-10-

it would be most helpful to be explicit. I would like to stress,
however, that it is not more politeness when I say that I think
very highly of Emmet and that I like him very much as a person.
Indeed, I have no objections to your showing this preference to
him. I will be delighted to work with him. But I do believe
there should be a focus for acting policy and that it should not
be left until specific speeches come up in your schedule.

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR
FROM: HENRY KISSINGER

March 4, 1960

Here are some notes in accordance with our conversation. They are rough, but perhaps they can form the basis for further discussion.

1. One of the problems we have in thinking about policy is that we generally approach it in the reverse order of priority. We talk a great deal about technical problems, very little about the concepts from which these problems derive, and even less about the values on which everything depends. Perhaps our most important national need at the moment is the courage to say again a few simple and perhaps obvious things, in order to have a meaningful policy for both foreign and domestic. The proper order of thinking about it would be in the following sequence:

a. Basic values

b. Basic concepts

c. Structure of the world that we would like to see come about

d. Specific technical solutions

2. Let me turn, then, to the problem of spiritual heritage. There is these days a great deal of discussion about values. Many people say we have to have values in order to survive. Others give the impression that one can simply invent values to suit one's purpose. This is not the case. We are the product of a particular tradition. We can only live by the values we have. We can revitalize them and give them meaning. Our ability

to contribute to a sense of direction so that the rest of the
world depends on the validity of these values and on the con-
viction with which we can imbue them.

3. It has become a commonplace to say that we are the products of the Judao-Christian tradition. The President has often referred to the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. Nevertheless it is fair to say that many of these phrases have been more in the nature of general incantation. We have not really been clear about what we mean by this and what relevance these general notions have throughout the world.

4. The tremendous contribution of Christianity was not so much the concept of human dignity - the Greeks and Romans had that also - but the idea that their moral standards not being made by man could, therefore, not be abolished by the state. When we say that man is not the servant of the state, we have in mind the existence of some standard of morality by which the actions of governments can be judged and which is not created by the state.

5. We are so used to thinking in these terms that we take them for granted, but it was an original contribution when it was developed. And it has not fully grown elsewhere. In all other societies, religion, and therefore morality, has been subject to the state. The idea that the individual conscience and the concern with eternal values has a fundamental significance for our present period.

-3-

6. Stated negatively, it defines our difference from the modern totalitarians including the Communists. The modern dictators have all claimed to represent the people. They have all paid lip service to promoting human dignity. What they have lacked is the sense of reverence which in Christian theology is produced by the notion of salvation. It requires a conviction that each human being is essentially unique and valuable, but also that there exists a standard bigger than man. The modern totalitarian is a manipulator of men because he lacks this sense of reverence. His symbol is the commissar who condemns millions to death or to misery without love or without hatred, simply pursuing some notion of efficiency or productivity. If we are true to our beliefs, we cannot make material achievement our end in itself. Its value is the quality of life it makes possible.

7. Stated positively, this notion of the Brotherhood of Man and of the sense of reverence towards man defines our historic opportunity. It means that we can contribute towards the creation of a world structure which helps the peoples of the world realize what must be their deepest goals if they are to live in dignity and on the basis of mutual respect.

8. This, however, is not a technical problem. The difficulty of American foreign policy in the past decade and a half is that we have not really believed in our deepest values. Cut off from our roots we have floundered in a sea of expedients, assailed by uncertainties, dominated more by our fears than our hopes. Our approach has been essentially manipulative and technical. But on the level of sheer technicality the problems

-4-

are insoluble and it is impossible to muster the required
purpose and dedication. As a Nation, we must be prepared to
bear witness to our values and not simply to offer a technique.
If other peoples feel our concern, revealed to them in a spirit
of consultation in developing together a world structure, a
great step forward will have been taken.

9. One of the appeals of Communism has been that for all its ruthlessness, it has seemed to many people to embody purpose, direction and a sense for the structure of the universe. By committing themselves to Communism, people have the feeling of belonging. It is a sign of our spiritual weakness that Communism has been able to appropriate such phrases as "freedom" and "human dignity." The seeming dynamism of Communism is really basically a reflection of the loss of the sense of direction of the free countries.

10. The great challenge before us is to develop a concept of a world structure which derives from our own values. In a sense, such has been America's history. The founding fathers created a political framework for the Nation, but based on values which they believed to be universal. And the history of America represents an expansion of its concerns. At first, our tasks were shaped by the need to tame a wilderness. But as our society developed we have always felt challenged, first by human inequality, then by social injustice. The purgatory of the Civil War testified to this struggle and every succeeding decade has seen an expansion of America's concerns.

-5-

11. On the international scene, these values expressed themselves in the work of missionaries and, later on, the private foundations. In the decades ahead, we must come to realize as a Nation, not only that we have specific technical tasks, but that what happens in other parts of the world is as important to us as the fate of people of America in any State of the Union. The structure of the world must become as basic an American concern as human equality was in the middle of the 19th Century, and social equality was in the 20th.

12. This is of great relevance to our relations, not only to the Communist world, but even more so to the new nations that are emerging. They are the products of the values of human dignity that we have affirmed. They were sufficiently inspired by them to conduct a struggle for independence, often with great suffering. They must now come to understand that a successful revolution is the end, not the beginning, of a process. As much suffering has been caused in the name of mankind as in the name of tyranny. We must work with them to create a world structure in which the affirmation of man is coupled with a feeling of reverence and the assertion of human dignity with a feeling of love, And we must genuinely feel this if we are to carry out the task. We can be convincing to others only if we are convincing to ourselves.

13. As a Nation we, therefore, must be clear that we are not working toward some terminal date on which all tensions magically disappear. We must also realize that our task is far more complicated than public acclaim. The Communists can be

satisfied with popular demonstrations in the free world, since
all they want is to produce chaos and they can rest on es-
tablishing a system of organization because their basic goal
is productivity and efficiency.

14. We, on the other hand, have a more complicated task of commending whatever good will we have to tasks of construction, and our construction can not rest on efficiency and productivity alone. We must help develop and believe in a respect for standards greater than the man and the aspirations to which defines man's unique quality. Too often we take refuge in technical tasks which, complicated as they may be, evade the real issue which is fundamentally spiritual and moral. Economic development and public administration are undoubtedly essential. Even more vital is the attitude which underlies them and the purpose to which it is put.

15. This can be applied to a number of things, such as negotiations, economic aid, etc.

June 3, 1960

To: Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York

From: Henry A. Kissinger

IMPORTANT NOTE

In your conversation with Secretary Gates, I think it is essential that you inform him at the beginning about your decision to speak out on national issues. It is also important to make clear to him that he is responsible for the classification problem. My worry is that they will give you a highly classified briefing and then accuse you of having broken security regulations if you speak. Most of the classified facts can be found also in published material if you know where to look for them.

It might also be a good idea if someone from your staff (maybe Emmet Hughes or Oscar) attended so that if an issue should be made later on, you will be protected.

 staff (may be Emmett Hughes or Oscar) attended so that if an item

it you know where to look for them.

the classified facts can be found also in hypoliped material
paving broken security regulations it you see. Most of
Give you a highly classified briefing and then accrue you of
for the classification problem. If worry is that they will
also important to make clear to him that he is reasonable
upon your decision to see out on national issues. It is
to think it is essential that you inform him at the beginning

IMPORTANT NOTE

From: Henry V. Klaasen

To: Governor of the State of New York
Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

June 3, 1960

A Possible Projection of Future Trends

Whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or whenever
it appears that an election can be won in the ordinary political
way, the nominee will be a far more conventional type than you.
It seems to me also that if there is "normalcy" Kennedy will be
well-nigh unbeatable. His social welfare program is going to
win over many who now oppose him on religious grounds. By 1964,
a new generation will have grown up to whom the Eisenhower era
will probably appear irrelevant.

Moreover, in many fields of policy the remedial measures
are reasonably obvious. Any energetic man cannot fail to bring
about dramatic movement. But for one fact, I would say that we
are entering another Democratic era. This factor is my conviction
that the international situation will almost certainly continue
to deteriorate.

There are two reasons for this conviction. The first is
outside Kennedy's control. I believe strongly that someone will
have to pay the bill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight
years we have been living on capital--a process which can be quite
pleasant as long as some capital remains. The net result, however,
is inevitably a stalling up of trouble. We have reached the period
when the bills are coming due and when we must face our challenges
with our reserves depleted. A few years ago, only foresight was
required to master events. For the 1960's, I'm lonely and harsh
tasks are almost unavoidable. The spasm of crises of last May
marked by the collapse of the summit, the cancellation of the
President's visit to Japan, the Congo and Cuba are a foretaste of
what seem to me inevitable at an every-accelerating pace, regardless
of what policies Kennedy follows.

For example, it seems likely to me that the next Administration
will see more upheavals in Africa and probably in Latin America. Iran
could collapse any day. Chinese pressure in South East Asia will
intensify. Castroism may spread. There will be a showdown on Berlin.
The Western Alliance is far from firm. The new Administration will
have to preside over a major revision of our relations with Communist
China, the best possible end result of which can only be a cutting
of our losses and not any positive gain. The use by the Soviets
of disarmament negotiations to demoralize the West is likely to
continue.

As the phrase "without disarmament there can be no peace" becomes
established the Soviets will be in the driver's seat. For failure
to achieve arms control will then convince many in the West that all
is lost and that unilateral disarmament is preferable to a continuation

it lost and that unilateral disarmament is preferable to a continuation to achieve arms control will then convince many in the West that all established the Soviet will be in the driver's seat. For failure As the phrase "without disarmament there can be no peace," becomes continue.

of disarmament negotiations to demoralize the West is likely to of our forces and not any positive gain. The use by the Soviet China's the best possible end result of which can only be a cutting have to break out over a major revocation of our relations with Communist The Western Alliance is far from firm. The new Administration will intensity. Castroism may arise. There will be a showdown on Berlin, could collaboration end. Czechoslovakia will see more upheavals in Africa and probably in Latin America. Iran For example, it seems likely to me that the next Administration of what policies Kennedy follows.

what seem to me inevitable at an ever-accelerating pace, regardless President's a visit to Japan, the Congo and India are a foretaste of marked by the collapse of the summit, the cancellation of the tasks are almost unachievable. The beam of crisis of last May required to water events. For the 1960's a lonely and hard with our reserve depleted. A few years ago, only foretaste was when the bills are coming due and when we must face our challenges it inevitably a striking number of trouble. We have reached the period pleasant as long someone capital remains. The net result, however, years we have been living on capital--a process which can be quite have to pay the bill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight outside Kennedy's control. I believe strongly that someone will There are two reasons for this conviction. The first is to deteriorate.

that the international situation will almost certainly continue are entering another Democratic era. This factor is my conviction about dramatic movement. But for one fact, I would say that we are reasonably optimistic. And energetic men cannot fail to bring Moreover, in many fields of policy the remedial measures will probably appear irrelevant.

A new generation will have grown up to whom the Eisenhower era will over many who now observe him on religious grounds. By 1964, well-nigh unprecedented. His social welfare program is going to It seems to me also that it there is "nowhere" Kennedy will be when the nominee will be a far more conventional type than you. it abates that an election can be won in the ordinary political Whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or whenever

## A Possible Projection of Future Trends

-2-

of the Cold War. Among intellectuals this kind of thinking is al-
ready alarmingly wide-spread. I would also expect the Soviets
gradually to transform their disarmament proposals into demands,
particularly vis-a-vis peripheral areas, and to seek to achieve
domination over them in the name of arms control. Not all these
things need happen, of course. But an accelerated tempo of crises
seems inevitable.

The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the inter-
national situation to be extremely probabe is connected with the
personality of Kennedy and, above all, with that of his intimate
advisors. During the immobility of the Eisenhower Administration
it has been overlooked that much of the criticism was as irrelevant
as the policy itself. Many of the critics assumed that the main
failure of Eisenhower was in the field of budgetary restraints.
They believed that all that was needed on the international scene
was an increase in foreign aid appropriations and in the military
budget. They reasoned that if the underfed, underdeveloped third
of the world witnessed a dramatic rise in its economic well-being,
it would look up to America much as the deprived in the Depression
looked up to the New Deal. They identify "flexibility" with wooing
the uncommitted and believe that these can somehow be brought to
our side. They assume that we must strengthen Khrushchev--who is
thought to be a liberal--against his domestic foes.

All these assumptions seem to me highly dubious. The New
Deal was carried out in a society whose political framework was
highly stable. The threat was social and economic discontent. By
removing the disparity between aspiration and reality the under-
lying political unity could reassert itself.

But political structure is exactly what is lacking in the con-
temporary world. To bring it about is a slow task and until it
comes into existence, upheavals are extremely likely. Nor can it be
achieved by purely economic means. Indeed, the most generous programs
will be ineffective as long as it is believed that we have no
other choice. In present circumstances even our most generous
actions may be interpreted as weakness, our most moderate policies
as imposed on us by events. Before economic measures can be effec-
tive we may have to undertake some difficult and lonely actions--
and without them these programs cannot succeed. Kennedy, in so far as
I can judge, is surrounded by people who grossly underestimate the
gravity of our situation. In arms control, on European policy, in
negotiations with the Soviets, they may undertake reckless experiments.

To repeat, in the best of circumstances the international situ-
ation is likely to deteriorate. But your role, it seems to me, will
be the same: to act as the conscience of the nation, to warn even

be the same: to act as the conscience of the nation, to man even
ation is likely to deteriorate. But here role, it seems to me, will
To rebest, in the best of circumstances the international esti-
negotiations with the Soviet, they may underestimate recusive experiments.

Gravity of our situation. In arms control, on European policy, in
I can judge, is surrounded by people who greatly underestimate the
and without them these programs cannot succeed. Kennedy, in so far as
tive we may have to underestimate some difficult and formless actions--
as implied on our p. events. Before economic measure can be effective
actions may be interfered as measures, our most moderate policies
will be ineffective as long as it is believed that we have so
achieved p. briefly economic means. Indeed, the most generous programs
come into existence, as above, are extremely likely. Now can it be
temporary world. To print it apart is a loan task and until it
But political structure is exactly what is lacking in the can-
ying political maturity could reassert itself.

removing the disparity between abnegation and reality the under-
presently staple. The threat we social and economic discontent. By
Debt was carried out in a society whose political framework was
All these assumptions seem to me highly problematic. The New


thought to be a liberal--against its domestic foes.
our side. They assume that we must strengthen Kruschevans--who is
the uncommitted and believe that these can somehow be brought to
looked up to the New Deal. They identify "flexibility" with moving
it would look up to America much as the deprived in the Depression
of the world witnessed a dramatic rise in its economic well-being.
pudges. They reasoned that if the underfed, underdeveloped third
was an increase in foreign aid appropriations and in the military
They believed that all that was needed on the international scene
was the policy itself. Much of the criticism assumed that the main
it has been overreacted that much of the criticism was as irrelevant
as the policy itself. During the impurity of the Eisenhower Administration
personality of Kennedy and, above all, with that of the intimate
national situation to be extremely broade is connected with the
The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the inter-
seems insignificant.

things need happen, of course. But an accelerated tempo of arms
domination over them in the name of arms control. Not all these
batterially anti-a-via Berlinwall areas, and to see to achieve
quickly to transform their situation proboufe into desMODES,
really widely widespread. I would also expect the Soviet
of the Cold War. Wrong intelectualize this kind of thinking is al-

-3-

There are two reasons for this conviction. The first is
outside Kennedy's control. I believe strongly that someone will
have to pay the bill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight
years we have been living on capital--a process which can be quite
pleasant as long as some capital remains. The net result, however,
is inevitably a stopping up of trouble. We have reached the period
when the bills are coming due and when we must face our challenges
with our reserves depleted. A few years ago, only foresight was
required to master events. For the 1960's, a lonely and harsh
tasks are almost unavoidable. The spasm of crises of last May
marked by the collapse of the summit, the cancellation of the
President's visit to Japan, the Congo and Cuba are a foretaste of
what seem to me inevitable at an every-accelerating pace, regardless
of what policies Kennedy follows.

it cost and that military disarmament is preferable to a continuation
to achieve arms control will then convince many in the West that all
eatplanted the Soviets will be in the driver's seat. For failure
As the phrase "without disarmament there can be no peace" becomes

continue.

of disarmament negotiations to demoralize the West is likely to
at our losses and not any positive gain. The same by the Soviets
China, the best possible end result of which can only be a cutting
have to breathe over a major revision of our relations with Communist
The Western Alliance to far from him. The new Administration will
intensify. Catechism may arise. There will be a showdown on Berlin,
conflict between us and Japan. Chinese brevets in South East Asia will
will see more upheavals in Africa and properly in Latin America. Iran
for example, it seems likely to me that the next Administration

of what policies Kennedy follows.
what seem to me inevitable at an every-accelerating pace, regardless
President's visit to Japan, the Convo and Cops are a foreseen
marking by the collaboration of the summit, the cancellation of the
cities are almost unavoidable. The abscissa of axis of last May
required to water events. For the 1960's may be few and far
with our reserves depleted. A few years ago, only forecast was
when the bills are coming due and when we must face our challenges
is inevitably a spending up of trouble. We have reached the period
blessed as long as some capital remains. The net result, however,
years we have been living on capital--a process which can be quite
have to pay the bill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight
outside Kennedy's control. I believe strongly that someone will
there are two reasons for this conviction. The first is
to deteriorate.

that the international situation will almost certainly continue
are entering another Democratic era. This factor is my conviction
about dramatic movement. But for one fact, I would say that we
are reasonably obvious. And energetic men cannot fail to bring
Moreover, in many fields of policy the remedial measures
will properly appear irrelevant.

a new generation will come born to whom the Eisenhower era
will over many who now oblige him on religious grounds. By 1964,
well-nigh unapproachable. His social welfare program is going to
It seems to me also that it there is "normality" Kennedy will be
way, the nominee will be a far more conventional figure than him.
it abates that an election can be won in the ordinary political
Whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or whenever

-2-

The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the inter-
national situation to be extremely probabe is connected with the
personality of Kennedy and, above all, with that of his intimate
advisors. During the immobility of the Eisenhower Administration
it has been overlooked that much of the criticism was as irrelevant
as the policy itself. Many of the critics assumed that the main
failure of Eisenhower was in the field of budgetary restraints.
They believed that all that was needed on the international scene
was an increase in foreign aid appropriations and in the military
budget. They reasoned that if the underfed, underdeveloped third
of the world witnessed a dramatic rise in its economic well-being,
it would look up to America much as the deprived in the Depression
looked up to the New Deal. They identify "flexibility" with wooing
the uncommitted and believe that these can somehow be brought to
our side. They asume that we must strengthen Khrushchev--who is
thought to be a liberal--against his domestic foes.

be the same: to act as the conscience of the nation, to warn even
action is likely to deteriorate. But how role it seems to me, will
To repeat, in the face of circumstances the international at-
negotiations with the Soviets, they wish underlie reckless experiments.

Gravity of our situation. In arms control, on European policy, in
I can judge, is surrounded by people who grossly underestimate the
and without them these programs cannot succeed. Kennedy, in so far as
we may prove to undertake some difficult and fewlly actions--
as imposed on us by events. Before economic measures can be effec-
tive may be interpreted as weakness, our most moderate policies
other choice. In present circumstances even our most moderate policies
will be ineffective as long as it is believed that we have no
achieved by barely economic means. Indeed, the most generous programs
come into existence, unless we are extremely likely. Nor can it be
temperarily world. To print it apart is a slow task and until it
But political structure is exactly what is lacking in the con-
cluding political maturity could researach itself.

removing the disparity between abnegation and reality the under-
highly staple. The threat was social and economic discontent. By
Debt was carried out in a society whose political framework was
All these assumptions seem to me highly dubious. The New

thought to be a liberal--against the domestic loss.
our side. They assume that we must strengthen Khrushchev--who is
the uncommitted and believe that these can somehow be brought to
looked up to the New Deal. They identify "flexibility" with moving
it would look up to America much as the deprived in the Depression
of the world witnessed a dramatic rise in its economic well-being,
p budget. They reasoned that if the underdeveloped third
was an increase in foreign aid appropriations and in the military
They believed that all that was needed on the international scene
future of Eisenhower was in the field of budgetary restraints.
as the policy itself. Many of the critics assumed that the main
it has been overlooked that much of the criticism was so irrelevant
advisors. During the immaturity of the Eisenhower Administration
benevolity of Kennedy and, above all, with that of the nation-
national attraction to be extremely probege is connected with the
The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the inter-
seems unattainable.

pungs need pabulum, of course. But an accelerated tempo of crie-
domation over them in the name of arms control. Not all these
particularly ate-a-via territorial areas, and to seek to achieve
stratify to transform their instrumentation proboscides into demands,
ready firmly wide-abroad. I would also expect the Soviets
of the Cold War. Wrong intellectuahve this kind of thinking is al-

-3-

November 18, 1960

Personal and Confidential

Mrs. Margaret Murphy
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Happy:

Enclosed is a copy of the memo-
randum which I mentioned the other day. I have
made it as explicit as I can. A copy has gone
to Nebon's apartment, but perhaps you might make
sure that he has received it and has a chance to
read it on his trip.

I wrote this memorandum for Nel-
son's personal use. If he should want to cir-
culate it, I would appreciate it if I could
prepare an expurgated version.

I hope to see you soon.

Kind regards.

Henry V. Kleinguer

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

I hope to see you soon.

breathe an exuberant version.
culate it. I would appreciate it if I could
know a personal one. If he should want to cir-

I wrote this memorandum for Mel-

read it over a few times.

sure that he has received it and has a chance to
to Nelson a apartment, but perhaps you might make
it as explicit as I can. A copy has been
made of it which I mentioned the other day. I have
 Enclosed is a copy of the memo-

Dear Happy:

New York 19, New York
22 West 22nd Street
Mrs. Margaret Murphy

Personal and Confidential

November 19, 1960

November 18, 1960

Personal and Confidential

Memorandum to the Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

From: Henry A. Kissinger

# 1. Introductory Comments.

Now that the election is over, a point has clearly been reached where it becomes appropriate for all of us to chart your future course, to evaluate the organization at your disposal and to seek to define the goals towards which you should be directing your efforts. I shall set down my preliminary thoughts with absolute frankness in the hope of being helpful.

You know my devotion to you. You are aware, I am sure, that you can count on my support, even if you disagree with my advice. My analysis is designed solely to help you and to supply a perspective which in your position may not always be available.

This is a period when it is easy to be discouraged. The past few months have been an emotional travail even for those at the fringes of the campaign. I know what it must have meant to you. Still, if we compare the point at which you find yourself now with the time that you left Washington, your achievement has been remarkable.

["the time that you felt Washington, your achievement has been remarkable.\nStill, if we compare the point at which you find yourself now with\nthe truce of the campaign. I know what it must have meant to you.\nbut few months have been an emotional travail even for those at\nthis period.", "This is a period when it is easy to be disappointed. The\na herewithive which in your position may not always be available.\nadvice. Myлыvai is designed solely to help you and to amply\nthat you can count on my support, even if you disagree with my\n

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -2- November 18, 1960

You have sparked a series of reports which focussed public attention on our peril and our opportunities. You have been elected Governor. Your record in this office has been outstanding. You have become a national figure. Almost single-handedly you moved the Republican Party to accept a platform which had it been maintained with conviction would surely have won the election.

Our present disappointment must not obscure the fact that events were largely out of your control. Though I shall offer suggestions for various changes in your organization and method of operation, these should not be taken as a judgment of the past, but as a means to help you shape your future.

The validity of everything that follows depends to a considerable extent on two factors: (a) My assessment of your role in our society and (b) the trends which I foresee, particularly in the international field.

## II. Your Role.

As for your role in our society, I have always believed that you were cast for greatness. Your idealism, sense of purpose, and conviction can inspire this society and may make it do the things of which it is capable. All of us who have had the privilege of being

of which it is capable. Will it be found that the privilege of being and conviction can inhere this society and may make it do the thing that you were cast for greatness. Your idea is some of hitherto. We for your role in our society, I have always believed

## II. Your Role.

international field.

our society and (b) the trend which I foresee, particularly in the etherable extent on two factors: (a) my assessment of your role in the validity of everything that follows depends to a con-

that should not be taken as a judgment of the past, but as a

evente were largely out of your control. Though I shall offer sugge-

Our present discharge must not obscure the fact that

the Republican party to accept a platform which had it been main-

tainable. Almost single-handedly you moved

tion on our behalf and our opportunities. You have been elected

You have embarked a series of reports which focused public atten-

tion

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -3- November 19, 1960

Personal and Confidential!

Personal and Confidential

-3-

November 18, 1960

associated with you have in the process discovered horizons which we had never known existed. It has always been my hope that some day you might do the same for the nation and indeed for the world.

Yet it is essential to realize that a price must be paid for greatness. The same qualities which will make you desperately needed in times of crisis will make you appear somewhat out of tune with your environment during periods of normalcy. If you are yourself, you will always make the regular organization man somewhat uncomfortable. Most organizations--and the Republican Party more than most--are run by a standard of average performance. Your vision and boldness, which may be desperately needed in times of crisis, are always likely to meet incomprehension in times of calm.

It is well to remember that the attributes which distinguish a great leader also doom him to a considerable degree of loneliness. Both Churchill and De Gaulle went through periods when they seemed politically doomed. Both were considered rash, or irresponsible, or simply irrelevant. Both prevailed in the end because history does not permit endless equivocation. Their opponents, who for a time seemed so clever and "balanced," were outstripped by events.

There is in the life of great men, then, an inherently tragic element. A people often learns only by experience; it 'knows' only when it is too late to act. But a leader must act as if his

only when it is too late to act. But a leader must act as if he were a creative element. A people alone learns only by experience; it knows there is in the life of great men, then, an inherently events.

who for a time seemed so clever and "balanced," were outstripped by
because preatory does not benefit endless education. Their exponents,
irresistible, or simply irrelevant. Both prevailed in the end
they seemed politically domed. Both were considered dead, or
inevitable. Both Churchill and Be Genie! went through periods when
Bulld a Great leader also does him to a considerable degree of lon-
lon. It is well to remember that the attributes which distin-
crate are always likely to meet incompensation in times of calm,
vital andجدeen, which may be deliberately needed in times of
tremendous--are run by a standard of average performance. Your
uncomfortable. Most organizations--and the Republican party more
soil, you will always make the regular organization man somewhat
with your environment during periods of normalcy. It you are hour-
needed in times of crisis will make you appear somewhat out of tune
tor Greatness. The same dittoities which will make you deliberately
Yet it is essential to realize that a price must be paid
due you might do the same for the nation and indeed for the world.
we had never known existed. It has always been my hope that some
associated with you have in the process discovered horizons which

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -3- November 18, 1960

## <u>Bluesman and Confident</u>

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aspirations were already reality. This is why great leaders often share the fate of prophets in the sense that they are without honor in their own country at least for a time. The more novel their intuition, the more likely this is to be true.

There is, however, one consolation in our period. Often the greatness of statesmen has been apparent only in retrospect when experience has caught up with their vision. In our day, the lead-time for prophets has been compressed, together with that of all other lead-times. Vindication is certain within a decade--though only an irresponsible person would predict that it must happen during the four year period which must concern us most immediately.

I have spent so much time on the nature of greatness because it seems to me to bear importantly on one of the problems connected with your public image over the past few years. There is a quality to the actions of great men peculiarly their own. Honesty compels me to say that I believe this to have been lacking in your performance over the past two years. Of course, you have done things no other person in public life would have dared to attempt: the tax increase, the civil defense program, your stand on nuclear testing. By any normal criteria, your actions have been outstanding.

You are not to be judged by normal criteria, however. My concern is not that outstanding things have not been accomplished but that the quality which has produced them has somehow failed to be

but that the quality which has produced them has someone failed to be
concern is not that outstanding things have not been accomplished
You are not to be judged by normal criteria, however. My
testing. By any normal criteria, your actions have been outstanding,
the tax increases, the civil defense program, your stand on nuclear
things no other person in public life would have dared to attempt:
performance over the past two years. Of course, you have done
combate me to say that I believe this to have been lacking in your
quality to the actions of great men benefitarily their own. Honestly
connected with your public image over the past few years. There is
cause it seems to me to bear importantly on one of the problems
I have about so much time on the nature of greatness be-
the four year period which must concern me most immediately.

only an irrefutable person would predict that it must happen during
other lead-times. Indication is certain within a decade--though
time for problems has been compressed, together with that of all
experience has caught up with their vision. In our day, the lead-
the greatness of statesmen has been abherent only in retrospect when
there is, however, one correlation in our period. Often
tuition, the more likely this is to be true,
in their own country at least for a time. The more novel their in-
spire the late of problems in the sense that they are without power
aspirations were already reality. This is why great leaders often

Honorable Nelson V. Rockeeller

November 18, 1960

Personal and Confidential

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -5- November 18, 1960

conveyed. You still lack a clear profile in the public mind. Far too few people know you for what you are. Far too many see only the activity you generate but not the purpose which animates you.

Your speaking style seems to me too often to have contained a kind of rhetoric which tends to obscure rather than clarify. Above all, it simply does not sound like you. Your measures, even when individually correct, as they almost invariably are, too often seem to lack relationship to each other. You have not received full benefit of the courageous and profound steps you have taken. Actions which to your friends could only prove your greatness of spirit have not made the impact they should have, even on people well-disposed to you.

I am trying to make two points. First, the greatest contribution to our society you can make is to maintain the values and to advocate the programs which represent what you most deeply believe. This is also your greatest political asset. Thus, the crucial problem is what _you_ believe and what _you_ want--not what some group of advisors, however dedicated or able, thinks you should want.

The test of your role in our society is not tomorrow's editorial, but the one two or three or five years from now. You are the only public figure with the strength, the courage and the conviction to stand alone, if necessary. You are therefore the person who is the hope of the country to reverse the collapse of values and

who is the people of the country to reverse the collusión of values and
viction to stand alone, it necessarily. You are therefore the person
the only public figure with the strength, the courage and the con-
editorial, put the one two or three or five hours from now. You are
The rest of your role in our society is not tomorrow's
Brand of advice, however dedicated orpie, thinks you should want.
crucial problem is what you believe and what you want--not what some
believe. This is also your greatest political asset. Time, the
and to advocate the program which represent what you most deeply
tribution to our society you can make it to maintain the values
I am trying to make two points. First, the greatest con-
to you.

pave not made the impact they should have, even on people well-informed
which to your friend could only prove your greatness of spirit
tot of the courageous and broombound acts you have taken. Actions
to lack relationship to each other. You have not received full pen-
individually correct, as they almost invariably are, too often seem
all, it usually does not sound like you. Your measures, even when
a kind of rhetoric which tends to opine rather than clarify. Above
Your shearing style seems to me too often to have contained
activity you generate but not the hubbub which animates you.

too few people know you for what you are. But too much see only the
conveyed. You still lack a clear brotile in the public mind. But

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November 18, 1960

of thought which has characterized so much of our post-war policy.

Second: your role in our society transcends fluctuating
political fortune. Of course, all your friends must hope that you
will have the opportunity to inspire the nation as you do them.
But this depends on many factors, some of them out of our control.
Whatever your political fortunes, your special qualities will be
desperately needed. As long as you uphold your principles, you will
play a major role and you will always have a major forum.

Thus the challenge ahead is to clarify your program, to
maintain it regardless of short-term swings of public opinion,
and to emerge in this fashion as the conscience of the nation. In
that case, there seems to me every possibility that in four years
the country will be ready for you.

I would now like to turn to this problem.

that case, there seems to me every possibility that in four years
and to emerge in this fashion as the conscience of the nation. In
maintain it regardless of short-term swings of public opinion.

Time the challenge ahead is to clarify your program, to
play a major role and you will arrive have a major form.

decently needed. We lack as you uphold your principles, you will
whatever your political fortunes, your special duties will be
but this depends on many factors, some of them out of our control,
will have the opportunity to realize the nation as you do them.
political fortunes. Of course, all your friends must hope that your
Second: your role in our society transcends fluctuating
of thought which pass characterized so much of our past and past.

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Confidential and Confidential!

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### III. A Possible Projection of Future Trends.

Whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or whenever it appears that an election can be won in the ordinary political way, the nominee will be a far more conventional type than you. It seems to me also that if there is 'normalcy' Kennedy will be well night unbeatable. His social welfare program is going to win over many who now oppose him on religious grounds.

as long as some cabaret remains. The net result, however, is inevitably
have been living on capital--a process which can be quite pisgah
but the pill for the Eisenhower Administration. For eight years we
side Kennedy's control. I believe strongly that someone will have to
there are two reasons for this conviction. The first is out-
continues to deteriorate.

than that the international situation will arise in certain
are entering another democratic era. This factor is my com-
about dramatic movement. But for one fact, I would say that we
are reasonably optimistic. And energetic men cannot fail to bring
Moreover, in many fields of policy the remedial measures
Eisenhower era will properly appear irrelevant.

By 1964, a new generation will have grown up to whom the
Going to war over many who now acknowledge him on religious grounds.
will be well sight unopposable. His social welfare program is
now. It seems to me also that if there is normally Kennedy
rural way, the machine will be a far more conventional scheme than
ever it appears that an election can be won in the ordinary bolt-
whenever conditions seem safe or non-critical or when-

### III. V Possible Projection of Future Trends.

Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler -7- November 13, 1960

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a storing up of trouble. We have reached the period when the bills are coming due and when we must face our challenges with our reserves depleted. A few years ago, only foresight was required to master events. For the 1960's lonely and harsh tasks are almost unavoidable. The spasm of crises of last May marked by the collapse of the summit, the cancellation of the President's visit to Japan, the Congo and Ouba are a foretaste of what seem to me inevitable at an ever-accelerating pace, regardless of what policies Kennedy follows.

"As the phrase without disarmament 'there can be no peace' becomes established the Soviets will be in the driver's seat. For failure to achieve arms control will then convince many in the West that all is lost and that unilateral disarmament is preferable to a

that all is lost and that unilateral disassembly is desirable to a
failure to achieve some control will then convince many in the West
become accustomed the Soviet will be in the driver's seat. For
the pressure without disassembly there can be no peace."
demoralize the West if likely to continue.

five gain. The use by the Soviet of disassembly negotiations to
act of which can only be a cutting of our losses and not any benefit
of our relations with Communist China, the past acceptable and re-
the new Administration will have to break down over a major reversal
a showdown on Berlin. The Western Alliance is far from firm.
East Asia will intensify. Castroism may abroad. There will be
America. Iran could collapse and day. Chinese pressure in South
stratton will see more upheavals in Asia and properly in Latin
for example, it seems likely to me that the next Abbi-
bolice Kennedy follows.

to me inevitable at an ever-accelerating pace, regardless of what
visit to taken, the Congo and Uganda are a foretaste of what seem
by the collapse of the summit, the cancellation of the President's
are almost unavoidable. The abatement of crises of last May marked
due to master events. For the 1960 a few days and then sales
our reserves depleted. A few months ago, only foretaste was re-
views are coming due and when we must face our challenges with
a staking out of trouble. We have reached the period when the

November 18, 1960

Confidential

[7]

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -9- November 18, 1960

continuation of the Cold War. Among intellectuals this kind of thinking is already alarmingly wide-spread. I would also expect the Soviets gradually to transform their disarmament proposals into demands, particularly vis-a-vis peripheral areas, and to seek to achieve domination over them in the name of arms control.

Finally, I would not be surprised if sometime over the next decade, the Communists would set up their own United Nations-- both Khrushchev and Mao have hinted at it in speeches and it is our fault if we do not take them seriously. Not all these things need happen of course. But an accelerated tempo of crises seems inevitable.

The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the international situation to be extremely probable is connected with the personality of Kennedy and, above all, with that of his intimate advisors. During the immobility of the Eisenhower Administration it has been overlooked that much of the criticism was as irrelevant as the policy itself. Many of the critics have assumed that the main failure of Eisenhower was in the field of budgetary restraints. They believe that all that is needed on the international scene is an increase in foreign aid appropriations and in the military budget. They reason that if the underfed, underdeveloped third of the world witnesses a dramatic rise in its economic well-being, it will look up to American much as the deprived in the Depression looked up to the

to American men as the deprived in the Debeaumont looked up to the
necesce a dramatic rise in its economic well-being, it will look up
reason that it the underfed, underfedfed fed up of the world wit-
creases in foreign aid appropriations and in the military budget. They
believe that all that is needed on the international scene is an in-
terlude of Eiispower was in the field of podgeryyly restraints. They
the policy itself. Many of the critics have assumed that the main
have been overlooked that much of the criticism was an irrelevant as
advisors. During the innumeracy of the Eiispower Administration it
the personality of Kennedy and, above all, with that of the intimate
ternational situation to be extremely propitious is connected with

The second reason why I believe a deterioration of the in-
pitude of course. But an accelerated tempo of class some inevitable.
tanit it we do not take them seriously. Not all these things need
pity Khrushchev and Mao have plated at it in shepherds and it is our
next decade, the Commentator would act up their own United Nations--
Actually, I would not be surprised if sometime over the
seek to achieve stabilization over them in the name of some control.
into demands, particularly via-a-visational areas, and to
the Soviet gradually to transform their treatment broadeels
thinning is already firmly wide-above. I would also expect
continuation of the Cold War. Among intellectuahle this kind of

Honorarle Nelson V. Rockettler -3- November 19, 1960

Reasons and Confidentia!

Personal and Confidential

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -10- November 18, 1960

All these assumptions seem to me highly dubious. The New Deal was carried out in a society whose political framework was highly stable. The threat was social and economic discontent. By removing the disparity between aspiration and reality the underlying political unity could reassert itself.

But political structure is exactly what is lacking in the contemporary world. To bring it about is a slow task and until it comes into existence upheavals are extremely likely. Nor can it be achieved by purely economic means. Indeed, the most generous programs will be ineffective as long as it is believed that we have no other choice. In present circumstances even our most generous actions may be interpreted as weakness, our most moderate policies as imposed on us by events. Before economic measures can be effective we may have to undertake some difficult and lonely actions--and without them these programs cannot succeed. Kennedy, in so far as I can judge, is surrounded by people who grossly underestimate the gravity of our situation. In arms control, on European policy, in negotiations with the Soviets, they may undertake reckless experiments.

To repeat, in the best of circumstances the international
with the Soviet, they may undertake reckless experiments.

of our situation. In some control, on European policy, in negotiations
Jarge, is surrounded by people who grossly underestimates the gravity
out them these programs cannot succeed. Kennedy, in so far as I can
we may have to undertake some difficult and lonely actions--and with-
though on my part events. Before economic measures can be effective
tions may be interpreted as weakness, our most moderate believes as
other choice. In present circumstances even our most generous ac-
Brzev will be ineffective as long as it is believed that we have no
achieved by merely economic means. Indeed, the most generous bro-
come into existence perhaps are extremely likely. Nor can it be
contemporarily world. To bring it about is a slow task and until it
But political structure is exactly what is lacking in the
political unity could reemerge itself.

removing the disparity between subtraction and reality the underlying
highly stable. The threat was social and economic discontent. By
New Deal was carried out in a society whose political framework was
All these assumptions seem to me highly dubious. The
a fiscal--against the domestic toes.

assumes that we must strengthen Kruppeweg--who is thought to be
and believe that these can somehow be brought to our side. They
New Deal. They identify "flexibility" with accepting the uncommitted

Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller -10- November 13, 1960

Personnel and Confidential

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Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -11- November 18, 1960

situation is likely to deteriorate. But your role, it seems to me, will be the same: to act as the conscience of the nation, to warn even when it is unpopular; to be clear and forceful and unequivocal. Of course, the trends I describe may not materialize in the first term of a new Administration. But you should be available should a crisis come and build up your moral credit for that eventuality.

In these conditions I can foresee two possibilities: your nomination in 1964 or your appointment to a Cabinet of national unity when the gravity of our situation becomes widely apparent.

## IV. The Obstacles to Getting the Nomination.

It would be idle to deny the obstacles in the way of your nomination. The election did not finish Nixon as a force in the Republican Party. It did not bring about a clear mandate for a more liberal Republican policy. It has done nothing to reduce the hostility of the regular party organization to you--in fact, it may have magnified it. Your own position in the state is still not solid. The Republican organization of the state of New York does not seem to me to be under firm control. The public does not fully understand how outstanding your work as Governor has been. On the contrary, there may be an impression of excessive absenteeism.

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November 18, 1960

one which is completely contrary to your real qualities.

I will now turn to this problem in greater detail.

V. Problems of Organization.

For purposes of discussion, it may be useful to divide
your organization into three general groups. These distinctions
are to some extent arbitrary, but they may serve to illustrate
some of the problems and also suggest measures of utilizing the
special abilities of your staff to best advantage.

These three groups are: (a) Individuals who have been
with your family for many years; (b) Individuals hired in the recent
past as your public activities have expanded; (c) Individuals charged
with primarily political tasks.

Since what follows may seem somewhat negative, I would
like to say now that I have never seen a more dedicated group and
that their ability is beyond dispute. The problems arise with the
present mode of utilizing them given their varying backgrounds. With
that qualification, let me now turn to the problems of each group:

(a) The people who have been with your family for many
years are marvelous human beings. They are still the mainstays of
your organization. With a few exceptions they find themselves, how-
ever, in a situation quite different from the one for which their ex-
perience had prepared them. Most of them had seen one of their

benevolent pad bóneóred them. Most of them had seen one of their
brothers in a situation quite different from the one for which their en-
joyment was completely contrary to their real desires.

(a) The people who have been with their family for many
times during the last ten years, let me now turn to the problems of each group:
before mode of utilizing them given their varying backgrounds. With
that their spillover is beyond dispute. The problems arise with the
time to each now that I have never seen a more dedicated group and
since what follows may seem somewhat negative, I would
with primarily political views.

These three groups are: (a) Individuals who have been
special individuals of their group to best advantage.

some of the problems and some effective measures of utilizing the
are to some extent extraneous, put that which serves to illustrate
their organization into three general groups. These distinctions
for purposes of discussion, it may be useful to give

## A. Problems of Organization.

one which is completely contrary to their real desires.

Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler -13- November 18, 1960

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November 18, 1960

primary duties to be protective. Their habit is to prevent things
from happening. They have a tendency to be cautious and analytical.
Moreover, most of their expertise has been in fields other than the
political. Thus in the area which is now your primary concern they
lack the competence, the assurance and the imagination to make the
same contribution that they do to the affairs of your family. I
say this not as a criticism--only to indicate that the balance wheel
on which you have relied in the past is now only one part of the
whole and has lost some of its effectiveness.

(b) The second group of the staff is in many ways the most troublesome. They have not been exposed to the spirit and dedication of your family sufficiently long. They lack the discipline of the professional politicians. I do not doubt either their sincerity or their devotion. But by temperament or background they are more used to thinking in terms of tactical expedients than of over-all strategy; more to pushing their immediate views than relating them to an over-all program. Their style is not your style. They can be useful but unless strongly controlled they create a frenetic atmosphere and fail to bring about coherent actions.

(c) The professional politicians have the opposite problem.
To them quite clearly you are measured in terms of vote-getting abil-
ity. Their horizons are limited by the risks of a difficult profession.

ity. Their portions are limited by the rules of a difficult proscription.
To them quite clearly you are measured in terms of vote-getting split-

(c) The professional politicians have the obverse problem.

nwise strongly controlled they create a tempestuous atmosphere and tell

more to busing their immediate views than relating them to an over-

(p) The second group of the staff is in many ways the most

turns contribution that they do to the affairs of your family. I

political. True in the area which is now your primarily concern try

from habitation. They have a tendency to be cautious and analytical.

Honorable Selma V. Rocketteler

November 18, 1960

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November 18, 1960

They have experienced too many upheavals to form permanent loyalties. They are experts at projecting familiar trends. They suffer from an excess of caution. They want you to prevail in the "normal" way--the only way they know and the one most inconsistent with your special qualities. They require discipline, organization, and someone to assume the responsibility for setting the goals. They are handicapped by the fact that few of them has had experience on the national scene. They are highly competent in a narrowly circumscribed area. Their effectiveness depends on how well they are related to other parts of your activities.

None of this is bad in itself. Indeed, if the over-all organization were more effective, the short-comings of each of these groups would cancel each other out and their assets could be mutually reinforcing. The real difficulty is posed by the fact that there exists no real focal point for coordination short of yourself.

This has several unfortunate consequences. I constantly hear complaints about your inaccessibility or about chaotic administrative arrangements when you travel. This was particularly true during your trips around the country last year. The merit of these complaints is not at issue. They would be less strident if there existed an individual or a group of them clearly entitled to speak for you and charged with coordinating technical arrangements.

Let me give another illustration. You are an extremely

Let me give another illustration. You are an extremely
lot you and charged with coordinating technical arrangements.

existed an individual or a group of them clearly entitled to ask
complaints is not at issue. They would be less strident if there
during your trip around the country last year. The merit of these
operative arrangements when you travel. This was particularly true
past complaints about your inaccessibility or about chaotic admit-

This has several undermost consequences. I concurrently
exists no real focal point for coordination short of yoursell.

reinforcing. The real difficulty is based on the fact that there
Brooks would cancel each other out and their assets could be usefully
organization were more effective, the apart-combute of each of these

None of this is bad in itself. Indeed, it the over-all
related to other bases of your activities.

described area. Their effectiveness depends on how well they are
the national scene. They are highly competent in a narrowly cir-
are handicapped by the fact that few of them has had experience on
someone to assume the reasonability for setting the scene. They
special qualities. They reduce discipline, organization, and
work--the only way they know and the one most inconsistent with your
an excess of caution. They want you to prevail in the "normal"

They are experts at projecting familiar trends. They submit from
They have experienced too many upturns to form permanent loyalties.
November 18, 1960 -12-

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November 13, 1960

strong personality. You therefore find it next to impossible to get advice which is contrary to what your staff thinks you want. Since the members of your staff are so deeply devoted to you, they are of necessity desperately eager to gain your approbation. And they tend to seek this in a rather short-term manner.

Tactics to enhance your immediate public reception are accordingly overstressed. Momentum tends to be confused with purpose. You, in turn, are put in an impossible position. For reasons of morale you cannot reject every suggestion made to you and in the absence of a planning staff or screening device, you lack an alternative proposal in any case. You are thereby often driven to accept a part of the program suggested. This creates an optical illusion. What may seem like moderation from the perspective of your office may appear to outsiders quite differently.

Thus, during the period of your "speaking out" last June, a statement was issued almost as often as some of your advisors could get to you. I agreed with the substance of these statements. Yet their mass gave an impression of a frantic quest for headlines. Two major pronouncements, sober in tone, solemn yet not sentimental in content, would have been much more effective. But there was no mechanism by which these considerations could be placed before you.

The recent campaign illustrates this also. You are undoubtedly aware of the widespread criticism of your role, however unjust. I

aware of the widespread criticism of your role, I support your actions.

The recent campaign illustrates this also. You are undoubtedly
mechanism by which these considerations could be placed before you.
in content, would have been much more effective. But there was no
Two major brominements, either in tone, or even not sentimental
yet their mass gave an impression of a frantic quest for headlines.
could get to you. I agreed with the substance of these statements.
a statement was issued almost as often as some of your advocates
that, during the period of how 'shocking' it was 'funny'.

aboard to outside人士 differently.

What may seem like moderation from the perspective of hour刊 may
a part of the program suggested. This creates an optical illusion.
native proposal in such case. You are thereby often driven to accept
appearance of a blundering effort or screening device, how lack an siter-
of morale you cannot reject every suggestion made to you and in the
base. You, in turn, are but in an inconsiderable position. For reasons
accordingly overstressed. Momentum tends to be continued with but-
tactice to enhance your immediate public reception are
they tend to seek this in a rather short-term manner.

are of necessity deliberately eager to gain your abhorrence. And
Since the members of your staff are so deeply devoted to you, they
get advice which in contrary to actual staff think you want.
at strong personality. You therefore find it next to impossible to

Honorable Melvin V. Rockefeller

November 18, 1960 -10-

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November 18, 1960

understand the difficulties posed for you by the kind of campaign
Nixon chose to wage. It clearly ran counter to your deepest con-
victions. It is also true that your speeches are generally more
effective with independents than with rabid Republicans.

The question remains whether the middle of a Presidential
campaign was the best time to make an issue. Was adequate consider-
ation given to the impact of the campaign on your posture after-
wards? Was a sufficient effort made to commit the Nixon people
to your campaign and thereby avoid the attacks now taking place--
particularly after it appeared likely that the Republicans would
not carry New York state? Above all, why has there been a failure
on the part of the public to understand that you in fact did work
yourself to the point of exhaustion?

Let me sum up the present shortcomings:

(a) There is no focus of authority below you. This forces
you into arbitrating <u>all</u> disputes between your advisors. On the one
hand, it makes it very difficult for you to adopt courses of action
different from those that come up to you. You can accept or reject
a given proposal. But you cannot insist on a sense of proportion or
force a sustained consideration of alternative courses.

Equally importantly, it imposes a physical and psychological
burden on you which no man can sustain indefinitely. The job to be
done is too big for one person. One man can inspire, encourage and
lead. He cannot in addition take the responsibility for seeing that

lead. He cannot in addition take the responsibility for seeing that done is too pig for one person. One man can inspire, encourage and burden on him which no man can sustain indefinitely. The job to be

equally importantly, it implies a physical and psychological force a sustained consideration of alternative causes.

a given proposal. But you cannot instate on a sense of proportion or different from those that come up to you. You can accept or reject, pass, it makes it very difficult for you to accept cause of action you into arbitrating all disputes between your advisors. On the one (a) there is no scope of authority below you. This forces me to act up the present outcome:

on the part of the public to understand that you in fact did work not carry New York state? Above all, why has there been a failure particularly after it appeared likely that the Republicans would to your campaign and thereby avoid the attacks now taking place...

was a sufficient effort made to commit the Nixon people action given to the impact of the campaign on your posture after-campaign was the best time to make an issue. We adequate consideration

The question remains whether the middle of a presidential election with independents than with rapid Republicans.

It is size true that your sheeple are generally more Nixon close to me. It clearly raw complex to your deepest considerations. It is size true that your sheeple are generally more

Honorable Melvin V. Rockeholder

November 18, 1960 -11-

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November 18, 1960

his inspiration, courage and vitality seep down to the roots of
the organization where it is essential. By trying to do too much,
all of your greatest qualities tend to be watered down.

(b) There exists no mechanism for developing long-range coherent plans with respect to either substance or to procedure. During your trips around the country in 1959 it was hard to obtain a description of the sequence of events which might lead to your nomination. During your subsequent period of withdrawal many of your advisors said that all was not yet lost. But never, despite many attempts, could I obtain a satisfactory explanation of just what this phrase meant and how you might do something else than simply wait for something to turn up. During the period of your speaking out there was poor advance preparation for your statements and a totally inadequate follow-up. During the campaign the opposite of what you intended was achieved.

had
Throughout one has a feeling of activities unrelated to plan or concept. I recall last June that the same group of advisors who on a Tuesday morning urged you to announce your candidacy were pressing you on Sunday afternoon to state on "Meet the Press" that you were not a candidate under any circumstances. These fluctuations indicate an absence of long-range thinking.

Similar comments can be made about substance. My experience with you has been that you have been masterful whenever you were in full control of your subject. On government organization, civil defense, social programs, no one can listen to you without failing to be moved by your conviction and your authority.

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November 18, 1960

In other areas, however, the same assurance has been lacking. Though I agree strongly with the Confederation proposal, you would have been even more effective had it been based on the same kind of advance work as your civil defense program or, for that matter, as the Confederation scheme has since received. I am partly responsible for this and I mention it only to indicate that strengthening the substance of your program must be one of our major goals.

(c) There exists no adequate administrative coordination. Each separate group carries out its functions with only a minimum of awareness of what the other groups are doing. They are brought together usually only under the pressure of a deadline when sober consideration has grown next to impossible. At the same time, there seems to me to be lacking a mechanism for following up on decisions taken to make sure they are phased into each other.

(d) Your public relations set-up, for all its size, is deficient. The image of absenteeism seems to me to have been wholly avoidable. The inadequate awareness of your record as Governor seems to me unnecessary. The lack of public understanding of your effort in the campaign should have been prevented.

There are other problems but I want to keep this memorandum within bounds.

randum within pound.

There are other problems but I want to keep this memo-
in the campaign should have been prevented.

to me unnecessarily. The lack of public understanding of how effort
avoidable. The inadequate awareness of how record as Governor seems
delicate.

(d) Your public relations set-up, for all its size, is
decals taken to make sure they are based into each other.

there seems to me to be lacking a mechanism for following up on
consideration has grown next to impossible. At the same time,
together usually only under the pressure of a deadline when some
of awareness of what the other groups are doing. They are brought
Each separate group carries out its functions with only a minimum

(c) There exists no adequate substitutive coordination.
our major goals.

that strengthening the substance of your program must be one of
us partly reasonable for this and I mention it only to indicate
that matter, as the Confederation scheme has since received. I
same kind of advance work as your civil defense program or, for
you would have been even more effective had it been passed on the
lacking. Through I agree strongly with the Confederation proposal,
In other areas, however, the same assurance has been

Honorables Nelson V. Rockefeller

November 18, 1960 -19-

Personnel and Confidential

Personal and Confidential

-20-

November 18, 1960

VI. Organizational Suggestions.

If the above analysis is correct, a major reorganization
of your staff seems necessary. Accordingly, I recommend:

(a) The immediate appointment of an administrative officer who acts as your Chief of Staff. He should be responsible for following up decisions that are taken. He should screen requests that come to you. He should relieve you of the burden of rejecting proposals which are clearly not meritorious.

(b) The creation of a group of intimate advisors who would act as a kind of policy planning staff. This group should have one man largely responsible for your political relationships in the nation, a man responsible for your substantive positions, a public relations advisor, the administrative officer described under (a) above, and perhaps somebody responsible for political organization in the state. (George Hinman?)

This group should immediately set about charting your
course for the next four years. Specifically they should formulate
concepts regarding the public functions that your appointment
officer should encourage, the relationship between state and
national activities and the theme of your pronouncements. This
plan should include a rather concrete scheme for getting the nomi-
nation in 1964. Things may work out differently, of course. But
each key member of your organization ought to have some yardsticks,