EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND

Ref.: 742.0. -JB/mw

WASHINGTON D.C. 20008,

2900 Cathedral Avenue N.W.
Telephone HO 2-1811/7

July 11, 1966

JUL 14 1966

Professor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I wonder if you would be good enough to send me a copy of your highly interesting statement given before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on NATO, or perhaps to advise me as to where such a copy could be obtained. The Committee secretariat has informed me that it has no more copies on hand.

Thanking you for your kind assistance, I am

[Y]

August 12, 1966

Dr. R.F.P. Bünemann
2301 Wellsee ben Kiel
109 Schulstrasse
Germany

Dear Dr. Bünemann:

Thank you for your nice letter of
July 18th which reached my office while
I was in Vietnam. I appreciated your
kind words very much indeed.

I believe that what you have in mind
for the SPD is very constructive.

I would be glad to see you on one of
my visits to Germany. There is a good
chance that I will be in Hamburg early in
February; in that case, we must get
together.

Kind regards.

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

Together.

February; in that case, we must get chance that I will be in Hamburg early in my visits to Germany. There is a good I would be glad to see you on one of

kind words very much indeed.

I was in Vietnam. I appreciated your July 18th which reached my office while Thank you for your nice letter of

Dear Dr. Bünemann:

Germany
109 Schirrastraße
2301 Mellsee pen Kiel
Dr. R.F.P. Bünemann

August 13, 1966

Professor Klaarner
Secretary to

Sincerely yours,

will bring it to his attention at that time.
office the first week in August and I
He is expected to return to the

knowledge your letter of July 18th,
on a trip abroad. I am writing to sc-
in Professor Klaarner's absence

Dear Dr. Bünemann:

Germany
109 Schlaefssee
2301 Welfare pen Kief
Dr. R.J.P. Bünnenmann

July 22, 1968

[Y]

August 12, 1966

The Right Honorable the Lord Gladwyn of Bramfield,
G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.
30 Gresham Street
London, E.C. 2
England

Dear Gladwyn:

Thank you for your nice note of August 4th.

I do not think that the Germans will be so stupid
to do what you think De Gaulle has in mind for them,
therefore, I do not believe that there is any need to
make a specific effort to warn them.

I agree with you completely that Britain ought to
seek its future in Europe instead of the Himalayas.
This seems to me prevented by the inability of the
present government to establish the right priorities
(or any for that matter).

Your letter reminded me that it has been much too
long since we have had a chance to talk.

With kind regards.

Henry A. Klaasen

With kind regards.

kind regards we have had a chance to talk.

(or any for that matter).

present government toatsplish the right priorities

This seems to me prevented by the insensitivity of the
seek its future in Europe instead of the Himayat.

make a specific effort to warn them.
therefore, I do not believe that there is any need to
to do what you think De Gansle has in mind for them,

Dear Gladwin:

England
London, E.C. 3
30 Greatham Street

G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

The Right Honorsple the Lord Gladwin of Bramfield,

August 12, 1968

TELEPHONE:
METROPOLITAN 7545

30, GRESHAM STREET,
LONDON, E. C. 2.

4th August, 1966

AUG 8 1966

Very many thanks for sending me a copy of
your Statement to the Foreign Relations Committee of
the Senate. Very wise and good, I thought, except that
I feel you are a little too apt to lean backwards in
excusing le général's behaviour! He genuinely does
want to get the Americans out of Europe, and he has
predicted that his strong arm tactics will result in the
Germans being outside NATO within the year. Then
he will feel authorized to do some deal with the Soviet
Union (if he wins the election, that is) involving some
sort of 'special relationship' between the EEC and the
Eastern European "popular democracies", including,
of course, the DDR. Britain will not be allowed into
the EEC until this deal is concluded. When it is she
may be admitted as a rather bankrupt poor relation
to the Council Table (in Paris).

How do we counter this plan? Presumably
(a) by telling the Germans that, if carried out, it can
only result in Soviet influence extending westwards
from the DDR and not in EEC influence extending
eastwards as the General pretends and (b) sticking
firmly to the line that only if Britain joins a meaningful
Community - and not a 'Europe of States' - can there
be any chance of a good long term and peaceful solution of
the German problem. (You are absolutely right when you
say that all depends on the Bonn-Paris-London triangle).

If our P.M. could be induced to make
constructive speeches on these lines instead of

contd....

CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON

1530 P STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

JUL 1 1 1966

July 7, 1966

Dear Henry,

Thank you so much for your welcome note of the fifth, which was most appreciated. I am so glad that you do plan to go further into the subjects dealt with in that article, for not only are they of very first importance, but I think that some of the insights about them — some touched on very lightly — are not only unique and remarkable, but are highly significant and ought to be expanded further.

And thank you especially for the copy of *The Reporter* with your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have not read it — having only heard a condensed radio summary — and so am particularly grateful for it and keenly anticipating reading it.

I do hope that there will be a chance to see each other during the summer. I was especially sorry to have to miss the chance of luncheon at the time that you were testifying. If anything further brings you to Washington during the summer, do be sure to let me know, and I shall do the same for Cambridge.

With every good wish,

Professor Henry A. Kissinger,
The Harvard Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Professor Henry A. Klaasen
Secretary to

Sincerely yours,

time.

will bring it to his attention at that
office the first week in August and I
He is expected to return to the
acknowledge your letter of July 7th.
on a trip to Vietnam. I am writing to
In Professor Klaasen's absence

Dear Dr. Haskina:

Washington, D.C. 20006
1230 P Street, N.W.
Carrie Institute of Washington
Dr. Caryl Haskina

July 14, 1966

THE REPORTER

660 Madison Avenue

Templeton 2-8800

New York 21, N. Y.

[LC]

Shirley Katzander

JUL 25 1966

21 July 1966

Dear Henry,

Thought you would want to see enclosed.

By the way, I met an old friend of yours --
Riva Tooley -- at the party you missed. It
was a good party, too.

1 August 1966 [LC]

AUG-3 1966

Your communication addressed to Professor
George Kennan has been received. Professor
Kennan is at present traveling in Europe, and
has asked that only mail of great urgency be for-
warded. He expects to be back in mid-September,
and will see the accumulated mail at that time.

Henry A. Klaasder

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

Defense Appropriations Bill.
comments during the debate on the
I was very interested to read your
very much indeed.

I appreciated your friendly comments
August 4th.

Dear Mr. Laird:

Washington, D.C.
Home of Representatives
Congress of the United States
The Honorsble Melvin R. Laird

August 15, 1968

15464

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

July 19, 1966

Speaker, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and others, as provided in the resolution which we have offered to bring in men like Admiral McNeil, Dean Acheson, and men of great stature who can give the kind of study necessary to this problem and who can make recommendations to the Congress that are so needed, and to evaluate these basic differences in defense planning. And, Mr. Chairman, we should treat their recommendations much as we treated the recommendations of the Hoover Commission.

Mr. Chairman, this idea that a Hoover Commission or a Blue Ribbon Commission should only be created by the President of the United States and the executive branch of the Government, as has been done in the area of manpower within the last few weeks, after our report came out by the way, and as they are prepared to do in the State and Defense Departments at the present time as I understand, is absolutely a mistake, and the Congress is abdicating its responsibility by failing to have these programs evaluated and to focus public attention upon them.

## BACKGROUND

Mr. Chairman, our belief that there is a vital need for the establishment of a Blue Ribbon Commission is predicated on our belief that far-reaching changes have taken place in the thinking of our defense and foreign policymakers in recent years.

The defense structure of any nation is determined by that nation's foreign policy.

The Secretary of Defense has said that the development of our defense structure should be guided by U.S. foreign policy.

With this principle there is no disagreement.

Yet, many of us do disagree with much that is being done in the Defense Establishment today especially in those areas that directly affect our present ability (Vietnam) and our long-range ability to deter potential aggressors.

Our basic disagreements, therefore, derive in part from basic foreign policy assumptions of the current administration and in part from the assumptions the Secretary of Defense uses to justify his force structure projections.

## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To summarize the views that were contained in our additional views to the committee report, we believe that certain basic changes have taken place in the defense policy of the United States since 1961. These changes need immediate evaluation by this impartial Blue Ribbon Commission. Among the changes we would list the following as particularly significant:

First, a changed attitude toward the cold war and, as a result, a different assessment of the potential and current threat;

Second, a changed attitude toward the desirability or necessity of pursuing advanced weapons development as vigorously as possible; and

Third, a changed attitude toward those areas of defense and defense planning which should receive priority.

In the intervening 5 years, we have had an opportunity to observe the consequences of these and the other changes that have been introduced. Based, therefore, upon actual experiences and not merely upon theoretical musings, there is, in our view, substantial reason to question both the correctness and the effectiveness of the new approach.

In foreign policy, the basic assumptions upon which this administration appears to base its defense strategy include the following:

First, that there has been in recent years a reduction in tensions between the free world and the Communist bloc—except China—and that further accommodations in the future can be anticipated and should be encouraged;

Second, that our military force structure should be related primarily to the "visible" threat posed by potential adversaries;

Third, that nuclear war is unthinkable to the Communists as it is to the United States and the free world and that therefore, the balance that has been achieved between the Soviet Union and the United States with regard to strategic forces should not be upset;

Fourth, that the United States should continue to assume a posture of response both in the area of "crisis control" such as Vietnam and in the area of weapons development; and

Fifth, that the threat from world communism has, in fact, eased during the course of recent years and, therefore, any attempt to maintain a decisive superiority in the years ahead would reverse this trend.

In Defense policy, the basic assumptions would include:

First, that the aggressive pursuit of advanced weapons development such as the antiballistic missile system—ABM—or the advanced manned strategic aircraft—AMSA—would lead to a "reaction" on the part of the Communists that would accelerate the "arms race" and that, therefore whenever, possible, such decisions should be stretched out, studied to death, or postponed;

Second, that the level of effort in new weapons systems should be tied, predominantly, to what the potential enemy is doing and that the determination of what "the other side is doing" must be based on "visible" information; and

Third, that the Defense Establishment must be prepared to execute and implement a strategy of "flexible response," one that permits the United States to gradually escalate any conflict and that will not force us into the dilemma of "humiliating retreat or nuclear war."

Mr. Chairman, it is our belief that many of these assumptions that guide our foreign and defense policy are largely unrealistic and incorrect and that the experience of the past 5 years bears out this contention. The importance of a complete evaluation of these assumptions cannot be underestimated.

We believe that there has not been a reduction in tensions but rather a reduction in our desire to recognize Communist actions for what they are.

We believe that our military force structure should not be related to the "visible" threat but rather to the capa-

bilities of the Communists and to the fulfillment of our own national objectives.

We believe that nuclear war should be "unthinkable" to the Communists but that this country should not base its plans on that illusive hope.

We believe that the strategy of response both with regard to crisis situations and with respect to weapons development should give way to a strategy of initiative. We would define a "strategy of response" as one in which this Nation permits a situation to become so serious that it must take extraordinary steps even to return to the status quo, and a "strategy of initiative" as one in which this Nation, when it first sees the possibility of a situation developing, will take steps to prevent its becoming a crisis situation either with respect to potential conflicts or to new advances in weapons development.

We believe that the threat from world communism has not eased and that, therefore, it is of the utmost importance that this Nation maintain a decisive superiority in offensive and defensive weapons.

We believe that the Soviet Union is not "leveling off" its effort in advanced weapons development and that it is, as a matter of fact, aggressively pursuing new developments both in outer space and inner space.

Finally, we believe that under the policies of the past 5 years, rather than escape the dilemma of "humiliating retreat or nuclear war," we have actually enlarged that possibility by, in effect, adopting policies that have reduced rather than increased our options.

To reverse this situation, four basic requirements are necessary:

First. A more objective and realistic assessment of the threat coupled with a thorough reevaluation of our foreign policy;

Second. A return to greater participation by and acceptance of military judgment in what are predominantly military affairs;

Third. A more aggressive pursuit of research and development especially in the area of advanced weapons; and

Fourth. A reassessment by the Congress of its own role in the area of national security.

There is, in our judgment, little possibility that these requirements can or will be fulfilled unless the initiative comes from the Congress. It is for this reason that we have called for and strongly support the establishment of a Blue Ribbon Commission of military and civilian leaders to reassess and reevaluate the defense posture of this Nation now and for the future.

Only in this way can the American people be reassured that this Nation is buying the very best defense consistent with the long-term best interests of the United States.

## MISTAKES IN DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, still another reason for this Blue Ribbon Commission is the unequalled record of mistakes that the present Secretary of Defense has managed to amass.

Consider, for example, the following:

July 19, 1966

Mr. Jay Lovestone
Director
Department of International Affairs
American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations
815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Lovestone:

In Dr. Kissinger's absence on a
trip abroad, I am writing to acknowledge
your letter of July 13th.

Mr. Kissinger's recent statement
on NATO before the Fulbright Committee
is being reprinted in *The Reporter*. I
will make sure that you get a copy.

Henry V. Klaasberg

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards.

I hope so.

Will I see you at the Pudelsuh meeting?

I read your comments on my article
and I do not think we disagree on funds-
ments.

July 30th.

Dear Monsieur Moch:

Paris, France
Republique Francsia
Ville de Paris
Monument Jules Moch

August 19, 1966

Columbia University in the City of New York

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE

Uris Hall
New York, N.Y. 10027

August 4, 1966

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

AUG 1 0 1966

Dear Henry,

I am delighted to have a reprint of your masterly analysis, "For a New Atlantic Alliance." Naturally, I had read it with keen interest and a wide range of agreement in *The Reporter*, but it is more satisfactory to have it in off-print form for frequent and helpful reference.

Once again, you have urged people to look from the details to the broad interests. This is invaluable.

With best wishes,

PEM:ss

[LC]

PRODUCTION IS DOWN. VIETNAM IS DEMANDING MORE AND MORE FOOD FOR OUR TROOPS. OUR MEAT PRODUCTION IS DOWN. OUR MILK PRODUCTION IS DOWN. ANY FARMERS KILLED OFF THEIR MILK CATTLE BECAUSE THEY FOUND THEY NO LONGER COULD MAKE A PROFIT PRODUCING MILK. THUS OUR POPULATION HAS INCREASED OUR WELFARE ROLLS HAVE INCREASED, OUR MANPOWER NEEDS IN VIETNAM HAVE INCREASED AND THE WORKING POPULATION HAS INCREASED IN LARGE NUMBERS OF AMERICAN EATING AND CONSUMING MORE AND WASTING MORE.

THESE ARE THE FACTS OF LIFE, YOUR EDITORS SEEM TO MISS AND YOUR ARTICLE WRITERS.

THIS IS SOMETHING YOU MAY CARE TO EXPLORE AND THINK ABOUT. THIS IS SUCH A SERIOUS TOPIC THAT I THINK IT SHOULD BE MADE A PRIORITY TO YOUR READERS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN WHAT THEY ARE FACING AND REFUSE TO UNDERSTAND. THIS IS SOMETHING SOME ONE SHOULD WRITE ABOUT AND PUBLISH.

I THINK IT IS SERIOUS ENOUGH FOR ME TO TAKE THE TIME OUT TO WRITE THIS LENGTHY LETTER. I THINK IT IS SERIOUS ENOUGH FOR YOUR REPORTERS TO LOOK INTO THE STATISTICS AND SEE WHETHER I AM CORRECT IN MY ASSUMPTION. THE FIRST PLACE TO LOOK IS IN THE LETTER, ISSUED THIS MONTH BY THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK. THEY HAVE A TABLE ON SOME FIGURES OF THE AMOUNT OF WHEAT, CORN, SOYA BEAN AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS NOW IN STORAGE IN THE UNITED STATES.

YOU MAY CARE TO GO SEE MR. PICK, THE WORLD MONETARY EXPERT ON MONEY MATTERS. WE WILL TEL YOU HOW MUCH GOLD WE HAVE LEFT IN OUR TREASURY. HOW MUCH GOLD FRANCE HAS AND HOW MUCH GOLD OTHER NATIONS HAVE.

YOU CAN GO TO COMMERCE DEPARTMENT AND CHECK ON OUR WORLD TRADE POSITION. SEE HOW MUCH GOODS WE ARE SELLING TO OTHER NATIONS AND COMPARE THE GOOS OTHER NATIONS ARE SELLING.

YOU MIGHT ALSO LOOK INTO THE WHEAT WE PROMISED INDIA. WHEAT THAT WE ARE GOING TO FIND SCARCE IN OUR OWN COUNTRY.

WE ARENO LONGER THE NATION THAT WE THINK WE ARE. THE HAVE NATION.

WE ARE A HAVE NOT NATION. UNLESS WE CAN SETTLY OUR PROBELMS DOMESTICALLY WITH THE NEGROES TO GET THEM TO STOP PROPOGANDIZING SO MUCH AND GET DOWN TO WORK AND GET A JOB AND EARN A LIVING AND GET OFF THE RELIEF ROLLS AND STOP DEMANDING HOUSING RAID FOR BY WELFARE WITH BRAND NEW HOUSING BECAUSE THEIR HOUSING IS SLUMMY.

CHEERFULLY YOURS,

LEO REINER

HENRY S. REUSS
5TH DISTRICT, WISCONSIN

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COMMITTEES:

BANKING AND CURRENCY
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JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE AND PAYMENTS
SUBCOMMITTEE

August 2, 1966

AUG 4 1966

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of July 27 and the enclosed article you did for *The Reporter* entitled, "For a New Atlantic Alliance". I greatly appreciate your sending me the article. You can be sure I'll read it with interest.