Henry Kissinger is one of the most fascinating public personalities
in recent memory. A talented and well-conducted academic, Kissinger
skyrocketed to international fame during his tenure as National-
for National Affairs Security Adviser and subsequently as Secretary of State.

a major
As the architect of U.S. foreign policy from 1969 to 1976
Henry Kissinger is credited with many diplomatic feats and also
criticized
for his policies. (and his personal style.)

Since leaving government service, Dr. Kissinger has been
University Professor of Diplomacy at Georgetown University's School
of Foreign Service. He also serves as counsellor to the University's
and International Center for Strategic Studies, and as a Special Fellow of the Aspen
Institute. Among his consulting clients are: NBC News, Goldman Sachs
investment bankers, and the General Electric Company, Ltd. He serves
as a director or trustee of the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Foreign Policy Association, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, and Kissinger chairs the International
Committee for International House, The Humphrey Institute, the
Alliance to Save Energy, and the International Advisory Committee
of the Chase Manhattan Bank.

-2-

(for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize),

Among the many triumphs Kissinger's supporters point to are the negotiation that ended American involvement in the Vietnam war, the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the two

the Middle East diplomacy after the October 1973 war that began a decisive turn toward stage-Middle East Agreements of 1975, and the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China, and the growth of US-Soviet detente.

Many of Kissinger's policies are still open to heated controversy. Although he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1973, his remains a subject of debate, and initiatives on Vietnam must still await the judgement of history.

Vietnamization, the Christmas bombing, his "Peace is at hand" statement, the incursions into Laos and Cambodia are still the subjects of research and controversy among journalists and scholars.

Administration
Kissinger's policies during the Indo-Pakistani War, in the midst of

Middle East,
of the Yom Kippur war, and on the use of covert action in Chile, and
Angola, and Cambodia still engender violent opposition or steadfast
support.

Kissinger's personal style and personality have also become Bureaucratic procedures when he was Nixon's public issues. As the dominant policy maker Dr. Kissinger short-National Security Adviser, and the wiretapping of government circuited the existing bureaucracy, took most initiatives into his Officials and journalists in the effort to stop leaks of own hands, instituted secrecy procedures, and authorized wiretaps sensitive military and diplomatic secrets, have been criticized. on colleagues and subordinates. His wit has also provoked con-

siderable comment. Since he left government service his activities

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[Y]

as a consultant, his lifestyle, and his income are regular topics
for admirers and critics.

Kissinger, a German immigrant, began his career after service
born in Germany in 1923, emigrated to the United States with his
parents in 1938 and became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1943.
He served in the US Army during World War Two. He earned his BA at Harvard
in 1950, his Masters in 1952, and his doctorate in 1954. He worked
his way through the academic ranks at Harvard rising from intructor
in 1954 to full Professor by 1962. Along the way he served as
Director of The Harvard International Seminar, Director of the Center
for International Studies, and Director of the Defense Studies Program.

His revised doctoral thesis, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace 1812-1822*, and his study of defense strategy in the nuclear weapons policy, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, are considered major academic contributions.

Prior to joining the government, Dr. Kissinger, had
Nixon Administration in 1969, and in 1971
served as a
consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State,
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security
Council. He was active in Council on Foreign Relations and a
Director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Dr. Kissinger married the former Nancy Sharon Maginnes on
March 30, 1974. He has two children, David and Elizabeth.
Dr.

KISSINGER

The memoirs of Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State during some of the most turbulent years in American foreign policy, will be discussed with Dr. Kissinger by the EMMY award-winning interviewer David Frost in an NBC News special report, it was announced today by Lester M. Crystal, President of NBC News.

The exclusive special program will be broadcast on the NBC Television Network Thursday, Oct. 11 (10-11 p.m. NYT). It will be fully sponsored by the 3-M Company, through BBD & O International, Inc.

In making the announcement, Crystal said: "Frost's skill and expertise as an interviewer is well documented. His history-making interviews with former President Nixon in 1977 demonstrated his grasp of complex matters and his ability to translate them effectively to television viewers. We at NBC News look forward to this program as an important insight into a critical period in our lives."

The first volume of the memoirs, WHITE HOUSE YEARS, will be published in October by Little-Brown & Co. It deals with the years 1969-72.

David Frost, who has begun work on the manuscript with an NBC News research team said: "We shall be spending the next two months researching and deciding on the most fruitful and significant areas for the special, but obviously the ending of the Vietnam War, the controversies currently raging over the bombing of Cambodia, Dr. Kissinger's working relationship with former President Nixon, and the triangular balance of power engineered between Russia, China and the United States will all be examined."

Davir Frost, who has begun work on the manuscript with an NBC News research team said: "We shall be spending the next two months researching and deciding on the most fruitful and significant areas for the special, but obviously the ending of the Vietnam War, the controversies currently raging over Cambodia, Dr. Kissinger's ~~working~~ relationship with former President Nixon, ~~and~~ the development of relations with allies, various crises in the Middle East, new strategic policies and the triangular balance of power engineered between Russia, China and the United States will all be examined.

NBC News

[LC]

Material From NBC News Regarding The Program

"HENRY KISSINGER: AN INTERVIEW WITH DAVID FROST"

To Be Broadcast Thursday, Oct. 11 (10-11 PM) On NBC

Because of the controversy surrounding the broadcast of the
NBC News/David Frost interview of former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, NBC will make a brief on-air statement
preceding the program stating NBC's position regarding remarks
made by Frost. That is enclosed.

NBC News has also decided to release the enclosed entire
unedited transcript of the taping session which primarily
concerned the bombing of Cambodia (taped Wed., Oct. 3).

Dr. Kissinger, as the interviewee, also suggested that we
make the full transcript available for publication. Additionally,
he requested that we release a clarifying letter from him to
NBC News concerning elements of that interview. That is also
included.

On page 7 of the full transcript, there is a discussion of
bombing area 704 in Cambodia. That was a point of contention
between Frost and Kissinger. Kissinger, in his letter, maintains
that 704 was in reality 740. Area 704 was originally mentioned

the Destruction of Cambodia." At the request of NBC News, Mr. Shawcross went back to the Pentagon and after three checks discovered that, indeed, the area referred to in his book and in Frost's question was 740 and not 704. The book was in error. A copy of Mr. Shawcross' letter is enclosed.

Questioning on the topic has been deleted from the broadcast by NBC News. Mr. Frost, having received a copy of the letter from Shawcross, also urged the deletion.

Enclosures:

1 -- Opening on-air statement from NBC News

2 -- Henry Kissinger letter to William Small, President of NBC News

3 -- William Shawcross letter

4 -- Unedited transcript of complete Oct. 3 taping session concerning Cambodia

--NBC NEWS

(OVER A SLIDE READING "A STATEMENT BY NBC NEWS")

What follows is an interesting and lively interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger. We believe our viewers should be aware of an equally lively controversy behind the scenes.

This hour is a distillation of two interviews taped last week. David Frost, Kissinger and NBC News agreed to a third taping on Saturday to continue a discussion on Cambodia over which there was disagreement on certain points and to discuss additional subjects.

Mr. Frost later changed his mind and withdrew from participation and made a number of public allegations.

NBC wishes to state categorically that Dr. Kissinger was at no time given any guarantee on what material would or would not be included, nor any privilege that would compromise journalistic standards. At all times, Mr. Frost was encouraged by NBC News to ask tough and difficult questions and Dr. Kissinger said he expected that and did not object.

Since the broadcast you now see is, of course, edited... NBC responding to a request by Dr. Kissinger, has agreed to release the full transcript -- unedited -- of the Cambodian section. It is being released to the press and to any viewer writing NBC News for a copy. We believe you'll find the edited version faithful to the complete interview.

###

October 9, 1979

Dear Mr. Small:

In light of the publicity attached to the taping of the Cambodia section of David Frost's interview of me, I believe it would serve everybody's interest if the entire transcript were released to the press.

As you know during the broadcast Mr. Frost referred to documents never shown to me and made several statements of fact based on inadequate information. Let me point out a few key ones:

1. There are hundreds if not thousands of documents bearing on the bombing of the Cambodian sanctuaries. To select any one of them for discussion is inherently misleading. In this case there is in fact documentary material which contradicts Mr. Frost's innuendos. (It seems clear that he confuses base area 704 with base area 740.) But whatever one document may be made to imply, the overall record supports without any question the following statement of facts:

a. No target was ever selected by the White House; no recommendation by the Joint Chiefs against bombing was ever overruled by the White House; not all recommendations by the Chiefs to bomb were approved.

b. Every target was proposed by the Commander in Saigon, through the Pacific Commander in Hawaii to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who recommended it to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense then sent the consolidated recommendation to the White House together with his own. There were no exceptions. The White House never approved a target not recommended by both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Recommendations were accompanied by a statement that civilian casualties were expected to be minimal.

Mr. William J. Small
President, News Division
NBC News
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

2

d. No statement that there was risk of significant civilian casualties was ever overruled. Any insinuation to the contrary is simply false. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Tom Moorer will confirm the accuracy of these statements. They are supported by the written record.

2. The United States did not recognize Lon Nol on March 19 as Mr. Frost alleged. My logs show no meetings of any kind on March 18 contrary to Mr. Frost's assertions. On March 19 the State Department announced that the question of recognition of the government of Cambodia did not arise since in effect the old government continued. The only change was the deposition of the monarch. Almost all other nations--including the UN and the USSR--took the same position. On March 21 President Nixon in a press conference stated our formal position, making clear its temporary nature and leaving open Sihanouk's return: "...we have, as you note, established relations on a temporary basis with the government which has been selected by the Parliament and will continue to deal with that government as long as it appears to be the government of the nation. I think any speculation to which way this government is going to turn, what will happen to Prince Sihanouk when he returns, would both be premature and unhelpful." *Emphasis added*/

3. The quotation ascribed to Ambassador Swank is incorrect as is clear from reading his press conference of September 5, 1973.

4. Sihanouk repeated his denial that Cambodia was being bombed in August 1969 to Senator Mansfield (according to official reporting).

5. The quotes ascribed to me regarding the incursions into the sanctuaries were totally out of context and grossly misleading. Any fair reading of the backgrounders will confirm that my comments were in answer to questions seeking to explain the reason for the ground operations and why they had not taken place previously; they were not addressed to air operations at all.

10 October, 1979.

Dear Nigel,

The conviction that Area 704 was "Supper" was based on the
White Paper submitted by Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Clements, Jnr., to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on September 9, 1973. It was reprinted in the
Committee's hearing record, "Bombing in Cambodia" p.p.481-
494. The original of the White Paper also describes "Supper"
as 704.

Following your request on Sunday, we checked with the
Pentagon to see if there could have been a mistake, since
Dr. Kissinger was certain that "Supper" was in fact 740.
The historians of the JCS eventually came back and said that
they had found no evidence to link 704 with "Supper". On
the contrary, the available documents showed 740 as "Supper".
They therefore believed there must have been a clerical
error in the original White Paper - one that remained
undiscovered until now. That also seems to us by far the
most likely conclusion.

As you know, David Frost and John Birt feel that, in these
circumstances, the exchange about Area 704 should not be
included. I agree with them.

Mr. Nigel Ryan,
N.B.C. News,
30 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York, NY 10020

FROST:
DR. KISSINGER, I GUESS THE SUBJECT OF THE
NEXT HOUR ONE WAY AND ANOTHER IS GOING TO
BE POWER, AND POWER DURING YOUR WHITE HOUSE
YEARS, AND YOU CAME TO OFFICE AT A TIME WHEN
AMERICA WAS VERY UNCERTAIN, PERHAPS MORE
UNCERTAIN THAN EVER BEFORE OF ITS ROLE IN
THE WORLD. WHAT WAS YOUR PLAN FOR HOLDING
ON TO, AND PERHAP'S STRENGTHENING, AMERICA'S
POWER IN THE WORLD?

KISSINGER:
WELL, I WOULDN'T SAY THE PROBLEM WAS ONLY
POWER. THE PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES
WHEN I JOINED THE ADMINISTRATION WAS HOW
TO DEFINE ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD...THAT
INCLUDES POWER, THAT INCLUDED OUR VALUES.
AND WE WERE ALSO INVOLVED IN A TREMENDOUS
DOMESTIC DEBATE ABOUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM.
THE PROBLEM WE FACED AT THE END OF THE
SIXTIES WAS THAT THE TRADITIONAL PATTERNS
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY WERE BEGINNING
NO LONGER TO APPLY. WE HAD BEEN SECURE
BEHIND TWO GREAT OCEANS, WE HAD HAD A
TREMENDOUS ECONOMIC SUPERIORITY OVER THE
REST OF THE WORLD. WE HAD HAD AN ATOMIC
MONOPOLY AND WE WERE BEGINNING TO LEARN
IN THE SIXTIES THAT WE COULDN'T DO EVERY-
THING SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THIS CAME HARD
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND WE HAD TO
TRY TO ADJUST AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS TO
THE REALITY AND MAINTAIN THE AMERICAN

[Lc]

2-2-2

IN THE WORLD BECAUSE WE WERE STILL THE
STRONGEST FREE COUNTRY AND THE SECURITY
AND THE PROGRESS OF SO MANY OTHER NATIONS
DEPENDED ON OUR DECISIONS. THAT WAS OUR
KEY PROBLEM.

FROST:

YOU MEAN YOU WERE THE STRONGEST FREE COUNTRY
BUT, AS IT WERE, YOU NO LONGER HAD FIFTY-ONE
PER CENT, YOU HAD THIRTY-SEVEN PER CENT SAY.
I MEAN THAT, IN OTHER WORDS, YOU NO LONGER
HAD A VOTING MAJORITY IN THE WORLD.

KISSINGER:

THAT'S RIGHT. WE WERE THE STRONGEST FREE
COUNTRY, BUT WE NOW HAD TO SET PRIORITIES.
THROUGH MOST OF OUR HISTORY WE COULD WAIT
UNTIL A PROBLEM BECAME NEARLY OVERWHELMING,
AND THEN ADDRESSED RESOURCES TO IT. NOW,
A GREAT DEAL WOULD DEPEND ON WHETHER WE COULD
ANTICIPATE ISSUES, WHETHER WE COULD SELECT
OUR PRIORITIES PROPERLY, AND WHETHER WE
COULD ACT IN ANTICIPATION OF EVENTS. AND,
OF COURSE, WE HAD TO LIQUIDATE A WAR IN WHICH
WE FOUND OURSELVES INVOLVED. ALL OF THESE
EVENTS OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY CREATED A
RATHER COMPLICATED SITUATION.

FROST:

WELL, THAT, AS YOU SAW IT, WAS YOUR AGENDA, AND
THAT IS THE AGENDA WE'LL BE EXAMINING IN THE
COURSE OF THE NEXT HOUR, AND WE'LL RETURN TO
THOSE THEMES AT THE END. LET'S TURN, AT THIS
POINT, TO THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR. AND, I
SUPPOSE, THE BASIC ISSUE WAS: DO YOU THINK,

[LC]

3-3-3

HAVING WRITTEN YOUR MEMOIRS, HAVING REANALYZED
THE SITUATION, THAT YOU ENDED THE WAR AS
EXPEDITIOUSLY AS WAS HUMANLY POSSIBLE?

KISSINGER:

WE ENDED THE WAR AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS WAS
HUMANLY POSSIBLE, ON TERMS COMPATIBLE WITH
OUR HONOR AND OUR VALUES. WE COULD ALWAYS
HAVE ENDED IT BY SURRENDERING. BUT IF WE
WANTED TO MAINTAIN OUR FUNDEMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
WE ENDED IT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

FROST:

WELL, LET'S GO THROUGH THE WAR, AND SINCE THE
FIRST MAJOR ISSUE THAT AROSE WAS CAMBODIA,
LET'S TURN TO CAMBODIA, AND THEN LET'S COME
BACK TO THE GENERAL OVERALL SUBJECT OF THE
WAR. I SUPPOSE CAMBODIA IS THE MOST
CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT, CERTAINLY CURRENTLY,
IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR FOREIGN POLICY DURING
THESE FOUR YEARS. I SUPPOSE ONE COULD
SUMMARIZE THE CRITIC'S CASE BY SAYING THAT
THEY SAY THAT IN ORDER TO HELP YOU IN THE
MILITARY CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, YOUR
POLICY ENGULFED CAMBODIA IN THE WAR IN A WAY
THAT WAS NOT THE CASE WHEN YOU TOOK OFFICE,
AND IT SET IN TRAIN A COURSE OF EVENTS THAT
WAS TO DESTROY THE COUNTRY. AND THEY SAY THAT
THAT WAS BECAUSE IF WASN'T THOUGHT THROUGH,
THAT CAMBODIA WAS PERIPHERAL, THAT YOUR
INTENTION WAS ON VIETNAM, THAT YOUR CALCULATIONS
IGNORED ANY REAL CONSIDERATION EITHER OF WHAT

[lc]

4-4-4

WAS HAPPENING POLITICALLY INSIDE CAMBODIA OR
WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SOMETHING AS POTENT
AS AMERICAN INTERVENTION WOULD BE. I MEAN
THAT, I SUPPOSE, IS THE CRITICS CASE.

KISSINGER:
THE FIRST THING TO KEEP IN MIND IS THAT WE
INHERITED A WAR IN VIETNAM. THAT IS VERY
OFTEN FORGOTTEN. WHEN WE CAME INTO OFFICE
THERE WERE 530,000 AMERICANS...

FROST:
BUT WE WERE NOT IN A WAR IN CAMBODIA AT
THAT POINT.

KISSINGER: NO, THAT IS NOT EXACTLY...

FROST: THAT WAR...

KISSINGER: JUST A MINUTE...

FROST:
FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW, THAT WAR WAS
YOUR WAR.

KISSINGER:
THAT IS NOT EXACTLY CORRECT. WE WERE IN THE
WAR IN CAMBODIA BECAUSE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
HAD ESTABLISHED FOR FOUR YEARS BASE AREAS ALONG
THE CAMBODIAN BORDER IN WHICH THEY HAD, WE
ESTIMATED, SOME HUNDRED THOUSAND TROOPS. LATER
ON, THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED
THAT THEY HAD HAD 300,000 TROOPS THERE, WHICH
WAS...

FROST: THEN YOU MEAN...THE POL POT GOVERNMENT...

KISSINGER: THE POL POT GOVERNMENT...

FROST:
YOU DON'T NORMALLY QUOTE THEM AS AUTHORITATIVE
SOURCES.

KISSINGER:
NO, BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY...OUR ESTIMATE WAS A
HUNDRED THOUSAND...IT DOESN'T MEAN...

[Lc]

5-5-5

FROST: LATER ON, NIXON SAID 40,000.

KISSINGER: IT WAS...I DON'T KNOW WHEN NIXON SAID 40,000.

FROST: DECEMBER 10, 1970, HE SAID 40,000.

KISSINGER: WELL, OUR ESTIMATE WAS AROUND A HUNDRED THOUSAND, SOMETHING LIKE FOUR DIVISIONS...IT FLUCTUATED BECAUSE THEY WERE COMING BACK AND FORTH...

FROST: YES. LET ME SAY...I DON'T DEFEND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATION OF CAMBIDIAN NEUTRALITY FOR FOUR YEARS. I DO THINK THAT TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE A RIGHT AND THAT...ANALYSIS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THAT IT WASN'T WORTH RISKING DESTROYING CAMBODIA TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE...

KISSINGER: YES, BUT FIRST OF ALL, IF YOU'LL LET ME ANSWER THE QUESTION AND THEN MAKE YOUR CASE, I THINK, WOULD BE BETTER. WE HAVE 40,000...WHETHER IT'S 40,000 OR A HUNDRED THOUSAND, IT'S VERY HARD TO DETERMINE BECAUSE THE SANCTUARY AREAS WERE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER AND THE TROOPS WERE MOVING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THEM. SECONDLY, WE WERE BEGINNING TO WITHDRAW TROOPS WHICH THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT DONE. THIRD, THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION WAS BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM WHICH WE WERE NOT DOING DUR TO THE BOMBING HALT THAT HAD BEEN AGREED UPON. SO, WE FACED A TOTALLY NEW STRATEGIC PROBLEM. WITHIN THREE WEEKS OF COMING INTO OFFICE, THERE WAS A NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE, DESPITE THE BOMBING HALT, WHICH KILLED UP TO

[LC]

6-6-6

FIVE HUNDRED AMERICANS A WEEK FOR FOUR WEEKS
BEFORE THERE WAS ANY REACTION BY THE UNITED
STATES. I CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT
TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT WHEN THERE IS...
WHEN THERE ARE BASE AREAS, ESTABLISHED BY THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE, FROM WHICH ALL NORTH...FROM
WHICH ALL CAMBODIAN AUTHORITY HAD BEEN EXPELLED,
IN WHICH THE RULER OF CAMBODIA HAD ANNOUNCED
THAT HE NO LONGER KNEW WHAT WAS, WHAT WAS GOING
ON AND IN WHICH, IN SELF-DEFENSE, WE WERE
ATTEMPTING TO LIMIT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE
OFFENSIVE WHICH WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST US IN AN
UNPROVOKED MANNER.

FROST: RIGHT. NOW, WELL, THERE'S THREE THINGS THAT...
ONE, YOU SAY IN YOUR BOOK THAT THIS WAS A
STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
ASSAULT AND...

KISSINGER: THAT'S RIGHT...

FROST: ...THAT YOU CONSIDERED BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM
AND NOT EMBROILING CAMBODIA. AND...

KISSINGER: BUT CAMBODIA WAS EMBROILED...IT IS AN ABSURDITY
TO SAY THAT A COUNTRY CAN OCCUPY A PART OF
ANOTHER COUNTRY, KILL YOUR PEOPLE AND THAT THEN
YOU ARE VIOLATING ITS NEUTRALITY WHEN YOU
RESPOND AGAINST THE FOREIGN TROOPS THAT ARE
ON THAT NEUTRAL TERRITORY. IT IS TOTAL HYPOCRACY..

FROST: I'VE ALREADY NOT MADE THAT POINT...DON'T GIVE
ME POINTS THAT I'M NOT MAKING. THE POINT IS

[Lc]

7-7-7

THAT, IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, SIHANOUK...
TWO THINGS YOU SAID...CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES
WERE NO LONGER ACTIVE IN THIS AREA, HOWEVER,
YOU KNEW, PRESUMABLY FROM ALL THESE VOLUMINOUS
REPORTS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT
INNOCENT CAMBODIAN PEASANTS WERE STILL IN
THESE AREAS. IN ONE CASE, MORE THAN A
THOUSAND, IN ONE CASE, A NUMBER MORE THAN
THAT, THAT THEY COULD...

KISSINGER:
NOW JUST A MINUTE...YOU ARE QUOTING A SOURCE THAT HAS HAD A VERY SELECTIVE LIST OF DOCUMENTATION. THE WHITE HOUSE CAN OPERATE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE REPORT IT RECEIVES FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. IT CANNOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REPORT THAT SUBORDINATES SEND TO THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. THE REPORTS WE RECEIVED FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY BOTH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WERE THAT THERE WERE NO CAMBODIANS LIVING IN THE TARGET AREAS. WHAT SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS MAY HAVE REPORTED TO OTHER SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS...

FROST: SO, WELL, YOU MEAN THAT..

KISSINGER: ...IS NOT IMPORTANT.

FROST:
WELL, THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THIS IS NEWS...YOU ASKED THE QUESTION: ARE THERE ANY CAMBODIAN PEASANTS AT ALL IN THIS AREA AND

[LC]

8-8-8

KISSINGER:

YOU RECEIVED THE REPLY...

FROST:

NO...

...THAT THESE REPORTS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE RUBBISH.

KISSINGER:

WE DIDN'T RECEIVE ANY REPORTS FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF THAT SAID THAT THERE WERE CIVILIANS LIVING IN THESE AREAS.

*FROST:

BUT...SO, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SENT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SERIAL NUMBER JCM 207/69, A THING IN WHICH HE SPECIFICALLY SAID TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE... IT WASN'T SOME JUNIOR IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF...SAID TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 198, 770 AND ALL OF THIS, THAT, DON'T LET'S BOMB 704 BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY CAMBODIANS.

KISSINGER:

WELL, THEN, WE PROBABLY DIDN'T BOMB 704.

FROST:

YES WE DID, WE BOMBED 704, IT BECAME SUPPER. AND 6,780 TONS WERE DROPPED ON IT. AND THAT WAS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE...IT WASN'T SOME TRIVIAL THING...WE KNEW WE WERE KILLING CAMBODIAN PEASANTS.

KISSINGER:

THAT IS SIMPLY NOT CORRECT. AND YOU ARE SIMPLY REPEATING TENDENTIOUS...

FROST:

WELL, IF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE...

KISSINGER:

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS...EVERY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WAS RECEIVED IN THE WHITE HOUSE FROM EITHER THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OR FROM THE SECRETARY OF

*see attached William Shawcross letter.*

[lc]

9-9-9

DEFENSE, INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO DANGER
OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. THAT WAS A CRITERION
FOR TARGET SELECTION. SECONDLY, SIHANOUK
PUBLICLY STATES, WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT
B-52 BOMBING IN THE SANCTUARY AREAS, WHICH WERE
FIVE MILES FROM THE FRONTIER...WE ARE NOT
TALKING HERE ABOUT BOMBING ALL OVER CAMBODIA...

FROST:

ABSOLUTELY...AT THIS POINT...ABSOLUTELY RIGHT...

KISSINGER:

WAIT A MINUTE. SIHANOUK PUBLICLY STATED THAT
NO CAMBODIANS WERE BEING KILLED, THAT IF THERE
WERE ANY CAMBODIAN CASUALTIES, IF THERE WERE
ONE CAMBODIAN BUFFALO INJURED, HE WOULD PROTEST.
BUT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON IN
TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
IN WHICH THERE ARE NO CAMBODIANS LIVING, AND
IN WHICH THERE WERE NO CAMBODIAN CASUALTIES.
HE SAID THAT PUBLICLY.

FROST:

HE SAID THAT PUBLICLY AND HE SAID IT PUBLICLY
IN MAY, 1969. AND YOU QUOTE IT IN YOUR BOOK.
BUT ON MARCH THE 28TH, 1969, HE CALLED A
SPECIAL PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH YOU DON'T QUOTE
IN YOUR BOOK, TO COMMENT ON A U.P.I. REPORT
FROM SAIGON THAT ABRAMS HAD REQUESTED B-52
STRIKES IN CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK LET IT BE
KNOWN THAT HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THEM. THAT
THAT WAS THE RUMOR. THIS IS ONE OF THE EARLIEST
LEAKS ON THE BOMBING AND SIHANOUK SAID, AND I'M
NOT SUGGESTING HERE THAT SIHANOUK IS ANYBODY'S

10-10-10

WITNESS...I'M JUST SUGGESTING THAT HE'S NOT
YOURS...IN THE WAY YOU'RE PORTRAYING. HE SAID
QUOTE: NOBODY, NO CHIEF OF STATE IN THE WORLD,
PLACED IN THE SAME SITUATION AS I AM, WOULD
AGREE TO LET FOREIGN AIRCRAFT BOMB HIS OWN
COUNTRY. THEY'VE NEVER DARED TO SAY I WOULD
AUTHORIZE SUCH BOMBINGS BUT THEY HAVE SAID
I WOULDN'T OPPOSE THEM. WELL, I WILL OPPOSE
IT FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THEY'VE NEVER BEEN
ABLE TO KILL A SINGLE SOMMUNIST. THEY'VE ONLY
KILLED ORDINARY PEASANTS, MALE AND FEMALE.
I DON'T WANT TO RUN THE RISK, BECAUSE OF THEIR
BOMBING OF THE COMMUNISTS, OF SEEING THE
ESCALATION OF THE WAR EXTEND TO CAMBODIA.
THAT IS, I WILL, IN ALL CASES, OPPOSE ALL
BOMBINGS ON CAMBODIAN TERRITORY UNDER WHATEVER
PRETEXT. THE REAL INTENTION OF THE AMERICANS
IS TO WREAK DEATH EVERY DAY AMONG THE KHMER
PEOPLE SO AS TO GET THE LATTER TO THINK THAT
BECAUSE OF ME THERE CAN NEVER BE PEACE WITH
THE AMERICANS. THUS I WILL BE OBLIGED TO...
(THIS IS INCREDIBLY FARSIGHTED)...THUS I WILL
BE OBLIGED TO RESIGN, TO GIVE ROOM TO A MORE
RIGHTEST AND PRO-WESTERN AND MORE PRO-U.S.
REGIME. TWO THINGS WILL HAPPEN. FIRST, THE
SUFFERINGS SUSTAINED BY THE PEASANTS AND THE
INABILITY OF MY GOVERNMENT, OR SO THEY FEEL,
TO STOP THE U.S. BOMBINGS, AND SECONDLY THE
FRIGHT OF THE CITIZENS WHO POSSESS VILLAS,

11-11-11

THESE PEOPLE WILL BECOME FRIGHTENED. THAT WILL BE THE MOMENT THE TWO CONDITIONS, THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PEOPLE AND PEASANTS AND THE FRIGHT OF THE RICH WILL BE FULFILLED TO FORCE THE RIPE (NOT CLEAR) FRUIT FROM THE CAMBODIAN TREE. THAT IS THE WAY THINGS WILL GO, ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN WISH, FOR THE AMERICANS KNOW VERY WELL THAT WILL NOT BE SO AS LONG AS I EXIST. I WILL DEFEND MYSELF WITH ALL MY MEANS, I WILL ALWAYS STAND NEUTRAL. THE AMERICANS WANT CAMBODIA TO BECOME ANOTHER SAIGON. (UNQUOTE) I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT SIHANOUK WAS THE WORLD'S MOST CONSISTANT MAN, BUT I SUGGEST THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE QUOTED THAT PRESS CONFERENCE AS WELL AS THE MAY ONE.

KISSINGER:

THE FACT IS THAT THE MAY PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWED THIS PRESS CONFERENCE. THE FACT IS THAT AFTER THE MAY PRESS CONFERENCE, SIHANOUK REESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, HE INVITED PRESIDENT NIXON TO PHNOM PENH, THAT FOR THE WHOLE PERIOD WE WERE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE BOMBING, TO PAY DAMAGES IF SIHANOUK HAD PROTESTED. WE WANTED TO GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFINE THE NATURE OF THE PRESSURE THAT COULD BE PUT ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. OUR PROBLEM WAS THAT HUNDREDS OF AMERICANS WERE BEING KILLED PARTLY ON THESE BASES...

[LC]

12-12-12

FROST: ...FROM THESE BASES AND THAT WAS TERRIBLE...

KISSINGER: ...PARTLY FROM THESE BASIS, THAT SIHANOUK DID NOT PROTEST, THAT, THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT I QUOTED WAS AFTER THE BOMBING HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND...

FROST: SO WAS THIS...MARCH 28TH...

KISSINGER: THIS WAS AFTER ONE HAD TAKEN PLACE. AND...

FROST: BUT IN MAY...

KISSINGER: FRANKLY, I WASN'T AWARE OF THIS PRESS CONFERENCE, TO BE FRANK.

FROST: WELL, YOU COULDN'T HAVE QUOTED THAT THEN... BUT IN MAY VERY LITTLE BOMBING HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE BOMBING STEPPED UP AFTER THAT. IN MAY HE COULD BE CONFIDENT ABOUT THE BOMBING. YOU YOURSELF, IN YOUR LETTER TO "THE ECONOMIST" SAY THAT IT STEPPED UP LATER AND, I MEAN, AS YOU I'M SURE, KNOW...

KISSINGER: YES, BUT HE HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO PROTEST.

FROST: CERTAINLY, BUT I MEAN THEY DID PROTEST...

KISSINGER: THEY DID NOT PROTEST...

FROST: ON THE 20TH OF NOVEMBER, '69, WHEELER SAYS WE'VE HAD A COMPLAINT FROM CAMBODIA ABOUT ELEVEN VILLAGERS KILLED IN A B-52 RAID. OKAY, HE DIDN'T DO A FORMAL PROTEST AND SIT ON THE STEPS OF THE WHITE HOUSE, BUT THEN...NOBODY SUGGESTS THAT...

KISSINGER: HE DIDN'T HAVE TO MAKE...HE DIDN'T HAVE TO SIT ON THE STEPS OF THE WHITE HOUSE. HE COULD HAVE

[LC]

13-13-13

MADE A DIPLOMATIC...

FROST: IT WAS AN INGLORIOUS COMPROMISE...NEUTRALITY IS AN INGLORIOUS COMPROMISE...WE KNOW THAT...

KISSINGER: NEUTRALITY WOULD HAVE BEEN GLADLY WELCOMED. WHEN YOU HAVE A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY FORCES ON YOUR TERRITORY, WHEN WE PICKED UP, DURING THE INCURSIONS, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF TONS OF SUPPLIES, THAT WERE ON THEIR TERRITORY, THEN YOU'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT NEUTRALITY. YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT THE INVASION OF THE NEUTRAL COUNTRY BY THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THAT IS WHAT HAD HAPPENED FOR FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO ANY AMERICAN REACTION.

FROST: BUT ON A COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS WE HAD LIVED WITH THAT BECAUSE WE DIDN'T WANT TO DESTROY...

KISSINGER: WE HAD LIVED WITH IT AT A TIME...

FROST: A COUNTRY...

KISSINGER: WE WEREN'T DESTROYING A COUNTRY WHEN WE WERE...

FROST: WE STARTED TO DESTROY A COUNTRY...

KISSINGER: WE DID NOT START TO DESTROY A COUNTRY...

FROST: FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW...

KISSINGER: WE DID NOT START TO DESTROY A COUNTRY FROM ANY...

FROST: THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE THERE FOR FOUR YEARS BEFORE...I AGREE.

KISSINGER: WE DID NOT START TO DESTROY A COUNTRY FROM ANYBODY'S POINT OF VIEW WHEN WE WERE BOMBING SEVEN ISOLATED NORTH VIETNAMESE BASE AREAS

14-14-14

WITHIN SOME FIVE MILES OF THE VIETNAMESE BORDER, FROM WHICH ATTACKS WERE BEING LAUNCHED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

FROST:

WELL, YOU QUOTE, YOUR PRESS CONFERENCES LATER... AND YOU QUOTE YOUR MEETING OF...THIS APRIL WITH SIHANOUK, ALSO IN YOUR BOOK AND, BUT, AND THEREFORE, ONE WANTED TO KNOW THE LATEST NEWS FROM SIHANOUK, SO WE GOT IN TOUCH WITH HIM LAST WEEK IN PYONYANG AND HE SAID THE AMERICAN BOMBING AND INVASION ARE NOW BOTH RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EXPANSION OF VIETNAMESE AND KHMER COMMUNISM IN CAMBODIA. DIRECT VERBATIM QUOTE FROM TELEX. SO THAT I MEAN, THAT'S THE LATEST QUOTE AND HE SAYS THAT. NOW, I'M NOT SAYING THAT HE IS UNFALLIBLE. BUT, I MEAN THAT'S WHAT HE SAYS.

KISSINGER:

THAT MAY BE...THAT IS NOT WHAT HE WAS SAYING AT THE TIME...THAT IS NOT THE PROBLEM AS IT PRESENTED ITSELF AT THE TIME. HE NOW HAS THE PROBLEM OF TRYING TO GET BACK INTO POWER, IF AT ALL, WITH THE TOLERATION OF HANOI, SO IT IS OBVIOUS THAT HE WILL NOT MAKE STATEMENTS TODAY THAT WOULD BE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF HANOI. THE HISTORICAL FACT IS THAT HANOI INVADED CAMBODIA YEARS BEFORE THERE WAS ANY AMERICAN REACTION. THAT WE INHERITED A WAR THAT WE ATTEMPTED TO END ON HONORABLE TERMS, THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE STARTED AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST US WITHIN THREE WEEKS OF OUR COMING INTO

[LC]

15-15-15

OFFICE. THAT THESE BASE AREAS WERE AN
IMPORTANT PART IN THAT, AND THAT THE BASIC
CAUSE FOR THE PROBLEM IN CAMBODIA WAS THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE INVASION, AND IT IS AN
ABSURDITY...

FROST:

BUT IT WASN'T AN INVASION...

KISSINGER:

WELL, WHAT WOULD YOU CALL IT?

FROST:

I MEAN, AN UNWELCOME PRESENCE... IT WASN'T A
SUDDEN INVASION.

KISSINGER:

WELL, I...

FROST:

THE INVASION WAS OUR IN '70. BUT IT WAS AN
UNWELCOME PRESENCE.

KISSINGER:

NOW, JUST A MINUTE...

FROST:

IT WAS NOT A SUDDEN, A SUDDEN INVASION. YOU'RE
MAKING IT SOUND AS THOUGH IT WERE SUDDEN. IT
HAD BEEN THERE FOR FOUR YEARS AND, ROTTEN AS IT
WAS, WE HAD LIVED WITH IT.

KISSINGER:

WE LIVED WITH IT UNDER CONDITIONS, WHEN WE
WERE BUILDING UP OUR FORCES. WHEN WE WERE
BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM. OUR PROBLEM WAS THAT
WE WERE WITHDRAWING FORCES, THAT WE WERE NO
LONGER BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM AND NEVERTHELESS
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE LAUNCHING MASSIVE
ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AT A TIME WHEN WE COULD
NOT HAVE FORMULATED A POLICY YET, BECAUSE WE
WERE TOTALLY, BECAUSE WE WERE TOTALLY NEW IN
OFFICE. IF YOU, OF COURSE, DEFINE WHAT THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE DO AS AN UNWELCOME PRESENCE
WHILE IF WHAT WE DO IN RESPONSE IS AN INVASION,

16-16-16

THEN YOU ARE JUST COOKING YOUR QUESTIONS IN
SUCH A WAY THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ANSWER...

FROST:

...THAT IS NOT COOKING QUESTIONS AND I'M
NOT DOMESTIC ENOUGH TO DO COOKING. IT IS NOT
COOKING QUESTIONS TO SAY THAT PEOPLE HAVE BEEN
AROUND FOR FOUR YEARS AND TO CALL THAT A
SUDDEN...IMPLY THAT THAT'S A SUDDEN INVASION...
YOU DID THE COOKING, NOT ME.

KISSINGER:

IT MUST HAVE BEEN A SUDDEN...WHENEVER IT
STARTED...IT WAS...

FROST:

AND YOU WERE SAYING YOU WERE RESPONDING TO AN
INVASION. YOU WERE NOT RESPONDING TO AN
INVASION. THEY HAD BEEN THERE FOR FOUR YEARS.

KISSINGER:

OF COURSE THEY HAD. THEY HAD BEEN THERE FOR
FOUR YEARS UNDER THE CONDITIONS THAT I HAVE
DESCRIBED. OF COURSE THE RESPONSE THEN WOULD
HAVE A STARTING POINT AND THAT STARTING POINT
YOU CAN CALL SUDDEN...

FROST:

BUT I MEAN THE STARTING...THE STARTING POINT
YOU CALL SUDDEN AND IMPLIED IT WAS WHAT YOU
RESPONDED TO, WHEREAS IN THE BOOK YOU SAY YOU
WERE RESPONDING TO AN OVERALL MILITARY THREAT.
BUT THE INCIDENT OF THE...

KISSINGER:

OF COURSE WE WERE RESPONDING TO AN OVERALL
MILITARY THREAT IN WHICH THESE BASE AREAS
WERE AN INTEGRAL PART.

FROST:

AND YOU CHOSE THE SANCTUARIES RATHER THAN...
THAT YOU WERE RESPONDING TO A MILITARY THREAT
SOLELY FROM THE SANCTUARIES, BUT THE TARGET...

17-17-17

THERE'S TWO TARGETS. THE SECRECY OF THE BOMBING, BUT THE OTHER THING IS THAT IT STARTED THE PROCESS OF DESTABILIZING, YET FURTHER, CAMBODIA. IT DID PUSH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA. YOU SAY, IN YOUR BOOK, YOU DON'T THINK IT DID, YOU THINK THAT IF THEY MOVED ANYWHERE, THEY MOVED INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. BUT IF WE WERE ATTACKING THE SANCTUARIES... BECAUSE THIS WAS WHERE PEOPLE WERE HIDING, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE...

KISSINGER:

NO, THEY WERE NOT...

FROST:

HIDING FROM OUR TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

IT'S INSANE TO SAY: WHOOPEE, HERE'S A CHANCE TO GET INTO GREATER DANGER. I MEAN, THE LOGIC OF THE THING IS THAT THEY WOULD MOVE THE OTHER WAY.

KISSINGER:

BUT IT IS NOT AT ALL INSANE. THEY HAD THEIR SUPPLY DEPOTS IN THE CAMBODIAN AREA. IT WASN'T JUST THAT THEY WERE HIDING THERE, THEIR SUPPLIES WERE THERE. THEIR SUPPLIES WERE AIMED AT SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS ALSO...

IT DOESN'T MAKE MUCH SENSE TO SAY THEY WERE GOING TO MOVE THEIR SUPPLIES FURTHER AWAY FROM WHERE THEY WERE GOING TO USE IT. AFTER ALL, THEY ALSO HAD SUPPLY DEPOTS INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM. I HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY MOVED THEM ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

[LC]

18-18-18

FROST: I THINK THE IMPLICATION OF YOUR BOOK, OR
THE IMPLICATION...

KISSINGER: I SAID, IF THEY MOVE THEM, IT IS MORE LIKELY
THAT THEY MOVED THEM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

FROST: WELL, AS YOU KNOW, GENERAL ABRAMS' SWORN
TESTIMONY TO THE SENATE IN '73, HE CONFIRMED
THAT THEY BOMBING QUOTE: MADE IT ALMOST
INEVITABLE THEY WOULD HAVE TO EXPAND THEIR
AREA OF CONTROL OR OPERATIONS, THUS BRINGING
THEM INTO INCREASING CONFLICT WITH THE
CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES (UNQUOTE). NOW AGAIN,
ABRAMS IS ONE VOICE, BUT HE'S A FAIRLY
AUTHORITATIVE...I WOULD CONSIDER HIM AN
AUTHORITATIVE VOICE.

KISSINGER: WELL, I WOULD TAKE ABRAMS AUTHORITATIVE...
I WOULD CONSIDER HIM AN AUTHORITATIVE VOICE.

FROST: AND SO, THEN WE MOVE ON TO THE NEXT STAGE IN
THE UNFOLDING TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIA...WHICH...

KISSINGER: I WOULD ONLY SAY HE DIDN'T SAY THAT IN 1969
AND 1970, WHEN HE WAS RECOMMENDING IT.

FROST: HE DID NOT SAY IT THEN AND THAT...FAIR POINT...
BUT IT...HE SAID IT WHEN HE RECONSIDERED. I
GUESS HE HAD SECOND THOUGHTS.

KISSINGER: YES, BUT WE HAD TO ACT ON THE BASIS OF HIS
RECOMMENDATION IN '69, AND NOT ON THE BASIS
OF THE SECOND THOUGHTS IN '73.

FROST: NO, SECOND THOUGHTS ARE THE LUXURY OF PEOPLE
WHO JUDGE EVENTS BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY
WILL BE THE JUDGMENT OF HISTORY...WILL BE

[lc]

19-19-19

WHETHER PEOPLE WERE RIGHT OR WRONG AT THE TIME,
ADMITTING THAT IT'S NOT EASY TO BE RIGHT OR
EASY TO BE WRONG. BUT THE COMING ON TO THE
NEXT STEP...THE NEXT STEP YOU SAY IN THE BOOK,
THERE HAVE BEEN ALL SORTS OF ALLEGATIONS ABOUT
THE LON NOL COUP, BUT YOU SAY THAT IT TOOK US,
BOTH IN THE BOOK AND IN "THE ECONOMIST" YOU SAY
IT TOOK US COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE...THE LON
NOL...

KISSINGER:

THIS IS CORRECT.

FROST:

...THE LON NOL COUP. AND THAT THE CIA REPORT
THAT HAD BEEN CIRCULATING HAD NOT REACHED YOUR
DESK AT THAT TIME. IN FACT...

KISSINGER:

WELL, WHAT CIA REPORT THAT HAD BEEN CIRCULATING?

FROST:

WELL, THERE WAS A REPORT THAT GENERALLY BECAME
AVAILABLE ON THE DAY OF THE COUP AND, I MEAN
THERE'S NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT IT WAS SEEN
EARLIER. I MEAN, I ACCEPT THAT...

KISSINGER:

THERE WAS A REPORT THAT BECAME AVAILABLE ON
MARCH 18TH, OR THEREABOUTS, WHICH WAS DESCRIBING
A GENERAL SITUATION THAT HAD ALREADY STARTED
ON MARCH 11TH WITH RIOTS IN PHNOM PENH. THE
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO THE OVERTHROW
OF SIHANOUK WAS NOT WHAT HAPPENED ON MARCH 18TH
BUT WHAT HAPPENED ON MARCH 11TH.

FROST:

WELL, THE POINT THAT THIS REPORT WAS AVAILABLE
ON THE 18TH, AS I SAID. THE POINT THAT I DON'T
UNDERSTAND IS, AND I'M NOT SUBSCRIBING TO THE

20-20-20

[L]

AMERICAN COUP THEORY, BUT I DON'T UNDERSTAND
WHY IT WAS A SURPRISE AND THAT WE COULDN'T
HAVE BEEN BETTER PREPARED WHEN YOU...YOU
DIDN'T HAVE TO READ THE CIA REPORT, YOU ONLY
HAD TO READ "THE NEW YORK TIMES" OF MARCH THE
11TH, MARCH THE 12TH, MARCH THE 13TH, WHERE
THE PREDICTIONS WERE SPECIFIC, THE QUOTES
FROM SIHANOUK WERE SPECIFIC. NOW, I
KNOW YOUR OPINION OF "THE NEW YORK TIMES,"
BUT I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT WAS THE DUTY OF
SOMEBODY TO READ THE THING.

KISSINGER:
NOW, JUST A MINUTE. EVERYBODY KNEW, ON MARCH
11TH, THAT RIOTS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN PHNOM
PENH AND IN OTHER AREAS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE.
THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYBODY'S REGARD
FOR "THE NEW YORK TIMES," EVEN WHEN I DISAGREE
WITH ITS EDITORIAL POLICY ON SPECIFIC, ON
SPECIFIC ISSUES. SO...

FROST:
WELL, PUT IT THIS WAS...IT WASN'T A FAVORITE
JOURNAL OF THE WHITE HOUSE.

KISSINGER:
THAT HAS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING TO DO WITH IT...
THERE WAS NO DISPUTE, THERE WAS NO...

FROST:
IT WASN'T JUST A REPORT...THE POINT IS IT WASN'T
JUST A REPORT OF RIOTING IN THE STREETS AND
SO ON, IT WAS A PREDICTION FROM SIHANOUK THAT
A COUP D'ETAT IS POSSIBLE OR LIKELY. HE RAISED
THE POSSIBILITY THAT GENERAL LON NOL, COMMANDER OF
THE ARMED FORCES, MIGHT LEAD THE COUP..I MEAN, ON
MARCH 13TH, THAT WAS. I MEAN TO SAY THAT ALL...I
MEAN IT SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A SHOCK...

21-21-21

KISSINGER:

ON MARCH 11TH, THE RIOTS TOOK US BY SURPRISE. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED TO LON NOL'S SUCCESSION TO POWER TOOK US BY SURPRISE. THAT IS THE KEY ISSUE. AT FIRST I THOUGHT, AND I WROTE MEMORANDA TO THE PRESIDENT TO THAT EFFECT THAT THERE WAS EVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SIHANOUK HAD STAGED ALL OF THESE EVENTS BECAUSE HE HAD ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS GOING TO GO TO MOSCOW AND PEKING TO ASK THEM TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO REDUCE THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN HIS COUNTRY. THE RESULT, THEREFORE, AT THAT TIME, ALL THE MEETINGS WE HAD ABOUT THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA, CONCENTRATED MUCH MORE OF LAOS WHERE THERE WAS ALSO A NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE GOING ON THAN IN CAMBODIA.

WE THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT BE ONE OF THOSE BYZANTINE GAMES THAT SIHANOUK WAS PLAYING EVEN AFTER MARCH 18TH, AFTER SIHANOUK WAS DEPOSED, PRESIDENT NIXON HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE, I FORGET NOW ON WHAT DAY, TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTERWARDS, AND EVEN THERE HE STILL KEPT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SIHANOUK MIGHT, MIGHT RETURN. WE HAD ONLY SEVEN PERSONNEL IN OUR EMBASSY AT THE TIME. WE HAD NO CIA PERSONNEL, IN PHNOM PENH AND MAYBE OUR INFORMATION WAS INADEQUATE BUT THIS, THIS WAS OUR PERCEPTION AT THE TIME.

[LC]

22-22-22

FROST: BUT, BUT I MEAN THE NEW YORK TIMES COULD'VE...
KISSINGER: THE NEW YORK TIMES COULD HAVE TOLD US NOTHING THAT WE DID NOT KNOW. WE KNEW THERE WERE RIOTS GOING ON. WE THOUGHT THAT SIHANOUK MIGHT GO BACK TO PHNOM PENH FROM PARIS AND LATER ON I LEARNED THAT HE WAS, IN FACT, SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING GOING BACK TO PHNOM PENH FROM PARIS. HE SUDDENLY WENT TO MOSCOW. THAT SURPRISED US AS WELL. WHILE IN MOSCOW, HE WAS DEPOSED. I CANNOT BELIEVE HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO MOSCOW IF HE HAD EXPECTED TO BE DEPOSED.

FROST: BUT THE POINT IS THAT WE CONTINUED OUR RECOGNITION OF LON NOL THE NEXT DAY AND...

KISSINGER: SO DID THE U.N. AND SO DID OVER A HUNDRED GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION.

FROST: THE NEXT...MORNING?

KISSINGER: WELL THE NEXT DAY, I DON'T KNOW.

FROST: I DON'T, I DON'T THINK IT WAS THAT QUICK...

KISSINGER: IT WAS WITHIN A WEEK OR SO. BY EARLY APRIL.

FROST: BUT WITH US IT WAS WITHIN A DAY. YOU HAD A MIDNIGHT MEETING AND IT WAS THE NEXT DAY.

KISSINGER: WHAT DO YOU MEAN WE HAD...WHAT MIDNIGHT MEETING?

FROST: WELL, THERE WAS A MIDNIGHT MEETING OR, OR A LATE NIGHT MEETING OR WHATEVER TO DISCUSS IT ON THE NIGHT...

KISSINGER: THERE WAS CERTAINLY NOT A MIDNIGHT MEETING AND I DON'T, THERE WAS NO LATE NIGHT MEETING. I DON'T KNOW WHEN THE MEETING...WHETHER THERE... I DON'T REMEMBER WHETHER THERE WAS A MEETING

[Lc]

23-23-23

OR NOT. I DON'T EVEN RECALL EXACTLY WHAT
DAY WE RECOGNIZED LON NOL.

FROST: NEXT...DAY...

KISSINGER: WELL, SO DID EVERY OTHER GOVERNMENT...OR
PRACTICALLY EVERY OTHER GOVERNMENT.

FROST: I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE CASE. I THINK,
AS YOU SAID EARLIER, IT WAS WITHIN A WEEK...
BUT THE POINT IS...

KISSINGER: I'M NOT SAYING THEY DID IT WITHIN...THEY DID
IT THE NEXT DAY. I AM SAYING, THAT THE
UNITED NATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE OVER-
WHELMING MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES, RECOGNIZED
LON NOL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

FROST: OF COURSE THE SOVIET UNION DID BECAUSE THEY
WERE ANTI-CHINA, BUT, BUT THE...

KISSINGER: BUT AT THAT TIME IT WASN'T OBVIOUS WHETHER IT
WAS PRO OR ANTI CHINA.

FROST: BUT I THINK THE BASIC POINT, DR. KISSINGER,
IS THIS: THAT YOU SAY, AND WHAT YOU JUST SAID,
THAT FOR TEN OR IN <u>THE ECONOMIST</u> FOR TEN DAYS
OR SO YOU THOUGHT THIS WAS ALL A SIHANOUK PLOT.

KISSINGER: THAT'S CORRECT.

FROST: IN THE BOOK YOU ALSO SAY THAT WITHIN THREE OR
FOUR DAYS SIHANOUK HAD REMOVED YOUR ALTERNATIVE
OF SUPPORTING HIM BY ALLYING HIMSELF WITH
HOSTILE FORCES. BUT AS YOU SAID ON NBC,
SIHANOUK WAS ALWAYS, AT ROOT, A CAMBODIAN AND
THE THING IS, THAT IF WE HAD AND WHAT I AM
SUGGESTING, IS, THAT SIHANOUK, AS WE'VE SEEN,

[Lc]

24-24-24

WAS MORE FLEXIBLE THAN YOU ANTICIPATED.
IN ONE CASE YOU THOUGHT FOR TEN DAYS HE
MIGHT BE BACK, IN ANOTHER CASE, FOUR DAYS
RUINED OUR ALTERNATIVES, THAT IN FACT WE
MADE THE SECOND BIG MISTAKE BY BACKING
LON NOL, RATHER THAN TRYING TO GET SIHANOUK
BACK BECAUSE IT LED INEVITABLY TO WHAT
HAPPENED A YEAR LATER, RATHER THAN THIS,
ADMITTED, I KNOW, I KNOW IT WAS FLAWED
NEUTRALITY. I KNOW SIHANOUK RULE WOULD
HAVE NOT BEEN RENAMED AND WOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN CLOSED TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SO
ON...BUT HISTORY WILL SHOW THAT THIS WAS...
YOU WERE ON THE RECORD, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER
ON THE RECORD IS THE CORRECT REMARK FOR CON-
VERSATION WITH MANY MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF,
AS, AS, AS THINKING OF LON NOL AS AN INCOMPETENT...

KISSINGER: I HAD NO OPINION OF LON NOL...AT THAT TIME.

FROST: WELL, MANY PEOPLE HAVE QUOTED YOU AS SAYING
YOU REGARDED HIM VERY SOON, AS A JOKE.

KISSINGER: AT THAT TIME I HAD PRACTICALLY NO OPINION ABOUT
LON NOL BECAUSE I DIDN'T...I KNEW NEXT TO
NOTHING ABOUT HIM.

FROST: BUT LON NOL CAME TO POWER AND THEN IT JUST LEAD
A FEW WEEKS LATER, THE NEXT STEP WAS THE INVASION.
NOW IN YOUR BOOK.

[lc]

25-25-25

KISSINGER:

NOW JUST A MINUTE, I THINK WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,
YOUR WHOLE LINE OF QUESTIONING IS MAKING A
MOCKERY OF WHAT WAS GOING ON IN INDOCHINA.
YOU ARE CONCENTRATING ON ONE COUNTRY. YOU
ARE NOT DISCUSSING WHAT WAS GOING ON IN
VIETNAM AT ALL. YOU ARE NOT DISCUSSING THE
CONSTANT PEACE OVERTURES THAT WERE BEING MADE.

FROST:

I'M PREPARED TO DISCUSS THOSE.

KISSINGER:

YOU ARE ACCEPTING ONE PARTICULAR THEORY OF ONE
PARTICULAR...OF A GROUP OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW
CONCENTRATING ON CAMBODIA BECAUSE THE OUTCOME
IN VIETNAM DID NOT FULFILL ALL OF THEIR
PREDICATIONS. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS NOT
AS YOU DESCRIBED IT. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
WAS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BROKE OUT OF THEIR
SANCTUARIES AFTER LON NOL HAD OVERTHROWN
SIHANOUK WITHOUT OUR HELP, WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE,
AND WITHOUT OUR ENCOURAGEMENT THAT FOR FIVE
WEEKS WE DID NOTHING.

FROST:

BUT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DID A HELL OF A LOT
WHICH YOU DON'T QUOTE IN YOUR BOOK. I MEAN
THERE IS AN ENORMOUS LIST OF THINGS THEY DID.

KISSINGER:

LIKE WHAT?

FROST:

WELL I MEAN THE LIST GOES ON FOR TWO PAGES.
I MEAN.

KISSINGER:

YES, BUT THE QUESTION IS WHO PREPARED THE LIST?

FROST:

PARDON?

[LC]

26-26-26

KISSINGER: THE QUESTION IS WHO PREPARED THE LIST?

FROST: I DID. LIKE YOU PREPARED THE LIST IN YOUR BOOK. THE LIST IN YOUR BOOK OF THINGS THAT WENT ON BEFORE THE INVASION. A LOT OF THE THINGS, MOST OF THE THINGS NIXON COULDN'T QUOTE WHEN HE ANNOUNCED THE INVASION. HALF OF THEM HE COULDN'T QUOTE ON JUNE THE 30TH. AND...

KISSINGER: LIKE WHAT?

FROST: WELL, IF YOU GO THROUGH THE BOOK. AND I THINK THIS IS VERY DETAILED. BUT I MEAN ON JUNE THE 30TH HE DIDN'T MENTION HUNG LOI. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE TWO BRIDGES AT SVAY RIENG.

KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW...

FROST: WELL, THEY'RE IN YOUR BOOK

HE DIDN'T MENTION THE SEVERAL CAMBODIAN POSTS NEAR SENMONOROM. HE DID NOT MENTION THE CAMBODIAN BATA LLION ARMY BADLY MAULED IN THE WEST BANK OF THE MEKONG. HE DID NOT MENTION ENEMY FORCES UNSUCCESSFULLY ATTACKING SNUOL NOL KRATII PROVINCE. HE DIDN'T MENTION THE COMMUNIST FORCES STRIKING THE TOWN OF TAKEO.

I MEAN HE DIDN'T MENTION THE RAIL LINE LEADING SOUTH FROM PHNOM PENH WAS CUT AT SEVERAL POINTS IN TAKEO PROVINCE, AND SO ON.

WHAT I...

KISSINGER: IN OTHER WORDS YOU ARE SAYING THESE INCIDENTS WERE NOT TRUE.

[Lc]

27-27-27

FROST: NO, WHAT I AM SAYING IS IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE OUTRAGE OF THE WORLD ABOUT CAMBODIA CAME TO LIGHT THAT THESE EVENTS WERE RESEARCHED.

KISSINGER: NO THESE EVENTS

FROST: BECAUSE WE KNOW, I MEAN IT'S COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE BOOK OF THE MONTH CLUB WENT BESERK. THAT YOU HAD TO RE-WRITE THE SECTIONS, THE CAMBODIAN SECTIONS.

KISSINGER: THAT JUST ISN'T TRUE.

FROST: WELL THEY SAY THAT THEY HAD TO RESEARCH. IS THAT ABSOLUTELY NOT TRUE. THAT YOU DID NOT ESPECIALLY WRITE AND ADD TO REBUTT SHAWCROSS?

KISSINGER: I ADDED TO THE BOOK ITSELF ONE PARAGRAPH AND I ADDED ONE OR TWO FOOTNOTES. THE BASIC TEXT WHICH CAN EASILY BE RESEARCHED OF WHAT IS IN MY BOOK WAS COMPLETED 99 PER CENT BEFORE THE THERE WAS ANY...

FROST: YES, THE THESIS...

KISSINGER: THERE WAS NO... TO SPEAK OF AN OUTRAGE OF THE WORLD IS SIMPLY MAKING A MOCKERY OF WHAT HAS GONE ON IN CAMBODIA. EVERYTHING THAT I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WRITE A BOOK THAT WILL STAND HISTORICAL SCRUTINY. I HAVE WRITTEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS THAT WERE AVAILABLE TO ME AT THE TIME AND ON THE BASIS OF WHICH WE ACTED. I HAVE NO INTEREST IN WRITING A HISTORICAL... A DEBATE WITH A JOURNALIST AND LOOKING FOR

[Lc]

28-28-28

DOCUMENTS AFTER...IN ORDER TO REBUT A JOURNALIST. I HAVE WRITTEN FROM THE DOCUMENTS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH WE ACTED, OF WHICH WE WERE CONSCIOUS AT THE TIME AND WHICH WERE THE REASONS FOR THE DECISIONS THAT WERE TAKEN. WHETHER PRESIDENT NIXON IN A DOCUMENT LISTED EVERY SINGLE EVENT OR NOT IS REALLY...THAT WOULD HAVE GONE INTO A DEGREE OF DETAIL THAT WAS AT THAT TIME NO NECESSARY.

FROST:

WHEN YOU SAY IN THE BOOK, YOU REFER TO THE BOOK, THAT QUOTE: NIXON IN HIS APRIL THE 30TH INVASION SPEECH ADDED A SENTENCE THAT WAS AS IRRELEVANT TO HIS CENTRAL THESIS AS IT WAS UNTRUE. THAT WE HAD HERETOFORE NOT MOVED AGAINST THE SANCTUARIES OVERLOOKING THE SECRET BOMBING.

KISSINGER:

THAT STATEMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE.

FROST:

WHY DID HE MAKE IT?

KISSINGER:

BECAUSE HE WAS GIVEN TO HYPERBOLE.

FROST:

WHY DID YOU MAKE THE SAME STATEMENT IN YOUR BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO THE PRESS ON THE SAME DAY?

KISSINGER:

BECAUSE I SUPPOSE WE DID NOT HAVE...TO US THIS BOMBING OF THE SANCTUARIES HAD BECOME SO MUCH PART OF THE LANDSCAPE THAT WE DID NOT REALLY FOCUS ON THAT BUT THAT WAS NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT.

29-29-29

FROST:

AND CAUSE IT ALSO NIXON SAID IT AGAIN ON
JUNE THE 30TH. THE IMMUNITY OF THE CAMBODIAN
SANCTUARY HAD BEEN A SERIOUS MILITARY HANDICAP
FOR US FOR MANY YEARS BUT WE HAD REFRAINED
FROM MOVING AGAINST THEM IN ORDER TO CONTAIN
THE CONFLICT AND HE WENT ON ABOUT PRESERVING...

KISSINGER:

THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC

FROST:

AND THEN HE DID IT AGAIN IN THE STATE OF THE
WORLD MESSAGE WHICH I THINK YOU WERE INVOLVED
IN FEBRUARY 25, 1971.

KISSINGER:

IT DOES NOT CHANGE THE BASIC PROPOSITION THAT
I'M MAKING THAT IT WAS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
WHO FIRST ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES IN CAMBODIA.
THAT IT WAS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO BROKE
OUT OF THE SANCTUARIES IN 1970 AND CUT
COMMUNICATIONS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY AND TRIED
TO ISOLATE PHNOM PENH AND SO THAT IT WAS OUR
PERCEPTION THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A COLLAPSE OF
THE GOVERNMENT THAT WAS AFTER ALL RECOGNIZED
BY THE UN BY MOST OF THE OTHERS TURNING ALL
OF CAMBODIA INTO ONE BIG BASE AREA AT A TIME
WHEN WE WERE WITHDRAWING HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS
OF TROOPS, FROM VIETNAM AND IT IS AFTER ALL
VIETNAM THAT HAS OCCUPIED CAMBODIA AFTER THERE
WERE NO AMERICANS THERE.

[lc]

30-30-30

FROST:

WELL, NO, THE THING IS THAT I MEAN THAT THE
SECRECY OF THE BOMBING LEADING NIXON AND
YOURSELF TO UNTRUE STATEMENTS IS AN EXAMPLE
OF SOMETHING THAT STARTED IN A SMALL WAY AND
OBVIOUSLY, OBVIOUSLY ESCALATED. AS WE KNOW
YOUR STAFF COULDN'T PROVE THAT PHNOM PENH WAS
REALLY IN DANGER PRIOR TO THE INVASION. BUT
I SUPPOSE...

KISSINGER:

WHAT DO YOU MEAN MY STAFF COULD NOT PROVE?

FROST:

ALL OF YOUR STAFF THAT WE HAVE SPOKEN TO SAY
THAT THEY COULD NOT FIND EVIDENCE TO BACK UP
THE CALIM THAT PHNOM PENH WAS IN IMMINENT
DANGER PRIOR TO THE INVASION.

KISSINGER:

I DON'T KNOW THAT YOU MEAN BY ALL OF MY STAFF,
BUT YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN SPEAKING TO...

FROST:

FOUR OR FIVE

KISSINGER:

THE, WELL, YOU KNOW AS WELL AS I DO THAT THERE
ARE A NUMBER OF MY STAFF MEMBERS WHO RESIGNED
IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY
TAKEN CERTAIN POSITIONS SINCE THEN. THE
EVENTS THAT I HAVE MENTIONED AND THE FACTS
THAT I HAVE MENTIONED WERE THE FACTS ON THE
BASIS ON WHICH WE ACTED. AND THEIR PURPOSE
WAS TO ENABLE THE U.S. TO WITHDRAW FROM
VIETNAM UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE WOULD NOT
BE FORCED TO OVERTHROW A GOVERNMENT AND TO TURN
OVER TO COMMUNIST RULE PEOPLE WHO HAD RELIED
ON US. AND COMMITMENTS MADE BY A PREVIOUS
ADMINISTRATION AND NOT BY OUR ADMINISTRATION, IT

[Lc]

31-31-31

WOULD HAVE BEEN AN EASY MATTER SIMPLY TO DUMP
EVERYTHING ON OUR PREDECESSORS.

THAT WAS THE KEY PROBLEM.

FROST:
LET ME TRY AND SUM UP THE SUBJECT. AFTER THE
INVASION THE HUGELY AMBITIOUS MILITARY PROGRAM
TOOK PLACE.

KISSINGER:
THAT IS ALSO NONSENSE.

FROST:
IN CAMBODIA, 35,000 TO 200,000 WAS PRETTY
AMBITIOUS.

KISSINGER:
PRETTY AMBITIOUS, BUT THE POINT IS...

FROST:
YOU SAID ORIGINALLY

KISSINGER:
THE CONGRESS LIMITED THE TOTAL AMERICAN AID
TO CAMBODIA TO SOMETHING LIKE $200 OR $250
MILLION WHICH WAS A SMALL FRACTION OF WHAT...

FROST:
WELL, THEY ARE NOT OUR TROOPS. I'M SAYING...

KISSINGER:
THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE WE COULD GIVE
WITHIN THE CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS WAS RELATIVELY
FINITE AND IN ADDITION THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN
ADVISERS...WE WERE NOT PERMITTED TO HAVE ANY
ADVISERS THERE. SO THAT THE ABILITY TO EITHER
MONITOR THIS OR TO TRAIN THESE PEOPLE PROPERLY
ALSO DIDN'T EXIST.

FROST:
WELL BASICALLY THOUGHT THAT DOESN'T AFFECT THE
FACT THAT FROM 35,000 TO 200,000 IN CAMBODIA
LED TO HOPELESSLY INEXPERIENCED OFFICERS.
TWELVE YEAR OLD TROOPS DOCUMENTED BY THE
AUSTRALIANS, $750,000 A MONTH DOCUMENTED BY
THE GAO FOR NON-EXISTENT SO-CALLED PHANTOM
SOLDIERS, THE MASSIVE BOMBING CAMPAIGN ACCORDING

[lc]

32-32-32

TO THE SENATE REFUGEE COMMITTEE LED THAT THE PEOPLE WHO FLED UP UNTIL 1974 CITED FIRST OF ALL THE AMERICAN BOMBING AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BOMBING AND SO ON. WHAT I HAVE IS A PICTURE OF A POLICY OUT OF CONTROL, I AM NOT SUGGESTING FOR ONE SECOND, THAT YOU DID NOT HAVE A GREAT MANY OTHER IMPERATIVES. BUT I AM SUGGESTING THAT THE POLICY WAS OUT OF CONTROL.

KISSINGER:

NO, WHAT YOU HAVE IS THE ONE-SIDED DOCUMENTATION OF PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW USING CAMBODIA AS AN ALIBI FOR A GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDOCHINA, WHAT YOU HAVE IS A TOTALLY ONE-SIDED AND MISLEADING PRESENTATION OF EVENTS.

FROST:

OKAY, WELL, I THINK THAT'S NONSENSE. BUT LET ME QUOTE TWO QUOTES. LET'S NOT JUST STAY WITH, LET'S FIRST OF ALL QUOTE THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN ITS PUREST FORM. NIXON'S OWN QUOTE: THE BEST INVESTMENT THE U.S. HAS MADE IN MY LIFETIME THE CAMBODIANS ARE PEOPLE OF SEVEN MILLION ONLY NUTRALIST PREVIOUSLY UNTRAINED (NIGHTMARE WORD) UNTRAINED AT TYING DOWN 40,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS UNQUOTE.

CERTAINLY WORTH TYING DOWN 40,000 REGULARS, IF TRUE, BUT TO SACRIFICE A NATION OF SEVEN MILLION, THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS IS QUESTIONABLE TO SAY THE LEAST.

[LC]

33-33-33

KISSINGER:
WE HAD OFFERED TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE NEUTRALIZATION OF CAMBODIA. THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED. WE HAD OFFERED AN IMMEDIATE DEESCALATION OF THE WAR. THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED. WE HAD OFFERED CEASEFIRES ALL OVER INDOCHINA. THAT HAD BEEN REJECTED. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE CONDUCTING AND SUPPORTING THE OPERATIONS AND WERE SUPPORTING THE KHMER ROUGE, THE ALTERNATIVE WAS THE COMPLETE TAKEOVER OF CAMBODIA BY THE COMMUNISTS AND THE...

FROST: WHEN?

KISSINGER: '70, '71

FROST: NOT THE SAME COMMUNISTS, NOT THOSE GENOCIDAL, CRAZY, LUNATICS.

KISSINGER: THERE WERE NO OTHER COMMUNIST LEADERS AT THAT TIME.

FROST: THE KHMER ROUGE WAS 4,000. IT COULD NEVER HAVE TAKEN CAMBODIA, IN 1970.

KISSINGER: IT COULD HAVE TAKEN IT OVER WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE HELP.

FROST: THERE WAS NO COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO WE ARE TALKING ABOUT UNTIL THE INVASION. THE KHMER ROUGE WERE ALMOST PARIAHS IN '70. THAT'S WHAT I AM SAYING, THAT AMERICAN POLICY CREATED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE KHMER ROUGE TO SIEZE POWER.

[Lc]

34-34-34

KISSINGER:

NO, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT INDOCHINA. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT CAMBODIA BECAUSE THIS HAPPENS TO BE THE MOST CONVENIENT ISSUE NOW ON WHICH TO HANG THE DEBATE. YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS INTO CAMBODIA. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THESE ATTACKS. YOU ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE INSISTING THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN PHNOM PENH HAD TO BE OVERTHROWN AS A CONDITION FOR ANY CONVERSATIONS IN CAMBODIA AS WAS THEIR CONDITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AGAIN, YOU ARE ONLY TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICAN ATTEMPT NOT TO TURN OVER A COUNTRY TO COMMUNIST RULE. WE DID NOT KNOW AT THE TIME,

FROST:

BUT

KISSINGER:

PLEASE LET ME FINISH. WE DID NOT KNOW AT THAT TIME THAT THE KHMER ROUGE WERE GENOCIDAL MURDERS. THIS WENT BEYOND OUR IMAGINATION.

FROST:

NOR DID THEY HAVE THE POWER, THANK GOD, IN 1970 TO BE GENOCIDAL MURDERS BECAUSE THERE WERE 4,000 OF THEM. THEY HAD THE POWER IN '75 WHEN BY A SERIES OF MISTAKES, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT VILLAINY NOW, I'M MERELY TALKING ABOUT MISTAKES, BY A SERIES OF MISTAKES WE HAD ALLOWED A SITUATION TO EMERGE IN WHICH THESE BASTARDS, AND THAT WORD WILL DEFINITELY BE BLEEPED, COULD SIEZE POWER WHICH THEY COULD NOT HAVE DONE IN '70.

[Lc]

35-35-35

KISSINGER:
THEY HAD THE POWER IN 1975 BECAUSE AFTER 1970
THERE WAS A CONSISTENT ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF AND
TO LIMIT AID TO CAMBODIA AND THERE WAS AN
ACTUAL CUTOFF OF AID THEN IN 1975. THAT IS
WHY THEY HAD THE POWER TO DO SO.

FROST:
NO, THE REASON THEY HAD THE POWER TO DO SO WAS
AS SIHANOUK SAID LAST WEEK, THAT THEY COULD
HAVE BEEN PREVENTED, MAYBE, BY, IF THE USA
WITH WHICH I DECIDED TO HAVE A RECONCILIATION
IN '69. I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PREVENT
BOTH VIETNAMESE AND KHMER ROUGE COMMUNISM.
WELL, MAYBE. BUT THE POINT IS THAT THE REASON
I AM DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT IS NOT BECAUSE
VIETNAM IS MORE DIFFICULT, BUT THAT VIETNAM...
AND I ABSOLUTELY SYMPATHIZE WITH YOU... WAS A
PROBLEM YOU INHERITED...

KISSINGER:
NO, BUT, WE HAVE NOW SPENT ALL OF OUR TIME
ON CAMBODIA. WE HAVE SPENT NO TIME ON THE
VARIOUS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

FROST:
WELL, I'M HAPPY TO TALK ABOUT THOSE.

KISSINGER:
BUT WE HAVE TO DO THAT ON SOME OTHER DAY. WE
CANNOT DO THAT NOW.

FROST:
YES. THE LAST QUESTION ON CAMBODIA IS THIS ONE.
WHICH IS THAT WHAT I AM SAYING, LET ME UNDERLINE
AGAIN, I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT YOU WERE NOT
INHUMANLY BUSY, I'M NOT SUGGESTING THAT YOUR
MAIN CONCENTRATION... INDEED, I THINK IT WAS ONE
OF THE REASONS... WAS ON SOUTH VIETNAM.

KISSINGER:
MR. FROST...

36-36-36

FROST:

BUT, I'M MERELY SAYING...

KISSINGER:

MR. FROST...

FROST:

NOW, NOW, NOW, PLEASE LET ME FINISH. THE THING IS THAT WHEN THE CAMBODIAN SECTIONS OF YOUR BOOK ARE EXAMINED, PEOPLE WILL SAY THIS IS THE REVERSE OF THE FORSYTHE SAGE, IT'S THE HINDSIGHT SAGA, THAT IN FACT THE AMERICANS, NOT THROUGH VILLAINY BUT THROUGH NEGLIGENCE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAPPENED--NOT SOLELY RESPONSIBLE--NOT SOLELY RESPONSIBLE--

FOR WHAT HAPPENED IN CAMBODIA, BECAUSE AND THIS IS WHY WE'RE DISCUSSING IT, AMERICA WAS NOT IN CAMBODIA UNTIL YOUR ADMINISTRATION. WELL, NIXON'S ADMINISTRATION. AND SINCE YOU CLAIM, TOTALLY FALSELY, THAT I AM QUOTING SOLELY FROM WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, WHEN I AM QUOTING FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND NIXON...LET ME QUOTE FROM EMERY SQANK, PUBLICLY, YOUR AMBASSADOR, WHO SAID, AS HE WAS LEAVING CAMBODIA, THAT THIS WAS AMERICA'S MOST POINTLESS, MOST USELESS WAR; HE ALSO SAID THAT LON NOL WAS INEPT, AND HE SAID IT WAS THE MOST POINTLESS AND USELESS WAR, IT HAD LOST ITS POINT, AND WHAT I AM SUGGESTING TO YOU IS THAT HISTORY'S JUDGMENT OF EVENTS IN CAMBODIA--AND WHAT WE SEE TODAY IS THE AFTERMATH-- BUT WILL BE THAT THE NIXON-KISSINGER REGIME WAS GUILTY, NOT OF GENOCIDE, BUT OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN THE DECISIONS THEY TOOK.

37-37-37

KISSINGER: WELL, I THINK THAT IS TOTALLY INCORRECT. I THINK WE INHERITED A TRAGEDY. WE ATTEMPTED TO, AND SUCCEEDED IN, EXTRICATING AMERICA WITH AMERICA WITH HONOR FROM THIS TRAGEDY, THAT WE FACED A DOMESTIC SITUATION IN WHICH THOSE WHO WANTED TO END THE WAR HONORABLY AND THOSE WHO IDENTIFIED HONOR WITH THE MOST RAPID TERMINATION OF THE WAR ON ALMOST ANY TERMS, MANAGED TO PARALYZE EACH OTHER; SO AS A RESULT NOTHING COULD BE CARRIED TO ITS CONCLUSION.

FROST: BUT WHAT ABOUT CAMBODIA?

KISSINGER: I'M TALKING ABOUT CAMBODIA.

FROST: YOU DIDN'T INHERIT A TRAGEDY. YOU INHERITED AN UNWELCOME SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. NOT A TRAGEDY.

KISSINGER: YOU ARE ASSUMING THAT THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA COULD BE TOTALLY ISOLATED FROM THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM. WE COULD NOT BOTH WITHDRAW, WITHSTAND NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVES, AND PERMIT THE COMMUNISTS TO ACT IN CAMBODIA WITH TOTAL IMPUNITY...WHICH THEY HAD OCCUPIED BEFORE WE DID ANYTHING.

FROST: BUT THE PREVIOUS REGIME HAD MANAGED, FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, TO ISOLATE CAMBODIA...

KISSINGER: THE PREVIOUS REGIME...

FROST: WE EMBROILED CAMBODIA...

KISSINGER: THE PREVIOUS...

FROST: WE ENGULFED CAMBODIA.