginning four years this 12 o'clock at night. So I hear even from Moscow the same -- I mean, the same sounds. Did you receive -- there was a message from Mr. Podgorny to President.

K: I haven't received it yet, no.

D: No. There is a message. It's -- I could give you but it's technical information but they send it through telegraph in this case.

K: Right.

D: It got to me. It goes like this one. "Mr. President: Please accept our congratulations on the occasion of re-electing you on the post of the President of the United States of America. I note it with the greatest respect of the process of a building relations between our two countries. A firm foundation for each was laid down by the summit meeting in Moscow in May. We would like to express the conviction that in the coming period the third American relation will receive further favorable development in the interest of the Soviet and American peoples, in the interest of the international security and __________ the peace throughout the world. And it's signed Podgorny."

K: Well, that's a very warm note and it exactly reflects our own attitude.

D: Yes, it --

K: And you can tell your leaders that accelerating even further the improvement of relations will be one of our principle objectives.

D: I definitely will.

K: And this you know to be the case.

D: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By: WW
Date: 11-04-74

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: W.W. Sta. Date

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:55 a.m., November 8, 1972

- 2 -

K: And it will be one of our principle goals.

D: And my best regards to you personally, Henry.

K: Thank you.

D: And to President. And I am looking for 4 more years to work with you
together.

K: I look forward to working with you as we have in the last years.

D: Definitely.

K: ... one of our most satisfactory relationships here.

D: Thank you very much. I will convey them to Moscow to Brezhnev and
to Podgorny. What your plans, Henry? Now you are going --

K: I am going to Miami with the President today.

D: Oh, today, yeah. You really think you want in this -- I didn't receive
really any --

K: Oh, from Vietnam?

D: Yeah.

K: Oh, yes. They have now proposed November 14th.

D: November 14th.

K: Yes. And we will accept for the 15th because I'm sending Haig to
Vietnam to Saigon.

D: Oh, uh-huh, before.

K: Before because I don't want again to meet with either Vietnamese party
without having the other one under control.

D: Oh, I think this is wise course really. Not to have a second [sense].

K: So I think this time --

D: It will be in Paris?

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:55 a.m., November 8, 1972

- 3 -

K: It will be in Paris. And I think if they come there with a -- you know, with a spirit of making some changes but keeping the essence of the agreement, we'll settle it next time.

D: Yeah, I think. Henry, by any chance to give them preliminary summary of what you are going to do or not yet, you didn't decide it?

K: We haven't decided yet whether to do it. Do you think it would be a good idea?

D: Well, I am -- This is my personal feeling as I mentioned but maybe now it isn't when they already give okay maybe it's not a matter of importance because I really have felt that maybe it was a good idea to show them --

K: Well, between you and me, if they hadn't accepted it, I might have done that eventually.

D: Yeah, but if they accept, maybe there is no specific need really.

K: Yeah.

D: Because of the different atmosphere.

K: Yeah.

D: When will you be back from Florida?

K: I'll be back on Monday, I'm sure.

D: On Monday.

K: Yes.

D: Well, I hope that we will have a chance to meet together to make a look through ......... because by the end of the month I would like to go home for vacation.

K: Definitely. No, we must get together before I go to Paris.

D: Yes. So we could arrange something. But you will be here on Monday. I will give you a call and we'll arrange it --

K: It probably will have to be Monday because I am leaving Tuesday.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
Date: 10/07/72
By: N.A.A.S.I.
H0400

TELCONE

- 4 -

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:55 am, November 8, 1972

D: Oh, you are leaving. Maybe we can arrange a lunch?

K: I think I have a lunch but let's definitely get together Monday.

D: On Monday. Okay, so I will give you a call in the morning and then you will --

K: We'll get together Monday afternoon, late afternoon.

D: Okay.

K: Good.

D: Well, once again, Henry, from deep in my heart I really like this development because I really have a very nice relationship --

K: I don't know whether one can have a feeling of personal friendship with a Communist diplomat but I have it.

D: (laughter) So my best personal regards towards you and to the President. Please regard my personal regards too.

K: Thank you.

D: And thank you very much, Henry.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: W.N.APAS, Jr.
Date: 10/3/74

TELCONE
Senator Humphrey/Mr. Kissinger
1:10 p.m., November 8, 1972

K: ... and I just wanted to make sure -- I didn't know how he left it with you -- that you understood that what he told you was really quite secret still.

H: Oh, absolutely!

K: I was sure it was left that way but I just wanted to make sure.

H: Oh, absolutely! I fully understand that.

K: No, I know you wouldn't talk about it if you understood what the situation was.

H: Oh, very definitely. And, as a matter of fact, I just kinda of rubbed it out of my mind.

K: Right, right.

H: Because I want very much that you folks proceed with great success.

K: Right. Well, we have, of course, as I told you the other day, absolute confidence and I look forward to seeing you whenever you come back into town.

H: Well, thank you, Henry. Well, it was a tremendous victory.

K: It was --

H: Oh, God.

K: It was unbelievable.

H: Unbelievable is right. I told him last night I thought he would carry Minnesota by about 50,000, that's about what it looks like now.

K: Well, it shows that the American people just don't like to be put down by their candidate.

H: That's right. You know, our people got too far out, Henry, and it's too bad because it makes it look awfully bad for us. But we'll be back there ready to go to work.

K: Good. And I look forward very much to seeing you. Will you call me when you are back in town?

H: I will indeed and my friend it will be done.

TEARCRED

TELCOM

1:10 p.m., November 8, 1972

- 2 -

K: Marvelous!

H: And good luck to you now and take care your health. How in the devil you travel as much as you do and stay as strong is beyond me.

K: Well, we'll try to get this thing wound up and then I'll take a vacation.

H: Yeah, you should do that. All right, and I'll respect every . . . .

K: Oh, no question. I have no question about that as long as you understood what the ground rules were, which I wasn't sure.

H: Oh, yes, I surely did.

K: Right.

H: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

UNCLASSIFIED

TelCon
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

Nov. 8, 1972

K: Hello.

Z: Henry, if you take me to the Paris peace negotiations, when you're talking I promise you I won't get up and leave the room.

(Laughter)

K: You guys are beginning to suffer from leverage--you believe your own press relations.

Z: What do you mean?

K: When they have you briefing on the domestic situation, Ron, then what's the stuff you're giving the press? No, I have no time really I thought it was-- lucid, generous

(laughter)

Z: No, I'm just kidding you. I'll see you later. Bye.

K: Bye:

CLASSIFIED

Approved 12/2/72 1:05 PM

BROOKLYN PARK

TelCon
Mr. Kissinger (Key Biscayne)
Ambassador Dobrynin (Washington
3:05 pm, Nov. 9, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol!

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: What the weather there is?

K: The weather is perfect.

D: You have already swimmed a little bit?

K: I what?

D: Did you swim a little bit?

K: Yes, and I took a long walk. I may even take off a half a pound.

D: I know it is a difficult struggle.

K: It is a hopeless struggle. (Laughter)

D: (Laughter) And it is difficult for me too. Henry, I just received
from Mr. Brezhnev a telegram addressed to the President. I
would like to read it to you.

K: All right.

D: "I and my colleagues have learned with deep satisfaction that the course you have taken towards lessening of international tension and towards improvement of relations between our countries received now such a convincing support by the American voters. We believe that this factor played a significant role in the decision of the population of your country which was passed on the election day."

"That is why Nikolai V. Podgorny, Alexey N. Kosygin, my other colleagues in the leadership and I personally express satisfaction on your reelection as President."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012052
By: W.N.APAR,جوئ

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: NNPA 50401

2

'I wish to express the conviction that the relationship and mutual understanding, already built between us as a result of the Moscow meeting, will not only continue but will also be deepened. We hope that in not distant future the deeds that have been started will come to successful completion and that a next important step will be made in the development of the Soviet-American relations. That would correspond both to the interests of our two countries and to the interests of world peace.

Sincerely,

(November 9, 1972)

L. BREZHNEV

K: This is a very, very nice telegram. As it happened, I was going to call you and then Col. Kennedy said you were coming in anyway. Because the President asked me to acknowledge the telegram from Podgorny and to tell you first, of course, that he will write a personal reply to Breshnev, but to tell you that the peace started in the first, and will be accelerated in the second; that this improvement in our relations is one of the cardinal principles of his policy.

D: I understand.

K: And we really look forward to working even more closely with you in the second term.

D: I understand. You say he will write Mr. Breshnev and--

K: And you can tell that already to Mr. Breshnev. I will bring a reply with me on Monday.

D: On Monday?

K: How about you and I having lunch on Tuesday.

D: On Tuesday, fine.

K: I'll be back Monday but I'm busy. The meeting has been put off four days.

D: Oh, I see! When it will be now?

K: On the 20th.

D: On the 20th. Okay, what time?

K: When we have time.

3

D: Yes, on the 20th. Okay, so this will--

K: Definitely fixed for this Sunday.

D: Okay, you look to me or I will come to you?

K: Why don't you come to me.

D: Okay, at one o'clock. I leave this with Col. Kennedy, but
you can relate it to the President.

K: We will relay it to the President today.

D: Yes.

K: Are you going to release it to the press?

D: I don't know about this one--this is what sent to the President. He asked to do this way, Mr. Breshnev. He said if possible to forward to you and the President in Florida. Because he said be in touch with Mr. Kissinger but this you should stress more briefly by telephone directly to the President, but I don't know whether I could do it or not.

K: Right. I will transmit it to the President within the next half hour.

D: Yes, okay. But if you think it best for me I could do it with pleasure, or is it more difficult?

K: Why don't I ask him?

D: Okay, I will leave it here, okay?

K: Well, I think he's out on a boat.

D: Oh, I see.

K: But he can call you at the Embassy.

D: That is no problem, and I will receive it with pleasure. I have now read it to you but if possible I would like--Mr. Breshnev asked me if possible to reach him by telephone.

K: Well, let me see whether I can get the President.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MW Arapoff, Oct 3-4-5

4

D: If it possible you would do, I would like to read it to him myself.

K: Right. Well--

D: You understand why?

K: I, of course, understand why. The only thing is, of course, if this becomes public your Chinese allies will declare war on us.

(Laughter)

D: I don't know. It would be my guess you don't relay it to the public--this one--Podgorny's is already published.

K: I'm joking, we are proud of it.

D: Podgorny's has already been published I know, but --

ship
K: There's nothing to hide in our relations with you, it's one of the best things we've done.

D: I understand, but this here -- if he personally wrote it and he usually on very rare occasions he wrote to me a telegram. He wrote this time and said please do it first if possible. Well of course you know I'm going through you, but at the same time

---

K: Why don't you stay there for five minutes and I'll see if I can reach the President.

D: Okay, I will remain here, okay.

K: And I'll call you back.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: Right.

D: Right.

TelCon

Mr. Kieeinger (Key Biscayne)

3:05 pm, Nov. 9, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatoli!

D: How are you?

K: Okay.

D: What the weather there is?

K: The weather is perfect.

D: You have already swum a little bit?

K: I what?

D: Did you swim a little bit?

D: (Laughter) And it is difficult for me too. Henry, I just received from Mr. Breshov a telegram addressed to the President. I would like to read it to you.

K: All right.

D: 'I and my colleagues have learned with deep satisfaction that the course you have taken towards lessening of international tension and towards improvement of relations between our countries received now such a convincing support by the American voters. We believe that this factor played a significant role in the decision of the population of your country which was passed on the election day.

"That is why Nikolai V. Podgorny, Alexey N. Kozygin, my other colleagues in the leadership and I personally express satisfaction on your reëlection as President.

UNCLASSIFIED

Author: F. F. 2658 -

Date: 10/10/72
From: B.S.

2

Sincerely,

(November 9, 1972)

L. BREZHNEV

K: This is a very, very nice telegram. As it happened, I was going to call you and then Col. Kennedy said you were coming in anyway. Because the President asked me to acknowledge the telegram from Podgorny and to tell you first, of course, that he will write a personal reply to Brezhnev, but to tell you that the peace started in the first, and will be accelerated in the second; that this improvement in our relations is one of the cardinal principles of his policy.

D: I understand.

D: I understand. You say he will write Mr. Brezhnev and--

K: And you can tell that already to Mr. Brezhnev. I will bring a reply with me on Monday.

D: On Monday?

D: On Tuesday, fine.

K: On the 26th.

D: On the 26th. Okay, what time?

K: When we have time.

D: Yes, on the 26th. Okay, so this will--

K: Definitely based for this Sunday.

K: Why don't you come to me.

D: Yes.

D: I don't know about this one--this is what sent to the President. He asked to do this way, Mr. Brezhnev. He said if possible to forward to you and the President in Florida. Because he said he in touch with Mr. Kissinger but this you should stress more briefly by telephone directly to the President, but I don't know whether I could do it or not.

K: Why don't I ask him?

K: Well, I think he's out on a host.

D: Oh, I see.

D: That is no problem, and I will receive it with pleasure. I have now read it to you but if possible I would like--Mr. Brezhnev asked me if possible to reach him by telephone.

4

K: Right. Well--

D: You understand why?

K: There's nothing to hide in our relations with you, it's one of the first things we've done.

D: I understand, but this here -- if he personally wrote it and he usually on very rare occasions he wrote to me a telegram. He wrote this time and said please do it first if possible. Well of course you know I'm going through you, but at the same time ----

K: And I'll call you back.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: Right.

D: Right.

DUE ASSESSMENT

856 221001
Approved By: B.B. Smith

TelCon
Ambassador Dobrynin (Washington)
Mr. Kissinger (Key Biscayne)

3:13 pm, Nov. 9, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Hello, Anatol. The President is out on a boat as suspected and I will do my best to get him to call you.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Before--will you be home in the evening.

D: I will be the whole day today in office.

K: Right, they'll find you.

D: Okay.

K: I'll strongly urge him to call you, but down here he usually shuts himself off completely.

D: I understand. Well, if possible, of course, I will be very much obliged because--

K: I think it's useful---

D: Because in this case---

K: I understand the significance of the message; also the personal touch and we appreciate in general the manner in which our relations have been---

D: Yes, because this is a personal, really, between them, it's very important, and it will grow up more and more.

K: That's exactly the way we look at it and I think we now can begin our second term on a very good basis so we don't have to spend two or three years getting to know each other.

D: Exactly. I think we already know each other rather well.

K: And I think we will ask with great determination.

D: I understand. Thank you very much, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12058
By: J.W. Stockton
Date: 10-04-72

TelCom
Ambassador Debryin (Washington)
Mr. Kissinger (Key Biscayne)

3:13 pm, Nov. 9, 1972

D: Hello.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Right, they'll find you.

D: Okay.

K: I think it's useful--

D: Because in this case--

TELCON

Joe Kraft/Kissinger

10:08 a.m. - 11/13/72

K: Hello.

JK: How are you? Have a nice weekend?

K: Yes.

JK: I notice you're a locker room buff.

K: What can you do? I was there and they asked me to go down. I've never seen any locker room.

JK: You've had a look now. You looked very well. How come you haven't been having lunch with Greta Garbo? I haven't seen that yet.

K: (Laugh) I hadn't thought of it; that's the only reason.

JK: OK. Look, I wanted to talk at some length about Europe because I'm going to be going over there as you know, next week - I mean the latter part of this week. If I possibly could, for my background, on expectations. I'm also going to be in Tehran and Islam so if you could give me some time later in the week I'd like that.

K: Definitely. I'll definitely do that. I'm a little reluctant to go into too much detail in this particular period but I'll talk general philosophy with you.

JK: All right. I'd like to do that. The second is, is there any kind of timing - my timing as I told you I can be over there, and would like to talk to Tho. Is he there this week?

K: I don't think I can give you much more than what I gave you last week. As I told you then I thought he might be over by then.

JK: By the 20th?

K: Well, you asked me about it.

JK: I don't want to play games, but

K: No, no, but your problem is that he'll be there by the end of next week - this seems to me to be your schedule. That seems to be a reasonable prospect. That is really all I can say.

BRASSFIELD

2

JK: It's a good prospect.

K: That would be my guess.

JK: Yeh. OK.

K: You know they pretty well said he's going to be back.

JK: Yeh. He hasn't started yet.

K: Not that I know.

JK: No, well, that's usually something publicized and that he takes
two days so that's a figureable thing.

K: I have not had any word yet that he's left.

JK: There was a rumor going around here over the weekend within
I think from somebody who's in pretty close touch with you, to
the effect that Connally was going to be getting some State job.

K: That was in the Evans and Nowak column. No one has had any
information about appointments from me. Directly, indirectly,
by ESP or by any other way. So that did not come from me. I
saw it in the Evans and Nowak column this morning.

JK: My guess as to where the source is - I mean I don't give a damn
about the story, but I do give a damn about do you think it's true?

K: I have no reason to believe that it's true. But that doesn't mean
it could not be true.

JK: Are you planning to stay on?

K: I'm going to wait to see what the shape will be like and how Vietnam
is turning out.

JK: Someday if you're interested I think I can give you very strong
argument on the ______ Vietnam.

K: I am very interested.

JK: We'll talk about it.

K: No, in fact you'd be doing me a favor. I mean not by the content
but I'd like to hear what you think.

CLASSIFIED

August 27 1966

BOSTON MORNING-GAZETTE

TELCONE

Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 11/13/72

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Nelson, I'm sorry to bother you.

R: A pleasure. I'm just going into a town meeting.

K: Nelson, it turned out that through a set of confusions with the Chinese who wanted the meeting at seven - they scheduled it at seven. Can you make it then?

R: Sure.

K: Good.

R: I'll be back at six. I didn't know when I talked to you before.

K: Good. Well, then we'll keep it at seven.

R: Great. Listen, I loved seeing you last night. Happy and I both. It was a great evening, Henry.

K: It was marvelous.

R: I want to tell you that we saw you afterwards on television at the football game.

K: That's the one thing you have to admit - You never thought of me as a ________ when I was working for you.

R: It made me upset when they said Nancy worked for the Ford Foundation.

K: I don't know why they keep that up.

R: I understand. It's the better - - the other things on there all the time create quite a bit of atmosphere.

K: Not at all. We didn't put it out. Oh no, we didn't put it out at all. I'd be proud on the contrary.

R: Aren't you great!

CLASSIFIED

August 12, 1972

BOSTON GLOBE-BOSTON DAILY NEWSPAPER

TELCOM

Taft Schreiber/Kissinger

10:33 a.m. - 11/13/72

K: Hello.

S: How are you?

K: Taft, how are you?

S: Very good. I saw that you were here yesterday. I read the papers.

K: God, I tell you it's certainly a great anonymous life that I'm leading.

S: I don't think there's anything wrong with it as long as it helps you have fun.

K: (Laugs.)

S: I ran into Iselin and the Leon Hesneck crowd who said you were with them.

K: Did you see them last night?

S: We were to Trader Vic's and the whole gang was there. I see you were with Nancy taking it easy and having an early evening.

K: That's right.

S: I figured that.

K: Listen, I know you're still not sure when you're leaving. We're coming down Thursday morning. I have that board meeting there at ________ Museum. I hope to go to Jim Rippe's Thursday night. If you're not leaving before the weekend then maybe we can get together Friday because I want to fill you in a little more. I've had some further conversations.

K: Yeh, I'd like to talk to you. Actually it's a good time.

S: And if you're not going, but if for example you're leaving Thursday afternoon, what I could do - I could fly down Wednesday - we're going to see Pippin and I could take the late plane Wednesday night and see you at nine o'clock Thursday.

K: I think I'll probably be able to make it Friday.

DECLASSIFIED

August 22, 1972

BJS BROWN & COMPANY

2

S: Friday would be perfect.

K: Why don't we have breakfast on Friday?

S: Perfect. Breakfast Friday at what time? 8 o'clock?

K: Right. 8 o'clock.

S: Where'll I meet you?

K: Do you want to eat a lousy breakfast in my office?

S: A lousy breakfast in your office can be very appetizing.

K: Good.

S: All right, I'll be there.

K: Terrific. Make it 8:30 - it's a little more reliable.

S: All right. 8:30 Friday. Well, the President's going to be away, isn't he until the end of the week?

K: He's going to be at Camp David.

S: Yeh, I thought that he wouldn't be here anyway. 8:30 is perfect. I don't have an appointment until 10:30. I'll have plenty of time.

K: Terrific.

S: See you then, Henry.

K: OK, Taft. Bye.

UNCLASSIFIED

AUG 21 1966 2:01PM

BASICS

TELCOM

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

10:50 a.m. - 11/13/72

K: Hello.

E: Hi, Dr. Kissinger.

K: How are you, Rollie? The conceptual Dr. Kissinger.

E: How did you like that piece?

K: I think it's crap but I figure you must know

E: You think everything I write is crap, Henry.

K: No, I think 99% of the time you're right.

E: Listen, will you have a minute today?

K: Probably not because I have to go to Camp David.

E: When? You couldn't see me right now?

K: If it's really only a minute.

E: Well, fifteen; ten or fifteen.

K: Then come at noon.

E: Can I do that? You're not going there for lunch are you?

K: No.

E: You're going up this afternoon?

K: Yeh.

E: OK. You'll see me at noon?

K: Yeh.

E: I'll be there at noon.

K: OK.

DR. KASSINGER

August 22, 1972

BAS. SMITH 8/1/72 10:01

TELECON

Admiral Gaylor/Kissinger

11:10 a.m. - 11/13/72

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Noel Gaylor here.

K: How are you?

G: Thank you, I'm well. I thought I'd let you know I was across the street here in case you wanted to have any conversation with me while I'm in town.

K: How long are you going to be here?

G: I'll be here until the middle of the afternoon. Going back to Hawaii then.

K: I unfortunately have to go to Camp David very shortly.

G: Yes.

K: So it may not be possible.

G: Well, why don't you get Al to stop by on one of his trips on the way back and I'll try to give you some lead time in case you'll want to talk to me the next time I come to town.

K: Good. I'd appreciate that.

G: Because I think it would be handy, I really do. I got some ideas and projects for the Pacific Command and I would like to run them by you at least.

K: All right. Well, if I find - are you going to be across the street for another hour or so?

G: I can be.

K: Well if I find I have some time I'll give you a call.

G: Great.

K: Good. Thank you.

DRT ASSIGNED

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

11:34 a.m., November 13, 1972

MK: Good morning.

HK: Marvin, how are you?

MK: Fine, thank you. I haven't had a chance to take your temperature in a week.

HK: (laughter)

MK: Was it a good game?

HK: No, very one-sided.

MK: Too one-sided, yes. Well, we had a good one down here in Washington.

HK: Yeah, I'm sorry I missed it.

MK: Absolutely marvelous.

HK: Did you see it?

MK: No, but we're on kind of a semi-strike here with CBS so it's a little screwy but I managed to watch a closed-circuit ______ and it was marvelous. It was just a superb game.

HK: It sounded like a great game.

MK: Sir, let me just have a couple of questions if I might. There are many, many stories in three capitals today that you're very shortly going to go back to Paris.

HK: Yeah.

MK: Is that roughly right?

HK: Well, I can't add anything to what Xuan Thuy and others have said publicly.

MK: Um-humm. Is Le Duc Tho necessary in this?

HK: I would think so.

MK: Yes. So in other words, the key sign for us at this point is still the news that he's coming back?

CLASSIFIED

Autobiography FEB 26 1978
B&W Photo-Diary 01/05/78

TELCON
Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

11:34 a.m., November 13, 1972

- 2 -

HK: Right.

MK: Okay. Do you have any -- as it's been written -- private assurance that he is coming back soon?

HK: Well, didn't Xuan Thuy say so publicly?

MK: Well, he didn't quite say that -- at least not as I read the story. I had the impression that he said he was coming back if you were going to return in order to agree on the signing and the procedures for the signing.

HK: Oh, nonsense. No, you know that doesn't make any sense.

MK: Um-humm. So that the idea of your going back to talk to him is --

HK: I mean, to talk only about the procedures for signing -- I mean, that just can't make any sense.

MK: In other words, this phrase, I just wanted to check.

HK: Yeah. Well, everyone has to prime off what they've been saying.

MK: Right. But this idea of some sense of assurance that it's going to happen is right?

HK: I just don't want to talk about it. I've never wavered in my view.

You know,

MK: Right. What about the sense of Saigon now? Are we closer to a union of views with Thieu?

HK: I think we're moving towards that.

MK: We are.

HK: Well, it won't be easy but I think we're moving towards that.

MK: The story in the Times today would seemed to have quoted Nha as suggesting that in principle withdraw as opposed to an actual before the ceasefire might be acceptable.

HK: Um-humm.

MK: Is that correct?

HK: I haven't seen it yet. But I don't want to go into -- I just can't talk about the actual negotiations.

MK: Yeah. Well, the trouble right now is that everybody -- not you -- I mean, everybody in my group is talking like hell and you don't even know whether they're talking sense.

HK: You mean journalists?

MK: Yeah. (laughter)

HK: I tell you 98% are not talking sense.

MK: Yeah. You know, you read this stuff and you just don't know --

HK: I know. It must be terribly maddening but there just isn't enough that's valid.

MK: Do you still feel that the business of a single detailed substantive session could do it?

HK: Well, it could break the back of it and then there will have to be consultations afterwards.

MK: Um-humm. With the South Vietnamese?

HK: Right. And maybe some exchanges with the North Vietnamese.

MK: Um-humm. Direct face to face or could that be done --

HK: That might be done by messages.

MK: Yeah. And do you have a sense of the possibility of the ceasefire around this month?

HK: I just don't want to put a time limit on it.

MK: Right, right.

HK: But I have no reason yet to change my original judgment that it can be done in a matter of weeks after negotiations resume.

MK: Right. Well, I sure wish you luck. Thank you, Henry, very much.

HK: But after this is over, I'll pick some country that caves after a week.

TELCORN

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

11:34 a.m., November 13, 1972

- 4 -

MK: What's that?

HK: If we get into war in the second term, we'll pick ourselves a country that caves in a week.

MK: (laughter) Okay

HK: Not these maniacs.

MK: I should hope you can avoid it.

HK: I think we've done our duty in warlike activities.

MK: I certainly think so. I certainly hope so.

HK: We'll certainly not be looking for it.

MK: Good. I certainly hope you wrap this up because I have to finish the book.

HK: When is that going to the press?

MK: Well, you know, I can't do it until you do this. I mean, I cannot in any kind of conscience complete a manuscript --

HK: No, you're right.

MK: ... until you've wrapped this thing up.

HK: No, you're right.

MK: You know, it's crazy.

HK: No, you're absolutely right.

MK: This is obviously the climax of the whole thing. I can't very well --

HK: No, I understand that.

MK: So you'll know when the book finishes.

HK: Okay.

MK: Thank you. Bye.

wgh

TelCon

David Frost/Mr. Kissinger

1:00, Nov. 13, 1972

K: Hello.

F: Henry!

K: David, how are you?

F: Terrific. What I read, does this mean y; our clients are calling you. Your Vietnamese clients?

K: No, I'm still planning to get together on Thursday.

F: Oh, that's marvelous. Oh, that's delicious dear. Oh, lovely.

K: So you'll come down.

F: That would be lovely.

K: Good. With Dianne?

F: Absolutely.

K: Good, I think you would put a new complexion on it if you came alone. You know how reluctant I am to see you alone.

F: Laughter. What time do you suggest, Henry.

K: Oh, let's plan--are you going back that night or are you staying over.

F: It depends. I next am going out to do a think with Mohammed Ali on the Coast. So, I will depend slightly on where the planes are best for me. Is there a late plane back to New York.

K: Well, actually, the latest is 10:00.

F: Oh, then we'll probably stay the night.

K: Good, well let's plan to have dinner around 8:00.

F: Lovely.

K: And, I'll figure out where to do it.

2

There really aren't very many good places here.

F: Well, how many are there for dinner. Rive Gauche if you like.

K: Yes, Rive Gauche is a possibility.

F: Well, nobody knows Washington, or indeed, Paris as well as you.

K: That isn't exactly true, but-- I will let you know and I'll let you know whether I'll bring somebody.

F: Oh, that sounds lovely. That sounds smashing. We both are looking forward enormously.

K: Marvelous.

F: We'll have a merry celebration on Thursday night.

K: Right.

F: Lovely, look forward to seeing you, bye bye, Henry.

K: Bye.

DECEMBER 17, 1956

256-2127-1956

HOLLYWOOD GAMES DE

1:07, Nov. 13, 1972

K: Hello.

Z: Henry, how violently do you want me buy WPI off of that lead.

K: I would just want everyone to shut up.

Z: Okay. I was just following your instructions this morning, I thought. Now, UPI would be hard with it. The question is how violently should I back them off of it or just leave them alone. We have that option now.

K: I'd just leave it alone, because it will just escalate it more and more, don't you think?

Z: Oh, I could ease them off., The point of it is I didn't say negotiations, I said consultations. I didn't say consultations with South Vietnamese, and then the North Vietnamese, I said consultations with the South Vietnamese and perhaps the North Vietnamese period.

K: Well, I'd just leave it as it is.

Z: Would you leave it as it is. I could back them off, if you want--

K: No, leave it as it is.

Z: You're not that bothered about it.

K: No.

Z: Actually, it opens our flexibility up on it, but I'll do what you want now.

K: No, no, I think I'd leave it.

Z: You want me to leave it.

K: Yeah.

Z: Okay, sir.

K: Good.

Z: Thanks, Henry.

TELCONE

Bernard Gwertzman (NYT)/Kissinger

9:29 a.m. - 11/14/72

K: Hello.

G: Hello. I see you got Le Duc Tho in motion now.

K: Yeh.

G: I just wonder if you could give me some last guidance before the
talks begin.

K: No, let me tell you something else. No one else can either.

G: I understand that. You've been right along on that. I just want to
check one thing - when Ziegler yesterday talked about the need for
additional consultations, which of course is not new to some of us,

K: No, I've said this I think to you before.

G: Of course, that's why we treat it as such. I mentioned that in the
story. Are we still in the same framework?

K: It's still the same framework that I mentioned to you.

G: So within weeks or less from the time you meet with Le Duc Tho

K: With the proviso assuming he's coming there with the same attitude
that he did in October. You know, we settled more crucial
issues but we've also been hung up on less crucial ones so it really
depends on his attitude.

G: UH-huh.

K: Assuming that the momentum is maintained, my position is essentially
I'll stick with my prediction and that's what I said then.

G: Right.

K: This is not a new nuance I'm giving you.

G: I understand that. I understand that. In other words, you haven't
settled - some people are saying everything's been settled privately
through diplomatic channels, but you really haven't?

K: NO.

2

G: You really haven't. This is really the first forward chance you get at him.

K: We've been exchanging things but this is the first solid chance.

G: And the situation is really South Vietnam - is that a workable situation?

K: I think so.

G: There argument about the troops just doesn't seem to have much weight. They're not going to hang up on that are they?

K: Well that remains to be seen but we'll - I've said all along we'll try to settle both issues in the same time frame. And I still believe we can.

G: Yeh, and rather apart, I take it, from Saigon.

K: Well, so much of it is serious and I think it will require wisdom on both sides.

G: They know, of course, what you said - that the US in the end will make it's own judgment if the agreement is right and you still left ambiguous what is right.

K: That doesn't surprise us. They know our views.

G: Uh-huh. Would it be signed without them?

K: Well, I don't want to go into that. Incidentally, none of this is for any sort of attribution.

G: OK. OK.

K: But you handled last week's story very delicately.

G: Well, I did get help on this.

K: No, I know it's very confusing for you but I think the TIMES has been very fair in it! s news coverage. I can't say that for the editorial page.

G: As I said I don't represent the editorial page.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 27 1967 5:01PM

New York, N.Y.

TELCORN

9:35 a.m. - 11/14/72

President/Kissinger

K: Hello.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, before we talk about the other thing, I wonder if you'd
get one of your Taiwan people - I talked to Billy Graham, he called
from Tokyo and he's going to be in Taipei tomorrow with - in fact
he's going to be there today, but he'd not going to see anyone until
tomorrow. And I said just reassure them and express my apprecia-
tion and so forth and so on and that we stand by our friends. But I
said that I'd have your office send him a little calbe to McConegie (sp. ?)
as sort of talking points. Would you just have them give him - you
know the idea, give reassurance.

K: We'll get it over there within the next couple of hours.

P: Fine. You know I don't need to know what it says but just so if he's
going to see them, then he can sort of feel the personal feeling.

K: Absolutely.

P: Great. Well, how did you go last night? Everything

K: It was unbelievable.

P: Where did you have it?

K: I thought I better entertain them. I did it at the Century Club in
New York.

K:

P: Where is that? / That's on 43rd Street - 7 West 43rd Street.

P: Is it upstairs? I mean on top of a high building?

K: No, it's a whole building.

P: Oh, I don't know the Club.

K: It's got the entire building.

DREASCHFILD

Autobahn E 12 295
Best Dated 11/10/72

2

P: Yeh. Yeh.

K: And well, first of all, personal felicitations from the Prime Minister to be conveyed to you, urgently again. And they are so delighted and you're the man who made the historic opening towards China and they'll never forget that. They were just burbling around. Then they talked about Vietnam and they said, of course, we won't interfere but we are in favor of a quick settlement without humiliation of either side and we'll use our influence in that direction. And it's the softest I've ever heard them on Vietnam. No particular support for the North Vietnamese. If they talk to the North Vietnamese the way they talk to us - they said Le Duc Tho is going to be coming to Peking and - but the whole tone of it was - they brought gifts for everybody and the whole tone of the conversation - it couldn't have been that cordial unless they had a pretty good idea it was going to be settled. Because if this headed into a confrontation, this would be very odd behavior. They as much as said that they would use their influence to keep things quiet in Cambodia.

P: That was a good point.

K: They did say that. I told them it was absolutely essential and I said, - They were violent on Russia and I said "Look, ..

P: Really?

K: Yeh.

P: Were you able to make that Haig point?

K: Absolutely.

P: That must have impressed them.

K: That impressed them and I now brought it into connection with the fact that we have to make some tough decisions in resisting hegemony around the world in the next four years. And it cannot be in anybody's interest that the United States is put into a difficult position in Southeast Asia after the war ends.

P: As a matter of fact sucked into a peripheral war anyplace, Henry.

3

K: Things have to be kept quiet. They can't be immediately starting again. And they said they understand that. Then they asked about our basic attitude towards Sihanouk - were we willing in principle to talk to them and I said, first there has to be a substantial period of tranquility but they said remember that the President had engaged in correspondence with them when there was no diplomatic relations. I think if we can keep things quiet in Cambodia for a year - I'm not sure that Sihanouk may not be somebody that could come back there at the right moment.

P: Cambodia wouldn't want him now. That's the problem.

K: They wouldn't want him now. But the major thing now is to get the ceasefire established in all those countries.

P: Yeh. If the poor people quit killing each other.

K: Yeh, but

P: They're still mad at the Russians.

K: And their words about you. I mean it couldn't - he drank a toast to you and to your victory. When we had said that the Senior Vice Foreign Minister, who had given a virulent attack on the Soviet Union in the afternoon and a virulent attack on the United Nations would drink a toast to the President in the evening and

P: What's he attacking them on right now?

K: He's attacking them on the non-use of force and the renunciation of nuclear weapons. And he says after all if they want to renounce force let them get out of Mongolia.

P: (Laugs) Why doesn't he tell them to give the outer islands

K: Oh, and he said he wants to assure us they will do nothing with the Japanese to weaken our position. They think it is a good idea for us to have our military arrangements with the ______.

P: That's come 180 degrees.

K: That's come 180 degrees.

4

P: They know it.

K: Well, they gave us back almost verbatim what you said to Chou in
your conversations.

P: Remember we had that whole business where Bill was reassuring
the Foreign Minister that we're not trying to help the Japanese and
so forth and I always tell him, Bill, we're going to stay in Japan.

K: And he said don't believe this business about the Japanese doing an
enormous amount of business with us. They tried to have us a colony
for 50 years and we're not going to be a colony of Japan. It was the
warmest meeting I've ever had with them. And on Vietnam, it couldn't
have been warmer.

P: Did the matter
or the possibility of David and Julie going over there come up?

K: No, I mentioned it to them.

P: That's just as well.

K: They always - those things

P: But you didn't have to - but on Mansfield you got that on the back burner.

K: That's right.

P: I really feel on him - I've been doing some thinking about that - I just
feel we've done enough for him, Henry.

K: It's not going to happen.

P: You know what I mean.

K: Yeh.

P: We've done a helluva of a lot for him. Let it go.

K: I don't think it's going to happen.

P: We should help our friends.

DRLASSIFIED
Autograph
E212958-
B-80
Skt V Date: 6/10/93

5

K: They're not going to invite him.

P: Good. Good. Good.

K: It was a very, very positive

P: We'll talk to Dobrynin about the other one because that is coming up.

K: That I will do today.

P: But let me say only if they feel that because the kids really don't give a damn whether they go or not. But if they would like for them to represent or you know, among the unofficial delegation, just let it come naturally.

K: Right. Right. Right.

P: Now with regard to this - you know what you left me yesterday was simply a copy of the letter that Thieu had sent to us, to me.

K: Oh, god, I sent you the - I'll immediately send over

P: I don't have a copy of the proposed letter.

K: I'll get it right to you. I'm sorry.

P: Now look __________ on that letter I think that the tone is certainly conciliatory, the substance, of course, on the troop withdrawal is tough. Yet, of course, the way he puts it it is a very cogent case, you know, if you kept arguing about it that they fight for ten years and what happens is that the North Vietnamese - that we get out and the North Vietnamese stay in. If you consider both of us foreign troops. So I'm just putting the argument the way he does. He makes a pretty good case. Now the only way I think you can get around it is what he needs more than anything else, as far as the fact of their being there and the danger of their being there, it's nothing because they're just as dangerous across the DMZ. They can pour it on anytime.

K: Right.

CLASSIFIED

August 22, 1966 - B561019

6

P: I understand that the main thing is, from his standpoint, is security and our commitment. On the other hand, what he is concerned is the appearance; he's concerned basically about the fact that after all these years, does he sign an agreement which says the North Vietnamese can occupy part of his country. That bothers him. Now, on that it seems to me that there could be some fuzzy language just in principle, that the conclusion of the juridical process; that is and so forth, that all the North Vietnamese troops go out or something like that.

K: It can't be put quite that way, but the basic idea is correct.

P: You've got to have something in there that says that the principle of the occupation of parts of South Vietnam by North Vietnamese troops is not recognized. That's his real problem.

K: They will never - you see

P: They don't admit they have them, I know.

K: You see one thing that he doesn't recognize is, it is actually an asset from the point of view of principle that they do not say they have troops there. They don't claim they have a right to have troops there. They claim they don't have troops there which is a lie, but which from the point of view of principle is easier to handle. What I think we can do, however, Mr. President, we can, in the section on the demilitarized zone put in a clause that the demilitarized zone must be respected. That establishes the principle. Second, we can put in something about demobilizing troops in the south and returning them to their homes. And thirdly, we can add to the agreement a protocol of their unilateral statement saying they have no troops there. With an American statement saying we don't recognize their right to have troops there.

P: Yeh, well, I understand. We will do everything we can. Now on the other points that he makes both of those are basically, we know, fairly cosmetic, but enormously important to him and couldn't matter less in my opinion to the North.

K: Oh, on his other points, we can get 80%.

P: Yeh, so that's where I read his letter.

K: I left you the wrong copy. I will immediately get up to you

P: How soon do you need the other one?

UNCLASSIFIED

Autumn 1969 - 8/26/69
BOSMA DEPT. 01-69

TELCONE

Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger

3:02 p.m., November 14, 1972

G: Henry.

K: By God, don't you dare call me in my office.

G: How did you like the Jets game, that's all I'm calling you on, Henry.

K: Well, I liked it very well ....

G: I must say the Redskins here was equally good.

K: That was a better game.

G: Just marvelous. Henry, what I'm calling about is am I allowed to ask -- what I'd like to do -- what I'd most like to do is have you to myself but I would really obviously if you would be willing and if I won't get you in trouble, I would rather have not one of those mass things which I think are torture and on the whole unsatisfactory. If you would be willing to say have about 4 people like Meg, Phil, Murray and maybe Marilyn or not I don't care but Murray-- I mean, if we could have maybe 6 of us to talk, that would be kind of marvelous for us but if you don't want to --

K: Well, I'll tell you --

G: And if you're not supposed to, then we'll understand.
No, no;

K: That isn't the problem. The problem is that the depths of bitterness against the Post here is not to be described. I mean, that happens to be a fact. And I was going to suggest -- you were kind enough to mention that we might meet at your house or some place.

G: Yes. Oh, very easy.

K: Which I would like to do. If you want one other person there -- you know, I can't tell you whom to invite to your house but if I can vaguely be accused of having -- you know, I pick my friends. I won't let my associates tell me who my friends can be but if at this period -- If I want to resign, I can resign but I don't want a blowup over having --

G: We just had lunch with Safire at Chez Camille. Meg and Phil and me. But maybe he's got a license to hunt.

K: I know it would be taking --

G: It would be taken amiss.

TELCONE

Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger

3:02 p.m., November 14, 1972

K: You know, it will be taken amiss if I see you but that's friendship and we've done that for a long time.

G: Right. So do it at home and maybe just ask Phil.

K: Yeah, sure. Phil and Meg, if you want to have two that you can actually rely upon to keep their mouth shut.

G: Okay.

K: You know, we made this date a long time ago.

G: Well, listen, Henry --

K: No, no.

just

G: If you want to have lunch with me, I'll do it that way.

K: No, no, no; God Almighty, I can't tell you whom you can have in your house.

G: Okay. You can't. Obviously I'm going to do what you want.

K: No, I know it but I'm afraid if you had Murray and Marilyn and a few others, then it will get out what I said where and --

G: The trouble is they'll write a memorandum for each other, cause they will.

K: They will, huh?

G: Well, not if I tell them not to. I mean, I think we could say do Meg and Phil and Murray alone.

K: No, Murray I wouldn't trust to do it.

G: Then let's not have it.

K: I like him but --

G: But he's all reporter.

K: Yeah.

G: And he might say you had had lunch with me, I see that. All right, let's just have Meg and Phil.

TELCORN

Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger

3:02 p.m., November 14, 1972

K: That would be fine.

G: And I'll just tell them I can't write a memorandum or say I've had lunch with you.

K: Yeah, except I wonder if they would then say others that won't be worse.

G: Should I just have Phil -- you know, they sign themselves "Jayfield" these days and I'd feel so disloyal to Meg who has just rescued not one but two speeches for me so you . . . .

K: Oh, have Meg and Phil and don't put any special restrictions on them.

G: All right. I'll just say look, he's on the spot. He said to come as friends.

K: Yeah.

G: And please not -- I can say please don't print a memorandum or discuss it.

K: All right, as long as you do it on your own.

G: Yeah, I'll do it.

K: Good.

G: Okay.

K: 1 o'clock at your house?

G: Yes, perfect.

K: Marvelous.

G: Great. Thank you, Henry.

K: See you then.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

August 12, 1972

BOSCHSDERFJUNI

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

3:10 p.m., November 14, 1972

K: Mr. President, sorry to disturb you but Dobrynin is leaving at 3:30.

P: Yeah.

K: And I raised the suggestion of Tricia and your son-in-law. There won't be an official delegation from us for the 50th anniversary.

P: Oh, fine, fine.

K: But he said that if you wanted to, he would be very glad to raise the possibility of a visit for them on an unofficial basis with Brezhnev and he's going there. If they'd be interested in going and he's certain that they would be very well received.

P: Well, we don't want to put it on the basis of a sort of a State kind of thing.

K: Oh, no; it would be unofficial.

P: But you might just tell him that their tentative plans are sometime in December to be in about 4 or 5 European capitals and they thought they might like to go to perhaps Moscow and Leningrad. And we don't want them to feel any obligation but that we just thought -- I'd put it on that low key.

K: Right.

P: That they are going to make the trip and that they would pay our respects or something of that sort. Put it on that basis.

K: Right.

P: How does that sound to you?

K: Oh, that's very good and I have the impression that they are anxious to do it on that basis.

P: Good, good.

K: But he thought it would be best if he could talk it over personally with Brezhnev so that it isn't --

ERASED

Author: ED1295B-
Date: 11/01/72

- 2 -

P: Oh, sure, sure. Put it on the basis that we don't want anything official, we just want informally, as a matter of courtesy. That they might come and naturally they ......... that's all. But that I'm not asking that they lay on anything special but that we'll let them know the dates and so forth.

K: Good.

P: Because they couldn't travel over there without their all knowing anyway.

K: Right. Would they be alone or would they be having -- some secret service?

P: Just alone but very minimal secret service. They don't need much, you see?

K: Right.

P: And they'll just betraveling commercially and staying -- there they probably would stay in the Embassy.

K: I'm sure they'll do anything they want.

P: But that will be fine, that will be fine. I was just looking at this -- working on this letter to Thieu at the present time.

K: Right. But if I could have your views by 5:30 or 6:00, that's when we have to get it out.

P: All right. Fine, fine.

K: To catch the deadline over there.

P: Get that off. The other thing is that I think that I told Bob that I want Ziegler up here to do the announcement Friday. So it ought to -- I think that will be much better than for him to do it down there where it's sort of by remote control so it's possible that you might like to either come up here Friday morning or come up Thursday night. Ziegler goes out and announces it. I'm going to have him up so that he can go out -- we have set up a big trailer out here anyway for a briefing room.

K: Oh, great.

- 3 -

P: So it's also close so Ziegler can go out and they've got telephones in it and everything. That's what we are trying -- we are building some sort of an office now so people -- when I come here I can work and they won't feel I'm on vacation.

K: Right, right. Well, it's a good idea.

P: That's the way we'll do it. I think the idea of having Ziegler make the announcement is right. If he does it from here and which also has a certain ______ too from Camp David.

K: Then I'll come either Thursday night or --

P: Thursday night or maybe morning, you can work it out because Ziegler will not brief till 11 o'clock at any rate.

K: Right, right.

P: Okay.

K: And then we can say that I talked to you then.

P: Right, right. Okay. Nothing else new?

K: No, nothing else. Right, Mr. President.

wgh

TELCOM

3:15 p.m., November 14, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Yes, hello, Henry.

K: I've just talked to the President. He said that on the basis of an
unofficial visit, he would be very pleased if you would explore it.

D: Yes.

K: They would come commercial air and probably just --

D: How many days would this be?

K: It's not definite, three or four days.

D: Three or four days, yeah.

K: Yes, Moscow and Leningrad.

D: What is the time approximately?

K: Middle of December I think.

D: Middle of December.

K: Yes.

D: I mean, I will look into this. I'm sure it could be arranged and
everything. Did they have some specific things to see? That we could
explore later on but a limit of principle I will check with Brezhnev and
we'll arrange it.

K: That would be very nice.

D: Okay.

K: And the President also asked that you convey his warm personal regards to Mr. Brezhnev and how much he's looking forward to welcoming him here.

D: Thank you very much, Henry. And I would like to thank you personally.
As you know, I really think everything is going fine.

TELCORN

3:15 p. m., November 14, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Yes, hello, Henry.

D: Yes.

D: Three or four days, yeah.

K: Yes, Moscow and Leningrad.

D: Middle of December.

K: Yes.

D: I mean, I will look into this. I'm sure it could be arranged and
everything. Did they have some specific things to see? That we could
explore later on but a limit of principle I will check with Breshnev and
we'll arrange it.

K: That would be very nice.

D: Okay.

K: And the President also asked that you convey his warm personal regards
to Mr. Breshnev and how much he's looking forward to welcoming him
here.

BRIEFING

TELCORN

John Chancellor/Mr. Kissinger

4:36 p.m., November 14, 1972

C: Thank you for calling back. I just wanted to say briefly good luck and --

K: Aren't you nice.

C: And we've all got our fingers crossed.

K: Aren't you nice.

C: And hope it comes true.

K: I really appreciate that.

C: Well, a lot is in your briefcase and in your head for all of us. And I just -
you know, God bless you and God speed.

K: John, that's one of the nicest phone calls I've had.

C: Well, I know you'll do a wonderful job and you've done it already but
we just think of you. I do particularly.

K: Well, it really means a lot to me.

C: Well, you mean a lot to us. Anyway, have a good trip.

K: Hope to see you when I get back. I'm not off for a bit but we'll announce
it before I go, just for your information.

C: Okay.

K: And I very much appreciate your call.

C: All right. And I know you'll have a successful journey. God bless you.

K: I hope so. Thank you. Bye.

C: Bye.

wgh

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler / Mr. Kissinger

5:00-ish, November 14, 1972

K: Ron, I don't know whether you can handle this. Maxine Cheshire had an item this morning that I was going to be an extra -- that I had agreed to be an extra in a movie, "The Exorcist," and I don't want to call there's absolutely no truth to it.

SANITIZED

Z: I'm disappointed.

K: And I'm going to be casting director of a movie studio but that's different when I leave here.

Z: Yeah.

K: Can you get her to retract it?

Z: Only if you will guarantee me a part in a movie.

K: Of course. Will you do it?

Z: Sure.

K: Can I count on it?

Z: I don't know if she'll do it, but I'll try.

K: Okay. Will you let me know?

Z: Sure.

K: Good.

Z: But will you guarantee me a part in a movie?

K: Yes, and I want to talk to you about this other thing but I have somebody with me -- in a little while.

Z: Okay.

K: Good.

wgh

TELCORN

George Sherman [Evening Star]/Mr. Kissinger

5:48 p.m., November 14, 1972

S: Dr. Kissinger, as I told your secretary, I have a bit of a problem here. I have to do a sort of summing up of where we stand on this moment in this thing and I don't know if you have been following at all some of the reports that we've been running out of Saigon. Our correspondent who does have quite well-placed sources in the Palace seems to be getting a much harder line than most of the other correspondents there and frankly, I'm rather worried about it in terms of -- Well, first of all, would you say it's an accurate reflection of what they're saying? I mean, is it still a very hard Saigon line?

K: Oh, I just don't want to go into the details of it.

S: Well, let me say generally, do you think it's sort of the tenor of what he's saying is a distortion of what's going on in private.

K: Well, no, I think it's that obviously some elements in Saigon who have
that view.

S: Um-humm. But do you have a feeling that -- In other words, what I'm
getting at -- Are they saying one thing to us -- I mean, that is both
privately and publicly before an audience and another for propagation
inside South Vietnam.

K: Well, I would think to some extent that's true but it's also probably true
that they'll make whatever concessions they have to make -- all of this
is off-the-record.

S: Right, okay.

K: As late as possible.

S: Um-humm. Well, I tell you the most immediate problem is the inter-
pretation of Lam's remarks. Now after the Lion's Club thing yesterday,
you seemed to be very upbeat on this in the dispatches saying that
agreement is very close and that only nebulous parts of the original
agreement remained to be clarified.

K: Yeah.

S: Would you say that's a fairly accurate reflection of your understanding of their position at the moment?

K: Well, it may have been a little bit too soft.

TELCON

George Sherman/Mr. Kissinger

5:48 p.m., November 14, 1972

S: Too soft.

K: Of their position.

S: In other words, too soft on what they're really -- of their position but --

K: I think it's probably in between these two extremes.

S: Well, the other question. Is it wrong for us to be concentrating so much as the Saigon dispatches seem to be on the question of North Vietnamese force withdrawals?

K: No, that's an issue that they keep raising.

K: I just will not talk about the negotiations any longer now until we've conducted some more. And I must warn you, I wouldn't believe a word that anyone in town tells you.

S: (laughter) You mean, you're telling me not to bother calling anyone else.

K: No, because those who talk won't know.

S: Well, when do you estimate that he's going to get to Paris? Have you plotted out his usual time of travel? I mean, he usually stays one day in Peking and one day in Moscow, doesn't he?

K: Yeah, I have a pretty good idea on when he'll be there.

S: (laughter) You mean, he's been sent there you mean?

K: I'm not saying that but --

S: Are you going to waken at 5 o'clock in the morning?

K: No, no, no; we'll announce it ahead of time.

S: That's breaking with precedents. What decides you on that?

K: Well, because I've been wanting to save you all from waiting at Andrews.

S: Um-humm. Was my story over the weekend where I remarked that it will be later this week?

TELCORN

George Sherman/Mr. Kissinger

5:48 p.m., November 14, 1972

- 3 -

K: I just hate to be so uncooperative but you know, if it succeeds, then it
won't make any difference whether I have dribbled out little bits of news
every day. And if it doesn't, it just makes it worse to have done so.

S: Well, I understand that. Of course, you know, you realize our problem.

K: Look, you're doing your job. Incidentally, you had something a few weeks
ago -- I didn't bother to call you about -- in which you said that the
agreement provides for a 30-day delay before that international group
gets into place, that isn't true.

S: No, I meant to the Conference there's a 30-day delay.

K: there's a conference, yes.

S: Oh, no.

K: The group is functioning immediately.

S: Right. There's agreement on that now?

K: That's always been agreed. The only question that wasn't agreed was how
you define "immediately" if you don't have it worked out. You see what
I mean?

S: Right.

K: The word "immediately" can still take two weeks.

S: I understood that we're trying to get a separate protocol --

K: that's always been the case; that's not new.

S: Which would -- said these people would be in place before the other
ceasefire was . . .

K: That's right, that is true.

S: So there would be a time interval there.

K: There would not be a time interval.

S: No, I mean time interval between the signing of the first protocol and
the coming into force of the ceasefire.

TELCORN

George Sherman/Mr. Kissinger

5:48 p.m., November 14, 1972

- 4 -

K: No, one could have the protocol signed simultaneously with the ceasefire.

S: U-huh. Okay. Well, I still basically the question I want answered is this business on the troop withdrawal and that's obviously something you can't talk about.

K: No, I really can't talk about it.

S: But would you say in general terms that General Haig's visit there did succeed in clarifying --

K: I think it did advance matters.

S: And you still think that you're going to have to go back to Saigon probably after the next round.

K: I would think that's a good possibility.

S: And then probably back to Le Duc Tho again?

K: Well, that remains to be seen. It may be sufficiently narrowed at that point, that we're just talking about technical adjustments.

S: The atmosphere of Haig's talks, this is the other thing we're getting conflicts on. I mean, the Embassy put out this cordial business. And other people are saying they were extremely tough and heated type thing. Now, is both true in fact. Are both true?

K: Oh, I think they were constructive and --

S: But frank talk on each side, in other words?

K: Yeah.

S: Okay. Well, thank you very much.

K: Okay. Nice to talk to you.

S: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 1995
BSP
FEB 14 1995

TELCONE

Dave Kraslow/Mr Kissinger

11/14/72 6:30 pm

HK: In the meantime Shermann got through to me.

DK: I know, I sort of slid down the list--he gets you before I do.
I've got a long memory--listen I appreciate your calling.

HK: I figured you were going to tell him anyway what I told you.

DK: That's right, but we were calling on different matters.

HK: What are you calling about?

DK: His was more immediate--I have two things--first of all would
you please consider when this is all behind you and you have put
this package together--and you have announced peace to the world,
consider the possibility of sitting down with us to do what the
President did--that is with the tape recorder--not to disclose any
state secrets--but to do sort of a philosophically reflective kind
of conversation with us about your experience with the Vietnam
issue--

HK: That I will think about--I am serious.

DK: I want so much to do this Henry and it doesn't have to deal with
any state secrets, but on a philosophical level, your own involvement
with this issue--your high points, your disappointments--that sort
of thing. Would that be feasible.

HK: I think it is a possibility.

DK: You think about it-- I'd like to very much do it--I think it can come
off as well as--if not better than the one we did with the President.--

HK: The Horner one?

DK: The Horner one, right. I thought that was a revealing conversation and I understand the President was quite pleased with it--but I'd like to do that again too--and again the editing would be done in a way that if you thought it was something objectionable to be taken out in terms of compromising some secret of some kind.

DK: Would you think about that?

HK: Certainly.

DK: Our correspondence in Israel has apparently talked to some of the
Soviet Jews who have come out against your visit to Moscow--

CLASSIFIED

Published: 11/14/72

BOSTON PRESS GROUP

Page 2

and the story he is filing is that you apparently gave Gromyko
a list of some 10's of Soviet Jews--10's plural of Soviet Jews
that this Government would like to see given permission to emigrate
from the Soviet Union without paying the head tax.

HK: That isn't true.

DK: There is nothing remotely true about that?

HK: No it is true that I talked to Gromyko about the head tax--but I wouldn't have intervened for individuals.

DK: In other words, you didn't talk about it in terms of specific names.

HK: That's right.

DK: But you did urge him for relief of the head tax?

HK: That's right.

DK: Can you indicate whether you got any commitment from him?

HK: I just don't want to say anymore, but I think you can see some easing.

DK: Right.

HK: And you can report that

DK: But we can definitely say that there was no discussions about any specific individuals

HK: That's right.

DK: Okay, Henry--

HK: Of course, I can't do that--if I do it for one--that's unfair for people that are in there.

DK: Right. Well maybe there is some reason --for some individuals-- some people of prominence or some scientists or whatever--

HK: Yeh, but it isn't true--all of this is off the record--

DK: And if you will think about this other matter, I will appreciate it very much.

HK: I am thinking of it and it is something I want to do. I haven't decided yet with whom. But I would in principle like to do with you.

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., November 14, 1972

K: Did you call Maxine Cheshire?

Z: I tried to reach her; she wasn't in.

K: Okay, I'll take care of it tomorrow.

Z: Well, I'll take care of it tomorrow, Henry. I can't do anything when she's not in.

K: I'll take care of it with Bradlee.

Z: Where will you see him?

K: I'll call him.

Z: You want me to call her still in the morning?

K: No, the hell with her.

Z: Well, I'll be happy to do it, Henry.

K: No, it isn't worth it. Okay, Thanks. You know, when it's three days old, it's useless so I might just as well just make a point with her boss.

Z: Well, you know, I still have a call into her, Henry. She just wasn't there and hasn't returned it.

K: Okay, fine.

Z: So I'll still try and reach her tonight if you'd like.

K: No, no, no; that makes it too important. Okay, fine, thank you.

wgh

TelCon
Vice President/Mr. Kissinger

7:32, December 14, 1972

VP: Hello.

K: Mr. Vice President.

VP: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

VP: All right.

K: I wanted to call you to apologize for having kept you standing by all week long.

VP: Well, Mike told me that things had washed.

K: It looks that way, yes. But what I would like to do is come by tomorrow at some point and brief you about where we stand.

VP: All right. Why don't you--what time are you going to be available in the office and I'll give you a call when I see what my schedule is.

K: Well, I'll be available--the best for me would be in the afternoon.

VP: All right. All right I'll call you in the morning and we'll make the arrangements.

K: Good, excellent, Mr. Vice President.

VP: All right, fine. See you then. Bye.

K: Bye.

DELEGATED

TELCORN

Mrs. Otis Chandler/Mr. Kissing er

Afternoon, November 14, 1972

K: Missy, how are you?

C: Oh, I'm really surprised to get you on the telephone, I will say that.

K: (laughter) It was good to see you the other day.

C: Oh, that was fun. Wasn't that a fun evening?

K: It was a good evening. Lots of fun.

C: Well, you did say you would be nice enough to escort me and I'm coming back next Tuesday night and I have a very strong suspicion that you'll be either in Paris or Saigon then. Tuesday, you cannot tell can you?

K: That's my trouble.

C: I know it.

K: Can we leave it that if I'm here, I shall escort you?

C: Well, that's right. Now, that's why I thought I'd better talk to you before you take off for parts ..

K: How late can I let you know?

C: To the last minute, Henry.

K: Okay.

C: Tuesday night and it's at 8:00 and it's at the Smithsonian and it's not black tie and I'll be getting in that afternoon to the Watergate Hotel.

K: Right. Now if I'm here, I'd be honored to take you.

C: I think it will be fun.

K: It would be great fun. How long will you be in town?

C: The next day -- I may stay and have lunch and leave. It's Otis' birthday though the next day and I sort of feel I should get back.

K: (laughter)

C: I'm a good wife so --

TELCORN

Mrs. Otis Chandler/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, November 14, 1972

- 2 -

K: You are.

C: So why don't you have your secretary just leave a message one way or the other at the Watergate Hotel.

K: No, I'll call you before then. I can do better than that.

C: Oh, okay.

K: But it's so nice of you to call. If we miss each other this time, we must do it soon.

C: But, Henry, good luck.

K: Thank you.

C: This week. And I hope you knock them dead -- not knock them dead, don't do that but I hope that --

K: I'm strongly tempted to do it.

C: What?

C: I would think so. I hope the South Vietnamese really cooperate this time.

K: I think we're going to make it.

C: Good, good. I'll cross my fingers for you. Is General Haig going with you?

K: That is not certain yet.

C: Well, anyway, say hello to him for me too, will you?

K: I will do that.

C: Good luck, Henry. And I hope I see you next Tuesday.

K: I hope so too. Bye.

wgh

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER ______ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)