benevolently applicable to France but something which was universally valid. This
And thirdly the French form of government was declared not see-be something which was
now policy was justified not by the divine right of kings but by popular legitimacy.
made it possible to increase the governmental controls over the population because
brought about that a domestic egalitarian in France and as the domestic egalitarian
or their national circumstances.

introduced into the concerns of all countries which did not arise from their locality
own borders. After the French Revolution as Burke said, considerations were
influenced that its domestic structure had any particular validity outside of its

In the 18th century no state made universal, ideological claim. No state
ended by the French Revolution.

equilibrium of Europe. It was, in short a conservative stable period. All of this was
relatively

limited wars. Adjustments did take place but they did not affect the basic
not imagined at the time. As a result, even though wars occurred they were very
had a high incentive to conserve his human resources. The war of peoples was
and since mercenaries not easy to come by countries were very low. Every general
international resources to the national effort. War were carried out by mercenary
subjects, to levy es- income taxes or to devote a very great percentage of

war-we absolute power in a certain sense but they had no right to constrict their
Europe. The governments were in the hands of kings who ruled by divine right. They
time, that German states would make alliances against other German states or with
having the

It was certainly conceivable, indeed it happened all the
speaking the German language should have the same nation and even less all people
would not have occurred to anybody in the 18th century for example that all people
but geographic entities comprising a number of different sovereign states. It

being located in Germany and Italy which at that time were not considered nations
century Europe was composed of a some 20 sovereign states, the majority of them
in 1812 as which I think illustrates some of these operations. In the 18th

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11

is the enormous difference between the British and the French conception of parliamentary government.

Britain had a certain doctrine of popular sovereignty also at the end of the 18th century. But Britain always insisted that it grew out of peculiarly British circumstances and it had no applicability necessarily beyond the Channel. The British system was not a crusade system. The French was. The impact of the French Revolution on Europe therefore was that henceforth what was the issue was no longer the adjustment of differences within the international system but the international system itself. Every conflict with France was not only a diplomatic conflict but a form of civil war. The application of the traditional maximums of dipole diplomacy in a revolutionary situation led to the same demoralization that always occurs when status quo powers try to deal with revolutionary countries by policies which had been at various times, which in 1930 were called appeasement, which now had connation which the positions that a country takes are to be taken at face value, that the policies are assumed to be limited until they are proved to be otherwise. The great success of the French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, the foreign policy successes of the French Revolution were, -were entirely to the fact that their opponents simply could not see that conceive of a policy of unlimited objectives. When the army of vs resources were infinitely greater than those of France in actual resources but whose mobilizable resources were much smaller confronted the French Army they would invariably surrender after a long battle which was what one did in the 18th century. Alliances against France never held together because France could always a split them by offering some limited settlement to one of the components of the alliances which again was a perfectly natural method for conducting foreign policy in the 18th century. Even before the event suffered of Napoleon, the French almost shuttled from one victory to another, suffered because they didn't expect to be successful. They mobilized the people because

because they didn't expect to be successful. They mobilized the people because of Napoleon, the French almost whetted from one victory to another, suffered

method for conducting foreign policy in the 18th century. Even before the event to one of the components of the alliances which again was a perfectly natural France could always be always a split them by offering some limited settlement one did in the 18th century. Alliances against France never held together because the French Army they would invariably surrender after a long battle which was what in actual resources but whose mobilizable resources were much smaller confronted

of these resources were infinitely greater than those of France Europe whose simply could not semest conceive of a policy of unlimited objectives. When she of the French Revolution were, -were entirely to the fact that their opponents the A French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, the foreign policy success to be measured limited until they are proved to be otherwise. The great success of that a country takes are to be taken at face value, that the policies are assumed 1920 were called abdication, which now had

revolutionary countries by policies which had been at various times, which in same democratization that always occurs when at least two powers try to deal with traditional maximum of the diplomacy in a revolutionary situation led to the only a diplomatic conflict put a form of civil war. The application of the system put the international system itself. Every conflict with France was not what was the issue was no longer the adjustment of differences within the international a was. The impact of the French Revolution on Europe therefore was that henceforth beyond the Channel. The British system was not a crusade system. The French peculiarly British circumstances and it had been no applicability necessarily of the 18th century. But what Britain was - always initiated that it grew out of Britain had a certain doctrine of popular sovereignty also at the end parliamentary government.

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they thought they were at an enormous disadvantage. Now when Napoleon appeared, he understood precisely what the situation was and he exploited it deliberately. Its probably true Marshall Foch that in World War I that ever since he became commander in chief of a coalition his respect for Napoleon declined. One of the advantages Napoleoon had was that he represented a single state while all his allies were trying to serve different policies based on different objectives. But the issues were not really drawn until the opponents of France and particularly the opponents of Napoøeon themselves took a more or less ideological stand and this is the dilemma with which any revolutionary foreign policy confronts the other countries. Even against their will they are often drawn into an essentially revolutionary foreign policy themselves. It was not until the other some countries of Europe began to organize their resources on something like the French model and of course could until Napoleon over reached himself that they would begin to deal with the problem. The vicious circle of this revolutionary conflict is shown by the fact that in part what drove Napoleon onward was not only an appetite for conquest but his own sense that his own continual rule was incompatible with the existence of the prevalent domestic order in Europe in the 18th century. He constantly said that other rulers in Europe could return to their capitals after a less lost battle. Other rulers in Europe could make limited settlements. He who was an upstart, who represented an incompatible political system could stay in power only by being strong enough so he could not be critically threatened. In short, what he was trying to achieve was what I have described in previous lectures absolute security. He could be secure only if everybody else was so insecure that they could no longer a physical thing. Therefore, he had to eliminate any source of independent action within Europe. Finally going as far as attacking Russia,

Now this was the situation that led to almost 20 years of war in Europe, of shifting alliances and at first enormous French victories until Napoleon overreached himself at and attacked Russia. But even after he was defeated in Russia, the

himself as and attacked Russia. But even after he was defeated in Russia, the
shifting alliances and at that everyone French victoried until Napoleon over reached
Now this was the situation that led to almost 20 years of war in Europe of
within Europe. Finally going as far as attacking Russia.

a physical thing. Therefore, he had to eliminate any source of independent action
secure only if everybody else was so insecure that they could no longer
was what I have described in previous lectures absolute security. He could be
so he could not be critically threatened. In short, what he was trying to achieve
incompatible political system could stay in power only by being strong enough
Europe could make limited settlements. He who was an upstart, who represented an
in Europe could return to their capitals after a few lost battles. Other rulers in
domestic order in Europe in the 18th century. He constantly said that other rulers
that his own continual rule was incompatible with the existence of the prevalent
what drove Napoleon onward was not only an appetite for conduct that put his own sense
The vicious circle of this revolutionary conflict is shown by the fact that in part
until Napoleon over reached himself that they would begin to deal with the problems,
could
pegan to organize their resources on something like the French model and of course
foreign policy themselves. It was not until the other great countries of Europe
Even against their will they are often drawn into an essentially revolutionary
dilemma with which any revolutionary foreign policy confronts the other countries.
of Napoleon themselves took a more or less ideological stand and this is the


were not really drawn until the opponents of France and particularly the opponents
were trying to serve different policies based on different objectives. But the issues
advantages Napoleon had was that he represented a single state while all his allies
commander in chief of a coalition his respect for Napoleon declined. One of the
Its properly true Marshall Roch that in World War I that ever since he became
he understood freely what the situation was and he exploited it deliberately,
they thought they were at an enormous disadvantage. Now when Napoleon appeared,

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13

problem was not only how to defeat Napoleon but how to rescue some kind
of order out of the chaos that had come about. The international system
of the 18th century had been smashed, and the problem now was whether it was
even conceivable to create another inter international system which
would have some of the elements of stability which I have described previously.
And there a great deal depends on the different conceptions of the major powers
of what constituted a threat to their security, what positive goals they had
to pursue and how to divest reconcile them. I will talk about these different
conceptions next time.

February-28

Reprint-58

conceptions next time.

to purify and how to purify reconcile them. I will talk about these different
of what constituted a threat to their security, what positive goals they had
And there a great deal depends on the different conceptions of the major powers
would have some of the elements of stability which I have described previously.
even conceivable to create some another same international system which
of the 18th century had been smashed, and the problem now was whether it was
of order out of the chaos that had come about. The international system
problem was not only how to defeat Napoleon but how to rescue some kind

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14

February 28

Last time I began to talk about the problems of diplomacy in the early
19th century, particularly the problems of making peace after a long series of
wars. The reason that the international system had been upset at that time
was through a combination of ideology, and physical expansion. The ideology
of the French Revolution h threatened the domestic stability of every other
continental state at least but new-s not so much Great Britain and combined
with the physical expansion that Napoleon brought about it upset the European
equilibrium. This led to a series, a decade e and a half, of war which
then brought to a focus all the issues that are involved in reconstructing an
international system. Particularly it illustrated the inter-play between the
personalities and the views of the statesmen and the objective conditions
under which they had to operate. This is something I would like to talk about
today.

When Napoleon *threatened* spread French influence over Europe and in fact
defeated all the continental countries until he attacked Russia, the reason
was initially that *wee*- none of them could visualize a policy of unlimited
objectives. After a defeat, coalitions *were* would disintegrate as they always
had in the 18th century. Napoleon could always present every claim as & his last
claim, every *struggle* as h brought about by a specific reason to be
*new* removed by particular aggression. None of the coalitions managed to stay
together, none of the countries at first were willing to fight popular wars
because they believed that the legitimacy of their rulers *w* could not survive
*take*-ta that degree of popular exertion.

Once they did
that everyone was *hhreatened*, the differences
in oh the European countries was determined in *pasty* part by the personalities
of their statesmen, in part by the objectives, the conditions in which they
found themselves. And there one can say perhaps as an example of contrast--

found themselves. And there one can say perhaps as an example of contrat--
of their statements, in part by the objectives, the conditions in which they
in all the European countries was determined in each part by the personalities
that everyone was threatened, the differences

because they believed that the legitimacy of their rulers w could not survive
together, none of the countries at first were willing to fight popular wars
but removed by particular aggression. None of the coalitions managed to stay
claim, every attempt to strangle as w brought about by a specific reason to be
had in the 18th century. Napoleon could always present every claim as & his last
objectives. After a defeat, coalitions were- would disintegrate as they always
was initially that see- none of them could vitiate a policy of unlimited
defeated all the continental countries until he attacked Russia, the reason
when Napoleon assessed spread French influence over Europe and in fact
today.

under which they had to operate. This is something I would like to talk about
personalities and the views of the statesmen and the objective conditions
international system. Particularly it illustrated the inter-play between the
then brought to a focus all the issues that are involved in reconstructing an
equilibrium. This led to a series, a decade e and a half, of war which
with the physical expansion that Napoleon brought about it upset the European
continental state at least but was not so much Great Britain and combined
of the French Revolution w threatened the domestic stability of every other
was through a combination of ideology, and physical expansion. The ideology
wars. The reason that the international system had been upset at that time
19th century, particularly the problems of making peace after a long series of
last time I began to talk about the problems of diplomacy in the early

February 58

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15

the conditions of Great Britain as contrasted with, to, the positions of
say Austria or Prussia, particularly Austria. Great Britain was located then,
as it is today, at the periphery. It could be that its domestic structure
was justified internally as a peculiarly British creation, what happened on the
continent was not of domestic significance to Great Britain. Britain was
threatened only if the continent was organized as a great power
because then the resources of Europe would exceed those of Britain
and eventually it would be possible for the continent to threaten Great Britain.
For Britain, then, the issue was always a problem about the territorial balance
of Europe. And in attempting to achieve a European equilibrium, Britain had
the typical view of insular powers, the one it had had through the centuries,
the one we had had tend to have--that it saw its allies as factors in a security
arrangement rather than an expression of a historical existence. To
Great Britain, the security problem of Europe was simple, if there was danger of
French agression then what had to be done was to organize the European
states into groups large enough to prevent the French from expanding. To the
Europeans, on the other hand, while of course they wanted security, security was
meaningless to them if it denied to them their own particular vision of their
own historical existence. A-S-European. The European were not only interested
in security in the abstract, but in security of the particular political entity
to which their whole historical loyalties attached. In this sense the misunderstandi
which occurred between Britain and the continent were very similar to the
misunderstanding that occur today between us and the Europeans. To us today,
the Europeans in a way are factors in a security arrangement. We talk of NATO
as if everything depended, as if the division of labors were an end in itself.
To the Europeans, the division of labor is useful but their own, the focus of
their traditional loyalties is also important and this is why today we are
having most trouble with the countries that have retained their political
structure more or less in tact like Britain and France, least trouble with the

structure more or less in fact like Britain and France, least trouble with the
having meat trouble with the countries that have retained their political
their traditional loyalties is also important and this is why today we are
To the Europeans, the division of labor is useful but their own, the focus of
as it everything defended, e. g. if the division of labor were an end in itself.
the Europeans in a way are factors in a security arrangement. We talk of NATO
misunderstanding that occur today between us and the Europeans. To us today,
which occurred between Britain and the continent were very similar to the
to which their whole historical loyalties attached. In this sense the misunderstanding
in security in the abstract, but in security of the particular political entity
own historical existence. V-2--Emeesham The Europeans were not only interested
meaningless to them if she it denied to them their own particular vision of their
Europeans, on the other hand, while of course they wanted security, security was
states into Groups large enough to prevent the French from expanding. To the
French agreement then what had to be done was to organize the Emeesham Europeans
Great Britain, the security problem of Europe was simple, if there was danger of
arrangement rather she-- than an expression of a historical existence. To
the one we had--had tend to have--that it saw its allies as factors in a security
the > typical view of inausiliar powers, the one it had had through the centuries,
to-- of Europe. And in attempting to achieve a European equilibrium, Britain had
for Britain, then, the issue was always a problem about the territorial balance
and eventually it would be possible for the continent to threaten Great Britain,
because then the resources of Europe would exceed those of Eastern Britain
 themselves threatened only if the continent was organized as a great power
continent was not of domestic significance to Great Britain. Britain was
was justified internally as a peculiarly British creation, what happened on the
as it is today, at the periphery. It could be that its domestic structure
say Austria or Prussia, particularly Austria. Great Britain was located then,
the conditions of Great Britain as contrasted with, to, the positions of

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16

countries which have always been protected by somebody else and with Germany which was completely smashed in World War II. But the British view in general was how to get the memorandum which was how to get great to contain France. How they were going to get those was of secondary importance to them and the internal European squabble seemed to the British as produced largely by short sightedness, pettiness and lack of understanding of the true issues.

Second problem was one having to do with domestic policy. For Britain there was only one problem, mainly to defeat France. For the Europeans, for the continentals, the problem was not only to defeat France but how France was going to be defeated, in the name of what doctrine and what principles the war was going to be fought. In Europe it was impossible to have a revolution which did not effect every other state. Therefore, domestic upheavals were of enormous concern to other European countries the cultures. In 1820s after the Napoleonic wars, there was a revolution in Naples and the Austrians wanted to move against it. On that occasion, the British Foreign Secretary wrote to the Austrians as follows: "when the territorial balance of Europe is disturbed, Britain can interfere with effect, but she is the last country which can be expected, or venture to commit herself on any question of a theoretical character. We shall be found in our place when an actual danger manages the system of Europe. But this country cannot and will not act upon an abstract principle of precaution. One problem for the Europeans was that to them domestic arrangements in Europe were not abstract principles. Another problem for the Europeans was that precaution was the essence of their international policy. States like Austria or Prussia surrounded on all sides by potentially hostile countries open to invasion was a very tenuous and complicated domestic arrangements could not be made indifferent to the domestic policies of their nations. To them, what seems like an act of precaution to Great Britain, was a question of survival. And therefore, Britain could act cooperatively on the continent in the 19th century only when the threat was really overwhelming and even then its particular

century only when the threat was really overwhelming and even then its particular
And therefore, Britain could act cooperatively on the continent in the 19th
what seems like an act of precaution to Great Britain, was a question of survival.

could not be so indifferent to the domestic policies of their nations. To them,
countries open to invasion was a very tenuous and complicated domestic arrangements
the

States like Austria or Prussia surrounded on all sides by potentially hostile
domestic arrangements in Europe were not abstract principles. Another problem got
apart principle of prevention. One problem for the Europeans was that to them
manages the system of Europe. But this country cannot and will not act upon an
of a theoretical character. We shall be found in our place when an actual danger
event- country which can be expected, or venture to commit herself, on any question
of Europe is disturbed, Britain can interfere with effect, but she is the last
Foreign Secretary wrote to the Austrians as follows: "when the territorial balance
and the Austrians wanted to move against it. On that occasion, the British
enemies". In 1820 after the Napoleonic wars, there was a revolution in Naples
countries the
state. Therefore, domestic upheavals were of enormous concern to other European
in Europe it was impossible to have a revolution which did not affect every other
in the name of what doctrine and what principles the war was going to be fought.
the problem was not only to defeat France but how France was going to be defeated,
was only one problem, mainly to defeat France. For the Europeans, for the continentals,

Second problem was one having to do with domestic policy. For Britain there
sightedness, pertinence and lack of understanding of the true issues.
the internal European adnappe seemed to the British as produced largely by short
France. How they were going to get those was of secondary importance to them and
to get the memorandum which was
how to get great
to contain
was completely smashed in World War II. But the British view in general was how
countries which have always been protected by somebody size and with Germany which

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17

approach was likely to be different than that of the Europeans.

Secondly, the Europeans had, in addition to the domestic problem, the European historical experience had been different from that of Great Britian. That is the European experience, even with the French, had been different. Britain had remained in tact throughout the Napoleonic period, had never been directly exposed to French attack or to domestic upheaval. The policies of the continental countries had been much more tenuous and much more complicated. All of them had been defeated at one stage or another and all of them had to conduct policy which placed an enormous strain on the domestic structure, namely peeling policies of collaboration. A country which is defeated in war has two choices. It can either fight to the death or it can try to adapt itself somehow to the victor. And in adapting itself to the victor, it has to pursue a very fine line. If it collaborates too enthusiastically, it will lose its national substance and will gradually lose its cohesion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the policy depends on what Metternick, who was then Austrian Prime Minister, once called the ability to appear a dupe without being one. If, in 1812, after Napoleonic defeated Russia, the policy had been conducted as it was 1945 after the defeat of Germany, probably every leader of every European country would have been executed for treason or for collaboration. And it wasn't easy to tell at any point whether these foreign ministers were collaborated with the French because they believed in the German French in betraying their country or whether they were collaborating with the German French in order to preserve as much national substance as they could. The policy of collaboration tends to attract, can be carried out only by some of the strongest or some of the weakest people. And their effectiveness depends on not tipping their hand. I think this was the experience of for example Vichy France. Some of the worst people in France collaborated and then a few who wanted to preserve

whereas most people in France collaborated and then a few who wanted to preserve
I think this was the experience of for example Vichy France. Some of the
weakest people. And their effectiveness depends on not tipping their hand.
to attract, can be carried out only by some of the strongest or some of the
as much national substance as they could. The policy of collaboration tends
or whether they were collaborating with the German in order to be preserve
the French because they believed in the German French in betraying their country
to tell at any point whether these foreign ministers were collaborated with
have been executed for treason or for collaboration. And it wasn't easy
the defeat of Germany, properly every leader of every European country would
Napoleonic defeated Russia, the policy had been conducted as it was in 1942 after
called the spilt to appear a dube without being one. It, in 1918, after
policy depends on what Metternich, who was then Austrian Prime Minister, once
gradually loose its cohesion. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the
enthusiastically, it will never lose its national substance and will
to the victor, it has to burake a very fine line. If it collaborates too
or it can try to adapt itself somehow to the victor. And in adapting itself
which is defeated in war has two choices. It can either fight to the death
the domestic structure, namely better policies of collaboration. A country
and all of them had to conduct policy which placed an enormous strain on
more complicated. All of them had been defeated at one stage or another.
The policies of the continental countries had been much more tenuous and much
had never been directly exposed to French attack or to domestic upheaval.
different. Britain had remained in tact throughout the Napoleonic period,
British. That is the European experience, even with the French, had been
the European historical experience had been different from that of Great
Secondly, the Europeans had, in addition to the domestic problem,
approach was likely to be different than that of the Europeans.

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18

a what could be preserved and it wasn't easy to tell who belonged to the
responsible ones and who belonged to the others. At any rate every European
country had gone through this kind of a thing and particularly the Austrians
had gone through this kind of a thing. So the defeat, when Napoleonic was finally
defeated in Russia, all the statesmen of Europe were confronted with the problem
of what to do and here their personalities were of some consequence. The
British Foreign Secretary, Castlereagh, was an icy, aloof, pragmatist. He took
literally the memorandum which I mentioned before which had been prepared by
Pitt early in the wars with France which in effect said that there had to be
great matters to contain France to which there was only one answer and this was
France. The fact that the Napoleonic wars might be succeeded by another threat
was as inconceivable to Castlereagh as it was inconceivable to Roosevelt in 1945
that the defeat of Hitler might lead to a vacuum which would encourage Russian
expansion. And the issue was much the same. Again between Castlereagh and the
continental. The issue for the continentals was not only to defeat Napoleonic
but how to prevent Russia from expanding so far that it would, that a Russian
threat would be substituted for a French threat. The problem for them was also
as they thought, I'm not saying they were right, the problem was not to fight
the war against the French in the name of the same principles as the French had
spread across Europe, for them it was desperately important, if they wanted to
stay on this-kick, not to fight a war of national liberation. The

The Austrian Prime Minister at this time was Metternick who was a man
of the 18th century, a rationalist, a calculator, facile, skillful, great
practitioner of the art of cabinet diplomacy, not a great statesman but a very
great practitioner. And he had the additional problem that he was Foreign
Secretary of a state with an almost impossible domestic structure. Later on in
his life he said once that he had several times governed Europe but never Austria.

The life he said once that he had several times governed Europe but never Austria. Secretly of a state with an almost impossible domestic structure. Later on in Great practitioner. And he had the additional problem that he was foreign practitioner of the art of cabinet diplomacy, not a great statesman but a very of the 18th century, a rationalist, a calculator, a skillful, great

The Austrian Prime Minister at this time was Metternick who was a man away on leave, not to fight a war of national liberation. The popular

abroad across Europe, for them it was deliberately important, if they wanted to the war against the French in the name of the same principles as the French had as they thought, I'm not saying they were right, the problem was not to fight threat would be all but eliminated for a French threat. The problem for them was also put how to prevent Russia from expanding so far that it would, that a Russian continental. The issue for the continentals was not only to defeat Napoleon expansion. And the issue was much the same. Again between Castrileagh and the that the defeat of Hitler might lead to a vacuum which would encourage Russian was as inconceivable to Castrileagh as it was inconceivable to Roosevelt in 1942 France. The fact that the Napoleonic wars might be succeeded by another threat great matters to contain France to which there was only one answer and this was first early in the wars with France which in effect said that there had to be literally the memorandum which I mentioned before which had been prepared by British Foreign Secretary, Castrileagh, was an icy, aloof, pragmatist. He took of what to do and here their personalities were of some consequence. The defeated in Russia, all the statements of Europe were confronted with the problem had gone through this kind of a thing. So the defeat, when Napoleon was finally country had gone through this kind of a thing and particularly the Austrians reasonable ones and who belonged to the others. At any rate every European

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The problem was that the Austrian Empire was composed of a variety of nationalist nationalities, held together by the personality of the King and that it suddenly found itself in a world in which what had been very modern 20 years previously was becoming anachronistic. Around 1790 a German nationalist, or who later became an advocate of German national unity, wrote a phamphlet about Austria in which Austria was described as the most modern state in Europe and in many ways it was very modern, it had solved the problem of feudalism by relating various feudal units together into a larger entity. In 1790, it would have occurred to no one in Europe that the Austrian Empire was ruled by a foreigner because their Emperor spoke German. Twenty years later the notion that people of the same same cultural background, or that people speak the same language should be grouped in the same political unit was the most modern expression of policy. The result was that for the Austrians to win a war that was fought in the name of national and particularly linguistic unity was to destroy themselves. For the Austrians, or the Prussians or for any of the smaller European states, to fight a war which opened the door of Europe to Russia was to substitute one menace for another menace. The attitude of the British and of Castlereagh was very similar to the attitude of the United States in World War I. That is, they constantly, if you read their dispatches, they were constantly spurring us on to defeat the French, everything else could be settled everything else but the one thing about which they were obsessed which happened to be who controlled the mouth of the

but every other issue
which a country believes its own

and this again proves that on the issues

which a country believes its own
put every other issue

to be who controlled the Month of the
everything else put the one thing about which they were operational which happened
as far as the European Union to defeat the French, everything else could be settled
abating
that is, they constantly, if you read their diaries, they were constantly
was very similar to the attitude of the United States in World War II.
was very much the same as Castlereagh
to fight a war which opened the door of Europe to Russia was to appoint one
for the Ukrainians, or the Ukrainians or for any of the smaller European states,
in the name of national and particularly linguistic unity was to destroy themselves.
The new result was that for the Ukrainians to win a war that was fought
should be grouped in the same political unit was the most modern expression of
the same same cultural background, or that people knew speaking the same language
Emperor spoke German. Twenty years later the notion that people of the same
in Europe that the Austrian Empire was ruled by a foreigner because their
units together into a larger entity. In 1790, it would have occurred to no one
very modern, it had solved the problem of fending off various fiscal
Ukraine was described as the most modern state in Europe and in many ways it was
an advocate of German national unity, wrote a pamphlet about Ukraine in which
was becoming anachronistic. Around 1790 a German nationalistic, or who later became
found itself in a world in which what had been very modern 50 years previously
nationalities, held together by the personality of the King and that it suddenly
The problem was that the Austrian Empire was composed of a variety of separate units

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20

survival is immediately threatened it will make meet immediate conditions. On
any other issue they felt that they could wait until the war was over. For the
Europeans the problem was how they could prevent both dangers. The danger of
France and the danger of Russia, and the problem was all the more difficult because
they couldn't be not admit that there was a danger from Russia since they
needed Russia's assistance to defeat France. In other words it was almost the
same problem as the problem of World War II with one important
difference. In World War II the United States, because of the collapse of
the European countries had become the dominant power and it could therefore
impose its vision, or its notion, of how the war should be fought and how the
peace should be made on its allies. You read the memoiries of American
generals during World War II you will see that they pride themselves on the
fact constantly on having kept the British out of the Balkans. These short
sighted British- British who wanted to fight a war for political objectives had
to be thwarted so that a war could be fought for purely military objectives.
In the Napoleonic wars this could not happen because while the British were
strong they were not so powerful as to impose their own mode of conducting the
war and above all they couldn't do it because the Austrians under Metternich
were not prepared to go along with it. And there started a process which
illustrates one of the real issues of policy making to which there was no issue
at the time because policy was not made democratically. It is an issue today
of how you can conduct foreign policy when everything depends on your
not revealing your objective, how you can justify foreign policy in a situation
in which you have to move extremely cautiously and with deliberate ambiguity
where the skill of your move and the dexterity of your policy depends to a
considerable extent on your own knowledge of where you are going but it is
very difficult to justify this publicly. If the Austrians had announced on the
day that Napoleon was defeated in Russia or when it became apparent that he was

day that Napoleon was defeated in Russia on when it became apparent that he was
very difficult to justify this publicly. If the Austrians had announced on the
considerable extent on your own knowledge of where you are going put it is
where the skill of your move and the dexterity of your policy depends to a
in which you have to move extremely cautiously and with deliberate ambiguity
not revealing your objective. How you can justify foreign policy in a situation
of how you can conduct foreign policy when everything seems to depend on your
at the time because policy was not made democratically. It is an issue today
illustrates one of the real issues of policy making to which there was no issue
were not prepared to go along with it. And there started a process which
war and spoke all they couldn't do it because the Austrians under Metternich
strongly they were not so powerful as to impose their own mode of conducting the
in the Napoleonic war this could not happen because while the British were
to be thwarted so that a war could be fought for purely military objectives.
sightedbreak- British who wanted to fight a war for political objectives had
fact constantly on having kept the British out of the Balkans. These short
generals during World War II you will see that they pride themselves on the
peace should be made on its sides. You read the memories of American
impose its vision, or its notion, of how the war should be fought and how the
the European countries had become the dominant power and it could therefore
difference. In World War II the United States, because of the collapse of
same problem as the problem of World War II with one exception- important
needed Russia's assistance to defeat France. In other words it was almost the
they couldn't - not admit that there was a danger from Russia since they
France and the danger of Russia, and the problem was all the more difficult because
Europeans the problem was how they could prevent both dangers. The danger of
any other sane they felt that they could wait until the war was over. For the
survival is immediately threatened it will make meet immediate conditions. On

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21

defeated in Russia, of what they were up to they would have been smashed.
If they had told their later allies how they were maneuvering they would
have lost their bargaining position. On the other hand it is obviously
highly undemocratic to conduct foreign policy on this basis. I am not saying
that foreign policy ought to be conducted with the deviousness with which
the Austrians conducted their foreign policy in 1812 and 1815, all I am
saying is that if you cannot conduct foreign policy this way there are
many options you loose, there may be some advantages you gain in greater
popular standing but this is an imperceptible important difference between the
way foreign policy was conducted then and the way foreign policy is conducted
now and therefore it isn't clear what that one can draw absolute conclusions
from what had happened.

The problem the Austrians faced was three fold. They were afraid
of nationalists. That is they were afraid if France collapsed that would
lead to a national revolution. They were afraid of Russian inconstancy. For
a decade before Russia had committed herself to ally in two wars and had quit
as soon as the allies were defeated so Austria was afraid of two contradicting
things of alliances today. She was always afraid of that they would
be jeopardized by their allies bellicosity or either they would be jeopardized
by their allies lack of bellicosity. In this case they were worried both by
the Russians stopping at the Russian border, stopping their pursuit at the
Russian border, they were even afraid of Russia pouring e into Europe in such
a way as dominating all of Europe which later happened in 1945. Certainly they
were afraid of becoming the focal point of the war, of becoming the theater of
operations. For them the issue of the war was extremely esاسي crucial and the
question of legitimacy was . They therefore did a number of things
to set the stage for later intervention. One complicating feature was that
when France invaded Russia, the Austrians were still allies of the French were

when France invaded Russia, the Austrians were still allies of the French, were to set the stage for later intervention. One complicating feature was that question of legitimacy was. They therefore did a number of things operations. For them the frame of the war was extremely amenable and the were afraid of becoming the focal point of the war, of becoming the theater of a way as dominating all of Europe which later happened in 1942. Certainly they Russian border, they were even afraid of Russia pouring in into Europe in such the Russians stopping at the Russian border, stopping their pursuit at the by their allies lack of pellicosity. In this case they were worried both by be jeopardized by their allies pellicosity or either they would be jeopardized of alliances today. She was always afraid at that they would as soon as the allies were defeated so Austria was afraid of two contradictive a decade before Russia had committed herself to ally in two ways and had quit lead to a national revolution. They were afraid of Russian inconsistency. For of nationsliams. That is they were afraid if France collaborated that would

from what had happened.

now and therefore it isn't clear what one can draw absolute conclusions

popular standing but this is an em弊em important difference between the

the Austrians conducted their foreign policy in 1812 and 1812, all I am

defeated in Russia, of what they were up to they would have been ashamed.

31

22.

still technically allies of the French and they even sent a corps to invaded Russia together with the Russian French. They mitigated the effect of this somewhat by always notifying the Russians ahead of time of what movements their corps was making and advising them to move out of the way or telling them which way they were going to move out of the way so there weren't any battles between the Austrians and the Russians. It wasn't a very heroic policy, they ended the war, if Napoleon had won would have had some sort of claim to participate in the peace settlement but by keeping the Russians informed of their movements they protected themselves in case should Napoleon would loose. The first problem was how to be relieved from the French alliance. This they did by announcing that they wanted to make themselves mediators, that they would were going to offer the conditions of a general European settlement. Now this was terribly important to them. Throughout, at least Metternick's tenure as foreign secretary which lasted about 40 years, they always strove to define, for Austria to be the country, to define the issues of any alliance in which they participated. For the Austrians legitimacy was as important as power. Once they were accepted by both France and France's enemies as leading, they were the ones that could define the conditions of the settlement and they were therefore insufficient to make sure that it would not turn into a war of national liberation. Secondly, they were getting a position from which they could later on turn against France, because if France rejected the conditions they would propose they would then be fighting in the name of a European settlement and they would not have overturned an alliance simply on the basis of expediency. As soon as Napoleon had accepted them as mediators, he had really, in a way, moved into a trap from which it was very difficult to escape because by the very terms of the reference rejecting the ultimate Austrian offer meant he was rejecting their notion of what would achieve peace. Second attempt they made was to

their notion of what would achieve peace. Second, attempt they made was to
of the reference rejecting the ultimate Austrian offer meant he was rejecting
from which it was very difficult to see how else because by the very terms
had accepted them as mediators, he had really, in a way, moved into a trap
overturned an alliance simply on the basis of expropriation. As soon as Napoleon
be fighting in the name of a European settlement and they would not have
because it France rejected the conditions they would propose they would then
were getting a position from which they could later on turn against France,
that it would not turn into a war of national liberation. Secondly, they
conditions of the settlement and they were therefore insufficient to make sure
and France's empires leading, they were the ones that could define the
legitimacy was as important as power. Once they were accepted by both France
to define the issue of any alliance in which they participated. For the Austrians
about 40 years, they always strove to define, for Austria to be the country,
Throughout, at least Metternich's tenure as foreign secretary which lasted
of a General European settlement. Now this was terribly important to them.
the Austrians meditated, that they went 44 were going to offer the conditions
French alliance. This they did by announcing that they wanted to make
Napoleon went 44 loose. The first problem was how to be relieved from the
should
the Austrians informed of their movements they protected themselves in case
had some sort of claim to participate in the peace settlement but by keeping
a very heroic policy, they ended the war, if Napoleon had won would have
weren't any battles between the Austrians and the Russians. It wasn't
or telling them which way they were going to move out of the way so there
movements their corps was making and advising them to move out of the way
of this somewhat by always notifying the Russians ahead of time of what
to invaded Russia together with the Russian. They mitigated the effect
still technically allies of the French and they even sent a
corps

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23

make it sure the Russians were really going into Europe and not stopping at accomplished or at least thought they could test the frontier. This they did by arranging with the Russians a number of number of theoretical battles with their amputai auxiliary corps telling the Russians that they should move their Army in such a way that their auxiliary eep corps would be cut off unless it withdrew into Austria and when the Russians were a little hesitant about moving they sent an outraged note saying where is this Russian attack which would enable us to get out our troops back into Austria. At any rate the Russians did move in that way which meant that they had to move into Europe, into Prussia. The Austrians withdrew into Austria and when they then sat on the flank of the Russian army and then on the flank of the French army and gradually moved their armies west so they sat on the flank of the French army. The major point was what the Austrians were trying to do was to get everybody else committed first so that they could carry their participation for the objectives which interested them most which were a territorial balance in Europe which would prevent eventual domination from both East and West. It isn't fruitful to go through all the maneuvers which were all extremely complicated by which this was achieved and throughout this period if you read the dispatches that the British sent to the Austrians, they dealt with the Austrians as if they were cowards, weaklings, didn't understand what the issue was, constantly told the Austrians that it was senseless to let Napoleon get away again that no settlement was possible with Napoleon, offering them economic assistance, none of which was relevant. And in fact, Austria did not enter the war until it had been guaranteed by Russia that the two central powers, that is Prussia and Austria would be strong enough to provide a barrier between East and West. And even after they entered the war. When they entered the war they had been guaranteed that first of all it would be a war of states and not of nations. Secondly the commander in chief of the allies was an Austrian field marshall.

Secondly, the commander in chief of the allies was an Austrian field marshall. Guaranteed that first of all it would be a war of states and not of nations. And even after they entered the war, when they entered the war they had been and Austria would be strong enough to provide a barrier between East and West. It had been guaranteed by Russia that the two central powers, that is, Prussia none of which was relevant. And in fact, Austria did not enter the war until that no settlement was possible with Napoleon, offering them economic assistance, told the Austrians that it was senseless to let Mademette Napoleon get away again were coasia, weaklinga, didn't understand what the issue was, constantly the British sent so the Austrians, they dealt with the Austrians as if they this was achieved and throughout this period it you read the dispatches that to go through all the maneuvers which were all extremely complicated by which would prevent eventual domination from both East and West. It isn't fruitful which interested them most which were a territorial balance in Europe which first so that they could their participation for the objectives the A-Ae-Ae Austrians were trying to do was to get everybody else committed weat so they sat on the flank of the French army. The major point was what flank of the French army and whatflank gradually they moved their armies and when-they then they sat on the flank of the Russian army and then on the had to move into Europe, into Prussia. The Austrians withdrew into Austria. Austria. At any rate the Russians did move in that way which meant that they is this Russian attack which would enable us to get us our troops back into were a little hesitant about moving they sent an outraged note saying where seb corps would be cut off unless it withdrew into Austria and when the Russians Russians that they should move their Army in such a way that their auxiliary number of theoretical battles with their smallest auxiliary corps telling the the frontier. This they did by arranging with the Russians a number of accomplished or at least thought they could best make a sure the Russians were really going into Europe and not stalling at

32

24.

The result was that throughout the subsequent war with the French after every victorious battle the army stopped. The Austrians would not advance after any victorious battle without having offered these terms to the French, on the theory that it was not in Europe's interest to smash the French completely. The assumptions of the Austrians was, of Metternick was, that there are some realities that are greater than the wishes of independent statesmen. The assumption of the British was that anything can be settled by the will of the political leaders that are involved. The British view waslets smash the French first and worry about a settlement afterward. We must show confidence in the Russians and on that basis we can then build an international

The notion of the Austrians and to a lesser extent the Prussians who were really on most of these issues following the Austrian lead, such of the Austrians was that there are certain realities which have nothing to do with the wishes of statesmen. That if France was smashed, one of the major elements in the security of Europe was eliminated. Henceforth some of the factors that had balanced off Russia previously would be eliminated and could be substituted only by the central powers, where is meant the Germany countries, or by them in conjunction with the-British- Britain. Now Britain's record was absolutely clear. Britain would not engage itself until the balance of Europe was already on the verge of being overturned. Britain would not commit itself to the defense of Europe on a theoretical basis. Therefore, politically France was eliminated, above all Austria and Prussia would either have to gain in strength or would be forced into a kind of policy that might be. Therefore, throughout the war with Napoleonic the Austrians always stopped after a battle in order to bring the French back into the community of neighbors. It didn't succeed because Napoleon did not believe that he could survive a defeat. There were various offers that the Austrians made to him or that the allies made to him under Austrian pressure every one of which lent France more territory than it finally

Austrian pressure every one of which lent France more territory than it finally
offers that the Austrians made to him or that the allies made to him under
Napoleon did not believe that he could survive a defeat. There were various
the French pack into the community of neighbors. It didn't succeed because
war with Napoleon the Austrians always stopped after a battle in order to bring
into a kind of policy that might be
therefore, throughout the

Austries and Prussias would either have to gain in strength or would be forced
above all
Europe on a theoretical basis. Therefore, politically France was eliminated,
urge of being overturned. Britain would not commit itself to the defense of
Britain would not engage itself until the balance of Europe was already on the
conjunction with the Russian-Prussian- Britain. Now Britain's record was absolutely clear.
by the central powers, where it meant the Germany countries, or by them in
balanced off Prussia previously would be eliminated and could be subordinated only
in the security of Europe was eliminated. Henceforth some of the factors that had
the wishes of statesmen. That if France was annexed, one of the major elements
Austrians was that there are certain realities which have nothing to do with
who were really on most of these issues following the Austrian lead, and of the

The notion of the Austrians and to a lesser extent the Prussians
show confidence in the Russians and on that basis we can then build an international
lets assimil the French first and worry about a settlement afterward. We must
by the will of the political leaders that are involved. The British view was
assumption of the British was
that anything can be settled

realities that are greater than the wishes of little individual statesmen. The
The assumptions of the Austrians was, of Metternick was, that there are some
theory that it was not in Europe's interest to assimil the French completely.
any victorious battle without having offered these terms to the French, on the
victorious battle the army stopped. The Austrians would not advance after
The result was that throughout the subsequent war with the French after every

34.

25.

completely
had after it was defeated, but he was of the view that it was easier for him
that he could not make a peace until he had scored a victory. In other words
as he
that he was not secure as long as one was strong enough to resist him and continued
for
the war. It turned out that it would be easier to accept him to accept total
defeat than a negotiated settlement. But he rejected conditions not because they
were particularly ungenerous conditions but because they were a limitation of his
strength. But the Austrians did achieve, due to the constant peace offers, every
peace
feasible offer reflected some kind of commitment to a European equilibrium and
even though eventually Russian, too, together with Austrian and Prussian armies,
took Paris there wasn't a crucial difference between the situation in 1814 and
the situation in 1945. In 1945 all the factors, not all but some of the key
factors, that had provided for a world balance of power were completely smashed.
In World War II created a vacuum both in Europe and in Asia which had to be built
by somebody and it wasn't only Soviet ill will that built it, it was the
necessity of the situation that provided an opportunity to ask a country not
to take advantage of an opportunity which may come along unsympathetically its
really to place a certain amount of self restraint for which history offers very
few examples, in fact, I can think of no example. In 1814 such a vacuum was
avoided. Austria and Prussia were still relatively strong, and were growing
stronger as the war continued. France, while it was completely defeated, was
defeated in a way which enabled it to participate in the peace settlement
which was drawn up right after the afterwards and when it wasn't possible
to save Napoleon which had been the first choice of the Austrians they were very
active in bringing back the traditional kings of France. Then in World War II
one of the themes that runs through World War II, through the diplomacy of
World War II is the American conviction that peace should be made after the enemy
was defeated. The only threat to peace was the agressor and the elimination of the
agressor would automatically restore the essential harmony which is typical of
international relations. Every international conference which took place during

international relations. Every international conference which took place during
agressor would automatically reacquire the essential harmony which is typical of
was defeated. The only threat to peace was the aggressor and the elimination of the
World War II is the American conviction that peace should be made steel the enemy
one of its the themes that runs through World War II, through the diplomacy of
active in bringing back the traditional kings of France. Then in World War II
to save Napoleon which had been the first choice of the Austrians they were very
which was drawn up right at the same time afterwards and when it was meant to be possible
defeated in a way which enabled it to participate in the peace settlement
stronger as the war continued. France, while it was completely defeated, was
avoided. Austries and Prussia were still relatively strong, and were growing
few examples, in fact, I can think of no example. In 1814 such a vacuum was
realistic to place a certain amount of self restraint for which history offers very
to take advantage of an opportunity which may come along unaptly. It is not
necessity of the situation that provided an opportunity to ask a country not
by somebody and it wasn't only Soviet ill will that built it, it was the
in World War II created a vacuum both in Europe and in Asia which had to be built
factors, that had provided for a world balance of power were completely amenable
to the situation in 1942. In 1942 all the factors, not all put some of the key
took Paris there wasn't a crucial difference between the situation in 1814 and
even though eventually Russian, e.g., together with Austrian and Prussian allies,
desirable offer reflected some kind of commitment to a European equilibrium and
peace
strongly. But the Austrians did achieve, due to the constant peace offers, every
were particularly ungenerous conditions but because they were a limitation of his
defeat than a negotiated settlement. But he rejected conditions not because they
the war. It turned out that it would be easier for him to accept total
for
that he was not secure as long as one was strong enough to resist him and continued
as he
that he could not make a peace until he had scored a victory. In other words
had after it was defeated, but he was of the view that it was easier for him
completely

32.

26.

the war the American instructions were to defer the particular issues which then arose until after Germany was defeated. There was the fear that any attempt to settle the outstanding issues would be divisive and would undermine the war effort. I have never understood why if it was divisive when the Germans were still in the field, no one asked the question why it wouldn't be even more divisive if there was no longer a common enemy. But at any rate, World War II was characterized by an absolute avoidance of political settlements and again if you read any of the memoirs of the time you will find that we took popular pride in the fact that of not permitting the short-sighted British who again were worried about the balance of power to impose their considerations on us. In 1814 And again I think it is always true, at least I don't know when it hasn't been true, that the time for the status quo countries to make their peace terms is during a war because during a war they can add, in effect, the pressure of the enemy to their own concerns as a bargaining weapon. After the war, when the enemy has disappeared, nothing restrains, or one of the key restraints of the aggressor big country is removed. What brings an alliance together is an overwhelming threat.

To the degree that a threat diminishes its coherence diminish too. And if harmony is going to be the mode of course of international relations, one should look into the question as to what produced the harmony in the first place.

Now during World War II it was perfectly plain that as the German threat diminished the Soviet incentive to make any political settlement diminished too. In 1814 the status quo countries which were essentially Britain, Austria and Prussia had achieved their special requirement, certainly Britain and Austria had, Prussia was in a special position, but the two big ones, Austria and Britain had achieved their special settlement requirements while the war was still going on. Britain had guaranteed for itself

that the mouth of the River would be held by a small country and it had gotten a settlement on maritime rights. Austria had been guaranteed its territorial

Gotten a settlement on maritime rights. Austria had been guaranteed its territorial
that the mouth of the
river would be held by a small country and it had

settlement
safeguarded while the war was still going on. Britain had guaranteed for itself
the Soviet incentive to make any political settlement diminished too.

In 1814 the
Now during World War II it was perfectly plain that as the German threat diminished
look into the question as to what produced the harmony in the first place.
harmony is going to be the message of the international peace relations, one should

motive force
To the degree that a threat diminishes
cohesion diminish too. And it

country is removed. What brings an alliance together is an overwhelming threat. A pig has disassembled, nothing restrains, or one of the key restraints of the aggressor enemy to their own concerns as a bargaining weapon. After the war, when the enemy during a war because during a war they can add, in effect, the pressure of the
And again I think it is always true, at least I don't know when it hasnt been
worried about the balance of power to impose their considerations on us. In 1814
pride in the fact absence of not permitting the short-awarded British who again were
you read any of the memoirs of the same times you will find that we took popular
was characterized by an absolute avoidance of political settlements and again it
divative if there was no longer a common enemy. But at any rate, World War II
were still in the field, so one saked the question why it wouldn't be even more
the war effort. I have never understood why it was divative when the Germans
attempt to settle the outstanding issue would
and would undermine
be divative
then arose until as after Germany was defeated. There was the fear that any
the war the American instructions were to defer the particular issues which

26.

27.

extent of 181 1805 which meant that it would be strong enough to be some
important area to the Russians and it had a Russian commitment that Prussia
would get something that would restore its territorial extent although the
Russians there were not because the Prussian diplomacy was not as skillful
And finally, & in 1814 contrary to 1905, it was not permitted that a vacuum
arise. There was a moderate peace treaty that was made with France, real
relatively quickly and this made France again available as a factor in the
international arrangements. And this accounted for the fact that when the
general European equilibrium was reconstructed it lead to a settlement
which in its main argument lasted for about 100 years. I'll go into that
next time.

next time.

General European equilibrium was reconstructed it lead to a settlement
international arrangements. And this accounted for the fact that when the
relatively quickly and this made France again available as a factor in the
arise. There was a moderate peace treaty that was made with France, best
And finally, 4 in 1814 contrary to 1902, it was not permitted that a vacuum
Russia there were not

because the Russian diplomacy was not as skillful

would get something that would restore its territorial extent although the
important area to the Russians and it had a Russian commitment that Russia
extent of 1871-1802 which meant that it would be strong enough to be some

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20

survival is immediately threatened it will make meet immediate conditions. On
any other issue they felt that they could wait until the war was over. For the
Europeans the problem was how they could prevent both dangers. The danger of
France and the danger of Russia, and the problem was all the more difficult because
they couldn't be not admit that there was a danger from Russia since they
needed Russia's assistance to defeat France. In other words it was almost the
same problem as the problem of World War II with one important
difference. In World War II the United States, because of the collapse of
the European countries had become the dominant power and it could therefore
impose its vision, or its notion, of how the war should be fought and how the
peace should be made on its allies. You read the memoiries of American
generals during World War II you will see that they pride themselves on the
fact constantly on having kept the British out of the Balkans. These short
sighted British who wanted to fight a war for political objectives had
to be thwarted so that a war could be fought for purely military objectives.
In the Napoleonic wars this could not happen because while the British were
strong they were not so powerful as to impose their own mode of conducting the
war and above all they couldn't do it because the Austrians under Metternich
were not prepared to go along with it. And there started a process which
illustrates one of the real issues of policy making to which there was no issue
at the time because policy was not made democratically. It is an issue today
of how you can conduct foreign policy when everything depends on your
not revealing your objective, how you can justify foreign policy in a situation
in which you have to move extremely cautiously and with deliberate ambiguity
where the skill of your move and the dexterity of your policy depends to a
considerable extent on your own knowledge of where you are going but it is
very difficult to justify this publicly. If the Austrians had announced on the
day that Napoleon was defeated in Russia or when it became apparent that he was

day that Napoleon was defeated in Russia or when it became apparent that he was
very difficult to justify this policy. If the Russians had announced on the
considerable extent on your own knowledge of where you are going but it is
where the skill of your move and the dexterity of your policy depends to a
in which you have to move extremely cautiously and with deliberate subtlety
not revealing your objective, how you can justify foreign policy in a situation
of how you can conduct foreign policy when everything seems depends on your
at the time because policy was not made democratically. It is an issue today
illustrates one of the real issues of policy making to which there was no issue
were not prepared to go along with it. And there started a process which
war and above all they couldn't do it because the Russians under Metternich
strongly they were not so powerful as to impose their own mode of conducting the
in the Napoleonic wars this could not happen because while the British were
to be thwarted so that a war could be fought for purely military objectives,
sighted Austro- British who wanted to fight a war for political objectives had
fought constantly on having kept the British out of the Balkans. These short
generals during World War II you will see that they pride themselves on the
peace should be made on its side. You read the memoirs of American
impose its vision, or its notion, of how the war should be fought and how the
the European countries had become the dominant power and it could therefore
difference. In World War II the United States, because of the collapse of
same problem as the problem of World War II with one hegemony - important
needed Russia's assistance to defeat France. In other words it was almost the
they couldn't - not admit that there was a danger from Russia since they
France and the danger of Russia, and the problem was all the more difficult because
Europeans the problem was how they could prevent both dangers. The danger of
any other sane they felt that they could wait until the war was over. For the
survival is immediately threatened it will make most immediate conditions. On

30

21

The problem the Austrians faced was three fold. They were afraid
of nationalists. That is they were afraid if France collapsed that would
lead to a national revolution. They were afraid of Russian inconstancy. For
a decade before Russia had committed herself to ally in two wars and had quit
as soon as the allies were defeated so Austria was afraid of two contradicting
things of alliances today. She was always afraid of that they would
be jeopardized by their allies bellicosity or either they would be jeopardized
by their allies lack of bellicosity. In this case they were worried both by
the Russians stopping at the Russian border, stopping their pursuit at the
Russian border, they were even afraid of Russia pouring e into Europe in such
a way as dominating all of Europe which later happened in 1945. Certainly they
were afraid of becoming the focal point of the war, of becoming the theater of
operations. For them the issue of the war was extremely crucial and the
question of legitimacy was . They therefore did a number of things
to set the stage for later intervention. One complicating feature was that
when France invaded Russia, the Austrians were still allies of the French were

as soon as the allies were defeated so Austries was afraid of two conducticcting

lead to a national revolution. They were afraid of Russian inconsistency. For

of nationalisms. That is they were afraid it France collapsed that would

from what had happened.

bohemar standing but this is an amusemen important difference between the

that foreign policy ought to be a conducted with the devianances with which

defeated in Russia, of what they were up to they would have been amazed.

31

22.

their action of what would achieve peace. Second attempt they made was to
of the reference rejecting the ultimate Austrian offer meant he was rejecting
from which it was very difficult to assure escape because by the very terms
had accepted them as mediators, he had really, in a way, moved into a trap
overturned an alliance simply on the basis of expediency. As soon as Napoleon
be fighting in the name of a European settlement and they would not have
because it France rejected the conditions they would propose they would then
were getting a position from which they could later on turn against France,
that it would not turn into a war of national liberation. Secondly, they
conditions of the settlement and they were therefore insufficient to make sure
and France's enemies leading, they were the ones that could define the
legitimacy was as important as power. Once they were accepted by both France
to define the issues of any alliance in which they participated. For the Austrians
apout 40 years, they always strove to define, for Austria to be the country.
Throughout, at least Metternick's tenure as foreign secretary which lasted
of a general European settlement. Now this was terribly important to them.
themselves mediators, that they went4 were going to offer the conditions
French alliance. This they did by announcing that they wanted to make
Napoleon went4 loose. The first problem was how to be relieved from the
should
the Russians informed of their movements they protected themselves in case
had some sort of claim to participate in the peace settlement but by keeping
a very heroic policy, they ended the war, if Napoleon had won would have
weren't any battles between the Austrians and the Russians. It wasn't
or telling them which way they were going to move out of the way so there
movements their corps was making and advising them to move out of the way
of this somewhat by always notifying the Russians ahead of time of what
to invaded Russia together with the Russian. They mitigated the effect
still technically allies of the French and they even sent a
corps

33.

23

make it sure the Russians were really going into Europe and not stopping at accomplished or at least thought they could test the frontier. This they did by arranging with the Russians a number of number of theoretical battles with their auxiliary corps telling the Russians that they should move their Army in such a way that their auxiliary corps would be cut off unless it withdrew into Austria and when the Russians were a little hesitant about moving they sent an outraged note saying where is this Russian attack which would enable us to get out our troops back into Austria. At any rate the Russians did move in that way which meant that they had to move into Europe, into Prussia. The Austrians withdrew into Austria and when they then sat on the flank of the Russian army and gradually gradually they moved their armies west so they sat on the flank of the French army. The major point was what the Austrians were trying to do was to get everybody else committed first so that they could their participation for the objectives which interested them most which were a territorial balance in Europe which would prevent eventual domination from both East and West. It isn't fruitful to go through all the maneuvers which were all extremely complicated by which this was achieved and throughout this period if you read the dispatches that the British sent to the Austrians, they dealt with the Austrians as if they were cowards, weaklings, didn't understand what the issue was, constantly told the Austrians that it was senseless to let Napoleon Napoleon get away again that no settlement was possible with Napoleon, offering them economic assistance, none of which was relevant. And in fact, Austria did not enter the war until it had been guaranteed by Russia that the two central powers, that is Prussia and Austria would be strong enough to provide a barrier between East and West. And even after they entered the war. When they entered the war they had been guaranteed that first of all it would be a war of states and not of nations. Secondly the commander in chief of the allies was an Austrian field Marshall.

Secondly, the commander in chief of the armies was an Austrian field general.

And even after they entered the war. When they entered the war they had been
and Austria would be strong enough to provide a barrier between East and West.

It had been guaranteed by Russia that the two central powers, that is Prussia
none of which was relevant. And in fact, Austria did not enter the war until
that no settlement was possible with Napoleon, offering them economic assistance,
told the Austrians that it was senseless to let Napoleon get away again
were cowards, weaklings, didn't understand what the issue was, constantly
the British sent to the Austrians, they dealt with the Austrians as if they
this was achieved and throughout this period it you read the diaries that
to go through all the maneuvers which were all extremely complicated by which
would prevent eventual domination from both East and West. It isn't fruitful
which interested them most which were a territorial balance in Europe which
first so that they could
their participation got the objectives
the Aust Austrians were trying to do was to get everybody else committed
weat so they sat on the flank of the French army. The major point was what
flank of the French army and what strategy gradually they moved their armies
and when they then they sat on the flank of the Russian army and then on the
had to move into Europe, into Prussia. The Austrians withdrew into Austria
Austria. At any rate the Russians did move in that way which meant that they
is this Russian attack which would enable us to get rid our troops back into
were a little hesitant about moving they sent an outraged note saying where
eep corps would be cut off unless it withdrew into Austria and when the Russians
Russians that they should move their army in such a way that their auxiliary
number of theoretical battles with their assets, auxiliary corps telling the
the frontier. This they did by arranging with the Russians a number of
accomplished or at least thought they could test
make a sure the Russians were really going into Europe and not stopping at

53

(a)

24.

The result was that throughout the subsequent war with the French after every victorious battle the army stopped. The Austrians would not advance after any victorious battle without having offered these terms to the French, on the theory that it was not in Europe's interest to smash the French completely. The assumptions of the Austrians was, of Metternick was, that there are some realities that are greater than the wishes of individual statesmen. The assumption of the British was that anything can be settled by the will of the political leaders that are involved. The British view waslets smash the French first and worry about a settlement afterward. We must show confidence in the Russians and on that basis we can then build an international

The notion of the Austrians and to a lesser extent the Prussians who were really on most of these issues following the Austrian lead, such of the Austrians was that there are certain realities which have nothing to do with the wishes of statesmen. That if France was smashed, one of the major elements in the security of Europe was eliminated. Henceforth some of the factors that had balanced off Russia previously would be eliminated and could be substituted only by the central powers, where is meant the Germany countries, or by them in conjunction with the British- Britain. Now Britain's record was absolutely clear. Britain would not engage itself until the balance of Europe was already on the verge of being overturned. Britain would not commit itself to the defense of Europe on a theoretical basis. Therefore, politically France was eliminated, above all Austria and Prussia would either have to gain in strength or would be forced into a kind of policy that might be. Therefore, throughout the war with Napoleonic the Austrians always stopped after a battle in order to bring the French back into the community of neighbors. It didn't succeed because Napoleon did not believe that he could survive a defeat. There were various offers that the Austrians made to him or that the allies made to him under Austrian pressure every one of which lent France more territory than it finally

Austrian pressure every one of which lent France more territory than it finally
offers that the Austrians made to him or that the allies made to him under
Napoleonic did not believe that he could survive a defeat. There were various
the French pack into the community of neighbors. It didn't succeed because
war with Napoleon the Austrians always stopped after a battle in order to bring
into a kind of policy that might be
. Therefore, throughout the
Austrian and Prussian would either have to gain in strength or would be forced
above all
Europe on a theoretical basis. Therefore, politically France was eliminated,

verse of being overturned. Britain would not commit itself to the defense of
Britain would not engage itself until the balance of Europe was already on the
conjunction with especially Britain. Now Britain's record was absolutely clear,
by the central powers, where it meant the Germany countries, or by them in
balanced off Russia previously would be eliminated and could be appeased only
in the security of Europe was eliminated. Henceforth some of the factors that had
the wishes of statesmen. That if France was annexed, one of the major elements
Austrians was that there are certain realities which have nothing to do with
who were really on most of these issues following the Austrian lead, such as the
. The notion of the Austrians and to a lesser extent the Prussians
show confidence in the Russians and on that basis we can then build an international
let us amend the French first and worry about a settlement afterward. We must
by the will of the political leaders that are involved. The British view was
assumption of the British was
that anything can be settled
realities that are greater than the wishes of simple individual statesmen. The
The assumptions of the Austrians was, of Metternick was, that there are some
theory that it was not in Europe's interest to amend the French completely.
any victories battle without having offered these terms to the French, on the
victories battle the army stopped. The Austrians would not advance after
The result was that throughout theinent war with the French after every

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25.

completely had after it was defeated, but he was of the view that it was easier for him that he could not make a peace until he had scored a victory. In other words as he that he was not secure as long as one was strong enough to resist him and continued for the war. It turned out that it would be easier to accept him to accept total defeat than a negotiated settlement. But he rejected conditions not because they were particularly ungenerous conditions but because they were a limitation of his strength. But the Austrians did achieve, due to the constant peace offers, every peace feasible offer reflected some kind of commitment to a European equilibrium and even though eventually Russian, teeg together with Austrian and Prussian armies, took Paris there wasn't a crucial difference between the situation in 1814 and the situation in 1945. In 1945 all the factors, not all but some of the key factors, that had provided for a world balance of power were completely smashed.

In World War II created a vacuum both in Europe add in Asia which had to be built by somebody and it wasn't only Soviet ill will that built it, it was the necessity of the situation that provided an opportunity to ask a country not to take advantage of an opportunity which may come along unsympathetically its really to place a certain amount of self restraint for which history offers very few examples, in fact, I can think of no example. In 1814 such a vacuum was avoided. Austria and Prussia were still relatively strong, and were growing stronger as the war continued. France, while it was completely defeated, was defeated in a way which enabled it to participate in the peace settlement which was drawn up right after it afterwards and when it wasn't possible to save Napoleon which had been the first choice of the Austrians they were very active in bringing back the traditional kings of France. Then in World War II one of the themes that runs through World War II, through the diplomacy of World War II is the American conviction that peace should be made after the enemy was defeated. The only threat to peace was the agressor and the elimination of the agressor would automatically restore the essential harmony which is typical of international relations. Every international conference which took place during

international relations. Every international conference which took place during
agreement would automatically restate the essential harmony which is typical of
was defeated. The only threat to peace was the aggressor and the elimination of the
World War II is the American conviction that peace should be made after the enemy
one of the themes that run through World War II, through the diplomacy of
active in bringing back the traditional kings of France. Then in World War II
to save Napoleon which had been the first choice of the Anatolian they were very
which was drawn up right after the afterwards and when it was meant to be
defeated in a way which enabled it to participate in the peace settlement
stronger as the war continued. France, while it was completely defeated, was
avoided. Anatolia and Eurasia were still relatively strong, and were growing
few examples, in fact, I can think of no example. In 1814 such a vacuum was
realistic place a certain amount of self restraint for which history offers very
to take advantage of an opportunity which may come along unaptly. It is
necessity of the situation that provided an opportunity to ask a country not
by somebody and it wasn't only Soviet ill will that built it, it was the
in World War II created a vacuum both in Europe and in Asia which had to be
built
factors, that had provided for a world balance of power were completely amenable
to the situation in 1942. In 1942 all the factors, not all put some of the key
took Paris there wasn't a crucial difference between the situation in 1814 and
even though eventually Russian, see together with Austrian and Prussian allies,
goodbye offer reflected some kind of commitment to a European equilibrium and
peace
strength. But the Anatolian did achieve, due to the constant peace offers, every
were particularly generous conditions but because they were a limitation of his
defeat than a negotiated settlement. But he rejected conditions not because they
the war. It turned out that it would be easier so see above-mentioned him to accept total
for
that he was not secure as long as one was strong enough to resist him and continue
that he could not make a peace until he had scored a victory. In other words
had after it was defeated, but he was of the view that it was easier for him
completely

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