DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/24

TELECON
Secretary Labrd
3/23/71 9:16 a.m.

L: We are sending these figures to you on MACV estimates of tonnage. But be sure you say they are from MACV because DIA and CIA will both be coming in here with figures and shooting us out of the water.

K: We won't use them.

L: Well Houdek wanted them . . .

K: I told Ziegler we are not going to use tonnages. We will take them but we are not going to use them. Don't you think it's the wrong thing to do? What the President was thinking of was throughput.

L: We have them too, but we sent over MACV's tonnages.

K: We will now use them. I assure you.

L: Well it doesn't bother me if you use them as long as you say they are MACV's.

K: We are not going to play that game -- we've got more theologians around. I had breakfast with a great admirer of yours this morning, Rowland Evans. His assessment is that you have got to work harder to get around me than anyone else in town.

L: One other thing. On the level of effort on these strikes we should just say they are about the same as last November.

K: Absolutely. The President doesn't want to use any figures.

L: Yes, and they terminated at 12:00 yesterday. I think it worked out okay to have the announcement before he went on the air. That way he wasn't hit too hard on that. But he sure nailed down a timetable on the 12,500.

K: He didn't think he nailed it done. He said the next increment . . .

L: No, he didn't.

K: That was what he meant to say . . . he doesn't want anyone else to go out and project it over the next 19 months.

L: Read the transcript.

K: We are just going to go through the same agone all over again.

L: I think you should go to Paris and get some mileage on it there.

TELECON
Secretary Laird
3/23/71 9:16 a.m.

page 2

By. 4

NARA. Date 5/26

K: Let him get over the next announcement.

L: It's hard to back away from the strong language he used.

K: I know what he wanted to say.

L: Look at the headline in the Washington Post and the whole story by Roberts. He's got to watch his language. But that tonnage thing is comign over; I didn't want to just float it over without warning you.

K: It will not be used.

L: You make that decision -- it doesn't bother me if you limit it to MACV&dx.

K: It's not worth it.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELCORN

Sen. Miller/Kissinger

10:31 am 3/23/71

M: I had an interesting breakfast THIS mornign with my 3:
Mayor Don Canney, John Naughton, and Rev. Schilling. Canney is mayor of
Cedar Rapids. They are members of 11 man delegation that went to Paris and
two got into see the NVN delegate general on prisoners. A unique meeting. They
had a 2 hour meeting with Bruce after and he was very impressed dith what took
place. Yesterday they met with an assistant secretary of State.

K: Green?

M: No.

K: Sullivan?

M: No.

K: Sieverts?

M: Sieverts, that's the one. A very cordial meeting and Bruce had apparently
reported and Sieverts knew about it. What they had in mind because of the
rapport was to try to get an invitation to go to SVN to visit NVN prisoners and
then try to get an invitation from the NVN for the same thing. It seemed to me
it was in your ball park and it might be helpful to visit with them.

K: How long are they here?

M: All day today and possibly tomorrow.

K: I can make sure that they see a staff member and I will drop in for a few
minutes.

M: The modus operandi is important. They thought of writing the SVN ambassador
I don't know. I know Amb. Diem well enough for him to see them and generate
an invitation from him.

K: What do they want from the SVN?

M: Visit the prisoners of war -- at least, some -- and then prevail on NVN to
go up north for the same purpose.

K: I will call you before 2:00. I will try to find half an hour.

M: I have heard a lot of storeis and I thought it was unique enough to see you.

K: I will try.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Annenberg/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

3/23/71

A: I did ascertain that the spring ministerial meeting is in Lisbon on June 3-4.

K: My problem is that I would like an opportunity to go to Europe but I can't come on such an invitation in which people say if you are in Europe -- for Presidential reasons I would like an excuse to come to Europe.

A: Comex here -- the oratory for the English Speaking Union. You don't need to come under the auspices of the English Speaking Union.

K: I don't want to come on my own because everyone flags it as a big visit. My impression was that there was a dinner where they invited a distinguished American but if it's just a dinner to speak --

A: Last year was the 25th Anniv. dinner. They had Borman, Scott and Mountbatten and they all spoke on Churchill. But it was the 25 Anniv. It's not an annual event. Certainly, you an old European hand, can come and stay at Winfield House.

K: I understand. I don't want to tie myself to the June 9 date.

A: I think I should indicate to Sir John Beh as early as I can so they are not waiting. I have to remind you that if you come here and speak they want publicity and I understand your position. You have reasons why you want to avoid the appearance of what they are interested in. Figurex some other basis and get back to me later on.

K: I will do that.

A: Come on a private visit and see anyone you want here. The government here would be delighted to visit with you.

K: Leave it on that basis.

A: If you want to come and stay at Winfield House, we would be delighted to have you.

K: That's nice.

A: We are going to Calif. on the 29th for two weeks and Phila. for 3 days inbetween for university business. But my wife can always find me.

K: I will be in touch.

A: I will indicate to Sir John Ben your unavailability.

Bv. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

11:15 a. m. 3/23/71

L: On the military assistance program before the Sen. Appropriations Committee.

K: I suppose they haven't talked with you. G__D__! We wanted it delayed before the legislature came up.

L: No, just discuss figures. I am going to be asked about the position of transferring military assistance authority to Defense or as it is or putting it in State. I feel k pretty strongly about this. I hope the President doesn't come to a decision giving it to State. I am ticked about the memos going to Ambassadors all over the world re-designing ______ and a interdepartmental study and told not to talk with the military about this when the Soviet Union is going in the opposite direction we have cut back to 4000 on military --

K: The President put it under State because doing otherwise would be too bloody.

L: Hell no because military assistance package will not be passed unless it meets military requirements.

K: You should talk to the President. Can you delay your appearance?

L: I will avoid testifying on that point. We should maintain it on present level.

K: We need to get you and me and Rogers and Shultz together after the NSC on Thursday.

L: Proxmire Bill is cracy. It shouldn't go in that direction.

K: If there's one agency I don't want to have their hands on the military, it's State.

L: I will get you a memo today on it. I sent one to the President giving exceptions on the Secy. of State direction.

K: We will have a meeting after the NSC.

L: If you have to compromise, fine, keep it the way it is. I will bring a few of the memos around that they are sending.

K: Could you?

L: Some of our ambassadors don't agree with this. I will bring it to you at the meeting.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

12:05 p.m.

3/23/71

R: I took care of what I called about. It was security assistance. Mel claimed he hadn't gotten the word which I talked with Schlessinger --

K: He was mad but weEx he didn't understand. He wanted a meeting with you and me and the President after the NSC but we can call this off.

R: I don't think we should bother the President. How do you think he did last night?

K: Well, I thought. Except for the withdrawal figure. Mel was back on the phone first thing this morning.

R: I chuckled at that. It's better to have the President say it rather than a Cabinet member.

K: He didn't indicate the time period.

R: I was surprised that Howard K. Smith took so long on SEA -- 40 mins. out of an hour. Nothing about the hemisphere. And he didn't give the President enough time to philosophise, which he is so good at. I thought his last answer was good but the choice of questions, while well put --

K: More aggressive than usual.

R: But it shows no matter what you talk about --

K: It goes in phases. One phase when you couldn't get about Indochina. I think Laos will subside in the next few weeks.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Mrs. Mitchell/Kissinger
12:45 p. m. 3/23/71

M: I have told everyone there to tell you to go to hell. (crying)

K: You can't say that to your old frined. What's wrong?

M: I don't think I can talk to you. You have sent my son to VN in the worst
position. The whole thing has been set up.

K: I didn't do it.

M: I don't care. Someone set it up. It stinks to high heaven.

K: I don't know enough about it.

M: John received a memo from Gen. Hughes which he didn't give me. We
received a letter from Jay saying he didn't volunteer and Hughes says he did
and the Under Secy. of State said he did.

K: I don't know enough about it myself.

M: I think they are trying to get me -- you know. Did you see CBS this morning?

K: No, what happened?

M: They showed a picutre of me and said something about the outspoken
Martha Mitchell. I am so sure it was set up. And someone is trying to get
me to say things. They are trying to get me to embarass the President.

K: But you wouldn't.

M: I could.

K: But you wouldn't. Let me look into it.

M: I am terribly up set.

K: I will look into it myself.

M: Dh, shut up! I -- I could kiss you!

K: I will look into it and call you.

By

NARA, Date

5/26

TELCORN

Atty. Gen. /Kissinger

2:22 p. m.

3/23/71

AG: Say, I was just watching Martha's son on TV over there and a thought occured to me. It doesn't concern any worry for him but with events over there, particularly as the AKVN get out and Americans take the casualties, it will really blow everything into a cocked hat. I presume someone has given consideration to this one. It might really give him some problems.

K: I agree.

AG: I think it would probably be determined by the casualty rate.

K: Right and it may be the opponent's strategy.

AG: I imagine you thought of it.

K: I talked to Martha.

AG: She is going up the wall.

K: That's right. I understand it if you see your son on TV.

AG: Right in the middle of it. One of those things that cannot be avoided but it's having a traumatic problem. I hope everything has been thought of in this respect so it doesn't blow right up.

K: Right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Osborne/Kissinger
2:43 p.m. 3/23/71

K: Don Oberdorfer is doing an article on these meetings and I just wanted to tell you that I would like to give him some of the six figures I gave you.

O: I figured you would give them to someone else.

K: I don't want you to think I was ? ? ? . But I won't go into detail as I did with you. That was personal. It won't offend you?

O: No and I assumed you would.

K: I will not volunteer information but people are writing articles.

D: Of course. Thanks for telling me.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NARA, Date 5/26", "TELCON\nCong. Ford/Kissinger\n2:58 p.m. 3/23/71", "F: I apologize for having to leave this morning.", "K: I appreciated your coming over.", "F: Bearing in mind the briefing you gave me before on what we have done I think we have done well and I fully support what we have achieved and I think exx the end result will be beneficial. I watched the news last night and NBC talking to some poor, tired GI.", "K: It turns your stomach!", "F: It makes no sense. Let me ask you something -- I am sure you have read that there's some action most likely in the Democratic causus on Tues. Might be a battle and may end in a resolution despite Albert oppostion on date of withdrawal, etc., on VN. I have had a couple of people ask if there's any alternative resolution exx that we can do prior to that time to take the sting from what they might do without undercutting the President but endorsing what's been done. H. Robinson on the record last ____ -- he is a very sound guy -- has a discussion on March 11 which we should approve that by July 7 exx all combat concluded except for Americans still remaining. Another is \"that substantial reductions in force already achieved in VN, in the national interest and not, should be supported to continue withdrawal without interruption and not less than the present rate and ?? - ? ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
5:09 p.m. 3/23/71

R: I just talked to John about Khe Sanh. The thing that concerns me about it and probably you too is whether we will carry the whole load in Khe Sanh. Our casualties will be high.

K: We will have to be sure our casualties are inside the VN perimeter.

R: But we have to make sure the SVN take the casualties because otherwise it will look as if they lost and we are trying to help.

K: I will talk with Moorer about it.

R: It could be a serious setback. Particularly because of Khe Sanh last time. We are in good shape now.

K: By the end of April we will be out of Khe Sanh. It will look awful if we get throuwn back to the coast.

R: Also if we put our tails between our legs and run.

K: I will call Laird and Moorer immediately because I think it's essential. I will call Moorer in the next 10 mins.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01252C
By LO NARAN Date 05/23/71

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

3/23/71 5:30 p.m.

D: I hope you arrived on time at your office last night.

K: You should know with your intelligence network.

D: Yes, but I received mixed reports. According to one you want straight to your office; according to the others you went other places.

K: You keep only the agents who said I went to my office. The others aren't worth their pay.

D: But the other things sounded too official.

K: I'll let you know when I am doing something unofficial. I am going to send over some partial comments.

D: That would be helpful.

K: On the draft.

D: I remember.

K: But I want you to understand these are not phrased in polite diplomatic language.

D: I understand.

K: They are phrased in terms of what is acceptable and what is not. We will instruct our Ambassador accordingly.

D: Just indicates the direction of your thinking?

K: Yes, they are not formal and are all negative.

D: They are all negative. There must have been something positive.

K: I told you the positives yesterday - these are the things we want changed. But we do not have an exact formulation. We will try to have that tomorrow, but have indicated what we want.

D: Those four major things?

K: They are in there. Was that all you wanted? I gave you comments on every section.

D: That is fine.

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

3/23/71 5:30 p.m.

page 2

K: But we will approach it in a positive spirit. One point on which I may have misled you. We prepared to upgrade the commercial representation you have ther, but we cannot do anything that has diplomatic status. But this is informal-- not in the document.

D: Okay. I understand. I am going to Moscow on Saturday. If I know you are leaving on Friday. If I have any questions I will drop them in the mail to you before Friday.

K: Okay, Friday afternoon is when I leave.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012557

By

CNAR A Date 5/1/71

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

3/23/71 5:30 p.m.

D: That would be helpful.

K: On the draft.

D: I remember.

D: I understand.

D: Those four major things?

D: That is fine.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

3/23/71 5:30 p.m.

page 2

cl
tom

D: Is...

K: They
every section

D: That is fine.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Alex Johnson

5:35 p.m., March 23, 1971

K: I just wanted to ask you about Marshall Wright.

J: He was just promoted to FSO-2 in 1969. It would be extraordinary
for him to be on this list.

K: Will you let me know when it's time.

J: Anytime that you want to -- now would be appropriate -- to
write a memo on it. I will see that it goes in his file and the next Board
will have it. You might as well do it now.

K: I will do that. The promotion list has gone forward to the President
today.

J: It did go forward today? Fine.

K: Thank you.

lds

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELECON

Frank Mankiewicz/Mr. Kissinger

5:45 p.m., March 23, 1971

K: I am afraid to talk to you guys -- it will be in the papers tomorrow.

back

M: Since you called me/that will be the early story for the 'overnight.' I am the most conservative, moderate guy you can talk to.

K: I liked the news coverage that I tried to get McGovern g to change his view on the Vietnam war.

M: I talked to Humphrey, but I didn't know you were supposed to tell the paper.

K: What do you mean?

M: I was just referring to your meeting with Gene McCarthy. I don't know how his story finally broke.

K: My view is it was a private meeting with a man I respect. I have meetings like this every week.

M: On the McGrory story, it said they could wait a week.

K: Nonsense. They put the story out. I have had a meeting like that at least once a week -- for reasons of some of my past associations as much as anything.

M: And they would be extremely helpful to you if you can spare the time.

K: I want these people who are concerned to feel that people listened to them.

M: I want to see you -- and I will wear a clerical collar if you want.

K: That just makes you a monk.

M: I want to tell you about another group -- it has to do with the Vietnamese elections.

K: I will be on the West Coast next week. Can it wait till I get back?

M: Unfortunately, no.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

5:45 p.m., March 23, 1971

- 2 -

K: Are you going to be out there? We could meet under more relaxed circumstances.

M: No. When do you go?

K: Friday afternoon.

M: Can we have breakfast or a pre-breakfast?

K: Is it urgent? I will find a half-hour before I go. Maybe late tomorrow afternoon.

M: It is required by television that I am unavailable on Friday morning from 8:30 to 11:30. Otherwise, I will rearrange all appointments I have. Friday's TV program is devoted entirely to you so I wouldn't want to miss it.

K: Do you want some good pictures?

M: I would appreciate it if you could see me -- 20 minutes would be enough. I have talked to a lot of young guys back from Vietnam. I see them doing responsible things which you should know about.

K: I will see you before Friday noon for a half-hour.

lds

has to do with

it wait till I get back?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
J. K. Galbraith
3/23/71; 6:45 p.m.

K: Welcome -- I don't know why as a member of this Administration I should welcome you in this town.

G: I see you are consorting with nothing but radicals yourself.

K: They are all my friends -- not so much the priests but the others. Are you free for dinner tomorrow?

G: I can't. I have to give a speech in Rome -- to make money.

K: Tomorrow?

G: Day after tomorrow but I have to catch a planetomorrow night.

K: The President wants me to have breakfast with him.

G: I am going to be back in three weeks' time.

K: I really would love to see you

G: I will be down in three weeks -- let's have breakfast.

K: What week will that be? I will be on vacation.

G: Why don't you have your secretary give me a call to say what your free time is. I have to come to Washington and I will work it around that.

K: Let me check on the breakfast tomorrow -- how urgent it is that I sit in. I don't have anything in particular to discuss with you except the pleasure of seeing you.

G: I completely understand what your schedule is. I am giving some lectures in Dresden and Leipzig.

K: Really! Have they had western economists lecture there before? I think that should be fascinating. I would love to talk to you about that.

G: I will give you a suitable condensed report.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

3/23/71; 6:45 p.m.

- 2 -

K: If you are free, what times will you be free tomorrow?

G: I have to stay in this meeting all day. The meeting starts at 9:00 and will last until 5:00. I am leaving at 4:00.

K: My breakfast is 8:30 -- I could see you before. Let me see how my meeting goes, whether I can get out of it. Can I reach you at the hotel?

G: Yes. I will be here all evening.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Bunker

7:10 p.m., March 23, 1971

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine.

K: I would appreciate two things from you: (1) Did you see the
President's TV thing yesterday?

B: I didn't see it but I heard about it. It was very good -- excellent.

K: If you can stick with that line out there, we would appreciate it.
Secondly, any assessment on the internal political situation and morale
situation in Vietnam you can give to us would be appreciated.

B: Fine.

K: Can you do that?

B: I think the internal morale situation here is very good. I
think the people here are strongly supporting the action in Laos. I
think it's been excellent here.

K: Good. Wonderful.

B: How are you?

K: In good shape.

B: I think things are going well here. I will get something off to you.

K: We would appreciate it. Thank you, Ellsworth. Good-bye.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/John Galbraith

8:00 p.m., March 23, 1971

K: I'll stop at nothing to keep you from doing what you are doing.

G: I was reading the paper.

K: Oh, somebody told me you were in a meeting room.

G: To tell the truth, I was just on my way there.

K: The bugging system that J. Edgar has is not working.

G: I understand your social activities are going to take over completely.

K: They are in about 10 minutes. Unfortunately I can't change the
breakfast but how early do you start? If you have 1/2 hour between
8:00 and 8:30 ...

G: You get to the office at 8:00?

K: Yeah.

G: Suppose I come by at 8:00 and have a cup of coffee.

K: I will give you a cup of coffee and a roll.

G: Then I will send you off to your 8:30.

K: Good, come at 8:00 and then I will go off at 8:30.

G: I will give you a few good suggestions for your further meeting to
close the credibility gap.

K: (laughter) If you can give me a suggestion to keep these guys from talking. I have a massive ______ with my colleagues.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Geyelin/Kissinger

late afternoon

3/23/71

K: This is how we treat heads of editorial pages of newspapers that don't give us unqualified support. Even newspapers that give us qualified support.

G: You should not have told the President who you were lunching with.

K: Are you going to be in Calif. next week?

G: I am sitting tight. One week in Nigeria --

K: Are you suggesting they are the same?

G: Not at all.

K: How about 6:30 tomorrow?

G: The Federal City Club is giving it's annual dinner at 7:30, black tie. That's not good. Do you have a breakfast?

K: No, I don't. I have an NSC Thurs.

G: I think you should go to it.

K: You do?

G: It doesn't hurt my feelings when it's you or the President or the NSC or that magnitude.

K: He kept me until 2:40.

G: Did you get any lunch?

K: At 2:40. Let's do breakfast at 8:00 at the Metropolitan Club on Fri.

G: Afternoons are bad for me because we are trying to put it together.

K: The less you put together the better for us.

G: ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: No. You ask Kay. She has a most distinguished editorial page. You take me too seriously.

G: I think it's an indiscretion to note that Broder takes notes on breakfast --

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Geyelin/Kissinger

late afternoon 3/23/71

-2-

K: No, it was lunch. Off the record.

G: I thought it was very interesting and persuasive. I am willing to accept what you want to say on this so long as I only man river rolls along and I don't think you can stop it.

K: Why should we? What's in it for the country?

G: Unless they get into a jam. Some of the best people have gotten hysterical.

K: That's what makes it so tragic.

G: I don't sense always -- not from you -- a general understanding of what's like for those with their noses placed to the window pane for years and have notebooks full of stuff that sounds similar and if you have been covering it for years it's beginning to be a little ragged. Even Murray Marder.

K: The difference between us and Averell -- when we talk it sounds 100% but in that truth the difference is 6%.

G: But you said if it's only 51 - 49 you have to sell it as 100.

K: No, you are stuck with it as if it's 100. If it fails, they say we lied all along. That's not true. You can fall off the tight rope in either direction.

G: I haven't found any lies. I have seen military estimates and reporting that's wrong.

K: But if you see some of it here --

G: I sometimes wonder when I hear Packard whose faith is touching --

K: But what do you do about it?

G: I don't know what you can do. I sense what you told those guys yesterday that you are close to seeing the mission accomplished.

K: That's what we think but there's so many intangibles. How much of a shot in the arm are NVN getting from what they think they accomplished. They were at the edge of the abyss and didn't fall of. What will they conclude?

G: Regularly they have done what we have not counted on. I understand capacity is.

K: I think through this year and next year their capacity is not enough for a military solution.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Geyelin/Kissinger

late afternoon 3/23/71

G: Are you concerned not just about the morale of the ARVN but of a
refusal revolt?

K: I haven't a clue to any evidence. Haig feels ? ? ? ?

G: Each unit differs. Two year set up is a difficult outcome.

K: I agree with you.

G: It happened to your predecessors more than we care. The VC, when
they landed in March of 65 they were wrong. Bill Bundy is candid about that.

K: I don't pretend that the campaign was as we planned it.

G: I thought that was sensible.

K: I tried to give assessment without numbers which are not important.

G: This question of deadline will come back and I hope it can be handled.

K: I don't see what's to be gained by it except a psychic satisfaction.

G: I can see if it's what you have in mind.

K: Even so.

G: Sharing of responsibilities if it goes sour.

K: But if you hope you can negotiate before and of deadline then it's not
a price worth paying.

G: I have never accepted the theory that when they get weak they negotiate.
We didn't when we were weak.

K: Just to get an agreed international status and unequivocal withdrawal.
If before, they are not negotiating /

G: Why isn't trade off on the table now?

K: They said they would talk about releasing as they said if we stopped the
bombing.

G: And we will not take them out while there's a prisoner --

K: Lets save it for Friday morning. My apologies. But when I am in
the building I don't feel I cannot go.

SENSITIVE

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:58 a.m.

3/24/71

K: I have just had a message from Bonn. I need to discuss it with you right away. We have many visitors around here. Could I come right over?

D: It's quite all right with me.

K: I will be there in 10 minutes.

SENSITIVE

TELEON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:45 a.m.

3/24/71

EXCLUSIVE

EYES ONLY

K: I just heard that your super-active ambassador there has asked for others too, separately, telling them all not to tell the others which is a brilliant move. Under those conditions it would be wrong to cancel with ours. He should make it formal and make no reference to anything else.

D: He decided probably to show them this text.

K: That's all right.

D: I still don't have anything there. It's probably really happening.

K: Some are on Sat.

D: On the 26th.

K: What he should do is have a meeting tomorrow with ours on the basis of showing advance copy of the text and no reference to anything else.

D: I am sure he has instructions. Probably in a general way. As for reference --

K: He must not mention names or contacts.

D: With this it's much more helpful.

K: Meet and only present the paper. I can count on that?

D: I will have an answer today or by morning. I will send this for additional warning

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASER
By CHARA DATE 6/20/71

EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

SENSITIVE

TELCONE
Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:45 a.m.

3/24/71

BY

NARA, Dato

5/26

K: I just found out that your super-active ambassador there has asked for others too, separately, telling them all not to tell the others which is a brilliant move. Under those conditions it would be wrong to cancel with ours. He should make it formal and make no reference to anything else.

K: That's all right.

K: Some are on Sat.

D: On the 26th.

SENSITIVE

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Sen. Jackson/Kissinger

10:52 a.m.

3/24/71

J: The reason I called is they got into a flap. Remember that letter I sent you on Singapore.

K: Yeah.

J: I sent you a copy of a wire that came to me on classified basis a letter from Gruman. You sent me a message and Rogers needs to know where it came from on the basis of a ______ to Mel Laird. We have so many problems, we don't need this one.

K: This kind is such fun!

J: Told Laird it's out of his shop. In other words, if it got into unfriendly hands -- I sent it to you for information for the President.

K: I sent it to the Depts. for comment.

J: Right and now some bureaucrat at State has a hand in it.

K: I will take some steps.

J: It's not any help to any one.

K: We will straighten it out.

J: Don't let it get into the newspapers.

K: Of course.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Cong. Pucinski/Kissinger

10:55 a.m.

3/24/71

K: I am terribly sorry I didn't get back sooner. The message got lost. It's as inefficient as any government office.

P: The Polish Govt. is trying to buy oil refining machinery from us. The company is based across the street from me. I understand it's under review again in view of the fact we sold this kind of equipment to Romania. I understand it's in your shop.

K: When a bureaucrat doesn't want to make a decision he says I'm the bastard. While that may be true I am not to blame on this. There was a decision made on foreign policy grounds and nothing to do with the merits of the thing which we can review later this summer.

P: The people here to see me from Chicago say that the Polish Govt. has to be making a decision and will buy from the U.S. or Russia. You can imagine where they want the business. It's for American dollars and exact same that went to Romania.

K: Yes but at the time the request came in the Polish Government had been difficult on other matters.

P: I am behind that decision. I am sure you didn't see a note I wrote to the President in which I said if he kept his fingers crossed like everyone else on Gehrig it seems they are trying to move.

K: I will try to look at it again.

P: May I say that you are doing a good job? I am very much impressed with the way you are handling this. And I say that as a good Democrat.

K: Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Rowland Evans

11:10 a.m., March 24, 1971

K: Mr. Evans. As it turns out, I looked over the papers, and none of the options were accepted in their unadulterated form. You can't say Option 3.

E: Between 2 and 3 and 4?

K: Have you seen the papers? No, it's not 2.

E: Can you define it? I know what 1 and 5 were. What is 2?

K: A military victory without escalation. That was not it.

E: Just stay and fight. A combination of 3 and 4 -- nobody can reject that.

K: The right thing to say is more a combination between 3 and 4 and 5.

E: I get you. One was a military victory with immediate escalation. Okay. Henry, I have a hideous feeling the Middle East will sit and sit and sit.

K: Not as long as you write.

E: I was talking to Rabin yesterday. He said, "I haven't felt any of all that pressure you said was coming from your government." We are going to have lunch today. They feel they have skinned us.

K: I would not go. Let's wait a bit.

E: All right, sir. What did you think of our column on Mexico?

K: I didn't read it yet.

E: It's interesting. It's right down your alley. The Soviets had a caper down there.

K: It was a disaster.

E: I read your piece in the New York Times magazine about the Khrushchev visit. It reads extremely well.

K: In '58?

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

2:24 p.m., March 24, 1971

K: I just wanted to tell you that we did get in touch with Moorer to make absolutely sure about the point you made yesterday. He promised me they would do this and since we got to Tchepone in five days, you know we can rely on their promises.

R: Some time I would like, if you have no objection, to talk to Haig about his trip.

K: Good.

R: I will give him a call.

K: K It's mainly the military side, but it will give you a good feel.

R: Marshall said he is satisfied about the way Swank is handling it. You know, you lose confidence in the military judgment on some of these things.

K: I don't know how often we were briefed that we would do it in five to eight days. At these WSAG meetings, we kept asking about reinforcements. It took 45 days to get these units in.

R: The President raised the question of there being any chance of getting cut off from the rear.

K: I don't know whether we would do it again. It would certainly have been good to know.

R: As a result of the discussions we had, everybody had the feeling of being somewhat uneasy and recognized it was not an easy one.

K: Looking back, we would probably do it again. The major concerns were domestic. In terms of supplies used up and enemy units destroyed, it almost certainly paid for itself. In contrast to Cambodia, we paid a psychological price which is hard immediately to make up.

R: From the political and diplomatic viewpoint, we handled it right.

K: The ending cost us. If they had told us 10 to 14 days, we could have said so. You could have used it in your press conference.

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

2:24 p.m., March 24, 1971

- 2 -

R: I gave them every opportunity. I am sending over a copy of our report to the President and you this afternoon.

K: Oh, good. When will it be released?

R: We will hand it to the press today or tomorrow and release it Sunday. The only report of its kind was done by Secretary Olney(?) in 1896. I think it will be useful.

K: The press reaction will be very good.

R: It fits into the President's report perfectly.

K: I think it dovetails very well. It will be a very helpful thing. I think it will get good press.

R: I think we will do it every two years, and I will say that. Every session of Congress will have one. The President's will be every year.

K: I look forward to seeing it. ~~XXIX~~ Will you inscribe it for me? I mean it.

R: I will send you one.

lds

~~I~~ contrast to
~~ediately to~~ rank up.

point, we handled it right.

I'd us 10 to 14 days,

in your press conference.

By. 5/26

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
4:35 p. m. 3/24/71

P: Anything new today?

K: Nothing of consequence. Everything out of Laos. Even the Marines.

P: Faster than I thought.

K: In good order. No major set backs and as a technical way to get out except for battalions beaten up, none were badly damaged.

P: I will lay you money $x at least 10 ofx theirs were damaged.

K: Very severely. If they had any real punch they could turn into a real rout. They can go to Khe Sanh or get all they have left with a psychological victory or ? ? ? ? . Or a harrassment of Khe Sanh.

P: What's the situation on supplies?

K: I will have a definitive judgment on the way to San Clemente. I am having a meeting Fri. morning. The work isn't done yet. A good judgement then.

P: If you have anything on the line, get Haldeman in. He can help pull -- we have to get our forces lines up like Laird and Rogers. Did Laird do something this week?

K: He has been briefing committees all week long. So was Moorer.

P: How are they getting along?

K: All right.

P: I guess Rogers not up there.

K: He can't add to it.

P: It's all military.

K: He can't add judgment.

P: They should all stick to my evaluation. That they suffered a 50% loss. When I said two weeks ago 50% flow -- that was absolutely correct?

K: Absolutely. At that time -- on Mar. 8 there was actually truck traffic of 55% but since it carried more than 20% of last year's total in SVN and Cambodia, we can justify it. Full intelligence reports to back it up.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

President/Kissinger

4:35 p.m.

3/24/71

P: OK. How do you find -- I feel that after the business we had those two rough days sAt. and Sun. but after that they haven't had a hell of a lot to show on TV.

K: Articles in the paper on the professional way they pulled out. Not a hell of a lot to show. Basically, we -- some of the stuff we put out -- that backgrounder helped on Monday.

P: Question of reaching the TV types. Maybe it will help to reach the columnists. Jos. Also had a couple of good ones. How about Stuart?

K: I'm seeing him for breakfast tomorrow morning.

P: Good. He is good. Can you believe You can be more off beat than I was. I never used success or victory but now we can say it was a success.

K: Because no danger of a rout.

P: Plus in terms of their losses against ours and cut supplies and in terms of guarantee of American withdrawal and reducing threat and strengthening SVN morale and Vietnamization. I hope our boys follow up on that. Getting it around?

All
K: Absolutely. On the Depts. have it and we will put it out as guidance at the meeting. You should repeat it when you make the speech on Apr. 7.

P: We will have to see the situation then. That will not be as formal as before. I many not use a text. Use charts and announce the number and no advance text. A surprise. It's a hell of a chore to do it. Maybe it's time to just talk straight out. Say this is where we are and where we are going.

K: Now the impression of calm.

P: I got that across.

K: And conviction. I thought you spoke with great fire in that interview.

P: Talking to Dominick today and he said Percy was saying he was disappointed in the interview.

K: Of course he was.

P: I have someone calling me.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

5:07 p.m.

3/24/71

K: The President keeps asking me and I don't know the answer. Did you special brief Senators and Congressmen?

L: Yeah. I went up to the Hill today and took that colonel with me.

K: Not just committees?

L: We didn't go to the Fulbright committee. We offered to everyone. Capin went to ______ and said if you want a special briefing we will do it.

K: Send me a list from the President will know. He will be pleased.

L: They won't run into the hearings --

K: He knows. These are beyond those scheduled?

L: These weren't scheduled last week.

K: How's it going?

L: Did a good job. That colonel does a good job. He raises hell with the press. He talked with Hughes (or Hugh Scott) after the briefing this morning. He told the colonel to be careful or you will get cut up if you are tough. He does well

K: Good.

L: I have a disconnect over there. Do you know what it is as far as the President is concerned? I keep getting orders -- he signs them.

K: Like what?

L: Today they opened the Portsmouth Navy Yard to get Mrs. Smith's vote. This won't do it. Cancelling closings for '64 to get SST. He shouldn't sign letters like that.

K: I don't know what -- I have been saying to these people -- I will go back to them.

L: They should protect the President.

K: Things that go to you should be sent through me.

L: Now he wants the abortion policy changed over there.

K: Why you dirty old man, do you have an abortion policy?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

5:07 p.m.

3/24/71

-2-

L: Requires certification of two doctors for military in military hospitals. Now they say the policy should follow state law. The President doesn't understand the yearning for being second and nothing new is terrifying.

L: He tried in his statement to get that out.

K: Ecology is nonsense because someone will fly those and it will be affected anyway. We are already flying supersonic planes.

L: And you will think about this.

It

L: Now

K: Why?

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/John Kenneth Galbraith

6:26 p.m., March 24, 1971

K: John, how are you? Anything I can do to take you away from your meetings...

G: They are not that damaging. I was overwhelmed by questions of why I was meeting with Henry Kissinger. I said it was purely personal. I had a cup of coffee with you before you went to breakfast.

K: It didn't come out of here. Helen Thomas saw you leaving the office.

G: At the press conference when they should have been inquiring about decisions we reached, they were mostly concerned with whether I was an extension of the Berrigan group. I said no, I never come to Washington without looking in on Henry as I did in Cambridge.

K: I said it was purely personal, and we have been doing it all along.

G: Great. When it comes to press relations, we have the same soundings.

K: I look forward to seeing you when you get back.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Herb Kaplow
3/24/71; 6:45 p.m.

K: I understand the point you are making -- you were doing this all along.

HAK: I never made any publicity on it and I still won't except these things are taking on ludicrous proportions. I felt I always had a position here as a professor. Let me give you some figures. They go back only a year from April 1. I have seen student groups and other young protestors 19 times since April 1; academic and intellectual non-students critics 28 times; academic and non-academic intellectuals who were not necessarily opponents 56 times -- that's for my own education; critics such as McGovern 27 times.

K: Who besides McGovern.

HAK: Harriman 4 times; John Gardner 3 times; Cy Vance 2 times.

K: Would you call Vance a critic?

HAK: Now I would. Galbraith, I see him every time he comes in because he is a friend.

K: This morning was not special?

HAK: Right. I have seen him four times in the last year. Harriman always talks about the war but once he came in to talk about his trip to Moscow with Muskie. I have seen Church, Clark Kerr.

K: He is a critic?

HAK: No, but we saw a group of his people -- yeah, he is a critic.

K: I think you made the point.

HAK: I have seen that fellow who fasted in Lafayette Square 6 times.

K: So, what you are saying is there is nothing new -- just more publicity. Can I say that just as a professor you felt you needed to see them?

HAK: And the President has strongly encouraged that.

K: I can also say that you don't want any publicity and have never made an attempt to make publicity. I think I called you earlier about Laos.

HAK: I have some people with me. Why don't you call me back on that.

K: I will call you back tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:25 p.m., March 24, 1971

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President

P: Hi, Henry. Anything else new?

K: No, things are going along rather well. Pompidou has sent over here on a personal basis the man who runs the Elleyes Palace, a combination of Haldeman's Ehrlichman's and my job. He wants to have a personal talk with me on behalf of Pompidou and for you about the situation -- about some French concerns.

P: Yeah.

K: And I'll be seeing him tomorrow.

P: Yeah.

K: The North Vietnamese called off tomorrow's negotiating session but have already scheduled it again for the following week and I have told you already that the South Vietnamese are out of Laos,

P: Oh, yeah.

K: And that there was a little screwup -- Abrasimov asked for a private meeting with Rush to ratify some of the things Dobrynin and I had to discuss -- little screw-up in the bureaucracy but Rush handled it beautifully.

P: That's fine. They are still planning this raid, the latest?

K: I'll believe it when I see it. Bunker cabled me that Abrams is going up to I Corps and is going to discuss it with Sutherland.

P: As far as I am concerned now it doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference, they are out.

K: They are out but it would show their teeth.

P: It would keep the enemy from raising forces.

K: It would keep the enemy on their toes but I don't think we should spill any blood on that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/24

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:25 p.m., March 24, 1971 -- page 2

P: No, no, our best bet is just to cool it and to remember that this
has given them a hell of a blow. The briefings -- has Mel had one
today?

K: Yes. They have offered it to every member on the Hill as a matter
of fact.

P: Has he reported to you, they are going well?

K: That's right. I knew they were going on and they took that helicopter
Colonel along and he took on the press in a very aggressive way. So
much so that Senator Hughes came up afterwards and said that if he
keeps up this, he will have the press ....

P: He took on the press, huh.

K: Oh, yeah, and he said they took just a few pilots ............ and that
this wouldn't have come from any of his pilots.

P: I hope there was some press there.

K: That will get out.

P: And Hughes is a (peacenick).

K: Hughes was the former truck driver and he probably has some of
those qualities even though he is a (Dove).

P: Probably appealed to by a guy like that.

K: I am sending over to you, Mr. President, the NSC book for tomorrow's
meeting on China and UN Membership. Rather complicated issues --
what State really wants is to get a Resolution -- a sole seat for
Communist China. There will be a lot of proposals and I think you
might want to reserve your views at the end of the meeting.

P: Yeah.

K: Not too far from it but one point which I will make in my memo ....

P: Well, hell ...

K: No, the major use of it is to get it on the table.

P: Anything on the domestic side? I see from the paper that Muskie really

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:25 p.m., March 24, 1971 -- page 3

By NARA, Date 5/26

struck out on the mayors. He said ______ and they really took him on. Muskie doesn't have it.

K: I thought your SST statement was very good.

P: I think your friend, Lake, is giving him some bad advice.

K: Muskie doesn't have it. There is something going around where McCarthy says, "You want to hear a Polish joke?" and when they say yes, he says "Muskie".

P: I think McCarthy is going again.

K: I believe he believes lightening is going to strike. He is going to cut away at everybody.

P: Muskie, huh. They are having their fun. Let them all go out. Muskie's problem is that he just doesn't have it in the big plays.

K: It showed up certainly as soon as he went public.

P: It is going to be continually hard to keep the Laotian thing off TV.

K: To keep it on TV you mean. How can they, there isn't anything going on in Vietnam now.

P: Unless they take a crack.

K: Within 4 weeks it has got to die down.

P: If it is going to pop, they will have to pop something now.

K: If they were really strong, the South Vietnamese couldn't have retreated without heavy casualties.

P: That should be getting across, read everybody in on that line.

K: You know I am having breakfast --

P: Mel is hitting -- following my line on the press conference?

K: Yes, Mr. President.

P: Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

TELCONE (TAPE)

Ambassador Dobrynin

Brought in 3/26/71

10:00 p.m., March 24, 1971

K: Anatoliy.

D: Hello, Henry. I hope you are having a quiet evening.

K: Well, what does your intelligence tell you? No, I am having a quiet evening.

D: Yeah, I hope so. Well, I received an answer from my Minister. First, he would like me to tell you that our Ambassador has very strict instructions never to mention or never to mention confidential dinners. It's just confirmation for your information. He has strictest instructions never to mention it. He hasn't mentioned it to his associates in no connection at all.

K: Yes.

D: So this is the first thing. Second, our Ambassador there, he dropped his request about meetings with your Ambassador for tomorrow.

K: Oh, he has.

D: Yes, and he is saying that technically he is not prepared to have it at all.

K: Right.

D: So this is what they would like me to tell you.

K: Well, I appreciate that. We had in the meantime accepted it, but it's all right.

D: Huh?

K: Our Ambassador had in the meantime accepted seeing him.

D: But I received -- you see he tells you that he is sorry and --

K: That's fine, that's the best way of doing it.

D: So there will be no meeting tomorrow.

K: That's the best way of doing it.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
Authorized

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCONE (TAPE)
Ambassador Dobrynin

Brought in 3/26/71

10:00 p.m., March 24, 1971

D: Yeah, no meeting tomorrow. I just received information,
received his instructions. So I think it is covered, Henry.

K: Okay, Anatoliy, I was going to call you tomorrow morning to
suggest that we have a meeting tomorrow at 5:00 if that's convenient.

D: At 5:00, could we make it 4:00?

K: No.

D: Okay, let's say 5:00.

K: No, I have something at 3:00 that may take until 5:00.

D: Well, let's if we do this -- let's make it 5:00, but if you could
make it earlier, it would make it better but otherwise it will be 5:00.

K: All right. I will see but would later be better for you?

D: No, because the fact is tomorrow is a traditional meeting of all
the Soviet ambassadors, we have a dinner.

K: Well, then let's do it at 7:30, I don't want you to be too successful
there.

D: No, no, no, I've got nothing to lose.

K: No, no, I'm joking.

D: I prefer to have it --

K: No, no, I will -- maybe I can shift something and do it at 12:00.

D: That would be better, that would be definitely better.

K: No, no, that won't work. Let me -- I will do this Anatoliy, there
is a chance if we have a meeting in the morning of the NSC -- the National
Security Council --

D: Understand, understand.

K: If that ends before 12:00, I'll call you.

D: Okay.

MVD OF 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Don Oberdorfer/Kissinger
late morning 3/24/71

O: I said I would call. I will read this. In the middle of the column: "Recent disclosures on Henry A Kissinger's contacts with Senators McCarthy and McGovern and the Berrigan ________ suggest that he has been using depth of ? ? ? ? ? ? Kissinger said that's not his purpose. ? ? ? ? principle purpose is opening lines of communication despite ? ? ? ? . One benefit for the Government is to engender that WH listening to what the people have to say. ? ? ? ? ? ? since last April 1, 19 meetings with students and groups, 28 meetings with academics and 28 meetings with individual xxx critics such as ? ? ? ? and JKGalibraith this morning."

K: How did you hear this about that?

O: We picked it up. "Also meetings with other groups that are not critics. Continuing process of many months and not a new ________. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? No clear evidence that the President will make clear compromise ? ? ? ?" That's me talking. What I have read is --

K: It's a fair statement. When you were starting I said I hoped you would make it clear that it's not just recent. It's a fair statement. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958
Authorit

By. NARA Date 6/4/04

TELCON (TAPE)

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

March 24, 1971

L: Henry.

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Pretty good. You probably saw the strike report from last night.

K: Yes, I did. Oh, no, from the ones that went last night.

L: Yeah.

K: No, I haven't yet. I know that they didn't get all off.

L: No, the weather's closed in there pretty badly but I think they have done -- the first 24-hour period they did real well.

K: Right.

L: They did terrifically well and there wasn't a lot of stuff on restrike up there anyway.

K: Right.

L: If they had gone over to the coast to those port towns along the coast and moved in beyond the 30 kilometers, they finally could have -- probably could have found some targets there but they hit most of the targets in the area up to the 30 kilometers and then we let them go over the 30 kilometers at that one point.

K: That was the right thing to do. You weren't in favor of their hitting the coast towns though were you?

L: No, I think that this is good enough for now.

K: That's what I think.

L: And I think it's a mistake to go and extend it beyond the 30 kilometers now to go on over and hit those coast towns.

K: No, no, no, no.

L: MACV is in here suggesting that because of the weather shutting in that maybe the weather might be good but hell, if we give them that authority for 24 hours, they know with this satellite shot we have here of the weather that we will be back in for an extension and extension and extension and I think we had just better call this one quits.

TELCONE (TAPE)
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

March 24, 1971

K: I agree.

L: Now we have got 6 more A-6s that can go in there at dark, it's dark
out there now and they may go in during the night.

K: That's okay.

L: But the last plane will be out by 12 o'clock.

K: And then we should announce that it is terminated.

L: Do you think we should just say as we come out today that it will
be 48 hours in duration.

K: I think after it is over we should just say the protective reaction
is terminated.

L: All right, that will be tonight at 12:00.

K: Oh, I see, so we can't say anything today.

L: We can't say anything today unless when we are asked about it, we
are going to be asked -- Tom Moorer and I will be asked up on the
Hill before you know the television --

K: Well, but are the A-6s, is that worth it?

L: Well, I really don't think it's worth it, they are just going in there
at night.

K: Oh, the hell with it. Why don't we just call it off? What do you think?

L: Well, let me find out what targets those A-6s have got, their night capable and let me find out if there is anything good, I hate to cancel them out, but let me find out --

K: Well, if they have something good, then let it go and then we will
just say today the authority extended for 48 hours and it will be
ending.

L: Ended at 12:00 tonight.

K: Right.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

March 24, 1971

L: Sure, I think that's all right.

K: That will take care of it.

L: Any other problems.

K: No, I think -- what's your political judgment, Mel, how much heat
are we going to take on that Laos operation?

L: Well, we'll take some heat on it. I think we will take some heat
on it for awhile but we would have taken heat on it anyway.

K: Oh, yeah.

L: I think that when this airstrike surfaces about Wednesday -- you know
they will be writing about that a little bit starting about Wednesday.
They won't really be able to figure it out but these guys are counting
airplanes over there that are around these air bases.

K: Yeah.

L: Those pilots will be talking about where they went so they really
won't figure this out until about Wednesday -- they will try to tie
that up with the Laos thing, they are already trying to.

K: Right.

L: But we will make it okay.

K: Okay and you do some briefing together with Moorer tomorrow of
selected groups of Congressmen and Senators.

L: Yeah.

K: And you bring them into the Pentagon/or go up to the Hill, whichever
you want.

L: We'll do it the easiest way for them, we'll work it out.

K: Well, you are the expert at that.

L: Right.

K: Okay, Mel, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

March 24, 1971

K: Mr. President

P: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, after I got through with Dobrynin I watched the rerun of your program.

P: Oh, yeah, yeah.

K: I think, first from a technical point of view, this was technically the best performance I have seen you put on. And from a substantive point of view, the only reason I don't say it was the best because you have had so many outstanding ones. And I think you did -- the only thing I regret is that it wasn't on preempted time.

P: Yeah.

K: But I think it was absolutely superb.

P: Well, I did get a chance to make some points but Smith was awfully good, he asked tough questions.

K: And that's better for you.

P: Oh, I want them tough. You know, it also made him more critical.

K: But when he said, "why don't you do the easy thing and pull the troops out! or whatever it was, the direct thing and you said" that's just it, you made it easy for me to answer this one because it is the easy thing to do". And when you said that -- I thought that was an eloquent speech you made at that point. And I thought the whole tone of it was superb. I don't know whether we have any rating reports --

P: Well, we won't get that until --

K: How many people watched it.

P: Yeah, yeah. It would be only about a third of the television audience at the most because ABC is the smallest of the networks but we will get about a third of it, that's not bad.

K: But it was at exactly the right psychological moment, you made exactly the right points, it was -- well, you might consider incorporating some of these points in your report on Laos.

DECLASSIFIED
MWO EO 12958
Authority
By - NARA Date 6/24/71

March 24, 1971

P: Yeah, I think we might, yeah.

K: Also, you delivered it with great fire and conviction.

P: That had to be done, of course you had to make these points in order to believe.

K: Yeah, but it was tough to do and --

P: And I was very careful you know not to claim victory or anything of that sort but at the same time to say that well, based on as you put it, you can't judge these things in terms of the usual victory and defeat, we have to judge them in terms of what happened. On that score, we are going to do rather well.

K: Well, you put it in a very balanced way with figures that can be fully supported and above all with the conviction that must be impressive to the listener. And also you handled the press very nicely by saying it was a philosophical disagreement not a personal disagreement. (laughter) That's really put it to them, and your whole tone was one of --

P: Basically I could have been much rougher in saying they were tougher on Johnson and Truman but hell, not even compare --

K: No comparison.

P: No comparison, he knows that but that's all right.

K: None at all, Truman, not at all.

P: Well, Johnson either.

K: And Johnson, as you put it, they were sort of making fun of his accent now and then.

P: Rather than with me, they just disagree.

K: But Johnson had it fairly easy until the end of 1967.

P: As a matter of fact ____.

K: That's right.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/4/04

March 24, 1971

P: Well, anyway, how did you get along with Dobrynin.

K: Well, we made some progress on Berlin. He doesn't have an answer yet on the SALT thing and he says one of the reasons is that they have to get a defense and foreign office position and they told him that they were meeting on the five-year plan right now. Well, so this may slip for a few weeks.

P: Humph.

K: Well, if we don't have it by the end of April, I would just make it as a unilateral public proposal and then let them kick you -- let them turn it down and then they are on the defensive.

P: Yeah, I think so too. I think they may be just bickering about Laos and the big win for them or something of that sort.

K: And not give you a success, or it may really be that they --

P: They may be so damn confused.

K: This is a tough bureaucratic problem for them to handle with something so ______. And with the Party Congress coming up.

P: One thing, of course, that really kicked them hard on tonight, that was allowing -- ending the war in the right way was the important thing.

K: That was beautifully put.

P: ______ that just couldn't -- I said that the bugout Resolution was ______ everything ______.

K: That's right, that was beautifully put.

P: Well, we shall see. Okay --

K: I thought it was outstanding.

P: All right, Henry, fine.

K: Goodnight.

MJD FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCON (TAPE)

Happy Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

March 24, 1971

K: Happy, how are you?

R: Henry, this is Happy.

K: How are you, Happy?

R: Listen, Nelson is giving a speech.

K: Oh, yeah.

R: And he is out there now and he ought to be back by 10 o'clock.

K: Okay, why don't I talk to him then?

R: You can call, I would think he left about oh, 6:30 and I would imagine that he would be -- 10 o'clock is a good time.

K: Okay.

R: How are you?

K: I'm fine.

R: We're thinking of you.

K: Aren't you great.

R: Okay, I'll tell him --

K: Tell him that he did a great deed today by talking to the President.

R: I'll tell him, and you will call him about 10:00.

K: Right, the President was elated and called me immediately.

R: Oh, well, I'm thrilled. We all want to do the best we can.

K: Well, it's a great service, Happy.

R: Thanks a lot, Henry.

K: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

mid-afternoon

3/24/71

R: The NVN came to our delegation in Paris and said because of the bombing of the north they will not participate in the meeting Thurs and wait untib April 1. Our delegation said fine. The delegation's purpose was to consult with the X GVN and then accept it on April 1. Then it will be set.

K: I agree. I thought Xuan Thuy had accepted mutual withdrawal.

R: I think if we can get the NVN to retrograde we could do that.

K: They have a high standard to imulate.

R: We could send Vogt to be their briefg officer.

K: He apparently gavea brieffing the first day saying that they would go West of Tchepone. But I am telling thm it's with SPU battalions coming out of ____.

R: That's right. OK.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Zeigler/Kissinger

mid-afternoon 3/24/71

Z: "B-52s and waves of fighter bombers hit NVN on Sunday ? ? ? ? military reported today. ? ? ? ? - ?"

K: We didn't attack anyone with B-52s.

Z: What did we use?

IX: Fighter bombers.

Z: "The Nixon Administration and ? ? ? ? ?"

K: Just say it's another hopped up military source.

Z: B- - - S- - -! This type of crap diminishes a lot of what you want to do in foreign policy because it heards the President's credibility. I think we should say there were other targets hit.

K: Say Defense will know the targets. Why not say nothing for a change?

Z: I mean the Administration, not me! I don't know if Defense would be prepared to do that. What do you mean, for one of I should say nothing? I don't say much as it is.

K: I wasn't have said that. We shouldn't have said anything out of here. We can say missile sites are protecting supply depots and these were probably hit too.

Z: OK, fine.

NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Gerard Smith/Kissinger (secure phone)
11:50 a.m. 3/25/71

(could hardly hear)

S: ? ? ? ? the statement.

K: What statement?

S: Back Stop committee ? ? ? ? I wonder if something new had happened

K: I don't know of anything. I don't know what the back stopping committee is doing.

S: The President is working hard on ________ option.

K: Absolutely.

S: We are being told ? ? ? ? saying what it is and in plenary tomorrow. &
Exactly what I know and ? ? ? ? we are told to strike that out. What the impli-
cation ? ? ? ?. People on track here. I will say whatever you want.

K: I know that. The safeguard we don't have fully worked out in detail. On
MCA you should work out whatever you can.

S: The U.S. side notes the convergence of views and ? ? ? MCA and ABM basis.
We have been told to strike that out. The whole paragraph. I told Semenov we
were told to strike that out.

K: That's wrong. We should stick to 4 safeguard sites. You must ask for 4.
Absolutely.

S: That's what I thought.

K: That's in the President's letter.

S: Your WH people are telling Phil ? ? ? ? ? ? .

K: I will get with Sonnenfeldt immediate and straighten it out.

S: I just had a couple of hours with Semonov. I don't expect any change in their
position. ABM only agreement and that's what they want to negotiate about and
forward base system is ? ? ? ? ? getting on with defxx offensive weapons.
The only thing of any note and it's a very slight ______. I pointed out the
safeguard position of offensive/defensive agreement. I thought they ridiculed it.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I didn't say a word.

K: That's interesting.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Gerard Smith/Kissinger

11:50 a.m. 3/25/71

S: Maybe that time something can be moved here. An hour and 45 mins. I tried to get him interested in a dialogue of ______ and he gave me double talk.

K: I think it may be the Party Congress. You should come back the last half of April and review where we stand. I will get after that other thing.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Zeigler/Kissinger

noon

3/25/71

Z: Are we thinking of not wxx showing for the Paris Talks next Thurs.?

K: No, we will show up. We have no character.

Z: My guidance is that we are currently discussing with GVN and will know in a
few days.

K: That's okay.

Z: It indicates we may not show up.

K: That's OK. It depends on where he got it. Find out where he got it. And
let me know.

Z: OK.

Return Call:

Z: From Barrett McGurn and Smyser.

K: Play it very low key. We expect the meeting to take place on April 3.

Z: Yes, because if we do this other -- I will try to stay away from it but if
we get pressured --

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger

1:05 p.m.

3/25/71

R: I have my mouth full so I may sound funny. The other night at the Gridiron dinner I sat next to Dobrynin and he said he was going back to the ______ committee. He is a delegate to the Congress. He said that Gromyko when he was here had been favorable to our policy on ______. He reported it and now because of the distance and passage of time, he thought it was eroded. I thought I might write Gromyko a friendly in tone letter to send back to him. I haven't decided but I have one here and I will send it to you to see it.

K: On first thought, it might not be a bad idea. Gives them an excuse if they want to come back with something. Not that they need an excuse.

R: Assuming this is true and it might be said that in the Congress if it appears there is great hostility developing it could be a set back but if it showed friendly contact it might be helpful. So nothing of substance. I used it as an occasion to re-state some positions.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON

President/Kissinger

4:30 p.m.

3/25/71

P: How did you get along with your breakfast with Stu Alsop?

K: Took a confident tone and will write an article which he decided to do in which if we increase our withdrawal everything will come out all right. He asked me what I thought and I said no comment. He is on your side but says the domestic situation is getting out of hand. Establishment is a national disgrace. Then I saw Frankel.

P: Probably a lost cause.

K: I gave him the facts. I am seeing Dobrynin at 5:00.

P: Berlin?

K: I want to see if he has anything. He wants to see me before he leaves. We won't have an answer until he gets back.

P: I have decided I don't want Bruce to go to the next meeting.

K: It's essential not to show we are panicking.

P: They put it off this week to next week?

K: That's right, until the 1st.

P: I want him to put that one off. Not because he has a cold, just turn it off.

K: Or let them hold the meeting and have Bruce not show.

P: How did they do it?

K: They turned it off.

P: No, just put the meeting off.

K: Any sign of strength right now.

P: As far as the situation is concerned -- Mel did a good job briefing?

K: Yes.

P: They seem to have done -- done better than you thought?

K: Superlative.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger
4:30 p.m. 3/25/71

-2-

P: You thought it would be hairy for a few days. I did too.

K: It's the sign of a dis______ army. It also shows the NVN are weaker then we thought. If they had power and shelled landing zones, they could have inflicted heavy losses on us. Now they are pulling back to repair the roads to start supplies again.

P: Bombing effective on that?

K: Absolutely. I think the net result will show us up a great plus.

P: It's the way we are playing it and it's true. Turning out -- coming through that way.

K: Seeping thour our ? ? ?. I have talked with Juillet today. He said even though they criticized us publicly they were pulling for us and an American defeat there would be a disaster for everybody. I don't think he deosn't quite agree with Pompidou.

P: There will be no defeat. I called Alsop and raised what you raised and maybe should call Mel. SVN cannot hakk it unless we leave adequate supplies for them. They should have everything they need. I don't care about budgets and inventories.

K: You might call him.

P: Perhaps I should have him, Packard and Moorer over and say this is the way to do it.

K: Or I have asked him to submit a plane of what he has in mind. Either method should be good.

P: Let me see tomorrow if time works out before we leave at 5:00. I could get him over. With Moorer and Packard. You talk to Haldeman about it and see if we can have a 15 minute meeting. Not on troops. See about something tomorrow.

K: I will do that. I have taken the liberty of telling Bill of what we are thinking on withdrawal. He is all for it.

P: Knowing what we were going to do -- did you tell him the whole thing? He liked it?

K: Yes. He was going before Sen. on public hearings next week but now thinking of waiting until after speech so he can do it on an up-beat note.

BY NARA, Dato 5/26

President/Kissinger
4:30 p. m. 3/25/71

-3-

P: OK. Did you discuss with him the problem and ask advice on Mel problem?

K: He feels we cannot tell him.

P: Are you going to inform Moorer? How can you do that?

K: I will do that. The way I did last time. First Bunker because he can keep his mouth shut.

P: Don't get disheartened on this operation. Better than Cambodia because it's harder.

K: I reviewed it 100 times and/recommend it again. An enourmous plus. Could only be better in the way we wound it up.

Subsequent call: Moments later

P: I think tonight you should play a firmer game with this fellow. Your fellow from Russia. I want a firmer game played. Very positive and successful and not try to find out what they are doing. Hit it hard. I want you to leave the threat I will have to make a public statement on arms control if we don't work out the letter thing.

K: I will lay it on the line.

P: Horsed around about that and the summit. We will not play around.

K: We will not tread water. We will do it one way or the other.

P: Say we value the channel but that's that. We have to make a decision on the Chinese thing. It was an interesting discussion.

K: On grounds of State I agree but we have to consider Peking.

P: State/UN types think it will be great with a two Chinese thing. It will be dynamite with the domestic.

K: And Peking might not like it.

P: Let the UN role us. People are sick of that organization. ? //

K: We could if we let them role us.

P: Connally is right. No one will believe us.

K: Their intention is to get them in on Romania resolution in two bites.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

4:50 p.m.

3/25/81

K: I just wanted to tell you I have the uninscribed version of the book and it's
excellent.

R: I will send you an inscribed one.

K: It's a better production then ours. I like the print better, and the maps and
charts. And documents. I haven't seen a Index.

R: On the front it does. Quite a turn out in the Sen. -- 67 out of 80. A little
room off the Sen. floor. Mansfield and Scott made good statements and then
told the press it was a good performance.

K: That's good and useful for the Administration.

R: Very successful. Hubert Humphrey said he was sorry he said what he did.

K: On M.E.

R: All M.E.

K: ______ to get anything and that's where we have greatest trouble in many
ways.

R: Could not have gone better. All candidates were there except McGovern.

K: That sounds terrific. Did you hear that McGovern has been going around
asking people if they want to hear a Polish joke and when they say yes he
says, Muskie.

R: Jesus, what taste! How our his spirits?

K: Pretty good. Usually my experience is that there's a withdrawal period.

R: Laos and SST both. It's a tough period.

K: I told him in passing we cleared a telegram on the meeting next week and
he feels we shouldn't go to the meeting. It's not a big deal. A show of strength
might not be a bad idea.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

4:55 p.m.

3/25/71

R: I forgot to say that the meeting this morning was excellent.

K: All points on the table. Of course your people did a great job of the
basic work.

R: It was a sensible discussion. I don't happen to agree with the VP and Connally but it's not a stupid position.

K: If you were convinced that we would lose on the other policy, it would be better to take that.

R: I don't understand the military when they turn on a record unrelated to the issues. Both Moorer and Mel sounded like there was a position that everyone agreed to.

K: I don't think we should put nuclear weapons on that island now. That wasn't the issue. Nothing said about military presence.

R: That was just the opposite.

K: You indicated you were in favor of meeting their military assistance request.

R: If the Agnew/Connally position is sustained it will make our jobs easier.

K: Then we won't have to protect Taiwan in the UN

R: Good discussion.

K: We all spoke to the point.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:10 p.m., March 25, 1971

K: Mr. President

P: Hello, Henry. Any news?

K: Well, I had a talk with our friend and most of it was on Berlin and technical points. When we were through with that, two interesting things. Dobrynin asked whether I had any message for Hanoi -- they are very ready to pass messages and he said any message I want to pass, he is willing to pass. But I think this is a bad time and I told him, "No, I don't have any." But he kept coming back to it. They let me know through him that they still ...

P: Hanoi?

K: Yeah. He passed me that message in February too but I think it is a bad time to respond.

P: You think they may really want to have a discussion?

K: It is absolutely inconceivable that Dobrynin would raise this on his own. He was reading from his notes which he had on a little slip of paper. That's the third time he has come back to it. He made an offhand comment in January that they are ready to but I said the reasons we had not ever gotten anywhere is that they had always made speeches to us. He knew about the meetings and he came back a month later and asked again and now this is the third time. They raised less hell about the bombing than any other and haven't gloated about their so-called victory.

P: Uh-huh.

K: Not going next week is an excellent consideration.

P: I am just not going to go.

K: I have already told State.

P: Yeah.

K: First when we talked about Vietnam, I said don't let your Allies confuse you. We know that they are in trouble, you have to make this a big decision -- we are not going to go one way or the other. Fundamentally understands your direction.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:10 p. m., March 25, 1971 -- page 2

P: Uh-huh

K: ... What's the progress on SALT? ......... working it out with the foreign minister. I told him we are not going to wait all year about the Summit. He doesn't know what the problem is. As far as he is concerned it will be the first week of August or September with their preference being for August. I told him the next thing would be when to announce it and we will have to block out some time on the President's calendar ......... about April 15th.

P: April 15th, huh. A meeting in August -- as far as he is concerned, he thinks the meeting is on.

K: Unless he is a goddamned ...

P: That's an interesting point. Actually I agree with you, they are squealing about a victory in Laos...

K: And not doing it.

K: They are not doing it but let you think they would. I smell something here, I think they are hurt a lot. This time they have really been hurt. This was an enormous surprise to them. It has presented problems for us in this country domestically of course. But the South Vietnamese went in there and fought very well but I still want to keep on ....

K: I got a long cable from Bunker today ....... the political situation is a big plus for Thieu. In the four battalions that were badly hurt, the morale is badly affected but think it will come back.

P: What did he say about the rest?

K: In good shape.

P: I don't want any of that to get out.

K: He is keeping these units up in I Corps and will not let them back in Vietnam until they have demonstrated.

P: Henry, I am having some Congressmen for breakfast in the morning, are you free for breakfast?

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:10 p.m., March 25, 1971 -- page 3

K: I have a date but I can change it.

P: You might just as well be there, Albert, Ford and Boggs will be there.

K: What time, 8:30?

P: Yeah, 8:30. Or if you want, you can do your breakfast and come in at 9:00.

K: Let me see.

P: If you are going to --

K: I will be there at 8:30.

P: You can come a little late, you can come at 9:00 and give us a little briefing. We will have a place for you but you can come in at 9:00.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

I said we are in trouble, not going to go one way, our direction.

F.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The Vice President

7:25 p.m., March 25, 1971

VP: Hello

K: Mr. Vice President

VP: How are you?

K: Okay.

VP: You called me earlier?

K: I called you earlier simply to tell you that I was proud to be on the same committee with you today. I thought what you said needed desperately to be said and I couldn't say it.

VP: Is that thing as bad as it really looks as far as our view is concerned?

K: It is worse. What the guys want is to get Taiwan kicked out.

VP: Maybe I shouldn't have said it.

K: You shook the President.

VP: I had a very strong feeling and thought I should say how strongly I felt about it.

K: You shook the President, I talked to him about it. So what if we get defeated and keep our principals.

VP: What really worried me is down the road -- a two-policy or the other people get kicked out. They will just be building a burner under us, they will just be building an authority and advantage in the community that they don't have now.

K: No question.

VP: Go by ________.

K: In the New York Times -- slobbering all over them.

VP: I sympathize with the President and I am glad I said it.

K: Right, Mr. Vice President.

VP: Okay, thank you, Henry.

MSS DIV LIB CONG.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
3/25/71; 7:30 p.m.

D: It is difficult for good friends to say good-bye.

K: I tell you, you terrify me so much. I don't see why I get you answers; you never get me any.

D: You saw I was efficient yesterday.

K: You were straightening out your mess. (laughter)

D: Everything is clear and I have no problem.

K: It is substantive answers that I need.

D: When you ask me for anything I get you answers very quickly.

K: Only on something you want. You have me so cowed that when I see you I get people out of bed and I talk to the President. I wanted to give you an answer if you would stop interrupting me (laughter). On the commercial business, no problem about equal status and so we are against discrimination.

D: After one hour of thought, I thought you would come to this conclusion.

K: See, you tell your Government you scored a tremendous victory.

D: When I say equal they will say naturally.

K: The last point -- consulate general -- we can be quite flexible about commercial enterprises. So, you can assume that most of the items on your list are acceptable. We want a little flexibility. And the other points on commitment and on the other two items -- I have found a way of communicating there and I will have a answer before tomorrow evening.

D: Fine.

K: But the general sense which I gave you is almost certainly correct.

D: Thank you very much. I always was thinking and deeply believed you were a very efficient man.

K: You also think that I am easily flattered.

EXCLUSIVE

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10258

By CAPRA Date 03-03-71

TOP SECRET

SECRET

SENSITIVE

EXCLUSIVE

EYES ONLY

SENSITIVE

IV LIB CONG.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
-2-

EYES ONLY

D: Oh, no, no, no, come on!!

K: When we are both out of government service, which will be a lot later for you than me, I hope you will let me read the reports you send in on me.

D: I can tell you before. When I get back I will tell you.

K: I will probably talk to you tomorrow. If not, I will put it in an envelope and leave it for General Haig. In that case I would call you Saturday morning.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOL2567
By CNAR Date 03/25/71

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

2

SENSITIVE

By NARA, Date 5/26

D: Fine.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

-2-

D: Oh, no, no, no, come on!!

SENSITIVE

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Haldeman

7:45 p.m., March 25, 1971

K: You called me.

H: I called you.

K: You called me at 5:43.

H: Now it is 7:43.

K: I was with Dobrynin

H: Out chasing girls again.

K: I would like to do it now if you would get off the phone. Is it about a meeting that the President wants with Laird, Packard and Moorer?

H:

H: I don't know anything about that, nobody told me that, tomorrow?

K: After 3:00 p.m. Can you give us a time in the morning?

H: It would be ....

K: No, no, give it to me in the morning for the afternoon.

H: Okay. What I may have called you about was Frank Banderlin (sp?).

K: Who?

H: Frank Banderlin (sp?), he is a guy who has asked to see you. He is writing a book. He will be on the plane tomorrow with the President.

K: If he is out there --

H: If you can do it before we go ..... He is an extremely friendly reporter, almost sickeningly so. I think Haig has talked to him but he still needs to talk to you.

K: If he wants it, it is done.

H: I think that was what I wanted to talk to you about. You caught me without my notes and without my notes, I am lost so go chase girls unless you want to go see Frank Banderlin (sp?) now.

K: No, I am going to chase girls.

H: Okay.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Phil Geyelin

7:50 p.m., March 25, 1971

K: What has happened is the President is having a breakfast tomorrow morning and wants me to be there.

G: He is getting to be a kind of problem.

K: He has intelligence.

G: He is going to come between us.

K: What are you doing at Noon?

G: I have a lunch but I will break that, are you free around then?

K: Yes -- wait a minute -- I see I have a luncheon with some people, what about 2 o'clock.

G: At 2:00 p.m., at your office.

K: At 12:30 I have a luncheon which should be over by 1:45, come at 2:00 to my office and you will have my undivided attention.

G: Okay.