ST. JAMES' CHURCH

866 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

January 26, 1970

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This is simply a word of very deep appreciation for your cordial welcome to the Princeton University Assembly representatives last Friday afternoon. You listened to us patiently, answered questions you have dealt with innumerable times, and gave us a clear picture of why the decisions of the administration are as they are.

Positions may not have been modified substantially, but attitudes certainly were. As one of the representatives, I have come away from the meeting with respect for the position you outlined, and renewed confidence in the men who are carrying the burden of formulating that policy. We are most grateful.

We send our deep appreciation to you which we hope you will share with your hospitable colleague, Mr. Smizer.

This comes also with kind personal wishes.

Doctor Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

RECEIVED

JAN 30 1970

CENTRAL FILES

PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

March 31, 1973

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am writing you in behalf of Dr. Shoki Coe,
Director of the Theological Education Fund in London
and former Principal of Tainan Theological College
in Taiwan.

Dr. Coe, who is responsible for the support of
theological institutions throughout the Third World,
will be returning to the United States from Japan and
will be on the East Coast on April 12-16, 1973. He
is extremely eager to have an appointment with you
to discuss the future of Taiwan.

Dr. Coe is a responsible Christian leader who
has been active in the World Council of Churches. He
has the respect of all those who have worked with him
through the years, and I am happy to commend him to
you. He is one of the leaders in the movement for the
self-determination of Taiwan.

I should count it a personal favor if you find it
possible to see Dr. Coe during the period that he will
be in the United States in April.

Thanking you and with kindest regards, I am

JIM:ear

J. I. COFFEY

# The Soviet ABM and Arms Control

The recent buildup of Soviet strategic strike forces and the knowledge that the Soviets could deploy some sort of ABM system around their major cities by the early 1970s have prompted the United States to consider several countermeasures, among them the installation of ballistic missile defenses, the production of new missiles such as Minuteman III and Poseidon, and the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

Although few would argue against maintaining strong, secure U.S. retaliatory forces, it is possible that particular ways of doing this will induce further increases in Soviet weaponry and thus stimulate the arms race, just as recent Soviet programs have done. Certainly the choices made will influence the nature and the likelihood of any agreement to limit or reduce strategic armaments, in which each country has shown interest. So it would seem imperative to assess the motives for particular Soviet deployments and the alternatives open to the U.S.S.R., lest the United States respond in ways that might, in the long run, adversely affect its own interests and objectives.

As in most major decisions, several factors militate for and against further Soviet deployment of ABMs. Among the factors favoring deployment is an understandable desire to deter nuclear strikes to inhibit "counterrevolutionary intervention" against peoples fighting for their "liberation from imperialist rule." Even though Soviet strategic strike forces are inferior to those of the United States (as shown in the table below), there is little doubt that the U.S.S.R. could, without deploying ABMs, kill millions of Americans, and hence deter a deliberate and unprovoked attack. But in extended deter-

rence, particularly in deterring actions against countries where Soviet interests are less than vital, an inferior nuclear posture may not be very convincing—which the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated. Ballistic missile defenses could erode the military and psychological effect of larger U.S. strategic strike forces, could introduce uncertainties into calculations of U.S. capabilities and, thus, could enhance the credibility of the Soviet deterrent.

NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES, mid-1969

<table><thead><tr><th>Types</th><th>U.S.</th><th>U.S.S.R.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBMs</td><td>1,054</td><td>1,050-1,100</td></tr><tr><td>SLBs*</td><td>656</td><td>250</td></tr><tr><td>Intercontinental bombers</td><td>646</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td>Approximate number of warheads carried</td><td>4,200</td><td>1,600-1,650</td></tr></tbody></table>

* Including those carried by Soviet non-nuclear submarines.

Should extended deterrence fail and Soviet troops become engaged, ballistic missile defenses (BMD) might inhibit escalation into general nuclear war. In particular, they might ease Soviet concerns that West Germany might launch a nuclear strike, a move that, however unlikely it may seem to the West, is a continuing preoccupation of Soviet authorities. Furthermore, ABMs could mitigate Soviet fears of fighting a war as a result of Communist Chinese "adventures" or, conceivably, as a result of Chinese pressures against the Soviet Union. Finally, antimissile missiles could to some extent guard against an accidental war and could reduce the pressures on the U.S.S.R. to "preempt" during

a crisis as the only feasible way of reducing damage to the Soviet Union.

## PRESERVING THE STATE

Finally, if nuclear war should come, antiballistic missiles could help to "preserve the vital activity of the state, to secure the uninterrupted functioning of the economy and transportation and to safeguard the combat potential of the Armed Forces." (From "Soviet-Military Strategy," edited by Marshall V. D. Sokolovskii, Prentice-Hall, 1963.) Whether Soviet air and missile defenses could do all this is perhaps open to question; Mr. McNamara thought not. Nonetheless, such defenses might assure survival of strategic nuclear forces on which so much dependence is placed. They might safeguard at least major cities such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, which are not only important industrial sites but also the centers of political power and the seats of important party organizations. And antimissile missiles, properly deployed, might cover the mobilization, movement and initial engagement of Soviet theater forces, whose mission of defeating the enemy's troops and overrunning his territory is considered necessary for final victory.

Furthermore, nuclear power may be useful not only in deterring or in waging war but also in achieving gains without war. In the past, however, neither defensive nor offensive exploitation of Soviet nuclear arms has been wholly satisfactory, as shown by the unhindered American bombing of North Vietnam, by the successful U.S. action to force the Soviets to withdraw missiles from Cuba and by the repeated postponements or abrogations of Soviet deadlines for a settlement of the Berlin issue on terms fa-

> "... The United States must proceed rapidly with arms-control negotiations if it is to preclude Soviet decisions concerning the installation of antiballistic missiles—decisions that could make the regulation of strategic armaments much more difficult and their reduction virtually impossible." Dr. Coffey is professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. Portions of his article appeared in "International Affairs."

January 1970 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39

vorable to it. These failures may be
explained by inherent difficulty of uti-
lizing the nuclear panoply to achieve
political gains, by the marginal nature
of the Soviet interests in Vietnam,
Cuba or even Berlin, or by the poten-
tial costs of taking the more direct
action needed to secure political ob-
jectives, but they may also be due to
the position of relative inferiority in
which the U.S.S.R. found itself.

Conceivably the growth of Soviet strategic forces may render any future Soviet pressures more effective, but this is questionable: The psychological effect of strategic parity has been felt long before the actuality. What could, however, add strength to the Soviet hand would be introducing a new weapons system, such as orbital bombs or antiballistic missiles. An effective ABM system might encourage Soviet leaders to believe they could press more strongly for concessions on Berlin or could, without fear of retaliation, intervene militarily in troubled areas such as the Middle East. Furthermore, their possession of such a system might, according to Sen. Henry Jackson (D.—Wash.) "inhibit our [American] government from standing firm in a period of crisis."

Entirely aside from their potential usefulness in supporting Soviet political pressures, antiballistic missiles could have other—and less dangerous —advantages. To the extent that they would render more credible Soviet security guarantees to countries such as India or East Germany, they could increase Soviet influence and promote closer political ties. They could reinforce the image of the U.S.S.R. as a technically advanced and militarily strong power. While none of these possible consequences can be readily assessed and while there may well be offsetting costs, some Soviet leaders, like some American ones, may sense political advantages in ballistic missile defenses.

MOSCOW DEFENSE HALTED

Unfortunately for the Soviets, only
comprehensive and effective ballistic
missile defenses, covering eastern Eu-
rope as well as the U.S.S.R. and pro-
tecting troops advancing into hostile
territory, would achieve all possible
aims, and defenses of that kind, even
if technically feasible, would be ex-
tremely costly. Moreover, deploying

ABMs would place more demands on
the industrial facilities and engineering
personnel required to produce missiles
and other advanced weapons. So any
attempt to install antimissile missiles
is likely to generate sharp debates
among Soviet leaders.

For one thing, it is by no means
clear whether Soviet ABM technology
has reached the stage where extensive
deployments would be justified; in
fact, the U.S.S.R. has temporarily
halted work on the Moscow defenses
while pushing ahead with developing
better radar and more advanced inter-
ceptors. For another, the continuing
divisions among the Soviet military on
the probable nature of future war and
on the relative priority to be given to
strategic and theater forces would
make difficult internal agreements on
the scope and timing of ballistic mis-
sile defenses. For a third, the deploy-
ment of such defenses would run
counter to other Soviet aims and mo-
tives, such as attempts at a detente
with the United States and the desire
to secure international adherence to
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty,
with its commitment to reduce stra-
tegic armaments. And finally, there are
the problems of cost and of resource
allocation already reviewed. Neither
the financial nor the political costs of
undertaking a crash deployment of
ABMs are likely to be palatable to the
members of the Soviet Politburo, and,
barring a major change in the leader-
ship or an intensified danger of war,
any expansion of existing ballistic mis-
siles defenses would probably proceed
at a measured pace, if at all.

LIKELY OPTIONS

This suggests that Western policy-
makers should look at the implications
of alternative Soviet deployments of
antiballistic missiles and not base their
decisions only on the potential con-
sequences of comprehensive Soviet bal-
listic missile defenses. What alterna-
tives, if any, the U.S.S.R. may adopt
cannot be determined in advance;
however, an examination of Soviet mo-
tives and concerns indicates several
likely options. For example, the So-
viets may use ABMs:

1. To defend air bases and missile sites against U.S. counterforce strikes, thereby enhancing their own retaliatory capabilities.

2. To protect their cities and those of their allies from attacks by present or future nuclear forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

3. To cover the mobilization, deploy-
ment, and operations of theater
forces, in either limited or general
war.

4. To safeguard centers of Communist power, such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev.

ROCKET FORCE DEFENSE

As suggested, one alternative would
be to employ long-range antimissile
missiles to defend those areas, such
as the western Ukraine and central
Siberia, where important elements of
the Strategic Rocket Force and the
Long-Range Air Force are deployed,
and to install around air bases and
missile sites shorter-range interceptors
for "point" defense. Although the So-
viets have in recent years placed their
ICBMs in hardened silos, their earlier
missile installations were "soft" and
clustered; moreover, improvements in
missile accuracy and the introduction
of MIRVs may make possible success-
ful U.S. counterforce attacks against
even well-protected missiles. Instead
of building more hardened sites, ex-
panding the missile-submarine fleet
(which is very expensive) or produc-
ing many mobile ICBMs, the Soviets
may decide to defend existing installa-
tions—in other words, to build a
counterpart to the Safeguard ABM
system recommended by the Nixon
administration.

Such a step, by ensuring the survival
of a larger portion of Soviet strategic
nuclear forces, could enhance the
credibility of the deterrent. It could
reduce pressures to preempt, or to "fire
on warning," in order to safeguard
inferior Soviet forces against an Amer-
ican attack. And it could enable the
Soviets to conduct a controlled nuclear
war, should changing circumstances
impel them to alter their present strat-
egy.

Measures to protect Soviet air and
missile forces are likely to have only
a marginal effect on the strategic bal-
ance between the United States and
the U.S.S.R. Although they would en-
hance the Soviet second-strike capac-
ity and increase the number of Ameri-
cans whom the Soviets could kill, they

40

would leave untouched the United States' "assured destruction capability." Moreover, if the United States, through the introduction of MIRVs, added to the 4,200 warheads now carried by its bombers and missiles, it should further increase its ability to wreak damage on the U.S.S.R., as well as to overwhelm Soviet missile defenses at selected points. In those circumstances, the Soviet Union's defense of its strategic strike forces might be less significant, in terms of ability to inflict damage on the United States, than the production of missile submarines or mobile ICBMs—and less threatening as well.

## AGAINST NATO NUCLEAR FORCES

Another alternative would be installing long-range ABMs to protect the western U.S.S.R. against attacks by French, British or other NATO nuclear forces. Such area-type ballistic missile defenses could not only safeguard vulnerable Soviet cities from small-scale attacks but could also make more difficult and more costly counterforce strikes on Soviet weapons systems targeted against Europe, even if they were not ringed by terminal defenses. The area defenses could inhibit the escalation of any conflict in central Europe and strengthen the Soviet hand in a crisis or confrontation with NATO forces. Although they could also afford a measure of protection to the Communist states of eastern Europe, it might be necessary to install long-range interceptors in Czech or Polish territory or to augment them with shorter-range ABMs for point defense in order to cope better with tactical rockets. Thus, to the Soviets it might seem that a comparatively small investment could reap incommensurate dividends, both military and political.

However, while such defenses could reduce the effectiveness of the medium-range ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles being introduced into French and British nuclear strike forces, they would have relatively little impact on the balance between East and West. For one thing, the U.S. Strategic Air Command could, without undue difficulty, saturate or exhaust the defenses or could leap over them to attack targets deeper in the U.S.S.R. For another, British and French bombers and the carrier aviation

and long-range tactical aircraft in and around western Europe could still attack targets in the western U.S.S.R. Finally, the NATO allies could if necessary strengthen their nuclear delivery capabilities by introducing longer-range, higher-thrust and more sophisticated tactical missiles capable of bypassing, penetrating or saturating Soviet ABMs. Thus military (as distinct from the political) consequences of deploying BMDs in the western U.S.S.R. would probably be marginal.

## DEFENDING THEATER FORCES

The Soviets may go a step further and try to protect their theater forces against missile strikes by American and other nuclear-armed forces. While area ballistic missile defenses along the western frontier could contribute to this aim, such defenses would also have to be built along the coast of the Black Sea, in the Maritime Province and in other regions from which the Soviets might want to launch air, ground or airborne assaults. Furthermore, these defenses would probably have to be augmented with terminal ABMs around communications centers such as Bialystok, Lvov and Khabarovsk and around industrial facilities such as the Dneprostrov Dam in order to protect the mobilization, equipment and dispatch of reserve forces to the theaters of operations. Finally, because troop concentrations and movements outside Communist territory could not always be covered by fixed missile batteries, the U.S.S.R. would have to develop mobile or semimobile ABMs to accompany its divisions into battle.

(Whether mobile antiballistic missiles capable of coping with tactical missiles can be developed is questionable, since their short time of flight and low altitude make tactical missiles difficult to track. Furthermore, radars

of the requisite effectiveness are likely to be large and bulky, as well as vulnerable to enemy attack. Finally, since terminal ABMs must be near the place to be protected, the number of interceptors required to cover troop deployments and operations could rise to fantastic levels. So even if the technical problems of mobile missile defenses could be solved, their costs might be high and their effectiveness and survivability low.)

Obviously, such a deployment of antimissile missiles (presumably paralleled by a corresponding strengthening of air defenses) would give the Soviets an enormous advantage in any local conflict, nuclear or nonnuclear. It would fill a gap in Soviet military planning, which depends in part on the mobilization of industry and manpower after a nuclear exchange. And it would add significantly to the credibility of Soviet threats against neighboring states, whatever their nature or their purpose.

## PROTECTING KEY CENTERS

It would appear, however, that even thick and extensive ABM installations designed to cover Soviet theater forces would not affect significantly the U.S. assured destruction capability, since strategic strikes could be redirected against population centers elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. To the extent, however, that the United States tried to interdict the movement of Soviet troops or to suppress supporting air squadrons and rocket batteries, it would require multiple warheads for its present missiles, more nuclear delivery vehicles or both. And to the extent that Soviet antimissile missiles reduced the credibility of the tactical nuclear deterrent or exposed conventional allied forces to the full weight of a Soviet assault, they could generate requirements for more ground divisions, air squadrons, and missile batteries—to say nothing of ABMs to protect Western troops and installations.

What deployments designed to cover theater forces would not do is protect the U.S.S.R. against attacks by American ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles, which could overreach or bypass ballistic missile defenses concentrated along the borders of the Soviet Union. Considering the centralized political system of the

January 1970 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41

U.S.S.R., the concentration of party leadership and party membership in urban areas and the fact that industry is still largely grouped in relatively few locations, the defense of cities such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev would seem to be a primary Soviet goal.

Such a task not only would very likely be less expensive than trying to protect border territories and mobilization centers on the periphery of the Soviet Union, but would also fit better with Soviet strategic concepts. Furthermore, the defense of these few centers, and perhaps even of the sizable territory enclosed by them, might be technically more feasible and would certainly be less costly than efforts to extend missile defenses throughout the Soviet Union. At the same time, it would safeguard crucial areas against inadvertent missile launches, against the kind of desperate nuclear counterattack envisioned by some French strategists and perhaps even against small-scale or ragged strikes by the United States. Finally, it would enhance Soviet confidence in the ability to manage a crisis or win in a confrontation, as well as add to Soviet prestige.

However, ballistic missile defenses around cities would take time to construct, would be difficult to conceal and would probably have only marginal impact on the U.S. strategic posture and on American "assured destruction" capabilities. As Mr. McNamara testified in 1968, even if the Soviet nuclear delivery forces increased more rapidly than was then estimated (as they apparently have) and even if the Soviets extended the Moscow ABM system to other cities, about 1,700 U.S. nuclear warheads could be detonated over their targets after a Soviet first strike—and 400 one-megaton weapons or their equivalent would kill 74 million Soviets. Against "higher than expected" increases in Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and a major expansion of Soviet missile defenses, the United States might want to make offsetting increases in its own programmed forces, but these would seem cautionary rather than mandatory, especially if plans for installing MIRVs are carried out.

### AFFECTING STRATEGIC BALANCE

The Soviets have many motives for deploying ABMs, ranging from fear that the United States might launch

a nuclear strike to an understanding of the political and psychological utility of antimissile missiles. Fortunately, few of the motives tend to push the Soviets in the direction of a single pattern of deployment, other than that of comprehensive but very costly ballistic missile defenses. More important, it would seem that few of the postulated patterns of deployment are likely to affect significantly the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Only if comprehensive missile defenses were built and if Soviet strategic strike forces were greatly augmented, would the U.S.S.R. begin to cut into U.S. "assured destruction capabilities." Even then, as Mr. McNamara estimated, the forces programmed by the United States could still destroy "about 18 to 25 per cent of the population and two-thirds to three-quarters of the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union, even after absorbing a surprise attack."

### U.S. RESPONSES

This does not mean that the United States would necessarily be satisfied to maintain its present strategic posture if the Soviets deployed more antimissile missiles; in fact the mere prospect of such a deployment has already induced the United States to program between $10 billion and $20 billion for penetration aids, improved warheads and new weapons systems designed to cope with Soviet ABMs. U.S. responses to any expansion of Soviet ballistic missile defenses will affect what limitations, if any, can be placed on strategic nuclear forces.

What the responses might be depends in part on the nature and the scope of the expansion. If the Soviets chose to defend their missile sites and air bases, the United States might not respond at all; in fact, the deputy secretary of defense, David Packard, has suggested as much. Since the American Safeguard system is also designed to serve this purpose (among others), agreement in principle to accept ABM systems intended to protect strategic strike forces should not be difficult to reach.

However, the Safeguard system could also protect American cities against a small-scale Chinese missile strike and could degrade, although not blunt, Soviet retaliatory attacks. Because the Soviet Union is almost three

times as large as the continental United States and because many of its missile sites are remote from centers of population, interceptors covering air bases and launch pads could not afford comparable protection to the Soviet people. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. has so far evinced little or no interest in defending its strategic retaliatory forces; instead, it has apparently chosen to increase the size of those forces, to rely more on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and to develop a mobile ICBM.

### ABM AND ARMS CONTROL

If this analysis is correct, the Soviets are much more likely to insist in any arms-control negotiations on ABM deployments that could protect six to 10 key cities—and perhaps even the heartland bounded by Leningrad, Odessa and Sverdlovsk—against light to moderate American (and Chinese) missile strikes. Moreover, long-range interceptors could, from positions around cities such as Kiev and Minsk, protect the MRBMs, IRBMs and medium bombers deployed in the Ukraine and Byelorussia, degrade attacks by NATO nuclear forces, and strengthen the Soviet hand in any confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The difficulty with any such deployment is not that it is unreasonable in terms of what the United States proposes to do, but rather that it may be provocative. At the very least, it could arouse anxiety among the NATO allies, who might be less willing to agree to arms-control measures affecting Europe (including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty) and more inclined to build nuclear strike forces or missile defenses of their own. And it could stimulate the counterexpansion of U.S. strategic forces; in fact, the secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, has testified that if the Soviets did acquire a first-strike capability and installed an ABM defense around their major cities, "without MIRVs in the Poseidon, our deterrent capability would be dangerously eroded." So unless Soviet city defenses were severely restricted, they, as well as the alternative deployments, could render difficult any agreement to limit strategic armaments.

This immediately raises the question whether U.S. willingness to fore-

42

go or to curtail its own ballistic missile defenses could induce the U.S.S.R. to do likewise. It would be tempting, but probably wrong, to answer "yes." First, the Soviets have, at least in the past, tended to regard antiballistic missiles not only as legitimate instruments of national security but also as contributors to international stability. Second, Soviet arms-control policy (like that of the United States) is subject to so many influences that a change in one factor by one country will not necessarily induce a corresponding change by the other. Third, the Nixon administration has already announced that its price for halting Safeguard is stopping weapons programs that could give the U.S.S.R. a first-strike capability; the United States can scarcely expect to be paid twice for the same goods.

What can be said, with some assurance, is that the Soviets will probably not settle for less than the Americans have in ballistic missile defenses: a concern for prestige, internal political pressures, and an understandable desire to provide some security against attacks are all likely to move them in this direction. Other U.S. weapons programs, specifically the installation of MIRVs may strengthen this prediction by convincing the Soviets that only a high level of defenses will give any protection against an American missile strike. Finally, the apparent unwillingness of the administration to abandon the Chinese-oriented component of the Safeguard system and its seeming willingness to accept a similar Soviet deployment suggest that the U.S.S.R. will encounter little or no opposition to deployment of "light" ballistic missile defenses.

This does not inevitably mean a spiraling level of armaments, sanctioned rather than limited by agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. There are elements within the Soviet Union, as well as within the United States, who want to avoid unproductive weapons programs and curb defense expenditures; were there not, the Soviets would never have indicated their willingness to discuss the imposition of limits on missiles and antimissile missiles. But it does mean that the United States must proceed rapidly with arms-control negotiations if it is to preclude Soviet decisions concerning the installation of antiballistic

missiles, decisions that could make the regulation of strategic armaments much more difficult and their reduction virtually impossible. It also means that the Nixon administration might be wise to defer or delay some of its programmed weapons systems pending efforts to reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. rather than assuming that the best way to obtain such an agreement is to build up a position of strength, a view that the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, characterized "as pressure, and as meaning, too, that the United State will continue the arms race. . . ."

## FURTHER MEASURES

In preparing for negotiations, the United States should carefully consider the implications of alternative Soviet ABM deployments and the kinds of constraints its should seek to impose on Soviet ballistic missile defenses. It would not appear necessary to prevent the Soviets from defending missile sites and air bases, since such a deployment is likely to serve as a safeguard against pressures to preempt. And although it might be desirable to preclude the installation of interceptors around key cities in the U.S.S.R., this could be difficult, especially if the United States proceeds with its own ABM system. Thus, efforts might be concentrated on inducing the Soviets to avoid those kinds of deployments that would seem threatening, either because, as in a comprehensive system, they could affect the credibility of the U.S. deterrent or because, as in deployments along the western Soviet frontier, they might arouse fears that

the U.S.S.R. intended to engage in limited wars in Europe.

Hand in hand with these should go measures to inhibit the further growth of Soviet strategic strike forces; indeed, it is conceivable that the United States might find it more advantageous to limit Soviet construction of missile submarines and mobile ICBMs or to preclude Soviet deployment of MIRVs than to prevent a moderate expansion of ballistic missile defenses. And the Allies would undoubtedly find it easier to accept Soviet ABMs if they were paid for by cutbacks in the bomber and missile squadrons poised to strike targets in Eurasia, squadrons whose political importance is out of proportion to their military value. Even if both of these approaches required restrictions on, or reductions in, U.S. strategic strike forces, they might well be worth it.

None of these measures alone will solve the problem of dealing with the Soviet Union. They may, however, obviate some concerns about the possible uses of Soviet military power and signal something about the means the U.S.S.R. proposes to employ in advancing its interests. Furthermore, there are at work in the U.S.S.R. forces that make for a more conciliatory foreign policy and for less zealous waging of political and ideological conflict; on these, as much as on the maintenance of U.S. military power, reliance must be placed. Indeed, only if such forces of conciliation continue to prosper is any detente between East and West likely, much less the kind of accommodation necessary to curb the deployment of antiballistic missiles.

January 1970 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists • 43

RICHARD S. LEWIS

# A Painless Path to Mars

If there is any doubt that a manned flight to Mars has become the next grand objective of the U.S. space program, a reading of the Space Task Group Report should dispel it. The Report, submitted to the White House last September, not only designates Mars as the next port of call for astronauts but also shapes most of the total space program in the next 16 years to fit the logistical requirements of a 1986 Mars Mission.

"We conclude that a manned Mars mission should be accepted as a long-range goal for the space program," the report states without equivocation. The Administration has acquiesced in principle and, by underwriting the initial phases of the new program proposed by the STG, has begun to lay the foundation for a manned shot to Mars in the mid-eighties. Without the fanfare which heralded President Kennedy's lunar landing commitment in 1961, the country appears, then, to have been launched on a 16-year engineering and industrial development program leading to inter-planetary manned flight. Reaching Mars, the final objective, would take twice as long as reaching the moon, but, from a fiscal point of view, would be relatively painless. In the design of the STG program for the next two decades, the nation is to progress in space exploration in a series of steps, the last mounting an expedition to the Red Planet.

The Mars expedition thus is not set out as a separate and spectacular goal

but as the technical climax of a series of lesser, more acceptable programs which lead up to it.

Chaired by Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew, the Space Task Group consists of Robert C. Seamans, Secretary of the Air Force and former deputy administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Thomas O. Paine, present NASA administrator; and Lee A. DuBridge, the President's science adviser. They are veterans of the first decade of the American space program from Explorer I to Apollo 11. They have become the architects of the second phase, covering the decade-and-a-half between the first lunar landing to the projected manned flight to Mars.

## PIGGYBACK MISSION

Their proposal takes into account the national budget limitation and the criticisms of the first 10 years in space. To make the Mars Mission acceptable in a period of social dislocations and military uncertainties, they have provided the Administration with target date options ranging from 1981 to the end of the century. The Mars bill not only is payable in a variable number of installments but the whole mission rides piggyback on precursor programs which are goals in themselves.

The report proposes the construction of specific items of hardware, at a cost which varies with the construction pace, for four purposes: to establish large space stations in Earth and lunar orbits; to explore the moon on the surface; to extend the physical investigation of the solar system to the outer planets and to land the first men on Mars.

These objectives are offered as a package deal, with a price tag of perhaps $80 billion if the nation opts to start the 600-day Mars Mission in 1986.

While the Mars Mission is the main item, it is not essential to the package. The nation can orbit its space stations, explore the moon and probe the outer marches of the solar system without going to Mars. But it cannot go to Mars without executing these programs first.

This design makes it appear that Mars is an option which can be decided later, in another frame of mind. But it is also an option that might be illogical to resist. For, in developing space stations and extended exploration of the moon, the space agency must build hardware which also is applicable to a Mars Mission. Consequently, much of the Mars costs will have been paid in precursor programs.

Orbital National Laboratory. Artist's rendition of space station modules joined to form a 12- to 24-man laboratory in orbit around the Earth.

[w]

44

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH • PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15213

CABLE ADDRESS: GSPIA, PITTSBURGHPENN, USA

OFFICE OF THE DEAN

6 July 1972

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

As you may have heard, I will be spending next year at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in London, where I will be working on Arms Control and European Security. In the course of that year I shall be talking to governmental officials, military leaders, and academicians on their attitudes toward and their interest in arms control measures affecting Western Europe. While I doubt that I will uncover anything not known to you, it may be that you or members of your staff might be interested in some of the impressions garnered. If so, I will be glad to pass on such impressions, or to be of help in any other way consistent with my status at the Institute.

Since I am writing, let me do here what I should have done in any case and congratulate you on your masterful performances at and since the Moscow Summit. While these are no less than those who know you would expect, it is gratifying to sense that others are increasingly appreciative of your abilities and of your contributions. I am sure that those of the past will only be exceeded by the ones you will make in the future.

With every good wish I am

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

EXECUTIVE

MAY 13 1971

Dear Ned:

Thank you for your April 22 letter. I appreciate your concerns, though I cannot agree with the phrasing of your views. No one has a monopoly on the anguish of this conflict; this Administration's highest priority is to end it, for all participants if possible, and in a way that will spare us further anguish abroad and at home. The direction we are going should be unmistakably clear by now.

I remember well our conversations, and I value your taking the trouble to write to me.

Mr. Edmund Coffin
Beaver Dam Stock Farm
Hegeman's Lane
Old Brookville, New York 11545

RECEIVED

MAY 14 1971

CENTRAL FILES

BEAVER DAM STOCK FARM

HEGEMAN'S LANE, OLD BROOKVILLE, N. Y. 11545 • (516) MA 6-1112

April 22nd

Dear Henry,

When we met at Benjy Franklin's house
during those years of constant escalation,
always preceded by promises of imminent
victory, always followed by claims of
great progress - and then more escalation -
I felt you thought the war was a mistake
for the same reason as I... that you
couldn't hope to create an independent
nation by pounding it to pieces, killing
thousands of its citizens and dislocating
millions more.

Here we are, four years later, withdrawing
troops and even starting conversations with
the Chinese - just as I had hoped we would
be doing - but still pounding the country
to pieces, killings thousands of its
citizens and dislocating millions more.

And we are doing it now not only in Viet
Nam, but in Laos and Cambodia as well.

And there is our president, still repeating
the completely discredited thesis that
the threat of more terror from the skies
will make the Northerners behave and re-
lease our prisoners.

Henry, for years now your friends, the
president's friends, the overwhelming
majority of those in both parties pre-
tending to any foreign affairs experience,
and millions of just plain citizens have
done everything in the book of democratic

TEXAS LAW REVIEW

2500 RED RIVER
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78705

ROBERT M. COHAN
Article & Book Review Editor

TELEPHONE
(512) 471-3164

October 16, 1972

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

We would like to review *A Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam* by Frances FitzGerald in one of the forthcoming issues of the *Texas Law Review*. We believe that you would be a most eminent and qualified reviewer of this book. Would it be possible for you to make such a contribution to the *Review*?

Because we are still shaping our winter and spring issues, deadlines are somewhat flexible at this time. If you could send a manuscript to us by early January, I will send you the book and further details.

Hope to hear from you very soon.

RMC:jw

GENERAL

MAY 27 1970

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Jerome:

Thank you for your letter of May 13. The luncheon
meeting with my Harvard colleagues was indeed
painful. I appreciate your writing to me and send-
ign me a copy of the law faculty statement.

Perhaps there will soon be a calmer moment for
an exchange of views. I would certainly appreciate
it.

Professor Jerome A. Cohen
Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

HAK:jlp:5/22/70

Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

May 12, 1970

# An Open Letter to the United States Congress

The events of the recent days have caused concern to all Americans. As members of the Harvard Law School faculty we have, against considerable pressures, reasserted the importance of law and legal education by declining to cancel classes or examinations. But as individuals we have a wider concern in these events, and it is as individuals that we are writing to you.

We are a diverse group. Our individual political views cover a broad spectrum. In the almost six years since American involvement in Vietnam became a matter of controversy, opinions among us have varied widely. Yet, like the public at large, we have come to doubt that continued U.S. involvement in war in Vietnam can serve U.S. interests and purposes.

The recent American military action in Cambodia and the recent new bombing of North Vietnam have further eroded our confidence and deepened our concern. We recognize that we lack confidential information and specialized knowledge about the military tactics involved. But we also recognize, as should have been apparent to the Administration in advance and as events of the past few days have demonstrated, that the implications of this expansion of the war far transcend the level of military tactics.

As both teachers and parents we have watched the progressive disillusionment of a generation who have received no convincing answer to the question why they should be required to kill and be killed in Vietnam. As citizens we have witnessed the substantial distraction of the energies of young and old away from urgent needs at home and abroad. As lawyers we have observed the alarming damage that accumulating frustrations over Vietnam and its consequences have begun to inflict on traditions of respect for law and mutual forbearance.

Because these concerns can no longer be suppressed, we write to share them with you.

1. The strength of our country depends upon its internal vitality. This requires a united people, working in a prosperous economy, to achieve political, economic and social justice through law.

January 27, 1971

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

Your return to Harvard was a great success. You gave us a highly informative, stimulating talk that won respect and admiration even from the grudging. The true test, I knew, would be the bartender's reaction, for he is a "radical" law student interested in Asian affairs, and I was somewhat concerned about his presence. He came to see me the next day to say how profoundly impressed he had been at your detached analysis and candor.

Our Asia group will meet in a few days to discuss your questions, and I will be in touch with you.

In the interim I enclose another intriguing report that suggests at least the possibility of our continuing support of Tibetan upheavals. This should be worth checking.

Again, many thanks for the other night.

JAC:be

April 2, 1972

Dear Henry:

You should by now have received a letter from me about Korea,
delivered by a friend. If not, please call me right away at 075-
451-9221. Here I want to raise two other matters.

I will be in Washington Thursday, April 27. Could we get together
at any time then - from breakfast on?

Could you please call the General Counsel of AODA and express
interest in the two volume study on China and International Law that
I have done (with my associate, Hungdah Chiu) for AODA? Harvard Press
has accepted it (the reader called it a monumental work of scholarship,
etc.), the subject is rather timely, to say the least, but HUP is
broke and needs a $10,000. subsidy at least to put it out at a mere
$36. or so (Derek Fired Mark Carroll, HUP President, and the boys
are running scared). AODA has apparently agreed to put up an un-
specified amount toward the necessary subsidy (after some gentle
prodding by Ted Kennedy), but the bastards have delayed for months
in saying how much. I didn't want to bother you with such mundane
matters while you are remaking the world, but have reached the
limits of my patience, since I've worked five years on the project
and am eager to have it appear. A call from you would undoubtedly
snap AODA out of its lethargy. I hope you can do it. Many thanks.

Medical
Opinion

575 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10022 • (212) 751-2350

an

**amtel**
company

February 11, 1972

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I certainly enjoyed meeting and talking with you at the 20th
Birthday party of the TODAY show.

As you requested, I have enclosed a copy of our November issue
with the article on ACUPUNCTURE.

I have read with considerable interest some of your comments
on the feeling of unrest in our country and I agree that we
will never reach utopia. I suppose people feel disenchanted
because the federal government has not produced that euphoric
state for its citizens.

People can do things for themselves, however, that would lead
to a better life and, in that vein, I would like to refer you
to our editorial - on page six - in the same issue entitled
"A Chance to Save Lives". This concerns a self-help program
to improve emergency medical care where communities utilizing
emergency medical systems extant can dramatically alter
emergency health care delivery through additional inputs to
the system.

Published by Medical Opinion & Review, Inc.

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Page 2
February 11, 1972

This educational Program sponsored by the not-for-profit ACT Foundation - funded by some members of the pharmaceutical industry - is already having some effect. Enclosed is an outline on what is happening in Kansas City which illustrates what can be done by an individual community through proper organization. I understand that their improved emergency medical care system will begin operation this May.

It would seem that this ongoing program, if successful, would help to accomplish the results called for by Senator McGovern in his speech in Boston, as reported by the enclosed New York Times clipping: The difference, however, is that the basic thrust will come from communities - and perhaps states - in cooperation with the federal government.

I would like to extend to the President, yourself and all members of your party best wishes for success on your forthcoming trip to China.

m
enclosures

MARION LABORATORIES, INC.

10236 BUNKER RIDGE ROAD • KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64137

January 19, 1972

Mr. Kip H. Cohen, Publisher
Medical Opinion and Review
575 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Kip:

As we had discussed, I am forwarding a brief outline of the progress to date in establishing comprehensive emergency services in the greater Kansas City area.

While the outline may be considered brief, and may not be chronologically correct, it should reflect the tremendous amount of work by many dedicated individuals. Needless to say, our participation and support of the A.C.T. Foundation couldn't have been more timely, since it supplied the needed catalyst to motivate other people.

Greater Kansas City's problems and needs could be considered unique from two viewpoints. First, we now have what could be termed a "minimal" emergency care system although all of the technology and people resources necessary to implement a "comprehensive" system are available. Secondly, we probably have the most bewildering array of political jurisdictions in the nation.

Working within and through these two parameters, we are confident that a comprehensive emergency care will develop which will serve as a model for other communities to follow.

As more information concerning the progress of our program develops, I will forward it to you. Once again, thanks for your help in establishing the A.C.T. Foundation, and for providing us with the vehicle to stimulate the awareness among our medical and community leaders.

LN:mdh

# BACKGROUND

## Current Facilities

The emergency care delivery system for Greater Kansas City could be termed "minimal" at best. In Kansas City proper, city ambulances can be dispatched to the scene of an accident or to a heart attack victim *after* being summoned by a police officer.

The majority of the citizens in the city and surrounding suburbs must rely on private ambulance services for their emergency needs. The usual "fatal delay factors" are inherent in this system. Other variables in the present system include:

- Wide variations in equipment and trained personnel operating private ambulances (many have minimal first-aid training, some know the basics of CPR, others have minimal equipment).

- The variations among the emergency care facilities of the local hospitals (they range from trauma teams and sophisticated CCU's to E.R.'s staffed by part-time residents or Doctors "on call").

- Communication is nearly "non-existent". In summary, there is no "system" established to meet the emergency care needs of the community.

To be most efficient, the emergency care plan should apply to a geographically large, particularly complex area with Kansas City, Missouri as its metropolitan core. This section of the midwest represents...and may well constitute the most bewildering array of political jurisdictions in the nation. This eight county region consists of five counties in the State of Missouri (Platte, Clay, Ray, Jackson and cass) and three counties in the State of Kansas (Leavenworth, Wyandotte and Johnson).

The 1,324,855 persons included in this region reside primarily in large cities (Kansas City, Mo.; Kansas City, Kan.; Independence, Mo.; Overland Park, Kan.) or in suburban communities -- a total of 108 cities in all.

Geographically, the area includes 3,804 square miles with Kansas City, Missouri representing 316 square miles of the total. Circumferential, interstate highways serve greater K.C. Mo; five interstate routes radiate out into three of the Missouri counties and two of the Kansas counties. In general, the road system of the area could be described as good, if not outstanding. As with most metropolitan districts in the county, the residential development of the post ten years has clearly tended to follow the completed sections of interstate highways.

-2-

## THE BEGINNING

The lack of comprehensive emergency care in our area may have been realized by many people, but it took one particular incident and a concerned physician to begin the focus of attention toward our difficulties.

The incident was an apparent heart attack, by a local orthopedic surgeon. While he was recovering, he began to review the series of events before his hospitalization. He had called a private ambulance and been subjected to the usual delay factors; that is, from the initial call for help to admittance into the hospital, a prolonged and potentially dangerous lapse of time had taken place. In recalling the trip, he remembered that the only communication was between the dispatcher and the driver. He later found that the training and equipment available during his trip consisted of approximately 30 hours of first-aid and a tank of oxygen. In short, he had been "taxied" to the hospital with no essential emergency care for over one hour.

By the time of his dismissal he had resolved to correct the situation. If he as a physician had to depend upon this type of emergency care, what services were available to the rest of the people in the area? Essentially the same services. No amount of money, influence, or prestige would ensure any better emergency care. The problem was not money...or lack of good intentions...the problem was that no system existed.

He quickly rallied a group of concerned medical and community leaders. The problems were discussed with the Mayor of Kansas City, Missouri. By October 8, 1971, the Mayor had established a special committee on Comprehensive Emergency Services with the specific purpose of designing and developing a metropolitan plan for the delivery of emergency medical services.

Committee assignments were delegated to study specific problems and potential solutions. Rather than describe the various people involved, meetings and findings, I have attached the "Statement of Purposes" of our group with specific responsibilities.

By mid-November, I had returned from the launch of our A.C.T. Program to the American Heart Association; and had the approval of Marion management to begin the program in Kansas City. Our involvement and commitment to this program extends beyond the support of the A.C.T. Program on a national basis. We also felt an obligation to improve the health care within our own community and to look towards establishing a mobile life support system in greater Kansas City.

Since many of the members of the local AHA had attended the meeting in California, I contacted them first. It was there that I learned of the Mayor's Committee and from the first meeting, became an active

-3-

participant. As is so typical of committees struggling with complex issues, the initial progress was slow. Many people were interested in our mobile coronary care concept and the suggestions provided in our "Blueprints for Action" monographs. But the "system" was not really understood initially.

In the meantime, three committee members visited Jacksonville, Florida to study their system. At the next meeting, they reported their findings, and it was at this point that I suggested the role of our film, "Life on a Line". The members who had traveled to Jacksonville were enthusiastic and committed to developing a "system", but how could they describe this system to enlist more support for the program? Our film could be the vehicle or catalyst to show people how a system saves lives...how it functions...and what could be done.

The film was shown at the next meeting to the mayor, city manager and other members of the committee. It was a catalyst. It showed what could be done and what we could plan toward. From this first showing came additional requests to show it to other groups of interested people.

During this same time, we had meetings and film showings with the Kansas City AHA with the hope of their utilizing this as a focal point for their fund-raising drive. Although they support the program, their conclusions were to work with the Mayor's Committee, endorse the program, and lend any training or support necessary to implement the coordinated emergency service plan for the metropolitan area.

## MOMENTUM

The initial trip to Jacksonville, the catalytic film and the convictions of the committee provided the momentum necessary to begin the initial progress. Through the cooperation and planning of the Mid-American Comprehensive Health Planning Agency, another visit to Jacksonville was arranged. On this visit, 95 fire, police, ambulance, and civic leaders had the opportunity to see the Jacksonville system and meet with the various people responsible for implementing and sustaining the program.

That trip, on January 10th, proved to be another needed catalyst for our committee. Now everyone had a frame of reference, a known system, a successful system to work toward. The A.C.T. film had shown examples and shared the experiences of other similar systems. Tentative support and commitments were made by elected officials, fire and police officials, and civic leaders.

The initial planning had evolved from the Mayor's Committee to the development of a bi-state authority to continue the planning, implementation and financing of an areawide emergency care system.

CURRENT STATUS

At the present time, each committee is preparing its findings and recommendations. A series of additional meetings is planned between now and the target date, March 18, 1972. It is the hope that on this date, a seminar will be held to present the findings and submit a plan for the establishment of a metropolitan emergency and disaster care authority to serve the eight county metropolitan area of Missouri and Kansas.

I have no doubt that a program will be implemented shortly thereafter, and although it may not initially encompass the entire area, it will have started by May 30, 1972.

As I stated previously, the problems of our particular area are complex but not beyond solution. For we have the people and technological resources to implement such a comprehensive program. Hopefully, the problems we overcome and solve, will serve as an example for other communities to follow.

I could not include all of the individuals and groups involved in this brief outline. It started with one physician's near-misfortune and has involved other physicians, elected officials, hospital administrators, public and private health organizations, and area business leaders. It will hopefully result in a comprehensive emergency care delivery system in which every citizen of the Kansas City Metropolitan Region is the benefactor.

Statement of Purpose: MECA

Metropolitan Emergency and Disaster Care Authority

We are the Mayor's Special Committee for the establishment of a metropolitan emergency and disaster care authority to serve the eight county greater metropolitan area of Missouri and Kansas.

The committee is comprised of representatives from government, industry, labor, clergy, law, medicine and education; specifically, political leaders, policemen, firemen, ambulance owners and attendants, communications experts, computer programmers, lawyers, doctors, hospitals, architects; insurance men, helicopter evacuation people, and others.

The primary purpose of this group is to devise a comprehensive plan that will improve the delivery of emergency care to the victims of heart attacks, accidents of all kinds, other illnesses and disasters.

Our aim is to salvage the lives of a great many people in the metropolitan area dying needlessly, and to reduce suffering and economic waste.

We will work toward the establishment of (1) better communications between the victims of accidents, disasters and other illnesses and someone who can help (2) an effective fleet of ambulances and helicopters; (3) better trained ambulance attendants, emergency room personnel and physicians; (4) strategically located expert emergency care facilities with the proper equipment and staff; (5) better communications between emergency care facilities and emergency vehicles; (6) better use of monies currently expended for inadequate facilities and vehicles.

We intend to create a bi-state authority to accomplish these goals.

We believe the public will support such an effort by gifts, subscriptions and better use of tax money.

We believe these efforts will save lives! One of those lives could be your own.

## EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Charles E. Workman, M.D. (Chairman) John L. Barnard, Jr., M.D.

Richard Brose, Dr., P.H. G. G. Roberts, M.D.

Hamilton V. Reid E. Grey Dimond, M.D.

W. O. Rieke, M.D. John D. Petterson

Donald Jackson Jacob Ruf

Mrs. Lydia Miller James DiRenna, D.O.

James Doarn Hon. Charles B. Wheeler, Jr., M.D. (Ex-Officio)

Charles M. Hart II Richard Davis
Kenneth D. Bopp

## STAFF

Russell G. Jones, Jr. Galen S. Mack

# COMMITTEES, CREDENTIALS, AND FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES

## I. Mobile Emergency Unit and Ambulance Personnel Committee

Chairman: John L. Barnard, Jr., M.D.,
Chairman of Jackson County Medical Society
(Emergency Care Committee)

### Objectives

A. To upgrade our current metropolitan mobile emergency units through better equipment and more highly trained personnel.

1. To develop methods to certify ambulance attendants as an emergency medical technician, a professional- and career man.

2. To develop mechanisms to train, certify, and equip the ambulance attendant to provide life support at the scene of the emergency and in transit to the hospital.

3. To develop methods to design and equip mobile emergency units to provide a basis for essential treatment as well as safe transportation.

## II. Categorization of Hospitals

Chairman: Richard Brose, Dr., P.H., Kansas University Medical Center, Chariman, Department of Emergency Services

### Objectives

A. To categorize our present metropolitan fixed base emergency units on the basis of staffing, equipment, and location.

1. To explore means of specializing selected fixed base emergency units on the basis of specialized service centers.

## III. Non-emergency - Out-patient Services

Chairman: Charles M. Hart II, Attorney, Chairman: Health Services Committee, Mid-America Comprehensive Health Planning Agency

### Objectives

A. Develop mechanisms for handling the non-emergency patients in units physically removed from the fixed-based emergency units.

1. 24-hour service hospital out-patient clinics

2. Decentralized primary out-patient service centers

B. Develop triage mechanism to refer non-emergency patients from fixed base emergency units to appropriate primary out-patient service centers.

*This task will be carried out by the Health Services Committee, a standing committee of the Mid-America Comprehensive Health Planning Agency.

## IV. Communications Committee

Chairman: Hamilton V. Reid, Executive Director: Baptist Memorial Hospital; Chairman, Disaster Planning Committee, Kansas City Area Hospital Association

### Objectives

A. To develop mechanisms to link our mobile and fixed base emergency units by means of a universal and continuous communications system.

1. To establish a central dispatching unit capable of continuous communication with all emergency units.

2. To develop a means of providing two-way voice communication available at all times between the mobile emergency unit, the fixed base emergency unit, a central dispatcher, and essential supporting services such as those of law enforcement and fire authorities.

3. To explore the feasibility of implementing a 911 concept in the Kansas City metropolitan area.

## V. Helicopter Service Committee

Chairman: G. G. Roberts, M.D.; Medical Director, Western Electric Company

### Objectives

To develop procedures and agreements to utilize helicopters as mobile emergency units, on a shared-use basis, in instances where distant, immediate, or specialized cases merit.

## VI. Physician Training Committee

Co-Chairman: E. Grey Dimond, M.D., Provost for Health Sciences, University of Missouri at Kansas City

Co-Chairman: W. O. Rieke, M.D., Vice-Chancellor, University of Kansas Medical Center

## Objectives

To develop more extensive and specific instructional programs for physicians, nurses, etc., to more readily identify and treat trauma patients. Also to develop more exhaustive continuing education and consultation programs in the field of trauma treatment.

## VII. Finance Committee

Co-Chairman: Charles E. Workman, M.D., Orthopedic Surgeon

Co-Chairman: Hon. Charles B. Wheeler, Mr., M.D., Mayor of
Kansas City, Missouri

## Objectives

A. Immediately secure funds for the purpose of sponsoring the March 18 Seminar on Emergency Services.

B. Attempt to identify and explore the feasibility of securing federal program funds to provide seed money for initiating an emergency service system.

C. Attempt to investigate the feasibility of financing an emergency service system through a bi-state (multi-jurisdictional) funding authority.

## VIII. Insurance Committee

Chairman: John D. Petterson, President, Board of Trustees
North Kansas City Memorial Hospital; Member
Blue Cross of Kansas City, Missouri

## Objectives

A. To develop and/or adjust current insurance mechanisms with proper incentives to include payment for emergency ambulance services and out-patient emergency services at the fixed base emergency unit.

## IX. Legal Committee

Chairman: Donald Jackson, Attorney, Jackson and Sherman; Past President, K. C. Bar Association

## Objectives

A. To seek deletion of legal statutes which serve to retard and restrict the delivery of emergency services, and develop new legal statutes to permit flexibility in the delivery of comprehensive emergency services.

## X. Computer Committee

Chairman: Mr. Jake Ruf, Executive Vice-President
Informations System Development Corporation, Inc.

## Objectives

A. To develop methods of collecting, storing, and retrieving vital emergency care data to speed treatment of emergency victims.

1. To develop special coding mechanisms to route, register, and monitor emergency care patients from the scene of the accident to the fixed base unit.

## Resource Distribution and Coordination

Strategic coordination of all committee activities will be conducted by the Executive Steering Committee of the organization. This Executive Steering Committee is composed of the committee chairman and the directors of those agencies involved. The purpose of the Executive Committee will be the identification and development of system objectives and the determination of system policies. Furthermore, the Executive Committee will overview all committee activities and evaluate these activities in terms of system design priorities.

Major staff coordination will be conducted by the Mid-America Comprehensive Health Planning Agency. Staff of the Metropolitan Planning Commission-Kansas City Region will be available for specific task assignment. All staff assignment will be issued at the direction of the Executive Committee.

PARTICIPANTS
MAYOR'S COMMITTEE
ON
COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY SERVICES

| NAME | ORGANIZATION |
| :--- | :--- |
| Mary Baldwin, R.N. | Liberty Mutual Insurance |
| John Barnard, M.D. | Jackson County Medical Society |
| Robert Boos, Director | Kansas City Alcohol Safety Action Project |
| Kenneth D. Bopp, Executive Director | Mid-America CHPA |
| Dr. Richard Brose, Director, Emergency Medical Services | K.U. Medical Center |
| Charles Classen, Administrator | North Kansas City Memorial Hospital |
| Fred. Cowart | Southwestern Bell Tele. Co. |
| Charles Curran, Vice President | Kansas City Association of Trusts and Foundations |
| W. Crosby, Executive Director | Providence-St. Margaret Health Center |
| Richard F. Davis, Executive Director | Metropolitan Planning Commission |
| Richard K. Degenhardt, Executive Director | K.C. Chamber of Commerce |
| Gene Desaulniers | Physician Exchange Ambulance Service |
| James DiRenna, D.O. | Osteopathic Physician |
| E. Grey Dimond, M.D., Provost for Health Sciences | University of Missouri at K.C. |
| James Doarn, Executive Director | Mid-America Council of Governments |
| Joe Folkurt | K.C. Health Dept. Ambulance |
| David Francisco, M.D., President | Wyandotte County Medical Society |
| Herbert Gershon | Jackson County Public Hospital |

Sam Glenner, Chief, Emergency Medical Services

Donald L. Green, Executive Director

R.A. Gruendel, M.D.

Arlo S. Hermuck, M.D.

Loren Humphrey, M.D., Chief of Surgery

Donald Jackson

Robert Jackson

Virginia Johnson, R.N.

Charles T. Jones

Russell G. Jones, Jr., Facilities Planner

Clarence Kelley

Donald Kuenzi, M.D., President

Galen S. Mack, Health Planning Specialist

W. Kendall McNabney, Chief & Surgery and Emergency Room Medicine

William McPhee, M.D., Pathologist

J.A. Morris, M.D.

Mrs. Lydia Miller, President

Col. James R. Newman

Les Nigro

E.G. Rainey, Sales Executive

W.O. Rieke, M.D., Vice Chancellor

HEW Region VII

K.C. Heart Association

Providence-St, Margaret Health Center

K.U. Medical Center

K.U. Medical Center

Jackson and Sherman, Inc.

Robert Jackson Associates, Inc.

Trinity Lutheran Hospital

HEW, CHP, Regional Office VII

Mid-America CHPA

Chief, Kansas City Missouri Police Department

Area Medical Council, K.C., Mo.

Mid-America CHPA

K.C. General Hospital and Medical Center

N.K.C. Memorial Hospital

COMPACT

Womens Chamber of Commerce K.C.

K.C. Mo., Police Dept.

Marion Laboratories

N.K.C. Memorial Hospital

Motorola C & E, Inc.

Baptist Memorial Hospital

G.G. Robert, M.D.

Paul F. Roth

Jacob F. Ruf, Vice-President

T.D. Schertz, M.D.

Allen D. Smith, Executive. Secretary

Carla States, R.N.

Sherman Steinzeig, M.D.

E.M. Throne, M.D.

Francis X. Tobin, Regional Director

Paul Ward, Regional Representative

Forrest E. Weddle

Dr. Charles Workman, Orthopedic Surgeon

Edwin O. Wicks, M.D.

K.C. Chamber of Commerce

Southwestern Bell Tele. Co.

Information Systems Develop-
ment

N.K.C. Memorial Hospital

Jackson County Medical Society
and Area Medical Council

Trinity Lutheran Hospital

Research Hospital

Office of Emergency Preparedness
Region VII

Information Systems Development

North K.C. Memorial Hospital

Mayor, Kansas City, Missouri

Kansas City, Missouri, Public

Health Director

PRESS
OFFICIAL, jlp, 3/10/72

Type of Request & Date

COHEN

(Last name and pending date)

GENERAL
NEB

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Kip Cohen, Publisher of "American Opinion" Magazine
212/751-2350

Request: Had some correspondence with Mr. Kissinger (Staffed by John Holdridge) just before the President left for China re emergency medical care. He has had another thought or two on the subject and would like to talk with Mr. Kissinger any time in the next three weeks for 15-20 minutes. He adds that he very much appreciated Mr. Kissinger's prompt reply to his letter in what must have been a very busy time.

CSH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: NO 3/15/72

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: Repeated to his office 3/20/72 - 9:45

Additional Information:

Resolution:

RECEIVED
MAR 2 1 1972

Personal visit

(Type of request)

June 11, 1970

(Date received)

L. Simkus

(By)

Name: Dr. Joseph Cohn, Zurich, Switzerland

Request: Dr. Cohn is in the United States -- presently in New York. He said he was in touch with the office on his present visit, and this time has a message from Mr. Weichert in Bonn, who is hospitalized and will be for a few weeks.

Dr. Cohn will be in Washington on Monday, June 15, and will call that morning to see if there is a possibility he could pay a brief visit.

In the interim, his number in New York is 212/CI 7-0691; however, he is in and out. If that number does not answer, a message can be left at 212/CI 5-7868. (He will be in New York until Sunday morning.)

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: Yes 6/15

Date and Time: 5:45 6/15

Party Contacted:

Additional Information: HAK unable to see

Resolution:

COHN -- Mon, June 15, 1970

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

To:

From:

RECEIVED

JUN 17 1970

CENTRAL FILES

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

618 Erudo Street
Linden, N. J. 07036

December 21, 1972

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It seems most appropriate at this moment to express to you our
gratitude for the efforts you have expended in trying to bring
about a workable settlement of the Indochina war. Of course,
with the peace negotiations still shrouded in secrecy and the
confusion between the many "news" reports, it is impossible for
us even to guess just how much has been accomplished...though
we do hope and pray the end is near.

We want you to know of our confidence in you, our deep apprecia-
tion for your untiring efforts to find a just and honorable
conclusion to the Vietnam war, our hope based on your dedication
to the cause of a lasting peace, return of our prisoners of war
and accounting for the missing. Our torment is lightened by the
belief that you will continue to do everything in your power to
bring an early end to the war and the early return of our men.

As a member of the Board of the National League of Families of
American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, John has had
the privilege of attending your briefings for the Board in the
past year and hearing directly from you your thoughts about the
general situation from time to time. We also thank you for the
time and interest you have taken to inform the families in this
way.

It is our hope and prayer that - whether from military or
political pressure, the devotion and concern of people like
yourself, the decisions and actions of rulers and powers, or by
the imposition of a Power greater than all earthly powers - we
will have peace in Vietnam quickly.

We hope your Christmas is a happy one, and that the New Year will
bring you and yours fulfillment, peace and health.

Season's Greetings

618 Erudo Street
Linden, N. J. 07036
Christmas Time 1972

Christmas bells are ringing. Music fills the air. That beautiful season of joy and hope and brotherhood is here. We wish it were possible to greet each of you personally, hold your hand, and tell you how much you mean to us, how you have helped us. Your sympathy and understanding, your prayers and your hopes, have given us strength.

As some of you know, we received from George last Christmas Eve three letters and two cards. Since then we got four more letters, the last written April 9 and received by us June 1. He had received a few of our letters, one or more packages, and some of the pictures we had sent him. George sent love and greetings to each and all of his family, relatives, and friends old and new. He said "I wish you a holy, merry Christmas. The true spirit of Christmas prevails beyond the miles & years, & I am with you. My love to all. I join with you every Sunday night in prayer & will on Christmas."

As we write these lines, peace in Southeast Asia seems tantalizingly near. We know you join us in the prayer that the peace talks will succeed, that the war in Vietnam will end soon, and that George and all the others held in prison camps half the world away will quickly return home.

We pray your Christmas will be a very happy one, and that each of you will enjoy love and peace and health throughout the coming year.

With deep appreciation,
John and Robbie "Len"
Mr. and Mrs. John B. Coker

GENERAL
B-52-6
KISSINGER, HENRY A./C*

Washington

WHB 044 (2351) (2-2172 62E 056)PO 02/25/73 2350

TCS IPMMTZZ CSP

ZCZC 2159470568 NL TDVT BRYNATHYN PA 100 02-25 1130P EST

PMS HENRY KISSINGER, DLR

WHITE HOUSE DC

DONT MAKE OUR DISSGRACEFUL DEFEAT ANY WORSE BY NOW FINANCIALLY

AIDEING THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMISE

CHARLES S COLE JR 3240 BUCK RD BRYN ATHYN PA 19009

1973 FEB 26 MI 07

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Washington

WHA045 (2351) (2-017267E056) PD 02/25/73 2350

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

1973 FEB 26 AM 12 02

ZCZC 2159470568 NL TDMT BRYNATHYN PA 100 02-25 1150P EST

PMS HENRY KISSINGER, DLR

WHITE HOUSE DC

KAREN PITCAIRN COLE 3240 BUCK RD BRYN ATHYN PA 19009

1973 FEB 26 AM 12 07

AM 9 07

RECEIVED

FEB 26 1973

GENERAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

August 8, 1969

Dear Mr. Colebrook:

As I am not now connected with the Center for
International Affairs, I have forwarded your
manuscript to Mr. Benjamin Brown who has
taken over responsibilities for the Center in
my absence.

You should be hearing directly from him.

Mr. M. J. Colebrook
16, Rue de L'Hotel de Ville
1204 Geneva, Switzerland

cc: Mr. Benjamin Brown
    × Center for International Affairs
    6 Divinity Avenue
    Cambridge, Massachusetts

RECEIVED
AUG 1 1 1969
CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Barbara Coleman

Guest list for Coleman party, May 19, 1971

Mr and Mrs. Jack Kaufmann - publisher Evening Star
Miss Perle Mesta

Mr. C.D. Ward - office of the vice president

Mr and Mrs. Sid Epstein - Managing Editor, Evening Star

Countess Ann Valde - Philadelphia social register

Betty Beale and her husband (Mr and Mrs. George Graeber)

Lee Bowman, former Hollywood movie star

Mary Gore Dean, owner of Jockey Club and sister of
Senator Louise Gore

Herman Greenberg, multi-millionaire Washington builder
with offices in California

Mr and Mrs. Steve McCormack - vice President Mutual network.

Mary Ann Snow, Herb Klein's office

Mr and Mrs. William Cafritz - Washington social

Mr and Mrs. Martin Malarkey, Washington social

Mr and Mrs. Ford Kalil, Washington social

Preston Pitts, Washington social

Mrs. Jane Coyne - former wife owner of Madison Hotel

Mr and Mrs. Edmond Howar, Barbara Howar; s former husband

Mr and Mrs. Mandel Ourisman - Washington social, board
of Riggs bank.

Mr and Mrs. Mike Monroney, son of Senator Monroney

Mr and Mrs. Howard deFranceaux - Washington social

Mr. Jean Pierre Nadjar - Paris designer

Dr. Stephen Deichelman - Philadelphia social -

Richard Lebherz - Frederick Post

Alex King - California businessman

Rochelle Malnick - New York designer.

Dr. and Mrs. Alan Pinkerson - both at HEW

RECEIVED

MAY 25 1971
CENTRAL FILES

CAPITOL B Fairfax Hotel, 2100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20008 202 - 833-1850 202 - 293-2100

CHICAGO

NEW YORK

PARIS

3

GENERAL

Mitchell, Hutchins & Co. FGB-11-1 Peterson, Pa.
Incorporated

Two First National Plaza KISSINGER, HENRY A. /CXT
Chicago, Illinois 60670

JOHN COLEMAN, JR.
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT

August 23, 1971

AIR MAIL

Dr. Henry Kissinger
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

We are trying to get Peter Peterson to come to one of
our priority account luncheons here in Chicago the first
part of September, and at the present time, I think he
is undecided whether or not he should speak to the group.

I understand he is going to have lunch with you sometime
this week and if you could put in a good word for Mitchell,
Hutchins, I would be most appreciative. It might be a
good opportunity for him to talk directly with a dozen top
money managers here in Chicago.

With heartiest congratulations for the great job you are
doing in your department, and many thanks for any help
you can give us, I am

JCJr/pb

Enc. - Luncheon Guest List

MONTHLY LUNCHEON LIST

Mr. Ronald Cramer, Vice President, Common Stock Division
Allstate Insurance Company

Mr. Ernest Roth, Manager of Investments
Commonwealth Edison Serv. Annuity Fund

Mr. James Hocking, Director of Research
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago

Mr. H. Robert Powell, Director of Research
CNA Financial Corporation

Mr. John Hawkinson, President
Supervised Investors Services, Inc.

Mr. William A. Maloney, President
Institutional Capital Corporation

Mr. John H. Marchesi, Jr., Vice President, Research Division
Northern Trust Company

Mr. David V. Dootson, Executive Director-Investments
The Savings & Profit Sharing Pension Fund of
Sears, Roebuck And Co. Employes

Mr. Donald Wallace, Director of Research
Standard Oil Company (Indiana)

Mr. Alfred F. Kugel, Partner & Assistant Director of Research
Stein, Roe & Farnham

Mr. John Magill, Vice President
First National Bank of Chicago

Mr. William Zeh, Vice President
Chicago Title & Trust Company

OFFICIAL 9/22/71

Type of Request & Date

COLEMAN

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY

Name: John Coleman, Mitchell Hutchins, Chicago

Request: Talked with Don Marron and understand HAK to be in Chicago in October and wondered if he could spare an hour to meet with 4 or 5 friends from Mitchell Hutchins. Low key in Coleman's office. Attendees beside Coleman: John Hawkinson, Supreme Investors; Ron Kraemer, All State; Bill Maloney, Institute Capitol (formerly of Sears); Dave Dootson, Sears; Jim Hocking, Continental Bank.

312/ST2-1700

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: No - 10/8

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

COVINGTON & BURLING

888 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

TELEPHONE
(202) 293-3300

TWX: (202) 965-0673

TELEX: 89-593

CABLE: COVLING

October 7, 1972

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
West Wing
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

One of the partners here at Covington & Burling has asked me to see if you would be interested in speaking to a luncheon meeting of the Firm's partnership. I suppose the number of persons would be about fifty. I told him that from my experience such a proposal was not a likely "winner" in the competition for your time. However, I did undertake to forward the request, and this is it.

The partnership luncheons take place each Monday at the Metropolitan Club, and could be set at a time convenient to you (1 p.m., for example). If not broadly Administration supporters, the group would be both interested in and well-informed about foreign affairs.

I hope you will be able to find time on some Monday to speak to the Firm. The proposal hasn't much to offer you, except a close-by lunch, and a not unfriendly forum. As far as I am concerned, I would like to take that opportunity to see you, since it would not be a time when I would know that others were lined up in the West Lobby.

As an outsider, I follow what is reported about your Asian efforts, and hope soon to read you have succeeded.

If you think this luncheon idea has any merit, I can work with Dick to find an appropriate time.

OFFICIAL, 4/26/71, jlp

COLLADO

5/13?

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

EXECUTIVE

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Mr. "Pete" Collado, Chairman of the Board, Standard Oil of N.J.

Request: Saw Mr. Kissinger at Bilderberg and they discussed getting together for half an hour or so with his assistant and a few members of Mr. Kissinger's staff on the energy outlook. Mr. Kissinger indicated his interest in doing this.

Collado could have come week of May 3 but I told him that Mr. Kissinger would be out of town. He can make it afternoon of Thursday, May 13 but will not be able to do it for a while after that as he is leaving, Saturday, May 15 for Tokyo.

Contact Collado at 212/974-2345.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: 5/10 - No (Admiral not present)

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information: I. L. Mijan writes to sit in

Resolution:

RECEIVED
MAY 11 1971

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY

HAK /C*
PERSONAL
FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL

January 15, 1973

Dear Henry:

I cannot find words adequate to describe my personal
admiration for your accomplishments. Having been
exposed just slightly in recent weeks to what you have
been up against and to the burdens you have carried,
I perhaps know more than most of the great strength,
courage and perseverance that was required on your
part. It has been a remarkable performance and when
all is finally written, I hope others will appreciate, as
I do, how brilliantly you handled it under the most
difficult circumstances.

I suspect that you will have no time in the next couple
days, particularly for trivia. I have one such item
that I need to discuss with you that is personal. If I
don't have a nervous breakdown before the middle of
February -- the prospect of which is becoming in-
creasingly likely each day -- I am hoping to take a
brief trip to Europe for which I am told there is sub-
stantial justification. This would be a great change
for me before I plunge into my law practice in March.
I do need a moment or two to discuss this with you,
however, if you have any time before you return to Paris.

Congratulations and Godspeed.

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

/hh

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1973

Dear Henry:

As I leave to return to private life, I do so with very mixed feelings. On the one hand, I will have the opportunity to repair somewhat the damage done to my net worth over the past 3 1/2 years and will have the opportunity to spend a little more time with my family. On the other side of the coin, I am saddened to be leaving the President, of course, and those men around him with whom I have enjoyed such a happy and I hope productive relationship.

It has really been a great privilege to work with you; I have learned much from you. Apart from the enormous respect that I have for your professional ability and the tremendous accomplishments that you have brought about working with the President these past four years, I have also become very fond of your personally. I hope you will consider me a friend and, whatever the future may hold for either of us, I do hope that you will call on me if I can ever be of any assistance or any service to you in any way.

I have no doubt that the historians will give full credit to you for the work that you have done with the President in bringing about one of the most significant and remarkable periods of foreign policy achievement in American history. I wish you well in your continued efforts. For the sake of all of our countrymen, I say to you, God speed.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

RECEIVED
APR 14 1973

CENTRAL FILES