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PROGRAM

The Today Show

STATION

WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE

October 12, 1981 7:15 AM

CITY

Washington, DC

SUBJECT

Interview with Henry Kissinger

TOM BROKAW: Dr. Henry Kissinger's in our Washington studio this morning. We want to talk with him about what happens next in the Middle East. Dr. Kissinger was in Cairo over the weekend for the funeral of President Anwar Sadat.

Dr. Kissinger, let me begin with the question that is on the minds of a lot of people. Presidents Ford and Carter now have said publicly and jointly that the United States will eventually have to negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization -- the Palestine Liberation Organization, the PLO. Do you agree with them?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: There are two levels in which one has to consider this. One is, what are our conditions for talking with the PLO. Those were laid down in 1975 under President Ford, and they required that the PLO recognize the state of Israel. The second is, what is the best strategy for making progress in the peace negotiations. Is the PLO the key to the peace negotiations. There I have serious questions whether the most radical group, the group that has been trained, financed, equipped by the Soviet Union is the key.

I have always believed we should deal with the established states and let them deal with the PLO, rather than make them put us into a position. But first we have to determine whether the PLO has met our conditions. Then we have to get Israel to negotiate with the PLO. Then we will be in a Vietnam-type negotiation in which the most radical group can constantly set the terms while the others are standing on the sidelines.

This is a question of strategy. I agree with main-

OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. • NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

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taining the conditions that were laid down in 1975. I have
doubt whether that is the best strategy for making progress
on the West Bank.

BROKAW: Generally speaking, do you think that Israel
now will have to be more flexible to achieve peace in the Middle
East?

DR. KISSINGER: I think generally now we all have an
obligation to think through where we are going, to define a route
of getting there, and to develop a strategy and not rely on the
theories of individual negotiating tactical moves.

BROKAW: But there can be no...

DR. KISSINGER: Including Israel, but not only Israel.

BROKAW: But what would happen if Israel, for example,
were to hesitate about giving back the final one-third of the
Sinai which is due Egypt in April of next year?

DR. KISSINGER: You know, strangely enough, I don't
believe they will do this, because I think Israel has had as much
of a shock as anybody by the death of President Sadat. If that
happens we are in a first-class crisis, and that will have to be
handled in its own terms. I don't believe that is going to happen.

The more significant question is, assuming the territory
goes back, as I think It will, and it must, what then -- before
and after this -- the steps by which the West Bank problem mu --
will be resolved. Who are the principal negotiators, what are
the goals that one sets oneself, what are the boundaries one
has in mind, who are the authorities that will emerge there
after Israel withdraws from much, all, part of the territory
depending on the negotiation, will it be done as one set or
a series of individual sets. Those are the issues that have
to be decided first by our government, then in consultation
with Israel and the friendly Arab countries that are interested.

BROKAW: We want to do a little primer right now, Dr.
Kissinger, and show a map of that part of the world and ask you
what you think will happen, for example, if Libya, which is just
to the left of Egypt there on your map, although unlabeled, goes
after the Sudan, which is just to the south of Egypt? And that
is a major concern in Cairo these days. What do you think the
United States' response to that kind of a move should be?

DR. KISSINGER: First, when one looks at the map, one
perceives only a very small border between Libya and the Sudan.
The viewer ought to keep in mind that the country just south of
Libya, the Chad, is under Libyan control so that almost all the
western border of Sudan is exposed to Libyan infiltration.

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The case you gave, Tom, is relatively easy. If Libya invades Sudan, then we have to give whatever assistance is necessary to defeat Libya.

BROKAW: Including American troops on the ground?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I -- if the Sudan and Egypt together must be able -- that together have a population of about 60 million -- must be to handle two million Egyptians -- Libyans. So I believe that the local forces in the ground, with American military assistance of equipment will be able to handle the Libyan situation.

The second -- the more important question is, we talked before about the peace process, and the peace process is essential. But unless some radical government is demonstrated, unless we demonstrate the limitations of power and influence of some radical governments, all our friends are going to become more and more fearful and more and more constricted. We have seen now the Shah of Iran, Sadat, even King Faisal either driven from office or assassinated. No radical leader has suffered or no radical government has suffered a major setback. That is a more immediate priority even if they don't attack the Sudan. If they attack the Sudan we have to resist.

BROKAW: We have to put enormous pressure then, are you saying, on the radical government of Colonel Qaddafi of Libya?

DR. KISSINGER: I think a government like Libya, South Yemen that has specialized in attacking their neighbors, there are terrorist training camps in all of these countries, every terrorist knows he can get material support and financial support from these countries, I think an end has to be put to these kinds of activities. I have nothing against these countries if they stay within their borders.

BROKAW: Let me ask you about your assessment of the mood in Egypt at the time of the funeral of President Sadat. I was struck by the abscence of a great public display of grief. And it seems to me that that is not a good sign for Vice President Mubarak who will not inherit not just his office but most of his policies.

DR. KISSINGER: There was no public display of anything because it was an amazing situation. For those of us who visited Cairo very frequently there was nobody in the street, that the personnel in hotels was not as voluble and as friendly and as outgoing as they were before. And I don't think this indicates an absence of grief over the death of Sadat, I think it indicates a shock of such enormous magnitude that the population, to me, seemed to be waiting for the other shoe to drop. Maybe there is no other shoe that is going to drop, maybe we have seen everything that is