THE NEW YORK COMMUNITY TRUST

415 MADISON AVE., NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

November 19, 1974

Mr. John W. Walter, Jr.
1184 East Shore Drive
Ithaca, New York 14850

Dear Mr. Walter:

We are pleased to acknowledge your contribution
towards the Kissinger Scholarship Fund which provides
financial assistance to the children of U. S. military
personnel killed or missing in action in Indochina.

As I am sure you can understand, the need is sub-
stantial. Your contribution enables us to help addit-
ional children that would otherwise not receive assist-
ance.

Thank you for your generosity.

TWM:aq

cc: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

bcc: This individual donated $1,000 to your fund.

COPY

COPY

pcc: This individual donated $1,000 to your fund.

cc: The Honorable Henry V. Klaasen

TMM:sd

Terry K. McAdam

On behalf of the children that would otherwise not receive assist-
ance. Your contribution enables us to help fulfill
As I am sure you can understand, the need is ap-
proached by the Klaasen Scholarship Fund which provides
financial assistance to the children of U. S. military
personnel killed or missing in action in Indochina.

Towards the Klaasen Scholarship Fund which provides
financial assistance to the children of U. S. military
personnel killed or missing in action in Indochina.
We are pleased to acknowledge your contribution

Dear Mr. Walter:
Ithaca, New York 14820
1184 East Shore Drive
Mr. John W. Walter, Jr.

November 19, 1974

THE NEW YORK COMMUNITY TRUST
418 MADISON AVE., NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22901
TELEPHONE 804-924-3358

WOODROW WILSON DEPARTMENT
OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
232 CABELL HALL

September 15, 1975

Dear Henry:

Please forgive a voice from the past, as we have not had the pleasure
of seeing you since your various visits to Mexico while I was Ambassador
there. Naturally we have followed daily your activities since our departure
last year. These have obviously afforded no time for relaxation in Mexico
or anywhere else. However this lack I know has more than been compensated
by the satisfaction of your great achievements.

We return to Mexico from time to time. I gather our mutual friend, Emilio, continues well though of course he lost his mother some months ago. Luis Echeverria continues most friendly personally though I realize he causes problems from time to time.

On retiring from the Foreign Service last year from Mexico after a
number of ailments, I was fortunate enough to be invited to join the Faculty
of the University of Virginia where I remain to my satisfaction on the Woodrow
Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs. It is in this connection
that I wanted to write to enclose one document that struck my attention. I
hoped you could fit it in somewhere in your torrent of paper as it seemed to
examine brilliantly a matter of major importance and to express views I thought
you would find interesting. The author, Professor Johnston, was at Harvard
and you may have met in your more tranquil days there.

I now find myself well and naturally would be at your service should
there ever be any chore you wished carried out for the Department. I wish
I could have the pleasure of being with you at the World Football Cup games
again sometime.

With respect and warm best wishes, as ever

Robert H. McBride

bd
Enclosure

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

[LC]

# Radical Revisionism and the Disintegration of the American Foreign Policy Consensus

## I. The Need for Doctrine in American Foreign Policy

<table><tr><td>(1) The Need for Doctrine: External and Internal</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>(2) The Great Doctrines of American History</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>(3) Containment and the Nixon Doctrine</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>(4) The Limitations of the Kissinger Perspective</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>(5) Varieties of Doctrinal Reconstruction</td><td>10</td></tr></table>

## II. Radical Revisionism

<table><tr><td>(1) Realist and Radical Revisionism</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>(2) D.S. Clemens' Yalta</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>(3) Our Approach to W.A. Williams' The Tragedy of American Diplomacy</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>(a) "Open Door Imperialism"</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>(b) The "Meaning" of the Cold War</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>(4a) The Divergence over Reparations: Williams' View</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>(b) The Divergence over Reparations: The Documentary Record: Six Instances</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>(5a) The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: Williams' View</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>(b) The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: The Documentary Record</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>(6) Williams' More Fundamental Errors:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(a) Of Intellectual Principle</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>(b) Of Moral Principle</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>(7) The Extent of Radical Revisionist Influence</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>(8) The Sources of Radical Revisionist Appeal</td><td>41</td></tr></table>

## III. Toward a Foreign Policy Doctrine for America

<table><tr><td>(1) Our Relation to Western Europe</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>(2) Our Global Role</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>(3) Limitations in Kissinger's "Structure of Peace"</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>(4) Doctrine and Legitimacy</td><td>52</td></tr></table>

[LC]

A state cannot have an effective foreign policy without a doctrine through which its statesmen relate the countless day-by-day decisions they must make on specific issues to a larger understanding of their state's interests. Through appeal to the doctrine statesmen attempt to reduce the incompatibilities which, to some degree, inevitably characterize the relation of these specific decisions to one another. The doctrine also provides criteria to aid in assessing whether a given decision is, or is not, likely to contribute to this larger interest. In short, doctrine plays an integrative and evaluative role in its relation to actual policy decisions. It is the custodian of the larger-range, longer-term interests of the state.

This is not to say that a doctrine should take the form of a comprehensive logical system. The complexity and dynamism of international politics would condemn any such aspiration to futility. What an effective doctrine should do is clarify a state's understanding of its longer-term interests, block out the major tendencies that have a bearing upon those interests, and assess their likely effects upon the realization of those interests. Failing a doctrine that fulfills these functions, the behavior of a state comes to resemble that of an individual who

["In addition, the policy of a state comes to reasonable that an individual who upon the realization of some interest, failing a doctrine that suffices these conditions, that have a bearing upon those interests, and seeks their help, may exercise his own right to have a doctrine that suffices these conditions, that have a bearing upon those interests, and seek their help, etc.", "This is not to say that a doctrine should take the form of a comprehensive or the like.", "In the latter, the doctrine plays an important and evaluative role in its relation to social and political decisions. It is, in fact, likely to contribute to this latter interest. In some sense, the doctrine also provides criteria to aid in assessing whether an issue arises, in which case the relation of these specific decisions may be made. In this latter, the doctrine is, in fact, likely to contribute to this latter interest. 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In some sense, the doctrine also provides criteria to aid in assessing whether an issue arises, in which case the relation of these specific decisions may be made. In this latter, the doctrine is, in fact, likely to contribute to this latter interest. In some sense, the doctrine also provides criteria to aid in assessing whether an issue arises, in which case the relation of these specific decisions may be made. In this latter, the doctrine is, in fact, likely to contribute to this latter interest. In some sense, the doctrine also provides criteria to aid in assessing whether an issue arises, in which case the relation of these specific decisions may be made. In this latter, the doctrine is, in fact, likely to contribute to this latter interest. In some sense, the doctrine also provides criteria to aid in assessing whether an issue arises, in which

[LC]

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does not know his own mind.

Doctrine is analogous to the map and compass which enable a statesman and a people to keep their bearings as they work their way through the obscure and often dangerous terrain of international politics. In its absence travellers may lose their way, turn in circles, find themselves stumbling into swamps from which it had been their earlier intention to free themselves. While it is rare for a single step to take them astray, a series of missteps over time will certainly have this effect.

History is replete with instances of states that have lost their way on this difficult journey and have suffered severe penalties in consequence. These penalties may be manifested in the ineffectuality of the state to further values internationally which are compatible with its own. They may be exacted in a drastic reduction of the state's freedom of action, or its security. Or the supreme penalty - the destruction of the state itself - may be imposed. As one casts his eyes over the ocean of international history he catches the panorama of countless ships of state that have run aground, of others after the wind has gone out of their sails that have been brought into tow by more powerful vessels, of still others that have been sunk beneath the water's surface and sit as rotting hulks on the ocean's floor.

Doctrine is also important in the building of domestic support for foreign policy. In any state the "politics of the policy process" entails forging a consensus among multiple constituencies. The politics of this process is more complex in democratic than in nondemocratic societies, for the number of constituencies that have a rightful claim to participation is greater, and much of the process

["first base a right of claim to participation in government and demand of the franchise to the democratic class a representative sample. For the number of the franchise holders in the country, see American sample.", "In any state the ", "Constitution is a law which in the strictest sense of the word is binding on the government of the state itself - may be imposed. As one case the state has the right to pass a law which the other states cannot enforce. The constitution of the United States is one of the most binding of all the constitutions of the states. It is the source of the general government.", "Of course it has been shown that the national government can pass laws which the individual states cannot pass, and which, in their turn, cannot pass. It is well known that the Constitution of the United States, as well as that of the individual states, is the source of the general government. It is also well known that the Constitution of the United States,

[LC]

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must be effected within full public view. Doctrine is of major importance in building this consensus through legitimizing policy to these several constituencies.

America is a special case among democratic societies, in part because of her domestic characteristics, in larger part due to her international responsibilities. The United States is among the most libertarian and egalitarian of democratic societies, and both traits compound the complexity of consensus-building through expanding the number of those who feel they have a right to participate in it. The intensity of American pluralism heightens these tendencies. The comparatively slight role of ethnic, religious, and class factors in America's national cohesion also increases the importance of doctrine. The two great documents at the foundation of American nationhood - the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution - testify to the critical significance of doctrine as a factor in national cohesion. If the Declaration and the Constitution did not exist, the Nation itself would not exist.

Doctrine also gains particular importance in America from the need to counteract the natural tendencies of the culture toward dispersion, reflected most significantly in the customary pattern of Congressional behavior, and toward pragmatism, the intellectual counterpart of this dispersive tendency. America's pragmatic penchant derives in part from the complacency of the insular peoples - a New World variant of the British confidence in "muddling through." This confidence also reflects the wide margin of security these peoples have enjoyed throughout most of their histories. The effect of British pragmatism has, however, been different from that of American. For foreign policy pragmatism has there been blended with a wealth of experience accumulated over time, and with a

been blended with a wealth of experience accumulated over time, and with a
been different from that of America. For foreign policy prudence has there
throughout most of their histories. The effect of British prudence has, however,
dence also reflects the wide margin of security these peoples have enjoyed
a New World variant of the British confidence in 

a New World variant of the British confidence in "muddling through". This com-
pragmatic prudence derives in part from the complacency of the major peoples -
pragmatism, the intellectual counterpart of this diactive tendency. America's
significantly in the customary pattern of Congressional behavior, and toward
complement the natural tendencies of the culture toward disempowerment, reflected most
directly also gains particular importance in America from the need to

the Nation itself would not exist
the Nation itself would not exist
factor in national decision. If the Declaration and the Constitution did not exist,
discipline and the Constitution - treaty to the critical significance of doctrine as a
document at the foundation of American nationhood - the Declaration of Indepen-
national constitution also increases the importance of doctrine. The two great
The comparatively slight role of ethnic, religious, and class factors in America's
participate in it. The intensity of American pluralism heightens these tendencies,
publishing through expanding the number of those who feel they have a right to
democratic societies, and broadest compound the complexity of communitarian-
politics. The United States is among the most libertarian and egalitarian of
her democratic characteristics, in larger part due to her international reasonab-

America is a special case among democratic societies, in part because of
publishing this consensus through justifying policy to these several communities.
must be effected within full public view. The doctrine is of major importance in

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[LC]

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continuity derivative from the steady influence of the "first set" through the generations. Even so, it is far clearer that Britain has continued to muddle than it is that she has seen her way through her major policy dilemmas. The American historic experience has, by contrast, been meager, brief, concentrated, and the culture has prided itself on the repudiation of the directive role of elites. Thus in America there has been a persistent tendency to deny the need for doctrine on the grounds that pragmatism is a "doctrine" sufficient unto itself.

It is from the range and uniqueness of the responsibilities America carries in the world today that the need for doctrine draws its most important momentum. If America should put her foot into quicksand, assuming it to be solid ground, she imperils not only herself, but all those who have entrusted their interest to her judgement. This situation of mutual dependency is one that will continue. We must not seek to find our standard of "realism" by looking backwards over our shoulders to eras - buried beyond resurrection - in which states could hope to serve their interests through exercise of a virtually unlimited freedom of action, restrained by such awareness of a larger interest as that contained in the beguiling notion of "preserving the balance of power." America cannot effectively serve her longer-term interests save through continued partnerships, novel in their range and intimacy, with many of the states of the world, nor they theirs save through continued partnership with her. These partnerships can neither maintain their sense of direction nor sustain their domestic support without a vigorous doctrine to give legitimacy to them.

The role of doctrine is far more important for sustaining an inter-sovereign consensus than it is for the intra-sovereign. In the latter undertaking policy

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makers have at their disposal a number of instrumentalities - bureaucratic, political, economic, moral - that are available in highly attenuated form in foreign policy, when they are found at all. More important, the "strain toward agreement," of critical importance in forging the domestic consensus is likely, more often than not, to be displaced by a "strain toward disagreement" in foreign policy. Thus Roger Hilsman, who follows Warner Schilling in the weight he attaches to this factor, stops his analysis at the very point where the problem becomes most difficult.¹ The strain toward agreement draws its power from loyalty to the nation; if this be absent the strain is inoperative. There is no comparable loyalty in inter-sovereign relations. Through default of this loyalty, for consensus to be sustained a far heavier proportionate burden must be carried by doctrine than is the case domestically.

Consideration of the role of doctrine in the history of American foreign policy properly begins with Washington's Farewell Address. This was a systematic "political testament" bequeathed by Washington and Hamilton to the American people for guidance in the pursuit of their larger interests. The second of the great doctrines was that of Monroe and John Quincy Adams, which offered a searching examination of the bearing of the Latin American revolutions, in their domestic, hemispheric, and international aspects, upon the American interest. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century there were no doctrinal formulations comparable in importance to these two, in part because America's primary preoccupations were domestic, in part because these two stalwart guidelines served America's interests very effectively.

China served America's interests very effectively.

Primary preoccupations were domestic. In part because America's communications comparable in importance to these two, in part because America's. Throughout the remainder of the ninecentury century there were no intellectual dominate, dominipubic, and international aspects, upon the American interest. Assuming examination of the bearing of the Latin American Revolutions in their great democracies was that of Monroe and John Quincy Adams, which offered a people for guidance in the pursuit of their larger interests. The second of the "political testament" described by Washington and Hamilton to the American properly begins with Washington's Farewell Address. This was a systematic consideration of the role of doctrine in the history of American foreign policy by doctrine fact is the case domestically.

for convenience to be assumed a far heavier importation burden must be carried
comparable loyalty in foreign sovereign relations. Through default of this loyalty,
loyalty to the nation. If this be assumed the affiliate is cooperative. There is no
becomes most difficult.¹ The affiliate toward agreement draws its power from
atTRADE to this factor, -above all analytical at the very point where the problem
policy. This Roger Hilfman, who follows Warner Sedding in the weight he
more often than not, to be displaced by a "affiliate toward disagreement" in foreign
agreement," of crucial importance in forming the domestic consensus is likely,
foreign policy, when they are found at all. More important, the "affiliate toward
political, economic, must - that are available in highly attenuated form in
makers have at their disposal a number of instruments - puneumetric,

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[LC]

Several efforts were made at fundamental doctrinal formulations in the earlier twentieth century to take into account the implications for America's interest of her changed relation with the world. The most compelling of these intellectually were those of Admiral Mahan and Woodrow Wilson. Although both were internationalist doctrines, there were significant differences between them, and each was sharply at odds with that "doctrine" of isolationism that had by now come to seem second nature to the majority of the American people. In his political career Theodore Roosevelt went a substantial way toward the implementation of Mahan's doctrine in actual policies, but he was unable to build a durable domestic consensus around it. Wilson's achievements were more brilliant than those of Mahan-Roosevelt both in doctrinal formulation and in policy achievement - most particularly his masterful building of domestic support for our role in the First World War, his extraordinary accomplishment in bringing that War to a negotiated conclusion, and his creation of the League of Nations. He too, however, proved incapable of building durable domestic support for his doctrine.

Lodge destroyed the domestic prospects for Wilsonism by forging a destructive coalition between the disciples of Borah and the disciples of Mahan, i. e. between those who opposed Wilson because they opposed internationalism as such and those who opposed him because they had a very different conception of internationalism. The immediate effect of Lodge's destructive action was to clear the way for him to try his hand at his own variant of internationalism, the most notable achievement of which was the negotiation of the Washington Treaties. Its longer-term effect was to render impossible a domestic consensus on an effective international policy in the inter-war years. Domestic preoccupation and pragmatic

["International policy in the interest of peace. General economic cooperation and strategic armament was to be made possible in a domestic sense by an effective development of which we are the keystone. The letter to him to try his distasteful own version of internationalism, the most notable sign of the immediate effect of Robb's administrative action was to clear the way for him to get a very different conception of internationalism. Those who opposed Wilson because they opposed internationalism are and must continue to be so. Wilson's arguments were made brilliant then and since of the same sort. It is billions of dollars which we must pay to make the world a better place for all. Wilson's achievements were made brilliant then and since of the same sort. It is billions of dollars which we must pay to make the world a

[LC]

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response to circumstance, rather than coherent doctrine, became controlling.

At the end of World War II it seemed, for a moment, that the destructive three-way divergence over doctrine among the heirs of Borah, of Wilson, and of Mahan would reassert itself, with the consequence of operational ineffectuality. However the threats proved too ominous to give Borah a solid footing and too recalcitrant to give Wilson one. After a brief interlude of uncertainty perspectives came to be integrated around the neo-Hamiltonian doctrine of containment. Although there were important differences of emphasis within this framework, they were far less significant - particularly in comparison with the previous historic experiences - than the strength of the areas of common agreement.

The period which followed was the most creative in America's foreign policy history, save for that of the Founding Fathers itself. The ship of state successfully navigated the often-narrow channel between two great dangers - nuclear war and appeasement. Materialization of either would have signified massive failure for American policy. The malignant "logic" of "either red or dead" was supplanted by the creative demonstration that one would be neither red nor dead. The magnitude of the achievement was also registered in the skill with which both the intrasovereign and the intersovereign consensus were built and sustained.

By the latter 'sixties indications were unmistakable that the containment doctrine no longer enjoyed its earlier support. Fissures had developed within and without which appeal to the doctrine proved powerless to close. The Nixon Doctrine was an effort to recast the conception of American interest in such a way as to close these breaches. The Nixon Doctrine has, however, proved among the least sturdy of the efforts at doctrinal formulation in American history. It has already

study of the efforts at institutionalization in American history. It was already
these procedures. The Nixon administration has, however, proved among the least
and slight to recent the constitution of American government. It is clear that
which implies the organic power of the state. The Nixon administration was
no longer enjoyed if the citizen supported it. Disagreements and conflicts within and without
the further analysis indicated were numerous; but the commitment to organic
file infrastructure and the institutionalization were built and sustained.

The significance of the achievement was a clear recognition in the shift with which both
brought by the organic infrastructure that the world of the market had changed, and
for American policy. The administration of Lyndon B. Johnson was an
- and implementation. The materialization of either would have been massive failure
truly navigated the offensive of the enemy and the negative flight of
history, gave for that in the financing of the war. The side of state success-
 historic experience - than the abstract of the areas of common agreement.

Historic experience - than the abstract of the areas of common agreement.
they were far less significant - particularly in comparison with the provision
of the American policy.

Although there were important differences of opinion within this framework,
case to be integrated around the neo-liberalism doctrine of containment.

Realistic to give Wilson one. After a brief interlude of uncertainty perspective
however the thrust proved to be wrong. The Wilson era was a sad tutelage and too
Manning would perhaps regard it, with the consequence of operational reliability,
too easily diverged over time from the idea of foreign policy, and of
At the end of World War II it seemed, for a moment, that the administrative
regime to be established, rather than coherent doctrine, became controlling.

The end of World War II it seemed, for a moment, that the administrative
regime to be established, rather than coherent doctrine, became controlling.

17

[LC]

- 8 -

suffered ignoble death in the area designated as that of its primary application - Southeast Asia. Through application of the Doctrine responsibility for ground combat was to be shifted to indigenous forces. This shift would undercut the major sources of opposition to our Vietnamese involvement within the United States. This would then make possible sustained usage of substantial American air and naval forces in that area. Their usage would, in turn, make possible achievement of a military balance between South and North in Viet Nam. This balance would, in its turn, make possible negotiation of a stable political accord between the warring factions. Negotiation of these accords would enable America to keep in place the larger structure of her commitments in Southeast Asia.

However the first premisses of this political syllogism could not be sustained. When they fell, they carried all pendent premisses with them. Only the memory of the "doctrine" remained.

Although Mr. Nixon has been retired from the scene and his doctrine is in disarray, his co-author still stands at the center of the national stage. Henry Kissinger would seem well cast for the role of articulator of an effective doctrine to fill the void resultant from the decline of the old. In his writings he has always stressed the need for the policy maker to relate his decisions to an articulate philosophy of history. He brought his most famous book to a resounding finale in his call for "the need for doctrine."² Yet one must wonder if, in the exercise of power, he has honored his own earlier injunction.

Much the most pronounced characteristic of Kissinger the practitioner has been his pragmatism, his tendency to play by ear. He often seems engaged in

["I am sorry I cannot provide you with the information you are looking for. As a foreign correspondent working in a foreign country, I am not allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. However, the final decision on whether I can remain in the country will depend on the outcome of the current events in the region and on the actions of the international community. If it is determined that I cannot remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. If it is determined that I cannot remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. If I am not allowed to remain in the country, I will be allowed to return home. In the meantime, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my entry into the country, and I will continue to report on the events that are relevant to my assignment. However, I will not be allowed to comment on matters that are not directly relevant to my assignment. Only the newspaper that I work for will determine whether I can remain in the country or not. If I am allowed to remain in the country, I will continue to work as a foreign correspondent for the newspaper in which I was working at the time of my

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the breathless pursuit of an unending series of *ad hoc* improvisations, while
"doctrine" tags raggedly behind. It becomes ever harder to suppress the doubts
that overtook Dorothy in the Land of Oz. Is the magic of the Emerald City real?
Or if one parts the curtains of the inner sanctum does he find plain old Frank
Morgan playing technical tricks to produce thunderous sounds and dazzling colors?

Doctrine can provide effective guidance to policy only if it enshrines a
standard of legitimacy independent of that policy. Through appeal to this inde-
pendent touchstone the policy maker is able to draw the critical distinction between
the negotiable and the nonnegotiable. As an academic there was no matter to
which Kissinger gave greater weight than the relation between legitimacy and
statesmanship.³ As practitioner, however, we witness an ever more pronounced
tendency on his part to undercut, through perverse reversal, the regulative role
a standard of legitimacy should exercise. He has become less concerned to
get what is right than to depict as right what he can get. The morally legitimate
becomes less the criterion of the diplomatically possible than the diplomatically
possible the criterion of the morally legitimate. The regulative and integrative
role of doctrine is supplanted and "doctrine" reduced to little more than an
instrumentality to win support for the *de facto* outcomes of the bargaining process.
After the door has been shut to the timeless moral insights of Solzhenitsyn, lest
their acknowledgement imperil the manifold benefits to be gained through across
the board accommodations with the Soviet Union, it leaves a bitter taste in the
mouth to be reminded in Minneapolis of "The Moral Foundations of Foreign
Policy."⁴

["The policy pursued by the Moscows of \"the Molotov-Rogachev formula\" was to affirmatively support the independence of the Soviet Union, and to seek a peace settlement with the Soviet Union. It was a policy which the Moscows had been unable to carry through successfully. After the door had been shut to the unrelenting moral pressure of the Soviet Union, it was impossible for the Moscows to continue their negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the course of the negotiations, the Moscows were able to offer the formula of \"the Molotov-Rogachev formula\" to the Moscows, and the Moscows accepted it. The formula was accepted by the Moscows, and the negotiations were successful.", "The formula of \"the Molotov-Rogachev formula\" was proposed to the Moscows by the Moscows themselves. It was based on the principle that theفا should be the criterion on which theفا should be decided. Theفا should be decided on the basis of theفا, and theفا should be decided on the basis of theفا. As an example, theفا was introduced into theفا. Theفا was introduced into theفا, and theفا was introduced into theفا. Theفا was introduced into theفا

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The present dilemma of American foreign policy bears a certain similarity with governmental crises under the Weimar Constitution: the forces of disintegration have proved strong enough to bring down the previous government but lack the cohesion to constitute its replacement. The pressures of dispersion are everywhere about - within and without, in doctrine and in action. The residue of containment clashes with the promise of detente. Initiatives to Moscow and Peking undercut the justification for defense spending within and strong alliances without. Church and McGovern bring to mind the long-gone memories of Borah and Bryan; the frustrations of the Southern patriots on the defense budget those of Theodore Roosevelt. Congress ever more blatantly becomes an arena for the indulgence of parochial interests. The pragmatism of Mr. Kissinger reenforces, more than it counteracts, the centrifugal tendencies.

One may take comfort in realization that, from an historic perspective, the unity of the previous era in American foreign policy was an exception to the rule, made possible in part by the nature of the challenge the Nation faced. Now that the threat has receded, it is only natural for America to return to her customary indulgence in diversity of perspectives, dispersion of effort, and _ad hoc_ responses to concrete problems. The consolation history gives on first glance is, however, rendered questionable on second. To "return" to a past pattern of response under circumstances which, in both their internal and external aspects, differ radically from the past signifies not an affirmation but a denial of historic continuity.

The novelty of current doctrinal divergence is shown by the range of prior doctrine that now finds itself on the defensive; not only containment but also the venerable doctrine of Monroe is under fire. Beyond this, the strength of radical

The validity of earlier decisions of the Supreme Court was shown by the range of cases in which the Supreme Court has also decided that such cases fell on the defenatives not only on the ground of jurisdiction but also on the ground of radius.

From the past it signifies not in affirmation but a consent of historic construction, that the past signifies not in affirmation but a consent of historic construction, which in both their internal and external aspects, either materially or materially, represents an active sale on second, third, return, to a past pattern of reasons under which the past has received, it is only natural for America to return to her own constitution made possible in past by the nature of the challenge the Nation faced. Now that unity of the previous era in American foreign policy was an exception to the rule. One may take comfort in realization that, from an historic perspective, the more than it counteracts the centralural tendencies, the influence of particular interests, the pressure of Mr. Klaasen's reasons, of Theodore Roosevelt, Congress even more definitely becomes an element for the and thus the illustration of the Southern patriots on the defense public those without, Church and McGoorth bringing to mind the forty-one memories of those looking upon theification for defense spending within and strong alliances, the consolidation of the promise of defense. Initiatives to Moscow and everywhere should - with right and without, in doctrine and in action. The possible of the constitution to constitute its replacement. The pressure of dispersion are the arguments against it, and the arguments for the constitution are the arguments for the

The present dilemma of American foreign policy bears a certain similarity to the present dilemma of Germany, which, following this, the attack of radial

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revisionism, with its pronounced anti-American and "prorevolutionary" emphases, signifies a novel doctrinal challenge. Radical revisionism constitutes, so to speak, a doctrinal shadow cabinet, waiting in the wings, eager to recast the definition of American interest in molds at fundamental variance with those of past doctrines. The strength of its own claim to legitimacy is inseparable from an aggressive denial of legitimacy to prior doctrine, especially that of containment. A major dimension of the revisionist perspective is this assault on the premisses of previous perspectives. The evaluation of historic questions thereby becomes of enormous moment for the determination of present and future political realities.

The Cold War is the central event of American foreign policy in our time. One's understanding of the policy appropriate to that challenge is inseparable from one's understanding of the causes and nature of it. By undercutting the accepted understanding of that conflict, radical revisionism undermines the justification for the policies based on that understanding and clears the ground for its own very different prescriptions. The whole is greater than its parts. The outcome of this debate on the premisses which should govern American foreign policy is of far greater import for the national future than the outcome on this or that specific issue which crowds the headlines. The contours of America's future policy are now being set by the shift in premisses taking place in our culture today - most notably in the universities and in the media.

Time waits for no man and history for no doctrine. *Rebus sic stantibus* is the fixed principle of international politics. Relentless tides wash against structures founded on hard rock. One does not squeeze an eighteen year old youth into

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the clothes of an eight year old boy. The Monroe Doctrine supplements the
Farewell Address to take into account experiences Washington had never had.
Wilson lived in a world unknown to either Washington or Monroe and sought to
modify the doctrines of both. Kennan bore responsibilities in a setting Wilson
had scarcely imagined, and felt it necessary to take his departure from different
premises. None can deny the need for change.

Recognition of the undeniable need for change does not invalidate the distinction
in the character of our approach to it. As Burke would remind us, the state is
not an artificial creation nor is the reach of its interest to be measured on a
scale commensurate with that of the individual. There are doctrinal reformula-
tions which take as their point of departure concern to gain understanding of
the prior experience of a people, and take as their goal a modification of doctrine
that will bring to more effective realization the moral values that find expression
in that experience. Creative reformulations of American doctrine have been of
this character - most notably those of Washington, John Quincy Adams, Lincoln,
Wilson, and Truman. There are also efforts at reformulation which begin from a
determination to flatten out the complexities of collective experience into con-
formity with the strictures of a preconceived ideology, and take as their goal
supplanting the intrinsic corruption of that society by a new and revolutionary
ethic. The radical revisionist undertaking is of this nature.

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[LC]

## II. Radical Revisionism

Before we consider radical revisionism it is important to distinguish it from what we may call realist revisionism. The perspectives of each will be developed with reference to their divergent interpretations of the causes of the Cold War.

Realist revisionism directs our attention to that complex blend of vice and virtue, sincerity and duplicity, desire for accommodation and will to power, defensiveness and aggressiveness it takes to be durable characteristics in the action and reaction of states with one another. In this light it rejects views of the origins of the Cold War as a simple morality play between aggressive evil, embodied in Russia and defensive innocence, embodied in America. Actions the Americans knew to be defensive the Russians may have seen as aggressive; Russian actions we were sure were offensive they may have felt to be legitimately defensive. For realist revisionists the origin of the Cold War is to be found in an enormously complex series of interactions in which the oftentimes defensive moves of each protagonist, taken as aggressive by the other, fed on themselves until the bonds of the Grand Alliance were broken and supplanted by hostile countercoalitions.

As a particular instance of misreading of intentions by the protagonists, realist revisionists call attention to the fate of the spheres of influence agreement concluded between Churchill and Stalin in the fall of 1944. To be sure the United States was not a party to this. But it did acknowledge the armistice agreements concluded as the fighting came to an end in Eastern Europe which implied that, at least for administrative purposes, the same general lines of division would

that there can be administrative problems, the entire general lines of division would
conclude as the lighting came to an end in Western Europe which implied that,
states who not a party in this. But at this stage the armistice agreements
clung between Germany and Stalingrad in the last of 1944. To the area the United
republicans sent their attention to the state of the agreement and influence agreement can
be a particular instance of this. The armistice results in
conferences.

until the close of the Grand Alliance were broken and accomplished by the allies
moves of each belligerent, taken as aggressive by the盟国, led on themselves
an enormously complex series of interferences in which the ultimate defensive
detentive. For neutralist revolatians are origin at the German War is to be found in
Hitler's actions we were some were offensive they may have fell to be estimated
Americans know to be defensive the fitzsimons may have seen a aggressive
conflict in Russia and the declaration of war. Actions in the
origins of the Cold War as a simple monthly basis between aggressive states
action and reaction of states with one another. In this light it reflects views of
detentivists and idealists. It causes to beppealing characteristic in the
manner, seniority and publicity, of the accommodation and will to power.

Resultant revolatians direct our attention to that complex thing of vice and
with reference to their divergent interpretations of the causes of the Cold War.
What we may call neutralist revolatians. The perspectives of each will be developed
hereafter. We consider resultant revolatians to be important to the discussion if they
in fact exist.

In General Revolations

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be observed. The degree of Stalin's respect for spheres of influence in Greece or Italy is seen as a partial justification for his expectation that he would be accorded "comparable" leeway for the assertion of his dominance in Poland or Bulgaria. In assessing the meaning to be attached to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which clearly pointed toward a very different basis for settlement, attention is directed to the impact of domestic political considerations on Roosevelt's policies. With reference to other aspects of the difficult Polish question the conflict between Russia's conception of her legitimate security need and the London Poles conception of their legitimate political role, along with many other issues, is stressed.

Realist revisionism directs our attention to the empirical and normative complexity of these events and thereby takes a first step toward their truer understanding. In the serious study of foreign policy there can be no place for automatic prejudgements which equate either the meaning or the justice of a policy with the interpretation put upon it by a single state. What Niebuhr has said of individuals is even more true of states: those blameless in their own eyes are insufferable in the eyes of others. Realist revisionism points the way toward the multiarchival analysis of these events, which may some day be a possibility. We may then gain a comprehension of them comparable to that given to us by, say, Ernest May's masterful study of *The World War and American Isolation*.⁵ Such an achievement would signify a qualitative advance in man's understanding of international history.

Diane Shave Clemens' study of *Yalta* illustrates the promise of realist revisionism in its first two parts and the perversity of radical revisionism in its third.

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As Robert Maddox has observed, the "book appears to have been written by two different people."⁶ The first is a careful historian who has explored Russian materials as well as American with an eye to better understanding the complexities of the bargaining process between the two. The second is a dogmatic ideologue quick to render definitive judgements on the motives of statesmen and to follow the prescribed revisionist line: When in doubt, condemn the United States.

Mrs. Clemens sees Yalta as a promising interlude of realism which stands in wholesome contrast to America's general tendency toward inflated moralism.

"It was a moment when American ideology, normally submerged in moralistic phrases uncharacteristic of its actual behavior, was submitted to a traditional negotiating experience with binding results."⁷ During the War

Washington hindered Great Britain from adjusting Anglo-Soviet policy and held out to the Soviet Union promises of postwar aid, co-operation, and amicable adjustments, while resolving nothing. The few tripartite negotiating experiences, such as the Italian surrender and the European Advisory Commission, raised serious questions about American intentions. On the other hand, the Soviet Union during the war remained basically co-operative.⁸

However the Americans were quick to revert to their old ways. "Within a few months after the Conference, the United States attempted to undo those agreements at Yalta which reflected Soviet interests."⁹ In particular Washington "diligently worked to overthrow" the three agreements "in which Moscow had demonstrated an interest at Yalta," i.e. dismemberment of Germany, reparations from Germany, and the Polish settlement. Through her abandonment of these understandings, "America created a self-fulfilling prophecy."¹⁰ "These decisions ... left the Soviet Union with no alternative than to substitute unilateral action for a policy of co-operation which they had hoped for, but which had never emerged - except

of co-operation which they had begun for, put white and never enshrined - except
Soviet Union with no alternative than to submit a fundamental action for a policy
"Allies created a self-fulfilling problem." 10 "These decisions, let us say
and the Polish settlement. Through perestroika of these understandings
an interest at Yalta, "i.e., settlement of Germany", represented from Germany,
worked to overthrow "the three agreements" in which Moscow had demonstrated
at Yalta which reflected Soviet interests." 9 In particular, Washington "differently
months after the Conference, the United States attempted to undo these agreements
therefore the Americans were quick to revert to their old ways." Within a few
united during the war remained basically co-operative.
questions about American interests. On the other hand, the Soviet
surround and the European Advisory Commission, a state serum
The few tripartite negotiating experiences, such as the Italian
co-operation, and amicable adjustments, while resolving nothing,
bpolicy and held out to the Soviet Union promises of postwar aid,
Washington indicated Great Britain from adjusting Anglo-Soviet
negotiating experience with binding treaties." During the War
beneath a characteristic of the actual behavior was admitted to a traditional
"It was a moment when American ideality, normally subordinated in military
in wholesome contrast to America's general tendency toward inflationary
first, citizens see America as a promising interlude of realism which stands
the prescribed revisionist line: When in doubt, consent the United States,
due to her rather definitive judgments on the motives of adjustment and to differ-
ing from the bargaining process between the two. The second is a dramatic ideologizing
materials as well as American with an eye to better understanding the complexi-
different people." 8 The fact is a curious history who has explored Huxley
As Robert Mlodzow has explained, the book addresses to have been written by two

negotiating experience with binding treaties." During the War
beneath a characteristic of the actual behavior was admitted to a traditional
"It was a moment when American ideality, normally subordinated in military
in wholesome contrast to America's general tendency toward inflationary
first, citizens see America as a promising interlude of realism which stands
the prescribed revisionist line: When in doubt, consent the United States,
due to her rather definitive judgments on the motives of adjustment and to differ-
ging from the bargaining process between the two. The second is a dramatic ideologizing
materials as well as American with an eye to better understanding the complexi-
different people." 8 The fact is a curious history who has explored Huxley
As Robert Mlodzow has explained, the book addresses to have been written by two

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[LC]

briefly, at Yalta. "¹¹ Mrs. Clemens then closes her study with the suggestive and bittersweet query, "It is perhaps relevant to ask what the world would have been like if the spirit of Yalta had triumphed."¹²

If Roosevelt was hero for a day, Truman was the consistent villain.

President Truman, in considering co-operation with Russia and the proposed reorganization of the Polish government in the spring and summer of 1945, formulated his policy on this basis: "our agreements with the Soviet Union have been a one-way street ... it was now or never ... (the Russians) could go to hell."¹³

This passage - a favorite of the radical revisionists - is designed to highlight the uncompromising belligerency of Truman in his approach to the Russians. In truth (as Maddox has reminded us) Truman never made these remarks to the **Russians** at all, but rather to his advisors, and this in the context of his quite specific (and justified) concern that the Russians threatened to boycott the forthcoming United Nations conference unless the Lublin government were admitted as the "legitimate" government of Poland. Mrs. Clemens transforms these remarks into explicit proclamation of American policy.

Mrs. Clemens' interpretation of these remarks is inseparable from her interpretation of the events to which they apply. For in her mind it was Truman, not Stalin, who broke the Yalta accords on Poland. Truman

... told Molotov the United States insisted that "the Soviet government carry out the Crimea decision on Poland." He handed him a memorandum which equated fulfillment of the Yalta decisions with establishment of a "new" government. As we have previously seen, at Yalta the United States had agreed in writing to a "reorganized" version of the Polish Provisional Government "which is now functioning in Poland."¹⁴

The official documents show Mrs. Clemens to be in error. With reference to the Polish government the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference

to the British Government the Protocol of the Principles of the Chiusi Conference

to the British Government, which is now known
as France, the United States had agreed to a "plan of action".
settlement of a "new" government. As we have previously seen,
Memorandum which stated the fulfillment of the Yalta Conferences with
a great many of the Crimean decisions on Poland," the British man a
"told Meliora the United States information that "the British govern-
ment in Poland," which is the correct one, is false. It is not true.

Not Stettin, who broke the Yalta records on Poland. Trueman

administered the event to whom they apply. For it was Trueman, who

Mrs. Clemens interpreted these remarks in such a way from her

that an efficient administration of American policy

the "legislatures" Government of Poland. Mrs. Clemens transforms these remarks
into "legislatures" because the British government was admitted to
the "legislatures" of the United Nations conference when the British government was admitted to the
united states and United Kingdom, and that in the context of the date
will be made clear in a future letter.

now or never... (the museum) could do it. It was
means with the Soviet Union have a one-way street... it was
summer of 1945, terminated the policy on this front. "our agreement"
broader communication of the British government in the spring and
President Trueman, in considering cooperation with the British and the
U. S. Government was done for a day. Trueman was the consistent willful

to be the will of Yalta and triumphed.

been like it in the days of Yalta and triumphed.

and持久的盟国." "It is perhaps relevant to ask what she would have said
briefly, of Yalta." "Mr. Clemens then closes her study with the significant

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reads as follows:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"... This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland .... "15

The burden of Mrs. Clemens' indictment of Truman is that he insisted on a "new" government while at Yalta Roosevelt had agreed that a "reorganized" government would suffice. Since the official Protocol makes use of both terms, and makes clear the "reorganized" government is to be seen as a "new" one, her case falls to the ground.

The message President Truman handed Molotov in April 1945 for immediate transmission to Stalin began as follows:

> There was an agreement at Yalta in which President Roosevelt participated for the United States Government, to reorganize the Provisional Government now functioning in Warsaw in order to establish a new government of National Unity in Poland by means

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of previous consultation between representatives of the Provisional
Polish Government of Warsaw and other Polish democratic leaders
from Poland and from abroad.¹⁶

In this message Truman was merely paraphrasing the wording of the official
Yalta Protocol. To Mrs. Clemens his request that the Russians abide by the
terms of that Agreement would seem to constitute a breach of it. And when the
President sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow in May for a direct conference with
Stalin in the hope of ironing out difficulties this was, for Mrs. Clemens, "but
a delaying tactic to postpone a confrontation until the United States was in a
stronger position - or, as one historian has claimed, until the atomic bomb gave
the United States the power to enforce its will on the Soviet Union.

With the maximum bargaining leverage, the United States would at
the proper time insist on free elections and a virtual return to the
prewar situation in Poland. As to free elections, there was no
reason to believe that Stalin ... would not allow moderately free
elections in Poland as promised. But when Western hostility
threatened everything short of war with the Soviet Union, the
Russians increasingly abandoned free elections and co-operation
in favor of consolidation of a defensive perimeter in Eastern Europe.
In effect, the Soviets responded to the West in kind; they closed the
doors they had previously left open. The West created its own
self-fulfilling prophecy of the dangers and goals of Soviet com-
munism.¹⁷

By this stage in Mrs. Clemens' account the ideologue has swallowed the scholar
without a trace.¹⁸

If the extent to which radical revisionists have degraded scholarship for the
purpose of ideological argumentation is to be fully appreciated it is necessary to
check their version of what happened in given instances with the documentary
record of those events. Since this is a time-absorbing and space-consuming
enterprise, let us now concentrate our attention on the writings of one of the

["If thisекто which is addressed to the public as a whole is to be fully developed, it is necessary that the government shall take into consideration the interests of the individual and the general public. It is not sufficient to regard the interests of the individual as sufficient. The interests of the general public are the interests of the community. The government should take into consideration the interests of the individual and the general public. It is not sufficient to regard the interests of the individual as sufficient.", "It is not sufficient to regard the interests of the individual as sufficient.", "If this aspect in Mr. Clemens's account of the government allows the public to believe that the government is not interested in the public good, it is not sufficient.", "The government is interested in the public good. It is interested in the public good because it is interested in the public good because it

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earliest and most important of the revisionists, William Appelman Williams. The bases of Williams' wide influence derive in part from the fact that he was among the first proponents of the new doctrine to appear on the scene. Beyond this, the volume of his work has been large and its analytic sweep broad. He would seem to have worked out a comprehensive view of the character of America's domestic structure, the meaning of her history, and the nature of her foreign policy. Everything appears to find its place in a coherent intellectual schema.

The doctrine of the "Open Door" stands at the center of Williams' analysis. Given the character of her capitalist economy there is a recurrent tendency for the United States to produce more than she can absorb domestically. Thus she is led to seek markets abroad to fulfill needs that cannot be fulfilled at home, unless the character of her system undergo drastic alteration. Pressure to fulfill this need is the controlling influence on American foreign policy. Thus John Hay's issuance of the Open Door Notes at the turn of the century was not a fortuitous diplomatic event but a necessary economic one, closely related to the closure of the frontier, the enormous significance of which Turner had perceived a few years earlier. Subsequent policy makers - Roosevelt and Taft, Wilson and Hoover - were all responsive to this same pressure. The notion that the interwar period was "isolationist" is a misleading legend, for the global reach of America's foreign policy in service of her "Open Door imperialism" was undiminished.

It is within this analytic-historic context that Williams sets his interpretation of the coming of the Cold War. The United States was not playing from weakness, but from enormous strength. Cordell Hull was not a naive and apolitical figure but a stubbornly aggressive and vastly ambitious one. While pretending to have

["If it were possible to understand what William was saying in his interpretation of the coming of the Golden Age, this interpretation would be confirmed by the fact that the Golden Age was not a time of great prosperity but a time of great depression. Certain of the Englishmen who were not so well informed about the Golden Age, however, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity was confirmed by the fact that the Englishmen who were earlier, in the Golden Age, were led to believe that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity. This notion that the Golden Age was a time of great prosperity

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no interests and being above power politics, the United States in truth asserted interests everywhere. The Cobdenite innocence of Hull's "no spheres of influence" orientation was but camouflage for an aggressive economic globalism which insisted that America not be shut out anywhere. The Americans wanted to preserve an Open Door in all parts of the world to American economic penetration which, given the scale of her economy, would pave the way for substantial American political control. In short, they wanted a world in which the mighty weapon of their economic strength could be most effectively wielded to gain economic, and consequently political, advantage.

This vast ambition was driven forward by powerful domestic interests long at work on American policy. A whole gallery of figures is included in Williams' analysis who are ranked on a "bad-good" spectrum in accord with the degree to which they yield to, or are critical of, the Open Door emphases. Williams is eager to show the impact of such figures as Will Clayton, or Harriman, or Leo Crowley, and points out that even Henry Wallace started his career as Secretary of Commerce by lauding Herbert Hoover's earlier commercial policies. This vast ambition was mightily strengthened by two additional factors: fear of the return of the Great Depression after the War's end, and growing awareness of the massive leverage which possession of the atomic bomb now gave to America.

Williams' interpretation involves a dramatic reversal of roles from that established in traditional views: America is seen as pushing and Russia as reacting; America as very powerful, Russia as rather pathetically weak; the Americans as refusing to come to terms while the Russians persistently try to do so; the Americans as insensitive to others' needs and the Russians mindful

["do not the Americans be incentive to offer their needs and the Russians willing to do so. The Americans are relating to terms which the Russians presently try to obtain. Americans are veryophilic. Gussa is rather膏肓like. The established in traditional manner. America is seen as purchasing and selling of products. The Americans are veryophilic. Gussa is rather膏肓like. The", "Williams' interpretation involves a dramatic reversal of roles from that of the massive leverage which possesses the atomic bomb now gives to America the return of the Great Depression after the war end. And growing awareness of this vast annihilation was Strenghted by two additional factors of Secretary of Commerce Henry Hoover's arrival in monetary policies. Lee Crowley, and before that even Henry Wallace stated the case as easier to show the impact of such figures as Will Clayson, or Herbert long, which they held to, or the outlook of the Open Door embassies. Williams analysis who are ranked on a scale of the spectrum in accordance with the degree to which they held to, or the outlook of, the Open Door embassies. Williams analysis who are ranked on a scale of the spectrum in accordance with the degree to which they held to, or the outlook of the Open Door embassies

[LC]

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of them. Even the vitriolic line associated with Zhdanov is seen as a reaction
to prior pressures from America. In Williams' image, Zhdanov and Wallace
passed each other in different elevators - as Wallace was going down Zhdanov
was going up. In short, as Wallace with his moderation was being shut out of
American policy Zhdanov, with his aggressiveness, was given an ever larger
voice in Russian. The implication, of course, is that the sequence was not
merely temporal but *causal*, i. e. it was *because* Wallace was being shut out that
Zhdanov had to be brought in. In an earlier conservative revisionism American
policy makers were attacked because they were "soft on Communism." For
Williams they are attacked because they are hard as adamant. It is not the
Americans who were put over a barrel by the Russians, but the Russians who were
forced to the ropes by the Americans.

Williams discusses a number of events which bear on the beginnings and
course of the Cold War to demonstrate how they "confirm" his thesis. To
illustrate the substance of his argument we shall examine two instances in some
detail: the Russian-American divergence over reparations, and the American
decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Our concern is first to show how
Williams depicts these issues and then to set his account against the documentary
record of them. Only in this way can one come to full awareness of the magnitude
of the distortion entailed by his "scholarship." His writings confirm Voltaire's
cynical remark that history is a pack of tricks we play on the dead. It should
be a matter of concern that they not be played on the living as well.

We turn first to Williams' view of the Russian-American dispute over
reparations. According to Williams, Stalin came to Potsdam seeking modest goals.

["Rejoinder. According to Williams, a slave came to Virginia seeking a job in\nthe North that he did not like, but he wanted to go to Virginia to get a job over", "the administration of Virginia that they did not like the living at work\nexactly. According to History is a book of books we find on the desk. It is about\nthe separation established by the schoolchildren. His writing is columnar. His\nrecord of them. Only in this way can one come to find out what the administration\nof the Virginia schoolchildren is a part of history we find on the desk. It is about\ndesire to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be settled in these issues and then to see his action against the documentary\nstatement to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Only concern is that to allow how\ndesire in the American-American divergence over the question of the administration\nwill be

- 22 -

He was still concerned about Russia's European frontiers, about preventing another attack from Germany, about economic aid for Russia's "battered economy." Shrewd enough to know he was unlikely to get aid from the United States, he laid immediate emphasis "on being treated as an equal and upon obtaining massive reparations from Germany and its former allies."

"This Council," Stalin remarked in explaining the Soviet view of the conference at its first general session, "will deal with reparations and will give an indication of the day when the Peace Conference should meet." The primary political issue, he continued, was that of dealing with Germany and its former allies. That was "high policy. The purpose of such a policy was to separate these countries from Germany as a great force." Recurring often to the "many difficulties and sacrifices" brought upon Russia by those Axis partners, Stalin argued that the proper strategy was "to detach them once and for all from Germany." As for reparations, Russia would if necessary 'compel' such deliveries.

The American response on reparations was crucial to the outcome of the Potsdam Conference, and also, very probably, to the whole course of subsequent events. "Reparations," Byrnes told Molotov on July 20, "do not seem to the United States to be an immediate problem." He then added that "the United States does not intend to make advances to any country in order that reparations may be paid by them." "We do not intend, as we did after the last war, to provide the money for the payment of reparations."¹⁹

In Williams' view the capital for Russian reconstruction could come from only two sources: an American loan, or Russian reparations taken from Germany and her satellites. If America denied the former, she could block recourse to the latter only by another war. America, by refusing a loan, placed herself on the horns of a painful dilemma.

The contradiction involved can be explained, however, by reference to the atom bomb. Byrnes knew, when he told Molotov on July 20 that reparations were not 'an immediate problem,' that the atom bomb was a success.... It seems very likely ... that the information on the bomb ... served to convince the United States that it could hold the line on reparations and bargain from a position of formidable power.²⁰

- 23 -

However the Russians showed no signs of abandoning their demand for reparations, even in the face of this formidable intimidation from America. On the other hand, "the old bloc against loans, when combined with the new vision of omnipotence, led the United States into a dead end."²¹ To work his way out of this dilemma, Byrnes proposed to Molotov on July 23 that each country take reparations from its own zone. Williams' continues:

> Now the fascinating thing is that the Russians fought that proposal for one whole week -- from July 23 to July 31 -- before Stalin finally agreed to it. Even then, he remarked very sharply that it was "the opposite of liberal."²²

William Clayton expressed his profound concern that these moves of Byrnes signified "complete abandonment of four power treatment of Germany." And Stalin tried persistently "to reach an agreement involving all of Germany." But to no avail. Byrnes was unyielding, and Stalin finally came, albeit with reluctance, to accept his position. But he "then extended it in a way that clearly foreshadowed the division of Europe."²³

Of the three possible explanations of why the Americans decided to give the Russians a free hand in reparations throughout eastern Europe, only one has any plausibility for Williams:

> It is, simply, that the United States -- confident in its vast economic and military superiority over Russia -- made the reparations agreement to avoid any indirect financing of Soviet recovery. American leaders were certain that the bomb, and Russia's great recovery needs, provided them with the leverage to re-establish the Open Door, and pro-Western governments, in eastern Europe.²⁴

Ponder for a moment what Williams has sought to demonstrate through this convoluted argument. From the very outset of the Potsdam Conference Stalin made unmistakably clear that defensive needs were uppermost in his mind.

- 24 -

In particular, he was determined to detach Germany from her Axis satellites and compel reparations from both. The Americans were bluntly insensitive to Russia's need for reparations. They refused Stalin's repeated overtures for a loan and sought to block his efforts to gain reparations from Russia's defeated foes. The initial American hesitation to go too far in their obstruction of these efforts, for fear this would involve them in another world war, gave way to a vision of omnipotence when news reached Potsdam that the test of the atomic weapon had been a success. Thereupon the American line perceptibly hardened. The Russians, however, still stood their rightful ground. Whereupon Byrnes shifted to the position that each occupying power should be allowed to take reparations from its own zone. This demarche led thoughtful members of the American delegation to fear we had abandoned all hope for German unity, and it struck Premier Stalin as manifestly illiberal. Yet he finally gave in, and then proceeded to interpret Byrnes' proposal rather more broadly than had their author. However the United States had not really meant to give up anything at all since, through the subsequent exercise of her superior economic and military power, she intended to regain what she had pretended to concede.

Through all the composition's countless variations an attentive listener catches the constant motif of American aggression and Russian restraint. As an instance, when America refuses to recognize special Russian interests in Eastern Europe she is condemned for aggressive support of "Open Door imperialism." When she shifts her position to advocate a _de facto_ spheres of influence arrangement with regard to reparations, she is guilty of blocking Russia's rightful access to

[Lc]

- 25 -

the resources of western Germany, and of initiating the division of Europe.

Whatever way Williams turns his blade it is always America that bleeds.

When one checks Williams' presentation step-by-step against the documentary record he gradually comes to sense the magnitude and persistence of his distortions. Since much of the book is a concatenation of errors a comprehensive corrective would involve a work far longer than his own. To keep within manageable bounds only six instances will be cited.

As Robert Maddox has pointed out, Stalin never made the "speech" at the opening of the Potsdam Conference to which Williams refers. Williams has pasted together, as if they were one, snippets from remarks made on different days in very different contexts. The end result has the accuracy of a composite photo in yellow journalism. The "Council" to which Stalin is said to have referred in his opening remarks was not that at Potsdam but rather a Council of Foreign Ministers which Truman had proposed be established. What Stalin saw as the primary concerns of a prospective Council of Foreign Ministers is transformed by Williams into the first order of business of the present moment at Potsdam.

As a second instance we may cite the latter part of Stalin's "speech" - "As for reparations, Russia would if necessary 'compel' such deliveries." These remarks were not made at the first plenary session on July 17, nor in connection with reparations due Russia from Germany, but during the fourth plenary session on July 20 with reference to reparations due Yugoslavia and Greece from Bulgaria. Stalin's remarks, as recorded in the minutes of Llewellyn Thompson, ran as

- 26 -

[L.C]

follows:

Finland had moved twenty-four divisions against Soviet troops. Smaller injuries had been caused them by Bulgaria. She had helped Germany against Russia, but she did not send her troops against them. On the other hand, she had caused harm to the Allies, Yugoslavia and Greece. Bulgaria should be punished for this and he was not opposed to punishing her. The armistice terms provided for reparations to be paid to these countries. He said not to worry, for the Russians would compel this payment. 25

Third, in the context of Williams' account, Byrnes' remark that "reparations do not seem to be an immediate problem" would seem to be an expression of a general American insensitivity to Russian need. The actual context was very specific and very different. In the Department of State minutes the exchange runs as follows:

Mr. Molotov stated that somebody must consider the question of Italian reparations.

Mr. Eden pointed out that this question would be dealt with in the peace settlement. Italy's admission into international organizations would be conditional upon the fulfillment of her engagements. However, he frankly felt that Italy would be unable to pay.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the United States Government has already advanced $200,000,000 to Italy and would probably have to advance $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 more. Therefore reparations do not seem to the United States to be an immediate problem.

Mr. Molotov asked whether it would be just to have small Finland paying large reparations and large Italy paying none. He asked how this would be understood by the world.

Mr. Eden asked what connection the question of reparations had with admission into international organizations. Reparations would be settled in the peace treaty and should have no effect on entrance into international organizations.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that the United Nations do not pay reparations.

Mr. Byrnes remarked that when the peace treaty was concluded it might be possible to work out some plan for Italy in future years to arrange some form of payment. However, in the best spirit he felt that he must say that the United States does not intend to make

["Is that he must pay that the United States shall not make\na charge against the United States for payment, however, in the case of any default in payment, it might be necessary to work out some plan, if it is in their best interest, that the United States would not be made liable for payment, however, in the case of any default in payment, it might be necessary to work out some plan, if it is in their best interest, that the United

[L.C]

- 27 -

Mr. Molotov stated that he had not suggested this.

Mr. Byrnes replied that he knew that but wanted to make the
situation perfectly clear.²⁶

A fourth example is Williams' version of Byrnes' offer on July 23 to Molotov that each country take reparations from its own zone. To Williams "the Byrnes offer ... clearly meant that the Russians would have a free hand in their zone of Germany and throughout eastern Europe." To support this conclusive judgment, he "reproduces" the following exchange between Byrnes and Molotov:

Mr. Molotov: My understanding, Secretary Byrnes, is that you have in mind the proposal that each country should take reparations from its own zone. If we fail to reach an agreement the result will be the same ....

The Secretary [Byrnes]: Yes ....

Mr. Molotov: said would not the Secretary's suggestions mean
that each country would have a free hand in their own zone and would
act entirely independently of the others?

The Secretary [Byrnes]: said that was true in substance .... 27

In the first place, the exchanges cited took place at different times and in
different forums. Far more important, as Maddox has again shown us, Williams
omits crucial qualifiers from Byrnes' statements, as we may see by placing the
second exchange in its context, as recorded in the minutes of Charles Bohlen:

The Secretary then said that he had also wanted to discuss privately with Mr. Molotov the difficult question of reparations. He said he had closed off the discussion of the Foreign Ministers meeting this afternoon since nothing could be accomplished until the new British delegation had returned to the Conference.

Mr. Molotov agreed.

The Secretary asked Mr. Molotov whether he had had an opportunity to think over the suggestion which the Secretary had made, namely, that each country would obtain its reparations from its own zone and would exchange goods between zones.

- 28 -

[L.C]

Mr. Molotov said would not the Secretary's suggestions mean that each country would have a free hand in their own zones and would act entirely independently of the others?

The Secretary said that was true in substance but he had in mind working out arrangements for the exchange of needed products between the zones, for example, from the Ruhr if the British agreed, machinery and equipment could be removed and exchanged with the Soviet authorities for goods -- food and coal -- in the Soviet zone. The Secretary said that he felt without some such arrangement the difficulties would be insurmountable and would be a continued source of disagreement and trouble between our countries.²⁸

Fifth, by taking William Clayton's words out of context, Williams gives them a very different meaning from that intended by Clayton. In Williams' version:

"There appears to be," he [Clayton] noted ruefully, "an unfortunate tendency to interpret the reparations operating agreement as an indication of complete abandonment of four power treatment of Germany. This is not stated in the texts and should not be accepted as a necessary conclusion...." But whether accepted or not, that was the meaning of the final arrangement.²⁹

In truth, Clayton was trying to counteract any tendency on the part of State Department officials in Washington to interpret the operating agreement as signifying abandonment of four power treatment of Germany, which he still hoped and felt to be a viable possibility. In his words,

> There appears to be an unfortunate tendency to interpret the reparations operating agreement as an indication of complete abandonment of four power treatment of Germany. This is not stated in the texts and should not be accepted as a necessary conclusion even though there may be many among the military forces in Germany who believe that a zonal treatment or a tripartite treatment of the western zones will be the only practicable method of operation.

> The economic principles specifically provide that the Control Council should attempt to formulate "common policies" covering a variety of important economic questions including the scale of deindustrialization, the scale of reparations deliveries, import and export programs, the standard of living the inter-area distribution of foodstuffs and other supplies. In addition finance communications and transport are recognized to require centralized handling....

- 29 -

We recognized that in practice it may be difficult to arrive at common decisions in the Control Council and in the Reparations Commission on all of the points on which it is hoped common policy will be determined.... General Clay has however indicated a considerable degree of confidence in his ability to work out at least some common policies in the Control Council and such efforts should obviously not be abandoned prematurely. 30

Our final example is the most revealing of all of the ingenuity with which Williams' conclusions lead him to his facts. We recall that the Russians fought Byrnes' July 23 proposal "for one whole week," and when Stalin finally gave in "he remarked very sharply that it was 'the opposite of liberal.'" This phrase was never directed by Stalin against any action of Byrnes but was used in an exchange with Ernest Bevin over the technical specifics of the percentage share for the Soviet Union of German assets frozen in other countries. We cite the Department of State minutes for the eleventh plenary meeting, on July 31:

> Mr. Bevin said that yesterday they had agreed that France be added to the Reparations Commission in order to work out these questions and he would like France to be added to the Reparations Commission.

> Mr. Stalin replied, I have no objection.

> Mr. Bevin said with regard to percentages, we thought we had met you yesterday in the meeting of Foreign Ministers. I agreed to 12-1/2 percent and thought that we had treated your claim liberally.

> Mr. Stalin said that it was the opposite of liberal. 31

For Williams the American leaders' "vision of omnipotence" was revealed in their attitude toward reparations, in particular in their assumption that, despite the seeming concessions in Byrnes' July 23 proposals, they had "the leverage to re-establish the Open Door, and pro-Western governments, in eastern Europe." However for Williams the "best evidence" of America's arrogance is found in the thinking that lay behind her decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan as quickly as possible. Let us turn to his portrayal of this decision and then check his

- 30 -

[LC]

argument against the documentary evidence.

The heart of Williams' contention is found in these passages:

In a very candid meeting on July 23, 1945, Truman, General George C. Marshall, Stimson and others generally agreed that the Russians were no longer needed in the war against Japan. They also talked very directly of using the bomb before the Russians could enter the conflict. Actually, however, that was not a new approach. Stimson had recommended as early as July 2, 1945, that the bomb should be dropped at a time when "the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far." And once it had proved out in the test, Truman was "intensely pleased" with the chance of using it before the Russians even entered the war.³²

For Williams there can be no real question that the bomb was directed at least as much against Russia as it was against Japan:

> The evidence provided by the government archives and private American leaders converges on one explanation: The United States dropped the bomb to end the war against Japan and thereby to stop the Russians in Asia, and to give them sober pause in eastern Europe.³³

Stimson's diary shows that there was no such meeting on July 23 but rather a request from Truman to find out from Marshall whether he felt we still needed the Russians in the war. America's possession of the bomb was but one of several factors with bearing on the question of Russian involvement in the war against Japan. In Stimson's words

> The President had told me at a meeting in the morning that he was very anxious to know whether Marshall felt we needed the Russians in the war or whether we could get along without them, and that was one of the subjects we talked over. Of course Marshall could not answer directly or explicitly. We had desired the Russians to come into the war originally for the sake of holding up in Manchuria the Japanese Manchurian Army. That now was being accomplished as the Russians have amassed their forces on that border, Marshall said, and were poised, and the Japanese were moving up positions in their army. But he pointed out that even if we went ahead in the war without the Russians, and compelled the Japanese to surrender to our terms, that would not prevent the Russians from marching

- 31 -

into Manchuria anyhow and striking, thus permitting them to get virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms.... Marshall felt as I felt sure he would that now with our new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan....³⁴

The burden of Marshall's advice was not that it was necessary to use the bomb "before the Russians could enter the conflict," but rather that, however we tried to influence Russia's role in the Japanese War, there was little we could do to block major Russian gains in that area.

Stimson's July 2 recommendation is reproduced in full in his Memoirs, where it may be seen to have a very different meaning from that assigned it by Williams.

5. It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan by the chief representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China, and, if then a belligerent, Russia, by calling upon Japan to surrender and permit the occupation of her country in order to insure its complete demilitarization for the sake of the future peace....

6. Success of course will depend on the potency of the warning which we give her. She has an extremely sensitive national pride, and, as we are now seeing every day, when actually locked with the enemy will fight to the very death. For that reason the warning must be tendered before the actual invasion has occurred and while the impending destruction, though clear beyond peradventure, has not yet reduced her to fanatical despair. If Russia is a part of the threat, the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far. Our own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as possible.³⁵

The central concern of Stimson's memorandum to the President was to suggest a course of action that would produce results equivalent to those of unconditional surrender by means other than the forceful occupation of the Japanese home islands. To this end Stimson tried to gauge the possible outcomes from the subtle interplay of Allied diplomacy and military strategy, on the one hand, and Japanese national character, on the other. It was his conclusion that the less destructive course he hoped to pursue would be foreclosed if Japan's national pride became

["come to an end to parties who would be forbidden if they chose to continue their war. It was the opinion of the British government that the�est of the two parties should be allowed to decide the question of the character of the�est. It was the opinion of the other powers that the�est should be allowed to decide the question of the character of the�est. It was the opinion of

- 32 -

fully engaged, which he felt would be the likely consequence if she were locked
in a life-and-death struggle with invading forces. That the same destructive
consequences would follow from a major Japanese engagement with Russian
invading forces as from one with Anglo-American was added as a supplementary
proposition - almost an afterthought - to Stimson's central contention. Williams
makes of this subordinate proposition a preconceived and controlling intention
by Stimson to constrict Russia's prospects in the Far East.

The phrase "intensely pleased" was an accurate description of Truman's
reaction to certain developments relating to the atomic bomb, but there is no
evidence linking this reaction "with the chance of using it before the Russians
even entered the war." The phrase is taken from Stimson's diary of July 22 and
describes the President's reaction to news that the atomic program was moving
ahead of schedule. In Stimson's words: "I also discussed with him Harrison's
two messages. He was intensely pleased by the accelerated timetable."36

Despite the countless errors of fact in Williams' work, it is not at this level
that the most fundamental deficiencies are to be found. These lie in the nature
of his intellectual and moral principles.

The starting point of his analysis is the faulty assumption that the nature of
state behavior is to be found in the domestic character of the state, a deficiency
which he compounds by the assumption that "capitalist" states are by nature
aggressive, because there is no other way they can save themselves from the
breakdown which will inevitably flow from these internal deficiencies. "Socialist"
states which have found a just basis for the resolution of their domestic difficulties,
have no need to be aggressive. If they did, the "solution" Williams proposes for

["have unlooked to be as good as, or even an equal\nas, the sum of the two, and stand on a balance even\nin the resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance even in\nthe resolution of their difference, which would\nbe highly significant, because there is no other\nagreement, which the two can have, except that of\nthe two, which would be sufficient to make the sum\nof the two equal, and stand on a balance

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our foreign policy dilemmas would turn out to be no solution at all. The naivete of this approach is shown in the arguments of such critics as Walter Lippmann in *The Good Society* who turn these propositions on their head, as well as in the evidence to the contrary that crowds international history. The naivete is also shown in the argument with which Williams makes a sympathetic differentiation between "radicals" and "liberals." Radicals rejected the liberal idea of the market, which they saw as neither fair nor efficient, and "advocated instead the idea of planned production for use and welfare. To accomplish this, they proposed that the government should take title to resources and direct the production of goods and services for all the society on an equitable basis."³⁷ Williams fancies through this appeal to move political life to a higher moral level. He seems oblivious to the fact that beneath the slogan "on an equitable basis" he has swept the most difficult problems of politics.

Since he does not understand the problems of politics Williams has a child's faith in the ability of slogans to solve them. After a criticism of liberal policies on national self-determination as, at best, "moralistic and paternalistic open-door imperialism," he sets forth his alternative view:

> Taken seriously, a commitment to the principle of self-determination means a policy of standing aside for peoples to make their own choices, economic as well as political and cultural. It is based on a willingness to live and let live - a broad tolerance for other people's preferences and a willingness, if the opportunity is offered, to help them achieve their own goals in their own fashion.³⁸

His assumption is that tolerance deposits its own foundations and self-limitation is a sufficient condition for general accord. Again, however, he gives us moralism in the name of morality, political illiteracy in the guise of radical sophistication.

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For societal cohesion always presupposes the effective enforcement of rules.
And effective rules cannot be formulated unless a distinction be made between
those diversities seen as permissible and those uniformities taken as necessary.
First Amendment freedoms are, after all, enforceable by law. In the name of
transcending liberal limitations, Williams gives us a naive reformulation of them.

Williams' political illiteracy is most appalling in the area where the weight
of political factors has always been most important - international relations.
We need not here retrace well-worn ground. But it may put the source of his
scholarly deficiencies in a new light when we realize that he does not find much
beyond defensive economic motives operative in Soviet foreign policy because he
sees no need to look for any other considerations. He tells us that, in light of
Stalin's determination to reestablish what he considered the Soviet Union's
"minimum and desirable frontiers in eastern Europe," the problem for American
leaders in the Second World War "was one of developing an attitude and a broad
set of proposals involving such security and economic aid for the Soviet Union
that would enable them to negotiate some kind of modus vivendi with the Russians."
In short, the Stalinist position was to be taken as a given and America's policy
cast in a mould most congenial to it.

In a methodological aside of critical importance Williams admits that

> If studied and written as a critique of Soviet policy, the emphasis involved in treating these matters would be different. In that case, the story might very well focus on the way that the break-down of the talks of 1941-1942 strengthened those Soviet leaders who laid primary stress on extending communism as the Red Army moved westward. That might very possibly be the real tragedy of Soviet diplomacy.³⁹

- 35 -

[LC]

However he quickly and doubly qualifies his qualifier by adding,

> But since this essay is about American diplomacy, and - even more - since it was the United States that refused to offer any clear and unequivocal basis for such fundamental negotiations, the essay has to concentrate on America's actions and the ideas behind them.

In other words, because his book is "about" American diplomacy the division of academic labor makes unnecessary extensive exploration of the Soviet responsibility for these difficulties and, since we already "know" the main blame is America's, such exploration wouldn't make much difference anyway.

Abstraction, like a sharp knife, must be handled with care. A watermelon may be cut in half to reward two contestants tied in a summer's swim meet and no harm be done. To do the same with a baby claimed by different mothers would have a different effect, as King Solomon taught us many long years ago. The asymmetrical interaction of sovereign collective personalities is at the heart of international politics. Isolation of the role of a single actor in international encounters always imperils an understanding of them. We should have some difficulty reconstructing the course of a heavyweight boxing match from a sports-writer's account confined to the blows delivered by one contestant, but if we knew nothing of boxing we would have ample data with which to demonstrate that contestant's unquestionable aggressiveness. Professor Williams' disclaimer, insufficient to redeem his analysis, makes explicit the source of its inadequacy.

His default is of moral, no less than of intellectual, principle. For the American faith has not been one of the open door, but of open doors. No society in history has held open its own door to so many for so long. The Statue of Liberty tells us more of the promise of America than does Williams' tract of its tragedy.

["relate as more of the promises of America than does William, trust at its tragedy in history, has held open the door to so many for whom the gain of liberty is not a gain at all. The gain of liberty in America has not been one of the outermost points, but of some chosen points. No society", "that the default is not a default of intelligence but a default of intelligence.", "In the first place, the default of intelligence is a default of intelligence in the sense of intelligence. It is a default of intelligence in the sense of intelligence in the

- 36 -

And the openness was never merely a commercial charter reckoned by the dollar sign. It was rather an expression of that confidence in the existence of universal moral standards which had been America's inheritance from the past and was to be her bequest to the future. If we would reduce openness to a commercial convenience let us not seek to do it at Thomas Jefferson's University. The University stands as testimony to Mr. Jefferson's affirmation: "I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man."

The Nation, if it be true to its inheritance, stands as a testimony to Mr. Jefferson.

If the moral underpinning of the American commitment to openness be appreciated, the many decisions which Williams' takes as confirmation of our "imperialism" take on a very different aspect. As an instance, the Soviet request for a loan of some $6 billion, no strings attached, for the post-war era. Williams is convinced this would have made of the Soviet Union a moderate partner, and freed it of the necessity to establish totalitarian dominion over eastern Europe.

On the other hand it might well have freed resources which would have enabled the Soviet Union to tighten its control over eastern Europe all the more ruthlessly.

We would be denied any effective means of inspection to see that this money was put to humane usage. The fact that such outside "interference" was deemed incompatible with the necessities of "security" by the Soviet leadership was surely not a problem for which we may properly be asked to bear the moral responsibility.

Had we adjusted to the political realities of their dilemma and moved ahead with such a loan, as Williams suggests, we might have found ourselves in the wholly illegitimate position of not only acquiescing in Soviet domination of eastern Europe but subsidizing that domination.

["The Soviet Union has established a firm determination of its foreign policy.", "The Soviet Union has established a firm determination of not only stationing its military forces in the Soviet Union, but also stationing its military forces in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has also stated its intention to station its military forces in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has also stated its intention to

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Williams, however, does not limit himself to a critical analysis of the failings of the past. He lights a torch to guide our course to the better ways of the future. After citations from Marx, Stalin, Mao, Richard Wright, and others he draws his conclusions in a final chapter entitled "The Wisdom of an Open Door for Revolutions:"

> This essay ... points toward a radical but noncommunist reconstruction of American society in domestic affairs. And it is at this point that the irony appears: there is at present time no radicalism in the United States strong enough to win power, or even a very significant influence, through the processes of representative government - and this essay rests on the axiom of representative government. Hence, ironically, the radical analysis leads finally to a conservative conclusion. The well-being of the United States depends - in the short-run but only in the short-run - upon the extent to which calm and confident and enlightened conservatives can see and bring themselves to act upon the validity of a radical analysis.⁴⁰

Others, less content with the ironic fare offered by Williams and less restrained by his scruples about representative government, stress the need to force the issue more decisively. For Christopher Lasch

> The question to which historians must now address themselves is whether American capitalism really depends, for its continuing growth and survival, on the foreign policy its leaders have been following throughout most of the 20th century. To what extent are its interests really threatened by Communist revolutions in the Third World? To what extent can it accommodate itself to those revolutions, reconciling itself to a greatly diminished role in the rest of the world, without undergoing a fundamental reformation - that is, without giving way (after a tremendous upheaval) to some form of Socialism?⁴¹

Gar Alperovitz has made clear his decision. The fourth of his *Cold War Essays* "concludes the book and also my own research on foreign policy." "Hence, my future work will be concerned almost exclusively with domestic policy matters and with efforts to transform the political economy of our domestic institutions."⁴²

["ing with efforts to restore the health of the economy of our commercial relations. The future work will be considerable, especially with commercial partners.", "The "conclusion" considers the point made by some reason or other foreign policy.", "The "conclusion" considers the point made by some reason or other foreign policy. \"The point made by some reason or other foreign policy is, that America's capital should decline, and the continuing decrease to which history must now address the consequences of that decline is a foreseen and inevitable, on the part of the United States, of a reduction of its military resources, and of its commercial resources in the following years, which can only be offset by the resources of other nations.", "The "conclusion" considers the point made by some reason or other foreign policy. \"The point made by some reason or other foreign policy is, that America's capital should decline, and the continuing decrease to which history must now address the consequences of that decline is a foreseen and inevitable, on the part of the United States, of a reduction of its military resources, and of its commercial resources in the following years, which can only be offset by the resources of other nations.\"", "The "conclusion" considers the point made by some reason or other foreign policy. \"The point made by some reason or other foreign policy is, that America's capital should decline, and the continuing decrease to which history must now address the consequences of that decline is a foreseen and inevitable, on the part of the United States, of a reduction of its military resources, and of its commercial resources in the following years, which can only be offset by the resources of other nations.\"", "The "conclusion" considers the point made by some reason or other foreign policy. \"The point made by some reason or other foreign policy is, that America's capital should decline, and the continuing decrease to which history must now address the consequences of that decline is a foreseen and inevitable, on the part of the United States, of a reduction of its military resources, and of its commercial resources in the following years, which can only be offset by the resources of other nations.\" In the effort to do so, only in the short run can we hope to secure the resources which are necessary to the success of the war. In the effort to do so, only in the short run can we hope to secure the resources which

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in that fourth essay Alperovitz makes clear the lines along which this transformation is to proceed.

The policy shift is in fact only in its initial stages, no more. To slow down or halt military or CIA intervention is the first step. Clearly, the second - now in its "tokenism" phase - involves a critique of the industrial-military complex in institutions which - in the brief period since the Second World War - has been erected to support the much older policies, and which has taken on a life of its own. The third effort, built on both of these, will have to break the hammerlock of the informal web of economic, political, and other ties to bankrupt ruling groups in underdeveloped nations - for only as these silent and systematic connections are undone can such nations be released from their miserable bondage to the old policy. The last objective is the most difficult: confronting and changing blind but basic "anti-Communist" attitudes that have become part of American political culture over the last seventy years.⁴³

Alperovitz, too, has a positive vision to give him courage through his long labor in the furtherance of human justice:

> Over the long span of the next generation of American history - through the coming interregnum of sporadic and increasing repression - those who oppose the policy of antirevolution must press their views with all force, increasing the constraints through confrontation, political organization, and education. Ultimately they must assert democratic control of foreign policy through radically new institutional forms; the United States must be forced to give up the traditional policy entirely.⁴⁴

How influential is radical revisionism? We cannot here seek to answer this question, a rather elusive one in any case. However complacency has proved a feckless guide in foreign policy, and the indicators are numerous that the influence is far wider than those of different persuasions have often found it comfortable to acknowledge. Thus Ronald Steel in *The New York Review of Books* - hardly a forum in which he would find it necessary to sound exaggerated notes of alarm - agrees that "Maddox is right ... in charging that the revisionist interpretation

- 41 -

There is no justification for assuming a direct connection between the rising volume of radical revisionist writing and this distribution of Congressional opinion. Equally, there are no grounds for ignoring the role revisionism may have played in generating Congressional outlooks in correspondence with its own biases.

It is also well to bear in mind the volume and the mutually reinforcing character of radical revisionist publications. Where Williams established an initial beachhead, fresh divisions have fanned out in all directions - backward to World War II and World War I and on into the past, forward to Viet Nam and the multi-national corporations and on over the horizon of the future. And the publishing world seems far more sympathetic to works in the revisionist grain than to those which cut against it. As Francis Loewenheim has observed

> ... not infrequently university teachers have had little choice about using New Left books. When the present writer sought, this spring, to obtain for his students copies of the memoirs of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, they were unavailable from the publisher, but Doubleday, which could not afford to keep these important books in print, could apparently afford the time and talent necessary to publish *The Essential Stalin* edited by H. Bruce Franklin, formerly of Stanford University.⁴⁷

The bases of the appeal of radical revisionism are in part intellectual, in part political. An aspect of its intellectual appeal, as we have noted, stems from the impression it gives of rational coherence and historic sweep. In the American academic setting radical revisionism is not unlike a well-disciplined offensive army which enjoys interior lines of communication and is deployed in terrain congenial to its advance against motley and undisciplined forces unaware that a struggle is underway at all. As against the pragmatism characteristic of the

["The basis of the annual meeting of medical revisionist are in part intellectual. In the University of California, edited by H. Bruce Prankle, formerly of Stanford University, and then edited by

- 42 -

American academic tradition it brings the striking power of articulate conceptions.
Thus Williams turns back an assault on his position by consigning it to a lower
level of understanding:

> The mental quality we call literal-mindedness, and the analytic\>n technique we know as the chronological ordering of raw data, have
> their place, but that place is at the beginning - by no means at the
> end - of historical understanding.⁴⁸

The academic who lacks articulate premises at the basis of his own thought -
and the courage to stand by them - is relatively defenseless against this form of
assault. His own characteristic response is to seek a "balanced" position between
what he had thought was an honest understanding of events and the novel perspec-
tive the revisionists bring to bear. In pursuit of this "balance," however, it is
his views that move toward the revisionists, not theirs that move toward his.

At a later stage, nonetheless, he finds himself under renewed assault, with the
result that the "balance" previously established has now become "unbalanced."

He once again applies the tactic that comes naturally to him - pragmatic adaption
of his own understanding of the meaning of events to that proclaimed by the new
perspective, in pursuit of a conciliatory "balance" between the two. Again,
however, the movement is on his part toward the indictments brought by the
revisionists, not by them toward such defense of his own position as he can muster.

Through this process of pragmatic adaptation of his own understanding of events
to that tirelessly reiterated by those with a different understanding the pragmatic
intellectual comes to be neutralized, and his independent contribution to the
interpretation of events vanishes. At best he is left to carry on the rather menial
tasks which must be done "at the beginning of historical understanding." At this

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stage, however, these are scarcely necessary any longer. For since the "true"
meaning of history now stands unopposed, it is merely necessary to instill that
truth in the body politic. The task of checking it against the events themselves
has been rendered superfluous. The ideologues have made "true," through the
untiring exercise of strength of will, what they could never have demonstrated
through a merely academic process.

An important source of the appeal of radical revisionism is this very inability
of American academicians to contain it by the processes dear to their own hearts.
For if it be blocked on one front, it will push out on another. If a judgement on
Truman be shown in error, truth will find confirmation in a passage from Acheson;
if this doesn't do, one from Harriman will; or, if not from Harriman, then from
Dulles or, if not from Dulles, then from McCloy - and so on and on ad infinitum.
One may do for events what one does for individuals. If the Marshall Plan
doesn't confirm one's case, NATO will; if not Korea, then Viet Nam; if not Cuba,
then Chile; if not Rhodesia, then South Africa. A successful response is possible
only if one articulates an intellectual and moral perspective more compelling
than that of the radical revisionists and only if, in the process, one adapts a leaf
from Mr. Dulles' notebook and practices massive retaliation on the premises
which underlie this perspective, rather than try to contain the endless factual
instances cited as its "confirmation."

Other factors in the American academic setting also play their part. One is
the void in substantive political analysis associated with the vogue of behavioralism.
In the sexless world of scientific politics the harlot radicalism is assured

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patronage. Another is the bond revisionism establishes, at certain points, with older intellectual traditions still slumbering in America. One of these is isolationism, and those with isolationist yearnings are tempted to welcome any rationale which seems to give a plausible justification for the reduction of America's world role. Revisionism gives ample justification for that reduction by arguing that the Soviet threat was never a very real one in the first place, and by tracing our troubles to overinvolvement stemming from national hubris. A third factor is the mass character of America's higher education system. While the exacting demands of scholarship can never gain popularity among the millions, the appeals of an ideology can. It is far easier for a mass educational system to become a channel for the transmission of ideology and political activism than for the transmission of scholarly integrity. The former tendencies increasingly make themselves felt at the high school level as well.

Political factors also contribute to the appeal of radical revisionism, the most obvious being that related to opposition to the Viet Nam War. Revisionism provides a rationale for attacking a society to which one may be opposed for reasons quite different from those spelled out in the ideology itself. Revisionism also feeds moralistic yearnings by drawing stark distinctions between good and evil in even the most complex of international encounters. It also nourishes activism by seeming to make the cause of one's dilemmas one over which one has direct control. For if the source of the world's ills can be traced to the domestic corruptions of the American system then, through electoral politics, confrontation, or more violent devices, one has it within his power to lift these evils from mankind's shoulders. The appeal of revisionism is part and parcel

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of its moralism and its activism.

External political factors also play their part. If the embers of radical revisionism slumber in a young man's heart, a year abroad is likely to bring them to full flame. For he is there certain to come into contact with a view of the United States similar to that put forth by the radical revisionists. Thus will he become ever more dedicated to the task of bringing the United States into step with "world historical tendencies."

This result is particularly likely if the time abroad be spent in a Third World country. For there are powerful and persistent political tendencies at work there which give wide receptivity to revisionist arguments. Rich political dividends are to be garnered from attack on the CIA or condemnation of the AID mission, from sending home the American ambassador or stoning the USIS library. It is, after all, far easier to condemn "American imperialism" than to engage in the difficult tasks of trying to further one's society's capacity for effective action, especially when the will is weak and the way clouded. Since the capacity for effective collective action for many of these societies will, for any foreseeable future, remain low, the political circumstances which generate anti-Americanism - and hence feed the appeal of revisionist dogma - will be sustained.

Another factor which contributes to the influence of radical revisionism is the absence, or inadequacy, of alternative perspectives. Let us reserve our observations on this deficiency for the closing section.

["of association on the basis of the following section\nof the Constitution, or of the principle of majority vote.", "Another feature which contributes to the success of the\nreform is the absence of alternative政体, i.e. a reserve arm\nof the state, or instead of alternative政体, i.e. a reserve arm", "future, remains low, the political circumstances which generate and sustain American political action are such that the capacity for effective collective action for many of these societies will be largely unavailable, especially when the will is weak and the way chosen, since the capacity for difficult tasks of trying to number one society's capacity for collective action after all is: either to conclude American intervention in the state, or engage in the from within, the political interventionist, or, if it is necessary, the political interventionist, remain low, the political circumstances which generate and sustain American political action are such that the capacity for effective collective action for many of these societies will be largely unavailable, especially when the will is weak and the way chosen, since the capacity for difficult tasks of trying to number one society's capacity for collective action after all is: either to conclude American intervention in the state, or engage in the", "be become even more dedicated to the task of bringing the United States into line with world historical tendencies,\n\nthe United States similar to that put forth by the radical revolutionists. This will lead them to willful, small, blind, and naive, if not ill-informed, but well-informed, small, blind

- 46 -

### III. Toward a Doctrine for American Foreign Policy

As suggested at the outset, a doctrine should help one estimate the likely effect of major international tendencies on the achievement of the longer-term interests of one's state. The achievement of America's most basic interests was, for over a century, intertwined with two conditions: the existence of a rough balance of power on the continent of Europe and the exercise by Great Britain of a generally benevolent predominance on the world's oceans. With the end of the Second World War both of these conditions came to an end.

The outcome of the Second World War registered the definitive destruction of the classical balance of power. Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand had been willing to go to war in 1815 over the accession of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw to Russia and of Saxony to Prussia. In 1945, the Russians dominated all of Poland, the entire Danube Valley, all of the Balkans north of Greece, the Baltic states, and Germany a hundred miles to the west of Berlin. Against Alexander, Metternich had been able to marshall Britain and France, and thereby preserve the classic balance. Against Stalin Churchill could marshall no comparable forces. The European balance of power was dead, and only those who had never known what it meant could be unaware of the magnitude of the change. The fate of Poland was of critical importance. Had Polish independence been maintained, the possibility of an independent role for Germany and for central Europe would have been kept open. With Poland as a Soviet satellite, the Russians then had a direct line of control to the borders of West Germany. The final chapter had been written in the history of the classic European balance. Henceforth international politics

["in the history of the classic European balance. Henceforth international politics\nhave been kept open. With Poland a Soviet satellite, the Huns attack them on the\nhostility of an independent layer on German soil. In the event of a war\nwith critical independence being guaranteed, the Polish independence\nwas of no avail. The European balance of power was dead, and only those who had never known\nthe classic balance. Against Stettin Churchill could not be made comparable because\nPoland had been able to maintain herself and to defend herself\nagainst Germany a hundred miles to the west of Berlin. Against Austria-\nHolland, the entire German territory of Austria, all of the Huns were cut off by the\nBaltic. In 1914, the Huns were dominated all over Russia and of course to\nBudapest. In 1918, the Huns were driven out of the German Reich by the\nBalkans, and Germany a hundred miles to the west of Berlin. Against Austria-\nHolland, the entire German territory of Greece, the French\nhad been able to maintain herself and to defend herself\nagainst Germany a hundred miles to the west of Berlin. Against Austria-\

- 47 -

was to be played out on a global stage. The knights of the old order, restless
in their subordinate position in the global theater, dreamt dreams of restoration
of the restricted continental theater. They might then once again regain freedom
of movement, and make real reborn visions of primacy. De Gaulle was the most
formidable of these dreamers, and the fate of his policies stands as commentary
on the plausibility of his dreams.

The consolidation of capabilities under the control of the Soviet Union after
World War II constituted a situation without parallel in European international
history. By the canons of classic statecraft such a concentration would be the
occasion for deep anxiety and constant watchfulness - independent of any estimate
of intentions. Had Europe been a self-enclosed entity the prospects for the
preservation of independence by the west European states would have been grimmer
than they had been in the era of their confrontation with Nazi Germany. For the
power of Russian totalitariansim had grown in many other critical respects during
World War II.

As one instance, the strength of Communist movements in western Europe
had increased markedly as a result of their role in the Resistance. Communists
could now wrap themselves in the national flag and insist they were the truest of
patriots. Conservative parties were subject to indictment for fascism, betrayal,
or ineffectuality, as were many of the "bourgeois" parties. Beyond this, the
fear of war - now greatly accentuated by the existence of nuclear weapons - was
more intense than it had been in the 'thirties, and was skillfully manipulated by
the Communists for the furtherance of their own purposes. Without the sustained,
in-depth involvement of the United States the likely outcome for western Europe

["The General Staff issued a directive to the General Staff on the 11th of March, 1942, stating that the General Staff was to be the authority in all questions of military strategy and policy. The General Staff was to be the authority in all questions of military strategy and policy. The