*

TELCORN

Secy. Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

9:02 am, Feb. 21, 1973

K: Hello, Bill.

R: Hi, Henry. Couple of things, one on the--

K: I have one thing for you, but go ahead.

R: Okay, why don't you go ahead first.

K: On the Chinese thing, one of the things that has to be held strictly between you and me, that we did agree was to set up some sort of an office. And they will notify us today what they want to call it.

R: Uh huh. Dan Rather had it this morning on the radio.

K: Because the God damned, you know, these insane filthly traps I told them it's a possibility, and they leaked it.

R: In any event, it's out.

K: For some reason they don't want to confirm until it's a joint announcement.

R: Yeah. Well what I was going to suggest is that I'll be asked something about this China trip, and I'd like to be able to say something, for example, I would like to say that we will have some statement on it in the near future, something, just whatever you want me to say.

K: You say we'll have a communique within the next few days.

R: Oh, that would be fine, sure.

K: Good.

R: That would be no problem at all, I just don't--I want to be able to say something.

K: No, no, you should say that we'll have a statement on it within-- before the end of the week.

R: That's fine. Another thing, I'm the Chairmanship of the conference not that I think it makes all that difference, what I plan to do

-2-

was to analyze the possibilities and say that we weren't fixed
on anyone, that--

K: Well, Bill has brief you, hasn't he.

R: Uh huh.

K: There's no reason why we have to oppose the Secretary General
but the Chinese are adamant on it, and I mean they absolutely
said no, they would go along with you as DRV, I think it's a bad
idea to give Hanoi a special status vis a vis Saigon.

R: I don't think we can do that. It seems to me that what I could
say is that there's some logic to the possibility to having the
Secretary General as Chairman--

K: That wouldn't be bad.

R: Yeah, on the other hand, there have been suggestions made that the ICCS members rotate, that would be one, one would be rotating the chairmanship among all those, now that's bad because of the PRG.

K: You mean the rotating chairmanship--

R: Among the whole parties of the conference.

K: What among the Security Council members, that's another
possibility.

R: Well I'll just mention those three possibilities. Secretary General rotating among the ICCS members, or rotating among the permanent members of the Security Council.

K: Those three seem all good to me. And I don't think the Chinese
would object to the--they want the US/DRV because that's what
Hanoi wants. But I don't see how we can put the DRV into a higher
position than Saigon.

R: No, Saigon won't accept it. I understand from Bill, they said
they just won't attend any of those things, I don't blame them.

K: I think they are right.

R: I don't blame them a bit.

K: You know, in a funny way, if the French weren't such bastards,
they wouldn't be a bad solution. That could get everybody off
the hook.

-3-

R: Yeah.

K: That's the host country.

R: I gather that nobody wants the French.

K: That's right. If you analyze it in terms of what is the least embarrassing, it would be the host country. It it weren't France---(laughter)

R: On that I'm going to say that the French government has said publicly that they did not think it would be appropriate. Might as well get that on the record. I don't think of anything else, I think we are in good shape. Oh, what about the Laos, that's the other thing I want to say. I'm going to say, unless there's some objection on the part of the President, that I've just read it over, but that we expect to comply to the provisions of the agreement.

K: That's correct. On military aid, I would just say that's covered by 54 and 62 accords.

R

R: Except for the ______ the agreement provides that there shall be no military aid.

K: Is that what the agreement provides?

R: By anybody. Well in any event, all right Henry thank you very much.

K: We can take a little credit for it if we can do it by implication because really both Bill and I in our various stops did a hell of a lot of work on it.

R: Right, okay Henry.

K: And Bill did a superb job again as always.

R: I know, he's good. Okay, thank you.

K: Bye.

R: Bye.

LONDON AIRLINES
Authority E0 12558
By: NARA Date 6/15/84

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Rabin
2/21/73; 9:58 a.m.

K: Hello.

R: Hello, good morning.

K: How are you Mr. Ambassador?

R: How are you? I am sorry to bother you after such a magnificent
trip on a small, minor issue like the Middle East.

K: Well, nothing is left for me now but to meet Sadat.

R: Yeah, I think so. The General called me and informed me about . . .

K: Well, you know the choice was between doing it this way or doing
it secretly.

R: No, no problem.

K: The secret thing would have gotten me into the principal role and
it -- you know that these guys can't keep anything secret anyway.

R: I know.

K: So it was just a question of how it would become public. I think
this gives a lot more flexibility, don't you.

R: I feel the same even though there are some people in this world that
always see something wrong in whatever will be done here.

K: The only question was that since it was going to be done anyhow. . .

R: You don't have to argue with me I know it and I believe it and the
Prime Minister understands it better than anybody else does.

K: I have an appointment with you tomorrow, right?

R: Yeah. I asked for an appointment. Remember I mentioned to you
about a meeting between this guy that is coming and somebody else from
another Communist country.

K: Oh, yes. Have you had some indication from them?

R: No. I've got all the minutes of the talk in which he explains to the
Yugoslavs the whole philosophy what he is trying to achieve here and
in the Soviet Union. I don't believe that he explained everything but I
think there is a very interesting paper -- hello?

REDACTED
Authority Eo 12958
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*

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K: Yeah.

R: I would suggest that I send it today to Peter Rodman.

K: Good!

R: And if you have time to read it before . . .

K: Oh, I want to read it . . .

R: Because it is very interesting.

K: Does he mention his meetings with me?

R: Yeah. No, he mentions -- he starts the F�xx current contacts between the two states, etc. etc. He explains that you took the initiative.

K: (Laughter)

R: And but later on he says at the beginning of this they took the initiative -- started at the end of June and beginning of July the American White House contacted us in order to find out the extent of our readiness to conduct talks at the Presidential level, etc. etc.

K: You know all about it. There is undoubtedly some phase in which we took the initiative following some phase in which they did. At any rate, you know what the motive was -- to move it out of one place.

R: Anyhow, I think it would be advisable if I send the minutes--about 14 pages . . .

K: That's all right.

R: Or fifteen. It's very interesting. He explains not their foreign policy. It's from the end of December. Before he went to the Soviet Union.

K: Well, I have to discuss with you what I have to discuss with him because I don't see how I am going to fill two days with him.

R: Well, I think you are in a good position. I mean after all he has to come with something.

A.D. HARRIS
Authority Eo. 2458
Bcf NAP Date 6/15/69

2/21/73; 9:58 a.m.

-3-

K: Well, Mr. Ambassador, I am not aiming for the Nobel Prize on the
Middle East.

R: I hope so because I doubt if it is possible. I hope that you don't have
too much illusions about it.

K: I have no illusions at all but we have to discuss it generally because
I have no intention of being in the principal position in this so I think it
is not as simple a matter as -- OK what I think can be had. And there
isn't just a simple matter of saying "no".

with

R: I know it depends very much on what he will come and there are
some indications in this statement. I am not sure that we know everything
but . . .

K: I will discuss with you what I know. He sent me a message which I
will discuss with you.

R: All right.

K: Which doesn't give anything concrete but which is at least not inconsistent
with the idea that he might come with something.

R: In terms of policy not in terms of concrete proposals.

K: Well let's see what happens. When I am fully engaged with all the
resources of our government my strategy is always to move very slowly.

R: When it comes to the Middle East that is the best approach.

K: I mean I have never rushed into -- it took us three and a half years
to get Vietnam to a point where something happened.

R: No, I think there is something in the paper that shows that this guy
is much beyond the average of the Egyptians. He understands the
difference between exchanging realities and exchanging diplomatic formulas.

K: Well, that would be a big progress.

R: Yeah. In realizing it he tries to cope with turning realities in his benefit
of course and...

K: That's what a lot of diplomats do.

REDACTED
Authority Eo.12458
BY: NAPA Date 01/15/89

*

-4-

R: Huh?

K: That's what diplomats do.

R: Well, not always. Sometimes they are mixed up.

K: Mr. Ambassador I have never known you not to try to change realities to your advantage.

R: A good diplomat tries. Some of them try just, you know.

K: They try but they don't all understand reality.

R: Yeh.

K: Well look, 3 o'clock tomorrow?

R: 3 o'clock. Fine.

K: It can wait until tomorrow. I mean there isn't anything fundamental going to happen. I mean I'm not going to do anything before

R: From my point of view it can wait. It's up to you, if it can be earlier the better.

K: Well, let's say 3 o'clock tomorrow, conceivably I'll move it to today.

R: Fine. I've got a lunch appointment. Before 3 I will not be able to make it.

K: No, no, I couldn't do it before 3 either.

R: Good. And I'll send now to Peter the document.

K: Good and I'll see you at 3 tomorrow if you don't hear from me.

R: At the same place?

K: At the Map Room.

R: Good. All right.

K: Bye.

RECEIVED

Authority E0 12/25/8

BY: NARA, Dale, 12/5/84

*

TELECON (Secure Phone)

Sec. Richardson/Kissinger

10:03 a.m. - 2/21/73

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry, welcome back.

K: Thank you, it was a good trip. Eliot, I wanted to check with you whether you could find out in a discrete way to what extent these POW statements are being ginned up by PR guys out of CINCPAC. They always lie but could we find out with reasonable confidence.

R: I asked ______ about that. He is the POW planning guy who was out there at the first plane out of Hanoi. He insists it has not been done; that the men themselves did them.

K: Well, Sieverts claimed that the PR fellow from CINCPAC is writing these statements. I don't know whether that is true. I am not necessarily saying it should be stopped, but if it is true we would like to know in case that story ever comes out.

R: I asked ______, he just got back at 3:00 a.m.

K: Yes, but they always lie if you don't phrase the question exactly correctly.

R: I know. I will pose it once more.

K: But we would like it done in a discrete way.

R: I hope when you have a chance we can get together.

K: I am eager to see you but I understand you are not free for breakfast when I am. Tomorrow we were going to have breakfast but now the President has asked me. I would like to do it soon.

R: I would like to hear about your trip. Are you going to have a press briefing?

K: Yes, tomorrow.

R: Good.

AUTHORISED BY
Authority E0 12458
By: [Signature] NARA Date: 6/15/69

TelCon
Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

10:52 am, Feb. 21, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Mr. Deputy Assistant Secretary--I don't know why I should
you Ambassador, you haven't been one for six years.

S: It's a constant dream. I looked this over and I find that two
things that worry me; one is this business of aerial espionage.
The second is on the question of the provisions for acquiring
war material. Both of these are vague, but this last sentence
on Article 3(d) says in case it is necessary to replace worn
out weapons or war materials both sides will consult and arrive
at an agreement. Now that presumably referred only to worn
out weapons. In 1962 agreements do not have any provisions
for worn out--they permit adequate weapons for the defense of
the country as determined by the provisional National Government.
So that's a little ambiguous. The one on the espionage by air--
what they were hoping to get was the distinction between hostile
acts and acts of force. It appears from this that they did not
get this. So they--

K: But what was the God damned hurry?

S: I don't know what his--it isn't even a question of hurry it seems
to me that those two things could have come out -- well he could
have gotten them flammed out probably just by holding for it.
In fact in the earlier drafts as I understood it, neither one of
those was in.

K: Yeah. Well--

S: Those are the two features on this thing--

K: Yeah, but if he winds up holding a Cabinet post on top of it,
it would be pretty bad.

S: I don't know quite what you mean.

K: If the Prime Minister is also holding a post, then it is an exactly
even split.

S: Oh I see what you mean. In other words that he's taking one of

*

-2-

the seats and therefore it isn't an even split.

K: That's right.

P: Well, I'm not quite sure what's weighing on me so heavily except the fear that he was going to get pushed off the map and that we were going to stop bombing.

K: Well, my cable said it had the opposite effects, it made--

S: I would have thought so, although of course it gave him the-- saying it was up to him to make the decision, maybe that was interpreted that way. I'm not sure how much difference any of these things are going to make except for that question of aerial reconnaissance. Up until now we've never had any inhibitions on that.

K: Yeah. Okay, well, I frankly don't understand why he moved so fast. I meant to slow him down.

S: Well I don't know. what

K: And isn't that/you thought I was bringing about.

S: I thought that was what he would do, rather than taking a rapid solution of a military ceasefire only, that he would hold out and bargain more carefully for his local settlement. And that would have been the reaction I expected from him. I don't quite know why, except at least these two features, the rest of it is more or less garbage. With regard to the comments about the United States, we could live with, because they will be forgotten in the press of things, but these two are binding.

K: Well, what can we do.

S: Not a hell of a lot, I don't know, I saw Godley is moving with him, it doesn't seem to have raised either of these two points.

K: But it's not a good agreement.

S: It's not as good as he could have gotten, I think.

K: That's what I think.

S: Should I send a cable to Godley raising these two points.

K: Yeah, and ask him in general why did it collapse so fast. That I was intending the opposite.

REPRODUCIBLE
 Authority Eo. 12458
 BY: NARA Dake 61594

*

-3-

S: You mean you want me to send one in your channels.

K: Why don't you.

S: All right I'll have a copy of it over to you.

K: I mean just for my understanding. Habib came in.

S: Yeah, what's his explanation.

K: His explanation is that when we said he couldn't have a notetaker there that his hackles rose. But that seems a little odd. You believe that?

S: I don't know. I thought you were going to let him have-- whom are you letting him have? Are you having Dr. Chou as a translator, he's--

K: Well, I don't know. I thought that--and he said the secondary possibility is that his feelings were hurt that I didn't come.

S: Oh, I don't think so, because he didn't make any request. Well, I don't know. As they say, he's inscrutable. He did have a cold when I was there and I was wondering if his doctor was him to bed, but--

K: No, he said they first had an appointment for today.

S: I see. Well he's cutting off his nose, I guess.

K: Well, you know, it's doing us no damage.

S: Yeah. Ah, final question, have you got anything back from our friend Mr. Thoc on the conference business.

K: No.

S: Okay. We are going to wander into that. I have a feeling, without any decision as yet on it.

K: No, but we've sent him--

S: I know, we've sent him the proposal. He owes us an answer.

K: But--we sent him something yesterday?

TelCon

Sen. Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

12:05 pm, February 21, 1973

K: Hello.

J: Hello, Henry, let me tell you what's happened. We've got two roll calls here between one and three o'clock, and we'll just have to skip the lunch. Can I come by later in the day.

K: No.

J: You'll be all tied up. I'm just trapped.

K: Okay.

J: You mind. I mean, I've got a roll call and--

K: No, no, of course I mind, but I--

J: When can we -- is there any time I can come by for twenty minutes or something. Later in the day or tomorrow morning.

K: Later in the day is definitely out.

J: All right.

K: Let me call you. Look I want to see you.

J: Right, I've got several things that I want to--you know, that's stewing around here, especially this AID thing, so--

K: How is Stennis, I haven't heard about it.

J: He's doing all right. He's going to make it.

K: Oh, terrific.

J: Yeah, thank God.

K: Oh God, I tell you.

J: And I think we've got to start looking at this AID business--

K: I've got to talk to you, about a lot of things as a result of this trip. But I think I've got the way greased for you if you now sit tight about it.

RECEIVED

Authority Eo. 12958

BY: NARA File Date 6/15/69

*

-2-

J: All right.

K: We mustn't let anything out.

J: No, I'll just say nothing.

K: But I really put in a strong pitch for you.

J: It wasn't unfavorably--

K: It was very favorably received.

J: Yeah.

K: No, no I think you can pretty well count on it but I don't want to get your colleagues mad, I want to get it so arranged that they are coming to you.

J: Yeah. At appropriate time I'll talk to someone up in New York or up in Ottawa about it.

K: Scoop, if it's devious, leave it to me.

J: Leave it to the expert.

K: You can count on it.

J: All right.

K: Good, Scoop.

J: Later in the day, these roll calls came up all of a sudden, and you know, I just am trapped up here.

K: I understand.

J: Okay.

K: Good.

J: Fine, Henry.

K: Bye.

FARRIS HILL
Authority E0 12458
By: NAPA Date 04/15/84

TelCon
Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

12:47 pm, February 21, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Welcome back Henry.

K: Thank you, Joe. Joe, do we have to pop off about that Israeli
shoot-down at all.

S: Well, we are just developing a statement here. We haven't said
anything.

K: I mean, planes get shot down around the world all the time without
the United States saying something.

S: Yeah. Well, the Secretary will probably get hit on this, and he
will probably say this is a tragedy and express regret over some
loss of life. What we have sent over to you which is on the,
whatever the machine is, we suggest two simple messages from
the President along the lines of the public statement of Golda Meir
which would limit it to an expression of condolences for the loss
of life.

K: What did she say?

S: She did this, she said this publicly. There were a lot of Egyptians
on this plane.

K: Why the hell did they do it?

S: Well, Rabin off the record said to me, Joe it's absolutely incom-
prehensible because while they went through all these procedures,
you obviously read this - the same tickers as I have, I think it
makes absolutely no sense whatsoever, even if the God damn
commercial plane was over Tel-Aviv. They shouldn't shot it
down. So frankly, Rabin is just aghast and he has no better
explanation than I have. I mean, it's crazy, absolutely crazy.
A lot of planes have been shot down but never this kind of an
incident in this way. But be that as it may, Henry, we're develop-
ing a statement and we'll clear it out. I'll suggest to the Secretary
to be sure we send it on to the White House.

K: Okay.

S: But as far as the -- along the lines we're going to recommend
here, is the two one paragraph letters that we just sent to you
for you to take up with the President if you'd like to do this. We

FEBRUARY 21, 1973
 Authority EO 12458-
By MAR 21 1973 9:15:09

-2-

think it's a good idea to do this, and not tie it in, Henry, with
calls for restraint for this reason, a simple message of con-
dolence which is completely depoliticized has the best kind of an
impact.

K: That I agree with.

S: And then the--

K: I just don't think we should say it's incompresible and inexplicable, I don't think we should--

S: Well we are not going to say that and--

K: Somebody recommended to me here and I can't get Saunders; we are concerned and we should just shut up and condolences are fine.

S: Well that's basically what -- it has been suggested to the Secretary condolence on the loss of life and secondly that this a tragic event, a major tragedy. In other words, avoid judgments.

K: Right.

S: Yep.

K: Good.

S: Thank you Henry.

K: Yes.

FEDERAL ORDERED BY
Authority Eo 12458
By: NARA Date: 6/15/94

TelCon
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 pm, February 21, 1973

K: Hello.

T: Hi.

K: Hello Bob, how are you?

T: Welcome back.

K: What did you say about me a few weeks ago that I vaguely objected to.

T: Vaguely objected, I can't see how you could, I've got so much
criticism of being too kind to you. I wrote a long profile about
you.

K: Yeah.

T: What did you object to.

K: Oh you said not everyone likes me, I find that very hard to imagine.

T: Glad you -- I didn't say I didn't.

K: Oh, I thought it was a good piece.

T: Did you see the original, or did you see the Washington Post version.

K: I say the L. S. Times one.

T: Okay, because the Post version was much too much personality in the long piece I did, the other one had more of the kind of stuff I wanted to do. Ah, did you, will you be able to go to the White House Correspondent's dinner with me, or did you accept somebody else.

K: I tell you I am not sure whom I accepted if anybody, can I let you know in a day.

T: Sure.

K: Something was done or not done, but I haven't got my girl here who handles that.

*

Authority Eo. 1258
By: [Signature] NARA Date: 6/15/94

*

-2-

T: Well, I called Julie while you were away.

K: Well, everyone calls Julie, the Henry Hubbard gunner.

T: What I'm trying to tell you Henry--listen can you talk at all about China or you going to wait until tomorrow.

K: I'll wait 'till tomorrow.

T: Okay. All right, well if you'll have your girl call me back I'll appreciate it.

K: Good, I'll do that. But I appreciate your asking me. I understand they moved it now.

T: The time or the date?

K: The date, to the 14th.

T: Did they?

K: That's my understanding from Ziegler.

T: All have to change it then, all right. Well--

K: I am assuming the invitation is good anyway.

T: Yes, this invitation is good.

K: Okay.

T: Okay.

K: Bye.

T: Bye.

Authority E012558

By: NAPA Date: 05/05/09

*

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

1:40 p. m., February 21, 1973

Z: Henry.

K: Yeah.

Z: wants to do a story about people who travel with you--in other words, do they have to keep your bags packed? How long do they work with you?,and just a color type thing around it trip.

K: Well there's a difference between girls and men.

Z: Well, I'm sure of that. But, I was thinking of...

K: Can we get that in subtly?

Z: I was thinking that Win Lord would be a good guy. You can trust him; he knows what not to say.

K: They work 18 hours a day; and that is the truth.

Z: I'm sure they do, and I think there's a.. you know...

K: So he can do it.

Z: He said he'd be willing to do it, pending your approval.

K: Oh, you've already talked to him.

Z: No. I wanted to see if he would want to do it.

K: Well wouldn't he have said he would want to do it unless you've already talked to him.

Z: Henry, I said he would do it if you approve.

K: So you've talked to him.

Z: Yeah

K: Well that's what I'm saying. Oh, Is April 1st all right for Diane to join my staff?

Z: April 1st? For Diane to join your staff?

*

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

1:40 p.m., February 21, 1973

- 2 -

K: Yeah.

Z: Henry, you would not believe the fountain of knowledge...

K: In other words she's sitting right there.

Z: that she has over here.

K: She's sitting there!

Z: Exactly right.

K: You're showing off.

Z: That's right. Okay, we'll work out a couple trades.

K: I'll take Diane for two draft choices. Will you tell her that at least?

Z: (To Diane) He said he'd take you for two draft choices.
(To K) She's laughing. Not very much, she told me to tell you.

How have I turned into a go-between the ~~PRINCIPAL~~ President and his
Security Adviser and my assistant?

K: Because I'm not talking to her directly.

Z: Oh, you're not?

K: No.

Z: (To Diane) He's not talking to you directly. Okay (Laughter)
I'll tell Win Lord it's okay with you, huh?

K: That's right.

Z: On the _B_ Walter saying, do you have a time yet?

K: Oh, I guess we might as well do it Friday.

Z: At what time?

K: In the afternoon sometime. That means I've got to take her to dinner.

Z: How about Friday at 3:00?

*

TELCONE

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

1:47 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Joe, if an Afghan shot down a Bangladesh airliner would the Secretary of State rush out with a statement?

S: No. he wouldn't. This is actually, Henry, to

K: Do what?

S: To keep the situation cool.

K: Now wait a minute. That's one of these platitudes. Keep what situation cool, where? I mean, who's going to do what.

S: Well, I think the danger in this situation at the present time is that Sudat will feel himself under pressure from Kadashi to take some counter military action. And, I think the purpose of this statement really is basically to disassociate the United States from this action. And, I think, myself, Henry, it's the minimum we can do.

K: Do we have to blubber... Do we have to say we were shy.... The shooting down of an unarmed airliner over occupied Sudat--70 innocent lives... Can we drop the adjectives?

S: Well, as far as I'm concerned, those adjectives were added by other people, Henry, and I'm in no position to add or subtract, quite frankly.

K: No. I'm going to subtract them. I just wanted to know the peace or war depends on it.

whether

S: Hardly. No, but I think the notion of disassociation is good. I think, myself, the dropping of the adjectives is fine. But, as I say, those weren't added by me, and I'm not trying to look as if I were on the right side of God. But, I think you really need to take this up with our 7th Floor.

K: I'm not going to take it up. I'm going to tell them. I just want to get a sane person's judgment.

S: ... your suggestions. "We were deeply saddened today to learn of the shooting down" is sufficient.

K: If we said, "of the shooting down of a Libyan airliner over Sinai." Do we have to say "occupied Sinai? "

S: No. I don't think..

REDACTED
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*

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

- 2 -

1:47 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Do we have to say, "unarmed?"

S: Well...

K: Do we have to say, "innocent lives?"

S: Well, I think Golda used something like this. We don't have to say any of these things, Henry, but I think this is in the context of the situation is very minimal, very minimal.

K: All I want to tell you fellows before you get to the last three days of the negotiations, there are three and a half years to go through before the television cameras come in. So...

S: It's the preparation...

K: Before the television stations...

S: You're going to get a crack at this, fella...

K: There's a lot of time to be sent in on this

S: At 9:00 Friday morning.

K: Well, we're only going to spend a half an hour with him. You've got him all day.

S: Well, here we've got to make up with quantity what we lack in quality.

K: Listen, you keep going like this and you'll have even less...

S: Well, send back whatever suggestions, but do it near the 7th Floor.

K: With pleasure.

S: Thanks a lot.

*

TelCon
Secretary Richardson/Mr. Kissinger
2:19 pm, February 21, 1973

K: Eliot!

R: Yes, Henry.

K: Eliot the Chinese handed me an AID memoir about an incident last July 26 when we shot up a fishing boat. Then signaled today accepts that we had some wounded aboard, their ship's not been authorized to reply, ignored it. They would now like the wounded or any information we have. If I sent you that AID memoir this afternoon--they've given us the names of the islands where this happened in Chinese letters, so we don't know where the hell exactly it is, but we've got the coordinates. Now the one thing the Navy cannot say is that they didn't shoot up the fishing boat, since they signaled the Chinese they signaled that they have a distressed seaman.

R: Okay.

K: So, could we get an answer within a couple of days.

R: You mean an answer as to what we know about the facts.

K: What we know about the facts--

R: Whatever happened to the seaman and that sort of thing.

K: What happened to the seaman, well the Chinese are not saying we have the seaman, the Chinese are saying the twelve fishermen disappeared without a trace, and they wind up saying the Chinese does not know whether on the two occasions on which American military vessel SIONAled the Chinese vessels had any relation to the above event. The Chinese side hopes that American side can assist in investigating and clarifying the situation. You know, it's a very gentlemanly way of putting it.

R: Okay.

K: And I'll send it over this afternoon. If you could take some personal interest in it.

R: Sure. Glad to.

K: And get us an answer by the end the week.

R: Okay, fine.

K: Thank you.

TELCONE
Adm. Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

2:35 pm, February 21, 1973

K: Tom!

M: Yes, sir.

K: Our little darlings in the North are bugging us on the mining, and
said we are not going fast enough, which means you are doing
what I've asked you to do.

M: Right. I think I've been doing pretty well, frankly.

K: Is there something we can do that looks like a speed up that I
could--but don't you get your eager beavers out there to do it,
let me give it to them as a concession the President has ordered.

M: All right.

K: Now, for example, they want some trucks to help remove the
inland mines. Let's get them those trucks, they want five or
six trucks. Sullivan has the details.

M: All right, I'll talk to him.

K: And see whether--and also they say instead of moving into each
area separately, could we work in two simultaneously. Could
you say by another 24 or 48 hours give me a plan that looks a
little faster.

M: All right.

K: I don't want it really all that much faster, but those bastards,
as long as you tell them you are doing something as an act of
good will, they think they've gotten something out of my trip.

M: Of course, the bastard only have about 25,000 trucks you know.
We'll give them six more.

K

K: Tom, they are the world's biggest sh____s, if I may use a word
they don't use in the Navy. But I'll get General Scowcroft to
send you the translation. The Air Force uses it I'm told.

M: That's right, we are very circumspect in the Navy.

ADMISSION CARD

Authority Eo 12458
By: CAPT NAPA Date 01/05/04

*

-2-

K: Incidentally I wanted to tell you, Tom, we were all tremendously impressed by the bombing.

M: Yeah, we really let it on.

K: No, no, but it's also God damned accurate.

M: Yeah.

K: I mean you go through some of these bomb areas and villages on both sides of them are totally untouched.

M: That's right. Well I thought it was a hell of a job.

K: I told the President I was really impressed.

M: Uh huh. Well, it's a bunch of pros, I told them too that the day after Christmas when we had that 116 B-52s and several hundred TacAir, and bombed it out in 30 minutes. That was a hell of an operation.

K: Well, I drive you guys crazy very often, but I want you to know you did a great job.

M: Well, we stuck right in there. I'll have to tell you some of my conversations with my boss on Christmas Eve about that sometime.

K: I can imagine.

M: Pretty hectic.

K: I'd love to hear it.

M: Okay, well I'll get you a paper on this. Now, how about this-- I had, as a precautionary measure last night to start--apparently we got a hold on these operations out there after midnight tonight local time, but we haven't sent out any official message yet, but I understand you are trying to clarify that unofficial version that says that no espionage by air.

K: Yeah, well you have to stop the operations.

M: They are stopped, but we haven't stopped from here, just stopped because I told Voigt to put out his own message which he's done.

Authority E0 12458

By: CAPT. NARA Dated 01/05/04

TELCOM

Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Mr. Deputy Assistant Secretary.

S: Yes, Mr. Assistant to the President.

K: I'll be goddamned if I call somebody -- if I keep calling you Ambassador.

S: [Laughter] That's the thrust of the driving dream.

K: I'm keeping you in the position which you are.

S: [Laughter] You called just to tell me that?

K: No. If you're this snotty, you won't get any of our information. We had a note from your pal, the Vice Foreign Minister.

S: Oh, what did he say?

K: No, no; we had a note saying they stick by their interpretation but they're willing to have a conciliatory outcome. They will not send us the draft ahead of time but they are willing to meet you on the 23rd -- that Park (?) is coming there on the 23rd ready to meet with you prior to the Conference to see whether some of these things can be smoothed out. Oh, I think you should go over on the 23rd and meet with them on the 24th and 25th.

S: All right. I guess, now are you going to tell my honorable Secretary.

K: I shall tell that to the Secretary of State.

S: I could go on the morning of the 23rd -- Let me see, Oh, hell, I don't know what the connections are but I'll find some connection that will get me there so that I can meet them on the 24th, yeah.

K: What do you mean, connections?

S: Well, I think I have to get a plane on the night of the 22nd commercially to get there --

K: Aren't there day flights any more?

S: I don't think so. There is one in the evening but I'll check that out.

K: Okay. So can we tell them that you'll be there ready to meet on the 24th?

S: On the 24th, yeah.

AUGUST 25, 1973
Authority Eo. 2458
By: B.P. NAFI Date: 6/15/73

*

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Marlo Thomas

2/21/73 3:20 p.m.

HK: Marlo

MT: Henry, how are you?

HK: By God, I thought you were leading the revolution to get me out of here--

MT: it's not you so much Henry.

HK: Just my company

MT: (laugh.s)--that's right. I don't like your friends
So have you been--you must have just gotten back--

HK: Last night.

MT: Oh my goodness--are you at the office or apartment?

HK: At the office--where are you?

MT: When are you coming out here?

HK: End of March or early April.

MT: Good, that'll be nice--I've been in New York all year

HK: I know--I saw you on television, castigating us.

MT: Oh you did--no, I'm quite mild actually.

HK: You are basically kind.

MT: I'm calling you for a very strange kind of request--there are some very good friends of mine who want to go to China.

HK:

HK: Who are they_? /He's a lawyer in New York--his name is Arthur Kline--
he's theatrical lawyer to millions of actors and playwrights--Mike Nichols
--and everyone practically in New York--really nice man and he and his
wife would like to go to China just on a tour-visit.

HK: That they usually prefer to do it in groups or--

MT: The reason I'm calling is to ask you--they don't know who--they have just come back from Africa

HK: They should write to the Embassy--my advice is to wait about 4 weeks.

LAWRENCELY
Authority E0 12458
By KAPABDg 6/15/94

*

Page 2

HK: Because some new procedures might be set up. And it may be easier then--

MT: Hmhuh. Wait about four weeks?

HK: Yeh.

MT: And would you be able to help them in anyway--or tell them who to call or -- I don't mean to make them visitors of the State, but is there any way that they seem--not to be very well informed.

HK: I can certainly tell them what the procedures are and

MT: So I should tell them to wait four weeks and then what--shall I call you back?

HK: Why don't you do that--might as well make you dependent on me.

MT: (laughs) I really am very dependent--you are so strong and powerful--
Why don't you come here--we'll give you dinner--

HK: What is your number now--do you still have the same number--

MT: My new number is 271 1345

HK: I will call you when I get out there.

MT: And if you are around the televisions set <u>around</u> on the 16th of March you should watch my hour television special.

HK: You are not doing to me--do you realize you owe me a whole tonight show that I watched just to see you, including I had to put up with Mickey Rooney

MT: (laughing) That's right. I forgot about that--that is so funny--this is on for sure--I'll be on the cover of TV Guide, --it's really good.

HK: I'll watch it. But if you are not on that show--I tell you--

MT: No, I'm on it, I play six different women--it's really dynamite--I'm really proud of it--

HK: That's about four less than the different facets of your personality.

MT: That's very good. You're getting better all the time.

HK: All right, it will be good to see you--

MT: All right, and I'll call you in about 4 weeks.

Authority Eo 12958

By:bf NARA File 615104

*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Sullivan

3:30 p.m. 2/21/73

BS: Yes, Henry.

HK: Bill, do you remember that extra $100M that Bunker was talking about?

BS: Yes.

HK: Are you working on that with all speed?

BS: There has been a further exchange of messages on this--before I got
back I note that our people still don't agree that they--

HK: Our people are always idiots.

BS: Now Cooper is coming in the next day or two--I talked with him, he's
going to bring all his papers with him--

HK: What do I have to do to get the money?

BS: To get the money is going to have to go to Congress-we just don't have
that money--and the only thing I can think of and I told Cooper and he'
going to bring in all the papers on this--the only way possibly get this
through the Congress is to put it all in the nature of being humanitarian

HK: Well, why not?

BS: I don't see any harm and that's what he said--he'd be bringing a whole
package of documents

HK: But will you tell your people that we want it--

BS: I'll tell them that and see what I can do about it--I am sure what they will
tell me is that we have to go to the Congress for it as a piece of legislation.
In other words, we can't get it out of the continuing resolution.

HK: That may or not may be true.
My experience has been that once the technicians understand what is needed
--what's wanted, they usually figure out a way of producing it.

BS: This time it might be a little tighter. Now they calculate here--just looked
at their stuff this morning that contrary to what Bunker says about being
$100 M in the hole, that he'll have $63 million surplus.

HK: Will you however keep in mind that we'd rather err on the side of giving
him too much.

*

Page 2

BS: I can take a plane over on Friday afternoon, the 23rd and be there to do business with them on the morning of the 24th, so I will set up a meeting for the 24th in the morning.

HK: Good. I haven't talked to the Secretary yet, but I will within the next hour.

BS: Okay and what I'll want to do is talk with you before I go about what --how we want to turn out on this thing.

HK: Good. I gave Bill Porter some of my ideas.

BS: All right. I'm meeting with him in about 20 minutes, so maybe I can get a little more from him.

HK: Good. Thank you.

<table><tr><td>MAY 28 1958</td></tr><tr><td>By: PAT NARA</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 6/28/58</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

3:40 pm, February 21, 1973

K: Mr. Ambassador?

R: Yep.

K: You've got our State Department in a state of advanced
excitement. I called you earlier just to find out what your
action would be--what I've done is to tone down their public
expressions to the minimum that I could.

R: Oh, I know--

K: You see, what they put out, if you get outraged, just remember
what it would have been--

R: I am not in any outrage whatsoever.

K: I'm glad to hear that your military are just as stupid as ours.

R: I don't want to talk about it on the phone. I doubt if I know the
pilots; I don't believe that any Israeli pilots would have taken
such a decision on himself. I'm quite sure that it was on in-
structions on a relatively level.

K: Yeah.

R: I'm going to Said, I think it was really a blunder on our part.

K: Yeah. Well, they were going to put out a statement about
occupied Sinai and innocent civilians and outrage, and so forth,
something is being put out.

R: I know, I saw the release of the State Department. I advised to
my government but--

K: I took out every adjective, but I just want you to know we had no
choice--well it was perceived to be no choice.

R: Yes, I talked back to Jerusalem and I said if somebody wanted
really to help Ismael and to honor Mme. Golda, he could have
done something.

K: Yes, it makes Ismael a great hero.

*

*

-2-

R: Yeah, I know it. I tried to have a meeting with some of American people, American media people, because they said--

K: Well, keep it cool.

R: Oh, I kept it cool--

K: The thing to do is to put it on the ground that idiocies happen everywhere.

R: No, no. I put it this way. I said distinguish between issues that have been in headlines a few days and return to basic issues. Just keep out the speculative outlook.

K: Exactly.

R: Second, the happens, three, I referred them to the 12th of January column by Jack Anderson, according to Cong. M, there is information that there is plan to take Arabic Civilian Airlines full of explosives and to play out some sort of a kamikaze operation against the city of Tel Aviv. I said I don't try to justify it but they reminded-me of the Jack Anderson column.

K: Okay, well let's talk about it tomorrow--

R: Yes, we'll try to pat it down to the extent that to swallow what we have to swallow--

K: If you want to join my staff after you leave here, you have the analytical ability to do it.

R: Thank you.

K: And I love to have Generals to push around.

R: Do you. So, you like to be a boss of Generals, I see.

K: That's my future dream. Okay, well we'll have a good talk tomorrow. I've read the whole thing you sent. Actually it's interesting, there are some sentences--they've sent me a message which I was going to show you yesterday--

R: Oh, I'm glad that you have read it because I believe it gives you some sort of the way the ______ are thinking. I would also like you to know that we gave the same to ______.

REDACTED
Authority F012458
By: NARA Date: 6/15/94

*

-3-

K: You must never do that when it mentions me. Well it's all right with Lessinger because they handle my contacts.

R: I see.

K: But check it with me from now on.

R: All right.

K: Now, their time sequence, I mean it isn't true that a date was fixed for October 6. That is not true. There are a few things in there that are not true, they are not important, but --

R: But the basic inscription is right.

K: Yep, the basic inscription is correct. Okay.

R: All right.

K: And we'll see you tomorrow.

R: Fine.

K: Bye.

ORIGINAL
Authority _E_ 12458
BY _R_ NARA Date 6/15/69

*

Telcon

Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

3:50 pm, Feb. 21, 1973

K: Hello.

A: Hello Henry.

K: Joe, how are you.

A: I'm fine, how was your trip.

K: It was fascinating.

A: Was my guess correct.

K: I would never argue with an old friend.

A: I long to see you.

K: Let me see, you want to have lunch tomorrow.

A: I sure do, I don't care what I'm doing, I'm doing nothing by the fact.

K: Okay, let's meet at the Metropolitan Club at 1:00.

A: Okay, wonderful.

K: Good.

A: Good, good.

K: Joe I have one other problem in which I need your assistance and even more probably, Susan Mary's. It has to do with Charlie Whitehouse.

A: I'll do anything I can. Susan Mary is not here, of course.

K: Oh, she isn't, where is she.

A: She's down in the Barbados for the trees.

K: Well, we have offered Charlie Whitehouse to go to Laos, which right now is about an important a post as we can have in Southeast Asia. Now he's taking the position that his wife prevents his going there.

RDMOULIED
Authority 5012958

By: MAR 13 1973

*

-2-

A: That's quite true.

K: Which is probably true. Now we'll change it if he insists enough, but he is going to wind up ruining his career.

A: I know that bec---

K: Because the Foreign Service correctly takes the position that this is not the second or third time this has happened, and, so I was just wondering whether somebody could talk to that young lady.

A: Well, I'll do my best, but I don't--well, let us talk about it at lunch tomorrow Henry.

K: Right.

A: I don't think I dare talk to her without talking to Charlie.

K: Okay.

A: Good, good.

K: Good.

A: Thank you.

K: Bye.

BROWNFIELD
Authority E012958
By: NAPA DATE 05/15/04

*

TELCONE

Kissinger/Cook

4:18 p.m. 2/21/73

DC: Henry, welcome home--I hope you get some rest.

HK: Thank you.

DC: Hey listen, I hope you have a chance to come to that reception tomorrow--
you know all the good guys coming down.

HK: You know I specialize in seeing the bad guys.

DC: I want you to meet some of the good guys. for a change.

HK: I'll be there.

DC: Okay, I'll see you tomorrow. Hey listen, I talked to your man about
maybe in the next week or two getting you up there for the -- a group of
good House republicans just for one hour--

HK: Sure, what time ?

DC: 8:00-9:00 and we're out of there at the crack of nine--no horsing around
and it'd be the perfect group to talk about --keep your powder dry on the
post-war aid picture.

HK: Sure. I get a lot of congressional requests these days and you'll have to
help me sort out--which is the Democratic Study Group?

DC: Oh, screw that. for the time being--DSC--we'll do that a little later
as we approach the Floor with an aid package -- that can wait, but this
one would be a good one to do and I think you'd enjoy it.

HK: Okay, will you set it up?

DC: You give me a Wednesday and I'll go with it--is next Wednesday morning
okay?

HK: No, that's the day that I have to brief--let's do it the Wednesday after.

DC: Wednesday after--I'll call right now and lock you in on it.

HK: Good, excellent.

DC: Fine.

*

TELCORN

Bill Baroady/Mr. Kissinger

6:30 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Hello

B: Hello. Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

B: Did Brent talk to you at all. The reason I called you earlier was to let
you know this little listeners group we've got going every morning. One
of the things we...

K: Who's "we?"

B: We, here, I'm running a little 9:00 meeting, that includes the guys from Ron Ziegler's shop, and the Domestic Council, Ken Cole, and so on, across the board. But, the main thing we're trying to do, Henry, is to counter-attack, and meet some of the issues as they come up across the board. I wanted to fill you in on that, and raise specifically one thing I am sure you know better than I is coming up on the Hill with some of the statements; there's an unholy coalition of people coming out against this aid to North Vietnam.

K: I'm really moved by McGovern's concern for humanity, I haven't heard a
word of it.

B: Right. It's incredible. But, in particular something like our friend, Hugh Scott, coming out and saying we're going to have to give aid in order to get our POWs back. I mean, it's... without having a specific line we can give to our...

K: It's...

B: I know it. ... looking like ransom and all this kind of stuff.

K: Very dangerous

B: I do too. The main reason I know you've been meeting with the President about tomorrow's leadership breakfast for example. It occurred to me that it would be very useful if the key line that you want us to follow on this is one presented there, and if we can get some kind of handle on the line. I know the President has said the key thing is investment in peace. So we will have incentive to give them incentive to keep the peace over there. The big question here is how can we put together a one page line and get it out to our friends get it out to outside organizations, the people on the Hill, and so on. To preclude this whole thing going down the drain before you finally have to go to the Hill on it. With everybody getting locked into...

AUGUST 25 1973

Authority Eo.
By: NAPA Dale Date: 6/15/73

*

Bill Baroady/Mr. Kissinger

6:30 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Well, what do you want me to do?

B: What I want to do is to find out are we at a point where we can say anything about this.

K: Not a helluva lot.

B: Can we, at least in the broad general terms put it on--develop a line.

K: Do you want me to meet with your group, or tell you something to tell to your group, what is it? you want?

B: The optimum would be to meet with my group if you're in a position to brief us on it. From there we'll get the line out all over creation.

K: Let's try for it early next week.

B: Early next week. All right.

K: It isn't that urgent.

B: Okay.

K: I can't do it tomorrow. And, I can't do it Friday. So it's got to be early next week.

B: All right. We'll lay that on. In the meantime, do you think there's any chance of laying some of the ground work tomorrow at the leadership meeting?

K: I'll do my best to meet your demand.

REDACTED

Authority Eo 12458

By NARA Date 6/15/74

*

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

2/21/73 6:30 p.m.

RN: You know I was just taking a look at the STAR and it--this fellow Arbuckle is a real bastard--he says that truce in Laos is seen giving gains to Reds--what he quotes is, "western diplomats and other observers, while hailing the end of the fighting, etc., noted that ceasefire agreement represented a series of major compromises to the communists on every major issue--"What do you think of that?

HK: Well,

RN: It's not true.

HK: It's not true--it's essentially--

RN: Souvanna would never have signed it--

HK: Exactly, we brought no pressure on Souvanna--we sent a message to Souvanna on Monday it was entirely up to him and we were not pressing him.

RN: What do you think of it yourself though?

HK: I think--my personal view is that he has one or two clauses in there that if he had asked our opinion, I would have advised against, --now there is a 50/50 split in cabinet posts between the communists and the rightists, but that is more apparent than real because they split--it used to be a 3 way split but they split the neutralists 50/50, so it was in fact a 50/50 split.

RN: Right.

HK: I think it is essentially the 1962 agreement--

RN: Let's face it, the main thing is that the damn war is stopped. . . for a while.

HK: And we face the other problem, Mr. President, that one more big offensive might have smashed the whole Laotian army.

RN: That's right. That's--that's the other point. He didn't have much bargaining position. And also we face another fact that there is a continuing erosion of American congressional support for the damn thing.

HK: That's right. But it is not an agreement that is significantly worse that what we thought --

RN: My main point is basically that Arbuckle as you know, his stuff out of Cambodia has been utterly irresponsible--he's a really bad reporter.

*

Page 2

HK: Mr. President, it is exactly the same thing as with the Vietnam agreement. These bastards for weeks they werewriting there wasn't going to be a ceasefire--

RN: Right, Arbuckle among them

HK: Now that there is a ceasefire in Laos, they are screaming that it is no good.

RN: Yeh, but maybe it'll work. He may be a more isolated--I don't think they are all going to scream that Henry--I don't think it is all that way, do you?

HK: I hadn't seen it anywhere else yet.

RN: That's what I mean.

HK: They have a vested interest in

RN: But this guy has particularly irritated me.

HK: You know, you have been trying to get him barred from Vietnam--he's been poisoned--he's the guy that killed us on Lamson (?) 719--

RN: Yeh, Tammy Arbuckle--

HK: Oh yes, AP or UPI

RN: AP he was now he's working for the Star. But the point is Okay.

HK: Right Mr. President.

*

TelCon

Amb. Porter/Mr. Kissinger

7:56 pm, Mx February 21, 1973

K: Hello. Bill.

P: Yes Henry.

K: Bill, does Marshall Green know about this Liaison Office.

P: To call in the Canadians, yes.

K: No, no, that's fine, that's no problem.

P: Yeah, because you know we don't want to over-put it to a higher level.

K: No, no, no, no, that's fine. I was wondering about this: I promised the Chinese that within two weeks I would get them what's required, personnel, technical outline of what we have to put in there and what facilities we need. Can you produce that for me, or should I call Marshall.

P: Certainly. No, no, I'll--

K: You talk to Marshall.

P: Because his mind is in other places, I think. I'll take care of it Henry.

K: Now don't start filling it because we've already got some people in mind.

P: No, no. I will provide you with an outline.

K: Yeah, something I can give the Chinese.

P: Yes, very good, and one more question, Henry. About the Economic Commission for the North Vietnamese--

K: Yeah, I need three to five names.

P: Three to five-- and I don't think you want any sort of outstanding figure, you want a good technician don't you.

K: And I need people we can control.

P: Exactly, for cosmetic reasons, not to overplay when you've got the Congress problem.

 Authority Eo 12958
 By: MAR 13 1973
 ARKANSAS VALLEY

*

TelCon

7:59 pm, Feb. 21, 1973

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry.

K: That Triangle is continuing to work. I had Voronsov in this evening just to hand him a copy of the communique because --well he brought me a copy of a letter from Brezhnev to you. Saying, that he's now looking over his schedule, he's decided June is the best time for him to come. He's firmly coming in June for a most significant visit, that Dobrynin and I should start working immediately, and he wants me to come to Moscow in April to --

P: When does he think we should announce this.

K: Well, let's wait until after Dobrynin is back in about two or three weeks. You shouldn't do it this close to the China one it looks too obvious.

P: Right, right.

K: But it works like a charm because before this they were playing us along and saying November, and--actually I would prefer it in November.

P: I know, but this will hurry us up a bit, that's just as well too.

K: We've got to work.

P: You've really got to go to work.

K: Dobrynin and I know. Really they agreed to have the SALT agreement come out of it, they've sent us a list of four other agreements they are ready to make, health, environment, and so forth, --

P: And maybe we can get something on that energy thing with them. I really think-- that would be a hell of a coup for him to get that thing.

K: That's right. Of course they raised again that nuclear one and the Middle East.

P: Well, we'll just have to do that. Well the Middle East--

K: We can't do the nuclear one without driving the Chinese into irreconcilable opposition.

P.

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2

P: What will we do about it then.

K: GIVE US WE Can give them a third of what they are asking.

P: Which is what, how much--

K: The British would go right up the wall too.

P: Well.

K: We can give them an agreement that we will work with them to create conditions in which such a treaty can be signed and we set up a commission to work on these conditions or something like that.

P: Yeah, uh huh.

K: That's about as much as we can do. NATO will follow--the effect on both NATO and the Chinese of a flat commitment not to use nuclear weapons would be just disastrous.

P: I know that, yeah.

K: But if he's nailed to a visit it gonna be--up to now he was trying to use his visit to get us to agree to the treaty. Now he's unconditionally agreed to the visit.

P: Right, good. That's good. You know, looking at this Israeli plane thing, that's a pretty rough deal isn't it.

K: Yeah. I talked to Rabin this afternoon and said what the hell did you do this for. He said frankly some high ranking idiot goofed. He said no ordinary pilot would do this, and somebody must have been given the order.

P: My God. Well if not

K: He's coming in tomorrow--

P: The problem is what the Egyptians are gonna do. You think they'll go ahead with the business.

K: No question about it, no question.

P: You think they will, huh.

K: No question.

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*

P: Uh humm.

K: They're getting more out of the visit than we are, we don't need to visit.

P: Uh huh. Well, we trust they will, it's--I don't want them to use this incident for the purpose of starting some silly thing, cause--

K: I can't believe it. Almost certainly not.

P: Well, the Israelis are -- just a very positive--

K: No, no, she's already expressed her condolences to the victims.

P: I think they ought to really compensate for them too don't you think so.

K: Well, let me find out tomorrow when Rabin comes in what the situation was. There's no excuse for it whatever.

P: No, but you know a 707 is such an obvious commercial plane and they should have known what the hell it is. To knock down one of those in unbelievable.

K: No excuse for it, none at all.

P: And I think the Israelis--you can tell Rabin that I think very strongly that they ought to really compensate, to say that will--you know-- that would be a great gesture on their part and it would pull a lot of the steam out of this.

K: I'll mention that.

P: Okay. Bye, Henry.

K: Bye.

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*

TELCOM

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: .... Now I know that Ron has talked to you about Friday afternoon but now the President is taking me off to Camp David Friday afternoon for a meeting with four other people.

W: I see. My conversations with Ron about the nature of this whole thing are very straight and very brief but I had not expected it to be this week. We were happier that it was this week because it's more timely. But what I cared most about was that you felt relaxed and had the time.

K: Yeah. Well, let me find out from the other participants in this whether we could move -- When would you have to film this?

W: So we can air it this Sunday. Well, we'll have until mid-Friday. What I had thought was late in the day when you -- you know, it's quieter. Are you definitely going to Camp David on Friday?

K: Almost certainly. Let me check with Ehrlichman, who is one of the other actors in this. But there's probably some finagling going on.

W: Oh, God. You know, I understand things now as I never did before.

K: You know, there's something more to it than meets the eye but I haven't yet figured out what it is. It has nothing to do with me this time.

W: What do you think it is?

K: Oh, its some maneuver. I forget what it is -- I don't know what it is. It has nothing to do with me.

W: Yeah.

K: Because this meeting was arranged -- the President didn't know about the television thing. I mean, he didn't know the time of it.

W: Well, he was the one who wanted it this week. He was the one who was pushing for it this week. When I talked to him that day on the phone --

K: Yeah, but that was two weeks ago.

W: The only thing that we did discuss was the timing of it. And he even wanted it done sooner. He wanted us to do it the day you got back.

Authority: E012458
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Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

- 2 -

K: Well, what he wants and what I do --

W: We could have aired it Friday night. We had two openings. This Friday night --

K: I would never have done it.

W: I know you wouldn't have! But he wanted to do it then. When I talked to Ron today, I said obviously it's up to you now. When do you want to do it? We can give you this Sunday night which is what our preference is because who knows what happens next week and how things may change. And then he called back and said Friday. And we said okay, fine. So I have to know, you know --

K: Well, I'll let you know tomorrow morning.

W: Okay.

K: Now what would you really intend to do?

W: What I'd like to do is I'd like to talk for an hour. We have a half-hour Sunday night.

K: Right.

W: Then the rest of it, we will decide what is the most important Sunday night. And of course a lot of what I will ask will depend upon how much you talk tomorrow in that briefing.

K: Yeah.

W: What comes out in that.

K: Well, nothing world shaking.

W: Whether there will be anything world-shaking in ours or what direction we will go in, you know I'm --

K: But give me a feel for the general thing. Is it like Kalb or is it like what?

W: I think we'll talk specifically about --

K: My sex life.

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

W: What has come out of Hanoi and China. We'll do something about the aid to Hanoi and how specific can you be about that, if at all.

K: Right.

W: What your views are about the strength --

K: Can I say that the American liberals make me throw up.

W: I think it would be wonderful if you said that.

K: No, really. Now, Barbara, you have to say -- You remember all these bleeding hearts in Javits' apartment?

W: Yes, very well.

K: Now where the hell are they now? If they're so concerned about the individual, why aren't they for aid to Hanoi?

W: Because we've got all these terrible problems in this country.

K: We had those terrible problems then. They were all going on relief missions to Hanoi when it was being bombed. Why doesn't it need relief now?

W: Look, say it. Say anything you want. This is probably the last interview you're going to do for a while.

K: [Laughter] Oh, you think I'm getting fired.

W: No, I'm taking you at your word.

K: It is going to be the last.

W: But if you think we want you to talk about that. I don't know what's come out of China, I don't know how much definite news that there is, how close are we to diplomatic relations, what is the situation withtrade, what about those two fliers. You know, you're aware of all the speculation there's been.

K: Yeah.

W: Now how much about this are you going to be talking tomorrow?

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

- 4 -

K: We'll see.

W: Okay. Certainly something about Mao. I mean, it's an extraordinary visit and what is he like? If we have time, a little bit about China at this point in history. And if you had any discussions with Chou En-lai about where they go from here. And how they keep a revolutionary spirit without a revolution. This is if we have time for that. I think we must go into now we're out of Vietnam, what next? Where next? Where are the problems and where are the areas. What was your uninvolvement date? And then I do want to have some time to talk with you about you. I think people are obviously feeling for you, so many rumors about you, people are amused by you and touched by you and ....

K: Like what? I mean, what about me? I mean, what would you ask?

W: I don't know. Don't make me ask you now. Look, this is on film and you know that when it's on film, that we have the opportunity to --

K: Well, actually, none of this makes any difference about the time. If the President takes me off to Camp David, that will be it.

W: If the President takes you off to Camp David, then we can't do it.

K: Can you do it Saturday morning?

W: If I have to, yes. It makes it hard because you see -- the reason I want to do it on film is so that we can go into different areas. How much of it is going to be hard news really depends on you. You know, how much can you tell me now? Do you know it? Is there anything that came out of Hanoi and out of China that's very important that's a breakthrough. Or do I stay tuned tomorrow?

K: How would I know. They never tell me until two minutes before I go on.

W: You know what I mean. How much -- Is there a Communique that you're delivering tomorrow?

K: Yeah, we're delivering a communique. But, you know, since the press has such an unusual ability to miss the point. I mean, everyone wrote about the Hanoi communique as if economic aid was its primary purpose. If economic aid is somebody's purpose, they don't send me. I don't go --

AUTHORITATIVE
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Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

W: ... story that we got was the economic aid.

K: I don't go to negotiate economic aid. I'm totally incompetent in it.

W: What was the point?

K: The point was to establish a new relationship. I mean, if you look at the tone of the communique, it's astonishing after 4 weeks. Four weeks after B-52 bombings, a streak of cordial atmosphere, constructive meetings, new relationship. That's a hell of a lot more important than aid.

W: Um-humm. Well, you talk about that. You talk about what you think -- you know, what are the most important things that came out of this trip. If we just start in that direction, we've got something. But what I want to do is to talk -- three parts. One is about the trip itself. Two is a more philosophical ____ events in Vietnam, where do we go from here, ....... this country, what are the next problems. What about the Middle East? Where are you in all of this? And then the last part of it if you can divide it into any kind of sense just in our own heads, about you. Now what we plan to do is to do that half hour that night and then the rest we have to run on Tuesday on TODAY, which gives us time again to do promotions on it and to talk about it and to select -- and also, I can't edit everything that fast. I mean, my major concern would be the Sunday night which is as soon as it's --

K: And if we skip a week, you would do the same thing a week later.

W: I would do the same thing a week later.

K: Right.

W: One reason I don't want to skip a week is, you know, who knows what can happen. Agnew can get assassinated, you know. Can we hold a week? Yes. Do we have the time next Sunday? Yes. We put a hold on both times. It is more timely this Sunday. But it really is up to you.

K: Let me talk to ....

W: I can do it Saturday morning and have it ready Sunday night. It's a hurry but I can. But I would rather do it Friday evening. I'd also like to have a little time with you beforehand but that's not difficult.

K: It's difficult but it's important.

FEBRUARY 21, 1973

Authority E012458

BY NAPAL Date 6/15/89

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

W: Well, it can be done earlier in the day. You can see what your schedule is like. You're doing the briefing tomorrow morning. Are you meeting with the Cabinet and Congressional Leaders tomorrow?

K: I'm meeting with the Congressional Leaders.

W: And all of that is being done tomorrow?

K: Yeah. Let me see, can we do it tomorrow?

W: I can't do it tomorrow because I've got to be on the air on Friday morning dammit. McGee is away and I've got to do the show by myself. Unless I somehow or other could do it tomorrow and have it come out of Washington but that's awfully hard.

K: What do you mean?

W: Well, if I'm -- Can I do it tomorrow? Yes, I can do it tomorrow. If we had to do it tomorrow, I could do it tomorrow.

K: Okay. Let me see what happens.

W: Okay. But I do think it's a week that -- I think by the time you've had this briefing tomorrow, you're going to know what points you really want to get across that they didn't ask you. And what areas you feel are terribly important that people know about.

K: Right.

W: So it is important that you and I have a chance to talk.

K: Well, let me talk to Haldeman and find out what they really have in mind with this energy thing that they have cooked up for Friday.

W: Okay. When will I hear from you?

K: Are you home tonight?

W: I am going out to dinner and I'll be home later this evening.

K: See, consumed by jealousy.

W: I know. The real reason I wanted to do this interview is just to have a few moments with you alone.

*

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m., February 21, 1973

- 7 -

K: Oh, I knew that. With a camera. You like warriorism.

W: Should I call you when I come home or will you be sleeping?

K: Well, what time are you coming home?

W: About 11:00 ish.

K: Well, call me at 11:00.

W: Through the White House switchboard?

K: Yeah.

W: All right.

K: Good.

W: Okay.

K: Now you know I'm going to be sitting there waiting.

W: You're so full of baloney. How can you be so marvelous, so fantastic, so interesting, so brilliant, and so full of ..... That's the first question I'm going to ask you.

K: Only if you complete the sentence.

W: [Laughter] I'm glad you're back.

K: Thank you, Barbara.

W: Congratulations.

K: Are you coming on March 3rd or are you giving me up for the *New York Times*?

W: No, no. I'm giving up the *New York Times* for you.

K: Good.

W: It's a great sacrifice but I figure after what you've done for your country, it's the least I can do for you.

K: [Laughter] Good.

W: We'll talk later.

K: Bye.

wsh

*

TELCORN

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

8:32 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hi, Henry.

K: Hi, Bill, how are you?

R: Good, thanks.

K: Bill, there was one thing I forgot to mention to you which is that the Chinese have agreed to discuss the issue of the blocked assets and private claims and we left it that you and their Foreign Minister would begin the discussions when you met there. And that then what's left would be turned over to a cleanup exercise by experts. They want a global settlement --

R: You mean other experts?

K: [Laughter] That was a tactless remark.

R: [Laughter]

K: Other experts.

R: Okay.

K: They want a global approach to it though. You know, some general formula rather than an individual examination of each claim.

R: We do too.

K: And I know that that's what we want.

R: Sure.

K: I got that from Jenkins.

R: Right.

K: And so I agreed to that in principle but we didn't settle on any particular formula.

R: I think it's important to get that out of the way.

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Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

8:32 p.m., February 21, 1973

K: Because then we can move on MFN.

R: Right. I thought the Communique looked good. And we'll notify the governments in the morning.

K: Right.

R: I had an easy time with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

K: Until -- Porter told me at the end Fulbright jumped you on that -- he said it was a love feast except for the very last question.

R: Yeah. On Libyan?

K: Yeah. Although that doesn't affect our policy.

R: No, not our policy. No, it was a love feast all the way around. Except McGovern was a little obnoxious but he didn't get anywhere. I noticed they used it on television. He's still talking about amnesty. But he's a strange character, I must say.

K: Well, you know, the ungenerous nature of him is --

R: Yeah.

K: And these bleeding heart bastards, you know. You don't hear a word from them now about aid. They wanted to send aid missions to Vietnam while we were at war. Now, they don't want to hear of it.

R: That's right. That's right. Well, anyway, it went very well and I think we're doing fine. I mean, Mansfield made a hell of a good statement. He's going to support us on foreign assistance for North Vietnam.

K: Good.

R: And quite a few others did too.

K: Well, he's basically a decent guy.

R: Yeah, he is.

K: No, I heard you did very well.

*

Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

8:32 p.m., February 21, 1973

- 3 -

R: Well, there wasn't any -- I didn't do very well -- It was just a easy session.
Everything was going well.

K: Yeah.

R: The statement -- there was a pretty good statement.

K: You know, I just had one minor suggestion.

R: Which we accepted.

K: Otherwise, I thought it was an excellent statement. It came out very well.

R: Okay, Henry. We have a little problem. I'll talk to you about it in the morning, about this Chairmanship. I got a call from Mitchell Sharp for the Conference. He thinks it's a little -- he says it's a little tricky if we add the four ICCS members because the idea is to have someone that they could report to.

K: Yeah, but they could report to the Conference or to the Security Council.

R: Yeah. The members of the Security Council?

K: Well, yeah. The ICCS could report to the members of the Security Council or to each member of the Conference.

R: Each member of the Conference might be better, yeah. Well, we'll work something out. It's not all that vital. Okay, I'll see you in the morning. Are you going to be at this breakfast?

K: Yes.

R: 8:30?

K: 8:30, if you can make it. I'm going to be there.

R: Who is attending? The leadership?

K: Six. The leadership.

R: Oh, uh-huh. If you see the President before, tell him that Mansfield couldn't have been better.

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TELCORN

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

9:09 p.m. 2/21/73

HK: Hello, Bob. How much importance is the President attaching to that
Camp David thing.

BH: I think a fairly substantial amount. Why you've got a problem?

HK: I have the problem that Ron had laid on with Barbara Walters that she filmed that tv show on Friday afternoon. Well, I could move it up say to 1:30 and could still get up there by say 3:30 and that would still give us the afternoon and dinner.

BH: I guess he'd wait and have everybody go up at 3:30--he's combining two factors--he's anxious to get the whole discussion done and he's also anxious to get himself up to Camp David under--you know with a reason. The reason for it being at Camp David is to get himself up to Camp David. And to take the time to get the thing done.

HK: There's nobody he wants to get away from.

BH: No. This is to have a reason to be going up and doing something--which is kind of silly.

HK: Let me see whether I can have her do it at noon.

BH: I think what he would do is delay going up himself and have everybody go up all at once, but he had made the point that he might not be able to go and that--if not, he'd have you all go up anyway and then he'd join you late afternoon and for dinner.

HK: Can you check for me?

BH: No, there's nothing to check and if it came out that way on Friday--if anything came up--that's not what he is planning, what he's planning is to go up at 12:30--

HK: What should I do?

BH: He told Steve to get his schedule clear so that he could go at 12:30.

HK: What do you think I should do?

BH: I think to the degree he can without getting things screwed up that you ought to do the Walters thing as early as you can do it. And then just schedule the departure for when that would be over.

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Page 2

HK: Okay, let's do it that way.

BH: And I think--he said either have lunch up there or down here--maybe that was after you left. He's loose, and he could leave at 1:30 instead of 12:30 or something like that.

HK: I can't realistically leave -- he's seeing Ismail at 11:00--I could have--I have a WSAG at 10:00

BH: And you ought to stay in that Ismail meeting too

HK: And I must stay in the Ismail meeting, so I could have it say 12:30 or 1:00

BH: Let's try that and

HK: Then we could leave at 2:30

BH: How long are you shooting with her?

HK: An hour.

BH: Okay. I think that's the thing to do.

HK: Okay, I'll aim for that. Thank you Bob.

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