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conventional defense should enhance the credibility of residual
nuclear threats because it will at least drive the enemy to an
unmistakably large and violent attack. Third, it will provide
a capability for safe response in inherently ambiguous situations,
and thus provide time for political consultation among member
nations to reach a sober decision about the nature of the crisis
and an appropriate forceful response to it. A commitment to an
immediate nuclear response provides no such safety margin, and
raises doubts about its credibility in an actual crisis.

But the worry, particularly in European circles, is that an
evident concern with conventional capabilities will be interpreted
by the enemy a weakening of nuclear resolve, and hence of deter-
rence, while sizeable defense spending in NATO will in fact lead
to poor conventional capabilities instead of the good capabilities
that are possible. If so, the probability of war may rise; and,
in any hostilities, an attempt at initial response that is
confined to conventional arms may lead quickly to a deteriorating
military situation. If a choice between nuclear response or
partial capitulation is delayed until after several days of a
losing conventional battle, both of these remaining alternatives
may look much worse than they looked in the first hour. Hence
there is great pressure either to commit oneself to very prompt
use of nuclear weapons or to good conventional defense, but not
to a queasy compromise that would combine poor conventional capa-
bilities with great reliance upon them. As the stock of tactical
nuclear weapons that are deployed forward in Europe rises, the

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choice among policies sharpens. If the weapons are not to be used promptly, military commanders cannot place dependence upon them; and if political authorization for their use is delayed, there are greater risks that NATO weapons will be overrun before their combat mission is fulfilled.

A clear-cut doctrinal solution that gave forward commanders assurance that they could use tactical weapons immediately amounts, however, to a vote of zero confidence, and not merely low or medium confidence, in the possibility of conventional defense. NATO will never know in the event of hostilities whether it would have done well or badly in a conventional phase because there will be no such phase. An extensive predelegation of nuclear authorization to commanders also means a loss of central control at top political levels.

In view of weaknesses within the Warsaw Bloc, and their lesser resources devoted to theater capabilities, a good conventional defense for NATO should not, in principle, be difficult to achieve. Prevalant pessimism arises, in part, from old quantitative perspectives and traditional methods of threat assessment. When in doubt, military planners naturally assume the worst about enemy capabilities, intentions, and conditions for war outbreak; e.g., premediated Soviet attack directed suddenly at NATO weaknesses with full cooperation from Soviet satellites. From these methods one tends to get a "twelve foot Russian," with so extreme a view of the threat that in despair only radical and risky NATO responses are presumed to be possible. Tradtional prenuclear

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conservative methods lead paradoxically, to radical nuclear prescriptions.

Currently Secretary McNamara has tried to counter excessive pessimism by pointing out that the Soviet reduced ground army is only large enough to supply 40 or 50 full division forces in the American definition of such a force. Further, he notes, the West has better tactical air power; Soviet doctrine is backward; their satellites unreliable; and an outbreak of limited hostilities might well begin with some sizeable initiatives by NATO rather than the Soviets. The obvious current possibility is Soviet interference with access to West Berlin, in which case any first shots would come from NATO forces if NATO had the courage to fire them.

Such are the optimistic considerations which are being emphasized in an effort to break away from an assessment of military situations that was relevant years ago when the Soviet army was far larger and NATO forces (before the German buildup) were much smaller. But a long list can be made on the pessimistic side, fundamentally because there has been no doctrinal consensus within the Alliance that would lead to military planning that would eliminate conventional deficiencies. One of the four major NATO powers, the United Kingdom, has never contributed greatly to conventional defense on the Continent. More conspicuously in recent years, France has proceeded to reorganize and reduce her army so that only a handful of divisions are designed to fight beyond French borders. Only two major powers, the United States and the Federal Republic, are left with sizeable contributions

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on the Central Front.

Many specific examples of key qualitative deficiencies can be cited. For example, a fixation upon nuclear war has led to a choice for the protection of theater aircraft between very elaborate and expensive protection (as one alternative, very hard shelters) or no protection at all. The result has been no protection, with resultant high vulnerability even against non-nuclear attack. The American Defense Department has again requested funds for inexpensive "soft shelters," but none as yet are under construction even for American aircraft. Comparable examples of remediable deficiencies can be listed in other areas. None of the other NATO armies can match the American 7th Army in conventional artillery, and the main direction of others' aircraft programs is still from conventional to nuclear delivery capability, rather than to the dual capability that has been the aim for American tactical forces in the last three years.

More generally, there remain the problems of maldeployment and imbalance in the theater posture. The long Northern Front is thinly covered. Central Front forces remain in the locations chosen for occupation of Germany after World War II, rather than locations directed towards a forward defense of the Federal Republic near the Iron Curtain. Strength in some sectors is partly vitiated by weakness in neighboring sectors. The notable political example is the position of the American 7th Army. Its expensive high quality may not be fully useable because forces to its north and south are too weak to cover its flanks adequately. In the long run, all the forces must approach some

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comparable standard. Hopefully it will be a high one, but, failing that, it will be a common low level. Continued imbalance is simply inefficient. Yet a lowering of American forces to European quality standards raises the specter of seeming partial American withdrawal, with all its disruptive political overtones.

Given the extent to which NATO outspends the Warsaw Bloc, and the great problems within the Bloc, NATO can afford a tremendous amount of waste. Equally clearly, excessive waste is intolerable to all, especially when some see little relevance in conventional capabilities anyway. The resources already exist to deny to the Soviet Union any easy conventional advantage in Europe, but those resources must be redirected and coherently related. They will only be so redirected when and if a doctrinal consensus emerges that explicitly recognizes the utility of conventional defense.

belligerent consequences emerge that explicitly recognizes the

refused. They will only be so directed when and if a

Europe, but those resources must be redirected and selectively
to deny to the Soviet Union any easy conventional advantage in

in conventional capabilities anyway. The resources freely exist

if indispensable to aid, especially when some see little relevance

fremontous amount of water. Equally clearly, excessive water

and the great problems within the Block. NATO can afford a

given the extent to which NATO outspends the Warsaw Pact,

overrunnen.

partial American withdrawal, with all its diabolical political

European quality assurance raises the希ère of approaching

comparable standard. Accordingly it will be a fifth one, but,

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