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Arcetriomphe, in tribute to France's Unknown Soldier, and a reception at the Hotel de Ville. I also found time to visit at the Embassy with several diplomats whom I had been anxious to see¹⁰ and to make a short address to the NATO Council, then meeting in Paris.

But the most important aspect of the visit was the chance for serious conversations with President de Gaulle. As usual, such talks were not expected to produce specific decisions; their real purpose was to facilitate an exchange of viewpoints and possibly to sweep away some of the underbrush of misunderstandings that grow up when positive personalities communicate only through the written word and diplomatic channels. I found the meetings more than rewarding.

There were many thorny issues to take up. While General de Gaulle's call back to public life had been triggered by the Army, he had received overwhelming popular support, its virtual unanimity unmatched in modern democratic societies. Thus his position in France was at that time unsuitable. With his almost mystical self-confidence and his unswerving dedication to the restoration of French prestige and leadership, I concluded it would be naive to expect much in the way of flexibility in any position he would take.

As a preliminary move, I went to some length to assure President de Gaulle that, in my forthcoming meeting with Khrushchev, I had no intention of putting forth new proposals or of beginning negotiations on any substantive matter that concerned any nation other than my own. I would never presume, in a bilateral meeting with the Soviets, to represent the views of all the West.

While President de Gaulle obviously regarded the invitation to Khrushchev as a futile gesture, he remarked that it was a decision for the United States alone and that little harm could come from it.

On the subject of a summit, our views were identical; we agreed that such a meeting, without tangible signs of progress in advance, would be unacceptable to both of us. Likewise we stood together on Berlin contingency planning; we must avoid letting the Soviets believe that we were weak, vacillating, or divided.

The President's views on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were much as had been reported to me earlier. While he vigorously supported the general idea of the North Atlantic Alliance, he was obviously against integration of national military forces in a supranational command structure such as then existed. The NATO organization, he said, had now

¹⁰ Paul Henri Spaak, Secretary-General of NATO, J. M. A. H. Luns, the Dutch foreign minister in his capacity of President of the North Atlantic Council, and Premier Antonio Segni and Foreign Minister Guiseppe Pella of Italy.

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been established for some years, and the situation in 1959 was entirely different from that which had faced Europe at the time of the organization's founding. He pointed out that the 1949 threat to Western Europe had been urgent, compelling the Western European nations to submit to the principle of integration under a Supreme Commander on the basis of immediate military need. This situation no longer applied. Moreover, when NATO was founded in 1949 the Communist threat had not developed on a global scale; Algeria had not become a serious scene of uproar; tropical Africa had not begun to erupt; the Indochina War was still a local affair, and the Korean War had not begun. President de Gaulle's point was that NATO as now organized no longer provided a satisfactory mechanism to meet the worldwide problems.

What he suggested to rectify the situation likewise held little surprise for me. Indeed, his proposal had been the subject of letters exchanged between us ever since he had taken office more than a year before. He proposed an organization comprising France, Britain, and the United States—the only free nations, he said, with global responsibilities—the purpose of which would be to coordinate the political policies of the three nations in every area of the world.

Appealing as the idea sounded, in part, I thought it one to work on in confidence rather than to proclaim publicly. I tried to point out the impact that publicizing such an arrangement might have on many of our allies and on newly emerged nations and neutral nations, each of which commanded a full vote in the United Nations General Assembly. I believed that any attempt to organize a coalition of the "Big Three" NATO nations would be resented by all the others to the point that NATO itself might disintegrate. He discounted this possibility but did not seem too disturbed even at the prospect of its coming about. I tried to convince him of my desire to coordinate our respective policies and actions around the globe, particularly when any two of us had important interests. What we should be seeking, I said, was the substance and benefits of coordination, not the façade of self-assumed authority among three great nations. I was quite willing, for example, to organize a permanent staff, representing the heads of all three governments, to look into such problems as alleged arms shipments from Tunisia to the Algerian rebels. Although this was not what De Gaulle had in mind, he accepted my views in good grace and did not push further the matter of a formal tripartite organization.

Returning to problems of NATO, De Gaulle believed that each nation in the last analysis must be responsible for its own security. To tell a Frenchman that the defense of France is the responsibility of an organization such as NATO is automatically to make him less zealous in his performance of duty. General de Gaulle was convinced that the influence

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of national rather than multinational organization on morale was over-
riding. In that spirit he had set the development of a French nuclear
capability as a matter of first priority, and he seemed determined to
develop all three of Frances' armed services to an extent that the nation
might be considered "in business for itself" from a military point of view.
This to me would be needlessly expensive; if all nations of NATO took
a similar attitude, the result would be a hodgepodge of fragmented mili-
tary power that could not be used effectively as a unit, while each na-
tional force, by itself, would be helpless against the Soviet juggernaut.

But I knew we had not merely a broad question to debate, but a
specific problem to face. Earlier in the year De Gaulle had removed the
French fleet from its previous commitment to the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe (SACEUR) in time of war. The French naval force, De
Gaulle announced, would cooperate fully with NATO in the event war
occurred, but would not operate under orders from SACEUR. His ex-
cuse for this action was concern for Algeria, requiring the French fleet to
keep open a lifeline across the Mediterranean in time of war.¹¹

Another De Gaulle decision forbade stationing Allied nuclear weapons on French soil without giving him a veto power on their use. This power, in justice to our other allies, we could not give. Therefore, we had been compelled to move several fighter squadrons armed with nuclear weapons from France to bases in Germany.

Because of geography and international politics, France was, and is,
vital to the successful functioning of NATO. Fully aware of this, De Gaulle
was able to force other members of the alliance to accommodate many
of their own arrangements to his actions. Fortunately, the others ap-
preciated the need for a collective defense; they patiently accepted the
difficulties caused by De Gaulle's unilateral decisions, and made the best
of them.

When we took up the subject of Africa, the President first expressed
his grave concern over the events transpiring on that continent, both in
tropical Africa, particularly on the west coast, and in the Arab regions to
the north. This former group of nations, he pointed out, is distant from
Europe, separated by a vast sea of sand. In tropical Africa, France
formerly had held substantial possessions, broken down into numerous
and artificially separated political divisions.¹² One of De Gaulle's first

¹¹ Actually the French fleet, as a result of losses incurred during World War II, was not strong enough to make much difference. But the attitude seemed a departure from reality.

¹² At that time the nations of the French Community included, besides France itself, Mauritania, Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta, Niger, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, the Congo Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, the Malagasy Republic, and Gabon.

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acts after taking office was to go to Africa to offer to each nation the
choice between complete independence and autonomy within a French
"community." All but Guinea had accepted membership in the French
Community. De Gaulle attributed Guinea's choice completely to its young
leader Sékou Touré, of whose motives and far leftist leanings he was,
at that time, particularly suspicious. He regretted the impatience for im-
mediate independence that uncontrolled nationalist ideas had engendered
in all these peoples. The Community was, of course, a good compromise
between complete independence—with its attendant responsibilities and
heavy costs—and a colonial status with France. It maintained economic
and social ties, meanwhile providing to each nation one of the gains they
most coveted: a vote in the United Nations. De Gaulle suspected that con-
siderable pro-Communist subversion was going on within the borders of
many nations in the French Community, with its local sources probably
found in Guinea and to some extent in Ghana, formerly a British colony.

Algeria brought forth his intense official and personal concern. De
Gaulle started out on the premise that eventually the status of Algeria
should be decided by the Algerians themselves, in a free vote. The
problems were complex, however. France had been in Algeria for 130
years, and more than a million Frenchmen, in a total population of over
ten million, had long considered Algeria their home. These people were
as determined to maintain close connections with the mother country as
were the Moslems to attain a separate status. In addition there was no
homogeneity among the peoples of Algeria or any recognized spokesman
for them. An Algerian nation as such had never existed in contrast to
either Morocco or Tunisia.

General de Gaulle's main point of contention was that a rebellion was
going on, headed by a small band of self-proclaimed leaders, who did
not really represent the views of the bulk of the Moslems of the region.
He refused to deal with these individuals, remarking that he would never
recognize a group that existed only through the terror of machine guns.
He pointed out, reasonably, that it was impossible to hold a referendum
or a vote of any kind in an atmosphere of active rebellion. A vote would
be held, to be sure, but only when there was a stop to the shooting. De
Gaulle's concern over suspected Communist influence in Algeria was
strong. If a totalitarian group took over control of Algeria, he feared that
this would soon result in a fully communized state.

Then we got down to the hard problem of what to do in the United Na-
tions if a resolution should come up again in the near future similar to
the one barely voted down the year before. De Gaulle, as expected,
hoped that the United States would avoid abstaining, as we had done
the year before, and instead would support the French. "We would like

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to stand by our traditional ally in this matter," I replied, "but I hope that France will make it possible for us to vote with you by taking some prior constructive action respecting Algeria that would prove acceptable to world opinion—or at least present a full explanation of their point of view—should a United Nations debate ensue."

In spite of my urging, the President declared flatly that if a debate should arise in the United Nations as a result of an unfriendly Afro-Asian resolution, then, France would make no defense whatsoever.

For a moment it seemed we had reached an impasse, but De Gaulle immediately came up with a reassuring program of action. He said that France would, within a matter of days, promise the Algerians the opportunity to determine their own future by free vote, to be taken as promptly as possible after rebellion ended. He assured me that once I had read his forthcoming speech carefully, I would be able to support his position in the United Nations. I replied that if his public speech was as clear, reasonable, and positive as the plan he had just described, I would, immediately after its delivery, say so.

Our talks were cordial. Despite our admitted disagreements, I left Paris with a renewed admiration for what President de Gaulle was trying to do in Algeria and the French Community,¹⁸ and for him as an administrator and political leader of a great nation. Popular morale was far improved over what I had encountered two years earlier.

For at least two years before he became his country's President, I had often remarked to Secretary Dulles and others interested in the future of that nation that only General de Gaulle's accession to power could save France.

Shortly before leaving Paris a White House aide arrived, Associate

¹⁸ On September 16, 1959, President de Gaulle made a speech recognizing the right of Algerians to self-determination. While it made no mention of dealing with the provisional Algerian government, it promised that within four years after the end of a cease-fire, the Algerians, observed by the rest of the world, could elect whether to (1) form a completely independent Algerian state free of ties with France, (2) remain as part of an integrated intro-metropolitan France, or (3) retain an association with France similar to the status of the members of the French Community.

While the timing of such an election, four years after a cease-fire, seemed long in view of the realities, the fact that the general conceded to use the word "independence" at all was considered a great step forward. His speech was overshadowed in the American press by the antics of Mr. Khrushchev, who had just arrived in the United States, but its impact was worldwide. For one thing it delayed a crisis in the United Nations, by postponing the submission of an Afro-Asian resolution on Algeria. At the same time it created a feeling of disillusionment and abandonment on the part of both the French army in Algeria and the French colonials. While an act of statesmanship, to which I could refer in my later dealings with Arab leaders, the speech represented the beginning of De Gaulle's difficulties with the right-wing elements of France, with whom he had supposedly been formerly aligned.

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Special Counsel Roemer McPhee, with an armful of bills that had just passed the Congress. One of these was a reckless and wasteful "pork barrel" public works bill which I refused to sign even though Roemer warned (correctly, it turned out) I was probably setting the stage for the first overriding of one of my vetoes in nearly seven years.

As we spent our last evening at Rambouillet, someone, knowing that I was planning to spend a few days of recreation at Culzean Castle in Ayrshire, Scotland, suggested that my visit there might prove a little lonely and suggested that I ask a couple of friends to fly overseas to meet me in Scotland for some golf and possibly a bit of bridge. The idea struck me as intriguing, in certain respects the brightest I had heard during the entire trip. Forgetting the time differential, I picked up the telephone and within minutes was talking to Bill Robinson in New York. My call got him out of bed; in New York it was two o'clock in the morning. Without a moment's hesitation he accepted my invitation and a few hours later he and "Pete" Jones were on their way. I was indeed fortunate to have friends who were such light sleepers.

The next morning, September 3, we flew by United States Army helicopter from the magnificent grounds at Rambouillet to the airfield. Shortly thereafter we were airborne for Scotland. Once in the air, I sent short messages to all of my former hosts. The trip had been memorable, not only for the unquestioned benefits of the discussions but also for the renewal of warm friendships in three countries.

Our short stay at Culzean Castle was a delight. Pete Jones and Bill Robinson arrived, slightly worse for wear, but repaired immediately to the golf course without rest except for catnaps the night before in the airplane. With Jock Whitney we formed a congenial bridge and golf foursome and thoroughly enjoyed the interlude. One evening I invited in the Pipe Major from the Ayrshire (Bag) Pipe Band, of which I am a proud honorary member, to play for my guests in a colorful traditional dinner ceremony. With the lights dimmed, the band, resplendent in uniforms and with kilts and medals, marched several times around the dining table—pipes blaring out "Scotland the Brave" and other stirring Scottish battle tunes.

Such a pleasant interlude could not long endure. Our stolen holiday was interrupted the following morning by bad news from Laos, and we started back for Washington.¹⁴

¹⁴ In Laos, reports were becoming more urgent regarding the activities of the Pathet Lao units. The Pathet Lao, under the leadership of Prince Souvannavong, were known to be pro-Communist, but the amount of direct aid which they received from the North Vietnam government was unknown. My action on return to the United States was to approve increased aid to the pro-United States government. Soon a degree of calm returned to the area.

A statesman who for years handled our relations with the Russians tells why he considers Khrushchev's demands on Berlin the gravest threat to the West since Korea, why he thinks we should make all-out preparation for war, and why he distrusts Washington's assurances that everything will be all right.

By DEAN ACHESON

U.S. Secretary of State, 1949-1953

Wishing

It is reported in Washington that the "official view"—what-
ever that may be—of the new Soviet pressure on Berlin is
that it is a maneuver which got out of hand. According to
this view, Khrushchev is anxious to "get off the hook," and
there will be no crisis, no danger of trouble with firearms. I
wish I thought so—but I do not think so. I think, on the con-
trary, that the United States and its allies may well be ap-
proaching the hardest test of the West's will and determina-
tion since June, 1950, when the Communists attacked in
Korea. And the test to come may be even harder than it was
in 1950.

in 1950.
Just what is it that Khrushchev has said? It is very clear
and direct. The Soviet Union regards the Potsdam agreement
as void. The government of Berlin and the presence in Berlin
of French, British and American troops are illegal and detri-
mental to Russian interests. Khrushchev proposes that the
troops be withdrawn, that the three western sectors be made
a self-governing free city with international guaranties of its
independence and access to and from West Germany. Mos-
cow has made it clear that, while it is prepared to discuss how
and when, it will not discuss whether the withdrawal will take
place. Furthermore, solution of the Berlin question must be
found, so Moscow says, in a plan which provides for the de-
militarization of Germany, the withdrawal of foreign troops
from Germany and of both East and West Germany from
the Warsaw and NATO alliances.
Western Alli...

the grand alliance can hardly overawe the Russians.
any more imposing. On

Nor is the West's military strength any more imposing. On
the ground the Allies altogether have a smaller force in Eu-
rope than the Russians have in East Germany alone. And as
for the "great deterrent," Sen. Stuart Symington has re-
mained uncontradicted since he said in the Senate on January
23, 1959:

"In other words, through 1961, our planning envisages the
Russians having over four times as many operational ICBM's
(intercontinental ballistic missiles) as the United States. . . .

"Accordingly, far from planning to close the current
ICBM gap, the administration is actually allowing it to
widen. . . ."

widen...
The Russian choice of time is understandable. But, one
still asks, what is the purpose? Is Berlin the glittering prize
they seek? Berlin is a glittering prize, but they seek much
more. Berlin, the greatest manufacturing city of all Germany,
still thought of as the capital city, standing as a flaunting re-
minder to the East Germans of their ill lot as citizens of a
Russian satellite, offering to the best and most skilled East
Germans an avenue of escape to a new life in Western Ger-
many and beyond—it would mean much to Khrushchev to
control all this. When Khrushchev called Berlin a "cancerous
tumor" and said that it must be cut out, it is certainly pos-
sible—indeed, I believe that it is very probable—that he
meant precisely what he said.
Americans out

meant precisely what he said.
But it would mean even more to force the Americans out
of Europe, to have no force in Europe or the Middle East or