MEETING NOTES

9th Pugwash Conference

Cambridge, England

August 25-30, 1962

August 25--Plenary Session

The Plenary Session was opened by Sir Nevill Mott (UK) and following readings of statements from Kennedy + Kruishoff, then by that five papers: were presented: ② "The Present Stage of Disarmament

Negotiations", V. M. Khvostov

① "Is a Meaningful Test Ban Agreement Possible?" -- Harrison Brown
"General-Problems-of-Disarmament

④ "General and Complete Disarmament" -- A. V. Topchiev

③ "General Problems of Disarmament" -- Louis B. Sohn

⑤ "The Way Ahead"--P. M. S. Blackett

Following that, the session was open for discussion of the papers.

was
First by Szilard, who stated that his remarks were intended to be a
criticism of Brown's paper. They were, briefly:

The Soviet Union desires disarmament for economic reasons
and in keeping with its economic policy. The United States
is not so motivated. In fact, the United States is probably
not interested in total disarmament. Instead, the United States
wishes to control the arms race to decrease the danger level

and incidentally to save a little in cost.

The United States thinks about disarmament "every other
day." In the meantime, the U.S. is building Minutemen
"as fast as possible," and by now has almost enough for
a counterforce strike against Soviet Union missile bases
"in case of war in Europe." This "implied" intention on
the part of the United States to destroy the Soviet
capability to strike the U.S. can only be temporary, at
least until 1965 but probably not much later, when the
Soviet Union will have such a large number of strategic
missiles that it will be impossible for the counterforce
capability of the U.S. to neutralize them.

The United States might give up this strategic superiority
if it can find some workable agreement, but it has so far
been quite difficult to find an agreement which the U.S.
considers workable and which the Soviet Union will accept.

Szilard suggested destroying some certain number of missiles on our
side for some certain number of missiles destroyed by the Soviets. However, it

is not likely that the Soviets will accept this, since in accepting
such an arrangement they will be admitting how few missiles they
actually have. One fundamental purpose of these Pugwash conferences
should be to find out what sort of arrangement the Soviet Union will
actually accept--but the Pugwash meetings have consistently failed to
do this. It should also be the function of the scientists from the U.S.
to come to Pugwash to criticize the U.S. proposals and the function of
the Soviet scientists to criticize the Soviet proposals.

The second comment was given by Professor Prochazka from the
Czechoslovakia Academy of Sciences. This seemed to be little more than
a ritual dance in which Prochazka complimented the Soviet scientists on
their interest in peace, etc., etc. He also wished to enthusiastically
(USSR) support academician Topchiev's suggestion for an international disarmament
year to be handled in a similar manner to the international geophysical
year (whatever that means).

The third speaker was (I believe) Professor Straub from Hungary
who also lent his support to the Soviet side.

Following this was an intermission during which Jay Orear and I
had a chance to talk to Professor Igor Tamm (USSR) on problems connected

with the test ban agreement. In particular, Tamm was reviewing the idea
of having an international commission of scientists sit in judgment on
all "suspicious events" reported recorded by seismic stations operated by
nationals in various countries. According to Tamm, when this international
commission concluded that the country under suspicion had not presented
sufficient proof that the event was genuinely seismic, the commission
would suggest to the country that it invite an on-the-spot inspection.

If the country under suspicion would not come through with the invitation,
then the agreement could be abrogated. Tamm felt that this would be very
effective, since the country under suspicion would also be under great
moral pressure from all other countries to come across with the invitation.

Orear wanted very much to get down to details, going over the total number
of events which might be expected to fall into this category, and I was
suggesting to Tamm that the international commission would not be making
a purely scientific judgment but would be actually making a highly political
judgment if it found evidence which would require some country to invite
an on-the-spot inspection. Scientists from India, no matter how objective
they might be, might be reluctant to suggest such an inspection in an

ambiguous case if they felt there would be any danger that the treaty
would be abrogated as a result. Tamm did not feel that scientists would
set aside their objectivity for political purposes but would always
recommend whatever data and scientific analysis indicated. After the
intermission, the first one to speak was Sarabhai of India who commented
on the September '61 document (the McCloy-Zoran agreement) as follows:

He did not feel that equal security was expressed in that
document was a very meaningful phrase because of the
great geographical, economic, and cultural differences
between the two major countries involved. He also did
not wish to accept completely all of the "existing agreements"
which tend to freeze situations in the world today. In
particular, it might tend to freeze the relative positions
of neutral nations, vis-a-vis the great powers.
He also felt that leaving China out of the considerations,
as had been done by all the speakers on the program so far,
was very unrealistic.

His final suggestion was that a third force, under some sort

of international control, be created for the complete
dissolution

of the United States and the Soviet Union forces.

This would permit this force to be recruited, trained,
developed and, in part, deployed before the conclusion
of disarmament and thus would prevent any power vacuum
even in a brief interim. He felt that the existence
of such a force might make it easier for the large
powers to reach a complete disarmament.

The fifth speaker was Rabinowitch, whose remarks were very brief,

and I have no notes on them.

The sixth was Artsimovitch (USSR), whose comments were:

We are following a well-traveled road which has already been taken

by the diplomats. However, we cannot follow quite so well in

their footsteps, since we aren't diplomats. On the question of

adequate controls of disarmament, Artsimovitch agrees this is a

very important problem, but it is only one side of the scale. The

United States says the control schemes offered by the Soviet Union

are not enough but Artsimovitch believes that the risks of no control

whatsoever (the only alternative possible in the present
situation) that is, the risks of a continued arms race,
are even greater. As an analogy, he described a man who is
drowning. Someone nearby throws him a rope. Does the
drowning man check carefully the labels on the rope? Does
he test it out to make sure it is strong enough to hold him?
No, he takes hold of the offered rope, since it is considerably
better than drowning. The United States wants too perfect a
control system, he stated, and this was impossible to achieve.
The risks of an uncontrolled race are even greater than the risks
of an imperfect disarmament agreement.

The next speaker was Rabi, who: objected to the course of the
discussion in which the talks were primarily political with very little
science. His second point was to remind the Soviets that the removal
of troops from Western Europe would result in sheer fright on the part
of the Western Europeans. He felt that the concerns of other countries,
apart from the Soviet Union and the United States alone, must be taken into
account.

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Speaker No. 8 was Leipunski (USSR), who brought up the following points:

In 1958, a seismographic system for the control of nuclear tests was proposed, but the U.S. rejected it. Now the U.S. is apparently prepared to accept the 1958 idea. In the meantime, however, technology has progressed, and the '58 system is out of date, both technically and politically.

Technically, we have more sensitive seismometers now. This implies that seismic monitoring based on completely national systems is technically possible. Politically, two conflicting desires are present. On the one hand, there is the importance of preventing secret testing, but, on the other hand, there is the importance of preventing espionage in the guise of test ban control. Leipunski claims that the Soviet Union treaty proposal satisfies both of these conflicting desires and, in fact, has taken full advantage of the compromise proposed by the eight neutral nations. He feels, therefore, that the United States should go along with the Soviet Union and the eight neutrals.

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August 26

Meeting of Working Group 2 on the Problem of Disarmament of
Conventional Forces.

Members of this Working Group were:

V. A. Kargin (USSR)
N. N. Bogolubov (USSR)
N. A. Talensky (USSR)
S. G. T. Korneev (USSR)

D. G. Brennan (USA)
Henry Kissinger
A. R. Hibbs
Robert Gomer

Sir Nevill Mott (UK)
J. C. Kendrew

Pierre Rosenstiehl (France)

Oscar Sala (Brazil)

The meeting opened with selection of the chairman. Henry Kissinger was selected, and General Talensky was selected as assistant chairman.

Kissinger suggested that we try to decide on an agenda.

Kargin suggested that the problem of the speed of the disarmament
process was a special question which we should discuss first. Kissinger
raised the question as to whether nuclear disarmament should ~~previously precede~~
conventional disarmament. Mott suggested that because of the European
problem, both types of disarmament must come together and be associated

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with a European settlement. Brennan raised the question as to what size
of forces would be left at the termination of various stages of a conventional
disarmament program.

Talensky suggested that we use the Noel-Baker paper, "Problems
of Conventional Disarmament in Stages I and II," as a starting point.

Kissinger then stated that we would take first on the agenda the
relation of nuclear to conventional disarmament and then go into the
details of some of the problems proposed in the Noel-Baker paper.

Mott: Referring to Paragraph 53 of the Noel-Baker paper, we could
begin a discussion of the relationship between conventional
and nuclear disarmament. This paragraph suggests that means
of delivery of nuclear weapons be destroyed along with means
of attack on land, such as tanks, all in the first stage.

Brennan: The involvement of China is crucial in the very early stages
of disarmament if conventional disarmament is/go early. This
to
fact implies that there will be some sort of delay in the
since
reduction of conventional arms, and/apparently China is not
to be brought in.

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[LC]

Talensky: Although the participation of China is necessary for a
complete disarmament program, it is still possible to
outline disarmament steps without the presence of China.
Referring to the paper of Noel-Baker, political and
technical problems are actually separate. The problem
of Chinese participation is at the present stage purely
political. Therefore, bringing China into the discussion
is essential, but we can simply note this in passing
and continue with the technical problems of disarmament.

Q: These problems are actually the more difficult. He suggests that the third portion on the agenda should be the problem of control which is indeed a very important part of our discussion of conventional disarmament. Therefore he wishes to add to the agenda the problem of control and disarmament.

Brennan: Chinese participation is clearly necessary for a substantial
reduction in conventional forces. However, it is possible
to achieve a bilateral reduction or control of nuclear weapons
before full participation by China.

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[LC]

Talensky: We must recognize the fact that the U.S. government does not recognize the People's Republic of China. As a result of this, both in the Geneva talks among the 18 nations and in the General Assembly conferences on disarmament in the United Nations, the means and techniques of disarmament have been completely discussed without Chinese participation. On the basis of the precedent established in Geneva in the United Nations, surely we, here at this meeting, can continue to discuss these problems without Chinese participation and without any further reference to China.

Mott: We must assume that China will be with the rest of us in any conventional disarmament agreement.

Kissinger: Summing up the points so far: 1. Chinese participation is desirable.

2. Without Chinese participation, little conventional disarmament would be possible.

3. However, the U.S. and the Soviet Union can discuss the first step, particularly nuclear disarmament, without Chinese participation in the discussions. Therefore, one

major question remains: What is a reasonable balance
of forces in a situation where we have achieved nuclear
disarmament?

Telensky: The elimination of the danger of war requires both
nuclear and conventional disarmament. During the
first stage of the disarmament program, we must do
away with all nuclear weapons. It is best to look not only at the first stage but at the three
gradual stages so far proposed. Although I wish to
discuss the points raised in the paper by Noel-Baker,
I do not agree with all of these points. In particular,
I do not agree with his emphasis on the importance of
"shock troops" as something special. This is a reference
to the strategy of the 30's which is no longer realistic.

The organization of armed forces is now fairly well
standardized in all countries: tanks, motorized infantry,
motorized artillery, tactical air, and so on. The discussion
of conventional forces thus means the discussion of these
tactical strike forces. The navy is not a very important

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part of conventional forces, since most naval forces are
now devoted to the delivery of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, nuclear powered submarines and aircraft
carriers can be included in a discussion of conventional
forces. In the air, our discussion must concern fighters.

However, heavy bombers and fighter bombers should be
included in a discussion of nuclear disarmament.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union has pointed out that a straight percentage
reduction of armaments tends to ~~XXX~~ And In the greater strength. ~~XXX~~ the question of conventional
force disarmaments would not such a strength percentage favor
the Soviet Union?

Talensky: We can take the view of the United States that the NATO
forces are now stronger than the Soviet Union's, or we can
take the remarks given by Blackett in yesterday's talk, " The
Way Ahead," where, in the middle paragraph of Page 4, he
points out that Soviet manpower appears to be about 3.8 million
compared with the present American figure of 2.4 million.

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The Soviet proposal to reduce to 1.7 million implies that the Americans would reduce by thirty percent and the Soviet Union by fifty-five percent. At the same time, a recent estimate shows that the Western bloc strength is 8.1 million while the Soviet bloc strength is 7.3 million thus giving a numerical advantage to the Western Bloc.

Kissinger: If the conventional forces are equal or nearly equal, then a percentage reduction is good, but if one group is stronger than the other then some different rule must apply.

Kendrew: We must distinguish between conventional disarmament on a global basis and in a regional basis. In Europe, the Soviet Union has the advantage, and special consideration must be given to this regional situation.

Talensky: The Soviet Union offers to take all of its forces away from foreign theaters. This means that following the removal of all troupes from foreign bases, only national forces would be left in central Europe. The ratio of forces thus would be very nearly equal in Europe. Further measures would certainly be useful to create a demilitarized zone in Central Europe.

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Kissinger: This does not answer Dr. Kendrew's point. If all foreign troupes were removed from foreign bases, then the Soviet Union would have to pull its troupes back a few hundred miles, while the United States would have to pull its troupes back a few thousand miles. This would make the imbalance in Europe even worse than it is now.

Talensky: My Western friends seem to be living with the ideas of 1914. Now, in modern strategy and tactics, it is more difficult to move troupes by rail than it is by air. I remind you of the proposition put forward by the Soviet Union a few years ago, that is to have control posts along railroads, in airfields, etc., to check troup movements. We have here the Noel-Baker statement suggesting that the Soviet Union could flood Europe when actually in a disarmament situation both the Soviet Union and the U.S. would have about a million troup each. One cannot flood Europe with a million troupes. This is only enough for a gentle sprinkle. If we only speed up the disarmament and make it quite rapid, this period of danger will pass.

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Mott: In reference to the Stage I ideas, what sort of a balance are we really talking about? ARYx Are nuclear weapons to be considered as completely removed, while the United States conventional forces remain in Europe?

Talensky: What kind of conventional forces are you suggesting will remain?

Mott: United States tanks, men, and tactical aircraft.

Talensky: Why not simply use national forces?

Mott: Why does the Soviet Union want purely national forces? Would the Soviet Union rather have German troupes than U.S. troupes defending West Germany? Over the next five to ten years, we may see a united Europe. The European economic community may actually grow to a political community. In fact, we might look forward to some time in which this will even involve the United States. Then there will be no difference, we will all be one nation anyway.

Talensky: The presence of U.S. troupes in European nations implies aggressive intent. If there is no aggressive intent on the part of the

United States then why do they have their troupes there?

The withdrawal should include all American troupes from all
foreign bases and leave only national troupes in Europe.

Kissinger:

We have pointed out that a general balance does not imply
necessarily a local balance. In Europe for example the
defense of Western Europe would rely upon the cooperation
of troupes from several countries, whereas the threat to
one
Western Europe requires the action of only/country. I
believe that Mott's point is that once the U.S. strength
is withdrawn the remaining separate forces of the various
nations would not be equal in actual capability to the
threat posed by the forces of the single nation.

Talensky:

There will be enough national forces left after the first
reduction proposed to adequately defend Western Europe. The
conventional forces of the various nations in Western Europe are
already considerably larger than the U.S. forces already in
Europe. We must realize that the ace card which the West holds
in its hand is the nuclear striking forces in Europe. This
force must leave.

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[Lc]

Gomer: The crux of the problem is the enormous amount of suspicion on both sides. I personally feel that most of the suspicion is not justified. But we must face the fact so long as this suspicion exists there will be no disarmament at all. It is therefore most suitable to look for those measures which will lessen this suspicion. Some decreases in conventional forces are possible which would lead to a reduction suspicion. Perhaps if we could find a way to make the existing forces look less threatening. I have no concrete suggestion, but I hope that our committee would look at this as a primary problem.

Mott: At the end of Stage I, we would have complete denuclearization of Europe plus some reduction in conventional forces. We ask the Soviet Union to consider the value of joint forces in Western Europe including U.S. conventional forces. Without the U.S. present, the German conventional forces would be the strongest. And it is significant to realize that only the Germans have any motivation to attack to the east.

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Bogolubov: It is important therefore that we should normalize the European situation and liquidate the German problem by reaching a peace treaty with Germany.

Talensky: Why don't you accept the Rapotski plan? This way we would be able to militarize Germany completely along with Czechoslovakia and Poland and do away with this threat once and for all.

Kissinger(summary of discussion so far):

1. What is the relation between a global balance of conventional forces and a local balance?

2. Should we determine a balance of forces as a balance between the Western nations as a whole, regardless of whose troupes are situated where, versus the Eastern nations as a whole under the same arrangement, or should we attempt to compute the balance by adding up the forces of separate nations assuming that no foreign troupes are present?

3. Can we think of any measures which we might take with conventional forces which would reduce the appearance of a threat?

4. Can we distinguish between bases maintained for purposes of local defense and bases maintained for purposes of strategic attack?

5. Can nuclear weapons be divided into two categories, defensive and offensive?

—(Lunch) Coffee Break

Kissinger: Suppose we take up the second and third points which I listed in the summary before [illegible] Coffee

Kargin: The problem which we face is not simply technical, it is also psychological.

Gomer: Considering the psychological problems, we can understand how the United States bases appear threatening to the Soviet Union. We can also understand how the Soviet Union distribution of forces appears threatening to the United States. It is not necessary to repeat the Soviet and the United States arguments, but I believe that both have some validity. I emphasize then that the problem is political and psychological. For example, could a reduction of Soviet

intermediate range missiles be balanced against a reduction
of U.S. bases?

Kargin: I don't understand why the U.S. wishes to keep any troup
after the strategic capability of the bases has been removed.
After the rocket launching capability goes, what do you have
left except barracks?

Mott: Even the barracks will have a supporting psychological
effect upon Europe.

Gomer: The United States bases are neutralized by the intermediate
range rockets of the Soviet Union. Both of these weapons
a systems are somewhat symbolic. Since a strategic deterrent
will stay after the reduction of conventional forces, perhaps
both the U.S. bases and the Soviet rockets can be reduced or
eliminated at an early stage.

Kissinger: If the Soviet Union's desire for complete withdrawal of foreign
troup is not possible immediately, can we discuss separately
the concept of the withdrawal of strategic elements?

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[LC]

Talensky: Are the American bases truly a symbol or are these bases in a fact?

Mott: To Europe, they are a symbol of U.S. intentions to help in case of trouble.

Talensky: Is it possible to consider the Soviet Union one-hundred megaton bomb also as simply a symbol?

Kissinger: Yes.

Talensky: Can we distinguish between strategic and defensive bases?

If there are nuclear weapons present then these bases are aggressive. How can such bases become purely defensive?

There are two ways. First, they must be occupied by national troupes only and no foreign troupes. Second, they must have no nuclear weapons.

Kendrew: I cannot accept your first point but I agree with the second point. I cannot see the color of the uniforms has any importance, but certainly the type of weapons present is important.

Talensky: Consider the following example. Suppose that due to some sort of geologic forces, a new island came to the surface of

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of our trouble. Therefore if we are considering concessions, consider we must different things against different things in order to take this asymmetry into account.

Talensky: Why should we believe that the Soviet Union is truly in an asymmetric position? The Soviet Union has the Warsaw Pact to bolster its defensive strength in Europe, but the Soviet Union is completely defenseless in the south. Thus, you see the Soviet has its soft points too, and has no real geographical advantage over the West. But I suggest again that an acceptance of the Repotski plan would help the situation.

Mott: It is difficult to discuss the position of the U.S. forces in Europe unless we agree that in Stage I we will see the destruction of all large nuclear forces.

Talensky: The basis for disarmament is an intent to remove the cause of nuclear war. Therefore both weapons and bases for the use of these weapons must go. Second, we must remove any cause of tension which might eventually lead to war. Therefore, all foreign troops must go. The remaining bases can be those

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in which all nuclear forces have been destroyed. These bases
can then remain if they do not have a nuclear threat and if
they are completely nationalized. As to the question of
nuclear arms for defensive purposes, any nuclear forces are
essentially offensive.

Brennan: Agreeing that all nuclear forces can be used for offensive purposes if desired, can we make a distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear forces?

Kendrew: this
Perhaps the U.S can make/distinction more easily than Europe.
For the U.S. the word "strategic" implies anything that can
strike America from Europe, whereas the word "tactical" implies
anything that is essentially constrained to be used within
the boundaries of Europe. However, for Europeans, a tactical
weapon can cross boundaries between these small countries
just as easily as a strategic one. So that the difference
is pretty well lost.

Talensky: Nobody would call the Soviet global rocket tactical. But it
it does not follow from this that we recognize the lawfulness

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nuclear
of tactical weapons. However, such major strategic weapons
are essentially small in number, whereas tactical nuclear
weapons are numerous and widely distributed. However, in
spite of the broad distribution of tactical weapons they
can be concentrated on a particular target and used as
strategic weapons.

Hibbs: Why are U.S. soldiers without any sort of nuclear weapons considered to be offensive to the Soviets?

Talensky: U.S. troupes could be replaced by national troupes. U.S. troupes are offensive by their mere presence. We continue to ask why are the U.S. troupes there?

Brennan: Would you accept replacement of U.S. troupes by German troupes?

Talensky: Yes. But if the allies stuck to the *treaty* which we made
after World War II there would be no German troupes for us
to be talking about.

Kargin: The Soviets would withdraw their troupes from East Germany if the U.S. would withdraw their troupes from West.

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**Mott:** But we must recognize that France is now building a nuclear force and Germany and France are now getting closer. This implies the distinct possibility that France will support Germany in the development of a German nuclear force. Secretary McNamara had tried with his "counterforce" concept to disuade Europe from establishing its own nuclear force. Surely in line with this approach, a few American troupes in Europe would help to ensure continuing American interest in the fate of Europe. Surely this is better than an independent European nuclear force.

**Kendrew:** The differences in what we're talking about seem to be in the timing at which various steps will take place.

**Bogolubov:** The most important thing is to destroy all nuclear arms during the very first stages of the program.

**Kissinger:** We have been discussing the deployment of forces during the first stages of disarmament. However, in the first stage let us consider that the nuclear level is to be reduced to a minimum deterrent level.

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Talensky: With regard to France and the intentions of General DeGaulle, we must recognize that it is necessary to have complete disarmament. If the three nations which now have operable nuclear forces agree on nuclear disarmament, and then also agree to conventional disarmament, we will find peaceful means of disarming all other nations including France. The problem of France simply emphasizes the importance of speed in the disarmament process. The faster we achieve a disarmament scheme, the less is the possibility for General DeGaulle or Chancellor Adenauer to spoil our intentions for disarmament.

Rosenstiehl: It is simply because General DeGaulle does not believe in the possibility of any such "fast" disarmament that he is not joining in to this plan. However, he is in favor of disarmament and will certainly agree to any actual scheme which is finally achieved between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Talensky: We must abolish all nuclear armaments in the very first stage and then prevent any other nuclear powers from arising.

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Rosenstiehl: I wish to make three statements on French policy regarding disarmament:

1. France does not plan to "spoil" any agreement on general world disarmament. General DeGaulle, the French public, and all French scientists wish for an agreement on disarmament. The French absence at Geneva does not imply a lack of faith in disarmament but implies simply an intention to join any plan which is agreeable to the major powers.

France has said: "As soon as an agreement on means of delivery of nuclear weapons is available, we will join in." France does not wish to offer problems to the Soviet Union as General Talensky has implied. Therefore France is not at Geneva.

2. The French atomic program is not very far from the minimum deterrent program which we have been talking about a little bit so far.

3. French policy is indeed defensive. As evidence of this note that in the last six months French conventional forces have been withdrawn from Africa.

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**Sala:** The question is how fast should we accomplish disarmament and what shall be the manner of its accomplishment. This problem does not exist only between the Soviet Union and the United States but many other countries are involved.

In a rapid disarmament arrangement between the Soviet Union and the United States what about these other countries?

**Talensky:** The idea of preserving minimum deterrent forces during the first stages of disarmament was discussed at the Stowe Meeting of the Pugwash Group and has been discussed since, in a committee there in which I took part with Jules Mach, Noel-Baker, and others, we discussed this problem and we concluded that, on the basis of the Soviet Union draft treaty (that all means of delivery of nuclear weapons are removed in the first stage), we proposed that a certain number of ~~might nevertheless~~ agreed weapons would still be in existence at the end of the twenty-first month. The number of such weapons and their exact type would be subject to agreement. The main criterion is this: the remainder should obviously be insufficient for

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initiation of a nuclear war. Furthermore, the number of such weapons must remain at a low level. Perhaps it might be possible to place these weapons under some sort of international control. After elimination of nuclear means of delivery, international control is established to reduce all other weapons to an agreed level. After this has been accomplished, the remaining means of delivery are destroyed by the end of the first stage.

Initial reductions will make the next steps easier.

Kissinger: Assume such a picture is correct and consider that the remaining conventional forces. Suppose we look upon these forces as being limited by absolute ceilings rather than being limited by some sort of a percentage cut. For example, in the Noel-Baker paper consider paragraph five. Is it possible that we can consider limitations on armaments rather than on actual troupes. After all, the distribution of men within various kinds of organizations differs from country to country. Or perhaps we should combine limitation on arms and men?

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[L.C.]

Talensky: The principle of establishing absolute levels is sound. Imagine levels established for the Soviet Union and United States, and then we begin to fix the levels which other European countries can have in their forces. If we approach the problem on the basis of establishing such absolute levels, then we can preserve an equality of conventional forces throughout the whole process of disarmament. In such a treaty both men and heavy armaments should be fixed, that is, tanks, planes, artillery, mortars, and so on. Of course, countries could reduce their forces below these limits if they wish to.

Kissinger: What about other countries at this point? Such as China? Or Iran, which General Talensky mentioned as a threat on the southern borders of the Soviet Union?

Talensky: We must assume that all countries will be included in the agreement, providing a good agreement between the major powers has been reached. The Soviet Union relies on the Security Council to make sure that all of this is happening. The People's Republic of China has stated that it believes in disarmament

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and I (Talensky) believe that they will go along if they
are not arbitrarily discriminated against by the big powers.

Kissinger: How could controls on the reduction of conventional armaments be created?

Brennan: U.S. studies indicate that ceilings on active personnel are more important than ceilings on total personnel. Non-active personnel can be inflated or deflated rather rapidly by the addition of civilian help. Furthermore it is easier to inspect total infantry under arms than to inspect, for example, details of the budgets which might apply to all personnel connected with the Armed Forces.

Kissinger: What about inspecting the armaments themselves?

Brennan: The records of the Ordinance Corps might available to carry
out such an inspection or you can visualize sample checks
compared with declared inventories.

Kissinger: Does Professor Talensky visualize inspectors travelling around the Soviet Union looking at conventional forces or what does he see as the means of control?

Talensky: Inspectors for what?

Kissinger: To assure that agreed upon numbers of forces are retained.

Talensky: In order to clear up a few differences which have come out in this discussion, let me make the following points:

1. The Soviet Union considers that not only should the forces actually under arms be considered in the agreement but also all civilians who are serving directly in the interests of the Armed Forces.

2. We agree that the general level permitted at various stages in the disarmament process should be established by the strategic needs of the particular regional situation and not strictly by some sort of percentage of population.

3. The total number of forces should be controlled, but the means of control must not be based on the budget alone. The budget is very useful as a source of information for the level of forces, but it must be considered as only auxiliary information. (I note that in the Noel-Baker paper he is skeptical about the use of the budget. But I think

-37-

that the budget is a very good means of control. Budgetary
control can be very quite precise. Since one knows
the cost of armaments and the cost of maintenance of
armaments, statistics from a budget can tell a great deal
about existing forces. I know from my own experience
how rigid some of these budget-makers can be.

4. The reduction of conventional forces can be checked by inspectors and stock piles can be checked separately. Studies show that the ratio between stock piles and active forces is quite constant. Furthermore, the relation between stock piles of armaments and the possibilities of rapid increases in armed forces is also quite regular and well known.

5. Studies carried out at the Stowe Conference showed that only approximately twenty percent of nuclear armaments can actually be hidden, and it is very likely that similar studies directed toward problems of controlling conventional armaments will show that even a smaller percentage of conventional arms could be hidden. For example, in the

-38-

last war we found that one million men amounted to about
fifty divisions. We also saw that there is a limit to
the maximum number of troupes which can be conscripted
from a population. This limit was reached in Germany
which conscripted nineteen percent of its population.
Therefore if we simply look at the population in various
countries we can determine the maximum number of troupes
which they might be able to conscript from the population
and see what the volume of armaments can be.

I propose then that the following steps be taken to achieve
conventional disarmament.

1. Each country declares a total number of conventional
armaments which it has.

2. Inspectors look at the destruction of the agreed upon armaments and the mustering out of the agreed upon number of troupes.

3. If the inspectors think that there is a particular unit is not
being demobilized as agreed, they can always go and look to
make sure this demobilization is going on.

-40-

Hibbs: You pointed out that it is possible for a nation to conscript nineteen percent of its population. For the Soviet Union this implies a maximum of thirty-eight million men. With this number in mind how can we be sure that the comparatively small number of 2.4 million which your numbers suggest is really a correct number for the Soviet Union?

Talensky: From various types of data available from previous times, it is now possible to determine quite accurately how big various armies are. It is very difficult to hide large numbers of troupes or to maintain the size of an army secret. Also, economic analysis can show the strength of the armed forces of a country.

Kissinger: If you believe we already know how big your forces are, why do you object to our looking at them to make sure?

Talensky: You don't understand Russian psychology. Much of our point of view on this is based on our memory of the German invasion. Prior to that Lindburgh came to Russia and saw the Russian airforce. But (for political reasons) he misrepresented

-41-

the strength of the Soviet Airforce to Hitler. This
made Hitler believe that the Soviet Airforce could be
easily and quickly conquered and thus encouraged him to
attack the Soviet Union. Thus you see in this case direct
inspection was worse than no inspection at all. In addition
I should point out that the German General Helm also saw
the Soviet Airforce and looked at several divisions of
Soviet troupes and gave a very correct report to Hitler's
general staff on the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.
However, Lindburgh was believed and Helm was dismissed.
I can only add to this that there is an old Russian saying,
"He lies like an eye witness."

Kissinger: Do you think people who would not believe proper firsthand evidence would be convinced ~~correctly~~ by statistics?

Talensky: In many cases, this is true.

Hibbs: Have you ever met a U.S. Senator?

Talensky: Yes. Senator Benton, who I met once on the shores of the Black Sea, told me that one major problem between the U.S.

-42-

and the Soviet Union was the Soviet's misrepresentation
of the U.S. "war of intervention" following the first world
war. According to Senator Benton, the U.S. only intended to
protect the Soviet Union against the British, the Japanese,
and others. Fortunately, I had no occasion to do battle with
these U.S. forces since I was in the southeastern section of
Russia in a portion of what is now called Kazakstan fighting
forces of the White Russian Army under General Bieloff. After
Bieloff was defeated and his forces liquidated we found, however,
Remmington and Springfield rifles and U.S.-made machine guns
comprising most of their armaments, so it was always difficult
for us to understand the friendly intentions of the United
States at this time.

Hibbs: Did you discover these American armaments by statistics or
by looking at them?

Talensky: I will agree that both things have to be used.

Kissinger: Could the inspection methods which we often consider as
applying to strategic arms be used to get some spot checks

-43-

on retained conventional arms?

Talensky: Inspection of remaining armament is undesirable.

Rosenstiehl: Why?

Talensky: Because in permitting such inspection, we would give away all of our defense secrets.

Mott: But suppose the nuclear armaments were already gone.

Talensky: I quote from the words of Chairman Khrushchev: "If the West agrees to the Soviet Draft Treaty requiring the destruction of all means of delivery in Stage I, that is by the end of the first twenty-one months of disarmament, then the Soviet Union will accept any kind of control or inspection desired by the West." For my own part I suggest the establishment of an eight-hundred kilometer zone on both sides of the present boundary between the blocs of East and West in which zone there would be no forces of any kind and the whole zone would be completely open for inspection.

Mott: We understand then that if all nuclear forces are destroyed, the Soviet Union would accept any kind of inspection. But are

-44-

also
we/to understand that this inspection is not applied to the
1.9 million conventional troupes left?

an
Talensky: No. The West can have/inspector on every single soldier
it wishes.

Brennan: I wish to explore further Chairman Khrushchev's statement.

I understand from General Talensky that the Soviet Union
has mobile forces. This makes possible a unique inspection
scheme. Although inspectors would report not only the
number of such forces but also report their location,
the mobile units could move before the inspector was able
to return to his station with information as to their location.
This would effectively prevent ~~the~~ inspection for purposes
of counting from becoming espionage for purposes of location.

Talensky: It is my understanding that all of the mobile forces subject
to inspection will be fixed. That is, they will be located
at the places of destruction, and their presence and number
will be declared. These are the only forces which will be open

-45-

to inspection. All of you should study this problem
in the way that scientists study problems. Then you
Union
will favor the Soviet/proposal, a proposal which would
require the destruction of all means of delivery of nuclear
weapons in the very first stage of disarmament. Look at
Secretary McNamara's plans for the development of the U.S.
forces over the next five years. He will produce a capability
of ten separate nuclear strikes, each one capable of taking
sixty million victims. By the end of the Stage I proposed
in the U.S. draft, this capability would only be reduced by
one-third, so that you would still possess the capability
of 6.6 nuclear strikes of this size. Is it possible under
such conditions to open targets in the Soviet Union for
attack? We must take into account such things the U2 aircraft
and Midas satellites.

Brennan: But I come back to the possibility that mobile forces could be moved about and thus would not be stationary targets for such an attack. I am referring to the remaining forces, not the forces declared for destruction.

-46-

Talensky: If any mobile forces remain at the end of the first stage
how can you be sure some of these mobile forces aren't
hidden?

Kargin: The problem is simply this. Without nuclear disarmament none
of these steps are possible. With nuclear disarmament all of
the steps are very simple.

Gomer: Let's return to the problem of this group which is the
problem of controlling and reducing conventional armaments.
For conventional armaments I do not consider inspection to
be a major problem. Realistically, both countries have
intelligent sources which are well acquainted with the
status of troupes. I think it would be more important for us
to discuss the problem of how much conventional disarmament
should occur in ~~war~~ peace various conceivable situations. I
believe that any real moves toward conventional disarmament
depend on a political settlement in Europe.

Talensky: Do you mean that the U.S. would not agree to a reduction in
conventional forces even if the Warsaw Pact decreased its

-47-

forces unless a settlement in Europe came first?

Gomer: Speaking personally, I think a political settlement must come first.

Talensky: By that do you mean a peace treaty with Germany and a resolution of the Berlin problem?

Gomer: I have no specific plan for reaching such a settlement but certainly the reduction of tension is necessary. And surely some sort of settlement of the German problem must come first.

Kissinger: But if we get on to the Berlin problem we'll never finish our discussions. What about the combination of a U.S. reduction to a low absolute numerical limit of its strategic forces to be counterbalanced by a Soviet Union reduction to some low limit of conventional forces?

Talensky: If this arrangement could be worked out on some sort of even basis I would think it possible.

Kissinger: In this case, the Soviet Union does not need to fear great attack. Thus, what about the inspection of retained levels of forces? I agree with Gomer that the problem of inspection of conventional

-48-

forces is not as difficult as for nuclear forces.

Talensky: The main problem is with the nuclear forces. After all means of delivery have been destroyed, reduction of conventional forces is not a very great problem and control of this reduction does not pose a great danger.

Mott: The position of the Soviet Union on inspection is clear. Maybe the United States doesn't like it, but there is little point in further discussion of that particular problem. Now I would like to ask what forces the Soviet Union visualizes as still being in Europe at the end of Stage I?

Talensky: Let's start calculating what armed forces are necessary in order to preserve a balance. The Soviet Union just cannot understand the basis for Western suspicion of Soviet intentions. In forty-five years of Soviet history, we have never threatened France, Germany, or England. We have no literature on war plane which we publish and discuss. However, we see in Western literature many references to preventive war and to surprise attack on the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: Let us admit that suspicion exists without arguing about its justification. As Rabi pointed out yesterday in the plenary session, removal of U.S. forces from Europe would cause terror on the part of the Western Europeans regardless of whether or not this terror is realistic. This is simply a fact.

Talensky: But this suspicion is the reason for our rejection of inspection, even inspection of mobile forces. You must admit that the process of stopping a mobile force long enough to have it inspected would subject that mobile force to attack. It would make it vulnerable.

notes

<u>August 27</u> (Transcript of penciled by Brennan)

Kissinger opened the meeting by a summary of the discussion
held yesterday.

Talensky: The formula for the reduction of conventional forces should
be as follows: the balance of the forces is to be adjusted

-50-

on an overall bloc basis, West versus East, but distributed
on a purely national basis. That is, there are to be no
foreign troupes left on a national territory.

Korneev: Yesterday we had a chance to review our positions. But we found that the West still is too preoccupied with the problem of control. By the end of the first stage, all the nuclear threat or the threat of delivery vehicles is gone. Thus there is no longer such a threat. If we can reach agreement on this it would have a favorable influence on the development of trust between our countries. Then additional measures of control might be organized. Hence yesterday's discussion leaves us now in the position to arrive at some general conclusions.

Kargin: We can make an assumption a summary to the Plenary Session on the basis of the summary which Dr. Kissinger presented a few minutes ago. My personal observation is this. The matter of speed of reduction is quite important. The quicker

-51-

we can achieve nuclear disarmament, the better. It is the
lack of trust which motivates a request for more and more
detailed inspection, inspection which perhaps goes beyond
all reasonable limits. The most dangerous period in the
disarmament is the first stage. I suggest we express our
opinion that the first stage of disarmament must be carried
out as quickly as possible.

Brennan: We can't prescribe such the speed of the first stage in
such an abstract way.

Gomer: I agree with this. Especially in view of the very deep
suspicion and inertia which now prevails in the U.S.
That will slow things down. Therefore I suggest in accordance
with the memo distributed by Mott that we concentrate on
reducing strategic bases around Europe.

Sala: Proceeding too fast in the first stage might upset a
delicate balance which now exists. I support Mott's memo
on the point of retaining U.S. forces in Europe.

--52-

Mott: On my part, I agree with Kargin that a fast first stage is desirable. Therefore we want a simple first stage so that it can be done fast. Such a simple first stage plan was recommended by one of the working groups at the Stowe Conference.

Talensky: The quicker the process of destroying means of delivery and nuclear weapons the faster the conventional process of disarmament can take place. I suggest that we take into consideration Noel-Baker's document, in particular paragraph fifty-three and the first subparagraph. If we were to follow the procedure recommended here, this would eliminate fears of a Soviet Union surprise attack on Europe. There is an especially important point in Noel-Baker's paragraph sixty-five, the second half of the paragraph. He suggests that we reverse the order of discussion of the Geneva talks, concentrating more on speed of disarmament rather than on inspection. At present there exists no technical problems which obstruct

those arguments which are very strongly in favor of rapid
action toward disarmament, as Noel-Baker points out
in paragraph sixty-six. The main obstacle here lies in
political difficulties.

Korneev: None of us are representing our governments, therefore we are not in a position to actually decide the speed of the disarmament steps. Let the governments decide this. Our government has suggested twenty-one months for the first stage but we can simply suggest that it should be the shortest possible time.

No one here could question this. Therefore I suggest we express our opinion that these steps must proceed in the shortest possible time.

Bogolubov: I agree with Korneev. Let's try to put this into the document.

Rosenstiehl: This is a good general principle, but as scientists we should look at the details and try to evaluate the speed in the light of these details. Hence I come to the utility of a

-54-

full-time study group which was suggested at the Stowe
meeting. These problems involve many difficulties in
many fields--economics, planning, finance, military concepts,
etc., and all of these difficulties give trouble to diplomats
trying to reach an understanding.

Kissinger: (First an elaboration in review of points made yesterday by
Telensky on the question of free inspections following the
destruction of means of delivery of nuclear weapons) If a
statement in favor of speed is coupled with a statement in
favor of adequate controls, then there is no great objection

But
to putting it into a document./ we must recognize that this
is a diplomatic statement of no real content.

Talensky: colleagues
My U.S. colleagues are excessively worried about controls.
Any division which is being demobilized would have its equip-
ment destroyed. One can watch this destruction.

ИМЖЖЖЖЖЖЖЖ

In the evening of August 27, a special dinner was held by
Mott, attended by Kargin, Talensky, Mott, Hibbs, Brennan, and Kissinger.

It was the purpose of this dinner to go over a draft report to be
presented to the Plenary Session on the afternoon of the next day,
August 28. During the dinner, General Talensky found the proposed
draft satisfactory, but wished to go over it again in the morning in more
detail prior to the General Session.

August 28

In the morning, Brennan, Kissinger, and Talensky were all
in separate locations privately going over the draft and amendments to
the draft. Most of the remaining members of the working group met for
a very informal discussion. The subject of this discussion this discussion
was the position of U.S. forces in Europe. Mott, Gomer, Rosenstiehl, and
Hibbs represented the following point: It is very difficult to remove
U.S. troops completely from Europe in an early stage of disarmament. In
a later stage it would be more practical.

Kargin and Bogolubov represented the following point: The
removal of troops from all foreign bases is a matter of principle. Perhaps
it can be delayed if all means of delivery are reduced in an early stage.
They suggested again the idea of the eight hundred kilometer zone on both

-56-

sides of the East-West boundary.

During the course of this discussion it was pointed out
that the word "bases" means different things to the West and to the East.

To the Soviet Union, it appears that "bases" means only missile launching
sites and not barracks for troupes. Thus the removal of "bases" does not
necessarily imply the removal of troupes. It is for this reason that they

of
always add on to the removal/bases the stipulation that all foreign troupes
must also be removed, and why they at the same time are willing to let all
other pieces of equipment stand although the "bases" have been dismantled.

August 29

(Notes for the first session in the morning, before coffee,
are not available.) The here notes represent the continuation of the morning
session following coffee.)

Brennan: Two factors are important in an analysis of the problems of foreign troupes. One is the psychological and political importance of these troupes, and the second is the military value. In regard to the first problem, the presence of U.S. forces in Europe provides confidence to the Europeans that

they will be protected. However, on the opposite side of
this argument is the fact that the presence of U.S. troupes
in Europe seems threatening to the Soviet Union and their
removal would be a step toward disarmament and increased
trust. It is difficult to say whether the actual tension
in Europe would go up or down as a result of the withdrawal
of U.S. troupes. With regard to the second point, if all
foreign troupes are withdrawn from Europe, then the defense
of Western Europe would be worse off than the defense of
Eastern Europe. For example when we consider the problem
of bringing back U.S. troupes to Europe in case of an emergency,
the very large Soviet Union submarine fleet/takes on great
importance. I have no conclusions from this approach to
the analysis, but I merely wish to show some of the aspects
of the problem.

Sales:

After general and complete disarmament is achieved, all U.S. troupes would be out of Europe. Our problem now is that we have no agreement about what happens in Stage I. I seem to

-58-

recall Professor Talensky said that the problem of U.S. troupes which was political and psychological. Is this true?

Talensky: The Soviet Union point is this. Leaving the U.S. troupes in Europe seems to have more political value than military value.

Sala: Then we must consider the other countries in Europe apart from just the Soviet Union. They would feel much better if the U.S. troupes stayed. If you were to ask these other countries they would answer unanimously that the U.S. troupes should stay. I am sure that the same is true with the East European countries and the Soviet Union. Can't we decide this problem by taking the desires of the other countries into account?

Kissinger: I have heard much internal discussion in the United States Government circles concerning this point, I have indulged in this discussion, and I have talked to members of both political parties about the problem. Each country must consider both unilateral and bilateral roads toward disarmament. Right or wrong, the U.S. must consider itself responsible for its own security. At the present time, we think that we have

the best of the nuclear strategic forces, but we consider
ourselves to be second best in conventional forces. Also
it is our opinion that the Western nations need unity for
their common defense.

There are many in the U.S. who argue for the reduction of
armaments to a minimum deterrent level. In such an argument
one always is confronted with the problem of the defense of
Western Europe when such a minimum/level has been achieved.

From our point of view the demands of the Soviet Union seem
to be simply demands for the destruction of the NATO Alliance
at the very beginning of the disarmament program. If the
Soviet Union maintains this position then the disarmament
agreement will be very difficult to achieve. This is not
a debating point which I am trying to make but a description
of operational reality.

Kargin:

Speaking frankly, we both keep referring to the position
of our governments. On the one hand there is a desire to
disarm completely to a level of no armaments at all as fast

-60-

as possible. On the other hand there is the desire to
maintain what is called a minimum deterrent. We all agree
that foreign troops are a result of abnormal conditions.
We seem much of our position in this regard as symmetrical,
but I do not understand why when the Soviet Union always
proposes to go fast through these steps of disarmament the
U.S. proposes always to go slowly.

Rosenstiehl: We just want to be sure that we reach the end of the disarmament
process. We must not just be idealists but also recognize
some of the difficulties which are going to slow down the
process.

Kissinger: The answer is not in the technical of the problem but in the
psychological and political aspects. The impression/have of
the Soviet Union proposals is that they bring about a very rapid
change in the equilibrium which now exists without any assurance
that enough of a balance can be maintained. Therefore the
effect on the West of the Soviet Union proposals is that the
result of following in that process would be chaos, not stability.

-61-

The U.S. wants to maintain an equilibrium and I am afraid
that the approach to these problems has often been pedantic.

I suggest the Soviet Union look at their proposals not just
as the Soviet Union intends them but also with a desire to
imagine how they appear to a suspicious adversary. Of course,
the U.S. has the same obligation in examining their own
proposals.

Kargin: But I ask again, why are the U.S. proposals always first for such slow moves?

Kissinger: The impression created by the Soviet Union proposals in the U.S. is that the Soviet Union desires a one-sided advantage by going too rapidly. Further, the demand for the removal of all U.S troupes from Europe seems to us a demand for the abandonment of NATO. I'm sure that General Talensky is aware of the old military maxim "divide and conquer."

Brennan: There are some additional aspects to the speed problem. So far we lack any consensus on the specific moves which are to be undertaken in the disarmament steps, the order of these moves, and

-62-

their actual detail. Once the details and the sequence of
these moves are understood, the problem of speed will be
automatically resolved.

Talensky: I hope that our present discussions can lead to a better understanding. I would like to make a few points which I hope will go in this direction. First, "divide and conquer" is not a principle of the Soviet Union. The principle of the Soviet Union is for the uniting of all peoples. The Soviet Union policy for uniting Europe for the common defense is inconsistent with this. But the West rejected this idea. As a result we have all suffered. Second, we don't like NATO, but we're not going to torpedo it. I assure Dr. Kissinger that we have no secret intentions for destroying NATO. There are no Soviet Union documents providing for NATO destruction. If NATO is purely a military alliance then it will disappear when we achieve general and complete disarmament. As for the economic cooperation which might be involved with NATO, we have no intention to liquidate this. Even forty years ago Lenin

-63-

assumed that such alliances would exist among capitalistic
countries, and we continue under that assumption. Third,
on security, we understand the psychological problem. But
this problem can be influenced by people. If the Western
people were told by their leaders that the Soviet Union
intends to destroy the West then we can understand that the
people will develop deep suspicions. But why don't we tell
frankly scientists how things really are and try to do away
with this suspicion. Let us try to establish some sort of
East-West parity in this regard. Fourth, Soviet Union trans-
portation is quite limited. The United States can bring in
troups back to Europe even from the United States using ships
and planes just as rapidly as the Soviet Union could bring up
its troupes to the boarders which now divide the two blocs.
Furthermore, we have learned by practice flights with transport
planes that the U.S. could bring troupes from America to the
front lines of Europe just as rapidly as it could bring troupes

-64-

from other European countries up to some trouble spot.

Fifth, the Soviet Union has no aggressive intention in Europe and has never done anything in Europe to merit the suspicion of such aggressive intentions.

Hibbs: You have pointed out that the psychological factors bearing on the problem of foreign troops can be influenced by people. You have also stated your opinion that U.S. troops stationed in America can be brought into Europe just as rapidly as U.S. troops spread over various European bases. This means that U.S. troops in America pose just as much of a threat to the Soviet Union as U.S. troops in Europe. This in turn means that the psychological fear of U.S. troops in Europe is without foundation. Why do not the Soviet leaders explain this to the Soviet people, and do away with this psychological problem?

Talensky: We are also worried that U.S. troops in Europe may get out of control of U.S. generals who are stationed back in America.

Gomer: Why does the Soviet Union feel threatened by five divisions of U.S. troops?

-65-

Talensky: Personally, I don't like even Soviet Union troupes in the German republic, in Poland, etc. Traditionally, foreign troupes crossed borders to make wars. Therefore the presence of foreign troupes on national soil always makes for tension. There is a very old tradition in Europe that in the olden times the appearance of a foreign military person in uniform other than a recognized attaché attached to an embassy was considered a serious offense, and simply was not done.

Kissinger: Both sides have clearly stated their position on the problem of foreign troupes in Europe. Can we now go on to consider the limits on the size of conventional forces without any further discussion of the question of the deployment or nationality of these troupes?

Mott: I would like to call up for discussion this note (note by W.G. 2.6 N. F. Mott, W. G. 2.6) (The group read over this note).

Kissinger: We have a fundamental disagreement on the problem of control of retained armaments. Shall we simply state that we do not

-66-

agree on this point? Or should we consider for example
such things as various sampling methods which might be used?

Talensky: How would these methods be carried out in practice?

Kissinger: This is a very difficult question. The best thing we could
do is to agree on a principle and then recommend that a study
of the detailed methods be carried out.

Talensky: I think that this is useless. Before an inspector could
come to a camp to carry out such a sample check, the commander
could quickly move all of his troupes out of camp. This would
completely confuse the sampling method, and make all statistical
deductions from the sampling inspection in error. I recommend
that we consider the disengagement zones between the two sides.

As long as conventional forces remain, we could establish
these zones and have complete control over all forces which
are in them until they are completely removed.

Kissinger: Before we get to a discussion of disengagement in zones,
let's conclude our discussion on the problem of retained forces.
Did not General Talensky suggest inspection processes to be carried

-67-

at
out in airports and train stations?

Kargin: But doesn't the disengagement zone satisfy your desires for inspection?

Kissinger: There are then three points which we might discuss with regard to retained forces.

1. Evaluate retained forces by a sampling procedure.

2. Carry out inspection at all rail stations, airports and so on to control the movement of retained forces.

3. Disengage over a broad zone on both sides of the dividing line.

Rosenstiehl: With regard to the idea of sampling as a means of inspection, I defend this as an excellent way to avoid surprise attack. The idea of disengagement cannot be similarly agreed to since it simply spoils the deployment of all the Western forces without equally spoiling the strategy of the East.

Talensky: I think I should restate the Soviet Union position on the problems of inspection, control, and its relation to general and complete disarmament. The inspection of railroad stations,

-68-

airports, etc., which mentioned would be carried out only in
the zones of disengagement.

Young: (interrupting) I think that the statement which you are now
making has nothing at all to do with the subject.

Talensky: If this is your view, then it is clear that we have all been
wasting our time for some days and are wasting it right now.

If this is your view then there is no point in any of us
going on talking about this problem any more. For my own
part I think that what I am saying has a great deal to do with
the subject and in fact that it is the subject. But if we
cannot even agree on that then surely we are wasting our time.

Neild: (Joined the group for this day's session) Since we are trying
to produce a document to present to the Plenary Session as a
result of this group's discussion, can't we simply list the
ideas which have been presented here and *then* indicate who
agrees with what and disagrees with what.

Kissinger: Then the ideas we have discussed so far are that control of
retained forces be carried out in zones of disengagement or

-69-

that it be carried out by some sort of sampling procedure
or by stationing inspectors at centers of transportation.

Can we say that these are the things we have discussed?

Talensky: (In English) O.K.

Kissinger: What equipment does the Soviet Union visualize as being left at foreign bases after the foreign troops have been removed following in General Talensky's concept?

Talensky: Everything but the nuclear weapons and the means of delivery of these weapons can remain.

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unveiling of the huge Tu-114 (not to mention the jet Tu-104) in Moscow indicates, moreover, that the Soviets are not backward in realizing the value of airlift. They have had long experience in the business and must be presumed to be capable of lifting very large quantities of men and equipment by air. To their total inventory might well be added the capabilities of their satellites, all of whose airlift is of Russian design and whose organization is patterned after the Soviet model. Whether or not this would be done is conjectural, but the possibility should be kept in mind.

How, then, should the Soviet airlift potential be assessed? At first glance it would appear that the Soviets are able to lift simultaneously considerably greater quantities than the U.S. Certainly their position of interior lines makes possible to them the use of quantities of twin-engine transports for lift to critical areas, whereas the U.S. would need the larger 4-engined variety to reach such places. The Soviet Union undoubtedly has a larger number of airborne divisions. Stockwell estimates 4 to 9. For limited wars on the periphery of the Soviet Union, these troops could probably be airlifted successfully. Whether they could accomplish their missions before the U.S. reacted is another matter, but in view of the U.S. reaction time even with the C-133 one should give them the benefit of the doubt. It is difficult to believe, however, that a sizeable airborne assault by the Soviet Union on some small neutral country could be accepted as the signal for a "limited war" by the U.S.; presumably the U.S. would find it necessary to attack the air logistics bases in the USSR in order to contain the threat. And this would probably mean general war. Should, however, a neutral country, (e.g. Syria or Egypt) request Soviet military assistance, then it appears that the Soviets could react with speed and decisiveness. In any case, the Soviet Union has both the troops and the airlift to use as it sees fit. It is difficult to believe that the United States, which presumably requires a strategic mobility capability greater than that of the Soviets, could match this.

Admiral Radford would not, however, agree.

"MR. MILLER. On this long-range lift proposition do our potential enemies have anything like the capability according to your best intelligence estimates that we have in that field?

"ADMIRAL RADFORD. No, sir.

"MR. MILLER. They are not even in our bracket, are they?

"ADMIRAL RADFORD. No, sir; we have those figures. I would like to keep them off the record, if I may just give you an idea of them...

"MR. MILLER. Is it proper to say on the record that our capability is infinitely greater than any other potential enemy that we have in this particular area?

"ADMIRAL RADFORD. Our transport capability is probably -- I have not figured it out in ton-miles and I do not know that we could say that we have many times the capability that the Russians have... (We have in the United States by far the largest transport fleet in the world.)" 59

This statement is very hard to reconcile with the other evidence, but no doubt Admiral Radford was including the many passenger type planes in his reckoning. On the available evidence, it would appear, on the issue 59. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, op. cit., p. 2090.

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How, then, should the Soviet airlift potential be assessed? At first glance it would appear that the Soviets are able to lift simultaneously considerably greater quantities than the U.S. Certainly their position of interior lines makes possible to them the use of quantities of twin-engine transports for lift to critical areas, whereas the U.S. would need the larger 4-engined variety to reach such places. The Soviet Union undoubtedly has a larger number of airborne divisions. Stockwell estimates 4 to 9. For limited wars on the periphery of the Soviet Union these troops could probably be airlifted successfully. Whether they could accomplish their missions before the U.S. reacted is another matter, but in view of the U.S. reaction time even with the C-133 one should give them the benefit of the doubt. It is difficult to believe, however, that a sizeable airborne assault by the Soviet Union on some small neutral country could be accepted as the signal for a "limited war" by the U.S.; presumably the U.S. would find it necessary to attack the air logistics bases in the USSR in order to contain the threat. And this would probably mean general war. Should, however, a neutral country, (e.g. Syria or Egypt) request Soviet military assistance, then it appears that the Soviets could react with speed and decisiveness. In any case, the Soviet Union has both the troops and the airlift to use as it sees fit. It is difficult to believe that the United States, which presumably requires a strategic mobility capability greater than that of the Soviets, could match this.

"ADMIRAL RADFORD. No, sir.

"ADMIRAL RADFORD. Our transport capability is probably -- I have not figured it out in ton-miles and I do not know that we could say that we have many times the capability that the Russians have... We have in the United States by far the largest transport fleet in the world." 59

This statement is very hard to reconcile with the other evidence, but no doubt Admiral Radford was including the many passenger type planes in his reckoning. On the available evidence, it would appear on the issue 59. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, op. cit., p. 2090.

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"ADMIRAL RADFORD. No, sir.

This statement is very hard to reconcile with the other evidence, but no doubt Admiral Radford was including the many passenger type planes in his reckoning. On the available evidence, it would appear, on the issue 59. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, op. cit., p. 2096.

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"ADMIRAL RADFORD. No, sir.

"ADMIRAL RADFORD. Our transport capability is probably -- I have not figured it out in ton-miles and I do not know that we could say that we have many times the capability that the Russians have... We have in the United States by far the largest transport fleet in the world." /59

This statement is very hard to reconcile with the other evidence, but no doubt Admiral Radford was including the many passenger type planes in his reckoning. On the available evidence, it would appear, on the issue /59. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1958, op. cit., p. 2090.

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"ADMIRAL RADFORD. No, sir.

59. U.S. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations, for 1958, op. cit., p. 2090.