Preface

For many years I had an opportunity to observe the impact of American foreign policy on the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. I have concluded that, contrary to the expectations of the creators of American foreign policy, their policy has strengthened anti-Americanism and anti-democratic forces throughout the Soviet bloc and the world.

Most of the American studies of Soviet problems that I have read have been based on an American interpretation of Soviet development and policy. They do not take into consideration that words, notions, and concepts used here have entirely different meanings in the Soviet bloc, or that their meanings change with changes in Soviet policy.

Therefore, I feel that it could be of some interest for Americans to look at American foreign policy as it has been observed from the other side.

I first became aware of the need for a new perspective on American foreign policy while lecturing at some 30 universities in this country. I saw a great deal of misrepresentation of the basic problems of the Soviet Union. In general, the power of the USSR was overestimated while its danger to the United States and to world peace was underestimated. I even attended seminars where Marxism was taught in a dogmatic way that has already been repudiated in the Soviet bloc. Even thinkers of the stature of John Kenneth Galbraith have persisted in asserting incredibly naive illusions about convergence

of the economies of the US and USSR.

In my opinion, the Soviet Union represents the greatest danger to
world peace. Since the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the USSR has pursued a policy
of imperialism. It is disturbing that the same pattern of appeasement,
seen before World War II is to be observed in response to Soviet
imperialism.

I am aware that my very critical remarks about Soviet policy
may be interpreted simply as an expression of bitterness; I was
imprisoned by the Soviets and have been a refugee from Soviet occupation
of my country since 1968.

In spite of my reluctance to include any subjective remarks
in this paper, I think that I must at least point out that my criticism
is not the consequence of what the Soviets have done to me. On the
contrary, I was subjected to persecution because I was critical of
Soviet policy and acted against their interests. Nor was I exiled
my only alternative after the Soviet invasion: Dr. Husak, Secretary-
General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, asked me to accept a
post in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. I voluntarily chose exile
rather than collaborate with the Soviets.

I have tried to interpret the problems of foreign policy within a
broad frame of reference: the role of applied science in our society.
Naturally, in this short paper, I can only hint at the complex problems
associated with the general application of scientific thinking to
economy and society. I have written a deeper analysis of this question
in book form and it will be published in the United States later this year.

Even before the war in Europe ended, the great powers (the US and the USSR) adopted a concept of foreign policy that logically leads to another world war. I refer to the Stalin-Hopkins conversations related in *The Beginnings of the Cold War* by Martin Herz. Herz's version of these talks is based on notes published in Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper, 1958) and later, officially, in Volume I of *Foreign Relations of the United States Conference on Berlin* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1960).

Mr. Hopkins pointed out to Stalin that the cardinal basis of President Roosevelt's foreign policy was the concept that American interests were worldwide and no longer solely confined to North and South America, and the Pacific Ocean. President Roosevelt recognized a similar Soviet concern for their sphere of interest.

Whatever the particular subjective aims of the participants in postwar great power talks, such conferences have a common theoretical basis. Both sides tacitly agree that the foreign policy of a great power naturally represents a worldwide projection of its interests. It is assumed that the interest of a great power is not limited to the territory within which it is rightfully sovereign. The establishment of multi-national spheres of influence has divided the world between the great powers. Despite the danger inherent in such a division, the concept of spheres of interest as the only practical basis for great power foreign policy remains unquestioned.

While diplomats, theoreticians, and the United Nations Charter pay lip service to the principle of self-determination for all nations, the concept of spheres of interest, adopted by the great powers even before the formation of the United Nations, is the real principle that guides foreign policy.

The idea of great power spheres of interest is the cause of the
Cold War. As a result of competition for spheres of interest, great
power relations have hovered near the brink of another world war.

The world powers have failed to realize that general acceptance of the
concept of spheres of interest has created a world situation in
which international conflict is imminent.

A critique of the prevailing theory of spheres of interest
should consider:

I. The Classical Spheres of Interest

II. The Existing Spheres of Interest

III. The Concept of Inevitable Conflict Between
Capitalism and Socialism

IV. Which of The Great Powers Derives the
Greater Benefit from the Prevailing
Basis of Foreign Policy

V. Humanism as a Realistic Basis for Foreign Policy

# I. The Classical Spheres of Interest

Historically, international economic competition has led to colonization by the existing great powers and division of the world into empires. Imperialism reflected an effort by these powers to enlarge their markets. Behind this effort was the economic assumption that the possibilities for national expansion are limited and that one power could only benefit economically at the expense of another. The total wealth of the world was seen as a cake of fixed size; in order for one piece to grow, another must shrink by an equal amount. The events of the last hundred years have made this analogy outdated.

The error of this view first became apparent when both the classical (Smith and Ricardo) and the Marxist schools of economy failed to correctly predict the future behavior of national economies. Both schools assumed that the wealth of a nation is fixed (similar to the assumption which underlies economic imperialism) and that any rise in the economic welfare of one group(or class) in a given country would be complemented by an increase in the misery of another group. The Marxist school predicted that the profits of one group would increase at the expense of rising misery for the rest of society, or that misery would be reduced and profits would be smaller. The possibility that profits and the standard of living might rise together was not entertained by either school. However, present day national economies (in the developed countries) are consistently and generally characterized by increasing profits and a rising standard of living. Despite its revolutionary implications, this new phenomenon, while recognized as an accurate

description of our times, has not been worked into a new theoretical
framework from which all of economy may be viewed. Failure to grasp
the importance of this phenomenon as it relates to national economy
is naturally accompanied by failure to understand its implications for
international economy and , subsequently, international relations.

This phenomenon is the result of man's application of a new level
of thinking to production: scientific thinking. The increase in wealth
is not caused by increased exploitation of man. Instead, it is the
consequence of application of scientific thinking in order to force nature
to serve man.

This new phenomenon is vital to a proper understanding of inter-
national relations and to the correct formulation of foreign policy.
The pursuit of classical colonialism is outdated. The exploitation of
men in one's own country or in a colony is no longer profitable. It
may be seen that those countries which have given up their colonies now
have greater economic strength and higher standards of living than at
any time during their imperial rule.

This does not imply that there is not some tendency to exploit
colonial situations or that single firms with vested interests in
underdeveloped countries have not exercised exploitative practices on
numerous occasions. However, it must be stressed that these practices
are no longer typical; such practices are outdated; and that when such
practices are employed, although they may be profitable for individual
firms they are detrimental to the national economy of the "exploiting"
nation. A colonial or neo-colonial policy is economically harmful
to the "imperial" nation as well as to the "colony".

There is no logic in continuing a policy of spheres of interest
based on economic considerations. Increases in national wealth can now
be attained without adoption of an imperialistic foreign policy, or a
policy of economic spheres of interest. Study of the mechanics of
the national economy of any world power (e.g. the United States) reveals
that the wealth that flows out of the world power into its sphere of
interest is much greater than the amount of wealth that flows the other
way.

Thus it may be seen that the classical concept of spheres of
interest motivated by national economic expansion is outdated.

The concept of spheres of interest, as adopted after the Second World
War, is very different from the classical concept. Postwar great power
foreign policy is based on the idea of inevitable political conflict
between capitalism and socialism. This political conflict is expressed
in the West as a militant "defense of the free world" and in the East as
a struggle against "capitalist imperialism" on behalf of the workers of
the world; as a result, each side has its share of crusaders.

Several important questions arise in this regard: Is the conflict
between capitalism and socialism a real conflict? Is the Soviet Union
a socialist nation? Is the West really capitalist? Most important, is
the form of ownership really the decisive factor in determining the nature
of society or economy in the second half of the twentieth century?

To understand Soviet policy one must realize that all the economic
and political power of the Soviet Union is concentrated in the hands of
the party leadership. Unlike the West, government in the Soviet Union
exists solely as the operational arm of the party. The parliament is
nominated by the party. Control of the economy and all the attributes of
ownership of the means of production and distribution are concentrated in
the hands of the party leadership. This concentrated power is exercised
by the party leadership to control all aspects of Soviet life, including
culture and the arts.

In my view there are two basic alternatives open to the Soviet system:
1. maintain the present regime i.e. continuation of absolute domination
by the party or 2. eliminate the concentration of power in the party

appartus and establish democratic rights within an economy of non-private
ownership.

The second alternative would provide the Soviet Union with the
necessary preconditions for socialism. At present the USSR is socialist in
name only. In the Soviet Union, the means of production are not owned by
the people, and the workers have no economic or political rights. In
fact there is not a single element of socialism to be found in the USSR.
Thus to attack the Soviet Union as a representative of socialism is
to accept the Soviet claim that the Soviet system is socialist and to ignore
its obvious inequities.

The first alternative is to continue the present policies of the Soviet
government. When government is based on the power of a certain elite
group, all government policy has a single primary criterion: whether
the proposed activity supports or diminishes the power of those in high
positions in the existing regime. The present Soviet system channels
potentially dynamic forces into maintaining and increasing the power of
the ruling elite, at home and abroad. Naturally, territorial expansion has
become vital to such a regime. But experience has confirmed that the present
Soviet regime cannot extend its power through ideological, political, or
economic influence.

In order to become ideologically and economically attractive the Soviet
Union would have to end the political, ideological, and economic monopoly of
the party.

It is generally accepted that the Soviet economy is relatively back-
ward. An efficient and attractive Soviet economy would require creation of

a system of independent socially owned enterprises where economic decisions were based on market, not political, considerations. Naturally, this would also demand the abolition of central economic planning and would end the party's ruling role in the field of economics.

Democracy (a prerequisite for political attractiveness and a pre-
condition for socialism) would have major consequences for Russia's
nationality problem. In a democratic Soviet Union, nationalities
amounting to nearly 100 million people would exercise their right of self-
determination. Without these nationality groups the USSR would amount to a
state with a population around 100 million. It would lose the rich Ukraine
and the border states on which Soviet agricultural production depends.
Naturally all of the "socialist countries", which follow Soviet policy only
because they are occupied by the Soviet army would become independent.
These countries (if Yugoslavia and Russia are included) represent a population
of nearly another 100 million. Thus while democracy might make the
USSR more attractive at home and abroad, a democratic Soviet Union would
no longer be a first class world power.

Russian suppression of these countries and nationalities is characteristic
of an imperialist Soviet policy that began with the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
Through the Pact, Stalin hoped to expand the amount of territory controlled
by the USSR by redividing the world with the cooperation of imperialist
Nazi Germany. The Soviet claim that the Pact was defensive in character
was disproven when the Soviet Union kept all of the territorial gains
that it had obtained as the result of the Pact. After the war, the USSR
extended its territorial gains by annexing part of Finland, Rumania (Bes-

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sarabia), Czechoslovakia (Carpatho-Ukraine), and Eastern Prussia.

It has militarily occupied Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and is threatening Rumania and Yugoslavia. As far as present Soviet policy is concerned, the so-called Breznev Doctrine is a blatant continuation of this policy of Soviet imperialism.

The decisive question in forming Western foreign policy is whether proposed policy supports Russian imperialism or counteracts it.

I have already pointed out that there are two basic alternatives for the Soviet system. Although the official Russian policy is imperialist expansion, there are very strong forces, even in the Politburo, the central committee, and the party apparatus which are not in agreement with this policy. Such groups have what might be called an "isolationist" policy. They think that the Soviet Union is large enough to find sufficient wealth within its own borders. They object to the expansion of war industries, the increased centralization of planning, and the elimination of conditions conducive to creativity. They are interested in using Russia's economic power to provide a rising standard of living for the broad masses of Soviet society. They are not interested in augmenting the military power of the USSR.

The existence of groups which favor such basically contradictory alternatives for Soviet development must be considered if we are to understand the reservations with which some groups behind the Iron Curtain have accepted the theory of spheres of interest.

The Cold War is the logical consequence of the adoption of the theory of spheres of interest by East and West. Pursuit of Cold War demands that both sides use power politics to insure control over their perceived

12.

political spheres of interest. Power politics, territorial expansion by the great powers, and continual danger of war are the logical results of the division of the world into spheres of interest. Regardless of the subjective national motive for adopting it, the concept of spheres of interest necessarily leads to an imperialist foreign policy.

As we have seen, the concept of spheres of interest requires the pursuit of imperialism and power politics and the Soviet system (under Breznev as under Stalin) depends on the pursuit of imperialism and power politics. Khruschev tried to moderate the policy of the Soviet regime by emphasizing coexistence between capitalism and socialism and enocuraging a higher standard of living. But, Khruschev was too much of an *apparatschick* to recognize and eliminate the basic causes of the Soviet Union's problems: the ruling role of the party and the concept of spheres of interest. His halfway measures were not able to achieve a qualitative change in the Soviet model and thus were doomed to failure. Khruschev's failure opened the way for a renaissance of Stalinism under Breznev and a reassertion of Soviet imperialism and power politics.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the tradition, history and ideology of the United States are opposed to imperialism and power politics. Thus it would be logical for the United States to abandon the concept of spheres of interest if it were realistic to do so.

Therefore we must determine whether or not there is an objective and irreconcilable conflict that divides the great powers. If such a conflict exists, the theory of spheres of influence could be explained as a necessary response to that conflict by the great powers. If no such conflict does exist, it would be realistic to attempt to find some practical alternate

basis for American foreign policy more consistent with traditional American
values.

The postwar political competition for spheres of influence reflects
the ideological division between the great powers expressed as the con-
cept of inherent conflict between capitalism and socialism. Naturally,
before we can discuss possible alternatives to the concept of spheres of
interest we must determine whether there is an absolute and irreconcilable
conflict between the forces of capitalism and the forces of socialism.
Is the conflict between the USSR and the US explained by such a concept?

As long as its economy is undeveloped, the form of ownership plays
a crucial role in determining the character of any society. But when
economy develops, when science is applied in the sphere of production,
the specific weight of the form of ownership declines. In a developed
economy, the intellectual level on which production is based becomes the
determining factor.

In an undeveloped economy, the role of the owner is very important.
The fact that profits are divided among a relatively small number of
employers has significant consequences. In an economy based on applied
science there is mass production and consequently mass consumption.
More and more goods can be produced with shorter working hours and less
physical strain. As a result of this mass production (made possible
through the application of science to production), all workers can be
guaranteed a higher standard of living. In such a productive system,
distribution of the net profit now used by the owners of the means of production
for their private consumption (as was suggested by Marx) among the very
large number of workers would not produce an appreciable increase in wages.
While the unequal distribution of income found in the developed economies
remains an important moral and political problem, it is no longer an
economic problem. As the owner plays a diminishing role the intellectual
level of management becomes the decisive factor.

Today, the intellectual level on which economy is based is the most general
dividing line between nations. It divides the underdeveloped nations from
the highly developed nations. It produces conflict between rich and poor

nations, whether they have private or "socialist" forms of ownership.

It should not be surprising that President Nixon was welcomed in Rumania
more heartily than in any "capitalist" country.

The conflict between "socialism" and "capitalism" is even more
artificial when we realize that the distinction between the two terms is
absolutely unclear. The only distinguishing criterion is the form of
ownership and, as I have pointed out, this is not a significant factor in
the developed part of the world. Moreover, the Soviet from of state owner-
ship is not at all socialist ownership. It is a form of ownership by the
party leadership and has nothing to do with socialism as formulated
by Marx, i.e. ownership of the means of production by the workers.

Even if socialism is defined as an economy run for the benefit of society
it is apparent, in light of the development in economy since Marx, that
socialism will not be the result of change in the ownership of the means
of production. Instead, it will be the result of a rise in the intellectual
level on which the economic process is based.

Since this paper deals with foreign policy and not a theoretical
discussion of socialism I cannot analyze this question in detail. However,
in this connection it is important to see that the conflict between capitalism
and socialism is really a pseudo-conflict.

The recent history of international relations has demonstrated that
countries with the same form of ownership may have very different and often
antagonistic political regimes. The Russian role in the Second World War
dramatically illustrates the artificial nature of the conflict between cap-
italism and socialism. Initially, Nazism in Germany was internationally
supported as the bulwark against Russian socialism. Then, this same Nazism

16.

allied itself with the Soviet Union in the first of a series of actions that eventually led to a world war waged against Nazi Germany by the Western powers (the same force that had supported Hitler's anti-Communism).

Finally, the Western powers allied with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, defeated Hitler, and, in the process, made the Soviet Union one of the two postwar great powers.

However, we can find even stronger proof for the absurdity of this concept in the politics of the postwar period. In order to make them follow the Soviet line the USSR has had to use military force to suppress rebellions in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Poland is under military occupation by the Soviets and Rumania and Yugoslavia are threatened with occupation. The conflict between the Soviet Union and China (two "socialist" countries) is more intensive than the conflict between the US and the USSR (a "capitalist" country and a "socialist" country).

Furthermore the Soviet Union is not at all interested in promoting a socialist revolution in Italy or France. Socialism in those countries would weaken the Soviet Union as a world power and undermine its influence on the Soviet bloc. The Communist party in France, under strict orders from Moscow, refused to exploit the revolutionary situation in France in 1968. The position of the Soviet Union would be far stronger if China were not a "socialist country"; the Chinese have successfully undermined the Soviet claim to hegemony over the poor nations of the world.

There is no capitalism (in the sense that Marx discussed capitalism) and there is no socialism. There is only a political conflict between pseudocapitalism and pseudosocialism, but the danger inherent in such a conflict is very real.

Instead of reflecting an absolute ideological conflict between
capitalism and socialism, pursuit of the concept of spheres of interest
by the great powers has created a political conflict between pseudocapitalism
and pseudosocialism. Through their continued acceptance, the concept of spheres of
interest has imposed on both of the great powers its own rules and logic.
It has led to a political climate where conflict between the great powers
is inevitable for political, not ideological, reasons.

Yet, the concept of spheres of interest is the creator of East-West
conflict and not a necessary response to some absolute conflict. Since the
concept of spheres of interest is volutarily accepted by both East and
West, it would seem that both sides perceive some advantage in prolonging
the political conflict it has created. But, in fact, do both sides profit
from the continued acceptance of this concept? And if both sides do profit,
is it possible that both sides profit equally?

19.

by the East. Despite my contact with the USSR, I feel that the concept of absolute
struggle between capitalism and socialism is so absurd that any attempt to
determine who began this pseudoconflict is senseless. Mr. Steinhard, the
American Ambassador in Prague, openly opposed the nationalization of Czech
industries; the Soviet Ambassador in Prague openly opposed any close
cooperation with the West.

As a consequence of this polarization in world politics, the Czechoslovak
democratic parties became outspoken advocates of a Western orientation.
The Social Democratic Party split; the greater half became Western oriented
and the rest leaned toward the East. The Communist Party was naturally
Moscow oriented. Only one orientation was lacking: the Czechoslovak orientation.
We had no party nor any leading politician who advocated an independent
Czechoslovak road. The accepted alternatives were alignment with the
West or alignment with the East. The independent road that had been adopted
immediately after the war was based on the assumption that there was no
basic conflict between the West and the East. When such a conflict arose,
the end of any independent role was inevitable. The subsequent breakdown of
political unity in Czechoslovakia had two sources. First, one group of
leading politicians spent the war in London while another group had gone to
Moscow. Second the liberation of Czechoslovakia had been, to a great extent,
a gift of East and West and not the result of a real Czechoslovak fight for
freedom.

When poliarization began, it was obvious that the Communist Party would
be the eventual victor. The Communist Party had a long tradition of opposition.
It was disciplined, organized, and ruthless. The non-Communist parties, on
the other hand, attempted to solve political crises by resigning their
positions of power. Thus, the Communist Party seized absolute power in

21.

and a group of high level party officials for conspiracy was actually an indictment against Czechoslovakia. The party leadership, the government, and the Parliament were on trial. All of the accusations were made by Soviet interrogators. The Soviets staged a trial in which policy approved by the party leadership, the government, and the Parliament of Czechoslovakia was declared high treason.

Towards the end of 1949, I was interrogated by Soviets in Prague. By allowing the Soviets to use their secret service to control internal affairs, the Communist Party made it possible for the Soviet Union to become the master of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia might have gone the way of Yugoslavia but for the willingness of the party leadership to give up Czechoslovak sovereignty rather than create conflicts with Stalin and the Soviet Union.

Generalizing from the Czechoslovak experience, I would say that most analysts of the Cold War have not seen the real weakness of the Soviet Union or the real strength of the United States.

Western policy makers have accepted the Soviet propaganda about the "Communist monolith". They do not see the important contradictions that exist between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other Communist parties. Despite their professed internationalism, the Second World War created a nationalist feeling which strongly affected national Communist parties (especially in those countries occupied by the Nazis). The Soviets claimed that it was in the highest interest of any Communist party to strengthen the power of the USSR, the "defender of world socialism". Despite Soviet pressure this concept was not accepted for two reasons. First,

22:

socialism did not seem to be endangered. Second, the prevailing nationalist feeling produced resistance to the relationship to the USSR implied in such a concept.

However, the tremendous influence of Stalin on practically all of these parties cannot be ignored. There was a strong Stalinist cult. Although no one dared to disagree openly with Stalin, the national Communist parties were not eager to sacrifice their national interests in obedience to Stalin.

The Cold War truncated the political possibilities of the development of independent national Communist parties. If it had had some years to deepen, if the independent road to socialism had proven successful, there would have been strong political forces acting to keep the national Communist parties on this road. The Cold War indiscriminately threatened both the Soviet Union and the independent socialist countries. Suddenly the concept of the Soviet Union as "defender" of socialism seemed valid.

The natural political consequence of American anti-Communism was that, for the United States, the more anti-Communist one was, the more reliable he became. This led to American political support of the group most ardently anti-Communist; the Facists. As a result of American cooperation with neo-Facist forces, non-Communist liberals were pushed toward the Communist Party. The imminence of world war increased this polarization.

Instead of encouraging greater differentiation within the Communist bloc, American foreign policy produced just the opposite result. The real weakness of the Soviet Union was not exploited. Although the Soviet Union had been very popular during the war and was greatly admired for its

23.

struggle against the Nazis, a deep, and I think permanent, disappointment in the Soviet Union followed the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. I saw this critical attitude even in the highest ranks of the Communist Party; not only in Czechoslovakia, but also in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania, not to mention Yugoslavia. Even Dimitroff was critical of the Soviet Union. We members of the Communist Party were shocked by Soviet art as it developed in the forties, by Soviet philosophy as formulated by Zhdanov, by the level of Soviet economy, not to mention the moral level of the Soviet army.

Still our criticism was generally sympathetic. We explained the Soviet failures by saying that Russia was a backward country. We were convinced that we would be able to avoid the negative elements of Soviet socialism. But the postwar anti-Communist policy (reminiscent, in many ways, of Hitler's anti-Communism) had the predictable effect: the international Communist Party closed ranks around the Soviet Union, and the opposition to Soviet policy steadily weakened.

On the other hand, the United States underestimated its own strength. A great democracy, which was also the world's leading scientific, and consequently, economic power naturally had a tremendous impact on the people's democratic countries. Cooperation with the United States became a part of the political program of all of the national Communist parties. Instead of capitalizing on this impact, the USA chose a battlefield which was more convenient for the USSR whose only strength was military. The USA, despite its military superiority, had a fatal weakness in the field of power politics.

Its democratic institutions would not permit a policy based only on force.
In order to obtain the same freedom of action the Soviets have, the United
States would have to liquidate all democratic rights.

All of this applies not only to American policy towards the Soviet
bloc in Europe but to its world policy, as well.

By formulating policy dictated by force instead of ideals, by accepting
a battlefield worthy of Soviet imperialism, by underestimating the inter-
national longing for a free and peaceful world, the United States lost an
opportunity to stimulate the growth of real democratic ideals all over
the world. Small nations began to feel that they were just pawns in the
games of big nations, that no one was really interested in their fates,
and that primitive political pragmatism was the basis of the policy of
the world powers.

It should be emphasized that Russia has nothing to offer these
countries. The total economic aid offered by the Soviet bloc was about
15% of that of the USA. However American economic aid was ineffective
because it was politically motivated. It was directed toward achieving
certain blatantly political aims. It supported the most militant anti-Communist
forces without regard for their moral standing. As a result American policy
often supported groups representing the most corrupt and bankrupt political
forces.

Under the existing party leadership the Soviet Union had no choice but
to use power politics to gain its ends. However, the United States could
have employed democratic means to achieve its ends. As I have pointed out,

26.

foreign policy. In the postwar period the USSR has been weakened by forces
within the so-called "socialist camp". Because of its aspirations for world
power, China, in particular, may be able to use its military strength to
force the USSR to abandon aggressive power politics. The grave contradictions
between the Soviet Union and Rumania and Yugoslavia are obvious. However,
it is important to note that the USSR has found it necessary to occupy the
other members of the "socialist camp" in order to make them comply with
Soviet dictates.

Since current American foreign policy based on the concept of spheres
of interest has aided Soviet imperialism it is obvious that some new basis
for American policy is needed. It would be logical for such a basis to:
1. reflect traditional American ideals of democracy and social justice and
2. strengthen those forces within the "socialist camp" which oppose
Soviet imperialism.

[LC]

27.

## V. Humanism as a Realistic Basis for Foreign Policy

The events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia have proven that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to humanistic ideas. The Czechoslovak concept of socialism with "human features" remains tremendously attractive throughout the Soviet bloc. Although the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was, in my opinion, dictated primarily by power politics (especially with regard to a possible conflict with China) it is known that the tremendous impact of the Czechoslovak policy of humanization had greatly shocked the Soviet leadership.

At a meeting of Party Secretaries in the USSR in April, 1968 the Soviet party leadership was warned of the potential danger of the new Czechoslovak policy. If the Czechoslovak leadership had not capitulated and the West had not accepted the occupation of Czechoslovakia as permissible within the theory of spheres of influence, a very serious political crisis would have arisen in the Soviet Union.

Although its standard of living is very low as compared with the West, the USSR is not an underdeveloped country. Its economy fulfills the basic needs of the people and even provides a slowly rising standard of living.

Even such modest economic achievements represent a great change in a country which has traditionally been poor.

The rapid increase in the number of its mental workers constitutes the other major change in the character of postwar Soviet society. Millions of children of poor and uneducated farmers and workers have high school and college degrees. Despite the fact that as yet they have no political influence, these intellectuals represent a growing social stratum that has a far-reaching

28.

influence on the social and intellectual climate of the Soviet Union. Even the party apparatus, which formerly consisted almost exclusively of laborers, is increasingly recruiting its membership from the ranks of mental workers.

These two great changes have created a new dimension of Soviet society: a growing concern for human problems.

Although the grip of the party's power mechanism is still practically unchallenged, the Soviet party leadership recognizes that a humanistic orientation threatens their interests. Humanism in the Soviet Union would necessitate democratization and elimination of the party's monopoly in government. The Soviets carefully observed the development of humanistic ideas in Czechoslovakia. They have seen how humanistic ideas can creep into the party apparatus and rise even to the highest echelons of the party. As humanism spreads in the USSR it can be expected to take the form of an increased emphasis on the solution of internal problems and de-emphasis of efforts to increase the USSR's world power.

Despite the differences in their particular social problems, we should recognize that for both the US and the USSR the problem of humanizing an increasingly complex technical society is becoming the central social issue. In fact, the problem of humanization is coming to the foreground in all of the developed countries (not just the highly developed ones).

The many Soviet admirers of the United States and the American way of life are not "capitalistically" oriented. As a result, prolongation of the concept of conflict between capitalism and socialism will alienate

from the West those groups which, while not satisfied with a system that
is not able to solve human problems, would certainly reject a system that
was indifferent to those problems. But once the issue became humanism versus
anti-humanism instead of capitalism versus socialism such groups clearly
would find themselves closer in orientation to the US than to the USSR.

What kind of foreign policy would be consistent with the concept of
humanism?

Most important, humanism in foreign policy implies acceptance by the
United States of the absolute right of self-determination and the absolute
right of sovereignty for all nations. A policy which was based on the
principle of self-determination (which used it in actually planning policy
instead of in rhetoric) would create a new international political climate.
In such a climate power politics, territorial expansion based on competition
for spheres of interest, and permanent confrontation between the great powers
would not exist.

We should have no illusions that the Soviet Union would immediately
adopt such a policy. The reasons why the Soviet Government would refuse
to accept this policy have been sufficiently emphasized in this paper.
However, I do expect that such a climate would strengthen those groups
within the USSR opposed to the present policy of territorial expansion. I
think that as the power of those groups increased, the USSR would alter its foreign
policy along more humanistic lines.

Specifically a humanistic American foreign policy would require that the
United States: 1. absolutely accept the principle of self-determination for

[LC]

30.

all nations; 2. withdraw all of its troops from all foreign countries;
3. pledge itself not to interfere with the internal politics of any country.
If the United States accepted these principles as its basis for a new concept
in foreign policy, I am certain that a radically new world situation would
result. The world needs moral leadership and the United States, by following
such a policy, would provide that leadership.

After the Second World War, the United States was the leading world
power and, consequently, was most responsible for the state of world affairs.
It was with American concurrence that the concept of spheres of interest
became the basis for international relations in the postwar period. However,
the very fact that the United States accepted a concept of foreign policy
in line with the interests of a ruthless dictatorship seems in itself to be
proof that such a policy could not be consistent with the democratic traditions
of this country.

Naturally we must determine whether or not the United States could
regain its position as the single leading world power by adopting a concept
of foreign policy based on the sovereign right of nations.

Such a policy would not imply isolationism. Since the world is becoming
more and more integrated, a policy of isolationism would be detrimental to
both the United States and the world. Instead of thinking of the world in
terms of great power spheres of interest we sought to think of the world as
a single sphere of interest when all nations are guaranteed the right of self-
determination and are free to choose the form of government and social system
which they prefer.

5. Since 1956 it has become apparent that the socialist "monolith" of Soviet claims does not exist. Within that "monolith" there is a permanent conflict between groups favoring policy with a humanistic orientation and groups seeking to preserve the absolute power of the party leadership. It is of greatest importance for us to determine which of these groups will be supported by American policy. As I have shown, a policy based on spheres of interest strengthens the group favoring continued use of power politics at home and abroad; a policy based on the concept of self-determination for all nations would strengthen the real and potential opposition to the present regime.

6. Adoption of a policy based on self-determination would not involve any risks for the US. I have already explained how the existing basis of American foreign policy has made it possible for the Soviets to pursue an imperialist policy in the postwar period. It is Soviet imperialism which represents the greatest possible risk for the United States and the world.

7. Humanist American foreign policy would create a situation where the Soviet Union either adopted a policy of self-determination, withdrew all of its forces from foreign territories, and revoked the Breznev doctrine or continued pursuit of a policy which would then be seen to be blatantly imperialist. In a situation where humanism had been introduced into foreign policy, the USSR could not justify its use of power politics as conformity to a concept of foreign policy accepted by both of the great powers. If the USSR continued to use power politics, it would be revealed as a representative of imperialism, not socialism.

[L]

33

8. If the Soviet Union continued its present policy of imperialism after the United States had adopted a foreign policy based on humanism, the existing illusions about the possibility of coming to some agreement with the present Soviet regime that would contribute to a lasting peace would have to be forsaken.

9. In an international climate determined by humanism instead of power politics, the West can abandon its policy of appeasement of the USSR before it leads to the same tragic failure that resulted from appeasement of another ruthless dictatorship, Nazi Germany, before World War II.

10. American response to Soviet refusal to accept the principle of self-determination as the basis for foreign policy could take the form of an ideological war (as distinct from a Cold War) against the USSR. From a position of humanism the United States could make a continuing appeal to the nations of the world (including the nations of the socialist world) to isolate the militant leadership of the Soviet Union. Such an appeal, would, I think, be successful.

11. If the Soviets respond to American humanism by continuing their imperialism any illusions Americans might have had about acheiving disarmament through agreements with the present Soviet regime will also be dispelled. We must realize that it is absurd to pursue an international policy based on spheres of interest and a peace policy based on disarmament at the same time. To do so, is necessarily a contradiction in terms.
Unless it is based on the principle of self-determination and non-interference with national sovereignty, disarmament is nothing more than a political

strategy used by one or the other of the great powers to gain a more favorable
situation in which to use arms.

12. To remain a first class world power the USSR must base its policy on the concept of spheres of interest. It must implement its policy with force and military power. Any democratization and humanization of the Soviet Union would lead to its disintegration (as well as the disintegration of the Soviet bloc), denying the Soviet Union of its status as one of the great powers.

13. The United States may well lose its position as a leading world power if it continues to base its policy on a concept of spheres of interest. It is probable that continued pursuit of this concept will increasingly contribute to internal disorder as well. On the other hand, adoption of a humanistic basis for American foreign policy is likely to unify the United States and make it, by virtue of its moral leadership, the single leading world power.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

MAY 23 1970

Dear Professor Loeb!

Thank you for your letter and your offer to write
a paper studying the subject of American foreign
policy in relation to the Soviet Union. While I
am not in a position to offer you reimbursement
for your work on such a project, I would be inter-
ested to read your paper if you do decide to under-
take the study.

Professor Eugen Loebl
Vassar College
Department of Economics
Poughkeepsie, New York 02601

jlp:5/12/70

VASSAR COLLEGE

POUGHKEEPSIE • NEW YORK 12601

Department of Economics

April 8, 1970

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20013

Dear Professor Kissinger:

The immediate impulse for this letter was given to me by our common publisher Bart von Wehrenalp, who was about to come to Washington to try to contact you. He intended to recommend a discussion between us as he thought that my views on the Foreign Policy, especially as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, might be of some interest to you. Since he was unable to make the trip and has returned to Germany, he advised me to write to you.

I do realize that you are very tight as far as time is concerned, and that to express my views to you would take up very much of your time. On the other hand, I do feel that most of the experts here do overestimate the power of the Soviet Union, while underestimating their difficulties, and especially do they underestimate the Soviet danger. I realize that the American Foreign Policy cannot be determined only by the role of the Soviet Union, never the less, I feel that it may be of some use to have a view of American Foreign Policy as seen for many years from the angle of the other side of the fence.

If you would have the time to read a study on this subject, it would be my pleasure to work out such a paper and I would do it with your kind permission in the German language, as my English is still poor.

May I take this opportunity to thank you for your kind letter of December 20, and I would be happy if your time will have permitted you to read my book.

EL:de

Monday, May 15, 1972

U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST NOT CONSIDERED
BEFORE SPREADING ENEMY PROPAGANDA
SAY NETWORK NEWS, WIRE SERVICE
EXECUTIVES

Incredible as it may seem, a top network news execu-
tive and a top wire service executive have told *Monday*
that when it comes to deciding if their facilities
should be used to disseminate Communist propa-
ganda, the question of whether the national interest
of the United States is or is not served, is not a
consideration.

*Monday* raised the question after watching an NBC
Nightly News broadcast featuring North Vietnamese
film and after seeing a Hanoi-supplied photo in *Life*
magazine, a picture which *Life* said they had pur-
chased from United Press International.

NBC Shows Communist Film

On April 28, NBC News showed a film which was
identified by anchor man Garrick Utley as "made by
the North Vietnamese of what they say was an air
attack (U.S.) on Haiphong on April 10." Utley went
on to quote "a North Vietnamese commentary" as
saying nothing in Haiphong was spared including the
heavily populated residential quarters in the heart of
the city. As the film showed what the Communists
said were the results of the bombing, Utley declared:
"These, say the North Vietnamese, are the bodies of
civilians killed in the bombing attacks; attacks made
with a new kind of plastic bomb falling in strings.
Like strings of spaghetti according to the (North
Vietnamese) commentary."

(The Defense Department denies this report as "totally without foundation." A department spokesman says that there are bombs with plastic casings but when the bomb explodes the plastic usually burns up and is vaporized.)

In the April 28 issue of *Life* magazine, a picture "re-
leased by the Hanoi government" was run showing a
man and two injured children. The picture claimed
that seven members of one family, mostly children,
had perished in the U.S. air attacks on Haiphong.

Curious as to whether the topic of whose interests
were being served by running enemy propaganda was
ever discussed, Monday spoke with Wallace Westfeldt,
Executive Producer of the NBC Nightly News and
Ted Majeski, Executive Picture Editor of United
Press International.

Aid and Comfort to Enemy?

In showing Communist propaganda film is the ques-
tion of what gives aid and comfort to the enemy

*the word propaganda here is being used as the dictionary defines it: the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause or a person; ideas, facts or allegations spread deliberately to further one's cause or to demagogu

CBS NEWS misrepresented this man and his fellow
volunteer soldiers as the "first line of defense" for the
city of Hue. They are not. For this and other CBS
distortions about the war, see story next page.

ever discussed; is it a consideration? Monday asked.
Westfeldt ducked the question saying: "We try and
put on what is news."

When showing such enemy propaganda film does the
question of whose interests are being served ever
come up? Monday asked. "It's not a question of
this," Westfeldt replied, explaining that the question
is whether or not what is being shown is news. "We're
trying to report a story that is going on," he said.
"That is the principal question."

Do you consider the question of whether or not the
Communist film shown grinds the enemy ax a rele-
vant one? Monday asked. "No," said Westfeldt, "we
try to put stuff on the air that is informative to the
American people."

When asked if the question of the U.S. national
interest ever comes up when it is being decided
whether or not to show a piece of enemy propaganda
film, Westfeldt replied in the negative, saying: "We're
not the government."

The particular piece of Communist film used by NBC

Monday, May 15, 1972

LC

## ENEMY PROPAGANDA

(Continued from previous page)

on April 28 was obtained from a British doctor who had been in North Vietnam and been given the film by the North Vietnamese, Westfeldt said.

When you make a decision to transmit enemy propaganda photographs, does the question of whether or not the photo serves the interests of the U.S. or that of the Communists ever come up? Monday asked UPI Executive Picture Editor Ted Majeski.

"No, I don't think it should. I don't think we can put ourselves to be judges of this....I don't think UPI or AP can put themselves in a position of making a judgment. We report the news," he replied.

Majeski said that an international organization such as UPI has to exist by doing business not just with U.S. papers but with papers around the world, in Asia, Africa, etc. Generally the only pictures that are not run are things that are "too horrible" or "naked women," said Majeski.

When asked if by running such photos UPI wasn't distributing Communist propaganda, Majeski agreed: "You are absolutely correct, correct in that sense." But he defended the distribution on the grounds that "we are not necessarily helping the enemy, we are just reporting the news."

## THREE OUT OF FOUR AMERICANS BACK PRESIDENT ON VIETNAM

Three out of every four Americans (74%) support President Nixon's decision to mine the harbor at Haiphong and every other port along the coast of North Vietnam. Only 21% are opposed to the President's decision.

Almost an identical number—75% of the American people—support the President's proposal to withdraw all American forces from South Vietnam, within four months after the return of our POWs and an internationally supervised cease-fire.

These are the results of a national opinion survey taken on Tuesday, May 9 after the President's announcement of Monday night. The survey was taken by the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey.

The results of this survey are based on 702 telephone interviews conducted among a nationwide representative sample.

In another national poll, taken by Albert Sindlinger and Company after the President's announcement of May 8, 76.2 percent of the American people replied that they support the President in his effort to end the war; 23 do not; .8 percent had no opinion.

## CBS NEWS ACCENTUATES NEGATIVE, DISTORTS FACTS IN REPORTING VIETNAM ACTION

"Both the correspondents in Saigon and their editors back in Washington and New York share, in overwhelming numbers, axiomatic beliefs about the war. The correspondent, consciously or not, tends to look at the worst side of things. The editor, consciously or not, tends to select news that is negative."—Syndicated columnist Robert D. Novak writing in a paper presented to a conference sponsored by the Public Affairs Conference Center, Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio.

Anyone who watches the network television news coverage of the war in Vietnam for more than two consecutive minutes knows that Mr. Novak as the saying goes, "tells it like it is."

During the past several weeks since the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, the Monday Media Monitor has picked up a few items of interest, items which show that when it comes to astigmatisms nothing sees things quite like the CBS eye:

### "Defeat" Not A Defeat

On the evening of May 6, 1972, CBS Evening News viewers were greeted by anchorman Roger Mudd telling them: "The South Vietnamese suffered two more defeats today trying to push back the Communists in the Central Highlands." One of the "defeats" cited by Mudd was at Firebase 42 where enemy forces reportedly killed or wounded at least 100 South Vietnamese in a three-hour assault.

Meanwhile, on NBC, Don North was reporting from Firebase 42 and his more detailed account showed that the battle wasn't quite the defeat CBS had made it out to be.

Pointing out that the attackers were an estimated company of North Vietnamese sappers ("probably the most feared enemy soldiers in Vietnam"). North reported that the base had been destroyed but "if the enemy mission had been to overrun and hold this firebase, as they have so many others, they failed." North said the base was not overrun due to the fighting of the elite South Vietnamese airborne unit that had "beaten off" the attack by the North Vietnamese.

### Volunteer Army Misrepresented

In the same May 6 CBS Evening News broadcast, there was a film report from Hue, South Vietnam, showing a volunteer army marching through the streets. As the camera focused on a close-up of a man

Monday, May 15, 1972

who looked like a 150-year-old Ho Chi Minh in a helmet, (photo, p.3) CBS's David Henderson (in Hue) intoned ominously:

"Led by a brass band playing patriotic marching tunes, the local militia for the ancient imperial capital of Hue paraded through the streets today to show off their strengths. The ragged army of volunteers will be the first line of defense when the expected enemy attack comes. The militia is made up of men too old or too young to be in the regular army, veterans—some of them disabled, local officials and teachers."

Henderson went on to point out that the parade was through mostly empty streets because most of the people left as "they were not impressed with the militia to protect them. Local armies in this country have a reputation for panicking and running away when attacked."*

## Not First Defense Line

**THE CBS EYE:**
Chronic astigmatism when viewing war.

The fact of the matter is that the volunteer army shown on CBS News was not and is not the "first line of defense" of the city of Hue. As an Associated Press story reported: "The government has provided 20,000 weapons for volunteers to defend the city if the army cannot hold off the North

Vietnamese." The AP report labeled the local militia "the last-ditch volunteer defenders of Hue." Thus, by presenting this disorganized group of volunteers as the primary defenders of Hue, CBS gave their viewers a much gloomier picture than the facts warranted.

The final items involve CBS reporter Bob Simon and things he said and didn't say.

In an April 29 report from Hue, Simon was reporting on the Communist shelling of Highway One and the thousands of refugees on the road. Commenting at one point on how the people had to learn for themselves that the road was being bombarded, Simon said: "The Communists were not aiming for civilians, at least one can't imagine why they would, there were more important targets on the road..."

## Communist Terror Tactic

What one can't imagine is why Simon would wonder

why the Communists would shell civilians. They have done so as a terror tactic since the beginning of the Vietnam war.

Just last week in a press conference, Defense Secretary Laird cited facts and figures to show the Communists "complete lack of regard" for civilians: Since the Communists invaded six weeks ago, the South Vietnamese city of An Loc, a two square mile area concentrated with a civilian population, has been hit by 35,000 rounds of enemy artillery. The four days before Quang Tri fell, the Communists were putting into that civilian population area a total of 3,000 rounds a day. The last day before it fell, the city took 4,600 rounds. As Laird put it: "They sprayed artillery into those civilian centers just as if they were using a water hose."

Another Simon report, April 28, ended on a very moving note. As the camera pans slowly showing the bodies of dead and injured men, women and children. South Vietnamese refugees, strewn across a road after their truck had hit a Communist mine, Simon says:

## Nothing Left to Say?

"By evening government spokesmen are saying another grand victory has been won in Quang Tri province, the situation is once again stabilized. But there will be more fighting and more words. Words spoken by generals, journalists, politicians. But here on Route One, it is difficult to imagine what those words can be. There is nothing left to say about this war. There is just nothing left to say."

Nothing left for Bob Simon to say obviously. But is there really nothing left to say about a truckload of innocent refugees killed and maimed by a Communist mine put there by an enemy who throughout the entire war in Vietnam has deliberately murdered civilians as an instrument of national policy? Is there really nothing left to say about an enemy who after years of aggression continues to try and enslave his fellow countrymen by force and violence? Is there nothing to be said about how 12 of North Vietnam's 13 regular army divisions are now engaged in aggression outside its borders against Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam? Is there nothing to be said about North Vietnam's violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords and the 1968 understandings which led to a cessation of U.S. bombing? Is there nothing to be said about North Vietnam's truculence and refusal to negotiate in good faith an end to the war?

*Not content with misstating facts and putting the gloomiest possible face on the situation in Hue at the moment he was reporting, Henderson went on to predict defeat saying that the South Vietnamese Marine

Monday, May 15, 1972

PRESIDENT REITERATES OPPOSITION
TO ABORTION IN LETTER TO
CARDINAL COOKE

President Nixon has reiterated his opposition to un-
restricted abortion in a letter to His Eminence,
Terrence Cardinal Cooke, the head of the Archdi-
cese of New York.

In his letter the President wrote:

"Recently, I read in the *Daily News* that the Archdiocese of New York, under your leadership, had initiated a campaign to bring about repeal of the state's liberalized abortion laws. Though this is a matter for state decision outside Federal jurisdiction, I would personally like to associate myself with the convictions you deeply feel and eloquently express.

Human Life Precious Commodity

"The unrestricted abortion policies now recommend-
ed by some Americans, and the liberalized abortion
policies in effect in some sections of this country
seem to me impossible to reconcile with either our
religious traditions or our Western heritage. One of
the foundation stones of our society and civilization
is the profound belief that human life, all human life,
is a precious commodity—not to be taken without
the gravest of causes. Yet, in this great and good
country of ours, in recent years, the right to life of
literally hundreds of thousands of unborn children
has been destroyed—legally—but in my judgment
without anything approaching adequate justification.
Surely, in the on-going national debate about the
particulars of the 'quality of life,' the preservation
of life should be moved to the top of the agenda.

"Your decision, and that of tens of thousands of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and men and women of no particular faith, to act in the public forum as defenders of the right to life of the unborn, is truly a noble endeavor. In this calling, you and they have my admiration, sympathy and support."

On the same day he wrote Cardinal Cooke, President
Nixon again expressed his opposition to unrestricted
abortion in a statement issued concerning the report
of the Commission on Population Growth and the
American Future.

Abortion Demeans Human Life

The President said he considered abortion "an unac-
captable form of population control." Unrestricted
abortion policies, he declared, would "demean human
life." The President also made clear that he is opposed
to the unrestricted distribution of family planning
services and devices to minors.

"I have a basic faith that the American people them-
selves will make sound judgments regarding family

PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM VETERANS
PROGRAM PRODUCING IMPROVED
JOB OPPORTUNITIES

Vietnam veterans accounted for nearly one-fourth of
the past year's growth in number of employed people
in the Nation even though these veterans represent
less than five percent of the civilian labor force, Sec-
retary of Labor J. D. Hodgson says.

"These results show that President Nixon's Veterans Program is producing improved job opportunity for our young men who have served their country so faithfully," Hodgson said.

Hodgson reported a 16.5 percent or 538,000 rise in the number of Vietnam veterans who found jobs in the last 12 months. This increase compares with a 2.7 percent rise in all U.S. workers who have jobs— from about 79 million to 81.2 million.

Jobless Rate For Vets Drops

Hodgson, who has been asked by President Nixon to
continue leadership of the Veteran Program for the
second year, said that the jobless rate for the veterans,
though still high at 8.6 percent, has dropped by half
a percentage point from last February.

Last year, there was a 2.1 percent spread between
the veterans' and non-veterans' rates. That differential
has now been cut in half.

"We still have a big job to do in getting all young men into jobs—veterans and non-veterans alike," Secretary Hodgson said. "But the fact that we have cut in half the gap between them proves we are making some real headway in getting our veterans back into civilian jobs."

The Secretary also pointed out that the Vietnam-era
veterans' improved employment picture has been
achieved despite the vast numbers of them being dis-
charged from military service and entering the labor
market. In 1969, 1970 and 1971, over 3.1 million
veterans returned to civilian life. Early in 1972 vet-
erans were being discharged at peak rates of more
than 100,000 a month.

Labor Force Increases

While some went back to school or college, there
was a net labor force increase of Vietnam veterans of
about 1.8 million (seasonally adjusted) from April
1969 to April 1972. All but 268,000 of these have
found jobs. (This total, plus the 89,000 jobless in
April 1969, equals the current seasonally adjusted

KISSINGER, HENRY

Dear Deena:

I was delighted to receive your recent
letter, and I am extremely pleased with
your kind remarks about my small role
in helping to bring our prisoners of war
home.

No, Deena, I do not bite my fingernails,
but don't worry about your doing so as I
am sure you will outgrow it.

With all best wishes for a happy future.

Miss Deena Long:
Havens School
West 3rd Street
Rushville, Indiana
46173

drc/5-8-73

RECEIVED
MAY 16 1973

CENTRAL FILES

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

ITHACA, N. Y. 14850

Vice President for Research
and Advanced Studies

April 28th, 1969.

PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

Mr. Henry Kissinger,
The White House,
Washington D. C.

Dear Henry,

Discussions with you during these last couple of days on the
possibility of reopening my candidacy as Director of NSF was anything but
easy for me to respond to. I deeply appreciate your enlightened attitude
and your recognition of the various factors which had entered. Much of
your analysis of the early history was helpful to me.

I was particularly glad to learn from you that the recognition of
the importance of NSF to the scientific community is fully established among
the White House staff. It was especially important to hear your belief
that President Nixon has a personal commitment to a strong NSF that is as
much removed as possible from partisan politics.

Given all this, given your persuasiveness and my deep respect
for your opinions, it was with a heavy heart that I found myself forced to
tell you finally that I simply could not change my mind and that, therefore,
the answer must be still that I consider the discussions terminated.
As you know the reasons have principally to do with the effect on NSF and
on the science community and on my assessment of my possibility after
these recent events to do an effective job as the NSF Director. (There were
also some personal aspects but I won't return to those here).

As I see it, I cannot escape from being under a somewhat complex
cloud, with strong and conflicting views about me coming from different
directions. Furthermore, I have inescapably been brought into the political
arena. I think these facts would present a serious problem to NSF as an
agency. I also believe that it would make the problem of my being an
effective director exceedingly difficult.

- 2 -

In the strictest confidence, I must also tell you that an important further component is the problem of my relations with the Science Advisor. I had earlier been persuaded that good and harmonious working relations with the Science Advisor was a sine qua non for proper relations with the White House and, hence, for an effective carrying out of the Directorship. The character of my recent dealing with the Science Advisor including the telephone conversation with him on the night of April 24th has persuaded me that I could not feel confident of a reliable working relationship. I say this with deep regret since I have known Lee DuBridge for many years. The fact remains that I do not think a regeneration of mutual respect and confidence is possible.

Let me thank you again for your personal intervention. I am especially heartened at the character of the current view about the NSF and I need hardly tell you again that I will expect to support NSF in whatever way I can.

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /L

January 28, 1972

Dear Ms. Longo:

Mr. Kissinger asked me to write to you
in response to your letter of January 10.

He was pleased that you took the time to
write to him and honored that you wanted
him to make a contribution to your cook-
book. As you may imagine, Mr. Kissin-
ger has little time to cook for himself,
much less to develop his own favorite
recipes. He regrets therefore that he
will not be able to help you.

Thank you for writing.

Ms. Rosalie Longo
Women's Editor
The Paterson News
P.O. Box 2117
Paterson, New Jersey
07509

RECEIVED
JAN 2 9 1972

CENTRAL FILES

MEMBER AUDIT BUREAU CIRCULATION — AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS' ASSOCIATION
Complete Wire Reports — United Press International

The Paterson News.

NEW JERSEY'S ONLY ALL DAY NEWSPAPER

NEWS PLAZA

P. O. Box 2117 - 07509

Paterson, N. J.

PHONE: 274-2000, Area Code 201

Jan. 10, 1972

Mr. Henry Kissinger
2527 Waterside Drive N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

You, perhaps, more than anyone else in the United States can proudly
boast that you have been able to sample foods around the world. The
president's advisor is always on the go, living out of a suitcase, so
to speak, never really having much time of his own.

Is there ever a time, Mr. Kissinger, that you ARE ABLE to relax a
little and do some of the things you enjoy most (not work) like
sneaking into the kitchen and whipping up a favorite recipe?

I am convinced that some of the best cooks in the world are men!
I am also told that most men love to cook. Is this true in your case?
Do you ever get into the kitchen?

For three years, The Paterson News has published the favorite recipes of famous personalities throughout the world. They have included: Mrs. Richard M. Nixon, Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson, Princess Grace, Mrs. Hubert Humphrey, Queen Elizabeth, Joan Crawford, Jane Russell, Betsy Palmer, Mrs. Ronald Reagan, Anne Baxter, Carol Lawrence, Mrs. Robert Kennedy, Golda Meir, Jayne Meadows, the Lennon Sisters, Virgil Fox and Janis Paige. Now, we would like to add your name to the list!

Will you please take a few minutes out of your busy schedule and answer
the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me with a black and white
photo? Our readers would be delighted. So would I!

P.S. Please send my best to
Connie Stuart if you see her.
I did a story on Connie describing
her boss (Mrs. Nixon) a few months ago.

NATIONAL ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVES: STORY & KELLY-SMITH, INCORPORATED

750 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y.; Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Building, Philadelphia, Pa.; 1720 Peachtree Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia; 478 Statler Building, Boston, Mass.; 1 Herald Plaza, Miami, Florida; Midtown Plaza—700 East Water Street, Syracuse, N. Y.; 5813 Main Street, Williamsville, N. Y.; 69 W. Washington Street, Chicago, Ill.; New Center Building, Detroit, Mich.; 2728 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio; 18 East 4th Street, Cincinnati 2, Ohio; 1800 North Argyle Avenue, Los Angeles, California; 235 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California.

The Paterson News.

NEWS PLAZA

• P. O. Box 2117 - 07509

Paterson, N. J.

Do you ever cook? If so, when and for how many?

What is your favorite recipe? (please enclose)

How do you like to entertain? Large parties, small...parties for two?

What do you serve friends when they come over for dinner or supper?

Where would you take a date? Do you have a special place for dinner?

Would your ideal girl have to be a good cook? What type of girl is your ideal? (describe; hair, eyes, personality, interests)

Whom, in your opinion, is the hostess with the mostest and why?

Is there any ethnic food that appeals to you more than any other?

What dish would you like to master some day?

Do you believe in the saying "The way to a man's heart is through his stomach"

The Evening News THE NEW CALL The Morning News NEW JERSEY'S ONLY ALL DAY NEWSPAPER

2

PUBLISHED BY
KISSINGER, HENRY A. /2

The News Printing Company

NEWS PLAZA

P. O. Box 2117

Paterson, N. J.

07509

Aug. 9, 1972

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

The women of America (or the world, for that matter) are dying to know! Just what does it take to be Henry Kissinger's "dream girl!"

Is she short, tall, blonde, brunette, quiet or aggressive? Is she a political-type or a movie star or model? Is she witty or reserved? Really, what type of girl is she?

At the present time, I am preparing a feature story on the world's most eligible men and their preference in women. Naturally, you are Numero Uno on the list. Among others who have already sent in replies is Mr. J. Paul Getty.

Will you please take just a few minutes from your busy schedule to describe your "ideal" by completing the enclosed questionnaire. Thanks so much for giving this matter your consideration and attention.

RECEIVED

AUG 24 1972

CENTRAL FILES

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Describe your ideal girl physically: tall, short, petite, well endowed, thin, sexy, blonde, brunette, redhead, blue-eyed, brown-eyed, green-eyed, gray-eyed, etc.

Describe your ideal girl personality-wise: quiet, talkative, shy, naive, witty, aggressive, business-like, sophisticated, career-minded, liberated, reserved, elegant, casual, masculine, feminine, mysterious, etc.

What turns you off about a woman

What do you first notice when meeting or seeing a woman?

(OVER)

Are political-minded girls more fun than glamorous models or film stars on dates?

Does your ideal have to share all of your interests (name interests) also

Does your ideal have to know how to cook? (name favorite dish)

Would you want your ideal to be anything like your own mother?

Would you ever think seriously about marrying again? If so, would you steer clear of a divorced woman?

How many marriage proposals do you get and do you ever answer letters of xx this type? (what kind of woman in general sends a proposal, if any?)

LCO