DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECCN

Joseph Kraft

12/15/71 8:45 am

HK: We're having lunch tomorrow.

K: Wonderful. I just got back and didn't know.

HK: I suggested it to my people three days ago so if they are through with their staff meetings on the subject can I settle it?

K: Wonderful. I understand what we gave the French. What did we get?

HK: Everyone who handles these things thinks it was a good deal

K: They gave up convertability?

HK: I can't go into the details.

K: The two Connally roles bother me; is it play-acting or is he getting turned around?

HK: Between you and me I think it's the latter. Excuse me, the President is calling.

12/15/71 3:40pm

K: I think we finished.

HK: Where shall we meet for lunch tomorrow? My office, Sans Souci?

K: Let's go to Sans Souci. You might be sick and tired of White House food.

HK: Yes, 1:00 at Sans Souci.

K: I saw a TV account saying the President seemed angry and black in mood in the Azores.

HK: Not at all; with the time changes your sleeping schedule gets thrown off.

K: But there was nothing to be angry about.

HK: The meeting achieved the best we could hope for.

K: I agree.

HK: We got constructive solutions and everyone benefitted. There were no winners or losers and we've stopped playing confrontation ______ with our allies.

K: It was a model of hard bargaining. I take it there is some understanding that there is not going to be conversion.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Bush/Kissinger
11:25 a.m. - 12/15/71

B: Henry, we are not secure here.

K: I know, George. I am glad we gave you the easy job you asked for and we will move you to some tougher one soon. Where does the British resolution stand?

B: Here's the problem. They are still negotiating but I am totally convinced that the Indians or the Russians will not agree to any resolution within the next few hours. The Russians are saying they realize we have to address ourselves to the transfer of power and certainly there has to be something of a withdrawal of Pakistani troops. Most of the people here are convinced that there is a massive stall going on. The French confirmed that late last night to me.

K: So the Russians are not playing?

B: No, not yet. The Polish people submitted a very one-sided draft. An Indian has come from Dacca - I don't know his name - but it appears to us there must be a surrender before there will be anything here. It is a hardening from yesterday morning although the resolution people are still talking about amendments. Bhutto was reasonably relaxed during the amendment discussions because he realizes there is no resolution until they have been driven to their needs. A little inside information - I had him alone for a while and he told me about a telephone call he had from his son. His son told him not to come home if you surrender, if you let Pakistan collapse. He was very emotional. He had tears in his eyes and he sat back with almost disinterest during the discussions.

K: His concern is to save West Pakistan. Look, just check everything with me. That is our objective too.

B: I can give you a call around 2 o'clock or whatever time is convenient on the green phone.

K: Call me at 2 or 2:30 would be better.

B: OK

TELCOM
Vorontsov/Kissinger

1:20 p. m.

12/15/71

V: Claim that I have speedy reaction to our talk but when I returned I had a cable from Moscow from our a conversation yesterday. "Advise President and Dr. Kissinger that we are in consultations with Indian leadership including in the Security Council. At this time we will inform President of substance of the matter."

K: It sounds constructive and if you let your leaders know my suggestions it which you should treat as thinking out loud.

V: I will

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012502
By D. NARA Date 6/10/71

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Vorontsov/Kissinger

1:20 p. m.

12/15/71

V: Claim that I have speedy reaction to our talk but when I returned I had a cable from Moscow from our a conversation yesterday. "Advise President and Dr. Kissinger that we are in consultations with Indian leadership includi in the Security Council. At this time we will inform President of substance of the matter."

K: It sounds constructive and if you let your leaders know my suggestions in which you should treat as thinking out loud.

V: I will

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Bhutto

12/15/71 1:25pm

K: I just saw a news headline which said you pulled out of the discussions at the Security Council.

B: All they wanted was for us to be parties to a surrender. They can do that for themselves.

K: Who is "they"?

B: The Polish and Russians.

K: We won't agree with that.

B: It was the most humiliating document that has ever been shown us.

K: Who showed it to you?

B: Involving pulling out of East Pakistan, getting Mujib out . . .

K: Who suggested that?

B: The Polish and the Russians.

K: We will veto that rather than agree with it.

B: I know that.

K: If we can get a cease-fire for you which leaves open political disposition of East Pakistan are you with us?

B: Yes, a simply cease-fire and the concept of one Pakistan, that would be better.

K: We are working on that in the Security Council and bilaterally with the Russians.

B: You are so kind in this time of crisis and we appreciate it.

K: We never forget our friends. Will you tell the Chinese?

B: Yes.

K: You have seen the tough statement we made against the Russians?

B: Yes, I spoke at the Security Council today. You will see the text in a few hours.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Schechter/Kissinger

3:00 p.m. 12/15/71

S: We turned a few pages of history here. A lot of things have happened. I thought maybe you might want to talk to me about some of them. I still know what a backgrounder is.

K: Are you black mailing me?

S: No.

K: Who wrote that brilliant analysis of India/Pakistan war?

S: I don't know. I didn't.

K: In case of war the first question to ask is who will be the x winner.

S: No but a feeling that Indian strategic role and we have made an effort there and not much of regime in Pakistan.

K: And 50 million Arabs and 2 million Jews and we should keep that in mind next time.

S: I don't try to defend the editors. It's gotten out of hand and not explained thoroughly enough.

K: By when do I have to see you?

S: I am going to Fla. Could you do it this evening or later today?

K: How about tomorrow?

S: I will have to stay over. What would be good for you?

K: I might be able to do it at 5:30 today. Let's aim for that.

Bv. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

3:33 p. m. 12/16/71

C: I got fogged in in NY.

K: I will see you later. As long as your people hold tight to your resolution
as it was at noon.

C: Yes.

K: We are working on Russians to support it. If they are not encouraging now
don't conclude that's it.

C: How about India?

K: We are not talking with them. Russians won't support it without India.

C: Indias are not difficult at moment.

K: I don't know how you tolerated them for those years.

C: We are a very tolerant race.

K: I want to talk about the Heath visit. I want to know ? ? ? if things go wrong.

C: ? ? ? . We are waiting for a message from India. It's very messy.

K: I will explain the situation to you when you get here.

C: Russians as of mid-day are prepared to go along.

K: Not reputed as of mid-day and strong representation from us and
looking at it now.

C: I will be there at 4:15.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Stans/Kissinger

4:00 p.m. 12/15/71

S: I haven't had a chance to talk to you or report to you. I would like to give you my judgment first hand. -

K: Could we do it next week? When can we start when hopefully the <u>crisis</u> is over?

S: I will be leaving Thurs. night. Shall I call you?

K: If I haven't called by Tues., call me. We are trying to keep <u>all</u> the heat off. Make sure we don't get <u>any</u> on trade. You are a great soldier.

S: You will find that all interviews are consistent with policies.

K: They are.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Sadruddin Agha Khan/Kissinger

4:47 p.m.

12/15/71

SAK: I am very sorry I wasn't in the office. I am leaving for Geneva tonight weather permitting. Before leaving I wanted to share a few thoughts. I am afraid all the things we talked about have materialized; and worse then we thought and I don't know what can be done.

HAK: Major takk must be to prevent an onslaught on W. Pakistan.

SAK: Including Security Council. With regard to E. Pakistan.

HAK: What the Security Council is suggesting for E. Pakistan is a ceasefire which will soon be an accomplished fact anyway.

SAK: The ______ in Dacca and ______ in zones. That includes ______ but not Bengal. Pakistanarmypeople who are seeking shelter to spare their lives in the next hours. You remember our talk on Mujib.

HAK: It's too late.

SAK: He would have been a major card.

HAK: Now OBE.

SAK: Except after recognition of Bangla Desh by India there had been a ______ /

HAK: The overriding problem now is not to talk up stupidities by Pakistan. It is to spare W. Pakistan and ? ? ? ? . I agree major mistakes were made.

XXIX

SAK: To help W. Pakistan the ceasefire which will be arrived at will help. It's all you are concentrating on.

HAK: Exactly right.

As
SAK: If you know there is a proposal for a mediator who could mediate like Jarring in the M.E.

HAK: You know area. If it ever became a live issue --

(Call disconnected.)

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Bhutto/Kissinger

4:52 p.m.

12/15/71

K: I just want to check with you in spirit we are dealing with each other to make absolutely sure. Are you willing to accept British resolution as it last stood?

B: With not mentioning of election things.

K: Let me read your paragraph. "including a political settlement in accordance with forces of people concerned in elections ? ? ? ? ?" That's the formula I have.

B: That's fine.

K: If it's acceptable to you we can make an effort to get Soviets to accept it.

B: As you read, it's acceptable.

K: We have promised Soviets if they vote for it, we will. I want to be sure if it's wrong I don't want to call the Soviets.

B: As it is now it's all right.

K: Now another problem. There's an Italian resolution. There will be as many as ingenuity of delegates will produce. We should be behind one. Shall we get behind the British?

B: I think British is better.

K: We will tell Bush to kill the Italian one and get behind British.

B: If it's possible to withdraw Italian one. I will be leaving soon but I was wondering if I could see you.

K: As soon as this is finished.

B: We have to think about post-war situation.

K: In Washington or NY and with publicity this time.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Bush/Kissinger
5:00 p.m. - 12/15/71

K: Two things. No matter what instructions you get you operate with us for this crisis. Second, we want you to kill the Italian Resolution if you can and get behind the British Resolution. That is the one we want to stay with because the more resolutions there are floating around the more confusing it is. God knows the British isn't perfect. I talked to Bhutto and he prefers the British to the Italian.

B: Let me go over and see what I can do.

K: Get rid of the Italian and make it clear we are behind the British.
We told the Soviets that is the one we are going with.

B: Have you heard anything about a last minute amendment.

K: No, I have an understanding with Cromer that the British
will check any major amendment with me. On the basis of the
last major amendment we are behind the British.

B: Ok, well, I'll go over now and see what I can do.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Sadruddin Aga Khan/Kissinger

5:17 p.m. - 12/15/71

SAK: Hello.

HAK: Yes, I think we were cut off, but we were just about finished anyway.

SAK: The one thing I wanted to tell you, of course, was the ceasefire on the Western front is completely out of my hands. Our presence has to be strengthened or no one will stop fighting.

HAK: I agree.

SAK: Now I have got to try to make an arrangement to facilitate the return of the refugees although I cannot talk to the Bangla Desh. But it will have to be a de facto kind of arrangement. I will have to go to Geneva but I will keep you very well informed.

HAK: Good.

SAK: It is really a tragedy. My father's whole life work.

HAK: Yes, it is a tragedy.

SAK: The part which the American people played at the UN will be very significant in the future.

HAK: I hope so.

SAK: At least you have fought for the integrity of the thing.

HAK: Right.

SAK: If there is anything in Mr. Bhuttos statement this morning which will be in any way noted it will be the whole business of the . . .

HAK: Yes.

SAK: We will have to find a new basis to start a whole organization on a new footing, if the UN can't do anything. This takes new leadership, dynamic leadership.

HAK: Yes.

SAK: Nice to talk to you and have a Merry Christmas.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Bush/Kissinger

5:27 p.m. - 12/15/71

The Ambassador had been talking to Gen. Haig
before Mr. Kissinger took the phone.

K: George, as I understand the President views it as follows: We do not want to delay the vote now. We don't have to get way out in front of everybody else either, but we want to use the fastest possible return which does not put us so far out in front that it looks as though we are just opening for another Soviet veto, but to move with all deliberate speed. You are not to stall. We are communicating this to the Secretary in the next 3 minutes. We are in touch with the Russians and we are trying to get them to agree on the British text.

B: The trouble is the British themselves have kind of pulled back their thing and the Pakistanis are trying to get other countries to back the Italian resolution.

K: But Bhutto just told me he is for the British one. There is one weakness in the Italian Resolution that doesn't mention Kashmir.

B: The first step is to get Bhutto and ______ on the same wave length.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Ambassador Cromer
12/15/71 5:55 p.m.

C: I have been speaking to New York. The Russians have told the French they will veto a resolution along our lines. Meanwhile the Indians being as awkward as they can be and you are quite right -- we were wrong to stay there for 150 years.

K: If the Soviets say they are going to veto it does that mean you won't put it forward?

C: We are asking London what they want to do.

K: It is an interesting question whether we are in a world where not only does a veto stop things, but the threat of a veto does.

C: I don't think just the veto itself would be enough to put us off.

K: The Soviets are this way because of the Indians.

C: I imagine this is true. I have told London of the instructions you gave to Bush. That will influence them.

K: And that we will vote for the resolution.

C: Yes. I have said that. You -- you will go with the resolution as long as it isn't altered too much.

K: It is really a key issue now whether the non-communist countries will just roll over when we are accepting the status quo of the cannibalization of a country.

C: A lot of the bleeding hearts can't figure out who the aggressor is also.

K: 104 nations had no problem.

C: No, but people not in government.

K: But people not in government have no responsibility in it. I can tell you the President wants to have it tabled.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger
5:55 p.m. - 12/15/71

R: On this business about the flagship that has a naturalized American on it, I was talking to Tom Moorer and he is unhappy about what they are doing about it. Does the President know that Tom has objected to it?

K: No.

R: We really should tell him because he doesn't think it's workable.

K: I will check on that. As I understand the issue is to save the people.

R: They have no capability at all and he just is worried it will be totally unproductive and he is not sure what the Coast Guard is doing at the moment either.

K: Get that to the President. If this is Moorer's judgment we should abide by it.

R: Right.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NARA, Dale 5/26", "TELECON\nAmb. Bush\n8 12.15.71 p.m.", "B: I'm just touching base to see where we go from here and whether there is any . . .", "K: We told the Russians if necessary we will veto the Polish resolution. You should give no encouragement to it.", "B: XXXXXXXXX It's dead anyway I think.", "K: We told the Russians we wanted them to support the British resolution.", "B: I can't get the Italians to do a damn thing but that might bring them around. There is a B______ one which sounds like a speech Bhutto made. It's on cease-fire and withdrawal; it's a very simply resolution. Bhutto in his speech said the British resolution is overtaken by events. ________ passed by. I don't know whether that means he wouldn't back it.", "K: I think the one of 8:00 last night we would go with, but don't tell that to the Department.", "B: No. The meeting convenes again at 3:30. I would like to have you take a look at the Italian-British thing. It has ingredients of cease-fire and withdrawal. It's a new one; we just sent it down an hour to an hour and a half ago.", "K: I will look at that. Keep checking with us and I want you to know the President is thrilled with WXXXIX the way you are behaving. He will write you a letter when it's all over.", "B: . . . . . . . . . .

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Brian McDonnell

12/15/71 p.m.

M: Oh Henry, I'm lost.

K: There is nothing anyone can ever say; there is no consolation. At least you had the privilege of living with an extraordinary person for a number of years which is more than happens to most of us.

M: It's amazing. I don't know.

K: I will try to get to the memorial service, but I may not be able to make it.

M: I understand that. You know, it really wasn't a terrible crime of violence; it was a struggle that did it. She wouldn't give up her purse. I know her; she insisted on doing things right.

K: She was one of the outstanding people I've met.

M: Yes.

K: And it was a great tribute to you that she felt so strongly about you.

M: I sometimes felt so inadequate.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

10:18 a. m.

12/16/71

E: How about that? Bhutto's performance yesterday.

K: At the UN.

E: It's tragic. What do you hear from the Soviets?

K: Nothing yet.

E: What do you think?

K: The next 36 hours tells us whether we are dealing with people who are
making a play for a strategic break ____ OR with people where some
co-existence is possible.

E: ? ? ? 345 Pakistani tanks at Kashmir border.

K: Today? Haven't seen it.

E: W. Pakistanis are talking as if they want war to continue in West.

K: They are ready to settle. Running out of spare parts and POL. They haven't
had military equipment since '65 and other side being taken care of all along.
I would have said inconceivable Soviets would jeopardize everything but now I
don't know.

E: Can you tell me ? ? ? ?

K: Have to wait.

E: Do you think it will blow up?

K: No but could have bad effect on middle and long term relations.

E: Could and still may. Do you know if any Soviet advisors helping?

K: Not for use, as a friend. They did much of reconnaissance
in East and West.

E: Why can't I write this?

K: Because you can;t.

E: On my own?

K: No.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

10:18 a.m.

12/16/71

-2-

E: Henry?

K: Wait a minute. It looks as if we need made it. Indians have ordered their troops to stop fighting along their borders.

E: Original borders?

K: Right. If it weren't for the incompetence of Haig who's in my office we would have done it 24 hours earlier.

E: Any word on how word was passed to Soviets --

K: What's the latest?

E: 1:00.

K: Absolute?

E: 3:00

K: You have been decent. I will tell you everything including reconnaissance when it's over.

E: I will call at 3:00.

K: I will be here. You tell Bradlee that it's one thing shooting ______ on something. It's another when you apply the Lindly rule.

E: Have you told Bradlee?

K: No and I won't argue with him.

E: I will call you at 3:00.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

10:37 a. m.

12/16/71

K: I think in light of bulletin we should hold off on seeing the Ambassador.

R: We don't want the President to think we are dragging our feet. We have called him in but we will soften it. I don't want to say drastic measures.

K: Say it has to be permanent and President teed off on his speech.

R: On advance (?) I have said make sure we approve it here first. We don't want to agree with what's happening in E. Pakistan. t

K: They are for the British Resolution.

R: They are so confused. We want to be sure signals are right. Joe and I will watch it closely and let you know if there's any problem.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
10:40 a.m. 12/16/71

K: The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West. We have made it.

P: What's it mean?

K: Ordered forces to stop fighting.

P: What's territory? From what you said yesterday -- taken Kashmir?

K: In West have ____ some desert and Pakistanis have taken a bit of Kashmir.
Major ____ is to stop defeat of Pakistan army.

P: What's the source?

K: Official announcement.

P: It's the Russians working for us. We have to get the story out.

K: Already a call from State. Until this morning we were running the UN thing. Now they are and say they will go over resolution. They are pulling off the British Resolution. You pulled it through and should take credit. I will give a backgrounder tomorrow afternoon.

P: Get people in and set story for the weekly news magazines.

K: Can't do it today. We have to clean it up.

P: Any other thing -- in view of Time Man of the Year thing get Schechter in. He will understand it. Or who at Time would know more about this subject?

K: I will start with Schechter. He has been decent.

P: Time might write best analysis of crisis. You really feel that they mean -- let me come back to it. You were bearish last night.

K: I felt nothing happen until Dacca fell. Soviets were dragging their feet because Indians took longer on taking Dacca then they figured. So this morning I said next 24 hours will tell.

P: If Soviets have cooperated on this I think we have got to play on an arms-length deal.

K: We have to get straight what they did.

P: What they did in '67 June war.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

President/Kissinger
10:40 a.m. ; 12/16/71

-2-

K: 60% instead of 100%.

P: June war.

K: Except they lost.

P: They got credit for bringing peace to the M.E. Agreed to peace after defeat of their army. And they were responsible for the war. Not a public statement but internal relations with Soviets. You handle that. ? ? ? ? You agree?

K: Absolutely. So we have not done anything. Indians did official doing. But I am sure it's Soviets that produced it.

P: On unilateral ceasefire what?

K: UN resolution making it official. When in ______ for weeks they want to come out and mastermind it. We have agreed to the British. Chinese are set with it. I will say I have talked with you and it is what you want done.

P: The President is committed to it. We have told the British and Chinese. Will the Russians accept it?

K: Probably.

P: Might not. If they do it's done.

K: One way or other there will be a resolution to put it together. State is trying to scavenge on your agony. Put it together with a UN resolution.

P: The average person doesn't understand about this. Pick the real movers and shakers. Ask Scali and let him sit in. Ask him who and Zeigler. Make it small enough to be powerful. I don't care if they are friends or enemies. Maybe Kraft. It's very important to do Time people and maybe a couple of network people.

K: Chancellor.

P: Anybody. You sit down there. Work it out. Get hold of Scali. A cold, blooded deal. On other levels let Scali carry the line. And Zeigler.

K: That would be good.

P: It's good to hear.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger
10:40 a. m. 12/16/71

-3-

K: The record will show again that you were ready to go the whole way this morning.

P: I almost called at midnight last night to say to Russians we are putting the summit on the line.

K: India would have taken Kashmir and ____.

P: Shastri got India's & victory wings. Only 30% of them.

K: 30% more than we expected.

P: You think the Russians did it? India would not have done it for us.

K: For us they would have done it (?).

P: I want strictest -- President make own decision. Hannah, Sisco, Rogers. I don't want Indian aid to maxx leak out but I will decide it. Shultz to examine budget and no Indian Aid init.

K: $300 million for S. Asia. $200 million to Pakistan and rest we will hold.

P: Give it to Ceylon.

K: Then we don't get argument we are cutting it. We can give agricultural stuff to India for economic relief.

P: They have to pay for aid.

K: Congratulations, Mr. President. You saved W. Pakistan.

P: Go off to other. No backgrounder until tomorrow.

K: As soon as it's cleaned up. I will get on it.

P: Don't do it pre-maturely.

K: Get Sunday papers.

P: Time and networks.

K: Congratulations!

TELECON
Sec. Connally

12/16/71 11:00pm

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: I wanted to tell you the Indians have just declared a unilateral cease-fire in the West and will let the UN ratify it, so we've made it.

C: That's great. God-damn, that's wonderful. Congratulations.

K: This one went down to the wire. You were a help . . .

C: No, no.

K: No, in giving one the moral courage to do it. It was a tough decision to make.

C: It sure was a tough one. You've performed a major miracle. Thank you for telling me.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON
John Chancellor
12/16/71 11:10am

K: I just wanted you to know that it's beginning to look as if that 72-hour prediction may come true.

C: I noticed there's a ceasefire in the West.

K: That's what we were after.

C: I saw it just... We've got Scali here, going over the footage on the one-hour show on the President. I saw the bulletin as I came down.

K: You are giving me 38 minutes of that aren't you?

C: As a matter of fact you are in it quite prominently at the beginning with the maps. We have to say something tonight about the overall situation; how does your day look?

K: Why don't you give me a call.

C: I'd like to as soon as I get something on paper.

K: Good, you give me a call.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Bhutto/Kissinger

11:15 a.m. 12/16/71

K: I have been seeing you on every TV show. If your political position is over in Pakistan which I hope not you can come here.

B: I hope not. I hope my country will last.

K: I have seen the Indian x ceasefire offer. I think we should formalize it as soon as possible.

B: The ceasefire but not dictation of political terms.

K: The text I have x from Indian radio is that they have declared India has no territorial ambitions. Ceasefire everywhere. Effective tomorrow, 17 Dec. 24 hours from now. Hope there will be corresponding action from Pakistan. Statement at UN tonight. So I think a simple ceasefire resolution will do it now.

B: It will but if India try to get Poles and Russians to say more.

K: We will go with The British Resolution. Is it still acceptable to you?

B: It is.

K: We will have Bush go ahead and no reason not to accept it.

B: Another point. In view of situation I was thinking if some reference to General Assembly which might prevent other countries recognizing E. Pakistan as Bangla Desh. India will try to get recognition. Eastern Europe first.

K: If we can get Security Council resolution. Mian thing is to get it formalized.

B: Next steps later.

K: We will -- before you go back I will talk with you. We are determined never to be in this position again.

B: I have a telegram from Yahya saying I should talk with the President. Will you say I have talked with you and it's as good as talking with him? I hate to keep saying I have tried.

K: I have always checked with the President.

B: Tell Farland so and the doesn't think I haven't tried.

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Bush

12/16/71 11:23am

B: I'm confused; what's happening?

K: Indee, as I understand it, has offered a cease-fire and unilaterally declared it. I understand their-Foreign Minister has been asked to submit it to the UN. Now we better get it wound up. There's no reason not to vote for the British resolution.

B: I have asked ______ urgently to meet me at ______.

K: I just talked to Bhutto. He still wants us to press for the British resolution.

B: He will take it as it is?

K: That's right. I told the British now there is no longer an excuse to delay the thing.

B: I will. Maybe when the meeting convenes, Singh will make that announcement. What's happening is the non-permanent members are getting restless, coming up with other drafts. Now we'll get the British one resurrected fully. We've been telling them all along this is what we want.

K: Right. State now wants to get into the bloddy act. The President's instructions are to stick with the British resolution and get it voted on.

B: All right. We will do our best.

K: And don't screw it up the way you usually do.

B: I want a transfer when this is over. But I don't want to go to the NSC. I want a nice quiet place like Rwanda.

K: This was a hairy one but I think we've got it now.

B: I just got a note saying ______ is trying to see Bhutto. They are all running around like chickens with their heads off.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
12:15 p. m. 12/16/71

P: I thought you should know. I called Mitchell on a couple of things. He was in a drug meeting with Rogers at the WH. I got Bill on the phone and told him that I x wanted Sisco and whoever at State to take a hardline on economic assistance thing. He said fine. I will do it myself. So he is on Salvo. Don't do it publicly. That's the line, don't you agree?

K: Exactly.

P: On your g background that's the way I would play it. Don't bust India publicly. It's where we want to have effect.

K: She's written a lett to you asking where she went wrong. The pdx policy is working.

P: You work with Sisco on conciliatory attitude. vis a vis State. Let them be tough instead of us.

K: I agree.

P: No reason for you to talk with the Indian Ambassador.

K: No trouble with State now that it's over. We are trying to get the British to ? ? ? ? ?. We have her text so it's genuine offer. Trying to formalize it because she can mext renege at any time. Talked with Bhutto and having Raza in. He thinks ______ and extremely xax grateful to President. He has Chinese aboard to.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Cromer/Kissinger

12:26 p. m.

12/16/71

C: It's not going well.

K: Why?

C: Because the instructions our people have at the moment is that if the Russians say they will veto they shouldn't press ahead. And the Russians will veto.

K: They are? I find it unbelievable that in surrender you cannot pass a cease-fire when a country will veto.

C: (I agree). Why should Russians veto this?

K: I don't know.

C: I think this is all I can do.

K: The major thing I want your people to understand is that we have people dancing around on the town so will you have your people check with us?

C: No one but you telling his anything except of course in NY.

K: Bush is our man.

C: This is state of play at the moment.

K: Should we get together on what will come out of Bermuda meeting? This afternoon.

C: Later part?

K: 4:00.

C: I will be there.

TELECON
The President
12/16/71 12:40pm

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

P: I don't know whether with the other thing you are aware of it, but a big story down here is the shoot-out . . .

K: Yes, I was following it yesterday and we scrambled planes to . . .

P: The wife of the captured captain is out here at the gate and I'm going to go out and express my sympathy on it. We cannot have this situation where the Cubans can pick up a boat in Bahamian waters and shoot it up. We Are we protesting?

K: Yes, we moved four F-4s to Guantanamo.

P: Is there anything wrong with my expressing smypathy on this?

K: I would like to know first what it was doing there.

P: It was not in Cuban waters or attacking.

K: It would have been on a raid.

P: It wasn't. But if it was, I'm for that too.

K: But you don't want to do it publicly.

P: But I want to take a hard line when Americans are being shot up. I want a hard line. This boat was in British waters and was shot.

K: If it hadn't been dark we would have gone in to do rescue work last night which is illegal, but the British would have shut their eyes.

P: Are you hitting Vorontsov hard on their joining with us?

K: I am doing to hear from him today. If I don't by the end of the day . . . with unilateral cease-fire resolution . . .

P: Are you watching for the Russians too?

K: There reply to what we gave them yesterday morning.

12/16/71 12:42 p.m.

P: You need to do some further checking. The report from our Coast Guard is that this ship dumped cargo at Haiti. It came down from Haiti to the U.S. unarmed. At 2:30 the Captain wired for assistance. So they had three hours of daylight; what were we doing in those three hours?

K: We got word at 4:00. We ordered an immediate scramble of F-4s out of here against everybody's protest. State was having a heart attack . . .

P: Of course. No, why was that . . . ?

K: Because it was in British waters and we had no right and all of that. We called Comer and he said he couldn't give us permission to get it. I said we

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President

12/16/71 12:40 p.m. p. 2

were going to do it unilaterally.

P: It's the old story; they keep nibbling off pieces. But you were absolutely right to order the scramble.

K: And we put the F-4s in there. We did it from here. I didn't want to bother you and knew how you would feel.

E: I supposed there is nothing we can do; a protest will fall on deaf ears. But I want a very hard line taken. These are American citizens who are being shot up.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCONE

President/Haig
1:30 p.m. - 12/16/71

P: Al, I just met with the wife and children of the captured boat. It is quite an experience because basically, as I have the story, the captain of the boat came over in 1960, an American citizen. He has made this run from Haiti to the U.S. with a little 1500 ton boat and a 15 man crew, all American. What we have here is a case of piracy on the high seas by an international outlaw. Correct?

H: Yes, but worse than that it was in the territorial waters of another state.

P: Now I am going to have Zumwalt put out a statement here saying that this is a case of piracy in international waters. They came to ask for mercy. What do we do here?

H: We have used the Swiss in Havana, called the Panamanian government and urge them to take the strongest stand and we have to get the British to bring pressure.

P: Now I want unbelievable pressure on the British this afternoon. I want the Panamanians to be called to protect them, but still what is wrong with the U.S., don't we protect them?

H: The only way we can do that is through the Swiss.

P: This is of the highest priority. Presently we are coming along very well on India/Pakistan, aren't we?

H: Yes, I am encouraged.

P: Frankly, Al, I wish I had been there, but if this ever happens again. We got the word at 2:30 from the captain that he was being shot at. Right then those ______ were to be ordered and nothing was done. I ordered airplanes to scramble immediately to demonstrate to the Cubans that we were about to take action. In the future I want the planes scrambled if they see the Cuban gunboat. I want them to sink it. Do you understand? They have no right.

H: Yes, but the legality of being in British waters.

P: Follow up on this, Al.

H: Yes, Mr. President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

John Chancellor/Kissinger

2:50 p.m. - 12/16/71

C: I came back to see Mrs. Gandhi's letter. How about that?

K: Is it out?

C: Let me read you something. I am going to be discreet about this to you and you will be about me.

K: John, if I can do anything it is keep secrets.

C: I know that. We have quoted in here a part of her letter which says (He reads starting with "The great powers of the world. . . ")

K: I talked to her in July. There was never any question of them. The question was how much time was there for a political solution and she said none. This was in July.

C: In July? That makes it strong.

K: In the White House we read out three basic propositions to her - unilateral withdrawal, discussion between the leaders of the Wambi League and Yahya and consideration of letting Mujib appoint these leaders. While she listened to all these three, she never gave the slightest indication that an attack was evident.

C: You said there were three points (1) unilateral withdrawal (2) discussion with the leaders of India and Pakistan and

K: And the third was Yahya. . .

C: I don't get three. I get two and a little more.

K: That's right.

C: The Indians did know this?

K: Absolutely. In fact it was told to Mrs. Gandhi and in July when asked about the time for political solution she said there was none even then and that they were prepared for what had happened. I wouldn't say that.

C: There are things in the AP which is all I have.

K: But she has it in her letter.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

2

C: That's interesting. Why would she say that in her letter?

K: Well, to say we weren't paying attention to the urgency of it. It was the first thing she talked about. On the other hand they were in the better position you know------not to move with Yahya having handed over power then was the case previously and if that had not been the case there would still have been time to take the extreme measure.

C: All right, then I am not going to put "yesterday". Do you feel now that her letter has been released, isn't it true we gave India more aid since '47 than any other country?

K: Absolutely.

C: Do you have any analysis as to why she did the letter?

K: To put us on the defensive. I think she was stunned by this criticism.

C: It really doesn't make a very intelligent case to me - the letter. I will look to you for guidance.

K: This other business about the unilateral withdrawal and negotiations with the Awambi League and the 20th still stands.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Jerry Schedter

12/16?/71 2:58pm

K: I understand you are making me Man of the Year.

S: Mrs. Ghandi seems to be doing it. That's quite a letter she sent the President, particularly that point about calumny. What are your feelings about the situation at this point?

K: Thought since we talked earlier this week we should complete it, or should I talk to Sidey?

S: No, let's do it.

K: Of course I always prefer to talk to senior people.

S: I can't see the expression on your face.

K: I'm joking. You think Ms. Ghandi is right?

S: No, but we have got an unfortunate situation there. The sending of the carrier, according to Times, makes it look like we are trying to influence the out come of the war.

K: The thing I find amazing in the press coverage of almost all of the papers are stuck in the muck and writing from the vantage point of an ant. What the Iddians are making at is irrelevant. They will not want to be a Soviet satellite. The same reasons that made them keep lines to the Soviets will make them keep lines to us. There is also something plaintive about this letter. What is she saying? She's complaining.

S: Yes that she was criticized for starting this. She is saying in her letter there is no feasible political plan.

K: No, she is saying there is only one plan -- immediate release of Mujib and making him the chief negotiator. But I didn't call you to discuss the letter anyway. We'll be answering it and making our view clear. She is not attacking the facts or the truth. I acknowledge the fact of what we did on the refugees, none of the concessions made to her in the fact that the almost inevitable outcome would have been a political solution. All she is saying is that her maximum demand wasn't met and wasn't met immediately. Let's just see if in three months they are still asking for release of Mujib and whether he'll still be in office. The thing we were trying to do we've done . . . prevent attack on West Pakistan and getting it settled. And it's hard to see how we could have gotten it done if we hadn't kept calling attention to the danger of aggressiveness.

S: I think that's putting a good face on the best situation.

K: What was the alternative?

S: The alternatives obviously fail. One has to get them not to go in there or at some point to get the UN to ask for . . .

TELECON
Jerry Schedter
12/16?/71 2:58pm p. 2

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

K: And she urgently asked us not to go to the UN. On two occasions we were thinking of it and at the specific request of the Indian government we didn't.

S: When?

K: October and the end of November.

S: Under what circumstances would we have gone?

K: The Paks wanted to bring their intentions to the UN. . . Indians in neither case wanted to go to the UN.

S: Did their request influence us?

K: Very importantly. In fact she wrote us a letter asking us not to.

S: When was that?

K: The middle of November. She sent it. Once the attack had started we limited the damage as much as possible. Don't know what other course we had if we wanted to limit damages and not have the whole global system shaken.

S: Limited damages as much as possible. . . What about this view that's cropping up now that there's a payoff in here for the Russians in submarine bases and new military influence?

K: I doubt that, but that's between them and the Russians. I would be amazed.

S: You don't feel that the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and that part of the world is changed as a result of this war?

K: I think they have been to some extent changes as a result of the treaty made during the summer, and some of the consequences that flowed from it. That fact of life having been called, we tried our best to limit it. But there's a major philosophical difference; I know the point of view of Time.

S: It's not my point of view.

K: In fact the other point of view hasn't even been presented in TIME in the last week. We are not saying this was a victory.

S: No, certainly not.

K: We have limited some of the worst consequences of what could have been a disaster for the whole international situation.

S: What's the status of our naval forces there now? Do you expect they'll be used?

K: With the cease-fire there will be no need for any evacuation.

By.

NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON
Jerry Schecter
12/16?/71 p. 3

S: Are we going to get involved in Chief Mujib?

K: I think that will take care of itself.

S: How do you feel about that letter?

K: If you want to have your story look good six months from now, you'll say the letter is a tactical event of no significance. It's something we have heard. To me it reads defensive and plaintive. This is not from Administration sources; I'm doing it for your guidance.

S: How do you want me to attribute this?

K: Say Administration official.

S: Okay, good.

K: If you people analyzed it cold-bloodedly you would have to say the only way to avoid war would have been measures they'd have screamed to high heaven about. The political solution, the only limit we put on that was we didn't want to bring about the disintrgration of West Pakistan. The outcome was forordained. And would have occurred in a six-months period.

S: When was it foreordained?

K: Would have been as soon as you brought the Awami League back into the picture. But obviously you can't argue against the fact that the Indians did attack.

S: Right.

K: The question is were they looking for an excuse to attack or an excuse no to attack? They were given plenty of excuses not to attack.

S: But as unpleasant as this situation is you feel is has been limited now?

K: That is right, and I believe it was our actions that prevented it if from getting out of control.

S: Good. Let me get that in.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Raza

12/16/71 3:55 p.m.

R: I got in touch with Mr. Bhutto; he was a very important message. If you can see him Tuesday or Wednesday he will stay over.

K: I got disturbing news that your President thinks I promised him American military intervention after 24 hours. That is total nonsense.

r: No . . . . I don't think he meant that. I never said that.

K: Everything I told you we did.

R: No, but I was told . . . not to go to the Security Council and to wait for two days or so. They it said "but if you want to go, you do so."

K: And I wanted till we had cleared it with the Chinese.

R: You want me to read that message to you?

K: Yes.

R: I will read exactly what I said . . .

K: Oh no, don't worry about it.

R: No, you never said intervention. If you wait until Friday I will have the Chinese, but if you want to, you go yourself. But I will read it to you.

K: No, don't worry about it.

R: (Reads)

K: It's XX December 11 he claims I told him something about thisi.

R: No, in fact I have been pointing out it is most unlikely you will be coming in. It may be intervention with the Russians or something like that.

K: That may be it.

r: Because I am not one of these people who breaks backs out of things. On December 12 I sent a telegram in which I said "at noon today Nixon made a strong statement . . . may move resolution . . . White House in touch with Saudi Arabia and Turkey . . ."

K: Let's not worry about it. I just don't want your President to feel we let him down.

R: No. On November 24 I sent a telegram observing that now is the time to decide on the question of calling the Security Council. He advised that it might be better to wait till he had a discussion with the Chinese and I had a discussion. I will go through all of the telegrams today.

K: Don't spend your time on that. I understand we are all under stress and

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

4:15 p. m.

12/16/71

L: There has been some sort of communication fall down over here. Yesterday in the early afternoon there was an approval over at the WH for the Coast Guard to go in --

K: The President is fit to be tied.

E: He should be. I was never notified that the President gave approval on that.

K: We gave approval and last next thing I know is State is bellyaching and Moorer and ______ saying we shouldn't do anything.

L: If I am not told when order issued -- I want to protect the CG but they never told me. They called after the MIGs had been scrambled and I got that through the back door. They should let me know.

K: We will make sure.

L: If the President authorized CG we have to back the CG up. I am upset about this. We should have gotten F-4s into� when the CG when out.

K: I agree.

L: I don't know who authorized this without telling me. I have nothing to do with CG but I can help the CG.

K: President said do it and I say do it. An hour later Rogers calls and says it cannot be.

L: It wouldn't have happened if I was there. But I was by-passed. I am stronger on these things. I didn't know President was upset about it.

K: The President's fit to be tied.

L: I am too.

K: You should have been told.

L: I didn't get word until it was dark.

K: The real mistake happened in the Task Force. Attack was at 2:30. First I heard was at 4:00.

L: Have to communicate on things like that. I can keep this building together.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

4:15 p. m. 12/16/71

-2-

K: No question about it.

L: But I don't want to be whipsawed by State and ____.

K: Pursely was told.

L: Near darkness.

K: I am told by Haig that Pursley brought up unshirted hell. I don't know what happened at 2:30. At 4:15 I heard about it. Shortly thereafter Pursely knew about it.

L: Pursely got in touch with me after that. I was with Mahan. I said get F-4s down there because F-8s not worth a damn. Pursley said we shouldn't get involved. I said we will get involved and protect the CG. I heard nothing until 4:30 in the afternoon.

K: You gave a good party last night anyway.

L: The first time was at 4:30.

K: When I leave you don't have to throw a party because State will throw a real wing-ding.

L: Dave makes out he deosn't like that but he had a good time. Great guy.

K: On that, there was a break down. You were informed as soon as we knew We knew at 4:00 and State holding on it for an hour and a half.

L: I could have gotten assistance there.

K: I don't think breakdown was between you and us. It was between State and the rest.

L: Pussely called me at 4:30.

K: I heard at 4:15 and Haig at 4:00.

L: I said we have to give assistance.

K: They got in touch with the President.

L: One American on that ship.

K: President is raising hell. He is blaming me.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

4:15 p.m.

12/16/71

L: Then blame me.

K: No. I am blaming Haig. We have to settle the Defense budget. Every
day Shutlz says you are committing ? ? ? ?.

L: I talked with Cap Weinberger and he says we have worked it out at 78.5.
I called Cap and said maybe you think it is worked out with Defense
but you haven't worked it out with me.

K: Maybe we can get together tomorrow afternoon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012587
By: L. NARA Date: April

TELCON
Vorontsov/Kissinger

4:40 p. m.

12/16/71

V: I just got very urgent instructions to inform the President through you that in view of the latest development in the subcontinent the Soviet representative in the Security Council is getting the instruction to put into consideration of the Security Council the following draft resolution. I would like to tell you what's in the draft and I will send it to you.

"With a view of re-establishment of peace in Hindustan subcontinent welcomes the _______________ and experiences hope that both sides would comply with the _______________ ceasefire which would ensure an immediate and unhindered _______________ of power to the people elected in September 1970 and ensure _______________ of the people in this region.

"Calls for immediate ceasefire and end all military activities in all Pakistan and line of 1965 in Kashmir. Welcoming in this respect a statement by the Government of India their decision to end military activities in this region beginning 1430 GMT, Dec. 17, 1971, and urges the Government of Pakistan to immediately adopt a similar decision.

"Calls on other state members of UN to fully _______________ of military activities and refrain from any _______________ to make it difficult on Hindustan subcontinent."

K: It's what you are going to do.

V: I have something addressed to you. In Moscow they express the hope that the Govt. of the United States will support this draft resolution and take all necessary measures to ensure its adoption by the Security Council.

K: If not, will you support a compromise?

V: It's best for termination of whole conflict now.

K: When will you table this?

V: Immediately I don't know how they will do it now.

K: We will handle it -- We will deal through normal process.

V: The Pakistan Govt. has made strong statements on their part because they don't want ceasefire on Western border.

K: We will use our influence to get them to do this. I don't feel your resolution is acceptable in this form.

V: Do you need it written?

K: Send it over.

TELECON

Amb. Bush

12/16/71 4:45pm

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

K: Did we ever get that resolution tabled?

B: We've got it working.

K: Russians now got a new resolution, but you can be sure they'll get theirs tabled in a hurry. 1

B: We've got a problem. The non-permanent members are with the President. What does theirs do?

K: It puts it all on the Paks. It's got a cease-fire in it. We could take parts of it if we can take parts of the permanent ones. But we will be god-damned if we will let the Russian resolution settle it.

B: I know what you mean. We've been having trouble with the Italians. The British and are giving us a hard time. But I don't think the Russians will get tabled if it draws opposition from the Chinese side because the British and French won't go along with it.

K: Okay, but see how quickly you can get this one moved. And don't accept the Russian one.

B: . . . . . and then pull out their own resolution. I thought we wanted to get this in ______ whether the ______, ______ and ______ are committed to vote for it or not.

K: That is correct.

12/16/71 5:05pm

B: On this . . . the British are locked in iron saying they will not support it unless it's unanimous . . . this damned Italian thing.

K: Then the hell with them. I've got Cromer here; if they want won't do it we will get it done alone. We'll do it without them. I want this introduced before the Russians surface theirs. Then we can come up with one that is not a Soviet resolution. It would be nice if we could get the British with us, but if they won't support it the hell with it.

B: We have kept a profile on it of not being out in front but of pushing. Is that still what you want?

K: Yes, stay off it as a sponsor because then we can ask the Soviets to join us without their supporting a U.S. resolution, but I would like to have something tabled before the Soviets table theirs so it won't be a Soviet draft. And if the British won't come along, the hell with them.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President
12/26/71 5:15pm

P: ... update on everything today.

K: Everything is now falling into place. The Soviets are tabling a resolution; it's better than the old one but we still can't accept it. We can't let it get settled on a Soviet resolution and secondly it is still very one-sided. Now the British are withdrawing theirs.

P: Are they going to support the Soviets?

K: That is unthinkable to me; that they wouldn't do. We have a good resolution with the non-permanent members and I have given Bush urgent instructions to get it tabled and told Vorontsov we wouldn't accept theirs but hoped it was negotiable and he said it probably was. He said let the people in New York talk about it.

P: What about the exchange of letters?

K: That's obviously off. It's just as well as far as the Chinese are concerned. We cannot support a Soviet resolution.

P: There is a unilateral cease-fire ...?

K: Yes, but we have a problem getting Yahya to accept it. The Indians told the British our offer is good for only 24 hours. She may figure Yahya XXXXX can't move that fast. I have sent a cable urging Yahya to accept it at least until the UN acts. This is all tactical maneuvering in the last 24 hours. It is aggravating for the people concerned, but nothing you need to follow step by step.

P: On this Cuban thing ...

K: You are absolutely right. It was a breakdown of communications between the Coast Guard, State and us. We were not informed of it until 4:15.

P: This lady said messages started coming in at 1:00.

K: But the White House didn't know about it until 4:15.

P: I want a report. You tell the State Department and the others I want a report.

K: We have already done that.

P: But you can do it in my name. I am personally interested; ... that I am god-damned mad. Do we have a plan ... You are trying to get the British and Panamanians to protest, and we'll protest it to no one I suppose.

K: We'll protest through the Swiss.

P: Trying to get information; find out if they are dead or alive. I want a contingency plan for this sort of thing in the future. If Castro gives us

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President

12/16/71 5:15pm p. 2

anything like this in the future I want a plan to go in and shoot them up. We
do nothing but make a timid protest. You say we will be on the edge of the law
and all that; that doesn't bother me. Does it bother you?

K: No. We were going to go into the British territorial waters. We were
giving orders here; the bureaucracy was having heart attacks and then darkness fell.
We would have done it.

P: What is the objection from the bureaucracy on this?

K: Complaining about international law; saying we would be getting into
an argument with the Russians.

P: Probably only you know how strongly I feel about the Cuban business. I
sharply stiffened Ziegler's statement this afternoon; it wasn't tough enough.

K: That's why I ordered these things without checking with you.

P: About recognizing Castro . . . it's going to come up one day, but
you understand.

K: I do.

P: And you will have a contingency plan for the future?

K: Within 24 hours.

P: I am writing a memorandum on this and on Allende which is for your eyes
only so you will know in the future how far I am willing to go.

K: That will be very helpful.

P: I was on the plane then -- you acted but . . .

K: It would have saved a half-hour's protest if I had had that piece of
paper to wave.

P: But you feel good about India-Pakistan?

K: Barring total treachery . . .

P: On the part of the Indians.

K: And the Russians. The real problem now is cosmetics.

P: What will this do to your backgrounder?

K: I still think we should do it/

P: But maybe not by noon tomorrow?

X

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
The President

12/16/71 5B66 5:15pm p. 3

K: I think it will be okay by then. The problem with a backgrounder is the Washington Post is now no longer recognizes them. I may have to do a series of individual interviews.

P: Or don't include the Washington Post.

K: But Knight now goes along with the Post.

P: So do the private ones. Can you imagine the British press doing this? Why are they doing it? They never did it with Kennedy.

K: They are trying to knock me off the public forum. This wasn't even a backgrounder. I said this was given on the Lindley rule. Krawlow made a very strong statement saying he thought this was an outrage.

P: At least will you be sure we cover this Time Magazine? And maybe the New York Times; that will screw the Post.

K: I think Time and Max Frankel.

P: And maybe the Star.

K: Maybe George Herman.

P: Ask Colson about that; maybe it should be Hempstone. I hope you are going to get a good rest.

K: I am fine.

P: I told Bob that you should go directly to California from Key Biscayne. Take your children and go out there. On the first I am flying from here to Washington to see Mrs. Nixon off. But this is a good time for you to get out there. Go out on the 29th if your kids can go then.

K: I have to have my kids back by the 31st, so I am going to Boston. But my kids will be in Key Biscayne with me.

P: Oh that's good.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Bush/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. 12/16/71

B: I got over here to the Council and the Russians were putting their draft out. They were just about to vote, nobody would put it in so I just went ahead and read into the record that there is another resolution getting wide circulation. I read this into the record. It could be ours or ours and the Japanese.

K: It is the one we approved earlier?

B: It is the Italian draft with just a slight change. It is the one Pakistan wants, the one the PRC would buy and exactly the one we have been talking about. I'd like you to back me up on this.

K: OK. You did absolutely right and if State complains you can blame me. Tell them you couldn't operate with a Soviet draft.

B: Good. I will leave it on the table.

K: Well, as long as it is not the Soviet draft it doesn't bother me.

B: We couldn't get any of the little countries. They will vote for it, but not put their name on it.

K: You did the right thing, George

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Rowland Evans/Kissinger
5:50 p.m. 12/16/71

K: Sorry I was so hard to get.

E: Anything going on?

K: It's winding up. Unless it is a perfidious trick, I think it will work. We will know by noon tomorrow.

E: When are you leaving town?

K: Sat. morning.

E: Early?

K: 9:00 or 10:00.

E: I would like a better view on some of this Soviet stuff.

K: I will do my best. Maybe we can have breakfast Sat. morning.

E: I will call your office tomorrow afternoon. I think there's a hell of an important story but it fascinates me personally.

K: It's a fascinating story and they have played a shitty role.

E: I will call your office.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
6:05 p.m. 12/16/71

H: I don't need to bother you because the President got caught up so I don't need to.

K: Coming home. Indian unilateral ceasefire permanent if accepted in 24 hours

H: Pakistanis accept?

K: We are working on them. Getting UN to ratify. By tomorrow all done.

H: I thought it was back on track. I talked with Al this morning. We haven't had any effort by Rogers to get through.

K: They are so far out of the game. Rogers said this morning he was taking personal charge. That was after India announced ceasefire.

H: That's good. We are back on track?

K: Yes. We have saved W. Pakistan. We turned disaster into defeat. Best we could do was save W. Pakistan. I am concerned about one other thing. Ad vance party to China & is turning into ________. We cannot announce now 3 heads of it. They have never heard of Zeigler. They expect Haig. Chapin Zeigler and Al Haig. I think it should be cut down on TV numbers. This has been a humiliating defeat to them. They are terrorized of an attack. So we cannot be TV nuts.

H: I thought of that. But with ground station --

K: They can do it with less. If Zeigler has to, he will.

H: We can cut back more. Let's try. It will smoke them out.

K: We are really skating on thin ice. You can trust me. I will background tomorrow afternoon. I have to do it with individuals. If groups, it will leak again.

H: You have trouble with the Washington Post and others will pick it up.

K: I didn't say I am making a major announcement on background.

H: Ben Bradlee will not accept background as background.

K: I said only on Lindley rule. Otherwise there was justification but not on this.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCON
Alton Marshall/Kissinger
6:20 p.m. 12/16/71

M: This is your friendly real estate broker.

K: I have just seen what you said about me in Cosmopolitan.

M: I said you are a sex fiend.

K: A moth around the flames.

M: Honest? What do you do? I do? Since 1:00 when I got your call I find that the Chinese group has contacted most of the real estate brokers in the city. So I am looking at the same houses. I have about 18 possibilities and a couple that have been checked this afternoon.

K: Should they get in touch with you?

M: I would like to help them.

K: Let them contact you. What can you do for them?

M: I can put some of my people at their disposal to sort out with brokers what they are being offered. Technical assistance. We are not brokers and don't deal in residences. If When I made the call they knew what the interest was because they had worked with them. I never used the name.

K: Where do they get you?

M: CI5-9000.

K: I will tell them what you said. Get in touch with brokers and technical assistance.

M: And glad to do it.

K: Here's the quote: "No one in campaign ? ? ? ? ? a month moth around the flame."

M: The last sentence has come out. He put that together. He asked if you like politics. I said of course he likes the political intrigue.

K: It's a friendly article. How are you?

M: I am great. I want you to see how great I am. We have the orange crates in place.

BY

NARA, Dalo

5/26

Marshall/Kissinger

6:20 a.m.

12/16/7

-2-

K: You have the girl I have been after for years.

M: Are you coming up for Christmas eve?

K: I may be up in NY.

M: Would you consider coming to our apt. with Nancy? For eggnog.
It's Sarah's first house with a Christmas tree.

K: If I come, I will.

M: She would be so thrilled. Would you make an effort to do that?

K: I will.

M: If you come before we would like you to come up. 7:30 or 8:00.
Whatever fits your schedule. Would you?

K: Certainly.

M: Not a big group. Bill Wicker (?) who sings at the Met. In town
and stopping by for a drink. Maybe another girl and another couple.
No background briefing.

K: I will do my damndest.

M:

By. NARA, Dato_ 5/26

TELECON
General Casey

8 12.16.71 8:08pm 6:42pm

C: Did you get a copy of the note Leo Cherne sent to Safire to get to your attention?

K: No.

C: Well, the International Rescue Committee is sending me to Calcutta . . . they are trying to get me to go with him.

K: To do what?

C: To review the refugee program there.

K: We don't want to give any encouragement to the Indians.

C: This is humanitarian business.

K: I don't want to give any moral support or backing to the Indians.

C: Well, I am not ______ about it.

K: I would just as soon you didn't.

C: Okay.

K: Okay, thank you for checking with me.

C: I wouldn't dare go xx without doing it.

K: Thank you.

C: Take care.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Shultz/Kissinger

6:57 p.m. 12/16/71

K: It looks like we are getting the war wound up.

S: Congratulations! It's an achievement under the circumstances.

K: We have turned a disaster into a defeat. I am not kiding myself.

S: I am on the subject of the Defense budget. I need to wind up.

K: First of all the President is determined on increas on F-111. The $500
million part of it.

S: In terms of economic employment impacts a spending program in the
'73 budget has no impact prior to election.

K: The problem is somebody has to give on that and since the President will not give orders and thinks I can get it done I don't know what to do. I was content with 78.5. He wants to do it for political reasons.

S: Let me track down what the F-111 amounts to.

K: $200 million.

S: What's the other item? We now have a sentence on pay (?) that takes 300 out. We have a 5th month in which they have not had 6 million in outlay in '72. Their spending level is below 6. Their ? ? ? ? 200 thousand between now and the end of the year. They will have to push hard to get spending up. They areawash with money over there. I will come back on the F-111.

K: Will you?

S: We do have to look this thing up. Another thing we have to be alert to. Say in it foreign aid handled in Pentagon. They are loading it into service budgets. Bad from a lot of stand points, including if you are not careful you will have each branch of the service with its own foreign policy. We have to have it here.

K: Where? Isn't it your job? They have it done there.

S: President would like that.

K: He doesn't care if it's donw there but not good through Foreign Relations Committee.

S: I will not succeed on that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Shultz/Kissinger

6:57 p.m. 12/16/71

-2-

K: Can't you set up budget procedures? No one will fight you on that.

S: I will if I can. Tell them not to put it into the service budgets.

K: I am not sure I understand it.

S: I will get you a memo on it.

K: Next year we want to give only humanitarian stuff to India. Less than 100 million dollars. Maury Williams thinks ? ? ? ? ? . ______ lump sum for South Asia with Pakistan getting the most.

S: You want only humanitarian type aid for India.

K: We don't want to face it as an overt thing.

S: Your numbers make it difficult. Amount going into India is difficult because people can add and subtract.

K: We will take that risk.

NARA, Date 5/26

[Mr. Hubbard in Key Biscayne]

TELCORN

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:25 p.m., December 16, 1971

H: You called before and I got the message 10 minutes ago for which I apologize.

K: I was returning your call.

H: Yes, I know. Have you had a good week so far?

K: Yes.

H: What happened on Air Force 1 and whether you had anything to say.

K: No, I was trying to do it for the reporters as a favor. At their urgent request to do something about the Azores and at the end of it took some questions from them on India-Pakistan. I said, Look this is not to be attributed and then I answered questions on it.

H: When I gave you the Pool report --

K: I suppose I could have taken it out then but I figured it was the Lindley Rule and they would take it out. If they had said it might and without ascribing Administration sources, I would have been better off putting on on background because then I could have edited it out.

H: You were ill served by some of my close colleagues.

K: The only part ... use the background technique to hide a major announcement. I was trying to be helpful to the reporters on Air Force 1. It was a long ride and boring. I should have taken it out of the Pool report. Using my name was no worse than using Administration sources.

H: I suppose so. Everything that you said has been forgotten because of all this fuss on ground rules. Dave Kraslow didn't hurt himself.

K: No, no; if they blow the whole background thing, I think they will get less information.

H: I don't understand my colleagues at the Washington Post sometimes. To deal with matters of substance, what have you been saying about your two breakfasts with Pompidou, how shall we deal with that, can you say what you discussed?

K: You can say we discussed the agenda, that we tried to narrow the issues for decision.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971

H: Oh, really. So that necessarily involved you in monetary affairs as well as national affairs.

K: Whatever was on the agenda.

H: Did you trade impressions on Brezhnev?

K: I don't think it would be right for me to comment on discussions.

H: Did you cover what discussions he would have with the President?

K: If within manageable proposals. I do it almost always. If not with the principal, with the principal's assistant.

H: On this, why not the head of State. Was there no one else there who could play that role?

K: In this case there were matters of more than usual sensitivities.

H: Fair enough.

K: And I happen to know Pompidou and in fact, I did this the last time he was here.

H: Oh, I didn't know that. Was it known?

K: I don't think so but this wouldn't have been known either but it is hard to move in the Azores.

H: Do you think you will be satisfied with the way things came out?

K: They came out very well. I think everybody got their issues covered which is what they wanted.

H: On South Asia, things have worked out well to the extent that they --

K: Worked out best way they could ..... I am not saying we wanted East Pakistan to go this way but when the war started we set ourselves -- It is boring as hell -- did we talk about it last week?

H: No.

K: It was Jerry Schecter I talked to about it.

H: (laughter)

TELCON

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971

By. NARA, Date 5/26

- 3 -

K: You didn't ask to see me.

H: I'm not complaining.

K: Our problem was to preserve West Pakistan and I think it is working out. A major crisis has been avoided by bringing all the factors into play including the Soviets.

H: About the hard line you and the President took on the Indian thing, there is a strain in relationships.

K: Yeah, I think we told .......

H: Was there a reason for it?

K: Yeah, but I don't want to go any further into it. Do not ascribe this ....
In fact, I have information that it is very probable that India would
attack West Pakistan and smash West Pakistan.

H: But the Soviet Union --

K: If we had not taken an anti-Indian line, they almost certainly would have continued.

H: I have no doubt of that. Actually, people say we drove India away

K: There is no doubt. We don't do this .... India bought about $600
million worth of Russian equipment while we were giving it billions
of aid so we didn't move it intentionally into the Russian orbit, nor
will their future policy during the crisis. They want to be independent
of the Soviet Union and we have no reason to believe they will wish
to become Soviet satelites. ...... The consequences of going
along with it would have been the destruction of a country of 100 million
people.

H: Any reason to believe the Soviets responded to U.S. comments or pressures.

K: I wouldn't say pressures but there were very active conversations with Moscow.

H: Moscow or Dobrynin?

K: I don't want to mention the channels used but there was very active action.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971

H: Finally they responded.

K: Let's wait until how the Security Council goes.

H: Would you say there was a change in Soviet attitude? In other words, either another 70 or another experience in adventure.

K: I think what we are in, the Soviets helped either deliberately or accidentally which like 67 they had great difficulty controlling.

H: That's a much softer line than you took on the plane.

K: On the plane I said they don't do nothing to restrain ...

H: Because they don't know how or because they choose not to.

K: Because they don't ... but I think they were one of the factors that brought it out reasonably well, assuming it came out reasonably well. We will have to hold our breath for a few days.

H: Did you take note of the Jack Anderson column this morning quoting you?

K: Look, I would be very leery of going with things took totally out of context.

H: It is pretty clear that it is out of context but are the quotes correct?

K: My minutes don't show it but my minutes might not report every word.

H: It is fair to say and it is ... that you were way out ahead of President Nixon even more behind ...

K: How could I survive in this Government where half the town is laying for me? You know there is nothing half the bureaucracy would like to find more than me with no support from the President. I try to give a moderate interpretation of what I believe are his views.

H: Would it be fair to say he was outraged or ...

K: It has never been our style ...

H: On India, to say it was ran from the White House with you executing from the White House.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971

K: As the crisis got worse, not at the beginning but where it reached the point when the [heads of governments] became involved. We brought it to the conclusion that was attainable.

H: It is difficult to argue with what it now considered success.

K: We turned a disaster into a net-minus.

H: Well phrased.

K: I am not claiming success of what had the capacity of being an enormous disaster put into containable limits.

H: Soviet supported Indian aggression.

K: In the case of military, active. I think I have stayed away from the word aggression.

H: You used it, we didn't.

K: I mean I haven't pressed on it.

H: Have we all overlooked ...

K: On a Lindley Rule basis, if there is still people to use it with.

H: It is easy to use it with one man but not with 150.

K: The Lindley Rule inconsistent with the Pool report. I blew it, I was just damn stupid, therefore, I am not claiming

H: Is that on-the-record, that you blew it?

K: No, no; you are not going to write about this?

H: No, I wasn't calling you about that. I wasn't going to use anything you said without your authorization. Oh, hell -- let's forget about that, it is not that important a story. It is over and done with and you needn't concern yourself with that. I am really interested in the Soviet-US. relationship.

K: On the Lindley Rule, you have to say it is worrisome. If you read what I said in the backgrounder about U.S. -Soviet relations, you will see that I was being very, very careful not to use unilateral advantage.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NARA, Date 5/26", "TELCORN", "Henry Hubbard / Mr. Kissinger", "8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971", "H: In the arena that the argument takes place . . . . . .", "K: In the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971

H: Are you including the President?

K: Yeah, and after all we didn't make negligible concessions. We had discussions with ...... offered to establish talks with Mujibur and his lawyer ...... They were never given a chance to develop. I am not trying to judge here, I am just saying India is not to be underrated.

H: The final solution on the Pakistani ......

K: Of course they may find out -- they will almost certainly be ...... The East Benglais suffered under the East Pakistanis from neglect but the Indians have a positive way to keep it under control because they can not have a completely independent Bangla Desh. .................... They have a positive interest to keep it in some sort of relationship and you have to remember when people say an elected government in Dacca was overthrown, this was perfectly true. In Calcutta there is presidential control. ...... Of course, I am not going to say Yahya was right.

H: Dealing with the situation given.

K: Our problem, given the danger of war, was to prevent it.

H: ......

K: I didn't mention China before because we didn't want the trip to Peking to be a success but didn't want China to think it is a threat.

H: From the Soviet Union?

K: From several of its neighbors.

H: On the plane, I thought it was an actual reflection of what you wanted the Russians to understand.

K: We had other means of conveying it. Will you check other quotes with me?

H: Yes. Are you coming down here?

K: No, I am out of favor. Look, the President -- this was his strategy and he didn't know what I was doing. He wanted us to get across to the Soviets that this had profound consequences.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELCON

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

8:05 p.m., December 16, 1971

- 8 -

H: All right.

K: On what basis were we talking here?

H: Ell, I think the basis is I will use the knowledge you have imparted upon me on my own and I will check quotes with you.

K: That would be very good. What about your other story?

H: I haven't finished it yet. I really ought to see you once more.

K: Yes, there's one part I ought to see you about. You know you asked me how much is mine and how much is the President's -- I shouldn't write it that way.

H: My impression leans toward the idea of your creation of the President ... that he has assigned you powers and if anything he is a little bit out ahead of you.

K: I think that's right. That is a fair impression.

H: I am willing that you can shape your ...

K: Up to a certain point.

H: He does have his own mind.

K: Of course, he does.

H: It is friendly --

K: and professional.

H: But that he knows who you are and what you both are doing. That your loyalty is to the ...

K: I think that is very perceptive. We can get together next week sometime. Or are you going to go to Key Biscayne.

H: Oh, is he coming back here. I will stick around next week and I think they will have somebody else here.

K: All right.