Lincoln P. Bloomfield

October 9, 1968

# Some Thoughts About Organization of the State Department

1. First of all, there are some things that should not be worried about too much. The *calibre* of State Department personnel is generally high in comparison with most other government agencies or private organizations. The organization of the State Department in *geographic* regions is inescapable. It is not clear to me that it is worth going through another round of the perennial cyclical experiments of integrating with the geographic desks, quasi-independent agencies such as AID, USIA, and INR and then a few years later decentralizing them again. (They are currently decentralized except for the special arrangement by which ARA is combined with the Alliance for Progress.) The *SIG-IRG process*, while controversial, should doubtless be given a further chance to succeed in its mission of coordinating interdepartmental policy activities, and of emphasizing State Department primacy. Finally, *political-military relations* within the government are better than at any time since World War II, and the current exchange programs should be continued.

2. What is *not* inevitable, however, are some other things. Perhaps the best way to get at them selectively is to consider what some of the chief complaints have been about the present State Department:

* Unwieldy ("too big"; a "bowl of jello")

* Mismanaged ("the Secretary is not a good manager")

* Unresponsive to Presidential wishes ("too stuffy, reactionary, conservative")

* Unresponsive to early warning of problems ("too crisis-oriented")

* Reactive rather than initiating (this may be a function of the nature of the world rather than any fault of the Department)

* Personnel dedicated but unimaginative ("too cautious, too many clearances required")

* Resistant to new methods (such as PPBS, the use of computers, political-military gaming etc.)

* The policy planning function has declined to an unprecedentedly low estate.

* The traditional geographic dominance downgrades functional approaches such as economic, U.N., etc.

3. The list could be lengthened, but it hits some high points. I think much of it boils down to three things:

a. Management

b. The planning function

c. Personnel

a. *Management*. The last two Presidents have been their own chiefs of foreign policy. If in that kind of regime a poor manager is appointed Secretary of State, the U.S. government then gets the worst of both worlds.