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Page 2

periods, allied ourselves, or tend to ally ourselves, too much with right-wing colonels, I suppose."

Kissinger: "We were the strongest free country, but we now had to set priorities."

Kissinger Voiceover Film:

"The problem for the United States when I joined the administration was how to define its role in the world."

Frost Voiceover Film:

"January, 1969. The new president of the United States -- a grocer's son from California -- begins what was to become a controversial partnership...

...with a former professor from Harvard. An immigrant from Germany. Partners, not only in running Washington's foreign policy...

but also in shaping events in Moscow... and Pnom Penh. In Peking...

Henry Kissinger, Assistant to President Nixon for national security affairs -- a position he molded into an instrument of immense power and prestige.

He was sometimes portrayed as a one-man band, an international super-star. The public perceived Henry Kissinger as a unique world figure, steeped in glamour, intrigue.... but, most important, power.

He took a major hand in running a war ...

...and he was the chief negotiator for peace.

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Page 4

(OVER A SLIDE READING "A STATEMENT BY NBC NEWS")

What follows is an interesting and lively interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger. We believe our viewers should be aware of an equally lively controversy behind the scenes.

This hour is a distillation of two interviews taped last week. David Frost, Kissinger and NBC News agreed to a third taping on Saturday to continue a discussion on Cambodia over which there was disagreement on certain points and to discuss additional subjects.

Mr. Frost later changed his mind and withdrew from participation and made a number of public allegations.

NBC wishes to state categorically that Dr. Kissinger was at no time given any guarantee on what material would or would not be included, nor any privilege that would compromise journalistic standards. At all times, Mr. Frost was encouraged by NBC News to ask tough and difficult questions and Dr. Kissinger said he expected that and did not object.

Since the broadcast you now see is, of course, edited... NBC responding to a request by Dr. Kissinger, has agreed to release the full transcript -- unedited -- of the Cambodian section. It is being released to the press and to any viewer writing NBC News for a copy. We believe you'll find the edited version faithful to the complete interview.

###

SECTION I

[Lc]

**KISS:** The problem we faced at the end of the sixties was that the traditional patterns of American foreign policy were beginning no longer to apply. We had been secure behind two great oceans, we had had a tremendous economic superiority over the rest of the world. We had had an atomic monopoly and we were beginning to learn in the sixties that we couldn't do everything simultaneously and this came hard to the American people and we had to try to adjust American conceptions to the reality and maintain the American position in the world because we were still the strongest free country and the security and the progress of so many other nations depended on our decision.

That was our key problem.

**FR:** You mean you were the strongest free country but as it were, you no longer had 51% you had 37%, say. I mean that in other words, you no longer had a voting majority in the world.

**KISS:** We were the strongest free country but we now had to set priorities. Through most of our history we could wait until the problem became nearly overwhelming, and then address resources to it. Now, a great deal would depend on whether we could anticipate issues, whether we could select our priorities properly

[ic]

Page 6

KISS: (continued)

and whether we could act in anticipation of events. And,
of course, we had to liquidate a war in which we found
ourselves involved.

FROST: Let's turn, at this point, to the subject of the war.
And, I suppose the basic issue was, do you think having
written your memoirs, having reanalyzed the situation,
that you ended the war as expeditiously as humanly
possible?

KISS: We ended the war as expeditiously as was humanly possible,
on terms compatible with our honor and our values. We
could always have ended it by surrendering but if we
wanted to maintain our fundamental principles we ended
it as expeditiously as possible.

FRDST: Well, let's go through the war and since the first major
issue that arose was er, Cambodia, let's turn to Cambodia,
and then let's come back to, to er, the general overall
subject of the war. (FILM- see page 7)

Er, I suppose Cambodia is the most controversial subject,
certainly currently. Er, in connection with your foreign
policy during these four years. Er, I suppose one could
summarize the critic's case by saying, they say that in
order to help you in the military conduct of the war in
Vietnam, your policy engulfed Cambodia in the war in a
way that was not the case when you took office and it
set in train a course of events that was to destroy the
country.

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Page 7

FROST VOICEOVER CAMBODIA FILM:

"Starting in March, 1969, the United States began bombing North Vietnamese sanctuaries...in Cambodia, without any public announcement of the fact, whatever.

In March, 1970, Prince Sihanouk was removed as head of state in a coup. He had maintained a delicate balance of neutrality between the North Vietnamese and the Americans. His successor Lon Nol quickly and openly joined the Americans as a military ally.

At the end of April, 1970, American and South Vietnam ground troops invaded Cambodia.

Demonstrations at home, of which Kent State was the most tragic example, heated up again. Anger fueled over the expansion of the Indochinese war."

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Page 8

KISS: The first thing to keep in mind is, that we inherited a war in Vietnam. That is very often forgotten. When we came into office there were 530,000 Americans.

FR: (over) We were not in the war in Cambodia at that point.

FR: From the American point of view, that war was your war.

KISS: Er, that is not exactly correct. We were in the war in er, Cambodia, because the North Vietnamese had established for four years, base areas along the r...er, Cambodia border in which they had, we estimated, some hundred thousand troops. Later on, the Cambodian Communist Government announced that they had had 300,000 troops there...

FR: (over) You mean...the Pol Pot government...

KISS: ...the Pol Pot government.

FR: ...you don't normally quote them as authoritative sources.

KISS: No, but it was certainly-our estimate was a hundred thousand...

FR: ...(over) later on Nixon said 40,000.

KISS: Whether it's 40,000 or a hundred thousand, it's very hard to determine because the sanctuary areas were on both sides of the border and the troops were fluc...were moving back and forth. Er, er, between them. Secondly, we were beginning to withdraw troops which the previous administration had not done. Third, the previous administration was bombing North Vietnam which we were not doing due to the bombing, half er, that had been agreed upon. So we faced a totally new er, strategic problem.

Within three weeks of coming into office there was a North Vietnamese offensive to, despite the bombing halt, which killed up to 500 Americans a week, for four weeks before there was any reaction by the United States.

[LC]

Page 9

**FROST:** You say in your book that this was a strategic response to the North Vietnamese assault and (under: that's right) that you considered bombing North Vietnam, said that you had the alternative but bombing North Vietnam, not embroiling Cambodia. And..

**KISS:** But Cambodia was embroiled... it is an absurdity...to say that a country can occupy a part of another country, kill your people and that then you are violating its neutrality when you respond against the foreign troops that are on that neutral territory.

(both speak)

**KISS:** It is total hyprocisy...

**FR:** I've already not made that point...don't, don't give me points that I'm not making. The point is, in this particular case, er, Sihanouk, two things you said.. Cambodian authorities were no longer active in this area, however you knew, presumably from all these voluminous reports from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Camb...innocent Cambodian peasants were still in these areas. Er, in one case, more than a thousand in one case a number more than that they could...

**KISS:** (over) Now just a minute...you are quoting here a source that has had a very selective list of documentation. The White House can operate only on the basis of the report it receives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It cannot be responsible for the report that

Page 10

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KISS: subordinates send to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The reports we receive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the recommendations made by both the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were, that there were no Cambodians living in the target areas.

....every recommendation that was received in the White House from either the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or from the Secretary of Defense, indicated that there was no danger of civilian casualties.

Er, that was a criterion for target selection. Secondly, Sihanouk publicly stated, when he was asked about B-52 bombing, in the sanctuary areas, which were five miles from the frontier, er, we are not talking here about bombing all over er, er, Cambodia.

FR: (Frost over...) Absolutely.

KISS: (over) Wait a minute. Sihanouk quickly stated that no Cambodians were being killed, that if there were any Cambodian casualties, if there were one Cambodian buffalo injured, he would protest but he does not know what is going on in territories occupied by the North Vietnamese in which there are no Cambodians living and in which there were no Cambodian casualties. He said that publicly.

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Page 11

FR: He said that publicly and he said it publicly in May, 1969. Er, and you quote it in your book. But on March the 28th, 1969, he called a special press conference which you don't quote in your book, to comment on a UPI report from Saigon that Abrams had requested B-52 strikes in Cambodia and Sihanouk let it be known that he would not oppose them. That was the rumor. Er, this is one of the earliest leaks on the bombing and Sihanouk said, and I'm not suggesting here that Sihanouk is anybody's witness, I'm just suggesting that he's not yours, in the way you're portraying. He said, "nobody, no Chief of State in the world, placed in the same situation as I am, would agree to let foreign aircraft bomb his own country." They never dared to say I would authorize such bombing but they have said I wouldn't oppose them. Well, I will oppose it for the simple reason they've never been able to kill a single communist. They've only killed ordinary peasants.

KISS: The fact is, that the May press conference followed this press conference. The fact is, that after er, the May press conference, Sihanouk reestablished diplomatic relations with the United States, he invited President Nixon to visit Phnom Penh, er, that for the whole period, we were prepared to acknowledge the bombing, to pay damages if Sihanouk had protested. We wanted to give him the opportunity to define er, the nature of, of the pressure that could be put on the North Vietnamese. Our problem was, that hundreds of Americans were being

Page 1'2 [LC]

KISS: (cont'd.)

killed partly from these bases.

FR: Very little bombing had taken place. But in May he could be
confident about the bombing, you, yourself in your....

Economist Letter say that it stepped up
later and, I mean, I'm sure, know...

KISS: (over) ... he had every opportunity to protest.

FR: (over)...? but I mean they did protest...

KISS: (over)... they did not protest...

FR: On the 20th of November '69, Wheeler says we have had
a complaint from Cambodia about eleven villagers killed in
a B-52 raid. OK...he didn't do a formal protest and,
and sit on the steps of the er, of the White House,
but then.... nobody suggested...

KISS: (over) He didn't have to make...he didn't have to sit
on the steps of the White House, he could have made...

FR: (over) it was an inglorious compromise

FR: (repeats) Neutrality is an inglorious compromise we both
know that...

KISS: Neutrality we could have gladly welcomed. When you have
a large number of enemy forces on your territory, when we
picked up, when we, during the incursion, tens of thousands
of tons of supplies, that er, that were on their
territory, then you're not talking about neutrality. You're
talking about the invasion of a neutral country by the
military forces of the North Vietnamese. That is what had
happened for four years prior to any American reaction.

END - SECTION I