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QUOTES ON WORLD LAW

Richard M. Nixon,
Academy of Political Science

April 14, 1959

"More and more the leaders of the West have come to the
conclusion that the rule of law must somehow be established to
provide a way of settling disputes among nations as it does
among individuals...I am now convinced, and in this I reflect
the steadfast purpose of the President and the wholehearted
support of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
that the time has now come to take the initiative in the right
direction of establishment of the rule of law in the world to
replace the rule of force...We should be prepared to show the
world by our example that the rule of law, even in the most
trying circumstances, is the one system which all free men of
good will must support."

Dwight D. Eisenhower
State of the Union Message

January 1959

"It is my purpose to intensify efforts during the coming
two years...to the end that the rule of law may replace the
obsolete rule of force in the affairs of nations."

Czechoslovakia
And
The
Experts'
Myopia

by Vladimir Petrov

One of the curious things about the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia is that it caught by surprise practically all communist world-watchers. Newspaper correspondents in Prague, Moscow and other capitals, and staff experts on communist affairs in their government offices suffered acute professional embarrassment when the news about the appearance of Soviet tanks in the streets of Czechoslovak cities was announced over Radio Prague. From all evidence, Western intelligence services were also caught flat-footed. President Johnson reportedly learned about the invasion from none other than Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. Even more distressing is that, judging by their expressions of "shock and dismay" in the interviews immediately following the events of August 21, most leading American Sovietologists on university campuses were equally unprepared for this development.

The failure of the CIA to anticipate the Soviet move is perhaps understandable. Although the Warsaw Pact troops had been massing along the Czechoslovak borders for some time, this action could conceivably have been interpreted as an instrument of political pressure; the Soviet field commanders themselves probably did not receive the signal to open a certain envelope with the orders to cross the border until shortly before the zero hour. But whatever the excuses to which the searchers for "hard evidence" might be entitled, such excuses

... inability of the observers to put themselves into the shoes (in this instance) of Soviet leaders and see things their way.

do not absolve political analysts. The latter were not obligated to forecast the timing and the scope of the intervention, but they certainly could be expected to predict its probability on the basis of their knowledge of communist behavior and modes of operation, of the specific situation in Czechoslovakia, and of the Soviet reaction to the developments in Prague in the preceding months and weeks.

That they didn't poses a question of the general misperception on the part of so many Western observers of the communist world, their apparent inability to take adequate cognition of relevant facts and draw from them rational conclusions. To a large extent, the fault lies with the excitable reporters on the scene, and it was admittedly difficult even for seasoned analysts to pinpoint what truly mattered in the flood of news from Eastern Europe. But it also ought to be admitted that many scholars — and government experts — had been emotionally inclined to accept the incredibly optimistic slant of the news at face value.

Misperception in critical situations is a very serious matter. As Ralph K.

American Sovietologists on university campuses were equally unprepared...

White, of the University, points out in his recent book (Nobody Wanted War, Doubleday, 1968) "misperception might explain how normally sane human beings can unwittingly, without intending the consequences, involve themselves step by step in actions that lead to war." And he shows how self-delusions and the inability to perceive the enemy's viewpoint were a major factor in the histories of wars.

In the specific case of Czechoslovakia, the United States has not been a direct party to the conflict. While the Czechoslovaks have been regarded as "good guys" and the hardline Soviet leaders, together with their followers in Eastern Europe, as "bad guys," the emotional involvement of the American public has been relatively limited. The sad memory of Hungary in 1956, the craving for détente with Moscow, the growing isolationism in the country, and the spectaculars of the Presidential campaign all served to dilute public interest in the Czechoslovak crisis. However, precisely because of this relative detachment, our surprise at the Soviet move appears even more puzzling, carrying with it far-reaching and ominous implications. If objective political analysts cannot foresee such a cataclysm in a well-studied area, if trained and experienced news reporters cannot adequately detect major developments in the onrush of fast-breaking news, we must assume that something is inherently wrong with their overall approach to their task.

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The answer, I submit, should be looked for in one of the forms of misperception analyzed by White, namely in the lack of empathy—the apparent inability of the observers to put themselves into the shoes (in this instance) of Soviet leaders and see things their way. To be sure, Soviet reasons for intervention had been spelled out numerous times in news reports, background articles, and in elaborate and intelligent discussions of the crisis by eminent authorities—

the Soviet fear of the contagious effects of the Czechoslovak peaceful revolution, the expressions of distrust and poorly concealed hostility towards Moscow in the uncensored Czechoslovak press, the economic reforms and the penetration of Western private capital into Czechoslovakia, Prague's general rapprochement with West Germany, the growing independence of the reformist leadership and its reluctance to permit Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory, the "liberals" attacks on the "conservatives" and other pro-Soviet figures, the excitement of the youth and intelligentsia, the disclosures of the crimes of the Stalin era, and, of course, obnoxious to Moscow, the cheers from the West every time Czechoslovakia appeared to be moving further towards internal democratization and external independence.

At the same time, however, the prevailing feeling among political analysts (and, consequently, of the American public and the government) was that the Soviets had no choice but to bow to the forces of change and to adjust to the new situation, much as the U. S. does in analagous situations. To that end, the press, including the analyses of many reputable specialists, cited a multitude of reasons—

the continuing Soviet preoccupation with the hostile Chinese and the resulting dependence of Moscow on the good will of "moderate" communist parties for the showdown with Peking scheduled for the fall, the psychological impossibility of repeating Hungary in the presumably relaxed atmosphere of the

> ... remember the Suez campaign of 1956, the Bay of Pigs, or the overthrow of the Diem government in Saigon?

late 1960's, the general weakening of Moscow's grip on the communist regimes of Eastern Europe (underscored by neutralist tendencies in Yugoslavia and Rumania), the presumed need for the Soviets to keep open the channels of communication with the United States, thereby fostering dissent and disarray within the NATO alliance.

Some analysts even reasoned that the Soviets would abstain from anything drastic as their contribution to the "stop Nixon" campaign in the U. S. Considerable evidence exists that the White House itself entertained such hopes while secretly planning a Johnson-Kosygin summit meeting and praying for a breakthrough in the Paris peace talks.

Most of this speculation was very clever, very sophisticated, and to a large extent, plausible. I myself was convinced last spring that such considerations were present in the minds of the Soviet leaders. I expected them to take into account the fate of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the heavy burdens of the armaments race resulting from the increase of tension in international relations, the Soviet image abroad, and the reaction within the Soviet Union itself, particularly among the youth and the intellectuals.

At the same time I wondered about two unknowns in this complex equation. One was the never openly acknowledged, almost irrational fear of Germany—divided or reunited—rooted in the trauma of World War II. Another was an equally unspoken but doubtlessly cumulative effect of the defections in Eastern Europe from the Soviet fold. The revolts in East Germany in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956; the breakaways of Tito and Ceausescu; the angry assaults of the tiny and totally helpless Albania—all must have been deeply humiliating to the Kremlin leaders, perennially worrying over the specter of the fall-

> ... the responsibility for Western inaction must be shared by political analysts...

ing dominoes. Having reconciled themselves to being unloved by their satellites, how far, I was asking myself, were they prepared to go in a display of self-restraint in dealing with Czechoslovakia? Would they follow the example of the United States? Or would they prove to be true to their own nature?

Whatever optimism I had vanished when Pravda published (on July 18) the text of the joint Warsaw Pact nations' (Rumania and, of course, Czechoslovakia being absent) message to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The ultimatum sternly ordered Dubcek and his colleagues to put their house in order and asserted the right of the other communist states to intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. This document, of such overriding importance, should have left no doubt as to the top priority Moscow attached to the Czechoslovak crisis. From then on, it was only a question of whether the Czechoslovaks themselves could carry out the terms of the ultimatum and, perhaps, of what position the United States would take. In retrospect, it also appears clear, judging by the remarkable efficiency of the invasion, that military contingency plans of the Soviet command were also approved about that time—if not earlier.

To my knowledge very few Russia-watchers recognized the threat and sounded the alarm. (Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian was an exception.) To others, the events of August 21 fell like a bolt out of the blue. As the military occupation became an accomplished fact, expressions of "shock and dismay" were heard everywhere. Even at this late date, some analysts refuse to admit their failure, insisting quite irrelevantly that the Soviets had acted against their own best interests, that they would be forced to withdraw before too long under all kinds of pressure, that it was Moscow's leaders who misperceived and miscalculated.

Admittedly, to predict the Soviet move was no easy task. In reaching a decision involving multiple and complex considerations, the Soviet leaders themselves were probably far from unanimous, and throughout they showed signs of hesitation and uncertainty. Yet the choice had nar-

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powered down to a simple choice — intervene or not intervene, for from Moscow's point of view the situation in Czechoslovakia was rapidly nearing the point of no return, with the Prague authorities helplessly floundering and clearly incapable of stemming the tide. Our political analysts first erred in underestimating the capacity of the Soviets to act decisively, probably because this capacity is such a scarce commodity in democratic societies. Their second error was in attributing to the Soviet leadership our own scale of values, which was plainly an exercise in wishful thinking. The third was a characteristic presumption of so many experts in international affairs: that of knowing what is good and what is bad for a given foreign nation, and a corresponding (but historically insupportable) assumption that "civilized" governments normally act in their own best interests as such are defined by detached and dispassionate scholars. This is often not true even in democratic societies where big issues are freely discussed — remember the Bay of Pigs, the Suez campaign of 1956, or the overthrow of the Diem government in Saigon? It is much less true in the communist world.

Finally, there was an error — quite widespread among liberal Sovietologists — in assuming that there exists, basically, the same logic and the same way of reasoning among all modern leaders and that, perhaps with minor variations — attributable to prejudices, ideology, upbringing, or insufficient sophistication — all leaders behave more or less the same way. The impressive Soviet record indicating certain substantial differences between the communist and, say, American behavior, was consciously or subconsciously dismissed. Aren't we all changing, becoming more enlightened and subtle in exercising power and self-restraint, and in taking into account the enormous complexities of the modern world?

Of course, alarming signs during the last few years came from within the Soviet Union suggesting a withering away of the "liberalism" of the immediate post-Stalin era. But those had been regarded as purely internal developments, not necessarily transferable to the international arena where the Soviets appeared to be aligned

> Even at this late date, political analysts refuse to admit their failure. . .

with "moderate" communists. Whatever the toughening of Soviet international behavior, many assumed that it could be explained by the strains of the Vietnam War: didn't we ourselves deviate from the "norm" in our behavior because of the same war? The temptation to attribute to alien political systems our own views, judgments, and concerns seems to be irresistible to a great many otherwise knowledgeable experts.

In the end, the watchers of the Czechoslovak crisis had lost sight of the perception of events from the perspective of the Kremlin. The Warsaw ultimatum was either played down or dismissed altogether by Western analysts. The Soviet-Czechoslovak encounters at Cierna and Bratislava, with the unprecedented attendance of the full membership of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as the initial withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops from the maneuvers in Czechoslovakia, were interpreted as signs of Soviet weakness or rationality. The Czechoslovak, on the other hand, supported by the vast majority of the world's communist parties, appeared to display cool defiance and determination to defend their newly won freedoms. Under such circumstances most analysts thought Moscow would avoid military occupation, even if it could be certain the West would take no action. Events proved them wrong, and the appearance of half a million Soviet troops in the heart of Europe, in a country that had never been occupied before, has upset the strategic balance of power in Europe no less than the placing of Soviet missiles in Cuba upset the balance in the Western Hemisphere in October, 1962. The significance of this drastic change is still given scant notice in the American press, although it has been fully realized in Europe and, somewhat belatedly, by the United States Government.

> Whether or not the invasion could have been thwarted is now a matter for speculation.

Whether or not the invasion could have been thwarted is now a matter for speculation. I personally believe that a strong warning from the White House before the event, noting that such a move would invalidate the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding following the Cuban missile crisis, might prevent the ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, could endanger cultural and trade relations and would compel the United States to transfer additional troops to West Germany, would have, at the very least, made the Soviets pause to guess what the next American move might be. As in 1956, anti-Soviet feelings in Eastern Europe are running high, making any kind of military confrontation with the West unthinkable to the Soviets in view of their extended and vulnerable communications across the countries with deeply divided populations.

Alternatively, it is also possible that the United States could have extracted, in return for a hands-off stand regarding Czechoslovakia, concessions on some other outstanding issues: in the form of a cease-fire in Vietnam, a tolerable agreement on the Middle East, or a return of the Pueblo crew.

But in order to take a firm stand, the American government and public needed a much clearer picture of what was going on, and an authoritative forewarning about the likelihood of Soviet action. To the extent that neither was forthcoming, the responsibility for Western inaction must be shared by political analysts, within and outside the government, who had misread the mind of the Soviets and grossly exaggerated the Czechoslovak ability to resist, thereby helping to create a climate in which no action was possible.

There is no assurance the United States would have acted even had the climate been different and the advice been sound. But this is an entirely different matter. For the moment, we will do well to examine our embarrassing lack of empathy in this particular episode, keeping in mind that the next time around American interests may be involved much more directly and that our failure to perceive through the eyes of the adversary may have much more dangerous consequences.

9

LIFE

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17 December 1968

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your kind note of 9 December. I should have responded earlier but for the fact that my entire household has been struck down by whatever it is that has put half the city under the care of doctors, who seem to know little more about Hong Kong flu than I do.

During my recent trip I made no attempt to do the whole Iron Curtain bit; I picked Yugoslavia and Rumania because I thought the element of fear and/or nervousness made it likely that in those two countries people would talk to me. I did not attempt to see Tito or Ceaucescu; I have acquired a personal distrust for the gimmick of journalistic summitry, and I thought Sulzberger's column, written after he saw Ceaucescu, was misleading. Anyway, for what they are worth, here are the impressions I brought back.

The period of genuine fear lasted from the time of the Czech takeover until about the end of September. The Yugoslavs oiled their guns, called up some reserves and made all sorts of contingency plans for a quick withdrawal into the hills should the Red Army start pouring down across the Hungarian border. (They would not fight the "ussians in the open field, of course.) The Rumanians called up some workers' militia, a kind of local National Guard. Ceaucescu has denied that these men were given arms, but the prevailing opinion is that at least some of them were. And De Gaulle remarked that for the first time since he had returned to power in 1958 he now had to take into account the possibility of war in Europe. I heard this as a rumor when I passed through Paris at the start of my trip; I didn't quite believe it, since this was tantamount to admitting that the General's whole "eastward" policy had been fatally compromised. But the British Embassy in Belgrade confirmed it; the remark had been made in Paris to the British Ambassador.

In Yugoslavia the guns are still oiled, but there has been some relaxation of tension. In early September emissaries from the Soviet and Bulgarian Embassies were charging around Belgrade, buttonholing intellectuals in general and journalists in particular to warn them they were being watched and that there was "a little list." Marko Nikezic, the foreign minister, says this personal intimidation has stopped, but at the time I was there Yugoslavia was still being blasted in the Soviet press. In any event the climate was still such

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that a rumor could get out of hand the last night I was in Belgrade (5 November): the Russians were supposed to have invaded Rumania. This got people at the Hotel Metropol bar ordering doubles instead of singles, and--I heard later-- thoroughly upset a party at the Italian Embassy. I don't think a line was ever filed on the rumor, because I checked the Associated Press that night by telephone and was informed that the talk was indeed all over the town but no confirmation had surfaced. The next morning I told Nikezic about it; he seemed genuinely surprised. Then he guessed that the rumor had started because of a shipment of Soviet military aircraft to the Rumanian Air Force which Nikezic had heard about over the weekend. This must have been the case, since the following day I was told by the Rumanian Foreign Office in Bucharest that the planes had been delivered, that the ferry pilots were Russian, and the planes were 30 in number. The Rumanians also insisted that the planes were now Rumanian property. I don't know how literally to take that, of course.

The big thing on Yugoslav minds is the Middle East and the "confrontation" possibilities which lie in that area. They are very bothered about the presence of a Soviet fleet in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and when they look at a map they see that the land road to the Mediterranean runs right through their front parlor. I tried to argue this point with Nikezic, suggesting that Russia's new status as a first-rate salt-water power made it unnecessary for the Red Army to overextend itself on land. He shot me down. "I see your point," he said, "but it is not valid. The Russians are not accustomed to scattering fleets all over the world and using them as instruments of power, the way the British did for so long. We think we know their military thinking very well, and they still want everything land-connected." Since Nikezic appears to be the only one in Belgrade who thought to the last that the Soviets would invade Czechoslovakia (Tito figured the danger was past), perhaps his opinion should be taken seriously.

There is no ideological clutter in such thinking; the Yugoslavs threw their ideological Bible away some time ago. But there is a renewed consciousness of Great Russian imperialism in the manner of Gathering the Great, who also sent a Russian fleet to the Mediterranean. I found, not surprisingly, that both Nikezic and Micunavic, who used to be Ambassador to Washington, had some fairly raw nerves on the subject of "the Socialist Commonwealth." (I had lost track of Micunavic, but he heard that I was in town and sent for me; he is now the local equivalent

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of Senator Fulbright at the parliamentary level.) Both men said in effect: Who, me? "We consider ourselves a Socialist country," Nikezic said, "but we are not in anybody's Commonwealth."

There is a good deal of talk in Belgrade to the effect that Nikezic is marked for bigger things, starting with the presidency of the Serbian Communist Party. I couldn't get a line on who is successor might be, but I wouldn't be surprised if it were Micunavic. Ambassador Elbrick's thoughts on that subject would be worth more than mine; he had the flu when I was there and I didn't see him. This shift could even put Nikezic in line for the succession when Tito goes, but I think it worthwhile to bear in mind something Koca Popovic told me two years ago: There is only one Tito, there won't be another, and in any successor government the power will be spread around differently. At the time Popovic was vice-president of Yugoslavia, but he is now old and ailing and is out of it.

Meanwhile it would appear that Yugoslavia continues to move more and more in the direction of an "open society," whether they call it Socialist or not; speech and press are relatively free, and a traveler has no feeling of being in a police state. As you know, no visa is required to enter or leave Yugoslavia. The abolition of the entrance visa requirement (all this took place two years ago) encourages tourism, and the abolition of the exit visa requirement for Yugoslav nationals made their labor force mobile; this cut out the paper work. They do have an unemployment problem because their industrialization is undercapitalized; there just aren't enough jobs. But it is still an odd form of Communism which permits you to sign for your whole hotel bill on an American Express card. For that matter, even the Plaza Athene in Bucharest will honor a Diners card.

Rumania is still a tight shop; the country seems to me to be run by a bunch of anti-Soviet Stalinists. There is also more nervousness in Bucharest (what a drab city, particularly in an autumn rain!) than Ceaucescu admitted in his conversation with Sulzberger. My principal source here was a deputy foreign minister named Malitza; he confirmed that the militia had been called up after the Czech takeover, and he certainly indicated that they had been armed with something more than their rifles.

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When I was there the Rumanians were playing their relations with the Soviet Union very, very carefully. Ceaucescu made a dramatic speech denouncing the Czech invasion the week it happened; but according to American intelligence the Soviet Ambassador paid Ceaucescu a sudden visit the following Sunday morning. For whatever reason, criticism thereafter was mused. But the Rumanians have a clever way of considering that, a thing having been said once, that's enough: they can point to something on the record and say, "That's our policy, that's all there is to it." Malitza had no illusions about the duress under which Dubcek & Co. signed the "normalization" agreement with the Soviets, but he took the stand that it was a legal document, and he said that privately the Rumanians were encouraging the Czechs to abide by it--that is, "be good." A document signed under such duress wouldn't stand up in a Western court, but this is Rumania and the Rumanians want no more trouble. They know how much mud they have thrown in Moscow's eyes in the past--more than the Czechs ever did.

I would guess that Ceaucescu would resist Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Rumania next spring, but not to the bitter end. If he did that, he would go the way of Dubcek, and his Army would face three awkward choices: 1) a hopeless all-out resistance; 2) the humiliation of submission; 3) running Westward for the Yugoslav hills. (The Yugoslavs give the impression of having allowed for the third possibility in their contingency planning, although they consider it a remote possibility.) Meanwhile economic relations between Rumania and the U.S.S.R. seem a little cloudy. A new trade treaty, to replace the one which expired at the beginning of 1968, has been initialed (according to Malitza), but it remains uncertain whether heavy equipment for two new power plants will be delivered as promised a long time ago. Although the Rumanians make a good deal of foreign currency by selling petroleum products, wheat and maize (particularly to West Germany), they are still vulnerable to economic as well as military pressures from Moscow.

Malitza had one comment on "war danger" which I found interesting. It went about like this: "You Americans go from one extreme to the other. All during the 1950s there was talk about 'war by accident' and 'war by miscalculation.' After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 one heard less such talk, and after the text-ban treaty

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was signed in 1963 the talk died out entirely. You assumed that more had been settled with the Soviet Union than was the case. There always was some danger of war, and there is now."

One reason I undertook this trip was to find out where so many people, including myself, had gone wrong in judging the danger of military action against Czechoslovakia to be past by mid-August. (I would have been much less surprised had it happened in June.) Of course de Gaulle and Tito were wrong too, but I was surprised to learn how early Tito had been cut in on the possibility of such an operation. This may not be news to you, but it was news to me that when he passed through Moscow, on his way home from the Far East during the last week of April, the Soviet leaders told him they were very worried about what Dubcek was doing, that military intervention was being considered, and what Tito think about it? Tito was completely taken aback; he said it would be "a catastrophe." According to one man who was there (Nikezic), "They didn't react at all. They just sat there." Obviously the Soviets were not seeking Tito's advice; they were just testing his reaction. Finally, after stating his opinion that what the Czechs were doing did not constitute a danger to the Socialist system, Tito said he would work on the Czechs, and he did. He thought he had worked successfully; there was a political council of war in Belgrade three or four days before the Red Army marched, and Nikezic seems to have been the only holdout vote.

It would be easy and a little dangerous to over-emphasize the role of the Soviet military in the final decision; the Yugoslavs think that even Grechko may have been against invading Czechoslovakia, although they think the Red Army's political commissariat types were probably for it. (I am inclined to agree on the basis of the evidence in so far.) Both the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs agree that Ulbricht and Gomulka, who had their own job security to worry about, were yelling their heads off to Moscow during the late winter and early spring, although there is no consensus on how much influence their yelling had; Malitza seems to think it counted for quite a lot. Then there is the traditional Russian fear of Germany; military habits die hard, particularly in the case of a land animal like the Soviet Union, and I suppose the Soviet generals still tend to think of the Bohemian hills the way Bismarck did.

My own view is that the Soviets moved out of panic when they

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saw, or thought they saw, the dismantling of a Socialist state in an intolerable place. Czechoslovakia's geography has been one of the curses of that country, and its location invokes, in the Russian mind, the old fear of Germany, some of which they fake for their own purposes but some of which I think is real. I think, however, that the fear is more psychological than military. The Soviet generals can't really be afraid of the mighty Bundeswehr, which has never been up to strength anyway. But Nikezic thinks the Russians were genuinely frightened of the economic consequences of a Czech getaway, particularly if West German banks startedponying up big credits. After all, even after the Communist takeover in 1948 the Czechs had to be slapped down when they wanted to come into the Marshall Plan.

I put the gist of this syllogism to Wilfred Burchett, the Australian journalist whose Communist connections you know. He professed to be shaken by what the Russians did ("Outraged? Let's say I was very upset"). His reaction: "That's about it, but you forgot two things. Even the pro-Dubcek Czechs now tell me that Dubcek was not as strong a man as they had thought, which indicates to me that the reforms may really have been getting away from him to a degree that the Russians could not tolerate. Also, the Czechs are Slavs and the Russians think of them as family. They think of the Romanians as a bunch of romantic and harmless Latins." (And, of course, there was no "media nonsense" in Rumania.)

I might add that I take Burchett seriously within his known limits; it is in his interest to tell the truth, even if it is not the whole truth. He has a nice racket shuttling back and forth between Hanoi and Paris with merchandise nobody else can get, and this makes him about $20,000 a year. Therefore he would be foolish to tell too many outright lies. Moreover he said one thing in this conversation, which took place in Paris, that I thought damned odd, to wit: "The big problem of the Socialist states is to find the means for official dissent and then learn to tolerate the dissent. If they don't solve that one, I don't know whether the system will survive." A couple of weeks later he was in New York (he got a visa in Montreal on a Cuban passport). I saw him for a drink and asked him if I had heard him correctly; I had.

All this leaves unanswered two questions:

1. Why did the Soviets stop short of turning Prague into another Budapest? Even allowing for the fact that the Czechs

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did not fight like Hungarian Freedom Fighters, it still seemed inconceivable at the end of August that Dubcek and his associates would be around, even in positions of nominal power, at the beginning of December. I deduce that the Soviets realized they had made a considerable political miscalculation and therefore rewrote the script as they went along. Although it appears that Dubcek was roughed up physically when he was taken to Moscow, the Soviets didn't shoot him and probably won't. They were even "negotiating" with him in the first week of December, although the presence at that meeting (in Kiev) of Shelest, the Ukrainian party boss, may have been significant. The Yugoslavs think he was the biggest hawk of all on the Czech matter.

2. Was the Czech takeover a 100% politically defensive mature? If so it's too bad about the Czechs, who are a historically unlucky people, but the military power balance has not been critically deranged and that does not mean we are in imminent danger of war. Or was the military operation designed in part to shore up the Czech-German border with Soviet troops with something else in mind? That old German word drang is back in conversation--Great Russian drang, that is. Micunavic says, "If there is drang in this, it is drang to the South, and that means us." On this question I have heard "I don't know" in half a dozen languages, including the Romanian and the Australian.

My guess is that we are entering a period of "gelatinous" cold war, neither all hard nor all soft, with all hands playing it safe, taking no wooden nickels and--to a degree, anyway--going back to the dreary practice of reading tea leaves. Like a lot of other people, I had hoped we were about out of that period; but considering the Russian mentality, which was pretty secretive even in the days of the Czars, maybe we will never be out of it entirely. Janos Radvanyi, the defected Hungarian who is now at Stanford, once told me he had seen documentary proof (in Budapest files) of a first-rate row in early 1967 which nearly cost Kosygin and Brezhnev their jobs. I suspect that that sort of thing happens more frequently than we can know.

During the first week of November the Yugoslavs were nervous not only because of a late and spectacularly warm Indian summer (this looked like good tank weather) but because of a dawning fear that the U.S. might fail to elect anyone President. I walked a Yugoslav editor(Julius, of Politika) through the jungle of the 12th Amendment one morning and he literally began to turn pale. When I had finished he went to the cupboard

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and brought out a bottle of what he called "the good slivovitz";
he thought we both needed one.

I was in Bucharest the day following the U.S. election, and I
spent most of that day at the American Embassy trying to keep
score. I broke at 1 p.m., Bucharest time, to visit the Foreign
Office and present my journalistic credentials. I was mildly
surprised to find the Press Section openly pulling for Nixon;
at that time, of course, the result was not yet known. My
conversation with Malitza turned up the reasons why: 1) Nixon
apparently got on well with Ceaucescu and the Rumanians liked
him rather than otherwise ("He asked a lot of questions and he
listened to the answers"); 2) Humphrey was in Johnson's shadow
and, like the Yugoslavs, the Rumanians liked the idea of a
change; 3) things being how they are, the Rumanians are not
at all unhappy about a U.S. President who is definitely not
pro-Soviet.

I think that ends it, and it's about time, since this letter
is too long already. If any of this is remotely useful to
you, I shall be glad.

With respect, and every good personal wish as always.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Office of the President-elect
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Working Together for Peace, Freedom and Justice

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FOR RELEASE: Sunday AM's
February 2, 1969

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- A fresh initiative for the reconciliation of Europe was urged on the Nixon Administration today by a National Policy Panel of the United Nations Association of the United States headed by Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to former Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and Peter G. Peterson, chairman of Bell and Howell. The 24-member group included John J. McCloy, Thomas K. Finletter and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, until his appointment as foreign policy advisor to President Nixon.

Assessing the situation in Europe following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the UN Panel outlined a course of action toward greater Western unity,

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UNA-USA is a non-partisan, privately-supported research and education organization composed of members, chapters and a Council of Organizations. Its purpose is to study and promote the fundamental bases of peace with justice and the international organizations necessary for their development.

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a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and a European settlement that
could resolve the German problem. "The premises and assumptions of
the past, valid as several of them at times have been in forming United States
approaches, are no longer adequate as guides for United States policy,"
the Panel asserted.

The Panel called for early Presidential affirmation of the "importance
which the United States attaches to its relationships to Western Europe,"
and suggested that the 20th Anniversary NATO Council meeting in Washington
in April be converted into a "summit meeting -- designed both to develop and
to reinforce a new sense of solidarity in the Alliance."

The UNA Panel also recommended that the Nixon Administration, after
consultation with our NATO allies, propose a Four Power Summit conference
to set up a European Security Commission for the preparation of the general
principles of a European settlement. The Commission would be composed
of West Germany, East Germany, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
in addition to the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France.

The Commission would also create machinery for crisis management.
But its basic function would be to negotiate, for the approval of the Four Powers,
the military posture and arms control safeguards of the NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces in the Central European region including the two parts of Germany,

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Poland, Czechoslovakia and some neighboring areas. Such negotiations would involve a freeze in present NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strength in the area, a 10-percent cut in all forces after one year with adequate inspection, and provision for subsequent across-the-board cutbacks and reduction of nuclear warheads stockpiled in the zone.

At the same time, the Four Powers would propose to West and East Germany negotiations between themselves for a step-by-step program for the eventual reunification of Germany, based on acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern frontier and the provisional character of Germany's division.

The UNA Panel recognized that the Czechoslovak invasion showed Moscow's strict limitations on liberalization in Eastern Europe, but pointed out that "the Soviet Union, deeply aware of its own dilemmas with its allies, might well conclude that its own best interests would be served by a new effort to resolve the German question. If that question is not resolved it could some day plunge Europe again into bloody conflict."

The strategy outlined for strengthening Atlantic unity after a NATO summit conference included:

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1. "Close and continuing consultations with our European allies on new political or military commitments and developments in weapons technology ... with a deep perception as to their options and dilemmas."

2. Encouraging the development of a European caucus in NATO, enabling the Europeans to assert more initiative and making possible the ultimate emergence of a European defense community.

3. In the present European situation, retention of present United States forces in Europe and enlargement of present military contingents of other NATO partners much nearer to previously agreed force levels. Should larger European contributions be made, the United States should in principle support appointment of a European Supreme Allied Commander in Europe -- provided an American remains in a position to fulfill U. S. statutory requirements on the control of nuclear weapons.

4. Establishment of a NATO Payments Settlements Authority to help equalize balance-of-payments by the purchase of medium term bonds from deficit countries and the corresponding sale of its own bonds to surplus countries.

5. Making the U. S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council a member of the President's National Security Council.

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6. A "Nixon Round" of negotiation on non-tariff barriers to trade.

7. "A more humanistic approach" to Western unity by common work on common problems, through establishing an International Urban Institute, an International Foundation for Education, and inviting our allies to join in a space program in which "an Atlantic astronaut could symbolize a new spirit of common adventure".

In addition to its major recommendations for a European settlement, the Panel urged Congressional passage of the East-West Trade Bill and repeal of all inconsistent legislation as "a matter of major priority". It recommended that the Executive Branch liberalize export controls, "retaining controls only over those items that can demonstrably be shown to augment significantly the warmaking capacity of an Eastern European country which cannot obtain such items elsewhere or manufacture them itself".

The Panel proposed enlarging United Nations efforts to develop East-West common interests through expanding the role of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, and a substantial increase in the inspection capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The full 36-page statement, entitled *Toward the Reconciliation of Europe*, has been communicated to the appropriate officials in the Nixon

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Administration and to leaders of Congress. The list of panel members who signed the statement is attached.

The United Nations Association for the United States, which sponsored the Panel, is a non-profit organization devoted to research and education to improve United States participation in international organizations. Its previous policy reports are two on *China, the United Nations and U.S. Policy*, one issued in October, 1966, and the other in September, 1967, by a panel headed by Robert V. Roosa; and *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* in December, 1967, by a panel headed by Burke Marshall.

Chairman of the United Nations Association is Arthur J. Goldberg, former U. S. Ambassador to the UN and Supreme Court Justice. The Association has 175 chapters throughout the United States, collegiate units on nearly 600 campuses, individual members numbering more than 70,000, and the affiliation of over a hundred national voluntary organizations.

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UNA-USA NATIONAL POLICY PANEL ON
ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS, EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Theodore C. Sorensen, Chairman
Partner
Paul, Weiss, Goldberg, Rifkind,
Wharton and Garrison

Peter G. Peterson, Vice Chairman
Chairman of the Board
Bell and Howell Company

Walker L. Cisler
Chairman of the Board
The Detroit Edison Company

Joseph D. Keenan
International Secretary
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers

Oscar A. de Lima
Chairman of the Board
Roger Smith Hotels, Incorporated

Henry A. Kissinger*
Professor of Government
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Thomas K. Finletter
Partner
Coudert Brothers

Robert Kleiman
Editorial Board of
The New York Times

Richard N. Gardner
Henry L. Moses Professor of Law
and International Organization
Columbia University

Philip M. Klutznick
Senior Partner
Urban Investment and
Development Company

Ernest A. Gross
Partner
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt
and Mosle

Col. Laurence J. Legere
Institute for Defense Analyses

Edwin Huddleson, Jr.
Partner
Cooley, Crowley, Gaither, Godward,
Castro and Huddleson

John J. McCloy
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy

James S. McDonnell
Chairman of the Board
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation

James N. Hyde
Lawyer
Consultant to Rockefeller
Brothers Fund

G. William Miller
President
Textron, Incorporated

* Dr. Kissinger served as a member of the Panel until his selection by the President-Elect as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. He did not participate in the drafting of the final report.

Emanuel R. Piore
Vice President and Chief Scientist
International Business Machines
Corporation

Marshall D. Shulman
Director, Russian Institute
Columbia University

Thomas C. Schelling
Professor of Economics
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Joseph E. Slater
President
Salk Institute for Biological Studies

Gen. Cortland V. R. Schuyler
Commissioner of General Services
Executive Department
State of New York

Mrs. Robert J. Stuart
Formerly, President
League of Women Voters of
the U. S. A.