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does not affect the basic psychological point. Moreover, the French
disaster came at the end of two decades in which France almost single-
hanedly shouldered the responsibility for the defense of Europe while
her erstwhile allies withdrew into isolation or offered strictures about
France's obsession with security. The nightmare that some day France
might again stand alone goes far deeper than the obstinate ill-will of
a single individual.

A comparable problem exists in Germany. Washington has at times
shown signs of impatience toward the German leaders and their constant
need for reassurance. Secretary Rusk has been reported more than once
to be restless with what he has called the "pledging sessions" which the
Germans seem so often to demand. However, insecurity is endemic in the
German situation. A divided country with frontiers that correspond to
no historical experience, a society which has lived through two disastrous
defeats and four domestic upheavals in 40 years cannot know inward
stability. The need to belong to something, to rescue some predictability
out of chaos, is overwhelming. The memories of our allies should be factors

[Y]

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as real in the discussions of our policy-makers as the analysis of weapons
systems.

The importance of this difference in historical perspective is
compounded by the continuing disparity in strength between the two sides
of the Atlantic. While it has become fashionable to speak of Europe's
new-found equality, it is important not to take it too literally. Europe
**has** gained in strength over the past decade and a half. It can and should
play an increasingly responsible role. But for the foreseeable future we
are likely to be by far the stronger partner.

It is important to be clear about this because it requires that
the United States show unusual tact and steadiness. Many of our allies
have been guilty of unilateral actions far more flagrant than ours. But
when we act unilaterally, disarray in the Alliance is almost inevitable.
Sudden, drastic, and, above all, unilateral changes in U.S. strategic
doctrine--whatever their merit--create a sense of impotence and are
resisted as much for symbolic as for substantive reasons. Actions without
adequate consultation--such as the removal of IRBM's from Italy and Turkey

[N]

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in troop deployment or the withdrawal of troops from Germany--increase the pressure for more autonomy. Bilateral dealings with the Soviets, from which our allies are excluded or about which they are informed only at the last moment, are bound to magnify Third Force tendencies. When our allies oppose such practices, it is not necessarily because they disagree with our view but because they are afraid of creating a precedent for unilateral changes in other policies. (Even statements of substantive disagreement may be a smoke screen for deeper concerns.)

Moreover, many allied leaders who have staked their prestige on U.S. policies can suffer serious domestic consequences if we change them drastically. This causes the voice of Europe to reach us in extremely distorted form. President de Gaulle sharpens all disputes and even creates them in pursuit of his policy of independence. But some other leaders do not give full expression to their disquiet because they do not want to undermine further the solidarity on which their security is thought to depend. Whereas France exaggerates her disagreements, some other countries obscure theirs. Thus the dialogue with Europe is often conducted on false

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issues, while real issues--like the future of Germany, or arms control,
or the role of tactical nuclear weapons--are swept under the rug in order
not to magnify the existing discord.

We, in turn, are faced with the problem that technology and
political conditions are changing so rapidly that no policy can be
maintained over an indefinite period of time. How to shape policies
that are responsive to change while maintaining the confidence of our
allies? How to develop a sense of unity from the diverse conceptions
of so many proud peoples?

[Y]

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VI. Whither the Atlantic Alliance?

Nothing is more dangerous than the fashionable theory that all problems in the Atlantic Alliance have been caused by one man and that the major problem is to await his disappearance from the scene so that the traditional patterns can be resumed. No doubt President de Gaulle's style of diplomacy, which is not really compatible with the requirements of coalition, has exacerbated tensions. The United States shares the responsibility through too much insistence on technical solutions and too little allowance for intangibles of political judgment and will.

However, it would be a mistake to confuse these symptoms with the causes. Regardless of the personalities of the leading statesmen, a redefinition of Allied relationships would have been inevitable. Any new act of construction, moreover, would involve stress. The danger is that an attempt may be made to solve new problems by applying traditional concepts. There is a great deal of talk about "unity," "community," or "indivisible interests." But the issue before the West is precisely to give these terms a new meaning. Invoking the need for unity will not change

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the fact that American and European interests are not identical outside
of Europe. Inveighing against exalting national sovereignty only
emphasizes the contradiction of United States policy which has nationalism
as the most reliable bulwark against Communist domination everywhere
except in Western Europe. Proclaiming indivisible interests does not
solve the problem of how allied cohesion can be maintained in negotiations
with a suddenly multifaceted Communism. Slogans of integration do not
answer the question of how in the era of nuclear weapons sovereignty
can be related to community. Above all, the United States will not for
long be able to evade this issue of how much of its own sovereignty it
is prepared to give up.

Under the impact of the strong personality of President de Gaulle,
it has become commonplace to speak of the recovery of Europe's strength
and self-confidence. American spokesmen never tire of emphasizing the
folly of an excessive estimate of Europe's power, while many U.S. policies
seem based on the assumption that European vitality will be permanent
and that the only obstacle to Atlantic cohesion is the traditional form of

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European nationalism.

However, de Gaulle's policy may have produced an illusion of European strength and self-confidence which is more a reflection of his personality than of underlying factors. If one moves from Europe in the abstract to an examination of the individual European countries, it becomes apparent how precarious Europe's stability really is. On the Iberian peninsula, stability may not survive two aged dictators. Italy's center-left coalition is tenuous; its capacity for major policy initiatives is limited. Its policy tends to confuse maneuvering with statesmanship and in times of crisis may verge on neutralism.

A post-de Gaulle France may be rent by internal schisms. Germany suffers from the absence of traditions and the pressures produced by a divided country. The vigor so noticeable in Europe today is very close in time to nihilism; European self-confidence is still precarious. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength by a neutralism which exalts impotence. To avoid both dangers and to create a new and more vital structure is the challenge before the Atlantic Alliance.