INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE GEOPOLITIQUE (KC)

Dr. Henry KISSINGER
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
U.S.A.

Paris, July 5, 1989

JUL 12 1989

Dear Secretary,

I am sending you, here enclosed, 'GEOPOLITIQUE', issue n°26 devoted to Gorbachev's Soviet Union, as seen by many distinguished analysts of the present state of the USSR.

We are very happy that we have been able, thanks to your cooperation, to publish as introduction to this exceptional issue your own remarks in a manner of interview that you have been kind enough to authorize.

The visit of the President of the USSR, which has just taken place in France, has illustrated the relevance of your own remarks. In particular nothing has been said about Eastern Europe as such. On the other hand, a very significant statement has been made in Strasbourg in front of the European Assembly concerning "la maison commune" (from the Atlantic to the Urals).

We are obviously at the beginning of a complex process of readjustment fraught with many dangers and ambiguities. As far as we are concerned, we share your own evaluation of what is, in fact, a permanent threat to Western democracies and fundamental freedom.

31, QUAI ANATOLE FRANCE, 75007 PARIS - TÉLÉPHONE (1) 47 05 60 35

Henry Kissinger
# DÉFAIRE YALTA
Un entretien avec Géopolitique

**Géopolitique** : Seriez-vous d'accord, Monsieur le Secrétaire, pour que notre échange de vues porte sur les conséquences de la perestroïka en Union soviétique d'une part, dans le domaine international et spécialement en Europe d'autre part ? La réponse de la diplomatie américaine, aujourd'hui et demain, au défi posé par Gorbatchev, nous intéresse évidemment au plus haut point.

**Henry Kissinger** : Je ne suis pas de ceux qui sont exagérément impressionnés par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev. Je rejette l'hypothèse implicite qu'un homme puisse, à lui seul, renverser le puissant courant de soixante-dix années d'histoire soviétique et de quatre siècles d'histoire russe. L'idée que nous avons à faire à un personnage prophétique qui peut, par lui-même, changer le cours de l'Histoire, me laisse sérieusement sceptique.

Je ne suis même pas sûr que M. Gorbatchev vise cet objectif et je doute qu'il puisse l'atteindre, même s'il le voulait. Il a certainement analysé avec lucidité les problèmes de l'Union soviétique et prouvé, par là même, un grand courage. Mais, contrairement à ce qui s'est passé en Chine, quatre ans après le début des réformes, nous ne constatons aucun résultat tangible dans les domaines de la production alimentaire, du logement, des biens de

consommation et ce qui s'ensuit. Je ne suis même pas certain qu'il soit un grand homme d'Etat ou un stratège éminent des relations publiques.

Pour ce qui concerne le succès éventuel de la perestroïka, la question que nous devons nous poser, en Occident, est celle de savoir jusqu'à quel point, en l'absence d'ajustements en politique étrangère, le redressement économique russe est souhaitable. A l'heure actuelle, la perestroïka n'ayant pas réussi, je ne pense pas que la Russie devienne plus forte, mais il se peut que la perestroïka soit plus efficace quand M. Gorbatchev aura assumé l'intégralité du pouvoir politique.

De mes contacts personnels à Moscou, je retire l'impression qu'il y règne une grande incertitude quant à ce que devrait être une nouvelle politique économique efficace pour le pays. A la différence des chefs militaires soviétiques, les planificateurs ne semblent pas faire le poids, ni être entendus. Il y a là une ambivalence. Par un curieux phénomène, ce pays qui traverse une telle crise sur le plan intérieur mène, en même temps, une politique étrangère extrêmement efficace. On semble y croire que l'Amérique et les autres pays occidentaux restent unis par la crainte, et que si cette crainte se dissipe, l'alliance entre les Occidentaux se désintégrera, ce qui ne manquera pas d'ouvrir de nouvelles chances aux Soviétiques, en particulier en Europe centrale.

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L'option «double zéro» a certainement contribué à la dégradation de la situation politique intérieure de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest. La position du parti conservateur se définissait par rapport à une Russie considérée comme un danger et à une Amérique représentant une amitié sûre. Ce postulat n'est plus aussi généralement accepté. Beaucoup d'Allemands se posent la question de savoir si la Russie est vraiment l'ennemie et si l'Amérique est la seule amie possible.

Les conférences sur le désarmement se sont révélées extrêmement fructueuses pour créer la confusion et atteindre des objectifs sans faire de concessions quant à un changement réel. C'est ainsi qu'aucun accord conclu jusqu'à présent n'a, en fait, amélioré la situation militaire.

Quant à l'idée d'une «maison commune européenne» de l'Atlantique à l'Oural, je trouve étonnant qu'aucun dirigeant européen n'ait déclaré qu'il s'agissait là d'une absurdité et d'une menace pour nous tous. A l'époque où de Gaulle mentionnait cette idée, elle pouvait avoir une certaine signification sur le plan stratégique. Mais, dans les circonstances actuelles, elle revient à dire que les Etats-Unis n'ont qu'une position subordonnée en Europe et que la prééminence soviétique en Europe de l'Est est parfaitement justifiée, ce qui donne aux Allemands toute latitude pour jouer leur propre jeu. En tout état de cause, les deux tiers de la Russie soviétique se trouvent de l'autre côté de l'Oural. Qu'en adviendrait-il ? Quid des Etats-Unis ?

Il nous faut changer d'angle d'approche et parler des problèmes dont les solutions éventuelles pourraient modifier la situation. C'est de l'unité européenne et de la réunification de l'Europe de l'Est avec l'Europe de l'Ouest, dans un système politique de références clairement défini que l'Occident doit discuter. Il nous faut aborder le problème de cette manière pour formuler des propositions susceptibles de recueillir notre adhésion commune et de nous dégager de ce jeu sans issue du contrôle quantitatif des armements. Cela est d'autant plus important que la situation en Allemagne me semble devenir extrêmement fluctuante.

L'Allemagne est le seul grand pays d'Europe qui n'ait pas de réelle tradition quant à son propre intérêt national. Quand l'unité allemande a été réalisée, qu'était alors la politique allemande ? En essayant d'empêcher des alliances dirigées contre eux, les Allemands ont réussi à provoquer ce qu'ils craignaient le plus. Avec tout le respect que je dois à la diplomatie française, je ne crois pas qu'elle aurait pu, à elle seule, réaliser «la Triple Entente». Ce résultat, ce sont les Allemands eux-mêmes qui l'ont obtenu : en cherchant à assurer leur sécurité, ils ont menacé tout le monde et ont fait, contre toute attente, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de la Russie, des alliés, alors qu'elles se combattaient entre elles quelques années auparavant.

La capacité de déterminer les priorités n'est pas le fort des Allemands. Nous avons aujourd'hui une politique allemande qui prétend être en même temps pro-Otan, pro-Moscou, pro-Europe orientale, en fait, pro le monde entier.

Dans la mise en œuvre d'une politique «nationale», ils

affirment que l'évolution en Europe orientale entraînera inévitablement l'affaiblissement de l'Union soviétique en Europe de l'Est. Venant d'Allemagne, cette affirmation n'est pas acceptable. De deux choses l'une : ou l'Allemagne se tourne vers l'Est, et la France et la Grande-Bretagne pouvant refuser de la suivre dans cette voie, il en résulte une nouvelle division de l'Europe; ou alors l'Allemagne entraîne l'Europe dans son sillage. S'il apparaissait que la politique nationale allemande ait pour résultat d'affaiblir à la base la position soviétique en Europe de l'Est, nous aurions une crise, peut-être, une nouvelle crise de Berlin.

Nous avons besoin de l'unité politique de l'Europe pour ancrer l'Allemagne à l'Ouest. Nous avons besoin que ce concept de l'unité européenne puisse figurer, à l'initiative de l'Occident, comme point de l'ordre du jour des prochaines discussions Est-Ouest. Dans ce contexte, nous pouvons donner aux Soviétiques certaines assurances, leur montrer ainsi, que nous ne cherchons nullement à déplacer vers l'Est notre potentiel militaire et que les discussions sur le contrôle des armements restent utiles.

**G.** Il est temps de clarifier le concept de l'intégration européenne. Jusqu'ici, nous nous référions au Marché commun; il s'agit désormais d'élargir ce Marché commun au concept d'unification et d'unité européenne. Nous sommes frappés par le fait que de nombreuses études ont été lancées dans les universités américaines sur l'avenir du monde et que l'Europe y est rarement mentionnée comme puissance, alors que le Japon, la Chine et les superpuissances comme la Russie soviétique et les Etats-Unis font l'objet de toutes les préoccupations.

**H.K.** C'est une erreur, l'Europe doit être considérée comme une puissance en elle-même et pour elle-même. Mais c'est à elle de se construire et de construire sa propre organisation de défense. On pourrait combiner les capacités de dissuasion nucléaire de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France. Il est certain, en tout cas, que le système de négociations que nous pratiquons ne correspond pas aux exigences de la situation.

**G.** L'Europe est d'abord une expression géographique et non politique. Il est clair que, lors d'une attaque éventuelle, tous les pays d'Europe ne sauraient, en aucun cas, être attaqués simultanément et que, par conséquent, les différents membres de l'Europe pourront adopter des attitudes différentes selon leurs propres intérêts. L'Europe comme entité militaire est un mythe.

En tout état de cause, les Russes n'accepteront jamais un système de défense franco-allemand, compte tenu du problème posé par la réunification des deux Allemagnes. Une défense européenne ou une défense franco-allemande sont, en fait, de complètes illusions, illusions que nous avons entretenues pendant les dernières années. Pour toutes sortes de raisons, y compris l'implication inévitable

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de la population civile dans toute situation de guerre, les concepts de défense d'il y a vingt ans ont complètement changé...

H.K. Si nous acceptons cette analyse, l'Occident est condamné.

G. Les Allemands ont peut-être le sentiment que l'Union soviétique est tellement affaiblie qu'elle n'est plus en position d'agir.

H.K. Naturellement, les Allemands n'essayent pas de provoquer délibérément une crise, mais ils pourraient bien obtenir le résultat exactement inverse de celui qu'ils désirent. Je ne pense pas que les Soviétiques atteignent un niveau de faiblesse tel qu'ils seraient amenés à évacuer l'Europe de l'Est sous la seule pression allemande. L'évolution des systèmes politiques de l'Europe orientale pourrait conduire à ce résultat mais pas une politique nationale menée par les Allemands.

Les Allemands n'écartent pas l'idée de mettre en œuvre leur propre politique dans le cadre plus vaste du système européen mais on ne leur a pas demandé de le faire. Gorbatchev sert de prétexte pour aider à résoudre les problèmes intérieurs en repoussant à plus tard les vrais problèmes. N'oublions pas que l'attraction émotionnelle que l'Est exerce sur l'Allemagne historique ne répond pas à un calcul rationnel.

G. Il n'est certes pas dans notre intérêt d'avoir une Russie qui soit ou trop forte, ou trop faible sur le plan économique. Quel peut être l'avenir de l'économie russe ?

H.K. Je ne vois aucun signe de progrès réel de l'Union soviétique dans le domaine économique. Les différents modèles de l'Europe de l'Est, tel que le modèle yougoslave et le modèle hongrois, ne sont pas particulièrement attractifs. Le fait est que Gorbatchev a créé une structure politique sans précédent dans l'histoire soviétique. Ses pouvoirs présidentiels trouvent leur origine dans le Soviet suprême et non dans le Comité central du Parti communiste.

Mais la réforme des prix n'a pas encore eu lieu. Elle est cependant indispensable, tout comme la possibilité d'utiliser, pour les échanges commerciaux, un rouble convertible. Or, la vérité des prix signifiera dans un premier stade, le chômage, la fermeture d'usines et une sévère inflation. Je ne crois pas pour autant que le système soviétique s'effondrera purement et simplement.

Le rêve de Gorbatchev est d'obtenir que l'Europe lui fournisse sa technologie de pointe en toute sécurité grâce au retrait des forces américaines d'Allemagne, la capacité de défense de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne étant réduite aux marges du continent européen, tout le reste passant sous hégémonie soviétique.

G. Le principal problème de la Russie soviétique est celui de la production alimentaire. Les récentes élections ont prouvé que le public était de plus en

plus conscient de l'inefficacité du système en vigueur.

H.K. Je pense en effet, que les Soviétiques ont réussi à collectiviser l'agriculture jusqu'à en éliminer totalement les paysans. Les travailleurs des champs, tout comme ceux de l'industrie, font la semaine de quarante heures. Depuis des années, l'Union soviétique doit importer des céréales...

G. Que penser de la volonté d'indépendance manifestée par les républiques baltes ?

H.K. Cette question se réfère aux problèmes de décentralisation. Ce qui paraît possible, par exemple en Chine, est plus difficile dans un Empire composé de nations séparées. Initialement, il semble que Gorbatchev ait voulu présenter les Etats baltes, peuplés d'éléments non slaves, de culture différente et grands travailleurs, comme une sorte de modèle que les Russes pourraient suivre. Les Pays baltes demandent maintenant leur indépendance. Au même moment, on observe dans les parties russes de l'Union soviétique, des sentiments croissants de nationalisme, d'opposition aux autres nationalités, dans la ligne de Soljenitsyne.

Cela étant dit, je ne peux pas imaginer un effondrement de l'Union soviétique. Il semble y avoir en Occident, une vue traditionnelle de l'histoire russe, selon laquelle tout changement au niveau du pouvoir suprême fait ressortir la brutalité du pouvoir précédent, et montre le nouveau comme plus moderne et plus sensible à la volonté populaire. Si l'Union soviétique sombrait dans le chaos, quelles en seraient les conséquences pour les différentes nationalités ? Je ne pense pas que les militaires qui sont l'instrument le plus efficace de la puisance soviétique, leur permettraient de se détacher de l'Union. Si elles tentaient de le faire, elles provoqueraient certainement une crise immense.

G. La présence des forces américaines en Europe, l'existence de l'Alliance atlantique et de l'OTAN représentent le véritable ciment de l'unité européenne. Si les Etats-Unis devaient devenir progressivement isolationnistes, ou s'orientaient vers une politique centrée vers l'Orient, l'Asie et l'Amérique du Sud, il y aurait peu d'espoir que l'Europe reste indépendante. Existe-t-il aux Etats-Unis un couvrant en faveur d'un retrait de l'Europe tôt ou tard ? Et, question liée à celle-ci, que pensez-vous de l'éventualité d'une dislocation du système soviétique et de la réunion des pays de l'Europe de l'Est avec l'Europe occidentale, à condition qu'il y ait retrait simultané des forces américaines hors d'Europe occidentale et des forces russes hors de l'Europe orientale ?

H.K. Je suis opposé au retrait des forces américaines hors d'Europe mais je ne suis pas contre une réduction de ces forces dans certaines circonstances. Je crois en effet, que le retrait des forces américaines remettrait en

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cause l'un des liens principaux assurant le maintien de l'Allemagne dans l'alliance occidentale. Ce retrait enlèverait un contre-poids indispensable à toute violation éventuelle par les Soviétiques des accords qu'ils auraient passés concernant leur propre retrait.

Il encouragerait le neutralisme en Europe, excepté peut-être en France et en Grande-Bretagne, mais qui deviendraient alors des puissances périphériques. Il pourrait bien y avoir à cet égard, une convergence objective entre les tenants d'une certaine attitude «gau-chiste» qui s'opposent à toute négociation parce qu'ils croient «qu'il n'y a pas d'ennemis à gauche», ceux qui veulent se limiter au contrôle des armements, sans vouloir aller au-delà et, enfin, ceux qui à l'extrême-droite prônent des réductions budgétaires sous prétexte de la nécessité d'un «partage du fardeau», simple excuse pour retirer nos troupes d'Europe.

Notre commandement militaire préfère stocker des armes en Europe plutôt que des hommes. Je ne crois pas que les Soviétiques feront des propositions tendant à un retrait total parce qu'ils en craignent les conséquences. Je suis moi-même opposé à ce genre de propositions. Une réduction des forces américaines et allemandes qui résulterait d'un accord sur le désarmement rendrait plus difficile encore l'élaboration d'un concept plausible de défense. Je pense, à cet égard, que le concept même d'un contrôle des armes conventionnelles n'a pas été suffisamment approfondi. L'histoire militaire de l'Europe prouve que l'égalité numérique des forces en présence ne garantit nullement la dissuasion.

**G. Ne pensez-vous pas que le principal danger pour Gorbatchev se trouve en Allemagne de l'Est? Qu'adviendrait-il si les Allemands de l'Est voulaient rejoindre leurs frères de l'Ouest?**

**H.K.** Après que la guerre froide, engagée il y a 40 ans, se soit livrée principalement dans le tiers monde, il est ironique de constater que le même problème est maintenant revenu en Europe, son point de départ.

Qu'il s'agisse de l'Allemagne de l'Est, de la Pologne, de la Hongrie, il est posé. Il est bien possible que l'Allemagne soit la zone la plus dangereuse. Je pense qu'il y aura une explosion quelque part. Contrairement au sentiment dominant, je pense, moi, que les Russes interviennent. Ils peuvent accepter la perestroïka, mais ils ne permettront pas ce qui apparaît comme un retrait du Pacte de Varsovie. C'est impossible pour la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et l'Allemagne de l'Est. Une seule exception peut-être : la Hongrie.

**G. Qu'arriverait-t-il si Gorbatchev devait disparaître comme Lénine, c'est-à-dire physiquement ou comme Khrouchtchev, c'est-à-dire politiquement?**

**H.K.** Gorbatchev n'est pas un pacifiste qui serait arrivé au pouvoir en Union soviétique par accident. Pour y parvenir, il faut être du type brutal, déterminé et ambitieux. Faute de quoi on ne peut survivre année après année. Je crois que ses successeurs suivront plus ou

moins sa politique, avec moins de panache et plus de pragmatisme. Ils essaient plus systématiquement de moderniser l'Etat. Ce sont les contraintes et pas les individus qui ont provoqué la situation actuelle. L'accent sera peut-être davantage mis à l'avenir sur le nationalisme russe. L'armée pourrait prendre le pouvoir de facto, en s'abritant derrière de «semi-politiques» de façon à obtenir des réformes technocratiques plus efficaces avec moins de glasnost. La glasnost, d'ailleurs pourrait bien être placée sous contrôle par Gorbatchev en personne. Dans les cinq ans, il faut rétablir la discipline. Je trouve significatif que Sakharov soit beaucoup plus réservé à l'égard de Gorbatchev qu'il ne l'était il y a deux ans. Je pense que les problèmes en Union soviétique ne font que commencer.

**G. Que penser de l'approche géopolitique de la nouvelle administration américaine à l'égard de la politique étrangère soviétique, plus particulièrement en Europe?**

**H.K.** Le Président ne s'est pas encore trouvé dans la position-test réelle du leadership, où il a à donner des ordres contre la volonté de certains et les obliger à s'y conformer. Il m'est apparu, dans les conversations privées que j'ai eues avec lui, comme extrêmement compétent.

**G. Comment voyez-vous le calendrier éventuel des négociations avec l'URSS sur l'Europe de l'Est, en supposant qu'elles aient lieu?**

**H.K.** Pour répondre brièvement, je dirais qu'il doit résulter d'un effort commun de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis. L'Europe doit présenter un ordre du jour de caractère politique. Les Etats-Unis ne peuvent se prononcer, au nom de l'Europe, sur l'organisation européenne. Les relations entre l'Europe de l'Est et l'Europe de l'Ouest doivent offrir, par exemple, la possibilité pour l'Europe de l'Est de bénéficier, sous certaines conditions, du statut de membre associé de la Communauté européenne. Concernant l'aspect militaire du problème, des garanties doivent être obtenues lors des négociations sur le contrôle des armements, auxquelles nous participons. Enfin, il faudrait adopter une position commune sur ce qu'on appelle «la maison européenne»; par exemple, l'Europe devrait commencer à la rivière Bug et non pas à l'Oural.

Nous devrions avoir des conversations exploratoires de caractère privé avec les Soviétiques, au cours desquelles nous expliquerions nos intentions, en précisant que notre but n'est pas de détruire la nation russe mais de créer des conditions plus normales en Europe.

Il est impossible d'entreprendre ce genre de négociations, si les Européens n'en prennent pas eux-mêmes l'initiative et la direction. L'Europe de l'Est doit s'organiser avec le concours de l'Europe de l'Ouest. Mon but est de défaire Yalta, c'est-à-dire que l'Europe de l'Est sorte, sans guerre, de la mouvance de l'Union soviétique. ■

## Interview with Henry Kissinger

# My goal is the reversal of Yalta

Géopolitique: If you agree, Mr Secretary, we would like to concentrate our discussion on the consequences of perestroika, on domestic affairs in the Soviet Union, on the repercussions of perestroika in international affairs and especially in Europe. We are naturally concerned with the present and future response of American diplomacy to the challenge presented by Mr Gorbachev.

Henry Kissinger: I am not one of those who are overimpressed by Mikhail Gorbachev. I do not accept the implicit assumption that one man can reverse the powerful stream of 70 years of Soviet and 400 years of Russian history. I question seriously the idea that we are now faced with an almost prophetic figure who can singlehandedly alter the course of events.

I am not even sure that Mr Gorbachev wants to do this and I doubt that even if he did want to, he could. He has certainly analyzed lucidly the

problems of the Soviet Union and in so doing has shown great courage. Contrary to what happened in China four years after the beginning of reforms, we don't see any improvement in such fields as food production, housing, consumer goods and the like. I am not sure whether he is a great statesman or a public relations strategist.

As to the possible success of perestroika, the West's question should be: "In the absence of foreign policy adjustments, is it so desirable that Russia become strong?". At the moment, as perestroika has not succeeded, I don't think that there will be a stronger Russia. It may be that perestroika will become a greater success after Mr. Gorbachev achieves full political power.

From my personal contacts in Moscow I have gotten the impression of great uncertainty about what the proper economic policy for the country should be. Contrary to the Soviet military leaders, the economic planners do not sound like men whose words have

consequence; there is an ambivalence. It is a curious phenomenon that a country which is in such a mess domestically is, at the same time, conducting an efficient foreign policy. They seem to believe that America and other Western countries are bound together by fear, and that if the fear were removed, the Western alliance would unravel and new opportunities for the Soviets would open up, especially in central Europe.

The "double zero" option has certainly helped to disintegrate the German domestic political situation. The conservative party position was based on the existence of Russia as a danger and America as a friend. This proposition is no longer so widely accepted. Many Germans question whether Russia is an enemy; and whether America is the only possible friend.

The arms control talks have proved to be an infinitely fertile subject to create confusion and achieve objectives without yielding any significant

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change; there has not yet been any arms control agreement which has in fact improved the military situation.

As to the idea of a "European house" from the Atlantic to the Urals, I find it astonishing that no European leader has, as yet, said "this is nonsense and a menace to all of us". At the time when De Gaulle mentioned the idea it may have had some strategic sense. However, in the present circumstances it is tantamount to saying that the U.S. has a subordinate position in Europe, that Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe is justified, and that the Germans have to pursue their own course. Two thirds of the Soviet Union is on the other side of the Urals. What happens to it? What happens to America?

I think the focus should be shifted; we have to talk about developments that, if they happen, change the situation. The unity of Europe is a subject that the West should discuss, as well as the reunification of Eastern Europe with Western Europe in some political system of reference. We need to do this to have a proposition on which we can unite and to get us off the endless number game of arms control. This is all the more important because I think the German situation is getting extremely fluid.

Germany is the one major country in Europe that has no tradition of its own national interest. Once it had been unified, what then was Germany's policy? By trying to prevent alliances against them, they managed to create what they feared most. With all due respect to French statesmanship, the "triple entente" could not have been achieved by France alone. It was produced by the Germans whose quest for security threatened everybody and made unlikely allies of France, Britain, and Russia, who had been fighting each other a few years earlier. The ability to choose among priorities is not a German forte. We have now a German foreign policy that says that it is at the same time pro-NATO, pro-Moscow, pro-Eastern Europe, pro-everybody. In the pursuit of what is in fact a national policy, they claim that "easing the conditions in Eastern Europe will in fact weaken the influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe". Coming from Germany this could not be

acceptable. One of two things will happen: strategically either Germany will move toward the East with a potential refusal of France and Britain to go along, thus creating a division of Europe; or Germany will move toward the East dragging Europe along. If it is perceived that a German national policy is undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, we may then have a crisis, perhaps over Berlin.

We need European political unity to relate Germany to the West, and a concept for the unification of Europe that we can put forward as a Western item on the agenda for East-West discussions. In that context, we can give some reassurances to the Soviets that this does not mean moving the military system east and that the arms control negotiations are useful.

**G:** The concept of the unification of Europe has to be clarified. For the time being, we refer to the Common Market and the difficulty lies in shifting from the Common Market to the concept of unification and unity. In this connection, we are struck by the fact that, while much study concerning the future of the world has been initiated in scholarly circles in the U.S., it speaks first of all about new powers like Japan and China and superpowers like the USSR and the USA. Europe is seldom ever mentioned as a power.

**H.K.:** This is a mistake. Europe should be a power in its own right but it is up to Europe to create itself. Europe should build its own defence organization. We could combine British and French nuclear capabilities. In any case, the present system of negotiations is no longer appropriate.

**G:** Europe is essentially a geographical expression and not a political one. The fact that all the countries in Europe will not be attacked simultaneously means that there might be different attitudes on the part of the various members corresponding to their different interests. Europe as a military entity is a myth. In the case of war the result might very well be reoccupation of Germany and the nuclear

destruction of France. Talk about German-French coupling likewise makes little sense for Germany as a commercial force. In any case, the Russians will never accept a Franco-German military system because of the problem of German reunification. European defense or Franco-German defense are complete illusions that we have been nurturing for the past 20 years. For many reasons, including the civilian involvement in any war situation and the massive urbanization of the European population, there is a complete change in the concept of defense compared with the one prevailing 20 years ago.

**H.K.:** The West will be finished if we accept this analysis.

**G:** The Germans seem to feel that the Soviet Union is now so weak that one can almost speak of an enfeebled Soviet Union.

**H.K.:** Of course, the Germans are not trying to foster a crisis, but they may obtain the exact opposite of what they ultimately want. I do not think that the Soviets will get so weak that they will permit themselves to be pushed out of Eastern Europe by the Germans. This may happen through the evolution of Eastern European systems but not by the Germans pursuing a national policy.

The Germans are not excluding the framing of their policy within a broader framework, but they have not been asked to do so. Mr Gorbachev is used as an excuse. He helps with their domestic problems by pushing the real problems into the future. Let's not forget the historic emotional German attraction to the East, which is beyond calculation.

**G:** While it is not in our interest to have a Russia too strong economically, it is not in our interest either to have a Russia too weak. What will the future of the Russian economy be? What will the position of the various satellite countries and of the nationalities inside Europe be?

**H.K.:** I have seen no evidence that the Soviet Union is making any significant progress in the economic

7

could be in the future greater emphasis on Russian nationalism. The army may take power de facto, putting semi-politicians out front, and it might be able to bring about more technocratic reforms with less glasnost. In fact, glasnost will eventually be brought under control even by Gorbachev. During the next five years they have to reestablish discipline. I find interesting that Sakharov is much more reserved about Gorbachev than he was two years ago. I think that the problems in the Soviet Union have only started.

**G:** What is your view of the geopolitical approach of the new administration toward the new Russian foreign policy, especially in Europe and possibly in Southeast Asia?

**H.K.:** The President has not yet been in a position that would constitute a real

test of leadership, where he has had to give an order that somebody did not want to carry out and then enforce it. Intellectually, though, sitting and talking with him, he is extremely capable.

**G:** Could you elaborate on the kind of agenda you have in mind for a negotiation with the USSR on Eastern Europe, should it take place...

**H.K.:** To put it briefly, it has to involve the combined efforts of Europe and the United States. Europe has to put forward a political agenda. The U.S. cannot speak for Europe on the matter. The relationship of Eastern and Western Europe ought to be advanced, for example, in a proposal for an associate membership for Eastern Europe in the European Community, provided they meet certain conditions. As to the military aspect, reassurances should be

obtained in the arms control negotiations in which the U.S. does participate. Finally, there should be a common position on the vision of a "European House"; for instance, Europe should begin at the Bug River and not at the Urals.

We should have private conversations with the Soviets in which we explain what we have in mind, that our purpose is not to destroy the Russian nation but to create more normal conditions in Europe. It is impossible to have this kind of negotiation unless the Europeans take the political lead. Eastern Europe should be organized together with Western Europe. My goal is the reversal of Yalta — to get Eastern Europe out of the Soviet orbit without war.

Henry Kissinger

9

Final Geopolitique Edits - June 12, 1989

**GEOPOLITIQUE:** If you agree, Mr. Secretary, we would like to concentrate our discussion on the consequences of perestroika, on domestic affairs in the Soviet Union, on the repercussions of perestroika in international affairs and especially in Europe. We are naturally concerned with the present and future response of America's diplomacy to the challenge presented by Mr. Gorbachev.

**Henry KISSINGER:** I do not belong to those who are overimpressed by Mikhail Gorbachev. I do not accept the implicit assumption that one man can reverse the powerful stream of 70 years of Soviet history and 400 years of Russian history. I question seriously the idea that we are now faced with an almost prophetic figure who can by himself change the course of events.

I am not even sure that Mr. Gorbachev wants to do this and I doubt that even if he wanted, he could. He has certainly analyzed lucidly the problems of the Soviet Union and in so doing, has shown great courage. Contrary to what happened in China four years after the beginning of reforms, we don't see any improvement in such fields as food production, housing, consumer goods and the like. I am not sure whether he is a great statesman or a public relations strategist.

As to the possible success of perestroika, the question by the West should be, "In the absence of foreign policy adjustments, is it so desirable that Russia becomes strong?" At the moment, as perestroika has not succeeded, I don't think that there would be a stronger Russia. It may be that perestroika would become a greater success after Mr. Gorbachev achieves full political power.

From my personal contacts in Moscow I have gotten the impression of great uncertainty about what should be the proper economic policy for the country. Contrary to the Soviet military leaders, the economic planners do not sound like men whose words had consequence; there is an ambivalence. It is a curious phenomenon that a country which is in such a mess domestically is, at the same time, conducting an efficient foreign policy. They seem to believe that America and other Western countries are bound together by fear, and that if that fear were removed, the Western alliance would unravel and new opportunities for the Soviets would open up, especially in central Europe.

-2-

The arms control talks have proved to be an infinitely fertile subject to create confusion and, achieve objectives without yielding any significant change; there has not yet been any arms control agreement which has in fact improved the military situation.

As to the idea of a "European House" from the Atlantic to the Urals, I find it astonishing that no European leader has, as yet, said "this is nonsense and a menace to all of us". At the time when De Gaulle mentioned the idea it may have had some strategic sense. However, in the present circumstances it is tantamount to saying that the U.S. has a subordinate position in Europe, that Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe is justified, and that the Germans have to pursue their own course. Two thirds of the Soviet Union is on the other side of the Urals. What happens to it? What happens to America?

Germany is the one major country in Europe that has no tradition of its own national interest. Once it was unified, what then was the Germany policy? By trying to prevent alliances against them, they managed to create what they feared most. With all due respect to French statesmanship, the "triple entente" could not have been achieved by France alone. It was produced by the Germans whose quest for security threatened everybody and made unlikely allies of France, Britain, and Russia, who had been fighting each other a few years earlier. The ability to choose among priorities is not a German forte. We have now a German foreign policy that says that it is at the same time pro-NATO, pro-Moscow, pro-Eastern Europe, pro-everybody. In the pursuit of what is in fact a national policy, they claim that "easing the conditions in Eastern Europe will in fact weaken the influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Coming from Germany this could not be acceptable. One of two things will happen: Strategically either Germany will move towards the East with a potential refusal of France and Britain to go along, thus creating a division of Europe; or Germany moves towards the East dragging Europe along. If it is perceived that a German national policy is undermining the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, we may then have a crisis, perhaps over Berlin.

We need European political unity to relate Germany to the West, and a concept for the unification of Europe that we can put forward as a Western item of the agenda for East-West discussions. In that context, we can give some reassurances to

-3-

**G.** The concept of unification of Europe has to be clarified. For the time being we refer to the Common Market and the difficulty lies in the shifting from the Common Market to the concept of unification and unity. In this connection, we are struck by the fact that while many studies in the scholarly circles have been launched in the U.S. about the future of the world, they speak about the new powers first of all Japan, China and the superpowers like the USSR and USA. Seldom is Europe ever mentioned as a power.

**H.K.** This is a mistake. Europe should be a power in its own right but it is up to Europe to create itself. Europe should build its own defense organization. We could combine British and French nuclear capabilities. In any case, the present system of negotiations is no longer appropriate.

**G.** Europe is essentially a geographical expression and not a political one. The fact that all the countries in Europe will not be attacked simultaneously, means there might be different attitudes on the part of various members corresponding to their different interests. Europe as a military entity is a myth. In the case of war the result might very well be a reoccupation of Germany, and vitrification of France. Any talk about German-French couple makes also little sense for Germany as a commercial force. In any case the Russians will never accept a Franco-German military system because of the problem of German reunification. European defense or Franco-German defense are complete illusions that we have been nurturing for the past 20 years. For many reasons, including the civilian involvement in any war situation and the massive urbanization of the European population, there is a complete change in the concept of defense compared with the one prevailing 20 years ago.

**H.K.** The West will be finished if we accepted this analysis.

**G.** It seems that Germans have a feeling that the Soviet Union is now so weak that we may almost speak of an infeebled Soviet Union.

**H.K.** Of course the Germans are not trying to foster a crisis, but they may obtain the exact opposite of what they ultimately want. I do not think that the Soviets will get so weak that they will permit themselves to be pushed out of Eastern Europe by the Germans. This may happen through the evolution in Eastern Europe systems but not by the Germans pursuing a national policy.

The Germans are not excluding the framing of their policy within a broader European framework, but they have not been asked to do so. Mr Gorbachev is used as an excuse. He helps with their domestic problems by pushing the real problems into the future. Let's not forget the historic emotional German attraction to the East, which is beyond calculation.

-4-

G. While it is not in our interest to have a Russia too strong economically, it is not our interest either to have a Russia too weak. What will be the future of the Russian economy? What will be the position of the various outside satellites and of the nationalities inside the Europe?

H.K. I have seen no evidence that the Soviet Union is making any significant progress in the economic field. The various models in Eastern Europe, i.e. the Yugoslavian and the Hungarian models are not very good. In fact, Gorbachev has created a political structure which is without precedent in Soviet history. His presidential power derives from the Supreme Soviet and not from the Central Committee. The price reform has not yet taken place and yet this is indispensable including the final ability to use a convertible ruble in trade. In practice, price reform will initially mean unemployment, the closing of factories and inflation. I do not believe that the Soviet system will just collapse. The dream of Gorbachev is to get Europe to supply high technology and to make that course safe, pushing America out of Germany, reducing the defense capability to Britain and France at the fringe of Europe, with everything else under Soviet predominance.

G. The main internal problem of the Soviet Union it to be found at the level of food production. The recent elections have proved that the public was more and more conscious of the inefficiency of the present system. A separate question relates to the move for independence in the Baltic republics.

H.K. I think that the Soviets have succeeded in collectivising agriculture to the point that they have no peasants left. The farm workers are working as their colleagues in industry, that is to say a 40-hour week. We know that the Soviet Union has imported grains for years. The second question relates to the problem of decentralization which seems possible, for instance, in China where it makes sense, but difficult in an empire of nations. Initially, it seems that Gorbachev intended to take the Baltic states populated with non-Slavic elements, with different cultures that are more hard working, and use them as a model that the Russians could copy. Now the Baltic countries are demanding independence. At the same time, you can see in the Russian part of the Soviet Union a growing feeling of nationalism and anti-nationalities, along the Solzhenitsyn line.

However, I cannot imagine a complete collapse of the Soviet Union. There seems to be a tradition in the West's perception of Russian history according to which whenever there is a change of leadership, the previous one was always brutal and the new one more modern and more responsive. We could wonder what would be the impact on other countries if the Soviet Union where to fall into chaos. I do not believe that the military, which is the most efficient instrument, will simply permit the various nationalities to split off. It would certainly create a huge crisis for us when they try, if they do.

-5-

G. The presence of American forces in Europe, the existence of the Atlantic Alliance and of NATO represent the welding force in Europe. If the U.S. were gradually returning either to isolationism or to a policy centered towards the Orient, Asia and South America resulting in a pulling off forces out of Europe there would be little chance for the European to remain independent. Is there a tendency in your country to pull out of Europe sooner or later? A related question is linked with the possible dislocation of the Soviet system and the joining of Eastern European countries with Western Europe on the condition of mutual withdrawal of American forces from Western Europe and Russian forces from Eastern Europe.

H.K. I am against withdrawal of American forces from Europe. But I am not against reduction of American forces under certain circumstances. I believe the removal of American forces from Europe will endanger one of the principal ties of Germany to the Western Alliance. It will remove a counterweight to Soviet violations of whatever agreements they make about withdrawing from Europe and will encourage European neutralism, except maybe in France and Britian, which however, will then be peripheral countries. There might be a convergence between the traditional sort of semi-radical superficial leftists who are against any negotiation because they really believe the enemy is never on the left; those who want arms control talks for their own sake; and finally, the right wing which is in favor of budget cuts under the guise of "burden sharing" which is really an excuse for pulling out our troops from Europe.

Our own military prefer to keep weapons in Europe rather than men. I do not believe the Soviets will make a proposal for total withdrawal because they are too afraid of what will happen. I am opposed to such a proposal.

A reduction of American and German military forces as a result of arms control talks would make a credible defense harder. I think in this respect that the concept of conventional arms control has not been thoughtfully studied. European military history seems to prove that equality in numbers is no assurance of deterrence.

G. Don't you think that the main danger for Gorbachev, is to be found in Eastern Germany? What would happen if the East Germans want to join their friends across the line?

H.K. It is ironic that, while the "cold war" started 40 years ago and was fought mostly in the Third World, the main problem has now come back to Europe; whether it will happen in East Germany or Poland or Hungary, I don't know, but it will happen. It may be that Germany would be the most dangerous place. I think there will be some explosion somewhere. Contrary to everybody, I think the Soviets will act. They might tolerate perestroika but they will not tolerate what looks like leaving the Warsaw Pact. This cannot happen in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Hungary perhaps.

-6-

G. What would happen if Gorbachev was to suffer the biological fate of Lenin or the political fate of Krushchev?

H.K. Gorbachev is not a pacifist who by accident came to power in the Soviet Union. To come to power there you have to be dedicated and ambitious, otherwise you would not have survived all these years. I believe his successors will follow, more or less, similar policies with less panache and less experimentation. They will try more systematically to modernize the state. Necessities not personalities have produced the present situation. There could be in the future greater emphasis on Russian nationalism. The army may take power de facto, putting semi-politicians outfront, and it might be able to bring about more technocratic reforms with less glasnost. In fact, glasnost will eventually be brought under control even by Gorbachev. During the next five years they have to reestablish discipline. I find interesting that Sakharov is much more reserved on Gorbachev than he was two years ago. I think that the problems in the Soviet Union have only started.

G. Talking about American public opinion what is your view of the geopolitical approach of the new administration towards the new Russian foreign policy, especially in Europe and possibly in Southeast Asia:

H.K. The President has not yet been in a position which is a real test of leadership, where he has had to give an order that somebody did not want to carry out and then enforce it. Intellectually, sitting and talking with him, he is extremely capable.

G. Could you elaborate on the kind of agenda you have in mind for a negotiation with USSR on Eastern Europe, if it takes place.

H.K. To put it briefly it has to involve the combined efforts of Europe and the United States. Europe has to put forward a political agenda. The U.S. cannot speak for Europe on the organization of Europe. The relationship of Eastern and Western Europe ought to be advanced for example, in a proposal for an associate membership for Eastern Europe in the European Community, if they meet certain conditions. As to the military aspect, reassurances should be obtained in the arms control negotiations in which we do participate. Finally, there should be a common position on the vision of a "European House"; for instance, Europe should begin at the Bug River and not at the Urals.

We should have private conversations with the Soviets in which we explain what we have in mind, that our purpose is not to destroy the Russian nation, but to create more normal conditions in Europe. It is impossible to have this kind of negotiation unless the Europeans take the political lead. Eastern Europe should be organized together with Western Europe. My goal is the reversal of Yalta -- to get Eastern Europe out of the Soviet orbit without war.

The arms control talks have proved to be an infinitely fertile subject to create confusion and achieve objectives without yielding any significant change; there has not yet been any arms

1

We need European political unity to relate Germany to the West,
and a concept for the unification of Europe that we can put forward
as a Western item of the agenda for East-West discussions. In
that context, we can give some reassurances to the Soviets that
this does not mean moving the military system east and that the
arms control negotiations are useful.

2

G. The concept of unification of Europe has to be clarified. For the time being we refer to the Common Market and the difficulty lies in the shifting from the Common Market to the concept of unification and unity. In this connection, we are struck by the fact that while many studies in the scholarly circles have been launched in the U.S. about the future of the world, they speak about the new powers first of all Japan, China and the superpowers like the USSR and USA. Seldom is Europe ever mentioned as a power.

H.K. This is a mistake. Europe should be a power in its own right but it is up to Europe to create itself. Europe should build its own defense organization. We could combine British and French nuclear capabilities. In any case, the present system of negotiations is no longer appropriate.

G. Europe is essentially a geographical expression and not a political one. The fact that all the countries in Europe will not be attacked simultaneously, means there might be different attitudes on the part of various members corresponding to their different interests. Europe as a military entity is a myth. In the case of war the result might very well be a reoccupation of Germany, and vitrification of France. Any talk about German-French couple makes also little sense for Germany as a commercial force. In any case the Russians will never accept a Franco-German military system because of the problem of German reunification. European defense or Franco-German defense are complete illusions that we have been nurturing for the past 20 years. For many reasons, including the civilian involvement in any war situation and the massive urbanization of the European population, there is a complete change in the concept of defense compared with the one prevailing 20 years ago.

H.K. The West will be finished if we accepted this analysis.

G. It seems that Germans have a feeling that the Soviet Union is now so weak that we may almost speak of an infeebled Soviet Union.

H.K. Of course the Germans are not trying to foster a crisis, but they may obtain the exact opposite of what they ultimately want. I do not think that the Soviets will get so weak that they will permit themselves to be pushed out of Eastern Europe by the Germans. This may happen through the evolution in Eastern Europe systems but not by the Germans pursuing a national policy.

3

[LL]

H.K. I think that the Soviets have succeeded in collectivising agriculture to the point that they have no peasants left. The farm workers are working as their colleagues in industry, that is to say a 40-hour week. We know that the Soviet Union has imported grains for years. The second question relates to the problem of decentralization which seems possible, for instance, in China where it makes sense, but difficult in an empire of nations. Initially, it seems that Gorbachev intended to take the Baltic states populated with non-Slavic elements, with different cultures that are more hard working, and use them as a model that the Russians could copy. Now the Baltic countries are demanding independence. At the same time, you can see in the Russian part of the Soviet Union a growing feeling of nationalism and anti-nationalism, along the Solzhenitsyn line.

However, I cannot imagine a complete collapse of the Soviet Union. There seems to be a tradition in the West's perception of Russian history according to which whenever there is a change of leadership, the previous one was always brutal and the new one more modern and more responsive. We could wonder what would be the impact on other countries if the Soviet Union where to fall into chaos. I do not believe that the military, which is the most efficient instrument, will simply permit the various nationalities to split off. It would certainly create a huge crisis for us in the West when they try, if they do.

 nationalities

 nationalities

4

[L]

H.K. I am against withdrawal of American forces from Europe. But I am not against reduction of American forces under certain circumstances. I believe the removal of American forces from Europe will endanger one of the principal ties of Germany to the Western Alliance. It will remove a counterweight to Soviet violations of whatever agreements they make about withdrawing from Europe and will encourage European neutralism, except maybe in France and Britain, which however, will then be peripheral countries. There might be a convergence between the traditional sort of semi-radical superficial leftists who are against any negotiation because they really believe the enemy is never on the left; those who want arms control talks for their own sake; and finally, the right wing which is in favor of budget cuts under the guise of "burden sharing" which is really an excuse for pulling out our troops from Europe.

5

H.K. To put it briefly it has to involve the combined efforts of Europe and the United States. Europe has to put forward a political agenda. The U.S. cannot speak for Europe on the organization of Europe. The relationship of Eastern and Western Europe ought to be advanced for example, in a proposal for an associate membership for Eastern Europe in the European Community, if they meet certain conditions. As to the military aspect, reassurances should be obtained in the arms control negotiations in which we do not participate. Finally, there should be a common position on the vision of a "European House"; for instance, Europe should begin at the Bug River and not at the Urals.

We should have private conversations with the Soviets in which we explain what we have in mind, that our purpose is not to destroy the Russian nation, but to create more normal conditions in Europe. It is impossible to have this kind of negotiations unless the Europeans take the political lead. Eastern Europe should be organized together with Western Europe. My goal is the reversal of Yalta -- to get Eastern Europe out of the Soviet

**GEOPOLITIQUE**: If you agree, Mr. Secretary, we would like to concentrate our discussion on the consequences of perestroika, on domestic affairs in the Soviet union, on the repercussions of perestroika in international affairs and especially in Europe. We are naturally concerned with the present and future response of America's diplomacy to the challenge presented by Mr. Gorbachev.

Henry KISSINGER:

Mikhail

I do not belong to those who are overimpressed by Gorbachev. I do not accept the implicit assumption that one man can come along and reverse the powerful stream of 70 years of Soviet history and 400 years of Russian history. I question seriously the idea [which seems to be shared by Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan] that we are now faced with an almost prophetic figure who can by himself change the course of events.

H.K. This is a mistake. Europe should be a power on its own right but it is up to Europe to be one. Europe should build its own defense organization. We could combine British and French nuclear capability. In any case, the present system of negotiations is no longer appropriate.

G. Europe is essentially a geographical expression and not a political one. The fact that all the countries in Europe will not be attacked simultaneously, means there might be different attitudes on the part of the various members corresponding to their different interests. Europe as a military entity is a myth. In the case of war the result might very well be a reoccupation of Germany, and vitrification of France. Any talk about German-French couple makes also little sense for Germany as a commercial force. In any case the Russians will never accept a Franco-german military system because of the problem of German reunification. European defense or franco-german defense are complete illusions that we have been nurturing for the past 20 years. For many reasons, including the civilian involvement in any war situation and the massive urbanization of european population, there is a complete change in the concept of defense compared with the one prevailing 20 years ago.

H.K. I thought that we were dealing with Gorbachev's diplomacy more than with military strategy. The West will be finished if we accepted this analysis.

G. It seems that Germans have a feeling that the Soviet union is now so weak that we may almost speak of an infeebled Soviet Union.

H.K. I am not saying that the Germans are trying to foster a crisis, but if we put aside the special aspect of nazi Germany we can see that they may obtain the exact opposite of what they ultimately wanted. I do not think

[D]

G. Don't you think that the main danger for Gorbachev, is to be found in Eastern Germany ?
What would happen if the East Germans want to join their friends across the line ?

H.K. It is ironical that, while the "cold war" which started 40 years ago and was fought mostly in the Third World, the main problem has now come back to Europe; whether it will happen in East Germany or Poland or Hungary, I don't know, but it will happen. It may be that Germany would be the most dangerous place. I think there will be some explosion somewhere. I think the Soviets will act. Contrary to everybody I believe they will. They might tolerate perestroika but they will not tolerate what looks like leaving the Warsaw Pact. This cannot happen in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Hungary perhaps.

G. What would happen if Gorbachev was to suffer the biological fate of Lenine or the political fate of Krutchev?

H.K. Gorbachev is not a pacifist who by accident came to power in the Soviet Union. To come to power in the Soviet Union, you have to be a brutal type otherwise you will not

a survivor

 Dedicated + ambitions

H.K. To put it briefly it has to be done by a combination of Europe and the United States. Europe has to put forward a political agenda. The U.S. cannot speak for Europe on the organization of Europe. The relations of Eastern and Western Europe ought to be advanced for example, in making possible an associate membership for Eastern Europe in the European Community, as a proposal if they meet certain conditions. As to the military aspect of these reassurances it should be obtained in the arms control negotiations in which we do participate. Finally, there should be a common position on the "European House" for instance, Europe should begin at the Bug River and not at the Urals.

We should have private conversations with the Soviets in which we explain what we have in mind, that is, we are not to destroy the Russian nation, but we want to create more normal conditions in Europe. It is impossible to have this kind of negotiations unless the Europeans take the political lead. Eastern Europe should be organized together with Western Europe. What I do want is to de-idealize Europe. I want to get Eastern Europe out of the Soviet orbit without the war. As to the possible membership of Austria in the European Community, we have to consider that East Germany is de facto an associate member of the European Community and, then, you may have the greater German Reich pulling the whole of Europe towards the East.

Dr. Henry KISSINGER
1800 K. Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
U.S.A.

Paris, April 14, 1989

APR 18 1989

It was indeed a great honor and also a pleasure to
have you attending our "Petit Déjeuner de travail" on
Friday the 7th of April.

All those who have attended told me how much they
benefitted from your clear insight in what is an extremely
complex situation. As everybody realizes, thanks to your
lucid exposition and your candid replies to the most
difficult questions, we are at a turning point of History
when Mr. Gorbachev is playing a key role, but like any
other statesman is part of a powerful flow of interlocking
events.

Listening to you, we can only express the hope that
your profound analysis will help the responsible circles
and persons in Washington who bear the tremendous respons-
ibility of guiding the United States policy in this troubled
world to see the light ahead.

You will find herewith the draft of what could be a
summary of our discussions. I hope this will respond to
your desire to have extracts of your statements which could
be read as an interview.

Please let me know as soon as you can, if you have any
amendments or any additional suggestions to make to your
contribution. Our intention is to publish these extracts,
if you so agree, in the forthcoming special issue of
'GEOPOLITIQUE' devoted to the changes in the Soviet Union
and their consequences on the european situation. Again
many grateful thanks.

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