November 3, 1976

333 Atherton Hall
University Park, Pa. 16802

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D. C

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am a graduate student at Penn State University studying
European diplomatic history. Since the election went against the
President and you will be leaving the State Department, I would like
to take this opportunity to express to you some thoughts of mine
prior to your leaving.

I believe you have done a very good job handling the foreign
affairs of our country and I admire and respect you very much. I
wish you weren't leaving the State Department, but I know Mr. Carter
will, of course, want his own Secretary of State. I would very much
like to meet you, but since this is in the realm of improbability
please accept this written expression of the high regard with which
you are held.

Thank you for your time and my best wishes for you and your family.

Dear Mr. Yen:

I was delighted to receive your very kind
letter of December 23. Your generous words
and warm wishes mean a great deal to me.
Thank you for your thoughtfulness.

Mr. Anthony Yen,
Yen Enterprises, Inc.,
29th Floor, Terminal Tower,
Public Square,
Cleveland, Ohio.

yen enterprises, inc.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COUNSELORS • IMPORT & EXPORT • MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVE

December 23, 1976

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C. Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It is with much regret that I see you leave your post as Secretary of State. In this most complex age when might no longer makes right, you, before anyone else, realized the proper path America should take in making the best of its responsibility. You have exercised your duties with honor and distinction, through adversity and under fire. You survived when others succumbed to their own failings and you depart having compromised nothing of yourself.

I have always remembered kindly your note to me at the time you were first appointed. My sons at Yale and Brown Universities share with me the opinion that you will take a place in history as one of the finest and most competent statesmen ever to have served the American people.

Count Tolstoy said something in *War and Peace* to the effect that if evil men can band together to achieve evil ends, why cannot good men join together to achieve honorable ends? This is somewhat moralistic in its tone, but no one has done more to bring good men together to achieve honorable ends than yourself. I would be honored if you would send me a photograph of yourself.

I wish you and Mrs. Kissinger the best of luck in your future endeavors.

AY/vb

29TH FLOOR, TERMINAL TOWER, PUBLIC SQUARE • CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113, U.S.A. • TELEPHONE (216) 621-5115 • TELEX 980-340 CABLE YENE CLVD

JOHN PHILIP SOUSA MEMORIAL, Inc.

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COL. GEORGE S. HOWARD, (Ret.)
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Vice Chairman

JAMES L. DIXON
Co-Chairman, Executive Committee

RICHARD E. TOWNSEND
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Publicity Director

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Troy State University
Troy, Ale. 36081

Dr. HENRY KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:-

You are a great man!

I have many friends in foreign lands and they all reflect the influence of your visits.

Best wishes always!

TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING THROUGH BAND MUSIC

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WHAT NOW FOR HENRY?

At his press conference last week, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had an answer ready for one question he was not asked. The question: "Will you resign because your Middle East shuttle failed and American foreign policy is in disarray?" The answer: "No."

Indeed, Kissinger had decided on his response even before he could gauge firsthand the reaction in the U.S. to the collapse of his attempt to negotiate another Israeli-Egyptian disengagement. During a stopover at London's Heathrow Airport, he assured British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan that "if the President wants me to stay, I shall regard it as my duty to do so." As far as anyone can tell, Kissinger retains Gerald Ford's full support. Nonetheless, the Secretary of State faces a time of testing and questioning.

His failure in the Middle East was initially greeted with far more sympathy than might have been expected. Europeans, many of whom had not expected the shuttle to succeed, were disappointed but not surprised. Said a West German Foreign Ministry official: "It was a good try. He did all that was humanly possible." A top official in Canada's Department of External Affairs agreed, "He came closer than anybody in a quarter of a century toward an agreement in the area." An editorial in the *Guardian* reminded Britons, "No one wins every poker game, not even Metternich, not even Henry Kissinger." Egyptians and Israelis generally retained a great admiration for him.

In the U.S., too, reaction was restrained. Kissinger received a grateful, even enthusiastic reception from congressional leaders when he briefed them at the White House. Later, after Kissinger appeared at a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Republican Jacob Javits said that he was "enormously encouraged" by Kissinger's evenhanded explanation of the problems he had encountered, though not by his message of frustration. A high State Department official who has been critical of Kissinger everything that he could over through no fault of his own."

Not all the reaction was so friendly. Conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina demanded Kissinger's resignation, arguing that his "usefulness as a negotiator is ended and his diplomacy is in ruins." An aide to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused Kissinger of fishing for sympathetic support: "He's playing the aggrieved party again, moping around, looking hurt and betrayed and talking about Greek tragedy." Recalling Kissinger's description of himself to Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci, the aide added, "So the cowboy in the white hat and on the white horse has become the Greek tragic hero cursed by the gods."

Such personal gibes were perhaps inevitable. Far more significant, the failure of his negotiations in the Middle East is bound to intensify debate over his style and role as Secretary of State. Some diplomats, politicians and academ-

ics maintained all along that shuttle diplomacy was unwise because a settlement was impossible unless the Russians were allowed a role in the negotiations. But it remains to be seen whether a settlement is possible with the Russians, and the step-by-step approach was certainly worth trying.

A more important criticism of shuttle diplomacy is that it required the commitment of far too much of Kissinger's time and prestige. One of his problems is that he is unwilling to delegate authority, and he takes on too many jobs. Often he has acted as both the planner and executor of foreign policy, giving the impression of a troubleshooter rushing from one crisis to another. He happens to be exceptionally good at it, but it forces him to neglect other tasks. Furthermore, because the U.S. President has been so long removed from the foreign policy arena—first Nixon on because of Watergate, then Ford because of inexperience—Kissinger has been forced to act, in the eyes of the world, as a sort of deputy President for international affairs. As a result, policy failures implicate him personally and intensify the loss of the aura of infallibility that had once made him appear to be the politician of world diplomacy. Says a high British foreign service officer: "Henry has become the prisoner of his own legend."

Kissinger, moreover, has too often failed to cultivate his relations with Congress. Oddly, although he is a skillful compromiser and has a remarkable feeling for the interplay of power overseas, he has been unable to deal with Senators and Representatives at home. A case in point was his emotional argument last week that Congress, by holding back on Administration requests for additional and relatively small amounts of military aid, was largely responsible for the worsening situation in Indochina. That line only exacerbated the debate and reopened old wounds.

Kissinger is obviously still deeply and emotionally involved with Viet Nam and believes sincerely that the U.S. has a moral commitment to continue aiding South Viet Nam's President Nguyen Van Thieu. Yet Kissinger's critics argue that he pressed harder for a political settlement in Viet Nam during the past year or so, the present situation might have been averted, regardless of his previous achievement in extricating the U.S. from the war.

But neither his flaws nor his damaging setback in the Middle East have destroyed Kissinger's effectiveness as Secretary of State. He will remain a conduit for the various belligerents in the Middle East, negotiating among them quietly or in the more public forum at Geneva. He hopes to persuade the Russians to moderate the Arab demands, while he preaches restraint to both sides, and he may have some success.

Kissinger's greatest accomplishment has been détente with the Soviets, and it seems not in jeopardy though in need of much future building. He knows that Moscow wants U.S. technology and credits, and he is lining up some big U.S. bank loans for the Soviets. In return, they may be willing to make some concessions. Major negotiations are coming up with the Soviets: on nuclear-arms control, on trade expansion, on the framing of a European security treaty. In all of these, the U.S. and its major adversary have high stakes, and Henry Kissinger has quite a few cards to play.

KISSINGER AT JERUSALEM'S KING DAVID HOTEL

EDDIE ADAMS

38

TIME, APRIL 7, 1975

SPECIAL SECTION

considerable comedown for the Socialist leader, who has frequently been mentioned as a possible Premier in a future civilian government. Soares and other moderates seemed weary and depressed by the swift turn of events that in only three weeks has seen:

1) The swift crushing of a right-wing coup and the flight of the revolution's first hero and president, General Spínola, to Brazil.

2) The hasty creation of a strongly leftist 28-member Revolutionary Council with extraordinary powers to legislate and override an elected government for up to five years.

3) The abrupt nationalization of banks and insurance companies, with the possibility that steel, mining and chemical companies will soon follow.

4) The banning of three parties, the intimidation of others and the installation of a Cabinet with strongly leftist representation.

At a rally in Lisbon's bullring, Soares declared pointedly, "We want to construct a socialist society in Portugal with respect for liberty, not copied after foreign models—neither Russian nor Swedish nor Chinese but Portuguese." And at another rally, in Coimbra, he told several thousand followers, "The people have a right to know if an authentic democracy is to be established; or is it to turn into a dictatorship?"

That question is increasingly being asked, not only in Portugal but also in Europe and the U.S. In the wake of fears that the Communists would seize control of the government, possibly jeopardizing American bases and imperiling NATO's southern flank, Lisbon has sought to reassure Washington of its desire for continued good relations and its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Last week President Francisco da Costa Gomes also promised that the outcome of the April 25 elections for a constituent assembly would be respected. But it was

tremely strong” and that the military is “determined to work within the NATO framework.” Added Carlucci, under attack from Portuguese leftists for alleged ties to the CIA: “Most Armed Forces Movement members will tell you Portugal has to find its own path to socialism, and that will take a while.”

Reaction in Washington was less sanguine, as Secretary of State Kissinger indicated during his press conference when he spoke of the disquieting evolution under way in Portugal.

Some top-level officials said the Administration was consulting its European allies about a means of imposing a kind of quarantine within the NATO alliance, should that become necessary. In a somewhat similar situation, *ad hoc* measures to ensure security were taken when Iceland had a Communist coalition in 1956.

Meanwhile, high-level Portuguese military officials an-

SOCIALIST LEADER SOARES

PETER COLLIS

FOREIGN MINISTER ANTUNES

PRESIDENT FRANCISCO DA COSTA GOMES (LEFT) AND PREMIER GONÇALVES

Pressures from friends on the right and on the left.

almost impossible to see how the elections could any longer be considered an accurate measure of Portuguese opinion, with some parties outlawed and others fearing to stage rallies.

The atmosphere of uncertainty is taking a heavy toll on tourism and foreign investment. At Lisbon's 300-room Ritz last week, there were fewer than 40 guests. Because of fears for the country's economic stability, Portugal's 2 million workers abroad have cut back sharply on the funds they customarily send home. In a television broadcast last week, Premier Gonçalves exhorted migrant workers to pay no heed "to the deformatory and reactionary campaigns of certain organs of information" and to come home and "verify that the country is happier than the sad Portugal you used to know."

For their part, American officials seemed to be of two minds. At a luncheon for U.S. businessmen in Lisbon, Ambassador Frank Carlucci emphasized that Portugal's ties to NATO are "ex-

nounced that they had uncovered a Portuguese Liberation Army whose aim was to overthrow the government and halt the decolonization of the African territories. The secret right-wing army, they said, was based in Spain, with cells in Angola and Mozambique, and had participated in the March 11 coup attempt. Officials went out of their way, however, to point out that no links had been found between the mercenaries and the CIA, although at least one newspaper claimed otherwise.

In the final analysis, the implications of Portugal's leftward turn may not be quite so bleak as they would at first appear, at least in the short run. No responsible Portuguese political leader, including Communist Party Leader Cunhal, has suggested that the U.S. give up its airbase in the Azores —yet. But many have hinted that the facility is a question for "later." As for NATO, even the Communists are notably reluctant to make any threats about pulling out of it, repeatedly declaring that "the question is one for five years from now."

There is evidence that Communist parties in Italy and France, as well as Spain, are exerting considerable pressure on the Portuguese left to go slowly so as not to provoke a torrent of reaction all across the Continent. The Soviet strategy, meanwhile, has been to offer adroit public reassurances of its friendship, send to Lisbon what one Western diplomat describes as "every dance troupe and chorus in Russia" and quietly beef up the sizable staff it has had quartered in a modern office building in Lisbon since diplomatic relations were established last year.

Reflects one NATO country analyst, "I can't believe that the Soviets want another satellite here. Portugal is far from the Soviet Union. It is the poorest country in Western Europe. If the Russians made a concrete move, they know that it would drive the West Europeans through the roof. Ultimately, détente would be at stake. When things are going your way, such risks are unnecessary, and if I were thinking this through in Moscow that is how I would see it." Another Western diplomat offers an equally disquieting thought: "The diabolical theory is that the Soviets will be very happy to see Portugal remain in NATO as a thorn in the side of the alliance—not a cancer but a thorn." Portugal already is a thorn in the alliance's side. What worries the West is that it may eventually begin to feel more like a dagger.

TIME, APRIL 7, 1975

37