EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

February 22, 1975

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is the interview I mentioned to you
(last time you visited Damascus) on the way to
the airport.

The magazine is the newest in Arabia. It
is called _IQRA_, which means "Read!" _IQRA_ is the
first "divine" order that Gabriel conveyed to
Prophet Muhammad.

The magazine is dated February 6, 1975.
This particular one is the ninth issue.

I hope you enjoy the enclosed excerpts from
the unscripted interview.

Enclosures: Excerpts from Article; _IQRA_ Magazine

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

EXCERPTS FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH
ISA K. SABBAGH

IQRA MAGAZINE, FEBRUARY 6, 1975

Published in Jidda, Saudi Arabia

1. Introduction:

The one person around Kissinger who shared his wit and optimism was Isa Khalil Sabbagh who shared with the American Secretary of State the hope in realizing what many unanimously thought was unattainable.

In the following interview-dialogue we shall know
more about Dr. Kissinger as a political beacon, an
intellectual, and a man of situations.

2. Q: How were you chosen to play the role of interpreting for Dr. Kissinger on his Middle East trips?

A: This question should be addressed to Dr. Kissinger and/or his assistants. My own feeling is that obviously those who picked on me wanted someone who is familiar with both cultures, Arab and Western, so as to put things in their proper perspective and context in either language--Arabic or English.

3. Q: Since you have interpreted for several Arab leaders and Kissinger, would you say that we are close to a solution to this question? How soon can we see a solution?

A: I am always an optimist believing in the Arabic saying "How narrow would life be save for the space of hope!" (which is similar to the English saying "While there is life there is hope.")

As to how soon we can see a solution, this is a
difficult question, answerable only by God, I guess.
My own impression is that efforts for bringing about
peace will continue as long as both sides desire them.

2

4. Q: Obviously, Dr. Kissinger has quite a team of assistants and aides through whom he works and who must be trained and qualified. Who are they, and what are their qualifications?

A: It is a long list of experts, generalists and specialists, whom I cannot enumerate without doing someone an injustice by omitting him. They are generally persons who have served in M.E. countries; also persons who are distinguished counselors, advisors, sociologists, professors of political science, etc. (Special mention was made of Mr. Joseph Sisco, and Mr. Atherton "chosen, I think, for their cool".)

Then don't forget the role played by the American Ambassadors in the area in keeping the Secretary of State informed of the realities of a given situation. The assumption, of course, is that the Ambassadors discharge their trust faithfully.

5. Q: If we probe the story of disengagement on the Golan front, may we know how it started, and how it ended?

A: This is a piece of narrative that had better be left to history to unfold in detail. My modest role in that episode amounted to my being pleasantly stuck in that beautiful city, Damascus, while Dr. Kissinger-- God grant him strength--kept shuttling back and forth for over a month. So observations are bound to be modest and limited. Like with every negotiation both sides, I had the feeling, started from a maximum set of demands. Later on it became clear that Dr. Kissinger had genuinely good intentions and honorable objectives. These obvious signs caused both sides to relax somewhat, trust the man and listen to his appeal that each side be satisfied with less than the unattainable 100%.

The Syrian side, as far as I saw, was quite intelligent, a very clever negotiator. The Syrian President Asad and Foreign Minister Khaddam proved

[LC]

3

very straightforward in their reactions. No twisting and turning, and of extremely high moral character which impressed Dr. Kissinger greatly.

Let us not forget that the path to a disengagement on the Syrian front was somewhat smoothed by the disengagement on the Egyptian front which preceded it.

6. Q: What are those salient qualities in Kissinger's personality which made him acceptable to both antagonistic sides?

A: In essence the man is very intelligent, obviously an avid reader, who does not approach a subject without thoroughly digesting the major elements therein.

He has the grace to admit, albeit sparingly, to certain gaps or points of weakness in previous attitudes or thoughts.

For instance, he would say "If I had not seen this or that with my own eyes I wouldn't have believed it".

It is no secret that after the first or second visit to Syria he is supposed to have said "If someone had come to me six months or so ago to say 'Henry, in six months you are going to visit Damascus, Syria', I would have recommended that such a person be put in a nut house!".

We must remember that Dr. Kissinger said this so frankly, at a time when the U.S. and S.A.R. had not resumed diplomatic relations, which made such a remark doubly significant and appreciated.

In my opinion the man is sensitive to, and tenacious about not giving up elements helpful to a solution. Should he, in the course of a meeting, discern that he is approaching a steep obstacle he would not butt it frontally but would go around it, changing the subject somewhat, instilling an anecdote here, and a joke there, until the atmosphere is "ventilated". In this process, I think,

4

lies part of Dr. Kissinger's genius of putting people at ease. It is a very useful tactic, based on a sound concept akin to that enunciated by the Caliph Muawiya (who ruled in Damascus more than a thousand years ago) when he said "Should there remain but one hair between me and the people I am dealing with I would not suffer it to be cut, but would pull and slacken as circumstances warrant".

It is interesting and amusing to relate that when I told this story to the Secretary and informed him that the Arabs refer to this principle as that of Muawiya's hair, Dr. Kissinger, with a smile, said "I can see that we are going to need not only Muawiya's hair, but his full beard in these negotiations!! Anyway, it is a very apt and wise story from Arab history."

7. Q: Would you give us your impressions of the first meeting you attended between President Asad of Syria and Dr. Kissinger?

A: It was, as we say in English, "correct": no chumminess or familiarity. Arab tradition and norms of behavior made it natural for the Syrian President and his aides to be hospitable and considerate. Here was a guest in their country which he was visiting certainly not as an enemy but rather as a person who is determined to contribute greatly to the solution of a thorny problem. It was with this noble background in mind that Dr. Kissinger was received in Arab lands. In Saudi Arabia he was received with obvious good manners and appreciation; the same in Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. As to the latter, I'm only guessing mind you, I have a feeling that the inimitable Egyptian sense of humor was more noticeable than elsewhere!

8. Q: What about his meetings with His Majesty King Faisal?

A: One could sense the respect and spirit of appreciation of the King's personality. As you know,

[LC]

5

a smile from King Faisal is enough usually to put the guest at ease.

Other questions and answers dealt *inter alia* with Dr. Kissinger's "ventilation humor", his obvious preference for "face-to-face" discussions: he seems to want to see for himself, feel for himself, then form a judgment. This is essential, especially with people who are not loquacious like His Majesty King Faisal whose one or two sentences mean volumes, but need elaborating. King Faisal believes, it seems, in the saying "A sign to the wise is sufficient!"

9. Q: Do you anticipate success in Dr. Kissinger's next visit?

A: Even my limited knowledge of this man would lead me to believe that if he did not think success was possible he would not be making the trip. He has often been quoted as saying "I am not known for starting something which is doomed to failure!"

10. Q: Every now and then we hear that Dr. Kissinger wants to quit the Department of State. Do you believe that his departure from the helm would lead to further complications in the area?

A: Logic alone would say that Dr. Kissinger's departure would certainly affect the approach and tempo of seeking a peaceful solution. In my opinion, the Secretary of State is doing everything possible to bring about a just, permanent solution. He wants this solution to happen in his time, resulting from his unique personal and official background making him genuinely acceptable to both sides. Dr. Kissinger is determined to enter history through a wide portal, hoisting the flag of peace.

11. Q: What are the true dimensions of the recent American pronouncements about occupying the oil fields in the Middle East?

[Lc]

6

A: Dr. Kissinger himself explained that he was replying to a hypothetical question. In my opinion what made a mountain out of this mole-hill was the speed with which certain publications started writing, analyzing, commenting on this one hypothetical point: I could say almost before the Secretary had finished giving the answer!

Let me be frank and ask you a question. If the situation were reversed and the Arabs felt threatened with strangulation what would they do, or feel like doing, or say they would do? Would they compose a panegyric in praise of the would-be strangulators? Is it believeable that the Arabs, the noble, passionate people one of whose poets once said "Let no one rashly commit an injury against us, for then we would become infinitely more rash and injurious!", would just sit back and say or do nothing if threatened?

It seems to me that a lot of people (writers, commentators, etc.) confused "ability" with "intent". To say that the U.S. is able to occupy this territory or that is from the literal, physical point of view almost axiomatic. But to say that because the U.S. has the power and the ability, it goes without saying that it, therefore, has the intention to occupy other countries is absolutely fallacious.

My deep feeling is that the U.S. has no intention to commit such an act, nor would any developments reach a point necessitating such a grave step which the USG understands fully.

It is unfortunate that some people tend to take things out of context. This is like half-quoting the famous phrase in the Quran "Approach ye not prayers while drunk!", i.e., like stopping after the word "prayers".

Two other questions were answered succinctly:

7

Q: We notice a recent adjustment in the direction of the U.S. foreign policy--more consonant with the Americans' interests as they see them. Do you share this observation?

A: Yes, and the key phrase seems to me to be "the Americans' interests as they see them". The Americans are a fair people who would render a just verdict once they know all the facts of a situation.

Q: Can we expect, in light of your service, etc. (a string of compliments by the interviewer--Ed.) to see you as American Ambassador, and when?

A: (Essentially) I pride myself on being a bridge between two cultures. It's kind of you to think this of me, but, in any case, this particular question should be addressed to the good "doctor" himself!

Jidda, Saudi Arabia

March 25, 1975

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have recovered from the slap of gloom which I felt, like millions around the world, upon learning of the "suspension" of your efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

It was precisely that unamused look on Joe Sisco's face (he and I took a brief stroll in front of King David Hotel prior to your departure) which impelled me to avoid witnessing your look of disappointment when you went to your car to go to the airport.

As a person who has certainly learned a lot by being associated, albeit ever so marginally, with your concentrated dedication to peace, I must admit to a swelling admiration I feel for, among so many of your other qualities which I wouldn't bore you with (!), your sense of timing. The situation demanded that you show everybody that you were less than jubilant with the endless swinging on the aerial trapeze between Arabia and Judea, only to be taken for granted. If the world is now shocked, then this is exactly the normal reaction to the masterful shock treatment you have administered to the feeble consciousness of participants and onlookers alike.

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

October 15, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

Once again, I very much appreciated the opportunity to visit Cairo and to consult with you. I especially want to thank you for your gracious hospitality and for your kindness in inviting me to stay at Tahra Palace.

Our talks were extremely useful, and I believe they will lead to further progress in our efforts towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We are entering a new and vital phase in our relations, as well as a decisive stage in the negotiating process. I want you to know again how I admire your wisdom and courage.

His Excellency
Anwar al Sadat,
President,
Arab Republic of Egypt,
Cairo.

S:kk

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for once again receiving me
in Cairo to review recent developments in
the Middle East. As always, I have bene-
fitted from your insight and statesmanship.
Peace, we all know, can only be attained
through the cooperative efforts of all parties.
The United States is pledged to do all in its
power to bring about a just and a durable
peace.

It was good to visit Egypt again. The
warm hospitality extended to Nancy and me
is deeply appreciated by both of us.

His Excellency
Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat,
President, Arab Republic
of Egypt,
Cairo.

March 25, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

It was with a heavy heart that I concluded on March 22 the best course for both our countries was for me to return to Washington to report to President Ford on the irreconcilable differences which have persisted throughout our latest round of negotiations.

I have said repeatedly, both to you and to Foreign Minister Fahmy, how much I admire the wise and courageous statesmanship with which you have conducted these extraordinarily difficult negotiations. I want to assure you once again how determined I am to do my utmost, in concert with the leaders of the area, to reach a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I pledge myself to this end.

Nancy and I want to thank you most sincerely for the warm hospitality you afforded us in Aswan. We are deeply grateful.

Warm regards,

His Excellency
Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat,
President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt,
Cairo.

THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
THE PRESIDENT

Cairo, July 10, 1976

Dear Dr. Henry Kissinger:

We have received with gratitude your tender message of congratulations on the occasion of the birth of our grandson, Sharif.

It pleases me and Mrs. Sadat to thank you and Madame for your very Considerate gesture and kind sentiments.

Appreciating your cordial and brotherly feelings, we wish you and your family a joyful and prosperous life.

With every respectful and personal best wishes, I am

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1312 Walnut Street,
Artiata\USA, Inc.
Ma. M. L. Sadel,

Personal Assistant
Susanne S. McFarlane

Sincerely,

Kindness in bringing it to his attention.
will enjoy looking at it, and he thanks you for your
to be congratulated for publishing it. The Secretary
did commemoration of the Centennial, and you are
beautiful book, Artiata\USA. It certainly is a splen-
how very much he appreciates your sending him the
The Secretary has asked me to let you know

Dear Ma. Sadel:

Apr 11 8, 1976

December 30, 1973

Dear Mr. Saffran:

Thank you for your thoughtful message, on behalf of your colleagues and students, on my nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.

It is a great honor, but I believe that the most important goal any administration can set itself is to work for a world in which the award will become irrelevant, because peace will have become so normal and so much taken for granted that no awards for it will have to be given.

I appreciate your kind words, and I regret that events have delayed this reply.

Mr. Samuel S. Saffran,
155 B 19th Street,
Far Rockaway, New York.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

1737 CAMBRIDGE STREET
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

CABLE ADDRESS: MIDEAST CAMBRIDGE

January 10, 1974

Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger
The State Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry;

The office of Governor Rockefeller referred to
me for advice upon your recommendation, for which I
thank you.

I was, however, puzzled to hear from them that
you told them I was an Israeli citizen. I have only
lived in Israel for four years (1946-1950) and have
been living in the United States, as resident and then
as a citizen since 1950!

Please keep that in mind for future reference.

As you may have noticed from my Foreign Affairs
piece (January 1974), I am thoroughly sympathetic to
your handling of the Middle East problem so far. My
only apprehension is about whether we have made it
sufficiently clear to the Soviets that we will not
allow them to eat their cake and have it too.

With my best wishes.

NS/bmbh

PROPOSAL FOR A MIDDLE EAST POLICY STUDIES PROJECT
AT HARVARD'S CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

# I. Purpose and Justification

1. The purpose of the project is to generate over the next three years a stream of policy-oriented studies of important aspects of the Middle East problem in all its ramifications, for practical and educational ends.

2. The importance of the subject matter hardly needs to be stressed. The Middle East has become the number one world problem today, bearing critically on the peace and welfare of the entire international community as well as on the fate of the peoples of the area.

The need for a project such as the one proposed here, however, may require further justification.

3. A glance at the relevant bibliographical sources may show that there is already a vast and rapidly growing body of literature on the Middle East question. However, a closer look at the material mentioned in the sources would soon reveal that much of the literature is either partisan, or outdated, or of poor quality, or too bulky, or relatively inaccessible to the public and the policy maker, or not policy-oriented. Moreover, that fraction of the material that is free of these defects tends to concentrate on aspects of the problem that have forced themselves on the attention of the public, often for fortuitous reasons.

p.2

[LC]

Important, sometimes crucial, subjects have received
insufficient or no treatment at all because their relevance
has not been discerned (See starred items in Appendix I
for illustrations).

4. Wanted is a means to keep the problem under constant,
systematic attention, and to promote study of all its
aspects from an overview that is itself constantly re-
examined during the next few years, which are bound to
be crucial for the problem. This is what the project
hopes to do.

## II. Project Design

5. The project aims to accomplish certain "functions."
A mechanism for doing so is also proposed, but that is
open to modification in the light of experience. The
functions are:

a) Identifying the various dimensions and ramifications of the Middle East problem, breaking them up into a list of discrete, manageable topics, keeping the overall conception and the parts under constant review, and replenishing the "topics bank" as necessary (Appendix I provides a preliminary illustration);

b) Assigning relative priority to topics on the basis of urgency of need and available knowledge, and keeping the order under constant review;

p.3

c) Commissioning topics to the most competent individuals in the United States or abroad, with instructions designed to elicit concise, high quality, policy-oriented draft-papers (more or less the size of the Adelphi Papers of the IISS);

d) Arranging for thorough critique of the draft-papers by competent individuals or study groups;

e) Seeing to publication of the final drafts in pamphlet form, with introductions as appropriate to relate particular studies to others and/or to relevant context;

f) Deciding, where appropriate, to commission more than one study on a particular subject, or to help make known and re-circulate already existing material.

### III. Organization and Administration

6. The project would be located at Harvard's Center for International Affairs. That center affiliates regularly a large number of scholars and Visiting Fellows of diverse disciplines and experiences. It maintains close relations with other relevant centers at Harvard, such as the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, the Russian Research Center, the Center for European Studies, the East Asian Research Center, and the Program for Science and International Affairs.

p.4

It is located in proximity to other major universities with institutions and personnel devoted to various aspects of international affairs. Thus, from its location at the Center for International Affairs, the project would have easy access to uniquely rich research facilities, and would be able to draw upon a vast pool of diverse talent for purposes of writing studies, providing critique, participating in study groups, tendering advice to the Steering Committee, etc.

7. The project would be administered by a Director and a Steering Committee composed of the Initiators plus additional individuals selected by them. The Steering Committee would organize conferences and arrange discussions and consultations to help it set down the dimensions of the problem, establish a "topics" bank, and keep both under review; it would decide on priorities and assignments of commissions; it would arrange for appropriate critiques of draft studies through individuals or study groups; it would decide on final publication; it would supervise the overall administration and finances of the project.

## IV. Budget

See Proposed Budget in Appendix II

p.5

V. The Initiators/Steering Committee

1. Raymond Vernon, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of Business Management; Director, Center for International Affairs, Harvard (ex officio).

2. Kenneth J. Arrow, James Bryant Conant University Professor, Harvard (Nobel Laureate).

3. Samuel P. Huntington, Frank C. Thompson Professor of Government, Harvard.

4. Edward Gullian, Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts.

5. Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor, Emeritus; Consultant, Development Advisory Service, Harvard.

6. Thomas C. Schelling, Lucius W. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Harvard.

7.

8.

9.

10. Nadav Safran, Professor of Government; Research Associate, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard; Project Director.

APPENDIX I

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# Suggestive List of Topics for Policy-Oriented Research on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The topics below are listed approximately under four more or less inter-related categories:

I) Background topics

II) Topics relating to the promotion of peace settlements

III) Topics relating to the situation in case of no peace

IV) Topics exploring the situation after a settlement in terms of factors that may undermine and factors that may buttress the peace.

## I) BACKGROUND STUDIES
(With a View to Possibilities of Change)

1. Arab and Israeli mutual perceptions and their evolution.

2. Inter-Arab politics and their impact in favor of peace or war.

3. The individual positions of the various parties to the conflict and their evolution.

*4. The origins and significance of the Cairo-Riyadh axis.

5. Internal Israeli politics and their relevance to Israeli foreign policy.

*6. The various burdens (and possible rewards) of conflict for Arabs and Israelis and their influence on policy.

7. The influence of superpower cooperation and competition on peace or war.

8. Internal constraints on American Middle policy.

*9. Internal constraints on Soviet Middle East policy.

*10. The *pattern* of American-Israeli relations.

Appendix - p.2

*11. The pattern of Soviet-Arab relations.

*12. The pattern of European-Middle Eastern relations.

13. The special position and role of the Palestinian guerilla organizations.

## II) PROBLEMS FOR PEACE AND SOLUTIONS TO EXPLORE

### 14. SINAI

A) Problems: Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli security; Israeli security and Egyptian security; waterways and navigation; link to other problems.

B) Solutions to explore: Demilitarization; protracted staged withdrawals; external guarantees; interjection of third party forces; conditional linked agreement; other solutions?

### 15. THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

*A) Problems: Finding a suitable Palestinian interlocutor; mutual exclusiveness of Israeli and PLO aims; viability of a Palestinian state; security problems for Israel; the threat of irrendentism to Israel and Jordan.

B) Solutions to explore: Mutual recognition by PLO and Israel; limitation of forces of Palestinian state and outside guarantees of its security; Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederation; economic union; open borders; etc.

Appendix - p.3

[LC]

16. THE GOLAN

A) Problems: Syrian sovereignty and Israeli security; presence of Israeli settlements.

B) Solutions to explore: Trading off Israeli settlements and pre-1967 land for Golan edge; limited Israeli presence; protracted staged withdrawal; demilitarization; external guarantees; interjection of third-party forces; etc.

17. JERUSALEM

A) Problems: Exceptional emotional significance; Israeli urban development; security; external interests.

B) Solutions to explore: Vatican-type solution; borough autonomy; federal system; etc?

*18. The role and nature of outside guarantees; feasibility; contribution, and implications of an American-Israeli security pact; feasibility, contribution and implications of a treaty system involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union in diverse pacts with both sides.

19. Strategies and tactics of peacemaking: The conditions for an effective "step by step" approach; for a comprehensive settlement approach; preparatory coordination with the parties; managing of priorities; the handling of the Palestinian question; the Soviet role in peacemaking and peacekeeping; etc.

Appendix - p.4

### III) IF THERE IS NO PEACE . . .

*20. The arms race, its burdens, its likely effect on the policies of the belligerents.

*21. Problems of maintaining a military balance between Israel and a variable Arab coalition.

*22. Changing military technology and defense establishments and likely types of war.

*23. The supply of arms and technology and its political implications.

*24. The development of indigenous military industries; extent, prospects, implications.

*25. Nuclear weapons: their availability and possible access to them; short and long term consequences of their availability to one party; to more than one party; possibilities and dangers of a "balance of terror" in the area.

26. Likely patterns of intra-regional alliances and alignments.

27. Likely patterns of regional-external alliances and alignments.

*28. Likely patterns of the "next war;" political and military objectives of the parties; basic strategies.

29. The role of the superpowers in a future armed conflict; the possibilities of superpower confrontation.

*30. The "oil weapon;" the conditions for its use; scope and limits of its likely consequences.

*31. The consequences of a new major war, for the parties, for outside powers, for the prospects of future peace or additional wars.

Appendix - p.5

IV) ... AFTER PEACE

*32. Automatic benefits and costs of peace for the parties, and the possibilities of enhancing the former and mitigating the latter.

*33. The threat to peace of a continuing arms race; possibilities of arms limitation and control. The problem of indigenous military industries.

**34. The threat to peace of nuclear proliferation; possibilities of control.

*35. Internal upheavals and change and their likely impact on peace.

*36. The possibilities of a customs union between Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and perhaps Lebanon.

*37. Possible role of the EEC in promoting regional economic cooperation.

38. The possibility of regional cooperation in tourism, transport and communications.

39. The possibility of regional power-desalination projects.

*40. The possibility of regional centers for advanced study and research in science and technology.

[L]

Middle East Policy Studies

Proposed Budget
1 July 1976 - 30 June 1979

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1976/77</th><th>1977/78</th><th>1978/79</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Staff Salaries</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Director (2 mos. summer salary with benefits)</td><td>$ 7,200</td><td>$ 7,770</td><td>$ 8,385</td><td>$ 23,355</td></tr><tr><td>Administrative assistant/ secretary (full-time with benefits)</td><td>11,730</td><td>12,670</td><td>13,670</td><td>38,070</td></tr><tr><td>Secretary (full-time with benefits)</td><td>8,700</td><td>9,310</td><td>10,050</td><td>28,060</td></tr><tr><td>Editor (half-time with benefits)</td><td>11,500</td><td>12,415</td><td>13,400</td><td>37,315</td></tr><tr><td>Publications</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>12 studies at $2000 ea.</td><td>24,000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>18 studies at $2,200 ea.</td><td></td><td>39,600</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>18 studies at $2,420 ea.</td><td></td><td></td><td>43,560</td><td>107,610</td></tr><tr><td>Honoraria</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>12 studies at $2,500 ea.</td><td>30,000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>12 critiques at $750 ea.</td><td>9,000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>18 studies at $2,500 ea.</td><td></td><td>45,000</td><td>45,000</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>18 critiques at $750 ea.</td><td></td><td>13,500</td><td>13,500</td><td>156,000</td></tr><tr><td>Workshops and study groups</td><td>12,000</td><td>18,000</td><td>18,000</td><td>48,000</td></tr><tr><td>Seminars and conferences</td><td>10,500</td><td>11,500</td><td>13,500</td><td>35,500</td></tr><tr><td>Travel and field work (authors, critics, staff)</td><td>10,000</td><td>11,000</td><td>12,000</td><td>33,000</td></tr><tr><td>Library materials (books, journals, and subscriptions)</td><td>3,000</td><td>3,350</td><td>3,700</td><td>10,050</td></tr><tr><td>Direct support costs (supplies, postage, reproduction, telephone, etc.)</td><td>14,500</td><td>16,000</td><td>17,500</td><td>48,000</td></tr><tr><td>University administration charge (est. 8%)</td><td>12,170</td><td>16,009</td><td>16,981</td><td>45,160</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>$164,300</td><td>$216,124</td><td>$229,246</td><td>$609,670</td></tr></tbody></table>

Ex-Hamburger wird Präsident eines
amerikanischen Lebensmittelkonzerns

Herbert St. Goar, 1938 aus Hamburg nach den Vereinigten Staten ausgewandert und seit damals für den "Dixie Saving Stores"-Konzern in Chattanooga (Tennessee) tätig, ist vom Aufsichtsrat dieses bedeutenden südstaatlichen Grossunternehmens zum Präsidenten und Generaldirektor gewählt worden. St. Goar entstammt einer bekannten jüdischen Hamburger Patrizierfamilie; seine Grossmutter Julia Eichholz war die Begründerin und Erste Vorsitzende des

Verbandes Deutscher Frauen; sein Onkel Dr. Max Eichholz ein langjähriges Mitglied der "Hamburger Bürgerschaft"; und sein Vater Otto St. Goar der Inhaber des angesehenen Import- und Exporthauses Kahn & Co.

Gute merkantilische Schulung befähigte Herbert St. Goar, sich nach dreijähriger Tätigkeit zum Assistenten des Generaldirektors der Dixie Saving Stores aufzuschwingen. Nach Erhalt der amerikanischen Staatsbürger-schaft meldete er sich als Freiwilliger zum Militärdienst und war zweieinhalb Kriegsjahre lang ein Angehöriger der Streitkräfte seines neuen Vaterlandes.

Zusammen mit dem kürzlich verstorbenen Firmenpräsidenten George Berke war St. Goar für den Aufstieg des heute mit 285

Der Aufbau

July 1969

Lebensmittel-Detailläden lierten Konzerns verantwortlich, dessen Jahresumsatz sich auf 24 Millionen Dollar beziffert und der unter seiner Leitung prädestiniert erscheint, in Chattanooga und in den Randgebieten dieser aufstrebenden Stadt die Rolle eines mustergültig organisierten Grossunternehmens beizubehalten und durch Eroberung neuer Absatzmärkte weiter auszugestalten.

r. a.

illion

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The U.S. Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station, constructed at the true geographic South Pole, replaces the station built at the Pole by the United States in 1956.

Here, at this scientific outpost, all directions are north. You can pick your own time because all time zones converge at the Pole; you experience only one sunset and one sunrise a year.

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