March 24, 1953

Mr. King
Operations Research Office
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dear Mr. King:

I have written a letter to George Pettee today recommending an
acquaintance of mine here at Harvard. I am not sure how your personnel
situation is and what the present plans of LEGATE might be but if you are
still planning some studies in Europe, I could think of nobody better
qualified to help you with them than George Springer.

I have known Springer since we served together in the Army and you will
agree that this is an excellent way of getting to know a man's character. He
is not a flashy type and perhaps not an extremely profound one. On the other
hand, he makes up for these qualities by a very great conscientiousness, patience
and application. Since he came back from the service he has taken up the study
of linguistics and he has mastered, as far as I know, all Eastern European
languages along with German. He is now engaged in a study of the logic of the
structure of languages and of syntax and will receive his Ph.D. here this year.
He served for three years in the Army during World War II in Military Govern-
ment and for eighteen months after the outbreak of the Korean War.

He is coming to Washington next week and I have suggested that he call you.
I am sure you will find him most interesting. If by chance you should not be
there, perhaps Borenson could talk with him.

HAK:ndj

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

6410 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND

OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT
WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

29 July 1953

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
10 Weld Hall
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

As you know, I believe, we've been planning to exploit the Halder
group on the "political undesirables" front. I don't expect too much from
it, certainly don't anticipate any tidy statistical summary of experience,
but we ought to be able to get something of real value from the people who've
had the only real experience with our problem in its native habitat.

I've now heard from Jack Montgomery after his first talk with
Col. Nye. Following is his account and his suggestion. The papers he refers
to are our request that Col. Nye be alerted that we want to explore the question,
the G-3 indorsement and the concurrence of the Chief of Military History.

"I spent a day talking with Col. Nye on the Halder group. Remind me to tell you about some off-the-cuff impressions I got from him. The main result of my visit was his concurrence in this project and his enthusiastic willingness to use the Halder group technique in exploring the subject we discussed in Washington. I think ORO can get all this done without putting out any money by drafting a set of questions and submitting them through Gen. Smith (Gen. Robinett's boss) through channels. Since this also concurs with Gen. Robinett's statement to me (sorry I can't spell his name), I suggest that you give that full consideration. The questions should be rather carefully drawn up, and Col. Nye and Dr. Fredrickson are willing to study the suggested program and make suggestions if it comes to them through channels or through me. Since the details of greatest interest to us are highly perishable - even German memories are not up to answering statistical questions about the problem - we should plan to do this not later than the fall. Henry Kissinger is probably the best man to draw up the questions. Incidentally, please bear in mind that the Halder group technique involves the use of other Germans than those in the original group, so there is no reason why the best qualified survivors of that experience could not be tapped for information.

"I have just seen the correspondence regarding the Halder Group (it just arrived from Washington.) As things stand, it now looks to me as though the best thing to do would be for ORO to make up its list of questions while I am still here, send them over to me, and let me talk them over with Col. Nye and Dr. Fredrickson before sending them out here through channels. I would therefore suggest that you ask Henry Kissinger to spend a day drawing up some questions, or in lieu of that that you go back through the files on that subject and let me have your ideas on it. I will add whatever I can to the project outline and go to Karlesruhe and talk it over with their people. I can then return

JUL 31 1953

Kissinger -- page two

to you an outline which makes sense to the field here and will conform to our needs. The questions can then be submitted to the Army Chief Historian's Office for official processing. This would mean that the questions would be given a routine priority for processing in their turn (might take 6 to 18 months). The results would be typed up and become the property of Office of Mil. History. They would be available for our use at any time in this way and would thus serve our purposes as well as if they had been done as a special ORO study.

"Of course, we would run the risk that Mil. Hist. might say these questions were of no interest to them, therefore would refuse to submit them to Col. Nye. In that case, ORO could review its position, decide whether it would be worth the cost of having them done by special arrangement using Col. Nye's personnel but ORO funds (the estimated cost is $3,000-4,000). This would also have to be arranged through channels in Washington, of course.

"In either case, the first step is for me to have a look at the proposed questions you have in mind, add my two bits' worth, and talk it over out here. Col. Nye & Dr. F. are entirely cooperative and will gladly review our suggestions informally."

Can you undertake what he suggests. I would, of course, want to add questions and so, presumably, would Jack. But you seem the logical one to start the ball rolling.

In general I think the study would have to be a compiling of experience in search of a pattern, if any, since statistics are out. I'd like to know if they automatically arrested liquidated or otherwise controlled (a) communists as such, (b) party officials, (c) government officials (if so which ones, how low down), (d) "activists," (e) others. I'd also like to know who cooperated (Dallin says there was cooperation) and whether there was a pattern which we can use. I'd also like to know how the pattern varied with localities and nationalities and when the variance was inherent and when it resulted from action on the side of the occupiers. At the same time it would be useful to know what form local civil administration took when it was allowed to survive, or was installed.

That is a start. Probably you can think of many more questions -- more acute.

I like Jack's proposal that we send the questions to him for an informal get-together with Nye, so let me know if you can tackle it, and when.

I found the two issues of Confluence very interesting, wish it continued success.

August 5, 1953

Mr. James King
Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dear Jim:

Thanks for your letter of July 31st. Montgomery seems to be making
excellent progress. He has dropped me a note, and I am extremely pleased that
he has been in touch with Rustow who is probably one of the best German social
scientists, if not the best and much better than Gurland in Berlin. Also he
is apparently in touch with a young man by the name of Hennis who will make an
excellent administrative assistant. But all this you know.

Regarding the Halder group, I would be quite willing to draft a set
of questions, but I do think it might be useful if I could get a look at the
files of some of our plans last year or at least at the report of my interview
with Halder. It might also be useful if we exchanged letters about your ideas
so that we can incorporate them in a manner which is feasible for the Halder
group. I have a fair idea of what Halder can and cannot do in terms of the
structure of his group. Perhaps we could phrase our questions with that in mind.
How do you propose that we proceed then? Should I send you a draft list of
questions, or can you come up, or should I come down for a day? I could not
spend much more than a day on it before the end of August, but then I do not
think that much more than a day is necessary. If you send me the Halder interview
report, I will do what I can from up here.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

HAK:eh

["HAK:ep", "Sincerely,", "Best wishes.", "report. I will do what I can to them as possible.\nI think that much more than a qah is necessary. It has enough to the Heifer interviewees, or can have come with it. I think I can get them to come with it. I should like to see them together with the Heifer. I think we should have them together with the Heifer. It might be useful if we exchanged letters with them. I would like to see them together with the Heifer. I have a few ideas of what Heifer can and cannot do in some of the directions, but I do think it might be useful if I could get a look at the directions, so that I might be sure of it. I could get a look at the directions, but I do think it might be useful if I could get a look at the directions, so that I might be sure of it. I could get a

January third.

Dear Henry,

Sorry I missed you. I meant to write you about
the use I proposed to make of your paper, but didn't, somehow.
Rumor hath it you may be gestating another one. Shoot me a
copy and I'll consider it for the series. There has been quite
a lot of interest here in ORO to the series as a whole, but
unfortunately for the most part from those who need it least
(that is, not from the mathematicians).

I shall be happy to put you on the regular distrib
list.

Why do you keep your wife under a bushel? I
certainly didn't intend to leave her off my Christmas list,
and shouldn't have If I'd known of her existence.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

1 February 1955

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
10 Weld Hall
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

I have just read your "Gray Areas" paper and will immediately place it in the Strategic Series. We are slowly assembling quite a collection, and Pettee is making vague noises about publishing. I have been writing something myself, but at the moment am on a limb in which I do not have complete confidence.

Meantime, I have another problem on which I need help badly, and which might bring me to Cambridge if it seems worth while. As you know I am one of a team of three, the others being a mathematician and a retired brigadier general, who are expected to come up with a strategic "game" within a reasonable time. Ellis now talks as though a year from now would be reasonable for an imperfect model, so the time aspect is under control. (He seems to be thinking in terms of three to five years as the time required to produce a useful model). The catch in it, so far as I am concerned, is that I have been put on the team in order to insure that the political and "sociological" factors are included.

Maybe you don't know anything about this gaming, but it is now becoming widespread, and whether it is a new technique of real "power", as the scientists say, or just a fad I am not yet prepared to say. The idea is to construct a mathematical model of a portion of the real world, providing for two or more sides, by means of which solutions to decision problems can be played out. In the more sophisticated approaches there are many probabilities and it is impossible to arrive at conclusions by ordinary analytical methods. An example, highly simplified, would be a question of our shipment capability to Europe in a war in which the enemy used various weapons to attack our ships and ports. We should begin with certain numbers of ships--or a mobilization or construction rate, a certain port capacity on both sides, and certain escort or other protective forces. The enemy would then have a certain range of attack capabilities. We should include probability estimates of damage as a result of enemy attack and of our own operational and defensive efforts and by running through the play many times, we should presumably arrive at some useful indications of real results. Of course, some quantities would have to be fixed fairly arbitrarily to account for factors not included in this particular part of the real world. For example, we might fix the number

of ships that would be available for escort duty--the remainder being employed elsewhere. There might also have to be other boundary conditions and artificial restrictions, but provided we considered them in interpreting our solutions they might not be serious (depending on their nature, obviously).

So far so good, and I have no doubt whatever that for some purposes, such as the example cited, this technique is a useful one. But when you start talking about strategic gaming, and particularly about a "global" model, you immediately become snarled in all kinds of things that aren't readily quantifiable. How do you express in numbers the stability of the French political system, or the possibility that the Commies will win the Vietnam elections, or the degree of dependence that the British can place on S. African participation in any given war situation? I know that other, wiser, heads have looked at this before and concluded that it can't be done. But I've got myself in a fix. I've got to do something about it, if only to demonstrate how the problem can be bypassed.

Have you done any thinking about this yourself, do you know anyone around Cambridge who has? I noted a piece in the Bulletin about a Harvard professor who is an exponent of "political arithmetic", would he have any ideas on this? You are aware, no doubt, that some people are quite sanguine of what can be done with economic factors--what with in-put out-put analysis and the theory of games--but the ultimate problems are problems of morale and organization and other things that normally express themselves through politics.

As I see it, we are not supposed to do anything more than assist, say, the JCS or the NSC to make decisions they have to make anyway, using precisely the same considerations that they use now. The theory is that the method, if it can be worked out, will be better than the present process because the interactions will all be carefully taken care of and because the best "scientific" knowledge will be brought to bear at every point. Thus an estimate of risk will be based upon the latest and most reliable damage estimates--expressed in the form of a range of probabilities--rather than upon someone's emotional response to the *idea* of the risk. On many points we cannot hope to improve on the balanced opinion of experts, but we can provide a means of insuring that this balanced opinion is written into the game and not overlooked. On the political issues at the moment my only contribution is negative. I can warn the gamesters against *assuming* that the Soviet system is more "stable" than the US and that the British will fight only if attacked. But this is not enough. In our preliminary discussions of the "global" model we are currently impaled on the issue of what the gamesters call the "payoff"--what is it that nations fight for, what are their strategic objectives? Because economics appears to be manageable there is a tendency to relate objectives to such concrete things as raw materials. Here, at the moment, I can only interpose my veto. I've suggested a probably useless ratio of "realizations to expectations" but haven't begun to get beyond it. Can you tell me if it can be done, or do you know anyone who can? I've gotten far out of touch with what is supposed to be my profession, so I need the advice of those who haven't. It is a far cry from political philosophy.

Mr. James E. King, Jr.

2.

February 17, 1955

theory may therefore contribute to sloppiness of thinking, because so much energy is being exerted on finding symbols and quantifyers that sight may be lost of the things being symbolized. I have studied enough symbolic logic to see the pitfalls in this.

I have no objection whatever to having "scientific" knowledge brought to bear on the problems of national strategy, but perhaps some thought should be given to the question of just what factors are scientific when you apply them to national strategy.

I take it that this is the drift of your own thought also, and I am sure if we had a few hours to sit down together I would make more sense. I don't know anyone up here who is doing more than playing with this. There are perhaps some people at M.I.T. As a matter of fact, I am rather sure there are at the Center for International Studies who would be worth talking to on this point. At any rate, it would be a great pleasure to see you up here, but do give me a little warning.

If you put my "grey areas" paper into the strategy series, be sure not to classify it, since major portions of it will appear in *Foreign Affairs*. Do put me on the distribution list for the strategy series.

I have not yet met John Montgomery's wife, but expect to soon.

Kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger

HAK:jm

HAK:Jm

Hilda V. Krausinger

gracefully yours,

King regriss.

I have not yet met John Montgomery's wife, but expect to see her.

Do but me on the distribution list for the illustrated series.
not to separately if, since major portions of it will appear in Foreign Languages.

It is not at all unusual to be into the illustrated series, but once

here, put do give me a little warning.

to on this point. At such rate, it would be a great pleasure to see your
there are at the Center for International Studies who would be very willing
are being some beds at M.I.T. We have a matter of fact, I am rather sure
that I know someone who is quite more than willing with this. There
are some at the law office of your own, and I am sure I will see you soon.

when you say thank you to someone that you want to see, and I am
thought should be given to the direction of that matter. I am sure I will
be very happy to see you at the close of our own thought life, and I am
looking forward to your电话 call.

I have no objection whatever to having "scientific" knowledge of
thought to be given to the direction of that matter. I am sure I will
be very happy to see you at the close of our own thought life, and I am
looking forward to your telephone call.

I hope to see the friends in France.

As I have said before, I have amended enough sentences
in order to meet the strictest standards and eliminate therefrom
any error. I have put exclamation marks and doubledots there so
that the reader will see the exclamation mark and doubledots
in the original document. I therefore contribute to the effectiveness of
thinking, because so

Mr. James E. King, Jr.

S.

December 13, 1922

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

7100 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4-4200

5 April 1956

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations
58 E. 68th Street
New York, New York

Dear Henry,

I've just read your article in the April *Foreign Affairs*.

Your rebuttal of Paul Nitze's defense of the nuclear "winner" is a de-
light. I have but one bone to pick: Why concede that his point is mili-
tarily or technically sound (I don't have text before me)? There are several
possibilities, assuming that the war takes place (none of which would make
the prospect particularly attractive), among them at least the following:

a. Despite catastrophic losses one side would emerge with the ability to "dictate terms" to the other (Nitze's point).

b. Losses on both sides would be so great that a third party, or a coalition of second rate powers, might be able to do the dictating. One may well imagine that their intervention would be easy to rationalize.

c. Losses and general destruction on both sides might be so great that neither side would be sufficiently vital to retain an interest in "winning."

My own inclination is to the last of these, but all three are certainly possi-
ble and there may be others. It seems to me that the only technically sound
proposition must include all cases.

My second criticism is more serious. It grieves me to see you fall for
the proposition that atomic weapons enable us to overcome the Soviet advantage
in forces. All arguments along this line, including those that have been
used to bemuse if not delude the American people, assume that we have more
bombs (in some decisive sense). But the time for which we must be preparing
is the time when this will no longer be the case. Where then the advantage?
If we are still less willing than he is to support our military forces he
will have a big atomic army and we shall have a little one. Meantime, what
I fear is that this groundless assumption may have persuaded reasonable
people like yourself that atomic weapons cannot be eliminated (from actual
employment, not from existence), not because such limitation is not practically

-2-

feasible, but because by agreeing to it or condoning it we should be surrendering a decisive advantage. Once the idea sinks in that the advantage is time-dependent it is much easier to think objectively about the eventual, and real, problem.

I know it has been argued that atomic weapons somehow favor the defense over the offense, and that owing to the dispersion required, they may limit the numbers of troops that can be used so that our inferior numbers will be enough. Neither of these arguments is convincing. The first is not favored by the military because they fear the Maginot complex it might give rise to. But it is unconvincing until we know just how the defense is favored, how much, and what the attackers can do about it. For example, the argument that the attacker cannot attack without concentrating his forces is a simple anachronism. The military are having trouble freeing themselves from their conventional experience when they make that one. It is true that the attacker cannot attack conventionally without concentrating. So the point is sound enough when used to argue against conventional weapons in the nuclear age (though I think there are answers to it). But it just does not apply to nuclear war, the conditions of which are--as you say--only vaguely seen as yet. The other argument obviously does not apply to the defense of Western Europe, where we are most anxious that it should apply. Space there is not that limited. It might apply to some local peripheral theater. But it is difficult to believe that the side with the larger atomic forces would not benefit by having larger atomic reserves, even if it could not employ them all at once.

In short, the proposition is a phoney, and my personal crusade has been to get a few friends who are thinking of these problems to see it, and to face up to the real question. What happens in the age of nuclear "plenty," when both sides have all the bombs of all the sizes they can use?

For the rest, I think your article is splendid. Your emphasis on political considerations is eminently sound and your argument is beautifully worked out. I'd appreciate an offprint to add to my collection of your "works."

April 12, 1956

Mr. James E. King, Jr.
Operations Research Office
7100 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter of April 5. Because I have since
had a chance to talk to you, I will answer it only very briefly.

I did not really mean to say that Nitze's argument is tech-
nically correct, but that even if it were technically correct, we
would not escape our dilemma. As for your second criticism, I
quite agree that nuclear war would not be a way of economizing on
manpower; in fact, it might require more. I do believe, however,
that it requires a different composition of the effective manpower
with a greater premium on technically trained personnel and an
emphasis on logistics and other areas in which our present advan-
tages might yield greater dividends than in a slugging match on
the conventional battlefield. I realize that even this may be a
wasting asset. It seems to me that whenever one writes about
strategy in the present period, one has to be clear about what
time-period one is writing about. My article was addressed to the
next five years.

I am enclosing a reprint of my article.

Best regards.

Enc.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

12 April 1955

Dear Henry:

I'm most grateful for the reprints you've sent me. I'd like to see
the *Yale Review* article too, and the *Journal* isn't available around here,
so if you have a reprint of that one, please ship it along.

I'm still following the "great debate" with bated breath, and partici-
pating in it when I can. The amount of attention it is getting from press
and public, as compared with other so-called "great debates", is an indi-
cation of one of the most glaring weaknesses of the democratic system.
When you think how much more fever was generated over the "guilt" in the
China affair, how much more concerned we apparently are with crucifying
individuals for past errors than with facing up to the future itself, you
can see what a tenuous hold we have on our estate.

Without being alarmist—I hope—I am extremely pessimistic. I take
no comfort whatever from the prospects of nuclear war and yet we seem to
be almost rushing into a position that they _must_ be employed both in defense
of NATO and in defense of Quemoy. You appear to be willing to accept the
NATO situation—where we have passed "the point of no return", according
to Montgomery—even though still fighting for sanity in the Formosa straits.
And I must say that most writers I've read agree with you. But I do not.
It seems to me that however you cut it there is a perfectly visible chance
that both sides in any nuclear conflict will be "destroyed"—whether they
will be annihilated and whether civilization will be destroyed too depends
upon definitions and further analysis not necessary here. Moreover it
seems to me that there is no absolute deterrent, no guarantee that there
will be no war. Thus what you call the all-or-nothing policy simply sets
up one set of alternatives, to the exclusion of all others, and that set is
unacceptable to any rational way of thinking. For it means (to me): either
there will be no war, or there is a good chance that the U.S. will be
destroyed. If war does come and it turns out to be the kind neither side
can win we shall certainly be destroyed, and even if one side _can_ win it
but we do not (perhaps a small chance but still a chance) _we shall_ (be also)
destroyed. In other words, the arguments used to justify the employment
of nuclear weapons because we cannot afford the cost of maintaining ef-
fective conventional forces over the long pull amount to saying that we
cannot afford _not_ to risk our own destruction.

Page 2

There are many things wrong with this. The idea that the richest
nation in the world cannot afford *not* to play Russian roulette with its
own survival is to me absurd; if there is any basis for it it indicates
that we are woefully deficient both in brains and in guts. It implies that
we lack the moral fortitude to act intelligently. It indicates also an
unwillingness to look realistically at what the threat amounts to. All
around me here people are saying that Douhet was wrong once so the same type
of analysis *must* be wrong again, that the defense *always* catches up with
the offense, *and* that, in any case, we have years in which anything can
happen before we must really face the issue. There are even people who
fear the "stalemate" because they fear conventional weapons more than
H-bombs. It is my honest conviction that the stalemate is our only hope.
In our present state of confusion I cannot even take comfort from our con-
tinued supremacy in new weapons—if indeed we do still possess supremacy.
But there is another thing wrong with the "absolute deterrent" and that is
its rigidity. The "thus far and no farther" formula, though it appeals to
the unthinking, violates the genuine principle that politics is the art of
the "possible". It is bad enough that we give the enemy no alternative
except acquiescence, but worse that we give ourselves none. You can see
the consequences in the Formosa straits, but you don't have to look far
to find the same thing in Europe. As long as there are states, or any
form of international life short of the world community and the world "state",
there must be diplomacy. Deterrents, in the absolute sense that SHAPE has
adopted, or in the just-short-of-absolute sense that Mr. Dulles has adopted
for South East Asia, like ultimata and war itself, are the end of diplomacy.

I took some comfort for a while from the fact that the President
seemed determined to control the military, so that we did not pass the
"point of no return" on a plea of military "necessity". But now the circle
is closed and I am appalled at the prospect of Congress' willingness to
leave the decision to employ or not to employ nuclear weapons in defense
of Quemoy to Ike. At this turning point in the affairs of man the key
decision should not be made by one man.

In short, as you will perceive, in my system of values the thing to
avoid above all is nuclear war. If we embrace nuclear war for the purpose
of resisting Communism the cost is too high. I don't know what my decision
would be if the alternative were a simple "surrender or use the Bomb". But
I do not have to make such a decision because that is not the issue. I am
thoroughly convinced of the necessity to stop Communism, but we must not
be blind to an even greater menace. I know that many cannot imagine any
greater menace, but in my mind there is no doubt. It is true that death
is better than 1984, but we could lose an awful lot of ground, over many
years, before 1984 became a real threat. And I do not see that we have to
lose any ground at all. The sane alternatives are at hand, though the
details need working out. They are not, of course, certain—nothing is
certain. Not even the consequences of the decision to commit ourselves to
nuclear warfare are certain, but they seem to me to be highly probable,
whereas the worst possible consequences of a decision to avoid nuclear
weapons appear to me to be quite improbable.

I have written a long paper about all this, and am engaged in writing
another on the specific matter of deterrence. The first paper has been
criticized for me in first draft by several people and requires some polish-
ing. If possible I should like to get it published, presumably in a some-
what shortened version. It will require Army clearance, though it contains

no classified information, so the time is not urgent. But if I can
get clearance I should like very much to get it in *Foreign Affairs*.
As one who has accomplished that, how do you go about it? The other
paper may turn out to be publishable, if so I rather imagine it will
be more appropriate for a "learned" journal, though I blanch at the
prospect of footnotes.

I meant this to be a simple note, but I like your thinking on all
this, though I don't think you go far enough. Incidentally, Pettee is
an almost-kindred soul, though he introduces more ifs, ands, and buts
than I do. My principal difficulty with him is his conviction that
world war is now so irrational that it has got to stop, and will stop,
in a matter of decades. My beacon is George Kennon, who seems to me the
sanest man alive on all these questions. George thinks the world state,
in one form or another, will come and will come quite quickly because
of the nuclear threat. He talks about the "last" world war and says
our problem is to determine, by our present and future policies, whether
the last world war was WW II, or will be WW III. I stand with Kennon
and others that if there is another world war and if it is a nuclear war
whatever possibility presently exists for orderly progress to a world
community (which I insist will more likely take centuries, not decades,
even with nuclear weapons) will be destroyed along with the principal
belligerents and their battlefields. This again is not a certainty,
but it is close enough.

I've had a pleasant correspondence with Walt Rostow about "socio-
logical factors" and have plans to visit him next month. I'd like to
see you on the same trip if you will be in Cambridge. I don't know
the date yet but will let you know when I do.

January 18, 1952

Dr. Edward M. Litchfield
Governmental Affairs Institute

Dear Ed:

Our correspondence and our recent discussion have convinced me that we are confronting two problems: the definition of the area of ORO interest in the proposed research and the writing of a contract which will state this in terms of objective criteria which will at the same time permit us to gauge the progress of the research.

As project chairman for Legate, I feel that this is the appropriate point in our negotiations to explain our requirements in the hope that this will assist reaching a closer understanding at our next meeting.

I believe that your letter stated the total range of problems very well. On the other hand, I am persuaded by your first report, that you agree with me that it is our task to select out of the vast material confronting us those aspects which are significant in terms of our purposes and, if you will, our limitations. The most obvious limitation is, of course, our relationship to the army. We must from time to time report on the progress of our research to an army advisory committee and justify projected research to this same group. As a matter of fact, every subcontract exceeding $25,000 must be specifically approved by the army. Our second limitation is our obviously restricted budget.

For these reasons we must establish a list of priorities among projects, however worthwhile they might be. These priorities seem to me to involve the following: (1) A definition of the army interest in any proposed research. (2) A phasing of each project in terms of our limited budget.

To focus this on the problem of policy formulation: One possible research effort might very well involve covering the total range of the problem and having the army's role emerge as a necessary component, as you suggest. (Note for Darwin: Maybe it would be best to use the phrase here he uses at the end of the next-to-last paragraph on page 2 of his letter.) I am afraid, however, that in view of the above considerations we will have to utilize a different procedure: We must first define the army's interest and expand it to other agencies only as required. Once the army's interest is defined we will have to decide the importance of the research effort in relation both to our other requirements and to our budget.

Let me illustrate what I mean: Before engaging in research in occupation policy I think we ought to define, to our mutual satisfaction, just what we will consider an occupation policy. As your report so clearly demonstrates, the impact

[L]

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

13 July 1953

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
10 Weld Hall,
Harvard University
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Our friend Kraemer staged a preview of Germany for me Friday evening. His company was made up of fully authenticated Germans from the Embassy, all of whom agreed at least on the moral issues of denazification. I feel very much indebted to him for the evening, which he pulled off with astonishing skill and polish.

Your interview notes have come to light, though the research proposals made to you in Germany are still missing. The notes will be very helpful -- I'm taking them along as an introduction to the ones I must see again for possible negotiations.

Otto Kirchheimer has recommended Potthoff of the Labor unions' Wirtschaft Wissenschaftsfthihen Institut in Köln for possible industry studies, and also recommends Sam Wahrhaftig of Frankfort as a handyman for introductions, etc. Know him?

My biggest surprise this trip was to find that Kraemer and company so strongly recommended J. K. Pollock of Michigan (now in Germany). I had never regarded him as more than an "operator" in the Litchfieldian sense. Of course he was among Clay's pro-German advisors. Does this account for his prestige among Germans?

I leave tomorrow. In case you've forgotten the ORO address, it is:

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
OPOT DIV HQ USAREUR
APO 403, c/o Postmaster
New York, New York

Will report progress.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4-4200

PROPOSED STUDY OF MANAGEMENT IN POSTWAR GERMANY

Changes in the structure of German management have been an important factor in the national response to economic problems of re-construction. The Operations Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University desires to initiate a study of these changes, and to secure the support and cooperation of interested American and German agencies. The broad object of the study is to develop basic principles concerning the role of management in economic reconstruction, and especially its capacity to renew itself after a major series of personnel changes and other disruptions.

Among the specific factors which may have changed the composition of company management are the following:

1. The mobility of population. During the war, industrial re-locations may have necessitated many reassignments of personnel, and in the postwar period there were even greater migrations of refugees from the East Zone. These migrations included businessmen and technicians from companies which were dissolved or dismantled.

2. The denazification program. During the reconstruction years, this barred certain business leaders and technicians from participating in economic operations. The vacancies thus created in the upper levels of management may have had important influences upon company policy and efficiency.

3. The breakup of German cartels. In many cases, this may have required a supply of managerial and technical talent greater than was available from the pre-war staffs to operate the numerous semi-independent companies thus created.

4. Postwar business failures and reorganizations, shifts in business operations, and other adjustments.

It is obvious that these factors did not operate equally in all parts of Western Germany, or in all industries. The research must therefore be organized to afford a basis for comparing (a) the relative influence of these factors; (b) the impact of these managerial changes upon different industries; and (c) the responses of

different forms of business organization to the inroads of the
personnel shifts and replacements.

The empirical basis for the research can be
found only in a large number of specific industry "case studies."
These cases must be drawn to represent a number of possible variables.

a. They must include major or key industries of both production and service type;

b. Companies studied must be located in all three zones of Western Germany;

c. Cases must include large intermediate and small size companies;

d. Companies organized according to various different managerial principles must be included.

The cases studied should include data on the fol-
lowing points:

a. Sources and nature of the managerial talent in each company prior to the war's end;

b. Losses suffered among this group through war casualties, denazification, or the reorganization of the company;

c. Gains in this group arising from population shifts, company mergers, promotions from within the ranks, additions transferred from associated or other companies, and recruitments from other groups;

d. Effects of the above managerial changes upon company policy relating to sources of financing, techniques of production, company organization, labor relations, and methods of distribution.

The number of cases studied should be in a broad
sense representative of postwar German industry. The necessary
information can be gathered only with the fullest cooperation of
German industry. Sources of information include financial statements,
company records, investment reports, union records, and interviews
with present and former management, union leaders, and bank officers
familiar with the company's operations.

-2-

Research of this type will require the use of
a mature staff trained in economics or business administration,
under the guidance of a senior director of recognized standing.

The results of this study will be significant for
Germany as well as for the general sociology of management. The
Operations Research Office needs certain of the conclusions in order
to advance another study which it is making. Accordingly, the Operations
Research Office is prepared to contribute to the cost of such a project
and cordially invites the cooperation of other interested groups, both
German and American.

Your comments and suggestions will be appreciated.

25 November 1953

MAR 3 1954

BABSON INSTITUTE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
BABSON PARK, MASSACHUSETTS

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

March 29, 1954

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
10 Weld Hall
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Here is Mr. Wildeman's letter, which I have copied for reference this summer when I get back to Germany. You see, my native optimism has been undampened by the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune - a fact which leads one to conclude that neither slings nor arrows possess any dampening quality.

Just back from Washington, where I find ORO in a state of complete reorganization (as distinguished from disorganization). Of the more than 100 professional staff members there, I have been told that not more than 6 or 7 will have the same boss after the shuffling is done! All of the divisions have been abolished, and a new setup has been adopted which represents a functional arrangement of the research in terms of the military mission. None of the old deputy directors are division heads, and most of the project chairmen have been changed. Jimmy King, for example, will be neither Deputy Director nor Chairman of Project LEGATE. The latter post has been thrust upon the reluctant Carl Wood. The implications for our research are not very clear, but I think the plan is to continue all projects now in progress. George Pettee emerges as #3 man in the whole organization, but has no substantive research or administrative responsibilities discernable from the organization chart.

I gathered a few more items for the German study, and feel reasonably content with progress. My Ford Foundation application will be forwarded from Babson Institute, with supporting letters from Ellis Johnson and the Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department offering whatever logistical support they can and assuming the importance and feasibility of the research. This whole mess will go forward to the Ford Foundation, where I believe some behind-the-scenes pressure may be exercised by Franz Neumann (though this is by no means assured). I have "rounded off" (to use Pettee's favorite phrase) to $50,000, around the net sum to find out almost anything about Germans or almost anybody else! If I get no money, I shall be reduced to using my remaining $4,000 from the original ORO grant.

Please extend my greetings to our mutual friend Bismarck.

JDM:shf

HAK:epb

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

I am sorry to have caused you all this trouble.

On one of my visits to Washington,
on September 15th, and I will drop in at the office
 bringing it when I go on active duty at Fort Hofspird
would like to have the release returned. I can
from Pirobe, but I am not absolutely sure. If you
that I returned the clothing bag when I came back
to that I have the release. I rather think
Of the two items that you mentioned, I am cer-
Deliver letter of July 28th.
I am sorry not to have answered your special

I am sorry not to have answered your special
Delivery letter of July 28th.

Dear Mr. Morris:

Chevy Chase, Maryland
6400 Connecticut Avenue
Operations Research Office
Office Services Office
Mr. Bernard B. Morris

August 17, 1964

8 Hamilton Street
Annandale, Virginia

30 April 1951

Dr. George S. Pettee
Deputy Director for Human Resources Research
Operations Research Office
Johns Hopkins University
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Dr. Pettee,

After careful consideration of the questions raised in your letter of 16 April, I feel that the requirements you outline would be fully met by H. Henry A. Kissinger. I worked with him over a year while stationed at the EUCOM Intelligence School and have seen him not infrequently since that time. In all of my contacts with Kissinger, I have been especially impressed with the profundity of his understanding of human problems and their relationships to the complexities of government and administration. The man has an uncanny flare for clear statement of intricate human relationships. In matters where he should naturally be inclined to have understandable bias he has shown an ability to remain dispassionate, objective. He is remarkably alert to those imponderables which are often the first to suffer from the simplifying process of analysis whose implications are often of primary importance for clear understanding and wise policy making in foreign areas. I have been most impressed by the work Kissinger has accomplished at the Department of Government in Harvard. His surprising maturity of mind, which I had respected upon first meeting him five years ago in Germany, has deepened and has given him the ability to make an outstanding record of performance. In the slightly rarified atmosphere of the academic approach he has remained aloof from the temptations of demonstrating sheer brilliance and, if anything, his deep reverence for the human realities behind words and formulae has become deepened. His activities at Harvard, which I have witnessed at short range, show that the man has a prodigious capacity for exhaustive (and physically exhausting) research. His academic schedule has been staggering and in addition he has written many outstanding papers which have been found most useful, I have been told, at policy levels in Washington.

With regard to your question re Kissinger's ability to devise new methods of research for problems being explored for the first time, I might say that I feel confident that he can meet such a challenge successfully. My conviction on this score is based on his demonstrated talent for clear and comprehensive definition. Any new problem in the field of social relationships will find him able to state clearly and effectively the full range of the complexities involved and assign to each its proper sequence and its relative importance to the whole. This talent of definition carries with it a parallel ability to explore.

the relative weight of tendencies. It is beyond question that the substance of political science can not be imparted to the present personnel in the time available. But an indoctrination in the importance of political science, sociology, and economics can be attempted. If the prospective agent learns that his techniques become effective only in terms of a political situation, the CIC School will have achieved a large measure of fruitful indoctrination.

7. This can be done by the measures described in Paragraph 9 of the basic memorandum. If the "break" in the interrogations occurs as a result of the interrogator's superior knowledge of a hypothetical situation, the importance of the political aspect will have been stressed. If the problems are closely related to that situation, this awareness may be reinforced. If the student is forced to justify his interrogation in terms of an auto-biographical sketch supplied by either the suspect or a control office, a certain way of thinking which understands the psychological aspect will have been created.

8. The undersigned officer does not believe that Capt Schnackenberg's memorandum expresses a fundamental difference from these viewpoints. The chief difference seems to be that he would let the various area detachments train their own personnel. This is probably desirable as to the factual situation, but not as to basic indoctrination. If the agents reach overseas areas with the proper comprehension of the importance of the political and social factors, local training can confine itself to the actual conditions and may perhaps reduce the required period of training. This may tend to increase the scale of CIC operations without increasing the personnel.

9. Capt Schnackenberg's other comments hardly differ from the basic memorandum. He would probably admit that no amount of instruction in report-writing would teach the agent the difference between Baltic and Balkan countries. (See his Paragraph 1). Moreover the answers to the questions he recommends - with which the undersigned officer is in full agreement - can only be evaluated by a person familiar with the political aspects of the security situation.

10. Capt Duke raises a more serious objection: He argues that a CIC agent is "not a political analyst" and that "an analyst merely represents his own opinions." This seems not an entirely fair picture. A CIC agent is in the very nature of things forced to become an analyst. He must select targets of penetration. He must - out of a large number of facts - select a few which he thereby defines as important and reports. He must see a certain number of people to stay abreast of developing events. All these actions indicate the CIC agent's estimate of the relative importance of certain features of the situation. Nor is it correct to say that analysis is merely opinion. Good analysis explains the meaning of facts to a commander whose distance from the scene of events forces him to rely partly on the judgment of subordinates. Good analysis depends entirely on facts.

October 19, 1951

Mr. Richard Sherman
ORO G-3
GHQ FECOM
APO 500
c/o Postmaster General
San Francisco, California

Dear Dick:

As you can see from the letterhead I am back at Harvard, the home of the conditional phrase and the contingent statement. The return trip was uneventful, and I am becoming almost convinced that my flying luck has changed. By now my experiences in the Far East are taking on a slightly strange and unreal quality somewhat on the order of the memories of one's childhood. The Harvard atmosphere still seems a little unreal, particularly the serious discussion of such profound subjects as what certain grounds exist for action. I feel that more can be learned on the issue north of Uijongbu than in a seminar at Cambridge.

Before plunging into the work here I should like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation for the manner in which the Far Eastern office was run. I know that you must sometimes feel isolated and occasionally frustrated, but I am sure that everybody who spent any time in the Far East since the middle of July was impressed by the sincerity that animated the Tokyo office. I particularly want to thank you for your personal kindness and for your gesture on my departure. Certainly the tone set by you contributed to a large degree in making this trip a most memorable event in my life.

By now I suppose you have returned to Tokyo. I should be interested to learn of your reactions to the combat zone and whether you shared the feeling of exhilaration I always experience when among men who do things rather than talk about them. I hope that your wife and mother reached Tokyo without any undue difficulty. I know that they will have a unique opportunity to see Japan. I should be very happy to hear from you sometime though I know how busy generals are.

HAK:jwm

OCT 21 1952
OCT 21 1952

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

22 October 1952

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
10 Weld Hall
Harvard University
Cambridge 39, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Dr. Pettee, Mr. King, and I have recently talked with Dr. Gurland about the research proposal which you and Darwin Stolzenbach brought back with you from Germany. Although we have made no specific commitment to this date, we are interested and are seriously considering further pursuit of the matter. Two questions arise which may have already been considered by you and Stolzenbach. One has to do with whether or not any portion of this work has already been duplicated by the Office of Military History and whether or not any jurisdictional problem would be involved. The second question has to do with whether or not you talked with our European director or GHQ in Europe regarding the clearance of this outfit. I am informed that it is no easy matter to subsidize a non-American organization with Defense Department funds, even when the material with which they may be dealing is unclassified.

I would appreciate what information and comments you may have in this connection.

RCS/mls

October 31, 1952

Mr. Robert C. Sorensen
Acting Chairman, Project LEGATE
Operations Research Office
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dear Bob:

Your letter reached me during the usual rush of trying to get the
next issue of CONFLUENCE to press and I couldn't answer for this reason
before today. I am glad you were impressed with Darwin because many
of the projects I explored with him, particularly the statistical analysis
part, seemed to be extremely good. I should like to make one comment,
however. I think the course of Legate has been a certain dilettantishness
of approach — that is, that any number of things were done, all of
them worthwhile in themselves, but not related to any central approach
and therefore not apt to emerge with any particularly meaningful con-
clusions for the Army. I would like to urge you to fit whatever project
you decided on with Gurland into a general scheme at least for Europe and
Preferably including both Europe and the Far East.

To answer your specific questions, nothing of what I discussed with
Gurland has been duplicated by the Office of Military History or by any
other German or American agency. As far as clearance for a German organiz-
ation is concerned, I cannot be of any great help to you. I could offer
as suggestions the method we used in Japan or, alternatively, you could
pay through HICOG which I understand is subsidizing Gurland. Another
suggestion might be through the Ford Foundation which is subsidizing the
Free University. I could go into more detail on that if you are interested.

If I can be of any other assistance to you, please let me know.

DEC 22 1952

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

19 December 1952

Dear Henry:

I appreciated the opportunity of talking with you the other day in Cambridge. There are a few other more concrete problems with respect to LEGATE's program planning which would have been worthwhile discussing, but our time was short and I honestly felt that you were too preoccupied with your coming trip to go into them in any detail.

Please be sure to have a grand trip and do keep us in mind over there, particularly with respect to how worthwhile you feel studies of the problems of purge, refugees, and relationships with indigenous community governments might be. I shall be wanting to get in touch with you as soon as convenient when you return.

RCS/mls

December 24, 1952

Mr. Robert C. Sorensen
Acting Chairman, Project LEGATE
Johns Hopkins University
Operations Research Office
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dear Bob,

Thank you for your note of December 19th.
I was glad to have a chance to see you here at Harvard
even if only briefly. I can imagine that the atmosphere
in my office is not one that is necessarily conducive
to planning and discussions.

While in Europe I will try to keep Legate in
mind, but please remember I will be in Germany only
about ten days. While in Frankfurt I will certainly
call some of the people we were in touch with in May
to get their reaction to any efforts on the part of
Oro in Europe.

I will be back in my office no later than
February 1st. Please give my best to everybody.

HAK:ejh

HAK:jh

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

Reverend father. Please give my best to everybody.

Oro in Europe.

to get their reaction to any efforts on the part of
call some of the people we were in touch with in May
apart ten days. While in Frankfurt I will certainly
mind, but please remember I will be in Germany only
while in Europe I will try to keep legate in

to planning and discussions.

in my office is not one that is necessarily conducive
even it only briefly. I can imagine that the atmosphere
I was glad to have a chance to see you here at Harvard
Thank you for your note of December 18th.

Dear Bob,

Chevy Grase, Newland
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Operations Research Office
Johns Hopkins University
Voting Chairman, Project LEGATE
Mr. Robert C. Sorensen

December 24, 1925

May 17, 1954

Mr. Carl Wood
ORO
6410 Connecticut Ave.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Carl:

It was good to see you in Washington and particularly to have
an opportunity really to talk to you. As you know, I share your
views both as to the direction of Legate as well as in the broader
sense of the impact of America abroad. I have tried to find some
things about my trip to Europe two years ago, but I think every-
thing I wrote is in your file.

The other day I ran into Arthur Sutherland who years ago
had been asked by Darwin to work on your project. After filling
out his security forms, he never heard from you again. I presume
this is due to the various changes of chairnship and not to any security
objections because I cannot believe that Sutherland who is an upstate
New York Republican could be found objectionable. In any case, it might be a
nice gesture if you wrote him.

It isn't that he wants to work for you, it is just that he wants
to be reassured on this security point, and since I suggested
him to Darwin and put some pressure on him to put his papers in
in the first place, it would also be a kindness to me if you
could do it.

I have thought about that French project we discussed, and
it strikes me as interesting and something I might like to do. The
only question now is the time. Nextspring would be the best
from my point of view. If there is anything you want me to do
on the other things we discussed, I would be only too glad to
drop a note to some of my friends.

I hope to see you here during the summer.

Kindest regards.

HAK:ebp

HAK:epb

Henry V. Kisainger

Kindest regards,

drob a note to some of my friends.
on the other things we discussed. I would be only too glad to
from my point of view. It there is anything you want me to do
only question now is the time. Maxhebriag would be the best
it strikes me as interesting and something I might like to do. The
I have thought about that French project we discussed, and

could do it.
in the first place, it would also be a kindness to me if you
him to Darwin and but some bresame on him to put his babas in
to be reassured on this security point, and since I angated
It isn't that he wants to work for you, it is just that he wants
the dose. Of the note him.

some day, perhaps, I cannot believe that Darwin wants to do
this is due to the various changes of characters and not so much
out his security home, he never heard from you again. I bresame
had been asked by Darwin to work on your project. After tiffing
The other day I ran into Arthur Sutherland who years ago

thing I wrote is in your life.
things I spent my trip to Europe two years ago, but I think ever-
sense of the impact of America abroad. I have tried to find some
views both as to the direction of legislation as well as in the broader
an opportunity really to talk to you. As you know, I share your
It was good to see you in Washington and particularly to have

Dear Carl:

Washington, D. C.
6410 Connecticut Ave.
ORO
Mr. Carl Wood

May 17, 1954

June 16, 1954

Mr. Carlton L. Wood
Operations Research Office
6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Dear Carl:

Thanks for your letter of May 25th. I have had the opportunity in the meantime to discuss informally some of the ideas of your project with a number of visiting French and Italian scholars. They are strongly convinced of its feasibility and indeed are surprisingly enthusiastic. The sums they mentioned seemed quite possible. I assume there is no great hurry about the matter, however,

I do hope you can come up here during the summer. I am enclosing a list of Seminar participants in order to give you an added incentive.

Kind regards.

HAK:ebp

Enclosure