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or to Quinn's conclusion that these practices characterized
Khmer Rouge rule as early as 1971.

## THE FALL OF CAMBODIA 1975

**Allegation:** Shawcross's account of Cambodia's final debacle draws upon the end-of-tour reports of the American officers who headed the Military Equipment Delivery Team in Cambodia (MEDTC). These were Major General John Cleland, who headed the MEDTC from 1972 to 1974, and Brigadier General William W. Palmer, who served from early 1974 until April 1975. Shawcross criticizes the reliance on firepower which he claims the US MEDTC inculcated into the Cambodian army, thus creating a "fatal new dependency" and making a disaster "inevitable" if Congress cut back aid or the enemy cut lines of communication:

> "Cleland explained the rationale -- and, unconsciously, its serious implications -- in his end-of-tour-report: 'The FANK depend on firepower to win. Seldom has FANK outmaneuvered the enemy--he has outgunned him.' But his own actions made this inevitable; instead of improving the intrinsic fighting quality of Lon Nol's troops, Cleland created a fatal new dependency in them. By mid-1974 fully 87 percent of all American military aid was being spent on ammunition. If the Congress began to cut back aid or if the Khmer Rouge closed all lines of communication, then the government's troops would be deprived of 'the quickfix' (to use another Cleland expression) which the Americans had thrust upon them. Both these things did happen and each contributed toward making the fall of the regime inevitable."

"The fundamental military problems of incompetence and corruption were, if anything, exacerbated by the actions Cleland took. FANK was unable to absorb the sophisticated accouterments of divisional reorganization he pressed upon it. Congressional restrictions on advice meant that the Khmers were denied the over-all training, management skills, and technical know-how essential to the sort of army that Cleland was creating. At the most basic level, the Cambodians could not maintain equipment. Army engineers earned so much more in the city that they would spend only a 30-hour week in the field. Servicing was rare; guns, trucks and armored personnel carriers would simply be used until they stopped. When it proved impossible to shift spare parts through Khmer Rouge roadblocks, equipment was

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abandoned or cannibalized. Parts were sold to whoever was in the market, friend or foe." (p. 313)

Shawcross disparages Cleland's and Palmer's own conclusions (without giving the reader the benefit of them) by ad hominem attack:

"These reports must be read with caution, since each man was anxious to promote his own career in the Army despite the Cambodian debacle. Each, therefore, was concerned to attach all blame to the Cambodians and refused to analyze carefully the effect of his own work in Phnom Penh." (p. 312)

Shawcross's line of reasoning is to attack the Nixon and Ford Administrations for persisting in seeking such military aid for Cambodia, and to fault the Congress only for the degree to which it acceded to Administration requests to provide such aid at all:

"That Congress bore a measure of responsibility for the last five years of Cambodian history is beyond dispute; the legislature had constantly intervened to alter the relationship but, until December 1974, had always provided the funds adequate for White House ends." (p. 350)

**Fact:** Shawcross turns the Cleland and Palmer documents totally on their head. Their analysis is that Congressional restrictions were an insuperable obstacle to any remedial measures to improve the ability of the Cambodians to defend themselves. Palmer's end-of-tour report, for example, makes poignantly clear that even the minimum objective of achieving a military stalemate was rendered impossible because the Cambodian army's most important advantages over the enemy were eroded by the reduction of American aid:

"By the beginning of 1974, the minimum US objective, had become a negotiated settlement between the KC and the GKR. Achievement of that objective necessitated continuous demonstration of GKR survivability, if not viability. National survival in turn meant holding the capital and major enclaves against enemy encroachment, while at the

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same time providing minimum necessities and some economic stability to the population under government control. All of this required protection of a strategic LOC, battlefield stalemate and continued US military and economic assistance, so that the KC would be faced with the prospect of a long-term, no-win proposition.

* * *

"(1) <u>Congressional Restrictions</u>

".... In January 1971, the Cooper-Church Amendment specifically prohibited 'advisors' in Cambodia, The Symington-Case Amendment of February 1972 prescribed that the total number of US personnel in Cambodia should not exceed 200. In view of the US Vietnam experience, the intent of these restrictions is understandable. However, their cumulative effect was to severely limit any MEDTC ability to ensure that millions of dollars in MAP funds were being well spent. FANK was provided modern equipment but was denied the overall training, technical know-how, and military professionalism desperately needed to modernize it in the areas of tactical leadership, staff planning and coordination, personnel and financial management or logistics operations. Proper management and effective use of the equipment provided was apparently to be learned by a trial and error, do-it-yourself process which time would not permit.

"Lacking any authority to provide in-country advice or US training, any improvement in FANK leadership was predicated on almost non-existent Khmer initiatives since American officers were too restricted to assist. The most important US training contributions possible were through return of CONUS and Third Country US-trained officers. While these cadres made a marked impact on the elites of the MNK (riverine forces) and KAF (aircrews), the small numbers possible had no significant impact on the Army.

"The 200-man 'headspace' ceiling for the US Mission also precluded any flexibility in reacting to new requirements such as the vastly expended civilian airlift, in March-April 1975, without severely crippling other, on-going efforts. The overall effect of the ceiling was a US Country Team personnel mix based on the nature of the current crisis with consequent ill-effects on program continuity.

"(2) <u>Reliance on Firepower</u>"

"FANK was originally conceived as a 'light infantry

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force' designed to fight 'Khmer Insurgents'. When it became apparent that the 'insurgents' were rapidly evolving into main force units in their own right, the US objective of keeping FANK alive and the GKR viable was assured through the quick-fix of massive US airpower. With the US bombing halt in August 1973, the Khmer Army artillery and tactical air inventories were augmented because this solution provided less expensive and politically more palatable sources of firepower to offset the leadership and manpower deficiencies in the Khmer Armed Forces. As that firepower was increasingly denied to them because of escalating munitions costs and reduced funding, the only remaining option appeared to be manpower.

"However the Army's inability even to maintain the strength of its intervention brigades, let alone achieve significant growth, soon became self-evident. Moreover, serious leadership and training deficiencies, combined with the absence of any US advisory or training effort, obviated major changes in the Khmer force structure, battlefield tactics or doctrinal reliance on firepower, even if sufficient time had been available.

"In sum, the US taught the Khmer Armed Forces to survive through firepower. FANK was equipped with the means to employ it in large amounts. Outside sources of firepower were withdrawn so that they relied solely on their own firepower assets. Firepower and the logistics to support it became the two most important advantages FANK had over the KC, and by 1974 it was too late to change that orientation to any extent in the short term. Therefore, as escalating prices drove munitions costs progressively higher, increasing rather than decreasing levels of MAP funding were necessary to promote successful achievement of US objectives in Cambodia."

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# OPENING

## Announcer with crawl:

"Tonight, Henry Kissinger talks about war and peace and about his decisions at the height of his powers.

"For the first time on television, he will be asked to account, in detail, for the four years of his White House experience."

## Montage of partial statements:

Kissinger: "When we came into office in 1969 the Soviet threat was rapidly increasing...

"And yet I believe we have an obligation to prevent the totalitarians from taking over the world by force."

Frost: "Can a foreign policy have a moral basis, or is..."

Kissinger: "If we acquiesce in the establishment of another Communist state in the Western Hemisphere."

Frost: "And the C.I.A. report that had been circulating...?"

Kissinger: "What C.I.A. report that had been circulating?"

Frost: "But I'm merely saying."

Kissinger: "Mr. Frost"

Frost: "That when the Cambodians..."

Kissinger: "Mr. Frost"

Frost: "Now, now, please let me finish"

Kissinger: "No Vietnamese can believe that there is an outcome to a war other than total victory."

Frost: "Do you think that we have, during this period and other