-14-

Possony, Stefan T., *Strategic Air Power*, Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1949.

Slessor, *Strategy for the West*.

12. Problems of Limited War.

a. Various concepts of limited war.

b. Nuclear weapons and limited war.

c. Missiles and limited war.

d. The problems of conventional war.

e. The problem of maintaining the limited character of the war.

f. Diplomatic prelude and contact during the war.
The role of the United Nations.

Readings: **REQUIRED**

Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Chapter 5 and 6.

Mao, Tse-tung, Thought on war from selected works.

Osgood, *Limited War*.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, *On Limiting Atomic War*.

SUGGESTED

Department of the Army, *Bibliography on Limited War*, Department of the Army Pamphlet, PAM 20-60, Washington, February 1958.

Halle, *Choice for Survival*.

13. The Armed Services - the ARMY: Function, Strategic Doctrine, Organization.

a. The basic assumptions, regarding future military requirements of the United States, which underlie the Army's position on its role and organization and which are implicit in Army strategic doctrine.

b. The requirements of ground force manpower for the deterrence of or success in future warfare.

c. The relation between Army strategic doctrine, organization and planned force composition and levels to the over-all strategic situation.

d. An examination of the basic Army doctrine.

e. A consideration of future requirements for the Army.

Readings: **REQUIRED**

Association of U.S. Army, *The Security of the Nation*, Washington, 1957.

Department of the Army, *The Role of the Army*, official pamphlet, Washington, Department of the Army, 1955.

British Army League, *The Army in the Nuclear Age*, Report of Subcommittee, London, 1955.

Senate, Armed Forces Preparedness (Johnson) Investigating Subcommittee, Hearings, "Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Program," especially pp. 461 and ff. (Testimony of Generals Taylor, Gavin, Medaris, Secretary Brucker and others). Part I, Washington, 1958.

-16-

Smith, James H., "Mobile Sea Base Systems in Nuclear Warfare,"

<u>U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings</u>, February 1955.

U.S. Naval Institute, <u>Proceedings</u>, see various issues(issued monthly).

15. The Armed Services - AIR FORCE: Function, Strategic Doctrine, Organization.

a. The principal utility of airpower as an instrument of national policy.

b. Evolution of, and the assumptions underlying Air Force basic doctrine.

c. An examination of a basic Air Force doctrine.

d. The relation between Air Force strategic doctrine organization and planned force composition and levels to the over-all strategic situation.

e. Prospects for Air Force strategy.

Readings: <u>REQUIRED</u>

Brodie, Bernard, "Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine,"

<u>World Politics</u>, April 1953.

Senate, Armed Services (Johnson) Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, <u>Hearings</u>, "Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs," Testimony of Secretary Douglas, Generals White and LeMay and others, Part I, pp. 839 ff, Washington, 1958.

Senate, Armed Services (Symington) Subcommittee on the Air Force, <u>Hearings</u>, "Study of Airpower," especially Testimony of Secretary Quarles and General Twining, Parts XX, XXI, XXIII, Washington, 1956.

U.S. Air Force, <u>Air Force Basic Doctrine</u>, AFM 1-2, April 1, 1955 (or revised edition).

<u>SUGGESTED</u>

Air Force Association, <u>Air Force</u>, the Magazine of Air Power, issued monthly, (see various issues).

Air University, <u>Readings on the Functions of Military Air Power</u>, Documentary Research Division, Research Studies Institute, 1957.

Giffin, Brig. Gen.S.F., "A New Future for World War II?", <u>World Politics</u>, January 1957,

Lee, Asher, <u>Air Power</u>.

Ransom, Harry Howe, "The Politics of Air Power: A Comparative Analysis," <u>Public Policy</u>, 1957, Harvard, Graduate School of Public Administration, 1958.

Slessor, Sir John, <u>The Great Deterrent</u>, New York, Praeger, 1957. (A collection of articles, essays and lectures).

Smith, Dale O., U.S. Military Doctrine, New York and Boston, Duell, Sloan and Little, Brown, 1955.

U.S. Air Force, Air University, <u>Air University Quarterly Review</u>, (see various issues).

Warner, Edward, "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky, Theories of Air Warfare," in Earle, Edward Meade, <u>Makers of Modern Strategy</u>.

-17-

16. Civil Defense and National Security.

a. The connection between civil defense and national strategy.

b. The degree of civil defense that is a feasible national goal.
What should be the goal: protection of the population, stockpiling?

c. The basic elements of and required organization for an
effective civil defense program.

Readings: **REQUIRED**

Hanson, Haldors, "If the Enemy Did Attack," *New Republic*, February 27, 1956, pp. 14-15.

Hoag, Malcolm, "Is 'Dual' Preparedness More Expensive?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1957, pp. 48 ff.

Johnson, Ellis A., "Our Defense is Very Poor -- If an Attack Were to Come Immediately," *U.S. News and World Report* (An Interview), January 31, 1958, pp. 50 ff.

Knorr, Klaus, "Passive Defense for Atomic War," Princeton Center of International Studies, Memo No. 6, Princeton, New Jersey, 1954.

SUGGESTED

Associated Universities, *Project East River, Report*, New York, 1952.

Brown, Harrison, "How Vulnerable Are We?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1957.

*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* issued 10 times a year
(see various issues).

Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "The Nature of Radioactive
Fallout and Its Effects on Man," Summary - Analysis of Hearings,
85th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1957. (Committee Print).

Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission, *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, Washington, June, 1957.

House, Government Operations (Holifield) Subcommittee, *Hearings*, "Civil Defense for National Survival," 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 7 Parts and 24th Intermediate *Report*, Washington, 1956.

Moses, Robert, "The Civil Defense Fiasco," *Harper's Magazine*, November 1957.

Sarnoff, David, *Civil Defense Planning*: a memorandum, New York, 1955. (20 p.)

Senate, Armed Services (Kefauver) Subcommittee on Civil Defense, *Hearings*, "Civil Defense Program," 84th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1955.

Teller, Edward, "If an H-Bomb Hits --" *U.S. News and World Report*, March 2, 1956, pp. 42-43.

17. The Economics of National Defense: the Availability and Allocation of National Resources for Military Security.

a. "How much can the nation afford to spend for national defense?" The various ways in which such a question can be answered.

b. The economic realities of defense spending. The methods by which the impact of defense expenditures can be measured and predicted.

c. The basic assumptions underlying restrictive ceilings in recent years on defense expenditures.

d. An identification of the line which separates the "economics" and the "politics" of ceilings upon defense expenditures.

[Y]

-18-

Readings: **REQUIRED**

National Planning Association, "Can We Afford Additional Programs for National Security?" Planning Pamphlet No. 84, October 1953.

Tobin, James and John Davenport, "The Eisenhower Economy and National Security," (2-part article, pro and con recent budgetary ceilings), *Yale Review*, Spring 1958, pp. 321-346.

SUGGESTED

Knorr, Klaus, *The War Potential of Nations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956.

Lincoln, Col. George A. (and others), *The Economics of National Defense*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1954.

Scitovsky, T., Shaw, L. Tarshis, *Mobilizing Resources for War: The Economic Alternatives*, McGraw-Hill, 1951.

See also annual *Economic Report of the President* (various years); *Hearings* and *Reports* and special studies of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report; also special reports and studies of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Special Studies, National Planning Association, Committee for Economic Development, and U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

18. Research and Development - Weapons Planning.

a. The lead-time problem in strategic planning.

b. The impact of technology upon strategic planning, defense organizational requirements, and military force requirements.

c. The principal facilities and tools for decision makers in calculating future requirements.

d. Dangers inherent in the technological race: technological imbalances inviting attack.

e. Some of the problems and organizational responses of industry in planning future weapons systems.

Readings: **REQUIRED**

Livingston, J. Sterling, "Decision Making in Weapons Development,"
*Harvard Business Review* (v. 36), January-February 1958, pp. 127-136.
(See also his statement and testimony in *Hearings*, "Inquiry Into
Satellite and Missile Programs," Senate Preparedness Subcommittee
on Armed Forces, 85th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Part I,
December 16, 1957, pp. 791-835.

Senate, Armed Services (Johnson) Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, *Hearings*, "Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs," Part I, Washington, 1958.

SUGGESTED

Leach, W. Barton (et. al.), "Fact-Finding and Analytical Facilities Available to Policy Makers in the Defense Establishment,"
Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 106 (February 1957).

Ransom, Harry H., "U.S. Military Research and Development - Organization and Mission," Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 105.

von Neumann, John, "Can We Survive Technology?" Reprint from Fortune, Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 121.

-19-

19. Logistic Requirements, Procurement and Industrial Potential in the Nuclear Age.

a. The Relation between the industrial base and required force levels.

b. The Degree of industrial "force-in-being" required in light of modern technology and resultant weapons system.

c. The Extent to which modern logistics doctrine and organization produce the required capability for logistics as the bridge between economic resources and combat capability.

Readings:

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government (Hoover Commission), *Military Procurement*, Task Force Report, 1955.

Hoover Commission, "Defense Procurement," Staff Study, by Lindsay et. al., 1955.

Knorr, Klaus, "Is Our Defense Effort Enough?" Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1957.

Knorr, Klaus, *The War Potential of Nations*.

Lincoln, Col. George A., *The Economics of National Security*.

20. Collective Security: Structure of Military Alliances in the Nuclear Age.

a. The basic political and strategic concept underlying America's present system of alliances with some 43 foreign nations.

b. Problems of the existing alliance structure: political and military.

c. Allied contribution to the over-all strategic equation.

d. Allied contribution to the problem of limited war.

e. Coalition diplomacy.

Readings: REQUIRED

American Assembly, *The Representation of the United States Abroad*, New York, June 1956.

Balch, F.G. and B.K. Gordon, "Alliances and Weapons - An Organizational Analysis," Harvard DPS Serial no. 128.

Fox, W.T.R. and Annette B. Fox, "Britain and America in the Era of Total Diplomacy," Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1952.

Haas, Ernest, "Types of Collective Security -- Organizational Concepts," *American Political Science Review*, March 1955.

Johnson, Howard, "Collective Security: Validity of an Ideal," *International Organization*, Vol. 8, no. 1.

Patterson, Gardner and Edgar Furniss, Jr., *NATO: A Critical Summary*, Report on a Conference, Princeton, 1957.

Thompson, Kenneth, "Collective Security Re-examined," *American Political Science Review*, September 1953.

-20-

SUGGESTED

American Assembly, (Lincoln Gordon, editor), International Stability and Progress, New York, 1957.

Matloff and Snell (U.S. Army in World War II) Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare.

Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, New York, Knopf, 1954.

Spaak, Paul H., "The West in Disarray," Foreign Affairs, January 1957.

U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, (issued weekly)--see various issues for official statements on United States collective security policy and aims.

Vagts, Alfred, Defense and Diplomacy, New York, King's Crown, 1956.

Wolfers, Arnold, "Collective Security and the War in Korea," Yale Review, Summer 1954.

21. Mutual Military Assistance: Problems of Implementing a Collective Security Strategy — A comparative Look at NATO and SEATO.

a. Analysis of the strategic concept of NATO.

b. Comparison of NATO strategy and that of other alliances.

c. Rationale for a military assistance program.

1. Political

2. Economic

3. Military

Readings: REQUIRED.

American Assembly, The Representation of the United States Abroad, New York, 1956.

Ball, W. MacMahon, "A Political Re-examination of SEATO," International Organization, Winter 1958.

Furniss, Edgar, "Some Perspectives on American Military Assistance," Princeton, Princeton Center of International Studies, 1957.

Senate, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Various research projects and studies especially No. 10, "Military Assistance: (a) The Policy (b) The Program (c) Military Review and Evaluation, 85th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Documents, Washington, March 1957.

SUGGESTED

Brookings Institution, The Administration of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Operations, Report for the Bureau of the Budget, Washington, June 1951.

Brown, William A., Jr., and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance, Washington, Brookings, 1953.

House, Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings and Draft Report, "Foreign Policy and Mutual Security," October-November 1956, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, 1956.

Keesing, Donald, (Ed.), "Economic Warfare and National Strategy," Harvard DPS Serial No. 111.

-21-

Ransom, Harry H. (compiler), "Foreign Military Assistance and National
Policy: Some Background Materials," Harvard Defense Policy Seminar
Serial No. 114 (April 1957), with Bibliography.

22. The United Nations and United States Security.

a. Problems of a system of world wide collective security.

b. The political role of the United Nations.

c. The military role of the United Nations.

d. Problems of unilateral action.

Readings:

Barclay, C.N., "United Nations Forces," Brassey's Annual, 1957.

Clark, Grenville and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958.

Frye, William R., *A United Nations Peace Force*, New York, Oceana Publications, 1957. (In brief in Public Affairs Pamphlet, No. 257, October 1957).

Goodrich, L. M., "The United Nations Emergency Force," *International
Organization*, Summer 1957.

Goodrich, L.M. and Anne P. Simonds, *United Nations and the Maintenance
of International Peace and Security*.

*United Nations Review*, "The United Nations Emergency Force," November 1957.

Wright, Quincy, "International Conflict and the United Nations," *World
Politics*, October 1957.

23. The Korean War: A Case Study.

a. The principal political-military lessons of the Korean War
experience, in terms of:

1. The United Nations

2. Alliance Policy

3. Military assistance programs

4. United States force levels, strategic doctrine, and
the strategic planning process.

Readings: REQUIRED

Kaufmann, William (Ed), *Military Policy and National Security*,
Chapter 4.

Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, especially pp. 43 and ff.

Mason, Bayley F., "The War in Korea: A Case Study in the Problems of Limited War," Harvard Defense Policy Serial No. 85, Parts I and II.

Osgood, Robert E., *Limited War*, especially Chapter 7.

-22-

SUGGESTED

Berger, Carl, *The Korean Knot*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.

Goodrich, Leland M., *Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the U.N.*

Oliver, *Why War Came to Korea*.

Reischauer, E.O., *Wanted: An Asian Policy*.

Rovere, Richard H. and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The General and the President*, New York, Farrar, 1951.

Senate, *Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, Hearings*, "The Military Situation in the Far East," 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1951, 5 parts including *Index*.

Truman, Harry S., *Memoires*, Vol. II, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, *passim*.

Warner, Albert L., "How the Korean Decision War Made," *Harper's Magazine*, June 1951.

Whitney, Maj. Gen. Courtney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History*, New York, Knopf, 1956.

24. Disarmament: Problems and Prospects.

a. The meaning of disarmament.

b. Brief history of negotiations since 1945.

c. The political-diplomatic problems involved in proposed agreements for the limitation of armaments.

d. The strategic issues involved in various disarmament schemes.

1. Bomb testing.

2. Disengagement.

3. Inspection.

25. Disarmament: The Coordination of Strategy and Policy.

a. The existing United States organizational structure for coordinating disarmament policy.

b. The basic political and economic issues raised by disarmament schemes so far advanced. The pros and cons of unilateral disarmament negotiations and agreements.

c. The requirements for inspection, enforcement and control of arms limitation agreements.

Readings: REQUIRED

Cavers, David F., "The Challenge of Planning Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1955.

Colm, Gerhard, "Economic Implications of Disarmament," *Illinois Business Review*, July 1957, pp. 6-8.

Frye, William R., "Disarmament: Atoms Into Plowshares," New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1955. (See numerous other writings on the subject by the author.)

-23-

Humphrey, Senator Hubert, "What Hope for Disarmament?", *The New York Times Magazine*, January 5, 1958, pp. 11, 65, 66.

Katzenbach, Edward L. and Bernard K. Gordon, "Perspectives on Disarmament," Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Serial No. 126, April 1958.

Leghorn, Richard, "How the Arms Race Can Be Checked," *The Reporter*, March 6, 1958.

Murray, Thomas E., "Disarmament Means Rational Armament," *Vital Speeches of the Day*," June 1, 1956 (v.22), pp. 491-494.

Teller, Edward and Albert L. Latter, *Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers and Opportunities*, New York, Criterion Books, 1958.

SUGGESTED

*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, (various issues)

Bernard, Stephen, "Some Political and Technical Implications of Disarmament," *World Politics*, October 1955, pp. 71-90.

Cavers, David F., "Arms Control in the U.N.--A Decade of Disagreement," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1956.

DeWeerd, H.A., "The Case for Weapons Limitation," *Army*, February 1957.

Senate, Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament: *Control and Reduction of Armaments, a Decade of Negotiations*, 1946-1956.

Senate, Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarmament, "The Executive Branch and Disarmament," Staff Study No. 1, February 20, 1956.

Senate, Foreign Relations (Humphrey) Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Hearings*, Special Studies and Reports, 1956, 1957, 1958.

April 1, 1958

Draft

Harvard Defense Policy Seminar, 1958-1959

An Introduction to Basic Concepts and Issues

1. Basic Issues of and Analytical Approaches to National Strategy in the Nuclear Age - The Nature of Deterrence - An Introductory Preview.

a. The problems modern weapons have raised for diplomacy and for strategy.

b. Evolving concepts of deterrence.

c. Deterrence and the strategy for fighting a war.

d. Offensive and defensive foreign policies.

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger

Readings:

2. The Nature of Likely Threats to Western Security and the Role of Force in Meeting the Threats.

a. The Nature of basic Sino-Soviet objectives.

b. The basic principles of contemporary Russian (and Chinese) political theory and military strategy.

c. The role of military force in the attainment of Communist objectives.

d. The political and military strengths and vulnerabilities of the Sino-Soviet bloc in the pursuit of their strategic objectives.

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger, Fainsod, Shulman, Rostow, Garthoff

Readings:

3. Related Issues of National Security Organization - An Introductory Summary.

a. The characteristics and assumptions of the existing defense organization.

b. The environment in which "Unification" evolved.

c. The balance that has been achieved between military functions and organizational structure. The conceptual basis on which military roles and missions are currently assigned.

d. The strengths and weaknesses of the present defense organization.

Suggested lecturer: Ransom, et. al.

Readings:

2.

[Y]

4. The Impact of Science and Technology upon Strategic Planning for National Security. Developing Weapons Systems.

a. The relationship between scientific and technological resources and strategic capability.

b. The nature of a technological breakthrough.

c. Problem of evolving weapons technology.

d. The relationship between technological development and strategic choice.

e. The role of the opponent in determining policy.

f. The degree to which there is freedom of choice and the techniques available for choosing among weapons systems.

g. The future of the arms race: advantages and disadvantages for the United States in the projection of present trends.

Suggested lecturer: General Gavin, General McCormack, Harvard or MIT scientist.

Readings:

## Strategy and Organization

5. The Concept of Civilian Supremacy in Military Affairs. American Governmental Machinery for Integration of Political, Economic and Military Elements into National Policy.

a. The problem of civil-military relations in the American environment.

b. The chief characteristics of existing machinery for national policy-making.

c. The basic elements of and requirements for national security decisions.

d. An assessment of existing White House (including NSC, ODM, CIA), State Department and Pentagon devices for and attitudes toward policy coordination.

Suggested lecturer: Prof. Bowie, Prof. Elliott, Gen. Cutler.

Readings:

6. Department of Defense Organization and the Strategic Planning Process.

a. The disadvantages and advantages of the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff organization.

3.

b. The relation of currently assigned roles and missions to the military capabilities of potential enemies and an accelerating weapons technology.

c. Is the Office of Secretary of Defense equipped with the organizational capability of initiating and implementing military policy?

d. Relations between the Defense Department and other Executive agencies.

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger

Readings:

7. Central Intelligence and Strategic Decision.

a. The potentialities and limitations of intelligence as a guide to strategic decision.

b. The organization of the intelligence community - does it fulfill its potentiality?

c. The aspects of existing CIA and intelligence community organization which impose limitations upon effective collection, evaluation and dissemination of national intelligence.

d. The fundamental characteristics of existing central intelligence organization and doctrine.

Suggested lecturer: Robert Amory, William Bundy, Langer, Ransom.

Readings:

8. The Role of Congress in the Formation of National Security Policy.

a. The role of Congress in military policy-making.

b. The Executive view of the role of Congress.

c. The Congressional view of its role in national security policy-making.

d. A rational and realistic model for division of role between Congress and the Executive in the determination of defense policy.

Suggested lecturer: Leach

Readings:

9. Information, Secrecy and National Security; the Flow of Public Information.

a. The effect of national security considerations on the basic principles of free speech, free press and other aspects of freedom of inquiry.

4.

b. The proper limits for the restricting of the free flow of information. The harmful effects of widespread secrecy.

c. The military requirements for secrecy.

d. The American governmental and social system's requirements for disclosure.

e. Public debate and classified information. The problem of the democratic process.

Suggested lecturer: Walter Millis. Comment by Don Price.

Readings:

10. The Military Budget as an Instrument of Strategic Choice.

a. The effectiveness of the present military budget process for providing means for rational choice of strategic alternatives or precise information about what the money is to buy.

b. The effectiveness of the budget, as presently developed, as an instrument for planning, programming, review and control, either by the Executive or by Congress.

c. The improvements that could be made in budgetary procedures to effect a device for rational choice, effective programming and true economy.

Suggested lecturer: Arthur Smithies

Readings:

## Elements of the Strategic Problem

11. The Relationship of National Security to American Foreign Policy - The Determination of Force Requirements in Relation to Political Objectives, with Special Reference to the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Armed Services.

a. The relation of force to diplomacy.

b. The problem of over-all power and its particular application.

c. The relation of American force levels to major threats.

d. The impact of the evolving technology on political and military concepts.

e. Weapons systems, force levels and the flexibility of diplomacy.

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger, Elliott, Bundy.

Readings:

[Y]

5.

12. Problems of Global War

a. The character of strategic war: the problem of surprise attack.

b. The concept of the quick war vs. the broken backed war.

c. Soviet strategic capabilities.

d. The basic design question: strike first or retaliatory blow.

e. The role of active defense.

f. Preview of civil defense.

13. Problems of Limited War.

c. Missiles and limited war.

e. the problem of maintaining the limited character of the war.

14. The Armed Services - the ARMY: Function, Strategic Doctrine, Organization.

a. The basic assumptions regarding future military requirements of the United States, which underlie the Army's position on its role and organization and which are implicit in Army strategic doctrine.

c. Is it true, as the Army claims, that the Army is "the only force which has the strategic and tactical flexibility and versatility required to gain permanent control of the land, people and resources of an enemy, which represent his war-making potential"?

Suggested lecturer: General Gavin, Colonel Lincoln, others.

Readings:

15. The Armed Services - the NAVY: Function, Strategic Doctrine, Organization.

a. Basic Navy strategic concepts.

6.

b. The basic assumptions underlying the Navy's reliance upon
the aircraft-carrier task force as its principal weapons system.

c. Is it essential, feasible and economical for the Navy to
maintain the full psetrum of deterrence capability which its
present program suggests?

d. The attunement of Navy strategic doctrine, organization and
planned force composition and levels to the accelerating weapons
technology and the future force requirements of the United States.

Suggested lecturer:

Readings:

16. The Armed Services - AIR FORCE: Function, Strategic Doctrine, Organization.

b. The assumptions underlying Air Force basic doctrine.

c. Is it true, as the Air Force claims, that "an in being
air/atomic strength is the most effective deterrent to Communist
exploitation of their military might"?

Suggested lecturer: Leach, General LeMay, others.

Readings:

17. Civil Defense and National Security.

Suggested lecturer: Member of Gaither Committee, et. al.

Readings:

18. The Economics of National Defense: the availability and Allocation
of National Resources for Military Security.

b. The economic realities of defense spending. The ways in which the impact of defense expenditures can be measured and predicted.

7.

d. Where is the line which distinctly separates the "economics" and the "politics" of imposing ceilings upon defense expenditures?

Suggested lecturer: Harris, Kaysen, Duesenberry, Dorfman.

Readings:

## Technology and Strategy

### 19. Science, Technology and Strategy.

Suggested lecturer:

Readings:

### 20. Logistic Requirements, Procurement and Industrial Potential in the Nuclear Age.

a. The relation between the industrial base and required force levels.

b. The degree of industrial "force-in-being" required in light of modern technology and resultant weapons system.

c. The extent to which modern logistics doctrine and organization produce the required capability that logistics be the bridge between economic resources and combat capability.

Suggested lecturer:

Readings:

## Strategy and Foreign Policy

### 21. Collective Security: Structure of Military Alliances in the Nuclear Age.

8.

a. The basic political and strategic concept behind America's present system of alliances with some 43 foreign nations.

e. Coalition diplomacy.

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger

Readings:

22. Mutual Military Assistance: Problems of Implementing a Collective Security Strategy - A Comparative Look at NATO and SEATO.

1. Political

2. Economic

3. Military

Suggested lecturer: Lincoln Gordon

Readings:

23. The United Nations and United States Security.

24. The Korean War: A Case Study.

1. The United Nations.

2. Alliance policy.

3. Military Assistance programs

4. United States force levels and strategic doctrine.

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger

Readings:

[N]

9.

25. Disarmament: Problems and Prospects.

1. Bomb testing

2. Disengagement

3. Inspection

Suggested lecturer: Kissinger

Readings:

26. Disarmament: The Coordination of Strategy and Policy.

b. The basic political issues raised by disarmament schemes so far advanced. The pros and cons of unilateral disarmament negotiations and agreements.