TelCon
John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

10:15 am, Jan. 5, 1973

K: Hello.

S: John Scali,

K: John, I have heard from a number of newsmen around town
that you told them that the President wrote letters to Pham
Van Duong during the bombing.

S: Oh, Henry, you couldn't have heard that because I haven't said
that to anybody.

K: No, no, I'm telling you what they told me.

S: Well, I don't know who you are talking to, Henry, but it is
completely and totally untrue because I don't know that the
President had sent any letter to Pham Van Duong.

K: Look, I'm not--the major problem I have, John, is we can't
have that sotry printed because he didn't send any letters to
Pham Van Duong. And, you know, they may have done this to
bait me.

S: Henry, the only thing I have said is at Col. Kennedy's request,
mainly that we were in touch with Hanoi for ten days.

K: And that was correct, that was--

S: Period.

K: No, no, that was my request through Col. Kennedy. I wanted
you to do that.

S: Yeah. The only think that I have said in an effort to disprove
that it was either a domestic or international outcry was--

K: That's exactly right.

S: Now, I have not said in any way that it involved direct communica-
tions between the President of the United States and Pham Van Duong.

K: Well, my concern, John, is to prevent that story from being printed
because if it does get printed--

S: Well, ah, what reporters have you heard this from, Henry. I mean I can go them and say, listen fellows, I understand you have some bum information.

K: Well, the ones I've heard it from I've already corrected. I said there were communications for ten days but they never take the form of a personal letter. So it didn't--

S: As a matter of fact, I assumed all along that there were just a series of messages---

K: That's exactly right.

S: And that I don't know who signs off on them but I didn't think the President of the United States was signing off on them.

K: Of course, the President sees them all.

S: Yeah. I assume they were messages from you.

K: That's right, but--

S: On behalf of the Government.

K: Well, but, you know, nobody's name is mentioned, they simply say the U.S. side believes--you know.

S: Well, sure--

K: You know, they don't state who they are from exactly. They are not in the form of a personal letter.

S: I understand.

K: Well, to the extent that people raise that issue, the people I've talked to I've straightened it out in a way that's not embarrassing to anybody.

S: Well, I am just flabbergasted, because I have not remotely said anything like this. All I've ever said was that the--an exchange of messages --

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K: Well, you know what they may have done, John, is there was one exchange of letters between Pham Van Duong and the President in October. It's the only one that ever happened.

S: Well, maybe they just went on from that to assume.

K: And that was published by the North Vietnamese. So it's quite
possible that they assume that every message comes from the
President.

S: Henry, as a matter of fact, I have been so super cautious on this whole thing and in doing the kind of things I thought would please you, but I--

K: I didn't take this as a reflection on me. The only reason I raise this - there wouldn't be a reflection on me. The only reason I raise it is because if it appears, and if then the North Vietnamese say this it's a God damned lie, we'd be--

S: It would hurt us, it will hurt your negotiation position among other things. I mean the Government's negotiations.

K: I have no complaints whatever about what you've done.

S: Because I just sort of knocked myself out here during this period and--

K: But if anyone should ask you about it, of the people you are in touch with, I would just put it on the basis that they were directoral exchanges through our private channels.

S: All right, okay. I'm pleased to make that emphatically clear. I thought I'd already made it clear, but I'll take special pains.

K: Okay, fine.

S: Many thanks.

K: Fine.

TELCONE

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

11:03 a.m. - 1/5/73

K: Hello.

S: Did you see Gwertzman's column this morning?

K: Yeh, the President saw it before I did.

S: Well, I talked to Warren and told him I would be glad to write
a letter to the _Times_ denying it.

K: Well, it's up to you.

S: I certainly had nothing to do with it, I can assure you.

K: Well, that I'm sure of, but that's entirely up to you what you want to do.

S: Well, it's not factual that that was my motivation and I'd be very happy to write the _Times_ and so state. I'll send a letter to Warren and give him my epoxy. If there's no interest in the thing I think it'd probably be well to not continue it but if there is we ought to have a denial.

K: That's entirely right, but you know I think it's a question of what you think should be done.

S: Well, I'd like to make the record clear.

K: OK, well it's entirely up to you.

S: All right. Will you tell the President I'm very sorry about this and I had nothing to do with it.

K: I will certainly tell him.

S: Thanks a lot, Henry.

K: Bye.

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger

11:13 A. M. January 5, 1973

K: Hello.

H: Bob, Henry.

K: Yes, Bob.

H: Ron was just going over his briefing stuff and the question arises as to what he should say on the Kraft thing and you know Kissinger opposing the bombing. How should he approach that?

K: It's total nonsense. Say it's total nonsense or whatever you think is appropriate.

H: OK

H: Did any of them hit you on that?

K: No, what I always say is --the only people I talked to was last week when TIME was doing that story and they got it right--they said the President and I were together on it and with the others. I always that as a question of principle I don't give a check list of what I recommend to the President, but on this one, I will leave no question that I have been in total agreement. I don't think it is a good idea for us to give a checklist.

H: Right.

K: And leave the impression that I have the right to disagree with the President -- well it is even conceivable that I would take an independent position on these things.

H: Yeh, okay. I didn't see the Kraft thing--there was a Kraft thing this morning.

K: No, there was a Kraft thing yesterday--the Kraft thing was less strong than the Reston (?), but Kraft's point was that he didn't know what my view was, but obviously I didn't fight against it and I have been so compromised now that I should resign--that was the basic point. I have been compromised both by being stabbed in the back here and by an ineffective role--that was Kraft's point, he didn't say I was opposed to it.

H: Hmm, huh. Okay. All right, I'll just tell him to shoot it down, then.

K: That's fine with me.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Sen. Hugh Scott

11:20 a.m. 1/5/73

HK: Hugh, how are you?

HS: Fine.

HK: I am seeing Mike Mansfield tomorrow to give him some of a general briefing, and I was wondering whether it might be a good idea for you to come over today with perhaps Gerry Ford.

HS: Okay, can do. What time?

HK: I haven't been able to reach Gerry yet--about 5:00 o'clock--

HS: Five o'clock is all right--we have a reception down there a little later--

HK: Do you want to come then, before the reception? 6:15--what time is the reception? 6:00

HS: I can tell you in a moment--I think 5 o'clock would be best

HK: Good, I won't have an hour because I have about 1/2 hr--

HS: Why don't you make it 5:30 then?

HK: Because I have a farewell party for General Haig

HS: Couldn't you do it for 5:30?

HK: No that is for 5:30--they've invited a lot of guests for it

HS: Oh, I see, yeh.

HK: You can drop down with me for a few minutes.

HS: Yeh, why don't we make it 5:00 then.

HK: Good let's make it 5 o'clock--

HS: And if Gerry and I want to see anyone else at the WH, we can at 5:30 with somebody--I have no body to see--thanks a lot, I'll see you a 5:00

HK: Good.

TELCONE

Ben Bradley/Mr. Kissinger

1/5/73 11:34 a.m.

HK: Hello, I've got another Maxine Cheshire problem.

BB: Oh God, what?

HK: (Laughing) The only reason I complain is that I don't want to give
the impression that I was galavanting while the war was going on.

BB: No, what--did we have something this morning?

HK: No, yesterday she had something that said I went to Frank Sinatra's house on New Year's Eve till 5:30 a. m. and danced with Ginger Rogers and so forth-- you know it's not a crime, it's just the mood of the situation.

BB: Yes, it is.

HK: The point is I arrived alone, I left alone and I didn't dance with Ginger Rogers, otherwise, it was accurate.

BB: Hmm huh.

HK: I don't want to make a big affair of it and if it weren't for the sensibilities that are involved at this moment, I wouldn't say anything. I don't want a big thing made of it.

BB: No, I will reinstitute the system I had when your name was mentioned
I'd just like to see it before it goes in.

HK: That's my only concern and that's because it's just the sensibilities of people--

BB: Quite properly.
Listen, have you heard about Murray?

HK: Yeh.

BB: What do you think of that?

HK: I think it's interesting.

BB: Why did they let him in?

HK: I think want to get their side out and--

BB: You think that because we were having troubles with the WH had anything to do with it?

Page 2

HK: I can think of no reporter I'd rather have there than Murray.

BB: That's nice.

HK: I mean he--
Should

should

BB: I don't think I know anything from you before he goes--did you talk to him, should--

HK: I have the time, when is he leaving?

BB: Technically, he's leaving Sunday.

HK: How is he going?

BB: Well, he was not going through Paris--you don't have a spare seat on plane do you?

HK: Our relations aren't that good.

BB: (laughing)
he

HK: But if were coming through Paris it would actually be easier for me to see him there for many reasons--but above all for time reasons.

BB: Yeh--can you think of a time now when you could see on Sunday--

HK: Sunday wouldn't be so good, but I might see him for breakfast on Monday morning.

BB: Breakfast Monday morning.
Let me see his schedule--I have a feeling he's headed the other way.
Let me relay that to him, Henry. Is there anytime you could see him beforehand?

HK: It's almost impossible.

BB: Yeh, okay.

HK: It really is practically impossible. I have to go to Camp David tomorrow. And I have almost no other time--maybe tonight at some point.

BB: Okay, maybe I'll ask him to call you.

HK: Ask him to do that.

BB: Good.

TELCORN

Henry Kissinger/Bill Timmons

1/5/73 11:44 a.m.

BT: Henry, Bill Timmons.

HK: Yes, Bill.

BT: What are you setting up with the leaders?

HK: Listen, you talk to Haldeman--I was instructed by the President to
see Scott and Ford.

BT: Uh huh.

K: And to see Mansfield tomorrow morning.

BT: Well, that's all right if we know about it we can cover our planks.
The problem we had is when we catch it on the Hill and we don't
even know about meeting--it's embarrassing to us--

HK: That's between you Haldeman and the President--I am just getting
sick and tired of being on a schedule every 15 minutes--being knifed
in the back when it suits people's purpose, being trotted out when it
suits people's purpose and I have no desire to see any goddamn
congressman

BT: Um huh. It's helpful, mind you, but it just helps us to--

HK: Well, let Haldeman inform you--the President ordered me to call Mansfield and Scott and Ford. I haven't reached Ford yet--

BT: Well, you want him at 5:00--

HK: Yeh

BT: Along with Scott.

HK: Right, if we can avoid getting that into every newspaper it would help.

BT: I'll tell them to keep it quiet--they've got to be here for a reception anyway and they can just come early for the reception.

HK: Right. I have from 5:00-5:30 and you of course can sit in.

BT: All right, fine. Thank you.

HK: All right.

TelCon
Secy. Laird/Mr. Kissinger

12:12 pm, January 5, 1973

K: Hello.

L: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. Mel, I don't think that they want you to have a press
conference today.

L: That's fine. You know, Henry, I think that, you know, you get
yourself wrapped around whichever way you go; if I continue to
be quiet I think they'll contribute that silence to whatever they
want to, but it doesn't bother me as long as it doesn't bother you.

K: Well, that's the decision of the people who claim they know some-
thing about public relations.

L: Right. Now we will not have any briefings to Committees or
anyone else that is open on Vietnam--

K: No, Rogers called me and said he saw on the ticker that you are
have open testimony on Monday.

L: That isn't on that, that is on a report on the Department of Defense
in the--based on Vietnam will be closed on Tuesday before that
Committee, it's a closed meeting.

K: Yeah, but the problem is Mel, is that if Rogers has declined to
appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee how can you
testify --

L: Well, this is something that has been set up months ago and it has
nothing to do with Vietnam. And I won't answer questions on it.
That's public.

K: No, no, I'm talking about the Executive session.

L: We will not have one. The Executive session will be Tuesday and
it will be closed.

K: I know it will be closed, but the problem that concerns me is how
can we maintain the position that Rogers can't testify and you can.

L: Well, I won't go on Tuesday, then, I'll send Tom Moorer and let him do it himself. We've given to the leadership of those committees the pictures and everything else, and now I'll just have Moorer and I won't go.

BROADCROSS

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~~ B. MARRI DUE 5/10/73 ~~

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/John Chancellor

1/5/73 12:22 p. m.

JC: How are you Henry?

HK: John, fine, how are you?

JC: Well, I'm tired and I've had the flu and I'm physically kind of down but otherwise all right. I haven't called you because you've been busy, I know and I've been up here mainly suffering with my--

HK: Right.

JC: You're going on Sunday?

HK: Yes.

JC: I'd love to see you before you go.

HK: Ohph. That's going to be impossible--Are you going to be overthere?

JC: Not at this juncture.

HK: Why don't we get together after I return.

JC: All right, I'd love to see you then and I'll callyou as soon as I know you're coming back.

HK: Good, and we'll definitely get together, we'll have lunch the week after I return.

JC: Oh, well that's fine.

HK: Let me raise one point with you John, You mentioned yesterday that Haig and I had policy disagreements--

HK: I haven't seen the actual text of what you said.

JC: All I said was that there were some indications that you and he did not see exactly eye to eye on some of the terms of the ceasefire.

HK: Well that isn't true or if it is true I'm not aware of it.

JC: Well, let me tell you one of the things that we did have--that was going around--you may be aware of it

HK: No.

JC: I have some notes here hold on a second--I don't have it right in front of me--but one of the things we have been told is that Haig

Page 2

had tried to harden up some of the things you said on the 16th that the word charade--I recall this now--the word was going around from various sources and I can't tell you who told me--that the word charade had been a suggestion of Haig's and there were one or two other formulations on the 16th that he asked to be put into public record that seemed to indicate--the one thing that I thought was uncharacteristic of you and we also had this from a fairly good source--I did not say it idly Henry at all--

HK: Look John, if you were not a responsible person--of course, you wouldn't say it idly. In this town, you can never tell. If there are disagreements between Haig and me, he's hidden them from me.

JC: (laughs)

HK: And it is practically inconceivable to me that he would go around implying disagreement.

JC: It didn't come from him--it came from someone who was in a position to have known--secondhand, but nevertheless fairly close

HK: Hmmm.

JC: And I hope I haven't given you or Haig that he said it.

HK: Oh no, no, no, no, no, you didn't. I am not conscious of this--it's never been expressed to me and I--my press conference is always extemporaneous so I can't make him responsible for what I said

JC: I wish I could find the other two examples that we had--as a matter of fact I didn't see that there was a lot of utility of running that story--here it is, I just found it hold on a second. The word that we had was that the phrase will not be charmed into agreement either" was added to what you planned to say and that Haig himself had suggested the use of the word charade. Now we had--that was the 16th of December?

HK: Yeah.

JC: I got word on that probably on Monday or Tuesday following and because I didn't see that it will help or advance the story any particular way, I didn't use it and I used it in passing only and really I have given you the entire item--

HK: Haig doesn't have that sort of influence. He's a good friend and invaluable aide and a man I respect and admire tremendously, but I wouldn't let him tell me what to say.

JC: What it finally got to me was that he and the President were suggesting you say various things and I didn't--as I say we haven't run any of that

Page 3

nor do we intend to. But I thought last night as long as he is leaving
that job for the record I would just put in one sentence there may have
been indications.

HK: You know it's not the most world shaking event--it's just Joe Kraft had a column yesterday.

JC: I didn't Joe's column didn't made a lot of sense.

HK: No, I didn't fully understand it and you in the evening so I thought that
--you are both serious people--that

JC: I don't know where Joe got it. I noticed two things in his column yesterday
one is that he is escalating his language which I think is an unusual way
way--talking about I think murder bombing.

HK: Yeh, which is really unfair.

JC: And the other thing is that the headline writer at the *Post* whoever --it
gave the impression because I looked at this and I thought ah--here's
something about Haig, it turned out that it really wasn't about Haig. The
only reason--I am delighted to hear you say what you said, the only reason
I put something in there last night because it was his last night.

HK: Obviously before I have a press conference, I talk to the President and
obviously I take the President's suggestions seriously and obviously I
don't give a check list of who says or recommends what--now I cannot
exclude that the President talked to Haig--it seems to me almost inconceivable
however that Haig would tell someto the President that he hasn't told
me.

JC: I agree.

HK: It's literally inconceivable to me. And Haig was not present when I talked
to the President.

JC: Oh, well, maybe we were then given wrong information. But --I'm sorry.

HK: I repeat I have enormous admiration and respect for Haig and I'm not
conscious of any policy disagreements--he's a military man, so obviously
he has inherently a slightly different perspective--I have a more historical
approach than he does, but that's why he was hired.

JC: Hm huh. The part of the reasoning, part of the spectualtion that was going
on and not very much of this ever got in the papers was that that Haig
being a military man and having been advanced over a number of other
generals and going on to a job of considerable importance in the Defense

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Department had a particular constituency he wanted to protect or at least keep in mind and I think you can say that bottle is half full or half empty--

HK: I think Haig has to speak for himself--all I can say Haig never expressed such views to me and given the relationship it is almost inconceivable to me that he would go to the President behind my back--

JC: Right. The way we had it was that you were all in there together, and see that's not true.

HK: Well, you know, sometimes were and sometimes weren't-- I am just not conscious of Haig--and the President's suggestions tend to be about the basic orientation more than specific sentences

JC: Hh, huh and the other thing that we have not run because it just didn't seem to me again to have any utility and it's a very difficult thing to check is that John Negroponte and Wilson Lord were not totally happy with the terms as they stood --the nine points--on the 26th of October.

HK: Winston Lord is on the dove side of this--I mean Winston Lord would be on the dove side--John Negroponte would be on the hawk side and therefore the two can't be put in the same category.

JC: That's right.

HK: Secondly, I don't think it's helpful for me to give a checklist of what what staff assistants may or may not say--I have the responsibility of navigating this in what I think is the best framework and it's totally possible that one or the other assistants will have a different view about this or that clause--

JC: Well, I agree.

HK: And on that I don't spent sleepless nights--that's what I got them for.

JC: Nor has any of that gotten press.

HK: That's what I got these assistants for--

JC: I think you've got good men and they obviously have independent points of view

HK: Absolutely and

JC: And we never ran anything on that nor have I seen a word on that.

HK: And I respect them for it--I want them to express their views--as it happens they have diametrically opposite views.

Page 5

JC: That's interesting. I knew Negroponte was more of a hardliner I didn't really know about Lord.

HK: Lord would be 25% softer--Negroponte might be 10% harder than I--but that's all really nonsense whe n you come right down to it because history isn't going to keep track of these fine points that way.

JC: I agree with you that you are in the position of the navigator on a staff on that--

HK: Not just on the staff--in the whole situation.

JC: Do you have any idea how long it will take you in Paris--

HK: I don't know--maybe a week. We got to be back for the Super Bowl for Christssake.

JC: I'm going. I would hope you are coming out.

HK: I don't think so.

JC: You know you can fly over the pole from Paris if you get it wrapped up.

HK: Make a great story, wouldn't it?

JC: Wouldn't it.

HK: 'Kissinger leaves the negotiations so he can watch a football game'.

JC: I don't think they will show it in Europe.

HK: Okay, John, look call me the week I'm back and let's have lunch.

JC: All right, I promise I'll do that and Godspeed and all the luck in the world.

HK: Thank you I'll really need it this time.

JC: Okay. Bye,

TELCON

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

5:28 p.m. 1/5/73

HH: Two questions just and I'll let you go.

We have a rumor that has a certain plausibility to it--

HK: I'm not resigning

HH: No, not this week.

That your friend and mine, John Connally is in Vietnam.

HK: Impossible.

HH: Impossible?

HK: Yeh.

HH: Okay.

HK: If he is--it's inconceivable.

HH: Okay, this came out of the business community and I think--

HK: Total nonsense.

HH: Okay. Second question is after a minimal amount of sober thought, I give you two choices of who it is who's trying to do a job on you-- to undercut you. It comes either to President Thieu or John Negroponte--I mean it's pretty clear that someone is trying to undercut you for in order to build up or defend Thieu and we all know that Thieu has taken a few potshots at you. For instance, its perfectly conceivable isn't it that Reston's source for that sovereignty column was the South Vietnamese? You say that you didn't give him it.

HK: No.

HH: So where did he get it?

HK: Even though I gave him something about the DMZ but in the same context as I gave it to you.

HH: What made it make that jump for the word sovereignty?

Did he see one of the South Vietnamese when he was there--highly possible

HK: Quite possible.

HK: Be sure you didn't get it from me.

HH: Right. Right.

Page 2

HH: Not to quote you or anything--have you seen any recent propagandizing directed you way from the South Vietnamese?

HK: No.

HH: So it's Negroponte? No, that's not fair--I may be wrong, but You are satisfied that nobody on your staff is badmouthing you?

HK: No, but it's impossible that Haig would.

HH: I know that, but I don't know Negroponte.

HK: I don't exclude that.

HH: Don't exclude that? That's interesting. There has to be some source--Chancellor is not a sloppy guy. Nor is Joe Kraft.

HK: And Chancellor is a friend of mine--

HH: But it points out that Chancellor has good South Vietnamese sources.

HK: But he claimed that somebody told him who claimed to have heard it in the WH and no Southvietnamese could claim that.

HH: Oh.

HK: I mean who had claimed that he had heard me give these orders.

HH: That's impossible--Only Haig and Haig would not say any reporter.

HK: Never. That's not the way the President gives me orders.

HH: Yeh, yeh. I can also see that neither Haig nor Negroponte would be particularly enchanted with a negotiator who is obliged to, as you were, to play it the way you had to with Le Duc Tho. I mean it's kind of necessary to play along and laugh and chuckle and that may offend a hawk, or a milita man.

HK: Well, you know they don't pay me for that-- I appreciate this.

HH: I won't quote you but I don't think we'll get into this.

HK: No, I don't think you should.

HH: Good.

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TELCORN

Ambassador Shen (China)/Mr. Kissinger

7:09 p.m., January 5, 1973

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

S: How are you, Dr. Kissinger?

K: Sorry I didn't see you.

S: I'm sorry we missed you.

K: Well, I'll tell you the problem was that I had a German Minister here whom the President couldn't see.

S: Oh, I see, I see. And so you were receiving him on the President's --

K: I was receiving the lower level people.

S: [Laughter] No, everything went off very well and I want to thank you very much.

K: Not at all.

S: Earlier I mentioned I want a private word with you. It's actually a word of advice from you. What should my recommendation be to my government with regard to January 20th? In other words, a State man has told us your government is not inviting or encouraging any country to send people here for that occasion. But you know early last year your President kindly sent General Eisenhower to ______ to attend my President's inauguration. So my -- I think my government still don't know what the difference . .

K: Well, I think --

S: Expression:

K: You should find out first of all what -- I don't know what the normal procedure is, Mr. Ambassador, what other friendly countries are doing. If your government wants to send somebody and if that is not totally inconsistent with what other governments are doing, we would certainly always be delighted to welcome him.

S: Uh-huh. But you would not -- But he would be not welcome alone doing it, is that it?

K: I frankly have not -- Let me look into it and I'll get somebody to call you on Monday.

S: Yeah. I'd like to have some guidance, personal advice from you, see.

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Shultz

1/5/73

HK: Mr. Secretary. I have to talk to Mansfield in the morning at the President's suggestion. Order. Can we do it this afternoon at some point--
Or I am seeing Mansfield at 8:15 if we could do it at 9:00 for half an hour tomorrow.

GS: Should be through you think?

HK: I'll make it my business to be--

GS: You want to make it at 7:30 or can't you get up that early.

HK: I'll make it at 7:30- let's do it at 7:30.

GS: All right why don't we come over to your office at 7:30.

HK: Okay good. See you then.

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