House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates. Weekly Hansard, No. 408, 13th Dec. - 20th Dec. 1957. London: H.M.S.O., 1957.

Thursday, December 19, 1957. Oral Answers. Nuclear Weapons. P.609.

Mr. Rankin: Is the Lord Privy Seal Mr. R. A. Butler telling us that he is not aware that according to the Press it has been decided to establish nuclear weapons bases in this country, four of them in Scotland? If that is the case, can he say whether the control and custody of the warheads of those missiles have to remain in the hands of the United States Government? Does he not regard that as an affront to this country? Are we now to become a Magi-not Line for the defence of the United States of America, even assuming that defence is possible?...

Friday, December 20, 1957. Foreign Affairs. P. 793.

Mr. Martin Maddan (Hitchin): ...I have heard it seriously suggested that we should be better off if we became the forty-ninth member State of the United States, because we should then at least elect two Senators and a number of Congressmen to the legislative authority of the United States, and in that way we should have some direct say in the choice of the people who would make these decisions. In this middle part of the twentieth century there must be a most fundamental change in the way in which nations in general, and alliances in particular, conduct themselves....

Ibid, p. 806.

Viscount Hinchingbrooke (Dorset, South): ...There is another aspect of the matter. Hitherto I have always thought that the principle of an Alliance was that it gave greater protection to ourselves, that it was a mutual arrangement because the nations who came in also thought that they were getting greater protection for themselves. On this occasion with these rockets, we are clearly inviting the risk of attack in some way, and we are giving a one-sided protection to the United States....

Ibid, p. 845.

Mr. George Brown (Belper): ...Therefore, I re-echo very deliberately what my right hon. Friend [Bevan?] said. We are not

"Comment," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, Thursday, January 23, 1958, p. 8.

"...A set of answers, with no claims to being the best, is offered here. It is, first, that Britain cannot at present renounce nuclear weapons, because to do so would aggravate the insecurity and risks in Europe. But, secondly, the Government and Mr. Bevan seem to have taken a wrong track in supposing that a separate British deterrent force will have a restraining influence on both the Russians and the Americans. We ought to stop that effort, because it does not add to our safety and because there are better things to do with our money. Thirdly, Britain ought not to accept new missile bases, because by the time they are ready they will be of little military value. The missiles should be sea-based...."

"Report of the 56th Annual Conference of the Labour Party,
Brighton, 1957," London, Transport House, 1957, p. 181.

Wednesday, October 2, General Debate on Disarmament and Foreign Affairs.

Rt. Hon. Aneurin Bevan, M.P. (National Executive Committee): "...But if you carry this resolution and follow out all its implications and do not run away from it you will send a British Foreign Secretary, whoever he may be, naked into the conference chamber...."

"How to get along with Bevan: Change most U.S. policies," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, November 22, 1957, pp. 118-119.

"Discussing Communism's plans for world conquest, for example, Mr. Bevan said this to the Economic Club of New York on October 28:

"I have found nothing at all where I have been, in China and Russia, to suggest this, that their leaders are now nurturing the idea of world revolution, because they themselves know that any attempt to push the frontiers of world revolution by aggressive acts would bring about such retaliation that such systems would be overwhelmed.

"In other words, the old, classical Communist idea that revolution supervenes upon war, no longer holds good when war itself would be the end of all political systems."

"In a press conference at Los Angeles on November 7, Mr. Bevan had this to say about Khrushchev, whom he talked to in Moscow earlier this year:

"His new strength and self-confidence increase the chance of world peace."

"In his Economic Club speech, the would-be Foreign Secretary described Khrushchev in these words:

"I think that on the whole he is a man that you could get on terms with. I believe that he is a practical-minded Communist who is not prepared to sacrifice the work of his country for any ideological adventures."

Manchester Guardian Weekly
Dec. 26, 1939

IF MISSILE BASES in Britain will add to Western security they ought to be accepted. But what they? It is highly doubtful. The four bases on the East Coast—or however many it turns out to be—will be placed in fixed sites. Their locations will be well known. That is unavoidable because of the disturbance their construction will cause, and because they will be easily detected by air photography. They will take three or four years to build (and if anyone says otherwise let him think of how long it has taken to fail to build most of the South Uist rocket range). By then the Russian armed forces will be well equipped with medium and long range missiles of their own, probably in large numbers. Since the initiative in any offensive action is bound to lie with them they will be able to destroy instantly any known base in Britain. They would have difficulty in doing so only if there were so many bases, not only in Britain and the United States but also at numerous other points of the compass, that they could not deal with them simultaneously. Of that there is no early prospect. The missile stations in England and Scotland will be openly vulnerable. What good, then, will they do? They will add less to the deterrent than obsolescent bombers, which at least can achieve some immunity from surprise destruction by staying in the air. About the practice of keeping a number of bombers aloft, armed with hydrogen bombs, people can have understandable qualms. But those aircraft do add to Western security simply because they cannot be destroyed without warning. In three or five or seven years' time they will remain more valuable than the missile bases that are now to be built in Britain. Mr Macmillan and Mr Eisenhower, with their Defence Ministers, should think again. To build these bases seems a senseless waste—and in all probability they will be abandoned as soon as they are finished. The next military step ought not to be towards fixed land bases but to submarines. They can move and are hard to detect.

(see next page)

(10)

Whether Britain should share in
the submarine effort is another
question. Mr Macmillan in Paris
appears to have answered it
negatively. In accepting the
principle that not every country
should try to contribute in every
military field, he has proposed for
the Royal Navy primarily an anti-
submarine rôle. To the United
States, it seems, will be left the
task of developing missile-bearing
submarines. That may be the logical
outcome of the advance which the
Americans have already made.
They and the Russians may be alone
in working on these latest weapons.
Conceivably the British and others
in the Atlantic alliance could have
contributed, if there had been
a genuine pooling of research,
development, and production. But
for years it has been denied by
American law in nuclear weapon
development, and in non-nuclear
research and production it has been
sought only limply. After the visits
of Mr Macmillan and Mr Sandys to
Bermuda and Washington earlier
this year there was talk of a fuller
sharing—as there has been from
time to time in the past—but little
appears to have come of it. Now
we are told that, as a result of the
Paris meeting, there are to be
"further measures" to promote
co-ordination and avoid duplica-
tion. If the effort in missile-
bearing submarines is being left
to the Americans alone, these
measures cannot be of the first

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

PHILIP W. QUIGG
ASSISTANT EDITOR

58 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

CABLE ADDRESS: FOR AFFAIRS, NEW YORK

February 5, 1958

by special delivery

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Littauer 127
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I hope the enclosed is of some help to you. I believe
it contains everything you asked for except some comment
from the Continent comparable to the New Statesman quote I
showed you at lunch. It may be that we don't have the pro-
per sources here, but of course reactions to the NATO meet-
ing were quite different in France and Germany from those
in England. We have only the weekly Le Monde here, and it
contains very little direct quotation. But the predominant
feeling in France after the NATO meeting was one of relief
that they had not been left out in the cold.

Ham and I are of course delighted that you are going
to show us a manuscript. I've just been reminded that next
Wednesday is a holiday for us and, though I'd be perfectly
happy to come in to see you that day, it occurs to me that
if you could let me have the manuscript late Tuesday after-
noon, I could then have the holiday to study it and then
perhaps we could get together Thursday morning.

Thanks for giving this job a whirl, Henry.

"Britain's Suicide Pact," New Statesman: The Week-End Review, January 4, 1958, p. 1.

"Yet the missile agreement is one of the most extraordinary and complete surrenders of sovereignty ever to be made by one country for the exclusive benefit of another. For the missiles are not intended to defend Britain; on the contrary, they decisively increase its vulnerability. Their prime purpose is to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet ICBM onslaught on America during the crucial three-year period which must elapse before America possesses ICBMs herself. The sole beneficiary will be America."

"The Gaither Report has revealed that, irrespective of any efforts which America may now make, the Soviet preponderance in advanced weapons has now reached such an absolute stage that America's national survival will depend, until 1961 at least, on 'Russian benevolence.'"

until 1961 at least, on 'Russian penevolence.'"

refuse stage that America's national survival will depend,
bondersance in advanced weapons has now reached such an ap-
of any efforts which America may now make, the Soviet pre-
"The Cather Report has revealed that, irrespective

herewith. The sole beneficiary will be America."

period which must elapse before America possesses ICBMs
ICBMohlant on America during the crucial three-year
Their prime purpose is to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet
the contrary, they dectively increase its vulnerability.
For the missiles are not intended to defend Britain; on
made by one country for the exclusive benefit of another.
ordinary and complete surrenders of sovereignty ever to be
"Yet the missile agreement is one of the most extra-

January 4, 1958, p. I.
"Britain's Suicide Pact," *New Statesman*, *The Week-End Review*.

["12", "L", "THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1957.", "Arnold\nconstable\nFIFTH AVENUE AT 40TH, N. Y. 16\n\nnew York store open thursdays 10 to 9 p.m.\ndaily, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.\ntown & country specialty...", "17.98", "COMPLETE", "the sheer wooly costume... a beautiful", "softly softened sheath, a blouson jacket, together-\ngood fashion at any hour! and just see how the wool\ndress moves towards evening this season... in black\nor royal, sizes 10 to 18 * belt by stelzer,", "STYLED BY WESTBURY.", "arnold constable town and country shop, third floor", "ALSO HEMPSTEAD • NEW HOBCHEL • MANHASSET", "HACKENSACK • TRENTON • NEW BRUNSWICH", "Fifth Avenue Shops Open Tonight Until 8:30", "Smart example of the\nself-held suit collar club called\nwith half-moon yoke detail.\nMulti-fed neck turned\nA Cola bus Day Special\nat 4995", "Columbus Day Suit Specialists", "Imported\nBritish Tweeds", "Regularly 6995 and 7595", "4995 and 5595", "On Sale Thursday—\nFriday—Saturday Only!", "Discovery of the year... an opportunity to save\n$20 right at the start of the season! Important\nnew suits in an exciting selection of famous\ntweeds from England, tailored to Peck and Peck's\nexisting standards. 10-16 in a wide range of styles\nand colours. Don't miss this special 3-day event", "At our Fifth Avenue stores only", "U.S. TO URGE PACT\nON 'MOONS' AT U. N.", "Proposal Today Will Seek\nPeaceful Assurances\nWithin Arms Accord", "By THOMAS J. HAMILTON", "The United Nations, N.Y. Oct. 9—The United Nations tomorrow will approve a disarming program moving across the space are used solely for peace—Henry Cabot Lodge of the United States will be the first speaker in the General Assembly. The British Parliament, led by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, will be represented by representatives of Japan and the Soviet Union.", "It was announced tonight that Liem, Gen. Antoliu Arkadyev, of the Soviet Union, will listen to the Soviet government, and the Soviet regime, of the Soviet republic.", "Two other Soviet representatives, Dr. S. M. Polushkov and Dr. A. M. Kozlov, will be with them. All three came to the United States to participate of rocket specialists in Washington, held in the International Geophysical Year.", "The Soviet scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government.", "The U.S. scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government. The U.S. scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government.", "The U.S. scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government.", "The offer, made by Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Soviet Secretary of the Soviet Communist party, in an interview with the New York Times, proved to be part of a general agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.", "Arms Move Delayed\nThe delay in a long-\ndelayed United States disar-\nrest which had been\nexpected today was again\npostponed until next year.", "The resolution will ask the United Nations Commission and its subcommittee to work out a final agreement with six principal objectives.", "These, in accordance with Mr. Lodge's speech in the Disarmament Commission, will include the suspension of nuclear tests, a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, control over objects moving within space, the six points listed, which are inter-dependent, contain the disarming program proposed, which was submitted last August but has not been accepted by the United Nations.", "Since the Western resolution makes no reference to other proposals, it would appear to indicate a renunciation of the Soviet disar-", "mament plan and also a\nSoviet, Japanese, and\nIndian proposals to purify\nnuclear tests by separate action.", "The U.S. scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government to believe it will be difficult to get the U.S. government to accept a new decision, and are afraid that the Assembly should end up by simply asking the U.S. scientists to keep on negotiating.", "The U.S. scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government to believe it will be difficult to get the U.S. government to accept a new decision, and are afraid that the Assembly should end up by simply asking the U.S. scientists to keep on negotiating.", "The U.S. scientists and representatives of the United States will meet with the U.S. government to believe it will be difficult to get the U.S. government to accept a new decision, and are afraid that the Assembly should end up by simply asking the U.S. scientists to keep on negotiating.", "6,000 WATCH MISSILE\nPursuing Sidewinder Downs\n5-inch Target Rocket", "VALPARAISO, Fla. Oct. 9—An F-100 fighter plane fired a laser laser near yesterday and then swiftly shot it down. Nearly 6,000 persons attended an Air Force fire-power demonstration, at Eagan, Air Force Base. They watched the destruction of the target, only 4 inches in diameter, shortly after it was fired.", "One Defense Department ac-\nientist who helped develop the\nGAR-4 sideward said in awe,\n\"That's what we intended it to\ndo... but I can't believe it!\"\nThe rocket, easily tracked by\nits smoky trail, hurtled far in\nadvance of the speeding jet.\nThen the pilot released the\nsidewinder, a simulation of\ninexpensive\nweapon, that was on its target.", "BEEP BLAST FOR NUTLEY", "Loud Speakers to Broadcast\nOver 6-Mile Radius", "NUTLEY, N.Y., Oct. 9—An\nattempt will be made today to\npick up the bop from the\nsidewinder, a machine that\ntransmit it by loudspeaker here\nover a 1-mile radius.", "Officials at the Federal Tele-\ncommunication, part of the national\nelectronic research and\nvision, and the U.S. Department\nof Telecommunications, said\nthat the machine would be able\nto detect signals as it passed over\nthe Sidewinder.", "The signals will be picked up\nby the company's 200-foot mi-\ntel, which will be placed on\ntop of the tower, used for research work,\nhas been built and is now in\noperation.", "The Coward Shoe\n20 West 52nd St., New York\n56 Trinity Place at Street Center\n2400 Central Avenue, Bronx\nHempstead, New York\nHempstead, Jersey City\nPhilipfield, Boston\nWorcester", "President, Noting Zhukov Bid,\nDenies U. S. Intended Rebuild", "Continued From Page 1", "July events did not differ greatly from the version, except that the President said he had added the Government certainly had not intimated the United States interpreted the United States had added the Government certainly had not int

3.

[Y]

States now is more dependent on her allies than they on her, this was the occasion "to make hay while the sun was shining." Thoughtful persons are calling for disengagement and a neutral belt in Europe and, in the extreme formulation of Mr. Kennan, for the reorganization of the military establishment of our European allies into militia type units.⁵ And leading officials of the opposition parties in Europe maintain that the increase in Soviet technological prowess has been accompanied by a transformation of Russian society which offers prospects of a more peaceful future policy.⁶

There can be no question that Western policy must develop more dynamism if it is not to be engulfed by the revolutionary changes occurring all over the globe. The rigid adherence to policies developed to meet different conditions can only create an impression of sterility and will force our measures to become ever more defensive. Yet a policy does not derive its validity from its "newness" but from its ability to cope with altered circumstances. A statesman will confuse only at his peril the desirable and the possible; indeed, he may have to forgo some desirable New Statesman and Nation, January 4, 1958.

2. Geoffrey Barraclough, "Who Won at NATO?" The Nation, January 4, 1958.

3. Hansard No 408, p. 800 (Viscount Hirdingbrooke).

4. Geoffrey Barraclough, "Who Won at NATO?" The Nation, January 4, 1958.

5. George Kennan, The Listener, November 1957.

6. Comments by Aneuran Bevan, London Times, Oct 2, 1957.

5.

[Y]

II

One central strand of the attacks on the attempt to reassess NATO strategy asserts that the Soviet earth satellite has placed the United States at a fundamental if not hopeless disadvantage: "The Gaither report has revealed that irrespective of any effort which America may now make the Soviet preponderance in advanced weapons has reached such an absolute stage that America's national survival will depend, until 1961 at least, on Russian benevolence."⁷ As a result, so the argument goes, the establishment of American missile bases in NATO is of primary benefit to the United States, spreading the risks without adding to the common security. "Yet the missile agreement is one of the most extraordinary and complete surrenders of sovereignty ever to be made by one country for the exclusive benefit of another. For the missiles are not intended to defend Britain; on the contrary they decisively increase its vulnerability. Their prime purpose is to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet ICBM onslaught on America during the crucial three year period which must elapse before America possesses the ICBM herself. The sole beneficiary will be America."⁸

7. New Statesman and Nation, January 4, 1958.

8. Ibid. See also speech by Viscount Hinchingbrooke, M.P.: "Hitherto I have always thought that the principle of an alliance was that it gave greater protection to ourselves... On this occasion with these rockets we are clearly inviting the risk of attack in some way and we are giving a one-sided protection to the United States." (Hansard No. 408, p. 806.)

4.

[y]

attainable objectives because to seek them may set in motion a series of
events which may bring about what he fears most. The difficulty of states-
manship is that it must provide not only for the optimum situation but for
the worst contingency. In assessing a proposed course of action, it must
analyze not only the consequences of success but the perils inherent in
failure.

It is this refusal to look at the worst contingency which causes
disquiet about a great deal of the recent debate. One can sympathize with
the efforts to create stabler international relationships, but many recent
proposals - such as the neutral belt in Europe - are likely to make the
situation more fluid and more incalculable - this in fact may be the
strongest argument in their behalf. One can understand the effort of our
allies to gain a greater influence over our actions, but many measures proposed
to achieve this goal are likely to result in exactly the opposite result.
The importance of negotiations is patent, but it is not clear why one has
to postulate a basic change in the Soviet domestic scene as the primary
catalyst. And some of the conclusions that have been drawn from the assumed
United States strategic inferiority indicate a disturbing absence of
comprehension of the strategic relationships of the nuclear age.

6.

[Y]

Even if the major premise that a defense of the United States is <u>no longer possible</u> without foreign missile bases were correct, it is a curious argument which sees a unilateral benefit in measures which might deter an attack on the strongest partner of the alliance. To the extent that missile bases in Europe do deter an attack on the United States, they would also seem to add to the safety of our European allies. Should a Soviet attack succeed in crippling the United States, Western Europe would be reduced to an impotent appendage of the USSR. Conversely if the failure to grant missile bases weakened the deterrent, <u>Form European hesitations</u> would have brought on what they most sought to avoid, an all-out war which, whatever the original target, would involve catastrophic casualties all over the world.

Thus even if the dependence of the United States on her allies were as great as alleged, this would hardly transform NATO into a unilateral arrangement, for our allies <u>would surely</u> (not find security <u>without</u> the United States. But the dependence is not <u>as great</u> - at least with respect to deterring an all-out attack on the United States. <u>There is involved in</u> these arguments deep-seated confusion between deterrence and the strategy one is prepared to implement should deterrence fail; between vulnerability and strategic inferiority; and between a temporary strategic inferiority

and the consequences which are likely to flow from it.

The gap between the Western policy of deterrence and the strategy the alliance is prepared to implement has been widening ever since the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it. The weakness of the doctrine of massive retaliation has always been that by emphasizing the most frightful applications of our power, we created a threshhold below which resistance to aggression seemed not worth the price. Heretofore, the belief in United States preponderance had lulled us and our allies into the belief that our threat, if it was sufficiently horrible, might never have to be implemented. Strategy was therefore identified with the maximum development of strength and the question of bringing our power into some relationship with the willingness to use it was evaded. And because SAC, the retaliatory force, was outside NATO control, the Western alliance took on some of the qualities of a unilateral guarantee. Our allies saw little significance in a military contribution save furnishing facilities; in fact they had a strong incentive to keep the proportion of our troops to theirs as high as possible in order to ensure that a Soviet attack would in fact unleash our Strategic Air Command. Thus, on the psychological level the approaching missile age does not so much alter

force, either of planes or of missiles. Or if the Soviet Union should
develop an air defense of such potency that it could blunt our counterblow
while it is launching a devastating attack on the United States.

Neither contingency is in prospect in the immediate future.

Whether it ever comes about depends on the level of our effort. If we
disperse our retaliatory force, if we push our missile development, there
is every technical possibility of overcoming the present Soviet advantage in
the development of missiles. In fact, assuming a major and continuing U.S.
defense effort, the greatest danger in the immediate future may be less the
Soviet superiority in the missile field as the nature of the missiles
themselves. For even with equality in numbers and in dispersal, the
aggressor will have a decided advantage in the missile age. The "count-down"
in present missiles - the time interval between the decision to fire and the
actual launching - is several hours. An attacking missile on the other
hand is in transit for less than half an hour. Thus until we are able to
reduce the reaction time of our retaliatory missiles to less than
the transit time of the attacking missile or unless we can make our missile
installations secure against all but direct hits, an aggressor may calculate
on an advantage from a surprise attack whatever the state of our missile
development.

12.

[Y]

do this, Soviet planners would have to be certain to destroy most of the bases of our Strategic Air Command both here and abroad; they would have to count on the ability of Soviet air defenses to reduce our counterblow to acceptable levels. Moreover the calculation would have to be almost foolproof. A slight probability of success would hardly afford a sufficient base for Soviet leaders to risk the existence of their country.

This is not to say that we are not in danger. No doubt if present trends are not reversed there may come about so great a disparity in strategic effectiveness that we will be at the mercy of a Soviet blow.

But the factors to avoid this eventuality are still in our control. If we behave at all effectively, it is difficult to see how Soviet planners can calculate a sufficient degree of certainty for an all-out attack. However good their defense, it is inherent in the nature of defense that its effectiveness is uncertain until the offense has shown its hand. And not too many American attacking vehicles would have to get through to pose a devastating threat - particularly if the goal is maximum destructiveness.

A proper concentration of active and passive defense measures, improved dispersal of our Strategic Air Command, and a growing missile capability should enable us to make Soviet offensive calculations sufficiently difficult to deter an all-out attack.

16.

The possession of missiles and nuclear weapons is essential to
create a local deterrent to Soviet aggression or to resist Soviet threats
which have been made increasingly boldly. If Europe is not to resign any
possibility of influencing its destiny it must be able to resist Soviet threats
in part at least with her own resources. Even Aneuran Bevan, hardly an ad-
mirer of American strategic thought, felt obliged to assert that a British
foreign secretary deprived of nuclear weapons would be sent "naked into the
conference chamber."⁹ Given the destructiveness of modern weapons and
our increasing vulnerability, any Soviet attack which is explicitly less than
all-out is inherently ambiguous. For, so the argument will go, if the USSR
were interested in a final showdown it would not alert our retaliatory force
by a "peripheral" move.

The reaction of many of our European allies to what they interpreted
a demand to man
as an invitation to participate in our defenses should serve as caution about
the hesitations inevitably produced by the prospect of all-out war.

9. Report of the 56th Annual Conference of the Labour Party, p. 181.

[Y]

18.

purpose is not primarily to *defeat* a major power which might attack - for
this they are quite inadequate - but to exact a price a potential aggressor
is unwilling to pay. Similarly a substantial military establishment on the
Continent would [deter] raise the risk of rash Soviet adventures. At the very least
it could force the Soviet Union into a scale of military effort which would
remove any ambiguity about its ultimate intention and thus make easier
invoking the sanction of all-out war. The fact that a military establishment
within Europe will probably be unable to defeat an all-out Soviet attack,
actually adds an element of stability to the situation, because it makes
clear the *defensive* nature of the local forces. Thus if it should be maintained
that a serious Soviet attack on Europe would *ultimately* lead to all-out war,
it does not necessarily follow that a defense of Europe should *begin* with
such a strategy. When all-out war threatens the survival of mankind, it
should be invoked as the last resort not as the only counter to every Soviet
move.

See
attached

[Y]

21.

for Europe should be designed primarily for the creation of a local deterrent and they should therefore meet two requirements: they should not be under United States but under NATO control; and they should be designed not as an extension of the strategy of massive retaliation but to fit the requirements of a local defense. They should be under NATO control in order to relate them clearly to the requirements of a European defense and to those situations in which NATO feels its vital interests are at stake. They should be designed primarily to fit the requirements of a defense of Europe and only secondarily as an extension of the retaliatory force for all-out war.

The retaliatory force must be able to inflict the greatest amount of devastation in a minimum of time. Accuracy here is less important than power and range. A deterrent force for local defense on the other hand should be able to apply its power with discrimination and in increments sufficiently small to permit a settlement before the situation gets out of hand. Because of the rapidity of its reaction time, the retaliatory force for all-out war can afford to be relatively stationary although even here mobility as in missile launching submarines or ships is perhaps the most effective

[Y]

not only against missile sites.

The argument that the acceptance of missiles increases Europe's vulnerability demonstrates to what extent our NATO allies have relied on the American Strategic Air Command as the chief deterrent and as the major weapon in case of war. For missile sites as such are no more likely to invite attack than the airfields, supply depots and communication lines which NATO has established in large numbers without question. The difference seems to be that many of our allies did not really rely on the existing installation but on the Strategic Air Command which is outside NATO control and whose major bases are located outside NATO territory (with the exception of British bases). As a result, the request for missile sites seemed to our allies to involve them in a strategy, whose protection they had heretofore enjoyed without direct participation.

## IV

The real argument about missile installations in Europe thus turns less on the nature of the weapon than on the strategy which underlies it. Missiles

22.

[Y]

means of dispersal. But a retaliatory force cannot afford to be in fixed positions if only because of its proximity to Soviet bases. Since Soviet missiles require less than 15 minutes to reach most of Western Europe from advanced bases, the reaction time of our local deterrent could never be sufficiently rapid to permit us to launch a counterblow before the Soviet attack has struck. Moreover, even if it were possible to reduce the reaction time, it would still be in our interest to design the local deterrent in such a manner that we could afford to wait until the Soviet blow has in fact been delivered and to adjust our counterblow accordingly.

As long as manned planes constituted the backbone of the retaliatory force it was essential to be able to launch them at the first warning for an airplane in the ground is totally vulnerable. And because of the relatively slow speed of manned planes, this was not too unstable a situation: a plane could probably be called back if the alarm turned out to be false. But in the missile age, the irrevocable decision is to launch the missile. It is therefore essential that a strategy based on find means to underestimate its dispersal. missile systems be so designed that their reaction is as foolproof against strategy for what kind of war?

You seem to be talking about terms about operations on an all-out scale. What has the local deterrent got to do with the Soviet blow, which suggests an all-out attack?

It will be said that missiles are, too.

Again I'm confused: strategy for what kind of war?

23.

[Y]

A prime requisite for a missile system particularly for local defense is accuracy and mobility. Accuracy is necessary to permit a discriminating application of our power; mobility is needed to reduce the vulnerability to surprise attack. We should strive to create a missile system which can be moved by motors, a major part of which is constantly shifting position. Submarines are another ideal mobile launching site. Both destructiveness and range should be sacrificed to accuracy and mobility, for the purpose of NATO missiles is not primarily to destroy the Soviet homeland but to pose risks out of proportion to any gains Soviet forces might make in Europe. Even an 800 - 1000-mile missile while it could not be decisive in an all-out war could pose such a threat.

27.

[4]

But an examination of the only proposal that the Soviet Union has put forward for disengagement -- the Rapacki plan for a demilitarized zone -- makes clear that the Soviet Union sees in disengagement a device to achieve a strategic preponderance. Acceptance of the Rapacki plan would not remove the Soviet nuclear threat from Central Europe -- even short-range Soviet missiles can reach much of Western Europe from Soviet territory. It would lead to the withdrawal of all American forces from Central Europe because we cannot fight effectively without [our whole strategy is dependent on] nuclear weapons. And since our forces cannot be stationed elsewhere in Western Europe they will have to withdraw from Europe altogether. At the same time, the Rapacki plan will [enforce the] color to a] persistent Soviet campaign to place nuclear weapons into a special category of frightfulness and thus inhibit their use. It would set up tremendous pressures to exclude nuclear weapons from all of Eurasia including Great Britain. Since there is no prospect of arresting a Soviet advance without nuclear weapons, a non-nuclear zone in Central Europe would create a vacuum in which Soviet conventional strength would predominate and in which the Soviet nuclear threat will gain added potency because of the almost certain elimination of the

28.

strongest Western nuclear power, the United States, from the Continent.

This situation would not be fundamentally changed by a simultaneous withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from the center of Europe and the creation of a "neutral belt." Soviet forces will withdraw only 600 miles within easy missile range of Central Europe while American forces would cross the Atlantic. Moreover, if the Soviet Union feels sincerely menaced by NATO power, it would seem that a neutral armed Germany would be an even more worrisome factor. For such a Germany is more likely to be forced by domestic pressures to push its claims to the Eastern territories to the limit than a Germany restrained, at least in part, by the Western alliance.

Instead of adding to stability, the long-term consequences of a neutral belt may thus make a tense situation even more explosive. The purpose of the neutral belt is declared to be to open the way for a more favorable evolution within the satellite orbit. [And the] withdrawal of Soviet forces may in fact be the catalyst which would turn a long smouldering resentment into open rebellion. Yet Khruschev has declared repeatedly that the "socialist achievements" in the satellite orbit are sacrosanct, that the Soviet Union would always lend a "timely assistance to a fraternal socialist state,"¹² in short that the USSR stands prepared to suppress ¹². Interview with James Reston.

31.

[Y]

Perhaps disengagement will come about in any case either because NATO is not willing to make the necessary sacrifices for a major effort or because it is unwilling to face domestic pressures. But it should not delude itself that it is a desirable goal for that it may not bring on the very contingencies it seeks to avoid.

V

Still, the rumblings in the Western alliance call attention to the difficulty our diplomacy has had in generating positive goals, to the tendency to consider the need for military strength a sufficient motive for its achievements. The reaction to our foreign policy since the launching of the Soviet earth satellite however unwise [strategically] underlines the necessity of generating a new sense of purpose within the Western community. Resistance to communism is not by itself sufficient to inspire men; we must be capable of generating other motives save those imposed on us by our opponent. Great tasks are waiting in the areas newly achieving independence, in the ever stronger thrust towards overcoming the confines of national sovereignies, and of giving hope to millions looking for a new sense of direction.

On the whole our answers and those of the rest of the Western

32.

[Y]

It has been fashionable to blame the overemphasis on military factors for many of the difficulties we have encountered abroad. But to some extent the Western world has been equally handicapped by a tendency of some of our most thoughtful critics to escape their dilemmas by ascribing only the most favorable motives to Soviet policy and to cling to a moral perfectionism which paralyzes action as certainly as the attempt to identify positions of strength entirely with military arrangements.

Every Soviet overture has evoked a debate about whether it augured a basic change in Soviet society. The dispute about whether to negotiate has turned less on the efficacy of negotiation than on an assessment of Soviet intentions. Both the advocates and the opponents of negotiations have seemed to agree that negotiations are not possible except against the background of a fundamental transformation in Soviet Russia, one group advocating a conference because a change had in fact occurred, the other denying any basic transformation. In the process not enough attention has been paid to the question whether negotiations might not be (particularly) necessary even if

[Y]

32-A.

Soviet intentions have **not** changed and whether on the other hand constant insistence on a change in Soviet society might not undermine whatever prospects negotiations offer.

WHO WON at NATO?.. by Geoffrey Barraclough

London

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE turned out, after all, much as we had thought. "Western Europe not expected to frustrate U.S. wishes," the headlines told us as the delegations assembled. And in the event, Western Europe has not frustrated U.S. wishes. But the course of proceedings nevertheless got out of step, and we may suspect that Mr. Dulles had more than one headache before it was all over. It was, of course, the second day that produced the excitement. After the first session the ticker tapes rushed out a confident Yes. But at the close of the second session a bewildered world, sharply divided between angry resentment and incredulous relief, jumped to attention as the newspapers told of disagreement at high level and predicted a possible No. It was too wildly improbable to be true. By the third day the ranks were closed, the verdict was Yes, and it only remained to draft and to issue the usual high-sounding agreement "in principle." Meanwhile the so-called "Charter of Paris" has appeared, President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have held forth on radio and television, and we are left to grope through the barrage of words to the intractable realities beneath.

If you take the results of the conference at face value, and keep to the surface of events, it is probably true that you can make of them what you will. Emphasize the first and final sessions, and you may say that the Suicide Club has met and solemnly decided to commit hari-kari. Emphasize the unexpected course of events on the second day, and you may say that the Western worm has turned—not very much, it is true, but at least it has writhed and twisted in its agony—and may turn some more. If your mind happens to work that way, you may even say that the Western powers, after a shocking exhibition of cold feet, have

recovered their senses, and all will be well after all. All these interpretations are possible because the agreements reached at Paris were agreements on principle and general policy which have still to be tested in practice; and the real test will come when they have to be put into operation. Then, and only then, shall we discover which of the conflicting forces and tendencies so plainly present throughout the Paris meeting are the stronger.

That does not mean that all we have to do is to sit back and wait. On the contrary, those who saw a gleam of hope and reason in the momentary resistance to Mr. Dulles' bulldozing had better realize that they are at the beginning of the road, and not at the end. The testing time lies between now and March, when the next NATO meeting is scheduled to take place; and it depends in large degree upon world opinion what the outcome will be. That world opinion produced even a moment's pause in the streamlined proceedings at Paris was pretty remarkable; but of course it was not enough. Meanwhile we must recognize frankly that the decisions taken at the conference have tipped the scales in the opposite direction. We must not underestimate them because they are only decisions "in principle," subject to future contingencies. Unless positive action is taken to reverse the trend, it is only a question of time before all the paraphrernalia of nuclear war is assembled in position, ready for a flat-footed general to stumble over an irreversible trigger.

THE FULL implications of what the Paris conference was asked to do, and has done "in principle," are still not often realized. To describe it in the usual formula as "adapting the Atlantic Alliance to the Missile Age" is a gross understatement: what it amounts to, in fact, is a total transformation of NATO. When NATO was first brought into being, in response to the shock administered to the West by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, it was pat-

ently a defensive alliance, and its strength lay in its defensive character. It was this fact, and this fact alone, which made it generally acceptable to the Western European peoples. Today, this is no longer the case. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, with a radius of action of 1,500 miles, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be called defensive weapons. They are weapons of retaliation which add nothing to the security of the countries housing them, but evidently add greatly to their perils. Armed with 1,500-mile missiles, in other words, NATO automatically ceases to be a defensive and becomes an offensive alliance; this revolutionary idea of making NATO into an offensive weapon has provoked a crisis of conscience in Europe.

IT WOULD be totally wrong to regard this reaction as a result of Russian propaganda. Long before Bulganin launched his barrage of notes and letters, a wave of profound uneasiness was spreading throughout Western Europe and, in particular, throughout Germany. Nor was it, as some American commentators have tried to argue, a new wave of "neutrality" and "defeatism" spreading from a pink-hued Left. What is significant is the way the movement spanned the whole political gamut. In England alone it was something of a phenomenon when the right-wing Sunday Times featured a series of world maps to illustrate "the outdated American defense strategy," and the Daily Express let loose its heaviest artillery on "The Maginot Mentality, 1958." More important, perhaps, was the initiative of the London Times, which carried three leading articles in one week, the gist of which was that "the forward deployment of the present IRBM"—in other words, the establishment of intermediate-missile bases close to the Iron Curtain—is not necessary "for the security of the West."

Behind all this lay a profound doubt as to the motives behind the new program. It seemed to stem—as, in sober fact, it did stem—from

GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, a frequent contributor, is a professor of international history at the University of London.

January 4, 1958

The Nation

3

[L]

the distraught and hysterical fears which the launching of the Russian sputnik let loose in the State Department, not from rational calculation of the needs of the situation. But the sputnik was not a new factor from a European point of view. We in Europe have lived for five or six years in the knowledge that our own cities will be in the front line in any atom war; and the knowledge that the cities of the United States will now be there also—though to some Europeans it is certainly a matter of satisfaction—does not fundamentally alter the situation for us. If there was a sudden demand for a revolutionary change of military policy, it was not hard to conclude that the need it expressed was American rather than European. No doubt European calculations did less than justice to American motives; but the

evidence seemed to indicate that the purpose for which IRBM bases in Europe were required was not to defend Europe from attack but to deter the Russians from launching missiles against the American continent, and to retaliate if they did. Americans will be shocked to hear that this conception of interdependence left Europeans cold.

What reasons, after all, apart from the sputnik scare, were there for revolutionary changes in Western strategy? What, considering that intermediate-range missiles were not available and not likely to be available for a couple of years, was the new urgency in the situation? There was not the least sign that Russia was waiting poised to swoop on Europe with all the military potential at its command. On the contrary, the military threat had, if anything, receded into the background, and Russia seemed more willing than

ever to observe the status quo in Europe while it developed its political program in Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, there was no evidence that intermediate-range missiles would increase European security; on the contrary, the "general impression," as made the Times pointed out, was that "even in the sputnik age" the West was already "overinsured rather than under-insured for nuclear deterrence." And, finally, would the alleged deterrents really deter? At this point even stalwart champions of NATO began to waver. If we in Europe thought the means were calculated to produce the desired end—if, in other words, we thought the reactivation of NATO by the deployment of strategic weapons would increase our security—few would hesitate to go through with it. The difficulty is that we think, on the contrary, that it is an old-fashioned and outmoded strategy, which will add to our insecurity. In other words, far from "deterring" Russia, a reinforced NATO equipped with 1,500-mile missiles is likely to act as an incitement, and perhaps even to provoke the very attacks which it is theoretically supposed to prevent. In any case, it stood in the way of a political settlement. This was the burden of Mr. George Kennan's by now famous "Reith Lectures," which made so profound an impression in Europe. It was not the weakness of NATO, Mr. Kennan argued, but its strength which put up Russian backs and made Russia unwilling to accept Western proposals for Europe's future.

These were the reasons behind European reluctance to commit itself all out to Mr. Dulles' proposals. The decision at Paris to explore ways and means to break the East-West deadlock and to reopen negotiations with the Russians—a decision certainly out of line with Mr. Dulles' thought—shows that they were not entirely without effect. That such a resolution was taken was undoubtedly a victory for world opinion. But it would be foolish to make too much of it. The way the proposal has been formulated suggests that it is there more for the record, and to placate European conscience, than with a view to real settlement. It would

be surprising if it were to come to anything in practice. At most, it means that a door has been unexpectedly left open. But no one doubts that the real substance of the conference was the decision "in principle" to deploy IRBMs in Europe, and it is round this question that debate in the weeks to come will concentrate. Until the missiles are actually ready and available for use, no decision can be said to be final. The essential question for the future is whether military will override political objectives, or whether there is still time for a political settlement to halt military preparations.

ONE THING is already certain. The decisions "in principle" at the summit have not cleared the practical obstacles out of the way. Denmark and Norway from the start made it plain that they would not participate in the nuclear program, and at the time of writing it is evident that German opposition to missile bases has not been quelled. But the problems which the implementation of the summit decisions will bring to light, go deeper than this. European statesmen were not slow to perceive the implications of American insistence on a quick over-all decision. For the first time since the formation of NATO, they realized, the United States was more dependent on her allies than they on her; and they decided, with few exceptions, to make hay while the sun was shining. We do not yet know what went on behind locked doors in Paris; but it is obvious that there must have been some hard bargaining. Each country had, and still has, its own particular objectives. France, for instance, made it clear that it expected support in North Africa and a more powerful voice in NATO, if it was to play Mr. Dulles' game. But in addition to particular interests, there were serious and intractable problems of a general nature, of which we have not heard the last. Not least among these is finance; but political control (who, in other words, is going to release the trigger) and possession of the nuclear warheads also loom large.

A great deal has been made of these problems, and it would be an

4

The NATION

[Lc]

error to sweep them aside as un-
important. But the very course of
the Paris proceedings shows that
we should not emphasize them too
much. If this is all, Mr. Dulles is
likely to get his way in the end. The
European powers may writhe and
haggle, but their position is too
weak for them to stand out for long.
If there is to be a change, it will
come through the pressure of world
opinion on governments, and in par-
ticular from insistence that the pro-
posed negotiations with Russia must
be real negotiations. That means,
first of all, that the West cannot
dictate in advance the terms of
negotiation, and then refuse to talk
except upon those terms. We have
already been told that if Russia re-
fuses a new approach to disarmament
on the basis set out by the West,
the world will face a "balance of
power through terror" as the only
alternative. It is precisely that al-
ternative that the world must res-
olutely refuse, because that way
there is no hope. The reach for
absolute security is an endless
quest, a dangerous dream. The great-
est peril inherent in the policy en-
dorsed at Paris is that the reactiva-
tion of NATO with nuclear missiles

will write "finis" to the existing
chances of peaceful negotiations to
reduce the danger of all-out war.

THESE chances are not negligible.
Since 1955, though there have been
many disappointments, East-West
negotiations have gradually been re-
duced from comprehensive world-
wide schemes to manageable pro-
portions. No one today expects to
sweep aside all issues in one great
disarmament plan; but proposals
such as those recently put forward
by Poland, in conjunction with
East Germany and Czechoslovakia,
are hard-headed, clearly defined and
practicable. What are the inhibi-
tions preventing the West from test-
ing them at face value? Present in-
dications are that we are likely—if
the NATO powers have their own
way—to be lost again in endless dis-
cussions over the whole field of dis-
armament, resulting in another
resounding failure with each side
blaming the other. New political
thinking simply was not on the
agenda in Paris, and for that reason
not only is the West unprepared for
new discussions with Russia, but
the political purposes of its military
and strategic program remain ob-

scure. The issues which were not
discussed in Paris—such questions as
the terms upon which the West
would agree to a neutralization of
Germany, or the concessions which
NATO would be prepared to make
in return for a Russian withdrawal
from the satellite countries—were
more important than those which
were. It is for us to see that they
now receive the thought and analysis
denied them in Paris. This is a
question for Americans as much as
Europeans, for now that the United
States is in the nuclear firing line,
the handing out to all and sundry
of the weapons which will unleash
the nuclear deluge touches them as
nearly as it touches us. At Paris,
the real issues—that is to say, the
political issues upon which peace
and war depend—were side-stepped
in the interests of fictitious unanim-
ity, and NATO, piling up arms
upon arms, is still without a policy.
The task of the coming decisive
weeks is to see that the political is-
sues which NATO side-stepped are
brought into the open and forced
upon reluctant governments, before
it is too late. It will not be easy to
do, but it is the most important task
of the new year.

MENACE of PAY-TV.. by Dallas W. and Jennie N. Smythe

ONE OF THE most skillfully con-
ducted public-relations campaigns
of modern times has brought pay-
TV to the verge of acceptance. It
is understandable that support for
pay-TV should come from those
whose self-interest would be served
by it—namely, the writers, actors,
directors and front offices of Holly-
wood and Broadway. For them and
for sports promoters, the attraction
is the tremendous revenue potential
of box offices located in the living

rooms of millions of American fam-
ilies who, on the average, spend five
hours a day watching TV.

But without the support or at
least friendly neutrality of intellec-
tuals, pay-TV would have made
little headway. Intellectuals, how-
ever, have fallen easy prey to the
pay-TV merchants. This is regret-
table on two counts. First, they have
not pursued their own self-interest;
second, they have failed to recognize
their social responsibility for the wel-
fare of the larger population of less
education and sophistication.

Let us examine the self-interest
of intellectuals, who are genuinely
frustrated in their need for mature,

lated and cajoled by advertising. It
is good that they feel this way. But
such is their despair with the cur-
rent product that they have grasped
at the first alternative which seemed
to promise Bach, Beethoven and
Bartok concerts and "Broadway
plays"—especially when it is sug-
gested that pay-TV would be free
of crass commercial announcements.

Looking only at the absolute eco-
nomics of pay-TV, the "eggheads"
are impressed by what they think
are the advantages of the "box of-
fice" approach. It might be profit-
able, they say, for a pay-TV operator
to broadcast a chamber music con-
cert free of advertising. Because they

DALLAS W. SMYTHE is research
professor of communications at the
University of Illinois. He has writ-	en extensively on current problems