This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(President's Visit to Yugoslavia)

CONTENT OF THIS
BRIEFING MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO WHITE
HOUSE OFFICIALS.
DIRECT QUOTATION
IS NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

8:43 P.M. LOCAL

OCTOBER 1, 1970

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: Ladies and gentlemen, can we have a little more quiet in the room while Dr. Kissinger is conducting the briefing? We would appreciate it.

What Dr. Kissinger will say will be on the same ground rules, on BACKGROUND. You may attribute his remarks to White House officials. As I say, we want to keep this relatively short, because Dr. Kissinger was kind enough to come here to take a couple of questions, but we want to confine your questions to the visit, which we will complete this evening.

I should add one thing at this point. As an official communique, you should add that at the conclusion of the meeting between President Nixon and President Tito, President Nixon extended an invitation to President Tito to visit the United States at his earliest convenience.

Q Ron, what does the Doctor consider to be the most important and significant ---

DR. KISSINGER: Do you want to tell me that question?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I wouldn't tell you that question.

DR. KISSINGER: I hope you won't think me broadminded if I conduct this briefing in tails.

The most useful and important result? Even though the two sides, of course, represent different social systems, and even though they obviously didn't agree on every detail of the international situation, it was possible, on the major lines of issues before us, to talk frankly and candidly and on a wide range of problems with a general agreement as to objectives and means of getting there; that it was possible to show that countries pursuing an independent policy, nevertheless could cooperate, that it was possible to be a friend of the United States without being an enemy, necessarily, of anyone else; and, therefore, that in the objective that we are setting for ourselves of, on the one hand, preventing threats to the security of others, and, on the other, trying to build a more stable peace, that we could achieve a wide area of understanding on both of these issues, especially the latter.

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Q Without your having to read President Tito's mind, is President Tito, after these conversations, about to be more hopeful about an early negotiated end in the Vietnamese war?

DR. KISSINGER: First, let me say that obviously on the subject of Vietnam the opinions of the two sides are not exactly coincidental, and there are many explanations for that, including the way the Yugoslav leaders are likely to see wars that they consider guerrilla wars. But leaving aside this explanation, Marshal Tito stated his views fully.

We put before the Yugoslav leader our ideas as to how the war might be ended on either of the two tracks that we are pursuing.

I think the fair statement would be that President Tito gained a fuller and, we hope, a better understanding of our point of view, which, in the measures that may have to be taken in the weeks and months ahead, we believe is going to enable him to put our view into a better perspective than before.

I wouldn't want to speculate what his assessments might be about an early negotiated end.

Q Can you tell us what you discussed about the Middle East, the most important points on that? Would you like to summarize that?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, you recognize that I can't give you a full rundown on everything that was discussed. Therefore, let me confine myself to the main lines. I think it is fair to say that both sides share the objective of bringing about a stabler peace in the Middle East. Both sides recognize that if tensions in the Middle East continue, and if they should erupt into war that they contain the possibility of spreading of the war, of not being able to confine it to the Middle East.

Obviously, Yugoslavia, as a Mediterranean country, at the crossroads that lead to the Middle East, would be especially sensitive to the prospects of the dangers of the spread of war. And, again, Yugoslavia, with its special relationship to some of the Arab countries, especially the United Arab Republic, is especially sensitive to some of the currents of opinion sweeping the Arab world.

I believe that on the Middle East we achieved a considerable degree of comprehension of what the objectives ought to be, that a peace has to be based on justice to both sides, a recognition that this would be difficult under present circumstances, but that it must be a principal objective of the policy of all of the countries. It is probably some shading of the weighing of various factors that are involved, but I would have to say that on the Middle East the understanding of what needs to be done is rather considerable. The problem arises in the unpredictability of events within the area which, over recent weeks, has several times erupted in ways that were totally unforeseeable for anybody.

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Q In that connection, did Marshal Tito support the position the President has taken this week on the policy of firmness of strength for future peace?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say two things. First of all, the President never said that the policy of strength could be the only foundation for peace; nor did he use the word policy of strength. He said that military power is one essential requisite in the area. He did not say that we were basing our policy on power alone.

Secondly, we did not ask Marshal Tito, any more than he asked us, to endorse every statement that we have made over recent weeks, or every tactical move that the United States may wish to make.

We confined our discussion to the objectives that are to be sought, and some of the broad lines of policy that ought to be realized. Therefore, I cannot answer what Marshal Tito thinks about every statement that the President made. All one can say is that Marshal Tito is a man of extremely impressive and forceful personality, and I did not hear him voice any objections.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did President Nixon get any insights from Marshal Tito on the possible succession and prospects for stability in Egypt?

DR. KISSINGER: Naturally the two leaders discussed, where it was appropriate, their views of the personalities in various countries and what impact they might have on the evolving situation. I think that certainly President Nixon hopes, and I am sure Marshal Tito shares his view, that any successor in Egypt would continue to pursue a policy which would lead to a moderate conclusion.

Q How long did the Presidents meet today and what opportunity did they have for private talks today?

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DR. KISSINGER: Did you cover this already, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: About an hour on the plane and --

DR. KISSINGER: They had about an hour and a half in the car, an hour on the plane, and then, of course, there was an advisors meeting in the morning that lasted about three hours, or two and a half hours -- well, you will get the exact times from Ron -- in which the two principal interlocutors were the two Presidents. They had a rather extensive set of conversations. They will sit next to each other at dinner to night and they plan to have another talk after dinner.

Q Do you recall the President having spent more time with any leader recently?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't recall that the President has spent that much time with any leader in one day.

Q Can you tell us why you use the phrase the opinion of the two sides is not coincidental to every issue in the Middle East?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think it is fair to say that the opinion of the two sides is not exactly coincidental to every issue. We are not thinking -- the Yugoslav Government has not pursued a policy of independence all these years in order to follow American prescriptions at this stage.

I would say that the difference in perspective is probably somewhat greater with respect to Southeast Asia than it may be with respect to other questions.

Q Ron, you told us that there was no request from President Tito for renewed American military aid. Was there any discussion of that subject between the two Presidents?

DR. KISSINGER: I was not present at every single private conversation. I have talked to the President briefly before coming here. To the best of my knowledge, the issue was not raised and I consider it highly improbable that it was.

The only reason why I am weaseling the answer is because I am not 100 percent sure. I think you are safe in saying, though, that it was not raised.

Q What did they criticize about Russia's actions towards the Middle East?

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DR. KISSINGER: There is an implication in the question which I would like to correct. The question was what changes would the two leaders like to see in the policy of the Soviet Union. Let me make very clear we did not come here to complicate the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. We came here to discuss and to gain insights into the possible evolution of policy. We therefore did not come herewith a list of charges against the Soviet Union and ask President Tito to endorse it or not to endorse it. This would have been highly inappropriate and this was not our purpose.

We discussed what the role of the great powers should be in the Middle East. I think it is safe to say that there was agreement that the great powers had a special responsibility to exercise restraint and to use their influence to bring about a peaceful solution. But we did not attempt to ascribe any particular failings or particular praise to any of the great powers. We spoke, rather, in terms of what was needed than in terms of what was failed to have been done.

Q What can you tell us about the talks with Generalissimo Franco?

DR. KISSINGER: Could I suggest the following? If there are any more questions about this part of the trip, could I take those first? Then I will take other questions.

Q Did you gather any valuable insight into the possible evolution of policy from these talks, particularly Soviet policy as regards the rest of the world?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, Marshal Tito is one of the senior Communist leaders in the world, with unique experience and substantial insights. Of course, he gave us his judgment as to the evolution of the policy of various Socialist countries, as well as his judgment on how East-West relations could be improved. So the answer to your question is yes, we gained insights, but I don't want to characterize their nature.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, did you get into any other such matters? Were there decisions made on trade between the U. S. and this country, or did you stay primarily in the diplomatic areas?

DR. KISSINGER: As the communique says, these subjects were discussed. The two Presidents called on their principal advisors. The two Presidents agreed in principle that these relationships should be strengthened and that a substantial effort should be made in that direction, and their principal advisors have been charged with working out some of the details and they will certainly be worked out over the next months.

Q Did you discuss the problem of Yugoslav security?

DR. KISSINGER: Did we discuss the problems of Yugoslav security?

Q In the Mediterranean.

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, if you are talking about Yugoslav security within its territorial frontiers in the specific sense, I must say that as a student of history of this part of the world, and any student of recent history knows that the Yugoslavs have taken rather good care of their own immediate security needs without excessive advice from the United States, so that issue -- in fact, without any advice from the United States. Therefore, the problem of the military defense of Yugoslavia obviously was not discussed.

In the general sense that the security of Yugoslavia depends to a considerable extent on a general state of peace in the Mediterranean, and the interest of Yugoslavia must have in a condition of peace in the Mediterranean -- in that sense the issue was discussed. But not as a military problem.

This lady and then we will go to Spain.

Q What is the point of view of the two Presidents on the nonaligned policy of Yugoslavia?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the two Presidents agreed completely that the nonaligned policy corresponded to the necessities of Yugoslavia's position. It is not in our interest to turn Yugoslavia into an American ally. The policy of independence that Yugoslavia is pursuing has our full understanding and endorsement. I think it can play a useful role in many parts of the world in stabilizing conditions.

Now a few questions about Spain.

Q What can you tell us about the possibility of bringing in the subject of the Mediterranean area when discussions are had with Spain?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, any country bordering the Mediterranean -- I have to give you essentially the same answer that I gave two days ago when I discussed the purpose of our visit here. The objective of the trip was to discuss the prospects of peace in the Mediterranean. This as a formal agenda item obviously remains.

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Q What are the bilateral subjects?

DR. KISSINGER: There is a problem of economic relationships. There is the problem of an extended cultural agreement, and some technical issues that grow out of the basic agreements. But, of course, the major focus of our discussions in Spain, as in Italy, will be the relationship of the United States to the Mediterranean area, both in the context of the relationship to the West and of the relationship to the Middle East and North Africa.

Obviously, in Spain, the focus is likely to be somewhat more on North Africa than it is on the Middle East, given the geographical position.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will take two more questions.

Q How are the Russians coming with their submarine base in Cuba?

DR. KISSINGER: What submarine base in Cuba? We will say no more about that topic. The facts, as we knew them, were given by the Defense Department last Friday. The interpretation that we place on it and our general attitude towards it have also been given last Friday. Until there are further developments that shed more light on it, we will say nothing further.

Q Are you aware that the anonymity of our briefer has just been exposed ---

MR. ZIEGLER: I cut it off. They are not using the film. I told them no. It is not going to be used.

DR. KISSINGER: This is in Cyrillic, anyway. They run it from right to left.

MR. ZIEGLER: This will be the final question.

Q Do you think President Nixon ---

DR. KISSINGER: Helen gets the last question.

Q Let me have one-half of a question.

DR. KISSINGER: Go ahead.

Q Do you expect President Nixon will discuss with Generalissimo Franco, in view of what you said about the Mediterranean, possible Spanish membership in NATO?

DR. KISSINGER: I think everybody agrees that the question of Spanish membership in NATO is one for the future of evolution, and it is probably not an issue for the immediate future. If it is discussed at all, it will come up as one of long-term evolution, rather than as an issue of immediate decision.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, does President Nixon agree with the high-level source saying that peace talks in the Middle East will be shelved, put off for some time, because of Nasser's death?

Also, how does he feel about a joint U.S.-Soviet peacekeeping force in the Mediterranean?

DR. KISSINGER: You know how much trouble we are having with high-level sources here.

Q Not as much as we are having.

DR. KISSINGER: That is a fine crew you brought here. I am going to go over the list the next time.

Of course, it is very difficult to comment on anonymous high-level sources given our desire to maintain unity in the administration.

Q What was the question?

DR. KISSINGER: I forgot the question.

What was the question?

Q The effect of Nasser's death on the peace --

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. The report that I received about that high-level source was that the word "shelved" was not used, but, rather, that there was some general reflection that the events in Jordan, plus the events in the United Arab Republic might bring about a delay.

This is not a delay which we will seek. We are going to urge the initiative to go forward as rapidly as possible. It was an analytical statement, not a statement of United States policy.

We are in favor and, as we understand it, President Tito is in favor, of the most rapid continuation of the peace initiative, consistent with what the realities of the situation permit.

If the Egyptian Government should be prepared to pursue the peace initiative immediately, we will certainly be more than happy to pursue it and we will, in any case, begin as soon as possible, exploratory talks to find out when would be an appropriate occasion to renew the peace initiatives.

Q With the Egyptian Government?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, we have to wait. Nasser's funeral was only today and we will have to wait to see what crystalizes in Cairo before we can make any prediction. That should not be treated -- that remark of the high-level source should not be treated -- as a statement of our preferences.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 9:10 P.M. LOCAL)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(New Initiative for Peace In Southeast Asia)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

6:40 P.M. EDT

OCTOBER 7, 1970

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You gentlemen know the groundrules; same as always, Administration sources without direct quotations.

We will go direct to your questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how does the cease fire which is proposed now differ from the cease fires that we have advanced before?

DR. KISSINGER: We have never formally proposed a cease fire before. We have indicated in the speech of May 14 our willingness to negotiate what was then called cease fires, by which we meant local cease fires, but we never proposed it formally, and we in a way invited a proposal by the other side and indicated a general readiness to discuss it.

Tomorrow we are going to make it as a formal proposal on an all-Indochina basis with specific methods of its implementation. So this is the first time that it has moved from a readiness to discuss it essentially on a local basis to being a major element of our position on an all-Indochina basis, and it will be fully spelled out.

It is partly spelled out in the speech. It will be more fully spelled out in the weeks ahead.

Q Will the part that is fully spelled out have to do with how it is to be supervised by the international observers?

DR. KISSINGER: That will be spelled out and some of the requirements will be more fully spelled out.

We have undertaken massive studies on the issue of cease fires. We started first an analysis of what the security situation was, province by province, last November. Then after we had that data, we started in the spring to analyze how a cease fire, in fact three different kinds of cease fires, would affect them. And then when the President ordered a new look at our negotiating position, we put all of this together into this proposal, starting in May, actually, during the Cambodian period.

Q Henry, what is there in this that you think the other side might respond to affirmatively?

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DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a few general observations about this.

In handling these negotiations, we have two broad choices as an approach: We can either say, "Let's find things that the other side will accept," or we can say, "Let's find something that would reflect a fair settlement." One would, of course, have to define "fair" in such a way that it takes into account the legitimate, or just, or whatever adjective you want to use, aspirations of the other side, and that is in our interest to do.

We recognize -- we are not children -- that when the war is over and the peace treaty is signed, we will be 10,000 miles away and they will be 300 miles away.

It is in our interest to come up with proposals for a settlement that the other side will have an interest in maintaining. We may not hit it right, but this is certainly our intention.

Then the problem becomes, is the other side prepared to settle for anything short of total victory?

To answer your question, what is there in this to which the other side is prepared to respond. We didn't make a list of things. We didn't want to go at it by saying we know the other side will accept A, B, and C and therefore we will accept it. We tried to find what it seemed to us a fair way of ending the war.

What this proposal will do is, it will separate the military outcome from the political outcome and says, in effect, to stop the fighting and let's create a political process which gives the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to express their will.

We recognize that that is going to be tough and that serious, honest people could disagree as to what gives people a chance to express their will. But that is what we are trying to do, start a process which moves the issue from the arena of military conflict into that of a political contest. And if the North Vietnamese really want the popular will to be expressed, we will more than meet them on that road, even though we recognize that that is tough.

What should they respond to? We think they should respond to everything in here, even though in the implementation we recognize that serious people can differ about various clauses. We are not offering it in its detail on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but we do think that they ought to be able to respond to all of this.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, hasn't the other side always held to the position that before you stop the shooting you reach some sort of political formula so that we know what we are getting out of it?

DR. KISSINGER: There is nothing in our proposal that makes it impossible to have a political solution concurrently with a cease-fire solution, although we believe that a cease-fire is somewhat easier to establish and could be established immediately.

It is true that the other side has generally said that it prefers to get a political solution first. But if this war is ever going to be brought to a conclusion, both sides will have to constantly be reviewing their position, and the whole history of negotiations is that the other side indicates that they will always take a rather extreme position first. They don't negotiate as we do by moving a little step at a time. They negotiate always from one posture of intransigence to another.

If you look at how they settled all of the issues that have been settled, the site of the conference, the bombing halt, the shape of the table, it is apparent that each of these issues seemed insoluble until about a week before they were settled, and then suddenly they broke.

So we, first of all, we can't really expect on the basis of past performance that they will accept this right away. In fact we wouldn't be surprised if they turned it down as a first step. But we don't consider that the last word on the subject. We think we are at the beginning of a process here.

We think that whatever their immediate response will be tomorrow or next week, that there will be some second thoughts and then if they want to discuss some of these issues concurrently, we can certainly look at them.

We wouldn't object to settling the whole thing altogether. We believe, however, that a cease-fire is easier to establish and would create the climate to settle all the other issues.

Q You said in San Clemente in dwelling on a question asked about the cease-fire, you pointed out the difficulties in a guerrilla war of having a cease-fire. And I notice the President mentions this difficulty, too.

What makes it any the less difficult now than it has been for quite some months, and why now instead of earlier?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me be quite candid about this.

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When we made our studies of the cease-fire we looked at three different kinds of cease-fire, as I pointed out in the San Clemente briefing -- a cease-fire in which all North Vietnamese troops are withdrawn, a cease-fire with regroupment, and a cease-fire-in-place. And as I pointed out in San Clemente, our studies showed that from a purely military point of view the cease-fire-in-place had the greatest complexities, and that remains true today.

On the other hand, a cease-fire-in-place has the advantage that it represents the smallest dislocation, that it politically gives the two sides the greatest insurance of maintaining at least the status quo as they see it. Therefore, we believed that it was the most easily negotiable, and we were prepared, to use a cliche, to run some risks for peace.

In this connection we sacrificed some of the technical studies to what we considered negotiability.

Secondly, and equally importantly, the situation now is quite different from what it was six months ago. In major parts of South Vietnam, III and IV Corps, the main-force war has been substantially reduced, if not eliminated. The impact of the Cambodian operation and the progress of Vietnamization have reduced the risks that would be run. And the military advice that we received until about three or four months ago was that a cease-fire-in-place was too risky. Now we believe we can take the risk.

Finally, we have worked out some rather detailed procedures and estimates on how to manage it.

So for all of these reasons, we thought that this was the time to do it and we couldn't have done it earlier.

Why did we do it now? We couldn't even consider it before the Cambodian operation with the forces in the sanctuaries, the sanctuaries well stocked, and large main-force units operating in the country. After the Cambodian operation, we frankly had to assess what the impact of it had been and whether the impact had lived up to the estimate.

Then we had the negotiating problem. Ambassador Bruce did not reach Paris until the first week of August. Xuan Thuy didn't reach Paris until -- I think the first session he attended was September 3. The North Vietnamese presented their eight points on September 17 and we wanted to study those to make sure whether there wasn't some aspect in them that was relevant to our planning.

Finally, there was a slippage of a week due to the Middle East crisis. But we had decided at an NSC meeting which took place at the end of July, I forget exactly when that meeting was, that we would make this proposal or some proposal like this in the last week of September or early in October. We missed it by a few days.

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Q Can I clear up one point? You said that until three or four months ago, the advice was that it was too risky. To refresh my memory, was that before or after Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: I should have said before Cambodia, that was the advice, and during Cambodia we didn't really recheck that judgment. We started looking at it again in July. In May and June it was really too early to tell what the impact on South Vietnam of the Cambodia operation would be.

Q But the advice changed after Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: The advice changed as a result of Cambodia.

Q Do you have any evidence from the other side in any way that they are now more interested in this kind of a proposal than they have been in the past?

DR. KISSINGER: We have had indications in captured documents -- which I swore I would never use -- we had indications that the other side has occasionally talked to its own people about cease fires. We have never had it in any conclusive way.

We are not saying that we know that the other side will accept it, but we hope that the other side will look at this proposal in the spirit in which it was made. We have really made a genuine effort to develop a proposal which is fair and just to what we consider their serious aspirations. We recognize they have not fought for 25 years in order to give away at the conference table what they didn't give up on the battle field. We recognize that they will be there after we are gone, and, therefore, we have tried to come up with a set of proposals which the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong who are willing to settle for something other than total victory can accept.

What we are, in effect, saying is let's separate the military outcome from the political outcome. Let us end the military process and let us agree together on a political process which gives each side a fair opportunity at registering the will of the population. If they have some ideas on what represents the will of the people, we are certainly willing to listen to them. We hope, and we have reason to believe, that the South Vietnamese government will spell out these political principles in greater detail and we thought it was more appropriate that the South Vietnamese government spell out these principles than that we spell them out. But, this is what we seriously mean. These proposals -- these three principles of registering the will of the people, giving each significant political force an opportunity to participate, and our willingness to abide by the outcome -- represent our firm and solemn policy. We believe that if the other side doesn't just want us to hand over the government to them, they can live with it, too.

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Q Henry, what are the chances of this coming unstuck on, as we would say, our side? In Cambodia today the story is coming out of there that they don't want a cease-fire until everybody has gone home. There - is quite a flurry of activity in the South Vietnamese side, Ky is going back to Saigon, et cetera.

Do we have problems on our side of the fence?

DR. KISSINGER: We have discussed the cease fire proposal. We have kept President Thieu generally informed of the progress of our cease fire studies over the whole period that we were conducting them; maybe not in every last detail of the technical studies, but of the general trend of our thinking. And we are convinced that he has come to the view that it is the correct way to proceed.

We have cleared our proposal with the government of Cambodia and the government of Laos. The problem in Cambodia we have to recognize is a special one in the sense that the Cambodians do not feel that they are engaged in a civil war. The Cambodians feel that they are invaded by a foreign army and that is essentially true.

Therefore, the Cambodians are more sensitive to this situation than countries where, together with the invasion from external sources, there is also a civil war going on. Nevertheless, we believe that, if the other side accepts it, that the proposals we have made will stick and will be implemented.

Q You are proposing, first, a cease fire followed by negotiations for total withdrawal of U. S. troops.

Would you reverse those and negotiate total withdrawal, first, to be followed by a cease fire? A date for total withdrawal?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the withdrawal is part of the general package. We are talking about two kinds of withdrawals that are taking place. We are, in any case, withdrawing as part of the Vietnamization process.

If there were a cease fire that lasted over an extended period of time, this would obviously affect our judgment about the rate at which we could withdraw troops, because it would meet one of the criteria that the President mentioned, namely, the level of enemy activity.

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When you talk, however, about a fixed deadline for withdrawal, that would have to be part of a general settlement. We are telling the other side, what is new about this withdrawal proposal is the following: If you read our public statements -- there are only two major public statements of the President on this subject. The first one is May 14, 1969, in which the President said that the major part of the forces should be withdrawn in a year, the others should withdraw into the base areas. In November 3, there was at least a perceived ambiguity in which at one point he said we have a plan that leads to the total withdrawal of our combat forces and then in another place he said ultimately the withdrawal of all our forces. But at no point did he say what he meant by ultimate.

What we are saying here is that if the other side is worried about an American presence in Vietnam on a permanent basis, it can put its mind at rest. As part of the settlement we are willing to give them a month-by-month schedule of what we will pull out; that we will pull out all of our forces. In short we are accepting the principle of complete withdrawal in relatively a short time period, namely a year, with no bases or worries about residual forces, but that has to be part of a general settlement.

Is that directly tied to mutual withdrawal?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends, of course, on how you define mutual. But if you are to have peace in all of Indochina, you cannot have North Vietnamese forces forever in all the states in the situation that would result.

In other words, you are saying that the North Vietnamese have to withdraw their forces as we have been insisting all along when we withdraw ours?

DR. KISSINGER: That is essentially correct, yes. That is, as part of the negotiations. It is however possible if the negotiations don't succeed, we will pursue the other route of gradually strengthening the South Vietnamese to a point where they can do it.

But the new phase in this is we are prepared to give them a time table in the negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: Give them a time table and an assurance of total withdrawal with no residual forces, no bases. That has never been stated unambiguously by the President before, or by the U. S. Government before.

Also, of course, the North Vietnamese have indicated in their own program that the question of their forces would be settled as part of the general settlement. They have said they wanted to discuss it with the South Vietnamese government that emerges. It will be settled by the Vietnamese which may be a device on their part not to put their forces on the same level as ours, as foreign forces.

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So they have never rejected the principle of mutuality as much as they have the modality by which it should be accomplished.

Q. In effect don't we have a cease-fire already where no one is shooting one another, because of the lower casualties, and there has been no major action of any kind? Is it a much different level from where we are now to what you are proposing?

DR. KISSINGER: It is true, of course, that our casualties have dropped considerably. Two years ago, our average casualties were 290. One year ago, they were about 190, and since the Cambodian -- that is over a period of a year -- since the end of the Cambodian operation, the average casualties have been 63, or 64, something like that, and last week they were 38. That will be announced tomorrow. Casualties have been dropping.

But still, while of course first we are content that military operations have dropped, they are still going on. South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese casualties still remain fairly substantial, in the hundreds a week.

And, therefore, I think the difference between a moderate level of military activity and a very low level of military activity is still substantial. Above all, it would be for the first time in 25 years that there is no organized military activity going on in Vietnam, and that in itself would create a new condition.

Certainly, the fact that military activity has dropped -- it would have been inconceivable to have a meaningful cease-fire two years ago.

What you have pointed out has been made possible by what we would like to think, what we believe, is the success of the policies we pursued.

But we still think it would be an enormous step if we could now go to a cease-fire.

Q. To clarify a point about the acceptance of the idea of mutual withdrawal, you are talking about all of Indochina, North Vietnamese troops out of Laos and Cambodia as well as South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to get into the precise details of how this would work out. Our primary concern is to get peace in Indochina. If you look at a map, you can see different situations.

Ultimately, we believe that peace in Indochina requires that everybody stays within his borders. And the North Vietnamese never have rejected that principle, but that can obviously, the staging, the timing of how you would do this, would have to be subject to negotiation. And you would want to move the troops away from the areas where they have the greatest impact on combat first, and from the other areas next.

So I don't want to tie our proposal now to something that sounds as if everything has to happen simultaneously.

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Q Henry, did you say in effect before that President Thieu is going to come up with some new ideas on a political settlement shortly?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe that the political solution should be, in order to be meaningful, primarily the work of the Vietnamese, and we believe that President Thieu, having accepted these three principles that we have pointed out, would logically want to spell out his ideas in greater detail, as he already has once before. And, therefore, we think that there is a good chance that this will happen. I don't want to speak for President Thieu.

Q On the peace conference, if I may move to that, the Russians and the British are the co-chairmen.

Are we thinking of something else, or are we thinking of the old 14-nation thing, and if so, have we discussed this with the British and the Russians, and do we have any reactions from them as co-chairmen?

DR. KISSINGER: We have, of course, had this somewhat puzzling overture, whatever it was, by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Malik in April, and you remember we took an early opportunity to call that a constructive suggestion.

Later on there were some intimations that perhaps this was not authorized, but if so, this would be the first time in Soviet history that a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister spoke without --

Q Off the cuff.

DR. KISSINGER: -- spoke off the cuff.

We have not specifically taken this up with the Soviet Union. We discussed it in a general way with several of our allies. The Secretary of State had extensive meetings today with a number of Asian and other leaders, and we have reason to believe that there is a considerable receptivity to the idea of a wider conference as well as to the idea of an international supervisory group.

We are not necessarily wedded to the 14 nations that composed the Geneva Conference of 1954. We believe that it is quite important that we engage those countries in the conference that have the greatest interest in preserving the peace in the area.

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[LQ]

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Q What about China?

DR. KISSINGER: We would believe that Communist China should be a part of such a conference.

Q Has there been anything to indicate that China has changed its negative way of thinking on that?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no indication of China's attitude one way or the other on this conference, but it is hard to see how peace can be preserved in that area that doesn't have China's cooperation. We would certainly be prepared to see China included in such a conference.

Q On the supervised cease fire, you say we have never formally proposed such a cease fire. Yet, my recollection is that we have done almost the same thing. I am reading here from some State Department notes that say that these proposals that the President made, President Nixon, include a supervised cease fire, arranged with the participation of an international supervisory body.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have the text of the May 14 speech here, which is the only time that the President has mentioned it. On that occasion, the President said, "Cease fires under international supervision." We used the plural because we are talking about local cease fires.

Secondly, and most importantly, we have never made it as a formal proposal to the other side. The President referred to it in a speech, and if the other side picked it up, we would have been prepared to negotiate it. But we have never said to the other side, "Let us have a cease-fire in South Vietnam", certainly not in all of Indochina, or, "We are proposing it now. Here is the way we think it should be done and this is why we think it contributes to the peace." The other side has never had to respond to a formal American proposal.

We have put it out as something we are ready to discuss, but never as a formal proposal.

Q Isn't it also true that the May 14 speech was put in package terms? You are now offering this as a single proposition?

DR. KISSINGER: Exactly, that is right. We are prepared to do this independently.

Q Without conditions which the May 14 speech suggested?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Henry, in view of the suspicion of the Communists and of some other cynics about the political implications of this kind of thing at this particular time -- I am speaking of the election campaign -- why wasn't this presented as a secret proposal or at least presented to them first, before all of this big world propaganda?

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LW

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DR. KISSINGER: I have explained to you already the sequence of events that led to the formulation of this proposal. This makes it clear that there was only a leeway of about 10 days built into that, that we couldn't really present it earlier than 10 days ago and we all know the circumstances.

Why was it not presented to them secretly?
First, because we had to consult with so many governments.
We couldn't propose a cease fire in Indochina without
involving Laos and Cambodia at a minimum. We had to talk
to the other troop-contributing countries.

And as one of your colleagues said to me yesterday when he tried to get me to give him an advance idea of the speech, he said, "Are you naive enough to believe you can keep this proposal secret for 24 hours when the President has already announced that it had been cleared with Saigon, Cambodia and Laos?" So, this was one problem.

Secondly, we wanted to make sure that we could put
it before Hanoi in a way that fully staked the President
and the highest levels of our Government behind it.

Thirdly, in negotiating with Hanoi, it is important
that they see what, if any, degree of public support we can
achieve.

It is one of the crucial factors, and I must say
that we tried to go as far in this package as we possibly
could, because we believe that the greatest degree of unity
that we can achieve is one of the elements that might make
Hanoi feel that this is roughly as far as we are going to
go and that it is now time to move forward to serious negotiation.

Q. You will be more specific in Paris tomorrow morning than you are here at all?

DR. KISSINGER: Tomorrow morning we will probably not be more specific but we are certainly prepared in Paris, in whatever forum that is available to us, to elaborate on these proposals. We will certainly, in the weeks ahead, elaborate on these proposals and be prepared to respond to questions and try to bring it into relation with whatever counter proposals may be made.

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Q In connection with the timing, I don't understand why you decided it was necessary to do it in late September or early October. What is the essential part of doing it then rather than, say, the middle of November?

DR. KISSINGER: We wanted to do it at the earliest possible moment after the peace conference had reconvened. We consider this a nonpartisan issue. We don't believe that peace in Vietnam is a matter that should be partisan and that should be as such part of the electoral campaign.

It would be highly inappropriate, it seems to me, for us to say we have got an election and therefore we can't take a peace proposal until the middle of November, when the negotiations had reassembled and everyone was waiting to see what would happen. Our decision at the end of July was to make it at the earliest possible moment that we felt confident that we knew what we were talking about and at the earliest possible moment after the two chief negotiators came back.

What we did here in terms of preparation was simply to what we did in SALT. We had a lot of technical studies backing this up which would be too boring and really unimportant for the main thrust tonight to present to you, but we will be able when the negotiations start to give to the other side a rather detailed picture of how we view the situation of this implementation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, under this plan here you called for the armed forces throughout Indochina firing their weapons to remain in the positions they now hold. Could you please estimate the percentage of territory and population the enemy would be holding in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Territory and population is somewhat different. They would hold in both Vietnam and Cambodia a larger percentage of the territory than of the population because a substantial percentage of what they are holding in terms of territory is unpopulated territories.

In terms of population in South Vietnam, it depends whether you count -- let's say, giving them the benefit of the doubt, 20 to 30 percent. But this would be giving them some contested areas. In terms of Cambodia, not as much; in terms of Laos, more. But these are my estimates. We actually have precise estimates on that. I gave you rough figures here.

These percentages, don't ascribe to me, just say it is thought that or whatever that rule is.

What would you call that?

MR. ZIEGLER: DEEP BACKGROUND.

Q Henry, could I ask you a last question? You have often said that every time we make a proposal they simply wait for us to make another one, so we are not in the business of making these proposals. Why shouldn't they now wait for us to make still another proposal?

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DR. KISSINGER: Because we won't make another one; because we think that this is about as far as we can reasonably go. That doesn't mean that we cannot explain aspects of this proposal. This doesn't mean that if they have a counter-proposal we can't take it into account. But I think we have reached a point now where we shouldn't be judged simply on the basis of whether a proposal is new, because really the people who keep pressing us to break every deadlock with a new proposal with the best intentions in the world are giving the other side an incentive to produce a deadlock. And the paradox is that if you keep pressing one side to be flexible, you are forcing the other side to be rigid.

We really think we have gone as far as we possibly can in this and people now ought to argue with us what is wrong with the proposal rather than whether it is new or old.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

7:15 P.M. EDT

This Copy For

HAK file

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(New Initiative for Peace in Southeast Asia)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

7:17 P.M. EDT

OCTOBER 7, 1970

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You have had an opportunity to read the President's statement which he will deliver at 9:00 p.m. I think we will go directly to your questions.

We will attempt to cut this off in about half an hour.
The groundrules: Attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to Administration
officials and no direct quotations.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you say why these
proposals are being made public in advance of the Thursday
meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: Why? We thought that it was
essential that the President put the American position to the
public clearly and unambiguously. These proposals had
been cleared by so many different governments that there
was a danger that they would be played back in perhaps a
confused way.

They are being made public as a matter of
fact only about six hours before the conference. We thought
that this was the best way, obviously, to present it.

Max?

Q Henry, two points: One is that about a year ago the general position here was that there need be no more new initiatives from the United States; that we had made a good-faith offer and it was for the other side to pick it up. So the first part is, why a new initiative now; and, two, why could not some such proposal, specifically the cease fire part, have been part of our original proposals? What has happened in the interim?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a general philosophical
point first. It is not always helpful to negotiations if,
as I have pointed out before, the presumption is that a proposal
is bad simply because it isn't new and if the presumption
is that we must break every deadlock with a new proposal.
Because that attitude gives an incentive for rigidity to the
other side.

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On the other hand, we must not take the position
that because that general principle is valid we must never
change our negotiating position lest we give the other
side an incentive to wait.

We have always mentioned cease fire in a general way in
previous proposals.

For example, in the May 14 speech, the President
referred to internationally supervised cease fires. We chose
the plural at that time because we thought that the best
that could responsibly be done at that moment would be
regional or provincial cease fires depending on the situation.

Since these proposals were made, we did a number of
things within the Administration. First of all, we made
meticulous studies, province by province, of the actual
security situation. We then made very detailed studies
of the impact of various cease fires, either local or
with various other types of cease fires, on the security situation.

Finally, there came the Cambodian operation. As a
result of the Vietnamization program and especially the Cambodian
operation, the military situation has now changed to a point
where in III and IV Corps, for example, main force operations
have been substantially reduced if not eliminated. Therefore,
we now believe that we can responsibly offer a standstill
cease fire throughout the Indochinese peninsula which we could not
have done last year.

In fact, our military advisers all through last year
were of the view that it was militarily unbearable or too
risky.

I must say in all fairness that when we made our studies
of the cease fire, we also came to the conclusion, as I have
pointed out in a backgrounder which I gave in San Clemente,
that of all the conceivable cease fires, standstill cease fire
was perhaps the most complicated. Nevertheless, it is the
easiest one from many points of view to negotiate. It gives
the parties the least need to relocate
and, therefore, is the least traumatic event in terms of
dispositions and, therefore, we decided that this was a
risk we could take for peace. So that the primary reason for
offering it now is that this is the earliest opportunity
when we felt we could responsibly make it.

Q Henry, do you consider that you are offering
anything new on point three having to do with the withdrawal
of our forces totally or the point four having to do with
the political terms of a political settlement or are these
substantially the past postures?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I would like to repeat
the point that I made with Mr. Frankel. I think this plan
should be judged on its merits, not on its novelty. Secondly,
the situation in terms of formal proposals by the
Government on withdrawals has been as follows: In his speech
on May 14, 1969, the President offered the withdrawal of
forces, leaving behind, however, some residual forces in base
areas on both sides. In his speech on November 3, 1969, the
President spoke of the withdrawal of combat forces in one
part of the speech and in another part of the speech he spoke
of the ultimate withdrawal of all forces, however, tied to
Vietnamization.

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The President has not previously accepted the
principle of total withdrawal of all our forces within a
specified time period, and the other side has consistently
demanded or has said that our acceptance of the principle
of total withdrawal would be a major contribution to the
negotiations.

This is designed to end the debate about the problem
of residual forces, American bases, and all the other
escape clauses which have agitated the public debate. It is
designed to remove any ambiguity that may have existed and
in this sense it is a major new step.

With respect to the political settlement, the
President mentioned some of these principles in a previous
declaration, but never in a form that was put to the other side
as a formal offer.

And what we are saying here is that these five proposals
should be read as a package, even though we are, of course,
prepared to separate the cease fire proposal from the others.
But they should be read as a package in this sense: We are
saying to the other side, let us separate the military
from the political outcome. Let us stop the fighting now,
and let us devise a political process that gives the people
of South Vietnam an opportunity to shape their own future.

We are not children. We recognize that a free
political process is, under conditions of South Vietnam,
going to be the subject of intense, complicated discussions.

But what we are saying in these proposals is let's
separate the military from the political outcome, and
we tell you now on the highest authority that we are prepared
to accept the outcome of the political process which we will
jointly establish. What we will not do is to pre-determine
the political outcome ahead of time.

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Q Henry, there have been many consultations with many governments today. Have you gone through this with the Soviet Union and could you tell us their reaction?

DR. KISSINGER: In the consultations today, we gave priority to the countries that might be involved either in peace-keeping operations or in international conferences.

All of these consultations were handled by the Department of State. It is my understanding that the Soviet Embassy has been informed of the fact that there will be a speech, and of the general content, but we did not ask for their reactions. We are less concerned with a quick superficial reaction.

We are much more concerned with getting a thoughtful reaction over a period of time and we hope that they will use their influence, whatever they say publicly, to produce a constructive response from North Vietnam.

With respect to the North Vietnamese reaction, we would be surprised if there were an immediate acceptance. This is not the normal negotiating tactic of North Vietnam. We do hope that they will give it serious consideration, and a considered reply.

We expect this to be the beginning of a process of exploration, no matter what you may read or write tomorrow about the immediate response of the other side.

Q But would the Russians attend a wider international conference?

DR. KISSINGER: We have remained flexible about the composition of a wider international conference, but it would seem to us logical that the Soviet Union as a major power with a significant interest in Southeast Asia might wish to attend such a conference and we would certainly not oppose it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said this was the first time we could reasonably and safely offer a cease-fire at the table.

DR. KISSINGER: Of this nature.

Q Of this nature.

This means to me, at least, that our military position is pretty good.

Are we giving any assurances to North Vietnam that they can accept this in their very inferior military position at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe that our military position makes it possible for us to offer this without excessive risks. We are not making this proposal in order to gain at the conference table things that do not reflect the existing situation there.

We recognize that the North Vietnamese have not fought for 25 years in order to be maneuvered out of their

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share of the political process at this stage.

Therefore, we are not making this offer in
order to gain a unilateral advantage. We believe that
this offer makes it possible for the other side to go
along without risking whatever position they now have.

It would certainly be our expectation that
neither side should take advantage of the situation that
would obtain after a cease-fire.

Q In your withdrawal proposals, are we
abandoning now the previous requirement of mutual with-
drawals? You did not use the word "mutual" in your text
tonight?

DR. KISSINGER: No. Of course, a lot depends on
how you define mutuality. But as part of the general
settlement that we envisage, we would expect that all out-
side forces would return to within the borders of their
countries.

The timing, the staging of this would have to
be the subject of negotiations. But we are not abandoning
this general principle.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any parallel with
our plan and the new Viet Cong plan?

DR. KISSINGER: The eight points of the other
side are stated in the somewhat elliptical manner in
which the other side specializes. And there are
certainly some similarities in the sense that the other
side also mentions cease-fire, though they put it at a
different stage of the process than we do.

The other side also mentions POWs. I would
certainly not exclude that a careful examination of both
of these points, of the points of both sides, might reveal
some similarities.

At any rate, we are prepared to discuss the
other side's points if they are prepared to discuss ours.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any prospect for
accelerated withdrawals assuming that this perhaps
gets no immediate response?

DR. KISSINGER: Assuming that this does not
get accepted?

Q Yes, what is the prospect on accelerated
withdrawals?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make this in two parts:
If this is accepted in its totality, then, of course,
the withdrawal could be completed within 12 months.

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If only the cease-fire part of it would be accepted, then, obviously, one of the conditions that govern our withdrawal rate would be satisfied, namely, the level of enemy activity, and that would certainly be reflected over a period of time in the rate of our withdrawal.

If no part of this is accepted, then we will continue our withdrawal policy as part of the Vietnamization program. This would be relatively the slowest of these three possibilities, but we would nevertheless continue it at a steady pace.

I don't want to speculate now as to what that rate would be and at what point we can accelerate it.

There is no question, however, that we will meet the announced goals that we have set for the spring of 1970.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you consider the cease-fire proposal here a new proposal?

DR. KISSINGER: We consider it new and sweeping, yes. It covers all of Indochina and it is spelled out in considerable detail as a formal proposal.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, on the Point Four of the political settlement, you are talking about devising a political process. Could you be more specific and, in particular, are we willing to talk at Paris about setting up a new government and election process?

DR. KISSINGER: We now have the full support of President Thieu. We think it would be more appropriate for the details of what this political evolution should be to come from Saigon, and we have some expectation that this will be forthcoming in the not too distant future.

Therefore, I don't want to speculate on what the precise program would be, except that it will be consistent with these general principles.

On whether a new government should be established before the political process has operated, our position has been made clear. We will not pre-determine the political outcome. We are prepared to set up a political process which, to the best of our judgment, is neutral -- that is, neutral as between the contenders -- and which gives every one of the participants a fair opportunity at the political outcome.

President Thieu, on an earlier occasion, mentioned the idea of mixed electoral commissions and it is quite possible that something like this can be elaborated, but we do not believe that the governmental composition should be pre-determined before the political process is operating.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would we expect to continue Vietnamization, and to continue sending arms to Cambodia under the cease fire?

DR. KISSINGER: I am assuming that you are separating Vietnamization from Cambodia, because we are not Vietnamizing Cambodia.

Q I know.

DR. KISSINGER: Under the terms of the cease fire, the introduction of American arms into Cambodia would be barred and there should be no outside military forces.

Q How about Vietnamization of Vietnam? Would that program continue?

DR. KISSINGER: That program would by definition continue. If we accelerated our withdrawal as a result of a cease fire, it by definition would continue.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in 1968, you wrote that a stand-still cease fire was tantamount to a political settlement. Can you say what you are proposing here is defacto partition in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: No. First of all, I do not want to be held responsible for things I may have committed prior to my access to the subtle and profound analysis which I now am able to read in my present position. (Laughter)

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Secondly, we believe, of course, that a cease
fire now can be the beginning of a process that will lead
to a political solution. But we are proposing it not as
a defacto partition. We are proposing it as a means of
giving a political process an opportunity to operate in
all of South Vietnam.

Q Which countries are we considering for the
international supervisory group and for the peace conference?

DR. KISSINGER: In both cases, our interests would
be to involve countries that have a maximum interest in
maintaining the peace in Southeast Asia, because those are
the countries that are likely to be most vigilant and
also are going to make the major contribution in the nego-
tiations. We have not put forward in this proposal a specific
list of countries, because we are prepared to be quite
flexible about it.

In his conversations this afternoon with foreign
diplomats, the Secretary of State and his associates placed
particular emphasis in talking to Asian countries, especially
about participating in the supervisory force. It is my
understanding that they were very encouraged by the response.

Q Do we have any indication whatsoever that the
North Vietnamese or Viet Cong are interested in agreeing
to a cease fire prior to a political settlement?

DR. KISSINGER: In analyzing prospects for Vietnam,
one's sources are extremely varied, and I took a vow before
this group when I came here that I would never refer to
captured documents. But we do find references occasionally
in some of the internal discussions of the other side in
which they talk about cease fires to each other as a separable
issue, or as something that might happen in the absence of
a political settlement. So, we have that sort of indication.

We have no indication from the other side's nego-
tiators that they are prepared to accept it, but then we have
never put it to them in any formal systematic way.

Finally, the whole record of negotiations with the
other side is that one cannot deduce their reaction to specific
proposals, or their willingness to settle, from a preceding
period of deadlock.

I have pointed out, perhaps at excessive length, to
some of you at least, that if you look at the previous history
of negotiations with the North Vietnamese, the three major
issues that were settled, site of the conference, the bombing
halt, and the shape of the table and the composition of the
conference, each of those was preceded by protracted deadlock.

Each of them seemed hopeless until there was a
sudden break a week, or at the most a month, before the final
resolution. And, therefore, I would not draw any conclusions
one way or the other from whatever North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong negotiators may have said about an issue that has never
been presented to them formally.

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Q Did you mean to indicate a few minutes ago that the Saigon Government may soon restate its position on a political settlement, possibly indicating more flexibility?

DR. KISSINGER: I am, of course, not qualified to speak for the Saigon Government. There is a school of thought that maintains I am not qualified to speak for any government. (Laughter.)

But it would seem logical that the Saigon Government might wish to elaborate on some of the principles which we have stated, given the fact that the political evolution of Vietnam is primarily a matter for the Vietnamese. Whether this indicates more flexibility or less flexibility, I will leave you to judge when these proposals appear, if they appear. But we have every reason to believe that the position that the South Vietnamese Government will take in these negotiations is fully consistent with the principles that we have enunciated.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what can you tell us about the problem of cheating? What incentive is there for the other side to not cheat on this cease fire agreement? What sort of level of guarantees would we demand in order to go through with this cease fire?

DR. KISSINGER: As I pointed out, we have made studies over a very extended period now about the modalities of various forms of cease-fires in Vietnam. In fact, we have made studies very similar to the ones we have made on SALT. We will, therefore, be in a position, if the other side responds positively, as we hope it will over a period of time, to make some very concrete proposals to them about guarantees by which this could be observed.

Obviously, no cease-fire, particularly in as complex as a situation as Vietnam, will be free of ambiguity. And the intent of our studies was to reduce these ambiguities to manageable proportions. We are confident that we can make specific propositions to them.

The problem is somewhat different from other areas of the world where the distances were shorter, the weapons more sophisticated, and the balance more tenuous. So we think this is a difficult problem, but a problem which we believe we know how to manage. Otherwise, we wouldn't have made the proposal.

Q Dr. Kissinger, under an in-place or standstill cease-fire applied to a situation like this in a guerrilla war, precisely where would the forces wind up physically? Where would they be? Can you spell it out, where they are and where our allies are? Number two, how do you enforce a cease-fire with the Viet Cong when the orders are sometimes passed down and they don't pay any attention to them and go ahead and do what they want?

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DR. KISSINGER: This obviously again is a problem that has much occupied us for over a month. Obviously, if the other side began to negotiate with us seriously about this location of forces, what they are permitted to do, where they are permitted to move would be an important subject of conversation and negotiation.

Again, we will be in a position to make very specific proposals to them. Obviously, there will be forces from each side on the other side of whatever dividing line may be achieved, especially as far as guerrilla units are concerned. And this is one of the reasons why we have insisted that a cease-fire would have to exclude acts of terrorism that are not permitted by organized military units.

It is also axiomatic that neither side can escape the responsibility for acts by declaring them unauthorized. As a matter of fact, one would have to say that there is very little evidence that the discipline on the other side is not up to performing a cease-fire. I would not agree that there are very many instances of unauthorized actions on the part of Viet Cong units.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that these proposals have never been presented formally to the other side. Do you know whether this cease-fire proposal or any other part of the package has been tested privately and informally on the other side, perhaps through an intermediary channel?

DR. KISSINGER: Somebody said if I knew I couldn't tell you.

I can tell you that this proposal has not been put to the other side.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you feel that this speech will end Vietnam as a political issue in the campaigning?

DR. KISSINGER: We do not treat Vietnam as a political issue. We consider the end of the war in Vietnam to have the support of both Parties, in which serious people may disagree about the best method of how to achieve it. We make this proposal on the basis of our best judgment of what is possible now. We made it at the earliest moment that we could responsibly do so, and we do not look at it as a political matter.

We also hope that it is recognized that the degree of unity that we can obtain in support of this particular proposal is going to be one of the elements that may increase the chances of its acceptance.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for three more questions.

In the back, Associated Press?

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Q How do you go about organizing the larger international conference? It has not been pre-arranged with the Russians.

DR. KISSINGER: It is true that it has not been pre-arranged with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there was a reference to the desirability of an international conference by Soviet Foreign Minister Malik in April and we do not believe that he was the first Soviet diplomat of that level to speak without authority.

In any event, the way it can come about and would come about very quickly is if the other side indicated a readiness to have a larger forum in which case we could either jointly or separately determine which countries each side thought were essential. There are some obvious countries without whose participation, it would not make a great deal of sense. So, we believe that the technical means of arranging such a conference are easily to be found.

It is obvious that such a conference cannot take place unless Hanoi agrees, because if Hanoi does not agree, its major allies will not agree. On the other hand, if Hanoi does agree, then it will be relatively easy to constitute such a forum.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said we have made detailed studies of cease fire. Where did you get your material on that and how did you study a thing of that kind?

DR. KISSINGER: We created a group called the Vietnam Special Studies Group on which there were represented all the major agencies at the Under Secretary level, State, Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, and experts from other departments.

This group first made a study of, I think, 20 key provinces to determine exactly what the local situation was, and they then extended these studies to determine the impact of cease fire on the local situation. These studies were then sent to Paris and to Saigon for their comments, were re-examined, were put before the National Security Council. This has had very extensive consideration.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you clarify one basic point? Does this proposal replace or amplify upon the existing U. S. proposal of May 14, 1969, because there are elements of that proposal which are not in here, and have left me unclear.

DR. KISSINGER: For example?

Q For example, the general election proposal, the specific proposal for general election, or is it your intent that those elements of that original proposal will then be amplified upon by the South Vietnamese delegation?

Is this a new position of the U. S. or an amplification?

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[L]

ERRATA

Holders of the transcript of the Kissinger-Sisco background briefing in Hartford on October 12 should make the following corrections in their copies:

On page 35, 3rd para, line 4: `insert "in" after "limit"`.

On page 38, 2nd para, line 2: `insert "not" after "reason"`.

On page 45, 1st para, line 2: `insert "brinkmanship" in place of "statesmanship"`.

On page 45, 2nd para from bottom, line 2: `delete "not" before "had a qualitative effect"`.

# # #

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

CONTENT OF THIS BRIEFING
IS STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL
6:00 P.M., TUESDAY,
OCTOBER 13, 1970. IT MAY
BE ATTRIBUTED TO ADMINISTRA-
TION OFFICIALS. DIRECT
QUOTATION NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; AND
JOSEPH SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

10:07 A.M. EDT

OCTOBER 12, 1970

MONDAY

Hartford, Connecticut

MR. KLEIN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

We are very pleased that we have had this opportunity
to get together with you today. I am sorry we are a couple
of minutes late. By the time we got down through the clouds
and everything, it took about that much time to get settled
down.

This is the fourth of the regional briefings which
we have had on foreign policy. I think the most notable thing
is that Henry and I usually sit together on this side. He has
now moved me to the right. I don't know what the significance
of that is. But I occupied that chair.

I might tell you a little about the briefings quickly.
We had this summer kind of a national briefing in which we
try to get a cross-section of the people from the broadcast
and newspaper industry to have the opportunity to not only
listen to an explanation of the background of our programs,
but also to have the opportunity to ask questions directly
of those who are working in them in great detail.

Since the time we have been in New Orleans, we had
another one in San Clemente, one in Chicago and now this
one in Hartford, and it means that we have covered all four
sections of the country. In doing so, we have tried to keep
them to about this size so that there is a good opportunity
for an interchange in discussion between the editors participating
and those we have who are policy leaders.

The effect has been that I think we have had tough
questioning and I would encourage you as we get to the question
period to feel free to ask about any part of the policy you would
like so that there is no holding off or any fear that you
might embarrass us by a particular question. We like to
have you feel free to ask anything that you would care to of
these particular gentlemen.

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[L]

The general procedure which we will have is one
in which we will start off with Dr. Kissinger, who will
talk about the broad aspects of foreign policy. We have
Assistant Secretary Joe Sisco, who is the number one
expert in the State Department on the Middle East situation.
The President is flying up, as you know, later this
morning when he will join us prior to the time that we
break off our own discussion here.

We would like to start by having the presentations
by both of these gentlemen and follow that with a coffee
break and then we will have a full session of questions
from you. That will be followed by the President and we
have a reception and a buffet lunch planned immediately
after that. So that we have got a full working day, I
believe.

Finally, in explanation, I might just say that, again,
we have tried to get a representative group from all over
the States involved. The group, if you look around the
room, represents a variety of views on politics, a variety
of views on foreign policy. So no effort has been made
at all to inhibit one side; rather we felt we had the
opportunity to have this wider spectrum.

In doing so, it is also inevitable that we can't
accommodate all of those who would like to attend, so that
we have had to try to get those we could from a cross-
section of States. There will be some who would like to
have been here, and we would like to have had them except
for the physical arrangements which I have explained.

The groundrules I would like to suggest for the
operation are these: We felt, and found in working with
these programs, that they work best if we operate on a
background basis. By background, I mean that in terms of
the presentations which will be made here this morning that
we would like you to refer to whatever you care to in terms
of Administration sources, or White House sources, but
probably Administration sources would be the best phrase.

You will get a transcript in the mail from
these. We would like to have you use them for indirect
quotation; in other words, not direct quotation of any of
the people involved.

When the President arrives, his comments should
be looked at as being off the record, so that you would
refer to them, if you do, in terms of third person. By
this I mean that if you refer to something that the President
has to say, we would suggest you do it in terms of "the
President is known to feel this way," or "the President
has told people this," or something which makes it third
person all the way through; or else, feel free to use
it on your own if it happens to fit with what you believe
or you can also refer to it that the President is known
to feel that way in bringing the points that you care to from
the presentation itself.

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- 3 -

[lc]

The final point on the groundrules is that to
allow time for you to have a transcript -- and since we
are looking at this as a general background thing -- the
release time on any information used from this meeting
today will be for Wednesday, A.M., Eastern, which will
be 6 o'clock Tuesday night and thereafter. We will
work tonight to get a transcript produced so that we will
send that to you air mail special tomorrow morning, so you
will have that on hand. However, you are free, as you
can see, to make whatever notes that you would like.

Are there any questions on the groundrules?

Q Mr. Klein, may I just suggest -- I come
from Baltimore, and I want to particularly thank you all
for setting this on a day between World Series games. (Laughter)
It shows that the Administration has a heart.

MR. KLEIN: I notice also, in looking at the first
two days of the games, You have got an unworried look on
your face. (Laughter) It is obvious that you are not a
Colt fan, or you would be a little more worried.

Q For the benefit of the Hartford reporters,
may I ask you why you selected Hartford? And you are
supposed to say something very nice about Hartford.

MR. KLEIN: I have been a fan of the leaves, and I kiew that it would serve the time of the leave festival in this area, and I knew it was one of the particularly great areas to see the colors between the airport and this hotel, where I have been previously for rallies and we have been here in the fall. It has been sort of a tradition normally in a campaign year to come to Hartford so you have that opportunity.

Seriously, Paul, we try to pick a place which
will be of convenience to all of you coming from the
various areas of the Northeast. We knew of the facilities
here in Hartford, having been here many times before. So
we thought that this would be a very good place for such
a meeting.

I think with that discussion, I will just make
one other point; that is, we have tried to look at these
as providing the opportunity for background, not necessarily
for what news might come out. So that our effort isn't
to produce news, although if a story results that is fine.
But basically, we look at it, as I said, as an opportunity
for a deep discussion and in-depth look at where we are
going in policy, where we have been, so that as things
move it just gives you the evaluation as we see it from
our particular point of view.

The man who will lead off, and who I think is
greatly qualified to do this, is Dr. Henry Kissinger. As
you know, Dr. Kissinger is the Director of the National
Security Council for the President. And I think he is
a man who has won universal admiration from our own staff,
and growing admiration of others who have seen him work,
for the outstanding job he has done in terms of helping
to build a major staff system to provide the President
with all of the background and all of the arguments which
are necessary as he makes major decisions on rapidly
changing foreign policy.

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- 4 -

If you look at just the last month, I think it illustrates how complex that is, the job of Dr. Kissinger and also the job of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense in this whole security area. Because if you recall in just a quick succession of events, we had a proposal for a cease-fire, eventually it was accepted; we had the hijackings in the Middle East; we had the Jordanian uproar; we have since come forth with some solutions to those. The President has had an opportunity to talk with leaders in the Mediterranean and emphasize our presence there; and most recently, of course, the President has come forth with new proposals for peace in Vietnam.

So you see from the point, if you think about it, that it is a very rapidly changing world in each of these areas, certainly the events change almost week by week. So the National Security Council itself, in providing in-depth background and in-depth material and analyzing possible situations ahead, certainly performs a great service for the President.

Dr. Kissinger is uniquely qualified for this because of his background of almost a lifetime of service in looking at international relations between the various countries, serving both as an adviser to one of our political leaders and also serving more in his major capacity in that as a Professor at Harvard University.

Dr. Kissinger has done a tremendous job in preparing, for example, the program we had as we went into these SALT talks and which he and his staff examined in detail, and we will discuss this more later.

The things you need to know if you talk seriously -- and I can assure you that one of the questions the President asks before any of these programs develop is "How do you handle the case of the worst as well as the best?" He has to provide all of the staff answers so that when the President makes a major decision it is not one that just is a shot from the hip or one off the cuff.

Dr. Kissinger will have the opportunity to discuss background and then move forward into policy today.

With this, I think the best thing I could do is introduce you to this man who I personally admire greatly, Dr. Henry Kissinger.

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DR. KISSINGER: Herb, I appreciate the introduc-
tion. I hope you will get a transcript of it to my colleagues
at Harvard when you point out that that is my major assign-
ment. Of course they may not share the same view.

I thought the other day, when I was asked to do
one of these briefings in which I understand that my job
is to communicate with you, of a story of a Christian who
was thrown into the arena with the lions. He thought he
had better start with a prayer before he started that
ordeal. When he did this, he found that the lion was
also adopting a rather reverential pose. He said, "Well,
thank God at least I am communicating with you." The lion
said, "I don't know about you, but I am saying grace."

When I was at Harvard, the thing that used to
infuriate me most was tired bureaucrats who arrived to tell
us that everything had been considered, that they knew so
much more than we did, that any differences of opinion were
due to gaps in knowledge and that if we only knew as much
as they did, of course, we would all agree with them.

But I just want to make sure, gentlemen, that
you understand that everything has been considered. (Laughter)
If you knew as much as we did, you would, of course, agree
with us, but that if you don't, we will take it with the
attitude that not even the press can be right 100 percent
of the time. (Laughter)

With that constructive spirit now, let me make
a few observations.

First, last week the President made a major pro-
posal on Vietnam. I will come back to that at the end of
my remarks. But I would like to stress what seems to us
to be its basic significance.

Earlier this summer we proposed a cease-fire in
the Middle East. There were many who doubted whether that
could work, and the initial reactions were anything but
encouraging. But after about six weeks, the cease-fire came
into being.

Last week we proposed a cease-fire in Vietnam.
We cannot say that the initial reactions have been encourag-
ing, but if you read the press briefing we gave before the
speech was even delivered, you will see that we didn't
expect the initial reaction to be encouraging.

This is the North Vietnamese negotiating method.

But the major point we would like to make is that
if the cease-fire should come into being, we would have, for
the first time since the end of World War II, no wars going
on anyplace in the world. And it would, therefore, symbolize,
initially primarily on a tactical level, what this Adminis-
tration considers to be its primary goal. We have had a
summer of crises, and we may have managed them reasonably well,
but we don't want to be judged by how well we manage crises.

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The task that this Administration has set for
itself is to try to contribute to a lasting peace. Since
the turn of the century, no generation has known a genera-
tion of peace in America, or, for that matter, in the world.
The objective of this Administration is, therefore, of course,
to avoid war if at all possible when a crisis arises, but,
beyond that, to build a structure of peace so that crises do
not occur, and so that the world can live increasingly with
some sense of tranquility, so that the younger generation
can look forward to building their lives with some expecta-
tion of continuity.

This is the primary objective of the Administration,
and in order to do this, we have to pay attention both to
our power as well as to the elements of negotiation and
conciliation.

There are many who have a tendency to say that
we should found policy on either one or the other,
that somehow or other strength is incompatible with generosity,
and to deride what they call geopolitical approaches as
against approaches of conciliation. But events over the
last two months should have made clear that you cannot but
have one with the other, that only the strong can be generous
and restrained. But .. by the same token, strength cannot
be an end in itself, and cannot become an obsession of
national policy.

It is how to navigate this line that has been
our concern, as I will try to show you when I talk about some
specific issues. But, having set this general stage, let me
go back to some of the structural problems of peace as we
see it.

This Administration came into office at what I am
sure in retrospect will appear as one of the great transi-
tional periods in American foreign policy. These periods do
not always coincide with the announcement of them.

In the early 1960's there were many who thought
that a tremendous new change had come across American
foreign policy. But I suspect that in retrospect that will
appear as the last flowering of the period which was ushered
in by the Marshall Plan, as a more energetic application of
the principle that unless the United States did everything
around the world at every moment of time it would not be done
at all.

It is interesting to remember that when, at the
end of last April, the President announced the operations in
Cambodia there was a considerable amount of editorial
criticism about what was considered the Cold War rhetoric
of that speech. But if you compare that speech with, for
example, the Inaugural Address of President Kennedy, you
will find that the global vision in the Inaugural Address
was infinitely more embracing. It was not this Administra-
tion which said, "We will pay any price; we will bear any
burden; we will meet any hardship; we will support any
friend; we will fight any foe to achieve" -- I forget what
the exact rhetoric was -- "the survival of liberty."

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And I don't say this as a criticism. I say this analytically, to point out the tremendous change that has occurred in the structure of international relations as between the period which was started at the end of World War II and the period into which we have moved. At the end of World War II, all the traditional great powers of international politics, with the exception of Great Britain, had been defeated at one stage or another during the War and Britain, too, was severely weakened by the War.

All the major countries, again with the exception of Great Britain, had been occupied at one stage or another in the War. The economies of all of these countries were weakened or smashed. No country in the non-Communist world was capable of conducting a major foreign policy. No country thought of itself as capable of defending itself or, indeed, of achieving its domestic objectives, without American support.

The new countries were just coming into being and major parts of the world were still colonial.

In these circumstances, it was unavoidable that the United States develop the idea that security and progress everywhere depended on plans, on the execution of these plans, and on concepts developed in Washington. All over the world the attitude grew up that unless the United States took the primary responsibility for either defense or development, neither of these objectives could be realized at all.

And, as time went on, the impression grew that the defense or progress of many areas was more important to the United States than to these areas themselves.

Now, I am not saying this as a criticism, because for the United States to shoulder those responsibilities at the end of World War II was a tremendous undertaking, and it was inevitable and necessary.

The difficulty was not that we undertook these tasks in the late 40's and 50's and that we reinvigorated them in the early 60's. The difficulty was that we continue to apply them when conditions had changed dramatically. And no matter who was elected in 1968, he would have faced the problem that the international environment had changed fundamentally since the late 1940's. Where in the 40's, 50's, and early 60's peace indeed depended on the American willingness to commit itself all over the world and development indeed depended, to a considerable extent, on the American contribution, this was no longer necessarily true in the late 60's and it will certainly not be true in the 70's.

Indeed, the attempt to apply the maxims of the old foreign policy to the conditions of the 70's will demoralize us as well as those who are dependent on us or related to us.

Conditions have changed because, to take two primary examples, the countries of Western Europe and Japan have regained a great deal of their economic vitality.

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Indeed, they have exceeded their pre-World War II economic performance by a considerable margin. Those countries are capable of acting on a much broader scale than they have, and of shouldering much greater responsibilities than has been the case previously.

The new countries have, most of them, gone through the birth pangs of independence and have developed their initial governmental structure, and they, too, would like to and should play a more autonomous role.

In these circumstances, it is impossible for the United States, and indeed demoralizing for everybody, to look at foreign policy entirely in terms or largely in terms of precepts developed in Washington and executed according to American prescriptions.

It creates an attitude in the countries around the world where their leaders can avoid difficult choices by pushing them to the United States, and where the United States has to act as if the development or the security of other areas is more important to us than it is to them, as I have already pointed out.

For all of these reasons, it is one of the basic principles of our foreign policy that to the greatest extent possible, the other regions of the world should play an increasing role in cooperation with us where that is possible in these programs.

Before I turn to that, let me point out some other changes. A second major change that has occurred as against the 40's and 50's is in the structure of the Communist world. In the 40's and 50's, one thought of the Communist world as monolithic, as inherently aggressive, comparable to Nazi Germany, as responding to a unified direction from a central authority.

Events since then have proved that that vision is no longer applicable. First of all, contrary to Communist theory, the spread of Communism has not brought unity to the Communist world or an era of peace, but quite the contrary. According to Communist theory, wars occur only because of the Capitalist structure of society and the spread of Communism allegedly would lead to the disappearance of international conflict.

The fact of the matter is that the Red army has been used four times since the end of World War II, always against allies. The Communist world has found it next to impossible to settle internal disputes by negotiation because it doesn't recognize that there should be internal disputes. It cannot apply the maxims of foreign policy to its internal disputes since they do not look at other Communist countries as foreign, but they cannot settle the matters as domestic issues because the countries retain a considerable measure of their sovereignty.

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Probably the most intractable conflict in the world today is not between us and the Soviet Union, but between the Soviet Union and Communist China. That affects the structure of international relations in a way that was unforeseeable in the 40's and 50's. If we imagine what the American attitude would be if the population of Canada were 800 million, if Canada claimed a stretch of territory along our borders to a distance from 50 to 100 miles, and, if in doing this it also were building nuclear weapons at maximum speed, we would have some sense of how eerie the growth of Communist China must appear to the Soviet Union, regardless of ideology.

And, a third factor that has changed enormously since the 40's and 50's, and not necessarily in our favor, is in strategic relationships.

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- 10 -

In 1962, when President Kennedy confronted the
Cuban missile crisis, the United States possessed about
300 long-range missiles and about 1400 airplanes. The Soviet
Union possessed something like 60 long-range missiles. And
we felt then we were going through a very difficult period.

Today the Soviet Union possesses land-based
missiles somewhat more in number than ours; well over 1,000.
The total what is called technically throw-weight of
the Soviet Union probably exceeds ours. We are still
ahead in some categories. I do not want to go into
a debate now as to who is ahead and who is behind because
the fundamental fact of the matter is this: Throughout
the '40s and '50s and the early '60s, the United States
could, in effect, be the policeman of the world by using
our strategic nuclear superiority to protect other countries.
Under the conditions that I have described to you it is
patently impossible, or, if not impossible, patently extremely
difficult to rely on general nuclear war for the defense
of all areas of the world.

Contrary to any other period, a President now has to
decide knowing that a general nuclear war would guarantee
the loss of tens of millions of lives on both sides, and
no leader in all of history has ever had to make that
sort of a decision.

This is a condition that cannot be removed by
abstract declarations. It could not be removed by giving
verbal reassurances. It is a fact of life that has changed
the conditions of the modern period and to which modern
foreign policy must adjust itself.

It is in this changed international environment
that this Administration came into office. And in addition
to this changed environment we inherited a war in Vietnam
in which 540,000 Americans were engaged and that had gone
on inconclusively for five years. We inherited a crisis
in the Middle East that had not been resolved and that was
leading to more and more extremism with every passing month.
There was a civil war in Nigeria.

I mention these matters only to indicate that
it hasn't been a dull period. It is against this background
that this Administration attempted first to change the
general approach to our foreign policy and then to apply this
changed approach to a number of specific circumstances. The
one charge that the President gave me when he appointed
me to this office was that he did not want to be bothered
with purely tactical decisions. He said he did not want
to administer chaos, and he didn't want to manage crises
primarily.

He wanted to know where we were going and then
to work back from that. He wanted us to look ahead
five or ten years and to give him some ideas of the kind
of world that we were trying to bring about, and then to
apply the specific policies to this perspective.

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[10]

Wherever it was possible, this is what we attempted
to do; sometimes against considerable opposition.

Most of the governmental process in Washington
is geared to adversary proceedings. Most of the discussions
within the bureaucracy crystallize, or the normal discussions
crystallize a policy, by having various departments come
up with specific proposals for specific situations and then
have the policy emerge either as a compromise or as a
specific decision of the President, but almost always related
to a concrete, specific, detailed decision.

What the President has attempted to do through
the National Security Council system is to insist on a
sense of perspective. I am sure I am not giving away
any secrets when I say that his insistence that he be not
given a recommendation but a choice, that this did not
always meet universal approval. Indeed, I have seen it
happen more often than not that when one asks for choices
one is always given three: two absurd ones and the
preferred one. And the experienced bureaucrat, which I
am slowly becoming, can usually tell the preferred one
because it is almost always the one that is typed in the
middle. It is almost always choice two.

So if any of you replace me, if you want to be
popular, always pick choice two. You will be right more
often than not. (Laughter.)

But the problem of developing and having the
option of something other than the status quo or the status
quo plus or the status quo minus is not necessarily easy.

One good example has been in the management of
SALT talks. Another one has been in the process by which
we developed the proposal for a cease-fire in Indochina.

As I have pointed out, most of the debates in the
bureaucracy concern disagreements between departments
about specific tactical responses to specific tactical
issues and, therefore, with respect to disarmament, there
were those who said, "Disarmament is necessary," and there
were those who said, "You can't trust the Russians." And
usually in the past what happened was one negotiating position
developed growing out of all of these, which was then put
to the other side. Since the other side almost never came
up with a similar proposal, that process had to be repeated
over and over again with a result that we were spending
more time negotiating with ourselves than with the Russians.

This was one of the reasons why previous disarmament
talks have taken such a long period of time.

When this Administration came into office the
President ordered a full review not just of an individual
position but of every weapons system that could conceivably
be the subject of negotiations. He ordered a review of
our intelligence capabilities with respect to that, of the
strategic significance of violations, of what we would do if
we found a violation, how quickly we could take counter-
measures.

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- 12 -

And on the basis of that we developed a broad catalogue of all conceivable proposals that could be made. This enabled us to package them into four major choices, of which two were put before the Soviets immediately embodying two different approaches.

This had two advantages: One was that inter-departmental disputes were shifted from the abstract to the concrete. They were shifted from developing one general position to developing an array of positions that would enable us to go through a process of negotiations. And above all, it gave the President an opportunity to ask his senior advisers and to determine for himself where he really wanted to go.

Therefore, when the two positions we put before the Soviets proved too sweeping in content we were able to adjust our positions to a more moderate one or to a more modest one, but still more sweeping than any previous one that had been introduced into these negotiations, by drawing on the work that had been done before. And this is a process that we propose to continue.

The same was true with the cease-fire proposal that was made last week. I have seen a lot of speculation of why now and how did it get made. And I will be glad to answer some of this in the question period. But the important thing to remember is that the analytical work on this began last December when the President ordered a detailed study, in a special study group that was set up within the National Security Council system, of the security situation in the provinces. We sent special teams to Vietnam to give us a map of what exactly the security situation was, province by province.

Later on in March we then analyzed the impact of three types of cease-fires on the security situation in the provinces, and from there we finally developed the models for the standstill cease-fire that we offered last week.

I am not at this point going into any detailed discussion of what it meant or what the significance of it is. But I want to point out that the process is directed at the purposes, and that the President insists on being presented with choices, and that we are trying to the greatest degree possible to reduce the tactical element and to concentrate on the long-term conceptual element.

It was this approach to the structure of international politics that caused the President to enunciate in Guam last year, in July 1969, what has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. It was based on the assumption that the situation that we had found at the end of World War II had fundamentally altered; that it was not possible for the United States to play the principal role in every part of the world at every moment of time in every crisis and for every purpose. We thought it was demoralizing for other countries and we were convinced that it was beyond our psychological resources and our domestic resources.

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[L]

13

Anybody who has ever seen high office in Washington will recognize that one of the nightmarish aspects about it is that--contrary to what I knew in academic life where when one identified a problem one could work on it for as long as is necessary--one is forced into developing a hierarchy of priorities. There are many issues that senior officials may know are coming. They may even know how they will deal with these issues, if they only had the time to get around to them.

So one of the arts of policy-making is to order your issues in such a way that the most urgent ones get solved before some that appear to be less urgent hit you. The greater the number of issues that a country takes on, the more it taxes the psychological resilience of its leadership group. It is not possible to act wisely at every moment of time in every part of the world. It isn't possible for domestic opinion to understand long-range policy in every part of the world at every moment of time, particularly if those countries that are in the principal line of pressure or that have the principal responsibility for their development do not seem to make the necessary efforts.

This is why the Doctrine developed in Guam stated the following three propositions: One, the United States would, of course, fulfill the commitments it had undertaken. It has to do this for the credibility of the American performance. Secondly, with respect to attacks by nuclear countries on other countries, the United States recognized a special responsibility. This was said because we did not want to give an incentive to every non-nuclear country to develop nuclear weapons of its own and therefore further complicate the international environment. But finally, and most importantly, the United States position is that with respect to other efforts either of defense or of development in other parts of the world, the primary responsibility must be borne, first, by the country concerned, secondly by region concerned.

The United States will help where our interests dictate it and where what we do can make a difference. We will not assume the exclusive responsibility. We will not put ourselves into a position, except in the most unusual circumstances, where the United States has to bear the primary brunt when the local resources are not adequately used.

This is a change of emphasis in our foreign policy. This lower profile requires a subtler management of our foreign policy and a less intrusive form of performance. And as in all transitional periods, one cannot point to a magic moment where this policy begins, nor is it possible to say that in every area of the world it can be applied equally well at every moment of time.

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It is the belief of this Administration, with the weapons systems that have accumulated over the last two decades, that such a course must lead to disaster, that if the great nuclear powers adopt a policy where they will try to squeeze the maximum peony advantage out of every situation, where it is a settled axiom of their policy that they will try to put their opponent at a constant disadvantage, the end result must be sooner or later some sort of confrontation that can easily get out of control.

Under present circumstances, restraint is an essential aspect of foreign policy and the willingness to settle outstanding differences has to be an essential component of any foreign policy.

This is why the President, in his Inaugural Address, announced the policy of negotiation and not confrontation. This is why on disarmament, the Middle East, the whole host of other issues, we have been prepared to negotiate with the other side and why we believe that it is a wise negotiating practice to keep in mind the legitimate concerns of the other side.

At the same time we are not confusing foreign policy with psychiatry. We do not believe that the other side will settle with us because they think that our negotiators are nice guys. We do not think that it is doing justice to the seriousness with which others pursue foreign policy to believe that they will make concessions on the basis of personalities and, therefore, we attempt to conduct our negotiations precisely, correctly, with the most careful preparation. And we insist that if we restrain ourselves, if we do not attempt to achieve unilateral advantage, that the same maxims must be applied to us. It will not do that other countries attempt to take advantage of negotiations with us.

In this respect, we are perhaps at a crucial point in our policy of negotiations in which it will have to be tested whether we will be met in the same spirit as the one with which we propose to proceed. This spirit recognizes existing realities, and recognizes that the preservation of peace must be a principal objective in the foreign policy of all countries, that it is inconsistent with such a policy to apply the old maxims of pure power politics, and that the greatest advantage that can be achieved for any country in the achievement of a peace which gives real security.

Having spoken of this general philosophy, let me make a few observations about some of the specific issues that have concerned us lately.

Secretary Sisco will talk to you about the Middle East, and I will confine myself to a few general remarks.

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The first is that while Vietnam may be our most anguishing problem, the Middle East is our most dangerous problem. In Vietnam, we recognize that serious people have disagreements but we also believe that we are on a course which will fulfill the promise that the President made that we will end the war in Vietnam. We do not see how the war in Vietnam could escalate into a general conflagration. So that the real issue in Vietnam now has to do with ourselves and with the ability to carry out the task that we have set for ourselves.

But in the Middle East we are confronting two groups of countries that, over two decades, have developed profound passions. Each of these groups, Israel on the one side and the Arab countries on the other, or some of the Arab countries on the other, are closely aligned to one of the great nuclear powers. But the great nuclear powers do not have full control over the actions of their friends in the Middle East. The great danger is that events that start as local crises can escalate unintended into a more general confrontation. There are other forces at work in the Middle East, which Secretary Sisco can talk about at greater length, that effect the future not only of the United States but of Western Europe and Japan, which are regions that are extremely dependent for the oil supplies from the countries of that area.

This is why it has been a basic objective of our foreign policy to try to bring about more settled conditions in the Middle East. This is why Secretary Rogers announced what came to be known as the Rogers Plan in June which ultimately led to the cease-fire.

We are realistic. We recognize that conflicts that have lasted two decades are not going to disappear magically. We are aware also that it is unlikely that a peace in the Middle East will be made that will equally satisfy all the parties. We recognize that the best that can be is a peace not with which all the parties are equally satisfied but maybe a peace with which all the parties are equally dissatisfied. But whatever may have happened, whatever may be possible, a continuation of the state of conflict has enormous dangers for us, for the Soviet Union, and for the countries of the region.

We have gone through excesses of euphoria, and excesses of depression in this country in recent weeks. We expected too much in July and we are too pessimistic today. But perhaps it is important to point out that the events of recent weeks may have provided a more realistic basis for progress by bringing home to all the parties the sobering fact that the status quo is extraordinarily dangerous, and that however unsatisfactory a settlement, it may be preferable to the uncertainties of what they face today.

Three weeks ago we faced a crisis in Jordan. And as always with dangers avoided, it is not easy in retrospect to prove how close to the brink one really came.

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But the United States faced an enormously difficult problem. We faced the problem that if the radical elements from the outside had succeeded in taking over Jordan, another Mid-East war could easily have developed, and whatever our position at the outset, another Mid-East war with the Soviet Union so firmly established in Egypt contained an enormous risk of a great-power confrontation.

We, therefore, face the problem of doing enough to discourage outside intervention but not so much as to give the other parties concerned the feeling that our moves were inevitable. We had to make sure that the countries that were most concerned would contribute to stability, but not at a level that turned it into more than a purely local contest. And we believe that the outcome of the Jordan crisis has at least given us a time to go back to a more long-range policy, a long-range policy in which all the parties of the region really are given another opportunity to ask themselves what their long-term purposes are to be.

The Soviet Union should have seen how precarious the balance in the Middle East is, whatever temporary gains may be achieved by this or that tactical move.

The Egyptians could have seen that things can easily get out of control, and Israel could have learned or could have seen the dangers of another Mid-East war.

So that when we go back to our domestic efforts, as we undoubtedly shall, we can perhaps do so in a more realistic atmosphere on the part of some of the other countries than was the case previously.

Now, let me say a word about Vietnam. Vietnam is, as I have pointed out, our most anguishing problem. And the debate about it has achieved an almost liturgical quality in which fixed positions tend to be repeated at great length. I have already pointed out that we inherited a situation where 540,000 Americans were in a foreign territory and where, therefore, the abstract choice of how to react to this kind of conflict was not open to us. We have committed ourselves to ending the war in Vietnam and we believe we are on a course of doing it and we recognize the concerns of many others.

One has to understand that in the six years of the war the choices are not as wide as they may have appeared earlier and that anyone taking the negative in these arguments has a certain advantage.

But let me first make a few observations about some of the comments we sometimes hear and then about the recent peace initiative. First, as you know, we are pursuing a two-track policy, a policy of negotiations, a policy of Vietnamization. We are attempting to turn over as rapidly as is possible the major responsibility for the conduct of the war to the Vietnamese. At the same time, we are attempting to negotiate with the other side as rapid an end to the war as they are willing to agree to.

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If the negotiations are successful, we have agreed to give a fixed timetable for our withdrawal and that timetable will be no longer than 12 months.

If the negotiations are not successful, we will withdraw over a longer period of time consistent with the ability to turn over responsibility to the Vietnamese.

We are often told that Vietnamization shouldn't be pursued, that we should emphasize negotiation. After last week, this will be somewhat more difficult to maintain. The major point I want to make is this: Without the policy of Vietnamization, negotiations will not have a chance, but what will make the negotiations go is the conviction of Hanoi that time is not necessarily on their side, that the longer they wait for the settlement the better the prospects for the South Vietnamese to be able to take over responsibility for their own future and the weaker their negotiating position becomes. Americans have a tendency to believe that there is some abstract magic formula that will end the war and the North Vietnamese are skillful in giving the impression that negotiations are like some sort of a detective story in which they throw out vague clues and we guess at an answer and that if we miss, then we will be blamed eternally for having failed to see some obvious hint which was thrown out.

This is not the way it will be settled. The war will be settled when Hanoi becomes convinced, one, that our terms are fair to them as well as to us -- in other words, that they can live with them -- but, secondly, that time is not necessarily on their side. We are not making an attempt to gain at the conference table what has not been achieved on the battle field.

On the other hand, the only issue that is now left in the negotiations is whether Hanoi is willing to have anything other than a total turn-over of political power to its side.

Now let me say a few words about the proposals of last week.

As I am sure you all know, the President's proposals of last week offered a cease-fire, an international conference, an exchange of prisoners, a fixed timetable for American withdrawal and a political settlement which would recognize existing realities in South Vietnam.

Of course the proposals did not spell out every last detail because something has to be left for the negotiations. But what the proposals attempt to do is the following: They attempt to separate the military from the political outcome, and they attempt to tell Hanoi that if it is willing to work with us on a political process that gives all the South Vietnamese a fair chance at the political process, we will accept the political outcome regardless of what the political outcome is, and we will ask the same from them.

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We recognize that defining a free political process in South Vietnam is not a simple matter. The sharing of political power is not the most obvious conclusion to which you are driven by the lessons of Vietnamese history. But we are not saying that the negotiations must be successful necessarily or will be successful, although we believe it can be.

We are saying it must be attempted, and this is what the other side has totally refused to do.

The other side has said that before negotiations can even start we must replace what they call Thieu, Ky, and Khiem. This attempts to present the issue as one of three personalities. But if we face the facts, we are not just talking about a few personalities, for last year the other side insisted that Thieu, Ky and Huong, who was then prime minister, had to be replaced. This year they are saying Thieu, Ky and Khiem. The way they said it is this: They say there must be a provisional coalition government set up before the political process starts. This provisional government is composed of three elements: The Provisional Revolutionary Government, which they control; those members of the Saigon administration who stand for peace, neutrality and independence -- only they know who stands for peace, neutrality and independence; they haven't told us that yet -- and thirdly, all other forces who stand for peace, neutrality and independence. Only they know who stands for peace, neutrality and independence.

In other words, they have demanded a veto on the composition of a government before the political process even starts, in which they nominate one-third and veto the other two-thirds. This is not our definition of a free political process. And it cannot be any fair person's definition of a political process.

We are prepared, I repeat again, to negotiate with them a political process which insulates the act of choice as much as possible from the pressures of the contending forces.

We are prepared to negotiate immediately a ceasefire or, if they prefer, to negotiate those two efforts simultaneously. But we must face the fact that the only issue left now is Hanoi's insistence on controlling the political process before it ever starts. If Hanoi is ever prepared to give up this demand, peace can come quickly.

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Now let me answer a number of comments that have been made since last week, even though we are enormously gratified by the unity that has developed as a result of these proposals.

A number of people say that this proposal with its reference to the progress of Vietnamization means that we are asking the other side to ratify our victory and to put itself at a permanent disadvantage.

This is simply not true. All of our studies show that under conditions of cease-fire the control of Saigon over the population could decline to some extent. And this is logical because a cease-fire will put an end to the movement of organized military activity, but it is much more difficult to control guerrilla actions and terrorists. We are taking a calculated risk.

We are not asking the other side to accept a disadvantage. We are willing to pay a price for the cease-fire in order to bring an end to the war.

None of our studies show that our situation will improve as a result of the cease-fire. The reason we could not do it before was because our studies showed that the results of a cease-fire under the conditions obtaining six months ago might have been catastrophic.

We do not believe that they are catastrophic now. We believe they are tolerable.

Another question that has been raised -- and these are all fair questions -- is why now, or why publicly? Why didn't you make it secretly? Of course, if we made it secretly we couldn't talk about it, so this is sort of a circular question.

All I want to say is that it was the judgment of everybody that the proposal had to be made under these conditions. We had to get the support of the Cambodian Government and the Laotian Government. We had to involve many other countries whom we needed either for an international supervisory force or for an expanded conference.

And rather than have the proposal come out in bits and pieces, we thought it was essential to make it publicly. But the major thing to remember is this: No one can be more interested in bringing this war to a peaceful conclusion than this Administration. No one can be more interested than to make sure that we achieve the minimum objective of giving the people of Vietnam an opportunity to determine their own fate.

We have no possible interest in playing games with the expectations of the American people. But conversely, it is also important that we do not confuse the validity of proposals with their novelty, and that we do not judge the utility of proposals by what the other side has said it will accept.

If we are in a position where we have to break every deadlock with a new proposal, if flexibility becomes identified with our constant movement towards the other

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position, we are giving an incentive not for flexibility, but for rigidity.

If the only test of a proposal is whether the other side has said it will accept it, then sooner or later we will wind up with the extreme program of the other side.

This is why we are encouraged by the support that has been achieved and this is why at the same time we have to ask for some patience. The negotiating tactic of the other side is always to refuse what is put before it. Sometimes I think they would reject our acceptance of their eight points to see whether there is something else that they could squeeze out of the negotiating process.

They are not lawyers trained in the American pragmatic tradition. Their approach to negotiations is different from ours. I am not saying this critically. I am saying this as an analytical fact. Therefore, they will no doubt want to see what else is forthcoming for a while. Nor can their private attitude always be deduced from their public attitude.

But we believe that it is important for this country, not just because of the war of Vietnam, that a war that has caused so much anguish, and so much division, should be ended in a way in which the greatest number of Americans can feel that they have had a sense of participation.

We believe it is important that it be ended as an act of governmental decision and not in response to demonstrations in the streets or other pressures.

So that we can at least then, after the war is behind us, turn to the more constructive tasks with a feeling that as a people we have managed this transition together and in a manner of which we can be somewhat proud.

This is why earlier this year, painful as it was, we felt we had no choice but to resist some of the types of pressures that were put on us, because we believe that the public will not forgive its leaders if the leaders produce a disaster even if the disaster is in response to seeming public pressures.

In 1938, Chamberlain was the most popular man in England. Eighteen months later he was totally discredited even though he had 85 percent of the public behind him in 1938.

We believed, and I think events have somewhat borne it out, that we had to hold the course which we had charted with respect to Vietnamization and we wanted to have the test of what people thought a year afterwards and not in the immediate aftermath of individual decisions.

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We believe that it was important also to hold our course because if decisions are made by demonstrations, they will not necessarily benefit those who are most active in making these demonstrations. But they could easily be taken over by much more elemental forces. So that we even believe that we are: the best protection of many of the groups, many of whom are close personal friends of mine with whom I have been closely associated for most of my life who were most unhappy at various stages of this process.

So then we are back at the original problem. The original problem was that we do not want to be known for our skill in managing crises, but for having started a process which will lead to a more permanent peace.

When the President travelled around the Mediterranean two weeks ago, these were his constant themes. On the one hand he wanted to show that we remained concerned about the stability of the area. But on the other hand, he never ceased stressing the fact that he did not simply want to shore up what existed, but to build something that was more lasting.

This will take some time. And it will not be easy to do. There are many factors in the world that are totally, and others that are considerably out of our control. But I wanted you to know that we don't take any particular pride in having overcome one particular crisis. And we consider even the important objective of ending the war in Vietnam as really only the beginning of our task.

Our long-term goal, and the one that I have tried to explain to you, is to begin in the 70's to lay a foundation for American foreign policy that will endure for several decades, and the major characteristic of which will be the achievement of a lasting peace.

Thank you.

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MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much, Henry.

I am sure you all know now what I meant in
terms of the great depth of background and the analytical
ability of this man who serves the President so well.

Paul Miller is aware of the tactics of you
broadcasters and asked me to get one more commercial in
between each part. He said he wanted, first of all, for
you to know that he is pleased to see so many AP clients
here.

Part of our foreign policy is to be evenhanded,
so I want to say that Mims Thompson also sent his greetings
and welcomes you to Williamsburg, if you get there tomorrow.

I might say, seriously for a second, also that
in answer to the original question about being in this area,
it does involve a philosophical approach which the President
has taken, and that is in terms of trying to bring government
and also trying to bring government leaders more into various
regions of the country.

One of the things we have learned in this process
has been that it has been most helpful for us to hear the
questions from people in various regions, because it gives
you a better insight as to what the thinking is in the
Northeast, the West, the Middle West, or South or.
wherever it may be. So this has been a helpful process
to us, and we hope in terms of the efforts we are making
to provide background not only in these meetings but in
mailings from my office and others reflecting our desire
to be certain that editors and those making decisions around
the country have the best opportunity to look and examine
the facts from as full as possible a position.

Some have said this is an effort to go around
the White House Press Corps. It is not. We have White
House Press Corps represented. They will have copies
of this transcript. They do a job of reporting day-by-day
news and we are trying to balance that, which they do so well,
with that of your job of analyzing policy itself.

To go to our second speaker this morning, Mr.
Joe Sisco, Secretary Sisco is again a man uniquely qualified
for the particular thing he will be discussing; that is,
in terms of the Middle East. He came into this Administration
with a broad background from having worked in the United
Nations as an Assistant Secretary for International Organization.

He is now the Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs. I think all from the President
on down would say, without qualification, that he has done an
excellent job in what Dr. Kissinger has reported to you to
be the most dangerous area in the world today.

He lives with it day-by-day and hour-by-hour and
in the Middle East, I suppose I should add moment-by-moment.

I know no one who is more dedicated, more hardworking,
and who despite the time he puts in overall comes up with
new ideas to look at new problems, no one who does this
better than Secretary Sisco.

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When you look at the fact that -- I remember maybe 20 years ago writing editorials about most of the problems we still have today in the Middle East. I think I solved the problem of how to get the refugees handled 20 years ago in a very brilliant editorial, but no one adopted it and it is still there.

This is the kind of problem which has been so long, and so that you need not only to understand the history and the background of the very volatile people, but you also have to understand the need for never being discouraged in seeking a new way to get at the problem.

This is the kind of input which Secretary Sisco has presented and I have the pleasure now of introducing Secretary Joe Sisco.

MR. SISCO: You, Herb, in your comments remind me of the fact that I too come from a newspaper family. When one talks about the Middle East, I can recall that I could at least solve one aspect of the Middle East in every editorial that I wrote and, at least, Henry, one aspect of it in every lecture that I gave since I am a former instructor of history and international relations.

Henry has already alluded to the fact that perhaps the Middle East is the most dangerous area that confronts us as a country over the next five years. And I think this is the case not only because of the fact that the Arab-Israeli dispute itself has proved intractable, not only because of the fact that there are and have been divisions within the Arab world which make events in the area highly unstable and highly unpredictable, but also because this is an area of potential conflict or potential cooperation between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

And it is this aspect, the USSR aspect, which over the weeks and months has come more and more to the fore. And I think if there was one principal reason for the President's trip to the Mediterranean it was really to make clear the United States' resolve to remain involved in this area with sufficient strength so that whatever diplomacy we pursue is a diplomacy which is credible, a diplomacy that can have some meaningful effect on the area itself.

We have assumed that the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States anymore than the United States wants a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We have also assumed, and I think recent evidence has tended to strengthen this view, that the Soviet Union does not see it in its interest to see a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities occur because it would confront the Soviets with very difficult choices, indeed as it would the United States.

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But we have come to doubt increasingly that
Soviet policy is directed at the kind of peace, at the
kind of stability which is required in the Middle East
if the risks that confront the major powers are not going
to lead to even more serious clashes either of diplomacy
or otherwise.

We have seen two major events occur in the area,
both of which I think illustrate the point that Henry
made, namely, the unmanageability of events in the Middle
East. First we have the death of Nasser. And there is
no doubt that from the point of view of the Soviet
Union Nasser was the principal instrument through which
the Soviets have sought to increase their position and
prestige in the area.

Nasser, in recent months, was the principal
cement in the area. Regardless of the differences within
the Arab world, the prestige of Nasser was foremost, and
certainly one of the pegs of our policy has been that
Cairo, or Nasser in particular, was key, and that if Nasser
chose to make peace regardless of the views of the Fedayeen,
regardless of the views of the more militant Arabs, that
he was in a position to make peace and to make peace stick.

The Egyptians have given, I think in the last
two weeks, a rather impressive example of orderly succession.
However, the leadership which has emerged and will emerge
will not have the same stature, will not be operating
from the same position of strength as did Nasser, particularly
within the confines of intra-Arab politics.

I think there is every sign that the principal
short-range objective of the Soviet Union at the present
time is to consolidate itself with the new leadership.
And since the new leadership does not possess the same
strength of a Nasser, I think we can expect over the
coming weeks that this will be a period of fluidity, this
will be a period of uncertainty, and the leadership
in Cairo will not be in a position to pursue policy with
the same self-assurance as the previous leadership.

And if the principal, immediate objective of the
Soviet Union in Cairo is to consolidate its position,
I think that we should not be at all surprised if we
find a real reluctance to press new initiatives, a real
reluctance on the part of Moscow to press Cairo in the
direction of correcting the situation that has occurred
as a result of the violations of the cease-fire standstill.

So in the days ahead I think we can expect a
certain amount of timidity and not the same kind of vigor
emanating from Cairo as was the case some weeks ago in
pursuing a political solution.

As you will recall, the so-called Rogers plan
had two principal elements. It called for a cease-fire
of at least 90 days and it called for the beginning of talks
between the parties under the auspices of the United
Nations representative, Ambassador Jarring.

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The stop-shooting part of the proposal is in effect. We have achieved and helped to achieve the first cease-fire along the Egyptian-Israeli front since the end of the June war. And this is a development of major significance. And for this reason one of our principal objectives in the days ahead will be to see whether we can get both sides to agree to an extension of the cease fire.

This will be no easy task. Because, first of all, the Israelis have taken the view that they are unwilling to begin talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring unless and until the missiles that have been placed by the Egyptians and the Soviet Union in the 50 kilometer zone west of the Suez Canal are rolled back.

And equally categoric, the Egyptians have said that they do not intend to move one missile.

First, let me say that what is being said in Cairo, what is being said in Moscow, denying violations of the cease-fire, is without foundation. The evidence that we have that there have been violations of the so-called cease-fire standstill is incontrovertible. There are a number of cases where at the time of the cease-fire no positions existed and today there are new positions.

There are a number of instances where at the time of the cease-fire the work on positions had just begun. Today, these positions are completed. There are a number of instances where the positions had been built, but there was no missile equipment in that position whatsoever. Today, a number of these positions contain missiles and missile-related equipment, some in an operational stage, others close to it.

And as we analyze what has happened since the beginning of the cease-fire, there has also been a general movement of the missiles forward closer to the Suez Canal.

So there really isn't any doubt in our mind that there have been violations of the cease-fire standstill, that both the Egyptians and the Soviet Union are responsible. None of this could have occurred without the full knowledge, without the complicity and the very probable participation of the Soviet Union itself.

So as we view the problem ahead of trying to get the cease-fire extended, and trying to get the talks started under Jarring's auspices, it is clear that some formula will be required in order to bring about rectification of the situation that has resulted from the Egyptian-Soviet violations of the cease-fire standstill.

I say this in all realization that the installation of these missiles has had some effect on the balance in the Middle East while not a decisive effect. It has put the Israelis at a greater disadvantage than the situation that existed for them at the time of the cease-fire.

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I do not say that Israeli aerial superiority over the Suez Canal has been lost; whatever adverse effects have occured with respect to the balance we, the United States, are in the process of compensating for some of what has occurred by supplying the Israelis with the kind of military wherewithal that is required.

It is not in the interests of the United States to create a balance in the area that will encourage either side to break the cease-fire. And in the process of trying to maintain the balance in the area, we have time and again made proposals for the beginning of arms limitation talks to the Soviet Union and in each instance we have had a flat turndown.

We have felt during the period in which the United States pursued its political initiative that we exercised a great deal of restraint in whatever we were providing militarily to Israel. But in view of the violations of the cease-fire standstill, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is continuing its supply efforts to Cairo, we do not feel that these two principal developments can be disregarded when we pursue, as we are, a policy of supplying arms in order to maintain a reasonable balance in the area.

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In addition to the death of Nasser where today Cairo is unlikely to be in a position to play the kind of role in the entire Arab world that it has played in the past, there are also the developments in Jordan which have an influence and will have a decisive influence on how the situation in the area will evolve in the coming weeks and months.

Hussein had no alternative but to confront the Fedayeen in this situation militarily. Over the months they have been a series of so-called cease-fire agreements between the Jordanians and the Fedayeen, none of which worked, and in each instance there have been examples of encroachment after encroachment on the part of the Fedayeen. In this particular instance the confrontation between the Fedayeen and the Jordanian government was much more serious than any in the past and the issue became one of whether Hussein, in fact, would survive as the viable leader of Jordan.

You will recall that one of the earliest events was the hijacking of several planes by the Fedayeen. And here the story of the hijacking, the story of diplomatic efforts to release a number of Americans, as well as other nationals, is really a story that is yet to be told, because I think, to put it quite modestly, it was in large measure the result of the diplomatic efforts of the United States quietly behind the scenes that we were able to achieve the release of all hostages without lending ourselves to the kind of blackmail which the militant wing of the Fedayeen was insisting upon throughout the period.

And what basically started out as hijacking and the holding of hostages, the militant wing of the Fedayeen sought to utilize as an issue to further weaken the structure of the Jordanian government and to weaken the position of the King. This was primarily because King Hussein had accepted the American initiative to stop the shooting and to start the talking between the parties under the auspices of the U.N.

So I can tell you, to give you some understanding of what the militant wing of the Fedayeen were doing, it was not only to dramatize the notion of the Palestinian movement that this problem must be resolved by force rather than by peaceful means; you must understand too that the PFLP have consciously sought to utilize the issue of the hostages as another means to try to weaken the King and the problem of the hostages became part and parcel of the tussle between the Fedayeen and the King himself.

The King confronts a very difficult internal situation in the months ahead. However, he has established reasonable security throughout most of the country. We make no claims and certainly the King does not, that this important military victory has resolved the fundamental issue of the Palestinian problem. You will recall that in this particular instance not only was the King confronted with the Fedayeen but at a crucial stage there was a very substantial invasion from Syria of some 200 tanks.

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Much has been said about why Syria decided a few days later to withdraw its forces from Jordan.

I think the first and the principal reason is that the King found that his army was a loyal one, a reasonably effective one, and if there is any principal reason as to why the Syrians decided to withdraw, I would say it was primarily because the Jordanian army, on the ground, administered a very severe defeat to the Syrians in northern Jordan.

Moreover, I think the Syrians realized that in the face of this strong Jordanian resistance, the facade that it had put forth that these were simply Syrian-supported Fedayeen and not regular Syrian forces would have been exposed as a phony, as it was. Because to continue the Syrian aggression it would have been very necessary for there to have been much more direct involvement on the part of the Syrian government itself and the Syrian armed forces, and this in turn might very well have brought into train events that could have led to a serious and direct Israeli intervention.

So that I think these two principal factors, plus the fact that the United States in this particular instance made it very, very clear that no options were precluded, I think these three factors were largely responsible in influencing the Soviet Union in doing whatever it decided to do -- and we have no direct evidence of this -- in encouraging the Syrians in Damascus to call off this invasion.

This prospect of course still remains. There are still Iraqi troops, for example, in Jordan. And the internal situation that confronts the King will take a good deal of effort, not only to bind wounds, but also in pursuing a policy of reconciliation which will maintain the broad support of the people.

And so there have been uncertainties in Egypt in past weeks. There are continuing uncertainties in Jordan. And, third, we confront a Palestinian movement in the area which today is a much more formidable political force than it has been at any time in the history of this problem.

I would only say this very briefly: In our own approach, we have always assumed that if any peace is going to come to the area, it has to take into account the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Palestinians.

However, when one speaks of the Palestinians, it is very difficult to know just what leadership is really calling the tune. If, for example, you take the present leadership of the Fedayeen, you find that the preponderant majority is talking in terms of a solution on the basis of force, a solution on the basis of destruction of Israel rather than on the basis of co-existence with Israel.

So that when I say that, yes, there is a genuine Palestinian problem, it is one that we have and will take into account in any solution.

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It is one that is unavoidable. However, if the Palestinians are to play any role in the foreseeable future in any upcoming political solution, what is required is a leadership which is committed to the notion of a political solution rather than one by force, a leadership that is willing to talk about peace, based on the notion of co-existence with Israel rather than its destruction.

In the next ten days, we will be spending a good deal of time at the United Nations and Secretary Rogers will be involved in a series of intensive discussions with a number of other foreign ministers on this issue.

And our principal objective over the next ten days will be to see whether some formula can be found whereby rectification of the violations of the cease-fire stand-still can take place.

If we can find some formula which is generally acceptable to both sides, then it is altogether possible that talks could get started under the auspices of the U.N. However, I think we must view the next ten days with a good deal of caution because both in Cairo and Amman there is not today the kind of freedom that may have existed a month or two ago, and, secondly, both sides have pegged out some very strong negotiating positions at the outset where one is unwilling to engage in talks unless some rectification takes place, and the other has clearly barred this as a possible compromise.

If the beginning of talks doesn't prove possible, as a minimum I think what we need to achieve over the next month is an extension of the cease-fire so that at least the shooting along the Suez Canal remains stopped and the door remains open to the beginning of talks.

Thank you very much.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much, Joe.

I would like to suggest at this time that we will have a coffee break. We will have to keep this short, because we want to give you the maximum opportunity to ask questions. So we will reconvene here in about 12 to 13 minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

MR. KLEIN: A couple of people arrived late and I would like to run quickly through once more the ground rules.

The program, up until the time that the President arrives, is on a background basis for attribution to Administration sources.

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As I said, we have found that we can provide you with more, I think, the kind of background that you want by keeping on this more informal basis and that is the purpose for doing that.

The information you have is for use after 6:00 P.M. Tuesday. We are sending a transcript to all of you. If any of you have a wrong address in your wires from us, if you will notify one of our people, we will be sure that you get it properly.

Before we go to the questions, I would like to introduce two other people, if I may, who assist me: My deputy, Mr. Jeb Magruder, who you may be talking to, and our local radio and television expert, Mr. Al Snyder.

With that, we will go directly to your questions, if you will direct them to one person or the other. We will be happy to start off.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say that our negotiating position had been made more difficult by the fact that in the last eight years our defense posture had been allowed to somewhat deteriorate?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say that the diplomacy is more complex as a result of the deterioration of our strategic position. Your question implies that all or most of this was due to acts of the U. S. Government. A great deal of it was unavoidable. The Soviet nuclear arsenal was bound to grow and, indeed, has grown independent of what we did, and even if we had a larger strategic force or a more versatile strategic force, the fact would still remain that the Soviet Union possesses something like 1,300 strategic missiles. And that is a different situation from the one that existed when they had 50.

So, it is a combination of two factors.

Q My question is for Mr. Sisco. With reference to the rectification of the missile sites along the Suez, what is the minimum that Israel would accept and is there any chance that the Egyptians and the Soviets would go along with it?

MR. SISCO: It is very hard for me to give you any precise indication as to what the Israelis would consider a minimum. We have an impression that they might be willing to consider something less than total roll-back.

We also have the impression or at least do not take as the last word from the Egyptians the barring of any rectification whatsoever.

One of the concerns, for example, that Israel has, is that a number of these missiles are sufficiently close to the Canal that if Israeli planes were flying on the Israeli-occupied side of the Canal, the range of some of these missiles is such that, if the Egyptians chose, they could knock down some of these planes even though the planes had not actually crossed the Suez Canal on the Egyptian side.

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That is a factor that is involved.

Secondly, the Egyptians themselves have said they have sought to reinterpret the cease-fire standstill to mean that they had a right under the agreement to move these missiles around. Actually, the agreement is very, very clear that there was no such right, but the argument which the Egyptians have used is basically a political argument that runs something like this: They say that unless they can move some of these missiles around they might find themselves suddenly one morning at a great disadvantage with the Israelis in full knowledge as to where these operable missiles are and that they are, therefore, much more open to a serious surprise attack than they might otherwise be if they didn't move these missiles around.

It seems to me that this is a factor that can be taken into account in any formula. And there are a number of others. But I would prefer, obviously, not being too specific, because this is really one of the things that in a formula of one kind or another is very likely to be explored over the next two weeks in our discussions in New York.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the AP had a story yesterday saying ---

MR. KLEIN: I thought we had heard all of those commercials. (Laughter.)

Q. The wire service had a story yesterday +-(Laughter) -- in which they said our relations with Russia have reached a two-year low. This takes in the Nixon Administration pretty much. Would you care to comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say our relations with the Soviet Union have reached the point where some important decisions have to be made, especially in Moscow. I wouldn't characterize our relations yet as having reached a two-year low, but I would say that events in the Middle East and in other parts of the world have raised questions of whether Soviet leaders as of now are prepared to pursue the principles that I outlined earlier; specifically, whether the Soviet leaders are prepared to forgo tactical advantages they can derive from certain situations for the sake of the larger interest in peace.

If a policy continues to be pursued such as the violations in the Middle East, such as other pressures that have been in the news, then inevitably we will be forced into acting in the same manner, or at least in-to attempting to protect ourselves against the tendencies that this would reveal. We would be very reluctant to do it because of the reasons that I have outlined in my presentation.

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On the other hand, we would have no choice. So I am not yet prepared to say that our relations are at a two-year low. I think we are at a point now where decisions have to be made, whether they are going to make a serious effort to settle disputes or whether we are going to each treat everything as just a tactical exercise in order to push the other side into a position of disadvantage.

If the Soviet Union is prepared to pursue a policy of serious conversations, we will prepare to meet them in the same spirit and we have not made the decision that our relations are now at a two-year low.

In these re-readings of Soviet intentions, how seriously does our Government regard this Soviet naval buildup, not just the Cuban thing, but in general?

DR. KISSINGER: We have just made a study of this issue. The Soviet navy, of course, is designed for somewhat different purposes than ours so that their weapons or their ships aren't always comparable to ours. But obviously the Soviet naval buildup reflects a decision to project Soviet power into areas that have not been traditionally accessible to the Soviet Union or for that matter to Russia traditionally. We have no right to object to that. This is part of the way that great powers act.

What we have to consider is the conclusions the Soviet leaders may draw from this capability and the uses to which they may put it. But simply as a statement of fact, the buildup of the Soviet navy does give the Soviet Union a capability to operate in areas such as, for example, the Indian Ocean, and in the Mediterranean in which in the past the Soviet Union could not appear as a naval power.

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Q In that respect, Dr. Kissinger, could you say a little more about what is happening at Cienfuegos in Cuba and what our government proposes to do about it?

DR. KISSINGER: We made a statement a few weeks ago which was then submitted to psycho-analytic and political analysis in leading newspapers in the country, in which the Defense Department stated the facts as we knew them and in which the White House stated its view of the implications if this turned into a base.

We also said that we would not add anything to it until there were further developments, and this remains our policy. So at this moment I wouldn't want to add anything to what was said, but what was said was the result of careful consideration.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was the President's recent in-place cease-fire proposal wholly new, or had not something substantially similar been made at least privately to the North Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: The proposal of a standstill cease-fire was wholly new. The President in his speech on May 14, 1969, referred to cease-fires. What we had in mind then were local cease-fires that were to be negotiated step-by-step as part of a withdrawal process. This was the first time that it was proposed as a separable item, though we don't insist that it be separated; we are willing to discuss it jointly with other issues.

It was the first time that it was specifically proposed as a standstill cease-fire.

So from both of these points of view, it was new. I would prefer simply in reference to future questions not to be asked to comment on whatever private or secret contacts may have gone on, because they would stop being private if I commented on it.

MR. KLEIN: We would prefer to leak those out. (Laughter.)

One other thing I meant to mention earlier, before we get to the next question, is that some may have been wondering about where my co-host is, Mr. Ron Ziegler. He is coming with the President and will join us at the reception.

Q Dr. Kissinger spoke of the possibility of a complete withdrawal from Vietnam, if a negotiated settlement is reached. I wonder if you would estimate the size of our occupation force if there is going to be an occupation force? Did you hear the question or were you busy?

DR. KISSINGER: He was coaching me as to the answer. (Laughter.)

Have you ever seen Herb on television? I always pity the poor interviewer. He has Herb shambling out there. Everyone feels sorry for him. No matter what the interviewer asks him, he gives one of his three standard speeches. He gave me one of them just now. (Laughter.)

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Q You spoke of the willingness of the United States to withdraw all of the troops from Vietnam if there is a negotiated settlement. My question is this: Are you talking about combat troops? Do we have in mind an occupation force after the settlement? And if we do, what would the size of the occupation force be?

DR. KISSINGER: Luckily, I don't have to take on the phrase "occupation force" to which I would object, because the answer to your first question is that in case of a negotiated settlement we would be prepared to withdraw all of our forces and give up all of our bases.

In other words, another new aspect of this proposal was that we have unambiguously agreed to a total withdrawal of all American forces within a definite time limit in a settlement. And, therefore, there would be no force, occupation or otherwise, and no significant American presence, no military presence of the United States in South Vietnam.

Q I hate to keep picking on Mr. Kissinger.

MR. KLEIN: I would like to give him one minute of rest. Who has got one for Joe Sisco?

I will come right back to you.

Q I would like to ask Secretary Sisco, looking down the road as Dr. Kissinger said we were trying to do five or ten years, once we get past the present crisis in the Middle East, what do you see as the ingredient of a permanent settlement there, particularly of the refugee problem?

MR. SISCO: First, insofar as the established states are concerned, I think from the point of view of the Arabs, as close to total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories as can be achieved. This is their principal objective.

Insofar as Israel is concerned, their right to exist within so-called secure and recognized borders is key. Freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran for their vessels as well as the vessels of all other countries is also key.

The Palestinian problem is much more difficult to predict. I would merely say this: That more and more it looks as if the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved simply on the basis of the choice that was to be given to the refugees under the U. N. resolutions; that is, the choice between going back to the homeland, that is now Israeli, or being resettled in the area with compensation.

While there are different Palestinian groups, while there is no agreement as to what the geographical confines of a Palestinian entity might be, more and more the Palestinians are thinking in terms of a given entity, wherever that may be.

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So that if I were to look ahead over the next five years, assuming that we can stabilize this area, it would be on the basis of the Arabs having adopted a live and let live attitude; that is, willing to live alongside of Israel, Israel's meeting at least part of the Arab demands insofar as the occupied territories are concerned, and, lastly, giving expression to the Palestinian movement and very likely in the form of some entity.

MR. KLEIN: We will go back to you now.

Q My question is this: Dr. Kissinger has inferred that our situation in Vietnam has improved considerably in the last six months and that this has given rise to the opportunity now for us to offer this new peace proposal. What I want to know is a reading of the effectiveness of the Cambodian incursion in light of this five and a half months later. Do you consider this an important event in this change?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me first explain the judgment. As I pointed out, we started the studies that led to this proposal last December. After we had made the security studies, we analyzed the impact of three different types of cease-fire on the security situation and on the other factors. That was started early in March.

Incidentally, these studies are conducted within the NSC system and not within adversary procedures in the departments, so that the departments cannot take fixed positions on this. We pull out the personnel and start separate study groups and we do not lift departmental positions. We develop through the analytical process while the analytical process is going on.

At that time, it was found that the only cease-fires that were tolerable involved withdrawal of outside forces or regroupment of outside forces on both sides. After the Cambodian operations, we re-analyzed the problem in July and August and came to the conclusion that the standstill cease-fire with the risks that I have already indicated was acceptable.

Now the changes that the Cambodian operation produced were, first of all, the destruction of the sanctuaries and dislocation of the enemy main force units right near the centers of population supported by the sanctuaries. As a result of the Cambodian operations, the main force units in III and IV Corps have substantially withdrawn from the populated areas, and their supply system has been substantially disrupted.

Also, the closing of the Port of Sihanoukville has eliminated what was then-- we have now documentary evidence-- the major supply route for military operations in III and IV Corps. When I say we now have documentary evidence, no intelligence estimate previously had made that assertion. So this is not confirming a pre-conceived notion. We have found that the supplies that came through there were double the highest estimates that the most extreme military estimate had previously assumed.

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So for all of these reasons, the Cambodian
operation from a military point of view achieved the
objectives for those areas of Vietnam contiguous to
Cambodia. The areas contiguous to Laos -- that is, I Corps
and the Northern half of II Corps -- are not in quite as
fortunate a position, and this is where we would estimate
that some of the losses of control that I indicated previously
might occur. But in military terms, through the disruption
of the sanctuaries -- and it isn't simply the destruction
of the supplies that were in the sanctuaries, it is also that
the whole supply system has been pushed further away from
Vietnam; and therefore the periodic stories one reads about
the restoration of the sanctuaries are quite misleading,
because these fixed installations in which they could
enjoy immunity from attack have disappeared. So for
all of these reasons the situation has improved.

Another major result of the operation was that
part of the South Vietnamese Army has at least jelled
enough now to be a more serious fighting force.
It was the first time that they took on the North Vietnamese
and fought them, in fact defeated them, which gave them
enough confidence so that in conventional type operations
they feel that they can handle themselves, where previously
they were very reluctant to agree to any additional
withdrawal of American forces.

In some areas now they are even somewhat
eager to take on responsibilities.

So the impact on pacification of the Cambodian
operation has been very good.

Of course, if the North Vietnamese start a massive
new infiltration, if they send down their whole
regular army into the South, then we may face a new
situation. But that is not so easy as it looks, because
it is a long distance; it takes three months for a
North Vietnamese battalion to come down the trails. And
while we vastly underestimated the North Vietnamese in 1964
and 1965, we should not make the opposite mistake now of
vastly overestimating them.

We believe the time has come for them not
to accept surrender, obviously not, but to accept the
one thing we are asking of them; namely, a political
process which does not guarantee the outcome to either side
in advance. Tha is all we are asking.

Q Back to Mr. Sisco, driving up in the
car this morning, I heard on the radio that Mohammed Heykal
had written in an article that the Egyptians were now considering
no longer abiding by the cease-fire. I was wondering
whether he is still speaking for the power structure
as he was when Nasser was alive?

MR. SISCO: Bill, as you know, the foreign minister
gave a press conference here about 48 hours ago. What
he said at that time, the Egyptian Foreign Minister,
was that he reiterated their willingness to extend the
cease-fire on the actual beginning of talks.

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What you report as the Heykal view seems to go a shade further than the Foreign Minister. But let me give you my judgment. Our judgment is that neither side really wants to take on the onus for resuming the shooting.

Secondly, our judgment is that each has very good reason to start the fighting. In other words, I think the cease-fire serves the purpose both of Egyptians and the Israelis. I take this Heykal statement primarily as an opening gun prior to the discussions that will take place later this week. We have a session scheduled tomorrow with Eban in Washington. We have a session scheduled with the Egyptian Foreign Minister in New York on Friday. We have a dinner with the Soviets, Gromyko, on Friday evening. So that there will be ample opportunity in the next few days to really explore this.

I would say the chances of extending the cease-fire are good. The chances of really getting the talks started under Jarring's auspices are probably less good.

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Q For Dr. Kissinger, really in two parts: There has been some confusion about to what extent there was a threat of intervention from the United States regarding the Jordanian crisis; and part two, regarding such a threat, would it have been made more credible by the Cambodian incursion?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first part of the question, we deliberately kept our options open in carrying out the principles which I described in my presentation, to do enough to discourage irresponsibility but not so much as to give the sense of irreversibility to what was going on, to restrain outside forces that had already intervened, but not to a point where we were triggering a whole set of other outside forces when it wasn't necessary, and to make sure that the Soviet power in that area would not be used in Jordan.

Here we are in the area of conjecture. We believe that the action in Cambodia, where the President in effect did what he said he would do if the war would be spread and if the other side escalated its action, did help establish the credibility of his action in Jordan. But this cannot be proved. But it is our judgment that it helped.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you made a remark that you believe that if the Administration had submitted to pressures of some segments of the country, that the situation might have been taken over by more elemental forces.

DR. KISSINGER: I can express my own personal view, because for me, given my academic background, the student protest and the academic protest is, of course, a very painful thing to observe.

It is a very painful thing for all of us because no one wants to see the young people alienated from society.

It has been our conviction that if political decisions were to be made in the streets, the victors would not be upper middle-class college kids, but some real tough guys. We have seen examples of that in New York City and elsewhere, of what happens when this trend develops, and the society which makes its decision in this manner will sooner or later be driven towards some form of Caesarism in which the most brutal forces in the society take over.

Therefore, we believe that what really was at stake here was not this President. What was at stake here was the problem of authority in this society altogether.

If you look at the history of the last Presidents, one has been assassinated, another has had a complete collapse of his credibility. This country cannot afford to destroy another President in this manner, no matter

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what its political convictions are.

So what has been at stake here is the
authority not just of this President, but of the
Presidency, and of all institutions. This is why
we felt so very strongly that the elected representative
of the country, the only man who is elected by the whole
country, should do what his best judgment indicated,
for he was committed to ending the war, and that
was his best judgment on how to do it. The penalties
for collapsing in such a situation would go far beyond
the issue of Vietnam. This is no disrespect to the
concern of those who protested it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, during your presentation, you remarked on the seriousness of the conflict between Russia and Communist China. Looking down the road, would you speculate on the resolution of that particular conflict?

DR. KISSINGER: In many ways, this is a
conflict that is very difficult to resolve. It is
probably impossible to resolve for a number of reasons.
First, ideological. It is very difficult in a movement
that claims to represent the truth to have two centers
of orthodoxy, each of which claims that it has the
infallible interpretation of the existing doctrine.

If you look back at the history of religious
conflicts, you will see that this is not an easy matter
to achieve.

Secondly, the control of the Communist parties
around the world is a major concern in the state rivalries
between those two countries. So both of these countries
are being driven by their attempt to control the world
Communist parties into positions that they might not
necessarily otherwise want to take, and actually it is
one of the reasons why there are limits on the
conciliatoriness they can show towards us.

A Stalin who represented the only recognized
central focus for communism could afford to advance
and retreat. This is not so easy for either of the
two big Communist centers now.

Thirdly, and most importantly, there is a
brutal geopolitical fact, which is there are
800 million people sitting along a frontier of
4,000 to 5,000 miles which is populated on the other
side by 30 million Russians. These 800 million
people are showing in their history books in high
school vast tracts of territory on the Russian side
as belonging to China. The Chinese are claiming
everything that was acquired by Russia in the 19th
century as part of China, including all the maritime
provinces on the Pacific, that is to say, Vladivostok
and the whole stretch of territory there. You can
imagine how we would feel -- actually, the Canada
example wasn't so good.

A better example would be if Mexico had a
population of 800 million and showed in its history

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books all the territories acquired by the United
States in 1948 as part of Mexico, and started building
nuclear weapons. We would get uneasy. (Laughter.)

Therefore, there has been a steady substantial
buildup of Soviet military power on the Chinese frontier
since 1965, not just in the last year. It has been
going on since 1965 and there are more Soviet troops
facing China now than there are facing Europe. They are
much further forward in relation to the frontier than
they are in relation to Europe.

This does not mean that with the death of Mao,
who carries disputes to ideological extremes, there
may be not an amelioration of some of the immediate
tensions. Nevertheless, whoever rules in the Kremlin
must be conscious of the fact that a Mao was possible
once, and, therefore, can happen again, and that this
basic fact which I have described is very difficult
to eliminate.

How it will end, whether it will lead to war,
I am not prepared to say. There is no benefit to us
in a Sino-Soviet war, because the upheaval that that
would create would be enormous, and we are not encouraging
in any sense at all Sino-Soviet tensions. We feel free
to deal with both parties.

We indicated last year some willingness to
open negotiations with Communist China, and we are
prepared to apply to Communist China the same maxims
we applied to the Soviet Union; that is to say, to judge
them by their conduct and not on the basis of abstract
preconceptions.

We do not feel that the United States, as
such, has any overriding conflicts with China. But as
far as the Sino-Soviet dispute is concerned, we think
it could ease, but we think it is extremely unlikely
that it can be finally resolved. Though we believe
that a conflict between the two would set off such
convulsions in both Asia and Europe, and would lead
to such a hardening of international relationships
that we would very much hope that it can be avoided.

Q I wanted to ask about one of the points
of our negotiating proposal, that it bore down heavily
on the release of all prisoners of war and return
to the place of their choice.

Does this include the Vietnamese civilians,
and if so, how many do you think there are?

DR. KISSINGER: By the North Vietnamese?

Q Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: We were talking of prisoners
of war; that is to say, people who were captured in
combat.

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I really would have to check where we would classify the civilians that have been kidnapped. The studies we have made indicate actually that this proposal of the exchange of prisoners of war is very disadvantageous to the South Vietnamese. They hold many more North Vietnamese prisoners than the North Vietnamese hold South Vietnamese prisoners, and, I believe, there are only about 400 American prisoners.

So that in terms of numbers it is a most disadvantageous proposal to the South Vietnamese ... and for a long time they were very reluctant to make it because they suspect, with reason, that the prisoners that they will release could fight against them again, while, of course, the prisoners that the North Vietnamese would release, the American prisoners, would obviously not fight against the North Vietnamese again.

Nevertheless, we place so much stress on ending the suffering of those Americans who have been prisoners in North Vietnam that we urged the South Vietnamese very strongly on grounds of humanity and not on grounds of equity to go along with our proposal.

As for your question, the figure that is most often used about the number of people that have been killed and kidnapped is between 20,000 and 30,000. I actually do not have the figures here as to how many of them have been kidnapped or what happened after they had been kidnapped, because they are not usually held in prison camps. What usually happens to them is that they are indoctrinated and many of them are then used to work on the other side, or are released as a warning.

But I will have to look at these figures. I don't know exactly what they are.

MR. KLEIN: Henry, I think it would be correct, also, that we don't know what the American figures really are. Isn't that correct?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right. We know of 400 that they are holding. There may be a few hundred more that are in the missing category. But even if you give the maximum figure, would still make it, in terms of numbers, a very advantageous proposal to Hanoi.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that none of our studies show that our position would improve as a result of a cease-fire. We are taking a calculated risk. I wonder if you would define those risks specifically?

DR. KISSINGER: When we made those studies prior to this Administration, the local officers rated themselves; that is, each province was rated by its MACV representative and they had five categories, A, B, C, D and E. They put each province into one of these categories according to their best judgment.

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What we did was, instead of giving the numbers, we set down criteria such as who is there at what time of the day and night. Then it was we who did the rating; that is, we set out questions which had operational definitions.

Then we created this special studies group in which we asked the various departments and the NSC staff -- it was done under the chairmanship of the NSC staff -- to nominate their people, hopefully people without vested interests on either side of the dispute, and we sent teams into the provinces to check on the answers. And on the basis of that we put together a security map.

What this tended to show, and this of course differs by Corps area, it tended to show not that areas would go from totally secure to totally insecure, but that they would tend to slide maybe half a notch down, as from relatively secure to contested, or from totally secure to relatively secure. In some cases there was no difference. It depended on how close the main forces were, what the degree of governmental control over it was, how strong the guerrilla forces were in the area. But on the whole, we estimated an average decline of some percent. But this average wasn't really very meaningful, for in some areas it was more and in some areas it was less.

Nevertheless, we do not believe that it will overthrow the basic pattern of control and, therefore, we were willing to take that risk. It will also encourage Saigon into competing with the other side by more political means and through efficiency of the government and so forth, and that is a healthy development.

All I am trying to stress is it is not true, as I have seen it written, that we are trying to find a new means by which we can secure and extend the gains that have been made.

We took these decisions really rather painfully and we took of cease-fires that we studied the one that was the most difficult, because we thought it might be the most easy to negotiate. If we had wanted to achieve the objectives of extending control, we could have proposed some other ones that would have done it.

MR. KLEIN: Mr. Patricelli.

Q Dr. Kissinger, some of the most savage and biting criticism of President Nixon's Vietnam policies have come from the Senate, from some men who are known euphemistically as Senate Doves. I hear no criticisms from them of the Soviet Union's deceptive practices in Vietnam, but I do hear rising objection to the Soviet policy in the Middle East. Is it possible that the soviet Union has two policies, or two faces, one of benevolence in the Far East and malevolence in the Middle East?

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DR. KISSINGER: Leaving aside the question of some of the collateral views of some of the critics of the Administration, many of whom supported the recent peace initiative, I think it would be a mistake to say that the Soviet Union has a benevolent face in Southeast Asia and a malevolent face in the Middle East.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I am not saying that.

DR. KISSINGER: I think anyone who says that is probably overstating the case, because in Southeast Asia it would be difficult to describe the Soviet policy as benevolent. Much of the equipment for Hanoi comes from the Soviet Union.

Q I say the Doves call it benevolent in the Far East, and malevolent in the Near East.

DR. KISSINGER: Right. Our view is you can't call it benevolent in the Far East. They are not doing much of anything to help peace. In fact, they are doing nothing to help peace moves. But they are not actively involved.

I also wouldn't call it malevolent in the Middle East. In the Middle East, they have done what I described earlier. They have taken advantage of a tactical situation in a direction which we believe is not even in their own long-term interest. It is to score a point in an area in which it can only exacerbate the situation. One of the problems we have had, quite candidly, is to try to understand just what it is they are trying to accomplish with these moves.

As Secretary Sisco pointed out, they strain the existing balance. But they don't upset it. There are other things we can do to correct the balance unilaterally to some extent.

So one of the things that the Secretary is going to try to do this week and next week is to get a somewhat clearer picture of what it is that the Soviet Union is really about in the Middle East and what it is trying to accomplish.

MR. SISCO: Let me add this postscript. I think what the Soviets have to ask themselves with respect to the Middle East is this: They may be deriving, or at least it may be their view that they are deriving certain unilateral advantage politically speaking from the turmoil. What they have got to ask themselves is this: Is this advantage, whatever the advantage is, sufficiently important to the Soviet Union to take the chances of the situation in the area really getting out of control? And I think you have had two evidences here in the last month. They certainly no more than we could have anticipated the death of Nasser. Certainly the events surrounding the Jordanian situation must give the Soviets a good deal of pause.

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They have not tended over the months, in my judgment, to broaden the parameters of the Middle East. But they have got to ask themselves whether this turmoil, whatever political advantage they think they get from this turmoil, whether this is worth the risk of the situation getting out of hand and having to face up to a possible confrontation between the major powers.

If you go before the June war in 1967, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, regardless of its efforts, was successful in preventing the parties from the kind of hostilities that occurred.

MR. KLEIN: George, you have been trying in the back for sometime.

Q I have a question for Secretary Sisco. According to my almost illegible notes, you have said that in pursuing a policy of trying to maintain a reasonable military balance in the Middle East that we could not disregard the violation of the standstill cease-fire along the Suez and the Soviet supplies to the Arab countries. Can you elaborate on that? Does this mean a larger aid program to Israel than we know of now?

MR. SISCO: First of all, we have a regular ongoing military relationship with Israel, which has been part of our overall relations over the months. The situation that concerns us is a situation where one side or the other is supplied with sufficient arms that one or the other might be tempted to push the button on another war.

Egypt being the larger country, the kind of strategy that it is pursuing at the present time, or at least was before the cease-fire, was really to proceed on the basis of a so-called war of attrition, on the assumption that a country that is a little over 30 million is in a better position to take a man-for-man loss ratio than is a country that is 2-1/2 million in population.

We think that the installation of the missiles has had a qualitative effect on the balance in and around the Suez. I said that it may have restricted the air maneuverability of the Israelis, but it has not jeopardized its aerial superiority.

Why is this important? We think, for example, that the Egyptians today, if they chose, if the cease-fire were broken, are in a better position as a result of the installation of the missiles to pursue this war of attrition against the Israelis at a greater cost to the Israelis. However, we do not feel that the balance has changed to the point where Egypt is strong enough today to cross the Suez Canal and to maintain a foothold on the Israeli side of the Canal itself. We don't feel that there has been that radical a change.

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And the purpose of our ongoing military program with the Israelis has been primarily to restore them roughly to the same position as they were prior to the cease-fire and prior to the disadvantage that has resulted from the violations by the Egyptians and the Soviets.

MR. KLEIN: I would like to suggest that we have short questions and answers.

Peter?

Q Dr. Kissinger, in your comment on the street demonstrations, you said that the Government could not make its policy on the basis of street demonstrations. My question is how much weight, if any, in your policy consideration do you give to the long-range effect of the street demonstration or other Vietnam protests?

DR. KISSINGER: As I indicated, we obviously want to end the war with a united people. We want to avoid a situation where making the peace compounds the already severe divisions that the war has caused. So obviously we listened. For two months after the Cambodian operation I was practically on the White House tour, as an example of the depravity human nature could reach, for every visiting college group, even though our public relations experts pointed out to me that this was not the audience most likely to be swayed by the persuasiveness of my argument. (Laughter.)

Nevertheless, I felt and we all felt that it was very important to give those who had taken the trouble to come to Washington a sense that they were heard, not necessarily that we would agree with them, but that they were heard. Indeed, we have continued. Every group that came in then was told that we would be prepared to see them at regular intervals afterwards, and many of them have come back, as the groups from Princeton and MIT have been back every month since then.

But one has to separate many of these groups who are more distinguished by the intensity of their emotion than by the precision of their thought. It wasn't always easy to do. It is no achievement to be against the war. The problem is how you get from here to the end of the war in a way that does not wreck international stability or domestic stability.

The President had felt very strongly that he owed something not only to those who protest, but to those who don't protest and to those whose sons were either killed or wounded in Vietnam or to those who have spent parts of their lives in Vietnam. So we gave it weight.

We have tried to stay in contact with them. And no doubt it has influenced in many intangible ways many of the ways of looking at problems. But we were convinced that the basic direction that had been chosen was the right one. And as I told a group of my colleagues who came to see me when this happened, we thought that they would feel more kindly a year after Cambodia than they did then. At least, we hoped that they would. We certainly were listening to them.

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MR. KLEIN: I think that is the point we have emphasized. We hope they will look as hard a year from now as they did then.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the event of a complete troop withdrawal, can you think of anything such as open warfare that would cause us to go back in again?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think this is a fruitful question on which to speculate. But the President has indicated that we would not make major military commitments without consulting the Senate. And I think you gentlemen are as aware of the advice we would be likely to get from the Senate in such a contingency.

Q Is any thought being given to funding of Government funds to the scientific community because of the great unemployment -- for example, that is pressing on Rte. 128 in Boston -- to keep these men alive and happy instead of being unemployed at this stage?

DR. KISSINGER: I can't really answer this question very competently. Obviously, we believe that the scientific community is extremely important. I don't know whether the unemployment along 128 is a regional phenomenon or whether it is a nationwide phenomenon, nor do I know exactly what scientists or what group of scientists you are talking about.

Let me look into this question, and if you leave your name with Herb I will write you an answer.

MR. KLEIN: I might just add to that that you do have to look at the fact that in the transition which we already have underway of going from greater wartime buildup to more emphasis on domestic priorities that inevitably some of those that have been connected are caught in that transition stage. Certainly this is a matter of serious concern to the President. We have been pleased with the fact that it is actually moving along and we are making gains in that whole area.

Q Mr. Sisco, we continually hear of the dangers to our oil interests in the Middle East. How great is the danger today to those interests?

MR. SISCO: First let me say that the United States, of course, does not rely on oil from the Middle East in the same way as our European allies or Japan. Because much of the oil from the Middle East goes to European markets as well as Japanese markets. However, from a strategic point of view, it is obvious that if, as a result of developments in the area, the Soviet Union were to get direct access to a number of these oil supplies so that it could deny these supplies to our European allies and to Japan, certainly this is a dagger at the throat of Europe and Japan prospectively which does concern us and would concern us if there were a development of this sort.

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In this connection, you will have noted that in the press conference which the Egyptian Foreign Minister gave the other day he alluded to this possibility. We have sought to achieve a stabilization and a peaceful settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides simply because of the fact that while we have an interest in supporting the security of the State of Israel, our national interests in the area go well beyond any one state.

We have tried to pursue genuinely a policy of friendly relations with as many countries as possible on the assumption that this is the best way to protect these lines of communication, to protect our strategic interests as well as the commercial interests as reflected in oil.

We do maintain good relations with the Saudi Arabians. We have good relations with Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. We certainly have had a setback in recent months in the developments that have occurred in Libya, and there are negotiations that are currently going on between the Libyan government and a number of the oil companies involving increases in posted prices.

So that the question of oil is certainly one of a number of interests that we are seeking to protect. But in saying this, I wanted you to be sure you understood that we are in a rather unique position given the fact that we rely primarily on sources here in the Western Hemisphere. And I don't think it would be in our security interests over the next five or ten years given the uncertainties of the Middle East to have the United States rely more on Middle Eastern oil than it does at the present time.

Q Mr. Sisco, this morning you mentioned the uncertainty as a consequence of Nasser's death. What is your view as to what conditions might exist in the event that King Hussein either were deposed or perhaps killed?

MR. SISCO: First of all, the King, of course, has demonstrated a rather remarkable resiliency, and the prospect or the possibility of assassination is one, frankly, that concerns the man, we know, on a day-by-day basis; and of course there have been a couple of attempts in the last few months.

The King still holds substantial loyalty not only of his army but of the people in the East Bank and the West Bank. There is kind of a simple explanation which has appeared from time to time with our press, which I think gives a rather wrong picture. It is true that the King has relied on his so-called Bedouin army. But what is not realized is that the King's army is made up of over 50 percent Palestinians; and, secondly, that while the Fedayeen, the Fatah, the PFLP purport to represent the Palestinians, our judgment is that the majority of the Palestinians in the Arab world -- and here I mean in Jordan and in other parts of the Arab world -- are in favor of a political solution.

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Our impression is that there is a good deal
of war-weariness in the Middle East, and our problem has
been to try to get at some of the leadership in the
Palestinian movement that favors a political solution.

If the King's leadership were lost in Jordan,
then there are two other possibilities. Frankly, these
were the three options that confronted us in this immediate
situation. One, that the Fedayeen would just take over the
country; two, the possibility that this country would
be held together by a strong army leadership -- and there
is a very, very strong army leadership in this country;
or, third, you might end up with the dismemberment
of Jordan. This was one of the things that concerned us
in this recent situation.

You had Syria that moved in in the North, you
had the Iraqis on the right flank watching the Syrians very
carefully and there was the possibility of an Israeli
intervention. It was altogether possible that the thing
could evolve in such a way that the Syrians moving South
towards Amman, the Iraqis very suspicious of the Syrians
deciding to carve out a piece of northern Jordan, and
this in turn would have probably brought in the Israelis,
because at the end of the June war the Israelis felt
at the time that they had really made a mistake in not
carving out this small portion of North Jordan, which
they conceive largely as an extension of the Golan Heights.

So I would have said there are these three
possibilities, the army taking over, possibly a radical
regime or, thirdly, an actual dismemberment of Jordan.

Q Mr. Sisco, you mentioned an entity which
might be part of the eventual solution to the Middle
East for the Palestinians. What do you mean by an
entity? And if you mean a peace of territory, where might
that be?

MR. SISCO: There are two kinds of problems. First
of all, who speaks for the Palestinians? It is very
difficult to find an individual or a group who can really
be said to represent and to be able to produce the
Palestinians. The second is the question of the
geographical confines. Would such a Palestinian state,
for example, one possibility -- and I only state this
as a possibility -- is the West Bank and Gaza. There are
others who are thinking in terms of a larger entity.

We have no particular policy on this. We have
not made any decisions either with respect to the notion
of an entity or where it might be located. We feel
that this is something that would have to be negotiated
out and the Palestinians are going to have to be a partner
in the peace and at some point consultations with the
Palestinians would be likely to be required.

This is the sort of thing that would have to
come out of the negotiations rather than some Washington-
made, American blueprint as it relates to either the
leadership or the geographical confines of an entity.

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MR. KLEIN: I think you will have to agree we
have covered a wide variety of area.

Q I wonder if Mr. Sisco thought that the choice
of a successor to Nasser by Egypt has been encouraging
or discouraging toward peace in the Middle East.

MR. SISCO: It is very difficult to predict.
The only thing I would say is that the leadership is
coming out of the very small group that was close to Nasser
over the previous decade. These are people who have
announced that they intend to pursue policies similar
to President Nasser's. But very frankly, I don't know
whether the collegium that will be ruling Egypt over the
coming months will be a stable one, whether there will
be arguments over a succession. It is much too early
to tell.

I think it is fair to say that this group is
at the outset a marriage of convenience. These are the
people that were closest to Nasser. Where, as I say,
divisions arise, whether they are able to stabilize the
situation internally and externally I think will depend
not only on how well they meet the increasing economic
needs of their people, but likewise it will be affected
by whether any progress is made in resolving the Arab-
Israeli dispute, whether any progress is made towards a
political solution, and how the movement, the Palestinian
movement itself develops over the coming months.

Q I have a question for you, Mr. Klein.
What is the thinking behind the groundrules that
we can't attribute these formal presentations to Dr.
Kissinger and Secretary Sisco? I think they have been
very impressive. What is your thinking on that?

MR. KLEIN: It comes from a process which has
been developed over a long period of time with newsmen
in Washington. It allows the official more freedom
in terms of a general discussion. So that it is basically
that process which allows this kind of indepth thing
where each word is not quoted directly, doesn't have to
go directly back to him. There is no hiding of the facts.
I am well aware of the fact that people will know that
they came from this general meeting. But it has been
a successful practice over a long period of time in terms
of how newsmen felt they could best get into background.
It is one which also, I would have to say, is debated
by some as well.

I think basically if the rule were to change it
would probably come because newsmen felt that they wanted
to change it in some way. We could certainly look at
that as well.

Q Dr. Kissinger, assuming that the conflict
between the Arabs and Israelis cools down, at least for
the next five years, the Russian presence of course is still
in Egypt. I am wondering if you would look ahead five
years. You have said we are not certain what the Russians
want. What do you think they want and how will the United
States counter this, if they expand their presence in the
Middle East?

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MR. KLEIN: Do that in one minute. (Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: There are a number of processes going on in the Middle East. One is the Arab-Israeli dispute. The other is the thrust of some of the Arab radical movements independent of the Arab-Israeli dispute against the West or the United States. The third is a Soviet military combat presence in Egypt.

We have made it clear that we oppose a Soviet military combat presence in Egypt as a permanent feature of the Middle East landscape. And therefore we would expect that the removal of it would be part of a settlement in the Middle East. How we would go about doing this and by what methods or what our specific measures would be, I don't think I want to speculate about.

I just saw that the pool from Washington is here. I just want to call to their attention that the word "expel" was not used. (Laughter.)

MR. KLEIN: You don't even know how to spell it, do you?

DR. KISSINGER: I do, but they don't. (Laughter.)

MR. KLEIN: When we depart from here in a few minutes, I might just call your attention to the fact that the reception where the President hopes to meet each of you personally will be in the Terrace Room, which is back and then upstairs to the right, I am told. That will also be the room where we will have not only the reception but a short buffet.

Now we will go to another question.

Q A quick one for Dr. Kissinger. How did you manage to persuade Vice President Ky not to come to Washington this month? (Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: It was my formidable--(Laughter). No, he actually made this decision quite independently on the basis of weighing all the facts.

MR. KLEIN: Very good answer, too.

Ron Ziegler, the President's Press Secretary, just arrived. As I told you, he has been traveling with the President. I wanted to take this opportunity to also introduce him.

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