IV

106TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. CON. RES. 42

Regarding the use of United States Armed Forces as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 1999

Mr. GILMAN submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring),

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This resolution may be cited as the "Peacekeeping"

5 Operations in Kosovo Resolution".

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 The Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The conflict in Kosovo has caused great

9 human suffering and, if permitted to continue, could

10 threaten the peace of Europe.

2

1

2

3

(2) The Government of Serbia and representatives of the people of Kosovo may agree in Ram-bouillet, France, to end the conflict in Kosovo.

4

5

6

7

8

(3) President Clinton has promised to deploy approximately 4,000 United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

9

## SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO KOSOVO.

10

11

12

13

14

The President is authorized to deploy United States Armed Forces personnel to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement.

•HCON 42 IH

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452 STATEMENT OF HENRY KISSINGER

453 Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
454 the committee, I must say it is a symptom of something or
455 other that here three Republicans are going to be arguing
456 among each other about the ~~foreign policy~~ of the Democratic
457 administration.

458 [Laughter.]

459 Secondly, if there is anything I have chosen less
460 enthusiastically than to be on the same panel with Senator
461 Dole, whom I have supported in several presidential
462 campaigns, and Jeane Kirkpatrick, whom I respect more than
463 almost anybody in the field of foreign policy and whom I have
464 admired for many years, I don't know what it could be. And
465 Congressman Lantos and I have been allies in so many battles,
466 that it is a strange position for me to be here. I turned
467 down this invitation at least three times, but finally I
468 decided, being in town, I didn't want to run away from an
469 article that I had published.

470 Let me also say that my friend Larry Eagleberger was
471 mentioned several times by Jeane and I think maybe you should
472 ask him about the immediate situation. He will not run away
473 from what he said before, but I think he would not
474 necessarily hold the identical view today that he expressed
475 in 1992. But I think you should ask him directly.

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nationalities, of empires that have fought over almost the same issue for hundreds of years. It is, in some ways, an insoluble problem. But I grant everything that Jeane has said about the human conditions. There is only one technical legal difference. Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, they are separate entities from Serbia. Nobody has yet challenged Kosovo as part of Serbia.

And, therefore, from an international, legal point of view, what is being proposed is that NATO military forces should be introduced on the territory of a sovereign country for the purpose of detaching a province which, in the history of that country, has been the origin of its national identity, because that is where the battle for Serbian independence started 600 years ago. That is a unique employment of NATO military power. I supported the independence of Croatia, Slovenia, and of all the units. And I would have favored, early on, putting a halt to Serbian intervention in Bosnia, although not necessarily with American ground forces.

Therefore, I believe that the introduction of American ground forces and of NATO military forces for that purpose is, first, an unprecedented extension of NATO authority; an extraordinary assertion of international law; and a dangerous precedent for America. It is to this limited issue that I am addressing myself. Nor do I necessarily say I hate that this

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C

526 is taking place in the middle of the negotiations. And
527 Members of the Congress and the Senate will have to weigh
528 their vote in the context of the ongoing diplomacy. I am
529 analyzing the issue as I see it.

530 I note also that Jeane has gone well beyond what the
531 administration is saying. The administration is saying that
532 the solution should be an autonomy, safe-guarded by NATO
533 troops, within the context of a unified Serbia. Serbian
534 troops and police remain in the province. The KLA is
535 supposed to be disarmed and a political process is supposed
to start which, at the end of three years, will allow some
536 permanent definition of autonomy. That is unmanageable. And
537 that will get the United States into a situation from which
538 it will be extraordinarily difficult to extricate ourselves.
539

540 It is obvious that neither of the parties like the
541 agreement as it now stands. We are winking at the Albanians
542 and saying, if you accept this, we will bomb the Serbs for
543 you. And we can't bomb the Serbs unless you accept this. So
544 we will have one party that was bombed into an agreement and
545 another party which accepted the agreement because we have
546 become the artillery for their purposes and they are then
547 under our aegis, supposed to manage a political process
548 extending over a period of three years.
549

549 I would be amazed if the KLA disarmed and, under the
550 conditions of the territory, I would not find it in my heart

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551 to blame them. I do not know what the impact will be, the
552 interaction of the KLA to the remaining Serbian population.
553 And, therefore, I believe the Congress, at a minimum, has to
554 ask what are the rules of engagement? If the KLA does not
555 disarm, as I believe they won't and can't, are we going to
disarm them? And are we willing to fight for that? Do we
556 protect various populations against ethnic cleansing and by
557 what means? Who polices the borders of that territory?
558

559 I recognize there is a danger of expansion of the present
560 conflict, but there is also a danger of expansion of the
561 impact of an increasingly autonomous Kosovo, which has no
562 international status, on Macedonia and its relations to
563 Albania. If we said we are going in there to make Kosovo
564 independent, I would still have serious questions. But that
565 is a political objective that I could understand.

566 I believe that the present terms guarantee that there
567 will be no peace. The President has said when there is an
568 effective peace, we have to police it. There is no end to the
war in the way the process is being defined, and we may
569 the definition of a continuing political process. We may
570 wind up in the position where we bomb the Serbs to be
permitted to put our troops so that we can then fight the
571 Albanians in order to get them to disarm. This is an extreme
572 statement. So I am raising these questions, so that--I am
573 addressing them especially to my friend Mr. Lantos, so that
574 he understands this is not--I am not fighting their
575

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576 principle.

577 The other states of former Yugoslavia were made
578 independent with our support and my enthusiastic agreement
579 and, in fact, when the administration then in power was
580 dragging its feet, I used whatever limited influence I had to
581 encourage them to go further. Kosovo was never an autonomous
582 unit like these other states. And, therefore, it is
583 technically an expansion of NATO authority and of American
584 military reach, which is unprecedented up to now. And which,
585 moreover, cannot end with that operation, which will be a
586 continuing process under the definition of an autonomy that
587 will be redefined and still remain an autonomy.

588 Moreover, unless we all understand the rules of
589 engagement, I believe that the long-term consequences for
590 NATO of this sort of an action could be as serious as turning
591 it down, which will also be serious. Because I would be
592 amazed if the unity of NATO could be preserved in the face of
593 all the challenges that are foreseeable, by both sides.
594 Almost every month, we will have to make decisions how to
595 react to one side or the other pushing against the edges of
596 an agreement. Because, for them, it is a matter of life and
597 death to come to a conclusion. This is not an area where
598 people make compromises.

599 And if, as is likely, in order to make this, even with
600 the threat of bombing, palatable to the Serbs, Russians are

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also ~~introduced~~, we will have introduced the classic Balkan
tragedies into this limited territory. So, for all of these
reasons, I am extremely uneasy and I believe that there are
questions that must be answered.

First, what is the political objective? What are we
really aiming at here? Because autonomy is not the
destination of the Albanians and cannot be made palatable to
the Albanians any more. So, therefore, if we are there to
defend the words of this agreement, we will be an obstacle to
those whom we are now trying to help.

Secondly, what will we do or not do? Third, how do we
handle the relationship of the Kosovars towards the
Macedonian-Albanians and the Albanian-Albanians? And I think
~~you~~ would do the administration a favor to ask them this sort
of question. This is what has brought me here at the
chairman's insistence. But I want to warn, solemnly, against
committing American ground forces into an area with such
historic hatreds, without a clear definition of political
objectives, without a precise definition of rules of
engagement, and without a concept of how it is going to end.
And I am also very uneasy about the very concept of NATO, in
effect, invading another country in this manner.

Having said all of this, I also owe it to my past as a
policymaker and having experienced all of these things to
tell the Members of Congress that to vote against American

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2170 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202/225-5021

March 15, 1999

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger and Associates

FROM: Allison Kieman
Staff Associate

RE: Hearing on "U.S. Role in Kosovo"

Enclosed are your remarks from the above mentioned hearing. Please make any
necessary edits and return to me by **March 29, 1999**.

Under Rule 11 (e) (1), the Committee is required to keep a complete record of all
Committee action, including in the case of meeting or hearing transcripts, "a substantially
verbatim account of remarks actually made during the proceedings, subject only to technical,
grammatical, and typographical corrections authorized by the person making the remarks
involved."

Also, if it has been requested that additional materials be submitted for the record, please send these submissions along with your edits.

If I have not receive your edits, or heard from you by the deadline indicated, I will
assume that you have no corrections and will send your edits to the printer as is. If you have any
questions, please feel free to contact me at 202/225-1046.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Enclosure

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PAGE 19

425 Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick. And
426 we welcome Senator Dole, who has joined us today.

427 Mr. DOLE. Do you want me to talk yet? I always learn a
428 lot from Henry. Have you spoken?

429 Mr. KISSINGER. No.

430 Mr. DOLE. Because he may have a shuttle to catch or
431 something. I live here, so.

432 Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Kissinger, would you mind going
433 next? I am pleased to introduce Dr. Kissinger. We welcome
434 him to our committee. He has provided advice to all U.S.
435 Presidents since Dwight Eisenhower. He is most well-known
436 for his service as President Nixon's national security
437 advisor and then as Secretary of State in both the Nixon and
438 Bush administrations. Dr. Kissinger's memoirs, a third
439 volume of which will be published in the very near future,
440 will provide fodder for historians and foreign policy
441 specialists for generations to come. We welcome Dr.
442 Kissinger to our committee. We invite him to provide his
443 testimony, which will be included in its entirety, in the
444 record of this hearing, without objection. Please proceed,
445 Dr. Kissinger.

446 And, before you proceed, I would like to welcome to our
447 committee some of our members who have joined us.

448 Congressman Wicker, from Mississippi; Congresswoman Dunn from
449 Washington; Congressman Bass, from New Hampshire;

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476 Now let me address one limited question. I agree with
477 almost everything, I would say practically everything of
478 Jeane's analysis of how this situation evolved. I am not
479 here to defend Milosevic or his actions. I recognize there
480 is a problem, a serious problem. I might argue whether
481 Kosovo is at the center of Europe, but we can look at a map
482 and argue about that later. I want to confine myself to one
483 limited issue: under what circumstances should American
484 military forces be used to pursue national objectives? And
485 what should these objectives be?

486 I am especially sensitive to this because I came into
487 office having been charged with extricating American forces
488 then were placed into an area in which we then were not
489 prepared to pursue the consequences of our actions. Before
490 they were placed, there was great unanimity, at the time, and
491 we are up dividing the country. So this is a special concern
492 of course. And also, of course, I have no prepared statement,
493 nor am I speaking extemporaneously. Some of you may say
494 translating from the German as I go along.

495 [Laughter.]

496 So my sentence structure may be a little complex.

497 Let me, therefore, address, therefore, this issue from my
498 perspective. I do not think the issue of Kosovo is
499 exclusively or maybe even primarily a Milosevic problem. It
500 is at the region of the confluence of religions, of

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PAGE 27

also introduced we will have introduced the classic Balkan
tragedies into this limited territory. So, for all of these
reasons, I am extremely uneasy and I believe that there are
questions that must be answered.

Secondly, what will we do or not do? Third, how do we
handle the relationship of the Kosovars towards the
Macedonian-Albanians and the Albanian-Albanians? And I think
we would do the administration a favor to ask them this sort
of question. This is what has brought me here at the
chairman's insistence. But I want to warn, solemnly, against
committing American ground forces into an area with such
historic hatreds, without a clear definition of political
objectives, without a precise definition of rules of
engagement, and without a concept of how it is going to end.
And I am also very uneasy about the very concept of NATO, in
effect, invading another country in this manner.

MAR-18-1999 15:07

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P.11

LY

PAGE 28

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626

participation at this late time is also a decision fraught

627

with heavy responsibility. And that at least they should try

628

to go the route of clarification before taking that step.

629

Thank you very much.

630

[The statement of Mr. Kissinger follows:]

631

******** COMMITTEE INSERT ********

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PAGE 43

934 there is substance behind it. There are some people in the country who use exit strategy as an excuse for isolationism.
935
936 Well, in this case, there is an exit strategy and the exit strategy is the European Union. At the end of the day, and
937
938 it may be a few years down the road, neither Serbia nor
939 Croatia nor Macedonia nor Kosovo will be able to function
940 unless they are part of a united Europe. So, unlike other
941 places, like the Middle East where one may not see an exit
942 strategy, there is an all-European exit strategy here and I
943 would be grateful if you would comment.

944 Mr. KISSINGER. With respect to your first question, I
945 agree with everything Jeane Kirkpatrick has said about the
946 conditions in Kosovo and even practically everything about
947 the causes of it. The only slight distinction I would make
948 is that I would make it a little less of Milosevic's problem
949 and somewhat more a historic problem. But I would also say,
950 there are a lot of other places in the world where the same
951 argument can be made, where there are ethnic groups that are
952 denied autonomy, where the government is oppressive, and
953 where I draw the line is I am saying American troops should
954 not be sent to every place where these conditions exist
955 unless there is a significant threat to American security or
956 some other overriding concern. My remarks were strictly
957 limited to the sending of American troops.

958 Secondly, with respect to exit strategy. I didn't use

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44

PAGE

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959 the word exit strategy here, because I don't think there is
960 an exit strategy. I think, under the terms of reference as
961 they are now defined, there is bound to be a permanent
962 political jockeying for the three years of this agreement and
963 I believe that the presence of Serbian troops, NATO troops,
964 and KLA disarmament, this is an incompatible combination.
965 This is an unworkable agreement that is being discussed here
966 and there is no exit strategy.

967 Now further down the road, I can imagine that there is a
968 solution if there were to be an independent Kosovo. But
969 Kosovo would be so far down the road, this won't happen for
970 20, 30 years when you think that they are talking 5 years
971 about Poland. So I am warning against the dispatch of NATO
972 troops and American troops under these conditions, with these
terms of reference, and with unclear rules of engagement. I
973 know the Chairman wanted to ask me a question.
974

975 Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

976 Mr. KISSINGER. I really am already in violation of--

977 Chairman GILMAN. And I thank you for exceeding your
time. I know you have an important engagement.

979 Mr. KISSINGER. But, go ahead. I know you wanted to ask
980 one question.

981 Chairman GILMAN. And I appreciate your giving us a
982 little time. And I would like to just note for my colleagues
983 that a senior advisor, State Department on Balkan Affairs,

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45

984 has just reported to our committee that Mr. Holbrooke has
985 reported to the State Department that his mission with Mr.

986 Milosevic today has been a complete failure. I just wanted
987 to bring you up to date.

988 Mr. DOLE. I'm not surprised.

989 Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Kissinger, as in Bosnia, the
990 argument for the NATO mission now being contemplated for
991 Kosovo runs something like this. An international military
992 force is necessary to the implementation of a peace plan.

993 And only NATO has the capability, as well as the credibility,
994 to make certain that the parties to the agreement respect the
995 plan and carry out their obligations. With that kind of a
996 rationale, how can NATO ever say no to a peacekeeping mission
997 in Europe without diminishing its credibility?

998 Mr. KISSINGER. First of all, let me remind some of you,
999 I supported the deployment into Bosnia. And I may have even
1000 lobbied some of you on behalf of the mission to Bosnia, even
1001 though that was getting to the edge of what I could support.

1002 But there, there was a workable peace agreement and the
1003 various ethnic groups were separated and I could imagine
1004 that, if there were no further progress, it would wind up
1005 with the partition of Bosnia, which was one way of ending it.

1006 In this one, I do not see the outlines of an agreement
1007 and I think the situation is inherently unstable. Now you
1008 are asking me whether NATO can ever refuse a peacekeeping

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46

1009 function in Europe. Yes. I think the NATO mission has to be
1010 carefully defined and we have to be very careful that NATO
1011 does not become an instrument of permanent intervention any
1012 place where some issue is unresolved.

1013 And I was in support of NATO expansion and I am. I am a
1014 deep believer in NATO as the key to our foreign policy. But
1015 I am very worried that we are getting ourselves into a
1016 situation in Kosovo in which the strains on NATO will daily
1017 magnify. But I must also, in fairness, point out this
1018 argument was more persuasive three weeks ago, had we been
1019 consulted, then it is today at the edge of a possible
1020 withdrawal. So I will grant that, for the Congress to turn it
1021 around now, at this late stage, is different from the
1022 Congress--but, analytically, I think we have to be very
1023 careful about expanding the mission of NATO without a full
1024 the mission of what the purpose is, what its limits are.

1025 But, if you will forgive me, Mr. Chairman, I have to
1026 I am sorry.

1027 Chairman GILMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr.
1028 KISSINGER, for overstaying your time.

1029 Mr. DOLE. Good luck. I will see you in Kosovo.

1030 Mr. KISSINGER. We will argue again.

1031 [Laughter.]

1032 Chairman GILMAN. And let me ask our other panelists,
1033 Senator Dole, you have been advocating that our U.S.

TOTAL P.15

March 15, 1999

MEMORANDUM

FROM: Allison Kiernan
Staff Associate

Enclosure

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429 Mr. KISSINGER. No.

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21

453 Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of
454 the committee, I must say it is a symptom of something or
455 other that here three Republicans are going to be arguing
456 among each other about the politics of the Democratic
457 administration.

458 [Laughter.]

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486 I am especially sensitive to this because I came into
487 office having been charged with extricating American forces
488 that were placed into an area in which we then were not
489 prepared to pursue the consequences of our actions. Before
490 they were placed, there was great unanimity, at the time, and
491 we had up dividing the country. So this is a special concern
492 : we. And also, of course, I have no prepared statement,
493 : I am speaking extemporaneously. Some of you may say
494 translating from the German as I go along.

495 [Laughter.]

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501 nationalities, of empires that have fought over almost the
502 same issue for hundreds of years. It is, in some ways, an
503 insoluble problem. But I grant everything that Jeane has
504 said about the human conditions. There is only one technical
505 legal difference. Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, they are
506 separate entities. Nobody has yet challenged Kosovo as part
507 of Serbia.

508 And, therefore, from an international, legal point of
509 view, what is being proposed is that NATO military forces
510 should be introduced on the territory of a sovereign country
511 for the purpose of detaching a province which, in the history
512 of that country, has been the origin of its national
513 identity, because that is where the battle for Serbian
514 independence started 600 years ago. That is a unique
515 employment of NATO military power. I supported the
516 independence of Croatia, Slovenia, of all the units. And I
517 would have favored, early on, putting a halt to Serbian
518 intervention in Bosnia, although not necessarily with
519 American ground forces.

520 Therefore, I believe that the introduction of American
521 ground forces and of NATO military forces for that purpose
522 is, first, an unprecedented extension of NATO authority; an
523 extraordinary assertion of international law; and a dangerous
524 precedent for America. It is to this limited issue that I am
525 addressing myself. Nor do I necessarily say I hate that this

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530 I note also that Jeane has gone well beyond what the
531 administration is saying. The administration is saying that
532 the solution should be an autonomy, safe-guarded by NATO
533 troops, within the context of a unified Serbia. Serbian
534 troops and police remain in the province. The KLA is
535 supposed to be disarmed and a political process is supposed
536 to start which, at the end of three years, will allow some
537 permanent definition of autonomy. That is unmanageable. And
538 that will get the United States into a situation from which
539 it will be extraordinarily difficult to extricate ourselves.

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25

566 I believe that the present terms guarantee that there
567 will be no peace. The President has said when there is an
568 effective peace, we have to police it. There is no end by
569 the definition of a continuing political process. We may
570 wind up in the position where we bomb the Serbs to be
571 permitted to put our troops so that we can then fight the
572 Albanians in order to get them to disarm. This is an extreme
573 statement. So I am raising these questions, so that--I am
574 addressing them especially to my friend Mr. Lantos, so that
575 he understands this is not--I am not fighting their

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26

576 principle.

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also introduced, we will have introduced the classic Balkan
tragedies into this limited territory. So, for all of these
reasons, I am extremely uneasy and I believe that there are
questions that must be answered.

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629 Thank you very much.

631 ********* COMMITTEE INSERT *********

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43

934 there is substance behind it. There are some people in the
935 country who use exit strategy as an excuse for isolationism.
936 Well, in this case, there is an exit strategy and the exit
937 strategy is the European Union. At the end of the day, and
938 it may be a few years down the road, neither Serbia nor
939 Croatia nor Macedonia nor Kosovo will be able to function
940 unless they are part of a united Europe. So, unlike other
941 places, like the Middle East where one may not see an exit
942 strategy, there is an all-European exit strategy here and I
943 would be grateful if you would comment.

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975 Chairman GILMAN. Yes.

978 Mr. KISSINGER. But, go ahead. I know you wanted to ask
979 one question.

980 Chairman GILMAN. And I appreciate your giving us a
981 little time. And I would like to just note for my colleagues
982 that a senior advisor, State Department on Balkan Affairs,
983

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987 to bring you up to date.

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1013 And I was in support of NATO expansion and I am. I am a
1014 deep believer in NATO as the key to our foreign policy. But
1015 I am very worried that we are getting ourselves into a
1016 situation in Kosovo in which the strains on NATO will daily
1017 magnify. But I must also, in fairness, point out this
1018 argument was more persuasive three weeks ago, had we been
1019 consulted, then it is today at the edge of a possible
1020 agreement. So I will grant that, for the Congress to turn it
1021 down now, at this late stage, is different from the
1022 Congress--but, analytically, I think we have to be very
1023 careful about expanding the mission of NATO without a full
1024 discussion of what the purpose is, what its limits are.

1025 But, if you will forgive me, Mr. Chairman, I have to
1026 ...

1031 [Laughter.]