HAK:

After your SASC testimony on NATO last
January, you were sent 3 additional ques-
tions from Sen. Santorum for written
response to include in the transcript.
You declined to answer because of travel
and other work.

The transcript has yet to be published,
and they are still trying to get these
written responses. And now, in what seems
an excess of bureaucratic zeal, we are
told that even if the testimony is printed
without them, it is the Committee's policy
to have them in their files.

I don't recall this ever happening before
after you have testified. They are now
planning to print in two weeks.

Would you want to respond? I have retyped
the questions because what was sent to us
is hard to read.

ssm

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SANTORUM (Addendum)

1. The US recently signed a Charter of Partnership with the countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In this Charter, the US indicates that NATO membership for the Baltic states would enhance European stability and NATO strategic objectives.

What do you recommend as the best strategy to provide security and stability to the Balkans?

2. There has been substantial debate on how best to respond to individuals indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Should NATO aggressively pursue these indicted war criminals?

3. What role should the US military play in the apprehension of these individuals?

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TRANSCRIPT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE COMMITTEE BY

I testified on NATO enlargement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 30, 1997, a copy of which is attached. Because of overseas travel, I have not had an opportunity to develop a full-fledged statement nor to address the more specific issues raised by Senators Thurmond and Levin in their letter of January 19. However, I will attempt to respond to these questions extemporaneously.

The following is a summary of my presentation.

Speaking Notes

Thank you for the opportunity to testify with respect to the extension of the American troop presence in Bosnia. Like several Senators, I was ambivalent about the deployment of American troops when it was first proposed, since it was at the margin of the American national interest as I understood it. Peace in Bosnia was important, but not every important international goal rises to the stature of having to be vindicated by risking American lives. Nevertheless, like many Senators here, I went along with it, (1) because of the danger of setting a precedent for other conflicts in or close to Europe, (2) because two NATO allies--Britain and France--were already involved and threatened to withdraw-- and the Administration had promised to support this extrication with American troops and (3) because of the intrinsic merit of the enterprise.

However, from the beginning, I have made clear that I supported the presence of American forces for one purpose only: the preservation of peace.

The key document with respect to Bosnia is the Dayton Agreement. The Administration and its negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, deserve much credit for bringing about a cease-fire. But the Dayton Agreement has two aspects: the military provisions that establish a cease-fire and place international forces between the contending parties; and political provisions which seek to bring about a unitary multi-ethnic state composed of Croats, Serbs and Moslems.

I support the first objective. I am deeply worried about the use of American forces to bring about the second.

The Administration's tendency is to treat Bosnian tensions as an institutional problem to be overcome by constitutional provisions that reconcile the parties and establish procedures for settling conflicts. But, for the Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical memory, which for centuries has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and unquenchable aspirations.

Throughout their histories, Serbs and Croats have considered
themselves defenders of their religions, first against a
Muslim tide, then against each other. The Serbs' identity
derives from a series of bloody battles in defense of the
Serbian faith and population against Islam. Once Islam was
stopped, the Serbs fought to vindicate their independence
from Catholic Austria, identified for them by the Croats.

The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse--they view
themselves as upholders of Catholicism against Serbian
Orthodoxy and Islam. And the Muslims know that they are
regarded by the two other ethnic groups as a historical
instrument of the hated Turks and therefore--since
ethnically they are at one with the Serbs and Croats--as
turncoats.

The deep-seated hatred of each party for all the others
exists because their conflict is more akin to the Thirty
Years War over religion than it is to political conflict.
And this should serve to caution the United States not to
get in between these parties by trying to impose political
solutions drawn from our own, largely secular, experience.

Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each group
committed unspeakable cruelties in the process of expelling
the other groups from the regions that they controlled--the
ethnic cleansing. The Serbs started the process but, as the
war continued, the other parties also engaged in murderous
acts--the Croats in Krajina, the Muslims around Sarajevo.

The NATO allies would have done well to stop the killing six
years ago, in its incipient phase. They could have taken
the position that they would not tolerate such outrages
within reach of NATO forces and on the continent where the
political concept of human dignity originated and is now
institutionalized. As a result of their failure to do so,
each of the ethnic regions of Bosnia has become largely
homogenous; the results of ethnic cleansing are now the
dominant fact of life in Bosnia.

The political provisions of the Dayton Agreement seek to
reverse this state of affairs. They provide for free
movement among the ethnic enclaves, for free repatriation of
refugees and for elections leading to national
reconciliation. This vision has turned out to be a mirage.

No free movement among the various ethnic enclaves takes
place, and no mail or telephone services exist. Each ethnic
group issues its own currency, license plates and passports.
Serbs with Cyrillic license plates are at particular risk in

other areas, but so are the Muslims and Croats if they leave
their enclaves. Not surprisingly, refugees tend to return
home only with armed escorts and are frequently obliged to
flee as soon as the escorts leave.

Attempting to create a unitary multi-ethnic state will
therefore involve us in one of two outcomes: either a
resumption of the civil war, which sooner or later will
claim American casualties, or a victory of the Muslim part
followed by ethnic cleansing, this time of the Serbs. (30%
of the Croats have already left.) The reason for this
prediction is that the military balance between Muslims and
Serbs has been reversed in favor of the former as a result
of America's only slightly indirect efforts. Either course
will risk American casualties; the second raises the
question of why it is in the American interest to create a
fairly large Muslim state with ties to Iran in the center of
the Balkans.

For all these reasons, I recommend that the Senate approve
the continuation of an American troop presence in Bosnia.
But the political purposes of the mission should be
redefined by a suitable Congressional expression. I support
the recommendation of former US Deputy Commander Charles
Boyd in a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs*. (a) Bosnia
should be constituted as a loose Confederation with no
attempt by us or the international force to increase the
power of the central authority. (b) The United States
should be more even-handed in the distribution of aid and
cease intervention in the political details of especially
the Serbian part of Bosnia. I am extremely uneasy about the
degree of detail of the intervention of the international
force, especially in the Serbian part of Bosnia.
Reconstruction aid should be more equitably divided.
(c) The US should avoid arming one of the constituent ethnic
groups.

Henry A. Kissinger

QUESTION FOR THE RECORD

Senate Armed Services Committee

NATO Enlargement/Bosnia Policy Hearing

From Senator Rick Santorum

February 2, 1998

Dr. Kissinger, the United States recently signed a Charter of Partnership with the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In this charter, the United States indicates that NATO membership for the Baltic states would enhance European stability and NATO strategic objectives.

A. What do you recommend as the best strategy to provide security and stability to the Baltics?

2. Secondly, there has been substantial debate on how to best to respond to individuals indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

b. What role should the United States military play in the apprehension of these individuals?

JAN-23-1998 18:11

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before this committee on a matter of such importance to America's future. If this century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success.

The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America or Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius. Without Europe, America's path would be lonely; without America, Europe's role would approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent it.

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role, Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of Europe that is historically valid--that is, which includes the nations of Central Europe.

An American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against German

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2

hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of its foreign policy.

Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays them.

I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would store up endless future troubles.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of the common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt America's leadership role and to try to influence the security position of the buffer zone. Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion between Germany and

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3

Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a
political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

Considerations such as these have transformed the great
Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early
NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely
appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic
evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the
most optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely
compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in
Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does
not share this view.

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two
conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia
against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe
between Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely
to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as
its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may
drift out of their association with Europe. The end result
would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has
tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from
defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is
opting for progressive irrelevance.

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply
worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia
to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils.
Alliances define a common threat; collective security deals
with a legal contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be
defended; collective security is open-ended and is redefined
from case-to-case.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective
security, not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties'
"shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided
Europe, whole and free" and refers to the parties' "allegiance
to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior." But
Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms
to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist.
Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting
of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border
with Ukraine. Of what, then, do the shared commitments cited
in the Founding Act consist?

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The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead (and only once) the euphemism "commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty" (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the nature of these commitments.

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes--not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states--decisions are made by consensus.

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall

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5

relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the US Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State for clarification on a number of these issues when she appeared before the committee two weeks ago.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution

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6

should declare that the United States expects Russia--after
the qualitative changes that we have made--to desist from all
pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the
meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of
Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to
join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the
institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion
comes into being years before expansion occurs.

If the administration does not want to be remembered as
having in effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this
century, it should welcome efforts to clarify the many
ambiguities in the Founding Act. In this way, a truly
bipartisan approach to American-European security relations
can be restored.

TOTAL P.07

TC:

Use this as the heading:

I testified on NATO enlargement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 30, 1998, and a copy is attached. Because of overseas travel, I have not had an opportunity to address the more specific issues raised by Senator Thurmond and Senator Levin, but I will attempt to comment on these questions extemporaneously.

I testified on NATO enlargement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 30, 1997, a copy of which is attached. Because of overseas travel, I have not had an opportunity to develop a full-fledged statement to address the more specific issues raised by Senator Thurmond and Senator Levin in their letter of January 19. However, I will attempt to respond to these questions extemporaneously.

[Y]

Because of overseas travel I have not been able to develop a full-fledged statement. The following is a summary of my presentation.

## Speaking Notes

2

3

4

1/26/98pm - Draft #3

Speaking Notes

Thank you for the opportunity to testify with respect
to the extension of the American troop presence in Bosnia.
Like several Senators, I was ambivalent about the deployment
of American troops when it was first proposed, since it was
at the margin of the American national interest as I
understood it. Peace in Bosnia was important, but not every
important international goal rises to the stature of having
to be vindicated by risking American lives. Nevertheless,
like many Senators here, I went along with it because of the
danger of setting a precedent for other conflicts in
or close to Europe, (2) because two NATO allies--Britain and
France--were already involved and threatened to withdraw--
and the Administration had promised to support this
extrication with American troops (1) and (3) because of the
intrinsic merit of the enterprise.

The key document with respect to Bosnia is the Dayton Agreement. The Administration and its negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, deserve much credit for bringing about a cease-fire. But the Dayton Agreement has two aspects: the military provisions that establish a cease-fire and place international forces between the contending parties, and political provisions which seek to bring about a unitary multi-ethnic state composed of Croats, Serbs and Moslems.

The Administration's tendency is to treat Bosnian tensions as an institutional problem to be overcome by constitutional provisions that reconcile the parties and establish procedures for settling conflicts. But for the Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical memory, which has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and unquenchable aspirations for centuries.

2

The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse--as upholders of Catholicism against Serbian Orthodoxy and Islam. And the Muslims know that they are regarded by the two other ethnic groups as a historical instrument of the hated Turks and therefore--since ethnically they are at one with the Serbs and Croats--as turncoats.

Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each group committed unspeakable cruelties in the process of expelling the other groups from the regions that they controlled--the ethnic cleansing. The Serbs started the process, but, as the war continued, the other parties also engaged in murderous acts--the Croats in Krajina, the Muslims around Sarajevo.

3

4

LYJ

5

1/26/98pm - Draft #2

Thank you for the opportunity to testify with respect to the extension of the American troop presence in Bosnia. Like several Senators on this Committee, I was ambivalent about the deployment of American troops when it was first proposed. It was at the margin of the American national interest as I understood it. Peace in Bosnia was important, but not every important international goal rises to the stature of having to be vindicated by risking American lives. Nevertheless, like many Senators here, I went along with it, because (1) of the danger of setting a precedent for other conflicts in or close to Europe, (2) because two NATO allies--Britain and France--were already involved and threatened to withdraw--and the Administration had promised to support this extrication with American troops [and] (3) because of the intrinsic merit of the enterprise.

However, from the beginning, I have made clear that I supported the presence of American forces for one purpose only: the preservation of peace. I do not believe that the political objectives rise in importance to the level of risking American lives.

The key document with respect to the political evaluation of Bosnia is the Dayton Agreement. The Administration and its negotiator, Richard Holbrooke,

deserve much credit for bringing about a cease-fire. But
the Dayton Agreement has two aspects: the military
provisions that establish a cease-fire and place
international forces between the contending parties. And
political provisions which seek to bring about a unitary
multi-ethnic state composed of Croats, Serbs and Moslems.

I support the first objective. I am deeply worried
about the second use of American forces & many about this
second reason.

Throughout their histories, the Serbs and Croats have
considered themselves defenders of their religions, first
against a Muslim tide, then against each other. The Serbs'
identity derives from a series of bloody battles in defense
of the Serbian faith and population against Islam. Once
Islam was stopped, the Serbs fought to vindicate their
independence from Catholic Austria, spearheaded by the
Croats, identified as Axis盟.

The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse--as
upholders of Catholicism against Serbian Orthodoxy and

2

Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each
group committed unspeakable cruelties in the process of
expelling the other groups from the regions that they
controlled--the ethnic cleansing. The Serbs started the
process, but as the war continued, the other parties also
engaged in murderous acts--the Croats in Krajina, the
Muslims around Sarajevo.

LYI

The political provisions of the Dayton agreement seek
to reverse this state of affairs. They provide for free
movement among the ethnic enclaves, for free repatriation of
refugees and for elections leading to national
reconciliation. This vision has turned out to be a mirage.

Attempting to create a unitary multi-ethnic state will
therefore involve us in one of two outcomes: either a
resumption of the civil war which sooner or later will claim
American casualties or a victory of the Muslim part followed
by ethnic cleansing, this time of the Serbs. (30% of the
Croats have already left.) Either course will risk American
casualties; the second raises the question of why it is in
the American interest to create a fairly large Muslim state
with ties to Iran in the center of the Balkans.

4

1/26/98pm - Draft #2

I support the first objective. I am deeply worried
about the second.

Throughout their histories, the Serbs and Croats have
considered themselves defenders of their religions, first
against a Muslim tide, then against each other. The Serbs'
identity derives from a series of bloody battles in defense
of the Serbian faith and population against Islam. Once
Islam was stopped, the Serbs fought to vindicate their
independence from Catholic Austria, spearheaded by the
Croats.

2

3

For all these reasons, I recommended that the Senate
approve the continuation of an American troop presence in
Bosnia. But the political purposes of the mission should be
redefined by a suitable Congressional expression(?).

(a) Bosnia should be constituted as a loose Confederation
with no attempt by us or the international force to increase
the power of the central authority. I am in this regard
extremely uneasy about the degree of detail of the
intervention of the international force, especially in the
Serbian part of Bosnia. (b) Reconstruction aid should be
more equitably divided. (c) The military build-up of the
Muslim part should be stopped as General Boyd, the former
Deputy Commander of NATO, has recommended.

5

JAN-23-1998 18:40

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1/23/98pm - Draft #1

JAN-23-1998 18:40

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The Administration's tendency is to treat Bosnian
tensions as political problem to be overcome by
constitutional provisions that reconcile the parties and
establish procedures for settling conflicts. But for the
Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical
memory, which has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and
unquenchable aspirations for centuries.

'The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse--as
upholders of Catholicism against Serbian Orthodoxy and
Islam. And the Muslims know that they are regarded by the
two other ethnic groups as a historical instrument of the

JAN-23-1998 18:41

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JAN-23-1998 18:41

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Attempting to create a unitary multi-ethnic state will therefore involve us in one of two outcomes: either a vacuum or a civil war which sooner or later will claim American casualties or a victory of the Muslim part followed by ethnic cleansing, this time of the Serbs. (30% of the Croats have already left.) Either course will risk American casualties; the second raises the question of why it is in the American interest to create a fairly large Muslim state with ties to Iran in the center of the Balkans.

JAN-23-1998 18:41

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Bosnia. But the political purposes of the mission should be redefined by a suitable Congressional expression(?).

(a) Bosnia should be constituted as a loose Confederation with no attempt by us or the international force to increase the power of the central authority. I am in this regard extremely uneasy about the degree of detail of the intervention of the international force, especially in the Serbian part of Bosnia. (b) Reconstruction aid should be more equitably divided. (c) The military build-up of the Muslim part should be stopped as General Boyd, the General of the Army, has recommended.

5

TOTAL P.05

1/23/98pm - Draft #1

The Administration's tendency is to treat Bosnian
tensions as a political problem to be overcome by
constitutional provisions that reconcile the parties and
establish procedures for settling conflicts. But for the
Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical
memory, which has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and
unquenchable aspirations for centuries.

00

2

3

Attempting to create a unitary multi-ethnic state will therefore involve us in one of two outcomes: either a _________ civil war which sooner or later will claim American casualties or a victory of the Muslim part followed by ethnic cleansing, this time of the Serbs. (30% of the Croats have already left.) Either course will risk American casualties; the second raises the question of why it is in the American interest to create a fairly large Muslim state with ties to Iran in the center of the Balkans.

4

(a) Bosnia should be constituted as a loose Confederation
with no attempt by us or the international force to increase
the power of the central authority. I am in this regard
extremely uneasy about the degree of detail of the
intervention of the international force, especially in the
Serbian part of Bosnia. (b) Reconstruction aid should be
more equitably divided. (c) The military build-up of the
Muslim part should be stopped.

5

The Washington Post
Monday, September 22, 1997

Henry Kissinger

# Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia

Every American foreign policy setback, from Indochina to Somalia, has resulted from the failure to define objectives, to choose means appropriate to these objectives and to create a public opinion prepared to pay the necessary price over the requisite period of time.

We are now on the verge of sliding into a similar dilemma in Bosnia: Our goals are unrealistic, the means available do not fit the objectives and the public is unlikely to back the probable consequences of our actions. Policy drifts because three issues await resolution: What are our objectives in Bosnia? How long should our troops stay? What risks should we run for the capture of war criminals?

In 1991, when Yugoslavia broke up, the United States joined the other NATO countries in recognizing its various administrative subdivisions as independent states. With respect to Croatia and Slovenia, inhabited by a dominant ethnic group, this decision made sense. But in Bosnia, populated by Croats, Serbs and Muslims whose reciprocal hatreds had broken up the much larger Yugoslavia, the attempt to bring about a multiethnic state evoked a murderous civil war.

The same flaw that attended the birth of the Bosnian state lies at the heart of the dilemmas of the Dayton accords mediated by the United States that brought about the current Bosnian cease-fire. Its military provisions separate the parties substantially along the lines of the ethnic enclaves that emerged as hostilities ceased. But the political provisions do the opposite: They seek to unite these enclaves under the banner of a multiethnic state that caused the explosion in the first place.

The American tendency is to treat Bosnian tensions as a political problem to be overcome by constitutional provisions that reconcile the parties and establish procedures for settling conflicts. But for the Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical memory, which has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and unquenchable aspirations for centuries.

The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse—as upholders of Catholicism against Ser-

bian Orthodoxy and Islam. And the Muslims know that they are regarded by the two other ethnic groups as a historical instrument of the hated Turks and therefore—since ethnically they are at one with the Serbs and Croats—as turncoats.

Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each group committed unspeakable cruelties in the process of expelling the other groups from the regions that they controlled—the ethnic cleansing. The Serbs started the process, but as the war continued, the other parties also engaged in murderous acts—the Croats in Krajina, the Muslims around Sarajevo. Among the existing leaders, few, if any, innovative are to be found.

The NATO allies would have done well to stop the killing six years ago, in its incipient phase. They could have taken the position that they would not tolerate such outrages within reach of NATO forces and on the continent where the political concept of human dignity originated and is now institutionalized. As a result of their failure to do so, each of the ethnic regions of Bosnia has become largely homogeneous; the results of ethnic cleansing are now the dominant fact of life in Bosnia.

Nor will elections solve the problem. In Bosnia, elections are not about alternation in office but about dominance determining life, death and religion. They must either ratify the new ethnic composition or, since refugees vote

(Over)

> Whenever the various ethnic groups have lived together in apparent harmony, it was due to the pressure of some outside force that overwhelmed their passions.

on the rolls of the towns from which they have been expelled, produce the bizarre situation that absentee voters are in a position to "win" and, in effect, gain the right to rule the group that expelled them. In the Krajina region, for example, now occupied by Croatia, the voting rolls of many towns show a majority of Serbs, all of whom have been expelled. Are NATO forces expected to enforce this outcome?

Refusing to recognize these realities has twisted American policies into contortions that will guarantee an ultimate breakdown. Exerting considerable economic and political pressure, we engineered the shotgun wedding between Croats and Muslims that goes under the label of the Bosnian Federation. In this technically multi-ethnic structure, within which no cease-fire line is necessary according to the official mythology, NATO patrols only the line between the so-called Federation and the Serb part of Bosnia.

Reality mocks this mythology. The dividing line between Croats and Muslims is as rigid as the one between them and the Serbs. No Croat officials enter Muslim territory; no Muslim official serves in the Croat part of the Federation. Few Croats are to be found in Sarajevo, the purported capital of the Federation that was ethnically cleansed when the Muslims took it over after the Dayton accords were signed. Nor is there free movement of Croat and Muslim groups within the Federation.

It is a conceit that this state of affairs is the fault of a few evil bigots who, once removed either to war crimes trials or to exile, will permit the natural preference of the ethnic groups for some sort of unity to assert itself. This misconception has tempted senior American officials to pretend that Croat attitudes are the aberrations of its president, Franjo Tudjman, and has led the American NATO commander to abandon the neutral position of mediator and involve himself in the internal struggles of the Serb part of Bosnia.

Neither judgment is correct. In Croatia, the opposition is even less flexible than the presi-

dent. And while Serb strongman Radovan Karadzic well deserves to be placed before a war crimes tribunal, his adversary, Biljana Plavsic, will not survive politically unless she too advocates nationalist Serb policies without, of course, the war-crime element.

A multiethnic state in Bosnia is unlikely to emerge except after another round of fighting, and then only if one of the parties achieves an overwhelming victory. Should NATO military power be used to promote such an outcome? Should American casualties be incurred to force the various ethnic groups into a multiethnic state that the majority of them do not want? Why should we violate our own principle of self-determination in pursuit of such goals?

American pressure to implement the political provisions of the Dayton accords may well lead to precisely such an outcome. The cease-fire now holds because of NATO's military preponderance and because the Muslims, the only ethnic group seeking a multiethnic state, are arming for the purpose of imposing what we are urging. Since they are now already the better equipped, they will probably achieve initial successes and thereupon implement another round of ethnic cleansing. At that point, the Croats would almost certainly enter the fray to keep the Muslims from achieving a dominant position. And Russia, the historical protector of the Serbs, is unlikely to remain passive—at least politically.

Some favor such risks to punish the evil men who are assumed to have undermined the traditional coexistence between the ethnic groups. But there has never been a Bosnian state on the present territory of Bosnia. Whenever the various ethnic groups have lived together in apparent harmony, it was due to the pressure of some outside force that overwhelmed their passions—the Turks, the Austrians or Tito's dictatorship. The Croats slaughtered the Serbs under Hitler; the Serbs slaughtered the Croats in the early years of Tito; both Croats and Serbs cling to a collective memory of Muslim atrocities under Turkish rule.

Another often-cited argument holds that to abandon the political part of the Dayton agreement is to reward aggression on the model of Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. The analogy is mistaken. Hitler violated a recognized sovereign state; Bosnia's civil war was triggered by the West's misconceived attempt to experiment with a multiethnic state among populations divided by religion and whose very reason for existence has been to prevent domination by the other ethnic groups.

America has no national interest for which to risk lives to produce a multiethnic state in Bosnia. The creation of a multiethnic state should be left to negotiations among the parties—welcomed by America if it happens but not pursued at the risk of American lives. America does have a political concern to preserve the cease-fire for a reasonable period. We have already extended the deadline for withdrawal which the president promised to Congress. A case can be made to extend it once again with gradually reduced forces for a limited period—but after next June with personnel who have specifically volunteered for this duty, backed up by air power and naval forces stationed nearby. Manning cease-fire lines in Bosnia cannot be a permanent American undertaking.

As for the war criminals, there is no doubt that they deserve to be judged before a tribunal constituted for that purpose at The Hague. In the current state of affairs, an American military move would be construed as an effort to break Serb resistance to a multiethnic state and therefore would be opposed bitterly by the Serb population. But if America confined its role in Bosnia to maintaining the cease-fire lines and left the political evolution to the parties, a situation might present itself in which the arrest of war criminals could be dealt with on its merits.

America must avoid drifting into a crisis with implications it may not be able to master. The administration deserves much credit for having brought about the end of hostilities. Ending communal hatred is a longer-term challenge. We can facilitate this but we cannot justify military action.

n:

JAN-23-1998 18:35

KAI DC

212 753 7248

STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN

JOHN W. WARNER, VIRGINIA
JOHN MCCAIN, ARIZONA
BAN DOATS, INDIANA
BOB SMITH, NEW HAMPSHIRE
DICK KEMPTHORNE, IDAHO
JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
RICK SANTORUM, PENNSYLVANIA
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, MAINE
PAT ROBERTS, KANSAS

CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
JEFF BINGAMAN, NEW MEXICO
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
CHARLES S. RODD, VIRGINIA
JOSEPH L. LIEBERMAN, CONNECTICUT
MAX CLELAND, GEORGIA

LES BROWNLEE, STAFF DIRECTOR
DAVID S. Lyles, STAFF DIRECTOR FOR THE MINORITY

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

January 19, 1998

JAN 23 1998

Office of the Honorable Henry Kissinger
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K. Street, N.W., Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Committee on Armed Services will conduct a hearing on Thursday, January 29 at 2:30 p.m. in SH-216 on the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia and the strategic rationale and national security implications of enlarging the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We invite you to provide your views on these two very important issues.

Your experience in national security and foreign policy will be of considerable value to the Committee as it prepares for the debates on these matters. So that the Committee may conduct a more focused view, we ask that you address issues related to costs associated with enlarging NATO. Specifically, we are interested in your views on the ability and willingness of current allies to bear their share of the costs associated with enlarging the Alliance and taking on additional security commitments while their defense budgets are declining. We are also interested in the ability of prospective new members to bear the costs required to bring their armed forces up to NATO standards at this early stage of their transition to market economies.

As for defense policy matters and adaptation of NATO, we ask that you address the Alliance's post-Cold War defense posture and strategy of mutual defense and how NATO will adapt to reflect new collective defense priorities and commitments. The Committee is also interested in several other important issues related to enlarging NATO membership. These issues include the manner in which decisions will be reached in an enlarged North Atlantic Council; the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO; the reorganization of NATO's military organization to reflect the Combined Joint Task Force concept; and the relationships between the NAC and the Permanent Joint Council and the Euro-Atlantic Joint Partnership Council.

Regarding the continued deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia, the Committee is interested in your views on the contribution of the SFOR operation to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and on NATO policies, to include the enforcement of restrictions on the size and use of police forces in Bosnia; the disestablishment of special police forces; actions or rules of engagement for SFOR forces for response to physical attacks against them; and SFOR