utilization of Syria's, the resumed flow of Communist arms into both styles and contentions to direct resistance, military or other, to the ready Communist to "over-aggression". From what we can gather, the U.S. Government States force would not be employed in the Middle East except in reason to harbor in the classic definition of aggression by indicating that United The President's message accompanying the "Eastdown Deadline" appears to "aggression" (see fourth in the Charter).

the Arab Canal, they were automatically condemned by the formal definition announced there, and when Britain and France acquired to restore their rights into the State Beach to destroy the entity of Communist arms that were being for these industries. But when at least that itself compelled to end blocks Moreover, appalls to the UN by the achieved barriers could produce no remedy preferable any sort of thick short of which without being branded as aggression, through the Arab Canal, violates the Treaty of Constanthinople, and otherwise East Canal until the advent of social war. Further could barely result to itself.

The UN, for example, showed itselfCLS to intervene in the Middle East already presented itself in several instances.

challenging to annul or otherwise insubordinate concessions. The latter has in
favourably because we will have announced in paralyzing our policy by an insistent
aggression. We will not be in danger of suffering any serious consequences by default,
unless definitely to defend important or vital interests against any foreign
invasion.

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Egypt, the threat of further **fedayeen** attacks against Israel, and the evident Egyptian plans to manipulate its control of the Suez Canal for political advantage. Yet it is impossible to ignore the fact that these represent the real problems and present dangers in the Middle East and that the Eisenhower Doctrine can be entirely nullified if they are permitted to unfold without effective counteraction by the United States. To date, our Government has insisted that these problems must be left to the United Nations, but the Charter prevents the UN from taking effective cognizance of such matters and this incapacity is reinforced by the fact that constructive action in the General Assembly can now be prevented by a combination of the Afro-Asian Bloc and the Soviet Union, which nations are not concerned with safeguarding United States interests in the Middle East.

Both of the foregoing seem to us striking examples of why the community of free nations is in urgent need of a more realistic conception of aggression.

And the latter also illustrates the U.S. failure thus far to achieve a sufficiently precise identification of our vital interests, to be clear enough about those specific shifts in the power balance we are seeking to prevent, and to face the fact that, if we are serious and mean to hold our own, risks must be taken to prevent such shifts.

In summoning up the will to be forehanded in the defense of our interests, we must also be aware that the hardest decisions will be required in those situations involving a conflict of ethical or moral values, each of which would appear desirable in isolation. For example, in the cases of

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Syria and Egypt, the adoption of useful policies by the United States for dealing with those countries tends to be inhibited by our respect for the right of national sovereignty; yet this sense of sympathy is in sharp conflict with our awareness that a Communist takeover in either country could have fateful consequences for the whole Middle East -- and for Western Europe with which our own physical security is intimately bound up. This type of conflict reflects, unfortunately, the essence of the ambiguity with which Communism has presented and is likely to present specific challenges -- the threat is sheathed in circumstances which create on our part a moral or psychological reluctance to act. And yet the choice is to act with resolution or accept grave losses: our policy was not sufficiently resolute to save northern Viet Nam, nor to prevent the delivery of Soviet arms to Egypt, nor to safeguard our national interest in the Suez Canal. The will to protect one's vital interests and thus to safeguard one's existence is not a logical exercise. History has not dealt kindly with nations who were paralyzed by their own preconceptions.

The growing cost and complexity of new weapons and weapons systems is the third reason why the military value of our alliances demands careful reexamination. In both Europe and Asia we face the central fact that the Communist Bloc is steadily improving its military capabilities, which means that the military strength of our allies in various places must either be correspondingly improved, or the United States must assume a more explicit primary responsibility for defense of the entire free world perimeter. We

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either effectively modernize certain indigenous forces, or we must have larger U.S. tactical forces and an explicit willingness to use them for the defense of particular areas. The only other alternative is to accept the deterioration of our position in many areas.

Europe presents a special problem which we shall endeavor to examine in the following section of this Report. In almost every other geographical area, and particularly in the underdeveloped countries, the cost and complexity of modern weapons systems would appear both to impose extremely heavy or even insupportable burdens on frail economies and to demand indigenous manpower skills that do not exist. This situation presents painful choices to U.S. military planners, and these are aggravated by intense nationalism in the newly emergent countries and by the fact that our military assistance program is inherently subject to overriding political considerations, including the prestige of the recipient country and its symbolic or strategic importance to the United States.

Thus in Korea we have raised a ground army of 300,000 men supported by modest air and naval units. The significant reduction of this force appears to be a political impossibility, and it is not at all clear that a reduction would be militarily desirable. But the South Korean economy cannot support this armed force, which requires about $400 million a year merely to feed and pay the troops and to maintain their fifteen-year-old equipment in usable condition. Any program of modernization would involve more initial outlay and would probably lead to a higher annual maintenance cost. Without some

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modernization program within the next few years, however, the combat
effectiveness of the ROK forces will inevitably deteriorate; but there are also
limits to the ROK capability for operating and maintaining modern weapons
systems.

The political prestige attaching to the possession of new weaponry,
the rising spirit of nationalism, the growing intensity of US-Soviet competition
for the allegiance of the uncommitted countries, and the consequences of the
Korean war have all served to limit US bargaining power with the recipient
countries and thus to diminish US influence over the composition of forces
within these countries. It has proved a difficult political task to tell a
sensitive, sovereign ally that its people do not have the technical capacity
to fly jet aircraft or that the introduction of expensive weapons systems will
seriously hamper their economic growth. It may be equally irrational to
provide them with rifles and piston-driven aircraft if a Communist aggression
against them is likely to be mounted with jet fighters and tactical atomic
bombs. This is a measure of the dilemma created by the revolution in weapons
since 1950 and by the need for us to treat every ally and potential ally as a
sovereign equal.

We think one reason for the elaborate demands, at least of the Asian
countries, is traceable to the vagueness of US military plans and intentions
for their defense against aggression. For example, our unwillingness to
designate particular forces for the defense of SEATO or to engage in preliminary
joint planning with the parties to that treaty arrangement has led to doubts

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about the seriousness of our intentions. This fact is pertinent because the
uncertainty of our own commitment precludes the establishment of intelligent
guide lines for the development of indigenous forces. If we could reach a firm
national decision as to the manner in which we intend to meet our SEATO
obligations, then we might, for example, persuade our allies in that region
that their forces need be concerned only with the problem of internal security.
Clarification of the US position on this point would immediately lift much of
the fog that surrounds the military assistance program; but this would require
us to escape from what we have previously described as the "general war
fixation" of military planning in the Pentagon and to do other things which would
develop a sense of genuine mutuality in our various defense arrangements
outside NATO. It is our concern that the present US attitude toward the defense
of countries in and near the SEATO area may be producing on the part of
those countries a growing disinclination to rely upon, and to act with, the
United States.

On balance, it is our feeling that (1) the rapid technological change in
weapons, (2) the high capital and maintenance cost of new weapons systems,
and (3) the doubtful capacity of certain friendly countries to use the new
weapons effectively must be expected over time to reduce the military value
of indigenous forces outside NATO and to impose on the United States a more
explicit responsibility for the primary defense of many peripheral areas.
Such a development will not in our judgment invalidate the military assistance
program, which will remain an indispensable political and psychological

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instrument, but it should gradually alter its character and delimit its military purposes.

This developing trend should, in our judgment, cause us to give greater emphasis to those other symbols and instruments of alliance which are less dependent upon the military effectiveness of indigenous forces. One such instrument of considerable promise would seem to be our overseas base system, which provides us with significant political and military advantages.

Politically, the base system meets our need to "show the flag" in a way that permits other peoples to visualize our power. The physical presence of our men and aircraft also serves to reinforce our common purpose with the host country and to make that country a more responsible friend and ally. Militarily, the forward bases bring our enemies within the reach of medium-range aircraft and make attack possible from all points of the compass. They thus impose severe defensive problems on the Soviet Bloc. They also provide a desirable precedent for the establishment of "regional staging bases" for combined forces which will be essential in our development of an effective capability for limited war.

In some countries the bases have of course been political irritants, or have placed the "host country" in position to demand substantial concessions from the United States; but by and large the program has been a significant political and military success and, in our view, warrants further emphasis.

In thus appraising our alliances and the role of force, we must bear

In this abating our alliances and the role of force, we must bear
emphasize:

significant political and military success and, in our view, warrants further
concessions from the United States; but by and large the program has been a
or have placed the "host country" in position to demand substantial

In some countries the base issue of course has been political issues,
limited war.

which will be essential in our development of an effective capability for
precedent for the establishment of regional staffing bases" for combined forces
severe defensive problems on the Soviet front. They also provide a desirable
and make attack possible from all points of the compass. They thus impose
the forward base upon our enemies within the reach of medium-range aircraft
country and to make that country a more reasonable friend and ally. Militarily,
men and aircraft also serve to reinforce our common purpose with the host
bonds other peoples to vitalize our power. The physical presence of our
politically, the base system meets our need to "show the flag" in a way that
which provides us with significant political and military advantages.

Instrument of considerable promise would seem to be our overseas base system,
dependent upon the military effectiveness of indigenous forces. One and
emphasize to those other symbols and instruments of alliance which are less
This developing trend should, in our judgment, cause us to give greater
hypothesis.

Instrument, but it should gradually after its character and definite its military

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always in mind that the central objective - the first purpose, in which we
dare not fail - is to defend our interests and prevent the further expansion of
Communist power. We cannot therefore afford to regard collective security
as the sole means of protecting the free world and we cannot ignore the challenge
of aggressions which are carried on by indirect means. We must see clearly
the great disparity between our power and the individual and collective weak-
ness of most of the other free nations at present, and must accept the primary
responsibility which that fact imposes upon the United States. While we must
strive to strengthen and sustain our allies and will always prefer to act in
concert with them, we cannot escape a forthright response to alien challenge
anywhere in the world, irrespective of what the UN or any particular alliance
may be willing to do. If necessary, we must act alone. Everything may depend
on how we define aggression, and then on how and when we are prepared to
respond.

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IX. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF NATO

Among our military arrangements none is so important as the NATO
alliance, and the effective staff structure and supporting military forces which
give it expression. Nor is any geographical region of such strategic signifi-
cance as that embraced by the North Atlantic Treat, for (1) it contains 300
million of the world's most highly trained and educated people, operating a
well-developed and diversified industrial economy exceeded in magnitude
only by the industrial complexes of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; and (2) its
geographical boundaries are essentially coterminus with Western Civilization,
whose preservation and extension is our fundamental purpose. Western demo-
cratic ideals may or may not come to predominate in other parts of the world;
but if they do, this will be wholly attributable to the strength, unity and
vitality of those nations in which the roots of these values are deepest. If,
on the contrary, these nations decay and their traditions wither, Western
Civilization is not likely to flourish elsewhere. We are concerned here
chiefly with the military aspects of NATO, and more particularly with what
we perceive to be present problems and weaknesses. But our analysis should
be read in a broader perspective, for we regard NATO as a basic element of
United States security.

If it is true that no military alliance is viable unless it can achieve
an effective military expression, then it is fair to say that NATO is in
trouble. This is not to suggest that NATO's basic problems are of recent

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vintage, nor that the very hopeful evidence of a greater political unity in Europe (as indicated by the Saar agreement, and by progress toward Euratom and a European common market) has not indirectly strengthened the military position. It is only to suggest that the basic problems have been aggravated by events over the past three years.

On the one hand, the change of international climate since the first Geneva Conference has tended to dissolve the sense of urgency that was in evidence when Stalin was alive and to revive a number of internal rivalries and irritations. The dispute over Cyprus was allowed to burst into the open without serious regard by Britain, Greece or Turkey for the consequences to NATO. France has withdrawn most of her fourteen European divisions to Algeria and resents the lack of political support she has received from her NATO allies for her effort to pacify that part of "metropolitan France". The failure of the Anglo-French adventure in Suez, including the condemnation of this action by the United States, has broken many intimate ties and destroyed many old confidences. More concretely, it has discouraged Britain from trying any longer to maintain at great expense the diversified armed forces of a Great Power. The recent White Paper on Defense, which basically reflects Britain's severe economic limitations, but which was surely hastened by the debacle at Suez, announced the British Government's intention to effect immediate and sharp reductions of British ground and air forces in Germany, to replace the home fighter defense command in due

forces in Germany, to replace the home fighter defence command in due
intention to effect immediate and sharp reductions of British ground and air
army sustained by the debacle at Dues, announced the British Government's
basically reflects Britain's severe economic limitations, but which was
armed forces of a Great Power. The recent White Paper on Defense, which
Britain from then on拟 to maintain at great expense the diversified
destroyed many old confidences. More concretely, it has discontinued
of this action by the United States, has broken many intimate ties and
failure of the Anglo-French adventure in Dues, including the condemnation
NATO allies for her effort to favour that part of "metropolitan France". The
Videns and reents the lack of political support she has received from her
NATO. France has withdrawn most of her fourteen European divisions to
without serious regard by Britain, Greece or Turkey for the consequences to
and irritations. The dispute over Cyprus was allowed to burst into the open
evidence when Stalin was alive and to revive a number of internal rivalries
Geneva Conference has tended to dissolve the sense of urgency that was in
On the one hand, the change of international climate since the first
by events over the past three years.

It is only to suggest that the basic problems have been aggravated
and a European common market) has not indirectly strengthened the military
Europe (as indicated by the vast agreement, and by progress toward EFTA/
the very helpful evidence of a greater political unity in
vintage, not that the very

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course with a guided missile system, to terminate conscription by 1960 and to aim at a total force of 375,000 at the end of 1962 as compared with present strength of 690,000. The full consequences of these drastic shifts and reductions are not yet apparent, but they do not strengthen NATO. In central Europe, the Germans are faced with the choice of unification on Soviet terms or continued membership in NATO and no unification. If they should leave NATO, the present strategy would have to be fundamentally revised and all allied forces withdrawn from Germany.

On the other hand, the Soviet development of a significant air-atomic capability has created progressive contradictions within the NATO structure and discrepancies between the organization of NATO forces and the strategy to which SACE UR is committed. The United States has about five infantry divisions in Germany and the British have about four, but SACEUR has pro-claimed a nuclear strategy of defense, which implicity rules out either local defense or the effective use of non-atomic forces. Nevertheless, the United States continues to press the Germans and the lesser members to contribute non-atomic ground forces, and NATO maintains a supply line across Europe wholly incompatible with nuclear warfare. Finally, the major component of this strategy (SAC) is outside NATO control and there are at least the beginnings of doubt in Europe whether it would be used in response to an attack on Europe, since its use would clearly imply devastation of the continental United States.

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For all of these reasons the future viability of NATO cannot be taken for granted; nor does it seem likely that attempts to give it either economic and political functions or a global frame of reference can remove the basic incompatibles. In our view, no major improvement will be forthcoming until a drastic effort has been made to bring the organization, equipment, and strategic concepts into rough conformance with present and foreseeable realities. While we have hopes that many of the same impulses which brought NATO into being will lead eventually to a cohesive political community embracing either Europe alone or the whole complex of nations which live on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, we regard NATO as primarily a military alliance. We believe therefore that the basic problem is to give NATO an effective military expression.

From the beginning the United States has exercised almost complete control over NATO strategy. This was tolerable so long as the Europeans felt they were making a meaningful contribution through the development of ground forces that would provide Europe's "shield" against the Red Army, and so long as full confidence was felt in our strategic air power both as a deterrent and as the "sword" with which to strike at Russia if war should come. But since the decision taken by the NATO Council in December, 1954, to defend in Europe with tactical atomic weapons, the trouble has grown. Only the United States has possessed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but United States law does not allow these instruments to be put in the hands

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of allies. Therefore, as planning for the use of atomic weapons has gone
forward, the Europeans have been progressively deprived of the chance to
make a meaningful contribution. They have, however, gradually become
aware of the damage and casualties likely to result from the use of several
hundred tactical atomic bombs in Europe; and the realization is growing that
the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear attacks upon the United States must
cast a certain doubt on the willingness of the United States to attack Russia
in response to a war that started locally in Europe.

To us the central problem is to provide, within Europe and controlled
by Europeans a military capability that will substantially reduce Europe's
dependence on U.S. strategic airpower. We think this is necessary both
to restore the declining power position of NATO vis-a-vis the USSR and to
bolster the European sense of hope and of participation, which are basic
ingredients of the will to resist. We believe the answer may lie in placing
the Europeans themselves in a position to exercise more influence over the
means and scale of their own defense by providing through SACEUR, begin-
ning now and extending progressively over the next few years, a variety
of tactical atomic weapons including intermediate-range missiles, and the
necessary training in their use. This could have the effect, in our judgment,
of creating a kind of atomic stand-off as between Europe and the USSR,
similar to the broader strategic stand-off now existing between the United
States and the USSR. It would have the effect of reducing the disparity in

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effective power as between Russia and Europe and would thereby reduce the dangers resulting from implied atomic blackmail, which now exist.

Europe needs to be strengthened militarily. For a great many reasons related broadly to United States economic and political interests and the development of self-confidence and responsibility in Europe, it would be very desirable if this strengthening were achieved in substantial part through a greater European contribution to NATO. We face the fact, however, that Europe cannot be prodded into developing large numbers of conventional forces when the U.S. and Britain are moving sharply away from reliance on such forces and toward a concentration on air-atomic power; for in light of these developments and of the proclaimed nuclear strategy for defense of the NATO area, the continued maintenance of standard infantry forces and propeller-driven aircraft must seem to the Europeans an exercise in futility. We do not believe this problem can be resolved in any way that safeguards our own military and political interests in NATO, except by our now taking steps to surmount the legal obstacles, and to begin providing the Europeans with nuclear weapons, through SACEUR. When we have done this, we can call upon them to carry a larger share of the NATO burden.

The risks which the United States would incur by taking this kind of action would have to be weighed against the risks of not acting. There is a possibility that the offer would not be accepted, but this seems remote since for most European powers the situation will increasingly appear to

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present a choice between abject defenselessness and possession of atomic weapons. The staunch courage displayed in April and May of this year by West Germany, Norway, Denmark, and other NATO countries in the face of harsh Soviet threats against the use of their territory for atomic weapons and guided missiles is heartening evidence of their determination. And the Soviet notes reflect the depth of the Kremlin's frustration and concern at the prospect of facing a Western Europe armed with intermediate-range guided missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

In the short term, such a re-distribution of nuclear capabilities would probably stabilize the NATO alliance. In the longer term, it might have the opposite effect, for possession of atomic weapons would increase the independence of the individual European nations and so tend to reduce their reliance on allies. Such a development would not necessarily work against the interests of the United States. Keeping Western Europe out of Soviet hands is a primary U.S. objective and we have long sought a situation in which that area could stand on its own feet. The United States need not therefore be unduly disturbed by a loosening of the NATO bonds, if the result were a stronger European will and capacity to resist Soviet pressure or attack. Such a development might well have adverse implications for bringing into being a political community of the NATO allies, but the alternative appears to be a policy of drift leading to a progressive disparity in military strength as between Europe and the USSR.

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In our view, another basic reason for the present uneasiness within NATO is the growing awareness in Europe that even tactical atomic weapons are extremely destructive and that the explosion of a few hundred in that populous and highly compacted area could effectively destroy "European civilization". It is this consideration which raises the question whether certain European countries would accept atomic weapons even if they were offered, and we must admit that the European hope to escape total destruction in the event of war appears, at least superficially, to conflict with the foregoing proposal that our NATO partners should be equipped with atomic weapons. We believe, however, that a careful look at the problem will show these views to be reconcilable.

**First**, it is evident that Europe cannot be defended against serious attack without recourse to nuclear weapons. This would seem to be true whether the Soviets employed massed conventional forces or atomic bombs. Therefore, if a serious defense is to be made, nuclear weapons must be used and the inevitable consequence will be extreme destruction. **Second**, nuclear weapons placed in the hands of the Europeans themselves offer the prospect of significantly reducing NATO dependence on U.S. strategic air power and thus of reaffirming the NATO deterrent which has been weakened by the growth of the Soviet capacity to strike heavy blows against the United States. **Third**, this new power situation requires the United States to revise its strategy of "all-out" response to an attack on NATO, and to

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recognize that it is in the interest of the United States to limit and localize
any conflict that might get started in Europe. For similar reasons, the
Soviets will also be interested in avoiding general war as a result of con-
flict in Europe, unless they deliberately provoke it.

The pertinent considerations are therefore: (a) a system of deter-
rence in Europe, to be reliable, must include a significant nuclear capability
owned and controlled by the Europeans; (b) a serious defense of Europe
against large-scale attack cannot be conducted without recourse to nuclear
weapons; (c) the United States, Western Europe, and probably also the
Soviet Union, are interested in limiting any conflict that might get started
in the European area.

These considerations suggest to us the following approach: (1) we
should create the maximum deterrent to war by providing the Europeans with
nuclear capability, beginning now; (2) while making clear to all concerned,
including the Soviets, that the defense of NATO is based firmly on the
abundant use of atomic weapons against large-scale attack, we should work
with the Europeans to develop a system of "graduated responses". Such a
system would definitely require respectable non-atomic ground forces and
support units in Berlin and other forward areas to discourage or deal firmly
with minor border incursions and any other local disturbances fomented
by the Soviets or their satellites. Such forces would either be maintained
with the full awareness that they could not be effectively employed in the

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event of large-scale conflict, or (if this were technically feasible) they would
be trained and equipped to fight both atomic and non-atomic war.

We believe that in such a system of "graduated responses" may be
found the means of reconciling the desire for maximum deterrence and combat
effectiveness with the desire for avoiding excessive destruction in Europe.
If deterrence should fail and a deliberate attack be launched in force, neither
Europe nor probably the United States and Russia would, of course, escape
great destruction. By the problem we are facing here is essentially political
and psychological. To the extent, therefore, that we can now join with the
Europeans in devising means of defense that offer the greatest chance (how-
ever slim) of avoiding total destruction -- which is to say, that offer an
alternative strategy to automatic, "all-out" counter-attack -- to the same
extent we may revitalize the NATO alliance by giving new hope and a sense
of meaningful participation to our European partners. And we should be able
to approach this task with conviction, for it is equally in our interest to
see that a conflict in Europe (particularly one that started by miscalculation)
did not immediately spread to world-wide hydrogen war.

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X. DISARMAMENT

There are valid security objectives to be gained through a variety of
inspection and disarmament proposals that have been made during the recent
past, and there are important reasons why the United States Government
should engage in disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union shelters or
not there exists a real hope of reaching meaningful agreement. The principal
security objectives would seem to be these:

(1) to improve security against surprise attack by bringing long-range delivery systems under observation: This is perhaps the chief purpose of the President's "open skies" proposal. Its implementation would constitute a step not toward disarmament, but toward a stabilization of the present strategic stand-off.

(2) to begin opening up the Communist Bloc: even a limited "open skies" proposal, supplemented by ground control posts, would further this objective which, if achieved in reasonable degree, could be expected to have favorable political consequences for the free world.

(3) to deal with the so-called "fourth country problem": there exists some reason for believing that the Soviets may share our concern over the prospect that other countries will in time develop ample stocks of nuclear weapons and that this may gravely upset the relative stability of the present strategic stand-off. It is the hope of some that this concern will induce the Soviets to accept a workable system of international control over nuclear

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weapons and delivery systems.

(4) to bolster our system of alliances: given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the relative defenselessness of most of the world, it is necessary for the preservation of our moral position generally, and for the maintenance of our alliances particularly, that we make an earnest and continuing effort to achieve an adequate system of disarmament and arms inspection.

(5) to shift the basic world struggle from armaments to the politico-economic sphere: It is the conviction of some that the greater economic strength of the free nations could be brought more effectively to bear upon the great social and political problems facing the world, if it could escape from the present heavy arms burden. It is held that such a shift would be an advantage to the free world in the basic struggle against Communism and could lead to an environment favorable to political settlements.

We believe these objectives are generally valid, but we would enter several caveats. First, it is hard for us to see that our enemies can share any of these objectives, except possibly the one relating to the "fourth country" problem. And even here we must be careful not to accept any agreement which deprived us of the right to provide our allies (principally in NATO) with nuclear weapons. However, we are skeptical that any agreement between the US and the USSR can ultimately prevent the development of nuclear power and nuclear armament in such countries as France, Germany, Canada,

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and Japan. Second, we believe a dangerous public complacency might result
from any agreement on disarmament, however partial, and we would thus
counsel the acceptance of limited, step-by-step agreements only where some
tangible increment of security were in fact gained at each step. Third, we
cannot fail to note that the growth of stockpiles, the advent of guided missiles,
and the proliferation of weapons of varying sizes adds every day to the burdens
of any conceivable system of inspection. It may well be that, beyond a
given point in time, we could not safely agree to an inspection procedure
that was qualified or limited in any way.

XI. CIVIL DEFENSE

At present there is no civil defense program in the United States worthy
of the name. The entire subject is surrounded by a profound apathy both in
government and throughout the population. To the best of our knowledge,
neither the Federal Government nor any State Government has as yet even
systematically developed a body of pertinent facts which would either prove
or contradict the prevailing intuition that nothing can be done. A number of
competent studies have been made of particular segments of the total problem,
but no definitive program has been put together. By general consent, it would
seem, this subject has been pushed under the rug. Yet the probability exists
that the freedom of action of the U.S. Government in a future crisis might
literally depend upon a feeling throughout the nation that there was at least
a reasonable chance of personal and group survival if the worst should ensue.

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We believe the nation must have a serious civil defense program and we think the present relative lull in international tension gives us the opportunity to begin working toward such a program. This will and should take time; it must be evolutionary because we shall wish (1) to avoid a frenzied build-up that might generate a crisis and (2) integrate civil defense measures into the construction programs which will be needed in the normal development of our expanding population and economy. Our civil defense measures should develop as a natural response to the age in which we live, with steady purpose and progress, but without haste or desperation. We need a program that will add to our military strength, support our diplomacy, and help our people to survive.

There appear to be four related threats against which the program should be directed: (1) physical - we must protect the American people, insofar as practicable, against the direct effects of nuclear attack; (2) psychological - we must provide against panic and paralysis caused by lack of authoritative information before, during and after an attack; (3) after-effects - we must provide against hunger, sickness and lack of housing following an attack; and (4) ideological - we must achieve a general understanding that our nation consists of much more than its physical assets, so that our sense of unity and nationhood will endure even if our physical assets should be destroyed. The nature and magnitude of these threats suggest the need for a program of public education conducted by high officials of Federal Government in advance of

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and during efforts to develop the major components of a serious program. We note, in this connection, a recent announcement that the Soviet Government has begun a "mass educational program" concerning the destructive power of atomic weapons and civil defense preparations.

We have in mind a program which would be directed primarily to safeguarding the American people, who constitute our most valuable asset; but we cannot visualize a program within the bounds of feasibility which will provide protection for everyone. This is a basic limitation which must be accepted, but which at the same time must not be allowed to paralyze our efforts. Total immunity from atomic attack, like total military security, is a chimera in our age, but this truth need not preclude our developing a serious and reasonably effective civil defense program. If the problem is attacked by first taking up the less difficult tasks, we believe that encouraging progress can be made.

The elements of the kind of program we have in mind would include:

(1) An attack-proof warning system that will give people a reasonable chance to reach shelters;

(2) An attack-proof radio net capable of providing the general public with information and instructions during and after an attack;

(3) A radiological monitoring system to assess the danger of radioactivity in various places and report the assessment to persons in shelters'

(4) A program for the underground stockpiling of food, medical supplies, building materials, machine tools, and other essentials. Some power

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plants might also be placed underground, but not industry in general.

(5) A shelter program consisting of deep shelters for command posts, radio stations and other vital activities; (b) large public shelters in urban areas (holding perhaps 1000 persons); and (c) small family shelters located in or near private dwellings.

The chief purpose of all other elements would be to support the shelter program, and it appears to us that only the shelter program will involve major expense or serious political controversy.

The deep-shelters should be constructed to withstand anything except a direct hit by a hydrogen weapon. Their precise number and location are beyond our competence to determine, but we estimate there might be a few hundred such shelters at a cost of $2000 per person.

The large public shelters in urban areas would be essentially dual purpose structures - underground parking areas, deep subway tunnels, underground passages between downtown buildings, etc. The Federal Government should not assume primary responsibility for this program, but should provide to structures that would be built in any case the supplementary funds needed to assure their utility as shelters (viz., providing bomb-proof doors, ventilating system and independent water supply for an underground garage). The cost of urban shelters for the nation as a whole would of course depend upon the number and size of the cities involved. In large sections of the country, like mountain areas, thinly populated flatlands, and remote lake regions,

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public shelters would be impractical and unnecessary. Still the total cost
might come to $______.

The principal effort should be to develop a home shelter program, based
on a family-sized, inexpensive shelter located in or near individual dwellings.
Such shelters could not provide adequate protection at "ground zero" and
nearby, but would otherwise provide reasonable protection, particularly against
fall-out, at a relatively low cost. The home shelter might be adjacent to the
basement of a house, and might consist of a fibre glass shell six feet under-
ground. It would be equipped with heat, food, sleeping accommodations and
a secondary exit. It might cost $______ per person and, as in the case of
public shelters, there would be remote areas of the country where home shelters
would probably not be necessary. The home shelter program is based on the
finding that most people in America live or work near their homes and are at
home about three-quarters of the time. It is proposed as a practical means of
providing the people with a measure of confidence in their chance of survival.
This may be an absolute prerequisite for the Government's freedom of action
in time of crisis.

The American people tend to think in terms of action leading to reasonably concrete results, but are disinclined to exert thought and energy on problems which appear beyond solution. We think the proposed program will commend itself to public support for at least two reasons: (1) it is a serious program which promises a measurable degree of real protection and thus a

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reasonably good chance of personal and group survival; (2) it is a practical
program which, though expensive, can probably be developed without basically
disrupting present economic and social patterns.

The cost of any serious civil defense program will be substantial,
but this should be measured against, among other things, the developing
cost of the active defense system. Given the growing disadvantage of the
defense vis-a-vis the offense, we face the possibility that effective warn-
ing and air defense measures will grow obsolete so rapidly as to make the
whole effort prohibitively expensive. Civil defense, on the other hand,
will not be subject to the same disadvantages. Radio nets, radiological
monitoring systems, stockpiling, and the shelters will be essentially one-
time expenses. They will be usable for many years and will be equally
valid against manned bombers and guided missiles. If the developing race
between the offense and the defense should unfold in the manner now pre-
dicted, a serious civil defense program may prove a wiser national invest-
ment than a costly air defense system of doubtful effectiveness, in terms
both of the deterrent effect and of assuring to our Government a full freedom
of action.

Nothing can be done until the highest officials of the Government
begin to take civil defense seriously, and probably not until measures have
been taken to make Washington, D.C. a model civil defense community.
A new law will be needed which gives substantial power to the Federal

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authority and which clearly recognizes that the essential components of
the program cannot be left to local initiative, but must be coordinated and
standardized by a central authority. It will be important also to insist that
the cost of this program must not be met by taking money away from the armed
forces. It must be a net addition.

To those who doubt the efficacy of embarking on a serious civil
defense effort, we would put this question: assuming the worst eventuality -
that deterrence fails and there ensues a large-scale nuclear exchange - do
we have at hand, or have we even conceived of, any other type of passive
preparedness that will assure the degree of human survival and of organization
necessary for us to take subsequent action as a nation? If the answer is no,
then where lies the path for responsible men?

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## XII. BUDGET FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Achievement of the objectives which we feel should be established for our national security programs in the years ahead hinges on the availability of resources and the manner in which those are applied. We are concerned with both the Defense Department budget and the workings of the budgetary process.

### The Budgetary Level

It is our general conviction that programs essential to U. S. security are currently underfunded and that the immediate prospects are for even greater fiscal stringency. The causes for this critical state of affairs are manifold.

In the first place, upon the cessation of hostilities in Korea it was natural to suppose that security expenditures could be greatly cut back, and that indeed is what happened. The cutting process was not particularly scientific, and the effects did not become evident for some time. Thus, the momentum of the air power build-up continued until the unspent appropriations from fiscal years '52 and '53 ran out. The Army is still living off its pre-'54 appropriations as far as major procurement is concerned. The Navy programs, which had not risen so sharply during the Korean war, required less readjustment. Secondly, a balanced budget was given sufficient priority in national planning to make difficult the task of those who sensed that reductions in '53 and '54 went too deep. Thirdly, in the face of these regressive trends, revolutionary changes in arms technology have continued

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at a quickened pace, forcing many hard choices and temporary expedients whose consequences cannot be long postponed.

The downward trend may now have been arrested, but the upturn may be too little and too late. Taking its cue from the Administration's own fiscal policy, the Congress with considerable public support may extend its present budget-cutting exercise to defense appropriations; and the President's own budget request for the Defense Department reflects a number of ill-considered compromises and serious deficiencies.

The following seem to us the principal spots in present budgetary support levels for national security programs:

## Strategic Forces

**Deterrence** -- (1) Additional funds should be provided for aircraft procurement so as to maintain modernization of existing units sufficiently into the 1960's in order to avoid a gap in ready forces between the latest types of manned aircraft and the operational stage of ballistic missiles.

(2) The SAC base structure should be made less vulnerable to surprise attack through dispersion and other protective measures, such as underground fuel storage, revetments, etc.

(3) More research and development support should be provided for such key programs as chemically-fueled and nuclear-powered aircraft and advanced reconnaissance systems.

**Active Defense**--All three Services should be directed to put more effort into improving early warning and anti-missile defense systems.

of the Air Force and Navy, and the Air Force and Navy are to be provided with suitable defense systems.

**Active Defense** - All three Services should be directed to but more advanced reconnaissance systems.

(3) More research and development support should be provided for underground fuel storage, reentry, etc.

(2) The SFC base structure should be made less susceptible to damage from nuclear and chemical radiation and nuclear-powered aircraft and such key programs as chemically-radiated and nuclear-powered aircraft and

into the 1960's in order to avoid a threat in ready forces between the latest procurement so as to maintain modernization of existing units sufficiently

**Distance - (1) Additional funds should be provided for aircraft support levels for national security programs.**

The following chart to use the principal shows in present program consideration comprehensive and serious deficiencies.

own product needs for the Defense Department reflects a number of future product-cutting exercises to defense subcommitments; and the President's fiscal policy, the Congress with considerable public support may extend it may be too little and too late. Taking its cue from the Administration's own

where consequences cannot be long delayed.

at a drinker's pace, forcing many hard choices and temporary expedients

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## Tactical Forces

To provide something more than token mobile striking forces, additional troop airlift must be provided and, the Army should be enabled to speed up the modernization of its division structure.

## Civil Defense

At least a start should be made on funding a deep shelter construction program.

To remedy these several deficiencies would require, in our judgment, increments of $3-6 billion (including at least $1 billion for Civil Defense) for the next two fiscal years (beginning on June 30, 1957). This would represent an increase in the pending Defense Department budget request of 8-15%. It also seems to us inevitable that, barring agreement on disarmament, the cost of military programs will continue to rise with no level-off occurring before about 1965. Thus, we should face up to the prospect that during the next five years, 1958-62, the Defense Department and Civil Defense budgets may have to go as high as %50 billion, to which must be added at least another $4 billion for military programs of the Atomic Energy Commission and for military aid to our allies. Together these would make a grand total on the order of $54 billion, or about 20% in excess of present figures.

To speak solely in terms of dollars may be misleading. A better gauge for measuring the budgetary burden is by reference to national income

To assess safety in terms of dollars may be misleading. A better
d measure for measuring the budgetary burden is by reference to national income

in excess of present figures.
these would make a grand total of the order of $24 billion, or about 50%
the Atomic Energy Commission and for military aid to our allies. Together
which must be added at least another $4 billion for military programs of
and Civil Defense programs may have to do as much as $20 billion, to
prospect that during the next five years, 1958-63, the Defense Department
level-off occurring before 1962. Thus, we should face up to the
disarmament, the cost of military programs will continue to rise with no
of 8 - 12%. It also seems to us inevitable that, barring agreement on
represent an increase in the pending Defense Department budget request
for the next two fiscal years (beginning on June 30, 1957). This would
increments of $3-6 billion (including at least $1 billion for Civil Defense)
to remedy these several deficiencies would require, in our judgment,
tion program.

At least a start should be made on funding a deep anaphetic construction

## Civil Defense

to ahead up the modernization of its divisional armaments.
additional troops should be provided and, the Army should be expanded
To provide something more than token mobile striking forces,

## Tactical Forces

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or national production. Tested by this standard, even with the increases we are recommending, defense expenditures in 1962 would be no greater than 12% of the Gross National Product predicted for that time. This is the same percentage level at which defense expenditures were running in 1952.*

The capacity of the U. S. economy to provide the added resources that we believe necessary for the support of our national security programs seems to us abundantly clear. Moreover, we are convinced that increases in the Federal budget of the order above suggested can be effected without either inflation or a greater tax burden on our people.

According to an as yet unpublished study recently made by an authoritative, non-governmental organization, it should be possible for this country to increase its major national security expenditures from their present level of $43 billion to $54 billion by fiscal year 1960 without direct materials allocation or other controls, and without increasing current tax rates or adding to inflationary pressures. The price for this $10 billion increment in defense spending would be the deferment of tax reductions, that might otherwise be made during the next three years.

*In this connection a note of warning might well be sounded against dollar versus ruble comparisons as an indication of the USA-USSR military equation. In terms of pay and subsistence, an American soldier receives 2-1/2 times as much as his Russian counterpart, and our aircraft technicians are paid 5 times as much as theirs. Thus, even though Soviet total national income is less than ours, any given percentage of Soviet GNP may buy more military strength than an equivalent percentage of our GNP.

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## The Budgetary Process

While we believe it will be necessary to increase defense expenditures, we recognize that unless there are improvements in the present processes for budgeting defense needs, it will be extremely difficult for the Congress to enact the larger appropriations.

We believe the budgetary process could be greatly improved if military budgets were prepared and presented in more meaningful terms. The present method of preparation does not give the President, the Congress or the public a clear indication of what the funds to be provided will accomplish, in terms of military missions or effective units. As a result, it is natural for the Congress, and not acceptable to the public, to make reductions by percentage cuts across-the-board, rather than by intelligent and selective examination of individual programs.

Complete budgetary reform may not be immediately feasible. We do urge, however, that a start be made toward a system of budgeting that corresponds more closely to the general strategic philosophy of this Report. It should not be too difficult, for example, to restate the presentation of the Air Force budget so that, instead of the present categories of "aircraft and related procurement, procurement other than aircraft, research and development, operation and maintenance, military personnel, military construction, etc.," there would be a clear indication of how much goes to SAC, how much to Air Defense, how much to the Tactical Air Command, and how much to Air Transport. The present budget structures of the other

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Services would be harder to break down along mission lines, but improvements of the type here suggested could be readily made.

A second change we recommend is to transform the present one-year budget cycle to two years. Under existing ground rules, the fiscal personnel of the Services spend the first six months of every year preparing, justifying and revising the budgetary requests of their departments to their own superiors, the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget.

The next six months are consumed in testifying before Congressional committees and otherwise defending the Service budgets as approved by the President. If the budget-making and justification process could take place only once in two years--that is, once for each Congressional term--there could be more concentration on efficient financial management and less pre-occupation with repetitive budgetary procedures. Nor would such a change attenuate Congressional control.

Another pre-condition to maintaining a satisfactory defense budget level is the elimination, or at least diminution, of valid grounds for criticism of the organization of the Defense Department. Unless the American people can be assured that good husbandry is being observed in the financial management of the Defense establishment, they will continue to be skeptical about supporting it even at its present scant level. We therefore consider as essential those changes in the Defense Department organization that have been proposed earlier in this Report.

classification that have been proposed earlier in this Report; therefore consider as essential those changes in the Defense Department's budget which would be made if the present budget were to be increased to $100 million. We believe that such an increase is not necessary at this present budget level. We feel that the present budgetary structure, which will continue to be effective until the end of the current fiscal year, can be assumed to be sufficient to fund the necessary budgetary increases that can be made in the future. It is being observed that the criticism of the organization of the Defense Department, unless the White House is the elimination, or at least diminution, of such accounts for the present budgetary structure, is well founded.

Another true condition to maintain at all times is a satisfactory defense budget. Adequate attractive Congressional support, pre-accordation with the budgetary procedures that would be necessary to provide for the additional funds required by the present budgetary structure, and the necessary funds to carry out the program of the present budgetary structure, are the three basic conditions that must be satisfied.

The next six months are contemplated in carrying out the present budgetary structure and otherwise detailing the service funds as approved by the President. At the budget-making and the identification process, which could take place in a matter of two years, it is once for each Congressional session. The only one in which it is possible to make concentration on efficient financial management and reduce the need for more funds in the future, would be a true pre-accordation with the budgetary procedures that would be necessary to provide for the additional funds required by the present budgetary structure, and the necessary funds to carry out the program of the present budgetary structure, and the necessary funds to carry out the program of the present budgetary structure.

A second change we should make is to eliminate the present budgetary structure of the type here suggested, which would be entirely made.

Services would be ordered to break down into sections that are necessary to the budgetary structure of the present budgetary structure.

J. B. H. Doolan
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A number of possible economy measures encounter resistance not from the military services, but from civilian sources and their representatives in Congress. One example is the excess of military installations in the continental United States, which continue to be a burden on the Federal budget primarily as a result of political pressures. We have it on good authority that there may be as many as 200 repair and supply depots, training stations, storage centers, semi-abandoned or inactive bases and other installations no longer necessary to support the present missions of the Services. This surplus condition is due in part to reductions in the size of ground forces, in part to the relocation of military units to conform to defense requirements in the air-atomic era, and in part from the transfer of complex maintenance work to factories, and away from maintenance shops traditionally manned by uniformed or civil service personnel.

Experience has shown that the elimination of such surplus installations cannot be effected piecemeal. Local political resistance can be met only on a non-partisan basis and as a major Administration measure.