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think that the agreement we have reached in principle for the
72 planes to leave Torafun(?) and that the projected reduction
of American presence in Spain has salted our problems, we the
race is all right now?

A: Well you know I think fundamentally relations between
countries depend on the importance each country attaches to
that relationship. It's not like a quarrel between two lovers
who have a choice of going their way. Spain...

Q: It looks like that attacks?

A: Spain is important, an important country and we cannot
afford petulance against Spain. We are important to Spain and
so there's a limit to how much of our disappointment can be
different(?). I thought it was a pity that in the year in
which we are destroying nuclear weapons from Europe a major
European country would also ask us to withdraw conventional
weapons important for the defense of Southern Europe from its
territories. Now that it has happened we have to see what can
be done. It has certainly created some some disillusionment
but fundamentally I think relations between Spain and the
United States should remain will remain on a friendly basis.

Q: Indeed. Can we now turn to to the Mideast?

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A: Yes.

Q: You you wrote, and we published a few days ago I think it was a week ago you wrote an article on the prognosis of the Middle East and you said various various interesting things and one precision if I'm not mistaken that it would be very difficult for anybody for Israel to negotiate with the PLO in any event?

A: At least at this point.

Q: But in Spain we say that you may be able to decide that you wouldn't play a match, a football match against Ramon(?) Maduke(?) but you certainly cannot determine who is going to play in their Madrid(?) against him?

A: No but I mean the PLO after all is a group whose program foresees the extinction of the state of Israel and it seems to me that it is not too much to ask that Israel accept the State of Israel before it really sits down in a negotiations --?--.

Q: Yes the problem there...

A: That was my basic point in the article.

Q: Yes I think it was well taken because the problem there is also two fold. One that if eventually Israel decides to sit at a negotiating table with a Jordanian delegation inflated

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with Palestinians those Palestinians would have been elected
and those Palestinians will be PLO people?

A: yes but they won't be as the representatives of the
organization that it's dedicated to the extinguishing of Israel
as part of its organic program and does not change that before
it even sits down. Realistically obviously any Palestinian in
the Jordanian delegation will have to be accepted will wind up
to be inseparable with the PLO. But I don't really think the
compositions of the delegations are the key issue of the
conference. The key issue of the conference is what are we
trying to accomplish? What is the term of reference of the
negotiations? I have the impression that an extraordinary
amount of discussions concerns purely procedural issues. Who
can attend? Should the 5 security council members attend or
should the United States and Soviet Union convene the
conference and then the other 3 security council members on as
advisors. Now you've been a diplomat and you know as well as I
do that when the 5 security council members sit in a room and
say Britain is their eminent advisor or France or China and
they express a view that the 2 co-chairmen are not gonna be

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major country wants to say something it will say it! And will
express its view and whether you put the label of advisor on
it or the label of full participant it's a peripheral issue.
Secondly I keep reading that the conference will only have an
authorit, authorizing function. It will meet for a day and
then the Israelis and the Arabs go off and negotiate
bilaterally. I think that is totally unrealistic. If there is
a conference and if the Israelis and Arabs go off to negotiate
bilaterally they will come back within a measurable time with
a total deadlock. It is not, this is not gonna be the first
negotiation between Israelis and Arabs. It goes smoothly, then
is the central, the plenary session going to say we have no
right to express a view? So what I would like is not exhaust
ourselves on procedures and define substance. Not the
occupying of substance but terms of refernce. What is it that
it's supposed to be negotiating? It seems to me that Israel
cannot stay where it is. But it is also clear to me at least
anyway I believe that the Arabs cannot get what they asking
for. They are asking for the 67 borders in the old city of
Jerusalem in return to which they will recognize Israel. That

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partner at the end of the negotiations ask in which he has to
make all the sacrifices. The real problem is the Arabs have a
justified claim for self-determination, that is a justified
claim. The Israelis have a justified claim for security. How
can one reconcile the Israeli concern for security with the
Arab claim to self-determination? Neither can have everything
because even if they went back to the 67 borders there would
still be several hundred thousand Arabs under Israeli rule in
the Galilee and elsewhere. Even if they divide the West Bank
Israel will not be perfectly secure because it's they're not
perfectly secure on the Jordan so as in much of diplomacy the
question is what relative it is you're willing to live with and
you can live with. Nobody is going to get an absolute
solution.

Q: Yes but the Arabs, the Palestinians already rejected I'm
thinking of Mr. Shultz's Chateau(?) Diplomacy now. The Arabs
already rejected the self determination plan in 79?

A: Well, I ahh...

Q: Limited autonomy I mean?

A: Yeah but that isn't self determine, I am I concede, I
affirm that Israel has to give up part of the West Bank. And

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much of the population not just on the autonomy basis but to
Arab control. Now to which Arab control? That is an issue
whether it's to be Jordan or a consortium of moderate states or
what you do as an interim step that I think needs to be
determined by negotiations so I'm, in fact to a certain extent
the autonomy negotiations are inconsistent with the
territorial adjustment negotiations because some Israelis want
autonomy negotiations as a means of maintaining their position
on the West Bank.

Q: And what do you think of Mr. Shultz's trick now?

A: Courageous!

Q: But doomed?

A: No I think they make, I'm, I think it is conceivable that
some sort of a half-baked compromise will appear on the
procedures of a conference.

Q: Yeah.

A: But on the substance I think he's making no progress, he,
I don't think he's trying to make progress on substance which
means we're mortgaging the future.

Q: What you see, what do you see the EC's role in that?

A: I believe it will be best if the United States, its

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allies, Israel enter some preliminary consultations on what
should happen in substance at a conference. Everybody is
afraid to do it because they know it would exhibit such a wide
division that then nobody would go onto, go to the conference
anymore.

Q: In any way in Europe we have seen those partition images of
the Israeli soldiers hitting with stones young Palestinians
etc. terrible concern and horror.

A: I can see the civil war as you know in Spain or better than
anybody is an awful spectacle and you know with Arabs do to
each other in Beirut which isn't covered by television so much
is also an awful spectacle. It's the question is will it be
ended by what is now being discussed? That is really the
desirability of ending it is beyond all debate.

Q: I see. May we turn to Mr. Gorbachev?

A: Okay.

Q: Is he in trouble? Has his opposition at home...

A: Let me say two things! I think the West may wind up
killing Gorbachev. The West is ascribing to a single Soviet
leader qualities of which no single leader can possibly be
expected to air(?). He's after all a product of Communist

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evolution. He's also a product of 400 years of Russian
industry(?). The idea that suddenly somebody appeared here who
is solving all our problems by an act of worth is a sign that
the West is really abdicating its own responsibilities for its
own future. Now it's, and because there is this fascination it
is easier for his enemies in the Soviet Union to point out
that the West is ascribing qualities to him which they
certainly have to consider not compatible with what has
happened before in the Soviet Union and which may not even be
his qualities. Now is he in trouble? His program has,
Gorbachev faces an objective dilemma. The dilemma is that if
the Soviet Union continues on its present course on it's
pre-Gorbachev course, it will become the most developed of the
under-developed countries. It will fall back in economic
evolution. On the other hand they can avoid this only by
changing structures that have been intimately associated with
the whole history of the communist country and some structures
intimately associated with the whole history of the Russian
State. You cannot have a modern economy without the
centralization. But in the Soviet Union his centralization is
very likely to run into the nationality question and it

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

already has. But it's likely to get worse. I saw a Russian, a
Soviet economic class --?-- and I said how is factory(?) and
he said enterprises should be autonomous. And I asked him how
will an enterprise in Kiev sell its products in Vladivostok if
he doesn't get them to the ministries to distribute? and he
said well that's a very interesting question which we haven't
solved yet. And so then you have to say they need advertising,
they need markets, they need a banking system, they need
wholesalers, and all of this is theoretically conceivable but
only achievable in reducing the role of the planning
mechanisms of the local governments and of the Communist
Party. Now the Chinese have made some progress in that balance
sheet(?) but for the Soviet Union this is a huge undertaking
so I would expect that Gorbachev constantly faces opposition
and the problem is to what extent his colleagues are convinced
that as painful as the process is it has to be carried out.

Q: And he's obtaining benefits from the Western, that other
leader might not?

A: And he is obtaining benefits from the West Coast in the
form of technology and in the form of foreign policy
concessions that nobody else could and that anybody else would

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PAGE 22

have to do more or less what he's doing domestically anyway.

Q: Do you think that Afghanistan, the withdrawal from Afghanistan is something viewed within the Soviet Army with relief or with a certain degree of bitterness?

A: Well with probably both! and probably if the Soviets, what I have found is, what I found here in Vietnam in the Vietnam War that President Nixon and I who used to be attacked for not ending the war fast enough are now attacked by the very people who led the peace demonstrations on the grounds that we made an inadequate peace so it is possible that the Soviet Army was unhappy when it was in Afghanistan. And will be unhappy when they see the results and that some demagogic(?) leaders might accuse Gorbachev of results that they would not have been prepared to avoid.

Q: And you think that this will apply to the Far East, to any Soviet initiative in the Far East as well?

A: You mean giving up territory?

Q: Yeah.

A: If you look at the history of the Russian state giving up territories it's not their specialty.

Q: No.

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A: But what territory could they give up in the Far East, you mean to Japan?

Q: Uhhuh.

A: It's conceivable that they'll do it but you know it's very dangerous for the Soviet Union to give up territory because the next, Afghanistan was never part of Soviet territory, it's an un, even that is an unusual step and a lot which depends and I can't judge this, if the Soviet Union if the government in Kabul can maintain itself then even if much of the rest of the country becomes falls to the Mujadeen I think the Soviets will feel they made a graceful exit but if the government in Kabul falls within 3 to 6 months then I think even some of those who welcomed the withdrawal will not like, they'll be unhappy.

Q: Guess we will know that, --?-- actual members if one looks at the map and you look at Armenia on one side and then immediately Afghanistan and then South...

A: No no they're in a difficult situation.

Q: --Want to take too much of your time, can we can we turn to Central America?

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

Q: Ahh this morning or last night...

A: Unbelievable!

Q: What happened and why do you to what do you ....

A: I think the issue has now become totally confused.
Nobody knows anymore what we are trying to accomplish in
Central America. I think the Administration made a mistake to
begin with by putting forward a request that was soo small
that you could not convince the American public that the
security of the United States could possibly be involved.
Secondly they defined the peace process in terms of criteria
that permit no objective assessments. If we say the Cubans
must leave Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan Army should be reduced
to historic Central American dimensions that is something the
public can understand but if you say you want Democracy in
Managua which has never had it in the whole history of
Nicaragua then it is a criterion which has no clear cut
objective definitions. So the combination of an originally
small sum coupled with a with criteria that were hard to
understand led to the first defeat plus the ideological
applications of the democrats based upon the American illusion
that negotiations are something that takes place independent

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

of the pressures that can be generated on their behalf. And
that's one problem. Now the next round that failed in part
because the republicans did not want the democrats to get
credit for it and secondly because the concept of non-lethal
aid for okay(?) let's get a army(?) Israeli an insult to the
intelligence. If you want to get an army to continue it's
obviously to fight a guerrilla war and to skip non-lethal aid
it's sort of a form of arrogance. It says we Americans will
support the guerrilla war but we are so noble that we do it
only with humanitarian aid which means somebody else has to
give the weapons because otherwise there's no point in giving
even the non-lethal aid. So there's now such a confusion of
objectives and the issue has become so politicized that I fear
that we are beginning to look ridiculous.

Q: However this would tend to highlight the fact for
instance we in Spain have always said let the Central
Americans sort out their own problems without interference in
this Kepoulaz(?) and the Arias(?) plan tend to enhance this
view.

A: Not(?) relatively I mean the American interest in
Central are 400 miles from our border we have a right to have

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

an interest.

Q: Certainly.

A: I mean you can't tell America that it must defend Japan Europe and everybody else but it has no right to a security --?-- next door to its border. Certainly the Central American countries should have a significant voice and certainly we should listen to them but yes Costa Rica without an army with 90,000 armed Nicaraguans on its borders it certainly affects its perception of the risks it can run and the positions it should look(?) over but I'm not attacking the Arias plan, I'm attacking the notions that you can negotiate separate from the whole context of things both positive and negative both pressures and incentives(?).

Q: Yet well I don't know how soon one thing comes after another and whether it affects are unrelated but as Congress last night said no to humanitarian aid Daniel Ortega said I will see the contra leaders in Managua anyway provided it is without Cardinal Obund(?).

A: Yes but what is more, no he didn't say in Managua he said at the border.

Q: At the border that's right!

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

A: At the border of Costa Rica and nobody the significant element here. The absence of Profundo(?) or the willingness to see the contra leaders because now he can see the contra leaders, break up that negotiations say they were obstinate and there's no third party there to express a judgment. We will have to see.

Q: That's why I said that maybe the two things are unrelated are too come too close one to another.

A: I find it very difficult to believe that the Sandinistas will agree to a significant reduction of their powers in circumstances in which with every passing month the Americans has to bring pressure is being reduced.

Q: Well I think, can we have a meeting with a Christian(?) Dole(?) who is going to be the next president of the United --?-- would you like to venture?

A: I find that situation rather confusing. A rather uncertain of course you have to understand I belong to the republicans, to the moderate wing of the republican party which barely exists any more. So logically one would have to say that unless there's a recession the republican candidate will have a better chance than the democratic candidate. On

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

the other hand there's some similarities with the situation demanding six years where another popular president who is on in years was leaving office and the public was looking for a new face and that produced John Kennedy. I really think it's a very close election.

Q: Because you think that --?-- one of the things that is constantly suggested is that there are no major eye-tents(?), no major confrontation, ideological confrontations or questions on resolve etc. it is rather something to do with personalities?

A: I don't think that's exactly true. I think that the democratic party to my --?-- is really much less willing to undertake to address the issue of national defense in the view of --?-- and the bipartisanship in foreign policy is important to --?-- reviews so I think there are significant differences. The personalities of the leading candidates are not so remarkable if these differences are apparent and right now they're spending all their time fighting each other within each party.

Q: Yes.

A: I think in the campaigns significant differences will

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PAGE 29

[LC]

enter it.

Q: And one will see what happens with this constitution innovation of next Tuesday which is...

A: Well it begins to look as if it achieved the exact opposite of what it was supposed to do. It was supposed to produce a moderate maybe marginally more conservative democratic candidate and it may well help the liberals in the democratic party more than anybody else.

Q: Maybe I should, I don't know whether I should ask you this but do you think that Mr. Cuomo will eventually?

A: You know a lot of people say it, I find it hard to visionize that the people who went through the long march through these primaries will agree to let an outsider get the nomination if one of them can withdraw in favor of the other.

Q: Yeah, one final question. You are an enthusiast of soccer.

A: Oh yes!

Q: Whom do you take for the European --?--either by or --?--

A: I think Real(?) Madre(?) not because he is finest(?).

Q: Ha, ha.

HAK-UNED 03-07-88

A: I don't think --?-- is as good as he has been and I like
Real(?) Madrid(?) is really beautiful thing to watch.

Q: Uhhuh he is.

A: I went to see it when I was in Spain last year and it
was beautiful, elegant.

Q: The machine, the Gold Machine.

A: Elegant, elegant performance. I would like to say one
thing cause you asked me about Central America.

Q: Please.

A: See we focus so much on Central America but in the long
term the future of Argentina is if Mexico are more decisive(?)
and I believe that the United States must come up with a
program on that governmental level to give these countries
more of a possibilities to grow. I don't think it is a
desirable objective when most of the negotiations between
these countries and the United States concerns how much
interest it can have in the ...

SOUND OFF ON SIDE A AT THIS POINT

SIDE B

RESUMED WITH:

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PAGE 31

Q: If we can turn because you know that Latin America for
us in Spain is tremendously important.

A: That's right, that's it.

Q: Thank you and that goes for the King and Phillipe
Gonzales, tremendously important figures there. They have been
in Uruguay, they have been in Argentina for a return to
democracy. What do you see of those tortured countries like
Chile and Peru? I'm not only focusing on the dramatic Chile?

A: Chile is doing well economically but requires still a
political evolution. Peru has had it pretty good political
evolution but has produced a debacle economically. I mean the
way in which Garcia came to power was very democratic but
since he's come to power it has produced, he has not been able
to fulfill this. So I there are many unresolved issues in
Latin America and the task of the friends of Latin America is
to help them to expose growth and democracy.

Q: Very good that's a very nice way of ending. Thank you
very much indeed.

A: Very nice to see you.

Q: Extremely interesting.