42.

aspects of disengagement for its own sake proceeds from the erroneous
premise that a danger which has arisen because of the disproportion of
power in Central Europe can be ameliorated by "freezing" that relationship.
It adds to the prevailing confusion by lending credence to the Soviet
argument that it is the extent of the Western defense effort rather than
its inadequacy which produces present tensions. A troop freeze in Central
Europe would moreover not affect the Soviet control of any of its territories
-- in fact the attraction of the scheme to the Soviet Union is precisely
that it confirms this domination. The liberalization of satellite regimes
promised for disengagement hardly applies to this situation. Nor will a
zone of "controlled armaments" in Central Europe by itself solve the basic
security problem which resides in the continued division of Germany and
the disproportion in available power between the Soviet bloc and the
Western alliance.

The same inequality inheres in the proposal to create a denuclearized
zone in Central Europe. For better or worse the strategy of the NATO shield
forces has been geared to nuclear weapons. A denuclearized zone would lead to
the expulsion of American forces from Germany since nuclear weapons are

the expansion of American forces from Germany since uncertain weapons are forces has been earned to uncertain weapons. A demoralized zone would lead to some in Central Europe. For better or worse the strategy of the NATO shield The same inexperience in the protocol to create a demoralized Western alliance.

the disintegration in availing power between the Soviet bloc and the security problem which resides in the continued division of Germany and some of "controlled areas" in Central Europe by itself solve the pales promised for disengagement hardly applies to the situation. Nor will a that it continue this domination. The liberalization of satellite regimes -- in fact the attraction of the scheme to the Soviet Union is precisely Europe would moreover not affect the Soviet control of any of its territories its independence which produces present tensions. A free trade in Central argument that it is the extent of the Western defense effort rather than it is due to the brevity of contraction by lending credence to the Soviet power in Central Europe can be justified by "free transit" that relationship should be free that a danger which has arisen because of the disintegration of subjects of disintegration for its own sake proceeds from the erroneous

45.

[N]

43.

[Y]

an integral part of their arsenal, and since without nuclear weapons they could offer no effective opposition to Soviet numerical preponderance. ⁹

It would therefore make NATO defenseless without any significant reduction in the Soviet threat. And the Soviet Union will retain sufficient conventional forces to suppress any domestic upheavals. Here again the West is caught in a vicious circle: The more it has relied on nuclear weapons to outbalance the conventional forces of the Soviet Union, the more "rigid" its diplomacy has to be with respect to proposals that involve nuclear disarmament alone. And the peril of the West is only increased because of its temptation to combine a military policy relying increasingly on a nuclear deterrent with a diplomacy seeking to bring about nuclear disarmament. The schemes for troop freeze or denuclearized zones are either irrelevant to the real security problem or they increase our danger.

They do not address themselves to the chief cause of tension even in the military field, if anything they perpetuate it. It is misstating the problem to argue that "the only troop freeze which is being advocated is one that does not affect the balance of forces" or that the only ceiling on

9. It is not necessary to argue here whether nuclear weapons are a substitute for numbers. They will at least add to deterrence by imposing on the Soviet Union an unfamiliar mode of warfare.

46.

[Y]

that they would not tolerate a change in their system and having at
their disposal the apparatus of a police state, it is not inconceivable
that they might use the quest for negotiations to separate Germany not only
from NATO but from all its other West European ties. Presumably, the
withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany is supposed to facilitate the
East German system. But it could equally well be argued - indeed the
preponderance of available evidence would seem to support it - that the
least likely method for solving the problem of German unity is by subterfuge.

The idea that East Germany can be eased out of the Soviet orbit without the
Soviet Union noticing it, as it were, is belied by all public statements
of the Soviet leaders - the last time on the occasion of the visit of the
German Social Democrats Schmid and Erler. The Kremlin has said repeatedly
that it would intervene in case of an upheaval in the satellite orbit.
12.

And if the Soviet Union should hesitate, the other satellites would certainly
exert great pressure in favor of intervention. For whatever their feelings
about the Soviet Union, there can be no doubt about their fear of a resurgent
Germany. They have an interest in the maintenance of the East German
puppet regime not only because the overthrow of a Communist regime might set

12. To be sure, Khrushchev has qualified this by saying that Soviet troops would intervene only if called by socialist leaders or if the upheavals were inspired from the outside. Some Communist functionary can be certain to ask

47.

[Y]

a precedent for Eastern Europe but also on nationalistic grounds. For them a divided Germany will for a long time seem the best protection against German revisionism. A disengagement not tied to a settlement of the German question, if it fulfilled the claims made for it by its proponents, would thus increase the dangers to peace while reducing the forces to meet it. Or else, contrary to expectations, the East German regime would maintain itself in which case NATO would have been disrupted for no political gain.

Thus disengagement as long as it is advocated for its own sake represents a definite danger to Western security. It reduces the capacity for local defense at the precise moment that it becomes the only meaningful counter to Soviet aggression and when the Soviet gain in missile and nuclear strength encourages an ever more venturesome policy. The Soviet concern with wrecking NATO makes sense after all only if directed against the capability for local defense. The Soviet Union must realize that a point will soon be reached where the United States does not require European bases in a show-down with the USSR. Elimination of NATO would thus not crucially affect the over-all deterrent equation. NATO does represent an obstacle to the

for assistance on the model of Kadar and as Hungary and Tibet have proved, uprisings against Communist rule are considered to be inspired from the outside by definition.

[N]

VI-14

of Germany.

But what would be the implications of the military neutralization of a unified Germany? It must be admitted that it is tempting to consider such a plan. It would make clear once and for all that German membership in NATO is a response to Soviet intransigence, that it is not made necessary by NATO strategy but that the reverse is true. The temptation is all the greater when it is considered that it would be next to impossible for a German government to refuse such an offer were Moscow ever to make it. Finally, one could look at the proposed neutralization as an important propaganda move entailing no serious risks, for the Soviet Union has made it abundantly clear that it would not accept German unification on any basis remotely acceptable to the West.

Nevertheless, it is important to be clear about what is meant by the neutralization both for the sake of Germany and for the sake of Europe. It means Germany's exit from NATO and the departure of Western forces from the Federal Republic and of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany

VII - 2

much is at stake for the West to permit open disagreement among the allies at the conference table, particularly those partners who have staked most on the alliance. But the mere fact that three weeks before the foreign minister's conference the West still had not worked out a program indicates that even on the technical diplomatic level unity of purpose has been lacking. Moreover, the tentativeness of the Western response goes deeper than the problems of coalition diplomacy. There has been lacking not only a program but conviction; not only energy but even more a vision of the world the West is striving for.

In this sense, the Soviet Union has already achieved a major objective. Immediately after World War II, Soviet pressure had a tendency to unify the West and to call forth a creative response. But a decade of Cold War has sapped Western resolution to a remarkable degree. There has consequently been much more discussion about what can be conceded than about what might be achieved; more awareness of our perils than of our opportunities.

The Berlin crisis has demonstrated that even in Europe, the area of our deepest concern, common action has been difficult to attain and the lowest common denominator is more likely to rule allied councils than a creative effort

VII - 4

is conceivable that the West gives such an impression of weakness
and irresolution that it furnishes arguments for collaborating with
Communism on nationalist rather than ideological grounds: in the sense
that patriotism may counsel accommodation to what will increasingly appear
as the dominant trend. And even where accommodation does not occur or is
impossible, a Soviet success in Europe will have unsettling consequences.
For example, Israel may now be restrained from seeking security in military
expansion by the belief that such a course would sacrifice the possibility of
Western support should it be attacked by its Arab neighbors in the future
when they have gained in power. On the other hand, Western vacillation over
Berlin will be a clear proof that safety can not be found in reliance on
the West. It will weaken not only NATO but contribute to the instability
of many other areas.

The stakes are high, then. And it would be idle to pretend that
the Western response has been adequate to them. Even more worrisome than the
lack of unity on specific issues is the tendency to seek to combine the
advantage of every course of action; the impression which is created that all
that stands between the West and a final solution of its problems is ingenuity

that arises between the West and a third solution of the problem is inimical to advantage of every course of action; the impression which is created that all lack of unity on specific issues is the tendency to seek to combine the Western response has been adequate to them. Even more worrisome than the The strikes are right, then. And it would be idle to pretend that of many other areas.

the West. It will weaken not only NATO but contribute to the inaptitude
Berlin will be a clear proof that safety can not be found in reliance on
when they have gained in power. On the other hand, Western oscillation over
Western anhost should it be attached by its Adjacent邻 States in the future
examination of the effect that such a course would sacrifice the feasibility of
for example, itself, now be restrained from seeking security in military
injustice, a Soviet success in Europe will have unmeasurable consequences.
as the dominant trend. And even where accommodation does not occur, if it
that barterism may mean accommodation to what will increasingly abate
Communism on nationalistic rather than ideological grounds; in the sense
and irresolution that it turnippe arguments for collBABYing with
its conceivability that the West gives and an impression of weakness

AII - 4

VII - 5

in devising a negotiating panacea. The reluctance to face the great
task before us or even to admit that we shall live for the indefinite
future in "abnormal" periods is the real measure of the inadequacy of current
Western policy.

One of the causes of this inadequacy is the difficulty all of the
Western nations have in dealing with the problem of conjecture. Any policy
must be based on an assessment about the future course of events or the
intentions of the other side or even merely the limits of the possible which
can never be proved "certain." Indeed to set up too rigid standards of
certainty is to lay down a prescription for inaction. Because of this
conjectural element there must inhere in policy an inevitable precautionary
element. Many measures are necessary not because the policymaker is absolutely
certain of a given trend but in order to avoid the worst eventuality. But
the more precautionary the policy, the more difficult it is to "sell" domes-
tically. The world will never know what horrors it avoided by taking
decisive measures in time and therefore it can never be "certain" that these
measures were in fact necessary. Had the West stood up to Hitler in 1936,
it would probably still be in dispute whether he was a misunderstood

VII - 6

[Y]

nationalist or a revolutionary, and if a revolutionary whether he in fact represented a danger to world peace: "Whatever one thinks of the Hitler regime," said Hugh Dalton after German troops reoccupied the Rhineland, "...it is indispensable that one should talk with this man...and bring to the surface all the grievances which he may still entertain and all the motives which may lie behind his actions... It is true that/Hitler has broken treaty after treaty. It is also true that the French government have thrown away opportunity after opportunity of coming to terms with him."

Partly because for reasons of domestic policy, partly because of the inward uncertainty of the leadership groups, but above all because of the inability to come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives, the democracies for over a generation now have resolved their doubts by making the most favorable assessment about the future and the intentions of the distatorships. In order to justify the negotiations they sought so earnestly, they have refused to make moral distinctions. And because they have at the same time increasingly rejected reason of state as a sufficient motive of policy they have been driven to postulate a moral equivalence between themselves and their sworn enemies: "I also agree in welcoming so far as Europe is

17. Hansard, 9 March 1936, col. 1926-1927. In the same debate, Arthur Greenwood said: "Herr Hitler's statement (offering to negotiate) ought

VII - 7

[Y]

concerned the attempt of the Government to establish contact with the rulers of Germany," a British Labour leader said in 1937. "Any attempt to separate the sheep from the goats and to have the world divided in two or more camps based upon ideological grounds would be absolutely fatal to the future welfare of mankind."

By thus resigning precaution and conjecture, the democracies have imposed a fearful price on themselves. It comes to expression in the vulnerability to the professions of the distators; in the timidity of the response to their pressures; in the lack of conviction of their positive programs; and finally in the physical sacrifice involved in achieving certainty. The British policy of appeasement undoubtedly served a useful purpose in uniting the British people when a stand finally had to be taken just as today negotiations are essential to prove to ourselves that no avenue for a settlement has been neglected. Nevertheless the question persists whether the role of leadership in a democracy is simply to register public fears and insecurities or whether it does not have an educational task as well.

It is constantly reiterated that the West has learned its lessons

to be accepted at its face value. Herr Hitler made a statement sinning with one hand but holding out the olive branch with the other which ought to be taken at face value. These may prove to be the most important gestures yet made... It is idle to say these statements were insincere... The dominant problem is peace and not defence."

18. Hansard 330, 21 December 1937, col 1841.

Keep

VII - 8

from the policy of appeasement. But what seems to be banished is the word, not the policy, much less the attitude it reflects. To be sure, many of the difficulties of the democracies is due to their best qualities: the stability of their societies has been due after all to an environment in which statements could be taken at face value and in which appearances were at one with reality. But this only defines the problem; it does not solve it. It would not be the first time in history that nations were overcome by opponents whose outstanding characteristic was a superior will.

The central problem before the democracies is not how to react to this or that overture but how to find the conviction to act with assurance in a world in flux. No Soviet success is so disquieting as the effrontery with which they have taken over the words "democracy," "freedom" and "public will" for it indicates an absence of spiritual dynamism on our part. The ability of Communism to solve its problems by the simple expedient of defining all measures of a Soviet state as just a priori is possible only because we have developed neither the philosophy nor the program to expose its absurdity. A 19th century philosophy has been permitted to define the issues in terms of means of ownership while begging the question of the oppression

in terms of means of ownership whilepegging the direction of the obsolescence
apportionment. A further century of philosophy has been permitted to define the issues
because we have developed neither the philosophy nor the program to expose its
detaching all measures of a given state so that a bridle is possible only
epistuity of Communism to solve its problems by the simple expedient of
will" for it indicates an absence of ahuman dynamism on our part. The
with which they have taken over the words "democracy," "freedom," and "bundao
in a world in flux. No Soviet success is so disappointing as the eternally
to this or that overture but how to find the conviction to set with assurance
the central problem before the democrates: is not how to reach
whose outstanding characteristic was a amorror will.
would not be the first time in history that nations were overcome by opponents
with reality, but this only defines the problem: it does not solve it. If
statements could be taken at face value and in which abstractions were at one
adequacy of their society has been due after all to an environment in which
differences of the democrates is due to their best qualities: the
not the horizon, when free the attitude it reflects. To be sure, many of the
from the horizon of abstinence, but what seems to be banished is the word,

AII - 8

[A]

VII - 9

of a legitimized bureaucracy which is the real issue of our time.

A great deal has been said about the transformation of Soviet society. But it is unlikely to come about until the faith and self-confidence of its leadership groups and its youth is shaken, not until there appears an inconsistency between expectation and reality or until the range of their expectations is raised by the vitality and validity of Western attitudes. It is the measure of our difficulties that we are more concerned with symptoms than with causes, that we look for technical solutions in what is a profound spiritual crisis. A great deal of the contemporary debate concerns the issue of our *ability* to survive; it is often overlooked that the answer may depend on something more fundamental: our worthiness to survive.

our workiness to survive.

it often overlooked that the answer may depend on something more fundamental:
consequently debate concerns the issue of our *spinity* to survive: it
solutions in what is a profound spiritual issue. A great deal of the
more concerned with symptoms than with causes, that we look for technical
western attitudes. If it is the measure of our billionth that we are
range of their expectations is raised by the vitality and validity of
there abounds an inconsistency between expectation and reality or *until the
confidence of its leadership grows and its youth is shaken, not until
society*, but it is unlikely to come about until the truth and self-

A great deal has been said about the transformation of Soviet
of a legislated permanency which is the real issue of our time.

AII - 3

II-10

The same is true with respect to the military aspect of a
European security system. It has been said that the phrase "protecting
legitimate security concerns" is without concrete meaning. But against
the background of the experiences of World War II and of a decade of
Cold War, understanding the problem should present no insuperable difficulties.
An agreement that takes into account the "legitimate" security interests
of both sides must protect the Soviet Union against the danger of a resurgent
German militarism and against an attack from NATO territory. But it must
also safeguard the West against the risks of Soviet pressure and encroachment.
It is true that its experiences in this century may make the Soviet Union
unusually sensitive to German military strength. But it is also true, that
the Russian Empire has been pressing on all peripheral areas, including Europe
for over a century. The Soviet Union has a right to demand protection against
military attack. Yet the security requirements can not be pressed to the
limit. In a society of sovereign states, a nation must always rely to some
extent in the good-will of its neighbors. For absolute security is obtainable
only by reducing all other states to impotence.

II-14

[Y]

the West and the Soviet Union against offensive operations. If the Soviet Union rejects these proposals it is because of the unwillingness to give up its East German springboard to the eventual domination of all of Germany. It will be proof that the Soviet Union is not so much interested in stability as in creating a situation which will demoralize the West and wreck Western unity. It would be pursuing the Cold War by claiming to end it.

But if the Soviet Union will not agree to the unification of Germany, cannot progress be made by developing a security system around the present dividing line in Europe? May such a scheme not relax tensions and lead to the eventual reunification of Germany? Here we must turn to the related problems of military security and disengagement.

III - 1

[Y]

III

Few topics have roused as many passions with such vague definitions as the term disengagement. It is applied equally to a troop-freeze, to the reduction of troops, to the withdrawal of American, British and Soviet forces from Germany, Poland and Hungary, to a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. It has been advocated as a step to be undertaken side by side with reunification, as a measure that might lead to German reunification and as a device to bring about a relaxation of tensions in its own right. Moreover, because of the prevailing confusion about the purpose of NATO and the political goals of the Western alliance, we possess no yardstick against which to measure our policy alternatives.

In order to put into focus the military implications of the various proposals, it is essential to discuss the problem of NATO strategy. Unhappily the role of NATO is far from clear. It is argued for example that NATO has prevented a Soviet attack without ever meeting the force levels planned for it. Since Soviet ground strength has been preponderant throughout the existence of NATO, so the argument goes, peace has been maintained for one of two reasons or a combination of

III - 2

[Y]

them: either because the Soviet Union never had any intention of
making a military attack on Europe in the first place or because it
was deterred from such an attack by the threat of a general war with the
United States. The corollary of this line of reasoning has been that a
limited war in Europe is "unthinkable." Disengagement in these terms
would merely shift the starting line for a Soviet advance 100 or 550
miles to the East without reducing the sanction against such a move.
To be sure, the Soviet Union might decide to reoccupy the territories
once vacated, but it could do so, in Mr. Kennan's words, "only once and
only for the highest stakes: in the contingency, that is, of general
war." Massive retaliation would furnish the deterrent against Soviet
attack whether on the Elbe, the Oder or the Bug.

These arguments have thus had the negative virtue of pressing
home all the inconsistencies of present NATO strategy: the reliance
for both deterrence and the conduct of the war on a weapon that is under
the exclusive control of the two extra-continental allies, the United
States and Great Britain; the demand by our European allies for a
substantial United States and British troop commitment coupled with a

III - 5

aggressor out of proportion to the objective sought. Because it was never
easy to determine how highly the aggressor might value any given objective,
deterrence came very rapidly to be equated with maximum destructiveness.

Every increase in the destructive power of weapons seemed also to call forth
a demand for an increase in their numbers. On this calculation nothing
short of complete obliteration of the opponent seemed to offer adequate
protection.

But however effective this conception may have been at the
beginning of the nuclear age, it failed to take into consideration the changing
technology which has caused strategy to pass through four phases: (1) the
period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and the monopoly
of the means of delivery, (2) the period when our monopoly of weapons was
ended but when we still possessed an overwhelming advantage in the means of delivery, (3)
the period when the Soviet Union began to develop a substantial delivery
system but our superiority in numbers and the strategic advantage of our base
system gave us a decided advantage in an all-out war, (4) the period when
both in numbers of weapons and in the means of delivery the capabilities of
the two sides begin to approach each other.

III - 6

[4]

During phases one and two of the deterrent equation - during the period, that is, of our atomic preponderance - our retaliatory force could be conceived of as a deterrent to any aggression we chose to resist.

It was a positive deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make our response dependent on the magnitude of the threat. Rather our primary problem was to decide that some response was called for. Massive retaliation could be effective because our invulnerability caused our willingness to react to appear to be high; our threat of all-out war was therefore credible.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear and missile capability, the threshold of provocation which would unleash the United States and British retaliatory force has constantly been rising -- or so an aggressor might calculate at least. In these circumstances, the threat of all-out war will deter an ever smaller range of possible challenges. Its credibility will constantly decline, and it will so increase the inhibitions of the side relying on it that it will only encourage appeasement as the alternative.

The challenge over Berlin was made possible because the Soviet advances in missiles have neutralized at least to a degree our strategic striking power and the vast Soviet ground strength has thus been freed for pressure

III - 7

[Y]

in Berlin

or blackmail. And the extreme caution of the Western response has been produced to a considerable extent because of the impossible alternatives presented by our strategic doctrine.

Against this background, it becomes futile for NATO to continue to rely on the strategy of the past decade. While the United States was predominant in the nuclear field, it made sense to regard NATO primarily as a device to unleash the United States Strategic Air Command. Then it was understandable that our allies were reluctant to contribute substantial forces for a local defense. But in the era of nuclear plenty, the defense of Europe can no longer rest on the threat of all-out war alone. The problem that all-out war involves costs out of proportion to the objectives of Soviet aggression (even in Europe) cannot be solved by proclaiming endlessly that a limited war in Europe is impossible. We must be able to reassure our European allies that they can count on our support by means other than the adoption of a suicidal strategy. And if our partners seek to insure through weakness that no alternative to all-out support is available, they will succeed only in demoralizing both sides. It is not at all obvious why Western Europe and the United States, whose combined resources of manpower

III - 8

[N]

and industrial potential far exceed those of the Soviet Union, should not be able to make a much more substantial effort to improve the capability for local defense.

It is argued by many that, since Europe is no longer necessary to the United States as a base, in an all-out war, the need for a substantial military establishment on the Continent has disappeared. But it is surely inconsistent to argue that the United States should be prepared to run greater risks than ever for an area which has become strategically less important.

It is precisely the dispensability of Europe in an all-out war that creates the need for a greater effort of local defense. It is essential to deprive the Soviet Union of the belief that the change in Europe's strategic importance will make us less ready to come to its defense.

Nor is it necessary to decide in the abstract the line of demarcation between limited war and all-out war in Europe. All NATO governments must have a common interest in seeking to avoid the outbreak of an all-out war. But they must have an equal interest in preventing a situation in which such a war can be avoided only by surrender. And they must not create temptations for Soviet pressure either through weakness or

9. See Speech by Ambassador Quaroni.

III - 11

[Y]

It would therefore make NATO defenseless without any significant reduction
in the Soviet threat. And the Soviet Union will retain sufficient conventional
forces to suppress any domestic upheavals in the satellite orbit. It can
be maintained, of course, that since the West is not prepared to make the
sacrifices necessary to assure an improved local defense it might as well
obtain the political benefits of offering to perpetuate its weakness. But
such an admission of futility cannot be the last word of Western policy. A
more worthy response would be to attempt to develop a more rational strategy.

Would the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany at least
represent a means to achieve unification? It is thought by some that since
the East-German regime is maintained by Soviet troops, a mutual withdrawal
would bring about the collapse or at least the liberalization of the East
German satellite. The establishment of a zone of controlled armaments,
followed by the withdrawal of American, British and Soviet forces, should
be accompanied by "some form of negotiation" between the Federal Republic

it is said,

11. It is not necessary to argue here whether nuclear weapons are a substitute for numbers. They will at least add to deterrence by imposing on the Soviet Union an unfamiliar mode of warfare.

III - 13

[Y]

noticing it, as it were, is belied by all public statements of the Soviet leaders - the last time on the occasion of the visit of the German Social Democrats Schmid and Erler. The Kremlin has said repeatedly that it would intervene in case of an upheaval in the satellite orbit. 13 And if the Soviet Union should hesitate, the leaders of the other satellites would certainly exert great pressure in favor of intervention. For whatever their feelings about the Soviet Union, there can be no doubt about their fear of a resurgent Germany. They have an interest in the maintenance of the East German puppet regime not only because the overthrow of a Communist regime might set a precedent for Eastern Europe but also on nationalistic grounds. For them a divided Germany will for a long time seem the best protection against German revisionism. A withdrawal of Western forces from Germany if it fulfilled the claims made for it by its proponents would in the absence of a political settlement increase the dangers to peace while reducing the forces to meet it. Or else, contrary to expectations, the East German regime would maintain itself in which case NATO would have been disrupted for no political gain.

13. To be sure, Khrushchev has qualified this by saying that Soviet troops would intervene only if called by socialist leaders or if the upheavals were inspired from the outside. Some Communist functionary can be certain to ask for assistance on the model of Kadar and as Hungary and Tibet have proved, uprisings against Communist rule are considered to be inspired from the outside by definition.

III - 15

from German territory. But before the West can negotiate effectively on this, it must admit to itself that the evasions and inconsistencies of NATO may cause the Soviets to believe that they would gain no <u>additional</u> security from any such control scheme. Thus, effective negotiations may be prevented not by the strength of NATO but by its weakness.

good wind-up FP