PR #387

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, with
respect to the CIA estimates, we may have reached a
point where the CIA estimates to nongovernmental
personnel have a greater degree of precision than the
CIA estimates which we received.

We have not been given that figure, but that is
not the point. I have not seen any confirmed reports
of any particular figure, $10 million, $2 million or
any other figure.

What I have seen makes $10 million seem high,
but that is not the issue which you are raising.

With respect to Portugal, it is important
to remember a number of things.

First, the original change in Portugal
had nothing to do with the Communist Party of Portugal
or with the Soviet Union. That resulted from the
colonial war and the inefficiency and lack of popular
base of the previous authoritarian Government.

Secondly, when the change occurred, the evolution
it took also was largely due to internal Portuguese
trends, including the fact that the dominant armed forces
movement had been serving in African colonial wars for a
long time and had not perhaps been in the mainstream of
Western European liberal democratic thought.

Thirdly, in assessing what outside powers did,
it is important to assess not only what one side did do,
but what the Western countries, for a variety of
reasons, did not do.

In making a fair assessment of the evolution
in Portugal, both of these factors have to be taken
into account.

Fourthly, to the extent that the Soviet Union
is active in Portugal, we consider it incompatible
with the spirit of relaxation of tensions, and we will
bring it to the attention of the Soviet leaders when we
meet with them, as we already have brought it to their
attention.

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Q Mr. Secretary, to follow that question, what
do they say?

Q What do they say when you bring it to
their attention?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question is, first
of all, what is the degree of their intervention.

I will not go into the details of the diplomatic
discussions. We have brought it to their attention. If
there is any result from our approaches, the result is
more likely to be reflected in actions, if there is any
result, than in a long exchange because Governments
are not in the habit of confirming this kind of
activity.

I would like to stress, however, again, it is
an easy way out for us to blame everything that goes
against our interests on Soviet machinations. We have
also to consider the failures of the West to do what it
can do.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you say now or give
any indication how close you believe Egypt and Israel are
to reaching a new interim agreement and whether you believe
another shuttle will be required?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Egypt and Israel, in my
view, are now both making serious efforts. These
efforts still have left considerable gaps between the
two positions. Nevertheless, if the two sides can survive
each other's public statements -- which is not yet
self-evident to me -- I believe that they are beginning now
to talk about the same range of issues in a negotiable
manner.

Whether there will in fact be an agreement is
premature to say. If we should get close to an agreement
and if the success is probable, then I would think that
a shuttle will be necessary to work out the language
and the final details.

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We are not yet at the point where we can
make that decision, but basically there has been a
serious effort by both sides, which has led to a narrowing
of the differences, which in several key areas, however,
are still quite wide.

Q Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary? Are
you prepared at this point to offer any suggestion of your
own in order to bridge the gap between the two sides?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the mediating process
in which we are engaged we obviously, when we receive
ideas from either side, occasionally indicate what in
our view the traffic will bear and occasionally make
suggestion of the direction in which we believe progress
can be made.

We have not thought, up to now, that the
difference between the two sides was sufficiently
narrow for us to put forward an integrated American
plan, and we still do not think we have reached that
point and, moreover, it is not necessary, as long as
there is not any total deadlock, and we don't believe
there is a deadlock now.

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PR #387

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports
that the CIA plotted to overthrow the Allende regime
in Chile. In one instance, the plot included the kid-
napping of a ranking military officer of that country.
Is this indeed the case, and were you aware of it, and
did you do anything about it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not believe that
any purpose is served by discussing fragmentary reports
that leak out of this or that office. All the documents
on all the covert activities that have ever been planned
or carried out in Chile have been submitted to the Church
Committee.

The Church Committee, therefore, will be able
to make a report based on all the documents in everybody's
file, and it will be able to distinguish between things
that may have been talked about and things that were
actually done in a way that the press does not always
do, in reporting about it.

Q Mr. Secretary, I am just interested in
your answer to Murray Marder a while ago on this criticism
where you said one of the things we have to do is keep
in perspective the nature and depth of the criticism.

What does that mean? Does that mean the
criticism is invalid in some ways?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, it does not mean
that even remotely. The criticism is put forward by
serious people with serious concerns, but I believe also
that it does not necessarily reflect the majority of
the American people.

It is inevitable that when you conduct a policy
across as wide a range of issues as are involved in moving
towards a less tense relation with the East European
countries and the Soviet Union, that there are many
aspects of it that will be objected to by this or that
group.

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Our point is that one has to look at the
evolution; and secondly, one has to look at the
alternative, and one has to ask oneself what the
alternative policy is that is being proposed.

We respect the views of the critics. We
take them seriously, but we have to assess that criticism
on its merits and we have to assess also its threats.

Q Would you answer a question on CSCE vis-
a-vis the matter of human rights, which there has been
skepticism raised about?

How far are the Soviet Union and Eastern
European countries willing to go on the matter of
respecting the human rights embodied in the CSCE document,
and how optimistic are you that the Soviet Government
and the Eastern European block will liberalize to that
extent?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the so-called Basket 3 which contains the human rights provisions, the outcome of the conference was substantially a Soviet acceptance of a joint Western proposal that was made as a final agreed position in early May. So if all of these provisions are carried out, we believe it would be a substantial step forward.

At the same time, of course, we cannot assert
that this document is without legal force with respect
to us, but is of legal force with respect to the other
side. Therefore, a great deal depends on the general
atmosphere that exists in the world on whether these
guidelines and principles will in fact be implemented.

What the so-called Basket 3 does is to enable
the West and the United States to appeal to agreed
documents as a guide for conduct, and this is what we
will do. And we will also hope to bring about a further
improvement of East-West relations that would accelerate
the process and improve the atmosphere. It is not
absolutely binding, but it is a step forward, to have
Communist agreement with these principles, and we will
do our utmost to hold them to it.

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Q Mr. Secretary, what reaction do you anticipate the Turkish Government will take in response to what Congress has done? Will they now cause us to have to give up, leave, or otherwise terminate some of our bases there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have learned one thing in recent months which is that if what you predict happens, you are blamed for having caused the result which you foresee by your prediction, and therefore, I am not going to make a prediction which we will then be accused of having encouraged the Turkish Government to take.

We believe that it was a very unfortunate and sad decision that was taken yesterday because it helped nobody, including those who passionately urged it. But we have made this case now.

We have been told by the Turkish Government on innumerable occasions that there would be some reaction. We are now engaged in talking to the Turkish Government -- I had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Demirel this morning. The President sent him a message yesterday -- in trying to urge restraint and moderation on the Turkish Government because the basic values that are involved in our joint defense and that affect issues far beyond Turkish-American relations, have not changed as a result of this vote.

So we are hoping that Turkey will not take any precipitous action and give everybody an opportunity to see whether progress can be made on the issues that have produced this in the first place, so I would not want to make a prediction. I do not know what the Turkish reaction to our appeals will be.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)

The Secretary
of State

Speech

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FOREIGN POLICY

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the
Upper Midwest Council.

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have long looked forward to coming to Minnesota because it is the home of a man I admire enormously, the one man who likes to talk almost as much as I do—Senator Humphrey. At the hearings on my nomination as Secretary of State, Senator Humphrey instructed me with much wisdom on the difficult job ahead. His advice was right on the mark, and has been ever since. He is a good friend, and a great statesman. Minnesotans can be proud that he represents them in the United States Senate, for he is an example of the spirit of our country—its decency, its humanity, and its strength.

America has now entered upon its 200th year as a free nation. In those 2 centuries our country has grown from a small agricultural nation with very few responsibilities beyond its borders to a world power with global responsibilities. Yet, while the range of interests has changed massively, our commitment to the values that gave birth to our nation has remained unaltered.

These are the aspects of our national experience I would like to address today: the pursuit of America's values as a humane and just example to others; and the furthering of America's interests in a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter. How do we reconcile and advance both aspects of our national purpose? What, in our time, is the significance of the age-old quandary of the relationship between principle and power?

Through the greater part of our history we

July 15, 1975

Minneapolis, Minnesota

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

have been able to avoid the issue. A fortunate margin of safety and an unexplored continent produced the impression that principle and power automatically coalesced, that no choice was necessary or that only one choice was possible.

But now for nearly a decade our nation has been weighed down by uncertainty and discord. We have found ourselves doubtful of our virtue and uncertain of our direction largely because we have suddenly realized that like other nations before us we must now reconcile our principles with our necessities. Amid frustration, many Americans questioned the validity of our involvement in the international arena; in the wake of our disappointments, some abroad now doubt our resolve.

We are, I believe, emerging from this period with a renewed sense of confidence. Recent events have brought home to us—and to the rest of the world—that a purposeful, strong, and involved America is essential to peace and progress. These same events have also reminded us of the contribution this country made in the 30 years since World War II—and what is at stake in the next 30 years.

The United States can look back on an extraordinary generation of achievement. We have maintained a stable balance of power in the world; we have preserved peace and fostered the growth of the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped shape the international trade and monetary system which has nourished global prosperity. We promoted decolonization and pioneered in development assistance for the new nations. We have taken major initiatives to forge more reliable and positive relationships with the major Communist powers.

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In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, in an international system not of empire but of scores of independent states, the global contribution of one nation—the United States—has been without precedent in human history. Only a nation of strong conviction and great idealism could have accomplished these efforts. We shall not turn our backs on this legacy.

## The Modern Agenda

Today we face a new agenda. Our accomplishments over the past generation have changed the world and defined our tasks for the coming decades:

* Our allies, the major industrial democracies, have recovered their vigor and influence. We are transforming our alliances into more equal partnerships. We shall act in harmony with friends whose security and prosperity is indispensable to our own and whose cooperation is essential for progress and justice.

* The incredible destructiveness of modern weapons has transformed international politics. We must maintain our military strength. But we have an obligation, in our own interest as well as the world's, to work with other nations to control both the growth and the spread of nuclear weapons.

* In our relations with the Communist powers we must never lose sight of the fact that in the thermonuclear age general war would be disastrous to mankind. We have an obligation to seek a more productive and stable relationship despite the basic antagonism of our values.

* Thirty years of economic and political evolution have brought about a new diffusion of power and initiative. At the same time, interdependence imposes upon all nations the reality that they must prosper together or suffer together. The destinies of the world's nations have become inevitably interwined. Thus, the capacity of any one nation to shape events is more limited, and consequently our own choices are more difficult and complex.

## The Legacy of Our Past

To deal with this agenda we require strength of purpose and conviction. A nation unsure of its values cannot shape its future. A people confused

about its direction will miss the opportunity to build a better and more peaceful world. This is why perhaps our deepest challenge is our willingness to face the increasing ambiguity of the problem of ends and means.

We start with strong assets. Throughout our history we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves—a beacon to the oppressed from other lands—from the first settlers to the recent refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a powerful force.

But the emphasis on principle has also produced a characteristic American ambivalence. Relations with a world of nations falling short of our ideal have always presented us with dilemmas. As a people, we have oscillated between insistence on our uniqueness and the quest for broad acceptance of our values; between trying to influence international developments and seeking to isolate ourselves from them; between expecting too much of our power and being ashamed of it; between optimistic exuberance and frustration with the constraints practicality imposes.

Through most of our history we have sought to shield our country and hemisphere from outside intrusion, to shun involvement in balance-of-power politics. Soldiers and diplomats—the practitioners of power—have always been looked upon with suspicion. We considered generosity in relief efforts, the encouragement of free international trade, and the protection of our economic interests abroad as the only wholesome forms of international involvement.

Our founding fathers were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and knew how to profit from it. For the succeeding century and a half, our security was assured by favorable circumstances over which we had little influence. Shielded by two oceans, and enriched by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special situation as universally valid to nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own.

Indeed, the concern of other nations for security reinforced our sense of uniqueness. We were a

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haven for millions, a place where the injustices, inequities, privations, and abridgements of human dignity which the immigrants had suffered were absent, or amenable to rapid redress. As our strength and size expanded, we remained uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power and involvement in day-to-day diplomacy. At the turn of the century, for example, there were soul-searching debates over the Spanish-American War and our first acquisition of noncontiguous territories. While many saw our policies as dictated by our interests, others considered them our entrance into a morally questionable world.

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems—all these were invoked to banish the reality of power. And when our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1917, Woodrow Wilson translated our geopolitical interest in preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe into a universal moral objective. We fought to “make the world safe for democracy.”

The inevitable disillusionment with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationist sentiment. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward, as we sought to deal with the problems of our own society—even as that same depression simultaneously generated real dangers abroad.

We were stirred from isolation only by external attack and we sustained our effort because of the obvious totalitarian evil. We opposed all-out war, and total victory further strengthened our sense of moral rectitude—and ill prepared us for the aftermath. Of all the nations involved, we alone emerged essentially unscathed from the ravages of conflict—our military power, economic strength, and political confidence intact. And in the postwar bipolar world of cold war confrontation we believed we faced a reincarnation of the just defeated foe—an apparently monolithic and hostile ideological empire whose ambitions and values were antithetical to our own.

Our success and the preeminent position it brought convinced us that we could shape the globe according to American design. Our preponderant power gave us a broad margin for error so we believed that we could overwhelm problems through the sheer weight of resources. No other nation possessed so much insurance against so

many contingencies; we could afford to be imprecise in the definition of our interests. Indeed, we often imagined that we had nothing so selfish as interests—only obligations and responsibilities. In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our cause.

## America's Role

We no longer live in so simple a world. We remain the strongest nation and the largest single factor in international affairs. Our leadership is perhaps even more essential than before. But our strategic superiority has given way to nuclear balance. Our political and economic predominance has diminished as others have grown in strength and our dependence on the world economy has increased. Our margin of safety has shrunk.

Today we find that—like most other nations in history—we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Today we must conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of our interests. We must be thoughtful in defining our interests. We must prepare against the worst contingency and not plan only for the best. We must pursue limited objectives and many objectives simultaneously. In this effort, the last decade has taught us:

* That our power will not always bring preferred solutions; but we are still strong enough to influence events, often decisively.

* That we cannot remedy all the world's ills; but we can help build an international structure that will foster the initiative and cooperation of others.

* That we can no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance; but as the richest and most powerful nation, we still have a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a sponsor of world order.

* That we cannot banish power politics from international affairs, but we can promote new and wider communities of interest among nations; we can mute the use and threat of force; we can help establish incentives for restraint and penalties for its absence; we can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation; and we can help construct a more equitable pattern of relations between developed and developing nations.

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This new complexity has produced in some a
rebellion against contemporary foreign policy. We
are told that our foreign policy is excessively prag-
matic, that it sacrifices virtue in the mechanical
pursuit of stability. Once attacked as cold-war
oriented, we are now criticized by some as insensi-
tive to moral values. Once regarded as naive in the
use of power, we are now alleged to rely too much
on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most
generous of nations, we now stand accused by
some of resisting a more equitable international
economic system.

It is time to face the reality of our situation. Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either, nor are they incompatible. This nation must be true to its own beliefs or it will lose its bearings in the world. But at the same time it must survive in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills.

We need moral strength to select among often
agonizing choices and a sense of purpose to navi-
gate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But
we need as well a mature sense of means, lest we
substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of
survival.

Clearly we are in need of perspective. Let me
state some basic principles:

**Foreign policy must start with security.** A nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk. There can be no security for us or for others unless the strength of the free countries is in balance with that of potential adversaries; and no stability in power relationships is conceivable without America's active participation in world affairs.

The choices in foreign policy are often difficult and the margins are frequently narrow; imperfect solutions are sometimes unavoidable. In the Second World War, for example, we joined forces with countries whose values we did not share in order to accomplish the morally worthy objective of defeating Nazism. Today we cooperate with many nations for the purpose of regional stability and global security, even though we disapprove of some of their internal practices. These choices are made consciously, and based on our best assessment of what is necessary.

At the same time, security is a means not an
end. The purpose of security is to safeguard the
values of our free society. And our survival is not

always at stake in international issues. Many of our
decisions are not imposed on us by events. Where
we have latitude we must seize the moral oppor-
tunity for humanitarian purposes.

Our assistance to developing nations, for example, serves both foreign policy and humanitarian ends. It strengthens political ties to other nations. It contributes to expanded trade; close to 90 percent of our foreign assistance is eventually spent in this country. And our assistance reflects our values as a people, because we cannot close our eyes to the suffering of others. Because of history and moral tradition, we cannot live with ourselves as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation.

In the whole field of foreign aid, and particu-
larly in food aid, America's record is unsurpassed.
We and the world owe much to leaders with vision
and compassion like Senator Humphrey who
drafted the Food for Peace legislation some 20
years ago.

Finally, our values link the American people
and their government. In a democracy the conduct
of foreign policy is possible only with public sup-
port. Therefore your government owes you an arti-
culation of the purposes which its policies are
designed to serve; to make clear our premises, to
contribute to enlightened debate, and to explain
how our policies serve the American people's ob-
jectives. And those principles—freedom, the dignity
of the individual, the sanctity of law—are at the
heart of our policy; they are also the foundation of
our most basic and natural partnerships with the
great industrial democracies which are essential to
our safety and well-being.

Morality and Policy

The relation of morality to policy is thus not
an abstract philosophical issue. It applies to many
topics of the current debate. It applies to relations
with the Communist powers, where we must
manage a conflict of moral purposes and interests
in the shadow of nuclear peril; and it applies in our
political ties with nations whose domestic practices
are inconsistent with our own.

Our relationship with the Communist powers
has raised difficult questions for Americans since
the Bolshevik Revolution. It was understood very
early that the Communist system and ideology
were in conflict with our own principles. Sixteen
years passed before President Franklin Roosevelt
extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet

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Government. He did so in the belief, as he put it, that "through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened."

Today again courageous voices remind us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to defend freedom. About this there is no disagreement.

There is, however, a clear conflict between two moral imperatives which is at the heart of the problem. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship between the two superpowers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance-when both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized life-there is no alternative to coexistence. In such conditions the necessity of peace is itself a moral imperative. As President Kennedy pointed out: "In the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

It is said, correctly, that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the furthering of Soviet objectives. In a world of nuclear weapons capable of destroying mankind, in a century which has seen resort to brutal force on an unprecedented scale and intensity, in an age of ideology which turns the domestic policies of nations into issues of international contention, the problem of peace takes on a profound moral and practical difficulty. But the issue, surely, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they also serve our own. Constructive actions in Soviet policy are desirable *whatever* the Soviet motives.

This Government has stated clearly and constantly the principles which we believe must guide U.S.-Soviet relations and international conduct and which are consistent with both our values and our interests:

* We will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve our security. We will as a matter of principle and national interest oppose attempts by any country to achieve global or regional predominance.

* We will judge the state of U.S.-Soviet relations not by atmospherics but by whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

* All negotiations will be a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable observance of agreements.

* We will insist, as we always have, that progress in U.S.-Soviet economic relations must reflect progress toward stable political relationships.

* We will never abandon our ideals or our friends. We will not negotiate over the heads of, or against the interests of, other nations.

* We will respond firmly to attempts to achieve unilateral advantage, or to apply the relaxation of tensions selectively.

Beyond the necessities of coexistence there is the hope of a more positive relationship. The American people will never be satisfied with simply reducing tension and easing the danger of nuclear holocaust. Over the longer term, we hope that firmness in the face of pressure and the creation of incentives for cooperative action may bring about a more durable pattern of stability and responsible conduct.

Today's joint manned mission in space-an area in which 15 years ago we saw ourselves in almost mortal rivalry-is symbolic of the distance we have traveled. Practical progress has been made on a wide range of problems. Berlin has been removed as a source of conflict between East and West; crises have been dampened; the frequency of U.S.-Soviet consultation on bilateral and multilateral problems is unprecedented; the scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the state of affairs 10, even 5, years ago. The agreements already achieved to limit strategic armament programs-the central weapons of our respective military arsenals-are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Your Senator [Walter F.] Mondale is a strong and constructive advocate of such strategic arms control efforts.

Our immediate focus is on the international actions of the Soviet Union not because it is our only moral concern, but because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationships, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation.

Therefore, critics of detente must answer:

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What is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does detente encourage repression—or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Can we ask our people to support confrontation unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored?

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States will maintain its strength, defend its interests, and support its friends with determination and without illusion. We will speak up for our beliefs with vigor and without self-deception. We consider detente a means to regulate a competitive relationship—not a substitute for our own efforts in building the strength of the free world. We will continue on the course on which we are embarked because it offers hope to our children of a more secure and a more just world.

These considerations raise a more general question: To what extent are we able to affect the internal policies of other governments and to what extent is it desirable?

There are some 150 nations in the world, and barely a score of them are democracies in any real sense. The rest are nations whose ideology or political practices are inconsistent with our own. Yet we have political relations and often alliances with some of these countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

Congressman [Donald M.] Fraser has raised this issue with great integrity and concern, and I have profited from many discussions with him. We do not and will not condone repressive practices. This is not only dictated by our values but is also a reflection of the reality that regimes which lack legitimacy or moral authority are inherently vulnerable. There will therefore be limits to the degree to which such regimes can be congenial partners. We have used, and we will use, our influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demand it.

But truth compels also a recognition of our limits. The question is whether we promote human rights more effectively by counsel and friendly relations where this serves our interest, or by confrontational propaganda and discriminatory legislation.

And we must also assess the domestic performance of foreign governments in relation to their history and to the threats they face. We must have some understanding for the dilemmas of countries adjoining powerful, hostile, and irreconcilable totalitarian regimes.

Our alliances and political relationships serve mutual ends; they contribute to regional and world security, and thus support the broader welfare. They are not favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of mutual interests. They should be withdrawn only when our interests change and not as a punishment for some act with which we do not agree. In many countries, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in many countries—especially in Asia—it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline, and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices.

The attempt to deal with those practices by restrictive American legislation raises a serious problem, not because of the moral view it expresses—which we share—but because of the mistaken impression it creates that our security ties are acts of charity. And beyond that, such acts—because they are too public, too inflexible, and too much a stimulus to nationalistic resentment—are almost inevitably doomed to fail.

There are no simple answers. Painful experience should have taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. Therefore let me state the principles that will guide our action:

* Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

* The United States will speak up for human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments.

* We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

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* We will not lose sight of either the requirements of global security or what we stand for as a nation.

## The Domestic Dimension

For Americans, then, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how. The issue is whether we have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; whether we will look behind easy slogans and recognize that our great goals can only be reached by patience, and in imperfect stages.

The question is also whether we will use our moral convictions to escape reality or as a source of courage and self-confidence. We hear too often assertions that were a feature of our isolationist period: That a balance of power is a cynical game; that secret conspiratorial intentions lurk behind open, public policies; that weapons are themselves the sources of conflict; that intelligence activities are wicked; that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement.

These are the counsels of despair. I refuse to accept the premise that our moral values and policy objectives are irreconcilable. The ends we seek in our foreign policy must have validity in the framework of our beliefs or we have no meaningful foreign policy. The maintenance of peace is a moral as well as a practical objective: Measures to limit armaments serve a moral as well as practical end; the cohesion of our alliances with the great industrial democracies makes our way of life and our principles more secure; cooperation to improve the world economic system enhances the well-being of peoples; policies to reconcile the rich nations and the poor, and to enhance the progress of both, serve a humane as well as a political end.

We live in a secular age which prides itself on

its realism. Modern society is impersonal and bu-
reaucratized. The young, who in every generation
crave a sense of purpose, are too often offered
cynicism and escapism instead of a faith that truly
inspires. All modern democracies are beset by
problems beyond the margin of governments’ abili-
ty to control. Debunking of authority further
drains democratic government of the ability to ad-
dress the problems that beset it. A world of tur-
moil and danger cries out for structure and leader-
ship. The opportunities that we face as a nation to
help shape a more just international order depend
more than ever on a steady, resolute, and self-
assured America.

This requires confidence—the leaders’ confi-
dence in their values, the public’s confidence in its
government, and the nation’s collective confidence
in the worth of its objectives.

Thus, for this nation to contribute truly to
peace in the world it must make peace with itself.
It is time to put aside the cynicism and distrust
that have marked, and marred, our political life for
the better part of the past decade. It is time to
remind ourselves that while we may disagree about
means, as Americans we all have the same ultimate
objective—the peace, prosperity, and tranquillity of
our country and of the world.

And most of all, it is time we recognized that
as the greatest democracy the world has ever
known, we are a living reminder that there is an
alternative to tyranny and oppression. The revolu-
tion that we began 200 years ago goes on, for most
of the world still lives without the freedom that
has for so long been ours. To them we remain a
beacon of hope and an example to be emulated.

So let us come together for the tasks that our
time demands. We have before us an opportunity
to bring peace to a world that awaits our
leadership.

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With respect to SALT, we have pointed out that the Soviet Union submitted to us, when Foreign Minister Gromyko and I met in Geneva some two weeks ago, its considerations on the issues outstanding in SALT, and we indicated that in our judgment progress was made at that meeting, especially in the area of verification.

We have conveyed our considerations in response to the Soviet ideas, and the discussions will be continued on Saturday, hopefully leading to an agreement to implement the Vladivostok decisions.

With respect to the Middle East, it is clear that no final settlement can be achieved by either of the countries by itself, and it is, therefore, natural that periodically we exchange ideas and also, as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, that we exchange ideas as to the appropriate time when that Conference might be reconvened and what procedures it might follow.

Of course, we have a long list of bilateral issues. These and other topics will be discussed again when the President and the General Secretary meet on Saturday.

The meeting with Prime Minister Caramanlis brought us together with one of the outstanding leaders of our period. We have the highest regard for what Prime Minister Caramanlis faces and what he has accomplished.

We wish the Democratic Government of Greece well, and we will do what we can to strengthen it.

We, of course, believe, as the President has repeatedly stated, that domestic developments in the United States have complicated our ability to play a useful role. However, within these constraints, to the best of our ability, we will respond to the wishes of the parties with respect to a Cyprus settlement.

Of course, we are prepared to be helpful to Greece's attempts to develop its economy and other areas of its natural life to the best of our abilities. It was a useful meeting which, as with the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev, was conducted in a very friendly atmosphere.

We cannot assess what may be possible on Cyprus until we have also talked to the Turkish Prime Minister, which will take place at breakfast tomorrow.

Now, these are the major events of the day, and our assessment of them.

Now why don't I take your questions.

Helen?

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Ford indicated there was progress today, and we assumed it was SALT, maybe even other subjects, and that further progress would be made on Saturday.

Specifically, what was that progress, and does that mean that President Ford and Brezhnev may reach some sort of agreement on Saturday, which would lead to a summit meeting in the fall, in Washington?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it would be incorrect to claim any particular achievement today. It was a very useful discussion, but it was not designed to lead to any specific conclusion. It was rather in the area of SALT, a further elaboration of our response to the Soviet ideas, which were given to me in Geneva.

It was more in the nature of a general assessment, and it had always been understood that the meeting today would be of a kind to put the positions, each side's position before the other, rather than one in which conclusions would be reached.

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Secondly, I do not know whether the discussion of SALT now lends itself to a
particular announcement even on Saturday from which one could deduce that an
agreement will certainly be reached.

Progress has been made. If that progress continues, and we hope it will be,
we think the chances are good that an agreement can be reached, but when I
said progress has been made, I am speaking over the last months, not necessarily
today.

The fact that I don't claim progress for today is not something from which you
should draw conclusions because the discussion was not of a nature that would
lend itself to a decision today.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you given up hope now of the House reversing its action on the Turkish aid problem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think I have amply demonstrated my inability to predict the actions of the House. It is my understanding that there is an attempt being made today to see whether perhaps a modified version of the bill we submitted last week could be added on as an amendment to some other bill.

It would then have to pass the Senate, after which the House. I have not had
a report as of the time that I left the office about where this stood. This
was the plan last evening, and it seemed to be a rather chancy procedure
because it required that certain rules be waived in both Houses, and that it
would move through both Houses with a rather rush procedure, so I really don't
know any more what is the situation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on Helen's question about the possibility of Brezhnev's visit to Washington in October. Has that been finally decided on?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It has not yet been finally decided, but we are proceeding on the assumption that a visit by the General Secretary will take place this year and all the discussions this morning took place in that framework, but no specific date has been set.

Of course, it depends somewhat on how we are proceeding on the SALT discussions.

Peter?

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, are the Russians content to allow the United States to continue its step-by-step effort?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My impression of the discussions this morning is that while the Soviet Union has indicated certain reservations about the possibility that the step-by-step approach can reach a final conclusion, that it is not actively opposing the efforts that are now going forward.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on SALT you have repeated several times that progress was made in Geneva and other parts of the world. In that case, why was there no briefing at NATO after the last Geneva meeting with the explanation that there was not enough to brief about, as was usually the case?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have received certain Soviet ideas on how to proceed. These ideas had to be analyzed by us first. As soon as they are being negotiated in a concrete way in Geneva and before any positions are put forward in Geneva there will be a briefing of NATO, and there has been an informal briefing of several of our allies.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how would you consider the chances of MBFR after the Helsinki Conference is over and the documents have been accepted?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has always attached importance to success in the MBFR negotiations, how we considered both SALT and MBFR of great importance, and finally, getting under control the spiral of arms.

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PR 390

In deference to the views of several of our allies, we have not linked the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations, but now that the CSCE negotiations are out of the way we share the views of Prime Minister Wilson -- that we should now make a very determined effort to make progress on MBFR.

I noted that in some of the speeches that were held from the Eastern side this afternoon that reference was made to MBFR as one of the important items on the agenda. It is too early to tell what progress will in fact be made.

We have, in my view, completed the stage of technical explorations and what is needed now is some political decisions to move it forward.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in view of your skepticism about the House vote, what appeal will you make to Mr. Demirel to not move in on the American bases?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't know whether skepticism is the right word. I just have no clear judgment of what the situation in the House is, but events last week proved that I didn't have a clear judgment of what the situation in the House was then so I don't think that judgment is decisive. All I have is a general account of what is going to be attempted, and I just don't want to claim anything for it.

Now what can we offer Prime Minister Demirel? As I have stated before, the security arrangements between the United States and another country are presumably ultimately in the mutual interest of both countries. I did not believe that it was wise to cut off arms to Turkey because it created the wrong impression about the nature of the relationship.

Equally, I believed that the closing of our bases in Turkey also gives the wrong impression as if the bases were there for the unilateral benefit of the United States, and the United States cannot be in a position of pleading to be able to defend its allies even if this or that base is in the general interest.

Nevertheless, we will discuss with the Prime Minister of Turkey what can be done to maintain the close relationship between Turkey and the United States, which is based on common interests, which is in the interests of the entire Eastern Mediterranean, and we will also make an effort to see whether we can be of any assistance in moving the Cyprus issue forward, keeping in mind that all these issues in some way affect each other.

So it is hard to predict what will come out of this meeting at this point. We have had no high-level exchange with the Turkish leaders since their decision to close the bases. We hope that the fundamental common interests of both sides will be understood and we will see what we can do that will help Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I have a follow-up question. Will you offer Demirel anything, or will you explore with him a new plan which may then be submitted to the House?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't really think that the President of the United States should negotiate with a foreign leader as to how he should handle or how he should deal with the American Congress. What we can do is to talk about the common problems we have. From that, the President may distill an approach to the House, but we will not work out a joint approach with Turkey to the House.

At this moment, I do not expect that out of that meeting something will emerge in addition to what I have already told you that could be submitted to the House, but if I am wrong we will, of course, inform you of it.

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PR 390

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there has been different information about the nature of the four-power European meeting that is going to take place. Some have expressed concern that economic problems will be discussed and the possibility of the creation of a four-or five-power economic directorate established.

Today, Italian spokesmen denied this. They said the United States has communicated to them that economic subjects will not be touched at all. Can you state what is the situation exactly?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The situation is that the four powers which have a special responsibility for Berlin that meet regularly at every NATO meeting decided to use their presence at the European Security Conference to meet on that issue. While they meet, it is, of course, possible that other issues will also be discussed, and I would consider it possible, in fact likely, that one of the several topics that will come up will concern economic matters, but basically it is an informal meeting of the four countries that have a special responsibility for Berlin and it was that symbolically and substantially important that these four countries meet.

I consider it extremely unlikely, in fact I consider it impossible, that there will be an announcement of a directorate that will be set up for economic matters and indeed there is no intention of setting up a directorate for economic matters.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if I can go back to Turkey for a minute, is there anything specifically that you will be asking the Turkish Prime Minister to do? Will you, for example, be asking him to go back on their decision to close the bases, or will you be asking him to reach a compromise decision that would somehow allow us to continue to operate? What specifically can you tell us about what we are going to ask them?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Turkish Government took the decision to close our bases knowing very well that we wanted to keep them open. Therefore, it was not our failure to ask them to keep the bases open that made them close it, but indeed on the day the decision was announced I, on behalf of the President, called Prime Minister Demirel urging restraint. So I think the issue of our bases in Turkey is not so simple as a formal American request to undo a decision that in itself had complicated causes both in our actions and in the domestic situation in Turkey.

What we would like to do is to discuss the sort of measures that might make it possible to put our relationship to Turkey on a new basis, and that in turn might make it easier for the Turkish Government to accede to what they know very well we are interested in in the common defense, namely, the reopening of all or at least some of our essential bases in Turkey, but that in turn requires that we look at all of the issues that led to this state of affairs to see whether we can bring about a radical solution rather than a stop-gap one.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, didn't Portugal come up in talks between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev today, and is there any possibility of President Ford meeting Prime Minister Gora's on Saturday?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The issue of Portugal did not come up directly in the talks but in a general way about the principles that each side should carry out.

Now as I have pointed out already in a press conference in Washington, I think we should keep in mind that détente cannot be used as a means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of our problems on our side of the line and a correct analysis of the situation in Portugal should emphasize or will emphasize that many of the problems in Portugal have indigenous roots and others have to do with Western countries.

But I repeat what I have said previously, that a substantial activity by any outside country in Portugal would be considered inconsistent with the spirit and indeed the letter of the CSCE declarations.

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PR 390

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a modification of the embargo legislation. What is that modification?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe it is substantially the same, Bill, as the one that was submitted last week with a proviso that a joint resolution of the Congress can veto sales above a certain figure. I believe it is $25 million, but you have to check this. This is the compromise that was being talked about which would make it consistent with all the other new legislation about military sales, but it would give Congress the sense that it could get another crack at sales through a joint resolution.

**QUESTION:** Did you advise the Greek Prime Minister of that arrangement at your meeting today, and what was his reaction?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There have been a series of absolutely misleading reports that we are attempting to ask the approval of the Greek Government. It should be clear that the Greek Government cannot approve, nor should it be asked to approve, American domestic legislation, and it is clear, also, that for a Greek Prime Minister the question of selling arms to Turkey is not something that one can ask him for his approval.

At no time during the discussions, despite many reports that have been printed, did the Administration make this claim to any Congressman and, of course, at no time today did we ask Prime Minister Caramanlis to approve the lifting of the embargo on Turkey.

It is our view, the view of the United States Government -- not the view of the Greek Government, necessarily -- it is the view of the United States Government that the course we have recommended to the Congress is the best means of preserving the security in the Eastern Mediterranean in which both Greece and Turkey should be interested, and to make progress on Cyprus.

We do not say that this judgment is necessarily shared by other governments, but we are responsible for giving our judgment to the Congress, and the Greek Government deals with the United States Government, not with the United States Congress.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Brezhnev indicate any interest in compromise on the issues of trade and immigration, and if so, what might be the general direction of such a compromise?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we reviewed the discussions that the group of Senators had had in the Soviet Union and we pointed out our judgment of what is required with respect to the trade legislation.

We have also had the view that progress in this field is more effective if it does not become a formal government-to-government matter but rather if it is understood by each side what the necessities are, and that then decisions are made independently on that basis. So I think the requirements of progress in the Congress have been made clear by our Senators and have been confirmed by us.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up, the Senators, when they came back from Moscow, talked about a compromise under which the credit ceiling of $300 million would be lifted, and there would be a period of several months under which Soviet behavior --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, my impression in talking to the Senators is that there is an understanding that both of these issues should be dealt with simultaneously, but there is no possibility of doing it now until Congress returns, and it will be the intention of the Administration to work at it

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 1, 1975

No. 392

PC 66

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
VAAKUNA HOTEL
HELSINKI, FINLAND, JULY 31, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me talk briefly about some of the meetings that took place today, and I will group them by subject.

We talked first about the breakfast of the President with Prime Minister Demirel, and then I had a brief meeting in the afternoon with Foreign Minister Bitsios. As you know, I had two meetings -- a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, and then, of course, there was the four-power lunch. I will talk about them in this order and then I will take your questions.

The meeting with the Prime Minister of Turkey: the President reviewed all aspects of the relationship between Turkey and the United States. Of course, also, they discussed in some detail the Cyprus question and possible means of negotiating a solution.

The relationship between the United States and Turkey and the whole complex of issues involving Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and the United States, is taking on the aspect of a Greek tragedy in the sense that each of the main actors, following perfectly understandable reasons and the laws of his own nature, is bringing on consequences they cannot possibly intend.

We, as I pointed out yesterday, believe strongly that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean requires good American relations with both Turkey and Greece. We believe, also, therefore, that a solution of the Cyprus problem is important. Indeed, it is crucial to this.

At the same time, the legislative actions that have been taken in the House of Representatives are reducing our influence and are making it more difficult, in addition to jeopardizing, as the Secretary of Defense pointed out yesterday, the national security of the United States.

We reviewed the situation. We discussed those possibilities that are open to us under existing legislation, as well as various measures that are now before the Congress. I don't believe that a significant change in the situation was registered, except that both of the leaders -- both President Ford and Prime Minister Demirel -- expressed their strong desire to maintain the traditional friendship between Turkey and the United States and to restore the security relationship to the situation that existed before events of last week.

I reviewed in a bilateral meeting I had with Foreign Minister Bitsios the state of Cyprus negotiations. I expressed to him the United States' willingness to be as helpful as we could, regardless of American legislative decisions. Also, we tried to assess what real possibilities existed.

For further information contact:

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PR 392

I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia and the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, and I expressed to both countries, both Foreign Ministers, that the United States has no -- there is no obstacle on the United States' side to an improvement in relations.

They expressed their strong desire to make progress in improving relations between the United States and their countries. We decided to start talks on scientific and technical exchanges and other subjects that might lead gradually to an improvement of our relationships.

With respect to the four-power lunch, the atmosphere could not have been warmer and more constructive, and we think it is a very significant result of the many meetings that President Ford has had with these various leaders bilaterally and, of course, of their many contacts with each other, that an atmosphere of cordiality and confidence exists that goes back to the very best days of allied relationships.

We had a review of the European situation, particularly as it affected the status of Berlin. There was a discussion of the Middle East and prospects for negotiations in the Middle East, as well as the position the various countries might consider taking with respect to issues that might come up at the United Nations affecting the Middle East.

On these subjects we will have to have a further exchange of views.

The subject of Portugal was discussed, and I think the unanimous view was dismay at the prospects for pluralistic democracy in Portugal. There was a brief discussion of economic issues in which some of our friends pointed out to us their concern as to American interest rates, but most of the discussion really concerned the relationship between the economic situation and the political situation; that is to say how the industrial democracies could convince their people that they were in control of their economic destinies.

No conclusions were reached. No decisions were taken. It was a discussion of the problem at the end of the general discussion which I have outlined. These were the major meetings that took place today in which the United States was involved, and now I will take your questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the German press officer briefing this afternoon said the Big Four meeting had reached conclusions on opposing any move to limit or expel Israel's role, or expel Israel from the UN; that you agreed to hold a conference in 1976 on currency problems and to prepare a conference including Japan, on interest rates. You say no conclusions were reached?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have listed the topics that were discussed. With respect to the United Nations, each of the countries represented has stated its view that it would oppose the expulsion or suspension of Israel from the United Nations or the expulsion or suspension of any other member for political reasons contrary to the Charter, but no conclusions were reached as to the particular measures that will be taken, and the four countries decided to be in touch with each other.

With respect to the monetary conference, there was no agreement reached to hold a monetary conference while I or the President was in the room.

**QUESTION:** You seem to be leaving open an option.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe this must be based on a misunderstanding of either the German press officer or the translation from the German. There was no decision reached to hold a particular conference.

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PR 392

The subject matters were the ones I described. Individual members raised individual problems but no conclusions were reached and no decision was reached to hold a particular conference, which does not exclude that one could be held later, but no decision was reached to hold a conference now, and I did not even hear a proposal that one should be held on currency.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on the Turkish situation, there was a meeting today between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers. Do you know anything about that meeting, whether they made any progress, and can you bring us up to date on what the situation is now in the House of Representatives regarding a vote?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have heard only the Greek Foreign Minister's view as to the meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, and he did not feel that great progress was made, but I have not yet had an opportunity to talk to the Turkish Foreign Minister.

I believe in any event these two Foreign Ministers ought to comment about their own meeting, and I should not comment about a meeting in which we did not participate.

As far as the situation in the House of Representatives is concerned, I am a little bit behind events. The latest information I have was at noon, in which the legislative people reported to the President about primarily the situation in the Senate.

The latest information -- it was supposed to come up for a vote at two o'clock this afternoon, and it cannot move to the House until the Senate has acted, and there were various parliamentary issues about unanimous consent.

We have not a clear estimate as to what will happen in the House of Representatives. We do have a clear estimate, however, about the consequences of what has happened, and we continue to believe it is in the interest of the United States, in the interest of Turkey, in the interest of Greece and in the interest of Cyprus, that the Congress act along the lines of our recommendations.

**QUESTION:** Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary. There was an impression this morning after the meeting that President Ford had with Demirel that the Turks might reconsider their actions on the U. S. bases or might go slow in taking them over in some way, in short, that they might have agreed with what you said yesterday about the value of these bases to NATO security.

Did you find any cause for optimism in the session this morning between Ford and Demirel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Our view has always been that our aid to Turkey is not a favor to Turkey any more than our bases in Turkey are a favor to the United States.

But, to answer your question specifically, we had no reason to believe, on the basis of the discussion this morning -- even though we explored several possibilities -- that there would be any prospect of a change in the closing down of American operations on these bases under present conditions.

I might add, incidentally, that one of the subjects that was also discussed between the Prime Minister and the President was the question of control of opium, in which the Turkish Prime Minister promised to do whatever was necessary to make sure that none of their poppy production would go into private channels, that all of it would be handled through Turkish Governmental channels.

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PR 392

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, along those lines, some of your Congressional critics in Washington, specifically Congressman Brademas and others, are raising questions as to why President Ford has not offered to waive $50 million in foreign weapon sales to Turkey under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Was that discussed today at all?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, we have to be clear what it is that Congressman Brademas and Congressman Sarbanes have proposed to us. What they have proposed to us is that Turkey make some concessions first. After Turkey has made some concessions, they would hope still for the President to waive up to $50 million of grant aid.

It is a subject that was discussed at some length between the President and Prime Minister Demirel, as it had been discussed in March, between myself and at that time the then Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and as it was discussed on the visit of Assistant Secretary Hartman in May, and as it was discussed on the occasion of my visit in May.

In other words, the proposal to waive $50 million in grant aid has been put repeatedly to Turkey. The Turkish position has been that they do not want a gift of United States aid; that their objection is to the embargo of an ally with respect to purchases that Turkey had already made and with respect to the Turkish ability to buy American equipment for cash or credit; so Turkey has consistently refused this proposal as a question of principle, because they feel that there is something contradictory about offering to give $50 million for free while preventing them from buying with their own money American equipment or taking delivery of American equipment already purchased.

The President made an eloquent presentation of his authority in this, and he received the same answer that we had received on four previous occasions. It is absolutely incorrect to say that the United States has not attempted to use this possibility.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, so we understand that precisely, did the President offer to waive the $50 million in exchange for returning the control of the American bases over to the United States?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The President offered this as a possibility in order to solve the problem that is posed by the bases, and it was not accepted.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, is there any particular impression of significance of the Brezhnev speech?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not had an opportunity to analyze it with the various Kremlinologists, so our reaction is a relatively off-the-cuff reaction based on brief exchanges.

We thought that on the whole it was a moderate speech, and on the whole it was a conciliatory speech -- which does not mean that we agree with every paragraph in it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, is there anything in the speech today -- you say on the whole it sounded conciliatory -- is there anything in the speech today that bothered you?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It depends what interpretation you give to certain phrases. For example, on the one hand, the phrase "there should be no interference in the domestic affairs, the internal affairs of other countries," has positive elements if you look at some of the things that have happened in Europe in the past two decades.

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PR 392

On the other hand, you can interpret it in another way -- with respect to the application of Basket 3. I am assuming that those principles that have been agreed to in the document will be lived up to in their entirety.

We have stated repeatedly that to us the document of the European Security Conference will be a criterion for how the implementation of the process of détente is working.

**QUESTION:** Isn't it possible, though, sir -- to put the interpretation on the Secretary's speech -- when he says, "Don't dictate to us our internal affairs," that he is saying in effect, "A pox on Basket 3?"

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have attempted to say -- I have said -- that if that is the interpretation we would not agree with it. Our assumption is that those obligations specifically undertaken in the European Security Conference will be carried out; that to the extent they will not be carried out that would, of course, raise serious questions. We do not interpret it in this way. I admit, however, that that phrase is capable of ambiguous interpretation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you mentioned yesterday that you were going to seek to put Turkish aid on a new basis and favored a radical rather than a stop-gap solution. Could you explain what you meant yesterday, and whether that was offered to the Turks, and what they said?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What we believe and what we have believed for the last year -- particularly since the negotiations started between the two sides -- is that a global solution of the Cyprus problem would enable all of these elements that we are now discussing piecemeal, to be dealt with in a coherent fashion.

On of the tragic aspects, as I view the situation, is that if the two sides could ever negotiate without artificial constraints, we judge the differences between the two sides to be not unbridgeable, but there are so many other elements that get involved -- domestic situations, national pride, and other pressures -- that have prevented a consecutive period of negotiation geared towards a rapid solution.

As far as United States-Turkish relationships are concerned, we continue to believe, as I said yesterday, that the fundamental security interests of Turkey and the United States require close association. But we have not found a way around the legislative obstacles that now exist.

**QUESTION:** Are you talking about some sort of a conference on the subject of Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-United States relations, or some such thing, to settle all the issues at once?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We strongly support a rapid solution of the Cyprus issue and we have repeatedly offered our good offices to both of the parties, and both of the parties -- and especially the Greek side -- have urged us to remain active.

As you may know, the President had an opportunity after dinner last night for an extended conversation with Archbishop Makarios, but one of the sad aspects of the present situation is the deadlock that has resulted before the negotiations have ever really got rolling.

Helen?

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you give us a curtain raiser on what the President is going to say tomorrow in view of the approach, the track he will take?

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PR 392

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the President obviously should speak for himself and will speak for himself. Basically, I think the President's speech will put forward our view as to the nature of détente, the importance of détente, the nature of it, the significance of the European Security Conference, what needs to be done in the future to give it complete political meaning and what other tasks are ahead of us in addition to what was done here.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said the President made an eloquent presentation of the constraints that are operating on him?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I said with respect to Mr. Brokaw's question, it was he made an eloquent presentation of the possibilities he has for waiving certain restrictions of the law in order to make clear that there was one limited area with respect to grant military aid in which he had discretion under existing law.

As Turkey has done on the previous occasions on which this was raised, they take the position that it is contradictory to be given for nothing certain amounts of aid while they are prohibited from taking possession of equipment they have already paid for and being prohibited to pay for their equipment.

They, in short, want the embargo lifted with respect to purchases. They do not particularly insist that it be lifted with respect to gifts, and we are in the paradoxical position that we are pleading with them to take for nothing what they insist they want to pay for.

**QUESTION:** Did you tell the Turkish Prime Minister that all of this was the fault of the Congress?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The President did not discuss whose fault it was. The President explained to the Prime Minister what authority he had under existing legislation and told the Prime Minister that he would be prepared to exercise that authority.

I hope we will not reach the point where various parts of the American Government, the Executive or the Legislative, go around to foreign governments to line up support against other braches of the government, and this is not the policy of the President nor the policy of any other member of the Administration.

**QUESTION:** What are you going to do about Turkey now, Mr. Secretary, about the whole question, the bases and the Cyprus issue?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With respect to the bases, these are decisions now that Turkey must make and Turkey must decide how far it wants to go in eroding a relationship that must, in the long term, be as much in its interest as in ours.

With respect to Cyprus, we remain prepared to use our good offices. In addition to whatever the United States might do on a national basis, we have talked individually to several of the members of the European Community, and we would encourage action by the European Community to help solve the disputes between Greece and Turkey.

We are prepared to join them, or we are prepared to act separately. But we cannot, by ourselves, create entirely new conditions, so we believe that the conflict between Greece and Turkey is a disaster for both countries and is a disaster for the Western alliance. We hope that all parties concerned -- within the United States, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean -- will understand the larger interest involved.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, are you certain that the Turks will still accept the quid pro quo for returning the bases for military aid or have relations been exacerbated by the latest House vote so that they might, even if the House were to go ahead with this aid --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is our impression that the situation is still recoverable; in other words, that the bases could be substantially restored if the House reversed itself.

In addition, the President has made clear in his many briefings to Congressmen -- and he has also made it clear to all the parties here -- that if the Congress reverses itself, the United States would feel a particular moral obligation to accelerate progress on the Cyprus issue, but in any event, we will do our best, though our ability to be effective has been reduced.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there was a meeting today between Demiral and Soviet leader Brezhnev. Is there any danger here that if action is not reversed, that Turkey could go into some kind of relationship with the Soviet Union, military relationship?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I consider it extremely unlikely that Turkey would go into a military relationship with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as the relationship between Turkey and the United States deteriorates, Turkey will look for other connections.

In my judgment, they are not necessarily or not in all likelihood going to be Soviet connections. They could be in other areas. In any event, when one looks at the situation in the Mediterranean, on one end the event in Portugal, it seems to us extremely risky, by American actions, to break up the security arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean, and I say this without choosing between Greece and Turkey because we require the friendship of both and we consider both equally important.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if I may return to the Conference for a moment and Mr. Brezhnev's speech, does it give you any pause when he praises the so-called "well-known humanistic policies of Lenin," which he wants to spread around the world?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This was an interpretation of Lenin, which I would not have put first on the agenda if I had been asked to give a lecture. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Soviet Union, because of Helsinki, will make some new move in Asia -- whether the Soviet Union would propose an Asian collective security system?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Soviet Union has not shared with me the future plans of its foreign policy, but if the Soviet Union is thinking of an Asian collective security system, it would be a conference without American participation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how far is the United States prepared to go in preventing Israel from being thrown out of the UN?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has expressed its very strong opposition to either the expulsion or the suspension of Israel from the United Nations. The United States objects to this on the grounds that it is in violation of the Charter.

The United States will certainly take definite and clear actions should the United Nations take a vote in violation of the Charter. What this action will be, I do not think it is appropriate for me now to discuss but we

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believe that such a decision by the United Nations would have serious consequences for the world organization.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, we received some reports from various U. S. officials to the effect that the loss we have encountered in Turkey, as far as our intelligence-gathering capability is -- concerning missile developments and other military matters -- is irreplaceable and they speak in the most dire terms of what could happen if we do not in some way regain this capability in Turkey. Would you assess that for us?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have briefed members of the House of Representatives and Senators as to the installations that are relevant to that issue. We believe these installations -- under present circumstances it is hard to see how they could be replaced.

For me to attempt an assessment here is impossible because it involves highly classified security information. But the blow would be very serious, especially with respect to certain categories of information that impinge on verification problems.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Wilson today expressed concern about Portugal and you said it was greeted with dismay. Are the Four Powers any closer to trying to expel Portugal from NATO than they were before the Helsinki meeting?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No specific decision was made or indeed no particular procedures were discussed as to how the various countries could register their dismay, except to make sure that we would stay in close contact with each other, but it was recognized that events in Portugal are of profound consequence for NATO, for the political evolution of Western Europe, and that they are incompatible in our present understanding of them with any concept of pluralistic democracy.

**QUESTION:** Then you did discuss attempts to expel Portugal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I thought I said we did not.

**QUESTION:** You said no decision was made.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. What I attempted to say was the relationship -- the impact of Portugal on NATO under these conditions was discussed, as it was discussed already in Brussels, but no specific proposal with respect to it was made. The meeting was primarily an analysis of the situation rather than a discussion of courses of action.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * *

PRESS INTERVIEW

Participants: Secretary Kissinger
Garric Utley, NBC News

<u>Sec. Kissinger</u>: I am really impressed by the way they have run this Conference.

<u>Mr. Utley</u>: On the few weeks' notice, the only thing I found that wasn't up to snuff was that once they didn't have the service in a restaurant...I waited an hour and 15 minutes for a lunch out there/and the only thing that didn't work.

I assume you're running, Peter, because I hear something in the back, so we can go right into this briefing.

The first question simply is the one that everybody in the United States is simply the price of tonight/is/Detente, and, on the road to detente from time to time you have to pay a price at the toll booth. How high was the price here in Helsinki?

<u>Sec. Kissinger</u>: Well, first of all, detente is in the interests of the United States. What it means is that the two nuclear super powers/reduce the danger of military confrontation. That is not a favor we do somebody else, that is something we do for ourselves and for other countries. As for the price/of any significant price that was paid in Helsinki, and I think the Conference established some principles which, if they're applied, will ease international relations.<u>and</u> If they are not applied, will leave

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things no worse than they were.

**Mr. Utley:** For example, the West was able to get some concessions out of the Communists...freer flow of information, Western newspapers, some easing of travel restrictions. Do you personally believe that the East European governments will carry this out anything more than a token gesture?

**Sec. Kissinger:** I think it depends on the general international situation. If relations continue to ease, they'll carry at least some of it out. And in any event, it gives us something to appeal to. If the Soviet Union, for example, were to invade another East European country, they wouldn't necessarily be stopped by the document but it would give them an additional obstacle, for whatever difference that makes. On our side, we recognize nothing that hasn't been recognized before and that has been challenged by anybody. So much is made of the recognition of frontiers, who is challenging what frontiers in Europe today.

**Mr. Utley:** This declaration of 30,000 words which has been signed here...do we intend to use it as a sort of a yardstick or a check list against which Communist performance and detente can be measured?

**Sec. Kissinger:** We are going to use it as a check list and as a criterion against which Soviet performance and Communist performance in Eastern Europe can be measured.

**Mr. Utley:** And if they fail to come up to scratch on a higher definition, what would that mean for detente?

**Sec. Kissinger:** Well, it would certainly hinder detente. One of the byproducts, incidentally, of this Conference is a general loosening up in East-West relations. We have the President visiting a number of key East European countries; we have had talks with several of the Foreign Ministers of the key East European countries, all of whom want to improve relations with the United States. And I don't think anybody could be at this Conference and believe that it was the West which was on the defensive. Quite the opposite was true.

**Mr. Utley:** In the Hall, at Finlandia House, listening to speeches for three days, I was struck by a fact that, in this debate, so to speak, between East and West there was unanimity as to the need of necessity of detente in theory in general. But it seemed there was disagreement as to what detente, in fact, should mean...that is, we talked about and emphasised the concessions which we expected from the East, the East talked about recognition in the security of their borders. It seemed there were two sides, in any case, for talking by each other. Did you notice this? How do you react to this?

**Sec. Kissinger:** Well, I would say I had a slightly different impression. I had the impression that the West was, I would have to say almost surprisingly self-confident about its values. The East, when it appealed to any values, appealed to our

values, not its own values. On the question of recognition
of frontiers, one has to remember every European country
has separate agreements with the East European countries
recognizing these frontiers. Nothing new was added by this
document to an existing state of affairs.

<u>Mr. Utley</u>: Where do you go now on the road of detente
after Helsinki?

<u>Sec. Kissinger</u>: Well, as the President said today, we have
to make progress on the limitation of strategic arms. We
should reduce the military confrontation in Central Europe.
Beyond that, we should try to check the spread of nuclear
weapons and, in the conduct of our relations to each other,
that is, East and West, we must show the strength and we must
try to move things to a more cooperative attitude. If these
things don't happen, then we will again live in a tense
period, and then the United States will do what is necessary.
But we have a duty, and I think it's in the interests of all
of our citizens that we try to reach the more positive evolu-
tion.

<u>Mr. Utley</u>: You think we'll get a SALT agreement?

<u>Sec. Kissinger</u>: I'll know a little better after tomorrow.
I'm hopeful that we'll get a SALT agreement.

<u>Mr. Utley</u>: And the reduction of troops in Central Europe?

<u>Sec. Kissinger</u>: That's a little further off, but I think we have a good chance with that, too.

<u>Mr. Utley</u>: Let's call it quits, then. Over and out.

<u>Sec. Kissinger</u>: Thank you. Well done, well done.