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MANAGERIAL SOCIOLOGY

Managerial sociology is concerned with the development and appli-
cation of knowledge relevant to the actions of executives in all types of
institutions. While the term "managerial sociology" is relatively new in
the sociological profession, the attention of sociologists to problems of
managerial behavior is implicit in much of the previous work in the field,
particularly in the study of formal organizations.

Traditionally, sociology has contributed to the study of mana-
gerial behavior through three applications of sociological theory and
methods. The first of these, industrial sociology, dates back to the
pioneering studies conducted at the Western Electric Company. ¹ These
studies and those following in the same tradition contributed to an under-
standing of the problems of the industrial worker by describing the nature
of his motivations and the social organization in which the work-life is
imbedded. The substantive problems in sociology central to these re-
searches included job satisfaction, labor relations, productivity, group
structure and function, and analyses of various forms of social-industrial
pathology such as low morale, excessive absenteeism, and labor turnover. ²

Studies of the industrial worker resulted in a shift in emphasis
in management theory and in the development of a movement designed to alter
management practice. The effects on theory were both of a negative and a
positive type. The negative consisted of statements to show what was *not*
true: that employees were governed by responses to simple logics of manage-
ment and that behavior was an outcome of the manifest contractual arrange-
ments of work. The target of these statements, of course, was mainly the
scientific management school with Frederick Taylor as its main spokesman. ³

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The positive contribution of the studies that came to be known
as the "human relations" school of thought was largely normative in
character, aimed at suggesting how managers _should_ behave. The manager,
for example, was advised to diagnose and be aware of the interrelation of
forces in the social system and to anticipate the efforts of management
action on the equilibrium of forces.⁴ Borrowing from medicine as well as
from functional schools of sociology, the manager was alerted to the dys-
functions in systems of control such as time standards in the measurement
of work, and wage incentive systems.⁵ This approach urged managers to lis-
ten to their employees and to encourage two-way communication as part of
broad programs of participative management.

Without question, this normative position generated a storm of
controversy which is still with us. For example, the development of in-
dustrial counseling, relying on the concepts of catharsis and human commu-
nication, attempted to alter the psychological climate of work through the
creation of a permissive atmosphere as a counter to alleged authoritarian
practices in the typical structure of organizations.⁶ The personnel coun-
selor, however, operated within a staff organization; he had no supervisory
responsibility and was generally unable to control the conditions of work.
The gradual isolation of counseling from the mainstream of activity and de-
cision-making finally led to its dissolution in the Western Electric
Company,⁷ and as far as we know, no other organization has utilized this
formal practice with much success.

The main criticisms of the normative approaches of the human re-
lations school were two-fold: (1) that its outcome as well as intention
was to create contented and apathetic workers who would be unwilling to
join unions; (2) that an outgrowth of the lack of militancy would lead to

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an inability to use collective power in correcting the structural de-
fects of industrial organizations. Critics feared an implicit anti-union
bias, a sense of patronage and "soft-soap." These criticisms were meta-
phorically sharp in the use of such terms as "cow sociology," "aborigines
and elites," and others.⁸

Interestingly enough, some of the strongest advocates of new
structures of industrial organization were to be found in the ranks of
both labor and industrial management; Golden and Ruttenberg, who fos-
tered the ideals of a new industrial democracy, were leaders in the
union movement.⁹ William Given, a leading management figure of the
American Brake Shoe Company, detailed his views of participative manage-
ment in a book called _Bottom-Up Management_.¹⁰ Similar concepts were ad-
vanced in the reports of techniques for bringing lower levels of manage-
ment into the decision processes of the McCormick Company.¹¹

While there were many differences in the aims of the labor and
management advocates of the new industrial democracy, the important point
to note is the influence on these practical leaders of the studies of Mayo
and others related to the field of industrial sociology. In general the
interest in broad, ideological applications was stimulated by the impact
of the depression and the sense of drift among leaders in the economy. ¹²
These leaders undoubtedly sought a new credo to fight against the mount-
ing disillusionment prevalent during the depression years. As a result,
the normative extensions of research in industrial sociology centered on
broad ideological discussions which are reflected in the literature, as
well as in human relations training programs. Of lasting importance how-
ever, was the way in which these studies brought together the social

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scientist and the manager. This new relationship had durable effects and perhaps stands at the foundation of the development of social science research applied to management.¹³

A second traditional field of inquiry in sociology of potential importance to the study of management is the research in occupations.¹⁴ Closely related to industrial sociology, yet with its own style and questions for inquiry, occupational sociology attempts to examine the structure, content, and value differences among professional as well as non-professional fields of work, generally quite apart from the organizational settings in which work activities occur. The study of occupations develops classifications of work and examines the characteristics of individuals who enter the various fields. These characteristics include social attributes such as education and family background, as well as psychological attributes such as personality traits, aptitudes, and intelligence. Trends in the movement in and out of occupations are related to problems of status mobility and the channels through which mobility is realized.

The research work in occupations is directed mainly to descriptive studies and the analysis of dislocations in work adjustment. The studies seek, by and large, to formulate theories of work adjustment and mobility, and to illuminate the nature of conflict and pathology in the world of work. Professionals in personnel guidance and selection have a greater direct interest in practice and utilize the studies in the field for purposes of counseling, predicting success and failure in job adjustment, and in developing reliable and economical selection techniques.

While noting the indirect connection between studies of occupation and the work of managers, we should emphasize the fact that research into occupations does not exclude the role of the manager. Research into the social origins of managers, predictors of success in management and

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problems in the selection of managers, contribute to understanding of the structure of this role in society. Yet, these studies are largely descriptive and they give little by way of explanation of the interaction between the individual and the work situation.¹⁵

The third traditional field of inquiry in sociology of importance to the study of managerial activity is the work in complex organizations and organization theory. This tradition dates back to Weber and his theories of bureaucracy.¹⁶ In contrast to the study of occupations, organization researches focus on the processes within and between defined work situations and thereby cut across occupational lines. In that managers act within a specific organization, organizational analysis is of prime significance in the study of managerial behavior.

Weber rightfully holds the position of pioneer in organizational studies for his descriptions of authority in bureaucratic systems. He discussed the nature and sources of authority that lead men to contribute sustained effort to purposes that go beyond narrow definition of their individual interests. Related to this tradition is the work of Chester Barnard, whose classic theoretical work, *The Functions of the Executive*, attempted to formulate how the executive sustains the organization as a system of cooperation.¹⁷ Weber's formulation of the ideal type of bureaucratic system has led in recent years to a respectable number of empirical studies and to modifications in the theory of authority.¹⁸ These studies show that the transactions in managerial activity are far from the impersonal and rational processes described by Weber. Many informal and seemingly deviant practices are shown to have an important mediative value in serving human needs, while at the same time correcting negative effects of bureaucratic systems.

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Closely akin to the literature on organizations is the work on decision-making and administration. Foremost among these studies is the work of Herbert Simon. In his *Administrative Behavior*,¹⁹ Simon develops a devastating criticism of the normative principles of management set forth in the tradition of Fayol and Gulick.²⁰ These principles were advanced to guide the manager in his decisions with respect to the structure of organizations. Simon shows the ambiguity and contradictory character of these principles and in labeling them "proverbs" points to their inadequacy both in a descriptive and normative sense. In its place, Simon, in this work and in a later book written with March,²¹ proposes the formulation of criteria in decision-making, taking into account value and choice. The importance of Simon's work along with that of other students of formal organization lies in the attempt to provide a framework for more adequate situational analysis. The term situational analysis describes in brief what managers do in formulating decisions. This work, therefore, can serve both as a guide in descriptive research and as a normative approach to decision-making.

There has been implicit in the preceding discussion of past work in sociology a structure of analysis of applied research that we should now clarify. This structure differentiates initially explanatory and normative studies in sociology. Explanatory studies attempt to describe and analyze important phenomena, while normative studies try to formulate rules of action to indicate how an actor _should_ behave to achieve certain desired objectives.

In addition, applied sociological studies of management differentiate between how an organization relates to its environment and the way in which it organizes itself to achieve its purposes. This distinction

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between external and internal orientations is based initially on the idea that definitions of organizational purposes and evaluations of organizational effectiveness are described in the language of a firm's transactions with clients. For a business, the main clients are customers who clearly belong to groups and institutions outside the boundaries of the business. For service organizations such as schools, hospitals, prisons, and the like, the clients are resident members of the organizations. But even in these cases the broad statement of objectives relates to the community and the society that exist outside the organization's spatial boundaries.

The relationship between the orientations toward the environment or the organization, on the one hand, and the normative or explanatory modes of investigation is represented in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1

Orientations of Sociological Studies of Management

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Normative</th><th>Explanatory</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>The Environment (External)</td><td>A. Policy Formulation<br>Decision-making</td><td>B. Historical, comparative,<br>or longitudinal analyses<br>of corporate strategy<br>and its outcomes</td></tr><tr><td>The Organization (Internal)</td><td>C. Exposition of principles of organization and management</td><td>D. Organization analysis<br>and theory</td></tr></tbody></table>

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We need not dwell here on the content of the four cells shown in Figure 1. The comparisons serve to organize the different approaches involved in studies of management. Cell A, the normative approach to environmental problems and processes, includes the areas of policy formulation and decision-making. In recent years the emphasis on statistical decision theory and rational models of decision-making belonging in Cell A, 22 attest to a growing concern for more formalization of an otherwise intuitive sphere of corporate management. Cell B includes those approaches to the study of corporate transactions with the environment which seek explanatory propositions and theories. This approach includes historical, comparative, and longitudinal studies of corporate policy and its outcomes. The studies may center on a single firm or a larger segment of the economy. Cell C, the normative approach to the problems of internal organization and management, traditionally includes the schools of thought devoted to statements of principles of management. The principles may be derivations from research or more intuitive extensions of experience.

The fourth cell D, includes studies of internal organization and management and the articulation and communication within the organization of its identity. The outcomes of this work, besides contributing to the empirical knowledge of how managers behave, also try to formulate propositions and theory to explain the patterns of behavior found in organizations.

In presenting a review and discussion of managerial sociology, our concern will be primarily with the approaches included in Cell D. Lazarsfeld's paper appearing in a Symposium sponsored by the Ford Foundation<sup>23</sup> reviews studies in categories belonging in Cell A and B. Concentration on Cell D permits us to focus on problems related to internal

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organization and executive responsibility and we shall organize the discussion around five topics: (1) the design of formal organizations; (2) management control; (3) the management of change; (4) the analysis of role performance; and (5) executive leadership.

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THE DESIGN OF FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS

One of the most neglected areas of applied research in sociolo-
gical studies of management is the comparison of formal organizational
structures. Researchers have tended to take work situations as given and
to study emergent interpersonal phenomena or the unanticipated consequences
of the structure's influence upon individual behavior. Managers, on the
other hand, consciously use criteria in selecting one or another of the
classic forms of organization structure: centralized versus decentralized,
functional versus divisional, person-centered versus position-centered. In
doing so their most important and explicit guidelines are the distribution of
authority and the allocation of responsibility.

The formal organization represents the commitment of leaders and
followers to an ordering of their relationships. It represents intention with
respect to division of authority and responsibility, the division of labor,
the allocation of statuses and the channels of communication and accountability.
In other words, formal organizational design represents a consciously main-
tained system for the quantitative distribution of authority which is sanctioned
by the highest management level within the structure.

But a managerial decision to distribute authority through the use
of a flat or pyramidal structure, or a line-staff arrangement, carries with
it an implicit decision as to the "qualitative" primacy of different types of
authority. It involves an attempt to legitimate a type of authority system
within the structure. A centralized structure, for example, emphasizes not
only limitations on the range of authority to be exercised as one moves down
the hierarchy (a quantitative distribution of authority), it also tends to
confine the exercise of individual competence to limited or specialized func-
tions. As one moves up the hierarchy, the converse is implied: because of the

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need to coordinate specialist functions, authority at this level is expected
to be wide ranging and knowledge and skill of a high order are taken for
granted. In such a structure the emphasis is clearly upon positional autho-
rity and differences in individual competence are formally disregarded as
legitimate bases for a wider or narrower exercise of authority.

The structural distribution of authority with its implicit legiti-
mation of a type of authority system is seldom accepted without question.
Competing systems of authority, in effect fostered by the structure itself,
emerge in the form of work group norms, cliques, and interdepartmental rival-
ries. Competing systems of authority may also be introduced from outside with
the entry into the organization of scientists or other professional specialists.
In analyses of organizational design and structure, therefore, researchers must
clearly account for the implicit meaning of the structure and authority system
under study in addition to their analyses of the patterns of behavior which
emerge in practice.

Weber's theoretical formulations on authority and bureaucracy out-
lined the types of authority systems which may exist within an organization.
He differentiated the sources and types of authority that ultimately control
individual actions by encouraging individual acceptance and internalization
of the organization's rules.²⁴ The rules, according to Weber, establish a
logic of relationships, a structure, and in fact a quantitative distribution
of authority, beyond the personal whim of individuals. The rules command
loyalty on the grounds of a rationality imposed by a system of authority.
He discussed three types of authority systems from which rules are derived:
traditional, legal, and charismatic.

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The system of traditional authority, based on historically relevant rules, sanctions the right of a particular individual or group to exercise authority. Implicit in such system is the extra-rational basis on which acceptance of its rules depends. A clear example of traditional authority is available in the case of the Catholic Church where the authority of the Pope over the Curia (the organizational headquarters) and the bishops (the field) is based on a tradition of divine sanction of the Pope's authority as the supreme source of guidance to the Church. In practice, however, the quantitative distribution of authority is subject to change by conscious design as reflected most recently in the work of the Ecumenical Council. Among the most important of the issues before the Council was the degree to which the centralized authority of the Pope and the Curia could be delegated to the agents of the Church in the geographic areas of the world. In changing the relationships the council was implicitly challenging and changing the qualitative basis of the Pope's authority.

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Legal authority is based on an acceptance of normative rules which prescribe the right of individuals who occupy positions in the structure to issue commands. Legal authority forms part of a status system in which vertical relationships are clearly delineated. It 'legitimates' hierarchical authority but it says little about horizontal relationships or channels of communication and influence among peers. The implicit meaning of this system is the assumption, referred to earlier, that as one descends the hierarchy one encounters a declining scale of individual competence, thus making subordinate dependence upon a superior imperative and horizontal relationships of negligible importance.

Charismatic authority is based on the emotional ties between leader and follower. In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, Freud accounted for the influence achieved by the charismatic leader, likening it to the primary emotional ties of parent-child.²⁵ In authority systems of this kind the symbolism with which the authority figure becomes invested is of extreme importance.

According to Weber, traditional and charismatic authority may reinforce the exercise of legal authority in the ideal bureaucracy, but individuals generally accept the system of 'legal' statuses and rules because of its implicit rationality in relating or adapting organizational means to clearly defined and desired ends and objectives. In short, the quantitative distribution of authority through a bureaucratic hierarchy appears as just and reasonable in the light of the superior skill and knowledge and the impartial bases of appointment of the individuals who hold office in the 'ideal' bureaucracy, and the system of hierarchical authority is thus legitimated. However, sociological research on formal organizations has subsequently altered this aspect of Weber's qualitative analysis of authority.

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Research in this area has dealt with the nature of motivational and behavioral dysfunctions in the bureaucratic structure leading to internal adaptations or secondary effects.²⁶ At the motivational level, legal authority systems do not by themselves provide for the universal requirement of men to establish relationships of *equality* as well as of authority.²⁷ The 'informal' organization discussed in the literature on work groups establishes empirically the forms and mechanisms inferred from behavior that appear to deviate from the bureaucratic rules.²⁸ Blau's study of a government agency also demonstrates how variant behavior in organizations relates to individual problems of managing anxiety, or of seeking help under conditions free from evaluation of formal authority figures.²⁹ A shift takes place in the qualitative base of authority and with it a corresponding shift in the quantitative distribution of authority occurs.

The departures from the logic of rules and formal authority relationships relate also to certain new requirements of formal organizations. These new requirements stem from the increasing complexity of the work roles found in modern organizations. Specialists who are trained in professions are increasingly found in organizations so that a dichotomy between hierarchical authority and professional authority presents another qualitative problem in the design of formal organizations.

As Selznick has shown in his study of the TVA, specialist functions emphasize, as a basis for influence, the use of knowledge and skill rather than vertical position in the formal structure.³⁰ Specialist functions tend, however, to develop their own sub-goals including the maintenance and expansion of their own collective identity. They tend to become independent of other groups and of the dominant hierarchical system of authority.

To clarify the differences between individuals and groups that invest in hierarchical as contrasted with professional authority, Gouldner

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described two cultures in organizations.³¹ One he called "punishment centered bureaucracy," referring to the influence achieved through the control of rewards and punishments inherent in the hierarchical system of formal organization structure. The second he called "representative bureaucracy" to characterize the relationships established among professionals who tend to establish a more egalitarian and peer-like atmosphere.

The tensions between hierarchical and professional authority are evident in the problems of the science-based organization. Industrial corporations rely heavily on research and development talent for product innovation to support both national defense contracts and "private sector" activity. A number of studies show how so-called 'organizationalists' and 'professionals' differ in expectations and preferences in their work orientations.³² The organizationalists tend to identify with the goals and reward structures of the organization and in this sense are, to use another of Gouldner's³³ terms, 'locals' in their outlook. The specialists appear more like a university-based scientist or engineer and adopt the 'cosmopolitan' or universal values identified with the professional world. On the whole, these studies demonstrate the differences in outlook and relationships preferred by the professional as compared with the organizational. Few studies, however, attempt to describe and explain the outcome of attempts at creating a structure of authority relations in which both types function.

Some understanding of the structural problems encountered in accompanying both professional and hierarchical authority is suggested in Weiss' study of two sections of a Government bureau.³⁴ The burden of his research is irrelevant for our purposes, but his description of the authority relationships which were established in the scientific section establishes the functional importance of the professional authority system. Hierarchical authority relationships were widely accepted in the administrative section

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but differences in individual ability made it essential in the scientific section that primary emphasis would be placed on professional competence and individual initiative as the basis for the allocation and coordination of activities.

Generally speaking, managers make implicit choices in establishing a formal organization structure between primary emphasis on hierarchical as compared with egalitarian work cultures. An organization structure with many levels of authority that adheres to formal channels of communication represents an investment in hierarchical relationships. The shape of the hierarchical structure is the "pyramid" since it adheres to the traditional concept of span of control, a logic of organization of which the military has been the most articulate advocate. The authority of a hierarchical superior is supported by formal codes vesting legitimacy of influence and control in positions.

The egalitarian culture generally fostered by those who invest in professional authority is built on a "flat" structure. The number of levels of authority between the top and bottom of the organization are fewer in the "flat" as compared with the "pyramid" structure. The emphasis is on lateral communication among peers, the use of committees, and ad hoc work groups. The legitimacy of any attempt at influence is based on the rationality of competence and skill that must be perceived in the transactions among individuals. In this sense, less emphasis is placed upon positional authority, and in an absolute sense, there is less difference in authority between the man at the top and the bottom of the organization structure. Experimentation with "flat" organization structure as we have indicated is prevalent in science-based organizations with a heavy representation of individuals trained and committed initially to a profession.

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An example of the interaction of authority systems in the transition
from a hierarchical to an egalitarian structure is provided in a study of
organizational change in a research and development center of a large company.
Dalton, Barnes, and Zaleznik examine, through the use of a partially controlled
field experiment, the rationale and outcome in the transition from a pyramid
to a relatively flat formal organization structure.35 This transition involved
increased emphasis on lateral communication and autonomous work groups, but
also included the elimination of key management jobs.

Their experiment, in addition, examined the interaction between
hierarchical and professional authority, since the stated objective that
led management to alter the formal organization structure was to give greater
weight to the technical functions and less to managing. In this connection,
the management had established a two-route promotional system: through the
technical channel leading to the position of senior scientist, and through
the managerial route leading to higher level supervisory jobs.

The results of the experiment indicated the significant impact of
the structural shift in the minds of participants. Individuals who identified
themselves with professional authority (scientists) supported the change more
strongly than those who identified with hierarchical authority (managers).
On the whole, people responded favorably to the changes whenever they could
anticipate an increase in personal authority and involvement in tasks. But
a year and a half after the change, individuals whose authority had actually
increased and who had experienced greater influence in their work were inclined
to be skeptical about continuing changes in the direction of emphasizing profes-
sional as compared with hierarchical authority. These individuals were,
typically, in supervisory positions and increasingly committed to both positionál
and professional authority as bases for influence and control of behavior.

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The tendency for complex organizations with increasingly sophisticated technologies to introduce specialists creates a set of alternatives for individual career routes and for patterns of exercising influence. These organizations create and change formal structures which represent a particular distribution of authority. Authority in reality is multi-dimensional and we find that members of organizational units identify with one or another of these competing sources of authority (usually profession versus position), leading to secondary consequences, like rivalries and power struggles.

Selznick, in his TVA study cited earlier, noted that specialist functions within the organization develop their own goals and justify them on the basis of their contribution to overall organizational objectives. Implicit in these goals is the objective of maintaining and expanding the organizational units in a way that suggests sensitivity to relative influence in the comparison of individuals and groups.

A subtle process occurs in the contention of one group with another for influence. It is as though rivalry proceeds according to the rules of a zero-sum game: as one gains in ascendency, it is at the expense of another, and it may only be theoretically relevant that as positions of influence alter, the contending parties may both be gaining in overall influence. The importance of comparison--who has more influence than whom--attracts considerable energy and takes on a meaning independent of the main purpose of the organization.

It may also be relevant to suggest that contending authority systems operate like Gresham's Law of Money: "Bad money tends to drive out good money." We would convert this to mean (without taking the 'good' or 'bad' seriously) that in any organization, hierarchical authority ultimately becomes dominant since as specialists achieve greater power and influence through the exercise of professional competence, they become increasingly attached

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to the organization and begin to exercise authority derived from position,
including greater proximity to top management.

A good case in point is the role of the scientist in politics and
government. The scientist may initially limit his sphere of influence to
technical questions, but as his success increases, and esteem capital mounts,
he is called upon, or volunteers, to extend his sphere of influence into
general policy functions whose outcome and implementation depend on the
authority vested in position.

The discussion so far has centered on both the qualitative and
quantitative aspects of distributing authority through commitment to a type
of formal organization structure. The bases for commitments can be related
to the increasing importance of the professional person in organizations.
Conflicts in commitment, however, are also related to the shifting of identi-
fications that occur when the individual begins to exercise positional authority
as he advances within the organization. The interaction among contending
systems of authority leads to efforts at informal control through the formation
of coalitions and alliances.

The main theme that we have attempted to establish is that
in exercising choice in the design of a formal organization structure,
managers are not only distributing authority, but are implicitly legitimating
a specific type of authority which may or may not be completely relevant in
the structure, given changes in sophistication and competence of individuals.

But still another condition affecting the interaction of authority
systems is relevant in considering the structure of formal organizations.
This condition relates to the relative emphasis on coordination of activity,
both with respect to the amount of coordination that is necessary and the
position in the structure where the coordination efforts are to be centered.

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Worthy's analysis of the Sears-Roebuck experiments in 'flat' organization structure is of special interest because it indicates the subtle relationship among work activity, organization purpose, and need for coordination as variables affecting the design of the formal structure.36 Sears dispensed with the need for the centralized coordination characteristic of functional organization. structures by making store managers as self-sufficient as selection, training, and job-rotation could make them, and by capitalizing on the narrow opportunities for sub-goal differentiation which the retail trade affords. In retailing, departmental objectives are the objectives of the store as a whole--to maximize the entry and movement of customers through the store and to maximize the amount spent by each customer. In the Sears experiment these objectives could be achieved independently by each department without recourse to the conflict characteristic of the zero-sum game, and as a result direct and frequent coordination of departmental activities was not required. The flat structure emphasized the quantitative distribution of authority at each management level and the manager's training and experience, expressly designed to encourage autonomous action within broad policy limits, contributed to the legitimation of his positional authority in the minds of his subordinates.

In assessing the effects of the structural changes in the Sears experiment the most important factor must necessarily be the characteristics of the retail trade itself, since the difficulties inherent in organization by function could be readily overcome by treating the stores as independent, integrated units.

Where the requirements of the task and its related technology are such that specialization is essential, however, structural changes aimed at redistributing authority from higher to lower levels appear, at least initially, to be less successful.

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In *The Changing Culture of a Factory*, Jaques describes a change intended to increase worker participation in management.³⁷ In putting the change into effect there was no explicit decision on the part of the company's management to flatten the structure; it was apparently expected that worker participation in the joint-committees would simply provide for a less inhibited flow of information up through the hierarchy. Inherent in this, however, is the shift to an authority system that is no longer legitimated essentially by position. Jaques found that there was a strong tendency among members of top management to use the joint consultative machinery which brought them into direct contact with workers' representatives as a means of avoiding their immediate subordinates entirely. The impact on middle management was considerable. The changes resulted in a substantial loss of authority as they were bypassed by higher management. Confusion over the role they were expected to play and noticeable interpersonal rivalry ensued.

Confusion in roles and rivalry may be viewed also as an outgrowth of lack of clarity in expected formal relationships. When the ambiguity in formal relationships impedes decision-making, remedial steps involving a change in formal organization structure usually occur. Managers frequently identify in their own minds the change in structure as a response to an increase in size of the organization and the felt need to move from a person-alistic-ambiguous culture to a formalistic culture in which consensus exists on how authority is distributed and exercised. Changes toward formalization and consensus are frequently coupled with efforts to decentralize responsibility through a new formal organization chart.

Weinshall studied the effects of a new organization chart in a company faced with expansion of business and an increase in the number of employees at all levels.³⁸ The immediate impetus for the change lay in the need to introduce a wider range of technological expertise to cope with the demands which expanding markets and product lines placed upon the organization.

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Authority had been centralized around the figure of the chief executive, and formal relationships below his level were poorly defined. Decentralization through the new organization chart involved a flatter structure, a redistribution of positional authority and added weight attached to professional skills through the importance assigned to research and development. The main variable in the study was the degree of consensus in management relationships as measured by the ratio of individually perceived formal and informal relationships to misperceptions of these relationships, both before the changes were implemented and two years later.

Weinshall found that the effects of the changes were strongly felt by the highest level of management. A survey made two years after the new organization chart was introduced showed that these people perceived their formal relationships more clearly while the number of informal relationships decreased as a result of the abandonment of those relationships which were no longer perceived to be necessary. In other words, the introduction of a new authority system was tied into the structural change, eliminating, rather than aggravating, the pre-change conditions in which individuals did not know whether a relationship was necessary until it was tested in practice.

In the lower levels of management, on the other hand, there was a decrease in the degree of consensus as to formal relationships and no reduction in informal relationships. This decrease in the clarity and reciprocity of both formal and informal relationships was attributed mainly to the influx of newcomers into the organization, to whom the new organization structure was not as clear as it needed to be. These individuals joined the corporation at a time when the middle management "old guard" was itself in a state of ambiguity, with the dissolution of old relationships, the elimination of some positions, and the formation of informal groups which united individuals

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in their resistance to change. In general, the study suggested the tendency for informal relationships to exist in response to problems in the formal distributions of authority.

From this discussion of formal attempts at structural change, we can go on to consider informal attempts to introduce authority systems which in some respects parallel and in others compete with the formal system. This tends to occur under conditions in which holders of positional authority, for one reason or another, fail to exercise their authority adequately, and in so doing undermine the assumption of competence which is implicit in the hierarchical structure. It represents a de facto structural change in which authority is sharply redistributed, and Dalton's study *Men Who Manage* provides a striking example.³⁹

In the course of research in several organizations, Dalton found associations among workers, staff, and line personnel which in some cases cut across formal superior-subordinate relationships, and in others across divisional and departmental barriers. He distinguished three recurrent patterns of association which he classified on the basis of their relationships to the hierarchical authority system as: (1) vertical cliques, composed of employees at different levels, usually within a single department, in which the rewards to members included information and support for the superior and protection and advancement for the subordinates; (2) horizontal cliques of employees at roughly the same level in the organization which were usually formed to resist change or to advance it; and (3) random cliques of employees who were personal friends or who were rejected by the more functional cliques.

The dominant authority system lay in the hierarchy, but its sanctioning of the cliques simultaneously limited its effectiveness: comparatively low status members of a clique dominated by a top-level manager exercised an autonomy that was almost inviolable by their own immediate

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hierarchical superiors. Except for one individual who was widely believed to have the backing of the company's head office, staff personnel were dependent for advancement on the line and had no recourse to an authority system of their own. Wherever it was felt necessary the power of clique members was used to stretch, misinterpret, or ignore the directives which staff members were officially expected to implement. Dalton attributed the emergence of such powerful informal structures to the discrepancy between "granted and exercised authority," which, in and of itself does nothing more than describe the effects of cliques and informal relationships. The more important issue is to explain the shifts in authority relationships under conditions where the formal authority structure appears unchanged.

Dalton's analysis, and others, such as Crozier's study of power and authority in bureaucratic settings,⁴⁰ suggest an underlying motivation on the part of individuals in organizations to regulate and control behavior. For top management, the desire is to control behavior in response to the relevance of over-all organizational objectives. As one proceeds down the hierarchy, there is an increasing tendency to control behavior in relation to the goals of sub-groups, which include maintaining the identity and saliency of group structures and individual positions.

The issue of control goes back a long way in the history of organizational research to the arguments, for example, on the meaning of restriction of output in the factory work group.⁴¹ In a very fundamental sense the decision to establish a formal organization structure with its allocation of functions, responsibility, and authority is a decision to attempt to control individual and group performance. We do not wish to argue that control at one level (top management) is rational while at another (low status) it is irrational. The question of control is always rational so long as means and ends are in harmony from the standpoint of the behavior

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under observation. Means and ends can be internally consistent at one
level of the organization, but in conflict with those of another level.

The problem of control grows out of the basic motivations that
lead people to participate in formal organizations. From the standpoint of
the manager, control involves basic issues in the allocation of resources to
achieve some desired and explicit objectives. To assist him in the process of
control, he has available a new range of sophisticated techniques that are an
integral part of the structure of authority in organizations. The nature of
these techniques, their function in the exercise of authority, and the
range of empirical research questions open to sociological inquiry will be
considered in the next section of this chapter.

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MANAGEMENT CONTROL

One of the most important developments in managerial practice, still not fully articulated, is the concept of the organization structure as an action variable. This concept leads to efforts to fit organization structure to the conditions reflected in purposes, technologies, individual motivations, preferred work climates, and leadership style. Organization structures can be designed to include a variety of forms reflecting basic differences in the quality of work to be performed within a single enterprise. Not only can forms be varied within a single overall structure, but also forms may be changed over time to reflect new conditions and problems in achieving organizational goals.

Recent developments in management control systems have contributed substantially to the treatment of organization structure as a variable. These developments as they affect organization structure and managerial behavior have been largely overlooked in sociologists' studies. In exploration of the literature, we could find few references to empirical studies of management control systems in relation to the dynamic aspects of management and organization. 42

Managers assume responsibility for appraising the results of action and modifying performance more nearly to reach desired objectives. Appraisal can consist of simple acts like the president of a company asking the sales manager if he has succeeded in winning a contract. The answer to this question then leads to a set of anticipations. If the company has received the contract, then revenues will reach anticipated levels, the cash flow will permit certain obligations to be fulfilled, new activities to be undertaken and so forth. If the company has failed to get the contract, then a set of negative anticipations follow leading to sets of alternative actions to regulate the effects of the negative outcome.

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The simple appraisal, planning, and action cycle based on verbal information can be viewed as the prototype for the development of complex information systems which permit managers to act within their spheres of responsibility. The complexity stems from several obvious sources: (1) large organizations require a breakdown of information to reflect the relatively autonomous performance of subunits within the total structure; (2) information is needed by many people at the same time requiring some method of reporting that is efficient and economical; (3) the mass of information required poses a cognitive as well as an economic problem, requiring planning and decision with respect to who gets what information, and when and how this material can be generated with the least cost; (4) information exchange, whether in an interpersonal situation or through the preparation of reports, has motivational consequences which are crucial to continuing performance and which must be subject to regulation and influence so that behavior moves toward desired objectives; (5) executives function within a time process and need to regulate their own actions in accordance with the time-span demands of their area of responsibility. Information systems have to create a match between the individual's time-span of thinking and the kind of data he uses in his work.

The obvious way in which these complexities are being met is through the introduction of electronic data-processing to allow greater quantities of information to be processed and reported more widely. But this use of the computer is a mechanical innovation and in a narrow sense will merit study by sociologists in a context similar to that of the introduction of the assembly line in the factory. Of more basic concern to the sociologist are the conceptual changes underlying management control systems and their relevance to organization structure, decision-making, and executive motivation and performances.

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The information systems permit top managers to design formal organizations around "profit centers" or more broadly, "performance centers".⁴³ A performance center is a unit of organization under the responsibility of a manager with a purpose and a technology that permit the comparison of actual with expected performance. The comparison may be narrow or broad. The foreman of a department can be viewed as the head of a performance center even though his unit makes only one part in a complex finished product. As long as it is possible to identify his objective, to quantify it, and to permit comparisons of what his unit is expected to do with actual performance, this person can be held accountable for the performance of his center as a whole. The same concept applies to the head of a major product division in General Electric, or for that matter to the head of General Electric itself.

The basic difference in the scope of responsibility among performance centers is reflected in the multiple criteria used for comparison, in longer time intervals between comparisons, and in the use of standards that create comparisons with units outside the boundaries of a particular organization. In this sense, General Electric's performance can be compared with Westinghouse or with other complex organizations competing for the same pool of capital resources. An important basis for comparison is the measure called "return on investment" which brings many diverse corporations into the same range of comparison and appraisal.

The concept of the performance center, as it is thoroughly articulated through the information system, permits wider choice in decisions on formal organization structure and styles of executive behavior. For certain purposes, organizations can be "flattened", with more heads of performance centers reporting to one executive as compared with "pyramid" structures that operate on the principle of span of control. Relatively flat organizations imply a

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high degree of delegation of responsibility that may be more apparent than real.
There may be wide latitude with respect to how the unit head maintains stability
in his unit from day-to-day, but very little latitude in the technique of work,
and in capital expenditure. The techniques of work can be governed by staff
personnel who develop new methods and program their use in routine operations.
Similarly, capital expenditures can be regulated through top-level budget
discussions and allocation of funds to be spent by units throughout the
organization.

Formal budgeting as a planning technique and process deserves careful study in a literal as well as symbolic sense. In the literal sense, the budget procedure brings executives to the point of decision and culminates in actions throughout an organization. In a symbolic sense, the budgeting process involves such issues as articulating the organization's identity, establishing the psychological bonds between superior and subordinate, making visible problems of cooperation and competition among divisions of the organization and other issues.

The issue of competition, as it comes into focus in budgeting, is a major organizational problem. The idea of establishing an organization with relatively autonomous performance centers is usually fostered by creating "arms length" relationships among the major centers, requiring the establishment of an internal market and price structure in a system called "transfer pricing". If each center is to be evaluated on its performance as reflected in measures such as profit percentage on sales and return on investment, then clearly conflicts of interest arise in the relationships among the centers, particularly where the product of one center is used by another. The so-called "arms length" principle is fostered to suggest that the performance centers doing business with one another should be free to negotiate

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and bargain for the terms of their transactions where the advantage of one
center may be reflected as a disadvantage for another. If, for example,
the coal producing unit of a large steel company is judged by the criteria
of return on investment, it will try to negotiate the best possible prices
in selling to the steel making unit which uses coal to produce coke for its
furnaces and ovens. Similarly, the steel making unit will seek the lowest
price possible to enable it to reflect a good return on investment. If
within the total organization, a monopoly position is established - all of
the products of the coal division go to the steel-making division - then a
situation of regulated prices must exist and becomes a matter for top
management control. If, on the other hand, the coal division can cultivate
markets outside the corporation, and if the steel division can look for alter-
native sources of supply, then a truly "arms-length" relationship exists so
that negotiation and bargaining serve to regulate performance. Here, the
arms-length principle serves to utilize intraorganizational competition to
increase efficiency.

The use of this normative management concept depends upon the
organizational separation of units into performance centers, the development
of information to measure performance, and the actual distribution of
rewards to correlate with performance. Once these criteria are met, then the
dynamics of competition among divisions becomes an important aspect of the
managerial process that in itself must be regulated.

Competitive relationships can go beyond reasonable bounds. The
arms-length doctrine is fostered by the existence of autonomous performance
centers. It is not always in the best interests of a total corporation
to permit weaker units in the bargaining relationship to be subject to the
market forces. Subsidies and supports become necessary, including the right

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to appeal a conflict to higher authority. Such rights of appeal then pro-
duce a structure for mediation and arbitration that is an important feature
of authority relations in complex organizations.

Our intention here is to illustrate the value to sociologists of
intensive study of management control systems as a springboard for organization
analysis. These studies can range both broadly and deeply into the types of
processes examined and will lead sooner or later into basic explorations of
how authority relations are governed in organizations and the structure of
individual motivations upon which organizations come to depend for their
effectiveness.

The concept of the performance center as the significant struc-
tural unit within a complex organization rests on a very elaborate set of
premises about human motivation. These premises and their consequences can
be explored through analysis of the formal information and control pro-
cess. The motivational premises range from an expectation of compliance to
authority, supported by a system of rewards and punishments, to an expecta-
tion of initiative from the individual in the direction of his and others'
performance.

It would be significant in the study of managerial behavior to
correlate the motivational premises with (1) the formal control system,
(2) performance, and (3) the unanticipated effects on interpersonal rela-
tions. The possibilities of such correlation in organizational studies is
suggested in Blau's findings on the effects of statistical performance
reports on individual and group behavior in a state government agency.⁴⁴

The function of the employment agency in Blau's study was to find
jobs for clients and prior to 1948 the number of interviews held per month

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was the only operation that was statistically recorded. The premise on which this index was based was that it should provide superior officials with accurate quantitative information about an important aspect of the work of their subordinates, permit them to identify those subordinates whose performance needed to be corrected, and provide a basis for subordinates' periodic performance ratings. However, rather than remaining an indirect mechanism of administrative control in the service of finding jobs for clients, the records directly influenced operations by inducing subordinates, because the records affected their ratings, to concentrate their efforts upon the factor measured. The knowledge that a superior would learn how many clients had been interviewed and would evaluate them on this basis led subordinates to maximize the number of interviews held at the expense of finding jobs for clients.

Early in 1948, new performance records were introduced which forced subordinates to pay more attention to the agency's objectives. The new indices measured not only the number of interviews held, but the number of clients referred to a job and the number so referred who were actually hired by an employer; they also measured the proportion of interviews to referrals, the proportion of referrals to hirings, and the overall proportion of interviews to hirings. The new records thus afforded a means of qualitative as well as quantitative assessment of subordinates' performance.

In the two sections which Blau studied two different types of behavior emerged under these conditions; each was to a large extent a consequence of the use to which the section's supervisors put the statistical records in rating his subordinates.

In Section A the supervisor relied heavily on the quantitative statistics and an outstanding record in filling openings became the basis

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for a favorable rating in the section. Since productivity measured quantitatively was dependent on the job openings available, the struggle to control this resource led to intensely competitive activity. As job orders came in from employers it was intended that they should be filed in a common order box from which all interviewers could draw for client referral. Instead of this interviewers hoarded orders on their desks or filed them incorrectly to prevent others from using them. In many cases marginally qualified clients were sent to an employer in order to avoid 'wasting' time in search of a fully qualified client and thereby running the risk of losing the opening to another interviewer.

In Section B, on the other hand, the supervisor's ratings were not primarily based on performance records. Members of the section were less anxious about productivity and this encouraged the development of group cohesion. In turn, group cohesion actually *raised* productivity: because interviewers shared their openings and discussed their clients among themselves, matching the best-qualified client to the job was facilitated. Section B's proportion of jobs filled to interviews was higher than Section A's.

In effect, the use of the statistical records as the basis for the rating system held interviewers responsible for a factor they could not control. The number of job openings available was fixed by outside forces and an interviewer could only improve his production figures by depriving another of his share of openings. This was done in Section A. In Section B the supervisor emphasized the qualitative aspect of the system - the proportion of referrals and jobs filled to interviews. This encouraged cooperation as no one interviewer could have a monopoly of best-qualified clients.

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The type of analysis Blau presents offers the promise of much higher yields to be gained in escalating the area of study from the lower to the higher levels of organizations with special attention to the implications of formal management control systems. These systems are bound to become even more sophisticated as they open new areas of experimentation in the structure and uses of authority. The possibilities for experimentation accelerate the rate of change experienced in organizations and we shall now turn to sociological perspectives and the management of change.

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THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

Sociologists, along with other social scientists, have played
two distinct roles in the study of the management of change. One role,
as "activist", places the social scientist in the organization as a
"change agent". In this role the social scientist operates from a norma-
tive theory about what is "good" for an organization and how one should go
about introducing change.

In his second role, the more traditional one of research analyst
or investigator, the social scientist takes advantage of change situations
in organizations to conduct field experiments. Almost any field study of
an organization involves the study of natural changes and in this sense the
investigator is always in the midst of examining the effects of new structures
or procedures on individual behavior and interaction. The only normative
theory the investigator uses is how to produce social research. He seeks,
basically, to contribute to explanatory theory on organizations and behavior
from study of the work setting.

There is, perhaps, a third role that combines elements of both of
these roles in the form of "action research". Here the social scientist seeks to
give advice and effect changes, while at the same time studying the organization
and the problems connected with change. The action research role is reminiscent
of the position of the participant-observer in anthropological studies,⁴⁵ with
some notable differences. The most important differences between participant-
observation and action research are the psychological contract and the related
goals and aspirations of the social scientist in his relationship to the objects
of study whether they be "clients" or co-participants. The nature of the

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psychological contract has an important effect on what is studied, how the study is conducted, and the nature of the contributions.

It is not possible within the main purposes of this chapter and section to compare sociologists in these different roles and the types of change studies both roles yield. Other chapters in the book give specific attention to such questions. The reader may permit, however, one general observation from our experience as both consultants and researchers involved in change studies although we would emphasize that we have never attempted to combine both roles simultaneously. The observation is that in attempts to combine both roles, the conflicts for the social scientist and the reciprocal conflicts produced in the objects of study may be so great as to yield bad consultation and poor research. In other words, neither role may produce satisfactory results when the social scientist attempts to combine them in organizational change processes.

The confusion in role has had an effect on types of empirical studies on change undertaken and on theories of change produced. Our purpose now is to explore these studies and theories of change and to suggest possible directions for productive research on the management of change.

One of the earliest normative positions advanced by social scientists in the initiation of change in organizations grew out of the researches at the Western Electric Company.⁴⁶ The researches were designed initially as laboratory experiments to test various hypotheses on worker productivity. The outcome of the researches and their elaboration resulted in a major statement of a normative theory of organization leadership. This normative theory has as its underlying objective the redistribution of power and authority

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from higher to lower status levels, or more generally, the transformation of organizations from hierarchical to egalitarian cultures. This redistribution of power is intended to enhance the autonomy of subordinates. The leader gives up areas of control unique to his position in the hope of gaining greater involvement in work on the part of subordinates. Following the model of the nondirective counselor, the change in leadership practice is also aimed at shifting the balance between activity and passivity, in the behavior of both leaders and followers, to correspond to the transfer of power from the upper to the lower strata of the organization.

The method of introducing these changes in the balance of power and activity is largely *educative* - attitudes of individuals are changed through training programs and counseling. These changes in attitude are intended to be reflected in the behavior of the individual and ultimately in a new organizational culture closely resembling egalitarian ideals.

This leadership theory, then, seeks to foster a cooperative system largely through leadership practices. Leaders cease to follow authoritarian practices and implement psychological prescriptions that are *educative* in nature. The intent is to develop a new type of cooperative system in organizations based on the growing psychological autonomy of individuals. This theory is very much alive in current thinking and practice. It is fostered also by Rogers and his students<sup>47</sup> and the followers of Kurt Lewin<sup>48</sup>; it is much in evidence in current executive and supervisory training efforts and it is also evident in writings on management practice.

In several books Argyris has attacked the dependent relationship which must be accepted by subordinates in a system of hierarchical authority. In *Executive Leadership*,<sup>49</sup> *Organization of a Bank*,<sup>50</sup> and *Personality and Organization*,<sup>51</sup> he takes the position that there is an inevitable conflict between formal organization and the healthy individual. He distinguishes six interdependent processes which are essential

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to an organization: reward-punishment, communication, authority, identification, work flow, and perpetuation (succession). He claims that all except work flow are dominated by the 'leader' with the result that individual capacity is severely restricted. As an advocate of organizational change, Argyris stresses the need to replace large scale organization with individual-need oriented groups which would weaken the element of subordinate dependency built into a hierarchy, and would foster the growth of 'democratic conditions'.

In *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness*<sup>52</sup>

Argyris discusses the initiation of change through alterations in the values and perceptions of members of an organization. He gives his views on the need for altered values and beliefs as follows:

> The higher one gets up the chain of command, the more the individual has control over his work environment and the more important it becomes to change the interpersonal (and then the policy) environment. Examples of the former are the rivalry, defensiveness within the organization. Examples of the latter are policies in the service of human growth and commitment such as decentralization.<sup>53</sup>

But the empirical results of his work in using T-Group methods to change management values are far from clear. Subordinates found it difficult to accept the new permissive stance adopted by their superiors as a result of the training program: when they went in to discuss a problem with a superior they resented having it turned back to them for solution unaccompanied by the instructions or orders formerly issued. In the Jaques study cited earlier, similar difficulties on the part of subordinates emerged following the introduction of greater worker participation in management.

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Douglas McGregor in *The Human Side of Enterprise*⁵⁴ also falls within the educative tradition. McGregor contrasts two types of leadership theory that he labels "theory X and theory Y", the "X" being older authoritarian assumptions and practices, which he claims are based on the primary levels of motivation as distinguished by Maslow;⁵⁵ the "Y" being the newer psychological practices aimed at meeting the increasingly intangible levels of need which are felt once physiological and safety needs are satisfied.

The normative theory developed by Kurt Lewin⁵⁶ and his followers, under the term of group dynamics, is based on propositions relating individual, group, and cultural determinants of behavior. The individual is conceived of as acting within a field of forces, both internal and external, in the time and space of the here-and-now. Behavior is a resultant of the forces within the individual's life space and is goal directed.

For behavior to change, the magnitude and direction of the forces must shift to yield a new resultant balance. How the forces change, then becomes the focus of the normative theory. The emphases for change are the group forces acting on the individual. If the individual is to change, the direction of the change must be supported by group or cultural norms; otherwise, the individual is in conflict.

Let us take as an illustration of this theory Lewin's experimental work on changing the food buying habits of housewives. Under the auspices of the American Red Cross, attempts were initiated during wartime to convince housewives of the value of certain meat products (sweetbreads, brains, etc.) in more ample supply than the conventional cuts of meat. The issue at hand was whether cognitive approaches would result in the necessary realignment of forces to yield a difference in the housewife's meal preparations. Now the

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significance of food preparation for the housewife is bound to her role in
the family and the satisfactions she derives from nurturant behavior that is
accepted and enjoyed by members of her family. If she is inclined to prepare
an unfamiliar meal, on the strength of new cognitive knowledge acting as a
force on her behavior, there is the counteracting force of the rejection she
might encounter in the possible negative reaction of her family to an unfamiliar
food. The investigators reasoned that the potential family rejection would out-
weigh the effects of the new knowledge, resulting in no change in the housewife's
food buying habits. To effect a change would require added forces working
in the same direction as the new knowledge on nutrition. The added forces
toward change exist potentially in group standards - the pressure groups
exert on the individual to act in expected ways as a basis of inclusion and
acceptance in the group. If the group standards (in this case in the experimental
groups) toward change became of sufficient magnitude, the resultant balance
would yield an actual change in behavior.

Two groups were initiated into the values of the new foods; one
group was exposed only to cognitive information provided during a lecture,
while the other group engaged in group discussion of the implication of
change in addition to securing necessary information. Follow-up studies
showed that a larger percentage of women in the discussion groups actually
tried the new foods as compared with the percentage who tried the new foods
in the group exposed only to cognitive approaches. These results tended to
support the theory of change underlying the experiment. Similar studies on
the effects of group forces in overcoming resistances to change were repor-
ted by Coch and French⁵⁷ in a factory setting.

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The theories of group dynamics as normative approaches to human relations also establish guidelines for the behavior of leaders. The guidelines aim at establishing democratic and participative group climates in contrast to autocratic and laissez-faire climates. The differences among the democratic, autocratic, and laissez-faire climates as a function of style of leadership were specified in the famous experimental studies of White and Lippitt⁵⁸. Groups of boys in leisure time activities were exposed to the three different group climates that were induced through the variable of leadership behavior. The democratic group climate produced more favorable responses on the part of the boys in terms of reduced aggression, more enjoyment, the absence of scapegoating, more imaginative productivity, and like effects. The examination of leadership and group climate was extended by the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center in the studies of productivity and satisfaction in industrial work groups. These studies seemed to suggest that "person centered" leaders have more positive effects than "production centered" leaders.⁵⁹

A different normative approach to organizational change warranting consideration here is represented by studies which view the organization as a socio-technical system and which focus on technology as a major variable affecting interaction and activity. Researchers of this school accept that as patterns of interaction change, patterns of behavior, and ultimately values, will also change. We include here workers such as chapple and Sayles,⁶⁰ Walker and his colleagues,⁶¹ Whyte,⁶² Richardson⁶³ and others. The view that individual behavior is a dependent variable affected by the structure of the organization, especially by technology, has stimulated research into the relationship between activities, interactions, and sentiments, and such organizational characteristics as the physical and spatial arrangements of work and the formal

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organization as it establishes the lines of communication and interaction.

The researchers seek to develop methods of changing the technology and organization to influence interaction patterns, and ultimately the quality of individual sentiments.

As Whyte expresses it,

> According to the theory, the social system of the organization is made up of activities, interactions, and sentiments which are in a state of mutual dependence. That means that a change in one will necessarily involve changes in the other. This theoretical approach would indicate that change in the organization can be introduced through activities, interactions, or sentiments. However, for most practical purposes, we can regard sentiments as a dependent variable responding to changes in activities and interactions. . . . When we are concerned with producing changes within the system, we will generally find it futile to make a direct approach to sentiments.⁶⁴

Probably the most clearcut example of the socio-technical system approach is demonstrated in the technology studies of Walker and Guest.⁶⁵ In studying the effects of technology on worker satisfaction, absenteeism, and turnover, their findings suggested that assembly line work, as compared with less standardized arrangements of work, prevents the development of readily definable work groups and reduces opportunities for building social cohesion among workers. As a result, satisfaction and other indicators or morale are low on mass production types of jobs. The experimental work reported by the Tavistock researchers⁶⁶ would seem to substantiate the validity of this approach to organizational and individual change through manipulation of the technology.

It should be emphasized that in using technological change as a basis for broader organizational changes, the process of change is implemented through the use of consultation and participation at all levels in the organization. The result of collaborative work between the consultants and managers is aimed at improving organizational and technological conditions

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of work that in turn will result in improved interpersonal relations. The main conception underlying this approach to consultation is the view of organizations as socio-technical systems. Studies of the arrangements of work result in planned changes not *necessarily* requiring leadership changes or participation. The group dynamics theorists, on the other hand, see little hope for sustained change apart from creating supportive group climates and democratic-participative leadership patterns. Insofar as socio-technical systems theorists use consultation, presumably they are also hoping to alter the over-all culture of the organization toward egalitarian practices.

Our discussion so far has been concerned with two types of normative theories of change: one, associated with the human relations school, attempts to alter the culture of organizations through educative practices; the second, the socio-technical systems approach, aims at changing patterns of interaction and activity in the expectation that changes in sentiment will follow.

On the whole, social science literature is replete with material advocating one or another of the normative theories of change. What is missing, in our view, are studies of change that explicate the nature and consequences of different types of organizational change at the managerial level. For example, as we suggested in earlier sections, the organization structure and its related formal control system is a frequent object of change yet, on the whole, there have been few attempts to study such changes and their consequences for managerial action. We have reported on the studies by Worthy, Weinshall, and Dalton, Barnes, and Zaleznik, each of which dealt with the effects of alterations in the structure of authority

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toward decentralization of decision making.

Another study by Lawrence<sup>67</sup> describes changes in the behavior of three strategically placed district managers following a move to decentralization in a large chain of supermarkets. Where, from management's point of view, the results were positive in that the district manager acted more as consultants and teachers than as givers of orders and monitors of performance of the store managers they supervised, this was interpreted as stemming from compatibility between the new type of required behavior and the district manager's "self-concept". Similarly, resistance to change was attributed to self-concepts which inhibited individuals from acting in the required ways. However, the descriptive nature of the study does not lend itself to analysis centered on the changes in the structure of authority; in fact this aspect of the change is hardly considered.

In a similar vein the phenomenon of resistance to change, reported upon widely in connection with studies of worker behavior, has not been analyzed in the literature on managerial change. There is no reason to <u>priori</u> assume that resistances apparent at the worker level are not present at the managerial level simply because of the expectation that managers will tend to identify with the organization and accept whatever changes are promulgated by higher authority.

Cursory examination of efforts at change in bureaucratic structures shows ample evidence of resistance. One case reported on in part in Rogow's biography of James Forrestal, indicates dramatically how changes that alter the balance of authority, (in this instance the establishment of a super agency, the Department of Defence, over the existing military departments) will induce a wide range of sophisticated efforts to prevent the shift from

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occurring. In the military case, allegiances with particular groups in the
Congress provided a means of flouting the changes through the handling of
congressional appropriations.

Resistance to change among managers can be classified as "rational"
or "irrational" depending on the realities of change. Rational resistance
consists of efforts to block those changes that result in an actual depletion
in autonomy, status, and power relations with other groups. The depletion is
experienced as a deprivation and the resistance is rational in the sense
that no individual can be expected to accept willingly a deprivation without
some offsetting compensation. Irrational resistance consists of acts
countering change when there is no deprivation. The deprivation may be
felt, but in relation to fantasied or assumed alterations in power. If
two groups are vying for power, a change may be interpreted as ascendancy
for one over the other, but in fact, both groups may see ascendancy for the
other and experience the emotions of deprivation.

Rationality or irrationality in the ways defined here do not
belong exclusively to any particular status level in organizations. The
problem is to trace through empirically instances of both
kinds at the managerial level along with their antecedents and consequences.

One example of irrational resistance to change at the level of
the middle class professional executive culture is available in Hodgson,
Levinson, and Zaleznik's<sup>69</sup> study of the latent role structure of an executive
group. The authors' approach to resistance to change is through the concept
of "reification" — *the conversion of an abstraction or mental construction
into a supposed real thing*.<sup>70</sup>

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Using Goffman's general notion of the staging of one's self - "the dramaturgical approach . . . to the study of organizations,"<sup>71</sup> Hodgson, Levinson, and Zaleznik extended it to include its reciprocal: the response of the 'audience'.

Every member of an actor's audience takes the behavioral data manifested by the actor, evaluates that data, establishes patterns analytically, and interprets these patterns according to his own state of knowledge of his action and the situation, his own feelings about himself and the actor, and his own strivings in relation to the actor. From all this, each member of the audience constructs his own notion of who the actor is, what he is like, what he is trying to do, how good he is at it, etc. This construct is a reification, in the sense that it is usually acted on as though it were the real thing, rather than a representation of it; that is, as though the audience's conceptions of the actor were what the actor really was. The audience never gets to know the actor completely, but this does not stop them from acting toward him as though they were totally informed as to the subjective reality of what is for them an object.<sup>72</sup>

In the course of research, the writers found that the reified personalities of the three top executives were so rigidly held to by their subordinates that the executives' attempts to institute changes were successful only when they appeared to be in consonance with the reified image. The holding of the reified image appears strong enough to transcend questions of self-interest, organizational gain, or achievement of purposes, and therefore contains elements of irrational resistance to change.

A somewhat related problem occurs in instances of "organizational paralysis" - the condition where need for change is accepted, but no person, instrument, or procedure to initiate change is available within the resources of the organization. A problem of this kind is discussed in *Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership*.<sup>73</sup> Guest suggests that a point is reached when an organization is incapable of changing itself internally. In this study he held that new and constructive patterns of behavior could only be introduced from outside since a cycle of superior-originated interactions

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increased tension and low performance had become established. The introduction of a new manager broke the cycle and led to an ability to change and to adjust that was free of earlier tension and conflict. For Guest, a central question was what would happen if the man who initiated the change process should leave the organization - the fact that when he did performance continued to improve was taken to mean that a rewarding and productive pattern of relationships had become institutionalized.

For us, the central questions would be why the state of paralysis under the first manager was ever reached and the implications of this for theories of change; why, under the new manager, conditions and relationship patterns changed to such an extent that members of the organization believed that the 'personality' of a superior or subordinate had changed. Although Guest cites Fleishmann, Burtt, and Harris⁷⁴ in support of the thesis that a willingness to cooperate must "start at the top and permeate down through the entire organization in day to day relationships,"⁷⁵ he ignores perhaps the most interesting findings in the Fleishmann study: that leadership climate, itself a form of reification, molds patterns of expectation on the part of both supervisors and supervised. It is worth noting that in the study by Lawrence cited earlier, the District Manager who displayed the greatest resistance to the required behavioral changes supervised a store manager whose behavior reinforced his own. It appears that factors more intrinsic than patterns of interaction are helping to determine the effects of change.

The phenomenon of reification impedes the ability of subordinates to experience changed behavior on the part of a superior as an actual behavioral change because the new behavior more often seems to be a gimmick or, at best, behavior that is somehow not "in character". Mann found

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that,

changes in subordinates' perceptions and attitudes which follow
a change in supervisory personnel are frequently of much larger
order than those generated by training, and other procedures for
changing the attitudes or behavior of incumbents.

Clearly individuals put their stamp on interaction to an extent that we
can appreciate only if we consider men acting in the interpersonal situation.

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THE ANALYSIS OF ROLE PERFORMANCE

The problem of analyzing managerial behavior especially within interpersonal situations can be approached in two ways: (1) as a problem in delineating the development of role structures in organizations; (2) as a problem in relating personality to performance. We suggest that both approaches warrant careful consideration in managerial studies.

Our aim in this section is to examine the first problem - the structure of role performances - while in the concluding section on executive leadership, we shall bring to bear concepts from the study of personality to explain the nature of different styles of leadership in executive role performance.

The term role performance in organizational studies applies to what individuals as members of a formal organizational hierarchy do in face-to-face encounters with other members of the organization. Role theory in sociology centers on others' expectations as to the behavior of the individual who occupies a given position.⁷⁷ These expectations are considered to be autonomous facts of culture⁷⁸ that sustain order and consistency in human interaction. These expectations are essentially normative prescriptions for behavior in relation to specific positions in the formal organization structure. A foreman, for example, occupies a position to which are attached certain expectations for his behavior toward others in the organization. The behavior of others toward him is equally a consequence of the expectations which are intrinsic to their positions. For a foreman to behave as he is expected to, depends in part on the capacity of another person to take the reciprocal role. Looked at in this way, role performance involves the mutual adaptation of individuals to one another in terms of the behavioral expectations prescribed for each other's position. The total structure within which the expectations operate is the role set and includes vertical as well as lateral relationships.⁷⁹

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In organizational settings elaborate role definitions are transmitted through formal and informal mechanisms. These definitions are inherent in the hierarchy in elaborate job descriptions, but they are also symbolically represented in a variety of ways: through dress, physical location, other status attributes including age and sex.⁸⁰ Foremost among the expectancies that govern role performance in organizations are the deference patterns inherent in authority relationships.

Despite the necessity for accurate role prescriptions, one cannot assume that mutual role definitions are always well established. Interpersonal tension and conflict would not exist if this were always the case. Tension and conflict can arise from the failure of individuals to establish reciprocal role relationships - each may have clear, but quite different, expectations for the other's behavior. In *Explorations in Role Analysis*, for example, Gross and his colleagues explored the problem of consensus in role definitions.⁸¹ They defined consensus as the degree of agreement between role definers - in this case school superintendents and school board members - on the expectations they held for incumbents of each others' positions. The researcher found that in allocating responsibilities between the two positions, school board members assigned greater responsibility to themselves than to the superintendents, and vice versa. School board members felt stronger obligations to the community than to the teaching staff, while the reverse was true for the superintendents. The conflict inherent in these disparate expectations was acutely felt in disputes over school curricula and finance, and in particular over the issue of teachers' salaries.

In contrast with this form of role conflict which is essentially inter-role conflict resulting from the conflicting expectations within a role set, an individual can also be subject to intra-role conflict. Intra-role conflict arises when members of a role set expect different and opposing kinds of behavior from a central figure in the set. In organizations a common source of conflict of this kind lies in the demands made on supervisors that they act

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permissively on the one hand and instrumentally on the other - in other words, the conflict between the expectations from below that the superior will be a 'nice guy' and the expectation from above that he will 'get out the work.'.

The individual caught in a conflict of this kind is often uncertain as to how to act and therefore may behave quite inconsistently, so that he eventually evokes conflict in the individual who must perform in the reciprocal role.

In *Organization Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity*, Kahn and others present and interpret data on the kinds of positions most susceptible to intra-role conflict.⁸² They found that individuals who were the focus of conflicting demands were often the incumbents of 'boundary positions'. Salesmen, for example, were subject to pressure from outside the organization - from customers - as well as from inside - from production superintendents and schedulers. In general, they found evidence of intra-role conflict wherever an individual's position required him to maintain contacts with others outside of the organization or outside of his own department.

A further source of intra-role conflict was found to exist in the organizational need for innovation. To meet this need, an organization is dependent on individual creativity and acceptance of change, but both of these factors are constrained by the resistance which the innovator must face from individuals who look upon him as a threat to their own security. Still another source of conflict for the individual charged with the task of innovator is to be found in the clash between the requirements of the innovating role and the more routine and rule-bound duties of administration.

Role conflicts create conditions that prevent orderliness in interaction while generating stress for members of the role set. An analogous condition is found in role ambiguity. In contrast to role conflict where clear but opposing expectations are present, ambiguity exists where the role expectations have not crystallized or are otherwise vague. Such a condition frequently holds in staff jobs in organizations in which it is quite unclear where giving assistance is to be differentiated from giving orders or in any other

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way directly controlling the behavior of others.

In the Kahn study just cited, the authors found that role ambiguity existed under conditions which de-emphasized the general organizational norms of orientation to rules, close supervision, and similar treatment for all. We would interpret this to mean that role ambiguity follows the movement away from positional authority to professional authority as the primary source of influence and from bureaucratic to individualized work cultures. A number of studies have shown the tendency for individuals high on authoritarian attributes to feel tension and dissatisfaction in loosely structured work situations.⁸³

Yet another type of conflict which affects role performance arises from the fact that individuals play multiple roles at any given stage in the life cycle. A man, for example, is at once husband and father, has an occupation and is a member of many formal and informal groups. Performance in any one role implies a capacity either to integrate the multiple role expectations or to select certain expectations to which he will respond while suppressing others in a fashion that is congruent with the situation at a given point in time. A man may 'father' his son in the family setting with success, but the same behavior in relation to subordinates at work is apt to produce conflict since it may imply a kind of subordination and dependency that others find inappropriate to the work setting.

How an individual integrates or selects and suppresses expectations for a given role performance is a function of personality structure and psychodynamic attributes, a problem we shall examine later in this section and in the one following. We shall consider now, as a further step in the analysis of role structure and performance, the theoretical formulations of Parsons and Bales.⁸⁴ Their theory and its related laboratory studies of problem-solving groups show how shifting role structures and performances are imbedded in the tensions inherent in work and interpersonal relations in organizations.⁸⁵,⁸⁶

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Bales postulates that problem-solving activity in groups represents a moving equilibrium in which one observes the recurrence of disruptive modes followed by counterbalancing modes. Two main modes or cycles exist in problem-solving. The first is task-oriented behavior where the acts are directed toward the solution of problems. During the course of task activity, the equilibrium is disrupted in that work produces a buildup of tensions. Work essentially calls for a release of aggressive energy in the exchange and evaluation of ideas. Competition inevitably results and as task-oriented behavior continues, the tension continues to mount. The cohesion of a group becomes threatened when the point is reached where the tension is intolerable (this point cannot be specified). To assure the survival and continuity of the group, a new mode or cycle must begin, directed toward draining the tension and restoring the cohesion within the group. This second modality requires catharsis, expression of warm feelings, and reestablishing the identity of the group in the mind of the members to assure their continued participation. But at a certain point, acts directed toward cohesion become blocks toward work, and acts are then introduced to begin to deal with problem-solving issues. Problem-solving is thus a process of alternating modes or cycles in interpersonal relations.

Bales, following Parsons, describes the task-oriented phase as the "instrumental-adaptive" and the cohesive phase as "social emotional-expressive." Bales' findings suggest that work tends to be disruptive of social relations, and that much socially oriented behavior may be seen as restoring the integrity of the group in face of the tensions resulting from work.

He concludes that:

> The problem of equilibrium is essentially the problem of establishing arrangements (or an "orbit of activity") whereby the system goes through a repetitive cycle, within which all of the disturbances created in one phase are reduced in some other. The dilemma of all action systems is that no one disturbance can be reduced without creating another.<sup>88</sup>

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Having identified and interpreted the equilibrium problem, Bales then describes how groups develop a structure of role relationships which is functionally related to the maintenance of group equilibrium. He notes that although groups without an assigned leader tend to have a more equal distribution of participation among members, there does tend to be a process of **quantitative differentiation** among members. When he ranked and aggregated participants in the laboratory study on the quantity of activity they produced, he found that the top man was the only one who addressed more comments to the group as a whole than he did to individual members, while all ranks distributed their comments to others in proportion to the amounts that the others spoke. Bales states that qualitative differentiation was associated with quantitative differentiation.⁸⁹ His findings, along with those of other investigators⁹⁰ confirm the high degree of association between individuals' participation rates and their statuses as measured independently.

In addition to being observed in action, the individuals in Bales' groups were asked to evaluate each other on several criteria. By comparing the results of the "voting" on quality of ideas, contribution to guidance, likes, and dislikes, with the participation rankings in five-man groups, Bales found indications that the roles taken by individuals tend to be specialized in ways which contribute toward the maintenance of group equilibrium. Men who ranked first in participation received the highest number of votes for guidance and ideas, but they also received the largest number of **dislike** choices. The men who ranked second on participation received the highest number of liked choices, but were lower than expected in votes received on guidance and ideas (the expectation had been that evaluations on all criteria would be proportional to participation rates). The interpretation of this finding is that the top participators, having done more work in the sense of initiating more instrumental-adaptive activity, disrupted the **social** equilibrium of the system and aroused negative reactions. The second ranking participator, by not being as directive and constricting in his activity,

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then became the person upon whom positive feelings were centered, thereby
allowing the group to reintegrate itself in the face of the top man's dis-
ruptive effects. Bales explains the unexpectedly high number of "dislike"
votes received by the lowest participators as the scapegoat effect; some of
the hostility generated by the top man's activities were displaced onto the
scapegoat to resolve some of the ambivalence toward the top man.

Bales' findings and interpretations lead to the conclusion that the
dilemma of group problem-solving lies in the apparent antithesis between work
and affection. Affection is the "cement" which binds groups together. The
aggressive activity which produces work tends to disintegrate groups. Yet
in order for group work to be achieved, the group must hold itself together
in some way. The processes by which cohesion and work are accomplished are
similar in kind to the physiological processes which maintain organisms in
a state of internal equilibrium while the organism as a whole maintains some
form of stable adaptive equilibrium in its interactions with its environment.

Slater's study addresses the problem of role differentiation in
small groups.⁹¹ It asks essentially whether performances in a group are flexible
and widely distributed among individuals or specialized with (a resulting
structure of complementary role performances.) Using measures of participation
and voting choices received on Ideas, Guidance, Liking, and Leadership, he
finds that:

> role differentiation in the High (consensus) groups seems to be
> bipartite, with an active "task specialist" and a best-liked man. In
> the low (consensus) groups it tends to be tripartite (as well as more
> extreme), with an active participator who is neither well-liked nor
> highly rated on task ability, a more passive task specialist who is
> not well-liked, and a popular individual who is neither active nor
> highly rated on task ability.⁹²

He also finds that role specialization tends to _increase_ over
time. His groups each met four times. In each succeeding meeting, the like-
lihood that a man would be top choice on both ideas and liking decreased
significantly.

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After their fourth meeting, each member of each group was asked who stood out as leaders over four meetings. Slater calculated the proportion of cases where the top man on leadership choices was also top in choices received in each of the other criteria. The results were as follows:

80% of top men on leadership were also top men on guidance.

59% of top men on leadership were also top men on ideas.

25% of top men on leadership were also top men on liking.⁹³

He states that although there was no association between leadership and liking, leadership was most highly correlated with liking - Receiving Interaction and Guidance. He concludes that:

> the chosen leader of a group is perhaps the man who has the highest hypothetical *combined* rating on all possible characteristics related to the group's purposes and needs.⁹⁴

When he compared the behavior patterns of idea men and best-liked men, Slater found that the idea men initiated more problem-solving attempts, disagreed more, and showed more antagonism, while the best-liked men initiated more positive social reactions, asked more questions, and showed more tension.

He summarizes as follows:

> The general picture is thus one of specialization and complementarity, with the Idea man concentrating on the task and playing a more aggressive role, while the Best-liked man concentrates more on social-emotional problems, giving rewards and playing a more passive role.⁹⁵

He also discusses evidence which shows that the idea men and the best-liked men tend to work together in a complementary team relationship.

Confirming and elaborating on the apparent antipathy between task activity and social activity reported in Bales' work on equilibrium, Slater demonstrates how the roles tend to polarize in group processes. He found that role complementarity provides one way for groups to deal with the task-social dilemma while indicating that highly specialized role performance may be an indicator of rigidity in personality. Slater's ideas suggest that effective leaders in problem-solving groups attempt to overcome the situational forces which tend to force role specialization and are relatively free

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of strong personal predispositions to specialize in role performance.

The empirical findings presented seem to suggest a division of labor in a group along the instrumental-expressive axis. Further confirmation of this division of role performance is found in a more recent study by Moment and Zaleznik of interpersonal behavior in problem-solving settings.⁹⁶ The groups, consisting of mature executives and professional persons, met in an experimental setting. In the course of their participation they completed sociometric questionnaires similar to the type used by Bales in his studies. The resulting correlation matrix of performance ratings is represented below:

Degrees of Association Among Components of Role Perceptions and Resultant Evaluations, Measured by Mutual Predictive Values.⁹⁷

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">GENERAL EVALUATIONS</th></tr><tr><th>LEADERSHIP</th><th>"LIKE TO WORK WITH"</th><th>"LIKE TO KNOW SOCIALLY"</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">SPECIFIC COMMENTS:</td><td>IDEAS</td><td>.50</td><td>.26</td><td>.00</td></tr><tr><td>GUIDANCE</td><td>.42</td><td>.05</td><td>.14</td></tr><tr><td>CONGENIALITY</td><td>.17</td><td>.00</td><td>.20</td></tr></tbody></table>

Clearly, there is a systematic relationship in the perception of task roles as significant aspect of leadership and the social roles as an aspect of friendship patterns. This general proposition is also supported in the studies of friendship structures and may be summarized, following Homans, to mean that "love flees authority".⁹⁸ Individuals who exercise aggression (authority) through the expression of ideas may end up influencing and controlling the behavior of others. They may be viewed as leaders but the desired relationship is one of distance and not intimacy.

While it appears true that role perceptions divide along the instrumental-expressive axis it may not necessarily follow that problem-solving

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activity involves a bipartite leadership structure. In the Moment and Zalesnik study just cited, the structure of roles was conceived in terms of a four-fold model. One role type consisted of the *fusion* of idea and congeniality components. A second and third consisted of the role specializations (task and social), following Bales. And, a fourth conceived of an erratic pattern that is perceived neither as strong on task nor social components. This last role type was designated *underchosen*, representing impoverishment in role performance. The four role types proved a very valuable model empirically and showed distinct differences in performances and underlying motivational states.

Parsons' and Bales' formulations are offered as general propositions about the nature of action systems. Two questions emerge from their theory of special importance to our discussion. The first deals with the adequacy of the model of the model of role structure in its dichotomy between instrumental and expressive roles. In our view, and we shall shortly cite supporting evidence, no role performance exists without an affective component. In all likelihood, the instrumental roles are charged with aggression and account for their divisive potential. Aggression is no less expressive, from the point of view of the actors in a role set, than the warm and nurturant performances of the social leader whose acts result in tension reduction.

The second question concerns the applicability of the model to large-scale organizations. The empirical data supporting the theory grew out of studies in the laboratory and observations of the family. Is extension to role structures in business, educational and governmental organizations valid? Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleszink in the *Executive Role Constellation*, a study of leadership structure and dynamics in a mental hospital, demonstrate the value of the Parsons & Bales model and offer modifications applicable to bureaucratic systems.⁹⁹

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Within the management structure of the mental hospital studied, the authors found a subsystem of three executives whose importance, although dependent in part on their high positions in the organization, was at the same time heavily reinforced by the ability of the three men to engage the task aspects of their jobs in ways which permitted a simultaneous "division of emotional labor".

The authors defined a role constellation as:

> an emerging and evolving system . . . which comes into being under certain social conditions through the active efforts of the person involved to develop a useful, personally meaningful enterprise. It requires a "division of emotional labor" as it were, along with the more explicit dimensions of function with regard to specific administrative tasks. In a relatively durable constellation the psychosocial functions of the executive group are divided among its members in a way that suits their personalities as well as the needs of the organization. There is specialization of function by each member. There is differentiation of function: individuals differ in the nature of their specializations. And there is complementarity of function: the specializations of the various members complement and balance one another to form a relatively integrated whole.¹⁰⁰

In looking at the executives as incumbents of a position and at the same time as complex personalities making responsible decisions and determining their own futures, the authors used the insights of role theory, exchange theory, the action theory of Parsons & Bales, and the contributions of the psychoanalytic theory of personality.

The authors found that the primary function of each executive was not "the internalizing of existing organizational values, but the institutionalizing of values new to the organization, drawn from the executive's personal value system."¹⁰¹

Each executive's role in the organization tended to become specialized around the performance of certain tasks and the expression of certain emotions. The symbolic significance of the role constellation is related to

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to the experience in the family. The study suggests that all organizations develop a latent role structure following certain familial patterns. The authors' observations indicated the importance to each individual in the system of actively developing situations which were satisfying to him for both personal and organizational reasons. His manner of doing so assumed a consistent pattern over time and created an image of him on the part of his subordinates which at times exerted a crucial influence on his ability to get on with his work as he wanted it done: when he stepped out of the 'personal role' he had established, acceptance by his subordinates was seriously impaired.

The literature on executive behavior is deficient in the study of the types of role structures found in different kinds of organizations. Studies of this type are badly needed to provide an analytic model of action in organizations where the objectives of action relate at a manifest level to the strategy and tactics of purpose, and at a latent level to the emotional and motivational spheres of individual existence. As we shall try to show in the next section of this chapter, the problem of action in executive leadership is one of demonstrating and explaining the outer and inner meaning of behavior and its consequences for organization survival and development.

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EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

The problem of leadership is directly concerned with how in-
dividuals mobilize and use power in its various forms as derived from
position, competence, and personal charisma. In Weber's formulations,
bureaucratic organization rests on a foundation of normative rules which
are accepted by individuals as the most rational way of ordering activ-
ity toward the achievement of organizational objectives. In the ideal
bureaucracy the system ensures that only the man best qualified to hold
an office can achieve it. Superior-subordinate relationships are accepted
as rationally ordained by differentials in skill and knowledge and, as a
concomitant of this, the authority of position or of office assumes par-
amount importance.

In "classical" theories of organization, this connection be-
tween position and competence was lost sight of and the office itself in-
creasingly became the sole source of authority in analyses of organiza-
tion structures. Orders from a superior were obeyed by subordinates be-
cause they emanated from a position of authority capable of meting out
reward, punishment, or sanction.

The formal authority delegated to a position was regarded as
coterminous with the authority exercised by its holder and accepted by
his subordinates: presumably, if the holder were authorized to 'lead',
his subordinates would follow.

The discrepancy between classical theory and organizational
processes inevitably led to revision of the theory. Barnard held that
"authority is another name for the willingness and capacity of individ-

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uals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems."<sup>102</sup> He distinguished two dimensions of authority, "authority of position" and "authority of leadership". Authority of position depended on centrality in the organization's communications system - it was determined by a structural decision - while authority of leadership was dependent on the superior ability of the leader. Barnard felt that taken together, authority of position and of leadership determined the extent to which a superior's directives would be followed and in this way he reintroduced the Weberian concept of expertise. Barnard differed from Weber, however, in according expertise the status of a variable; he did not view it as inherent in the system. To the extent that an executive lacked 'authority of leadership', subordinates would tend to question whether an order was consistent with their understanding of organizational purpose or with their own personal interests; to the extent that he possessed it, his subordinates would function in a 'zone of indifference' in which they felt no need to judge the order's merits but simply accepted the prior judgment of their superior. Barnard felt that it was the task of the executive to widen the zone of indifference, to mobilize the authority of superior ability in order to encourage suspension of judgment on the part of his subordinates. At the same time, he expressly eliminated coercion from his analysis of authority: "authority lies always with him to whom it applies . . . force creates a contrary illusion but it destroys the authority postulated."<sup>103</sup> The inference here is that if 'authority' exists, force is superfluous, and if force is used we are dealing, not with authority, but with something quite different. This effectively discounts the coercive power inherent in position.

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Subsequent work has followed Barnard's line of reasoning so that we find a distinction drawn by Gibb, among others, between 'leadership' and 'headship'.<sup>104</sup> Leadership, in Gibb's view, is accorded by peers, not by subordinates. Gibb states that:

> The leader's authority is spontaneously accorded him by his fellow group members, the followers. The authority of the head derives from some extra-group power which he has over the members of the group, who cannot meaningfully be called his followers. They accept his domination on pain of punishment rather than follow. The business executive is an excellent example of a head exercising authority derived from his position in an organization through membership in which the workers, his subordinates, satisfy many strong needs. They obey his commands and accept his domination because this is part of their duty as organization members and to reject him would be to discontinue membership with all the punishments that would involve.<sup>105</sup>

> 'Leadership' according to Gibb is a variable while 'headship' is not. His definition of leadership clearly follows Barnard's, while his description of headship leans heavily on the classical theory of unilateral authority vested in position and backed by organizational sanctions.

> For our purposes distinctions such as these are meaningless for the problem of leadership cannot be addressed by concentrating on, eliminating, or varying any single factor whether it be authority of position or voluntary acceptance of authority by subordinates (itself a consequence of the use/authority inherent in competence and charisma). For us, the problem of leadership is essentially the problem of how and for what purpose an executive generates and mobilizes the power and authority vested in his position, in his level of competence and in the charismatic appeal with which he may be endowed.

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These concepts clearly owe much to Weberian analysis, but the fundamental difference in our use of them is that we view them not as structural attributes normatively required, but as variables dependent for their functioning on the capacities of a man in action within a structure. We shall illustrate this view initially by reference to the work of political analysts whose accounts of chief executives in office provide the clearest indication of the extent to which individual pre-dispositions and personality have shaped and reshaped an office. Political analysts point out that the positional power of the President of the United States is always there, but that there are marked variations in the way different incumbents have used their powers; the variables are not simply the ways in which power is exercised but whether the individual is sensitive to and aware of power processes.

As a guide in their comparisons of leaders exercising power, political analysts have used the concept of 'style.' We can define style, following the psychoanalytic concept of "character," as the patterned modes of behavior with which an individual relates himself to external reality and to his own internal dispositions. For the time being, we shall refrain from developing a more general conceptualization of what 'reality' is in an executive situation; what, for instance, the functions are that must be served and what means are available for the purpose. We shall also leave until later the attempt to delineate the predispositional sets which affect the way in which a man perceives his functions, and which affect, as a result, his ability to use the power available to him in their service. We shall concentrate initially on descriptions of presidents in office, on the styles of leadership with which they respond to the functional demands of their positions. We shall thus attempt to move from what actually happens in the encounter between the individual and the situation to why it appears to happen in the way that it does.

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In *Presidential Power*, Neustadt gives a clear account of the functions a president must serve, of the means available to him for the purpose, and of the leadership styles of three very different presidents as they used their power in the execution of policy. 106

The president is, of course, acting within a structure, and Neustadt, while identifying the constitutional function that he must serve, also brings into relief one of the crucial dilemmas of power and position.

In form, all Presidents are leaders nowadays. In fact, this guarantees no more than that they will be clerks. Everybody now expects the man in the White House to do something about everything. Laws and customs now reflect acceptance of him as the Great Initiator, an acceptance quite as widespread at the Capitol as at his end of Pennsylvania Avenue. But such acceptance does not signify that all the rest of government is at his feet. It merely signifies that other men have found it practically impossible to do their jobs without assurance of initiatives from him. Service for themselves, not power for the President, has brought them to accept his leadership in form. 107

The "constituents" of the president, who look to him for initiatives, come from five groups: executive officialdom, Congress, political partisans, citizens at large, and officials in foreign countries. Representatives of each of these constituent groups seek to develop claims on the chief executive in ways that enable them to perform, while the president himself seeks to establish claims upon their decisions to act.

Neustadt's thesis is that the president has to exercise choice in acting so that he establishes priorities among the pressures emanating from such different sources. He cannot be all things to all men. Rather he must be able to bargain with individual self-interest in order to win support for the initiatives that his functions demand of him. Presidential power, in reality, or the power to initiate successfully, according to Neustadt,

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is influence of an effective sort on the behavior of men ac-
tually involved in making public policy and carrying it out.
Effective influence for the man in the White House stems from
three related sources: first are the bargaining advantages
inherent in the job with which he persuades other men that
what he wants of them is what their own responsibilities re-
quire them to do. Second are the expectations of those
other men regarding his ability and will to use the various
advantages they think he has. Third are those men's es-
timates of how his public views him and of how their public
may view them if they do what he wants. 108

For Neustadt, the positional power inherent in the Presidency
is the power to persuade, to bargain for support of the President's de-
cisions against an ever-present background of power to reward, punish,
and coerce. Reinforcing his efforts at persuasion are his strength of
purpose and the additional leverage which the charisma attached to him
and to his office confer. The decisions he takes will reflect the way
in which he sees his office.

The way in which an individual executive sees his role in-
volves a series of complicated mental processes. The work of formulat-
ing a role conception is the "role-task" of the executive. Hodgson,
Levinson and Zaleznik describe the executive's role-task as the "linkage
between a man's assessment of his personality, his here-and-now con-
ception of himself, and his assessment of the requirements of his posi-
tion in the organization."109 Role-task work proceeds in the reflective
self-assessment processes of the executive. It manifests itself through
his actions and his interpersonal relations.

For striking comparisons of the outcomes of role-task work re-
flecting the differing role conceptions of the occupants of the office
of the President, Neustadt contrasts the styles of leadership of Roosevelt
and Eisenhower.

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Eisenhower wanted to be President [although] what he wanted from it was a far cry from what F.D.R. had wanted. Roosevelt was a politician seeking personal power; Eisenhower was a hero seeking national unity. . . he genuinely thought the President was or ought to be the source of unifying, moderating, influence above the struggle.¹¹⁰

Eisenhower's presidential style was that of a leader above the struggle. He established a staff system in the White House which

imparted more superficial symmetry and order to his flow of information than was ever done before. Therefore, he became typically the last man in his office to know tangible details and the last to come to grips with acts of choice. His one-time chief assistant in the White House, Sherman Adams, is reported to have told a close associate: 'I count the day lost when I have not found some new way of lightening the President's load'.¹¹¹

Eisenhower did not want the details, as Roosevelt did, of every factor that could affect a decision. He wanted the details ready-weighed and only the final alternatives presented to him. These alternatives often reflected other men's interests more closely than his own and Neustadt's description of the circumstances surrounding Eisenhower's 1957 budget points to this. The system limited Eisenhower's ability to exploit the power available to him since he lacked information on how and where it should be applied.

Dahl stresses that a power base is inert or passive; it must be exploited in some way if the behavior of others is to be affected.¹¹²

He defines the means of power as "a mediating activity by A between A's base and B's response" and he illustrated this by suggesting that

in the case of the President, the means would include the *promise* of patronage, the *threat* of veto, the *holding* of a conference, the *threat* of appeal to the electorate, the *exercise* of charm and charisma, etc.¹¹³

The bases of power in position, competence, and charisma are apparent, but in Eisenhower's case they went largely unused. Franklin D.

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Roosevelt, on the other hand, was a man bent on taking the initiative. The Roosevelt of the 1930's was intent on making new departures and he exploited every base of power available to him to rally support for his decisions.

The first task of an executive, as he evidently saw it, was to guarantee himself an effective flow of information and ideas. . . . Roosevelt's persistent effort therefore was to check and balance information acquired through official channels by information acquired through a myriad of private, informal, and unorthodox channels and espionage networks. At times he seemed almost to pit his personal sources against his public sources.¹¹⁴

In doing this, however, he not only checked and balanced the flow and validity of his information, at the same time he ensured for himself a position of the utmost centrality at every stage of the decision-making process. He could assess who wanted what and why they wanted it. He could establish his priorities and make his choices guided by clear indications as to where and at whom his power should be directed in order to secure support.

Roosevelt's style of leadership was not only that of an initiator, it also involved the use of ambiguity in interpersonal relations. The use of ambiguity provided a means for maintaining a central position in the communication network and flexibility in negotiation and making decisions. A chief executive can attempt to assume the initiative but with an interpersonal style that involves aloofness and distance. An illustration of this is available in descriptions of Woodrow Wilson as Chief Executive. In _Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House_, the Georges make it clear that Wilson was dramatically aware of the Chief Executive's function as initiator.¹¹⁵ In fact, whatever leadership position he attained, whether as President of Princeton University, Governor of New Jersey or President of the United States, Wilson initiated reforms of a sweeping nature. His style

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of initiation reflected an emotional attachment to abstract ideas and ideals such as justice and democracy. His expression of these ideals involved a narcissistic bond between himself and the masses. This narcissistic transaction proceeded through the spoken word, the "giving" in verbal imagery of strong emotional currents which mobilized and sustained the idealism. The "getting" in this exchange involved the adoration of the masses to reinforce a self-image built on the theme of the warrior overcoming malevolent forces that impede man's struggle for justice and equality.

In contrast, Wilson was unable to function freely when action depended on negotiation and persuasion in close face-to-face relationships. In the earlier stages of his Presidency he depended upon Colonel House to deal with the hard realities of negotiation and in this sense established a pair relationship involving complementary role performances. Wilson's personal inability to negotiate, either with the Allies or the Senate in the ratification of the Peace Treaty, reflected his desire to carry the issue of the League of Nations through direct appeals to the people. He grew to distrust House and blocked his efforts at acting as a surrogate at the Peace Conference.

These brief excursions into political studies have served the purpose of centering our discussion of executive leadership upon the individual acting within a structure. The point that we wish to underline is that in all organizations executives face the problem of fusing a personal style with structural realities in asserting power. Executives may or may not be conscious of the functions that in reality they are called upon to serve. The structure does not necessarily make these functions clear and unequivocal. As a consequence an individual may or

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may not be aware of the bases of power available to him, or as in Wilson's case, he may overexploit a particular base while ignoring others that are equally available and in fact more appropriate as a means of achieving his objectives. In the same vein, the executive is probably unaware of the major life themes that determine his personal style including the elements of the situation that he actively attaches himself to and those he unconsciously avoids.

Little work has been done so far in the sociological study of leadership which attempts to deal systematically with the problem of the person - position encounter. A model for such analyses must provide concepts that relate both personality and structural variables. A small attempt in this direction is the paper by Zaleznik, "Managerial Behavior and Interpersonal Competence."116

Zaleznik identifies three basic organizational functions: the homeostatic, the mediative, and the proactive. The homeostatic function is concerned with the maintenance of the organization - the assurance of its internal stability in the face of internal disruption. The mediative function, on the other hand, is fulfilled by processes which occur under the impact of environmental pressure: the executive attempts to influence individuals and groups within the organization to modify behavior and attitudes so that a different form of adaptation to the environment is secured. The proactive function, rather than being a reaction to environmental pressure, is concerned with inducing change in the environment to conform to the creative use of resources available within the organization.

In terms of the primacy of objectives, the homeostatic function stresses maintaining the stability of the system as the fundamental objective, sometimes to the point where it becomes a substitute for activity in the environment; mediation

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involves activity in the environment in order to distinguish pressures to which the organization must respond by way of altered internal relationships. Proaction, on the other hand, is the mark differentiating the innovative entrepreneur and typically tends to induce resistance, aggression, and in some cases outright hostility within the organization; it may be disruptive of internal relations in the service of changing the environment.

Historically, organizations seem to move through phases in which emphasis is given to one of these three functional types. An example is available in a brief study of management succession in Sears Roebuck by Perrin Stryker. In *The Character of the Executive* he gives an account of the correlation between management succession in Sears Roebuck and the changes in company policy.¹¹⁷

The head of the company from 1893 - 1908 was the founder, Richard W. Sears. He started out in partnership with a watch repairman named Roebuck selling watches by direct mail. As the business grew, Sears introduced basic innovations in mail order selling, not least among which was an insistence on keeping the standard of his goods up to the hyperbolic descriptions of his advertising copy; and this at a time when, as Stryker writes, "fleecing yokels was a standard business practice." Sears kept his prices low, his mark-up small, and depended on high-pressure advertising to increase turnover. His advertising changed tastes and formed new ones. Farmers who had never thought of buying banquet lamps, phonographs or bedroom suites, discovered that they could buy goods by mail which were as attractive as those available in the big-city stores. Under pressure from Sears' merchandising tactics, businessmen in the cities, as well as those in small towns, improved their sales and service policies to compete

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with Sears and often copied his techniques outright. Sears, in fact, changed the environment which merchandizers up to then had taken for granted; his proactive style initiated change.

The man who followed him as head of the organization, however, had quite different views. Julius Rosenwald bought a half interest in the Company in 1895, and he found Sears' methods increasingly disruptive of what, in his view, was efficient management. Sears' advertising and promotion had spurred such a level of orders that in ten years the Company's sales jumped from three-quarters of a million to nearly forty million dollars. The buying and shipping departments were overburdened and in confusion. Rosenwald opposed many of Sears' proposals, even those which later proved to be brilliant marketing successes. The Company's sales fell in the 1907 depression and although Sears argued strongly for even larger expenditures on advertising to combat the fall, Rosenwald defeated him and began a drastic cost-cutting program. Sears resigned and Rosenwald assumed control. Rosenwald, if anything, maintained the status quo. He stressed the homeostatic function of maintaining internal stability. His most far-reaching innovation was the improvement of methods of quality control, but even these were later eliminated as part of an economy drive.

Rosenwald's eventual successor was Robert E. Wood. Wood, as Vice President of Montgomery Ward had begun to apply statistics to the mail-order market and had foreseen that the declining rural population was reducing the need for mail-order services, while at the same time increasing the need for retail stores in suburban towns. Wood realized that competition from chain stores was intensifying and he became convinced that the future of mail-order houses lay in shifting the emphasis to retailing. After Wood joined Sears Roebuck, he immediately began to

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move the company into the retail trade. In 1928 the number of company-owned stores jumped from 27 to 192 and the chain grew to more than 630 over the next 20 years, accounting for approximately three-quarters of Sears total sales. Wood's contribution to the company lay in his essentially meditative activity of adapting the business to an environment which had changed substantially. He foresaw trends and moved to meet them.

In 1954 Wood was succeeded by Theodore Houser. As chief merchandiser of Sears under Wood, Houser had devised an unusual strategy of 'basic buying' which called for close cooperation with the Company's suppliers in the design of products and in the calculation of materials, labor, overhead, and profit. Houser's aim was to develop low-cost suppliers capable of making a steady profit for themselves who were located so as to save distribution costs, and assisted by Sears Roebuck's research and volume orders, to reduce their operating costs. Thus, Houser viewed Sears' suppliers as part of the Company's structure - with Sears assisting each to become more efficient as a producer - rather than as sources of goods at the lowest possible price, the original mail-order buying concept.

This illustrates some of the difference between the adaptation of mediation and the innovation of proaction; a further innovation by Houser makes the distinction even clearer. Sears had long been criticized for the cash drain its mail-order sales imposed in many rural areas. Houser found, for example, that Sears was buying less than $500,000 a year in Mississippi while selling $8 million to $9 million of goods in the state. Houser felt that Sears

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could change this situation if instead of using one very large supplier it encouraged the establishment of several small plants spread over a wider area. On this basis, Sears acquired suppliers across the country bringing sales and purchases into balance; for example, Sears helped to establish nearly 100 small factories in the southeast, in this way increasing its purchases in the area to a point where they were approximately the same as the company's sales.

Stryker implicitly discusses the quality of the leadership shown by Wood and Houser in terms of the functions they served.

Wood, for instance, dramatically expanded Sears into the retail-store business, and changed its internal and external organization in line with the changes in population and marketing that he foresaw; whereas Houser led by carefully planning and developing the means for changing Sears into a new kind of industrial unit that aims at linking the supplier, the distributor, and the customer - the linking to be not only for mutual benefit but for the benefit of the general economy.¹¹⁸

We would go back even further. Under its founder, Sears Roebuck changed the mail-order environment; the organizational function which was discharged almost to the exclusion of any other was essentially proactive and the internal disruption which ensued led to a homeostatic counter-revolution under Rosenwald. This was followed by Wood's successful attempts to adapt the company to an environment that had in the meantime changed appreciably. Houser in his turn reverted to an emphasis on pro-activity which leads us to the interesting speculation that emphasis on one or the other function forms part of a cycle in organizational life.

Our purpose here, however, is the delineation of the functions themselves rather than the patterns that they may form, and if we consider that the fulfillment of these functions represents organizational reality for an

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executive, then it becomes necessary to discuss the means by which func-
tional demands are met or avoided. The situation in which these demands
are responded to is interpersonal, but the first stimulus is necessarily
intrapersonal and the question becomes one of how the demands of organ-
izational reality will mesh with the individual's predispositions.

In Role Development and Interpersonal Competence, cited
earlier, the authors distinguished four predispositional sets to which
we have already referred. Three of these sets concern us here. The
sets represent essentially the direction of emotional energy outward, or
the individual's energy cathexes. The objects toward which the cathexes
are directed are of two main kinds: persons and ideas. In one internal
set the individual may direct his emotional energy toward the task - tech-
nically we speak of his cathacting the idea aspects of the work. The
interpersonal aspects are not cathacted to the same degree and may even,
in fact, be defended against. A second internal set consists of a
strong orientation toward persons - the cathexis is directed toward human
relationships. Tasks may assume relatively little significance in the
individual's inner need and value structure, and in fact the cognitive-
technical aspects of work may be defended against. The third predis-
positional set represents a fusion of cathexes. In this case, the
individual in his inner world weighs both persons and ideas as important
to him and blends them in his concern with situations in the real world.

These three main predispositional sets represent the center of
outward concern of the ego. They are a product of the complicated ego
processes involving identifications, self-esteem, and energy utiliza-
tion which emerge in the successive stages of the life cycle.

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Zaleznik noted that,

> It would seem that the predispositional sets are conducive for performance within specialized functions. This idea is expressed by the shadings within each cell. While every individual can probably shift interpersonal modes to conform to the various functional requisites, each set would appear to be selectively oriented toward a particular function. The person-oriented individual would perform most easily in the range of interpersonal behavior associated with the homeostatic functions. We would assume that such an individual would, relatively speaking, avoid proactive functions. Under conditions where proaction was thrust upon him and avoidance became difficult, the defensive apparatus of the individual would be under stress. The idea-oriented individual, on the other hand, would perform most easily in the proactive functions, utilizing aggression and dominance as major components of his interpersonal style. Presumably the homeostatic functions are not well understood and may be strongly avoided. . . . organizational effectiveness would seem to require as a prerequisite some mix in the performance of executive functions to assure both the securing of purpose and the maintenance of the internal capacities of the organization.¹²⁰

The concept of leadership style emerges from the interaction between functional demands and individual predispositions, but the means by which style becomes apparent are the ways in which the executive makes use of the bases of his power.

French and Raven identify five bases of power: reward, coercive, referent, legitimate, and expert.¹²¹ Reward, coercive, and legitimate power are built into high organizational positions. A superior can mediate rewards and punishments for his subordinates. French and Raven postulate that the strength of reward or coercive power increases with the magnitude of the rewards and punishments involved and with the subordinate's subjective probability that his superior will mediate them. Legitimate power stems from internalized values in the subordinate that his superior has a right to influence him and that he has an obligation to accept this influence. This concept is closely related to Weber's formulation of legitimate authority. Referent power is based on one individual's identification with another. By identification French and

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Raven mean a "feeling of oneness . . . or a desire for such an identity."
This identification can be established or maintained only if the individ-
ual desiring the relationship behaves, believes, and perceives as the
other does. In this way the individual with whom the relationship is
desired has the ability to influence the other without even attempting to
do so and this concept clearly takes us into the realm of charismatic
power. The final power base identified by French and Raven is that of
expert power: the belief on the part of the individual that another
possesses special knowledge or skill. The reasons on which such a be-
lief can be based are several: the other's training, experience, rep-
utation, and demonstrated ability.

French and Raven's analysis takes us more deeply into the
psychological aspects of power and influence in executive situations.
Functional demands cue the individual into the use of a power base
appropriate to the situation. For example, implicit in Neustadt's
analysis of the Presidency referred to earlier, is the degree to which
its effectiveness, its 'success', is dependent on proactivity; the sys-
tem turns on presidential initiative. But for the President to win sup-
port for his initiatives he must be able to use the power available to
him and this in turn depends on his awareness of the demands placed upon
him and on the way in which these coincide with the predispositions which
he brings to the office.

To speak of Roosevelt, therefore, as 'a politician seeking per-
sonal power' is to do him less than justice.¹²² In him a predispositional
idea-oriented set and the functional demands of his office effectively
meshed. He was psychologically free to achieve his objectives through the
use of all the bases of power available to him. He could use people.

"His favorite technique was to keep grants of authority incomplete, jurisdictions uncertain, charters overlapping. The results of this competitive theory of administration was often confusion and exasperation on the operating level; but no other method could so reliably insure that in a large bureaucracy filled with ambitious men eager for power, the decisions and the power to make them, would remain with the President."123

In this respect, he differed fundamentally from Wilson. Wilson's cathexis to ideas was fraught with inner conflict over the challenge to his authority that he felt in relationships with other men; in the Presidency he dealt with this problem either by referring it to his close associate, House, or by avoiding it entirely and relying instead on positional, and to a much larger extent, charismatic power, to achieve his objectives.

Neustadt's description of Eisenhower's style suggests the contrasts with Franklin Roosevelt's:

"Eisenhower's use of men tended to smother not enhance, the competition roused by overlapping jurisdictions. Apparently this was intentional; . . . Eisenhower, seemingly preferred to let subordinates proceed upon the lowest common denominators of agreement than to have their quarrels - and issues and details - pushed up to him."124

Evidently Eisenhower defended against conflict and aggression and his conscious attitude was one of altruism rather than the egoism of Franklin Roosevelt. The success of a President in office, according to Neustadt, is dependent on his ability to initiate. To initiate successfully he must be able to exploit the bases of his power, but personal power - the means by which an idea orientation is transformed into a proactive style - held no attraction for Eisenhower. Doubting his own, he clung to the judgment of the people around him and to this the conflict over his 1957 Budget attests.

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Yet another illustration of the meshing of functional demands with individual predispositions can be found in the _Executive Role Constellation_, cited earlier. In this study Hodgson, Levinson, and Zaleznik observed the work of three executives in an important teaching and research hospital. The three men, all doctors who had gained recognition in their field, were in the key positions of Superintendent, Clinical Director, and Director of Research. The Superintendent was an active, assertive, and dominating figure who specialized in external relations.

(He) viewed himself very much as a builder, who who could put things together and make them run. He talked of his many activities and commitments in terms of their instrumental place in building the future of psychiatry. His professional memberships as such were not only of interest or value in and of themselves. They too were part of (his) larger design to assist and to influence the unfolding cause of his profession. 125

Yet in this hospital the homeostatic function had also to be met. The Superintendent contributed a sense of action and movement, but at the same time more than a few of his subordinates feared him for his very qualities of assertiveness. They avoided him and weakened his lines of communication throughout the organization. To a large extent this deficiency was met by the Clinical Director, a warm quiet figure with close emotional ties to people in the organization and an intimate knowledge of what went on in their daily lives.

The researchers took the view that

> . . . executive groups . . . usually consist of two or three (rarely more) central individuals, although some others may be peripherally involved . . . We have used the word 'constellation' rather than 'group' to emphasize the significance of the personal relations among members, the emotional climate of the group, and the psychological properties of the interactions that define the group. Constellations . . . involve (1) role specialization of executive members, (2) differentiation among individual roles, and (3) complementary relations

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among them. This would indicate that little in the way of
group development could occur among individuals who had, for
personal and tactical reasons, not specialized their organ-
izational roles either instrumentally or expressively. ¹²⁶

Here the researchers are implicitly discussing the way in which
power among executives is mobilized and redistributed in interpersonal
structures to meet the functional demands of the organization. Assump-
tion of a particular function, whether it is homeostatic, mediative, or
proactive, is closely related to personality structure and dynamics and
in its manifestation as a style of executive leadership involves the
mobilization and redistribution of power itself.

Executive constellations as structures for redistributing power
can take a variety of forms each with its own symbolic and instrumental
meanings to the actors in the situation. Research on types of constella-
tions, their relation to leadership styles, interpersonal relations and
the strategy and tactics of organizational purpose, promises to unfold
new understanding of organizations as action systems. Observation indicates
that types of constellations include the *patriarchy* built around
the dominant leader as the central figure; the *group*, an executive system
of equals; and the *pair*, a structure often encountered in which one ex-
ecutive is concerned with external problems while the second deals with
internal relations. The *triad*, discussed in the Hodgson, Levinson, and
Zaleznik study of the executive group in the mental hospital,¹²⁷ contains
interesting features of instability in the internal status structure of
the executive constellation. The instability leads to examination of
internal changes in the constellation and its consequences for over-all
leadership of the organization.

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SUMMARY

We have attempted in this paper to move from consideration
of organization structure to the study of individual action within
a structure. In our view the structure is necessarily a variable de-
pendent upon the legitimation of authority systems within it. The
legitimation of positional authority tends to create a pyramidal
structure, while reliance on a professional authority system flattens
the organization and redistributes positional authority. The prob-
lems that arise are essentially those of ensuring the relevance of
the authority system implicit in the structure to the achievement of
organizational objectives. We have considered the effect of control
systems on the definition of organizational objectives and through this
their implications for the structure itself.

Underlying the views that we have put forward is our conviction that organizational structures owe their variable character to the ways in which they are used by individuals in the service of their own individual needs, and we have illustrated this by reference to laboratory studies of role taking in groups. We have considered the process of organizational change from a similar point of view. The acceptance of organizational roles (and by this we do not refer to static behavioral descriptions but to the functional roles which keep an organization moving) is essentially a consequence of individual predispositions which, in actuality, take on a symbolic character both for the individual and for his subordinates thus facilitating or impeding the process of change. Finally, we have attempted to bring these views together by considering men in action within a structure, on the face of it constrained by the functional demands imposed by the structure, but perceiving these

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demands and acting on them in very different ways.

The basic problem in social research on managerial behavior
is to forge a strategy of investigation that will be equal to the task
of both description and explanation. The unit of study is man in
action in purposive organizations. The problem of explanation demands
adequate conceptual tools for the interpretation of personality, ac-
tion and influence. To this end, the concepts of psychoanalytic psychol-
ogy linked with the theory of authority in sociology provide exciting
possibilities in the development of empirical studies of managerial be-
havior. If, in the end, managerial sociology becomes a social-psychology
of executive action, the profession of sociology will have strengthened
its position in the applied social sciences.

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NOTES

1. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. *Management and the Worker*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939.

2. Mayo, E., and Lombard, G. F. F. *Teamwork and Labor Turnover in the Aircraft Industry of Southern California*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Bureau of Business Research, 1944.

Fox, J. B., and Scott, J. R. *Absenteeism: Management's Problem*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Bureau of Business Research, 1943.

3. Taylor, F. W., *The Principles of Scientific Management*. New York: Harper, 1911.

4. Roethlisberger, F. J. *Management and Morale*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947.

5. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. *Op. cit.*

6. Rogers, C. R., and Roethlisberger, F. J. "Barriers and Gateways to Communication", in *How Successful Executives Handle People: Twelve Studies on Communications and Management Skills*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Business Review, 1954.

7. Landsberger, H. A. *Hawthorne Revisited*. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958

8. Kerr, C., and Fisher, L. H. "Plant Sociology: The Elite and the Aborigines", in *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences*. M. Komarovsky (Ed.). New York: Free Press, 1957.

9. Golden, C. S., and Ruttenberg, H. J. *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy*. New York: Harper, 1942.

10. Given, W. G. *Bottom-up Management: People Working Together*. New York: Harper, 1949.

11. McCormick, C. P. *Multiple Management*. New York: Harper, 1938.

12. Donham, W. B. *Business Adrift*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1931.

13. Barnard, C. I. *The Functions of the Executive*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948.

Brown, W. B. D. *Exploration in Management*. New York: Wiley, 1960

14. Miller, D. C., and Form, W. H. *Industrial Sociology: The Sociology of Work Organizations*. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.

15. Warner, W. L., and Abegglen, J. *Occupational Mobility in American Business, 1928-1952*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955.

Warner, W. L., and Abegglen, J. *Big Business Leaders in America*. New York: Harper, 1955.

Stryker, P. and The Editors of *Fortune*. *The Executive Life*. Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday, 1956.

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16. Weber, M. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Ed. T. Parsons. Trans. A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

17. Barnard, C. I. *Op. cit.*

18. Selznick, P. *T.V.A. and the Grass Roots*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.

Selznick, P. *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation*. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957.

Gouldner, A. W. *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954.

19. Simon, H. A. *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Macmillan, 1947.

20. Fayol, H. *General and Industrial Management*. Trans. Constance Stours. London: Pitman, 1949.

Gulick, L., and Urwick, L. (Eds.) *Papers on the Science of Administration*. New York: Columbia University, Institute of Public Administration, 1937.

21. March, J. G. and Simon, H. A. *Organizations*. New York: Wiley, 1958.

22. Raiffa, H., and Schlaifer, R. *Applied Statistical Decision Theory*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1962.

Simon, H. A. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice." *Quart. J. Econ.*, 1955, 69, 99-118.

23. Dahl, R. A., Haire, M., and Lazarsfeld, P. F. *Social Science Research on Business: Product and Potential*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

24. Weber, M. *Op. cit.*

25. Freud, S. "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego." *J. Strachey (Ed.) Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*. Vol. XVIII. London: Hogarth Press, 1962.

26. Merton, R. K. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

27. Homans, G. C. *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961.

28. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. *Op. cit.*

Lombard, G. F. F. *Behavior in a Selling Group*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1955.

Zaleznik, A. *Worker Satisfaction and Development*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1956.

29. Blau, P. M. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

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30. Selznick, P. *T.V.A. and the Grass Roots*. Op. cit.

31. Gouldner, A. W. *Op. cit.*

32. Barnes, L. B. *Organizational Systems and Engineering Groups*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1960.

Pelz, D. C. "Interactions and Attitudes Between Scientists and Auxiliary Staff." I. and II. *Admin. Sci. Quart.*, 1959, 4, 321-336, and 1960, 4, 410-425.

33. Gouldner, A. W. *Op. cit.*

34. Weiss, R. S. *Processes of Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1956.

35. Dalton, G., Barnes, L. B., and Zaleznik, A. *The Authority Structure as a Change Variable*. Paper presented at the 57th Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 1962, in Washington, D. C.

36. Worthy, J. C. "Organizational Structure and Employee Morale." *Amer. Soc. Rev.*, 1950, 15, 169-179.

37. Jaques, E. *The Changing Culture of a Factory*. London: Tavistock, 1951

38. Weinshall, T. D. *The Effects of Management Changes on Organization Relationships and Attitudes*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1960.

39. Dalton, M. *Men Who Manage*. New York: Wiley, 1959.

40. Crozier, M. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

41. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. *Op. cit.*

42. For an example of what we sought, see: Argyris, C. *The Impact of Budgets on People*. New York: Controllership Foundation, 1952.

43. Anthony, R. *Planning and Control Systems*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1965.

Learned, E. P., Christensen, C. R., and Andrews, K. R. *Business Policy: Text and Cases*. Homewood, Ill: Irwin, 1965.

Drucker, P. F. *The Practice of Management*. New York: Harper, 1954.

44. Blau, P. M. *Op. cit.*

45. Leighton, A. H. *The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945.

46. Roethlisberger, F. J., and Dickson, W. J. *Op. cit.*
See also: Mayo, E. *The Political Problems of an Industrial Civilization*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1947.

Mayo, E. *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949.

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47. Rogers, C. R. <u>Counselling and Psychotherapy</u>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942.

48. Lewin, K. <u>Field Theory in Social Science</u>. New York: Harper, 1951.

49. Argyris, C. <u>Executive Leadership</u>. New York: Harper, 1953.

50. Argyris, C. <u>Organization of a Bank</u>. New Haven: Yale University, Labor and Management Center, 1954.

51. Argyris, C. <u>Personality and Organization</u>. New York: Harper, 1957.

52. Argyris, C. <u>Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness</u>. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1962.

53. Ibid. p. 4

54. McGregor, D. <u>The Human Side of Enterprise</u>. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

55. Maslow, A. H. <u>Motivation and Personality</u>. New York: Harper, 1954.

56. Lewin, K. <u>Op. cit.</u>

57. Coch, L., and French, J. R. P., Jr. "Overcoming Resistance to Change," in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds.), <u>Group Dynamics: Research and Theory</u>. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1953. Pp. 257-279.

58. White, R., and Lippitt, R. "Leader Behavior and Membership Reaction in Three 'Social Climates'", in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds.), <u>Group Dynamics: Research and Theory</u>. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1953. Pp. 585-611.

59. Likert, R. <u>New Patterns of Management</u>. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.

60. Chapple, E. D., and Sayles, L. R. <u>Measure for Management</u>. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

61. Walker, C. R., and Guest, R. H. <u>The Man on the Assembly Line</u>. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Walker, C. R., Guest, R. H., and Turner, A. N. <u>The Foreman on the Assembly Line</u>. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.

62. Whyte, W. F. <u>Man and Organization. Three Problems in Human Relations in Industry</u>. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1959.

63. Richardson, F. L. W., Jr. <u>Talk, Work and Action, Human Reactions to Organizational Change</u>. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University, Society for Applied Anthropology, 1961.

64. Whyte, W. F., Hamilton, E. L., and Wiley, M. C. <u>Action Research for Management</u>. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1964. Pp. 184-185.

65. Walker, C. R., and Guest, R. H. <u>Op. cit.</u>

66. Trist, G. L. <u>Socio-technical Systems</u>. Lecture given at University of Cambridge, November 1959.

Trist, G. L., and Bemforth, K. W. "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Long-wall Method of Coal-getting." <u>Hum. Relat.</u>, 1951, 4, 3-38.

Rice, A. K. <u>Productivity and Social Organization, the Ahmedabad Experiment</u>. London: Tavistock, 1958.

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67. Lawrence, P. R. *The Changing of Organizational Behavior Patterns*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1958.

68. Rogow, A. A. *James Forrestal: A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy*. New York: Macmillan, 1963.

69. Hodgson, R. C., Levinson, D. J., and Zaleznik, A. *The Executive Role Constellation: An Analysis of Personality and Role Relations in Management*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1965.

70. See *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*, 1956. P. 713.

71. Goffman, E. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday Anchor, 1959. P. 240.

72. Hodgson, R. C., Levinson, D. J., and Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.* P. 60.

73. Guest, R. H. *Organizational Change: The Effect of Successful Leadership*. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1962.

74. Fleishman, E. A., Burtt, W. E., and Harris, E. F. *Leadership and Supervision in Industry: An Evaluation of a Supervisory Training Program*. Columbus, Ohio: Monograph No. 33, Bureau of Educational Research, 1955.

75. Guest, R. H. *Op. cit.* P. 96.

76. Mann, F. C. "Studying and Creating Change: A Means to Understanding Social Organization," in *Research in Industrial Human Relations*. C. M. Arensberg (Ed.) New York: Harper, 1957. Pp. 146-167.

77. Linton, R. *Study of Man*. New York: Appleton Century, 1936.

78. Goffman, E. *Encounters*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961.

79. Merton, R. K. *Op. cit.*

80. Parsons, T. "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States". *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 1942, 7, 604-616.

81. Gross, N., Mason, W. S., and McEachern, A. W. *Explorations in Role Analysis*. New York: Wiley, 1958.

82. Kahn, R. L., Wolfe, D. M., Quinn, R. R., and Snoek, J. D. *Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity*. New York: Wiley, 1964.

83. Vroom, V. H. *Some Personality Determinants of the Effects of Participation*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960.

Barnes, L. B., Dalton, G., and Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.*

84. Parsons, T., and Bales, R. F. *Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955.

Bales, R. F. *Interaction Process Analysis*. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1951.

85. Bales, R. F. "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups," in T. Parsons, R. F. Bales, and E. A. Shils (Eds.), *Working Papers in the Theory of Action*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953. Pp. 111-161. Abridged in A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, and R. F. Bales (Eds.), *Small Groups*. New York: Knopf, 1955. Pp. 424-456.

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86. Slater, P. E. "Role Differentiations in Small Groups," in A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, and R. F. Bales (Eds.), *Small Groups*. New York: Knopf, 1955. Pp. 498-515.

87. These two concepts resemble the requirements of a cooperative system as specified by Chester Barnard (op. cit.) when he discusses the terms "effectiveness" and "efficiency".

88. Bales, R. F. "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups" *Op. cit.*, p. 433.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 438.

90. Blau, P. M. *Op. cit.*
Zaleznik, A., Christensen, C. R., and Roethlisberger, F. J. *The Motivation, Productivity, and Satisfaction of Workers: A Prediction Study*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1958.

91. Slater, P. E. *Op. cit.*

92. *Ibid.*, p. 504.
Slater divided his groups into high-consensus and low-consensus groups on the basis of the degree of agreement among the members on their voting choices. Members of high-consensus groups tended to show more agreement in the way they ranked others than did the low-consensus group members.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 505.
The average number of members in Slater's group was five.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 505.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 507.

96. Moment, D., and Zaleznik, A. *Role Development and Interpersonal Competence*. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1963.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

98. Homans, G. C. *Op. cit.*

99. Hodgson, R. C., Levinson, D. J., and Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.*

100. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. xii.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 476.

102. Barnard, C. I. *Op. cit.* p. 184.

103. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

104. Gibb, C. A. "Leadership," in *Handbook of Social Psychology*. C. Lindsey (Ed.). Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 882.

106. Neustadt, R. E. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*. New York: Wiley, 1964.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 6. Our italics.

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108. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

109. Hodgson, R. C., Levinson, D. J., and Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

110. Neustadt, R. E. *Op. cit.*, p. 165-166. Our italics.

111. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.

112. Dahl, R. A. "The concept of Power." *Behav. Sci.*, 1957, 2, 201-218.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

114. Schlesinger, A. M., Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt, Vol. 2: The Coming of the New Deal*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959. Pp. 522-523. Quoted in R. E. Neustadt, *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

115. George, A. L., and George, J. L. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study*. New York: Dover Publications, 1964.

116. Zaleznik, A. "Managerial Behavior and Interpersonal Competence," *Behav. Sci.*, 1964, 2, 156-166.

117. Stryker, P. *The Character of the Executive*. New York: Harper and Row, 1961.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 210. Our italics.

119. Moment, D., and Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.*

120. Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.*

121. French, J. R. P., Jr., and Raven, B. "The Bases of Social Power," in D. Cartwright (Ed.), *Studies in Social Power*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1959. Pp. 150-167.

122. Neustadt, R. E. *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

123. Schlesinger, A. M. Jr., *Op. cit.*, p. 528. Quoted in R. E. Neustadt, *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

124. Neustadt, R. E. *Op. cit.*, p. 161.

125. Hodgson, R. C., Levinson, D. J., and Zaleznik, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 92.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 285.

127. *Ibid.*