Mary Rockefeller, Women's Advocate, Dies at 86

By ENID NEMY

Mary French Rockefeller, the wife of Laurance S. Rockefeller and for more than four decades active in promoting leadership opportunities for women, died at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center on Thursday from injuries she suffered in a fall in her Manhattan apartment. She was 86, and a family spokesman said she had been in failing health for several years.

Mrs. Rockefeller was a dedicated supporter of the Young Women's Christian Association, where she took a prominent role as an advocate for women throughout the world. She began in 1951 as a member of the national board and in 1988 was elected to the Board of Trustees. From 1955 to 1973, she was vice chairman and then chairman of the Y.W.C.A.'s International division, and from 1958 to 1964, she was chairman of the organization's World Service Council. In the early 1960's, both Mr. and Mrs. Rockefeller traveled more than 50,000 miles to study Y.W.C.A. activities around the world.

In addition to her work with the Y.W.C.A., Mrs. Rockefeller was active in many educational, cultural and religious organizations. She was a trustee of Spelman College in Atlanta for nearly 25 years, a trustee of the Gordon-Conwell Theological

She was, too, a member of the Distribution Committee of the New York Community Trust and the Women's Administrative board of Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer

Seminary in South Hamilton, Mass., and the Whitney Museum of American Art and, in 1972, was chairman of the Y's National Convocation on racial Justice.

Mary French Rockefeller

A woman who spent
years speaking out
on opportunities.

Center.

Mrs. Rockefeller was the daughter of John French and Mary Billing French and granddaughter of Frederick Billings, the 19th-century president of Northern Pacific Railroad. She attended Vassar College and, in 1934, married Mr. Rockefeller, the fourth of the six children of John D. Rockefeller Jr. and Abby Aldrich Rockefeller, and a grandson of John D. Rockefeller, the founder of the Standard Oil Company.

In 1992, Mr. and Mrs. Rockefeller donated her family home and surrounding property in Woodstock, Vt., to the Federal Government for development as the state's first national park.

She is survived by her husband and four children, Laura R. Chasin of Cambridge, Mass., Marion R. Weber of San Francisco, Lucy R. Waletzky of Pleasantville, N.Y., and Laurance (Larry) Rockefeller of Manhattan. There are nine grandchildren and three great-grandchildren.

["01/13/97 MON 17:12 FAX 202 887 5222", "NIXON CENTER", "→→→ KISSINGER", "002", "Hebron Hangups", "JAN 14 1997", "AN Israeli-Palestinian deal on military redeployment from the West Bank town of Hebron may be done by the time you read this. It has been reported as \"imminent\" for three months now. But, as is usual in the Middle East, the details endlessly haggled over are surrogates for more profound issues.", "Under the Oslo accords, Israel is to redeploy its troops from Palestinian neighborhoods in Hebron while continuing to protect the (once large but now tiny) Jewish community there and the Cave of the Patriarchs, a major shrine sacred to both Jews and Muslims. Since the blowup last September over the (contrived) issue of the opening of an archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem, Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been eager to solve the Hebron impasse in order to show he can keep the peace process alive. His diplomatic weakness—the fact that he needs a Hebron deal more than PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat does—is part of the price he is still paying for losing control over events last fall.", "One issue left over for the new year was a Palestinian demand for joint patrols at the Cave of the Patriarchs. Another was a Palestinian demand for a timetable for further Israeli redeployments from other portions of the West Bank. Oslo specifies that these are to be completed by September, but it does not specify exactly when and to what extent. Netanyahu, facing open rebellion in his cabinet from colleagues who fear he has already conceded too much, has rejected both demands.", "The question of further redeployments is the most important one. Whether or not the timetable is linked to the Hebron deal (there is no reason why it should be), such redeployments will sketch out on the ground the territorial limits of the Palestinian- and Israeli-controlled portions of the West Bank and Gaza. Any future negotiation over Palestinian sovereignty, final borders, Jerusalem, etc. will *begin* where the redeployments left both sides. The Palestinians could end up with anywhere between 25 and 85 per cent of the disputed territory.", "Net

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021

TO THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE:

I, Henry A. Kissinger, recommend that, as the Committee selects nominees as candidates for election to the Board, the Council member(s) whose name(s) and description(s) are appended hereto be considered.

Date: 2/12/97, 1997

Signature:

NOTE: Since the attached form, as completed, will be xeroxed and distributed to each member of the Nominating Committee, please fill it in by typewriter. The form may be duplicated if you have more than one name to suggest.

Your suggestions should be mailed to the: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, Attention: Nominating Committee. Suggestions must be received no later than February 19, 1997.

TO THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE:

Date: 2/12/97, 1997

NOTE: Since the attached form, as completed, will be xeroed and distributed to each member of the Nominating Committee, please fill it in by typewriter. The form may be duplicated if you have more than one name to suggest.

Return by Wednesday, **February 19, 1997**

(Attach Who's Who Entry, if available)

TO: The Nominating Committee
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021

FAX: (212) 628-1664

Date of Submission: Feb. 12, 1997

Candidate's Name: Peter W. Rodman

City of Principal Business: Washington, DC

Present Occupation: Foreign policy analyst, commentator

Birthdate: Nov. 24, 1943

## Positions held during the past 10 years:

Director of National Security Programs, Nixon Center for Peace & Freedom, 1995-

Senior Editor, National Review, 1991-

Director of Middle East & Eurasian Studies, CSIS, 1994-95

Fellow, Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1990-94

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs & NSC Counselor, 1987-90

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy), 1986-87

## Additional experience (such as government service):

Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff, 1984-86

Staff Member, National Security Council, 1969-77

Director of Research, Kissinger Associates, 1977-83

Senior Policy Advisor, Republican Platform Committee, 1992

Awards, Honors and Publications: Books: *More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (Scribner, 1994);

*America Adrift: A Strategic Assessment* (Nixon Center, 1996)

## Other relevant information:

Member, Board of Trustees, Freedom House

Vice President and Member, Board of Directors, World Affairs Council of Washington, DC

RODMAN, PETER WARREN, foreign policy specialist; b. Boston, Nov. 24, 1943; s. Sumner and Helen Rhoda (Morris) R.; m. F. Veronique Boulad. Apr. 13, 1980; children: Theodora, Nicholas. BA summa cum laude, Harvard U., 1964, JD, 1969; BA, MA, Oxford (Eng.) U., 1966. Staff mem. NSC, Washington, 1969-77; fellow in diplomatic studies Ctr. for Strategic and Internat. Studies, Washington, 1977-83; dir. rsch. Kissinger Assocs., Washington, 1982-83; mem. policy planning council Dept. of State, Washington, 1983-84, dir. policy planning staff, 1984-86; dep. asst. to pres. for nat. security affairs (fgn. policy) NSC, Washington, 1986-87, counselor, spl. asst. to pres. for nat. security affairs, 1987-90; fellow Johns Hopkins Fgn. Policy Inst., Washington, 1990-93; dir. Middle East and Eurasian studies Ctr. for Strategic and Internat. Studies, Washington, 1994-95; dir. nat. security programs Nixon Ctr. for Peace and Freedom, Washington, 1995—; sr. advisor on fgn. policy Rep. Platform Com., 1992. Author: More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World, 1994; sr. editor Nat. Rev., 1991—; contrb. articles to profl. jours. V.p. World Affairs Coun., Washington, 1996—. Mem. Coun. on Fgn. Rels., Internat. Inst. for Strategic Studies, Atlantic Coun. U.S., Cosmos Club. Office: Nixon Ctr for Peace and Freedom 1620 I St NW Ste 900 Washington DC 20006

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET • NEW YORK • NEW YORK 10021
Tel 212 434 9400 Fax 212 628 1664

Carla A. Hills
Chair
Nominating Committee

January 31, 1997

Dear Council Member:

The annual Election of Directors for the Council's Board of Directors will take place in May. On behalf of the Nominating Committee, I write to ask for your suggestions of Council members who, in your judgment, should be considered by the Committee as it develops its slate of candidates to run in the election. Members of the Nominating Committee, identified below, are obliged under the By-Laws to seek diversity on the Board with regard to age, gender, race, geographical representation, and professional background.

As a result of normal term expirations in the Class of 1997, the Council must fill a total of six (6) vacancies of 5-year terms in order to complete the authorized total of thirty (30) directors (not including the President, who serves ex officio).

Of those six (6) directorships, Council By-Laws provide for election by the membership at large of three (3) directors in the class of the year 2002. In addition to charging the Nominating Committee to solicit the entire membership for the names of possible candidates, the By-Laws require the Committee to nominate twice as many candidates as there are directorships open for election in that class. For 1997 that means the Committee will present six (6) candidates for three (3) directorships.

As you know from the December 12, 1996, letters from Chairman Peter G. Peterson and from Kenneth W. Dam and myself, the By-Law Review Committee recommended adjustments in the procedures for selecting Directors, which the Board of Directors considered and approved at its January 1997 meeting. Those changes permit an incumbent Director to run for election to a second term and authorize the Nominating Committee to present an appointee to a vacancy on the Board as the Committee's recommended nominee to complete the balance of the term to which he or she was appointed. The 1997 Election of Directors will proceed on the basis of these new procedural policies.

Following the election, the Board will complete the class of 2002 by appointing three additional directors to complete the class.

If you wish to suggest the name of a Council member for the Committee's consideration, please complete and return the enclosed form. If you have more than one suggestion, please

97-480 F

April 22, 1997

CRS Report for Congress

Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress

NATO and Bosnia: A Looming Transatlantic Debate

Stanley R. Sloan

Senior Specialist in International Security Policy
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

SUMMARY

NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia is scheduled to remain in Bosnia until June 1998. But already it is apparent that NATO faces a potential decisionmaking crisis concerning what will be done to "stabilize" Bosnia after SFOR's mandate runs out. The Clinton Administration has said unequivocally that the United States will pull its ground forces out of Bosnia at the end of the SFOR mandate. British, French and German officials say that they went into the NATO Bosnia commitment with the United States and they will leave with the United States. Yet it is difficult to find U.S., allied, or NATO civilian or military officials who believe that the current objectives of the Dayton Peace Agreement can be met without an external military presence to help enforce the peace beyond June 1998. Many Members of Congress have expressed their sentiment on behalf of U.S. withdrawal and some have called on the European allies to stay on the ground in Bosnia with U.S. support from outside. But most European officials judge that European defense cooperation is not yet sufficiently robust, structurally or politically, to take on a mission as demanding as Bosnia. It therefore appears that, just as the U.S. Senate is considering ratification of NATO enlargement early in 1998, a Bosnia-based burdensharing dispute could break out across the Atlantic, perhaps further complicating the ratification debate.

THE SFOR MANDATE

According to President Clinton, the mission of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia (which succeeded the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) after IFOR's one-year mandate had expired) was to "prevent a resumption of hostilities so that economic reconstruction and political reconciliation can accelerate."¹ NATO ministers approved the SFOR plan on December 10, 1996, and the United Nations Security Council authorized the force on December 12, for an 18-month period. SFOR took over from IFOR on December 20, 1996. Congress took no action concerning the transfer from IFOR to SFOR. The transfer called for a continuing, albeit substantially-reduced, U.S. ground force presence.

¹For a detailed examination of SFOR see CRS Report 97-475, *Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) and U.S. Policy*, by Steven R. Bowman, Julie Kim, and Steven Woehrel.

CRS

CRS Reports are prepared for Members and committees of Congress

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The Clinton Administration has said that it is determined to pull U.S. forces out of Bosnia when SFOR's mandate expires in June 1998. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has issued strong reassurances to the Congress that this commitment will be honored. U.S. and allied officials caution against excessive speculation about any military presence in Bosnia after SFOR. They argue that the Bosnian parties to the conflict should be kept under pressure to build a system of internal stability that does not require such outside support.

## CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES

There never has been enthusiastic congressional support for the U.S. presence in Bosnia, and it appears that many Senators and Representatives prefer that the U.S. involvement on the ground in Bosnia be brought to an end. Some Members have even proposed forcing an early termination. On March 20, 1997, Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich, National Security Committee Chairman Floyd Spence and seven other members introduced H.R. 1172 which would prohibit funding for the deployment of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia past September 30, 1997, with the exception of funds required to carry out the withdrawal of U.S. forces by October 31, 1997.

Some Members, in spite of wanting to see U.S. forces out of Bosnia, believe that an external military presence will be required after June 1998 to maintain the peace and to support continued implementation of the Dayton Accords. Senator Carl Levin, for example, has proposed that the European allies demonstrate their desire to take on more responsibility for defense in Europe by taking charge of a post-SFOR force.

## EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

The European allies, however, are for the most part not inclined to take responsibility for post-SFOR. The position of all the major allies involved in SFOR is that they came in with the United States and they will leave with the United States. The reasons why the Europeans do not wish to take up the challenge of running a post-SFOR operation are numerous.

* Most European governments are reluctant to remain in Bosnia without the United States. Given the uncertain future for Bosnia under even the best of circumstances, they fear they might be left holding the bag of failure to implement Dayton and perhaps even face U.S. criticism from the sidelines for the outcome.

* The European experience in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which preceded IFOR, leads them to believe that only a NATO force *with* U.S. combat troops on the ground has the requisite political and military credibility to keep the Bosnian parties pacified.

* The goal of ensuring implementation of the political objectives of the Dayton Peace Agreement, namely creation of a unified multi-ethnic state, is *not* enthusiastically shared by European governments; European officials are increasingly skeptical that this goal can be accomplished without continued

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external pressure, given the attitudes of the parties to the Bosnian conflict. They see the Bosnian factions as waiting until the end of SFOR so that they can resume pursuit of their individual agendas rather than seeking to make the Dayton Accords work.

* The European allies anticipate that reform of the NATO system to be announced at the NATO summit in Madrid will create the future possibility for European-led combined joint task forces (CJTFs) under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU).² But it is the judgment of most NATO and WEU officials consulted for this report that, even if the political will existed to do so, the WEU is not yet capable of assuming the responsibilities that would be required by a follow-on to SFOR.

## BOSNIA, NATO'S IMAGE AND THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

As it stands, if the United States and the allies follow through on their current commitments, SFOR will be withdrawn in June 1998, and not replaced by any Western military force. Some officials and experts believe that the military situation in Bosnia plus the civilian implementation program will allow continued implementation of the Dayton Accords after SFOR is withdrawn. They believe that the process of arming the Croatian-Muslim Federation will have created a military balance that can be self-sustaining. But, if most experts, including high-ranking NATO military officials, are correct, de-facto partition of Bosnia will follow. Opinions vary concerning whether or not partition would be accomplished peacefully or following another period of bloody fighting, but most experts see further conflict as at least a strong possibility.

## Perceptions of NATO's Effectiveness

Until now, both IFOR and SFOR have been viewed as technical successes for NATO. The NATO forces have performed their assigned mission with a minimum of casualties. They have successfully integrated military forces from non-NATO nations into the NATO operation. And, in both IFOR and SFOR, Russian forces have worked with U.S. forces under NATO command in what is seen as a critical opportunity to advance understanding and cooperation with Moscow. The two operations have served as models for how future Combined Joint Task Forces could operate in the framework of a much-changed NATO.

If SFOR is withdrawn and implementation of the Dayton Accords continues without serious interruption, the successes of IFOR and SFOR will be confirmed. However, if SFOR is withdrawn and Bosnia is partitioned by the former warring parties or new fighting breaks out, the technical successes of the NATO operations will be seriously diminished by the political failure of the operation.

²CRS Report 97-443, *NATO: July 1997 Madrid Summit Agenda*, by Stanley R. Sloan.

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Post-SFOR and the NATO Enlargement Debate

At the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, it is widely anticipated that some Central European states will be invited to begin negotiations leading toward NATO membership. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has suggested that these negotiations should conclude by December 1997, and that the resulting protocol(s) to the Treaty of Washington, NATO's founding document, should be sent to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent early in 1998. When the allies agreed to deploy SFOR, they said that the mission and its progress would be reviewed every six months. In the scheduled December 1997 review of SFOR, it seems likely that NATO military authorities and Bosnia experts will conclude that the end of SFOR could well risk the partition and conflict scenarios discussed above. Under these circumstances, a transatlantic debate about the consequences of leaving Bosnia could be at its peak just as the Senate is considering the question of NATO enlargement.

One of the likely issues in the Senate debate on NATO enlargement is the question of appropriate U.S.-European burdensharing in future security operations. Bosnia has been and remains the most important and demanding security challenge taken on by NATO in the post-Cold War world. The Senate and transatlantic discussion of burdensharing could become quite fractious if assumptions of failure in Bosnia become linked directly to the unwillingness of the Europeans to provide a military presence in Bosnia after SFOR is terminated. The European allies would likely respond to any criticism that they indeed had tried to help the United States implement the Dayton Accord, and that it is not their fault alone that the goals of the accord were not accomplished.

POLICY OPTIONS

Because most experts apparently doubt that the Dayton Accord implementation process can proceed successfully if SFOR withdraws and is not followed by any similar effort, the Clinton Administration and the allies will be under some pressure during the second half of 1997 to produce agreed options on post-SFOR Bosnia that go beyond current policy. None of the theoretical alternatives currently would enjoy the support of all the allies. And most observers would agree that there are no options, including current policy, guaranteed to win support in NATO *and* among Members of Congress.

One alternative would be simply to withdraw and let the chips fall where they may. This would relieve the United States and other allies of the current burdens of sustaining SFOR or a successor. There are some who believe that this approach can work. But for many, this option would put at risk further implementation of Dayton and could create serious moral dilemmas in Western countries if the policy is seen as simply "let them fight it out," with a repeat of the atrocities and civilian casualties that the war has already visited on Bosnia. It is possible that renewed conflict could spill over into Macedonia and Kosovo and that Iranians would return to support the Bosnian Muslims once they had been "abandoned" by their American supporters. The "success" of the NATO operations would be quickly forgotten and the money spent would be seen as having been poured down a black hole.

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Perhaps the option at the other end of the spectrum of choices would be to extend the SFOR mandate. This would likely keep the lid on conflict in Bosnia and ensure added time for implementation of Dayton to proceed. Most European governments would be willing to remain in Bosnia, provided that the United States remained involved with combat forces on the ground. On the other hand, it could create a major political issue between the Clinton Administration and its critics in Congress. The Administration would be accused of having broken its promise to pull U.S. forces out of Bosnia by June 1998, enlarging the "credibility gap" between the Administration and Congress.

Another theoretical option is one that was first floated in 1996 as a possible follow-on to IFOR. It was referred to as the "NATO-minus" option.³ This option would retain a NATO force in Bosnia "minus" U.S. ground forces. The "NATO-minus," found attractive by some allied officials in 1996, would require extensive U.S. involvement, including sea and air forces, intelligence, logistics support, and U.S. intervention forces prepared to return to Bosnia on short notice if required. This approach could give the Dayton process a continuing chance of success. But it would require more U.S. involvement than some Members of Congress would like. It could also call for more European responsibility for implementing Dayton than they desire.

A fourth theoretical option would be to admit that partition is inevitable and to direct allied civilian, military and arms control efforts toward ensuring as bloodless a process of partition as possible. This approach could be seen as simply acknowledging reality and making the best of it.⁴ Some would argue that such a major shift in political goals would at least have a better chance of preserving the peace, even if it did not lead to a unified Bosnian state. On the other hand, it could be seen as a complete failure for the Dayton goals and an unstable political and economic foundation for Bosnia's future. In addition, this option could be the most disadvantageous for the Muslims who probably would believe they could get a better outcome from a resumption of fighting than by accepting current partition boundaries.

In conclusion, while none of these options appears very attractive, current trends could lead to unintended consequences for transatlantic relations and the debate in the U.S. Senate on NATO enlargement. Perhaps the worst development for the United States and NATO governments would be one in which the Bosnia outcome fails to maintain peace in the region, undermines the demonstration of NATO's utility in the post-Cold War world, and questions the ability of the United States and its NATO allies to share security burdens effectively in the new international context. At the moment, there appears at least a chance that current policy directions in the United States and Europe could produce some if not all of these consequences.

This suggests that the allies would benefit from a thorough discussion before December 1997 of the goals that they seek in their Bosnia policy and the alternative

³See CRS Report 96-344, *Bosnia After IFOR*, by Stanley R. Sloan.

⁴O'Hanlon, Michael, "Bosnia: Better Left Partitioned," The Washington Post, April 10, 1997, p. 25.

11/25/97

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A FORUM FOR
AMERICAN INTERESTS

NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

Nixon Center articles or quotes appearing in newspapers and magazines.

Source: The Weekly Standard

Date: December 1, 1997

Page(s): 17-18

NOV 2 5 1997

# U.N. PARALYSIS

by Peter W. Rodman

JOHN KENNEDY WAS HAILED FOR HIS TRIUMPH in the Cuban missile crisis. Only later was it understood that he had secretly promised the Soviets the *quid pro quo* they had asked for—removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey—and acquiesced in the restoration of the Soviet-Cuban military alliance. And Fidel, of course, is still with us, 35 years later. President Clinton has emulated President Kennedy in many areas—his response to an aggressor may prove another.

Whatever the claims about Saddam Hussein's "unconditional" capitulation, the outlines of our compromise with him are now apparent. Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov gave Saddam a variety of reassurances; the United States had already telegraphed its agreement to most of them.

Saddam had denounced U.S. "domination" of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). The United States has let it be known that it will not oppose Security Council reexamination of the composition and scope of UNSCOM. The Iraqis say the Russians also promised to seek an end to U-2 flights and inspection of presidential palaces. Presumably all this will be on the Security Council agenda.

Saddam wanted assurances on the easing of economic sanctions, even before his full compliance with the ban on weapons of mass destruction. The United States indicated that it was open to expanding the scope of the oil-for-food arrangements. The whole sanctions issue will now be reopened in the Security Council, with the Russians and the French insisting on some sort of timetable for relaxation.

This is not the end of it. Did our Arab friends claim that they have been inhibited in supporting us because of Israeli recalcitrance in the peace process? The U.S. response—instead of rejecting this linkage—was a startling anti-Israel speech by Madeleine Albright at the economic forum in Qatar. Saddam will get credit for this in the Arab world, boosting his prestige as a champion of the Palestinians.

These are Saddam's diplomatic gains. More ominous are the advances his weapons technicians have made in secret during the three-week hiatus of UNSCOM—advances that the inspectors will never be able to undo. Then there is the dramatically advertised further erosion of the international coalition that once resisted Saddam. The dictator comes out far ahead of where he began. Instead of being penalized for his stunt, he has been paid off.

Needless to say, the Russians gain too in the Middle East—demonstrating their ability to shield rogue

states from American pressure, proving they can deliver diplomatic results at American expense. A destabilizing precedent.

Why this outcome? It was a confused and self-defeating American policy that let three weeks go by before any significant augmentation of naval and air forces in the Gulf. Despite tough talk about "keeping military options open," the administration's preoccupation was pursuit of a diplomatic solution—first in the U.N. Security Council, then via the Russian mediation. It was a tortuous process, while with every passing day Saddam's technicians were accelerating their work on designing biological and chemical warheads for upgraded SCUD missiles, freed from the pesky constraints of U.N. inspection.

Time was not on our side; it was in the American interest to bring matters quickly to a head. Saddam's rejection of the U.N. mandate was clear at the outset; there was no question to which we did not already have the answer. Diplomacy was a substitute for action, advocated by those most eager to block the kind of military response that had the best chance of compelling a truly unconditional Iraqi climb-down.

This is an administration that worships the United Nations and "multilateralism." Thus, it should have been no surprise that preserving the Security Council consensus became the be-all and end-all. Given Russian and French objections to military action, the administration was stymied—uncomfortable in the first place with the use of force and even more allergic to acting without Security Council endorsement. (Even in Haiti in 1994, the administration insisted on a Security Council blessing.) For three weeks, the buzzword in Washington was "ratcheting up sanctions." Thus, the absurd utterance by State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin on November 10: "With each passing day that he refuses to let these inspections do the job, he's only hurting himself"—referring to the imminence of... a U.N. ban on travel by Iraqi officials! Poor Tariq Aziz: barred from doing his Christmas shopping in London this year. But Saddam's weapons technicians were still at work.

Coalition-building in the U.N. Security Council can be a means to an end. George Bush used Security Council resolutions skillfully—they helped broaden the coalition and win votes in the (then-Democratic-controlled) U.S. Congress. But Bush never imagined that we needed U.N. permission to act. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter acknowledges the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. We could have—and I believe Bush would have—gone to war without Security Council "authorization."

Bush also understood the paradox of American unilateralism. An image of absolute determination to act unilaterally has a galvanizing effect on other

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nations. Those (say, on the Security Council) who don't like American military action are given an interest in going along: If they see us as implacably charging ahead, they are better off throwing some U.N. cover over us as a claim on our duty to consult in the future. If we break free of the Security Council, they lose all influence over us.

American decisiveness has a similar effect in the Arab world. The media made much of Secretary Albright's "failure" to secure Arab support for military action on her recent trip. None of us, of course, knows the content of her conversations. But it is a certainty that our Arab friends are terrified of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction and desperately want us to protect them. Their public dissociation meant not that they disagreed with us, but that they lacked confidence in us. If they saw Saddam as the likely winner, their appeasement reflex was bound to operate.

The Clinton administration had its priorities backwards from the outset. It clung to a mystical faith in economic sanctions and diplomatic procedures, delaying for two weeks the dispatch of a second aircraft carrier and additional land-based aircraft. It permitted a

series of redundant diplomatic overtures to a rigid Saddam. Then we invited in the Russians. A cardinal principle of Minister Primakov's foreign policy is to reduce American "hegemony" in the world; and Russia (an energy exporter) could not care less whether the West's energy lifeline falls into Saddam's grip. This is the same Primakov whose attempted intervention in 1991 was deflected by George Bush as the unfriendly obstructionism it was.

This time, however, the negotiating bazaar was open. Our unconditional deference to the Security Council reduced our leverage, leaving a brokered compromise the inevitable outcome.

In the new context—the disastrous hiatus of UNSCOM, the accelerating erosion of the economic-sanctions regime—we are weaker. The administration will plead that it lacked international backing. History is, of course, an understanding judge—but such an excuse would surpass historians' understanding.

Peter W. Rodman is director of national-security programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and a senior editor of National Review.

JUL-29-1997 11:37

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0042

P.02/04

ART SERVICES INTERNATIONAL
a non-profit traveling exhibitions organization

Directors
LYNN K. ROGERSON
JOSEPH W. SAUNDERS

July 24, 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was delighted to learn from Prof. Dr. Jan Ostrowski, Director of the Wawel Castle in Krakow, that you recently visited and expressed interest in the extremely important exhibition entitled "Land of the Winged Horsemen: ART IN POLAND, 1572-1764." which we are organizing for a major US tour. At the suggestion of Dr. Ostrowski, I am sending you, via post, more information on the exhibition.

Because of the enthusiasm I understand that you now have for this project, I hope that I may take the liberty of seeking your assistance in two crucial ways that will significantly impact the success of this major project:

1. Would you accept our invitation to serve on the Honorary Committee for the exhibition? The Committee is composed of Dr. Bzigniew Brzezinski, Nicholas A. Rey, US Ambassador to Poland; and Jerzy Kozminski, Ambassador of Poland. While an Honorary Committee, and one that does not require any active participation on your part, your key presence on the Committee would be invaluable in confirming the significance of the project. The Honorary Committee will be recognized in the scholarly all-color catlaogue which will accompany this exhibition, and will of course be invited to all openings along the tour. Your presence at these openings would, we fully understand, be contingent upon your schedule -- but, you would be a most honored guest if you could attend

2. We are awaiting venue confirmation from two of the museums on the tour:

- Jim Wood, Director of the Art Institute of Chicago

- Arnold Lehman, Director of the Brooklyn Museum

I cannot express how significant it would be at this crucial point for these two gentlemen to receive your indication of support for this project. As you have just returned from seeing first-hand many of the works of art which will be included in the exhibition, your endorsement would be most effective. In the hope that you will be able to call or fax these two directors, I have attached their contact information.

"Land of the Winged Horsemen: ART IN POLAND, 1572-1764" will be a phenomenal visual presentation, embodying theatre and spectacle in the celebration of Poland's "golden age." The exhibition, drawn from over 35 public collections throughout Poland, will provide an in-depth examination of the cultural and historical influences on the art of Poland -- influences from both the West and the East extending over two centuries. As a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization, we seek your collaboration in this groundbreaking project. We feel that the timing of this project provides a particularly advantageous coincidence -- coming as it does just at the decisive consideration of Poland's membership in NATO. The world will be looking at the politics and economy of Poland, and this exhibition will provide an ideal overview of the wealth of the cultural contribution that it has provided to the world.

700 North Fairfax Street, Suite 220

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dr. Sieghardt Rometsch
Managing Partner
Trinkaus & Burkhardt

Königsallee 21/23
40212 Düsseldorf
Telephone (02 11) 9 10 28 02

13. Oktober 1997

Herrn
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K.-Street North-West

USA - Washington DC 20006

OCT 22 1997

am 24. und 25. April 1997 haben wir ein ausführliches Gespräch über die Europäische Währungsunion geführt. Sie waren Ehrengast bei der Jahreshauptversammlung der Amerikanischen Handelskammer in Düsseldorf. Ich selbst hatte die Tagung organisiert.

Inzwischen ist das von mir angekündigte Buch von Arnulf Baring mit dem Titel: „Scheitert Deutschland?“ erschienen. Seit zwei Wochen steht es auf der Spiegel-Bestsellerliste. Ich erlaube mir, es Ihnen zuzusenden. Vielleicht findet es Ihr Interesse.

Der Seite 329 können Sie entnehmen, daß ich entscheidend mitgewirkt habe. Mit den in dem Buch bezogenen Grundpositionen identifiziere ich mich ganz.

Ich habe die mir angebotene Gelegenheit, den guten Namen Barings für eine aus meiner Sicht wichtige Sache zu „nutzen“, gern wahrgenommen.

Meine Skepsis dem Euro gegenüber nimmt täglich zu. Das Risiko, daß er zu einem Verhängnis für Europa wird, ist groß.

Es ist natürlich keine wissenschaftliche Abhandlung. Wen würde das wohl interessieren? Wieviele würden es lesen?

Mit den besten Grüßen und Wünschen bin ich

»Die Deutschen weichen Realitäten gern aus, reden lieber vom Wünschbaren, träumen. Wenn wir jetzt aufwachen, nüchtern Bilanz ziehen und beherzt anpacken, werden wir gemeinschaftlich, jeder an seinem Platz, die vor uns liegenden Aufgaben meistern. Davon kann eine mächtige Bewegung ausgehen.«

Arnulf Baring

WELTVERTRÄGLICH
ILOS' DARI' PRÜfen

UMWELTVERTRÄGLICH
POSTDAH' PRÜfen

ISBN 3-421-05095-3

9 783421 050953

HENRY A. KISSINGER

July 22, 1997

Dear Mrs. Rosenbaum:

It was so nice to hear from you again and to learn of your
courageous efforts in building a Holocaust memorial in Portland.
Though I wish I could join you at the dinner in September to help
you achieve your goal, my busy schedule will unfortunately prevent
me from doing so. Please accept my sincere apologies.

My visits to Portland are few and far between but I look forward to
another opportunity when our paths may cross again. All my best
to you.

Warm wishes,

Henry A. Kissinger

Mrs. Jane Schlesinger Rosenbaum
Oregon Holocaust Memorial Coalition
c/o American Jewish Committee
1220 SW Morrison Street, Suite 930
Portland, Oregon 97205

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300
TELEFAX (212) 753-7248

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

March 4, 1997

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 1021
Washington, DC 20036

MAR 07 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This week, I will be leaving the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and returning to the
Clinton administration as Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for NATO Enlargement
Ratification. As I make this transition, I wanted to inform you of my plans.

My new assignment will be to help President Clinton and Secretary Albright build public and
congressional support for ratifying the addition of new members to NATO. The task is both challenging
and exciting. As the President and Secretary have stressed, NATO's enlargement is a central part of
American efforts to erase the outdated lines of the Cold War, and to help build an undivided, peaceful,
and democratic Europe. Adding new states to the Alliance requires the active, informed, and bipartisan
support of the American people and Congress, and I look forward to helping make the case for this
initiative as it is considered both here in Washington and across our nation.

To do so, I will head up a newly created NATO Enlargement Ratification Office. It will be located at the
State Department, and will coordinate efforts related to ratification at State, the Department of Defense,
and the National Security Council.

I move to this new challenge after a very satisfying residence of more than two years at the Carnegie
Endowment. I leave with admiration for Carnegie's president, Morton Abramowitz, who has created an
extraordinary environment in which foreign policy specialists have the freedom to think, write, and
contribute to the international dialogue on their issues. I have greatly enjoyed the opportunity to work on
books, articles, and conferences, as well as the intellectual stimulation provided by my Carnegie
colleagues.

Now, as I move to my new position, you can reach me at 202-647-4539. My new address is: NATO
Enlargement Ratification Office, Room 7524, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20520. I look forward to talking with you again soon.

2400 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153 / Phone: (202) 862-7900 / Fax: (202) 862-2610

Heritage Lottery Fund

NOV 12 1997

3 November 1997

I have great pleasure in enclosing a copy of National Heritage Memorial Fund and
Heritage Lottery Fund's joint Annual Report for 1996/97.

The report represents an extremely active and successful year for the Heritage
Lottery Fund during which grants totalling £450m were awarded to 607 projects. It
brings the total that we have awarded to more than £748m for 1,270 projects
throughout the UK.

Two of the highlights of the year were the announcements of our Major Museums
Programme and Urban Parks Programme. We were overwhelmed by the response
and huge vote of confidence that these grants received. In many cases the capital
works are now well underway.

The larger projects supported in the past year included a £25m grant to help restore
the Kennet and Avon Canal; a substantial overhaul of three of Manchester's
museums which will put them at the forefront of the city's cultural life; and the
repair and restoration of the south block of Somerset House, that hidden palace
which overlooks the Thames, to provide public access to and a home for the
magnificent collection of gold and silver that Arthur Gilbert has given to the nation.

Most of our grants, however, have been for less than £100,000, such as £17,000 for
urgent repairs to an 18th century corn mill in Gwynedd, and £12,500 to purchase ten
hectares of ancient woodland at Littledean in Gloucestershire. These examples
typify our activities which cover a vast range of heritage themes. These themes
include nature reserves, threatened habitats, meadows, parks and rivers; town
centres, museums, galleries and their collections; historic buildings, cathedrals,
churches and chapels; manuscripts and archives; and railways, canals and
lighthouses.

The coming year will provide even greater opportunities in the form of the National
Heritage Act 1997 and the National Lottery White Paper. The new Act will
broaden substantially the range of projects that the Heritage Lottery Fund is able to
support and remove restrictions which have prohibited some applicants in the past.

We look forward, therefore, to even greater challenges in 1997/98, working closely
with the other heritage and environmental agencies and our advisers to secure even
greater successes.

7 Holbein Place London SW1W 8NR Telephone 0171 591 6000 Fax 0171 591 6001

Administered by the Trustees of the National Heritage Memorial Fund

THE COUNCIL ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
AT THE
NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE

**John W. Rowe, M.D.**
*Chairman*

**Jeremiah A. Barondess, M.D.**
*Co-Chairman*

**Robert M. Schiffer**
*Executive Director*

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Karl P. Adler, M.D.
Robert J. Beckman
Stanley Brezenoff
Norman H. Edelman, M.D.
Saul J. Farber, M.D.
Margaret Hamburg, M.D.
Jeremy Levin, M.D.
Russell Miller, M.D.
Maria Mitchell, R.N.
Thomas Q. Morris, M.D.
Mitchell Moss, Ph.D.
Herbert Pardes, M.D.
Dominick R. Purpura, M.D.
W. Ann Reynolds, Ph.D.
Fredrick J. Spar
Frederick W. Telling, Ph.D.

July 31, 1997

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

AUG 0 6 1997

Dear Honorable Kissinger:

Enclosed is a reprint from this month's issue of the *Bulletin of The New York Academy of Medicine* entitled "Losing Ground: NIH Funding to New York Researchers" by Lawrence S. Sturman, M.D., Ph.D. and colleagues at the New York State Health Department researchers, including Commissioner, Dr. Barbara A. DeBuono. The article summarizes NIH funding trends from 1981, when New York received 15.1% of the NIH budget, to 1995, when our share had fallen to 11.1%. While other states increased their numbers of NIH supported investigators (California increased by 800; Massachusetts by 600; and Illinois by 140), we lost 12. Had New York maintained its prior position, we would have secured some $1.7 billion more during this period and would today be employing thousands more in our academic medical centers. In addition, please find our commentary "Reinvigorating New York's Academic Biomedical Research Enterprise," discussing the implications of Dr. Sturman's report and suggesting a course of action. In response to the article and commentary, Commissioner DeBuono has asked The Council on Biomedical Research and Development at The New York Academy of Medicine to outline the elements of a response by the State.

We must act now to reverse this trend. We are asking you to join us in forging a public/private partnership to raise funds required to turn this slide around. It is likely that more than one hundred million dollars will be

1216 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10029-5293 Tel: (212) 822-7288 Fax: (212) 348-2238