[LC]

# Foreword by the Overall Panel

The Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. is an attempt to assess major problems and opportunities which are likely to confront America over the next ten years.

As the twentieth century nears the end of its sixth decade, America faces a world in swift and often turbulent change. Both within our borders and beyond, enormous transformations—in human aspirations, in the structure of society, in economic development, in scientific knowledge—are reshaping the pattern of existence at a speed without parallel in history. The recurrent shock of our age is the discovery that concepts and patterns of action of a more secure past no longer fit the present reality.

We live in a period which insists continually on choices being made. But choice without purpose leads to paralysis or to fitful and erratic behavior. And power without a sense of direction may drain life of meaning if it does not destroy humanity altogether. Our problems, therefore, require for their solution not only great effort and skill, but even more importantly steadfast conviction. And our opportunities will reflect above all the boldness and vision with which we face the future.

This report on international security is the work of Panel II, one of seven panels. Others deal with United States international objectives, foreign economic policy, domestic economic and social objectives, education and manpower, the democratic process and the moral framework of national purpose. Thus security was only one of our concerns. While it is the most urgent it is not in the long run necessarily the most important. We are concerned with national security because we must be. We are concerned with more positive tasks because we want to be. Security defines our military necessities. Our other panels will deal with our hopes and our humane necessities.

Despite the fact that the work of the other panels still is in progress, we consider it appropriate to release this report on international security before the other studies are complete. Power alone will not supply an answer to the challenge of the future. It does offer the prospect that there will be a future. A people preoccupied as we are with the tasks of peace is always

3

in danger of confusing its aspirations with reality, of refusing to
believe that there may be states which prefer conquest to peace.
Because we would prefer to dedicate ourselves to constructive
tasks, we need constantly to be reminded that we are in great
peril and that we cannot substitute our preferences for our duty.

Our goal is a world under law; our aspiration is an inter-
national community from which the threat of war has been
removed and based on respect for individual and national dignity.
But we will not realize these aims unless we are prepared to make
the effort required to survive. We must therefore strike a fine
balance between vigilance and conciliation, prepared to use force
to defend freedom but wary not to let force become an end in
itself. Power can only give us security against immediate dangers.
In the long run, our security is founded in the principles for
which we stand and in the confidence which we earn.

Each of the members of this Overall Panel has also served
on one of the subpanels. We have met regularly since November
1956. Obviously we are most familiar with the subpanels on
which we have served. But we have heard periodic reports from
all other groups. We have considered the draft of this report at
various stages of preparation and we have gone over the final
draft in full committee. Not every member of our group neces-
sarily endorses every detail, but we have approved its substance
and we strongly urge implementation of its recommendations.

This report concludes that we can afford what has to be
done to assure our security; indeed that we cannot afford less. We
are convinced that we can achieve the necessary military power
while preserving and expanding other elements of our strength,
such as health, education and economic growth. We recognize
that this will require great exertion. But although the leadership
of a democracy is a far more exacting task than the direction of
a police state, the power which is generated by the voluntary
effort of a free people cannot be equalled by the reluctant com-
pliance of subject nations.

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, chairman of the panel

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., senior partner, Berle, Berle & Brunner and former Ambassador to Brazil

CHESTER BOWLES, former Ambassador to India and former Governor of Connecticut

ARTHUR F. BURNS, president, The National Bureau of Economic Research

4

GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAY, chairman, Continental Can Company, Inc. and former commander-in-chief, U. S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor, U. S. Zone, Germany

JOHN COWLES, president, Minneapolis Star & Tribune and chairman, The Des Moines Register & Tribune

JUSTIN W. DART, president, Rexall Drug Company

GORDON E. DEAN, senior vice president—nuclear energy, General Dynamics Corporation and former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

JOHN S. DICKEY, president, Dartmouth College

JOHN W. GARDNER, president, Carnegie Corporation of New York

LESTER B. GRANGER, executive director, National Urban League, Inc.

CARYL P. HASKINS, president, Carnegie Institution of Washington

THEODORE M. HESBURGH, president, University of Notre Dame

MARGARET A. HICKEY, public affairs editor, Ladies' Home Journal

OVETA CULP HOBBY, president and editor, The Houston Post and former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and director of the WACS

DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS, chairman, New York Life Insurance Company

MILTON KATZ, director International Legal Studies, Harvard University Law School

HENRY R. LUCE, editor-in-chief, Time, Life, Fortune

THOMAS B. MCCABE, president, Scott Paper Company

GENERAL JAMES MCCORMACK, vice president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and former director of research and development, U. S. Air Force

RICHARD P. McKEON, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago

LEE W. MINTON, president, Glass Bottle Blowers' Association of the United States and Canada

CHARLES H. PERCY, president, Bell & Howell Company

JACOB S. POTOFSKY, general president, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

ANNA M. ROSENBERG, public and industrial relations consultant, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel

DEAN RUSK, president, The Rockefeller Foundation

DAVID SARNOFF, chairman, Radio Corporation of America

CHARLES M. SOFFORD, partner, Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl and former Deputy Representative to NATO

EDWARD TELLER, professor of physics, University of California, Berkeley and associate director, University of California Radiation Laboratories

FRAZAR B. WILDE, president, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company

ROBERT B. ANDERSON, resigned from the panel when he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury. JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR., president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, resigned from the panel when he was appointed Special Assistant to the President

HENRY A. KISSINGER, director of The Special Studies Projects, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., and associate director of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University

5

A Word by Panel II:
International Security
The Military Aspect

This report is the result of a group effort by Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. Although not every member subscribes to every detail, it reflects our substantial agreement.

We were charged with exploring the military aspect of international security, the strategies most likely to achieve this end and the challenges in this area which may face the country during the next ten years. We have been meeting since November 1956. We have had the benefit of many specially prepared papers and we have heard testimony of numerous experts.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U.S. security policies and operations. The over-all U.S. strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation. In major respects defense organization is unrelated to critically important military missions. Systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management are out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military developments. The United States system of alliances must be adapted to constantly changing strategic requirements. The United States is rapidly losing its lead in the race of military technology.

We are convinced that corrective steps must be taken now.

We believe that the security of the United States transcends normal budgetary considerations and that the national economy can afford the necessary measures.

Our panel therefore hopes that the most important result of recent Soviet advances in the field of earth satellites may be that they will serve to spark a deep review of the basic attitudes and policies affecting the security of our country and of the free world.

For the U.S. lag in missiles and space machines, however worrisome, is a symptom and not a cause. It reflects our national complacency over the past dozen years. It is vitally important to the U.S. to calculate its security requirements on an integrated and long-range basis, and to set about correcting all deficiencies.

We cannot conclude without paying tribute to one of our

6

colleagues. Frank Nash was a member of our group until his untimely death on December 11, 1957. In a real sense he was a victim of the principles in which he believed and which caused him to give of himself unstintingly in the service of his country. He will be remembered with respect for his services to our nation and with affection for his warmth and greatness as a human being.

FRANK ALTSCHUL, vice president, Council on Foreign Relations

GENERAL FREDERICK L. ANDERSON, former Deputy U. S. Special Representative in Europe

KARL R. BENDETSEN, vice president, operations, The Champion Paper and Fibre Company and former Under Secretary of The Army

DETLEV W. BRONK, president, Rockefeller Institute and president, National Academy of Sciences

*GORDON E. DEAN, senior vice president—nuclear energy, General Dynamics Corporation and former chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

JAMES B. FISK, executive vice president, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. and former director of research, Atomic Energy Commission

BRADLEY GAYLORD, chairman, The Pennroad Corporation

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore and former Under Secretary of the Air Force

TOWNSEND W. HOOPES, J. H. Whitney and Company

ELLIS A. JOHNSON, director, Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University

COLONEL GEORGE A. LINCOLN, professor, Social Sciences, U. S. Military Academy

*HENRY R. LUCE, editor-in-chief, Time, Life, Fortune

*GENERAL JAMES MCCORMACK, vice president, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, served as chairman of the panel until October 1957 when illness forced him to withdraw from that position

FRANK C. NASH, U. S. Delegation to General Assembly of the U. N. and Presidential consultant on overseas base study, was a member of the panel until his death on December 11, 1957

LAURANCE S. ROCKEFELLER, president, Rockefeller Brothers, Inc.

ARTHUR SMITHIES, Department of Economics, Harvard University, and former economic advisor, Office of Defense Mobilization

*EDWARD TELLER, professor of physics, University of California, Berkeley and associate director, University of California Radiation Laboratories

T. F. WALKOWICZ, aeronautical engineer

CARROLL L. WILSON, president, Metals & Controls Corporation and former general manager, Atomic Energy Commission

JOHN F. FLOBERG, served as a member of this panel until his appointment as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission in June 1957 after which date he did not participate in the deliberations of the group or the drafting of the conclusions.

This report has been prepared under the direction of Dr. Kissinger.

*Also Overall Panel members

7

# I—Framework of the Study

THE WORLD is living through a period of swift and far-reaching upheavals. Standards and institutions which have remained unchanged for centuries are breaking down. Millions who have hitherto passively endured their place in life are clamoring for a new and more worthy existence. Western Europe, the fountainhead of our civilization, has lost its position of dominance in world affairs. Across the great land-mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa new nations are rising in the place of colonial empires.

Mankind is yearning to realize its aspirations in peace. But it is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to achieve world domination which seeks to exploit all dissatisfactions and to magnify all tensions; and the new weapons technology capable of obliterating civilization.

The United States has thus been placed in a fateful position. Our whole tradition impels us to desire peace. Relatively invulnerable behind two great oceans, we have until the end of World War II asked little of the world save to be free to work out our destiny undisturbed. But we have been forced to realize that our security is inextricably bound up with the safety of the rest of the free world and that freedom everywhere depends on our strength and resolution. Force alone will not supply the answer to the hopes of humanity. Yet our strength effectively mobilized can help bring about a framework of security in which these aspirations may be realized in freedom and without fear.

Looking at the world from the perspective of our past isolation and recent nuclear supremacy, perhaps the most difficult thing for us is to accept the reality of our peril. Other more exposed nations have had to learn to live over a period of centuries with the awareness that their existence might be imperiled by foreign attack. It is a new experience for Americans.

A new technology of unprecedented power and destructiveness has placed all nations of the world in dire peril. The largest "conventional" bomb of World War II—the famous blockbuster—had an explosive power of 20 tons of TNT. The first atomic bomb had an explosive power equivalent to 20 thousand tons of TNT, a thousand-

8

fold increase. Today weapons with an explosive equivalent of 20
million tons (20 megatons) have been tested and there is no theo-
retical upper limit: it is possible to construct weapons of almost any
explosive power.

As the weapons have become more powerful, their speed of
delivery has grown ever faster. Soon missiles will be able to travel
intercontinental distances and wipe out whole cities in one blow.
A blow on 50 of our most important metropolitan areas would bring
under attack 55 per cent of our population and 75 per cent of our
industry. Moreover, if the fireball of a nuclear weapon touches the
ground, it sucks up particles of earth and buildings and deposits them
downwind as radioactive material. The area of this "fall-out" would
depend on meteorological conditions, but it could cover an area of
10 thousand square miles or the size of the State of New Jersey. A
successful attack on 50 of our most important urban centers would
produce at least 10-15 million dead and 15-20 million injured from
blast and heat and another 25-35 million casualties from "fall-out"
or a total of 60-65 million dead and injured.

What gives this weapons technology its ominous quality is
that it is in the hands of a Communist movement which has proclaimed
for over a generation now—the last time in the Moscow declaration
of all Communist states on November 16, 1957—the irreconcilability
of its system with that of the free world. Of course "peaceful co-
existence" has reappeared periodically as a Soviet slogan. But, as
used in Soviet propaganda, it has in the past been primarily a device
to disarm intended victims. After World War II, it did not stand
in the way of Soviet domination of the satellite orbit and the breaking
of the most solemn wartime pledges regarding respect for freedom
and independence of Eastern Europe. It did not stop the Berlin
blockade, the Greek civil war and the Korean aggression. After the
Geneva "summit" conference, "peaceful co-existence" did not restrain
the Soviet Union from fomenting a crisis in the Middle East or
from brutally suppressing the Hungarian revolution. In 1957 it did
not keep the Soviet Union from threatening nuclear attacks on
Norway, Denmark and Turkey. Both their doctrine and their internal
dynamism will impel the Soviet Union and Communist China to
try to encourage every dissatisfaction and to fill every vacuum. Should
we ever allow the U.S.S.R. and Communist China to attain strategic
superiority, we can be certain that subsequent events will be brutal.
And the power of these states, particularly of the U.S.S.R., has been

9

## II—The Nature of Our Strategic Problem

EVER since our unilateral disarmament at the end of World War II failed to produce the peace we desired so earnestly, the United States has been forced to engage in a military effort unprecedented in our history in peacetime. Even so, it has still proved inadequate to the challenge we confront. The sporadic nature of our effort has been caused by many factors including the nature of our historical experience. Tradition impels us to believe that peace is the normal relation among states. As a result, we have conceived it to be the task of our military policy to assemble overwhelming power to "punish" the disturber of the peace—the aggressor. Also, aggression is best understood when it is an unambiguous and clear act. Because, in the past, many other states were threatened before the danger to our security became explicit, we have been able to count on other countries to hold a forward line while we rallied our physical, moral and psychological resources. Thus, our remoteness from the other major centers of world affairs has enabled us hitherto to rely on relatively small forces-in-being and to mobilize our resources only *after* a war had started.

Many of these ideas have been overthrown by technological developments since World War II and by the emergence of the United States in the forefront of world affairs. Soviet policy has coupled an attempt to develop overwhelming power with a strategy of deliberate ambiguity. The ambiguity resides in advancing by steps so small that the risks of resisting any given advance always seem out of proportion to the objective or masking the aggression so that the Soviet move appeals to what the free world considers as "legitimate" methods of political warfare. As a consequence, the recognition of aggression has often proved as difficult as finding the means to resist it. A symptom of the difficulty is that a United Nations committee charged with the task of defining aggression felt itself forced to abandon the effort.

At the same time that the forms of aggression have multiplied and become more ambiguous, we have lost the safety indicators of a more secure past. We can no longer think of our military effort as

11

[LC]

designed for a conflict which we enter only after other nations have run the initial risks as was the case with our participation in World Wars I and II. Since no other nation any longer has the strength to resist alone, the safety of the non-communist world will depend on our ability, psychological and military, to engage our forces promptly and decisively in case of aggression.

The importance of forces-in-being is magnified by the changed significance of industrial potential. As long as the destructiveness of weapons was relatively limited as compared to the complexity of their means of manufacture, victory in war could be achieved only through a quantity of equipment too large to stockpile before the outbreak of hostilities. Massive production of armament during the course of a war was thus a vital element of national strength and an attack on production facilities was a highly effective strategy. But with the rapid and overwhelming destructiveness of modern technology each major power will, in the absence of a massive and reliable defense, be able to disrupt the production facilities of its opponents with a relatively few weapons in a matter of hours. Industrial strength is therefore a military asset only to the extent that it can provide armaments before the outbreak of war.

Thus our military problem, with which this particular Subpanel is exclusively concerned, has four aspects:

(a) We require a growing industrial technological and scientific base in order to achieve a state of continual readiness for the long haul. Without an adequate industrial plant we will not be able to produce the ever-increasing variety of weapons required for our protection. Without an expanding pool of scientific talent and a steadily rising level of scientific activity, we shall not be able to maintain our security in a situation where the real armaments race is in the laboratories.

(b) Scientific development by itself is ineffective strategically, however, if it cannot be translated rapidly into operational weapons. Great importance therefore attaches to two kinds of lead-time: (1) the interval between the drawing board and operational weapon; and (2) the rapidity with which weapons are manufactured. A lag in either category is certain to create a strategic weakness.

(c) At the same time, long-range programs and balance cannot become ends in themselves. However powerful we may be potentially, our strategic effectiveness in any given crisis depends on our active forces supplemented by any quickly mobilizable reserve capabilities. Given the power and destructiveness of modern weapons, we cannot

12

count on an extended period of mobilization prior to the outbreak of
hostilities.

(d) But however vast our over-all strength, it may still be ineffective in meeting certain challenges if it cannot be applied with discrimination. With the development of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, we can no longer rely on our capability to deliver crushing retaliation on the Soviet homeland as the deterrent to all types of aggression. For with the growth of the Soviet capability to inflict a massive blow on the United States, there exists the great danger that the Soviet Union will seek to use its nuclear striking force as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. Thus the adequacy of our military establishment will be determined by its ability to discharge two distinct though related tasks: one, to discourage an all-out attack through the existence of a powerful, instantly ready retaliatory force; and, two, to react effectively to limited aggression through the ability to make our response fit the challenge.

These four factors—the importance of a growing industrial base, the crucial role of lead-times, the increasing significance of forces-in-being, and the necessity of a versatile military establishment—impose on policy makers an unparalleled problem of choice. It is further complicated by the explosive rapidity with which technology is developing. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons system would be good for nearly a generation; the equipment of U.S. ground forces, for example, changed very little between 1919 and 1940. Today a weapons system begins to be obsolescent when it has barely gone into production. The B-17 "Flying Fortress" remained in operational use for eight years; the B-36 intercontinental bomber was obsolescent in less than five years; and the B-52 jet bomber is beginning to be outdated even before all wings of our Strategic Air Command are fully equipped with it.

Moreover, all weapons are becoming increasingly costly. A new submarine costs ten times as much as its World War II counterpart. A B-52 wing is four times as expensive as the B-36 wings it replaces. Each new weapons system costs more than double its predecessor which it replaces at shorter and shorter intervals.

This technological race places an extraordinary premium on the ability to assess developing trends correctly, to make and back decisions firmly and to be prepared to change plans when necessary. It also places the side which is on the defensive at special disadvantage. The aggressor need prepare only for the war he proposes to fight. But the

13

side which is militarily on the defensive must gear its planning and
procurement to the possibility of an attack at any moment. We must
therefore take care to see that no important strategic weakness exists at
any given point of time.

The basic problem of American strategy then is the ability to
make effective choices. This will depend on the courage and sense of
purpose of our leadership, the effectiveness of the organization of our
government, and on the spirit of our people.

14

III—Developing Power
Trends

THE OUTSTANDING characteristic of the strategic situation is a military technology in a state of spectacular change. Starting with World War II scientific research has produced military equipment and new patterns of military operations at an ever accelerating pace. Four trends appear to be of particular significance.

1. Weapon technology will become increasingly complex with a corresponding increase in the difficulty of choosing the most effective combination of weapons. The atomic bomb of 1945 has been outmoded by a broad range of highly developed weapons both large and small. The original nuclear weapons required a large aircraft and crew. Equally powerful warheads have been reduced in size and simplified to the point where it will soon be possible to employ them effectively in anti-aircraft rockets. And with the increasing capacity for the production of fissionable materials, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have become available in very large quantities.

The outlook is even more portentous than the achievements of the recent past. Aircraft will be capable of cruising at several times the speed of sound, of bombing from altitudes of a dozen miles and more, and of carrying air-launched missiles so that they need not pass directly over heavily defended target areas. New high energy fuels will give them greatly increased range and performance.

Within a very short time, a major role in both offense and defense will be played by missiles. It will be possible to produce missiles of almost any desired range, from very short distances analogous to traditional artillery to intercontinental ranges of five thousand miles or more. Because these weapons require less extensive installations than airplanes, it will be possible to disperse and protect them more easily and they will therefore be less vulnerable to surprise attack.

Earth satellites are a special adaptation of missiles which explore a new frontier in outer space and which will have important military applications.

Submarines, already extremely powerful weapons, will be even

15

[LC]

more important as nuclear propulsion comes to play an ever greater role. They can imperil our harbors and our sea communications with friendly nations. As a platform for missiles they can pose a constant threat of a sudden, devastating blow from unpredictable directions.

These are not dreams of the far distant future. Many of these weapons are in existence now; even the most remote among them is attainable within the time frame of this report by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Many of them will be in the hands of several nations.

2. The rate of technological change will increasingly complicate the tasks of the defense relative to the offense. Both offense and defense will improve—and improve enormously. However, foreseeable new offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles—sudden in action, massively destructive, difficult to destroy either before launching or in flight—will greatly aggravate the problems of strategic defense and enormously increase its costs.

3. The U.S.S.R. will continue to gain in over-all military strength greatly aided by Communist China and some of its other allies. Although the rate of growth of these countries may slow down, the economic superiority of the West will become less and less significant militarily at our present levels of effort. By sacrificing the civilian sector of its economy, the Soviet Union has caught up with the United States in major fields of technology. In certain areas assigned high priority by the Kremlin, the Soviet Union has surpassed us qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Unless we greatly increase the pace and level of our military effort, the Soviet Union will achieve superiority in other fields as well.

4. The concept of "scarcity" in nuclear weapons will disappear from the calculations of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and to a lesser extent Great Britain. The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain will continue to increase the number and variety of their atomic weapons. Other countries will in due course have their own atomic arms if on a more limited scale.

## Soviet Capabilities

Ever since World War II, the United States has suffered from a tendency to underestimate the military technology of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet Union produced its first long-range bomber we comforted ourselves with the belief that it was simply a copy of

16

our B-29. When it developed jet engines some dismissed this achievement as due to the imitation of a British design. When our atomic monopoly was ended we treated it more as a reflection on our security methods against espionage than as an indication that our technological lead was inherently transitory.

In the meantime the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its achievements in the immediate post-war period were far from accidental. Today Soviet science is at least equal to our own in many strategically significant categories. In the military field, the technological capability of the U.S.S.R. is increasing at a pace obviously faster than that of the United States. If not reversed this trend alone will place the free world in dire jeopardy.

The result of the Soviet concentration on military technology is an impressive and rapidly growing military establishment which already poses a very serious threat to the free world. The generally accepted facts with respect to it can be summarized as follows:

The Soviet ground forces, far larger numerically than our own, are being reorganized and re-equipped for atomic war. New rockets and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads add to their atomic capability. New tanks, artillery pieces, and light weapons give them a powerful conventional strength. Vehicles and communications equipment have been markedly improved. In addition to these substantial forces-in-being, the U.S.S.R. possesses a vast and readily mobilizable reserve.

The Soviet Union now has the second largest navy in the world and since World War II has produced more vessels of every type, except aircraft carriers, than the United States. The Soviet Union has long concentrated on submarines. A fleet of well over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the German force which severely menaced Allied surface shipping during the early years of World War II. There is no doubt about the capacity of the U.S.S.R. to develop naval atomic power plants, or to adapt ships and submarines to launch short and medium-range missiles; in fact, Soviet leaders have pointedly discussed the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks. The magnitude of the threat becomes clear when it is realized that 43 of our 50 largest cities and 85 per cent of our industry are located within 500 miles of our coasts. Missile launching submarines are the Soviet equivalent of our overseas air bases.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor

17

aircraft, an increasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are a major element of the air defense system.

Over the last ten years, the U.S.S.R. has not only maintained the largest number of planes in the world, but has progressively re-equipped its airforce with new and modern aircraft. The Soviet Union now produces many aircraft at least as advanced as our own—and produces them in large numbers. Moreover, the Soviets have demonstrated their ability to manufacture modern electronic equipment and to master the techniques required to guide and direct defensive and offensive aerial operations.

The Soviet weapons program has given high priority to the development of rockets and missiles. A medium range ballistic missile capable of reaching Japan, Taiwan, and most of Western Europe from Communist bloc bases is already operational in limited quantities. Missiles of intercontinental range will soon follow.

From what is known of the present Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons it is inferior to that of the United States, but it is already large and growing rapidly. Soviet nuclear attacks against the United States of great severity are possible now; within a few years the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering massive air and missile attacks against all major targets in the non-communist world. In short, Soviet military strength poses a major threat to all countries of the non-communist world.

## U. S. Capabilities

As compared with the U.S.S.R., the United States now has these military advantages:

* Our democratic structure is more stable and commands wider popular support than the Soviet system of dictatorship which can resolve policy differences only by periodic purges.

* We have a superior industrial base and production know-how, which, providing we apply it with a clear sense of direction, should enable us to assign high priority to a greater variety of projects than the U.S.S.R.

* The system of alliances in which we participate is superior in integrity and strength and in the cohesiveness that comes from free association to the Soviet system of forced satellites. Moreover our allies are stronger domestically, industrially and in technical and scientific potential.

18

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range manned airplanes. Our location coupled with our system of advanced bases favors us geographically.

We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially surface naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some of these advantages must be qualified, and others are only temporary. For example, our long-range bomber force is always in competition with improving defenses. And our advantage in training is transitory because missiles will increasingly take over missions heretofore performed by manned planes. Moreover, some U.S. forward bases will continue to be exposed to the instability of the areas in which they are located and all of our air bases at home and abroad are vulnerable to surprise attack, particularly as Soviet missiles become operational.

Nor can we afford to take for granted an indefinite continuation of our present superiority at sea. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval power is built, is vulnerable to nuclear attack, though protected to some extent by its mobility. It also faces a problem of limited refueling facilities, particularly for its aircraft complement. The unresolved naval weakness is the inadequacy of our anti-submarine capability. Moreover, our submarine fleet has not been given the attention its potential warrants.

Another point of present U.S. military advantage is in the number and variety of atomic weapons. But the U.S.S.R. is closing the gap and because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons numerical superiority tends to become less important after a given point, at least for certain purposes. It is therefore crucial to develop a notion of "adequacy" for each military mission so that we do not drain resources from some vital tasks by maintaining an excessive capacity in others.

Thus it appears that the U.S. is rapidly losing its lead over the U.S.S.R. in the military race. For perhaps the next two years, we still possess a superiority in strategic striking power and any Soviet attack on us would meet a crushing reply. But our position a year or two hence depends on decisions which must be taken immediately. Unless present trends are reversed, the world balance of power will shift in favor of the Soviet bloc. If that should happen we are not likely to be given another chance to remedy our failings. However, it is emphatically not too late if we are prepared to make the required big effort now and in the years ahead.

19

IV—Missions

THE VARIOUS challenges with which we may be confronted tend to overleap the traditional boundaries between the military services. With modern weapons the distinctions between the missions of the three services based on land, sea and air warfare have lost a great deal of their validity. The criteria by which any future wars can be distinguished will turn on the nature of the conflict, the issues in dispute, and the geographical area of hostilities, rather than on means of locomotion.

Among the possible challenges we may confront, three stand out most starkly: all-out war, limited war and a kind of war new to the twentieth century and highly developed by the communists—the disguised or obscure war concealed as internal subversion or takeover by coup d'état or civil war.

All-Out War

Of the threats to our security, all-out war is the most overwhelming. It can be defined as an attack of such magnitude that our survival would be directly and immediately at stake. It is therefore the ultimate war, in which no inhibitions would apply as regards the use of weapons.

For this reason the purpose of our capability for all-out war is above all to prevent war from breaking out; it is effective to the extent that it deters a sudden onslaught on us. At the same time, our capability for all-out war is the essential prerequisite for more discriminating applications of our power. Since the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile, the capability to conduct all-out war does not protect all our security interests. But it does preserve our ability to protect these interests by means less drastic than all-out war. Limited war, for instance, can be kept limited only if an opponent must consider expansion of the war too risky. Preparedness for all-out war must therefore be the first charge on our military establishment.

The basic requirement for all-out war is a retaliatory force so well protected and numerous that it can overcome any defense. For the next two or three years this will be largely composed of manned

20

[LC]

planes; later missiles will continue to play an increasingly important role. The hard core of this striking force, whether based at home or overseas, must be continuously alert, fully armed, and as secure as we can make it against destruction or neutralization by surprise attack.

The second requirement for all-out war is an active and passive defense system capable of protecting the bulk of our striking force no matter what the scale of any foreseeable surprise attack, and of reducing the effects of a blow against our centers of population and industry.

Active defense seeks to blunt the enemy attack by providing warning to likely targets and by destroying as many attacking vehicles as possible. The speedier the enemy delivery system, the more rapid must be the reaction time of the active defense. The more powerful the offensive weapons, the higher must be the percentage of "kills" achieved. Thus, the protection of our retaliatory force and of our civilian population both require that a major and increasing effort be made to strengthen our active defense. Should the U.S.S.R. achieve an effective air defense before we do, our retaliatory force would correspondingly diminish in value. Conversely, a strong active defense on our side would reinforce the deterrent to surprise attack.

As attacking vehicles become speedier and weapons ever more destructive, increasing attention will have to be paid to passive defense, often called civil defense. Its task is to reduce enemy damage as much as possible. This can be accomplished through shelters, dispersal of industries and air bases, and the stockpiling of critical supplies. A nation which has succeeded in protecting its population at least to some degree is in a stronger psychological position than an opponent totally vulnerable to attack. In the age of the long-range missile, the known ability of a society to withstand attack through passive defense will become an increasingly important deterrent.

Preparedness for all-out war therefore depends on a combination of three factors: (a) A retaliatory force so powerful and well protected that, no matter what the scale of the enemy attack, an aggressor must always contend with a return blow which will inflict an intolerable amount of damage; (b) An active defense which can assure survival of at least a sizeable portion of the retaliatory force and which is able to limit the disruptive effects of an enemy blow on our population and economy to the smallest possible proportions; (c) A passive defense which affords some protection for our population and economy.

21

The importance of defensive measures is that they force the enemy to increase his investment of resources in his offensive effort without adding to its strategic effectiveness. The value of a powerful retaliatory force is that it can deprive the aggressor of the fruits of a surprise attack. The task of strategy is to decide on the relative emphasis to be given to offensive capabilities and to active and passive defense and on the "mix" which will provide the greatest degree of deterrence.

In looking at the strategic equation for all-out war there is reason for serious concern. Our retaliatory power, on which we have heretofore relied as the major element of our security, is imperiled by Soviet advances in the missile field and by the inadequate dispersal and protection of our Strategic Air Command. Our active defense designed against manned planes will have to be redesigned for the missile age. Our civil defense program and that of our allies is completely inadequate. A substantially greater effort is therefore required in order to insure an adequate system of deterrence.

## Limited War

Unfortunately, the capability to deter all-out war does not exhaust our strategic problem. For no matter how vast our over-all strength, we face the dilemma that the magnitude of the total does not assure its sufficiency in any particular situation. Even if we succeed in deterring all-out war by the threat of total annihilation, our country and the rest of the free world remains in peril. For we cannot expect to counter limited military challenges by the response appropriate to all-out surprise attack.

Until the development of a Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, our retaliatory force could serve as the major deterrent to Soviet aggression. But as the Soviet capability to attack American cities increases, our reluctance to engage in all-out war will grow proportionately. If all-out war becomes our only counter to aggression, the Soviet Union may be enabled to use its strategic striking force as a shield behind which to achieve limited advances, confronting us in each case with the alternative of yielding to what will seem a marginal Soviet gain or of precipitating a world-wide holocaust.

As a result, though all-out war is our greatest danger, it does

22

not represent the most likely threat. The distinctive feature of lim-
ited war is that its outcome does not involve or seem to involve
national survival. It is precisely for this reason that we have had
such difficulty in coming to grips with it. For any peripheral Soviet
move raises doubts whether this particular encroachment warrants a
final showdown. A major difficulty is our lack of mobile forces
capable of intervening rapidly and of restoring a local situation before
matters get out of hand.

The forces designed to deter all-out war will, of course, also be
useful in preventing or stifling limited war. It would be dangerous,
however, to rely too heavily on the principal deterrent—our strategic
striking force—to fight limited war. Since the chief sanction against
the expansion of a limited war resides in a crushing capability for
retaliation, the deterrent force must be kept in a state of the highest
readiness particularly during periods of limited conflict. An aggressor
who could inflict substantial attrition on our strategic striking force in a
limited war would gain an advantage however those particular military
operations ended.

It is therefore imperative that in addition to our retaliatory
force, we develop units which can intervene rapidly and which are able
to make their power felt with discrimination and versatility. For this
task we require modern sea lift and an airlift capacity we do not now
possess. Our mobile forces must be tailored to the gamut of possible
limited wars which may range from conflicts involving several countries
to minor police actions. Limited wars may require a highly complicated
weapons system including nuclear weapons. They may involve con-
ventional forces capable of assisting friendly governments to resist
border incursions.

The effectiveness of our power thus depends on our unmistak-
able ability and willingness to oppose force with force at whatever
level of intensity may be required. We do not now possess the neces-
sary versatility.

The Problem of Non-Overt Aggression

We must not make the mistake of assuming that even a diver-
sified military establishment can protect us against the total range of
our dangers. To begin with, force by itself is useless without the reso-
lution to use it if need be. A great deal, therefore depends on our

23

psychological and political readiness. An effective policy must not only find the means to prevent adverse changes in the strategic balance, it must also be able to determine what changes to resist.

For our security can be imperiled not only by overt aggression but also by transformations which are made to appear, insofar as is possible, as not aggression at all. These "concealed wars" may appear as internal revolution or civil war, they may be instigated by outside forces or merely exploited by them. Greece has furnished one example; Vietnam another; the Middle East still another. One of the greatest threats to the security of the Free World is gradual Soviet infiltration and domination of vital areas through steps each of which is so small and seemingly so insignificant that it does not seem to justify overt intervention.

These conflicts raise issues with which in terms of our preconceptions and the structure of our forces we are least prepared to deal. The gradual subversion of a government by concealed foreign penetration is difficult to deal with from the outside, even though the fate of millions may depend on it.

As a result, unless we have a clear understanding of our national purpose and close political ties with other nations of the free world we shall find ourselves paralyzed in the face of upheavals which may gravely imperil the safety of the whole world. We must also realize that non-overt aggressions presents issues which are deliberately and intrinsically unclear. To ask for certainty in these situations is a prescription for inaction. Nor is it possible in advance to determine the nature of the conflict or every United States response. The problem in its deepest sense is not military but political and will therefore be treated more fully by Panel I.

It should be our aim to prevent such situations from developing. When they do become acute we may have a choice only between evils. Our security and that of the rest of the non-Communist world will then hinge importantly on our willingness to support friendly governments in situations which fit neither the soldier's classic concept of war nor the diplomat's traditional concept of aggression.

24

V—The Problem of
Nuclear Weapons

NO ONE can look at the prospect of nuclear war with equanimity. It is with us not by our wish but because of Soviet hostility. The world knows that the United States will never engage in preventive war. But in resisting aggression we cannot in advance forego weapons which technology makes available to all who seek them, including those who might attack.

In dealing with the use of nuclear weapons we come up against the hard fact that the choice is no longer entirely our own. Whatever we may decide, the Soviet Union may choose to conduct its aggressions with nuclear weapons. The introduction of nuclear weapons by an opponent would immediately raise the question of our reaction. Would we be prepared to respond with all-out war? And if not, we would be forced into a limited nuclear war under the worst possible circumstances: in the confusion of battle and without adequate psychological preparation.

Thus against a nuclear power we must always be prepared to fight a limited nuclear war. Even when we decide to use conventional weapons, we would not dare to do so without a nuclear establishment ready at hand. And in a war in which the U.S.S.R. is a direct participant, nuclear weapons will have to be used almost of necessity. Confronted with their use, the huge Soviet conventional armament becomes obsolescent. In their absence the Soviet Union will have the choice of seeking to prevail with its preponderant ground army or to introduce nuclear weapons at a moment of maximum difficulty for us.

The use of nuclear weapons has been the subject of much debate. It is argued by some that the use of nuclear weapons marks the dividing line between all-out and limited war. Others maintain that even if there should be an intention to keep the war limited, neither side would accept defeat without resorting to every weapon in its arsenal.

Modern technology has created a spectrum of weapons, however, which makes it unreasonable to draw such rigid dividing lines.

25

Some "conventional" weapons are more powerful than the lowest yield nuclear weapons. Very powerful nuclear weapons can be used in such a manner that they have negligible effects on civilian populations—as high altitude explosions over purely military objectives, for example. Relatively low yield weapons or "conventional" bombs used against population centers can have devastating consequences. Whether a war produces more or less devastation depends on the manner and discrimination with which any modern weapon, nuclear or otherwise, is employed. Morality does not depend on the type of explosive, but upon the use to which the explosive is put.

As for the argument that neither side will accept defeat short of having exhausted every means at its disposal, it would not seem to make any difference whether the war started as a conventional or as a nuclear war. A power unwilling to accept defeat in a nuclear war is not likely to be more prepared to accept defeat in a conventional war. This particular argument tends to run counter to every experience since World War II. If we keep our retaliatory force in a high state of readiness, it can be expected that both sides will look for reasons to limit, not to expand the war. The Korean war was limited because of the fiction that the Soviet Union was not a direct participant and because neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to precipitate a general war.

We would also do well to recognize that since World War II it has been primarily the U.S. nuclear stockpile and delivery capability which has stood in the way of Soviet domination of the world. That the Soviet Union is well aware of this is shown by its persistent "ban the bomb" propaganda. Even a U.S.-Soviet equality in nuclear weapons will not change the fact that nuclear weapons complicate the tasks of an aggressor and reduce the significance of Soviet numerical superiority in conventional forces. The argument for not renouncing the use of nuclear weapons is that it represents our best chance to maintain the peace and to eliminate the Soviet advantage in conventional forces. The willingness to engage in nuclear war, when necessary, is part of the price of our freedom.

26

# VI—Defense Organization

BECAUSE of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been a pre-occupation of successive administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task and constantly out-stripped by a rapidly evolving weapons technology.

Detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments outside the scope of this panel's undertaking. We have therefore confined ourselves to identifying the critical areas of weakness and to advancing several broad principles which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. It seems to us that the major defects in the present organization are inherent in its structure. They cannot be removed by modifying it. They will be further aggravated by the passage of time. These defects are three in number:

1. The roles and missions assigned to the individual military services have become competitive rather than complementary because they are out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety;

2. The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff preclude the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States;

3. The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of trying to arbitrate and control inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.

These points will be discussed in order.

## *The Problem of Roles and Missions*

The range and destructiveness of modern weapons have tended to overleap the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result,

27

our effort to develop an integrated national strategic plan has been
beset by interservice rivalry. This rivalry is not due fundamentally to
"parochialism" on the part of our military leaders; it is built into the
present assignment of roles and missions.

Ten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense
organization, one result was expected by the public: that through joint
planning by the Chiefs of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the
authority of the Secretary of Defense, there would be a coordinated and
harmonious development of our potential in all three media of opera-
tions: land, sea, and air.

Such has not occurred. With the advantage of hindsight, it is
now clear that the organization itself doomed this important goal. For
the assignment of roles and missions among the Army, Air Force and
the Navy has become increasingly inconsistent with the new technology.
Heretofore, the Army has been assigned the task of winning a war on
land; the Navy has been charged with control of the seas and the Air
Force has been responsible for dominating the sky. Thus the method
of transportation by which a weapons system moved determined which
service controlled it.

Until the development of long-range airpower, the division of
functions based on methods of locomotion worked relatively smoothly
because it reflected the actual tasks each service had to perform. Each
service was therefore able to develop its own strategy and to develop
under its own control the weapons required for achieving its mission.
But the revolutionary advances in technology have made the traditional
division of functions increasingly obsolete. Given the range and
destructiveness of modern weapons the present assignment of roles and
missions forces each service to duplicate the efforts of some other
service. Thus one service, the Navy, operates in all the media—sea,
land and air. Other missions are shared by two or more services, such
as tactical air support. There are three services with airpower and two
with armies; the Air Force is responsible for coordinating air defense
but the Army is responsible for the air defense of specific targets.
And there are three separate service war plans with the common tend-
ency of reducing the reliance on other services as much as possible.

Thus the division of functions which worked without funda-
mental frictions until the end of World War II has led to bitter
conflict in the nuclear air age. It is inherent in the philosophy and
training of each service that it should see in any developing enemy
threat predominately those elements which its own particular organi-

28

zation seems best adapted to counter. And each service by a natural
rationalization judges the proper balance of forces to be the one
which maximizes its own role.

A duplication of weapons systems and a wastage of scientific talent is inevitable. This prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and forces our policy makers constantly to arbitrate among sharply conflicting advice. New weapons are placed into the strait jacket of obsolescent missions instead of missions being reshaped to conform to an evolving technology and to new military problems.

Conversely, the present organization may neglect certain vital
tasks. An example is the problem of airlift for the ground forces.
To provide such facilities is an Air Force responsibility. When
budgets are tight, the Air Force is understandably reluctant to favor
this mission at the expense of its primary task of defeating the
enemy in the air, especially against the background of growing Soviet
strength in planes and missiles. On the other hand the Army is
prevented by our mechanistic assignment of functions from developing
and operating the transport aircraft required to move forces swiftly
to the combat zone.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Except for the Chairman, the members of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are the senior officers of the military services. Therefore, even
with the best will in the world, they cannot avoid being advocates of
a service point of view. The position of each reflects a lifetime of
dedication to his service. He is primarily the product of its training
schools, and its environment. Since he is responsible for the future
of his service, its status and morale must be one of his chief concerns.

Thus under the present organization most of the decisive
pressures on the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization are produced by
the individual services, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff functions too
often as a committee of partisan adversaries engaged in advancing
service strategic plans and compromising service differences. Too little
in present arrangements permits the Chiefs of Staff time and oppor-
tunity to think spontaneously or comprehensively about over-all
strategic problems. The result is that our military plans for meeting
foreseeable threats tend to be a patchwork of compromise between

29

conflicting strategic concepts or simply the uncoordinated war plans of the several services.

## The Role of the Secretary of Defense

The organization of the military establishment into three competing services, and the aggravation of this difficulty by ill-defined and sometimes obsolete roles and missions, have shaped the role of the Secretary of Defense in ways not foreseen when the office was created in 1947. To a considerable extent, these conditions have confined him to the essentially negative functions of arbitration and control. He has become the referee in disputes over policy issues originating in the services or in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the essence of a referee's position that disputes reach him only after positions have hardened. The Secretary of Defense has, in consequence, found it difficult to play the positive, creative role required of the cabinet officer who together with the President and the Secretary of State formulates high policy for foreign and military affairs.

In exercising the functions of arbitration and control, the Secretary of Defense and his staff have become overwhelmed with many administrative tasks which, were it not for deep-seated inter-service rivalry, could be better handled by the individual services. This condition is reflected in the ever increasing number of Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the heavy emphasis of the Secretary's office on financial controls at the expense of strategic doctrine. Financial controls are no doubt essential. Nevertheless a principal objective of any reorganization plan should be to create conditions in which the Secretary of Defense can give a more effective lead to the initiation and formulation of broad military policy, while delegating to the substructures of the defense organization a substantial portion of his present administrative burden.

## Recommended Changes

The foregoing analysis indicates that the difficulties described are inherent in the present organization of the Defense Department, and that they cannot be removed merely by adjustments of the existing structure. The obstacles to correcting these deficiencies are formidable indeed. Yet the growing complexity of modern technology, the fore-

30

[c]

seeable rise in the cost of maintaining weapons systems, and the interdependence of foreign policy and military capability make it clear that our future security—which is to say, our survival as a nation—will require a far more efficient system for military planning and military decisions.

To remedy the central weaknesses, the following changes are recommended.

## Roles and Missions:

a) *The military departments should be removed from the channel of operational command.* The existing military departments should cease to be responsible for carrying out particular combat missions. Henceforth, their responsibility should be to provide support in matters of recruitment, training, research, procurement and supply for unified operational commands (to be described below). Relieved of their responsibilities for strategic planning and combat operations, the service chiefs and their civilian superiors could concentrate on tasks of management and logistics.

b) *All of the operational military forces of the United States should be organized into unified commands to perform missions which are called for by our strategic requirements.* No foreseeable conflict will fit the category of land, sea or air battle. Therefore, unified commands, each composed of appropriate land, sea and air elements and assigned a particular mission, are essential. Each unified command should be composed of the appropriate elements from each military service brought together under a single commander. As units complete their training within the existing services they would be assigned to a functional command. The units assigned to each of the unified commanders should be organic to his command and not simply placed under his operational control temporarily. Each unified command would be, in effect, a combined force with its own mission and trained to carry out a distinctive task.

The composition and mission of these unified commands should not be frozen by legislation. They should be determined from time to time in the President's discretion, so that they remain abreast of technology and of the tasks an evolving strategy will require. The conduct of all-out war may be one mission; continental defense another; limited war still another.

In such an organization officers could more easily transcend the confines of service loyalty and address themselves more objectively to strategic problems. With each functional area representing a clear

31

strategic mission, the requirements of self-interest and of strategic
doquence would be much more in harmony than now.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be desig-
nated Principal Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the
President. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the only member who
can give his full-time attention to problems of over-all strategic doc-
trine. It is therefore logical that he be the Principal Military Advisor
to the President and the Secretary of Defense instead of the Joint
Chiefs collectively. The Chiefs of the several services would continue
to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff but only as advisors to the Chair-
man and with particular responsibility for the areas of logistics, train-
ing and procurement.

d) The staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be organized
on a unified basis and placed under the control of the Chairman. The
Chairman should be in a position to shape strategic planning. One
major obstacle is that officers on interservice staffs and committees are
negotiators rather than planners and tend to represent the point of
view of a service rather than an over-all approach. A unified staff
under the direct control of the Chairman would remove many of the
service pressures on the members of the staff. The organization of
the unified staff would be analogous to that of the functional com-
mands. It would assist the Chairman in his capacity as Principal
Military Advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense in
strategic and operational planning.

e) All officers above the rank of Brigadier General or equiva-
lent should receive their permanent promotions from the Department
of Defense and would become officers of the Armed Forces of the
United States. This change is essential in order to derive the full
benefits from recommendation (d). For effective over-all planning,
it is vital that we develop a group of top officers who throughout
their careers have been encouraged to transcend the thinking of any
one service. The procedure recommended here would retain the spe-
cialization necessary to command specific units and the morale which
goes with membership in a service. At the higher levels, however,
where the requirement is for an over-all view, the primary loyalty of
all high-ranking officers would transcend service boundaries. Since
entry into this group would be the goal of most if not all officers
throughout their careers, junior officers would know that their future
would depend on their ability to take a broad view, rather than on

32

the ability to defend the point of view of their service on inter-
departmental committees. When a higher rank within a service seems
required by circumstances, a temporary appointment should be made.

The Authority of the Secretary of Defense:

f) The line of operational command should be from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the functional commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his capacity as Principal Military Advisor. Any modern war requires swift reaction and this can be achieved only if there are a minimum number of organizational layers. Since the present division of functions among the military services often represents no distinguishable strategic task, the separate military departments should be relieved from responsibility for the unified commands as recommended above. Rather, the unified commands should be under the Principal Military Advisor to the President. This proposal recognizes that the Secretary of Defense is the deputy commander-in-chief. His position in the line of command would preserve civilian control over the armed forces.

g) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the three military Departments. This recommendation is an application to logistics and the recruitment and training of manpower of the previous recommendation.

h) The Secretary of Defense should be given authority over all research, development and procurement. He should have the right of cancellation and transfer of service programs together with their appropriations. He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of research and development programs at the Defense Department level. One of the outstanding characteristics of the present period is the basic relationship between strategy and technology. When technology was relatively stable, the technical aspect of military planning usually involved problems either of procurement or of engineering. But today with technology developing at an explosive rate, the direction of both research and development is a primary strategic concern. As a result, another war may well be won or lost in the laboratories and on the drawing boards. As long as the Secretary of Defense cannot shape the direction of research and development or of procurement, his role will be the essentially passive one of arbitrating disputes formulated elsewhere. Where so much depends on keeping up and staying ahead in the technological race, it is essential that our weapons development reflects a clear sense of direction and not a series of compromises.

33

## The Problem of Lead Times

Lead time—the interval between conception and execution—has never been more crucial. The best plans will be fruitless if they cannot be carried out rapidly. The best production apparatus will be ineffective if it requires too long to produce the necessary implements of defense. A nation can achieve a basic advantage if it is able either to develop or to produce weapons more rapidly than its opponent.

One of the major weaknesses in our strategic posture has been our inordinately long lead-times. They have been produced in part by the cumbersome machinery in the Department of Defense. In part they have been caused by a quest for perfection in development and by its corollary which is an over-concern with the avoidance of mistake. As our government has grown, it has followed the familiar course into a system of rewards that favors caution and mediocrity. Punishment for inaction is rare, but retribution is swift and harsh for measures that were imaginative, risky and failed. It is especially important that this pattern be reversed in a situation which is inherently uncertain and where great achievement is inseparable from great risk. It is essential that we compress our lead-times and the recommendations in this report should help in this direction. At the same time there has to be a greater flexibility and willingness to run risks in research, development and procurement.

## Strategy and Psychology

Another great weakness in the organization of our national government is the absence of a clear focus at any single point to assess the psychological impact of our actions. Whatever the wisdom of the decision not to engage in a race with the Soviet Union in the space satellite field, it does not appear that the psychological reaction of other nations to a Soviet "first" in this field has been given sufficient weight. Yet the more revolutionary the developments of technology, the more their significance depends on the interpretation placed on them. Since very few of the modern weapons have ever been used in wartime, their impact on policy reflects what people think with respect to them. It is therefore essential that within our national government there exists a mechanism to assess the psychological impact both at home and abroad of our actions in the military field as in others. This is a problem far transcending the organization

34

of the Department of Defense and will be dealt with at greater length
in the report of other Subpanels. It is mentioned here only because a
section on organizational remedies would be incomplete without it.

Conclusion:

Implementation of the recommendations in this section would
provide a unity and coherence now absent from our defense organiza-
tion. They are the primary means to achieve economies in our defense
structure because they will permit a better utilization of resources and
eliminate the present duplication of functions.

35

[L.C.]

# VII—Alliances and the Role of Force

WITHIN the framework of Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter the U.S. has since the end of World War II entered into a wide variety of mutual assistance agreements with other states. These range from the sweeping multilateral defense arrangements of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to a number of bilateral agreements with individual nations. Our armed forces overseas are reminders of our determination to carry out these commitments.

## The Basis of the Free World System of Alliances

Strategically, the system of alliances in which the U.S. participates is invaluable in the over-all world balance of power. Overseas bases provide advanced observation and warning posts against possible Soviet aggression. They bring the retaliatory forces closer to possible targets, thus adding to the deterrent by making the counter blow more certain. The advent of missiles will not reduce the importance of alliances. To be sure, missiles will increase the vulnerability of all free world nations. On the other hand, intermediate and short-range missiles can reach almost all of the U.S.S.R. from present free world territory. The geographic relationship is such that intermediate range missiles in the hands of our allies or on their territory have strategic significance similar to that of intercontinental missiles in the hands of the U.S.S.R. And the shorter range the missile, the more mobile its launching site and, therefore, the less vulnerable it is to Soviet surprise attack.

The significance of alliances has been further increased by the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. As long as the United States possessed an atomic monopoly, the chief significance of alliances was in providing advance notice of the American intention to resist a Soviet move against countries covered by security arrangements. At the same time, as long as the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression was the U.S. predominance in retaliatory power, there was an understandable reluc-

36

[LC]

tance on the part of our allies to make a major military effort. As long as it was believed that the issue of a war would be decided elsewhere, few of our allies saw much significance in making a large military contribution. The reliance on an all-out strategy tended to run counter to our desires for building common strength.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, all members of the alliance have an equal interest in removing any Soviet illusion that it might use its capability for all-out war as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. They also share an interest to keep any war that does break out to the smallest proportions. This is possible only to the extent that local resistance is feasible. Alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check aggression. They can strengthen the local will to resist because they guarantee that a threatened country would not stand alone. The efficacy of the alliances in which we participate may not only determine the issue of a war; they are good insurance against such wars breaking out in the first place.

## Alliances and the United Nations

The United Nations remains the greatest symbol of man's hope for peace and the most comprehensive organization working toward it. It has proved its ability to act in a number of situations from Korea to Suez. It is an indispensable forum for expressing the hopes of humanity and an effective institution for pursuing agreed ends.

Still, it would be idle to pretend that under present circumstances the United Nations can replace the regional alliances the need for which was foreseen in the Charter. The Soviet veto in the Security Council prevents effective action by that body in all situations where communist powers are parties to the dispute. And these are precisely the cases which present the gravest threat to the security of the world. Moreover, many other dangers may see the United Nations paralyzed either by communist intransigence or by disputes among U.N. members extraneous to the issues actually at stake. Thus while we should strive to resist aggression through the widest possible expression of the consensus of humanity, we cannot permit the world to be dominated by hostile totalitarian nations simply because these have been able to hamstring the machinery of the United Nations. Until United Nations action is taken we should try to act in concert with the widest grouping of nations attainable as provided by Article 51 of the Charter. The

37

system of free world alliances thus is not an alternative to the United
Nations but its complement; it is the only means for collective security
where the processes of the United Nations may be blocked or its action
rendered ineffective.

Pressure on the Alliance System

To assert that alliances are important does not imply that all is
well with them. On the contrary it is essential that we recognize three
sets of forces tending to weaken our system of alliances: the fear of
communist military power, the ambiguity of communist tactics of
aggression, and the lack of a strategic concept offering reasonable pros-
pects of protection to our allies.

Our allies are faced with a situation in which, at one and the
same time, the danger of war seems less imminent and the fear of the
consequences of war grows greater. In Europe and in Asia, the com-
munist bloc is steadily improving its military capabilities, including
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Against the threat of nuclear
attack, many of our allies have little defense of their own. The concern
—assiduously fostered by the U.S.S.R.—that the use of even the smallest
atomic weapon would involve enormous destruction may weaken the
will to resist of many allies, in and out of NATO.

A correlative force contributing to the reluctance of many coun-
tries to make a substantial military effort is the growing cost and com-
plexity of modern weapons. This imposes a heavy burden on frail
economies and it requires skills and facilities which some of our allies
do not have. The attainment of a capability to deter or check local
aggression is made much more difficult. In many cases, the ability to
resist locally is actually decreasing, while the need for it has become
greater than ever.

Aggravating the other pressures on our alliance arrangements
is the concept of aggression which underlies them. Existing treaties
essentially are concerned with open attack by armed regular troops,
and do not cover a whole range of communist aggressive techniques,
from economic strangulation to slow take-overs by communist-guided
and communist-armed fifth columns. As a result, the communist bloc
has learned that if it keeps its challenges sufficiently ambiguous and
below the level of intensity which the non-communist world considers
to warrant major military measures, we and our allies may prove unable

38

[10]

or unwilling to take effective action. Korea, Indochina, and the Middle East deserve close study with this problem in mind. Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are very similar often find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response.

## Alliance Strategy

One of the major problems faced by our alliance policy is to devise a military strategy equally meaningful both to us and to our allies. In view of its manifold commitments, the United States has been understandably reluctant to commit itself to defend specific allied territories locally. Instead, we have largely relied on our retaliatory force, supplemented by mobile sea and tactical air power, to deter aggression of all kinds. While the allies of the United States have joined together on that basis, none has ever given up the strong desire to see its own homelands protected from invasion or devastation.

This difference of viewpoints has meant that, with the partial exception of NATO, the alliances in which we participate are not based on a military strategy equally congenial to all partners. The lack of an agreed strategy has resulted in weaknesses, indecisions and contradictions at all levels of our security arrangements. It has led to endless difficulties in formulating and implementing U.S. base agreements and military aid programs. There have been disagreements concerning military requirements and programs. And there has been a reluctance on the part of our allies to make or to meet specific force commitments, partly because the function those forces would perform has been so vague. Moreover our strategy is largely atomic, those of our allies generally non-atomic, except those of Great Britain. Thus as nuclear weapons and delivery systems play an ever greater role, present allied forces will become less capable of making major military contributions to other than internal security missions.

The United States must therefore make a concerted effort, together with its allies, to develop and implement plans which meet the joint security requirements of all partners. If allied forces are to be capable of acting in concert with U.S. forces, we will have to assist in their transformation and development. This does not mean that all allied elements must inevitably be equipped along the lines of comparable U.S. units. To the maximum degree possible both the

39

types and levels of equipment should be adapted to the particular
security requirements of our allies. But we must establish a measure
of harmony between the tactical doctrine of our allies and our own
and equip the respective forces accordingly.

The free world is faced with a major task of strengthening and re-equipping its forces at a time when both rapidly changing technology and, in many parts of the world, decreasing popular support for military programs combine to make the job extremely costly and difficult. It is probable that the United States will have to provide—either directly or indirectly—substantial quantities of equipment needed by our allies, or else see their political stability decline along their military strength. Increased consultation will be of great significance in removing the sense of impotence of many of our allies produced by unfamiliarity with modern technology and by a feeling of being left out from decisions which affect their fate.

The proposed military measures are by no means the sole means of maintaining the vitality of the system of free world alliances. They must be supplemented by positive programs for political cohesion, for economic and technical cooperation, and by other measures discussed more fully by various groups of the over-all study project of which this panel is but one part.

40

[L.C.]

# VIII—The Special Case of NATO

## Introduction

OF THE alliance systems in which we participate, the two most important are the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is militarily the most highly developed of our multiple alliances. It covers an area of great cultural and economic significance to both East and West. As in the case of our Western Hemisphere allies, it embraces nations with whom we share a common spiritual and cultural heritage.

In order to appreciate the military importance of NATO we need only to contemplate our situation were Western Europe in Soviet hands. The Communist Bloc would then have an industrial potential at least equal to our own. It would lie astride the world's main communications lines. It would flank and engulf the Middle East. It would be able to manipulate the manpower, factories and cultural prestige of Europe to dominate Africa and infiltrate South America.

## The Weaknesses of NATO

Western Europe is deeply affected by the revolutionary changes taking place all over the world. Its position in world affairs has been altered by the emergence into nationhood of many of its former colonial possessions in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, the sense of urgency on which NATO was founded has declined and a number of rivalries and irritations between NATO members have been revived. The dispute over Cyprus was permitted to fester to the detriment of NATO; France has withdrawn most of her NATO units for action in North Africa. The Anglo-French adventure in Egypt and our reaction to it weakened NATO ties while the British White Paper on Defense for 1957, the issuance of which was hastened by the debacle at Suez, fore-shadows sharp reductions of British military power on the continent.

41

Sentiment toward neutralism, or at least toward a more passive adherence to the alliance, has been growing in some NATO countries. Many factors contribute to this psychological retreat from a nuclear reality in which they have no part, including the relative weakness of our NATO partners as compared to the Soviet Union and the United States. But perhaps the most pervasive reason is the reaction to the consequences of nuclear warfare. This anxiety has two aspects: on the one hand, Europeans recoil from the damage and destruction they believe would result from the use of any sort of atomic weapons; on the other, they are beginning to question whether the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile will not make the U.S. reluctant to risk devastation of the American mainland in order to protect Europe.

Nevertheless, whatever the disagreements within NATO, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the significance it attaches to NATO by its incessant efforts to disrupt it. The disagreements indicate, however, that in order to continue to play a major role in the protection of the free world, NATO will have to be adapted to the new conditions created by an evolving technology. It will have to find new means of political and economic collaboration and a new expression for its military strategy.

## NATO Strategy

Since 1954, NATO planning has been based on the assumption that in any major war NATO forces would use nuclear weapons from the outset. Accordingly, NATO strategy calls for the maintenance of two components: a shield of local tactical forces and a sword of nuclear retaliatory force. The shield component of NATO has a double purpose: it provides sufficient tactical forces in Western Europe to discourage or contain local aggression, and its presence notifies any possible antagonist that aggression with which these forces might not be able to cope, would trigger the second component of NATO strategy, the sword of strategic striking forces carrying nuclear weapons.

However, three factors have served to cast serious doubts upon this strategy:

The first is the Soviet development of a large-scale air-atomic capability. This has led to speculation that the "sword" of NATO

42

[LC]

—the strategic air forces of the United States and the United Kingdom—may not be unsheathed in the event of Soviet aggression on Europe for fear of a devastating attack on the United States and the United Kingdom.

The second factor is that recent trends in U.S. military policy, and perhaps even more in British military policy, have done much to discredit the NATO effort to build forces capable of resisting locally. Both countries have emphasized the massive deterrent rather than the shield force. Thus our European allies are placed in a position where they feel they can no longer rely on the retaliatory force to deter every form of war while that element of power is being stressed at the apparent expense of forces needed for their local defense. This is compounded by the fact that the retaliatory forces are not under NATO command, that of the tactical forces only the British and the Americans possess nuclear weapons, and that the opposing Soviet forces are daily increasing their capabilities to wage both strategic and tactical nuclear warfare. Under these circumstances many Europeans may well regard aggression as posing solely a choice between occupation and destruction.

A third factor making for instability is the reverse of the above: a tendency on the part of some NATO allies to seek to escape their dilemmas by a policy of disengagement and neutralism. There is an understandable temptation to depend for deterrence on the military effort of a stronger power and to rely for protection on a war fought elsewhere. The strategic striking forces in the exclusive possession of the United States and the United Kingdom tend to produce a feeling of impotence inhibiting a major effort.

## Recommendations with Respect to NATO

The problem of NATO is therefore one of will as much as of power. All partners must realize that henceforth security can be enhanced only by a sharing of risks and capabilities. And they should all be placed into a position where they are able to contribute responsibly to their own security.

To be sure, the ultimate answers to the problems of NATO may be found in the realm of policy and not of strategy. NATO to survive must generate a common sense of political economic and social purposes. Many of the difficulties of NATO are aspects of East-West

43

relations in general; others are produced by situations outside of NATO area proper. Subpanel I is dealing with the political problem at greater length and Subpanel III with the economic and social factors. Nevertheless, an alliance designed to provide protection against aggression can survive only if it is able to develop a common military strategy in which all partners can play a role. If it cannot adapt itself to new conditions, it must of necessity become sterile.

Fortunately there are two factors which seem to offer possibilities for a viable common strategy. The first of these is the disaffection in the Soviet bloc, so vividly illustrated in the cases of Hungary and Poland. This reduces the combat value of satellite forces and makes even more precarious the already tenuous line of communications between the Soviet forces in Central Europe and their home base.

The second, and more important, is the availability in quantity of tactical nuclear weapons. The battlefield advantage accruing to tactical defensive forces, through preparation of positions, prior determination of target areas and stockpiling of both nuclear and conventional munitions, offers hope that even relatively small but highly trained NATO forces could hurl back a local attack and blunt major aggression. It is perhaps too early to say that this is possible; it is crucial that we re-examine our present concept of the capabilities required to defend Western Europe in addition to the threat of strategic retaliation on the U.S.S.R.

Thus a prime element in the new strategy must be a significant strengthening of the NATO shield forces. The ability to resist local incursions will remove one temptation to aggression. The knowledge that an attack will meet with substantial local resistance provides an additional deterrent to Soviet encroachments. The United States must pursue with conviction this task of strengthening the shield forces, for it is equally in our interest to see that a conflict arising in Europe, either by design or by miscalculation, does not inevitably result in all-out war. But however earnest our effort to strengthen the shield forces it will be unavailing unless our allies are prepared to make a substantially greater contribution both in forces and in the spirit with which they approach the *common* task of defense.

A corollary of this central problem of establishing an adequate NATO shield is to provide within Europe—controlled by Europeans—an atomic and missile capability that will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U. S. and British strategic air power. This is necessary to restore the declining power position of NATO vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.

44

[L.C.]

and to give reality to the European sense of participation, which is a
basic ingredient of the will to resist.

A strong NATO shield is all the more important because one of
the purposes of the growing Soviet naval threat is undoubtedly to bring
about a situation where the Soviet Union may be able to disrupt sea
communications between us and our NATO allies by submarines and
by mining European harbors. In such a situation, the willingness to
resist a simultaneous Soviet invasion will depend importantly on the
forces available in Europe and under NATO control.

## The Role of the United States

To accomplish these objectives will require the following of the
United States: First of all, we must pool with our allies scientific and
technical information and assist in mobilizing the research and devel-
opment capability of NATO both in the civilian and the military field.
The history of science suggests that such pooling would in the long
run be of special importance to the United States which throughout its
history has drawn heavily on the intellectual resources of Europe.

Second, we must strive for a true military interdependence
which closely ties together the United States and the other NATO
powers.

Thirdly, we must acknowledge the necessity for maintaining in
Europe for an indefinite period a strong contribution to the shield
forces.

Finally, we must provide those of our allies that desire them
with nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as well as with some of
the other complex equipment of modern war. A step in the direction
of these objectives was taken at the NATO Council meeting in Decem-
ber 1957.

It would be unrealistic to say that such policies will be either
cheap or without risk. But the cost and risk of being without them
would be greater still. A strong, self-reliant Europe must always be a
major American concern. Such a Europe, continuing along its present
path toward greater unity, is a major force for peace and can play
an ever greater role in the future evolution of free society.

45

[10]

IX—Civil Defense

THERE are few problems of the atomic age with which the United
States has had greater difficulty in coming to grips than civil
defense. Because of our historic invulnerability to direct military
attack, we have treated civil defense as a minor adjunct to our over-all
strategy both in terms of planning and in the resources allocated to it.

The full civil defense problem is well beyond the scope of this
report and has been the subject of a special study in the government.
The technical possibilities of defending our cities and homes, the
costs, the impact on our national psychology and ways of working and
living present a complex of considerations deserving detailed and
separate examination. Nevertheless, the connection between civil
defense and the other elements of our national security requires a
general evaluation of the subject.

If relations with the Soviet bloc ever reach the showdown
stage, the edge of difference, which may be very fine, may well depend
on the strength of the competing wills. This in turn is likely to reflect
the relative vulnerabilities. It is an oppressive thought that such cir-
cumstances might in fact occur, but it would be irresponsible to suggest
that they are impossible. Courage in crisis, if it is to be effective and
continuing, must rest on confidence and hope.

Deterrence, in short, depends on a combination of power and
will. The factor of power requires a retaliatory capability sufficient to
overcome any enemy defense, and as invulnerable as possible to sur-
prise attack. The factor of will may hinge importantly on a reasonable
combination of active and passive defense measures. An enemy who
felt confident that he could disrupt and disorganize our society while
preserving the substance of his own might be tempted to launch an
all-out blow. Conversely the ability to afford reasonable protection to
our population may enable us to act with firmness and resolution in
times of crisis. In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability
of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important
deterrent.

Civil defense will not be easy, and it can never be complete.
Protecting against massively destructive weapons is an enormous prob-
lem. A 20-megaton thermonuclear weapon, which is by no means the

46

largest available, with a radius of surface destruction by blast and heat of between five to eight miles, will inevitably have devastating consequences.

Difficulty does not mean impotence, however. While it may be impossible to protect the population against the blast and heat of an atomic explosion, protection against radioactive fall-out and other contamination appears to be much more feasible. Equally important is increased understanding on the part of our people about the effects of modern weapons. This will enable us to respond with discipline and effectiveness to a surprise attack and it will discourage such a move because an aggressor would no longer be able to gamble that a sudden attack might disorganize our society.

It is possible to state certain general principles in relation to the development of any civil defense program:

1. Civil defense must be considered as part of the over-all U.S. strategic posture. It must be faced forthrightly. It should be part of our defense planning and included in our over-all strategic plans. Cadres charged with supervising civil defense activities, both in possible pre-attack and the post-attack phase, must be developed and trained immediately. The expense involved should be in addition to existing military outlays.

2. The American people need to be told more clearly the dimensions of the damage that would be inflicted on us by a sudden attack and about the measures to reduce its effects. Any civil defense program must have as a prerequisite a program of public information supported by the Federal Government and carried through at all levels.

3. A civil defense program should be integrated with the construction program needed for the normal development of our expanding population and economy.

An effective civil defense program can be separated into three stages:

1. To provide warning, where possible, and information about radiological levels. This requires an attack-proof radiation-level monitoring system and an attack-proof radio-net to broadcast instructions during and after an attack.

2. Protection against fall-out. It has been estimated that half of the casualties of a large-scale atomic attack or between 25-35 million might result from radioactive fall-out. A

47

fall-out shelter program could prevent such a calamity by
reducing casualties substantially.

3. *Protection against atomic blast and heat.* This is a major problem particularly in our big urban concentrations. This panel has heard testimony about the utility of deep shelters. The subject is of such complexity, however, and the costs are so very large that this report cannot go further than to commend such a program for careful study. If indeed it proves feasible, it will add greatly to our security as a nation.

The major difficulty with civil defense has been our failure to treat it as an integral part of our defense planning. The first step will have to be to construct an attack-proof radio-net, and to begin on a program of fall-out shelters. Fall-out shelters are more feasible than blast shelters because they are easier to construct and because the population does not need to enter them until *after* an enemy attack has in fact occurred. Thus in most areas a warning time of 45 minutes could be counted on. The shelter program should be carried out with a maximum degree of cooperation with local and state authorities.

In addition to the protection of the population against fall-out, provision should be made for the post-attack period. It will be highly important to plan on centers of administration and government. Stockpiling food supplies and industrial reserves in safe places will prevent famine and enable the early resumption of economic activity. At the same time a continuation of organized activity will be aided by the greatest possible degree of dispersal of industry. It would be too costly to disperse existing industrial installations but tax incentives could be provided for the location of *new* facilities away from main concentrations.

While engaging in a civil defense at home, we must be prepared to assist our allies in similar efforts. Nothing would demonstrate better our basic concern for the security of our allies than a readiness to cooperate in the protection of their populations.

The main feature to note with respect to civil defense is that it is overdue. It does not make sense for the free world to engage in a major military effort without at the same time protecting its most important resource: its civilian population.

48

# X—International Tensions and the Reduction of Armaments

## Arms and the Prospects of Peace

THE destructiveness of modern weapons has focused the hopes of mankind as never before on the attainment of a stable peace. Considerable attention has been paid to the effort of reducing tensions through the reduction and control of armaments.

This panel, as all Americans, considers the achievement of a peaceful world the primary challenge before mankind. The United States disarmed unilaterally and drastically immediately after World War II; it refused to take advantage of its atomic monopoly; it acted patiently and moderately in the face of constant Soviet provocation. Even after the Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean War had caused us to undertake a substantial rearmament program, we have responded to every seeming relaxation of tension by reducing our military establishment, sometimes even below the point of safety. In fact, many of the difficulties described in this report are due to this tendency.

The desirability of easing international tensions therefore does not require argument. It would be highly irresponsible, however, to raise hopes which cannot be fulfilled or to hold out prospects which on closer examination prove to increase our peril. However dangerous the multiplying armaments, the illusion of security brought about by a spurious agreement to disarm would be a poor substitute for vigilance based on strength.

Genuine, enforceable, inspected reduction of arms is an objective on which all Americans are agreed. Yet we must realize that of all the outstanding issues, disarmament is the most difficult problem to settle directly. There are many other problems such as German unification or Soviet subversive activities in the Middle East which, if re-

49

solved, would greatly ease tensions and thus almost automatically bring about a reduction of arms. We will make disarmament negotiations more realistic if we face their inherent difficulty frankly and if we are not seduced by Soviet slogans which in the past have used these negotiations as a means to disarm their intended victims.

The nature of disarmament must be understood if peace and not slavery is to result from efforts to attain it. It has several meanings, all of which hide great complexities: the reduction of forces, the control of arms, the prevention of surprise attack and the end of bomb testing. Each will be considered in turn.

## The Reduction and Control of Arms

Reduction of forces is bound to be difficult to negotiate because it seeks to compare unlike quantities. What for example is the relation between the United States Strategic Air Command and the ability of Soviet ground forces to overrun nearby countries? How does one compare an aircraft carrier to an armored division? If the United States disbanded its Strategic Air Command, it would take a decade at least to reconstitute. The Soviet Union can demobilize parts of its vast army and still retain the ability to reassemble it from reserve components at very short notice.

Moreover, the Soviet Union is not likely to accept a reduction of forces which curtailed its ability to control the satellites and to play a major role in areas like the Middle East. But forces sufficient to accomplish these tasks are also sufficient to imperil all the powers on the Soviet borders. A reduction of forces which leaves unimpaired the Soviet ability to overrun its neighbors will not diminish the basic security problem of the non-Soviet world.

A reduction of armaments is not meaningful unless it contains safeguards against violations of the agreement. But effective control has been complicated by the increasingly rapid advance of technology. Scientific research and development can decide the armament race. Hence no reduction in standing forces, however scrupulously carried out, can protect a nation against a technological development which drastically changes the strategic balance. The fact that so much of the armaments race occurs in laboratories makes control and inspection more and more complex. It is difficult to find something when one does not know what it is one is looking for.

50

[lc]

Many control schemes which would have been effective had they been accepted at the *beginning* of a given scientific development become meaningless when that range of technology is fully developed. Thus acceptance by the Soviet Union of the U. S. Baruch-Lilienthal plan of 1946 which proposed the control and inspection of the production of fissionable material might have practically eliminated the possibility of nuclear war. In the meantime so much fissionable material has been produced and it is so easily hidden that no control scheme could completely guarantee against a violation. And the spread of fissionable materials through the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will complicate the problem even further.

## The Problem of Surprise Attack

Because a controlled and verifiable reduction in forces has proved so complicated, a major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to the prevention of surprise attack. It is often argued that an inspection system which reduced the danger of surprise attack also would remove some of the urgent strains from international relationships.

There is no doubt that the danger of surprise attack contributes to the tensions of the nuclear age. But with evolving technology it is questionable whether aerial inspection will significantly reduce the element of surprise. The high state of readiness required of strategic striking forces means that they need no noticeable mobilization to launch their blow. As the speed of planes increases, warning times will be progressively reduced. And in the age of the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, which is close upon us, the maximum warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection system will be half an hour, the period of time the missile will be in transit. Under such circumstances, even a foolproof inspection system will tell largely what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning.

But if aerial inspection can no longer protect against surprise attack, it can reveal an almost equally grave threat from hidden installations. Even a partial inspection system, operated by the U.N., would protect the world to a degree from hidden military capabilities. But more than this is unlikely from aerial inspection. Much as we would like to be more optimistic, we cannot see how present vigilance could

51

be reduced or insecurity be removed, by any aerial inspection system
now in prospect.

## The Problem of War Limitation

This study has considered various suggestions for preventing
the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation or through
the spreading of small wars. It seems doubtful that ground rules for
the conduct of limited war could be established by mutual agreement,
since in order to undermine the will to resist, the Soviet Union has
every interest in painting the consequences of resistance in the direst
terms. Nevertheless, it would seem wise for the U. S. to include on
the agenda of disarmament negotiations concrete proposals to limit such
wars as may be forced on us to the smallest necessary dimensions. Even
should the Soviet Union reject our proposals, they would serve to
clarify our intentions and make less likely a war caused by miscalculation.
Even a unilateral declaration which gave an indication of some
of the steps we propose to follow to achieve the goal of reducing non-
combatant casualties, such as a decision to use only weapons without
substantial fall-out effects, would give an opponent a strong incentive
to follow suit.

The value of unilateral declarations is proved by the experience
of World War II. Neither the Soviet Union nor Japan had ratified the
Geneva convention of 1929 with respect to the treatment of war
prisoners. Yet on June 27, 1941 the U. S. S. R. informed the International
Committee of the Red Cross of its decision to adhere to the
convention and within a week of the outbreak of the war Japan
announced that it would abide by the Prisoners of War convention.
Though violations undoubtedly occurred, this indicates that both countries
saw an advantage in projecting themselves before the world as
subscribers to rules of war. Clear United States declarations, firmly
adhered to, might provide a similar framework for mitigating the
consequences of modern war.

## The Issue of Testing

Despite the vital importance of nuclear weapons to our survival,
it would be irresponsible to be blind to the hazards inherent in their
use. An indiscriminate and all-out use of existing nuclear stockpiles

52

would bring about an extremely serious level of radiation on the entire
planet.

The growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has been aptly
described as the "balance of terror." It is a condition which some have
incorrectly interpreted as a static, unchanging, nuclear "stalemate" or
"standoff." Nothing could be further from the truth.

Nuclear deterrence is immensely complicated, since each new
scientific advance, if applied by one side and not the other, is capable
of overturning the strategic equation. In a dynamic situation, we must
continually strive to improve our technological position lest an accumu-
lation of advances by an aggressor ultimately confront us with over-
whelming strength. It is this situation which should cause us to be
extremely wary about ending nuclear weapons testing.

It has been proposed to start disarmament by an agreement to
stop tests of nuclear weapons. It has been claimed that such a ban
would be self-policing. Nuclear tests are said to be a hazard to the
health of all people and of generations yet unborn; and they are
represented as leading to ever more horrible weapons.

Unfortunately a nuclear test is easily recorded or monitored
only if no serious attempt is made to keep it secret. If a nation wants
to hide its tests, observation will become very complicated and uncer-
tain. To be sure, secret tests require considerable effort. But the
Soviet Union has never spared resources in order to secure a military
advantage. On the other hand, our history and our free society make
it certain that we will respect the international obligations which we
undertake.

As to the medical danger, there is much evidence to indicate
that past tests have had a much smaller effect on public health than
other biological effects to which mankind is constantly exposed. The
accumulated radiation from weapons tests is only an insignificant frac-
tion of the dosage to which most Americans are exposed from X-rays.
To be sure, exposure to *any* additional radiation should be avoided. As
in the case of X-rays what is involved, however, is a balancing of risks.
The dangers of continued weapons testing must be weighed against
the hazards inherent in conducting them. If an end of weapons testing
weakened the deterrent and made a war more likely, or more cata-
strophic, we would have brought on what we most wished to avoid.

As long as the production of fissionable material continues, an
end of weapons testing would probably ensure that any future war
would take the most extreme form. It would have to be fought with

53

weapons in their present state of development and past tests on both sides have concentrated on the most powerful devices. Conversely, since the most destructive weapons have already been tested, further tests will enable us to use nuclear arms in a more discriminating manner. By increasing our capability for limited war this will add to the deterrent to local aggression. At the same time continued testing may enable us to reduce radioactive fall-out to the point where we will become increasingly able to confine any war which may be forced on us to our opponent's war machine. And it may make possible the development of nuclear anti-aircraft or anti-missile weapons to protect our population against enemy attack.

Thus, a ban on weapon testing without adequate inspection and without an end to the production of nuclear weapons would be beneficial only to the side prepared to violate the agreement. Our strong desire for peace and security should not induce us to buy the semblance of one at the expense of the other.

## The Prospect of Peace

A world from which the threat of war has been removed would correspond to the deepest desires of American society. But peace cannot be attained by wishing for it. It requires patience, understanding and determination. We must always stand ready to negotiate on the issues that divide the world including disarmament. But until the Soviet Union has shown a greater willingness to settle these disputes on terms other than her own, it would be dangerous for us not to be wary of a power that has brutally suppressed Hungarian freedom, fanned the flames of violence elsewhere and constantly threatens the world with rocket and nuclear attacks. As soon as the Soviet Union shows a sincere willingness to help in the construction of a peaceful world order it will be able to count on an eager American cooperation in any disarmament effort.

54

[LC]

# XI—Budget for National Security

ACHIEVEMENT of the objectives of our national security programs in the years ahead hinges on the availability of financial resources and the manner in which they are applied. There is grave reason for concern with respect to the inadequacy of recent levels of military appropriations as well as with respect to the workings of the budgetary process.

## The Budgetary Level

Programs of great importance to U.S. security now suffer from insufficient funds. Several reasons have brought about this state of affairs. When the Korean War ended, it was natural that an effort be made to reduce military expenditures. But the execution of the reductions has had serious consequences which did not become evident for some time because of a backlog of unspent appropriations. For example, the momentum of the Air Force build-up continued until unspent appropriations from 1952 and 1953 ran out. Similarly, Army procurement has been financed well into 1956 from pre-1954 appropriations.

The result has been a serious imbalance in our military preparedness. Recent budgetary ceilings could be maintained only by a reduction of forces in all services, a process which has been slowly going on for the past three years. The budgetary squeeze affected not only force-levels, it also slowed down our research effort in many fields causing us to lose ground to the U.S.S.R.

Recent military expenditures are therefore insufficient to maintain even our current force levels. And events have made clear the inadequacy of these levels. This panel has noted these major shortcomings in our strategic posture:

### Strategic Forces

1. Aircraft procurement to modernize existing units will have

55

to be authorized into the 1960's. Otherwise, a gap in ready forces between the latest types of manned aircraft and the operational stage of ballistic missiles seems unavoidable. We cannot risk obsolescence of present weapons before new ones are ready.

2. At the same time we should press for the most rapid development and procurement of operational Intermediate Range and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

3. The base structure of the Strategic Air Command, long out of phase with other elements in its program, should be made less vulnerable to surprise attack through dispersion and other protective measures.

4. Accelerated research and development support should be provided for all key programs including missiles and advance reconnaissance systems.

5. The SAC alert time should be reduced. As the Soviet strength in missiles increases, the maximum warning time available will probably not exceed 20 minutes. It is therefore essential that as long as we rely on manned planes, the Strategic Air Command achieve a 15 minute alert time.

6. The establishment of a retaliatory system based on missile-launching submarines should be expedited.

## Active Defense

Today, the U.S.S.R. can attack the U.S. with a strong bomber force. In a few years it will be able to attack with a stronger bomber force, submarine-launched missiles, and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

Whichever side first achieves a strong defense will be in a strong psychological position. The stronger the active defense, the more it reduces the threat of the opposing strategic striking force.

Our early warning and anti-missile defense systems therefore require greater attention.

## Forces for Limited War

To provide the mobile units essential for limited war, additional troop lift should be authorized in the form both of modern aircraft and modern ships.

56

[LC]

The Army should be permitted to speed up the modernization of its weapons and of its division structure.

## Navy

Anti-submarine warfare requires additional funds. The program of equipping both surface and underwater ships with missiles of various types should be accelerated. We require a large number of modern, nuclear-powered submarines.

## Personnel

With the complexity of modern weapons, the importance of a highly competent professional force has never been greater. But despite recent increases present pay scales are inadequate to retain the skilled officers and men necessary to an effective and economic military establishment. Neither are we attracting a sufficient number of the best of our youth to military careers.

## Civil Defense

A start should be made without delay on a program of fall-out shelters and related warning and communications equipment.

## Mutual Assistance

The re-equipping of allied forces, particularly in NATO, with modern weapons should be speeded up.

## The Level of Effort

The above deficiencies in our strategic posture can be removed only by substantially increased defense expenditures. These increases will run into billions of dollars and must rise substantially in each of the next few years. This panel does not possess the data to determine

57

the precise budgetary level. The best testimony it has heard indicates
that the deficiencies noted above will require successive additions on
the order of $3 billion each year for the next several fiscal years. This
figure does not cover the necessary increases in mutual assistance pro-
grams and in civilian defense. Because we must maintain our present
forces, particularly of manned planes, even while we go into production
on new weapons, such as missiles, the cost of military programs will
continue to rise with no leveling-off likely before 1965.

This is a heavy burden, even though its effects will be cushioned
by the expected growth of our Gross National Product. The impact
of defense spending on our national economy will be discussed by
Subpanel IV. It is worth noting here that the proposed increases in
expenditures will be ineffective or reduced in value if national policies
permit any important reduction in the purchasing power of the dollar.

The price of survival, then, is not low. This panel is convinced
however that the increases in defense expenditures are essential and
fully justified provided that the greater expenditure is coupled with
increased efficiency. We can afford to survive.

The Budgetary Process

An increased defense effort will not be fully effective unless it
is accompanied by the organizational changes outlined in Section VII.
These in turn can be prompted by improvements in existing methods
of presenting the budget.

The budgetary process could be greatly improved if military
budgets were prepared and presented in more discriminating terms.
The present method of preparation does not give the President, the
Secretary of Defense, Congress or the public a clear indication of what
the funds requested will accomplish in terms of military missions or
effective units. As a result, it is natural for Congress to make reduc-
tions by percentage cuts across-the-board, without the opportunity for
a full examination of the effect on strategy and military missions.

Complete budgetary reform may not be immediately feasible.
However, a start can be made toward a system that corresponds more
closely to a coherent strategic doctrine. It should not be too difficult,
for example, to restate the presentation of the service budgets, so that
instead of the present categories of "procurement," "operation and
maintenance," "military personnel," etc., there would be a much better

58

indication of how much goes, for example, to strategic air, to air defense, to anti-submarine warfare and so on.

Another highly desirable change is to transform the present one-year budget cycle to two years. Under present rules, the top personnel of the services spend a great part of six months of every year preparing, justifying and revising the budgetary requests of their departments. Much of the next six months are consumed in testifying before congressional committees and otherwise defending the service budgets as approved by the President. If the budgetary process would extend over an entire congressional term, the energies of key personnel could be directed toward strategic doctrine and overall management. At the same time congressional control would be more meaningful because the examination of requests could then be more careful.

59

XII—Conclusion

NO ASPECT of America's problems presents a deeper challenge than the field of national security. It is not only because the technical problems are so complex, though an accelerating technology will test severely our wisdom and our ability to make choices. Nor is the economic challenge the most complicated one we face, though the price of security in the nuclear age is high and likely to increase. It is not even the field of strategic doctrine which presents our deepest problem though military strength is sterile without a doctrine for employing it.

Rather our long-run difficulty resides in our approach to the problem of the role of force. We like to believe that reasonable men can settle all disputes through good-will and compromise and that power should be invoked only as a last resort. We therefore tend to think of diplomacy and force as successive and separate phases of national policy. Unfortunately the position in which we find ourselves does not permit such absolute distinctions. In a revolutionary period the ability and willingness to use force may in itself provide a factor of stability. To a world threatened by aggression and infiltration American strength and resolution are essential if there is to be a guarantee of security.

To be sure, this may not always be apparent in the public declarations of other nations. To countries primarily concerned with domestic development, foreign aggression may seem unreal and the measures required to resist it may appear as irritating interruptions of more primary tasks. But while we should have full understanding for the psychology which produces these reactions, we would be wrong to gear our policy to it. Force will not solve the problems of this period but the resolution to use it if necessary may afford the breathing spell in which nations can work out their own destiny without foreign interference. We must not forget that the neutrality of many nations is possible only as long as we are strong, just as for a century and a half the British navy made possible our American neutrality. Many of our most vocal critics would be deeply troubled were the protection of our military strength suddenly withdrawn.

Power is a fact whether it be ours or that of the Soviet Union. Its existence cannot be ignored. The dilemmas which it imposes cannot be wished away. Yet the destructiveness of modern weapons confronts us with a moral dilemma. The extensive and indiscriminate use

60

of modern weapons in war runs counter to our deepest sense of private and public morality. We should seek to prevent war and to limit it if it breaks out to the smallest area, terminate it as rapidly and decisively as possible, and conduct it with the minimum loss of life. Yet in a conflict between despotism and freedom, it would be immoral were we to shrink from an adequate defense of the values for which we stand. The very shrinking may serve to precipitate armed conflict.

We are engaged in the phase of a global struggle which has come to be known as the cold war. In this report we have tried to set forth measures which we feel are imperative in the interest of national security. We consider them essential if we are to reduce the likelihood of war and to make sure that if in spite of all our efforts war should be forced upon us, we shall not be overwhelmed by it.

The cold war poses a two-fold dilemma: In our desire for peace, we must not overlook the importance of power in maintaining it. But once we have recognized the role of force we must forever beware that it does not become an end in itself. The more drastic the consequences of modern war, the more we must make certain that we are true to the principles the defense of which alone justifies resort to force. These are facts which we must never forget in the middle of the cold war.

When the security of the United States and of the free world is at stake, cost cannot be the basic consideration. The cold war cannot be won and a "hot" war cannot be avoided without a major effort. This is clearly not time for complacency; it is just as clearly not a time for hysteria. What is required throughout the country is an attitude of sustained and informed determination. If this report makes a contribution to the emergence of such an attitude, it will have served its purpose.

61

## Summary of Main Points

The Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. is an attempt to assess major problems and opportunities which are likely to confront America over the next ten to fifteen years.

This report on international security is the work of Panel II which is one of seven panels. The others deal with United States international objectives, foreign economic policy, domestic economic and social objectives, education and manpower, the democratic process and the moral framework of national purpose. Thus security was only one of our concerns. While it is the most urgent, it is not in the long run necessarily the most important. We are concerned with national security because we *must* be. We are concerned with more positive tasks because we *want* to be. Security defines our military necessities. Our other panels will deal with our hopes and our humane necessities.

Each of the members of the overall panel has also served on one of the subpanels. We have been meeting regularly since November 1956. Obviously we are most familiar with the subpanels on which we have served. But we have heard periodic reports from all other groups. We have considered the draft of this report at various stages of preparation and we have gone over the final draft in full committee. Not every member of our group necessarily endorses every detail, but we have approved its substance and we strongly urge implementation of its recommendations.

It is the judgment of the panel that prepared this report that all is not well with present U.S. security policies and operations. The over-all U.S. strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense organization is unrelated in major ways to critically important military missions. Systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management are out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military developments. The United States system of alliances must be adapted to constantly changing strategic requirements. The United States is rapidly losing its lead in the race of military technology.

In brief the conclusions of the panel are:

I. The world knows that we would never fight a preventive war. But we and the rest of the free world must be prepared to resist any one of three types of aggression: all-out war, limited war, and non-overt aggression concealed as internal take-over by coup d'état or by civil war.

II. In order to deter aggression, we must be prepared to fight a nuclear war either all-out or limited.

III. At present there are major shortcomings in our posture

62

for both all-out and limited war. Our retaliatory force is inadequately dispersed and protected. Our active and passive defense is insufficient. Moreover, we lack mobility and versatility for limited war.

#### IV. Basic changes in our defense organization are recommended to correct the inefficiency and duplication of effort growing out of interservice rivalry.

a) The military departments should be removed from the channel of operational command.

b) All of the operational military forces of the United States should be organized into unified commands to perform missions which are called for by our strategic requirements.

c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be designated Principal Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

e) All officers above the rank of Brigadier General or equivalent should receive their permanent promotions from the Department of Defense and would become officers of the Armed Forces of the United States.

g) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the three military departments.

h) The Secretary of Defense should be given direct authority over all research, development and procurement. He should have the right of cancellation and transfer of service programs together with their appropriations. He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of research and development programs at the Defense Department level.

#### V. We must strengthen the regional groups of nations, not as an alternative to the U.N. but as its complement in line with Article 51 of the Charter.

#### VI. The U.S. must make a concerted effort to meet the joint security requirements of all partners in the alliances in which we participate by contributing to the development of a common strategic concept, by assisting in the re-equipping of allied forces by fostering political cohesion and by economic and technical cooperation.

63

VII. We must pool with our allies in NATO scientific and technical information, and provide them with nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

VIII. Civil defense must be part of our over-all strategic posture. A program must be undertaken to include a warning system and fall-out shelters.

IX. We must face the fact that a meaningful reduction of armaments must be preceded by a reduction of tensions and a settlement of outstanding issues that have divided the world since World War II. At the same time, concrete proposals to limit such wars as might be forced on us should be introduced into negotiations on reduction in forces. Even if the Soviet Union should reject our proposals, a unilateral declaration might give it a strong incentive to follow suit.

X. Starting immediately, defense expenditures must be increased substantially over the next few years. Testimony indicates that current deficiencies in our strategic posture require additional expenditures each year of approximately $3 billion for the next several years. This does not include necessary increased appropriations for mutual assistance and for civil defense. Because we must maintain our present forces as we go into production on new weapons, such as missiles, the cost of military programs will continue to rise until at least 1965.

Specific recommendations include the following:

a) Aircraft procurement to modernize existing units be authorized into the 1960's while pressing for the most rapid development of operational Intermediate Range and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

b) The SAC base structure be made less vulnerable to surprise attack through dispersion and other protective measures.

c) An accelerated research and development support be provided for such key programs as missiles.

d) Additional troop transport be authorized in the form of modern aircraft and ships.

e) The program of equipping both surface and underwater ships with missiles of various types be accelerated and additional funds for anti-submarine defense be provided.

f) Military pay scales be raised to retain skilled officers and men.

PRINTED BY PUBLISHERS PRINTING-ROGERS KELLOGG CORP., N. Y.

DOUBLEDAY HEADLINE
PUBLICATIONS

Doubleday Headline Publications give busy, modern, thinking people a unique perspective on the news. More comprehensive than newspapers and TV, more timely than regularly-produced books, Doubleday Headline Publications clarify the major issues and crises of our times.