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Indeed, it is the facts of present US advantage and the
possibility of future Soviet advantage that pose the major
problems in the SALT negotiations.

-- As long as the Soviets remain substantially behind in
the number of warheads and bomber weapons, which in their cal-
culation also includes forces we consider tactical rather than
strategic, we can only expect a determined Soviet effort
to close the gap.

-- The problem is that this effort has the potential
of creating a momentum and temptation in the USSR to acquire
a temporary advantage at some point in the next decade.

-- Thus, some of our planners foresee a theoretical
Soviet advantage in the future and urge that we either
abandon SALT or reduce it to a minimum and seek our security
in an accelerated rearmament program to recapture the out-
right superiority of the 1950s.

This is why the present is a critical juncture for the
strategic arms negotiations. If each side now relaxes the
effort to achieve mutual restraint, and relies solely on its
own capabilities, then we face a multiplication of weaponry
that will leave our political leaders with an ever de-
creasing freedom of choice. As the leaders of Europe in
1914, we will become the prisoners of our plans and strategies
that will dictate our actions in a crisis.

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The Moscow talks in July were of profound importance
in this regard. For the first time each side seemed to
understand the longer term fears, concerns and perceptions
of the other. What at first seemed to us grossly exaggerated
Soviet statements about the military threat to them, proved
more plausible if it were assumed that the United States
would strike first. We are accustomed in our own analysis
to count what we would have left after a first strike by
the other side; the Soviets have done the same.

We realized that we could not come to an agreement in
Moscow because a truly permanent agreement would inevitably
face the many uncertainties of technology change, and thus
would have to have far too many hedges built into it. On
the other hand, perpetuating the five-year current agreement
for a year or two more would allow us to address only the
current cycle of weapons decisions. By 1978-79, just after
the end of the five-year Interim Agreement, the United States
and the USSR will both be potentially on the edge of a period
of vast increases in their strategic capabilities. Thus we
now believe a ten-year approach might be the most realistic
timeframe.

We think we now have a general framework within which,
over the next six to nine months, we should be able to tell
how serious the Soviets are in reaching an understanding.

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Moral Choices and Policy Dilemmas

The final issue, and one that has run throughout the postwar period, is the relationship between our foreign policy objectives and the "liberalization" of the internal policies of the UNGR. The issue has now been joined, specifically in the matter of making our economic relationship dependent on a policy of free emigration.

The morality of conducting relationships with totalitarian governments or more broadly with governments of which we disapprove is an old one in our foreign policy. It was established even in Washington's administration that we could not define our national interests in terms of our ideological preferences alone. In the modern period, each President has followed the doctrine that while our preferences are clear, we will not impose our own set of values on foreign governments.

Yet, the problem of dealing with Communist governments has always troubled the American people and the Congress. There is the implication that by dealing with a regime that pursues internal policies so sharply in conflict with our own values, that we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. It is believed by some that until there is a genuine "liberalization" or some sign of serious progress in this direction, all other

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elements of relaxation or conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. Thus, they would make demands for internal changes the condition for our own pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

Our position has been clearly set forth on many occasions. We cannot condone the repression of fundamental liberties in any country. We must always urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But there are two questions: first, are there limits to such efforts, and second, can we make internal changes in any country a pre-condition to constructive diplomacy.

How hard can we press without provoking Soviet leadership into a return to those practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Would a new Cold War encourage the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies? Would it nourish the hope of liberalization in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union? Has detente increased repression or has it helped generate the pressures and demand for openness we are now witnessing?

Our position is that there are sharp limits to what we can insist upon as part of an improved relationship with the USSR. We have a right to demand responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union. But with respect to basic changes within the Soviet Union the issue is not whether we condone what the USSR does internally; it is the extent

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to which we subordinate our foreign policy objectives to
domestic change.¹

We believe we have accomplished much over the past five
years. The attitude of the American people has been made
clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced
effective results:

- The exit tax on emigration is not being collected.
We have been assured that it will not be reapplied.

- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government
have been given increased attention.

- The volume of Jewish emigration increased from a
trickle to the tens of thousands.

But there are those who say this is not enough. They
argue that the Soviets must massively reshape their policies.
What they seek is in fact a sudden reversal of five decades
of Soviet history and of centuries of Russian history.

The goal may be a noble one, but they have chosen to
seek it through the wrong vehicle at the wrong time.
Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, especially
since 1956, and more will come. But if they come it is
most likely to be through an evolutionary process that can
only take place in an environment of decreasing inter-
national tensions.

As political pressures in this country have cast doubt
on our willingness to live up to the agreements of October
1972, Soviet emigration rates have slowed, and even

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slipped backward. Now we must acknowledge that if our
ability to affect emigration is real, it is also limited.

It may be that we have allowed a debate over tactics to
obscure agreement about objectives. If a consensus emerges
from this debate, then I am confident we will see a resolution
that ensures both increased trade and increased emigration.

If, on the other hand, the debate is over the principle
of making internal change a pre-condition to the pursuit
of our foreign policies, and, indeed, subordinating other
aspects of policy to its achievement, then we have a major
issue that involves a fundamental reorientation of American
foreign policy.

## Conclusion

In concluding my statement I want to turn to the prospects
for the future: it is obvious that the international environ-
ment has changed radically since the early post-war period when
we first defined out general policy toward the Soviet Union.
At that time the closest we came to a great State paper was
the brillian analysis of Ambassador Kennan about the nature
of Soviet society and the policy which came to be called
containment.

In his famous Mr. X article of July 1947, he made the
following points:

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"It is clear that the main elements of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. ... It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival not a partner, in the political arena."

In 1947, the US had no choice but to pursue the general directions of policy outlined by George Kennan. It may be that historians will find that the unfolding of the cold war was not as clear as it seemed to that generation. But the point I want to make is that at present there seems to be an inclination to return to the view that our relations with the Soviet Union are basically intractable, and to resign ourselves again to a long period of struggle.

The United States faces a moment of historic choice. It exists for us as a people, not as partisans of any particular cause. The consequences of our choice will be borne not by this Administration, but by its successors in the decades to come, not by our contemporaries but by future generations.

Our view is that we face a vital opportunity that was not possible 25 years ago, but one that will not soon return:

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-- First, to ensure that a history in which brief moments of improved Soviet-American relations gave way to prolonged periods of confrontation is replaced by an irreversible process of growing contact and restraint.

-- Second, to place limits on the acquisition and deployment of arms so that military technology is not the sole determinant of policy.

-- Third, to create an international environment in which problems ranging from energy to peace can be addressed outside the rigidities of stark confrontation.

-- Fourth, to build a network of East-West cooperation that by reducing international tensions may gradually ameliorate conditions in the East.

Foreign policy must not become an alibi or a distraction from domestic ills. But equally, domestic problems must not be used as an excuse for abandoning the bipartisan consensus which has supported our foreign policy for over a quarter century.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union -- in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more decent relationship. In the nuclear era there is no rational alternative to a peaceful relationship between the two powers which have the capacity to destroy mankind.

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# I. The Challenge

Since the dawn of the nuclear age the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for peace have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Throughout history men have sought peace but suffered war; all too often deliberate decisions or miscalculations have brought violence and destruction to a world yearning for tranquility. Tragic as the consequences of violence may have been in the past, the issue of peace and war takes on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind. In the nuclear age, as President Eisenhower pointed out two decades ago, "there is no longer any alternative to peace."

The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the necessity of the task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union point up its difficulty. These differences do not spring from misunderstanding, or personalities, or transitory factors:

- They are rooted in history, and in the way the two countries have developed.

- They are nourished by conflicting values and opposing ideologies.

- They are expressed in diverging national interests that produce political and military competition.

- They are influenced by allies and friends whose association we value and whose interests we will not sacrifice.

Paradox confuses our perception of the problem of peaceful coexistence: if peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other goal, other values will be compromised and perhaps lost; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values, along with everything else, will be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. However competitive they may be at some levels of their relationship, both major nuclear powers must base their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its will on the other without running an intolerable risk. The challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence.

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There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

Thus we must be clear at the outset on what the term "detente" entails. It is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union reflecting the realities I have outlined. It is a continuing process not a final condition that has been or can be realized at any one specific point in time. And it has been pursued by successive American leaders though the means have varied as have world conditions.

Some fundamental principles guide this policy:

The United States cannot base its policy solely on Moscow's good intentions. But neither can we insist that all forward movement must await a convergence of American and Soviet purposes. We seek, regardless of Soviet intentions, to serve peace through a systematic resistance to pressure and conciliatory responses to moderate behavior.

We must oppose aggressive actions and irresponsible behavior. But we must not seek confrontations lightly.

We must maintain a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is the most complex in all history.

Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace — not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values too.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a relationship must provide advantages to both sides and that the most constructive international relationships are those in which both parties perceive an element of gain. Moscow will benefit from certain measures just as we will from others. The balance cannot be struck on each issue every day, but only over the whole range of relations and over a period of time.

## II. The Course of Soviet-American Relations

In the first two decades of the post-war period US-Soviet relations were characterized by many fits and starts. Some encouraging developments followed the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 for example. But at the end of the decade the invasion of Czechoslovakia brought progress to a halt and threw a deepening shadow over East-West relations.

During those difficult days some were tempted to conclude that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and that US policy — even while the Viet-Nam agony raised questions about the readiness of the American people to sustain a policy of confrontation — had to be geared to this grim reality. Others recommended a basic change of policy: there was a barrage of demands to hold an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the SALT talks, and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union which was widely criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

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These two approaches reflected the extremes of the debate that had
dominated most of the postwar period; they also revealed deep-seated
differences between the American and the Soviet reactions to the process
of international relations.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations
are anomalies, the cause of which is attributed either to deliberate
malice or misunderstanding. Malice is to be combatted by force, or
at least isolation; misunderstanding is to be removed by the strenuous
exercise of good will. Communist states, on the other hand, regard
tensions as inevitable by-products of a struggle between opposing
social systems.

Most Americans perceive relations between states as either friendly or hostile, both defined in nearly absolute terms. Soviet foreign policy, by comparison, is conducted in a grey area heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces. Thus, Soviet diplomacy is never free of tactical pressures or adjustments, and it is never determined in isolation from the prevailing military balance. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad especially in Western Europe — and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

The issue, however, is not whether peace and stability serve
Soviet purposes, but whether they serve our own. Indeed, to the
extent that our attention focuses largely on Soviet intentions we
create a latent vulnerability. If detente can be justified only by
a basic change in Soviet motivation, the temptation becomes overwhelm-
ing to base US-Soviet relations not on realistic appraisal but on
tenuous hopes: a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic
change of philosophy. Atmosphere is confused with substance. Policy
oscillates between poles of suspicion and euphoria.

Neither extreme is realistic, and both are dangerous. The hopeful view ignores that we and the Soviets are bound to compete for the foreseeable future. The pessimistic view ignores that we have some parallel interests and that we are compelled to coexist. Detente encourages an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.

A. <u>American Goals</u>

America's aspiration for the kind of political environment we
now call detente is not new.

The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the
Soviet Union is not made in the name of any one administration, or
one party, or for any one period of time. It expresses the continuing
desire of the vast majority of the American people for an easing of
international tensions, and their expectation that any responsible
government will strive for peace. No aspect of our policies, domestic
or foreign, enjoys more consistent bipartisan support. No aspect is
more in the interest of mankind.

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to improve our
relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva, Camp David and
Glassboro were evanescent moments in a quarter century otherwise
marked by tensions and by sporadic confrontation. What is new in the

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current period of relaxation of tensions is its duration, the scope of
the relationship which has evolved and the continuity and intensity
of consultation which it has produced.

A number of factors have produced this change in the international
environment. By the end of the sixties and the beginning of the
seventies the time was propitious — no matter what administration
was in office in the United States — for a major attempt to improve
US-Soviet relations. Contradictory tendencies contested for preeminence
in Soviet policy; events could have tipped the scales towards either
increased aggressiveness or towards conciliation.

— The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960s challenged the leading position of the USSR and its claim to be the arbiter of orthodoxy. The USSR could have reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the capitalist world in order to assert its militant vigilance; instead the changing situation and US policy seem to have encouraged the Soviet leaders to co-operate in at least a temporary lessening of tension with the West.

— The prospect of achieving a military position of near parity
with the US in strategic forces could have tempted Moscow to use its
expanding military capability to strive more determinedly for expan-
sion; in fact it tempered the militancy of some of its actions and
sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the military competition
through negotiations.

— The very real economic problems of the USSR and Eastern Europe
could have reinforced autarkic policies and the tendency to create
a closed system; in actuality the Soviet Union and its allies have
come closer to acknowledging the reality of an interdependent world
economy.

— Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for
greater well-being, the Soviet Government could have continued to
stimulate the suspicions of the Cold War to further isolate Soviet
society; in fact it chose — however inadequately and slowly — to
seek to calm its public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: to provide as many
incentives as possible for those actions by the Soviet Union most
conducive to peace and individual well-being and to overcome the
swings between illusionary optimism and harsh antagonism that had
characterized most of the postwar period. We could capitalize on
the tentative beginnings made in the sixties by taking advantage
of the compelling new conditions of the 1970s.

We sought to explore every avenue towards an honorable and just
accommodation while remaining determined not to settle for mere
atmospherics. We relied on a balance of mutual interest rather than
Soviet intentions. When challenged — such as in the Middle East,
the Caribbean or Berlin — we always responded firmly. And when Soviet
policy moved towards conciliation we sought to turn what may have
started as a tactical maneuver into a durable pattern of conduct.

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that in moving forward
across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds
momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement
stands alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next
crisis. We did not invent the inter-relationship between issues ex-
pressed in the so-called linkage concept; it was a reality because of

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the range of problems and areas in which the interests of the United
States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other. We have looked
for progress in a series of agreements settling specific political
issues and we have sought to relate these to a new standard of inter-
national conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. By
acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West the
Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it would lose by a
return to confrontation. Indeed it is our hope that it will develop
a self-interest in fostering the entire process of relaxation of tensions.

B. The Global Necessities

In the late 1940s this nation engaged in a great debate about
the role it would play in the postwar world. We forged a bipartisan
consensus on which our policies were built for more than two decades.
By the end of the 1960s the international environment which molded that
consensus had been transformed. What in the fifties had seemed a
solid bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers of
power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength and self-
assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and formed blocs of their
own; and all nations were being swept up in a technology that was
compressing the planet and deepening our mutual dependence.

Then, as now, it was clear that the international structure formed
in the immediate postwar period was in fundamental flux, and that a
new international system was emerging. America's historic opportunity
was to help shape a new set of international relationships — more
pluralistic, less dominated by military power, less susceptible to
confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and
diverse elements of the globe. This new, more positive international
environment is possible only if all the major powers — and especially
the world's strongest nuclear powers — anchor their policies in the
principles of moderation and restraint. They no longer have the power
to dominate; they do have the capacity to thwart. They cannot build
the new international structure alone; they can make its realization
impossible by their rivalry.

Detente is all the more important because of what the creation
of a new set of international relations demands of us with respect to
other countries and areas. President Ford has assigned the highest
priority to maintaining the vitality of our partnerships in Europe,
Asia and Latin America. Our security ties with our allies are essential
but we also believe that recognition of the interdependence of the
contemporary world requires cooperation in many other fields. Coopera-
tion becomes more difficult if the United States is perceived by allied
public opinion as an obstacle to peace and if public debate is polarized
on the issue of whether friendship with the United States is inconsistent
with East-West reconciliation.

One important area for invigorated cooperative action is economic
policy. The international economic system has been severely tested.
The Middle East war demonstrated dramatically the integral relationship
between economics and politics. Clearly whatever the state of our
relations with the USSR the international economic agenda must be
addressed. But the task would be infinitely more complex if we proceeded
in a cold war environment.

International economic problems cut across political dividing
lines. All nations, regardless of ideology, face the problems of
energy and economic growth, feeding burgeoning populations, regulating

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the use of the oceans, and preserving the environment.

At a minimum easing international tensions allows the West to devote more intellectual and material resources to these problems. As security concerns recede humane concerns come again to the fore. International organizations take on greater significance and responsibility, less obstructed by Cold War antagonisms. The climate of lessened tensions even opens prospects for broader collaboration between East and West. It is significant that some of these global issues — such as energy, cooperation in science and health, and the protection of the environment — have already reached the US-Soviet agenda.

In the present period mankind may be menaced as much by international economic and political chaos as by the danger of war. Avoiding either hazard demands a cooperative world structure for which improved East-West relations are essential.

### III. The Evolution of Detente — the Balance of Risks and Incentives

The course of detente has not been smooth or even. As late as 1969 Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure negotiations on Berlin and SALT had begun. But the tendency towards confrontation appeared dominant.

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East cease-fire of August 1970, during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward fashioning a detente in bilateral relations with our Western European allies, while challenging the US.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then — as we do today — that detente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or towards one group of countries only. For us detente is indivisible.

Finally, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts — in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control negotiations — that generated the process of detente. It consists of these elements: an elaboration of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements; economic relations; and arms control negotiations, particularly those concerning strategic arms.

#### A. The Elaboration of Principles

Cooperative relations, in our view, must be more than a series of isolated agreements. They must reflect an acceptance of mutual obligations and of the need for accommodation and restraint.

To set forth principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of the series of documents is the Statement of Principles signed in Moscow in 1972. It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantages; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build a firm long-term relationship.

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An Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War based on these principles was signed in 1973. It affirms that the objective of the policies of the US and the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of *any* war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other, but also against allies or third countries. In other words, the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between the US and the USSR, it is explicitly extended to include *all* countries.

These statements of principles are not an American concession; indeed we have been affirming them unilaterally for two decades. Nor are they a legal contract; rather they are an aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior. We have never intended to "rely" on Soviet compliance with every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union would violate only to its cost. And if over the long term, the more durable relationship takes hold, the basic principles will give it definition, structure and hope.

## B. Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements

One of the features of the current phase of US-Soviet relations is the unprecedented consultation between leaders either face-to-face or through diplomatic channels.

Although consultation has reached a level of candor and frequency without precedent, we know that consultation does not guarantee that policies are compatible. It does provide a mechanism for the resolution of differences before they escalate to the point of public confrontation and commit the prestige of both sides.

The channel between the leaders of the two nations has proved its worth in many crises; it reduces the risk that either side might feel driven to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or confusing information. The channel of communication has continued without interruption under President Ford.

But crisis management is not an end in itself. The more fundamental goal is the elaboration of a political relationship which in time will make crises less likely to arise.

It was difficult in the past to speak of a US-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. There were no cooperative efforts in science and technology. Cultural exchange was modest. As a result there was no tangible inducement toward cooperation and no penalty for aggressive behavior. Today, by joining our efforts even in such seemingly apolitical fields as medical research or environmental protection, we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples but all mankind; in addition we generate incentives for restraint.

Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment, on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject to earthquakes, and on devising new transportation methods. Other bilateral areas for cooperation include an agreement on preventing incidents at sea, an agreement to exchange information and research methods in agriculture, and the training of astronauts for the Soviet-US rendezvous and docking mission planned for 1975.

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Each project must be judged by the concrete benefits it brings. But in their sum — in their exchange of information and people as well as in their establishment of joint mechanisms — they also constitute a commitment in both countries to work together across a broad spectrum.

### C. The Economic Component

During the period of the Cold War economic contact between ourselves and the USSR was virtually non-existent. Even then many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate international tensions; in fact there were several Congressional resolutions to that effect. But recurrent crises prevented any sustained progress.

The period of confrontation should have left little doubt however that economic boycott would not transform the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign policy. The USSR was quite prepared to maintain heavy military outlays and to concentrate on capital growth by using the resources of the Communist world alone. Moreover it proved impossible to mount an airtight boycott in practice, since over time, most if not all the other major industrial countries became involved in trade with the East.

The question then became how trade and economic contact — in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested — could serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the political context. Clearly, we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic benefits even if in the process we deny ourselves some commercially profitable opportunities. On the other hand, when political relations begin to normalize it is difficult to explain why economic relations should not be normalized as well.

We have approached the question of economic relations with deliberation and circumspection and as an act of policy not primarily of commercial opportunity. As political relations have improved on a broad basis, economic issues have been dealt with on a comparably broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the USSR has been negotiated, side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extension of most favored nation treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business in the USSR by American firms; our government credit facilities were made available for trade with the USSR; and a maritime agreement regulating the carriage of goods has been signed.

These were all primarily regulatory agreements conferring no immediate benefits on the Soviet Union but serving as blueprints for an expanded economic relationship if the political improvement continued.

This approach commanded widespread domestic approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were issues regarding Soviet domestic political practices raised. Indeed, not until *after* the 1972 agreements was the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painfully achieved.

This sudden, *ex post* facto form of linkage raises serious questions:

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- For the Soviet Union, it casts doubt on our reliability as a negotiating partner;

- The significance of trade, originally envisaged as only one ingredient of a complex and evolving relationship, is inflated out of all proportion;

- The hoped-for results of policy become transformed into pre-conditions for any policy at all.

We recognize the depth and validity of the moral concerns expressed by those who oppose — or put conditions on — expanded trade with the USSR. But a sense of proportion must be maintained about the leverage our economic relations give us with the USSR:

- Denial of economic relations cannot by itself achieve what it failed to do when it was part of a determined policy of political and military confrontation.

- The economic bargaining ability of Most Favored Nation status is marginal. MFN grants no special privilege to the USSR; in fact it is a misnomer since we have such agreements with over 100 countries. To enact it would be to remove a discriminatory hold-over of the days of the Cold War. To continue to deny it is more a political than an economic act.

- Trade benefits are not a one-way street; the laws of mutual advantage operate or there will be no trade.

- The technology that flows to the USSR as a result of expanded US-Soviet trade may have a few indirect uses for military production. But with our continuing restrictions on strategic exports, we can maintain adequate controls — and we intend to do so. Moreover, the same technology has been available to the USSR and will be increasingly so from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies us a means of influence and possible commercial gain; it does not deprive the USSR of technology.

- The actual and potential flow of credits from the US represents a tiny fraction of the capital available to the USSR domestically and elsewhere, including Western Europe and Japan. But it does allow us to exercise some influence through our ability to control the scope of trade relationships.

- Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.

### D. The Strategic Relationship

We cannot expect to relax international tensions or achieve a more stable international system should the two strongest nuclear powers conduct an unrestrained strategic arms race. Thus, perhaps the single most important component of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons competition.

The competition in which we now find ourselves is historically unique:

- Each side has the capacity to destroy civilizazation as we know it.

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- Failure to maintain equivalence could jeopardize not only our freedom but our very survival.

- The lead time for technological innovation is so long, yet the pace of change so relentless that the arms race and strategic policy itself are in danger of being driven by technological necessity.

- When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over ten thousand warheads, and when the characteristics of the weapons of the two sides are so incommensurable, it becomes difficult to determine what combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities would give one side a militarily and politically useful superiority. At a minimum clear changes in the strategic balance can be achieved only by efforts so enormous and by increments so large that the very attempt would be highly destabilizing.

- The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance. Therefore, the probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher levels of forces.

- The arms race is driven by political as well as military factors. While a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the appearance of inferiority — whatever its actual significance — can have serious political consequences. With weapons that are unlikely to be used and for which there is no operational experience, the psychological impact can be crucial. Thus each side has a high incentive to achieve not only the reality but the appearance of reality. In a very real sense each side shapes the military establishment of the other.

If we are driven to it, the United States will sustain an arms race. Indeed, it is likely that the United States would emerge from such a competition with an edge over the Soviet Union in most significant categories of strategic arms. But the political or military benefit which would flow from such a situation would remain elusive. Indeed after such an evolution it might well be that both sides would be worse off than before the race began. The enormous destructiveness of weapons and the uncertainties regarding their effects combine to make the massive use of such weapons increasingly incredible.

The Soviet Union must realize that the overall relationship with the United States will be less stable if strategic balance is sought through unrestrained competitive programs. Sustaining the buildup requires exhortations by both sides that in time may prove incompatible with restrained international conduct. The very fact of a strategic arms race has a high potential for feeding attitudes of hostility and suspicion on both sides, transforming the fears of those who demand more weapons into self-fulfilling prophecies.

The American people can be asked to bear the cost and political instability of a race which is doomed to stalemate only if it is clear that every effort has been made to prevent it. That is why every President since Eisenhower has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms while maintaining the military programs essential to strategic balance.

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There are more subtle strategic reasons for our interest in SALT. Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of nuclear conflict, through the maintenance of sufficient political and strategic power. Estimates of what constitutes "sufficiency" have been contentious. Our judgments have changed with our experience in deploying these weapons and as the Soviets expanded their own nuclear forces. When in the late 1960s it became apparent that the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States, we adopted the current strategic doctrine.

We determined that stability required strategic forces invulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. Reality reinforced doctrine. As technology advanced, it became apparent that neither side could realistically expect to develop a credible dis-arming capability against the other except through efforts so gigantic as to represent a major threat to political stability.

One result of our doctrine was basing our strategic planning on the assumption that in the unlikely event of nuclear attack, the President should have a wide range of options available in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. We designed our strategic forces with a substantial measure of flexibility, so that the United States response need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities — thus inviting the destruction of our own — but could instead hit other targets. Translating this capability into a coherent system of planning became a novel, and as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity; but progress has been made. In our view such flexibility enhances the certainty of retaliation and thereby makes an attack less likely. Above all, it preserves the capability for human decision even in the ultimate crisis.

Another, at first seemingly paradoxical, result was a growing commitment to negotiated agreements on strategic arms. SALT became one means by which we and the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding of the doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. Through SALT the two sides can reduce the suspicions and fears which fuel strategic competition. SALT, in the American conception, is a means to achieve strategic stability by methods other than the arms race.

Our specific objectives have been:

(1) to break the momentum of ever increasing levels of armaments;

(2) to control certain qualitative aspects — particularly MIRVs;

(3) to moderate the pace of new deployments; and

(4) ultimately, to achieve reductions in force levels.

The SALT agreements already signed represent a major contribution to strategic stability and a significant first step toward a longer term and possibly broader agreement.

When the first agreements in 1972 were signed, the future strategic picture was not bright:

- the Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program that had closed the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBMs, at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching on the average eight submarines a year with 16 ballistic missiles each.

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- the United States had ended its numerical build up in the late 1960s at a level of 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs. We were emphasizing technological improvements, particularly in MIRVs for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. Our replacement systems were intended for the late 1970s and early 1980s.

- by most reasonable measurement of strategic power, we held an important advantage, which still continues. But it was also clear that if existing trends were maintained the Soviet Union would first, exceed our numerical levels by a considerable margin, and then develop the same technologies we had already mastered.

The five-year Intermin Agreement which limited antiballistic missile defenses and froze the level of ballistic missile forces on both sides represented the essential first step towards a less volatile strategic environment.

- by limiting antiballistic missiles (ABMs) to very low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union removed a potential source of instability; for one side to build an extensive defense for its cities would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward a first-strike capability. Before seeking a disarming capability a potential aggressor would want to protect his population centers from incoming nuclear weapons.

- Some have alleged that the intermin agreement, which expires in October 1977 penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-based and sea-based, than the United States. Such a view is misleading. When the agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union already possessed more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) than the United States and, given the pace of its submarine construction program, over the next few years it could have built virtually twice as many nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

The interim agreement confined a dynamic Soviet ICBM program to the then existing level; it put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBMs, the weapons that most concern us; and it set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program. No American program was abandoned or curtailed. We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No restraints were placed on bombers — a weapons system in which we have a large advantage. Indeed, the US lead in missile warheads is likely to be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

The SALT I agreements were the first deliberate attempt by the nuclear superpowers to bring about strategic stability through negotiation. This very process is conducive to further restraint. For example, in the first round of SALT negotiations in 1970-72 both sides bitterly contested the number of ABM sites permitted by the agreement; two years later both sides gave up the right to build more than one site. In sum, we believed when we signed these agreements — and we believe now — that they had reduced the danger of nuclear war, that both sides had acquired some greater interest in restraint, and that the basis had been created for the present effort to reach a broader agreement.

The goal of the current negotiations is an agreement for a ten-year period. We had aimed at extending the Intermin Agreement with adjustments in the numbers and new provisions aimed at dealing with the problem of MIRVs. We found, however, that our negotiations for a two- or three-year extension was constantly threatened with irrelevance by the on-going programs of both sides that were due to be deployed at the end of or just after the period. This distorted the negotiation, and indeed devalued its significance. We shifted to the ten-year approach because the period is long enough to cover all current and planned forces but not so long as to invite hedges that would defeat the purpose of an arms control agreement. In fact it invites a slowing down of planned deployments; further a period of this length will allow us to set realistic ceilings that represent more than a temporary plateau from which to launch a new cycle in the arms race. Future reductions thus become a realistic objective.

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With respect to ceilings on strategic forces, we have defined our goal as essential
equivalence in strategic capabilities. What constitutes equivalence involves subjective
judgment. Because US and Soviet forces are different from each other — in number and size
of weapons, in technological refinement, in performance characteristics — they are
difficult to compare.

Yet in the negotiations we shall, for example, have to compare heavy
bombers in which the United States is ahead with heavy missiles which the
USSR has emphasized. We shall have to decide whether to insist on
equivalence in every category or whether to permit trade-offs in which an
advantage in one category compensates for a disadvantage in another. The
equation does not remain static. We shall have to relate present advantages
to potential development, existing disparities to future trends. This is
a difficult process but we are confident that it can be solved.

Numerical balance is no longer enough. To achieve stability, it will
be necessary to consider as well the impact of technological change in such
areas as missile throw weight, multiple reentry vehicles and missile
accuracy. The difficulty is that we are dealing not only with disparate
levels of forces but with disparate capabilities -- MIRV technology being
a conspicuous example. The rate of increase of warheads is surging far
ahead of the increase in delivery vehicles. This is why the United States
considers MIRV limitation an essential component of the next phase of the
SALT negotiations. If we fail, the rate of technology will outstrip our
capacity to design effective limitations; constantly proliferating warheads
of increasing accuracy will overwhelm fixed launchers. An arms race will be
virtually inevitable.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments of new or
more modern systems. Neither side will remain in its present position
without change for another decade. The Soviets are already embarked on
testing an initial deployment of a third generation of ICBMs and on a
third modification of submarine launched missiles -- though the rate of
deployment so far has been far short of the maximum pace of the late
sixties.

For our part we are planning to introduce the Trident system, and to
replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the capability of
improving our Minuteman ICBM system, adding to the number as well as
capability of MIRV missiles, and, if we choose, of deploying mobile
systems, land based or airborne. Thus, our task is to see whether the two
sides can agree to slow the pace of deployment so that modernization is
less likely to threaten the overall balance or trigger an excessive
reaction.

Finally, a ten year program gives us a chance to negotiate reductions.
Reductions have occasionally been proposed as an alternative to ceilings;
they are often seen as more desirable, or, at least, easier to negotiate.
In fact, it is a far more complicated problem. Reductions in launchers,
for example, if not accompanied by restrictions on the number of warheads
will only magnify vulnerability. The fewer the aim points the simpler it
would be to calculate an attack. At the same time reductions will have
to proceed from some base line and must therefore be preceded by agreed
ceilings -- if only of an interim nature. But a ten year program should
permit the negotiations of stable ceilings resulting from the start of a
process of reductions.

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Detente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. But it is a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the post-war period. When linked to such broad and unprecedented projects as SALT, detente takes on added meaning and opens prospects of a more stable peace. SALT agreements should be seen as steps in a process leading to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

## IV. An Assessment of Detente

Where has the process of detente taken us so far? What are the principles that must continue to guide our course?

Major progress has been made:

- Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flash point has been substantially reduced through the Quadripartite agreement of 1971. The U.S. considers strict adherence to the agreement a major test of detente.

- We and our allies are launched on negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation - a conference designed to foster East-West dialogue and cooperation.

- At the same time NATO and the Warsaw Pact are negotiating the reduction of their forces in Central Europe.

- The honorable termination of America's direct military involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering of regional conflict were made possible by many factors. But this achievement would have been much more difficult - if not impossible - in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility toward the United States.

- America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. Many feared that detente would undermine them. Instead, detente has helped to place our alliance ties on a more enduring basis by removing the fear that friendship with the United States involved the risk of unnecessary confrontation with the USSR.

- Many incipient crises with the Soviet Union have been contained or settled without ever reaching the point of public disagreement. The world has been freer of East-West tensions and conflict than in the fifties and sixties.

- A series of bilateral cooperative relations have turned the US-Soviet relationship in a far more positive direction.

- We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war.

- New possibilities for positive US-Soviet cooperation have emerged on issues in which the globe is interdependent - science and technology, environment, energy.

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These accomplishments do not guarantee peace. But they have served to lessen the rigidities of the past and offer hope for a better era. Despite fluctuations a trend has been established; the character of international politics has been markedly changed.

It is too early to judge conclusively whether this change should be ascribed to tactical considerations. But in a sense, that is immaterial. For whether the change is temporary and tactical, or lasting and basic, our task is essentially the same: to transform that change into a permanent condition devoted to the purpose of a secure peace and mankind's aspiration for a better life. A tactical change sufficiently prolonged becomes a lasting transformation.

But the whole process can be jeopardized if it is taken for granted. As the Cold War recedes in memory, detente can come to seem so natural that it appears safe to levy progressively greater demands on it. The temptation to combine detente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union will grow. Such an attitude would be disastrous. We would not accept it from Moscow; Moscow will not accept it from us. We will finally wind up again with the Cold War and fail to achieve either peace or any humane goal.

To be sure, the process of detente raises serious issues for many people. Let me deal with these in terms of the principles which underline our policy.

First, if detente is to endure, both sides must benefit.

There is no question that the Soveit Union obtains benefits from detente. On what other grounds would the tough-minded members of the Politburo sustain it? But the essential point surely must be that detente serves American and world interest as well. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of power, influence and position, our interests have not suffered -- they have generally prospered. In many areas of the world the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the case for many years. It is also true that Soviet influence and presence are felt in many parts of the world. But this is a reality that would exist without detente. The record shows that detente does not deny us the opportunity to react to it and to offset it.

Our bilateral relations with the USSR are beginning to proliferate across a broad range of activities in our societies. Many of the projects now underway are in their infancy; we have many safeguards against unequal benefits -- in our laws, in the agreements themselves and in plain common sense. Of course, there are instances where the Soviet Union has obtained some particular advantage. But we seek in each agreement or project to provide for benefits that are mutual. We attempt to make sure that there are trade-offs among the various programs that are implemented. Americans surely are the last who need fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

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Second, building a new real relationship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional Alliance relations.

Our approach to relations with the USSR has always been, and will continue to be, rooted in the belief that the cohesion of our alliances, and particularly the Atlantic Alliance, is a precondition to establishing a more constructive relationship with the USSR.

Crucial, indeed unique, as may be our concern with Soviet power, we do not delude ourselves that we should deal with it alone. When we speak of Europe and Japan as representing centers of power and influence, we describe not merely an observable fact but an indispensable element in the equilibrium needed to keep the world at peace. The cooperation and partnership between us transcend formal agreements; they reflect values and traditions not soon, if ever, to be shared with our adversaries.

Inevitably, a greater sense of drama accompanies our dealings with the Soviet Union because the central issues of war and peace cannot be other than dramatic. It was precisely a recognition of this fact and our concern that Alliance relations not be taken for granted that led to the American initiative in April of 1973 to put new emphasis on our traditional associations. We sought political acts of will which would transcend the technical issues at hand, symbolize our enduring goals and thus enhance our fundamental bonds. Much has been accomplished. The complications attendant to adapting US-European relations should not be confused with their basic character. We were tested in difficult conditions that do not affect our central purposes. Today relations with Europe and Japan are strong and improving. We have made progress in developing common positions on security, detente and energy. The experience of the past year has demonstrated that there is no contradiction between vigorous, organic alliance relations and a more positive relationship with adversaries; indeed they are mutually reinforcing.

Third, the emergence of more normal realtions with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense.

There is a tendency in democratic societies to relax as dangers seem to recede, there is an inclination to view the maintenance of strength as incompatible with relaxation of tensions, rather than its precondition. But this is primarily a question of leadership. We shall attempt to be vigilant to the dangers facing America. This Administration will not be misled -- or mislead -- on issues of national defense. At the same time we do not accept the proposition that we need crises to sustain our defense. A society that needs artificial crises to do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal danger.

Fourth, we must know what can and cannot be achieved in changing human conditions in the East.

The question of dealing with Communist governments has troubled the American people and the Congress since 1917. There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ so sharply with our own, we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging

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their continuation. Some argue that until there is a genuine "liberaliza-
tion" -- or signs of serious progress in this direction -- all elements of
conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical.
In that view, demands for internal changes must be the precondition for the
pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

Our view is different. We shall insist on responsible international
behavior by the Soviet Union and use it as the primary index of our
relationship. Beyond this we will use our influence to the maximum to
alleviate suffering and to respond to humane appeals. We know what we
stand for, and we shall leave no doubt about it.

Both as a government and as a people we have made the attitude of the
American people clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced
results. I believe that both the Executive and the Congress, each playing
its proper role, have been effective. With respect to the specific issue
of emigration:

-- The education exit tax of 1971 is no longer being collected. We have been assured that it will not be reapplied.

-- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government have been given increased attention, and remedies have been forthcoming in many well-known instances.

-- The volume of Jewish emigration has increased from a trickle to tens of thousands.

-- And we are now moving toward an understanding that should
significantly diminish the obstacles to emigration and ease the
hardship of prospective emigrants.

We have accomplished much. But we cannot demand that the Soviet Union,
in effect, suddenly reverse five decades of Soviet, and centuries of
Russian, history. Such an attempt would be futile and at the same time
hazard all that has already been achieved. Changes in Soviet society have
already occurred, and more will come. But they are most likely to develop
through an evolution that can best go forward in an environment of decreas-
ing international tensions. A renewal of the Cold War will hardly encourage
the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies or adopt a more benevolent
attitude towards dissent.

V. <u>Agenda for the Future</u>

Detente is a process, not a permanent achievement. The agenda is full
and continuing. Obviously, the main concern must be to reduce the sources
of potential conflict. This requires efforts in several interrelated
areas:

-- The military competition in all its aspects must be subject to increasingly firm restraints by both sides.

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-- Political competition, especially in moments of crisis, must be guided by the principles of restraint set forth in the documents described earlier. Crises there will be, but the United States and the Soviet Union have a special obligation deriving from the unimaginable military power that they wield and represent. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is not acceptable.

-- Restraint in crises must be augmented by cooperation in removing the causes of crises. There have been too many instances, notably in the Middle East, which demonstrate that policies of unilateral advantage sooner or later run out of control and lead to the brink of war, if not beyond.

-- The process of negotiations and consultation must be continuous and intense. But no agreement between the nuclear superpowers can be durable if made over the heads of other nations which have a stake in the outcome. We should not seek to impose peace; we can, however, see that our own actions and conduct are conducive to peace.

In the coming months we shall strive:

-- to complete the negotiations for comprehensive and equitable limitations on strategic arms until at least 1985;

-- to complete the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, so that security will be enhanced for all the countries of Europe;

-- to conclude the Conference of European Security and Cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human aspirations;

-- to continue the efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without depriving those countries of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy;

-- to complete ratification of the recently negotiated treaty banning underground nuclear testing by the US and USSR above a certain threshold;

-- to begin negotiations on the recently agreed effort to overcome the possible dangers of environmental modification techniques for military purposes;

-- to resolve the long-standing attempts to cope with the dangers of chemical weaponry.

We must never forget that the process of detente depends ultimately on habits and modes of conduct that extend beyond the letters of agreements to the spirit of relations as a whole. This is why the whole process must be carefully nurtured.

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In cataloging the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is attainable. We must consider what alternative policies are available, and what their consequences would be. And, the implications of alternatives must be examined, not just in terms of a single issue, but for how they might effect the entire range of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for world peace.

We must assess not only individual challenges to detente, but also their cumulative impact:

If we justify each agreement with Moscow only when we can show unilateral gain;

If we strive for an elusive strategic "superiority";

If we systematically block benefits to the Soviet Union;

If we try to transform the Soviet system by pressure;

If, in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results, then we would be reviving the doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of the 1950s. And we would do so at a time when Soviet physical power and influence on the world are greater than a quarter century ago when those policies were devised and failed. The futility of such a course is as certain as its danger.

Let there be no question, however, that Soviet actions could destroy detente, as well.

If the Soviet Union uses detente to strengthen its military capacity in all fields;

If in crisis it acts to sharpen tension;

If it does not contribute to progress towards stability;

If it seeks to undermine our alliances;

If it is deaf to the urgent needs of the least developed and the emerging issues of interdependence, then it in turn tempts a return to the tensions and conflicts we have made such efforts to overcome. The policy of confrontation has worked for neither of the superpowers.

We have insisted toward the Soviet Union that we cannot have the atmosphere of detente without the substance. It is equally clear that the substance of detente will disappear in an atmosphere of hostility.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union -- in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more constructive relationship.

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We face an opportunity that was not possible 25 years, or even a decade ago. If that opportunity is lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indeed, it may not come at all.

As President Kennedy pointed out: "For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future, and we are all mortal."

* * * * * * * * * *

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

special report

Department of State
Office of Media Services

Secretary Kissinger's Statement
on U.S. - Soviet Relations

No. 6

On September 19, 1974 Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger presented a major foreign policy statement on U.S.-Soviet relations to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as part of the Committee's continuing hearings on U.S. Relations with Communist Countries. This Special Report provides the complete text of the Secretary's statement to the Committee.

CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I. The Challenge</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>II. The Course of Soviet-American Relations</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>A. American Goals</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>B. The Global Necessities</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>III. The Evolution of Detente -- the Balance of Risks and Incentives</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>A. The Elaboration of Principles</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>B. Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>C. The Economic Component</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>D. The Strategic Relationship</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>IV. An Assessment of Detente</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>V. Agenda for the Future</td><td>15</td></tr></tbody></table>

A transcript of all the hearings will be published by the Committee at the end of the year and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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I. The Challenge

-- They are rooted in history, and in the way the two countries have developed.

-- They are nourished by conflicting values and opposing ideologies.

-- They are expressed in diverging national interests that produce political and military competition.

-- They are influenced by allies and friends whose association we value and
whose interests we will not sacrifice.

There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relation-
ship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international
stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with
restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

Thus we must be clear at the outset on what the term "detente" entails. It is
the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union reflecting
the realities I have outlined. It is a continuing process, not a final condition,
that has been or can be realized at any one specific point in time. And it has
been pursued by successive American leaders, though the means have varied, as have
world conditions.

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We must maintain a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nu-
clear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power
is the most complex in all history.

Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned we are
not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal
changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the
necessity of peace-- not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and
human society are moral values, too.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a relationship must
provide advantages to both sides and that the most constructive international re-
lationships are those in which both parties perceive an element of gain. Moscow
will benefit from certain measures just as we will from others. The balance cannot
be struck on each issue every day, but only over the whole range of relations and
over a period of time.

II. <u>The Course of Soviet-American Relations</u>

In the first two decades of the postwar period, US-Soviet relations were
characterized by many fits and starts. Some encouraging developments followed the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, for example. But at the end of the decade the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia brought progress to a halt and threw a deepening shadow over
East-West relations.

During those difficult days some were tempted to conclude that antagonism was
the central feature of the relationship and that US policy -- even while the Vietnam
agony raised questions about the readiness of the American people to sustain a pol-
icy of confrontation -- had to be geared to this grim reality. Others recommended
a basic change of policy: there was a barrage of demands to hold an immediate sum-
mit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
[SALT], and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union
which was widely criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations are anoma-
lies, the cause of which is attributed either to deliberate malice or misunderstand-
ing. Malice is to be combated by force, or at least isolation; misunderstanding
is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will. Communist states on the
other hand, regard tensions as inevitable by-products of a struggle between opposing
social systems.

Most Americans perceive relations between states as either friendly or hostile, both defined in nearly absolute terms. Soviet foreign policy, by comparison, is conducted in a grey area heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces. Thus, Soviet diplomacy is never free of tactical pressures or adjustments, and it is never determined in isolation from the prevailing military balance. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad -- especially in Western Europe -- and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

The issue, however, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes,
but whether they serve our own. Indeed, to the extent that our attention focuses
largely on Soviet intentions we create a latent vulnerability. If detente can be
justified only by a basic change in Soviet motivation, the temptation becomes over-
whelming to base US-Soviet relations not on realistic appraisal but on tenuous hopes:
a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic change of philosophy. At-
mosphere is confused with substance. Policy oscillates between poles of suspicion
and euphoria.

Neither extreme is realistic, and both are dangerous. The hopeful view ignores
that we and the Soviets are bound to compete for the foreseeable future. The pessi-
mistic view ignores that we have some parallel interests and that we are compelled

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## A. American Goals

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to improve our relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro were evanescent moments in a quarter century otherwise marked by tensions and by sporadic confrontation. What is new in the current period of relaxation of tensions is its duration, the scope of the relationship which has evolved, and the continuity and intensity of consultation which it has produced.

A number of factors have produced this change in the international environment. By the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the time was propitious -- no matter what administration was in office in the United States -- for a major attempt to improve US-Soviet relations. Contradictory tendencies contested for preeminence in Soviet policy; events could have tipped the scales toward either increased aggressiveness or toward conciliation:

- The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960's challenged the leading position of the USSR and its claim to be the arbiter of orthodoxy. The USSR could have reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the capitalist world in order to assert its militant vigilance; instead the changing situation and US policy seem to have encouraged Soviet leaders to cooperate in at least a temporary lessening of tension with the West.

- The prospect of achieving a military position of near parity with the US in strategic forces could have tempted Moscow to use its expanding military capability to strive more determinedly for expansion; in fact it tempered the militancy of some of its actions and sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the military competition through negotiations.

- The very real economic problems of the USSR and Eastern Europe could have reinforced autarkic policies and the tendency to create a closed system; in actuality the Soviet Union and its allies have come closer to acknowledging the reality of an interdependent world economy.

- Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for greater well-being, the Soviet Government could have continued to stimulate the suspicions of the Cold War to further isolate Soviet society; in fact, it chose -- however inadequately and slowly -- to seek to calm its public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: to provide as many incentives as possible for those actions by the Soviet Union most conducive to peace and individual well-being and to overcome the swings between illusionary optimism and harsh antagonism that had characterized most of the postwar period. We could capitalize on the tentative beginnings made in the sixties by taking advantage of the compelling new conditions of the 1970's.

We sought to explore every avenue toward an honorable and just accommodation while remaining determined not to settle for mere atmospherics. We relied on a balance of mutual interests rather than Soviet intentions. When challenged -- such as in the Middle East, the Caribbean, or Berlin -- we always responded firmly. And when Soviet policy moved toward conciliation we sought to turn what may have

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Our approach proceeds from the conviction that in moving forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement stands alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. We did not invent the inter-relationship between issues expressed in the so-called linkage concept; it was a reality because of the range of problems and areas in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other. We have looked for progress in a series of agreements settling specific political issues and we have sought to relate these to a new standard of international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. By acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West, the Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation. Indeed it is our hope that it will develop a self-interest in fostering the entire process of relaxation of tensions.

## B. The Global Necessities

In the late 1940's this nation engaged in a great debate about the role it would play in the postwar world. We forged a bipartisan consensus on which our policies were built for more than two decades. By the end of the 1960's the international environment which molded that consensus had been transformed. What in the fifties had seemed a solid bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers of power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength and self-assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and formed blocs of their own; and all nations were being swept up in a technology that was compressing the planet and deepening our mutual dependence.

Then, as now, it was clear that the international structure formed in the immediate postwar period was in fundamental flux, and that a new international system was emerging. America's historic opportunity was to help shape a new set of international relationships -- more pluralistic, less dominated by military power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the globe. This new, more positive international environment is possible only if all the major powers -- and especially the world's strongest nuclear powers -- anchor their policies in the principles of moderation and restraint. They no longer have the power to dominate; they do have the capacity to thwart. They cannot build the new international structure alone; they can make its realization impossible by their rivalry.

Detente is all the more important because of what the creation of a new set of international relations demands of us with respect to other countries and areas. President Ford has assigned the highest priority to maintaining the vitality of our partnerships in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Our security ties with our allies are essential but we also believe that recognition of the interdependence of the contemporary world requires cooperation in many other fields. Cooperation becomes more difficult if the United States is perceived by allied public opinion as an obstacle to peace and if public debate is polarized on the issue of whether friendship with the United States is inconsistent with East-West reconciliation.

International economic problems cut across political dividing lines. All nations, regardless of ideology, face the problems of energy and economic growth, feeding burgeoning populations, regulating the use of the oceans, and preserving the environment.

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The climate of lessened tensions even opens prospects for broader collaboration between East and West. It is significant that some of these global issues -- such as energy, cooperation in science and health, and the protection of the environment -- have already reached the US-Soviet agenda.

The course of detente has not been smooth or even. As late as 1969 Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure, negotiations on Berlin and SALT had begun. But the tendency toward confrontation appeared dominant.

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East ceasefire of August 1970, during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward fashioning a detente in bilateral relations with our Western European allies, while challenging the US.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then, as we do today, that detente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or toward one group of countries only. For us detente is indivisible.

Finally, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts -- in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control negotiations -- that generated the process of detente. It consists of these elements: an elaboration of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements; economic relations; and arms control negotiations, particularly those concerning strategic arms.

An Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War based on these principles was signed in 1973. It affirms that the objective of the policies of the US and the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of any war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other, but also against allies or third countries. In other words, the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between the US and the USSR, it is explicitly extended to include all countries.

These statements of principles are not an American concession; indeed we have been affirming them unilaterally for two decades. Nor are they a legal contract; rather they are an aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior. We have never intended to "rely" on Soviet compliance with every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union would violate only to its cost. And if over the long term, the more durable relationship takes hold, the basic principles will give it definition, structure, and hope.

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One of the features of the current phase of US-Soviet relations is the unprecedented consultation between leaders, either face-to-face or through diplomatic channels.

Each project must be judged by the concrete benefits it brings. But in their sum -- in their exchange of information and people as well as in their establishment of joint mechanisms -- they also constitute a commitment in both countries to work together across a broad spectrum.

## C. The Economic Component

During the period of the Cold War economic contact between ourselves and the USSR was virtually nonexistent. Even then many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate international tensions; in fact there were several congressional resolutions to that effect. But recurrent crises prevented any sustained progress.

The question then became how trade and economic contact -- in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested -- could serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the political context. Clearly, we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic benefits even if in the process we deny ourselves some commercially profitable opportunities. On the other

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This approach commanded widespread domestic approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were issues regarding Soviet domestic political practices raised. Indeed, not until *after* the 1972 agreements was the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painstakingly achieved.

This sudden, *ex post facto* form of linkage raises serious questions:

- The hoped-for results of policy become transformed into preconditions for any policy at all.

We recognize the depth and validity of the moral concerns expressed by those who oppose -- or put conditions on -- expanded trade with the USSR. But a sense of proportion must be maintained about the leverage our economic relations give us with the USSR:

- Trade benefits are not a one-way street; the laws of mutual advantage operate, or there will be no trade.

- The technology that flows to the USSR as a result of expanded US-Soviet trade may have a few indirect uses for military production. But with our continuing restrictions on strategic exports, we can maintain adequate controls -- and we intend to do so. Moreover, the same technology has been available to the USSR and will be increasingly so from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies us a means of influence and possible commercial gain; it does not deprive the USSR of technology.

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-- Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.

-- Each side has the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.

-- Failure to maintain equivalence could jeopardize not only our freedom but our very survival.

-- The lead time for technological innovation is so long, yet the pace of change so relentless, that the arms race and strategic policy itself are in danger of being driven by technological necessity.

-- When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over ten thousand warheads, and when the characteristics of the weapons of the two sides are so incommensurable, it becomes difficult to determine what combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities would give one side a militarily and politically useful superiority. At a minimum clear changes in the strategic balance can be achieved only by efforts so enormous and by increments so large that the very attempt would be highly destabilizing.

-- The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance. Therefore, the probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher levels of forces.

-- The arms race is driven by political as well as military factors. While a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the appearance of inferiority -- whatever its actual significance -- can have serious political consequences. With weapons that are unlikely to be used and for which there is no operational experience, the psychological impact can be crucial. Thus each side has a high incentive to achieve not only the reality but the appearance of reality. In a very real sense each side shapes the military establishment of the other.

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There are more subtle strategic reasons for our interest in SALT. Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of nuclear conflict, through the maintenance of sufficient political and strategic power. Estimates of what constitutes "sufficiency" have been contentious. Our judgments have changed with our experience in deploying these weapons and as the Soviets expanded their own nuclear forces. When in the late 1960's it became apparent that the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States, we adopted the current strategic doctrine.

We determined that stability required strategic forces invulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. Reality reinforced doctrine. As technology advanced, it became apparent that neither side could realistically expect to develop a credible disarming capability against the other except through efforts so gigantic as to represent a major threat to political stability.

One result of our doctrine was basing our strategic planning on the assumption that in the unlikely event of nuclear attack, the President should have a wide range of options available in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. We designed our strategic forces with a substantial measure of flexibility, so that the United States' response need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities -- thus inviting the destruction of our own -- but could instead hit other targets. Translating this capability into a coherent system of planning became a novel, and as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity; but progress has been made. In our view such flexibility enhances the certainty of retaliation and thereby makes an attack less likely. Above all, it preserves the capability for human decision even in the ultimate crisis.

(2) to control certain qualitative aspects -- particularly MIRVs [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles];

-- The Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program that had closed the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching on the average eight submarines a year with 16 ballistic missiles each.

-- The United States had ended its numerical buildup in the late 1960's at a level of 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]. We were emphasizing technological improvements, particularly in MIRVs, for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. Our replacement systems were intended for the late 1970's and early 1980's.

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-- By most reasonable measurements of strategic power, we held an important
advantage, which still continues. But it was also clear that if existing trends
were maintained the Soviet Union would first exceed our numerical levels by a
considerable margin and then develop the same technologies we had already mastered.

The 5-year Interim Agreement which limited anti-ballistic missile defenses and froze the level of ballistic missile forces on both sides represented the essential first step toward a less volatile strategic environment.

-- By limiting anti-ballistic missiles [ABMs] to very low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union removed a potential source of instability; for one side to build an extensive defense for its cities would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward a first-strike capability. Before seeking a disarming capability a potential aggressor would want to protect his population centers from incoming nuclear weapons.

-- Some have alleged that the Interim Agreement, which expires in October 1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-based and sea-based, than the United States. Such a view is misleading. When the agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union already possessed more land-based ICBMs than the United States and, given the pace of its submarine construction program, over the next few years it could have built virtually twice as many nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

The Interim Agreement confined a dynamic Soviet ICBM program to the then-existing level; it put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBMs, the weapons that most concern us; and it set an upper limit on the Soviet SLBM program. No American program was abandoned or curtailed. We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No restraints were placed on bombers -- a weapons system in which we have a large advantage. Indeed, the US lead in missile warheads is likely to be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

The SALT I agreements were the first deliberate attempt by the nuclear superpowers to bring about strategic stability through negotiation. This very process is conducive to further restraint. For example, in the first round of SALT negotiations in 1970-72 both sides bitterly contested the number of ABM sites permitted by the agreement; two years later both sides gave up the right to build more than one site. In sum, we believe when we signed these agreements -- and we believe now -- that they had reduced the danger of nuclear war, that both sides had acquired some greater interest in restraint, and that the basis had been created for the present effort to reach a broader agreement.

The goal of the current negotiations is an agreement for a ten-year period. We had aimed at extending the Interim Agreement with adjustments in the numbers and new provisions aimed at dealing with the problem of MIRVs. We found, however, that our negotiation for a two- or three-year extension was constantly threatened with irrelevance by the on-going programs of both sides that were due to be deployed at the end of or just after the period. This distorted the negotiation, and indeed devalued its significance. We shifted to the ten-year approach because the period is long enough to cover all current and planned forces but not so long as to invite hedges that would defeat the purpose of an arms control agreement. In fact it invites a slowing down of planned deployments; further a period of this length will allow us to set realistic ceilings that represent more than a temporary plateau from which to launch a new cycle in the arms race. Further reductions thus become a realistic objective.

With respect to ceilings on strategic forces, we have defined our goal as
essential equivalence in strategic capabilities. What constitutes equivalence
involves subjective judgment. Because US and Soviet forces are different from
each other -- in number and size of weapons, in technological refinement, in
performance characteristics -- they are difficult to compare.

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We shall have to relate present advantages to potential development, existing disparities to future trends. This is a difficult process, but we are confident that it can be solved.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments of new or more modern systems. Neither side will remain in its present position without change for another decade. The Soviets are already embarked on testing an initial deployment of a third generation of ICBMs and on a third modification of submarine-launched missiles -- though the rate of deployment so far has been far short of the maximum pace of the late sixties.

For our part we are planning to introduce the Trident system, and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the capability of improving our Minute-man ICBM system, adding to the number as well as capability of MIRV missiles, and, if we choose, of deploying mobile systems, land based or airborne. Thus, our task is to see whether the two sides can agree to slow the pace of deployment so that modernization is less likely to threaten the overall balance or trigger an excessive reaction.

Finally, a ten-year program gives us a chance to negotiate reductions. Reductions have occasionally been proposed as an alternative to ceilings; they are often seen as more desirable, or, at least, easier to negotiate. In fact, it is a far more complicated problem. Reductions in launchers, for example, if not accompanied by restrictions on the number of warheads will only magnify vulnerability. The fewer the aim points, the simpler it would be to calculate an attack. At the same time reductions will have to proceed from some base line and must therefore be preceded by agreed ceilings -- if only of an interim nature. But a ten-year program should permit the negotiations of stable ceilings resulting from the start of a process of reductions.

Detente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. But it is a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the postwar period. When linked to such broad and unprecedented projects as SALT, detente takes on added meaning and opens prospects of a more stable peace. SALT agreements should be seen as steps in a process leading to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

#### IV. An Assessment of Detente

Major progress has been made:

- Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flash point has been substantially reduced through the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971. The US considers strict adherence to the agreement a major test of detente.

- We and our allies are launched on negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation -- a conference designed to foster East-West dialogue and cooperation.

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-- The honorable termination of America's direct military involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering of regional conflict were made possible by many factors. But this achievement would have been much more difficult -- if not impossible -- in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility toward the United States.

-- America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. Many feared that detente would undermine them. Instead, detente has helped to place our alliance ties on a more enduring basis by removing the fear that friendship with the United States involved the risk of unnecessary confrontation with the USSR.

-- Many incipient crises with the Soviet Union have been contained or settled without ever reaching the point of public disagreement. The world has been freer of East-West tensions and conflict than in the fifties and sixties.

-- A series of bilateral cooperative relations have turned the US-Soviet relationship in a far more positive direction.

-- We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war.

-- New possibilities for positive US-Soviet cooperation have emerged on issues in which the globe is interdependent -- science and technology, environment, energy.

To be sure, the process of detente raises serious issues for many people. Let me deal with these in terms of the principles which underlie our policy.

### First, if detente is to endure, both sides must benefit.

There is no question that the Soviet Union obtains benefits from detente. On what other grounds would the tough-minded members of the Politburo sustain it? But the essential point surely must be that detente serves American and world interests as well. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of power, influence, and position, our interests have not suffered -- they have generally prospered. In many areas of the world the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the case for many years. It is also true that Soviet influence and presence are felt in many parts of the world. But this is a reality that would exist without detente. The record shows that detente does not deny us the opportunity to react to it and to offset it.

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are in their infancy; we have many safeguards against unequal benefits -- in our laws, in the agreements themselves, and in plain common sense. Of course, there are instances where the Soviet Union has obtained some particular advantage. But we seek in each agreement or project to provide for benefits that are mutual. We attempt to make sure that there are trade-offs among the various programs that are implemented. Americans surely are the last who need fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

**Second, building a new relationship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional Alliance relations.**

Inevitably, a greater sense of drama accompanies our dealings with the Soviet Union because the central issues of war and peace cannot be other than dramatic. It was precisely a recognition of this fact and our concern that alliance relations not be taken for granted that led to the American initiative in April of 1973 to put new emphasis on our traditional associations. We sought political acts of will which would transcend the technical issues at hand, symbolize our enduring goals, and thus enhance our fundamental bonds. Much has been accomplished. The complications attendant to adapting US-European relations should not be confused with their basic character. We were tested in difficult conditions that do not affect our central purposes. Today relations with Europe and Japan are strong and improving. We have made progress in developing common positions on security, detente, and energy. The experience of the past year has demonstrated that there is no contradiction between vigorous, organic alliance relations and a more positive relationship with adversaries; indeed they are mutually reinforcing.

**Third, the emergence of more normal relations with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense.**

There is a tendency in democratic societies to relax as dangers seem to recede; there is an inclination to view the maintenance of strength as incompatible with relaxation of tensions, rather than its precondition. But this is primarily a question of leadership. We shall attempt to be vigilant to the dangers facing America. This Administration will not be misled -- or mislead -- on issues of national defense. At the same time we do not accept the proposition that we need crises to sustain our defense. A society that needs artificial crises to do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal danger.

**Fourth, we must know what can and cannot be achieved in changing human conditions in the East.**

The question of dealing with Communist governments has troubled the American people and the Congress since 1917. There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ so sharply with our own, we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. Some argue that until there is a genuine "liberalization" -- or signs of serious progress in this direction -- all elements of conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. In that view, demands for internal changes must be the precondition for the pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

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We have accomplished much. But we cannot demand that the Soviet Union, in effect, suddenly reverse five decades of Soviet, and centuries of Russian, history. Such an attempt would be futile and at the same time hazard all that has already been achieved. Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come. But they are most likely to develop through an evolution that can best go forward in an environment of decreasing international tensions. A renewal of the Cold War will hardly encourage the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies or adopt a more benevolent attitude toward dissent.

## V. Agenda for the Future

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In cataloging the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is
attainable. We must consider what alternative policies are available, and what
their consequences would be. And, the implications of alternatives must be
examined, not just in terms of a single issue, but for how they might affect the
entire range of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for world peace.

If, in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results, then
we would be reviving the doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of the
1950's. And we would do so at a time when Soviet physical power and influence on
the world are greater than a quarter century ago when those policies were devised
and failed. The futility of such a course is as certain as its danger.

Let there be no question, however, that Soviet actions could destroy detente,
as well:

If in crises it acts to sharpen tension;

If it does not contribute to progress toward stability;

We face an opportunity that was not possible 25 years, or even a decade, ago.
If that opportunity is lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indeed, it
may not come at all.