he had reason to believe wants it. Cobb also asked about publishing the Von
Igel papers. I told him the matter was in process, since I had taken it up
with the Department sfxjumikizay in Washington.

Hollis Godfrey telephoned from Philadelphia concerning the Council of Na-
tional Defence. Madame Paderewski telephoned asking for an appointment for
Mr. Paderewski.

David Miller came by appointment to discuss ways and means to aid the
President in the event of war. Joseph Davies telephoned from Washington to
suggest Bob Woolley for Japan.

Billy Phillips came from Washington to deliver some messages from the
Secretary and Frank Polk. Fortunately, the main things the Secretary wanted,
the President had already done a few hours ago, that is, he gave the order
for the arming of merchantmen, and called Congress in executive session for April
16th.

Another important matter the Secretary of State and Polk wished Phillips to
bring to my attention was the attitude of Denman, Chairman of the Shipping Board.
He is running amuck. His father-in-law had had ill treatment from the British
regarding his shipping interests, and Denman now has an opportunity to retaliate,
which he is small enough to be willing to do. I have agreed to write the Pres-
ident and call the matter to his attention, provided Lansing will follow it up
with a personal interview on Monday.

Phillips saw something of my intense activities while here and wondered
how I lived through the day. I told him it was because I slept well at night
and did not worry about anything; no matter how serious it might be. If I did
not have this faculty I could not last a week during these fateful days.

March 10, 1917.

Allen Baker, M. P. came to say goodbye and to take some messages to Lloyd

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George, Balfour and other friends in England. I took lunch with Henry Morgan-thau. The only other guests were Cleveland and Mrs. Dodge. We discussed the coming municipal election. I announced my intention of refusing to take part in it, but rather advised Morganthau to support the Fusion Ticket. I do not believe that party politics should in any way be carried into municipal elections.

Captain Gaunt called to bring the Rev. Dr. Kellman, a Scotch minister who is here to lecture at Princeton and other universities.
Paderewski followed to ask about the Polish offer which was made to the Government through him some days ago. I shall write the President about this tomorrow.

I had a long and interesting telephone conversation with Frank Polk about current affairs. It will be remembered that about half of my activities have but little record here in the way of documentary evidence since they are largely done by telephone and by personal conferences. For instance, the State Department communicates with me practically every day and sometimes oftener. Then, too, in my visits to Washington and in my conversations with the President and the Cabinet, a vast amount of results follow. To illustrate, the President is actively backing up Navy affairs, and is pushing Daniels to an activity that did not seem possible a week or ten days ago. This, I take it, is the result of my talks with the President, the prodding of Daniels through Franklin Roosevelt and others.

March 11, 1917.

Police Commissioner Woods telephoned late last night after I had retired to tell me something of the Hindoo plotters who have been arrested and are about to make a confession.

Franklin Roosevelt was the first caller this morning. He gave some additional information concerning the Navy, and I made a memorandum as to where to prod Daniels next through the President. Roosevelt says things are going well

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at the moment.

Sir William Wiseman followed Roosevelt to talk of better coordination of
the Secret Service. My letter to Frank Polk will give my suggestions.

Hoover bade me goodbye as he is sailing for Europe via Cadiz tomorrow for
the purpose of closing out the American-Belgian Relief.

William Bullitt of the Philadelphia Ledger brought a suggestion he has
made to the State Department concerning the establishment of a bureau to obtain
information from Germany and Austria. The State Department referred him to me.
Я demand I think the plan a good one but I shall wait until Gerard arrives before
advising And this reminds me that Gerard sent me the following wireless from
the S. S. Infanta Isobel:

"Shall I go to Washington direct or New York first?"

I answered as follows:

"I would advise Washington first. Congratulations and felicitations."

I sent this to the Hotel Sevilla, at Havana, and I hope the Department
will not hear of the matter.

March 12, 1917.

The most interesting visitors today were Frederick Palmer, the war correspondent, and Willett, of the London Times. Palmer told of his lecture trip from Winnepeg to New Orleans, and of the temper of the people. He agrees with me that those of our citizens who have done the country most harm are the ultra pro-Allies. The influence is felt in both directions. It hardens German sentiment here, and it creates a prejudice against the United States in the Allied countries because we do not do all that these extremists advise. Their talk is made under the guise of patriotism, but I am afraid it is largely for self glorification.

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Polk telephoned from Washington for our usual daily talk. I asked him to send Lanier Winslow, of the Secret Service Division, over on the night train. We discussed at some length the successor of the late Ambassador Guthrie. I suggested that it might be well to send Willard to Japan, placing Brand Whitlock at Madrid. Polk thought well of this. Ira Morris at Stockholm is also being considered. I fear he has too much of a commercial mind and not sufficient breadth of view for this important post.

March 13, 1917.

Among the callers today were, William Phillips, George Foster Peabody, Mrs. Borden Harriman and Mrs. McManus, a daughter of General Antonio José Paez. She came to offer her services in behalf of better relations between Columbia and the United States.

I cannot get our Government to understand how the Latin peoples should be treated. Both the British and Americans insist upon acting toward them in a perfectly commonsense, straightforward, Anglo-Saxon way. It is impossible to deal with them successfully in this way. We think if we give Columbia money as indemnity for the rape of Panama, we have done all we are called upon to do. As a matter of fact, it is not the money so much as the way in which we give it that counts. In dealing with Latins it is necessary to go through a certain formality of compliments, grandiloquent expressions of friendship, brotherhood and equality. They like to be treated as an equal and as one gentleman with another.

Peabody, as usual, had a number of pleasant things to repeat which he had heard said of me by Dr. Bergson, Sidney Brooks and others.

We dined and went to the theater with Mrs. Charles Marshall. The others in the party were Worthington Whitehouse, Ogden Hammond, Mr. Potter and Mrs. Hammond. We went to see "The Willow Tree".

March 14, 1917.

Jospeh Davies was the first arrival. He is discouraged at the outlook.

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important places in Washington largely because the President holds in his offices Tumulty, whom he disapproves, and men like him. He expressed his determination to resign at the end of his term and perhaps before.

Lincoln Steffens is always interesting. He has just retired from the West Indies where he has been studying conditions in Porto Rico, St Thomas and Santo Domingo. He came to give his observations and to tell of the Cuban revolution. He thinks Menocal failed of re-election and, while he is the best man for the place, it is not our business but that of the Cuban people to determine who shall be their President.

Sir William Wiseman followed Steffens to tell of the trouble Denman of the Shipping Board is giving Sir Richard Crawford and other British officials. He hoped I would see Sir Richard tomorrow and get the facts at first hand. Wiseman tried to persuade Crawford and the Ambassador not to worry me with these minor troubles, and he apologized for their insistence.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt. Among the guests were Lord and Lady Aberdeen, Mr. and Mrs. Charles E. Hughes, Mr. and Mrs. Wickersham, Mr. and Mrs. Stimson, Henry C. Frick, the Mayor and Mrs. Mitchel, George Harvey, Charles R. Crane, Lindley V. Garrison, Frank Hitchcock, Ralph Pulitzer, Mrs. Goelet, Mrs. Marshall, the Montgomery Hares and many others.

March 15, 1917.

Sir Richard Crawford came this morning to tell of his troubles with Denman. Sir Richard looks to me like a very over-worked man, and I cautioned him to take things easier. He was full of his troubles with the Shipping Board, as Wiseman had said. I promised to keep in touch with the situation and to help if necessary. My letter to the President will indicate my feeling in the matter.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. S. R. Bertron. The other guests were Dr. Henri Bergson and Dr. and Mrs. William M. Polk.

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March 16, 1917.

Polk telephoned from Washington while I was out last night and again
this morning. He asked my good offices again in the trouble Denman is giving in
the Shipping Board. I promised to write the President today and my letter is at-
tached. The balance of our conversation concerned Gerard's home-coming and tou-
tine matters.

Paul Warburg was my first caller. He is very fairminded, although pro-
German in his sympathies. He knows that at the present moment it is to this
country's advantage to cooperate with the Allies. He was complimentary as al-
ways.

Gerard arrived this afternoon and after his public reception came directly
to me. We had a conference of an hour and a half. There was not much new that
he could tell excepting his interview with the King of Spain. The King is dis-
gruntled with the President and he considers he has been badly treated by him,
even going so far as to say that if Wallard represented the President correctly,
the President had not kept his word. It seems that Willard told the King that
the President had promised not to make any peace overtures without first inform-
ing His Majesty. Willard tells Gerard that he made no such statement, so the
question of veracity lies between the King and Willard.

I asked Gerard concerning his own ambitions. He would like to go into the
Cabinet if that is possible. If not, he would be glad to get into the public ser-
vice in some way. I shall help him where I can for he has proven himself a use-
ful public servant and a loyal friend.

March 17, 1917.

Today has been exceedingly busy. Martin, Godfrey, of the Council of Na-
tional Defence, Homer of the Navy, Gordon Abbott of Boston, Bullitt of the Pub-
lic Ledger, Whitehouse and Sidney Brooks were among the callers.

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Godfrey is disturbed at the lack of comprehension in governmental circles.
He declares they cannot see beyond the present and do not understand how to do
the work before them as efficiently as the situation demands.

Homer came about the Navy and the desire of the personel that Franklin
Roosevelt should succeed Daniels.

Abbot was disturbed about the rumored order of the Federal Reserve Board regarding the discount rate. He was good enough to say that he considered me the financial expert of the Administration and excused himself on that ground for bringing the matter to me.

Bullitt desired to write an article in the Public Ledger answering the
London Times' criticism of Colcord's article upon the proposed peace conference.
I gave Bullitt an outline of what I considered it best to say, and also some data
regarding a statement of Sir Edward Grey's concerning the freedom of the seas.

My English friend Whitehouse wished to show the necessity of the Presi-
dent moving slowly in our relations with Germany. He hopes we will not get into
the war, believing if we do not, we can force peace before the end of the year.

Sidney Brooks came for a general discussion of passing events. I thank-
ed him for the complimentary references he has been making of me in his lectures.
I do not know what these references are, but he said that in Ohio where he has
been lecturing for the past week or ten days, he stated that I was the only Amer-
ican he knew who had a European mind. He laughed and said that none of his au-
dience, he felt sure, knew what he meant, and he never undertook to explain, though
he, himself, felt the statement to be true.

He expressed pleasure that I happened to be in Washington when the Senate adjourned because I was certain it was through my insistence that the President had acted so promptly in his denunciation of that part of the Senate responsible for thefilibuster. He thought if the President had postponed the

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statement, it would have lost its effect. He considers the tendency to delay in the President to delay a serious fault. I told him there were two sides to that question. Oftentimes the man who delays is the one who is successful, and the man who acts quickly often regrets it. He agreed to this in a general way, but thought in political and military affairs it was quick action that got the best results. In this I agree with him.

The news from Russia concerns me greatly. I have been fearful lest bureaucratic Russia and autocratic Germany would link fortunes and make trouble for the democracies of the world. Now that Russia bids fair to be free, one sees more hope for democracy and human liberty than ever before.

All during the war I have been fearful of its consequences, particularly if Prussia won. I have felt certain that eventually the pendulum would swing back and the people would finally rule, but I foresee a long and bloody road down which the world must go for freedom. My whole life work has been directed toward the unfortunate many without equal opportunity, and their bitter struggle for existence. Everything I have done, or tried to do, has been with this end in view. I stood back of every liberal movement, both in Texas and in the Nation, which seemed rational and headed in the right direction. Sometimes I have feared that other zealous friends of liberty might go too fast and cause a reaction which would be difficult to overcome. I have advised moderation, but have always pushed in the one direction.

Philip Dru expresses my thought and aspirations and, at every opportunity, I have tried to press rulers, public men and those influencing public opinion, in that direction. Perhaps the most valuable work I have done has been in influencing the President. I began with him before he became President and I have never relaxed my efforts. At every turn, I have stirred his ambition to become the great liberal leader of the world.

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Now that Russia seems like to be free, I feel there is less need for furth-
er effort, although I shall watch with solicitude the outcome there. If the war
had not come, it was my intention to urge the President to formulate a program
of social reforms in this country. It was my purpose also to urge him in the
direction of a more responsive government, both by limiting the power of the
courts and making the Executive more responsive to the will of the people. Wheth-
er this wikk war will make my ambition in this impossible of realization depends
upon how quickly the war ends and also upon the terms of settlement.

Commander Gherardi, our former Naval Attache at Berlin, came from Wash-
ington to talk over conditions in Germany.

Bullitt of the Ledger telephoned from Philadelphia and read the editorial he
has written in answer to the London Times. I approved of what he wrote but made
it clear that he must take the responsibility of it himself for the reason that he
mentions the President's intentions in a way that would seem inspired.

March 19, 1917.

Sidney Brooks, Arthur Bullard, Frederick Dearing and Captain Gaunt were call-
ers. Brooks took lunch with us and asked me to dinner to meet Senator Root which
I agreed to do.

Bullard had some plan of press censorship that he wanted adopted. I asked
him to draw it up in concrete form and I would take it to Washington.

Dearing wished some assurance that in the future Ministers would be main-
ly drawn from seniors in the Diplomatic Corps. I could not do more than tell him
the President's intentions and of my endeavors in that direction. I advised him
to ask for a leave of absence for a year and accept a position offered him by the
International Corporation. He decided to do this.

Gaunt and I discussed ways and means by which our two countries could as-

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sist one another in the event of war. He said he had given direction for the
routeing of the American Line boats, which have just gone out armed fore and aft.

Polk called me twice from Washington. He is disturbed at the President's
inertia and he and Lansing wish me to come to Washington to see if I cannot stir
him into action. Both Lansing and Polk wish Congress called immediately. I
doubt whether this is wise. The President has authority now to do what is necessa-
ry to prepare the country before a declaration of war, and it is to our advantage
to make some preparation before hostilities begin. Our coastwise shipping might
find itself in a bad way if war was declared suddenly.

March 20, 1917.

An important letter came from Lansing. He enclosed a despatch from Minister
Egan at Copenhagen which Bernstorff evidently inspired. Lansing's letter and the
despatch are parts of the diary and also my reply.

As a matter of fact, Lansing does not know how the Zimmermann note was ob-
tained further than we got it from our Embassy in London. "Blinker" Hall, head
of the British Naval Intelligence Bureau was the man who caught, decyphered and
gave it to us.

Vance McCormick was my first caller. He is disturbed because there is
not more activity in Washington and because the President has no well defined pol-
icy of action. He believes there will be an unfavorable reaction against the
President unless he formulates a plan and announces it, at least, to his closest
advisers, and follows it vigorously.

David Starr Jordon, Willard Straight and Dr. Henri Bergson were my
most important callers. Jordon indicated his intention of supporting the
President but is hopeful that war may be averted. He told me of his trip to
Germany before the war, and of his talks with some of the German officers. It

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was interesting in its bearing upon the starting of the war.

Willard Straight came to talk of the Far East and of the desirability of Japan and the United States financing China. Later in the evening we took dinner with the Straights. The other guests were Otto Kahn, Lloyd Griscom, President of the Asiatic Society, and de Casenave. I fancy the dinner was arranged largely for my benefit, for the discussion again took the Eastern field and the question of financing China. No matter what their purpose was, it was an interesting discussion we had after dinner and I got something of value from it. There was general agreement that democratic Russia would not join Japan in the future in the exploitation of China, and that Japan would probably moderate her policy in that direction. My opinion is that recent events in Russia will be of more value to China than to any other nation.

Bergson followed Straight in the afternoon. We talked of the foreign situation and he made some suggestions in the event we entered the war. I outlined a plan looking to the cooperation of France, England and the United States which caught Bergson's imaginations. When I told him this cooperation could force other nations to behave toward one another like gentlemen, he became enthusiastic.

March 21, 1917.

Polk telephoned that he would be here tomorrow. Lloyd Griscom came to suggest Willard Straight as Ambassador to Japan. I pointed out the difficulties because of his connection with the International Corporation.

Governor John Stanchfield called to ask if I thought the Government would consider a settlement with the coal magnates who have recently been indicted by the grand jury. I asked him to make a proposition and I would submit it to Gregory when he comes tomorrow. He proposed, on his own initiative that he would advise his clients:

First, To admit guilt and pay a fine. Second, To cancel all their present con-

tracts. Third. To dissolve their organization.

While I have no doubt that jail is the proper place for his clients,
yet the New Haven criminal suit indicated quite clearly that it is impossible to
convict such offenders. It is a question whether the public would be better
served by going to an enormous expense and putting the magnates to great incon-
venience and distress of mind which would necessarily come about, or save the ex-
pense of the trial and obtain a verdict of guilty.

I went to dinner with Arthur Little to discuss the local situation
with Judge Samuel Seabury.

March 22, 1917.

The Attorney General is here for the day and I have been with him a large part of it. He lunched and dined with us, and we later went to see Henry Miller in the "Great Divide".

Gregory told of the last Cabinet meeting. He thinks the President had no idea of calling Congress together earlier than the 16th but was persuaded to call it on the 2nd of April because of the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet that he should do so. He said Burleson remarked that the people wished this country to go into the war actively. The President replied that it did not make so much difference what the people wished as what was right. Burleson answered that if he were President and a situation like this arose, he would want the opinion of the people back of him.

The President gave no intimation to the Cabinet as to what he intended to do, but early next morning he called Congress for April 2nd. When Gregory telephoned yesterday at ten o'clock to tell me he would be in New York today, he did not then know that the President had made the call.

I spoke to Gregory about Stanchfield's proposal. He said they ought

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to be in prison; that the question was whether they could be placed there, but he
would at least hear what Stanchfield had to propose.

Dr. Godfrey and Dr. Crampton were the first callers this morning. I suggested that they take their matters directly to Secretary Lane and try and convince him of the righteousness of their cause, and I would cooperate with Lane in the event they convinced him they were right.

Gerard followed. He is disturbed over a report coming from Washington that the President is angry because of his recent speechless commenting upon the unpreparability of the nation. Gerard contends, and I believe justly, that he had no thought of the President and his criticism was directed entirely at Congress.

Polk came in the afternoon to talk over departmental matters and to tell of the situation in Washington. He says there was something akin to panic there in the early part of the week, and that there was a feeling in governmental circles that if the President did not act promptly, a strike would come about in Cabinet and official circles. He states that Secretary Baker is now belligerent, but the condition of army affairs has not been bettered materially in the past few months. He believes if war is declared, there will be great weakness shown in the War Department as well as in the Navy, and the President will come in for an avalanche of criticism.

We agreed upon Gordon as a representative of the State Department in that New York in secret service, financial and trade matters. He is to cooperate with the Treasury, Department of Justice, with the British and French and others when necessary.

Peter Brady, labor leader, came to offer suggestions regarding the making theسكkakax heads of labor organizations a part of the army. I asked him to put his suggestions in writing and I would forward them to Washington. He has the germ of a good idea if it can properly be worked out. It would probably save the country

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much of the disorganization and labor troubles that Great Britain had.

March 23, 1917.

Lincoln Colcord came this morning to plan some additional articles. He has been ill and this is his first day out for several weeks. When I told him of my thought of going to Japan, China and Russia and the work I hoped I might accomplish by doing so, he spoke of it as "audacious imagination" and hincerely hoped I would carry it through. My only reason for not doing so is because I feel I am needed here and I hesitate to leave and be so far out of touch with the main situation.

Polk came for a final talk before returning to Washington. He sees almost no one here except the extreme war party and, in consequence, is very pessimistic.

Sir William Wiseman called to say that his secret service men had obtained information from the Austrian Consulate here which leads them to believe there are German submarines off our coast. I asked him to give me a memorandum to show Lansing. The memorandum is attached to the diary. I promised to give him an answer as to what he should do after Lansing and I have a talk tomorrow when he and Mrs. Lansing are to be here to attend a dinner we are giving at the Colony Club.

I went to dinner at the Plaza with Sidney Brooks to meet Elihu Root and Frederic Coudert. Prof. George Louis Beer of Columbia came in afterward. It was the first time Root and I had met.

The conversation at dinner related almost wholly to the situation in the United States regarding German-Americans. The talk was intemperate, Brooks being the mildest one of the three, which indicates how violent Coudert and Root were. None of us were sure that our waiter was not a German; for he was a foreigner. Both Root and Coudert, with Brooks backing them, proposed hang-

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ing Germans to lamp-posts upon the slightest provocation. Such talk arouses the
accused passions and makes it difficult for saner counsels to prevail.

After dinner we talked principally of international law, embracing the freedom
of the seas, etc. I did not join in to any extent for it all seemed academic and
futile at this particular time. International law *should* be rewritten when the war
is ended and upon broader and saner lines than has ever heretofore been contemplated.
The conversation seemed to me to be technical and narrow, and I did not desire
to be drawn into an exposition of my ideas as to what should be, no matter what has
been, for I felt certain of an unsympathetic audience and one that would not understand my point of view.

I expressed the opinion that I hoped the President would make an indictment
of Prussia and Prussian methods such as has never been made before. I thought he
should begin at the invasion of Belgium and carry it down to date, showing how by
the violation of international law and usage, Prussia had created international
chaos. Out of deference to his age, I waited for Root to make the move to go,
but when eleven o'clock came and there was no sign of his doing so, I arose and
the party broke up.

March 24, 1917.

Lansing and I had a long conference this morning. He gave an account
of the last Cabinet meeting. I did not tell him I had already gotten it from
Polk and Gregory. It is no economy of time to listen to repetitions of this
sort, but it makes, in the long run, for cordial relations.

We discussed Wiseman's memorandum and agreed that he should be authorized to get the papers from the Austrian Consulate as he suggested. Lansing is something of a Prussian when it comes to serving his country. He said he had offered $10,000, for a copy of the Swiss Code. If he obtains this, he will

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have a key to what the Germans are trying to do.

We discussed Egan's despatch and decided that it would not be wise to
make any statement regarding the Zimmermann note, for the reason that anything
said would give them some clue as to what we had and how we got it.

We went into our Mexican relations; our relations with Japan and the se-
lection of a successor to Ambassador Guthrie. He asked me to write the Pres-
ident my views and I promised to do so. He has no idea what the President has
in mind to say in his address to Congress when it convenes. He saw the Pres-
ident yesterday and tried in several ways to get some line upon his thoughts,
but failed. He wishes me to write the President and tell him what I think
should be done, believing my advice will be along the lines of his, Lansing's,
views. He is as anxious as I am that the President should take the reins in
his own hands and not allow Congress to run away with the situation.

Lansing always makes a careful memorandum of his conversations with the
President and of all Cabinet meetings.

Gordon Abbott called to ask whether the Government had formulated
any plan of financing in the event of war. I thought not, but advised him to
write me a letter asking the question and giving his views. I promised to
take it up and to have the entire subject thought through, which is the only
way such a matter can properly be done, otherwise we will be in as much chaos
as England and France have been.

Vance McComick and Governor Campbell of Texas were other callers.
Our guest^5^ at the dinner we gave the Lansings at the Colony Club were: Dr.
Henri Bergson, Lady Lister-Kaye, Cornelius and Mrs. Vanderbilt, Mr. and Mrs.
Montgomery Hare, Mr. and Mrs. Willard Straight, Mr. and Mrs. C. B. Alexander,
Mr. and Mrs. Luciaa Wilmerding, Mr. and Mrs. Frederick H. Allen, Mr. and Mrs.
Rogers, Mrs. Soley, Judge G^e^ard, Dr. and Mrs. Mezes and Gordon and Janet.

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March 25, 1917.

Although Sunday this has been one of my busiest days. It began at ten o'clock with the Pacificists including Amos Pinchot, Paul Kellogg and Miss Lilian Wald. I think I satisfied them that the President knew more about the situation than they did, and was quite as anxious to keep out of war.

Andrew Peters followed to tell of his resignation as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and to offer his services if they were needed in the event of war. I advised him to think out a well ordered revenue scheme and let me have it as soon as he could.

The Lansings called and Lansing and I went into executive session for a half hour or more. We talked of the financing of China and of the financing of war loans.

Charles R. Crane and Mrs. Crane came to lunch. Sidney Brooks came just before lunch and S. R. Bertron just afterward. Crane goes to Russia on Tuesday and I wanted to talk over that situation with him, since he knows more about it than most. Bertron told of his recent interview with the President and of his endeavor to get him to see the necessity for going into the war vigorously, if we went at all. He says he told him that people believed that he would not fight under any circumstances. He says the President flushed and declared it was not true.

Albert Roberts called to tell of his recent visit in England and of his return home via Paris, Madrid and Cuba with the Gerard party. He said he received the impression that Gerard and the Embassy people were afraid of me. He heard Gerard tell a newspaper man, who was speculating upon who the next Secretary of State would be in the event Lansing's health failed, that it did not matter who was named for the place, that I would continue to be the real Secretary of State.

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March 26, 1917.

Howard Coffin, of the National Defence Council, came from Washington by ap-
pointment and went over with me the data the commission has accumulated. He
tells the same story as the others, that is, that the bureau chiefs in the
Army and Navy have not the necessary punch for this crisis. There is some-
thing, however, to be said for them and that is an active business man com-
ing in touch with governmental affairs for the first time is apt to misjudge
conditions and want to hurry things beyond prudence.

My interview with Coffin definitely determined me to go to Washington
tomorrow in order to talk matters out with the President. I am also anxious
to talk with him concerning his message to Congress which, in some ways, will
be the most important one he has yet delivered. I feel sure that I know what
he will say, but I do not want to leave anything to chance.

Carl Ackerman, of the United Press, called to tell of a book he is
writing about Germany and the diplomatic correspondence between the United
States and Germany. I have promised to advise with him as his work progress-
es.

Stanley Quinn wished to discuss city politics but I did not give him much
encouragement. He believes I can name the next Mayor if I will take the trou-
ble to advise certain leaders.

W. L. Saunders, of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, called apropos of
pretty much nothing. Walter Lippmann came for his weekly quiz. I outlined
two or three articles for him, one in regard to this country taking the lead
in refusing to join a league to enforce peace if any autocracy was a member.
I shall speak to the President about this and try and get him to incorporate
the suggestion in his message to Congress.

Mr. Julliard gave us his box at the <u>Metropolitan</u> and we took

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Mr. and Mrs. Robert Brewster, Walter Davis and Gordon and Janet. During the acts I went across to Mrs. Vanderbilt's box and told her I had been called to Washington and could not attend her dinner to Judge and Mrs. Gerard tomorrow night. We sat in the rear of her box and she told me some more or less interesting political gossip. Her house is something of a rendezvous for politicians of both parties.

The White House,
Washington,
March 27, 1917.

I took the 11.08 for Washington. I had a quiet and restful trip. Frank Polk met me at the station and took me to the White House. The President was waiting for me. He had just finished with the Cabinet meeting which he now holds in the afternoon. He was not well and complained of a headache. We went to his study and discussed pending matters particularly his forthcoming message.

The President asked whether I thought he should ask Congress to declare war or whether he should say that a state of war exists, and ask them for the necessary means to carry it on. I advised the latter, I was afraid of an acrimonious debate if he put it up to Congress to declare war. I told him a crisis had come in his administration different from anything he had yet encountered, and I was anxious that he should meet it in a creditable way so that his influence would not be lessened when he came to do the great work which would necessarily follow the war. I said it was not as difficult a situation as many he had already successfully met, but it was one for which he was not well fitted. He admitted this and said he did not believe he was fitted for the Presidency under such conditions. I thought he was too refined, too civilized, too intellectual, too cultivated not to see the incongruity and absurdity of war. It needed a man of courser fiber and one less a philosopher than the

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the President to conduct a brutal, vigorous and successful war. I made him feel, as Mrs. Wilson told me later, that he was not up against so difficult a proposition as he had imagined. In my argument I said that everything he had to meet in this emergency had been thought out time and time and again in other countries, and all we had to do was to take experience as our guide and not worry over the manner of doing it.

I thought it not so difficult as taking a more or less ignorant, disorganized party in Congress and forcing it to pass the Federal Reserve Act, the Tariff Act, the Panama Tolls Act, and such other legislation as he had gotten through. I thought, however, he ought to change Daniels and Baker; that they were good men in peace time but did not fit in with war. That even if they were fit, the country did not believe them to be, and the mistakes that were sure to be made would be laid upon his shoulders because of them. I felt that he had taken a gamble that there would be no war and had lost, and the country would hold it to his discredit unless he prosecuted the war successfully, and he could not do this unless he had better timber than was generally thought to be in the War and Navy Departments. If he did not get rid of Daniels and Baker, then I thought it was imperative that he make a changes in the heads of bureaux. He listened with a kindly and sympathetic attention and while he argued with me upon many of the points, he did it dispassionately.

The President, Mrs. Wilson and I dined alone and he and I went to the theater. I could not fail to observe how easy it would be to assassinate him should anyone desire to do so and was willing to sacrifice his own life.

It was a vaudeville performance and a part of it consisted of the film "Patria". I asked the President if it could not be suppressed because it incited ill feeling between this country and Japan, to say nothing of Mexico. He said nothing could be done, although he had thought of writing a letter to the

management protesting that it should not be shown in Washington, and having
the letter published. I remarked that it was a wonder that mankind got along
as it did when there were so many selfish and mischievous people abroad. The
President thought that there was more ballast, as he termed it, in the people
generally than we gave them credit for, which kept the fools from doing the
harm they intended. We returned to the White House and immediately went to
bed.

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March 28, 1917.

The President played golf this morning and McAdoo was my first caller.
He remained practically all morning and until I told him I had to leave in order
to see the President who had returned and was waiting in his study. McAdoo wants
war-- war to the hilt. He said his appetite for it was so strong that he would
like to quit the Cabinet, raise a regiment and go to the front. All three of
his sons have enlisted. We talked of how to finance the war and the kind of
revenue bill we should have in order to meet expenses.

McAdoo says, and I agree with him, that a large part of the war's cost
should be met by taxation. He believes that incomes beyond a certain limit,
say two millions, should be taken entirely. He does not believe it right that he
should be called upon to give his sons for defence and those of enormous means
not to be called upon to give their incomes, beyond a certain amount. He be-
lieves one should give both sons and incomes if needful, but that those giving
their sons are giving the greater gift to the nation. I advised him to keep
this note to the fore in discussing revenue measures.

Knowing that the President would not appoint McAdoo to the War or Navy,
I magnified the importance of the Treasury Department and declared it would have
the big work of the war, to do, and I hoped he would make such a success as to add to
his already great reputation.

Mrs. Wilson has told me of the President's growing irritation because
McAdoo wishes to advise every Department and the President as well. I urged
him to attend to his own department and to leave the President and the other
departments alone.

The President, Mrs. Wilson, Dr. Grayson and I lunched together. Grayson
left immediately after lunch and we went into executive session. I suggested
to the President that he have what I termed, "an executive secretary" in addi-

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tion to Tumulty. The executive secretary I thought could be used as an aid to inter-departmental communication, and I suggested Vance McCormick for the place. I thought he might be called a "Cabinet officer without portfolio", so as to gild the position somewhat.

The President thought it would create jealousy; that the Secretaries would not like communicating through a second party. He spoke of my having given my services in an unselfish and unofficial way, taking no honors, and yet he said there was a certain note of jealousy he caught every now and then. This did not convince me that my plan was not a good one, but I did not push it further. I am intolerant of petty jealousy and if I were President I would eliminate it or the one guilty of it.

I was surprised to hear him say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; that he was good for a second place but unfitted for the first. That he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed. On one occasion, he told me, Lansing offered his resignation which he declined to accept. I do not think he does Lansing justice. Any man holding that place naturally comes in conflict with the President, particularly, if he does not hold similar views, which is the case in this instance. Their minds are not sympathetic. The President likes the Baker type, which, indeed, I do myself, but I also respect Lansing's type of mind.

I suggested taking Baker from the War Department and sending him to England in place of Page. He thought Baker would do admirably but said that recently, in a misguided moment, he had told Page he could continue and he supposed "we would be compelled to have a British-American representing the United

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States at the Court of St. James". One reason he gave for having told Page was that he could not find a suitable man to take his place.

We talked further of his message. Since last night he had made a memorandum of the subjects he thought proper to incorporate and which I approved, for most of them were suggestions I have made from time to time both verbally and through letters. Unless he changes his mind, he will have a message which could not please me better had I written it myself. He will differentiate between the German people and those who have led them and the world into sinking of this disaster. I believe I suggested this to him as long ago as the Lusitania in letters and cables from England.

Long ago I advised the British Government to do this but they never acted upon it, and I am glad it is to be done now. My purpose was, and is, to break down the German Government by "building a fire" back of it within Germany. The President agreed to incorporate the thought that the United States would not be willing to join a league of peace with an autocracy as a member. That is the main note I have urged him to strike, that is, this is a war for democracy and it is a war for the German people as well as for other nations.

I had a long talk with Mrs. Wilson after the President left to keep an engagement with Senator Hustings of Wisconsin. I asked her to try ask to get the President to be more liberal in his views regarding republicans, and to influence him to see and consult with them. I thought it would have a fine effect if he would send for Root, Hughes and Lodge. I complained that he was not diplomatic enough. She admitted this and said that she was even worse than he was; that neither of them could endure people they did not trust or like.

McAdoo had come in again and I had to leave Mrs. Wilson to go down and talk with him. Our conversation was in line with that of this morning--merely a continuation of it. He wanted me to tell him what the President

had in mind for his message. I "sidetraked" this by telling him he knew the
President well enough to realize that he kept these things religiously to him-
self. My impression was that the message would be satisfactory, and that he
should not worry. He remarked that the situation needed an Andrew Jackson,
meaning, I suppose, himself. And, as a matter of fact, the situation does call
for such men as McAdoo.

Frank Polk, Leland Harrison, Breckenridge Long were other callers. Most
of our conferences related to departmental and routine affairs.

The President, Mrs. Wilson and I dined alone and after dinner we played
games until ten o'clock. This is an innovation the President has inaugurated
since I was last here. He says he finds that it diverts him more than reading.
We had a thoroughly delightful evening and I left for New York on the midnight.

Before I left we talked for a half hour reviewing the situation and decid-
ing upon a program. He promised to look over the War and Navy tomorrow and
see what could be done to strengthen them. Both he and Mrs. Wilson urged me to
return next week to hear him make his address to Congress.

I drove from the White House to Gregory's and picked up Grayson, who
went to the train with me. While I have been at the White House but thirty-
six hours, the President gave me of his time all that I desired.

New York.
March 29, 1917.

Among the visitors today were Cleveland H. Dodge, Sir William Wiseman,
Gifford Pinchot and William R. Willcox.

Dodge made some suggestions concerning the Belgian Relief. I had already
spoken to the President about this while in Washington and had gotten his tenta-
tive approval for segregating a hundred and fifty million dollars for the Belgians.

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out of any loan the United States might make to the Allies.

Willcox discussed the organization of Congress. He will go to Washington tomorrow and try and get the republican leaders to consent to the democrats organizing the House. He believes this to be both patriotic and good politics from the republican viewpoint. I was surprised to hear Willcox approve of the transfer of General Wood.

Pinchot requested solicited my good offices in securing him some sort of place for service in the event of war.

Wiseman and I went over affairs of interest between our two governments.
I gave him some intimation of what the President would say in his address to
Congress, in order that he might forecast it to his Government and have them, in
turn, arrange for a favorable reception by the European press.

Through the patriotic generosity of David Miller we now have a direct
telephone wire from my apartment to Gordon's office and thence to the State De-
partment at Washington. It is only necessary to lift off the receiver and I
t reach Polk's desk immediately. It is instantaneous, perfectly secret and very
satisfactory. The cost to Miller is considerable, but he insists upon it as
a contribution to the war. It gives me constant touch with Washington and I
hope it will be of value to the Government.

March 30, 1917.

Hugh Wallace was my first caller. He came
from Washington, so he said, to have me "brush the cobwebs out of his brain".
This process seems more satisfactory to him than to me.

Herman Ridder and Carl Schurz followed. They are cooperating actively
with the Police Department in trying to keep down disturbing elements. I urged them to tell their people to be calm and not place themselves in the wrong;
to let the "war at any price" party do that.

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Commander Gherardi of the Navy called to discuss naval matters. The Collector of the Port telephoned to say that the Red D Liner Philadelphia from Caracas sighted a submarine yesterday 53 miles off our coast. I immediately conveyed this information to Polk who, in turn, conveyed it to the Navy Department. Polk informs me that the shells used on the six inch guns on the S. S. St. Louis were shown to be distressingly defective in their target practice.

Whitehouse followed Gherardi. He is heartsick over the turn of events. I tried to give him a more optimistic view and to reassure him as to the ultimate outcome in the event we enter the war.

Thos. Chadbourne called to get the latest information as to the situation. Then came Wiseman. He tells me that the article by Colcord in the Public Ledger on the peace conference has created bad feeling in England, again. They believe the article was inspired. I told him frankly of my connection with it, declaring however that the President knew nothing of it. I insisted that the British reactionaries need not contemplate any unity of thought or feeling between the United States and themselves; that our purposes were entirely at variance. It is a pity that at this time when a wave of liberalism is sweeping over the world, Great Britain should have a reactionary Government.

March 31, 1917.

Captain Gherardi, Inness Brown, David Miller and Edward G. Lowry were callers. Lowry came to tell of the result of his observations in a two weeks' trip through Kansas and Missouri. He believes the people do not wish war but that they will follow the President. He said in Missouri they do not seem to know what it is all about. This is the pathos of the things and what is true there is true largely all over the world.

Inness Brown gave me the Seaboard Air Line's ideas concerning the con-

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gressional committee which is endeavoring to formulate a plan to regulate or
rejuvenate the railroads.

David Miller and Gordon called to talk over matters connected with
their work for the Government.

We went to dinner at Sherry's given to Dr. Henri Bergson by George
Foster Peabody. There were some twenty-odd guests. I took out the Marchion-
ess de Godowski, the Polish woman who has recently written "When the Prus-
sians came to Poland". I found her intelligent, broad-minded and interesting.
She said that von Hindenburg stayed at her home in Poland for a week and that
he was coarse, brutal and not too intelligent.

April 1, 1917.

Hugh Gibson, Amos Pinchot and Dudley Malone were the principal callers.
Gibson conferred with me upon departmental affairs; Amos Pinchot upon his pro-
paganda regarding the enlisting of the rich to pay the expenses of the war. He
has taken the President on trust, believing he has done all that he could to
keep the country at peace. I persuaded Pinchot that the best thing for us to
do now was to go in with a heavy hand, otherwise, the President would not be in
aposition to help the unhappy many who bear the burden of war made by their
masters.

We dropped in at the Adrian Iselin for a moment to tea.

Mrs. Wilson telegraphed that the President may address Congress tomorrow and
I have sent word that I would leave for Washington on the night train.

Dudley Malone asked my advice concerning the German ships at this port.
The Navy Department sent him word today to take the necessary steps to protect
them. Dudley at first thought of taking some drastic action, but upon my ad-
sertion that the President did not desire anything done that looked like Ger-

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man methods, he decided upon a milder plan.

The White House,
Washington, D. C.

April 2, 1917.

I arrived in time for breakfast. The President and Mrs. Wilson were ready to play golf and I saw him for a moment only. While he was on the links I motored with Frank Polk and we discussed pending matters. He says neither Lansing nor any member of the Cabinet knows what the President will say in his address to Congress today. As far as I know, he has spoken to no one on the subject of this address excepting me. We outlined it together when I was here last week and I have the substance although not the form of it.

I returned to the White House around noon but did not attempt to see anyone other than Polk. My reasons for this were that I did not want the Cabinet members to ask me about the address. I do not wish them to know that the President has discussed it with me, and I do not wish to reveal its contents.

McAdoo telephoned and asked about the address and asked how I liked it. I evaded a direct answer by saying that from what the President had told me of it I thought it would meet every expectation.

The President read the address to me and I suggested his eliminating a phrase which read something like this: "until the German people have a government we can trust". He was doubtful about this part of the sentence and I had no difficulty in persuading him to eliminate it. It looked too much like inciting revolution. It is needless to say that no address he has yet made pleases me more than this one, for it contains all that I have been urging upon him since the war began. I have tried, time and again, to get the British

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Government to differentiate between the German Government and the German people, and I suggested this also to the President after the sinking of the Lusitania. I have tried to get the President, as my letters will show, to demand among nations the same code of honor and morals as between individuals. He handles this apart superbly.

I suggested, too, a short time ago, a statement that the United States would not join a league of nations of which an autocracy was a member.

The President was apparently calm during the day, but, as a matter of fact, I could see signs of nervousness. Neither of us did anything except "Kill time" until he was called to the Capitol. In the morning, he told me he was determined not to speak after three o'clock, believing it would make a bad impression-- an impression that he was unduly pressing matters. I thought differently and persuaded him that he should hold himself ready to address Congress whenever that body indicated their readiness to hear him. It turned out, however, that he began to speak at twenty minutes to nine and finished in about thirty-two minutes. I timed him carefully.

I asked him why he had not shown the Cabinet his address. He replied that if he had, every man in it would have had some suggestion to make and it would have been picked out to pieces until it was unrecognizable if he had heard their criticisms. He said he preferred to keep it to himself and take the responsibility. I feel that he does his Cabinet an injustice. He should not humiliate them to such an extent. Not a member knew what he would say until they heard it delivered. I have noticed recently that he holds a tighter rein over his Cabinet and that he is impatient of any initiative on their part.

It would be interesting to know how much of his address the President thinks I suggested. He does not indicate, in any way, that he is conscious that I had any part in it, I think it is quite possible that he forgets from what source he receives ideas and suggestions.

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that
We had early dinner at half past six, for word had come from Congress
had been organized and would be ready to receive him at eight o'clock. We
talked of everything excepting the matter in hand. There was no one present
at dinner other than members of the family who had come to Washington to hear
the address, and no one touched upon the coming speech.

When we returned from the Capitol, the President, Mrs. Wilson, Margaret
and I foregathered in the oval room and talked it over as families are prone
do do after some eventful occasion. I had handed the President a clipping
from Current Opinion, giving the foreign estimate of him. He read this aloud,
and we discussed the article. I thought the President had taken a position
as to policies which no other statesman had yet assumed. He seemed surprised
to hear me say this and thought perhaps Webster, Lincoln and Gladstone had an-
nounced the same principles. I differed from him. It seemed to me that he
did not have a true conception of the path he was blazing. Of the modern
statesmen, Mazzini is the one who had a similar outlook, but no other, as far
as I know.

I left at 10.30 to take the train for New York. I could see the Pres-
ident was relieved that the tension was over and the die cast. I knew this
would happen. Grayson went with me to the station.

New York,
April 3, 1917.

Professor Irving Fisher and Sir William Wiseman were my principal visitors.
There was nothing important to report concerning their calls. I have been
busy today trying to catch up with correspondence and talking with friends who
are sending in their congratulations because of the President's speech. Many
thanked me for the part I have taken, though none know how much or how little
that was.

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April 4, 1917.

Frederick Allen, Frederick Palmer, S. R. Bertron and D. H. Hough were my principal callers. Palmer came to suggest his fitness for the Censorship if one is established. He does not desire it except in a spirit of patriotic service and, I think, because of his experience abroad, he would make a satisfactory one.

Hough reported on Russia from whence he has just returned. He gave an interesting account of the revolution which was pending when he left.

April 5, 1917.

The days are a continual turmoil now. Telephone calls, telegrams, letters and personal interviews occupy every waking hour. Poor old Whitehouse is distressed unto death at the turn of events. I tried to hearten him and partially succeeded.

April 6, 1917.

Last Night Dudley Malone returned from Washington and told of the decision to take over all the German ships. I was sorry to hear this because I think, for the moment, it would be better to let them remain as they are.

Willet, of the London Times, George Gordon Moore, friend of Lord French, Macfarlane, of the Boston American, Thos. Chadbourne, Captain Gaunt, Lincoln Colcord, and Harry Sleeper were some of my callers.

Glauck Last Night Gaunt brought me a cable from Balfour. My letter of last night to the President will explain. Polk tells me over the telephone that the President read the cablegram at the Cabinet meeting today and they discussed the advisability of my sending a favorable response. Polk thinks they will delay until they have another incident similar to the one when the President failed to answer Alphonso's message sent through Ambassador Willard.

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If it is done, it should be done quickly.

The French Government have offered to send Joffre and Viviani over, and the President is also halting regarding them. The only objection to their coming that I can see is that it might create an unfavorable feeling throughout the country that we are fighting more for the Allies than we are for the great principles laid down by the President in his April second speech.

Moore came at the request of Howard Coffin of the Council for National Defence who sees in him a good commissioner to be sent to Europe.

Macfarlane was disturbed because they have had an intimation from the State Department that the film "Patria" is objectionable at this time because of its reference to Japan. Macfarlane said that Hearst paid $750,000. for the film and hoped no serious objection would be raised. They promise to eliminate, as they have in Canada, objectionable features. I took the matter up with Polk later and he thought a compromise might be made and I so informed Macfarlane. The objection from the State Department was probably made because of my suggestion to the President.

Chadbourne is disturbed because of the excessive income tax proposed. He also accuses the Navy Department of trying to squeeze manufacturers down to no profits in the purchase of war materials.

Harry Sleeper's trouble was about the American Ambulance Corps in France. An offer has been made to merge it with the Red Cross and to this he objects.

Colcord came as usual to talk of articles in preparation. He says the Public Ledger has increased its circulation from 60,000 to 100,000 under its new policy. I am delighted, and am advising them what further to do toward making it an influential liberal organ, which I hope it may become.

B. M. Baruch is back from Washington to tell of his trials and tribu-

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lations as a member of the Council of National Defence.

April 7, 1917.

My first caller this morning was Edward S. Martin. Then Howden Smith of the Evening Post, Hilda Spong, the actress, followed and she was succeeded by the Mayor.

The Mayor desires to form a brigade and wishes my good offices at Washington. He declares he will not be candidate for re-election, but of this I have some doubt.

Miss Spong asked advice as to how she could best help Arthur Little raise a regiment. I outlined a plan for him to follow and promised to help when that was done.

Commissioner Woods called during the day to outline some plans of coordinating the National Intelligence departments.

Bertron came to tell of his visit to Washington yesterday. McAdoo asked him to see the French Ambassador and request him to come out publicly declining the suggestion that the United States give France a billion of dollars. McAdoo said there was no chance of Congress doing this and it was interfering somewhat with his plans for a bond issue. He thought if the Ambassador would make this statement, it might be possible to get Congress to lend France a billion for ten years without interest which would amount to an equivalent of nearly that much. Jusserand declined to make the statement, giving as an excuse that Cobb of the World might feel offended. He also thought he would have to consult his Government. Consulting his Government is an admissable excuse, but the idea of deferring to a newspaper editor when the Secretary of the Treasury made a request to the contrary, is too absurd to comment upon.

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Dr. Henri Bergson followed Bertron. He had several suggestions to make, the most pertinent of which was that he was afraid Germany intended to treat the United States as she had treated Italy, that is, refusing to declare war, and keeping on more or less friendly relations, which he thought Germany might do in order to confuse the peace conference and get American opinion on her side.

We took dinner with Sir William and Lady Wiseman. There were no other guests as it was our purpose to have an intimate talk. We discussed the question of Balfour coming to America. I told him that Joffre and Viviani were also coming. He was surprised at this and did not seem enthusiastic. I often catch some ill feeling on the part of the English against the French and, again, on the part of the French against the English.

I shall write the President tomorrow and will sum up the conclusions to which Sir William and I came.

Polk telephoned from Washington to tell the day's news. Brazil, it seems, would like now to sign the peace pact which I started some two and a half years ago, and which fell through for one cause and another. I advised letting Brazil sign it as they desire. I cautioned Polk, and Lansing through him, to urge as close a union with Brazil as it was possible to bring about. I hope she will have the good sense to join us in the war, because it would have a disheartening effect upon Germany to have the Americas solidly against her.

April 8, 1917.

Beruch is here from Washington and tells me of the activities of the Council for National Defence. Things are going so much better than anyone anticipated that one feels encouraged to believe that we may pull through without severe criticism. As I have remarked before, the President has a

Notes. I took this up with Lansing and he thought we had best let Ritter remain for the moment.

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tendency to dampen both enthusiasm and initiative, which is a dangerous thing to do since once gone it is difficult to revive. I wish he knew more about the experience Great Britain and France have gone through. That is what we should take as our guide.

We went to the Henry Street Settlement to dinner and later to the Neighborhood Playhouse. It was an interesting experience and I shall write Miss Weld tomorrow and tell her what I think of her work.

April 9, 1917.

Remely of the Evening Mail brought me a cable from Odell, their correspondent in Berlin, which says that he should see me and tell me that my presence at the Hague is most desirable. This must mean that the Germans are thinking more earnestly of peace than is apparent on the surface. Odell is in close touch with the German Government, and is considered by some, a German agent. I shall forward the despatch to the President for his information.

Rabbi Wise was one of my callers. He is in an exalted frame of mind because of the happenings in Russia and because of the high note struck by the President in his April second speech. There were several matters about which he wished advice and others about which he made suggestions.

Shelling the pianist though an American is in close touch with the American-Swiss colony. He asked whether the Swiss Minister at Washington was persona grata to our Government to the extent that he, Ritter, tried to convey. The Swiss in the United States do not like him. They consider him pro-German and wished me to give them a hint that we were not entirely wedded to him. If this is done, they promise to have him recalled and a man more friendly to the Allies sent in his place. Note.

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Mr. Alexander, President of the National Bank of Commerce, called with one of his vice presidents to discuss the forthcoming bond issues and to make suggestions as to their sale. He suggests an advisory committee of bankers.

Oscar Straus followed to talk of Russia and his plan to send a commission there. He was kind enough to suggest me as Chairman and President Taft, George Kennan and others as members. I told him it was impossible for me to leave at this time, but I promised to take the matter up with the President.

Cleveland Dodge, Roy Howard, Polk, Hemphill of the Guaranty Trust Co. and innumerable others have held me at the telephone today.

April 10, 1917.

I went to Muller-Ury's to make some suggestions regarding the portrait he is painting of the President while in the attitude of *making* delivering his historic April second address.

Stephane Lausanne and Marcel Knechth came for a conference which was entirely pleasant and perhaps useful. R. W. Woolley came for advice about accepting a position with the League to Enforce Peace. I advised accepting under certain conditions.

Whitehouse, Taylor, Secretary of the Century Association, Lefèvre, the author, and many others called during the day.

Madame and M. Paderewski gave us a charming dinner at Delmonico's. There were twenty-odd guests. The table was beautifully decorated, and after dinner they entertained us with selections by French musicians playing on ancient instruments. We drank the health of the President, and to both France and Poland. We have never had hosts kinder or more complimentary. All the guests seemed to have been selected for our entertainment, and there were many artists among the number. No one was allowed to talk politics or serious

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matters, which I appreciated. Paderewski said he thought Loulie had "the most
heavenly face I have ever seen". And this reminds me that Maxine Elliott told
Mrs. Chadbourne that she considered Loulie the most beautiful woman she had
ever seen.

April 11, 1917.

Bainbridge Colby was my first caller. He said the Grand Jury had unanimously voted to indict the officials of the paper trust. I told him they had caused me infinite trouble by sending people to try influence me in their behalf.

Paderewski came in great excitement as some of the Polish Falcons had
had their guns taken away from them and they could not understand why. I
called up Commissioner Woods and found it was a mistake so peace soon reigned
in Polish quarters.

I discussed with Walter Lippman the subject of a publicity bureau. I
advised that he get in touch with Professor Canby of Yale and work out a plan
with him and I would help them put it through.

Mr. Hemphill came to discuss the financial measures which the Administration is proposing to Congress. He said about 33 1/3% of the war enthusiasm has already departed from Wall Street because of the suggested taxation. I felt that it would.

Hamilton Holt followed to discuss matters concerning the League to Enforce Peace.

Mr. and Mrs. Chadbourne, Dr. and Mrs. Robert Myles and Mrs. Leggett came to dinner. WAXWAXWAXWAXWAX Afterward we were Sir Beerbohm Tree's guests at the New Amsterdam Theater to see him in "Colonel Newcomb". It was a very interesting performance, although measurably well done.

I had the usual number of telephone calls and from Washington and
elsewhere.

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April 12, 1917.

James M. Beck, Sidney Brooks and Edward S. Martin lunched with me. They are all clever and it was an enjoyable affair.

Governor Herrick was my most important caller in the afternoon. He came apropos of nothing as far as I could see.

A committee from the League to Enforce Peace called to ask whether I would advise their giving a dinner to Balfour, Joffre and Viviani and other notable guests coming from France and England. I advised doing nothing for the moment; that as soon as I knew their itinerary I would let them know what was best to do.

Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt telephoned to offer her home for any purpose I thought might be pleasant in entertaining the Balfour party. She offered to give a dinner, allowing me to name the guests. I told her also that I would later let her know.

We dined with Mrs. James Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt's mother. Some of the other guests were, Mrs. E. H. Harriman, Mr. and Mrs. Cass Ledyard and some sixteen or eighteen others.

April 13, 1917.

Among the callers today were Gordon Abbott of the Old Colony Trust Co. and Herman Ridder of the Staats Zeitung. Abbott came about war financing and Ridder about German-Americans influencing their brethren in Germany in the direction of democracy. We agreed upon a plan which I think will be effective if it can be carried out.

The President's cypher telegram about Brazil and my reply are attached. I am exceedingly anxious that this South American pact should go through, for it was my conception and, for a long while, my pet child.

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We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Amos Pinchot. It was a small dinner of long hair-
ed men and short-haired women. To my mind, Max Eastman was the most interesting
guest. I talked to them after dinner, trying to prove that it was best for de-
mocracies like England, France and the United States to give their governments
dictatorial powers in time of war. I thought if this were not done, democracy
would not be able to cope with autocracy, and the argument should be made that no
country could be effective or safe under democratic form of government. I de-
sired these socialists to approve of the powers Congress is giving the President.

April 14, 1917.

Henry Morganthau and Sir William Wiseman were interesting callers. I asked Morganthau to get the Jews of America, who are foregathering here tomorrow, to send a cable to their kinsmen in Russia asking them to sustain the present government there, and urge them not to make a separate peace with Germany because of the blow such a move would give to democracy throughout the world. He promised to do this.

Wiseman told of the plans made for Balfour and his party. I had received this information direct from Washington from Polk. Wiseman is anxious for me to see Balfour alone before he sees the President. He and the Ambassador have sent warning telegrams to Balfour at Halifax, cautioning him not to get in touch with the wrong people when he arrives. This is important and I am glad they thought of it.

Polk telephoned a cablegram from our Minister at Copenhagen saying he would be careful about transmitting any further messages. He did not answer our main question, that is how much substance there was in O'dell's message sent through the Evening Mail. I asked Polk to repeat this question and to get an answer.

Yesterday, McAdoo telephoned me to use my good offices with the
President for him, McAdoo, to head the Russian Commission. I arranged by tele-

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phone for Lansing to make the suggestion at the Cabinet meeting this afternoon.
He did so and it was favorably received. Most of the members were enthusiastic at the thought of getting McAdoo out of Washington for a few months. They all complain that he tries to run not only his own department but theirs as well.

Today, McAdoo telephoned again and his enthusiasm had waned. He thinks now he will be too busy to leave. Yesterday he thought it could be easily arranged. How easily our judgment is guided by our desires.

April 15, 1917.

It has been a quiet day. Wiseman was my only important visitor. We discussed Balfour's visit and a plan by which I could see him before he saw anyone else. Wiseman thinks I should give him a survey of the situation as to the attitude of the United States. He told me what Spring-Rice had in mind to say to Balfour and he thinks this should be neutralized. What a task it is to work against such erratic and uncertain influences. Sir William thought I should guide Balfour as to what he should say to the President and not allow him to drift on the rocks.

We took dinner with Nancy and Sidney.

April 16, 1917.

Whitehouse reported on his visit to the President. He talked with the President nearly an hour. I am afraid the next time I send someone to him for a "minute talk" he will shy. Whitehouse was in an exalted frame of mind. It meant so much to him to see the President before going back to his constituents in England. If he had failed to see him it would have embarrassed him. He asked me to write a letter thanking him expressing my appreciation of what he had tried to do over here. This letter can be found in the copying book. He gave me one of his books and wrote in it: "To Colonel House, with the gratitude

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and affection of the author".

Young Marcellus Dodge called to ask if anything could be done concern-
ing the contracts which his company, the Remington Arms, had with Russia. He
said they had borrowed forty millions of dollars to carry these contracts through
and that it now seemed likely the Russian Government would not go on with its
part. I refused to advise further than that he go to Washington and find for
himself the proper channel to work through.

Mr. Ohl, of the New York Herald, followed Dodge. His trouble was that the
Jews were about to offer Russia a replica of the Statue of Liberty. Ohl thought
this would be a mistake and I agree with him. We believe if this is done it
should be done by the United States and not by any sect. I promised to look
into the matter and see what action was necessary to head off the movement.

We dined at the Plaza with Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Brooks. They had a
private dining room and sitting room. The other guests were Elihu Root, Mr. and
Mrs. James Byrne, and Mr. and Mrs. Corbin and Miss Poor. Root and I talked for
an hour after dinner to the exclusion of the other guests. It was not a very
courteous thing to do, but since the dinner was given largely for that purpose,
we took advantage of it.

We discussed foreign affairs almost exclusively. Root criticised Roosevelt
for what he considered his attempt to ride two horses at the same time, that is
he was endeavoring to raise a division by the volunteer system and yet was urging
conscription. I told Root that the trouble the Administration was having
with conscription was that there were men like Roosevelt in every State in the
Union urging their senators and representatives toward the volunteer system
because they desired to raise divisions, brigades and regiments.

Root has been spoken of in such lauditory terms by the Eastern press and

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by the Republican Party that I expected to find a keener mind than he really has.
I believe he has a steadier mind than Wilson's and a more practical one, but he
is not so brilliant nor so alert, neither has he the literary and historic back-
ground which comes to the President said in almost every conversation on public
affairs. However, I believe from a republican viewpoint, Root would make a
great President.

April 17, 1917.

Frederick H. Allen came in distress because he was not placed upon the
Mayor's Executive Committee to receive Joffre and Viviani. I asked Gordon to
call up the Mayor's office and request that Allen be placed upon the Committee.

Vance McCormick followed Allen. We talked mainly about conditions at
Washington and the availability of Roland Morris for Ambassador to Japan. It
was agreed that Morris should lunch with me tomorrow so I might look him over.
I told McCormick of my suggestion to the President to have him, McCormick, act
as his aide. This pleased him and he indicated a keen desire for such work,
Hecompalined that the President never asked him for help or suggestions and he
was afraid to intrude. I advised him to make whatever suggestions seemed to him
pertinent, but not to make too many and not to press them after they had been made

Dr. Dwight Hillis followed McCormick. He has changed from a Wilson X-type
"baiter" to a Wilson "rooter". He seems a brilliant, nervous individual with
rare ability to do and say indiscreet things. He does not strike one as having
steady force.

Lippmann and Croly and Miss Ida Tarbell came to lunch. Lippmann arrived
a half hour in advance in order to have their weekly talk. Miss Tarbell remained
after they left to have a conference. I outlined to all of them the things I
thought they should do to help best.

Dr. Bergson came for a talk before leaving for Washington. I do not

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know whether it is French politeness or whether he really thinks of me in the
terms that he expresses, but he is certainly the most complimentary visitor I
have.

Rutger Jewett of Appletons, and Dudley Malone followed Bergson.
Herman Bernstein, for whom I sent at the suggestion of Morganthau, agreed
that the Jews would give up the exclusive privilege of presenting a statue of
liberty to Russia.

April 18, 1917.

This morning Carl Ackerman brought me a draft of his forthcoming book
which he may call, "Mr. Wilson and German Autocracy".

Roland Morris of Pennsylvania lunched with me. I like him and believe he
would do well for Japan-- in many respects better than McCormick.

C. R. Macauley, the cartoonist, James B. Duke, General Jacob Smith (Hell Roaring Jake) and Sir William Wiseman followed each other in succession. Wiseman and I discussed the coming visit of Balfour and his party, and also the details of the days work.

April 19, 1917.

Sir Horace Plunkett lunched with me. I was glad to see him so fit after his
long and tedious illness. We discussed the international situation at some
length. He surprised me by making, what seemed to me, the foolish proposal
that the United States should show her good will by sharing with Great Britain
the expenses of the war to date. In other words, we were to go back to the
beginning and take up the financial burden with her. I told Sir Horace I hoped
he would not mention this to anyone else, for I was sure it would be misconstru-
ed and hurt rather than help our good relations.

I had an interesting half hour with Dr. Simkhovitch of Columbia, Pro-
fessor of History and Political Economy. I have my views of the Russian sit-

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uation which was that the provisional government there was just as much at sea
as to what would happen in Russia as we were over here. I thought, since they
had swung themselves free of oppression centuries old, they would be eager to
make peace and take up their new and important domestic problems. Simkhovitch
agreed with this conclusion, but thought they would not be so dishonorable as
to make separate peace with Germany. We hoped they would feel the importance
of not making peace while German autocracy still lived.

William R. Willcox reported what he had accomplished in Washington the last
few days in his endeavor to help the President get compulsory service through
Congress.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Francis Rogers. Mr. and Mrs. Shelling and
Mr. and Mrs. Gardiner were the other guests. Shelling gave an interesting ac-
count of his early struggle toward fame in the musical world. He also told of
Paderewski's improvidence. He evidently believes he will be in monetary streits
before long because of his prodigality. He spends money like a king.

April 20, 1917.

Frederick Palmer was the first caller. He had suggestions regarding
the coordination of certain kinds of war work with which he is familiar. I have
promised to help put it into motion.

Mrs. Joseph Fels followed. I did not quite understand why she was so in-
sistent upon an interview, for her talk did not indicate anything further than
a desire not to lose touch with me. She was complimentary in her estimate of
the public work I am trying to do. She declares she always thinks of the Pres-
ident and me as one. She has accepted our entrance into the war as perhaps
providential, and she is big enough and broad enough in her views to see the
good that may come of it. She could not understand how I did the work I was
doing with "such an imperturbable countenance". She said it seemed as if I

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was doing the most commonplace things since there "was no evidence in my face of anxiety, responsibility or disturbance".

I motored with Martin to his country place near Wilton for the day. I intended to stop with him the night but before I started, Wiseman telephoned to say the British Mission might pass through tonight so I returned in order to keep in touch with the situation.

Polk telephoned in the evening to say that the British party would not be here until Sunday morning. His suggestion was for me to meet them at New Rochelle about seven o'clock. I vetoed this and asked him to schedule the train to reach New York around half past eight or nine, and I would go with them as far as Trenton.

April 21, 1917.

This is the anniversary of the Battle of San Jacinto. It always brings back memories of that valiant band of Texans who overthrew the Mexicans and won for Texas independence.

I have had many conversations with Washington concerning the Ball four party. I am sick unto death of it and have more than half a notion to avoid it.

I went up to Mezes' for dinner to meet General George Goethals. There was no one else present excepting one of the Trustees of the City College with whom Mezes talked so as to give me an opportunity to confer with Goethals. It has been a long time since I have met anyone I like so well. He is modest and able. I feel he is something like Kitchener, slow but sure. The undertaking which he has in hand needs celerity rather than thoroughness, and I urged him to bend all his great energies toward accomplishing quickly what was expected of him in creating a merchant marine.

He told of the difficulties. There is not sufficient seasoned timber

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to build the wooden ships contemplated, and we discussed how he could get steel
to build them of that. We agreed it would be better to use steel because the
ships would be lighter by 15%, therefore they would bear that much more cargo,
and they would be more valuable for a merchant marine after the war.

He believes if the President will permit him to commandeer certain steel
products which foreigners have contracted for, and to commandeer shipyards which
are now building for foreign accounts, he can make a creditable showing within
a year. The people will be disappointed because the tonnage will be far less
than anticipated. Goethals doubts whether he can do better than two million
tons the first year, and he does not believe he can get out any tonnage before
October 1st.

April 22, 1917.

Gordon and I met the British Mission this morning at nine o'clock. There
were besides Balfour, Admiral de Chair, General Bridges, Sir Eric Drummond, Lord
Eustace Percy, Lord Cunliffe and several minor officials of the British, and
General Leonard Wood, Admiral Fletcher and Assistant Secretary of State, Breck-
enridge Long with some minor American officials.

Balfour and I talked for more than an hour. It gave him an opportunity to
tell me the purpose of his visit and to ask questions of the situation here which
he wished to know for guidance. The letter I wrote the President upon my re-
turn tells of the conversation though not all. I advised Balfour to be entire-
ly frank in his statement to the President of the difficulties under which the
Allies are struggling. I suggested that he might exaggerate rather than minimize
them which would cause the President to feel that it was necessary for this
country to go in up to the hilt rather than in a desultory way.

I urged him not to talk peace terms, and to advise the President not
discuss peace terms with any of the other Allies. If he did, differences would

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be certain to arise and the problem now was to beat Germany and not discuss peace.
Balfour agreed to this in full, and said he would not talk to the President about
peace terms unless the President, himself, initiated it. Note.

Balfour asked what I thought of negotiating with Austria, Turkey and
Bulgaria for separate peace. I thought well of Austria and Bulgaria but believed
that we should put Turkey into the scrapheap along with German militarism. He
assented to this.

It pleased me to have Balfour rise with enthusiasm to my suggestion that
Great Britain and the United States should stand together for a just peace-- a
peace fair to all, to the small and as well as the large nations of the world.
Great Britain and America, I thought, were great enough to rise above all petty
considerations. I thought that what was best for the smaller nations was best,
in the long run, for Great Britain and the United States. This peace might
easily be one of the greatest events in history and if we were to justify our-
selves, we should not be small or selfish in its settlement.

In speaking of the war, Balfour said it was perhaps the biggest event in
history but beyond that he could not think; he could not grasp the details and
probably would never be able to do so; that coming generations might find it
possible to see the thing as it really existed but we could not.

In reference to the Allied representatives here, I could not resist
expressing regret that they had been without effective representation. He
asked whether Spring-Rice got on well with the President. I replied that he
never saw the President. I hoped, however, they would not recall Spring-Rice
for the reason that his subordinates like Wiseman, Gaunt and Sir Richard Crawford
were working in such close harmony with us that it would be a pity to disturb
existing relations by putting in a new man no matter how efficient he might be.
Spring-Rice I thought was charming in his best mood and was able, when at himself,

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to maintain his position. Balfour thanked me for giving this intimate view
of the diplomatic situation here.

I suggested, after he had seen the President, and if the he did not veto the
idea, that he make an announcement minimizing the importance of his visit. The
people, I thought, believed that some secret entanglement with Europe was immi-
nent. They should be disabused of this idea because it was so far from the
facts.

I had a few minutes' talk with Lord Cunliffe, with Admiral de Chair, with
General Bridges and with Sir Eric Drummond. Balfour urged me to come to Wash-
ington, and I promised to be there either the latter part of this week or the
first of next. He said that Grey, as well as himself, had the utmost confi-
dence in my fairness and judgment, and they appreciated what I had done toward
maintaining good relations between Great Britain and the United States.

Gordon and I left the train at Trenton and was met by David Miller with
whom we motored back to New York.

Sir William Wiseman called to get news of my conference and seemed
pleased with what I told him. My letter to the President is attached.

April 23, 1917.

Mrs. Marshall Field, Etienne Grosclaude, the French publicist, Commission-
er John J. Murphy and Governor Glynn called.

Mrs. Field confided to me some of her troubles and asked for advice and as-
sistance. She is a charming woman with much good sense, and we had no diffi-
culty in coming to an understanding as to what would be best, in the circum-
stances, for her young husband, who, later, will have great responsibility on
account of the enormous wealth he will inherit. She gave me an insight into
his capabilities and ambitions. He has no financial ability but has a <u>penchant</u>

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for polotice and diplomacy. I promised to advise with them both and to try to steer him in the right direction as far as I could see it.

Grosclaude brought a letter to me from Jules Cambon which is interesting and a part of the record.

Commissioner Murphy desired to interest me in some plan for food conservation, and Governor Glynn wished my sympathy and support in his own ambition to serve the Government in some conspicuous way.

April 24, 1917.

Herman Bernstein called to report on the Russian statue of liberty plan, and I advised as to further procedure.

Commissioner Marcus Marks wished to enlist my cooperation in furtherance of the daylight saving measure. I gave what I considered the best plan for action.

My old friend, Walter Morton, son of Senator Oliver P. Morton the great Republican War Governor of Indiana, appeared after a lapse of some forty years. He wished advice concerning his son. I was glad to give it, for his brother, Oliver T. Morton, was one of the closest friends I ever had, and some of the happiest days of my life were spent with him in Washington and elsewhere.

Dr. George Hale of the American Academy of Science reported on their activities regarding defence measures. It was a continuance of our talk of last summer. He explained how the American scientists were cooperating with their European brethren in the Allied countries.

April 25, 1917.

Mark Sullivan, Charles Grasty and Commander Azan took lunch with me. Our most interesting discussion was of Northcliffe. Sullivan and Grasty know him well. They say he never thinks a thing through, but acts upon impulse and his success is due to driving power and a belief in these impulses. Sullivan

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likened him to an abnormal boy whose mind had never fully developed and whose
brain had slipped a cog.

R. W. Woolley, Henry Morganthau, Sir Horace Plunkett and Dr. Simkhovitch
followed in succession with various subjects of minor importance to discuss. I
am leaving on the midnight for Washington to stop with Hugh Wallace over the
Balfour dinner he is to give.

1800 Massachusetts Avenue,
Washington, D. C.

April 26, 1917.

Frank Lane was my first and longest caller. We went over the work of the
it
Council for National Defence. He thought it an admirable body but was not
doing effective work because the President would give them no authority. He
said, in the early days of his administration of the Interior Department, he took
several matters to the President which delayed him in their execution so long
that he determined to act upon his own judgment and take the consequence.

He asked if the President relied upon my advice as much as ever, and whether
I saw him as frequently as in former days. I gently evaded this, and left him
under the impression that, perhaps, I was not consulted more than the Cabinet.
I was glad to see that he was pleased with himself and the work of the Council.
I shall make inquiries from others on the inside to see how well they agree with
his view.

I had lunch with the President and we talked for an hour or more afterward. He said his first conference with Balfour, at which Lansing was present, was not satisfactory for the reason, as he expressed it, "Lansing has a wooden mind and continually blocked what I was trying to say convey. I would like to have a conversation with Balfour, you being present. How would it do to invite him to a family dinner and then go into a conference afterward. Do you think this could be done without hurting the sensibilities of anyone?"

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My reply was that it could easily be done and it was therefore arranged.
He wrote a note to Balfour and asked me to hand it to Drummond with whom he
knew I had a four o'clock engagement. In this letter he substantially said
this:

My dear Mr. Balfour

I would like you to dine with me informally next Monday eve-
ing at eight o'clock. I have asked House to spend the week-end with me so the
three of us may discuss matters together.

Sincerely yours,

The President then told me the substance of his first interview with Balfour and the ground covered. I argued against discussing peace terms with the Allies, just as I did in my first conversation with Mr. Balfour, and in my letter to the President. The President thought it would be a pity to have Balfour go home without a discussion of the subject. My thought was that there was no harm in discussing it between themselves if it was distinctly understood and could be said, that there was no official discussion of the subject, and if neither Government would discuss peace terms with any of the other Allies. It was agreed that this should be done.

In my conference with Sir Eric Drummond, it was thought advisable for
me to see Mr. Balfour again before he saw the President, so I might know how to
guide the conversation and make it effective and harmonious. Drummond dis-
cussed with me quite frankly the situation which faces them as to Spring-Rice.
They see he is nervously unfit for his duties. Drummond thought they would take
him back to England for a rest. I expressed the hope that it would be merely
for a rest, and that they would not replace him by another man who would disturb
existing conditions. The fact that Spring-Rice has not been fit has forced us
to work with his subordinates, and this arrangement is now quite satisfactory.

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and we do not wish it interrupted. He promised nothing would be done to upset
the method now in force.

We talked of the unsatisfactory condition of the submarine warfare. I
thought that whatever they were doing they should try something else, for they
could not do worse than at present. It interested me to have him explain the
"funnel idea" which I gave Gaunt some two months ago and which he has evidently
passed on and which they are planning to adopt.

We worked out an arrangement by which we were to keep in close communica-
tion through Viseman.

April 27, 1917.

Ex-President Taft arrived at the Wallaces this afternoon as a house guest.
We had an interesting talk before dinner. He constantly referred, in a humorous
way, to my reputation for silence. Every time he left the room he would say,
"I hope the Colonel will not be indiscreet in my absence".

The dinner guests, besides Mr. Taft and Mr. Balfour, were Jus-
tices Day and McReynolds, Senators Knox, Saulsbury and Gary and Representative
Gillette and Gordon. I sat with President Taft on the one side and Stilson
Hutchins on the other. Hutchins amused me by giving his opinion of Roosevelt
and George Harvey whom he considered the greatest egotists and advertisers the
world had ever seen. He said that God was kind to P. T. Barnum for letting
him die before he knew of Roosevelt and Harvey, as he would have been deeply
humiliated at his inferiority as an advertiser.

Knox asked Taft how how people addressed him, "President Taft, Professor Taft or Judge Taft". Taft replied, "It does not concern me so long as they do not call me Colonel". Knox asked if this was a reflection upon me. I replied that I did not feel that it was; that I had a suspicion Mr. Taft referred to someone else. I offered, to save Mr. Taft's feelings, to use my good offices

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in having Colonel Roosevelt made a General. Taft said if I succeeded in my ef-
forts he would then be glad to join the ranks of colonels.

Later, Knox told us an incident which Taft afterward confirmed. On a train
not long ago and after Taft's overwhelming defeat, a man came up to the ex-Pres-
ident and said: "Mr. Taft I would like you to know that I voted for you for
President". Taft answered, "Thank you my friend I will keep it in confidence".

When I asked him as to the truth of this incident, he said the other day
he was in a shop making some purchases. The clerk, not knowing him, said,
"Sir, you are the dead image of Mr. Taft." Taft replied, "Please do not lay
so much emphasis on the word dead".

I thoroughly enjoyed being with Mr. Taft. He is a big hearted, good-
natured, indolent fellow.

Balfour stood in the drawing room after dinner from half past nine until
eleven o'clock. We all tried to be polite and stand with him but McReynolds
and I dropped into chairs first and the others gradually followed. Balfour
asked my advice concerning the many invitations he is receiving for different
functions, offers of degrees from universities etc. My advice was to decline
everything, conserving his strength, and promising to return at a more auspi-
cious time to accept the kindly hospitality offered.

I had many important conferences during the day. Secretary Houston called
and spent an hour with me. He says it is stated there are one hundred and one
people in the United States. He discredits this, declaring he has received two
hundred million letters advising him how to run the Department of Agriculture.
He said he was fond of Lane, and then proceeded to tell me that if they could
get rid of Lane in the Council for National Defence they might be able to ac-
complish something. Lane, he said, was browsing around interfering with every-
body and not doing anything. I hope Houston does not learn to like me as he

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says he does Lane.

Sir Eric Drummond told Wallace at dinner that many people had asked Viscount (Sir Edward) Grey for his photograph but, as far as he knew, Lord Grey had never asked for anyone's excepting mine. I hope this is true for I have a real affection for him.

April 28, 1917.

My most important conference today was with Mr. Balfour. I made no secret of it and went directly to Breckenridge Long's house, which he is occupying. No else one was present and we talked for an hour and a half without interruption. And this reminds me that Sir Eric asked yesterday whether it would be convenient for Balfour to continue to be a guest of the Government rather than going to the British Embassy as planned. I told him it would be. I later spoke to the officials in the State Department and told them of Balfour's request and my reply.

I asked Drummond, and Balfour as well, to open their minds to me as freely as to one another so that things might go without friction. They promised to do so and this is an evidence of it.

Balfour wished to know where we should begin our discussion, whether we should first take up peace terms to be imposed in the event of a decisive defeat of Germany, or whether to take it up on a basis of a stalemate or partial defeat. I thought we had better discuss the first proposition.

He had a large map of Europe and of Asia Minor and we began this most important and interesting discussion, the understanding being that he and I would go through with it first, according to my estimate, letting me convey our conclusions to the President before the three of us had our conference on Monday.

We took it for granted that Alsace and Lorraine would go to France, and that France, Belgium, and Serbia would be restored.

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We first discussed Poland and outlined what its boundaries should be. Of course, the stumbling block was the outlet to the sea. There can be no other excepting Danzig, and to take Danzig would be to go through East Prussia. This, I thought, would be a mistake because it would leave an Alsace and Lorraine to rankle and fester for future trouble. Balfour thought it might be made a free port, and in that way satisfy Poland. At the moment, I do not look upon this with favor, particularly since the Germans and Poles would be antagonistic and upon the slightest provocation, ready to find grievances against one another. We decided came to no conclusion upon this point because none could be arrived at. However, I warmly advocated a restored and rejuvenated Poland-- a Poland big enough and potential enough to serve as a buffer state between Germany and Russia.

Serbia came next, and it was agreed that Austria must return Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that Serbia, on her part, should give to Bulgaria that part of Macedonia which the first Balkan agreement gave her, and which was lost by her greediness in trying to grab additional territory which was not rightfully hers. Balfour thought Serbia would object to this, but that she must be forced to do so in the solution of a peaceful settlement.

Roumania, we thought, should have a small part of Russia which her people inhabited and also a part of Hungary for the same reason.

three

We thought Austria should be composed of these states, such as Bohemia, Hungary and Austria proper.

We came to no conclusion as to Trieste. I did not consider it best or desirable to shut Austria from the Adriatic. Balfour argued that Italy claimed she should have protection for her east coast by having Dalmatia. She has no seaport from Venice to Brindisi, and she claims she must have the coast opposite in order to protect herself. Balfour referred to Italy as being greedy.

This led me to ask what treaties were out between the Allies as to

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the division of spoils after the war. He said they had treaties with one an-
other, and that when Italy came in they made one with her in which they had pro-
mised pretty much what she demanded.

Balfour spoke with regret at the spectacle of great nations sitting down
and dividing up the spoils of war or, as he termed it, "dividing up the bearskin
before the bear was killed". I asked him if he did not think it proper for
the Allies to give copies of these treaties to the President for his confidential
information. He thought such a request entirely reasonable and said he would
have copies made for that purpose. He was not certain they had brought them
over, but if not, he would send for them.

I asked if he did not consider it wise for us to keep clear of any
promises so that at the peace conference we could exert an influence against
greed and an improper distribution of territory. I said to him, what I once
said to Grey, that if we are to justify our being in the war in this world we
should free ourselves entirely from petty, selfish thoughts and look
at the thing broadly and from a world viewpoint. Balfour agreed to this with
enthusiasm. He was good enough to say: "I like to confer with you; I like your
mind. It is so clear and direct". He spoke with much feeling, which surprised
me, for he is not given to emotions.

Constantinople was our next point. We agreed that it should be inter-
nationalized. Crossing the Bosphorus we came to Anatolia. It is here that the
secret treaties between the Allies come in most prominently. They have agreed
to give Russia a sphere of influence in Armenia and the northern part. The
British take in Mesopotamia which is contiguous to Egypt. France and Italy
each have their spheres embracing the balance up to the Straits.

It is all bad and I told Balfour so. They are making it a breeding
place for future war. I asked what the spheres of influence included. Balfour

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was hazy concerning this; whether it meant permanent occupation, or whether it
meant that each nation had the exclusive right to develop the resources within
their own sphere, he was not altogether clear.

We did not touch upon the German Colonies, neither did we touch upon
Japan, China, or the Eastern question generally.

We went back to Poland. His objection to a Polish state, cutting off
Russia from Germany, was whether it would not hurt France more than Germany for
the reason it would prevent Russia from coming to France's aid in the event of
an attack by Germany. I thought we had to take into consideration the Russia
of fifty years from now rather than the Russia of today. While we might hope it
would continue democratic and cease to be aggressive, yet if the套筒式武器
contrary happened, Russia would be the menace to Europe and not Germany. I
asked him not to look upon Germany as a permanent enemy. If we did this, it
would confuse our reasoning, and mistakes would likely be made. Balfour, how-
ever, was more impressed with the German menace than he was by the possible
danger from Russia.

I stated with emphasis that I believed a right solution could only come
by the British and American Governments taking a stand together for the right.
In this I thought we might be joined by Russia under the new control.

As I left the house a number of photographers tried to photograph me.
The secret service men prevented them from doing so unless I gave my consent
which I did not do. I walked back to Wallace's where I was to have lunch with
Secretary Baker. The photographers had driven down the street and were awaiting
me when I arrived. A few feet in front of me were some six or eight negro la-
boards striking off for lunch. I walked into the midst of them. They began to
give way but I begged them not to do so and to allow me to walk with them. The
newspaper photographers grinned and said "All right Colonel, if you do not want

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us to take you we wont do it".

There was no one present at lunch except Mr. Teft, Baker, Wallace and myself. The conversation at the table was general and Baker and I excused ourselves afterward and went into private conference. I wished to go through army matters with him, and to give such advice as I thought might be of value. I told him of the many criticisms I had heard of his department, particularly what General Wood had said. He met most of the criticism satisfactorily. I like Baker so much that I hope he may succeed in carrying through his difficult undertaking. While he is not the man for the place, it is evident that the President will keep him, and, if retained, I want him to excel.

Woolley, Gregory, McAdoo and many others took up the afternoon, I dined alone with the President and Mrs. Wilson. After dinner we went to the theater and then to bed without having any serious discussion.

I moved over to the White House today.

April 29, 1917.

I devoted my morning to going through mail and telegrams which have poured in upon me and which I have not even had the time to open.

At one o'clock, Frank Polk, Miss Bones, Miss Brennan and I drove to the Navy Yard to board the Mayflower which Secretary Daniels had commissioned to take the French and British Commissions to Mount Vernon. In addition to the personnel of the Missions the members of the Cabinet were present. I was busy from the time I boarded ship until I returned with discussions with different people. The most interesting was person aboard was Marechal Joffre. I decided not to ask him any questions but, on the contrary, I told him something of political conditions which I had found in Germany preceding the war and since, which I had followed closely. He seemed interested, especially in my description of the intrigues of von Falkenhayn and von Tirpitz, and the manner in which von Hindenburg

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superceded them. When I stated that Ludendorff was the master mind behind Hin-
denburg, he wanted to know if it was not a fact that Hindenburg was the ruthless
executor. That is, Ludendorff's plans would perhaps be futile from the Prus-
sian viewpoint, if Hindenburg was not there to brutally execute them.

Lansing, Spring-Rice, Jusserand and I had an interesting conversation.

Lansing told me of Japan's desire to purchase the Philippines. We discussed this at some length. My view was that it might be done, provided safe-guards be thrown around the Islands for their protection and for their political independence. Lansing concurred in this view and we wondered what view the President would take of it. I thought of Philip Dru and the solution I made there of this question.

The British Ambassador spoke of me in the most affectionate terms, and insisted that our coming into the war and the good relations existing between our countries was largely due to me. He looked ill and I was touched by his pathetic look and condition.

The French Ambassador was equally complimentary. He lifted his hat and
said: "you have prophesied correctly concerning recent events. I wrote my
government about you and told them that, while you had prophesied accurately, it
must be remembered that you had the making of events in your hands.""

I concluded not to leave the boat at Mount Vernon, thinking I
would have a rest of an hour or so while the ceremonies took place. After
everyone had left the ship, I leaned over the rail to see the last boat cast
away. Baruch, who was about to board it caught sight of me and asked if I
were not coming. When I replied in the negative, he scrambled back and re-
mained with me the entire time. I was so fretted that it occurred to me that
it would be a good opportunity to ask him to let Seitz, of the New York World,
have $8500.00 for his Portland Argus, the unpaid part of $15,000.00 which Crane

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has been carrying for a year or more and now wishes to have paid. So the visit
with me cost Baruch $8500.00 which, I must say, he seemed entirely willing to pay.

The President, Mrs. Wilson, Miss Bones and I had dinner alone. After dinner we went to the upstairs sitting room and talked upon general subjects for awhile. The President read several chapters from Oliver's "Ordeal by Battle". He was interested in what I had to tell him of Oliver, and we discussed the different points Oliver made in the chapters read, agreeing to some and disagreeing as to others.

The President declared his intention of writing some things which were on
his mind after he retired from office. I suprised him by advising against his
writing at all. Mrs. Wilson said, "You astonish me. Why, that it was he does
best." The President spoke up, saying: "You do not understand, House is
afraid to have me write." This accusation I had to acknowledge was true. I
thought he would go out of office with such a tremendous reputation that it would
be a pity to endanger it by writing or doing anything that might make people
think less of him. The President agreed in general to this, and said he had
no notion of writing about his administration, but expressed a desire to write
one book which he has had long in mind and which he thought might have an influence for good.

He said, "I write with difficulty and it takes everything out of me".
This estimate of himself in that field of his endeavors would surprise the gen-
eral public since he is considered such a fluent writer. I asked how long it
took him to write his April second Address to Congress. He said ten hours. I
offered the opinion that his January 22nd speech to the Senate was a much able-
document because it had more original thought. His April 2nd speech pleased, I
thought, because it reflected the public mind, both here and in the Allied coun-

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tries. He concurred entirely in this conclusion.

We talked of the proposed book and its contents. I thought if he would bring out clearly the necessity for a more responsive form of government, and the necessity for having Cabinet members sit in the House of Representatives, it would be worth while. We agreed that if the Cabinet officers sat in the House, the outcome would be that the President would have to take his material for the Cabinet from Congress. This, in the end, would give the Cabinet more power, and would have the further effect of bringing into Congress the best talent in the country. It would eventuate into something like the British system.

I arranged with the President to see Cleveland Dodge and Harry Davison, of Morgan & Co. on Wednesday. Dodge wants Davison to be the executive head of the Red Cross during the war, believing it will mean a difference between a five million proposition and a fifty million. I also asked the President for authority to send a despatch to Sir Horace Plunkett thanking him for the good work he has been doing on both sides of the Atlantic. The President said he would sanction anything I cared to say.

April 30, 1917.

This has been a day filled with important work. I will not mention State Department officials, Cabinet members, etc. etc. but will go directly to the conversations I have had with the French and British Missions and with the President and Mr. Balfour.

I lunched at the French Embassy. The other guests besides the Ambassador and Madame Jusserand were, Marechal Joffre, Viviani, Admiral Chochresprat, Henry White, Myron T. Herrick, Marquis de Chambrun, Frank Polk and myself. Before lunch there was a very pretty ceremony. The household servants and some neighborhood children brought flowers to Joffre and presented him with a small souvenir. He thanked them in a few sentences.

There was no conversation of importance either at the table or afterward. My next engagement was with Sir Eric Drummond which we filled by a drive in a White House motor. Since our last talk he had thought of Viscount Grey of Fal-lodon as a special envoy to the United States to remain indefinitely. This, I considered, an admirable suggestion. He wondered whether Grey would accept. I was sure he would. It would mean that they would have a member of the British Government here with whom I, at least, and I believed the President as well, would talk to as frankly as to a member of our own Government, so much confidence did we have in Grey.

I again expressed the hope that they would not recall Spring-Rice or hu-miliate him in any way. The occasion should be made one of compliment to him rather than otherwise, and he should be brought home, given a peerage, and have all the badges pinned upon him as having completed a great work for his govern-ment. Drummond assured me this would be done.

We arranged to keep in constant communication through Wiseman, and I urged him to let me know of any difficulties which might arise, or of any annoyances however petty which might come up and would not be known unless he dealt frankly with me.

My next engagement was with Emile Hovelaque. This also was filled by a drive with him through Rock Creek Park. He desired to tell of the differences between Joffre and Viviani. Viviani, he said, has no sympathy with military men or their methods, and he and Joffre are continually quarrelling over the most trivial matters. The fault he laid to Viviani. Joffre's nerves are as steady as a rock, while Viviani is as jumpy as Spring-Rice. Viviani, being a social-ist, never wished France to prepare for war and he is impatient of the entire propaganda. Then, too, he is jealous of the marked difference between the re-ceptions given Joffre and himself.

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Hovelaque told of how serious conditions were in France and how necessary
it was to send our troops at once. It is very evident to me now that if the
United States had not entered the war when we did, Germany would have had more
than an even chance of success. The Allies seem to be pretty much at the end of
their tether, and it is to be hoped Germany is in an even more depleted condition.

Although I had seen Joffre at lunch, he sent me an earnest request for
another interview. It was unfortunate that I could only give him a half hour
as the request came so late that my remaining time was completely filled.

I went to Henry White's residence, where the French Mission is quartered,
and was shown into the Marechal's bedroom where we had our conference. Joffre
began by saying that he understood when he reached me he had reached the Amer-
ican Government, and he was anxious to explain the condition of France and how
necessary it was for American soldiers to be sent over at once. He thought he
could put them in condition to go to the front within five weeks after they ar-
rived, provided they knew the rudiments of military tactics. He merely wanted
them to be disciplined and to know the manual of arms.

We passed the usual compliments, both as to our countries and personally,
he not falling behind me in expressions of admiration. To me Joffre looks
more of the German than the French type. He must have been quite blonde when
young. His hair is now so streaked with grey that it is difficult to know its
original color. His eyes are peculiar, and, to me, the most striking feature he
has. He seems to have a well ordered mind, and appears to be the type of Gen-
eral well suited to the French in the time of stress which they were under when
he was in general command. I constantly compared him, in my own mind, to Gen-
eral Grant. I told him this, and he seemed not displeased at the comparison.

I had to leave before we had finished since I had an engagement with
McAdoo, and it was now after six o'clock and the President had asked me to re-

quest Balfour to move up the White House dinner engagement from eight o'clock to seven in order to give us more time.

I have asked the President to see Jeffre and Viviani separately in order to allay whatever feeling they might have because he had invited Balfour for to-night. My reason for this was that the importance of the Balfour conference should be minimized, not only with the public, but with Lansing so he might feel it was merely a social courtesy.

Besides the President, Mr. Balfour and myself there was no one present at dinner excepting Mrs. Wilson and Miss Bones. The President did most of the talking. I could see that he was nervous although I doubt whether it was apparent to Balfour. The conversation was along general lines, mostly educational, historical and architectural. The President told several stories of Lincoln, and Balfour listened with interest. He said Lincoln was not ready for the Presidency when it came to him; that up to that time he was not sufficiently educated and had not had adequate public experience. He spoke of the difficulty Lincoln had in acquiring an education and of his manner of obtaining it. They both thought it little less than marvellous, with his antecedents and limited opportunities, that he should develop a distinct literary flavor. Without saying so, I disagreed with them, for such things are given one at birth and not acquired except in a mediocre way.

In talking of education, the President expressed himself as not being in agreement with the general modern trend against the Classics. He thought the world had gained as much by the untruths of history as by the truths. He did not believe the human mind should be held down to facts and material matters. He considered that the trouble with Germany today. German thought expressed itself in terms of machinery and masses. The reading of the romance languages and of the higher flights of fancy in literature led one into spiritual realms

which, to say the least, was as advantageous to the world as its material progress. Balfour said he had never heard this view expressed but agreed with it, whether from politeness or not I do not know.

We took our coffee in the oval sitting room and when it was finished we went to the President's study and began a conference, the importance of which cannot be over-estimated. The President continued to do most of the talking. It was evident to me that he was keyed up for this conference as he had been resting most of the afternoon, not taking his usual exercise. To my mind, he was not at his best because of an apparent eagerness to excel. I had talked of Balfour so often to him and had given such a high estimate of his quality of mind, that he wished to make a good impression. As a matter of fact, he more than held his own, and presented a remarkable process of reasoning throughout the interview. But it seemed to me that I had seen him appear better, though I may have been over critical because I was anxious that he should appear as I had represented him to Balfour.

The ground we covered was exactly the same as Balfour and I had covered in our conference Saturday. I did but little talking, but tried to steer the conversation so as to embrace what Balfour had said to me and what the President and I had agreed upon in former conferences.

When we touched upon the internationalization of Constantinople I suggested that it might lead to trouble. Neither Balfour nor the President caught the point and seemed to think I objected to that future for Constantinople. It was with some difficulty that I made them understand that I thoroughly agreed with the general idea, but desired to point out that it would inevitably lead to an attempt to internationalize the Straits between Sweden and Norway, and Continental Europe, and the Suez and Panama Canals. They caught the point but did not agree with me that there was much in common with the questions I had

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find that statesmen are apt to look upon the interests of their own countries
from one viewpoint, and the interests of other countries from quite another.
They cannot see clearly the relationship of two similar problems when one
touches their own interests and the other the interests of someone else.

The conclusions arrived at were exactly the conclusions which Balfour
and I had reached in Saturday's conference, so it is unnecessary to re-state
them. The discussion ran from shortly before eight o'clock until nearly half
past ten when the President was due at a reception given by the Secretary of
State to the members of Congress to meet the British and French Missions.

I asked Balfour again about the Allies' treaties with each other and the
desirability of his giving copies to the President. He again agreed to do so.

In all the conferences I have had with the French and British I feel
that they do not altogether trust one another. Joffre indicated it in our con-
ference this afternoon, and when I told him I had met the King of the Belgians
he remarked that the King had requested that the French rather than the British
troops should be in touch with the Belgian troops.

The French have used bad judgment in sending envoys here who cannot
speak English, for it makes it impossible for us to have as complete an under-
standing with them as with the English. One hesitates to entirely trust an in-
terpreter. I can see more and more clearly the danger of friction between
the Allies. Distrust lies close beneath the surface, and a little difference
between them would bring it from under cover. I feel that this danger is not
being well guarded. The Japanese, Russians and Italians are being left out
of English, French and American calculations. As far as one can see, they do
not appear at any of the functions in Washington except the larger ones, and
there is a lack of Russian, Japanese and Italian flags which might easily hurt
sensibilities. The British and ourselves are not unlike the Germans in that

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our manner indicates that other nations do not much matter.

When the conference broke up I walked down stairs with Mr. Balfour and asked if he felt that his mind and that of the President had touched at all points. He was quite enthusiastic and said he had never had a more interesting interview. He spoke of the President as having a wonderful combination of human philosophy and political sagacity.

The President and Mrs. Balfour went to the reception together and I went to my room to prepare for taking the train. Before I left the President had returned and we had a few minutes further conversation. He was delighted at Balfour's comments, and seemed happy over the result of the evening's work.

New York,

May 1, 1917.

The rush today has been so great that I have not been able to read my accumulated mail, much less answer it.

Sir Horace Plunkett, Don Seitz, Sidney Brooks, Cleveland Dodge, Harry Davison, Mrs. Gerard and Sir William Wiseman were among the callers. Besides callers there were an infinite number of telephone calls both from Washington and elsewhere. I did not get out for my usual walk either in the morning or afternoon. I shall not give details of the day's work further than that Dodge and Davison came to discuss the proposed reorganization of the Red Cross which Davison has expressed a willingness to undertake.

May 2, 1917.

George Gordon Moore called to make an appointment for Mr. Farrell of the United States Steel and Mr. Bedford of the Standard Oil.

The Japanese Ambassador took lunch with me and we had more than two hours discussion. There was no one present other than ourselves. It is

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delightful to me to come in touch with Eastern diplomacy. Sato is an able fellow and maintained his position well. I got a glimpse of the Japanese Government and of the constitution under which they work.

At the conference between the President and Balfour the other day I asked Balfour how liberal the Japanese Government was. He confessed ignorance and the President was equally so. I determined then to find out something of Japan myself, and the lunch today gave the opportunity sought. The discussion at the Balfour conference was how far we could trust Japan as a democracy. From talking with Sato I am inclined to think it is not much more of a democracy than Germany or Austria.

The most important point of conversation occurred when he asked me whether or not this was a good time for his government to take up with the Washington Government the unsettled questions between the two. He said when the war ended, all points which might cause friction between the United States and Japan should be smoothed out. This, he said, he understood to be the President's desire. I asked him to enumerate the points he had in mind. He spoke of the land law and our immigration laws as being the ones that hurt their national sensibilities most. He thought, however, that if an arrangement could be made between the two countries by which no new adverse legislation would be enacted in the Western States against the Japanese, they might be satisfied.

He understood the difficulty under which our Government was working because of the rights of states to pass legislation which sometimes conflicted with the national policy and with foreign treaties.

I advised Sato not to take these matters up officially at this time because it might leave a suspicion that it was done for the purpose of forcing a decision just as the United States was entering the war against the Central

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Powers. I advised that he give me a memorandum of his Government's views so that they might be discussed unofficially. He saw the point and agreed to do so. He is to give me the memorandum when he returns to Washington. He hesitated, however, about putting it in writing, saying his Government had not authorized him to take the matter up officially. It is evident that the Japanese have chosen this time to press their claims, and unless they are exceedingly careful, it will make a bad impression and will lead to future trouble. As a matter of fact, I see difficulty in the future unless our Western States cease insulting Asiatics.

The calmness, the poise and the placidity of this conference delighted me. We were both as expressionless as graven images, and there was no raising of voices or undue emphasis upon any subject no matter how important.

Charles Grasty followed Sato. He came to advise as to whether he should go to Russia with the new Mission or go to the Western theater of war. I advised the latter because Russia is so distant he might be unable to get into the West at a critical time. He asked whether I would go on any of the missions. I replied in the negative, saying that I did not wish to become a peace commissioner and desired no badges or honors. I would like to act at the peace conference in the same capacity I am acting now.

Paderewski followed Gradty to discuss Polish matters. Farrell, Bedford and Moore came upon his heels. The purpose of their interview was to discuss how this country could most quickly supply the tonnage the Germans are destroying. I suggested General Goethals be communicated with and that Farrell, Goethals and I get together here for luncheon or dinner Sunday and work it out. I would then place the matter before the President and ask him to give Goethals absolute authority and not have him hampered by the Shipping and other Boards.

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We had for dinner, Lady Kingston, Mrs. Auchincloss, Janet and Gordon. They went to the Economic Dinner afterward to which Mr. Willcox had given me a box. I remained at home to work and go to bed early.

May 3, 1917.

Herbert Hoover landed this morning and asked for an immediate interview which I was not able to give him. He came at half past four and talked for an hour. He is in a most pessimistic mood. He believes the Allies would have caved in before Autumn if we had not entered the war. He thinks they deceived us and lured us in. As a matter of fact, we would have come in sooner had we known their plight was as Hoover believes it. This diary will show that I told both the French and the British Governments during my last visit to Europe that if they would let us know when they were in extremities, and before they were too far gone, we would stretch out a helping hand.

The effectiveness of the unbridled undersea warfare, and the authorization by Congress of a seven billion bond issue, reminds me of our prophetic Ambassador at London. He, along with most English, declared that the Germans were already doing all they could to sink merchantmen and that they were not restrained in the slightest by the President's attitude. Page also thought, I remember, that the war would end almost immediately if we announced our intention of coming in, and that it would not cost us one hundred dollars in actual cash.

Hoover's principal worry was as to what authority he would be given in controlling the food situation. He has a well thought out and comprehensive plan if he can only put it into execution. Houston, I think, is a man of better judgment than Hoover, but Hoover knows the question of food control as no other man does, and he has the energy and driving force which Houston lacks. I shall use every effort to get the President to give Hoover the authority he desires.

Judge Fowler of the Surrogat Court here called, Bainbridge Colby.

and the Belgian Minister followed in quick succession. It was my first interview with de Cartier and I was surprised to find him so able. He has been in China for ten years and I got much information concerning that country. If his picture of China is true, it is in bad condition. The Republic is a farce, both as to its President and its Parliament, neither of which are representative in the slightest degree.

We took dinner at Sherry's with Secretary and Mrs. McAdoo and they went with us to the theater to see "The Thirteenth Chair". McAdoo is full of his worries. The President will not give him all the power he wishes. He says he has heart trouble and that he cannot stand the strain. I asked if it was not a little in consistent to say he could not stand the pressure of work he already had and yet demand more. His answer was that it was not the work but the restrictions thrown around him that caused the strain.

He declares he will resign if the President does not give him practically unrestricted authority in the Treasury and in the purchase of all supplies both for the Allies and for our own Army and Navy, and also full authority over all shipping. McAdoo is modest in his desires. He says he has not been in the White House socially for six months except at large functions. He feels that the President is not fully conscious of the seriousness of the situation which confronts him, and that he is not taking anything like adequate measures to meet it.

May 4, 1917.

McAdoo and I had an interesting interview this morning along practically the same lines as last night.

Etienne Grosclaude called to tell of the French desires, of which I was already cognizant from other sources.

Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski took lunch with us. Paderewski and I went

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into conference afterward, endeavoring to devise a racial boundary for Poland which would be satisfactory. I am saturating myself with facts concerning these questions.

Kessler, Bernstein, Willcox etc. were callers. General Tom Bridges came over from Washington to dine with us and discuss the war and our participation. Bridges has taken a distinguished part in the war, yet no boasting words came from him at any time.

In the event Russia makes a separate peace and Italy and France caved in, and in the event Great Britain should be compelled to give in because of the submarine campaign, I thought if the British would send their fleet to Canada, f America could light the war through until Germany would be compelled by economic pressure to make peace and undo, as far as possible, the harm which she has done Great Britain, France and the other Allies. This cheered Bridges, although he feels that the extraordinary conditions I outlined were so remote as to be practically impossible. He believes, as I do, that hard pressed as the Allies are, that the Germans are more so and will go under first.

May 5, 1917.

Those Chadbourne was an early caller. He discussed the building of ships. I placed him in touch with George Moore and they agreed to take his crowd into conference tomorrow night. I will tell of this after it happens. We dined with the Bertrons and went to see the play, "Out There".

May 6, 1917.

General Goethals and James A. Farrell came at half past twelve, took lunch and remained until half past two. We conferred on the ship building program. I asked General Goethals to state in writing just what authority he needed. He did so in pencil on a pad and I attach the original notes herewith.

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I sent the President a copy of them and wrote him a letter to further explain.

Mrs. Charles Marshall followed them. She came to talk of her son-in-law, young Marshall Field, and what his activities should be during the war.

Sir William Wiseman reported on his latest visit to Washington. He says Sir Eric Drummond is not treating Sir Cecil Spring-Rice with much courtesy. I shall try to make up for this by enlisting Balfour's sympathies and also by sending some complimentary messages. Spring-Rice has acted in a fine way since the Balfour Mission has been here, and has added much to my good opinion. Wiseman told me of Drummond's conferences with the Catholics in this country, and of his, Wiseman's opinion that he was taking up the Mexican question with the Catholics. This is an important and interesting development which must be watched with care. Drummond has conferred with Archbishop Gibbons and others.

Wiseman also said that Tumulty had made an extraordinary request of the British Foreign Office concerning the son-in-law of Regan, the hotel man, who is with the British Consul in Paris. Twice the Foreign Office refused Tumulty's request made through the British Ambassador. Tumulty continued his quest and put it directly up to Drummond and Drummond has insisted that the Foreign Office comply with it, which I believe they have done.

I assured Wiseman the President knew nothing of the matter and would not look with favor upon it. It is not altogether a happy coincidence that the Secretary to the President and the Secretary to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs are both Catholics.

I arranged with Wiseman the program for Balfour and his associates while they are in New York for the time not taken up by public functions.

I went to Tom Chadbourne's to dinner. The other guests were Mr. Stone of Stone and Webster, Monnell of the International Nickle Co. George Gordon

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Moore, and Bedford of the Standard Oil Co. We discussed the building of a new type of submarine freight boats, a memorandum of which I shall tomorrow send to both the President and General Goethals.

May 7, 1917.

Professor Stephen P. Duggan of Columbia was one of my early callers. He desired me to suggest someone in sympathy with the administration's foreign policy to speak at the next meeting of the Academy of Political Science which is to be held May 29th.

Edward G. Lowry called to discuss articles he is writing relating to the war situation.

Walter Lippman was an interesting afternoon visitor. He came in this instance to talk about a personal matter. His father is dying and he is to be married next month, and he was wondering whether he should enlist or continue the work he is doing in the New Republic. He spoke incidentally of wishing to go on the Russian Mission. After he left, I wrote him a letter outlining my views. My letter to the President is also a part of the diary.

April 8, 1917.

Dr. George E. Hale of the Academy of Science, and Dr. John Carty were important callers. My letter to the Secretary of the Navy explains the purpose of their visit. I found Carty an interesting man. He has the true inventive mind. He said he hoped when peace came to be able to have it heard by wireless telephone throughout the world. He told of the experiments he had conducted which led to his being able to talk from Washington to Paris, and from Washington to Honolulu. He thinks there is no limit to future accomplishments of science. He spoke of scientists as pioneers who went in advance, poorly equipped and poorly paid, while those like himself came afterward to reap the profit of their endeavors. He has in mind to have his corporation place aside a fund for the use of scientists.

He believes if this were done, not only by his own corporation but by others, it
would be an act of justice and would prove of great commercial value. He
looks for an age when drudgery of mankind may largely be overcome. For instance, the
housewife is compelled to heat her kitchen and perhaps give herself heat prostration
on a summer's day in order to get the few particles of heat necessary to cook an egg.
He believes this will be entirely done away with and no surplus heat be engendered
and lost.

Mr. Walker of the Scientific American came for advice concerning some further
criticisms of Navy construction plans. I advised leaving it alone for the moment.
He brought with him a design for a freight carrying submarine submersible which had
been presented to him and which seemed to him workable. I put him in touch with
Charles A. Stone and told him I would get Mr. Stone to report to me after a thor-
ough investigation had been made.

The President's letter and the one from General Goethals and my replies are
parts of the diary.

Dr. Henri Bergson followed Walker. He thinks of returning to France
with the French Mission. Bergson is alarmed over the submarine peril. I told
him of my endeavors in trying to get the British not to take the gamble, but to
make some sort of compromise with the Germans regarding the submarines. He thought
their refusal almost criminal. I doubt if he would have held this opinion at that
time. He, like everybody else, now sees what I thought I saw in the beginning, and
about which I warned them repeatedly as my diary will show.

Peter Brady, labor leader, came to discuss the proposed raise of the
postal rate which will affect labor periodicals.

The usual telephone calls came from Washington and elsewhere. Wiseman had
word from Washington that Balfour will be glad to lunch with us Sunday. I have
also arranged to dine with the British Ambassador Saturday and have Sir Eric Drum-

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mond for tea on Sunday. This will give satisfactory conferences with all of them.
I have found it advisable not to have them together for I get much more information
by having each separate.

May 9, 1917.

A letter from Sir Eric Drummond and one from the Japanese Ambassador are the most important in today's mail. The one from the Ambassador is particularly significant and is a part of the diary, as, indeed, will be my letter concerning it to the President which I shall write tomorrow.

Frank Polk comes over today and I shall discuss it with him.

The French Mission has arrived in New York, but I have not seen any of them.
Mr. Frick gives them a dinner to which I was invited but declined. There is not
much satisfaction talking with the French for the reason they are not clothed with
any authority, and are merely here to tell of France's needs and to express her ap-
preciation of our entrance inot the war. With Balfour it is different. He is
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of our most powerful ally and it may be that
he will figure largely at the peace conference. I mention this to indicate why
I have devoted myself so much more to the British than to the French.

May 10, 1917.

Judge Lovett, Professor Jeremiah Jenks and Walter Rogers were important cal-
lers. Rogers is just back from Japan and gave me a summary of his impressions-
there that are of much value, since I am thinking now of the Eastern question and
of its bearing upon our future international relations. My letter of tomorrow to
the President will touch upon this subject.

We went to the opera as the guests of Mr. and Mrs. August Belmont. It
was an inspiring spectacle. Joffre arrived while Paderewski was playing in his
inimitable way. The crowd arose and cheered vociferously but Paderewski played
on seemingly oblivious to the fact that his exquisite melody was lost in the rear

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of applause which the entrance of Joffree caused. I had a delightful talk with
Mrs. Belmont who was Elinor Robson the charming actress.

May 11, 1917.

Dr. Frederick C. Howe and Lillian Wald were two visitors of note. Howe was pessimistic over our entrance into the war, and it his belief we will soon start a hate campaign which will place us in the class with the other belligerents. I told him the story of my endeavors for peace, both before and during the war, and pointed out the advantage that would probably accrue to the world by the power which this country would hold at the peace conference. I gave him an insight into my thoughts, which seemed to please him much, for upon leaving he said quite fervently, "I pray your life may be spared to do the things you have in mind".

Lillian Wald came to tell more of the Russian situation, but we did not discuss it at length after she found that most of the points had already been covered by others.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Adrian Iselin alone and afterward took Mrs. Iselin and Sir William Wiseman to the Waldorf to occupy a box and hear the speeches of the British and French Missions. The speeches of the Mayor and Choate were poor and not in the good taste one would expect from such able, well poised men. Balfour and Viviani failed to take the lead which Choate and Mitchel indicated. In speaking to Balfour of the matter later, and thanking him for bringing the discussion back to its proper plane, he said he did it deliberately for it seemed to him wholly out of place to drag in politics at such a time.

I was constantly disturbed by visitors to the box. Among them was Mr. Taft who wished to talk about the Red Cross situation. Bertron came to discuss Russia and there were many others. We did not leave the Waldorf until twelve o'clock and then drove to the residence of Cornelius Vanderbilt where Mr. Balfour was to receive an honorary degree from Columbia University.

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There were not more than twelve or fourteen invited. President Butler in a speech of unusual eloquence and substance presented the degree to Balfour. I have never known anything better done. Balfour replied in a felicitous speech of appreciation-- a speech, by the way, in no way comparable to Butler's. It must be remembered though that Mr. Balfour was a very tired man and had done an arduous day's work.

May 12, 1917.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey was my first caller. He reported on the excellent work which he declares he is doing in organizing the scientists and educators of the country. He appeared more normal than usual due, doubtless, to his recovered health.

Frank Polk followed. We discussed Gordon's desire to serve the Government. His eyes are so defective that military service is barred, therefore, Polk and I arranged for him to become Assistant to the Councillor of the State Department, a very important place and one which will give him access to the innermost councils of that department. It is a place that almost any man would be glad to take during these stirring times. Gordon has won this distinction because of his good sense, his modesty and his great discretion.

Senator Owen and Chas. W. Flint followed Polk. Their visit was apropos of nothing excepting to further Flint's ambition to go to Russia, an ambition impossible of accomplishment.

Both Bertron and Bergson called for a farewell talk, the one going with American Mission to Russia.

the RUSSIAN MISSION, and the other with the French Mission back to France. Bertron wished a last word of advice. He said that Bergson lunched with him yesterday and that their conversation was mostly of me. Bergson confirmed this later, as far as that part was concerned. Bertron wishes me to give some hint to the French Government that Bergson would be an acceptable Ambassador.

Bergson and I had a long and confidential talk. I am naturally de-

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sirous of pleasing a man who seems to think so well of me.

I dined with Sir William Wiseman. The dinner was given at my request and no other guests were present excepting the British Ambassador. There was no point to the dinner further than that my sympathies have been enlisted for Spring-Rice. I wished him to feel that, with all the adulation Balfour was receiving, someone thought he was worth while.

It was a quiet evening. When we got Spring-Rice safely over the spy danger and away from McAdoo and other traitorous members of the Cabinet, things went smoothly and delightfully. He spoke of Balfour as an "intellectual aristocrat", meaning that he was democratic enough where birth and position are concerned, but that he required mental equality in his associates. I told Spring-Rice that I had suggested to his Government it was about time to pin some badges on him. He was pleased with this, but disclaimed having any part in bringing the United States into the war. Nevertheless, he should be recognized on account of it, because as Ambassador here he is as much entitled to recognition as I imagine people generally are for such things. He asked me to speak to Mr. Balfour about keeping Wiseman here and I promised to do so without telling him I had already made the request.

May 13, 1917.

The main business of the day was my conference with Mr. Balfour. He came for lunch and remained until four o'clock giving us ample time to go over the international situation. At lunch, I explained the impossibility of a distinguished visitor getting the true American feeling or spirit because of the kind of people they necessarily met and the limited area of country they visited. I told of the South and the West and of their sturdy and silent patriotism, and how they would quietly make ready for the struggle upon which we have embarked. The East was more vociferous, but the South and West were coming forward with as much promptness and earnestness.

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Balfour asked whether there was an "intellectual element" in New York City. I answered, yes, but that he would not come in touch with much of it. The Century Club, I thought, was the rendezvous for many of that element.

There was no one at the table excepting Balfour and myself. After lunch we adjourned to my study and it was there that we took up more serious subjects. I thought we ought to have some understanding as to each other's minds regarding the inauguration of peace measures. Germany at any time might make a tentative offer, the peace terms of which would be based upon the status quo ante.

Balfour thought if Germany put out even tentatively such terms, that it would be because she was in a failing condition. I felt that this might be true, and yet we must remember that Russia, Italy and France might be in the same condition which would leave Great Britain and America with "the bag to hold". He assented to this. While I felt the necessity for a just punishment being meted out to those responsible for the war, yet it might not be possible or feasible to bring this about. Desirable as it was to eliminate Turkey from the life of the world, I thought it not so essential as that we should defeat Germany. If the integrity of Germany was maintained it would settle the vexed question of the distribution of Anatolia between Russia, Great Britain, France and Italy, a distribution full of perplexities and dangers. With the Straits internationalized with Turkey's consent, I thought Turkey might, in certain circumstances, be left as she was. Balfour agreed to this.

I made the same argument in regard to Austria, to which he also assented. I spoke of the desirability of each country sending not more than one or two delegates to the peace conference in order that it should not be unwieldy. The President, I hoped, would be the only one from the United States. He concurred in this proposal too, and added that anyway the serious questions to be settled at the congress would be settled on the outside by informal discussions and by the

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ones best fitted for it.

Balfour expressed himself as hoping we would pattern our administrative part of the war after the British. I spoke here of the difficulty of getting the President to act in this direction. I told him that the President and I agreed almost wholly upon matters of policy, but often disagreed upon the methods of carrying them out and matters of administration. I illustrated by telling him of the formation of the Cabinet and of my advice as to the desirability of its reconstruction during his second term.

In speaking of Russia and the submarine peril as being the two vital questions confronting the Allies, he remembered that I had warned the British Government of both since the beginning of the war.

We agreed to exchange memoranda upon all matters bearing upon the peace settlement, and those touching upon the immediate conduct of the war. We exchanged memoranda upon Poland. He wondered how much time I would have to think of these matters. I explained that when I went up to the North Shore for the summer I could give much more thought to such questions than in New York.

We had a delightful time as, indeed, I always do when I am with him. Our minds are sympathetic and we have much in common. He agreed to return to New York in the event it was thought necessary for further conference.

I asked Balfour whether he thought it necessary to carry out Page's suggestion as to American propaganda in England. My personal impression was that it would be better not to do so, but to leave our interests in the hands of the British themselves, provided they would undertake to set the public right. He as-sented to this, and promised to take it up at once with his Government. He is to make a speech in London before the American Club on the Fourth of July, and in that speech he will endeavor to make the British public see the United States as he sees it.

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Eric Drummond followed Balfour. Our conversation was largely about details. Balfour and I agreed to exchange documents relating to the war and its settlement and Drummond is to see that his promise is fulfilled.

He tells me Balfour has made the proposal to send Grey as a special en-
voy to the United States, but him they have not heard his decision. I again sug-
gested it was time to give some honors to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, and Drummond de-
clared, in the event he was brought home, this would be done. He will be made a
peer and perhaps given some orders.

My letter of today to the President is a part of the record. We dined
with Mr. and Mrs. Chas. Dana Gibson. Among the other guests were Major General
Bridges, Sir Earnest Shackleton and Capt. Spender Clay. Bridges is staying over
tomorrow in order to have a talk with me. Shackleton also wanted to see me and
I shall try to arrange for that as well.

I forgot to mention that President Nicholas Murray Butler followed Balfour. He wished to tell me what Columbia University was doing toward meeting the submarine peril. Professor Pupin is gathering around him an excellent staff of scientists and advisers including John Carty. George F. Baker Jr. has promised to raise the necessary money, perhaps as much as three or four hundred thousand dollars. Pupin has made a good start and hopes for further success.

In talking with Drummond, I called attention to the Allied demand that we
build submarine destroyers at the expense of our major battle ships program. To
do this would leave us at the end of the war where we are now, and in the event of
trouble with Japan or Germany, we would be more or less helpless at sea. I
thought if Great Britain would agree to give us an option on some of her major
ships in the event of trouble with Japan, we could go ahead with our destroyers
without fear of subsequent events.

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Drummond replied that Germany's navy might be left intact after the war and
Great Britain might have need of all her fleet in a further war with Germany. In
this event I suggested we give Great Britain an option to read that in case of war
with Germany we would return the battle ships which we had taken over, and would
give her in addition an option on some of our major ships. He thought this an ex-
cellent arrangement and is to take it up with Mr. Balfour and let me know the result

May 14, 1917.

Major General Bridges was my first caller. We discussed our army plans
and he gave his views as to where they could be strengthened. We discussed the
feasibility of sending a Polish division of the Army and having it trained in Can-
ada.

Bridges thinks our weak spot is our Army Staff. In his opinion, tkayxaxa
the officers are too old, too much out of date, and too lethargic. He spoke to
me with all the frankness of a native. Bridges sees quite clearly the harm Moose
velt is doing in his insistence that he be sent abroad with a volunteer division.
In our efforts to bring about an effective army we must keep it out of politics,
and if T. R. is permitted to raise troops, dozens of politicians throughout the
country will also insist upon doing so, to the consequent undoing of our regular
army. Bridges expressed the hope that if T. R. is sent abroad we send him direct-
ly to France and not via England. He believes he might be of some service in
the
France because of his enthusiasm he would stir, but he sees clearly how impossible
the situation is and how much harm can be done.

The front elevator was broken when Bridges left and I had to take him
through the kitchen and down the freight elevator.

Herbert Bayard Swope followed. It was to get advice as to whether he should
apply for the position as head of the Intelligence Department of the Army. I made
a suggestion which he said he would adopt.

Paderewski was the first caller in the afternoon. He brought his photograph with the following inscription. "To Colonel House, with expression of everlasting gratitude." He dated it January 22nd; the day of the President's speech to the Senate in which he declared for a reconstructed Poland.

When Paderewski was here last I told him I did not wish to be misled in any way concerning Poland, because I always desired to be accurate in any statement I made. He said today that he was deeply hurt, for he feared I had reference to him. He declared "I come to you as I would to my God without holding back anything".

I asked him if I was right in believing that at the Metropolitan Opera House on Thursday night he played with unusual fervor. I had never heard such music and I was lifted out of myself, and wondered whether he felt it himself. He replied that I was right, for he poured out his soul to me. I sat in a box just above him and he continually looked into my face as he played. I felt at the time that he was trying to please me, but I did not realize that he felt as strongly as he did. Paderewski is an emotional soul, and I am as tender in my treatment of him as I would be of a highly sensitive child.

Dr. Short called to persuade me to ask the President to do something further toward stimulating interest in the League to Enforce Peace. I declined to do so.

Commissioner Woods and Colonel Dancy, of the British Intelligence office, spent an hour trying to formulate with me a plan by which our secret service might be coordinated. I made a suggestion which they may or may not follow, but which I believe is the only solution.

and

The Mayor's Secretary, Robert Adamson came to enlist my services in getting the President here on the Fourth of July for the greatest patriotic celebration they are planning. I talked them out of the idea, telling how unsafe it was for the President to attend such celebrations.

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May 15, 1917.

Sir William Wiseman was the first caller. We planned to do some effective intelligence work in Russia. He is to outline a scheme by which this can be done and I am to obtain the consent of both the American and British Governments for its execution.

Edward S. Martin followed and then Joseph C. Grow who has just arrived from Vienna. He gave an interesting account of his stay there. As a matter of fact, this is all in the Archives of the State Department therefore I will not duplicate it here.

Lieut. Colonel Grow, who has spent two years as a surgeon in the Russian Army called, and gave an account of conditions there.

Dr. Henry Pritchett lunched with me in order to discuss the Japanese situation. He favors a mission going to that country, and I can now see more reasons for it than I could the other day. We agreed, if it is appointed, that it should be nominally for the purpose of coordinating the work Japan and the United States are doing for Russia but that actually, it should devote itself to solving, if possible, the differences between the two countries regarding China and the immigration and land questions here.

Pritchett thinks we might make a treaty with Japan which would limit immigration from both countries, placing them on a parity, which would exclude American labor from Japan and Japanese labor from here. He believes if it was understood in Japan that our interest in China did not go further than the open door, they would not feel concerned about our interference politically in China.

While Pritchett was here, Edwin Webster, of Stone & Webster, called to let me know what a very reprehensible tax measure was being formulated at Washington. I ended the discussion as soon as I politely could and brought him back in my study to meet Dr. Pritchett whom he knows well.

Frederick Palmer and Dr. Hirsch were other callers of note. Hirsch is a chemical engineer who has been directing the manufacture of dyestuffs in Japan and, strangely enough, wanted to talk to me along the line Dr. Pritchett and I had already followed.

I am pretty well saturated now with information concerning Japan and Japanese feeling and I think I shall ask Roland Morris, our prospective Ambassador, to come to New York so I may give him the benefit of what I have learned.

May 16, 1917.

Dr. George Hale, Sir Earnest Shackleton and Miss Ida Tarbell were my most interesting callers. Shackleton took lunch with us and showed us some of pictures of his last Antarctic expedition. Joe Grew was also at lunch. Miss Tarbell desired advice as to the work she is doing for the Council for National Defence.

May 17, 1917.

George Gordon Moore was the first visitor. He very much hopes the President will not send troops to France. I asked him to write a memorandum to send the President giving his year's experience with the British Army under General French.

Mr. Pomeroy Burton, friend and associate of Lord Northcliffe, Commissioner Adamson and Sidney took lunch with me. The discussion ran almost wholly around Burton's plan for propaganda to arouse the country. I promised to say a good word to both Willcox and McCormick who enter into the scheme.

William R. Willcox called to report concerning his last trip to Washington and to tell of conditions as he saw them.

Judge William McAdoo brought Lewis Nixon to tell of his "wonderful accomplishments in ship building" both in Russia and here.

Carl Ackerman reported on conditions in Indiana, his old home, and

where he has been for some ten days. He gave an interesting account of his last
visit to the Western Front.

Paul Kellogg and Ratcliffe of the Manchester Guardian came to seek ad-
vice regarding certain plans they have for influencing the Allies toward peace
proposals. I advised them to do nothing for the moment, advice which they pro-
mised to follow.

May 16, 1917.

I have seldom had a more strenuous day than this. Sir William Wiseman,
Colcord, Gerard, Penfield, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, Mrs. August Belmont, Oscar Straus,
Chas. A. Stone, Cabot Ward, and Henri Lambert of Belgium were among the callers
who took up their share of my time. The correspondents and telephone calls, made
the day; from start to finish, a trying one.

Wiseman came first. With him it is always to map out plans affecting the
war and international relations. We again discussed the plan to start propaganda
in Russia to affront offset German propaganda of like sort. My suggestion was
that the British and American Governments pay for this jointly, and let Wiseman
assume charge of it. It is a one man job and, of necessity, should not be talked
about if it is to be successful. We thought it would take a million dollars to
do it properly. A memorandum of our joint ideas is attached as a part of the re-
cord.

Frederick Penfield gave an account of conditions in Austria, from whence he
has just come. He states that Austria is now merely a vassal of Germany, and
he was unable to obtain a decision from them, concerning anything of importance,
until it had been passed upon by Berlin. He told of interesting interviews
with the Emperor and Prime Minister. He presented me with a bottle of brandy
which he said was had a certified pedigree of 150 years and was bottled 115 years
ago for the Great Napoleon whose coat of arms is blown in the glass.

Mrs. August Belmont lunched with us. She wished advice as to how best to sell Liberty Bonds. She should do effective work in this direction because she speaks well and has an attractive personality.

We dined with the Mezes and some eight or ten others. I talked with Owen Johnson who has recently returned from France.

May 19, 1917.

Stettinius of Morgan & Co. who has done the purchasing for the Allies during the last year or more, called with Wiseman. The British Ambassador was insistent that I should meet him. He is an able fellow and has well conceived ideas as to how the purchasing should be done jointly for this country and our Allies. I requested a memorandum which he promised to give and which I shall send to the President.

Sir Eric Drummond lunched with me. He brought a letter from Mr. Balfour relating to the coordination of our Intelligence Departments.

When Col. Dancy was here I told him that if Balfour thought it was of sufficient importance to write me a note, I would undertake to see what could be done. Balfour wrote the note and a memorandum. However, I talked Drummond out of the idea, and together we agreed upon a different plan which leaves Wiseman practically in control and makes the State Department the center of information as now.

No reply has come from the Prime Minister concerning the proposal I made Balfour, through Drummond, as to the exchange of battle ships after the war. An answer is expected before they leave. We discussed this at length, and I asked him to take the matter up with Lansing in order that the Secretary and I could jointly take it up with the President. Drummond was rather in favor of leaving it in my hands and that of the President without letting it go through the State Department, largely because it would have to go through the British Embassy at

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Washington, in the event it went to the State Department.

This plan touches closely upon the proposal I made in Philip Dru,

Drummond suggested that France might also come in, to which I concurred.
One of the reasons I wished to see Drummond today was to suggest that the Allies
should speak, either jointly or through the President, and say to Germany that we
were willing at any time to discuss peace terms with the German people; that we
were not willing to discuss them with a military oligarchy which was in no way re-
presentative of the entire German people; that it was unfair to expect the repre-
sentatives of the people of Russia, of Great Britain, of France, of Italy or of
the United States to talk to the representatives of a military oligarchy which
the German people had not chosen.

Drummond was somewhat confused as to my ideas, but finally became enthusiastic and said Great Britain would willingly consent and, if Great Britain consented, I need not bother maxxiankaxxy about the rest.

The cables coming for me through the State Department from our Mihis-
ter at Copenhagen which are parts of the diary, show that a large element in Ger-
it
many is now working for democracy. If this is true, as these despatches indicate,
that Bernstorff is leading this movement, I have great hopes for its success, for
Bernstorff is much cleverer than either the Chancellor or Zimmermann who seem to
be standing in the way. Bernstorff has been away from Germany long enough to
catch the drift of world opinion, and he sees that eventually democracy must come
to even autocratic Germany, and he evidently desires to become its sponsor and
the recipient of its favors.

My thought is to give the German liberals every possible encouragement so
they can tell the German people that "here is your immediate chance for peace be-
cause the offer comes from your enemies who will treat with you at any time you

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are in condition to express your thoughts through a representative government. On
the other hand, the present government is offering you peace through conquest which,
of necessity, has in it all the elements of chance and cannot be relied upon".

Drummond is to take this up with Balfour on Monday and if Balfour acqui-
esces, which Drummond assures me he will, he, Balfour, is to discuss it with the
President. I shall write the President tomorrow and prepare him for the inter-
view. And this reminds me, I cannot get action from the President on more than
one thing at a time. He seems utterly incapable of taking up more than one se-
rious matter at once. He is allowing the Japanese situation and the South Amer-
ican situation, and even the diplomatic end of the European situation, largely
take care of themselves while he is pushing through the army and tax measures.
It is too bad that such a great man should be so handicapped by this limitation.
He lacks, too, as I have said before, the power of large administration, depend-
ing almost wholly upon his individual efforts. He is unable or unwilling to shift
the burden to other shoulders.

Barry Faulkner, the artist, called with some photographs representing
the efforts of himself and associates to provide our army with uniforms to make
them as nearly like the landscape as possible. It is the first time I have seen
anything of this new device which the French call, "camouflage".

May 20, 1917.

I was to have seen Drummond at five this afternoon, but Wiseman telepho-
ed that he had to take an earlier train to Washington. I therefore gave up my
proposed trip to the country to lunch with the Couderts and conferred with Drum-
mond instead.

I gave him a pad and asked him to outline what he thought the President
should say in the event it was agreed that it was best to make such a statement

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as I suggested yesterday. Drummond worked over the matter painfully for almost a
half hour but without success. I thought he had better take his time and do it
on his way to Washington. He could then show it to Balfour and send me a copy.
of what they agreed upon and then arrange for Balfour to see the President.

My letter of today to the President covers the points. There are many
elements of danger in this proposal, and unless it is done properly, it had best
not be done at all. But surely, with us all looking for the danger points, they
should be avoided.

I discussed with Drummond the advisability of my going to England rather
than to have Lord Grey come here when it was necessary for a conference. I beg-
ged him not to send the S.O.S. call for me, however, before they were certain I
was needed. He agreed that it would be better to have me there rather than to
have Grey here. I asked his opinion concerning my going to Holland in the event
the Germans called for me. At first, he enthused over the thought, but after we
discussed it, he was afraid the French or some of the other Allies might think
that something was going on over their heads; I made it quite clear that I
would not go unless an intimation came directly from the German Government and
only then after France and England had been consulted.

Drummond says they have heard from Grey and he does not feel well enough
to come to America at this time. This does away with the plan of taking Spring-
Rice back on a visit.

Robert Adamson came to talk further about the publicity plan which we
have in hand with Willcox, Chas. E. Hughes, Thos. Chadbourne, Vance McCormick and
others.

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May 21, 1917.

Mrs. Jos. Fels and B. W. Huebsch, the publisher, came to lunch. I was amused at Loulie. She expressed deep regret that the Bryce estate on Long Island would have to be divided now that both Mr. and Mrs. Bryce were dead. This was not all for she expressed regret that the Marlborough estates in England were in financial straits. She thought it a great pity. Mrs. Fels, Huebsch and I looked at one another and burst into laughter. I do not believe Loulie knew why she did not know that Mrs. Fels is doing all she can to break up large landed estates with her single tax propaganda.

General Bridges is over again from Washington and we had a long conference. He says neither he nor his Admiral de Chair have seen the President. He thinks the Embassy is responsible as they have had the direction of the Mission's movements. Balfour has been the center and everything has been done through him. Bridges was good enough to say that he supposed when he saw me it answered the same purpose as seeing the President.

We discussed sending troops to France; the conscription law, and the gathering in of the British "slackers" here. It saddens me to hear these things referred to in such a cold-blooded way. It is much the same as a butcher speaks of animals considered fit for slaughter. While the circumstances call for it, nevertheless, it is distressing that such things should be necessary.

I asked Bridges to say to Balfour, and to other members of his Government when he returned, that I would appreciate their letting me know at all times when our actions were not understood. In this way we would be able to avoid friction. He promised to do so. I asked him to make inquiries through me officially and I would always reply with the utmost candor. Sometimes, I thought, we might act from motives easily understood when the circumstances were known. At other times, we might act through ignorance. I agreed, in turn, to ask them about anything which we did not understand.

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The Wallaces, Gordon and Janet came to dinner. My other callers were unim-
portant.

May 22, 1917.

Snowdron Marshall called first. He wished to discuss the coming vacancy
in the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Vance McCormick followed to tell of
his recent visit to Washington. Franklin Roosevelt and Captain Barry have
been telling him the kind of things they told me of the Navy Department. They
are violent in criticism of Daniels. In pinning them down to concrete examples,
McCormick was as unsuccessful as I have been. I have never been an advocate of
Daniels, as this diary will show, but I dislike to hear his subordinates talk of
him as they do and without substantial evidence. He seems to procrastinate,
which is, perhaps, his worst offence.

Henri Bernstein called to tell of his decision to go to Russia to repre-
sent the New York Herald. He says I am responsible for his appointment, having
give
brought him in touch with Ohl. I gave Bernstein many messages to the Russian
people through the press.

Menken of the National Security League, and Richard H. Dana, of the Civil
Service Reform League, followed. Lincoln Colcord made his usual daily visit to
discuss articles for the Public Ledger.

May 23, 1917.

Esty Stowell, Colonel Haywood and Captain Arthur Little were early callers.
Haywood and Little wished me to use my good offices with the War Department in
having the Fifteenth Regiment of the National Guard mustered into the National
Service at once. I telephoned Washington to see what could be done.

Sir William Wiseman followed to report upon his visit to Washington.
Everything is going well as far as our plans are concerned. He has arranged
a special code with the Foreign Office so we can talk with the utmost freedom.

The coming of Balfour and Drummond has given Sir William a tremendous "Boost".
They found how much I think of him and I how much I trust both his integrity
and ability, and they have reciprocated by following my lead. I am looking
forward to Wiseman's future career in English politics. I should like to see
him go far.

The Attorney General lunched with me. We discussed governmental and depart-
mental affairs at Washington. He dines with us tonight.

Emile Hovelaque, Inspector General of Public Instruction in France, called.
He was very interesting. He speaks English with accent. He said the reason
Viviani went home so suddenly was because of his fear of submarines. He wished
to go in the "dark of the moon". Viviani had this on his mind constantly while
here, and every new proposal for entertainment was always objected to because
they would not be able to leave by the 13th or 14th and avoid the full moon.
I should like to know Joffre's feelings as to the courage of his colleague.

Hovelaque said that Viviani's jealousy of Joffre amounted almost to in-
sanity. He likened him to an emotional actress. At a club banquet in Chicago,
Viviani had the club destroy all the programs which they had prepared at a cost
of something like $200.00 in order that Joffre's name be eliminated as one of
spoke
the speakers. He always spoke as himself as Joffre's "superior" and maintained
that Joffre must not be permitted to speak if he, Viviani, decided to the contrary
At one meeting, Hovelaque, at Viviani's instance, sat behind Joffre on the plat-
form and urged him not to speak even if he were called upon.

Hovelaque gave the best insight into the feeling of the French people re-
garding the war and our entrance into it that I have yet had. He gave historic
reasons for the French feeling toward America. When I say French, I do not
mean the educated classes, but the ordinary workmen and peasants. After this
interview he sent me his book, "The Deeper Causes of the War".

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Dudley Malone followed Hovelaque to get my opinion as to whether he should accept the invitation of the British Mission to go with them to Canada. I advised doing as he wished.

I telephoned Judge Gerard to tell him that the British Government were willing to discuss the advisability of allowing the International News Service resume service, and that Wiseman and I had agreed that he, Gerard, would be a good medium of approach. He was glad to do this.

Gregory, Fred Proctor, Mrs. Sheeks and Mrs. Maxey took dinner with us. When we came into the study to smoke Gregory got Proctor to tell of the Mexican situation and the reasons why he did not think maximum price fixing was a good policy. I listened to Proctor for nearly two hours and during that time I scarcely opened my lips. Proctor has been for many years, and still is, the legal adviser of the Gulf Refining Co. This company is interested, as all the other large oil companies are, in the Mexican Oil Fields, and are antagonistic to the Carranza Government. I dare say, Carranza is blackmailing them as Proctor claims, but it seems to me that Gregory is making a mistake in having Proctor as his confidential, though temporary, adviser, able lawyer as he is. Proctor is serving without pay and for the term of the war. He is a man of integrity and I am sure has no sinister purpose, but it would be better for both Gregory and him if the connection was severed.

May 24, 1917.

Francis Burrall Hoffman and Morris Hillquit were the only interesting callers during the day. Hilquitt explained his reasons for wishing to attend the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, for which the State Department has refused him passports. He was surprised to find that I was in close touch with the socialist movement in Europe. I showed him my last batch of English papers. He looked at them with longing eyes and said it had been a long while since he had

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been able to get some of them. I find myself interested in the Socialists and their point of view. They would go further if they were more practical.

May 25, 1917.

Dr. Crampton telephoned from Washington yesterday asking if he might come over today to see me. I gave him twenty minutes and he seemed grateful for it, just why, I do not know. He asked advice about several matters pending in the Council for National Defence, which I could have told him over the telephone as easily as I did here.

Frederick Prince of Boston followed Crampton. He brought his son, Lieut. Prince, who has for so long been an aviator in the French Army. I gave him a card of introduction to Major General Bell with whom he wishes to return to France, in the event Bell is sent, and one to Major General Barry who also may be ordered over there.

Miss Buel who is syndicating Norman Hapgood's articles came to tell that in her opinion he should return home. She wished me to agree with her in order that she might use my name. I declined to have her do so. I thought it was a matter which Hapgood had better determine himself, although Miss Buel did not think so. She is a capable little woman, and has much common sense.

André Tardieu, High Commissioner of France, called by appointment this afternoon. He brought letters of introduction from the French Ambassador and and from our Paris Embassy. I did not read the letters while he was here, telling him he needed no introduction since he was well known to me as the author of the remarkable articles on the Agadir Incident which electricified the capitals of Europe. This put us on good terms at once. There is no need to go into details of our conversation. He wished to explain the needs of France, both from a military and an economic standpoint. I suggested that he write a letter covering the substance of our conversation. He is to write the letter

to the President and send a copy of it to me. We parted with assurances of
high esteem. He seems to be so much more able and
I do not doubt will serve his country well.

I note by the papers today that Lloyd George, Admiral Balfour and
other Englishmen are taking a cue which I gave Balfour sometime ago regarding
the submarine peril. I believe it is largely through my influence that a more
optimistic view is being taken, not only in America but it England and France as
well. It seemed to me a stupid move to throw the Allied world into such a
panic and depression, and serve no other purpose than to impress the United
States with the enormity of her task. This could be done so easily by impress-
ing the President and our Government officials, but it was not needful to send
such a gloom broadcast over the world.

May 26, 1917.

Today has been crowded all the way through. Arthur Bullard, Lincoln Col-
cord, Harry Sleeper, Commissioner Woods, Page Gaston, Carl Ackerman, Marshall
Field and a Mr. Davis of the British Commission were among those who called.

Davis was the most interesting one for the reason that, I am told,
he came over as a personal friend of Lloyd George in order to observe from the
sidelines just what success the Commission had and what conditions were. He
was much distressed over the ship building program. I reassured him. At one
time he thought that Mr. Balfour should return here from Canada and remain un-
til something more definite was accomplished in that direction, and he suggested,
in any event, the sending of a super-Ambassador to do the things he feels sure
Spring-Rice is temperamentally unequal to. He suggested Lewis Harcourt as a
possible type. I discouraged this thought and told him of our working ar-
rangement with the British staff. This, I thought, would be upset if a new
man was sent over. It is apparent to every observer who has inside information

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that Spring-Rice is not equal to the demands which his position calls for at
this time. The French have met their need by sending Tardieu, and yet Jusse-
rand is far better able to fulfil his duties than Spring-Rice.

Davis seemed to be impressed when I told him that ever since February 1915
I had tried to get his Government to appreciate the seriousness of an unbridled
submarine campaign. I told him the story of my endeavors with Grey, of the par-
tial negotiations with Germany, and of subsequent discussions with his people,
which developed the fact that they felt Germany was doing all she could with her
submarines, and was fooling America into believing that she could do much more
if it were not for the position taken by the President.

I told Davis that the President and I had discussed the submarine ques-
tion many times, and that one of the principal reasons for our not wanting to
come into the war sooner was our belief that we were helping the Allies more by
giving them all our resources, with the exception of man power, and by keeping
down submarine warfare to a minimum. That while Great Britain had always been
ready to take the gamble, we had hesitated. However, the British had been so
confident of what they could do and what they were doing that it made me skepti-
cal of my opinion.

I let him know what Captain Gherardi, our Naval Attache at Berlin, had
said upon the subject, and how uncertain he was of the result should Germany re-
sort to an unlimited submarine campaign. Davis declared that the action of
the British Admiralty was little short of criminal, because they had not taken
active steps toward combatting the danger. He evidently saw for the first time,
and in a new light, the President's reluctance to enter the war. It had never
occurred to any of the British that the United States might be more far-seeing
than they, and that in keeping out of the war we were serving their cause better
than in.

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My conversation with Commissioner Woods was largely about matters of detail.

Page Gaston is the man with whom Gerard had so much trouble in Berlin regarding British prisoners. I received him because I did not remember his name, and he introduced himself over the telephone as a friend of Sir Ernest Shackleton. A very little concession on Gerard's part would settle their differences, and if I were in Gerard's place I would make them because, from what I remember of the controversy, he was too severe on Gaston.

Carl Ackerman came to submit an article for my approval. I shall read it tomorrow.

Marshall Field's purpose was to seek advice. He has political ambitions and after the war will attempt to realize them. I hope he may rise equal to his opportunities, but I doubt whether he has the political flair.

We went to the theater with the Mezes and Professor Stark Young of Amherst. The play was Ibsen's "Ghosts", a most gruesome thing.

May 27, 1917.

We motored to Ridgefield to see the Mezes summer home. Vance McCormick telephoned from Harrisburg very much concerned about the proposed appointment of Bernard Baruch as purchasing agent for the United States and the Allies. He will have an expenditure of nearly a billion a week, and McCormick agrees with me that he is not the type of man the President should appoint. I believe Baruch is able and I believe he is honest, but I do not believe the country will take kindly to having a Hebrew, Wall Street speculator given so much power. He is not the type that inspires confidence. A man like Goethals is almost the only type the country would thoroughly approve and trust with so much power.

May 28, 1917.

not
This has been a very busy day. Sir William Wiseman was my most inter-