STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

February 23, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Littauer Center
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I received a call from Tick last week, which was the final thing needed for our meeting on March 4th. I am leaving San Francisco on March 3rd on TWA Flight 46, which arrives in New York at 10:45 P.M., and will be staying at the Plaza Hotel. I have many things to discuss with you and data for your review. Could you let me know where to come first thing the morning of the 4th? (Your secretary called today and told me where to be at 8:30 A.M. on 4 March.)

The plans for the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar are going along rapidly. Happily, your request to be on Monday, April 25, coincides with Brodie's request to be moved from Monday to Friday, the 29th, and I have moved Cannell's "Active Role of Passive Defense" to Thursday to replace your talk on "Power and Diplomacy." Monday now shapes up as follows:

Welcoming Remarks

General Cannon, CG, Sixth Army

Keynote Address

General Alfred M. Gruenther
USA (Ret.)

The United States in a
Changing Historical
Environment

Dr. Walt W. Rostow

Power and Diplomacy

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The Communist Challenge in
the Protracted Conflict

Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe

Albert Wohlstetter and Herman Kahn are also on the program, together with Guy Pauker of the University of California, Martin Travis of

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University

-2-
February 23, 1960

Stanford; Bill Kintner; probably General Trudeau; hopefully Klaus E. Knorr on "The Meaning of the NATO Alliance"; and others. We are still trying to line up the policy speakers as I discussed with you over the phone.

As Bill Kintner undoubtedly told you, the Institute is preparing
the Course material and the military are the actual sponsors and
will have charge of financial arrangements. However, they have
empowered us to offer to all speakers round trip first class airline
transportation; complete accommodations while at Asilomar; and a
modest honorarium.

Since I will be seeing you on March 4, I will discuss the entire
Course at greater length with you.

I am looking forward to seeing you.

RBF: cmf

February 25, 1960

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
The Governor of New York
Albany, New York

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

On the last week of April 1960 the commanders of the U.S. western military forces are sponsoring a National Strategy Seminar to be held at Asilomar Conference Grounds, Pacific Grove, California. The enclosed announcement gives the background of the Seminar together with the preliminary program for the week of April 25.

We recognize that you have an extremely busy schedule, but we would like to invite you to come to Asilomar to give the evening address on Thursday, April 28: "Power and Policy Problems in the Defense of the West." Perhaps you would like to modify the topic somewhat; any related subject would be appropriate. Lt. Gen. Cannon, Commanding General of the Sixth U.S. Army, extends with me this invitation.

Those professional speakers who have already accepted include Dr. Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter of The RAND Corporation; Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard; Robert Strauss-Hupe and William R. Kintner of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania; Walter Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and others who are professionally competent in the various fields that contribute to the formulation of national strategy. General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret.), has agreed to give the keynote address on April 25.

We would be honored indeed to have you participate in the National Strategy Seminar.

EFC:ds
Enclosure

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

DIVISION OF ECONOMICS RESEARCH

February 29, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center of International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Confirming our telephone conversation of this morning, I am writing
you some background information for March 4. First of all, the
Central War Briefing was first put together in January 1959. It
was the first of the studies that examine the implications of
ballistic missile warfare and the broad technique of calculating
such a war. It followed a series of studies, among which was
The Lead-Time Race of 1958 which was put together for the Presi-
dent's Committee on the Reorganization of the Department of Defense
specifically at the request of Nelson Rockefeller. The Lead-Time
Race was briefed to a large number of organizations and to Mr.
Rockefeller three times.

General Bonesteel, under the direction of Generals Lemnitzer
and Taylor decided in December 1958 that ballistic missile calcu-
lations we had under way at that time should be completed earlier
than planned because Wohlstetter's article, "The Delicate Balance
of Terror", was being reviewed by General Taylor and his staff in
galley proof.

Following the completion of the study and its back-up (which is
very lengthy - about 30 hours of briefing material) and a series
of briefings to the General Staff Council, General Taylor directed
through General Bonesteel three actions:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

February 29, 1960

1. That a special study group be formed to examine the validity of the study and its implications for future strategy;

2. That a complete staffing job be done on the study and that all calculations and assumptions be thoroughly checked out; and

3. That the presentation be given to all of the major military commands and the military services and executive departments involved in the problems presented by the study, and that these groups critique the analysis.

As a result of the last directive, the Central War Briefing was given about 130 times between February 4, 1959 and January 16, 1960. Among the groups and individuals briefed were the following: the Army General Staff Council; the Army Policy Council; General White, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Le May; General Twining and his staff; the JCS Joint Planning Staff; Admiral Burke; the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Navy Pentagon Staff; the Air Staff Council; General Power and the SAC Headquarters Command; General Partridge and the NORAD Headquarters Command; RAND; ORO; OEG; CIA; the Board of National Intelligence Estimates; Mr. Gates (on his first day as Secretary of Defense); Bureau of the Budget (twice); members of the White House Staff; including General Goodpaster and others; the U.S. elements of SHAPE (General Norstadt was unable to attend so the meeting was chaired by General Van Schuyler, Norstadt's Chief of Staff - he is now with Governor Rockefeller); Headquarters, USAREUR, at Heidelberg, including General Eddelman; Headquarters, USAFE, including General Smith of USAF; Headquarters, EUCOM, including General Palmer and Admiral Bruton; OCDM; OCDM Program Advisory Committee; the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council; Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army; Dr. Herbert York of DD R&E and his staff; ARPA; Mr. Frederick M. Eaton, the President's Chief Disarmament Negotiator; and others.

In May and June of 1959 I spent several weeks working with Generals Bonesteel and Taylor in developing a study of the proposed alternate national strategies which were then emerging in JCS and other papers. Much of this is in the Five Strategies paper on which I briefed you. Also, I developed a study entitled: "Trends in General Nuclear War" for General Taylor. Much of the results of these latter two studies were presented in unclassified form in General Taylor's book, "The Uncertain Trumpet".

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

-3-

February 29, 1960

We have since completed a study of Soviet ballistic missile war in Europe. I will describe some of the results of this study also. Working with members of the RAND Corporation, as well as with Dalimal Kybal, consultant to the State Department under the Coolidge Committee, we have developed some of the problems inherent in disarmament and arms control as they affect the U.S. deterrent posture and negotiating position.

Much of the value of the work to date has resulted from combining under a single research program the passive and civil defense work for OCDM and the studies of military defense sponsored by Department of the Army and other agencies of the Department of Defense. We have worked closely with Mr. Herman Kahn of the RAND Corporation in the development of his concepts of "The Military Implications of Nonmilitary Defense". Much of the defense study work for the Army has been directed toward examining the interaction and trade-off between military and nonmilitary defense measures. Some of this active-passive defense trade-off analysis and a broad strategic analysis of the 1965-1970 period were incorporated in the so-called "Oberbeck Study" dated 1 October 1959 in which the Army stated (as a position) that there was a military strategic requirement for fallout shelters and other civil defense measures of equal priority to ballistic missile defense. (This is in addition to the "quick fix" fallout shelter program advocated by General Taylor in his book.)

Please treat all of the above information in confidence. It is for your use.

I have changed my reservation so as to arrive in New York about 5:00 o'clcok, Thursday, March 3, and will be at the Plaza Hotel awaiting you.

I am also most grateful to you for your acceptance of the speaking engagement at the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar. Please let me know the time of your arrival on Sunday so that we may pick you up at the airport. Mr. Carter, President of SRI, and Lt. General Cannon, Commanding General, Sixth Army, also asked me to extend their appreciation for your acceptance.

RBF:mnk

R. B. FOSTER ITINERARY - March 3-18, 1960

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Thursday, March 3</td>
      <td>Leave SFO for NYC at 8:30 am on UA 800. Arrive New York City 4:30 pm, stay at Plaza Hotel.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Friday, March 4</td>
      <td>New York City. Meeting with Kissinger, 8:30 am.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Saturday, March 5</td>
      <td>New York City. (Possibility of meeting with Kintner and Felker.) Leave for Washington, DC., stay at Dupont-Plaza.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sunday, March 6</td>
      <td>Washington. Work on ORD-710 presentation.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Monday, March 7</td>
      <td>Meet: Harker, White, Wiley, Christman, Hopkins(?), and Hoeber at SRI WDC office 8:30 am for ORD-710 briefing; then to Pentagon, Dr. Colin Hudson, Room 2E375 (X 78389) at 9:30 am. Briefings at Pentagon to be arranged by Dr. Hudson starting at 10:00 am.<br/>Evening: Meeting with Kintner on Seminar.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Tuesday, March 8</td>
      <td>Briefings at Pentagon. Meeting with General Bonesteel.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Wednesday, March 9</td>
      <td>Team under White and Harker's direction continue checkout of data at Pentagon. Foster joins Carter for meeting with General Bonesteel and others on Seminar.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Thursday, March 10</td>
      <td>Foster and Carter on Seminar.<br/>Evening: Foster (and others) to Huntsville. Appointment being arranged by Hudson and Snipes of ARGMA.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Friday, March 11</td>
      <td>Foster to brief General Schomberg at AOMC. Athans, Rogers and others may join.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Saturday, March 12</td>
      <td>Foster returns to Washington. Work on ORD-710 and Seminar.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sunday, March 13</td>
      <td>Washington. Foster on Seminar.<br/>Evening: Leave for NYC (tentative).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Monday, March 14</td>
      <td>Foster in New York City with Kintner (tentative) to meet with Felker of Esquire and others on SRI Journal. Five Strategies(U), Leadtime Race(U), and Seminar. Perhaps on to FPRI.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Tuesday, March 15</td>
      <td>Foster in New York City with Barnett (call at Richardson Foundation) for Town Hall talk on Journal, Leadtime Race and related topics (U), from 5:00 pm to 7:00 pm.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Wednesday, March 16</td>
      <td>AM. Foster to Chicago to brief Institute for Air Warfar Research at U. of Chicago on Central War(S). See Mr. Wester there.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

March 7, 1960

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Dick Foster told me to send you the two enclosures immediately:

A. Our invitation letter of February 25 to Governor Rockefeller to address the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar.

B. The reply from Governor Rockefeller's appointment secretary.

Dick and I regret that we failed to send you a copy of the original invitation when it first went out. Had you received it, it might have received somewhat different consideration.

At any rate, I am wondering whether in the light of the meeting you and Dick had last Friday you could get the Governor to reconsider our invitation. If you can, we will be most grateful and the Seminar will benefit tremendously.

WJP:ds

Encls.

cc: R. B. Foster

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

March 4, 1960

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Enclosed are two copies of the letter of invitation to Governor
Rockefeller to address the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar.

Mr. Foster asked that we send these copies to you for the Governor.

(ETL)

Enclosures (2)

COPY

[LC]

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

February 25, 1960

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

Those professional speakers who have already accepted include Dr. Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter of The RAND Corporation; Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard; Robert Strausz-Hupe and William R. Kintner of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania; Walt W. Rostow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and others who are professionally competent in the various fields that contribute to the formulation of national strategy. General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret.) has agreed to give the keynote address on April 25.

EFC:ds

Enclosure

COPY

Enclosure
EM:qa

COPY

President
R. Miley Carter

\a/

Verh trujh homa,

Strategy Seminar.

Give the keynote address on April 28.

**Strategy.** General Vitfred M. Gruenther, USA (Ret.) has agreed to in the various fields that contribute to the formulation of national institute of Technology; and others who are professionally competent the University of Pennsylvania; Walt W. Rosnow of the Massachusetts and William R. Kintner of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of RAND Corporation; Henry V. Klaarner of Harvard; Kopert Straner-Bebe Dr. Bernard Brodie, Herman Karp, and Vipert Mopfetter of The Those professionals abusers who have strictly accepted include

inattention.

Commanding General of the Sixth U.S. Army, extends with me due
somewhat; and related subject would be appropriate. Lt. Gen. Cannon,
Defense of the West.". Permits you would like to modify the table
squadron on Thursday, April 28: "Power and Policy Problems in the
world like to invite you to come to Vatikan to give the evening
We recognize that you have an extremely busy schedule, put me
together with the preliminary program for the week of April 28.
The enclosed announcement gives the background of the Seminar
held at Vatikan Conference Gromma, Pacific Grove, California.
Military forces are abounding a National Strategy Seminar to be
On the last week of April 1980 the commanders of the U.S. western

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

Vipary, New York
The Governor of New York
The Honorspe Melon V. Rockefeller

February 22, 1980

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

COPY

## The Asilomar Conference Grounds...

Asilomar overlooks Monterey Bay on the Pacific Ocean. The conference grounds are owned by the California State Division of Beaches and Parks and are operated by the Asilomar Foundation. Lodges, dormitories, a dining hall, recreation and conference facilities are all in one integrated, informal setting.

Accommodations at the Asilomar conference grounds will be available only for invited participants.

## PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

A partial list of the organizations that will participate includes:

* The Institute for American Strategy

* The Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania

* The Richardson Foundation

* The World Affairs Council of Northern California

* Reserve Officers Association

* American Ordnance Association

* Association of the United States Army

* The Navy League

* Air Force Association

## ADVISORY COMMITTEE

LT. GENERAL R. M. CANNON
Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army

VICE ADMIRAL M. E. CURTS
Commander, Western Sea Frontier

MAJ. GENERAL S. SMITH
Commanding General, Fourth Air Force

E. FINLEY CARTER
President, Stanford Research Institute

## PROGRAM
COORDINATING COMMITTEE

COL. ERNEST VON PAWEL (Chairman)
Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army

LT. CDR. DOROTHY J. JOYCE
Western Sea Frontier

CAPTAIN EMMET D. FENTON
Headquarters, Fourth Air Force

## SEMINAR COURSE COMMITTEE

RICHARD B. FOSTER (Chairman)
Stanford Research Institute

WILLIAM R. KINTNER, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Univ. of Pennsylvania

F. G. A. KRAEMER, Consultant

From Stanford Research Institute:

WILLIAM J. PLATT

ROGERS S. CANNELL

DAVID C. FULTON

RICHARD H. RAYMOND

MARIA N. KINGSTON (Secretary)

## SPEAKERS

Approximately twenty speakers and twenty five discussion leaders will take part in the program, including recognized authorities in course subjects; men prominent in public policy matters; and military leaders.

Announcing

# ASILOMAR
NATIONAL STRATEGY
SEMINAR

Sponsored by Sixth U.S. Army
with the participation of the Western
Sea Frontier (USN) and Fourth Air Force

Course prepared by
Stanford Research Institute

April 24-30, 1960
ASILOMAR CONFERENCE GROUNDS

MONTEREY PENINSULA
CALIFORNIA

...To study and discuss elements of a national strategy appropriate to the spectrum of conflict between the free world and the communist bloc during the 1960's, with emphasis on military and economic factors.

## BACKGROUND

In 1959 the National War College conducted a National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers. The seminar, authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was sponsored by the Institute for American Strategy and the Reserve Officers Association of the United States. The course was prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania.

This year, because of the interest aroused by the 1959 seminar, Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army, in cooperation with the Commander of the Western Sea Frontier and the Commanding General, Fourth U.S. Air Force, is sponsoring a National Strategy Seminar to be held from April 24 to 30.

Stanford Research Institute, in cooperation with other professional organizations, is preparing the course material.

## PURPOSE

The seminar is designed to bring together members of the Reserve Forces, the Armed Services, and civilian leaders so that they may examine critical phases of the conflict between the free world and the communist bloc and, through discussion, foster a broad public comprehension of the problems of national strategy.

## PARTICIPANTS

Invitations are being extended to selected Active and Reserve Forces personnel of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force, and selected civilian leaders.

## PRELIMINARY PROGRAM

/ Asilomar National Strategy Seminar

There will be three or four formal presentations each day. All participants will also meet daily in small groups, led by assistant course directors, to discuss subjects of the day. Reading materials pertaining to the course themes will be mailed in advance to persons registering. All sessions will be unclassified and off-the-record.

### Sunday evening, April 24

Registration, Asilomar

### Monday, April 25

#### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Welcoming and keynote addresses

**PAPERS FOR DISCUSSION:**

* The United States in a Changing Historical Environment

* Trends in Balance of Power since World War II

* The Communist Challenge in the Protracted Conflict

  * Discussion group assignments

  * Evening Reception

### Tuesday, April 26

#### SOME BASIC STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

**PAPERS FOR DISCUSSION:**

* Comparative Economic Potential of U.S. and U.S.S.R.

* Implications of the Explosion of Technology

* U.S. Organization for National Security

* Roles of the Scientist and of the Policy Maker in Formulating National Strategy

**Evening Address:** Strategic Objectives and Power of the Communist Bloc

### Wednesday, April 27

#### MILITARY FORCES AS INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POLICY

**PAPERS FOR DISCUSSION:**

* Nature and Feasibility of Thermonuclear War and Deterrence

* Nature and Characteristics of Limited War Security, Arms Control, and Deterrence

### Thursday, April 28

#### BUILDING BLOCKS OF ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL STRATEGIES

**PAPERS FOR DISCUSSION:**

* The Meaning of the NATO Alliance
* Alternative U.S. Military Strategies for the 1960's

* Power and Diplomacy

**Evening Address:** Power and Policy Problems in the Defense of the West

### Friday, April 29

#### ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL MILITARY PROGRAMS AS A PART OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

**PAPERS FOR DISCUSSION:**

* Active Role of Passive Defense
* Implications of Minimum Deterrence

**Panel Discussion on Elements of National Military Strategies and the Supporting Programs**

Evening Reception

### Saturday, April 30

**FINAL SUMMARY SESSION**

**Discussion Groups:** The Role of the Citizen in National Security

**Consensus of Discussion Groups**

**Graduation Luncheon Address:** Power and Law

[LC]

GUEST LIST

Dinner for Richard Foster, March 14, 1960

Clay Felker, Features Editor, Esquire Magazine (Host)

James Shepley, Chief of Correspondents, Time & Life

Osborne Elliott, Managing Editor, Newsweek

Irving Gitlin, Director of Special Projects, CBS Television Network

* Richard Rovere, Political correspondent, New Yorker

Russell Lynes, Managing Editor, Harper's Magazine

Donald Newhouse, Publisher, Jersey Journal, Director Newhouse Newspapers

Charles Byrne, Chairman, Berkeley Publishing Corp.

Joe Kraft, Correspondent, free-lance writer for Esquire, Harper's Saturday Evening Post, Reporter

Enno Hobbing, Assistant National Affairs Editor, Life Magazine (now on leave of absence as speech writer for Nelson Rockefeller)

William Vanden Heuvel, Lawyer, candidate for Congress in New York's 17th District, Democrat, partner in law firm of Senator Jacob Javits

Burton Glinn, Vice President, Magnum Photographic Agency

* Frank Barnett, Director, Richardson Foundation

Dick Witkin, New York Times

Tom Lanphier

* Invited but unable to attend

Tom Landbier

Dick Withers, New York Times

Burton Grinn, Vice President, Magnum Photographic Agency

Jaeop Jisits

District, Democrat, partner in law firm of Senator
William Lunden Hensley, lawyer, candidate for Congress in New York's 11th

of attendance as each writer for New York Rockefeller)

Ema Hopping, Assistant National Affairs Editor, Little Magazine (now on leave)

Evening Post, Reporter

Joe Kraft, Correspondent, free-fame writer for Endure, Harber's Saturday

Charles Brint, Chairman, Berkeley Publishing Corp.

Dorothy Meade, Publisher, Teray Tomi, Director, Meade's Newsagents

Hansel R. Pines, Managing Editor, Harber's Magazine

* Richard Roere, Political correspondent, New Yorker

Irving Griffin, Director of Special Projects, CBS Television Network

James Sibley, Chief of Correspondents, Time & Title

Clay Reifer, Features Editor, Endure Magazine (now)

Dinner for Richard Rosten, March 14, 1980

GUEST LIST

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

March 18, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center of International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Mr. Richard Foster has notified the Course Committee of your acceptance of his invitation to speak on the subject of "Power and Diplomacy" Monday, April 25, at the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar. The Course Committee is delighted that you are able to accept this invitation. Enclosed is a copy of the latest revised list of speakers and panelists.

The Course Committee plans to prepare a Roster and Course Syllabus which would include a short biographical sketch of each speaker and a brief summary or abstract of the talk he plans to deliver. We would appreciate it if you would be kind enough to send us as soon as possible (attention of the undersigned) a brief biography and an abstract or brief of the talk you plan to deliver. Would you also please indicate whether you will require visual aids, such as a slide projector, etc. The Sixth Army would like to make arrangements to have all necessary equipment available. Would you also please send us a copy of the complete talk as soon as it is prepared. It is planned to make copies of each speech available to the participants, and we are certain there will be a great demand for copies from other sources.

Would you also be good enough to recommend books, reports, etc. which you think should be included in the bibliography which will be distributed to the participants at the Seminar.

The Sixth Army has requested that we notify them as soon as possible of your expected point of departure so they may make suitable arrangements for your transportation. Would you please include this information when you send us your biography and abstract.

March 21, 1960

Mr. Richard Foster
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, California

Dear Dick:

After looking over my calendar I have come to the
very painful conclusion that I must not attend your con-
ference, much as I would like to. I know you will be
disappointed, but I am operating now at the very limit
of my physical capacity, and it would be foolhardy for
me to strain it. I will be traveling constantly from
March 31st to April 13th, and, in addition, I must get
a book to the publishers by May 15th. I will have to
rewrite 500 pages within the space of four weeks to make
the deadline. This plus the pressures I find myself
under in New York would make it extremely unwise for
me to take out even two days from my schedule.

Even though I must regretfully withdraw my accep-
tance, I want you to know that I consider you to have
a claim on my services on some other occasion, as soon
as my life becomes a little less hectic.

With warm regards.

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

March 24, 1960

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

You were right. I was indeed disappointed to receive your letter of March 21. Not only will we miss you as a speaker, but a number of us were looking forward to seeing you in a somewhat relaxed social atmosphere Sunday evening at Asilomar; among these being my wife, Penny. However, I fully understand your problem; a great many of us find ourselves in the same time bind.

I very much appreciated your note and that of the Governor's. A copy of his note is enclosed. It was indeed a high privilege to meet with you both on that rather hectic Friday.

I am currently not only trying to wrap up the Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, but in addition I am preparing a summary of the NATO study that I mentioned to you. Following my meeting with you in New York I briefed it very widely around the Pentagon for evaluation, and they have asked that it be summarized for a one-hour presentation for the General Staff Council during the week of April 11. I am sure you will find it a most interesting study, considering your understanding of the NATO situation. Perhaps when time permits you might contact either Bill Kintner or General Bonesteel, as I would welcome your eventual critique of this one.

I also had a very interesting meeting at Clay Felker's apartment. A number of the members of the "mass communications industry" were present, namely, Osborne Elliott, the Managing Editor of Newsweek, and James Shepley, Chief of Correspondents, Time & Life. Others present are shown on the attached list of guests (note Enno Hobbing's attendance). They were extremely interested in the unclassified background discussion of the strategic framework for

[L]

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University

-2-
March 24, 1960

deterrence and to a man they seized on the role of civil defense
in a posture of deterrence, as well as in terms of Herman Kahn's
thesis on the importance of nonmilitary defense measures for war.
Some of them were very outspoken about the reason for their
interest--most of them seemed to be either doubtful or cynical
about the New York State civil defense plan. They all took
copious notes on the whole discussion concerning the role of civil
defense in the total strategy. I pointed out there was a very thin
dividing line between mutual annihilation and nuclear war--particu-
larly in the role of fallout protection for both civil and military
populations.

As a follow-up on this we received a visit from the West Coast
correspondent for Newsweek--a Mr. Jim Flynn. Apparently Osborne
Elliott sent him a wire asking that he see me on my return to find
out what the SRI competence was in this field, and also to find
out what the SRI shelter program amounted to. I took him through
a brief explanation of strategic framework which points up the
military requirements for fallout shelter. Then Rogers Cannell
went through the elements of a relatively low cost civil defense
program that had a very high payoff. Mr. Flynn spent several hours
with us and took a large number of pictures, including pictures of
the SRI basement fallout shelter with its food supply, independent
water supply, etc.

I am sending you a copy of Rogers Cannell's survival booklet
"LIVE: Three Plans for Survival in a Nuclear Attack." This was
released on March 14 and there has been a great deal of local
interest and press coverage. City planners and others have asked
Rogers Cannell to assist in community fallout shelter programs.
Mr. Cannell spent last Monday in Sacramento with Governor Brown's
civil defense planners. Cannell has been studying the kinds of
things that could be done to provide fallout shelter at "no cost."
In this vein a preliminary study was made of the feasibility of
combining surface freeways with underground rapid transit lines
to provide "free" fallout shelter for civilian population. Com-
bining the two actually reduces the cost over both constructed
separately. I am sending a copy of his proposal to Governor
Brown.

February 24, 1961

Mr. William J. Platt, Director
Management Sciences Division
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, California

Dear Bill:

This is just a note to tell you
how much I appreciate your thoughtful comment on
the CBS program.

I do wish all of us on the panel
had been able to get away more from platitudes and
discuss some of the real issues which confront us.

All my best wishes.

May 12, 1961

Dear Henry:

Attached is a Draft of:

"U.S. Unilateral Arms Control Measures
and the Setting for Negotiations"
by Richard B. Foster

It is planned to prepare a final version of this paper for submission by 26 May. Accordingly I would very much appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have toward its improvement. I would be grateful if I could get them by 16 May.

The major purpose of this draft is to describe a framework and setting in which rational arms control negotiations might take place. It is my intention to expand the discussion of the unilateral measures which the U.S. might take in the subsequent revision. Your suggestions with respect to such measures would be particularly useful.

Comments should be forwarded to me or Mr. Rudolph Brunsvold at:
Stanford Research Institute (Washington, D.C. Office)
711 - 14th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Or by phone at: EX 3-7588

At the present time the distribution of this draft is being limited to a few people with particular interest and competence in the problem. I would appreciate it if you would limit the distribution of this copy to yourself and those in your office immediately concerned.

Richard B. Foster

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

December 11, 1961

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Sir:

You are cordially invited to attend a seminar on unconventional warfare, which Stanford Research Institute is holding at Menlo Park on January 4 and 5, 1962.

The panel members will be the contributors to a special issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science which is to be devoted to the subject of unconventional warfare. It will be published next spring under the editorship of Dr. Janusz Zawodny.

The agenda for the two days is enclosed. There will be three half-day sessions with three presentations and a discussion period in each session. The afternoon of the second day will be reserved for general discussion. Some portion of each discussion period will be open to audience participation.

We would be happy to have other people from your organization attend this seminar. Extra sets of invitations are enclosed, and more probably can be made available upon your request.

If you can attend, would you kindly return the enclosed postcard to us as soon as possible?

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION

15 March 1962

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Along with sincere thanks for the interest which you expressed in my research on armament/disarmament problems when I visited you two weeks ago, I am sending some promised material that will help to explain the background for my project and how it fits into the overall Studies in International Conflict and Integration.

The questions that I raised with you were based on two papers which I shall elaborate for my dissertation. Briefly, I shall use the verbatim records of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament to study the perceptions each side seems to have of its own policies as well as those of its opposition, as filtered by its own world view. I hope to elaborate findings obtained from this step in the research, by taking examples from diplomatic records as far back as the League of Nations negotiations for disarmament in order to show the importance of "what the opposition thinks". Finally, I hope to show how the Russians are now organizing their approach in the light of the importance of psychological principles, in the manner suggested in my two papers. I do not suggest that Soviet leaders have planned atmospheric tests solely for psychological outcomes, but rather, that this is one important aspect of their plans. A pattern does seem to emerge if one studies the analogy between Russian psychological theories and experiments and Soviet international activities, yet I am sure that military considerations and relations with the People's Republic of China or West Germany figure prominently into their planning.

As you stated, the problem ultimately concerns the Soviet hope for a Marxist-Leninist outcome based on demoralization of Western societies. In this connection, my colleague, Mr. David E. Clarke, is working on an aspect of the problem. He is dealing with the relation between affect laden symbols and personality traits. I expect him to turn up much new information concerning how individuals react to certain policies, the role of emotions (especially anxiety) in pushing them into so-called left or right camps of persuasion, and what may prompt changes in their positions or lead them to support or commit aggressive acts. His work and mine meets in joint research on the dynamics of semantic systems.

I consult you mainly because of the concern which you have expressed
in *The Necessity for Choice*. If my papers suggest one way to describe
the armament/disarmament problem, how can we deal with the system to our
advantage? I have only briefly dealt with this aspect, but I am sending
along a second draft research proposal by Professor Robert C. North
which is directed precisely to this problem. This draft is being revised
and I shall forward a copy to you, to complete the description of our
work.

Thank you again for your comments and for any advice you may care
to offer in the future.

cc: R. C. North
Enc. 5

Dr. Kissinger

Page 2

I know that the granting of an interview will mean a sacrifice of time from your work, but I believe the research can offer in return information that will be useful to authors such as yourself as well as to federal policy planners.

If you are willing to be interviewed, I hope you will be able to indicate times and places that would be convenient in terms of your schedule. I shall be looking forward to hearing from you.

July 20, 1962

Miss Kathleen Archibald
International Studies, Conflict and Integration
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Dear Miss Archibald:

Thank you for your letter of July 17.
I wish that it were possible for me to agree
to an interview with you but, unhappily, I
will be out of the country during the entire
time of your visit to the East.

Henry V. Klaasberg

Sincerely yours,

time of your visit to the East.
will be out of the country during the entire
to an interview with you put, unsatisfably, I
I wish that it were possible for me to agree
Thank you for your letter of July 17.

Dear Miss Archibald:

Stanford, California
Stanford University
International Studies, Conflict and Integration
Miss Kathleen Archibald

July 30, 1963

STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE

MENLO PARK, CALIFORNIA

July 26, 1962

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

A world of nations without arms has been considered by many the ultimate aim of man's prolonged search for peace. But few of us have taken the trouble to examine what the world would be like if we should attain "general and complete disarmament" without settling the issues that divide the world.

Four staff members of Stanford Research Institute--each experienced in the study of related problems--have taken an imaginary leap into the world of nations without arms. They record their observations in the attached issue of the SRI Journal. The picture they present is neither rosy nor hopeless; it does illuminate a variety of problems that must be solved if a disarmed world is also to be a peaceful and prosperous one.

We think this picture of nations without arms will interest you. You may agree with the authors or you may disagree. Either way, we would greatly value your comments and your suggestions, particularly regarding the direction of future studies that may lead to solutions of the problems involved.

CAPTAIN CARL HENRY AMME JR., U.S.N. RET.

550 WHISKEY HILL ROAD
WOODSIDE, CALIFORNIA

April 23, 1963

The Reporter Magazine
660 Madison Ave.
New York 21, N. Y.

To the Editor:

Malcolm Hoag's letter (April 25) criticizing Henry Kissinger's article on NATO's Nuclear Dilemma brings into focus the cause of much muddled thinking, + the tendency to think of deterrence in terms of the actual use of nuclear forces.

When Mr. Hoag transposes the deterrent effect of France's force de frappe into a hypothetical strike against Moscow "either before the defense of Europe requires a general strike at the Soviet Union or before that strike has to degenerate into city attacks", he pinpoints the very circumstances De Gaulle fears. Who decides when "the defense of Europe requires a general strike"? The President of the United States? Who makes the decision when the strike "has to degenerate into city attacks", or is this decision a de facto by-product of inaccurate counterforce attacks against Soviet military bases?

The potential deterrent value even of an inferior force such as France's Mirage IV certainly weighs in the calculations of the Kremlin and it is just an added disincentive to Soviet aggressive intentions. This is the nature of deterrence and it is not invalidated because Russia has so many more bombs that can be dropped on France.

Mr. Hoag goes on to state that "France, unlike America, spurns allied political guidelines". Since when has the U.S. Strategic Air Command been subject to allied political guidelines? It is not allied political guidelines that De Gaulle spurns, it is the American veto.

I'm convinced that an acceptable solution to the NATO nuclear dilemma will be arrived at, but I am equally convinced that it will not be achieved by opposing France's decision to have what Britain, the United States and the Soviets now have, an independent nuclear deterrent force. We should remember that De Gaulle has offered France's "cooperation, either technical or strategic if that is on the other hand desired by our allies". Perhaps if we explored a little more ways of achieving this cooperation, we would be closer to a solution.

[LC]

April 23, 1963

To the Editor:

Malcolm Hoag's letter (April 25) criticizing Henry Kissinger's article on NATO's Nuclear Dilemma brings into focus the cause of much muddled thinking, - the tendency to think of deterrence in terms of the actual use of nuclear forces.

When Mr. Hoag transposes the deterrent effect of France's
**force de frappe** into a hypothetical strike against Moscow "either
before the defense of Europe requires a general strike at the Soviet
Union or before that strike has to degenerate into city attacks", he
pinpoints the very circumstances De Gaulle fears. Who decides when
"the defense of Europe requires a general strike"? The President of
the United States? Who makes the decision when the strike "has to
degenerate into city attacks", or is this decision a de facto by-
product of inaccurate counterforce attacks against Soviet military
bases?

Carl H. Amme, Jr.

Carl H. Vumme, Jr.

to a solution.

little more ways of achieving this cooperation, we would be closer
the other hand desired by our allies". Perhaps if we explored a
France's "cooperation" either technical or strategic it that is on
deterrent force. We should remember that De Gaulle has offered
the United States and the Soviets now have, an independent nuclear
not be achieved by obfuscating France's decision to have what Britain,
dilemma will be arrived at, but I am equally convinced that it will
I'm convinced that an acceptable solution to the NATO nuclear
veto.

sified political guidelines that De Gaulle abnons, it is the American
Command been subject to allied political guidelines? It is not
sified political guidelines." Since when has the U.S. strategic Air
France's Air Force IVA certainly weighs in the calculations of the

Mr. Hosk goes on to state that "France, unlike America, abnons

because Rnais has so many more poms that can be drobbed on France.
intensions. This is the nature of deterrence and it is not invalidated
Kremlin and it is just an added disincentive to Soviet aggressive

cases?
product of inaccurate counterforce attacks against Soviet military
degenerate into city attacks", or is this declaration a de facto dy-
the United States? Who makes the declaration when the strike "has to
"the defense of Europe requires a general strike"? The President of
binpoints the very circumstances De Gaulle fears. Who decides when
Union or before that strike has to degenerate into city attacks", he
before the defense of Europe requires a general strike at the Soviet
force de force into a hypothetical strike against Moscow "either
When Mr. Hosk transcribes the deterrent effect of France's

terrace of the actual use of nuclear forces.
much muddied thinking, - the tendency to think of deterrence in
article on NATO's Nuclear Dilemma brings into focus the cause of
Mufconm Hosk's letter (April 22) criticizing Henry Kissinger's

To the Editor:

New York 31, N. Y.
660 Madison Ave.
The Reporter Magazine

April 23, 1963