DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

The President/Mr. Kissinger
6:25 p.m., November 20, 1970

K: If they had taken the initiative, we wouldn't be in the mess we are in now.

P: I like the idea of something daring. You and Laird work quietly on it. This is the 'end of the war plan.' Do it on the basis that we are guaranteeing Vietnam while we withdraw. What South Vietnam does after that is their business. The only problem is what the Russians will do, but let them do it.

K: They have played/very rough game with us.

P: It will change. This strike today will hurt.

K: And if we do one or two other things...

P: Like raising the budget. We are going to start, in effect, by rebombing the north on the basis of protective reaction. We took this one -- another next week. If they ask questions, Mel says it was protective reaction -- he's good at that. We didn't do it earlier because of the weather. For everyone they give us, we give them more.

K: They have told us now they will shoot any other planes.

P: I want to see some of the plans. If they give us any provocation...

K: It was a little pinprick before -- they used 10 planes. It was nothing to talk about.

P: Use 100 planes -- knock the Sons-of-bitches out. These guys sure must be down.

K: They probably are disappointed.

P: It's amazing -- 20 miles from Hanoi. That proves something, too.

K: I am sure they are shaken.

P: We say nothing. Deny everything. It could have been a search and destroy operation which we have going all the time. That really must screw up Hanoi.

K: They are totally confused. They can't figure out what hit them.

By NARA, Dale 5/20

P: Tell Moorer to have the same Colonel brought back for planning. He must have great imagination. He will find another one. I like guys like this. One thing which will help the Defense morale is the bigger budget.

K: It will change the whole atmosphere.

P: They will see whether American will be No. 1 or No. 2.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will keep you informed.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
11/20/70 6:35 p.m.

P: I've got to leave now. Anything new?

K: No final word, but I am pretty certain. I talked to Moorer and
since you told me . . . he was terribly moved. He thought if you had been
President five years ago we wouldn't be in the mess we're in today.

P: Oh well, this is fine. Nothing wrong with this.

K: It was in inspiration to these people that you had the guts to do this.

P: It was a brilliant move, brilliantly executed. We'll find something
else to do. Keep looking.

K: I told them you wanted to see the commander when he returns and
decorate them. They were very moved.

P: Is Laird okay?

K: He's disappointed but he feels fine.

P: There were no casualties, right?

K: Yes and our intercepts say the enemy is totally confused. They
don't know what has happened.

P: Let them be.

K: One thing, the weather is closing in, so they may just be able to
do one strike. They might not be able to make two. I thought they should
do the one.

P: Do what they can. They are going to do something tonight though?

K: It depends on the weather. If they have 10 hours of good weather
they'll do something.

P: My feeling is to do it because with the confusion of the North Viet-
namese, they might just think this is a diversionary action. You told Laird
and Moorer to say nothing?

K: Yes, absolutely nothing. We lost an F-105 today.

P: Over North Vietnam?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

11/20/70 5:35 p.m. page 2

K: Yes.

P: In this operation?

K: They don't know for sure. It might have been one of the feinting planes. It wasn't one of the task force.

P: Damn, poor devils. We have to start some pretty good bombing hits now. That's another they shot down. We owe them one for that, don't we?

K: Yes.

P: I'll be at Camp David in half an hour. I'll call you back then. You should have the final word then shouldn't you?

K: Yes, by then.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Moorer/Kissinger

6:40 pm

11/20/70

K: Sorry to bother you. The President wanted to make sure that that commander and I will have a personal not of appreciation.

M: We are sending out a message in his name. Also to the other men in his group. He told him on the phone too.

K: Did they close it?

M: We think so. He is sending in a complete message and when they do we will send a copy to you.

K: We will do another one and bring that commander and his men into see the President.

M: Writing him up now.

K: That other operation is in operation?

M: ? ? ? to Abrams and Abrams is a TOT message. I will let you know as soon as I have it.

K: Would you? I am holding up a cable to Bruce.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Finch/Kissinger

6:41 pm

11/20/70

K: Frank Lincoln was in here to talk about the Gleason case. I would appreciate it if you wouldn't re-open that.

F: I have no intention of it.

K: He said you were going to Rogers, Stans and the President.

F: I said we understood his fax problem and going on for a while sometime.

K: The President has the call on it for 4 times. We will approve it after the announcement but we cannot do it while the Russians are moving ships around Cuba.

F: I said I would bring it to the President's attention but of course I won't. I won't move until I talk to you about it.

K: You did exactly what I would have in this case.

F: I am off to tip-toe around the Atlantic Union. Accepting an award for the President.

K: Is that Cubx Clarence?

F: I thought of turning it over to you. Then I said no, I couldn't do that to Henry.

K: That entitles you to another speech in L. A. If you run out there I will speak with great conviction and more than once.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer

6:49 p.m., November 20, 1970

M: Henry, 2100 eastern standard time 9:00 p. m. tonight TOT, they are manning the planes and getting ready to go now.

K: We won't know about the strike until tomorrow.

M: Glad you agree with me, we'll go and do what we can. [something said about the weather]

K: Absolutely, right. If a restrike is necessary, we will do it. Give them hell. Don't leave a plane on the ground.

M: Right, you know me, this is what I like. 2100 hours tonight. That's it.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Alex Johnson

6:55 p.m., November 20, 1970

K: They are going tonight, hitting around 9 o'clock our time.

J: Okay, I will get the message out to Dave. DOD is going to make the announcement tonight or tomorrow morning on this. All statements will be made by them.

K: Do it in their eyes only.

J: Sending it Cherokee. Directly to him. I called Al, standing of the reconnaissance on our understanding send a paper over here done in January 1969 with no indication that you had seen it. I called Al and sent it over to him. It is a fairly complete and accurate summary of this situation.

K: Okay Alex. I am sorry I couldn't see you in action on one of these consultations...

J: I am too, I feel for the fellows that didn't make it. I really feel for them, how they wasn't for the lack of trying.

K:

J: Had to do it, couldn't turn it down on the lack of intelligence for the

K: Okay Alex, thanks for your help.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers

11/20/70 1:45 a.m. (tape) 11/21/70;

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill, sorry to bother you. Radio Hanoi has announced that some air attacks are going on but they seem to be including one that has wounded American prisoners -- that has produced casualties at an American prisoner camp. Now, what they seem to be reporting, the area that they are reporting is not where the air strikes are going on -- they are reporting Haiphong, and the province where that other operation went on. So, what Defense wants to do is to come out with the agreed statement on the protective reaction part and then the question is should they say anything about the other operation. Before I agreed to anything, I wanted to get your judgment.

R: I am inclined to think not but that's one of my off-hand reactions. How do you feel about it.

K: Well, my first reaction was exactly the same as yours. My first reaction was just to say, "Yes, there are protective reaction strikes going on against installations, etc." -- none of them in the area they are mentioning or none north of the 19 parallel whatever the thing is. On reflection, the only other thing we could add to it so that we are not accused of creating a credibility gap is just a sentence saying in addition there was a commando raid on a prisoner of war -- what we had reason to believe was an American prisoner of war camp north of that area and we found the camp vacated with no American prisoners there.

R: Did we get a full report on it. Was it alright -- no one was hurt?

K: We know that there were no Americans there and that it had been empty for several months is what the report says that we've got. So it makes you wonder about that goddamned -- it's like that camp they had, you remember, two years ago.

R: Underground...

K: Yeah.

R: How is Hanoi reporting the prisoners business?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authoritative
By NARA Date 6/9/04

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/1/04

K: Hanoi is reporting -- I am I don't have the flash here but in effect they are reporting that waves(?) of American planes have started attacking at 2:30 Hanoi time, which is, of course, the other operation. And that we hit an area from Haiphong to that province where that camp is located. And they are, of course, reporting the f______ operations and that as a result of this there was an attack also on the prisoner camp leading to the casualties of American prisoners.

R: Well I think under those circumstances it probably is alright to add this sentence. That leaves open the question of casualties to American prisoners though, doesn't it?

K: Yeah. I think we should say we know there were no American prisoner camp in those areas -- well, that's a little strong because we don't really know that.

R: Yeah.

K: The areas they mentioned we didn't bomb. Some of this may have been just complete confusion on their part as to what did go on.

R: Yeah. I am inclined, I think, to leave it out. We certainly don't want to leave open the question of whether American prisoners have been killed. I am afraid if we just mention the fact we made an attack on a prison camp and say nothing about American casualties -- how does the sentence read that you thought maybe we should use?

K: We should say there was a commando raid -- make that other statement a protective reaction -- and say all of this south of the 19th parallel, on missile installations and associated equipment and then say in the area north of the 19th parallel there was -- we conducted a commando raid by a small team against a suspected prisoner of war camp for the purpose of saving American prisoners. The camp had been vacated several weeks -- we found that the camp had been vacated several weeks previously. All members of the commando team returned safely and there were no casualties either on the ground or something like that.

R: Do we know it was vacated two or three months ago?

K: That's what the report said that we got -- that it looked as if it had been uninhabited for several months.

-3-

R: I thought they told us they had seen a lot of activity there from the air.

K: Dammit they told us -- when I got the briefing they told us that they had been moving people in. Had gone from 60 to 90 and that's what they told you.

R: Yeah, they told us that there was some recent activity there.

K: Well.

R: It makes us look awful silly if we say we conducted a commando raid and the camp had been vacated two or three months ago.

K: Well, we don't have to say anything. We can just say this didn't happen. I mean we can just say nothing -- no air attacks took place north of the 19th parallel.

R: Yeah.

K: Our concern is that if any of these guys blab when they come back -- afterall, there are sixty people involved.

R: Yeah, Oh, it will be known in the camp -- we can't avoid that. Can't we say that the camp had been vacated but there were no casualties.

K: Certainly. We found that the camp had been vacated and there were no casualties. We don't have to say how long ago.

R: I think maybe that's the way to do it. I suppose we might as well say it first rather than have it dragged out of us tomorrow.

K: That's the argument for it. Also, it would put us in a position of killing the notion that we attacked any of our PW camps by aircraft.

R: Right. Okay. I think that's fine.

K: Okay, Bill, maybe we will have a merry weekend.

R: I'll say. Okay, Henry.

feg

MJD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized By NARA Date 6/9/04

By NARA, Dale 5/26

U. Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

November 21, 1970 8:50 a.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

J: Did you get any sleep last night?

K: It wasn't as bad as Jordan.

J: No, One. Any new developments? I have been sitting here reading everything we have from the tickers from Hanoi. We are not going with any other statement are we other than the one you put out?

K: I think not but you will probably have to shoot Laird to keep him from doing it.

J: Oh, well, I think it is just as well we are standing where we are. I don't think it would be a good idea to go with a statement.

K: Why don't I call Mel and tell him.

J: There are no other developments?

K: We have a report on the other operation.

J: I want to see that. I would like to read it and tell the Secretary about it before he leaves. Who got it - DOD? Could they LDX it to us?

K: I will ask Mel to send it over to you. I am not sure they want to LDX it?

J: I would like to see it and tell Secretary about it before he leaves LDX today.

K: That is all I have but I will keep you informed.

J: We have heard nothing from Paris. They are having a meeting to decide for the next meeting.

K: Thursday?

J: It is set for Wednesday. We asked for it and they agreed to Wednesday. If they ask for a postponement we will have to agree.

K: I'll get that report over to you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
November 21, 1970 8:55 a.m.
jlj

(paraphrased)

K: In crises we never have any problem with you. We never have a problem with you anyway.

L: Hell no.

K: In light of the way this is playing I don't think we should make any announcement.

L: Sometime along the way we ought to make something out of it. It is going to get out sooner or later and rather than just letting the newspaper reports get out I think we should get some mileage on it. Everything is going fine.

K: I do not exclude the possibility later but let's let it settle down a bit.

L: So far so good. It is night over there and maybe we can wait until it is over. Let's ride it out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger
November 21, 1970 9:00 a.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

K: I just talked with Alex. We have the report in of the operation and I am getting it over to him right away. They apparently killed 5 guards. Went through the compound and felt that it had been used as a prison but not used for several months. There was no one else there. The killed 2 others making it a total of 7 altogether. Put some ordinance in near there to keep those troops from coming in - all according to the plan. It was a beautifully executed plan it was just bad luck that there were no prisoners to extracate. Laird is going to make a brief protective reaction statement. In the light of this I have just been talking to Mel. We should not go with this commando operation. . . Next week if things cool down a bit and . . . No one will . . .

R: I agree. I think that is the right policy. This doesn't make you trust intelligence decisions does it? How is the President taking it?

K: The last time I talked to him last night he took it very well. He had words of encouragement to Moorer and the men.

By NARA, Date 5/26

November 21, 1970 9:20 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

K: I am sending over to you the report you wanted. However, I think it should be held very close and only yourself, the Secretary and the Under Secretary should see it. There is no official authorization for this to be distributed. I just talked with the Secretary and gave him a brief run down on it.

J: I just hung up from him.

K: I talked with Mel and he will make no statement without checking with us. I don't think there should be an announcement because they could say was a failure and on a day when you are operating it anyway.

J: What was it in the first place?

K: It had obviously been used as a prison camp. However, it looked like no one there for several months. At lunch for the first time yesterday, Moorer told me that they had a letter in from one of the prisoners in code that said the camp was closed July 14. We thought they thought it meant the gates were locked and no one was admitted. They never told us about this letter. We had absolutely flat assurances that there would be 60 people in there. . . . never was a camp there. . . . Hanoi must be thinking those crazy bastards. What will they be doing next.

J: It's only virtue is that it holds some people around various . . .

K: I would like to bexxx in on some Hanoi conversations this morning. They must be saying that those guys go into a place and blow up one of their helicopters and take off in another one.

By NARA, Date 5/20

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

November 21, 1970 9:45 a.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

L: Have you heard or read what they did at the press conference in Paris?

K: ... grave consequences ...

L: The text is moving now and maybe you can look at that. My concern is that (maybe I should not be upset about this but I feel I have the responsibility) - does Bruce know generally what we have done?

K: He knows that it was planned but he doesn't know that it came off. I will get a flash out to him.

L: If we do not go public with this I think that Bruce should know so we have no problem whatever about that. ... thrust of what I did want to say. Do that through Bruce ...

K: Better do it publically. How would Bruce do it?

L: They took us on for our raids and killing PWs. Get that text and then I will talk to you.

K: Let me look at the text and I will call you back in half an hour.

L: Accuse us of gutting up our PWs. We will get Simons and Manner (phonetic) in here and then we will find out what happened. ... whether is bad. I do not think they will take ... Laos.

K: Announce that we have concluded this series. Don't you think ...

L: Let me check on the ~~weather~~ weather. It is bad and we don't know if we can fly anymore sorties.

K: If the weather holds up for another 10 hours...

L: The 7th Air Force says they cannot fly. We haven't heard from the carriers. I know this is in the foreign policy area but ...

K: I think you ought to do it. It cannot be done in Paris. Let me get the text.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

(paraphrased)

November 21, 1970 10:10 a.m.

jlj

K: I have read all the ticker stuff I can lay my hands on. I still do not think we should go until next week. . . . No bombing attacks on PW camps. . . . no bombings along . . . Haiphong. They will be held responsible for any loss of Americans. . . . Will not look very good. . . . brought these people over to the President on Monday. I do not think it should get out.

L: I want to know about the operations and you can't tell until you get about the third report.

K: What do we gain by putting out the commando raid?

L: Not very much and I do not think it would be a good idea.

K: We should give them a tough warning to the xxx A tough warning to them regarding PWs would be in order. That I think we should just categorically state. We know the location of the camps and we did not hit them.

L: I have just had a report. There are a couple of sorties still out. I will be back in touch with you in 15 or 20 minutes. The weather does not look good.

K: Could say operations are now concluded. No bombing attacks were near PW camps.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger
November 21, 1970 10:30 a.m.
jlj

(paraphrased)

[Note: Mr. Peter Flanigan was listening on another extension.]

K: I have talked to our expert who is handling this. We are prepared to make a proposal to you along these lines. We can accept 6 groups but severely limit to shifting in each group. . . . Your friend will accept that. We will make that proposal through your max expert here. Isn't that quite right?

Y: That is right.

K: One thing I have to tell you on the basis of our friendship. The price in terms of our relationship is severe. . . . confidence declining. . . . Your friend said 4 of 5 points are acceptable and that only the 5th had some problem. Then your representative said 4 of the points are a basis for a discussion. Anything is a basis for discussion. Well, I do not want to go into the whole history. This weekend, probably tomorrow, we will accept 6 group. . .

W: Could you spare a little more time. I have had an extensive conversation with my friend. . . . what exchanges between our experts. You would be prepared to agree with our proposal of 6 groups for 17 items.

K: Not for 17 items. 20 items - in that neighborhood.

Y: 20

K: We want to limit severely shifting within the groups and not just between the groups.

Y: My friend really needs a name. 6 groups for 17 items . . .

K: 17 items we cannot accept.

Y: Then counter-prepared to give in your proposal of very very limited shifting within group and between groups and also the growth rate - only 3 points (?? difficult to understand at this point)

K: Growth rate. You agree with our growth rate?

Y: That is what I understand. Not the growth formula 6 (?) very modest growth rate. . . . Your expert suggested that if we could not accept your growth rate. . . . shifting with group . . . carry over. Your minimum comments.

K: I do not know the carry over arrangements to judge that part.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Y: My friend needs at least the name that you agreed with our basic proposition.

K: 17 points is a problem for us. It may have to be 7 groups for 20 items or something like that.

Y: This is negotiable. Exchange of views - what we have after review by experts - what we can sit down and discuss. My friend has here is the strong political need for the impression that you make concessions, so this is agreement.

You said you had made

K: One thing you should understand. . ./. concessions yesterday. That is not the impression that our experts had.

Y: That's right.

K: In fact our experts wanted to drop the whole thing yesterday.

Y: My friend definitely does wish to drop this. Our political point of view at home now ______ starting from Tuesday so he told me now that he would like to get the whole thing scheduled by Monday night.

K: That's almost impossible.

Y: Impossible did you say?

K: We will make a proposal to you probably tomorrow. However, it will have to be 20 groups. Some of the other items we can see about.

Y: I will make some frank and honest . . . modification of our position in order to reach an agreement with you. You have substance and in turn you give us name.

K: We have high regard for your friend and last year much of what we did was to help him. We have now lost confidence with our businesses. Our people here are very tempted to break yesterday but it is only due to our relationship that they did not.

Y: I understand very much. If it is leaked out in our press this will cause a big problem for us and you in our press. Would you rather for us to make a similar kind of proposal from our side.

K: Dictate it on the telephone?

Y: Not necessary. Our permanent representative is an expert. He knows how much scope he has. If we were to make a proposal today or this weekend your time then he has to cable it to us and it is very probable to leak out. I can ask my friend for us to make a very similar proposal to you. It is quicker and safer. Have had a problem here with leakage in the press.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: That is all right. One frank suggestion. I have the impression
that your representative takes the hardest possible side of the instruction.
He, of course, is trying to get the best possible deal for you. If he comes
in without a proposal we can accept then there will be no agreement and no
more negotiations. . . . 17 items - categories. It has to be around 20.
no flexibility

Y: I see. Are you quite sure/that you know because the cable we got said
your expert did not react negatively. Did not say anything about items.

K: I understand there is none on that item. I could probably use my
influence and give up one.

Y: Your friend would be involved if you would make another proposal
... could not accept.

K: If you want to make a proposal this weekend but it has to be very
close to what we have given you. I am in the position again where I must
run.

Y: Would not be possible politics to handle the negotiation. Haig could
give me more details about % of these three points. Shift limits, vested
growth rate.

K: I think that it would be better if we make it. Then we know what we
want.

Y: As quickly as possible. My friend has strong hope that
this be reached at Monday of your time. All we need is name that you
made concessions. If possible at all, 17 items.

K: We will have a proposal by tomorrow evening.

Y: I will get in touch with you again.

K: I will call you when you we have our proposal.

Y: Sooner the better. Up till then we will not make any counter proposal.

K: Major effort to make the best agreement.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Under Secretary Irwin
Mr. Kissinger

11:02 a.m., 11-21-60 -

I: Hello Henry. I just had a call from Chris Phillips - more on a personal basis than official. He said the situation there for Charlie was getting to be intolerable. Charlie does not know whether he was in or out. He has been getting calls from other Ambassadors and the press seems to have such authoritative articles. I don't know what you can do about this.

K: I don't want to get involved. I will talk to the President.

I: It seems to me if they could say definitely that he is in or out it would be very good. If you would like me to speak to the President, I will.

K: No, I don't know whether it would serve any purpose. I will talk to him. I will bring it to his attention.

I: And perhaps the President could call Yost.

mlh

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

November 21, 1970 11:20 XXXXX a.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

L: I just wanted to read this announcement to you. (reading) The
limited duration protective . . . finished 6 p.m. EDT today. . .
purpose for missile and anti aircraft . . . hit south of 19th parallel.
One other point I have noted . . . (reading continued re PWs)

K: Is this put out as a statement or are you going to read it?
We will continue these reconnaissance flights. XXX One matter, purely
of writing style. The second XXX line referring to PW's I think should
go in the paragraph with PW/s. It is a very good paragraph. When you
change it to the other paragraph it puts all points dealing with PW's together.

L: Say such reports are false. We will hold that we
will continue to take protective reaction strikes.

K: Or put that up in the other paragraph. Link safety of our prisoners . . . When are you going with this?

L: 11:30 a.m.

K: Are you going to put it out or read it?

L: Just put it out. A-6 striking but these are the last two out.

K: Not done in reaction. You said 6 p.m.

L: That's just so they don't think we did this in reaction to what they
said.

K: It is well to do it this way.

L: Tom has no problem with this. We are sending it to you and to State.

By NARA, Date 5/26

The President/Mr. Kissinger (paraphrased)

November 21, 1970 11:45 a.m.

jlj

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date on a few things. Hanoi radio starting reporting massive air attacks. Their radar probably picked up Commando raid and they are picking up diversionary strikes. Said we attacked one of our own PW camps. Laird is issuing a short statement. I worked with Laird and I talked with Rogers so we are all on board, that we didn't hit anything south of the 19th parallel and caused by fact that they were hitting some of our unarmed reconnaissance planes and this was done in protection. Talking about saying something about the Commando operation but they would just say it was another Bay of Pigs and decided not to say anything about it.

P: I don't want anyone to say anything. There is no point to say anything about it.

K: This morning in Paris the North Vietnamese delegation called a press conference and the delegation said the strikes threatened success of the conference. They stated no conclusions. They may cancel one meeting.

P: Will Bruce say anything. He could step up and say we don't care if they cancel all the meetings. They are not getting anywhere.

K: At 11:30 this morning Laird put out a statement saying that the strikes were ending at 6 p.m. today and second, no air attacks on PW camps and holding them solely accountable for American lives. The other operation went beautifully, except no one was there. They killed 5 guards.

P: Guards were still there. Why would they have guards there if there were no prisoners. Do you suppose they could have hidden them underground?

K: Guards or caretakers but they were military personnel. If they had hidden them they would have been expecting us and hit us with a buzz saw.

P: Why do the military guard the place if no one is there.

K: Just to keep the natives from moving in or perhaps just to move people through. It was damn bad luck. The whole operation worked exactly as they planned. The weather is so bad that we are not getting photo reconnaissance on the areas hit. But the visual reports say that we are doing a lot of damage.

P: What do you mean visual reports?

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: The visual reports of the pilots. When they are going over on bombing missions they look and try to determine amount of damage while they are bombing. However, photo recon would be better.

P: When will we get those reports. Well it doesn't matter. There is no reason to believe that they were successful. On this other operation I want you to hold right to the line and do not discuss it at all. No comment whatsoever. This is the way it is going to be.

K: I will call Laird and tell him that.

P: He knows that. What do they want to talk about it for?

K: They would like to crow about it a little bit. It was a beautifully executed operation deep into enemy territory and their office had a lot to do with it. They are pretty close to the situation to see the importance of not talking about it.

P: We will recognize them and let them know we thought they did a good job. We won't talk about it now but later we will explain what happened. Get that Col. back here. Get in a group of them. Get Defense to work on similar actions. They must have some others but thought they would get turned down so didn't propose them. We are going to be out of there in a year so we can do some of these things. What do we care.

K: I have already told Moorer.

P: Proves that something can be done. We need more schemes of this sort. For the past 5 years no schemes because nobody approved them. Well we will approve them. We only have one year left.

K: Hanoi screaming because they are shaking a bit.

P: ... say we attacked a PW camp ...

K: Haiphong and Hanoi. Probably shows up on their radar.

P: Do not say that we will leave it out that we might bomb these. Keep them guessing.

K: Did bomb only south of the 19th parallel so that later if they claim we bombed a PW camp we can hold them responsible. However, we did not say we were not going to.

P: Was anybody hurt?

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

K: 2 slightly injured. But we went in 20 miles from Hanoi Mr. President.

P: slightly injured. That's pretty good. Do you think the prisoners were there and underground.

K: They of course would say no. If they had any reason they would have known that we were coming and radio seemed to indicate that they did not know what was going on.

P: Why don't we put some of the South Vietnamese on this type of operation. They have a big army. Scare the hell out of these people.

K: Certainly. Now that they have seen that we can do it they are probably doing a lot of thinking. To land 20 miles from their capitol and get out does not reassure them.

P: The failure will not be discussed. . . successful operation. We went in to see if there were any there and got rid of the guards. . . other operations being planned.

K: Another thing. These news stories about Moynihan's appointment to the UN.

P: Talk to Haldeman. We do not want to get into this at all. Rogers has the action. Bob talked with Rogers about it. The story came out of Boston. Haldeman is in complete charge and they will work it out the best way they can. Do not want the White House to get into it. I do not want Yost to be embarrassed. I can't really blame Monihan, he probably talked to someone at Harvard and they told it to embarrass us.

K: And the Boston Globe.

P: We have got to go forward on it and . . . people just have to learn not to talk to anyone. They tell people thinking they are their friends and that Joe is not going to tell anybody, but Joe does talk to other people. Haldeman is in charge and Rogers has the Action.

K: I did not want to get involved but wanted you to be aware of the stories.

P: No decision has been made. The guys did a hell of a job. We would like to look for another one. How many PWs do they have?

K: Camp or not. . . Have 400 with several hundred missing.

P: This is the only major initiative to negotiate. What will they do with them if we don't negotiate and just pull out, kill them?

K: Oh no. We would go back to bombing the living daylights out of them.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

P: 7 day strike so that we do not have to maintain the tension during all that time. As you recall 7 day strike hitting complexes up there would give them a blow that would set them back several months.

K: Working on mining plans now.

P: Mining plan and provides it seems to me a good possibility and has liability of internation argument - hospital, etc. What we need is more imagination in some of the things we can do now. Incentive to work have a negotiated plan. There will be no incentive for us to have a negotiated settlement after March is over. After that war is ended.

K: But we can say that anyway.

thing

P: Good way to add to the protective reaction. All eyes on the PW thing if it hadn't had the protective reaction bombings. We do not talk about PW thing. We will talk about it later and tell what happened.

K: Unsuccessful attempt to rescue. However, it worked great with it in conjunction with the strikes.

P: It should be handled basically as a rescue mission. I do not want it described - that would endanger the others.

K: Daring attempt at...

P: I do not want it described. It was just one of our routine (what do you call them?) search and rescue operations. Tell Laird to Stonewall it right through. And I want them to come up with some other plan.

K: We will get the Col. back and get him to report.

P: They must have others. They must have others.

K: Pentagon, you hit it correctly, gave up because they never got it approved.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Mr. Yoshida
Mr. Kissinger
11:45 a.m., 11-21-70

Y: Hello. Sorry to take your time again but this is important. I have an appointment with my friend this morning. We are now close to 2 AM Sunday morning. Could I talk to you again sometime around 8:00 pm your time?

K: If you call my number here at 7:30 pm, they will connect you with me. I will be in New York.

Y: Then I believe I can say something final. And I think you are right, you make the last proposal - say Sunday morning your time.

K: I can't guarantee you that. It will be sometime Sunday.

Y: Alright. Then this will have to be cabled from your place to here. We will take care of getting it to our experts and they will work on it all day Monday and perhaps we can reach an agreement by that night. And when you prepare your final proposal, I would like to ask you to use your influence to accept nominally our proposal and also to say that you made a great concession by accepting 6 groups over 17 items.

K: I will do my best. Our experts are reluctant to go below 17. So there may have to be concession here.

Y: Then it is 6 groups over 17 items.

K: Okay, I will take care of that and I will talk to you tonight.

Y: I will talk to my friend and call you tonight.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

November 21, 1970 1:15 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

J: I see Mel has gone into print again. . . help from PW camps.

K: He is staying away from the subject.

J: Tom told me that he used the word agreement again and Mel talks about 6 p.m.

K: In order to not tie it to response to what the other side said. Tom's information is correct.

J: Just for your information I have told them over here that we had some diversionary flight over there. I told Jack Irwin the story though. We have a problem with what we tell Bruce.

K: I will get a backchannel on the other thing out to him.

J: I think maybe it would be helpful. Tell him not to mention it in conversations here. Only with myself, the Secretary or Jack Irwin.

K: Just to tell him what happened. Oh yes, only with you three, that is very important. As a friend of mine in CIA always says this has the added virtue of being true.

J: Paris is waiting for word on Hanoi. . . . judge Dave's instructions. . . . Dave and ourselves . . . on drawing something and you can look inxx at it on Monday. In the meanwhile I think we should get something to Bruce. They have those after action reports through military channels.

K: I will see to it that it is done. . . . Pentagon does that.

J: Mel went pretty far on the agreement and it was part of the understanding.

K: I have just read your paper which is very good. You know he did that once before.

J: I do not think we should go dig ourselves in any further.

K: DOD DOD should stop talking about it altogether.

J: Yes, I think that is a good idea.

K: I will do my best.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Amb. Wm. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

November 21, 1970 1:30 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

S: Alex told me about his last talk with you and I wanted to talk to you about the nuances of understanding. Reporters around the building have backgrounders given at the time of the understanding. No reconnaissance mentioned in the understanding. Made clear at the time of cessation of bombing . . . and we . . . back up that statement. We will get flack from those people saying reconnaissance was not covered. We gave this to Laird's people some time ago. It is fuzzed up enough in the statement that we could probably get away with saying it is our understanding.

K: I think we should just stop saying understanding. I will see to it.

S: Why he came back to this is a problem. You will probably see it in tomorrows papers. New subject. We have just sent over a briefing paper for the President with Ky. Have you seen the newest latest document.

. . . thing in from Paris on what he had done . . . Helms. We refer . . . interesting intrigue. He has talked to the other side now.

K: How did it go.

S: It is reported on that fact in the report. Blue chit on top of it.

EXX K: CIA report? I will try to get it.

S: I have talked to Habib. Before they cancelled the other meeting they gave us 2 hours notice and he feels that is the way it will be handled this time. . . . what they do or what they say at the time.

. . . come in as soon as he gets all the facts that a meeting will go ahead but based on past performance it is our consideration that they will cancel. I do not think we should make one.

K: We do not need to say a hell of a lot. At the time we did not say we would not continue our reconnaissance. That should be the line.

S: Latest supplementary statement, this is a knitpick, erroneous reports that we have bombed DRV. Some bullets have hit the camp. But these could have come from a MIG interceptor and in a fight. We may get some nibbling from the press. We have wives calling asking if we hit any of the camps.

K: Is there anything we can do about it now. I am going to insist that statements get cleared all the way around. In fact we did clear the things last night and this morning we just had 5 minutes to do it.

S: On this understanding thing we had made very clear to his substantive people.

K: ISA?

S: ISA and JCS

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Under Secretary Irwin
Mr. Kissinger
1:45 pm, 11-21-70

K: Jack, I have talked to the President about that matter (Yost) and he says it is between Rogers and Haldeman and Rogers has the action.

I: Okay.

K: I don't think I should get into it. I figure I have enough troubles with your bureaucracy without getting into that.

I: Okay Henry. I appreciate your asking. Whatever it is, it's not good.

K: Let me call Haldeman and call you back.

I: Yes. Let's settle it. I may be wrong but my impression is that if I call Bill he may not realize it is final and he should be taking action.

K: I will call you back.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger
1:55 pm, November 21, 1970

K: Bob, we are having a terrific flap at the UN about Yost.

H: Well, Rogers knows all about it. Let him handle it.

K: I just wanted to be able to say to Irwin in Rogers absence
--

H: Rogers is not away.

K: Isn't he down at Williamsburg? I just wanted to be able to
tell Irwin that Rogers knows all about it, that he has talked
to Yost. I think Rogers thinks it will go away.

H: No, it is not going away. Rogers does not want to do it. He
thought it would go away.

K: The decision is taken then?

H: Just tell Irwin to talk to Rogers. It is all settled. Obviously
the way the story got out was Moynihan told someone at Harvard
and they put it out up there.

K: What is Yost's frame of mind?

H: Well, he is a little startled. Rogers did not come right out
and tell him. He is afraid to bite the bullet. I think he has to
now in view of the stories that are out. It is too bad because
it hurts Yost's position. We wanted to give him an
Ambassadorial post and give him an easy way out.

K: Okay, I will tell Irwin to call Rogers.

mlh

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Under Secretary Irwin
Mr. Kissinger
2:05 pm, 11-21-70

K: Jack, I have talked to Haldeman. My understanding is that the Secretary is fully aware of the situation. Also that he talked to Haldeman yesterday afternoon, that he talked to Yost yesterday afternoon without giving him a clear understanding of the situation. I am giving you this for your information only. The last Rogers said was if it didn't go away over the weekend, he would do something Monday.

I: I don't understand what will go away.

(had to drop off phone to answer calls coming in)

K: The decision has been made. The President told me that it was done. This is really none of my business but I think he might really get irritated if you push him.

(had to drop off phone again to answer calls)

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
2:40 pm, 11-21-70

L: Henry, you got that last report of what you can send on up to the President. We are transmitting it to you in a few minutes. Then we will have better wrapup a little after 6:00 pm.

K: What is your impression of it?

L: We ended up with about 235 good strikes. The third wave we were not able to get in because of the weather. Weather is really closed in and will be for about 4 or 5 days.

K: What about results?

L: We have big fires. We will have better reports tomorrow morning when we get the pilots in and get the pictures developed. It is worthwhile.

K: Right.

L: There is one thing. I noticed I am kind of on report for some these flights we have been making. We are trying to be careful with that. I have been raising hell with the military on that and I try to keep the heat on them. Maybe I should send a memorandum to the President?

K: I wouldn't worry about it.

L: We have a flight tomorrow that could cause some problems. You know which one I mean?

K: Yes. I wouldn't worry about it.

L: If it is successful and detected, then we will get a little heat but we have to keep going on these.

K: You have absolutely no problem on this with us and we will be right behind you. I saw that memorandum and did not see that it did anyone any good to have it in writing.

L: I think the thing that brought it to a head was the C-135 incident but we were clean on that.

K: You are okay. We are behind you.

mlh

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/The President
7:26 p.m., November 21, 1970

K: Mr. President

P: Anything further?

K: No, but I have just talked to Admiral Moorer a few minutes ago. The strike is going to go at 9:00 tonight our time. They are going to make a maximum effort until the weather stops them.

P: Good. One or two?

K: All three but will not be able to do the ______. They think they are socked in for 4 days but they will make a maximum effort and get what they can get then we can see if we want to [do the other].

P: Nothing further.

K: Have sent your personal congratulations and good wishes to them.

P: Good.

K: Writing them up for some awards. We have to wait for the written report to see just what happened, either the weather was faulty or what.

P: Good, good.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
8:26 p.m., November 21, 1970

K: I still haven't anything to tell you unfortunately because your people came in today with a very negative attitude and we have to decide tomorrow whether we want to continue talking at all.

Y: Is that so? My friend and ... [could not hear any of this].

K: When were they sent out? Our people think they have to decide tomorrow. Don't even have the details.

Y: It is so vitally important, would you kindly -- if you -- I know you have tight and busy you are here at -- but could you get a full report from your expert and then could you please call me again?

K: What time should I call you.

Y: In a hour's time.

K: Today, no I cannot do it tonight.

Y: No?

K: I will do it tomorrow morning.

Y: I see, you cannot do it tonight.

K: No, I am already late for something else.

Y: What time could I expect to hear from you?

K: 11 o'clock, that is again midnight for you, 10:00 my time.

Y: Anytime, I am working on a 24-hour basis.

K: I will call you 11:00 my time.

Y: That's all right, I will be at my home.

K: All right, I will call you at your home.

Y: Please.

K: You can count on it. It may be a little earlier, it may be 10:30.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Y: I again had a talk with my friend and my friend is determined to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. His instructions ....

[conversation at this point most difficult to hear]

.... at a far more fixed meeting of our side. He is in the town to
______ which we made.

K: I understand. Let me talk to our experts tomorrow morning and I will call you immediately.

Y: Please. I will be standing by. You can imagine that I am at an almost desperate stage, we must have an agreement. I posed to my friend just now, our prominent representative on discretionary authority to our representative in your place, your experts can raise an agreement later on with my friend himself. I gave my own considered advice to him and he is seriously thinking about it.

next Tuesday and he has to finish negotiations by then. We have only three days left.

K: I will call you, 10:30 or 11:00 my time.

Y: Goodbye.

wgh

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Amb.

November 21, 1970

K: Hello John.

Yes Henry.

K: Sorry to bother you at such an unearthly hour but a number of things happening we didn't want you to read in the newspapers.

Right.

K: We are right now conducting some pretty massive air attacks in North Vietnam.

Yes.

K: In the panhandle area which we -- which are technically in response to the shootdown of American planes but for your information primarily designed to hit some of the supplies they have piled there for their very large high infiltration that is going on at this moment.

Yes.

K: Hanoi has just announced and we wanted you -- we are not notifying any other foreign government and indeed I am doing this with of course the approval of the President but no one else knows I'm telling you this. Secondly, you should also know that for the Prime Minister's own information that this is -- was done at this particular time as a cover for a commando raid where we were trying to free some American prisoners in a camp that we had identified.

Um-huh.

K: And that raid unfortunately failed because the camp had been vacated just recently. The raid itself went off as planned but the prisoners had left.

What very bad luck.

K: It was like a -- it was actually a brilliantly done plan. It worked just as it should but all our commandos got away.

And was that yesterday?

K: That was yesterday evening. Now that has not yet come out. It was just to give the whole picture to the Prime Minister. We will dribble that

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Auth
By NARA Date 6/9/94

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb.

November 21, 1970

K: second fact out sometime during the course of the day tomorrow.
Yes.

K: Hanoi claims that Haiphong and the belt north of -- in that area -- there's a beeping sound from this phone -- Hello --
Yes, I got it myself.

K: Right.
Oh yes, I got it then.

K: Yeah. That is being attacked, that is not true, all the bombing is south of the 19th parallel.
Yes.

K: But there was air activity in that northern area in order to detract to deflect the radar from the commando raid.
Yeah.

K: But it did not drop any ordnance. (long pause) -- Hello.
Yes.

K: Well, that is the situation.
Well, that's -- I'm grateful to be told all that, um-huh.

K: And you will keep it to the narrowest channels and protect me also here in town.

Of course I will. Indeed, yes. And most of this will be out in today's newspapers ....

K: The air attacks but not the extent.

No, no. Okay, I'm gratefully indeed to be told, thank you very much.

K: And not the reasoning and the other operation we will hold for a bit.

I quite understand.

K: Right.

MVD E012958
DECLASSIFIED