- 43 -

any policy beyond the one that we have already proclaimed,
except to underline our interest in the independence and neutrality
of Cambodia once again.

Q Then our present policy is to render all possible
assistance to Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: You know when you say "all possible
assistance" ---

Q Mr. Agnew says it.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but you can interpret all possible
assistance to mean we will send in troops, there is no limit
to what we are going to do, or you can interpret it
in the way I have interpreted it, which happens to be governmental
policy.

Q We should reinterpret interdiction, Dr. Kissinger,
shouldn't we? What about interdiction?

MR. KLEIN: Let me get to a couple of other people
and we will get back to you. I am not trying to avoid your point.

Q Mr. Sisco, what is the status of Nasser within
his own country? Does he have the support of the army and what
is his status among some of his allies since the cease fire?

MR. SISCO: Our impression is that Nasser has
continuing solid support within the UAR and he continues to
enjoy very, very substantial support in the Arab world generally.

I say this because it is a rather remarkable thing,
because if one goes back to the June war, and you think in terms
of the defeat which the UAR suffered, Nasser is I think an
exception to the rule that no one can take that kind of a defeat
and survive.

Again, the interesting thing about the American
proposal is that it seems to have unleashed some very important
forces in the area. First, the Israel government, of course,
had to face up to the challenge from its own right wing;
secondly, there is evidence of both Nasser and Hussein standing
up much more firmly, not only with respect to the countries
that do not support a peaceful solution and do not support the
Security Council resolution, namely, Iraq and Syria; but
likewise I think it has stiffened Nasser's position and Hussein's
position vis-a-vis the Fedayeen, and in particular those that
are pursuing a more militant solution and are not talking
about a political solution based on co-existence between the
Arabs and the Israelis.

So that I would say to you that in our judgment
Nasser continues to be the number one charismatic figure in
the Arab world and we think he is key. We think that if in fact
both sides can be encouraged to move away from their maximum
positions -- and I tried to emphasize this morning there isn't
going to be a political solution on the basis of each holding
to their maximum terms -- if both sides can move towards a
conciliatory stance, our judgment is that Nasser is key; Hussein
will follow his lead and we think he can make a peace stick
if he decides to make it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, going back to Vice President Agnew
and his statement about Cambodia, he was also reported,
I think by AP, to have said that if the Communists overrun
Cambodia that the United States will find it impossible to

MORE

- 44 -

withdraw its troops from Vietnam.

Would you care to comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, again, let me explain that I haven't seen the full text of what he said. But, let me explain our reading of the situation.

First, it wouldn't be that easy for the Communists to overrun Cambodia. They have to make a major reenforcement effort before they can even contemplate doing that.

Secondly, we have our doubts that the South Vietnamese would permit the reopening of the Port of Sihanoukville, which would take away one of the significant impacts of any such move, because it would prevent the supply by sea from that area.

Thirdly, while the loss of Cambodia, or the transformation of Cambodia, or even eastern Cambodia into a Communist base area would have had disastrous consequences in April, with the loss of sanctuaries, the strengthening of the South Vietnamese, and with the gains in pacification in South Vietnam, we do not believe that this would have been as disastrous as it would have been then.

We do not foresee anything in the next year, or until the completion of the current phase of our withdrawal, that would affect this program.

Now, there could be something of a totally unforeseen nature. But we intend to carry out the withdrawal program, and I am sure that Vice President Agnew intended to put the strategic significance of Cambodia into the context of the whole operation going back to April.

MR. KLEIN: I might say that it is my understanding that the comments we are referring to here are ones in some type of comment with the press itself on the airplane en route between Guam and South Korea, so that this would be the reason there is no immediate text on this.

Q Dr. Kissinger used the word "anguished" talking about the Far East, and "danger" in talking about the Mideast.

About South America and the rest of the Americas and the recent diplomatic problems, would you care to give us your word for that, and perhaps elaborate on that?

MR. KLEIN: Briefly. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: I am sustained by the affection and support of my colleagues. (Laughter)

In Latin America we have attempted also to pursue the policy that I have described for other parts of the world; that is, to reduce to the extent possible the visible domination of the United States, and above all, to end the idea that Latin American programs had to be designed in Washington.

The Alliance for Progress, for example, contained many elevated objectives. But, for many Latin Americans, it was a program which was designed for them instead of by them. And it was announced on theawn, or in the Rose Garden of the White House, even though it spoke of social revolution in their country.

MORE

- 45 -

[lc]

What we have been attempting to do is to change the orientation and put a greater emphasis on self-help and self-development, perhaps lower the rhetoric, but improve the performance.

And the President, on October 31, last year, made a major speech on Latin America which did not receive what we considered adequate coverage in the United States, but which was well-received -- we ought to keep the pool out of here. They are wincing all over the place. (Laughter)

MR. KLEIN: It was well written. It just wasn't properly received.

DR. KISSINGER: But it actually was very well received in Latin America -- in which we set forth the philosophy that, to the extent possible, we would attempt to develop programs jointly with the Latin Americans and put as much of the initiative into Latin America as we possibly could.

And then we went through a whole list of programs that had been hanging fire for a long time to see what we could do by unilateral administrative action to encourage this process.

There was shortly afterwards a meeting of the InterAmerican Economic and Social Council -- and there was some difficulty, in fact, in getting the Latin Americans to come forward with some ideas, because they were so used to the United States being the dominant partner that they didn't do it. But, the process has now moved along quite well.

I am talking about governmental relations. Within each country, however, there is a process of profound social revolution going on. You have the traditional oligarchies, you have the military, who in the past have played with the traditional oligarchies, and you have the left wing.

One of the problems is that there is no inherent reason why the military have to play with the traditional oligarchies. They could play a national social revolutionary role. And you could then get Nasserite type situations focused on anti-Americanism all over Latin America.

So, what we are trying to do is to navigate between these various shoals to make clear that we are for humane, progressive institutions, but, at the same time to put the primary responsibility on the Latin Americans.

We will see a fair amount of turmoil in Latin America, much of it beyond our direct control. And the important thing to remember is what will be there after that process settles down. There is no way you can avoid the process from taking place in one way or another.

MR. KLEIN: Hank, you were trying to get a question in.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said you have not read the full text of the Vice President's proclamation, let's say, of foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

Is there any one in the Administration who does read the full text of his remarks before he remarks them?

DR. KISSINGER: The Vice President had a long talk with the President, with the Secretary of State, and I was also present, before he left, in which we all discussed the general outlines of our policy and what he would attempt to accomplish on this trip.

And we have every confidence that he stayed within

MORE

- 46 -

[LC]

the framework of National policy.

As a general rule, the President, having been Vice
President himself, and knowing what can befall a serious man
in that office, is very delicate about the degree to which he
feels he should exercise detailed supervision over every
word that may be uttered.

But, the general line of policy, the Vice President,
of course, is fully aware of. And we believe that he has stayed
within the basic guidelines of our policy.

He does have on this trip a member of my staff and a
representative from the State Department, so he has adequate
advice.

Q Before we leave the Vice President, Dr. Kissinger, you said in discussing the credibility of the Administration that nobody can be more sincere or dedicated to a reconciliation of our society than the President himself.

I would like to inquire if the Vice President in the
judgment of the Administration is probably the most effective
spokesman to such a posture?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, my jurisdiction starts outside
the three-mile limit. (Laughter)

Q The Land Reform Movement is judged by many as
one of the keys to peace in Vietnam. But it seems as though
there is a difference of opinion. It has been reported in
some quarters that Mr. Habib and the peace delegation in
Paris, as well as the South Vietnamese government, don't see
eye to eye with the White House on the importance of the Land
Reform Movement.

Does the White House consider the Land Reform Act
that was passed in Saigon as being vital?

DR. KISSINGER: Just for my information, who is
on what side of that argument?

Q The group that went over ---

DR. KISSINGER: No, I mean is Mr. Habib supposed to
be more eager than the White House?

Q Less eager.

DR. KISSINGER: Less eager for land reform? Are we
on the good side of one argument? What are your people doing,
Mr. Sisco? (Laughter)

I frankly don't know what the opinion of Habib is
on the land reform situation now. I knew it when he was
political counsellor in Saigon. At that time he was strongly
for it.

As far as the White House is concerned, we have
pushed the land reform policy ever since President Thieu and
President Nixon met at Midway last year, on which occasion
President Thieu indicated to us that he would
carry out a major land reform program, which he later introduced
within a month, and then which had rather tough passage through
theicate in Saigon.

MREP

- 47 -

It was passed, I think, in March. And I am not
aware that there is any element of the American bureaucracy
or of the top level of the government in Saigon that is
opposed to it.

There are, of course, some vested interests in Saigon
that would like to put off the evil day as long as possible.
But this happens to be not one of the issues on which I am
aware of any disagreement within the government.

MR. KLEIN: As a matter of fact, as Henry says,
one of the interesting things is when you get on the other
side and read a number of things about what is happening at
the White House.

Q We were talking at the table at lunch with
Ron Ziegler about what interdiction means now.

MR. ZIEGLER: Here is one time Henry Kissinger can
clarify my statement. (Laughter)

Q It seems to me there is a very great difference
between what the President said in the initial stages on Cambodia
and what we are now doing with the airplanes. Interdiction
so far as I know means cutting of the supply lines coming
down from North Vietnam.

Now it seems to me we are using the planes in direct
support of the 46,000 troops, support for tactical actions.
Is that right or not?

DR. KISSINGER: Of whose 46,000 troops?

MORE

- 48 -

Q The Cambodians?

That is wrong about the troops. I am sorry, you are
right about that.

DR. KISSINGER: I understand the question.

Q I would like to know how many South Vietnamese
troops there are and whether we are supporting them tactically
with the airplanes?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not supporting them. The mission of our Air Force is interdiction. It is possible that in carrying out the interdiction they may have collateral benefits that also help combat operations.

The supply lines obviously all run through population
centers and many of the Communist attacks have been directed
towards population centers. So it isn't always easy to draw
an absolute distinction between interdiction missions and combat
support missions, but the primary responsibility of our Air
Force in Cambodia is to interdict the supplies that are coming
down from North Vietnam through Cambodia.

There is one additional problem. After our incursion
into the sanctuaries, the Communists have moved their supply
lines further west; that is, previously they followed the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, and now they are sending much of it down parallel to
or along the Sekong and Mekong Rivers. This has meant that our
interdiction effort has had to follow them about 100 miles further
west. But the mission of our Air Force is interdiction.

If any close support is flown deliberately, that is
assigned to the South Vietnamese Air Force. It can happen, of
course, that interdiction missions help combat operations, but
that is not the normal procedure.

I want to add just one quick word to the previous
question. I am literally not conscious of any disagreement
on the Land Reform Program that has come to the President.
There may be some low-level things that I am not aware of,
but I have not heard that there is any disagreement within the
Government on the Land Reform Program.

MR. KLEIN: Gentlemen, I think you agree with me
in my statement I made in the introduction that we are very
fortunate to have two such capable people who are working
on this.

Henry, I would like to thank you, I know, on behalf
of this group for the time and the depth and the candor you
expressed during the day.

Joe, I would like to also thank you.

In closing, I would like to thank you again on behalf
of Ron Ziegler and myself for joining us here today. The President
again expressed his pleasure for your taking the trouble to be
here. Some of you have come very long distances. We hope
this has been helpful to you. It has been our pleasure to have you.
We thank you very much for coming and we hope you have a pleasant
flight back.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END

(AT 3:30 PM PDT)

STATEMENT BY STATE DEPARTMENT -- AUGUST 19, 1970

We have concluded that there was forward deployment
of surface-to-air missiles into and within the zone west of
the Suez Canal around the time the ceasefire went into effect;
there is some evidence that this continued beyond the ceasefire
deadline, although our evidence of this is not conclusive.

With respect to additional information which the Israeli
Government has brought to our attention concerning possible
violations of the ceasefire, we are examining it and are
in touch with the parties through diplomatic channels. We
do not now anticipate making further public statements on
this matter.

Adherence to the ceasefire and standstill is of great
importance to the success of current peace efforts. The
main thing now is to concentrate all efforts on getting
discussions going under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.
The U.S. believes that these talks should begin promptly.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1970

DEPT SPOKESMAN MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT NOON
PRESS BRIEFING SEPT 3

QTE OUR LATEST EVIDENCE CONFIRMS THAT THERE
HAVE BEEN VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE-STANDSTILL
AGREEMENT. WE ARE NOT GOING INTO DETAILS. WE ARE
TAKING UP THIS MATTER BOTH WITH THE UAR AND THE USSR
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. WE ARE CONTINUING TO
WATCH THE BALANCE CLOSELY AND, AS PREVIOUSLY STATED,
HAVE NO INTENTION OF PERMITTING ISRAEL'S SECURITY TO
BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. IN THE MEANTIME, WE BELIEVE IT
IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THE TALKS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES UNDER AMBASSADOR JARRING'S AUSPICES PROCEED
FORTHWITH. END QTE

thus restore the person, natural or juridical, State or
international organization on whose behalf the claim is
presented to the condition equivalent to that which
would have existed had the damage not occurred.

We hope that this approach would be accept-
able to all members of the Outer Space Com-
mittee. It would make clear the victim orienta-
tion of the convention but would not require any
government to accept a standard that conflicts
with domestic legal concepts.

We have all moved away from initial posi-
tions on applicable law. We should seize the
opportunity now to agree on a formula based on
this approach.

Mr. Chairman, the Outer Space Treaty was
negotiated in 1966 and opened for signature in
January of 1967. The Astronaut Assistance and
Return Agreement was negotiated later that
same year and opened for signature in 1968. All
of the members of the United Nations have con-
sidered that the liability convention is a neces-
sary complement to these two agreements. We
do not believe that the liability convention
should continue to be delayed. We are about to
begin the 25th anniversary session of the Gen-
eral Assembly, and we strongly hope that with
renewed efforts we can conclude this convention
in time to present it to this anniversary session
so that it may be opened for early signature.

U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution
on Lebanese Complaint Against Israel

Statement by William B. Buffum ¹

Some of the facts put before us today about
the current situation along the Lebanese border
with Israel are in dispute. However, there can
be no dispute about the fact that over a long
period of time there have been attacks on Israel
conducted from Lebanese territory and Israeli
counterattacks directed against Lebanese terri-
tory. This problem has been the subject of
lengthy consideration by the Security Council

in August 1969 and, later in this year, and more
recent events have been reported in document
S/9822 of June 5, 1970, and in statements of
official spokesmen in both Lebanon and Israel.

The situation in the Council today is, in our
judgment, somewhat different. We have listened
attentively to the statements made this after-
noon. First of all, we heard the report, delivered
by the Secretary General in such a thoughtful
and timely manner, from the Chief of Staff of
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organi-
zation in which he informed us of allegations
of continuing Israeli attacks on Lebanese terri-
tory together with a statement by the Israeli
representative to him that Israeli troops had
been withdrawn.

We have also heard before this Council of
the concerns which have quite understandably
been reflected in the statement from our col-
league from Lebanon about military operations
on his territory and information from his Gov-
ernment that these operations continue. At the
same time, we have also listened to a statement
by the Representative of Israel in which he has
assured us categorically twice, at least I took
it as a categorical assurance, that all Israeli
troops have in fact now been withdrawn from
this most recent operation.

Therefore, Mr. President, this text which has
just been circulated 2 strikes us as passing judg-
ment not only on the principle that Israeli
troops should be withdrawn, which we fully
support, but in a sense is asking us to make a
judgment as to which of the two parties is giving
an accurate version of the present situation on
the ground. To wit, are there troops still there
or are they not there? If they are not there, then
such a resolution is redundant.

If they are there, it would command full sup-
port of the United States, because we believe
they should not be on Lebanese soil.

Mr. President, we frankly find ourselves, in
the face of this conflicting evidence, confronted
with a rather painful dilemma. We merely re-
gret that the resolution has been introduced with
such haste and that there has not been an ade-
quate opportunity to ascertain through some
impartial source, such as UNTSO, what the

¹ Made in the U.N. Security Council on Sept. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 114). Ambassador Buffum is Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

² U.N. doc. S/9928.

402

Department of State Bulletin

precise situation is as of the present time along
the border.

That being so and taking account of the con-
flicting evidence and of the haste with which
we are asked to pass judgment on a matter of
this seriousness, my Government has instructed
me to abstain while making clear that this in
no way detracts from our continued full and
complete support for the maintenance of the
territorial integrity of Lebanon.

There is one other point, sir, which my dele-
gation would like to make in connection with
consideration of this complaint. However much
we may deplore the Israeli attacks on Lebanon's
territory, we do not think that the Security
Council in all fairness can continually disre-
gard, in such a total fashion, the continued pro-
vocations which are directed against Israel from
Lebanese territory.

Israel, as well as Lebanon, and indeed all
other members, has a full and equal right under
the charter to freedom from outside interven-
tion and attacks against its territory. Ambas-
sador Yost said on May 14, and I quote, "I
cannot emphasize too strongly that my Govern-
ment continues to oppose all acts of violence
across frontiers in violation of the cease-fire
from any source." ³

I should like today to reiterate this concern.
I also wish to reaffirm our special concern for
the integrity of Lebanon, a democratic state
with an illustrious history, and one which has
repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to the
United Nations Charter and to peace.

[In a further statement in right of reply, Ambassador
Buffum said:]

The abstention of the United States Govern-
ment on this resolution was in no way related
to the principle of withdrawal of Israeli troops.⁴
The United States regrets that Israel attacked
Lebanon. The fact which is in dispute is whether
or not the troops are still there. If the troops
have withdrawn, we welcome it. If they have not
withdrawn, they should do so immediately.

³ BULLETIN of June 8, 1970, p. 726.

⁴In Resolution 285 (1970) (S/992S), adopted on Sept. 5 by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), the Security Council demanded "the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory."

Mr. Weatherbee Named U.S. Director
of Asian Development Bank

The Senate on September 1 confirmed the
nomination of Artemus E. Weatherbee to be
U.S. Director of the Asian Development Bank.
He will succeed Bernard Zagorin, who has re-
signed. (For biographic data, see White House
press release dated August 11.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex.
Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.¹

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, August 27, 1970.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement amending the agreement of December 20,
1955, and February 20, 1956, as amended, prescrib-
ing nonimmigrant visa fees and validity of nonimmi-
grant visas (TIAS 3539, 6410). Effected by exchange
of notes at Taipei May 8 and June 9 and 15, 1970.\ Entered into force June 15, 1970.

Malaysia

Agreement relating to trade in wool and man-made
fiber textile products. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington September 8, 1970. Entered into force
September 8, 1970.

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington September 8,
1970. Entered into force September 8, 1970.

Panama

Understanding relating to the agreement of February 12
and March 4, 1970, concerning the limitation of im-
ports from Panama of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat
of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during
calendar year 1970 (TIAS 6850). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Panama August 7 and 24, 1970.
Entered into force August 24, 1970.

¹ Not in force.

October 5, 1970

403

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 11, 1970

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The menace of air piracy must be met -- immediately and effectively. I am therefore announcing the following actions to deal with this problem:

1. To protect United States citizens and others on U.S. flag carriers, we will place specially trained, armed United States government personnel on flights of U.S. commercial airliners. A substantial number of such personnel are already available and they will begin their duties immediately. To the extent necessary they will be, supplemented by specially trained members of the Armed Forces who will serve until an adequate force of civilian guards has been assembled and trained. We will also make anti-sabotage training available to airlines personnel.

2. I have directed the Department of Transportation to have American flag carriers extend the use of electronic surveillance equipment and other surveillance techniques to all gateway airports and other appropriate airports in the United States and -- wherever possible -- in other countries. The Federal government will provide enforcement officers to work with this equipment, to conduct searches when appropriate and to make necessary arrests. Such equipment and techniques have already helped to reduce the problem of air piracy in many areas.

3. I have directed the Departments of Transportation, Treasury and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Science and Technology and other agencies to accelerate their present efforts to develop security measures, including new methods for detecting weapons and explosive devices. At the same time, the Departments of Defense and Transportation will work with all U.S. airlines in determining whether certain metal detectors and x-ray devices now available to the military could provide immediate improvement in airport surveillance efforts. To facilitate passenger surveillance, appropriate agencies of the Federal government will intensify their efforts to assemble and evaluate all useful intelligence concerning this matter and to disseminate such information to airlines and law enforcement personnel.

4. I am directing the State Department and other appropriate agencies to consult fully with foreign governments and foreign carriers concerning the full range of techniques which they use to foil hijackers. Some foreign airlines -- though they are particularly susceptible to hijacking -- have been successful in deterring hijackers and in coping with piracy attempts. We want to learn all we can from their experience.

5. It is imperative that all countries accept the multilateral convention providing for the extradition or punishment of hijackers which will be considered at the International Conference which will be held under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization. I affirm the support of the United States both for this Convention and for the Tokyo Convention, which provides for the prompt return of hijacked aircraft, passengers and crew. I call upon other governments to become parties to these conventions.

I further call upon the international community to take joint action to suspend airline services with those countries which refuse to punish or extradite hijackers involved in international blackmail. For this purpose and in order to consider other ways and means of meeting this new international menace, I have directed the Secretary of State to ask the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization immediately to convene that Council in an emergency meeting.

6. It is the policy of the United States government to hold the countries in which hijacked planes are landed responsible for taking appropriate steps to protect the lives and the property of U.S. citizens.

7. An additional indication of our deep concern with the hijacking menace is the request which the United States and the United Kingdom made earlier this week for an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider this problem. I am gratified by the unanimous action of the Security Council in calling upon the parties concerned immediately to release all hijacked passengers and crews. I am pleased, too, that the Security Council has asked all nations to take all possible legal steps to protect against further hijackings or other interference in international civil aviation.

* * * *

These are not the only steps we will take in the coming months to meet the threat of airplane hijacking. But they do provide a decisive program for the immediate future. The Secretary of Transportation will direct this program and take responsibility for preparing further proposals. In this capacity he will work closely with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense.

Piracy is not a new challenge for the community of nations. Most countries, including the United States, found effective means of dealing with piracy on the high seas a century and a half ago. We can -- and we will -- deal effectively with piracy in the skies today.

# # #