# SUMMARY

## I. The Problem

1. The technological revolution has enormously multiplied the available weapons systems. To seek to procure all weapons that can be developed would invite bankruptcy.

2. The basic problem of contemporary military policy is therefore to make effective choices: the ability to decide on the most effective strategy; on the weapons system to implement it and the priorities to achieve it.

3. There are strong indications that the U.S.S.R. has outstripped us in the field of priorities and lead times.

4. Our situation is complicated by interservice rivalries with three dedicated services simultaneously developing partially overlapping, partially competing strategies.

## II. Causes of the Situation

1. The traditional expression of U.S. doctrine has been the allocation of missions among Army and Navy and Air Force. Each has been charged with defeating its counterparts. This was meaningful as long as each service could control most of the weapons essential to achieving its mission.

2. New weapons have obliterated traditional service boundaries, and emphasized interdependence of services. No service can achieve its primary mission by itself, but at the same time is often in disagreement with its sister services over what constitutes an essential target or an adequate strategy or an effective weapon.

2.

3. Without an agreed doctrine, services feel that they cannot relinquish control over weapons each considers essential to achieve its mission. Therefore each service will hoard every weapon that may remotely affect its mission. This results in duplication and waste and in the proliferation of partially overlapping, partially conflicting weapons systems.

4. The traditional division of functions which once worked smoothly has in the nuclear age become a source of bitter rivalry with services fighting over control of each new weapon. And doctrine tends to be created as a tool of interservice rivalry.

5. This transforms the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the best will in the world, into advocates of a service point of view. Over-all doctrine tends to be a compromise of conflicting points of view.

6. The office of the Secretary of Defense, instead of shaping over-all doctrine, is forced to serve as an arbiter of interservice disputes. It is the essence of a referee that issues reach him only after positions have hardened. It leaves insufficient for influencing decisions at a formative stage.

## II

### III. Outlines of a Solution

1. The basic problem is the distortion of strategic thought caused by the obsolescent division of functions among the services.

2. The logic of strategy demands a greater degree of unification among the services, particularly where roles and missions overlap most, and at levels where attitudes are formed as well as at the top.

3. Among the various methods for unification, the first step would be a functional reorganization of the Defense Department based on an analysis of tasks imposed by the strategic situation and to develop clearly distinguishable tasks.

4. Two possible ways of achieving this would be either a single service or two functional commands representing distinguishable strategic mission areas: A Strategic Force and a Tactical Force.

5. In the latter case, the Joint Chiefs would be composed of the chiefs of the Strategic and Tactical Forces, and a Chairman.

Service chiefs would continue administration of traditional services freeing the chief of each Force to give his full attention to problems of over-all strategy.

6. A reorganization of the military side of the Defense Department should be accompanied by strengthening the office of the Secretary of Defense through the creation of an Under Secretary of Defense for strategic planning.

NOTES ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

I. The Problem

The technological revolution of the past decade has overthrown
many of the notions on which our military policy has been traditionally based.
Until the outbreak of World War II, our military policy was based on the
assumption that our peacetime forces needed to be cadres only and that
we would have time in case of emergency to mobilize our resources.

Given the range, power and speed of modern weapons, this is
no longer possible. In order to avoid disaster, our forces must be at
instantaneous readiness. Any war will be fought with our forces-in-being.

Moreover, until the end of World War II, weapons technology
was relatively stable. When a weapons system might be good for a
generation and when the available weapons systems were very few, military
policy resolved itself into procuring the greatest amount of military
hardware. But today weapons systems change at an ever-accelerating rate.
The number of possible combinations is enormous and far transcends the
available resources of any power. Even if it were financially possible
to procure every weapon that can be developed, it would not solve our
problem. It would merely shift the problem of choice from procurement
to utilization; it would overwhelm policy makers with a multiplicity
of possible courses which because of their very number would paralyze
action.

The basic problem of contemporary military policy is therefore
the ability to make effective choices. To seek to develop every conceivable
weapons system is to invite financial disaster. At a time when our
economy is already beset by inflationary pressures, the efficient
utilization of resources devoted to defense is a matter of paramount

2.

importance. An organization which produces constant friction and duplication of effort will sap our economy without adding to our military effectiveness. The key problem is the ability to decide on the nature of the most effective strategy, on the weapons system to implement it and on a system of priorities to achieve it.

Without an organization capable of producing effective, over-all decisions, we will squander our resources. We will not be able to use effectively even the forces we do develop, because they will not represent an agreed purpose. In every crisis our policy makers will be handicapped by conflicting advice.

This is in fact the situation today. Three services developing partially overlapping, partially competing strategies produce a duplication of effort in some fields and cause others to lie neglected. They waste scarce resources and absorb the energies of policy makers in adjudicating interservice rivalries rather than in shaping strategic doctrine.

This situation is all the more worrisome because of the seemingly greater effectiveness of the Soviet Union in solving the problem of priorities. Operating from a substantially smaller industrial base, the USSR within a period of 6 years has succeeded in ending our atomic monopoly, developed a long-range bomber force, beat us in the missile race and launched an earth satellite superior to any envisaged by us. Moreover, the Soviet Union has shown impressive skill in translating its military power into political advantage. It has coordinated physical pressures and threats with appeals to the resentments of centuries and the hopes of millions all over the world. As its power has developed, the daring of the Soviet Union has multiplied.

3.

Its threats of using force have become ever bolder until the threat of missile attacks have become almost a commonplace in Soviet diplomacy.

Thus the U.S. and the free world find themselves in mortal peril. The technological superiority which was supposed to offset Soviet manpower has disappeared in many fields. Unprecedented peacetime military budgets have not been able to arrest this trend because we have not been clear about the *purpose* of our strategy and therefore we have been prey to duplication of effort and the uncertainty produced by conflicting advice.

["conflicting advice.\n\nhave been to substitution of efforts and the mercantilism produced.\n\nhave not been clear upon the purpose of our strategy and therefore we\n\nhave not been able to spare time to study this trend because we\n\nhave not been able to reach the purposes of

4.

## II. Causes of the Problem

The U.S. military establishment has been beset by interservice
rivalry which has produced wasted effort and a diversion of energies.
The expression of our strategic doctrine has been the allocation of
roles and missions among the military services - the Army, Air Force
and Navy. Each of these services has had the mission of defeating its
enemy counterpart: the Army had primary responsibility for the land
battle, the Navy for control of the seas and the Air Force for the con-
trol of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of
locomotion with everything moving by water assigned to the Navy, every-
thing moving by land assigned to the Army and everything moving through
the air assigned to the Air Force.

Originally this assignment of roles represented distinguishable
strategic tasks: the Army was powerless on the sea beyond the range of
its coastal artillery, and the Navy was unable to project itself far
inland. The Air Force was not yet independent, and the range of its
planes was sufficiently short to permit the division of functions between
the Navy and Army air arms to follow roughly that between the senior
services. Each service was, therefore, able to control all the weapons
it considered essential for achieving its mission. It could in effect
develop its own strategy without too much concern with that of the sister
service or without too much dependence on the interpretation of a sister
service as to what constituted an essential target.

But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the
incomparable destructiveness of weapons have almost obliterated the
traditional boundaries among the services. Today, no service can
achieve its primary mission without either trespassing on the role of

achieve its primary mission without either trooping on the role of
traditional pombarries among the services. Today, no service can
incumbble defensiveness of wasbes have almost obliterated the
But the four-range airplane, the Buffalo aircraft and the
service as to what constituted an essential stage.

service or without too much dependence on the infrastructure of a state
depending on its own infrastructure without too much concern with that of the state
it considered essential for achieving its mission. If could in effect
services. Each service was, therefore, able to control all the wasbes
the Navy and Navy air arms to follow roughly that between the senior
plans was sufficiently broad to permit the division of functions between
inland. The Vir-Force was not yet independent, and the range of its
the coastal area, and the Navy was able to project itself far
asymmetrically: the Navy was powerful on the sea beyond the range of
Originally this assignment of roles represented qualitative advantages
the air assigned to the Vir-Force.

the air moving by land assigned to the Navy and everything moving through
recognition with everything moving by water assigned to the Navy, either-
royal of the air. These wasbes were placed in effect, on means of
pallets, the Navy for control of the sea and the Vir-Force for the con-
enemy counteracts: the Navy had primarily reasonableness for the fund
and Navy. Each of these services had the mission of defeating its
rolee and wasbes among the military services - the Navy, Vir-Force
The expression of our administrative doctrine has been the allocation of
ravish which has produced wasted efforts and a divergence of energies.

The U.S. military adaptation has been based on infrastructure

## II. Causes of the Problem

14

5.

the other services or calling on them for assistance. And cooperation
among the services is difficult unless there is an agreement on doctrine,
the practical manifestation of which would be that all services hold the
same view as to what constitutes an essential target. Is the sea con-
trolled by bombing shipyards from carriers or by destroying the enemy's
industrial potential? Is a land battle possible without having won
air supremacy, and is it necessary after the air battle has been won?

In the absence of an agreed strategic doctrine, each service
will give its own reply. So long as each service has the primary mission
of defeating its enemy counterpart, and so long as there does not exist an
agreed strategic doctrine, no service can afford to relinquish control
over a weapon which it considers essential for the performance of its
mission. For the Navy's conception of what is essential to win control
of the seas may conflict with the Air Force's notion of its requirements
for winning the air battle. And in view of the necessity for quick re-
action imposed by the increasing speed and power of modern weapons, each
service will seek to escape this dilemma by hoarding as many weapons as
possible.

A duplication of weapons systems and a proliferation of partially
conflicting doctrines is inevitable. The division of functions which
worked relatively smoothly for a century and a half has become a source
of bitter rivalry in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a bitter
wrangle as to which service should control it. It was thus with the A-bomb:
it is now the case with missiles. And in each instance the doctrinal issue
was evaded by permitting each service to develop its own weapon even if it
duplicated the efforts of a sister service.

demonstrated the excellence of a similar service.

was enacted by mandating each service to develop its own measures even if it
if it now the case with matters. And in each instance the director issues
wrinkle as to which service should control it. If we were with the V-pump:
of better rapidity in the event above. Each new measure has led to a differ-
working relatively smoothly for a century and a half has become a source
contributing doctrine is indeed false. The division of functions which
A definition of measure above and a proliferation of partially
possible.

service will seek to escape this dilemma by mandating as many measures as
action implied by the increasing ahead and behind of modern weapons, each
tor winning the air battle. And in view of the necessity for further re-
of the same may conflict with the Air Force's notion of its responsibility
mation. For the Navy's conception of what is essential to win control
over a weapon which it considers essential for the performance of its
attacked strategic doctrine, no service can allow so far-flung control
of defending its enemy counterparty, and so long as there does not exist an
will have its own reply. So long as each service has the primary mission

In the absence of an agreed strategic doctrine, each service
airily subsumed, and if it necessarily after the air battle has been won?
industrially beneficial? Is a final battle possible without having won
profiled by pumping expenditure from carriers or by extracting the enemy's
сына as to what constitutes an essential target. Is the sea con-
the basicost manifestation of which would be that air services hold the
among the services is difficult unless there is an agreement on doctrine,
the other services or ceding them for assistance. And cooperation

2.

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6.

Such a solution is costly. It prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and in every crisis it confronts our policy makers with conflicting advice. It fosters a tendency to create doctrine as a tool in the interservice battle for appropriations; the incentive it provides is for the theoretical elaboration of a service view and not of an over-all approach to strategy.

The setting of force levels on the basis of each service's primary mission, when this mission represents no clearly distinguishable strategic option inhibits the development of over-all doctrine and leads to an enormously wasteful duplication of effort. The primary missions of the services become ends in themselves; new weapons are placed into the strait jecket of obsolescent missions instead of fitting missions to revolutionary departures in technology. Given the range and power of modern weapons the attempt by each service to hoard all weapons that can affect a service's primary mission must lead to a tendency for each service to develop a capability for winning a war by itself. Its efforts will be directed toward reducing its reliance on other services.

As a result our Joint Chiefs of Staff have become, with the best will in the world, essentially advocates of a service point of view. The Joint Chiefs have risen to their position through a lifetime of dedication to one service. They are a product of its problems, its training schools, its environment. Maintaining the morale of their service can never be far from their minds. And mastering the primary mission of each service is becoming so difficult that all effort almost inevitably inhibits a consideration of its relationship to an over-all mission; or, more accurately, it leads to a psychological distortion in which over-all strategy tends to be equated with a service's primary

which over-all strategy tends to be adopted with a service's primary
mission or, more accurately, its job to a behavioral diagram in
involving individuals a consideration of its relationship to an over-all
mission of each service is becoming so critical that all efforts focus
service can never be far from their minds. And measuring the broadly
training agenda, its environment, maintaining the morale of their
discipline to one service. They are a product of its problems, if
the total Agenda have risen to their position through a lifetime of
passivity in the work, essentially advocates of a service bound of view.

As a result our total Agenda of 300 have become, with the
will be directed toward requiring its relevance on other services.

service to develop a capability for winning a war by itself. Its effort
relates to a service's primary mission must feed to a tendency for each
modern service the attempt to do each service to do all service that can
reliably support development in technology. Given the range and power of
atomic devices of科学技术 services based on lifting missions to
the service become able in subsequent new missions are placed into the
so an enormously massive dedication of effort. The primary missions of
a strategy to obtain individuals the capability of over-all doctrine and jobs
primarily mission, when this mission represents no clear-cutableendeavor
The setting of force reveals on the basis of each service's
and not of an overall effort subsumed to strategy.

conative to provide it for the theoretical extrapolation of a service's view
despite as a tool in the infinite service paffe for subordination; the in-
volving means with conflicting equations. If desired a tendency to create
benefit from our artificially exuberance and in easily create it contrive om-
shop a solution is costly. If breviate me from drawing the full

P.

7.

mission. The test of an organization is how naturally and spontaneously it enables its leadership to address itself to its most severe challenges. There is little in the organization of our national defense establishment that impels the service chiefs in a spontaneous fashion to consider over-all strategic doctrine.

The difficulty of over-all planning by the military has its counterpart in the office of the Secretary of Defense. At present, the Secretary of Defense is at best an arbiter of doctrinal disputes. He possesses neither the staff nor the organization to shape them.

Because the primary tasks of the office of the Secretary as now constituted are the adjudication of interservice rivalry very few of the civilian assistants of the Secretary of Defense have duties actually relevant to the conduct of a war. In the event of large-scale hostilities, the bulk of the civilian echelon of the Department of Defense could serve only by abdicating.

To be sure, a violent shift of mission of our military headquarters when a war starts is part of our national history. But the speed and destructiveness of modern weapons may cause our survival as a nation to depend on a degree of instantaneous efficiency in our military commands beyond the capacity of an organization in the process of changing gears. To be sure, the Department of Defense as the nation's largest business, must be run in a business-like manner. But it must also be able to discharge effectively the purpose for which it was designed. Testing our peacetime organization against the ultimate threat, it is necessary to point out that the main mission of the defense establishment, which is war-readiness, deserves an over-riding priority it does not have now.

deserves an over-riding priority, if does not have now.

out that the main mission of the defense capabilities, which is war-readiness, becentered organization against the ultimate threat, it is necessary to bring charge effectively the purpose for which it was designed. Giving our must be run in a business-like manner. But it must also be able to discharge the eachofh of an organization in the process of chunking sense, to depend on a degree of instantaneous efficiency in our military commands and effectiveness of modern weapons may cause our survival as a nation quarters when a war starts is hard of our national priority. But the speed To be sure, a violent shift of mission of our military head of Defense could serve only by advertising.

Since difficulties, the bulk of the civilian population of the Department actually relevant to the conduct of a war. In the event of large- of the civilian assistance of the Secretary of Defense have given now constituted are the obligation of interagency directly and few because the primary task of the office of the Secretary as businesses neither the staff nor the organization to impose them. Secretary of Defense is at best anارد of doctoring diabetes. He counterpart in the office of the Secretary of Defense. As present, the The difficulty of over-all planning by the military has its all strategic doctrine.

that implies the service chiefs in a homogeneous team to consider over- there is little in the organization of our national defense capabilities it adds its responsibility to address itself to its most severe challenges. Thus the best of an organization is how naturally and abusively

8.

### III. **Outline of a Solution**

If the above analysis is correct, the immediate task is to recognize that the present organization of our Defense Establishment does not produce optimum readiness and leads to a great deal of waste and duplication of effort.

The basic problem is the obsolescent division of function among the services. It is inherent in the philosophy and training of each service that it should see in the enemy threat predominantly those elements for which its particular professional role is best adapted. And each service naturally judges the proper balance of forces to be the one which maximizes its own role. This reduces the top echelon of the Defense Department to the role of the referee of interservice rivalry. And it is the nature of a referee's role that problems come to him only *after* positions have hardened. It leaves insufficient room for shaping and influencing decisions at their formative stage.

The objective should be to replace present procedures with a system whereby strategic doctrine emanates from the top of the organization. However much inspiration may originate within the services, over-all doctrine cannot be a patchwork of their individual differences.

The basic challenge of an organization is how to bring its leadership to think naturally and spontaneously about the problems of greatest over-all concern. The organization of the Defense Department charged with developing strategic doctrine will be ineffective if little in the daily experience of its top personnel leads them naturally to reflection about the problems of strategy. By contrast, a different organization will encourage profound strategic thought if it leads officials to reflect spontaneously about problems of doctrine, not

officials to reflect reasonably about problems of choice, not
organization will encounter strategic differences if it places
reflection upon the problems of choice. By contrast, a different
in the daily experience of the job personnel from a similarly
charged with developing strategic choices will be more likely to
emerge over time. The organization of the Defense Department
fostered a thinking maturity and homogeneity about the problems of
the past that led to an organization that was able to print its
cirolne cannot be a benefit to their individual differences.
However, many institutions may originate within the services, over time
whereby strategic choice emanates from the job of the organization.
The objective should be to reduce present procedures with a
influencing factor at their innovative stage.

bottlenecks have been identified. If these institutional room for shortcoming and
the nature of a release's role that the problem come to him only after
Department to the role of the release or interagency staff. And if
maximize its own role. This reduces the job function of the Defense
service naturally unless the broader balance of forces to be the one which
takes over its larger professional role is past due. And even
service that it should see in the enemy future brochures itself presents
the services. If it is pertinent in the literature and stating of each
The past problem is the objective division of function among
specialization of effort.

The past problem is the objective division of function among
specialization of effort.
not produce optimum responsiveness and results to a great extent of work and
recognize that the present organization of our Defense capabilities does
not approve the above as correct, the immediate task is to

**III. Organization of a Service**

III. Organization of a Service

only by fiat when they have achieved eminence but throughout their
careers, not only when they sit on interservice committees but through-
out their day-to-day concerns.

This is impossible as long as there exists a mechanistic
division of functions among our services which is growing increasingly
unrealistic. A strategy utilizing missiles is not necessarily analogous
to air strategy simply because missiles fly through the air, any more
than a 1500-mile missile is a tactical weapon because it is fired like
an artillery projectile. The logic of strategy, therefore, demands a
greater degree of unification among the services. This unification is
as important at the lower and intermediary echelons where attitudes
are formed as at the top where often little can be done except to
provide a forum for well-established views.

The methods of achieving this unification are various.
The first step would be to remember that the reason the division of
missions among services worked relatively well in the past is that
it was in fact a _functional_ division: the Army, the Navy and the
Air Force had distinguishable strategic tasks. The goal of any
reorganization of the Defense Department should therefore be to
identify meaningful _functional_ tasks. No organization can eliminate
the self-interest which is the reverse side of organizational loyalty.
But it can channel it in such a fashion that self-interest and the
requirements of an over-all strategic doctrine are in harmony. If
the functional subdivisions of the Defense Department are properly
defined, rivalry might still occur, but it would produce a healthy
competition of ideas.

combination of ideas.

defined, it rarely might occur, but it would produce a perfect
the functional suppositions of the Defense Department are proper
requirements of an ever-more ambitious doctrine are in demand. It
But it can be assumed if in some a notion that self-interest and the
self-interest which is the reverse side of organizational laziness,
identically meaningful functional tasks. No organization can attain
recognition of the Defense Department should function as to
Air Force and administrative strategic tasks. The task of an
it was in fact a functional division: the Navy, the Army and the
ministries among services worked relatively well in the past is that
The task of a job would be to remember that the reason the division of
the methods of achieving this multiplication are various.

provide a form for well-adapted areas.
are formed as at the job where often little can be done except to
be important at the lower and intermediately above where attitudes
broaden degree of multiplication among the services. This multiplication is
an artificial bottleneck. The figure of asserted, therefore, demands a
than a 1200-mile missile is a tactical weapon because it is tried life
to sir, assertedly almost impossible to make it through the strata, and more
unsuccessful. A assertedly stiffening message is not necessarily unresolvable
in a division of functions among our services which is growing increasingly
This is impracticable as long as there exists a momentum
out their way-to-day concerns.

careers, not only when tried at an inter-service committee but throughout
only by that when they have achieved eminence put throughout their.

3.

11.

## IV. Possible Mechanisms

It should be stressed that the validity of the diagnosis and the outline of a solution is independent of any specific mechanism to remedy the situation. The suggestions in this section are intended to indicate a direction rather than a fully worked out reorganization plan.

The most immediate means to eliminate inter-service rivalry would be the creation of a single military service, though the obstacles to this would be great. Through the medium of a common staff, such a service could then decide on the functions to be performed and create appropriate commands to develop the proper organization and forces. A single service would have the advantage of permitting a very flexible assignment of functions. It would have the disadvantage that it might be extremely unwieldy and that the obstacles to implementing it quickly might cause an undue delay in bringing it into being.

Another approach would be to start at the other end and to reorganize the existing services into broad mission areas which represent clearly distinguishable tasks. Two such missions stand out most clearly: the conduct of all-out war and the conduct of limited war. Other areas might be distinguished, such as continental defense and/or anti-submarine warfare.

As an immediate step, two basic commands could be created, each representing a clearly distinguishable mission: the Strategic Force and the Tactical Force. The Strategic Force would be the units required for all-out war; it would include the Strategic Air Command, the Air Defense Command, those units of the Navy which are to participate in the retaliatory attack. The Tactical Forces would be the Army, Air Force and Navy units required for limited war. The training and doctrine of

12.

the Tactical and Strategic Forces respectively should be uniform and
its officers should attend the same technical and service schools.
The Army, Navy and Air Force could continue as administrative and
training units, much as the training commands within the various
services function today. Training schools could continue to be
administered by a parent service but the curriculum and student
body should be determined by the Force commander.

The division of our forces into a Strategic and a Tactical
Force would reflect the real nature of the strategic problem we
confront: the necessity of being protected against all-out war as
the prerequisite of all other measures and the capability to fight
limited war as the form of conflict where the cost is commensurate
with the issues actually under dispute.

In such an organization, too, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
would change their character. They would be composed of a Chairman,
the Chief of the Tactical Forces, the Chief of the Strategic Forces,
and the Chief of any other Force which might be created to perform
a distinguishable function. Such a group would in its very nature
be more oriented towards doctrine than the present Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The Chief of each Force would represent an integrated
strategic mission and not a means of locomotion. Since service
chiefs would continue to administer the traditional services, the
Chief of the Strategic and Tactical Force would be freed of many of
the routine problems of administration which, as Admiral Radford
pointed out before the Symington Committee, make the Chairman the

13.

only member of the present group who can give his full attention to
problems of over-all strategy.

The advantage of the proposed organization for the conduct
of military operations is demonstrated by the fact that joint commands
reflecting the same basic concept have been set up in every recent
war in which we have been engaged. Even today the operational commands
are on a joint basis. The new organization would create in peacetime
the structure which the requirements of combat would impose on us in
any case. To be sure, there would be a possibility of the same
contest over appropriations as now between the Chiefs of the Strategic
and the Tactical Force. And there would be the same temptation to
invent doctrine to support budgetary requests. But with each Force
representing a distinguishable strategic mission, self-interest and
requirements of strategic doctrine would be in harmony.

The change in the organization of the services should be
supplemented by strengthening the organization for strategic decisions
of the civilian side of the Department of Defense. Implicit in the
present organization is the notion that strategic doctrine reflects
"purely" military considerations for which professional officers are
uniquely qualified.

Such a separation of strategy and policy can only be achieved
to the detriment of both. Since the difficult problems of national
policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and
military factors overlap, we should give up the fiction that there is
such a thing as "purely" military advice. The Secretary of Defense

14.

requires in his office a deputy charged with considering the over-all
strategic situation. There should be an Under-Secretary of Defense
for Strategic Planning charged with developing the political, psycho-
logical and economic implications of strategic doctrine. This office
could be strengthened by the creation of a Strategic Advisory Council
composed of eminent individuals from private life.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense should be related
more closely to the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Under-Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning should participate
in all meetings of the Joint Chiefs, save those of a purely technical
nature.

Both the civilian officials and the Joint Chiefs would profit
from an amalgamation of their functions. At every stage of formulation
of strategy, doctrine would be considered as a combination of political,
economic, psychological and military factors replacing the incongruity
of the present system which seeks to compromise two incommensurables:
"purely" military and "purely" political considerations.

With the emergence of an agreed strategic doctrine within the
Department of Defense, the whole process of formulating security
objectives within the Executive Branch would gain in balance. An
explicit Department of Defense position would then confront the
fiscal position. With a better structure for producing strategic
decisions, inter-service disputes would substantially disappear.
Doctrine could then be built on the only sound basis: a concept of
the nature and the possible goals of war.

the nature and the possible beta of war.

Decide how they can put on the only some data: a concept of
deceleration, infer-service diabetes would suddenly crash.

First hypothesis. With a perfect structure for promoting strategic
objectives. Department of Defense budget would then confront the
objective within the Executive Branch would gain in balance. An
Department of Defense, the whole process of formulating security

With the emergence of an agreed strategic doctrine within the
"bureaucracy" miffery and "bureaucracy" budget considerations.

Of the present system which seeks to condense two incommensibles:
economic, budgetary and miffery, therefore replacing the incommensity
of strategy, doctrine would be considered as a combination of budget,
from anification of their functions. At every stage of formulation
Both the civilian officials and the joint Chiefs would broach the
nature.

In all meetings of the joint Chiefs, save those of a hereby technical
Under-Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning should barter
more closely to the deliberations of the joint Chiefs of Staff. The
The Office of the Secretary of Defense should be refaced
combined of entire individuals from bursary file.

Could be strengthened by the creation of a Strategic Advisory Committee
and economiculations of strategic doctrine. This office
for Strategic Planning operated with developing the budget, balance-
strategic situation. There should be an Under-Secretary of Defense
required in the office a deputy charged with considering the over-all
situation.

J.J.

15.

## V. Possible Counterarguments

**Argument:** That the present shortcomings of the Department of Defense reflect "parochialism" which can be overcome by better understanding by the services of each other's problems and an end to the effort to invade each other's prerogatives.

**Reply:** The difficulties are independent of personalities. The officers concerned are patriotic and well-meaning. Their problem is that the present structure forces them to become advocates; that their skill is measured by negotiating ability in interdepartmental committees; that the mission assigned to their service represents no distinctive strategic option so that the time devoted to developing a "service doctrine" represents from the national point of view a division of resources.

Moreover, interservice disputes have arisen not so much because the services have sought to take over each other's primary mission but because each in support of its own mission has been impelled by conflicting pressures of technology and of budget-making into overlapping weapons systems. The real difficulty has been that the power, speed and range of modern weapons have obliterated the traditional distinctions between ground, air and sea warfare. It is no longer possible to define a distinguishable strategic mission based on a means of locomotion.

**Argument:** That the elimination and downgrading of the services would undermine the morale which is a mainstay of their organization.

**Reply:** Nothing is more demoralizing ultimately than the assignment of tasks which imply no distinctive purpose. The inter-service rivalry is demoralizing for all concerned. Moreover the tactical and strategic force concept would retain the traditional services as training organizations.

Proper and strategic care concepts worth retaining the traditional service vary to the degree of concern. Moreover the requirements of sales when they no longer have business. The inter-

**Rejoice:** Morning is more democratic than the

work underlie the morale which in a manner of their organization.

**Commitment:** That the elimination and downgrading of the services a distributional strategic mission based on a means of location.

between ground, air and sea warships. If it is no longer possible to define and range of modern weapons based on the traditional distinctions between aircraft and of the same power.

Using distribution of technology and of people-making into overlapping parts produces each in subpart of its own mission plan targeted at common the services have sought to take over each other's primary mission. Moreover, interdepartmental cooperation not so much be-

rebranded from the national point of view a division of resources.

The option so that the time devoted to developing a "service doctrine" that the mission assigned to their service represents no distinctive aspect of it measured by netting efficiency in interdepartmental committees; that the broadest extrinsic forces from which to become advocates! that their the officers concerned are botroole and well-meaning. Their problem is

**Rejoice:** The difficulties are independent of barterificies. Effort to increase each offer's barterificies. Extending by the services of each offer's propylene and an end to the Defense relief "barterificies" which can be overcome by better methods.

A. **Propylene Combinations**

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16.

**Argument:** The existing machinery for producing strategic decisions is adequate. Every service is doing its best to avoid waste.

**Reply:** Waste occurs not only because of duplication but because some missions fall between two stools. Thus airlift for the army is outside the army's primary mission (because it moves through the air) but is only secondary to the Air Force's primary mission of defeating the enemy air aim.

Moreover, even when services seem to agree, it is not clear that they mean the same thing by a given term or that they are coordinating their planning effectively. For example, while each service has some concept of limited war, it thinks of it not as an integrated problem but of defeating its enemy counterpart in a "limited" fashion. Thus in its planning it tends to make the other services dispensable.

**Argument:** That forces for all our war imply forces for limited war and we therefore do not require a separate organization for planning it.

**Reply:** The strategic striking force is the prime deterrent against all-out war; it must therefore be reserved for this contingency. This is particularly important during a limited war, because to the extent that our retaliatory force suffers attrition in such conflict, the enemy would lose his incentive for keeping the war limited. An aggressor who could tempt us to utilize our strategic striking force in a limited war would gain a strategic advantage, however military operations ended. To the extent that our retaliatory force declined

17.

in strength, our ability to deter all-out war would decline and therewith the sanction for keeping the war limited. To use our strategic striking force as a dual-purpose force would weaken the deterrent to all-out war at the precise time when it should be strongest.

Moreover, the nature of the weapons, the planning and the concept of operations, differ radically between forces useful for all-out war and those for limited war. The weapons system for all-out war is designed to inflict maximum destruction in the shortest time. The weapons system for a limited war, on the other hand, must be flexible and discriminating. In an all-out war the targets are known in advance, in fact each crew of the Strategic Air Command is training for a specific Soviet target all the time. Everything depends therefore on the efficiency with which the plan for all-out war can be implemented. In a limited war neither the locale of the conflict nor the targets can be determined in advance. Everything here depends on the rapidity with which planning can be adjusted to a developing situation. In an all-out war the chief problem is to eliminate the enemy's retaliatory force before it has done too much damage. In a limited war the problem is to apply graduated amounts of destruction for limited objectives and also to permit the necessary breathing spaces for political contacts.

A weapons system for limited war is therefore basically different from a retaliatory force. Limited wars require units of high mobility and considerable firepower which can be quickly moved

pursuance of积极 and considerable further work which can be greatly moved
differently from a satisfactory force. Limited were radical ideas of
a weather system for limited war. In consequence particularly
abuse for beneficial contracts.

for limited objectives and so to benefit the necessary pressing
limited war. The problem is to supply distributed amounts of destruction
enough a satisfactory force before it has done so much damage. In a
full operation. In an all-out war the chief problem is to eliminate the
damage on the task force with which planning can be adjusted so a desired
conflict nor the target can be determined in advance. Effectively here
our war can be implemented. In a limited war neither the locale of the
defence须forces on the efficiency with which the plan for all-
out training for a specific force targets all the time. Everlasting
are known in advance, in fact each crew of the Strategic Vth Command
must be flexible and disinfluencing. In an all-out war the targets
time. The weather system for a limited war, on the other hand,
is designed to utilize maximum destruction in the shortest
all-out war and those for limited war. The weather system for all-
out war is designed to utilize maximum destruction in the shortest
course of operations, tiller respectively between forces nearly to
be advanced.

Moreover, the nature of the weather, the planning and the
be foreseen.

the determination to all-out war at the precise time when it should
be strategic striking force as a multi-purpose force would mean
therefore in the execution for meeting the war limited. To see our
in strength, our ability to defer all-out war would be quite and

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18.

to trouble spots and which can bring their power to bear with dis-
crimination. The capability for rapid deployment is crucial. Given
the power of modern weapons and the speed of movement of military
units, it will be very difficult to dislodge an enemy once he has
become established. Since aggression is unlikely to occur unless
the aggressor doubts either the capability or the willingness
of his opponent to intervene, the ability to get into position
rapidly even with relatively small forces can serve as a guage
of the determination to resist and contribute to the re-establishment
of an equilibrium before either side becomes too heavily committed.

**Argument:** We do possess a strategic doctrine reflected in the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.

**Reply:** The decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the National Security Council give a misleading impression of unity of purpose. The officials comprising these bodies are either heads of military services in the case of the Joint Chiefs, or heads of executive departments in the case of the National Security Council. As administrators of complex organizations they must give most of their attention to reducing the frictions of the administrative machine, both within their departments and in the relation of their departments to other agencies. Their thoughts run more naturally to administrative efficiency than to the elaboration of national objectives. In the committees where national policies are developed, they become negotiators rather than planners, and the positions they seek to reconcile inevitably reflect a departmental point of view in which administrative

invariably reflect a departmental point of view in which administrative
angles rather than broad perspectives, and the positions they seek to reconcile
compromise where national policies are developed, should become negoti-
cated, then to the elaboration of national objectives. In the
evening sessions, their thoughts run more naturally to administrative
within their departments and in the relation of their departments to
attention to reducing the tritium of the administrative personnel, pos-
sible administrative costs of complex organizations which must have more of their
time departments in the case of the National Security Council. As
ministerial services in the case of the Joint Council, or those of excom-
bureaus. The officials combining these policies are either made of
the National Security Council give a reflecting impression of much of
the National Security Council's work, and especially in the case of
Council.

the decisions of the Joint Council of State and the National Security
Committee: We do believe a strategic doctrine reflected in
of an encapsulated philosophy before either she becomes too heavily committed.

of the determination to react and contribute to the re-encapsulation
respectively even with relatively small forces can serve as a gauge
of its obsolescence to interpose, the sparsity to get into being
the atmosphere of either the encapsulation or the willingness
become encapsulated. Since aggression is unfavourable to occur unless
it will be very difficult to confound an enemy once he has
the power of modern weapons and the sheet of movements of militarily
ennoblement. The encapsulation for which degradation is crucial. Given
the trouble above and which can print their power to pass with great-

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19.

or budgetary considerations play a major role. The heads of de-
partments do not stand above the battle of the bureaucracy; they
are spokesmen for it. In fact, the departmental viewpoint is
sometimes purposely exaggerated in order to facilitate compromise.

As a result, the conclusions of both the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the National Security Council reflect the attainable con-
sensus among sovereign departments rather than a sense of direction.
Because agreement is frequently unattainable except by framing con-
clusions in very generalized language, decisions by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff or the National Security Council do not end serious inter-
departmental disputes. Instead they shift them to an interpretation
of the meaning of directives. And departments or services whose
disagreements prevented the development of doctrine in the first
place will choose the exegesis closest to their original point of
view. Seeming unanimity merely defers the doctrinal dilemma until
either some crisis or the requirements of the budgetary process force
a reconsideration under the pressure of events.

a recognition under the banner of events.
either some criteria or the redetermination of the pugestly process force
away. Seeming manifestly mere steps in the gradual diffusion until
steps will choose the executives closest to their original bond of
decisive influence prevented the development of doctrine in the life of
the meaning of directives. And departments or services whose
departmental differences. Instead they split them to an interpretation
of Staff or the National Security Council do not end serpentine infer-
malions in any generalized manner, decisions by the joint Council
Because agreement is traditionally most stable except in training con-
 sequences amount to separate departments rather than a sense of direction.
Staff and the National Security Council reflect the stable con-
V a result, the conclusions of both the joint Council of
sometimes mistakenly extended in order to facilitate comparison.
are abrogated for it. In fact, the departmental framework is
broadened do not stand above the patiences of the previous era, thus
or pugestly considerations play a major role. The needs of de-

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