- 7 -

#934

[L]

Q What is the subject of this speech? Is the subject foreign policy?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. It will be an address on foreign policy relating specifically to the Foreign Policy Message.

Q Why no TV on this?

MR. ZIEGLER: In the past, the President has used radio to address the nation on the economy and so forth. He has chosen this forum.

Q Will this be limited to the Foreign Policy Message?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, the President's address will relate to the Foreign Policy Message.

Q That is 11:00 a.m.?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Don't we have a gap between that time and the embargo time?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, You will be able to move the President's remarks immediately; in other words, when he gives them.

Q Is the President going to address himself to the Laotian operations which are not part of the foreign policy review?

MR. ZIEGLER: Although the remarks have not been complete yet, I don't know specifically, Gene, but he perhaps would refer to the operation in general terms as Henry, I think, referred to the fact that the Foreign Policy Message referred to Indochina in general terms. But it will not be addressed specifically relating to the ARVN operation in Laos, no.

Let me make it clear. It will be an address relating to the President's Foreign Policy Message and will be an address relating to this Government's foreign policy and the thinking about foreign policy as related in the message.

Q Ron, tomorrow's Presidential schedule so far ---

MR. ZIEGLER: It is not complete yet, Bob. We will be firming that up. We simply are delayed today in completing his schedule. We will post that for you first thing in the morning.

Q You said 12:15 and then you said it was Shultz.

MR. ZIEGLER: I am sorry. The President will drop by. I am sorry, I didn't say that.

Q Will we be allowed coverage of that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't anticipate that.

MORE

#934

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

## CONTENT OF THIS BRIEFING IS STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 11:00 A.M., EST FEBRUARY 25, 1971. IT MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 4:25 P.M. EST

FEBRUARY 24, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: I am sorry we are a little late. The President has just completed work on his radio address for tomorrow. That is why Dr. Kissinger was detained.

The ground rules for this backgrounder are you can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to White House officials and no direct quotation.

The material contained in today's backgrounder, of course, is embargoed until the Foreign Policy Message is released tomorrow. We have a new time on that. This is the third new time and the final time. The embargo for the release of the Foreign Policy Message tomorrow is 11 a.m. Eastern time. So, we have moved it from 12 until 11 a.m.

That is the only change in the embargo.

With that, I give you Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: I will take questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the report you place troop strength in Laos at 90,000 and the strength in the panhandle at 60,000. I think at the time of the incursion two weeks ago they placed total strength at 70,000 and the panhandle strength at 45,000, troop strength in Laos.

DR. KISSINGER: All I can say is that these are figures we received from the Departments and that were checked in the Departments. There is no independent White House facility for determining the size of the forces.

Q Are these supposed to be as of now or as of December 31?

DR. KISSINGER: To tell you the truth, I can't answer that satisfactorily. These were the figures we were given as reflecting, I suppose, the forces now. If you use them other than quoting from the document, and if you have any question about it, I think you should check in the Defense Department. I will check again from the sources and make sure as of what date the figures were given.

MORE

-2-

Q Doctor, if you were in our position and had to deal with this report, how would you handle it? Would you tick off the six most important things in it so far as you are concerned?

DR. KISSINGER: What I would do is I would print the whole thing. (Laughter).

Q What would be your lead? (Laughter).

Q Are you finished answering that question? I have got one, Doctor.

DR. KISSINGER: If you get us out of Vietnam, I will write your lead. (Laughter).

What the report attempts to do is to put before the public and before other governments the basis for the actions of this Administration, why it does what it is doing, how it views the changes in the world, what it believes to be America's role in the world under present circumstances, what it takes to be the essential elements of how to build a peaceful world, and then to relate these philosophical views to a number of concrete areas and to show where we have gotten in the last three years and where we tend to go. This is a brief summary of what it intends to do.

We can give you specific points about individual areas. But if you want to have the main theme of the report, this is it.

In addition, one of the reasons why the President has taken such an intense interest in this document, and why so many people have spent so much time on it is because we believe that to the extent that foreign policy has been a divisive issue in our society, it is important for the people to understand where their government is going so that even if they don't agree with everything that is being done, as they obviously will not and cannot be expected to, they at least have the assurance that the decisions are taken seriously and hopefully in a direction with which they can agree, even if they don't agree with all the tactics.

Q Doctor, some of the critics of the Indochina policy are saying that the Administration has no plan for total unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam, that its only plan is partial unilateral withdrawal and a residual force kept there indefinitely.

Can you tell us whether these critics are right in what the end goal of the policy is?

DR. KISSINGER: The goal of the Administration is to enable the South Vietnamese to stand on their own feet and to withdraw American forces from Vietnam without turning the country over to the other side.

MORE

-3-

I know, and we are aware of the fact, that the ability
to do this is being questioned by many serious individuals.

We also recognize that we will be judged by our
performance and not by anything that we said. We believe that
we can achieve these objectives.

The President has repeatedly stated, however, that
as long as there are American prisoners in North Vietnam,
regardless of the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend
themselves, we will not abandon these prisoners.

But our objective is the withdrawal of American forces.

Q Doctor, would it be wrong to characterize these
sections on the Soviet Union as being somewhat pessimistic
as well as a warning to the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I think that would be wrong.
What we did in last year's report was simply to affirm in
general the desirability of negotiations. We believe that at
the end of the second year of an Administration it isn't
proper anymore simply to talk about the desirability of
negotiations in the abstract, and, therefore, we try to draw
up as fair a balance, Pete, as we could. We tried to list the
factors that make for negotiations and the factors that have
in the past represented obstacles to negotiations.

We attempted, and, of course, one can't judge how
successful one has been, but our intention was to convey that
we will approach negotiations with the Soviet Union with great
seriousness, with the profound conviction that on our ability
to regulate our relationships will depend the future peace
of the world, compared to which many of the tactical disputes
are really in historical perspective relatively trivial.

But we wanted to do this in a serious way and not
simply in an abstract sentimental way and therefore, we felt
that any fair statement to the American people and to the Soviet
Union had to lay out also the obstacles that have in the
past, and especially in the past year, been an obstacle.

In addition, though, if you look at the specific
subjects of negotiation that we are listing in other chapters,
such as the SALT discussion in the Arms Control section, and
such as the Berlin section in the Europe section, we are
optimistic with respect to both of those in the realistic way.
But we are trying to convey to the Soviet Union that we are
prepared to make a serious effort to have serious settlements
and we do not believe that it is necessary to issue warnings.

But when we drew up the balance sheet, we had to
give the negatives as well as the positives.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you are saying, in other words,
it is not a warning, but a bridge perhaps for renewed
negotiations. Can it be interpreted that way?

MORE

-4-

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is an invitation to the
Soviet Union to seek to look with us at the problems of the
future and among those, the problem, the overwhelming
problem, of assuring a stable and just peace.

Q Doctor, I notice in the section on China that
it is stated that the United States is prepared to see the
People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the
family of nations. I gather that means the United Nations.
And the development of relations with Peking is the big
challenge of this decade.

What is the government doing organizationally and
procedurally to bring this about?

DR. KISSINGER: As we indicated some weeks ago,
we are now engaged in a review of one existing restrictions with
respect to trade and travel towards Communist China to see what
further steps can be taken to indicate our willingness to
move in the direction indicated in this report.

And we will have recommendations for the President
on this within the next few weeks. Also, we are reviewing
within the government, as has been also pointed out, the position
to be taken at the United Nations session coming up.

But the particular tactics at any one U.N. session
are not as important as the general direction that is being
indicated here which represents the agreed policy of the
United States Government.

Q Does that represent a new Red China policy?

DR. KISSINGER: It represents our China policy. I
don't want to give it any particular adjective.

Q With regard to the Soviets, you say "Events
in Cuba are not encouraging." What specifically do you mean?

MORE

- 5 -

DR. KISSINGER: One of the problems with writing a report like this is that different events are covered in different contexts and receive elliptical references in different contexts.

This particular sentence to which you refer is in a balance sheet of good things and bad things that happened last year. And in that connection, the attempt by the Soviet Union, or whatever it was, the activities of the Soviet Union in Cienfuegos were not considered to be constructive contributions to the easing of relationships.

On the other hand, we have also pointed out in another section of the report, on page 125, that after some period of discussion with the Soviet Union these understandings with respect to the deployment of offensive weapons were applied also to sea-based systems and that, therefore, we listed this as, in that context, one of the mitigating factors; in fact, as a way by which this particular period of difficulty could be overcome.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to get back on this China section dealing with the United Nations, you are saying in there, on page 84, third paragraph, you say, we will continue to oppose efforts to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the UN and its Specialized Agencies. You are not in that section, then, ruling out the possibility of the seating of the Peoples Republic of China, you are making clear that we are resisting any effort to expel Nationalist China. Is that it?

DR. KISSINGER: That is how I would read those sentences.

Q Isn't that inconsistent, though? You lay down a general philosophy, you say you want to end the insulation of China from outside realities, and at the same time you keep the position of keeping them out of the UN.

DR. KISSINGER: That isn't how I would have interpreted this particular sequence of sentences. But I think the meaning of the sentences is fairly clear, and I don't think I need to elaborate on them very explicitly.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned the guarantees for investments in Romania and Yugoslavia. I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit on that, what kind of guarantees you would give American businessmen going into those countries?

DR. KISSINGER: This referred to making them eligible for the OPIC guarantees, which is, I believe, now being done.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 70, you say even if Hanoi were to negotiate genuinely about Vietnam difficult issues remain concerning its neighbors. You talk about the removal of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops. Is this saying that the withdrawal of North Vietnamese from South Vietnam is not only negotiable, but there must be mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and Laos as well?

MORE

DR. KISSINGER: This statement explicitly reaffirms
the President's October 7 speech which calls for the withdrawal
of North Vietnamese forces also Laos and Cambodia.

But it would be difficult to see how one can
have a permanent peace in Indochina without the removal
of North Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, at least from
the areas adjoining South Vietnam.

Q Is that now going to be a negotiable issue
in Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: This states one of the problems.
In Paris we have not up to now negotiated the issues
of Cambodia and Laos. But it is one of the problems
that any realistic assessment of peace in Indochina
will have to face.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 27 you speak of
Soviet policy being directed at offering relaxation of
tensions selectively with some allies. On page 28, you
caution against individual approaches to the east in the
absence of, I gather, a consensus of allies; and yet on
page 27 you also apparently approve of the treaties the
West German Government has reached with the eastern
countries. Could you tell us what you are concerned
about in this area?

DR. KISSINGER: One of the characteristics of
the diplomacy of the year 1970 was that many of the
European allies, including many of the NATO countries,
including ourselves, were engaged in bilateral conversations
with the Soviet Union. This involves a delicate problem.

On the one hand, we attempted to convey in this
document our readiness and our belief that these negotiations
can contribute to a genuine relaxation of tensions.

On the other hand, they can do so only if each of
the allies engaged in it is aware of the fact that allied
unity is also an important factor, that indeed made
it possible to reach a point where these negotiations could
safely be conducted.

So each ally has to find the line between
emphasizing purely national concerns and,
at the same time, to balance its national concerns
with the interests of the unity of the West.

One cannot lay down hard and fast rules. And
we specifically said we are not referring to anything that
has as yet happened. We are pointing out that it is
inherent in this diplomacy that it could happen. We are
also pointing out that we are applying that restriction
to oursel. We have been meticulous in our SALT
negotiations, for example, to keep our European allies
carefully informed of every move, both before and during
the negotiations, and to have had fuller consultations
on that issue than has ever been the case on any other
disarmament issue.

MORE

And we have also found that our German allies, for example, have been very meticulous in consulting with us. We were expressing here a general philosophy of how to conduct bilateral diplomacy and allied diplomacy simultaneously without having one used to stifle the other or one used to wreck the other.

Q On page 70 of this report, you say, referring to Laos and Cambodia, that enemy intentions and capabilities in Indochina will pose some hard choices about the deployment of allied troops as we pursue our own withdrawals. Taking that statement and comparing it with a statement on page 61 in which you say that despite heavy losses the North Vietnamese have the capability to continue fighting and pose a considerable threat, are you hinting that it might be necessary to use American troops either in Laos or in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: No. No American troops will be used in Laos or Cambodia.

Q What hard choices are you referring to?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem will be partly for the South Vietnamese and partly for what the North Vietnamese will be able to do in these countries that will affect South Vietnam. But we are not considering using American ground forces in Cambodia or Laos.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I would like to follow up on this same general area that is talked about on page 70. In contrast to last year's message, I believe this year's message places far greater emphasis on the problems in Laos and Cambodia as it concerns the U. S. withdrawal effort and also this year's report does make notice of the fact that it leaves open the possibility that the enemy may eventually be able to regain the initiative in the fighting in South Vietnam.

Is this to say that we are no closer and perhaps farther away from our disengagement effort than we were a year ago?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know how you drew this conclusion from this chapter. We are convinced, since we have withdrawn about 200,000 troops since the last report was made, we are by definition closer to our disengagement than we were before.

We believe that we have made enormous strides in the last year.

On the other hand, we have tried to prepare this document in such a way that we took account of some of the problems that continue to exist and some of the things that could conceivably go wrong.

But the conviction of this Administration is that we have made enormous strides in the last year, that if this progress can be continued and accelerated, we will make even greater strides during the next year.

MORE

Q Let me phrase it this way, then: Concerning
the goal of total disengagement, are the obstacles now
greater, as far as total disengagement goes, than they
were a year ago, now that we have talked about Laos
and Cambodia in this country?

DR. KISSINGER: The military situation, even
including Laos and Cambodia, is considerably improved over
the military situation that existed last year.

So last year, Cambodia was a neutral country.
Prince Sihanouk was still in office and, therefore,
the need to address Cambodia as a separate problem did
not exist. This is the reason why obviously much more
emphasis had to be given to Cambodia this year, since
it involved so much of our effort.

But our total assessment is that very great
progress has been made in the last year. The statistics
of the casualties, the statistics of population control,
and the independent assessment of the situation that
cannot be reflected in statistics all indicate this.

Our general policy is to try to do more
than we claim and not to make wildly optimistic assessments
that we will not be able to back up. This may account
for some of the qualifications.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 57, you list the
positive results of the Cambodian operations of last May.
Do you not consider that there were any negative results
of these operations and are they covered in here anywhere?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, for every action you
take in foreign policy you pay a certain price. We do not
believe that within Indochina there were any negative
results; that is, we cannot find anything that would be
better in Indochina if we had not done the action than
is the case if we did the action.

Obviously, anyone who went through the experience
of last May and June has to consider the domestic uneasiness
that was triggered by these actions as a very painful
experience.

The choice that we confronted was whether -- first,
this would not have occurred in any event if the foreseeable
consequences of inaction had taken place; namely, a consolida-
tion of Cambodia into one vast sanctuary from which then
the enemy would have dispersed into Vietnam and our
casualties had continued at the pre-Cambodia level of
above 100 a week -- that is what it was in the two months
before -- with the predictable consequences.

So no one is pretending that there were not
painful costs. But the conviction of the Administration
is that the costs were necessary, that the costs were
largely domestic, and that they were made necessary
by the situation we confronted.

MORE

Q Dr. Kissinger, assuming there is no settlement in Paris, is the decision to keep a residual number of troops in South Vietnam conditioned wholly to release of the prisoners of war or are there other considerations which will still remain a political settlement, a mutual withdrawal?

DR. KISSINGER: We would prefer to let our actions on the withdrawal speak for themselves. And the President has stated in the press conference last week some general principles with respect to our withdrawal policy. We have made this clear. We are continuing our withdrawals even while there are operations going on in Laos. We have made clear that we will make other withdrawal announcements towards the end of the period that is now provided for, and we will make announcements from time to time as we reach certain points.

But certainly one of the factors that affects the residual forces is the fate of the prisoners.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does this statement deal with the apparent Laotian incursion?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it does not cover it explicitly, because this is a report for events in the calendar year 1970.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the warning on the bottom of page 29 on Berlin that access procedures will not necessarily prevent administrative harassment might create the impression that you are viewing agreement on Berlin with a grain of salt. Would that be a correct conclusion or what is the true value of the Berlin statement?

DR. KISSINGER: Incidentally, I am assuming that when you ladies and gentlemen are saying "you" you mean the whole Administration. Because this is a document that was jointly worked at and, as I read in the papers, actively contested by all of the Departments.

This statement simply refers to a fact of life. The fact of life is that no matter what the agreement, the future of Berlin will be affected by the general state of political relations in Central Europe. It is not to indicate that we look at an agreement with a grain of salt. It is to indicate one of the facts of life that has to be taken into account and that a fair assessment of the situation in Berlin has to be put before the American public. But it does not affect our desire in these negotiations to improve those procedures that can be improved.

MORE

-10-

Q Dr. Kissinger, how does the United States help the prisoners in North Vietnam by keeping American forces in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: It helps the prisoners in North Vietnam by keeping American forces in South Vietnam by giving the North Vietnamese an incentive to negotiate about the release of American prisoners in North Vietnam in return for the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if you retreated from our original goals of going into Vietnam in the first place, all of Indochina, the Domino theory and so forth, would we still have the same purposes we went in for, self-determination of the people?

DR. KISSINGER: Helen, it is not always self-evident, but this Administration did not go into South Vietnam.

Q I am talking about the United States. I understand President Nixon supported it.

DR. KISSINGER: The report makes clear that the one irreducible objective we have in the negotiations is to preserve the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese. But we will not, as an American decision, turn over the government against the wishes of the people in South Vietnam to the other side.

So, we have not retreated from that objective. But I would prefer to talk about the objectives that we have stated, fully stated, in this report rather than go into an analysis of the various reasons that may have been put forth five or six years ago, which I have not studied in all of that detail.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how does the President view the resolution proposed by a majority of the Democratic Senators for a definite date for cut-off or removal of all American troops from Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I have stated, which is not covered in this report of in this briefing, that the subject matter is confined to this report.

Q How critical, sir, is the condition on our withdrawal from Vietnam is the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia? Can you discuss that. Can we withdraw while they are there, would we?

DR. KISSINGER: There are two different circumstances in which we might withdraw. One is a negotiated settlement, and the other one is as part of our Vietnamization program.

As part of our Vietnamization program, it is by definition related to the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. Under the conditions that the withdrawal takes place unilaterally, it would assume that the South Vietnamese are able to defend themselves even with the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos reserving, of course, the right for themselves to act against these North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos insofar as their strength permits.

MORE

-11-

So, our Vietnamization program takes into account
that if the withdrawals are unilateral the South Vietnamese
will have to be in a position to defend themselves as well
against the movements that may come at them through Cambodia
or Laos.

Q Is it safe then to say that even if North
Vietnamese troops were to remove themselves from South
Vietnam, we still might find it necessary to stay in South
Vietnam as long as the Vietnamization had not reached the
point where they could deal with the enemy in Laos and Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: I can assure you we are not looking
for excuses to stay in South Vietnam, even though that is not
always obvious when I read some of the public commentaries.

I would have to say that the removal of North
Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam would be a matter that
we would have to take very seriously in assessing the necessity
of our own troops and the ability of the South Vietnamese
to control their own territory.

Q Dr. Kissinger, may I ask one question on the
Middle East, please? Would you describe what differences
there are in the President's views, if any, between the
matter in this report and the views, say, of a year ago at
the time of Secretary Rogers' proposals in December of 1969?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to get into a discussion.
Obviously, when the Secretary of State speaks, he represents
Administration policy and he does not represent a personal
idiosyncrasy.

Secondly, this report attempts to account for the
general approach that we have taken towards the negotiations
and towards a settlement in the Middle East, both in terms
of the Arab-Israeli negotiations in the Jarring forum, and
secondly, in the discussions we have had with the Soviet
Union bilaterally and in four-power forums with the other
countries.

This is what this report discusses and it does not
go into the details of what particular views we would have
about particular aspects of a settlement, which we have
always stated should be principally negotiated among the
parties concerned.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 150 in the SALT
section, you referred to the necessity for agreement on both
the defensive and offensive weapons systems. Do you mean to
say that this must be written into a single agreement, and
are you ruling out an agreement on limited ABM's and some kind
of tacit understanding on freezing deployment?

DR. KISSINGER: This document on SALT explains the
American position as it has been taken in the existing
negotiations, in the negotiations as they have gone up to this
point.

MORE

-12-

We do not want to get into a position where we spend
most of our time negotiating with ourselves. So far, we are
in the process within this government now of analyzing what
occurred at the last session.

We have not yet issued instructions to Ambassador
Smith for the next session of SALT. We are assuming that the
Soviet Union will also review our considerations as we have
put them forth at the last session and that they will put
forward certain views at the next session in Vienna.

And until that happens, it would be premature for me
to speculate what particular relationship between offensive
and defensive forces we will consider the ultimate shape of
an agreement should take.

Q This is not a question of speculation. In this
speech, sir, you have used the language "agreement". What I am
asking is whether or not you mean by that agreement that
includes the limitations on ---

DR. KISSINGER: Where are you?

Q Page 150, last paragraph, last sentence.

DR. KISSINGER: We have explained here what differences
exist and we are stating what the difference is. We are making
an inventory of the existing differences of the views each side
has taken. This is a correct expression of the views which
both sides have taken. And I do not want to speculate in
detail about the evolution of the various positions.

Q Will the President's speech tomorrow be
a digest or an interpretation of this document?

DR. KISSINGER: I suppose it will be both.

MR. ZIEGLER: We are going to have to wrap up here
because of time. We will take this as a final question.

Q On page 39, the report talks about the United
States' willingness to maintain cooperation with neighbors
in the Western Hemisphere regardless of their diversity.

Is this a suggestion that we might try to normalize
relations with Cuba?

DR. KISSINGER: We have stated that the general view
of this Administration is that we judge governments by their
actions in the international field and that this has
characterized our relations with Chile. The general judgment
of the Administration heretofore has been that Cuba continues
to be dedicated to the violent export of revolution, so that
its actions in the international field have been an obstacle
up to now, but the general principle has been expressed in
this document and would be applied equally.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 5:06 P.M. EST)

the close ties of cooperation between our two coun-
tries. Ethiopia has been a leader in Africa's creation
of regional organizations. Their growing vitality is en-
couraging, and we hope that activities of this kind will
serve increasingly as the focus for economic coopera-
tion between African countries. We believe such a de-
velopment will both promote and increase the effective-
ness of foreign assistance.

The Future

The potential of Africa is great, but so are its prob-
lems. We view Africa with the strongest of goodwill,
tempered by the sober recognition of the limits of the
contribution which we can make to many of its prob-
lems. We look to African leadership to build the frame-
work within which other nations, including the United
States, can fully contribute to a bright African future.
A peaceful, progressive, and just Africa is an exciting
and worthy goal. We hope by our policies to facilitate
economic progress in one part of Africa, human and
social justice in the other, and peace in both.

THE MIDDLE EAST

"The Middle East is a place today where local rivalries are intense, where the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are both involved. Quite obviously, the primary responsibility for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East rests on the nations there themselves. But in this region in particular, it is imperative that the two major powers conduct themselves so as to strengthen the forces of peace rather than to strengthen the forces of war."

Address to the United Nations
General Assembly
October 23, 1970.

121

Vietnam is our most anguishing problem. It is not, however, the most dangerous. That grim distinction must go to the situation in the Middle East with its vastly greater potential for drawing Soviet policy and our own into a collision that could prove uncontrollable.

There are three distinct and serious aspects of the Middle East problem, each by itself difficult enough to resolve. They cannot, however, be treated in isolation. They have become enmeshed, and each tends to exacerbate and make more intractable the others. The Middle East crisis must be recognized as the product of these three dimensions:

- The **Arab-Israeli conflict**, which for more than twenty years has festered when it has not burned. It is the core problem of the Middle East crisis, and its intensity today is undiminished.

- The **Intra-Arab differences**, which focus primarily on whether a negotiated settlement of the Israeli conflict is acceptable or whether force is the only solution. There are also differences over how Arab nations should be governed, which have led more than once to civil conflict. And there are rivalries growing out of disagreement about the relation of Arab states to each other in the quest for unity in the Arab world.

- The **conflict between the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States**, each of which is now more deeply than ever engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Events surrounding the hostilities in Jordan in September showed how fragile are the barriers to direct great power confrontation in the Middle East.

America's interest in the Middle East—and the world's interest—is that the global structure of peace not be allowed to break down there. But this objective has to be pursued in a situation in rapid flux:

- The relationship between Middle East countries and outside powers has changed. The system of

122

outside and first the peacemaker in any situation of things.

- The changed now common technology of Soviet economic and Market

- The relation changed. Soviet Union has split into two lines existing change taking place, their overlap changes toward greater

The Arab-Israeli

This protrusion of the Middle East to be sure, but But the simple fact of this conflict is concerned:

- It has drawn the States into combat against the world peace

- It has caused tensions with

[10]

ing problem. It is not that grim distinction the Middle East with its existing Soviet policy and has proved uncontrollable. Some aspects of the self difficult enough to be treated in isolation. And each tends to ex-istable the others. The problem as the product

which for more than ten years it has not burned. The Middle East crisis, and the undiminished

爭 which focus primarily on settlement of the Israeli-ether force is the only differences over how the problem is being solved, which have led to conflict. And there are agreements about the solution to the problem, each other in the quest

of the interests of the Soviet Union, each of which is engaged in the Arab-Israël问题. The hostilities have been very low, but how fragile are the power confrontations

 Middle East—and the problem of the Middle East's global structure of peace are. But this objective has been realized in rapid flux:

 Middle East countries engaged. The system of

outside control that characterized the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries is gone; the peoples of the Near East have achieved national independence. There is a continuing search for a new balance between the strong nationalisms of the area and outside forces.

- The character of the outside influences has changed. The nations of the Middle East must now come to terms on various levels with the technological, capital, political, and military presence of the United States; with a new projection of Soviet power; and with a new Europe establishing economic association through the Common Market with a number of nations in the area.

- The relationship among the outside powers has changed. With lines between the U.S. and the Soviet Union firmly drawn in Europe, their contest has spilled over to the south where no such lines exist and where local conflict and rapid change draw them into new competition. This takes place against a background of changes in their own global strategic relationship and changes in their respective national postures toward global involvement.

## The Arab-Israeli Conflict

This protracted and bitter struggle lies at the heart of the Middle East crisis. Its harmful potential is, to be sure, enhanced by great power involvement. But the simple fact remains that the continuation of this conflict grievously damages the interests of all concerned:

- It has drawn the Soviet Union and the United States into close military association with the combatants, with all the danger that poses to world peace.

- It has caused the disruption of normal U.S. relations with a number of Arab countries. This, in

123

[L]

turn, has increased the already excessive Arab dependence on Soviet support, and therefore their dangerous vulnerability to excessive Soviet influence.

- It has provided an issue which has been exploited and manipulated by radical elements to undercut the internal stability of the Arab nations.

- It has, for two decades, kept the 50 million people of Israel and the adjoining Arab nations in a permanent state of hostilities, and in constant fear of attack.

- It has forced both the Arab states and Israel to divert a tragically disproportionate share of their resources to the instruments and activities of war.

- It has condemned to squalor and to soul-searing hatred the lives of the Palestinian refugees, who include not only those who originally fled their homes upon the establishment of Israel, but a whole generation born and reared in the hopelessness and frustration of the refugee camps. They are the material from which history creates the tragedies of the future.

That is the outline of the situation which prevails. It is, and was when my Administration began, of deep concern to the American people.

We faced a choice. We could have elected to stand aloof from the problem, on the theory that our diplomatic intervention would serve only to complicate further an already excessively complex problem.

We rejected that course. We did so for three reasons. First, the stakes involved are too high for us to accept a passive role. Second, we could see nothing resulting from our restraint but the steady deterioration of the situation into open war. Third, it would have been intolerable to subordinate our own hopes for global peace and a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union to the local—if severe—animosities of the Middle East.

Therefore—with no risks—this Administration and prolonged effort of the Middle East counterpart in full measure have had a degree of success. Excellent, and because of it, for settlement, I wish the problem of the problem of the problem

The interests of a people of the kind we have are the parties work out a plan that each will want We have proceeded to their concerns.

The Israelis seek neighbors in secure places, and they will seek more and of Israel's legs and arms for security. For Israel's security, and for a paper peace.

The Arab governments lost during the years of conflict, and that will permit them to attack. Peace for the Middle East.

If these concerns must be met:

- Judgment on the part of the United States to make and produce a just solution of the problem.

- Judgment on the part of the United States to keep its commitments.

- Judgment on the part of the United States to provide for whatever

124

The already excessive Arab support, and therefore the inability to excessive Soviet

re which has been exploited, the medical elements to undercut the Arab nations.

Arabs, kept the 50 million Bedouins, the adjoining Arab nations in hostilities, and in constant

Arab states and Israel to proportionate share of their documents and activities of

equalor and to soul-searing Palestinian refugees, who who originally fled their establishment of Israel, but a land reared in the hope of the refugee camps. From which history creates

a situation which prevails. Administration began, of deep

e. They have elected to stand the theory that our diplo- only to complicate fur-

 complex problem. He did so for three reasons: are too high for us to be, we could see nothing but the steady deterioration of the steady deterioration. Third, it would have to our own hopes for the relationship with the there—animosities of the

Therefore—with no illusions about the difficulty or the risks—this Administration embarked upon a major and prolonged effort to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis. In that effort, we have encountered in full measure the difficulties we expected. We have had disappointments as well as a limited degree of success. Because this problem is so important, and because our role is central to the chances for settlement, I wish to discuss in detail our assessment of the problem, and our efforts to resolve it.

The interests of all concerned require a settlement. The purpose of the United States has been to help the parties work out among themselves a peace agreement that each would have a stake in maintaining. We have proceeded with a sense of compassion for their concerns.

The Israelis seek recognition as a nation by their neighbors in secure circumstances. In any settlement they will seek more than simple declarations of peace and of Israel's legitimacy. They also seek physical security. For Israel, peace must be something more than a paper peace.

The Arab governments seek the recovery of territories lost during the June war, justice for those who have lost lands and homes through more than twenty years of conflict, and a sense of dignity and security that will permit them to feel no longer vulnerable to attack. Peace for them must also be real.

If these concerns are to be reconciled, three conditions must be met:

- Judgment on each side that the other is willing to make and live up to commitments that could produce a just and lasting peace.

- Judgment on each side that the other will be able to keep its commitments.

- Judgment on each side that the world community can provide realistic supplementary guarantees of whatever agreements may be reached.

125

The United States Initiative. Throughout 1969, the United States sought a framework for an agreed settlement through bilateral talks with the Soviet Union and in the multilateral channel of the Four Power talks, as well as through continuing consultation with Israel, Jordan, and the UAR. We sought to work out common guidelines which Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, could use as a catalyst for talks between the parties.

By May of 1970 these efforts were stalled. And while they had proceeded, the intensity of the conflict had again reached the critical level. Fighting was taking place daily along the Suez Canal. In retaliation, Israeli air power had reached deep into Egypt. Fedayeen attacks had provoked serious incidents on the ceasefire lines between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The Soviet Union had taken steps to alter the military balance in the UAR's favor. Forces opposed to any kind of settlement were increasingly assertive in many Arab countries.

Obviously, the situation was once again about to go out of control. A new approach in the search for a settlement was urgently required.

Our experience over the past year had convinced us that no serious movement toward peace was possible unless the parties to the conflict themselves came to grips with the issues between them.

On June 19, therefore, the United States launched an initiative to get both sides to:

- re-establish the ceasefire.

- observe a military standstill in an agreed zone on both sides of the Israel-UAR ceasefire line.

- agree on a set of principles as the basic starting point for Arab-Israeli talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

The essence of this proposal was described by Secretary Rogers publicly on June 25 as a major political initiative "to encourage the parties to stop shooting

and start taking into consideration the initiative proposed

- It halted and the level of political

- It obtained Jordan's peace agenda and its integrative withdrawal from the conflict

However, peace negotiations with the Soviet and Suez Canal effect on military strategy was further complicated by the Government of P.F. the Governor of Abygailov to reach an

The situation, and the conflict, and the from Syria since this

More work with dangerous onstrate came. But scribed: subversion of other full hand. With

126

e. Throughout 1969, the work for an agreed settlement with the Soviet Union and of the Four Power talks, including consultation with Israel, sought to work out common solutions to the problem of the Israeli-Gunnar Jarring, the UN Representative, could use the parties.

Its were stalled. And while the intensity of the conflict had level. Fighting was taking place. In retaliation, Israeli forces into Egypt. Fedayeen attacked incidents on the ceasefire in Lebanon, and Syria. steps to alter the military forces opposed to any ideas singly assertive in many

times again about to go back in the search for a solution.

It had convinced us that peace was possible if they were forced to submit themselves to us.

United States launched

all in an agreed zone on the Israeli-Gunnar Jarring ceasefire line.

The basic starting point for the negotiations was

was described by Sec-25 as a major political issue to stop shooting

and start talking." The UAR, Jordan, and Israel accepted the proposal, as did the Soviet Union. Our initiative produced significant results:

- It halted the bloodshed along the ceasefire line, and thereby helped reduce national passions to a level more conducive to sober consideration of a political settlement.

- It obtained, for the first time, agreement by Israel, Jordan, and the UAR to seek "a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgement by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with" the UN Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967.

However, the ultimate goal of our initiative, a serious peace negotiation, did not follow immediately. For the Soviet and Egyptian buildup of military forces along the Suez Canal continued after the ceasefire went into effect on August 7, in violation of the agreement for a military standstill. The fragile opening toward peace was further endangered in early September by the actions of Palestinian groups which attempted to force the Government of Jordan to withdraw from the effort to reach a settlement.

The situation in Jordan deteriorated into open conflict, and the subsequent intervention of armored forces from Syria created the gravest threat to world peace since this Administration came into office.

More was at stake than Jordanian policy. As always with dangers avoided, it is not easy in retrospect to demonstrate how close to greater dangers the world really came. But the prospect which threatened can be described: If Jordan had succumbed to either internal subversion or external aggression, the danger of another full-scale Middle East war would have been at hand. With the Soviet Union so deeply involved in the

127

military operations of the UAR, and with firm U.S. support for the survival of Israel, the risk of great-power confrontation would have been real indeed.

The United States had no responsible choice but to prevent events from running away with the ability to control them. We took a firm stand against the Syrian intervention. We acted to stabilize but not to threaten, to discourage irresponsibility without accelerating the momentum of crisis.

The Syrians withdrew, the Government of Jordan re-established order, and a fragile agreement was reached on the future role of the organized Palestinians.

This sobering experience should demonstrate to all the parties involved the extreme volatility of the present state of affairs. The entire world has seen how precarious is the balance and how great the danger in the Middle East.

**The Shape of Peace in the Middle East.** It is not for the United States to attempt to set the precise terms of a Middle East peace settlement. That can be done only by the parties directly in conflict, and only by a process of negotiation with each other.

However, some of the principles and elements that must be included if a settlement is to be reached are clear and evident:

- The Arab Governments will not accept a settlement which does not provide for recovery of territories lost in the 1967 War. Without such acceptance, no settlement can have the essential quality of assured permanence.

- Israel will not agree to withdraw from occupied Arab territories, which she sees as enhancing her physical security, unless she has confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement. She also believes that the final borders to which she will withdraw must be negotiated and agreed in a binding peace settlement. She must, therefore, have confidence that no attack is forthcoming,

and confidence in both sides, especially in the Middle East.

- The lack of recognition of the Arab state by the United States and the Arab League, and the Arab major element of a solution in time with both sides, sharing control of the Middle East.

- No lasting solution to the Middle East problem can be found in the present conditions. The only solution is to set up a series of communes that command the support of the vast majority of the people of the countries concerned. The immediate aim of the United States is to set up such a series of communes in each of the countries concerned.

The immediate task of the United States is to set up an agreement that will secure the balance of power in the Middle East. The United States seeks and will seek, of the terms proposed in the初步 draft of the settlement,

## Great Power Coordination

For over a century, the great powers of the world have been engaged in competition for control of the Middle East. In recent years, the competition has been more intense. While the powers have not yet reached the level of conflict which existed in the 1960s, the competition has caused some concern among the powers about the potential for instability and volatility in the region.

Despite the concerns of the United States and other powers about the potential for instability and volatility in the region, the United States has not established a firm policy of resistance to the power of the great powers in the Middle East which could cause them to lose confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement. The concern causes the United States to seek a solution which will not only end the instability and volatility but also to ensure the permanence of the peace settlement.

Any effort by a power to establish a position which would cause the United States to lose confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement, or to cause the United States to lose interest in the region, could cause the United States to lose confidence in the permanence of the peace settlement.

128

and with firm U.S. and with the risk of great-great real indeed.

 choice but to stay with the ability to and against the Syrian e but not to threaten, thout accelerating the

ernment of Jordan re-gr agreement was reached ed Palestinians.

uld demonstrate to all volatility of the pres-world has seen how w great the danger in

liddle East. It is not ot to set the precise ssettlement. That can ectly in conflict, and with each other.

es and elements that is to be reached are

not accept a settle- vide for recovery of War. Without such an have the essential

ndraw from occupied sees as enhancing s she has confidence eace settlement. She porders to which she tiated and agreed in She must, therefore, tack is forthcoming,

and confidence in her acceptance by her neigh-bors and in other assurances.

- The lack of mutual confidence between Israel and the Arab countries is so deep that supplementary major power guarantees could add an element of assurance. Such guarantees, coupled in time with a reduction of the armed strength of both sides, can give the agreement permanence.

- No lasting settlement can be achieved in the Middle East without addressing the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people. For over two decades they have been the victims of conditions that command sympathy. Peace requires fruitful lives for them and their children, and a just settlement of their claims.

The immediate task is to help the belligerents con- struct an agreement that will achieve a workable balance between the security and recognition that Israel seeks and a just resolution, which the Arab states seek, of the territorial and Palestinian issues. Only in such a balance can peace be found.

## Great Power Contest

For over a century the Middle East has been an area of great concern to the major powers. To NATO and Europe its independence is vital, militarily and economically. Similarly the Soviet Union has important interests which we recognize.

Despite the depth of these interests—perhaps to some extent because of them—the major powers have not established a pattern of relationships with the Middle East which accommodates the interests of all. The concern caused by that fact is magnified by the instability and volatility of the region.

Any effort by any major power to secure a dominant position could exacerbate local disputes, affect Europe's security, and increase the danger to world peace. We

129

[1c]

seek no such position; we cannot allow others to establish one.

We believe that the stability of the Middle East requires establishing a balance in the activities of the various outside powers involved there. Each must be free to pursue its own legitimate interests, but within the limits imposed by respect for the legitimate interests of others and the sovereignty of the nations of the area.

On this basis, the United States sought in 1969 and 1970 to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union on the Middle East question which would have global significance for us and them, and would also contribute to making constructive peace negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis possible.

We repeatedly made clear to the Soviet leaders our desire to limit the arms race in the Middle East on a reciprocal basis:

- On February 4, 1970, I proposed to Chairman Kosygin that the United States and the Soviet Union discuss the question of limiting the arms which our two countries provide to the Middle East. The Soviets rejected this proposal as they had done similar proposals in the past.

- On March 23, Secretary Rogers announced that we would hold in abeyance a decision on Israel's request for additional aircraft, pointing out that: "Restraint will be required on the part of other major suppliers to the Middle East. No nation can pursue a policy of seeking unilateral advantage in the area if peace is to be achieved."

The Soviet Union responded by stepping up the shipment of air-defense missiles and aircraft, manned by Soviet combat crews to Egypt—the first time that Soviet combat crews have been moved to a nation outside the Communist orbit.

While indicating that the U.S. preferred restraint in the shipment of arms, I have also repeatedly stated

that the military balance in Israel must be maintained.

- In my February report made clear that we hesitate to proceed in any required in order to do so.

- On July 31, I stated that of our cease-fire position in the Middle East would have to be established by a military buildup.

The Soviet Union's foundation for peace has not been its readiness to make peace. Against this no choice but to maintain the military balance in the Middle East.

Throughout most of the year the Soviet Union has made no move to engage the Soviet Union in Israeli negotiations, particularly on thre

- The need for cific obligations

- The need for further occupie peace which boundaries.

- The need for tiating process a peace settlement.

The Soviets have made no commitment to settlements. The Soviet settlement which man and security in the Middle East has no support by the United States or its allies.

130

cannot allow others to
of the Middle East re-
the activities of the
there. Each must be
e interests, but within
for the legitimate in-
reignity of the nations

ies sought in 1969 and
with the Soviet Union
which would have global
and would also con-
peace negotiations be-
bles.

the Soviet leaders our
the Middle East on a

proposed to Chairman
States and the Soviet
of limiting the arms
provide to the Middle
this proposal as they
in the past.

logers announced that
a decision on Israel's
aft, pointing out that:
on the part of other
le East. No nation can
unilateral advantage
chieved."

stepping up the ship-
d aircraft, manned by
—the first time that
moved to a nation

preferred restraint in
also repeatedly stated

that the military balance between the Arab states and
Israel must be maintained:

- In my February 4 letter to Chairman Kosygin, I made clear that the United States would not hesitate to provide arms to Israel if they were required in order to maintain that balance.

- On July 31, I said publicly: "It is an integral part of our cease-fire proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire period to improve its military position in the area of the cease-fire lines. All would have to refrain from . . . undertaking a military buildup of any kind in such an area."

The Soviet Union's disregard for this essential
foundation for peace talks raised serious doubts about
its readiness to cooperate in the effort to achieve
peace. Against this background, the United States had
no choice but to take further steps to help maintain
the military balance.

Throughout most of 1969 we had attempted to en-
gage the Soviet Union in developing a basis for Arab-
Israeli negotiations. Our talks with the Soviets focussed
particularly on three points:

- The need for an Arab commitment to accept specific obligations in a peace agreement with Israel.

- The need for an Israeli commitment to withdraw from occupied territories as part of a binding peace which establishes recognized and secure boundaries.

- The need for both sides to enter a genuine negotiating process to work out the detailed terms of a peace settlement between them.

The Soviets have persistently called for an Israeli
commitment to total withdrawal from all occupied ter-
ritories. The Soviets have also called for a refugee
settlement which inadequately reflects the practical hu-
man and security problems involved on both sides. The
United States has recognized that any changes in pre-
war borders should be insubstantial, but we insist that

131

any agreement to fix final borders must be directly
linked in a peace agreement to mutually agreed prac-
tical arrangements that would make these secure.
These are matters for negotiation between the parties.
The Soviets have insisted, however, that the major
powers make these judgments and, in effect, impose
them on the parties.

In June 1970, the USSR offered further formula-
tions on some of the obligations that all parties would
undertake for preventing hostile acts from their soil
and on the precise time when peace would come into
effect in relation to the withdrawal of troops to final
borders. But these formulations, which were modifica-
tions of earlier Soviet proposals, came belatedly and
still failed to take into account the need for a nego-
tiating process engaging the parties themselves.

The U.S. continues to welcome Soviet suggestions
for a settlement. But to be serious, they must meet
the legitimate concerns of not one but both sides.

Nationalism in the Area

Apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, a strong Arab
nationalism has grown in reaction to an era of outside
political control which has now ended. It is nurtured
by a persistent yearning for unity among Arab nations.
But traditional and ideological rivalries make it difficult
for Arabs to agree on the form their unity should take.
The attempts to fashion unity, therefore, sharpen
tensions.

At the heart of these disputes is a fundamental
ideological disagreement on how Arab society should
respond to pressures for rapid modernization. As a
consequence, some of the more militant forces exploit
issues of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism, even
where these are not the real issues. For their own na-
tionalist or ideological reasons, they seek to reduce the
U.S. position. The ironic result of their action—if they

succeeded—more vulnerable

Thus some
more difficult
wish to do,
sides of inte-
tain friendly
which welcom-
icant contrib-
velopment of
and technical
vestment. Th-
and wish to
maintenance
pressures to

Issues for the

The search
tlement—an
tionship that
integrity of
priorities. O
strong inde-
with each o
structively v
to consider
opment of t
Israelis onc

In pursu-
these princi

First, if t
we have pr
Arab-Israeli
guarantees
our diplom
United Nat
for peace r
is the prop

[x]

132

orders must be directly
mutually agreed prac-
d make these secure.
on between the parties.
however, that the major
and, in effect, impose

ffered further formula-
s that all parties would
le acts from their soil
peace would come into
awal of troops to final
, which were modifica-
ls, came belatedly and
the need for a nego-
ties themselves.

Some Soviet suggestions
arious, they must meet
one but both sides.

conflict, a strong Arab
on to an era of outside
ended. It is nurtured
by among Arab nations.
valries make it difficult
their unity should take.
y, therefore, sharpen

tes is a fundamental
w Arab society should
modernization. As a
militant forces exploit
rab nationalism, even
ues. For their own na-
ney seek to reduce the
f their action—if they

succeeded—would be to make the area once again
more vulnerable to outside domination.

Thus some political currents in the area make it
more difficult for the U.S. to maintain, as we would
wish to do, productive relations with nations on both
sides of inter-Arab disputes. We will continue to main-
tain friendly relations with all the countries of the area
which welcome our friendship. We can make a signif-
icant contribution, as we have in the past, to the de-
velopment of the Arab world in the fields of education
and technical training, business management, and in-
vestment. The value of the contribution we can make,
and wish to make, creates a common interest in the
maintenance of decent relationships which may offset
pressures to disrupt them.

## Issues for the Future

The search for peace—especially an Arab-Israeli set-
tlement—and the quest for a stable U.S.-Soviet rela-
tionship that will help preserve the independence and
integrity of each nation in this area will remain our top
priorities. Our aim is to see an epoch begin in which
strong independent nations in this area—in association
with each other as they choose—relate freely and con-
structively with the world outside. The U.S. is prepared
to consider new and fresh ways to assist in the devel-
opment of the region to the benefit of both Arabs and
Israelis once a real peace agreement is achieved.

In pursuing those goals, the United States will face
these principal issues in the months ahead:

First, if the United States is to play a major role—as
we have promised to do—in helping to bring about an
Arab-Israeli settlement and provide supplementary
guarantees, what should be the nature and extent of
our diplomatic involvement? As I pointed out at the
United Nations last October, the primary responsibility
for peace rests on the nations of the Middle East. What
is the proper relation between the efforts of the inter-

133

national community to encourage a settlement and the
responsibility of the negotiating parties themselves?

Second, our bilateral relations with Arab nations are
in flux. With some, formal diplomatic relations have
been suspended. In others, attitudes toward the U.S.
and the West are undergoing reassessment. The chang-
ing relationships in the Persian Gulf necessarily raise
new issues for American policy. How do we best en-
courage and assist the constructive forces in the area
to build a regional system of stable relationships?

Finally, there is a range of broader worldwide issues
that form the background to Middle East politics. Lim-
iting the external supply of arms to the area is one
such issue. The U.S.-Soviet military relationship in the
Mediterranean area is another. Beyond this, what is
our policy toward the broadening commercial associa-
tion which the European Common Market is establish-
ing with nations in the area? How can we help assure
the access of Western Europe and Japan to the supply
of oil, and also help assure that the producing states
receive fair revenues for their oil?

On some of these issues, our work is already well
advanced. With others we are coming to grips for the
first time. Our purpose is to resolve them in a way that
helps us and every nation involved in the Middle East,
including above all the states of the area, to build and
strengthen the relationships—at every level—that will
hold together the structure of peace.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

"Peace has an economic dimension. In a world
of independent states and interdependent econ-
omies, failure to collaborate is costly—in political
as well as economic terms."

U.S. Foreign Policy For The 1970's
Report to the Congress

February 18, 1970

Material v-
nations. But
The tragedy
of it. For m
matter of su
ment and pi
and societies
ing them to

Economic
potential if
The interde
1970's gives
functioning  
have thus b
affairs. An  
operation, o  
riers to fair  
nations, wou  
ships which

The United
factor in the
interest in m
economic tr
as well as
highlighted

The year
of the three
policy—mo

- It was
  internal

- We un-
  assista-

- But it
  the tra
  to our

In a world
in a field e
mately conn

[LC]

134

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 25, 1971

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
ON
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S

AT 11:00 A.M. EST

Good morning, my fellow Americans.

Over the past ten years, Presidents of the United
States have come before the American people in times of
crisis to talk about war or the threat of war.

Today I am able to talk to you in a more hopeful
and positive vein -- about how we are moving this Nation and
the world toward a lasting peace.

We have brought ourselves to a time of transition,
from war toward peace, and this is a good time to gain some
perspective on where we are and where we are headed.

Today I am sending to the Congress my second annual
comprehensive report on the conduct of our foreign affairs.
It discusses not only what we have done, but why we have
done it, and how we intend to proceed in the future.

I do not intend to summarize all that is in my
detailed report on foreign policy at this time. Instead, I
would like to focus on three key points:

-- How we are getting out of the war this Nation has
been in for the past six years;

-- How we have created a new and different foreign
policy approach for the United States in a greatly changed
world;

-- And how we are applying that approach in working
with others to build a lasting peace.

The most immediate and anguishing problem that
faced this Administration tow years ago was the war in
Vietnam.

We have come a long way since then.

Two years ago, when this Administration took office,
there were almost 550,000 Americans in Vietnam. But within
60 days we will have brought home 260,000 men, and this spring
I will announce a new schedule of withdrawals.

Two years ago, our casualties each month were five
times as high as they are today.

MORE

Two years ago, the additional demands of the
Vietnam war cost us approximately $22 billion per year.
That cost has been cut in half.

Much of the progress in Vietnam was due to the
success of the allied operations against the enemy
sanctuaries in Cambodia last spring.

The clear proof is in this figure: American
casualties after Cambodia have been half the rate they were
before Cambodia. Our decision to clean out the sanctuaries
in Cambodia saved thousands of American lives. And it
enabled us to continue withdrawing our men on schedule.

Just as last year's cut-off of supplies through
Cambodia has saved lives and insured our withdrawal program
this year, the purpose of this year's disruption of the Ho
Chi Minh Trail in Laos is to save lives and insure the success
of our withdrawal program next year.

The disruption of the Communist supply line through
Laos is being accomplished by South Vietnamese troops, with
no US. ground troops or advisers. Their army is doing the
fighting, with our air support, and the intensity of the
fighting is evidence of the importance of that supply line
to the enemy.

Consider this combination of events that many
people thought was impossible only two years ago:

We have kept our commitments as we have taken out
our troops. South Vietnam now has an excellent opportunity
not only to survive but to build a strong, free society.

Thanks to the disruption of so much of the enemy's
supplies, Americans are leaving South Vietnam in safety;
we would much prefer to leave South Vietnam in peace.
Negotiation remains the best and quickest way to end the war
in a way that will not only end US involvement and casualties,
but will mean an end to the fighting between North and South
Vietnamese.

On October 7 we made a proposal that could open the
door to that kind of peace; we proposed:

-- An immediate standstill cease-fire throughout
Indochina to stop the fighting.

-- An Indochina Peace Conference.

-- The withdrawal of all outside forces.

-- A political settlement fair to both sides.

-- The immediate release of all prisoners of war.

I reaffirm that proposal today. It is supported
by every government in Indochina except one -- the Government
of North Vietnam.

I once again urge Hanoi to join us in this search
for peace.

MORE

If North Vietnam wishes to negotiate with the United States, they will have to recognize that time is running out. With the exception of the prisoners of war issue, if North Vietnam continues to refuse to discuss our peace proposals, they will soon find they have no choice but to negotiate only with the South Vietnamese.

Our eventual goal is a total withdrawal of all outside forces. But as long as North Vietnam continues to hold a single American prisoner, we shall have forces in South Vietnam. The American prisoners of war will not be forgotten by their Government.

I am keeping my pledge to end America's involvement in this war. But the main point I want to discuss with you today -- and the main theme of my report to the Congress -- is the future, not the past. It matters very much how we end this war.

To end a war is simple.

But to end a war in a way that will not bring on another war is far from simple.

In Southeast Asia today, aggression is failing -- thanks to the determination of the South Vietnamese people and to the courage and sacrifice of America's fighting men.

That brings us to a point that we have been at several times before in this century: aggression turned back, a war ending.

We are at a critical moment in history: What America does -- or fails to do -- will determine whether peace and freedom can be won in the coming generation.

That is why the way in which we end this conflict is so crucial to our efforts to build a lasting peace in coming decades.

The right way out of Vietnam is crucial to our changing role in the world, and the peace in the world.

To understand the nature of the new American role we must consider the great historical changes that have taken place.

For 25 years after World War II, the United States was not only the leader of the non-Communist world, it was the primary supporter and defender of this free world as well.

-- But today our allies and friends have gained new strength and self-confidence. They are now able to participate much more fully not only in their own defense, but in adding their moral and spiritual strength to the creation of a stable world order.

-- Today our adversaries no longer present a solidly united front; we can now differentiate in our dealings with them.

MORE

-- Today neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a clear-cut nuclear advantage; the time is therefore ripe to come to an agreement on the control of arms.

The world has changed. Our foreign policy must change with it.

We have learned in recent years the dangers of over-involvement. The other danger -- a grave risk we are equally determined to avoid -- is under-involvement. After a long and unpopular war, there is temptation to turn inward -- to withdraw from the world, to back away from our commitments. That deceptively smooth road of the new isolationism is surely the road to war.

Our foreign policy today steers a steady course between the past danger of over-involvement and the new temptation of under-involvement.

That policy, which I first enunciated in Guam 19 months ago, represents our basic approach to the world:

We will maintain our commitments, but we will make sure our own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs;

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

But we will look to threatened countries and their neighbors to assume primary responsibility for their own defense, and we will provide support where our interests call for that support and where it can make a difference.

These principles are not limited to security matters.

We shall pursue economic policies at home and abroad that encourage trade wherever possible and that strengthen political ties between nations. As we actively seek to help other nations expand their economies, we can legitimately expect them to work with us in averting economic problems of our own.

As we continue to send economic aid to developing nations, we will expect countries on the receiving end to mobilize their resources; we will look to other developed nations to do more in furnishing assistance; and we will channel our aid increasingly through groups of nations banded together for mutual support.

This new sharing of responsibility requires not less American leadership than in the past, but rather a new, more subtle, form of leadership. No single nation can build a peace alone; peace can only be built by the willing hands -- and minds -- of all. In the modern world, leadership cannot be "do it yourself" -- the path of leadership is in providing the help, the motive, the inspiration to do it together.

In carrying out what is referred to as the Nixon Doctrine, we recognize that we cannot transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and preventing self-reliance, and suddenly doing too little and

MORE

undermining self-confidence. We intend to give our friends
the time and the means to adjust, materially and psycho-
logically, to a new form of American participation in the
world.

How have we applied our new foreign policy during
the past year? And what is our future agenda as we work
with others to build a stable world order?

In Western Europe, we have shifted from pre-
dominance to partnership with our allies. Our ties with
Western Europe are central to the structure of peace because
its nations are rich in tradition and experience, strong
economically, vigorous in diplomacy and culture; they are
in a position to take a major part in building a world of
peace.

Our ties were strengthened on my second trip to
Europe this summer and reflected in our close consultation
on arms control negotiations. At our suggestion, the NATO
alliance made a thorough review of its military strategy
and posture. As a result, we have reached new agreement
on a strong defense and the need to share the burden more
fairly.

In Eastern Europe, our exchange of State visits
with Romania, and my meeting last fall with Marshal Tito in
Yugoslavia, are examples of our search for wider reconciliation
with the nations that used to be considered behind an Iron
Curtain.

Looking ahead in Europe:

-- We shall cooperate in our political and economic
relations across the Atlantic as the Common Market grows;

-- We and our allies will make the improvements
necessary to carry out our common defense strategy;

-- Together we stand ready to reduce our forces in
Western Europe in exchange for mutual reductions in Eastern
Europe.

The problems of Africa are great but so is her
t potential. The United States will support her people's
efforts to build a continent that provides social justice
and economic expansion.

Turning to our own hemisphere: In Latin America,
there was too much tendency in the past to take our closest
friends and neighbors for granted. Recently, we have paid
new respect to their proud traditions. Our trade, credit
and economic policies have been re-examined and reformed,
to respond to their concerns and their ideas, as well as to
our own interests.

Our new Latin American policy is designed to help
them help themselves; our new attitude will not only aid
their progress, but add to their dignity.

Great changes are brewing throughout the American
Hemisphere. We can have no greater goal than to help provide
the means for necessary change to be accomplished in peace,

MORE

and for all change to be in the direction of greater self-
reliance.

Turning to the Far East: A new Asia is emerging.
The old enmities of World War II are dead or dying. Asian
states are stronger and are joining together in vigorous
regional groupings.

Here the doctrine that took shape last year is
taking hold today, helping to spur self-reliance and
cooperation between states. In Japan, South Korea, Thailand
and the Philippines, we have consolidated bases and reduced
American forces. We have relaxed trade and travel restrictions
to underline our readiness for greater contact with Communist
China.

Looking ahead in that area:

-- While continuing to help our friends help them-
selves, we must begin to consider how regional associations
can work together with the major powers in the area for a
durable peace.

-- We will work to build a strong partnership with
Japan that will accommodate our mutual interests.

-- We will search for constructive discussions with
Communist China while maintaining our defense commitment to
Taiwan. When the government of the People's Republic of
China is ready to engage in talks, it will find us receptive
to agreements that further the legitimate national interests
of China and its neighbors.

MORE

In Asia, we can see tomorrow's world in microcosm. An economically powerful democratic free nation, Japan, is seeking new markets; a potentially powerful Communist nation, China, will one day seek new outlets and new relations; a Communist competitor, the Soviet Union, has interests there as well; and the independent non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia are already working together in regional association. These great forces are bound to interact in the not too distant future. In the way they work together, and in the way we cooperate with their relationship, is the key to permanent peace in that area -- the Far East, the scene of such a painful legacy of the recent past, can become an example of peace and stability in the future.

In the Middle East, the United States took the initiative to stop the fighting and start the process of peace.

Along the Suez Canal a year ago, there was daily combat on the ground and in the air. Diplomacy was at an impasse. The danger of local conflict was magnified by growing Soviet involvement and the possibility of great powers being drawn into confrontation.

America took the lead in arranging a cease-fire and getting negotiations started. We are seeing to it that the balance of power, so necessary to discourage a new outbreak of fighting, is not upset. Working behind the scenes, when a crisis arose in Jordan, the United States played a key role in seeing that order was restored and an invasion was abandoned.

We recognize that centuries of suspicion and decades of hostility cannot be ended overnight. There are great obstacles in the way of a permanent, peaceful settlement, and painful compromise is required by all concerned.

We are encouraged by the willingness of each of the parties to begin to look to the larger interest of peace and stability throughout the Middle East. There is still the risk of war, but now -- for the first time in years -- the parties are actively calculating the risks of peace.

The policy of the United States will continue to be to promote peace talks -- not to try to impose a peace from the outside, but to support the peace efforts of the parties in the region themselves.

One way to support these efforts is for the United States to discourage any outside power from trying to exploit the situation for its own advantage.

Another way for us to help turn a tenuous truce into a permanent settlement is this: The United States is fully prepared to play a responsible and cooperative role in keeping the peace arrived at through negotiation between the parties.

We know what our vital interests are in the Middle East. Those interests include friendly and constructive relations with all nations in the area. Other nations know that we are ready to protect those vital interests. And one good reason why other nations take us at our word in the Middle East is because the United States has kept its word in Southeast Asia.

MORE

Page 8

We now come to a matter that affects every nation -- the relations between the world's two great superpowers.

Over the past two years in some fields the Soviet Union and the United States have moved ahead together. We have taken the first step toward cooperation in outer space. We have both ratified the treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Just two weeks ago, we signed a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds.

These are hopeful signs, but certain other Soviet actions are reason for concern. There is need for much more cooperation in reducing tensions in the Middle East and in ending harassment of Berlin. We must also discourage the temptation to raise new challenges in sensitive areas such as the Caribbean.

In the long run, the most significant result of negotiations between the superpowers in the past year could be in the field of arms control.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union have produced the most searching examination of the nature of strategic competition ever conducted between our two nations. Each side has had the chance to explain at length the concerns caused by the posture of the other side. The talks have been conducted in a serious way without the old lapses into propaganda.

If both sides continue in this way, there is reason to hope that specific agreements will be reached to curb the arms race.

Taking a first step in limiting the capacity of man-kind to destroy itself would mark a turning point in the history of the postwar world; it would add to the security of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and it would add to the world's peace of mind.

In all our relations with the Soviets, we shall make the most progress by recognizing that in many cases our national interests are not the same. It serves no purpose to pretend they are; our differences are not matters of mood, they are matters of substance. But in many other cases, our separate national interests can best be pursued by a sober consideration of the world interest.

The United States will deal, as it must, from strength: We will not reduce our defenses below the level I consider essential to our national security.

A strong America is essential to the cause of peace today. Until we have the kind of agreements we can rely on, we shall remain strong.

But America's power will always be used for building a peace, never for breaking it -- only for defending freedom, never for destroying it.

America's strength will be, as it must be, second to none; but the strength that this nation is proudest of is the strength of our determination to create a peaceful world.

MORE

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#939

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN, DEPUTY PRESS
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

AT 11:23 A.M. EST

FEBRUARY 26, 1971

FRIDAY

MR. WARREN: I just want to review with you the
releases that you now have or are getting.

We are pleased to announce that the President has
announced his intention to nominate Jerris Leonard to be
Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

If you will, add "Administration" to the first
sentence of the release.

This will come as no surprise to any of you, I am
sure.

The salary for the position of Administrator of the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is $38,000 per year.

Q I thought before it was $42,500, but maybe
I am wrong.

MR. WARREN: It is $38,000.

Q Is he taking a pay cut?

MR. WARREN: It is the same.

Q Is there a successor?

MR. WARREN: We have no successor to announce.

Moving along, the President is announcing the
appointment of three members and one alternate member to
serve on the District of Columbia Commission on Judicial
Disabilities and Tenure. That means that this Commission
has the power to suspend, retire or remove a judge of a
District of Columbia Court pursuant to the provisions of
Public Law 91-358.

Moving further along, additions to the schedule
have been posted.

At 11:45 this morning the President will meet
with USIA Director Frank Shakespeare who has just returned
from an overseas trip and will report on that trip to the
President.

Also, we have posted the details of the open hour
this afternoon. There will be pictures of a number of those
which we will point out to the photographers.

MORE

#939

NEWS CONFERENCE

This Copy For

#943

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 4:36 P.M. EST

MARCH 2, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As many of you may recall, this morning I indicated that I was not going to brief this afternoon. Jerry was going to handle it. But the President has asked me to brief this afternoon because he wanted me to make a couple of points to the members of the press this afternoon, and was quite firm in having me make the following points. They relate to Senator Symington's remarks today before the Senate.

In Senator Symington's remarks before the Senate today some impressions were left. The impressions that were left in Senator Symington's remarks today regarding the Secretary of State, I would like to say that it is the President's view, and it is our view, that they were misleading, totally inaccurate, and unfair.

As many of you know, the Secretary of State -- and the President wanted me to emphasize this to you -- is a valued member of the President's Cabinet and a man he values as his chief adviser on foreign affairs.

The President went on to tell me that he has known the Secretary of State longer than any other member of the Cabinet and has valued his friendship for 24 years.

He went on to tell me to tell you, gentlemen, and you can quote this directly, that President Nixon has the utmost confidence in the Secretary of State and in the judgment of the Secretary of State.

The President wanted me also to say to you that the Secretary of State is the President's chief adviser on foreign affairs. He will remain that. And he told me that people who think otherwise are misleading both themselves and others; in other words, those who may have the impression that the Secretary of State is not the President's chief adviser on foreign affairs are misleading themselves and others.

MORE

#943

#943

The President went on to say that he understood that it is oftentimes traditional here in Washington by those who are politically motivated to attempt to drive a wedge between key advisers and the President.

He went on to say that he knows better than anyone the contribution that the Secretary has made to this Administration in foreign policy, and that he has complete confidence in the Secretary and his judgment and that he will continue to rely heavily in the future, as he has in the past, on the advice and the judgment of the Secretary of State.

I would just like to add to that, that in the course of the discussion with the President about this, I made an observation to the President. I know that the President during the course of the day -- this is virtually every day -- talks to the Secretary by phone; the President, most of the time, initiating the calls to talk with the Secretary of State about foreign policy and other matters.

Also, because foreign policy is a very important matter of consideration within this Administration, as it is in other Administrations, the President probably sees the Secretary of State more than any other member of his Cabinet.

So, to conclude, I would just like to say that the impression that is left by Senator Symington's remarks today about the Secretary, as I said at the outset, are misleading, unfair, and totally inaccurate.

MORE

#943

February 27, 1971

The plight of refugees around the world continues to be of great concern to me personally and to countless fellow citizens. The splendid voluntary efforts of the United Hias Service have been in the best tradition of those organisations that have sought to alleviate the suffering of these homeless men, women and children. And they have been in keeping with the American spirit of helping those in need.

Voluntarism is one of the greatest forces for good in the world. And United Hias Service has been an integral and eminent part of this force in action. I know that Americans everywhere join me in expressing appreciation for your past achievements and support for your continuing service to humanity.

Sent Special Delivery to: Mr. Harold Friedman
President
United Hias Service
200 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10003

RN:Hasek:ck

cc: Rose Mary Woods/S. Browne/M. White/H. Saunders, NSC/E. Hasek/CF

DUE: ASA&D(Printing)

EVENT: MARCH 14, 1971

Requested by Organization.

Approved by Ray Price.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #944

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:20 A.M. EST

MARCH 3, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We have several announcements this morning. We have a posting which will announce that the President has signed an Executive Order continuing the authority of the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations to inspect any income, excess-profits, estate and gift tax returns. This authority has been extended at the beginning of each new Congress since 1953. We will post the details on that.

Also, you have two releases which indicate the President today is announcing his intention to nominate Robert Beatty to be Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. He will be responsible for the administration of the Department's public affairs program. The salary level for this post is $38,000.

You also have a release which announces the President's intention to nominate Stephen Kurzman to be Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Labor for Legislation. He will succeed Creed Black, who resigned, as you recall, in September of 1970. The salary level for that position is also $38,000.

There is some information regarding the President's trip to Rochester on Friday. The President will depart for Rochester sometime around 11 o'clock on Friday. And in Rochester, in addition to making brief remarks before the media background briefing, which will take place in Rochester, the President will meet with the Mayors of several upstate New York cities and also county executives, New York Legislative leaders, and State officials.

They will discuss the urban development special revenue-sharing proposal which will be sent to Congress on Friday. We will have that message and fact sheets and information regarding the urban development special revenue-sharing legislation for you early on Friday morning.

Q Are you going to have a list of the officials?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will have that for you tomorrow.

Q Will we get that before we go on the trip, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think so, yes.

Q For release at noon?

MORE

#944

- 6 -

#944

Q It concerns the question of not only policy, but the way orders are given in directing the war and some great faults. What did you say, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have no comment on the story.

Q I didn't say if you had any comment. I would like for you to find out if the President has read this story, if he is taking any action on it with the Pentagon?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will stand on my answer.

Q Ron, are you saying that there has been no discussion within this Government or no consideration of the possibility of the United States giving any support to an invasion of North Vietnam?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is what I say, yes.

Q Is the President of Israel meeting with our President here next week?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Ron, has the President spoken with Secretary Rogers about Senator Symington's criticism?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would assume he has talked to the Secretary about that. He talked to him several times yesterday. I think he talked to him yesterday evening. But I am not prepared to convey to you what they talked about. I don't know. But I would imagine that in the course of their conversation it was brought up.

Q May I ask one more question on your answer? When you say there has been no discussion here in this Government on that matter, referring to the question on the Thieu statement, I gather what you said in response to Mr. Pierpoint's question was that there has been no discussion in this Government of the possibility of the U. S. giving aid to any South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam. Has there been discussion within this Government of a possible South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam without regard to U. S. aid?

MR. ZIEGLER: This is a matter that has not been in any of the deliberations I have been aware of or a matter that has come under discussion.

Q Ron, a Senate Committee has reported out a Bill to extend the life of the Appalachian Regional Commission, I think, for four years. How does the President feel about this?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think our position, as was described in testimony before the Committee, was that we support the extension of the Appalachian Regional Commission for the one-year period, I believe, anticipating that revenue-sharing will be passed.

However, I should also, in response to your question, say that when revenue-sharing is passed that this does not automatically or would not automatically eliminate the Appalachian Regional Commission.

MORE

#944

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #945

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT; AND JERRY
WARREN, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT

4:40 P.M. EST

MARCH 3, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. WARREN: You have one release which is a
Memorandum to Heads of Departments and Agencies concerning
the Combined Federal Campaign and voluntary efforts in that
campaign.

You have the schedule for tomorrow.

Q No, we don't.

MR. WARREN: The press conference at 9 o'clock.

Q What about the Manpower Message?

MR. WARREN: 9:30 in the morning we will have
the Manpower Message for you.

Q Is that for noon release?

MR. WARREN: For noon release, yes. We will
brief about 10 o'clock.

MR. ZIEGLER: Is Cliff Evans here? Cliff Evans
asked me a question this morning which I was wrong in on
whether or not the President of Israel would meet the
President when he is here. President Shazar, I think next
week on March 8th, is going to be here. He is here
not on official business, as I understand, but he is
speaking here in the United States and will pay a courtesy
call to the President on March 8. I said no to that
this morning and wanted to clear that up. I was wrong in
that information.

Q Ron, can I ask you a question? I understand
that a Japanese news agency is carrying a story today
saying that Peter Flanigan is going to break off those
textile talks with the Japanese. Is it true?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are not going to break off those
talks, no. We still are motivated to try and reach a
voluntary agreement. There has been no progress in the
talks. But I wouldn't say that is a breaking off of the
talks. We would hope that we can move on that.

Q You still will shoot for an agreement rather
than this unilateral action, as you said yesterday?

MORE

#945

conference—we can debate as to whether or not
my view of it is right or the rest. I hope for the
good of the country mine is, and if it is right,
what you say now doesn't make any difference.

I am only suggesting while the jury is still
out, remember the purpose of this, like the pur-
pose of Cambodia, is to reduce American forces,
to reduce our casualties. And I should point out
that that is exactly what this administration has
done. We have kept every promise that we made.
We have reduced our forces. We have reduced
our casualties. We are going to continue to re-
duce our forces, and we are getting out of Viet-
Nam in a way that Viet-Nam will be able to
defend itself.

Mr. Healy [Paul F. Healy, New York Daily News].

Q. Mr. President, terrorists in Turkey have kidnaped four of our flyers and are holding them for $400,000 ransom. Do you think the Turkish Government should negotiate with the terrorists, and is there anything that you think we can or should do in a situation like this?

The President: Mr. Healy, we have had that
situation with several other governments. And
I would not suggest that the Turkish Govern-
ment negotiate on this matter, because I believe
that is a decision that that Government must
make, having in mind its own internal situation.

Mr. Semple [Robert B. Semple, Jr., New York Times].

Pres. March 4, 1967, Press Conference
Settlement in Middle East

Q. Mr. President, if I may turn to the Mid-
dle East just for a minute, the Arabs have re-
portedly agreed to sign a peace treaty with
Israel in exchange for certain withdrawals by
Israel from territory occupied in 1967. Is it not
now time for the Israelis to make some concessions
of their own, and will you be asking them
publicly or privately to do so?

The President: Mr. Semple, as you well know
because you are sophisticated in this area, the
question there is whether or not the United
States will impose a settlement in the Mideast,
and the answer is no. We will do everything that
we can to urge the parties to talk. And, inci-

dentally, when we talk about the problems in the
Mideast, let it not go unnoted that we have made
some progress. There was 4 years of fighting up
until August of last year, and for 7 months no
guns have fired in the Mideast. That is progress
of a kind.

We hope that the cease-fire, either by agree-
ment or de facto, will be extended. We hope
that the Israelis and the Egyptians, and for that
matter the Jordanians, will continue some kind
of discussion. As far as imposing a settlement,
however, we can only say that we can make
suggestions, but we are going to have to depend
upon the parties concerned to reach an
agreement.

And we, of course, will be there to see that
the balance of power is maintained in the Mid-
east, which we will continue to do. Because if
that balance changes that could bring on war.
And also we are prepared, as I have indicated,
to join other major powers, including the Soviet
Union, in guaranteeing any settlement that is
made, which would give Israel the security of
its borders that it might not get through geo-
graphical acquisition.

Q. May I ask you, sir, when you said earlier
about Communist China—at least you were not
perfectly clear about your position on Commu-
nist China, about seating in the United Nations.
Somebody asked you if you would favor a two-
China policy, but you were not completely clear
about that. Could you say, sir, if Taiwan main-
tained its position on the Security Council, if
it maintained its position in the United Nations,
if you would favor seating Communist China?

The President: That is a moot question at
this time because Communist China or the Peo-
ple's Republic of China—which I understand
stirred up people in Taiwan because that is the
official name of the country—but Communist
China refuses even to discuss the matter. There-
fore, it would not be appropriate for me to sug-
gest what we might agree to when Communist
China takes the position that they will have no
discussion whatever until Taiwan gets out. And
we will not start with that kind of a proposition.

Mr. Warren [Lucian C. Warren, Buffalo Evening News].

438

Department of State Bulletin

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #946

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:50 A.M. EST

MARCH 4, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As you know, the President will have a press conference tonight at 9:00 p.m. for live television and radio. And, as I mentioned the other day, the President will take all questions on foreign policy.

You have an Executive Order which creates an emergency board to investigate the dispute between certain carriers and rail carriers and the employees represented by the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen.

For your BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, this does not relate to the discussions that the Secretary of Labor referred to this morning in the discussions that are going on with the UTU which is taking place at this time. This order is similar to many orders issued pursuant to the Railway Labor Act and it creates an emergency board to investigate certain disputes between the carriers and, as I said, the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen.

The disputes cover the labor organization proposals for changes in rates of pay, rules, and working conditions and the carriers counter-proposals.

The order creates an emergency board to investigate the dispute and make recommendations in 30 days. This, then, becomes the basis of further negotiations and after an additional 30 days the union is then free to, if there is not settlement, call a strike or stop working.

So it extends the period of negotiations for 60 days.

Q How many workers are involved? Have they threatened to strike tonight?

MR. ZIEGLER: There are some 10,000 workers involved. So the scope of this is somewhat different than the current situation.

MORE

#946

- 8 - #946

Q No, but I am saying, Ron, can you give us guidance as to what is the attitude about it? This has been perking for more than a week. It surfaced last week. I asked you about it then.

MR. ZIEGLER: My answer to your question is I don't have an attitude to express on it. We have no trade with the People's Republic of China and we don't have any discussion or consideration of this matter under way within the Government. So there is no attitude to express about it.

Q Is that all for BACKGROUND, what you said said?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, it is.

Continuing on BACKGROUND, when I say no attitude to express, it is not a thing that has been discussed, so there is no attitude. We have no trade with Communist China, as you know.

Q No, but I think it is pertinent in view of the tone and attitude as expressed in the state of the world message regarding the People's Republic of China.

MR. ZIEGLER: I understand. But I have no attitude to give you because it is not discussed.

Q Do you have any comment on the kidnapping of airmen in Turkey and the expulsion of a missionary from Taiwan?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are, of course, concerned for the welfare of these men and the Department of State and our Embassy in Turkey are in close contact with the Turkish Government on this matter. The State Department would have further information for you on that.

Q Ron, there is a report from Des Moines in the paper this morning about what appears to have been an extreme anxiety of White House staff over possible interruption of the President's speech to the State Legislature out there. Did the President share that anxiety at the time?

MR. ZIEGLER: To the best of my knowledge, President Nixon was not even aware of that particular story or the details of the story as reported.

He has, of course, seen the news stories written about that matter. But he was not aware of those discussions with the Legislature as they took place.

Q Now that the story is out, does he feel that his staff acted properly in this matter?

MR. ZIEGLER: I really would hesitate to give an impression from the President on that. I think the Speaker of the House out there has put the matter in perspective. I think it has been put in perspective from that standpoint.

Q Ron, has the President received yet the report he requested in November from the Office of Emergency Preparedness on the oil price increase?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, he has not.

MORE

#946