- 12 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you still rule out the
possible reintroduction of U.S. ground forces and the use
of nuclear weapons?

DR. KISSINGER: That has been ruled out by the
President, yes.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell me how the
proposal that the President made last night, the conditions
he stated for the four-month withdrawal, differ from the
proposals you made on May 31st in the secret military
proposals and can you also say why you think that they might
be more acceptable now to the other side than they were then?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not saying they might be more
acceptable now. Of course, the deadline has been shortened,
certain events have happened since then which might make
the other side believe that it has now proved its military
capacity to a point where it could afford a purely military
solution, but we have to face this fact: If we can make only
proposals that the other side has said it will accept, we will
be pushed into the position of sooner or later accepting their
political formulation.

We are not saying that the other side will accept it.
We are saying this is a fair proposal and it should accept it.
We are not saying that we know the other side will do this,
we are saying that looking at the situation and the need to
end this war, there is no reason for the other side not to accept it.
We think it is a just proposal. We are not saying it is at this
moment an acceptable proposal, but we hope it will be an acceptable
proposal.

Q Last night he said nothing whatever about the previous condition of free election country-wide. What is our attitude now toward that particular proposal?

DR. KISSINGER: Our attitude is that if the other side is prepared to discuss political issues, we will discuss our proposal of January 25th, or some variation of it, or listen to their counter-proposal to it. If the other side insists that the only political solution is the one that they have proposed, which is a defacto imposition of their government by us, then we suggest we have a deadlock in the political field and we solve the military problem.

As far as the United States is concerned, we are prepared to pursue an alternative approach; either a comprehensive solution or a purely military solution. Since the other side totally rejected a political approach last time, or insisted that there had to be a literal acceptance of its published program, the President did not refer to it yesterday -- but we are prepared to continue.

MORE

- 13 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President told us many times that his preference was for negotiation but that he is willing to go the Vietnamization route if that didn't succeed. Did that Vietnamization program assume that the North Vietnamese would not at some time fight with all of their might and means?

DR. KISSINGER: We had hoped that in the light of the proposals we had made that there would be a possibility for a negotiated outcome. We had also perhaps underestimated the massive influx of offensive weapons particularly from the Soviet Union, weapons that came in in quantities and of a type that changed the military balance and that in many respects, especially artillery and heavy tanks, tipped the balance in the North Vietnamese direction.

Now, while I have a chance to talk about Soviet supplies, and with Ron looming over me, let me give you our assessment of the Soviet role so that we don't misunderstand each other.

There are two schools of thought. One school of thought maintains that this operation was supplied, conceived, and planned by the Soviet Union in order to impose a maximum humiliation on us prior to the Summit.

Another school of thought maintains that, to be sure, the Soviet Union supplied the weapons, and therefore has to be held responsible for some of the consequences. But that it did not plan this operation, that it could not have considered it in its interest for it to take this extreme form, and that what we face here is one of the problems great powers have in dealing with their clients, that the client looks at problems from its own regional or national perspective, while the great powers may take actions in a much wider one.

We tend to lean towards the latter interpretation. We do not argue that this was a deliberate plan to inflict a humiliation on the United States. We are saying that any thoughtful national leader looking at the masses of offensive equipment might have considered the consequences and, prior to a meeting that had, and still has such high prospects, one should ask oneself whether it can be in the interest of either party to impose a major setback on the other.

This has been our concern, vis a vis the Soviet Union and this has been the reason for our occasional criticism. Not the charge that this is a massive all-out conspiracy.

Q Do you foresee the possibility of a victory by the Hanoi forces of such magnitude that we would have to have a Dunkirk type of operation to withdraw our troops?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we do not foresee a victory of such magnitude, but one has to say that their behavior suggests that such a victory may be their intention and therefore it has to be considered by us. We don't foresee it though.

MORE

- 14 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, for months you have expressed a
personal view and conviction that this war will be resolved
by negotiation, perhaps at the Summit. Two parts in this
question: Do you still feel that is a probability and secondly,
given the breaking off of this private session, have you
hopes that it can be revived in the future, the idea of private
negotiations, with yourself playing a part?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, to take the last part first,
these private negotiations haven't remained very private
lately. For example, after the last meeting at the insistent
request of the North Vietnamese, we did not announce the fact
of a meeting, even though we had proposed that to them. Then
we were forced to confirm it by their own announcement of it.

Now, leaving aside how possible it is to have really
complete private meetings under present circumstances, we
believe that the most effective way of ending the war, the
most certain way, is by negotiations. We respect Le Duc Tho
as a serious, dedicated spokesman for his side, and we are
prepared on our side to resume negotiations with him at any
time that he is prepared to discuss propositions that are
consistent with our principles. And we would make every
effort to understand his point of view.

Therefore, on our side, we will never break off the
channel of communications and we will always be ready to talk
to them.

Now, do I still believe that there is hope for
negotiations? I have always based my hope of negotiations on
the fact that even in Vietnam there must be some realities
that transcend the parochial concern of the contestants and
that a point must be reached where a balance is so clearly
established that if we can make generous and farseeing proposals
that a solution may be possible.

I still have hope that we can do this. And that we
may be able to do it soon. I expect that when the present
turmoil has subsided that both sides will make efforts to
resume the negotiation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)

# Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam

Text of the Agreement To Be Signed in Paris on
January 27, 1973.¹ Released January 24, 1973

To be signed at the International
Conference Center, Paris,
Saturday morning, Paris time,
January 27, 1973:

## AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on
Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peo-
ple's fundamental national rights and the South Viet-
namese people's right to self-determination, and to con-
tributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the
world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake
to respect and to implement them:

# CHAPTER I

## THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS

### Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity

¹ For Dr. Kissinger's explanation of the signing of two versions of the agreement, see page 68 of this issue.

of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments on Vietnam.

# CHAPTER II

## CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES—WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

### Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-
nam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its mili-
tary activities against the territory of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces,
wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the
territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will
remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in
the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of
North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this
Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

### Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and
to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

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PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

- All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;

- All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

### Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

### Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

### Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

### Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

# CHAPTER III

## THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

### Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21(b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT. TO SELF-DETERMINATION

### Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

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## Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

## Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

- achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

- ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

## Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and assurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

## Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

## Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

# CHAPTER V

## THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

## Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

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# CHAPTER VI

## THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

### Article 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

- Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

- Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam;

- Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

- Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

- Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties;

- Article 8(b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

### Article 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

- Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

- Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

- Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article;

- Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

- Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

### Article 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

- Article 3(c) regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam;

- Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and

Volume 9—Number 4

49

supervision of the implementation of the following pro-
visions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

—Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this Article;

—Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

—Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam;

—Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the Commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18(b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the Commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18(c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.

## Article 19

The parties agree on the convening of an International Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties that they participate in this International Conference: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam.

# CHAPTER VII

## REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

### Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

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# CHAPTER VIII

## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

### Article 21

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

### Article 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

# CHAPTER IX

## OTHER PROVISIONS

### Article 23

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:

TRAN VAN LAM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

FOR THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH VIETNAM:

NGUYEN THI BINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

To be signed at the International
Conference Center, Paris,
Saturday afternoon, Paris time,
January 27, 1973:

The Government of the United States of America, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam,

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world,

[Text of Agreement Chapters I-VIII Same As Above]

# CHAPTER IX

## OTHER PROVISIONS

### Article 23

The Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolu-

Volume 9—Number 4

51

tionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.
The agreement and the protocols to it shall be strictly
implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Viet-
namese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts
are official and equally authentic.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Protocol on Prisoners of War

Text of the Protocol To Be Signed in Connection With
the Vietnam Agreement.¹ Released January 24, 1973

PROTOCOL

TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

CONCERNING

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY
PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AND
CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on
Vietnam,

In implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed
on this date providing for the return of captured military
personnel and foreign civilians, and captured and detained
Vietnamese civilian personnel,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The parties signatory to the Agreement shall return
the captured military personnel of the parties mentioned
in Article 8(a) of the Agreement as follows:

—all captured military personnel of the United States
and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in
Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United
States authorities;

¹ For Dr. Kissinger's explanation of the signing of two versions of the protocol, see page 68 of this issue.

—all captured Vietnamese military personnel, whether
belonging to regular or irregular armed forces, shall be
returned to the two South Vietnamese parties; they shall
be returned to that South Vietnamese party under whose
command they served.

Article 2

All captured civilians who are nationals of the United
States or of any other foreign countries mentioned in
Article 3(a) of the Agreement shall be returned to United
States authorities. All other captured foreign civilians shall
be returned to the authorities of their country of nation-
ality by any one of the parties willing and able to do so.

Article 3

The parties shall today exchange complete lists of cap-
tured persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this
Protocol.

Article 4

(a) The return of all captured persons mentioned in
Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be completed within
sixty days of the signing of the Agreement at a rate no
slower than the rate of withdrawal from South Vietnam
of United States forces and those of the other foreign
countries mentioned in Article 5 of the Agreement.

(b) Persons who are seriously ill, wounded or maimed,
old persons and women shall be returned first. The re-
mainder shall be returned either by returning all from
one detention place after another or in order of their dates
of capture, beginning with those who have been held the
longest.

Article 5

The return and reception of the persons mentioned in
Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be carried out at
places convenient to the concerned parties. Places of
return shall be agreed upon by the Four-Party Joint
Military Commission. The parties shall ensure the safety
of personnel engaged in the return and reception of those
persons.

Article 6

Each party shall return all captured persons mentioned
in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol without delay and
shall facilitate their return and reception. The detaining
parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason,
including the fact that captured persons may, on any
grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced.

THE RETURN OF CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 7

(a) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian
personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will
be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the

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52

basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954, which reads as follows:

"The term 'civilian internees' is understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities."

(b) The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

(c) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, the two South Vietnamese parties shall exchange lists of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained by each party and lists of the places at which they are held.

## TREATMENT OF CAPTURED PERSONS DURING DETENTION

### Article 8

(a) All captured military personnel of the parties and captured foreign civilians of the parties shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

They shall be given adequate food, clothing, shelter, and the medical attention required for their state of health. They shall be allowed to exchange post cards and letters with their families and receive parcels.

(b) All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice.

They shall be protected against all violence to life and person, in particular against murder in any form, mutilation, torture and cruel treatment, and outrages against personal dignity. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason, including the fact that captured persons may, on any grounds, have been prosecuted or sentenced. These persons shall not be forced to join the armed forces of the detaining party.

### Article 9

(a) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured military personnel of the parties and for-

eign civilians of the parties, the parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where captured military personnel and foreign civilians are held.

(b) To contribute to improving the living conditions of the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel, the two South Vietnamese parties shall, within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, agree upon the designation of two or more national Red Cross societies to visit all places where the captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel are held.

## WITH REGARD TO DEAD AND MISSING PERSONS

### Article 10

(a) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall ensure joint action by the parties in implementing Article 8(b) of the Agreement. When the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, a Four-Party Joint Military team shall be maintained to carry on this task.

(b) With regard to Vietnamese civilian personnel dead or missing in South Vietnam, the two South Vietnamese parties shall help each other to obtain information about missing persons, determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead, in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, in keeping with the people's aspirations.

## OTHER PROVISIONS

### Article 11

(a) The Four-Party and Two-Party Joint Military Commissions will have the responsibility of determining immediately the modalities of implementing the provisions of this Protocol consistent with their respective responsibilities under Articles 16(a) and 17(a) of the Agreement. In case the Joint Military Commissions, when carrying out their tasks, cannot reach agreement on a matter pertaining to the return of captured personnel they shall refer to the International Commission for its assistance.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form, in addition to the teams established by the Protocol concerning the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions, a sub-commission on captured persons and, as required, joint military teams on captured persons to assist the Commission in its tasks.

(c) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional sub-commission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks.

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concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel.

(d) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of the persons mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol at each place in Vietnam where such persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall send joint military teams to observe the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained at each place in South Vietnam where such persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.

## Article 12

In implementation of Articles 18(b) and 18(c) of the Agreement, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall have the responsibility to control and supervise the observance of Articles 1 through 7 of this Protocol through observation of the return of captured military personnel, foreign civilians and captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel at each place in Vietnam where these persons are being returned, and at the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return, the examination of lists, and the investigation of violations of the provisions of the above-mentioned Articles.

## Article 13

Within five days after signature of this Protocol, each party shall publish the text of the Protocol and communicate it to all the captured persons covered by the Protocol and being detained by that party.

## Article 14

This Protocol shall come into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

[Separate Numbered Page]

[Separate Numbered Page]

## PROTOCOL

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-13 same as above]

## Article 14

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolu-

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54

tionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam.
The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the
parties concerned.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietna-
mese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are
official and equally authentic.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Protocol on the International
Commission of Control and
Supervision

PROTOCOL

CONCERNING

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed
on this date providing for the formation of the Interna-
tional Commission of Control and Supervision,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The implementation of the Agreement is the respon-
sibility of the parties signatory to the Agreement.

The functions of the International Commission are to
control and supervise the implementation of the provi-
sions mentioned in Article 18 of the Agreement. In carry-
ing out these functions, the International Commission
shall:

(a) Follow the implementation of the above-men-

tioned provisions of the Agreement through communica-
tion with the parties and on-the-spot observation at the
places where this is required;

(b) Investigate violations of the provisions which fall
under the control and supervision of the Commission;

(c) When necessary, cooperate with the Joint Mili-
tary Commissions in deterring and detecting violations of
the above-mentioned provisions.

Article 2

The International Commission shall investigate viola-
tions of the provisions described in Article 18 of the
Agreement on the request of the Four-Party Joint Mili-
tary Commission, or of the Two-Party Joint Military
Commission, or of any party, or, with respect to Article
9(b) of the Agreement on general elections, of the Na-
tional Council of National Reconciliation and Concord,
or in any case where the International Commission has
other adequate grounds for considering that there has
been a violation of those provisions. It is understood that,
in carrying out this task, the International Commission
shall function with the concerned parties' assistance and
cooperation as required.

Article 3

(a) When the International Commission finds that
there is a serious violation in the implementation of the
Agreement or a threat to peace against which the Com-
mission can find no appropriate measure, the Commis-
sion shall report this to the four parties to the Agreement
so that they can hold consultations to find a solution.

(b) In accordance with Article 18(f) of the Agree-
ment, the International Commission's reports shall be
made with the unanimous agreement of the representa-
tives of all the four members. In case no unanimity is
reached, the Commission shall forward the different views
to the four parties in accordance with Article 18(b) of
the Agreement, or to the two South Vietnamese parties
in accordance with Article 18(c) of the Agreement, but
these shall not be considered as reports of the Commission.

Article 4

(a) The headquarters of the International Commis-
sion shall be at Saigon.

(b) There shall be seven regional teams located in the
regions shown on the annexed map and based at the
following places:

<table><thead><tr><td>Regions</td><td>Places</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I</td><td>Hue</td></tr><tr><td>II</td><td>Danang</td></tr><tr><td>III</td><td>Pleiku</td></tr><tr><td>IV</td><td>Phan Thiet</td></tr><tr><td>V</td><td>Bien Hoa</td></tr><tr><td>VI</td><td>My Tho</td></tr><tr><td>VII</td><td>Can Tho</td></tr></tbody></table>

¹For Dr. Kissinger's explanation of the signing of two versions of the protocol, see page 68 of this issue.

Volume 9—Number 4

55

The International Commission shall designate three teams for the region of Saigon-Gia Dinh.

(c) There shall be twenty-six teams operating in the areas shown on the annexed map and based at the following places in South Vietnam:

Region I

Quang Tri
Phu Bai

Region II

Hoi An
Tam Ky
Chu Lai

Region III

Kontum
Hau Bon
Phu Cat
Tuy An
Ninh Hoa
Ban Me Thuot

Region IV

Da Lat
Bao Loc
Phan Rang

Region V

An Loc
Xuan Loc
Ben Cat
Cu Chi
Tan An

Region VI

Moc Hoa
Giong Trom

Region VII

Tri Ton
Vinh Long
Vi Thanh
Khanh Hung
Quan Long

(d) There shall be twelve teams located as shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

Gio Linh (to cover the area south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line)

Lao Bao
Ben Het
Duc Co
Chu Lai
Qui Nhon
Nha Trang
Vung Tau
Xa Mat
Bien Hoa Airfield
Hong Ngu
Can Tho

(e) There shall be seven teams, six of which shall be available for assignment to the points of entry which are not listed in paragraph (d) above and which the two South Vietnamese parties choose as points for legitimate entry to South Vietnam for replacement of armaments, munitions, and war material permitted by Article 7 of the Agreement. Any team or teams not needed for the above-mentioned assignment shall be available for other tasks, in keeping with the Commission's responsibility for control and supervision.

(f) There shall be seven teams to control and supervise

the return of captured and detained personnel of the parties.

Article 5

(a) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties as stipulated by Article 8(a) of the Agreement, the International Commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in Vietnam where the captured persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons will be taken to the places of return.

(b) To carry out its tasks concerning the return of the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam mentioned in Article 8(c) of the Agreement, the International Commission shall, during the time of such return, send one control and supervision team to each place in South Vietnam where the above-mentioned captured and detained persons are being returned, and to the last detention places from which these persons shall be taken to the places of return.

Article 6

To carry out its tasks regarding Article 9(b) of the Agreement on the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam, the International Commission shall organize additional teams, when necessary. The International Commission shall discuss this question in advance with the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. If additional teams are necessary for this purpose, they shall be formed thirty days before the general elections.

Article 7

The International Commission shall continually keep under review its size, and shall reduce the number of its teams, its representatives or other personnel, or both, when those teams, representatives or personnel have accomplished the tasks assigned to them and are not required for other tasks. At the same time, the expenditures of the International Commission shall be reduced correspondingly.

Article 8

Each member of the International Commission shall make available at all times the following numbers of qualified personnel:

(a) One senior representative and twenty-six others for the headquarters staff.

(b) Five for each of the seven regional teams.

(c) Two for each of the other international control teams, except for the teams at Gio Linh and Vung Tau, each of which shall have three.

(d) One hundred sixteen for the purpose of providing support to the Commission Headquarters and its teams.

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54

## Article 9

(a) The International Commission, and each of its teams, shall act as a single body comprising representatives of all four members.

(b) Each member has the responsibility to ensure the presence of its representatives at all levels of the International Commission. In case a representative is absent, the member concerned shall immediately designate a replacement.

## Article 10

(a) The parties shall afford full cooperation, assistance, and protection to the International Commission.

(b) The parties shall at all times maintain regular and continuous liaison with the International Commission. During the existence of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the parties to that Commission shall also perform liaison functions with the International Commission. After the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities, such liaison shall be maintained through the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, liaison missions, or other adequate means.

(c) The International Commission and the Joint Military Commissions shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions.

(d) Wherever a team is stationed or operating, the concerned party shall designate a liaison officer to the team to cooperate with and assist it in carrying out without hindrance its task of control and supervision. When a team is carrying out an investigation, a liaison officer from each concerned party shall have the opportunity to accompany it, provided the investigation is not thereby delayed.

(e) Each party shall give the International Commission reasonable advance notice of all proposed actions concerning those provisions of the Agreement that are to be controlled and supervised by the International Commission.

(f) The International Commission, including its teams, is allowed such movement for observation as is reasonably required for the proper exercise of its functions as stipulated in the Agreement. In carrying out these functions, the International Commission, including its teams, shall enjoy all necessary assistance and cooperation from the parties concerned.

## Article 11

In supervising the holding of the free and democratic general elections described in Articles 9(b) and 12(b) of the Agreement in accordance with modalities to be agreed upon between the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord and the International Commission, the latter shall receive full cooperation and assistance from the National Council.

## Article 12

The International Commission and its personnel who have the nationality of a member state shall, while carrying out their tasks, enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

## Article 13

The International Commission may use the means of communication and transport necessary to perform its functions. Each South Vietnamese party shall make available for rent to the International Commission appropriate office and accommodation facilities and shall assist it in obtaining such facilities. The International Commission may receive from the parties, on mutually agreeable terms, the necessary means of communication and transport and may purchase from any source necessary equipment and services not obtained from the parties. The International Commission shall possess these means.

## Article 14

The expenses for the activities of the International Commission shall be borne by the parties and the members of the International Commission in accordance with the provisions of this Article:

(a) Each member country of the International Commission shall pay the salaries and allowances of its personnel.

(b) All other expenses incurred by the International Commission shall be met from a fund to which each of the four parties shall contribute twenty-three percent (23%) and to which each member of the International Commission shall contribute two percent (2%).

(c) Within thirty days of the date of entry into force of this Protocol, each of the four parties shall provide the International Commission with an initial sum equivalent to four million, five hundred thousand (4,500,000) French francs in convertible currency, which sum shall be credited against the amounts due from that party under the first budget.

(d) The International Commission shall prepare its own budgets. After the International Commission approves a budget, it shall transmit it to all parties signatory to the Agreement for their approval. Only after the budgets have been approved by the four parties to the Agreement shall they be obliged to make their contributions. However, in case the parties to the Agreement do not agree on a new budget, the International Commission shall temporarily base its expenditures on the previous budget, except for the extraordinary, one-time expenditures for installation or for the acquisition of equipment, and the parties shall continue to make their contributions on that basis until a new budget is approved.

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## Article 15

(a) The headquarters shall be operational and in place within 24 hours after the cease-fire.

(b) The regional teams shall be operational and in place, and three teams for supervision and control of the return of the captured and detained personnel shall be operational and ready for dispatch within 48 hours after the cease-fire.

(c) Other teams shall be operational and in place within fifteen to thirty days after the cease-fire.

## Article 16

Meetings shall be convened at the call of the Chairman. The International Commission shall adopt other working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of its functions and consistent with respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

## Article 17

The Members of the International Commission may accept the obligations of this Protocol by sending notes of acceptance to the four parties signatory to the Agreement. Should a member of the International Commission decide to withdraw from the International Commission, it may do so by giving three months notice by means of notes to the four parties to the Agreement, in which case those four parties shall consult among themselves for the purpose of agreeing upon a replacement member.

## Article 18

This Protocol shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of all the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are officially and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
TRAN VAN LAM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
NGUYEN DUY TRINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

FOR THE PROVISIONAL
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM
NGUYEN THI BINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

## PROTOCOL
TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM
CONCERNING
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

In implementation of Article 18 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date providing for the formation of the International Commission of Control and Supervision,

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-17 same as above.]

## Article 18

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Proto-

Volume 9—Number 4

58

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

## Protocol on the Cease-Fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions

### PROTOCOL
TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM
CONCERNING
THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

In implementation of the first paragraph of Article 2, Article 3, Article 5, Article 6, Article 16 and Article 17 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date which provide for the cease-fire in South Vietnam and the establishment of a Four-Party Joint Military Commission and a Two-Party Joint Military Commission,

Have agreed as follows:

### CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

#### Article 1

The High Commands of the parties in South Vietnam shall issue prompt and timely orders to all regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police under their

command to completely end hostilities throughout South Vietnam, at the exact time stipulated in Article 2 of the Agreement and ensure that these armed forces and armed police comply with these orders and respect the cease-fire.

#### Article 2

(a) As soon as the cease-fire comes into force and until regulations are issued by the Joint Military Commissions, all ground, river, sea and air combat forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall remain in place; that is, in order to ensure a stable cease-fire, there shall be no major re-deployments or movements that would extend each party's area of control or would result in contact between opposing armed forces and clashes which might take place.

(b) All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts:

(1) Armed patrols into areas controlled by opposing armed forces and flights by bomber and fighter aircraft of all types, except for unarmed flights for proficiency training and maintenance;

(2) Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever, including the use of small arms, mortars, artillery, bombing and strafing by airplanes and any other type of weapon or explosive device;

(3) All combat operations on the ground, on rivers, on the sea and in the air;

(4) All hostile acts, terrorism or reprisals; and

(5) All acts endangering lives or public or private property.

#### Article 3

(a) The above-mentioned prohibitions shall not hamper or restrict:

(1) Civilian supply, freedom of movement, freedom to work, and freedom of the people to engage in trade, and civilian communication and transportation between and among all areas in South Vietnam;

(2) The use by each party in areas under its control of military support elements, such as engineer and transportation units, in repair and construction of public facilities and the transportation and supplying of the population;

(3) Normal military proficiency training conducted by the parties in the areas under their respective control with due regard for public safety.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions shall immediately agree on corridors, routes, and other regulations governing the movement of military transport aircraft, military transport vehicles, and military transport vessels of all types of one party going through areas under the control of other parties.

#### Article 4

In order to avert conflict and ensure normal conditions for those armed forces which are in direct contact, and

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pending regulation by the Joint Military Commissions, the commanders of the opposing armed forces at those places of direct contact shall meet as soon as the cease-fire comes into force with a view to reaching an agreement on temporary measure to avert conflict and to ensure supply and medical care for these armed forces.

### Article 5

(a) Within fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into effect, each party shall do its utmost to complete the removal or deactivation of all demolition objects, minefields, traps, obstacles or other dangerous objects placed previously, so as not to hamper the population's movement and work, in the first place on waterways, roads and railroads in South Vietnam. Those mines which cannot be removed or deactivated within that time shall be clearly marked and must be removed or deactivated as soon as possible.

(b) Emplacement of mines is prohibited, except as a defensive measure around the edges of military installations in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads. Mines and other obstacles already in place at the edges of military installations may remain in place if they are in places where they do not hamper the population's movement and work, and movement on waterways, roads and railroads.

### Article 6

Civilian police and civilian security personnel of the parties in South Vietnam, who are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, shall strictly respect the prohibitions set forth in Article 2 of this Protocol. As required by their responsibilities, normally they shall be authorized to carry pistols, but when required by unusual circumstances, they shall be allowed to carry other small individual arms.

### Article 7

(a) The entry into South Vietnam of replacement armaments, munitions, and war material permitted under Article 7 of the Agreement shall take place under the supervision and control of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and through such points of entry only as are designated by the two South Vietnamese parties. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree on these points of entry within fifteen days after the entry into force of the cease-fire. The two South Vietnamese parties may select as many as six points of entry which are not included in the list of places where teams of the International Commission of Control and Supervision are to be based contained in Article 4(d) of the Protocol concerning the International Commission. At the same time, the two South Vietnamese parties may also select

points of entry from the list of places set forth in Article 4(d) of that Protocol.

(b) Each of the designated points of entry shall be available only for that South Vietnamese party which is in control of that point. The two South Vietnamese parties shall have an equal number of points of entry.

### Article 8

(a) In implementation of Article 5 of the Agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in Article 5 of the Agreement shall take with them all their armaments, munitions, and war material. Transfers of such items which would leave them in South Vietnam shall not be made subsequent to the entry into force of the Agreement except for transfers of communications, transport, and other non-combat material to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission or the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(b) Within five days after the entry into force of the cease-fire, the United States shall inform the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision of the general plans for timing of complete troop withdrawals which shall take place in four phases of fifteen days each. It is anticipated that the numbers of troops withdrawn in each phase are not likely to be widely different, although it is not feasible to ensure equal numbers. The approximate numbers to be withdrawn in each phase shall be given to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision sufficiently in advance of actual withdrawals so that they can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

### Article 9

(a) In implementation of Article 6 of the Agreement, the United States and the other foreign countries referred to in that Article shall dismantle and remove from South Vietnam or destroy all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article, including weapons, mines, and other military equipment at these bases, for the purpose of making them unusable for military purposes.

(b) The United States shall supply the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the International Commission of Control and Supervision with necessary information on plans for base dismantlement so that those Commissions can properly carry out their tasks in relation thereto.

### Article 10

(a) The implementation of the Agreement is the responsibility of the parties signatory to the Agreement.

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60

The Four-Party Joint Military Commission has the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the Agreement by serving as a channel of communication among the parties, by drawing up plans and fixing the modalities to carry out, coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the provisions mentioned in Article 16 of the Agreement, and by negotiating and settling all matters concerning the implementation of those provisions.

(b) The concrete tasks of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission are:

(1) To coordinate, follow and inspect the implementation of the above-mentioned provisions of the Agreement by the four parties;

(2) To deter and detect violations, to deal with cases of violation, and to settle conflicts and matters of contention between the parties relating to the above-mentioned provisions;

(3) To dispatch without delay one or more joint teams, as required by specific cases, to any part of South Vietnam, to investigate alleged violations of the Agreement and to assist the parties in finding measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases;

(4) To engage in observation at the places where this is necessary in the exercise of its functions;

(5) To perform such additional tasks as it may, by unanimous decision, determine.

## Article 11

(a) There shall be a Central Joint Military Commission located in Saigon. Each party shall designate immediately a military delegation of fifty-nine persons to represent it on the Central Commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be a general officer, or equivalent.

(b) There shall be seven Regional Joint Military Commissions located in the regions shown on the annexed map and based at the following places:

Each party shall designate a military delegation of sixteen persons to represent it on each Regional Commission. The senior officer designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel, or equivalent.

(c) There shall be a joint military team operating in each of the areas shown on the annexed map and based at each of the following places in South Vietnam:

<table><tr><td>Region I</td><td>Region V</td></tr><tr><td>Quang Tri</td><td>An Loc</td></tr><tr><td>Phu Bai</td><td>Xuan Loc</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Ben Cat</td></tr><tr><td>Region II</td><td>Cu Chi</td></tr><tr><td>Hoi An</td><td>Tan An</td></tr><tr><td>Tam Ky</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Chu Lai</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Region III</td><td>Region VI</td></tr><tr><td>Kontum</td><td>Moc Hoa</td></tr><tr><td>Hau Bon</td><td>Giong Trom</td></tr><tr><td>Phu Cat</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Tuy An</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Ninh Hoa</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Ban Me Thuot</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Region VII</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Tri Ton</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Vinh Long</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Vi Thanh</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Khanh Hung</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Quan Long</td></tr><tr><td>Region IV</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Da Lat</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Bao Loc</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Phan Rang</td><td></td></tr></table>

Each party shall provide four qualified persons for each joint military team. The senior person designated by each party shall be an officer from the rank of Major to Lieutenant Colonel, or equivalent.

(d) The Regional Joint Military Commissions shall assist the Central Joint Military Commission in performing its tasks and shall supervise the operations of the joint military teams. The region of Saigon-Gia Dinh is placed under the responsibility of the Central Commission which shall designate joint military teams to operate in this region.

(e) Each party shall be authorized to provide support and guard personnel for its delegations to the Central Joint Military Commission and Regional Joint Military Commissions, and for its members of the joint military teams. The total number of support and guard personnel for each party shall not exceed five hundred and fifty.

(f) The Central Joint Military Commission may establish such joint subcommissions, joint staffs and joint military teams as circumstances may require. The Central Commission shall determine the numbers of personnel required for any additional sub-commissions, staffs or teams it establishes, provided that each party shall designate one-fourth of the number of personnel required and that the total number of personnel for the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, to include its staffs, teams, and support personnel, shall not exceed three thousand three hundred.

(g) The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties may, by agreement, establish provisional sub-commissions and joint military teams to carry out the tasks specifically assigned to them by Article 17 of the Agree-

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ment. With respect to Article 7 of the Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall establish joint military teams at the points of entry into South Vietnam used for replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which are designated in accordance with Article 7 of this Protocol. From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall form a provisional sub-commission and provisional joint military teams to carry out its tasks concerning captured and detained Vietnamese civilian personnel. Where necessary for the above purposes, the two parties may agree to assign personnel additional to those assigned to the two South Vietnamese delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

### Article 12

(a) In accordance with Article 17 of the Agreement which stipulates that the two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate their respective representatives to form the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, twenty-four hours after the cease-fire comes into force, the two designated South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall meet in Saigon so as to reach an agreement as soon as possible on organization and operation of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, as well as the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

(b) From the time the cease-fire comes into force to the time when the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational, the two South Vietnamese parties' delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall simultaneously assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels, in addition to their functions as delegations to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

(c) If, at the time the Four-Party Joint Military Commission ceases its operation in accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement, agreement has not been reached on organization of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, the delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties serving with the Four-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels shall continue temporarily to work together as a provisional two-party joint military commission and to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels until the Two-Party Joint Military Commission becomes operational.

### Article 13

In application of the principle of unanimity, the Joint Military Commissions shall have no chairmen, and meet-

ings shall be convened at the request of any representative. The Joint Military Commissions shall adopt working procedures appropriate for the effective discharge of their functions and responsibilities.

### Article 14

The Joint Military Commissions and the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall closely cooperate with and assist each other in carrying out their respective functions. Each Joint Military Commission shall inform the International Commission about the implementation of those provisions of the Agreement for which that Joint Military Commission has responsibility and which are within the competence of the International Commission. Each Joint Military Commission may request the International Commission to carry out specific observation activities.

### Article 15

The Central Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating twenty-four hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The Regional Four-Party Joint Military Commissions shall begin operating forty-eight hours after the cease-fire comes into force. The joint military teams based at the places listed in Article 11(c) of this Protocol shall begin operating no later than fifteen days after the cease-fire comes into force. The delegations of the two South Vietnamese parties shall simultaneously begin to assume the tasks of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission as provided in Article 12 of this Protocol.

### Article 16

(a) The parties shall provide full protection and all necessary assistance and cooperation to the Joint Military Commissions at all levels, in the discharge of their tasks.

(b) The Joint Military Commissions and their personnel, while carrying out their tasks, shall enjoy privileges and immunities equivalent to those accorded diplomatic missions and diplomatic agents.

(c) The personnel of the Joint Military Commissions may carry pistols and wear special insignia decided upon by each Central Joint Military Commission. The personnel of each party while guarding Commission installations or equipment may be authorized to carry other individual small arms, as determined by each Central Joint Military Commission.

### Article 17

(a) The delegation of each party to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall have its own offices, communication, logistics and transportation means, including aircraft when necessary.

Volume 9—Number 4

62

(b) Each party, in its areas of control shall provide appropriate office and accommodation facilities to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission at all levels.

(c) The parties shall endeavor to provide to the Four-Party Joint Military Commission and the Two-Party Joint Military Commission, by means of loan, lease, or gift, the common means of operation, including equipment for communication, supply, and transport, including aircraft when necessary. The Joint Military Commissions may purchase from any source necessary facilities, equipment, and services which are not supplied by the parties. The Joint Military Commissions shall possess and use these facilities and this equipment.

(d) The facilities and the equipment for common use mentioned above shall be returned to the parties when the Joint Military Commissions have ended their activities.

### Article 18

The common expenses of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall be borne equally by the four parties, and the common expenses of the Two-Party Joint Military Commission in South Vietnam shall be borne equally by these two parties.

### Article 19

[Separate Numbered Page]

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

TRAN VAN LAM

Minister for Foreign Affairs

[Separate Numbered Page]

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

NGUYEN THI BINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

## PROTOCOL
TO THE AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR
AND RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM
CONCERNING
THE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
AND THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Have agreed as follows:

[Text of Protocol Articles 1-18 same as above]

### Article 19

The Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the Cease-fire in South Vietnam and the Joint Military Commissions shall enter into force upon signature of this document by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and upon signature of a document in the same terms by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Protocol shall be strictly implemented by all the parties concerned.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

Volume 9—Number 4

63

[L/C]

# Protocol on the Deactivation and Removal of Mines in North Vietnam

Text of the Protocol To Be Signed in Connection With the Vietnam Agreement. Released January 24, 1973

## PROTOCOL

THE REMOVAL, PERMANENT DEACTIVATION, OR DESTRUCTION OF MINES IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, PORTS, HARBORS, AND WATERWAYS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

The Government of the United States of America, The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

In implementation of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed on this date,

Have agreed as follows:

### Article 1

The United States shall clear all the mines it has placed in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This mine clearing operation shall be accomplished by rendering the mines harmless through removal, permanent deactivation, or destruction.

### Article 2

With a view to ensuring lasting safety for the movement of people and watercraft and the protection of important installations, mines shall, on the request of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, be removed or destroyed in the indicated areas; and whenever their removal or destruction is impossible, mines shall be permanently deactivated and their emplacement clearly marked.

### Article 3

The mine clearing operation shall begin at twenty-four hundred (2400) hours GMT on January 27, 1973. The representatives of the two parties shall consult immediately on relevant factors and agree upon the earliest possible target date for the completion of the work.

## Article 4

The mine clearing operation shall be conducted in accordance with priorities and timing agreed upon by the two parties. For this purpose, representatives of the two parties shall meet at an early date to reach agreement on a program and a plan of implementation. To this end:

(a) The United States shall provide its plan for mine clearing operations, including maps of the minefields and information concerning the types, numbers and properties of the mines;

(b) The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall provide all available maps and hydrographic charts and indicate the mined places and all other potential hazards to the mine clearing operations that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is aware of;

(c) The two parties shall agree on the timing of implementation of each segment of the plan and provide timely notice to the public at least forty-eight hours in advance of the beginning of mine clearing operations for that segment.

## Article 5

The United States shall be responsible for the mine clearance on inland waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall, to the full extent of its capabilities, actively participate in the mine clearance with the means of surveying, removal and destruction and technical advice supplied by the United States.

## Article 6

With a view to ensuring the safe movement of people and watercraft on waterways and at sea, the United States shall in the mine clearing process supply timely information about the progress of mine clearing in each area, and about the remaining mines to be destroyed. The United States shall issue a communique when the operations have been concluded.

## Article 7

In conducting mine clearing operations, the U.S. personnel engaged in these operations shall respect the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and shall engage in no activities inconsistent with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and this Protocol. The U.S. personnel engaged in the mine clearing operations shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for the duration of the mine clearing operations.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam shall ensure the safety of the U.S. personnel for the duration of their mine clearing activities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and shall provide this personnel with all possible assistance and the means needed in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that have been agreed upon by the two parties.

Volume 9—Number 4

64

## Article 8

This Protocol to the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam shall enter into force upon signature by the Secretary of State of the Government of the United States of America and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It shall be strictly implemented by the two parties.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

NGUYEN DUY TRINH

Minister for Foreign Affairs

News Conference of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. January 24, 1973

DR. KISSINGER. Ladies and gentlemen, the President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the texts. And I am here to explain, to go over briefly what these texts contain, and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months and where we expect to go from here.

Let me begin by going through the agreement, which you have read.

## PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

### CHAPTER I: VIETNAMESE NATIONAL RIGHTS

The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, agreements which established two zones, divided by a military demarcation line.

### CHAPTER II: CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL

Chapter II deals with the cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at 7 o'clock Washington time on Saturday night. The principal provisions of Chapter II deal with

permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire.

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Vietnam within a period of 60 days. And it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisers and civilian technicians serving in certain of the military branches.

Chapter II further deals with the provisions for resupply and for the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Vietnam from outside of South Vietnam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements, replacements, or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a one-to-one basis under international supervision and control.

There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side, three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision.

## CHAPTER III: RETURN OF POW'S

Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Vietnam.

This, as you know, throughout the negotiations, presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separated from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained—partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities, and secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American personnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Vietnam.

This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues, that was settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations.

As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians is separated in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame, from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel.

Volume 9—Number 4

335 Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace
in Southeast Asia. October 7, 1970

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

Tonight I would like to talk to you
about a major new initiative for peace.

When I authorized operations against
the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last
April, I also directed that an intensive ef-
fort be launched to develop new ap-
proaches for peace in Indochina.

In Ireland on Sunday, I met with the chiefs of our delegation to the Paris talks. This meeting marked the culmination of a Government-wide effort begun last spring on the negotiation front. After considering the recommendations of all my principal advisers, I am tonight announcing new proposals for peace in Indochina.

This new peace initiative has been dis-
cussed with the Governments of South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. All sup-
port it. It has been made possible in large
part by the remarkable success of the
Vietnamization program over the past 18
months. Tonight I want to tell you what
these proposals are and what they mean.

First, I propose that all armed forces
throughout Indochina cease firing their
weapons and remain in the positions they

now hold. This would be a "cease-fire-in-
place." It would not in itself be an end to
the conflict, but it would accomplish one
goal all of us have been working toward:
an end to the killing.

I do not minimize the difficulty of main-
taining a cease-fire in a guerrilla war
where there are no frontlines. But an un-
conventional war may require an un-
conventional truce; our side is ready to
stand still and cease firing.

I ask that this proposal for a cease-
fire-in-place be the subject for immediate
negotiation. And my hope is that it will
break the logjam in all the negotiations.

This cease-fire proposal is put forth
without preconditions. The general prin-
ciples that should apply are these:

A cease-fire must be effectively super-
vised by international observers, as well as
by the parties themselves. Without effec-
tive supervision a cease-fire runs the con-
stant risk of breaking down. All concerned
must be confident that the cease-fire will
be maintained and that any local breaches
of it will be quickly and fairly repaired.

A cease-fire should not be the means by

56-087-71-58

[335] Oct. 7

Public Papers of the Presidents

which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina.

And a cease-fire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror.

A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we do seek is to widen the peace.

Finally, a cease-fire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina.

A cease-fire-in-place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it's always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations.

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters.

A second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

I propose an Indochina Peace Conference. At the Paris talks today, we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders, and establishing bases in South Vietnam—they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well.

An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. The war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak.

The essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as

a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. And we shall accept the results of agreements reached between these states.

While we pursue the convening of an Indochina Peace Conference, we will continue the negotiations in Paris. Our proposal for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as through other diplomatic channels. The Paris talks will remain our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement, until such time as a broader international conference produces serious negotiations.

The third part of our peace initiative has to do with the United States forces in South Vietnam.

In the past 20 months, I have reduced our troop ceilings in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year, these withdrawals will have totaled more than 260,000 men—about one-half the number that were in South Vietnam when I took office.

As the American combat role and presence have decreased, American casualties have also decreased. Our casualties since the completion of the Cambodian operation were the lowest for a comparable period in the last 4½ years.

We are ready now to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an overall settlement. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight.

Fourth, I ask the other side to join us in a search for a political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese.

Three principles govern our approach: —We seek a political solution that re-

826

Richard Nixon, 1970

Oct. 7 [335]

flects the will of the South Viet-
namese people.

-A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces in South Vietnam.

-And we will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Let there be no mistake about one es-
sential point: The other side is not merely
objecting to a few personalities in the
South Vietnamese Government. They
want to dismantle the organized non-
Communist parties and insure the take-
over by their party. They demand the
right to exclude whomever they wish from
government.

This patently unreasonable demand is
totally unacceptable.

As my proposals today indicate, we are
prepared to be flexible on many matters.
But we stand firm for the right of all the
South Vietnamese people to determine for
themselves the kind of government they
want.

We have no intention of seeking any
settlement at the conference table other
than one which fairly meets the reason-
able concerns of both sides. We know
that when the conflict ends, the other side
will still be there. And the only kind of
settlement that will endure is one that
both sides have an interest in preserving.

Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.

War and imprisonment should be over
for all these prisoners. They and their
families have already suffered too much.

I propose that all prisoners of war, with-
out exception, without condition, be re-
leased now to return to the place of their
choice.

And I propose that all journalists and

other innocent civilian victims of the con-
flict be released immediately as well.

The immediate release of all prisoners
of war would be a simple act of humanity.

But it could be even more. It could
serve to establish good faith, the intent
to make progress, and thus improve the
prospects for negotiation.

We are prepared to discuss specific pro-
cedures to complete the speedy release of
all prisoners.

The five proposals that I have made to-
night can open the door to an enduring
peace in Indochina.

Ambassador Bruce will present these
proposals formally to the other side in
Paris tomorrow. He will be joined in
that presentation by Ambassador Lam ¹
representing South Vietnam.

Let us consider for a moment what the
acceptance of these proposals would mean.

Since the end of World War II, there's
always been a war going on somewhere in
the world. The guns have never stopped
firing. By achieving a cease-fire in Indo-
china, and by holding firmly to the cease-
fire in the Middle East, we could hear the
welcome sound of peace throughout the
world for the first time in a generation.

We could have some reason to hope that
we had reached the beginning of the end
of war in this century. We might then be
on the threshold of a generation of peace.

The proposals I have made tonight are
designed to end the fighting throughout
Indochina and to end the impasse in nego-
tiations in Paris. Nobody has anything to
gain by delay and only lives to lose.

There are many nations involved in the
fighting in Indochina. Tonight, all those

¹ Ambassador Pham Dang Lam, Head of the
Republic of Vietnam delegation to the Paris
talks on Vietnam.

827

[335] Oct. 7

nations, except one, announce their readi-
ness to agree to a cease-fire. The time has
come for the Government of North Viet-
nam to join its neighbors in a proposal to
quit making war and to start making
peace.

As you know, I have just returned from
a trip which took me to Italy, Spain,
Yugoslavia, England, and Ireland.

Hundreds of thousands of people
cheered me as I drove through the cities
of those countries.

They were not cheering for me as an
individual. They were cheering for the
country I was proud to represent—the
United States of America. For millions
of people in the free world, the nonaligned
world, and the Communist world, Amer-
ica is the land of freedom, of opportunity,
of progress.

I believe there is another reason they
welcomed me so warmly in every coun-
try I visited, despite their wide differ-
ences in political systems and national
backgrounds.

In my talks with leaders all over the
world, I find that there are those who
may not agree with all of our policies. But
no world leader to whom I have talked
fears that the United States will use its
great power to dominate another country

or to destroy its independence. We can
be proud that this is the cornerstone of
America's foreign policy.

There is no goal to which this Nation
is more dedicated and to which I am more
dedicated than to build a new structure of
peace in the world where every nation,
including North Vietnam as well as South
Vietnam, can be free and independent
with no fear of foreign aggression or for-
eign domination.

I believe every American deeply be-
lieves in his heart that the proudest legacy
the United States can leave during this pe-
riod when we are the strongest nation of
the world is that our power was used to
defend freedom, not to destroy it; to pre-
serve the peace, not to break the peace.

It is in that spirit that I make this pro-
posal for a just peace in Vietnam and in
Indochina.

I ask that the leaders in Hanoi respond
to this proposal in the same spirit. Let us
give our children what we have not had
in this century, a chance to enjoy a
generation of peace.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his of-
fice at the White House. The address was broad-
cast live on radio and television. An advance
text was released on the same day.

21 Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for
Peace in Vietnam. January 25, 1972

Good evening:

I have asked for this television time
tonight to make public a plan for peace
that can end the war in Vietnam.

The offer that I shall now present, on
behalf of the Government of the United
States and the Government of South Viet-
nam, with the full knowledge and
approval of President Thieu, is both
generous and far-reaching.

It is a plan to end the war now; it in-
cludes an offer to withdraw all American
forces within 6 months of an agreement;
its acceptance would mean the speedy re-
turn of all the prisoners of war to their
homes.

Three years ago when I took office,
there were 550,000 Americans in Viet-
nam; the number killed in action was run-

ning as high as 300 a week; there were no
plans to bring any Americans home, and
the only thing that had been settled in
Paris was the shape of the conference
table.

I immediately moved to fulfill a pledge
I had made to the American people: to
bring about a peace that could last, not
only for the United States, but for the
long-suffering people of Southeast Asia.

There were two honorable paths open
to us.

The path of negotiation was, and is, the
path we prefer. But it takes two to nego-
tiate; there had to be another way in case
the other side refused to negotiate.

That path we called Vietnamization.
What it meant was training and equipping
the South Vietnamese to defend them-

100

Richard Nixon, 1972

Jan. 25 [21]

selves, and steadily withdrawing Americans, as they developed the capability to do so.

The path of Vietnamization has been successful. Two weeks ago, you will recall, I announced that by May 1, American forces in Vietnam would be down to 69,000. That means almost one-half million Americans will have been brought home from Vietnam over the past 3 years. In terms of American lives, the losses of 300 a week have been reduced by over 95 percent—to less than 10 a week.

But the path of Vietnamization has been the long voyage home. It has strained the patience and tested the perseverance of the American people. What of the shortcut, the shortcut we prefer, the path of negotiation?

Progress here has been disappointing. The American people deserve an accounting of why it has been disappointing. Tonight I intend to give you that accounting, and in so doing, I am going to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations.

We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict. But early in this Administration, after 10 months of no progress in the public Paris talks, I became convinced that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels, to see whether it would be possible to end the public deadlock.

After consultation with Secretary of State Rogers, our Ambassador in Saigon, and our chief negotiator in Paris, and with the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, 30 months ago, to begin these secret peace negotiations.

Since that time, Dr. Kissinger has traveled to Paris 12 times on these secret

missions. He has met seven times with Le Duc Tho, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, and Minister Xuan Thuy, head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks, and he has met with Minister Xuan Thuy five times alone. I would like, incidentally, to take this opportunity to thank President Pompidou of France for his personal assistance in helping to make the arrangements for these secret talks.

This is why I initiated these private negotiations: Privately, both sides can be more flexible in offering new approaches and also private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions free from the pressure of public debate.

In seeking peace in Vietnam, with so many lives at stake, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by—private or public—to negotiate a settlement. As I have stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared and I remain prepared to explore any avenue, public or private, to speed negotiations to end the war.

For 30 months, whenever Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, or I were asked about secret negotiations we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace. There was never a leak, because we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations. Until recently, this course showed signs of yielding some progress.

Now, however, it is my judgment that the purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the proposals we have been making in private.

Nothing is served by silence when the other side exploits our good faith to divide America and to avoid the conference table. Nothing is served by silence when it misleads some Americans into accusing their own government of failing to do

101

[21] Jan. 25

what it has already done. Nothing is
served by silence when it enables the other
side to imply possible solutions publicly
that it has already flatly rejected privately.

The time has come to lay the record of
our secret negotiations on the table. Just
as secret negotiations can sometimes break
a public deadlock, public disclosure may
help to break a secret deadlock.

Some Americans, who believed what
the North Vietnamese led them to be-
lieve, have charged that the United States
has not pursued negotiations intensively.
As the record that I now will disclose will
show, just the opposite is true.

Questions have been raised as to why
we have not proposed a deadline for the
withdrawal of all American forces in ex-
change for a cease-fire and the return of
our prisoners of war; why we have not
discussed the seven-point proposal made
by the Vietcong last July in Paris; why
we have not submitted a new plan of our
own to move the negotiations off dead
center.

As the private record will show, we
have taken all these steps and more—
and have been flatly rejected or ignored
by the other side.

On May 31, 1971, 8 months ago, at one
of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered
specifically to agree to a deadline for the
withdrawal of all American forces in ex-
change for the release of all prisoners of
war and a cease-fire.

At the next private meeting, on June
26, the North Vietnamese rejected our
offer. They privately proposed instead
their own nine-point plan which insisted
that we overthrow the Government of
South Vietnam.

Five days later, on July 1, the enemy
publicly presented a different package of

proposals—the seven-point Vietcong
plan.

That posed a dilemma: Which pack-
age should we respond to, the public plan
or the secret plan?

On July 12, at another private meeting in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question to the North Vietnamese directly. They said we should deal with their nine-point secret plan, because it covered all of Indonesia including Laos and Cambodia, while the Vietcong seven-point proposal was limited to Vietnam.

So that is what we did. But we went
even beyond that, dealing with some of
the points in the public plan that were
not covered in the secret plan.

On August 16, at another private meet-
ing, we went further. We offered the com-
plete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces
within 9 months after an agreement on
an overall settlement. On September 13,
the North Vietnamese rejected that pro-
posal. They continued to insist that we
overthrow the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment.

Now, what has been the result of these
private efforts? For months, the North
Vietnamese have been berating us at the
public sessions for not responding to their
side's publicly presented seven-point plan.

The truth is that we did respond to the
enemy's plan, in the manner they wanted
us to respond—secretly. In full possession
of our complete response, the North Viet-
namese publicly denounced us for not hav-
ing responded at all. They induced many
Americans in the press and the Congress
into echoing their propaganda—Ameri-
cans who could not know they were being
falsely used by the enemy to stir up divi-
siveness in this country.

I decided in October that we should

102

Richard Nixon, 1972

Jan. 25 [21]

make another attempt to break the dead-
lock. I consulted with President Thieu,
who concurred fully in a new plan. On
October 11, I sent a private communica-
tion to the North Vietnamese that con-
tained new elements that could move
negotiations forward. I urged a meeting
on November 1 between Dr. Kissinger and
Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, or some
other appropriate official from Hanoi.

On October 25, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20 as the time for a meeting. On November 17, just 3 days before the scheduled meeting, they said Le Duc Tho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he recovered, either with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who could come from Hanoi.

Two months have passed since they
called off that meeting. The only reply to
our plan has been an increase in troop in-
filtration from North Vietnam and Com-
munist military offensives in Laos and
Cambodia. Our proposal for peace was
answered by a step-up in the war on their
part.

That is where matters stand today.

We are being asked publicly to respond
to proposals that we answered, and in
some respects accepted, months ago in
private.

We are being asked publicly to set a
terminal date for our withdrawals when
we already offered one in private.

And the most comprehensive peace plan
of this conflict lies ignored in a secret
channel, while the enemy tries again for
military victory.

That is why I have instructed Ambas-
sador Porter to present our plan publicly
at this Thursday's session of the Paris

peace talks, along with alternatives to
make it even more flexible.

We are publishing the full details of our
plan tonight. It will prove beyond doubt
which side has made every effort to make
these negotiations succeed. It will show
unmistakably that Hanoi—not Washing-
ton or Saigon—has made the war go on.

Here is the essence of our peace plan;
public disclosure may gain it the attention
it deserves in Hanoi.

Within 6 months of an agreement:

-We shall withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.

-We shall exchange all prisoners of war.

-There shall be a cease-fire through-
out Indochina.

-There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.

President Thieu will announce the ele-
ments of this election. These include
international supervision and an inde-
pendent body to organize and run the
election, representing all political forces
in South Vietnam, including the National
Liberation Front.

Furthermore, President Thieu has in-
formed me that within the framework of
the agreement outlined above, he makes
the following offer: He and Vice Presi-
dent Huong would be ready to resign one
month before the new election. The Chair-
man of the Senate, as caretaker head of
the Government, would assume adminis-
trative responsibilities in South Vietnam,
but the election would be the sole respon-
sibility of the independent election body
I have just described.

There are several other proposals in our
new peace plan; for example, as we of-
fered privately on July 26 of last year, we
remain prepared to undertake a major re-
construction program throughout Indo-

103

[21] Jan. 25

china, including North Vietnam, to help all these peoples recover from the ravages of a generation of war.

We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.

We are ready to negotiate the plan I have outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues. Because some parts of this agreement could prove more difficult to negotiate than others, we would be willing to begin implementing certain military aspects while negotiations continue on the implementation of other issues, just as we suggested in our private proposal in October.

Or, as we proposed last May, we remain willing to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone. Under this approach, we would withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within 6 months in exchange for an Indonesia cease-fire and the release of all prisoners.

The choice is up to the enemy.

This is a settlement offer which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam. It deserves the light of public scrutiny by these nations and by other nations throughout the world. And it deserves the united support of the American people.

We made the substance of this generous offer privately over 3 months ago. It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored. I reiterate that peace offer tonight. It can no longer be ignored.

The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, which the United States of America will never do. If the enemy wants peace, it will have to recognize the important difference between settlement and surrender.

This has been a long and agonizing

struggle. But it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position on the war, could now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair, fair to everybody concerned.

By the steadiness of our withdrawal of troops, America has proved its resolution to end our involvement in the war; by our readiness to act in the spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout Indochina.

We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.

If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces as the South Vietnamese develop the capability to defend themselves.

If the enemy's answer to our peace offer is to step up their military attacks, I shall fully meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to protect our remaining troops.

We do not prefer this course of action.

We want to end the war not only for America but for all the people of Indonesia. The plan I have proposed tonight can accomplish that goal.

Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our Government says must be false, and whatever our enemies say must be true, as far as this war is concerned. Well, the record I have revealed tonight proves the contrary. We can now demonstrate publicly what we have long been demonstrating privately—that America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself for all concerned.

This has been the longest, the most

104

Richard Nixon, 1972

Jan. 25 [21]

difficult war in American history.

Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all 9 years ago; and there has been disagreement on the conduct of the war. The proposal I have made tonight is one on which we all can agree.

Let us unite now, unite in our search for peace—a peace that is fair to both sides—a peace that can last.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 8:30 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on radio and television.

Before delivering the address, he met with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress.

The President spoke from a prepared text. An advance text of his address was released on the same day, as well as the text of the joint U.S.-South Vietnam peace proposal which read as follows:

1. There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam within 6 months of an agreement.

2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day the agreement is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed when they are completed.

3. The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within 6 months of an agreement. This election will be

organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the Government, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that it:

- will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the election,

- will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves,

- is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

- South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy consistent with the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

- Reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.

4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle their own affairs by themselves.

5. The problems existing among the Indo-chinese countries will be settled by the Indo-chinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled

105

VIETNAM 1972: SAMPLING OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

February 2, 1972 Senator Muskie offered a two-point peace plan for Indochina. It would:
--set a date for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops in return for the release of American POWs and the safety of American forces as they withdraw, and
--urge the South Vietnamese Government to seek a political accommodation with the Communists or be deprived of U.S. military support after U.S. forces withdraw.

February 9, 1972 Senate Foreign Relations Committee by unanimous vote reported a war powers bill sponsored by Javits/Stennis, a synthesis of war powers bills introduced in 1971. Debate on war powers legislation began March 29.

March 23, 1972 Seven Democratic Senators and 34 House members announced the introduction of end-the-war legislation. Their bill would:
--require total withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Indochina and a cessation of all U.S. air and shelling operations in Indochina within 30 days in exchange for an agreement by North Vietnam to release all American POWs;
--failing such an agreement, the withdrawal deadline would be extended 30 days;
--after that time, unless Congress cancelled the measure, withdrawal would proceed with or without a POW agreement.

March 29, 1972 Senate began debate on war powers legislation. As reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the bill provided that the President could take emergency military action - in the absence of a Congressional declaration of war - only to repel or forestall an attack on the United States or on U.S. forces stationed abroad, or to protect U.S. citizens or nationals in danger in a foreign country or pursuant to some specific statutory authorization, short of a declaration of war, confined to some particular area. When the President took such emergency action, he had to terminate it within 30 days unless Congress specifically authorized

2

it to continue.

April 11, 1972

Senate rejected a Hruska motion to send the war powers
bill back to the Committee on the Judiciary for further
study. The vote was 26-60.

Senate however rejected a Gravel amendment to the war
powers bill to apply the bill's provisions to the
Indochina war, unless Congress declared war. On North
Vietnam within 15 days. The vote was 11-74.

Senate adopted a Javits motion to table (kill) a second
Gravel amendment to the war powers bill to delete the
provision exempting ongoing hostilities and substitute
a declaration of war on North Vietnam. The vote was 78-
7.

Senate rejected a Fulbright amendment to the war powers
bill specifying that the bill, while exempting the
Vietnam War, did not give the President any authority
to continue hostilities in Southeast Asia. The vote was
28-56.

April 13, 1972

Senate by a vote of 68 to 16 passed the war powers
legislation, along lines reported by the SFRC with the
addition of perfecting amendments proposed by Sen.
Javits. No conference was requested with the House
which had passed much milder war powers measures in 1970
and 1971. The House version required only that the
President report to Congress whenever he acted without
prior Congressional authorization to commit US forces
to hostilities, to send combat-equipped troops overseas
or to enlarge forces already stationed abroad. It urged
but did not require the President to consult Congress
before taking such action.

The Senate, having voted its legislation on April 13,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 20
reported adversely on the House version and sent it to
the Senate floor with a recommendation it not be passed.
It was hoped that when it came to the Senate floor, the
Senate passed version would be offered and adopted as
a substitute, followed by a conference. However, the
Senate took no action on the House resolution.

April 17-19, 1972

Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings
on the Administration's foreign military aid requests.
Secretary of State Rogers and subsequently Secretary of
Defense Laird testified at the opening sessions which
focused almost exclusively on U.S. resumption of full-

scale bombing of North Vietnam.

Following Secretary Rogers' testimony, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 9-1 in favor of a Church-Case end-the-war amendment to the State authorization bill cutting off all funds for U.S. ground, naval or air operations in or over Vietnam after December 31, 1972, conditional upon the release of American POWs and an accounting of American MIAs.

Senator Muskie has introduced a resolution calling for the immediate end to all American military action against North Vietnam.

April 19, 1972

House Democratic Caucus considered (and narrowly rejected by a vote of 97-105) a resolution sponsored by Rep. O'Neill calling upon Democrats to support legislation to:

--cut off all funds for U.S. military operations in or over North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos 30 days after enactment;

--cut off funds for air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand immediately;

--cut off funds for bombing in South Vietnam immediately unless the President determines it is necessary to protect withdrawing American forces;

--provide for a 30 day extension of the military operations deadline if American POWs have not been released.

At the request of Senator Cranston, the Senate set aside five hours of debate on American bombing policies in Indochina. Senators engaged in the debate spoke on both sides of the issue.

April 20, 1972

House Democratic Caucus adopted an O'Neill resolution ordering the House Foreign Affairs Committee to produce, within 30 days, legislation setting some deadline for total U.S. withdrawal from the war subject to the release of American POWs and an accounting of MIAs. The vote was 135-66.

House Democratic Caucus adopted a Gibbons amendment to the O'Neill resolution adding a condemnation of the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. The vote was 186-16.

House Democratic Caucus adopted the O'Neill resolution with the Gibbons amendment by a vote of 144-58.

House Democratic Caucus rejected a Montgomery amendment to the resolution condemning the Soviet Union for sending weapons to North Vietnam. The vote was 51-149.

April 26, 1972
House tabled an Abzug resolution of inquiry to require the Administration to supply Congress with sensitive information on:

--current U.S. troop strengths in Indochina and all movements of men and supplies to Southeast Asia since March 15, 1972;

--detailed bombing statistics regarding North and South Vietnam and American casualty figures for the first ten days of March and the first ten days of April 1972;

--bombing statistics regarding Cambodia and Laos from January 1972;

--Administration compliance with the Mansfield amendment (passed in 1971) stating it was U.S. policy to withdraw totally from Indochina by a specified date, contingent upon the release of American POWs. The vote was 113-270.

May 2, 1972
House Armed Services Committee rejected a Nedzi amendment to the military procurement bill calling for total U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina by September 1, 1972, contingent upon the release of American POWs. The vote was 5-32.

House Armed Services Committee maintained a point of order against a Leggett amendment to the military procurement bill to bar the reintroduction of American ground troops or the use of nuclear weapons to counter the current Communist offensive in South Vietnam.

May 9, 1972
Senate Democratic Caucus adopted a resolution "disapproving the escalation of the war" reflected in the President's decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors and continue intensified bombing of that country. The vote was 29-14.

May 10, 1972
Democrats in the House Foreign Affairs Committee (10-1) agreed to support legislation ordering an end to all American military involvement in South Vietnam and withdrawal by October 1, 1972 conditional upon American POW release, MIA accounting and safe withdrawal of U.S. forces.

May 11, 1972
20 House members and 2 Senators filed suit to obtain an injunction to enjoin the President from continuing the Vietnam War, from further bombing or the mining of harbors, from further interruption of communication and

5

rail transportation and other acts of violence against
North Vietnam.

May 16, 1972

Senate narrowly adopted an Administration-backed Byrd
amendment to the Church-Case end-the-war amendment
(State authorization bill) to make U.S. withdrawal also
contingent upon North Vietnam's acceptance of a
ceasefire (putting the Senate in line with the
President's proposal for a ceasefire). The vote was 47-
43.

House Foreign Affairs Committee began hearings on a
draft joint resolution requiring termination of U.S.
military involvement in or over Indochina by October 1,
1972.

May 31, 1972

Senate first adopted the Church-Case end-the-war
amendment to the State authorization bill, as modified
by the Byrd amendment. In response to the President's
May 8th proposal, Senators Church and Case had modified
the December 31, 1972 withdrawal deadline reported by
the committee to four months after an agreement was
reached for the release of American POWs and an
accounting of missing. Voice Vote.

Senate then adopted a Stennis amendment to delete the
entire Church-Case amendment from the State
authorization bill. Voice Vote.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported the FY73
foreign military aid authorization bill with a Mansfield
end-the-war amendment. This amendment would prohibit:
--(1) the use of funds to keep U.S. forces in South
Vietnam after August 31, 1972 (no preconditions);

--(2) participation by U.S. forces in hostilities in or
over Indochina upon completion of a ceasefire agreement
between US and communist forces (only), release of
American POWs and an accounting of MIAs.

As reported, the bill also placed a $275 million limit
on U.S. aid to or spending in behalf of Cambodia
(excluded air operations) and required specific
Congressional authorization for use of funds to finance
foreign forces operating in Laos, Thailand or North
Vietnam (aimed at CIA funding of Thai "volunteers".)

June 12, 1972

Senate began consideration of the FY73 foreign military
aid bill which included the Mansfield end-the-war
amendment.

June 13, 1972

House Foreign Affairs Committee narrowly adopted a

6

Buchanan end-the war resolution that the U.S. withdraw from Vietnam within four months of an agreement on American POW release but also conditional on a ceasefire. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 19-18, in substance was an endorsement of the President's May 8th peace proposal. It was a substitute for the proposal supported by committee Democrats (May 10) for withdrawal by October 1, 1972 without complete ceasefire condition.

June 27, 1972
House rejected a Harrington amendment to the military procurement bill to cut off funds for military operations in Vietnam on September 1, 1972, contingent only upon POW release. The vote was 152-244. House also rejected a Mikva amendment to prohibit the bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. Voice vote.

July 18, 1972
Senator Cannon offered an end-the-war amendment to the foreign military aid bill as a substitute to the committee-approved Mansfield amendment (May 31). Senator Cannon's proposal would alter the first section of the Mansfield proposal by changing the withdrawal date from August 31, 1972 to "90 days after enactment" (about December 1, 1972 given Congressional timetables) and make such withdrawal contingent only upon an agreement for the release of American POWs. The second section of the Mansfield provision would be unchanged.

July 19, 1972
Senator Cooper offered an end-the-war amendment to the foreign military aid bill to require the unconditional withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina within four months.

July 24, 1972
Senate adopted a Mansfield amendment to the Cannon end-the-war proposal to change the withdrawal deadline to October 1, 1972 and deleting an agreement that POWs be released before troops were withdrawn. The vote was 60-32.

Senate rejected the modified Cannon amendment to the foreign bill. The vote was 44-49.

Senate rejected a second Cannon end-the-war proposal offered as a substitute to the Cooper amendment (above). This would cut off war funds 90 days after enactment contingent upon an agreement for American POW release. The vote was 40-55.

Senate rejected an Allen amendment (in the nature of a substitute for the Cooper amendment) stating the sense

7

of the Congress that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from
Vietnam four months after an internationally supervised
ceasefire and release of American POWs. The vote was 45-
50.

Senate adopted a Brooke amendment to the Cooper end-the-war proposal requiring the release of American POWs before the fund cut-off would become effective. The vote was 63-32.

Senate adopted the Cooper end-the-war amendment, as
modified by Brooke. The vote was 50-45.

Senate then rejected a Stennis amendment to delete the
Cooper-Brooke provision from the bill. The vote was 46-
49.

Senate finally rejected the entire FY73 foreign military
aid bill by a vote of 48-42. Those opposed to the end-
the-war provision were aided by traditional opponents
of military assistance.

July 25, 1972
House Foreign Affairs Committee, reversing itself, narrowly adopted a Hamilton amendment to the foreign military aid authorization bill to require the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina and the termination of all hostilities no later than October 1, 1972 contingent upon a ceasefire with North Vietnam "to the extent necessary" for the safe withdrawal of American troops and upon the release of American POWs and an accounting of MIAs. The vote was 18-17.

July 26, 1972
Senator Cranston reintroduced the revised Mansfield end-the-war proposal (October 1, 1972 deadline) as an amendment to the military procurement bill.

Senator Brooke reintroduced the modified Cooper end-the-war amendment, defeated with the foreign aid bill July 24th, as an amendment to the military procurement bill.

August 1, 1972
House Foreign Affairs Committee voted end-the-war language in the foreign aid authorization bill. It would terminate US military actions "in or over" Indochina by October 1, 1972, with US troops withdrawn by that time, subject to a US ceasefire with North Vietnam "to the extent necessary" to withdraw US forces, and subject to POW release and MIA accounting. The vote was 18 to 17 in favor.

**August 2, 1972** Senate first adopted an Aiken amendment to the Cranston end-the-war proposal (above) to declare withdrawal would be completed four months after an internationally supervised ceasefire had been declared (in line with the President's terms). The vote was 50-47.

Senate then adopted the Brooke end-the-war amendment as a substitute for the Cranston and Aiken proposals. The vote was 49-47. Senate reaffirmed adoption of the Brooke substitute by a vote of 50-47.

It adopted a Miller amendment to the Brooke substitute making withdrawal also conditional upon an accounting of MIAs. The vote was 95-2. And it rejected 1-96 a Mansfield motion to table (kill) the Miller amendment.

Senate also adopted a Pastore motion to table (kill) a Dole amendment stating that Congress accept full responsibility for the consequences of adopting the Brooke amendment. The vote was 59-38.

**August 10, 1972** House adopted a Bolling amendment to delete the end-the-war provision from the foreign aid bill. The vote was 229-177.

**August 14, 1972** The House, considering war powers legislation previously passed by the Senate, passed by a vote of 344 to 13 amended language which was less restrictive of the President's war powers than the Senate version; the House version was similar to the milder resolutions passed in the two preceding years.

**September 8, 1972** House and Senate conferees to the military procurement bill agreed to delete the Brooke end-the-war provision adopted by the Senate August 2. Senator Brooke announced he would reintroduce the amendment when the Senate considered the revived foreign military aid bill.

**September 14, 1972** House rejected an Addabbo amendment to the DOD appropriations bill to cut off funds for support of U.S. activities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia pending the release of American POWs and an accounting of MIAs. The fund cut-off would become effective four months after enactment and apply only to funds in the defense bill. The vote was 160-208.

**September 19, 1972** Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a revised foreign military aid bill with Brooke end-the-war provision requiring the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina in four months contingent upon the return

9

September 26, 1972 Senate narrowly adopted Stennis amendment to the foreign military aid bill to delete the Brooke end-the-war provision from the bill. The vote was 45-42.

October 2, 1972 Senate rejected (26-55) a Proxmire amendment to the DOD appropriations bill to ban the use of funds in the bill for American bombing in Indochina.

Senate however also adopted a Mathias amendment reaffirming the 1971 anti-war language (the only language approved by both Houses of Congress) that it was US policy to end military operations in Indochina "at the earliest practicable date."

October 10, 1972 Senator McGovern outlined his plan for peace in Indochina. Under the proposal outlined, he, as President, would:

- bring an immediate halt to all bombing and acts of force in Indochina;

- terminate any shipments of military supplies that continue the war;

- withdraw all American forces from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia along with all salvageable American military equipment within 90 days;

- inform Hanoi of these steps and request it, in exchange, to release all American POWs and provide an accounting of MIAs to be completed during the 90-day American withdrawal;

- notify all parties that the U.S. will no longer interfere in the internal policies of Vietnam;

- close American bases in Thailand once American POWs had been released and an MIA accounting provided;

- join with other to provide reconstruction aid to Vietnam;

- expand Veterans' programs in the United States;

- provide amnesty to draft evaders contingent upon a period of alternative domestic service.

December 18, 1972 Resumption of bombing of North Vietnam prompted renewed anti-war statements on the Hill, foreshadowing new legislative end-the-war efforts in 1973.

VIETNAM 1973 - SAMPLING OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

January 1, 1973
18 House Democrats, in letters to House Speaker Albert and Party Chairman Strauss, urged a national campaign to mobilize opposition to the bombing of North Vietnam.

Senator Brooke announced that he would reintroduce his end-the-war amendment in the form of a bill as soon as Congress reconvenes.

January 2, 1973
House Democratic Caucus adopted a resolution in support of legislation to immediately cut off funds for U.S. combat activities in Indochina, subject only to the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of POWs.

January 4, 1973
Senate Democratic Caucus voted 36-12 in favor of legislation to cut off all funds for the Indochina War as soon as an agreement could be reached for safe American troop withdrawal and the release of American POWs.

January 10, 1973
Senator Hughes announced that there may be an attempt in the Senate to delay confirmation of President's cabinet nominees as a means of putting pressure to end the war.

May 2, 1973
Senate Democratic Caucus adopted a resolution calling for legislation stopping further use of funds for U.S. military activity in Cambodia. Senator Mathias vowed to introduce legislation to end all military actions over Indochina.

May 3, 1973
House Appropriations Committee rejected an Addabbo amendment to the second FY1973 supplemental appropriations bill to prohibit a DOD transfer of funds from other programs for costs related to the war, which would have prohibited the use of funds for military activities in Southeast Asia, including Cambodia. The vote was 14-31.

May 10, 1973
House Democratic Caucus agreed to support the Addabbo amendment on the House floor. The vote was 144-22.

House voted in favor of the Addabbo amendment to the second supplemental appropriations bill. The vote was 219-188.

House also adopted Long amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill to specifically prohibit the use of any funds in the bill for support of combat activity in or over Cambodia. The vote was 224-172.

House adopted, by voice vote, a Rarick amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill prohibiting the use of funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam.

May 14-15, 1973
Senate Appropriations Committee voted unanimously (24-0) in favor of Eagleton amendment (to second supplemental) to cut off all money for US bombing "in, over or from the shores of Cambodia or in Laos."

The Senate committee also voted to prohibit DOD from transferring funds from other departmental programs to finance combat activities in Cambodia or Laos (but approved transfer of $170 million to pay for increased military costs due to devaluation of the dollar and increased military subsistence costs).

The Committee also agreed to incorporate the House passed Rarick amendment prohibiting funds for reconstruction of North Vietnam.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a 13 to 3 vote, approved a ban on the use of any present or past government funds to finance any US combat or bombing activities in Indochina. This prohibition was sponsored by Case and Church, attached to a State authorization bill.

May 17, 1973
Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 15 to 0 in favor of war powers legislation restricting the President's ability to wage undeclared war for more than 30 days without Congressional approval. Bill sponsored by

Javits, Eagleton and Stennis. (Senate had passed a similar bill in 1972 which died when the House passed a weaker version. In 1973 a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee passed a stronger measure sponsored by Zablocki, with a 120 - vice 30 - day deadline in the Senate version.)

**May 23, 1973**
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out (16-0) the State Department authorization bill with a Church-Case end-the-war amendment which was broader than the Eagleton amendment to the supplemental (re Cambodia and Laos). Church-Case barred expenditures for all U.S. military operations throughout Indochina without specific Congressional approval. SFRC also attached an amendment prohibiting aid to North Vietnam without specific Congressional approval.

**May 29, 1973**
Senate ruled by a vote of 55-21 that the Eagleton amendment was germane to the supplemental appropriations bill.

**May 31, 1973**
Senate voted 63-19 in favor of the Eagleton amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill to cut off all funding for bombing in Cambodia and Laos.

In debate, Senate had rejected a Taft amendment to the bill to permit partial bombing to continue, directed solely against North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The vote was 17-63.

Senate also rejected Dole-Helms amendment to postpone implementation of the Eagleton amendment if the President informed Congress that the North Vietnamese were not making a good faith effort to account for American MIAs. The vote was 25-56.

**June 7, 1973**
House adopted a Rarick amendment to the State Department authorization bill barring the use of any funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. The vote was 44-18.

House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 31 to 4 in favor of war powers legislation. (It would require Congressional approval for continued

[LC]

US bombing in Cambodia). Contained a reporting deadline for the President of 72 hours after US military action and termination within 120 days absent Congressional approval.

**June 13, 1973**
Day of Hanoi/Washington communique on peace agreement implementation. Press reported that Congressional opponents of bombing in Cambodia would nonetheless continue their efforts to enact legislation cutting off funds for air strikes. Senator Mike Mansfield felt as far as he knew that there was nothing in the joint communique "that changes the situation in Cambodia."

**June 14, 1973**
Senate voted 67-15 to pass the State Dept. authorization bill with the Church-Case provision. Bill to be sent to conference with the House.

**June 19, 1973**
House and Senate conferees on the second supplemental appropriations bill agreed to maintain the Eagleton anti-war amendment in the bill.

**June 25, 1973**
House voted in favor of a funding cutoff, adopting an amendment to the supplemental appropriation bill providing that the House accept the Eagleton amendment. The vote was 235-172.

The Administration failed in a tie vote to delay the effective date of the fund cutoff until September 1. The vote was 204-204.

House agreed to the conference report on the supplemental appropriations bill with the Eagleton cutoff provision.

**June 26, 1973**
Senate also adopted conference report on supplemental appropriation bill with the Eagleton provision, 81-11.

House attached to a continuing funding resolution a Long amendment prohibiting use of funds for combat activities in Cambodia and Laos, by a margin of 240 to 172. In debate, Mahon amendment to defer cutoff date until September 1 failed.

5

June 27, 1973 President vetoed supplemental appropriation bill because of its Cambodia rider. While it mustered its largest anti-war vote yet - 241 to 173 - the House fell 35 votes short of the two-thirds needed to override. The Senate promptly reacted by voting 67-29 to attach a bombing ban amendment to another bill on the national debt ceiling.

June 28, 1973 House Appropriations Committee reported a new supplemental appropriations bill containing compromise language. While adding North and South Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos, the effective date of cutoff would be put off to August 15, 1973.

Senate Appropriations Committee voted (9-8) a Continuing Resolution with an amendment providing for an immediate cutoff of all funds for combat activities in North or South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. (Case-Church)

June 29, 1973 House compromise anti-war language for supplemental appropriations bill - with August 15, 1973 deadline won support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15-2, to be added to Continuing Resolution. Fulbright presented compromise language to Senate. After debate, Senate passed the House-approved language 64 to 26. Also that day, Senate passed an amendment barring funds for reconstruction aid for North Vietnam without specific congressional authorization.

June 30, 1973 Conferees on the Continuing Resolution agreed to delete reference in the bill barring the use of future appropriated funds with respect to activities in SE Asia.

July 1, 1973 President signed the supplemental appropriation bill and Continuing Resolution with compromise language (August 15 deadline); statement released by White House (San Clemente).

July 15, 1973 Senators returning from holiday visits reported firmly resistant to any consideration of extending August 15 bombing deadline; President would face certain defeat.

July 18, 1973 Full House passed war powers legislation

6

approved in June by House Foreign Affairs Committee, despite threat of Presidential veto. Vote was 244 - 170. Senate also began debate on a war powers measure of its own.

**July 20, 1973** Senate voted 72 to 18 in favor of its own version of war powers legislation, with 30 day deadline. This measure to go to a Senate-House conference to resolve differences between the two versions.

**July 26, 1973** House rejected an Abzug amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill to reduce military assistance grants for Indo-China from $550 million to $450 million (aimed at deleting assistance to Cambodia). Voice vote.

House rejected an Abzug amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill to bar grant aid to Cambodia. The vote was 26-105.

House adopted a Biaggi amendment to that portion of the same bill barring materials or commodities to North Vietnam unless it was deemed in the national interest; Biaggi added requirement that there be assurances that North Vietnam was cooperating in accounting for remaining POWs and MIAs. (58-8)

House adopted a Rarick amendment to bar the use of funds for reconstruction aid to North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress. Voice vote.

**September 10, 1973** Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported (10-0) a foreign aid authorization bill with a McGovern-Hatfield amendment providing for an immediate cut-off of funds for activities, both military and paramilitary, in Indochina and requiring specific congressional approval of any renewal of U.S. involvement in the war. The bill also contained a Case amendment barring U.S. funding or support of military or paramilitary activities by third country military personnel in Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and North or South Vietnam, unless specifically authorized by Congress.

**September 21, 1973** Senate adopted without dissent a Case-Church amendment to the DOD procurement authorization

7

bill to prohibit the use of any funds in the bill for combat activities in Indochina unless authorized by Congress.

**October 4, 1973**
Follow-up to action in the House on July 18 and Senate on July 20 on war powers legislation, House-Senate conferees filed a conference report on war powers legislation with a 60 day deadline (and 30 days extension to protect US forces). The bill was steered through conference by Javits and Zablocki.

**October 10, 1973**
After two House-Senate conferences on State authorization bill, Congress cleared bill which included, among other provisions, the requirement for Congressional authorization effective August 15, 1973, of any funds "heretofore or hereafter appropriated" to finance involvement of U.S. military forces in hostilities in, over or from off the shores of North and South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia; barred use of any funds "heretofore or hereafter appropriated" for aid to North Vietnam unless specifically authorized by Congress.

Senate voted 75 to 20 in favor of the compromise war powers legislation worked out in the previous week's conference.

**October 12, 1973**
House voted 238 to 123 in favor of compromise war powers legislation.

**October 24, 1973**
President vetoed war powers legislation.

**November 7, 1973**
House overrode the Presidential veto of the war powers legislation, 284-135, four votes more than the two thirds majority needed to override.

Four hours later, the Senate completed the process with a 75-18 vote to override, or a 13 vote margin over the two-thirds needed.

**December 14, 1973**
Senate adopted (60 to 33) an amendment proposed by Sen. Cotton to cut off funds for Pentagon fuel shipments to Indochina. This symbolic protest was added to the $73 billion DOD

NEW HAMPSHIRE

15 JAN 72 (13)

Let's Find Out . . .

A year times has been a clarification of judges on Vietnam which does not clarify The confusion arises out of a dispute between the President and Senator McGovern (among others) over what Hanoi demand in return for the release of American POWs. The President triggered the debate by telling a CBS interviewer that these "international outlaws" in North Vietnam had said "no deal on freeing the prisoners in exchange for an announced date for US military withdrawal. McGovern then accused the President of deception, and said that the offer had never been made by the administration. Within 24 hours, another background briefing by a White House spokesman concluded that Mr Nixon hadn't exactly made that offer but that he had concluded from what has been said in Paris, that no deal could be arranged because the North Vietnamese are still demanding what they have always demanded, that we pull the rug out from beneath the South Vietnamese government." This is how the administration interprets Hanoi's statement last July, that the US must "respect the South Vietnamese peoples' right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam," and specifically, cease its efforts to maintain the present Saigon government in power.

Two questions arise. The first is whether this demand of Hanoi is inseparable, as the White House insists, from an offer to let the prisoners go if a deadline for withdrawal is fixed and met. Senator McGovern believes the two are separable; the President doesn't. We are inclined to think the senator is right, but we are not sure. And we would note in passing that by prisoners, Hanoi means all prisoners, not just Americans, which complicates the problem further.

The second related question is whether Hanoi has in mind to hold prisoners unless and until the President, formally and explicitly, announces his support of the present Saigon regime. We are not mind readers, but that is not our understanding of the situation. We read Hanoi as saying that the war will go on so long as the US government acts on the belief that the survival of Thieu is vital to its national interest. But if that belief were discarded, if Mr. Nixon were to decide, as he ought, that Thieu is not worth the price we pay for him, it would not follow that the President would have to collaborate in Thieu's overthrow. All Washington need do is allow Vietnamization full play, leaving the political and economic future of Vietnam for the Vietnamese to decide.

These opinions of ours are speculative, but they could be put to the test. One way of testing them was suggested by Max Frankel in The New York Times of January 4. "American negotiators have wondered why the North Vietnamese have not played on American feelings to offering in unambiguous exchange of prisoners for ground and air withdrawal." We have wondered something else. Why doesn't the North act as if in unambiguous reception of all US military men in Vietnam one by one out of our force by a day or two later? An offer on Hanoi's part to let us go, and a decision that clarifies.

THE TODAY SHOW - 100's of the best news, views and analysis from around the world

JAN 21 1992

## Symington Comments On VN

BILL MONROE: Senator SYMINGTON, you indicated yesterday that you felt some of the policies we are pursuing in Indo-China don't seem to you to be consistent with our plans for withdrawal.

Why not?

SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON: It's difficult to understand why we bomb heavily up in NVN, increase our military operations in Cambodia, our support, maintain the military operations in Laos; at the same time say that we are moving out of that war as quickly as we can.

If we continue this operation, there's a chance that our troops that are left could be in very serious trouble.

It's been my position for many months that if we agree to a date and provided a withdrawal, provided they released our prisoners of war, that we could get out of Indo-China, which I now believe is important for the future of this country.

MONROE: You believe we could get out if we simply said we will pull out by a certain date in exchange for release of prisoners?

SYMINGTON: I think that would end this Indo-China war.

And I believe that would be to the advantage of the US for many reasons.

MONROE: Now, Senator, you're talking in exactly an opposite direction than from the Administration.

The Administration says that these activities in Cambodia and Laos and the bombings are actually done to protect our remaining troops and to speed withdrawal.

SYMINGTON: Well, I may be talking against the Administration, but I'm talking about something that the Senate three times has passed and been in favor of.

The House has not approved it, nor does the Administration approve it.

And I think what we're doing today is dangerous from the standpoint of our future.

And it's going to kill a lot more people on the ground - civil-

It's going to kill more of our own flyers and soldiers. We lost five planes in the week that I was out there.

And I would like to see us either pursue it, which is now obviously wrong, or get out of it.

And I think we could get out of it if we were to agree to a date on the withdrawal of the prisoners.

Provided that the prisoners were withdrawn at the same time. (?)

***

[20]

WASHINGTON POST

23 JAN 72 (24)

New Hints on Ending the War

In his CBS interview on January 2, President Nixon hinted for the first time that he would later propose to Hanoi a total American withdrawal in exchange for release of the POWs. This is, of course, the crux of the matter. The administration has talked a good deal about it but it has not made a proposal embodying a withdrawal-prisoner deal to North Vietnam. Thus North Vietnam has never been forced to go through what surely would be the terribly difficult political exercise of deciding how to respond.

Rather, Hanoi has been free to make propaganda on the issue and to float differing and confusing versions of its bargaining position—one should say its "propaganda position" because the United States has yet to force it to define a "bargaining position." For it is of the essence to distinguish what North Vietnam may say to inquiring politicians and journalists—or to American diplomats who are under instructions in effect only to buy time for President Thieu—from what its actual response on a withdrawal-prisoner proposal might be.

Now, however, the administration seems to have moved a step closer toward making such a proposal, though Mr. Nixon's State of the Union message contained no suggestion of it. Diplomatic correspondent Murrey Marder wrote on Friday that "administration strategists are reported to be increasingly tempted to put the question directly to counter critics of administration policy." One hopes the temptation is not based on private assurances that Hanoi will reject the offer. But the critics, assuredly, are gaining force. Last year they were led by Senator Mansfield, whose leverage was limited to legislative politics. This year they are led by Senators Muskie, Humphrey and McGovern,

whose leverage is applied in the much more critical arena of presidential politics.

This newspaper has previously stated its conviction that Mr. Nixon has full and fair reason to declare the United States has achieved its appropriate mission in Vietnam, and that a withdrawal-POW deal should now be offered. To many, it will be deeply disturbing that Mr. Nixon should not start issuing hints of interest in that course until now. But if Mr. Nixon is seeing matters more clearly in 1972's early light, then we urge him to move on.

Senator McGovern, among others, claims that Hanoi would surely accept a withdrawal-POW offer. We are not so sure. It is not inconceivable that some in Hanoi, perhaps those who might win the internal debate such an offer would provoke, might insist that the United States must withdraw not only its own forces but all forms of support for President Thieu. It would involve a risk. There is, however, only one way to find out whether Hanoi will bargain and that is to put the question to put it, furthermore, in a way and in a form designed to enhance prospects of its acceptance.

The administration is currently advertising its alarm about a forthcoming military "spectacular" the Communists are said to be planning and about the unravelling effect it may have on domestic support for administration war policy. If the White House is in fact as alarmed as it professes, then why should there be any further delay in submitting a serious proposal in Paris? Such an offer could well deter the "spectacular" they believe is being planned. Surely Mr. Nixon would not want to delay the offer, if he is actually contemplating one, because he does not think this is the proper moment for it in his re-election campaign. We repeat our comment on his CBS interview: why not now?

26 January 1976

# REACTION IS MIXED

## Backers of President Praise His Offer—Critics Skeptical

By JOHN W. FINNEY

From The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25—
President Nixon's eight-point
peace proposal was applauded
tonight by Congressional sup-
porters of the Administration,
but was greeted with a mix-
ture of skepticism and surprise
by critics of the Vietnam War.

To the Administration's sup-
porters, the President's disclo-
sure of the secret negotiations
and the American offer was
taken as evidence that Mr.
Nixon had done everything
possible to achieve a negotiated
settlement of the war.

Among the critics there was
doubt that the President had
gone far enough or that his
proposal would be acceptable
to North Vietnam.

Senator John Sherman Coop-
er, Republican of Kentucky,
who in the past has teamed
with Senator Church in offer-
ing Vietnam withdrawal amend-
ments, described the President's
offer as 'fair and just.'

"It ought to be accepted but
I doubt that it will be," he
said. "If not accepted, I still
think we should move out."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, the
Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and one
of the harshest critics of the
Administration's Vietnam pol-
itics, said: "that the '68
had offered what would be
considered in western eyes a
"fair and generous" proposal.

### Sees a 'Sticking Point'

"But what looks generous to
us may not look generous to
North Vietnam," Senator Ful-
bright said. "We may have to
do more" to get a favorable
relevance from North Vietnam.

The "sticking point," he said,
remains the question of whether
the United States is "willing
to get out and leave the Viet-
nam Government to its own devices."
From the initial Compre-
sion- al reaction, it did not appear
that the President, in disclosing
his peace initiatives, would
achieve one of his stated goals
of unifying the American people

toing and froing around his
position.

There were expressions of
support, such as from Senator
John Stennis, Chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, and Representative F. Ed-
ward Hebert, chairman of the
House Armed Services Commit-
tee.

Senator Stennis said, "This
shows that the President has
repeatedly done all that he
could reasonably and honor-
ably do as the chief executive
of our nation."

Mr. Hebert said that: "In
light in the cause of peace the
President had his finest hour."

"He demonstrated beyond
earnest his sincerity of pur-
pose and his continuing effort
in spite of the efforts to chal-
lenge the fact that he has been
fighting the cause of peace to
bring about the end of the use-
less and tragic slaughter in
Vietnam," Mr. Hebert said.

Senator Hugh Smith, the Re-
publican leader, said the Presi-
dent's detailed accounting of
the secret negotiations "sup-
ports the wisdom of the Presi-
dent's push for peace" and
Representative Gerald R. Ford,
the House Republican leader,
said, "the President has set the
record straight by revealing his
efforts to end the war through
broads and comprehensive ne-
gotiations."

Mr. Nixons critics admitted
they had been caught off bal-
ance by the disclosure of the
secret peace negotiations—a
fact that contributed to their
generally cautious reaction.
Mingled among some words of
praise for the President by the
Vietnam doves was uncertainty
as to exactly what the Presi-
dent had and was proposing
and skepticism that his peace
proposals were sufficient to
end the war.

Expressing disappointment,
Senator Frank Church of Idaho,
a Democratic dove on the For-
ign Relations Committee, said
that "had President Nixon con-
fined his offer to a withdrawal
of the remaining forces in ex-
change for our prisoners of
war, I would have applauded
him without reservation."

"However," Mr. Church went
on, "he added another condi-
tion which would require the
north to stop fighting and settle
instead for elections in the
South under a caretaker Gov-
ernment. This has been sug-
gested before and rejected.
Nevertheless, I hope Hanoi will
not turn down the President's
effort out of hand but will re-
ward it as a constructive point for
serious negotiations."

Senator Paul A. Flow
of Minnesota, a Democratic
democrat, interpreted the President's offer
as embracing the concept of
the amendment offered by Sen-
ator Stennis which would be
theistic, leaving for with-
drawal of all American forces.

in six months, contingent only
upon release of American pris-
oners of war. "It's not the
Mansfield Amendment, but it
certainly affects the underly-
ing elements of it," he said.

Senator Mansfield, who ear-
lier in the day had persuaded
the Causus of Democratic Sen-
ators to embrace once again his
amendment, was not immedi-
ately available for comment.

Senator Alan Crenshaw, Dem-
ocrat of California, suggested
the President had still not met
the terms of the Mansfield
Amendment. The issue remains,
he said, of "how long do we
want to stay in Vietnam and
fight and die there until Viet-
nam is able to defend itself?"

Senator Jacob K. Davis, Re-
pubликан of New York, said that
while the Nixon offer was "fair,
obviously its being made public
inates that there is little
hope for negative outcome."

"The question therefore is
whether in the U. S. interest and
that of the American people, com-
plete freedom and the de-
velopment of our wills and
interests can be guaranteed
without the threat of
infringing upon the
right of the President to make
the decision," he said.

Senator the Hon. John
South Dakota, chambering in
Congress for the Democratic
party, said, "I doubt that the
President's offer would be
encouraged, positive, because
the Nixon offer is to a date
rather than a time for
negotiations."

Senators John and Dan an-

cused the President of contrib-
uting to a "credibility gap" with
his secret negotiations.

"At the same time Mr. Nixon
was bitterly opposed to the Mc-
Govern-Hatfield proposal to end
the war, he was at the very
same time offering it to the oth-
er side," the Senator said. "This
leads to a credibility gap, both
with the United States Senate
and the other side."

Senator Henry M. Jackson of
Washington, another contender
for the Democratic Presidential
nomination, said Mr. Nixon "re-
vealed a course of negotiation
and action close to what I
have been en phrasing — the
release of our prisoners based
on an agreement for withdraw-
ing all our forces and a stand-
still cease-fire."

Gov. George Wallace of Ala-
bama said the President had
made a "generous offer" but
"since the North Vietnamese
did not respond in private talks,
I doubt if they will make any
positive reaction to an offer
from publicly to the American
people."

Representative John M. Ash-
burn of Ohio, a conservative
member of the Senate for the
Southern states, committed
the President "for re-
fusing to how to pressures
from the 'get it home' for un-
conditionally withdraw." But he
expressed concern that the
people were being used as
barriers to their rights by the
South, Vietnam and con-
ed against "withdrawing our
troops simply on the basis of a
negotiation's promise."

10

CHANCELLOR: There was considerable political reaction today to the President's speech.

Republican Senator Hugh Scott said the speech was an answer to reasonable people who had reasonable doubts about the negotiations.

Senator Mike Mansfield, the Democratic leader, said the President's speech was a long step forward in laying the cards on the table.

Senator Edward Kennedy said of the President's eight-point plan, that there should be a one-point plan, to withdraw all American troops contingent only on the release of the prisoners.

And some of the candidates for president had their comments.

SENATOR MCGOVERN: What the President is proposing is a complicated eight-point proposition, much of which represents warmed over details from previous offers that have been rejected by the other side. I'm not very hopeful that the Nixon formula will move us any closer to a negotiated settlement.

REPORTER: Senator, what would you do if you were president?

SEN. MCGOVERN: I would accept the offer that the other side has made, in which they said if we would announce now a definite timetable for the withdrawal of all American military operations, in the air and on the ground, no preconditions, just announce a deadline, that that would then open the way for negotiations on the release of prisoners and a cease fire.

I would announce that deadline without further delay.

SEN. HUMPHREY: It seems to me that the better way, and I'm not trying to be a carping critic, because I'm very pleased that the President has taken the steps that he has outlined to the public, it seems to me that the better way would be to set the time for withdrawal, to take the initiative on our part, and of course, at the same time, tie the subject of the release of the prisoners and the MIA's, the missing in action, and set up the machinery to identify the release or to supervise it. It seems to me that's the way to end the war.

SEN. MUSKLE: To propose political initiative aimed at new presidential elections in SVN under international

Thieu's offer to resign and that of his Vice President to resign a month before the elections is a new element.

On the military side the one speaking point in the proposal is that it would call for a cease fire throughout IC, not simply in VN, that is it would call for a cease fire in Cambodia and Laos as well as Vil. This could well lead, I think, to stalemate in Paris, and to a prolongation of the war.

CHANCELLOR: Clark Clifford, who used to be Secretary of Defense, and who was one of Muskie's advisors, today reinforced this point about a cease fire.

Clifford said that in all his dealings with the NVNese, they have always been dead set against any deal involving a cease fire, and Clifford says the President knew that

There was also comment today from Republican Congressman Pau McCloskey of California, who is running in the New Hampshire Primary against Mr. Nixon's VN policy.

CONGRESSMAN PAUL MCCLOSKEY: I didn't think he said too much that was new, except to disclose the secret negotiation efforts. I think that as long as the President continues to insist on the survival of the Government in SVN that the other side isn't going to be impelled to negotiate.

I think that the purpose of the speech is more here for domestic consumption than there's any hope of expectancy that it was going to be answered affirmatively.

CHANCELLOR: It's being said at the White House that the President decided to disclose his own secrets because of domestic divisions in the country. Mr. Nixon has been called his own Daniel Ellsberg.

Domestic divisions on the war, however, are at a low point, and some cynics have suggested that the President's dramatic disclosure had something to do with all those politicians running against him.

ABC EVENING NEWS,

FEBRUARY 2, 1972

## Peace Plan Comes Under Sharp Attack

REASONER: President NIXON'S eight point peace plan came under sharp attack today from Senator Edmund MUSKIE. The Democratic presidential front runner delivered a major foreign policy speech in Washington.

FRANK REYNOLDS: MUSKIE'S immediate response to the President's peace plan was cautious but basically positive.

And he believed, criticism of Mr. NIXON would be resented. Now, a week later, he has changed his mind.

SENATOR EDMUND MUSKIE: Most Americans thought they heard the President agree to set a date certain for our withdrawal.

But it is not the genuine date certain so many of us had urged on him.

He did not offer to exchange our presence in VN for the freedom of our prisoners.

Instead, he laid down additional conditions, in short, in the face of a frustrating deadlock, the President has basically renumbered and reissued the proposals that have failed for six years.

We are still trying to win at the conference table what we have not won and cannot win on the battle field.

REYNOLDS: One week ago, MUSKIE was persuaded that he would suffer a political backlash if he criticized the President's peace plan.

He no longer feels that way and again insists the only way to end the war and recover our prisoners is to withdraw all Americans and leave the SVNese to deal with the NVNese.

MUSKIE now believes that not only would that be wise policy, but is good politics.

REASONER: While Senator MUSKIE has been relatively subdued on the VN issue up to this point, another Democratic presidential hopeful, Senator George MCGOVERN has made it a major part of his campaign.

This week MCGOVERN is campaigning in New Hampshire.

BILL MATTNE: One year and a million dollars later, George MCGOVERN now believes he is finally seeing some momentum in his long campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Here in New Hampshire, MCGOVERN emphasizes first that he is a serious candidate all the way to the last delegate vote in Miami Beach six months from now.

SENATOR MCGOVERN: I think what we have to demonstrate to skeptical people who might want to support me on the basis of my views but who wonder whether I can really win, we have to demonstrate to them that we do have strength where the voters are.

I've got to either come through with a victory or I've got to come through very strong in some of these early primaries.

I don't say I have to win them all or even to win one of them, but I do have to indicate that I'm a serious contender and that I can draw a heavy vote at the grass roots.

###

MCGOVERN: I would commit us to a definite date - I would make the same kind of a commitment that the Premier of France once made that if he couldn't meet that commitment, he would be willing to resign.

[L.C.]

The road to Vietnam prime

HON GLOBE

FEB 72 (6)

The government of South Viet-
nam has now made public the text
of the nine-point Peace Plan it
offered secretly to the United States
last June. This is the plan in-
tended Jan. 25 by President Nixon
on nationwide television and subse-
quently discussed in some depth by
Presidential Assistant Henry A. Kiss-
singer at a press conference the fol-
lowing day.

' Examination of the text, and commentaries upon it by leaders of both sides, makes it painfully clear that the United States and Hanoi are still a long way apart in at least two major respects.

First, there is the issue of a time-
table for the withdrawal of US mili-
tary forces from Indochina.

Hanoi's position was, and remains,
that the United States withdraw un-
conditionally from all of Indochina
within approximately six months.

The United States's position is
that withdrawal should take place
only after agreement has been
reached in principle on a final settle-
ment of the differences between the
US and its enemies.

Thus Hanoi demands withdrawal
by a date certain. We propose a date
uncertain — since we set no date for
the final settlement.

The second major divergence of
aims lies in the contending proposals
over the political future of South
Vietnam.

Here, Hanoi wants us to abandon
the Thieu government forthwith and
agree to replace it with a "new ad-
ministration standing for 'peace, in-
dependence, neutrality and democra-
cy.'" This administration would ne-
gotiate a political settlement with the
Viet Cong.

For our part, we would have an
election carried out by a commission
with Communist participation. One
month before this election, President
Thieu and Vice President Huong
would resign. Thereafter, a caretaker
government headed by the chairman
of Thieu's Senate would reign until
a new president was elected.

The chances of the United States
achieving significant modification of
Hanoi's demands through further ne-
gotiations are plainly slim and get-
ting slimmer as we continue the uni-
terial withdrawal of our ground
forces from South Vietnam.

There is virtually no incentive for
Hanoi to agree to a compromise po-
itical settlement just to get a date
certain for our final withdrawal,

from the point of view of the
evaluation of being left in the air,
as a base of Lining the North
Vietnam to the last possible only been
tried by former President Johnson
and powered by a false

As for President Nixon's plan
for a new election, it seems revalu-
lated to perpetuate the present gov-
ernmental system and certainly is
regarded as such by the North Viet-
namese.

'As the Times of London has ob-
served, "this would leave the South
Vietnamese army and administra-
tion, right down to the village level,
still in effect answerable to President
Thieu. Thus the independent body
supervising the elections on which
Communists and others would be
represented would have little direct
power."

To expect that Hanoi would ac-
cede to Mr. Nixon's proposal is un-
realistic. Their object is to see that
the Thieu government is supplanted,
not perpetuated in power.

Thus, barring major new initia-
tives on Mr. Nixon's part, the pros-
pect is for prolongation of the war
through continued arming of the
South Vietnamese and, perhaps,
stepped-up retaliatory bombing of
the kind already begun late last year.
In short, perpetuation of a limited
war. And so long as this is the case,
the problem of freeing our prisoners
of war will remain unsolved.

Is there then a way out of the di-
lemma?

The Globe believes that there is
one way, and only one. Simply, it is
for the United States to offer the
enemy a firm and early date for our
withdrawal from Indochina — lock,
stock and barrel — in exchange only
for the simultaneous release of the
prisoners of war.

This is not unconditional sur-
render. It is only recognition of the
realities of a situation which has
gone on far too long from the stand-
point of all the combatants.

As former chief US representa-
tive to the United Nations, Charles
W. Yost, has pointed out, the time is
long since past when we had the ca-
pability of playing a decisive role ei-
ter in prepping up the South Viet-
namese government or changing it.

"The future of Vietnam," says
Mr. Yost, "will eventually be settled
between the two Vietnamese govern-
ments, either by negotiation or con-
tinued fighting. . . . Vietnamese poli-
tics are no longer our business. That
should be the ultimate meaning of
'Vietnunication.'"

ELEJ

WASHINGTON POST

7 FEB. 1972 P-1

WarDeal
Rejected
By Hanoi

Won't Release POW's in Trade For Pullout

By Hedley Burrell

Washington Post Staff Writer

North Vietnam's chief delegate to the Paris peace talks made it clear yesterday that his side will not give up prisoners of war in return for withdrawal of all U.S. forces.

The delegate, Xuan Thuy, also indicated that the military and political issues must be handled together.

The conditions for settlement, he said, changed with a re-election last October of the Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

He suggested that the POWs could have been returned in exchange for a total withdrawal, and the political and military issues could have been handled separately last year if the Nixon administration had withdrawn support of Thieu.

"It would have allowed Mr. Nixon to get out of the war very honorably," Thuy declared on "Face the Nation" (CBS-WTOP). "But Mr. Nixon refused to do that."

Thuy asserted in a New York Times interview Saturday that had the United States set a precise date for withdrawal before the October elections, Thieu would not have been re-elected. He thus suggested that an overall settlement would have been possible by withdrawal alone.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers, reaching on a separate segment of "Face the Nation" to Thuy's comments, said, "We have on every opportunity, pronounced so, that

"the Vietnam would not be a separate military and

political settlement." They have said. We won't return your POWs unless you throw out

them. But we can't get them out of the country. That's not the way to do it. We must have a military solution unless we lose them exactly when they are there and they can't mean to do it for the country."

They was indicated to Paris, France, in Washington.

Sen. George S. McCulloch (D-SDA), a presidential candidate, has repeated his argued that the Communists would release the POWs of Mr. Nixon set a firm withdrawal date. Thuy indicated yesterday that while this would have been possible before the October elections in Vietnam last year, it was no longer the case.

Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine), who has come under fire for tagging Mr. Nixon's peace proposals a rearrangement of rejected offers, has said the United States should offer a withdrawal date in return for the POWs and press Saigon to work out a settlement with the Communists.

Except for the suggestion that the United States pressure Saigon to talk with the other side, Muskie's proposals are not considered drastically different from those of Mr. Nixon or other Democrats.

In Miami Beach, another presidential hopeful, Sen. Herbert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) said in an interview with Paul G. Edwards of The Washington Post that he does not consider the North Vietnamese position outlined by Thuy to be an obstacle to ending U.S. involvement in the war.

"Our last priority should be the preservation of Mr. Thieu as head of the South Vietnamese government," Humphrey said. "He has indicated he is willing to step aside...the point is that his successor should not be selected by either the United States or North Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam must have the right to choose a leader in elections that include the Vietcong."

Presidential adviser H. R. Haldeman, meanwhile, in an interview to be broadcast on the "Today" show (NBC-WRC), said that critics of Mr. Nixon's efforts to reach a Vietnam settlement were "consciously riding and abetting the enemy."

In the Interview broadcast yesterday, Thuy asked: "Why doesn't President Nixon make a statement stopping commitment to the Saigon administration? And then the Vietnam problem would be very rapidly settled, both political and military."

Secondly, he said, "It is not true that the Saigon regime was supporting the people in South Vietnam so that they can decide their own future. We just want to work out a relation so South Vietnam can decide its own future."

They were asked why North Vietnam refused to let an international group of observers visit American POWs.

"The conditions of this war are different from any other war," Thuy replied. "You must understand that. The war in Vietnam has its own characteristics. If now we let those people visit camps it might help Mr. Nixon in his aim..." He then referred to the unsuccessful U.S. commando raid of a POW camp in North Vietnam in 1970.

Thuy said that the disclosure Jan. 23 by Mr. Nixon of secret meetings between U.S. national security affairs adviser Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese negotiators was a serious obstacle to a peace settlement.

This was the second time that Mr. Nixon disclosed secret meetings to end the war. Thuy added. The first, he said, was in 1969, when the President spoke of talks with the North held by Henry Cabot Lodge, then the U.S. chief negotiator in Paris.

Asked if his side would favor new talks should Kissinger request them, the minister responded that it would depend on whether Mr. Nixon was serious about reaching a settlement.

He said he does not think that the United States and China would strike a deal adverse to North Vietnam when Mr. Nixon visits Peking later this month.

Peking has always supported progressive movements, he said, adding that China had denounced the U.S. peace proposals and supported the Viet Cong's bid for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces and the end of American support for Thieu.

Asked why the POWs had to be used as pawns in the negotiations, Thuy replied, "It is Mr. Nixon who uses the POWs as pawns, not us."

He said the prisoners were receiving medical treatment and a new list of captives would be published in due time."

Rogers was asked about the prospects for a North Vietnamese and Viet Cong offensive in the near future.

"My information," he said.

"In that they were making moves to get to a central highlight, and thereafter their forces near the Demilitized Zone," he said on offensive could come within the next month and might coinide with Mr. Nixon's Feb. 21 visit to China.

Thuy said the reports were all speculation.

"Statements make me wonder whether it is the United States who is now conditioning opinion for launching some military adventures against the Vietnamese..." he remarked.

In Paris, meanwhile, Jean de Broglie, leader of a French parliamentary mission visiting North Vietnam, was quoted as saying the Viet Cong not only want Thieu's resignation but are insisting that the police system in the South be disbanded.

It was put to Rogers that the Communist position all but booted down to one point—"how they define continued American support of Saigon."

"It appears very clear from both these broadcasts that there is something utterly irreconcilable about it, both philosophically and politically," an interviewer suggested.

Rogers answered that negotiations always "seem irreconcilable until they're reconciled."

"I think the President's proposals provide us a foundation on which negotiations could succeed," Rogers added.

WASHINGTON POST 26 MARCH 1972

# Vietnam Pullout

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

Concerning President Nixon of
us to continue massive In-
China bombing operations
finitely, seven Democratic
ators and 34 House mem-
bers yesterday launched a
paign to cut off all funds
to all U.S. bombing, shelling
land operations in Indo-
na within 30 days.

On, Mike Gravel (D-
ca), the chief Senate spon-
sor, said the President, while
underwriting ground forces
from Indochina, was stepping
the bombings and offshore
pings and creating an "au-

tomated war... that may lit-
erally hover over Southeast
Asia for years to come."

According to Gravel, Sen.
Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) Rep.
Robert Drinan (D-Mass.) and
other sponsors of the new
fund-cutoff legislation, the
bombing is intended to pre-
serve American-backed gov-
ernments in power in Indo-
china without the use of U.S.
ground forces.

Gravel and Mondale, as well
as Fred Branfman, director of
a group called "Project Air
War" who appeared with Dri-
nan at a news conference, dis-
played what they said were

anti-personnel weapons
dropped by U.S. planes to crip-
ple and maim North Vietnam-
ese civilians.

The devices included a plas-
tic shrapnel bomb whose frag-
ments don't show up in the
human body under X-ray: a
small pin-like weapon with
raspy teeth, called a flechette,
which rips the flesh; and a
fragmentation bomb.

Gravel read from a letter
which he identified as a Dec.
10, 1971, report from the De-
fense Department, in which he
said the government denied
using plastic shrapnel weap-
ons.

"Yet they are manufactured
by a U.S. manufacturing com-
pany within 25 miles of this
room and used in Indochina,"
he asserted.

"The legislation outlined yet
today would require total
withdrawal of all U.S. forces
and a cessation of all U.S. air
and shelling operations
throughout Indochina within
30 days after enactment, in ex-
change for North Vietnamese
agreement to release of U.S.
prisoners. If there is no such
agreement, the date of with-
drawal would be extended for
30 days. But after that, unless
cancelled by Congress, the
withdrawal would proceed
with or without a POW agree-
ment.

All activities outside South
Vietnam would stop immedi-
ately; the 30-day limit would
be to allow withdrawal of U.S.
forces from South Vietnam.

WASHINGTON POST 26 MARCH 1972 (27)

## Slamming the Paris Door

Mr. Nixon's decision to suspend American participation in the Paris talks with Hanoi and the Vietcong does nothing so much as call into question his interest in a negotiated Vietnam settlement. We would have thought it essential to his own purposes to stay at the table, no matter how abusive or unresponsive the other side might be, In order to keep pressing his eight-point settlement proposal of Jan. 25. The resultant image of patient earnest questioning could have served his diplomacy and his politics as well.

Instead, the President had Ambassador Porter deliver a savage and bullying attack on the Communists; part of it are excerpted "For the Record" on this page today. Although the Communists spoke first, Mr. Porter's prepared statement read: "Our side is very disappointed by your presentations of today." The clear intent to break things off is evident. The statement was studded with gratuitous remarks explicitly and insultingly questioning the other side's good faith. His demand that Hanoi apply the Geneva Convention to American prisoners could not have been put in a form more certainly calculated to draw a rejection. It is almost as though the President feared that North Vietnam might be inclined to grant him a point on the POWs and thereby to make it more difficult for him to continue the air war and to continue his support of Saigon.

Ambassador Porter's words on suspending negotiations were utterly meretricious. There will be

no more Thursday talks, he said, until "some sign
from you that you are disposed to engage in mean-
ingful exchanges." He went on: "If you do indicate
a desire for "'serious discussion'... we may need
to explore your intentions rather fully prior to
agreeing to meet." We do not say—nor can anyone
know: that is the point of talking—that Hanoi and
the Vietcong are interested in negotiating now.
But we do not see how any self-respecting party
could continue talks on the arrogant conditions laid
down by Ambassador Porter. To speak as he did
on the eve of the return to Paris of the chief Viet-
cong negotiator, Mrs. Binh, is to assure that the
United States will not soon hear any hints of change
she may have borne.

Will this gesture by Mr. Nixon "break the filterer," in his own phrase Friday, or reduce the Communists' propaganda opportunities, or leave open whatever secret negotiating channels may still exist? Will the American electorate appreciate the President's show of toughness? Will the Russians in May be the better induced to urge compromise on their Vietnamese friends? How will the American prisoners (and their kin) react to learning that Mr. Nixon has blocked indefinitely the one bridge —negotiations—by which they might cross back home? The answers are problematical. But we suspect that if the President had deliberately set out to impair the chances of his own Jan. 25 proposals, this is what he would have done. And we cannot understand why.

WASHINGTON POST 17 APRIL 1972

## Vietnam: "Getting Out" by Way of the Brink

What President Johnson and his predecessors steadfastly tried not to do over 15 years or more, President Nixon has managed to do almost overnight: he has brought the war in Indochina to the brink of a hotly confronted war with the Soviet Union by his decision to send American soldiers over the suburbs of Hanoi and the part of Vietnam and to amass an American naval armada off the North Vietnamese coast.

There does not seem to be any other way to interpret what he has done. One could understand—if not accept—the monumental air support given to the South Vietnamese during the ongoing North Vietnamese offensive of the past few weeks, and the systematic substitution of our air power for our manpower in the months before that. One could see this as having something to do with bolstering the South Vietnamese forces, and even with "saving the lives" of our remaining troops. Leaving aside the cynical euphemism of "protective reaction," there were enemy tanks to be hit, and SAM missile sites to be taken out and trucks and roads and bridges to be blown up. You could even believe, but just barely, that most of this was being carried on in remote, unpopulated areas so that civilians were pretty much out of the way of it.

But you cannot believe that anymore about a reversion to bombing tactics which plainly endanger population centers and which cannot be related in any immediate sense to the fighting now under way south of the Demilitarized Zone and in the Central Highlands and around Saigon. Nothing that is blown up in Hanoi or Halphong today is going to influence, in any direct way, the course of battle in the South for a good many months, perhaps even a year; we have ample evidence of that, out of long experience.

And you cannot seriously believe that this revival of the thumbscrew is directed at "the will of Hanoi" for we have more than enough evidence on this score, too: the thumbscrew, sometimes called "rolling thunder" (by the military) or "graduated response" (by the professors in residence in government), has never really worked. In the days of Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, it didn't persuade the North Vietnamese to "leave their neighbors alone"—if anything it stiffened them—and there is no reason to believe that the effect would be any different now. Moreover, there is nothing "graduated" about what is going on.

So you have to assume that the Russians, who are the main suppliers of the heavy weaponry now in use by the North Vietnamese, are the main object of the weeken bombing strikes around Hanoi and Halphong; that the President is reviving and applying what John Foster Dulles described as "the necessary art" and which his critics called "brinkmanship": that he is seeking to persuade the Russians to use their benefactor's influence on Hanoi either to slow down the current offensive or to promote negotiations, or both; and that he is prepared, for lack of any other leverage, to throw Soviet-American relations into the scales, to put the SALT talk and the European detente and Rus-

tions in general on the table, for the sake of salvaging whatever precisely it is that Mr. Nixon would conceive of as an "honorable" way out of the war.

There is a grim logic in this assessment. It fits the Dr. Strangelove long-standing concept about the utility of air power, particularly in Indochina; it is quite to keeping with his often expressed admiration of the way President Eisenhower supposedly achieved a Korean truce—by threatening the Chinese with nuclear attack. It accords with the Administration's own proud account of how Jordan was saved and a Middle East collocation averted—by the maneuvering of American sea power in the eastern Mediterranean. It would be, in short, almost a classic exercise in balance-of-power policies of the sort that Mr. Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger have long espoused.

In other words, it figures—which leaves you to wonder only by what set of values, or what sense of American obligations or security interests, or what reading of American sentiment, it is necessary at this stage of the game to go to the brink with the Russians over Vietnam?

We were told long ago of a plan "to end the war." Can this be it? Can the Russians, in fact, maintain their position in the world while telling their sister socialists in North Vietnam to abandon what they have been fighting for these forty years?

We were told that the South Vietnamese could "hack it by themselves." Are we now to believe that what this really means is that this country must not only continue to provide massive combat air support but also to confront the Russians with the twin threats of serial and naval blockades against North Vietnam? Is this what "Vietnamization" is all about? Or isn't the real meaning of the Hanoi-Halphong raids that "Vietnamization" doesn't work well enough to guarantee the President the kind of outcome of the current Vietnam fighting he could feel comfortable with, either in Moscow at next month's summit, or in the election campaign next fall?

This, in our view, is the rub of it—the sort of outcome the President wants and the risks that are worth taking to bring it about, for the risks involved do not seem to us to bear any relationship to the possible gains. If the President's "Vietnamization" policy is as successful as he would have us believe, we have done all that we could reasonably have been expected to do for the Saigon government and we ought to fix a date for our total military disengagement, negotiate as best we can for the return of our prisoners, and get out.

If "Vietnamization" turns out, in fact, to be less than it has been proclaimed to be, the end of it all in Vietnam may then be something well short of what we set out to accomplish, and some might even see it as "dishonorable." Against that ultimate, and still hypothetical judgment, however, you have to weigh the honor, not to say the sanity of trying to influence the outcome in Vietnam at this late date by resuming bombing in or around population centers in North Vietnam for the indirect and largely theoretical effect this may have on the actions of the North Vietnamese.

WALL STREET JOURNAL, 21 APRIL 1972

Eug

# Raids on North Vietnam Peril Nixon Stand
## Against Pullout Law, Especially in House

By NORMAN C. MILLER

The President of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON--The Nixon administration's renewed bombing of North Vietnam is threatening to destroy the White House's risky defenses against end-the-war legislation in Congress.

The new drive for legislating a Vietnam pullout deadline is most dramatically evident in the House, which has always quashed Senate withdrawal proposals in the past. While the Senate moved toward a vote on a Vietnam measure, possibly next week, the usually cautious House erupted over the newly charged war issue.

Yesterday, the House Democratic membership voted 144 to 58 to order the House Foreign Affairs Committee to produce within 30 days legislation setting some deadline for total U.S. withdrawal from the war.

Moreover, the resolution adopted by House Democrats condemns the U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong as "a dangerous escalation of our role in the Indochina war." The Democrats also approved a one-sentence condemnation of North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam, but they rejected a tougher resolution attacking Russia, for its arms-supply role, as well as Hanoi.

The Democrats' unusual directive to the Foreign Affairs Committee poses the prospect of the first full-dress House floor fight over Vietnam policy. In earlier tests, pullout proponents always were handicapped because the House was considering Senate-initiated bills under restrictive rules. Still, in the most recent House test last October, administration forces beat back a pullout deadline by only 23 votes. Gain in Strength

The overwhelming Democratic vote yesterday indicates that the opponents of the Nixon policy have gained strength since then. While a pullout bill might still be defeated in the House, to do so the White House would have to hold almost all Republicans behind the Nixon policy -and that would be difficult if current antiwar sentiment continues to boil.

The resolution by the Democratic Caucus directs the House Foreign Affairs Committee to write legislation establishing a date to "terminate all U.S. military involvement in and over Indochina," subject only to the release of U.S. prisoners and an accounting of the missing. Democrats control the House and thus have a majority of the committee. While the committee could nonetheless refuse to obey the Democratic directive, the unusual order by the partly membership is so unusually strong that the measure's backers are confident that one way or another they will be able to force a pullout bill to the floor.

The effect of such legislation, even if passed, is questionable, as it would depend on acceptance not only by the Nixon administration but by the North Vietnamese. But its passage obviously would put powerful political pressure on the administration.

The Senate, which three times has approved policy declarations calling for a Vietnam pullout, may vote as early as next week on a far tougher proposition: A cutoff of appropriations for U.S. land, sea or air forces engaged in "hostilities in Indochina" after next Dec. 31. The cutoff would be conditional on the return of American prisoners of war.

Not even the Senate has been willing to invoke the ultimate congressional weapon of closing the purse strings on the war, though the doves have tried several times. The new effort is a rider attached by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Monday to a bill authorizing funds for the State Department. The amendment, sponsored by Sens. Frank Church (N.), Idaho and Clifton Case (R., N.J.), would cancel any other law authorizing combat spending in Indochina after this year.

### Floor Vote Next Week

The State Department money bill is scheduled for floor action next week, and administration supporters will try to remove the Church-Case rider. However, the White House could decide to stall this vote in hopes the current criticism of the air action over Vietnam will subside, especially if there isn't any repeat bombing in the Hanoi area. Another reason for possible delay is the absence of Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana and Republican Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, who are in the middle of a three-week visit to China.

Another possible hitch in Senate approval of the Church-Case rider is dissatisfaction with it among some of the war critics themselves. Making the money cutoff conditional on release of the prisoners of war could indeed prevent a withdrawal, contends Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.).

The POW condition was attached to the Senate's milder policy resolution last year as a way of nullifying the administration's use of this issue as a just fication for keeping a residual U.S. force in Vietnam. Now, more antiwar Senators—including some Democratic presidential candidates—are openly suggesting North Vietnam will release the prisoners only after the American forces depart.

Sen. Jacob Javits (R., N.Y.) concurried in this view, in a Senate speech yesterday. "It is my firm conviction that there should be no preconditions attached to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam." he said. "The likelihood of getting out the prisoners is on precedent much greater on this basis."

The White House reacted angrily to the condemnation of its bombing policy by House Democrats. "Words and resolutions are very ineffective in stopping brutal armed aggression," declared Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler.

Mr. Ziegler also attacked the House Democrats for taking a "somewhat contradictory" position in condemning both U.S. and North Vietnamese military actions. "The Democrats are trying to have it both ways," he said. "In matters such as this they can't have it both ways."

Meanwhile, a group of long-time Senate and House doves joined antiwar organizers in calling for massive demonstrations on May 4 against the Nixon Vietnam policy. At a press conference, they said demonstrations are being planned in several cities.

At the same time, antiwar lobbying organizations, such as Common Cause, are beginning to organize a grassroots campaign in support of end-the-war legislation. The lobbying effort will concentrate both on the pending Senate measure and on members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee as they take up their bill.

Mr. Nixon's Brinkmanship

Eag

NYT
5/10/72

In ordering the closing of land and sea supply routes to North Vietnam by American military action, President Nixon is taking a desperate gamble that alters the entire nature of the war, that risks the fundamental security and correct interests of the United States for dubious and dangerous gains, and that runs counter both to Congressional mandate and to the will and conscience of a large segment of the American people.

The mining of the harbors of North Vietnam poses a direct challenge to the Soviet Union and other arms suppliers to Hanoi that could quite possibly escalate into a confrontation between the world's two great superpowers. Only the gravest threat to the security of the United States could justify such a challenge, as was indeed the case in the Cuban missile crisis. But Vietnam is not Cuba; and there is no conceivable American interest at stake in Indochina today as there was in Cuba to warrant the risk—and the escalation—the President has so clearly undertaken.

Let us grant that the North Vietnam Communists are infirmably—even insensibly—intransigent in the negotiations at Paris and are stubbornly egressive in the field, as indeed they are. Let us grant that the United States still has a commitment to support to the death the present Saigon Government as representative of South Vietnamese democracy—a commitment which, if it ever existed, has surely been long ago fulfilled. Let us even grant—contrary to fact—that President Nixon's Vietnamization program has been a success and that all that is needed is a little more time and a few more arms to bring Hanoi's belligerence to a halt. Granting all these hypotheses, what possible good could President Nixon's present escalation-cum-confrontation accomplish?

Even if the closing of the ports by mining and the interdiction of land routes by renewed extensive bombing should succeed in their goals without retaliation by the Soviet Union and China, the resultant cutoff in supplies could not materially affect the outcome of the present North Vietnam offensives in the South.

In any case, the bulk of North Vietnam's military supplies enter not from the sea but from China via road and rail. The entire history of deep interdiction of supply routes, from World War II to the present, demonstrates its ineffectuality. At most, therefore, Mr. Nixon's orders would simply tend to move Soviet supplies back to the Trans-China route and shift the balance of influence in Hanoi a little more toward Peking.

This semi-blockade policy is both spurious and impractical and it is difficult to understand how the President and his advisers, given the history of the war, can genuinely believe in it either. But to explain it, as the President did in his television address Monday night, as a means of protecting the American troops still remaining in Vietnam strains credibility to the breaking point. In fact, it is painfully obvious that Mr. Nixon's escalation of the conflict, including the stepped-up bombing of the North in reprisal for the Northern successes in the South, only increases the peril of American ground troops in Vietnam while obviously raising with every air raid the potential number of American prisoners held by Hanoi.

The President's risky action Monday evidently signals a decision to intensify and enlarge American military involvement in the war from sea and air, with all the attendant risks accompanying such escalation. The President is in fact leading the country down precisely the road—though by different means—that President John-

Yet like the Communists, they seem to be forgetting and ignoring and ignoring and ignoring.

Even the peace offer included in Mr. Nixon's speech has a specific ring to it. He tells Hanoi that if it agrees to an internationally supervised cease-fire and returns the American prisoners, the United States "will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina" and will be out of Vietnam "within four months." On the face of it, this sounds as though Mr. Nixon were at last cutting all ties with the Saigon Government, for there is no mention of any political condition whatsoever. But given Hanoi's present military successes, there is little incentive to North Vietnam to accept a cease-fire row, and while Mr. Nixon specifically promises American withdrawal from Vietnam within a short period, he does not promise withdrawal from the neighbouring states, leaving the implied threat of American force and American power still hanging over the peninsula.

By his rash and precipitate action, President Nixon is not only risking military confrontation with the Soviet Union over an issue that is not and never has been vital to the security interests of the United States; he is also risking the almost equally dangerous collapse of the painfully built progress toward a genuine diplomatic détente, at it is already taking form in the SALT agreements and would surely be further advanced by the now threatened Moscow summit conference.

By his action, President Nixon is also inviting Soviet retaliation, if not in East Asia, then in other sensitive parts of the globe. By his action, he is unwittingly encouraging the Soviet hawks. By his action, he is inciting the possible speedy dissolution of the thin and delicate relationship just painfully constructed with Peking. By his action as well as his rhetoric, he has dug the United States deeper into the hole from which it had for four years been trying to extricate itself in Indochina.

And by his action he has clearly defied the Congress if not the Constitution. This may turn out to be the most dangerous of all the ominous aspects of Mr. Nixon's present course. The Congress of the United States last year resolved that it was "the policy of the United States to terminate at the earliest possible date all military operations of the United States in Indochina . . ." Mr. Nixon said at the time that tre resolution was "without blinding force or effect and it does not reflect my judgment about the way in which the war should be brought to a conclusion."

But now Mr. Nixon has in effect defied the expressed will of the Congress by replying to North Vietnamese escalation with more escalation—an old, familiar and demonstrably useless course of action. His dangerous and unnecessary resort to semi-blockade and massive bombing in a futile search for military victory in an undeclared war repudiated by a large section of the American people can only weaken the country internally and discredit it abroad.

The only recourse now is in the hands of Congress. It still has the Constitutional power to curb and control the Executive. While it is an extremely distasteful action, under the circumstances Congress still can regain its along the general lines of the Church-Case amendment in the Senate. It can shut off funds for all further military operations after return of the prisoners and after a certain date, either in Indochina as a whole or, as a more limited restraint, above the North Vietnam panhandle.

Mr. Nixon is pushing the country very near to a Constitutional crisis; Congress can yet save the President from disaster.

NATION AT WAR 22 MAY 1972 (19)
The Danger of Definitions

The President and briefing by Dr Kissinger indicated the need for a critical dialogue about the war. The more one looks and hears what they have to say, the clearer it becomes that US policies are almost hopelessly enshrined in myth and illusion. From the outset, American policy in Vietnam has been based not on misconceptions or erroneous judgments but on willfully false definitions. Over a seven-year period, these definitions have been endlessly repeated and are now firmly embedded in innumerable policy statements. By dint of a bipartisan repetition at the highest levels, these definitions have, to some extent, been accepted by a large section of the public as unassailable propositions. Still worse, the decision makers are so entangled in these false assumptions that they habitually deceive themselves.

A fundamental rule in the rational handling of embittered controversies is that each party should be able to give a fair and accurate statement of the other's position. Neither the President nor Dr Kissinger is capable of such an exercise. They cannot or will not see the situation as the North Vietnamese must see it or, for that matter, as the Russians or Chinese may see it. Or if they can, they are so caught up in their own mistakes that they cannot afford to make the effort. Worse, they must cling to these accumulated false definitions in order to avoid acknowledging profound misjudgments by themselves and their predecessors. So they take new and steadily more dangerous risks in a desperate effort to redefine the situation in a way that will rally domestic opinion and shore up a disintegrating political position.

Thus the President's latest gamble is not primarily designed to "win" the war—his own actions and statements imply that it has been lost—but to make it possible for him to journey to Moscow without the stigma of defeat. It would be difficult to negotiate with the Russians about anything just when, say, the North Vietnamese were entering Hue. At the same time he assumes that he can count, at least temporarily, on a section of the public rallying "in support of this President," as it usually does in a time of national crisis. So he is willing to accept the risks because, as he sees it, he has run out of options. But what if the Russians elect not to stage a direct confrontation? What will the next escalation be? A landing of some kind in the North? A threat to use nuclear weapons (as Dulles once threatened the Chinese through the Indian ambassador?) Or the actual use of tactical nuclear weapons?

Bemused by 19th-century notions of power, Kissinger believes that if preponderant power is escalated, a step at a time, and if the "carrot" is seemingly sweetened a bit at each escalation, the enemy must eventually do the bidding of those who turn the screws. It was Metternich's

Rice Strategy Newsletter that the British were reading in the plantation in Lister in 1606. But the trouble in the plantations in Lister is that the British have not yet ended nor will it until the British out-deceiving themselves about the Irish General de Gaulle tried to hammer this point home to President Kennedy about Vietnam but without success. In *Memorials of Hope*, he quotes himself as having said to Kennedy: "You will find that intervention in this area will be an endless entanglement. Once a nation has been aroused, no foreign power, however strong, can impose its will upon it."

Kissinger's strategy of escalation also assumes that the way to win in the nuclear poker game is to raise the ante, at the right time, in such a way as to force the opponent to make the hard decision of acquiescing in the ultimatum (the bid for power) or of staging a counter-escalation. But suppose the other party elects to do nothing for the time being? Suppose the Russians and the Chinese believe (and in this they would be supported by CIA and other "evaluations") that mining the harbors of North Vietnam and bombing the rail links to China will be as ineffective as Vietnamization in solving America's dilemma? No one pretends that the recent actions can have any short-term effect on the war, and substantial expert opinion on logistics believes that the long-term effect will also fall short of the goal. Mr. Nixon, then, will have "spent" one of his few remaining options to no avail, and will be faced with the need to employ some still more dangerous escalation. It is a progress from unjustified aggression to complete outlawry.

There were, to be sure, some new elements in the offer which the President tried to bury beneath the bluster and arrogance of his address, but the North Vietnamese are not likely to take the bait. So then what? He could try to take the entire issue to the Security Council, but he won't. There is, of course, the possibility of a coup in Saigon. Thieu's declaration of martial law is evidence that he senses the danger. If the present regime were toosed out, the successor regime would not need to be called a "coalition" government even if it were that in fact.

In the meantime, the war continues, the number of POWs increasing, the destruction is mounting and so are the casualties, and Nixon's Vietnamization policy is in tailers. Why, then, doesn't the President show real concern for the American honor about which he talks so much? Why doesn't he follow the examples of Mendes-France and de Gaulle, who saved French honor by bowing out of Indochina and Algiers? The answer, in brief, is that they were not self-deceived, whereas the President has so entrapped himself in a weight of dogmas, promises, affirmations, threats, declarations and false definitions that he is incapable—psychologically, morally, intellectually, politically—of facing the reality of defeat.

[LC]

THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV 7:00 AM

June 8, 1972

An Interview with Senator McGovern

BILL MONROE: ...Senator, you have talked about going to Hanoi or to Paris, if necessary, to try to wrap up an agreement to end the Vietnam war and bring the prisoners home. And you have said you have no doubt that you can accomplish such a negotiation.

Now, this suggests that you're going to offer Hanoi something President NIXON is not offering Hanoi. What would that be?

SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN: I would offer them two things that I think are essential to bring about the release of our prisoners and to end the war. Number one, I've felt for months that we're going to have to set a definite deadline for ending all American military operations. And I think that has to be announced in advance. I don't think they're going to negotiate that point. We'll just have to say that within ninety days, or some such period of time, all operations will be ended.

The second thing we're going to have to agree to is that we will cut off any further foreign military aid to the government in Saigon, the THIEU regime.

Now, I would be willing to make those two concessions in advance, with the understanding that if we carried out our part of the bargain our prisoners would be released, our missing in action men would be accounted for, and our troops would be permitted to withdraw in safety. And I don't have the slightest doubt that that can be negotiated.

The trouble with our present policy is that while we continue the bombing and continue the military presence in Southeast Asia, the other

I am going to make these two concessions. I think the most important one is that we stop all of passive aerial attacks. They're holding on to the situation currently to -- as a protection to them against that...

FRANK MCGEE: Senator McGoern, you say you would make these concessions in advance and then negotiate the release of the prisoners. If you made the concessions in advance, with what would you be left to negotiate?

SENATOR McGOVERN: Well, I would make clear, Mr. McGee, that the reason for setting the timetable for our withdrawal and the reason for our pledge to cut off aid to the THIEU government was with the understanding that our prisoners would be released, as prisoners always have been at the end of a conflict.

Now, we have to keep in mind that the other side has no selfish interest at all in holding those prisoners once we've agreed to get out and once we've cut off aid to the THIEU regime in Saigon. But as long as we continue our military presence there, I'm convinced the prisoners will stay in their cells.

We know the present course isn't working. So let's make these two concessions that are in our interest anyway, which is to get out and which is to terminate any further military involvement with the THIEU regime, and then take whatever steps we can to see that our prisoners are released.

I am convinced that I could accomplish this whole matter within ninety days of becoming President of the United States...

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

[L0]

WASHINGTON POST 13 JULY 1972 P14

# McGovern Changes On Asia Withdrawal

The day before the 1972 Democratic presidential nomination, Sen. George McGovern substantially moderated his position on withdrawing all American forces from Southeast Asia, saying he would "retain the military capability in the region" to assure the return of all U.S. prisoners of war.

In a statement in response to an endorsement by a group of relatives of American prisoners, McGovern pledged that he would "never abandon those men."

He said: "I intend to use every resource available to the President, including direct personal diplomacy in Hanoi, to insist upon release of all prisoners and a complete, impartial accounting for all missing in action."

Then he added: "While I am fully confident that there would be no such need, I would also retain the military capability in the region—in Thailand and on the seas—to signal and fulfill our firm determination on this issue."

Previously McGovern had said: "I don't think there's a chance in the world of getting those prisoners out of there until hostilities end and we get those troops out of there."

In his Tuesday statement he said the prisoner issue "is the only cause for which I would retain any U.S. forces in or adjacent to Southeast Asia." But he reiterated his position that the prisoners "will not be brought home by more American blood, by more American treasure, or by more American bombs raining on the people of Asia.

"Their only hope is peace," he said.

McGovern said that if he were elected President, "we would be out of the brutal war in Vietnam in 90 days. There would be no forces on the ground in Vietnam, and there would be no American aircraft bombing anywhere in Asia on behalf of the Thieu government."

He said: "We must take the keys to those POWs, prison cells away from General Thieu and place them in American hands."

McGovern said the POWs "can be returned within 90 days of a single decision— that their freedom, and not the political survival of a corrupt dictatorship in Sa

con. is our first and only priority in Southeast Asia."

McGovern's nomination was seconded last night by Valerie Kushner, the wife of Maj. Floyd H. Kushner, who has been a prisoner of war since November, 1967.

The Democratic Party platform adopted Tuesday states that, "We must insist that any resolution of the war include the return of all prisoners held by North Vietnam and other adversary forces and the fullest possible accounting for the missing. With increasing lack of credibility, the Nixon administration has sought to use the prisoners of war as an excuse for its policies."

The platform pledged, "as the first order of business, an immediate and complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces in Indochina."

In testimony before the foreign policy panel of the Democratic Platform Committee, Prof. Abram Chayes, a McGovern foreign policy adviser, said that, "Sen. McGovern has said that if elected he will, on inauguration day, order an end to all armed action by U.S. forces in Indochina, except in self-defense if fired upon. He would withdraw all such forces, lock, stock and barrel, within 90 days thereafter."

Chayes said: "When the war is over there will be no need and no purpose for the North Vietnamese to hold them (the POWs)...That is the way it has always happened after past wars. That is the way it will happen this time."

McGovern also threw his support behind an amendment to the proposed platform sponsored by Sen. Henry Scoop Jackson of Washington, strengthening the plank on support for Israel. The revised plank, adopted by a voice vote of the convention during the early hours yesterday, states that the next Democratic administration should "maintain a political commitment and a military force in Europe and at sea in the Mediterranean ample to deter the Soviet Union from putting unbearable pressure on Israel."

McGovern has not altered his position that American forces in Europe should be reduced from 310,000 to 130,000 troops.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 22 JULY 1972

[20]

# Church: Hanoi will get its own terms

7/22/72

By Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of TCSM

Washington

While White House officials are alternately hopeful and discouraged over Vietnam peace prospects, a leading Democratic dove says that Mr. Nixon "has come to the end of his rope."

"If a settlement is possible at all," says Idaho Sen. Frank Church - who has been mentioned by Senator McGovern as a potential secretary of state - "it will have to be made on Hanoi's terms."

"Now it can be camouflaged to look like an acceptable arrangement. But I don't think Hanoi will back down on any of its basic demands."

He was referring to the possibility of some kind of interim cease-fire in South Vietnam in exchange for ending the U.S. bombing of the North.

The Idaho Senator was questioned on Vietnam in an interview as the Senate grappled with the Mansfield end-of-the-war resolution and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger kept his bags packed for further secret talks with the Hanoi delegation at Paris.

This central sticking point in Paris and in the debate in this country has not changed over the past two years, U.S. officials

acknowledge. How much further support should the United States give the SAIGON GOVERNMENT BEFORE IT IS LEFT TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH Hanoi?

The heavy air support that was dispatched to rescue the South Vietnamese from the North Vietnamese offensive indicates, according to the doves, that the Nixon program of Vietnamization is not working even at this late date.

Secretary Melvin R. Laird and others, however, praise the South Vietnamese Air Force, point to the disruption of North Vietnam inflicted by U.S. bombers, and say these are the realities Hanoi must deal with.

It has been axiomatic among Democrats that Mr. Nixon needs peace in Vietnam to be re-elected. Statements by Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger that the U.S. would now negotiate its "already generous" peace package still further have tended to confirm this.

A converse theory has gained more believers here since the Democratic Party splintered itself at Miami Beach. It is that Mr. Nixon now doesn't need a Vietnam peace to smash the McGovern candidacy.

## Indefinite holdout seen

Thus, it is argued, he can hold out for his terms indefinitely. The administration is passing the word to its newspaper columnist supporters that the Soviet Union and China have already concluded that Mr. Nixon will be re-elected and are advising Hanoi to make the best of this before the election.

In these moments of uncertainty on the President's ultimate decision, the tide of public opinion is being watched closely

The television networks show films of destruction of civilian targets and a Swedish narrator says some legitimate military targets nearby were untouched. If this is so in a few instances, it is accidental, administration officials say.

The Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary-general of the World Council of Churches, believes U.S. planes are deliberately bombing kikes in North Vietnam.

According to Dr. Blake, he requested a meeting in April with President Nixon on behalf of a group of American church figures to "discuss the moral issues involved in the Vietnam war.

"As of today," he complained in a letter to Mr. Nixon, "There is no indication of your willingness to discuss these matters with the ecumenical leaders of your own country."

## 'Ought to have withdrawn'

Senator Church says he is convinced that "this bombing, despite the devastation, has really unified the North Vietnamese. . . . All

that's left is to level Hanoi. . . . I think they can absorb the last and final punishment we can give out."

In the Senator's opinion, "We could not honorably agree to the political conditions laid down by Hanoi. Therefore we ought to have withdrawn our own forces, inasmuch as we have fully armed and equipped the South Vietnamese to defend themselves."

"Had we done that, then the Vietnamese themselves would either have fought the war to a finish one way or the other, or would have found a basis for compromising the struggle. It would not have been one involving the United States or one that forces the United States to displace the very government we have undertaken for so long to sustain in power and for which we have sacrificed so much."

## What chance to succeed?

What assurance is there that the Church-McGovern plan for ending the war will be any more successful than that of Mr. Nixon, the Senator was asked.

"One thing that should be clear by now is that the strategy of retaining American forces in South Vietnam and continuing to participate in the war has not succeeded in releasing the prisoners," he replied.

"I think, and I've thought all along, that North Vietnam will never be willing to give up our prisoners until we are willing to give up the war."

"Hanoi then would have no further reason for keeping them once we have stopped bombing the North and once we have withdrawn the balance of our forces from the South. This has been the case in the past. It was true with the French. It was our experience in Korea.

## What basis for expectation?

Is there anything in the record of North Vietnam that can be pointed to which demonstrates that Hanoi would do as the doves say they would?

"I should think the evidence is there only in a negative way. Time and time again they have said the prisoners won't be released until the United States ends its participation in the war."

Administration spokesmen have said they, too, would be willing to settle for a military solution - that is, one that leaves a political settlement up to Saigon and Hanoi. But, they insist, Hanoi balks.

The counter to this by the doves is that the Nixon administration would continue aid to the Saigon government, whereas the Democrats would cut it off. This, the doves say, would be sufficient concession to Hanoi and Hanoi would not expect the U.S. to get involved in forming a coalition government.

3 AUG. 1972 P-1

(L/C)

# New Vote Sets GI ullout

## Senate, 50-47, Puts 4-Month Limit on Funds

In a new rebuff to President Nixon on his Vietnam policy, the Senate voted 50 to 47 yesterday to force total U.S. military withdrawal from all of Indochina in four months, provided North Vietnam releases U.S. prisoners of war within that period.

It was the second time in two weeks that the Senate has voted to cut off funds for U.S. military operations in Indochina within four months, subject to prisoner release. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, the same amendment signed to the foreign military aid authorization week ago Monday on a 49 to 46 vote, but the Senate then killed the said bill.

Yesterday; however, the amendment, sponsored by Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.) and backed by 10 other Republicans and 39 Democrats, was added to the $20.6 billion defense procurement authorization bill, and the bill was then passed, 92 to 5. The procurement measure, unlike foreign aid, is considered absolutely necessary to U.S. security even by most critics of the war.

The bill now goes to conference with the House, which doesn't have a similar antiwar provision. The administration hopes to kill the amendment in conference.

Administration supporters like Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) argued that by setting a fixed withdrawal date without requiring North Vietnam to agree to a cease-fire as a prior condition, the amendment would cripple the President's efforts to negotiate an able peace that could South Vietnam with some hope of survival.

"It's ridiculous to try to carve into hard law" a specific date for withdrawal and instructions to the President

to the purpose of withdrawal, said Stennis.

"That might be a good regulation for a schoolchild, but the idea of putting the President of the United States under restrictions like this he's not permitted to be Chief Executive . . . why they'd laugh at him, they'd laugh at him."

"Binding the hands of the President—if we're going to do that, I think we ought to send up the white flag." Stennis thundered.

Brooke, Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), Jacob K. Javitz (R-N.Y.) and other supporters of the fund cutoff argued that the time had come, once and for all, to put an end to the war subject only to release of U.S. prisoners. They said this should be done without waiting until the future of South Vietnam as a non-Communist power had been made certain, regardless of how long this would take.

"If we don't bite the bullet, if we keep hoping for negotiation, we might be there not four months more, but a year or two more," said Brooke.

Cranston argued that the preconditions of withdrawal demanded by the President—release of prisoners and an Indochina-wide cease-fire—were simply a formula for endless U.S. involvement, since the South Vietnamese could veto the cease-fire. Others argued that the all-Indochina cease-fire requirement implied a demand that North Vietnam guarantee the non-Communist future of South Vietnam, and meant endless war.

Seeking to reassure Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), who feared the language of the Brooke amendment might not contain guarantees strong enough to require release of U.S. prisoners, Brooke said, "before he withdraws all our forces (under his amendment), they must return the prisoners of war."

Cranston gave this interpretation. "It is my understanding that if we don't get all the way out . . . we retain the right to use land, sea and air forces, until the last prisoner is out. If there's no release (of prisoners), we don't necessarily apply" the withdrawal requirement for U.S. forces.

Final passage of the Brooke amendment and the bill came in a series of 12 successive roll-call votes which took more than two hours. With Vice President Agnew in the chair, administration forces—knowing they were a few votes short—forced one roll-call vote after another 'in an attempt to reverse the outcome, perhaps by delaying the final vote so long that some senators favoring the Brooke amendment would leave for out-of town engagements, a

But the blue favoring the amendment held firm on one procedural roll-call vote after another.

The first vote on the war issue came on an amendment by Sen. George D. Aiken (R-VI), which, in effect, killed strong Vietnam fund-cutoff language being proposed by Cranston and substituted an endorsement of President Nixon's demand for prior release of all U.S. prisoners of war and for an Indochina-wide internationally supervised cease-fire before the United States withdraws.

This carried, 50 to 47, since many middle-of-the-road senators considered the Cranston language simply too tough in requiring withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam by Oct. 1, without preconceptions.

However, the Senate next took up the Brooke proposal—a more moderate amendment than Cranston's, but far stronger than Aiken's in the demands it placed on the President to withdraw.

This carried, 49 to 47, in the first crucial roll-call, with 11 Republicans favoring it while 14 Democrats (virtually all Southerners) opposed it.

This vote wiped out the earlier Aiken language. On this vote and all the others, Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) and William B. Spong (D-Va.) voted to back the Brooke amendment, while Harry Flood Byrd Jr. (Ind.-Va.) and J. Gleon Beall (R-Md.) voted to oppose it.

Administration forces then began their series of procedural moves to reverse the 49- to 47 decision. They lost them all by margins of two and three votes.

Brooke forces then mopped up by tabling (killing), 59 to 38, a Dole amendment that Congress "assumes responsibility" for the consequences of passage of the Brooke language.

Just before final passage, the Senate accepted, 95 to 2, an amendment by Jack Miller (R-Iowa) adding the requirement that North Vietnam account for U.S. men missing in action, as well as release prisoners of war, as a pre-condition of U.S. withdrawal from Indochina.

The final vote on the Brooke amendment was 50 to 47. It would have been 49 to 48 had Sen. James B. Allen (D-Ala.), opposing the amendment, switched his vote to "yes" in order to be eligible to move for reconsideration.

Despite heavy pressure from the administration, none of the Republicans who supported the fund cutoff last week switched their votes.

"Funds authorized or appropriated, by this or any other act for United States forces with respect to military actions in Indochina may be used only for the purpose of withdrawing all United States ground, naval and air forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and protecting such forces as they are withdrawn. The withdrawal of all United States forces from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia shall be carried out within four months after the date of enactment of this act; provided that there is a release within the four-month period of all American prisoners of war held by the government of North Vietnam and all forces allied with such government."

The Senate bill authorizes $20.6 billion in Fiscal 1973 for weapons procurement. The administration asked $23.3 billion, and the House voted $20.6 billion. Total Defense Department appropriations, for which the Nixon administration has requested $86 billion, will be voted separately. The $86 billion includes pay, food, equipment and benefits for the armed forces, as well as weapons.

The Senate bill also includes an unlimited authorization for arms credits for Israel through the end of 1973; authority for a one-time recompensation of military retirement pay for persons who retired before Jan. 1, 1972; a requirement that the Defense Department notify all subjects being used for medical experiments of any danger to their health; and a ban on deliberate attempts to start fires and alter the weather as methods of warfare.

All these provisions were added by Senate floor amendments and aren't in the House bill.

Major provisions of the Senate bill provide the full $444.5 million sought for the B-1 bomber, virtually the full amount sought for the Trident submarine-fired missile system ($906.4 million in the Senate bill), the full $299 million sought for the fourth nuclear-powered carrier, $732 million for the F-14 navy fighter (procurement of 48 is called for), and $171.4 million for the SAM-D missile. All these provisions are the same as the administration asked and the House approved.

The Senate bill, however, contains only $561 million for the anti-ballistic missile system and limits it to one site, the one already being built at Grand Forks, N.D. It bars a start on a second ABM site in the Washington area. The House granted the administration's request for $800 million for both sites.

# The Brooke Amendment: A Potential Nixon Boon

For the second time in a week, a working majority of 50 senators, including 31 Republicans, has amended a bill in such a way to require a cutoff of funds for American war activities in Indochina in four months—if Hanoi returns the prisoners. Since Mr. Nixon wants not only to relieve the prisoners but to bring about a certain political result in South Vietnam, he remains adamantly opposed to this second amendment sponsored by Republican Edward Brooke. Speaking for Mr. Nixon, Senator Stennis argued that the amendment would bind the President's hands. This, of course was exactly what the Senate majority wanted to do. It had evidently lost confidence that the President, if left to pursue his own policy, would soon enough end American participation in the war. The Senate majority was also well aware that its conditional four-month deadline — conditional on prisoner return—is slacker than the now three-month deadline the President set for himself by in effect pledging to end the war by election day.

To be sure, the Brooke amendment is still a long way from becoming law. Last week it was attached to the military aid bill; Mr. Nixon showed his distaste for any war-policy restriction—and, incidentally, his concern for supposedly crucial military aid—by having his Senate lieutenants join with aid's regular foes to kill the bill. But now the Brooke amendment is on the $20.5 billion military procurement bill, which few think the President would kill or veto. Since procurement goes to a conference of the two armed services committees, both generally respectful of White House prerogatives, the bill they report out is unlikely to include the restrictive amendment. But would the Senate then accept the report? The Senate has the further option of attaching the Brooke amendment to the foreign aid bill when it comes out of the House; foreign aid is handled by the two foreign affairs committees and even the House committee now wants to use legislation as leverage on the war. Just how the battle over the Brooke amendment will end is uncertain. That it will rage right up to November 7—unless Mr. Nixon has managed to reach a negotiated settlement before then—seems virtually assured.

As we have noted previously, the Brooke amendment, even if enacted into law and implemented by the President, would not of itself end the American role in the war in Vietnam. Any policy demanding the release of prisoners before the hars of hostilities assures that the Initiative will remain in Hanoi: Hanoi holds the prisoners and, alone, decides whether to let them go. It has not long since so far we point out, not only against a bombing halt and total troop withdrawal but as trading bait in its negotiations for a wide political opening for its comrades in Saigon.

Close readers of this page know that we had some reservations about both the proprie and effectiveness of Congress jumping in, after years of permissive support of White House policy in Vietnam, and issuing legislative orders which effect would be to undercut President Nixon's efforts to reach a settlement. Now that the Senate has gone ahead and taken this leap, however, it seems to us right to acknowledge that the stance of the Brooke amendment does in fact off an opportunity to end the struggle between the President and the Congress. For its language provides a broader basis than any other in sight on which different branches of the American government and different segments of American opinion can unite on a common route out of the war. There is possibility is open now that it has been fully proven to practically everyone but Mr. Nixon and supporters on this matter—that the United States has done all it could reasonably and honorably be expected to do for the cause of South Vietnam.

For a President who campaigned in 1968 or promise to end the war, who entered the White House with a pledge to bring the American people together, and who faces strong opposition to his Vietnam policy in his re-election campaign in 1972, the Brooke amendment or so variation on it would seem to constitute a potent boon. The Congress, as we say, assumes serious political and even moral risks by leveling an election eve war-policy challenge at a President who has a secret negotiation with the enemy in mind. For his part the President must weigh the political and moral risks of his own.

WASHINGTON POST

17 AUG 1972 Pgl 1

Hanoi Spurns
McGovern's
POW Plea

By William Greider

SPRINGFIELD, Ill. Aug. 16 — Sen. George McGovern sent a personal emissary to ask the North Vietnamese to release American prisoners of war before the November election, but Hanoi turned down his down.

McGovern's communication was through Pierre Salinger, press secretary to the late President John F. Kennedy and a McGovern campaign aide. Salinger said today that he met with North Vietnamese officials in Paris twice in the last month, asking about the possibility of an early release of prisoners before the war is over.

Salinger said he also advised the North Vietnamese that McGovern wants a quick settlement to the war, even if that means a Nixon peace agreement which would wipe out the war in Vietnam as a political issue in the fall campaign.

McGovern, campaigning today in Illinois, acknowledged the efforts and said:

"Anything I can possibly do to secure the release of those prisoners, I'm going to do."

His campaign political director, Frank Mankiewicz said the prisoner return, if successfully engineered, "might have taken the issue out of the campaign—defused it."

Mankiewicz added: "It was worth asking. I don't know how much hope there ever was."

These developments came to light today in a somewhat tangled manner in which McGovern at first seemed to deny any connection with Salinger's conversations in Paris then later in the day announced that he had requested the inquiry.

It began with a United Press International dispatch from Paris which quoted unidentified "friends of the McGovern campaign." The story said Salinger had called on the North Vietnamese delegation to urge a peace settlement with the Nixon administration and to warn them not to delay until after the election.

When reporters confronted McGovern in the lobby of the St. Nicholas Hotel here with questions about that report, McGovern said he gave no such instructions to Salinger.

"I know nothing of any such report," McGovern said. "There's no truth in it at all."

The Democratic presidential candidate recalled that Salinger told him he was traveling to Paris after the Democratic National Convention and said, "He might make some inquiries about the status of negotiations and I told him I would be interested in talking to him when he returned." But McGovern said there had been "no instructions whatsoever."

A few hours later after a phone conversation with Salinger who was back in New York, McGovern issued this statement about the trip to Paris:

"At my request he met with members of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. The only purpose of the discussion was to determine if any change had occurred which would permit the return of the prisoners prior to the end of hostility.

"Mr. Salinger found no change in the publicly stated position of Hanoi. Mr. Salinger also made clear that I have repeatedly stated my conviction that the end of the war should not be delayed by a single day because of the American election campaign."

Confronted later again by reporters, McGovern insisted there was no inconsistency in his two public statements.

As Salinger reconstructed the events, McGovern called

him the day after the Democratic convention and asked me if I would make contact with the North Vietnamese delegation on one point only — if there was any chance of releasing prisoners and if there was any change in their position on the prisoners and anything that would induce them to change.

He met with two members of the delegation staff in Paris on July 18 and put the question to them. They told me they would get answers for them," he said. That was the day before White House foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger met in Paris with Le Due Tho of North Vietnam, a meeting which Salinger was told about.

Salinger said that in inquiries about the prisoners he also stated to the Vietnamese: "What has been Sen. McGovern's public position—that I desire to end the war, greater than his desire to see the war remain as a political issue and therefore, if they felt they could make peace, they should not delay."

Two and a half weeks later, the delegation staff called him and they met again on Aug. 9.

They told me the word from Hanoi was that there was no change on the POW's and the prisoners will not be released until hostilities are ended," Salinger said.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

6 April 1973 (17)

# The Illegal War In Cambodia

By ordering the continuous heavy bombing of Cambodia in support of the Lon Nol government, President Nixon has shown disdain for the Constitution, which confers on Congress the power to declare war, and for laws of the United States, through which Congress in several instances has withdrawn its legislative authority for continued military operations in Indochina, including Cambodia.

The extent of Mr. Nixon's contempt for the law and for the legislative branch of the Government is underscored by his failure to even report to Congress on his actions in Cambodia, to say nothing of explaining and legally justifying them. He has left that task to unofficial spokesmen in the Senate and in the State and Defense departments. And they have fallen back upon the flimsiest imaginable arguments.

Listing them in descending order of importance, the arguments are that the President, under his powers to conduct foreign policy and to command the armed forces, has the authority to enforce the settlement of the Indochina war; that a Circuit Court of Appeals, in Orlando vs. Laird, upheld the legality of the Indochina war by noting congressional appropriations and other acts supporting the conflict; that U.S. help has been requested by Lon Nol; and finally that the President is justified merely by the fact of his re-election.

None of these arguments can be sustained in even the most tenuous way on the basis of the record of what has happened. Cambodia was not a party to the Paris agreements ending the war, nor do these accords specify any Cambodian cease-fire deadline or Cambodian political settlement. Nor, as Senator Eagleton has pointed out, do the Paris accords contain any enforcement machinery with respect to Cambodia, as they do for Vietnam — although the accords expressed the vague objective of ending military activities there.

As for the Orlando decision, it came before the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was the original congressional act cited in support of the Vietnam war. Since that time

Congress has enacted the Cooper-Church amendment, which specified that no funds could be expended to conduct combat activity in the air over Cambodia and the Javits amendment, which stipulated that aid extended to Cambodia should not be construed as a U.S. commitment to defend that country. Nor can the U.S. be said to have any treaty commitment to defend Cambodia. In fact, Lon Nol explicitly rejected the SEATO pact, which itself is of dubious applicability to Cambodia, a country that Mr. Nixon originally invaded without legal authority.

With the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Vietnam and the return to all U.S. prisoners, the President lost the last vestige of legal authority to conduct military operations in Cambodia — the 1971 Mansfield amendment having proclaimed the "policy of the United States" to be the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from Indochina "at a date certain," contingent only on the release of American prisoners.

Leaving even the pretext of a need to protect American forces or lives or property, Mr. Nixon has no justification for invoking his power as commander in chief; confronted with specific withdrawals of congressional authorizations for continued military operations in Indochina, he can hardly claim the authority to carry on a war merely on the basis of his power to conduct foreign policy.

As a means of stopping what he deems to be the unconstitutional and illegal air operations in Cambodia, Senator Eagleton is backing, for the short term, new legislation to prohibit military activity in Indochina and, for the long term, a war powers act which would limit the President's war-making powers. These are laudable objectives. But against a President who has already usurped the congressional power to make war and who terms ready unilaterally to enforce (with bombs) peace on terms which he alone has assumed the power to interpret, legislation may be of no avail. Public protest, when new U.S. casualties begin, may be the only message which Mr. Nixon understands.

DES INDIRES REGISTER

4 APRIL 1973(17)

Threatening North Vietnam:

Defense Secretary Elton Richardson's statement that renewed U.S. mining of North Vietnam and mining of Haiphong harbor are "among the kinds of things that could be done" if President Nixon decides North Vietnam isn't living up to the peace agreement was meant to frighten North Vietnam. It should frighten a lot of Americans, too.

President Nixon has made the same threat, in less explicit form, over and over. He also said recently that North Vietnam is not keeping the peace agreement. He is in danger of locking himself into a situation from which it will be difficult to escape. Threats of war are always dangerous for a government leader.

The peace agreement is not being well kept, by either side. The United States has done better by it than either the Saigon government of South Vietnam or the Viet Cong or North Vietnam. But North Vietnam accuses the United States of serious violations.

One violation by the United States is turning over bases in South Vietnam to the Saigon government when the agreement calls for "dismantlement" and removal of all "armaments, munitions, and war materiel." The United States has taken home the equipment it wanted, but it did leave the rest in usable shape, and it rushed great quantities of planes, tanks and supplies to the Saigon government in the months before the agreement was signed.

Another violation charged against the United States is its official statements that it continues to recognize the Saigon government as the only legal government in South Vietnam. North Vietnam's view is that the peace agreement gives the Viet Cong "Provisional Revolutionary Government of South, Vietnam" equal status in areas it controls. This is an arguable point, and a subtle one. But the text of the agreement has a good deal of support for the North Vietnamese position.

The biggest violation of the peace agreement lies in the continued fighting. The cease-fire has not become effective. Both sides blame the other for that. The United States claims an alibi—its troops are not there. North Vietnam blames it anyway, for encouraging or permitting the Saigon government to fight on.

It would be a grave mistake for the United States to decide the peace violations by the other side were intolerable and jump back into combat again, after four years of step-by-step extrication. The peace agreement is hard to make work at best, and it is full of ambiguities and double standards. But one thing

about it is clear, and in line with the deepest feelings of the people of the United States. The agreement calls for the United States to get out and stay out, and leave the Vietnamese to settle the future of Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES - 20 APRIL 1973

Bombing for Peace?

United States bombers rain death on Cambodia, South Vietnamese troops sally across the Cambodian border, American bombers strike intermittently in Laos — it has all the aspect of the runup of a bad movie.

And yet, thus far the American public seems largely unconcerned about this repetition of the sordid history of United States escalation in Indochina. "How short our memories! How still our voices!" laments Senator Eagleton. Is it possible that Americans have forgotten so soon the sour lessons of the past decade? Can it be that public opinion is genuinely immobilized by what Mr. Eagleton has suggested may be "a stupifying cynicism about the whole governmental process."

Few Americans today would knowingly advocate heavy involvement in Indochina. Yet, for the time being at least, many appear content to accept the argument of Administration spokesmen that the intense bombing in Cambodia and Laos is merely designed to stabilize the tenuous peace of Paris. This may be a dangerous delusion. Bombing cannot solve the complex political problems left unresolved in the Paris agreements. The indiscriminate use of United States air power in Cambodia, according to Western diplomatic observers, has only increased the alienation of the people from the unpopular American-backed regime in Phnom Penh, which has just undergone a face-lifting that appears largely cosmetic. Bombing cannot bring peace, nor does it reflect honor on the United States when a foreign diplomat is moved to observe that "the Americans are throwing air support around like a mad woman."

The most disturbing aspect of the continuing bombing in Cambodia and the renewed if spasmodic bombing in Laos is the Administration's underlying assumption that it has the power and authority to enforce an American peace throughout Indochina, without regard to the will of the peoples there, to constitutional processes at home, or to public opinion abroad. This was the fundamental error that led earlier Administrations into the Indochina quagmire in the first place.

It is one thing to try to hold the Communists to their side of the January agreement through use of what Secretary of State William P. Rogers has described as "dipomatic devices"—a category in which he includes the withholding of promised economic aid from North Vietnam and even the suspension of mine-sweeping operations in North Vietnamese waters. But to go beyond such devices into arbitrary Presidential use of American air power to try to enforce the peace could lead this country inexorably back into Vietnam, where the Paris accords are also crumbling.

"Legislation" proposed by Senators Church, Democrat, of Idaho, and Case, Republican, of New Jersey, which would bar re-introduction of United States military forces in or over any part of Indochina without express Congressional consent, is an appropriate vehicle to compe! the President—and the public and Congress—to think twice before risking full-scale repetition of the costly

CLC

WASHINGTON — In the spring of 1970 President Nixon provoked what he later was to describe as "an unprecedented barrage of criticism" by, sending American troops into Cambodia. The stated purpose was to clear out North Vietnamese sanctuaries in that presumably neutral country and eliminate a military threat on South Vietnam's western flank.

Last week Cambodia was back as a potential crisis for Mr. Nixon's Indo-china strategy.

The military situation in Cambodia has deteriorated dramatically in the past month. American officials last week used words like "serious" and "grave" to describe the outlook for the American-equipped forces of President Lon Nol. As though scenting a possible change in his fortunes, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, whose longquistalist reign in Cambodia ended with the Lon Nol military coup of 1970, turned up last week in Hanof and according to a French news agency report from that capital—confided to a diplomat there that he had just spent a month with "his forces" in Cambodia. The Prince, who lives in Peking, claims political leadership of the "patriotic" indigenous insurgent groups in Cambodia.

Whatever the merits of his claim— and officials in Phnom Penh expressed doubt that he had really visited Cambodia—it underscored one important change in the situation. In 1970 the military threat to the Lon Nol Government came from regular North Vietnamese units in Cambodia. Today the Government forces are plied against primarily Cambodian insurgent forces fighting under several pro-Communist banners. For all their numerical superiority and the hundreds of millions of dollars of American military equipment, Cambodian Government troops are performing poorly. The main reason for that, in the view of American officials, is lack of will and leadership.

The insurgents have put a stranglehold on Phnom Penh, cutting off all roads as well as the crucial Mekong River route into the Cambodian capital. Defense Secretary Elliot L. Richardson said last week the situation could become serious enough to force the United States to consider mounting an airlift of supplies and military equipment into the city.

One problem for Mr. Nixon is that he has seemed to make Cambodia a test of his policies and prestige. In 1971 he described Cambodia as "the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form." That is so, he explained, "because in Cambodia what we are doing is helping the Cambodians to help themselves . . . rather than to go in and so the fighting ourselves."

In some ways, of course, the United States has been fighting in Cambodia ever since the 1970 "incursion"— though not with troops but with air power, as contemplated under the Nixon Doctrine. This bombing has intensified in the past month. About 60 B-52's and 150 fighter-bombers are now operating daily over Cambodia, striking at insurgent positions in an attempt to reopen the supply lines to Phnom Penh. Yet there are political, legislative and perhaps constitutional restraints on how much deeper the

Congress in 1970 imposed a prohibition on the reintroduction of American ground troops into Cambodia. Questions are being raised on Capitol Hill as to the President's authority to undertake any further military action in Cambodia—even if only air action—now that all American troops have been withdrawn from Vietnam. The general justification offered by Mr. Richardson is that the President's authority rests on his power to clean up a "lingering corner" of the war.

More critical, in practical terms, is the policy question — Is the Nixon Administration prepared to tolerate the collapse of the Lon Nol Government before the Communist-led insurgency? The Nixon Administration has

the defense of the Cambodian Government. That policy, in fact, was spelled out in the Congressional mandate of military aid to the Lon Nol regime. The Administration says the current bombing is meant to force the Communists into accepting a Cambodian cease-fire.

But the rationale for the bombing could change if the military situation continues to worsen. Mr. Richardson, who at one point referred to Cambodia as an "ally," appears to be resurrecting the argument that if Cambodia fell it would endanger South Vietnam. The concern in some Congressional quarters is that the Administration may be dragged by events—and its own actions and rhetoric—into a mili-

NEW YORK TIMES & APR(9)

# A New Test In Cambodia

LCJ

ATLANTA JOURNAL - 9 April 1973 (22)

# Is Cambodia to be our next Vietnam?

IN THE congressional debate now beginning over the bombing of Cambodia, and indeed over the possibility of future military operations anywhere in Indochina, the key question has been posed by New York's Senator Javits. "The issue," he said, "is not whether it is in the American interest that the bombing in aid of the central government's forces in Cambodia is substantively desirable, but rather who is to determine that fact for the United States." The answer that Senator Javits and many other concerned members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, give to that question is that there is no longer any reason why such decision-making should be made unilaterally by the President.

Until now, President Nixon has consistently defended his right to act independently of Congress by falling back on his constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief. These powers, however, are vague. While U.S. ground troops remained in Vietnam he obviously required the authority to take whatever military action was necessary to protect them. It was a recognition of this right—plus a similar r education to do anything that might jeopardize the lives of the withdrawing troops and the chance of recovering our prisoners of war—that prevented the passage of the end-the-war amendments that Congress gave birth to over the past few years.

## 'Authorizations' now lacking

But that situation has changed now. No longer are there troops or POWs on the ground to protect. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which President Johnson had leaned on for additional authority, was repealed more than two years ago. The U.S. is not obligated to help the Cambodian government under the SEATO treaty, since Cambodia is not a member of that organization. Furthermore, the various acts of Congress under which military aid has been provided for Cambodia specifically state that this aid shouldn't be construed as a commitment to the defense of that country and, since 1970, have explicitly ruled out the re-introduction of American ground troops or advisers.

The Paris peace settlement makes no provision for one of the former belligerents to have recourse to military action if any part of it should break down. The U.S. is, in fact, expressly bound to a cessation of hostilities against North Vietnam that is to be "durable and without limit." The supervisor of the

truce in the South is supposed to be the International Control Commission and the guarantor of the entire agreement is supposed to be the international conference that met briefly at the end of February. Nobody has been at all surprised to find that neither of these groups has accomplished anything meaningful. Right from the start it was doubtful that they ever would.

Yet the Paris agreement is in serious danger of breaking down completely. The conflict within Vietnam hasn't moved, as was intended, from the military to the political level. Spot fighting is still going on all over the South: North Vietnam is illegally moving men and equipment across the demilitarized zone; and the political dialogue between the Thieu government and the Viet Cong is getting nowhere. But for President Nixon to threaten, as he has, that he would react "vigorously" if Hanoi continues to violate the agreement, is almost to invite the North Vietnamese to intervene first. They would have no qualms about claiming that the U.S. was encouraging President Thieu to renege on the peace terms.

## Another long tunnel?

Clearly Mr. Nixon hopes that threats will be enough, that the conflict eventually can be switched to the political level and that the U.S. can completely disengage militarily. Whether or not this turns out to be a wild hope, the war still continues in Cambodia—and so, too, does heavy U.S. bombing in support of the Cambodian government forces.

The Nixon administration, failing to find any legal basis for its role in Cambodia, has been arguing that we have a continuing political obligation to help bring about a ceasefire there. If heavy bombing is what it takes, the argument runs, as was necessary to finally push the North Vietnamese into signing a truce, then that's what the U.S. must do. Unfortunately, all the reports coming out of that beleaguered country suggest that if the war is indeed almost over, it's the Cambodian government and army that are on the verge of collapse, not the Communists. If we are going to stick around until President Lon Nol is as firmly entrenched as President Thieu is now—which isn't all that firmly—then we could be in for another long haul. As Senator Mansfield warned the other day, Cambodia could have "the makings of another Vietnam."

That's why it's so vitally important that whatever we do next be done with the concurrence of both President and Congress. For Americans, the promise of peace in Vietnam was more than just an end to this particular slaughter. It was also to provide assurance that never again would our young men be asked to go abroad and die for reasons that wouldn't be fully explained and justifiable both to them and to their elected representatives. Ever since we all woke up at the height of the Johnson escalation and asked ourselves, "What are we doing here?" the American people have been determined not to let themselves drift helplessly into such a situation the next time. But what's going on now in Cambodia may be the next time unless Congress is finally ready to insist on regaining its proper voice in determining what is in our national interest.

[L]

WASHINGTON POST - MARCH 17, 1973 (Page 26)
# Legislating War Powers

It is possible to draft legislation that will restore to Congress a meaningful role in war-making without crippling the United States in its international relations. Foes of the war-powers bill say it is not. Their strongest argument is that our responsibilities as a super-power in a chaotic world are so complex that the President must have a free hand in using our military forces without the restraint of legal formalities.

A few years ago that view was widely held. It commands less support today, not only because the perils of presidential wars have been so graphically demonstrated, but also because patient and understanding legislators have devised a bill that gives promise of restoring the constitutional balance without excessive rigidity. Chief credit for the bill goes to Senator Jacob Javits, but it now has 60 sponsors in the Senate.

In its present form S. 440 is a composite worked out largely by Senators Javits, John Stennis and Thomas Eagle.

> This is the third of three articles by Merlo J. Pusey, former associate editor of The Washington Post and author of "The Way We Go to War." The first two articles appeared on Monday and Tuesday in this space.

ton and their staffs. Senators Robert Taft and Lloyd Bentsen, who had introduced war-powers bills of their own, joined the trio for the sake of consolidating support behind a single measure. The Foreign Relations Committee held extensive hearings, and the Senate passed the bill in April, 1972, by a vote of 68 to 16.

The measure failed to become law last year because the House passed the much weaker Zablocki bill and there was time for only one meeting of the conference committee before Congress adjourned. New hearings have already been held on the House side this year, however, and new Senate hearings are scheduled for today and tomorrow. Representative Clement J. Zablocki has substantially strengthened his bill, and the prospect that a useful measure will be sent to the White House has notably improved.

It is worthy of note that these are not partisan bills designed to embarrass the President. The Republican and Democratic sponsors have worked closely together with the commendable objective of reasserting the constitutional authority of Congress and of preventing presidential wars. Both the majority and minority leaders of the Senate are co-sponsors of the Javits-Stennis-Eagleton bill. It likewise has wide support among both liberals and conservatives.

Care has been taken to avoid any encroachment on the President's constitutional powers. By way of codifying the law, which Congress has a right and duty to do under the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution, the bill spells out the circumstances under which the armed forces could be used without a declaration of war. The President could repel an attack on the United States territory or its armed forces stationed outside of the country. He could retaliate against such attacks, and he could act to "forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an

attack." He could use military force to protect the evacuation of American citizens abroad if their lives were in imminent danger, and of course he could act under any specific congressional authorization such as the Middle East resolution.

The later provision does not, of course, imply that Congress might again give the President blank checks in regard to using military force, as it did in passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The bill specifically provides that the right to use the armed forces in hostilities shall not be inferred from any resolution unless such action is specifically authorized. Specific congressional authorization is also required for the assignment of any part of our military to the armed forces of another country that is at war or in imminent danger of being involved in hostilities.

To minimize controversy, the bill leaves undisturbed the three so-called area resolutions now on the books—authorizing the use of armed forces in Formosa, the Mideast and Cuba, if the President finds it necessary. It is anticipated, however, that one of the first actions of the President under the bill would be to review these situations and go to Congress with fresh recommendation.

One of the most delicate problems sponsors of the bill had to deal with was its effect on NATO. The NATO treaty provides that an attack upon one of its members shall be regarded as an attack upon all of them. If it is to remain effective, the unified NATO commands must be able to respond to attacks in Europe at the discretion of the President and other NATO executive authorities without waiting for legislative action. The Foreign Relations Committee report interprets the bill, however, as meaning that "no treaty, existing or future, may be construed as authorizing use of the armed forces without implementing legislation." This seems to say that any military action, by American forces in defense of an ally in NATO, would have to be approved by Congress.

The debate in the Senate makes clear that no such crippling of NATO is intended. The President could respond to an attack upon a NATO country by American forces stationed there were involved or if he deemed the attack to be also aimed at the United States. Such action would not necessarily mean full-scale war any more than a presidential response to an attack upon the United States would. In either case follow-up action by Congress would be necessary if a war had to be fought.

Congress has a legitimate interest in preventing use of the NATO treaty as a substitute for a declaration of war. A treaty ratified only by the Senate cannot nullify the war power which belongs to both houses. In reasserting its war power, however, Congress should be careful to avoid casting any doubt upon the right of the President to speak for the United States in authorizing immediate NATO action in case of an emergency. The language of the report on this point needs to be clarified.

The heart and core of the bill are Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 would require the President to report promptly to Congress whenever he might take emergency military action under the

terms of the bill. Section 5 would forbid him to continue the hostilities thus begun for more than 30 days without congressional approval, unless Congress had been put out of operation by an armed attack. In any circumstances, however, the military could continue to fight while disengaging from the unauthorized hostilities.

In case of an outrageous abuse of presidential power to make war Congress could, by a two-thirds vote (overriding a veto), tell the President to stop in less than 30 days. And of course Congress could always extend the 30-day period by legislative action. Accelerated procedures are laid down to make certain that Congress would not be namibiaed by filibustering or other dilatory tactics. While the 30-day cut-off is necessarily arbitrary, it would allow time for reports and deliberation, and it would force Congress to act before a military build-up like that in Vietnam could take place.

The effect of the bill would be to put the President on notice that he could not undertake a military venture without explaining to Congress his action and his aims and his claim of authority. That alone would be a powerful restraint upon dubious hostilities that would not bear scrutiny or win popular support. Even more important, the bill would almost compel Congress to face the issue and to assume responsibility for the course to be taken.

Congress itself has been shamefully negligent in relinquishing into the hands of the President all but absolute control, over the fate of the nation. Now it is attempting by cool and rational legislation to redress the balance and to assume its rightful place as the national policy-making body. Every American has a vested interest in the success of this undertaking, even though the details of the bills under consideration are still open to debate, clarification and improvement.

WASHINGTON POST - 13 APRIL 1973 Pg 7

# Senators Worried By Cambodia Crisis

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate anxiety over deeper U.S. military involvement in Cambodia intensified yesterday as President Nixon reviewed options for reinforcing the Phnom Penh regime.

Although speculation here is soaring about decisions that may follow the trip to the war zone by Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., only marginally increased allied activity is visible so far.

President Nixon met for about an hour yesterday with Haig on his return from Thailand and Indochina. The White House was silent about the outcome of the meeting.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.) told the Senate he is alarmed by "rumors that South Vietnamese and Thai troops may become engaged in Cambodia..." Mansfield said that would only "embitter the struggle."

From Thailand, however, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, who conferred with Gen. Haig earlier this week, was reported to have said that Thailand will immediately increase its training of Cambodian soldiers in Thailand but will not send any Thai troops to Cambodia.

Field Marshal Thanom, Agence France Presse re-

ported, said Thailand has started to deliver 40,000 tons of rice, purchased with American aid, to Cambodia by ship. "Thailand may also deliver petrol and petroleum products within the next few days" to Cambodia, the marshal said.

In Saigon, South Vietnamese officials have declined to discuss possible use of their troops in Cambodia until South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu returns from his world trip. Increased use of American-supplied South Vietnamese gunboats to escort convoys up the Mekong River to Communist-encircled Phnom Penh is anticipated. Thieu and his top officials, however, have indicated opposition to any major new involvement of their ground forces in Cambodia.

White House officials indicated that neither Cambodia nor Indochina as a whole were discussed at a morning meeting yesterday of the National Security Council.

"The Nixon administration has been ambivalent about just what state of alarm it wishes to project publicly about its assessment of the Cambodian problem. It apparently seeks to convey a sense of continuing concern that will focus international atten-

tion on the need for a ceasefire in Cambodia to help preserve the Vietnam ceasefire. At the same time, the administration apparently wants to avoid a crisis atmosphere implying that the Vietnam accord is in danger of collapse, after President Nixon hailed that agreement as "peace with honor."

In this murky situation, with no clear sign of President Nixon's intentions, Sen. Mansfield warned again that "there are no legal or constitutional grounds for our becoming involved in any way, shape or form in the Cambodian civil war."

Mansfield called for what the Nixon administration also is known to be seeking, "a restoration to power of Sirik Matak" in Cambodia. In place of ailing Premier Lon Nol. But Mansfield also advocated, again, negotiations with Cambodia's deposed leader, Prince Norodom Sihanouk who now claims to represent all the rebel forces.

Senate Republican leader Hugh Scott (Pa.) joined in expressing concern about the prospects in Cambodia. Scott, however, said that while it is "deplorable" that American bombing "has to continue," at the same time, "I do not want to see Phnom Penh destroyed by the advancing forces."

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in hearings on legislation to limit presidential war powers, attempted unsuccessfully yesterday to try to obtain from the Nixon administration a more precise accounting for its authority to continue American bombing in Cambodia Chairman J. Wil-

Ham Fulbright (D-Ark.) contends that the administration is using "specious legal justifications."

Charles N. Brower, State Department acting legal adviser, said the President has "constitutional authority to wind up the war" in his functions as commander-in-chief and chief executive. Brower said Defense Secretary Elliot L. Richardson and other officials "illuminated the issue" in recent weeks, and "it seems clear to me beyond a doubt that the President has full authority to conduct air strikes" in Cambodia.

"I don't think they have illuminated it at all," countered Fulbright, Sen. Jacob K. Davits (R-N.Y.) challenged Brower to specify "what laws?" the President is enforcing. Brower responded, "all laws passed by Congress with respect to Cambodia."

Any prospect for using new war powers legislation to halt American activities in Cambodia was seriously set back yesterday in a statement sent by influential Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Stennis is recovering from gunshot wounds inflicted in a heldup last January.

Stennis, a sponsor of the war powers limitation bill, said while he hopes "the war will finally be ended" in Cambodia when the legislation reaches its final stages, "this bill excludes hostilities in which the United States is engaged on the date when it becomes law."

In other words, Stennis would not use it to cut off ongoing involvement in Cambodia.

WASHINGTON POST 23 April 1973

# The Right 'Signals' in Vietnam

In suspending mine-clearing operations off North Vietnam and in halting talks with Hanoi about reconstruction, Mr. Nixon has sent just the right "signals" to indicate his concern over Communist violations of the Vietnam cease-fire. These are gestures of diplomacy, not of war: a wielding of the carrot rather than the stick. Unlike bombing, they do not raise either constitutional or political issues at home. Very few Americans, we surmise, will find it unreasonable that Mr. Nixon has taken these steps. Moreover, they are gestures of American disengagement. In our view, the mine-clearing and reconstruction offers made sense as part of the whole cease-fire package, but if there is not to be a cease-fire, then the logic of mine-clearing and reconstruction fades. Hanoi does not lack for friends who can help out at both tasks.

We see yet another positive aspect to the President's new gestures. Some administration members declare that the January agreement must be "fully carried out" and that the United States will not abide the other side's selective fulfillment of it. But the new gestures seem to suggest that this is not the President's policy—now that the troops and prisoners are out, he intends to carry out the obligations undertaken in the agreement only to the extent he deems appropriate. Exhibit A is his suspension of the mine-clearing and aid discussions. Exhibit B—quite different, of course, in its threatening implications—is his resumption of reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam. One can deplore that the complete agreement is not being smoothly consumated but it appears to us wiser to recognize, as the President now implicitly has, that the agreement is not "of a piece."

It is not, after all, that full implementation is necessary in order for Mr. Nixon to deliver on his stated war aim of assuring South Vietnam a reasonable chance to make it on its own. By past American sacrifice, by continuing American aid, by readying Saigon to fight its own battles by using his new leverage in Moscow and Peking—by all these elements, the President has fully satisfied the requirements of his own policy. To insist on "full" implementation, when it is plain that both Vietnamese sides mean to cheat just about every chance they get, is merely to provide a rationale for open-ended American participation in a struggle among the Vietnamese.

Mr. Kissinger is reportedly dismayed that North Vietnam has not switched more quickly and cleanly from

the military to the political track. No doubt Mr. Nixon is similarly dismayed. One can have sympathy, especially in view of the prediction of many war critics that Hanoi and the Vietcong would make a quick switch to politics. Fortunately, however, the American mission can fairly be judged to have been accomplished, despite what has happened since January. And surely a responsible President will not elevate personal disappointment to the level of a national imperative. Those who urge the President to continue regarding Vietnam as an essential arena in which to demonstrate American will, when there is no legitimate American interest to be served by such a demonstration, are, in a word, irresponsible.

We would note that it is not that clear—exactly what has happened in Vietnam since January. The administration concedes that not all violations are on the Communist side; a "preponderance" are, it says, whatever that means. Hanoi has continued sending men and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail—for a purpose (a military offensive or political action) which events have not revealed—but at the same time Hanoi has, according to the Pentagon, withdrawn portions of one or more divisions from South Vietnam. In any event, it is conceivable to us that the flaunted results of the Nixon-Vietnamization program have evaporated in just three months. For the administration to imply that, by its jitters, is careless and wrong.

American warplanes are now bombing in Cambodia within a few miles of Phnom Penh. Presumably, by continuing to move in, the insurgents can "walk" American bombs downtown. The U.S. embassy in Cambodia concedes, by the way, there is no documented evidence that North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops are fighting there. That the insurgents can withstand aerial pounding does not seem to be seriously in doubt. But whether the American-supported government of Lon Nol could survive the American bombing of its capital is in doubt. Our sense of events is that Prince Sihanouk will be back in Phnom Penh before too long. Some may be apprehensive at this prospect but we share the editorial judgment of the Star-News that, so great is Communist control in Cambodia anyway, "It is not clear that a complete Communist takeover in Cambodia would place South Vietnam in much greater jeopardy than it is in today." And Mr. Nixon has, we repeat, put South Vietnam in an excellent position to send for itself.

WASHINGTON POST - 27 APRIL 1973

Vietnam Perspective

There is something troubling, not to say ambiguous and a little redundant, about the President's latest decision to send Henry Kissinger back to Paris next month to confer with Le Due Tho on obtaining "strict implementation" of the three-month-old cease fire accord. Perhaps the President means only to eat up a little more time while waiting for the military and political crises in Cambodia somehow to settle down, and for monsoon rains to curtail whatever offensive operations the Communists may be planning in South Vietnam. It is hard to see what extra measure of threat or other incentives toward peace Dr. Kissinger can add to the "signals" already conveyed by this continued bombing of Cambodia, the resumption of air reconnaissance over North Vietnam and the suspension of mine-clearing and aid discussions—and therefore hard to see what there is to talk about. Sure to be extravagantly publicized, the Kissinger trip would seem to commit the administration further to a hard and unilateral American line at a time when we would have thought it better served the American interest to try to associate as many other nations as possible with evolving events in Vietnam. As we suggested the other day, Mr. Nixon's problem is letting go.

What in fact does "strict implementation" of the Vietnam agreement mean? We do not condone violations, either Hanoi's or Saigon's or Washington's. But what did Mr. Nixon have in mind when he accepted the agreement? He said then he "expected" all parties to observe its terms "scrupulously." But aside from the inducements of reconstruction, mine-clearing and political relations which were written into the agreement, it provided only for certain international supervisory devices—which have proven inadequate to ensure that North Vietnam in particular honored its terms. "Of course," Mr. Kissinger explained, when he was first presenting the agreement, "It is not inconceivable that the agreement will not in all respects be lived up to. In that case, adding another clause that will not be lived up to, specifically requiring it, would not change the situation." Precisely so.

Some may now wonder whether Mr. Nixon is not so determined to compensate for Watergate and other political deficits, and to preserve—or rather reconstitute—his handwork in achieving a "cease-fire" that he and Dr. Kissinger have accepted the goal of "strict implementation" against their own better political judgment. This seems unlikely. Both men know Indochina deeply. In making the January accord, they could not have failed to realize the depth of the Vietnamese Communist commitment to continue working for power in Saigon; indeed Dr. Kissinger conceded as much at the time. It identifies the President and his chief adviser to claim for them that they did not expect Hanoi and Saigon to keep on struggling, or to expand their struggle beyond the confines of the agreement. Surely Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger

do not mean to justify further unilateral applications of American power now by saying that in January they were naive.

Nor is there public evidence to show that in January they Intended only to provide a "tidegle" for American withdrawal of troops in exchange for our prisoners—a "decent interval", as it has been described, between American departure and whatever consequences might follow, including South Vietnamese collapse. The immense American effort to prepare Saigon to defend itself—an effort we have often joined the President in commending as a major success—argues against that kind of cynicism. So do the large loud claims of "peace with honor" which Mr. Nixon has repeatedly made.

There is, in short, a fundamental contradiction in the administration's current attitude toward Vietnam. On the one hand, we are told privately and sometimes even openly that there was always great risk in the terms of the January agreement, apart from that portion of it which directly dealt with our withdrawals and the return of our POW's; that the means of enforcement of the cease-fire terms would inevitably slip from American hands; that in the end it would be up to the Vietnamese, North and South, to work out the destiny of South Vietnam by one means or another; and that the Thieu Government had acquired the means and the capability to defend itself.

And then, on the other hand, we are told that entirely predictable North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire somehow pose a new and terrible threat to Saigon; that massive bombing of Cambodia by B-52's is the only solution; and that we must take upon ourselves almost the entire burden of securing the "strict implementation" of an agreement which was supposed to be enforced by a presumably effective supervisory procedure underwritten by big and little powers around the world.

The President cannot have it both ways. Either he accomplished something durable and respectable in January or he was unbelievably naive about his adversaries—and the "peace with honor" which he then proclaimed was at best an illusion and at worst a fraud. We happen to believe the President made as good a deal as could reasonably be expected. And we also doubt that it can be made much better now by renegotiation or by adopting for the United States a largely unilateral, open-ended enforcer's role. It is redundant to suppose that the maintenance of America's honor depends on what happens in a corner of Asia where this country has already fulfilled the fundamental mission of readying an ally to send for itself To believe otherwise—to jingo on in search of an elusive will-the-wispy "peace with honor" in an area torn by rival ambitions and doomed to continuing conflict of one form or another—is to lose the essential sense of perspective the President should now be bringing to Vietnam.

LOS ANGELES TIMES - 27 APRIL 1973

Our Continuing Intrusion in Asia

The United States is elaborating its pursuit of
peace in Indochina today with consultations with
North Vietnam, for which there is a precise provi-
sion in the international conference agreement of
March 1.

It is a marked improvement over the bellicosity
that has otherwise marked American reaction to
the breakdown of the cease-fire, including the
American bombing of Cambodia and Laos, for
which there is no legal provision whatsoever either
in International arrangements or American law.

The conversations today between William Sulli-
van and Nguyen Co Thach, and the consultations
next month between Henry A. Kissinger and Le
Duc Tho, represent one of the two remedies for
cheating provided in the international agreement.
The other remedy is to reconvene the international
conference itself, either on the joint call of the
United States and North Vietnam or on the call of
six or more of the 12 member nations.

Now, there is no question that cheating has been
going on. It was evident in the heinous shooting
down of the peace observation helicopter by the
Communists. Report after report has itemized the
movement of arms and men. There have been re-
ports of cheating by the South Vietnamese, but the
preponderance of the reports has involved cheat-
ing by the Communists, and their cheating has
been accompanied by a deliberate program of con-
cealment that has frustrated the work of the Inter-
national Commission of Control and Supervision.

But this tragic, regrettable, dismal situation, this
shocking disregard for solemn international obliga-
tion and commitment, does not sanction American
military intervention, either the kind that we have
seen in Laos and Cambodia or the kind that the
Pentagon is now threatening in Vietnam.

On the contrary, the cease-fire agreement of Jan.
27 and the international conference agreement of
March 1 deny to any outside power the right of in-
tervention. The four nations of the International
Commission of Control and Supervision are report-

ers. The "guaranteeing" of the end of the war is
left to the 12-nation conference, of which the Unit-
ed States is but one member. The conference itself,
in a document approved by the United States, re-
served to itself the problem of cheating. But it in-
vited the signatory parties "either individually or
jointly" to enter consultation "with a view to de-
termining remedial measures."

This basically reinforces the principle of nonin-
tervention that undergirds the cease-fire agree-
ment itself. The only direct participatory authority
for the United States, as a member of a temporary
joint military commission, expired 60 days after
the cease-fire was signed. At that moment, North
and South Vietnam were left in charge. Kissinger
added his endorsement of this principle in the com-
munique of Feb. 14, at the end of his visit to Hanoi,
which said that "the two sides reaffirmed that the
problem existing between the Indochinese coun-
tries should be settled by the Indochinese parties
on the basis of respect for each other's indepen-
dence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and
noninterference in each other's internal affairs."

The operative words are worth repeating:
"should be settled by the Indochinese parties."

So it was, at the end of the international confer-
ence in March, that the British delegate empha-
sized that peace depended solely on the parties con-
cerned on the ground and "if they are determined
that the agreement will work, it will."

Any diplomatic effort to shore up, extend and re-
vitalize the cease-fire is to be encouraged. So the
meeting today and the meeting next month are
welcome. But they are robbed of some of their
credibility by the continuing American bombing,
by the threat of more, by the continuation of a
force of American civilians that monitors, directs
and intrudes into the life of Indochina as if there
were never to be an end to the American commit-
ment. These actions erode the single most im-
portant achievement of the cease-fire, which was
to get the Americans, and with them the other
foreigners, out of Indochina once and for all.

["N.Y. TIMES 29 APRIL (30)", "Diplomacy\nMay Get\nA Chance", "WASHINGTON — North Vietnam charged the United States with "brutally and systematically" rupturing the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. Washington responded by accusing Hanoi of "direct and inexcusable" breaches in the three-month-old accord. American reconnaissance planes again flew over North Vietnam — a none-too-subtle warning of a possible renewal of American bombing.", "Yet despite the angry polemics of\nlast week and the threat of a renewal\nof warfare, the diplomats seemed as-\nsured of another chance to put the\nHumply-Dumpty peace accord together again.", "As the result of an agreement worked\nout with Hanoi, negotiations re-\nsumed in Paris on Friday to achieve\n\"strict implementation\" of the agree-\nment. William H. Sullivan, the State\nDepartment's top Southeast Asia ex-\npert, flew to the French capital for\nfive and a half hours of talks with\nhis counterpart, Deputy Foreign Min-\nister Nguyen Co Thach.", "The purpose of the Sullivan-Thach\ntalks, due to continue this week, was\nto prepare the way for a meeting in\nmid-May between Henry A. Kissinger\nand Le Duc Tho, the men who worked\nout the terms of the actual cease-fire\nagreement.", "A high White House official said\nhe thought Mr. Kissinger had a \"50.50\nchance\" to achieve an understanding\nthat would reinforce the agreement,\nbut as the sharply-worded recrimina-\ntions between Washington and Hanoi\nindicated last week, there were se-\nrious disagreements between the two\nsides over the causes of the break-\ndown of the accord.", "Hanoi's View. Hanoi argues that the United States has violated the spirit of the agreement by not disengaging from Indochina. North Vietnam apparently believed that once President Nixon got his troops and prisoners out of Vietnam, he would let the Indochinese send for themselves. While apparently not breach-\ning the letter of the accord, Wash-\nington has given considerable military,\neconomic and political support to\nPresident Nguyen Van Thieu and has\nbacked up the anti-Communist gov-\nernments in Laos and Cambodia.", "In North Vietnam's view, this\namounted to renewed \"neocolonialism\"\nby the Americans. Moreover, Hanoi\nhas accused Washington of suspending\nmine-sweeping in North Vietnamese\nwaters and of reconnaissance flights", "over the North — both violations of\nthe accord. Washington acknowledges\nthese infractions but says they were\nin response to more serious ruptures\nof the accord by North Vietnam.", "Washington's View. The United\nStates charges Hanoi with violating\nboth the letter and spirit of the accord.\nMr. Kissinger says Hanoi had promised\nto bring about a cease-fire in Cam-\nbodia within a month of the Vietnam\ncease-fire but now seems to be giving\nfull support to the anti-Government\ninsurgents closing in on Phnom Penh.\nWashington also charges Hanoi with\nbreaking the terms of the agreement\nby infiltrating men and supplies into\nSouth Vietnam.", "The United States acknowledges\nthat the Saigon forces have also com-\nmitted breaches of the accord, but\nMr. Kissinger says their violations\nhave been less serious than Hanoi's.", "One of the factors the White House\nmust weigh is the deep reluctance of\nCongress to remain involved in that\npart of the world. Mr. Kissinger al-\nluded to this when he complained to\nan editors' meeting on Monday that\nthere was criticism both of the \"stiff\"\npolicy of threatening new air raids\nand the \"carrot\" policy of promising\neconomic aid to Hanoi in return for\ncompliance. In that case, Mr. Kiss-\ninger asked with some passion, \"what\nshould the United States do?\"", "But he did not give an answer.", "—BERNARD GWERTMAN", "NEW YORK TIMES 29 April 1973 (30)", "A Quarter of 'Peace'", "Three months after the signing of truce in Vietnam, the United States is still at war. Not only is the end not in sight, but each day brings new intimations that the Administration is ready for heightened combat in Southeast Asia.", "Since the cease-fire came into effect Jan. 27, the United\nStates has dropped at least 150,000 tons of bombs on\nCambodia and Laos. Reported violations of the formal\ncease-fire acts have become routine. The question is\nno longer: Who is torpedoing peace? Rather it has become:\nCan Hanoi and Washington retrieve enough of the com-\nmon interest they once perceived to make the fragile\nstructure of the cease-fire hold together very much\nlonger?", "For this purpose, the two hardy negotiators who\ninitially achieved the truce are apparently preparing to\nadd an epilogue to the Paris Vietnam negotiations that\nboth assured had ended in success.", "Henry A. Kissinger asked the other day, \"What should the United States do?\" Should a solemn international agreement, once it is \"totally violated\" . . . simply be treated as irrelevant?\" This is hardly an easy question, even if the agreement was not \"totally violated\"—all the American prisoners are free. Put the basic dilemma was inherent in the ambiguities and divergent motives embodied in the Jan. 27 accord. The Administration freely entered into an agreement, including a system for dealing with truce violations, and declared itself satisfied with what was clearly received by many critics at the time as an unworthy charge. One can understand the despair of the Presidential adviser now, but not his", "President Nixon is ready to take the credit for disengaging the United States from the Vietnam war, but he is not ready to disengage. It seems that the Administration retains some unrelieved sense of open-ended obligation to police Southeast Asia, and to the commitment of American resources in participation in what is officially acknowledged to be civil warfare.", "The nation's elected representatives, now concluding\nEaster recess in their districts, find Vietnam a concern\nof low priority among their constituents—a predictable\nreaction with the fighting men and prisoners all at home.\nIt takes little imagination, however, to foresee the\npossibility of making new prisoners from among the\nAmerican airmen now flying their daily death raids\nover Cambodia. Already at least one flier has been re-\nported killed in a Cambodian mission.", "Congressional moves to limit continuation of the war\nare building up to confront the Administration this week.\nThough the White House will presumably flourish the\ntime-worn bary of preserving the President's bargaining\npower just as his national security side is negotiating in\nParis, the first concrete act of legislative opinion will\nprobably arise in the House.", "With little public notice, the Defense Department has\nrequested authority to transfer $500 million from other\nPentagon accounts to pay for these weeks of intensive\nbombing. Significant opposition to this ostensibly routine\nrequest when the House Appropriations Committee meets\nin the next few days could flash a meaningful signal to\nthe White House that Congress is at last ready to assert\nits responsibilities in deciding when—and whether—the\nmilitary force of the United States, are committed in\nforeign war.", "[L](L)"]

5

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>June 27, 1973</td>
    <td>President vetoed supplemental appropriation bill because of its Cambodia rider. While it mustered its largest anti-war vote yet - 241 to 173 - the House fell 35 votes short of the two-thirds needed to override. The Senate promptly reacted by voting 67-29 to attach a bombing ban amendment to another bill on the national debt ceiling.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 28, 1973</td>
    <td>House Appropriations Committee reported a new supplemental appropriations bill containing compromise language. While adding North and South Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos, the effective date of cutoff would be put off to August 15, 1973.<br>Senate Appropriations Committee voted (9-8) a Continuing Resolution with an amendment providing for an immediate cutoff of all funds for combat activities in North or South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. (Case-Church)</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 29, 1973</td>
    <td>House compromise anti-war language for supplemental appropriations bill - with August 15, 1973 deadline won support of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15-2, to be added to Continuing Resolution. Fulbright presented compromise language to Senate. After debate, Senate passed the House-approved language 64 to 26. Also that day, Senate passed an amendment barring funds for reconstruction aid for North Vietnam without specific congressional authorization.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 30, 1973</td>
    <td>Conferees on the Continuing Resolution agreed to delete reference in the bill barring the use of future appropriated funds with respect to activities in SE Asia.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 1, 1973</td>
    <td>President signed the supplemental appropriation bill and Continuing Resolution with compromise language (August 15 deadline); statement released by White House (San Clemente).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 15, 1973</td>
    <td>Senators returning from holiday visits reported firmly resistant to any consideration of extending August 15 bombing deadline; President would face certain defeat.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>July 18, 1973</td>
    <td>Full House passed war powers legislation</td>
  </tr>
</table>

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 26, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

11:35 A.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will be on the record this morning.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: We have now heard from both Vietnams and it is obvious that a war that has been raging for 10 years is drawing to a conclusion, and that this is a traumatic experience for all of the participants. The President thought that it might be helpful if I came out here and spoke to you about what we have been doing, where we stand, and to put the various allegations and charges into perspective.

First, let me talk about the situation in three parts: Where do we stand procedurally; what is the substance of the negotiations, and where do we go from here?

We believe that peace is at hand. We believe that an agreement is within sight, based on the May 8th proposal of the President and some adaptation of our January 25th proposal which is just to all parties. It is inevitable that in a war of such complexity that there should be occasional difficulties in reaching a final solution, but we believe that by far the longest part of the road has been traversed and what stands in the way of an agreement now are issues that are relatively less important than those that have already been settled.

Let me first go through the procedural points, the arguments with respect to particular dates for signing the agreement. As you know, we have been negotiating in these private sessions with the North Vietnamese for nearly four years. We resumed the discussions on July 19th of this year. Up to now, the negotiations had always foundered on the North Vietnamese insistence that a political settlement be arrived at before a military solution be discussed, and on the companion demand of the North Vietnamese that the political settlement make arrangements which, in our view, would have predetermined the political outcome.

We have taken the view, from the earliest private meetings on, that rapid progress could be made only if the political and military issues were separated; that is to say, if the North Vietnamese and we would negotiate about methods to end the war and if the political solution of the war were left to the Vietnamese parties to discuss among themselves. During the summer, through many long private meetings, these positions remained essentially unchanged.

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As Radio Hanoi correctly stated today, on October 8th the North Vietnamese for the first time made a proposal which enabled us to accelerate the negotiations. Indeed, for the first time they made a proposal which made it possible to negotiate concretely at all. This proposal has been correctly summarized in the statements from Hanoi; that is to say, it proposed that the United States and Hanoi, in the first instance, concentrate on bringing an end to the military aspects of the war; that they agree on some very general principles within which the South Vietnamese parties could then determine the political evolution of South Vietnam, which was exactly the position which we had always taken.

They dropped their demand for a coalition government which would absorb all existing authority. They dropped their demand for a veto over the personalities and the structure of the existing government.

They agreed for the first time to a formula which permitted a simultaneous discussion of Laos and Cambodia. In short, we had for the first time a framework where, rather than exchange general propositions and measure our progress by whether dependent clauses of particular sentences had been minutely altered, we could examine concretely and precisely where we stood and what each side was prepared to give.

I want to take this opportunity to point out that from that time on, the North Vietnamese negotiators behaved with good will and with great seriousness. And so did we. We have no complaint with the general description of events as it was given by Radio Hanoi.

However, there grew up the seeds of one particular
misunderstanding. The North Vietnamese negotiators made
their proposal conditional on the solution of the problem
by October 31st, and they constantly insisted that we give
some commitment that we would settle the war and complete the
negotiations by October 31st.

I want to stress that these dates were not dates
that we invented or proposed. I would like to stress that
my instructions from the President were exactly those that
were stated by him at a press conference; that is to say,
that we should make a settlement that was right, independent
of any arbitrary deadlines that were established by our own
domestic processes.

In order to avoid an abstract debate on deadlines,
which at that time still seemed highly theoretical, we did
agree that we would make a major effort to conclude the nego-
tiations by October 31st, and it is true that we did, from
time to time, give schedules by which this might be accom-
plished. It was, however, always clear, at least to us, and
we thought we made it clear in the records of the meetings, that
obviously we could not sign an agreement in which details
remained to be worked out simply because in good faith we had
said we would make an effort to conclude it by a certain date.

It was always clear that we would have to discuss
anything that was negotiated first in Washington and then
in Saigon. There has been a great deal of discussion whether
Saigon has a veto over our negotiations, and I would like to
explain our position with respect to that.

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Clearly, the people of South Vietnam, who have suffered so much, and the Government of South Vietnam, with which we have been allied, who will be remaining in that country after we have departed, have every right to participate in the making of their own peace. They have every right to have their views heard and taken extremely seriously.

We, of course, preserve our own freedom of judgment and we will make our own decisions as to how long we believe a war should be continued. But one source of misunderstanding has been that Hanoi seemed to be of the view that we could simply impose any solution on Saigon and that their participation was not required. But I also want to make clear that the issues that remain to be settled have a number of sources and I will get into them in some detail.

Saigon, as is obvious from the public record, has expressed its views with its customary forcefulness both publicly and privately. We agreed with some of their views. We didn't agree with all of them and we made clear which we accepted and which we could not join.

In addition, while my colleagues and I were in Saigon, we visited other countries of Southeast Asia and we had extensive conversations with American officials, and it appeared there that there were certain concerns and certain ambiguities in the draft agreement that we believe required modification and improvement. But I want to stress that what remains to be done is the smallest part of what has already been accomplished, and as charges and counter-charges fill the air, we must remember that, having come this far, we cannot fail and we will not fail over what still remains to be accomplished.

Now, let me first go briefly over the main provisions of the agreement as we understand them, and then let me say what, in our view, still remains to be done. We believe, incidentally, what remains to be done can be settled in one more negotiating session with the North Vietnamese negotiators lasting, I would think, no more than three or four days, so we are not talking of a delay of a very long period of time.

Let me, however, before I go into the issues that still remain, cover those that are contained in the draft agreement, of which, on the whole, a very fair account has been given in the radio broadcast from Hanoi. I don't refer to the last two pages of rhetoric; I am referring to the description of the agreement.

The principal provisions were and are that a cease-fire would be observed in South Vietnam at a time to be mutually agreed upon-- it would be a cease-fire in place; that U.S. forces would be withdrawn within 60 days of the signing of the agreement; that there would be a total prohibition on the reinforcement of troops; that is to say, that infiltration into South Vietnam from whatever area, and from whatever country, would be prohibited. Existing military equipment within South Vietnam could be replaced on a one-to-one basis by weapons of the same characteristics and of similar characteristics and properties, under international supervision.

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The agreement provides that all captured military personnel and foreign civilians be repatriated within the same time period as the withdrawal; that is to say, there will be a return of all American prisoners, military or civilian, within 60 days after the agreement comes into force.

North Vietnam has made itself responsible for an accounting of our prisoners and missing in action throughout Indochina and for the repatriation of American prisoners throughout Indochina.

There is a separate provision that South Vietnamese civilians detained in South Vietnam, that their future should be determined through negotiations among the South Vietnamese parties, so that the return of our prisoners is not conditional on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails on both sides of the conflict. With respect to the political provisions, there is an affirmation of general principles guaranteeing the right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people and that the South Vietnamese people should decide their political future through free and democratic elections under international supervision.

As was pointed out by Radio Hanoi, the existing authorities with respect to both internal and external policies would remain in office; the two parties in Vietnam would negotiate about the timing of elections, the nature of the elections, and the offices for which these elections were to be held.

There would be created an institution called the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord whose general task would be to help promote the maintenance of the cease-fire and to supervise the elections on which the parties might agree.

That council would be formed by appointment, and it
would operate on the basis of unanimity. We view it as an insti-
tutionalization of the election commission that we proposed on
January 25th in our plan.

There are provisions that the disposition of Vietnamese
armed forces in the South should also be settled through nego-
tiations among the South Vietnamese parties.

There are provisions that the unification of Vietnam
also be achieved by negotiations among the parties without
military pressure and without foreign interference, without
coercion and without annexation.

There is a very long and complex section on inter-
national supervision which will no doubt occupy graduate stu-
dents for many years to come and which, as far as I can tell,
only my colleague Ambassador Sullivan understands completely.

But briefly, it provides for joint commissions of the
participants, either two-party or four-party, for those parts
of the agreement that are applicable either to two-parties or to
four-parties; it provides for an international supervisory com-
mission to which disagreements of the commissions composed of
the parties would be referred, but which also has a right to
make independent investigations, and an international confer-
ence to meet within 30 days of the signing of the agreement to
develop the guarantees and to establish the relationship of the
various parties to each other in greater detail.

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There is finally a section on Cambodia and Laos in which parties to the agreement agree to respect and recognize the independence and sovereignty of Cambodia and Laos, in which they agree to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of other countries.

There is an agreement that foreign countries will withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia and there is a general section about the future relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in which both sides express their conviction that this agreement will usher in a new period of reconciliation between the two countries, and in which the United States expresses its view that it will in the post-war period contribute to the reconstruction of Indo-China and that both countries will develop their relationships on a basis of mutual respect and non-interference in each other's affairs, and that they will move from hostility to normalcy.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, in the light of where we are, it is obvious that most of the most difficult problems have been dealt with. If you consider what many of you might have thought possible some months ago compared to where we are, we have to say that both sides have approached this problem with a long-term point of view, with the attitude that we want to have not an armistice, but peace, and it is this attitude which will govern our actions despite occasional ups and downs which are inevitable in a problem of this complexity.

Now, what is it, then, that prevents the completion of the agreement? Why is it that we have asked for one more meeting with the North Vietnamese to work out a final text? The principal reason is that in a negotiation that was stalemated for five years, and which did not really make a breakthrough until October 8th, many of the general principles were clearly understood before the breakthrough, but as one elaborated the text, many of the nuances on which the implementation will ultimately depend became more and more apparent.

It was obvious, it was natural, that when we were talking about the abstract desirability of a cease-fire that neither side was perhaps as precise as it had to become later about the timing and staging of a cease-fire in a country in which there are no clear front lines." And also the acceptance on our part of the North Vietnamese insistence on an accelerated schedule meant that the text could never be conformed, that English and Vietnamese texts tended to lag behind each other.

And that ambiguities in formulation arose that require one more meeting to straighten out. Let me give you a few examples, and I think you will understand that we are talking here of a different problem than what occupied us in the many sessions I have had with you ladies and gentlemen about the problem of peace in Vietnam, sessions which concerned abstract theories of which approach might succeed.

We are talking here about six or seven very concrete issues that with anything like the goodwill that has already been shown, can easily be settled. For example, it has become apparent to us that there will be a great temptation for a cease-fire to

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be paralleled by a last effort to seize as much territory
as possible, and perhaps to extend operations for long enough
to establish political control over a given area.

We would like to avoid the dangers of the loss of
life, perhaps in some areas even of the massacre that may be
inherent in this, and we, therefore, want to discuss methods by
which the international supervisory body can be put in place at
the same time that the cease-fire is promulgated.

The Secretary of State has already had preliminary
conversations with some of the countries that are being asked
to join this body in order to speed up this process.

Secondly, because of the different political circum-
stances in each of the Indochinese countries, the relationship
of military operations there to the end of the war in Vietnam, or
the cease-fire there in relation to the end of the war in Viet-
nam, is somewhat complex, and we would like to discuss more
concretely how to compress this time as much as possible.

There were certain ambiguities that were raised by
the interview that the North Vietnamese Prime Minister, Pham
Van Dong, gave to one of the weekly journals, in which he seemed
to be, with respect to one or two points, under a misapprehension
as to what the agreement contained and, at any rate, we would
like to have that clarified.

There are linguistic problems. For example, we call
the National Council of Reconciliation an administrative struc-
ture in order to make clear that we do not see it as anything
comparable to a coalition government. We want to make sure that
the Vietnamese text conveys the same meaning.

I must add that the words "administrative structure"
were given to us in English by the Vietnamese, so this is not
a maneuver on our part.

There are some technical problems as to what clauses
of the Geneva Accords to refer to in certain sections of the
document, and there is a problem which was never settled in
which the North Vietnamese, as they have pointed out in their
broadcast, have proposed that the agreement be signed by the
United States and North Vietnam; we on behalf of Saigon, they
on behalf of their allies in South Vietnam.

We have always held the view that we would leave it up
to our allies whether they wanted a two-power document or
whether they wanted to sign themselves a document that estab-
lishes peace in their country. Now they prefer to participate
in the signing of the peace, and it seems to us not un unreason-
able proposal that a country on whose territory a war has been
fought and whose population has been uprooted and has suffered
so greatly, that it should have the right to sign its own peace
treaty.

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This again strikes us as a not insuperable
difficulty, but its acceptance will require the redrafting
of certain sections of the document, and that, again, is
a job that will require several hours of work.

We have asked the North Vietnamese to meet with us
on any date of their choice. We have, as has been reported,
restricted our bombing, in effect, to the battle area in
order to show our good will, and to indicate that we are
working within the framework of the existing agreement.

We remain convinced that the issues that I have
mentioned are soluble in a very brief period of time. We
have undertaken, and I repeat it here publicly, to settle
them at one more meeting, and to remain at that meeting
for as long as is necessary to complete the agreement.

So this is the situation in which we find ourselves.
With respect to Hanoi, we understand its disappointment
that a schedule toward the realization of which it had made
serious efforts could not be met for reasons beyond the
control of any party, but they know, or they should know,
and they certainly must know now, that peace is within reach
in a matter of weeks, or less, depending on when the meeting
takes place, and that once peace is achieved, we will move
from hostility to normalcy, and from normalcy to cooperation
with the same seriousness with which we have conducted our
previous less fortunate relationships with them.

As far as Saigon is concerned, it is, of course, entitled to participate in the settlement of a war fought on its territory. Its people have suffered much, and they will remain there after we leave. Their views deserve great respect. In order to accelerate negotiations, we have presented them with conclusions which obviously could not be fully settled in a matter of four days that I spent in Saigon. But we are confident that our consultations with Saigon will produce agreement within the same time frame that I have indicated is required to complete the agreement with Hanoi, and that the negotiations can continue on the schedule that I have outlined.

With respect to the American people, we have talked to you ladies and gentlemen here very often about the negotiations with respect to the peace, and we have been very conscious of the division and the anguish that the war has caused in this country. One reason why the President has been so concerned with ending the war by negotiation, and ending it in a manner that is consistent with our principles, is because of the hope that the act of making peace could restore the unity that had sometimes been lost at certain periods during the war, and so that the agreement could be an act of healing rather than a source of new division. This remains our policy.

We will not be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right. We will not be deflected from an agreement when its provisions are right. And with this attitude, and with some cooperation from the other side, we believe that we can restore both peace and unity to America very soon.

Thank you. I will be glad to answer your questions.

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Q Do you feel that this program could not have been achieved four years ago?

DR. KISSINGER: There was no possibility of achieving this agreement four years ago because the other side consistently refused to discuss the separation of the political and military issues, because it always insisted that it had to settle the political issues with us, and that we had to pre-determine the future of South Vietnam in a negotiation with North Vietnam.

As the statement from Hanoi said on October 8th, Hanoi, for the first time, made what it called a very significant proposal in which it accepted the principles that the military issues should be settled first, and that the political issues should be left essentially to a negotiation among the South Vietnamese parties, with just the most general principles to be settled in the private negotiations.

As they say, "With a view to making the negotiations progress" -- this is reading from the Hanoi statement -- "at the private meeting on October 8th, the DRV side took a new, extremely important initiative. It put forward a draft agreement and proposed that the government" and so on, "immediately agree upon and sign this agreement to rapidly restore peace in Vietnam."

In that draft agreement, the DRV side proposed the cessation of the war throughout Vietnam, a cease-fire in South Vietnam, and a total withdrawal of U.S. forces, and then it said, "The two South Vietnamese parties shall settle together the internal matters of South Vietnam within three months after the cease-fire comes into effect."

This is not an exact description of what the agree-
ment says. The agreement does not say it must be done within
three months. The agreement says that the two parties will do
their utmost to get it done within three months. The exact
text to which I referred is as follows:

"Therefore, as the U.S. side has many times proposed, the Vietnam problem would be solved in two steps. The first step is to end the war in Vietnam, to have a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to end military involvement in South Vietnam. In the second step, the South Vietnamese sides will jointly solve South Vietnamese internal problems."

This has been our position since the beginning of
these negotiations. It was never accepted four years ago,
three years ago, or two months ago. The first time it was
accepted was on October 8th. As soon as it was accepted, we
completed within four days a rough draft of an agreement
from which we have since been operating.

Q What is the recourse if the negotiations for elections break down? That has been a point at which the North Vietnamese have balked in the past.

DR. KISSINGER: The agreement provides that the cease-fire is without time limit.

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Q Does President Thieu go along with this whole
deal?

DR. KISSINGER: As I have pointed out, the South Vietnamese agree with many parts of it and disagree with some aspects of it. We agree with some of their disagreements and not with all.

Q Have the South Vietnamese been informed of the negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: The South Vietnamese were informed of the negotiations as they went along. However, the negotiations really were composed of two phases. There were the negotiations between July 19th and October 8th. In that negotiation, the other side constantly proposed various formulas for the institution of a coalition government which would replace the existing government in Saigon and which would assume governmental power, and Saigon was informed.

I took a trip to Saigon in the middle of August to have a long discussion with the South Vietnamese Government. My deputy, General Haig, took another trip to present to them the various formulations that had been developed.

On October 8th, for the first time, Hanoi presented the different approach which they have correctly described in their statement. They then insisted that we, on the basis of this approach, begin to draft the outline of an agreement in order to meet their deadline for October 31st.

Now, if we had wanted to protract negotiations, we
could easily have said that we have to return to Washington
first, or return to Saigon for further consultation. We be-
lieved that this was such an important step on the part of
the North Vietnamese that took into account so many of the
proposals that we had made, and such a significant movement in
the direction of the position consistently held by this
Administration, that we had an obligation, despite the risks
that were involved, of working with them to complete at least
an outline of an agreement, and we spent four days, sometimes
working 16 hours a day, in order to complete this draft agree-
ment, or at least the outline of this draft agreement.

I mention this only because, if we had wanted to
delay, we had much better opportunities than to raise a few
objections of the kind that I have described, at the very end.
But we did insist and we constantly emphasized that we could
not conclude this agreement without a full discussion with our
allies in Vietnam.

I want to make clear another thing: that many of the
concerns that I have expressed here, while they are also
shared by Saigon, are ours as well, and the particular issues
that I raise would require a solution if the agreement is to
bring a real peace, and if it is not to lead immediately to
endless disputes as to what its provisions mean.

Q Why are you waiting for Hanoi to propose the
date of the next meeting? Why don't you suggest that you
start tomorrow?

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