TELCON
Cromer/HAK

October 26, 1973/10:42 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Good morning, how are you?

K: OK rollie.

C: I do congratulate you on your press conference. A magnificent performance.

K: Aren't you nice.

C: I'm going to say this. Our Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to see Brezhnev yesterday and to make a couple of points which I will tell you about on the telephone which was firstly dispatched to the sensitive area of admitting U. N. truce observers can be monitored and we've provided an airlift for the people from Cyprus to Egypt for that. And we'll do it thirdly, the sum resolutions of the problem of the Egyptian Third Army and we suggested that one possibility would be an immediate exchange of prisoners plus the lifting of the Egyptian blocade and the ____ mandate. And the Russians put this to the Egyptians and the Sadat came back with a reply to the Russians which they passed on to us which I will read out to you but I will also send it down to you. It reads as follows: "Egypt proceeds on the assumption that Israel, in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 23 October wants immediately to begin withdrawing its forces to the lines they held on the 22 of October at 1800 hours. As soon as in the course of that operation, Israelis troops on the Western bank of the canal withdraw from the rear of the Third Army towards the Bitter Lakes, the blockade of the Straits of Babal mandate will be lifted and the mine fields installed there will be cleared. As soon as the Israeli troops complete their withdrawal to the lines they held on the 22 of October, there will be an exchange of prisoners of war.

K: Very good.

C: So this is moving a little.

K: Can you send that to me. Send it to the State Department.

C: We'll sort of keep things moving so they don't bog down in the sand.

K: Good. Thank you bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Date: 10/04</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

Robert Galvin/HAK

October 26, 1973/10:54 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Doc Galvin Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

G: Fine thank you sir.

K: I wanted to talk to you on behalf of the President. As you know we are pulling Bob Ingersoll out of Japan as the Assistant Secretary of State and therefore we are looking for an Ambassador for Japan which we consider one of our absolutely key posts and the President wondered and I strongly endorsed it, whether you would consider that position.

G: Well, that's a...

K: I can't really think of a more important Ambassadorial post we have.

G: That's an amazing invitation sir. I genuinely appreciate it. Let me take the subject under brief advisement. May I do that sir.

K: Please. But I really would like to tell you that we are very serious about our relations with Japan and about the decisive role the right individual could play there. Bob is doing a very patriotic thing in coming back from a position of much greater independence to being a bureaucrat but I needed him back here to help me run East Asia.

G: I think its a superb selection on your part on terms of Bob and I would be pleased to give it consideration.

K: He thinks you would be a superb selection as his successor.

G: When is he returning?

K: He'll be returning after my trip to China around the end of November and of course we'd have to get you confirmed and so forth and there can be a hiatus of a month. Because we'd like you there as quickly as possible.

G: I see.

K: But if a month made a difference we could handle that.

G: May I ask you one procedural and structural question? Was Bob obliged to do anything with regard to the disposition of equity in his corporation which would be a matter of some concern to me as it relates to the equity that I hold in the corporation I'm with.

K: I'm almost certain not. I think its generally thought desirable to put ones holdings in a blind trust but not necessarily to dispose of them. But those restrictions are much more severe in the case of Defense Department personnel. You wouldn't really be in a position to influence contracts.

G: That's correct. I think this from a common sense standpoint should have no great effect.

K: I'm not sure. I can look into it and I'll get word to you this afternoon. But to my almost certain knowledge it does not require of disposing of stocks you hold.

G: Let us assume that while I'm going through my decision process.

K: Right

G: So at least let me have the weekend and I will be back in touch with your office with my first evaluation of the subject and than I may wish to visit with Bob personally. I could go to Tokyo for that purpose.

K: I'd be delighted.

G: And ultimately maybe at least a few private words with you to determine.

K: I think that would be important.

G: Thank you. I'll start at my evaluation. Now a private word. I thought your handling of the very difficult issues of yesterday from a public standpoint were excellent.

K: Aren't you nice.

G: You do fine work sir.

K: Thank you and I hope to have you as an associate very soon.

TELCORN

Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

11:30 a.m.

(missing first part)

K: No, no, I told you what I think the problem is. You don't have one man who can make foreign policy decisions.

D: That's correct.

K: If you and the Prime Minister could act like the President and I do...

D: Your'e right. That's what the Prime Minister has said on several occasions.

K: By the time you have the cabinet, each of which is knifing each other...

D: That's correct. Everybody having discourse and adding their suggestions. Absolutely right. One of the ills of the parliamentary system. And I don't think the British are any better.

K: English are putting out we have over reacted too. That's extremely dangerous.

D: Did you see the editorial in the Post, very good. In support of the President, in support of your press conference, for the Washington Post that's something. I am happy to see some result. .....Did you know they offered the Arabs....they ....cosponsored the resolution yesterday provided Americans agreed to withdraw non participation of permanent members in the forces....They are really worse than the Arabs.

K: They are worse.

D: Some thing else, Brezhnev made a statement in Moscow...

K: I have seen that.

D: Urgent and necessary measure required to ....cease fire, referred to personnel sent, linked with UN observers.

K: Yes, I saw it.

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

11:58

N: Hello Henry.

K: Mr. President.

N: What, ah, how are things going. Still the same?

K: Still about the same. Some back and forth on whether the Soviets and Americans can be in the observer force. We have taken the position that on the whole we prefer the observers be obtained as the same type of people as the military force. But if the Secretary-General requests Americans and Soviets we will accept. The Soviets have sent in 70 people they call observers. We are saying they can send anyone they want but they have no status as far as we are concerned, except for what the Secretary-General recognizes. You had another message from Sadat about the 3rd Army. Alot of technical stuff and needn't be brought to your attention. We should get the Egyptians to check this with the UN. We will pass it on to the Israelis.

N: I want it passed to the Israelis.. strongly. Let's keep our side of the bargain.

K: When we can determine that the Israelis are doing something wrong we leaning on them very hard.

N: I understand.

K: The Egyptians have made a proposal and they have sent this message about a comprehensive proposal on my visit. And we have sent a warm message to Sadat from you saying you have instructed me to take a constructive and positive attitude..

N: Good, good. How about the reviews?... still getting positive reviews?

K: Oh, yes. The post was supportive of you on the editorial page, I haven't read the other. On the whole the news play was very positive.

N: Good, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President

END

TELCON

Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

12:15 p.m.

C: Hello Henry. Did you get my note?

K: Yes.

C: Do you feel you can pass it on?

K: I shall pass it on, if you agree.

C: If you please. Hope you will be able to urge the Israelis this is a good idea.

K: We will talk to them in that sense.

C: Can I tell ______ you are doing that?

K: You can tell them I will pass it on with our view that they do something constructive. I don't want to endorse every last word in it.

C: Did you see that the Israelis have deferred their elections until Dec. 31.

K: No, I haven't seen it.

C: I got the message from Tel Aviv. It was 11 Dec. but now they've put it off until the 31st.

K: We may have to start the process before that.

C: That's what I was thinking.

K: Now, Rollie, I understand the British press is commenting that White hall believes we have over reacted.

C: jActually, the press comments I have seen have been pretty good. I don't get the impression Whitehall does think that.

K: It concerns me because we believe .... it may be next time in Europe... if we don't react....

C: I'm sure we don't think you over reacted. Press comment has really been rather good. "Thank God for the Americans" was one headline, the Sun also for American and the Yorkshire Post, the Times was a bit

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 6/16/73</td></tr><tr><td>By: O.J.</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

Dobrynin Dec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 26, 1973

1:00 p.m.

K: Anatoly.

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: Fine. We have a message from the British who said that they got it from Sadat. Are you using the British as a channel?

D: I know there is discussion with the British but I do not know the discussion. Yesterday he received the British Ambassador. What does it say?

K: That we should pass it on to the Israelis.

D: What is the message?

K: It has to do with the Israelis withdrawing certain distance, what the Egyptians are willing to do, etc.

D: I do not know of this message from Moscow at all. For your information we asked the British to see Sadat.

K: No. No. It was just that -- we have been asked by the British to pass on to the Israelis and I wanted to find out what you thought of it.

D: The British asked Sadat?

K: Sadat asked Gromyko and Gromyko gave it to the British.

K: The message addressed to the Israelis?

K: The British have asked us to pass it to the Israelis. I would have thought it faster if Gromyko had sent it to you.

D: He did not. I have no information on this. About Malik, what we discussed on the telephone -- he mentioned that those UN troops are or forces that there is more than 50% of NATO. He said exactly 113. He did not mention what was sent yesterday but what was sent today was 50%.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 26, 1973

1:00 p.m.

K: Anatoliy.

D: Hello, Henry, How are you?

D: What is the message?

D: The British asked Sadat?

D: The message addressed to the Israelis?

D: He did not. I have no information on this. About Malik, what we discussed on the telephone -- he mentioned that these UN troops xxx or forces that there is more than 50% of NATOS. He said exactly 118. He did not mention what was sent yesterday but what was sent today was 50%.

TELCORN

October 26, 1973

1:17 p.m.

D: Food and Water ......

K: It is my strong advice to enable us to say something, we can say we
have achieved....enable us to pay less later.

D: You recommend food and water.

K: You offered to let food and water through .....could cause very
serious consequences with Russians.

D: I want to ask you about something that has been on my mind, not
by Government's mind. Suppose we offer to return all the people free
without equipment, wouldn't take prisoners, let them have food and
water and let them return home safely if they wanted, open the road.

K: In my view the best thing to offer food and water, non-military supplies.

D: OK, I will pass that on. That also will not solve the problem, though.
Will delay confrontation we are going to have with Egypt.

K: You will wind up in my judgment, we will end up on the wrong side of
the confrontation. It would be a whole hell of a lot better to establish
the principle of limited supply now.

D: I'm not negating this,

K: In addition, and to offer that anybody who wants leave will be permitted
to leave the Egyptians will consider that insulting.

D: We don't want to insult Egypt, but there must be a solution to the
problem, we don't want to allow them to become fighting forces again.

K: I understand, eventual solution will be to open the road to non-military
supplies.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: You will get under irresistible pressure if you keep it up.

D: Not keeping it up, we started with nonmilitary, humanitarian things,
and I think the possibility....

2.

K: My personal advice, you understand its not an official position yet, but it is my usual tactic of anticipating in order to gain time.

D: As I said last night.

K: You will not be permitted to capture that army. I am certain.

D: Its not first priority. We would rather have them go home.

K: I don't think that will be possible either. Unless you withdraw your forces.

D: Well. That comes back to your suggestion, that we suggested to you that night.

K: You won't ______ in the North.

D: Don't want both sides of the canal in the North.

K: I frankly think you will make a mistake if you push into a total confrontation.

D: We're not trying for a confrontation, just want to find the best way to solve it.

K: Well, I have given you my views, it would be helpful if we could get an answer in the early part of the afternoon. Oh, something I have meant to tell you earlier and have neglected to twice, what I talked with Dobrynin about the conference was very minor, whether the site would be in New York or Geneva. that the site would not be in New York, but Geneva which is what the Foreign Minister told me. Why he wanted that I don't know.

D: I will find out.

K: I think it has some remoteness from here and from the UN and that American and Soviet person of appropriate rank would sit in on the first few sessions and that's as much as we discussed.

D: OK, I will pass it on.

K: No substantive discussion whatever.

D: Fine.

K: Do tell them because the President has been bugging me to do it.

TELECON

Ambassador Scali/Secretary Kissinger

October 26; 1973

2:35

S: I talked with the Secretary General and I think I have his position properly.. for a twenty man Soviet and twenty man US observer corp.

K: Yes, but they are not separate.

S: Right. They are part of the regular observers. No special privileges and with in the structure. I also talked about Romania..

K: Let me get an answer for you on that.

S: He said it was surprised Takoa didn't buy it immediately. I said I would talk with Takoa. Meantime I have had a shouting call from Malik, who says I am dictating to the Secretary General and trying to keep the Soviet bloc out.

K: He.. to me through Dobrynin. I told Dobrynin I would let him know this afternoon. I am trying to get an answer by this afternoon.

S: Malik insists on coming over here by 4:00 today.

K: Let me see if I can get back to you.

S: I need some guidance because..

K: As long as integrate into UNSO, we must do something.

S: Question is how.

K: I will call you before 4:00.

S: OK, good.

K: Thank you;, John.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: J.S. KARL, Date: 10/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

3:00 p.m.

K: Anatoly, we have instructed Scali to work out with Malik in
when they meet at 4:00

D: Today?

K: Yes, some participation from the Soviet sphere, or whatever you want to call it,

D: Good, meet today? Fine. Thank you very much. Will notify Gromyko.

K: They can settle what country.

D: That point, it is my guess _________

K: I don't worry about it....

DECLASSIFIED

ECI 2958
by MWARA 5-67

TELCONE

October 26, 1973

3:00 p.m.

D: Today?

K: I don't worry about it....

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Origin: 5.83+</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By: OJARA, Dale 6/16/73</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELECON

Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

3:00

K: I wanted to tell you how much your statement meant to me.

F: That thing was a gross distortion. After I made it on the floor, Mr. Humphries said he apologized because they did not carry the report as he sent it in. I asked him to send me a note about it and I intended to pass it on to you. I was trying to minimize the Jackson statement. I am not sure whether it was the Post or AP who picked out one aspect and gave a distorted view. I was not trying to criticize the alert at all. I was an exaggeration...

K: We agreed on that at lunch.

F: This morning in one paper... this is not what I wanted to say. Did you see what I said at noon?

K: Yes, I have it here... statement by Senator Fulbright at the Senate.

F: I said it at noon. and I was going to send to you for my satisfaction... I don't want you to think something funny... I am trying to help.

K: You have been helping.

F: I also have instructed my staff to start an agenda on the hearings designed to strengthen the concept of detente. Maybe we can get started when you get back from China.

K: Terrific. We can get the Senate moving...

F: You will be at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs on..

K: I understand it is at 10:00.

F: God damn Mansfield..

K: If you want to shift it to Wednesday, that's fine. I had agreed to shift to Wednesday and then I got a message to shift it to Tuesday.

F: They first said... to 2:00 on that and then Mike called and he changed the conference to Tuesday. I wouldn't let any conference stand in my way.

K: Whichever you prefer. I have two messages, shifting to Wednesday and then back to Tuesday.

TELCOM
The President - Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

3:45 p.m.

N: Yah.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, I can't make out something your staff sent over here with regard to sending Soviet observers. I understand we did receive a message from Brezhnev.

K: Mr. President, the situation is the following. We don't want to get sucked into a separate UN observer force.

N: I understand, the point that I am making is this. The Secretary General would say.....

K: The Secretary General should suggest, ... should be willing to contribute to an augmented.

N: My point is suppose he doesn't want to, what do we say with regard to the Soviets sending.....

K: For your information, we are working out this afternoon a situation where the Secretary General will request 20 American and Soviet observers, so the question you raise will be hypothetical, Mr. President. As you say, there are two points to be made:

N: I understand and there should not be a separate US force...

K: Also should be no self-appointed forces of any one nation. We believe there will be small numbers of Soviet and US personnel requested.

N: I have reason to believe that will be done.

<table><tr><td>CLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Attention: 6/23</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Date: 6/10/73</td></tr></table>

TELCOM
Mr. Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 26, 1973, 4:00 p.m.

K: (The Egyptians have asked) Waldheim to help them with the
Third Army. I think we have to do something.

S: Larry just showed me the message prepared to go to the
Egyptians. Let's send that off and see what happens. As I
said earlier this morning I think that we have got to be satisfied
that they are really doing what they say they are doing and I
don't know how we do that.

K: There are two problems. One is that and secondly, is for the
Israelis to do something on that @##$% line.

S: You mean by way of pulling back.

K: Yes.

S: I felt that the trade off was that they would get those observers
there and there would be some pull back. As I say I don't feel
like we are going to get the Israelis to do this in the next 24
hours but it is worth trying.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 10/26/73</td></tr><tr><td>STATUS Open</td></tr><tr><td>BY: O.H. MAR. Date 10/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELCON
The President/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 26, 1973

4:05 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: It is necessary to be somewhat precise on this now. What can we say that the United States will participate in providing observers if requested by the Sec. Gen. I don't want to be behind the news. I would like to be ahead of it.

K: If requested by the Sec. Gen.

N: Fine. The Soviet Union is sending unilaterally. Are we going to object?

K: They cannot do anything until the Sec. Gen. asks for them.

N: Henry, I am getting at this. It is already in the news. To the effect that Soviet Union is sending observers and has asked us to.

K: We have responded to that -- We have to avoid, Mr. President, -- they are pouring people in there and calling them observers and they have to be observed.

N: I am trying to see what we say tonight.

K: The US is -- we think a small number of US observers -- we are prepared if the Sec. Gen. asks for them and we have every reason to believe this is what will happen.

N: This is being discussed now and we think it will be ~~wxxk~~ worked out this way. And that can be said.

K: Yes Mr. President.

N: Thanks, Henry.

END

TELCOM

Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 26, 4:15

D: You wanted me.

K: The Egyptians have asked for a SC meeting tonight. They have now made another appeal to us from Sadat and from New York -- El Zayyat through Waldheim in which they say the Third Army will never surrender no matter what you do and that they will take drastic measures if you continue blockading them. They don't care what line you go back to. They won't quibble about that and they are willing to talk about prisoner release and other matters. It seems to me you are going to come to a crossing point tonight of either making concrete proposals or. I tell you this as a friend, I have kept this from the President who is preparing for a Press Conference. I don't want him to say something you will regret. I have no doubt what he will do when he gets there. We also have a hot line message coming in from Moscow.

D: Can I tell you what the military situation is. I will not elaborate.

K: Our own information is that you did not start it.

D: Thank God.

K: But that does not make any difference. What produces the fighting is that they are desperate.

D: Absolutely correct. They are attempting to break out.

K: Why don't you let them break out and get out of there.

D: We would be willing to let them break out and go home but they are not trying to break out and run. They are shooting at our forces and...

K: Why can you not let them take the tanks with them. The Russians will replace them anyway.

D: We will not open up the pocket and release an army that came to destroy us. It has never happened in a history of war.

2
Dinitz
Oct. 26

K: Also it has never happened that a small country is producing
a world war in this manner. There is a limit beyond which you cannot
push the President. I have been trying to tell you that for a week.

D: We are not trying to push the President.

K: You play your game and you will see what happens.

D: The PM is sitting now on suggestions on what to do.

K: I am suggesting to you to make a constructive suggestion.

D: I understand and I asked you if you have any thing in mind.

K: I gave you what I have in mind.

D: About the food.

K: That while talks are going on you permit non-military supplies
to go in there and perhaps you can establish the principle that no
military supplies can come in from the road and you pull back
from it.

D: One of the suggestions from the PM as I left the phone to
come to you is that she thought she would send to you Gen.
(Riva?) with a complete proposal of how to solve the situation.

K: That would take ten hours.

D: At least. She thought he could convey that would mean either
swapping people, territories. Things that would solve the
question. We cannot let them out without getting something in
return.

K: That is right but you have to buy time for this discussion.
We will be glad to propose that there will be immediate discussions
between you and the Egyptians to solve this problem. We are
willing to be cooperative but I tell you what will happen is another
maximum Soviet demand and you cannot put the President in con-
frontation day after day.

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

Before 6:30 p.m.

D. Hello.

K. Anatoly, we were told a couple of hours ago that a hot line message was coming.

D. It could be. I don't have any information. They don't usually take more than 2 or 3 minutes to pass by hot line.

K. There is a meeting at 9:00 of the Security Council.

D. You get the news from your Embassy?

K. I don't know who we go the information from. If it is important whatever judgments we should eventually make on this we would try to avoid another one.

D. I know the President makes a speech today and I just have routine telegrams. I don't have a single telegram that is on a top issue except one issue about UN Socialist countries. I cannot answer your question. They sometimes send me a flash.

K. Let me find out where we got the information from and I will call you back.

D. O'k.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By: OAK</td><td>Date: 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
The President/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

6:30 p.m.

K. Mr. President.

N. Have we had any further developments with the UN or Secretary General requesting us to participate in---

K. Not yet.

N. In the one case it is a peace-keeping force and in the other case an observer force.

K. We will under no circumstances approve the peace-keeping force. That is what the Security Council ordered.

N. They agreed to that...

K. On the observer force we have not yet been asked but we can see that we have reason to believe we will be asked.

N. And the Soviets indicate they so desire. Is it sent in already?

K. They send 70 people but we should not praise them because of that.

N. No, No. O'k I will try to dance around it.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/26/73</td></tr><tr><td>REASON</td></tr><tr><td>By: OAKARA: Date 6/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

6:45 p.m.

K. Anatoly, we understand it was alerted from your end, just
on the hot line.

D. It could be that fighting going on in the southern part of the
Suez Canal. That is my guess.

K. For your information we are urging Israel very much to make
some sort of offer to the Egyptians on this.

D. Is the Security Council already in session?

K. No, at 9:00 tonight.

D. If we have anything, of course I will be in touch.

K. Good, I would appreciate it.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>originally</td></tr><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr><tr><td>By: OAN/ARY, Date 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Haig/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

7:55 p.m.

K. The crazy bastard really made a mess with the Russians.

H. What?

K. Didn't you listen to his press statement. First we had information of massive movement of Soviet forces. That is a lie. Second, this was the worst crisis since the Cuban missile crisis. True, but why rub their faces in it. Third, Brezhnev and I exchanged brutal messages. That has never been acknowledged before. Four, Brezhnev respects me because I was the man who bombed Viet-Nam on 18 and mined the harbors on May 18.

H. I don't think that is a third of the problem. He just let fly. He got all he had about the Middle East from you. I assumed you had cleared that. I was surprised.

K. Compare it with my press conference when I said there was no confrontation with the Russians....He has turned it into a massive Soviet backdown. Brezhnev is known to his Politburo as a man with a special relationship with Nixon and he is being publicly humiliated.

H. How about the rest of it. Disaster.

K. Yes, a disaster of something that is already a disaster. We are getting a hot line message tonight. Would you call Dobrynin. It doesn't do me any good to call him. You better call in the name of the President and say he wanted to stress his close personal relationship with the President. In a replay on television it may look like he is taunting Brezhnev. He wants him to know he places the greatest stress on the personal relationship. This is inadvertent and will be corrected. This guy will not take this. This guy over there is a maniac also.

H. I will take care of him. The rest is just as bad. We are off to the races.

K. I don't know what significance the other answers have. He just looked awful.

H. He took on the press like I have never heard.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 6/26/73</td></tr><tr><td>By CH</td><td>ARA: Date 6/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin

8:04 p.m., October 26, 1973

H: Mr. Ambassador, General Haig.

D: Oh, hello, General.

H: How are you?

D: Now I think we are coming to the real crust of the problem. (laughs)

H: Yeah. (laughs) I hope you don't think that.

D: Yes, what's the matter?

H: Listen, I just came back from the President and I told him that his remarks tonight were I thought very much overdrawn and would be interpreted improperly.

D: Yeah.

H: And I wanted you to know that he did not in any way have the intention of drawing the situation as sharply as he did. What he was trying to do -- and I don't think it came across -- he thought he was doing it but as being a member of the audience, I didn't think he did it, was trying to emphasize his strong personal relationship with Mr. Brezhnev and it did not come across that way to me at all.

D: Yeah, it didn't come to me either.

H: No. And he's quite upset about it because he did not intend it to be that way.

D: You see, General, I would like to say only one private observation. It is my own but maybe it's good for you to understand and for the President.

H: Sure.

D: What is really in Moscow, they very much upset and if I may use a word -- I am speaking on my own, you should be very clear on this.

H: I understand.

D: Because I didn't know that you would phone me.

H: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F012058
By: NNPA 530-0040

General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin

2

D: But I think understanding between us on this is very important. But they are very angry because they consider that you created all these things by reasons we don't know -- we don't want to discuss it -- but artificial crisis, why? And when you compare it with the even human crisis, it is really -- excuse me -- but it is going beyond any comparison. Because why? It's only one detail I would like to mention, we are [constantly] in touch with Henry on all the matters, big and small.

H: Yes.

D: Every hour on the hour. But what happened in the night? When I give this letter, it was as the President said: I determined he answered firm. It's quite all right. The usual procedure is through the confidential channel. But until we received letter, Henry didn't mention a single word that you are going to put this on an alert. It's the easiest way ... just to call and say to Ambassador: Look here, the President feels very strongly so if you really going to persist sorry -- well, you may use any language you like, tough or no tough or diplomatic -- but we will be forced to do it. Then I will be in touch with Moscow, Brezhnev will answer and then it's natural.

H: Yeah.

D: But you were holding for 5 hours -- Henry and Scowcroft calling me and they say a reply, wait a reply, then I will receive a reply. Reply was well firm, right, President said. But he didn't even mention about this alert. We find out on the radio, by the way.

H: Yeah.

D: But for me, it looks really it was not real. Because if you really were concerned, I am sure you will first be in touch with Brezhnev to find out what's going on, if it's real. But you were not really concerned so it was the easiest way to make up an air raid without telling us. So I am a little bit, quite frankly, I'm telling you without anger, without specific emotions, but I'm really feel sorry about this episode because it damaged very much of what was done, by what reason we don't know really. It was so good trip of Henry to Moscow. Brezhnev spend with him so many hours that the President never spends with Gromyko, by the way. And it looked so it was quite all right. But then he created this ________ crisis that you are real and we are just weaker partners standing looking against braver United States. Really, we have our people too around Moscow. Of course, he looks differently.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWBAPD
Date: 06/04/84

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: N.W. Smith, 50403

General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin

3

*

H: Yeah. Well, Mr. Ambassador, what worries me, I don't think it's a reflection of the attitudes here at all.

D: Yeah.

H: For example, what was done on the alerts I am sure you know that's been done on countless occasions and for some reason none of the fanfare.

D: Yes, without fanfare. Why you make it without even telling us, why? If it was really war, I am sure you will try to prevent the war.

H: No, no --

D: And you will tell us if so. But if it was not the war, why to play the game publicly about it because you put us in a very difficult position domestically really. Well, we are just thinking what to do -- to make a public statement denying all these things really because after all, one impression in the letter couldn't justify or just to be quiet but remember this thing. This is not the thing to be done. I have spent too many years and I'm telling you rather frankly -- that is not necessary to do but it is better for us mutually to understand what is going on.

H: Well, obviously, I wouldn't call if I was at all comfortable with what was said tonight.

D: Yeah. No, I do appreciate your call and I do appreciate the thoughtfulness of the President about it because it is very important to keep the personal relationship as strong as it was before.

H: Well, that's what he feels about it and he feels that way very strongly. And what he was trying to convey was just that -- the strong personal relationship.

D: Yeah. This is the point.

H: Well, I'm afraid that it just did not come across well tonight at all.

D: No, it did not.

H: And he wanted you to know it. He is very concerned about it. He is up there -- I replayed the thing for him because I wanted him to see -- you know sometimes when you speak you don't know.

D: No, I understand.

General Haig/Amb. Dobrynin

H: There was a degree more tension in that room tonight than I think he's accustomed to, you understand.

D: Yes, I understand. There is certain kind of things which happen here.

H: I did want you to know that.

D: Yes, thank you very much. I do appreciate it really. Because it is very important now to keep really everything as much as possible intact.

H: Right.

D: Thank you very much. Bye, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By W. M. Smith on Oct 30, 1964

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

8:13 p.m.

H. I am with the President. We noticed you are the only one who hasn't called.

K. No, no. We were trying to get through. I think it was very effective.

H. Stu Alsop who was at dinner in Georgetown said that most of the guests were in a state of stunned admiration.

K. Yes, he called me too. It was quite a *tour de force*. The hot line is active.

H. Are they sending a message to us?

K. Yes, that is probably related to local conditions.

H. Right.

K. Which was one reason I wanted to wait until I had the report. Please express my feelings. It was a great *tour de force*.

H. O'k Henry.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator</td><td>US Air Force</td></tr><tr><td>Date</td><td>10/26/73</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CH</td><td>AR</td><td>Date</td><td>10/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 26, 1973

8:13 p.m.

H. Henry, I have had a good talk with Dobrynin. He is bitching more about yesterday than tonight. He said it was the alert and publication of it that really got them.

K. Why did the god damn thing get published?

H. I don't know. We have done this countless times with no wimper from anybody.

K. Do you remember in November 1972 we were on worldwide alert for three weeks prior to the November 9 speech. Do you remember that?

H. I do. I think I did some good. I had Brent listen so he can give you a detailed report. They were very upset. Mostly about the exchange of notes and the five hour delay. He said the note was not intended to be mean.

K. What do you mean the five hour delay. If it was serious we had to get ready before we answered.

H. That is what he complained about. That thing tonight. How could they describe it...I have to go the boss is calling me. We are off to the races. We are getting great reaction, believe it or not.

K. Don't tell him that or he will do it again. You know what he did. He made Brezhnev a Khruschev in case you are interested to know.

H. I have to go. He is mad.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 10/26/73</td></tr><tr><td>By CH</td><td>AR: Date 10/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

8:45 p.m.

K. Mr. Ambassador, this is a call not as Secretary but as a friend.

D. I understand.

K. We are going to get a hot line message within an hour. I just wanted to tell you it is my honest judgment if you don't move in some direction to get serious mention on the enclave you will lose everything.

D. Maybe I don't know what your suggestion is.

K. My suggestion this morning was to offer some time... You should know once the President is involved he will order that we should join the others because we have nothing to hold on to. It is water over the dam at this point.

D. The supply business? That is what you mean?

K. The supply business or something else Israeli ingenuity could produce. His suggestion is a negotiation.

D. I told you that is what we intended to offer them.

K. You told me it might be. I didn't know you wanted us to pass it on to them.

D. We don't want to reveal all of the cards. Maybe I didn't make myself very clear. I did not mean for you to withhold it from them.

K. That would be considered humiliating and it's just as well. I know what you are trying to do. Maybe you should play it your way for awhile and they may buy it.

D. We have a mutual friend and he just called me on the direct line and he said something that I wasn't going to tell you. But since you called, he said tell my friend, Henry, that if Golda Mier or any other government opens this route he will not survive 24 hours in Israel. I didn't....

K. The tragedy is that my judgment is that Israel will lose everything on this route but it is better for them to be raped and forced than to make it as a decision.

D. In this embassy we have three girls who lost either a brother or a cousin in this fighting. This is an example of what it has done to

our country. In the closing of this route we have lost scores and
scores of lives. If we open the route, we vitalize two or three
divisions that will be a threat to our bridgeheads. We know what
their intention is as of this evening. They are threatening us and
the President of the U.S. We cannot let them execute these plans.
We are not trying to... We cannot afford to have this army
revitalize and they will be. They have the missiles and tanks
ready for reloading. We saw them and we have tapes as of this
afternoon.

K. I am trying to tell you it doesn't make a bit of difference. You
w ill be forced if it reaches that point.

D. The Prime Minister asked if she should write a message to
the President.

K. Write if it makes you feel good. It is almost totally impossible...

D. We are prepared to release them but should we...them. Should
Israel take these enemies...

K. There is one...that you can hold the road after the ceasefire.

D. It is not a realistic argument here. The Soviet Union decided
they cannot have the Egyptian army humiliated so we are trying to.....

K. Let's see what the hot line message says. We don't know what
it says yet. We may not have a problem. I am honestly very
pesimistic. At least there should have been a proposal that is
being considered.

D. By the way, now we have allowed the Red Cross to go in for the
wounded. This evening.

K. You know I am on your side. If that 3rd Army could disappear
tonight nobody would be happier than I. I have no interest in the
3rd Army, but this thing is going to get too big for us. It is my
judgment but in no official capacity whatever. What I advised you
this morning I advise you as a tactic for what I was sure would
happen. It hasn't happened yet. Let's not worry about it now.

D. We will wait and face the situation as it comes. I don't think
we have any other choice.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>DATE 6/26/84</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>TO A/SC C/417</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>FOR C/417</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>BY CH</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELECON, 9:25 p.m., October 26, 1973

Secretary/Lord Cromer

C. I thought the President was absolutely great. By allusion to the State Department remarks this afternoon, I think you might have a hornet's nest. I was at a lunch today--as you know, I have no complaint, but they were full of complaints over no consultations on anything. So when the President goes on the air and says he has received less than cooperation from the Europeans, this can cause a lots of unhappiness. I know what..

K. Well, we are willing to take this, Rollie. We have just about--the Europeans have to face the fact that the President is fed up.

C. They weren't called in to be told.

K. That's not true of you.

C. That is what I am saying. I am ringing you up as a friend, not as an Ambassador. I have no complaint whatsoever. I'm ringing just to say you might get a blast.

K. Let's be honest. We could have consulted to the devil and back with the Europeans and they would not have changed one iota.

C. That might be true. I am not getting into the right or wrong of the thing. From what I heard at lunch today they are pretty unhappy.

K. We might reach a point where on both sides of the Atlantic there will be a need to reassess U.S. relations. Let me tell you what is irritating the President: refusal to put "..." in the declaration. The whole declaration is not worth fifty percent of the effort they put in it.

C. I'm not making excuses but it will not translate into that language. If you look into the technicalities..

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 10/26/73</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHAARA, Date 10/26/73</td></tr></table>

K. They refused synonyms. I have told my people to stop pushing it. If you accept--if we accepted it exactly as it stands that wouldn't make a tinker's damn one month from today. If we accepted a five times revised draft it wouldn't make a difference. We're getting a blast but what can we do?

C. When you have time I would like a half hour, just you and I together, because I think we are getting to a crossroads in time.

K. I agree.

C. Could be we could help more. But I think you will be getting a brick bat from this.

K. Did it bother them more than McCloskey?

C. No. I think McCloskey was very upsetting. There is no problem, except people. There's much more amour propre now.

K. What McCloskey said is that we are surprised our allies separated themselves publicly from us.

C. Well, you say that. It isn't quite that simple. They will always put their interests first--as would you and as would we.

K. You're telling me. Thank you, Rollie, Thank you.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: 5/8/85</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHA. Date 6/1/85</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

10:58 p.m.

D. ....is transmitting it over the telephone to the Prime Minister this minute. As soon as he is finished reading it I will go back on.

K. I will give you the President's reaction. Right now if you want it.

D. Sure, I will go back to my office. Just a moment.

K. Let me give you the President's reaction in separate parts. First he wanted me to make it absolutely clear that we cannot permit the destruction of the Egyptian army under conditions achieved after a ceasefire was reached in part by negotiations in which we participated. Therefore it is an option that does not exist. We will support any motion in the UN that will...Secondly, he would like from you no later than 8:00 a.m. tomorrow an answer to the question of non-military supplies permitted to reach the army. If you cannot agree to that, we will have to support in the UN a resolution that will deal with the enforcement of 338 and 339. We have been driven to this reluctantly by your inability to reach a decision. Whatever the reasons, this is what the President wanted me to tell you is our position. An answer that permits some sort of negotiation and some sort of positive response on the non-military supplies, or then we will join the other members of the Security Council in making it an international matter. I have to say again your course is suicidal. You will not be permitted to destroy this army. You are destroying the possibility for negotiations which you want because you are not making possible.....

D. Your proposal to let the army go is very close to our proposal.

K. You can make any proposal you want to us and we will transmit it. We are not transmitting anything to the Egyptians. We have not had an answer to the last message, but that only went out two or three hours ago. Maybe it will turn out they will accept your proposal and I will have a drink with you. As it stands now it is our official position that if you do not make some proposal along these lines, we will have to go along with the majority of the Security Council. We can probably make a proposal and you can delay the implementation of it on practical grounds and get a little more time.

D. If we make an offer on the supplying of non-military supplies?

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 10/23/73</td></tr><tr><td>By CH</td><td>WAR. Date 10/23/73</td></tr></table>

K. That is right. Then we could at least point to something that we have managed to achieve in the...I must tell you that you are perfectly free to play it your way and see what happens. Maybe the Egyptians will be so desperate they will accept your proposal. It is not my judgment. It is inconceivable that the Soviets will permit the destruction of the Egyptian army and that the Egyptians will withdraw their army. It will bring down Sadat. It is not something he will agree to.

D. I am not authorized or feel competent to give advise. But why can't I answer that Israel offers to let this army go intact with all side arms but cannot have 200 tanks go with these people so they can go back on us.

K. The agreement was ceasefire in place. Now they won't accept losing all that equipment and giving it to you.

D. They can blow it up.

K. You are asking them to destroy 200 tanks and pull their army out. They will never to it and the Soviets won't take that. Why don't you bluff for a day and see if you can get it.

D. That is what we tried to do.

K. If that is going to be your formal answer we will of course transmit it. It can be under no....

D. Mr. Secretary, if I asked my government to transfer to you the military plans we were able to obtain about the defenses of this army, will it make any difference. What is their operational plan?

K. Right now I don't think they have any plans.

D. They do as of today. We have it on tape.

K. That is their way of breaking out.

D. If they want to break out and go home we could help them. They don't have to kill our people. Their plan is to cut us and fortify themselves with tanks and missiles. It is suicidal for us in either way.

K. It is.

D. 10,000 tons of supplies that the Soviets have provided them.
Twenty-four hours and we would have to rush to you like last Friday
night.

K. I have given you the President's views of the ceasefire agreement.

D. It is not we who force your confrontation with the Soviet Union.
By its actions they have forced it.

K. If the Soviet Union did this to you or Egypt after a ceasefire
agreement I would urge on the President the most drastic measures.

D. We did not do this without them fighting us after the ceasefire.
You say it's immaterial. The note of Brezhnev is full of mistakes
and you know it, Mr. Secretary.

K. I know only the basic situation is produced by bottling up of the
Third Army, and I think you can make demands that no additional
military equipment go into there.

D. Under what auspices?

K. UN personnel.

D. Including Soviet personnel?

K. That is one of the things that can be raised. That will be reasonable.

D. I will transmit it to the Prime Minister, of course, and get her
reaction. Maybe she would want to send a note to the President. She
has wanted to and I have been talking her out of it.

K. She can send a note to the President. It won't make the slightest
difference. I will get the.... It is the mildest possible reaction you
will get in the bureaucracy. If everybody got...

D. I think what is at stake here is so important for us I cannot come....
what I have said to you.

K. If you will call me at 8:00 in the morning.

D. If the Prime Minister asks some more questions, can I still get
you?

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/16/65</td></tr><tr><td>TO H. E. BURTON</td></tr><tr><td>FROM C.A.R. DATE 6/16/65</td></tr><tr><td>REF 100</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 26, 1973

11:15 p.m.

K. I tell you if I had looked at the military situation on Sunday I wouldn't have made a ceasefire agreement.

D. Maybe you are right.

K. Have you seen the hot line message now that we got from Moscow?

D. No, I have not gotten it. I probably will receive it in a few minutes.

K. It is about the Suez situation.

D. That was my impression.

K. One of our problems is we get totally conflicting reports from the two sides, and we have almost no means of telling it.

D. I think your people and ours could judge it better.

K. Yes, I wanted to tell you we will send an answer in a couple of hours. We will discuss the issues that are raised on a really urgent basis with the Israelis and we hope to get an answer by tomorrow afternoon our time but it is a real tough problem.

D. Do you want me to tell Moscow or will you use the red phone?

K. Red phone?

D. Hot line so to speak.

K. We will say something to that effect but we were wondering if you could transmit it. They will get an answer from us now but I cannot give you a conclusive answer until we talk to the Israelis.

D. Sometime tomorrow afternoon. O'k. Good night.

TELECON, October 26, 1973

11:25 p.m.

Scali/ Kissinger

S. Hi Henry.

K. Hi John.

S. Did you hear my defense of you?

K. What were you defending me against?

S. They quoted you out of context.

K. Who did?

S. None other than your friend Malik who said you had admitted the Israelis violated the ceasefire in your press conference. In my right of reply I

K. What did he quote?

S. He said you said the ceasefire broke down and Israel made some territorial gains. In any event I thanked him for the tantalizing reference to the news conference because I had already sent the complete text to all other missions of the Security Council and I just said I wanted to thank the Ambassador for exciting interest because I thought it was so fairminded. They will all read it and see you were more balanced than anything that has been said here. We had this meeting with him afterwards.

K. How did it go?

S. He insisted on the Poles. I retorted by offering Romania. I said it is Romania or none at all--no blocs, neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO.

K. What did he say?

S. That is discrimination. That is like going back to the cold war. On the observer side I said we would send 50 or 20 or were willing to withdraw ours completely in return for none of yours. It hit him like a sledge hammer.

K. He also is pretty dumb.

S. He said that he didn't understand this. We were trying to dictate to the Secretary General. He is furious because we won't accept Poland. We are trying to dictate to the Secretary General and that Poland is a great country.

K. Poland, with a long and distinguished history of affection for the Jewish people. They haven't had a program since the last Jew left.

S. He said he had very firm instructions on this.

K. Has anything changed in their attitude -- since the alert?

S. He has become more obnoxious.

K. More obnoxious since the alert? Are they beginning to hit us harder?

S. In the language they are using, yes. I gave a very reasoned answer and said we both had a responsibility at a time when there are charges and countercharges, none of which can be verified.

K. What is your view as to what we should do now?

S. We should stick firm on this offer we have made them.

K. I mean if the issue of withdrawal of the Israelis to the Oct. 22 line comes up.

S. I think unless we get the Isrealis to back up we are not going to have a friend in the house.

K. The British won't support us?

S. No. You see, we are in a unique position now because we got the non-aligned to go alone with us.

K. Do you expect a Security Council vote tomorrow?

S. We go into an informal session to consider the Secretary General's report. After that, there is to be a formal session. So if we are going to agree with the Russians on it they are going to have to come to us in advance, if not, we are going to have a problem. You see, the Secretary

<table><tr><td>CLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/18/94</td></tr><tr><td>REF 6/18/94</td></tr><tr><td>STATUS DATED</td></tr></table>

3

General's report does not go into the makeup, terms of reference, size of forces or estimate of what it will cost for the first six months, which is 30 million bucks. I think there is now a widespread suspicion that the Israelis are stalling so they can get Suez City. The language used tonight was just awful. The questions being directed to are "Do you mean to say the U.S. is impotent to stop Israel?" I just replied we believe very sincerely in the ceasefire but I never answer that question. I just ignored it.

K. Thanks, John.

S. You will be in tomorrow? -- to look over the draft.

K. Oh, yes.

S. Are you going to take over any part of these negotiations with the Russians?

K. No. You are in charge of that negotiation -- unless Dobrynin appeals to me, you are in charge of negotiation.

S. They will probably report back and sayI have been tough, and that we are trying to dictate to the SYG and who are we to say the Polish ..

K. Keep your relations friendly, if possible.

S. But if he keeps creaming us ..

K. Then you have to hit him

S. Since we have had these negotiations come up it made him look like a goddamn fool for ranting and raving. The non-aligned afterwards were delighted about my statesmanlike attitude on this.

K. You are having more fun than a UN Ambassador deserves.

S. Right. Good night.

A/1-1*

TELECON

Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger

October 26, 1973

W: ..but I thought I should contact you. I had a visit from Al Zayyat and he was asking me to come back to you because he is worried about what is going on in Egypt. Fighting broke out. .They have the impression that this is beginning of a new attack against the 3rd Army and that is against the Security Council resolution and then he said the 3rd Army will not surrender. They will keep fighting. He was very emotional. First essential step is return of Israeli forces to line occupied on 22 of October as demanded by the Security Council resolution. If this doesn't happen, Egypt will have to extricate 3rd Army by other means. and no question of POW exchange for any country...this is turning point. If Israelis don't stick to resolution, then no chance to settle this matter once and for all. And everybody recognizes this...and US has photographic evidence of situation as of...hours on 22 October. And no doubt..details of the line..and then he asked me to put this matter to you as an essential step ..in resolution.. and he asked me to ask you that the US should prevail upon the Israelis to take this step..so that the..that has been started can be seized in time. And this is the content of my conversation with him.

K: Thank you. I appreciate it. Well, I will get on it immediately.

W: One other thing. We have some problems. I remember what you tole me..the Russians are insisting on having an East bloc country...

K: I told Scali we could accept Romania.

W: We can proceed on this basis and also about the 70 Russians. I have refused to integrate them in the observer corp and I told the Russians I couldn't do it.

K: Exactly.

W: Scali mentioned the possibility of accepting twenty from both sides.

K: We don't rule that out.

W: I will wait until I get further notification from you.

K: That would be nice.

END