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NOTES for Secretary Kissinger

Based on his talk before the CSIS Advisory Board, March 11, 1977.

Prepared by David Wendt

March 25, 1977

Secretary Kissinger began by noting that Americans were in no position to regard foreign policy as a partisan matter. Our position around the world depended upon the establishment of a certain continuity in foreign policy. This was all the more imperative in view of the irregularity of our political history since the second Eisenhower Administration, which was the last presidential administration to run its normal course.

The Secretary described the central problem facing American foreign policy over the past decade as being our adjustment to a notion of having continuous interests in the world. Although such a notion had characterized the diplomacy of the founding fathers. it had been substantially missing from our foreign policy since their time. First, of course, there was our long period of isolation, during which we approached foreign affairs as if we could involve ourselves in it at our own discretion. Then, however, cam our emergence from isolationism, which was marked by two tendencies. First, our experience with Hitler determined our reaction to all subsequent adversaries, causing us either to overreact, or to underestimate the danger when our worst fears were not realized. Second, we tended to apply to foreign affairs the experience of our own New Deal,

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in that we tended to conduct foreign policy as if it were
domestic policy, and assumed that political stability depended
upon economic growth. The problem since this time has been to
realize the paradox that while we are essential to world peace
and progress, this cannot be achieved on the basis of once-and-
for-all efforts. A more permanent conception of our interests is
required.

In this reorientation of our traditional perspectives, we
must remember that, as in the case with both World War I and
World War II, war can break out <u>despite</u> a balance of power. We
must further pay attention to the unique aspects of power in our
time. Certainly, the cornerstone of our position in the world is
our relationship with Western Europe and Japan. We must bear in
mind, too, that the burdens upon us would be all the greater
because of the instability of the regimes of the Third World.
The statesman, who must confront these situations, cannot
be blamed for not always achieving the best possible outcome; his
job is also to avoid the worst.

Q. What do you see as being the "best case" and the "worst case"
in southern Africa?

A. The overriding imperative shaping our relations with southern Africa is the need to avoid a race war, of the sort that would inevitably tend to involve forces from the outside. The object of U.S. policy must therefore be to dissociate ourselves psychologically from the support of white supremacy, but to do this in such a way as not to enhance the position of the radical elements. It is

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these elements who would be most likely to provoke a race war.

The search for multiracial societies can best be advanced through the encouragement of the moderate African leadership. But a race war, on the other hand, is not the only danger, although it is the most serious one in terms of its implications for both the world and for the U.S. domestic structure. The establishment of satellites as such is not the only means by which the Soviets could enhance their position; as in the case of Eurocommunism, they can achieve gains simply through the realization of our losses.

Q. Has detente had the unintentional effect of strengthening the forces of European Communism?

A. We must weigh the domestic costs of detente against the domestic costs of sustaining a policy of continued confrontation. It is true that detente may have helped to create a framework in which Communist gains are regarded as less unthinkable than before. But domestic support cannot be maintained over the long term for our own position unless it is clear that every avenue is being explored towards peace. Moreover, detente has spared others the task of having to defend the "American connection." For these reasons, it is an effective policy for the pursuit of our long-term interests.

Q. To what extent is the "moral" dimension of freedom a value which we should seek to advance in our foreign policy?

A. In human rights, as in other areas, the pursuit of objectives that are not linked to observable consequences could be counter-productive. Our own record on human rights within the Administration was quite notable. But results were achieved precisely by not making human rights a foreign policy issue.

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Q. What is the relationship between political stability and economic growth?

A. The success of the Marshall Plan reinforced our belief in the 1950's and 60's that the principal threat to peace sprung from the gap between reality and expectations -- i.e., the "revolution of rising expectations." This version of economic determinism overlooked some of the significant differences between the Western world and the developing world, where the creation of political legitimacy is seen as being the main issue. Marxist leaders, furthermore, do not share the tradition of Western revolutionaries of "fighting for a form of power that makes them dispensable." Economic aid programs do not, therefore, in themselves provide a solution to the problem of political stability.

Q. Would you care to comment on your perception of the main trend in Western democracies? Is it one characterized by optimism or pessimism?

A. It is self-evident that the industrial democracies face problems of major proportions, such as their apparent inability to engage the commitment of the younger generation. To ignore such problems is to condemn ourselves to certain decline. There will be no easy solutions: what is required is leadership groups that have sufficient inner confidence to act with assurance in the face of complex situations. Yet it is precisely such attributes that the selection process for our highest political office discourages. Nor is creativity encouraged within the bureaucracy, where the question of where we are going is unable to find organic expression.

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But these problems are not unique to the democracies; they
characterize the Soviet Union as well, where they are compounded
by the absence of a regular procedure for succession. Together,
then, the United States and the Soviet Union are like "two
blindfolded giants staggering around, groping their way for an
exit they cannot see." Does all of this amount to a verdict of
despair? I do not think so. Surely to have operated on as broad
a historical canvas as I did assumes some degree of faith in the
possibility of solutions. But the problems cannot even begin to
be solved unless people can be told the truth by their political
leaders about the problems' complexities.