LC

# Angolan Guerrillas To Take Red Help

Special to The New York Times

LEOPOLDVILLE, the Congo, Jan. 3—The Angolan government-in-exile headed by Holden Roberto has decided to accept the help of Communist China and “other Communist countries” in the fight to free Angola from Portuguese rule.

Within a month an Angolan delegation is expected to visit Peking at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Government, African diplomatic sources said. This trip will probably be followed by visits to Moscow and possibly Cuba.

"The Communists assured me that we can have whatever we need in arms and money," Mr. Roberto said in an interview today. "We are firmly decided to accept."

Mr. Roberto is considered a

Continued on Page 4, Column 3

In October 1963 at a reception offered by the Cameroon Mission to the United Nations in the United Nations Delegates Dining Room, I was introduced by a member of the United States Mission to the United Nations to Mr. Vladimir Suslov, Under-Secretary for Political and Security Council Affairs, and Vadim Bogoslovsky, Assistant to the Under-Secretary--both of the Soviet Union. On hearing some discussion of the work of the International Official Visitors Office, Mr. Suslov had asked to be introduced. After a few moments, Suslov and Bogoslovsky called me aside and Mr. Suslov then explained that he was the ranking Soviet representative in the Secretariat and that he had come here from a post as Chef de Cabinet to Foreign Minister Gromyko. He said that he was explaining in detail because he wanted me to take seriously his next statement, which was that his government would "look with favor on Governor Rockefeller being elected President of the United States."

The remark was surprising because the Soviet representatives at the United Nations are usually careful to avoid discussions of United States partisan politics and are not inclined to be facetious. Nevertheless, I laughed and said that Mr. Suslov must certainly be aware that Governor Rockefeller had constantly taken positions that could be described as a hard line on the protection of the United States interests, and that this inevitably would present numerous conflicts between his policies and those of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Suslov reiterated his credentials and repeated the same statement as to his government's attitude toward the Governor, and suggested that his remarks should be conveyed to the Governor.

Still jokingly, I said that I was puzzled as to what would bring about such an unexpected endorsement of the Governor, when at that time he had not even indicated that he would seek the Presidency. Mr. Suslov said that the Soviet Union has to be careful to analyze political situations in other countries from an objective and realistic point of view and that in order to do this, the analysts must be aware that many public statements are made for public purposes. Also, he said that the period ahead would be difficult and that it was the considered judgment of the Government of the Soviet Union that the principal qualities in a president of the United States which could be helpful in getting the world through this period safely would be flexibility, objectivity and a pragmatic approach to international relations.

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[Lc]

I told him I could not take that seriously, but he insisted that the Johnson Administration has been making overtures in that direction and that it was quite possible that there would be consultations on such a suggestion in the summer. He suggested that this would be of interest to Governor Rockefeller and that there were many reasons why an opportunity should be found for Mr. Suslov and Governor Rockefeller to meet. He also mentioned at this point that in 1959 Governor Rockefeller had met with the Premier of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and that he had read the Premier's report on this meeting while serving in the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

About the Chinese, Bogoslovsky indicated his belief that by mid-January there would be clear evidence of an effective penetration of Africa through the initiative of Chou En Lai during his current visit there. He said that there is even the possibility that Chou may offer Chinese volunteers to the Organization for African Unity when the time comes for an invasion of South Africa by the other African countries.

*********************

January 10, 1964

# THE DEPENDABILITY OF U.S. MISSILES

## QUESTION

Senator Goldwater has said: "I don't feel safe at all about our missiles, to tell you the truth. I wish the Defense Department could tell the American people how undependable the missiles in our silos actually are." Asked how undependable the missiles were, he said: "I can't tell you, it's classified ... they're not dependable." He also criticized the "phasing out" of the bomber force. What is your position?

## RECOMMENDED POSITION

The unimpaired strength of our military arsenal is, of course, of direct importance to every American. This subject has two parts: The adequacy of the present arsenal and the long-range adequacy.

### (1) The adequacy of the present arsenal

While I do not have access to the pertinent classified information, it is inconceivable to me that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose loyalty cannot be questioned and whose technical knowledge in these matters is unsurpassed, would rely on an undependable missile system. I have full confidence in their abilities and rely on their judgment.

Senator Goldwater's statement is particularly ill-advised because deterence of a Soviet attack depends on Khrushchev's judgment that we could respond with overwhelming force. Statements by American public officials which down-grade the capability of our deterrent force thus may have the effect of encouraging Soviet attack.

And, as Senator Goldwater said on August 29, 1961, when speaking of a pessimistic article about our defenses:

"Statements of this nature, particularly during this time of heightened international tension, can seriously undermine the morale of the American people and our allies, who repose great trust and expectation in our primary deterrent, the offensive strike capacity of our strategic bombardment force.

"In my judgment, an article of this nature constitutes a great disservice to the Nation since it presents a negative point of view and no real alternative for improving our deterrent posture."

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(2) The long-range adequacy of our military arsenal

In this connection, I am concerned by two trends in our
military posture:

(a) While our present strategic forces are adequate, there exists in the Defense Department a dangerous complacency about long-term developments which may amount to a Maginot mentality - the assumption that what we have today will prove sufficient tomorrow. This is exemplified by the so-called "cost-effectiveness" approach of Secretary McNamara, which has recently been criticized in a unanimous, bipartisan report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as follows: "If this theory had been rigidly applied in the past, we would not have many of the essential weapons we have today. If our potential enemies do not choose to use the same cost-effectiveness criteria as our Department of Defense, we may well find that they will oppose us with the best weapons technology will provide."

I am similarly concerned with the cost-effectiveness judgment that the manned bomber force can be phased out of existence. In order to retain flexibility in our military capabilities, a manned bomber force should be retained.

(b) I am concerned about the steady redeployment of troops from overseas back to the United States which has been going on for more than a year from Europe, Japan and even Vietnam. Once before, in Korea, such redeployment invited Communist aggression. The visible shrinkage of the U.S. presence overseas is bound to dishearten our friends and may embolden our enemies.

January 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The Attached Proposal by Keating for an Inter-American Subversion Control Board Under the OAS.

1. Keating's proposal makes a good deal of sense to me. My understanding of the 1967 Rio Treaty indicates that the creation of such a board would be entirely legal.

2. I recommend that it be included in the Governor's Cuban position as one of the items which he believes the United States should urge the OAS to undertake. I suggest adding the following subpoint to the appropriate section of the pending Cuban position:

f. "Creation, under the OAS, of an Inter-American Subversion Control Board to assist member governments in identifying the sources of Communist propaganda and subversive activities, to provide a system for the exchange of information on known Communist agents and subversives who travel to Cuba, and to direct the activities of our own security agents in a cooperative effort to arrest, resist, and prevent subversive activities throughout the Hemisphere."

January 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROSWELL B. PERKINS

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Material With Which NAR Can Distinguish Himself From Goldwater

Pursuant to the Governor's request for delineated
positions on subjects where he disagrees with Goldwater
for use in New Hampshire, I have sent him the following:

1. a copy of the draft of the UN speech;

2. the memo on the Dependability of US Missiles;

3. the Q. & A. on the Authority to Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons;

4. the Q. & A. on the Withdrawal of Recognition From the USSR;

5. the Q. & A. on Breaking the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

MEMORANDUM

January 17, 1964

2. the Q. & V. on Breaking the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

3. the Q. & V. on the Withdrawal of Recognition from the U2R;

4. the Q. & V. on the Withdrawal of Recognition from Weapons;

3. the Q. & V. on the Authority to Use Tactical Nuclear weapons;

2. the memo on the Dependability of U2 Missiles;

1. a copy of the draft of the UN abeecy;

for use in New Hampshire. I have sent him the following: positions on subjects where he disagrees with Goldwater. Pursuant to the Governor's request for delineated

January 19, 1964

Robinson Newcomb, Esq.
Newcomb, Gillogly & Associates
2015 N. Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C.

Dear Robbie:

Thanks a million for your letter of January 10
and the follow-up material.

In the paper on housing which you sent to me on
December 26, 1963, a statement is made on page 8 that the
Alliance for Progress program for mortgage insurance on
private housing in Latin America "has been almost a total
failure to date". We agree with the author's suggestion
that this issue might provide some useful political ammuni-
tion.

I wonder if it would be possible for you to give
us some more information on this point, including your
opinion of the transfer of this housing program to the FHA?

We would also be interested in knowing more
about A.I.D.'s apparent mishandling of the housing project
in Panama, if you happen to have more information.

cc: Ann Black
✓Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

January 19, 1964

TO: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Foreign Aid

I heartily concur in your memo of January 14, namely, having a committee of yourself, Bailey, Butler and Stacy to discuss a paper prepared by Stacy.

Stacy has been working on a paper and he will bring it to a conclusion soon with Dick Nathan's help. Our present thought is to wait until the New Hampshire primary is over before convening the discussion group, and at that time to bring in Prof. Mikesell and Prof. Mason as well.

Meanwhile, we will consult you about a proposed Q.&A. to sharpen up the Press Club answer NAR gave on foreign aid. We may also have to do a one-minute TV spot (in draft) as to the differences with Goldwater. Otherwise, I think we should stay out of this issue in N.H.

Thanks for keeping this uppermost in your mind.
Dick Nathan will keep June and Doug informed.

cc: Stacy May
Richard P. Nathan
Douglas Bailey
June Goldthwaite

February 7, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: Henry A. Kissinger

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Shortening of the "Communist Challenge"

I forgot to mention to you over the phone the following:

About a week ago, when we were getting criticism that the foreign affairs drafts were much too long and sounded too much like the magazine *Foreign Affairs*, I thought it would be useful to see if someone could cut the length of the "Communist Challenge."

I asked June whether she would like to try this, or whether I should get a speech writer to see if he could edit it for length. June said she would prefer to try it.

Her revision should be on your desk Saturday morning. She honestly feels that the shortening is helpful rather than hurtful, and I personally am inclined to agree.

I think we would have a more salable product in shorter form, and one that would be more widely read.

However, this is entirely up to you as to which version we push hard on.

RBP/mr1

February 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Outside Assistance on Position Papers

1. Could I get a chance to know when our position papers are sent to outsiders? In general I do not think much of Seidman's comments.

2. In essence I agree with June's comments on Zartman. Zartman has no academic standing that I can discover. On the other hand, I do not think any damage has been done.

I see no academic attending that I can discover. On the other hand,

S. In essence I agree with TIME's comments on SATURDAY.

SENTENCE IS NOT THE POINT. THE POINT IS THAT THE COMMENT IS BASED ON OUTGOING COMMENTS.

J. CONF. I GET A CHANCE TO TALK TO OTHERS ON THE POOR CONDITION OF THE PRESS.

SUBJECT: Outstanding Vastatence on Position Papers

FROM: Henry V. Kraemer.
TO: Howard B. Perkins

MISCELLANEOUS

DECEMBER 17, 1964

ROOM 230
60 WEST 49TH STREET

Feb. 4 1967

To: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: June

You may wish to comment to Rod
on Mr. Seidman's suggestions on
Southeast Asia.

My own thought on this, as on
the Zartman offer of assistance on
Africa, is that if we wish to go out-
side our own resources, which we may
very well wish to do on those areas
where we have not had time to do
outside research particularly, we
should select fairly carefully the
people to whom we turn.

You may remember that we drew
up lists of authorities and experts
last summer.

February 1, 1964

TO: June Goldthwait

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

A chap with Lehman Brothers who wants to help
the Governor made detailed comments on the South East
Asia draft. They are attached hereto.

Although this is all outdated, presumably we
are going to say something more about South East
Asia in the future. I hope you will have a chance
to review this fellow's ideas.

I think one of his basic points is that the
statement rather narrowly focused on the military
situation in Vietnam, and Seidman hopes we will be
able to say something in the broader sphere of
South East Asia which includes economic problems.

Do you think we ought to ask Henry to get
a paper written from some outside source?

RBP:js

Attach.

SAMUEL N. SEIDMAN

Mr. R. Perkins

LEHMAN BROTHERS
ONE WILLIAM STREET

NEW YORK

Draft-

The focus of the platform is too limited. The platform should include, for example:

a. some considerations on expediting development in Southeast Asia

b. a criticism of deteriorating relations between the United States and Pakistan.

c. a reassessment and strengthening of SEATO in order to contend more effectively with insurrection rather than outright invasion. Some consideration might be given to penetrating across international border lines where another country is supplying and supporting insurgents so as to get at the source of guerilla strength. This may be basic to settling the conflagration in Vietnam.

It might not be out of place to demand an assessment of the activities and effectiveness of the neutralization and U.N. maintenance of peace commissions. (See: Keshav in India in Asia; Less Korea in Asia)

Apropos Vietnam, an international mission should once and for all, for all the world to know, establish the fact that the guerrillas operate from a privileged sanctuary. This should be exposed and pressed in the United Nations (for propaganda purposes). If this does not work, an international military force (perhaps SEATO) might be permitted to intercede. (See: Vietnam; Korea)

d. Should press for the speeded development of our free enterprise, democratic friends in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand and encourage further economic cooperation between the three, of them:

e. a demand for the preservation of the stake of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. This is both a humanitarian gesture and important, fundamental, to the economic development of these areas.

By offer point (e), correct things are being said. At the same time, it has a quality of uniqueness and provides a scope and depth to platform development which is otherwise lacking.

DRAFT 2

January 16, 1964

STATEMENT BY GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

It is high time that the Johnson Administration told the American people frankly just what this Nation's policies and objectives in Southeast Asia really are.

We are pursuing policies toward Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam
utterly at variance with each other, despite the fact that the
fate of these countries has been historically linked.

Official statements about the progress of the war in
Vietnam have been confusing and contradictory.

The public announcements of the Administration about its
policies and purposes have been completely inconsistent and
misleading.

The American people have a right to know what our policies
in Southeast Asia are. They have a right to know why these policies
have been adopted. They have a right to know how successful these
policies have been.

Therefore, I urge that the Administration give public and
complete answers to the following:

1. How is the war going in South Vietnam?

2. Is the American military commitment sufficient to win the war?

3. Does the United States still intend to withdraw all its military forces from Vietnam by the end of next year?

4. If the war is not going well, why were 1,000 American troops withdrawn in December?

5. If the war in Vietnam has not been going well, how does the Administration explain the optimistic statements extending well over two years?

[y]

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# I. The Neutralization of Laos

In 1961 when the Democratic Administration took office, the United States was backing a pro-Western government in Laos. The Communist Pathet Lao controlled only one-fifth of the area. On March 23, 1961, in the face of a Communist advance, the President announced that the "safety (of Laos) runs with the safety of us all". U.S. troops moved into the Gulf of Siam.

When the Communists continued their advance, despite our "show of strength", the Administration came up with a scheme for the "neutralization" of Laos. It abandoned our support for the pro-Western government of Phoumi Nosavan and insisted on a coalition government in which the Communists play an increasingly powerful part. Since the so-called neutralization the Communists have constantly expanded the area they control. Today the Communist Pathet Lao control over half of Laos, including the entire area contiguous to the Vietnamese border, extending over 260 miles, thus opening up a new supply line and a sanctuary for the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam.

In December 1961, while Laos was being "neutralized", the United States formally committed itself to a major effort to defeat the Vietcong guerrillas. Over 10,000 U.S. military personnel were sent to Vietnam as instructors. Military assistance was stepped up. It was announced that Vietnam was "different" from Laos.

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The "neutralization" of Laos was inconsistent with our
Vietnam policy on two counts: psychologically, it spurred on
the Vietcong (Communist guerrillas) and demoralized our friends.
It set the precedent that we were capable of sacrificing a
government we had been instrumentally in establishing. It thus
must have created the hope in some, and the fear in others,
that if the war in Vietnam was sufficiently prolonged, we would
tire of it as we had in Laos.

Militarily, the so-called "neutralization" of Laos
opened up the entire frontier between Laos and Vietnam to guer-
rilla infiltration and enabled the Communists to establish
sanctuaries in Laos, and new supply lines into Vietnam.

These supply lines have strengthened the Vietcong in
their unending war of harrassment.

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## II. How the War in Vietnam is Going: The Process of "News Management"

We are now told by the press that the war in Vietnam is not going well. The Administration has apparently made every effort to hide this fact from the American people. Thus:

- On July 24, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara said that the South Vietnamese were "beginning to hit the Vietcong insurgents where it hurts most - in winning the people to the side of the government".

- On April 5, 1963, General Taylor testified that "in the bitter struggle in the Republic of Vietnam, 1962 was the critical year. For the first time in fifteen years the people of Vietnam with our military assistance started winning instead of losing the fight to protect their freedom".

- On April 12, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk said that "an important corner has been turned" in the war in Vietnam.

- On September 25, 1963, Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester said that military events in Vietnam were "getting better and better" and that reports showed that the government was "rapidly approaching" militarily the point where the "goals set will be reached relatively shortly".

- On October 2, 1963, a White House announcement stated that the war was going so well that 1,000 U.S. military personnel could be withdrawn before the end of this year and most of the remainder before the end of 1965.

- On October 31, 1963, the day before the overthrow of the Diem regime, General Harkins, the Commander of our forces in Vietnam, said that victory, in the sense that it applied to this kind of war, was only months away.

In other words, even before the overthrow of the Diem regime, the Administration consistently maintained that we were winning the war in Vietnam. After the overthrow, these claims continued, if anything more strongly, because the new government was supposed to be more determined. Thus:

-5-

-- On November 20, 1963, high Administration officials meeting in Hawaii reported that the war had taken a decided turn for the better and reaffirmed the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by January 1st.

-- On November 25, 1963, President Johnson was reported to have reaffirmed the policy for Vietnam, including the October 2nd statement on the withdrawal of 1,000 troops before the end of 1963.

-- On December 3, 1963, the first of 1,000 United States service-men were withdrawn from Vietnam.

Suddenly, after two years of extraordinary optimism over the military effort in Vietnam, after a coup d'etat which put in power a government described as significantly more capable of prosecuting the war, it appears that the war is going badly. The American people have now been getting reports that, in fact, all is not well in Vietnam:

-- The month following the coup d'etat on November 1st was the most disastrous of the year for the Vietnamese forces. Government casualties and losses ran higher than in any other month. The Vietcong staged about 3,100 military and sabotage and propaganda actions, a record total since the resumption of hostilities in 1958.

-- A high ranking officer from Washington has disclosed in Saigon that the situation in the Mekong Delta is, in fact, "rough - really rough".

-- Secretary McNamara has told President Johnson that the Communists have overrun a number of strategic hamlets in Vietnam in recent weeks.

-- The press now tells us that, in fact, the war has been going poorly for the last year.

How are all these announcements to be reconciled? How can we withdraw troops when the war is going badly? What are the American people to believe? The cynicism of the "news management" of the Administration is shown by a statement from an unnamed Administration official quoted in the New York Times on October 14th.