November 16, 1966

Memorandum

NOV 18 1966

To:

Mr. Paul Berman Mr. Jonathan Moore
Dr. Robert F. Delany Prof. Richard Neustadt
Dean Edward Gullion Miss Jane Pratt
Prof. Fred C. Ikle Prof. Lucian Pye
Prof. Harold Isaacs Mr. Frank Rendall
Prof. W. Kaufmann Prof. I. Milton Sacks
Prof. Henry A. Kissinger Prof. Jack Ruina
Mr. George Cabot Lodge Prof. Tom Schelling
Mr. Stuart Methven Prof. Frank Skolnikoff
Prof. Max Millikan Prof. Adam Yarmolinsky

From: Ithiel de Sola Pool

Subject: Viet Nam Seminar

The next meeting of the Viet Nam seminar will be
on Monday, November 28, at noon. This will be a luncheon
meeting at M.I.T. faculty club, Sloan Building, 50 Mem-
orial Drive, Dining Room one.

Mr. Frank Rendall will discuss policy alternatives.

RSVP: Jane Pratt - 536-3239 (afternoons and evenings)

November 29, 1966

Memorandum

DEC 1 1966

To:

Mr. Paul Berman
Dr. Robert F. Delany
Dean Edward Gullion
Prof. Fred C. Ikle
Prof. Harold Isaacs
Prof. W. Kaufmann
Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. George Cabot Lodge
Mr. Stuart Methven
Prof. Max Millikan
Mr. Jonathan Moore
Prof. Richard Neustadt
Miss Jane Pratt
Prof. Lucian Pye
Mr. Frank Rendall
Prof. I. Milton Sacks
Prof. Jack Ruina
Prof. Tom Schelling
Prof. Eugene B. Skolnikoff
Prof. Adam Yarmolinsky

From: Ithiel de Sola Pool

Subject: Viet Nam Seminar

The next meeting of the Viet Nam seminar will be
on Tuesday, December 13, at noon. This will be a luncheon
meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy Street,
Cambridge.

Mr. Stuart Methven will discuss cadres.

RVP: Jane Pratt - 236-3339 (afternoons and evenings)

Mr. Stuart Mathen will discuss issues.
Cambridge,
meeting at the Harvard Faculty Club, 30 Quay Street,
on Tuesday, December 13, at noon. This will be a launch
The next meeting of the Viet Nam seminar will be
at

Viet Nam Seminar

Subject: Viet Nam Seminar

From: Ittuel de Bois Pool

To: Mr. Paul Berman

Prof. Max Mifflin

Mr. Stuart Mathen

Mr. George Capet Lodge

Prof. Henry A. Krasunder

Prof. W. Kaufmann

Prof. Harold Issac

Prof. Fred C. Dje

Dean Edward Gifford

Dr. Robert R. Delany

Prof. RichardMEMNASTADT

Mr. Jonathan Moore

Memorandum

November 29, 1966

MEMORANDUM

January 27, 1967

JAN 30 1967

To: Members of the Viet Nam Seminar

From: Ithiel de Sola Pool

An informal canvass of members has indicated that the majority approve of formalizing the status of the joint MIT - Harvard Faculty Seminar on Viet Nam, following the model of the Joint Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament. We will continue to meet over lunch at intervals of approximately three weeks.

Any suggestions for future discussion topics would be appreciated.

The next meeting will be Wednesday, February 15, 12 noon, at the MIT Faculty Club (Dining Room 6).

"Psychological Effects of the Use of Air Power in South Viet Nam" will be the topic of discussion. The panel will include Paul Berman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Adam Yarmolinski -- and, hopefully, Henry Kissinger.

R.S.V.P.: Jane Pratt, Tel.: 536-3239 or use tear strip:

Please check one and return to Jane Pratt, 391 Beacon St., Boston.

I will attend ( )

I will not attend ( )

Signature:

SUGGESTED TOPICS:

MEMORANDUM

To: Viet Nam Seminar Members

From: Ithiel de Sola Pool

Enclosed are two articles containing
background information pertinent to our next Seminar
on "Psychological Effects of the Use of Air Power in
South Viet Nam."

Also, for the sake of non-MIT seminar members,
the next meeting and all future meetings will begin
at 12:15 instead of 12:00 noon.

The above meeting as you know is scheduled
for Wednesday, February 15, 1967.

February 7, 1967

February 7, 1967

for Wednesday, February 12, 1967.

The above meeting as you know is scheduled
at 12:12 instead of 12:00 noon.

the next meeting and all future meetings will begin
Viac® for the sake of non-MIT seminar members.

South Viet Nam.

on "psychological effects of the use of Vix Power in
background information pertinent to our next seminar
Enclosed are two articles containing

From: Initial de Sois Boon
To: Viet Nam Seminar Members

MEMORANDUM

January 1967

Discussion Notes on Air and Artillary Use in South Vietnam
for M.I.T. - Harvard Vietnam Seminar

1. <u>Present Policy</u>

Air strikes on populated places (except in support of ground combat) may not be undertaken except if authorized by both American air controllers and by Vietnamese authorities.

If, for example, an American plane draws fire from a hamlet, the pilot must radio back for permission before he may retaliate. Control on the American side is by an officer who may be only a Captain or First Lieutenant and who brings to bear such purely military considerations as availability of aircraft, alternative targets, etc. Control on the Vietnamese side is ordinarily exercised by the Province Chief, who is presumed to consider the political justification and political consequences of an air strike on that village.

Despite the restrictions, air and artillary strikes
on inhabited places are numerous.

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## 2. Justification of Present Policy

2.1 Evidence strongly supports the view that American air and artillary strikes have severely damaged and demoralized the Viet Cong. More casualties are inflicted on the enemy by these means than by any other. To allow inhabited places to be sanctuaries for the Viet Cong would aid them greatly and would draw the VC into places where they would control substantial populations.

2.2 The casualties inflicted on the population are usually small since the civil inhabitants know that when the Viet Cong make their presence in a hamlet known, the inhabitants should take shelter against the expected blows.

2.3 The Province Chief knows the political tendency of a hamlet better than anyone else, and is the man who must suffer the consequences in eroded popular support for unjustified attacks on civilians.

2.4 Villagers, according to one view, blame the Viet Cong who come into a hamlet for air strikes rather than the Americans or GVN. If that is so, the present policy helps lessen the popularity of the VC.

- 2 -

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### 3. Criticisms of Present Policy

3.1 By permitting frequent attacks on innocent civilians in inhabited villages, the present policy jeopardizes the legitimate use of air and artillery in close support of ground operations and for harassment and suppression of VC in the countryside. Press and public reactions will inevitably blow up at some point as they have recently blown up on the bombing of the North, and will fail to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of air and artillery. These reactions should be headed off by restriction of strikes on inhabited places.

3.2. The present rules inevitably lead to frequent errors wherein friendly villages are attacked.

3.2.1 The Viet Cong can punish pro-government villagers by mixing among them and firing on US or ARVN planes or forces. They apparently use this trick to get us to punish our supporters and thereby erode our support.

3.2.2 Province chiefs are often unreliable guides to the political consequences of striking a hamlet. They are normally educated, urban, military men with little feeling for villagers. Their intelligence on the true state in the villages is poor. They share the characteristic ARVN distaste for taking any casualties and the corresponding preference for so-called reconnaissance at a distance. Indeed, occasionally venal or private motives cause officials to assert that an unco-operative village contains Viet Cong.

- 3 -

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3.3 Strikes against villages are counter-productive.

3.3.1 Despite frequent assertions to the contrary, the villagers are alienated from the GVN and the US by attacks on their hamlets. The only evidence that they do not resent being attacked is that in interviews by persons from the government side they frequently say that they really blame the VC However, such replies are suspect. villagers. Vietnamese culture is such that any direct assertion of blame against the person to whom you are talking is taboo. No research has been done to directly measure attitudes where attacks have taken place and where they have not.

3.3.2 On the average, every time a village is hit it adds more men to the VC than the VC that were killed.

3.3.2.1 By making life in a contested or unfriendly hamlet intolerable, by destroying men's homes or capital, or breaking up families, many men are driven into the VC full-time who before may have been, at most, part-time. Viet Cong supporters.

3.3.2.2. The Viet Cong in a hamlet have better cover than some of the innocent inhabitants.

3.3.2.3. The evidence seems to be that vengeance against those that have abused one's family is a main and persistant motive for hard core enemy to the government.

3.3.3. Making it possible for ARVN to call air strikes on VC units with which they have not made ground contact encourages the worst habits of ARVN. A change in the rules that make air support dependent on ground contact, would encourage ARVN to patrol more aggressively.

- 4. -

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## 4. Alternatives

4.1 Between the justifications and criticisms of present policy there are some contradictions that could be resolved by research. We do not now really know what attitudinal effects bombing of Viet Cong in inhabited places is having and whether it kills or creates more Viet Cong. Careful studies are needed.

4.2 Granting of US permission for air strikes on inhabited places (except in support of ground operations) could be lifted from the FAC's to higher authorities.

4.3 The US authorities could be made responsible for making an independent finding of the political justification of hitting a particular hamlet, rather than relying on Vietnamese authorities for that political judgement.

4.4 The US civilian province-team chief could be put into the loop of permissions along with the Vietnamese Province Chief. The new reorganization provides for the first time a local US authority with the knowledge and comprehensive responsibility to make such a judgement.

- 5 -

USAF reconnaissance photo shows concentration of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at a site in North Vietnam. Missiles are encased in long, slim tubes for storage and shipment. USAF intelligence counted 132 canisters in this concentration.

# Airpower Gives U. S. Edge in Vietnam War

## Top military officials pressing White House to approve raids on MiG bases near Hanoi to bolster USAF domination of sky

By Cecil Brownlow

Saigon-U. S. airpower is providing the margin against defeat in the Vietnam war. It also is confounding Army critics of Air Force close air support and USAF critics of the Army's concept of helicopter deployment, at least when employed in the permissive combat environment of South Vietnam.

Airpower may yet prove to be the instrument of victory. But its effectiveness continues to be severely limited by White House-imposed political restraints on its use against North Vietnam and the Communist supply routes filtering through the dense jungles of Laos in a welter of paths and highways known collectively as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

If these restrictions remain intact, U. S. airpower over North Vietnam is in immediate danger of losing at least a portion of its present effectiveness in view of the increased activity of Hanoi's small, but harassing, force of Soviet-built MiG-17 and MiG-21 jet fighters over the past few weeks.

Top military officials here continue to urge the relaxation of all restrictions prohibiting the bombing of at least 75 targets in North Vietnam that they regard as purely military. At the top of the list are the MiG bases around Hanoi where strikes could destroy aircraft on

the ground. This, these officials contend, is the most effective and least costly means of accomplishing the task.

There is no doubt, they add, that the MiGs must be contained. If they are not, U. S. striking power against North Vietnam will suffer. Although small—about 15 Mach 2 MiG-21s and 50 old MiG-17s and -15s—the North Vietnamese force is beginning to do an effective job of hampering U. S. strike and interdiction aircraft.

The air space around Hanoi has now become a "regular MiG alley," according to one veteran Air Force officer

here. "Within the next three or four months, we're going to have to hit those MiG bases," says another, who adds:

"The MiGs are under very good GCI [ground control intercept] control. You go in with bombs on your aircraft, and you are at an extreme disadvantage. About the best thing you can do is jettison and run. You're in no position to fight. And, this is just what he wants. When he sees you jettison, he breaks off and tails it.

"... A MiG-17 or MiG-21 pilot normally has only the time it takes an aircraft to fly 60 mi. to acquire, launch and get into position against U. S. strike aircraft. It takes a skilled pilot to get into position. He [the North Vietnamese MiG pilot] is attaining this capability now, and it's time to move against the airfields.

"As it is now, even if a strike aircraft gets to the target [with an intact bomb load] the pilot has to spend 90% of his time in a defensive posture. This disrupts his navigation and his precise ability to get the ordnance on the target.

The major North Vietnamese MiG

16

Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 9, 1967

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# F-4 Sweep Decimates North Viet MiGs

Saigon—About one-third of North Vietnam's MiG-21 interceptor force was destroyed last week by a USAF fighter sweep of approximately 60 Thai-based McDonnell F-4C aircraft. The sweep represented the initial U. S. response to increasing activity of the Soviet-built aircraft in recent weeks.

The new MiG activity, which is leading top military officials here to press for White House permission to strike their home bases (see story), has severely harassed U. S. fighter-bomber strikes over North Vietnam and has forced a number of missions to abort.

Last week's White House-approved sweep was an attempt to answer this accelerated MiG threat one step short of actually striking their bases. It was made "with the idea of engaging any MiGs that wanted to fight," according to Lt. Gen. William W. Momeyer, 7th Air Force commander. It also was the first major fighter sweep of this type in the Vietnam war and proved remarkably successful.

The F-4Cs flew at an altitude of 12,000 ft. and were supported by about 25 Republic F-105s flying SAM suppression missions. The formations swept virtually all of North Vietnam before encountering and shooting down seven MiG-21s in a 12-min. battle. The fight ranged across a 30-mi. arc north and nothwest of Hanoi. No U. S. aircraft were lost in the action. One was damaged when it flew through the debris of a damaged MiG-21.

The number of MiGs actually engaged could not be accurately determined here because of the probability of several pilots sighting and reporting the same aircraft. The maximum number of U. S. aircraft engaged at any one time during the 12-min. fight was estimated at 12-15.

The battle was fought above a solid cloud cover over the area and ranged in altitude from 12,000-15,000 ft.

U. S. kills were scored by a mixed bag of Philco Sidewinders and Raytheon Sparrows. MiGs were seen to fire their cannon, but it is not known whether any actually launched their own heat seeking air-to-air missiles.

The first MiGs were sighted as they broke through the cloud cover at about 11,000 ft., and one locked onto the tail of the sweep commander, Col. Robin Olds. Olds went into a bank to the left, and as he did sighted two MiGs directly ahead. He fired two missiles at one, but the aircraft disappeared into a cloud bank before he could determine whether he hit it.

He sighted another, pulled up to a point above and directly behind the Soviet-built aircraft, and while on his back launched a Sparrow. After what Olds describes as a "tremendous orange flash and black smoke," he saw one wing fall off the MiG as it dove straight for the ground.

Despite their lack of success in action, Olds said, the North Vietnamese pilots were "using their aircraft very aggressively." The majority of the MiGs were believed to have come from Phuc Yen air base just north of Hanoi.

This action brought the total number of late-model MiG-21s destroyed in air action over North Vietnam thus far to 12. The total North Vietnamese MiG-21 force before the fight was estimated at 20, and the losses are expected to be replaced by the Soviets at the earliest possible date. In addition, 22 earlier model MiG-19s have been downed.

The U. S. thus far has lost 10 aircraft in air-to-air action over North Vietnam.

The supporting F-105s struck several SAM sites in the area with Shrikes and conventional ordnance, but cloud cover prevented any accurate damage assessment.

There probably will be similar anti-MiG sweeps in the future, particularly if the harassment of U. S. strike fighters continues near the present level. But they still will be the exception rather than the rule, according to officials here.

MiG activity had been building progressively over the past few weeks to the point where one veteran Air Force officer here describes air space around Hanoi as a "regular MiG alley," often forcing U. S. strike bombers to jettison their ordnance before arrival over target.

base is at Phuc Yen, 5.5 mi. north northwest of Hanoi. Another is near Khep, 40 mi. northeast of the capital. Jet fighters also have been observed at Cat Ba, Kien An and Gia Lam near Hanoi.

The latter has a runway only 5,000 ft. long, and it cannot be used by these aircraft on a regular operational basis.

Volume and capability of U. S. airpower in Southeast Asia has grown markedly over the past 18 months. Among the changes:

* Air strikes against North Vietnam have blunted its efforts to infiltrate and conquer South Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the rate of infiltration from the north into South Vietnam has risen.

* Air defense capabilities of the North Vietnamese have grown to formidable proportions.

At the same time, U. S. aircraft ability to penetrate this net has been more than equal to the task.

* Army confidence in USAF ground support has increased markedly.

* Aerial ordnance shortages are growing less severe.

Viet Cong, supported by regular North Vietnamese army troops who have infiltrated the south, might now have the upper half of South Vietnam under firm Communist control but for the Air Force-Navy interdicting air strikes over North Vietnam and Laos, in the estimate of a number of top officials here. Air strikes undoubtedly are crippling Hanoi's efforts to resupply the Communist forces in the south with men, materiel, weapons and ammunition. Precisely how much, it is difficult to judge. According to one official, "the air war in North Vietnam has stopped him from launching a major invasion or offensive."

## Vietnam Coverage

With this issue Aviation Week & Space Technology resumes its on-the-spot coverage of the air war in Vietnam. National Editor Cecil Brownlow is again in the field with U.S. combat forces in Southeast Asia, and his first two dispatches from Saigon appear on these pages.

It's 100% harder this year than last for him to get things down with the integrated Air Force-Navy system we have now."

One index of the damage being inflicted is that USAF air strikes have destroyed over 4,100 trucks and 7,000 sampans since the raids over North Vietnam began on a sustained basis in February, 1965. Another is the extent of Hanoi's efforts to keep its supply lines open to the south. An estimated 300,000 laborers, 120,000 of them imported from Communist China, are working to repair the damage on the road and bridge network inflicted by striking U.S. aircraft.

On the adverse side, the North Vietnamese are managing to infiltrate an estimated 9,000 men a month into the south, although the time it takes them to reach here was stretched considerably.

There also is no tangible evidence that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army units are suffering any lack of ammunition, except possibly heavy mortars.

Eighteen months ago, Defense Dept.

17

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Communists placed cables across Ban Pa Huone highway bridge over Nam Meuk river in North Vietnam after USAF aircraft destroyed it. Wooden planking (right arrow) was pulled across cables (left arrow) at night for foot and truck traffic carrying supplies to Communist troops in South Vietnam. In photo above, taken during daytime, some planking apparently have been pulled back from the cables and hidden on the river banks to give the impression of a useless bridge.

officials placed the infiltration rate at 4,500 men a month and estimated that Hanoi's maximum capability was 5,000 a month. U. S. air efforts have forced the Communists to rely more and more on the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam for their infiltration attempts rather than the traditional Ho Chi Minh Trail.

U. S. air strikes have prevented the North Vietnamese from moving any large numbers of anti-aircraft weapons, including the Soviet-built and supplied SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile (SAM), to points south of Vinh, which lies about halfway down that country's coast line. An exception was Dong Hoi. Some arrived there, but were knocked out before they became operational.

North Vietnamese air-defense network as a whole has developed into "a very sophisticated system" over the past year, according to officials here. There are now well over 200 SAM sites in the country, backed by a wide array of conventional anti-aircraft weapons with MiG operations integrated into the system. Conventional anti-aircraft weapons may total over 10,000. Conventional weaponry includes everything from light automatic weapons to 100-mm. anti-aircraft guns donated by both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

One veteran pilot describes the "Hanoi circle" as "the toughest defense environment ever created." Another terms the anti-aircraft fire as "worse than anything we ever encountered over Ger-

many" during World War 2. There have been instances where flight leaders have lost visual contact with their wingmen because of the density of the black smoke from exploding proximity fuse shells.

Almost all weapons above 37 mm. in size are radar directed, and the greatest damage to U. S. aircraft is being inflicted by mobile 37-mm. and 57-mm. guns. As of late last week, the U. S. had lost 453 aircraft to hostile fire over North Vietnam, most of them to these two weapons whose accuracy is excellent up to altitudes of 6,000-8,000 ft. Because White House restrictions place strict limits on the number of available targets, one top officer says the North Vietnamese, through experience, "can pretty well figure out where we are going and how we are going to get there, and they are ready for us."

## Effect of SA-2s

The SA-2 missile, while relatively ineffective as a weapon system, has served to disrupt U. S. air operations over North Vietnam, particularly in the area of target acquisition. To avoid the SAM threat, pilots come into their targets at near on-the-deck altitudes and then "pop up" at the final instance to make their bomb run. This gives them only a few brief seconds to visually acquire and line up on the target.

It also has hampered CAP ( combat air patrol) cover flights for the strike aircraft. "A CAP in a SAM environment is very difficult," an Air Force officer said. "The SAM keeps you low and denies you the air space you need for a defensive CAP. We still use it on occasion, but, by and large, the strike flights are their own defense."

Recently installed electronic countermeasures (ECM) on U. S. strike aircraft have reduced the effectiveness of the conventional North Vietnamese radar-controlled anti-aircraft weapons as well as that of the SAMs. Installation of this equipment, much of which was put through extensive test at USAF's Tactical Air Warfare Center, Eglin AFB, Fla., before its final acceptance, has served to keep the U. S. loss rates below those of World War 2 and Korea despite the intense air defense effort.

## B-52 Raids

High-altitude, pattern-bombing strikes against traditional Viet Cong strongholds and base camps by Boeing B-52F strategic bombers have proved so successful over the past year that a group of 18 aircraft is being established at Thailand's Sattahip base 60 mi. southeast of Bangkok to augment a unit on Guam. Even before this, B-52 sortie rates had been on the rise, from the one-a-day average of a year ago to three a day.

The new B-52 unit is being supplied

18

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at the request of Army Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who heads the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Prime value of the B-52 is its harassing effect, forcing the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army units to keep on the move, denying them any rest in their stronghold areas. B-52s also are striking north, hitting south of Vinh where there is no SAM threat.

Strike aircraft and helicopter-ferried 105-mm. artillery backed by infantry and the Army's armed Bell UH-1B helicopter are thwarting the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese efforts to mass for a major attack. They also may be forcing the Communists to reassess their present tactics and return to hit-and-run guerrilla warfare, abandoning massed, conventional warfare.

There is disagreement about this between the U.S. civilian and military leadership here, however. Military leaders generally believe that Hanoi will continue to strive for a major victory over American ground units because of the propaganda impact it would have on world opinion and the morale of its own forces.

## Support Tactics

Tactics evolved here since U.S. troops began to arrive in South Vietnam in mass in the summer of 1965 call for small probing units to fan out on the ground to find the Communist troops. Once they have been found, air and artillery are called in to do the job of destruction.

The artillery is carried into position by Army Boeing/Vertol CH-47 Chinook helicopters so that it is always in position to cover the infantry. "The Chinook," says one Army officer here, "with its ability to drop artillery and ammunition into small jungle clearings, has made it possible for us to carry out the major 'search-and-destroy' ground operations the way we are conducting them now."

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners cite as their greatest fears the B-52s, close air strikes and artillery, in that order.

Army commanders are no longer hesitant to call for Air Force close air support. Two years ago, Army of Vietnam battalions were severely mauled on at least two occasions because their U.S. advisers refused to request close air support, although it was available. Such refusals were based on the mistaken belief that armed helicopters alone could do the job—and a suspicion of the close-air-support concept in general. Hard experience in the field has erased such hesitancy.

Brig. Gen. James Hollingsworth, assistant commander of the 1st Infantry Div., says flatly that "tactical air is doing a tremendous job here. I can cite you example after example of how tac-

tical air and artillery have saved us over here. They are the two things that are keeping our casualties down." Casualty ratio of the 1st Div. in a recent major action was 17:1 in favor of the U.S. troops.

A MACV directive states that close-air-support pilots must keep their bomb and napalm drops at least 100 meters from friendly troops unless the ground commander accepts the responsibility. He often does, as in one of the examples cited by Gen. Hollingsworth.

Two hard-core, seasoned Viet Cong battalions with a total force, of about 1,200 hit units of two 1st Div. companies numbering approximately 200 men at 5:30 a.m. The American units suffered heavy casualties before the arrival of air. When support aircraft arrived overhead, the ground commander ordered the pilots to drop their loads of

CBU clustered bomblets along a line 50 meters from his troops. This was done with precision, and then the ground commander asked for a second strike 25 meters from his position. After this was accomplished, there was no further Viet Cong contact.

## Air-Mobile Operations

Tactical air cover and support is being provided for all Army air-mobile helicopter troop-lift operations unless a friendly village is in the direct proximity of the assault landing zone, on the direct order of Gen. Westmoreland. This compares with 18 months ago when Army commanders in the flat marshlands in the southern part of South Vietnam felt they could conduct air-mobile operations without tactical air support. They operated on the premise that, should enemy fire at one landing

Map shows the areas of major concentrations of Communist anti-aircraft weapons and Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missiles in North Vietnam. Most heavily defended area is shown by the ring around the Hanoi-Haiphong industrial and supply complex. Other strong defenses surround Hon Gai and Cam Pha, Yen Bai and along the river, rail and road supply lines around Communist China as well as around the cities of Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, Vinh and Dong Hoi. Largely because of U.S. air interdiction efforts, there currently are no SA-2 sites south of Vinh.

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Large Communist anti-aircraft artillery repair plant in North Vietnam was photographed by USAF aircraft. Several weapons can be seen in various stages of repair around the buildings. Facility is located a few miles southeast of Hanoi.

zone prove too heavy for the armed helicopters troop-carrying vehicles could be simply diverted to another area.

Air Force capability of striking at night and in marginal weather has improved markedly over the past year. Biggest asset has been the adaptation of the Strategic Air Command's MSQ-35 airborne radar-computer bombing system manufactured by Reeves Instrument Corp. for the ground control and guidance of strike aircraft. With this adaptation, known here as the MSQ-77 Sky Spot, the radar tracks the aircraft, while the computer correlates all relative data such as air speed, windage, etc., to determine just when the pilot should drop his bomb load to strike a designated target. As he approaches this point in space, the pilot is told by the ground controller to pickle his ordnance.

## Accuracy Evaluated

The accuracy of the MSQ-77 system was first evaluated by USAF here under VFR weather conditions and then placed into operational service on May 1. Present MSQ-77 network of stations provides full coverage of the south plus some coverage of North Vietnam. The stations are located at Bien Hoa, near Saigon; Pleiku, in the central highlands; Dong Ha, south of the demilitarized zone, and Dalat, in the south central section of the country. In the biggest month recorded, the Air Force flew 3,000 MSQ-77-directed missions.

The one, and only, allied outpost to be completely overrun and destroyed by the Viet Cong this year was hit at night, under marginal weather condi-

tions and before the introduction of the MSQ-77. Strike aircraft could provide only marginal assistance. With the system in operation, USAF officials say they are confident that the Viet Cong will not be able to repeat the success.

Another major factor in the Air Force's improved night capability is the accelerated use of the Douglas C-47 transport as a strike aircraft. Equipped with three General Electric 7.62 mm. Miniguns, each with a rate of fire of 8,000 rounds/min., and designated the AC-47, it is now being used in direct support of allied ground troops. It also provides area suppression fire around the periphery of besieged outposts. In some instances, their fire has been directed to within 100 meters of friendly forces on the ground. The aircraft, carrying their own flares, are flown on station throughout the night to provide quick response to requests for support.

Ordnance shortages that have periodically plagued military air planners here are slowly disappearing, according to these officials, as industrial production and the logistics pipeline from the U.S. begin to catch up with expenditure.

The situation had been serious as new production attempted to overcome a Defense Dept. decision of several years ago to cut back ordnance stockpiles while the expenditure rate here continued to climb. In March, 1965, as an example, the Air Force flew approximately 3,000 sorties in the south, dropping 5,200 tons of ordnance. In March, 1966, the figures stood at 15,000 sorties and 16,384 tons, respectively. USAF's highest sortie rate was attained in July

when 17,777 were flown in the south, with the expenditure of 20,000 tons of ordnance.

Top military planners here continue to dispute individual pilot complaints that ordnance shortages coupled with the individual service desires to attain high sortie rates have resulted in their being sent on missions within South Vietnam with inadequate bomb loads on their aircraft (AW&ST Sept. 19, 1966, p. 21).

One Air Force official says:

> "You can take a [McDonnell] F-4C and hang 24 500-lb. bombs on it, but what is your radius of action and how effectively can you deliver them on the target? In-country, the biggest percentage of targets don't need this kind of ordnance, and, with it, you don't have enough fuel for multiple passes or loiter. I wouldn't like to make a pullout [from a bomb run] with even half of those bombs left on my racks. Operationally, it would be a real unsound tactic.

> "I know it's frustrating for the pilot. He doesn't understand this reasoning, and he can't see what he hits [because of the dense foliage over much of South Vietnam]. We fly with the Marines and VNAF [Vietnamese air force] 500-plus sorties a day in the south. How many of these are really hurting him [the Viet Cong], it's hard to say. We know we're hurting him, but we can't see it."

## Standard Bomb

The Air Force in the north is using the 750-lb. bomb as its standard bomb, going to the 2,000 and 3,000-lb. category against certain hard targets such as heavily-revetted bridges. More attention now is being given to cratering the approach roads than to hitting the spans.

> "We went through a bridge-busting phase last spring," says one official here, "but it just wasn't worth the cost. Most of them have been heavily reinforced, and, to get them, there's usually only one way to make your approach to the target. The North Vietnamese know what that way is as well as we do."

There still are insufficient numbers of 750-lb. bombs on hand for the USAF Republic F-105s and McDonnell F-4Cs flying strike missions over North Vietnam, although the stockpile is growing. For a period last year, only 3,000-lb. bombs were available for missions over the north. The 500-lb. bomb has become the standard ordnance for Air Force aircraft in the south and for the Navy in the north.

Buildup of the Air Force, with about 600 strike aircraft in South Vietnam alone, has permitted the Navy to close down its "Dixie station," an aircraft carrier and support ships for air strikes against the south. Prior to the closing of "Dixie" in August, the Navy kept one

20

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attack aircraft carrier on station off the coast of South Vietnam and two in the Tonkin Gulf off the northern coast on "Yankee station." Now, three attack carriers are kept on the line on "Yankee" station at all times. The duty alternates between five ships: the nuclear-powered USS Enterprise, the Kitty Hawk, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ticonderoga and Coral Sea.

The Air Force now has approximately 1,200 aircraft of all types in the Southeast Asian war theater—800 of them in South Vietnam—as compared with about 700 for the three services just one year ago. In addition to South Vietnam, where the standard USAF strike aircraft has become the transonic North American F-100, the Air Force maintains in Thailand two F-105 wings, a reconnaissance wing and some F-4C units as well as Sikorsky HH-3C search-and-rescue helicopters. The Thai-based aircraft bear the brunt of the USAF operation over North Vietnam.

Navy Lockheed P-2V piston powered and P-3 turboprop patrol aircraft and surface ships are doing an increasingly effective job of intercepting the North Vietnamese sampan and junk fleets attempting to smuggle arms and supplies to the Viet Cong in the south. In 1965, it was estimated that 70% of the Viet Cong supplies reached them by sea. The current estimate is 10%.

Vietnam's air force, which will begin its modernization program early next year with the introduction of Northrop F-5 and Cessna YAT-37 jet fighters, continues to show marked improvement. Its Douglas A-1H piston-engine aircraft are handling approximately 25% of the strike missions flown over South Vietnam, primarily in support of the Army of Vietnam.

## Naval Interception

U.S. aerial reconnaissance capabilities have increased significantly over the past 15 months, primarily through the introduction of the RF-4C version of the F-4C and development of new sensors, whose need was inspired by the war in Vietnam. Intelligence also has improved. The Marines, for instance, had advance information of plans to move the 304B North Vietnamese division into the demilitarized zone earlier this year, and Maj. Gen. William E. Depuy, commander of the 1st Infantry Div., says that the number of friendly agents reporting to his division is 50% higher now than 1965. So far as the information received is concerned, Gen. Depuy says it is "several hundred percent" better than a year ago.

Improvements in both aerial reconnaissance and standard intelligence channels are still needed, however. Read-out times for the RF-4C's sidelooking radar, as one example, are about 6-8 hr., an unacceptable figure

in a war against a mobile, elusive enemy.

The Army of Vietnam (ARVN), with a current total strength of approximately 700,000, is still far from approaching the status of a truly professional army, predominantly because of the continuing lack of leadership from the platoon level on. The ARVN, unfortunately, inherited the old French tradition of rank based on family and school. So did the VNAF. However, the VNAF procedure was switched to the merit system shortly after the present premier, Nguyen Cao Ky, took over its command.

## Merit System

ARVN's recent announcement that it, too, will convert to the merit system is a strong indication of Ky's growing strength in the ruling military directorate. The question now is just when the announcement will be put into effect and how long it will take before any results become evident.

In the meantime, the decision has been reached to send U.S. ground troops in force into the delta, a controversial step because of the high density of civilian population in the area and the consequent risk that many may be killed by American arms. U.S. military officials here consider the move a necessary one if the Viet Cong are really to be crippled. The delta is their recruiting ground, their rice bowl, their

traditional stronghold, and they have reached a detente with the ARVN. Neither bothers the other to any great extent.

Detailed plans of just how the U.S. forces will operate in the Delta, with its 3,000 mi. of waterways in the dry season and twice that in the wet, and which are vital to the Viet Cong communications and supply net, currently are being hammered out. It will be a new type of war and include major adjustments in the use of airpower in support of the ground troops.

Airpower, artillery and the combined search and destroy operations on the ground are having their effect upon the Viet Cong. Its infrastructure is still strong and widespread, extending down to the village and hamlet levels in all areas of South Vietnam, but it is becoming shaky and reportedly has been hit by a series of purges. Viet Cong also are becoming less welcome in the villages, whose populace knows that the presence of Viet Cong may invite an air or artillery strike.

## Defections Increase

As a consequence, defections are going up, and recruiting is becoming increasingly difficult. The defection rate now is averaging about 80 persons a day, almost double that of a year ago. By the end of November, a total of 19,000 defectors had turned themselves in to the government during 1966 as compared with 11,000 for all of 1965.

Because of the battle losses, defections, and difficulties in recruiting, regular North Vietnamese army troops are having to fill in the ranks of the predominantly southern Viet Cong. This causes problems of its own. The North Vietnamese soldier has been trained for conventional warfare, and he is unfamiliar with the tactics and methods of the guerrilla. He doesn't know the countryside, and the people distrust him. His method of fighting, massed attack, is the method against which U.S. airpower can be most effective.

At the beginning of 1966, total Viet Cong and North Vietnamese strength in the south was estimated by U.S. intelligence officials at 238,000. It reached a peak of about 283,000 later in the year and now has dropped back to an estimated 279,000. Breakdown includes 45,600 North Vietnamese army troops, 30,400 in the Viet Cong main force, 32,500 in the local force and 112,800 work-by-day, fight-by-night guerrillas. There are an additional 18,700 combat support troops plus a political cadre of 39,200.

This provides the Communists in the south with an estimated 180 combat-effective battalions—86 North Vietnamese, 63 Viet Cong main force and 31 local force. Size of a battalion ranges between 300-600 men.

## NADGE Award

Geneva-North Atlantic Treaty Organization has awarded the final contract for construction of the $300-million NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) system.

France is participating in the project despite its withdrawal from NATO's unified military command. This participation had been in doubt (AW&ST Oct. 10, 1966, p. 26), and final agreement was possible only after the remaining 14 member nations formally approved a dual alliance policy which allows France to remain active in NATO political affairs and join in selected military projects (AW&ST Dec. 26, 1966, p. 17).

The NADGE system will be built by a consortium led by Hughes Aircraft Co. Other companies involved include Compagnie Francaise Thomson-Houston of France; Marconi Co., Ltd., of Great Britain; Selenia S.P.A., of Italy; Hollandse Signaal Apparaten of the Netherlands, and Telefunken of West Germany.

Equipment for the network will be purchased in each of the 14 participating countries. Iceland does not contribute to military infrastructure projects in NATO.

21

MEMORANDUM

FEB 20 1967

17 February 1967

To: Members of the Joint MIT-Harvard Seminar on Viet Nam

From: Ithiel de Sola Pool

The next meeting of the Viet Nam Seminar will be on Tuesday, February 28th at 12:15 p.m. It will be held at the Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy St., Cambridge.

"What if there were a cease-fire?" will be the topic of discussion. The panel will include Henry Kissinger, Tom Schelling and Roger Fisher.

RSVP: Jane Pratt, Tel.: 536-3239, or use tear strip below.

I will attend ( )

I will not attend ( )

Signature-----

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Joint M.I.T.-Harvard Seminar on Vietnam

FROM: Ithiel de Sola Pool

MAR 15 1967

The next meeting of the Joint M.I.T.-Harvard
Vietnam Seminar will be on Tuesday, March 28th, at the
Harvard Faculty Club at 12:15.

Milton Sacks will discuss "Alternative
Approaches to Peace".

R.S.V.P. Jane Pratt, tel: 536-3239, or use the tear sheet.

MINUTES OF JOINT M.I.T. - HARVARD VIETNAM SEMINAR

MAR 31 1967

Date: February 17, 1967

Subject: "What If There Were a Cease-fire?"

Chairman and discussant: Henry Kissinger

Panelists: Thomas Schelling and Roger Fisher

Professor Kissinger started by listing some of the problems involved in a cease-fire negotiation. Who is to negotiate? What unit can guarantee the enforcement of the agreement? What should a cease-fire agreement specify?

To ask Hanoi to agree to a cease-fire gives it a most difficult nut to crack. It must admit, thereby, its responsibility for the Viet Cong. It is not clear whether Hanoi could deliver compliance by the Viet Cong to a cease-fire agreement. In any case an agreement negotiated by Hanoi would make the NLF look like a pawn.

Turning to the terms of a possible agreement, Professor Kissinger noted the following difficulties: If the government is given complete access to all parts of the country then a cease-fire is a Viet Cong defeat. If present lines are to be adhered to, how can they be defined? Furthermore, that in effect recognizes the Viet Cong as a government, in its areas. What acts are to be allowed to the government without violating the agreement? Can the government, for example, arrest criminals? Who is to collect taxes? Where?

All of these difficulties through a simple cease-fire agreement suggest that such an agreement must, in effect, merge with a political settlement, otherwise, the cease-fire will not last.

Roger Fisher then presented a first draft of a cease-fire agreement which is appended. The draft agreement avoids spelling out any aspects of the political settlement, nor the rights of either side. It simply provides for a control commission to intervene locally whenever there are complaints or incidents, so as to stop violence; thus leaving the solution to be worked out in the local situation, however it may be.

Henry Kissinger: Article 3 of Roger Fisher's draft, which would have the control commission intervene if the Viet Cong objected to tax collection or other law enforcement activity by the government, would, in effect, give the NLF a veto on the government.

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**Ithiel Pool:** Agreeing with Henry Kissinger that a cease-fire must have some of the character of a political settlement, he argued that the right to tax was not a crucial one for the government to protect, since rural taxes are currently only a minimal source of revenue for the government of Vietnam, and abolition of rural taxes might be a very good thing in eliminating one of the main incentives to rural rebellion. However, the government must be given the right to punish crimes of violence committed after the cease-fire. Assassination, mining of roads, and individual terrorism, camouflaged as irresponsible action, would otherwise be infective tools by the Viet Cong for continuing the war. The Viet Cong could be permitted to retain influence in their own rural enclaves so long as they accept the principle of refraining from violence. The rest of the political solution could gradually work itself out, under the pressure of the right of the government to intervene wherever there is violence.

**Edmund Gullion:** Rather than a settlement between nations, a cease-fire should probably be an agreement between the commanders in the field. This gets Hanoi off many of the hooks Kissinger had mentioned and makes the consequences of violation less severe. It also pinpoints responsibility.

**Thomas Schelling:** One should distinguish two kinds of cease-fire: the first was illustrated at the end of World War I, when the outline of the emerging settlement became clear it was then simply a mechanical matter to arrange the suspension of physical hostilities. The second kind of cease-fire that people discuss is one entered into long before the outcome of a war is clear because both sides decide not to prosecute it further, and agree to sit down to talk out what the character will be.

This second type of cease-fire is an illusion. As long as there is no visable delineation of the outcome on the horizon neither of the two sides is likely to give up totally the instrumentality of force. Negotiations in such an undefined situation between two sides which already distrust each other, are likely to lead to greater distrust rather than less, so it is the first type of cease-fire, not negotiated when the shape of settlement has already become clear that is the generally possible one. That important point in a cease-fire agreement are the terms for termination of it, it need not be absolute; it could be established twenty-four hours at a time, or made subject to denunciation in case of violence. There is a period measured in weeks rather than months during which a kind of inertia sets in that makes it hard to reverse a cease-fire once under way.

It will, perhaps, be necessary to have observer teams with a controller and perhaps two observers numbering in the hundreds. It will also be necessary to have a very good commanding control

center for the dissemination of information and communication
with any such large number of teams.

Ithiel Pool: There is another very thorny problem: What if the Viet Cong suddenly offers a cease-fire; both sides to stay in their present positions and refrain from acts to expand their control? It would be extraordinarily difficult, given both international and domestic political pressures, for the American Government to reject such a cease-fire. If the GVN is allowed to reject it, it will reinforce opposition to U.S. support of the GVN.

To meet such an eventuality, the U.S. Government and GVN should be prepared with a plausible counterproposal. For all the reasons indicated above, this must contain the nucleus of a generous political settlement, without which a cease-fire won't work. As far as we know, little thought has been given to the character of such a political settlement. (that will be discussed at the next session of this seminar)

Among the essential elements of such a settlement would be
a guarantee to the NLF of amnesty and political rights at the
village level, provided it comes out into the open. There might,
for example, be registration of contestant political groups. The
counter-offer might also provide for UN or other third force
participation in law enforcement activity, so as to assure that
the right to repress acts of terrorism (which right cannot be
abandoned) does not become a cover for continued warfare by the
government.

March 28, 1967

IP/fm

2/27/67

A FIRST DRAFT OF A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

PARTIES

1. The National Liberation Front and the Government of South Vietnam agree that effective at 1:00 a.m. Saigon time on __________, 1967 there shall be a cease-fire throughout all of Vietnam, both North and South. They request all other governments and parties to respect this cease-fire and all other terms of this agreement.

DEFINITION

2. All military forces are requested to adopt defensive positions and to conduct no offensive activity. All violence and discharge of weapons shall cease except for the firing of warning shots.

LAW
ENFORCEMENT

3. The Government of South Vietnam agrees that in circumstances where tax collection or other law enforcement activity leads to a situation or incident apparently involving resistance by supporters of the National Liberation Front, the matter will be referred to a Control Commission Team for its recommendation.

INCIDENTS

4. Any incident or non-compliance with this cease-fire in one locality shall not justify any departure from the terms of this cease-fire in any other locality. In the event of any discharge of weapons or violence or other non-compliance with this cease-fire the nearest Control Commission Team shall be notified.

PROCEDURE

5. Upon the request of any person or upon its own motion any Control Commission Team may investigate any situation and shall be guaranteed safe-conduct and complete freedom of movement. Upon the arrival of a Control Commission Team all violence and combat shall cease regardless of the cause of the situation, and all persons shall cooperate with the Control Commission Team. Without the necessity of deciding who, if anyone, was at fault, the Team shall make such recommendations for immediate action including such local change in the deployment of personnel and such practical arrangements, as to it seems wise in the local circumstances.

2.

INTERIM
ARRANGEMENTS

6. Local commanders and personnel of all kinds are hereby instructed to accept and comply forthwith with every recommendation of a Control Commission Team, and to continue to abide by them unless and until they receive subsequent explicit orders in writing to the contrary signed either by ______ for the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front or by ______ on behalf of the cabinet of the Government of South Vietnam. Compliance with any request of any Control Commission Team shall be without prejudice to the terms of any settlement or to the legal rights of any party.

INITIATIVE
BY
COMMISSION

7. The Control Commission is asked to establish and maintain teams at appropriate places throughout South Vietnam and to keep its chief representatives in daily session in ______ available to representatives of any party. The Control Commission is requested on its own initiative to suggest from time to time steps which in its judgment would tend to help maintain the cease-fire and at the same time to move the situation toward that provided for in the Geneva Accords.

DISCUSSIONS

8. Representatives of the Liberation Front and of the Government of South Vietnam will constantly be available, severally and jointly, to the Commission to discuss such questions as may arise and to help restore peace and order throughout South Vietnam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the United States and the governments of such other countries as have forces within South Vietnam are invited to have representatives available at all times to work with the Control Commission. The exchange of prisoners of war shall promptly be discussed.

GENEVA
ACCORDS

9. This agreement in no way affects the validity of the Geneva Accords. The parties renew their commitment to implement a solution based on those accords.

STATUS
QUO

10. The principle that no political or military advantage should be gained by either party throughout the period of operation of the cease-fire agreement is recognized by the parties.

Because I believe that our broadcast of March 21, 1967, surveying South Vietnamese opinion on the war contributes to an understanding of the people about whom the conflict is being waged, I thought you might like to see the script of the program as well as the full study on which it was based.

RICHARD S. SALANT
President, CBS News

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# INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings from a public affairs study conducted among the civilian population of South Vietnam. Because of the unusual nature of the assignment, and because it would be reasonable for the reader to be concerned about the degree of validity of the data, considerable detail is included - most of it in the Appendix - on the technical aspects of design and execution.

## Objectives

The overall objectives of the study were to discover some of the attitudes, feelings and factual knowledge of the South Vietnamese population in a number of content areas: the war, the principal countries or groups engaged in the hostilities, the stated goals of the participants, the methods which are being used by each side to accomplish its objectives, and the more personal hopes, concerns, and aspirations of the people themselves.

## Background

The management of CBS News expressed interest in the possibility of accomplishing this research during the summer of 1966. Two kinds of problems immediately suggested themselves:

1. Whether there were people in Vietnam with sufficient experience in survey research to meet the conventional standards for accomplishing as ambitious a project as this one.

2. The extent to which respondents would be suspicious of the motives of the interviewer and consequently refuse to participate or distort their answers in a way which they thought would minimize personal risk to themselves.

An investigation of these issues was carried on in October and November of 1966, during which we asked for and received assistance from several sources. Richard Salant, President of the CBS News Division, made some preliminary inquiries as part of a trip to the Far East, in the fall of 1966; Dr. Charles Ramond of Columbia University was in Saigon engaged in other research and provided enormous assistance, and Dr. Herbert Abelson, Vice President of ORC visited Vietnam to determine the feasibility of the study and to work with the agency responsible for the sampling and field work. Mr. Bill Leonard, Vice President of CBS News was in Saigon at the same time as Dr. Abelson, and his observations were asked for several times.

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**Available research skills.** The first of the two problems was relatively easily resolved. We selected the Center for Vietnamese Studies as our contractor. The Center has been in existence since 1957 as a non-profit organization whose two main functions are survey research and textbook publishing. The director of the Center since 1960 is Mr. Nguyen-khoa Phon-anh, whose experience, knowledgeability and resourcefulness became a major asset of the research during the planning and data gathering stages. The Center has completed a number of survey research studies in recent years, and retains a corps of some 40 interviewers as well as an office staff experienced in sampling, interviewer training and supervision, and data processing. The assignment which we gave the Center under our supervision included planning of the sample, conduct of the field work, and content analysis of the free-response questions. Data processing and report preparation were carried out by ORC in Princeton.

**Distortion of responses.** There are compelling reasons to expect that at least some respondents in replying to some of the more sensitive questions would not necessarily reveal their actual viewpoints to the interviewer. In fact, some social scientists have expressed their doubts about the utility of any public affairs study conducted among the Vietnamese people.*

The decision to go ahead was a consequence of several considerations:

The encouraging views of a number of social researchers who had recently worked in Vietnam, or who were in Vietnam in the Fall of 1966.

The research experience of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and our very favorable impression of the qualifications of its director.

The clear willingness of CBS News management to scrap the study if either the experience of the interviewers or the data themselves should indicate an unacceptable degree of bias.

The findings themselves can be examined from at least two different perspectives:

The data can be accepted as a literal representation of what the South Vietnamese people are thinking. This is a "pollster's" view, and assumes a direct correspondence between the responses of the sample and the attitudes and beliefs of the population. It is a view which is too often implicit even in domestic studies. We think it is an inappropriate perspective for the present survey, and this is one reason that we have asked CBS News not to refer to the study as a "poll" on the air.

* For example, see "Misperception and the Vietnam War", by Ralph K. White, a monograph issue of *The Journal of Social Issues*, XXII, No. 3, July 1966.

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## Questionnaire development

A list of key public affairs issues related to the situation in Vietnam was formulated in the course of discussions between ORC personnel and CBS News management. These issues were then recast into questionnaire form exactly as though they were to be later administered to respondents in the United States. No attempt was made at this point to anticipate changes which would have to be made to satisfy semantic or cultural differences between the United States and Vietnam.

Copies of the draft questionnaire in English were sent to the Center for Vietnamese Studies and to the CBS News Bureau in Saigon. These groups suggested revisions intended to minimize obstacles in data collection, while at the same time retaining as much of the spirit and content of the issues as possible.

At the Center for Vietnamese Studies, the English-language questionnaire was translated into Vietnamese, then back-translated by other people from the Vietnamese into English. This process was repeated until we were satisfied that the Vietnamese and English versions of the questionnaire were reasonable approximations of each other.

The questionnaire was pretested by Vietnamese interviewers and revised again before being reproduced in final form.

An English translation of the questionnaire which was actually used is bound into this report.

## The sample

The universe for the study was defined as the civilian population of South Vietnam of voting age, and living in secure areas of the country at the time of interview.

A probability sampling design was used as the model for sampling, with some modifications necessary because of the local situation. For example, we know that there is an under-representation of young men of draft age in the sample. There were also some instances where the presence of the Vietcong made it necessary to substitute sample locations for those already drawn. In addition, the lack of reliable census data on sex distribution led to a decision to sample about equal numbers of men and women.

Among the virtues of the sample design used are that the chances of any given member of the population being included in the sample can be estimated and that the interviewer has only a minimal and carefully controlled role in selection of respondents.

A detailed description of the design and procedures is in the Methodological Report bound into the Appendix.

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## Interviewing

A total of 1,545 interviews were conducted during the period November 24, 1966 to February 1, 1967. A description of interviewer qualifications, training for this study, and experiences in the field is included in the Methodological Report in the Appendix.

## Organization of report

The report for this study is in two parts. This part presents highlights, describes methodology, and includes percentage responses for the sample as a whole.

In addition, detailed tabulations are separately bound. The detailed tabulations show responses by selected demographic and attitudinal characteristics for each question.

## Acknowledgements

In addition to the people whose names are mentioned earlier in this report, we received excellent advice and administrative assistance from Mr. John Flynn and Miss Judith Osgood of the CBS Saigon Bureau. Mr. Robert Chandler, producer of the broadcast which reports this study was an active participant in every phase of the work.

We would like to note that only Opinion Research Corporation is responsible for deciding on the feasibility of the study and for carrying out the work.

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HIGHLIGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS

1. The state of mind of the people: hopes, aspirations, concerns

a. The Vietnamese people want peace. More than four out of five respondents express a wish for an end to the war. Sample comments:

"No more of this fratricidal war."

"As long as there is war everyone has to suffer."

"We could live again in peace and hear no more gunfire."

Although the desire for peace is expressed by a somewhat higher proportion of women than men, it is mentioned in about equal proportions by people of different age groups and educational levels, and by people living in all parts of the country.* Almost no other issues are responded to in this "across the board" fashion by people of all types.

b. The overriding personal concern of the populace is related to their economic situation, the lack of employment, the high cost of living, the burden of stable income in an increasingly inflated economy. Women, the less well-educated, and people of the Buddhist religion are most likely to indicate their unhappiness over economic conditions.

"Wish the government would loan us some money so that we could raise pigs or do some trading."

"Wish I could find a job."

"Wish I could have enough money to have adequate food and clothes . . . "

c. About one-fourth of the people feel better off now than they think they were a year ago. The chief reason for this sense of well-being is given as economic.

"I can earn more now with overtime."

"Because of foreigners, I have more customers."

"Life is easier because we have a bumper crop."

* Data from subgroups of the population are in the detailed tabulations. Differences between subgroups are mentioned only if they are statistically meaningful at the .05 confidence level.

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## 2. Media exposure and knowledgeability

a. Over half of the people read a newspaper (or have it read to them) once in a while or more often. About one person in five reads a paper daily. Four people in five listen to the radio, half of them every day.

Nearly everyone who reads a newspaper also listens to the radio.

Profile of the daily reader of newspapers:

* More likely to live in Saigon than elsewhere, and in a big city than in the countryside.

* More likely to live somewhere in the III and IV Corps areas than in other parts of the country.*

* More likely to be a man, and to have a relatively high amount of formal education.

* More likely to have arranged his own marriage than to have had it arranged by his parents.**

b. The people who fit the above profile of the newspaper reader are much more likely than others to know of efforts by other countries to end the war. Only 57% of the total population report knowledge of outside truce efforts.

The United States, the Vatican, Great Britain, and the United Nations - in descending order of mention - are most frequently named as sources of attempts to bring about peace. Only a few people think that either the government of South Vietnam or any Communist country has tried to end the war.

c. Only three-fourths of the people correctly identify Ky or Thieu as the leader of South Vietnam. In addition:

* About 60% give an acceptable name as leader of North Vietnam.

* Just over 40% know that Johnson is the President of the United States.

* One-third of the people correctly identify a leader of Red China.

The most knowledgeable people are men, newspaper readers, residents of Saigon, those who have arranged their own marriages, and those who have had the most formal education.

* For military administrative purposes, South Vietnam is divided into four Corps areas, with the I Corps farthest north and IV Corps farthest south. Saigon is geographically within the III Corps, although it is part of a separate administrative unit.

** We analyzed all questions according to whether the respondent arranged his own marriage or had it arranged for him. Our reasoning is that in Vietnam, as in other cultures, departing from traditional marital customs (in this case selecting one's own spouse) is a clue to the individual's value system and helps to discriminate between the traditionally-oriented and mobility-oriented types of people.

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d. The apparent ignorance of the Vietnamese people comes into a more favorable perspective when we compare their knowledge with questions asked of the American public within the past year-and-a-half in connection with two CBS News productions: The Current Events Test, and a public opinion survey on Vietnam conducted late in 1965 (relevant data are in the Appendix).

For example:

In December, 1965, one-quarter of the American public did not know that the U.S. was allied with South Vietnam, rather than North Vietnam.

In December of 1965, half of the American people would not try to name a country which borders on either North or South Vietnam, and some of the countries which were named were incorrect.

In December of 1966, one-fifth of Americans named Ho Chi Minh and one-fourth of Americans named Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of Red China.

In December of 1966, fewer than one-third of Americans had any rough idea of the number of U.S. troops stationed in Vietnam, and only about a third knew that Ky was not elected to his office.

In general, Americans are somewhat better informed than are the Vietnamese on the factual issues for which we have data and can make rough comparisons. Considering the immediacy of the situation to them, the Vietnamese people seem to have less information than would seem desirable for a nation whose officially prescribed goal is self-government.

e. One-fourth of the people whom we interviewed have had no formal education, half have been to school for up to five years, and a fourth for more than five years.

Young people, residents of Saigon, men, and those who have arranged their own marriages are disproportionately likely to be in the better-educated group.

### 3. A rough typology of the people

As we examined the responses to attitude questions by types of respondents, it became apparent that a number of background characteristics were related to each other, just as in this country we often find a relationship between being a Republican, having a college education, having a managerial or professional career, and earning a substantial income.

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In general, the data suggests the existence of two identifiable types of Vietnamese, one a victory-oriented group, the other, peace-oriented. Both groups constitute substantial minorities in the overall population. The profile of the victory-oriented group has these shared characteristics:

Male

More education than most Vietnamese

Relatively high exposure to newspapers and radio

Less traditionally-oriented than other Vietnamese
(i.e., selected own spouse)

To a lesser extent than the above, this type is more likely to come from the big cities than from the countryside, and is more likely to be Catholic than Buddhist (which helps to explain the way that the spouse is chosen).

Naturally, the emergence of the above profile may be a consequence of Vietnamese women having fewer educational opportunities and thus being less alert to or interested in news events. For whatever reasons, the type described above seems to exist. People who share these background characteristics are also likely to share a point of view on the issues which were studied. For example:

A feeling of personal well-being attributed to an increasingly favorable economic situation.

Strong anti-Communist sentiments coupled with a marked desire for some kind of nationalist government.

A "hawk"-like attitude toward the war - that the war against the North should be pursued aggressively.

That the Americans are a very useful instrument for achieving Vietnamese aims, but of little utility once the war has been won.

The peace-oriented group are demographic counterparts, e.g., women, not well-educated, tend to be Buddhists, etc. Both the victory-oriented and the peace-oriented groups want peace, but the peace-oriented people are more preoccupied with their own personal welfare, attempt less to understand the war and related events, and probably have a much less clear view of any strategies that might lead to peace. The victory group wants to win the war by conquering the enemy. The peace group wants peace and wants to avoid as much military action as possible.

As long as the reader keeps in mind that the typology of victory-oriented and peace-oriented are abstractions from the data and not found in pure form when we discuss attitudinal issues, then these concepts may be useful to refer to in some of the ensuing discussion.

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4. Pursuit of the war

a. One person in six reports having lived in an area which was under attack by some military means during the past year. Even though we only interviewed in areas which were secure at the time of interview, this proportion is probably lower than most Americans might think.

There is disproportionately high reporting of having been under attack by people living outside of the big cities, and by people in the II Corps area. The area least under attack according to our data is III Corps.

When asked to identify the group responsible for the damage, there is a slight tendency for I and II Corps residents, more than those in other areas, to blame the VC and for II Corps residents to also blame the United States.

b. About one-tenth of the respondents say they have lived in an area controlled by the VC, notably in the II and IV Corps areas.

c. At this time, nearly two-thirds of the people think that South Vietnam and its allies are winning the war. Only a handful feel that the Vietcong is winning at this time.

The victory-oriented people (see Section #3) are disproportionately likely to see the GVN (South Vietnam) as winning at this time.

d. About two-thirds of the people will not venture a forecast about the duration of the war.* The median estimate of those who do answer the question is that it will take another two years.

Nearly two-thirds of the people think that South Vietnam and its allies will be victorious. About one person in twenty thinks there will be no winner. Only a few people predict victory for the North.

Those who predict victory for the South are much more likely than others to advocate aggressive military action as the route to success.

* We have observed a relatively high "no opinion" response to questions asking for any kind of prediction of the future. We wonder if this is related to the cultural view of time and the meaning of time which is different in the Orient than in the West. (For example, see F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*, Yale University Press, 1947.)

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c. An overwhelming majority of the people feel that their lives would be easier if they lived in an area controlled by the GVN than by the Vietcong. Only a few people would prefer to live under VC rule.

Men and the better educated respondents are even more likely to prefer the present government than are other people.

d. After the war is over, nearly three-fourths of the people express a preference for a government free of any participation by the Liberation Front (VC). Six percent of the people would like VC participation, with a slight tendency for II Corps residents to opt for VC participation more than do other people.

It may be well to note again that the interviews were conducted only in areas secure from VC control. It is possible that the desire for Liberation Front participation in the postwar government might be somewhat higher in areas where the VC has been dominant.

## 6. United States involvement in the war

a. The United States is most highly regarded for its social welfare activities in Vietnam.

"They give money and food to the people in the hamlets."

"Their physicians give care to the villagers."

"They give money to refugees, take care of Vietnamese in hospitals."

b. Less often mentioned, but expressed by about a fifth of the people, are gratitude for United States military aid to Vietnam, and admirable personal qualities of Americans.

"They risk their lives to help us fight Communism."

"They send their troops here to help our combatants."

"They are able to endure hardships during combat."

I Corps residents, men, and people exposed to the mass media are more likely than others to express approval of Americans.

People living in the countryside are much more likely than city-dwellers to like Americans for their social welfare activities.