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THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

plan would be rejected by the U.S.S.R., a development that would oblige the West to reconsider its tactics once again and might still open the door to dangerous concessions.

In view of these not very promising auguries, the West was to find grounds for considerable satisfaction in the unified and effective performance of Messrs. Herter, Lloyd, and Couve de Murville and Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano of West Germany throughout the twelve weeks of the Geneva conference. If no agreement with the Russians was achieved, Western unity was at least preserved and in some respects strengthened. This achievement at least ensured that the West would be in a somewhat stronger position as it entered on the new phase of East-West discussions initiated by Premier Khrushchev's September visit to the United States.

## 35. INNER SIX AND OUTER SEVEN

The Berlin crisis somewhat overshadowed a number of significant developments in the life of the Atlantic community which were unrelated to the East-West problem and, in most cases, involved the United States only indirectly. The partial disarray into which the principal NATO countries had been precipitated by the threat to Berlin was counterbalanced by signs of definite improvement and increased stability in at least some aspects of Western affairs.

The most significant political development of early 1959 had undoubtedly been General de Gaulle's inauguration as President of the Fifth French Republic on January 8, and the installation of a ministry headed by Michel Debré which could be expected to carry out the will of the new head of state without significant parliamentary interference. In conjunction with a new economic austerity program administered by Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Antoine Pinay, France could look forward to a respite from the parliamentary and budgetary

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

191

troubles that had beset so many recent French governments. It seemed by no means impossible that a strength-ened and regenerated France might find an equitable way of settling the war in Algeria and thereafter resuming a more normal position in European and world affairs. From the standpoint of general Western interests, these favorable prospects seemed to outweigh their immediate cost in restrictions on French political life and the growth of a more assertive French attitude in current international matters.

Another ground for satisfaction was the settlement on February 19 of the long-standing dispute between Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain over the future of Britain's colony of Cyprus. Much of the credit for this unhoped-for achievement could be allotted directly to NATO and its energetic Secretary-General, Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, who had been instrumental in getting Greece and Turkey to begin serious discussion of the issue during the NATO Council meeting in December 1958. The basis of the new arrangement, which required some sacrifices from each of the interested parties, was the shelving of the Greek Cypriote demand for union with Greece. Instead, Cyprus would be set up as an independent republic, subject to elaborate safeguards for the Turkish-speaking minority and an international guarantee of the new state's separate status. Great Britain, which may have had some doubts about the viability of an independent Cyprus, nevertheless seemed glad enough to surrender its unruly colony on terms that would ensure permanent British sovereignty over two military bases and the use of other needed military facilities.¹⁹ The settlement, in President Eisenhower's words, could be considered not only "a victory of common sense" but also "an imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship which cannot fail to strengthen and encourage the whole NATO alliance."²⁰ Although considerable tension still persisted among the Cypriote population, terrorism in the island had ceased. With the election in December of Archbishop Makarios,

["ally on March 15 in Paris, or in\nWashington before April 2.", "THE PROPER MEANS", "It had been agreed that an east-west\nconference should be held before May\n27. The United States was agreeable to\nan open agenda. It would discuss any-\nthing brought up, including disengage-\nment. \"We may even bring it up our\nselves,\" the spokesman said.", "The United States still believed that free elections were the proper means of bringing about reunification. It could not accept the Soviet idea of a confederation, which amounted to a liaison between two sovereign States. It wanted true reunification under one Government. In regard to Soviet responsibilities in Berlin, unless the Soviet Union made some formal declaration, the United States could not accept the substitution of east Germany for the Soviet Union. It held the Soviet Government to its agreements.", "Mr. Dulles had said that his European\nvisit had been most fruitful. He did not\nthink that any basic shift of decision had\nbeen made in any capital. The purpose\nof his visit was to find out how best to\napply the present positions, how they", "a wider nature are thought unlikely to\nbe effective.", "For this reason, the remarks of Sir\nHarold Caccia in Washington have\ncaused disquiet here. If western troops\nare subjected to unacceptable east\nGerman controls on the road to Berlin,\nthe immediate choice will be between\nsending armed columns along the Auto-\nbahn or confining movement to the air.\nBoth have their dangers.", "LESSER EVIL", "The halting of a column by the destruc-\ntion of a bridge—and there are many\nbetween Helmstedt and Berlin—would\ncreate a situation that could lead to war.\nOn the other hand, aircraft could be\nexposed to hostile fighters or interfer-\nence with navigational aids. The\nsecond is considered the lesser of two\nevils by the Federal German command\nand, it would appear, by Britain. The\ndestruction of a bridge would threaten\ncivilian as well as military supplies, and\na new and more dangerous situation\nwould arise.", "There is also a widespread feeling here\nthat no country would be prepared to\ngo to war over a military lorry. \"Work\n票\n票\n票\n票\n票\n票\n票\n

EISENHOWER AND THE COLD WAR

with the NATO allies. He wanted the Western response to "make it plain that the U.S. does not want war." "But if they deny us our rights," the President added, "then we'll have to reassess our position. They've got to know that we're willing to put our whole stack in the pot."³³

In late December, the Western nations sent identical replies to the Russian note of November 27. They rejected the six-month ultimatum, reaffirmed Western rights in Berlin based on the occupation agreements at the end of World War II, and yet expressed a willingness to negotiate not only on Berlin but on the broader issue of an overall German settlement. The Russians indicated they were ready to enter into such negotiations, but they refused to lift the May 27 deadline.

The President now had to face the question of how the United States would respond if the Russians went ahead and signed a separate peace treaty with East Germany. At a White House meeting on January 28, 1959, General Nathan Twining, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended that the United States should be prepared to send in an Army division to secure access to Berlin if the East Germans halted American truck convoys. Secretary of State Dulles immediately objected, warning that world opinion would not support such an aggressive move. Twining responded by saying that any smaller use of force would be easily repulsed, forcing the United States to back down. He was ready, he asserted, "to fight a general nuclear war."

Eisenhower intervened at this point to side with his secretary of state. One division, he contended, would be too large for a show of force but at the same time "lacked capability" to open up full access to Berlin across 110 miles of enemy territory. In such a delicate situation, he preferred

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EISENHOWER AND THE RUSSIANS

to "give peace forces a chance." He then said that if the East Germans stopped an American vehicle after May 27, the United States would try to send a small armed convoy to Berlin. If this probe was halted, then Eisenhower would order an airlift, break off relations with the Soviet Union, take the whole issue to the United Nations, and prepare for general war. The President thus made clear his ultimate determination to defend Berlin while at the same time refusing to be stampeded into an overly aggressive response. In the last analysis, he was prepared to risk nuclear war over Berlin, but not before every other possibility had been exhausted. "Our approach was cautious, controlled," Eisenhower commented later, "and I was confident that it was correct."³⁴

While the crisis continued to mount, the American people got a glimpse of Eisenhower's policy in his press conference replies to reporters' questions. He ruled out the use of conventional weapons, telling reporters that the United States had no plans "to shoot our way into Berlin" and asserting that "we are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe." At the same time, when a reporter asked him if the United States was ready "to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend free Berlin," Ike replied, "Well, I don't know how you could free anything with nuclear weapons." But then he went on to say that the United States was prepared to meet its "responsibilities with respect to Berlin." Any movement toward "real hostilities," he added, would have to come "from the side of the Soviets." Only then would he make his final response. Thus the President took refuge in ambiguity, just as he had during the Formosa Straits crisis. Aware of the tactical situation in Berlin, he ruled out a ground war, but he left open the possibility of a nuclear conflict, always with the

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EISENHOWER AND THE COLD WAR

understanding that he would never fire the first shot. Walking a careful line between firmness and conciliation, Eisenhower sought to convince the Russians that the best answer to the Berlin crisis lay in diplomacy, not war.³⁵

The tension began to break in March. Harold Macmillan journeyed to Russia and came back with word that Khrushchev was willing to call off the May 27 deadline in return for Western agreement for a new summit conference. Macmillan came to the United States in late March to urge Eisenhower to grant this Soviet condition. The President expressed his reluctance to attend a summit conference unless there was substantial progress toward a settlement at a lower level. When Macmillan pleaded with the President, expressing his belief that as few as eight nuclear missiles could wipe out England, Ike finally agreed to a foreign ministers conference with the Soviets, with a summit meeting in the future "as soon as developments justify." Khrushchev quickly accepted this formula, and, while the Russians never formally gave up their May 27 deadline, the agreement to meet at the foreign ministers level in Geneva on May 11 effectively removed the ultimatum.³⁶

John Foster Dulles was not able to represent the United States at Geneva. Stricken by a recurrence of the abdominal cancer that he had first suffered during the Suez crisis, Dulles resigned as secretary of state in mid-April. Eisenhower replaced him with Christian Herter, who had served as undersecretary of state for the past year. Herter was experienced in foreign policy, but he lacked the national stature and the rapport with Eisenhower that had been Dulles's strength. Although the new secretary of state represented the United States ably at the Geneva Conference, Soviet intransigence prevented any headway.

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EISENHOWER AND THE RUSSIANS

The diplomats adjourned their negotiations to fly to Washington to attend the funeral of John Foster Dulles on May 27, ironically the day the earlier Soviet ultimatum expired.

The deadlock at Geneva convinced Eisenhower that a summit conference would be useless, but the British continued to push hard for the meeting. The President finally agreed to an intermediate step. Persuaded by Herter and Robert Murphy, the new undersecretary of state and Ike's old wartime diplomatic adviser, Eisenhower issued an invitation to Nikita Khrushchev to visit the United States and meet privately with the President following his tour of the country. Murphy, who passed on this offer to a high-level Soviet official visiting the United States, misunderstood Ike's instructions and failed to condition the invitation on progress at the deadlocked Geneva Conference. Eisenhower was furious when Khrushchev accepted without offering any concessions at the foreign ministers meeting, which finally recessed in mid-August without accomplishing anything.

As the time for Khrushchev's visit neared, Eisenhower began to view it as a good opportunity to use his personal charm. "... any President that refused finally to use the last atom of prestige" in the cause of peace, Ike told a press conference on August 25, "ought to be condemned by the American people." Privately he planned to use the meeting "for one great personal effort, before leaving office, to soften up the Soviet leader even a little bit." When Khrushchev arrived in Washington, he raised Ike's hopes by stating his belief that the President did not want war and adding, "we assume that you also believe this about us." Eisenhower responded by telling Khrushchev that he had the chance "to go down in history as one of the truly great

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EISENHOWER AND THE COLD WAR

statesmen of all time" if he would help the President end
the Cold War.³⁷

Khrushchev undertook a ten-day whirlwind tour of the nation and then went to Camp David for a face-to-face meeting with Eisenhower. The Soviet leader repeated his desire for a summit conference, while Ike made clear his refusal to negotiate while under the threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. After several days of discussion, the two men finally agreed on a formula. Eisenhower would drop his demand for substantial progress on a lower level and attend a summit in the spring of 1960; Khrushchev would remove any time limit on the negotiations and withdraw his plan for a Soviet-East German peace treaty. There was no agreement on a Berlin settlement and no progress toward one; the two leaders had simply agreed to continue negotiating.

Despite the lack of accomplishment, the Camp David meeting did help to defuse the tense Berlin crisis. In a press conference the day after Khrushchev left the United States, Eisenhower announced that the Soviet leader had removed the element of duress by agreeing that, while the negotiations "should not be prolonged indefinitely," neither could there be a "fixed time limit on them." The President expressed satisfaction that with the end of the threat of a separate East German treaty, all element of compulsion had been removed from the negotiations. At the same time, he startled American observers by agreeing with Khrushchev's description of the Berlin situation as "abnormal" and indicated a willingness to seek a more enduring solution. The next day, back in Moscow, Khrushchev confirmed Eisenhower's statement that he had agreed that there should be no time limit on the Berlin negotiations, but the Soviet leader also stressed his inten-

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EISENHOWER AND THE RUSSIANS

tion of settling the question of West Berlin "without
delay."³⁸

In his memoirs, Eisenhower claimed that as a result of
his diplomacy at Camp David "a crisis over Berlin had
been averted without the surrender of any Western rights."
Yet in fact Khrushchev had persuaded the President to
agree to a summit conference without any adequate assur-
ance of prior progress toward a settlement in return for
lifting a time limit that the Soviet leader had arbitrarily
imposed in the first place. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was
right in feeling that his diplomacy had been effective. The
military situation in Berlin placed the United States in a
very perilous position; the longer the President could post-
pone a showdown, the better the chance for avoiding a nu-
clear confrontation. Eisenhower's combination of firmness
and restraint had clearly impressed Khrushchev, who re-
alized that the President wanted a peaceful solution but
could not be sure how the United States would respond to
direct Soviet provocation. The American people, sensing
the prudent way in which Eisenhower had averted a show-
down over Berlin, responded by giving him a strong vote
of confidence, as reflected in the Gallup poll, where his
popularity rose from a post-Sputnik low of 49 per cent to
a respectable 66 per cent in November 1959. The "spirit of
Camp David" may have been no more substantial than the
afterglow of the Geneva summit in 1955, but everyone
breathed a little easier when the President opted for diplo-
macy rather than force over Berlin.³⁹

139