November 18, 1955

Dear Paul:

As I believe I indicated in my previous letter to you, I think your article for *Foreign Affairs* is excellent. I have only one serious question about it, which I mentioned last Monday, i.e. whether the dispersal of our base structure outside the North American continent will really add to our security in the era of IBM's and even of mass use of B52's. I would certainly think that even in the new era warning systems close to Russia would be enormously valuable.

Most of my other comments refer to matters of detail:

*Page 24, para. (c)*: Might not the last sentence be lengthened to read "We should not initiate the bombing of industrial or population centers, and we should announce we will not do so, unless the Soviet Union attacks our cities and industrial centers." I would suggest adding a paragraph (e), stating that if a war does break out we should limit our political objectives so that our opponents would know a reasonable settlement would be open to them. Otherwise the desperate gamble of an all-out attack might seem attractive to them, especially if they were losing. If you do decide to include these points, you may need to add a couple of sentences on the following two pages.

*Page 10, first para., last sentence*: Would it not be more correct to say, "But it is a very large and uncertain number, one which undoubtedly will not be reached unless the war is fought in an entirely irrational way, and probably not even then."

*Page 11, line 8*: Would it add to clarity to put "all-out" before "nuclear war."

*Pages 15, 17, and 25*: It seems to me that your discussion of defense is, by implication at least, vastly more optimistic than Mervin Kelly's. Your words seem to imply, though they do not state, that if the attack is one which the "defense system" can contain, the damage may not be so very great.

*Page 16, line 9*: I would substitute "many" for "a few."

I hope some of these comments may be useful.

Mr. Paul H. Nitze
1906 Florida Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

October 19, 1960

Mr. Paul Nitze
Foreign Service Education Foundation
1906 Florida Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Paul:

It was good to see you again at the English Speaking Union Monday, if only briefly. I wish you well in your efforts, and hope we will have a chance for a longer conversation soon.

I am writing you to introduce Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, who is a member of the executive committee of the Christian Democratic Party of Germany. He is being sent over here as Chancellor Adenauer's representative (in his capacity as chairman of the CDU) to observe the American election. He would like very much to meet some members of Kennedy's staff, and I would be very grateful if you could do something for him.

With kind regards.

December 30, 1960

Dear Paul:

I just wanted to let you know
how delighted I was about your appointment
as Assistant Secretary of Defense. My only
reservation is that those of us who make
a profession of criticizing the Defense
Department will have nothing to do.

Warm regards and all good wishes.

December 30, 1960

a protestation of criticizing the Defense

now delighted I was about your appointment

I just wanted to let you know

Dear Paul:

Washington, D.C.
1900 Florida Avenue
Foreign Service Education Foundation
Mr. Paul Mitze

Henry V. Kieisinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards,

did find that you had the time to see him.
ot next week, and will call your office. I would be grateful if you
you two to meet. He will be in Washington from Monday to Wednesday
taken the liberty of suggesting to him that it might be beneficial for
Blimmfeld is over here to form some impressions and I have

political scene.
of the Chancellor and clearly one of the coming people on the German
of the Christian Democratic Party of Germany. He is a close friend
I would like to introduce Mr. Erik Blimfeld, a leader

Dear Paul:

Washington, D.C.
Department of Defense
for International Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Mr. Paul Nitsche

June 12, 1961

June 15, 1961

Mr. Paul Nitze
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Affairs
Department of Defense
Washington, D.C.

Dear Paul:

I have taken the liberty of giving your
name to someone who will be in Washington from
June 20th to 23rd and who may be calling you.
He is Anthony Verrier, a defense correspondent
for the OBSERVER. This, as you know, is one of
the leading British weeklies. Mr. Verrier is
a thoughtful individual who is on his first
visit to this country, and I would be grateful
for anything you can do for him.

Since it has been established by Newsweek
that I am behind the defense changes you are
making, you cannot very well refuse me without
undermining my reputation.

With all good wishes and many thanks.

DRAFT - 1 March 62

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NITZE'S TALK
IN GERMANY

I am happy to have this opportunity to talk with such a distinguished group of Germans about the defense policies of the U.S. Nowadays it is an accepted fact in the U.S. that our interests are so inter-related with those of Germany and of our other NATO allies that our policies are legitimately a great concern of yours, just as yours are legitimately a great concern of ours. Since the advent of a new Administration in the U.S., naturally enough, entails a shift of focus though not of basic objectives, it should be mutually beneficial for us to exchange views on the defense picture as seen by President Kennedy's team.

When the new Democratic Administration came into office about 15 months ago, the President immediately ordered a reappraisal of our defense structure, including our strategic plans and the nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities of our forces. That re-examination, undertaken by a group under the chairmanship of Dean Acheson, confirmed, among other things, the continuance as a central axiom of our national policy

other things, the continuance as a central axiom of our national policy
by a group under the chairmanship of DeanАчerson, confirmed, among
non-unclear capabilities of our forces. That re-examination, undertaken
defense structure, including our strategic plans and the unclear and
months ago, the President immediately ordered a reappraisal of our

When the new Democratic Administration came into office about 12
views on the defense picture as seen by President Kennedy's team.

basic objectives, it should be mutually beneficial for us to exchange
the U. S., naturally enough, entails a shift of focus through not of
a great concern of ours. Since the advent of a new Administration in
are legitimately a great concern of yours, just as yours are legitimately
with those of Germany and of our other NATO allies that our policies
is an accepted fact in the U.S. that our interests are so inter-related
Group of Germans about the defense policies of the U.S. Nowdays it

IN GERMANY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INITIALS MARK

of an overriding U.S. concern with the security of Europe and the
strengthening of the NATO Alliance. From this conclusion stemmed
President Kennedy's re-affirmation of our commitments to Europe's
security and of our intention to maintain the full strength of our
forces in Europe.

This re-examination also reflected our belief that the NATO re-
lationship had changed from the days of its creation in 1948 when
the significant military core of the Alliance was the commitment of U.S.
power to the support of Europe. Since then, NATO has evolved from
this primary reliance on U.S. power to one of substantial interdependence --
in miliary as in other respects -- between the European and American
partners. This is natural. First, just as it is not practical for
Western Europe to develop the entire range of military forces -- nuclear
as well as non-nuclear -- to offset fully the Soviet military threat,
so it is impractical for the U.S. to achieve military self-sufficiency
independent of NATO. Secondly, the astonishing economic success of

- 2 -

- 5 -

Independent of NATO. Secondly, the astonishing economic success of
so it is impractical for the U.2. to achieve military self-sufficiency
as well as non-nuclear -- to offset fully the Soviet military threat,
Western Europe to develop the entire range of military forces -- nuclear
partners. This is natural. First, just as it is not practical for
in military as in other respects -- between the European and American
this primary reliance on U.2. power to one of substantial interdependence --
power to the support of Europe. Since then, NATO has evolved from
the significant military core of the Alliance was the commitment of U.2.
lationship had changed from the days of its creation in 1948 when

This re-examination also reflected our belief that the NATO re-
forces in Europe.

security and of our intention to maintain the full strength of our
President Kennedy's re-affirmation of our commitments to Europe's
strengthening of the NATO Alliance. From this conclusion stemmed
of an overriding U.2. concern with the security of Europe and the

TO