SPECIAL REPORT

# Living With the Inevitable

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

Policy," the 19th-century Austrian Foreign Minister, Metternich, once wrote, "is like a play in many acts which unfolds inexorably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not go on is an absurdity. The play will be completed either by the actors or by the spectators who mount the stage."

In recent weeks, the curtain has risen on a new play in Europe. Many of the players are still hesitant, waiting to see what roles others assume first. Still, in the end, only one choice will remain: to complete the play or to be consumed by it.

Although the weight of the past—and uneasiness about the re-emergence of a unified Germany—may keep some from acknowledging it, we are witnessing the end of the immediate postwar era. The political world familiar for over a generation is disintegrating before our eyes.

The new realities are:

* German unification in some form has become inevitable, whatever the misgivings of Germany's neighbors and World War II victims. The only statesman who seems to understand this fully is President Mitterrand of France—despite France's visceral fears of German unification.

* NATO will have to be fundamentally altered to take into account the transformation of Germany and the perceived erosion of the Soviet threat.

* The Warsaw Pact will not survive in its present form very far into the next decade.

* Integration of the European Community will have to be accelerated to take account of new opportunities in Eastern Europe, most recently in Czechoslovakia.

* These trends will require a new look at East-West relations, including (and perhaps especially) arms-control negotiations.

The observer's perplexity is the statesman's challenge. President Bush has an opportunity unequaled since the period immediately following World War II. Rarely have so many elements of international relations been so fluid simultaneously. The occasion to build a more stable and

more hopeful international order occurs no more than once in a century.

Though it will take many months and perhaps years to complete, that process must now begin at the Malta summit between President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev. What had been conceived—at least on the American

side—as a relaxed, philosophical stock-taking has turned into an urgent opportunity to begin shaping a revolutionary situation. To be sure, President Bush will

not fall into the Reykjavik trap of negotiating a surprise Soviet agenda. But this does not change the fact that the Malta summit will take place with an agenda and under conditions of international upheaval not foreseen when it was planned.

Let me discuss the key issues in turn:

## Unifying Germany

In recent weeks German unification, for so long the subject of ambivalent rhetoric, has become a real possibility. Now that it is disintegrating, a sudden nostalgia has developed for the status quo. Atlanticists insist that the alliance can

continue unchanged and that German unification remains the responsibility of World War II's victors. Believers in détente warn against promoting German unification for fear of disquieting the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the West has no reason to get ahead of German desires on reunification. Perhaps 40 years of Communist rule have produced the ironic result of stimulating East German nationalism. But if this is not the case, it would be extremely dangerous for the Western democracies—whatever their secret yearnings or their theoretical legal rights—to try to keep Germany divided against the wishes of the German people. For sooner or later, such a stand would ignite a new German nationalism. And that would only serve to undermine the responsible, essentially pro-Western leaders in all of West Germany's major political parties.

Until recently, German unity, insofar as it had any operational meaning, was equated with the unification of Europe. Extending some of the benefits of the European Community to Eastern Europe was expected to help repair Europe's various fault lines. Though that program remains essential, recent events leave no doubt that the unification of Europe has a different rhythm than the unification of Germany. For in Germany, the moving force is not a pragmatic concept of integration but elemental pressures for popular participation in government.

When the new East German leader, Egon Krenz, was appointed a month ago, he announced that the so-called German Democratic Republic had to be a Communist state or it was nothing. He was right. There is no historic basis for the East German state except as a Communist outpost. If it becomes democratic, it loses the rationale for its separate existence.

But democracy is exactly what the rebellious East German population is so passionately demanding, and what its government has promised. The impact of free elections would be quite different, however, in the German Democratic Republic than it has been elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In Poland, Hungary or

The fall of the wall: Celebrating in Berlin three weeks ago

## German unification now seems bound to take place in some form

MALTA

SUMMIT

NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989 51

SPECIAL REPORT

(LO)

Czechoslovakia, free elections arguably strengthen the state; in the GDR they are likely to undermine it. Genuinely free elections would in all likelihood bring to power parties similar to those of the Federal Republic. The winners would almost certainly seek to synchronize West and East German policies and move the country toward unity.

Political tendencies will be reinforced by economic realities. Now that the border between the two Germanys has for all practical purposes been opened, it will be necessary to match economic conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise there will be an exodus, especially of younger and more ambitious groups, that will drain the East German economy. Such improvement will require massive help from the Federal Republic. That is unlikely—and indeed senseless—if the Communist Party insists on maintaining its dominance over East German political life. (Of course, the Soviet Union has the physical power to stop all this. But it could do so only at the cost of heavy civilian casualties and the collapse of Gorbachev's mystique in the West.)

What form will the new Germany ultimately take? It is conceivable that the two Germanys may form some sort of confederation, with separate democratic governments linked by some common institutions. There is a historical precedent: 19th-century Germany was organized as a Confederation of separate states linked by a Customs Union—though it proved the precursor of a national state. A confederation may make it easier to satisfy Soviet security concerns by maintaining East Germany as a special security zone with limited armaments.

In the end, the outcome will be shaped by the wishes of the German people, not by outside forces. Outsiders can impose a solution only if they are prepared to use force—and to defy a people whose desire for freedom was strong enough to puncture the Berlin wall after 28 years of repression.

The synchronization of political and economic policies will inevitably raise the issue of the German Democratic Republic's military role. Even in a confederation, its membership in the Warsaw Pact would become questionable. It is hard to imagine how a German confederation whose Eastern portion was dominated by more or less the same political parties as the Western portion could be allied to both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. And it is inconceivable in the event of a federal state.

How can Moscow be persuaded to allow

East Germany to leave the Warsaw Pact? On one level, the Soviet Union has no choice. For after free elections, membership of the German Democratic Republic in the Warsaw Pact will become untenable. Certainly, the Soviet Union is entitled to guarantees against its nightmare of military aggression from the West. Some sort of special military status for East Germany is desirable, and the presence of some Soviet forces for an agreed period is conceivable. The United States and its allies should be prepared to deal with these subjects generally. But in the end, Soviet security concerns will have to be met by new arms-control arrangements or by a European peace treaty rather than by East German membership in the Warsaw Pact.

If the German Democratic Republic cannot remain in the Warsaw Pact indefinitely, what about West German membership in NATO? The Soviet spokesman, Gennady

Gerasimov, has asserted that unification is impossible so long as the two Germanys are each part of opposing military blocs. Does this mean that Gorbachev has decided to play "the German card"? Will the Kremlin offer unification in return for German military neutrality? Indeed, in his speech in East Germany in October, Gorbachev referred favorably to a proposal along those lines made by Stalin in 1953.

It is to be hoped that the Soviet leader will not be tempted by a specious symmetry between East Germany's membership in the Warsaw Pact and West Germany's alliance with NATO. If East Germany leaves the Warsaw Pact, it does not follow that the

Soviet Union is any better off if the Federal Republic leaves NATO. I would argue in fact that it is worse off. No Russian leader should disregard the lessons of history: that this century's two world wars grew out of Germany's attempt to pursue a purely national policy in the center of the Continent. Seeking to pre-empt any possible combination of surrounding countries, Germany threatened each of its many neighbors individually and provoked them to form rigid military structures that contributed to war.

Today, a nation of 80 million standing alone in the center of the Continent would again threaten European stability—and in the long run Soviet security as well. How would one define neutralization for a nation of such magnitude? How would one monitor it? Over time, such a Germany would be bound to become a military force. Or else the Soviet Union might be tempted to exploit a

neutralization agreement by insisting on verification measures tantamount to hegemony over Germany. Either course would threaten European stability.

Thus the safest outcome would be a united (or confederated) Germany that remains integrated into NATO but is constrained by new arms limitations throughout Europe. Strange as it may sound, membership in NATO would provide the best mechanism for monitoring agreed limits on armaments, because Germany's allies would have a selfish interest in seeing them observed. Such limits would have to prohibit NATO deployments beyond present dividing lines in Europe and include special provisions for the territory that is now the German Democratic Republic.

The problem of German unification is above all conceptual. It requires an idea of process—of how Germany might be unified and over what period of time. Will it become a single country with federal institutions, a confederal state or something in between? What arms limitations are needed or acceptable? What is the appropriate European and Atlantic framework in which these changes should take place?

As they seek to answer these questions, it is imperative that the Federal Republic and its Western allies work together closely. But in doing so, they must keep in mind one overriding reality: the prerequisite for the continued adherence of the Federal Republic to the Western camp will be to concede some form of unification. The challenge is to ensure that it happens under circumstances that make every nation feel secure, including the Soviet Union.

LELOUP—J.B. PICTURES

After Reykjavik: A disappointed Reagan and Gorbachev

## Malta offers the chance to begin shaping a revolutionary situation

52 NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989

SPECIAL REPORT

NATO and Western Europe

Events in East Germany will undoubtedly speed up a process of attrition that has been going on within the Atlantic Alliance for several years. Driven by arms-control negotiations and "Gorbachev fever," the NATO countries have all stopped any serious efforts to improve their armaments. The Bush administration agreed last May to postpone the modernization of medium-range nuclear missiles in the Federal Republic. Now that postponement is likely to become permanent; under current conditions, there is no political party in Germany prepared to reopen the issue. A recent German visitor to Washington called the modernization prospect "laughable."

Yet the argument made against modernizing Lance missiles—that Germany must take special measures to avoid becoming a nuclear battlefield because it is so

geographically exposed—logically applies to all nuclear weapons deployed on German soil. Thus the likely next phase of the NATO debate, even before the recent upheaval in East Germany, was the promotion of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. And once the concept of a nuclear-free zone is accepted, a doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons—that NATO will not fire first under any circumstances—cannot be far behind. For given the range of nuclear weapons, the only way for participants in a nuclear-free zone to avoid nuclear war is by forgoing any use of nuclear weapons based outside that zone.

The progressive reduction of Western conventional forces on the central front appears to be irreversible. West Germany already plans to reduce the length of compulsory military service, a move that will cut its armed forces from 600,000 to 420,000—proportionally a larger unilateral reduction than what the West has proposed for the Soviet Union.

And the Soviets will surely insist on additional reciprocal German cuts as a part of arms-control negotiations later on.

A significant reduction of American ground forces in Europe has also become highly probable. Whether undertaken under direct or indirect pressure from Congress, the result will be a further erosion of NATO strategy. The concept of flexible response—that deterrence is only credible if it includes many stages short of all-out nuclear war—cannot be sustained under current conditions.

Even if the Federal Republic remains in NATO, a reassessment of NATO's purpose has become imperative. Against what

threat—and with what forces—should NATO be organized? What reductions of U.S. forces should be made, and based on what strategy? How large a U.S. presence should be left in Europe? What is to be the role of European forces? What should be the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces?

The answers to these questions ought to be the subject of the fullest and deepest NATO consultations since the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, a number of principles can be stated:

* NATO should be adapted to new realities, not abandoned. The end of NATO would spell political chaos in Europe, trigger nationalist rivalries and tempt renewed Soviet expansionism.

* The process may well lead to substantial reductions of U.S. and Soviet ground forces—perhaps their total removal if overall Soviet forces are sharply reduced and

withdrawn deep into the U.S.S.R. But this prospect can be realized only if the NATO nations put an end to the irresponsible process of unilateral reductions now going on. While no country has anything to be proud of, the United States—as the leader of the alliance—runs the risk of setting an appalling example by prematurely suggesting dramatic defense cuts. If this process is not stopped, NATO will hand the Soviets an impotent Europe at the precise moment that the postwar generation's goals are within sight.

* Whatever the balance of conventional forces, some American nuclear presence and air forces must be retained on the Euro-

pean continent, with the exact level subject to negotiation. If the defense of Europe were again to rely exclusively on conventional weapons, peace would be at the mercy of historical instabilities. War after war has occurred despite the existence of conventional forces that on paper appeared more or less in balance. This is because success in conventional war depends on so many intangibles—of leadership and maneuver—that actual balances of power have proved very difficult to calculate.

Reliance on U.S. nuclear weapons based on American soil or at sea is not the answer, either. It was the lack of credibility of such a distant deterrent that brought American nuclear forces to Europe in the first place. What was true when NATO's deterrent was hugely superior is even more crucial today, given the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the trend of strategic-arms-control negotiations. In short, NATO

must link the nuclear defense of Europe and America, whatever happens with German unity or conventional disarmament. Otherwise we are on the road to Soviet hegemony if perestroika succeeds, and to nationalist chaos if perestroika fails.

* Conventional arms control negotiations must be redesigned. Currently, they are based on the continued existence of two military blocs. But the future of the Warsaw Pact—and especially of East German membership—is now in question. Above all, arms-control proposals must get away from the pedantic "bean counting" approach—weapons system by weapons system—so much in vogue. It must be brought into line with the growing sense of independence in East Europe and the need for a special status for the territory of the German Democratic Republic.

* Whatever happens, the relative weight of America within NATO is bound to diminish. A major withdrawal of U.S. forces, combined with a politically integrated Europe, will make it necessary to rethink an organization that evolved when America had a nuclear monopoly and was economically dominant. Europe must assume a growing responsibility for its own defense, with the United States playing a supporting role.

For the European Community to assume this strengthened position, it will have to come to terms with German unification. Some leading Europeans and Americans have warned that the European Community was never designed to accommodate a united Germany with a population of some 80 million. Though his-

FPG INTERNATIONAL

Iron chancellor: Bismarck, the father of German statehood

History teaches the risks of an unchecked German national policy

56 NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989

SPECIAL REPORT

torically accurate, that view is irrelevant
to the existing situation. For the European
Community cannot survive if the Germans
see it as a device to thwart unification.

There is merit to the concern that a uni-
fied Germany would have disproportionate
weight within the European Community.
But the other members have the capacity to
prevent German hegemony. Surely Brit-
ain, France, Spain and Italy, not to mention
the smaller states, could shape a consensus
that prevents domination by any one coun-
try, however powerful. Indeed, the strong-
est argument for Britain's wholehearted
participation in the 1992 process is the
need for Britain's political experience in
establishing an appropriate balance with-
in the European Community.

The precise balance is for Europeans to
decide. But Americans can help to close a
growing gap between the European Com-
munity, where frontiers are being blurred
and the United States is not repre-
sented, and NATO, where nations
still speak with separate voices
and the European Community has
no means of expression. This sug-
gests a twofold task: (1) Europe
should be given some institutional
voice within NATO, perhaps by re-
viving the West European Union;
(2) the European Community and
the United States should develop
some systematic method of politi-
cal consultation at a high level.

East-West Relations

Ever since the advent of Gorbachev, the West has been obsessed with his mercurial and courageous personality. But reliance on a single personality is a counsel of despair. For if Gorbachev's foreign policy is a personal tour de force, it will not be sustainable in the long run. Indeed, the possibility that Gorbachev will not survive cannot be excluded, given his challenge to so many vested interests within the Soviet Union.

For the moment, however, Gor-
bachev's position still seems strong. No So-
viet leader could have risked the Soviet
Union's position in Central Europe with-
out the support of the Soviet Army and the
KGB. Those two institutions must have
concluded that the only other option—re-
pression—would require such brutality as
to thwart any hopes of enlisting Western
help in modernizing the Soviet economy.
Yet if one believes that there exists a rela-
tively wide consensus in the Soviet leader-
ship, it becomes especially important to
analyze the elements of that consensus.

There are three possibilities: (1) the Sovi-
et leaders may believe that by relaxing the
grip on Eastern Europe, they will be able to

maintain existing arrangements at less
cost; (2) they may be playing the German
card—that is, using the prospect of a neu-
tral unified Germany to drive American
military power from the Continent; (3) the
Soviets may genuinely want to conduct
a serious negotiation on a new East-
West equilibrium. Unfortunately, Soviet
leaders have made statements supporting
all three theories. The most likely reason is
that the Soviets have yet to make up their
own minds.

At least some high-level Soviet officials
may hope that discarding a failed ideology
will allow them to continue the historic
Russian policy of crushing any power cen-
ter within Moscow's reach. Last summer
an eminent Russian scientist, a member of
the Supreme Soviet, told me that the Soviet
Union's strategic position could not be
challenged so long as it retained a large
stockpile of nuclear weapons and Germany

and Japan were denuclearized. Hence, he
argued, the thrust of Soviet policy should
be to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from
Eurasia. After that, it would be safe to ask
Germany and Japan to help rebuild the
Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union could
always keep those countries in line by bran-
dishing its nuclear monopoly in Eurasia.

At the time, I considered these the theo-
retical musings of an out-of-power intellec-
tual. I am no longer so sure. It is not impos-
sible that some in the Kremlin are
gambling for high stakes. This group may
calculate that a neutral unified Germany
would enable the Soviet Union to salvage
the Warsaw Pact and frighten Western Eu-

rope while exploiting new disarmament
provisions to achieve step-by-step political
domination over Central Europe.

Gorbachev is too intelligent not to recog-
nize the perils of such a strategy. For on the
road to hegemony lie many potential pit-
falls for the Soviet Union, any one of which
could spell disaster. Every effort should
therefore be made to negotiate a true equi-
librium. History teaches that a stable
peace can occur only if the interests of all
major players are met—if the security con-
cerns of all sides are adequately recog-
nized. Both the Soviet Union and the Unit-
ed States will have to break with
traditional patterns. The Soviet Union will
have to abandon the strategy of weakening
every other power center in Eurasia. The
United States will have to drop challenges
to the Soviet Union within its national
frontiers. We have no reason to help sus-
tain the internal arrangements of the Sovi-

et Union, but we should be pre-
pared to leave their erosion to the
forces of history.

In practice, the new equilibri-
um should include the following
elements: (1) a concept for Ger-
man unification based on self-de-
termination; (2) a special security
status for East German territory;
(3) a negotiated balance of forces
on both sides of the present divid-
ing line in Europe; (4) a sharp re-
duction of Soviet ground forces
and the withdrawal of most of
them deep into the Soviet Union,
coupled with a withdrawal of a
major portion of U.S. ground
forces; (5) some provision for keep-
ing U.S. nuclear weapons and air
forces as part of the common
Western defense strategy; (6) an
integrated Western Europe with
strengthened ties to the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe;
(7) a verifiable strategic-arms
agreement.

The United States, which did so
much to build the postwar era,
now must help prepare a new in-
ternational order. The meeting in

Malta cannot produce any agreements, as
President Bush has repeatedly pointed out.
But it can mark the first step of a long
march toward a hopefully better world. In
that journey, the United States cannot
solve every problem, but it can contribute a
sense of direction.

In a period of turmoil, it is important to
avoid recklessness. But caution can only
preserve the status quo; boldness is needed
to reach a better future. Few presidents
have had the opportunity that President
Bush now has to leave his imprint on an
era. The time has come—it has never been
more urgent—for what President Bush has
called that “vision thing.” ■

SUSAN BIDDLE—THE WHITE HOUSE

A piece of the wall: With Bonn's foreign minister, Genscher

Events have given Bush
an opportunity to leave
his imprint on an era

NEWSWEEK : DECEMBER 4, 1989

SPECIAL REPORT

# Living With the Inevitable

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

The new realities are:

Though it will take many months and perhaps years to complete, that process must now begin at the Malta summit between President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev. What had been conceived—at least on the Ameri-

can side—as a relaxed, philosophical stocktaking has turned into an urgent opportunity to begin shaping a revolutionary situation. To be sure, President Bush will

## Unifying Germany

MALTA

SUMMIT

ORBAN—SYGMA

NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989 51

SPECIAL REPORT

Political tendencies will be reinforced by economic realities. Now that the border between the two Germanys has for all practical purposes been opened, it will be necessary to match economic conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise there will be an exodus, especially of younger and more ambitious groups, that will drain the East German economy. Such improvement will require massive help from the Federal Republic. That is unlikely—and indeed senseless—if the Communist Party insists on maintain-

LELOUP—J.B. PICTURES

NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989

SPECIAL REPORT

NATO and Western Europe

FGI INTERNATIONAL

56 NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989

SPECIAL REPORT

There is merit to the concern that a unified Germany would have disproportionate weight within the European Community. But the other members have the capacity to prevent German hegemony. Surely Britain, France, Spain and Italy, not to mention the smaller states, could shape a consensus that prevents domination by any one country, however powerful. Indeed, the strongest argument for Britain's wholehearted participation in the 1992 process is the need for Britain's political experience in establishing an appropriate balance within the European Community.

The precise balance is for Europeans to decide. But Americans can help to close a growing gap between the European Community, where frontiers are being blurred

and the United States is not represented, and NATO, where nations still speak with separate voices and the European Community has no means of expression. This suggests a twofold task: (1) Europe should be given some institutional voice within NATO, perhaps by reviving the West European Union; (2) the European Community and the United States should develop some systematic method of political consultation at a high level.

## East-West Relations

For the moment, however, Gorbachev's position still seems strong. No Soviet leader could have risked the Soviet Union's position in Central Europe without the support of the Soviet Army and the KGB. Those two institutions must have concluded that the only other option—repression—would require such brutality as to thwart any hopes of enlisting Western help in modernizing the Soviet economy. Yet if one believes that there exists a relatively wide consensus in the Soviet leadership, it becomes especially important to analyze the elements of that consensus.

There are three possibilities: (1) the Soviet leaders may believe that by relaxing the grip on Eastern Europe, they will be able to

maintain existing arrangements at less cost; (2) they may be playing the German card—that is, using the prospect of a neutral unified Germany to drive American military power from the Continent; (3) the Soviets may genuinely want to conduct a serious negotiation on a new East-West equilibrium. Unfortunately, Soviet leaders have made statements supporting all three theories. The most likely reason is that the Soviets have yet to make up their own minds.

At least some high-level Soviet officials may hope that discarding a failed ideology will allow them to continue the historic Russian policy of crushing any power center within Moscow's reach. Last summer an eminent Russian scientist, a member of the Supreme Soviet, told me that the Soviet Union's strategic position could not be challenged so long as it retained a large stockpile of nuclear weapons and Germany

and Japan were denuclearized. Hence, he argued, the thrust of Soviet policy should be to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Eurasia. After that, it would be safe to ask Germany and Japan to help rebuild the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union could always keep those countries in line by brandishing its nuclear monopoly in Eurasia.

At the time, I considered these the theoretical musings of an out-of-power intellectual. I am no longer so sure. It is not impossible that some in the Kremlin are gambling for high stakes. This group may calculate that a neutral unified Germany would enable the Soviet Union to salvage the Warsaw Pact and frighten Western Europe

Gorbachev is too intelligent not to recognize the perils of such a strategy. For on the road to hegemony lie many potential pitfalls for the Soviet Union, any one of which could spell disaster. Every effort should therefore be made to negotiate a true equilibrium. History teaches that a stable peace can occur only if the interests of all major players are met—if the security concerns of all sides are adequately recognized. Both the Soviet Union and the United States will have to break with traditional patterns. The Soviet Union will have to abandon the strategy of weakening every other power center in Eurasia. The United States will have to drop challenges to the Soviet Union within its national frontiers. We have no reason to help sustain the internal arrangements of the Soviet Union, but we should be prepared to leave their erosion to the forces of history.

In practice, the new equilibrium should include the following elements: (1) a concept for German unification based on self-determination; (2) a special security status for East German territory; (3) a negotiated balance of forces on both sides of the present dividing line in Europe; (4) a sharp reduction of Soviet ground forces and the withdrawal of most of them deep into the Soviet Union, coupled with a withdrawal of a major portion of U.S. ground forces; (5) some provision for keeping U.S. nuclear weapons and air forces as part of the common Western defense strategy; (6) an integrated Western Europe with strengthened ties to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe; (7) a verifiable strategic-arms agreement.

The United States, which did so much to build the postwar era, now must help prepare a new international order. The meeting in Malta cannot produce any agreements, as President Bush has repeatedly pointed out. But it can mark the first step of a long march toward a hopefully better world. In that journey, the United States cannot solve every problem, but it can contribute a sense of direction.

SUSAN BIDDLE—THE WHITE HOUSE

## Events have given Bush an opportunity to leave his imprint on an era

(L)

58 NEWSWEEK: DECEMBER 4, 1989

DR. KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE FINAL DRAFT 11/24/89

"Policy," the 19th century Austrian Foreign Minister, Metternich, wrote, "is like a play in many acts which unfolds inexorably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not go on is an absurdity. The play will be completed either by the actors or by the spectators who mount the stage."

In recent weeks, the curtain has risen on a new play unfolding center stage in Europe. Many of the players are still hesitant, waiting to see what roles others assume first. Nor is anyone precisely sure of the nature of the play. Still, in the end, only one choice will remain: to finish the play or to be consumed by it.

-2-

Although the weight of the past - and uneasiness about the reemergence of a unified Germany - may keep some from acknowledging it, we are witnessing the end of the immediate post-war era. The political world as we have known it for over a generation is disintegrating before our eyes.

The new realities are:

- German unification in some form has become inevitable, whatever the misgivings of Germany's neighbors and World War II victims. So far the only statesman who seems to understand this fully is President Mitterrand of France - the Western country that viscerally fears German unification the most.

- NATO will have to be fundamentally altered to take into account the transformation of Germany and the perceived erosion of the Soviet threat.

- The Warsaw Pact will not be able to survive in its present form very far into the next decade.

-3-

- The integration of the European Community will have to be accelerated to take account of new opportunities and avoid being torn apart by the centrifugal pull of changes in Eastern Europe.

- These trends will require a new look at East-West relations, including (and perhaps especially) arms control negotiations.

The observer's perplexity is the statesman's challenge.
President Bush has an opportunity unequaled since the great
period of American statesmanship immediately following the
end of World War II. Rarely have so many elements of inter-
national affairs been so fluid at the same time. The occa-
sion to build a new international order both more stable and
more hopeful than its predecessor's occurs no more than once
in a century.

For better or worse, that process must now begin at
Malta between President Bush and Secretary Gorbachev though

-4-

it will take many months and perhaps years to complete. What
had been conceived - at least on the American side - as a
relaxed, philosophical stocktaking, has turned into the
necessity to begin shaping a fast-moving, revolutionary
situation. To be sure, President Bush will not fall into the
Reykjavik trap of negotiating a surprise Soviet agenda. But
this does not change the fact that the Malta summit will
take place with an agenda and under conditions of interna-
tional upheaval not foreseen when it was planned.

German Unification

In recent weeks German unification, for so long the
subject of ambivalent rhetoric, has become a real possibili-
ty. Understandably, the prospect fills many with uneasiness.
But it can no longer be avoided.

With the familiar status quo disintegrating, a coali-
tion of nostalgias for it is suddenly developing.

-5-

Atlanticists insist that the alliance can weather this storm
unchanged and that German unification remains the responsi-
bility of the victors of World War II. Believers in detente
with the Soviet Union warn against promoting unification of
Germany in order not to disquiet the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the West has no reason to get ahead of
German desires on reunification. Perhaps - as some seem to
hope, 40 years of Communist rule have produced the ironical
result of stimulating not Communism but East German nation-
alism. But if this is not the case, it would be extremely
dangerous for the Western democracies - whatever their
secret yearnings or their theoretical legal rights - to try
to keep Germany divided against the wishes of the German
people. For sooner or later, such a stand would ignite a new
German nationalism. And that would only serve to undermine
the current responsible, essentially pro-Western, leaders in
all of West Germany's political parties.

-6-

Until recently, German unity, in so far as it had any
operational meaning, was equated with the unification of
Europe. Extending some of the benefits of the European
Community to Eastern Europe - was expected to help repair
Europe's various fault lines. But though that program
remains essential, recent events leave no doubt that the
unification of Europe has a different rhythm than the
unification of Germany. For in Germany the moving force is
not a theoretical concept of integration based on prudent
calculation but elemental pressures for popular participa-
tion in government.

When the new East German leader, Egon Krenz, was
appointed less than a month ago, he announced that the
so-called German Democratic Republic had to be a Communist
state or it was nothing. He was right. There is no historic
basis for the East German state except as a Communist

-7-

outpost. If it becomes democratic, it loses the reationale
for its separate existence.

But democracty is exactly what the rebellious East
German population is passionately demanding and what its
government has promised to bring about. The impact of free
elections would be quite different, however, in the German
Democratic Republic than it has been elsewhere in Eastern
Europe. In Poland or Hungary, free elections arguably
strengthen the state; in the German Democratic Republic they
are likely to undermine it. Genuinely free elections would
in all likelihood bring parties similar to those of the
Federal Republic into government. The winners would almost
certainly seek to synchronize West and East German policies
and move the country toward unity as quickly as possible.

Political developments will be reinforced by economic
realities. Now that the border between the two Germanies has
for all practical purposes been opened, it will be necessary

-8-

to equalize economic conditions in the two parts of Germany.

Otherwise, there will be an exodus, especially of younger and more ambitious groups that will drain the East German economy. But such improvement will require massive help from the Federal Republic. That is unlikely - and indeed senseless - if the Communist party insists on maintaining its dominance over East German political life. (Of course, the Soviet Union has the physical power to stop all this but only at a fearsome peril: the prospect of heavy civilian casualties and the collapse of Gorvachev's mystique in the West.)

What form will the new Germany ultimately take? It is conceivable that the two Germanies may form some sort of confederation with parallel domestic institutions and comparable economic programs but separate governments linked by some common institutions. There is a historical precedent: 19th century Germany was organized as a Confederation of

-2-

the nature of the play itself. Still, in the end, only one
choice will remain; to complete the play or to be engulfed
by it.

For we are witnessing the end of the immediate post-war
era. On both sides of the dividing line, traditional catego-
ries have become too familiar, the uneasiness about the
reemergence of a unified Germany is too great to permit full
acknowledgment of the process now in train as one that will
reshape the categories of thought in place for over a
generation.

The political world as we have known it is disintegrat-
ing before our eyes. Its chief features are:

- German unification in some form has become inevitable
whatever the misgivings of almost all of Germany's neighbors
and of its victims during World War II. So far the only
statesman who seems to understand this fully is President

-3-

- NATO will have to be fundamentally altered to take into account the transformation of Germany and the erosion of the perception of the Soviet threat.

- The Warsaw Pact will be even less able to survive in its present form very far into the next decade.

- The integration of the European Community will have to be accelerated to avoid being torn apart by the centrifugal tendencies unleashed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union's East European empire.

- These trends will require a new look at East-West relations, including and perhaps especially arms control negotiations.

These events have transformed the upcoming Malta summit between President Bush and Gorbachev. What had been conceived - at least on the American side - as a relaxed,

-4-

philosophical stocktaking, now becomes the initial explora-
tion of a fast-moving, revolutionary situation. As at
Reykjavik, an American president will have to deal with an
unexpected agenda evoked by Gorbachev. Whether Gorbachev had
any choice or is accelerating his actions to produce a sense
of urgency at Malta cannot now be known and is in any case
irrelevant. Most probably it is a combination of reacting to
events and conscious design. To be sure, President Bush will
not fall into the Reykjavik trap of negotiating the agenda
awaiting him; but this does not change the fact that the
Malta summit will take place under conditions of incipient
crisis not foreseen when it was being planned.

Let me discuss these issues in turn:

German Unification

In recent weeks German unification, for so long the
subject of ambivalent exhortation, has moved center-stage.
Understandably, the prospect fills many with uneasiness. But

NO

-5-

it can no longer be avoided; all reflection on European
policy must start from that premise.

To be sure, the West has no reason to get ahead of
German desires on the reunification question. But equally it
would be extremely dangerous for the Western democracies -
whatever their secret yearnings based on experience - to
collude in the division of Germany against the wishes of the
German people. For sooner or later such a stand would
suffuse the German political landscape with nationalism. The
present responsible, essentially pro-Western, leadership in
all German political parties would lose the capacity to
shape the future.

Until recently, German unity, in so far as it had any
operational meaning, was equaled with the unification of
Europe. The evolution of the European Community - especially
the extension of some of its benefits to Eastern Europe -
would heal Europe's various fault lines, in time melding

CD

-6-

together the two parts of Germany. But recent events leave
no doubt that the unification of Europe has a different
rhythm than the unification of Germany, which follows its
own momentum. In Germany, the moving force is not an ab-
stract desire for unity but pressures for democracy.

When the new East German leader, Egon Krenz, was
appointed less than a month ago, he announced that the
so-called German Democratic Republic had to be a Communist
state or it was nothing. He was right. There is no historic
basis for the East German state except as a Communist
outpost. To become democratic means abandoning the rationale
for its separate existence.

But democracy is exactly what the East German popula-
tion demands in large and relentless demonstrations and what
its government has promised to bring about. The impact of
free elections is quite different, however, in the German
Democratic Republic from what it is in Eastern Europe. In

-7-

Eastern Europe - in Poland or Hungary - free elections arguably strengthen the nation; in the German Democratic Republic they are likely to undermine it. Free elections - if they are genuinely free - will almost certainly be contested by parties analagous to - and in time identical with - the political parties of the Federal Republic. The outcome of elections will be an overwhelming victory for parties which will almost certainly seek immediately to syncronize West and East German policies and in a few short years move the country toward unity.

Political tendencies will be reinforced by economic realities. Now that the border between the two Germanies has for all practical purposes been opened, it will be necessary to equalize economic conditions in the two parts of Germany. Otherwise the exodus, especially of the younger and more ambitious element will drain the East German economy. But equalization requires massive help from the Federal

-8-

Republic. That is unlikely - and indeed senseless - if the
Communist party insists on maintaining its dominance over
East German political life. It is the one serious demand put
forward by the Bonn government. Of course, the Soviet Union
has the physical power to stop all this but only at a
fearsome peril: a heavy loss of life and the collapse of the
Gorbachev mystique in the West.

To be sure, there is a historical precedent that two
and more German states with similar domestic institutions
and comparable economic programs might conclude that they
should merge into one state. 19th century Germany was
organized as a Confederation of separate states linked by a
Customs Union. It is conceivable that something like that
could be the outcome, though it must be remembered that the
19th century German Confederation and Customs Union were
precursors of the national state. A confederation may make
it easier to maintain East Germany as a special zone of

-9-

limited armaments to meet Soviet security concerns. But the key decision will in the end be shaped by the wishes of the German people not by outside forces. Outsiders can impose a solution only if they are prepared to use force against a people whose desire for freedom was strong enough to puncture the Berlin Wall after 28 years of repression.

Moreover, the issue of the military role of the German Democratic Republic will arise inevitably with the syncronization of economic policies of the two Germanies and with free elections in East Germany. Even in a confederation, the long-term membership of the German Democratic Republic in the Warsaw Pact would become extremely questionable. It is hard to imagine how a German confederation whose Eastern portion was dominated by more or less the same political parties as the Western portion could be Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe and NATO allies in Western Europe.

-10-

The Soviet Union is entitled to security guarantees
against its well-founded historic nightmare of renewed
German military aggression. Some sort of special military
status for the territory of the German Democratic Republic
is desirable and the presence of some Soviet forces for an
agreed period is conceivable. The United States should be
prepared to negotiate on these subjects with an open mind.
both with its allies and with the Soviet Union. In other
words, as far as East Germany is concerned, Soviet security
concerns are far better met by new arms control arrangements
or by a European peace treaty rather than the Warsaw Pact
which in Germany after free elections will be a broken reed.

If the German Democratic Republic cannot remain in the
Warsaw Pact indefinitely, what about West German membership
in NATO? The Soviet spokesman, Gerasimov, has asserted that
unification is impossible so long as the two Germanies are
each part of opposing military blocs. Does this mean that

-11-

Gorbachev has decided to play the German card? Will the Kremlin offer unification in return for German military neutrality, perhaps even conceding German membership in the European Community in the process? Indeed, in his speech to the East German parliament on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic in October, Gorbachev referred favorably to a proposal along those lines made by Stalin in 1953.

It is to be hoped that in the end the Soviet leader will not permit himself to be tempted by a specious symmetry between the significance of Europe's military blocs for the two Germanies. No Russian leader should disregard the lessons of history that the two European wars of this century resulted importantly from Germany's attempt to pursue a purely national policy in the center of the Continent. Seeking to protect itself against all possible combinations, it threatened each neighbor individually and thus

-12-

contributed to bringing about the rigid military structures
that led to war. Today such a nation of 80 million standing
alone in the center of the Continent would once again
threaten European stability - in the end even for the Soviet
Union. Moreover, how does one define military neutralization
for a nation of such magnitude? How would one verify or
monitor it? Over time, such a Germany would be bound to
become a military factor as well. Or else the Soviet Union
might be tempted to use the neutralization provisions to
establish its hegemony over Germany. Either course would
threaten European stability.

Thus the safest policy is a Germany that remains
integrated into NATO with the territory that is now the
Federal Republic as part of a regime of limited armaments
for all of Europe. Such a regime would have to contain
special disarmament provisions for the territory that is the
present-day German Democratic Republic. These arrangements

-13-

could be embodied either in an arms control agreement or as part of a broader European peace treaty.

Clearly, the problem of German unification is in the first instance conceptual. It requires an idea of process, that is of how Germany might be unified and over what period of time; whether it becomes a single country with federal institutions; a confederal state; or something in between; what arms limitations are needed or acceptable; consideration must be given as well to an appropriate European and Atlantic institutional framework.

The key is the closest harmonization of views between the Federal Republic and its Western allies. Neither the United States nor its allies need to get ahead of internal German discussions; they do have a responsibility to help provide a framework for them. They must not solve an immediate problem by mortgaging the future. Soviet goodwill must not be brought by seeming to collude in the division of

-14-

Germany. For that would hazard the Western orientation of
the Federal Republic by making it seem an obstacle to German
national aspirations.

NATO and the European Community

After the perforation of the Berlin Wall, any attempt
to continue business as usual must lead to the gradual
atrophy of the institution. Events in East Germany have
culminated a process of attrition within NATO that has been
going on for several years driven by arms control negotia-
tion and "Gorbachev fever." Even before the upheavals in
East Germany, the process starting with the INF argument had
severely undermined NATO's proclaimed goals.

All NATO countries have stopped any serious effort to
modernize and improve their armaments. The postponement of
the modernization of the medium range nuclear missiles on
the territory of the Federal Republic - agreed to by the
Bush Administration last May - will prove to be permanent;

-15-

under current conditions, there is no political party in
Germany that would be prepared even to discuss it. But the
argument made against modernizing Lance missiles - that
Germany being geographically exposed must take special
measures to avoid becoming a nuclear battlefield - logically
applies to all nuclear weapons deployed on German soil.

Indeed, the shorter the range of the weapons the more valid
is the argument. Thus the likely next phase of the NATO
debate, even before the recent upheaval in East Germany,
would have been the establishment of a nuclear free zone in
Central Europe - though its onset might have been delayed
until after the German elections. And once the concept of a
nuclear free zone is accepted, a doctrine of no first use of
nuclear weapons cannot be far behind. For given the range of
nuclear weapons, the nuclear free zone can avoid the danger
it seeks to escape only by foregoing the use on its territo-
ry of weapons based outside it.

-16-

Recent events in East Germany and Eastern Europe will
surely accelerate this trend. The decline of conventional
forces on the central front appears to have become irrevers-
ible. By reducing the length of compulsory military service,
German armed forces will be cut from 600 to 420 thousand - a
larger proportional unilateral reduction than what the West
has proposed for the Soviet Union. And the Soviets will
surely insist on additional reciprocal German cuts as a
part of arms control negotiations later on.

Moreover, significant reduction of American ground
forces in Europe has become highly probable. Whether under-
taken as a Congressional mandate or as an Executive branch
anticipation of Congressional pressures, the result will be
an erosion of existing NATO strategy. The concept of flexi-
ble response cannot be sustained under current conditions.

Thus the choice before NATO - assuming that the neu-
tralization of a united Germany is avoided - is the creation

-17-

of a European security system involving varying zones of
limited armaments or a process of unilateral reductions
which drains NATO of strategic significance.

But even if the Federal Republic remains in NATO - by
far the best outcome for the stability of Europe - reassess-
ment of NATO strategy and organization has become impera-
tive. Specifically: against what threat and with what forces
is NATO being organized? What reductions of US forces can be
made in the service of what strategy? What residual US
forces should be left in Europe? What is to be the role of
European forces? What is to be the relationship between
conventional and nuclear forces? What military organization
would best reflect the new realities?

This is not the occasion to give answers to questions
which should evoke the fullest and deepest Atlantic consul-
tations since the formation of NATO if the Atlantic Alliance
is to retain any meaning.

-18-

Still, a number of principles can be stated:

(1) NATO should be adapted to new realities, not abandoned. The end of NATO would spell political chaos in Europe triggering nationalist rivalries and tempting Soviet hegemonial designs.

(2) Whatever the balance of conventional forces, some American nuclear presence must be retained on the European continent, its level subject to negotiation. If the defense of Europe is returned exclusively to conventional weapons, peace would be at the mercy of traditional patterns which for centuries have proved highly unstable - war after war occurred despite the existence of conventional forces that seemed on paper more or less in balance. This is because success in conventional war depends on so many intangibles of leadership and maneuver that the actual has proved very difficult to calculate. At the other extreme, Europe should not rely on American nuclear weapons based on American soil

-19-

or at sea. It was the apparent lack of credibility of such a distant deterrent that brought American ground forces, nuclear and conventional, to Europe in the first place. What was true when NATO's nuclear forces were hugely superior is even more crucial today when the growth of the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile and the trend of strategic arms control negotiations are depriving strategic nuclear war of all rationale. European opponents of American nuclear weapons on their soil might ask themselves why America should run risks in defense of distant countries which these countries are unwilling to run on their own behalf. NATO, in short, must link the nuclear defense of Europe and America in some organic manner whatever happens to German unity.

-20-

(3) Conventional arms control negotiations must be redesigned. Currently, they are based on the continued existence of two military blocs. But this is the least likely outcome in Eastern Europe and especially in East Germany over the next decade. Arms control proposals must be brought into line with emergent political reality and made consistent with a special status for the territory of the present German Democratic Republic.

(4) Whatever happens, the relative weight of America within NATO is bound to diminish. The withdrawal of major American forces and the emergent role of an integrated Europe make it necessary to rethink the organization that evolved when American had a nuclear monopoly and was militarily and economically dominant. Europe must assume a growing responsibility for its own defense with the United States playing an essential role which is supportive of those efforts.

-21-

The evolution of this paradigm depends importantly on
the elaboration of the European Community. And this in turn
will reflect what happens on the plane of German unifica-
tion. Leading French political figures have pointed out that
the European Community was never designed to accommodate a
united Germany with a population of some 80 million. Such a
state would, in that view, throw the entire European design
out of balance.

That view is accurate historically but irrelevant to
the existing situation. Whatever the nostalgia for Monnet's
original design and however justified historic fears, the
European Community can not survive if in German eyes it
becomes a device to thwart unification. Whatever may be said
publicly in the present confused period, German domestic
politics will turn increasingly anti-European in such
circumstances.

-22-

There is merit to the concern that a unified Germany would represent a disproportionate weight. But the members of the European Community have the means and the mechanisms to prevent German hegemony. Surely Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, not to speak of the smaller states, could shape a consensus that prevents domination by any one European country, however powerful. Thus the strongest argument for Britain's wholehearted participation in the construction of a united Europe is precisely the need for Britain's political experience in establishing an appropriate balance within the European Community.

The precise evolution of internal European arrangements is for Europeans to decide. But Americans can point to one anomaly in existing Atlantic relations. Within Europe the weight of political decisions is moving from the nation to the European Community where the United States is not represented and with which its consultation is a vestige of

-23-

the period when the Community was a largely economic insti-
tution. But within NATO - in the crucial field of military
security - matters are left to the nation state with no
means of expression for the emergent European political
entity.

This suggests a two-fold task: (a) Europe should be
given some institutional voice within NATO, perhaps by means
of the West European Union; (b) the political relations
between the European Community and the United States should
include some systematic method of political consultation at
a high level.

The Future of East-West Relations:

For years the argument has been advanced - ever more
insistently - that the Western democracies should "help"
Gorbachev weather the hostile forces arraigned against him
at home. I have always questioned the wisdom of tying
Western policy to a single personality no matter how able

-24-

and impressive. Long-range policy can survive only if it is
sustained by a foreseeable consensus of Soviet leaders.

The concept of "helping" Gorbachev implies unilateral
concessions that one would not make to anyone else. But if
concessions reflect reciprocal interests, we would not be
helping Gorbachev but ourselves. Our policy should be
discussed in terms of a balance of interests, not its
presumed effect on internal Kremlin politics.

Ironically, events in Eastern Europe and especially in
Germany suggest that Gorbachev's position is probably much
less precarious than has been thought. No single Soviet
leader could on his own have brought about the startling
changes in the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and espe-
cially in East Germany. Gorbachev's courage and daring were
surely useful; but he could not have risked the Soviet
Union's position in Central Europe without the support of
the Red Army and the KGB. Those two institutions may have

-25-

thought that the only other route - that of repression -
would have required an effort of such scale and brutality as
to isolate the Soviet Union and thwart any hopes for modern-
izing the society with outside help.

But if the Soviet leadership is united in loosening its
hold on Eastern Europe, it is not yet clear on its long-term
objectives. There are three possibilities: (a) the Soviet
leaders may believe that by loosening the pressures in
Eastern Europe, they will be able to maintain existing
arrangements at less cost; (b) the Soviet leaders may be
playing the German card, that is, using the prospect of a
neutral unified Germany to expel American military power
from the Continent. In the Soviet view, this may reduce
Soviet risks if perestroika fails and lay the basis for
eventual Soviet hegemony over Europe if perestroika should
succeed; (c) the Soviets would like to conduct a serious

-26-

negotiation on a new equilibrium between itself and the
Western democracies.

Unfortunately, statements abound in which Soviet
leaders support all three theories. Reading tea leaves may
not get us very far - perhaps because the Soviets have not
yet made up their own minds among the various options.

For the West, cooperating with the Soviet Union to keep
Germany divided is not a viable course. Without maintaining
the status quo it would go a long way toward undermining it
by turning Germany's national feelings against its Western
allies. Thus the first option really merges with the second
paranoid one: to use the fluidity of the current situation
to increase long-range Soviet power in Eurasia. By
disembarassing themselves of the baggage of a failed ideolo-
gy, some Soviet leaders think they can continue the historic
Russian policy of dismantling any power center within reach
of Russian strategy.

-27-

Last summer an eminent Soviet scientist, a member of the Supreme Soviet reported to be close to Gorbachev, argued to me that the Soviet Union's strategic position could not be challenged so long as Germany and Japan were denuclearized and the Soviet Union retained a large stockpile of nuclear weapons. Hence, he argued, the thrust of Soviet policy should be to remove American nuclear weapons from Eurasia. After that, it would be safe to use Germany and Japan to rebuild the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union could always control any attempt by these countries to achieve political gains by the threat of its nuclear monopoly in Eurasia. Nor would they dare to thwart Soviet designs so long as they were totally vulnerable.

At the time I considered these the theoretical musings of an out-of-power intellectual. I am no longer so sure. It is not impossible that Gorbachev is gambling for high stakes. He - or some of his colleagues - may calculate that

-28-

a neutral unified Germany would enable the Soviet Union to salvage the Warsaw Pact and to appeal to Western Europe on the basis of the fear of Germany while using enforcement of the disarmament provisions of such an agreement to achieve step-by-step political domination over Central Europe.

Gorbachev is too intelligent not to recognize the perils of such a strategy. For on the road to hegemony many chasms beckon to the Soviet Union. I therefore regard it as possible that Gorbachev may be prepared to negotiate a true equilibrium. This requires both the Soviet Union and the United States to break some traditional patterns. On the part of the Soviet Union it would require abandonment of the strategy of weakening every other power center in Eurasia if not the world. On the part of the United States it would require a willingness to accept the Soviet Union's national frontiers without a foreign policy challenge.

-29-

We have no reason to approve the internal arrangements of
the Soviet Union. But we should be prepared to leave its
erosion to the forces of history rather than to foreign
policy challenges. The test of the new equilibrium is quite
simple: the Soviet Union must be prepared to settle for a
balance of power. The United States must be willing to
coexist with an unfriendly ideology.

In practice this means working out a concept for the
German unification on the basis of self determination; a
special security status for the territory of the present
East German state; a balance of forces on both sides of the
present dividing line in Europe, with most Soviet ground
forces withdrawn deep into the Soviet Union; and a major
withdrawal of US ground forces into the territorial United
States, but with some provision for the use of nuclear
weapons in Western defense strategy. The level of remaining

-30-

forces and the duration of their stay is obviously a subject
for negotiation.

At this stage the need is not for detailed bargaining
but for a concept to be developed first with our allies and
then with the Soviet Union. The meeting in Malta thus cannot
settle anything and should not attempt to do so as President
Bush has repeatedly pointed out. But it can be useful in
exposing each side to the other's philosophy for handling
the present crisis. Before there can be any detailed negoti-
ation, we must reach some agreement on where we are going.

Great presidencies occur when there is a confluence of
opportunity and leadership. The Bush presidency has an
opportunity unprecedented in the immediate post-war period,
not since American and European statesmanship first forged
order out of chaos. But the current opportunity, though more
complex, is also more hopeful. In 1815, a European Congress
created a new order at Vienna that lasted a century; the

-31-

1919 peace settlement of Versailles lasted barely twenty years. Our hope must be that with America's encouragement the Western democracies will now forge an international structure worthy of the highest aspirations of our western civilization.