A/WEU (9) CR.8

MR. KISSINGER (Professor of Political Science at Harvard University)- I appreciate the kind words that your President has expressed about my books. I think that in fairness I should point out something a British reviewer once wrote about me. He said that, "he did not know whether Mr. Kissinger was a great writer but that anyone finishing his book was a great reader."

I am always a little uncertain when speaking before a dis-
tinguished group of parliamentary leaders where eloquence is so
much a condition of the public career. I should like to point
out to you that a Harvard obtuseness is sometimes considered a
sign of profundity.

I speak to you at a somber moment in our history. The United
States has suffered a tragic and unexpected loss. Having worked
at one time with President Kennedy, the sadness is personal as well.
Naturally, there will be anxieties about the continuity of American
policy. The question will be asked whether fundamental changes in
U.S. policy might be considered.

I speak here, as you know, as an irresponsible Harvard professor.
Indeed, there is a school of thought in the United States which holds
that once a man has identified himself as a Harvard professor the
adjective is quite unnecessary. Therefore, I can tell you, without,
I hope, being suspected of following an "official" line, that I do not
see any possibility of change of American foreign policy. There
may be - indeed, there will be - changes in style.

may be - indeed, there will be - changes in style.
see and possessibility of change of American foreign policy. There
I hope, being unsubstantiated of following an "official" line, that I do not
adjective to due unnecessary. Therefore, I can tell you, without,
that once a man has identified himself as a Harvard professor the
Indeed, there is a school of thought in the United States which holds
I ask here, as you know, as an irresistible Harvard professor.

Policy. The question will be asked whether fundamental changes in
Naturally, there will be anxieties about the continuity of American
at one time with President Kennedy, the anxiety is bilateral as well.
States have suffered a tragic and unexpected loss. Having worked
I ask to you at a somber moment in our history. The United
sign of broomstick.

out to you that a Harvard aptness is sometimes considered a
much a condition of the public career. I should like to point
to a group of parliamentary leaders where eloquence is so
I am always a little uncertain when asking before a dis-

writer put that anyone hinting his poor was a great reader."
said that, "he did not know whether Mr. Klaasen was a great
bent out something a British reviewer once wrote about me. He
has expressed apout my poems. I think that in fairness I should
University)- I appreciate the kind words that your President

MR. KISSIMMER (Professor of Political Science at Harvard

V\MEN (a) CE.8

Mr. Kissinger speaking

There are likely to be alterations in personnel over a period of time. But the main lines of American foreign policy will remain.

President Johnson was a close associate of President Kennedy. In terms of his background he is in the tradition of President Truman, who holds such an honored place in Atlantic relationships.

As for our imminent national election, one obvious result of the recent tragedy has been the strengthening of the moderate, internationalist wing in the Republican party. I know some of their leaders, and I can assure you that regardless of the results of the election next Fall, the main lines of our European policy will be continued. Regardless of who will be President after November, the main categories of the discussion before this Assembly need not be affected by the tragedy which befell America.

These categories as far as the U.S. in concerned are as follows: There is no dispute in the United States about the indivisibility of interests of the Atlantic area. As an old friend of many of you here and as an old friend of Europe, I must tell you that it does not advance our discussion very much to imply that the United States might be planning to withdraw from Europe, or betray Europe, or perhaps get itself into a position where it might make a settlement at the expense of Europe. Obviously on issues of the complexity of those before us serious people are going to differ within the Alliance and within each government. But I am convinced that the majority of both our political parties are dedicated to the notion of an Atlantic Community.

parties are dedicated to the motion of an Atlantic Community.
Government. But I am convinced that the majority of both our political
serious people are going to differ within the Alliance and within each
of Europe. Obviously on issues of the complexity of those before us
itself into a position where it might make a settlement at the expense
be planning to withdraw from Europe, or betray Europe, or betray us get
advance our discussion very much to imply that the United States might
and as an old friend of Europe, I must tell you that it does not
interests of the Atlantic area. As an old friend of many of you here
There is no dispute in the United States about the individuality of
These categories as far as the U.S. in concerned are as follows:

affected by the tragedy which befell America.
main categories of the discussion before this Assembly need not be
continued. Regardless of who will be President after Monmayer, the
election next Fall, the main lines of our European policy will be
leadership, and I can assure you that regardless of the results of the
internationalist wing in the Republican party. I know some of their
the recent tragedy has been the strengthening of the moderate,

We for our imminent national election, one option result of

Truman, who holds an honored place in Atlantic relationship.

In terms of the background he is in the tradition of President

time. But the main lines of American foreign policy will remain.
There are likely to be alterations in personnel over a period of

Mr. Kieiser asking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

America believes in the concept of a joint defense. The only worthwhile dispute in America, and, I hope, the only useful dispute within the Alliance, concerns how a common policy can best be organized and a common defense implemented. We do not have a monopoly of wisdom, and sometimes our judgments about common goals may be wrong. Certainly they should at all times be open to challenge. But the useful framework for discussion is in terms of community and not rivalry as between Europe and the United States.

Nevertheless, there have been differences of which we are all aware. I should like to mention a few, beginning with some psychological and political problems.

It is inevitable that American-European relations should change as Europe gains strength, vigor and self-confidence. At the end of World War II Europe was devastated and completely dependent on American material and military support. Partly as a result of the Marshall Plan, partly due to European efforts, economic conditions have greatly improved. It is natural and healthy that Europe should aspire to something closer to its traditional role in foreign affairs. This forces both sides of the Atlantic to overcome certain bad habits that may have developed over the past few years.

When America started the Marshall Plan it was above all conscious of Europe's economic weakness. Perhaps subconsciously many thought of a future Europe no longer in need of economic assistance, but which would more or less automatically accept our political lead.

a future Europe no longer in need of economic assistance, but which
of Europe's economic weakness. Perhaps unconsciously many thought of
When America started the Marshall Plan it was above all conscious
that may have developed over the past few years.

This forces both sides of the Atlantic to overcome certain bad habits
abreast to something closer to its traditional role in foreign affairs.
Have greatly improved. It is natural and healthy that Europe should
Marshall Plan, partly due to European efforts, economic conditions
on American material and military support. Partly as a result of the
end of World War II Europe was devastated and completely dependent
change as Europe gains strength, vigor and self-confidence. At the
It is inevitable that American-European relations should
and political problems.

aware. I should like to mention a few, beginning with some psychological
Nevertheless, there have been differences of which we are all

community and not rivalry as between Europe and the United States.
challenge. But the useful framework for discussion is in terms of
may be wrong. Certainly they should at all times be open to
monopoly of wisdom, and sometimes our judgments about common goals
organized and a common defense implemented. We do not have a
within the Alliance, concerns how a common policy can best be
worthwhile debate in America, and, I hope, the only useful debate
America believes in the concept of a joint defense. The only

Mr. Klaasinger beacking

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Mr. Kissinger speaking

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not easy for any government to accept the notion of its possible
fatigueability. For some Americans it is probably a little irritating
now to have to fight for proposals that used to be accepted as a
matter of course some years ago. In Europe there developed a need
for constant reassurance and a certain querulousness. On both sides
of the Atlantic, therefore, certain bad habits have to be overcome
and this has exacerbated some of the inevitable differences.

Then, too, the Soviet threat, which was obvious and simple
under Stalin, has changed its appearance. With more flexible Soviet
tactics, the challenges to the West are bound to be more ambiguous.
The Western Alliance now must consciously create a unified diplomacy
that was perhaps imposed on us in the simpler periods in the late
40's and early 50's. Bilateralism in diplomacy is inappropriate at a
time when we insist on unified military planning. One of the problems
to which the West must address itself is how to develop unified negotiating
positions. It may well be that a common foreign policy is more crucial than
common targetting, useful as that is. Indeed, I would suggest also that
If there were greater political confidence the issue of "who presses what
button?" would lose some of its urgency.

Let me turn now to the problems of strategy. Some people claim
that U.S. policy has triggered the debate within NATO. I doubt this.
There would have been a strategic debate within NATO regardless of what
policy we pursued. The debate was inevitable because we are dealing
with weapons of unprecedented destructiveness, of unprecedented novelty
and in an extraordinary state of change.

with weapons of unprecedented destructiveness, of unprecedented novelty
belligerent we presumed. The debate was inevitable because we are dealing
There would have been a strategic debate within NATO regardless of what
that U.S. policy has triggered the debate within NATO. I doubt this.
Let me turn now to the problems of strategy. Some people claim
patents?" would lose some of its urgency.

If there were greater political confidence the issue of "who braves what
common targeting" useful as that is. Indeed, I would suggest also that
positions. It may well be that common foreign policy is more crucial than
to which the West must address itself if we want to develop untried negotiating
time when we initiate an untried military planning. One of the problems
40's and early 20's. Bilateralism in diplomacy is appropriate at a
that was basically imposed on us in the simpler periods in the late
The Western Alliance now must consciously create a united diplomacy
tactice, the challenges to the West are bound to be more ambiguous.
under Stalin, has changed its appearance. With more flexible Soviet
then, too, the Soviet threat, which was opulent and simple
and this has exacerbated some of the inevitable differences.

of the Atlantic, therefore, can only pad gaps to be overcome
for constant reassurance and a certain duperiority. On both sides
matter of course some bears ago. In Europe there developed a need
now to have to fight for proposals that need to be accepted as a
tatfishy. For some Americans it is properly a little irritating
not easy for any Government to accept the notion of the transpoe

Mr. Kleiber speaking

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[n]

Mr. Kissinger speaking

During the debate on the nuclear test moratorium last summer, there was a great deal of discussion about the testing of war-heads. But if one looks at the whole nuclear arsenal one is struck by the fact that never before has so much depended on weapons for which there is so little operational experience. You are familiar with the published figures of the number of weapons that we are planning. The inter-continental missiles alone approximate a thousand. I doubt that we shall have fired as many as fifty of them. Firing them in salvoes will have to be based on theoretical calculation for a long time. Much of the strategic debate is bound to have a somewhat esoteric, almost metaphysical, character.

Secondly, as Mr. Erler correctly pointed out, deterrence takes place in the mind of the opponent. A threat which is meant as a bluff but is taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a threat which is meant seriously but is interpreted as a bluff. Any military policy therefore, has to be designed in terms of its impact on Soviet calculations. There we are obviously in the realm of intangibles. We have to analyze how the Soviets will interpret our capability and we have to know how they will understand our strategy.

We face many problems of a similar nature. How do we threaten with solid fuel missiles? With conventional weapons armies could be mobilized as a sign that things were getting serious. Even airplanes could be put into a state of increased readiness. But how do you demonstrate additional resolve when your weapons are designed to be in a state of acute readiness? These problems were not invented by us

in a state of acute readiness? These problems were not invented by us
demonstrate additional reserve when your weapons are designed to be
could be but into a state of increased readiness. But how do you
modified as a sign that things were getting serious. Even airplane
with solid fuel missiles? With conventional weapons armies could be
We face many problems of a similar nature. How does we threaten
capability and we have to know how they will understand our strategy.

Tangibles. We have to analyze how the Soviets will interpret our
on Soviet calculations. There we are obviously in the realm of in-
military policy therefore, has to be designed in terms of its impact
a threat which is meant seriously but is interpreted as a bluff. And
but it is taken seriously as more useful for purposes of deterrence than
place in the mind of the opponent. A threat which is meant as a bluff
Secondly, as Mr. Ehrer correctly pointed out, deterrence takes
effective, almost metaphysical, character.

Much of the strategic debate is based to have a somewhat
time. Much of the strategic debate is based on theoretical calculation for a long
that we shall have to be based on theoretical calculation for a long
time. The inter-continental missiles alone approximate a thousand. I doubt
the hypulated figure of the number of weapons that we are planning.
there is so little operational experience. You are familiar with
fact that never before has so much depended on weapons for which
But it one looks at the whole nuclear arsenal one is struck by the
there was a great deal of discussion about the testing of war-weapons.
During the debate on the nuclear test moratorium last summer,

Mr. Kießinger speaking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

and would be serious regardless of what policy we adopted.

The enormous rapidity with which weapon technology has changed
produces another distortion. Deterrence is working when war has not
occurred. But it is logically impossible to demonstrate why something
has not happened. Did the Soviets never intend to attack in the first
place? Did they not attack because we have pursued the optimum policy?
Or did they not attack because we are pursuing a very risky policy which
is depreciating all the time in effectiveness? (in effectiveness) all the time?

We will not know an irrefutable answer to these questions unless
deterrence fails. But our policy must never fail--not even in one case
out of 10,000, an average which diplomats have not always achieved
in the past.

Finally, the destructiveness of weapons has produced a certain
change in the nature of alliances. Some people argue that it has made
alliances completely useless, that henceforth no country will die for
another. I reject this. I do not believe that the performance of even
those who allege it supports it. Conflict within the alliance has
become more intense because of the knowledge that the United States has
no real choice except to protect its allies.

Also, the new technology has produced the technical possibility
for a country to try to be protected by the alliance but to have a war
conducted on someone else's territory. In 1914, Belgium could not insist
that it would defend itself only if it had a guarantee that Britain would
be equally devastated. It was always considered an inevitable consequence

be equally defeated. It was always considered an inevitable consequence
that it would defend itself only if it had a guarantee that Britain would
conduct on someone else's territory. In 1914, Belgium could not insist
for a country to try to be protected by the alliance but to have a war
with the new technology has produced the technical possibility

no real choice except to protect its allies.
become more intense because of the knowledge that the United States has
those who allege it supports it. Conflict within the alliance has
another. I reject this. I do not believe that the performance of even
alliances completely useless, that henceforth no country will die for
change in the nature of alliances. Some people argue that it has made
finally, the destructiveness of weapons has produced a certain
in the past.

out of 10,000, an average which diplomats have not always achieved
deterrence fail. But our policy must never fail--not even in one case
We will not know an irrefutable answer to these questions unless
is depreciating (in selectivity) all the time.

Or did they not attack because we are burrowing a very tricky policy which
place? Did they not attack because we have burrowed the optimum policy?
has not happened. Did the Soviets never intend to attack in the first
occurred. But it is logically impossible to demonstrate why something
produces another distortion. Deterrence is working when war has not
The enormous rapidity with which weapon technology has changed
and would be serious regardless of what policy we adopted.

Mr. Kießinger speaking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

of war that those areas immediately attacked would receive greater
devastation than those further away. Today the option exists, or
is thought to exist, that countries can use an alliance to elaborate
a casus belli but to shift the actual conduct of military operations
onto other territories. This is a very understandable tendency.
It is not, however, a good basis on which to found long-range policy.

In what way has military technology changed then over these past
years? We have witnessed essentially four phases. First, there was
the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and a
monopoly on the means of delivery. This ended around 1955. Then there
was a period when we no longer had a monopoly in either weapons or
means of delivery but could probably have won a war by striking first.
This phase is almost now ending. We are entering a period during which
the notion of military superiority in the field of strategic weapons
is bound to change its meaning whether we like it or not.

During the first three periods it was sensible to rest the defense
of Europe largely on American strategic power. The Soviet Union could
not attack Europe alone because this would have lead to a crushing first
blow by SAC. It could not attack the United States simultaneously with
Europe because our superiority was too great. In the period ahead some
degree of effective parity is inevitable regardless of what we do and
regardless of what we intend. This is not our fault, this is not our
design, and neither we nor our allies can avoid it.

regardless of what we intend. This is not our fault, this is not our
degree of effective parity is inevitable regardless of what we do and
Europe because our superiority was too great. In the period ahead some
pion by SAV. It could not attack the United States simultaneously with
not attack Europe alone because this would have led to a crushing first
of Europe largely on American strategic power. The Soviet Union could

During the first three periods it was sensible to react the defense
it found to change its meaning whether we like it or not.

the notion of military superiority in the field of strategic weapons
This phase it was now ending. We are entering a period during which
means of delivery but could probably have won a war by striking first.
was a period when we no longer had a monopoly in either weapons or
monopoly on the means of delivery. This ended around 1932. Then there
the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and a
years? We have witnessed essentially four phases. First, there was
In what way has military technology changed them over these best

It is not, however, a good basis on which to found long-range policy.
onto other territories. This is a very understandable tendency.

a cause still put to shift the actual conduct of military operations
its thought to exist, that countries can use an alliance to evaporate
devastation than those further away. Today the option exists, or
of war that those areas immediately attacked would receive greater

Mr. Kießinger asking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

Two general approaches have been attempted to maintain the old validity of strategic nuclear forces. One answer that has been given is that with a very sophisticated and flexible use of strategic weapons the situation of the 1950's can be prolonged. I do not believe this is a realistic policy. The West cannot indefinitely maintain a monopoly of invulnerable weapons while the Soviet weapons remain vulnerable. Whatever the West does, the Soviet capacity to retaliate is therefore likely to grow. I do not believe that any President will be able to muster the necessary confidence in theoretical calculation to rely on the strategic forces as the sole deterrent.

Some European countries have developed another theory. Their solution for the changed situation is to conduct a policy of massive retaliation based entirely on national nuclear forces. That, too, I do not believe to be feasible. I have not been as opposed to the national nuclear forces of Britain and France as some of my colleagues in the United States. However, these forces do not enable us to go back to the strategy of the 1950s. They must be considered an absolutely last resort not as the sole deterrent to Soviet aggression.

I support the statement of my friend Mr. Erler that all our countries have an interest in preventing the most fearful devastation. All of us have a stake in finding a spectrum of deterrence to enable us to resist various forms of Soviet challenges.