DR. HENRY KISSINGER
WORLD STATESMAN AWARD

Rabbi Schneier, Paul, Percy, John, I'm very honored by this award.
And of course I'm very pleased that you mentioned my parents. The economy
would be in terrible shape if my parents' maxims had been strictly followed.
Because it's true that they considered the head of the Federal Reserve much
more important than the Secretary of State.

What they emphatically did not believe in was the theory of the
volatility of money. They were convinced money was something you hold on
to, not something you spend. And, for a few of you here who may not have
heard me tell this story, my mother was found unconscious at one point in her
apartment, and was taken to the hospital. They said she had had brain
damage, a terrible stroke, and would never recover. And I said, well let's see
what happens.

Three days later she came to. She had tubes down her throat and
couldn't talk. So she wrote out on a piece of paper, where am I? We told
her. She said: "What day is it?" We told her that, too. "What time is it?"
We said it was 9:00 in the morning. She wrote: "I have a dental appointment
at 11:00 and, if you don't cancel it, I'll have to pay for it." So, that took care
of that problem. And she lived, I would say, another five years.

It's really a great privilege to be honored together with Percy Barnevik,
whom I have admired over a period of 20 years for his vision, and for his rare

As edited
by Gina
but not sent

combination, if he will forgive me, of business acumen and almost naïve
innocence. He just doesn't believe that there is such a thing as an insoluble
problem.

Percy has unbounded faith that, with sufficient analysis coupled with
determination, there is no such thing as an insurmountable obstacle. And I
have seen him make this maxim come true time and again. I mention it here
because there are lessons in that for the conduct of foreign policy.

The hardest task of any statesman is to take his society from where it is
to where it has never been. That requires, first of all, some vision of the
future. And, secondly, the courage to walk that road- at least part of the time
- alone. Because whenever you concentrate on the analysis of the present, you
run the risk of being overwhelmed by events. And when you are describing
the future, it is possible that you may outrun the experiences of your society.

How to strike a balance is, especially for Americans, the overwhelming
challenge. And it's a particular problem in our period, when so many of the
traditional parameters of foreign policy have disappeared.

This is a strange country in which to conduct foreign policy. It's the
only major country in the world almost exclusively populated by immigrants;
the only major country that can date its history from a precise date, and
dedicate it to a single concept of liberty. Above all, it is the only major
country that has never had a powerful neighbor, has never faced a foreign
enemy on its soil, has never suffered irretrievable disaster. Therefore, the
overwhelming American temptations are to believe that our commitment and

our withdrawal are entirely up to us, and that we can make the world over in
our image in a brief period of time.

Whatever one thinks of the events of recent weeks, it's a very American
approach to take a Muslim ethnic group and a Serbian ethnic group and hand
them an 80 page document, and say this is the final solution to 400 years of
history; if you both sign it, the problem will disappear.

Only in America could such an approach originate. You find a similar
temptation at every stage of American foreign policy. We achieved
extraordinary things when we had a clear-cut enemy, or a specific challenge,
as we did in World War II and in the Cold War. Then we launched the
Marshall Plan and the programs of relief to which no other country could have
dedicated itself with the same commitment, or on so large a scale.

But now we find ourselves in a world without a clear-cut enemy. It is
also a world replete with the kinds of conflicts Americans find very hard to
comprehend. These ethnic conflicts are not between peoples who, as in the
United States, have fled here and grown used to coexistence. The ethnic
conflicts of the Old World usually occur between peoples who have been
overrun for centuries by one group or another.

The weak have been killed, the conciliatory have emigrated. And very
often what is left are those who have refined their commitment. That's the
purpose of their existence, and it fuels the voracity with which they fight each
other.

If you look at the history of the Balkans, you will see that, quite often
in Bosnia, Kosovo, wherever, the various groups have lived peacefully
together provided there was some outside force who imposed it on them.
Ferocious fighting starts as soon as the issue becomes which of the indigenous
groups should govern, because they have heretofore found it impossible to
submit one to another.

I once conducted a negotiation between Turkey and Greece --
something that makes the Israeli - Arab conflict look like a tea party. In the
course of it, the Turks made a proposal which I thought did not demand
unconditional surrender -- amounting to huge progress in these sorts
negotiations.

So I said to the Turkish Foreign Minister: "They'll never accept it
coming from you. Why don't you let me propose it as an American idea?
They might accept it from America, and then you can both sign it.

So off I went and presented it as a brilliant brainstorm on my part. And
the Greeks accepted it. I was on the verge of success until I brought the
Greek acceptance to the Turks, who then rejected their own proposal. I see
that my Orthodox friends in the rear have full understanding for this
experience, but it is very hard for Americans to understand.

And also that in the world right now there are at least three different
kinds of international relationships going on. The first is of Europe and the
Atlantic area, which is sort of based on democratic ideas and market
economics, and in which war is almost inconceivable.

[13]

The second is in Asia, which is conducting foreign policy more or less in the way Europe did during the 19th century: major states considering each other strategic rivals, and in which the United States really should be playing a role akin to that of Great Britain in Europe in the 19th Century- if we had any experience with it.

And then there are revolutionary areas like the Middle East, which have yet other purposes. So here's the United States having to develop three or four different approaches simultaneously, a society that thinks every problem has a very immediate solution and that finds it hard to believe that in the world in which it now lives, every solution is an admission ticket to yet another set of problems.

All this is compounded by the fact that we are living through a change in human consciousness similar to the invention of printing in the medieval period. Knowledge then was based strictly on religion or epic poetry, something everybody understood, and because one had to learn by memory you couldn't very well have everyone remembering something different.

With books, the range of knowledge expanded and secularization became a concomitant of that. But books, we now know though we didn't know it then, are hard to learn from because you can't remember everything you read and you have to form concepts.

Today we have computers and a range of knowledge at our disposal unimaginable to any previous generation. But this has the strange impact that, though one learns more than ever before and more easily, one doesn't really

know all that much. And in foreign policy there's no reason to remember
anything, since you can always call it up again and again.

Yet in foreign policy, as I said, the great task is to get from here to
there. The German statesman Bismarck once said: "The best thing a statesman
can do is to listen to the footsteps of God through history, get a hold of the
hem of his cloak and walk with him a few steps of the way." There is no
contemporary statesman who could form that idea, much less express it.

The contemporary statesmen are obsessed with tactics. They want to be
certified by the evening news. They're driven by what the commentary will be
on their day-to-day actions. And this is a problem to which I know the
problem better than I know the solution. The overwhelming challenge is how
to organize all this knowledge around a sense of purpose when the issues
aren't purely technical.

In this connection I want to take the liberty of making one final
comment. We keep reading that we are now in a new phase of foreign policy,
the so called humanitarian foreign policy, one motivated primarily by morality
rather than by interest. I should like to raise a few questions about it. The
question of a just war is one I believe theologians have wrestled with for a
long time. And the reason is that, in foreign policy, you need, as I said before,
purpose. But you also require a sense of proportion, some relationship
between ends and means, some ability to distinguish. The danger is that if one
takes refuge only in general propositions, the sense of proportion can easily
become lost.

In all fairness, when I look at history, it seems to me that more lives
have been lost in crusades than in wars on behalf of the national interest. And
while I don't advocate either, I think it crucial in defining our foreign policies
that we not develop a kind of moralism that becomes an excuse for avoiding
complicated and tough decisions.

Foreign policy at a high level involves very difficult choices. Without a
moral compass, these choices cannot be made, because one is always
essentially insecure without having strong underlying moral convictions.

At the same time, one has to keep in mind that the well-being of peoples
depends on recognizing that history is longer than anyone inside it and that
principles have to be related to the possibility of being implemented over an
extended period of time and with some reverence- if I may say so- for
historical experience. I'm always uneasy when people say they have
transcended history and that they're starting an entirely new phase. Because
those are usually the invitations to periods of great extremists.

So, having presumed to leave my field to speak in that of such
distinguished moral leaders, I want to say something which is very
uncharacteristic of me. I don't pretend to have the answers to all the issues
that I have raised. But I do want to say that I'm very worried by the self-
righteous simplification with which some of our problems are being tackled.

And I want to compliment Rabbi Schneier and his colleagues for trying
to introduce their perspective into these complexities. Thank you for honoring
me.

Rabbi Schneier, Paul, Percy, John, I'm very honored by this award.
And of course I'm very pleased that you mentioned my parents. The economy
would be in terrible shape if my parents' maxims had been strictly followed.
Because it's true they considered the head of the Federal Reserve much more
important than the Secretary of State.

But they emphatically did not believe in the theory of the volatility of
money. They were convinced money was something you hold on to, not
something you spend. And for a few of you here who may not have heard me
tell that story, let's say my mother was found unconscious at one point in an
apartment, we took her to the hospital. And they said she had, had brain
damage, terrible stroke, would never recover. And I said well let's see what
happens.

Three days later she came to and she had tubes down her throat and she
couldn't talk. And she wrote out where am I? We told her. She said: "What
day is it?" We told her that. "What time is it?" We said 9:00 in the morning.
She wrote, "I have a dental appointment at 11:00 and, if you don't cancel it,
I'll have to pay for it." So, that took care of that problem. And she lived, I
would say, another five years.

[ll]

Now it's really a great privilege to be honored together with Percy Barnevik, who I have admired over a period of 20 years for his vision, and for his rare combination if he will forgive me, of business acumen and almost naïve innocence. He just doesn't believe that there is such a thing as insoluble problems.

And he has unbounded faith that with adequate -- with sufficient analysis coupled with his determination -- there is no such thing as an insurmountable obstacle. And in my observation, I have seen him make this come true. And I mention it because there are lessons here for the conduct of foreign policy.

The hardest task of any statesman is to take his society from where it is to where it has never been. That requires, first, some vision of the future. And secondly, the courage to walk that road at least part of the time alone. Because when you concentrate on an analysis of the present, you run the risk of being overwhelmed by events. But when you describe a future, it is possible that you may outrun the experience of your society.

And how to strike this balance is perhaps the overwhelming challenge. And it's a particular problem in our period when so many of the traditional parameters of foreign policy have disappeared, especially for Americans.

[L.C.]

This is a strange country for the conduct of foreign policy. It's the only major country in the world almost exclusively populated by immigrants. The only major country that can date its history from a precise date, and dedicate it to a single concept of liberty.

But above all, the only major country that has never had a powerful neighbor. Has never faced a foreign enemy on its soil. Has never suffered irretrievable disaster. And so the American temptation is to believe that our commitment and our withdrawal are entirely up to us.

And also, that we can make the world over in our image and in a brief period of time.

Whatever one thinks of events of recent weeks, it's a very American approach to take a Muslim ethnic group and a Serbian ethnic group and hand them an 80 page document, and say this is the final solution to 400 years of history. And if you both sign it, the problem has disappeared.

This is something that could basically originate that approach, only in America. And you find that temptation at every stage of American foreign policy. We have done extraordinary things when we had a clear cut enemy, or a specific challenge, in World War II and in the Cold War and in the Marshal Plan, and in the programs of relief to which no other country dedicates itself with the same commitment, and certainly on such larger scale as the United States.

[LC]

But now we are in the world without a clear cut enemy. And in a world
in which there are kinds of conflicts that are very hard for Americans to
comprehend. These ethnic conflicts are not between peoples in the United
States that are used to coexistence and that have fled here. These ethnic
conflicts occur usually between peoples who have been overrun for centuries
by one group or another.

The weak have been killed, the conciliatory have emigrated. And what
is left very often are those who have refined their commitment. That's the
purpose of their existence, and therefore the voracity with which they fight
each other.

If you look at the history of the Balkans, you will see that quite often in
Bosnia, Kosovo, wherever, the various groups have lived peacefully together,
provided there was some foreign conqueror who imposed it on them.
Ferocious fighting started as soon as the issue became which of the
indigenous groups should govern, because they have up to now found it
impossible to submit one to another.

I once conducted a negotiation between Turkey and Greece --
something that makes the Israeli - Arab conflict look like a tea party. And the
Turks made a proposal which I thought did not demand unconditional
surrender -- which is huge progress in these negotiations.

[L.C.]

So I said to the Turkish Foreign Minister: "They'll never accept it coming from you. Why don't you let me propose it as an American idea? And they might accept it from America and then you can both sign it."

So off I went and presented it as a brilliant brainstorm that had occurred to me. And the Greeks accepted it. And I was on the verge of success until I brought the Greek acceptance to the Turks who rejected their own proposal. So it's -- I see that my Orthodox friends in the rear have full understanding for this experience. But this is very hard for Americans to understand.

And also that in this world right now where you can identify at least 3 different kinds of international relationships going on. Europe and the Atlantic area, which is sort of based on democratic ideas and market economics, and where war is almost inconceivable.

Asia, which is conducting foreign policy more or less like Europe did in the 19th century -- of major states considering each others strategic rivals, and in which the United States really should play something like the role of Great Britain in Europe in the 19th Century if we had any experience with it.

And then revolutionary areas like the Middle East, which have yet another reason. And here it's the United States and it has to develop three or four different approaches simultaneously, for a society that thinks every problem has a very immediate solution, and that finds it hard to believe that in the world in which we live now, every solution is an admission ticket for

another set of problems.

So, and this is compounded by the fact that we are living through a
change in human consciousness, similar to the invention of printing in the
medieval period, when one had to learn by memory. Knowledge had to be
based on religion or epic poetry, something that everybody understood,
because you couldn't have everyone remembering something else.

With books, the range of knowledge expanded, and secularization
became a concomitant of that. But books, we now know which we didn't
know, are hard to learn from because you can't remember everything -- you
have to remember more. You have to form concepts.

Now we have computers and we have at our disposal a range of
knowledge unimaginable to anyone -- any previous generation. But this has
the strange impact that one learns more than ever, but so easily that one
doesn't know all that much. And for foreign policy: there's no reason to
remember anything, because you can always evoke it again.

But in foreign policy, as I said, the task is to get from here to there.
The German statesman Bismarck once said: "The best thing a statesman can
do is to listen to the footsteps of God through history. Get a hold of the hem
of his cloak and walk with him a few steps of the way." There is no
contemporary statesman who could form that idea, much less express it.

The contemporary statesmen are obsessed with tactics. They want to be certified by the evening news. They're driven by what the commentary will be in their day to day actions. And this is a problem which I know the problem better than I know the solution. But it is the overwhelming challenge of how we can organize this knowledge around the sense of purpose, when the issue isn't technical.

And in this connection I want to take the liberty of making one final comment. We keep reading that we are now in a new phase of foreign policy, the so called humanitarian foreign policy. Policy that is motivated primarily by morality rather than by interest. And I dare not in this distinguished ecclesiastical group -- I should not dare to take on that (unintelligible).

But I would like to raise a few questions about it. The question of a just war is one that I believe theologians have wrestled with for a long time. And the reason is that in foreign policy you need as I said before, purpose. But you also require a sense of proportion, some relationship between ends and means. Some ability to distinguish -- and the danger is that if one takes refuge in only general propositions, the sense of proportion can easily be lost.

In all fairness, if I look at history, I think more lives have been lost in crusades than in wars for the national interest. And, while I don't advocate either, I think it is crucial in defining our foreign policies, that we do not develop a kind of moralism that is an excuse for avoiding complicated and tough decisions.

Foreign policy at a high level involves very difficult choices. And, without a moral compass, these choices cannot be made, because one is totally insecure without some strong moral convictions.

But, at the same time, one has to keep in mind that the well-being of
peoples depends on recognizing that history is longer than anyone inside and
that these principals have to be related to a possibility of being implemented
over an extended period of time and with some reverence if I may say so, for
historical experience.

I'm uneasy when people say they have transcended history and that
they're starting an entirely new phase. Because those are usually the
invitations to periods of great extremists.

So, having presumed to leave my field to speak in that of such
distinguished moral leaders, I want to say something which is very
uncharacteristic of me. I don't pretend to have the answers to all the issues
that I have raised. But I do want to say that I'm very worried by some of the
self-righteous and simplification with which some of our problems are being
tackled.