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Present on this occasion is a glorious mix of tongues, creeds, and races.

Here also are the leaders of an institution designed to serve all peoples of the world, not a particular people or culture or national policy.

And here are leaders of the United States Congress, men who remind us that, from the days of Warren Austin and Arthur Vandenburg, Americans -- no matter what their party -- have always supported the United Nations.

Finally, we are honored by the artists, academics and journalists who are with us tonight, for they are all guarantors of our diversity and trustees of our common humanity.

Thus, this assemblage symbolizes the world as it is. But more, it symbolizes the world as it can be. For here in the United Nations, and at these tables tonight, we

Toast by Secretary of State Kissinger at a luncheon for Latin American Delegations at the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York, New York, October 5, 1973.

President Benites, Excellencies, ladies and
gentlemen:

There is a story of an Englishman who visited Sweden and when he was going through passport control, he was confronted with two lines, one was marked for Swedes, the other one was marked for foreigners. After a while an official came by and found him sitting between these two lines. And the official said, "Sir, will you please go into one line or the other?" And he said, "That's just my problem. I am not a Swede and I am obviously not a foreigner."

(Laughter.)

I think that story is symbolic of our meeting today. We obviously do not belong all to one country but we obviously are also not foreigners in this room.

I am grateful that you came and for this opportunity to tell you that we are serious about starting a new dialogue with our friends in the Americas.

(Applause.)

As we look back at the history of the relationships

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of the United States to its neighbors to the south, it
has been characterized by alternating periods of what
some of you have considered intervention with periods
of neglect.

We are proposing to you a friendship based on
equality and on respect for mutual dignity.

(Applause.)

And such a relationship is needed for all of us
and I believe it is needed also for the rest of the
world.

In the United States in the last decade, we
have experienced many dramatic changes. Throughout most
of our history we could overpower most of our foreign
policy problems and we could also substitute resources
for thought. Today, without understanding, we can do
very little.

Throughout much of our history, indeed throughout
much of this Administration, we used to believe with
respect to agriculture, for example, that our primary
problem was how to get rid of seemingly inexhaustible
surpluses. We have now learned that we share the world's
problems, how to allocate scarce food resources in
relation to world needs.

When I came to Washington, the discussions with

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respect to energy concerned means of restricting
production and allocating it among various allies.
Today the problem is to find energy sources around the

world that can meet world needs.

So we in this country are going through a
revolution of sort and the whole world is undergoing a
revolution in its patterns. And the basic problem we
face is whether we will choose the road of nationalism
or the road of cooperation, whether we will approach
it from the perspective of each party trying to get the
maximum benefit for itself or, whether we can take a
common view based on our common needs. And this is
why our relations in this hemisphere are so crucial for
all of us in this room and for all the rest of the world
as well. We in this room, with all the ups and downs
in our relationships, share a common history and similar
values and many similar experiences. The value of human
dignity is nowhere better understood than in the countries
of our friends to the south of us.

(Applause.)

So if the technically advanced nations can ever
cooperate with the developing nations, if people with
similar aspirations can ever achieve common goals, then
it must start here in the Western Hemisphere.

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We in the United States will approach this dialogue with an open mind. We do not believe that any institution or any treaty arrangement is beyond examination. We want to see whether free peoples emphasizing and respecting their diversity but united by similar aspirations and values can achieve great goals on the basis of equality.

So we are starting an urgent examination of our Western Hemisphere policy within our government. But such a policy makes no sense if it is a United States prescription handed over to Latin Americans for your acceptance or rejection. It shouldn't be a policy designed in Washington for Latin America. It should be a policy designed by all of Latin America for the Americas.

And so as we examine our own policy, we must also ask for your help. We know that there isn't one Latin America but many different countries. We know also that there are certain sub-regional groupings. But it isn't for us to say with whom to conduct the dialogue. That has to come from our guests here in this room.

And so as we form our policy, I would like to invite your suggestions, whatever form you think appropriate, as groups or sub-groups or individual nations.

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And when our final policy emerges, we will all
have a sense that we all had a share in its making
and we will all have a stake in maintaining it.

So, President Benites and Excellencies, I would
like to propose a toast to what can be an adventure of
free peoples working together to establish a new
relationship that can be an example to many other nations.

I would like to propose a toast to Western Hemisphere
relationships, to our distinguished guest of honor,
President Benites.

(Applause.)

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PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 8, 1973

No. 362

TEXT OF SPEECH OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

PACEM IN TERRIS CONFERENCE
SHERATON-PARK HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 8, 1973

(FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY, EXPECTED AT 8:45 PM E.D.T. MONDAY, OCTOBER 8.)

The Nature of the National Dialogue

This is an important anniversary. A year ago today - on October 8 - came the breakthrough in the Paris negotiations which led soon afterward to the end of American military involvement in Viet-Nam. It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment of hope and uncertainty when suddenly years of suffering and division were giving way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

We meet, too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is always precarious and never to be taken for granted. Pacem in Terris remains regrettably elusive. However well we contain this crisis as we have, contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict.

The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent and no assembly is better suited for such a discussion than those gathered here tonight.

Dramatic changes in recent years have transformed America's position and role in the world:

- For most of the postwar period America enjoyed predominance in physical resources and political power. Now like most other nations in history, we find that our most difficult task is how to apply limited means to the accomplishment of carefully defined ends. We can no longer overwhelm our problems; we must master them with imagination, understanding and patience.

- For a generation our preoccupation was to prevent the Cold War from degenerating into a hot war. Today, when the danger of global conflict has diminished, we face the more profound problem of defining what we mean by peace and determining the ultimate purpose of improved international relations.

For further information contact:

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-- For two decades the solidarity of our alliances seemed as constant as the threats to our security. Now our allies have regained strength and self-confidence, and relations with adversaries have improved. All this has given rise to uncertainties over the sharing of burdens with friends and the impact of reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances.

-- Thus even as we have mastered the art of containing crises, our concern with the nature of a more permanent international order has grown. Questions once obscured by more insistent needs now demand our attention: What is true national interest? To what end stability? What is the relationship of peace to justice?

It is characteristic of periods of upheaval that to those who live through them, they appear as a series of haphazard events. Symptoms obscure basic issues and historical trends. The urgent tends to dominate the important. Too often goals are presented as abstract utopias, safe-havens from pressing events.

But a debate to be fruitful must define what can reasonably be asked of foreign policy and at what pace progress can be achieved. Otherwise it turns into competing catalogues of the desirable rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Dialogue degenerates into tactical skirmishing.

The current public discussion reflects some interesting and significant shifts in perspective:

-- A foreign policy once considered excessively moralistic is now looked upon by some as excessively pragmatic.

-- The Government was criticized in 1969 for holding back East-West trade with certain countries until there was progress in their foreign policies. Now we are criticized for not holding back East-West trade until there are changes in those same countries' domestic policies.

-- The Administration's foreign policy once decried as too cold-war oriented is now attacked as too insensitive to the profound moral antagonism between Communism and freedom.

One consequence of this intellectual shift is a gap between conception and performance on some major issues of policy:

-- The desirability of peace and detente is affirmed but both the inducements to progress and the penalties to confrontation are restricted by legislation.

-- Expressions of concern for human values in other countries are coupled with failure to support the very programs designed to help developing areas improve their economic and social conditions.

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The declared objective of maintaining a responsible American international role clashes with nationalistic pressures in trade and monetary negotiations and with calls for unilateral withdrawal from alliance obligations.

It is clear that we face genuine moral dilemmas and important policy choices. But it is also clear that we need to define the framework of our dialogue more perceptively and understandingly.

## The Competing Elements of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy must begin with the understanding that it involves relationships between sovereign countries. Sovereignty has been defined as a will uncontrolled by others; that is what gives foreign policy its contingent and ever incomplete character.

For disagreements among sovereign states can be settled only by negotiation or by power, by compromise or by imposition. Which of these methods prevails depends on the values, the strengths and the domestic systems of the countries involved. A nation's values define what is just; its strength determines what is possible; its domestic structure decides what policies can in fact be implemented and sustained.

Thus foreign policy involves two partially conflicting endeavors: defining the interests, purposes and values of a society and relating them to the interests, purposes and values of others.

The policy maker, therefore, must strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible. Progress will always be measured in partial steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative goals. Tension is unavoidable between values, which are invariably cast in maximum terms, and efforts to promote them, which of necessity involve compromise. Foreign policy is explained domestically in terms of justice. But what is defined as justice at home becomes the subject of negotiation abroad. It is thus no accident that many nations, including our own, view the international arena as a forum in which virtue is thwarted by the clever practice of foreigners.

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In a community of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: the attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder. Stability depends on the relative satisfaction and therefore also the relative dissatisfaction of the various states. The pursuit of peace must therefore begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence -- especially in a period of ideological conflict.

We must, of course, avoid becoming obsessed with stability. An excessively pragmatic policy will be empty of vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction, but also roots and heart. General de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that "France cannot be France without greatness." By the same token America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always had a sense of mission. Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements. A purely pragmatic policy provides no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people can rally.

But when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on truth obstructs negotiation and accommodation. Good results may be given up in the quest for ever elusive ideal solutions. Policy may fall prey to ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades.

The prerequisite for a fruitful national debate is that the policy makers and critics appreciate each other's perspectives and respect each other's purposes. The policy maker must understand that the critic is obliged to stress imperfections in order to challenge assumptions and to goad actions. But equally the critic should acknowledge the complexity and inherent ambiguity of the policy maker's choices. The policy maker must be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be imagined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete knowledge without the information that will be available later to the analyst. He knows -- or should know -- that he is responsible for the consequences of disaster as well as for the benefits of success. He may have to qualify some goals not because they would be undesirable if reached, but because the risks of failure outweigh potential gains. He must often settle for the gradual, much as he might prefer the immediate. He must compromise with others, and this means to some extent compromising with himself.

The outsider demonstrates his morality by the precision of his perceptions and the loftiness of his ideals. The policy maker expresses his morality by implementing a sequence of imperfections and partial solutions in pursuit of his ideals.

There must be understanding, as well, of the crucial importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are usually irretrievable. New relationships in a fluid transitional period -- such as today--- are delicate and vulnerable; they must be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still there or whether there is some marginally better location for them.

We are now at such a time of tenuous beginnings. Western Europe and Japan have joined us in an effort to reinvigorate our relationships. The

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Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy -- at least partially -- as a relationship between states rather than as international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries are impatient for economic and social change. A new dimension of unprecedented challenges -- in food, oceans, energy, environment -- demands global cooperation.

We are at one of those rare moments where through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design man seems in a position to shape his future. What we need is the confidence to discuss issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define together the nature of our world as well as the vision to chart together a more just future.

## Detente with the Soviet Union

Nothing demonstrates this need more urgently than our relationship with the Soviet Union.

This Administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system. We have always insisted that progress in technical fields, such as trade, had to follow -- and reflect -- progress toward more stable international relations. We have maintained a strong military balance and a flexible defense posture as a buttress to stability. We have insisted that disarmament had to be mutual. We have judged movement in our relations with the Soviet Union, not by atmospherics, but by how well concrete problems are resolved and by whether there is responsible international conduct.

Coexistence to us continues to have a very precise meaning:

-- We will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally.

-- We will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our alliances.

-- We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.

The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States.

On this basis we have succeeded in transforming U.S.-Soviet relations in many important ways. Our two countries have concluded an historic accord to limit strategic arms. We have substantially reduced the risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in crisis areas. The problem of Berlin has been resolved by negotiation. We and our allies have engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on major issues of European security including a reduction of military forces in Central Europe. We have reached a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation -- health, environment, space, science and technology, as well as trade. These accords are designed to create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint.

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Until recently the goals of detente were not an issue. The necessity of shifting from confrontation toward negotiation seemed so overwhelming that goals beyond the settlement of international disputes were never raised. But now progress has been made -- and already taken for granted. We are engaged in an intense debate on whether we should make changes in Soviet society a precondition for further progress -- or indeed for following through on commitments already made. The cutting edge of this problem is the Congressional effort to condition most-favored-nation trade status for other countries on changes in their domestic systems.

This is a genuine moral dilemma. There are genuine moral concerns -- on both sides of the argument. So let us not address this as a debate between those who are morally sensitive and those who are not, between those who care for justice and those who are oblivious to humane values. The attitude of the American people and government has been made emphatically clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced effective results. The exit tax on emigration is not being collected and we have received assurances that it will not be reapplied; hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government are being given specific attention; the rate of Jewish emigration has been in the tens of thousands where it was once a trickle. We will continue our vigorous efforts on these matters.

But the real debate goes far beyond this: Should we now tie demands which were never raised during negotiations to agreements that have already been concluded? Should we require as a formal condition internal changes that we heretofore sought to foster in an evolutionary manner?

Let us remember what the MFN question specifically involves. The very term "most favored nation" is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. What we are talking about is whether to allow normal economic relations to develop -- of the kind we now have with over 100 other countries and which the Soviet Union enjoyed until 1951. The issue is whether to abolish discriminatory trade restrictions that were imposed at the height of the Cold War. Indeed, at that time the Soviet Government discouraged commerce because it feared the domestic impact of normal trading relations with the West on its society.

The demand that Moscow modify its domestic policy as a precondition for MFN or detente was never made while we were negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides have carefully shaped an overall mosaic. Thus it raises questions about our entire bilateral relationship.

Finally the issue effects not only our relationship with the Soviet Union, but also with many other countries whose internal structures we find incompatible with our own. Conditions imposed on one country could inhibit expanding relations with others, such as the People's Republic of China.

We shall never dondone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Are we

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ready to face the crises and increased defense budgets that a return to Cold War conditions would spawn? And will this encourage full emigration or enhance the well-being or nourish the hope for liberty of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Is it detente that has prompted repression -- or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demand for openness which we are now witnessing?

For half a century we have objected to communist efforts to alter the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we now to come full circle and _insist_ on domestic compatibility as a condition of progress?

These questions have no easy answers. The government may underestimate the margin of concessions available to us. But a fair debate must admit that they _are_ genuine questions, the answers to which could affect the fate of all of us.

Our policy with respect to detente is clear: We shall resist aggressive foreign policies. Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East. As for the internal policies of closed systems the United States will never forget that the antagonism between freedom and its enemies is part of the reality of the modern age. We are not neutral in that struggle. As long as we remain powerful we will use our influence to promote freedom, as we always have. But in the nuclear age we are obliged to recognize that the issue of war and peace also involves human lives and that the attainment of peace is a profound moral concern.

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The World As It Is And The World We Seek

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly two weeks ago, I described our goal as a world where power blocs and balances are no longer relevant; where justice, not stability, can be our overriding preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation in the world interest to be of their national interest.

But we cannot move toward the world of the future without first maintaining peace in the world as it is. These very days we are vividly reminded that this requires vigilance and a continuing commitment.

So our journey must start from where we are now. This is a time of lessened tension, of greater equilibrium, of diffused power. But if the world is better than our earlier fears, it still falls far short of our hopes. To deal with the present does not mean that we are content with it.

The most striking feature of the contemporary period -- the feature that gives complexity as well as hope -- is the radical transformation in the nature of power. Throughout history power has generally been homogeneous. Military, economic and political potential were closely related. To be powerful a nation had to be strong in all categories. Today the vocabulary of strength is more complex. Military muscle does not guarantee political influence. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political influence even when they have neither military nor economic strength.

It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, for there are several which have to be related to each other. In the military sphere, there are two super powers. In economic terms, there are at least five major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged; some 80 new nations have come into being since the end of World War II and regional groups are assuming ever increasing importance.

Above all, whatever the measure of power, its political utility has changed. Throughout history increases in military power -- however slight -- could be turned into specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is reached, additional increments of power do not translate into usable political strength; and attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm.

This environment both puts a premium on stability and makes it difficult to maintain. Today's striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods. The very notion of "operating" a classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means.

More specifically, there is no parallel with the nineteenth century. Then, the principal countries shared essentially similar concepts of legitimacy and accepted the basic structure of the existing international order. Small adjustments in strength were significant. The "balance" operated in a relatively confined geographic area. None of these factors obtain today.

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time. In an age of ideological schism the distinction between friends and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals as well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength of our friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

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When we refer to five or six or seven major centers of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded but that a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new centers of power have meant greater freedom of action and greater importance for all other nations.

In this setting, our immediate aim has been to build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of sparing mankind the scourges of war. An interdependent world community cannot tolerate either big power confrontations or recurrent regional crises.

But peace must be more than the absence of conflict. We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human aspirations, not an end in itself. We have learned much about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots. We have begun to accommodate our differences, but we have not affirmed our commonality. We may have improved the mastery of equilibrium, but we have not yet attained justice.

In the encyclical for which this conference is named, Pope John sketched a greater vision. He foresaw "that no political community is able to pursue its own interests and develop itself in isolation" for "there is a growing awareness of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The opportunities of mankind now transcend nationalism, and can only be dealt with by nations acting in concert:

- For the first time in generations mankind is in a position to shape a new and peaceful international order. But do we have the imagination and determination to carry forward this still fragile task of creation?

- For the first time in history we may have the technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs. The imperatives of the modern world respect no national borders and must inevitably open all societies to the world around them. But do we have the political will to join together to accomplish this great end?

If this vision is to be realized, America's active involvement is inescapable. History will judge us by our deeds, not by our good intentions.

But it cannot be the work of any one country. And it cannot be the undertaking of any one Administration or one branch of government or one party. To build truly is to chart a course that will be carried on by future leaders because it has the enduring support of the American people.

So let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and the executive, between the government and the press, between the people and their public servants. Let us learn once again to debate our methods and not our motives, to focus on our destiny and not on our divisions. Let us all contribute our different views and perspectives but let us, once again, see ourselves as engaged in a common enterprise. If we are to shape a world community we must first restore community at home.

With Americans working together, America can work with others toward man's eternal goal of a Pacem in Terris -- peace abroad, peace at home and peace within ourselves.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L.C.]

October 12, 1973

No. 380

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PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A.' KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 12, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I suggest that we do this

Press Conference in two parts:

I will begin with a few personnel announcements and
I'll take some questions on those:

And then I'll make a few comments to introduce the
substantive part, and we'll have a question and answer period
on that.

Now with respect to personnel appointments, I would
like to mention a number of Presidential appointments, all
of which are subject to confirmation by the Senate.
I have recommended to the President, and he intends to
nominate, the following individuals for the positions stated:

As Under Secretary for Security Assistance,
WILLIAM DONALDSON. Mr. Donaldson is currently Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the investment banking firm

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of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette. He was named Businessman of the Year, by the Associated Press for 1969 and 1970. He's a member of the Board of Trustees for the Ford Foundation, and Member of the Yale Corporation and to show the ecumenical spirit in which we proceed.

In addition to his duties as Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Mr. Donaldson will be responsible for the energy aspects of foreign policy, and he will also have general supervision over those bureaus in the Department that have not had a normal home on the 7th Floor -- Cultural Affairs, and Science and Technology -- and he will also do other special assignments.

As Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador DEAN BROWN, who is now in Jordan. He is one of the most energetic, younger Foreign Service Officers. It will be his job, together with the new Director General of the Foreign Service, whom I will mention later, to look at the whole personnel structure of the Foreign Service, to make sure that the ablest, most energetic people get into the key positions as rapidly as possible.

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As Legal Adviser of the Department, the President has nominated Mr. CARLYLE MAW. Mr. Maw is a senior partner in the law firm of Cravath, Swaine and Moore. He has been Chairman of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; the International Law Association, the American Society for International Law. One of his primary tasks will be to work on the creative relationships *international law* and the conduct of our *foreign policy*.

The Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador ROBERT INGERSOLL, currently our Ambassador in Japan. Ambassador Ingersoll has performed with great distinction as our Ambassador to Japan since 1972, following a long and distinguished career in business. He emphasizes the importance we attach, in our Asian policy to the special role of Japan. Also, by picking a man of his distinction, the intention is to emphasize that the Assistant Secretaries will henceforth play a very crucial role in the formulation and conduct of our *foreign policy* and will have greater discretion and greater responsibility.

As Assistant Secretary for Administration, JOHN THOMAS. Mr. Thomas is a career Foreign Service Officer with extensive experience in the Department of State in the administrative field.

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With respect to Ambassador Brown, I would like to emphasize that he will stay in his present post for the duration of the current crisis in the Middle East.

In addition, I wish to announce that I intend to appoint the following, who do not require Senatorial confirmation:

As Director General of the Foreign Service, Ambassador NATHANIEL DAVIS, our current Ambassador in Chile. As you know, Ambassador Davis has held three Ambassadorships: to Bulgaria, to Guatemala, and to Chile where he is presently serving. He is a career foreign service officer. I believe he's the youngest Career Minister in the Service and he and Ambassador Brown will have the primary responsibility for vitalizing the Foreign Service and for making certain, as I pointed out previously, that the able and energetic individuals get promoted rapidly to key positions.

As Director of the Planning and Coordinating Staff, Mr. WINSTON LORD. Mr. Lord has been my Special Assistant at the National Security Council Staff for three years. He was closely associated with the overtures toward the People's Republic of China. He has been one of my closest associates in the White House. He served before that in the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

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He has been told that the Policy Planning Staff has top priority on the ablest young people in the Foreign Service, and the Policy Planning Staff is going to be given a major role, I would say almost a principal role, in developing the choices for the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretaries to make certain that we do not spend all our time on dealing with current crises, but that we have a sense of direction.

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As Inspector General of the Foreign Service, JAMES SUTTERLIN. Mr. Sutterlin will be moving to the Inspector General post from his current assignment as Director of the Planning and Coordinating Staff. He is, as you know, a career officer with a distinguished record.

As a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, Mr. GEORGE VEST. Mr. Vest is presently in charge of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. He is returning and will be available in the Department on Monday to begin his duties under the stern supervision of the incumbent, Ambassador McCloskey.

The officers who have held the positions for which new personnel have been announced today have given this Government long and faithful service. They have my gratitude as well as that of the President for a job well done. I want to express my regret that Under Secretary Curtis Tarr has decided to return to private life, and he has all our good wishes.

Now, I'll be glad to answer some questions on this, and then I'll get to others.

Q Mr. Secretary, will George Vest have the title of Deputy Assistant Secretary, also?

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A We have not yet decided what title he should have at present. It will be Special Assistant until we have considered it further.

Q Mr. Secretary, the successor to Ambassador Ingersoll in Japan, what is the status of that?

A It will be announced within three weeks.

Q Mr. Secretary, can we assume that the other Assistant Secretaries will now stay in place for the near future, or will there be other changes?

A No, I would not assume that these are the last changes that will be made.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the appointment of an Ambassador to the Soviet Union?

A I have told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that all vacant ambassadorships will be filled within two months of my swearing in. I expect to hold to this schedule and we expect to announce an Ambassador to the Soviet Union by the middle of November after my return from China.

Q Mr. Secretary, now that you have discussed your employment questions, can we go to more substantive things?

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[L.C.]

A. If there are no more questions on personnel, yes. Maybe it would help if I made a few observations first on the Middle East, and then I'll take your questions.

Q. Right.

A. I thought it might focus our discussion if I began by giving you a brief summary of the situation in the Middle East as we see it.

You ladies and gentlemen will understand that we are, at this moment, in a delicate phase in which our principal objective has to be to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and to lay the basis for a more permanent peace in the Middle East, and that therefore I will have to be somewhat guarded in some of the observations I make and in some of the answers I give to your questions. But I expect that after the conclusion of this phase to have another press conference in which I will give a fuller account than may be possible today.

Now, let me talk about the situation in the Middle East in the following parts:

First, the situation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Secondly, the American efforts after hostilities started to bring about a cessation of hostilities.

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Third, a very brief observation on the military situation as we see it today. And, finally, where we hope to go from here.

First with respect to what we knew prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the United States was aware that there were additional concentrations of Syrian forces and also that the Egyptian forces were engaged on what was interpreted both by our intelligence as well as by Israeli intelligence as their regular fall maneuvers.

We asked our own intelligence, as well as Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions during the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to give us their assessment of what might happen. There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening. Nor was the possibility of hostilities raised in any of the discussions with either of the parties that took place at the United Nations during the last week.

In these circumstances, the United States had no occasion to warn any country against engaging in pre-emptive action. The United States, therefore, in the

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PR #380

week prior to the outbreak of hostilities, gave no advice
with respect to a contingency that we had been unanimously
assured was not likely to happen -- in fact was certain
not to happen.

The first time the United States Government was
informed that hostilities might be imminent was at six
o'clock Saturday morning, when I was awakened and immediately
contacted the President. From then until the time that
we were informed that hostilities had, in fact, begun,-- which
was around nine o'clock on Saturday morning, we did make
intensive efforts with the parties, as well as with the
Soviet Union and the Secretary General of the United Nations,
to attempt to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.

Obviously, given the scale of preparation that
must have been made prior to the outbreak of hostilities,
these efforts were unavailing.

After hostilities broke out, the United States
set itself two principal objectives. One, to end the
hostilities as quickly as possible. Secondly, to end the
hostilities in such a manner that they would contribute
to the maximum extent possible to the promotion of a more
permanent, more lasting solution in the Middle East.

Therefore, the United States has sought during

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PR #380

[lc]

this period - - first in the United Nations, and, secondly,
through a series of bilateral contacts - - to create
framework in which both of these objectives could be
realized. We have explored the possibilities of crystal-
izing a consensus within the United Nations. We have
also been in touch with the parties, as well as with the
Permanent Members of the Security Council, in order to see
what bilateral efforts might bring.

We have not gratuitously sought opportunities
for confrontations in public forums which might harden
dividing lines, and which might make it more difficult to
move towards a settlement.

When this phase is over, we will give an accounting
of the efforts we have undertaken, and then a judgment can
be made with respect to them. For now, our objective is
to bring about an end of hostilities in such a manner that
we will be in contact with all of the parties, as well as
with the Permanent Members of the Security Council, after
hostilities are ended, because we believe that in this
manner, we can make a maximum contribution to a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East.

-12-

PR #380

[LC]

Our assessment of the military situation as we see it this morning is that Israeli forces seem to have advanced some distance into Syria. Egyptian forces are holding the east side of the Suez Canal to a distance of about six to ten miles, The Egyptian front -- the Suez front-- is reasonably stable, and the Syrian front is somewhat fluid.

As for the future, the United States will continue to make, and is now engaged in making, efforts to bring about an end to hostilities in a manner that contributes to long-term peace in the area, and I may say to long-term peace in the entire world. This is the framework of our discussions.

And now, Stewart, if you would like to ask the first question.

Q What I would like to ask is in connection with bringing about a framework of stability, and so forth.

You said Monday that the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States could not withstand or could not survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East. And I am wondering whether

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PR #380

[L]

in that connection you feel that the Russian statement urging other Arab states to join Egypt and Syria in the fight against Israel constitutes the sort of irresponsibility which jeopardizes the detente and, if it does so, whether you intend to match from the American side the war supplies which are said to be coming in to the others from the Soviet side.

A That's at least two questions.

With respect to the first question: the behavior of the Soviet Union in the Middle East crisis, and the effect of the Middle East crisis on U.S.-Soviet relations. Any assessment has to recognize that both the United States and the Soviet Union confront, each from their own perspective, a very complex situation in the current crisis.

Indeed, the reason why we believe that a long-term settlement in the Middle East is so important is the danger that the Middle East may become in time what the Balkans were in Europe before 1914. That is to say, an area where local rivalries that have their own momentum that will draw in the great nuclear powers into a confrontation that they did not necessarily seek or even necessarily start.

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PR #380

It is obvious that the United States has a
traditional friendship with Israel, which it will maintain
in this crisis. It is also clear that the Soviet Union
has a relationship going back some years with some of
the Arab states, which it also will not rupture during
this crisis. The difficulty both of us face is whether,
while remaining true to our principles, we can, nevertheless,
conduct the relationships in such a manner that the larger
interests of peace are served.

We did not consider the Soviet statement to the
President of Algeria helpful. We did not consider the
airlift of military equipment helpful. We also do not
consider that Soviet actions as of now constitute the
irresponsibility that on Monday evening I pointed out
would threaten detente. When that point is reached, we
will in this crisis, as we have in other crises, not
hesitate to take a firm stand. But at this moment we
are still attempting to moderate the conflict. As of
this moment we have to weigh against the actions of which
we disapprove, and quite strongly, the relative restraint
that has been shown in public media in the Soviet Union
and in the conduct of their representatives at the
Security Council.

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PR #380

[LC]

And as of this moment, our objective is, as I stated, to end hostilities on terms that are just to all without exacerbating relations to an unbearable point.

I want to repeat; when we make the judgment that actions have reached the point of irresponsibility we will be very firm in making this clear.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may change the subject for a minute, was the dialogue with Europe slowed down by the cancellation of your trip? And could you help us to guess when the Declarations of Principles will be ready for signature?

A The dialogue with Europe was not significantly slowed down, although my vanity will not permit me to admit that my inability to conduct conversations will have no effect on on-going diplomacy. (Laughter)

Basically, the discussions that are now going on between us and the Europeans concern two declarations and the general structure of our relationship. The two declarations are between the United States and the Common Market about economic relationships and those political relationships impinging on economic relationships; and between the United States and all its other fourteen

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[LC]

partners in NATO in a multilateral forum about the future
direction of NATO policy. And the third effort is to go
beyond these declarations, to use them as a starting point
to take a look at the future and to consider how the Western
Nations envisage the world in which they may want to live, or may
have to live, over the next 25 years.

-17-

Now, with respect to the dialogue with the Common Market, that too has two aspects: first, the internal cohesion of Europe, which has been, I believe, fostered, and strongly fostered, by our initiative; and, secondly, the relationship of this united Europe with the United States.

On October 18th, the Political Directors of the Nine European nations and Assistant Secretary of State Stoessel will meet in Copenhagen to continue the discussions conducted by me with the Foreign Ministers and conducted subsequently by them in New York. therefore, that process will continue.

As you all know, I met with French Foreign Minister Jobert yesterday, and we had an opportunity to discuss both of these efforts.

Last week France submitted a proposal for a NATO Declaration. I want to take this opportunity to emphasize that the Declaration submitted by the French representative in the NATO Council is considered extremely constructive

by the United States. And even though we have some additions that we may wish to discuss, we

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[LC]

believe it represents a very major advance in the
NATO discussions.

I think it is important to point out
that it is not without significance that it is France
which would have made this major contribution to the
NATO dialogue.

So we believe that our discussions with
Europe are now on course and that they will lead to a
successful conclusion within a reasonable time span.
And I want to emphasize again: We are not interested
in time but in substance. And we're not concerned
with just a headline but we're concerned with getting
our relationships defined in a manner that can stand the
test of time.

Marvin?

Q Mr. Secretary, back on the Middle East,
do you believe, in light of the Soviet evacuation of
dependents from Syria and Egypt, last Thursday and Friday,
that, (1) they knew in advance of the plans for the
attack? Do you feel that they should have informed
the United States of those plans? And (2) do you feel that
the Soviet Union, to any degree, encouraged the attacks?

-19-

A It is too early to make a final judgment on all of these matters. If the Soviet Union encouraged these attacks -- which we have, as of now, have no evidence of -- that would have to be treated by us as a very serious matter.

Now, if the Soviet Union learned of these attacks through its own intelligence or in some other manner and did not inform us, then this is a different problem.

In an ideal world, one would expect closer consultation but, given the particular volatility of the Middle East, it would have been a heavy responsibility to make known certain advance information. Nevertheless, we would like to stress that if either side in this relationship has certain knowledge of imminent military operations in any explosive part of the world, we would consider it consistent and, indeed, required -- by the principles that have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union -- that an opportunity be given to both sides to calm the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary --

-20-

[Lc]

A Here.

Q -- in view of the reputation of Israeli intelligence, to what do you attribute the failure of both their and our intelligence to spot what was about to take place?

A Nobody made any mistakes about the facts. There are always two aspects to intelligence: One is a determination of the facts; the other is the interpretation of these facts. And there is the tendency of most intelligence services -- and, indeed of most senior officials; and, indeed, of some newspapermen -- to fit the facts into existing preconceptions and to make them consistent with what is anticipated. And if you start from the assumption that a war is probably unlikely, -- if you know that there have been Egyptian maneuvers every September over the last ten years; -- then there is probably a tendency to make observed facts fit your preconceived theories. This is one of the gravest dangers of all intelligence assessments. And facts are much easier to come by than intentions.

Over the years that I have been in this position, the possibility of a massive Arab attack was not

-21-

[1c]

considered among the most likely by any of the
evaluators that I've talked to.

Q May I follow that? Mrs. Meir said
that she had advised other governments -- I think she
used the expression "a reasonable time in advance"
-- so that they could attempt to prevent it.

A Well, it depends on your definition
of a reasonable time. We were informed, at six o'clock
on Saturday morning, that a war might be imminent.
We were informed somewhat earlier that Israel did not intend to
attack herself, but that did not indicate to us necessarily
that an Arab attack was imminent.

Q Mr. Secretary, what kind of help are
the Soviets giving Egypt and Syria? What kind of help
are we now, or will we later, give to Israel?

A Herb, at this time I would like to
stress again that our principal problem in responding to
questions like this is to keep in mind that we are in a
very delicate situation which can be very easily inflamed
by rash statements or by responding to very immediate
pressures.

The Soviet airlift, at this moment, is moderate.
It's more than light. It's a fairly substantial airlift,

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PR #380

and it has to be addressed in relation to the possibility
of influencing immediate military operations.

As far as we are concerned, you all know
that we do have an ongoing military relationship with
Israel, which we are continuing. And we are having
discussions with Israel about the special situation
created by recent events, but I don't think any useful
purpose would be served by going into detail

Q In that connection, Mr. Secretary,
some Arab countries are threatening to cut off Western oil
supplies, if the United States continues this ongoing
relationship, and resupplies Israel. How heavily do
those threats weigh in the determination of the policy?

A We have made a very serious effort, in
this crisis, to take seriously into account Arab
concerns and Arab views. On the other hand, we have
to pursue what we consider to be the right course,
we will take the consequences in pursuing what we consider
to be the right course.

Murrey?

Q Can you give us any idea, Dr. Kissinger,
of the kinds of obstacles that you're running into now

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PR #380

[lc]

in this quest for ending hostilities?

A Well, I have seen a fair amount of discussion about the desirability of some United Nations action. Now, the difficulty has been that our almost daily canvass of the consensus in New York is that the opinions are so divided and the willingness to take a position on the part of the major -- or on the part of all -- the members of the Security Council is so low that our judgment that to force a formal vote on any proposition that we might put forward would only harden the dividing lines and would only serve to underline the inability to achieve a consensus.

We have, therefore, placed more stress on attempting to crystallize a consensus than we have in going through a battle of resolutions and counter-resolutions.

Beyond this I cannot go, except to make clear that we are in touch with the parties and with the major -- with the permanent members of the Security Council -- as well as, on a daily basis, with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Murrey?

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PR #390

Let Murrey; Murrey has been overridden
twice!

Q Two questions, if I may.

A I probably will regret recognizing him
in a minute:

(Laughter.)

Q Would you give us, sir, your overall
assessment of the state of attitude by the super-
powers -- by the three major powers: the United States,
the Soviet Union, and China -- in respect to the danger
of any spread of these hostilities?

Secondly, if I may, as Presidential National
Security Adviser, how do you evaluate the handling
of this crisis by the State Department?

(Laughter.)

Well, first with respect to the second
question, we are very impressed, in the White House,
by the leadership that the State Department has received.

(Laughter.)

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PR #380

[LC]

But, on a serious level, I think that --
for crisis situations, certainly -- the combination of
these two positions enables a more coherent policy. And with
the operation of my associates in the State Department,
the conduct has been outstanding and has contributed to
keeping the crisis, so far, contained within its
present framework.

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PR #380

[lc]

Now, with respect to the first question, the danger of escalation as it is evaluated by, may I say, the permanent members of the Security Council, so that I am not making distinctions here. I think everybody is aware that a war of this nature has a possibility of escalating. I think that up to now both sides, the two countries that are most capable of producing a confrontation, that is the United States and the Soviet Union, have attempted to behave within limits that would prevent an escalation into such a war. If you compare their conduct in this crisis to their conduct in 1967, one has to say that Soviet behavior has been less provocative, less incendiary and less geared to military threats than in the previous crisis.

It is, of course, an extremely volatile situation which has potentialities for getting out of hand. And I can only emphasize once again the great importance for restraint by all of those countries who have it in their capacity to bring about an escalation and an expansion of hostilities, and the expectation of the United States that all countries that have a capacity to influence events influence them on the side of restraint and moderation, as we are attempting to do.

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PR #380

[lc]

Q Mr. Secretary, in this connection, have you tried to reach an agreement with the Soviet on suspending the deliveries of arms to the parties?

A I don't think I should go into any of -- into the details of any exchanges with the Soviet Union at this time.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about firmness if the thing should get that far, are you thinking of the kind of firmness that the United States demonstrated in 1970, at the time of the Syrian crisis?

A I think that is --

Q Question.

A The question is whether, if the situation reached the point, the United States would act with the same firmness as in 1970. Situations are never comparable, but the basic principles that governed our policies throughout this administration remain constant, and I don't think I should speculate on the particular methods we would use. But we would be guided by the same principles.

But let me repeat -- we do not want this to happen, we don't expect it to happen, and we think that

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PR #880

with restraint by all sides there is no need whatever
for it to happen.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you assess the
superpower or the large powers -- could you assess what
you consider the Arab strategy in launching these attacks?
I mean you have talks with the Arab Foreign Ministers
at the United Nations. There has been some talk that they
had a limited psychological-political objective -- in
view of the talk about the so-called peace initiative
that you were about to launch.

A The Arab objective, of course, has not
been fully shared with us. And so we are here in the
realm of speculation. And the Arab objective will
also become clearer as the days go on.

If the Arab objective was, as is sometimes
stated, to emphasize the fact that the Middle East
is -- that permanent stability cannot be assumed in the
Middle East, and that there is an urgency in achieving
a negotiated settlement, or that it is important to
achieve a negotiated settlement, then it would be our
judgement that that point has been made. The United
States stands ready now, as it stood ready before the

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PR #380

[LC]

beginning of hostilities, to help the parties if they
want to pursue a negotiated solution. We believe that it
would be useful and we would be prepared, as I pointed out
to both sides in New York, to be helpful in that.

If that is the Arab strategy, then we are at a
point where perhaps we can turn, after the end of
hostilities, to that search for peace, which the United
States would support.

Q Mr. Secretary, sir, obviously you can't
ask the Russians to not send any more arms to these people
if you are sending arms to Israel. Why don't you tell
the Soviets that we will stop sending arms to Israel
if they will stop sending them to the Arabs?

A As I said, this is not the time to discuss
what exchanges are going on between the Soviet Union and
the United States, except to emphasize again that our
primary objective is to bring about restraint and to
bring about as rapid a solution as is possible.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you stressed in your
speech on Monday night at the Pacem in Terris conference
the need to move from preventive diplomacy to more
creative diplomacy. Does this crisis present an
opportunity, do you believe, for the United States,

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PR #380

particularly in cooperation with the Soviet Union, to
stress a new urgency to move to direct or indirect
Arab-Israeli negotiations?

A We would hope that after the completion --
after the conclusion of hostilities, that all -- that
first the parties directly involved and secondly the
countries indirectly involved would recognize the
fragility of the situation that erupts so periodically
into conflict. And if that conclusion should be reached,
as we believe it should be reached, the United States
stands ready to help the parties in reaching a just
settlement. And we have also urged, and I want to use
this occasion to urge, all the parties in the conduct of
their diplomacy now to keep in mind that whatever
momentary advantages might be achieved in this or that
forum, our principal objective should be to maintain
relationships that can move both the area and the world
towards a more lasting peace. We will conduct our foreign
policy and our diplomacy in that manner, and we hope all
other countries will also conduct themselves in that manner.

Q Mr. Secretary, there is an Arab view that

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PR #380

[Lc]

it would be easier to reach a permanent settlement if the Egyptians maintain a certain foothold on the Sinai Peninsula. What kind of map at the end of hostilities do you think would contribute most to a settlement -- a permanent settlement?

A This is not an American determination to make. We stated some general propositions at the Security Council on Monday, and we will be prepared to participate in any other exchange and discussion. But I don't think any useful purpose would be served now . . .

Q Mr. Secretary, you are planning a trip to China at the end of this month. Has that trip been jeopardized in any way by these developments? And would you expect Chinese cooperation in the restraints that you are advocating.

A Our call for restraint is addressed to all nations with a capacity to influence events. Of course, the Chinese capacity to influence events, given the geographic distance, is not as great as that of other countries, and that must be weighed. But our appeal for restraint is addressed to all countries.

I do not foresee that my trip to China will be

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PR #380

jeopardized by the situation as it now exists. But of
course this depends on how long it will go on.

Q Mr. Secretary, in pursuit of an end to
hostilities --

A Could you talk a little louder, please.

Q In pursuit to an end to hostilities,
would we be willing to support a cease-fire in place
now in the Mid-East, or do we want withdrawal to the '67
line?

A At this moment, this is not
the occasion to discuss any specific formula that may be
advanced, because the attitude to a specific formula
will depend on conditions which exist when it is advanced.
And there are so many approaches that have been canvassed
that it would serve no purpose to review now.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the light of what was
apparently a failure to gauge intentions on the facts
prior to the outbreak of hostilities, what steps do you
think this country can take to improve its capability
to gauge intentions in a situation like this?

A The judgment of the intentions of other
countries is always an extremely difficult matter. And
it isn't something that can be solved by improving any

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PR #380

[lc]

particular capabilities.

Surprise would never be possible if there were not misjudgments of intentions. And obviously the people most concerned, with the reputation of the best intelligence service in that area, were also surprised, and they have the principal problem of answering the question which you put to me.

To the degree that one can improve one's understanding of the mentality of other countries, to the degree that one understands their decision-making process, to that degree one can reduce the dangers of being taken by surprise. But the element of surprise can never be totally eliminated.

Q Dr. Kissinger, before in assessing possible Arab objectives, you gave us one possibility, which broadly translated means making a political point. What other possible Arab objectives are there beyond that, and if there are, what could be the expected United States response?

A I can't speculate on what conceivable objectives there might be which could range from the one I gave to a total military victory, which could be

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PR #380

from a short campaign to a war of attrition. The United
States would believe that a prolonged war of attrition in
the Middle East would have such a high possibility of
great power involvement -- at least great power involvement
in the sense of increasing the tensions to a point
which would affect the entire international atmosphere
and raise issues of supplies to both sides in such a
manner -- that we believe it is in the interest of all
countries, including also, and above all, the participants,
to bring the war to a reasonable and honorable conclusion
as soon as that can be accomplished.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for
spending this hour with us. We hope to see you again
soon.

(Whereupon at 11:58 a.m. the press conference
was concluded.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE [lc]

October 16, 1973

No. 384

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON BEING NOTIFIED OF THE
AWARD OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

OCTOBER 16, 1973

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I don't have a formal statement. I thought I would make a few informal observations.

Nothing that has happened to me in public life has moved me more than this Award, which represents a recognition of the central purpose of the President's foreign policy which is the achievement of a lasting peace.

I am grateful to the President for having given me this opportunity and also for creating the conditions which made it possible to bring the negotiations on Viet-Nam to a successful conclusion.

When I shall receive the Award, together with my old colleague in the search for peace in Viet-Nam, Le Duc Tho, I hope that that occasion will at last mark the end, or symbolize the end, of the anguish and the suffering that Viet-Nam has meant for so many millions of people around the world — and that both at home and abroad it will mark the beginning of a period of reconciliation.

The news of this Award reached me while I was chairing a meeting at the White House in which we were discussing means to speed peace in the Middle East. Nothing could underline so much that the search for peace is never ended. And nothing could have given us a greater impetus to work with even more energy and more dedication to end the hostilities that are now going on in the Middle East, and to move from there rapidly to bringing about a just and decent and lasting peace in the Middle East.

But beyond all these immediate crises, perhaps the most important goal any Administration can set itself is to work for a world in which the Award will become irrelevant, because peace will have become so normal and so much taken for granted that no awards for it will have to be given.

Thank you very much.

*****

[L]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 18, 1973

No. 386

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON RECEIPT OF THE
GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL MEDAL
OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
OCTOBER 17, 1973

We are now engaged in very serious, very open-minded consultations with many countries, trying to bring about an end to the hostilities in the Middle East. So that this crisis through which we are now living is a test of the possibilities of diplomacy and of the real meaning of detente. Because it must be clear that while the United States is trying to make our nation safe from war, we will not do so at the price of making the rest of the world safe for war.

We believe that there exists an opportunity for a decent and just settlement, fair to all of the parties, which must be reached first by bringing about an end to hostilities, and then by a dedicated effort that will end the conditions that produced this current conflict.

This is our policy which we will pursue with conviction and which we believe and hope will succeed.

No one would understand these purposes better than the man in whose honor this Award was named. He was a master in the art of war, and he won equal acclaim for his dedication in building peace. He demonstrated that one of the quotes of de Tocqueville who was one of the keenest observers of the American scene, about the dilemmas of democracies in the conduct of foreign policy was wrong. De Tocqueville wrote that "It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior." "There is," he said, "a propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion." This is indeed a great danger in democracies. But General Marshall, as Secretary of State, faced a nation tired of the sacrifices of war and reluctant to sacrifice for the maintenance of peace. With no clear vision of America's role in the world, partisan political considerations had begun to dominate post-war foreign as well as domestic affairs. But General Marshall's great contribution was to prove that democracies can conduct an effective foreign policy. He provided a new vision, making foreign policy an expression of national rather than partisan purpose. He induced Congress to share in its design, and he established the closest relations with Senator Vandenberg and other Congressional leaders.

PR #386

[L.C.]

-2-

While every moment in history is unique, a few moments are similar in their openness to fundamental choice.

George Marshall faced the danger of a world descending into chaos, and he had the opportunity to build a new international order. The reconstruction of Europe, the creation of NATO, the rebuilding of Japan, the beginning of Point IV were major acts of statesmanship and substantially determined the course of the past quarter century.

Now we face another open moment in history, when once again we must clearly perceive the shape of the world and purposefully seek to shape it. And this moment indeed has come about because much of the vision that General Marshall represented has been fulfilled. It is due to the success of the policy he inspired.

In our relationship, particularly to Europe, which was shaped by a plan that bore his name, we now must redesign that relationship in the face of new conditions.

Western Europe is no longer as weak as it was in the immediate post-war period, and is able to assume a much greater political responsibility. The military vacuum that existed at the time has been filled to a considerable extent by the Atlantic coalition. The relationship with the Soviet Union, despite difficulties that exist at this moment, nevertheless gives hope that the danger of war has receded.

The unity of Europe, which they have forged and which we have supported, creates the need for a new set of economic relationships.

This is why we are now in the process of developing a new set of patterns and strategy in political relationship and economics in which we hope to be worthy of the vision that inspired General Marshall. Because if the nations of the Atlantic area, sharing similar traditions, having experienced many of the same agonies and combining the same or very similar purposes, cannot work together, it is difficult to see how we can achieve cooperative relationships in a dynamic situation in other parts of the world.

And so it is around the globe.

Japan has recovered. In Southeast Asia, a new relationship has to be developed.

China, with which General Marshall's name was associated, has gone through a dramatic period and has re-entered the international scene.

We have the opportunity to repeat his great tasks of construction. But we face it in a different environment.

At the time that General Marshall was Secretary of State, his wisdom was a bonus because the United States was physically so preponderant that we could overwhelm every problem with resources. We could always substitute our resources for thought. We were not in a position where we faced the danger of irretrievable error.

But today we face the problem of applying scarce resources to limited objectives. We require intelligence and vision and foresight — not just as an accident of history but as a necessity for all times.

We also confront choices that are clouded by ambiguity.

PR #386

-3-

A generation ago the challenges were clear, the alternatives were naked. Today
the dangers appear less immediate, the choices less clear-cut.

Date:

We are, therefore, required to summon an unaccustomed ability to deal with
nuance, to strive for what is good while never forgetting what is best. The America
of de Tocqueville faced no such challenge. Even the America of General Marshall knew
no such overwhelming need.

Now we have to decide — were the achievements of General Marshall an interlude
or an introduction, a passing moment of American maturity or the beginning of an era
of great achievement.

Will we follow President Truman's wise advice, that peace is not a reward that
comes automatically to those who cherish it; it must be pursued, increasingly and
unswervingly, by every means at our command. This is the challenge that General
Marshall summoned America to meet, and this is the summons we must once again
answer.

Thank you very much.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 25, 1973

No. 390

#3

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
OCTOBER 25, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I thought the most useful introduction to your questions would be a summary of events between October 6 and today so that you can evaluate our actions, the situation in which we find ourselves, and our future course.

The crisis for us started at 6 a.m. on October 6, when I was awakened with the information that another Arab-Israeli war was in progress. I mention this personal detail because it answers the question that the United States intervention prevented Israel from taking preemptive action. The United States made no demarche to either side before October 6 because all the intelligence at our disposal and all the intelligence given to us by foreign countries suggested that there was no possibility of the outbreak of a war. We had no reason to give any advice to any of the participants because we did not believe -- nor, may I say, did the Israeli Government -- that an attack was imminent.

In the three hours between 6 a.m. and 9 a.m., we made major efforts to prevent the outbreak of the

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war by acting as an intermediary between the parties, of
assuring each of them that the other one was attempting
to obtain the assurance of each side that the other one
had no aggressive intention.

Before this process could be completed, however,
war had broken out. And it started the process in which
we are still engaged.

I do not think any useful purpose is served
in reviewing every individual diplomatic move, but I thought
it would be useful to indicate some of the basic principles
we attempted to follow.

Throughout the crisis the President was con-
vinced that we had two major problems: first, to end
hostilities as quickly as possible -- but, secondly,
to end hostilities in a manner that would enable us to
make a major contribution to removing the conditions
that have produced four wars between Arabs and Israelis
in the last 25 years.

We were aware that there were many interested
parties. There were, of course, the participants in the
conflict -- Egypt and Syria on the Arab side, aided by
many other Arab countries; Israel on the other. There
was the Soviet Union. There were the other Permanent Members

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of the Security Council. And, of course, there was the
United States.

It was our view that the United States could
be most effective in both the tasks outlined by the
President -- that is, of ending hostilities, as well
as of making a contribution to a permanent peace in the
Middle East -- if we conducted ourselves so that we
could remain in permanent contact with all of these
elements in the equation.

Throughout the first week, we attempted to
crystallize a consensus in the Security Council which
would bring about a cease-fire on terms that the world
community could support. We stated our basic principles
on October 8th. We did not submit them to a formal
vote because we realized that no majority was available
and we did not want sides to be chosen prematurely.
On October 10th, the Soviet Union began an airlift
which began fairly moderately but which, by October 12th,
had achieved fairly substantial levels.

Let me say a word here about our relationship
with the Soviet Union throughout this crisis and what we
have attempted to achieve. The United States and the
Soviet Union are, of course, ideological and, to some

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extent, political adversaries. But the United States and
the Soviet Union also have a very special responsibility.
We possess -- each of us -- nuclear arsenals capable of
annihilating humanity. We -- both of us -- have a
special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept
within bounds that do not threaten civilized life. Both
of us, sooner or later, will have to come to realize that
the issues that divide the world today, and foreseeable
issues, do not justify the unparalleled catastrophe
that a nuclear war would represent. And, therefore, in
all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have attempted
to keep in mind and we have attempted to move them to a
position in which this overriding interest that humanity
shares with us is never lost sight of.

In a speech -- Pacem in Terris -- I pointed
out that there are limits beyond which we cannot go. I
stated that we will oppose the attempt by any country to
achieve a position of predominance, either globally or
regionally; that we would resist any attempt to exploit
a policy of detente to weaken our alliances; and that
we would react if the relaxations of tensions were used
as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble
spots. We have followed these principles in the current

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situation.

It is easy to start confrontations, but in
this age we have to know where we will be at the end
and not only what pose to strike at the beginning.

Throughout the first week, we attempted to bring
about a moderation in the level of outside supplies
that were introduced into the area and we attempted to
work with the Soviet Union on a cease-fire resolution
which would bring an end to the conflict.

This first attempt failed, on Saturday, October
13th, for a variety of reasons -- including, perhaps,
a mis-assessment of the military situation by some of the
participants. We were then faced with the inability to
produce a Security Council Resolution that would command
a consensus, and the substantial introduction of arms by
an outside power into the area. At this point, on
Saturday, October 13th, the President decided that the
United States would have to start a resupply effort of
its own.

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And the United States, from that time on, has engaged in
maintaining the military balance in the Middle East in
order to bring about a negotiated settlement that we had
sought.

Concurrently with this, we informed the Soviet
Union that our interest in working out an acceptable
solution still remained very strong, and that as part of
this solution, we were prepared to discuss a mutual limita-
tion of arms supply into the area.

In the days that followed, the Soviet Union and
we discussed various approaches to this question, the basic
difficulty being how to reconcile the Arab insistence on an
immediate commitment to a return to the 1967 borders with
Israeli insistence on secure boundaries and a negotiated
outcome.

As you all know, on October 16, Prime Minister Kosygin
went to Cairo to work on this problem with the leaders of
Egypt. He returned to the Soviet Union on October 19th.

We began exploring a new formula for ending the
war that evening, though it was still unacceptable to us.
And while we were still considering that formula, Secretary
General Brezhnev sent an urgent request to President Nixon
that I be sent to Moscow to conduct the negotiations in

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order to speed an end to hostilities that might be difficult
to contain were they to continue.

The President agreed to Mr. Brezhnev's request,
and, as all of you know, I left for Moscow in the early
morning of October 20th.

We spent two days of very intense negotiations and
we developed a formula which we believe was acceptable to
all of the parties and which we continue to believe repre-
sented a just solution to this tragic conflict.

The Security Council Resolution had, as you all
know, three parts. It called for an immediate cease-fire
in place. It called for the immediate implementation of
Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in Novem-
ber 1967, and which states certain general principles on
the basis of which peace should be achieved in the Middle
East. And, thirdly, it called for negotiations between the
parties concerned under appropriate auspices to bring about
a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

This third point was the first international
commitment to negotiations between the parties in the Middle
East conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union were
prepared to offer their auspices if this proved to be
acceptable to the parties to bring about and then to speed

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the process of negotiations. The United States continues
to be ready to carry out this understanding. This, then,
was the situation when I returned from Moscow and Tel Aviv
on Monday evening.

Since then, events have taken the following turn.
On the first day--that is, Tuesday--of the implementation
of the cease-fire, there was a breakdown of the cease-fire
which led to certain Israeli territorial gains. The United
States supported a resolution which called on the participants
to observe the cease-fire, to return to the places from which
the fighting started, and to invite United Nations observers
to observe the implementation of the cease-fire. This
seemed to us a fair resolution.

In the last two days, the discussion in the
Security Council and the communications that have been
associated with it have taken a turn that seemed to us
worrisome. We were increasingly confronted with a cascade
of charges which were difficult to verify in the absence
of United Nations observers, and a demand for action
that it was not within our power to take. There was a
proposal, for example, that joint U.S. and Soviet military
forces be introduced into the Middle East to bring about
an observance of the cease-fire.

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I would like to state on behalf of the President the United States position on this matter very clearly. The United States does not favor and will not approve the sending of a joint Soviet-United States force into the Middle East. The United States believes that what is needed in the Middle East above all is a determination of the facts, a determination where the lines are, and a determination of who is doing the shooting, so that then the Security Council can take appropriate action. It is inconceivable that the forces of the great powers should be introduced in the numbers that would be necessary to overpower both of the participants. It is inconceivable that we should transplant the great power rivalry into the Middle East, or, alternatively, that we should impose a military condominium by the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States is even more opposed to the unilateral introduction by any great power, especially by any nuclear power, of military forces into the Middle East in whatever guise those forces should be introduced. And it is the ambiguity of some of the actions and communications and certain readiness measures that were observed that caused the President at a special meeting of the National Security Council last night, at

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3 a.m., to order certain precautionary measures to be taken by the United States.

The United States position with respect to peace in the Middle East is as follows: The United States stands for a strict observance of the cease-fire as defined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 adopted on October 22nd. The United States will support and give all assistance and is willing to supply some personnel to a United Nations observer force whose responsibility it is to report to the Security Council about the violations of the cease-fire, and which would have the responsibility, in addition, of aiding the parties in taking care of humanitarian and other concerns that are produced by the fact that on the Egyptian-Israeli front a series of enclaves exist in which demarcation is extremely difficult.

If the Security Council wishes, the United States is prepared to agree to an international force, provided it does not include any participants from the Permanent Members of the Security Council, to be introduced into the area as an additional guarantee of the cease-fire.

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The United States is prepared to make a major
effort to help speed a political solution which is just
to all sides.

The United States recognizes that the conditions
that produced the war on October 6th cannot be permitted
to continue, and the United States, both bilaterally
and unilaterally, is prepared to lend its diplomatic
weight to a serious effort in the negotiating process
foreseen by paragraph 3 of Security Council Resolution 338.

We are, therefore, at a rather crucial point.

From many points of view, the chances for
peace in the Middle East are quite promising:

Israel has experienced once more, the trauma of
war and has been given an opportunity for the negotiations
it has sought for all of its existence, and it must be
ready for the just and durable peace that the Security
Council asks for.

The Arab nations have demonstrated their concern

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and have received international assurances that other countries will take an interest in these negotiations.

The Soviet Union is not threatened in any of its legitimate positions in the Middle East. The principles I mentioned earlier of the special responsibility of the great nuclear powers to strike a balance between their local interests and their global interest and their humane obligations remain.

And, seen in this perspective, none of the issues that are involved in the observance of the cease-fire would warrant unilateral action.

As for the United States, the President has stated repeatedly that this Administration has no higher goal than to leave to its successors a world that is safer and more secure than the one we found. It is an obligation that any President, of whatever party, will have to discharge, and it is a responsibility which must be solved -- if mankind is to survive -- by the great nuclear countries at some point, before it is too late.

But we have always stated that it must be a peace with justice. The terms that have been agreed to in the United Nations provide an opportunity for the

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peoples of the Middle East to determine their own fate in consultation and negotiation -- for the first time in twenty-five years.

This is an opportunity we are prepared to foster. It is an opportunity which is essential for this ravaged area and which is equally essential for the peace of the world. And it is an opportunity that the great powers have no right to be permitted to miss.

Now I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you go into a little more detail on the Soviet threat that caused the alerting of U.S. military elements last night?

And also, if you could tell us if Ambassador Dobrynin delivered you a brutal note, as described by Senator Jackson on the Middle East situation?

A Senator Jackson is a good friend of mine, but he does not participate in our deliberations.

I will not discuss the details of individual communications.

We became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units and we were puzzled by the behavior of some Soviet Representatives in the discussions that took

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place.

We do not consider ourselves in a confrontation
with the Soviet Union. We do not believe it is necessary,
at this moment, to have a confrontation. In fact, we
are prepared to work cooperatively toward the realization
of the objectives which we have set ourselves.

But cooperative action precludes unilateral
action and the President decided that it was essential
that we make clear our attitude towards unilateral
steps.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you were, early on,
talking about the special responsibility of the two
nuclear super powers to avoid anything which would eliminate
or incinerate humanity, you went on to say that there are
limits beyond which we can't go.

And among those, you said: We would resist any
attempt to exploit the detente in a manner to weaken others,
or weaken our allies -- I didn't get that exactly -- but
you will recall what you said.

And what I want to know -- what I wanted to
ask you is whether you believe that the action of the
Russians so far -- particularly in departing from what

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you thought was an agreement -- has gone to the
point where it threatens exploitation of the detente
to an adverse extent.

A We are not yet prepared to make this
judgment. We have to realize, of course, as I pointed
out in my remarks, that the Soviet Union and we are in
a very unique relationship. We are at one and the same
time adversaries and partners in the preservation
of peace.

As adversaries, we often find ourselves drawn
into potential confrontations and each of us has
friends that let themselves pursue objectives
that may not be sought fully by either of us.

When we took the precautionary steps of which
you are all aware, we did so because we thought there
might be a possibility that matters might go beyond the
limits which I have described. But we are not yet
prepared to say that they have gone beyond these limits
and we believe that the possibility of moving in the
direction that the Security Council had established
earlier this week, is still very real. And if the
Security Council today were to pass a resolution that

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permitted the introduction of United Nations forces
except those of the Permanent Members, the United
States would feel that we are back on the road that
had been charted earlier this week.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the United States received a specific warning from the Soviet Union that it would send its forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do you have intelligence that the Russians are preparing for such an action? The reason I raise these questions -- as you know, there has been some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much perhaps by American domestic requirements as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East. And I wonder if you could provide some additional information on that.

A. Marvin, we are attempting to conduct the foreign policy of the United States with regard for what we owe, not just to the electorate, but to future generations. And it is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons.

"We do not think it is wise at this moment to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges that prompted this decision. Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic efforts, one way or the other, we will make the record available, and we will be able to go into greater detail. And I am absolutely confident

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that it will be seen that the President had no other choice
as a responsible national leader.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say, sir, why
the United States feels that the permanent members of the
Security Council should not send forces, although there
is a chapter in the UN Charter, I believe, that calls upon
all members of the UN to provide forces if called upon to do
so.

A We believe that the particular provision
of the Charter which you mentioned should be seen in
the light of the particular circumstances. When you have
a situation in which several of the permanent members
may have conflicting interests, and when the presence
of the forces of the permanent members may themselves
contribute to the tension in the area, it seems to us
the only possible course is to exclude the members -- the
forces of all permanent members.

It would be a disaster if the Middle East,
already so torn by local rivalries, would now become,
as a result of a UN decision, a legitimized theater
for the competition of the military forces of the
great nuclear powers.

And therefore it seemed to us that the political

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purposes would be best served if any international
force that were introduced were composed of countries
that have no possibility of themselves being drawn into
rivalry as a result of being ...

Q Dr. Kissinger, it may seem obvious, but I
would just like to ask you -- is the purpose of the alert
which is now going on to tell the Soviet Union that if
they send forces into the Middle East we will do the
same?

A I don't want to speculate about what the
President may decide to do in circumstances which we
fervently hope will not arise. It would seem to us that
to threaten all that has been achieved in the search for
peace by unilateral action, would be a step of
irresponsibility that we do not believe is likely. And
therefore, I do not want to speculate what the United
States would do if it should appear that instead of
beginning an era of cooperation, we were thrown back
to the confrontations which sooner or later will have to
be surmounted -- because humanity cannot stand the
eternal conflict of those who have the capacity to
destroy it.

Q Mr. Secretary, Cairo Radio said that such

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an offer of Soviet troops for enforcing the cease-fire
has been received from Moscow. Has such an offer been
made, and if so, have the Soviet troops indeed been
alerted, and are they on the move?

A We are not, of course, aware of the
diplomatic exchanges that may go on between the
Government of Egypt and the Government of the Soviet
Union. We are also not aware of any Soviet forces that
may have been introduced into Egypt. And we believe, and
we will bend every effort in that direction, that any
actions that are taken by any country in the Middle East
will be within the framework of the Security Council and
of United Nations decisions.

I want to repeat again! we do not now consider
ourselves in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We
continue to be prepared, and we believe it is entirely
possible to maintain the direction that has brought us
to this point, and on which the peace of the world depends.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the
Soviet Union has threatened unilateral action and pushed
this circumstance to the brink of confrontation? Do you
see it possible that they saw the events of last weekend as
having so weakened the President-- he was threatened with

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impeachment, that they saw a target of opportunity and
decided to move?

A Speculation about motives is always
dangerous. But one cannot have crisis of authority in a
society for a period of months without paying a price
somewhere along the line.

Q Dr. Kissinger, from a public standpoint, until this morning the public would have had the belief and the view that this crisis was in hand, that the cease-fire was taking hold. You have declined to discuss the diplomatic context of the specific communications. But was there prior to this latest sudden development any indication that this situation might go into such a direction?

A No, there was not. Until yesterday afternoon we had every reason to believe that the basic direction that had been established, and to which all parties had agreed, would in fact been implemented. And I repeat -- we still believe that it is possible to continue in this direction. Nobody can gain from introducing great power rivalry, or from compounding -- by compounding great power rivalry. The overriding goal in the Middle East must be a just and durable peace

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between the Arab nations and Israel. That the United
States is prepared and indeed determined to promote. And
that is the issue to which we should address ourselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to follow that up, please,
Senator Jackson among others has said that this government
has been operating under what he called an illusion of
detente from the very beginning. Can you be a little more
precise now under these circumstances about the status
of the detente with the Soviet Union?

A Mr. Lisagor, we have, from the beginning
of this Administration, recognized that there is a -- that
we are dealing with an ideological and political adversary.
We have also believed that we had an historic obligation,
precisely in these conditions of being in opposition, to
attempt to remove the dangers of war. We have always made
clear, and we have always practiced, that we would resist
any foreign policy adventures through the many crises
in the early parts of this Administration.

Where we have differed with some of our critics,
in
it was/our conviction that it was dangerous to attempt to
interfere in the domestic affairs of a
country with such a different domestic structure and
such a different ideological orientation.

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We have maintained the integrity of our allies
and the security of the United States, while reducing
the danger of war.

As I said in my remarks, this is a historic
task that somebody will have to solve, and that it is in
the interests of all Americans and all of mankind that
it be solved as quickly as possible.

As for the status of the detente, I think we
can make a better judgment when we know whether peace
has taken hold. If the Soviet Union and we can work
cooperatively, first towards establishing the cease-fire,
and then towards promoting a durable settlement in the
Middle East, then the detente will have proved itself.
If this does not happen, then we have made an effort--
for which we have paid no price--that had to be made.
And then one has to wait for another moment when the
task of insuring or of bringing peace to mankind can
be attempted.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the reports of this joint --
the Soviet plan for a joint Soviet-U.S. force were
rather widespread before you went to Moscow, especially
in Eastern Europe. Did Mr. Brezhnev discuss this idea

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with you in any way? And if not, why do you think he
kept quiet about it then only to appear to activate it
a few days later?

A I don't know what plans were widespread
in Eastern Europe. I can only deal with plans which
reach us in some official manner. The plan for a joint
U.S.-Soviet military force in the Middle East was never
broached to us, either publicly or privately, until
yesterday. And we immediately made clear that we would
not participate in such a force, and also that we would
oppose any unilateral moves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have said that U.S.-
Soviet auspices might be useful in moving this along
diplomatically. Are you prepared personally to play a
role in getting these talks started? And secondly,
have all the parties accepted the necessity for direct
Arab-Israeli talks?

A We have not been in equally close
contact with all of the parties. And we have reason
to believe that a sufficient number of the parties have
accepted these talks for them to start. And indeed, as
late as yesterday afternoon, preliminary conversations took
place between Ambassador Dobrynin and me about the site,

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the participation and the procedures for these talks.

Q Dr. Kissinger, earlier you referred to legitimate Soviet interests in the Middle East and indicated that we felt they were not threatened there. Have the Soviets indicated they agree with your assessment?

A On the basis of the conversations that I had with General Secretary Brezhnev as late as last Sunday, and the communications that were exchanged afterwards between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev, there was every reason to expect that while, of course, our interests were not congruent, and while, of course, there were differences in approach, that a certain parallelism could develop in the direction of producing a permanent peace. And therefore I would have to say that we had reason to believe, and we have no reason yet to alter our estimate, that the joint auspices of which the Security Council resolution speaks can yet be implemented.

Q Dr. Kissinger, between the two cease-fire resolutions in the United Nations, in that period the Israeli forces have made substantial military gains on the ground. Is the United States prepared to urge

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Israel to comply with the resolution which calls for all parties to withdraw to the lines at the time of the first cease-fire?

A The United States supported both resolutions and is today supporting another resolution containing similar provisions, as well as a provision for an international force drawn from all member states of the United Nations -- for which all member states of the United Nations would be eligible except the permanent members of the Security Council.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I notice that you said the President decided on the military alert, and that you said the President had no other choice. Did you recommend this, or did the President initiate the military alert matter, and do you feel that it is a totally rational decision?

A Mr. Mollenhoff, I have a general rule not to provide a check-list of what advice I give to the President. But due to the particular implications of your remark, I may say that all of the President's senior advisors--all the members of the National Security Council--were unanimous in their recommendation, as a result of a

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deliberation in which the President did not himself
participate--and which he joined only after they had
formed their judgment--that the measures taken--that he in
fact ordered--were in the essential national interest.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say what in your
judgment changed from the period yesterday when you and
Ambassador Dorbynin were talking about participation and
site and so on for talks, and the period last night
which led the Soviets to take the action that they took?
What in your estimation changed?

A I would like to make clear that as of now
the Soviet Union has not yet taken any irrevocable action.
It is our hope that such an action will not be taken.

I repeat again what I have said on many occasions
in this press conference. We are not seeking an
opportunity to confront the Soviet Union. We are not
asking the Soviet Union to pull back from anything that
it has done.

The opportunity for pursuing the joint course
in the Security Council and in the diplomacy afterwards
is open. The measures we took and which the President
ordered were precautionary in nature. They were not

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directed at any actions that had already been taken. And
therefore there is no reason for any country to back off
anything that it has not yet done.

As to the motives, I think we should assess
that after the current situation is over.

Q Dr. Kissinger --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A Well, let me get this question, and then you.

Q Sir, in the reasons that prompted the
President to make his decision, did any of those reasons
include a threat aimed against this country as opposed
to a threat in the Middle East?

A I really do not think it is appropriate
for me to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges.
We are not talking of threats that have been made against
one another. We are not talking of a missile crisis
type situation. We are talking of a situation where
seventy-two hours ago we still introduced joint
resolutions, where the necessity for a joint movement
towards peace is as real now as it was then, where the
participants in the Middle East have everything to
gain from a period of quiet and from at least watching
or attempting to see what an American diplomatic effort

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can produce. And therefore we are talking about a
precautionary situation and not an actual one.

Q Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that you are
asking the American people -- you and the President -- who
are already badly shaken by the events of the last week,
to accept a very dramatic military alert, involving
nuclear forces, on the basis of a kind of handful of
smoke, without telling them or us exactly why. If I
understood you earlier, you said that we had discovered
the alert of some Soviet forces, and we were disturbed
by the behavior apparently of some people that American
officials were dealing with. And that is all we really
have to justify this alert.

Now, this country is pretty badly shaken right
now. And I wonder if you can give us any more information
that will help convince people that there is some solid
basis for the actions that have been taken.

A "We are attempting to preserve the peace in
very difficult circumstances. It is up to you ladies
and gentlemen to determine whether this is the moment to
try to create a crisis of confidence in the field of
foreign policy as well. We have tried to give you as

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much information as we decently and safely and properly
can under these conditions. As soon as there is a clear
outcome, we will give you the full information. And
after that you will be able to judge whether the decisions
were taken hastily or improperly.

The alert that has been ordered is of a
precautionary nature and is not of any major and
irrevocable -- it is not in any sense irrevocable.
It is what seemed to be indicated by the situation.

We will be prepared, however, and I am certain
within a week, to put the facts before you.

But there has to be a minimum of confidence
that the senior officials of the American government
are not playing with the lives of the American people.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the chief problem in the
Middle East at the moment seems to be the concern by
the Egyptians for the safety of its Third Army on the
east bank of the Canal. Are there any steps being
taken to possibly ameliorate their situation? And
secondly, could you give us some more details about the
results of your conversation as to forthcoming talks?
About twelve hours ago everybody was waiting for talks

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to begin. Can you tell us in which direction we can
anticipate that will go?

A We believe that the particular problems
that are raised by a cease-fire in which the forces are
deployed in such a curious fashion--each army having units
behind the lines of the other--that these conditions first
of all produce, especially in the initial phases, many
difficulties. We also are absolutely convinced that
with the presence of observers, with good will on all
sides, and with the active participation of the United
States and the Soviet Union, that the difficulties can
be substantially eased and eventually removed.

It is my understanding, for example, that some
humanitarian supplies reached the Third Army today.

And we would certainly be prepared to lend our good
offices to an effort in which neither side gained a
decisive advantage as a result of the deployment of their
forces.

I therefore am convinced that the particular
conditions of the cease-fire, difficult as they are, can be
dealt with and can be ameliorated with statesmanship on
all sides.

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Q Mr. Secretary, you have surely told Dobrynin and others what you have told us and perhaps even more. Can you give us any indication of what effect this had on these people?

A We are at this moment in the Security Council debating the resolution that we are supporting. If that resolution is accepted and carried out, we believe that it will lead to an immediate easing of the situation and to a restoration of the conditions as we observed them at noon yesterday.

May I say also that this press conference was scheduled at a time before this latest event was known or suspected. And I went through with it in order to be able to put into perspective the evolution that brought us here, and as much of the reasoning as I could, given the delicacy of the situation.

Q You didn't answer the second half of my question, Dr. Kissinger --

A What was the second half?

Q About negotiations, where they were going to go.

A We believe that negotiations can and should begin in a matter of a very few weeks.

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Q How?

A How?

Q Yes. You said we were discussing participation and forum. I wondered if you could give us more details.

A I think we should wait until the parties are prepared to announce this.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you any indication of how the Soviet Union will vote on the resolution today?

A I think the debate is still in process. And once we know the result of that vote --

Q Is there any indication of how they might vote?

A We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution.

Q If the resolution is passed, Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the alert would be taken off?

A The alert will not last one minute longer than we believe is necessary.

Q Dr. Kissinger --

A And it would be taken off as soon as any danger of unilateral action is removed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, concerning the role that the

PR #390

United States may play in obtaining conditions for an
enduring peace, several months ago you were reported as
saying that you were supportive of an American policy
that supports Israel but not Israeli conquests. What
is your view on that now?

A I think I was quoted to that effect
four-and-a-half years ago, before I understood the
special nomenclature that is attached to the various
ground rules.

Our position is -- as I have stated publicly --
that the conditions that produced this war were clearly
intolerable to the Arab nations, and that in a process
of negotiations, it will be necessary to make substantial
concessions.

The problem will be to relate the Arab concern
for the sovereignty over territories to the Israeli
concern for secure boundaries.

We believe that the process of negotiations
between the parties is an essential component of this.
And as the President has stated to the four Arab Foreign
Ministers, and as we have stated repeatedly, we will
make a major effort to bring about a solution that is

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considered just by all parties. But I think no purpose
would be served by my trying to delimit the exact nature
of all of these provisions.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

(Whereupon at 1:00 p.m. the press conference
was concluded.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 7, 1973

No. 402

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON DEPARTURE FROM RABAT, MOROCCO
NOVEMBER 6, 1973

I wish to thank King Hassan and Moroccan officials for the extraordinary courtesy with which we have been treated, the warm hospitality that's been extended and the extremely useful talks that we have had.

This is the first Arab country I have visited, and it is, of course, my first stop on a trip which I hope will contribute to a permanent and just peace for the Middle East. It was therefore particularly appropriate that this visit should be to a country which is at one and the same time a close friend of the United States and also closely allied with its brothers in the Arab world.

The conversations with His Majesty were conducted with an attitude of friendship, but they also contributed greatly to my understanding of the point of view of the Arab countries. I leave here with greater determination and I hope greater courage to contribute to peace in the Middle East that extends to all of the people of the Middle East.

We also had some discussions of bilateral problems between the United States and Morocco, and Assistant Secretary Newsom is returning here on November 15 for more extended talks with the Foreign Minister.

Thank you very much.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 8, 1973

No. 408

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN, JORDAN
NOVEMBER 8, 1973

I have just completed rather extensive and extremely useful talks with the Prime Minister and His Majesty. As the United States improves its relationships with all the countries in the area, it will not forget its close friends that have stood with it for many years. We spoke mostly about the construction of a just and lasting peace in the area, in the negotiations in which Jordan will play a principal role from the very beginning. I think we achieved a very close correspondence of views.

**QUESTION:** What are the prospects of peace at this stage?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, that is what I am travelling through this area to discover. The United States is committed to making a major effort and we will make a major effort to help promote it.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that Israel will change its policy towards a more moderate one?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I won't characterize the foreign policy of any country. I am here to discuss what the United States is going to do. That is the only question.

**QUESTION:** Did you discuss the status of the West Bank of Jordan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We discussed all the elements that would enter into a peace negotiation.

**QUESTION:** How about Jerusalem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I won't go into any further details.

********

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 12, 1973

No. 409

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON DEPARTURE FROM ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
NOVEMBER 10, 1973

Ladies and Gentlemen: We think it is appropriate that we should end the first part of this journey in Pakistan with our old friends.

Pakistan, as you all know, has close and historic ties with the countries of the Middle East, and it is also a valued friend of the United States.

I, therefore, had an opportunity to review our efforts with Prime Minister Bhutto, and we agreed that a lasting and just peace in the Middle East is in the interest of all mankind and that we would undertake, each in our own way, major efforts in that direction.

I am leaving now for the People's Republic of China on the same route that I took the first time on what was then a secret trip and the opening of the relationship with the People's Republic of China. Indeed, some of the Chinese officials traveling with us to Peking were on the first trip.

We attach great importance to our relationship with the People's Republic of China. We think it is an essential component in the structure of peace that the President is developing around the world, and we are grateful to our friends in Pakistan for having arranged it the first time and for having treated us so well as we depart on this journey today.

Thank you very much.

*********************

[L]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 12, 1973

No. 410

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER'S
INTERVIEW BY ABC, CBS, AND NBC
IN PEKING

NOVEMBER 12, 1973

#R3

Q: Mr. Secretary, what have you been talking to the Chinese about?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ever since we established contact with the Chinese we have been meeting at this level twice a year and there is generally an exchange of views about the whole range of international problems and also a discussion of where Sino-US relations should go over the next period and that has been the main subject of our conversation.

Q: Can you be more specific about what you have been discussing?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In general, you can assume we have discussed all outstanding international issues as well as Sino-US relationships.

Q: On the Middle East, when and how will the peace conference proceed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had from the beginning two objectives: one is to stabilize the cease-fire and then once the cease-fire was stabilized, we move from there to a peace conference. As you know, Israel and Egypt yesterday signed the cease-fire stabilization arrangement that was worked out last week. They have to negotiate some of the implementation of modalities of this. When that is completed, which we hope will be soon, we will move into setting up the peace conference. Our expectation is that this should not be more than a matter of weeks.

Q: Mr. Secretary, isn't it inherently dangerous for the super powers, the US and Russia, to become committed to guaranteeing peace arrangements in the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So far, Marvin, there has not been any precise discussion of guarantees. What we have done up to now is not guarantee any particular settlement but try to be helpful to the parties in narrowing the difference between them. The Arab nations and Israel have been fighting each other for nearly a generation and many issues are fraught with tremendous emotion with them. Therefore, if we can strip away some of the emotion and present it in a way that is more acceptable to both sides, we can make some progress as was made last week. We have not yet given any particular guarantees. However, I would assume that if the peace negotiations succeed, there will be a very serious problem especially for Israel of how its security can be assured under

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conditions when the final borders will certainly be different from the cease-fire lines and when withdrawals are involved as Security Council Resolution 242 provides. At this point the question of guarantees will arise and we have to then ask the question: What sort of guarantees -- unilateral, several countries, and so forth? Second, moreover, the great powers are already involved to some extent in the Middle East. What we have to do is to try to prevent every crisis from turning into a clash of the super powers. In that respect I agree with you.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how much pressure is the United States willing to apply to get Israel to make the kind of concessions that will be necessary for a fair settlement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First you are assuming something that will still remain to be revealed through the process of negotiation. Israel has always agreed that the final borders will not be the cease-fire lines either of 1967 or 1973, and we have every hope that through the process of negotiation a mutually acceptable settlement will be achieved. The United States stated during the conflict and has stated since that it would make a major effort to bring the parties together. That will be our intention. We don't expect that it will require major pressure on either of the sides.

Q: Are you satisfied that the major powers in sponsoring this peace conference will not try to use it in the future to gain a major edge in the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The temptation is always there to exploit a situation to the advantage of one or the other of the super powers. However, if the super powers understand their own interests and the world interests they ought to realize that the other side can always match them in terms of military equipment, and that the attempt to turn this into a super power confrontation must lead to a constantly increasing danger of war. The effort may be made. When it is made we will resist it as we have in the past. We hope, and that will certainly be our attitude, that the Soviet Union will approach these negotiations with the same spirit we shall: namely, that a settlement just to all parties is in the interest of everybody. If they do not, then we will have to see what else can be done.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union has direct bilateral arrangements with Egypt, Syria, Iraq and a number of other Arab countries. Senator Fulbright in the past has called for the establishment of a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel. Would the Administration

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support that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It has been a constant American policy supported in every administration and carrying wide bipartisan support that the existence of Israel will be supported by the United States. This has been our policy in the absence of any formal arrangement, and it has never been challenged no matter which administration was in office. The question then is where are the borders and what are the security arrangements and this is what is going to be negotiated in the next phase in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242. Whether the security guarantees should be expressed in some formal document or in some other way I think we should wait until the negotiations are completed; but it is one of the ideas that is under consideration.

Q: In that connection, Mr. Secretary, given the oil situation, the number of people and territory involved, the new relationship with the Soviet Union, why is it in the American national interest to support Israel so strongly? I ask that within the context of guaranteeing the existence of Israel.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States in the entire post-war period has supported the concept that international conflict should not be settled by force. It has, moreover, supported the concept that nations should not be eliminated simply by the superior numbers or in any manner of their neighbors. The United States has supported Israel because of the emotional ties that have existed, because of the democratic tradition of Israel, because of the fact that it is a going concern in this area, and because, as I have said, about our opposition to the domination of one nation by force to others. The oil situation will continue for the indefinite future, and while we are highly respectful of the views of the Arab world it is not possible for us to be swayed in the major orientation of our policy by the monopoly position or the temporary monopoly position enjoyed by a few nations.

Q: Do you get no indication from King Faisal or others in your recent journey that the oil restrictions might be changed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had very extensive talks with King Faisal and with his advisors, and it is a problem that has many complexities both for us as well as for King Faisal. I think that both sides are studying its adaption in the light of the developing situation.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as you get into the formal negotiations now, is it safe to assume that arms deliveries by the US to Israel, the Soviet

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Union to the Arabs, will continue or do you have some kind of arrangement
already with the Soviet Union that when you reach a point in the
negotiations both of the super powers will knock down the flow of arms?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No such arrangement exists as of now, but the United
States has always held the view that it was prepared to discuss
limitation of the flow of armaments into the Middle East in order to
avoid the present situation of the piling up of armaments on both sides.
If there is a limitation of the flow of armaments, it has, however, to
include all those countries which might transfer their arms to one or
more of the combatants and not just the parties in the last war.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are some people who argue that detente was exposed as a myth during the Middle East crisis because the Russians threatened to use military force even though their own vital interests were not affected. How do you answer them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been a misunderstanding in many respects about detente. There has been the idea that detente reflects the fact that the two sides agree with each other and that it reflects an era of good feeling or similar domestic structures. We have always believed that detente is necessary precisely because we have opposing interests in many parts of the world and totally different social systems. Detente is necessary because of the danger posed by the accumulation of nuclear weapons on both sides. We are in favor of detente because we want to limit the risks of major nuclear conflict. That gives us an opportunity to communicate and to move rapidly if we want to. It does not eliminate the conflicting interests. It does not prevent occasional clashes -- what it does make possible is a more rapid settlement and a certain amount of restatement when crises develop when both of these things occur. But there are limitations beyond which it cannot go.

Q: Mr. Secretary, thank you for your time.

* * * * * * * * *

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE

8:00 A. M. EST

NOVEMBER 14, 1973

[LC]

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U. S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 10 to November 14, 1973. He was accompanied by Robert Ingersoll, Robert McCloskey, Arthur Hummel, Winston Lord, Oscar Armstrong, Jonathan Howe and Richard Solomon.

Chairman Mao Tse-Tung received Secretary Kissinger. They held a wide-ranging and far-sighted conversation in a friendly atmosphere. Secretary Kissinger conveyed greetings from President Nixon, and Chairman Mao Tse-Tung sent his greetings to the President.

Secretary Kissinger and members of his party held frank and serious talks with Premier Chou En-Lai, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-Fei, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Hai-Jung, Director Lin Ping, Director Peng-Hua, Tsien Ta-Yung, Ting Yuan-Hung and others.

Officials of the two sides conducted counterpart talks on bilateral issues of mutual concern and made good progress.

The two sides reviewed international developments since Dr. Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China in February, 1973. They noted that international relationships are in a period of intense change. They reaffirmed that they are committed to the principles established in the Shanghai communique and that disputes between states should be settled without resorting to the use or threat of force, on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In particular, they reiterated that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

The two sides agreed that in present circumstances it is of particular importance to maintain frequent contact at authoritative levels in order to exchange views and, while not negotiating on behalf of third parties, to engage in concrete consultations on issues of mutual concern.

Both sides reviewed progress made during 1973 in their bilateral relations. The U.S. side reaffirmed: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; the United States Government does not challenge that position. The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.

Both sides noted with satisfaction that the liaison offices in Peking and Washington are functioning smoothly. Both sides agreed that the scope of the functions of the liaison offices should continue to be expanded.

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Exchanges have deepened understanding and friendship between the two peoples. The two sides studied the question of enlarging the exchanges between the two countries and agreed upon a number of new exchanges for the coming year.

Trade between the two countries has developed rapidly during the past year. The two sides held that it is in the interest of both countries to take measures to create conditions for further development of trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The two sides stated that they would continue their efforts to promote the normalization of relations between China and the United States on the basis of the Shanghai communique.

Secretary Kissinger and his party expressed their gratitude for the warm hospitality extended to them by the Government of the People's Republic of China.

# # #

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 16, 1973

No. 413

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER
ON THE OCCASION OF
FOREIGN SERVICE DAY

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1973

[Delivered by Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush]

I had looked forward to attending Foreign Service Day this year, and regret that I am not able to be with you.

This trip has confirmed my belief that the United States has entered a period in which the Department and the Service will confront unprecedented demands and unequaled opportunities to serve the nation. We cannot recreate the condition of our early history in which the United States based its security on the breadth of two oceans. Nor can we recover the margins of resources which in the more recent past allowed us to try to overwhelm every problem through massive applications of strength. The technology which has shrunk the world has extended the range and complexity of international relations.

Today — at a time when there is an unusual opportunity to build a stable and lasting structure of peace — we must be both more thoughtful and more purposeful in our diplomacy: reaffirming ties to old allies, building new relations with former adversaries, and working to make the poorer nations full participants in global prosperity.

Thus, I would like history to be able to record that in the next years a new level of excellence in American diplomacy was achieved. A commitment to understand their own and other societies, a willingness to consider alternatives, and an ability to relate events to American interests are the hallmarks of great professionals — of men like Murphy, Bohlen, Thompson and Kennan.

I will do my best so that the career system will promote excellence and will work to see that it identifies individuals with both the ability and the desire to assume responsibilities. I will devote personal attention to finding and promoting only the very best people for Ambassadorial and other senior positions.

Performance in the Department of State will determine the success of our policies. Our ability to do what is right rather than what is expedient will determine whether these policies endure.

As we seek a Foreign Service able to meet the challenges of the future we must do so with a sense of common purpose. It would be unfortunate indeed if we were to

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perpetuate a view in which the policymaker is seen as the nemesis of the policy implementor, the manager as the adversary of the employee.

Over the past five years we have made great progress towards President Nixon's goal of handing on to future generations a more cooperative, more stable and less dangerous world than the one he found upon coming to office. The Foreign Service has made important contributions to that goal — just as its professionalism has been a critical element in our efforts to deal with the Middle East crisis. The next few years will determine whether the excellence that has so frequently marked the Service will become a constant throughout its activities. As we pursue that goal the experience and the wisdom of men and women like yourselves will be invaluable. I know that I will be able to call upon it in time of need.

**********

[L.C.]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 16, 1973

No. 415

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON HIS RETURN FROM HIS VISIT TO
THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA
Andrews Air Force Base
November 16, 1973

Ladies and Gentlemen, as we return from ten countries and 25,000 miles, I wanted to say on behalf of all my colleagues how much we appreciated the courtesies and hospitality that was extended to us everywhere.

We intended on this trip to carry out the President's foreign policy in ending the fighting there and improving relations with adversaries and in strengthening existing ties with old friends.

As you all know, in the Mid East we contributed to stabilizing the cease-fire and now our task is to work with conviction and energy on getting the peace negotiations started.

In China, we made further progress toward normalization of relations and also strengthened the bilateral ties.

And in Japan and Korea, we strengthened the friendships that have lasted now for most of the post-war period.

As we look back on this trip, all of us can well keep in mind that America remains the hope and the inspiration for all people who seek peace and goodwill; and all of us have drawn courage and greater determination from this fact.

Thank you very much.

[L]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 21, 1973

No. 423

#4

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
NOVEMBER 21, 1973

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am missing that group
that was in front of me. I'm slipping.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will just make a very
few brief observations about where we stand in the Middle
East, where we expect to go, then say a word about our
attitude towards the various oil pressures.

First, with respect to the situation in the
Middle East. As I have pointed out before, our objective
was to solidify the cease-fire so that we could move
forward, together with the other interested parties,
towards peace negotiations.

Now, in the complex situation that exists on

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the Egyptian-Israeli front, sufficient progress
has been made on the cease-fire, in the cease-fire
negotiations, so that we can look forward with some
confidence to the beginning of peace negotiations.

Our effort will be to create the appropriate
auspices called for in Security Council Resolution 338
and under the auspices of the United Nations, to begin
a negotiating process--hopefully during the month of
December-- that we believe and that we expect and hope
will lead towards the just and lasting peace that all
parties have pledged themselves to attempt to negotiate.

The United States has committed itself, in
Security Council Resolution 338, to support the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 in
all of its parts.

We will make a major effort to narrow the
differences between the parties, to help the parties
move towards the peace that all the peoples in the area
need, and that the peace of the world requires.

Now, this will be our policy in the Middle East.

We stated this policy to the Arab Foreign
Ministers at the United Nations prior to the outbreak of

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the Arab-Israeli War. And I lay stress on this because
the United States policy is determined, not by the
pressures that this or that nation may attempt to
generate, but by the American conception of the
national interest and of the interest of general peace.

Now, the United States has full understanding
for actions that may have been taken when the war was
going on, by which the parties and their friends attempted
to demonstrate how seriously they took the situation.

But as the United States has committed itself
to a peaceful process, as the United States has pledged
that it would make major efforts to bring about the
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242,
those countries who are engaging in economic pressures against
the United States should consider whether it is appropriate
to engage in such steps while peace negotiations are
being prepared, and even more while negotiations are being
conducted.

I would like to state for the United
States Government that our course will not be influenced
by such pressures, that we have stated our policy, that
we have expressed our commitments, and that we will
adhere to those and will not be pushed beyond this point

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by any pressures.

Now, this is all I will say on the Middle East.

But of course I will be delighted to answer your
questions.

There is one matter that I wanted to raise with
you ladies and gentlemen, growing out of my last press
conference, in which I promised, within a week, to
supply the material or the evidence on which our decision
to go on alert was based. It was a statement that, quite
frankly, I regretted having made in terms of the short
deadline immediately afterwards. The reason is that
as we are now moving towards peace negotiations, which we
expect to conduct with the cooperation of the Soviet
Union, I do not believe any useful purpose would be served
if the United States recited confidential communications
that had taken place, and tried to recreate an episode
of confrontation that hopefully has been transcended.

As time goes on, and as the spirit of cooperation
which we are attempting to foster in the Middle East
takes hold, as things can be seen in fuller perspective,
we still expect to fulfill what I have stated.

I am also glad to note that whatever the

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formal cooperation of the government, reportorial
enterprise and the reluctance of associates to admit
anything less than full knowledge of participation in
events have both combined to produce journalistic
efforts that have given a fuller picture of events than
those that were available on the morning of my last
press conference.

So with these two observations, I will turn to
your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your exposition on the
situation in the Middle East, you said the United States
will not be influenced by the pressures -- I assume you
are talking economic or otherwise. And I wanted to ask
you whether the opposite side of that coin has any validity.
In other words, Mr. Vest, your spokesman, early this week
ruled out any retaliatory economic measures against what
he called the Arab blackmail. I don't know whether he
used the term "blackmail". I shouldn't say that. But
anyway, he ruled out retaliatory economic measures. Then
last night Under Secretary Porter in a speech indicated
what some people thought was a possibility of economic
retaliation by the United States when he said that this
sort of thing was a two-edged sword. And then a number of

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eminent economists from your former neighborhood called upon the government to resist Arab blackmail and to consider taking counter-measures.

Now, that is a long question, but what I want to know is are you going to slap back at them in some way?

A The principle objective in the Middle East now is to try to move the contestants towards a spirit of greater conciliation, and towards a greater understanding that the requirements of world peace simply do not permit the constant warfare that has been characteristic of the past twenty years. We still hope that some of the steps that were taken, when certain assumptions were made about the principal American objective in that area, will be changed when it becomes apparent that we are attempting to bring about a just peace.

However, it is clear that if pressures continue unreasonably and indefinitely, that then the United States will have to consider what counter-measures it may have to take. We would do this with enormous reluctance and we are still hopeful that matters will not reach this point.

Q Mr. Secretary, during your talks in China

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there appears to have been a speed-up in the normalization
process. Would you say, please, what effect this may have
on our relations in Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia,
and our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan?

A First let me make a negative point. I have
seen several stories to the effect that the United States
on my trip to China attempted to bring about a full
normalization of relations and failed. This is totally
incorrect.

With respect to our relations to the People's
Republic of China, we have always placed primary emphasis
on the substance of the communications and on the substance
of the consultations rather than on the form in which it
took place.

On this trip, we brought about an expansion
of the functions of the liaison officers, a continuation
of the exchange programs, an expansion of trade, and a
substantial expansion of the consultative processes. This
was the maximum that we had set ourselves as a goal.

With respect to future normalization, I think
that there are certain indications in the communique
which now remain to be explored as to the form that that
might take.

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With respect to the impact of normalization of relations or increased contacts between the People's Republic and the United States on Southeast Asia, it has always been understood that progress towards normalization would be aided by a general condition of stability and tranquility in Asia and that both sides had an obligation to do their utmost to bring this about.

So we are hopeful that the situation in Southeast Asia will not be exacerbated by the actions of any outside country.

With respect to our relations -- with respect to the situation on Taiwan, there have been no changes in the basic relationship.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the Soviet Union has introduced tactical nuclear weapons into Egypt. Is that true, and if so how do you view it?

A We have no confirmed evidence that the Soviet Union has introduced nuclear weapons into Egypt. And there are public Soviet statements rejecting this allegation.

If the Soviet Union were to introduce nuclear

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weapons into local conflict, this would be a very grave
matter and would be a fundamental shift in traditional
practices, and one hard to reconcile with an effort to
bring about a responsible solution.

But I repeat -- we have no evidence, or at least
we have no confirmed evidence that this has been the case.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have talked about the
Arab boycott lasting perhaps unreasonably and indefinitely.
Based on your conversations with Arab leaders, what in
your estimation will it take to get a lifting, even partial,
of the boycott, and how soon might that happen?

A I don't want to speculate as to the timing
that Arab leaders foresee as to easing the boycott. I
think the Arab leaders can take two positions. They can
either give us a reasonable opportunity, once the negotiating
process is under way, to see what we can do to make our
contribution to bringing about the just and lasting peace
to which we have committed ourselves, and which they
affirm is their goal as well. Or they can attempt to
deal with us by making a series of specific demands,
backed up by economic pressures.

We would not be in a position to be able to
accede to that second procedure. And we believe that for

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10

the sake of our future relationships, for the sake of
making clear that we conduct our policy for the interests
of the general peace, that the first course is by far the
more advisable for the Arab leaders. And the decision,
of course, is up to them.

Q Mr. Secretary, what measures could the United
States take to counter these economic pressures?

A Well, I don't want to speculate on what
we might do under circumstances that we hope will not arise.
But you should remember that 85 percent of our energy is
produced in the United States, so that we are not a
total prey to outside pressures.

Q Mr. Secretary, do your remarks about
external pressure apply equally to internal pressure --
and I have in mind those traditional supporters of Israel
versus those who believe that we ought to change our policy
in order to get the Arab oil flowing again?

A Our policy will be conducted on the basis
of our assessment, our best judgment, of the national
interest, and our best judgment of the general interest
of world peace, and they would apply to all special pressures.

Q Mr. Secretary, you seem to concentrate your
answer about the alert on the contents of a confidential

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11

communication from the Soviet Union. And I have great
difficulty with that answer, when you said that you saw no
useful purpose that would be served by it. This is a
democratic country of two-hundred-million people who have
been put on alert before, and this is the first time they have
never been told why. The Russians certainly know what was
in their note. And I would like to hear some more about
why the American people cannot.

A Mr. O'Leary, I have given an account of these
events to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
Senate Armed Services Committee, to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. And there are in international politics
situations in which, as I pointed out in my last press
conference, there has to be a modicum of confidence between
the public and the responsible officials. At this point to
go through the whole sequence of events would only bring
about a recitation of a situation of confrontation, a
score-card of who won or lost, which we do not believe
would contribute to the atmosphere of confidence that is
necessary.

We have given an account to elected representatives
of the American people. We have given some account to
the press. And I recognize the seriousness of your question.

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12

It is not any lack of confidence in our judgment as to
the alert, but a plea for some understanding that there
are greater imperatives at this moment--when we are trying
to calm the situation, when we in a very delicate situation
are trying to bring about a cooperative attitude on the part
of all parties--not to recite, in this time-frame, the
elements of a situation of confrontation.

Q Are you committed not to give -- by a promise
to the Russians -- not to release that note?

A We have not in the past released any of the
private exchanges between the Soviet leaders and the
President, and it would therefore be a very serious matter
if we suddenly began to do it on a selective basis.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, you
have explained why you cannot or will not go any further on
this issue. Can you not, perhaps, clarify some of the
existing apparent discrepancies on the record. You said
at your press conference that there were certain ambiguities
as to what the Soviet intent was. The President said
that this was the gravest crisis since the Cuban missile
crisis. Could you possibly clarify that fundamental issue
for us?

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13

[LC]

A When I gave my press conference, I was motivated by the same considerations that I have expressed here. I saw no purpose at that time to stress the aspect of confrontation. In any set of actions, unless the event which you are trying to prevent has in fact happened, there is always a certain element of uncertainty. We believed, on the basis of evidence, of an intelligence nature, coupled with specific communications, that there was a serious danger that we attempted to avoid. The President described his judgment of the seriousness of the event -- had it occurred. The difference perhaps in characterization is due to the fact that I spoke before I was aware of the UN decision, and I attempted to influence a conciliatory attitude in the decisions that were to be taken.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the stories to which you referred, or one of them, to which I assume you referred in your opening comment, it stated and attributed to a Cabinet official that in the course of the decisions on the alert, the President empowered you and Mr. Schlesinger to manage the crisis on your own, to conceive and carry out various moves, and the President himself only ratified those moves. Is that a correct characterization of his role?

A I don't want to go into the details, but I

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14

thought also I made clear in my statement that not every
official who comments to journalists is in equal possession
of the facts.

Q Dr. Kissinger --

A Bob.

Q Mr. Secretary, in one of your answers before
you left open the possibility that the first option available
to Arab leaders, which is the preferable one from your point
of view, wouldn't occur until after peace negotiations had
begun. If we are talking about next month, talking about
some movement in those peace negotiations, implicitly
you are not holding out any hope for an end to the embargo
before the beginning of the year. Is that fair?

A No. I don't want to set a deadline to
decisions that are not of our own making. I would have
thought that the most constructive course would be to
give the negotiating process a chance now that the point
has been made, and to permit the countries concerned to
make their efforts. What the appropriate timing for
their decision is I think should be left in the first
instance to the leaders who have to make that decision.
I didn't want to give a deadline.

Marvin.

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15

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how you envisage this peace conference? On the Israeli side there is one state -- on the Arab side several. Is a veto to be implied? How do you see this developing?

A Well, of course the conference, to be effective, would have to be left to a considerable extent to the decision of the participants. For example, there are many ways it could be conducted. It could operate through plenary sessions that then break up into a series of bilateral negotiations. It could address some issues of common concern in plenary sessions, and then some issues of bilateral concern in separate meetings. I think the procedural possibilities are fairly wide and should be explored in the first instance by the parties concerned. Obviously no agreement can be made, and certainly no agreement can last, unless it has the willing participation and agreement of all of the parties at the conference.

Les.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding of the modified Cooper-Church legislation on Indochina that it prohibits all direct U.S. military activity -- land, sea and air -- with respect to North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia?

PR# 423

16

A That has been my understanding of it, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Meir, addressing some Israeli troops today in the Sinai, said that the U.S. will put pressure on Israel to make some concessions. Could you now elaborate on what concessions you would expect Israel to make?

A What the United States will do will depend on the process of negotiations. It is obvious that the conditions that produced the war that started on October 6 will have to be changed. And it is obvious, and it has always been understood, that a peace settlement will not ratify the cease-fire lines as they existed on October 6. Therefore, a peace settlement will have to have a number of elements. It will have to have an element of withdrawals. It will have to have an element of security arrangements between the parties concerned. And it may have to have an element of outside guarantees. In addition, there are such issues as the Palestinians and the future of Jerusalem. It will undoubtedly have to be discussed in some form or another at a peace conference.

We hope that Israel, as well as the Arab countries, will recognize that one of the clear consequences of recent events is that a purely military solution to the

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17

[LC]

problems of the Middle East is impossible, and that all
countries therefore have the problem of the right balance
between their security needs and the needs of legitimacy,
acceptance or whatever you want to call it.

We do not consider it axiomatic that this can
only be achieved by pressure on Israel by the United
States to make concessions. We expect to have full
consultations with Israel, as we expect to have discussions
with the Arab participants, and the positions we will take
as the negotiations develop depend on the positions
the various parties take during the course of the
negotiations, and cannot be assumed ahead of time.

Q Mr. Secretary, what role do you foresee
for the Palestinians at the peace conference?

A This is a very difficult question that
affects Israel, the other Arab states, and among the other
Arab states Jordan in particular. And it is a question
which sometime in the course of the negotiation will
require explicit discussion. Whether it is necessary
to address it in the very first phases of the negotiations,
when probably the military issues will loom largest,
remains to be seen, and I would doubt it. But the
Palestinian issue is of course one of the key questions
that will come up.

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18

Q Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions yesterday with the representatives of American oil companies, were you at all encouraged that these oil companies would take the effort, the American effort to produce a peace settlement in the Middle East, into consideration, particularly with emphasis on Japan, on the supply of oil to American troops stationed on Okinawa and Japan, and will they provide some of the scarce reserves that they have to help the Japanese particularly.

A The problem of the world-wide energy crisis has been a very profound challenge to all of the oil-consuming countries. At a minimum, we have an obligation to study seriously what we can do to alleviate difficulties that have been caused either by policies which we consider responsible during the war, which would be the case with The Netherlands, or which are produced by the stationing of American troops, which would be the case in Japan.

We are now looking at this problem very seriously and hope to formulate some position by the early part or by the middle part of next week.

The meeting with the oil executives was not primarily concerned with these more or less technical issues.

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19

It was rather concerned with the fact that here are
representatives of American companies that are operating
in many of these countries, and that need to understand
what the basic direction of our policy is so that in their
own economic activities they are at least aware of how we
conceive the national interest.

Q Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon has been saying
that the personal relationship between himself and the
leaders of the Soviet Union played some kind of role in
connection with this alert. But the facts, as far as we
know them, which by your new policy is virtually zero,
suggest that the communication was so bad that you had to
call a military alert to get your message across.

A I didn't understand the question.

Q What I am trying to ask is whether or not,
or exactly what role President Nixon's personal relationship
with Mr. Brezhnev played in the recent alert.

A The relationship between the Soviet Union
and the United States is an inherently ambiguous one.
We have never said that detente indicates that we have
parallel objectives, or that it indicates that we have
compatible domestic structures. Our view has been that
the detente is made necessary because as the two great

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20

[lc]

nuclear superpowers, we have a special responsibility
to spare mankind the dangers of a nuclear holocaust.
And if one looks at history and sees how often it has
happened that wars have been produced by the rivalries
of client states without a full consideration of the world-
wide issues, how easily misunderstandings could produce
confrontations that could have catastrophic consequences,
the overriding need of finding a solution to the problem
of world-wide general nuclear war becomes overwhelming.

As I pointed out in my last press conference,
this is the central problem of our period, and it is a
problem that will have to be solved either by this group
of officials or by their successors. But it cannot be
avoided.

Now, in this situation, in this relationship,
one will always have an element, both of confidence and
of competition, coexisting in a somewhat ambivalent
manner. The relationship that has developed between
the Soviet Union and the United States since 1971 has
been one of considerable restraint, and there have been
very frequent, very confidential exchanges between
General Secretary Brezhnev and the President. At the
same time it is perfectly conceivable, and indeed it has

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21

happened during the Middle East crisis, that longstanding commitments or ideological pressures produce actions that bring these two sides into confrontation. At that point it is important that enough confidence exists so that the confrontation is mitigated. And therefore, one has to judge not only the fact that a confrontation occurred, really in the aftermath of a settlement, and as a result of actions which could not be fully controlled by either of the two sides because it happened the immediate cause was the violation of the cease-fire.

But one also has to consider how rapidly the confrontation was ended and how quickly the two sides have attempted to move back and are now moving back to a policy of cooperation in settling the Middle East conflict.

I would therefore say that the relationship that had developed between the two governments and between the two leaders played a role in settling the crisis, even though it had not yet been firm enough to prevent the crisis.

Q That it played the role is one thing.

But what kind of a role was that in this particular instance?

A I have tried to give my best --

Q It had to be some kind of a role.

A It played in my judgment a significant role,

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22

the degree of which one will have to assess over a period
of time.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have referred several
times to peace negotiations within the next several weeks.
Yet Prime Minister Meir has said this is impossible until
after the Israeli election December 31. Do you have
assurances from the parties concerned of a place and a
date, and which parties will participate, and may we know
them?

A We have no absolutely firm assurances, but
we have some rather substantial understandings with all
of the parties of the time frame which I indicated.
The participants remain fully to be determined, but we
are close to an agreement on that as well. And we will
also agree, then, on the site.

We hope that this process should be completed
during the next week, and we will then announce it as soon
as all the parties have agreed to it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that the United
States had --

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you --

A I am trying to understand this process where
I look at one person and another speaks. But ladies first.
Go ahead, Marilyn.

PR# 423

23

[LC]

Q You said the United States produces 85 percent of its energy, and it has been noted that other countries are not that fortunate. Is the United States, among the things it is considering, thinking of sharing some of its energy sources with Japan, and the Netherlands, and other countries less fortunate in a time of embargo?

A Well, our first problem is to understand exactly what needs to be done to get our own energy crisis under control, and I am told that energetic steps in that direction are being taken.

The degree to which we can share our energy sources with other countries is a very complex matter, and, of course, the more broadly the sharing is conceived, the more difficult it becomes. But with respect to specific needs, such as in the case of The Netherlands, and the particular issue that Mr. Wallach mentioned in the case of Japan, require our careful study, and we are trying very hard to look into it.

The second issue that is raised by your question is the attitude that the more vulnerable countries should take in this crisis with all understanding for their vulnerability, and they have to consider whether, by taking

PR# 423

24

isolated actions, they will contribute more to the peace
settlement on which, after all, the ultimate solution of
this problem depends, or whether their better course
would not be to try to work as closely with us in the
responsible efforts that we are trying to undertake.

Q Mr. Secretary, during your confirmation hearings, you said that the United Nations could not, or would not, be able to play a useful political role because of the veto that the super-powers or the major powers have in the Security Council. In the event, during this Middle East crisis, it looks as if the United Nations was able to play a useful role. First, have you changed your opinion, and, second, what does this forecast for the United States use of the U.N. in the future.

A I must say that the United Nations played a
more effective role in this crisis than could have been
deduced from my theoretical statements as a professor,
or from my statements during my confirmation hearings.

It proved to be an extremely effective
sounding board, the most rapid means of communication among
the parties, and when the chief participants had decided
on a settlement, the most effective way by which the

PR# 423

25

[Lc]

settlement could be achieved.

Finally, it performed the absolutely essential
role of providing the buffer that prevented the confronta-
tion that could have occurred without it.

So, we believe that the United Nations played
a very useful role, and we will take very serious account
of that in the solution of other problems.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the evident and con-
siderable advantage to Russia inherent in the reopening
of the Suez Canal, granting their large Mediterranean
Fleet access to the Indian Ocean, to the Persian Gulf,
and so on, can you tell us why, as I think is the case,
the United States so strongly favors the reopening of the
Suez?

A The United States has not favored the reopening
of the Suez Canal in the abstract. The United States has
favored the evolution of the Middle East policy of such
a nature that some reasonable prospect towards a final
settlement was opened up to the chief participants.

If anything has become clear in recent years,
it is that the situation as it existed prior to October 6th,
was simply unacceptable to enough of the Arab countries and
to the Middle East, so that it would constantly produce

PR #423

26

[LC]

the danger of renewed warfare, and of a kind of warfare
that as the war has made clear is not in the long-term
interest of Israel, either.

Therefore, the opening of the Suez Canal
ought to be seen, not in the context of the strategic
movements of the Soviet Fleet, but in the context of
world peace in general.

Now, with respect to the greater ease of
movement of the Soviet Fleet from the Mediterranean into
the Indian Ocean, there is a great danger of looking at
the developments in this area in terms of a strategy that
is more appropriate to the previous century than now.

Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean will not
depend primarily on the number of ships it can deploy
into the Indian Ocean. And I am confident that to the de-
gree that power becomes the principal factor in the Indian
Ocean, that we will be able to generate a fleet of sufficient
size in that area so that we could counter-balance anything
that the Soviet Union might put into the Indian Ocean,
as the recent visit of the Hancock in that area has demon-
strated.

Q Are you favoring a permanent U.S.- Indian
Ocean Fleet, or inferring that?

PR #423

27

A I am saying that the future of the Middle East should not be deduced from the steaming time of the Soviet Fleet from the Black Sea into the Indian Ocean, and whether adding ten days to it, or cutting ten days off it, will not be the determining factor.

Therefore, the United States attitude towards the opening of the Suez Canal, and to the military disengagement of forces in that area, will be determined primarily, first by the contribution this would make towards the general peace in the area, and, secondly, by the possibilities it gives to reduce the influence of outside powers in general, by focusing matters on Middle East concerns. That is the principal issue, and this is the best way to reduce Soviet influence, and, for that matter, any outside influence in that area.

Q Mr. Secretary, a three-part question. In your opening statement, you referred to the peace talks under U.N. auspices. I think at your last press conference, you talked about Soviet-American auspices. Is this a slight change? And, secondly, after your appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, you said you had no plan but certain principles that you would like to see in an agreement.

PR #423

28

[lc]

Chairman Fulbright, in his talk with newsmen yesterday, went through certain principles, including which he said he favored the Rogers plan of Israeli pull-backs to the old boundaries with insubstantial changes.

I wondered how you felt on that question.

A With respect to the procedural issue, we still believe that the appropriate auspices foreseen in Security Council Resolution 338 could best be provided by the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe, however, also, that these auspices should be generally blessed by the United Nations, and we would have no objection -- in fact, we would welcome -- some participation by the Secretary General of the United Nations to symbolize this United Nations aegis.

With respect to the specifics of an American position, our attitude -- I have stated the general principles with respect to Security Council Resolution 242, and some of the elements that we believe are likely to be contained in such a negotiation.

We do not believe it is effective for the United States to put forward a proposal in all its details which then will enable both parties, or will tempt both

PR #423

[Lc]

29

parties, to start shooting at the American proposal, rather
than to concentrate on what it is that they should accom-
plish.

We believe that the process that was followed
in bringing about the six point agreement solidifying the
cease-fire may be more effective, in which the parties assume
responsibility for their own positions. And once they
put their positions on the table, then the United States
can attempt to bring about a closing of the gap and perhaps
inject its own ideas where those appear to be useful.

Q NATO proved to be a rather fragile vessel
at the height of our airlift, Mr. Secretary, and some hard
words were exchanged openly and privately. Would you give
us your estimate of the damage that has been done to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and what can be done
to shore it up, if anything?

A Well, let me say, first of all, that the
relationships in the Atlantic area remain the absolutely
core element of American foreign policy. We remain con-
vinced, as we have been convinced--on a bipartisan basis
in the entire post-war period--that if the free nations
of the North Atlantic cannot regulate their relationships
with each other, it is hard to see how they can cope with

PR #423

30

the problems on a global basis that they confront.

On the other hand, it is necessary to
realize that serious difficulties arose in recent weeks.
These difficulties were not accidental, but have reflected
strains that have been apparent for a good part of this
year.

Now, I have read a great deal of speculation
which ascribes this to inadequate consultation by the
United States. And, of course, senior officials have a
tendency towards a conviction in their infallibility,
and they rarely admit that mistakes might have been made.
But I don't even want to argue that point. Any process of
consultation can be improved. The key question one has
to ask one's self however is -- and that one has to answer--
is this: It is a root fact of the situation that the
countries that were most consulted proved among the most
difficult in their cooperation; and those countries that
were most cooperative were least consulted. So that there
is at least no automatic relationship between consultation
and agreement.

Secondly, if we deal with the question in its
deepest aspect, are the objections that were raised due
to inadequate information or to a different perception

PR #423

of their role. And one cannot avoid the perhaps melancholy conclusions that some of our European allies saw their interests so different from those of the United States that they were prepared to break ranks with the United States on a matter of very grave international consequence, and that we happen to believe was of very profound consequence to them as well.

Now, I don't want to debate the merits of this issue. And, in answering your question about what damage has been done to the Atlantic Alliance, I would say the recent weeks made evident the need which the United States tried to underline by its initiative for these declarations of defining just what it is that the nations of the North Atlantic can do together, and what they should do separately; of defining what forms of consultation are appropriate; how the nations of the North Atlantic can cooperate. This is what we put before the Europeans in April. This is what we hope to achieve. And this is why the need for it should have been made evident to both sides of the Atlantic in recent weeks. And if that is the conclusion that is drawn on both sides of the Atlantic, as it is on this side of the Atlantic, then I think it will have been a good thing, and it can lead to a new period of progress.

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32

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accomplish on that issue?

A Well, we are having a NATO Ministerial Meeting on December 10th and 11th, and this gives an opportunity for the Foreign Ministers of all NATO nations to discuss the state of the Alliance. We expect to do this candidly, and in a constructive attitude, and with the determination to put new vitality into Atlantic relationships.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you tell us what led you to pledge the documents on the U.S.-Soviet situation? Particularly, was it the American domestic turbulence at that time that encouraged you, particularly with that short deadline which you gave?

A It is a mistake to assume that everything that is said in a press conference is fully considered.

[Laughter.]

Q Mr. Secretary, does it remain the intention of the United States Government to ask the Congress for the full $2.2 billion in aid to Israel, and has the United States committed itself to delivering that full total in armament to Israel?

A We maintain our request, and we will judge

[10]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 30, 1973

No. 432

TEXT OF
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LETTER
TO THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE COMMITTEE
DATED NOVEMBER 29, 1973

Mrs. Aase Lionaes
Nobel Peace Prize Committee
Oslo

Dear Mrs. Lionaes:

As I have previously conveyed to you, the award of the Nobel Peace Prize has
moved me in the most profound and personal sense. I am deeply thankful.

As you also know, I regret that I cannot be present on the occasion of the award
ceremony and have asked Ambassador Byrne to accept the Prize on my behalf.

The Viet-Nam war was the cause of so much anguish the world over that any
part I may have played in ending that war is its own reward. Therefore, in this par-
ticular instance, I believe that the Prize is its own justification; recognition for having
contributed to the cause of peace is far more gratifying than any remuneration.

Thus, while I most gratefully accept the Nobel Peace Prize, I prefer not to
accept the financial gain that customarily accompanies the award. Instead, I have
chosen to dispose of the money associated with the award in the following manner:

I have established a scholarship fund for children of American
servicemen killed or missing in action in Indochina. The fund will be
administered by Community Funds, Inc., 415 Madison Avenue, New
York, New York, 10017, and directed by an Advisory Committee
initially appointed by me. It will be known as the Kissinger Scholarship
Fund in honor of my parents, Paula and Louis Kissinger.

Please make payment of the Prize on my behalf to Community
Funds, Inc., for the Scholarship Fund.

I would sincerely appreciate your transmitting this information to the Nobel
Foundation.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 30, 1973

No. 433

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT RECEPTION HONORING CHIEFS OF MISSION
THE JOHN QUINCY ADAMS ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1973

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The reason for this event is that in the standard operating procedure of the State Department, the new Secretary of State is supposed to be introduced to the Diplomatic Corps at an early opportunity. I had a party in New York for the UN Permanent Representatives and other distinguished visitors — and 36 hours afterwards, the war in the Middle East broke out. That has made me a little bit reluctant to have another affair.

Of course, I know why my associates arranged this — because, being familiar with my retiring nature, they thought there was no other way for me to become acquainted with you all.

Now, we have on this occasion invited not only the diplomats but Congressmen and Senators as well. Congressmen and diplomats have at least this in common — they both report home about what goes on in Washington. As Dean Acheson used to say, he had never read a report in which the writer lost an argument.

Now, I expect that after tonight Congressmen will relate that diplomats were drinking openly and talking secretly, while the diplomats will cable home that the Congressmen were talking openly but drinking secretly.

Washington is a city that has evoked mixed enthusiasm among those who, like us, voluntarily or involuntarily take up residence here. President Kennedy reportedly called it a town of southern efficiency and northern charm.

Foreign visitors have often looked upon the town with a jaundiced eye. Nearly a century ago, James Bryce, once British Ambassador to Washington, called it a "city without commerce or manufacture," where "political intrigue and semi-political intrigue is the only gainful occupation." He had seen nothing.

Bryce spent much of his life seeking to understand America and Americans and seeking to convey this understanding to a non-American audience. With the knowledge he gained, he said that if a hundred times he was disheartened by something about America, "a hundred times the recollection of the abounding strength and vitality of this nation chased away these tremors."

PR#433

-2-

Like de Tocqueville before him, Bryce not only gave others an appreciation of America; he also gave Americans an understanding of themselves.

We are not so presumptuous as to expect others to follow in Bryce's footsteps as chroniclers of this nation. But we do want others to know what Bryce knew — that from Washington alone, it is impossible to appreciate fully the vitality, the durability and the diversity of this nation.

In our Congress, which is represented here, we have an institution that can provide diplomats as well as Secretaries of State with that knowledge.

It is important that we all meet here because we are at one of those rare moments in history where it is possible to bring about a new international order and a new period of peace. We hear a great deal at this time of war and conflict about balance of power and the necessity of strength. And of course the security of nations is of paramount importance. But the predominant goal of our age is to move from a peace based on security to a peace based on a sense of community, in which all nations have a share and which all nations want to keep because they consider it their own.

This is the principal task this Administration has set for itself. It is a task that will not be finished in one administration and which must be carried on by our successors, and it is therefore a challenge that we believe is bipartisan in nature within this country and which cannot be completed without the participation and I may say the enthusiasm of other countries.

We believe that we cannot fail, for history is replete with opportunities unused and challenges ignored. It is the responsibility of all our governments to assure that the future does not recall our period of stewardship with the words of the poet:

"Footfalls echo in the memory
Down the passage we did not take
Toward the door we never opened."

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you here tonight with us in assuring that what will echo in memory will be the magnitude of what we strove for, not the failure of our spirit, and that future generations will remember that we moved the world over a new threshold into an era of stability and peace.

Thank you.

********