CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

PASADENA, CALIFORNIA

W. K. KELLOGG RADIATION LABORATORY

June 1, 1956

PERSONAL

Lt. General James M. Gavin
Chief, Research and Development
Office of the Chief of Staff
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for your good letter of May 27, and for taking the time to read my little paper and giving me your comments. I realize that the choice of the words "strategic" and "tactical" as names for the two types of forces is not good and I hope that you will suggest better ones. You are certainly right that the strategic force is really a "global" force, but so is the tactical force if my concepts are valid.

In my opinion, the purpose of the strategic force is to discourage a surprise attack against our homeland. In the long run it cannot effectively do more. Presumably, this is the mission of the Strategic Air Command and that is of course why I used the term strategic. Perhaps a more descriptive name would be the Retaliatory Force.

I realize fully that there are strong groups in both Army and Navy that honestly believe they must share in this mission if they hope to get a reasonable share of available funds and resources, but I believe that this is a fundamental and perhaps fatal misunderstanding. It will still further detract effort and attention away from the need for a strong and ready Army and Navy. This retaliatory force will in a few years consist mainly of intercontinental missiles, and it is not going to stop the Russians in the Middle East or keep them out of Africa and it is not going to stop the Chinese. The Chinese gave us a bad time in Korea five years ago in spite of the fact that they had little and poor equipment. Next time it will be different. They have built up their heavy industries at a surprising rate - they will start turning out automobiles this year. If they can do this they can build tanks and airplanes and before long atomic weapons. It will take more than intercontinental missiles to make them listen to reason.

Our people and the Congress must be made to understand the need for a strong military posture and this understanding can only come if we V

THE ROLE OF MILITARY POWER

Throughout history all nations have found it necessary to devote
a goodly part of their substance to what is euphemistically called
national defense. A more descriptive name for it is military power.
Defense is in some ways an unfortunate and misleading expression, for
we need more than defense, we need a military posture that will command
respect, and that is commensurate with our position and responsibilities
in world affairs. We need it, for protecting our own interests and for
aiding weaker nations in obtaining fair treatment in their dealings with
more powerful and often ruthless nations.

Whether we like it or not, as long as different nations have conflicting
aims and interests and as long as no reliable peaceful means exist for
settling disputes between nations, military power is necessary, not only
for achieving our legitimate short term national aims, but for ensuring
our long term chance of survival.

We are a peaceful people and we have come to mistrust military power;
for military power has too often in the past been misused for promoting
selfish national interests at the expense of weaker nations and this, when
carried too far, has lead to wars and often to catastrophe. In fact,
it is an unpleasant subject and we would rather not think about it. We
like to think that if we could just be left alone all would be well
with us. But nothing could be more wrong. We depend on the rest of the
world for many things, including raw materials and markets without which
we cannot prosper. Our interests are worldwide, and therefore we have

worldwide commitments. These must under present conditions be backed by
military strength when required.

In the past we have not found it necessary or desirable to maintain
large military forces in peacetime. Instead we have relied on our ability
to mobilize our enormous production facilities in case of emergency. In
general this reserve power has been adequate for our needs and it fits
well with our general philosophy and highly efficient industrial society.

But twice in recent times this reserve power has been discounted by
Germany in the hope of obtaining a favorable decision before we could
effectively convert our industry and our population from peace to war.
Both times Germany was wrong, but both times with an uncomfortably narrow
margin and with such devastating consequences that the world has not yet
recovered and will not recover for a long time. Whether these catastrophies
could have been prevented if we had been in possession of greater military
strength at the time is debatable, but it is clear, that this reserve
power no longer commands the respect of a hostile power.

This is more than ever clear now that an enemy can destroy all our
major cities and most of our production facilities in a single surprise
attack with nuclear weapons. Such an attack might be decisive.

Nuclear weapons in large numbers are now available to ourselves and
to Russia and they will soon be available to other nations. As long as
there is no possibility of an adequate defense against a surprise attack -
and this will be true for a long time - our only hope is to try to prevent
such an attack. In view of the enormous advantage that nuclear weapons
have conferred on the strategic offensive we see at present no alternative
to a strong retaliatory striking power for discouraging a surprise attack.

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But such a striking force, necessary as it is, does not by itself constitute the kind of military strength that can support our legitimate aims and meet our worldwide commitment, for inasmuch as its use implies our own destruction, it will be used only at the discretion of the enemy. By this we mean that Russia will almost certainly be careful not to force us to take desperate measures. But the strategic force has not in the past prevented Russia from gaining her objectives by subversion, infiltration and by force and the threat of force, nor can it do so in the future, no matter how powerful it becomes. Paradoxically, the strategic force can fulfill its mission only if it is never used. If it becomes necessary to use it, it has failed in its mission. In fact, at best it is a Maginot Line behind which we can build and maintain the kind of military strength that is required in the present world situation. The primary aim of this strength must be to prevent further Russian aggression and to ensure peaceful settlement of international disputes. In this application the role of nuclear weapons is reversed, for they are ideally suited for making large scale aggression unprofitable.

From the foregoing discussion we conclude that we must have, and to some extent we do have, two kinds of military forces.

1. A deterrent force, which for simplicity we shall call the Strategic Force.

2. A military force for more conventional military and diplomatic purposes, which we shall call the Tactical Force.

These names are not entirely appropriate but are used for convenience.

We shall discuss their meaning in some detail.

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The Strategic Force.

The purpose of the Strategic Force is to make a surprise attack unlikely. There are two aspects to this problem, one is to make an attack difficult, first by early warning, second by an effective defense, the second is to make revenge certain.

In this role then, early warning and continental air defense are essential parts of the Strategic Force and serve the same purpose as the strategic striking force. Although it is true that we see no prospect of a fully effective air defense system, its importance should not be underestimated. Even short warning will make it possible to take many protective measures that will save lives and property and it will alert our active defenses and our striking force, thus minimizing the effectiveness of a surprise attack, and every bomber that we shoot down may save a city.

Although our active defenses are far from perfect they are already adequate for inflicting heavy damage on slow medium altitude bombers, such as the Russian TU4. In the same way the Russian air defense has made our B50 and B36 obsolete. Both sides have been forced to develop faster and higher flying bombers, and these in turn will become obsolete as the defense improves.

The next step will be the ballistic missile which is already on the way. This will make both warning and defense much more difficult, but it will make revenge more certain and it is therefor presumably a better deterrent than anything we now have. However, it will be a long time before we can rely solely on ballistic missiles for retaliation and in the meantime we must improve our more conventional striking force, first, by making it more secure on the ground, second by making it less vulnerable when over

enemy territory. This will require great efforts and huge sums of money.
These problems will not be solved by building a few more bases.

We must have a striking force that is as secure as possible and
adequate for its purpose. This means that it must be strong enough to
convince the enemy that if sufficiently provoked we can and will inflict
a degree of devastation in his territory that he cannot tolerate. Destruction
much beyond this point serves no useful purpose and could be as detrimental
to us as to the enemy. This is not only because the greater destruction
will make recovery and peace more difficult, but there is real danger of
worldwide contamination from a too generous use of nuclear weapons.

It is not possible to get an accurate estimate of what degree of
destruction would serve our purpose, nor how large a striking force is
required to accomplish it, but it is necessary to have a reasonable estimate
of both, at least of an upper limit. Strategic forces much beyond these
requirements add little to our military strength and they divert funds and
efforts away from the tactical forces where they are urgently needed.

It seems almost certain that the destruction of some 50 of our largest
cities and perhaps 30 of our strategic air bases would make it impossible
for us to support military operations outside of our own country. Indeed,
it would be extremely difficult for us to function as an organized society
and maintain any kind of orderly existence. It is not clear whether the
same number of targets destroyed in Russia would have the same effect, but
it would probably not be very different. It is also not clear how many
weapons would be required to accomplish this destruction with reasonable
certainty, but in any case the stockpiles on both sides are more than adequate
for this purpose as well as for tactical applications.

The Tactical forces.

The purpose of the tactical forces is to protect our worldwide interests and promote our national aims, and at the present time, above all, to cooperate with all the nations that are still free in preventing further Russian expansion by force or by the threat of force.

To do this we need combined forces of Army, Navy and Air, with much greater mobility, flexibility and striking power than anything that is now being planned. Just as nuclear weapons have completely altered the concepts of the strategic forces where the immediate advantage is all on the side of the attacker, so have they changed the tactical situation, but in just the opposite direction. They can make an advance on the ground extremely difficult and costly if the right kind of weapons and equipment are available to the defending forces. This requires above all full cooperation with our allies and among our own forces, but it also requires better weapons and weapons systems than we now have. We must develop lighter weapons with greater striking power that can be transported quickly by air to any danger zone, anywhere in the world. We cannot transport big cannon and heavy tanks by air in numbers that will be decisive. We need small tactical airplanes that can operate from improved positions and can deliver tactical nuclear weapons, and we need air transportable ballistic missiles with ranges from one to five hundred miles or more. It will be some years before such missiles will be available and sufficiently reliable, but in the meantime we must make better use of the tactical air forces which we now have or which we can develop more quickly.

Tactical forces must be designed to convince our allies that they can and will be defended against aggression and military pressure if

They do their part of the job. To most nations such a deterrent against attack is just as vital as our deterrent forces are to us. Without it they are at the mercy of the enemy and can do nothing that will strengthen our position. In the long run they will succumb, one by one, and we will find ourselves in an untenable position.

Even if a war should come to be fought with tactical forces employing nuclear weapons it is quite possible that a decision will be achieved, without either side resorting to the use of strategic bombing when this can only end in mutual destruction.

The Balance between Strategic and Tactical Forces.

It may be argued that the above sharp distinction between strategic and tactical forces is an oversimplification and this is to some extent the case, for there is obviously some overlapping in function. In some circumstances, the strategic forces can supplement the tactical forces and in turn some part of the tactical equipment can have a strong deterrent effect on a surprise attack as well as on local aggression. This applies particularly to short range aircraft and ballistic missiles based close to enemy territory.

Nevertheless, the sharp distinction is valid and it is important to keep it clearly in mind, for each system is designed for and serves a distinctive purpose and both are equally necessary and important. It is not sufficient that we avoid a surprise attack if at the same time we lose our position and freedom by gradual encroachment. Nor is it sufficient to maintain a strong tactical posture if the population and industry needed to support it can be wined out in a surprise attack. The two systems are complementary, but they are also competitive. They compete for funds and resources and for popular support. It is important that we understand the need for and the needs of both these forces and that we build up a proper balance between them.

Ever since the first nuclear weapon was exploded in 1945 it has been foreseen by most informed people that in the long run this weapon would revolutionize international relations and could become a serious menace to our country. This has already happened and as a consequence we are now engaged in a determined effort to reach some sort of agreement on arms limitation and control of weapons for mass destruction. Our ever

increasing reliance on nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery
systems has made the solution to this problem almost impossible, for
without strong tactical forces our position for negotiating is poor and
it is difficult for us to advance any kind of acceptable proposal or to
accept any kind of proposal made by others. However, the need for
agreement and control is so compelling that we must continue our effort
and hope for success.

But even if satisfactory agreements are reached, there will still be
conflicting interests among nations and widespread unrest. If we are
to play our role, safeguard our interests, and meet our obligations we
must improve our tactical forces. The Department of the Army should take
the initiative for planning these forces and for explaining to our people
what our needs are. It will require better and friendlier collaboration
with the other services and with all the nations that are still on our side.

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**limited war** McMahon: "General, your recommendations for our operations in China would still be a limited war. We would not commit American ground forces to the operation in China under any circumstances, as I understand it." MacArthur: I would not advise it; no sir....I believe, as I explained several times ye terday, that the application of the, if you want to call it, limited pressures would be quite sufficient to bring Red China to a reasonable attitude to gather around a peace conference table to end this savage slaughter. 103

**allies:** "The fundamental reason that would animate me in this is the interest of our own country. If it was to be our interest to help an ally, we should do it; if it ran contrary to our interest - I believe our own interests are the paramount consideration, not only there, but every place else." 108 (along same lines, supported by Chiang Kai-shek because in our interests) 112

**deterrent** Lodge: Do you think that our Air Force, today, is big enough to undertake bombing missions in the Far East, and at the same time retain enough power to act as a deterrent to the Kremlin, by being able to threaten the Soviet war-making potential?" MacArthur: yes. 116

**global strategy:** "The other fellow has the same problems that we do. If we have to work on two fronts or three fronts or four fronts, so does he; and if we can't meet him and defeat him, our ultimate destruction is certain. I believe we can; but I believe to let him breach us in any one sector, that he will overwhelm us from that sector." 120

(23 Dec, 1949 State Department said Formosa has no strategic value) 123

(MacArthur thought he and JCs were in agreement on all counts)

**factors affecting soviet decision to attack:** "My own belief is that from the strategic military point of view, the relative strength of the two sides would be of the greatest possible influence in dictating the Soviet action. Another point would be whether they were succeeding politically and by the present methods in achieving the aggressive intent, the expansion which is so evidently being attempted by them. 131, 132

**war with China** Fulbright says Chinese will inherently be able to mount some kind of an offensive. MacArthur: if you disrupt industrially, they will have to stop the slaughter. Fulbright, but if it doesn't succeed there would be no way to limit it and would be a larger commitment. More worried about Russia not coming in than of her coming in "It seems to me she really is given a free hand in Europe and in the rest of the world. What really bothers us is the situation in the Middle East and Europe." if could prove it would be quick, that would be one thing. 138 MacArthur: enemy is communism, Fulbright, it is Russia. 142

**war inevitable** No. sir; I do not feel that war is inevitable. I believe that the great masses of the world, what you might call the ordinary men of the world, are invincibly against war. 147 this is the greatest hope 148

stop the war, be cause it is a drain on us and not on Russia. 152

**aggression seeks least resistance** Long: Our experience has shown that wherever the Communists knew they were not having or going to have resistance, they invariably went. 175

**preparedness:** MacArthur "...as I understand it, ...our preparedness program envisions its accomplishment in about 2 years' time or something of that sort." 207 "The first blow in the next war may well be the decisive blow....With every passing year that diminishes. Therefore, the corollary is with every passing year, as long as you have a maverick running loose in the world, it means that your necessity for preparedness increases unless you can find the formula to settle the whole matter. 211

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**preparedness now:** are we ready for surprise show: "I should say from my general knowledge that we are rather inadequately prepared at the present moment." *must have been

**inviting aggression:** "I don't believe there is anything that you could do that would accelerate the tempo of possible war with the Soviet than to show weakness in the far East today." 218 "I believe it would act as the greatest possible deterrent upon the enemy if we were successful in stopping this predatory attack in the Far East. I believe if we do not do it, it would be an incitation to him to attack another area." 222

**techniques of Communism:** "I have made the statement many times, and repeat now, that the Russian pattern is never to move from the outside in until it thinks it is also in a position to move from the inside out." 226

**original withdrawal from Korea:** was based on the military strategic concept that it was not in the line of defense and we didn't contemplate defending it. 243

**importance of Red China to Russia:** "It has been quite apparent to me, Senator, that the linking of the Soviet to this Korean War has paled out as the events have progressed." 250 (Morse says therefore avoid doing things that cement the two) 251

**first line of defense for Europe:** I believe the first line of defense now, for Europe, is right where we are fighting over there, in Korea. It is a global effort, and if you breach that, it will roll around to Europe as sure as the sun rolls round." 263 and it will exhaust us not to end it.

**preparedness:** "I do think that it is important that we keep in mind that time is not necessarily on our side." 291 - Knowland

Marshall from now on

**risks in extension of conflict:** "General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have Our objective in Korea continues to be the defeat of the aggression and the restoration of peace. We have persistently sought to confine the conflict to Korea and to prevent its spreading into a third world war. In this effort, we stand allied with the great majority of our fellow-members of the UN. Our efforts have succeeded in thwarting the aggressors, in Korea, and in stemming the tide of aggression in southeast Asia and elsewhere throughout the world. Our efforts in Korea have given us some sorely needed time and impetus to accelerate the building of our defenses and those of our allies against the threatened onslaught of Soviet imperialism. General MacArthur, on the other hand, would have us, on our own initiative, carry the conflict beyond Korea against the mainland of Communist China, both from the sea and from the air. He would have us accept the risk of involvement not only in an extension of the war with Red China, but in an all-out war with the Soviet Union. He would have us do this even at the expense of losing our allies and wrecking the coalition of free peoples throughout the world. He would have us do this even though the effect of such action might expose Western Europe to attack by the millions of Soviet troops poised in Middle and Eastern Europe. 325 doing this also would "result in a great increase in casualties without a decisive finish,..." "The possibilities of the loss of our allies, the loss of continuation and development of collective action, collective defense, and the hazard of entering into a general war appealed to us as being so serious that the other possibilities which would flow in his opinion, from carrying out his proposals, were not considered advisable." 354 We are intimately associated with them, with France, the other western European countries, in the effort to build up a defense in western Europe that will have some body to it, some assurance of deterrent action against a possible Russian action." 354

**Korean method:** "That method was to inflict the greatest number of casualties we could in order to break down not only the morale but the trained fabric of the Chinese armies." 365 *retain allies*

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**global policy** "For the last 5 years our supreme policy has been to curb Communist aggression and, if possible, to avoid another world war in doing so. (Iran, Greece, Turkey, Trieste, Berlin, Indochina) 365 "There can be, I think, no quick and decisive solution to this global struggle short of resorting to another world war. The cost of such a conflict is beyond calculation. . . . . . We are applying there the same policy that has been successfully applied in the attempted aggressions that preceded it elsewhere in the world. . . . Nevertheless, even though the conditions have been different, our policy has been uniform in the following respects: We have spurned appeasement. We have brought to bear whatever has been necessary, in money and manpower, to curb the aggressor; and we have sought in every possible way to avoid a third world war." 366

**importance of European defense** "...but what I was talking about there is a set-up which would be successful in deterring full war, deterring the Soviet military aggression. Now there is also involved, of course, Soviet political aggression such as occurred in Hungary, Czech and at a much earlier date in Poland, and that is where the European recovery program came into play to work against such a matter as that. That phase of the matter was one of the great failures in connection with China in their battle with the Communist forces there. We start with the development of deterrents and thereafter it is a question of good government." 384
At present time, we couldn't keep them from running over Europe, but we could make them stop and think, and we have the atom bomb. 385

what base action on, is Soviet decision already made: "Now, as to basing our action on what we think is the Soviet procedure in the direction of their affairs, I don't think we can very well do that because it is speculative." 402

**versus the timetable idea** "There is actual fighting going on in the Far East, and Communist China is a very important factor to the Soviet Union in that it provides forces to carry out their aggression against our world, and the Soviet suffer no losses except in the way or the materiel they furnished. Now whether or not the Soviet Government can afford to have China defeated decisively by the Allies and put in a position where the reaction of China toward the Soviet Government might be one of deep distrust because they weren't fully supported, that introduces a factor in a current active situation that is not duplicated in Europe." 432

(January 5, President discounts Formosa, Secy of State too) 469

(recognition of Red China and Formosa negotiations excluded from talks) 470

**present course of action** "The best military advice I have, in which I concur with the information available to me, is that the course we are now following is the only practical course at the moment which we feel can lead to a successful outcome of that campaign in terminating the aggression, and a victory in consequence, with the least loss of life and with the least possibility of the intervention of the Soviet Government." 478

(some talk all the way through of the budget now under consideration, and the manpower act. urging it. 478 emphasis on fact we are now gathering strength. 479)

defense of US not adequate 489

**preparedness** "I am quite certain we are not." 479

**acceptance of risks in Europe and Asia** why did we risk in Europe and not here:

"In Western Europe, as I said the other day, we literally had no choice." here we do 495

"The principal difference that I see in the matter is that we have an issue there that is very critical to the Soviet Union in that they now are in complete accord with the Chinese Communist government so far as we know, and they have a treaty of accord. . . . Therefore, the situation as to the possible actions of the Soviet Government is a more acute one by far than in Western Europe. . . ." 500 (But why wouldn't they be just as hesitant about the limited defeat now - Hickenlooper)

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**Formosa position:** "We are very clear on that, that Formosa must never be allowed to come under the control of a Communist government or of a government that is under Soviet Communist domination. Now that is clear; however otherwise that might be handled is another matter which undoubtedly would be discussed one way or another. The entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations is a matter right now we are adamant in regard to. Now, you have to take the long view into the future, and, if you could conceive of that becoming, as I say a respected government in the family of nations, then you have got a new consideration on your hands." 531

**China in 1945** (although there was some testimony on this here, the Acheson part turned out to almost center on this, as a sort of investigation of it. most of this now was just sort of informational) "Next, undoubtedly this Government was influencing the Kuomintang Nationalist Government to bring about a more general people's government than was in existence at that time....Now as to the Communists themselves, you are correct when you say there was very little influence we could bring to bear upon them, unless you undertook to increase the efficiency of the Chinese forces...It was a continuous effort at that time to keep clear of the involvement of a civil war, and that, of course, was related to our demobilization procedure and the fact that we could not do these things very effectively, but it is to avoid civil war in China" 556 "and I think undoubtedly our Government exercised its influence toward the establishment by the Nationalist Government of a people's government which included the Communist regime." 557

**bringing Russia into the war against Japan** It was the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that it was highly important that the Soviets carry out the campaign against Manchuria and against Korea.....I think they were unanimous." 563

**military objective in Korea** "Our military objective in Korea is to resist this aggression and in general to secure the situation. That may mean the advance into Northern Korea, as it did at one stage, or our holding South Korea safe from aggression. The advance into North Korea as a military proposition was the destruction of the North Korean forces. At the present time the military objective is dominated by the factor that the security of our forces is the preeminent requirement because we are so much outnumbered in Communist Chinese strength. But in general terms, it remains the same - to resist the aggression, which carries with it the implication that we not only resist the aggression but within our means we try to terminate the possibility of a continuation of the aggressive threats." 570

Senator

**collective security** McMahon: "May I assume, General, that the co-use with our allies of certain portions of the geography of the earth is of the utmost importance to a defense of the U.S. of A." Marshall: I would think so absolutely sir; and that is the principle of collective security, which is the only principle that we think can carry us to a peace." 574

(Gain - thinks free world has failed to keep promises and carry out mission in Korea with serious results. 577) thinks leadership is the crying need of the world 591

**relative threat of Russian intervention in Europe and Asia:** Senator Gain: What are your fundamental reasons for assuming that an aggression will not take place in Western Europe until we are better prepared to meet it, while seemingly you believe that Russia will enter the Korean conflict if we bomb and destroy military installations possessed by the Red Chinese: I ask this question in part because it has seemed apparent to me for some time that Russia could presently, today, defeat any forces which might be opposed to her in Western Europe." Marshall: "In regard to Western Europe, first I go on the basis myself that Russia may step into the aggression at any moment. Also that that is no argument that we do not do our best to prepare for it even though it may take 2 or 3 years......Now I will try to be brief again in regard to the difference I think in the situation in the Far East, and it is this in the main: that Russia possesses a very valuable ally in China. That you might say is a Russian protectorate in a sense, but one who is paying a great bill of human lives and other things in order to fulfill that role. Now in view of their treaty

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line about 200 miles long to work on now and we can exercise very concentrated attacks on that supply line." "Normally you go after certain targets with strategic bombing that are producing the war materials of a nation. In this case most of these supplies are not made in China, but they are made in Russia, so that you cannot go after the real source of supply. You can only get the supply installations where they are moving them down toward the front." 887

**global defense** "We do not think that Korea is the place to fight a major war. In other words, in case you get into a third world war, I don't think you would choose Korea as a place to fight it. So that we would like to have our forces committed to Korea limited for that reason, and we would also like to limit our commitments there so that these other forces would be available in other parts of the world if something else happens." 895

**avoiding World War III** "We feel that we are not in the best position to meet a global war. We feel that we are improving all the time our own position, and that of our allies, and we would like very much to avoid a war at this time, not only as to our own readiness, but the longer you can avoid a war the better chance you have of avoiding it altogether, in the end." "...and we also feel that by fighting this war in Korea, even on a limited basis, that we may be postponing other actions which may have been on the timetable, and we have possibly avo ded the outbreak of war in other parts of the world. And if we can continue to keep the attention focused on Korea without becoming too much involved in it, in other words if we can fight this limited action in Korea without its being spread, we may be going a long way toward avoiding world war III." 896

much was made out of these quotes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for the Senate Committees on Korean Operations: February 13: "During the course of the discussion it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State would prefer not to express political objectives with respect to Korea until military capabilities there were established. On the other hand, the consensus of the opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that a political decision was required before there could be suitable determination of military courses of action." and on March 15: "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff held an informal conference with representatives of the Department of State and among other things discussed the Korean situation. It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea...." 920. Bradley's comment: "That pertained primarily to whether or not we crossed the thirty-eighth parallel in the spring, and at this time it was pretty much understood that we would not be able to get any political-military policy until we had been able to see what would happen to this next offensive. It is fact, of course, that this is still a wait-and-see proposition." 921

**Formosa's value** "We have always had the view that Formosa had very considerable strategic value, if held by the enemy. We have always said it did not have sufficient strategic value to justify our occupying it by our own troops." 930

**present objectives in Korea** "From the military point of view we hope that by inflicting severe casualties on the enemy and proving to them that they are not invincible, that they cannot gain anything by aggressive action, that it is too costly a matter, that they have been let down by Russia in getting in, that they will be willing to negotiate a peace with the U.N." 937

**Soviet intentions** "It would be pretty hard to try to guess what the men in the Kremlin are thinking. They have a timetable; they may be willing to step up that timetable to meet certain conditions; and my opinion is the fact that they started this - and I say, I think they started in Korea - the North Koreans started it at their instigation - I think the fact that they started this is an indication that they were in a position now where they were willing to risk war...." 942 "I wish we could feel sure that Russia realized the destructiveness of these bombs, as well as we do, and would consent to a period of peace. Apparently they are not willing to do so, and their announced

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intention today is to some day rule the world. They have announced that capitalism and communism cannot exist in the world together. Now, whether or not we can avoid a war by a deterrent like the A-bomb, and by building up our strength long enough to let them change their minds and get in a new regime - maybe the man following Stalin will have a falling-out with somebody else and by some kind of a turn-over we will have a condition where they will abandon their presently announced intention. And, that is one reason I am of the opinion we should always try to avoid war as long as possible, with the hope that in the end we will avoid it altogether." 946

666666 of Korea "I think the aggression in Korea, the nature of it and the size of it, made us all realize that Russia had reached the point where she was willing to risk war, and that in order to meet that, or in order to try to prevent it by raising a great deterrent to war in the form of larger security forces that we had better get busy and increase our security forces; and I think it has not only had an effect on us to increase our own security forces, but it had a very marked effect on a lot of our freinds in Europe with whom we are allied." 969

effect of Korea on Russian strategy he doesn't believe the Russians expected us to call their hand. " If you look at it, if Russia is trying to cause as much trouble in the world as possible, and is trying to conquer additional peoples and additional resources, by the use of her satellites, in which she doesn't lose very much, maybe it wasn't any mistake. She hasn't lost anything yet, in men. True it has cost her equipment, but she makes that under State-controlled industry, and it keeps her war industries going; and I wouldn't know whether she would think it was a mistake, from that angle or not. Certainly she hasn't lost any of her own forces yet....I think possibly in my opinion she has had her timetable set back and the fact that we intervened in Korea has kept her from taking action elsewhere, and to that extent I think our intervention in Korea has been a considerable disadvantage to her. The fact that she started the Korean incident is just one of several she probably had planned; and I doubt if she would be sorry she started it. I think she is probably sorry we intervened." 971

policy in Korea "As far as military directive was concerned, I think he was given sufficient directives. He was told that he no longer should consider it his mission to clear all of North Korea of the enemy and that the safety of his troops was paramount, and that his mission should be to inflct as severe casualties as possible on the Chinese with a minimum to himself, and, of course, later on, as was brought out, that he should stay in Korea if at all possible to hold. Now as far as the political decision is concerned as to whether or not we intend to drive them entirely out of Korea or whether or not we are willing to stop at the thirty-eighth parallel or what other political decision is concerned, I think it is fair to say that he has not received that from the UN or from the US." 986 have asked for A.1054

strength as deterrent - he in general - he lays no particular stress on air or bomb. 1006
air doesn't stop ground troops 1014

Russia China Treaty has some effect, because Russia would want to start a war when it would look favorable to her allies and support them. 1056

limited war "I think you might define it in that way, as a limited war, in that it is limited to an area." 1065

deterrence "Now Stalin indicated on several occasions during the war that he realized the importance of industrial production, and I think that is one of the things that acts as a deterrent today. He realizes we have so much more production than he has." 1069

goal in Korea "...as a result of these operations going on now, we should reach a state where some kind of negotiations and settlement would be possible." 1076 "I believe everybody recognizes the long-range political objective of the UN is a united and free Korea, but that does not necessarily follow that we have to obtain that militarily at this time." 1083

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The next part is General Collins:

**reasons for limiting war** "We have felt, all along that we went into Koea under the aegis of the UN, and that if the conflict were broadened at all, it should be done with the full agreement of the nations participating in the Korean show. And, furthermore, that if we get into a major war, we would need allies; and if we were to take unilateral action in Korea to broaden the war there, then - not only would there be a possibility of a third world war developing there, but we might very well stand to lose the principal allies whom we certainly would be dependent on in event of a major war. Now, I feel, with the other Chiefs, that we are not prepared for a major war, as of now; and that the returns that we would get from bombing in Manchuria, risking a naval blockade which, to be effective, we would have to blockade Dairen, for example, would not be worth the increased risk of getting us now into a major war which, from a military point of view, I would certainly not want to see us carry on alone." 1188

**objectives in Korea** "Well, right now I would say that our objectives were to punish the Communist forces to the very maximum, and to hold in Korea as much of Korea as possible for us to hold until some form of settlement can be had of the conflict there."

1191

**other defenses** "I have been all over Alaska, and in my judgment, we do have adequate defenses there now." "Now, turning to the European situation, my answer to your question, if I can recall its exact form, its exact phrasing, would be, no, that the Western Powers do not have sufficient forces as of now to hold Western Europe in the event of an attack by the Russians." on a holding action: "I think that we have sufficient forces out in the Far East to hold there, I think we have sufficient forces in Alaska to hold there. I do not think we have sufficient forces in Europe." 1212

**Russia's capacity for war in Far East in distinction from MacArthur:** "...to the best of my knowledge and belief, Russia does have sufficient forces and sufficient supplies out there in the Far East to carry on operations for some period of time." 1220

**putting down aggression or punishing it** "Both, in my judgment, Senator. Put it down within the capabilities - within the capacity of the forces we are willing to commit for the purposes - If that is not sufficient, then at least to punish so severely these aggressors and to make clear to them that they cannot get away with it without very severe punishment." 1225

**buying time** yes, they are 1241

**goal in Korea** "It isn't only a question of making it clear to Communist China that they can't get away unsathed with flagrant aggression, such as they have, but it should be quite clear to Russia itself that militant communism - that is, communism backed up by military force - is not going to have just a free rein in the world, and I think that is a very important thing, if our objective - if our broad objective is to prevent outbreak of a major war." 1245

**lack trained manpower** - we do 1247

**new weapons** practically the only mention of them. Knowland: "Yes; but on the question of hot pursuit, of course, the action was vetoed, and what I am concerned with - we are developing new weapons all the time. The new weapons might be the difference between victory and defeat. Will the same type of a veto be used on our responsible commanders in regard to the use of such weapons?" 1365

The next part is General Vandenburg:

**on jets** "The indication is, Mr. Chairman, that they have a jet engine in the MIG 15 that is superior to any jet engine that we have today. Our training is superior and our gunnery control in the aircraft is superior, which gives us an advantage even though they have the advantage of speed and climb and operations at altitude."

1377

13

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air in Korea and shoestring airforce "Air power, and especially the application of strategic air power, should go to the heart of the industrial centers to become reasonably efficient. Now the source of the materiel that is coming to the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans is from Russia. Therefore, hitting across the Yalu, we could destroy or lay waste to all of Manchuria and the principal cities of China if we utilized the full power of the USAF. However in doing that....we are bound to get attrition. If we utilize less than the full power of the USAF, in my opinion it might not and probably would not be conclusive. And even if we utilized it and laid waste to it there is a possibility that it would not be conclusive. But the effect on the USAF, with our start from approximately 40 groups, would fix it so that, should we have to operate in any other area with full power of the USAF, we would not be able to. The fact is that the US is operating a shoestring air force in view of its global responsibilities. Starting from a forty-odd-group AF, the aircraft industry is unable until almost 1953 to do much of a job toward supplying the airplanes that we would lose in war against any major opposition. In my opinion, the USAF is the single potential that has kept the balance of power in our favor. It is the one thing that has, up to date, kept the Russians from deciding to go to war. In my opinion, we cannot afford to, what I would like to call, peck at the periphery as long as we have a shoestring AF." 1378

air in the future Today the US is relatively safe from air attack. Tomorrow in my opinion we will not be. Because we are relatively safe from air attack today, an air force of a certain size can protect the US and keep the balance of power in our favor. Today we only have one job that we would have to do if we got into a major war with Russia, and that is to lay waste the industrial potential of that country. Tomorrow when they have developed their long-range air force and they have more atomic weapons, we have two jobs. We would have to put into first place the job of destroying the Russian air potential that could utilize atomic bombs against the US, and lay waste the industrial potential. Today the air defenses of this country are about adequate. Tomorrow they will not be nearly adequate enough. 1379

balance of forces "I said that what we have to balance our forces toward is the threat, not against each other. We must balance our forces against the enemy and his forces and his potential. It should be designed in proportion to evade an enemy's strength and to exploit his weakness. I still have that opinion, sir." 1383

deterrent "In connection with your statement that it should be saved for outbreaks in some other section of the world, I would like to go back to my pecking at the periphery and say in my opinion the shoestring USAF that we are operating today, in view of our global commitments, must not be utilized until it is larger for anything except holding it intact as nearly as possible against a major threat, against a major power, because in my opinion again it is the sole deterrent to war up to this time; and if we emasculate it, that sole deterrent will be gone." 1393

95 group a stepping stone. 1399

two meanings of victory "For a long time Great Britain held the balance of power, and thereby kept peace in a world that was, let us say, in an explosive condition over a period of a great number of years. They have had a great deal of experience in this balance-of-power business, and they - incidentally, I often used to hear Secretary Forrestal talk about this theory, and I am an advocate of what he believed - that there are two ways of going about establishing peace in the world. One, in which you completely bring to the knees a nation so that its power of resistance is gone for many years, and that shifts the balance of power. Another method is to have a victory that does not require unconditional surrender, but that leaves a force still in the world that can be applied against the balance of power so that by playing the balance of power, if it is done carefully, peace can be preserved over a great many years under explosive situations. Now, I am not sure in my own mind and, as I say, this is a little over my head, because it has to do with other than strictly military matters, but I would

18

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and destruction. And back of this shield we need to huge the potential that would enable us to win a war.

This is the measure of the force we need; as we approach it, we approach our objective of preventing war.

Can we do this? I believe we can. We and our allies have the capacity to outproduce the Soviet bloc by a staggering margin."

"There is also the critical factor of our will. The future belongs to freedom if free men have the will to make time work on their side." 1720

**policy on Formosa** "The President has stated that we are not prejudicing the future of Formosa. That is a matter which should be decided, he said, either in connection with the Japanese peace treaty or by the UN, and the view which has been taken more recently is that the UN is the appropriate place where it should ultimately be decided.

It has been our clear view that the attack on Korea makes it quite impossible to discuss this matter, and therefore we have put it to one side in the UN..." 1729

**Russo-China treaty** "I think it is significant that increasingly, both Soviet and Chinese propaganda is making charges that Japan is being used in connection with the fight with the Chinese, and sometimes that Japanese are being used.... That propaganda seems to me to be calculated to lay a foundation in case it is wanted to be used, to invoke this treaty." 1730

**Formosa** "...the President has made our policy very clear on numerous occasions, that we are not going to allow it to be taken by force." 1755

both can be discussed in

**Red China and UN:** have opposed and will continue to oppose.

**Korea possible stalemate:** "What I am talking about is the defeat of the Chinese effort, and when the Chinese know that they are defeated and have suffered as they have suffered in the last two attacks, then I think their purpose changes and, as their purpose changes, you get a possibility of a settlement." 1761

1984

**collective security** "The basis upon which we are building our security, in addition to the strength of our own Armed Forces, is collective security, which is based on arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Treaty. Those are essential to us... we work absolutely hand in hand with our allies." 1764

**long term political objective** "Now, the long-term political objective of the UN in Korea has been to establish a free, independent, and democratic Korea." 1782

**mission or money**

**December 49, mil. assistance to Formosa:** "The only thing I thought it would accomplish would be to involve the prestige of the US in an event which everybody had agreed seemed to be impossible to prevent." 1808

had threats Red China would come in if crossed 38th, but thought it improbable. 1833

**Senator McMahon:** "I think it important to have in the record at this point, and I make it without fear of contradiction, that in the years between '47 and '49 there was not a single, solitary suggestion made for the formation of policy, change of policy, or disagreement with policy by any member of this committee." (on China) 1906

"Well, as I recall it, Mr. Secretary, there was a complete agreement in the Foreign Relations Committee in the spring of 1949 that we had best get out of China as fast as we could." 1909 2241

**Red China and UN** "The important attitude which can be taken here is one of leadership, and in taking that attitude, it is necessary to convince other nations and have other nations feel that they wish to act with the US in taking the view that the Communists can not shoot their way into the UN."

If you can present that great major thought powerfully to your associates in the UN, then you can get them to vote with you on preventing this thing from happening." 1934

If a minority, would have to go to World Court to get view on veto." 1935

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**military policy in Korea:** "The purpose of whatever instructions have been given to them is to defeat the attacks which are being made on Korea; to repel, in any effective a wau as we can possibly do it, the attacks which are being made on Korea; and to take such military action, either north or south of the parallel, as we may need to do to bring about the conclusion of this campaign, with failure on the part of the Chinese, and success on our part, to repulse attacks on the Republic of Korea, sir." Flanders: Now, by the Rep of Korea do you mean the Rep of Korea as it existed south of the 38 parallel? "That is the Republic of Korea." Flanders: aha, then it does have a military significance. 1943

**limited war in Korea:** "The point is, are you or are you not going to attack Manchuria? And if you do attack Manchuria, you can say, of course, we are only doing this in a limited way, but that doesn't assure that the other people are going to deal with it in a limited way." 1946

**withdrawal from Korea:** "As I say, the UN recommended that both sides shouldl withdraw. Our own Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it was very wise for us to withdraw. We thought from the international point of view it was wise to withdraw, and the withdrawal took place - and it may have been unwise." 2011 Byrd: ineffective warning. 2013 however, June 19th, 1950, Dulles gave speech telling South Koreans they were not alone.

202022

(on China ammunition in 45, was Barr right, or Wedemeyer, Brink, Badger and Chennault who said they lacked it? Acheson: Barr the best official view) 2025 example on 2064

Acheson view on Nationalist failure: against our advice, they overextended themselves.
" " " bringing Russians into war: If had known it wouldnt be necessary, shouldn't have 2036, but thought it was. 2029

sent Marshall to China on policy based on MacArthur, Spruance and Wedemeyer cable saying: "It is suggested that the US assistance to China, as outlined above, be made available as a basis for negotiation bey the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united democratic China." 2047. Wedemeyer later says that although he signed it, his views were that it couldnt be done - don't know why he signed it.

Flanders: hopes some diplomatic action for rebuilding Korea is underway. 2091
Sparkman

views on China in 45 "I do believe, however, it will be helpful to the American people to have recalled to their attention how widespread was this feeling, as erroneous as it may have been, that there could be successfully worked out in China a coalition of the forces there that would bringpeace to that war-torn country." thought the Reds were agrarian reformers. 2094 "Perhaps it would be a little more generous to say that not only the common people but the leaders in China were unaware of the larger plans of the Communists at that time." Acheson y.a.a. 2124, Wiley
why felt China wouldn't come in 50 "mong the reasons for believing that they would not come in were the amount of well-trained troops which they would have to commit, the possible weakening of the Government in China itself, the lack of real advantage to China itself in coming in, and these are some of the factors - its position internationally, it would probably lose ground rather than gain ground in its international position." 2101

Chinese losses from coming in: Long: lost part of chance to get Formosa by bringing us in; lost initiative in SE Asia by tying down her armies; international criminal; economic injury from blockade and war goods; any influence in Japan peace treaty. 2101

Vandenburg on bipartisan foreign policy as regards China: 1947: "What the policy of the State Department is, I am unable to testify....I have never been consulted about the Chinese policy or the Pan American policy or many other policies..." 2110

didn't arm South Korea more because afraid they might attack North Korea. 2115

20

much made of the fact that it was a political and not a military decision to not bomb Manchuria." 2274

The next part is Nedemeyer

**Formosa** "To summarize, I have never accepted the State Department's pessimistic view with reference to the future of Formosa. I have consistently and repeatedly recommended American supervised aid to the Chinese Nationalist Government, presently located in Formosa, in order to stop the advance of Communism in the Far East." 2297

**coalition in China** "I never believed such a government possible." gave him a hard time on the basis of the telegram. 2297 Told Marshall so. 2305

**what he would have done in Korea** "I would have taken punitive action against the North Koreans with my air and with my naval forces, but I would not have put ground forces in Korea."

"There are lots of potential powder kegs around the periphery of Soviet Russia. They would be happy to fuse those powder kegs, to detonate them, and to cause you Americans to fill them with the best manhood that you have got. That is exactly their primary purpose, in my judgment, to create vacua that you Americans must fill with your most precious commodity, American manhood, and with American materials, and they are going to wreck you if they can economically, and they are going to embarrass you psychologically." 2522

In other words, in my judgment, it is their third team opposing our first team, and their third team at times has defeated us in battle, in combat, and at least it has accomplished a stalemate.

If, as the newspapers indicate, we effect a truce very shortly with Soviet Russia or with their satellites, at the 38th parallel, that will be tantamount to a defeat for us psychologically." 2307

**advice not asked** "I don't believe men in uniform should formulate or enunciate policy. ...But I do think that some military men have unique opportunities to obtain information and to have experience that would be helpful to our country, and I think these men should be used."

I thought that I wasn't being used in that capacity, sir, so I asked for relief. 2311

**allies** "Senator Smith, if any of these peoples refuse to go along with us in this common objective of stopping the advance of communism, their alternative is enslavement of mind and body; and we ought to make it crystal clear to them that our way is a selfless, Christian approach to international problems; and if they don't follow us, they have the alternative of enslavement." "If they don't go along with us, I say we go alone, because we have right, as I understand, right on our side." 2315

**mission in Korea** "Now the people who issued his directive should carefully have studied the implications of this mission; and he should never be given a mission that requires him to bomb bases or that involves the bombing of bases and the blockade of a coast if they did not want to involve that country in a war." Once in, you can change mission "Only at great psychological loss - loss of prestige in the world," 2316

**why Chiang fell:** "The Chinese people, I am sure, after so many years of war, terrific dislocations, psychological, economic - that country was just tired of war. The people were tired of war. All they wanted, I have repeatedly stated to congressional committees here, when talking about that area, all the people wanted was food, shelter, and peace. 2317 "I imagine that what went through most of the hearts and minds was, "Hell! Let's try this other ideology or philosophy," or whatever you might want to call it. But they were just so fed up they just stopped fighting." 2318

**Fromosa** not vital, but important 2318

**future war** "But in future warfare the essential weapon is air. We must have undisputed control of the air. It isn't on the ground that the future wars are going to be settled, sir, it is in the air. I can't emphasize that too strongly-both tactical and strategic air"

2318

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**Attila the Hun** "I would like to say though, sir, that the cohesive element that enabled them to win at that time was Christianity, in my judgment, and we have got to have faith and we have got to have conviction in what we are doing or we are going to lose this struggle with communism, in my judgment." 2320

**China not supported** "...and I don't think we gave moral support to the Chinese National Government after the war....Their corruption, their maladministration, and these other things were all emphasized by so many people." by me too. 2328
"My military opinion on that, sir, is lack of spirit, primarily lack of spirit; it was not a lack of equipment." "He wanted our assistance very much. Now, we didn't give them this moral or material aid, in my judgment. The material aid was given, in my judgment, begrudgingly." 2329. this and the sick of fighting.
"These people had been fighting, as I say, for years and were fed up with war, but on the moral side, they were not sure of our traditional American assistance and friendship." 2330 we gave a lot of scrap iron.

**allies** "If we try to criticize continuously these other peoples, if we don't approach this in an offensive way but if we continue to approach it in a negative way - I am talking about the international developments - in my judgment we are never going to get collective security in the world for free peoples."

We are never going to get it, sir, and we have got to be realistic, as I stated, and integrity has to permeate everything we do, and we must make no commitments that we can't fill, but we must require these people to make a proportionate contribution to collective security, and we're not doing that in my judgment." 2334

**lack of directives** "I was in command of the Chinese theater, as you know, the last 2 years of the war. Now, it is this I want to say; that I had a very difficult time to get directions from appropriate authorities in this country. ...Situations were developing involving political, economic, and psychological matters - and I would send radiogram after radiogram requesting guidance, because as I said this morning, I think a civilian should formulate and enunciate policy." 2347

**what he would do in Korea withdraw.** "I would break off diplomatic relations with them. I would go into full mobilization. And I would clearly lay it all before the world - I would lay it before the bar of the whole world, and I would go further; I would go to the real perpetrator of all this, because it is not the Koreans - the crux of this thing is in the Kremlin. And If we continue to permit them to call the tune to which we shall dance, our form of government would be in jeopardy." 2363.

State department squelched Wedemeyer report on basis of part calling for a guardianship in Manchuria and trusteeship in Korea to create a buffer. 2367

**danger** What worries me is that we became involved in all these little areas around the periphery of the Soviet.... and they are nondecisive." 2383

importance of regaining propaganda initiative. 2387 not imperialist

**future war** "...anything you can do to insure that our country has undisputed control of the air would bring us the greatest security that anything you can do. The Navy ought to be directed to protect our sea lanes, and it ought to work on the submarine menace."

The AFQ ought to insure that we have tactical and strategic air controls, undisputed control. I just can't emphasize it too strongly. In my judgment that is the case. The Army would just be required to seize, maintain, and control bases from which we can with increasing effectiveness operate these other two services. In other words, sir, I would not become embroiled in a large land-locked battle in Europe, nor would I visualize again in a future war controlling, as we have controlled the Germans and the Japanese postwar, controlling Russia. If we do that, we will wreck ourselves economically, so we have got to visualize what our objective must be if we are going to go to war with Russia, and in my judgment it should be this."

We should determine, we should destroy their war-making potential and convince people through propaganda of our friendly intentions in the process. "Any other program in my judgment is going to ruin this great land of ours." 2398

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**State Dept men in China** "Invariably those statements which they submitted to me were very critical of the Nationalist Government and they were rather praising of the Communist regime." 2401. liked what the Reds had done in Yemen.

**he's all for psychological warfare.** 2403. 2414. "We have permitted the enemy to have the initiative in the field of ideas..." 2530.
**time** "I don't agree with those who say that time is playing in our favor.** I think it is playing in the Russian favor...." 2407

**further on future war** "So my suggestion, sir, is that through psychological means we make clear to all peoples of the world, continuously, what we are trying to do.... Concurrently, I would take areas from which I could conduct effective air operations; I would maintain areas in close proximity to the heartland, to the war-making potential of my enemy, and maintain those areas, but I would not engage in the land struggle where I would suffer prohibitive losses in manpower....We must utilize and exploit our technological skills." 2415

**1940** "Both Hpkins and Harriman in my discussions with them, neither of them agreed with me. I feel they didn't accept my theories, my concern." with communism.
**1946** - Harriman came round.

**German rearmeament** "I would rear them the German.

In my judgment, if we don't rear them, the Soviets ultimately will." 2452
stresses political, edonomic, and psych. 2472 all the way through
hesitancy of our people to speak strongly to our allies is poor. 2485
**prestige** "I think we have lost pre tige in the eyes of the orientals." 2488

**1945** "I felt as theater commander that there was uncertainty back home here relative to our future policies and actions in the area. I strove to obtain direction from my chiefs."

"It seemed to me that any constructive purposes or ideas with reference to that area had their genesis in Congress, and the opposition to those constructive ideas usually occurred in the State Department." 2497 **no directives**

**Russia into China** he advised Russia go into war - mistake 2506

Knowland: nothing collective about the UN at this point.

**no set-up for planning** "I don't know of any agency where such important international planning is possible. The National Security Council is set up to do it, but those gentlemen, the President ex officio is the head of it, the Sec. of D, the Sec. of S, and so forth, the members, they are too busy with their primary jobs and there is no organization that I know of or agency performing that highly important coordinating effort, planning and action on the part of our Government in the international field."

2509
**future war** "I think they will pick the time and the place of the conflict; as long as they can implement satellite against us it is to their advantage to do so and not become involved themselves." and it is working 2517

**global policy approach** "All through my testimony I have made an earnest effort to emphasize two points. First, the employment of military force has never, by itself, solved international frictions or problems, and never will. Second, there must be global direction, timely and intelligent guidance concerning our national and international policies, plans and actions, if we Americans are to answer successfully the challenge of the Kremlin. A crudely mechanical approach to these diverse problems cannot yield effective solutions. On the contrary, true solutions to these problems require the application of all four elements of global strategy, namely, the political, the economic, the psychological, and the military." 2561

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The next part is Louis Johnson

**failure of intelligence** when in Japan in 1950, June: "In the briefing of my intelligence covering all that part of the world, nothing was said about any immediacy of trouble in Korea, nor did anyone else on that trip give to me or to General Bradley, in my presence - and we were together in all these conferences - any indication of such." 2572

**Formosa in 1949** JCS advised me, and I think in writing, that they were of the opinion that they shouldn't even do the limited thing of sending a mission over to check into the Formosan situation." 2577 in December they changed their minds. "By that time the military was getting much more exercised about Formosa. We were not agreeing with the State Department." 2577 President didn't disagree with the military considerations, but went along with state for political grounds. 2578 Acheson felt: "He felt we would lose face with other governments in Asia whose friendship and support we needed; that it might be adversely construed in Japan itself; that he really wanted to have nothing to do with the Nationalist Government." 2579 he thought Formosa essential to our security - 2593

**reasons for entering Korean conflict** "The fairest statement I can make as to the general approach was that if you let this one happen, others would happen in more rapid order; that the whole world looked to the majesty of strength of the US to see what we were going to do about this picture.....Moreover, we have joined the UN, which had certain commitments contained in its Charter, and this was a direct violation of that Charter - it looks to me now as though it was a testing ground for the Charter. 2585**

**friction between State and Defense** "When I went to the Defense Department, Mr. Forrestal was concerned about the political domination of Defense in many ways by State." So they set up an official channel and it was o.k. 2591

**efficacy of defense dept.** "You will pardon me if I say that most of the things that we then argued about.....have now been decided as they were initiated in the Defense Department...." 2625

**Russian intentions** "At the moment, talking now as a citizen I worry more now when I hear about $70 billion budgets.....You would conclude, if you read Stalin's books, and what Stalin said, that he doesn't look to a clash of arms, that he expects America to spend itself into bankruptcy." 2627

**justification of strategic AF** "I think that there has been no war and Russia is not ready for war because our policy has been todeter, defend, and defeat. There has been no stinting, therefore, in building up the Strategic air force. I think it was entitled to preference." 2638

What strategic air force is the greatest deterrent to war in the hands of America; and to not have given it preference and priority within the funds available might have us involved in war today." and we are not on a shoestring AF as Vandenburg says. 2638

**military situation in Korea** "You have military men. They are disagreeing. There is confusion between them. I don't want to add anything to that confusion...." 2639

**when left dept: Saltonstall** "In other words, by the time you left the Department, there was no definite policy lined out as to what our action should be and how we were going to end this thing?" "The answer is that that is quite a correct statement." 2641

**now:** "I think that the situation demands that we go along with the current successes, successes maybe ultimately, at the present moment, to see if this thing can be ended as a lot of people are guessing it will be. It just can't go too long this way....We know that the blood-letting operation is to drain America, and I believe there will have

24

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to be a part of the MacArthur program adopted." 2642

**defense preparations**: "Senator, I don't think it is necessary for this country to do everything to be in a readiness for full all-out war on a moment's notice. It will bankrupt us." 2649 "I don't quarrel with the 95 groups, but when you begin to talk 150-group AF, I think there ought to be an independent commission brought in..."

**UMT**: "You know, if we don't pass universal military training, we are selling America short. Strategic air force is a great deterrent, but the greatest deterrent in the world to Russia would be the fact that you can mobilize 10 million men overnight who have had universal military training." 2650

**Korea plans**: "Was there on June 25 last a war plan for Korea?" "No, Sir." 2671

**too much State Department, no planning**: "I think the State Department ought to be kept in the diplomatic field. The State Department has in the period of years - I am not now talking about eh present Sec of S - but over a period of years the SD has been growing and expanding."

"I think the State Department some day has to be reorganized to be the diplomatic agent and not be all over the lot, handling economic aid and everything else." 2673

**Russel on UN**: Limp and halting, but only hope for collective action. 2680

**possibility of war**: "I do not think that Russia is ready for war, although a pistol shot might start one.

I think the growing might of America, plus the continued development of the strategic air command and our knowledge of atomic weapons will prevent a war for a reasonable length of time; and in that time, I hope that the great moral forces of the world, and the moral forces which I believe exist in the echelons below the Kremlin in Russia, will come into play." 2683

**allies**: "Of course, we are, and therefore to a certain extent America must make concessions that other nations don't make, but I sometimes get worried that America concedes too much for its own security." 2688

**Hickenlooper**: "...we still do not have a program to meet possible contingencies in advance. We, in the language of Remosthenes, wait for bad news before we act on too many occasions; that was the purpose of that." 2694

**time**: "Time, if we continue to use it judiciously, is in our favor in my opinion."

25

This next part is Admiral Badger

**effect of defeat in Korea** "I have seen that one of the basic things that I think we should do and which I think we are doing is to strengthen our military position, and I previously testified that, whether we believe it or not, the Soviet propaganda - which is incidentally a great source of well-planned aggression - put in the minds of those people that we have weakened ourselves and also that we were considerably weaker than the Russians." 2771

"We have achieved a great end in my humble opinion by taking a definite stand against aggression, and I think that the vast majority of people in the Far East appreciate that no end. I think that that adds to the respect that they had for us throughout the years, which I also commented on.

Now, if we have what amounts to a defeat, in that we do not attain our objective of insuring a unified free and democratic Korea, I think it is going to set us back. But I think that everything points to the fact that if we stick to our principles, and stick to our determination to oppose aggression, that a minor set-back from time to time is not going to affect the picture very much. But a major set-back would in my opinion weaken us very considerably, and require - well, it would weaken us just, say, very considerably." 2772

**what doing in Korea** "...what we are doing in Korea at the present time is, in my opinion, to give evidence of our strong opposition, and willingness to oppose aggression, and also to prevent ...the need for any presumption of failure." 2773

"I think that the reason you are unable to get a satisfactory answer is because of the fact that there may be no satisfactory answer at the present time. That doesn't mean that there isn't being developed a satisfactory answer." 2774

**moral strength** "I might say that we do a good deal of talking about military strength, but I think that you have gathered from me that I place moral strength in the form of what we are doing out there and the way we do it out there almost as important in the Far East as military strength."

"And in my opinion that is the most insidious, effective, well- planned, difficult to oppose, means of aggression that the Communists have used out there, and moral strength is very greatly affected by that." 2775

**Formosa** "Well I said before and I am repeating myself right now, that I considered Formosa extremely important from the point of view of being a source, and I think the leading source, of favorable propaganda in the Far East in building up...our moral strength and our ability to effect improvements." 2782

we criticize failure too much - witness China. 2792

**reason for propaganda failure** "We have been, I think, tremendously handicapped in the whole psychological warfare or propaganda struggle because of this offer of immediate action to forcibly redress wrongs, whereas we offer them a plan of gradual redress through legal means of these same wrongs." 2796

a fair amount of talk about winning China back 2803

This next part is Patrick Hurley

**mistakes of American policy** "My primary purpose is to show what were the underlying principles of American foreign policy at the beginning of World War II and then to show where, when, and how our State Department surrendered them and embarked our Nation on an entirely different policy. This surrender of the principles and objectives for which we said we were fighting and the support of principles completely opposite to them is responsible for the confusion and for the costly failures in American relations."

We should quit supporting ideologies abroad which if successful will destroy the American system of liberty. We should quit the policy of appeasement and present again a positive foreign policy based upon the principles of individual liberty, self-government, regulated free enterprise, and justice."

"A weak and confused foreign policy after Yalta, and in general after World War II, is the primary cause for every international problem confronting our Nation and for every casualty we have suffered in Korea."

26

[LC]

"Beginning at Yalta in February 1945 our foreign policy changed from the support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to a policy based on concessions to communism and imperialism, and fear of Russia, rather than on confidence in America. Confidence in America is a better basis for a foreign policy than fear of communism." 2829

tells about his problem with state Department men in China 2837 -Service, Davie

**Yalta** "America was in a position at Yalta to speak the only language the Communists understand, the language of power." "On the contrary, your diplomats and mine surrendered in secret every principle for which we said we were fighting." 2839

**foreign policy** he said in 45: "The astonishing feature of our foreign policy is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and the conduct of our international relations." 2841 Korea reversed 5-year policy of appeasement. 2853

This next part is General Barr

**Formosa** "I think the strategic value of Formosa to the US is principally in not letting the other fellow have it." 2959

**China** "Chinese never lost a battle, during my time in China, through lack of arms or ammunition." no leadership, no care of them. 2968 "Had we given unlimited aid to China and had we given unlimited advice to China, the situation would have probably been different." 2987

This next part is General O'Donnell

**misuse of heavy bombers in Korea** "I think we should be very careful in the future about assigning heavy bombardment, medium bombardment, to this type of task. I am afraid that particularly after we get new equipment, super, really ultra modern equipment, and highly trained crews to fly them, we must be very careful about their utilization."

**numbers in air** "That is one reason we must in this country build an overwhelming air force. I think our safety is in numbers." 3070

**Manchurian bombing now** "We are now in a position where we are going through a reconversion program, going from the Bp29 to the B-36 to the B-50's to the B-49's. In addition to that we are going through quite a large expansion of the AF and much of our talent is wrapped up in doing these jobs."

Whether or not it is wise to go over and involve the whole outfit in the Chinese war or to stay back and continue the development, I don't know. It is beyond my province. I know we could do it, but I doubt the wisdom of doing it now because I think we would wind up in a very bad situation, and we would take the threat away from Russia. We have maintained a constant threat against "Russia."

Small as the strategic air command is today, it can deliver the most hopelessly destructive single blow that the world has ever seen from one unit, and as many people...have said, it is the deterrent.

We have that force, we maintain it, we keep it always aimed as a deterrent. Now and then what we don't need for that effort we can play around with in these other theaters."

**failure in past** "I think the great sin, is the failure of our country to follow up the tenets of the masterful reports which Mr. Finletter submitted in 1947, in which he said that the AF of the US should never fall below 70 groups, an absolutely irreducible minimum."

And yet 3 years later we get caught right before the Korean War with no warning but 42 groups..." 3073

**shoehorning air force in numbers** "We do not have enough to maintain a sustained effort."

3084

27

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we are giving the Russians experience. 3088. and ours are all veterans.

Russia's goal "I have a personal opinion that Russia's objective in the Far East is Japan ultimately anyhow." 3087

Knowland: concern with using strategic AF in the wrong way, effect of the then failure of it on allies' opinion of its usefulness, and whether we will do the same in another instance. 3091

in Korea should have used air and naval alone." 3092

all this furor about Rashin - bombed it once and missed. Could have taken it in one visual raid. 3098

mistakes in Korea ""Well, I think that there is one principle of war that I have always liked and have always wanted to observe, and that is the economy of force.

"I think it is against the national interest for us in the US to become involved in large-scale ground wars in either Asia or Europe."

mistake of demobilization "I think we as a nation have failed to exercise the leadership which God rested in our hands at the end of the last war.

"...when you think of 1945, here we were out there with the greatest military juggernaut that the world has ever seen, deployed and ready for action.....What did we do? We throw the whole thing over our shoulder.....and 5 years later we find ourselves in a position of having to rebuild what we had and threw away."

We had our ground forces in position, and I think that we failed to exploit our victory and in typical American fashion we only half did the job." 3105

"Because we can't continue to go on, in this life, either as a nation, or as individuals, and continue to make mistakes like we have been making." 3108

war against Japan in 45 on ending the war: "I think you will find that the AF and Navy thought we could do it and the ground forces did not think we could do it." 3112 also Groves said before Yalta that the bomb was 99% sure. 3119

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OFFICE, CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

IN REPLY REFER TO:

14 June 1956

Dear Henry:

This is a follow-up on our discussion the other evening on the
matter of a budget.

You will recall in my letter of March 12, I stated that a 28-
Division force would require an increase on the order of 50% in the
Army budget. This would put it in a category of $14-$15 billion.
When Mr. Gilpatrick discussed the problem the other evening he dealt
with figures of this character. I introduced the problem of the
increasing cost of missiles. Since I live with these problems from
day to day, I am somewhat inclined to take for granted a general
awareness of their seriousness. It should have, but it didn't, occur
to me that the group was unaware of the impact that our missile pro-
grams will have upon our past budget estimates. In recent weeks the
Army has completed a study of our missile and warhead requirements, and
the dollar costs associated with these requirements, looking well into
the future. The figure that is of immediate interest to your group is
that in FY 1958 the Army will require almost $3 billion to support its
missile programs, both development and procurement. This would raise
the overall figure presented to the Committee the other night to $17
billion. This is a very sound figure and I think that it would stand the
test of any analysis very well.

I am sure that the other Services are having similar problems in
the missile area. They are just now becoming very costly as they reach
the stage of development that makes possible procurement in some numbers.
I should add that a considerable portion of the work being done by the
Army is for the other Services since, and I believe this is not an
exaggeration, we have pioneered the missile field in the United States.
A figure of $17 billion is much more realistic than that suggested the
other evening. This does not include strategic air lift and tactical
air lift of the larger aircraft types such as are the responsibility of
the Air Force.

I was especially interested in your discussion of the European
military thinking, and I am sorry that my time did not permit me to
stay any longer so that we might have discussed the ideas that you

had further. I will be in Europe from 24 June until about 7 July
after which I hope we may be able to get together for a visit. I
will give you a ring after I return.

As a matter of interest I am inclosing a letter that I recently
received from Dr. Charles Lauritsen of Cal Tech that I believe has
in it some very good ideas. I am also inclosing a copy of my reply
to him. He is one of our most distinguished scientists particularly
in the field of nuclear physics and he has been deeply disturbed
for some years with the pattern of development of our weapons systems.
You reminded me of him the other evening when you made the statement
that our strategy has been essentially one of revenge. I've heard him
use the same expression. If it were, and I am afraid it has been so
far, it certainly is sterile indeed as the events of the past few
years would seem to indicate also.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Made in United States of America

Reprinted from THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
Vol. 82, No. 3, March, 1956

# Some Problems of Scientific Manpower

ELI GINZBERG

Director
Conservation of Human Resources
Columbia University

## Some Problems of Scientific Manpower

THERE are five preconceptions about scientific manpower that have wide currency. One stipulates that the United States is suffering from a severe shortage of scientists and engineers and that our basic security is threatened by the prospect that the U.S.S.R. may outproduce us in the number of trained personnel. A second holds that the United States is wasting a large percentage of its intellectual potential because little more than half of all the young people in the country with good native intelligence complete college. A third preconception holds that if the nation is to increase the number of able young persons who are interested in pursuing careers in science, it will be necessary to strengthen the high schools of the country, particularly with respect to their offerings in mathematics and basic science. A fourth formulation holds that the Armed Services, which have become the largest employer of manpower in the country, are conspicuously wasteful when it comes to the utilization of highly trained scientific and engineering personnel. Finally, a fifth proposition holds that any marked increase in the numbers who choose to pursue a scientific profession will depend in large measure on an alteration in the basic attitudes of the American public so that the status of scientists and engineers can be substantially improved.

These five preconceptions seem to be so obviously true as to leave little opportunity for critical appraisal. Yet closer inspection may disclose that the obvious is, after all, not quite so obvious.

It may not be out of place for an economist to begin the inspection of the theorem that we are suffering from a shortage of scientists and engineers by stressing that in a world of limited resources we are always short. There is a shortage of good baseball players, of top-flight business executives; beautiful women are in short supply; competent philosophers are likewise scarce. How could it be otherwise, then, than that there would be a shortage of good scientists and engineers? A related

consideration is the arbitrariness, and in fact the fickleness, of the demand for scientists and engineers, at least for a large part of the total demand. During the last few years, the Congress of the United States has seen fit to make available approximately $2 billion annually for research and development, an amount that is more than half of the total annual expenditures for these purposes. It is no secret that recently there has been a threat of a 20-percent reduction in the research and development budget of the Armed Forces. If such a reduction should in fact take place, much if not all the present shortage of scientists and engineers, viewed at least in gross quantitative terms, might disappear overnight. Clearly, if the Congress decided to increase appropriations for research and development from $2 billion to $3 billion, the shortages would reach astronomical heights.

What about the relative position of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the training of scientists and engineers? Considering what we do not know about our own scientific and engineering manpower resources, comparative analyses of the United States and the Soviet Union would seem to rest on shaky grounds. To advise caution about such comparisons does not commit one to lack of concern about the magnitude and quality of the effort the Soviet Union is making to strengthen its scientific manpower resources. From the earliest days of the Communist Revolution, the leaders of the Soviet Union have recognized the importance of overcoming the scientific lead of the West and have striven to do what they could to enlarge their scientific manpower resources.

Some months ago, a leading newspaper gave emphasis to the threat of U.S.S.R. scientific superiority by detailing not only what is going on within the Soviet Union itself, but including also quantitative data on the training of scientists and engineers in the satellite countries. There is little reason to question that Hungary, Rumania, Poland, and Bulgaria are turning out varying numbers of scientists and engineers, although it is indeed questionable whether anyone in the United

2

States has any clear perception of the true magni-
tude and, more important, of the quality of this ef-
fort. But this fact calls attention to the somewhat
startling failure of most of the comparative studies to
include on the side of the West not only the Amer-
ican figures but also those of Canada, Great Brit-
ain, France, Western Germany, and the other allied
nations. Nor is proper weight given to the obser-
vation of a well-informed Government scientist
that the Soviets are anxious to translate the text-
books and scientific treatises of the West, but that
there has been little need as yet for Western trans-
lations of the scientific material available from be-
hind the Iron Curtain.

Since the population behind the Iron Curtain is
considerably larger than that of the United States,
there is nothing to stop the leaders of the Soviet
Union, if they are determined to do so, from rais-
ing the output of scientists and engineers above
the American level. But it would be well to re-
member that the same power that could bring
about this result also brought about an agricultural
policy decision some years ago that resulted in the
slaughter of perhaps as much as 50 percent of the
total livestock of the country. It is possible for any
country, through compulsory powers or through
incentives, to increase substantially the number of
trained people in any particular sector of life. What
no country has yet been able to accomplish is to
insure that highly competent people rise to the
top in every sector of life. There were many good
scientists in Germany in 1933, but that did not pre-
vent Hitler from coming into power. To reduce all
considerations of national security and welfare to
concern over the number of scientists and engi-
neers would be the rankest type of materialism. It
would also be to withdraw behind an intellectual
Maginot Line.

What about the second preconception, which
holds that we are wasting about half of the best
brainpower of the country because only about half
of the boys and girls in the upper range of intel-
ligence-test results complete college? Several points
are worth noting, each one of which must be
assessed before a valid conclusion can be reached
about this particular thesis. About half of the most
intelligent young people who fail to complete col-
lege have been so little attracted to their studies
during their high-school careers that they have
failed to complete secondary education in the up-
per fifth of their classes. It may be stated that stu-
dents who are not in the upper fifth of their high-
school graduating classes are poor bets for becom-
ing outstanding scientists or engineers. Forty per-
cent of all students who score high on intelligence
tests fail to take college preparatory courses. Al-
though they have the intellectual potential to pur-
sue a college education successfully, they have not

qualified themselves to do college work. Since the
present concern with this wastage of brainpower
derives largely from a desire to increase the num-
ber of students who will pursue scientific or engi-
neering careers, it is well to note that one-half of
all those who score high on intelligence tests are
girls and that only one girl out of ten secures in
high school the foundation in mathematics neces-
sary for college study in engineering and science.
Hence, even if many more able girls were encour-
aged to go on to college, it is doubtful that any
significant increase would take place in the total
numbers preparing for science and engineering.

It would be a serious error to overlook the fact
that it would be a disservice to many individuals,
and also to the country, if every person of high
intelligence were persuaded to go to college. The
leadership of such institutions as trade unions con-
tinues to be chosen from the noncollege group. It
is clearly in the national interest to have able peo-
ple compete for these posts. Although our culture
places little emphasis on the arts, it would surely
be a questionable national policy to exert direct or
indirect pressure on the promising musician or
artist to attend college when he might well de-
velop his talents more effectively through other
means.

There are unquestionably a considerable num-
ber of able young men and women who do not
now enter college but who, with encouragement,
financial assistance, and better guidance, might do
so, and thereby more effectively develop their po-
tential and be in a better position to make a sig-
nificant contribution to the nation. The point of
the foregoing analysis has been to challenge the
assumption that we are wasting 50 percent of our
brainpower.

One of the most salutary effects of the recent
preoccupation with the supply of scientists and
engineers has been to focus a new spotlight on the
state of secondary education. Appalling conditions
have been revealed. No mathematics is taught in
one-quarter of the high schools in one southern
state. In many parts of the country, it is usual for
the football coach to teach science as a secondary
duty, since science is a man's subject. The recent
efforts of the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science and other groups to seek
remedial action are to be commended, but it seems
unlikely that any significant improvement can take
place in the short run.

The problem is not limited to science and mathe-
matics in high schools, but involves the whole
status of high-school teaching. Consider for a
moment the contrast between the circumstances of
our high-school teachers and the status in the
community, the salary, and the opportunity for
meaningful work that were accorded to the Gym-

3

[LC]

nasium professor in pre-Hitler Germany. It may not be out of place to mention in this connection that it would hardly be a national gain for high schools to strengthen their instruction in science and mathematics and neglect to improve the teaching of English and history. A society of technically trained illiterates is no desideratum. From the viewpoint of public policy, this renewed interest in the status of secondary education must not be permitted to become an unbalanced preoccupation with one area of secondary education. Rather, it must be used as leverage to improve the quality of secondary schools across the board. Considering the tremendous stress that schools will soon be under because of rising enrollments, any substantial improvement is likely to come, at best, very slowly.

The fourth preconception singles out the Armed Services as a major waster of trained manpower. The typical formulation runs as follows: Unless the Armed Forces have need for a chemical engineer or physicist, they should defer him so that he can pursue his specialty in civilian life rather than waste his time, and more particularly his skill, in the performance of military duties. If this contention were limited to men with a Ph.D. degree who were needed for research, teaching, or defense work, it could be soundly defended. But it is often applied indiscriminately to the tens of thousands who receive bachelor's degrees in one of the sciences and obtain positions in industry that have no relationship to defense effort. One aspect of the problem that is seldom considered is the likelihood that in many instances the individual will be able to develop his full potentialities more through a tour of duty with one of the Services than through a 2-year assignment at the drafting board in a large corporation's engineering department.

But all of these considerations of efficiency aside, it is well to remember that we are citizens first and scientists and engineers second. In periods of full mobilization, it is obviously necessary to use every man at his highest possible skill, but at a time like the present when we are devoting but a small part of our total national effort to defense, considerations of equity cannot be lightly ignored. The economy depends on skill, but democracy depends on more than skill.

The fifth and last preconception stresses the importance of a change in basic values in favor of science and the scientist, without which no substantial increase in the number of young people who pursue a scientific career can take place. In simple terms, the proponents of the position argue in favor of an increase in the income and prestige of the scientist. Alterations in the basic values of a community are always hard to bring about, particularly in the short run. But the question must

be asked whether any real effort should be made to bring about this change in favor of science alone. What about the other important human activities that have such difficulty finding a place in the sun—the humanistic, the artistic, and the religious activities? Is it not equally important from a national point of view to deepen the American public's understanding and appreciation of the artist, the writer, the man of God? Why single out the scientist or the engineer?

There is probably much that could be altered for the good if some of the national energy that is now devoted to the making of goods and money could be deflected to other ends. But to establish as a primary end quantitative increases in the number of scientists and engineers hardly seems a worthy national objective of and by itself, important as it may be within the context of the larger goal of stressing the intellectual rather than the practical in national life.

If we are dissatisfied with quantitative approaches to the problems of scientific manpower, what other approaches should be pursued? It would be well to start with a consideration of the nature of the scientist. Two years ago the National Manpower Council published its report on *A Policy for Scientific and Professional Manpower*. Included therein is a chapter on the physicist that benefited greatly from the ideas of Lee DuBridge, a member of the council. DuBridge emphasized the subtle combination of qualities required in a good physicist: a high order of general intelligence, a special interest in mathematics, a tolerance for indeterminate solutions, and finally, an emotional involvement with the subject matter of physics proper, which he best described as a state similar to "falling in love." Clearly, the development of a larger number of competent scientists is very much more than a technical matter such as is involved in raising the production of steel or of automobiles. We are not dealing with what the economists call freely reproducible goods. The beginning of wisdom is to recognize the inherent limits set by the order of qualities required.

In a recent issue of the *Harvard Alumni Bulletin*, Lawrence Kubie, the distinguished psychoanalyst, discussed how the weak financial position of the universities is discouraging young people from pursuing careers in research and teaching. He stressed the fact that it is impossible for the young scholar and scientist to maintain a standard of living that does not place undue burdens on his wife and children. Although Kubie does not make the point, it has seemed that we have been shadowboxing for many years now with respect to the financing of higher education. At present, selected universities receive about $400 million annually from the Federal Government for research

4

and development work. They feel free to take this money because it is for contract work, while they would have qualms in asking for a general Government subsidy. Yet it is widely recognized that many assignments on Government contracts deflect people from important to less important problems, from areas of primary concern to areas of peripheral interest. Moreover, contract funds are not a sound basis for providing the long-term security and perquisites that are the key attractions to the university scientist and scholar, who above all wants a balance between teaching and research with the freedom to determine the directions of his own work.

Another point worth raising is the probable distortion that has come about in scientific effort as a result of the international situation, which it would be insane to ignore and yet foolhardy to respond to without balance and circumspection. Most Government research funds are spent on applied research and the practical development of new weapons. Relatively little is spent on the basic research that is the necessary foundation for radical future alterations in civilian as well as military technology. One acute observer has remarked that we have a shortage of first-rate men to work on second-rate problems.

A fourth factor, little recognized, grows out of the trend toward a younger age of marriage. At present one out of every four girls is married at 18, and more than half are married before 21. What is more, couples tend to have their children during the early years of marriage. As a result, a young man who, in the 10 years after acquiring his doctor's degree, should be concentrating on deepening his knowledge and skills is likely to be harassed by mounting family expenses. To an alarming degree, the abler young people are leaving the university for greener pastures in industry, with the result that the teachers of the next generation and those with primary responsibility for basic research may soon represent second- and third-best talent, rather than best talent.

A fifth factor worth stressing is the difficulty in a large country such as the United States where there is a penchant for organizational activity of not interfering with the effective performance of outstanding scientists. Wesley Clair Mitchell, a remarkably disciplined scholar, was appalled to note at the end of every year what a high proportion of total working time had been deflected from his basic research. And the testimony of Einstein was to the effect that the atmosphere in the United States is not conducive to reflective thought.

These are but a few of the neglected factors that clearly help to determine the quality of scientific manpower and the effectiveness with which it performs. Imbedded in the foregoing analysis are at

least three major policy determinations that the nation must make in the immediate future.

With bulging enrollments at both the high-school and college levels, we must begin to face the question of what we want high schools and colleges to do. Should the high school remain a common school where the instruction is geared to the average student? Should all who want to go to college and who possess the minimum intellectual qualifications be admitted? Or should we try as a people to make a more self-conscious determination of the additional resources that we want to make available for educational purposes and to consider more critically than we have in the past the most effective way of using such resources to insure, not an increase in the number of years that people spend at school, but rather an increase in the effectiveness of each year that a person is in school in terms of knowledge gained and skills acquired.

A second very difficult question that awaits evaluation, if not solution, is the changes that are called for with respect to the fuller development and more effective utilization of the potential of American women, who represent the majority of high-school graduates and a high percentage of college graduates. If there is serious concern about increasing the number of highly trained persons in our society, we should recognize that women represent the greatest potential supply.

Finally, there is a need to appreciate fully the crucial role of the university in producing both new scientists and new scientific knowledge. In this area, there are at least three major problems: more adequate financing of higher education, keeping enough distinguished scientists in the universities, and determining a proper balance between basic and applied research. These problems cannot be solved apart from each other, nor can they be solved by the universities alone, for the actions of industry and government have a profound effect on each. Until this strategic area is seen as a whole and until a sound and imaginative program for the strengthening of the universities is developed, improvisation will continue. When forced by poverty to improvise, no university community can make its maximum contribution to society.

The solutions to these and allied problems will not be easy to come by. In a democracy, a role will be played by the legislator and the general, as well as by the industrialist and the university administrator. But the real challenge is directed to the leaders of science. It behooves them to be worthy of their position, to eschew the temporary and expedient, and to show the hallmark of true leadership by contributing sound analyses and presenting solutions worthy of the great tradition of which they are the contemporary spokesmen.

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE

15 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 5

TELEPHONE
HANOVER 2-3000
CABLE ADDRESS: CRAVATH, N.Y.

HOYT A. MOORE
CARL W. PAINTER
LEONARD D. ADKINS
MAURICE T. MOORE
DONALD C. SWATLAND
BRUCE BROMLEY
ROSWELL MAGILL
A. I. HENDERSON
ALFRED McCORMACK
CARLYLE E. MAW
EDWARD S. PINNEY
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
THOMAS A. HALLERAN
ALBERT R. CONNELLY
L. R. BRESLIN, JR.
BENJAMIN R. SHUTE
GEORGE B. TURNER
FRANK H. DETWEILER
GEORGE G. TYLER
JOHN H. MORSE
HAROLD R. MEDINA, JR.
FREDERICK S. BEEBE
CHARLES R. LINTON
WILLIAM B. MARSHALL
RALPH L. McAFEE
ROYALL VICTOR, JR.
JOHN N. CALDERWOOD

NEW YORK

June 26, 1956

Dear Henry:

Returned herewith is General Gavin's letter with
its enclosures which I read with interest. His $17 billion
figure for the Army's FY58 budget does not, you will note,
include anything for airlift which he would have the Air
Force include in its budget at a minimum cost of $1 billion
or more.

Henry A. Kissinger, Esq.,
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.,
58 East 68th Street,
New York 21, N. Y.

Encls.

R