Chapter 6 - page 2

put it in the context of your feelings about the Foreign
Service. Both you and Ford went out to Andrews to
honor Davies. (p 140)

--Your chat with Iakovas on September 22, 1974 (p 142).

--Further talks with Ford on Cyprus, 143 ff.

--CFR review of the Turkey aid issue -- 148-A ff.

--Ford on October 7, 1974: "I'm fed up with the Greek conspiracy against us...I'm seeing the Archbishop today..."

--More Ford/HK telcons - p. 151 ff. HK briefed Ford on the
Eagleton Amendment on December 4, 1975 - p. 155. Plain talk
by Ford on December 16, 1974 - see p. 157.

--Some talks on Cyprus in 1975 -- p. 162 ff. Ford's deter-
mination not to be undone by Brademas, et al -- p. 163.

--A nice note: Ford tells HK "Henry...if we ever disagree, you can tell me and I can tell you." (Perhaps this could go in Chapter 1 or 2 if you want to use it.)

--HK talks with Nixon mentioning Greek/Turk situation
(p 168 ff).

--HK/Ford talks -- 173 ff. And Ford statement of July 24, 1975 on failure of the House to lift the embargo on Turkey. ((p 177). Ford's resentment of the Greeks (p 178, 179).

As noted earlier, materials on 1976 will be sent separately
because they all become involved in the campaign.

116

5/2/96-#6

## Chapter 3
### The Transition:
#### Ethnic Conflicts and Cyprus

Gerald Ford had been in office barely 72 hours when Cyprus erupted. It had been smoldering since a coup d'état against its mercurial president, Archbishop Makarios, on July 15 and the landing of Turkish troops a few days later. Now an active diplomacy was under way in Geneva (under British auspices) on the very days that Ford and I were spending in a nonstop series of meetings with foreign ambassadors in Washington to assure them of the continuity of American foreign policy and in intensive Oval Office briefings to bring the new president up to speed on the global range of issues. We did not--and the responsibility [lay with me], as the

Famagusta, town in eastern Cyprus, administrative center of Famagusta District, near the capital city of Nicosia. A seaport, Famagusta is a center for the export of citrus fruits and other agricultural products and livestock; other major economic activities include cotton spinning, the distillation of brandy, and fishing. Near the town are the ruins of the ancient city of Salamis, destroyed in AD 647. Famagusta was a haven for Christian refugees in 1291 after the fall of Acre (Akko, in what is now Israel) to the Ottoman Turks. The Genoese seized the town in 1376 and controlled it until 1464, when it became a part of the kingdom of Cyprus. In 1489 Famagusta passed into the hands of the Venetians, under whose control it became a rich and flourishing seaport with 30,000 inhabitants. In 1571, after a long siege, it fell to the Turks. Over a period of several decades it began to diminish in importance, and in 1735 an earthquake brought about its ruin. The town came under British administration in 1878. Its harbor, once choked with silt, has been dredged. During the Cypriot fighting in 1974, the town was occupied by Turkish forces and its residents were displaced. Population (1989 estimate) 20,516.

"Famagusta," Microsoft (R) Encarta. Copyright (c) 1994
Microsoft Corporation. Copyright (c) 1994 Funk & Wagnalls
Corporation.

BRIEF HONEYMOON

137

came to the Oval Office station and ready to complicate. A Soviet for days, was hovering agency plans in case the armed. Moreover, she had designed as an unarmed. Moreover, she had kept supporting ships the 1968 seizure of U.S.S. rescue in time.

not to continue the op-
ty that the trawler might
gressed as far as we had,
our hours later, Glomar
ections of the sub into the
part of the sub fell back
a significant amount of
never interfered.

newspapers were full of bi-
ways. Some of them indicat-
t that Nixon's mental stability
sident couldn't give orders
made me furious because
ken. I talked to Haig about
ked deliberately from the
time madder still. Haig was
Oval Office. "Jim," I said,
what was done in the Pen-
Administration. Obviously,
ation straightened out right
had been the source of the
leaks did stop, at least for a
in I had with Schlesinger. I
otherwise.

Progress were more significant
the nation than an erroneous

leak. In my August 12 speech to the joint session, I had said, "To our allies and friends in Asia, I pledge a continuity in our support for their security, independence and economic development." One day after I'd made that promise, a Senate subcommittee cut $5.1 billion from the defense budget for fiscal year 1975. Congress had been asked for approximately $2 billion in military and economic aid to South Vietnam. Congress later slashed $1 billion from that and, in my opinion, gravely impaired the ability of our ally to forestall further aggression from the North. Its action diminished the prospects for lasting peace.

Equally disturbing was the Congressional response to the Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus. In July, when I was still Vice President, the military junta in Greece instigated a coup on Cyprus. Their purpose was twofold: to assassinate the country's leader, Archbishop Makarios, and to strengthen the Greek Cypriot National Guard. The Turks responded by sending forty thousand troops to Cyprus and soon occupied some 40 percent of the island, even though the Turkish Cypriots constituted only 18 percent of the island's population. That caused the downfall of the Greek junta and its replacement by a democratic government led by Prime Minister Constantine Karatzamanlis. Instead of blaming the former Greek government for starting the incident, Congress moved to embargo delivery of American arms to Turkey. The lawmakers' argument was that the Turks had used American arms—in violation of U.S. law—to invade the island. It didn't matter to them that the Greek Cypriot National Guard had also used weapons of U.S. origin. Nor did it seem to concern them that a Turkish withdrawal from the NATO Alliance—something the Turks were threatening at the time—would imperil the security of the entire eastern Mediterranean. They didn't want to know the facts; they simply wanted to punish the Turks.

The leaders of this effort in the House were three Democrats, Ben Rosenthal of New York, Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and John Bradeemas of Indiana. In the Senate, Missouri's Thomas Eagleton was spearheading a similar drive. I tried to persuade them that if we stopped delivery of arms—which the Turks had paid for already—they would probably respond by closing vital intelligence facilities we had been using for years near their border with the Soviets. I tried to con-

138

A TIME TO HEAL

A time to heal

ince Rosenthal in particular that a weakened Turkey would imperil the future security of Israel. None of my arguments made any headway. Congress was determined to interfere with the President's traditional right to manage foreign policy, and if this interference had dire consequences for the country as a whole, well, that was just too bad.

The final Congressional challenge came from opponents of legislation designed to improve our relationships with the Soviet Union. For years the Soviets had wanted us to grant them most-favored-nation status for purposes of trade. This didn't mean that they would receive preferential treatment, only that they'd fare as well as any other country. That is, their exports would be subject to the lowest tariff rates we applied to any third country. We had already granted most-favored-nation status to other Communist nations—Poland and Yugoslavia—so ideology didn't pose a problem. Nixon had wanted to extend it to the Soviets because he thought that it would advance the cause of détente. The House had passed the Administration's Trade Reform bill, but it had been stalled in the Senate for nearly a year. The argument centered on the degree of control that the Congress would exert over decisions made by the President. In return for giving trade concessions to the Soviets, Senator Henry M. ("Scoop") Jackson, a Democrat from Washington, wanted a written commitment from the Soviets that they would agree to allow at least fifty thousand Jews to emigrate every year, and when he had such a commitment, he intended to hold a press conference to claim that it was his tough stand that had made the Russians capitulate.

I fully agreed that the Soviet anti-emigration policy was deplorable and contrary to my long-held belief that people should be free from oppression. Yet by pursuing quiet but firm diplomacy, Nixon and Kissinger had persuaded the Soviets to ease their restrictions. Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. jumped from four hundred a year in 1968 to about 35,000 in 1973. When I became President, I sought to assure the Soviets that I was going to pursue the same kind of quiet diplomacy.

On Wednesday, August 14, I welcomed Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to the Oval Office with Henry Kissinger. I told him that I would consider it a personal favor if his government would agree to

BRIEF HONEYMOON

199

said. "If he had have no new in-learned any new

Capitol Hill and the Building. That my confirmation there because at of the committee to be Vice President questions com-ware of how deli-

able] purpose [of the bill] to do all I could President to the I mentioned my him, the pardon been considered by me, and I said nor that idea or any

time for my deciding the hope that acts about the party's Representative from Brooklyn, could say would not "the format of American people the that her questions were created in the other or not there

the Subcommittee on Amendments, 93rd Congress, p. 60.

"There was no deal, period, under no circumstances," I managed to interject.

Obviously, she didn't believe me, for she proceeded to confront me with nine accusatory questions in a row and didn't even extend me the courtesy of pausing long enough for me to answer her. Other committee members—even her fellow Democrats—bridled at her rudeness. At the end of the two-hour session, I was convinced that my appearance had accomplished its objective. "I hope that I have at least cleared the air," I said, "so that most Americans will understand what was done and why it was done. And again I trust that all of us can get back to the job of trying to solve our problems both at home and abroad."

In the area of foreign policy, several of those problems in fact appeared to be diminishing. One of the most troublesome was the Congressional reaction to the simmering dispute between Greece and Turkey over the future of Cyprus. Ignoring the objections of their own leadership, both the House and the Senate had amended the Continuing Appropriations Resolution—which provided funds to run departments and agencies as well as money for foreign aid—by tack- ing on a provision calling for an immediate cessation of military assistance to Turkey. Because I was convinced that such a cutoff would, in the long run, damage Greece, preclude the possibility of a Cyprus settlement and undermine NATO's eastern flank, I vetoed the measure on October 14. The House sustained my veto. The next day, Congress passed a similar resolution. I vetoed it again. Finally, on October 17, Congress suggested a compromise. It required a cutoff of military aid to the Turks but permitted me to delay the ban until December 10. Despite Kissinger's objections, I agreed to sign the bill. If it wasn't a victory, it was at least a respite, and I was hopeful that between October 18 and December 10, Congress would come to its senses and reverse its foolish ban on aid to a valued ally.

Although Kissinger's week-long trip to seven nations in the Middle East hadn't resulted in any spectacular breakthroughs, it had kept the momentum going in the search for peace and lessened the likelihood that the parties involved would resort to war. Late in October he took off again—this time for Moscow—to pick up the discussions he'd had with Gromyko in September in Washington.

244

A TIME TO HEAL

consider the package as a whole. Mansfield said my request was impractical. "You may be right, Mr. President," he went on, "but it's just not possible." Albert agreed with him. "I understand what you want to do and why you want to do it," he said, "but I'm not in any position to destroy committee jurisdiction, to interfere with the established rights of a committee. If I tried to do that, it would create horrendous internal problems in the Congress."

Congressional resistance to my proposals didn't apply only to energy. Increasingly, both houses of Congress were giving me a hard time on foreign policy. The first battleground was Cyprus. On February 5, the suspension of arms deliveries to the Turks, originally voted by Congress in October, went into effect. Not only was that action likely to impede our hopes of achieving a just settlement of the Cyprus issue, it also posed a threat to the security and political stability of the entire eastern Mediterranean, and I urged the Congress to reconsider a decision so clearly contrary to our national interests. Using quiet diplomacy, Henry Kissinger had persuaded the foreign ministers of both Greece and Turkey to meet with him in Brussels to resolve their differences. But when the Turks heard what Congress had done, they stayed home. I couldn't blame them.

Congressional irresponsibility also led to new problems in other parts of the world. Wishing to punish Arab nations that had taken part in the 1973 oil embargo against us, the sponsors of the Trade Act of 1974 had tacked on an amendment that barred me from extending routine tariff preferences to countries that belonged to OPEC. What the lawmakers overlooked was the fact that at least five of OPEC's member states—Iran, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria and Indonesia—had refused to participate in the embargo. Yet because Congress hadn't thought to provide an escape clause, these friendly countries were being penalized. The Venezuelans, in particular, were outraged, and even though I reassured them that I would ask the Congress to remedy its mistake as soon as possible, they stayed angry for months afterward.

No foreign policy challenges occupied more of my time in the early months of 1975 than the deteriorating situations in both the Middle East and Indochina. Negotiations between Israel and Egypt

ON THE MOVE

285

121

the Mayaguez affair dis-
f casualties we sustained:
in the chopper crash—
her fifty were wounded.
The second was some
ent. The first strike nev-
been "completed." The
It's possible that commu-
to the misunderstanding.
wave—which I had de-
low on fuel. They may
order to return to Coral
Is. why the fourth air
was never carried out. I
eparently, someone had,
travened my authority.
con were not satisfactory.
Perhaps I should have
ved our objective, I let
p; we had rescued the
it had given us as a peo-
ut; I roll Hubbard,
man caucus, said, "It's

I began to fade. Many
and my standing in the
only reason, of course;
but the net effect was
determined to do what I
I would keep the fed-
in the two weeks after
easures for my signa-
tion Act, a bill to au-
d the Emergency Em-
upped the deficit by
them. Then, just be-
 Brussels on May 18, I

Back in January, I reminded viewers on nationwide TV, I had sent
Congress a 167-page draft of detailed legislation and urged it to enact
my program within ninety days. We were dependent upon foreign
sources for 37 percent of our petroleum needs, I noted. In 1970, we
had paid only $3 billion for that foreign oil; now the figure was up to
$25 billion per year, and it would continue to rise so long as the law-
makers did nothing. "We are today worse off than we were in Janu-
ary," I said. "Domestic oil production is going down, down, down.
Natural gas production is starting to dwindle. Coal production is still
at the levels of the 1940s. Foreign oil suppliers are considering an-
other price increase. We cannot continue to depend on the price and
supply whims of others. The Congress cannot drift, dawdle and for-
ever debate America's future. I will continue to press for the program
I recommended in January, which is still the only total energy pro-
gram there is. I cannot sit here idly while nothing is done. We must
get on with the job."

Of all the problems NATO faced in the late spring of 1975, per-
haps the most serious was psychological. In the wake of Vietnam,
would the U.S. remain firm against Communist aggression else-
where? Could our old allies still depend on us? Democratic Senate
leader Mike Mansfield and others had been calling for us to with-
draw many of our troops from Western Europe. Understandably, the
leaders of the NATO countries wanted to know whether this new
mood of isolationism would prevail or whether we would honor our
commitments abroad. But there were specific military and political
problems as well. The dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cy-
prus still threatened NATO's eastern flank. The new left-wing lead-
ers of Portugal posed a danger of a different kind. Suppose Commu-
nists joined or, worse yet, dominated the Lisbon government. How
could the West share military secrets with them? What would hap-
pen if the Soviets won access to Portuguese airfields or naval bases?
Would we have to strip Portugal of its NATO membership?

And what should we do about Spain? The Spaniards had a role to
play in the defense of the West. They recognized that and were will-
ing to join the alliance. The problem there was that some of our more
liberal NATO allies—the Dutch, Norwegians and Danes—insisted on
blocking Spain's membership as long as Generalissimo Francisco
Franco was alive. Finally, Italy's political and economic stability was

288

A TIME TO HEAL

any new ideas for peace. "Concessions will have to be made," they were saying in effect, "but we will make none of them. Sadat will have to make them all. And if Ford disagrees, we will show him who's boss." I thought they were overplaying their hand. For me, that kind of pressure has always been counterproductive. I was not going to capitulate to it.

From the perspective of our European allies, I'm sure that the NATO meeting loomed as a very significant opportunity. They would have a chance to talk with the new American President, whom many of them had not met before. Shortly after eight o'clock on May 28, *Air Force One* touched down at Zavantem Airport outside Brussels. The next morning, in an effort to see what progress we could make toward reaching a settlement of the Cyprus dispute, Kissinger, Scowcroft and I met with the prime ministers of Greece and Turkey. We had a working lunch with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; we visited with Danish officials, then sat down with Portugal's new Prime Minister Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves.

In my speech to the NATO conference later that afternoon, I was candid about the challenges we faced. "Because of the United States' long involvement in Indochina," I said, "[recent] events [there] have led some to question our strength and reliability. I believe that our strength speaks for itself: Our military power remains and will continue to remain second to none—of this let there be no doubt; our economy remains fundamentally sound and productive, and our political system has emerged from the shocks of the past year stronger for the way in which it met a severe internal test. Our actions will continue to confirm the durability of our commitments."

I listed areas where we as NATO allies still had work to do. Obviously, we had to maintain a strong and credible defense. We had to improve the process of political consultation between member states, and we had to develop a realistic agenda for bolstering our alliance. In the future, Spain could make an important contribution to our mutual security. We had to consider ways to integrate her forces with others in the West. Then I got to the heart of the matter: "We must preserve the quality and integrity of this Alliance on the basis of unqualified participation," I said, "not on the basis of partial membership or special arrangements. The commitment to collective defense

THE PRESIDENCY OF GERALD R. FORD

material, Ford allowed Congress to corner the post-Watergate market on morality. The Church committee secured the shift that had been taking place since 1973 as to whom the country saw as its moral leader. Unquestionably by 1976 that role had been taken away from the president and assigned to the Congress.

The Church committee also reinforced the shift of power away from the executive and onto Capitol Hill. With a more aggressive chair and with a greater sense of purpose than its counterpart in the House, the committee was no mere carnival sideshow. Despite his attempts, Ford could not deny the Church committee the documents that it requested; what the Rockefeller Commission had refused to do, the Church committee did with a vengeance. Ford could only sit and watch the inevitable. A strange combination of politics and public catharsis, the Church committee was a significant portent of the future. The Clark amendment had established congressional oversight of intelligence operations once and for all. That same congressional pressure would provide the most important element in the formulation and conduct of the administration's foreign policies.

116

"REASSESSMENT"

Few scholars are left who attempt to argue that Richard Nixon's foreign policy was anything less than revolutionary. Nixon was one of the first American leaders of either party to acknowledge that the Vietnam War had limited America's influence throughout the world and also among the first to recognize that the Soviet Union had become similarly restricted on the world stage, primarily because of its economic travails. Thus before the end of his first term of office, Nixon had succeeded in achieving a relaxation in U.S. relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and had succeeded in extricating the United States from Vietnam. Nixon's methodology in reaching those two goals can and should be debated; it most certainly was during the final months of the Watergate crisis. Nevertheless, he bequeathed to Ford a foreign policy that had begun a thorough reassessment of America's place in the world.

For the most part, Ford agreed with those changes. Had he had his way, détente would have been strengthened and devolution would have been completed. Yet just as with an economic or a social policy, Ford was unable to develop a foreign policy of his own. The War Powers Act had indicated a renewed congressional interest in overseeing the president as commander in chief; this attitude was demonstrated during the first crisis, domestic or foreign, that Ford faced as president—the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Cyprus had long been a pawn in Mediterranean politics. A small island located some fifty miles from the Turkish coast, Cyprus was inhab-

117

ited by both Turks and Greeks. Since gaining his country's indepen-
dence from Britain in 1957, Archbishop Makarios III had attempted to
maintain a balance between the majority Greek population and the
Turkish minority, which constituted one-fifth of the island's population.
His efforts were opposed by Turkey, who, acting out of a centuries-old
fear of a resurgent Greece in the Mediterranean, was wary that Makar-
ios would seek union (enosis) with Greece to solve his problems. As a
result, in March 1964 the Turks turned to the United Nations to mediate
the crisis. Although a UN resolution guaranteed the integrity of Cy-
prus, Turkey periodically reaffirmed its right to intervene, thus prompt-
ing Greece to assert that any Turkish moves in Cyprus would bring re-
taliation.

The Nixon administration's hopes for stability in the region were
dashed when on 15 June 1974 the Makarios government in Cyprus was
overthrown by a group of Greek Cypriots led by Nikos Sampson and
supported by the Greek military junta. Sampson immediately declared
enosis between Cyprus and Greece. One month later, to the surprise of
virtually no one, Turkey invaded Cyprus, using American-supplied
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) weapons in their invasion.
Kissinger managed to initiate peace talks at Geneva among the Greeks,
the Turks, and the Cypriots, but they achieved nothing; four days after
Ford took office, the talks broke down. Turkey then undertook a mas-
sive military move into the northern part of Cyprus, driving some
200,000 Cypriot refugees south. Blaming the United States for the Turk-
ish invasion, on August 19 Greek Cypriots stormed the American em-
bassy in Nicosia, killing American ambassador Rodger Davies in the at-
tack.¹

Faced with the possibility of a lengthy war that could weaken and
perhaps destroy NATO, the Ford administration sided with Turkey. The
relationship between the two nations had been on relatively solid
ground since 1945. Turkey had allowed the United States to place its Ju-
piter missiles on its soil and had also allowed the presence of CIA listen-
ing posts and military bases along its border with the Soviet Union, ba-
ses from which U-2 reconnaissance flights had been launched. Many
Americans, however, most notably Greek Americans, thought that the
United States had sided with the wrong ally. Congress, sensing an op-
portunity to give the Ford administration a black eye in foreign policy
before it was one month old, agreed. On September 24 the House voted
overwhelmingly to forbid the use of any funds for military assistance to
Turkey. Ford vetoed the measure on October 14, and the attempt to
override failed by thirty votes. The bill was reintroduced the next day;
Ford vetoed it again, referring in his veto message to the "dangers

118

"REASSESSMENT"

posed by legislative restrictions destroying our ability to assist the par-
ties involved [in the dispute]." The House once again sustained the
veto, but this time the override vote was closer-only sixteen votes
short. Congress then presented Ford with a compromise measure: if
Ford agreed to an embargo, he could delay its implementation until De-
cember 10. Despite Kissinger's objections, Ford signed the bill, and the
White House heralded it as a moral victory. The embargo finally went
into effect on 5 February 1975. Turkey reacted by closing all U.S. military
and intelligence facilities and all but one NATO air base on their terri-
tory. It was a major defeat for Ford, and one that he was unable to re-
verse. Despite repeated attempts to cajole Congress, the embargo was
only slightly modified and not fully repealed until three years later, dur-
ing the Carter administration.

As the first foreign policy crisis after Nixon's resignation, the Cy-
prus affair represents an important turning point in the conduct of
American foreign policy. For the first time in two decades, Congress had
actually been the initiator of a foreign policy contrary to the desires of
the White House. Coming as it did in the middle of the congressional
elections of 1974, the crisis bolstered the faith the congressional Demo-
crats had in their own foreign policy role as Ford lost the opening
rounds with Congress over his policies toward the Soviet Union. The
situation also testified to the decline of the influence of Henry Kissinger.

Henry Kissinger had emerged from Watergate with his reputation
not only undamaged but enhanced. He was depicted in the press as the
indispensable man, "Super-K," who had kept the nation's foreign poli-
cies intact while Watergate raged on. Aptly described by one Ford ad-
ministration insider as "one of the most gifted men ever to serve his
government, and not altogether eager to deny it,"² Kissinger, who was
then serving in the dual capacity of secretary of state and national secu-
rity adviser to the president, was the one Nixon holdover whose posi-
tion was secure from the start. Ford had had little interest in or experi-
ence with foreign policy matters while in Congress. As vice president,
he had been a member of Nixon's National Security Council; however,
the vast majority of the international issues of the Nixon administra-
tion's final days had been handled quietly by Kissinger, involving nei-
ther Nixon nor other members of the administration. Kissinger ex-
pected that the situation would be much the same under Ford. As NSC
deputy Joseph Sisco remembers, Kissinger thought that Ford "was a de-
cent man, but he didn't give him very high grades intellectually. That
was very clear."³

119

16. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE I

(July 15-August 1, 1974)

[The most serious international conflict of 1974 began within a fortnight of President Nixon's "Journey for Peace" and less than a month before his final departure from office. In contrast to the Mideast crisis of 1973, the conflict over Cyprus that broke out in the early hours of Monday, July 15, did not involve a direct threat of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Other interests, possibly not less weighty, were nevertheless at stake in this triangular quarrel among the governments of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Among them were not only the strength and solidarity of the Atlantic alliance, so recently acclaimed at Ottawa and Brussels, but the politico-strategic situation of the entire Eastern Mediterranean, in which the U.S.S.R. as well as the Western governments had become an active element in recent years. While much of the immediate responsibility for "crisis management" could in this instance be left to Foreign Secretary Callaghan and the British Foreign Office, the United States was ultimately involved not only through its close relationships with Greece and Turkey but also by reason of its interest in the stability of the entire region.

What first precipitated the latest in the lengthy series of interna-
tional crises over Cyprus was a frontal attack upon the delicately
balanced arrangements that had made possible the emergence, and
the survival since 1960, of an independent Cypriot Republic that
was dominated by members of the local ethnic Greek community
but afforded at least nominal guarantees for the rights of the ethnic
Turkish minority, comprising some 18 percent of the island's
population of around 650,000. The visible symbol of the 1960 ar-
rangements was Archbishop Makarios III, who, as leader of the
Greek Cypriot community and President of the Republic, com-
manded the loyalty of most Greek Cypriots but was detested not
only by Turkish Cypriots but also by those Greek Cypriot elements,
mainly of right-wing nationalist outlook, who rejected the whole

249

250

AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 1974

idea of Cypriot independence and sought instead to promote political union (enosis) of Cyprus with Greece. Greece and Turkey, hereditary foes as well as fellow members of NATO, had repeatedly come close to war over Cyprus in the past and, as mentioned earlier, were currently at odds with one another over Aegean offshore oil exploration rights and other matters as well. The United Kingdom was directly involved as Cyprus' former ruler and a guarantor of the 1960 independence arrangements, under which Britain retained certain "sovereign base areas" and continued to garrison troops on the island. In addition, a U.N. Peacekeeping force, currently consisting of some 2,341 men from eight countries, had operated since 1964 as a buffer between the hostile Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

This already precarious situation had become virtually unmanageable when the military junta that had ruled Greece since 1967 was replaced late in 1973 by a new group of military leaders that was dominated from behind the scenes by the head of the military police, Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannides. With a singular disregard for international obligations, this group was soon providing open moral and material support to those right-wing Greek Cypriot elements that were engaged in fighting the elected regime of President Makarios. His patience exhausted by the recurrent intrigues and plots against his government and his own person, Makarios on July 2, 1974, took the extraordinary step of addressing an open letter to the Greek President, General Phaedon Gizikis, in which he demanded the withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers who controlled the Cypriot National Guard in conformity with the 1960 arrangements but, as the Cypriot leader bitterly pointed out, had converted what was supposed to be an internal security force into what amounted to a machine directed against his government.¹

The response of Makarios' enemies was the mounting of still another attempted coup, this one initiated by the Cypriot National Guard on the morning of July 15 and crowned with what at first appeared to be complete success. President Makarios, marked for assassination and initially presumed dead (though actually unscathed, and soon afterward evacuated from Cyprus with British assistance), was promptly replaced as head of the Cypriot Government by Nikos Georgiades Sampson, a former terrorist and right-wing newspaper publisher.

'Text in Keesing's: 26661-2. For background see especially Stern, "Bitter Lessons," especially pp. 34-56; also the report of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Cong., excerpted in Village Voice (New York), Feb. 16, 1976: 80-81.

16. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE I

This patently illegal action, which had been openly supported by the military regime in Greece, was widely denounced in Europe and elsewhere. Considerable criticism was also directed against the U.S. Government and particularly its intelligence agencies, which were widely believed—though without convincing proof—to have at least tacitly acquiesced in the attempt to get rid of Makarios. The prevalent impression of U.S. complicity was heightened by the seeming equanimity of the American Government in face of so open a challenge to international law and order. No explicit condemnation of the coup or of the insurgent regime in Nicosia was heard in official Washington, which took the position that the change of government in Cyprus was virtually an "accomplished fact" and that the prime U.S. objective must be merely to "prevent further exacerbation of the situation" by "urging restraint on all concerned."¹

A similar emphasis marked Ambassador Scali's initial comment to the U.N. Security Council, which convened on Tuesday, July 16, on the initiative of Secretary-General Waldheim.]

(29) Discussion in the United Nations Security Council, July 16-19, 1974.

(a) Statement by Ambassador Scali to the Security Council, July 16, 1974.¹

The United States strongly deplores the violence which has upset the delicate balance on the island of Cyprus. Unhappily, such violence and bloodshed have all too often influenced the fate of this Republic.

We have listened with keen attention to the report of the Secretary General on recent developments there. I am sure that all of us share a common sense of relief that Archbishop Makarios is alive and free. Unfortunately, there is much more we still do not know about the emerging situation on Cyprus, and it is difficult at this moment to see clearly whether and how the Council can make a positive contribution.

We continue to support the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its existing constitutional arrangements. We urge all other states to support a similar policy. We wish to urge in particular that all interested parties exercise the utmost restraint and

¹New York Times, July 16, 1974.

²USUN Press Release 88, July 16; text from Bulletin, 71:262.

18. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE II

(August 8-30, 1974)

[After closing out the Nixon administration with a final, furious paroxysm, the parties to the Cyprus conflict inaugurated President Ford's regime with an even more dismaying exhibition of national and ethnic violence. The tentative agreements announced at Geneva by the British, Greek, and Turkish Foreign Ministers on July 30¹ had soon proved insufficient to contain the disruptive elements in the situation. Within little more than a fortnight, the Turkish forces in Cyprus, which had been built up to an estimated strength of some 40,000, were once again upon the offensive and would not rest until the whole northern third of the island had been subjected to Turkish military control.

Like every earlier attempt to solve the problem, the tripartite diplomatic talks that formally resumed in Geneva on August 8— the day of President Nixon's resignation announcement—soon foundered on the irreconcilably opposed demands of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, whose leaders, Acting President Clerides for the Greek and Vice-President Denktash for the Turkish Cypriots, had been invited to join the talks as they turned to the matter of the country's constitutional future. A Turkish Cypriot demand for the formation of a binational state, with an autonomous Turkish area in the north that would encompass 34 percent of the entire Cypriot land area, was promptly rejected by the Greek Cypriot spokesman; while a "compromise" plan put forward by Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş, in which the Turkish Cypriots would still get 34 percent of the territory but would be concentrated in a number of autonomous enclaves, was flatly rejected when its author refused to permit a 36-hour adjournment to enable the Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives to consult their

'Chapter 16, Document 34.

296

18. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE II

297

governments. The Turkish representative's "unreasonable" and "entirely arbitrary" stand, as Foreign Secretary Callaghan was to call it, occasioned the break up of the Geneva talks at 2:15 A.M. on Wednesday, August 14.

Within two hours of the Geneva debacle, the Turkish military forces in Cyprus were opening a new offensive whose aim, according to Prime Minister Eçevit, was nothing less than to gain control of an area large enough to ensure an unmolested future for the Turkish Cypriot population. While Turkish tanks and infantry, preceded by air and artillery bombardments, thrust east and west from their Kyrenia bridgehead, the Security Council hastily assembled in New York for a pre-dawn meeting at which it unanimously adopted a British-sponsored resolution reaffirming the earlier demand for a cease-fire and a resumption of negotiations.]

(39) *Renewal of the Turkish Offensive: Meeting of the Security Council, August 14, 1974.*

(a) *Renewed demand for a cease-fire: Security Council Resolution 357 (1974), August 14, 1974.*²

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, and 355 (1974) of 1 August 1974,³

Deeply deploring the resumption of fighting in Cyprus, contrary to the provisions of its resolution 353 (1974),

1. Reaffirms its resolution 353 (1974) in all its provisions and calls upon the parties concerned to implement those provisions without delay;

2. Demands that all parties to the present fighting cease all firing and military action forthwith;

3. Calls for the resumption of negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus, in accordance with resolution 353 (1974);

4. Decides to remain seized of the situation and on instant call to meet as necessary to consider what more effective measures may be required if the cease-fire is not respected.

[Following the adoption of this resolution, Ambassador Scali

Text from Security Council, *Official Records: 29th Year, Resolutions and Decisions 1974: 8.*

²Respectively Documents 30a, 33a, and 35c.

430 Keyey Nam Tai Road (home)
Phrakanong
Bangkok, Thailand

Exchange Control Division

Its Section, Exchange Control
ent Thailand to make a study
over Exchange Fellowship

ion, Bank of Thailand

the Department of Art and
Labor of Music Studies, Chulalong-

General Secretary of the Thai
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e, Bangkok

fessor for Public Administration
ce, University of Ankara

Turkish UNESCO National
ish government at the 14th
ris in November 1966

re, Faculty of Political Science,
of Journalism and Mass Media;
commerce at Eskienir; head of

or of short stories and essays

lumn for a local newspaper

ECEVIT, Bulent M.
Cadde 37
Bahcelievler
Ankara, Turkey

Year of attendance: 1957

Position at time of attendance: Columnist on political and international affairs for ULUS, daily

Positions held since Seminar: Member of Parliament since 1957; member of Constituent Assembly in 1961

Present position: Secretary-General of the Republican People's Party (main opposition party) and Member of Parliament

FEYZIOGLU, Turan
6 Sokak
41 Bahceli Evler
Ankara, Turkey

Year of attendance: 1956

Position at time of attendance: Professor of Administrative Law, University of Ankara

Positions held since Seminar: Professor and Dean, Political Sciences School, Ankara University; Member of Parliament, 1957-1960; President, Middle East Technical University; Member of the Constituent Assembly and Chairman of the "Committee for the Preparation of the Provisional Constitution"; Minister of Education, 1961; Minister of State and Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, 1962-64; Vice-Secretary General of the People's Republican Party

Present position: Member of Parliament; Vice President of the People's Republican Party; Turkish representative at the Assembly of the Council of Europe

FUAT, Memet
Turkey

Year of attendance: 1962

SINANOGLU, Professor Doctor Suat
Bülten sok. 48/5 Kavaklidere
Ankara, Turkey

Year of attendance: 1958

Position at time of attendance: Professor and Chairman of the Institute of Classical Philology at the University of Ankara

Positions held since Seminar: President of the Turkish Society of Classical Studies Cultural Counsellor at the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT)

Present position: Professor of Greek Philology at the Ankara University

UN, Mrs. Zerrin
Gayrettepe, Mobil Sitesi
Emek ap D. 22
Mecidiyekoy
Istanbul, Turkey

Year of attendance: 1966

Position at time of attendance: Faculty member, Department of English,
Faculty of Letters, University of Istanbul

Present position: Associate Professor, Department of English, University of Istanbul

121

To Ecevit, Kissinger stated US sympathy for the idea of an autonomous Turkish area/areas on Cyprus, reiterated that Turkish military action was unjustified (and noted it offered opportunities for Soviet exploitation), offered to engage the US directly in the negotiations but could only do so usefully after military action had stopped. [HK had also instructed that Ecevit be informed that HK could not leave Washington at this time -- e.g. could not come to Turkey to meet with him].

To Clerides (in a message sent later, on Aug. 15), Kissinger repeated the view that the Turkish action was "unjustified", expressed the hope for a rapid return to negotiations, and offered a more direct US role "if the parties concerned believe that would be helpful." [Our Ambassador was also instructed to try to get the Cypriot Ambassador at the UN to stand down--Rossides was actively supporting the Soviet proposal to send a UN mission to Cyprus. Clerides indicated to Davies that afternoon that he was not in contact with Rossides and suggested approaching him through the UK!].

From M. Brownell's summary, mentioned, there was also an effort to restrain the British from adopting a harshly condemnatory stance toward the Turks. Ford called Wilson on the morning of Aug. 14 to urge a watch-and-wait posture. That evening Kissinger talked to Callaghan about the evolving situation. Both agreed that the US and UK would coordinate their approaches on the problem. It was agreed to send parallel messages to Ecevit seeking to tie him to his earlier word that the Turks would not take more than their "fair share." [There is no record in the files but apparently Ecevit had made this promise to HK earlier that day. HK had conveyed this position to Karamanlis]. Callaghan agreed to make clear to the press that the U.S. and U.K. were coordinating [HK had noted this would be helpful with respect to domestic US criticism. News articles were reporting UK unhappiness with the lack of US pressure on Turkey in the negotiations and after the breakdown of the talks in Geneva. Callaghan was reported to have placed the blame squarely on the Turks.]

By the time the WSAG met at about 3 p.m. that afternoon, the Turks were advancing toward Famagusta and the Nicosia airport (UK and UN forces in the area reportedly had suffered some casualties and the UK reportedly had issued a warning to Turkish forces to keep their distance from the SBAs.) The UN had appealed to the US to intercede with the Turks to bring the air attacks against the Famagusta area to a stop and to help the UN arrange a ceasefire.

18. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE II

feeling was the fatal shooting of the new U.S. Ambassador to
Cyprus, Rodger P. Davies, in the course of an anti-American
demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia on Monday,
August 19. This and other aspects of the situation were discussed
by Secretary Kissinger at a Washington news conference that same
day.]

(42) Recapitulation of United States Policy: News conference statement by Secretary of State Kissinger, August 19, 1974.²¹

(Excerpts)

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to begin with a few observations about the tragic death of Ambassador Davies.

Ambassador Davies has been a close associate for all the years
that I have been in Washington. He worked closely with me on
Middle East problems when he was Deputy Assistant Secretary. His
performance after he was appointed Ambassador in Cyprus has
been outstanding. I think I can do no better than to read to you two
cables which I sent to him, one on July 22, the other on August 10.

On July 22 I sent him the following cable:

I would like to express my thanks for your performance and
that of your staff during the last week. I relied heavily on your
good judgment and on the excellent reporting from Nicosia. The
steadiness and courage displayed by you and your staff under
dangerous conditions were examplary. The Embassy's overall
performance deserves the highest commendation. Please convey
my congratulations and profound thanks to all members of your
staff. Hopefully, and in great measure due to your efforts, the
situation will calm in Cyprus.

Then on August 10 I sent him another cable:

Art Hartman [Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs] has just reported to me in some detail on the
magnificent performance of all of you under the most dangerous
and trying circumstances. Your courage under fire, your accu-
rate, perceptive and calm reporting, and your continued efforts
to further our policy and protect American citizens with a reduc-
ed and overworked staff are a credit to you and are in the finest
tradition of the Service.

²¹Department of State Press Release 331, Aug. 19; text from *Bulletin*, 71: 353-6.

306

My associates will tell you that the highest praise they usually get from me is the absence of criticism. And I want to call your attention to these two cables which express the extraordinary performance of Ambassador Davies. Those of us who have known him will miss him for his outstanding human qualities.

The Foreign Service, which is often criticized, has produced no better representative. And his work is in the best traditions of a Service to which dedication and the performance of a national duty are the principal objectives.

I have sent the following message to Ambassador Davies' children:

> You both have my deepest sympathy in this tragic time. While there is little that anyone can say at a moment such as this to lessen the sorrow, I want you to know that we share your deep sense of loss. Your father was loved, respected and admired by all of his colleagues in the Foreign Service and the State Department. You should be very proud of him; we are. Mrs. Kissinger and I stand ready to do anything we can to help in the difficult months ahead.

You know that the White House has already announced that the President has ordered that a plane be sent for the children. I have asked our Deputy Under Secretary of State, [L. Dean] Brown, whose distinguished service includes service as Ambassador in Jordan in very difficult circumstances, to go out with this plane, to represent the United States in Cyprus until we can appoint an Ambassador and get him in place. The designation of an officer of the distinction of Ambassador Brown leaves no doubt of the importance we attach to a speedy and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue.

This morning also, President Clerides called me to express his personal sorrow at the loss of Ambassador Davies, whom he described as a close personal and very trusted friend. I assured President Clerides that the United States fully understood the lack of responsibility of the Cyprus Government for this tragic event. I assured him that the United States would continue a major effort to bring about peace, and he urged us to make such an effort. I emphasized to him, however, that these efforts would not be helped by anti-American demonstrations that were unjustified by the record and that could only create conditions to hamper these efforts.

I also have had an opportunity this morning to speak with President Ford about the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. We were in close touch by telephone yesterday, and we have met personally several times in the preceding days. President Ford has

18. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE II

307

asked me to make the following statement on behalf of the United
States:

*First*, the United States shall insist on the strict maintenance
of the cease-fire on Cyprus.

*Second*, the imperative and urgent need is to begin negotiations.

*Third*, we will continue to support efforts to bring the parties
to the negotiating table.

*Fourth*, the United States will play any role requested by the
parties. We are also prepared to support the able efforts of the
British Foreign Secretary, Callaghan, in this regard.

*Fifth*, in these negotiations, we believe it will be necessary for
Turkey, as the stronger power on the ground, to display flexibility
and a concern for Greek sensitivities, both in terms of territory
and the size of military forces on the island. I have made
this point directly this morning to the Prime Minister of Turkey.
I have been assured that the Turkish Government considers the
demarcation line negotiable and that it will carry out the provisions
of the Geneva agreement calling for phased reductions of
troops on Cyprus.

*Sixth*, the United States greatly values the traditional friendship
of Greece. It has the highest regard for Prime Minister
Karamanlis and wishes every success to his democratic government.
We will use our influence in any negotiation to take into
full account Greek honor and national dignity. At the same
time, we assume that all of our allies, including Greece, join in
collective defense in their own interests. We are willing to
strengthen these common alliance ties and to help the Greek
Government in any way possible. We will not be pressured by
threat of withdrawal from the alliance, or anti-American
demonstrations, which in any event are totally unjustified by our
record.

I repeat that this statement has been gone over by President
Ford.

*Q. Will you take questions?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Reluctantly.*

*Q. Last week, one of your associates described as plain
"baloney" suggestions that the United States has tilted toward*

308

Turkey. Do you share in that view? And can you tell us specifically
the consideration that was given to cutting off arms to Turkey and
why arms were not cut off during the building crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: With the speaker sitting here and looking
balefully at me, my options, as they say, are severely limited—I
completely support the statement of Mr. McCloskey.²²

The situation on Cyprus tilted toward Turkey not as a result of
American policy but as a result of the actions of the previous Greek
Government which destroyed the balance of forces as it had existed
on the island.

The United States did not threaten the cutoff of military aid to Turkey, for these reasons: First, it was considered that such an action would be ineffective and would not prevent the threatening eventuality; secondly, as was pointed out in this statement, we are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most drastic consequences and not just over a period of time covering a few days but over an extended period of time.

For all these reasons, it was judged that the United States would
be both ineffective and counterproductive to threaten the cutoff of
aid.

Short of this, however, we made the most repeated and urgent
representations to Turkey in order to prevent the military action
that happened. We have criticized the action, and we believe also
that the inflexibility of all of the parties in Geneva contributed to it.

* * *

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been widespread criticism around the
world from diplomats, as well as from public demonstrators, that
the United States used "quiet diplomacy" which was so quiet
during the past four weeks that it was ineffective. Can you address
yourself to whether the United States at an earlier point might have
done what it has done today, if it had issued a firm, specific state-
ment?

Also, you have been burned in effigy on Lafayette Square, I
believe for the first time.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am honored—is it really only the
first time? [Laughter.]

Q. In Lafayette Square, I believe.

²² Ambassador at Large Robert J. McCloskey.

18. CYPRUS CRISIS, PHASE II

309

Secretary Kissinger: I hope you all realize that half of the demonstrators were State Department employees. [Laughter.]

Let us understand the context within which the negotiations have taken place.

Until early August, until in fact August 8, it was the general judgment of all those dealing with the negotiations, including specifically that of the United Kingdom, that the conference in Geneva would lead to a settlement and that in fact it would, after an initial phase which would be conducted by Foreign Ministers, break up into working groups that would settle the issue.

Under those circumstances, it would have been highly inappropriate for the United States to make a public statement of the solution that it advocated.

After it became apparent that the negotiations in Geneva were heading for a stalemate, the United States, first, responded to every request by the principal mediator, the British Foreign Secretary, for specific assistance and specific proposals. In addition, the United States made many demarches to Turkey to prevent the threatened military action.

And it [the United States] would have preferred if, perhaps, some more flexibility could have been shown by all of the parties in Geneva.

Our judgment was that a public statement would freeze the positions and that it would not achieve the objective of thwarting a military attack.

After the event, it is never possible to prove whether some other course might not have been successful. Our judgment was that under the circumstances quiet diplomacy would lead to these results. But there is a limit to what diplomacy can achieve. It cannot substitute for an existing relationship of forces.

We understand the frustrations of the Greek community. We understand also the frustrations and disappointments of the Greek Government—but it is important to remember that the original dislocations were not of our own making and that the United States, while it will try to be helpful, cannot solve all problems around the world.

With respect to the demonstrations, it is worth while to remember that a few years ago the demonstrations were complaining about excessive American involvement. Now the complaint seems to be the opposite.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the perception of the United States as "tilting toward Turkey," regardless of whether it's correct or incorrect, in any way hampered your efforts to serve as an effective mediator between the two sides?

310

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that it is understandable that Greek emotions run very deep at this moment.

I believe that upon calmer reflection the responsible Greek leaders will recognize that the United States has shown deep sympathy for the Greek Government, that we welcome the present democratic government in Greece, and that within the limits of what was possible we have attempted to play a constructive role.

I think the Greek Government will also realize that the U.S. roles can be very important in bringing about a result consistent with the dignity and honor of all of the parties—and we hope it will realize that anti-American demonstrations and anti-American gestures do not contribute to our effectiveness.

* * *

[Secretary Kissinger's observations did not entirely dispel the view that the United States had been and was being unduly lenient to Turkey, particularly in light of that country's use of U.S.- supplied military equipment in ways that seemed to contravene bilateral agreements as well as the provisions of the foreign assistance legislation. Nor did there seem to be any early prospect of reconvening the Geneva talks, although Secretary-General Waldheim succeeded late in August in persuading Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, leaders respectively of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, to initiate bilateral talks on prisoners of war and other humanitarian problems.

The most serious of these humanitarian concerns, the plight of the estimated 225,600 persons displaced by the recent fighting, was meanwhile being handled on behalf of the U.N. Secretary-General by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and Coordinator of U.N. Humanitarian Assistance in Cyprus. The importance of doing what was possible to alleviate human suffering on the island was the focus of still another Security Council resolution that was unanimously adopted on August 30.]

(43) Political and Humanitarian Problems: Meeting of the Security Council, August 30, 1974.

(a) Humanitarian assistance to the people of Cyprus: Security Council Resolution 361 (1974), August 30, 1974.²³

²³Text from Security Council, Official Records: 29th Year, Resolutions and Decisions 1974: 9.

problem for Greece whether and under what circumstances it will enter negotiations. We favor early negotiations because we do not believe that the situation will improve. Indeed, the status quo will tend to be confirmed the longer the negotiations are delayed.

I have stated the American position with respect to the negotiations and with respect to the role we would play in a negotiation, and we expect to have clearer responses about that in the next few days.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain the American position on the next step in the diplomatic dialogue in the Middle East? Yesterday's U.S.-Jordanian communique said that at an appropriately early date there should be a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Does this now mean that the United States sees the next step being between Israel and Jordan?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let me say that there are many versions of disengagement schemes between Jordan and Israel, and the United States did not imply by this statement that it backed any particular scheme between Jordan and Israel.

As to which negotiation should be next, I ask we cannot decide until the round of discussions is completed which involves the Foreign Minister of Syria, who is arriving this week, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who is arriving next week; and we have also invited the Prime Minister of Israel to come here in the first half of September for discussions with the President. It is only after all of these discussions are completed that we can make a judgment as to what the next move should be.

Q. Following up on that, do you expect on your scheduled trip to India to stop off in the Middle East to possibly begin some shuttle diplomacy between Amman and Jerusalem?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that as a general practice a foreign government must not expect that every time there is a crisis the Secretary of State will come rushing into the area and spend all of his time settling that

particular crisis. On that basis we could never conduct a consistent American foreign policy. And it cannot become the rule that every issue is settled by the personal shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary of State.

I'm prepared to go to the Middle East for a specific trip. And I may, if there is an especially critical point, engage in a brief shuttle diplomacy. But I do not think it is in the U.S. interests nor in the interests of other countries to expect me personally to settle every issue no matter where it arises.

So we will support further diplomatic moves, but one must not expect the same degree of extended absences from Washington which characterized the last negotiations.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

## President Ford and Secretary Kissinger
### Mourn Ambassador Davies

Following are remarks made by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger at Andrews Air Force Base on August 21.

### SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 336 dated August 21

Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: A professional Foreign Service officer has come home. He returns not to joy but to sadness, not to parades but to solemn ceremony.

Rodger Davies embodied the qualities and spirit which marked an American. He chose an unusual profession, a profession which required that to serve his country he leave his home, but never forget it. Wherever he went the heritage of America was in his heart. He remembered the dignity of the individual where individuals had lost their dignity. He remembered the rights to liberty and justice where these rights were under attack. He remembered peace where there was war. In that sense, Rodger Davies never left home.

In the diplomatic entrance at the Depart-

ment of State, the American Association maintains public names of those members who gave their lives in tragic circumstances in country. It is not a tragically, another name.

I am today awarding the highest award of State, the Secretary's A reads as follows:

"For inspiring leadership, courage, and dedication," he gave his life, Nicosia.

Awards and names of comfort to those who lost Rodger Davies. To his family, John, I would only repay Monday that Ambassador loved, admired, and resented. He was a professional and best sense of the world.

Dana, John, your father's legacy of which any man is proud. Even more important, he of friends whose lives knowing him.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is to introduce a man who has given hope to a person who is inspired by the United States.

### PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated August 21.

Secretary Kissinger, De members of the family, dis This is a very sad occasion.

359

Department of State Bulletin

September 9, 1974

State, the American Foreign Service
Association maintains plaques which list the
names of those members of the Foreign Serv-
ices who gave their lives under heroic or
magic circumstances in the service of their
country. It is not a short list. And now,
magically, another name will be added.
I am today awarding to Ambassador Dav-
ide the highest award of the Department of
State, the Secretary's Award. The citation
reads as follows:

"For inspiring leadership, outstanding
courage, and dedication to duty for which
he gave his life, Nicosia, August 19, 1974."

Awards and names on plaques are little
comfort to those who loved and admired
Rodger Davies. To his children, Dana and
John, I would only repeat my remarks of
Monday that Ambassador Davies was be-
loved, admired, and respected by his col-
leagues. He was a professional in the fullest
and best sense of the word.

Dana, John, your father leaves behind a
legacy of which any man should be proud.
Even more important, he leaves a multitude
of friends whose lives were enriched by
knowing him.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is now my honor
to introduce a man who in less than two
weeks has given hope to America and in-
spired confidence in the world: The Presi-
dent of the United States.

PRESIDENT FORD

Secretary Kissinger, Dana and John, and
members of the family, distinguished guests:
This is a very sad occasion for all Ameri-

cans as we gather here to pay tribute to a
great patriot, one of our most admired and
one of our most respected diplomats. Rodger
Davies leaves behind many friends and many,
many accomplishments in the career that he
selected.

He possessed the full measure of many of
those attributes which are so invaluable as
a person and in the career that he sought.
He had judgment, he had dignity, he had
wisdom, and he had humor, and all of these
are necessary ingredients for the job that
he chose for his full life.

As the Secretary has mentioned, Rodger
Davies was a professional in the fullest
sense. His services to our country embodied
the best of time, of effort and competence.
He loved and worked for peace, and he lost
his life in the search for peace for all Amer-
ica and all the world.

On Monday of this past week I had the
opportunity to make some remarks to a
group who had served their country in uni-
form and I had the sad occasion to announce
to that group the loss of life by Rodger
Davies. And I said to them, and I repeat
here today: Some serve in uniform, some
serve in other capacities; the loss of life in
either case means as much to America.

And therefore it is appropriate on this
occasion that we pay a very special tribute
to a great Ambassador, highly respected by
his friends; a person who gave his full life
to the career that he sought. So I say it is
an honor for me on this occasion to present
on behalf of all Americans the flag to Dana,
the Ambassador's flag, to which your father,
as my personal representative in the service
of his country, brought such great distinc-
tion.

September 9, 1974

359

TELECON

Archbishop Iakovas/The Secretary

September 22, 1974

1:46 p.m.

K: Hello Your Eminence. How are you.

I: I am fine, Mr. Secretary.

K: I am sorry that over the last few weeks I have been
remiss in getting in touch with you. I have been extremely
busy but also the President has wanted to wait until events
in Greece and Cyprus had reached a certain point. He
would like very much to see you, but the earliest it can be
worked out is towards the end of the week after next, around
October 3 or 4. Would that be convenient for you?

I: Fine.

K: We would very much like to have a meeting between you
and President Ford.

I: Good. I am very grateful to you. Would you call my
office again.

K: We will call your office and give you the precise
date. If it is necessary, could you also do it on
Saturday the 5th ?

I: Yes. I would prefer not, because I usually go out of
New York on the weekends, but if it is necessary I will
make it.

K: We will aim for the 3rd or 4th.

I: I would appreciate it. It is needless to say I would
like to see you.

K: I think it would be better if we had a brief chat
before then I will take you into see the President.

I: I understand. Thank you very much.

END.

MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

CLASSIFIED ITEM(S) REMOVED

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Collection: Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part III

Box Number: 210

Folder Number: 6

Item(s) and Security Classification:

Ford/HAK, September 23, 1974

1p

MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES

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President/HAK, 9/24/74 - 7:37 p.m.

3pp

MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

CLASSIFIED ITEM(S) REMOVED

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TELCON - Secretary Kissinger/President Ford, 9/30/74, 6:55 p.m.

2pp

24. CONGRESS, TURKEY, AND DÉTENTE (I)

E (I)

Though reversed later in the session, this action was widely
viewed at the time as a rejection of the whole philosophy of
economic development of which the United States had been a
leading supporter for nearly three decades. The sense of a growing
isolationist trend in Congress was reinforced a few days later, on
February 5 and 6, when a minority of Senate opponents succeeded
in blocking two attempts to force a vote on ratification of the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.

Despite its overwhelming preoccupation with Watergate and im-
peachment matters, Congress did enact a number of legislative
measures with foreign policy implications during the closing
months of the Nixon era. Especially noteworthy from the point of
view of future foreign policy operations was the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,³ which provided
among other things for (1) the setting by Congress of overall
appropriation targets for each fiscal year, and (2) the commence-
ment of the 1977 and later fiscal years on October 1 instead of the
traditional July 1. Under this arrangement, the fiscal year 1976
would terminate as usual on June 30, 1976, after which a three-
month "transition quarter" would precede the opening of the new
fiscal year 1977, which would begin October 1, 1976 and terminate
September 30, 1977.

Among other pieces of legislation enacted in time for President
Nixon's signature, the Antihijacking Act of 1974 sought to imple-
ment the provisions of the Hague Antihijacking Convention of
1970 by establishing severe penalties for hijacking offenses and
authorizing the suspension of civil air traffic between the United
States and any nation that failed to cooperate in antihijacking ef-
forts. In working over the military procurement legislation for fis-
cal year 1975, Congress reduced the administration's overall fund-
ing estimate of $23.1 billion to $22.2 billion; slashed military assist-
ance for South Vietnam from $1.6 billion to $1.0 billion; reduced
funds for weapons research, development, and procurement on
such projects as the Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS), the B-1 bomber, and an improved submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM) system; and slightly lowered the year-end
authorized military personnel strength to 2,149,000.⁶ A criticism of

¹Public Law 93-344, July 12, 1974.

²Public Law 93-366, Aug. 5, 1974.

³Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague Dec. 16, 1970 and entered into force Oct. 14, 1971 (TIAS 7192; 22 UST 1641); text in *Documents, 1970: 350-55*.

⁴Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975, Public Law 93-365, Aug. 5, 1974.

376

some features of this legislation was one of Mr. Nixon's last statements as President.⁷

Another important enactment, signed by President Ford a few days after taking office, reversed the January action of the House of Representatives by authorizing the $1.5 billion requested for the International Development Association and also—somewhat incongruously—permitting U.S. citizens to buy and sell gold after December 31, 1974.⁸ But though it authorized the full appropriation for IDA in four annual installments of $375 million each, this measure did not actually provide any funds, and almost another two years were to elapse before the first appropriations were made available in support of the U.S. commitment. In the meantime, Congress also approved late in 1974 a plan for increased U.S. participation in the Asian Development Bank, including a $50 million contribution (in addition to $100 million previously authorized) to that institution's Special Funds for concessional lending to less wealthy countries.⁹

By October, a further series of bills was emerging from Congress and arriving on the desk of President Ford. The Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1975, signed by the new President on October 8,¹⁰ trimmed total obligatory authority for the ongoing fiscal year from the Pentagon's amended estimate of $87.1 billion to $82.6 billion; although no major weapon system was eliminated or sharply reduced, military aid for South Vietnam was trimmed again, this time to $700 million. By the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, signed October 11,¹¹ Congress abolished the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and set up two new agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In passing the State Department/USIA [U.S. Information Agency] Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1975, signed October 26,¹² Congress urged a "phased reduction" of economic as well as military assistance to South Vietnam; in addition, it repealed the long-forgotten Formosa Resolution of 1955, which had authorized the use of U.S. armed forces to protect Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands off the China coast.¹³

None of this legislation impinged upon what had emerged as the two most controversial foreign policy issues of the year and, as

⁷Signature statement, Aug. 5, in *Presidential Documents*, 10: 1007.

⁸Public Law 93-373, Aug. 14, 1974.

⁹Public Law 93-537, Dec. 22, 1974.

¹⁰Public Law 93-437, Oct. 8, 1974.

¹¹Public Law 93-438, Oct. 11, 1974.

¹²Public Law 93-475, Oct. 26, 1974.

¹³Public Law 84-4, Jan. 29, 1955; text in *Documents, 1955*: 298-9.

ixon's last state-

dent Ford a few
on of the House
quested for the
—somewhat in-
I sell gold after
full appropri-
billion each, this
almost another
ions were made
the meantime,
increased U.S.
including a $50
on previously
r concessional

From Congress
Department of
President on
to the going
$87.1 billion
as eliminated
was trimmed
ization Act
e old Atomic
es, the Ener-
(A) and the
ne State De-
ization Act,
d a "phased
South Viet-
osa Resolu-
ed forces to
ids off the

rged as the
car and, as

such, were to provoke the first important collisions between the
new Republican President and the opposition-controlled Congress.
One of these issues was the familiar matter of most-favored-nation
commercial treatment for the U.S.S.R., as affected by the latter's
policy regarding Jewish emigration. A second major problem had
arisen more recently with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the
determination of some members of Congress, particularly younger
members and those with Greek backgrounds, to exert pressure for a
removal of the Turkish forces and a return to peaceful conditions
in the island. Proponents of this effort seemed, by and large, to
share the view that recent U.S. policy in this area had been doubly
at fault, first in maintaining excessively warm relations with the
Greek military junta and then in failing to oppose and condemn the
Turkish Government's resort to force.

The method chosen by congressional critics of the Greek-
Turkish policy consisted mainly in the attachment of amendments
to the pending foreign aid legislation that would have the effect of
suspending U.S. military aid to Turkey so long as Ankara persisted
in its current line of policy. Since the most recent long-term foreign
aid appropriation had expired on June 30, the program was cur-
rently being carried on under the authority of successive continuing
resolutions until work on the aid appropriation for the new fiscal
year could be completed. But the attempt to make an exception of
the Turkish military aid program encountered an unexpectedly
vigorous opponent in the person of President Ford. On two succes-
sive occasions in mid-October, the new chief executive went so far
as to veto the resolutions passed by Congress because of "harm-
ful" and "reckless" amendments which, he claimed, would deprive
the United States of its negotiating leverage, "imperil our relation-
ships with our Turkish ally and weaken us in the crucial Eastern
Mediterranean," "directly" jeopardize the NATO alliance—and,
at the same time, afford no help to Greece or to "the Greek Cypriot
people who have suffered so tragically over the past several
months."¹⁴

Attempts to override these presidential vetoes having failed in the
House—the first by 16 votes, the second by 2 votes—Congress pro-
ceeded on October 17 to enact a third continuing resolution (House
Joint Resolution 1167) which, though it again decreed a cutoff of
military aid to Turkey, empowered the President to suspend its ap-
plication until December 10 if Turkey meanwhile observed the
cease-fire and refrained from increasing its forces in Cyprus or
transferring U.S.-supplied arms to the island.¹⁵ "With serious

¹⁴ Messages to the House, Oct. 14 and 17, in *Presidential Documents*, 10: 1282-3 and 1316-17 (also in *Bulletin*, 71: 656-8).

¹⁵ *Sec. 6, Public Law 93-448, Oct. 17, 1974; text in *Bulletin*, 71: 658n.*

378

reservations" over this persistence in a course he still considered "ill advised and dangerous," President Ford signed this resolution on October 18, "... This bill," he complained, "can only hinder progress toward a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. . . . Whatever we can still do to assist in resolving the Cyprus dispute will be done. But if we fail despite our best efforts, those in the Congress who overrode the congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for that failure."¹⁶

Still larger matters had meanwhile come into focus with an approach to executive-legislative agreement on the terms of the pending Trade Reform Act, the basic measure required to authorize U.S. participation in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations as well as the implementation of the U.S.-Soviet economic bargains negotiated in 1972. As already pointed out,¹⁷ a version of this key enactment had passed the House of Representatives late in 1973, and the only serious obstacle to passage by the Senate was the prevalent disapproval of the Soviet Union's policy of restricting the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. In an attempt to bring about the lifting of such restrictions, the House of Representatives had included as Section 402 of the Trade Reform Act the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, named for Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington and Democratic Representative Charles A. Vanik of Ohio, which undertook to bar the extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment or U.S. Government credits to any Communist country that restricted freedom of emigration.

Foreseeing that the U.S.S.R. would react unfavorably to any attempt at outside interference with its emigration policies, Secretary Kissinger had repeatedly advised the Congress to discontinue its efforts and leave such matters to the administration's "quiet diplomacy." Since early 1974, moreover, he had been actively engaged in trying to eliminate, or at least reduce, the gap in viewpoints between the Soviet Government and its congressional critics. His efforts were not made easier by the indications that the U.S.S.R. was curbing its would-be Jewish emigrants with even greater rigor than the year before: according to one later tabulation, total Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union decreased from about 35,000 in 1973 to 20,000 in 1974, while emigration to Israel decreased from 30,604 to 16,849 in the same years. Despite these discouraging portents, however, Secretary Kissinger's efforts appeared by mid-October of 1974 to be on the point of bearing good fruit. Some of the details were later disclosed by Dr. Kissinger himself in an appearance before the Senate Finance Committee.]

"Signature statement, Oct. 18, in *Presidential Documents*, 10: 1320-21 and *Bulletin*, 71: 658-9. For further developments see Chapter 35 at notes 21-25.
¹⁷Cf. Chapter 15 at notes 10-11.

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[426]

Public Papers of the Presidents

July 24

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think it will be made public, but there is a book being written¹ that I gather will be very complete.

NOTE: The President spoke at 12:40 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House where Captain Miller

presented him with the wheel from the SS Mayaguez.

427

Statement on House Action Refusing To Modify the Embargo on
United States Military Assistance to Turkey. July 24, 1975

I AM deeply disappointed by the refusal of the House of Representatives to partially lift the embargo on the shipment of arms to Turkey. It is my strong conviction that this negative vote can only do the most serious and irreparable damage to the vital national security interests of the United States, including our normally excellent relations with the Government of Turkey, U.S. security interests in the Atlantic Alliance and the Eastern Mediterranean, and U.S. efforts to assist the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to reach a just and equitable Cyprus settlement. It will also seriously affect important interests elsewhere.

I and members of my Administration worked hard to persuade Members of the House of Representatives that vital, national defense interests are at stake in this issue. I am very proud of those 206 Members of Congress of both parties, as well as the Members of the Senate who supported a similar measure, for casting their votes in the national interest. I deeply appreciate the efforts of the bipartisan leadership of the Congress and the members of the House and Senate Committees on International Relations and Foreign Affairs who supported the legislation. I will continue to make every effort to assist in achieving an equitable settlement of the Cyprus dispute. I will work to reassure our allies, Turkey and Greece, of our continuing desire to maintain strong and effective relationships with them despite this setback. I hope the House of Representatives will reconsider its failure to act affirmatively.

¹ "The Four Days of the Mayaguez" by Roy Rowan.

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