Announcer:

We have cancelled the program regularly scheduled at this time to bring you a special
report on the Middle Eastern situation.

World Implications of the Middle Eastern Crisis: With Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, .........
.......................................... of Harvard University. Here now is
Mr. Henry Morgenthau of the WGBH staff:

M
Dr. K., I think the reason that all of us are so concerned about the explosion in the Middle East is that we want to know just/far down the path it's leading us toward another World War.

Specifically, Mr. Sobolov, the Russian delegate to the UN has charged that the United
States is threatening world peace. Does this in fact mean just the reverse.. that
the Soviet Union does plan to take some military action?

K
Well, let me answer this in 2 parts. It is, of course, a standard Soviet technique
to accuse whomever opposes them of disturbing the peace. When the League of Nations
protested against the Soviet invasion of ............ in 1989 it was the League of
Nations which threatened the peace and not the Soviet Union. So this statement, by
itself, is merely the Soviet way of saying that something has happened that they don't
like and that they are preparing to oppose.

The second question, then, is how far will the opposition go? Are we on the road to
another World War? It would be idle to say that the action that the President has
taken does not have ramifications. I do not believe that it will lead to a World War.
In fact, I do not believe that it will lead to a substantial conflict.

M
Do you think that we should look for some move from the Russians ... are the Russians
getting ready for some kind of direct action? ... Either here, or perhaps elsewhere?

K
Well, I think it will depend a little bit on how the situation develops in the
Middle East. I would not be surprised if the Russians send volunteers into the
M.E., particularly if some fighting develops, along a recognizable front line, or even
if fighting develops anywhere between our forces and local forces. I would be even
less surprised, in fact I think I hope our government is paying close attention to it.
If the Soviet Union took some move within the satellite bit, particularly China

[L.C.]

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..... to bring Poland completely back into the fold, and perhaps to do something about Yugoslavia, but I think Poland would be the more likely.

M Do you think they would take action similar to the Hungarian invasion?

K Well, after Hungary I don't think it's necessary anymore to be quite as drastic as they were in Hungary. I would assume that they could probably bring the Poles to deal by a demonstration of force which stops short of Hungary. I would expect that the pressure of the Poles would increase tremendously over the next few weeks.

M And do think that the Yugoslav echo of the Russian line indicates that they are very disturbed by the situation?

K The Yugoslav echo of the Russian line has 2 motives, in my judgement. The 1st is that Tito has just been meeting with Nasser. And that the action we have just taken is certainly not calculated to please Nasser. Also Nasser is the only reliable/that... well, maybe not reliable but is an aly that Tito has been cultivating. Therefore it is not surprising that he is supporting him on this issue.

Secondly, Tito may use this opportunity to try to get back to the Soviet camp, or at least not to separate himself to far from it. And to use this particular issue to do so. And finally, he may want to forestall some additional Soviet pressure by showing to the Soviet Union that on major issues he follows the same line as they do.

M I don't know whether one can class Yugoslavia as an uncommitted nation, but is there perhaps some implication that the Russian remarks have been addressed to the other uncommitted nations, and what will be the action of these.. India, for example, and some of the other uncommitted countries?

K The Middle Eastern situation is a mess. There is no possible way that we can pretend it that/is a good situation. It would depend again -- I hate to be evasive -- on how the situation develops. They will certainly not welcome it. If there is any substantial fighting by local forces against us, then probably we will become identified with Imperialists and Colonialists powers; I would expect the Indians and others generally to oppose our action in Lebanon, and certainly to oppose it if it leads to fighting.

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[LC]

As long as our action is confined to Lebanon it will appeal ... we can still be justified in the Asian eyes and Indians eyes as perhaps supporting the legitimate government. If it spills over into Jordan and Iraq, as it well may, I think the uncommitted will probably take a position against us.

M Hmmm. Does all of this imply a real failure of American foreign policy?

K I think the American Middle Eastern policy has been a complete fiasco. It has is collapsed completely and the beginning of wisdom/to admit that there has been a fiasco and to undertake a complete reassessment.

M Does this mean that the Eisenhower doctrine was doomed before it was ever declared? dangers

K The Eisenhower Doctrine has never been geared to the / that would be likely to threaten these nations. In fact, it wasn't directed to any danger that had ever threatened these nations. It is one thing to say that the Communists produced the thing in the Middle East, as I believe they did. But it is quite enough to say that these were Communist forces which were engaging in this operation, and since the Eisenhower Doctrine offered protection only against Communist aggression, and aggression across sovereign boundaries, neither of which was very likely to happen, it was a meaningless gesture on the part of.......... On the other hand, while it was meaningless, it was enough of a gesture to create a rallying point for the nationalist forces in the ME against us. It seems to me the kind of gesture which a responsible statesmanship should never undertake because it threatens without force, it envokes contingencies that are not likely to arise and provides a symbol for the oponent.

M In looking back, what perhaps would have been a More reasonable policy.. a more realistic policy?

K It depends how far back you look.

M Let's go back to Suez.

K My own view is this. That there were... there that is no doubt that Nasser, for better or for worse, may well represent the really dynamic forces in the Mid E. That nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-zionism in fact, represent real forces in the Mid E. The objection one could have to Nasser was that he had given

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a nationalist and anti-colonialist revolution a ...................., and in the
process he was putting many of the Western nations in a state of economic dependence
on him and he threatened their very survival. This, I thought, was inadmissable.
The second problem raised by Nasser was that he emerged as a major power through the
same.... through the purchase of Soviet arms. Whatever his motives were in getting
Soviet arms, and whatever mistakes had been before, it was very unwise for us to
permit a nation to emerge into such a dominant position merely by buying Russian arms,
because this made it very clear it provided a tremendous incentive to any other nation
to buy Russian arms and thereby upset the whole international situation.

Ideally, we should have been leading the nationalist revolution in the Mid East...
with constructive programs for development. Once we had missed this opportunity and
it had taken an anti-Western turn we had 2 choices, of which I preferred the first.
The first was to bring down Nasser and then to hope that his successor would persue
a more favorable policy toward the West and support him in carrying out a constructive
and dynamic policy in the Mid East which might in some respect be very similar to
Nasser's except for its... that it wouldn't have the anti-Western bias.

The second course was to support Nasser against Britain and France, but then to
realize that a Nasser who had defeated Britain and France, who would appear to the
Arabs to have defeated Britain and France, would be a very powerful person in the
Mid East and would undoubtedly seem to the Arabs to represent a way for the future.
To support Nasser against the British and then to base an anti-Nasser policy on it
King Saud, who represented very little and certainly not the way for the future was
certainly a bankrupt policy. If we had supported Nasser in the Mid East I think it
would have not been unwise to let nature take its course. But... perhaps we should
have tried to bring about a democratic regime in Iraq or some other country and
try to build it up much faster than Egypt was developing in hopes of developing a
counter pole of attraction.

Do you think the Nasser regime is actually becoming a sound regime? That it can
continue?

M

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Or can it only continue with Russian support?

**K** The Nasser regime has made its reputation now, and its whole foundation rests upon its defiance of the West. The Nasser regime also depends upon foreign policy successes because its domestic problems are so difficult. It will seek these foreign policy successes against the West. It's become the center of attraction among the anti-Western forces, in fact for many .. for almost all of them. It is not a very hopeful regime for us.

**M** And at the moment we are left without any friends in the Mid East at all?

**K** We are left without any friends, and I would say this: I would not antagonize Nasser unless I were prepared to deal with him very harshly. To engage in half-measures and to try and please both sides will continue to lead to disaster. We must either decide to take our chances with him, or we must deal with him very sternly. But we cannot do both... we cannot irritate him and then take half a step towards him again.

**M** So then, the one possibility would be another Suez. To pull out...

**K** I'm not recommending another Suez. I am saying this: Lebanon is not the end of the story. We must either try to achieve some .................... with Nasser or we must base our policy on the assumption that he is our enemy. We cannot both try to fight him and try to hope that he will come over to a more reasonable position. This has been exposed as a fiasco now.

**M** Are there any indications as what we will do, what will be the next step in this crisis?

**K** Well, the President said tonight that we might send additional forces into Lebanon. We have a very serious policy decision to make... whether we are going to go beyond Lebanon and into the Iraq situation, or whether we are going to stabilize the situation and let events take their course.... in the rest of the Arab world.

**M** Dr. K., I want to thank you very much for being with us and really making some very important statements on the whole world implications on this situation in the Middle East. Thank you. Goodnight.