Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML V

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Senator Buckley/Mr. Kissinger

1:19 p.m., May 12, 1971

B: Jim Buckley.

K: Jim, how are you?

B: I have been getting more and more concerned and depressed about our overall strategic prospects -- militarily around the globe. I judge by something Bill told me you are also concerned. The other thing I now have a feel for is the country at large is not appropriately educated to the problems we are facing. If I seem to have a voice-box available to me, I am thinking in terms of getting up on my hind feet and expressing my concern.

K: You will have my strong behind-the-scenes support.

B: I will be leap-frogging the Administration's official position here and there. The Press may say I am turning on President Nixon. I would like to have a few minutes with the President to tell him what I am up to.

K: Let me try. I don't control his schedule, but I will make a request on your behalf. We will suffer no pain having someone to the right of us. It would be a great national service. As long as I have you on the phone, I hope you will find something appropriate to say on the NATO Resolution. It is essential that that be defeated and that there be no compromise.

B: I will be glad to. Could you give me some ammunition? Get it to my foreign policy guy -- Bill Schneider. [This was done by John Lehman on 5/12/71]

K: I will do that. Thank you, Jim. Bye

lds

By KWL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Senator Griffin/Mr. Kissinger

1:19 p.m., May 12, 1971

K: I'm sorry to keep you waiting. I have talked to the President, and Javits is now bugging us with another compromise language which he thinks you, Scott and Stennis want to go along with.

G: His language would certainly be innocuous.

K: No -- because it commits us to withdrawal of forces and negotiation to withdraw forces three months after we made a commitment not to withdraw forces.

G: I see.

K: Why don't we stick with what we discussed this morning and see what we can generate. George Ball is willing to work full time on Democratic Senators full time. He was very close to Humphrey. I have talked to McGeorge Bundy. We are getting the foreign policy establishment lined up -- but we need time.

G: We are going to be meeting at 2:00 with Stennis, Scott and Mansfield trying to reach agreement as to time. There is a Mathias amendment up now. I think we could probably -- if we could agree to vote on it -- maneuver over to Tuesday. But I don't think we can go all week without any voting.

K: All we can do is tell you that what is being considered now isn't a termination of one particular thing with unpredictable consequences. What is being discussed now is shaking the whole basis of American foreign policy.

G: What we can do is be sure that Mansfield does not come up till next week. We will do that under any circumstances.

K: And that we do not have any other compromises floating now until we can see what can be generated.

G: That I don't know. That will be tough. Have you read the Mathias thing?

K: Yes.

G: Is that a problem?

Senator Griffin/Mr. Kie

1:19 p.m., May 12, 1971

By KHLU NARA, Dale S/12/04

K: Let me look at it again. It will not survive in that form.

G: We are in a position of not just being able to filibuster until
next week.

K: When the whole post-war American foreign policy is at stake?

G: Look at the Mathias thing. It isn't going to pass; I can tell you that. It's a question of whether there can be a vote on it.

K: I can't tell you how to handle it parliamentarily. But I can't
support it for the Administration.

G: All right.

lds

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird

1:35 pm, 5/12/71

L: Hello Henry, did your meeting go along okay at noon? We will win that alright because Mansfield has gone so far that in conference committee even if we lose in Senate I guarantee we can win in conference.

K: Will you then quiet down MacGregor?

L: He is upset because we might lose in Senate. We should not go for a compromise. You want it as bad as it can be. Mansfield has gone as far as he can.

K: May I tell the President this?

L: Yes, of course. But the problem we are going to have here - this is one of a series of bad things that will take place. Because we had a close vote on the two-year extension of draft, we are going to have trouble holding our troops. We have to have a draft. These Republicans, and I am calling them today, in the election year you will get nothing. The other thing, we have to get the Manpower Amendments for SEA and ______? -- we cannot panic on them but it is going to be damned hard period.

K: What limitations?

L: In the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, Eagleton said we were going to use the manpower limitations in 1973. I have been trying to finesse and not talk about it. We cannot have that and that is why I have been playing it down. I say we just have to have options available. I say we cannot have the enemy know what we are planning in 1973.

K: Right. I appreciate this Mel and I will tell the President.

L: I think Mansfield has gone so far we should not move toward a compromise move at this time.

K: Right. I am trying to keep everyone together. If you can help with State?

L: I think State is alright.

K: I will try to keep MacGregor in line.

L: The next few months will be a tough period.

mlh

By: KWL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Stennis/Kissinger
1:45 p.m. 5/12/71

K: I am taking the liberty of calling you which I don't do if I can avoid it on the Mansfield business. The President's deep conviction is that the resolution and any compromise would unravel the whole postwar <u>foreign policy</u>. This goes to the heart of everything we have been trying to do and <u>we</u> can't go along with the Mansfield resolution or any compromise including the Javits one. You will make your own decision but this is a matter of undermining our national interest. If Congress wants to take that responsibility / / / or leave any doubt that he is opposed to it.

S: I am glad to talk with you about it and get his position. Starting with that <u>the</u> question of the botes I just don't know. I think it's against us vote-wise.

K: If the Senate wants to be on the record on something <u>that</u> it doesn't hold a hearing to un-do 25 years of bipartisan American foreign policy -- if we have come to that point then it will be but the President hopes good sense of the Senate will take hold.

S: I am not yelling one iota.

K: On VN we believe we are right. But that's one policy we are trying to disengage but on NATO it's the whole <u>structure</u> of the post-war ______. And when both things are defeated simultaneously we will have a policy that's like Finland or go completely independent in nuclear way in which the whole Atlantic relationship is jeopardized. I have talked with the President about it and we cannot go on a compromise that will maintain the principle that is contrary to our judgment on what's necessary to preserve the peace when the strategic balance is ______ unless there's substantial ground forces there.

S: I am with you. I would like a token reduction to keep it from overwhelming us.

K: We are going to end negotiations on force reductions and I know the President would appreciate whatever you can do in the national interest.

S: You mean filibuster it to death? We don't have the vote. We stand a chance of deteriorating our stance on selective service act.

K: <u>fax</u> Not fillibuster but go into the next week to see what the public mood is.

S: Scott, Griffing and I talked about it and we plan to go over it with Mansfield. I asked him to withdraw his part until we have finished the other parts of the bill but he wouldn't. I haven't ought of anything -- we can probably get it.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

Stennis/Kissinger

1:45 p.m.

5/12/71

-2-

S: ((cont) into next week but there might be a preliminary vote to get it over.

K: I don't talk parliamentary tactics with you.

S: We don't have the vote to beat them. Without you agreeing to anything like the Javits proposal I don't think we could get enough votes to substitute the Javits proposal but within its own terms there's nothing injurious in it.

K: Our judgment is that there would be.

S: Weaken you in other matters?

K: It does tell the President to start withdrawing troops and make a 90 day report to that effect.

S: I just heard about it orally. For some withdrawal that's been told me. The first thing I did was to ______ the President's group up here.

K: You have always been a patriot and I am only telling you what the President's feelings are.

S: There's no agreement yet and back to this being specific -- you want it carried over until next week before a vote. You are against everything.

K: It's not very constructive but we think it's in the national interest.

S: I am disappointed in it's being jeopardized in the selective service. It's close now as to whether we can hold it to 2 years. If we sit on it a couple of weeks --

K: If we go on a couple of weeks. (?)

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

XXXXXXXXXX
TELCON
McCloy/Kissinger
1:59 p.m. 5/12/71

K: I am calling you because of the Mansfield resolution.

M: I saw it in the paper this morning.

K: It's picking up steam to cut forces in Europe by half. Now they have anoth
it looks as if it will pass the Senate and we are being beseiged with compromis
which
the mildest one says'?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?". You know what -- I don't have
to tell you what it will do in Europe.

M: It couldn't be worse.

K: The Republicans were ready to cave this morning and the Democrats are
out of control. I appealed it to them on the ground that leaders of foreign
policy establishment will rally and so it will be a disaster. I am phoning all
over today -- Geo. Ball, Mac Bundy -- he will follow someone else but he
won't take the first bout.

M: What do you want me to do?

K: Anything you can. If you have some influence with the newspapers.

M: The Times is always critical and the Washington Post. I could call Kay Graham.

K: That would be a tremendous help.

M: The Times I could call Oakes. When is it coming up?

K: I can delay a vote until next Tues. but it's urgent to get ground swell going
Do you know any Senators?

M: Javits.

K: He is sponsoring a compromise solution but it's the sort -- I will read you the text. "The President is requested to negotiate for the assumption of great troop levels / / / / . He is further requested to withdraw in Europe to the extent made possibly by such negotiations ? ? ? ? ? on the progress of suc withdrawals."

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

McCloy/Kissinger

1:59 p.m.

5/12/71

-2-

M: Sure, Sure.

K: I rather have no compromise then to have Javits sponsor such.

M: I will call him and do what I can with the two newspapers. Would Lovitt's intercession be helpful?

K: Absolutely!

M: I suppose G-- is discounted but he should be approached.

K: I will call him.

M: Let's see --

K: We are bringing Goodpastor back.

M: Where's Percy stand?

K: It doesn't do any harm.

M: I will call the newpapers and I will try to get Lovitt lined us and Javits and Buckley.

K: We have talked with him.

M: Muskie out of line?

K: It would be appropriate if you call him. You know what it will do to Brandt. I feel about him as you do but we don't want to do this to him.

M: That's right. I just got a call from the German Consulate in NY saying Brandt is coming here in the first part of June and wants me to appear with him on the platform. I said I would but what does he want me to say? I will not give on my position. No public debate on Ost-Politik. I said let me know what you want me to say and why you want me and what it's about. I will have to get in communication with him. Another thing -- Slater called me and said you talked with him that you wanted me to communicate with Brandt to put strength behind any British Entry.

K: We thought it would be helpful. Strongly in the national interest.

M: I can do that. I will go to work.

By: KLC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

McCloy/Kissinger

1:50 p.m.

5/12/71

-3-

K: We are under a time pressure. Do you know anyone at TIME or NEWSWE

M: Sure. Donovan.

K: That would help. Better then if I do it.

M: I will take care of that. I will go on my own.

K: I will let you know what I have done.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Johnson/Kissinger
3:01 p.m. 5/2/71

J: I was going to suggest we postpone this 3:00.

K: I am inclined to do it too. I will postpone it.

J: This other is higher priority at the moment.

K: I will cancel it.

J: I will see you at 6:00.

K: I called McCloy and he is calling Oakes, Donovan, Graham, Muskie and
Lovvit.

J: Good. You talked with Geo. Ball. I talked with Springsteen and he is
calling me. I told Geo. He is coming down. You will be hearing from him.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

3:20 p.m.

5/12/71

B: I talked with several people and wanted to give you the upshot. George (?) is ______ for hours. Goint to Washington and up on the Hill. Many think there should be a public advertisement by people who have dealt with European matters. Post is all right. Doing an editorial agiaanst Mansfield. Kleiman is with you. Gehelin told me that the guy who best understood Germany wa Mathias and has a resolution and feeling very neglected by the WH. He thinks he can talk Mansfield out of it.

K: The Mathias resolution isn't so bad but when you have a ? ? ? and the amendment process starts it all over again.

B: He understands that.

K: If we could be sure the Mathias resolution would go as it is we have no problem.

B: He is feeling thet the WH never talks with would be friends.

K: It's a symptom of the Senate but I will do it.

B: His heart is in the right place and has good lines to the John Coopers of the world. He is a good guy.

I am

K: When one of the two fellows who talks with him but not when I should. He is a good guy.

B: Give him a line he can use. His feeling to me was that Mansfield thing has been coming but the administration hasn't given alternatives and not working on how to stop it. I said it was difficult in our time but then he was in the House.

K: I appreciate this. Thank you.

By KCLW

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Geo. Ball/Kissinger

3:26 p.m.

5/12/71

K: I understand you are churning up the town.

B: We are doing what we can.

K: If you are not already planning it, we would appreciate your coming down.

B: I am coming the first thing in the morning.

K: The President would like to meet with you tentatively at 4:30 tomorrow afternoon. 3-5 wiseness who have dealt with Europe.

B: Vance may be in Washington tomorrow. I have just been talking with him.

K: I don't know if he is liked in the front office.

B: He is prepared to go down the line. Katzenbach would go. Clay. I have talked with Lusius and he is deeply committed and would do anything to help the situation. My position is that it's my initiative and I am volunteering.

K: To us it's not a partisan thing.

B: I don't want to embarrass the WH. It's the position I have taken.

K: Wait a minute. The President is calling -------- I will check Vance and Katzenbach.

B: Bundy would be good on this.

K: Have you talked with the Times?

BV: Kleiman is going to Washington in the morning. I have a call to Oakes. Kleiman writing it. I have talked with Springsteen who is getting the information together.

K: Someone should get to Kleiman before the weekend.

B: I will talk with Kleiman tomorrow. Also I will see Scotty and if there's anybody else in that line that will be useful.

K: Does Kraft write any sense.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Geo. Ball/Kissinger

3:26 p.m.

5/12/71

B: I will call him. I might be able to deal with him on this. I will touch base with this -- I know the press corps well. I will have a NEWSWEEK column on Monday.

K: How about Elliott?

B: I will talk ? ? ?. I could do a strong column.

K: And also in their news section. It's great to work with an old pro. Come to my office at 4:15.

By KCL-

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

David Rockefeller

5/12/71 3:40 p.m.

K: I'm calling at the request of the President, and on my own, about the great situation being raised by the Mansfield Resolution

R: Isn't it awful.

K: He is tacking this on his amendment to a draft bill so it doesn't go before committees where we could Marshall testimonies. You can imagine what a Congressional vote forcing reduction of forces in Europe of 50 percent would do. Everyone is panicked. The Republican leadership has come up with a compromise which does not have the figures but would hold the President to immediate substantial withdrawal. I talked this morning to Scott and Griffin the told them that this relationship with Europe is the cornerstone of our ________. We can't unravel it on the basis of an amendment to a draft bill. I told them if they could restrain from compromises and hold the vote off for a week we could elicit statements from senior citizens. The President would like to get a group together at 4:30 tomorrow to discuss this situation. He is asking . . . . . . . . . . and you.

R: My trouble is I'm leaving in a couple of hours for Europe. I've gotto make a speech. I don't see how I can. You certainly have my ________ and perhaps McCloy could let me know.

K: When will you be back?

R: I'll be away for two weeks.

K: I am wondering whether there might be a chance for you to call in Heald, Donovan or someone at the New York Times to express your concern before you go.

R: I certainly will. I think it's desperate. Be delighted to send telegrams telegrams or anything like that.

K: It might be better if you could send telegrams to some Senators your voice might carry some weight with.

R: Who in your office can we gear this in with? I literally am going to have to fly -- I'll get someone else to work on the telegrams and approve them before I go.

K: Have someone get in touch with John Lehman through the White House. If they have any trouble calling him, let them get in touch with General Haig -- he'll get them together. Or Sonnenfeldt would be even better. If you could send some telegrams to Senators . . .

TELECON

David Rockefeller

5/12/71 3:40 p.m.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

R: It might be best.

K: It would be very helpful.

R: I feel very badly about having to leave, but I will certainly do that and I can be reached along the way if you need more telegrams or something. If you feel additional telegrams will be helpful I'll be delighted.

K: That would be very helpful and if you could get word to some of the key newspapers and magazines about your personal concern that would be very helpful.

R: Okay, I'll certainly do that.

K: Thank you/ Have a good trip. I may get in touch with you along the way.

R: My office will always know where to reach me.

K: Good. Have a good trip.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Dean Acheson

5/12/71 3:45 p.m.

A: I've been thinking over your difficulty. It seems to me what we want is a little volley firing and not just a splattering of musketry. If the President prepared a short and simply statement and we got all the living ex-President's, all the living former Secretaries of State, all the former military top men, former high commissioners, Chiefs of Staff...

K: I get the point.

A: Include all of these and have the President put it all out. If he said a sentence or two along the lines of "I believe that to withdraw any of the forces now standing at arms with our allies in Europe would be a disaster of incalculable proportions."

K: Excellent.

A: Then have the others say "I wholeheartedly concur with the President" and sign it.

K: That's an excellent idea. I was going to call you because the President wants a group of people like you together tomorrow at 4:30 to discuss this, if that is convenient.

A: Sure.

K: This other I am almost certain will also be done. Can you make it at 4:30?

A: Yes.

K: And let me get that other started right away.

A: I think with Truman the best thing would be for the President to call him himself, and with Mr. Burns also. He's a funny fellow; he might be too ill to do it, but I don't think so. It will be an imposing group of people.

K: And I think we'll get them all.

A: With a phalanz like that it's hard to oppose.

K: Good. We'll see you tomorrow.

By KHL

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

TELCON
Katzenbach/Kissinger

4:18 p.m.

5/12/71

K: Have you changed your VN policy?

HAK: I want the same toleration -- I am not calling on VN. I am coalling on the Manfield business of pulling out half of our troops in Europe. No matter what our disagreements in Vn we can't shake the policy in Europe in this way. The President would like to get together a bipartisan group tomorrow to talk about that problem. I wondered if you could come at 4:30. Nothing to do with politicits. We know where you stand on several other issues.

K: I haven't donw you much damage, Henry.

HAK: No, you haven't.

K: Obviously.

HAK: We are asking McCloh and Ball and Nitze.

K: 4:30.

HAK: If it's -- we ;understand it's short notice.

KI have a desperately important to them hospital board meeting in NY. I will get a 3:00 shuttle.

HAK: We will meet you at the airport. Maybe you and I can have a word afterwards.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KCLW

NARA, Dale

5/12/04

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

5/12/71 4:30pm

Z: I didn't get asked about the Mansfield thing, but I'm going to plant a question this afternoon. Go over what you said to me again.

K: . . . would overthrow bipartisan foreign policy carried out in four Administrations since the end of the war, and the very cornerstone of American foreign policy.

Z: And that's our strength in Europe?

K: Don't put it just on military terms. It's the whole Atlantic relationship that would be jeopardized.

Z: And that's the NATO structure.

K: NATO structure, political relationships, everything.

Z: Overthrow the bipartisan foreign policy structured by the last four Administrations and the very . . . what?

K: The very cornerstone of our foreign policy. But don't put it in only military terms. And the President is all charged up on it now so you can hit it hard.

Z: Seriously detrimental to our alliance . . .

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

The President
5/12/71 6:14pm

P: Have you finished your meeting?

K: Yes, I just got out. They have, in effect, accepted everything.

P: You think so?

K: I know so. Before I can give you the absolutely final work I have to go to a Mansfield meeting now, but I can drop over afterwards.

P: What time?

K: 7:00

P: Good.

K: In the meantime, they are thinking of making an announcement next Thursday. We got practically everything we asked for.

P: Conciliatory?

K: Oh yes. I really shook him yesterday.

P: Good.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

General Haig & Mr. Kissinger/Cy Vance

7:15 p.m., May 12, 1971

H: The President asked us to call a group of people on the NATO thing.

V: Right.

H: What he is trying to do in a bi-partisan way and to keep it out of the political field for the good of our country and in our future negotiations with the Russians is to get a group of people together to talk about it.

V: Right.

H: The whole thing Mansfield has recommended would really devastate us here. We are bringing in people tomorrow bi-partisan in national field. This could be disastrous to us. He would like to include you if you felt you could do it.

V: I will be coming down tomorrow with George on the 7:30 plane and I will be at a meeting in the morning and I **have** to be back in New York in the evening. What time is the meeting?

H: 4:30.

V: Well, I must be back in New York and I have got a 5:30 plane to catch because I have to be back.

H: Nick Katzenbach, Dean Acheson, Cabot Lodge and of course, Lemnitzer are some of those who will be coming in. Dean Rusk is going into the hospital and can't make it.

V: That's too bad.

H: Something about getting tidied up. Hold on a minute, Henry's here and he wants to speak with you.

K: Hello, Cy. While you are at it, you should make a brief statement endorsing our Vietnam policy. It's not necessary to do it at the same time, you can do it later.

V: (laughter) Sorry I was in that damn meeting, I had to get something out of the way.

K: Seriously though, Cy, whatever divides us on Vietnam, on foreign policy ............ Without hearings and without debate this would be a national calamity. We wanted to get a group together to talk about it.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Gen Haig & Mr. Kissinger/Cy Vance

7:15 p.m., May 12, 1971

V: Right.

K: If you felt able to come, the President would be extremely pleased.

V: The problem is I have a houseful of people coming at 8:00 tomorrow night including the UN and I am on a 5:30 plane coming back. I could come back on the 6:00 plane but withe the weather being bad, I don't know how devil I'll make it. I will be with the Democrats in this meeting in the morning -- Hubert Humphrey, Ed Muskie.

K: If you could talk to some of the Presidential candidates --

V: I will talk to Ed and Hubert in the morning.

K: Why don't you come in at 4:30 anyway. If you want to make the 5:30 plane, we will have a care waiting to take you.

V: Fine, I'll do that.

K: Good, Cy. Thank you.

By KHC

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joe Kraft
5/12/71; 7:15 p.m.

Kraft: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: I have been approving of some of your columns.

Kraft: All this whispering of summits -- any truth to this?

K: Not that I know.

Kraft: The story is that Dobrynin came home with an invitation.

K: No! Your assessment from Moscow is a lot better. He did not come here with an invitation.

Kraft: Are you on the point of doing something with Gerry?

K: We will be next week.

Kraft: I was up on the Hill today and talked to some of the senators about European troop resolution which I think is crazy.

K: It is a disaster -- an unraveling of our foreign policy.

Kraft: The Draft by itself is a pretty big deal, Vietnam is a big deal and to draw a third thing is . . . Since there is a troop limitation overall in it, it would be appropriate to put a vote to it on the overall instead of Europe.

K: I will put this to ____. We will figure out where to meet and the time.

Kraft: Okay, Henry, see you on Friday.

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Dean Acheson

7:25 p.m., May 12, 1971

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I talked to the President about your idea, he thinks its superb. He also asked me to tell you that since you think he has trouble with pronouns, you might consider drafting a sentence or two which you might think appropriate.

A: I should do so. Should I bring it with me tomorrow?

K: If you could phone it in in the morning, we might be able to solicit some of them on the phone.

A: You want me to give it to you first thing in the morning.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012368
By CHARA Date 01/12/71

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

5/12/71; 7:30 p.m.

D: I would like to tell you a few things. First, I am leaving for New York on Friday and will be back late on Sunday. I am just telling you this if you feel you could do it tomorrow. If not, let's do it on Monday.

K: I am on the way to see the President now. I had an earlier talk with him and I am getting these documents translated into better English and then if your view is correct . . .

D: Oh, come on. Come on. It is correct.

K: I cannot make my own judgment on the Russian. Anatol, you are much more devious than I. If it is possible to translate your letter to be consistent with your release, I think we can solve most of the problem.

D: I could make another suggestion but it is only on my own. Maybe put it this way -- one letter to say I am honored to confirm we have reached an agreement and then a supplement to this particular letter and instead of saying one government, we would say both governments.

K: Rights.

D: Or maybe just a letter saying I would like to confirm we agreed about following instructions which we will both give our determination and then quote and unquote but instead of one government both governments then it will be just a confirmation on reached agreement and nothing else.

K: Let me see. That is a variation. The easiest thing would be if your letter could be put into better English and then we look at it and I am now on the way to see the President and I may call you in the morning to tell you what his initial reaction is.

By KCL NARA, Dale

5/12/04

K: I am on the way to see the President now. I had an earlier talk with him and I am getting these documents translated into better English and then if your view is correct...

K: Rights.

By K.L.V. NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Haldeman
5/12/71; 8:20 p. m.

K: Our pal gave in on all disputed points.

H: He did! You are kidding!

K: There is only one minor issue. It may force one more go-around.
Chances are -- nine out of ten -- that we can make an announcement next
Thursday.

H: Boy, that would be great. You don't know whether he is going to have
another go-around?

K: All most certain not. The issue is whether it is possible to translate
the Russian text the way he said it can be. They already agreed to a press
announcement. The only other point is to see whether the text of the letter
also has the same formulation as the text of the press announcement. If
that's the same then we have no problem at all. We can handle it in two
ways -- get another formula out of them which would take two weeks or
to make the press announcement -- in other words we got exactly what we
wanted.

H: That was a worthwhile afternoon. How long did you spend with him?

K: About one and one-half hours.

H: What is his mood?

K: After I let him have it yesterday -- he is abject now. He says I am the
toughest guy he has had to deal with here.

H: Good! That's exactly what he ought to be thinking. That's really great
if we could actually tie it together.

K: The thing, Bob, you have to prevent is to oversell this thing. This is
only an agreement to negotiate. If we lock ourselves into ______ then
they will screw us in actual negotiations. That's something we will discuss
next week. Let's wrap it up first.

H: The tendency is to go all out on it.

K: That's right and you have to help me resist it. We have not gone wrong
by playing it cool. The beauty of it is that no one will look at it for four weeks

By KHLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Haldeman

5/12/71; 8:20 p.m.

- 2 -

H: Smith doesn't go back to Vienna?

K: Just to wind it up. For four weeks that can't attack us -- it would be just suicide.

H: Smith would not make the announcement?

K: The President would make the announcement.

H: Does he know we are going to do it?

K: No. The Russians have offered him one-half of what they offered us and he was just panting to take it.

H: How is he going to deal with his friend on it? I don't see how it is all that big of a problem but it worries him.

K: It is a crucial situation where the President has to worry about achieving an arms proposal by putting up proposals which his bureaucracy said was impossible.

H: But we can't make high of it because we have to wait for the negotiations.

K: We already got more than what most people thought we could get -- an agreement to negotiate.

H: Did you get into any announcement on the Summit?

K: No, but I have Berlin cooking in such a way that I am...

H: But he didn't raise the Summit at all -- your plan now is to lay low until he says something?

K: Right. He will come back. Our judgment has proven very accurate now on what they do.

H: Who knows, maybe we will start a sequence going now. Win one on the SST -- if we can win one on the Mansfield amendment -- pick up a few others along the way.

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Senator Javits

5/12/71; 8:55 p. m.

J: I called you because I am to go off to Japan on Saturday.

K: I understand you gave a great speech today.

J: I will miss the vote on Wednesday and I wondering how much weight you placed on it.

K: We think it is crucial. We are determined to win.

J: You won't want an alternative?

K: That's right.

J: Okay, Henry, let me figure out my situation and I will see what can be done. You are going after them to knock them down?

K: That's right. You could put a lot of money in the bank -- not with me, you don't need it with me.

J: Let me see what I can do.

By KLC U

NARA, Date

5/12/04

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Mike Wallace

9:20 p.m., May 12, 1971

W: I am calling about -- I called Dan Henkin about something and he said it was too big for me to handle and so suggest you get started higher up and I said how far up and he said all the way so I went all the way up. I think it would be of interest to get Mel Laird to sit down with the SS-9s and other pictures taken and say this is what we think and .....

K: Let me consider it. That's worth considering but I have to discuss it with the President and Central Intelligence.

W: We could say here is what one of these photographs look like, this is what a U-2 looks like, this is what we see in Cuba or whatever.

K: I get what you are driving at. Let me raise it with the President and Helms.

W: Are you glad to be back in your bailiwick?

K: They didn't take my whole job away.

W: Did you get any rest?

K: I got a good rest.

W: I just spent another 2 days with Lyndon Johnson. It's like spending 3 months in Coney Island.

By: KHC

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Governor Rockefeller

9:24 p.m., May 12, 1971

K: I am sorry I was in a meeting and tied up. I also called your brother, David, but maybe this isn't anything you can get engaged in.

R: Did you get David?

K: I did. Mike Mansfield has not introduced a Resolution in the Senate asking for a cut in our NATO forces in half.

R: You are kidding.

K: That is, of course, going to wreck the basis on our foreign policy. I have taken the position and I have gotten the President to go along with it; we will not compromise now at all, we will not pull anything out of Europe at all. We are lining up an almost unanimous support who have had in foreign policy bi-partisan people coming down tomorrow and we are going to get statements from every Secretary of Defense and State and the Under Secretaries over all the years against this and one reason I called you is to see if there is anything you could do to join.

R: Well, I was an Assistant Secretary for President Eisenhower.

[Interrupted briefly]

R: What I am delighted to do is make some statement on this that you could use along with everything saying I was a former Special Assistant to the President.

K: Any statement you might consider on your own or any influence with the newspapers -- the New York Times. What we are going to do tomorrow is have a 2-3 sentence statement from the President on the importance of NATO and then follow with statements from all the NATO commanders, chiefs of staff and so forth. 98% are going to sign this saying they support the President.

R: Why don't you have someone in your office give me a draft?

K: I haven't got it yet, we are working on it. We have to show the American leadership group are together on this. We can't bug out of this.

R: How did Mansfield get himself in this?

By: KHL

NARA, Dato:

5/12/04

TELCOM

9:24 p.m., May 12, 1971

K: He has always been for this.

R: [Who is with him? ]

K: Jackson is, Humphrey is. Muskie has changed his mind twice so we don't know where he stands.

R: I have no problem with this particularly with the way it's being done. I would have done it anyway. Who in the Times is the best guy?

K: Probably Johnny Oaks.

R: My relationship with him is not the best, anyone else there?

K: Anyone you know there.

R: George Woods is on the Board and he understands this stuff.

K: This goes to the very heart of the world. I can understand how people feel on *Why do we have to go to Vietnam and I think that is wrong but what the Administration is --*

R: What is Mike trying to do?

K: He added it on to the draft bill.

R: An extension of the draft.

K: Can't even go to the committee.

R: And have its full hearings and so forth.

K: Not really partisan. George Ball is coming down tomorrow to work over the Democrats. Lucius Clay has been calling all over the place. Your brother has sent telegrams to 12 Senators.

R: What about Javits?

K: He has been wavering but when I told him there would be no compromise he came with us.

R: Buckley in this at all?

K: Behind us all the way.