HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 15, 1986

To Whom It May Concern:

Ed Starnes was a member of my security staff from November 1983 until July 1985 when for personal reasons he left to return to the Washington, D.C. area.

In addition to the protection of my family and myself, his responsibilities included advancing many of my foreign and domestic trips, coordinating with the local authorities and seeing that all arrangements were satisfactory. Under circumstances that demanded extensive travel and long hours, Ed was always reliable, courteous and professional.

I do not hesitate to recommend him to any person or organization requiring executive protection.

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

United States Department of State

The Fine Arts Committee

Washington, D. C. 20520

JAN 21 1986

January 14, 1986

Dear Committee Member:

I am pleased to announce that the annual reception hosted by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Shultz for donors and lenders will take place on **Friday, March 14, 1986, from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.** You will be receiving a formal invitation in due course.

A meeting of the Fine Arts Committee will take place the following morning, **Saturday, March 15, 1986, at 10:00 a.m.** in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. We expect the meeting to last approximately one and a half hours. Please return the enclosed form indicating whether or not you will be present for the meeting.

Please note our new telephone number below.

Enclosures:

Return form.

Return envelope.

AUG 12 1986

Dear Nancy & Henry,

By now you have probably received the San Antonio Museum of Art letter concerning the opening of our new Folk Art Gallery in the Fall.

Since this event is of such importance to me personally, I would very much like for you to help us celebrate at a dinner Marshall and I are giving at our home following the museum preview on November 1.

Happily, this is not a fund raising or benefit event but simply our chance to show off the new Folk Art Collections at the San Antonio Museum of Art and to say thank you to all who have shared our hopes and dreams for this wonderful addition to the artistic profile of Texas.

More formal invitations will be sent later - so no reply is needed now - just circle All Saints Day and plan to be with

us.

Our gathering will be rather small — seated — and memorable, I hope! It would be nice fun to have you two Tuesday, the fifth of August at our house again.

Mrs. Marshall Steves

[4]

11/27/85

Re: 'd late
December

HAK:

A John Q. Public letter to which
you might wish to reply personally.

A senior at Nova College in Florida
chose you for a research paper on
qualities of greatness. The paper
defends you against all critics
(including Shawcross) and expresses
deepest admiration - as does the
cover letter. It is really very
sweet.

Attached, a short thank you if you
are interested. ___ sign

___ no reply necessary

A little more rosemary
substantially

ELC]

NOV 22 1989

13161 SW 8th Street
Davie, FL 33325

November 12, 1985

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K St., NW, #400
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am a student in my senior year at Nova College, studying to earn a BS in Psychology. I just finished taking a course in Humanities titled: "Qualities of Greatness," taught by Dr. Steven Alford. We read literary, historical, and political works concerned with great individuals in history and also had the opportunity to attend several of the Nova Speakers Series lectures. This class was the most memorable intellectual experience I have had in school thus far.

One of the requirements of the course was to submit a research paper, the focus of which was to be an analysis of an individual of greatness. I chose you. This particular assignment made a real impression on me. Not only did I gain historical knowledge, but feel I was able to glean a perspective on what I consider to be important virtues. I am enclosing a copy of my paper (it earned me an A!) I would be interested in any comment you might have on it.

Naturally, after putting in much time and effort on this paper, I was especially excited with the prospect of hearing you speak in person. And I must tell you, you fulfilled my expectations completely. Even though many people, far more prestigious than I, have thanked you for the contributions you have made toward world peace and stability and for exemplifying courage, integrity, sincerity and wisdom, I wish to add my name to theirs.

With great admiration,

[lc]

HENRY KISSINGER

On that April day in 1975 when Saigon fell, Dr. Kissinger told a friend, "Vietnam is a Greek tragedy. We should never have been there at all. But now it's history."
(Stoessinger, 1)

Heroes are made not born. The pinnacle of greatness is easier achieved than held, and so, perhaps, only those heroes whom time immortalize, are truly great. In a diplomatic career, involving the ambition, sincerity, perception and intelligence needed to help resolve international disputes, Henry Kissinger has shown qualities of excellence which have allowed him to stand taller than the masses. In 1973 Henry Kissinger placed first in the Gallup Poll's "Most Admired Man Index" (Caldwell,2). In May 1973, 78 percent of Americans were able to identify him, a number unmatched except for presidents, presidential candidates, and major sports and entertainment figures (2). But society is fickle and a hero always has adversaries who will try to topple him from his pedestal. Dr. Kissinger's actions have brought acclaimation from some, while others see him as a deceitful, unscrupulous, power hungry individual. By examining his personality, beliefs, attitudes, values and actions, through biographical, psychological and historical studies, including the derogatory commentary, SIDESHOW, I wish to deal with the following questions: "What makes this Nobel prize winner great?" "What do others say are his imperfections and why?" and looking in particular, at his dealings with Indochina, "Why do I disagree with critics such as William Shawcross?"

Beginning with a biographical sketch, I will highlight how Henry

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Kissinger's environment gave rise from a would be accountant to a man who was once called, the second most powerful man in the world.

Alfred Heinz Kissinger was born May 27, 1923 in Furth, Germany (3). His father was a respected man in his community, but in 1935 when Nuremberg laws forbade any Jew from holding a government position, he lost his job and the family moved to America (3). Louis Kissinger, a former teacher over 50, worked as a bookkeeper and accepted his changed status meekly (3). This must have been hard for young Henry to accept and was probably the beginning his long rebellion against orthodox Jewishness (3).

Heinz became Henry in New York. As he reveals in *WHITE HOUSE YEARS*, he felt a special gratitude toward America. In Germany, he lived in fear.

> I always remembered the thrill when I first walked the streets of New York City. Seeing a group of boys, I began to cross to the other side to avoid being beaten up. And then I remembered where I was. I therefore have always had a special feeling for what America means, which native-born citizens perhaps take for granted. . . its idealism, its humanity, and its embodiment of mankind's hopes.

(Kissinger, 4)

Henry graduated high school and spent a year at New York City College (Starr, 5). In 1943, he was drafted into the army and became a naturalized United States citizen (5). In the army, he met Fritz Kraemer, his first "patron," an opinionated man with two doctorates, who impressed Kissinger with his air of authority (5). They became immediate friends, for Kraemer was equally impressed with Kissinger's intelligence and his aptitude for dealing with others. He later said, "Kissinger showed human understanding, self-discipline. Unbelievable impartiality . . ." (5). Through Kraemer, Kissinger was assigned as an interpreter with Army Intelligence, soon after promoted to PFC and then to staff sergeant serving as an officer course instructor (5).

When Kissinger returned to college, Kraemer advised him to choose

[1c]

one of the best (Caldwell, 6). Accepted at Harvard, "Kissinger was quiet and withdrawn, but he found the words to write a 350-page paper that resulted in the school setting a limit of 150 pages on all under-graduate theses in the future" (6). Kissinger got his Master's degree in 1952 and his Ph.D. degree in 1954, under the tutelage of his second patron, William Yandell Elliot, a professor of government (6). "Elliot had a flair and a style which were unmistakable, to Kissinger, a mark of confidence backed by a tradition of intellectual order . . . He possessed a fiery and flamboyant personality which made him stand out among his contemporaries" (6).

In his lengthy thesis, "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant," Kissinger criticized Kant and Spengler because their philosophies left little room for human action and will (Caldwell, 7). According to Spengler and Kant, civilization was moving toward its predestined end and nothing man could do would stop it (7). "Kissinger's past experience had shown him the necessity for human choice and action. His father's passivity, Kraemer's gospel of action, and Elliot's preaching of that gospel kept Kissinger searching for the fit between his past and his future" (7).

An interesting side note of college days, is told by a fellow student, John Stoessinger:

> Elliott was one of the two most powerful professors in the Government Department. The other was Carl J. Friedrich. Both men taught political philosophy and were bitter intellectual rivals. Any doctoral student found out soon after his arrival that he had to make a choice between Elliott and Friedrich. It apparently was impossible to be on cordial terms with both. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Henry Kissinger, most of us thought, was the fact that he had managed to be on excellent terms with both these supreme rivals. (8)

In 1951, Elliott had the Harvard International Seminar established and named Kissinger its executive director (Starr, 9). The seminar was funded by Ford Foundation money, Rockefeller money, and other sources.

(3)

[LC]

"As many have noted, Kissinger created an unprecedented and unmatched set of worldwide contacts through the seminar. It gave him access to a network of foreign elites and future policymakers" (9). Also, he became a trusted friend to his third and clearly most powerful patron, Rockefeller (9).

Kissinger was terribly self-conscious about his accent. In a magazine interview, he said, he finally lost his embarrassment over it in 1957 (Caldwell, 10).

The date . . . is by no means arbitrary. It was in 1957 that Kissinger was to be finally accepted. This was the year that the public recognized Kissinger's worth, for his book, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY*, that was published and stayed on the best seller lists for fourteen weeks. (10)

In 1954, he worked in New York on the Counsel of Foreign Relations and from 1957 to 1965, taught at Harvard, taking some time off during 1964, to serve as a Rockefeller aide, during the Governor's unsuccessful bid for the Republican presidential nomination (Starr, 11). In 1965, when Henry Cabot Lodge was appointed ambassador to South Vietnam, he became a consultant to the State Department on Vietnam. He spent most of 1968 working on Rockefeller's second presidential campaign. In November, he was asked to join the Nixon White House as the president's assistant for National Security affairs. "At the age of forty-five, Kissinger had made his way to the upper reaches of the American foreign-policy machine--and was soon to be its undisputed master" (Starr, 12).

As can be seen by the forgoing information, at the time Kissinger was invited to join the Nixon Administration, he had already chalked up some fine accomplishments. He had also formulated a philosophy of history, of foreign policy and a political style that would not change throughout his time in the White House. He had an assuring continuity for those who believed in him.

(4)

[10]

Kissinger is understandable. He held a coherent and plausible view of the world concerned with certain values and not with others; concerned with order, limits, and restraint; and concerned with a psychological perspective on how one forged agreements with opponents. . . Kissinger's view is an intellectually respectable and coherent view, and it appears from a variety of analyses that he attempted to follow it.

(Caldwell, 13)

Kissinger had a very clear-cut theory of global order which, in his judgment, would bring the world closer to stability and peace.

Stoessinger says, "Nothing was more important to him (Kissinger) in 1969 than the chance to test that theory. He believed with the most absolute conviction that he was the one best qualified" (14).

Perhaps, Kissinger was thinking of himself when he quoted Metternich as saying: "Because I know what I want and what the others are capable of, I am completely prepared" (Kalb, Kalb, 15). While some people interpret this quality as extreme arrogance, others see it as confidence, a fearless ability to face up to crises and also be willing to take the risks involved. "This is in marked contrast to the young boy who ran to the other side of the street to avoid the risk of an oncoming threat" (Caldwell, 16).

While difficult to sum up Kissinger's theories in a short paper, there is a basic theme of a necessary balance. In *WHITE HOUSE YEARS*, he states:

> In the late eighteenth century the philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his essay Perpetual Peace, had written that world peace was inevitable; it would come about either because all nations shared the same sense of justice or because of a cycle of wars of ever increasing violence that would teach men the futility of conflict. . . But the root dilemma of our time is that if the quest for peace turns into the sole objective of policy, the fear of war becomes a weapon in the hands of the most ruthless; it produces moral disarmament. How to strive for both peace and justice, for an end of war that does not lead to tyranny, for a commitment to justice that does not product cataclysm-to find this balance is the perpetual task of the statesman in the nuclear age. (17)

Richard Barnet, who wrote, *THE GIANTS, RUSSIA AND AMERICA*, expresses another view. He sees "detente" as Kissinger's nostalgic vision of a

(5)

nineteenth-century balance-of-power system resting on a seventeenth-
century principle of international law, which said, "Whoever controls
the territory may impose his own religion" (Barnet, 18). He says
Kissinger felt,

It was naive to think that you could have peace with great
powers and try to remake their societies at the same time.
Stability required concrete agreements with leaders in
power . . . In a world of strategic choices, peace came before
justice, and if that required clinking glasses with people
who oppressed their own people, so be it. (18)

Grolier Encyclopedia explains it this way:

Kissinger regards peace and international stability as best
maintainable by a balance of power, which he perceives more
as a livable political equilibrium than a military (or
nuclear) imbalance in favor of the United States. Thus, he
deems it necessary "to construct an international system
based on a sense of justice so that its participants would
have a stake in maintaining it; with a sufficient balance of
power so that no nation or group of nations would be
dependent entirely on the good will of its neighbors, and
based on a sense of participation so that all nations could
share in the positive aspirations." (19)

Shawcross is quick to point out in his book, _SIDESHOW_, that Kissinger called Nixon, "unfit to be president" (20). Caring and working as hard as he did for the Rockefeller campaign, it was no secret to the public how Kissinger felt, but when asked to join the Nixon staff after the election, knowing the tremendous challenge and opportunity it afforded him, he could not be blamed for shifting gears. Also, without really knowing Nixon well prior to 1969, Kissinger admits after working with him, "I was struck by his perceptiveness and knowledge so at variance with my previous image of him" (21). From earlier statements, as well as Kissinger's memoirs, it is clear that Nixon and Kissinger both understood the formal hierarchy of authority, and they had similar views of the world and how international relations should be shaped in that world. They were not socially attracted to each other, but worked well together. The only real riff in their relationship was a jealousy on Nixon's

(6)

[Lc]

part. This was quite a natural consequence, as Harvey Starr points out: "Kissinger emerged as the 'star' of the Nixon Administration because of Nixon's strong emphasis on foreign policy and Nixon's own lack of charisma" (22).

Along with the same view of foreign policy, they both had little confidence in the governmental bureaucracy's ability to develop and implement an effective and innovative foreign policy. Nixon knowing there was an overwhelming majority of Democrats on staff who would oppose his initiatives, distrusted the bureaucracy and knew that avoiding them was often the best way to avoid problems. Shawcross quotes Kissinger as saying, "The only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from the making of the decisions all those who are theoretically charged with carrying it out" (23). These actions, while devious, were conducted purposefully to bring about what the two statesmen felt best for the nation. Caldwell explains the necessity of this action, using another quote from Kissinger:

> International agreements are sometimes possible only by ignoring safeguards against capricious action. It is a paradoxical aspect of modern bureaucracies that their quest for objectivity and calculability often leads to impasses which can be overcome by essentially arbitrary decisions."

(24)

Although some observers see Kissinger's negotiating style as dishonest or at the least, highly manipulative, he seems to have a unique quality in persuading others by convincing them that he understands and can sympathize with their point of view. Starr says, "Rather than freezing an opponent into the image of the enemy, Kissinger let his experiences lead him to an empathy and identification with opponents that permitted him to be flexible in dealing with them" (25). Along with his habit of establishing close relationships with adversary leaders, Kissinger insisted on conducting negotiations personally. The reasoning behind this style is

(7)

[Lc]

explained by John Stoessinger in two different ways:

His penchant for the solo performance has been variously attributed to Kissinger's "enormous ego," his "obsessive secrecy," or to his "elemental need for power and glory." There is another interpretation. In order for Kissinger to succeed in his most historic diplomatic initiatives, he had to establish personal dominance over the bureaucracy. To establish such control moreover, he had to act decisively, often secretly, and, at times, alone. (26)

Early in 1974, the journalist, Bernard Kalb, asked Kissinger to reflect on his hopes and ambitions. He responded softly,

> I'd like to leave behind a world that seemed to be more peaceful than the one we entered. More creative in the sense of fulfilling human aspirations. And of course, it's been my dream, which for many reasons has not been fully realizable, to have contributed in some sense to unity in the American people. That was my approach in Vietnam. And, you know, we couldn't foresee Watergate then . . . No, I have my vanity and ego and everything else that people allege, and I'm sure it's true. But my policy is really more geared to what people will think in 1980 than what the newspapers say tomorrow.

(27)

Watergate, a calamity we are all too familiar with, is discussed in *SIDESHOW*. Shawcross implies it was on Kissinger's recommendation, that the FBI wiretap Halperin's home, and goes on to say, "This tap was immediately followed by others . . . They marked the first of the domestic abuses of power now known as Watergate" (28). Kissinger's memoirs stated, "I went along with what I had no reason to doubt was legal and established practice in these circumstances, pursued, so we were told, with greater energy and fewer safeguards in previous administrations" (29). Also, in writing about the Senate Foreign Relations Committee clearing Kissinger of lying about the wiretaps, Shawcross says,

> The idea that the nation might be deprived of its brilliant Secretary of State as well as its President was too alarming for the Senate; fifty-two Senators quickly signed a statement declaring that the Nobel Prize winner's "integrity and veracity are beyond reproach," and the Foreign Relations Committee promised to hold more hearings. When it did so, it was clear that it had no wish to probe. (30)

(8)

It is hard for me to imagine that a committee intent on bringing to
light the wrongs of public officials, including the president, would
bypass any other individual for fear of hurting national pride, if they
truly found evidence of any crime.

While his autocratic temperament and highly personal style made him
a natural target, whatever debate there might be as to the ethics of
Henry Kissinger as a statesman, his pursuit of world order based on
the premise that the lives of hundreds of millions of people depended
on the stability of American-Soviet relations, must be acknowledged.
The first SALT treaty that he negotiated with considerable skill,
undoubtedly helped secure those lives. And what set the stage for
Nixon's visit to Peking ended more than twenty years of destructive
hostility toward China. Dickson says, "Only time will tell how
lasting Kissinger's achievements ultimately prove to be . . . his
participation should earn him a permanent place in the annals of
history as the first truly global statesman" (31). The book,
CRUSADERS AND PRAGMATISTS, tackles the question, "What should be our
criterion for judging his success-his intentions or the consequences
of his actions?" (Stoessinger, 32). It notes:

> In short, what must concern us is the problem of
> statesmanship and moral choice . . . Kissinger made the
> pursuit of a stable world order the categorical imperative of
> his foreign policy. If, in the process, the human element
> had to be sacrificed at times on the altar of stability or of
> a larger strategic vision, so be it, since without stability,
> peace could not be born at all and justice, too, would be
> extinguished. He felt that in a tragic world, a statesman
> was not able to choose between good and evil, but only among
> different forms of evil. Indeed, whatever decision he made,
> some evil consequences were bound to flow from it. All that
> a realistic statesman could do in such a world was to choose
> the lesser evil.

(32)

Turning to the particulars of the war in Indochina, while reading
numerous accounts, one cannot fail to recognize the complexity of the
situation, to gasp at the enormousness of money, bombs and loss of

[lc]

(9)

lives and property, to wonder at the hours of negotiations and the
differing opinions and ideologies as to methods of settlement, and to
be aware of the ebb and flow of pacifist discontent and citizen
support. There were no easy answers. From the beginning it had been
apparent that this was not the kind of war that would inspire
civilians to rush into combat. Historically, men have fought for God,
for national honor, for survival, for liberation, or for sheer lust of
conquest. The conflict in Vietnam did not provide the United States
with any of these goals, noble or ignoble. The sole objective of the
American forces was to push the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong back
across a geographical line and restore the status quo. In its
totality, the situation raised an issue that was not taken into
account until it was too late. It was whether a democracy has the
will to sustain a major war whose sole purpose is to put pressure on
an alien ideological bloc and induce its leaders to sign an agreement
that leaves the world power balance unchanged. Dickson says:

> His (Kissinger) position was complicated by the fact that he
> was, in his role as chief negotiator, attempting to find a
> political rationale for what was essentially a de facto
> military defeat. The task of ending a disastrous military
> commitment, which was inherited from a previous
> administration and which had already proven extremely costly
> in terms of domestic turmoil, was a losing proposition from
> the beginning.
> (33)

"'My nightmare!' was Henry Kissinger's favorite description of the
Indochina war" (Stoessinger, 34). Kissinger states:

> The ideal bargaining position would have existed if our
> public had trusted our goals and our enemy had been uncertain
> about our tactics. Our domestic discord produced exactly the
> opposite state of affairs. We faced a constant credibility
> gap at home while our opponents understood only too well the
> direction in which we were being pushed.
> (35)

Kissinger believed that diplomacy, to be effective, must be backed by
force. Knowing that approximately 50,000 North Vietnamese soldiers
were massed in "staging centers" bordering South Vietnam in Cambodia,

[lc]

(10)

raids began in March 1969 and were conducted in utmost secrecy for
over a year, until officially acknowledged in May 1970 (Stoessinger,
36). Kissinger explains:

It was not from a desire to expand the war, but to avoid bombing North Vietnam and yet to blunt an unprovoked offensive which was costing 400 American lives a week. . . . It requires calculated advocacy, not judgment, to argue that the United States was violating the neutrality of a peaceful country when with Cambodian encouragement we, in self-defense, sporadically bombed territories . . . which were occupied in violation. (37)

Nor is it true that the bombing drove the North Vietnamese out of the sanctuaries and thus spread the war deep into Cambodia. To the extent that North Vietnamese forces left the sanctuaries it was to move back into Vietnam, not deeper into Cambodia-until after Sihanouk was unexpectedly overthrown a year later. (38)

Kissinger addresses the reasons for secrecy by saying:

We would have been willing to acknowledge the bombing and defend it had there been a diplomatic protest. There was no protest; Cambodia did not object, nor did the North Vietnamese, nor the Soviets or the Chinese. Proceeding secretly became . . . a means of maintaining pressure on the enemy without complicating Cambodia's delicate position, without increasing international tensions in general, and without precipitating the abandonment of all limits. (39)

It was kept secret because a public announcement was a gratuitous blow to the Cambodian government, which might have forced it to demand that we stop; it might have encouraged a North Vietnamese retaliation (since how could they fail to react if we had announced we were doing it?). The North Vietnamese kept silent because they were not eager to advertise their illegal presence on Cambodian soil. Our bombing saved American and South Vietnamese lives. (40)

News of the incursion traumatized an already angry and divided America, producing an outcry on Capitol Hill, death at Kent State University, and a massive antiwar demonstration within hearing distance of the Oval Office. Kissinger's memoirs, numerous times shows his compassion for the protesters:

I found it easier to respect these committed and consistent pacifists, who hated all killing, than those whose morality was selective, who condemned American military actions but not North Vietnamese or Indian or Soviet. (41)

I listened, explained, argued. But my sympathy for their

[lc]

anguish could not obscure my obligation to my country as I
saw it. They were, in my view, as wrong as they were
passionate. Their pressures delayed the end of the war, not
accelerated it; their simplifications did not bring closer
the peace, of the yearning for which they had no monopoly.
Emotion was not a policy. We had to end the war, but in
conditions that did not undermine America's power to help
build the new international order upon which the future of
even the most enraged depended.
(42)

Shawcross asserts that the raids were not legal (43). But a
fact, he reveals in his book, is:

> When William Rehnquist of the Justice Department was asked to prepare legal justification, the assistant attorney general claimed, "...the Commander in Chief clause of the Constitution was 'a grant of substantive authority' that allowed all Presidents to send troops 'into conflict with foreign powers on their own initiative.'" (43)

Aside from legality, Shawcross further feels Kissinger's decisions
were incorrect. He writes:

> Any American administration would have faced dreadful
decisions in Vietnam from 1969 onward. . . . At every stage of
the war, choices-although difficult ones-did exist. The
record shows that those choices that Nixon and Kissinger
actually made were made wrongly.
(44)

Shawcross makes specific reference to a choice in March or April of
1970:

> If it (the administration) had decided not to encourage, let
> alone to arm Lon Nol, it could have compelled either the
> return of Sihanouk or, at least, an attempt, by Lon Nol, to
> preserve the country's flawed neutrality.
(45)

Whereas, Kissinger argues that the administration did not have a
choice:

> They did not encourage Lon Nol nor even begin to arm him for
> weeks after North Vietnamese troops were ravaging a neutral
> country. The option of Lon Nol's restoring Cambodia's
> neutrality did not exist; it had been explicitly rejected by
> Le Duc Tho. And by then Sihanouk was no longer in a position
> to be neutralist. . . . "freedom of choice" is precisely what
> we did not have, for the prospect it describes would have
> meant a massive shift in the military balance in Indochina.
(46)

In addressing the dilemma of how to responsibly withdraw forces
and reduce military operation in a way that would not betray a small

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[L]

country in the midst of its life-and-death struggle, Kissinger
insisted that steadfastness of purpose would afford a new opportunity
to negotiate.

The strategy Nixon and I devised in November 1970 was carried
out in essence in 1971 and 1972. And it worked. We managed
to withdraw all our forces within little more than a year of
the chosen date of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. And we
accomplished this without overthrowing an allied government.
(47)

We had no illusions about Hanoi's long-term goals. Nor did
we go through the agony of four years of war and searing
negotiations simply to achieve a "decent interval" for our
withdrawal . . . We sought not an interval before collapse,
but lasting peace with honor. But for the collapse of
executive authority as a result of Watergate, I believe we
would have succeeded. (48)

Shawcross, in his summary of SIDESHOW, states: "Neither Nixon nor
Kissinger addressed the dimensions of the disaster in Cambodia" (49).
Just a paragraph later, he gives the report of an interview Kissinger
had with Theo Sommer in 1976, which very clearly states how the
statesman felt as he reflected the situation:

We found 550,000 American troops in Vietnam and we ended the
war without betraying those who in reliance on us had fought
the Communists . . . No one could possibly foresee that
Watergate would so weaken the executive authority that we
could not maintain the settlement that was in itself
maintainable, . . . I may have a lack of imagination, but I
fail to see the moral issue involved and why Cambodian
neutrality should apply to only one country. Why is it moral
for the North Vietnamese to have 50,000 to 100,000 troops in
Cambodia, why should we let them kill Americans from that
territory . . . And, finally, I think it is fair to say that
in the six years of the war, not ten percent of the people
had been killed in one year of Communist rule. (50)

No one can argue that the gentle people of Cambodia were not
essentially neutral in 1969, and unable to stop North Vietnamese from
invading their borders. No one can deny that they did not suffer
horrendous, heart-breaking devastation under the Communist takeover in
1975. But, to blame American policy, or Nixon-Kissinger policy, for
the brunt of this tragedy is unfair.

There are assertions that the tensions within Cambodia that

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[lc]

toppled Sihanouk resulted from the westward movement of
Communist forces allegedly caused by our bombing since 1969.
In reality, the westward drive of the North Vietnamese began
in early April, before our incursion. . . Without our
incursion, the Communists would have taken over Cambodia
years earlier.
(Kissinger, 51)

Shawcross and others close their eyes to the fact that it was "Hanoi's
insatiable quest for hegemony-not America's hesitant and ambivalent
response (that was) the root cause of Cambodia's ordeal" (52).

Kissinger despised the war, he spent innumerable hours in his search
for compromise, but when American troops were withdrawn, the war never
really stopped. Kissinger, along with President Ford, begged Congress
to give aid to Cambodia, but it was in vain. As Stoessinger notes:

> The American people had simply become tired of the war and
> had reconciled themselves to a Communist victory in
> Indochina. . . Kissinger's efforts . . . had come to naught
> . . . its (Hanoi) determination to outlast the United States
> guaranteed its final victory.
(53)

Dan Caldwell, in his assessment, claims Kissinger failed his
endeavors because his policies were not built on the values and
traditions of his society, hence:

> The Congress and the American public were unwilling to grant
> their support to a foreign policy founded upon the
> maximization of power rather than upon ideals, upon the
> maintenance of stability rather than upon peace.
(54)

Shawcross put it in another light by expressing, "Kissinger was
more moved by the statesman's freedom of action than by the needs and
dynamics of democratic restraint" (55). In 1964, Kissinger wrote:

> The statesman is therefore like one of the heroes in
> classical drama who has a vision of the future but who
> cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot
> validate its 'truth'. . . he must bridge the gap between a
> people's experience and his vision, between a nation's
> tradition and its future.
(56)

So perhaps, Kissinger's problem lay not in his vision but in not being
able to fully bridge the gap. Stoessinger applauds this vision:

> Kissinger stood accused of ignoring humanity in the name of
> order. It would not be fair to Kissinger to let these
> judgments stand without giving him a hearing. On Indochina,

(14)

[lc]

the question he might ask is this: What is more merciful and more compassionate, an end with horror or a horror without end? . . . Is it not easier to abstain from any decision altogether? Kissinger never thought so. He knew that abstention from evil did not affect the existence of evil in the world, but only destroyed the faculty of choice . . . I think the world is a safer place today because of his courage and his vision. (57)

Dr. Henry Kissinger soared to the pinnacle of greatness as he charmed the American public with his persuasive intelligence. In fact, as a negotiator, he was compared to a magician. But even his magic could not provide a quick solution, so many turned on him in anger, born out of their own frustration, bitterness and disappointment of a seemingly endless, useless war, fought halfway round the globe. Some of their accusations can never truly be resolved, for history can never accurately say what might have been if an action had been different. During a time when a judicious eye was being cast on all of America's public servants, the public questioned whether Kissinger's brutal means were justified to attain a peace with honor. I see Henry Kissinger as a man with a vision, between his nation's tradition and its future; a man who agreed with Goethe: "If I had to choose between justice and disorder, on the one hand, and injustice and order, on the other, I would always choose the latter" (58). I see Dr. Kissinger as a man of compassion and hunger for world unity, stability and order. Behind the myths of accolade and condemnation, stands a human being, who had the courage to act on his convictions with confidence and sincerity. In my eyes, that makes him a man of greatness.

(15)

[c]

ENDNOTES

1] John G. Stoessinger, HENRY KISSINGER, THE ANGUISH OF POWER
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1976), p. 77.

2] Dan Caldwell, HENRY KISSINGER, HIS PERSONALITY AND POLICIES
(Durham, N.C.: Duke Press, 1983), p. 4.

3] Ibid., p. 32.

4] Henry Kissinger, WHITE HOUSE YEARS (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1979), p. 229.

5] Harvey Starr, HENRY KISSINGER, PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1984),
pp. 20-21.

6] Caldwell, p. 45.

7] Ibid., p. 43.

8] Stoessinger, KISSINGER, p. 4.

9] Starr, p. 23.

10] Caldwell, p. 47.

11] Starr, p. 27.

12] Ibid., p. 28.

13] Caldwell, p. 23.

14] Stoessinger, KISSINGER, p. 212.

15] Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, KISSINGER (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1974), p. 549.

16] Caldwell, p. 61.

17] Kissinger, p. 70.

18] Richard J. Barnet, THE GIANTS, RUSSIA AND AMERICA (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), p. 77.

19] Elmer Plischke, "Kissinger," GROLIER ENCYCLOPEDIA (New
York: Grolier Inc., 1975), p. 43.

20] William Shawcross, SIDESHOW (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1979), p. 75.

21] Kissinger, p. 12.

22] Starr, p. 4.

(16)

[lc]

WORKS CITED

Barnet, Richard J.

THE GIANTS, RUSSIA AND AMERICA.

Caldwell, Dan.

HENRY KISSINGER, HIS PERSONALITY AND POLICIES.

Durham, N.C.: Duke Press, 1983

Dickson, Peter.

KISSINGER AND THE MEANING OF HISTORY.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978

K alb, Marvin, and Kalb, Bernard.

KISSINGER.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974

Kissinger, Henry.

WHITE HOUSE YEARS.

Plischke, Elmer.

"Kissinger." GROLIER ENCYCLOPEDIA.

New York: Grolier Inc., 1975

Shawcross, William.

SIDESHOW.

Starr, Harvey.

HENRY KISSINGER, PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.

Stoessinger, John G.

HENRY KISSINGER, THE ANGUISH OF POWER.

Stoessinger, John G.

CRUSADERS AND PRAGMATISTS.

New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1979

HENRY A. KISSINGER

December 18, 1986

Dear Mary Ann:

Nancy and I were tremendously saddened to learn of Walt's death, and we join in expressing our deepest sympathy to you and your family.

Walt meant a great deal to me as a friend and professional colleague through these many years. His preeminent experience, thoughtful perspectives and unfailing grace are elements of a legacy which commands the admiration and appreciation of all. He was an extraordinary diplomat on whose talents and judgment I and others relied in dealing with some of the most difficult issues of our time. The nation can be grateful for Walt's contributions. I feel privileged to have known him personally.

Nancy and I want you to know that you are in our prayers in this most difficult time.

Mrs. Walter Stoessel Jr.
5155 Rockwood Parkway, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300

MAR 21 1986

5910 BRADLEY BOULEVARD
BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20814

March 18, 1986

Dr. and Mrs. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry and Nancy:

I just wanted to drop you both a line (or more) thanking you
for dinner.

Long before he became Argentine Ambassador to the United States,
Lucio Alberto Saturnino Garcia del Solar was known for his
friendships, hospitality as well as his "think for yourself"
kind of politics, diplomacy. But, it was his friendships that
allowed certain thinkers to survive--literally. So, your
evening about affairs of state and how to give one's labrador
happy hips was most in keeping with Lucio's life: Much
appreciated by him; much enjoyed by everyone present. Well,
I certainly enjoyed myself.

Thank you again--Happy Spring.

TRANSLATION - jw

5 December 1985

Dear Henry:

You have enriched the Festschrift which appeared on my
70th birthday with a contribution which leaves no wish
unfulfilled in terms of inner consistency, its wealth of
thought and its power of persuasion!

You combine vigorous criticism of the too pragmatic historical
insight of the politically responsible personalities in the
USA, of their almost irrational rationalism, with a clear-cut
conception of the future role of Europe and the USA in the
critical world political West-East contrast.

I completely agree with your conclusions, sharply formulated
as always, and above all with the crucial sentence: "The
greatest encouragement for Soviet foreign policy in the West
is the Alliance's lack of clarity with respect to its
intentions." (p. 444)

I also have to thank you for assuming particular responsibility
for the Festschrift's success as co-publisher.

You congratulated me especially warmly on my 70th birthday.
I was touched by your warm words and good wishes.

I also hope to see you again soon.

As a token of my gratitude, I am sending you a silver medallion
which was coined on the occasion of my birthday.

Enc: Silver Medallion (imprinted, "Franz Josef Strauss on His
70th Birthday, 6 September, 1915-1985")

Inscribed copy of the Festschrift: "To Professor Henry A.
Kissinger, former Secretary of State of the USA, with warm
thanks, F. J. Strauss, Christmas 1985")

Der Bayerische Ministerpräsident

A III 6-01500-7-7

Air Mail

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
20006 Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

DEC 20 1985

8000 München 22

Prinzregentenstraße 7

Tel. (089) 21650 · FS 05-23809

5. DEZ. 1985

Lieber Henry!

Du hast die Festschrift, die anläßlich meines 70. Geburtstages erschienen ist, um einen Beitrag bereichert, der hinsichtlich innerer Folgerichtigkeit, seines Gedankenreichtums und seiner Überzeugungskraft keine Wünsche offen läßt!

Energische Kritik an dem zu pragmatischen Geschichtsverständnis der politisch verantwortlichen Persönlichkeiten in den USA, an ihrem fast irrationalen Vernunftglauben verbindest Du mit einem scharf umrissenen Begriff von der zukünftigen Rolle Europas und der USA im weltpolitisch entscheidenden West-Ost-Gegensatz.

Deinen Schlußfolgerungen, wie stets messerscharf formuliert, stimme ich voll zu, vor allem dem entscheidenden Satz: "Die größte Ermutigung für die sowjetische Außenpolitik im Westen ist die fehlende Klarheit der Allianz im Hinblick auf ihre Absichten." (S. 444)

./.

- 2 -

Ich habe Dir außerdem dafür zu danken, daß Du als Mitherausgeber
der Festschrift besondere Verantwortung für ihr Gelingen übernom-
men hast.

Zu meinem 70. Geburtstag hast Du mir besonders herzlich gratu-
liert. Deine warmherzigen Worte und guten Wünsche haben mich sehr
gefreut.

Auch ich hoffe auf ein baldiges Wiedersehen.

Als Zeichen meiner Dankbarkeit sende ich Dir eine Silbermedaille,
die anläßlich meines Geburtstages geprägt wurde.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

FEB - 5 1986

LC

AKIN, GUMP, STRAUSS, HAUER & FELD

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

1333 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N.W.

SUITE 400

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SAN ANTONIO OFFICE
1100 ONE RIVERWALK PLACE
700 NORTH ST. MARY'S STREET
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78205
(512) 224-1801

January 28, 1986

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
435 East 52nd Street
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry:

On May 6th, a roast will be held for Walter Cronkite in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the roast is to honor Walter and to raise funds to establish an endowed chair in his name at his alma mater, The University of Texas at Austin.

I have agreed to serve as Chairman of the Steering Committee and Lady Bird Johnson and Vice President George Bush have agreed to serve as honorary Co-Chairmen. We hope to make this a memorable social event as well as an event to honor Walter and generate funds to support the Chair in his name.

We asked Walter to supply some names of several friends with whom he has had close contact and who might be willing to serve as roasters. You were among those he named. All of us involved join him in that request. I hope you will accept this invitation and will place May 6 on your calendar now. More specific information concerning the roast will be provided in the near future.

Your willingness to participate will, of course, please Walter and certainly add a great deal to the evening. Please drop me a line or call and let me know if you will be able to attend.

O° Congresso Mundial de Compras e Administração de Material

June 24/26 - Rio de Janeiro - 24 a 26 de Junho

"Materials Management Strategies in a New World"
"Estratégias na Gestão de Materiais em um Novo Mundo"

CLC

São Paulo, 25th of November 1986.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
New York

Reply to:
Resposta p/

the undersigned

Re: 6th IFPMM World Congress 1987

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

On the 24th through 26th of June 1987, the "International Federation of Purchasing and Materials Management" will hold the 6th World Congress in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

We expect more than 1.000 attendants from all over the world
with a U.S.A. delegation of about 300.

The opening theme for this Congress is "The New World" and by unanimous request of the executive committee, it would be the utmost honour for the organization to have your presence for the congressional inaugural address.

We feel that your participation would be an inspiration to
the 100.000 members of IFPMM throughout the world.

It is my privilege to be the one to extend this invitation
to you and hope that you will accept.

This letter is being relayed to you by our patron, Dr. Israel Klabin, who will surely talk this matter over with you as well as the arrangements regarding your visit to Brazil.

I thank you in advance for your consideration.

Very Truly Yours,

Herbert Lowe Stukart,
Member of the IFPMM Committee
for the 6th World Congress.

Enclosures: - Leaflet of the Congress
- Other invitations

[LCT]

6th IFPMM World Congress 1987
° Congresso Mundial de Compras e Administração de Material

Reply to:
Resposta p/

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, SOME OF THE LECTURERS WHO HAVE ALSO BEEN INVITED:

- Dr. Ross R. Reck and Dr. John H. Hoagland* - U.S.A.

- Prof. Angelo Caloia (President of Mediocredito) - Italy

- Dr. Hans Busch - Germany

- Prof. Ericsson - Sweden

- Prof. Joe Ezekiel - India

- Dr. Juan Carlos de Pablo* - Argentine

- Dr. Ozires Silva (President of Petrobrás) - Brazil

AND OTHERS.

* PhD of Harvard