APR 20 1967

Aerospace
Systems Division

3300 Plymouth Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107
Tel (313) 665-7766

18 April 1967

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Executive Director
International Seminar
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Late this month my book on the Test Ban Treaty will come off the press, and I have asked the publisher to send you a copy. Enclosed is an abstract which will give you an idea of its scope and content.

I would appreciate very much any comments or criticisms that you may have, especially concerning my approach to the problem and method of analysis. I hope that my conclusions are too pessimistic, but current developments in strategic military postures lead me to believe that I was only too right.

Abstract

THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

By James H. McBride

Publishing date: 15 May 1967

Henry Regnery Company

The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, on the future security of the United States. The implications of the treaty are approached from three different, but closely interrelated points of view: military, technological, and political.

The immediate background for the study is the two separate hearings held on the treaty by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and official statements made by members of both the executive and the legislative branches of the government.

The first chapter establishes the rationale for the study and discusses the two hearings and committee reports. It is interesting to note that the two committees came to opposite conclusions concerning the implications of the treaty. Chapter II sketches the historical background of the treaty. Chapter III then describes and compares the comparative levels of nuclear

technology in the United States and the Soviet Union as of the summer of
1963. First the Soviet and American post-moratorium test series are
described and compared; then the comparative state-of-the-art of the
United States and the Soviet Union are discussed in terms of high yield
technology, intermediate range, submegaton range, nuclear weapons
effects, antiballistic missiles, and penetration. The next two chapters
are concerned with the problem of clandestine testing as it applies to
this limited treaty and some strategic military problems that will be
affected by the restrictions on nuclear testing.

Chapter VI provides an analysis of the treaty in terms of the military
and technological advantages and disadvantages which it portends for the
United States. Twenty-three risks or disadvantages are uncovered, while
the advantages claimed for it by its proponents are examined and found to
be unpersuasive under analysis. Chapter VII discusses the safeguards
demanded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and promised by the political leader-
ship, and analyzes their impact upon the risks and disadvantages uncovered
in the preceding chapter.

Chapter VIII treats the political aspects of the treaty. The political
advantages publicly claimed for the treaty by key political figures in the
executive branch are discussed and analyzed. Of the four political advan-
tages claimed for the treaty, only one is found to be persuasive, and it

is of limited validity. Two of the claimed advantages, under analysis, prove to be disadvantages.

In view of the military, technological, and political disadvantages of the treaty and the absence of offsetting advantages, it is concluded that this attempt to seek security through arms control and detente with Soviet Union is counter-productive.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Amherst College

Amherst, Massachusetts

August 18, 1954

Mr. John McCallum
Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.
383 Madison Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear John:

As I understood the arrangement we agreed upon last June for
handling the Ross-van den Haag manuscript, I was to read and comment
upon Section III by the third week in July, at which time I expected
to get more manuscript so that we could finish up by the third or last
week in August. I met the July deadline but have not received any
more of the manuscript and assume, therefore, that the authors were
not able to come through on the schedule that they themselves had
devised and insisted upon.

In the meantime I have run across a manuscript here at Harvard
that you or someone in the trade department might want to look at.
It is the doctor's thesis of Henry Kissinger of the Harvard Depart-
ment of Government, was awarded the Sumner Prize, and presents a
theory of international relations in an historical context under the
title, *Peace, Legitimacy and Equilibrium*. The setting of the thesis
is the period from 1812 to 1822 in Europe and the focus is Metternich
and Castlereagh, with special emphasis on Metternich, who was able,
in the name of the principle of "legitimacy," to contain a revolu-
tionary movement (much more successfully than our State Department)
by playing the Conqueror against the Prophet, Napoleon against Alex-
ander, and at the same time develop a position of decisive Austrian
strength out of what had been a position of extreme weakness. Of
Kissinger's able political analysis of the factors in play, Arthur
Holcombe said that it reminds him of "the young Macaulay."

I read every word of the 500 or so pages of the manuscript and
I was greatly impressed by its erudition, readability, grasp of the
manifold complexities of intrigue and manoeuvre, and its original in-
sights into the elements that make foreign policy. Among the latter
are observations on the nature of coalition (p. 158); the weakness of
pride in diplomacy (p. 215); international settlements (p. 239); the
elements of an international order (p. 285); the nature of war and
peace (p. 228); the dilemma of the conservative in a revolutionary
period (p. 317); the requirements of statesmanship (p. 514); and

period (b. 317); the redactions of statemannsip (b. 314); and
peace (b. 328); the differences of the conservative in a revolutionary
elements of an international order (b. 328); the nature of war and
bridge in diplomacy (b. 312); international settlements (b. 326); the
are observations on the nature of coalition (b. 188); the weakness of
slight into the elements that make foreign policy. Among the latter
multifaceted complexities of justice and maneuver, and its original in-
fluence greatly impressed by its edition, headstrong, thus of the
I read every word of the 200 or so pages of the manuscript and
Hofkompe said that it reminds him of "the young Macaulay."

Klaasen's able political analysis of the factors in play, Arndt
strength out of what had been a position of extreme weakness. Of
anger, and at the same time develop a position of democratic Austrian
p. playing the Condorcet against the Jacobin, Napoleon against Alex-
tonian movement (which more successfully than our State Department)
in the name of the principle of "legitimacy," to contain a revolu-
and Counterreact, with special emphasis on Metternich, who was able,
to the period from 1818 to 1838 in Europe and the loose is Metternich
title, Peace, Legitimacy and Unipolitism. The setting of the theme
theory of international relations in an historical context under the
ment of Government, was awarded the Summer Prize, and presents a
It is the doctor's theme of Henry Klaasen of the Harvard Debar-
ted that you or someone in the trade department might want to look at.

In the meantime I have run across a manuscript here at Harvard
delivered and insatiated now.

not able to come through on the schedule that they themselves had
more of the manuscript and name, therefore, that the authors were
week in August. I met the only deadline but have not received and
to get more manuscript so that we could finish up by the third or last
now Section III. by the third week in July, at which time I expected
handling the Roas-van den Haast manuscript. I was to read and comment
As I understood the arrangement we agreed upon last June last.

Dear John:

New York 17, New York
382 Madison Avenue
Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.
Mr. John McCallum

August 18, 1934

Amherst, Massachusetts

Department of Political Science

Mr. John McCallum

- 2 -

August 18, 1954

many others. The style tends towards balance and paradox but does not seem to me to err in the direction of pedantry in the first respect nor an uncommunicative allusiveness in the second. As I have said, it seems to me to be very readable and especially so in the latter two-thirds of the text.

The pitch, of course, is scholarly but you do not have to be a scholar to read, follow, and enjoy it. It is longer than Viereck's *Conservatism Revisited* but it is infinitely sounder in fact, interpretation and judgment. It is based on original documents and is not derivative. It makes a contribution to an understanding of Europe's problem in the time of Napoleon and of Europe's (and therefore our) problem in the present day. It seems to me to supply a useful approach to international relations in its assumption that one can abstract the contingent and the episodic from previous experience and discern the operation of recurrent forces.

There are, inevitably, certain caveats. The Introduction supplies a good conceptual frame for a theory of international relations but it may need further development. The whole, of which the text is illustration, may need to be delineated more clearly. The contemporary applications may need to be made more obvious. The reader would be helped if there were somewhere a summary chronology of the principal events which are examined in detail. One map would be useful. You might think that the market for such a book would be too small - it is not a text and could not be used as a text in any course with which I am familiar. It would probably have to be a trade book and as such might cost too much to publish.

But I have been so well impressed with the quality of Kissinger's manuscript that I should like to have it looked over by the eagle-eyed ones in Harcourt Brace if this is possible. I have not suggested to Kissinger that he send it along because I wanted to get the word from you first. When I get the word, I shall have him send the manuscript forthwith.

I expect to be in New York one day the week after next to talk with people in the United Nations. I have been asked to be chief of an educational mission to Israel, and I have been invited down to discuss the details. I shall try to get in touch with you when I know which day I shall be going.

Hartley Petchem

Yonnes

to diacuse the details. I shall try to get in touch with you when
of an educational mission to France, and I have been invited down
with people in the United Nations. I have been asked to be chief

forthwith.

Yon that? When I get the word, I shall have him sang the manuscript
Klaasen that he send it along because I wanted to get the word from
one in Harecourt Brace if this is possible. I have not suggested to
manuscript that I should like to have it locked over by the editor-eyed
but I have been so well impressed with the quality of Klaasen's

and might cost too much to publish.

I am familiar. It would properly have to be a large book and so
is not a text and could not be read as a text in any course with which
I might think that the market for such a book would be too small - it
events which are examined in detail. One man would be useful. You
helped me there were somewhere a summary of the principal
applications and need to be made more obvious. The reader would be
satisfied, may need to be defined more clearly. The contemporary
may need further development. The whole of which the text is illus-
a good conceptual frame for a theory of international relations but it

There are, inevitably, certain cavasts. The introduction簡ifies

the operation of recentant forces.

the confinement and the abscissa from previous experience and discoun-
to international relations in its assumption that one can abstract
problem in the present day. It seems to me to imply a neat approach
problem in the time of Napoleon and of Emloba's (and therefore our)
derivative. It makes a contribution to an understanding of Emloba's
pretension and judgment. It is based on original documents and is not

Conversational Revisited but it is infinitely somniferous in fact, inter-
senter to read, follow, and enjoy it. It is longer than Viterba's
The bitch of commerce, is scholarly but you do not have to be a

said, it seems to me so very readable and especially so in the
aspect not an uncommunicative affiniveness in the second. As I have
not seem to me to err in the direction of bedantry in the first re-
many others. The style tends towards balance and paradox but does

Mr. John McCallum

- 3 -

August 19, 1934

(10)

commitments are made to a less soundly conceived and more costly program than is
necessary.

Efforts should be continued to encourage cooperative programs with other
nations, including the Soviet Union, with as free and complete interchange of
scientific and technological data as is practicable. Realism suggests that true
joint operation of highly complex, costly and technologically intricate programs
may be difficult of accomplishment, but continuing emphasis upon progress in this
direction should well repay the effort.

Finally we stress the need to count the cost in manpower when making decisions
about great space programs which require thousands of skilled personnel, especially
scientists, engineers and technicians, all in short supply. By attracting too
much of our best innovating talent into one field such as space exploration, we
are likely to rob other areas of industry, science and education of the high-level
talent they need.

30 30 30

Not every member of the Critical Issues Council or
Republican Citizens Committee necessarily subscribes in
every detail to all the views expressed. The Council endorses
its papers as a substantial contribution to public awareness
of current critical issues and to the presentation of positive
solutions.

2

NEW YORK TIMES

May 17, 1964

DUPLICATION SEEN
IN SPACE ROCKETS

Space Agency and Pentagon
Better Developing Boosters

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 16 — After five years of worrying about the nation's lack of rocket thrust in space, the space agency and Pentagon are coming to the embarrassing realization that independently they are developing two super-boosters with roughly the same weight-lifting capacity.

One is the 1.5 million-pound-thrust Saturn I of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The other is the Air Force's Titan III, with about 2 million pounds of thrust.

Each rocket will cost about $1 billion to develop.

The prospect that a choice will be made between the two rockets was reported by officials to have stimulated intensive lobbying by the competing industrial contractors and within the Government both the space agency and the Pentagon are coming up with proposals and requirements to defend their projects.

In some Government circles, it has become increasingly apparent that both rocket sprobably are not needed to launch the relatively limited number of heavy scientific payloads planned for the next decade.

Before leaving early this year as the President's Science Adviser, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, tried unsuccessfully to kill one or the other project, preferably the Titan III.

Blocked Cancellation

The space agency and the Pentagon were able to block an immediate choice on the ground that both rockets were needed for manned space flights in the latter part of this decade—the Saturn as a test vehicle for the Apollo lunar program and the Titan III first for launching the recently canceled Dynasort space glider and now for launching the newly authorized manned orbital laboratory of the Air Force.

It now appears, however, that a choice may be forced by Congress. The Senate Space Committee, headed by Senator Clinton P. Anderson, has announced that it will hold extensive hearings next month on "standardizing" the rocket boosters used by the Air Force and the space agency.

The Saturn was proposed in 1958 by the Army rocket team headed by Dr. Wernher von Braun. Repeatedly before the rocket was transferred in 1960 to the space agency, Pentagon officials tried to slow down the project, only to have it rescued by the prestige of Dr. von Braun on Capitol Hill and the concern of the legislators in overcoming the booster advantage of the Soviet Union.

Saturn has always suffered from lack of specific missions in space. Initially it was thought the rocket could be used for manned flights to the moon, but as studies were made of the weights required for a manned lunar spacecraft it became apparent that the rocket did not have enough thrust.

Developes New Rocket

Instead, the space agency found it necessary to develop the Titan V, a 7.5 million-pound-thrust rocket that re-pound-thrust rocket that resembles its predecessor mostly in name.

The only present requirements for the Saturn I are as a test vehicle for the early phases of the Apollo manned lunar project.

Initially it was planned to use the Saturn I for manned orbital flights in the Apollo spacecraft. Last year, partly for economy reasons, the space agency cancelled six of the planned 16 shots, including all manned launchings. Another rocket will be used only for launching three "boiler plate" versions of the spacecraft and for launching two or three large micrometeorites satellites.

The initial manned flights will be conducted with the Saturn IB, an improved version with a more powerful second stage. Twelve flights of the Saturn IB are planned, eight of them manned.

The Titan III project was initiated by the Defense Department in mid-1962. At the time, the move was widely interpreted as a Pentagon gambit to get back into the super-booster field dominated by the civilian space agency.

The Pentagon argument, however, was that the rocket was needed as a "building block" for potential, still undefined manned military missions in space.

For military purposes, the Titan III has certain advantages over the Saturn in the readiness with which it can be launched.

Unlike the Saturn, the Titan III has no complicated fuelling problems. Its core is a modified version of the Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile, using storeable liquid fuels. Strapped to the side of the missile are two large solid-fuel rocket engines, 120 inches in diameter, each producing about a million pounds of thrust.

The prospect of a Congressional investigation has prompted some scurrying within the Astronautics and Aeronautics Coordinating Board, the group that is supposed to coordinate military and civilian space activities.

The board's launching vehicle panel has reached agreement on one point: for more efficient use in the lunar and interplanetary flights, the two rockets, as well as the smaller boosters, need an improved upper stage.

The current proposal is to develop a 40,000-pound-thrust upper stage using high energy fuels—hydrogen and fluorine.

The Saturn I rocket lost its third stage somewhere along the development cycle and thus is now incapable of launching lunar or planetary payloads.

The Titan III has a restartable third-stage that is designed primarily for maneuvering a manned spacecraft in orbit, but for lunar or planetary "escape missions" the rocket is limited to the relatively small payload of around 5,000 pounds.

MISSILES/SPACE DAILY May 18, 1964

GAO SEEKS BETTER GOV'T. MANAGEMENT OF R&D CONTRACTS

There is a definite need for substantial improvement in the awarding, execution, and administration of research and development contracts issued by the Defense Department, a General Accounting Office official told a House inquiry into Government research contracts. "Improper charges amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars have been borne by the Government through erroneous cost allocations and overhead distributions," according to the witness, Frederic H. Smith, deputy director of GAO's Accounting and Auditing Policy Staff.

Such overcharges, he told the House Space R&D Subcommittee, reflect the need for improved attention by contractors to contract terms, Government regulations and proper accounting. "They also reflect the need for improved contract administration and auditing by the responsible Government officials," Smith said.

In addition, recent GAO reviews have shown "a great deal of laxity" on the part of all concerned "with respect to protecting" the Government's interests and obtaining and using the full benefits paid for in the area of patents, patent rights, and technical data, drawings and specifications. This is of even greater importance, he claimed. "Contractors have not only failed to submit the patent and technical data on a timely basis, as required," Smith explained, "but in some cases they have treated such material as 'proprietary' thereby increasing the cost to the Government for procurement of items developed largely at Government expense." Adding to this problem is the fact that Government technical and administrative personnel have failed to follow through and protect Federal interests.

November 7, 1958

Captain William M. McCormack
USS Valley Forge
Fleet Post Office
New York, New York

Dear Captain McCormack:

It is unforgiveable of me to
have delayed so long to thank you for
your excellent hospitality when your
ship was in port. As Captain Taylor
undoubtedly told you, this was my first
visit aboard a war ship of any kind.
I appreciated your various kindnesses
and also the excellent briefing your
officers gave me. If you can ever
spare some time when you are in town
I would welcome the opportunity to
talk to you further.

With kind regards.

AUG 18 1967

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
SUMMER SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES AND OF EDUCATION

735 HOLYOKE CENTER, 1350 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

THOMAS E. CROOKS, Director

DANA M. COTTON, Associate Director

Lehman Hall M-3

August 17, 1967

Professor H. A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I was very pleased to have received your offer of
help to the Intensive Summer Studies Program. At
this point, however, the students are engaged in
preparation for exams and no longer have time to
meet with our professors.

I am sorry we were not able to use your services,
but sincerely appreciate your kind response to my
memorandum.

HAM:mc

JUL 26 1967

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

THOMAS E. CROOKS, Director

Lehman Hall M-3

July, 1967

Professor H. A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University

Dear Sir:

As you may know, the Harvard-Yale-Columbia Intensive Summer Studies Program is designed to encourage students at predominantly Negro Southern colleges to attend graduate school. Within that broader purpose, we wish to encourage them to attend the best possible graduate school in the light of their interests and abilities.

Most graduate school catalogs, however, do not include the following information:

1) The strength of a particular department (Political Science, English, etc.) vis-a-vis those of other schools.

2) The topic within a particular discipline upon which a department concentrates or feels particularly strong in (E.g., Urban Politics, Public Administration, or Political Theory within the Department of Political Science.)

Dean Crooks suggested that you may be able to help us on a completely informal basis with some of this information. I would greatly appreciate any help you could give us--perhaps a list covering some of the information requested, perhaps a visit to a meeting of some of our students in your discipline, in which some of these questions might be discussed.

Thank you, and I hope to hear from you soon.

HAM:mc

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT

6 January 1958

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

A Conference on Basic Army Doctrine for Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, will be conducted at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the period 3-7 February 1958. The tentative agenda for this conference is attached as Inclosure 1. I am extending to you a most cordial invitation to participate in the preliminary sessions of this conference on 3, 4, and 5 February.

As you may know, FM 100-5 sets forth the basic doctrine for United States Army forces in the field. The current revision of this manual, under preparation at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, will reflect the most modern concepts of the role of the Army, the atomic environment which conditions all combat, concepts of limited warfare, and the results of experience and doctrinal research since the 1954 edition of the field manual. The initial chapters will include a discussion of the military as an instrument of national policy, the nature and employment of military force, the range of operational environments in modern warfare, and the organization, characteristics, and control of operational forces, particularly joint forces.

In addition to this College, the following agencies will be represented at the conference:

Office, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of Army

United States Continental Army Command

United States Military Academy (Colonel G. A. Lincoln has been invited)

United States Army War College

U.S. Army Representative, Armed Forces Staff College

U.S. Army Representative, Air War College

U.S. Army Representative, Naval War College

Your background in the military-political field, as evidenced most recently by your book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," will be of considerable assistance to this group of U.S. Army doctrinal officers. In addition, I believe that you will find this conference personally and professionally rewarding in that it will provide you an opportunity to examine and discuss concrete examples of the operational details of employment of field forces in the varying conditions visualized for modern warfare.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College will distribute to all conferees approximately 15 January 1958 a paper to be considered as a point of departure at the conference. Conference work will be directed toward improving, refining, or otherwise revising this initial point of departure.

To assist you in making travel plans, I might suggest that you plan to arrive Sunday, 2 February, and to depart the afternoon of Wednesday, 5 February. If you inform us of your arrival time we shall arrange for a car to meet you at the Kansas City Municipal Airport. Please plan to stay at Fort Leavenworth in our guest accommodations.

The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College will, of course, reimburse you for travel and per diem expenses, and can also provide an honorarium of $50 per day for the three-day period.

I hope that your schedule will allow you to join us in this timely and significant project.

Sincerely,

LIONEL C. MCGARR
Major General, USA
Commandant

1 Inclosure

2

CONFERENCE ON

BASIC ARMY DOCTRINE FOR

FM 100-5, FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS, OPERATIONS

AGENDA

Tentative Agenda - revised agenda
will be mailed about 15 Jan

Monday 3 February 1958

<table><tr><td>0830-0900</td><td>Grant Hall</td><td>Registration</td></tr><tr><td>0900-0910</td><td>Grant Hall</td><td>Welcome by Commandant USA CGSC</td></tr><tr><td>0910-0920</td><td>Grant Hall</td><td>Security and Administrative Briefing</td></tr><tr><td>0920-1000</td><td>Grant Hall</td><td>USA CGSC presentation of proposed point of departure</td></tr><tr><td>1030-1200</td><td>Grant Hall</td><td>Open conference discussion of USA CGSC presentation</td></tr><tr><td>1315-1700</td><td>Conference Rooms</td><td>Discussion by Working Teams. Initiation of team studies. Composition of Working Teams and assigned topics are as follows:</td></tr></table>

Team 1: (DCSOPS; US CONARC; U.S.M.A.; Army War College; USA CGSC; Civilian Political Scientist - See Note 1)

SCOPE: Analyze and submit recommendations on the
doctrine contained in the USA CGSC draft paper with
respect to: the nature of conflict; the nature and
employment of military force as an instrument of
national policy; the range of operational environ-
ments of field forces; limitations on warfare.

Team 2: (DCSOPS; US CONARC; Army representatives
at Naval War College and Air War College; USA CGSC)

SCOPE: Analyze and submit recommendations on the
doCTRine contained in the USA CGSC draft paper with
respect to: operational organization for field
forces; the theater of operations; organization,
command, and control of joint forces.

Incl 1

1

**Team 3:** (DCSOPS; US CONARC; Army representative at Armed Forces Staff College; USA CGSC; Civilian Political Scientist - See Note 1.)

**SCOPE:** Examine the USA CGSC paper in its entirety.

Recommend such revision as may be indicated from the viewpoint of validity, consistency, logic, compatibility with current and projected weapons systems, and impact upon national and service policy. (NOTE: Some duplication of team scope is intentional, in order to ensure analysis from a general as well as a specific point of view).

Tuesday 4 February 1958

0800-1200 Conference Rooms

**Team 1:** USA CGSC presentation of concrete map illustration(s) of the application of the operational doctrine included in the USA CGSC prepared paper.

**Team 2:** USA CGSC presentation of concrete map illustration(s) of the application of the operational doctrine included in the USA CGSC prepared paper.

**Team 3:** Continue discussion and preparation of studies.

1315-1700 Conference Rooms

Working teams continue discussions and preparation of studies.

Henry V. Klaasunder

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards,

procurement.

involvement in some of the defense
respect to detting greater European
extremely interesting particularly with
NATO. I found some of the ideas in it
very interesting article on revitalizing
Thank you for sending me your

Dear Mr. McGarrish:

Bettiehead's, Maryland 20034
7913 Charleston Court
Mr. Robert E. McGarrish

August 15, 1966

7912 Charleston Court
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

5 July 1966

Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
104 Fletcher Road
Belmont, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

The attached paper describes some concrete ideas that may be useful to those concerned with NATO. If you think they have merit, please bring them to the attention of appropriate officials in any manner you may desire.

My present position is vice president of a not-for-profit firm serving the Office of the Secretary of Defense as a captive consultant on logistics problems. I have been advised that NATO's problems are outside the purview of the charter of our firm. I am much more interested in having the ideas considered now by thoughtful and influential leaders concerned with NATO, than in having them published sometime in the future.

Thus, I trust you will excuse my presumptuous and unorthodox manner of inviting your attention to the paper. I shall appreciate your consideration.

Attch.

August 20, 1957

Dear Brian:

It was good to see you in Cambridge the other day and
doubly fortunate that we had a chance to sit together at dinner. I
have since had a thought with respect to the Georgetown Faculty
that you might consider perfectly gratuitous but which I would like
to take the liberty of putting before you.

I have known for many years a most remarkable man who now
lives in Washington, working as a GS-15 for the Department of the
Army in the Office of Military Government. He is Dr. Fritz A. Kraemer,
of 4319 Fessenden Street, Washington, D. C., phone number:
Emerson 2-0978.

Dr. Kraemer was born in Germany and has a Doctor of Law
from the University of Geneva, and a Doctor of Political Science from
the University of Rome. I served with him in the Army and would like
to commend him to you not only for his intellectual capabilities which
are outstanding but for his qualities of character and judgment which
are even more remarkable. No one has had greater influence on my own
intellectual development. I do not know whether he could be induced to
do any teaching at Georgetown but if he could, I would think he would
be a tremendous asset either in your Faculty of International Law or of
International Relations. Professor Kronstein, who I think is on your
Faculty, knows him well. I do not suppose that Dr. Kraemer could be
induced to work on a full-time basis but it might be worth trying him for
part of his time.

I will give you a ring when next I am in Washington.

Best regards as always.

Father Brian McGrath
Georgetown University
Washington 7, D. C.

Hollins College Faculty of Science - Department of Psychology

F. JOSEPH McGUIGAN, Professor of Psychology and Chairman, Department of
Psychology. Born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, December 7, 1924.

EDUCATION:

University of California, Los Angeles, B.A., 1945

Harvard University, 1945

Columbia University, 1947 (summer)

University of California, Los Angeles, M.A., 1949

University of Southern California, Ph.D., 1950

University of Colorado, 1951 (summer)

EXPERIENCE:

Military: U.S. Navy, 1942-1946

Oklahoma Publishing Company, consumer research, 1946 (summer)

Pepperdine College, instructor, 1949-1950

University of Nevada, assistant professor, 1950-1951

Psychological Corporation, research associate, 1950-1951 (part-time)

The George Washington University, Human Resources Research Office,
research scientist to senior research scientist (one year acting
director of research, Human Research Unit No. 1), 1951-1955

University of Louisville and USAFI, lecturer, 1952-1955 (part-time)

Hollins College, professor, 1955-, chairman, department of psychology,
1955-1965; 1968-

University of Hawaii, visiting professor, 1965 (summer)

University of California, Santa Barbara, visiting professor, 1966 (spring)

PUBLICATIONS:

Articles

The Minimal Laws of Behavior, *Psi Chi Newsletter*, 1949.

An Evaluation of a Tank Gunnery Program Under Three Degrees of Specialization, *Staff Memorandum*, Human Research Unit No. 1, (1952).

Formalization of Psychological Theory, *Psychological Review*, 60, 377-382 (1953).

A Comparison of Whole vs. Part Methods of Rifle Marksmanship, *Information Report*, Human Research Unit No. 1 (1953).

The Relationship Between 1000" Range and Known Distance Range Scores, *Research Memorandum*, Human Resources Research Office (1953). With V. H. Denenberg.

Accuracy of M-1 Rifle Scores Obtained on the Known Distance Range, *Research Memorandum*, Human Resources Research Office (1954). With V. H. Denenberg.

Evaluation of a Special Live Firing Trigger Squeeze Exercise, *Technical Report*, Human Resources Research Office (1954). With V. H. Denenberg.

The Relationship Between Rifle Steadiness and Rifle Marksmanship and the Effect of Rifle Training on Rifle Steadiness, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 39, 156-160 (1955). With E. F. MacCaslin.

Whole and Part Methods of Learning a Perceptual Motor Skill, *American Journal of Psychology*, 68, 658-661 (1955). With E. F. MacCaslin.

Confirmation of Theories in Psychology, *Psychological Review*, 63, (1956).

The Logical Status of Hull's Principle of Secondary Reinforcement, *Psychological Review*, 63, 303-309 (1956).

[LC]

The Prediction of Rifle Marksmanship, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, **40**,
341-343 (1956). With E. F. MacCaslin.

Manifest Anxiety and the Palmer Perspiration Index, *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, **20**, 356 (1956). With A. D. Calvin, Marshall Soyers, and Sybil Tyrell.

An Investigation of Several Methods of Teaching Contour Interpretation,
*Journal of Applied Psychology*, **41**, 53-57 (1957).

A Further Investigation of the Relationship Between Anxiety and Classroom Performance, *Journal of Educational Psychology*, **48**, 240-253 (1957).
With A. D. Calvin and M. W. Sullivan.

Psychological Changes Related to Intercultural Experiences. *Psychological Reports*, **4**, 55-60 (1958).

Evidence That the Secondary Reinforcing Stimulus Must be Discriminated.
*Journal of Experimental Psychology*, **55**, 184-187 (1958). With Frances Crockett.

A Crash Research Program for Peace. *American Psychologist*, **13**, 224-228 (1958).

Incidental Learning in the Formation of Concepts. *American Journal of Psychology*, **71**, 539-547 (1958).

Delay of Knowledge of Results; A Problem in Design. *Psychological Reports*,
**5**, 241-243 (1959).

Further Study of Psychological Changes Related to Intercultural Experiences.
*Psychological Reports*, **5**, 241-243 (1959).

The Effect of Precision, Schedule and Delay of Knowledge of Results on Performance. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, **58**, 79-84 (1959).

Variation of Whole and Part Methods of Learning. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, **51**, 213-216 (1960).

The Effect of Knowledge Results Before and After a Response. *Journal of General Psychology*, **63**, 51-55 (1960). With Frances Crockett and Carolyn Bolton.

The Problem of Secondary Reinforcement and Discriminative Stimulus Training.
*Proceedings of the International Congress of Psychology*, (1960). With
N. E. Sullivan.

Psychology in the U. S. Science Exhibit: Seattle World's Fair (1962).
*American Psychologist*, **17**, 798-800 (1962). With S. Ross.

The Experimenter -- A Neglected Stimulus Object. *Psychological Bulletin*,
**60**, 421-428 (1963).

The Retroactive Interference of Motor Activity With Knowledge of Results.
*Journal of General Psychology*, **70**, 279-281 (1964). With Carolyn Hutchens, Nancy Eason, and Teddy Reynolds.

Silent Speech During Silent Reading, *Office of Education Cooperative Research Report* #1863 (1964).

Covert Language Responses During Silent Reading. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, **55**, 339-343 (1964). With Eleanor Stanton and Barbara Keller.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Programmed Texts -- Methodology and Some Findings. *Journal of Programmed Instruction*, **3**, 23-34 (1965). With R. Peters.

Evocation and Learning Tests for Secondary Reinforcement. *American Journal of Psychology*, **78**, 307-308 (1965). With Barbara Equen and Judith Stellings.

Covert Oral Behavior and Auditory Hallucinations, *Psychophysiology*, **3**, 73-80 (1966).

Subvocal Speech During Silent Reading, *Office of Education Cooperative Research Project Report* #5-0347 (1967).

The G Statistic, An Index of Amount Learned, *Journal of National Society for Programmed Instruction*, **6**, 14-16 (1967).

Feedback of Speech Muscle Activity during Silent Reading: Two Comments, Science, 157, 579-580 (1967).

Book Review: Robert Rosenthal, *Experimental Effects in Behavioral Research*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1966. *American Journal of Psychology*, 81, 120-121 (1968).

Effects of Auditory Stimulation on Covert Oral Behavior During Silent Reading, *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 76, 649-655 (1968).

Books

*Current Studies in Psychology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958.
With A. D. Calvin.

*Experimental Psychology*. New York: Prentice Hall (1960). Second Edition, 1968.

*Psychology*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon (1961). With A. D. Calvin, M. Scriven, J. McConnell, J. Gallagher and C. Hanley.

*The Biological Basis of Behavior*. New York: Prentice Hall (1963).

*Thinking: Studies of Covert Language Behavior*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1966).

PROFESSIONAL AND HONORARY SOCIETIES:

American Psychological Association (Fellow)

Psychonomic Society

Sigma Xi

Society for Psychophysiological Research

A Behaviorist's Suggestions for the Reduction of
International Tension¹

F. J. McGuigan

Hollins College

Through the centuries man <u>has</u> managed to progress by means of traditional kinds of international behaviors, but the real possibility of a nuclear holocaust has dramatically changed the rules that could, in any sense, justify such modes of international relations as presently rational. The point can be illustrated by using the theory of games as our source of models -- international relations can no longer be considered to be a zero sum game, but has now become a non-zero sum game. In a zero sum game there is a certain amount of "booty" divided among the participants, and the object is for each of the participants to obtain the shares owned by the others -- whatever one player loses, the other player wins. In the sense of an approximation, many of our past wars fit the model of a zero sum game, for there have been winners and losers. One country initiated aggression and acquired rewards in the form of indemnities, increased markets, expanded political influence, territorial control, and so on. Countries that operated according to the principle that "To the victor belong the spoils" were thus engaged in a zero sum game.

It is due to the development of nuclear weapons and effective delivery
systems that we have now moved from approximations to the model of a zero sum
game to that of a non-zero sum game, for in a non-zero sum game there is no
amount of booty that necessarily passes from one participant to another. The
non-zero sum game is such that it may be destructive of all of the economic
assets of the players so that the "winner" is the one who loses the least.

¹Thanks to Fred Keller, Henry Nash and Charles Osgood for their helpful suggestions.

2

World War III thus would more closely fit the model of a non-zero sum game for all, or almost all of the assets of the world may well be destroyed -- "To the 'victor' would belong decimated countries."

Yet, our foreign policies remain as they were. Though they have often been successful, they have often been unsuccessful, based as they have been on "rules of thumb." The fact that we are now "playing" a non-zero sum game no longer allows us the luxury of continuing such unsystematic approaches. We can no longer merely rely on the hope that somebody in authority will again guess right and be successful.

If one is sufficiently audacious -- "foolhardy" may be a better word -- to enter the arena of international politics, he must be prepared for numerous criticisms from a variety of specialists. The intensity of the criticisms will no doubt be increased due to feelings of territorial infringement on the part of policy makers, political scientists, economists, historians and others. Principal among the criticisms, regardless of who says what about what, is that the complexity of the approach is not commensurate with the complexity of the problems. At our present level of knowledge, it cannot possibly be. Nevertheless, I'm sure that what I have to say will evoke immediate reactions of the sort that "The analysis is grossly oversimplified -- there are numerous variables that have not been considered and numerous consequences of the approach that have not been dealt with;" that "you can't leap all the way from the individual to the behavior of the largest of our groups, viz., to 'a nation';" and so forth. All of this, and more, is true. Yet, the alternative of not making the present attempt is personally more dismal to me. A necessary condition for even partial success is to at least try. And, given the great complexity of the problems that we are addressing, one must necessarily start with a simple formulation and expand it as the difficulties met

3

with require. I ask, then, that you bear with me for awhile as we explore the implications of the psychologist's laws of individual behavior -- as we attempt to see if they might contribute to an understanding of how those intricate amalgamations that we call nations interact. At the conclusion I shall make some brief comments about how we might progress to a higher level of understanding by elaborating on some of the oversimplifications that will necessarily be introduced.

## Principles of Individual Behavior

The systematic construction of an enlightened foreign policy should begin, I believe, by examining past successes and failures in an attempt to understand why they worked or why they failed. A preliminary effort has been made to abstract certain characteristics from past international behaviors and to fit them to some simply stated laws of individual behavior. Let us immediately consider three laws, all of which have an extremely sound empirical base and essentially unrestricted generality with regard to individual behavior. They thus form a solid foundation for extrapolating to the international level.

The question will be: to what extent are these extrapolations sufficient? The three laws are the laws of reinforcement, of punishment and of extinction.

Briefly stated, the law of reinforcement says that if a person's response is followed by reinforcement (reward), that response increases in strength. For example, if one person makes a response and a second reinforces that response by making his approval known, the response will occur more frequently in the future. If the response is reinforced sufficiently often, then it can become a permanent part of a person's behavioral repertoire.

If, however, a person's response is punished, then the response will be suppressed as long as the punishing agent remains effective. Or if a person's response produces no consequences (for example, if the response is ignored)

4

then the person is likely to stop making the response -- a response that is not
reinforced usually becomes extinguished.

While I have oversimplified many features of these laws and have selected
only three out of a large storehouse of knowledge, there is one requirement in
their successful application that cannot be slighted; that is, the consequence
(reinforcement or punishment) must be contingent on the response. In order to
strengthen a response, for instance, the reinforcement must be given only when
the response is made -- we call this a *response-reinforcement contingency*.

To effectively modify behavior, the combined use of the laws of reinforcement, punishment and extinction is often resorted to. Consider two responses that are incompatible -- that is, one or the other, but not both, can be made. If the stronger of the two responses is considered undesirable and the weaker desirable, one would seek to reverse the relative strengths of these two responses. To accomplish this, one would punish or not reinforce the undesirable response, then wait for the desirable response to be made. When the desirable response eventually occurs, it is immediately reinforced. By repeating this procedure, the desirable response eventually becomes the stronger and dominates the undesirable response.

## Applications to Past International Behaviors

Now let us consider these laws with regard to past foreign policies. One of our most notorious foreign policy failures, of course, was the manner in which we behaved during Hitler's rise to power. Abstracting certain characteristics out of the international situation from 1936 onward, one could argue that Hitler was playing a zero sum game. He mounted a major propaganda campaign for *lebensraum* and, through a series of aggressive moves, received considerable in economic, territorial and political rewards. In a number of psychological experiments, it has been found that aggressive behavior can be

5

strengthened if it is followed by reinforcement. In 1936, Hitler made a weak
aggressive response by moving into the Rhineland. Had the Allies vigorously
opposed him, apparently Hitler was prepared to withdraw rather than risk a
major premature confrontation. Unfortunately, however, the Allies reinforced
this initial aggressive response by allowing him to remain, and his aggressive
behavior was further strengthened in 1938 by rewarding him with the Sudetenland,
then Czechoslovakia and Austria, until he finally unleashed his *blitzkrieg*
against Poland in 1940. In short, this analysis would indicate that consider-
able of Hitler's behavior can be understood according to a principle of rein-
forcement, reinforcement that was available because international behavior of
the day fitted the model of a zero sum game. The lesson was well learned by
our policy makers, and we have since expended considerable energy in refusing
to reinforce aggressive behavior. As but one example, for years the U. S. has
denied Mainland China entrance to the UN on the verbalized grounds that a
country should not be allowed to shoot her way into that organization. While
our analysis would suggest that this may be part of a wise foreign policy, it
is incomplete in that, while aggression is not reinforced, one wonders about
the reinforcement of incompatible, non-aggressive behavior. Perhaps an example
of successful reinforcement of constructive behavior would be our postwar
behavior toward Germany and Japan. While World War II may be regarded as our
efforts to successfully suppress aggressive behavior, our postwar behavior has
created conditions for the Germans and Japanese to emit various constructive
responses which we have generously reinforced.

One aspect of the Cuban missile crisis offers another illustration of
successful foreign policy that well fits our laws of individual behavior. At
a critical point, Chairman Khrushchev sent President Kennedy two conflicting
letters. Facilitating later developments, Kennedy chose to favorably respond

6

to the peaceful letter and to ignore the hostile one -- an effort to simulta-
neously extinguish aggressive behavior and reinforce peaceful responses.

Examples such as these indicate that at least some aspects of our past
failures can be understood in terms of the unwise (or unwitting) application
of principles of behavioral modification, as in the case of rewarding aggres-
sive behavior; and that some of our past successes can also be understood in
that constructive responses, incompatible with aggression, were reinforced.
The difficulty with our foreign policies, from this point of view, would appear
to be that we do not systematically and consistently engage in the combined
use of our laws -- we often attempt to modify international behavior by means
of punishment or threat of punishment, with relatively little emphasis on the
reinforcement of non-aggressive behavior. Except, possibly, in the relatively
trivial cases of the zero sum games of conventional and limited wars, such a
principle is undeniably outmoded. We presume to maintain peace with a Soviet
Union, armed to the teeth, by means of a principle of "balance of nuclear
terror." The U. S. holds a second strike capability, as does the Soviet Union,
clear examples of attempting to control behavior through the threat of punish-
ment. The plain and simple facts of the matter are that, should one nation
unleash aggression, the other nation may be in a position to punish that
aggression, but in that event, there would be no one left who would have the
opportunity of emitting constructive responses that could be reinforced. Nor,
for that matter, would there by anybody left who would possess reinforcing
powers. Clearly, it seems, these traditional techniques of modifying behavior
are bankrupt and must be replaced with more effective procedures.

A Proposal for the Future

The discussion to this point sets our problem. However, if this approach
has merit, cultural lag would make it difficult to appropriately reorient our

7

foreign policy -- only if we are extremely fortunate would there be time for the world to acquire policy makers who are extensively educated in the basics of behavioral modification. Nevertheless, the program implied to this point should be more precisely presented.

This will be an exercise in attempting to reduce (and then eliminate) aggressive behavior between countries A and B. The state of tension between these two countries is great and consistently rising, so that nuclear aggression may well be instigated by country A on country B, or vice versa. What would a behavioristically based foreign policy be like?

## Applying Principles for modifying Behavior

The first step, as we have said, in modifying behavior is to establish those events that are reinforcing to one party (and to the other, too, for that matter). To be more realistic, however, we note that country A is the scientifically and technologically more sophisticated, so that it is country A who exercises the initiative. The State Department of country A undertakes an extensive study of the needs of country B. The citizens of country B, it is clear, have many basic bodily needs -- food, clothing, housing, and the like. Country B, furthermore, suffers from what, in the vernacular, is called "an inferiority complex" and therefore B has a need for greater prestige in the world of nations. They also have a need for security in a potentially explosive world, and view, perhaps in a paranoid fashion, many behaviors of other nations as direct or implied threats to their survival. The list of needs could continue, but the point is made that country A is in a position to satisfy many of the needs of country B.

In short, country A develops an extensive list of events that can be used as reinforcers for country B. And A also can specify acts that it considers desirable and undesirable on the part of B. A has, thus, planned for a

8

number of potential response-reinforcement contingencies. At this point, A simply waits and observes the behavior of B. Country B will emit a number of various kinds of responses, most of them hostile considering the existing relationship with country A. Examples of such behavior will range from the active supply of troops and material in a relatively limited and "covert" engagement with country A, to "We will destroy you," to "The east wind will prevail," and so on. But somewhere in this massive, continuous range of behavior will occur responses that country A can consider desirable, or at least relatively so. For example, with a famine facing them, country B will make efforts to obtain food from just about any country. If country A immediately, and without being asked, proclaims in a very demonstrative way that they wouldn't send one ounce of grain to country B, clearly approach responses from B to A will be suppressed. On the other hand, should country A send a token shipment of food after a minimal approach response has been made by country B, the strength of B's approach response to A will increase. (This is the initial step in modifying behavior and the process is referred to as "shaping"). Asking for food cannot, in any reasonable sense, be regarded as aggression and in fact, it is quite clearly a response that is incompatible with aggressive behavior. In the history of the world, no one party of a war has ever seriously asked the other for help -- aggression and peaceful approach responses are simply incompatible. And if a response that is incompatible with aggressive behavior is increased in strength, there is a dimunition in the relative strength of the aggressive response. Hence, by specifying non-aggressive responses that country B can make and by being ready to reinforce those responses, country A can place itself in the position of strengthening peaceful behavior on the part of B. If country A can, painstakingly, proceed on such a course, B's peaceful behavior would eventually become sufficiently

9

dominant over its undesirable behavior. Eventually, for all practical purposes,
B would cease to emit aggressive responses.

The example of the food requirements of B is, while quite a real possibil-
ity, merely meant to be illustrative. Numerous other positive responses can
also occur, and country A should be constantly alert to effect immediate rein-
forcements. As but one further illustration: A leader of country B says,
deeply buried in an extremely hostile speech, that "peace is desired." A's
State Department should totally ignore the extensive hostility (consistent
failure of a response to produce a consequence may lead to extinction of that
response), and immediately reinforce the verbal response "peace is desired" --
perhaps country A asserts that it was extremely pleased to note the desire for
peace on the part of the country B, that it feels similarly, and A can subtly
imply that any country that has a peace-oriented policy increases its opportu-
nities to progress to an advanced stage of economic development. Such a
statement by A would reinforce B's peaceful behavior in that it would constitute
a partial and initial satisfaction of B's need for security in a war-threatening
world.

The response-reinforcement contingencies are critical! A cannot indis-
criminately reinforce (or even punish) B if A seeks to develop a constructive
behavioral repertoire in B. Examples of the use of inappropriate response-
reinforcement contingencies effected by the U. S. (and other) governments no
doubt fill many files in Washington. Individuals, groups, and governments
have been given numerous "hand-outs" for say, "doing nothing" -- or even when
they were emitting behavior that was undesirable. In such cases, "doing
nothing" or making undesirable responses were strengthened, with attendant in-
creases in the difficulty of the control problems.

10

## The Shaping Process

To emphasize further the importance of the contingencies, we can contrast the present approach with one traditional attempt to modify behavior, namely the universal religious principle of "love thy neighbor." Indiscriminate application of such a principle is a serious danger that country A can fall victim to in the form of a misdirected foreign policy. This is, in fact, a danger that the U. S. has succeeded in succumbing to a number of times in its recent history. That is to emphasize that, in the indiscriminate application of reinforcement, undesirable behavior can be strengthened. During the shaping of behavior a behaviorist might reformulate the principle as: "love thy neighbor if..." or "love thy neighbor when...." At the conclusion of the shaping procedure, the "if" or "when" can be dropped, for at the point the desirable behavior is a permanent part of the party's repertoire -- behavior has already been modified to the point that the parties are interacting in a manner that is mutually beneficial, and further modification would be unnecessary.

In the initial stages of modifying behavior, the shaping process is slow and requires painstaking, often almost infinite, patience on the part of the would-be controller. Any laboratory psychologist can attest to this, even in the case of a simple response with a lower animal. Intentionally shaping the behavior of a nation would require exceptional astuteness, patience and skill. But once an initial, though even minor, success has been achieved, the process tends to snowball. Furthermore, the process, as it moves along, is not uni-directional. The reinforcer himself receives reinforcement by the reinforced. Country B, because of the favorable consequence administered by country A, increases its approach tendencies to A, more frequently proclaims its desire for peace, and the like. As a consequence, A's constructive behavior to B is reinforced by the reduction in B's threat to A's own security. In short, from

11

small beginnings, a well designed and sophisticated foreign policy by one
country could produce massive constructive responses in another, and the mutu-
ally reinforcing relationships can improve indefinitely.

Stimulus Control -- The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis.

So far we have emphasized the role of the response-reinforcement contin-
gency. Another general class of control techniques utilizes existing stimulus-
response relationships. An individual, through conditioning and due to innate
capacities, will make a given response in the presence of the effective stim-
ulus. If one wishes to control the occurrence of a response, he may do so by
either presenting the evoking stimulus or by withholding same.

Perhaps the most relevant illustration is in terms of the frustration-
aggression hypothesis, a relationship that has a rather solidly based empiri-
cal history. Simply put, when one is presented with an environmental situation
that is frustrating, (prevents the satisfaction of a need), he emits aggressive
behavior. Let us, for example, consider a country hostilely isolated in the
world. On one of her borders are encamped many well equipped divisions of
soldiers supported by the most sophisticated of nuclear arsenals. On another
border is a weak, but potentially aggressive army. Her seashore is antagonis-
tically patrolled by the world's most powerful navy. Some few miles offshore
resides a sizeable and modern military force that daily predicts a major assault
on the country's beaches. A huge military force from the world's most powerful
nation is engaged in a war within air minutes to the country's south; and in
fact, hostile air missions are carried out within a stone's throw of the country's
borders (and surreptitiously or accidentally over its actual territory). Far
above the country, intelligence-gathering satellites observe important happen-
ings, and long-range nuclear-carrying missiles are aimed at targets throughout
the country, only minutes away. Her trade with other countries is restricted,

12

with few actual points of outlet for this function. Friendly or even neutral
communications with others are limited. And the internal needs of the country,
steeped in a retarded technology and science, are staggering. To understate
the matter, such a country has little freedom of movement.

A country unfortunate enough to find itself in such a situation, regard-
less of how it arrived there would, without doubt, experience numerous and
deep feelings of frustration. And the frustration-aggression principle quite
clearly predicts that as the level of frustration increases, the amount of
aggressive behavior will increase. How would a country like the U. S., well
equipped with knowledge of control methodologies and materiel, intelligently
behave toward a country who, like Mainland China, is in this condition?

One possible principle of action would be to expend considerable energy
to further isolate China. The rationale would be to bring sufficient force to
bear that the country's government would cease to exist. A revolution, or
some such social action, might cause it to fall. The question here can be
simply put: Would such a change occur before the aggressive behavior, dictated
by the increasingly heightened state of frustration, erupted into a nuclear
holocaust? The foreign office of the power that exercises this policy of con-
tainment would clearly be betting on the former possibility, and humanity would
certainly like to see the bet won.

An alternative principle of action would be for the nations that construct
the frustrating environment to attempt to reduce the country's aggressive
behavior by reducing those frustrating conditions. If the frustrated country
eventually comes to experience few frustrations, there would be a noticeable
reduction in its aggressive behavior. But this is an end result and could not
be achieved in one fell swoop -- again, consideration of the contingencies is
vital. If, for instance, the isolated country, while emitting aggressive

13

behavior, was reinforced by total withdrawal of the frustrating conditions imposed by others, their aggressive behavior would grow in strength. The alternative is, then, a calculated and gradual reduction in the frustrating conditions, and we interweave the frustration-aggression principle with that of reinforcement. In short, we can specify one major reason why China would emit aggressive behavior. And at each instance in which China emits a constructive response, a slight reduction in the frustrating conditions should be effected; not only would there be less potent conditions for evoking aggressive behavior, but non-aggressive behavior that is incompatible with aggression would be strengthened. A patient and continuous foreign policy based on this principle should eventually contribute to the establishment of a more peaceful world.

## A Concluding Statement

Clearly, the matter of international relations is much more complex than we have made it. The effort has been to abstract some of the more important variables and to see how we might intelligently deal with them. And also, for purposes of contrast, to note how we sometimes have dealt with them in an unintelligent manner in the past.

Let us now briefly consider some of the difficulties encountered so far with this preliminary analysis. First is the question of the appropriateness of applying principles of individual behavior in an effort to modify the behavior of a nation. At first glance, the question appears to be a real one. But on closer analysis, I would suggest that it is not, for what I have advocated is the application of behavioral principles to individuals and not to "nations." A "nation" is an abstract concept and, in any single sense, a nation does not make a response. International relations are executed, and relevant policies are formed, by individuals -- a few decision makers -- not

14

by a nation as a whole. If the decision makers identify closely with the needs and general welfare of their constituents, then the extrapolations here offered could well be valid. Alternatively, if the reinforcements and punishments that are presented affect huge portions of the populace but do not affect (even indirectly) the decision makers themselves, these contingencies would not be effective in modifying the behavior of those decision makers. It may well be, for instance, that the decision makers in Peking would care but little if millions of Chinese are destroyed, better fed, or what have you. If such were the case, the problem would seem to be not so much a matter of the inappropriateness of the behavioral principles, but rather that reinforcers and punishers were applied to the wrong people. In this event, ways would have to be found to construct effective contingencies for the decision makers -- "to get closer to them" -- rather than considering the status of the citizens of the nation as a whole.

This line of thinking indicates that a much more serious problem is the recognition that there are many sources of reinforcement and punishment for the leaders of nations other than those that can be effected by outside countries. That is to say that decision makers are subject to partial control by their own constituencies and internal events, and the question thus concerns the relative potency of external vs. internal reinforcers and punishers. If the decision makers receive reinforcement from within and from without their country for the same behavior, there is of course no problem. However, if another nation attempts to reinforce a decision maker for one kind of behavior while a competing response is reinforced by their constituency, serious difficulties arise. This kind of situation is not new to behaviorists, and we have acquired considerable information about the modification of behavior as a function of competing responses with varying reinforcing and punishing conditions. A necessary extension of

15

the present analysis would be to examine this question in great detail.

Another extension of the present analysis would require elaboration of the mutual relationships between two countries as a function of reinforcement, punishment, and extinction procedures effected by one on another. We have pointed out that when one country effects response-reinforcement contingencies on another, there is enhancement of mutual reinforcements. But punishment and extinction are potentially dangerous with regard to counter-effects. For instance, should one country attempt to punish another, the second would have a tendency to counter-aggress -- we know that aggression often evokes counter-aggression. In this case, the unwise use of punishment may result in dramatic escalation of hostilities. The same problems can also occur if one country unwisely uses extinction techniques. For instance, if one country is reinforcing another, and then suddenly withholds reinforcement without in some way signalling the reason, the net effect may be to evoke hostile reactions. The whole problem of the effects of signalling the presentation of reinforcers, punishments, or withholding same is another area for more detailed analysis.

Emphasis should be placed on the fact that successful application of the above laws requires exceptional astuteness and ingenuity. If they are misapplied, drastic consequences can result. For example, it is possible to actually increase the strength of a response by punishing it under certain conditions. Less dramatically, it should be pointed out that behavior can be further strengthened by administering reinforcers less than 100% of the time; and that many responses are of such a nature that they simply cannot be extinguished by withholding reinforcement.

We have explored one possible approach to international relations, but regardless of the merit of this particular approach, one conclusion seems inescapable: that the foreign policies of the nations of the world should be

16

based on empirically sound and systematic principles of behavior, rather than
on the anecdotal rules of thumb that have guided policy makers for centuries.
Clearly, such an objective is difficult to achieve, but the pitifully small
research budget of our State Department indicates that our present efforts to
achieve this objective are minimal. Even though it is commonplace, it is
vitally important to continue emphasizing the nature of the race that civili-
zation is facing: Can a rational system of international controls be effected
before an irrational or accidental act returns us, optimistically, to the Stone
Age?

January 23, 1964

Mr. Porter McKeever
Director of Information
Committee for Economic Development
711 Fifth Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Porter:

I am delighted, tof course, that
Joe Slater has been elected to member-
ship in the Century.

I will try very hard to come to
the dinner on February 6th. However,
I might have to cancel at the last
minute.

With warm regards.

Henry V. Kieزلuger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

minute.
I might have to cancel at the last
the dinner on February 6th. However,
I will try very hard to come to
ship in the Century.

Joe Slater has been elected to member-
I am delighted to come, that

Dear Porter:

New York 33, New York
111 Fifth Avenue
Committee for Economic Development
Director of Information
Mr. Porter McKeever

January 33, 1964

COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 711 Fifth Avenue, New York 22, New York • MURRAY HILL 8-2063

PORTER MCKEEVER, Director of Information

February 11, 1963

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
104 Fletcher Road
Belmont, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Stimulated by a recent bulletin from the Century which still had Joe Slater listed among those proposed for non-resident membership, even though he has been back in New York for a year, I concluded something should be done to activate the Membership Committee's consideration of Joe.

I am sure you agree with me that he would make a wonderful member of the company of Centurions. Therefore, I am taking the liberty of asking if you would write a letter to the Century Membership Committee setting forth your views on his qualifications for membership.

My impression is that letters dealing with Joe's deep interest in the arts and the humanities and the joy of his company may be more persuasive than comments relating to his philanthropic duties. However, let me say thanks in advance for whatever you may be able to do to advance this pleasant conspiracy.

PMcK:be

February 26, 1962

Mr. Thomas McLeod
Harvard Advisory Group
P.O. Box 2645
Teheran, Iran

Dear Mr. McLeod:

Just after I returned from Asia & few
weeks ago, I found that I had to turn around
and go to Europe. This is, therefore, the first
opportunity I have had to tell you how much I
appreciated your courtesies during my short
visit to Iran.

I was very interested by what I saw of
your work, and of the Planning Commission. I
was only sorry that I did not have more time.

We found Iran one of the most fascinating
places we visited, and I hope to come back to it
before too long.

With kind regards and many thanks.

Huntington Park, California
6051 Fishburn Avenue

January 30, 1959

Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

I trust that you received my two-page letter
of the 14th instant. I enclose two more pages - copies of what I
started to write to Galbraith and Schlesinger, Jr. I did not finish
the letter because the postman brought me a reply from my publisher
regarding my Ms. titled ALL THE ANSWERS.

I quote from the (Vantage Press) Editorial Report:

"This is a clear,
excellently organized and written analysis of the truth concerning
man and his relation to the universe, based upon scientific and religious
truths, presented from a metaphysical point of view. The author
systematically relates his material to our present, inadequate concepts
of the world about us and man's place in it, and his conclusions are
both provocative and worthy of serious thought. This is a searching,
positive work, one that will both enlighten and fascinate the
intelligent reader. Highly recommended for publication."

As an Astrologer and Determinist I was not surprised at the good
report - I take it as a matter of fact or course in the predetermined
affairs of mankind upon this planet. And I know full well that my Ms.
is but the mechanical product of the mechanico-intelligent Forces.
Also, I know what the future holds for this nation and the world,
and I know my own destiny - simply because of Astrology and because
of my Intuition, and because of logic and reason and the conclusions
formed from the consideration of facts and knowledge and the present
state of affairs as we see them in the world today.

Presently, I am but a bum, Henry, and I have been a bum or just a
poor common man all my life, excepting, perhaps, the five years (1945-
1950) when I held a key position in a branch of a large corporation.

But for 29 years I have been gathering, studying and synthesizing
all knowledge and facts concerning man, life and the universe - and
the whole truth about everything lies in the public libraries (where I
found it in 1930) in the works of Max Heindel, a trained clairvoyant,
who was able to perceive the inner structures and workings of all things,
including man, and he was able to function in the inner worlds at will.

In 1930 I took a free correspondence course in Astrology from the
Rosicrucian Fellowship, Oceanside California, founded by Heindel in
1911 - one of the seven Schools of the Lesser Mysteries in the world.

As to Determinism, the fact that all physical action, on the part of
animate and insanimate objects, is mechanical, predetermined and related,
it was ascertained by Alexis Carrel, the late eminent scientist, over
a period of many years in which he investigated the phenomenon of

clairvoyance in humans. In his book, *Man, the Unknown, he says:*
"Clairvoyants perceive not only things spatially remote, but also past
and future events". And while the book was an international bestseller,
in 1936, he publicly declared, "We know positively that clairvoyants
have the ability to accurately predict the future".

From that, and from the writings of Max Heindel, the only conclusion
to be formed is that Determinism is a fact. But, of course, the fact
is unacceptable unless one considers the fact of Rebirth and the
knowledge pertaining to the freedom the individual has to choose, by
Will and Desire, what he shall think about. The individual has the
freedom to form abstract thoughts or ideas - in accordance with the whole
truth concerning man, life and the universe - and they become concrete
and are ensouled with good desire matter and mechanically deposited in
the subconscious memory structure - there to remain as a potent force
upon the being and to influence future thoughts and feelings.

The Will is free to Imagine new Ideas, and they become a part of the
individual. We may freely think, imagine or feel as we may choose,
except when necessary mind action is required to perform a mechanical act
physically. But I explain the whole thing, in scientific detail, in the
Ms. I sent to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Today I had word from his secretary that he is in London, so I suggested,
by letter, that she (Julie Jeppson) hand the Ms. to Arthur, Senior or
Professor Paul Tillich. I have written Paul Tillich regarding the matter.

I have the project in mind of getting the Intellectuals of Cambridge
interested in the whole truth about everything, in forming conclusions
from all available facts and knowledge, so that we may furnish some
leadership and direction towards the things that are bound to happen
in the imminent Reconstruction Period.

May I suggest that you contact Arthur Schlesinger, Senior,
regarding the manuscript?

[LC]

January 29, 1959

John K. Galbraith
Art M. Schlesinger, Jr.
et alii
Cambridge, Mass.

Gentlemen:

It is a bright day here in L.A. It is not only that the sun is shining through the smog, but 1000 food markets are opening after being closed for a month because 1400 clerks wanted a raise in pay. They got it - 60 to 68¢ an hour over a five year period. And they even got psychiatric care written into the health and welfare program - everyone needs a psychiatrist nowadays, you know.

But there is a cloud on the horizon, and it can even be seen through the smog - the Metropolitan Transit Authority employees, the guys who push the busses and streetcars around, want to strike, again, but there is a court order against it - they just cannot inconvenience the public thataway - like they did last year for 58 days. It's unconstitutional, and it is irrelevant that they need more money to pay for what they have bought on credit, and they do not deserve more money because they are incompetent - they cannot operate the vehicle and make change and hand out transfers at the same time, while answering silly questions.

It seems that the country is going to hell, fast. Happiness and prosperity is dependent upon Capitalism, and the Old Guard and all of the Republicans are having a frightful time trying to heighten their public appeal, while clinging to all of the standards which have given the country such prosperity and happiness in the past. They would have us go on pursuing, as Adlai put it, a "fat, dumb, happy, complacent way" and Adlai calls this "a chaotic, selfish, indifferent commercial society" struggling against the "iron discipline of the Communist world."

And Brother Khrushchev and Chou En-lai say that the Russkys and Chinks are going to defeat capitalism in the field of peaceful competition; and I don't think that it would take much to outcompete the competitive "free enterprise" system - because our businessmen are fast losing their incentive - because of high taxes and ever-increasing wages; they are awfully discouraged, like my wife's boss. He has been in business for 15 years and he just mopes around at the office and lets my poor wife (she is a bright C.P.A.) do all the work, because he is disinterested, and gloomy. There is a gloomy outlook for business - them Democrats think that all that is needed is for the government to spend more, and increase the nat'l. debt - which now requires 10¢ out of every tax dollar (or out of your pocketbook) for the interest on it.

Then there are the poor farmers - living in luxury off of the subsidy money, another big bite out of the people's money, so big that it is next to the Defense and nat'l. debt interest bites. And, while paying the farmers not to raise things, they go ahead and produce the biggest bumper crop of wheat - and we can't do anything with it, besides paying millions of dollars for its storage. In 1955 Ike wanted to give our surplus wheat to Russia. I think that would be a great idea - just to let them know that we are real friendly like - sort of Altruistic.

page two

[LC]

If we would be altruistic to Russia - give them all the goods and help we can spare, it would show them that we are not afraid that they will outcompete us, and it would perplex them - they would not know what to do with the great organization they have to eventually cause the downfall of Capitalism, and they would not know what to do with all of those ICBM's and subs and things, because, if we become altruistic and Cooperate with them it would seem like that we, also, are Communists - and how can Communism fight Communism.

But that brings up the question: How can we be Communistic, in a real nice way? How can we be cooperative amongst ourselves and cooperate with all of our brothers in this little old scheme of evolution? We've got a system of Competition, which has made us the glorious nation we now are(?), and Cooperation is directly opposite to Competition - and Altruism is opposite to selfishness, or private profit. Besides, we don't have any money to throw away - we can't even get enough for ourselves, individually, nationally or State-wise - all the States are scrounging around for ways and means of raising more money, by more taxes, of course, to stay out of the red and increase the educational and hospital facilities, et cetera.

Now, there is a solution to it all - just go along with the Democratic spenders and ignore that frightful nat'l. debt and let it increase and also quit paying the damned interest on it. And if we be real nice to Khrushchev we can take about half of the forty billion for Defense and use it for Health, Education and Welfare. Of course, that would not provide for many jobs, and there would be no monetary profit or revenue for the Government; and if we curtail defense work several more million people will be out of work - but we could start the good old WPA again - using money promiscuously while saying to hell with the nat'l. debt. Then everyone would be happy - plenty of money and material things - happiness and prosperity, again, under the good old Money System.

We have great natural resources, technical ability and plenty of manpower - all we have to do is get flexible with the money.

Of course, there is an alternative, summed up in word - Technocracy. But it, the very word itself, is so repugnant to the Old Guard and the Madison avenue boys - and all of the Plutocracy element, they who have been in their hey-day, running the country - in their "fat, dumb, happy, complacent way"

But there is another matter which should be of national interest - the investing in people - by educating them to the whole truth concerning man, life and the universe and the scheme of evolution - the Scheme which decrees that we have to be in this cockeyed world along with Khrushchev, Chou En-lai, Mao, Nasser, Tito and Fidel Castro. The latter is a guy who has, temporarily, put a crimp in the sugar business in Cuba, and there is no telling what he will do next. He might do something inimical to Capitalistic Profit and Capitalistic Theory, the theories Batista had - and he was doing so well - for the Capitalists who were profiting from the sugar business. Castro should have let well-enough alone - he should not have worried about the Cuban people so much. After all, the great United States did not worry about them - the powers-that-be in the States do not even worry about their own people - let them suffer, in ignorance, while being economic slaves - Money and Capitalism must prevail, for prosperity and happiness - the good old "American way of life" under the competitive "free enterprise" system - where the few are free to flee the many, and take from their rights. However, we have a great new Civil Rights program coming up - they are going to clamp down on labor bosses - so that the people can be free to be slaves without interference from Unions.