First Draft--September 28, 1957

# CHAPTER V
## THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE

### I

Any attempt to envisage America's position in the world today must begin with a recognition of two momentous realities that make it impossible to equate or compare the present with any previous epoch of history. The first of these is the great technological revolution which, in the last two decades, has annihilated time and space as barriers to both the bellicose and friendly intercourse of man. The other is the world-wide political and social revolution now rapidly obliterating the international order that has shaped the patterns of human society since the emergence of modern nations from the chaos of feudalism more than five centuries ago.

In the extraordinary advance of modern technology, the most fateful event has been, of course, the development of long-range nuclear missiles whose impact on military thinking and international diplomacy will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.

Less dramatic but no less consequential in affecting the deep currents of history has been the enormous expansion and acceleration of human communication in the last twenty years. Today transmission of information is instantaneous--which is to say that news travels

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with the speed of light--and thus produces an instantaneous effect
everywhere in the world where there exist the means to receive it.
Whereas in the not so distant past reactions to historic events were
duiled by the lapse of days or weeks required for the transmission of
information, today every event, every official utterance, every govern-
ment action exercises an immediate and hence powerful influence on
the stream of contemporary history. The revolt in Hungary, the Suez
crisis, the disorders in Little Rock were known within minutes of
their occurrence not only in government offices but in the private
homes of millions of people around the globe from Moscow to Monti-
video and from Tokyo to Trinidad.

A major political consequence of the instant transmission of
news has been to produce a blurring in the lines of demarcation between
domestic and foreign policy. Our government can no longer act, for
example, upon a Navy appropriation, or farm subsidies, or civil
rights, without considering what repercussions its decision will
precipitate immediately abroad. A new dimension has thus been
added to national action. Moreover the vistas revealed by this new
dimension disclose certain opportunities of profound importance.
For endowed with the means of transmitting information about America
directly to the people of other lands, we can envisage the possibility

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for the first time in history of awakening uncommitted nations or even
currently antagonistic nations to an appreciation of our aspirations
and ideals. Our challenge is to employ this endowment with intelli-
gence and tact. It is possible that the direct and honest communication
of American principles and moral values may prove to be one of the
greatest, if not the greatest, of all our technological resources.

The second great reality in the international picture today is
the global revolution which has radically revised and in many areas
demolished existing forms and patterns of government through which
human society had long sought to preserve order in world affairs.
The first shock waves of this revolution began to spread from their
European epicenter less than fifty years ago. Perhaps no half century
in all history ever witnessed upheavals of such scope or far-reaching
effect on the whole fabric of human existence. But the forces behind
them had been building up for at least 150 years previously, and in order
to perceive clearly the world situation today, it is necessary to peer
briefly into the past.

II

Throughout human history, most of mankind resignedly accepted
the view that their destiny was to live in poverty and want, and their
optimum hope the achievement of simple subsistence. In the pyramid

obtained through the achievement of simple subordination. In the pyramid
the view that their destiny was to live in poverty and want, and their
throughout human history, most of making themselves Bekhteriyah accursed

II

II

briefly into the past.

to bereave clearly the world situation today, it is necessary to put
them had been building up for at least 150 years previously, and in order
to select on the whole fabric of human existence. But the forces bearing
in all history ever witnessed unprecedentedeur of such scope or far-reaching
European epiphany less than fifty years ago. Perhaps no half century
The first shock waves of this revolution began to arise from their
human society had just sought to preserve order in world affairs,
demolished existing toms and patterns of government through which
the global revolution which has radically revised and in many areas
The second great reality in the international picture today is
 greatest, if not, the greatest, of all our technological resources.
of American principles and moral values may prove to be one of the
gence and tact. If it is possible that the direct and honest communication
and ideals. Our challenge is to employ this embodiment with intelligence
currently enunciated nations to an appreciation of our aspirations
tor the first time in history of awakening uncommitted nations or even

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First Draft—September 28, 1927

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of society some might be fortunate enough to ascend a few levels, and
a few might attain the resources for luxury and power. It was not until
the 18th Century that the inevitability of such a social order was
challenged, and with it the justice and sanction of the political systems
that maintained that order. The philosophers of the American Revolution
first proclaimed the theory of the political equality of all men and their
unalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness--these
rights being endowed by their Creator, and secured by governments
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. The
French Revolution followed a decade later with its clarion cry for
**Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité**. Within the next century most nations of
the western world (with the notable exception of Russia) embraced
these principles and revised their structures of government to encom-
pass them.

The concept of *economic* equality was not affirmed, however,
nor was the hope of economic betterment held forth (though free enter-
prise was a by-product of political liberty). Not until the 19th Century
when the abuses of the Industrial Revolution demonstrated that increased
productivity did not necessarily improve the well-being of the worker or
farmer, did the crusade for economic equality get under way. A new
doctrine then evolved, holding that *political* equality was meaningless

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within an economic system that engendered and tolerated flagrant disparities of poverty and wealth. The socialist movement found its philosopher in Marx, its political leader in Lenin, and its realization when Tsarist Russia, the one great country which had resisted any substantial liberal reform, collapsed in the flames of World War I. Thereafter, swiftly, the belief spread around the globe that the political institutions of the state could be used to promote an economic environment capable of shielding man from the miseries of hunger and want.

While rejecting Communism, most of the governments of the world began to undertake, during the depression years of 1929-35, a substantial degree of responsibility for the economic condition of their people. With the advent of World War II the combattant nations were forced to regiment, even socialize, their economic life. As a consequence of the all out effort of the war processes of technology and production shot ahead. The United States doubled its productivity between 1940 and 1945. And when the war ended, many of the patterns established by the military emergency lingered on in peacetime life. Production remained at an all-time high; the post-war prosperity seemed to prove that the problem of poverty had at last been resolved. Worldwide Communist propaganda proclaimed this thesis, adding that the best means of fulfillment lay in the machinery of the Communist system.

Post means of fulfilling lay in the necessity of the Communist system.
wide Communist propaganda proclaimed this theory, adding that the
so to prove that the problem of poverty had at last been resolved. World-
Production remained at an all-time high the boat-war prosperity seemed
established by the military emergency fomented on in before time.
between 1940 and 1948. And when the war ended, many of the bottom
production not ahead. The United States doubled its productivity
duce of the all out effort of the war process of technology and
forced to regiment, even socialize, their economic life. As a cause-
people. With the advent of World War II the combatant nations were
substantial degree of reasonability for the economic condition of their
world begun to understand, during the depression years of 1939-38, a
While rejecting Communism, most of the governments of the
 capable of shielding men from the miseries of hunger and want.
tions of the state could be used to promote an economic environment
embrace, the belt abead around the globe that the political inad-
ternal return, collapsed in the flames of World War I. Therefore,
Terror runs amok, the one great country which had related any substantial
other in Man, its political leader in Berlin, and its realization when
tities of poverty and wealth. The socialist movement found its bridle-
within an economic system that engendered and tolerated despot-
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First Draft--September 28, 1927

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In general, almost everywhere around the world, there arose in the post-war years a clamor of many voices in many lands, demanding better standards of living and asserting that these standards could be achieved by a change in political process. Existing processes fell under attack and existing governments were held responsible for failure to fulfill the hopes held forth in this "revolution of rising expectations." The prime result of the world-wide revolution was an inexorable and still-continuing breakdown of the entire international edifice and the dissolution of long-established methods of maintaining order and exchange in world affairs. The attack on the international order today assumes two forms: one inheres in the drives and aspirations of former and present colonial peoples who assail the existing order because its proponents do not live up to their own values; the other consists in the Communist assault which seeks to overthrow not only the visible structure of the traditional world order but also the values that sustain it.

### III

The motives impelling the attack from either flank are philosophical as well as economic and political. The formerly subjugated people and those still in colonial status are in ferment precisely because they have accepted western concepts of freedom and human dignity---because they have in a sense been converted to the precepts of Judeo-

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Christian civilization. Most of the leaders of the various colonial uprisings were educated in the West and drew their revolutionary inspiration from its teachings emphasising the value of the individual and the right to self-government. And in these very teachings, ironically, lay the seeds for the destruction of colonial government itself. On the other hand, the Communist attack is directed at targets far deeper than the exterior edifice of government or its working processes; it aims at the very heart and vitals of western culture--at the democratic belief in the primacy of the individual and the doctrine of government by consent of the governed. It proposes to reconstruct the world anew on the basis of principles forever and hopelessly irreconcileable with our own. The essential difference between the Communist and non-Communist forces enkindling the world-wide revolution is thus a difference in philosophy and motivation.

Their combined activities, however disparate in inspiration, have between them already wrought enormous changes on the political architecture of the world today. To comprehend the scope of the cataclysmic transformations that have taken place in our time, one need only refer to the Atlas. (Insert maps here?) At the turn of the century, following the fall of the Spanish Empire in 1898, thirteen empires ruled the Old World, maintaining a balance of power through varying

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combinations of alliance and counter-alliance, and preserving peace
with minor interruptions. The system was far from perfect, but it
worked--generally providing order, administration and the means for
economic interchange--until the tenuous balance of power teetered,
tottered and tumbled in the upheaval of 1914. Then the great trans-
formations began, succeeding one another with accelerating speed
and violence. World War I erased the German, Austrian, Ottoman
and Russian empires. (The Chinese empire, long decaying, was
already in the throes of the revolution of Sun Yat Sen.) World War II
ended the Japanese Empire and destroyed the captive imperial enclaves
of Hitler and Mussolini. In the post-war years, under pressures
exerted in some areas by the Communists and in others by the rovo-
lution of rising expectations--the empires of Great Britain, France and
the Netherlands began to disintegrate. Although imperial holdings still
remain, the basic system of empire as a means of maintaining world
order and organizing international economics essentially died at the
end of World War II and its final remnants are still shrinking today.

One of the chief implements in the process of imperial dismem-
berment has been a new and special kind of militant nationalism, galvan-
ized by the passionate desire of native (but aware and cognizant) popu-
lations for sovereignty within their own territorial borders, and for a

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better economic life. It is one of the ironies of modern history that the ideal of independence--the most basic and universal of all political aspirations--is being frustrated and devitalized in many of the erstwhile colonial countries by the hard, countervailing fact that a small nation is almost hopelessly inefficient as an economic entity. For the well-being of any state, even the largest and most powerful, depends ultimately on its natural resources and its access to raw materials and foreign markets.

A few of the newly-created, post-war nations have slid, of their own necessity, into the Communist orbit, thus affirming Bernard Shaw's sardonic aphorism that no revolution ever did more than shift the fetter from one ankle to the other. Yet in sum the Communist acquisitions have been relatively few--the Iron Curtain countries of central Europe, North Korea and Viet Minh.

The panoramic view of national organization on the planet today reveals a mosaic of ninety independent sovereign countries, ranging from the giant antipodal poles of world action like the United States, the Soviet Union and Red China (each of these representing not merely a political unit, but a massive dynamic force whose vectors of action affect the destinies of every other nation on earth) down to tiny defenseless principalities like Luxembourg and Monaco and new-born infant entities like Ghana.

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It is within the domain of the new nations, and specifically the ex-colonial dependencies, that some of the most serious challenges to America's foresight, conscience and self-interest are beginning to arise. Save for those already within the Communist orbit, all of these new nations are seeking some kind of union or attachment which can provide them with a measure of the stability they had known under the colonial system they overthrew. Their existence depends on their becoming part of a larger system, for few of them can maintain independent economic lives and none can defend itself alone. Internally all of the underdeveloped countries are experiencing powerful pressures to industrialize as swiftly as possible. In nearly all of them, the population is increasing with alarming speed as a consequence of improved public health and a falling death rate. But aspirations are far out-running achievement. Aware of the modern doctrine that poverty is unnecessary, the people look to industrialization as a magic device for effecting an immediate improvement in their living standards. Throughout the underdeveloped areas industrialization has become an index of national prestige and political independence. Today steel mills and dams have replaced pyramids and temples as symbols of national grandeur.

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Rapid industrialization, however, is a painful and disrupting
process which entails the necessity of making present sacrifices for
future gains. If a new state is determined to industrialize quickly, it
may be tempted to adopt methods of totalitarian regimentation, follow-
ing the examples of Russia and Red China. If on the other hand, through
concern for present welfare, it holds sacrifices to a minimum and indus-
trializes too slowly, it faces the risk that national progress may not
keep pace with the needs and demands of an increasing population. A
further hazard lies in the fact that rapid industrialization may produce
social and political instability, since it entails the dissolution of exist-
ing structures of society and the imposition of new patterns of working
relations.

Here then, in the very storm center of the revolution of rising
expectations, lies one of the major challenges now confronting America
and the rest of the free world: to find some means of helping the under-
developed countries to industrialize with satisfactory speed, but without
sacrificing human and democratic values to the exigencies of economic
progress. It is impossible for these countries to industrialize by them-
selves. They are forced to rely on the advanced nations of the world
for assistance in the provision of capital, machinery, technical skills,
and in the training and development of high level manpower. The

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gravitational pull of the Communist Bloc is already making itself felt in many of the underdeveloped nations. While recognizing that it is in America's interest to prevent these areas from becoming too dependent on Communist support, we have tended to succumb to the dangerous illusion that we can accomplish this end merely by preferring economic and technological assistance. But material aid alone will not affect the course of their growth or the form of their future development. The truly compelling question we must ask ourselves therefore is: can we render our assistance, both public and private, in a manner that will not only abet the process of industrialization but also encourage the creation of an economic and social environment consistent with free world values? We have successfully combined these goals in our own economic system. We are challenged by the present world crisis to repeat our past performance in the underdeveloped nations now caught between the polarities of Communism and the free world. Abroad, as at home, our concern must encompass not only the challenge of economic development but the far deeper challenge of fostering the development of man.

IV

The attack on the international order precipitated by the revol-
ution of the underdeveloped nations presents us, therefore, not only
with grave problems but with opportunities of an affirmative nature. The

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other and far stronger arm of the attack, organized by the forces of Communism, presents us with problems of an entirely different character. The Communist challenge is not an affirmative one. Its quintessential premises are negative -- i.e., the unimportance and expendability of the individual, the repudiation of religious faith, and the postulate (Oriental, perhaps, in philosophical derivation) that man's greatest expectation of self-fulfillment is to submerge himself in a collective ideal. Despite such nihilistic overtones, the power and swift expansion of the Communist movement takes rank, historically, with the explosive spread of Islam or of militant Catholicism in the heyday of the Spanish and Portuguese empires. To meet this challenge, which is backed by enormous strength and aggressiveness, requires more than a policy of containment or co-existence or cold war; more than a passive accumulation of equivalent and opposite armaments and resources; more than a rhetorical counter-attack of outraged or contemptuous rebuttal. It requires affirmative action of great delicacy, complexity, strength and honesty on every level of national existence, and in many far-flung regions of the world.

Until perhaps five years ago, the Communist drive emanated from a single center of decision: the Kremlin. Since the Korean War it has

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become evident that a second nucleus of activity has been developing in China. Although these two centers appear to work together in mutual opposition to the West and especially the United States, it is no longer certain that Moscow can control the policies of Peking. In Europe too, the Communist movement has been fragmented -- as evidenced by the advent of "national Communism" in Yugoslavia, and the struggles of Poland and other satellite states to attain that end. There are hints that the edifice of world Communism is no longer the absolute and monolithic entity it appeared to be at the zenith of Stalin's power. In the long perspective of history this possibility need not evoke surprise. For no human institution is immutable. "There is nothing permanent in the world," the Greek philosopher Heraclitus observed 2500 years ago, "except change."

Internally too there have been symptoms of change behind the ramparts of the Soviet State. The significance of recent events has been difficult to evaluate, for Russian history -- both Tsarist and Communist -- has been punctuated by periodic palace revolutions effecting violent revisions of personnel but producing no permanent mutations in the anatomy of the state. If the Soviet structure is destined to undergo any fundamental future revision, the present likelihood is that it will

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come gradually through evolution rather than revolution. Its nature and direction is not now predictable.

Certain trends, however, have been noted in the domestic policies of the present rulers of the Soviet State. One of these is the policy of "controlled relaxation," designed to satisfy the minimum aspirations of the Russian people for a higher standard of living, for greater personal security and greater individual freedom -- without, however, abandoning fixed Stalinist goals. Another possible trend (for which numerous precedents may be found in the history of previous revolutions) may be leading to the eventual strangulation or perversion of the intellectual core of the Russian revolution -- i.e., the synthesis of Marxist ideas which enkindled the initial Bolshevik revolutionary action -- by the power apparatus of the government. That is to say, the Russian revolution, like other revolutions, may end ultimately in a military dictatorship. There is some evidence to suggest that the Communist movement is following this course. But at the same time there is no evidence, or little reason to hope, that a Red Army dictatorship would be any more tractable than that of Stalin. For the moment we can only assume that the present forces of Communism, now radiating from Russia and China and impinging on peripheral states, will continue to exert their influence for an indefinite

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First Draft -- September 28, 1957

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time to come. And we must presuppose that their hostility to all governments outside their orbit will continue unabated, and that their continuing and implacable aim will be world domination by any available means.

What will be our answer to this challenge? Both the United States and the Soviet Union derive their power from two elements: (1) Their military and economic strength, both present and potential; and (2), their influence over the minds and political action of other peoples by reason of ideological leadership. With respect to the first element of the Soviet challenge, our answer is self-evident. We must maintain our armament and continuously augment our economic productivity -- and this will not be easy. At the present moment Russia's heavy industry is growing at a rate three times that of our own and may, indeed, soon overtake and surpass it. Armament races, however, have never achieved more than the preservation of an uneasy and pre-explosive tension. Armed coexistence with Communism is a misleading slogan, implying only that formal war is temporarily inexpedient, since the destruction of the free world by Communism will be pursued by other means. The mere preservation of peace, without affirmative connotations, is a dreary and negative objective. To define our national purpose as "no war" is analogous to Schopenhauer's definition of "pleasure" as "the absence of pain."

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It is the consummate assertion of philosophical cynicism to say that man's essential desire is not to live but simply not to die.

What doctrines we adduce to meet the Communist challenge must be inspired by higher impulses than the mere survival instinct. And our vision of the future must encompass broader prospects than an indeterminate future of isolation in a continental fortress, without responsibility and without the friends we might have saved from Communist tyranny. In recent years our national perspective has been so distorted by our preoccupation with the menace of Communism that we have lost sight of America's positive goals and aspirations. Obsessed with the concept of "security," we have concerned ourselves with defensive measures rather than affirmative thought and action. It is true that we must maintain our national armament. It is equally true that we must continue to provide assistance to uncommitted countries and lend encouragement to "Titoist" governments. But we must do these things because we see objectives that are worth attaining, because we have plans and purposes and a vision of the future -- and not because we feel coerced to hand out bribes or tribute to a dubious ally. Any successful defense of the free world must consider not only the possibility of military rape, but the equally dangerous possibility of intellectual seduction. If we

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fail to encourage the uncommitted countries of the world they will inevit-
ably succumb to either the threats or the enticements of the Communist
Bloc.

The tragedy of such a development would entail more than the
tactical loss of a potential friend to the forces of the foe. It would pre-
sent us with the prospect of a future day, perhaps not too far distant,
when America might find itself by reason of our indifference a lonely
continental island in an envious, unfriendly world. We may somehow
have succeeded in our wish to survive. But the price of survival will
be the abdication of our leadership, moral and material, in the world of
tomorrow, and our abrogation of the long-range affirmative ideals of
America and the American dream.

V

To recapitulate: as we survey the world today we perceive a
shrunken, riven, interdependent planet on which the old coordinates of
space and time have been reduced to inconsequential quantities and the
transmission of an intercontinental ballistic missile may be effected in
a matter of minutes. We see a world wherein reciprocally antagonistic
forces are polarized between the anode (positive pole) of democracy
and the cathode (negative pole) of Communism. In dead center, en-
trapped in the eye of this field of political and economic energy, pulled

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now this way, now that, by opposing forces, are the uncommitted, the
underdeveloped and the neutral nations of the Near East, Asia and Africa.

Yet this is not the complete picture. Peering more closely, we
discern additional details. And of these the most salient is the situation
of the great, historic, independent nations of western Europe -- Great
Britain, France and Italy. Perhaps the most melancholy aspect of the
international scene today is the fact that the epic of Europe in world
history has come finally and completely to an end. Not only has Europe
lost its central position in the world, it is bereft of its economic and
military independence as well -- its control over its own destiny. The
splendid, vital nations that engendered our political and economic sys-
tems, established all the aesthetic forms and standards of western culture,
and dominated world history for more than 1,000 years -- these venerable,
brilliant states now find themselves reduced to subordinate roles in a
world arena dominated by the conflict of giant powers. Not only are they
dependent for military security on the grim canopy of America's thermonuc-
lear arsenal, their very economic existence depends on the protection
provided by America to their oil supplies in the Middle East. If the
United States was enabled to flourish during the Nineteenth Century under
the benevolent aegis of the *Pax Britannica*, Western Europe exists today
by virtue of the *Pax Americana*.

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Although the European nations lack the power to constitute a "third force" in this polarized world, they nevertheless represent a crucial factor in the world struggle as essential partners -- if not formal allies -- of the United States. Strategically they provide us with a bridgehead in the Eastern Hemisphere. Economically they collaborate with us in maintaining the commerce and augmenting the financial health and prosperity of the non-Communist world. But there is a difference between partners and allies. The institution of formal, international alliance -- i.e., a system of agreement between states to wage war together for common causes and common ends -- has been rendered obsolete by modern military technology; it is a diplomatic anachronism in an age of nuclear war-fare. For the ability to wage nuclear war depends on a highly complex and excruciatingly costly technology which only a very few wealthy nations have yet developed or can ever hope to sustain. Lacking the capacity to wage war effectively in the atomic age, the tendency among most members of the existing family of nations has been to adopt a policy of neutrality and avoid formal alliance. The role of friend, however, remains as crucial today as ever before in the history of national rivalry.

Another significant change in the patterns of world society may be discerned in the decline of the autonomy and importance of the sovereign, self-governing political unit which we call a "nation." No less than the

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institution of alliance, the old nationalist basis of world organization
has become anachronistic -- rendered obsolete by the economic and
technological realities of today. No nation -- however cohesive politic-
ally, linguistically, culturally, racially -- can any longer fulfill the
two functions which until now have comprised the essence of national
sovereignty. They cannot promise their people protection from destruct-
ion by air-borne atomic weapons; and they cannot promise them a con-
dition of economic well-being independent of the international economic
order.

National potential varies, of course, in direct proportion with
the size of the individual national unit. The United States, the Soviet
Union, and probably Communist China obviously stand a better chance
of survival in the event of atomic war; smaller countries stand little
chance of survival, or none. The hard fact of the modern nuclear age
is that national frontiers are indefensible.

In the domain of economic relations, as in warfare, no country
can stand alone. No country, however abundantly endowed, can hope
to fulfill the needs and expectations of its people through the exclusive
use of its own resources. Even the United States sells 10 percent of its
agricultural output abroad and is deeply and inextricably committed to
international trade. In the contemporary world each nation must subsist

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within a larger complex of nations whose economic needs and capacities reciprocally complement and are complemented by others. Whether the interdependency of the existing nations of the free world can be met through regional groupings or only through a larger agency -- a world community of states -- remains to be seen. At this present interlude of history the United Nations, as the blueprint and precursor of a future, more cohesive world organization, is fragmented by traditional concepts of "national" sovereignty. Yet the supreme and unanswerable argument for the preservation and encouragement of the United Nations rests in the fact that its major function -- the maintenance of peace -- can only be discharged through the sanctions of a world community. Today, as the people of the modern world become ever more aware of the ineffable horrors of nuclear war and ever more convinced that international disputes can and must be solved without recourse to ultimatums backed by military force, the consensus in favor of a world community is gaining momentum. Given such a consensus in all nations, the United Nations may in time evolve into the effective agency for the settlement of international conflicts and the preservation of peace which its architects hoped it might ultimately become.

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VI

Although neither an easing of tensions or a diminution of danger
can be foreseen in the immediate future, the continuance of pressure may
in the end prove a national stimulant rather than a source of despair. For
the world has always moved forward with struggle. History has demonstrated
repeatedly that crises are the seed beds of opportunity, that peril evokes
great effort and great effort engenders great achievement. To keep this
precept in mind will prove a challenge to our national morale, and one
we may find singularly difficult to meet.

For our monolithic preoccupation with the drama of the contest
between the free world and the world of Communism has induced a
psychological climate wherein we have come to regard containment of
Soviet aggression as an end in itself rather than a means to an end.
Our foreign policy has developed a kind of Pavlovian reflex, causing
our behavior to appear sometimes as a mere automatic, conditioned
response to the moves and actions of the enemy. In the perspective of
the outside world we are seen most of the time in a defensive posture
--and what is more awkward, seemingly defending the status quo. While
it is not inconceivable that most of us enjoy our own particular status quo,
it would be a mistake to infer from our own attitudes that other people
elsewhere are satisfied with or even resigned to theirs. Indeed a

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perpetuation of the status quo is the last thing in the world they want, and the whole far-flung tumult of the revolution of rising expectations is simply the active expression of their passionate desire for a change. The world of tomorrow is not waiting to be shaped tomorrow. It is in the process of shaping itself today.

Related psychological factors, along with certain attributes of our national character have also combined to obscure our perception of the fact that America is more than a political entity, an economic complex or a military power -- it is a dynamic philosophical force, hurtling through history with enormous energy and mass, and with constant acceleration. This vision of America, seldom discerned by Americans themselves, is, however, clearly perceived with varying emotions by millions of people in other parts of the world.

Owing to our curious myopia -- or inability to scrutinize ourselves at close range -- we tend to forget that our noblest and most basic aspirations and values can only flower fully in a world which shares our own appreciation of their worth. An ideal America which cherishes every life as sacred and insists on man's responsibility to man, which regards government as the servant of man and not his master, and upholds the self-fulfillment of the individual as society's chief concern -- such an America requires for its own fulfillment an international order which itself is moving toward an ideal state.

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Our national objectives are thus essentially global in a multiple
sense. Through their emphasis on order and the dignity of man they
reflect the aspirations of mankind everywhere. They cannot be realized
unilaterally -- by erratic, impromptu countering of every fitful Commu-
nist move. They can be realized only through the perservering pursuit
of American aims, both for ourselves and the world at large, in close
collaboration with cognate and compatible men in other lands. A con-
sistent and continuing advocacy of American ideals and purposes, undi-
verted by Communist alarms and ambiguities, will serve to inspire other
nations to work with us in behalf of a new world order.

Even the most tough-minded of political theorists, Machiavelli,
once observed that over and above the power of armies and other ele-
ments of force the true strength of a prince resided in the goodness of
his laws and in the awareness of his enemies that, should they be
defeated, the prince would apply "good laws" to them. His reasoning
holds equally true today. And it indicates specifically the binding force
through which the diverse nations of the world can ultimately be welded
in a permanent community dedicated to a lasting peace combined with
freedom and a more abundant life. Everywhere throughout the world
today man is in quest of the unity he knows to be his birthright. To
encourage his quest is not only our moral obligation but our best road to
survival in tomorrow's unknown world.

CHAPTER IV.

SOME CONCLUSIONS OF POLICY

§1. The Scope of Possible Conclusions.

§2. Certain General Conclusions.

(a) Emphasis on positive objectives of United States.

(b) "Legitimacy"

(c) Continuous Communication; especially with associated groups.

(d) Bold promulgation new ways handling problems.

(e) "Timing."

§3. Defense and Military Preparation. HAK

§4. Possible Changes Political Method:"Collective App."

(a) Consolidation of Positions.

(b) InterAmerican Group.

(c) NATO

(d) Handling Economic Problems.

(e) Economic Systems and Polit.Policy

(f) Exploration of Economic Groups still in infancy.

§5. The World-Wide Group;