Rolf van Baarda

Some Observations on NATO Defense Policies

I.

This paper originated as a reaction to some discussions of NATO defense problems in the Center for International Affairs in the course of which NATO defense policies came in for some highly critical questioning. This paper therefore does not purport to contain a full exposition of what NATO stands for and of the great many complex and intricate problems this organization and its members are wrestling with. I have rather tried to concentrate on those observations, assertions and questions which to me seemed to go to the very core of our collective military effort under the Treaty. At the same time account was taken of the chapters directly or indirectly relating to NATO defense policies in the following works:

*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* by Henry A. Kissinger
*Limited War* by Robert E. Osgood
*NATO and the Future of Europe* by Ben T. Moore
*Power and Diplomacy* by Dean Acheson
*NATO, the First Five Years* by Lord Ismay
*Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* by Raymond L. Garthoff
*NATO, A Critical Appraisal* by Report of the 1957 Princeton University Conference
*War and Peace in the Space Age* by Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin

as well as a number of fairly recent articles in political and military periodicals.

2

II.

This paper does not aim to explore the degree of probability of major
Soviet aggression against Western Europe and North America separately or simul-
taneously, or for that matter of any Soviet military attack. As regards the
threat which Communist Russia--and China--represent to the Western World, this
paper rests on the following assumptions which I believe to be generally valid.

The Soviet long-range objectives remain as before: Soviet Russian
domination of a world converted to Communism. Whereas the Soviets have amply
demonstrated that they do not hesitate bodily to eradicate leaders of the opposing
classes (Katyn!), their aim is not to wipe out "foreign" peoples in an utterly
destructive assault, but to subjugate them to the Soviet Union, preferably through,
or accompanied by the establishment of a Communist regime. However, where there
is opposition between the two sides of this double-edged aim, power politics
take precedence over doctrine, realism over idealism, expansionism over conversion,
cynicism over missionary seal.

The flexibility of Soviet tactics so often in evidence is greatly
favored by the absence of any fixed target date for the achievement of the ul-
timate goals. There being no rigid time schedule, the Soviets are free to take
full advantage of their conscious policy of shifting the areas, methods or even
the momentum of their pressure in response to international and internal obstacles
or to capitalize on opportunities as they seem to open up. Conversely, where
Soviet tactics are clearly rigid--as in the case of German reunification and the
control of the Eastern European nations--the dictates of old-fashioned national
security as assessed by Moscow assert themselves over possible long-term gains
in terms of winning the world for Communism.

Although Soviet tactics in general are characterized by a high degree
of flexibility, Soviet armed might would appear to be an immutable element in
the arsenal of methods. Even in the course of the era since the immediate

3

aftermath of the second World War, the USSR repeatedly has manipulated its armed forces as an instrument in the struggle for global domination (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, West Berlin); it has fomented and supported armed insurrection (Greece); it has resorted to outright, blunt threats of missile warfare, no less than to ruthless, bloody repression by its regular military forces.

The re-equipment of the Soviet Armed forces, particularly of the Army --far and away the world's biggest army that is--with a variety of nuclear weapons, has been pursued vigorously. Whereas until some years ago the overall build-up of Soviet armed forces could be characterized as having a predominantly defensive character, recent Soviet concentration on long-range submarines, strategic bombers, and long-range ballistic missiles, high-yield nuclear weapons and other additions to its panoply, would appear to vitiate this epithet.

One of the major roadblocks on the Soviet path to world domination is the military strength, political cohesion, economic soundness and moral fortitude of the Powers allied under the North Atlantic Treaty. Relentless Soviet diplomatic as well as less diplomatic activities directed against NATO and the implementation of its defense plans, dating from before the actual conclusion of the Treaty and reaching a crescendo at every major increase of its strength and adequacy, have born this out. (Accession of Greece and Turkey, of Germany, introduction of nuclear weapons, IRBM bases, etc.) As long as the overall Soviet-Communist aims remain the same, and as long as the Western World stands fast, one of the major objectives of Soviet policy will be, perforce must be, the destruction of NATO, the liquidation of US overseas bases, the withdrawal of US forces from Europe, the political cleavage of the Atlantic Alliance, and the isolation of the US. Any means which contribute to these aims without excessive cost or risk to the Soviet Union will be employed.

4

One final observation with regard to the nature of our opponents. I am struck by a tendency on our part to ascribe to Soviet leaders a near-perfect degree of rationality. Granting that by and large the Kremlin has demonstrated a cold-blooded rationalism which distinguishes it from the fascist type of totalitarianism, it seems equally incontestable that the Soviet Union has committed momentous blunders in flat defiance of what, even from Moscow's point of view could be regarded as rational considerations (Marshall Plan, Korean issue in the Security Council, Pasternak). The present day foremost Soviet leader is known to be apt to act rather more emotionally than Stalin. Moreover, the less-than-absolute sway of rationalism over Soviet actions is compounded by a cynical disregard of many of the forces which keep us in check.

Though we must all hope that the Communist revolution eventually will spend itself, and that as more undistorted information pierces the iron curtain a better understanding of the West will gain ground, to fit our Western policies to the assumption that the Soviets will always be governed by rational, sensible considerations to me would amount to a criminal abdication of responsibility.

Thanks to our growing strength and cohesion, the danger of a major armed attack by the Soviets on the West may have somewhat receded. "Nevertheless," as Lord Ismay said, "the threat remains, and it would be a mockery of all the exertions and sacrifices that have been made if the members of the North Atlantic Alliance were, under whatever pretext, to allow their unity to be disrupted."

### III.

I do not intend to embark on a detailed analysis of the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its method of operation and its non-military activities. But as much of the outspoken or implied criticism of NATO

5

would seem to rest on a somewhat inaccurate understanding of the character and consequently of the powers and the limitations of NATO and of what it was designed to do, I will try to bring out its essential features in a few words.

The North Atlantic Treaty, concluded in 1949, is an alliance of sovereign states for collective defense against armed attack on one or more of the partners, such an attack to be considered as directed against all. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, set up in pursuance of the Treaty, has been provided with elaborate, multi-national machinery, evolved gradually in the light of experience over the years. The Allies have agreed on strategic concepts for the integrated defense of the Treaty area; they have assigned or earmarked the near-totality or a considerable part of their armed forces to unified, integrated NATO commands, adopted common defense planning, uniformity of training and some degree of burden-sharing.

NATO is not so much a regional organization determined by geographical accident as an association founded on a community of interests in certain fields and in a particular area.

NATO's collective defense build-up is founded on the principle of self-help and mutual aid. From its very origin the US has made it clear that American aid would be forthcoming to the extent that the recipient countries make a determined effort themselves. Thus even in its first year the Mutual Defense Assistance Program amounted to no more than one-fifth of the defense expenditures of the beneficiary nations.

Although NATO, in the words of its first secretary-general has become "... an experiment in international relations unprecedented in peacetime," it labors under serious limitations inherent in any purely inter-governmental body. NATO is no supra-national community to which member states have transferred or delegated some attributes of national sovereignty and responsibility. To be sure, the Permanent Council has effective powers of decision, but these are exercised by reconciling national viewpoints and--formally at least--the rule

6

of unanimity applies throughout.

But I submit that in the present state of international society and considering the tremendous disparity in power and responsibilities between the members of the fairly heterogeneous group that makes up the Atlantic Alliance, this might well be the only realistic solution. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 2 and much time and effort spent to develop activities in pursuance of this clause, the North Atlantic Treaty's predominant purpose so far has remained one thing and one thing only, viz., to secure the interests of its members in a certain area against military aggression. It seems questionable whether this essential but nonetheless limited objective in itself constitutes a sufficient basis for attempts at union constructions.

But the foregoing does mean that if we want to revise and revamp NATO, it is in our respective national administrations and parliaments that we have to campaign.

NATO was designed to aim not with uprisings in the satellites, revolutionary changes in the Near East, Communist subversion, Soviet economic and political penetration or even indirect aggression, but with overt military attack, primarily on Western Europe. It originated and developed as the Western European and North American reaction to the manifest danger which the Soviet Union represented to the Free World since the end of the second World War.

When after the Communist invasion of Korea the North Atlantic Council on the proposal of the United States resolved to integrate the national contingents assigned to the common defense and place them under central unified commands, the mission of these forces was expressly stated to be not only to deter aggression but also to insure the defense of Western Europe. Since that Council meeting in September 1950 great strides indeed have been made in translating this concept into actual capabilities in terms of organizational structure, staff planning, manpower, equipment, arms, infra-structure, and--lately--combat-ready

7

forces in being. NATO's first mission remains the deterrence of aggression, but the build-up of forces, training, armament and common exercises are very much designed for fighting a war if and when aggression should nevertheless occur. Nobody who has been connected in any way with the various highly realistic wargames that have been conducted over the years can harbor any doubts on that score.

## IV.

The strategic concept underlying NATO defense planning is based primarily on the assumption of a major Soviet effort to force a breakthrough in the central European sector with or without simultaneous offensive action. elsewhere. The "forward strategy" concept calls for the defense of Western Europe as far to the East and ceding as little territory as possible. The implementation of this "forward strategy" rests on two main elements. A "shield" of--in the central sector--predominantly ground and tactical air forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and a "sword" of strategic striking forces largely of the US Strategic Air Command and the British Bomber Command remaining under exclusive national control but--and this is one of the fundamental, crucial understandings underlying the military and political viability of NATO--in fact committed to the common defense of the NATO area in the event of a major aggression. Correspondingly, bases for use of the US Strategic Air Force have been made available on the territory of some of the European NATO members and in some adjacent countries.

Although in accord with NATO's mission its military posture is overwhelmingly defensive, the Atlantic Alliance has some redoubtable strategic strike capabilities of its own in the naval forces earmarked for the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT), in the American Sixth Fleet assigned to the Allied Forces Southern Europe under SHAPE, and lately in the intermediate range ballistic missiles directly under SACEUR.

8

The importance of NATO in the minds of the people of Western Europe, the loyalty and readiness to make sacrifices it can command, is commensurate with the promise this organization holds for the protection of their territory.

To these peoples, debates on the relative merits of strategies which do not include the defense of Western European territory against a possible Soviet onslaught as an immutable objective can only be of academic interest. The phrase "forward strategy" has become more than the basic military concept for the defense of NATO's European territory, it has become a political maxim. To Europe atomic liberation after Soviet occupation is almost a contradiction in terms.

An exacting military alliance which cannot protect the territory of the Allies from being overrun by the Soviets, in the nuclear age will seem worth neither the burden nor the risk that it entails. Instead people will tend to accommodate themselves to the seemingly inevitable and their eyes will focus on Moscow rather than on Washington.

Differences of opinion, on the best means of implementing the forward strategy, sometimes influenced by political considerations, will exist: how strong a shield, how soon the sword, how large an American and British ground commitment, how much reliance on nuclear weapons, etc.

There is certainly no tendency in Europe to underrate Soviet armed might to an extent that it is believed that a major Soviet attack could be held indefinitely without the long-range strategic forces being unleashed against the enemy. But the shield forces will have to be sufficiently strong to contain a major attack until the effects of the air-atomic sword make themselves significantly felt on the enemy's forward thrust. Much is the only meaningful concept for the defense of Western Europe in the eyes of the people most directly concerned.

9

V.

Let us examine this question of how strong the shield in Europe should be more closely. At one end of the scale we will encounter the so-called trip-wire concept, at the other extremity, the concept of combined forces packing such defensive and retaliatory capabilities that they could by themselves deter and defeat any enemy action.

The trip-wire, or plate-glass window concept--to use another graphic expression--although having stirred up a great deal of international discussion, was never even considered in NATO. Under such a concept the NATO forces in Europe would consist of a mere string along the Iron Curtain so as to obtain early warning and to emphasize that any crossing of the line would entail massive retaliation. Obviously, at the time NATO was conceived, defense plans had to be based on something like the trip-wire concept and reliance on the US air atomic retaliatory power was heavy. Insofar as an extra stimulant to develop a different strategic concept was needed, it was provided by the Soviets' gaining a posture amounting to nuclear plenty and by the Korean War.

Suppose we were to rely on the trip-wire concept in the present state of power relationship. It would present an enemy bent on destroying NATO with these alternatives.

1) If convinced that any, however seemingly insignificant, crossing of the watershed actually would unleash massive retaliation, the most promising course would be to concentrate on a simultaneous devastating surprise attack against the Allied strategic forces wherever they are. Although there can be little doubt that the Soviets at the same time or subsequently would make a concerted effort to subjugate Western Europe they probably would try to keep this prize as much intact as possible. From a strictly material point of view, considering the alternatives in the nuclear age, the trip-wire concept therefore

10

still might be the least unattractive to Europe if it could be relied upon;
that is, if either the deterrent or the enemy strategic assault could be 100%
effective. . .

2) If the Soviets had considerable doubts about the promptness of Allied retaliatory counteraction even after serious provocation, that is, if the deterrent would fail in its main purpose, they might gamble on confronting the US and Britain with a fait accompli and concentrate on overrunning Europe on, say, Christmas Eve. Then the indeed agonizing dilemma for the US and Great Britain would be compounded by the greatly increased hazards of a new military proposition: not only to defeat the Soviets entrenched in all of the Eurasian continent but to liberate Western Europe without wholesale devastation.

3) If not fully convinced that any crossing of the line will mean all-out war the Soviets could avail themselves of another option which a trip-wire defense line seems to offer par excellence: local, in time and place apparently disconnected incursions, perhaps by proxy, on a scale large enough to reap some gains but small enough not to trip the wire. And the wire will not lend itself to easy tripping when it is in fact tied to massive retaliation as the only reaction.

The decisive factor influencing our opponent under the trip-wire concept therefore would appear to be his assessment of the degree of probability that the deterrent will be promptly used in response to aggressive moves on different scales. It may be submitted that our obvious intellectual and moral preoccupation with the consequences of massive retaliation in the nuclear age, as well as the almost total absence of civil defense preparations, might tempt the Soviets to take quite a few calculated risks under this defense concept.

If not a trip-wire, let us turn our attention to the opposite proposition:

11

Even if the European societies could meet all the grim conditions for the realization of a self-sufficiency concept in defense, it would appear to be doubtful that this posture in fact could be achieved. For one thing, because of the shallowness of Western Europe particularly as a strategic staging area, for another on account of the extreme vulnerability of its over-populated and highly integrated societies.

The preconditions for any serious attempt at self-sufficiency would include a tremendous rise in productivity, the standard of living remaining stationary, or a drastic cut in the level of subsistence and the comforts of daily life whilst keeping up productivity, or--most likely--both; acceptance of near-absolute government control in enterprise and private life, so that production and human activities can be rigidly channeled towards the new goals; uninterrupted supply of resources from overseas, particularly the USA and a singleness of purpose and willingness to sacrifice not to be expected in peacetime democratic societies.

I do not think that we need discuss this proposition any further, its desirability apparently being wholly academic.

If it is futile to strive after self-sufficiency, if it is foolish to rely on a tripwire, how strong then a shield?

The shield forces should be adequate in size, training and equipment to nip in the bud small-scale military incursions, probing actions and accidentally arising local slashes by the instant application of a measure of counteraction best suited to this purpose and proportionate to the occasion. The shield should be strong enough to compel an enemy, relying on conventional weapons, to concentrate his forces for a break-through, thus offering suitable targets; strong enough also to dash any hopes the opponent may cherish of overrunning Western Europe overnight by employing any means. But neither so strong as to risk conveying to the Soviets and perhaps the European NATO partners the impression that

12

the United States will be content to leave the fighting to the forces available
in the tactical theatre should the enemy force the issue. Nor so strong as
to give the people of North America a false sense of security.

VI.

In view of the political impossibility for the Allies--constrained
as they are to maintain and raise their standard of living--to match the Soviets
man for man, division for division or on the basis of any adequate ratio, it
is imperative for the shield forces to have a considerable and variegated
nuclear capability. But not only are we faced with a high preponderance in
military manpower; our opponent operates from the depth and breadth of the
sheer infinite landmass of Eurasia, affording him a freedom of movement which
we in Western Europe greatly lack. This is doubly grievous in the nuclear age
with its dictates of wide dispersal and extreme mobility. The Western European
peninsula of the Eurasian continent simply no longer offers sufficient space
for an adequate defensive posture without reliance on the terrific fire power
of nuclear weapons. We have no choice but to resort to nuclear weapons at an
earlier stage of hostilities so as to compensate for both manpower and space as
well as for our conceding the first blow.

Thus the question is not whether the shield should have a nuclear
capability--in fact that matter was settled years ago--but how and to what extent
to equip NATO with nuclear weapons.

Accepting for the sake of argument a rough distinction between tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons in which anything with a range of up to 600
miles and a yield of up to 20 kilotons is considered tactical, the following
questions can be identified:

Should the NATO assigned forces of the European Allies be equipped
with tactical atomic weapons or can the desired posture be achieved by attaching

13

American and possibly British atomic support units to the European forces?

Should NATO have its own strategic nuclear striking forces or can it continue to rely on those of its most powerful members?

If NATO is to remain without a strategic sword of its own, should NATO claim control of the strategic forces of its strongest members?

VII.

Let us first see wherein a tactical nuclear capability at present consists.

Fighter-bombers of the tactical air commands with a radius of approximately 500 miles and easily capable of carrying 20 kiloton bombs; pilotless aircraft like the Matador with a range of 600 miles and a 20 kiloton warhead; guided missiles like the Redstone and Corporal with ranges up to 200 miles; the Honest John rocket, the 280 mm. gun, and the 8" howitzer, all with a 20-mile range, and before long possibly the 155 and 105 howitzers with ranges of 12 and 6 miles respectively. The minimum yield of nuclear warheads and shells at present probably stands at about 1/10 kiloton or 100 ton TNT equivalent.

For the next few years, smaller, lighter delivery systems organically incorporated in units below a regiment are not likely to become widely distributed. Thus from an organizational point of view and on condition that all the forces are being actively trained in nuclear warfare, the atomic capability for the NATO shield for the time being could be provided in the form of US support units attached to Allied divisions.

But it is subject to serious doubt whether it would be a wise policy to maintain so marked a distinction between the American and continental European NATO forces. For one thing it would facilitate Soviet attempts to ban nuclear weapons—at least from Europe—and to drive a wedge between Europe and

14

[LC]

the US; for another it would emphasize Europe's dependency and undermine its fortitude. It would make for crises of confidence between the Allies, and aggravate the always delicate task of maintaining harmonious relations between coalition forces--and their commanders!--particularly in times of stress and trial. Even the present solution in which some selected European units are trained in the use of specific nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads and shells are stock-piled near these units in the European countries but under American custody, will have to be considered an intermediary one. Considering the disruption of a possible nuclear surprise attack, I doubt that this solution is satisfactory from the military point of view. But European pressure to abolish the fundamental difference in control of nuclear firepower will certainly be mounting, if only for this one reason: without necessarily questioning the allied fidelity of their big partners, the European governments will want the physical certainty that these weapons will be available to them when the hour, their hour strikes.

In this connection it does no harm to keep in mind that although the North Atlantic Treaty in its crucial article 5 stipulates that "...an armed attack against one or more of the Parties . . . shall be considered an attack against them all," and furthermore that " . . . if such an attack occurs each . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked . . .," the form and means of such assistance in the last resort are those deemed necessary by the assisting Power. Without wanting to make too much of the less than one hundred per cent automatism of this clause, which can be explained in its historical context and which to a large extent has been bypassed by the adoption of integrated forces and a unified command, the fact remains that the people in Europe, once under Soviet fire, prefer not to be dependent on a decision from the White House for their most effective--local--defense.

15

Equipping the NATO shield forces with nuclear weapons however should certainly not be effected at the price of the ability of these forces to suppress a localized incursion with conventional means. Nuclear weapons should supplement, not supplant, our conventional means here.

Nuclear weapons would serve the purpose of decisively strengthening the shield force for two of its tasks: namely to help to deter all-out war, and to contain a major attack if the Soviets should decide on a final showdown. As a means for accomplishing the third and fourth tasks of the shield forces: to deter local incursions and to smother these in their initial stages if they should occur, nuclear weapons might be more self-defeating in the densely populated, economically closely integrated and highly vulnerable parts of Europe than anywhere else. A defense against local transgressions based on nuclear weapons here would indeed be so incredible as to pose no deterrent at all. If our NATO shield forces for all of their tasks were to become unalterably committed to nuclear weapons we would be wide open indeed to the demoralizing effects of the then probably recurring questions: is resistance worth the price?

VIII.

Although some of the considerations outlined in the preceding chapter also have a bearing on strategic weapons there is this important difference. The tactical nuclear weapons of the shield forces indispensable to the direct territorial defense of the European NATO area have to be located locally; they are tied down in one theatre for a given set of purposes. The long-range, highly mobile striking forces of the major NATO partners not only have a global function, but can be employed for that purpose from distant staging areas. They can be brought to bear on the European theatre as well as on any other at a few hours notice. The whole strategic thinking in NATO is based on the assumption that a major Soviet attack on NATO Europe will instantly bring the US and British

16

strategic striking forces into play.

Now NATO is not some abstract, idealistic concept somewhat opposed to the day-to-day, concrete interests of its members. On the contrary, NATO has been created for the very protection of their vital interests by the adoption of the principle of collective security. When it comes to a threat to the survival of our world, NATO commands all of the military power, the resources and the resilience of its members. The strategic striking forces of the US and Great Britain, although they have a role to fill outside the NATO area, are as much a part of the collective military establishment of the North Atlantic Allies as the forces already assigned to or earmarked for NATO commands, as for that matter are the national territorial guards, etc. The difference resides entirely in the manner of control: national rather than integrated.

The question whether NATO should have its own strategic nuclear striking forces, apart from those noted earlier, therefore becomes meaningful only either insofar as an affirmative answer would lead to an increase in the sum total of Allied strength or in the light of a seeming conflict of interests.

With respect to the first proposition, only a qualitative contribution to the overall retaliatory deterrent developed by the European powers would have any real significance, as the US and Britain already wield plenty of sheer destructive power. But in the fields of guidance, submarine warfare, air defense and overcoming air defense, more sophisticated missiles, etc., any new development could be of tremendous importance. The burden the European members could assume in the field of refinement of strategic weapon systems can, however, only be limited; it has to be an additional burden, of course, as their first and natural task is to maintain the shield.

As to the second proposition, personally I cannot envisage that in the case of an attack imperiling our common shield in Europe, and thus the vitals

17

even of the Western Hemisphere, the US would fail to draw the sword. Nonetheless, it may not be the wisest policy to rely entirely on understandings and convictions. Insofar as it does not detract from our overall strength, why should the Supreme Allied Commander Europe not have direct authority over strategic striking forces other than those of the Sixth Fleet? After all, the US and Britain have responsibilities for keeping the peace in many areas outside NATO, whilst the European Allies would prefer not to be wholly dependent for their strategic retaliation on partners who initially may not be in the direct line of verbal or actual fire. Then again, the Soviets may doubt that the US would risk nuclear annihilation for Turkey, e.g., whereas the unleashing of its ultimate weapons by a small nation driven to desperation may appear more credible.

But we should distinguish between physical dislocation of the strategic weapons systems and their control, which could either be exercised by SACEUR or by the members individually.

Generally speaking all of the European NATO area is a very poor place for the establishment of strategic bases. The area is so shallow that these bases could hardly be provided with adequate warning and protection, whereas this very factor would increase their magnetic attraction to possible enemy strikes. All of the European NATO countries, including Great Britain, are within easy striking distance of the about 1,200-mile-range Soviet IRBM's, against which there is not an imminent probability of defense. To exert a meaningful deterrence, strategic weapons systems based in this area would have to be of a type with a reaction time measured in minutes. Present-day liquid fueled ballistic missiles e.g. obviously do not qualify. Establishment of strategic bases under SACEUR's control in areas peripheral to the European theatre, particularly in Africa, could only be considered for long-range missiles; moreover, to some extent it would vitiate one of the main attractions to the European

[LC]

18

NATO members, to wit, the sense of direct, physical control. If the promising development of solid fuel missiles further materializes, however, even if only for intermediate ranges, both the overall deterrent strength of NATO, and the position of the European NATO powers individually would be greatly enhanced by having these missiles available in the European NATO area. The whole problem may acquire a still different character when--as General Gavin forecasts--solid fuel missiles become really mobile in the sense of being adapted to overnight airlift to easily concealed mobile launchers.

On the matter of whether SACEUR or the national military authorities should be responsible for unleashing strategic weapons in the European NATO area, the trend of the development of our Allied cooperation under NATO obviously points to the Supreme Commander. The strategic strike potential, may be even more than early warning and air defense, and should be centrally controlled instead of being broken up along national frontier lines. The only valid reason why SACEUR possible should have control of some strategic striking forces rather than having all of NATO's strategic capability centralized under the Military Committee (or its Standing Group) is predominantly geographical and psychological; it should be considered as a concession to a principle, not as an ideal solution.

It may be argued that control of strategic retaliatory weapons by SACEUR would not provide for Soviet threats against a NATO member individually in connection with a non-NATO issue. When it comes to the Soviets directly threatening one of the NATO members, however, the occasion will be of secondary importance. It may be recalled that when the Soviet Union threatened Great Britain with missiles in the Suez crisis in 1956, the US, although in the UN voting with the Communists against Britain and France, warned Moscow explicitly that the implementation of any such threat would meet with appropriate US retaliation.

19

True, the limited strategic retaliatory capability which the European NATO forces under SACEUR could possibly achieve would never in itself pose a threat sufficient to deter an all-out war or an opponent not convinced that an effort to overcome Europe would unleash the US retaliatory forces, but it could wield a decisively discouraging influence in less extreme situations. Man is infinitely stronger than a wasp, but he will treat this modest creature with due circumspection.

But in acquiring some kind of a retaliatory capability, Europe, as noted before should be careful not to be drawn into a defense policy which might tempt the US mentally to disengage itself from its responsibilities under article 5 of the North Atlantic Alliance and to adopt a "wait and see" attitude in the face even of a major Soviet aggression on NATO-Europe.

## IX.

The third proposition was whether NATO should seek control of the strategic air-nuclear forces of its biggest members if it cannot have its own.

This proposition probably would amount to placing the US Strategic Air Command and the British Bomber Command under the composite, multinational authority of NATO's Military Committee or its executive Standing Group. However, these commands have a missions which is related to the world-wide responsibilities of the US and Great Britain; the role of these strategic forces transmits the boundaries of NATO. Unless the territory to which the North Atlantic Alliance is applicable were to be extended globally it is hard to see how these commands could be subordinated to NATO.

The solution here clearly lies in the realm of close political consultation and coordination of defense planning rather than in that of integration. In this way NATO has indeed a voice in the control of these tremendous retaliatory powers; informal and not decisive, but nonetheless a voice.

Finally, let us recognize that it would hardly be realistic to expect

20

more. As long as the units of international society remain sovereign nations and a universally accepted authority an illusion, we cannot expect the major antagonists to surrender final and exclusive control of their weapons of ultimate recourse.

## X.

On the matter of defense questions of the North Atlantic Alliance in general let me state my belief that in view of the highly unequal distribution of power among its members and the differences in the type of military threat to which each may be exposed, in the long run the most satisfactory and certainly most efficient constructions are to be found within the framework of a lively sense of interdependence, of a balanced collective effort, of allocation of primary missions and responsibilities. This concept should underly our common strategy, our defense planning and our national military contributions no less than defense research, development and production.

If Europe's resources are strained already, instead of seeking a relatively feeble, hazardous and costly strategic striking capability of its own, it might be better first to concentrate on the more immediate needs of protection in both limited and all-out war, such as much improved integrated early warning, identification and air defense, including large-scale adoption of interceptor missiles; the building up of the shield forces to the required, agreed-upon strength quantitatively and qualitatively, and such passive defense measures as to provide the population and the national subsistence bases with some chance of survival. Not only are these the minimum measures every responsible government owes to the nation, but without them no retaliatory posture will yield a really credible deterrence.

Far from striving to make the European NATO partners as independent as possible of each other--a retrogressive development--we should be careful in

21

defense matters to cultivate a measure of reciprocal dependency. Furthermore,
in the nuclear age and confronted with the Communist bloc this doctrine of built-
in interdependence can only be meaningful on an Atlantic in contradistinction
to a separate European scale. In keeping our common defense effort on an Atlantic
basis we will obviate to a considerable degree the never wholly absent danger
of suspicion and a profound antithesis between Europe and the Western Hemisphere.
Our common defense effort then in the long run cannot but significantly further
the political and economic cohesion of the Atlantic community.

If we are to retain this concept of interdependence as the guidepost
for our cooperation under the North Atlantic Treaty, if we are to fit our
national contributions to a pattern of reciprocal dependency, our basic Allied
unity in the face of armed attack and of threats of aggression may, of course,
never be questioned. If the Allies were to entertain doubts about each other's
alacrity to stand together when the chips are down they would do better to
return to the much more loosely knit traditional coalition form. But I, for one,
submit that the political development of the Western World then would be taking
a momentous step backward.

XI.

Although the subject of this discussion is NATO defense and not the
relative merits of limited war, nuclear or otherwise, let us briefly consider
the types of hostilities NATO's shield forces in Europe may become engaged in
and the reaction that would be appropriate.

As against Soviet or Soviet-inspired probing actions or a local spon-
taneous outbreak of fighting, quick resolute intervention of ground forces employ-
ing only conventional weapons of course, probably will be all that is called for.

One can envisage a larger scale attempt to test both the strength of
the shield and the unity of the Allies in the hope that military as well as

22

political cracks will show up which the Soviets would be quick to exploit. But in this supposition the opponent definitely still wants to avoid a major war; consequently he will not press the attack if met by strength. Our Allied reply to this kind of large-scale military probing should not leave the slightest room for doubt about our determination. Thus the shield forces should not allow and significant penetration and no provocation should remain unanswered. It might be advisable where appropriate to employ a few low-yield nuclear weapons tactically against strictly military targets in the immediate combat zone, possibly more as a manifestation of our firm intention to use nuclear weapons in self-defense than on account of acute necessity. But as the purpose of this hypothetical Soviet action will be to test our collective Allied fidelity as much as anything else, I think it imperative that above and beyond the engagement of the US and British elements of the shield forces some unmistakable demonstration be given that all of the armed might of these two powers stands squarely behind Western Europe.

But if the Soviets were to go beyond a military testing of the front-line shield forces and Allied resoluteness, if they were to undertake a determined attempt to crush the shield, if they were to resort to aerial bombardment, and bombardment, if they were to employ nuclear weapons, then they should be exposed to the concerted fury of the Allied counter-blasts. For whatever may have been the enemy's hopes and intentions of, even in these circumstances, keeping the war limited, to Western Europe this would have ceased to be a meaningful proposition. In an area such as Western Europe, not even on paper is it possible to differentiate between tactical and strategic targets, let alone in the heat of battle. Fighting on any substantial scale could not fail to affect the very basis for national survival. For Western Europe the war would be--if not unlimited in a literal sense--in any case all-out, vis. to avoid defeat

23

and Soviet occupation. In these circumstances to think of restricting the actual fighting to "the battlefield" would appear to be as unrealistic as it is militarily untenable. For if and when the Soviets decide to attack on a scale sufficient to overcome the shield forces the Allies will have to unleash their strategic striking forces so as to avoid being defeated.

The West cannot and will not tolerate a deep Soviet penetration into its heartland--and from the point of view of Free World survival Western Europe is as much heartland as Alaska or Canada. To the West these areas are vital and they are clearly so marked for all to see. For the time being this is understood by the Soviets as distinctly as we realize that a military attack on our part on the protective belt of Eastern European countries now under Soviet domination would trigger a violent counteraction. If the Soviets attack Western Europe in strength they are not after a limited objective. They are then undertaking the irrevocable, final assault on the Free World.

## XII.

It is being argued that, confronted with the risk of thermonuclear destruction the US would hesitate to identify Western Europe with its own survival and consequently would refrain from engaging its retaliatory might.

As the NATO shield forces have been designed to contain an all-out Soviet onslaught only until the effects of the strategic counteroffensive make themselves felt on the battlefield, this proposition would amount to acquiescence in the loss of Europe to the Soviets and the sacrifice of the equivalent of six US crack divisions, representing considerably more than one-third of the active US Army force! And what would be the prospect for the European NATO partners? Wholesale rout of their forces, utter devastation and indefinite Soviet occupation. It should be obvious that if the Western European Allies came to harbor serious doubts that a large-scale Soviet attack on them would fail to bring the US strategic striking forces into action, the North Atlantic Alliance would founder forthwith.

24

And what would the effects of such a proposition be on the enemy? He would then know that he could make an effort to overrun Europe with considerable chances of success and without exposing his heartland at all. The NATO forces proper never having been designed to mount a large-scale counteroffensive, he would hardly risk more than the forces he chooses to engage and possibly some loss of territory in the Satellites. We should never lose sight of the fact that to this day it is the threat of the Soviet Union itself being devastated by the air-atomic retaliatory forces that constitutes the main deterrent.

But in the hypothetical proposition under discussion the Soviets may not even have to launch a military attack. One or two incidents and a barage of threats may then be all that is needed to subdue Europe. For without hope that at least ultimate defeat can be avoided, what responsible statesman can expose his nation to nuclear destruction?

As for the reverse propositions: What will Europe do if the Soviets unleash a strategic surprise attack restricted--initially--to the Western Hemisphere, I think we may recall that Europe has lived with the prospect of utter, sudden devastation somewhat longer than the US without noticeable damage to its moral fiber. The reactions of even the smaller Western European countries to the repeated blunt Soviet threats against nuclear armament and missile bases should bear this out.

And throughout Europe it is widely realized that once the Western Hemisphere is subdued, there can be no hope of remaining free, of retaining the characteristics of our society which we cherish so dearly.

### XIII.

What these last two searching questions really relate to are the factors of intention and fortitude.

25

On the first one there can be little uncertainty. The text of the
North Atlantic Treaty, repeated solemn declarations by our highest authorities,
the defense structure built in the context of NATO, all these should have made
our intention to stand together unequivocally clear. The impact of nuclear wea-
pons has been under discussion in the NATO Permanent Council of course. What-
ever the effects on our policies and defense plans, it has never been suggested
that we alter our basic Treaty relationship, which is one for all, all for one.

As for the second factor: moral fortitude, strength of will, we are
here entering into the realm of human intangibles, of beliefs, of speculation.
After everything is said and done, it does indeed remain theoretically possible
that at some hour perception is numbed and the will paralyzed. But in that case
we shall have to write *Finis* to our civilization.