DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Joe Alsop

9/22/70 11:15 a.m.

A: I need a few minutes of your time. Could you fit me in
tomorrow morning or late this afternoon?

K: I'll try.

A: I know it's tough. You were advertised as such in this
week's New Republic by Mr. Osborne.

K: Complainingly?

A: No. But do you think you could see me?

K: This is a rough time.

A: I know. If Hussein loses, the Israelis will end by invading
Jordan.

K: No question. They may invade without Hussein losing.

A: To help save him.

K: At any rate, we've come out of our period of torpor.

A: We can't go on being torpid when somebody sticks a large
pin in our rear.

K: It's been known to happen.

A: How about 6:30 this evening?

K: Let me call you later. I just have to be sure.

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

11:33 a.m. 9/22/70

S: I don't want you to undermine my staff. You are passing out too many compliments.

K: Do you think the Israelis will attack without coming back to us?

S: I don't think so without answering number 2. Do you think I should call Rabin and say I assume nothing will happen before hearing from you. I thought of this an hour ago.

K: It's better if you do it than I. If you have any questions --

S: Before any buttons are pushed, you will be back in touch with us. That sort of thing.

K: You will be in touch again with me.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1985
By NARA Date 6/9/01

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger

11:33 a.m. 9/22/70

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9/22/70 3:20 p. m.

R: I would appreciate it if in the morning on this German question you would call on Hillenbrand. He is very knowledgable and has just come back from there. I don't think there's an intelligence question involved here.

K: Okay. The President wanted originally to spend an hour on that and half an hour on Jordan. But I see no sense in talking about Jordan now.

R: No, I think it is a good idea to have a meeting just for him to hear it first-hand, but there is nothing much for him to decide.

K: That was the purpose of it--to lay out the issues.

R: Okay. I will tell Marty.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.1258
By NARA Date 6/9/70

By NARA, Date

5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9/22/70 3:20 p.m.

R: Okay. I will tell Marty.

By NARA, Dale

5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Freeman/Kissinger

3:22 p.m.

9/22/70

K: Two things -- the President will see Home at noon tomorrow. What he said was it was to be him, Home and myself. Let me check about you.

F: Fine. Whatever you say.

K: I will check on that. I think he meant no other Americans. I will let you know.

F: Do we come to your NW door?

K: yes. He is suggesting a dinner for Mountbatten for Nov. 5.

F: That's generous. I will pass that on. I will probably see you tomorrow.

K: You will come along in any event.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

3:30 p.m.

9/22/70

K: The jungle looks good after the desert.

S: I see you are taking a weekend in Paris.

K: It will never take place.

S: You don't think so? I am interested about Ky.

K: The Secy. brought that up. I told him I have no intention of seeing him.

S: I wanted you to see him. I don't see how you can be there and not see him.

K: Tell your Secy. I would like a call from him without a needle. I will see Ky if it serves a useful purpose. I am going because I wanted to see the delegation outside the President's office and I find ? ? ? ? ?

S: Habib called. Bui Diem will be going on the 25th to persuade Ky not to come. They will know when you are in Paris whether he has been persuaded not to come. Phil x feels with you there that you would have to see Ky.

K: The Secy. had no strong views.

S: There was a cable saying we need to send a special emissary to Paris to tell Ky not to come and I guess they put two and two together.

K: See the <u>x</u> Secy. Tell him you think I should call on Ky. I am delighted to do it. I will <u>x</u> take Habib along.

S: Habib will give you his feeling based on Bui Diem. We must let Bui Diem know you are there.

K: You and I have no problems.

S: I have really been scratching my head on how to work on what could be a disaster if Ky comes. At a certain point we could offer an official visit in late November. I asked the Secy. to check on that and see if the President agrees.

K: The answer is yes.

S: We could hold that out. I thought you might be in a position to do that in Paris. The other thing if this thing is really riotous we could lift the permit for the rally.

K: That's strong.

S: Consider the bipartisan support.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Sullivan/Kissinger

3:30 p.m. 9/22/70

-2-

K: But we have never done that for a peace-nik group so we shouldn't do it to a pro-war group. If you want me to see Ky --

S: Phil will give you the latest on that after he sees Bui Diem. On the cables we have, I think it's very good on the first go round. There's some question in the cables and it's premature to answer before we know the timing. I wonder if I could give Bunker back a little. What we have in mind is a cease-fire.

K: I will call you back.

S: I will give you a draft.

K: And I will respond to it.

S: On timing, do you have any clues?

K: Within a week of our return.

S: That will raise a question of Long Nol and Souvanna.

K: Maybe we should do it during the week we are gone.

S: That's what I thought. Both Lon Nol and Souvanna have been very good about keeping it to themselves.

K: Let's think about doing that on the 1st.

S: Symser's your man?

K: Abosutely.

S: I will send over a draft with some sketchy answers. Nothing definitive, just some ideas.

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

5:11 p.m.

9/22/70

S: Tomorrow I have been asked to brief the Senate Foreign Relations and I want to be sure I don't miss anything in the meeting today. Was there any question with the President and the Leadership if there was a request from Jordan for us to interfere.

K: The President didn't address that and he said we will be considering it in the evacuation context only.

S: That's very helpful.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1958

By AB NARA Date 6/9/70

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
9/22/70; 6:40 p.m.

K: I know I have ruined your day -- the President has tied me up.

J: No, Henry, I understand.

K: What I wanted to ask you -- is there any sense in having a pre-NSC meeting on this.

No.

J: /I had a talk with Tommy on this. I know what he thinks about it -- his views are damn hard to understand. His first thought was possibly a Kosygin letter but this opens it up for replies on our bases abroad, etc. The thing I come down to is a private talk when Gromyko comes here. Rogers can take this up with Gromyko -- this is an area we have kept out of -- we thought that since 1962 we were agreed we were not going to let this thing come up again. They can talk about the emotional problem here in the U. S. and what it all means and what they are going to do about it.

K: Okay.

J: That type of thing. If Gromyko doesn't show up, that's another thing. I was rocked by paper that Tom's people produced.

K: You mean about things we should do.

J: SALT and Czechoslovakia, etc.

K: I saw it and consider the first three pages irrelevant.

J: Here is Tommy's view. He says Soviets are 15 years behind us. They are trying hard to catch up. We are the model of the big power. They are now doing things we did 15 years ago -- overseas bases, getting their submarines built, etc. -- trying to catch up with us. They want to be a first class power like us. Great deal of Russian inferiority complex involved here. The thing he has a hard time explaining is what is going on in Egypt. But I believe and strongly feel that the private approach at this time is the thing to take seriously and it would not open us into the problem of getting into correspondence at this stage. I want to talk to Dave and Tom about this -- that these barges are associated with submarines. We want to be absolutely solid on our facts. I am not questioning this, but I want to be sure on this.

K: Right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

9/22/70; 6:40 p.m.

-2-

J: Those are about the only thoughts. I called Dave and said I was a little surprised about this paper which represented quite a different point of view -- obviously a joint staff thing.

K: That talk about Kosygin -- we made no secret of fact that he would be welcome. That they are making a crash program of building a base in the area, I think is provocative.

J: One thing is to get a better negotiating position on these in SALT. This is an obvious way of doing it. New Subject: I sent a message to Ed Korry over. I cleared it out with Dave Packard and Tom Karamessines and it is ready to go as far as I am concerned -- all it needs is a phone call.

K: Okay, I will get to it. I am sure if everyone has approved it, I will. Maybe one way of handling this is to have WSAG meeting at 8:00 a. m. to catch up on Jordanian situation and then the principals can stay together to talk about Cuba for a few minutes.

J: Okay, I will plan on that.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Attorney General Mitchell
9/22/70; 7:00 p. m.

K: My maniacal friend.

M: All hell was raised at Congressional about Ky coming over and the President said I should talk to Henry and see if you can get that turned off.

K: The situation is well in hand. I mean we have done what we can.

M: Was that for the benefit of the Congressmen? I am sure he knows what has gone on.

K: I guess he thinks you are the only man who can frighten me. Actually, I thought what you said was flattering except for the first word.

M: Let me tell you now that I have you on the phone -- I don't know that woman -- somebody asked me if I thought you would be leaving Washington. I said hell no you were the President's closest adviser and in pure humor he has quite a life with all the motion picture actresses, etc and I am sure he would not want to miss that.

K: Now you say it's my position not my charm that's getting them -- now you have done it! Look I am aware of the Ky problem. There is a chance I will be in Paris on Saturday. If I talk to Ky, he will not come.

M: Let me tell you this will really be one of the biggest confrontations we have had here. This could be a disaster. This is what the Senators were worried about. Vietnam has been put on the back burner that it is not even an issue now.

K: I don't know if we will turn it off.

M: Just refuse the son-of-a-bitch admission. I think word has to get out quickly.

K: The word got to him. If I can go to Paris, believe me, he is not coming.

M: It is also important that we get the word out quickly so that we don't have all the kooks coming to Washington for this. This is really appealing to the kooks. Anything I can do?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Attorney General
9/22/70; 7:00 p.m.

- 2 -

K: No, we are handling it -- I mean I don't know if we are handling it. But call Bill if you want, it can't do any harm.

M: But will he have guts enough to.

K: I will take care of it.

M: Do you or don't you want me to call Bill? Okay, let me register a protest.

K: It can't do any harm.

M: Please keep your eye on the public announcement aspect of it.

feg

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
9/22/70; 7:20 p.m.

K: I have not had a chance to study the text of this reply and we just told the President that there has been a reply and I thought that we should meet on it tomorrow rather than try to fire one off tonight. He wanted to use the 9:30 - 10:30 period. He thinks the German issue interesting but not crucial right now so I just wanted to let you know and we will confine it to the same group that has been meeting.

R: Will you have someone let Ted Eliot know. That other matter, are we going to discuss that, too?

K: Yes. I was to check with everybody to see whether there was anything else to be discussed. There is nothing we need to do tonight.

R: Right. Let's all try to get a night's sleep. Poor Joe, he is groggy. Okay, we'll see you in the morning at 9:30.

feg

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E.0.12958</td></tr><tr><td>By AB NARA Date 6/9/70</td></tr></table>

By NARA, Date 5/26

feg

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., September 22, 1970

S: You and the Secretary will talk on this and draft a reply.

K: For your and my information, it would help if you and I could agree informally.

S: I am going home to eat something, why don't you give me a call.

K: If I had as pretty a wife as you have, I would do the same.

S: I can see that you say this feelingly.

K: If you are good to me, I will take care of you on the West Coast.

S: Give me a call when you are free and we can talk orally.

K: Going to the UAR Embassy tonight.

S: You go there and you are off my list.

K: I thought that would throw off.

S: Stay home. I will see about getting the Senate Relations thing cancelled -- either that or send Roger Davies.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.1458
Authority
By AD NARA Date 6/9/70

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., September 22, 1970

K: I thought that would throw ______ off.

wgh

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Packard
9/22/70; 7:50 p.m.

K: We have been trying to get an assistance package together for Israel in case it has to move. We are going through the same song and dance that always happens.

P: Look, I have one on my desk that is okay with me.

K: The Israelis called today and said all he said he could discuss was additional anti-ammunition. We need two packages: one for the northern front and one for the southern front. Not to be delivered but to be ready in case circumstances require it.

P: I have one on my desk but I don't know if it is adequate. I will get on it.

K: We need a package for the southern area and a package for the northern with the clear understanding that these are on a contingency basis. He does not have to tell the Israelis what we are going to do. We have to know what we can do. He was supposed to straighten it out with their military attache but he told them he could not discuss it. If you are satisfied that we have a package for both contingencies, that's fine.

P: Okay.

K: Okay.

feg

DECLASSIFIED
F.O.1558
Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/70

By NARA, Dale 5/26

K: The Israelis called today and said all he said he could discuss was additional 1/4/4 ammunition. We need two packages: one for the northern front and one for the southern front. Not to be delivered but to be ready in case circumstances require it.

P: Okay.

K: Okay.

feg

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Amb. Rabin
9/22/70; 8:50 p.m.

K: At a reception at an Embassy I ran into John Chancellor who said that Valeriano had been told by an Israeli official that joint planning was going on for an Israeli attack.

R: Total nonsense. I don't believe that any Israeli said so. I will tell you what happened. In Israel it appeared on some papers that the Government of Israel has no intentions to take the chestnut out of the fire for the Americans.

K: Just make sure that none of your people.

R: I had an opportunity to talk to John Chancellor because he attended the luncheon for the Prime Minister and I don't believe that anybody said so.

K: He said it was said to Valeriano.

R: I don't believe anyone said that. I know exactly what I said and what I instructed everyone to say. I can check it because our spokesman is here.

K: Don't bother. I take your word for it.

R: The whole problem came about with the news that Israel is not going to do anything. This is what happened in our newspapers. We had a lot of questions why Israel is waiting. Why they are not doing anything -- that's 90% of the questions. May I ask you another thing? When do you believe you will be in a position to tell me something?

K: Before noon tomorrow. I know what the President is going to decide but we want to do it with the others.

R: It is very interesting because my own Ambassador (?) is after me.

K: I ran into the Soviet Charge at this Embassy reception and they seem to be extremely nervous.

R: He phoned my Ambassador at least ten times. I am sure it is not true what Chancellor told you and the problems we have had today since all the newspapers in Israel came out that Israel is not going to do anything -- we are getting a lot of questions Why Israel sits idle and doesn't react.

K: Okay.

feg

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By NARA Date 6/9/70

By NARA, Date 5/26

R: He phoned my Ambassador at least ten times. I am sure it is not true what Chancellor told you and the problems we have had today since all the newspapers in Israel came out that Israel is not going to do anything --we are getting a lot of questions Why Israel sits idle and doesn't react.

K: Okay.

feg

MSS DIV LIB CONG.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

September 22, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig
SUBJECT: Israeli Matter

Attached at Tab A is the substance of the
Israeli response.

Attached at Tab B is the elaboration which
you obtained from Rabin.

Rabin called at 7:15 p.m. with the following
message: (1) The Syrians tried to attack south
again this afternoon and were badly mauled
and lost 20 tanks. (2) Rabin has read the
essence of the Israeli Cabinet message to
Sisco over the phone and will deliver a
written copy in about 20 minutes. (3) The
Israelis met with Pranger this afternoon at
Defense and were told that their only
authorization was for additional ammunition
if they had any shortages. I told Rabin that
we had a Presidential directive which I was
confident would untangle the problems at
Defense.

Attachments

TOP SECRET

E.O. 1258
Authority

By A. A.

NARA Date 6/9/70

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Amb. Rabin
9/22/70 p.m.

R: I got a response from the government and would like to come
as soon as possible.

K: How long will it take you to get here?

R: 15 minutes.

K: Okay. I have to see the President, but you just wait for me.

R: I think it's a matter of principle. We are ready ______ but
another operation to follow it up. I think I have to explain it in detail to
you. Where should I come?

K: The Map Room.

R: And Young will be there?

K: Yes.

MSS DIV LIB CONG.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 22, 1970

FROM: Al Haig

SUBJECT: Conversation with Ambassador Rabin

I had the following phone message from Rabin just as you departed for the Sans Souci. He stated:

-- The Syrians again launched attacks south at 10:00 a.m. Jordanian time this morning. They ran into heavy artillery fire from the Jordanians and suffered casualties and as of 1:30 pm were withdrawn. There is no sign of new attacks this afternoon.

-- The above report is effective 1:30 p.m. local.

-- Rabin said that heavy fire is still going on in Amman.

-- Yesterday, there were several C-130 and Antonov-12 flights from Libya to Syria and today there were Antonov-12 flights from Egypt to Syria. The Israelis estimate that a battalion size Libyan force is being introduced into Syria. They also now believe that Egypt may be sending elements of the Palestinian Army into Syria.

-- Rabin stated that they are watching Iraqi forces closely and that there are some indicators of an imminent Iraqi attack (contrary to Secretary Rogers' estimate this morning, the Israelis had previously reported that Jordanian forces have already placed artillery on Iraqi forces with some casualties).

-- Rabin stated that he expects the cable resulting from today's Cabinet Meeting and in response to our communication of last night to arrive between 4:00 pm and 5:00 pm this afternoon. He will call here as soon as it arrives and let us be the first to see it.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1958
Authority
NARA Date 6/9/1970
By AB

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Brian McDonnell (215/IV3-2711)

9/23/70 8:10 a.m.

K: When I have been able to reach you you've been unavailable and now I have to go to a meeting. How long will you be there?

M: Until 2:00.

K: I will do my damnedest to call you before then.

M: I am thinking about coming down tonight, seeing you tomorrow morning and coming right back. I don't want you to go over there till I see you.

K: Over where?

M: Are you going with the President?

K: Yes.

M: That's what I thought. That's why I want to come down.

K: Let me call you later today. If you are leaving there, call my office and let them know.

By

NARA, Dato_5/20

TELCONE

Amb. Freeman/Kissinger

9:30 a.m.

9/23/70

K: On the meeting with the Foreign Secy. the President would prefer to do it alone. It has nothing to do with you.

F: I don't take umbrage at all.

K: The difference between the British and American foreign service is not understood here. You could let Home come by himself.

F: That might be best. It will be clearly understood that Foreign Secy. will go in alone.

K: We have highest regard for you.

F: You will have to leave it up to me to work out how I get him there but I will see that he meets with the President alone.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
V.P./Kissinger

11:15 a.m.

9/23/70

VP: I am going to do a TV interview and I need guidance on what I can respond to on the M.E.

K: I would be very enigmatic. We are making contingency plans. We are making plans for all eventualities.

VP: Not profitable to discuss them. How many American nationals in Jordan?

K: 200-300. There are 80 official Americans and remainder are married to Jordanians.

VP: How many hostages?

K: 47. Be enigmatic.

VP: I will be that m without question. For my own information --

K: We have made no decision to intervene and we are not eager to do it. We now hear the Syrians are pulling out.

VP: Any movement of Israelis?

K: Mobilizing but not moving yet. They usually move after they mobilize and so they probably will but no one else agrees with me so don't nail yourself to that.

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

11:21 a.m. 9/23/70

K: When can we see a draft?

S: I just dictated a draft. I will seex want to go over it myself and see the
Secy. I think within an hour.

K: OK. I am wondering if I should call that group together.

S: The Secy. has just called me. It's 11:30. If at 2:00 or something.

K: I will be back to you.

S: I can judge better after seeing the Secy.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

11:21 a.m. 9/23/70

K: When can we see a draft?

K: I will be back to you.

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

11:47 a.m.

9/24/70

K: The President appreciated your suggestion on the carrier and he agreed with it.

L: I thought I should check with you on this visit to Turkey. I have an invitation I am accepting and I don't want to give the impression that it's something we asked for. I am just trying to get State to turn it off and meet with the Defense Minister.

K: You don't want Sisco.

L: In Turkey, fine, but he is poison in Greece. They think he is the reason for the hold up in aid. I am accepting Turkish Defense minister's invitation.

K: How can they think a thing like that. Would he do anything contrary to the President's wishes? We were trying to get rid of him.

L: Send him home.

K: Tell him that he must stay on top of the M. E.

L: Can't have everyone out of town at the same time.

K: I will take the blame. I will tell him the President wants him back here.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/70

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Brian McDonnell/Kissinger
1:45 p.m. 9/23/70

K: This is a rough time for us to get together. I am sorry I have been so hard to reach.

M: Is the Jordan peace for real?

K: It's too early to tell.

M: Problem of your going. Unless you know some information on what Henry Kissinger means over there to some people. I am your friend, I am not threatening you.

K: Physical danger?

M: No. From our own. Henry is not liked over there by some people.

K: Where?

M: Egypt.

K: I'm not going there.

M: I mean our people. I am thinking of taking a night train down there and seeing you for 10 minutes.

K: You are a good friend and I appreciate this. Who is it?

M: Could I come down?

K: Of course.

M: It's not physical or assassination. I want you to know. You can avoid it by knowing before you go. Just don't want you to be hoodwinked.

K: Can you fly down?

M: Can't afford it.

K: Can I pay?

M: If it's your money, sure.

K: Of course it's my money. Why put you up all night.

M: Because we are freinds.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

Brian McDonnell/Kissinger

1:45 p.m.

9/23/70

-2-

K: You are really a good friend. I could see you today about 7:30.

M: That's not good. I need to see Alice before I can come down.

K: How about first thing in the morning? 7:45 in my office. Unless you will be embarrassed.

M: No.

K: I don't know what your information is --

M: I think it's necessary that I let you know before you leave.

K: May I have Winston sit in? Do you want to make it earlier? 7:30?

M: Very good. How do I get in? I will stay with people who will not know why I am there.

K: Then I can't pick you up. I will have Win pick you up. Anyway, come to the NW gate.

M: What's Win's last name? I forget it.

K: Lord.

M: I will call him.

TELCOM

Sen. Stennis/Kissinger

2:47 p.m.

9/23/70

K: I am sorry I have been so hard to get to.

S: We have this Israeli amendment. It's acceptable to me, of course. The questions is whether or not to put a ceiling on it.

K: Our objective on this is --

S: I want that in a confidential way.

K: We would prefer no ceiling because it will be understood as actual aid. The Arabs will be ______ and the Soviets could use it. If it's low it might be misunderstood as less commitment. We prefer that no ceiling be put on it.

S: That's fine.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12558
By: A.J. NARA Date 6/9/70

S: We have this Israeli amendment. It's acceptable to me, of course. The question is whether or not to put a ceiling on it.

S: That's fine.

LIB CONG.

Classification
on
Department of State

TELEGRAM

INDICATE:

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

<table><thead><tr><th>DISTRIBUTION</th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>PAGE 2 of TEL to TEL AVIV, AMMAN, etc.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">First and foremost, Rabin said, there was the Jordanian Army, loyal to the King, which gave the Syrians a real beating. Rabin recalled that GOI view has always been that Jordanian Army has the capability and is effective provided King showed resolve. Rabin was laudatory as to how Jordanian Army has exemplified itself in recent crisis.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">Second factor, according to Rabin, was Syrian Government realization that in order to press attack further against solid Jordanian resistance more Syrian Government involvement and regular Army involvement would be necessary, required, which in turn carried increased risk of confrontation with Israelis. Moreover, no longer could Syrians maintain that fedayeen were doing the fighting.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">Third, was the American posture in the Middle East which said Rabin said was very helpful in situation. Rabin felt that steps taken by US amounted to a credible threat and signal to USSR.</td></tr><tr><td>IV.</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>TE. EXT.</td><td>APPROVED BY:</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E.O. 1958</td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date 6/9/61</td></tr><tr><td>By AB</td></tr></table>

SIGNATURES

Gus H. K. H.

["LIB CONG.", "Classification\n---", "Department of State", "TELEGRAM", "INDICATE:", "☐ COLLECT", "☐ CHARGE TO", "<table><thead><tr><th>DISTRIBUTION</th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>PAGE 3 of TEL to TEL AVIV, AMMAN, etc.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Fourth, and of least significance in Rabin's view, was the Soviet role. He cautioned US on giving QTE Soviets too much credit UNNOTE. In his judgment, it is not clear what subordinate Soviets did in Damascus and whatever they did, was to have an important role and less importance than the above three factors. He is convinced that Syrians could not have moved 200 tanks across border into Jordan without knowledge of USSR. In any event, whatever Soviets may have done in Damascus was inconsequential in his view, if compared to principal reason for Hussein's success, namely, real beating which Jordanian Army gave to Syrians.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>GP-3</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>END</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE BY OC/T.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>DRAFTING DATE:</td><td>TEL. EXT:</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>APPROVED BY:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

3:20 p.m. 9/23/70

L: I have been in touch with that conference over there. I don't want you to panic on it. Between the House and Senate on Defense Authorization Bill.

K: I won't panic.

L: I hear they are cutting back. I have talked to Stennis and Rivers.

K: We shouldn't have a x ceiling.

L: Rivers wants a ceiling but I think I have got him.

K: I don't think so. I told him that a high ceiling is counter-productive and a low ceiling --

L: Of course. I don't want you to panic. Belieu was concerned.

K: I checked with the President and I want him to say he would handle it.

L: I talked to Stennis and Rivers. They are meeting now. We got that language on Fulbright amendment knocked out. And Brookes' We added $425 million for ships.

K: Rivers is a fact of life.

L: We will have to get a few financed now.

K: I take your judgment is that this other thing will go public.

L: Yeah.

K: We can't sit on it.

L: It will sooner or later get out. The Soviets should have a message from us before it goes public.

K: That's what we are working on in the next day or so.

L: I have to cancel out on a couple of speeches. Eric Severeid has this on going to Greece and Turkey but it's not been announced.

K: I have told them a hundred times. I will check on it.

L: I think the WH should announce it.

K: As part of the trip.

L: Monday morning if I see the Defense Minister --

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

3:20 p.m. 9/23/70

-2-

K: That's the best thing to do. An advisor's meeting with the Italians is worse than an American Cabinet meeting.

L: Any objection if I visited a friend, the King of Greece?

K: I wouldn't do that with the President there.

L: We still recognize him.

K: I think it's bad on a foreign policy point of view.

L: I understand. I will turn it off.

K: If you will see the Defense Minister, that will be k good.

L: It's better than sitting in that meeting.

K: They will just be standing around.

L: I can work on the Defense Ministers meeting in Europe. If it's there's anything else, so I can cancel out that speech in San Francisco.

K: I will check on it right away.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger
4:00 p.m. 9/23/70

P: Tomorrow did they tell you to come to a breakfast? We are having breakfast for the 90 and 91st session -- young Republicans. I thought you might want to talk for a 20 minute shot. Cover whatever will impress them. Brag a little about Cambodia and this is a pretty good thing today if it holds until tomorrow.

K: Incidentally, Rabin's view was that in the order of ____ our measures, the dispatch of the plane to Tel Aviv, the plane to pick up target information @ -- you remember, we flew it so there was a pick up -- and their moves and lastly, as a result, the Soviet reaction.

P: They were reacting to these things. So the Soviets restrained their people. We can't gloat. In the morning -- how should we handle it?

K: Cold analysis of what's happened. I wouldn't let the air out of the balloon yet.

P: Hopefully development but we are still on the alert.

K: If it remains its the beginning of the end of the crisis.

P: Sounds good.

K: I think that we are over the hump of this one.

P: Be sure to tell Joe the casualties are down this week. It's interesting the VN and Cambodia have been out of the paper for the last 10 days.

K: Will help us also in things that will come up in the next few months.

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

4:13 p.m.

9/23/70

K: I just wanted to tell you what I told the President 5 mins. ago. We think we hav broken the back of this crisis. I told him that you, Packard and Moorer really pulled their weight. You are really great patriots. When the chips were down you really delivered. Pranger/wasn't in it but he dark delivered like a great man. I have needled him from time to time and I wish you would get word to him that he is a tower of strength. And Dave. And you.

L: Thanks.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E.O. 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By AB NARA Date 6/9/70</td></tr></table>

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Hugh Sidway

9/23/70 4:32 p.m.

S: Have you got the world steadied there?

K: Absolutely.

S: Carl Rowan saw you yesterday with a beautiful girl in the
Sans Souci so I knew things were under control.

K: I always take a beautiful girl to lunch during a crisis.

S: I'm for it--too many decisions are made under stress and
fatigue.

K: About your letter--I talked to the President. Ziegler will be
calling you eventually, but here are the President's views. If you are
sure to use a cover he'll agree to let me do it. But if you are not, I
am then just giving you an exclusive backgrounder and he won't let
me.

S: That presents a problem; what if the situation changes? How
does this differ from any talking with me? Or are you turning every-
one off this week.

K: I'm turning everyone off this week. I have no interest in
this one way or another. But just be thinking about this. Ziegler
will be calling you; don't tell him that I called you.

S: No, I won't.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
John Kenneth Galbraith
9/23/70 5:05 p.m.

K: I wanted to tell you how distressed I was at missing seeing
you Sunday. But the Syrians chose that moment to invade Jordan.

G: We figured you were staying rather busy. But I think you are doing
just right.

K: It looks like we are beginning to break the back of it. It's not
absolutely clear, but it's the best it's looked.

G: If your distinguished predecessors were still in office, we'd
be in there. I can only praise your restraint and that of the President,
and if necessary I will say so.

K: We always appreciate your saying so. But I would like to
see you. I hear you are going to Europe. For how long?

G: Yes. I'm going to teach two terms at Cambridge. I'm giving
the English the benefit of the new industrial state.

K: A week from today?

G: Yes.

K: I may be in London a week from Sunday. Will you be there?

G: Yes, at the Ritz.

K: I may go to London for an evening. I would like to see you.

G: I have to do a thing Sunday evening for the BBC.

K: But we could have a drink.

G: Except for that I will keep everything in the clear. I will be at
the Ritz from Friday morning on. It will do you good to get away and
would improve your image with the Socialists.

K: I would love to see you.

G: This was a marvelous example of the virtues of knowing what
not to do. I have nothing but admiration.

K: I appreciate enormously what your friendship has meant to me.

By NARA, Date 5/26

9/23/70 5:05 p.m. page 2

G: This just shows what good sense accomplishes.

K: Thank you. You will be at the Ritz from Friday morning on?

G: Yes.

K: I really hope to see you. I hope to break away Sunday noon and come back to London. I will spend Sunday night and Monday morning in London.

Telecon:
Phil Potter - Baltimore Sun

9/23/70 5:30 p.m.

P: Is there any chance of getting over to see you?

K: No.

P: What I wanted to ask today was, the word out of State is some-
what ambiguous with regard to the withdrawing of Syrian tanks.

K: That's correct. We have some indications that they might be
withdrawing, but we want to look at it more carefully.

P: Did you by any chance see Sherman's piece in the Star today?

K: What does it say?

P: It says something to the effect that you were assured by the
second man in the Soviet Embassy last night that when they said no
foreign intervention they explicitly told you Syria was included in that.

K: Where? At the Soviet UAR Embassy?

P: Yes.

K: Well, he sort of suggested that they were using their influence
to get the Syrians . . . well, he was a little ambiguous, either to with-
draw or not to advance or whatever. You know the Middle East.

P: Yes.

K: Therefore, it is just too premature to draw any conclusions.
If the Syrian tanks have withdrawn some of the air is out of the tension
and with some of the air out of it the tension will have been reduced.
We have some reports that Syrian tanks are withdrawing, but Sunday
night we had a report they had withdrawn across the border and before
we knew it they were back that night. This time, if they have withdrawn
it is unlikely that they will come back. But it is unwise to throw out
hats in the air yet. I am telling you exactly what we in the White House
think. If at this time tomorrow the Syrian tanks are out we'll be a little
more optimistic.

P: What about the Cairo posture toward Hussein?

K: They follow the events. At first they were on his side; then
they didn't want to be outdone by Syria. They have not been in a leading

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 10/25
Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/01

Telecon
Phil Potter

9/23/70 5:30 p.m. page 2

position. Today again they are acquiescing. I would say they are on
the side of the Fedayeen on the whole. But they are almost more con-
cerned with making a record than with doing anything decisive.

P: They have wavered with the flow of events?

K: That's right.

P: What do you think accounts for this? The Israeli role on the
flank is a reason for Syrian withdrawing? Soviet influence?

K: The Israeli's obvious mobilization, or readiness measures,
and the unexpectedly strong resistance of Jordan probably account for
a lot. I would put Soviet influence last. They didn't exercise any real
influence we noticed till all these others came into plan. The Soviet
role over the last few weeks has not been very helpful. They've
been pouring things into the standstill zone.

P: Okay. Thank you very much.

K: Right, Phil.

P: I would love to see you one of these days.

K: I would like to see you. There's an unfortunate bias toward
the irresponsible journalists who need to be straightened out. Are
you going to be on the trip?

P: No, I would love to be, but I cannot take it away from the
White House correspondent.

K: Okay. I'll see you when we get back.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Phil Potter - Baltimore Sun

9/23/70 5:30 p.m.

K: No.

K: What does it say?

K: Where? At the Syrian UAR Embassy?

P: Yes.

P: Yes.

K: Therefore, it is just too premature to draw any conclusions.
If the Syrian tanks have withdrawn some of the air is out of the tension
and with some of the air out of it the tension will have been reduced.
We have some reports that Syrian tanks are withdrawing, but Sunday
night we had a report they had withdrawn across the border and before
we knew it they were back that night. This time, if they have withdrawn
it is unlikely that they will come back. But it is unwise to throw our
hats in the air yet. I am telling you exactly what we in the White House
think. If at this time tomorrow the Syrian tanks are out we'll be a little
more optimistic.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Phil Potter

9/23/70 5:30 p.m. page 2

K: That's right.

P: Okay. Thank you very much.

K: Right, Phil.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Alex Johnson
9/23/70 5:35 p.m.

K: We had some reports from newspapers, from correspondents, who have been calling in here, saying that Soviet restraint is one of the great factors in solving the crisis.

J: Oh God.

K: First, we don't want to say that it's been solved. It could boil up again. Secondly, the last thing we can afford to do right now is to give the Soviets credit for anything. The President feels we should go the other way. We should take credit for what's been done and strongly downplay the Soviet role and Soviet helpfulness. And the President in general wants us to take an icy posture toward the Soviets. If Dobrynin runs loose, he wants an icy cordiality. This talk about Soviet helpfulness is not virulent yet, but we wanted to stop it before it got out of hand.

J: I will see what I can do. I don't know where this has been coming from. I have been spending the last 45 minutes trying to stop Ky's visit here.

K: The President wants me to see Ky after all while I am in Paris.

J: Bui Diem was here with me with Lam. I pulled out all the stops on what a disaster this would be for all of us.

TELCON
Argov/Kissinger

6:00 p.m.

9/23/70

K: The President asked me to call the Ambassador but since he is not here to tell me about it, you, the Prime Minister will hear that we will not forget your behaviour this week and we feel very lucky that Israel was there.

A: That's very kind.

K: That may effect some of the things later.

A: I think so too.

K: Do you think it's broken now?

A: That's what the information was. The Syrians are out. The Jordanians are moving tanks into Irbid and the situation in Amman is very bad under control. Only a few nests. Now I suppose he will move into a haggling with the characters he has visiting him. They came to him and he didn't go to Cairo and that's a better position than he has had for years.

K: That's better for you too.

A: Yes, if he plays his cards well.

K: ?? his attitude towards what you have done. Al Haig has some advice for you that he will pass on later. I am glad we have had a chance to discuss things.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12158
Authority

NARA Date 6/9/70
By AB

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Argov/Kissinger

6:00 p.m.

9/23/70

K: The President asked me to call the Ambassador but since he is not here to tell you, the Prime Minister will hear that we will not forget your behaviour this week and we feel very lucky that Israel was there.

A: That's very kind.

A: I think so too.

K: That's better for you too.

By [機] NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

6:02 p.m.

9/23/70

K: A number of things. One, I talked to Alex when I couldn't reach you. We had some reports that some lower-level State people are praising the Soviets. This isn't critical because they don't know what concerns us about the Soviets. We don't know their names.

R: We have that word around. That's been taken care of.

K: I don't know if the President discussed with you, he has asked me if Ky matter isn't ~~wx~~ settled to see him and dissuade him. Bill Sullivan mentioned this yesterday. I leave it up to Phil Habib and I have no interest in doing it.

R: I am going to see him now. In fact I'm late. We will talk about that ~~XXXXXXXX~~ tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Lucet

7:00 p.m., September 23, 1970

L: ..... you know to think of but Quai D'Orsay. Difficult first because I don't know if the President would be in Paris that day.

K: It is Saturday.

L: Secondly, you told me you were not sure. It would depend on the circumstances.

K: It is much more likely now that I will come.

L: You will come anyway, you will be in Paris.

K: Yes.

L: You think you will be in Paris anyway?

K: Yes.

L: So, I shall get in touch again with you tomorrow morning.

K: I am not making an issue of this.

L: [I understand that] I thought that from the beginning.

K: I will tell him in all frankness of what we are doing or did but it is entirely up to him.

L: You will be in Paris anyway on Saturday.

K: Yes.

L: May I call you in the morning?

K: Yes but it should be no later than tomorrow noon.

L: What time can I call you in the morning.

K: I get in at 7:30.

L: You are wonderful, thank you anyway, I will call you in the morning.

wgh

By

NARA, Date 5/20

Telecon

Mr. Yoshida

9/23/70 7:05 p.m.

Y: The first thing, I did everything possible for your two friends when they were in Japan.

K: It worked out well?

Y: I think so. Within limits I did my very best, but with such short notice . . .

K: I fully understand.

Y: I got hold of good people.

K: Wonderful.

Y: They had a chance to talk with some good people, in official capacities and positions. We did well by a cross-section view of men in my country. Another difficulty was that I cannot mention this line of communication to Dick Sneider, who is responsible for the entire program. But since we are good friends I managed well in a discrete way. I hope they were satisfied. They had only two working days, with a tight schedule already. But within that limit it was good. As soon as they get back home you will hear their reaction about my country. I should like to know.

K: I will let you know when I talk to them.

Y: Could you? I would appreciate it. I had a chance to talk to both of them over a lunch with other friends of mine in Tokyo. We had only an hour and a half, but we had a good conversation. And in Kyoto two of my best friends had a good talk. They went to a typical Japanese restaurant and had a good talk. I couldn't go to Kyoto due to a previous speaking engagement. But one of my best friends said it was a most productive conversation.

K: Wonderful.

Y: Also, I talked with Dick Sneider and according to him the two of your friends were very pleased. I wanted to do more than that, but couldn't, partly due to the time limitation, and partly Dick.

K: I understand.

Y: That is the first subject. At your request I will do anything I can. Secondly, I am still very much concerned

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Mr. Yoshida

9/23/70 7:05 p.m. page 2

about the unsettled issue. Do you know what I am referring to?

K: Yes.

Y: Mr. Kishi is coming to your place to meet your friend toward the end of this month or at the beginning of next month. Am I correct?

K: Yes, but it has to be moved to a week later because we are going on this trip.

Y: I see. When would it be?

K: After October 5. Can you arrange that?

Y: I would like to do so.

K: I am unfortunately in a position again where I must run. I talked, though to my friend this afternoon and he asked me to find out whether the man we are talking about could delay his visit by 10 days or so. If after October 5 he could give a little lunch or dinner for him.

Y: It is very important because he is the brother of my friend. My friend is coming to the UN, and would like to see your friend then. Do you think the issue will come up again?

K: Not if you don't raise it. We will not raise it again.

Y: Ix see. My friend is very much interested.

K: Yes, but we have to agree on some concrete proposition. Could you ask your friend and tell him ask him how he wants to proceed? If there's a good chance of an agreement my friend will veto the Trade Bill. Otherwise, he will let it go through. He will not veto it unless we have an agreement with you or a good chance of getting one.

Y: The bill has a good chance of going through?

K: Oh, yes.

Y: K When?:

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida

9/23/70 7:05 p.m. page 3

K: Some time next month.

Y: That is one of the things one of your friends mentioned to me privately. Could I ask my friend's brother, who is also a friend of mine. The topic my friend's brother is going to raise when he meets your friend would be that issue.

K: Right.

Y: Could I ask my friend to get in touch with his brother who is now somewhere in Europe to delay his visit to Washington a week or 10 days, so his brother could have a chance to talk with your friend?

K: Yes, but we cannot have another inconclusive conversation.

Y: Your friend will meet with the brother if Mr. Kishi could delay his visit several days later so it would be after the fifth?

K: Exactly.

Y: All right. I will do that. There is no harm if your friend and Mr. Kishi have a good talk.

K: Okay. Can you let me know about this?

Y: Yes. When are you leaving?

K: I will be leaving on Friday.

Y: All right. I will let you know before that.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Sullivan

7:15 p.m., September 23, 1970

K: Absolutely the urgent and insistent request of the President that tomorrow we feature POWs. I hope you all understand that.

S: I put this through to these people.

K: It has got to be done.

S: Have you seen the text?

K: I haven't seen it.

S: I sent a copy of the text to John Holdridge.

K: You don't think the bureaucracy is going to let me at anything important do you.

S: It is about 5 paragraphs, it is strong and eloquent.

K: He wants this to be the lead in the news stories tomorrow. I would condense the other statement. Hate to do this but this is a Presidential order, I wouldn't have thought of this ploy myself.

S: I told them it had come from the President. I have been tied up with Long all day. I will have Kurt call them again. He's got the text of it. I will make another call to make sure that there is prominence in the press.

K: I have only been asked about three or four times today.

S: I will do it again if you really think there is nervousness on it.

K: There is.

wgh

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/ Joe Sisco

8:10 p.m., September 23, 1970

S: I've only got a minute, I am calling from home. Going off to the Lebanese Embassy tonight. They are giving a dinner for our new ambassador. Wanted to say two things to you -- hope that some of the heat on all of us is off. It has been a pretty good day. Henry, I really wanted to tell you you have done an outstanding job, you have raised a lot of tough questions that haven't been very easy to answer. You have been tremendous throughout.

K: Without you it couldn't have been done. I appreciate the delicate position you have been in.

S: The whole team has pulled very well together. All of us have served the President well. I wanted to call you from home because I didn't want to call you from the State Department.

K: Joe, this means a lot to me. We will be friends for a long time.

wgh

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/ Joe Sisco

8:10 p.m., September 23, 1970

wgh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Belieu/Kissinger

afternoon 9 23/70

B: Stennis just called and his is calling you. How much limitation on Israel? I said you will divulge just as much information by saying the amount of money as you would by telling the number of troops.

K: I wouldn't say anything. No ifs. You will let the air out of the balloon. Tell him not to put a limit on it.