II-1

II

Limitation of war by these preconditions
To be effective a limited war capability must meet

The capability for limited war
three requirements: (a) it must be of sufficient size so that the potential aggressor cannot count on creating a fait accompli; (b) it must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that its use while involving an increased risk of all-out war is not an inevitable prelude to it; (c) It must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not our sole response to aggression and which is flexible enough to negotiate a settlement during pauses in military operations. If a limited war capability can be easily overrun, aggression may be encouraged and the dilemmas of massive retaliation will then confront us in even sharper form. If we resist by measures which we intend to be limited but which an opponent interprets as the prelude to an imminent all-out attack, he may launch a pre-emptive strike. If our diplomacy cannot take advantage of pauses in military operations

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The concept of a "limited" strategic war and limited retaliation starts from the premise that our all-out war force can be used to limit objectives. Limited strategic war would employ the retaliatory force for measures which are normally a prelude to all-out war. It would seek to achieve a military advantage but in a manner that does not commit us to a final show-down. For example in response to Soviet occupation of West Berlin we could destroy part of the Soviet radar warning net. This would increase Soviet vulnerability to an all-out attack. It could serve as a warning of the consequences of persisting in the aggressive course it might be taken sufficiently seriously to lead to a settlement. Graduated retaliation would not seek to achieve military objectives as such. Rather it would attempt to inflict sufficient damage on the aggressor to cause him to desist from his aggression. For example in case of an invasion of Iran we would announce

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war force while at the same time making clear that such employment
will be limited -- at least initially. All the difficulties
described in the previous chapter in making the threat of all-
out war plausible would seem to apply also in this case. If
~~with undetermined force~~
~~threat of all-out war~~
anything the deterrent may lose the remainder of its credibility
though our efforts to convey our desire to establish some
~~on the one hand of some retaliation~~
limitation. The threat to conduct limited all-out war or
graduated retaliation may be taken as a symptom of the enormous
inhibitions against using our retaliatory force. On the other
hand, if we do not make the attempt to communicate at least
an outline of our intentions to keep the war limited, no prospect
for limitation exists at all.

Moreover, limited use of the retaliatory force does
~~not really deal with~~
not really deal with the problem of how to prevent pressure
against our allies. The Communist capability for blackmail is
based on two factors: the ability to threaten devastation
~~threat of~~

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II-8

overlook attacks you make in the first few hours after this
communication. From then on, we will retaliate in precise
proportion as you attack, but no more." Is it a foregone
conclusion that a President would use our retaliatory force in
that case? Or that it would be wise to do so?

Even if we resorted to our declared strategy, we would
still be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We would be
forced to engage in actions each of which almost guarantees at
least similar destruction in the free world and the constant risk of all-out war while the issue which produced
the conflict has already been settled in the aggressor's favor.
Every passing day would strengthen the Soviet hold on its prize
and bring home to us the futility of our course. In these
circumstances there is every prospect that skillful Communist
peace offensives would cause to weary of so unrewarding a
strategy, unless complete frustration were to induce us to launch

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to
insistent that they will then fail in bringing our determination
home to the aggressor. We may find ourselves having to choose
between ineffectualness or all-out war.

The aggressor might furnish less of a military incentive to retaliate. As long as the aggressor's retaliatory force remains intact, he may be prepared to endure a measure of damage without retaliation, if only to demonstrate the futility of our military effort. On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the military compulsion to retaliate may be smaller than in the case of limited strategic war, the psychological compulsion will be greater. It will be difficult not to retaliation when one's own civilian population is under attack. Moreover, the opponent may mistake what we intend as graduated retaliation for the prelude to an all-out attack -- unless we behave with a self-defeating circumspection. Thus whatever eventuality is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the retaliatory force is either defeat

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or all-out war.

The problem is so intractable because limited employment of the strategic force rather than preventing an aggressor from attaining his objective seeks to compel him to relinquish it once achieved. But to relinquish an objective once gained involves a loss of prestige which an aggressor may consider intolerable. Inability to advance leaves a stalemate; retreat after a victory is an admission of failure. Thus the limited employment of retaliatory forces confronts us with a more complex psychological problem than any other form of limited war while at the same time committing us to a strategy peculiarly unsusceptible to limitation, militarily.

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory forces must meet two requirements which in practice cancel each other out: The aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited strategic war or retaliation while it increases the

II-12

risk of all-out war it is not an inevitable prelude to it, and

(b) that we **are** prepared to resort to all-out war rather than accept defeat. If we fail in meeting the first condition, the opponent will probably strike pre-emptively. If we fail in meeting the second condition the aggressor may be encouraged to outwait us or to engage in a test of nerves with a built-in escalator to all-out war. This is not altogether bad for the very riskiness of such a course may make the aggressor recoil;

The very ease with which matters **could** get out of hand might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether the democracies would impose on themselves so daring, indeed so reckless, a strategy. Once deterrence has failed we will be confronted at every turn by the alternative of defeat or all-out war. In most circumstances limited strategic war will probably combine the disadvantages of limited and of all-out war.

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limited use of our retaliatory force. It might increase the credibility of our deterrent by emphasizing a threat which is not plausible. The gap between deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement will be smaller.

At the same time such a strategy has problems of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce the risk to the aggressor to the point where blackmail or military pressure become tempting. Where the limited use of the retaliatory force involves an undue danger of all-out war, most measures of retaliation too + long-term indirect punishment are so circumscribed in their nature that they are the one kind of limited war which may not significantly increase the possibility of a final show-down. This would not be bad — indeed it would be highly desirable — were not the punitive effect of most of the steps proposed so long-term. A naval blockade does not prevent a fair accompli. Closing the Dardanelles could not save Iran and its impact on the USSR would be long delayed.

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As a result, we would be forced to maintain over an indefinite period measures whose utility every passing day throws into question. Indeed, after a sufficient lapse of time they might supply additional pretexts for renewed Soviet pressure. There may in fact be a Communist incentive to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure and the importance of our response. At the same time, it will be difficult to resist Soviet peace offensives urging us to adjust to facts. The fate of the embargo of strategic goods against Communist China after the invasion of Korea can serve as one example of the difficulty of maintaining such a policy. The increasing pressure to accept the Soviet fait accompli in Eastern Europe is another.

If such a strategy presents great complexities for us, it is perhaps the least desirable cause of action for our allies. The blackmail situation described earlier will be even more poignant when the American response is so indirect. With Soviet

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occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide scope exists

for the gradual erosion of morale through steady Soviet pressure.

Another form of limited war is partisan warfare. Many thoughtful people horrified by the risks of nuclear war have come to the conclusion that any war involving the great powers would carry with it an intolerable risk of expanding into a nuclear halocaust. They therefore strongly imply that the areas should be defended by organizing the civilian population into partisan groups and confronting the Communists with the prospect of a long drawn out campaign of pacification.

One difficulty with this view is that it oversimplifies the task. There is no known instance of large-scale sustained partisan activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those uprisings which did occur were ruthlessly and quickly suppressed. There is little in this experience to cause them to be overly impressed by the threat of popular resistance and Communist theory would make them doubt even its possibility.

III-5

Moreover, there is a confusion between the effectiveness of partisan warfare as a strategy and its utility as a threat for deterrence. A country relying on partisan warfare for deterrence would have to convince the potential aggressor that while it would offer no organized resistance it would be able to train guerilla groups and would persevere in using them until the aggressor withdrew. These two requirements are to a large extent inconsistent with each other. The decision not to resist with organized forces can only be interpreted by the aggressor as lack of will. The threat to resort to partisan warfare is more likely to be construed as bluster than as a real menace. It is not easy to see what concrete steps a state could undertake to demonstrate its readiness for guerilla warfare or how it could be certain of its ability to carry out its threat. To make such a deterrent effective a government would have to convince an aggressor that while unable to protect its people against invasion, it has

III-6

sufficient prestige to ask for the most difficult and, for those
involved, most costly form of resistance. The more highly
organized the society, the greater its discipline, the more
an aggressor is likely to regard the threat as bluff, ~~as to count~~ *In a highly organised western society, the aggressor may* ~~with some confidence~~ on his ability to coerce the leadership groups to assist him in
restoring order. Whatever the value of partisan warfare, it is
next to impossible to convey as a threat -- especially by an
advanced society.

Guerilla warfare almost invariably requires special
conditions to be possible at all: of terrain, as in Yugoslavia
or Algeria, of overwhelming numbers as in China, or of vast
expanse, such as in Russia. Even then it could be conducted
~~militarily~~ *in a military and generally only when there was outside support, -- at the very least the moral support implied by outside military pressure on the common enemy* giving some prospect of eventual victory.

Partisan warfare can make a contribution to other forms of
*resistance; it cannot be a substitute for action.*

IV-12

discouraged by them. If war does break out, by accident or miscalculation, it is desirable to create the possibility for pauses to permit the two sides to reassess the situation and to negotiate a settlement before the ultimate catastrophe becomes inevitable. Under the pressure of events, the two sides may agree on limitations rather than face the prospect of all-out war. The task is without doubt complex. It is not eased by the penchant of some to use its complexity as an opportunity to score debating points.

(e) In case deterrence fails, how can we be certain
that local defense will not lead to general war? The obvious
reply is that we cannot be certain. Limited war is based on
cooperation among the protagonists, a kind of tacit bargain
not to exceed certain restraints. One side's desire to keep
the war limited is of no avail unless the other cooperates: it
takes two to keep a limited war limited or a local defense local.

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In a limited war between major powers, both sides have available
a greater military capability than they employ. Both sides, by
love
definition possess the technical ability to expand the war.

This is any reason for us to "spare" our military time.

Thus critics of the concept of limited war have a merry time proving the unreasonableness of any restraints. As long as either side has uncommitted resources at its disposal, any limitation can be made to appear arbitrary or ridiculous. Even granting many of these objections, the worst that would happen as a result of attempting a local defense is what is certain to happen with our present military policy. It does not make sense to refuse to consider local defense because it might lead to all-out war and then to adopt a strategic doctrine which must lead to all-out war.

However, paradoxical as it may seem, the danger that the conflict may expand is one of the factors that makes for limitation. Paradoxical as it may seem, the risk that any war

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could become all-out, places constraints both on its extent and its duration. If either side wanted an all-out war it would be foolish to alert the retaliatory force of its opponent by engaging in local conflict. The mere fact that a limited war of the desire to avoid a is taking place is a signal to both sides not only of the risks of all-out war but of the intention to keep it limited. Indeed, experience has shown that both sides generally lean over backwards to convey their limited aims and methods to the other.

This is why the argument which fails to see any logic in specific limitations misses the point: an illogical limitation is often particularly effective in conveying one's intentions to the other side. Its very lack of reasonableness is a token of self-restraint. During the Korean war we did not attack the airbases in Manchuria from which alone air attacks against our forces could be mounted. The Communists in turn did not bomb the only two ports through which we could obtain supplies. Similar

IV-15

restrictions were observed in the conflict over Quemoy. Our ships were permitted to approach within three miles of Quemoy without being fired on, and despite the fact that Communist China has always claimed that its territorial waters extend twelve miles, we then loaded supplies on small Nationalist landing vessels which were under fire as soon as they approached within onehalf of three miles to Quemoy. We in turn did not use our planes to bomb Chinese shore batteries. Neither of these limitations came about through explicit agreement. Neither would have been thought very sensible had it been proposed as a model at military staff colleges.

To assert that limitations must be to some extent arbitrary is not the same as saying that every limitation is equally valid and that the opponents can afford purely random, unpredictable behavior. Any limitation, illogical or otherwise, will work only if each side understands the intentions of the other and

be effective

IV-16

cooperates, with them. Limitations cannot be established by
This is difficult to do
good will alone. They cannot be improvised under the pressure
However, until the notion is确定ed, it is essential
of events, unless both sides tacitly agree as to what they
will avoid a
show-down. That would be a limited instance, not
understand by limitation.* Whatever the intentions of the
However, in time the desire might arise until such time
protagonists, limited war (could expand through a failure of
or aaryl incident,导致 minimization, if)
communication. For these reasons, the limitations which inspire
greatest confidence are those which might most "naturally" occur
to both parties assuming they wish to establish limitations --
and without this desire no limitation of any kind is feasible.

For example, any limited war must have some sanctuary
areas -- if only because a global war cannot be considered
limited. There is no particular reason for establishing the
boundaries of these sanctuaries in any particular place. In
the danger of misunderstanding is less
practice, however, it will probably prove easiest if the limits
of the sanctuary follow national boundaries. Such a demarcation
line will be easier to recognize than one chosen entirely at

* For a brilliant discussion see Schelling, Thomas, "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

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is a key factor, perhaps the decisive one, in keeping the war limited. Many of the theories of "automatic escalation" assume that the two opponents will move successively and that each will seek to add sufficient force to defeat the other. There is likely however to be a built-in limitation in the fact that both sides must make their commitments simultaneously. Simultaneous moves mean that each side is somewhat in ignorance of the commitment and measures of the other. Provided both sides really wish to avoid all-out war -- and if they did not they would not engage in limited war in the first place -- all pressures would make for caution. To be sure, the most likely outcome of such a conflict is a stalemate. But the possibility of a stalemate would be an enormous improvement over the present situation in most parts of the world.

Nevertheless, the danger of a limited war spreading to the risk of escalation "The must not be minimized. It will be particularly great if local

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V

Few problems have aroused more controversy than the role of and relative emphasis to be given to conventional and nuclear weapons in Western strategy. Understanding is not eased by the crucial significance for an enemy's age, strategy, and policy of the fact that there is reluctance of the debaters to identify the levels of discourse, and the future of arms control negotiations. Whether the judgment is moral or political or strategic; whether the argument addresses itself to feasibility or desirability?

Two basic facts need to be understood: whatever the ultimate judgment about the desirability or the possibility of limited nuclear war, no war in the nuclear age can ever be completely free of the specter of nuclear weapons -- at least until arms control measures are much further advanced and much more reliable. Even if no nuclear weapons are used in a war between nuclear powers, both sides would have to protect themselves against the possibility that they might be. The tactics would necessarily differ from those of World War II; the strategic concept would have to be protected against the sudden introduction of

V-2

Above all, Diplomats negotiate nuclear weapons; the diplomacy would have to take into account with the knowledge

the possibility that any prolonged conventional war may turn

into a nuclear conflict, if not into an all-out show-down. This

menace is not necessarily undesirable -- it may make unlikely a war of attrition on the model of World War I. But desirable or not, it cannot be ignored. Every war henceforth will be nuclear to a greater or lesser extent whether or not nuclear weapons are used.

A second fact is equally important: The choice between using conventional or nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to us. The Soviet nuclear arsenal is growing. Soviet military journals report tactical excercises with nuclear weapons. It would be a rash statesman who asserted that these weapons might not be used against us, or who staked our survival on such a proposition.

Even if we prefer to resist with conventional weapons, we have to be prepared for it. And in assessing its

nuclear war, we have to be prepared for it. Only being ready for limited nuclear war will give us the option of a conventional strategy. Otherwise an agreement can be a positive incentive to do so. As a background she can summarize the arguments for and against it. See below for further details. To p. II-4 Hamilton

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benefit from it. If we really wish to rely on conventional weapons, limited nuclear war must appear even more unattractive to any possible opponent. Only by being ready for limited nuclear war can we even discuss the possibility of not relying on it. In that case -- and in that case only -- we can have the policy choice of whether we should initiate nuclear war in case of every substantial aggression and whether we should threaten to initiate it to strengthen the deterrent.

The arguments for both sides carry great weight.

Advocates of a nuclear strategy emphasize the disparity in mobilizable manpower between the Communist bloc and the free world, a disparity made even more acute by the Communist ability to concentrate their whole weight against states much smaller and much less well-equipped. Nuclear weapons, it is claimed, could be used to serve as a substitute for manpower. At the very least they would force an attack on the forces preventing dispersal. This prevents breakthroughs of established defensive

V-5

positions and consolidation of occupied territory.

The proponents of this course admit that if nuclear weapons are simply added to the tactics of World War II the result will probably be the complete devastation of the combat zone. They reply that such a course would be senseless. The cost of a nuclear strategy must be judged in terms of the tactics appropriate to nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons are so destructive and at the same time so easy to transport, large military formations cannot be maintained in the field.

To concentrate is to court disaster. Safety resides in mobility.

Masses of troops are no longer required for firepower and the traditional supply system is too cumbersome and too vulnerable.

Accordingly, a great premium will be placed on small, self-contained units of high mobility, fighting apposing units of similar nature. In such circumstances, it is argued, the destruction would not be excessive; indeed it might be less than

V-6

that of a conventional war of the World War II variety with a
flankless frontline rolling over the countryside.

A nuclear strategy according to its proponents would
have these advantages over a conventional one: (a) The dispersal
of troops would separate the requirements of victory from those
of controlling territory. To prevail in a nuclear war, it is
necessary to have small, highly mobile units. To control
territory, larger concentrations are required particularly in
the key centers of administration. For example the Soviet
army had to concentrate some twenty divisions to crush the
Hungarian rebellion. This it is argued would have been clearly
impossible in the face of nuclear weapons. Aggression would thus
be deprived of its object. (b) Nuclear war would complicate the
aggressor's calculations -- if only because it is an unfamiliar
The Soviet Union possesses many 'agents'
in conventional warfare. Its main aim is to nuclearize war
mode of warfare. However, confident an aggressor might be, there

the calculation is incorrect; there
would always remain the inevitable uncertainty produced by

V-7

embarking on a course in which no experience can guide action.

(c) Nuclear war would be an effective device to weaken the political control of Soviet dominated areas. The small detachments appropriate for nuclear war will be extremely vulnerable to guerilla activity and can be handicapped severely by a hostile population. Since the population on the Western side of the Iron Curtain is more loyal to its governments than those under Communist rule, a nuclear war is thought to be the best means of exploiting Soviet political difficulties, -- at least in Europe -- and therefore the most effective means of deterring Soviet aggression.

d) Nuclear weapons are our "best weapons," the result of our most advanced technology. To forgo using them is to deprive ourselves of the advantages of a superior industrial potential. (e) Any other course would impose impossible force requirements. It is admittedly impossible to fight a conventional war against a nuclear enemy without having a nuclear establishment in the field --

V-8

otherwise the temptation to use nuclear weapons and sweep all
before him might become overwhelming, for the aggressor. This
means that we would need a well-protected retaliatory force, a
capable limited war force and increasing conventional strength.
Since the expense of maintaining each category even at present
levels is multiplying and since the military budget is
shrinking, any attempt to build up conventional forces must
result in a fundamental, perhaps fatal, weakness in each category.*

The advocates of a conventional strategy reply that the
very concept of limitation is inconsistent with the decision to
use nuclear weapons, Pointing to such exercises as *Carte Blanche*
in Europe and *Sagebrush* in the United States where tactical nuclear
weapons were tried in military maneuvers, they stress that whatever
inevitable consequence
the military outcome of a nuclear war its inevitable result will
be the desolation of the combat zone and the decimation of the

* For a fuller discussion of limited nuclear war see the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Ch. VI - "Problems of Limited Nuclear War," p. 191 ff.

V-11

A conventional strategy according to its advocates would
have these advantages. 1) It would provide the best chance to
limit any conflict that might break out. 2) It would use our
industrial potential to best advantage. Since the destructive
power of individual weapons is relatively low, victory can be
achieved only through a substantial production effort which puts
a premium on our special skills. At the same time, the relative
slowness of military operations and the need to build up supplies
before each new advance give the maximum opportunity for attempting
a political settlement. 3) Conventional defense provides the best
means of preventing the occupation of threatened countries. The
concept of a flankless line which advocates of a nuclear strategy
wish to abandon is likely to be considered by threatened countries
as the best guarantee of their safety. Liberation will always be
a less attractive prospect than protection. 4) If nuclear weapons
were used, after all, the onus of initiating such a war would be

V-12

shifted to the Communist states.

One of the difficulties in resolving these arguments
is that the moral fervor of the debaters sometimes obscures the
and makes it hard to see thealm to be true
nature of the issues: Those who think that to forego nuclear
weapons is an offense against Progress have as their counterpart
those who are passionately convinced that even to consider
modalities of nuclear warfare is to insult morality. As a result,
arguments that closer examination would reveal at least as
imprecise and sometimes as erroneous have been elevated into
dogma. For example it is often said that a nuclear war cannot
be limited because neither side would accept defeat without
resorting to ever larger weapons. Now there are many good reasons
for concern about the possiblity of limiting nuclear war. But the
argument that neither side will be prepared to accept a set-back
implies that it is somehow worse to be defeated in nuclear than
in conventional war. In reality it seems much more likely that

V-13

the decision whether a war is expanded depends more on the value
attached to the objective than to the weapons used to attain it.
It is not clear why a country should be more willing to acquiesce
in a conventional than in a nuclear defeat. Whatever the technical
difficulties of limiting nuclear war, the political argument that
it makes defeat unbearable does not bear scrutiny.

Conversely, the argument that to forgo nuclear weapons
is to give up our best technology begs the principal question.
For the issue turns precisely on what is considered "best."
Nuclear weapons may be best in terms of explosive power; this
very factor may make them less desirable in terms of over-all
cost. Similarly the argument that dispersed, mobile units may not
be "worth" the employment against them of nuclear weapons misses
the point that value is a relative term. Measuring the cost of
the weapon against the cost of the target is a crude engineering
approach. The real measure is how important it is to have the

V-14

target removed. A batallion preventing the occupation of a vital
area may be an important objective regardless of how much its
cost compared to that of the weapon used against it. A target
that may not have been "worth" a nuclear weapon during the period
of nuclear scarcity may become "worthwhile" in the era of nuclear
plenty.

The frustration in the debate all too often is because
the paradox that both the proponents and the opponents of a nuclear
strategy are right: their disagreements arise from the perspective
from which they consider the issue. Looking at the problem from
the point of view of deterrence, the advocates of a nuclear strategy
argue that the greatest possible reliance on advanced weapons
would be the most effective sanction against the outbreak of a
war. Looking at the actual conduct of a war, the opponents of a
nuclear strategy are above all concerned with reducing the impact
of military operations and increasing their predictability. The
destructiveness of individual weapons and the uncertainties of an

VI-2

tensions were highest and the threat to it therefore potentially greatest. And we had to reduce the mobility of our Strategic Air Command while it was most needed to perform its deterrent function.

With fourteen divisions, some of them understrength and most of them less well-equipped than their Soviet counterparts, we are in no position to fight a limited war against a first class opponent. Our tactical airpower is the lowest priority item in the Air Force. The Marine Corps is at the very bottom of its statutory requirements. Our airlift is totally inadequate. These shortcomings are not the fault of the services -- though the inadequate organization of the Defense Department does not help matters, clarification of doctrine. The basic difficulty is that at recent budgetary levels every mission has been neglected. And adjustment within the present budgetary ceilings can do no more than ameliorate our growing weakness somewhat. It is meaningless.