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whole world will suffer.

The United States has made its position clear. At the U.N. Special Session called to discuss these issues 2 weeks ago, I pledged our country to a cooperative, understanding approach. I said that we are prepared to work with other nations to put the technological and economic genius of the modern age in the service of all mankind. The United States is convinced that the developed and the developing nations working together can achieve through cooperation what neither can extort through economic warfare or ideological pressure —economic advance for all our peoples.

In this spirit the United States presented a comprehensive and detailed program for economic and social cooperation to the Special Session. These proposals and this attitude will guide us in future discussions with the less developed nations. The results at the Special Session, which just concluded today, were constructive. Discussions took place in a conciliatory spirit, and the final document produced considerable convergence between the developed and the developing countries and the outlines of a consumer program of action.

Cooperation must remain a two-way street. If nations wield their special strengths as weapons, the promise of global progress will give way to the perils of global confrontation.

The most critical immediate issue, of course, is the question of the price of oil. We and our partners in the International Energy Agency have already taken major steps to conserve oil and to establish financial structures that will help us cope with the impact of rising oil prices. Much still remains to be done. But the United States, in cooperation with other industrial nations, will make a determined effort to reverse the conditions that have enabled oil prices to be set unilaterally. The United States cannot, and will not, entrust its political and economic destiny to decisions made elsewhere.

At the same time we are ready to seek a new relationship with the oil-producing nations. We ought to be partners, not adversaries. Consumers must have reliable access to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest their new oil wealth, the producers must become major importers of our products. We are ready to cooperate with the oil producers in linking our economies on equitable terms.

Next month the oil producers, developing

countries, and industrial countries will meet to launch a dialogue on energy, raw materials, development, and finance first proposed by President Giscard d'Estaing of France. We have worked hard to make these meetings possible. We will work hard to make them a success. They provide us the opportunity to shape new constructive relationships in the world economy.

But another oil price rise would severely jeopardize these hopes. It could set off a relentless sequence of action and reaction to the detriment of all countries, developed and developing. This vicious cycle must be avoided. The possibilities of a cooperative world order depend upon it.

## Peace in the Middle East

There is no more vivid example of the stake that we have in the world around us, and the decisive contribution that this nation can make, than the conflict in the Middle East.

The Congress is now deliberating on the recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement. As it does so, it is important for the American people to understand why the United States is involved, what strategy we have pursued, the significance of the agreement, and where we will go from here.

The Middle East lies at the crossroads of three continents. Because of the area's strategic importance, and because it provides the energy on which much of the world depends, outside powers have continued to involve themselves in its conflicts, often competitively.

For the United States a diplomatic role in the Middle East is not a preference but a matter of vital interest:

* Because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel;

* Because of our important concerns in the Arab world, an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world's largest oil reserves;

* Because perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies in Europe and Japan;

* Because upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being of the industrial nations and the hopes of the developing world; and

* Because tension in the Middle East increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation

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with its attendant nuclear risk.

Each successive Middle East crisis has presented us with painful choices between our many commitments and interests. And each successive crisis accelerates the trends of radicalism in the area, putting greater pressures on America's friends in the moderate Arab world and heightening all the tensions and dangers.

The stake of every American in peace in the Middle East was dramatically and concretely illustrated by the Middle East war of 1973:

* The oil embargo, coupled with the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price increases, cost Americans half a million jobs and over $10 billion in national output. It added at least 5 percentage points to the price index, contributing to the worst inflation since World War II. It set the stage for a serious worldwide recession, from which we are only now recovering 2 years later.

* Partly because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil, our principal allies in Western Europe and Japan separated from us over Middle East policy in the most serious strain in our alliances since they were founded.

* The 1973 crisis tested the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, leading us briefly to the verge of confrontation in the October 24 alert.

The October war also set in train momentum that is now irreversible. Events can be channeled toward diplomatic progress, or they can pull us headlong toward another war. This is why the United States, since October 1973, has been actively engaged in promoting a peaceful solution. We have no illusions about the difficulties. The Middle East has seen more than its share of dashed hopes and disappointment. But progress depends crucially, even decisively, on the United States. Time and again the parties have turned to us for mediation. Time and again we have acceded to these requests because we are convinced that stagnation invites disaster. The next Middle East war will pose greater risks, complexities, and dangers and cause more dislocations than any previous conflict.

What, then, has been our approach? For nearly three decades it was axiomatic that *all* issues pertaining to *all* the countries involved had to be addressed comprehensively: the final frontiers of

Israel and the reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab states; the future of the Palestinians; the status of Jerusalem; and the question of international guarantees should all be considered together. But for 30 years it proved nearly impossible even to begin the process of negotiation. Every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed—from the partition plan, to the Lausanne conference, to the Rogers plan and the Four Powers talks of 1969 and 1970, to the U.N. Security Council deliberations. To discuss simultaneously issues of such complexity, between countries whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even the concept of compromise, was futile until a minimum of confidence had been established. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant dream.

The United States therefore concluded that instead of seeking to deal with all problems at once we should proceed step by step with the parties prepared to negotiate and on the issues where some room for maneuver seemed possible. We believed that once the parties began a negotiating process, they would develop a stake in success. Solutions to problems more easily negotiable would build mutual confidence. On each side a sense would grow that negotiations could produce benefits and that agreements would be kept—agreements that could become building blocks for a final peace. Ultimately we expected that the step-by-step process would bring about, for the first time, the basic political conditions needed for the overall settlement called for by Security Council Resolution 338. This remains our goal.

Progress since the October war has been without precedent since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council Resolution 338 launched a negotiating process and the first Geneva conference. Agreements to separate the opposing forces and establish U.N. buffer zones to strengthen the cease-fire were successfully negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Syria and Israel in May 1974.

The role of the United States was crucial in helping the parties reach these agreements. It reflected the fact that only we had developed strong relationships of trust with all parties. Major Arab

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countries that broke diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore their ties with us, creating a new climate of confidence and thereby the conditions for progress. And our traditional friendship with Israel has been reinforced in the crucible of crisis and the long months of close association in negotiations.

The momentum of progress was interrupted in the summer and fall of 1974: first by our Presidential succession; then by the decision of the Arab summit at Rabat which made negotiations over the West Bank impossible. When negotiations were resumed in March of this year, they first ended in deadlock. We therefore reexamined our approach asking whether we should continue the step-by-step strategy or move directly to the Geneva conference and a comprehensive approach. The imminent crisis we feared as a result of the March deadlock did not materialize—almost solely because everyone expected that the United States, in one way or another, would resume its effort.

The President consulted widely with Congressional and civic leaders, with our Ambassadors from the area, and with the Middle East parties. He met with King Hussein [of Jordan], President Sadat [of Egypt], Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel], and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. We benefited from the views of the new Saudi leadership which is continuing the policy of the highly respected late King Faisal.

The President concluded that the time was still not ripe for a comprehensive approach. In the wake of an apparent failure, the intractability of the issues would only be compounded by their being combined. Bringing all the parties, including the most irreconcilable, together in one dramatic public negotiation was an invitation to a deepened stalemate. This could discredit the whole process of negotiation and create a slide toward war. It was widely understood that the momentum of diplomatic progress had to be restored before Geneva was convened to consider the broader issues. Therefore, at the request of both sides, the United States resumed its step-by-step effort. The result was the new agreement between Egypt and Israel which was signed in Geneva on September 4.

The agreement is fair and balanced.

* Territorially, it provides for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic Sinai passes. Egypt re-

covers a significant portion of its territory, including the economically important oil fields.

* Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the ceasefire. It widens the buffer zone and extends the limitations of forces that were negotiated in the disengagement agreement of January 1974. These balanced provisions markedly reduce the danger of surprise attack that figured centrally in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

* Politically, the agreement—which remains in force until it is superseded by another one—commits both sides to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict, and to refrain from use or threat of force or of military blockade. It permits nonmilitary Israeli cargoes to go through the newly reopened Suez Canal.

Both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have hailed the agreement as a possible turning point. It represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace—political, military, and psychological—in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time Israel and an Arab state have taken a step, not just to halt fighting or to disentangle the forces but to reduce the danger of future war and to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of the conflict. The effort that went into it and the inhibitions that both sides had to overcome reflect a serious determination to end a generation of violence. And both sides have affirmed that the agreement is a significant step in a process that must be continued toward a just and durable peace.

The achievement owes much to the courage of leaders on both sides. President Sadat and his government moved Egypt on the path of moderation and development. They have understood that a political process offered the only realistic hope for the achievement of all Arab interests. Credit is due equally to the courage of Prime Minister Rabin and the Government of Israel. Israel's dilemma is that to obtain peace it must give up tangible assets, such as territory, for intangible concessions, such as assurances and recognition. Israel's leaders realized that only negotiation offered a hope to achieve what Israel has sought for 27 years: New political conditions that would mean acceptance by its neighbors in return for withdrawal from territory. They had the wisdom to recognize that the time had come to start this difficult, even painful, process.

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The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the early-warning system in the small area of the passes is a limited, but crucial, American responsibility. It was not a role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides only when it became totally clear that there would be no agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the United States.

In the aftermath of Indochina the concerns of some Americans about this presence are understandable. But the two cases are totally different. The American presence in the Sinai is not a step into conflict; it is a move which gives added insurance against conflict. It is limited to 200 volunteer civilians by agreement with both sides. They will be stationed in a small, but important, sector of the U.N. neutral zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers engaged on one side of an ongoing war. They serve both sides at their request and complement the U.N. presence from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria, and Finland.

Our presence in the area is not new. Indeed 36 Americans are at this moment serving with the U. N. Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The agreement provides the President the right to withdraw the American personnel if they are in jeopardy. We are prepared, as well, to accept a congressional proposal making the withdrawal mandatory in case of hostilities. In short, what we have proposed to the Congress and the American people is not an engagement in war, but an investment in peace.

There will also be deliberation in the Congress over military and economic assistance to the parties. We will submit our recommendations within a month. This assistance is not part of the agreement, itself. Indeed most of the assistance we shall request would have been sought even if there were no agreement. But in the present context our aid takes on new significance; it is central to our policy and vital to the chances for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Economic and military support for Israel's security has been American policy during five administrations. Last May 76 U.S. Senators wrote to President Ford urging that the United States "be responsive to Israel's urgent economic and military needs." The Administration's request for new

assistance to Israel is responsive to this call. It will reflect longstanding criteria of assistance. Only a small part grows out of new requirements arising from the agreement.

The case for aid to Egypt is equally strong. Egypt has taken important steps toward peace and closer relations with the West. Egypt deserves our encouragement. American technology and capital, public and private, can strengthen all the constructive tendencies in the Middle East. The symbolic and substantive significance of American support to Egypt is immeasurable.

Thus the additional burden of U.S. assistance is modest—infinitely smaller than the demonstrated costs of another war, which in 1973 required direct appropriations to Israel of $2.2 billion in addition to the indirect costs. But its role is crucial: It reduces the incentives for war; it, too, is an investment in peace.

Where do we go from here?

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step in a continuing process. The agreement states explicitly that the parties shall continue the negotiating efforts to reach an overall, final peace settlement in accordance with resolution 338.

The path ahead will be difficult. In the immediate future, we must begin the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. This must await the deliberation and decision of the Congress. When this is settled and if the agreement goes into effect, we will start our consultations with all concerned to assure that there is consensus on the next step. We will not move precipitously, because we want confidence to build. We will not move without careful preparation, because we want the process to continue to succeed.

But the effort to achieve a lasting peace must resume. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement has created new opportunities for the future—but these opportunities must be seized, or they will disappear. The United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace but to give it new impetus. There can be no stagnation for the area remains tense and volatile.

For our part, we stand ready to assist as the parties desire. We will seriously encourage a negotiation between Syria and Israel. We are prepared to consult all countries concerned, including the Soviet Union, about the timing and substance of a reconvened Geneva Conference. And we are fully

7

aware that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

The United States seeks no special advantage in the Middle East. It has always been our policy that the nations of the region should be free to determine their own relationships with any outside power. Therefore the United States would not understand and would be obliged to oppose efforts by any outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

In the search for a final peace the United States is prepared to work with the Soviet Union. We are cosponsors of the Security Council resolutions that launched this hopeful course of negotiation; we are cochairmen of the Geneva peace conference which met at an early crucial phase. While we have had important differences with the Soviet Union over the substance of a settlement, our two countries have held parallel views that the Middle East situation poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of, and contribute to, progress toward a comprehensive solution.

In the Middle East there is a yearning for peace surpassing any known for a generation. Let us seize this historic opportunity. The suffering and bravery of the peoples of the Middle East demand it; the highest interests of the United States require it.

This is why the American people, their Congress, and the President, are to an extraordinary degree, united on the course of our Middle East policy. And this is why we will not cease our effort.

## Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, we Americans have spent the better part of a decade apologizing to ourselves and the world for what we thought we had become. We have spent most of the last 3 years enmeshed in a national tragedy that caused many to lose sight of what our country has meant, and continues to mean, to the billions abroad who look to the United States as a beacon of freedom and hope.

Today the issues that threatened our unity and confidence are in the process of being put behind us. A world of turmoil, danger, and opportunity cries out for our purposeful leadership. There is no doubt of our physical capacity and technical skill. But we must put them in the service of a common purpose.

After a decade of challenge and crises, we must strive to insure that our government will be united, that our people will have confidence, that our country will be strong, and that our freedoms will flourish. As we enter the year of a political campaign at home and an era of unprecedented challenge abroad, a spirit of unity and bipartisanship becomes our international, as well as national, duty. We cannot afford a year and a half of partisan warfare. Our foreign policy must be a common enterprise of all Americans, for what we do—or fail to do—will inevitably affect events for many years to come.

If the past 2 years of effort in the Middle East have lessened the dangers of war and set that part of the world on the road to peace—as I pray they have—it is the United States that has made the difference. It is the United States alone, among the world's nations, that Israel and its Arab neighbors were prepared to trust. It has been deeply moving for me to observe, after all the travails and self-doubts of the last decade, the confidence that others have in us. The nations of the Middle East have thus done us a service in reminding us of how in serving our international responsibility we also serve our own highest goals.

In the final analysis it is our own principles and hopes that define our obligation. America has always stood for something beyond our own material success: We have always believed—correctly—that we meant something to others. Our Founding Fathers spoke of the rights and hopes of all men. Our belief in the inalienable rights of man is no less compelling today—no less worthy of sacrifice—than it was 200 years ago when a few dreamers came together in Philadelphia to proclaim history's only truly permanent revolution.

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO TO THE PRESS FOLLOWING THEIR DINNER
AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1975

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: We tonight discussed the Middle East
and there is no need to discuss it in much detail. The policy
of the USSR is well known. Any objective thinker is familiar
with the policy. We didn't go into great detail. I want to
say it was very helpful. We are in favor of peace in the Middle
East.

First point is for the occupied Arab territories to be given up.
Second, to recall the Palestine problem on the basis of sustaining
a Palestine national entity -- without that no reliable solution
can at this time be found. And third, an agreement must be found
(inaudible) invision strict guarantees of the existence of all of
the states of the region of the Middle East, naturally including
Israel.

And that in brief is what should be done. We are prepared to
consider that problem at a broad forum, of course on the under-
standing that it would reconstitute it with the participation
of all of the parties concerned. And we are prepared to engage
in consultations in another forum including bilateral consultations
between the Soviet Union and the United States. We have been
in favor of that before and today there has been an agreement that
there should be decent and profound consultations and they should
be held in the nearest possible time. And, that we feel is good,
and we certainly say for ourselves that we would like to see real
progress, not just visual progress, but real, substantive progress
in this matter.

**QUESTION:** Are you saying that the agreement in your opinion is just visual progress, is that what I am supposed to get the impression what you mean by that?

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: I prefer to speak in the positive. We are in favor of a serious approach, in favor of serious effrots to resolve to settle the problem.

**QUESTION:** Do you have any comment, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had an extensive exchange and we agreed to
continue to exchange ideas and maintain close contact through the
processes of negotiations, including what negotiations might be most
useful.

**QUESTION:** Can I take it to mean that anything on Geneva was decided?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was a preliminary exchange with no final
decisions, but we will remain in close contact about the problem.

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[LC]

Foreign Minister Gromyko then departed.

**QUESTION:** I don't know how he is so vigorous!

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** He's been in great shape before the press. He has a new approach.

**QUESTION:** Bill says this is what we got from Helsinki -- a freer, more extensive exchange of ideas. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** How is it going -- are you getting anything on the SALT really?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We had a very detailed exchange today which -- really, you people keep taking the temperature every day, and it's impossible in the nature of this thing to give a daily progress report. The atmosphere is good; I think there is an effort to come to an agreement. We are working at it with the intention of seeing where adjustments are possible. And the next progress that is going to be made is likely to be breaking the deadlock, so it's not easy to --

**QUESTION:** That won't be until you go to Moscow, presumably?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Probably.

**QUESTION:** Was tonight just the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes.

**QUESTION:** And then Sunday is going to be SALT again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes.

**QUESTION:** So when have you had any chance for trade and things like that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That we have also discussed this afternoon briefly and that we'll discuss sometime.

S/PRS
9/20/75

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

PRESS RELEASE

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

For Release at 11:00 a.m. EDT

PRESS RELEASE USUN-99 (75)

September 22, 1975

ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE

THIRTIETH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

BUILDING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen:

At the outset, let me say how pleased we are that our deliberations this year take place under the Presidency of the distinguished Prime Minister of Luxembourg. His contribution to European cooperation, his diplomatic skills, his dedication to democracy give us confidence that this 30th session will be marked by a constructive and creative spirit.

And I want also to pay tribute to the distinguished Secretary General whose fairness, leadership, and tireless effort are dedicated to carrying this Organization forward into a new era of cooperation for world peace.

This century has seen war and cataclysm on an unprecedented scale. It has witnessed the breakdown of established patterns of order and practices of international conduct. It has suffered global economic depression and cycles of famine. It has experienced the birth of thermonuclear weapons, and the proliferation of armaments around the planet. Ours is a world of continuing turmoil and ideological division.

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KISSINGER

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But this century has also seen the triumph of the principle of self-determination and national independence. A truly global community has begun to evolve, reflected in a multitude of institutions of international cooperation. We have shaped new methods of peaceful settlement, arms limitation, and new institutions to promote economic development and to combat hunger and disease worldwide. And our very presence here signifies the hope of all nations that disputes and conflicts can be resolved by cooperative means.

As we deliberate the future, an event of potentially vast implication has just been achieved in this Organization: the unanimous agreement produced by the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly on measures to improve the economic condition of mankind.

Despite differences of ideology and approaches to economic development, the nations assembled here began the move towards the recognition that our interdependence spells either common progress or common disaster; that in our age no nation or group of nations can achieve its aims by pressure or confrontation and that the attempt to do so would damage everyone. They agreed to transcend the stereotypes of the past in the search for a cooperative future. The Special Session forged a sense of common purpose based on the equality and cooperation of states. Now we must dedicate ourselves to implement this consensus.

Let us carry forward the spirit of conciliation into the deliberations of this Regular Session. Let us address the issues of world peace--the foundation of all else we do on this planet--with this same consciousness of our common destiny.

It is our common duty to avoid empty slogans and endless recrimination. We must instead sustain, strengthen and extend the international environment we and our posterity will require for the maintenance of peace and the furtherance of progress.

Only in a structure of cooperation, can disputes be settled and clashes contained. Only in an atmosphere of conciliation, can the insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, be eased, and habits of compromise and accommodation be nurtured. Social progress, justice and human rights can thrive only in an atmosphere of reduced international tension.

The United States stands ready to dedicate itself to cooperative efforts to harmonize the different perspectives of the world community in creating a new sense of security and wellbeing. We do so not out of fear, for we are better able to sustain ourselves in situations of confrontation than most other nations. Nor do we do so out of a sense of guilt, for we believe that we have on the whole used our power for constructive ends.

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KISSINGER

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We affirm our common destiny because of our recognition of global interdependence and because global peace requires it. Indeed there is no realistic alternative to shared responsibility in dealing with the international agenda of peace, security, economic wellbeing and justice.

Let me set forth the views of the United States on the work we face in each of these areas.

## BUILDING FOR PEACE

Our first and transcendent concern is for peace in the world.

Peace is never automatic.

It is more than the absence of war.

And it is inseparable from security.

A world in which the survival of nations is at the mercy of a few would spell oppression and injustice and fear. There can be no security without equilibrium and no safety without restraint.

Only when the rights of nations are respected, when accommodation supplants force, can man's energies be devoted to the realization of his deepest aspirations.

The United States will pursue the cause of peace with patience and an attitude of conciliation in many spheres.

- We shall nurture and deepen the ties of cooperation with our friends and allies.

- We shall strive to improve relations with countries of different ideology or political conviction.

- We shall always stand ready to assist in the settlement of regional disputes.

- We shall intensify our efforts to halt the spiral of nuclear armament.

- We shall strive to improve man's economic and social condition and to strengthen the collaboration between developed and developing nations.

- We shall struggle for the realization of fundamental human rights.

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