SALUTE TO ISRAEL

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, distinguished
guests, fellow performers:

I say this because

Before coming on stage tonight I was warned
that a speaker is someone who speaks less than five
minutes; anything more makes you an actor.

It is difficult for me to stand here in front of a
group of professionals -- many of whom are probably
trying to get my accent straight so they can use it in
their next act. It is, of course, a Harvard accent.

So it occurred to me that it might be
interesting if I talked as if this were a diplomatic
dinner in Washington, though this crowd is a little

January 1976

ELCJ

more lively than what I am used to.

I have been asked: "was the Rabin visit to America a success?" I am asked this repeatedly by the many members of the Israel Protective Society who suffer from the illusion that the Prime Minister needs help.

What can I say? The Prime Minister is accompanied by the Israeli press. As is appropriate for a country with three million people and six million opinions, the Israeli press corps is a wild group of individualists united by a common dedication to paranoia. If I say that the Prime Minister

- 3 -

and we agreed, they will write that the _Prime Minister_ has just betrayed Israel. If I say that we disagreed, they will write that _President Ford_ or -- more likely -- I have betrayed Israel.

So let me be diplomatic, which is to say evasive.

One day on the last shuttle, the Prime Minister sent me to Egypt with fifteen issues to be settled. We managed to solve 12 of them. I returned to Israel inordinately proud of myself -- a not unusual occurrence -- until the Prime Minister cast a cold eye on me and said: "You betrayed us again."

- 4 -

So knowing his standards -- we did a little
better this time.

In fact, the Prime Minister did so well with
Congress that I am thinking of becoming his agent
and collecting a fee. This way I might have a fund
that is safe from Senator Tunney.

Speaking of Congress, you may have read that
recently a Congressional Committee cited me for
demonstrating contempt of Congress.

Some of my friends claim this was unfair.
They hold the view that I have spent seven years in
Washington <u>concealing</u> my contempt for Congress.

- 5 -

In a more serious vein, the Prime Minister and I are old and close personal friends. We worked together in great intimacy for many years when he was Ambassador to Washington, during events of great moment in the history of Israel and the United States. We have seen each other so often that we not only thoroughly know each other's arguments, but what is worse, each other's strategies as well. This makes it tough for both of us unless we are completely honest with each other.

- 6 -

Our discussions this past week have reflected
the mutual and sometimes silent understanding
of old friends--though I would not say that silence
is the distinctive quality for which Israelis will
be known by history. And they were conducted,
as always, in a spirit of trust. I believe they
will be seen in retrospect as another positive
step in the cooperation and friendship
of our two countries.

-7-

All of us are here because we admire Israel,
that country of inestimable courage, vision
and humanism. It is those qualities, which
have so often meant for Israel the margin
of victory in war, that give us confidence
that Israel will also win peace. No people have
earned it more than the people of Israel, who
have never known a day's peace in their national
history, and who have indeed lived in the
shadow of oppression or injustice for thousands
of years.

-8-

No one who has worked in the Middle East
has any illusion about the difficulty of the task
we face. It is often easier to be dominated
by events than to be responsible for them.
Change requires courage; progress requires
vision.

Together the United States and Israel have
accepted the challenge of resolving the most
complex dispute of our time. We have joined
with Israel in seeing that the negotiating
process does not wither, that the impetus to peace

-9-

is not extinguished, that we leave no
possiblity unexplored.

Throughout the millenia of the diaspora,
Jews repeated a chant that only faith could
validate: "Next year in Jerusalem."

Israel is a living example of the historical
truth that all great achievements start as
dreams. Against all probability, the Jewish
people returned to Jerusalem and out of the swamps
of Palestine grew the State of Israel. The wisest
of realists are those who remember that only
men of faith have the power to shape reality.

-10-

We now have need for one more dream: it
is part of the tradition of Judaism that the
world rests on three pillars: on justice, on
truth, on peace -- and that these three
are one and the same: for if there is justice,
there is truth, and if there is truth, there is
peace.

So let us all hope that in some year soon the
cradle of our civilization will again be an
example of what men of faith and good will
can achieve, so that a people that have suffered
much and struggled heroically may find at

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY YIGAL ALLON
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL
AT A DINNER IN MR. ALLON'S HONOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JANUARY 7, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

(Whistle by Mr. Danny Kaye calling meeting
to order.) (Laughter.)

Foreign Minister, distinguished guests,
Mr. Kaye (laughter) -- I hope you all have heard the
new Chief of Protocol of the State Department (laughter)
summon you to dinner and announce that toasts
are now going to be delivered.

Yigal, who is an old friend of mine and a
good friend of all of us here, is in the United States
for one of his periodic visits in order to prepare with
us the discussions at the Security Council, which will
take place next week; and there has been, in the press
and elsewhere, a great deal of discussion about what we
may be facing at the Security Council in our meetings
this week. But I think that anybody who knows our
relationship, as countries and as individuals, can be
sure that this meeting that takes place at the Security
Council next week deals with one of the objectives that's

2

dear to the hearts of Israel and dear to the
hearts of the United States -- which is how to
promote peace in the Middle East.

The United States has been committed to
producing progress towards peace on the basis of two
Security Council Resolutions: Security Council
Resolution 242, Security Council Resolution 338.

This is the only basis on which the United States
will move towards peace. It has provided a reliable
framework that can account for the interests and
concerns of all of the parties. And, therefore, what
Yigal and we have to discuss this week concerns only
the essentially technical question of how the Security
Council discussions can lead to the reopening of the
Geneva Conference, or perhaps a preparatory conference
to the Geneva Conference, which we'll then negotiate on
the basis of those two Resolutions.

But this, as I pointed out, is an essentially
technical diplomatic question. The more fundamental
question is how to move an area, that for 30 years has
been torn by war, towards some consciousness of peace.

And there can be no people in the world that more

3

years for peace than the people of Israel.

Some of you have heard me talk about my visits to Yigal's kibbutz in 1961. Yigal and I met at Harvard in 1957, right after the war of '56. We've been close friends since. And I visited him at his kibbutz in 1961. And I saw the fishermen out on the lake right under the Golan Heights and I will never forget what the courage meant to me of these people who went out night after night. And I remember being taken around this kibbutz, where every square inch reminded somebody of somebody who had died for it or suffered for it.

And, therefore, we of course understand what this process of peace must mean to a people whose country was a dream before they could ever have the courage to go there and whose margin of security is so narrow that they cannot afford many of the experiments that are given to more favored nations.

And since we're close friends, we sometimes disagree. We can afford to disagree -- because we know that as far as the United States is concerned, there can be no settlement that does not assure a secure Israel that can survive in recognized borders -- and recognized by all: by people in the area, and by anybody

4

who aspires to become a party to any negotiation.

We have always known that only a strong
Israel can afford to run the risks inherent in the peace
process. And I think, however, that every American has
to know that only a strong America can contribute to the
peace process and that to the degree that other
countries begin to question America's ability to
shape events, to the degree that America ceases to
be a relevant factor in world affairs, somebody --
somewhere along the line -- will have to pay in blood and
sacrifice Americans and friends of America.

So the deep problem we face -- if we want
to move the world towards peace -- is not only whether
America will be reliable -- which is guaranteed by
our affection, by our knowledge, and by the fact that
nobody could face himself if he had impaired the
survivability or security of Israel -- but also the
question is whether with all the good intentions in the
world America can stay relevant and strong enough.

That is not a problem for Israelis; that
is a problem for Americans -- and they should remember that
our capital is not inexhaustible.

5

But I want you to know, Yigal, that on the
course of moving towards peace we will move together.
We will reconcile our views. We can afford to
discuss them in complete frankness.

And, after all, when we think back to where
we were at some times in 1970 and during dark days in
1973 and how we've come through the war and how far
we've really come already on the road towards peace,
we know we can go the rest of the way together --
arduously, painfully, confidently, and successfully.

So it is always a joy to welcome you here.
And I'd like all of you to join me in a toast to our
friend, the Foreign Minister of Israel, and to the
friendship of Israel and the United States.

(Standing toast)

....

6

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALLON: Mr. Secretary -- or may I say,
rather, Henry -- Nancy, Excellencies, fellow
parliamentarians, friends:

It was very kind of Henry to remind me
of our good days at Harvard, when both of us were a little
younger and probably none of us thought the day might
come when we may negotiate relations and plans between
our two countries. But I remember at the end of that
exciting seminar Henry gave me a lift from Boston to
New York, and he drove the car and I took the risk
(laughter) and joined him, and on our way we discussed
the last war -- which, unfortunately, was not the
last -- the war of 1956 in Sinai -- and I made a
complaint. I said, "You see, Henry, twice we won the
war -- in 1948-49, and in 1956. And twice we lost
the peace."

And my complaint was directed not against
Henry but against the Secretaries of State of those
respective years who made us withdraw from Sinai
without getting peace first. And Henry said, "You know,
Yigal, if Heaven forbid and there is another war and you

7

take Sinai again, don't withdraw unless you get peace."
(Laughter.)

Henry, this was one of the lessons I learned from
you (laughter), and you are going to pay for it now.
(Laughter and applause.)

Really, that seminar was for me a revelation.
It was one of my very first visits to this great
country. It gave me an opportunity to get to know
a little bit of America, some idea about international
relations, and to get acquainted with many friends
who remained friends from all over the world --
including some of the Arab countries. Maybe, when a
day comes and we shall be able to exchange Ambassadors
with our neighbors, one or two of them may show up --
I hope not in Tel Aviv but in Jerusalem -- as
Ambassadors.

Meanwhile, until this dream is being materialized,
the great problem is, first, how to avert another war;
and, secondly, how to progress towards peace.

I read in the papers a couple of weeks ago
that one of your experts gave a testimony to a Joint
Committee of the Congress in which he tried to persuade
his listeners -- I hope not successfully -- that as far

8

as the balance of strength between Israel and
her neighbors are concerned, the Israelis have already
enough means of warfare or means of defense.

When I took the details of that testimony,
I found out that it wasn't quite a correct analysis.
When it came to the Israeli side, he brought into account
also the weapons we ordered and which will supply us through
the pipeline for the next few years -- while he ignored
the pipelines of the other countries.

Secondly, he excluded a few of our neighboring
countries by explaining they were not important.

But, basically, I think, his conclusions
were wrong in one particular aspect -- which I would
like to stress here and now: When the Israelis speak
about a "balance of strength," we never even pretend
to have a numerical balance. We take it as an axiom
that if numerically the balance is one against two and a
half -- or one against three -- in favor of the other
side, this can be considered as a balance of strength.

But not only this. What is needed in our
particular situation is not only to secure Israel's
victory in case it is being attacked but, if possible,

9

to deter the other side from attacking altogether.

And, therefore, it would be wrong to judge
or to measure the balance of strength only in terms of
whether the Israelis can win or -- God forbid -- may
lose. The major problem -- and this is the statesmanship
-- is how to avert war, how to deter the other side from
taking the initiative.

Henry has done a great job in both ways --
first, to help us to help ourselves, ever since he
entered the White House, and later on in his dual capacity
-- and, secondly, how to clear the way towards a
political settlement in the area.

And this is exactly the combination which is
needed for the Middle East.

As far as we are concerned, we have to combine
both: the possibility of a war, and the perpetual
effort to achieve peace -- or, in other words, to prepare
for war as if it is inevitable but, at the same time,
to work for peace as if it is attainable.

And thanks to the fact that we have a
rationalistic society, we can combine those contradictions
-- which really do not contradict each other; they

10

complement each other.

Only a strong Israel which can defend itself --
by itself, for itself -- may convince the other side
that any other war will be futile and there is no
alternative to peace.

As a farmer I know that there is a similarity
between diplomacy and farming. First, you need a lot of
patience to plow the soil, to seed it, to cultivate it
-- in our country, to irrigate it -- and sometimes
in the future, if there are no troubles, you may
harvest it.

And when Henry undertook upon himself, on behalf
of this great country, to bring about a political
settlement in our area, he mobilized his patience, his
skill, his vision -- and, indeed, we mustn't underestimate
the importance of the three agreements which have been
signed during the last one and a half years: two
disengagement agreements, one with Egypt and one with
Syria; and one special agreement, which is being called
wrongly an "interim agreement" but it really isn't of
an interim nature, between Israel and Egypt. And all of
us hope that this is not the last achievement. This is a

11

hopeful beginning.

If these agreements were possible, why should we count out further agreements in the future? If we are strong enough, if there is the goodwill -- and wherever there is the will, there is a way. And I truly and sincerely believe that peace is badly needed by all countries in our region. We need it badly; I'm sure our neighbors need it badly.

What is necessary is a trustworthy friend of ours and of our neighbors, at one and the same time, who can help to pave the way towards an agreement. But this can be done not only by a skillful person. This skillful person should represent a strong, united power. History determined that the United States of America, thank God, is a major power in the world.

And the future of democracy of many societies, many countries, and the future of freedom and happiness of many people in the world depend on the credibility and prosperity of the United States of America.

America cannot afford isolationism. America must not isolate herself from her many friends who look upon her, in many corners of the world, in many continents --

12

practically all continents. They need America, and
America needs them. And I see no reason on earth why
the United States should isolate itself.

This is not an accidental comment. Many of us
in the world, in all continents, are watching events
in this country and cannot but hope that you will
overcome the difficulties which will enable America --
as Henry said -- to shape events in the world. This is
a tremendous historical responsibility, and I'm pretty
sure that America will live up to its historic duty.

I don't want to elaborate now on the forthcoming
debate of the Security Council. I listened with great
interest to what Henry had to say about it, and I couldn't
agree more. We have to do our best that the forthcoming
meeting of the Security Council will reopen the way
for further progress in our area. And I am pretty sure
that once the political momentum is being regained,
further achievements will be gained by all parties
concerned for the benefit of all of us.

And I do wish this country and the rest of the
world that Henry will be able to come back this great
effort -- one of the greatest efforts towards

13

peace in our area, as well as in other areas of the
world. Even for this alone we deserve to have another
toast.

For your health, Henry, for peace in the
Middle East, and in the world at large -- lechayim.

VOICES: Lechayim. (Standing toast
and applause.)

---

The U. S. holds the view that the essence of the US-Soviet relationship, if it is to proceed towards a genuine easing of tensions, is that neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate tense situations into confrontations between our two countries.

It is the U. S. view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract "good will"; they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and, indeed, open conflict.

It is precisely this pattern that must be broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved.

-2-

Whatever justification, in real or alleged requests for assistance, the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening, and actively supporting the wholly unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet, or Russian, interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move into Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated. The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in US-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet interest.

The question arises of whether, in light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is advisable to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made: *in this context*

First, we have never considered the limitation of Strategic Arms as a unilateral favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations.

It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. *This rare constrains* But if this occurs, it will have a profound *MAY* consequences for the well being of all of humanity. *The limitation of strategic arms is, therefore, a permanent and global problem, that should not be subordinate to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations. At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate and therefore the SALT negotiations will also be affected.*

h- But we have never taken

First, we have never considered the limitations of strategic arms as a unilateral favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations.

-- SALT is clearly in our mutual interest. From the beginning of the process we have considered the long term stabilization of the nuclear balance as a central element in, and prerequisite for, an easing of tensions with the Soviet Union.

-- It has been our hope that SALT, plus other agreements such as the Berlin accords, would become the foundation for progressing toward a more normal relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- But we have never taken the position that if this progress does not occur at some constant rate, we would then abandon the effort to achieve a greater mutual confidence in the long term nuclear relationship.

Second, we must consider the long term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations:

-- We should have no illusion that if the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints: they can add heavy

The Secretary
of State

Press Conference

January 14, 1976

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

MAJOR TOPICS: Angola, SALT Negotiations, Trip to U.S.S.R.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have two statements, a brief one and a somewhat lengthier one.

I was grieved to learn this morning of the death of Prime Minister [Tun Abdul] Razak of Malaysia. He was a good friend of the United States, a most effective leader of his country, and the voice of peace and moderation in Southeast Asia. We are extending our condolences to his widow and to the Government of Malaysia.

The second statement deals with the United States attitude toward Soviet actions in Angola and toward the SALT negotiations.

The United States holds the view that the essence of the United States-Soviet relationship, if it is to proceed toward a genuine easing of tensions, is that neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate tense situations into confrontation between our two countries.

It is the United States view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will; they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage,

only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and indeed in open conflict.

Whatever justification in real or alleged requests for assistance the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening and in actively supporting the totally unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet or Russian interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move in Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated.

The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the world interest.

The question arises whether, in the light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is consistent with our policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made in this context.

First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the

PR 13/82

2

ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is, therefore, a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate and, therefore, the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBMs. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical gap frozen in SALT I, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.

Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola, or 'similar situations, will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side.

Now I will go to your questions.

**THE PRESS:** Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

A: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way

of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point?

A: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok, because the technology was not yet developed at that time. Primarily the issues concern how to deal with the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and how to deal with the American cruise missiles; whether and how to count them; whether and what restraints to accept. These are fundamentally the outstanding issues. Most other issues have either been settled in principle or in detail.

Q: Excuse me, if I may follow up. But that was the case several months ago and you didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going. Does this mean that at least these two outstanding issues are pretty much settled?

A: There has been no discussion with the Soviets except that the Soviets have assured us that they are prepared to modify their last position and, on that basis, we hope to be able to work out some solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that you are making Soviet restraint in Angola a quid pro quo for any successful conclusion to the SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?

A: I am saying two things: I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also, over time, affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that is in our interest and it is in the world interest and it is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the negotiations in the present framework.

Q: To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successful SALT II negotiation later on?

A: We would have to face this in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message—you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss

(LC)

(10)

3

this with the Soviets when you go Moscow?

A: It is a close race between the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic position. And messages that are not backed up at home lose a fair amount of their credibility.

We are prepared to discuss Angola, and we have had some exchanges with the Soviet Union on Angola in recent weeks which we will have to clarify.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow—can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

A: There is the possibility of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet position, and on the other hand we assume that the Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev [General Secretary, Communist Party], unless a major effort would be made to come to an agreement.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at—are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

A: No, there cannot be a final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the Vladivostok agreement, but covering the outstanding issues such as BACKFIRE and cruise missiles, and to relate them to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions. And that, under the best of circumstances, would take another 2 to 3 months.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in Angola. On the other hand, you are going to Moscow in a few days presumably to conclude an agreement in principle. How can you do that without knowing what the Soviet reaction in Angola is?

A: I have made clear in my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the strategic field between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It is a generic problem of world order that must be settled at some point and for which conditions are propitious now because of a long record of negotia-

tion, and because technology is at a point where it is possible to accept certain restraints now which might then have to wait for another cycle of technology before they can be made effective.

The point I am making is that if there is a general deterioration in our relationship, it could affect SALT. In any event, whatever is agreed in Moscow will take several months to negotiate in greater detail.

Q: If I could just follow up for a second, please. In other words, you are not saying, then, that if there is not some Soviet pull-back in Angola before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

A: That is correct.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that messages not backed up at home lose certain credibility, I think. We are now entering a presidential election year. Isn't it likely that those messages will continue not to be backed up; and what impact will that have on foreign policy in general?

A: I have always believed very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States must reflect the permanent values and interests of the United States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan support.

It would, therefore, be a tragedy if during this election year we did not find some means to put some restraint on our domestic debates in the field of foreign policy and to find some means of common action.

As soon as the Congress returns, I will talk to several of the leaders to see what cooperation is possible to put at least some restraint on partisan controversy, because the penalties we will pay for lack of unity will have to be paid for for many years.

But it is a problem. I agree with you.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? Are you asking them to totally cease arms shipments to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]? Are you asking them to get the Cubans out of there? Or would you be satisfied with something less than that—that they, for example, moderate the amount of arms that they are sending and take some of the Cubans out?

A: First of all, let us get some idea of the

4

dimensions of what the Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to $200 million worth of military equipment to Angola in the last 9 months, which equals the total amount of all military equipment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by all other countries. So that is not a minor infusion of military force. In addition to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban military forces are in Cuba—are in Angola—in fact, they seem to be everywhere except in Cuba. The fighting in the northern front in Angola is conducted almost entirely by Cuban forces and without even a pretense of any significant MPLA participation. Now, that is a significant international event for which there are no clever explanations and from which other countries must draw certain conclusions.

As far as the United States is concerned, our position is that there should be a cease-fire; that all foreign forces should be withdrawn. We are even prepared to discuss a phasing by which South African forces are withdrawn first, if there is a stated, brief interval after which all other forces are withdrawn; that there should be negotiations between the main factions; that all outside powers, including, of course, the United States, cease their military intervention. And we are prepared to agree to the end of all military shipments.

If the issue comes down to nominal shipments for a normal government by African standards, this is something about which we are prepared to negotiate.

We want to get the great powers out of Angola. We want to return it as an African problem. And we are prepared to accept any solution that emerges out of African efforts.

Our concern about Angola is the demonstration of a Soviet willingness to intervene with what, for those conditions, is a very substantial military infusion of military force-plus an expeditionary force-while the United States paralyzes itself by declaring a fraction of this as a massive involvement of the United States, when we have declared that there is no possibility of any American military forces or advisers going there. And that is an event of considerable international significance- both the Soviet action and the American reaction.

Q: *Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you spoke of the need to break the pattern of action and reaction that could build toward crisis. Isn't that what the Senate was trying to do, to break that pattern?*

A: Well, you can always break the pattern of action and reaction by yielding. Our idea is to maintain the international equilibrium-not to give temptation for aggressive and irresponsible action-and at the same time to establish principles of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always possible to solve these problems in the short term by declaring that they do not exist.

Q: *Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a previous press conference that the United States would not table another SALT proposal unless the Russians tabled another one first? And secondly, have all the members of the NSC [National Security Council] and the Verification Panel signed off on this new proposal that we plan to offer in Moscow?*

A: With respect to the first question, I said that the United States cannot table a new proposal simply because the Soviets had rejected the old one. We have been given a clear promise that there would be a significant modification in the Soviet position. Under these conditions, we are prepared to put forward a modification of our position, because we would prefer to negotiate from our position rather than from some other.

We have made clear-and I can repeat it here-that if the Soviets do not modify their last position, there can be no agreement. And the position which we will forward to them will be substantially different from the last Soviet position. So it will require-

Q: *Substantially different from their last position?*

A: It will also be somewhat different from our position. It is an honest attempt to find a solution that takes into account the real concerns of all sides.

With respect to our internal discussions, I will not have a clear picture until I have read all the newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks, which are invariably more dramatic than the discussions which in fact take place. But my impression is that there is unanimity on the course that we are pursuing. We have had very good meetings. We have had two Verification Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be another NSC meeting before I go just to review

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5

the bidding. And I would say that the Government
is operating, until the Sunday editions, with
complete unanimity.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing on to this proposal?

A: The Joint Chiefs of Staff are signing on to this proposal, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you recommend conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

A: I am going to Moscow in order to see
whether the deadlock in these negotiations can be
broken. We should not play with the strategic arms
limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of
profound concern for the long-term future. It is in
an area in which no significant advantages can be
achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consequences that could
be very serious. And therefore we will not use it
lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas. On
the other hand, obviously if the general relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of
time even affect the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks. But I think we should make every effort to
avoid that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you and your people have been talking to the Soviet Union about what they are doing in Angola. How would you describe, or what are your impressions of, the Soviet attitude toward a lessening or a decrease of their role there that would be satisfactory to us?

A: We are exploring with the Soviet Union now what steps can be taken in the wake of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] meeting, and we have had some exploratory talks, some of which would offer the possibility of progress. But we would have to be sure that we understand the meaning that the Soviets attach to some of their ideas.

Q: One follow-up. If the Soviet Union wants the Cuban expeditionary force out, would that bring about its departure?

A: That's their problem.

Q: But you must have an opinion.

A: I think major powers have a responsibility
to think about the consequences they will face
when they engage their troops or troops of their
friends. It is a lesson we have had to learn; it may
be a lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

Q: Mr. Secretary, two additional points on Angola. There have been totally contradictory reports from the United States and from the Soviet Union about the presence of Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say they are there. The Soviet Union says this is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU
meeting-what is the U.S. perception of whether
that has enhanced or retarded the prospect of a
diplomatic movement from here on?

A: There is no question that there are some
Soviet vessels off Angola—or at least they were
yesterday. I haven't seen today's report. There was
a cruiser heading south, which is now in port in
Guinea. So we don't know whether it will continue
to head south or whether it will move to another
destination. That would be the largest Soviet vessel
that has been off southern Africa in many years.
But we are not sure yet whether it will continue to
move south. When the original announcements
were made, it was heading south. It has since put in
at the port in Guinea.

What was your other question?

Q: The Soviet Union has denied that it has
any ships there. Where do you go from that kind of
a stand-off?

A: Well, if there are no ships there, and if we
should wake up one morning and find there are no
ships there, we will agree with them. And that will
end the debate. We are not going to pursue—it's a
good way to make the ships disappear.

Q: The second point was your perception of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has that advanced or retarded the diplomatic prospects?

A: I think, considering events in this country
in recent weeks and the difficulty we have had to
give a clear indication of what the United States
could do, considering the massive Cuban and
Soviet lobbying effort that went on at the OAU
meeting, it is remarkable that half of the members
of the OAU substantially agreed with our perception of the problem, which is to say, not to
recognize any of the factions and to bring about an
end of foreign intervention.

We think, moreover, that a vast majority of
the OAU members favor an end of foreign intervention, if one can separate that problem from
some of the local issues.

So we think that there is a considerable
African support for the main lines of our policy

6

which is, after all, to leave African problems to the
African nations and to insulate Africa from great
power confrontation.

We do not want anything for the United
States. We are not opposed to the MPLA as an
African movement. We are opposed to the massive
foreign intervention by which a victory of the
MPLA is attempted to be achieved.

So I believe that this position, which in its
totality is supported by, after all, half of the
African states in the face of much discouraging
news from here, is in its major elements supported
by more than half of the African states. And we
hope that a diplomatic solution can be built on
that.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, given the Congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counterproductive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?*

A: I have been briefing Congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process, but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since, in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries of who speaks for the United States. Somebody has to speak for the United States, and there can be no foreign policy without authority.

So if an agreement were repudiated, it would
accelerate this very dangerous tendency, but we do
not have an agreement yet.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai affect relations between the United States and China and between China and the Soviet Union, and how do you view the return of the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the Soviet Union?*

A: The relationship between the United
States and the People's Republic of China is based
on the permanent interests of both countries; and
even though my admiration for Prime Minister
Chou En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it
was his personality, alone or principally, that was

the basis of that relationship. So I would think that
the main lines of our relationship to the People's
Republic of China can continue along well-estab-
lished lines. And, certainly, as far as the United
States is concerned, as I said in my speech to the
General Assembly [September 22, 1975], there is
no relationship to which we attach greater impor-
tance than the relationship with the People's
Republic of China.

On the other hand, we should have no illus-
sions on what that relationship is based. There is
no question that the interest the People's Republic
of China has in a relationship with the United
States depends on its assessment of the relevance
of the United States to problems of concern to the
People's Republic of China. And to the degree that
the United States seems less able to play a major
international role, for whatever reason, to that
extent, the leaders in Peking, who are extremely
sophisticated, will draw conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of personali-
ties, that will affect the final judgments that will be
made.

*Q: Mr. Secretary, on that last point then, how
can there be no movement on Taiwan, as there has
been none over the last couple of years—how is
that relationship then relevant for China?*

A: Well, first of all, I am not saying there has
been no movement over recent years.

Secondly, one would have to say that there
are other issues that are considered more important
by the People's Republic of China, in the present
phase of its relationship with the United States,
than Taiwan.

*Q: Can you give us some examples?*

A: Well, the overall performance of the
United States with respect to the world equilib-
rium.

*Q: Do you see any chance that in the U.N.
Security Council debate that is now going on on the
Middle East—that anything constructive could
come out, either for Israel or for the United States;
and would you say that the polarization that seems
to be occurring as a result of that debate between
Israel and the Palestinians—the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization]—has hastened the need
for a reconvening of the Geneva conference?*

A: Well, the United States supports the recon-
vening of the Geneva conference, or of a prepara-

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7

tory conference to discuss the reconvening of the
Geneva conference.

I do not want to prejudge the outcome of a
debate which is still going on, but, from what we
have seen, the resolutions that are at this moment
being talked about seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States strongly
supports progress toward peace in the Middle East
and will make efforts, when this debate is con-
cluded, to begin the negotiating process in what-
ever forum can be arranged.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possi-
bilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention
in Lebanon?

A: Well, we have stated repeatedly that we
support the independence and sovereignty of Leba-
non and the right of the communities within Leba-
non to lead their own lives. We would believe that
any outside military intervention, from whatever
quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace
and stability in the Middle East; and we have left
the parties concerned in no doubt that the United
States would oppose any military intervention
from whatever quarter.

Q: Mr. Secretary, earlier you said that the
United States would favor a South African with-
drawal even in advance of withdrawal by the other
foreign forces. Can we infer from this that there's
been some sort of work on a timetable or some
coordination with South Africa about its presence
there?

A: No. The United States favors the with-
d withdrawal unconditionally of all foreign forces—South
African, Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other foreign
forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation
might even—could even support a phased with-
drawal, as long as the interval were sufficiently
short and it is not just an excuse to permit the
Cubans to take over all of Angola, which is what

the military fighting is now coming down to in
Angola. But this refers to diplomatic possibilities;
it does not refer to any understanding between us
and South Africa.

Q: Mr. Secretary, this being the first news
conference for 1976, I wonder if I could walk you
out on the limb a bit. What do you think will
happen insofar as a Syrian disengagement? Do you
think, in fact, there will be a SALT agreement in
'76? And how do you think the Angola crisis will
eventually end? [Laughter.]

A: This is an absolutely no-win question.

I think we have the possibility of a SALT
agreement that is in the national interest and that,
with a rational debate in which the alternatives are
clearly put, can be sold to the American public and
to the American Congress. At any rate, as far as the
United States is concerned, we will be working in
that direction. I cannot speak until I have seen the
Soviet position; I cannot make a flat prediction.

With respect to Angola, I think the major
powers have a responsibility to show great re-
straint, and I think the African countries have a
great opportunity to keep great power rivalries out
of their continent and have an opportunity also
not to permit outside expeditionary forces to be-
come the dominant event. A greater degree of
unity in this country would help us achieve this
objective. And under present conditions we have
severe difficulties due to our domestic situation.

With respect to a disengagement agreement
between Syria and Israel, we of course support
negotiations between Syria and Israel on this sub-
ject. Syria has declared so repeatedly that it would
not negotiate alone, and only in an Arab context,
that I would think that a separate agreement be-
tween Syria and Israel, without involving some
other parties, is now less likely than would have
seemed the case a few months ago.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 14, 1976

No. 13

#82

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JANUARY 14, 1976

I was grieved to learn this morning of the
death of Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia. He was a good
friend of the United States, a most effective leader of
his country, and the voice of peace and moderation in
Southeast Asia.

The United States holds the view that the essence
of the United States-Soviet relationship, if it is to
proceed towards a genuine easing of tensions, is that

For further information contact:

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It is the United States view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will. They are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era.

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First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity.

Limitation of strategic arms is therefore a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations.

At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT negotiations will also be affected.

Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBMs without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBMs. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical

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Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola, or similar situations, will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world, and cannot be easily abandoned.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok, because the technology was not yet developed at that time. Primarily the issues concern how to deal with the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and how to deal with the American cruise missiles; whether and how to count them; whether and what restraints to accept. These are fundamentally the outstanding issues. Most other issues have either been settled in principle or in detail.

QUESTION: Excuse me, if I may follow up. But that was the case several months ago and you didn't go to Moscow. Now you are going. Does this mean that at least these two outstanding issues are pretty much settled?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been no discussion with the Soviets except that the Soviets have

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assured us that they are prepared to modify their last
position, and on, that basis, we hope to be able to work
out some solution.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that you are making Soviet restraint in Angola a *quid pro quo* for any successful conclusion to the SALT treaty, or are you not saying that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying two things:
I am saying that Soviet actions in Angola, if continued, are bound to affect the general relationship with the United States; that a substantial deterioration of that relationship can also over time affect the strategic arms talks.

At this point, however, I would also maintain
that the limitation of strategic arms is not a concession
we make to the Soviet Union, but it is an objective that
is in our interest, and it is in the world interest, and it
is in the interest of world peace. So we will pursue the
negotiations in the present framework.

QUESTION: To follow up, if there is no change in the Soviet position on Angola, would you then expect that there could be a successful SALT II negotiation later on?

PR #13

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would have to face this
in the light of the circumstances that may exist later.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have been sending this message, you and the President have been sending this message to Moscow now for several weeks. Have you had any indication whatsoever that the Soviets might be interested in a diplomatic solution to Angola, and secondly, are you willing to discuss this with the Soviets when you go to Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is a close race between
the messages we send and the deterioration of our domestic
position. And messages that are not backed up at home
lose a fair amount of their credibility.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is the fact that you are going to Moscow -- can that be taken as a sure thing that you will reach an agreement, or is there still the possibility of failure?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is the possibility
of failure. We do not know the details of the Soviet

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position, and on the other hand we assume that the
Soviet Union would not invite the Secretary of State
to negotiate with Mr. Brezhnev, unless a major effort would
be made to come to an agreement.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it your expectation that if things go as you anticipate that you will be able to conclude an agreement in Moscow? Will you set out for us what you are aiming at -- are you aiming at an agreement in principle?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, there cannot be a
final agreement in Moscow. The most that is achievable in
Moscow is an agreement in principle similar to the
Vladivostok agreement, but covering the outstanding issues
such as BACKFIRE and cruise missiles, and to relate them
to Vladivostok. And then there will have to be technical
discussions at Geneva to work out the detailed provisions.
And that, under the best of circumstances, would take an-
other two to three months.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am curious as to
how you are going to conduct these parallel negotiations
with the Soviets. On the one hand, you are indicating that
the success of SALT may hinge on Soviet activities in

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made clear in
my statement that the regulation of nuclear arms in the
strategic field between the United States and the Soviet
Union is not a benefit we confer on the Soviet Union. It
is a generic problem of world order that must be settled
at some point and for which conditions are propitious now
because of a long record of negotiation, and because
technology is at a point where it is possible to accept
certain restraints now which might then have to wait for
another cycle of technology before they can be made
effective.

QUESTION: If I could just follow up for a
second, please -- in other words, you are not saying, then,
that if there is not some Soviet pull-back in Angola
before the termination of your trip to Moscow, that that is
going to have an adverse effect on SALT.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said that messages

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12

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have always believed
very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States
must reflect the permanent values and interests of the
United States. It is not a partisan foreign policy. And
to the best of my ability, I have attempted to conduct this
office in a manner that can make it achieve bipartisan
support.

It would therefore be a tragedy if during
this election year we did not find some means to put some
restraint on our domestic debates in the field of
foreign policy and to find some means of common action.

PR #13

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what exactly is it that you are asking the Soviets to do in Angola? Are you asking them to totally cease arms shipments to the MPLA? Are you asking them to get the Cubans out of there? Or would you be satisfied with something less than that -- that they, for example, moderate the amount of arms that they are sending and take some of the Cubans out?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, let us get some idea of the dimensions of what the Soviet Union has done.

The Soviet Union has sent close to $200 million worth of military equipment to Angola in the last nine months, which equals the total amount of all military equipment sent to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa by all other countries. So that is not a minor infusion of military force. In addition to that, between 5,000 and 7,000 Cuban military forces are in Cuba -- are in Angola -- in fact, they seem to be everywhere except in Cuba.

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of a Soviet willingness to intervene with what for those conditions is a very substantial military infusion of military force -- plus an expeditionary force -- while the United States paralyzes itself by declaring a fraction of this as a massive involvement of the United States, when we have declared that there is no possibility of any American military forces or advisers going there. And that is an event of considerable international significance, both the Soviet action and the American reaction.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, you spoke of the need to break the pattern of action and reaction that could build towards crisis. Isn't that what the Senate was trying to do, to break that pattern?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you can always break the pattern of action and reaction by yielding. Our idea is to maintain the international equilibrium -- not to give temptation for aggressive and irresponsible action -- and at the same time to establish principles of mutual restraint. Certainly it is always possible to solve these problems in the short term by declaring that they do not exist.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. I am not sure I have this exactly right, but didn't you say at a

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previous press conference that the United States would not
table another SALT proposal unless the Russians tabled another
one first? And secondly, have all the members of the NSC
and the Verification Panel signed off on this new proposal
that we plan to offer in Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the first
question, I said that the United States cannot table a
new proposal simply because the Soviets had rejected the
old one. We have been given a clear promise that there
would be a significant modification in the Soviet position.
Under these conditions, we are prepared to put forward a
modification of our position, because we would prefer to
negotiate from our position rather than from some other.

We have made clear -- and I can repeat it here --
that if the Soviets do not modify their last position,
there can be no agreement. And the position which we
will forward to them will be substantially different from
the last Soviet position. So it will require --

QUESTION: Substantially different from
their last position?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It will also be somewhat
different from our position. It is an honest attempt to

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17

With respect to our internal discussions, I
will not have a clear picture until I have read all the
newspaper articles that will emerge over the next few weeks,
which are invariably more dramatic than the discussions
which in fact take place. But my impression is that
there is unanimity on the course that we are pursuing.
We have had very good meetings. We have had two Verification
Panel meetings, two NSC meetings. There will probably be
another NSC meeting before I go just to review the bidding.
And I would say that the government is operating, until the
Sunday editions, with complete unanimity.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
don't provide much drama for you, but are they signing
on to this proposal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Joint Chiefs of Staff
are signing on to this proposal, yes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you recommend
conclusion of a new SALT agreement with the Soviets if
Soviet and Cuban forces are still in Angola?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am going to Moscow in
order to see whether the deadlock in these negotiations can

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18

be broken. We should not play with the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations. It is a matter that is of profound concern for the long-term future. It is in an area in which no significant advantages can be achieved by either side but in which the momentum of events can lead to consequences that could be very serious. And therefore we will not use it lightly for bargaining purposes in other areas. On the other hand, obviously if the general relationship deteriorates, then it could over a period of time even affect the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But I think we should make every effort to avoid that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you and your people have been talking to the Soviet Union about what they are doing in Angola. How would you describe, or what are your impressions of, the Soviet attitude towards a lessening or a decrease of their role there that would be satisfactory to us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are exploring with the Soviet Union now what steps can be taken in the wake of the OAU meeting, and we have had some exploratory talks, some of which would offer the possibility of progress. But we would have to be sure that we understand the meaning that the Soviets attach to some of their ideas.

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QUESTION: One follow-up. If the Soviet Union wants the Cuban expeditionary force out, would that bring about its departure?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's their problem.

QUESTION: But you must have an opinion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think major powers have a responsibility to think about the consequences they will face when they engage their troops or troops of their friends. It is a lesson we have had to learn; it may be a lesson that the Soviet Union should learn.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two additional points on Angola. There have been totally contradictory reports from the United States and from the Soviet Union about the presence of Soviet vessels off Angola. U.S. officials say they are there. The Soviet Union says this is a total fabrication.

Secondly, the outcome of the OAU meeting -- what is the U.S. perception of whether that has enhanced or retarded the prospect of a diplomatic movement from here on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no question that there are some Soviet vessels off Angola -- or at least they were yesterday. I haven't seen today's report.

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There was a cruiser heading south, which is now in port in Guinea. So we don't know whether it will continue to head south, or whether it will move to another destination.

That would be the largest Soviet vessel that has been off Southern Africa in many years. But we are not sure yet whether it will continue to move south.

What was your other question?

QUESTION: The Soviet Union has denied that it has
any ships there. Where do you go from that kind of a
stand-off?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if there are no ships
there, and if we should wake up one morning and find there
are no ships there, we will agree with them. And that will
end the debate. We are not going to pursue -- it's a
good way to make the ships disappear.

QUESTION: The second point was your perception of the outcome of the OAU meeting. Has that advanced or retarded the diplomatic prospects?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, considering
events in this country in recent weeks and the difficulty

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So we think that there is a considerable African
support for the main lines of our policy, which is, after
all, to leave African problems to the African nations, and to
insulate Africa from great power confrontation.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East -- could you take a question on the Middle East now?

QUESTION: Well, more like Angola.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. Let me get somebody there. Henry?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, given the Congressional attitudes on foreign affairs in general, do you intend to talk to any leaders of Congress before you go to Moscow to negotiate further, and is there any danger that a repudiation by Congress of a SALT agreement might be counter-productive to the very objectives you're seeking for the long term?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have been briefing Congressional leaders on SALT negotiations consistently. There has been no significant new development in the negotiating process, but I will no doubt be in touch with some of the senior members of the Senate.

As far as repudiation of an agreement is concerned, it would of course be a very serious matter since in any event, one of the biggest foreign policy problems we now face is the question from other countries, of who speaks

PR #13

23

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your assessment, how will the death of Prime Minister Chou En-lai affect relations between the United States and China and between China and the Soviet Union, and how do you view the return of the helicopter pilots by the Chinese to the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is based on the permanent interests of both countries; and even though my admiration for Prime Minister Chou En-lai is well known, I do not believe that it was his personality, alone or principally, that was the basis of that relationship. So I would think that the main lines of our relationship to the People's Republic of China can continue along well-established lines. And, certainly, as far as the United

PR #13

24

States is concerned, as I said in my speech to the
General Assembly, there is no relationship to which we
attach greater importance than the relationship with
the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we should have no illusions
on what that relationship is based. There is no question
that the interest the People's Republic of China has
in a relationship with the United States depends on its
assessment of the relevance of the United States to
problems of concern to the People's Republic of China.
And to the degree that the United States seems less able
to play a major international role, for whatever
reason, to that extent, the leaders in Peking, who are
extremely sophisticated, will draw conclusions from it.

And it is this, and not the issue of personalities,
that will affect the final judgments that will be made.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on that last point
then, how can there be no movement on Taiwan, as there
has been none over the last couple of years -- how is that
relationship then relevant for China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I am not
saying there has been no movement over recent years.

PR #13

25

QUESTION: Can you give us some examples?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the overall performance of the United States with respect to the world equilibrium.

QUESTION: Do you see any chance that in the
UN Security Council debate that is now going on in the
Middle East that anything constructive could come out,
either for Israel or for the United States; and would
you say that the polarization that seems to be occurring
as a result of that debate between Israel and the
Palestinians, the PLO, has hastened the need for
a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the United States
supports the reconvening of the Geneva Conference, or of
a preparatory conference to discuss the reconvening of the
Geneva Conference.

PR #13
26

(c)

seem not too promising.

On the other hand, the United States strongly supports progress towards peace in the Middle East and will make efforts, when this debate is concluded, to begin the negotiating process in whatever forum can be arranged.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how do you see the possibilities now of either Syrian or Israeli intervention in Lebanon?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have stated repeatedly that we support the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and the right of the communities within Lebanon to lead their own lives. We would believe that any outside military intervention, from whatever quarter, would involve the gravest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East; and we have left the parties concerned in no doubt that the United States would oppose any military intervention from whatever quarter.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, earlier you said that the United States would favor a South African withdrawal even in advance of withdrawal by the other foreign forces. Can we infer from this that there's been some sort of work on

PR #13

27

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The United States
favors the withdrawal unconditionally of all foreign
forces -- South African, Cuban, Soviet, and whatever other
foreign forces could be there.

The United States in a general negotiation might
even -- could even support a phased withdrawal, as long
as the interval were sufficiently short and it is not just
an excuse to permit the Cubans to take over all of
Angola, which is what the military fighting is now
coming down to in Angola. But this refers to diplomatic
possibilities; it does not refer to any understanding
between us and South Africa.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, this being the
first news conference for 1975, I wonder if I could walk
you out on the limb a bit. What do you think will happen
in --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is '76.

QUESTION: '76. What do you think will happen
in '76 insofar as a Syrian disengagement? Do you think in fact

PR #13

28

there will be a SALT agreement in '76? And how do
you think the Angola crisis will eventually end?
(Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is an absolutely no-win
question.

With respect to Angola, I think the major powers
have a responsibility to show great restraint, and I think
the African countries have a great opportunity to keep
great power rivalries out of their continent and have
an opportunity also not to permit outside expeditionary
forces to become the dominant event. A greater degree of
unity in this country would help us achieve this
objective. And under present conditions we have severe

PR #13

29

With respect to a disengagement agreement
between Syria and Israel, we of course support negotiations
between Syria and Israel on this subject. Syria has
declared so repeatedly that it would not negotiate
alone, and only in an Arab context, that I would think
that a separate agreement between Syria and Israel,
without involving some other parties, is now less
likely than would have seemed the case a few months
ago.

Do you still say "Thank you" ?

QUESTION: I do again. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon at 12:43 p.m., the Secretary's
Press Conference was concluded.)

---

RECEPTION FOR DONORS AND LENDERS TO
THE DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION ROOMS -
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 16, 1976

We are delighted and proud to have these
fine portraits of John Quincy Adams and
Louisa Catherine Adams.

Clem Conger has assured me that he is
arranging to have my portrait painted and that,
unlike Secretary of State Adams, I won't have
to wait two centuries to have it hang in the
Department of State.

In fact, there are a number of people around
here who would like to hang me even sooner.

However, since the only time I sit still is
during plane rides to and from the Middle East,
if Clem wants my portrait he's going to have
to teach Joe Sisco to paint.

-2-

It is a pleasure to welcome you here this evening and to share with you the great pride we have in these rooms -- which, through your generosity, make it possible to show the best of America to the leaders of the world.

These surroundings remind us that a dedication to the greatness of the human spirit has been at the heart of our country since the earliest days of the Republic.

The physical world we live in -- and today's world of ideas -- are vastly altered from those which the founding fathers knew. But the principles upon which they created our nation remain valid, and a beacon to all peoples. Indeed, they are often more cherished in lands where they are absent than here at home where we sometimes take them for granted.

-3-

The founding fathers held the conviction that mankind was one -- that every individual held a claim to rights of liberty, security, and opportunity. And, in the same sense, that each was accountable for his decisions and his deeds.

Whenever any of us who serve in government get weary and think we've put forth enough effort, it is instructive to recall John Quincy Adams, who served his country as Ambassador, as U. S. Senator, through eight laborious and highly effective years as Secretary of State, as President of the United States -- and then for 17 years as a Congressman.

I might add that he was also a Harvard professor. But I disclaim any intention of otherwise emulating his career.

-4-

The generations of the Adams family run like an enriching river through the landscape of American history. And Louisa Adams deserves her share of praise for this as well. When John Adams said that he must study politics and war in order that his grandchildren might study poetry, music and art, it may well have been an influence like Louisa's he was counting on to make that prediction come true. As a poet, translator, and writer whose journal-letters add much to our knowledge of her era, she added a love of literature to the family's preoccupation with public affairs.

Indeed, Louisa's career may have been far more trying than that of her husband -- as I am sure any woman here tonight would agree if they reflect for a moment on what it must

(10)

-5-

have been like to have Abigail Adams for a mother-in-law.

America's foreign policy remains dedicated to these principles.

Our country today faces three central challenges. First, we must meet the most urgent need of the present -- to move the nations of the world toward peace by helping to resolve dangerous conflicts such as the Middle East, and by continuing to build more stable relations with our potential adversaries to reduce the threat of global nuclear war.

Second, we must build for the future by helping to shape a new era of international cooperation capable of effectively addressing the vast new range of economic, political, social, and environmental problems that

(lc)

-6-

increasingly affect every nation in the world.

But our efforts now and in the future in
these areas ultimately rest upon another
dimension - the heritage of our values. We
must understand, cherish and consolidate the
achievements of our past -- of those who have
worked to make America great for these two
hundred years.

John Quincy Adams understood that America
would succeed only if each generation regarded
themselves as trustees for the past as well
as for the future. He called upon his fellow
citizens to "think of your forebears; think of
your descendants!"

These rooms are the tangible response
which you here tonight have made to that appeal.
Winston Churchill said that "we shape our

[c]

-7-

buildings, and then they shape us." I fervently hope that the shape of American foreign policy is in no way determined by the external architecture of this building. But here in these rooms we have fashioned, not a museum, but a vibrant influence on our people and an impressive display to others of what we stand for. The grace, the pride, the creativity, the dedication to the grandest values of civilization are here around us.

And it is to you here tonight -- who understand the great qualities of our country and are committed to make our heritage live that we thank for this.

[LC]

PRESENTATION OF FRANKLIN PORTRAIT
RECEPTION FOR THE FRANKLIN MINT CORP.

January 17, 1976

Mr. Andes, Mrs. Andes, distinguished
Members of Congress, friends of the Franklin
Mint, honored guests:

When I learned that we had acquired this
portrait, I recalled that it was Franklin who
said that "three men can keep a secret if two
of them are dead."

So I thought that Benjamin Franklin might render
yet one more service to American diplomacy if
we were to inscribe those words on this frame
and put this portrait out on loan to the
Church Committee.

I have always felt a great affinity for Franklin,
as we value the same things in life: national
unity, subtle diplomacy, and pretty women.
Not necessarily in that order.

-2-

I forgot one more quality we share --
humility. Franklin, as you may recall, drew
up a list of 12 virtues to guide his conduct.
A Quaker friend read it and pointed out that
Franklin had neglected to guard against his
well-known tendency toward pride. So
Franklin wrote down "humility" as number 13 --
and then added "imitate Jesus and Socrates."
He obviously felt he needed to remind himself
not to outshine either of them.

When I became Secretary of State, I called
upon my colleagues in the Department to
demonstrate excellence in all aspects of our
work. I must confess that I didn't anticipate
that Clem Conger would take this as an order
to begin pulling off major coups in the art

-3-

world. But I am nonetheless delighted to see
that envious comments by the National Portrait
Gallery about Clem's acquisition of this painting
have already been recorded in the "Style"
section of the Washington Post.

This magnificent portrait is not only an
historic artifact of great significance, it is an
important work of art as well. The Department
of State is deeply grateful to the Franklin
Mint for this gift.

It is most appropriate that Franklin, our
nation's first great diplomat, should be
represented by this work here in these rooms
which, unlike a museum, provide an impressive
setting for the conduct of some of America's
most important diplomatic business.

-4-

The objects in these rooms are thus not only accessible to the American people, but serve as a reminder to other nations of the greatness of our past and of our continuing commitment to the ideals of the founding fathers.

As a statesman, philosopher, scientist, writer, inventor, printer, and tireless public servant, Franklin is one of history's great figures. But he was also, as the British historian Trevelyan said, "the most typical American that ever lived."

He was the first to envision the United States as an industrial, densely populated union of peoples from every corner of the globe spread from coast to coast. He was the first to foresee our future as a great world power.

-5-

Yet he embodied another aspect of America
as well. When Franklin arrived in France --
where he would win the cause of American
Independence at the French court -- it was said
of him, at about the time this portrait was
painted, that "there was scarcely a peasant,
or a footman, or any citizen who did not consider
him a friend of human kind."

No example from our history is more
important to us today.

Thank you.

1/16/76

[LC]

TOUCHDOWN CLUB AWARD
Sheraton Park Hotel

January 17, 1976

Most of you don't realize that Bob Hope is with us tonight
only because I was able to restrain him from leaving the
country. He heard there were American mercenaries in
Angola and wanted to fly out to entertain them.

To let you know how important this award is to me, I
went to one of the World Series games in Boston and had a
chance to meet Carl Yastrzemski. My son was more impressed
by the fact that I had met Yastrzemski than by anything else
I've done.

Fidel Castro generously allowed Luis Tiant's parents
to come to Boston to watch him pitch in the World Series.
But in return, they had to sign up for two years in Angola.

I appreciate your giving me this award even though I no
longer wear two helmets.

-2-

Despite the name of this Club, I assume you
have no objection to other methods of scoring points
in football.

Therefore, I am very pleased to accept this
award--which I regard as a long-overdue tribute to
European-born soccer-style kickers. Eat your heart
out of Alex Karras*.

If the Redskins are interested, I remind them
that my present contract is up at the end of this year
and I'm willing to negotiate. I used to be known as
the Vince Lombardi of foreign policy. Now some
people call me the Howard Cosell of foreign policy.

*Karras, co-announcer with Howard Cosell on ABC "Monday Night Football", is constantly grumbling about foreign-born soccer players brought in to win NFL football games with last-minute field goals.

-3-

If the Rozelle rule remains in effect the Redskins
can compensate the government by giving up
George Allen. Congress needs him--since they
apparently are determined to run a nickel defense.

Sports are an important part of our international
relations, for they speak a universal language. It
is a language which some sportsmen speak louder
than others--as the Philadelphia Flyers demonstrated
earlier this week.

Actually the game advanced mutual understanding
between our two nations. The Russians now understand
what an American hockey puck tastes like. '

-4-

I want to categorically deny that I was the "high Administration official" seen leaving the Flyer's dressing room prior to the game.

Thus sports can have a real impact on our foreign policy.

To take another example, I'm sure that Muhammad Ali is going to do wonders for our relations with Belgium next month.

I'm happy to see Ali here tonight. I might disagree with him about who is the greatest, but not when we are in the same room.

Like most Americans, I'll be watching the Super Bowl.

If the Russians do anything to disturb me between 2 and 5 o'clock tomorrow afternoon that's the end of detente.

I'm glad Ted Marchibroda is being honored tonight. I know he would have liked to take the Colts to the Super Bowl. But he can be proud that he has now become Baltimore's most famous personality -- replacing Blaze Starr.

-5-

Whatever the emotions aroused by any particular competitive
event may be, it is undeniable that athletic engagements with
other peoples are an important strand in a larger network of
international cultural and educational ties. These can provide a
more conducive environment for those critical times when
nations must seek to moderate or resolve potentially dangerous
economic or political differences; they can provide a continuity
of human contact that gives us hope for a future of peaceful
involvement with others even as we may be enmeshed in the
confrontations of the moment.

-6-

Our country's participation in international athletics is, of
course, primarily conducted by the private sector rather than
the government. The Department of State's part is small, but
intended to be catalytic--to help make the most of this valuable
tool of international relations. We send teaching teams of out-
standing coaches and athletes abroad. We bring foreign admini-
strators here to exchange ideas. And we try to encourage and
facilitate US teams touring abroad.

An example of how private American groups and the
U. S. Government can work together to serve positive ends
of great significance has been our athletic exchanges with
the People's Republic of China.

-7-

The role of our table tennis players in helping to launch our
new relationship to China is well-known. Since then, private
of State
organizations and the Department/have cooperated in a series of
successful events with the Chinese--including swimming, basket-
ball, and track and field. We estimate that a quarter million
Chinese saw our track athletes in China last spring. We look
forward to continuing to develop our athletic ties with the PRC
as our overall relationship progresses.

Of course, relations with China haven't been quite the same
since the Chinese band played the Michigan State fight song
during the President's trip.

Strength and skill and experience will always be as differ-
ent as the variety of humanity. But in sport, as Winston Churchill
said, all people meet on equal terms--all are committed to a
set of rules, agreed upon and enforced. Thus sports not only
can link the peoples of the world in common experiences, they

-8-

can as well be a model for the kind of international society we
do not yet have, but must never cease to seek--an international
structure of free competition, tempered by basic principles of
fairness, giving free rein to peoples' striving for excellence
and identity.

I cannot let this occasion go by without saying that I am
especially proud that this award is given in memory of Sam Rayburn.
There has never been a leader with closer ties to the heartland
of this country. Born in a Tennessee log cabin, brought up
on a Texas farm, Sam Rayburn never crossed the Atlantic or
Pacific, nor had he any desire to do so. But he had the vision to
see that America's wellbeing depended not only upon our domestic

-9-

strength but upon an effective foreign policy which had the non-
partisan support of Congress and the confidence of the American
people. Nonpartisanship, as Dean Acheson pointed out, is
the oil of government. And from his basement office in the House,
Sam Rayburn lubricated our government and helped preserve our
foreign policy through World War II and the darkest days of the
Cold War. "No power can defeat us," he said, "except our
disunity. We must be united."

Those words, and Sam Rayburn's example, carry a deep
significance for America today. I am proud to accept this
award given in his memory.

Award to Fran Tarkenton
NFL Player of the Year
at the Touchdown Club Dinner
11:15 p. m.

January 17, 1976

It gives me great pleasure tonight to present an award to someone who has to stand up in the face of more charges than I do.

Over the course of 15 outstanding seasons Fran Tarkenton has come to hold virtually every NFL passing record. In the last game of this season he completed his 291st touchdown pass to become the all-time leader in completions for touchdowns.

And he is just as troublesome to opponents when he runs with the ball. He has rushed for over 3,600 yards, more than any quarterback in history.

-2-

This season he led the Vikings to a 12-2 record and the championship of the National Conference Central Division. He threw for 25 touchdowns and almost 3,000 yards, completing better than 64 percent of his attempts.

For this superb performance, it gives me great pleasure to present the Timmie Award as NFL Player of the Year to Fran Tarkenton.

DONOR CARD -- MVP --MOST VALUABLE PERFORMER -- OF THE CENTURY
(BOB J HOPE)

We have honored tonight some of the greatest performers in
the history of sports. There is one final award. In keeping
with the bicentennial theme of this dinner, the Touchdown
Club has named Bob Hope the Most Valuable Performer of the
Century. It is a dual honor. It honors Bob Hope the
entertainer, surely one of the all-time greatest performers
who has ever appeared before the footlights, the camera or the
microphone. And it particularly honors Bob Hope the
humanitarian, the man who for several decades has devoted his
time and his talent to helping people. Everyone knows of his
dedicated efforts to bring entertainment and a bit of home to
servicemen stationed all over the world; since 1941, when he
started that program, he has traveled more than a million miles
to cheer more than ten million troops. As a fund-raiser for
charitable causes, he is undisputed champion. One example familiar
to a sports audience is the Bob Hope Desert Classic. This pro-
amateur golf tournament, the 17th edition of which will be played
next month, has raised more than four million dollars for the
Eisenhower Medical Center and a number of other charities. I
could go on and list hundreds of other ways in which Bob Hope
has helped people. Perhaps I can sum it up by saying that Bob
averages two benefit performances every week of the year. He is
a Most Valuable Performer in every sense of the term. In behalf of
the Touchdown Club, it is my privilege and sincere pleasure to
present the Timmie Award to the MVP of the Century....Bob Hope.

*skilled people*

Toast by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
at Luncheon Hosted by Foreign Minister Gromyko

January 21, 1976

Mr. Foreign Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I have not counted it precisely, but there must now have been more
than 15 occasions, during less than 4 years, when we have visited each
other in our respective countries or met in third countries to discuss
the serious issues of our times. As in the past, my associates
and I appreciate your hospitality and the thoughtful arrange-
ments you have made for our stay here.

Our meetings, though not without their relaxing moments,
have always concentrated on the hard tasks we face together.
The discussions I am having on this occasion with your General
Secretary, you and your colleagues are no exception.

Since the beginning of our new relationship, our two
countries have recognized the enormous and fateful special
responsibility resting upon us, as the most powerful nations
of the world, to manage our affairs so that a secure peace
can be built. Three years ago, at the summit meeting of 1972,
we concluded significant first agreements to limit defensive
and offensive strategic weapons; we enunciated principles
to govern our relations so that not only we ourselves would
benefit from them but that security and peace everywhere
would be strengthened; we signed several bilateral cooperative
agreements. Since then, President Ford has carried our re--
lationship forward, building on those first accomplishments; our
frequent contacts at the highest levels are a part of that process.

Today, we are faced with the challenge of giving fresh momentum to our dialogue, on issues that are much more complex. For we have learned already that the evolution we have mapped out is not automatic; it requires persevering effort, imagination and courage, and above all, that scrupulous respect for the interests of all concerned to which we have so often referred in our joint documents and in our meetings.

Our discussions here on this occasion are focussed once again on the limitation of strategic arms. We must give substance and binding force to the accords agreed upon by the President and the General Secretary in Vladivostok 14 months ago. On the success of this effort depends the fulfillment of the commitment we have both made before the whole world that we will achieve not only the limitation but the actual reduction of the levels of strategic offensive arms. Each of us, Mr. Foreign Minister, must, if we fail, answer to his own people, to the world at large and to history the question: did this or that specific, possibly quite technical issue, justify the failure or prolonged delay of the total effort? Did we do everything in our power to spare mankind the burdens and risks of a nuclear arms race? I can assure you that this question has been asked many times in the deliberations of my Government. And in answering it to ourselves, honestly and with the full responsibility inherent in our positions, we have strengthened our resolve to seek an equitable and mutually acceptable outcome. We believe we have a right to ask a similar

- 3 -

approach from you. Our task is a common one, just as success in its accomplishment will be to our common advantage and failure will leave us both losers.

Strategic arms limitation is perhaps the most concrete task we face together, but it is far from the only one. In recent weeks we have found ourselves with differing or opposing views on important issues bearing on international peace and security. We believe that the principles of restraint, and respect for each other's interests, and the understandings concerning the avoidance of crisis situations and the acquisition of unilateral advantage, remain at the core of the search for a stable world order. These principles are part of our special responsibility. They must be applied to specific situations, wherever they arise, for they must be the norm of international conduct if peace is to be secure and lasting. We know from history that great powers will not long accept a diminution of their security or inroads into their interests and that sooner or later they will seek -- and find -- compensation in some other place or manner. But it is precisely this chain of action and reaction that has led to catastrophe in the past and which must be broken if the disasters of history are not to be repeated. We have said to each other and the world that we understand these stark realities. So, we must act in accordance with them.

If we do so, the vistas before us and mankind are
filled with the most promising prospects. The choice,
Mr. Minister, is ours. We have the capacity to translate
our words and our expressed sentiments into deeds and living,
long-term policies. That is the historic challenge before
us and that is how we see these meetings this week.

So it is in this spirit -- of accomplishment but of
greater tasks yet to be accomplished, of determination to
fulfill the obligations placed before us by history to
contribute to a just and secure peace -- that I ask you to
join me in raising your glasses. To your health, Mr. Minister
and that of your colleagues; to the wisdom and statesmanship
that we owe it to ourselves and future generations to display.

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 22, 1976

NO. 24

ANSWERS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO QUESTIONS BY THE PRESS
UPON ARRIVAL AT
SPASO HOUSE
MOSCOW

January 22, 1976

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you give us your impression of the negotiations as they now stand?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think both sides have been very serious; we have made some suggestions. The Soviets have made some counter proposals and we have responded.

**QUESTION:** Have you any feelings, Mr. Secretary, about what the outcome of these negotiations might be?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would not want to speculate. We have to wait for the Soviet response and then we have to study it carefully.

**QUESTION:** Do you feel at this particular point that these negotiations might go either way, toward success or possibly even toward failure?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as I have indicated there are many possibilities. We could make some progress -- we could stalemate. We will do what we believe is in the national interest. But I think so far the negotiations have been very serious, with both sides making responsible proposals and narrowing the gap.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you think that if the negotiations do develop problems you may revise your own schedule and remain in Moscow another day or two or will you in fact leave on Friday, that is, tomorrow?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There is a meeting of the NATO Council scheduled for tomorrow afternoon to which many foreign ministers have indicated they would come. So it would be very difficult for me to change my schedule.

**QUESTION:** Could you return to Moscow from Brussels, Sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I would have to see what develops. Next week we are expecting Prime Minister Rabin in the United States. I think that we are on a course in which we can take the progress that has been made to Washington and see where we go from there.

**QUESTION:** Well, how would you think that would be interpreted then if you did not have the full agreement and only progress?

EXCHANGE WE HAVE WITHIN THIS COUNTRY. BECAUSE WE HAVE BY
FAR THE GREATEST ECONOMY, ONLY WE CAN TAKE THE LEAD IN MOVING
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY IN THIS DIRECTION. WE MUST NOT FAIL
TO EXERCISE THAT RESPONSIBILITY.

BUT OUR LEADERSHIP ROLE MUST NOT AND DOES NOT PREVENT US
FROM USING OUR ECONOMIC POWER TO MAKE SURE THAT AMERICAN TRADERS
AND INVESTORS GET A FAIR OPPORTUNITY.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE A SPECIAL CASE. IF WE
WANT THEM TO JOIN THE OPEN ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF WHICH THE
UNITED STATES IS THE CENTER, WE HAVE TO MAKE IT MORE ACCESSIBLE
TO THEM. THIS IS THE KEY TO THE PROPOSALS I MADE AT THE
SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION: TO USE NEW TRADING, INVESTMENT AND
COMMODITY MEASURES RATHER THAN LARGE SCALE NEW AID TO
ACCELERATE THEIR DEVELOPMENT. THESE POLICIES CAN BRING
IMPORTANT BENEFITS TO US: NEW TRADING AND INVESTMENT
OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICANS AND BETTER PROTECTION AGAINST
INFLATION. TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES THE IMPACT OF THESE POLICIES