COMMENTS ON DC DRAFT 5, REPORT OF SUBPANEL II,
US INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

General Comments

1. I would suggest that Section XI, limited to a description of past US measures and the present situation, be placed as Section II. If emphasis were given to the factors which in the past have inhibited the use of our retaliatory power, to the development of at least a psychological deterrent by the USSR, and to the present implications of this for United States military policy, this would form a logical base from which to consider future trends and problems.

2. The discussion in Section IV on missions gives rise to several major questions.

a. Is the "strategic deterrent" of such a reciprocally destructive nature that it should be used only in the event "our survival was directly and immediately at stake"? If so, then this would seem to rule out its use as a "realistic threat to our enemies" in anything short of a direct attack on the US or - possibly - Western Europe. While I recognize the necessity for ambiguity in our policy concerning strategic retaliation, the later course of the report appears to visualize its non-use even in the event of attack on Western Europe. If our ultimate aim is to utilize SAC only to preserve our home territory, then we had better be clear about the consequences and the requirements of this policy; if we do propose to extend the "strategic umbrella" to Western Europe then politically palatable rather than militarily meaningful local measures would seem to be indicated, and many of the programs proposed for NATO would be unnecessary.

b. What kinds of "limited" or "non-general" wars are we talking about? If our concept embodies the use of relatively few atomic weapons (not more than 100 and probably less than 50) in support of military

operations this is one thing; if we are contemplating the use of 500, 1000, or 5000 tactical atomic weapons by either side, then this is distinguishable only geographically from "general war" -- i.e. our respective homelands remain sanctuaries. Unless and until we examine the limits within which meaningful military operations are possible, and have some concept of operations designed to punish aggression without exceeding these limits (whether they be political or radiological), definitions are meaningless.

3. The discussion on pp 34-35 seems to pose a related question by confusing an inevitable technological trend (the integration of nuclear weapons and delivery systems into the armed forces) with a problematically desirable end (their use). Given the geographic facts of life, with the US engaged on the periphery of a Russo-Chinese "sanctuary", and the relatively few numbers of weapons required to destroy even fairly sizeable forces, there would appear to be a serious question whether the policy outlined is correct. Rather, a desirable policy would seem to call for the use of nuclear weapons against local aggression only as a last resort. Moreover, only this policy would suffice to maintain in the Army any real conventional capability, since the Army finds much more difficult than the other services the development of dual-capability forces. I realize that my brief argument may not be persuasive, but I urge again that we consider the type of "limited" war we are considering and its magnitude before reaching judgments as to how to deal with it.

4. In Section V I have the very definite feeling that we have not made a case. While the criticisms in the first part (through p 41) are fairly good they lead nowhere, and the suggested changes from p 42 on are never stated with sufficient precision to enable me to judge their effectiveness - nor indeed to know what they are! If we are going to cover

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detailed recommendations in an annex, then I suggest this part be more
specifically critical and outline at the end half-a-sozen precepts, such
as development of functional commands, divorcement of the JCS from service
responsibilities, use of the program budget or what have you, all to be
covered in detail in the annex.

5. I would note that Chapter VII brings out a fundamental dichotomy between the policy regarding the use of the Strategic Air Command and the actual need for that use. Given the proposed development of tactical atomic power in Western Europe -- indeed given the present level of such power -- is SAC really needed to defeat Soviet aggression against Western Europe? I would doubt it. Yet, in contradiction to what is said on p VII-5, the US apparently does not intend to wait and find out; its immediate response purportedly includes strategic strikes against Soviet long-range aviation, based *within* the USSR. Thus SAC may be used, unnecessarily, to bring on the very nuclear interchange which our report urges we avoid. I suggest that the report must specifically consider both the feasibility of defending Western Europe without SAC and the circumstances under which SAC would be used if we are to reconcile the stands taken in Chapters IV and VIII.

6. The statement on means to limit war in Section VIII raises some
questions similar to those asked above:

a. Do we, by announcing that we will retaliate with SAC only in the event of attack on the US, throw away the advantage of the strategic deterrent, or has this already been lost?

b. Do we, in effect, aim at establishing the territories of the US and the USSR as sanctuaries? If so, what is likely to be the reaction of our Allies, whose territory is left unprotected? Of China?

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c. Do we not ignore the very understandable impulse of the military commander to destroy or neutralize every conceivable weapons system which can deliver nuclear weapons on his force? In other words, given the number and range of delivery systems, _are_ there any limits to the scope of nuclear attack or counter-attack? Perhaps the answer lies in the development of sufficient short-range weapons and delivery systems, locally deployed, to insure that they cannot be knocked out -- but this is entirely different approach than is suggested in the report.

### Specific Comments

Pp 1-2: I agree that the introduction should be set off from the rest of the report.

P 6: The middle paragraph seems to belong on p 5 under American security, rather than under national military programs.

P 7: The paragraph on deterring general war requires elaboration to stress both the nature of the problem and its magnitude.

P 9: The sentence concerning the _future_ state of Soviet technology seems relatively optimistic when compared with subsequent discussions of their _present_ situation on pp 12-14.

P10: Is not this statement on the advantage of the offense questionable in absolute terms (for example, some have argued that an "anti-missile missile" _will_ destroy most delivery systems)? If kept, more stress should be laid on the factor of relative effort, and less on invulnerability of specific weapons.

P 10: I feel very unsure of this statement about technical breakthroughs. one Can Teller _et al_ guarantee that no/will develop anti-gravity or a fore field? And can we be as complacent about the "scientific stalemate" as the next sentence indicates?

P 11: Should there not be here at least some mention of the effect of these trends on military strategy, on relative power, and on the cohesiveness of alliances, both ours and theirs?

P 13: I believe more can and should be said about the capabilities of the Soviet ground forces to wage atomic war.

Pp 15-17: Does failure to mention them mean that we concede to the USSR advantages in guided missile systems, air defense, tactical air, etc? If not, we should at least indicate relative parity in these fields.

P 19: The new functional missions should be cited.

P 23: The paragraph concerning improvements in military communications requires expansion, both with regard to what is being talked about, what kind of combat is envisioned, and why it is assumed that these developments favor us over the Communists -- who presumably can do the same.

P 26: Rather than using new categories of warfare (which further obscure the obscure war), I would suggest either:

a. Adhering to general, limited, and cold war as categories or

b. Using the definitions in the Dictionary of Military Terms, or some similar technical work.

P 29: There is no mention of air defense, active or passive, as an element of the strategic deterrent; indeed, there is almost no discussion anywhere of active air defense.

Pp 31-33: Both "limited war" and "war of major alliances" badly require clarification, as indicated in general comments. In particular, we need to consider the role of Allies in both types of conflict.

P 33: It is not clear whether the reference to a "different order of conflicts" is designed to guide military aid programs or the development of

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US forces. In any event, there is no further reference to US forces for para-military operations.

Pp 38-39: The argument here is not entirely persuasive. Reference could be made to lack of a "command post", to the fact that service secretaries do not control "strategic direction" of forces, to the cumber-someness of present systems for determining policy, etc.

Pp VI-12 & 13: Have we considered that our role with regard to "neutrals", under this concept, might be to prevent their going Communist whether or not they want to do so? Do we wish to touch on this here?

VII-3: It should not be thought that the problem in NATO is one of contradictions in strategy: *any* war involving the use of atomic weapons in the hundreds may well cause the destruction of Europe (as this report indicates on p VII-9). Rather it is that:

a. Present concepts of tactical operations envision the use of fairly large ground combat forces to (corralize) and dam up an enemy advance, thus creating good targets for nuclear weapons.

b. The Europeans can see no great sense to their making such a contribution since:

(1) It isn't decisive;

(2) The real shield is SAC (or so they've been told);

(3) It costs too much;

(4) Their cities get bombed anyhow.

I submit that the problem is largely a psychological one -- and indeed the recommendations in the latter part of Section VII treat it as such.

P VII-6: As indicated above, neither we nor the Europeans are prepared to move any faster toward Pentomic units or jet aircraft. Moreover, none of the three principal powers (US, UK, France) have provided to date any real guidance in the reorganization of ground forces for atomic combat.

P VII-7: I think this statement much too strong. Not only have we given considerable information in fields other than atomic weapons but the Europeans have a development program of their own, which we partially coordinate and held finance. The real problem is twofold: no one knows where we should be going, equipment-wise, and national procurement has meant poor standardization and even poorer coordination of research and development.

P VII-10: The third point seems obscure, since supposedly the USSR would like to limit war in any event.

P IX-2: Check new handbook just issued by AEC and DOD before letting stand statement on paucity of information.

P IX-3: I don't think this sentence concerning the value of Civil Defense is valid; we might retain a future potential but scarcely an actual ability to equip, dispatch, and support armed forces not already in being.

P IX-7: Should there not be at least some mention of purpose, feasibility, and cost of active air defense?

P X-3: These figures simply don't jibe. While $3 billion annual increase is roughly 8-9% of present $36 billion appropriation, it would total only $48 billion by FY 62, not "over $50 billion". And a budget of $54 billion would be about 40% above present total spending of $40 billion (including direct military aid). I think the real obstacle to understanding is in the sentences beginning "Looking beyond 1960 . . ."

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"We anticipate..., which should follow all other cost figures. In addition, the various dates used (1960, 1962, 1965) should be reconciled.

P X-4: I believe the Soviet figures used elsewhere are 16-20% of GNP. Can these be checked?

P X-4: Federal revenues will rise by only about $3 billion annually; the remaining $2 billion of increased tax monies goes to state and local governments.

P X-8: I would suggest reference to additional changes in budgetary procedures, such as development of truly joint logistics plans by the services, changing the budget cycle to correspond more closely to the policy-making cycle of the NSC, requiring less detailed back-up on submissions, etc.

P XI-3: Do you not mean "freedom" or "willingness" to wage limited war, rather than capability, which is dependent on the tactical forces themselves?

P XI-4: The sentence in brackets is one of the most debatable in modern politics, and serves no useful purpose here. I suggest deletion.

P XI-5: The discussion of "limited war" should be clarified and related to the similar discussion in Section IV and to my general comments -- if the impossible can be done!