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The Nature and Genesis of Civilizations

In an empirical study methodology becomes a focal point. Toynbee utilizes a comparative approach of wide scope, that attempts to derive its generalizations from data based on the development of twenty-one identifiable civilizations. He distinguishes four types, growing, disintegrating, arrested and abortive civilizations. Yet the tenuous basis of his philosophy appears at every turn, for both the criteria for identification, and the generalizations constitute metaphysical emanations of a theological world-view which can fit various historical phenomena into its pattern only with difficulty.

Life, according to Toynbee, constitutes a pattern of evolution in the divine scheme of which the history of civilizations represents only a minute fraction. The dynamic activity of differentiation is but the prelude to a higher level of integration which in good time will serve as the condition for a further advance. Thus civilizations are not an ultimate stage of development but a species in an evolutionary process, in which they, too, will be superseded by beings of a new and higher order.

Yet what is a civilization? Toynbee answers as a first approximation that it represents an intelligible field of study. The history of none of the component political communities can obtain meaning without reference to a larger whole. Societies,

1. For full discussion see post Conclusions.

2. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 159.

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Two strands of thought can be distinguished in Toynbee's philosophy.
The biological approach regards history as an evolutionary process, its recurrence
of growth and decay a testimony to Man's efforts to turn himself into Superman.
This view dominates Toynbee's analysis of the genesis of civilizations and their
growth. The theological conception sees in history the realization of a divine
plan to teach man the essential meaninglessness of temporal success. All typical
attitudes towards life fail, save the recognition of the supra-mundane plane of
reality which denies the substantiality of all worldly endeavor. This is the
tendency of Toynbee's analysis of the breakdown of civilizations and their disint-
tegration.

Toynbee's postulation of freedom is therefore deceptive. The biological approach reduces Challenge-and-Response to a mechanistic description of the immanent Elan Vital. The theological view considers purposiveness merely God's tool to teach man his impotence on the mundane plane. This is compounded by the empirical method which moves with great patience through a vast amount of historical data. But data belongs to the past and is therefore ruled by necessity. Freedom, on the other hand, can not be derived as an attribute of reality but only through an inward experience. History's purpose represents a metaphysical assumption not a necessary conclusion from historical events. ①

This becomes very noticeable in Toynbee's analysis of the genesis of
civilizations. Challenge-and-Response, the interaction of Race and Environment
is conceived as the key factor in a civilization's birth. But this theory becomes
a meaningful assertion of purposiveness only if the analysis concerns itself with
the imponderability of the response. But this is precisely what an empirical
method can not do, its chief concern is not the uniqueness of the response but
the generality of the challenge. Toynbee carefully classifies all possible challenges,
conceived as qualitatively equivalent and varying only in intensity. This, how-
ever, reduces Challenge-and-Response to but a restatement of the Environment theory.

1. For full discussion see post "Conclusions".

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not states, are the "social atoms" with which a historian must
1
deal. A vast difference exists between relations within a
2
society and the relation of the civilizations among themselves.

The contact of the political communities exhibits the process
by which a civilization's growth accomplishes itself. Success-
ion in time characterizes the relation between civilizations.
Only two wholly unrelated civilizations - the Egyptian and the
3
Andean - have heretofore existed. A universal church serves
as the connecting link between two Societies. It arises as the
4
dynamic reaction of the internal proletariat to the oppressive
rule of the dominant minority, and becomes the repository of
the inner meaning of the decaying civilization, the guarantee
5
for the continuation of its profounder ideation. This process
of appellation-and-affiliation involves, as a rule, a displace-
ment of the geographical center of gravity, the boundary between
the disintegrating civilization and its external proletariat
6
forming the political axis of the new civilization.

Therefore civilizations constitute not merely intellig-
ible fields of study but also reveal man's attempt at achieving
increased self-determination. Their common task serves as the
condition for the comparability of civilizations. Toynbee re-
jects the implication that this proves the unity of civiliza-
tions. The assumption of unity derives from the ego-centric

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 45.

2. Toynbee uses Civilization and Society interchangeably.

3. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 131.

4. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 183. See also post.

5. See appendix for list of civilizations.

6. The relation of the civilizations in Space is part of the
   as yet unpublished Volumes.

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These are the problems raised by this phase of "The Study of History."

Toynbee's philosophy of history begins with a query: What are the smallest meaningful entities which a historian may study? An examination of England's past leads Toynbee to the conclusion that every nation moves with a larger unit which sets the frame-work for its endeavors. Consequently civilizations, not states, are the social atoms with which a philosophy of history must concern itself. For this reason, too, relations between states have a completely different import than contacts among civilizations. Relations between states represent the mechanism of a Society's growth. Contacts among civilizations reveal the process of apparent tion-and-affiliation by which new civilizations rise on the ruins of the old. Toynbee distinguishes only two completely independent civilizations among his twenty-one specimen.

Toynbee considers the civilizations intelligible fields of study because they are the representatives of the evolutionary rhythm that premeats existence. Here his biological approach comes to full expression. The dynamic activity of civilizations is but a prelude to a new level of integration which in good time will serve as the jumping off point for a fresh advance. Their common task serves as the condition for the comparability of civilizations. For this reason, Toynbee rejects the view that any one civilization can represent an ultimate stage of development. (begin level will his assumption p. 146)

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delusion which equates the influence of a civilization in its
growth phase with the total meaning of history. The conception
~~of the "Unchanging East"~~ represents the reflection of an atti-

ATTITUDE which considers its point of observation as normative in-
stead of accidental, a method discarded by the physical sciences
since the Copernican revolution. The stagnation observed by
Western observers in other civilizations, exhibits the unifor-
mity imposed by an immutable environment which severely limits
the possible modes of adaptation. Moreover, the integration
of the world into a Western pattern is confined to the economic
and perhaps the political plane. The contributions of the Syriac
civilization to Western ideation, the edifice of Chinese phil-
osophy, the profundity of Sumeric astronomy all testify to
levels of achievement which make the attribution of ultimacy
to any one civilization meaningless.

~~Toynbee therefore suggests~~ the periodization of history into ancient, medieval and modern, thus can not serve as a matrix for Toynbee's study. ~~REUVAL~~ UNINTERRUPTED, Civilizations do not represent stages of a uniform progress but the emanation of a common effort, the success of which can be judged only by the attainment of a new level of integration. All civilizations are consequently philosophically contemporary. Compared to the life of the earth, the difference in age between civilizations becomes negligible, the youth of the species in ~~APPARENT~~ APPARENT 2 term of its own time-scale pronounced.

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 160. See obvious reliance on Kant and even more pronouncedly on Spengler.

2. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 17 (For Toynbee's assumptions as to the age span of the earth.

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delusion which equates the influence of a civilization in its
growth phase with the total meaning of history. The conception
of the "Unchanging East" represents the reflection of an atti-
tude which considers its point of observation as normative in-
stead of accidental, a method discarded by the physical sciences
since the Copernican revolution. The stagnation observed by
Western observers in other civilizations, exhibits the unifor-
mity imposed by an immutable environment which severely limits
the possible modes of adaptation. Moreover, the integration
of the world into a Western pattern is confined to the economic
and perhaps the political plane. The contribution of the Syriac
civilization to Western ideation, the edifice of Chinese phil-
osophy, the profundity of Sumeric astronomy all testify to
levels of achievement which make the attribution of ultimacy
to any one civilization meaningless.

The periodization of history into ancient, medieval and
modern thus can not serve as a matrix for Toynbee's study.
Civilizations do not represent stages of a uniform progress but
the emanation of a common effort, the success of which can be
judged only by the attainment of a new level of integration.
All civilizations are consequently philosophically contemporary.
Compared to the life of the earth, the difference in age between
civilizations becomes negligible, the youth of the species in
term of its own time-scale pronounced.

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1

been turned into Superman. Life is ruled by an immanent evolutionary process expressed by alternate stages of integration and differentiation. The genesis of civilizations is testified to a mutation from static condition to creative effort. This holds true even in cases of apparentation-and affiliation.

With respect to the internal proletariat, the dominant minorities are stated by definition. The secession of the internal proletariat constitutes the dynamic reaction, its universal church is the institutional embodiment of the condition for new growth. The Chinese conception of Yin and Yang gives symbolic expression to these tendencies. As phases of the Universe they express the Seasons and in which the ascendancy of each is achieved at the expense of the other. The genesis of civilizations then, discloses particular beats of a general rhythmic pulse of the Universe.

This explains the nature of the genesis of civilizations but not their particular appearance at a definite time. What are the factors that lift these entities out of the stream of humanity? What accounts for the long interval of Yin before the climb up the precipice commences? The empirical method requires Toynbee to examine all possible causes before drawing conclusions. He finds the negative factor in the vis inertia, the "cake of custom", the inherent tendency towards stability.

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 194.

2. See post - Metaphysics.

3. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 204. Note the similarity of this concept with Spengler and its inconsistency with the emphasis on pure volition.

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indicates that all races except the Negro race have at one
time or another produced a civilization. The simile of the
climbers on the precipice proves, however, that this deficiency
need not be inherent but may result from the comparative Youth
of the species.

The Environmental theory fares no better. A conclusive proof, for the decisiveness of environmental factors would involve an examination of all conditions that are claimed to be conducive to the genesis of civilizations and a determination of whether they were so operative wherever they occurred.

Such an empirical survey will reveal a wide variety in the geographical or climactic conditions that attended the genesis of civilizations. Though the Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations developed in a river basin, not every river of similar extend - such as the Colorado river- has produced a civilization. Again though the Eurasian and Arabian steppes have produced nomadism, the American prairie and the Argentine pampas have not served as an obstacle to a different type of society.

If both the race and environmental theories which suggest the diversity of human physique and the variability of climactic and topographical conditions as the respective differentiating cause for the evocation of creativeness, are discredited what factor does account for the genesis of civilizations? Toynbee finds the solution in a combination of the two

1. For a discussion of empirical proof by simile see Conclusions.

2. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 253. For a discussion of the conclusiveness of such a proof see Conclusions. That these environments might yet produce civilizations is indicated by Toynbee's assertion that the MINIAN ISLAND-EMPIRE was not rejected in Indonesia. Recent history may have demonstrated the weakness of this argument.

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The Environmental theory fares no better. A conclusive proof for the decisiveness of environmental factors would include an examination of all conditions that are claimed to be conducive to the genesis of civilizations and a determination of whether they were so operative wherever they occurred.²

Such an empirical survey will reveal a wide variety in the geographical or climactic conditions that attended the genesis of civilizations. Though the Egyptian and Sumeric civilizations developed in a river basin, not every river of similar extend - such as the Colorado river has produced a civilization. Again though the Eurasian and Arabian steppes have produced nomadism, the American prairie and the Argentine pampas have not served as an obstacle to a different type of society.

If both the race and environmental theories which positulate the diversity of human physique and the variability of climactic and topographical conditions as the respective differentiating cause for the evocation of creativeness, are discredited what factor does account for the genesis of civilizations? Toynbee finds the solution in a combination of the two

2. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 253. For a discussion of the conclusiveness of such a proof see Conclusions. That these environments might yet produce civilizations is indicated by Toynbee's assertion that the b was not respected in Indonesia. Recent history may have demonstrated the weakness of this argument.

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of Brandenburg over the Rhineland, of the Yellow river basin
over that of the Yangtse and the triumph of New England over
its rivals in the colonization of North America.

Since the essence of creativity consists of the direction of mimesis, and since its basic condition is the breaking of the "cake of custom," new ground provides a stimulus by the REMOVAL OF LIBERATION from the weight of tradition, and the challenge of its VINGINITY.

The stimulus of blows and pressures accounts for the rejuvenation of many political entities, for the virility of border provinces. France underwent a regeneration through the military catastrophe of 1871, as did Prussia under the impact of Jena and Austerlitz. The dominant position enjoyed by border provinces within the civilizations results from the tempering they undergo in the constant challenge as guardians of the marshes. The history of the growth phase of the Holy Roman Empire exhibits a continuous shift of the center of gravity towards the border regions, its decline a reversal of that tendency. Neither the Ottoman nor the Austrian Empire survived the relaxation of their mutual pressure in the contest for the Balkans.

Penalizations represent the final stimulus in Toynbee's scheme, exemplified by the compensatory qualities developed by minority groups or physically handicapped individuals.

If an increase in the severity of the stimulus yields

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. II. p. 166. For a discussion of Toynbee's data see post Conclusions.

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Since the essence of creativity consists of the direc-
tion of mimesis and since its basic condition is the breaking
of the "cake of custom", new ground provides a stimulus by the
liberation from the weight of tradition and the challenge of its
virginity.

The stimulus of blows and pressures accounts for the
rejuvenation of many political entities for the virility of
border provinces. France underwent a regeneration through the
military catastrophe of 1871, as did Prussia under the impact
of Jona and Austerlitz. The dominant position enjoyed by border
provinces within the civilizations results from the tempering
they undergo in the constant challenge as guardians of the
marshes. The history of the growth phase of the Holy Roman
Empire exhibits a continuous shift of the center of gravity to-
wards the border regions, its decline a reversal of that ten-
dency. Neither the Ottoman nor the Austrian Empire survived
the relaxation of their mutual pressure in the contest for the
Balkans.

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a correspondingly successful response, can this process be in-
CONTINUED INDEFINITELY, DENIES THIS AND POSTULATES
finitely continued? Toynbee defines the optimum challenge as
AN OPTIMUM CHALLENGE DEFINED AS,
the Golden Mean, of sufficient intensity to elicit the maximum
potential of creativity, though not so oppressive as to be
1
stifling. The "Law of Compensation" expresses his mechanical
formulation of this principle. It states that an excessive
challenge by either the physical or the human environment must
2
be compensated by an alleviation of the alternate factor. Such
was the case of Switzerland and Holland, both of which mastered
a prohibitive physical environment in exchange for the lessen-
ing of the human pressures.

The postulation of the Golden Mean raises formidable
problems in methodology. For how is a challenge proved excess-
ive? The unsuccessful response to a particular challenge may
merely indicate a lack of inner reactive ability. Toynbee of-
fers two approaches. An excessive challenge can be proved by
a relation in three terms, of which, in comparable conditions,
the Golden Mean of severity produced the optimum response.
Another version of the same may be found in the
3

The abortive civilizations which collapsed soon upon
attaining birth under the formidableness of their challenges.
constitute another testimony to the possibility of an excessive
stimulus. Thus the Far Western Civilization of the Celtic

1. For a discussion of the essential meaninglessness of this
   adaptation of an Aristotelian concept see post Conclusions.

2. Toynbee op. cit. Vol.II. p. 274.

3. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 290. For illustrations see p.
   291-322. This argument, of course, does not really resolve
   the original dilemma, since all terms are defined by each
   other. mutually define each other.

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a correspondingly successful response, can this process be in-
finitely continued? Toynbee defines the optimum challenge as
the Golden Mean, of sufficient intensity to elicit the maximum
potential of creativity, though not so oppressive as to be
stifling. The "Law of Compensation" expresses his mechanical
formulation of this principle. It states that an excessive
challenge by either the physical or the human environment must
be compensated by an alleviation of the alternate factor. Such
was the case of Switzerland and Holland, both of which mastered
a prohibitive physical environment in exchange for the lessen-
ing of the human pressures.

The abortive civilizations which collapsed soon upon
attaining birth under the formidableness of their challenges
constitute another testimony to the possibility of an excessive
stimulus. Thus the Far Western Civilization of the Celtic

3. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. I. p. 290. For illustrations see p.
291-322. This argument, of course, does not really resolve
the original dilemma.

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## The Growth of Civilizations.

The growth of civilizations in Toynbee's scheme does not exhibit an immanent inexorability, but a process of increasing self-determination, with break-down the penalty for an unsuccessful response. Just as the genesis of civilizations results from the reaction to the challenge of disequilibrium, so growth constitutes a series of successful responses to continuing challenges. The loss of the capacity for successful response, or the appearance of an excessive challenge, mark the stage of breakdown. The difficulty of uniting the metaphysical assumptions with the empirical data reappears, again methodology constitutes the weak point in the pragmatic approach. The question of whether the insuperability of the challenge or the weakness of the response are signs of the breakdown, whether etheralization results from an inner state or a physical extend that perforce becomes its own environment represent the problems of this phase of Toynbee's philosophy.

Once the genesis of civilizations has been accomplished and the dangers inherent in birth overcome, must their subsequent development follow a uniform pattern? Does every civilization, which avoids being abortive, exhibit identical symptoms of growth? Toynbee distinguishes a third specimen of the genus, the arrested 1 civilizations, to refute the necessity of uniform growth. All the arrested civilizations have been petrified in response to a challenge of such severity that its solution required a tour de

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. III. p. 3.

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force. The entire strength of the society was required for res-
ponding to this oppressive stimulus, a task achieved only at
the price of pegging the civilization at a level of inflexible
readiness for one crisis.

Such was the case of the Polynesians who had responded
to the challenge of the Pacific Ocean with an intensity just
sufficient for the attainment of an equilibrium. They succeeded
in crossing the vast spaces but never with any margin of safety,
until the tension went slack and their civilization degenerated
on the forgotten islands of the Pacific.

This, too, is Toynbee's conception of the history of the
Nomads whose existence results from a successful response to the
recurrent challenge of desiccation. The drought forces the
cultivators of the soil to either withdraw to more fertile
regions or to launch themselves on the inhospitable and steppe,
no longer the domesticators of plants, but of animals. Mani-
festly the latter is a higher art, more comparable to Industrial-
ism than to agriculture. It substitutes the indirect utiliza-
tion of vegetation, for the planting of crops, by causing tame
GRAZING animals to feed on the sparse produce of the Steppe (transformed)
ing them into food and clothing. This involves a Division of
Labor and a hierarchy of specialization articulated into the nomad,
his animal auxiliaries (the dog, camel, etc.) and the animal
herds of cattle. The survival of the group depends on a finely

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. III. p. 12.

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This, too, is Toynbee's conception of the history of the
Nomads whose existence results from a successful response to the
recurrent challenge of desiccation. The drought forces the
cultivators of the soil to either withdraw to more fertile
regions or to launch themselves on the inhospitable and steppe,
no longer the domesticators of plants, but of animals. Mani-
festly the latter is a higher art, more comparable to Industrial-
ism than to agriculture. It substitutes the indirect utiliza-
tion of vegetation, for the planting of crops by causing tame
animals to feed on the sparse produce of the Steppe transform-
ing them into food and clothing. This involves a Division of
Labor and a hierarchy of specialization articulated into the nomad,
his animal auxiliaries (the dog, camel, etc.) and the animal
herds of cattle. The survival of the group depends on a finely

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Aeschylus' trilogy contains a poetic chronicle of Hellenic history. The challenge inherent in birth had been overcome and under Athenian leadership Hellas had advanced from the Minoan interregnum to the summit of achievement. Zeus represents the danger of the arrested civilizations, the forces of which, opportunity immobilized in a social fabric of caste and specialization, only an issue in violent explosion. Prometheus testifies to the Elan that breaks the stranglehold of this tradition and offers continuous opportunities for fresh creation. Under his impact Zeus is galvanized into dynamic activity. In time, the Promethean victory becomes the condition of even Zeus' survival. Similarly the history of Hellas disclosed a recurrent series of challenges. The first challenge, offered by the barbarian highlanders evoked the response of mastery over the brigands. This victory decided that Hellas should be a world of cities and agriculture, not of villages and pasturelands. The limit of maximum density of population supportable by agriculture proved to be inelastic, however. The Malthusion problem served initially as a stimulus for overseas expansion. But the impact of Hellenic imperialism evoked the reaction of greater unity among the Mediterranean peoples and set an effective limit to Greek colonization.

This challenge of overpopulation was finally solved by Athens, which became the "education of Hellas". Under its

1. It is doubtful whether Pericles meant his reference to Athens as the education of Hellas in an economic sense.

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minority the withdrawal of which results in an inward tempering and which becomes effective through its return. It leads by mimesis, a social drill, in the absence of the direct inspiration which will be attained at the next level of integration. Life presents a series of problems, each a challenge to undergo an ordeal. Yet each problem is essentially unique, each response singular. Moreover the successful solution of one problem exposes the civilization to a new challenge, the nature of which is largely determined by the previous response. Spengler asserted that each Culture possessed a soul, which revealed itself through the selection of its appropriate symbolism in the apprehension of which contained the key to understanding of its development. This Toynbee denies. He opts for a willed direction, based on a series of overbalances, each successful response creating a fresh challenge. Differentiation is achieved by growth, not through a determined immanence.

The Growth of civilizations, in Toynbee's scheme, exhibits that purposiveness, which his metaphysical assumptions postulate. The dependence of Toynbee's concepts on Dante is striking, though its precipe resembles nothing so much as Dante's Mount Purgatory. The direct mutual illumination in the new state of Yin parallels the ability of the denizen of Dante's Paradise to reach each other's thoughts.

Yet again the empirical method leads to the logical inconsistencies and philosophical difficulties observed previously.

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minority the withdrawal of which results in an inward tempering and which becomes effective through its return. It leads by mimesis, a social drill, in the absence of the direct inspiration which will be attained at the next level of integration. Life presents a series of problems, each a challenge to undergo an ordeal. Yet each problem is essentially unique, each response singular. Moreover the successful solution of one problem exposes the civilization to a new challenge, the nature of which is largely determined by the previous response. Spengler asserted that each Culture possessed a soul, which revealed itself through the selection of its appropriate symbolism the apprehension of which contained the key to understanding of its development. This Toynbee denies. He opts for a willed direction, based on a series of overbalances, each successful response creating a fresh challenge. Differentiation is achieved by growth, not through a determined immanence.

The Growth of civilizations, in Toynbee's scheme, exhibits that purposiveness, which his metaphysical assumptions postulate. The dependence of Toynbee's concepts on Dante is striking, Toynbee's precipe resembles nothing so much as Dante's Mount Purgatory, the direct mutual illumination in the new state of Yin parallels the ability of the denizen of Dante's Paradise to reach each other's thoughts.

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the breakdown proceeds and the inner strength of society dissipates itself in domestic strife, the barbarians beyond the borders cease to be charmed by the civilization's creativeness and overrun large areas. This, again, is a result not a cause of the inner decline. The barbarians appearance on the civilizations geographical field heralds the beginning of the time of troubles from which in time a new civilization emerges.

Similarly the impact of an alien civilization may not cause a society's breakdown. An alien civilization succeeds in making its domination effective only in the advanced social stages of legal breakdown. A society that has undergone a prolonged "Time of Troubles", without being able to create a universal state may welcome an alien intrusion that affords relief from the intolerable warfare. This was the service performed by the Ottomans for the Orthodox-Christian civilization which had broken down in the Bulgar wars of the 11th century. The interethnic warfare of the subsequent centuries had not issued from the peace of a universal state and in these circumstances the Ottoman Empire represented a relief from an oppressive situation. This, too, according to Toynbee, seems the condition of Russia, Japan and India all of which achieved universal states under Western inspiration.

Its human environment may absorb a society in two ways. The more painful process of apparetation-and-affiliation really

1. Toynbee op. cit. Vol. IV. p. 89.

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Similarly the impact of an alien civilization can not account for a society's breakdown. An alien civilization succeeds in making its domination effective only in the advanced stages of logical breakdown. A society that has undergone a prolonged "Time of Troubles", without being able to create a universal state may welcome an alien intrusion that afford relief from the intolerable warfare. This was the service performed by the Osmalis for the Orthodox-Christian civilization which had broken down in the Bulgar wars of the 11th century. The internerine warfare of the subsequent centuries had not issued into the peace of a universal state and in these circumstances the Ottoman Empire represented a relief from an oppressive situation. This, too, according to Toynbee, seems the condition of Russia, Japan and India all of which achieved universal states under Western inspiration.

Its human environment may absorb a society in two ways. The more painful process of appellation-and-affiliation really

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the motive-force of the universe and This World is conceived as
but the preparation for the Kingdom of God. For this reason, the
SUBMIT
Le subject
evolutionary manifestations of the Elan Vital ~~He~~ subjects to a
normative criticism which rejects militarism as an original sin
and which judges all actions by their aptness for the attain-
ment of the Kingdom of God. The criticism of the typical atti-
tudes of a soul are less descriptions of the alternatives of a
disintegrating society than the denial of the substantiality
1
of all secular activity. In the final analysis only the King-
dom of God matters. Mundane success hides the inner hollowness
of political institutions, the existence of which ever depends
on violence.

The difficulties of Toynbee's position are compounded
by the utilization of an empirical approach whose exhibition of
deep learning tends to obscure its methodological shallowness.
Empirical analysis relies on a recognition of recurrent situa-
tions. The formulation of laws requires a comparability of
phenomena. The inner meaning of these manifestations can not

1. Toynbee's categories of archaism, futurism and promiscuity lead to this conclusion. It is obvious that all activity must fit one of these classifications. For example, Toynbee castigates the Renaissance for its traditionalism and the modern West for its rejection of traditional art-styles. Similarly, Peter's reforms in Russia, Japan's modernization, Napoleon's administrative reforms are criticized as symptoms of a suicidal futurism while the retention of the British King and the organization of the Parliament of Westminster on the basis of territory instead of corporations is described as the emanation of an archaism doomed to self-destruction.

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the motive-force of the universe and This World is conceived as but the preparation for the Kingdom of God. For this reason, the evolutionary manifestations of the Elan Vital He subjects to a normative criticism which rejects militarism as an original sin and which judges all actions by their aptness for the attainment of the Kingdom of God. The criticism of the typical attitudes of a soul are less descriptions of the alternatives of a disintegrating society than the denial of the substantiality of all secular activity. In the final analysis only the Kingdom of God matters. Mundane success hides the inner hollowness of political institutions, the existence of which ever depends on violence.

The difficulties of Toynbee's position are compounded by the utilization of an empirical approach whose exhibition of deep learning tends to obscure its methodological shallowness. Empirical analysis relies on a recognition of recurrent situations. The formulation of laws requires a comparability of phenomena. The inner meaning of these manifestations can not

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enter into calculations, the uniqueness of experience constitutes a contradiction in terms. An empirical method is therefore unsuited for the demonstration of a theological view which must of necessity rest on a transcendental experience. To be sure, a philosophy of history based on theology is feasible, as Bessuet and Niebuhr demonstrate. Yet their formulation in the first instance, derives from a frank recognition of a normative pattern and a profound metaphysics.

RESULT FROM
Two consequences accompany Toynbee's attempt to combine his theological and biological approach. Survival, which in an evolutionary development becomes the only criterion of inner fitness is given divine sanction. Sin denotes the Causality of which failure constitutes the phenomenal manifestation. Success represents the reward for moral action. This Calvinist concept

INDUCE

1. For example of the utilization in terms of mundane success of even the concept of Transfiguration see the following quote: Toynbee Vol. VI. p. 321. "What response to this challenge is Christian to make? Is he going to look this way or that as if he would run, yet stand still because he can not tell which way to go - until the fire from heaven duly descends upon the City of Destruction and the wretched hoverer perishes in a holocaust which he has so dismally foreboded without ever bringing himself to the point of fleeing from the wrath to come. Or will he begin to run - and run on crying 'Life! Life! Eternal Life!' with his eyes set on a shining light and his feet bound for a distant wicked - gate? If the answer to this question depended on nobody but Christian himself, our knowledge of the uniformity of human nature might include us to predict that Christian's imminent destiny was Death and not Life. But in the classic version of the myth we are told that the human protagonist was not left entirely to his own resources in the hour that was decisive for his fate. According to John Bunyan, Christian was saved by his encounter with the Evangelist. And, inasmuch as it can not be supposed that God's nature is less constant than Man's, we may and must pray that a reprieve which God has granted to our society once, will not be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and with a broken heart."

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enter into calculations, the uniqueness of experience constitutes a contradiction in terms. An empirical method, is therefore unsuited for the demonstration of a theological view which mustof necessity rest on a transcendental experience. To be sure, a philosophy of history based on theology is feasible, as Bessuet and Niebuhr demonstrate. Yet their formulation in the first instance, derives from a frank recognition of a normative pattern and a profound metaphysics.

1. For example of the utilization in terms of mundane success of even the concept of Transfiguration see the following quote: Toynbee Vol. VI. p. 321. "What response to this challenge is Christian to make? Is he going to look this way or that as if he would run, yet stand still because he can not tell which way to go - until the fire from heaven duly descends upon the City of Destruction and the wretched hoverer perishes in a holocaust which he has so diamally foreboded without ever bringing himself to the point of fleeing from the wrath to come. Or will he begin to run - and run on crying 'Life! Life! Eternal Life!' with his eyes set on a shining light and his feet bound for a distant wicked - gate? If the answer to this question depended on nobody but Christian himself, our knowledge of the uniformity of human nature might include us to predict that Christian's imminent destiny was Death and not Life. But in the classic version of the myth we are told that the human protagonist was not left entirely to his own resources in the hour that was decisive for his fate. According to John Bunyan, Christian was saved by his encounter with the Evangelist. And, inasmuch as it can not be supposed that God's nature is less constant than Man's, we may and must pray that a reprieve which God has granted to our society once, will not be refused if we ask for it again in a contrite spirit and with a broken heart."

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1. of the Giants growing out of the earth. Toynbee's analysis of challenges involves the same difficulties of Spengler's postulate of historical necessity as a guide to action. For what constitutes a challenge? Toynbee replies that which produces a civilization. A challenge is proved excessive by a comparison in three terms, of which the middle term represents successful adaptation. The Golden Mean exhibits that challenge which evokes the most potently creative act. Yet Toynbee here defines not challenge, but the fact of survival. Just as the "pleasure principle", just as the "necessary" dictum, challenge-and-response assigns conceptual quantities to past action.

In these terms it becomes useless for the prediction of events, not because the reaction of the protagonist to the ordeal remains obscure, but due to the inability to estimate the nature of the challenge. Toynbee's empiricism implies that every event can only result from a commensurate causality defined as Challenge, and applicable only to past action not for the prediction of future occurrences. This is illustrated by his survey of the genesis of civilizations, postulated as the consequence of the stimulus of hard countries. It becomes apparent, however, that among Toynbee's twenty-one civilizations all climates and all topographical conditions are represented. This indicates that it is not the challenge which structures the response, but the

1. Toynbee utilizes the same misstatement to refute Spengler.

2. See post Ch. "History as Intuition". (Conclusions).

3. All these terms are defined syllogically in terms of each other.

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reality, the apprehension of the kingdom of God.

Spengler had a vision of the world-as-experience but felt only the organic element. Toynbee saw in History a machine, but recognized theoretically the purposive factor. His failure, despite many brilliant empirical analysis, resulted from an attempt to look into the mere manifestations of history for a proof of their noumenal significance, to find a moral sanction from an effort in political events instead of within himself.

The problem of necessity and freedom remains unresolved. But a way has been pointed along which the two realms can be united. If freedom is not an attribute of external, objective reality, it must result from an inward state that imposes its patterns on phenomena. If morality is not denoted by successful activity, we must find better criteria for ethical conduct. The two realms of freedom and necessity are perhaps reconcilable through our experience of freedom in a however determined world. The meaning of history may appear, as the emanation of man's moral personality.

We have come up to the problem of History and Man's Experience of Morality.

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Spengler had a vision of the world-as-experience but felt only the organic element. Toynbee saw in History a machine, but recognized theoretically the purposive factor. His failure, despite many brilliant empirical analysis, resulted from an attempt to look into the mere manifestations of history for a proof of their noumenal significance, ~~to find a moral sanction from an effort in political events instead of within himself.~~

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Serious problems are raised, however,
Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason is maintained. Yet,
on the other hand, Kant means that a hidden plan of nature in-
* WITH HUMAN VOLITION BUT AS TOOL OF NATURE'S MECHANISM. *
exorably compels humanity towards harmony, whereas
anise. Necessity can never contain a sanction for moral action.
Purposes-as the Critique with human volition but the tool of
*nature's* mechanism of Pure Reason abundantly demonstrates - are
not to be derived from phenomena. The Critique of Judgment il-
lustrates that a conception of purposiveness in nature can be
formed as the condition for mechanical law. Yet purposiveness
2 does not mean a definition of purposes. Though a demonstra-
tion of its impossibility would vitiate the command of the cate-
gorical imperative for peace, this does not logically imply the
necessity for proving inevitability. Moreover the possibility
of the categorical imperative results from its very conception
3 not from its relation to empirical reality. Theory and prac-
tice are united in the moral norm derived from a transcendental
experience of freedom.

Withal a road has been pointed towards the resolution
of our enigma of man's freedom in a world of determined pheno-
mena. The meaning of life has been seen to constitute the eman-
ation of a personality not an attribute of reality. Morality
derives its sanctions from the inward necessity of a universal

1. For Kant's implication of inexorability see FRIEDRICH FRIEDRICH "The Philosophy of Kant" p. 453 (Eternal Peace).

2. See Friedrich op. cit. p. 458. (Essay on Eternal Peace). For full discussion see post "Kants Philosophy of History".

3. See Bernard - Critique of Judgment p. 25. See post for full discussion also of psychological difference for proofs of 'impossibility' and 'possibility'.

-263-

Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason is maintained. If, on the other hand, Kant means that a hidden plan of nature inexorably compels humanity towards harmony, serious problems arise. Necessity can never contain a sanction for moral action. Purposes-as the Critique with human volition but the tool of nature's mechanism of Pure Reason abundantly demonstrates - are not to be derived from phenomena. The Critique of Judgment illustrates that a conception of purposiveness in nature can be formed as the condition for mechanical law. Yet purposiveness does not mean a definition of purposes. Though a demonstration of its impossibility would vitiate the command of the categorical imperative for peace, this does not logically imply the necessity for proving inevitability. Moreover the possibility of the categorical imperative results from its very conception not from its relation to empirical reality. Theory and practice are united in the moral norm derived from a transcendental experience of freedom.

Withal a road has been pointed towards the resolution of our enigma of man's freedom in a world of determined phenomena. The meaning of life has been seen to constitute the emanation of a personality not an attribute of reality. Morality derives its sanctions from the inward necessity of a universal

1. For Kant's implication of inexorability see Frederick "The Philosophy of Kant" p. 453 (Eternal Peace).

2. See Frederich op. cit. p. 458. (Essay on Eternal Peace). For full discussion see post "Kants Philosophy of History".

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to achieve certainty by an analysis of innate ideas was doomed
to failure, despite many great achievements of internal consis-
tency. The Rationalists were ever forced to abstract from the
uniqueness of experience in order to achieve the minimal forms
capable of intellectual manipulation. The problem of what is
deductive existence of external reality and its relation
antees existed that external reality corresponded to innate ideas
was in this formulation insolvable. The irony of the rationalist
position is best expressed by their ultimate recourse to an in-
ward experience, subjective certainty, as the final criterion
of the validity of their judgments.

Empiricism, on the other hand, faced the dilemma that
despite the acuteness of its analysis of ordinary thought, its
judgments lacked the universality which forms the foundation of
profound ideation. To base cognition on mere experience is to
risk the overthrow of one's concepts with each new experience.
In the field of ethics, conduct could obtain sanction only through
a cataloguing of pleasing preceptions.

Kant was thus faced with the alternatives of freedom as
a function of a mechanistic naturalism or morality as an en-
lightened hedonism. How in a world obeying well-understood laws
of causality can reason give effect to the transcendental exper-
ience of freedom? What impact can moral maxims have on the un-
folding of political events? What is the relation of history to
man's experience of morality?

Kant decided that the problem was insoluble until the
boundaries of the realm of necessity and freedom were defined.

-270-

to achieve certainty by an analysis of innate ideas was doomed
to failure, despite many great achievements of internal consis-
tency. The Rationalists were ever forced to abstract from the
uniqueness of experience in order to achieve the minimal forms
capable of intellectual manipulation. The problem of what guar-
antees existed that external reality corresponded to innate ideas
was in this formulation insolvable. The irony of the rationalist
position is best expressed by their ultimate recourse to an in-
ward experience, subjective certainty, as the final criterion
of the validity of their judgments.

Empiricism, on the other hand, faced the dilemma that
despite the acuteness of its analysis of ordinary thought, its
judgments lacked the universality which forms the foundation of
profound ideation. To base cognition on mere experience is to
risk the overthrow of one's concepts with each new experience.
In the field of ethics conduct could obtain sanction only through
a cataloguing of pleasing preceptions.

He asserted that a mechanistic description of nature did not
preclude a conception of its transcendental immanence, to be
derived, however, as a datum of inward experience not as a
category of reason. He limited knowledge to make room for be-
lief. His political theory and consequent philosophy of history
represent an emanation of his moral philosophy. ~~Kant reconciled~~ the antinomy
between necessity and freedom. Kant reconciles by way of an in-
ward state, a recognition of life as meaningful alternatives
based on an explicit limitation of mere rational analysis. Man
can find a sanction for conduct only within himself, not as an
attribute of external reality.

Kant's metaphysics, expressed in his Critique of Pure
Reason, thus ~~become~~ serve as the basis for an understanding of his
philosophy.

Philosophy.

Reason, thus becomes the basis for an understanding of the
Kant's a metanaphysical, expressed in the driftline of who
attribute of external reality.

can find an emmation for a consumer only within himself, not as an
placed on an explicit limitation of mere national analysis. Man
is a state, a recognition of life as a meaningful life.
which affects a recognition of life as meaningful alternatives
between necessity and freedom, some-reality by way of an in-
represented an emmation of his moral philosophy. The entity

filed. His political theory and consequence philosophy of history
category of reason. He limited knowledge to make room for de-
graded, however, as a datum of inward experience not as a
premise a conception of its transcendental imnence, to be
assumed that a mechanical description of nature did not

-547-

-271-

He asserted that a mechanistic description of nature did not
preclude a conception of its transcendental immanence, to be
derived, however, as a datum of inward experience not as a
category of reason. He limited knowledge to make room for be-
lief. His political theory and consequent philosophy of history
represent an emanation of his moral philosophy. The antinomy
between necessity and freedom, Kant reconciles by way of an in-
ward state, a recognition of life as meaningful alternatives
based on an explicit limitation of mere rational analysis. Man
can find a sanction for conduct only within himself, not as an
attribute of external reality.

Kant's metaphysics, expressed in his Critique of Pure
Reason, thus becomes the basis for an understanding of his
philosophy.

-293-

of the categorical imperative by other states can serve as an
excuse for war. The very existence of oppression should serve
as a stimulus to others to implement the categorical impera-
tive. Peace represents man's noblest duty to be violated ex-
cept in self-defense.

The pervasiveness of the moral law in Kant's philosophy
of history now becomes apparent. Conformity to the categorical
imperative represents the moral sanctions of the political world.
In this sense, the formulation of diplomatic documents, the
maintenance of armies, the utilization of economic means for
foreign policy, the employment of force all reveal violations
of a moral law, of which even the command for eternal peace
represents but a particular instance. Man's experience of free-
dom in a determined world issues into ethical activity and fur-
nishes humanity's guide on the journey through history.

But Kant realized that the application of the categori-
cal imperative to specific abuses could not provide the ultimate
foundation of eternal peace. Kant's three definitive articles
of the Eternal Peace, embody his conception of the absolute basis
of war, his affirmation of the supremacy of the moral law in the
political realm.

Kant argues that a true state of peace results at least
in part, from lawful institutions within nations. If eternal
peace is a moral law, it can be given effect only by a moral

of the categorical imperative by other states can serve as an
excuse for war. The very existence of oppression should serve
as a stimulus to others to implement the categorical impera-
tive. ~~To WORK FOR~~ peace represents man's noblest duty to be violated ex-
only
~~only~~ in self-defense.

The pervasiveness of the moral law in Kant's philosophy
of history now becomes apparent. Conformity to the categorical
CONTAINING imperative represents the moral sanctions of the political world.
In this sense, the formulation of diplomatic documents, the
maintenance of armies, the utilization of economic means for
foreign policy, the employment of force all reveal violations
of a moral law, of which even the command for eternal peace
represents but a particular instance. Man's experience of free-
dom in a determined world issues into ethical activity and fur-
nishes humanity's guide on the journey through history.

But Kant realized that the application of the categori-
cal imperative to specific abuses could not provide the ultimate
foundation of eternal peace. Kant's three definitive articles
of the Eternal Peace, embody his conception of the absolute basis
OF PEACE, HIS RECOGNITION THAT PEACE IMPLIES MORE THAN THE
OF war, his affirmation of the supremacy of the moral law in the
political realm.

~~The passage is uncertain~~

Kant argues that a true state of peace results, at least,
in part, from lawful institutions within nations. If eternal
peace is a moral law, it can be given effect only by a moral

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a monopoly of force, humanity's central political problem. The tendency to make exceptions in one's own favor ever fights against the assertion of the supremacy of law. Law, again, suffers from the fact that it is a product of man and at the same time conceived as embodying objective principles of justice. The emergence of a just civic constitution will therefore testify the proper disposition of the will. But this can occur only after many disappointing failures, as the goal of all striving, as the ultimate purpose of history.

The perfect civic constitution, moreover, presupposes lawful relations among states. There is no use in working for domestic peace, if war constantly threatens from across the borders. The ceaseless preparation for conflict, the feeling of insecurity engendered by armies, the ravages of never-ending strife, all teach humanity what reason alone would have indicated without all this suffering. Just as experience of the state of nature among individuals led to the formation of nations, so the eternal tensions between states reveal nature's mechanism for the attainment of peace. The creation of a just civic constitution, which will forever banish war and begin the era of harmony among mankind therefore constitutes the purpose of history.

The unfolding of events forces its achievement regardless of THE UNFOLDING OF EVENTS. Technical considerations will force the emergence of this constitution, even if moral precepts fail.

A philosophy of history based on these assumptions must be

1. Kant - Idea for a Universal History - Friedrich - op. cit., p. 128.

-304-

The unfolding of events forces its achievement regardless of humanity's wishes. Technical considerations will force the emergence of this constitution, even if moral precepts fail.

-307-

become a consequence of the determination of the will out of
a conception of the moral law, not a technical problem of man-
ipulating the mechanism of nature. This, indeed, forms the
foundation for the nine articles for the Eternal Peace. It
can not be asserted that their obligation depends on empirical
conditions. On the contrary, Kant repeatedly rejects the argu-
ment that the categorical imperative and its application to
the problem of peace can take any account of the accidental
1
constellation of political events. The moral law reveals the
objective principle that guides humanity's quest for a meaning
of history. It reveals peace as mankinds noblest task, to be
achieved through the institutionalization of the categorical
imperative in a republican constitution.

The Idea for a Universal History derives the sanction
for its political maxims from an inexorable development, however.
In its view peace results not from the determination of the will
by the moral law, but from the proper evaluation of technical
requirements. The categorical imperative at best arises as the
revolt of a frustrated soul against the dark uncertainties of
constant warfare. Discord may produce harmony, but only through

1. For example see this quotation. Kant - Theory and Practice (Friedrich op. cit. p. 414):

"The maxim about Theory and Practice which has become common in our wordy and deedless times causes very great damage if applied to moral questions. For the cannon of practical reason is involved in this realm. Here the value of a given practice depends upon its appropriateness to the theory upon which it is based. All is lost if empirical, and consequently accidental, conditions of the execution of the law are made conditions of the law itself. Then a practice which is valuated in relation to the probable result of previous experience is accorded the right of determining the theory itself.

-307-

"The maxim about Theory and Practice which has become common
in our wordy and deedless times causes very great damage if
applied to moral questions. For the cannon of practical
reason is involved in this realm. Here the value of a given
practice depends upon its appropriateness to the theory
upon which it is based. All is lost if empirical, and con-
sequently accidental, conditions of the execution of the
law are made conditions of the law itself. Then a practice
which is valuated in relation to the probable result of
previous experience is accorded the right of determining
the theory itself.

-331-

If freedom resides in the recognition of necessity and
morality depends on
personality in the sanction ascribed to the inevitable in the
environment, then the progression from Homer to Virgil to Dante
to Milton reveals an enlargement of the concept of freedom.
The blind necessity of the Iliad gives way in the Odyssey to
the vision of life as a possibility which leaves some margin
for human striving and the perseverance of whose hero is re-
warded by his return to Ithaca. Freedom achieved by submission
to an objective necessity was too oppressive, however. In
Virgil there appears the groping for a moral sanction, the
change in the concept of arrete from outward distinction to
inward Grace. Yet no such certainty was to be found in the
Augustan Empire and Virgil's sadness results, a testimony to
his loneliness in a valueless world. Dante removes all doubts
by attributing a divine sanction to necessity and solves Virgil's
sorrow by the bliss of absolute knowledge. In Milton, freedom
is completely internalized, necessity no longer requires dog-
matic buttressing. Justification by faith affirms the intrin-
sic worth of the individual.

This gradual enlargement of conceptual freedom through
the internalization of a moral code, culminating in the suprem-
acy of the individual conscience, represents only one aspect of
humanity's hopes, however. Life seems to involve death, in
history as in individuals. Though ageing in a culture is not

1. Whatever progress theory is implied in this analysis does not derive like Toynbee's from physical phenomena nor does it claim permanence as a criterion.

-331-

If freedom resides in the recognition of necessity and personality in the sanction ascribed to the inevitable in the environment, then the progression from Homer to Virgil to Dante to Milton reveals an enlargement of the concept of freedom. The blind necessity of the Iliad gives way in the Odyssey to the vision of life as a possibility which leaves some margin for human striving and the perseverance of whose hero is rewarded by his return to Ithaca. Freedom achieved by submission to an objective necessity was too oppressive, however. In Virgil there appears the groping for a moral sanction, the change in the concept of arrete from outward distinction to inward Grace. Yet no such certainty was to be found in the Augustan Empire and Virgil's sadness results, a testimony to his loneliness in a valueless world. Dante removes all doubts by attributing a divine sanction to necessity and solves Virgil's sorrow by the bliss of absolute knowledge. In Milton, freedom is completely internalized, necessity no longer requires dogmatic buttressing. Justification by faith affirms the intrinsic worth of the individual.

This gradual enlargement of conceptual freedom through the internalization of a moral code culminating in the supremacy of the individual conscience, represents only one aspect of humanity's hopes, however. Life seems to involve death, in history as in individuals. Though ageing in a culture is not

Corrected Bibliography

Page 384 Bibliography on Kant:

Friedrich, C. J. - The Philosophy of Kant - (Introduction, Modern Library 1949)

Page 386 General Bibliography on the Philosophy of History:

Niebuhr, Reinhold - Faith and History - A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views on History (Scribner 1949)

Page 388 Articles on Spengler:

Plato's Conception of the Future as Opposed to Spengler's.

H. Hansler - Monist 39 : 204 - 24 April 1929.

Corrected Bibliography

Ortega Y Gasset, J.- Towards A Philosophy of History (W.W.Norton Co. 1940)

Plato's Conception of the Future as Opposed to Spengler's
H. Hansler - Monist 39, 204 - 24 April 1929.

Spengler als Staatss und Wirtschaftsphilosoph.
E.V. Beekersch Schmoeller's Jahrbuch 47, 33-47, 24.

Some Problems raised by historical relativism.
B. J. Loewenberg. Modern History. 21:17-23 March '49.

Study of History (Toynbee) Review. H. Kahn. Journal of Philosophy. 44: 489-99. August 28, 1947.

Note on Collingwood's criticism of Toynbee. E.D. Myers. Journal of Philosophy. 44:485-89. Aug. 28, '47.

Idea of History by R. G. Collingwood. Review. M. Mandelbaum. Journal of Philosophy. 44: 184-88. Mar. 27 '47

Meaning of Human history by M. R. Cohen. Review, H. Cairns. Law and Contemporary Problems: 13 no. 3: 547-9. 1948.

Toynbee against history. C. Tripkaus. Science and Society 12 no. 2: 218-39. 1948.

"Kingdom of God" concept in Sorokin and Toynbee. G. M. Bryan. Social Forces 26: 288-92. March 1948.

Relative Archaism: a new fallacy and Mr. Toynbee.
J. W. Dowling. Journal of Philosophy 43: 421-35.
August 1, 1946.

Reviews of Study of History - Toynbee. Journal of the History of Ideas 9:93-124. January 1948.

Religion in Toynbee's history. J.H.Nichols. Journal of Religion 28:99-119. April 1948.

Some recent ideas of progress. W. Thomas. Personalist. 29:128-36. April 1948.

Nationalism and the philosophy of despair: pre-Nazi German ethics, 1913-33. D. Baumgardt. Sewanee Review 55:223-37. April 1947.

Toynbee - Reviews:

American Sociological Review (H.E.Barnes) 12:480-86 August 1947.