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(CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.)

HENRY KISSINGER

For release Sunday, October 2, 1988

(c) 1988, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Dae-Hoon Lee, Paris Bureau Chief, and Jung-Ku Nam, London Bureau Chief, of Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul, Korea.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, what in your opinion are the most significant ideas and principles which govern present world affairs which will be passed over to the 21st-Century international order? Do you think that recent trends in Soviet ideology and East-West relations may vindicate Daniel Bell's convergency theory?

ANSWER: The most important developments are, first, the relative decline of the superpowers. The superpowers are still absolutely very strong, in fact, stronger perhaps than they were 10 years ago. But new power centers are developing: China, Japan, India, shortly after that Brazil, Mexico. Therefore the power in the world will become more diffuse. Secondly, the decline in communist ideology. Communist ideology now seems to be believed only in countries outside of the communist world, in radical groups in Germany and in the Middle East. But nobody seriously believes that communism has an answer to the economic problems of our time. And within the communist world, they are all changing to variations of market economy: which in practice means that the role of the communist party as the leading force in the society must decline. Third, the continuing emergence of the role of the Third World -- of the so-called non-committed nations.

Do I believe in convergence theory? No, I believe, certainly, that the Soviet Union and China are changing their systems. First of all, as between China and U.S., there are such huge cultural differences that to believe China will become anything like a western capitalist democratic state seems to me extremely far-fetched.

I think the Soviet Union will go through a long period of turmoil, and uncertainty, and at the end of it, its system will be modified. But, of course, the convergence theory also assumes that tensions between nations with similar economic systems are not likely. If you look at the history of Europe before World War I, they had more or less similar systems and nevertheless managed to start a world war among themselves. So in the sense that the economic systems may become more similar, yes; in the sense of a decline of tensions, that may happen but not for the reasons of convergency.

Q: A new era of detente seems to be dawning in U.S.-Soviet relations. How do you view the current improvement in relations and how do you think this will affect the future course of

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### international relations?

A: I think the period of detente is only at a very fragile beginning, and has so far concentrated largely on arms control, and on establishing better personal relations among the leaders. But these developments will bring about significant political changes also. For example, I believe it highly probable that a combination of perestroika and detente and arms control will create a new situation in Eastern Europe. And therefore I believe that the problem of Eastern Europe will become an increasingly key issue in the decade ahead.

In other parts of the world, the situation is somewhat different. But in Afghanistan, for example, the conflict will not end after Soviet troops withdraw, but will be conducted in a different manner, with maybe different participants. In short, I believe that we do have the beginning of a period of detente, but its most important problems will be in the political field and have to be addressed as political problems by the new administration in the United States.

Q: General Secretary Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost are widely considered to be the most innovative shift in policy direction in Soviet history. Would you agree with that assessment? In your opinion, Dr. Kissinger, what are Gorbachev's ultimate goals and what are the limitations on his reforms?

A: I think Gorbachev has made a very courageous analysis of the weaknesses of the Soviet system. It is not clear to me that he has analyzed the solutions, because in coming up with solutions, he faces not only the economic problems but the political reality that the biggest obstacle to economic reform is the communist party. But the communist party is the instrument with which he governs. And this is a dilemma that no communist state has yet solved, with the possible exception of the People's Republic of China. In the next phase of Soviet policy, this is the issue he has to deal with. In fact, I look at the recent party conference as a means for him to deal with it; because by creating the office of the president he has now put forward a power center in which the most important office in the country is no longer totally in the control of the communist party; in which the president has at least equal power, if not more power than the Politburo. I don't think we can tell whether perestroika is succeeding until Gorbachev has the power to implement it. Up to now, he really has not made any significantly visible reforms -- he has talked about them in the economy.

The Soviet Union has major problems. In contrast to China, which is a homogeneous society, which has an entrepreneurial tradition, which has Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and overseas Chinese from which they can learn, there are no such phenomena for Soviet Union, and it's not clear to me how it is going to work in the Soviet Union. And I think they will go through a period of extreme difficulty and extreme dislocation in which the nationality question may become more acute. Where they will get the managers from to run the enterprises, for example. How you establish markets in a centrally planned economy. All of this, I think, they have only begun to consider. And therefore, I think the Soviet Union is in for a period of great confusion.

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Now, what are Gorbachev's ultimate goals and what are his limitations. I've already talked of his limitations. His ultimate goals -- I'm not sure he knows. He wants to reform Soviet society. He would like the Soviet Union to be competitive. But you have seen in Korea how many years it takes and how much sacrifice it takes to get there. And you started with nothing, which is better than to start with the wrong system. But in the communist systems, to make the sacrifices is very much more difficult because the existing power structure appeals to the public against making sacrifices -- when the sacrifices are tied to reform. When I talk to Soviet reformers, I am struck by the huge disparity between their analysis of the problem, which is usually very good, and their remedies, which are usually superficial. I talked to a leading reformer once who gave me a very good account of what was wrong with the management of their economy, and I asked him where are you going to get the managers from, and he said we are going to let the workers elect them. Now, workers don't know who a good manager is -- why should they? Secondly, since one of the problems in the Soviet Union is to work harder, it is highly improbable that they will elect a manager who will make them work harder even if they should recognize them. How do you become a candidate for a managerial position so that the workers can vote?

Gorbachev begins to look to be like a man who starts a lot of measures but so far he hasn't completed any of them. And I think it is not yet self-evident to me that he will succeed. But I give him very high marks for courage. He deserves a lot of credit for courage.

Q: In Mr. Gorbachev's new peace proposals for Asia and the Pacific last week he implicitly suggested extending the arms control process to Asia, including limitations and reductions in both nuclear and conventional forces. Do you foresee real changes in the political and strategic scene in Asia and the Pacific as a result of these proposals? What effect would a successful Sino-Soviet summit have on U.S. diplomacy?

A: Now, extending the process to Asia: that is clearly what the Soviets are up to. But in Asia they come up against more difficult problems than in Europe. The Asians are about at the state of, shall we say, intellectual development toward international affairs that Europe was in the 19th Century. They are much more national interest oriented than the current Europeans. And Asians are not impressed by the fact that Gorbachev wears nicer suits and smiles. Asians have an unsentimental approach to foreign policy. Some of it they have learned from European colonialism, and some of it they have learned from their own history. So the Japanese ask for their four islands, they don't ask for smiles. And the Chinese ask for their three conditions. In other words, every Asian nation has its own concrete objectives. So the Soviet Union cannot do it in Asia by atmospherics. They have to do it with concrete negotiations. In Europe they can achieve a lot by atmospherics, but I cannot imagine a Japanese or Chinese prime minister going home from a meeting with a Soviet leader and saying he is a personal friend of Gorbachev.

Now, the arms control process in Asia: In Europe you have large armed forces of alliances confronting each other. In Asia, that's

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quite different. I think some limited control is possible. I don't know what the concrete agreement would be in Asia. The giving up of American bases in the Philippines, for example, is not going to be a result of arms control. It will be a result of Philippine conditions -- if it happens. Korea is going to be difficult. It's not going to be handled as an arms control problem. It's going to be handled as a political problem. So that will be much more difficult.

As for China and the Soviet Union, I expect their relations to improve and I would not be surprised if there were a high-level meeting next year between China and the Soviet Union. It is important for everybody to keep calm when that happens. The tensions between China and the Soviet Union are geo-political, they are not personal. There is a long frontier between China and the Soviet Union of 3,000 miles. On one side of it there are a billion people, on the other side of it there are 30 million people. That frontier does not get shorter no matter what agreement they make, nor will the inequality of populations change. I don't think the Soviets still feel calm about China, and I don't think China will be reassured or gamble its policy entirely on Soviet good will.

So what effect would a Sino-Soviet summit have on U.S. diplomacy: it depends in part on with what enthusiasm it is done. If it leads to great demonstrations of friendship between China and the Soviet Union, it will affect public opinion in the United States. If it's done in a calm, serious manner, it should not affect American diplomacy.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, your personal efforts at reconciliation in China in 1972 constituted a momentous turning point in Northeast Asian affairs and your well-remembered proposal for cross-recognition of the Two Koreas represented a potential breakthrough on the Korean question. What are your views today on the reduction of tensions in the Korean peninsula and the prospects for Korean reconciliation and reunification?

A: That depends largely on North Korea. I noticed that in South Korea there are many people who seem to think that there is some tremendous effort that could be made by South Korea and that there is some formula that South Korea could put forward which will bring about reconciliation. The North Korean regime is well established with very definite principles. I would be astonished if any particular proposal from South Korea could alter its basic views. It is economically and socially a different system. It cannot unify with South Korea without giving up its structure. Certainly they would like American troops to be withdrawn from South Korea. But what would happen then? The political issue would remain. South Koreans should be very careful about making an issue about American troops, because many Americans are only too eager to withdraw troops from all over the world. If there are too many Korean demonstrators against American troops -- it is not hard to get your wish. Then where will Korea be? I believe that if China, the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan cooperate, in time, it may be possible to have some gradual progress.

Q: The 24th Olympiad has brought most of the socialist countries

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to Seoul and South Korea is now establishing new trade and diplomatic relations with several communist countries, including China, the Soviet Union and several East European governments. In contrast, North Korea seems to be facing a dilemma of deeper international isolation. Overall, what effect do you think the successful staging of the 24th Olympiad in Seoul will have on the international status of Korea?

In what ways do you think the Olympics will affect relations between the two Koreas themselves? In particular, given President Roh Tae-Woo's July 7 statement and Kim Il Sung's Sept. 9 address, do you think a summit meeting between the two Koreas may take place in the foreseeable future? What do you think the likely ramifications of such a meeting will be for the Korean situation?

A: South Korea has greatly improved its international situation. The whole world sees South Korea on television as an advanced state. It is no longer thought of as a somewhat backward faraway country. It has been repeatedly pointed out that its situation is similar to Japan in 1964. Not only is the setting impressive but the execution has been perfect. So this creates a tremendously favorable image for Korea. I have followed the Olympics on American television until I came here, then on British television. I have not yet heard one critical comment about the organization of the games or about Korean society.

The presence of socialist countries has helped because many of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China, would like to have better economic relations with Korea. And in many respects what South Korea is doing is relevant to them. Because if Korea could become a major industrial country in 20 years, that is perhaps a model they can follow. It is very difficult for them to imitate Britain, or Germany, or the United States. Korean trade with the Soviet Union is increasing, as is trade with China. Korea is establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary, or trade offices with Hungary, and I think the Olympic Games have provided an opportunity. While the Olympic Games are going on, it is easy for people to travel back and forth and for discussions to take place between Koreans and Chinese, Soviets and other communist countries that will make it a lot easier to deal with each later on. So I believe that the isolation of South Korea is breaking down while the isolation of North Korea is increasing. I suppose that after Kim Il Sung dies it is unforeseeable what will happen in North Korea. I don't know whether his son can take over without a contest, and that may be the opportunity for an improvement in relations.

Do I think that a meeting between the two leaders can take place: Yes, it's conceivable. The biggest obstacle is that the systems are so different. South Korea has no reason to change its system because it's economically so far advanced. And the North Korea leaders have probably no desire to change their system. So there are objective limitations to what can be done. But fundamentally I believe that this is a matter to be negotiated between the two Koreas. The only thing I would say is -- Koreans ought to keep in mind that Americans and other foreigners do not always understand Korean domestic politics so that measures that

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are taken in Korea for domestic political reasons may be taken very literally outside and one should analyze one's moves not just in relation to domestic politics, but to international politics.

Q: North Korea seems to be resisting the trend toward reform now prevalent in the communist states. What in your view are the reasons for this stubbornness and how do you view Kim Il Sung's plans to arrange for his son to succeed him in power?

A: One of the strange aspects of the communist world is that some of these states lean toward what in Europe in the medieval period was considered feudal rule. Romania has a personal monarchy. North Korea has a personal monarchy. Poland has a Bonapartist type of dictatorship or semi-dictatorship. So, the forms that are emerging in the communist world are very strange and very unexpected. As for Kim Il Sung he recognizes it cannot have any general appeal, he is making it a personal system. But the weakness of that is that it is dependent very much on his personality. And he wants his son to continue because that is the only person that can assure some continuity. On the other hand, it is conceivable that other power centers, once Kim Il Sung departs, will challenge his son. So I think the situation in North Korea is extremely complicated and extremely uncertain. I would be amazed if the system as it now exists will last 10, 15 years after Kim Il Sung disappears. But what forms it will take, one can only make a guess after one sees who emerges as a contestant for power.

Q: So you think his son may not remain after Kim Il Sung's death?

A: Yes. This particular form of personal rule, some form of personal rule, will be attempted but the fact is that all other communist countries, with the exception of Romania, have had to move toward more legalized systems, more constitutional systems; and sooner or later this has to happen in Korea too. And the enormous disparity in the economic achievements of North and South Korea will sooner or later create a necessity.

Q: Are you optimistic about the future of South Korea's democratization process? Do you have any suggestions for untangling the domestic political conflicts and the problem of economic distribution within South Korea after the Olympics?

A: Koreans, in my observation, are a passionate people, in whom the tendency for compromise is not the most outstanding quality. Moreover, there is Confucian tradition that has a high regard for hierarchy. The leaders of every Korean organization, even of the radical organizations, are very hierarchical, which makes compromise very difficult.

On the other hand, I've been impressed by developments in the last year. The middle class that has been created by the economic development process has produced a greater democratization than one would have thought was possible. And where, say, 15 years ago, there was a strong polarization, now what seems to be happening is that when the balance goes too far toward one side, the middle class resists it. So I'm fairly optimistic about the democratization process. I've been very impressed by President Roh's moderation but also the opposition leaders have shown considerable restraint and moderation.

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**Q:** The rapid economic growth of Asian Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs) has elicited stronger trade pressures from industrialized nations. For instance, the U.S. wants South Korea to open its markets further and to let the (ital) won (unital) appreciate against the dollar. In turn, there are growing fears of protectionism in U.S. trade policy itself. How do you view these developments in international trade relations?

**A:** I believe two things: one, there is definitely a growth of protectionism in the United States. And interestingly enough, it is stronger in the Democratic Party, which used to be the free trade party, than in the Republican Party, which used to be the protectionist party. And if there is a recession in the United States, this protectionism will increase. So it is important for Korea and the United States to avoid getting into the same position as Japan and the United States did with endless controversy over individual items, and it would be desirable to have a comprehensive negotiation in which Korea and the United States agree what level of trade deficit is tolerable for the United States, and that then Korea, within its own structure, apportions that deficit. Because if we negotiate industry by industry with Korea, it will be an endless process, which would aggravate all tensions.

Secondly, I believe, and this is a minority view, that it is likely that within 10 years, there will be trade in blocs in the world: in Europe, we already have it, also in the U.S. and Canada, which maybe Mexico will join, and in East Asia led by Japan. Then Korea will have to decide which trading bloc it wants to join, with which it wants to have special relations. That is a problem for the 21st Century.

**Q:** Recently there have been positive developments toward the resolution by diplomatic means of several major regional conflicts, such as Afghanistan, Angola, Kampuchea and the Iran-Iraq war. Do you see a possibility of a breakthrough in the regional conflict in Central America and the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and their Arab supporters as part of this new trend?

In addition, there seems to have been a trend during the Reagan administration toward the collapse of many authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, some of which have been supported by the U.S. in the past, and a concomitant trend toward democratization. How do you view these developments? For example, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Philippines, Haiti, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, South Korea, and recent events in Mexico, Burma, Pakistan and Taiwan...

**A:** Two points: In America the resolution of these regional conflicts is usually presented as having ended the conflict. A more sophisticated analysis would show that it is a continuation of the conflict by other means. The Soviet Union has had an interest in Afghanistan for 150 years. It fought the British there for 100 years. It is inconceivable that it would have abdicated its intertest in Afghanistan.

Vietnam has attempted to achieve predominant influence on its neighboring countries ever since the war. It will not give up its goals, though it will perhaps change its methods. South Africa: The Cubans have actually increased their forces rather than decrease

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their forces; so that each of these raises new issues.

So in the next phase, these regional conflicts will be conducted by more indirect means; requiring all the powers to define their interests, the limits of their interests, the amount of backing they want to give them. But we should not think of them as an end of the conflict, and in some areas like Afghanistan, I think the Soviets are in a potentially strong position because of their propinquity. They are neighbors.

With respect to Central America, and the Palestinians, the idea of breakthrough implies that the goal is a magic day at which you can say now we have solved the problem. I don't think that will happen. Of course Central America and the Middle East are different. In Central America, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandinistas are willing to have a more democratic government, whether they are willing to reduce their armed forces, and even more whether they are willing to get rid of foreign communist advisers on which their system depends.

In the Middle East, I believe if you attempt to achieve a total solution, it must fail, because as of this moment the differences are too great. But what is achievable in the Middle East is a series of interim arrangements that improve the situation for, say, five to 10 years, at the end of which the situation will be discussed anew. At this moment, for example, the biggest problem on the West Bank is to get agreement in principle from Israel to withdraw from some Arab territories even if not all. If one could get some self-governing structure into Gaza and parts of West Bank governed by local Arabs, supported perhaps by Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and if that group could then coexist with Israel in a concrete manner for say five-seven years. At the end of that period, one could consider the role of other organizations. This I believe is possible, and after the American and Israeli elections that should be attempted.

It is true, there have emerged several democratic governments. For some we are responsible, for others, I believe, that we owe to our friends in Latin America not to take credit for their own efforts. The United States had next to nothing to do with the emergence of the democracy in Argentina and Brazil. We welcomed it; but we did not do it. And the same is true in Mexico. And I say it only out of deference to our friends in Latin America, that when they free their own countries from totalitarianism, we should give them credit. The American government welcomed it and supported it, and our obligation is, and I hope our policy will be, to encourage these governments after they have emerged. However, it seems to be a trend in the world, and I think it's a good trend.

Q: Could you specify further some possible changes in Northeast Asia after the Olympics?

A: Well, one possible solution is that the United States and Japan recognize North Korea; and China and the Soviet Union recognize South Korea. Then there could be two Korean states for a while, both in the United Nations. That is the German solution. Another possible solution is that the two Korean states negotiate their political issues with each other and that China, the United States and the two Koreas discuss the military issues. These are

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things that could conceivably happen after the Olympic Games.

Q: Do you feel, in general, optimistic or pessimistic about the future situations in Northeast Asia after the Olympics?

A: I think there will be a balance of power in Northeast Asia between China, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States, and with Korea being one of the components. All these countries have an interest in keeping the situation as calm as possible because nobody can gain anything except by attacking the home territory of the other. There are no territories like Europe that are a buffer between the two in which it is possible to imagine transformation, and in Korea, the two states are relatively strong, so it isn't so easy to make conquests in Korea.