TELECON

The President

10/12/71 8:30 a.m.

P: Hello, Henry. Feeling better today?

K: Yes, thank you.

P: I think you should cancel your trip to Chicago if you have any problem at all. What is the trip?

K: It's something I had agreed to. A group of all the newspapers. Another one is the Republican group that has been supporting us. Above all, Mr. President, I promised Percy I would go to his dinner. He doesn't deserve it, but he got us the Mansfield vote.

P: All right. But it's just ridiculous for you to have to go out there.

K: I am sorry I agreed to it.

P: It's a hard trip at this point.

K: Percy isn't noted for his generosity.

P: He is a greedy bastard. What kind of dinner is it?

K: Illinois Republicans giving him a dinner. Taft, Griffin and Scott are going out.

P: Going out tomorrow? x

K: Incidentally, the Japs haven't leaked yet.

P: If it leaks, it won't this morning.

K: No, not out of Japan.

P: It won't here either.

K: It just shows what type of bastards these Russians are.

P: It's just like our little boys though. One of our guys put out a story that Byrd is not a possibility for the Court.

K: I heard that.

P: They don't realize the game though. He isn't going to be, but I haven't told him that. It is driving them . . . we've got Byrd . . . and Humphrey is licking his chops; McGovern doesn't know what to say. It makes them all take positions; they will have a bloodbath. So one of our little

TELECON
The President

10/12/71 8:30 a.m. p. 2

boys said 'I've got to get the President off the hook.' What is the matter with people Henry? And they wonder why I don't tell the staff anything. I don't tell them anything because they don't have any brains, no brains. Or no judgment. Loyalty, they are loyal, but they have no judgment. They just didn't understand the game.

K: I suspected you weren't going to appoint him, but I thought it was interesting the way everyone was having to take a stand.

P: Well, he'll be back in the race as soon as Ziegler gets at them today! The only thing I see in the news is Chile, and I want to be tough with them. Have you seen this?

K: Yes, I've just seen it.

P: Are you preparing something to say? I will say something but I want you to have your staff -- get Haig to, the toughest son of a bitch you've got, to work something up. It's time to kick Chile in the ass.

K: The only thing it was being held up for is the Comptroller General.

P: They have acted. Can you get a paper over to me.

K: I will have a paper.

P: I just want a strong statement knocking their brains out. What will we do?

K: We can cut off their credit.

P: I want a strong statement kicking Chile in the ass. Have Connally make it. Really blast their butts. And don't bring State into it. What are they doing?

K: They are probably wringing their hands, but they should say something too. I will call Connally this minute.

P: I want to over-act on this one and I expect State to tow the mark. They have confiscated American property and we won't allow it.

K: That you should say. We'll have a program by the end of the day.

P: I will know what to say, "appropriate action," but I want the strongest action on it and I want it highly publicized and highly visible, and I want it on TV today.

TELECON
The President

10/12/71 8:30 a.m. p. 3

K: Tomorrow would be better.

P: Okay, tomorrow. Is there anything else for today's conference?

K: No, I think what we had yesterday is good. And I would say yes, we did inform the Chinese, just say that.

P: Yes, I'm going to be monosyllabic on that. Chinese representation may come up, but we'll see.

K: Just say the Secretary of State has stated our position on that.

P: I'll just say we are expecting a close vote and hope to win it.

TELCOM

J. Alsop/Kissinger

10:20 a.m. 10/12/71

K: Good to know you are back.

A: I long to see you. What's your time in the next day or so?

K: Today is impossible. Perhaps in the afternoon we can improvise something.
Could I call about 3:00?

A: I will be in bed.

K: Tomorrow I am away. How about Thurs.?

A: Lunch?

K: I can't. We will get together.

A: When do you go to China?

K: Sometime next week.

A: I wonder what's going on over there? The Soviets are probably involved.

K: Something fishy going on with that airplane.

A: And why ______ if the Soviets not in air involved.

K: And why wait 3 weeks to announce it and why invite the Chinese Amb.
in Mongolia Republic to view it? They are not usually that meticulous.

A: Estraordinary business. ______ was nice to me because of your message.

K: Did he impress you?

A: I didn't see Osborne. Had a wonderful time with David Dean. He was only
there on the weekend. Osborne was with the Governor General.

K: They treated you well?

A: All on account of you. At the end of the day today?

K: I don't know. I will call you. Good to know you are back.

TELCONE
Amb. Plimsoll/Kissinger

10:40 a.m.

10/12/71

K: I have a reply for the PM and if you would like to come by to collect it sometime, it will be here.

P: I can come anytime.

K: I have a date for the PM but it may be too early to suit him. Nov. 2, here. When he is here there will of course be an appointment in the office for some length and the President would like to give a State dinner rather than a private one.

that
P: I think they will fit in.

K: We can confirm that. If you can accept the Nov. 2 date, you can consider it settled.

P: I will let you know tomorrow.

K: Due to some slip up here we didn't give you advance warning I wanted but the President has agreed to meet with the Soviet leaders in Moscow at the end of May. It will be announced at noon. You might consider it advance information. I don't suppose it will be much of a shock in Australia.

P: We expected something but didn't know when.

K: We are so intent on notifying European Allies and it just occured to me this morning. Can one admit incompetence? The President will be prepared to discuss this when they meet.

P: I will come by your office and pick up the other reply.

K: It's a formal reply and was wending its way through the WH bureaucracy.

P: Do I have to come myself or send someone?

K: Send someone. You will hold this until noon?

P: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012582
By: L. NARA Date: El 01 Sp 82

*

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:47 a.m., October 12, 1971

D: Good morning, Henry.

K: Anatoliy, I have decided the following. We will send all our communications to Japan through you because they don't leak them when they get them from you.

D: I received the following telegram to you from our Foreign Minister. 'For understandable reasons, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had to inform its embassies regarding the forthcoming announcement. Apparently the Charge d'Affaires in Tokyo thinking only one or two days remained informed his counterpart and committed a blunder. Of course, no serious damage is done because it was not made public. Sometimes American representatives have committed the same type of thing. We believe no serious importance should be attached to this. The American side is well aware that our agreement with you regarding the confidentiality of our negotiations is strictly adhered to by the Soviet Government. Clearly, in the future we should discuss these aspects in order to avoid misunderstandings on these points.'

K: That last point is a good one. However, the Japanese now have reason to believe they heard this from you before they heard it from us, their allies. It's embarrassing, apart from the danger of a leak which strangely enough did not occur. Usually, they leak like crazy. But at any rate, I understand what your Foreign Minister is saying. And we accept it in the spirit in which it is made. We have to be explicit who is told and who isn't.

D: We didn't tell anyone on the substance of the matters discussed.

K: There was some irritation that perhaps you were trying to take advantage of the fact that the Japanese feel neglected.

D: No. We attach importance to all the things we discuss with you.

K: We will have dinner on Thursday evening. You tell the Foreign Minister we appreciate the nature of his reply.

D: All right. 8:30 on Thursday?

K: Yes. Good-bye.

lds

TELECON

Gerard Smith

10/12/71 10:50 a.m.

S: I was wondering if anything passed between Gromyio and the President I might be made aware of on SALT.

K: Just to be sure that nothing important was discussed with you.

S: Aside from that?

K: Yes, I will let you have the extract from the memcon that deals with it. The President rather firmly stated his view that they couldn't insist on equivalence on defensive and _status quo_ (?) on offensive. Gromyko stated his views . . .

S: I just hope they won't say you have got twice as many in defensive weapons so it justifies our having more in offensive.

K: They will have more offensive.

S: No, not in any formal agreement I hope.

K: In the interim one.

S: . . . . .

K: . . . . Of course, mentioning zero ABM to you is like putting a drink in front of an alchoholic.

S: No, I am refreshed after a week off, so you can take that chance now.

TELECON

Gerard Smith

10/12/71 2:20 p.m.

S: I read on the ticker that you and the President are going to negotiate SALT in Moscow.

K: Oh Jesus Christ, relax. For Christ's sake! Read what the President said.

S: I am relaxed. I'm disgusted, but relaxed.

K: They asked if SALT was going to be finished. He said he didn't know but if it wasn't it might be discussed. But read what he said. He said we are pushing ahead and we now expect that the SALT agreement we are working on will be finished. But if it's not, then maybe it will be discussed. If it's finished then the direction of the next steps may be discussed.

S: Henry, do you remember our discussion in December 1970 about whether we were planning for a Summit? Semenov had been saying there would be one and so I asked you about it. You assured me that if there was one I would be advised. So we still took the position that in December of 1970 there was no discussion of a Summit.

K: In December of 1970 as it happens there wasn't.

S: Okay then, before December.

K: There was an earlier one which aborted, and that was it.

S: I look like a fool with Semenov for not knowing about that. I will look like one this time.

K: In what way are you affected this time?

S: What am I to say if I am asked if I knew about this by newsmen? Say no, I knew nothing about it? I went to the edge of the truth in my talk about the May 20 business. But I don't want to do anything at this point more than register my state of mind.

K: First, with regard to what will be discussed at Moscow, there has been no exchange on that at all, and no change whatever. If you can get it settled before May, so much the better.

S: Do you think the prospects are brighter now than they were yesterday for that?

TELECON

Gerard Smith

10/12/71

2:20 p.m. p. 2

K: The President said . . . he put great stress on this year or early next year at his press conference. He reminded them of that phrase.

S: I am puzzled as to our tempo here. If we are expecting something I don't know how we'll discuss it in May.

K: Where did you get the idea that we are discussing SALT in May? They asked if SALT would be a subject and the President replied that we have an understanding with the Soviets which was announced. He went further by saying that we would try to reach an agreement this year. If not this year, certainly try for early next year. And if something remains to be discussed we'll talk about it in May. I don't see why you think it wouldn't be mentioned.

S: No, but it would have been at least courteous to have the head of the agency directly responsible at least aware that the meeting had been discussed. When you have to read it on the ticker it makes you wonder.

K: He didn't volunteer it. Sisco will be calling me next because he said something about the Middle East too.

S: But he is not the head of an agency. I have had this analogy made to me before. I don't get happy when I hear about an Assistant Secretary being upset. If you had an agency in charge of the Middle East I wouldn't blame him for being concerned. But if Marty Hillenbrand didn't know about Berlin, that would be different.

K: The President didn't say it would be on the agenda. He said it could be. I don't think that is so startling. I take your criticism as you being the head of the agency.

S: I go into the Secretary of State staff meeting and hear that there will be an announcement and don't know anything it's about. Then I am asked to talk about SALT. And a few hours later this comes out and I look like a fool. I don't know how you expect people to go playing along like this.

K: I don't see how this affects you.

S: That's the problem; no one sees how it affects anybody else. It makes me look like a fool with Semenov going around saying that I don't know about the discussions for a summit.

K: At that time there had been a discussion which had aborted. There was one on October of 1970 which aborted, but by early November 1970.

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

3:05 p. m.

10/12/71

R: That went well I thought. I am calling about Chile. We are preparing
a statement to be issued tomorrow.

K: That's right.

R: If the statement being issued that unless the President wants to issue it
and I don't think it wise -- someone said Connally but I don't think it's wise.

K: I told my man either Treasury or State. If you are willing to do it, it
would be more effective.

R: We took the lead in the case of Peru not to invoke the Hickenlooper. I
think we will have to invoke it this time. I will do it in my name.

K: The President wants a strong statement. Better from you. I don't know
if you want it as a State matter -- let's do it. Or if you want it as a Commercial
matter, that's fine.

R: IPC is a similiar matter.

K: The President wants to be tough.

R: As tough as you want. If it appears in the next 10-15 days nothing that's
good then we will have to appeal Hickenlooper.

K: ? ? ?

R: They have all the muscle in this one. They owe us and the govt a lot
of money running into millions. Nothing much we can do. What did the
Foreign Minister say? I told him that last year you said fair compensation
to our companies.

K: He said this wasn't the final process and I asked when the Process would
be completed. He said 2-3 weeks. I said we will wait until then. We hav
our legal problems and so do you.

R: I want to say we think you are committed to expropriation
without compensation. I think it doesn't look like you are working out what
you told me last year. He said I am wrong. I said we would be watching.

K: I said if you want to work it unilaterally, that's fine with us.

R: 4:30 meeting?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F01258
By CNARA Date 6/2/81

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:26 p. m.

10/12/71

D: I just read the transcript of the President. What he said. It's my
turn to ask you. He said you informed all Europeans and Japanese too.

K: An hour before.

D: What about the Chinese?

K: Very briefly.

D: When you inform the Chinese?

K: Yesterday evening.

D: Because this is a point too. The Govt. of the People's Republic was informed
this announcement would be made today and aware of the date of the Soviet
visit.

K: All they were told is a Soviet announcement. No one on our side has been
told the date.

D: The President said --

K: It has not been correct. The date is not correct. They only know the announce-
ment made.

D: You informed yesterday only?

K: 25 hours before -- I have to check the time change.

D: One or two days in this case. They are aware --

K: In the last day. It was simply informed that there will be an announcement.

D: Could I make a comment to my people that on first case in Japan this
was one hour and one day before?

K: No one told other than there would be an announcement and what was in
the announcement. Nothing further.

D: This slip of tongue.

K: That's what I meant. Latter half of May. They don't know the exact date.
No one knows the exact date including the Chinese and we will not tell them.

D: One hour and one day. I will tell them because I will get a telegram tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOL2557
By CHNARA Date 03/12/71

Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:26 p. m.

10/12/71

K: It's the time differential. We cannot get to the Chinese to notify in an hour.

D: Others you inform in Washington. So that was true this one. I will tell them to get questions from their side.

K: I am sticking to my agreement with you that you will know of anything with the Chinese 24 hours before.

D: Is it fixed yet your date? Next week.

K: Probably next week. I will probably call you tomorrow.

D: OK. It will probably be a press conference.

K: Just be sure that not even the Chinese know the precise day. They were told a paraphrase of the announcement.

D: But May mentioned.

K: We said we would announce a meeting with your leaders in the latter part of May.

D: They will want to know what kind of advance meeting there was.

TELCON
S. Alsop/Kissinger
5:30 p. m. 10/12/71

A: I am in excellent shape. I am having a test tomorrow and expect them to be more amazed. Remember we discussed over lunch the possible reconstruction of evidence since the President made the statement in Aug. on possible negotiations. I am sure you saw the Teddy Kennedy thing that if there had not been the failure of Americans to negotiate American (men) would not be rotting in VN Jails.

K: Noneense.

A: Of course. Wouldn't it be to your advantage and mine if I had knowledge to show it's ridiculous and a very hard blow to negotiations and because of this negotiations brought down?

K: What I would rather consider is this. It would be damaging now for reasons I cannot go into. When I am prepared to talk about this I will talk to you and alone.

A: That's fair enough. I would like to slap Ted down.

K: It will not be in the next week or two. I don't mind telling you it was a impressive reconstruction.

A: The weakness of the situation is that people like Ted and McGovern ? ? ? . It's ridiculous.

K: They are looking more and more ridiculous. Do you think it's plausible this Administration is screwing about this subject when everything else is showing imagination? You consider what the President said in his first press conference and what State of the World report and you will see what we have done.

A: The circle has been squared. This is true but the prisoner thing remains emotional and highly controversial. These people will consider to say that as a result of this our children are rotting in jails.

K: When I open up it will be with you first. The thing we want from you is white blood cells up. Will you let me know?

A: I will give you a reading.

TELCONE

Stans/Kissinger

5:35 p. m.

10/12/71

S: They told me Friday you have a message.

K: The Soviets want someone to discuss trade matters with them there and we are sending you. We don't want to announce it for a couple of weeks. We want to wait until I am back from China.

S: When are you back?

K: In a couple of weeks. We wnat to go in Mid-Nov.

S: The only advantage for going early is the weather.

K: We have political things to keep in balance.

S: I know.

K: We are keeping our promise that you will be the first to go.

S: When can I talk with the Ambassador?

K: He doesn't know yet. I would like to send a staff member along.

S: And the President wants also someone from State.

K: They have an ambassador there. I can take care of it.

S: When you get bakc I will want to check on a lot ot other points with you.

TELECON

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., October 12, 1971

K: Tom, how are you?

M: Henry, do you recall the SRG meeting when we were talking about the Middle East force and Bahrain facilities we were going to take over in the absence of the British.

K: Yes.

M: We are going ahead with this. I talked with Laird and Alex Johnson who agree. We will make arrangements with the Bahrain authorities. This is necessary for us to have a force there and everybody is agreeable with it, but I wanted to touch base with you. We won't take but about a tenth of the facilities the British have.

K: That's all right.

M: If we don't go in now, we will lose the opportunity to take the things we need, so we are going ahead. But I wanted to clear it with you.

K: I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

lds

TELCORN

Secy. Laird/Kissinger

6:15 p. m.

10/12/71

L: I don't mean to be a rascal as you call me but I will go but ? ? ?

K: We are sending Richardson. We will send you a day later under these conditions.

L: I don't get through until the 31st with the bilaterals.

K: We don't want any speculation on troop announcements.

L: I am leading the fight to get it quieted down.

K: We will send someone else to the inauguration.

L: You understand why. Tom Moorer and I represent the military aspects and that's what we will be discussing and we don't think we should be the President's representative.

K: This gives two pillars of support. Send Richardson and you.

L: Send a message out tonight because Bill was thinking of Romney or
Lodge.

K: Lodge won't go.

L: Sorry about the problem.

K: We talked about it some weeks ago.

L: I thought it was on track.

K: Don't worry about it.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Dwight Chapin
10/12/71; 6:30 p.m.

K: The schedule under which you are working is just going to kill me. If you give me books on Thursday and the President wants to see me all day on Thursday, I will have no chance to make any comment at all. That's point one. Point two -- we are up to 400 again! The Chinese won't take 400, believe me.

C: When we go with 150 press . . .

K: We won't be able to go with 150 press. I am almost ready to give up on the whole advance. I would like to tell the President to take me off the advance thing. I tried to tell everyone selling it is easy. The price we will pay for it is hard.

C: It's awfully hard for me to understand today when you agreed yesterday. . .

K: Yesterday we had 245 now we have 400. The President is calling me, I have to go. I will call you back.

10/12/71; 6:55 p.m.

K: It is my considered opinion that the figure which you people are putting forward is unreasonable as a public relations figure. If we want to blow a historic thing so that we can get better TV pictures, that is up to us. I feel 400 is going to be so ridiculous to these people even if they give it to us. From then on we are through. That's also Haig's opinion. That's not what I was screaming about -- we had it down to 383 before that.

C: I am sure we can get it back down to there.

K: I go to Bob and ask for a scrub and we get 400. The very austere level you had was about 400.

C: I have the figures before me -- 618; 412 was the austere figure with 245 as the . . .

K: I had to waste a whole afternoon yesterday to get it from 412 to 400. If the end result of an afternoon of screaming is to go from 412 to 400 . . .

C: We can cut out 63 people from ground station -- some from TV, etc.

K: Believe me when the Chinese get through with us we will be cutting more than that. Can I get a book tomorrow night so that if it is wrong I can get a crack at it.

- 2 -

C: Yes. The back-up book will be in first thing Thursday morning.
On these figures I think we are just going to have to . . .

K: If you people feel better about making a separate advance trip and
keep me out of it then you can do it. I am embarrassed to present this.
I know they have never had an entourage with more than 40 people.

C: But you agreed to 150 -- we decided we had to have couriers for
you.

K: Why?

C: If the President goes off to another city somebody has to service
you. We went through it with a fine-toothed comb.

K: They will never believe this. We will see what happens. Just put it
into your notes that I have told you we are producing a disaster. That's
not what the Chinese thought we had agreed to.

C: Okay, very good.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
10/12/71; 6:35 p.m.

P: How is your talk going with Cromer?

K: They are not eager for that meeting on December 16 to put it mildly. They are playing the Gaullist line.

P: That's fine -- just an offer.

K: We can see as many of them bilaterally as we want. Watson has told us that Pompidou is dying to see you and Sato is dying to see you and Brandt would be happy to come charging over. Another possibility would be to ask Pompidou to arrange a visit with everybody in Paris.

P: Good. I would be for that. Okay, alright. I understand the British. They want to play their own line. But that's alright, they have their own interests. I understand -- don't you?

K: Oh, yes! Of course, the big mistake was made by Kennedy in pushing them so hard on the Common Market.

P: I don't think we ought to appear anxious with the British.

K: Why don't I back channel Watson and say we are prepared to have bilateral talks with Pompidou.

P: Either here or there.

K: If it is there, we ought to get together the others.

P: What about the NATO thing?

K: That might not be a bad idea.

P: This thing is getting a hell of a line!

K: In the newspapers it is terrific!

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Richardson
10/12/71; 6:40 p.m.

R: I thought I would call you back on this proposed delegation to Saigon. My first reaction on this was sure I would like to go and if the President wanted me to go I would naturally do it anyway. There are some real questions though if I am to represent him and the Administration. I thought, for example, in terms of HEW employees for instance who are anti-war and of course the constituency that we represent generally on the domestic front urge the earliest possible abandonment of any further investment of U. S. resources. So, the question is quite serious.

K: I will put it to the President.

R: For his point of view of my effectiveness on his behalf. We have managed to keep things quite pretty much -- at least out of the newspapers -- but it is a continuous problem. I was handed a sheet on the way to work this morning asking for a rally of HEW employees on the war.

K: It is pretty bad when you can't get Cabinet members to go to the inauguration.

R: On a personal basis I would like to go but I think it needs consideration. I work for him and his Administration and that ought to be considered pretty carefully.

K: I will make that point to him and call you in the morning.

TELCOM
R. Zeigler/Kissinger
evening 10/12/71

Z: The French are saying they were informed by the Soviet Union on Oct. 6 and never informed by the U.S.

K: Not true. They were informed by the U.S.

Z: When?

K: Today.

Z: Can I say that?

K: Well before the announcement. For your guidance but not know to State, we <u>know</u> Watson in with a personal letter to Pompidou first thing this morning.

Z: That's fine. It's interesting the Soviets informed them on the 6th.

K: They are SOB's.

TELCON

Ben Bradlee/Kissinger

9:55 a.m.

10/14/71

K: I thought about this. You do what you want. The only thing I ask is you
print it and I make no comment. I met this girl through Taft Schreiber who is
President of Universal.

B: Brown?

K: Yes. No one said she is playing in skin movies. I took her out twice more
and when she used me for publicity I dropped her.

B: The trouble is it's in the trade papers and movie magazines. I killed it
last night because it wasn't ready. I don't know what to do.

K: I will ride it out or not. This is what happened and I stand by it. I did what
I did and it's perfectly -- I didn't do anything wrong. That's my position and I
refuse any comment.

B: Where are you?

K: In my office.

B: Oh, I thought you were out West somewhere.

K: I am leaving Sat. I don't want to hide behind the China trip. I think it's a
disgrace but that only proves that victims only feel agreived.

B: I don't know what I will do. I am just in now and have things more important
than that.

K: That's our circumstances. I took them to public places and I never was
told about it. Three times in 9 months is hardly an intimate relationship. The
last time was when photographers were waiting and I walked out through the kitchen
and dropped her.

B: We may drop it.

K: I wonder if one does it each time as persistent as Maxine does.

B: 700,000 subscribers are reading all about it.

K: I won't read the article. When this maniacal girl does this I am not proud.
I am revolted by it. I haven't read it and I won't.

B: I will call you this afternoon if I may.