TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Alex Johnson

10/24/72 4:30 p.m.

HK: Alex, how are you?

AJ: How are you, that's the question.

HK: I'm okay--well, we've had a hectic day--

AJ: I must say, just from a physical point of view and an emotional one. This is--

HK: That was about the roughest four days I've ever had.

AJ: About the roughest you've had, I'm sure.

HK: I've had brutal ones but they won't so emotionally painful.

AJ: No, and such crucial issues as this.

HK: Yeh, Bill Sullivan incidentally was terrific. I--

AJ: Well, thanks--I have great regard for him.

HK: It was a tremendous contribution and it really lays the basis for a sort of cooperation which will be characteristic rather than--

AJ: Fine, very good. Well, I must say he speaks very high for you--
Henry, I talked to him this morning, of course.

HK: I mean not with him just, but I think we can do this now on a regular basis

AJ: Good, good.

HK: His contribution was first of all, totally loyal, discreet, and substantively he couldn't have been better.

AJ: He's got a good grasp of it.

HK: And he told you about all the changes we obtained--

AJ: Yes, Of course I don't have any text here, sometime when it is convenient I might come over and just go through--

HK: By all means.

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AJ: I haven't seen the unilateral statements at all.

HK: We got major ones on Cambodia and Laos

AJ: That's what I understand.

HK: I mean really major ones on Cambodia and Laos--unbelievable.

AJ: Yeh, yeh. Well let me say Al did a superb job of keeping us informed --we find him very fine to work with.

HK: Alex I have just heard from Ellsworth that Lamb has been briefing foreign ambassadors and you know these guys on one of their--

AJ: Did you see the message of Ellsworth came in with this morning there is a message in from him saying he heard k that they were talking for giving out a briefing paper; he sent Charlie Whitehouse over right away--Charlie Whitehouse got it and was horrified--

HK: Well they are doing it on the basis of an old plan--

AJ: Then then Charlie got some changes made and Ellsworth sent in the change paper--have you seen this exchange--

HK: No I haven't seen the changed papers--

AJ: There are three telegrams, one saying that they were doing this then one sending in the original paper and then two the paper that he'd been able to get modified--

HK: They are talking on the basis of a proposal we no longer maintain.

AJ: I find it hard to know what they are talking about--I haven't got the full text of--

HK: Would you have been able--the thing that I was proudest of was that we had destroyed the coalition government.

AJ: You know, Thieu is also in his speech talking about coalition government --well of course this comes out of de Bourchgrave (I always have trouble with his name) interview up there--in Hanoi. Now in that interview if you read the text of it, the text Pham Van Dong is very careful not to use the word government, however, the Newsweek article and all the other articles based on it very freely use the word--

HK: Because the goddamn newsmen have a vested interest in it.

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HK: But if we would take the position this is clearly not a coalition government--

AJ: I agree.

HK: The thing that worries me is that Ellsworth is under the impression that they have for example told the British the membership of that control commission--

AJ: Isee.

HK: And if that's the case, I think we better start talking to Canada and Indonesia.

AJ: That's what I feel--I don't know--did you talk at all with--I talked to Secretary earlier this morning--

HK: No I didn't have a chance to mention it to the Secretary--I used to be opposed to it.

AJ: Yes, yes, I know you were.

HK: But I wonder whether the maniacs have leaked it.

AJ: I have no indication yet that it's got to the Canadians of the Indonesians however, I would expect Lon Nol probably to tell the Indonesians and I would expect the British to pick this up--or the Canadians to pick this up in Saigon, but I don't have any indication yet that they've done so.

HK: Do you think we should talk to them or what do you think?

AJ: I think the earlier we talk to them the better--I don't see how we'd lose much by it. They are going to get us at a distorted form--

HK: Why don't you make a suggestion how to do it.

AJ: All right, the way we should do it is to have Bill Rogers arrange to see Mitchell Sharp in New York or something of that kind to make the broad pitch to him on it.

HK: Well then why don't we plan on it.

AJ: The Canadians are not going to be--enthusiastic about this.

HK: But Bill thinks if we appeal to Trudeau he might do it.

AJ: No Bill thinks he might do better with Mitchell Sharp than we might do with Trudeau.

HK: I meant that Bill Sullivan thought--

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AJ: Oh, Bill Sullivan thought--he just meant to appeal to the Canadians.

HK: No, no, let's try sharp first and we can always go to Trudeau from there.

AJ: Yes, yes. All right. The Secretary can do that at any time.

HK: Why don't we wait until tomorrow and keep it in mind.

AJ: And then a letter or something from the Secretary to Malek or --we will have to have somebody go out to Djkarta and explain it to him. Now what we were thinking about was if and when you --if and when Bill at least makes another trip out there--

HK: Yeh, but I thought --if those bastards haven't kicked us in the groins I was going to send Bill down from --

AJ: That's what he mentioned.

HK: from Saigon.

AJ: Yeh, all right, let me talk to the Secretary. again, I think that he and Mitchell are getting together in New York quietly and then something from him to Malek and sending somebody out to --

HK: or from the President to Suharto--I don't know which is better.

AJ: I don't know either -- we can do them both on the one, two; that is, try it at the level and keep the President in reserve or I don't know how does he feel or how do you feel. On Suharto I don't know.

HK: I am sure on Canada the Secretary and Sharp are the best level.

AJ: Yeh, I'm clear on that.

HK: On the other, I think the President and Suhart may be better.

AJ: I agree, all right, let me work something up on this.

HK: Good and we'll be in close touch and keep you fully informed. We keep getting little billydos from the North Vietnamese screaming --insisting we sign the agreement this month.

AJ: Yeh, I know, now you are expecting something later on this evening.

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HK: Yeh.

AJ: I think you are doing exactly the right thing--let's keep the dialog open--

HK: What we've told them is that we need another round after that now that ~~xx~~ our consultations are completed in Saigon that ought to be definitive

AJ: That's perfectly reasonable.

HK: I don't know how we are going to bring Saigon along, to tell you the truth.

AJ: I think they are going to come.

HK: There are two explanations--either he's gone the Diem route or the new route or he's setting up strong men which he can then knock down and say he drove--

AJ: That's right. I hope of course it's the latter--he really has no place to go, but of course he's perfectly capable--like all Vietnamese--completely irrational too.

HK: Because when he talks about this unfortunate ceasefire--here we have been proposing it since October, 1970, he signed off on all of them, there wasn't one proposal for withdrawal of NVA forces in any of the ceasefire proposals, so what the hell are we doing to him.

AJ: I know, I know, I know, I know. You'll get no argument out of me on that.

HK: I thought you were going to take his side.

AJ: (laughing)

AJ:

HK: Okay thanks for letting us have Bill Sullivan's--he's yours to be of any help he can any time.

HK: He'll be in as an equal partner from now on.

AJ: Thanks a lot.

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

9:35 a.m. - 10/25/72

K: Hello.

R: Hi, Henry.

K: Oh, Bill, I'm sorry I didn't know that you were on.

R: That's all right. I guess you didn't hear anything, huh?

K: Yes, we heard something late last night. They're just screaming that we should sign on the 31st and you know, they didn't say what they were going to do if we didn't. You know how can we sign a document that begins with the concurrence

R: Well, I mean they didn't say anything about the meeting?

K: They said another meeting is unnecessary and we should sign the document. But Dobrynin called and said that he thought that if we did something face-saving it might still work out.

R: Well, we've done that on the bombing, haven't we?

K: That's right, but I don't think that message was only received yesterday. I mean they saw the fact, but they didn't know that it was a commitment of permanence.

R: Did you tell Dobrynin that?

K: Yes. We handed them the message yesterday that the bombing north of the 20th was stopped. We had done it the day before but they might have thought it was only a day or two.

R: Yeh. Ok. I think I better get in touch with the Canadians.

K: I talked to Alex about that yesterday because apparently those madmen out there have been briefing people already.

R: That's right. And I've also got Plimsoll, the Australian, come in. He's complained a lot of times and I'll give him just what he's reading in the newspaper.

K: Good.

CLASSIFIED
BY
THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE

E012958

Original
Date 10/25/72
B

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R: On Indonesia, how do you want to handle that?

K: I think a letter by the President to Suharto might be the best and then you could follow it up with Malek.

R: Yeh, I think that's probably the best.

K: Or maybe Sullivan would like to draft that letter.

R: OK. Fine. Are you going to have a press conference?

K: We've been talking, but this will depend on what answers we get. If the speculation doesn't get out of hand

R: Gee, I think you're in a terrible position to give a press conference.

K: I certainly won't have one today. We'll play that from day to day.

R: It seems to me we ought to - the other thing is that you either have to say nothing, it seems to me, and say you can't talk about it or - then you aren't much better off than you were without the press conference so you have to sort of lay things out. If you do that then it's sort of gets everybody in more of a flexible position. It seems to me if we can sort of stay reasonably flexible and just point out we're still working on it and we think the possibility still exists, etc., etc.

K: Well, that's our present position.

R: Yeh. All right.

K: I'll talk to you before it anyway.

R: I gather that the newspaper people expect it but

K: Well, but we never really - the President said it to Ziegler yesterday to say that we were thinking of it for later this week.

R: Oh, I see.

K: That's how that developed.

R: That's how that developed. Yeh. Well, it could be useful, I don't know, but I would think

K: That's how that one developed.

R: Yeh. OK, Henry. Thank you.

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
10:19 a.m. - 10/25/72

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I don't know whether you've got the time or not, but one person who could have an enormous effect in seeing that the hawks don't get off the beam would be Buckley. If you could just

K: Absolutely. I'll get him down here.

P: Now, I'd just call him.

K: I'll call him and I'll get him down here.

P: I wouldn't waste your time getting him down, but if you can say, Bill if you agree this is the right thing to do, then here's your chance to stand up and be counted on a great issue. We're doing the right thing and so forth and so on and use the term the issue now is "peace with honor" or "peace with surrender".

K: Absolutely.

P: That's what the other side is for. Another one in that category who doesn't have a helluva readership in the writing thing are Bill White or Dick Wilson. Either one. You understand our problem is on the right, not the left. That's why Howard Smith is important.

K: OK. I'll get Dick Wilson and Howard Smith both today.

P: Good deal.

K: Right.

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:20 a.m. - 10/25/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, I got a very pleasant girl answering me.

D: It was my wife.

K: She refused to talk English to me.

D: Oh, she was so scared because she's been ordered not to touch this telephone. Anyone. And that's why she called me from my bedroom you know where you called yesterday. I have two telephones - in my bedroom and in my office.

K: I've never seen your office actually.

D: If you like I can show you. It's very modest. It couldn't compare to your one. You have a very nice.

K: Yes, but our Ambassador doesn't have a very nice office there.

D: I think he has in Moscow.

K: In Moscow, not so nice.

D: No?

K: No

D: But he has such a nice residence, hasn't he?

K: Yeh, the residence is nice.

D: For two of them it is quite enough.

K: Yeh, the residence is lovely.

D: In this case it's combined - in my case it's the residence and the embassy, as you know.

K: Yeh, Anatol, I've just been talking to the President about the message from your leaders. First of all he wants you to know that - he wants your leaders to know how much he appreciates the attitude you have shown and that he agrees with them completely that issues of prestige should not stand in the way when peace is so near.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: N.M.aba 5/20/72

D: Yeh..

K: Now concretely, however, he believes that a trip by me to Hanoi now would produce exactly the opposite effect of what we want.

D: Why?

K: Because it might make Hanoi happy but it would so exacerbate the situation in Saigon that it would absolutely not bring about the result we want. However, here is what he's proposing: First of all, I'm prepared to meet Le Duc Tho anywhere. If he would prefer to meet me say in Vientiane, I will go there.

D: But why not Hanoi?

K: Not now. From the point of view of managing Saigon the best location is Paris and both Hanoi and we have a common interest now in getting that part of it done. Now, however, in order to show our good faith if Le Duc Tho meets me in Paris, and if we arrive at a final document, that we will convince Saigon of, in the interval while we are convincing Saigon we will stop the bombing of the north completely.

D: First you would like to finish

K: I would like to finish - I would like to see Le Duc Tho

D: In Paris and finish

K: And finish the final document.

D: Yes.

K: As soon as that document is finished, I would then ask him for say two weeks to get everything arranged in Saigon, but with the understanding that we would not ask for anymore changes. It's just a matter of persuading our allies.

D: Yeh.

K: But in that interval we would stop the bombing of the north completely. You see what I mean? So that the bombing would stop as soon as we had finished the document.

D: Yeh, I understand. Well, of course it's clearly answered. The impression that I got really

3

K: And then I would go to Hanoi, as soon as - you know after the election as soon as the agreement is made. I will still go to Hanoi to initial the agreement.

D: Oh yes, I understand. But it will be in the period after you've persuaded Saigon.

K: That's right.

D: It's approximately - well, I mean.. .

K: My judgment is - I don't want to give a fixed date again - but I think we could say - I've just talked to the President, by November 20th it will be done.

D: You mean the whole procedure

K: The whole procedure would be finished by November 20th.

D: Including signing ?

K: Including signing.

D: Your trip to Hanoi then, too?

K: Everything will be finished, yes. The signing will be in Paris; the initialing will be in Hanoi; and the bombing would stop at the end of next week.

D: If you come to this and so on.

K: Yes. Yes.

D: . . . . . . this draft schedule so it's more or less what kind of draft schedule it would be, yes?

K: That's right.

D: Well, that's my impression. My impression is they really felt that, for what reason I do not have any information, that if you will be there in Hanoi that it would be easy to solve all the problems in the negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055
By: N.W. Gage

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055
By W. M. S. Bane

K: For your information I have asked Saigon, I have asked Bunker in Saigon to give me his judgment on what the impact would be in Saigon if I did this. He said that it would have a very bad effect in Saigon and that it would slow up what we are now doing, I assure you, with great energy.

D: I think we just wanted to proceed with this . . . . . . and we are under the impression that you could explain eloquently, as you usually do, in Hanoi and then everything would straighten out. But maybe . . . . . . . . for the time being.

We're talking
K: You know I'm giving a fairly reasonable schedule. about three weeks in a war that has lasted ten years.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: And in which, you know there are only two possibilities that are reasonable. One is that all of this is a tremendous plot between us and Saigon. (D laughs) This is insane. Or that we are genuinely trying to bring the war to a conclusion, but that we cannot do everything we want in three days.

D: I understand.

K: And that is the truth.

D: I understand.

K: We've already unilaterally stopped bombing north of the 20th parallel. If they come to an agreement with us, we will stop all the bombing so that we're rid of that. All we want from them is something that we can go to Saigon and say we've got a few of your changes, now you must do what we tell you.

D: I understand. Did you receive the message from Hanoi?

K: Yeh, but it's the same as before - that we must sign by October 31st.

D: Oh, I see.

K: How can we sign a document which begins with the concurrence of the GVN, when they haven't concurred?

D: With whom?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F01265
by M.W. Saree 06/04/57

K: It says "The United States with the concurrence of the Saigon Government, the DRV with the concurrence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. . . agree to the following". But how can we sign it even if we wanted to?

D: Have you made the proposal you just mentioned to me from the President to them yet or not?

K: No, we will make it later today.

D: So this way I can send this rough schedule of what you said on behalf of the President in reply to yesterday's message to our leadership.

K: That is correct.

D: Will you give me

K: Oh, the letter to Brezhnev.

D: Yeh.

K: You will have it by the end of the day or first thing in the morning.

D: OK. I do not press you but I really would like to have a letter

K: No, no, it is definitely

D: OK, that is no problem at all - tomorrow is no problem.

K: But if you could get this message to Moscow.

D: I will right now.

K: And we will deliver it to the North Vietnamese in about three hours. I will send you a copy. You can tell your leaders that this offer of a bombing halt is really in response to the note we got yesterday from you but we won't say that to Hanoi. Or we will if you want to.

D: You use your own judgment.

K: But I can assure you on behalf of the President.

D: No, I understand.

K: It isn't possible for me to go to Hanoi because that would have the

D: opposite effect. I understand. Thank you very much.

TELCONE

Secretary Peterson/Kissinger

11:00 a.m. - 10/25/72

K: Hello.

P: Henry, how are you? Welcome, my friend. I don't know whether
you are happy or not, are you?

K: I have only one desire - to turn the Vietnamese loose on each other
in the hope that the maximum will kill each other off.

P: (Laugh's) Well. . .

K: But I think we're getting it.

P: Yeh, well OK, we can talk later about that. I'm bothering you for
this reason, Henry.

K: Where are you?

P: I'm in Phoenix. I'm on the campaign trail. If you were more important
and close to everyone, you could participate in the campaign too, but
you can't do it. Listen, your Ambassador friend has mentioned several
times the subject of gas; most recently the night before last. . .

K: In some sort of a public statement.

P: Right. Now the issue is since you made the commitment to their
leader, how we announce it and what we say. Now when we announced
the trade deal, Henry, we said very little about this and I think he
is feeling that we owe him something.

K: Right. I made the commitment from your talking points.

P: I understand that. I understand that. When you get into this subject,
Hal is briefed and Flanigan is briefed and Flanigan is inclined to have
us make a Commerce announcement. I want you to focus on whatever
you think you have to do because in the talking points, you know there
was a bit of Presidential commitment there. Could you get into that
right away because

K: I think you should make a Commerce announcement to which Ziegler
calls attention.

P: All right. Will you get into that subject over there and be sure it's
handled properly because after the maritime business I want to be
sure that

CLASSIFIED
Allan E. 3017258
B. MARRIAGE

5/1/74

2

K: But what does that mean, get into it?

P: Well, Flanigan is working up something and Sonnenfeldt's aware of it and Flanigan had some ideas of his own. I just want to make sure that your commitment is lived up to.

K: Good, I'll take a look at it.

P: You know Peter's view on this whole subject is not yours or mine, I don't think.

K: That's the truth. When are you coming back?

P: Tomorrow afternoon. Okay, I need Maritime and the situation on lend lease--all of this broke, of course, while you were gone.

K: I knew you would get me out of the picture.

P: Yes, I was brilliant on the way I did that. My sense of it, Henry, is that Anatol is feeling reasonably good now.

K: I thought it came out beautifully.

P: Yes, he was quite bruised after the Maritime deal, but if you could have seen the histrionics we put on settling the other issue, I think Kapolichev has gone back thinking he is the greatest negotiator that ever lived. And I think they feel they really took us on that one, and that makes up for the Maritime. Actually all we gave up was, you know, nothing as you know. But I think they think that we really made a concession:

K: Well that's what these bastards needs. We will settle for the first deal if it looks as if we made a concession, a good one, on which we don't yield at all.

P: Yes, well Hal can tell you, cause he was there. We just bled all over the floor and Potolichev just felt just marvelous when he left. But might want to confirm this with Anatol cause I felt badly about the Maritime thing because I know how important it is to---

K: No, no, no. I think you did exactly the right thing. It came out very well.

BECERTIFIED
By: E. O. 12. 55

B. NARA DUE 5.1.50

#3

P: Fine, now finally, I'm coming back tomorrow afternoon. I don't know what your schedule is like on Friday. In addition to orchestrating the gas thing because we--

K: The gas thing for luncheon Friday.

P: What?

K: How about lunch on Friday?

P: I may be free, but I think I'm giving some awards to Blacks unless the Jacky Robinson thing--I'd be delighted--

K: Otherwise, let's get together during the day.

P: All right. Now, the specific thing I want to talk to you about aside from the gas, which I want you thinking about, we've got our Oriental friends that we've got to talk to. They're expecting something, and I don't know what you promised over there, but you promised something and--

K: The God damned Japs?

P: No, no. Kim Lin told me that you said something to the big man about our working with the Japs and you have to visit over there, and I don't know what your commitments are but discuss this Friday.

K: I think we should do that.

P: All right, now, the other thing--by the time I get back I will have written something on the European question. You and I have discussed. The more I live with that, the more profound I think that problem is. If you could give me a little time, I'd like to kick around some ideas on that.

K: Okay. Let's aim to get together Friday or Saturday.

P: All right. Now, the other thing--you should know is there is a curious ambivalence in your establishment over there about this whole deal. The top man didn't want to get involved in signings and, you know, it had to be over at State and brother Rogers was involved in the whole thing.

K: We were trying to keep Rogers happy.

P: Well it seems the big man mentioned to me some polls that he saw that illustrated that this issue was not very popular or some damned

thing, and I really need to get some good signals on this, Henry,
because my reaction is that we got a good deal, but most of the
press thinks it's great--

K: My reaction is to ignore this.

P: Well, okay, but if you can sniff around and find out what the problem is it would be helpful.

K: In ten days sanity will return. If I paid any attention to what they tell me day by day the polls, we wouldn't have a foreign policy left.

P: Yeah.

K: I wouldn't pay any attention to that.

P: Right. You are coming through, incidentally, brilliantly over here.

K: What do you mean?

P: What I mean by that is that sober, serious, constructive, not giving the store away but obviously trying very hard--it couldn't be better, in my opinion.

K: Terrific, thank you. See you soon.

P: All right, Henry.

K: Bye.

P: Bye.

TELCONE

Gov. Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

11:14 am - October 25, 1972

K: Hello.

R: Henry!

K: It's nice to know you want to talk.

R: Listen, you're a nice guy. I got into New York last night about three minutes after your plane left.

K: Oh, isn't that a pity.

R: I was coming in from up-state, introducing the Vice President.

K: How did you know I was there.

R: I didn't know. The police, the guards---

K: Oh, yes, yes

R: Oh, I had no idea you were up.

K: Well, I had to see the Chinese.

R: q That's what I figured. Listen, I didn't call you right away because of two reasons-- one, I know what you are under, and two, had quite a long chat with your boss on the phone.

K: Oh!

R: And he had some ideas and said he wanted me to deal with you, I guess, which I thought I'd just--

K: (Laughter) You don't suppose he could do that himself. I mean I

R: Well, that was my feeling. But I was going to let it come on your initiative, and not me call you, you know what I mean.

K: Yes, you can always--

R: How are you, personally.

K: I'm fine.

GIBBSONS VILLAGE

8502103

BOSTON DAILY GAZETTE 5/1/72

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R: It must have been a most grueling experience.

K: Oh well, you know, the deal I told you about the other day. I can prove by about 75%, it's a really spectacular thing, and those maniacs in Saigon are not playing.

R: Well, is it really true that they are not, I mean what we read in the papers--

K: There are two explanations: either they have lost their minds or they will eventually give in but only after they prove they had a fare in it, you know, just to prove I can't just arrive there. and hand them something.

for

R: I see, well they try to make this/their own politics.

K: That's right. And that's the most likely. But in the process, he's doing himself so much damage here, you know, it's going to be hard to get the appropriation.

R: I see. Your boss put it on the ground that the story in the Newsweek from the north--

K: Well, that had something to do with it. But frankly, I think--and another thing he's trying to do in his, you know, these three are hanging out there now just holding on by their teeth. And he figures if he can gain three weeks, he can kill a few more thousand of them.

R: Oh.

K: Of course, that may deprive them the incentive to go ahead.

R: Yeah, which side is killing the most.

K: Oh no, he's killing more now.

R: He is?

K: Yes. Militarily, this thing is in good shape.

R: Truth! Is that right, Henry?

K: Yes. Well, it will take a few cool notes. We'll have it done by the end of November.

R: The end of November.

K: We won't have it done for the election.

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R: Okay, well that was the thing he was concerned about.

K: Oh, that it cannot be done before--

R: That's right.

K: He told me you told him that. He told me that you pleaded with him. you'd lose NY State if it got done before the election. But I had had the benefit of your views earlier.

R: I was listening, Henry, I was listening.

(Laughter)

R: And I was asked to talk to you about it. And I thought that maybe your having your own conversation down here would be the right thing and I would then get after you, you know.

(Laughter)

K: Now you see what we are up against here.

R: Oh, yes. But the way I feel about it from the point of view of the election is that one way or the other now, I don't think it matters.

K: If we can hold the north together which is now 50/50 because these guys have made all the preparations on the other attempts, then it's better to do it after the election because then can get unstuck in the south which we can never prove, then it won't look as if we had patched it together just because of the election.

R: That's right.

K: But from the point of view of public morality, it's better; from the point of view of the South Vietnamese, it's better because they can get their own people lined up. From the point of view of the North, we are paying a hell of a price. Long term good will is needed to implement this God damned thing.

R: I got you. Well, my feeling is, Henry, and this is the way I feel about it is that you've got to keep going, and that it really is going to be defense that dictates it rather than strategy--on the timing.

CLASSIFIED

Authentic
3012958
BANA DATE 5/10/9

4

K: Well, I think now the strategy is clear. First, this thing stays in motion now. The Vietnamese, North and South, are really maniacs. Both of them, because you never can be sure that one of them won't do something suicidal. But if we can keep either of them from going over the cliff, then it must end by the end of November. There's no way it can go on.

R: Right, well I would take it from the point of view of the President that you have to not drop the ball because of Thieu, but to keep on working.

K: Oh, but that's easy.

R: Well, I'm just talking about public reaction.

K: It's not easy. That depends on what the other side--you other side stresses all that brilliance; the other side can publish what's been received and say we refuse to go through with it. Well, I can totally confuse the issue, I can say yes we stand behind what's achieved, but in any negotiation when you to the final, there are a lot of nuances appear, and they want to stampede us into a settlement before the election and we wouldn't do it. I think that will go with the public.

R: Well, are you going to be continuing to negotiate?

K: Well, that's what I'm trying to set up.

R: Yes, because I think that is important.

K: Yeah, but that's no good because the other side recognizes that and they are not so eager.

R: I see.

K: But, I think we will bring it off.

R: You do. Marvelous, marvelous. But even if you went back to the South on another trip, you know I think in the long run you'd lose if it looks as though you had dictated to the United States.

K: Yes, that won't look right. I think we can avoid that. I'll not more about that by the weekend.

R: You will?

95CLASSROOM

Author: E0172958

BY MIRA DRE 5/14/01

5

K: Yes.

R: Well, you're marvelous, Henry, and I my heart went out to you when with what I knew you were going through there.

K: Well, it was pretty rough. It was the roughest I've had since I've came here.

R: I don't know, I mean, it's day after day--must have been very unpleasant too.

K: Very unpleasant.

R: Well, you're just fabulous, Henry. I want to tell you that Nancy has been doing a most terrific job on this speech.

K: Oh, really?

R: Yeah. For the first.

K: Unless I'm off negotiating, I'll be at the head table with you.

R: That's marvelous. And I have to assume that what she's got here, her interpretations are a reflection of yours.

K: That's correct. I looked it over. She gave me a copy last night.

R: Marvelous. Well, that's terrific, I think it's brilliant. I think this is one of the really great--the way she has unfolded what you've been doing. And, the philosophy in back of it, this ought to be a very important record document of what this Administration between you and the President--

K: I look forward to listening to it.

R: I look forward to making it because it's a tribute. This is sort of--you know like a magician, I'm witnessing it.

K: Well, you've been a great inspiration and we've done so many things together, you ought to know who thought up what.

R: That's a year with my generous friends.

K: One other thing, I wanted to ask you, Nelson, I want to give a dinner next week for the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister and the Chinese Ambassador because we arranged that in Shanghai when I was there, and they practically asked for it. We have to do it in New York, what evening you might be free to do it.

6

R: Next week? Monday looks all right. Wednesday I could--Monday or Wednesday.

K: What about Thursday?

R: Thursday, I got to be in Rhode Island, wait til I find out from Ann when I get back from Rhode Island. I'm going up to help John Tracy. Would you like to have it at our apartment?

K: Well, I wonder if I shouldn't be the host.

R: I couldn't be back Thursday until nine o'clock. Monday or Wednesday I can do it.

K: I'll check with them.

R: We'd love to have you invite them and do it at our apartment if you'd like.

K: Let me ask my Chinese experts what they think of that.

R: We've got some fascinating--not all the good things here, but some nice Chinese things.

K: Oh, I'm sure of that. Let me just think about how to do that. It would look a lot better at your apartment than anything that I could arrange, but I'm just wondering about the symbolism that it should be I who is--

R: Well, you can use the Knickerbocher Club too if you want--we've got lots of places, Henry.

K: Right, or the Century--

R: Well, this is great, Henry.

K: Well, I'll just make it one or two members of my staff and you.

R: Oh, marvelous.

K: I don't know whether--can you think of anyone in New York I should have? But I can think we could talk more frankly if I just tell them you are an intimate friend and they can be absolutely candid in front of you.

A

R: Yeah. You're a nice guy--this new president of the Rockefeller Foundation is a very interesting guy.

K: What's his name?

TELCOM

Bill Buckley/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 am - Oct. 25, 1972

Hello:

B: Hello, Doc. Welcome home. How are you?

K: I'm getting on. I can't of course go into a great detail on the telephone, but what I can tell you is that we are now negotiating on much much further, and not in the direction of coalition, I'm using the ones I discussed with you.

B: Oh, that's the best news I've heard all week, that's wonderful.

K: And I hope that our conservative friends don't panic on what is being put out by newsmen who have *distracted* interest in preserving coalition because they have been predicting it.

B: Right.

formula

K: In fact, the political we are now working out with, will collapse if the other side of that issue is taken. That's just a fig leaf now of the sort of a semi-advisory thing--it's much less than what you saw.

B: I see. I'm awfully glad you told me. I literally sitting down to write about it and obviously I lean towards the explanation the papers are full of this morning.

K: Well, they're wrong.

B: I'm awfully pleased that you told me. Obviously I won't quote yo u. But I'll simply say that we have every reason to believe that the President is going to stand firm.

K: Absolutely.

B: Oh, that's good news.

K: You know, Bill, what I described to you.

B: I do.

K: Now, could there be something like that--it will have, however, first to be negotiated by the parties themselves--as a purely advisory nature and not to come into being for many months.

B: Right.

2

K: But, it has no--it's explicitly described as non-governmental.

B: Right. That's absolutely truthful

K: But there will not be installed a caretaker government, a coalition government, In fact, I can assure you that the present personnel and government will remain in tact.

B: Oh, that's tremendous.

K: But that you cannot say.

B: Of course.

much of

K: But what's going on in Saigon is an Oriental Sun dance in which he's trying to prove that he did it. And, he's setting up straw men so that he can claim later victory for what he has achieved.

B: I see. That's sort of unpleasant, isn't it.

K: Oh, it's murderous. You know what breaks my heart is, if he had gone along with us we could have done it in one fell swoop; we could have killed the anti-jew agitation here once and for all and we could have destroyed all our opponents because what we would have come out with would have been so shockingly different from what they expected.

B: Oh, yeah. Is he hard to deal with?

K: Oh, he's impossible.

B: No kidding!

K: You know, I can see his point, but like all Vietnamese he's incapable of understanding the requirements of others, and what he claims domestically he's going to lose here. He could send me back, putting his arm around me, and saying America has saved us and thank you very much. He drew a God damned zero now. And after that, you know, we'd have proved everything. We kept him in office and, you know, it's really an amazing deal we are giving Thieu to develop. And, if we could have spent it with them, but now by the time that three week's of newspaper speculation it will look as if we dragged him kicking and screaming to his salvation.

3

B: Or else it would look as though he used you which we don't want either.

K: That's right. To impose a different appearance.

B: Yes, yes, yes. I'm really grateful for this, Henry, because I can now write with a perspective that I was worried about.

K: I can assure you, Bill, that this is going to come out unless--you know, my nightmare now, and none of this can be used, we've gotten Hanoi to make concessions with--make them as American demands, or only would have frosted them out as our intransitives. You might have thought we were going a little far, or at least unattainable.

B: Right

K: But, now that we've gotten all of this out of them, and this other guy kicks it over, or seems to <u>knock</u> kick it over while he postures himself, they may pull back. This is my present nightmare.

B: I hope at least you succeeded in communicating to them that the time table was important.

K: No, no, we won't get it done by election, no. We had it all wrapped up and -- in fact the only way we can get it done now is after the election.

B: I see, yeah, yeah.

K: But this is not to be put out.

B: No; of course not.

K: Because we'd like to keep McGovern guessing as to what is going to happen.

B: That's re-assuring.

K: From the point of view of public morality, Bill, there's a lot to be said for not forcing it through before the election. Because, if anything goes wrong in this situation, at least <u>we</u> won't look as if we did it as an election ploy.

B: Absolutely. I suppose McGovern will do everything he can now to take advantage of the situation.

DEC 14 1975
AM 10:2455

B: MARA Dic 5/1/75

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:49 - 10/25/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol!

D: Oh, yes, welcome. I received your message. The only thing I
was hearing --you put it so flexible that I do not understand. Where
is the point "C"---United States' right would make itself responsible
for the document going out of this meeting without further change,
and give it to the Vietnamese -- in two weeks.

K: Right.

D: What meeting? Was it military in the sense that they are going to, I mean--

K: No, no, what I mean is we will agree to this document, and we will
get it accepted within two weeks.

D: Yes, this is the point!

K: This is the point.

D: It gives tahem two weeks to visit here, yes?

K: That's right.

D: That was my interpretation because if you use this particular sentence
it doesn't--

K: You've got a good point. I had better straighten that out.

D: Yeah, it is my impression.

K: Right. That's what I meant. Now, what I wanted to add though is this,
Anatol, now if they start dancing around with that--they are already
beginning to unleash propaganda.

D: In what way?

K: Well, that we have put up Thieu to all of this.

D: Well, what Thieu--you couldn't solve them because--you know,
there's a last ditch furor.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 125574
By: W.W. Sumner

2

K: No, I know, that's the tragedy. We had this politic quieted down. But, no, no, they can say about him, but they say we instigated it. Now the point is this, if they come next week, we can get this whole thing done quite easily.

D: Yes,

K: If they now turn it into a contest of strength--

D: Well, ;what kind of contest it would be?

K: Well, you know, they could start screaming for a few more weeks.

D: I don't think so.

K: Then we will have to go back to military action, then everything will be delayed for weeks.

D: Yes, well ¡I understand thispant.

K: Or months!

D: I understand. But it--they--I say two weeks, it will be no harm. I don't have any information at all, but I believe ---

K: If they want to take two weeks, that's fine with us.

D: I understand. No, I think they have to make their minds right now to proceed or whether to--

K: But the more delay there is, the harder it will be for us. We cannot maintain this bombing halt indefinitely if nothing happens.

D: But is is not really a halt, I mean--

K: We've cut it at the 20th parallel.

D: Yeah, I mean this one---

K: But we've cut down the number of sorties also.

D: I understand. I think they do understand, but it's not a question about judging of ______ their minds, it's rather more interested in whether the agreement is signed. I think this is uppermost in their minds and I think we general this is the real issue -

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EO12058
By: MW -Page 50-
October 4

#3

K: What chance would th is agreement be signed. They've had some
opportunity to present some changes which we have---

D: What changes they have opportunity to discuss, but I really would
have thought it would go because in this case I'm sure everything
would be ready, but the situation ______ you have your own allies,
but otherwise I'm sure if you are there then everything will work
right, I think so. If you go there next week---down there--and
I don't feel--by that time it will have a chance to quiet down. What
the difference. I don't understand your argument when you said
you need this week to go to Saigon, yes, there is no point in it.
But what if already we go, so everybody I think will have a
natural---Is the public opinion of your country all right on this
Saigon. There is confusion, and if you go back to Saigon it is
understandable.

K: But it will be considered a conservative stand.

D: I don't think so.

K: In spite of the election.

D: But you will make a statement when you are finished with that --- well this is approaching--but some details should be---no doubt it will take two or three weeks time to be very clear that the North is doing this before the election so you can make it do so rather easily I think. To make some impression on Hanoi say that you come around the 4th, 3rd or 2nd, that is not important really. You say, look here we make good progress in practically everything but if you need talks, I think within 2 or 3 weeks everything will be settled so nobody could accuse you of something because you will say all this should be finished after but not before. I believe it. But in this case you will definitely have in your pocket already a firm agreement with the North---

K: This will happen anyway because if we leave next week, we will have
a firm agreement.

D: Yes, but this is the question of delay. They may want another week--
this is the point because in this---

K: But you see if they come to Paris next week they'll certainly have a
firm agreement in hand, so that meeting and we will certainly stop
the bombing.

D: Well they may decide it this way. If you don't hurry now they could
have this meeting in Paris right after the election from the point of
view we cannot improve really. You could make a little fuss because
they delayed for one week the meeting.

DECLASSIFIED
 authority E10019
 By N.A.iga 1940

4

K: Oh, that's all right.

D: The only think - I really thought of in my mind that everything could be wrapped up before the election.

K: You know there is one advantage for them. If they meet me before the election--they have a firm agreement before the election no matter what happens.

D: Well that's all right but then they've a chance to wait until they know what would be the results of the election (laughter). As of now, they may have some indication but they can see that they are making rather big sacrifice without really waiting the test of the voting so to speak. So they going to make the final before--or they may decide to simply after all only a week why should be to Paris.

K: Refinement---

D: No, no. I'm not saying everything is refined but this could be the way that they think---to delay the talk in Paris until after--I don't know. It is my on way of interpreting the way they think. I know they were thinking about a lot of things.

K: Anatol, I could be tougher after the election.

D: Well, but I think there is not a question about popularity or not popularity because one week's delay is after all not a cause for being more tough.

K: No it's not a cause but it removes a slight pressure on us.

D: Yes, I'm sure they understand this too.

K: So it's up to them. We won't do anything if they want to delay another week.

D: I understand.

K: That's not a big issue.

D: Okay, I will mention it, but they know you already not defied them. Because when Haig mentioned to me on your behalf--he did not--but I make it--I presented it--or about this point that they should be really not to go very far in their public----

K: Did you have a chance to transmit what I gave you already?

D: Not the--I transmitted already what you told me.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012057
By: WW. M. Sze. 00304

K: Right.

D: But what you gave me, I'm just reading.

K: Right. You could fix it that paragraph "C" to make sure that the word is--

D: Well, I will just explain in brackets for them to just understand. Particularly this is a question about agreement--I will make it plain.

K: Okay, thank you.

D: Fine, thank you very much, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E. E. 01-22534
By: M. W. M. 10-14-74

TELCORN

Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 p.m., October 25, 1972

K: Joe, how are you?

A: How are you is what matters.

K: I'm fine.

A: Well, I long to have a moment to chat with you.

K: (laughter)

A: Is that foreseeable?

K: You're too bright, Joe, I won't see you at all.

A: Oh, the hell with you! (laughter) That's the damnest reason to give
for seeing someone and also as phoney as a 3-dollar bill.

K: It's not at all phoney. I can tell your colleagues ________ profound
things which they'll never understand or report literally but you know
what they mean.

A: Well, why don't you try it?

K: (laughter) By that time it's too late.

A: I do long to see you. How about at the end of the day tomorrow?

K: Let me call you. I'll definitely see you in the next few days.

A: The end of the day tomorrow would be heavenly.

K: Good, I'll do my best.

A: And you're not free for lunch tomorrow, are you?

K: I might even be.

A: Why don't we say that, just tentatively.

K: Okay, let's say that tentatively. Where? Anyplace except my office,
even I can't stand the food here.

A: Well, I'm really as you know about 8 minutes from your office.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01-2357
By CNARA Date 01-01-72

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:27 p.m., October 25, 1972

D: Hello. Oh, yes, Henry, hello. I called -- I just received a telegram from Gromyko and he asked me on his behalf -- or rather from his name to discuss with you one point. You mentioned yesterday about this profile of the discussion on this Germany and United Nations.

K: Yes.

D: And he asked you, couldn't you in a few weeks -- how to say -- go fast on the whole declaration to make it a little bit weaker than its --

K: Well, I'll do my best.

D: Because he's even mentioned tomorrow they have about -- you couldn't really ______ for tomorrow?

K: Let me call immediately and see what I can do.

D: Yes, because this is his personal approach to you and he would like --

K: I appreciate it and we will do our best.

D: Yes, but you will notify today whether it's possible or not?

K: I'll call you back within an hour.

D: Within an hour. Oh, thank you very much, Henry.

K: Right.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

TELCOM

4:27 p. m., October 25, 1972

K: Yes.

K: Well, I'll do my best.

K: Right.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

95CLASSIFIED

S5B271003

BANKRUPTCY DEC 5/10/72

TELCORN

Amb. Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

5:00 p.m., October 25, 1972

K: Bill, I'm sorry I wasn't there when you --

S: Well, I gave all the things I wanted to check with you to John Negroponte.

K: What were they?

S: Well, there were two things. One, I wanted to be sure that we were in coordination on some actions the Secretary has taken. He's called Sharp and he's calling in the Canadian Ambassador tomorrow and I'm going to sit in with him and give him a sort of rough outline of the control provisions.

K: Yeah, but keep it -- make sure this is . . .

S: Very rough.

K: Yeah. But why the Ambassador too?

S: All he talked to Sharp -- On the telephone with Sharp, you knew he said he wanted Sharp to know that their name was being mentioned and he wanted him to hear it from us and Sharp said, "I'll fly right down" and he said, "That's not necessary, we'll take it up with your Ambassador."

K: I see. But wouldn't it have been better to talk to Sharp?

S: Well, I think -- Not on the telephone, no?

K: No, no, but have him come down?

S: They've got elections Monday and he thought he might be wanting to use it for some sort of --

K: Oh, I see, I see. Yeah.

S: Another thing is that I've given you a draft over there for a letter to Sue Hodgel (sp?) from . . .

K: Oh, terrific, terrific. Yeah.

S: Now, another thing I wanted your judgment on -- We've been doing a lot of leafeting and dropping of miniature radios and things of that sort . . .

CLASSIFIED

Author's Signature

5/10/72

BRAUNER

*

TELCORN

- 2 -

5:00 p.m., October 25, 1972

K: I would go easy on that.

S: North of the 20th, huh. What I think I'll tell them is they can still use the balloons to drift in, right?

K: Right.

S: And they can launch stuff that floats in from the sea but no air drops.

K: Absolutely.

S: No. Okay.

K: On our side we keep getting, you know, insistent messages that we sign on March 30th.

S: I'm sure.

K: On October 30th, and I finally asked them to explain to me how we can sign a document that begins by saying "with the concurrence of a party that hasn't concurred."

S: You're getting logical again.

K: And we've got the Russians and Chinese in action and we hope we can get everyone quieted down now.

S: I think the general -- I haven't finished reading this long diatribe of tears but the general impact of it on the press is not all that too bad.

K: No, but we got some intelligence that the guy is really off his rocker.

S: So Al Haig told me.

K: You know, I could live with -- If all of this is posturing, it's actually quite true but if --

S: But if he's really thinking the same behind us.

K: But he thinks he's got us face down and that his trick now is to come up with an alternative proposal.

DECLASSIFIED
All but 3012958

BANA DUE 5/1/72

TELCON

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 pm, October 25, 1972

HK: Hello.

DK: Greetings. How are you?

HK: I'm fine.

DK: Thank God. You're getting clobbered all over the place.

HK: (laughter)

DK: How can you take it?

HK: I'll tell you, we'll turn the Vietnamese over to each other.

DK: (laughter) Well, we can pull that off. I think I can ... (laughter) ... Mind if I ask you a couple of questions?

HK: Well, you may not get much of an answer.

DK: That will be nothing new with me either. I realize you're in a bind but you I'm sure appreciate the mass of confusion that's afloat in the world on what the hell is really happening. I suppose, Henry, the most central question is, "Does the Pham Van Dong interview plus all the rumors exaggerate the amount of progress made in the private talks?"

HK: A little bit but they've a slightly wrong emphasis to some of the directions in which we're going.

DK: Can you indicate where the emphasis should be placed?

HK: No, that I can't do but, you know, you can bet that when Pham Van Dong says progress is being made, he sees the right cables.

DK: Um-humm. Is Hanoi really so compromising now on its willingness to have a ceasefire in-place before the model for transition government with Vietcong, Thieu and the third force worked out?

HK: Well, I would go a little easier on that transition government than most of the press is.

DK: Does a ceasefire seem like a realistic expectation, Henry, before the election?

TELCORN

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., October 25, 1972

HK: You know, as I've told you a thousand times, we are not gearing it to the election, we're really not.

DK: I understand you're not gearing it. You're taking it when you can get it.

HK: And when all the proper details are worked out.

DK: Right, right. So just for own sense of timing --

HK: I think it could be before, it could be after. You know, you can say it's
in a timeframe that's foreseeable but I couldn't predict whether it will
be before the election.

DK: Does there have to be another session between you and Tho before this thing can get off the ground?

HK: There's a good chance of it.

DK: Fairly soon you think?

HK: Well, we're still working on that. He's still in Hanoi as far as I know.

DK: But that would be the phasing. The first phase would be the ceasefire,
you know, stop the fighting and then we work out the other details, right?

HK: Well, -- that could be partially the way -- It's a complex problem and so it's not easy to --

DK: Well, it may not be a proper analogy but could it be, Henry, that we're
in a kind of Phase A, Phase B situation where you're dealing with a
number of stages at one time and you permit one stage to take effect
publicly with an understanding, implicit or otherwise, that certain things --

HK: The trouble is, Dave, I'd have to tell you -- you know, since I know what
the facts are --

DK: Yeah.

HK: All I can say is most of you guys are just going way overboard because
you've all been doing it in terms of certain theories by which you thought
it would be done and it may not work that way. But obviously some progress
is being made that permits the various aspects to be handled, political
and the military ones.

BASIC CLASSIFIED BY
~~AUTHOR~~ E012958

~~Signed:~~ B. M. Dae G. H. O. 1972

TELCON

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., October 25, 1972

DK: Aside from the ceasefire, are we talking about some sort of coalition arrangement in South Vietnam?

HK: No, If you stick with what the President has said he would and what he said he wouldn't do, you will not be far wrong.

DK: He would not impose --

HK: Yeah.

DK: ... a coalition government. Can there be some step backwards but still a coalition arrangement which would be acceptable to Thieu?

HK: What's a coalition arrangement?

DK: I don't know, I'm asking. Some organizational structure --

HK: No, not of a governmental function.

DK: Pardon?

HK: Well, I just don't want to ... [change in tapes] ... go into detail. I don't want to go into any of that.

DK: In other words, it could be another body with some powers but not as a government, which gets back to a plan which the President put forth a long time ago, right?

HK: Well, Dave, I just don't want to go into any more.

DK: (laughter)

HK: Because let's let events develop a little bit.

DK: Well, let me ask you this, Henry, would it be fair to say that the first evidence of whatever it is that's going to happen would be a ceasefire?

HK: Well, it could be that way; it could be a comprehensive agreement.

DK: But you're working within a foreseeable timeframe?

HK: Yes. You know, you're dealing with Vietnamese, you know. Specialists at breaking your heart so it's --

DECLASSIFIED
20120585

August 2012

BRA Drie 5/10/04

TELCONE

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., October 25, 1972

- 4 -

DK: I'm going to clip out a picture we ran the other day -- It showed a picture of Henry Kissinger with two South Vietnamese and the caption underneath said, "Henry Kissinger left." (laughter) As if we had to make that distinction.

HK: It's not just -- you know. Any one of them is hard enough but when you've got both of them on your hands simultaneously, you got yourself a gate full of tigers.

DK: Speaking very privately, Henry, just you as an individual guy who has suffered with this problem for so many years, are you very down deeply very much encouraged?

HK: I think we are making real progress. But all of this is deep -- you know, you can't say Administration sources.

DK: No, no, no, no. All right, sir. I understand there's some word out that you might have a briefing in the next day or so, is that possible?

HK: Yeah, yeah, but I won't say a hell of a lot so don't expect any startling relevations.

DK: When do you think you're going to have this tomorrow?

HK: Maybe Friday.

DK: Maybe Friday, not tomorrow.

HK: I doubt it.

DK: Will this be on-the-record?

HK: Yes. But all I would really say is to try to put this thing in perspective.

DK: Well, if I knew what the perspective was.

HK: Well, I won't give you -- I gave you more than I'll give at the briefing.

DK: What perspective would you guide me towards, the President's speech on a given day?

HK: No, I've done my talking, Dave. Don't get impatient.

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger (Wash. Post)/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., October 25, 1972

B: I can't believe it, I tried once and I got you.

K: Well, I just called you back to tell you I won't tell you anything.

B: Nothing at all? I mean, here the Times is so full of interesting tidbits and you won't tell me anything.

K: Well, I sent an anonymous letter, I might as well admit it.

B: (laughter) Oh, is that why you're not going to tell me anything.

K: Yeah, I really did most of it myself.

B: Have you been having fun?

K: Oh, of course. The Vietnamese are a barrel of laughs -- North or South.

B: Yeah, they have always been lots of fun, I noticed that myself. The Max Frankel piece today raised a number of very interesting questions --

K: The thing that is so nice about them is that they don't take themselves seriously.

B: They don't? Well, do you take them seriously?

K: Of course. Marilyn, you are the brightest girl in town and I'm not going to answer any of your bloody questions because you'll get something out of them.

B: Flattery will get you nowhere. Are you going to be meeting with the press at all?

K: I may meet on Friday.

B: You may.

K: I hope you're out of town.

B: Are you planning -- Well, I know you don't tell me whether you're planning to go back -- In other words, you'll be meeting with us before you play on the rest of this sequence that I assume we're still in the middle of?

K: I would think that.

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., October 25, 1972

- 2 -

B: All right. Now do you have any reason to believe that what they're saying in their public statements so far as not decoupling the political and the military is anything but propaganda?

K: That they are not decoupling the political and the military?

B: Yeah. In other words, that they are still -- Madame Binh again today and Hanoi again today are saying that they want to know where they're going politically in order to get the ceasefire.

K: Yeah. Well, you know, everyone is screaming now.

B: I know.

K: They are all -- everyone is posturing himself.

B: Well, and everybody is trying to put pressure on everyone else by what they're saying publicly.

K: That's right.

B: But are there any indications that --

K: Well, I really can't tell you because I know what the facts are so there isn't any sense --

B: Are they reciprocating in fact to our change in bombing pattern over the North?

K: What do you mean?

B: There are reports --

K: No, they're not bombing North of the 20th either.

B: They are not. Oh, come on -- we are not bombing north of the 20th, is that correct?

K: That's what I read in the newspapers.

B: Is that correct though?

K: Well, I don't know.

B: Are they reciprocating in any way?

*

TELCON

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 pm, October 25, 1972

- 3 -

K: On what?

B: Well, are they pulling back any troops? Are they not going to launch a high point or are they fading back into Laos and Cambodia?

K: Well, you know, when you travel around as I have, the Vietnamese want them in Laos and Cambodia and the Laotians and Cambodians want them in Vietnam and we haven't settled that question yet.

B: (laughter) Well, what about -- It seems that when everyone talks about a ceasefire they are getting a little bit confused about over who wants what kind of ceasefire and it looks to me -- and as you know, I've been away from Vietnam a great deal and I've been looking at other things --

K: Yeah, like the New Hampshire campaign.

B: Yeah. Well, look, I can't help it when things fall into my lap.

K: I can't believe that anyone can be that stupid but I suppose --

B: Well, I really wish I had not been in the middle of that, if you really want to know the truth.

K: No, I'm sure; no I am sure of that.

B: And I think you know that that's not the game I play.

K: No, no; my objection to you is not your lack of decency, it's your acumen.

B: Well, let's not change the subject. It's the North Vietnamese are saying they will accept -- they need a ceasefire that will protect their cadres in the South obviously and the way they give their cadres protect in the South is knowing where they are going politically. Thieu seems to be saying that they can have a ceasefire but one, either where the North Vietnamese pull all the way back away from us or one where they can continue -- there are four kinds of ceasefires I see that are possible, none of which are comfortable to the other side.

K: Yeah.

B: And I know you are walking the tightrope between them and trying to figure out who is going to accept what but I don't want to talk -- Look, I have a feeling we're all saying look at November 7th and we shouldn't be looking at November 7th and this is a long process that we're in the

DECLASSIFIED
Date: 01/29/95
By: ANNA DREW GRIFFIN

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 pm, October 25, 1972

- 4 -

B: (cont'd) middle of, is that right or wrong?

K: That is essentially right. You know, we're not looking at November 7th, we really aren't.

B: Well, I should expect at this point you would want to hold off until after
November 7th.

K: That isn't the wiser, you know --

B: Well, not to specifically hold off but not rush.

K: We have no reason to rush.

B: They do though, the North Vietnamese do.

K: Why?

B: Well, everything says to them look if you don't get some kind of ceasefire
before November 7th and if Nixon wins by a landslide, which it looks like
he might, you're going to have to watch out militarily.

K: Yeah.

B: So it might be better to get a commitment toward stopping of the bombing
before that.

K: Yes.

B: Well, what did they have to give to get a stopping of the bombing?

K: Well, that's what we're negotiating.

B: Well, Thieu is saying one thing -- What do the Americans say? As Max
points here, the Americans are the ones that are being silent.

K: Well, we're talking where it matters. I mean, what's the sense of
making public statements? We're making our points to the parties that
can do something about it.

B: Well, do you have any reason to believe though that the North would accept
a ceasefire -- at standstill ceasefire?

5:55 p.m., October 25, 1972

K: Look, I happen to know what the North would accept. The one thing you ought to get into your mind, Marilyn, you live in the world of Dan Davidson and Harriman where people were making an exit thesis of a change in a clause and that's fair enough because that's the way it was but that isn't our world any more. We know pretty exactly what the situation now is.

B: Well, have they changed their tactics? It used to be said that the North Vietnamese never said anything in public that they were not also saying in private.

K: Well, Marilyn, I'm saying no more. I'm just telling you we know exactly what they'll settle for.

B: Well, it seems to me you would not have gone to South Vietnam obviously without knowing what they will settle for and it certainly would not have been done so publicly because you have managed to do things in a more private way if you wanted to.

K: Well, not lately.

B: Well, no, but you could have certainly. There are other means of talking to Thieu. Now, one has to conclude either that you expected Thieu to react the way he did and you don't mind the way he's reacting or that you were surprised by it.

K: Why can't you assume that this was a necessary stage?

B: All right. Well, that's the point that Victor Zoysa says, it was a great success, you did what you had to do and now later on when the time comes you'll be able to make the moves that are necessary.

K: Well, is that implausible?

B: All right, so let's say Thieu is kicking and screaming --

K: Maybe he's not kicking and screaming, maybe he's posturing himself.

B: To get a further peace effort from the North?

K: Maybe that or maybe to be able to claim a victory later on, or God knows why.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EOL7958
Date: 10/26/79
B: NARA DFC 510/1

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., October 25, 1972

- 6 -

B: Oh, then the North replies saying the Americans can't hide behind Thieu's skirts and Thieu is not the real obstacle but the Americans are the obstacle.

K: Well, Marilyn, I am not going into a public debate with the North, certainly not in the Washington Post.

B: Well, you say he's either going to have to get it or to claim a victory later. Oh, in other words, they are ready to accept some of the things --

K: I don't know.

B: . . they've been yelling about. Well, you do know what they are ready to accept?

You know,

K: Maybe, maybe not. I'm just giving you conceivable theories.

B: All right. Is Kraft right so far in saying that you're discussing (1) a ceasefire --

K: Now, listen, Marilyn, stop it -- that's all you're going to get out of me.

B: I haven't gotten anything out of you.

K: Well, by the time you get through figuring it all out -- that's all we're going to say. At what party am I going to see you next?

B: Oh, I don't go to parties, you know that. Unless we get invited to parties.

K: Well, I hope to see you soon.

B: How can you leave me this way? I mean, I still don't know what's happening?

K: That's how I want to leave you.

B: Are the links to the -- all right -- Can you give me a --

K: No, I can give you no more. I just really called you back out of friendship.

B: Well, it's very courteous of you. And you may meet at the press on Friday?

TELCOM

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., October 25, 1972

- 7 -

K: Yeah.

B: To indicate --- can you give me some content to tell Marty because he's out today and I want to give him some vague idea on that.

K: When?

B: Yeah.

K: I haven't decided yet, maybe in the afternoon.

B: And you can't give me any timeframe on when you would expect this kind of settlement that you're working toward which you will not define?

K: No.

B: To be wrapped up.

K: No.

B: Is it correct that they say you met with the President on this subject today?

K: That's true. I am with him on this almost every day.

B: (laughter)

K: Okay.

B: Well, and is the bombing pattern changed? At least one solid thing.

K: I won't say anything more.

B: All right.

K: Marilyn, really -- I knew I couldn't tell you anything but I didn't want you to think that I was ignoring your call.

B: Is it conceivable that we'll get a ceasefire in the North -- an exchange of prisoners, a standstill and nothing else?

K: I just don't want to speculate it but that I would consider improbable. Okay, Marilyn, goodbye.

B: We've got to get --

BCLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 5/1/76
BY order

["TELCOM", "Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger", "6:38 p.m., October 25, 1972", "DK: Henry, I'm sorry but if you could just give me guidance on a story by Barney Gwertzman which the New York Times has moved for tomorrow, the lead of which says that details of the tentative outline of the Indochina settlement now under intensive discussion in Washington, Paris, Hanoi, Saigon and elsewhere have become available today. The main points of the settlement include and then he discusses the ceasefire, the controls, the political structure and the timing.", "HK: Well, I haven't seen it so I can't tell anything.", "DK: Do those areas sound familiar to you?", "HK: Well, look, I just can't go into it.", "DK: Do you know of anyone who has talked to Bernie which would --", "HK: It seems inconceivable to me.", "DK: Well, let me just read the control thing to you. \"Two types of control groups to guarantee the ceasefire in South Vietnam have been discussed --\"", "HK: Well, I just tell you right now I won't confirm anything.", "DK: You couldn't tell us whether to use it or not?", "HK: I can't, no.", "DK: Can I read you one more sentence?", "HK: You can read it but I just want to --", "DK: Let me just read you this section and then see what you can --", "HK: I will say nothing so don't draw any conclusions!", "DK: Okay. \"Two types of control groups to guarantee the ceasefire in South Vietnam have been discussed. The first involving mixed commissions of Vietcong neutralists in the Saigon government would travel around the countryside making inspections. In addition, French and American sources said an international body is being talked about with France, Canada, Poland, Britain and Japan mentioned as possibilities. But above all, the United States and Soviet Union and China would be expected to back the Accords and not provide the type of military equipment that could disrupt the Accords. A major Communist violation such as a fresh", "950100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

TELCONE

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

6:38 p.m., October 25, 1972

DK: (cont'd) invasion could be met by renewed American bombing from carriers or from Thailand Washington sources said.

HK: Well, you know, that's all speculative.

DK: Well, would we look foolish if we played that kind of a ballgame.

HK: Dave, I just can not get into the game where I confirm some and don't confirm others. Any reasonably bright guy is going to be able to come up with some parts that are true, some parts that are false, some parts that are partly true. I just won't go into this game.

DK: Yeah.

HK: I repeat what I told you before -- those who know won't talk and those who talk don't know.

DK: Well, I gather you're saying be cautious.

HK: I'd be cautious.

DK: Okay, thank you. I'm sorry, Henry.

HK: Right.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E017258
Date: October 5, 1972
By: B. Kraslow

*

TELCORN

Amb. Mosbacher/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., October 25, 1972

M: Welcome home, Henry, I don't believe it.

K: (laughter)

M: ______ and I just wanted to remind you that there was a quiet place in the country if you ever do stay in the country long enough to enjoy it.

K: Aren't you sweet.

M: And I know you've got a lot of other things on your mind but but quite seriously, if you were coming up and wanted to relax somewhere quietly we'd love it, you know that.

K: Well, you're terrific. I haven't got any plan right now. I'm here so rarely that I'm frankly not coming up to New York as much as I did. I usually ask Nancy to come down.

M: Right, right.

K: But I'd love to see both of you again.

M: Well, we would love to see you. Actually one of these days when you have a few minutes, I would like to drop by and visit with you in the office, nothing special, just to --

K: I'd love that any time. Really, any time you're free.

M: Well, if you're going to be in perhaps next week or something. If Julie could give me a call one day when it looks like you have 15 minutes or something, I'd run down to do that.

K: We'll do it! Good.

M: And if you can seriously at any time, you know, give us an hour's notice and even if we're not here, the house is here and it's quiet around here.

K: I'd love to do it.

M: Okay. And gee it's great, keep it up whatever it is you're doing.

K: (laughter) I don't know what I'm doing myself.

M: Oh, God, don't tell me that. You're going to scare 208 million Americans out of their mind if you talk like that.

DEC 27 1972 9:00AM

85021003

AUG 27 1972 5:00PM

AM 27 1972 5:00PM

TELCONE

Amb. Mosbacher/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., October 25, 1972

K: Okay.

M: We've got enough problems with some of your friends I'm afraid.

K: That's the truth.

M: (laughter) But I'm sure there are some people who have quietly had a private smile too the last few days.

K: Well, you know, the stupidity is almost worse than the immorality.

M: That's right. That is so precisely correct that you know, it's -- quite a number of people have been trying to head off in a way.

K: That's right. It couldn't happen to a nicer bunch.

M: That's right. Well said.

K: Okay.

M: Henry, if you can anytime give us a holler.

K: Right.

M: Right, thanks, bye, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Aubrey 3017258

B ARA DUE 5/1/72

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012887
By CNARA Date 01-01-87

TELCORN

7:25 p.m., October 25, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you we've given instructions now through
official channels to avoid this dancing around.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: To Hillenbrand to move in this direction.

D: Um-humm.

K: I hope they get there fast enough for tomorrow but you can certainly
count on the fact that we will now energetically move in that direction.

D: Directly by orders from you from White House, yes?

K: From the White House but we gave it through the State Department.

D: Yes, I think it will --

K: It makes it less complicated.

D: Yes. I'm sure Mr. Gromyko will appreciate it.

K: Well, you tell him that this is -- that this has been done. Incidentally,
as far as meeting the Vietnamese is concerned, I don't give a damn if
it's after the election.

D: The meeting what? Oh.

K: You know, you said they may --

D: Yeah, this is what might just --

K: That's up to them.

D: Yeah, I didn't specifically have any information on this particular point
but just tell you, discuss with you several possibilities so --

K: Well, I'm relaxed about that.

D: (laughter) I understand. Now I think we will get certain kind of
'clarification tomorrow, day after tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012357
By LJB NARA DATE 5/1/72

TELCORN

7:25 p. m., October 25, 1972

K: That's what I think.

D: Because they have to make their mind up.

K: Well, I think everyone now of these two lovely Vietnamese parties has to calm down a little bit.

D: Yes, it's quite a party I should say. (laughter) An orchestra is not so easy to conduct.

K: As soon as one of them talks, the other one starts screaming.

D: (laughter) Well, this needs a special kind of a conductor so you will be receiving a new qualification I shall say in your experience.

K: That's right. Except it will only apply to Vietnamese and after this is over, I will never deal with them again.

D: I'm sure you -- in either you are very honest and sincere desire. And I could understand that.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: You tell Gromyko that we are moving energetically in that direction.

D: Okay, thank you very much, Henry. And I am sure he will really appreciate because this is a rare occasion when he asks me directly . . . .

K: No, no, but I . . . .

D: . . . on his behalf to call.

K: No, you can tell him that the orders have been issued.

D: Okay, this is enough.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much, Henry.

K: Right.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

TELCORN

7:25 p. m., October 25, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

D: Yeah, I understand.

D: Um-humm.

D: Yes, I think it will --

D: The meeting what? Oh.

K: That's up to them.

D: (laughter) I understand. Now I think we will get certain kind of
clarification tomorrow, day after tomorrow.

TELCOM

7:25 p. m., October 25, 1972

K: That's what I think.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: You tell Gremyko that we are moving energetically in that direction.

K: No, no, but I . . . .

D: Okay, this is enough.

K: Good.

K: Right.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED
Ambassador E017958
BANK OF AMERICA Due 5/1/74