Henry: My only general suggestion with regard to this chapter is that you consider carefully whether you do not undertake to prove things which it may not be necessary to prove. Especially in the British section, I felt the impact of your central and crucial x points were was weakened by trying to spear too many fish, a few of which looked like red herrings. This led you to overstatement in some instances. I know you want to reserve the right to anticipate all objections, but I would try to make some cuts in this chapter if you can. But not in the "uncommitted" section.

One other thing: As you are aware, there is some repetition in this chapter. In reorganizing would it be possible to gather up front all your material bearing on your concept of nuclear strategy and tactics, and set in general terms. This would give the reader a better perspective with which to read your chapters on U.S. strategy, Nato et al. He could see more clearly what you were driving at and why present strategies were inadequate, but most important he would understand the potentialities for improving our strategy before you had pulled down the whole scaffold rather than afterwards. As it is now, your theoretical discussion of strategy is rather scattered through the book. If brought all together in a Part I — even prior to the present chapters 2 and 3 — it would provide a really firm basis for comprehending the specific discussion of present policies.

(Y)

2

concept of warfare. Superior mobility and the use of artillery, a better relationship between fire and movement furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples were the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights. All these were victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all the more complete for confronting the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Thus the key to a proper doctrine is the correct understanding of the elements of one's superiority; and to develop the capacity to apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems.

But our effort to assess the meaning of the new technology has been inhibited by several factors: it is not only that our past makes us more comfortable with technology than with doctrine, it is also that what has passed for strategic doctrine in our history has been made irrelevant by the power and speed of the new weapons. The traditional expression of our strategic doctrine was the allocation of roles and

expression of our strategic doctrine was the allocation of roles and
irrelevant by the power and speed of the new weapons. The traditional
what has based for strategic doctrine in our history has been made
us more comfortable with technology than with doctrine. It is also that
been inhibited by several factors: it is not only that our best makes
But our effort to assess the meaning of the new technology has
existing weapons systems.

of an advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of
apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice
of the elements of one's superiority; and to develop the capacity to
Thus the key to a proper doctrine is the correct understanding
which he had never even considered.

the more complete for confronting the antagonist with contingencies
which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all
else but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break the framework
against the medieval knights. All these were victories not of reason-
Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers
of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples were the victories of the
a better relationship between fire and movement furnished the base
concept of warfare. Superior mobility and the use of artillery,

(Y)

2a

missions among the military services: until the end of World War II
the Army and the Navy. Each of these services had the mission of
defeating its enemy counterpart: the Army had primary responsibility
for the land-battle and the Navy for the sea-battle. Although these
missions were based in effect on means of locomotion with everything
moving on land assigned to the Army and everything moving by water
assigned to the Navy, they represented ...

assigned to the Navy, they represented ... moving on land assigned to the Army and everything moving by water missions were based in effect on means of locomotion with everything for the land-battle and the Navy for the sea-battle. Although these defesting its enemy counterpart: the Army had brimsry reasonability the Army and the Navy. Each of these services had the mission of missions among the military services: until the end of World War II

2s

represented a meaningful and distinguishable strategic mission. The Army was powerless on the sea beyond the range of its coastal artillery and the Navy was unable to project itself far inland; the Air Force was not yet independent of its planes was sufficiently short to permit the missions of the division of functions and the range of xxx

THE naval and army air to follow roughly the division of roles among the senior services. Each service was therefore able to control all the weapons it considered essential for achieving its mission; it could in effect develop its own strategy without too much concern with that of a sister service or without too much dependence on the interpretation of a sister service about what constituted an essential target.

But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the incomparable destructiveness of weapons have almost obliterated the traditional boundaries among the services. No service can achieve its primary mission without either transgressing on the role of another service or calling on it for assistance. And cooperation among the services is difficult unless there is an agreement on doctrine, the practical manifestation of which is that each service should have the same view as to what constitutes an essential target. The notion that the primary task of the Air Force is to control the air, that of the Navy to control the seas and of the Army to fight on land has become next to meaningless.

7

as long as there does not exist an agreed strategic doctrine, no service can afford to relinquish control of a weapon it considers essential for the performance of its mission. Since the Navy's conception of what is essential to win control of the seas may conflict with the Air Force's notion of its requirements for winning the air battle, each service runs the risk that it may have to repeat in combat the doctrinal arguments which have proved inconclusive before. And in view of the necessity for quick reaction imposed by the increasing speed and power of modern weapons, each service will seek to escape this problem by hoarding as many weapons as possible. Thus the Army and Navy are developing a 1,500 miles missile, the Navy is developing a long-range seaplane which OUR mechanistic approach to doctrine treats as a naval weapon because it takes off from water; and the Strategic Air Command is reported to have established a form of ground forces to protect its air bases. A duplication of weapons systems and a proliferation of partially conflicting doctrines is inevitable; the division of functions which worked relatively smoothly for a century and a half becomes a source of bitter rivalry in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a bitter wrangle about which service should control it. It was thus with the A-bomb; it is now the case with missiles. And in each instance the doctrinal issue was evaded by permitting each service to develop its own weapon.

8

Such a solution is not only costly; it simply defers the problem
until some crisis brooks no further ambiguity or some other pressures bring the
inter-service dispute into the open. Thus the chief impetus to our strategic
thought
doctrine has come not so much from a spontaneous consideration of the strategic
implications of the new technology as from international crises, particularly
the Korean war and even more importantly, from the periodic economy drives of
the Administration and of Congress. At intervals either the Executive or Congress
have proclaimed that bankruptcy was a more immediate threat than military defeat
and that our economy would collapse under the burden of defense expenditures
if they exceeded a theoretical ceiling variously estimated at 11 billion dollars
in 1946; 14.5 billion dollars in 1949; and 35 billion dollars in 1953. Nothing
has stimulated strategic thought as these periodic economy drives. In a period
of national emergency when budgets were plentiful, each service has protected
itself by guarding against every possible contingency and by procuring the entire
gamut of possible weapons, a course which, whatever the budgetary level, will soon
be foreclosed by the extraordinary variety of possible choices. But during
periods of budgetary squeeze, and in the face of the complexity of weapons systems
each service must make a choice between the weapons systems available
because it cannot afford them all and it can do so only
in terms of a doctrine. Moreover, each service faces the problem not only of

(Y)

9

establishing priorities among the weapons available to it, but of justifying
its role vis-a-vis the other services. When the services become competitors
for available appropriations, an incentive is provided for developing a doctrine
about the purpose of war and the contribution each service can make to our security.

But while budgetary pressures have spurred ~~magnificantly~~ consideration
~~of~~ *strategic* doctrine, their influence has not been entirely wholesome. They have
fostered a tendency to create doctrine as a tool in the inter-service battle
for appropriations; ~~musk~~ the incentive they have provided is for a theoretical
elaboration of a service and ~~not~~ *of* an *over-all* point of view. Such general
doctrines as have been advanced have been deliberately vague in order not to
bring inter-service rivalry into the open. Moreover, the periodic ~~musk~~ economy
*drives* have confirmed our predilection for ~~all-out~~ *FINAL* solutions. They have
usually been justified with an argument well-attuned to our national psychology:

~~THE TREMENDOUS DESTRUCTIVENESS OF MODERN WEAPONS~~ that ~~there~~ existed an *all-out* solution to our military problem which made a diversified capability unnecessary. Both the Army and the Navy have been victims of the *COLLOMBIALLA EXPRESSED AS "MORE BANE FOR A BUEK"* argument, the Navy in 1949, when its super-carrier, *the United States*, was cancelled by administrative fiat and the Army since 1953. Only the Air Force has escaped an attack on its mission, if not always budgetary cuts: alone among the services its Strategic Air Command has been able to maintain the "pure"

10

doctrine, the secret dream of American military thought: that there exists
a final answer to our military mmx problem, A that it is possible to defeat
the enemy utterly and that war has its own rationale independent of policy.

Because of their awareness that the budgetary rewards were in the field
of strategic striking power, the other services in turn have been tempted to
emphasize that part of their mission which approximated long-range warfare:
in budgetary hearings at least the Navy has stressed the offensive power of
its carriers over its less dramatic anti-submarine role and the Army has
since 1955 emphasized its medium range missiles as much as the subtler
application of its power. This set up another wuxixixix vicious circle: the
more the other services extended the range and power of their weapons, the more
they approached what the Air Force considered its primary mission, laying the
basis for endless jurisdictional disputes.

In the process the basic strategic problem of the nuclear age has
been rarely confronted explicitly: whether it is possible to find intermediary
applications mmx for our military strength, whether our doctrine can
develop concepts of war where power and the willingness to use it would be most in harmony.

Against the background of inter-service rivalry, the xxixxxxxx recon-
ciliations of views that have been attempted have resulted less in a clear

11

strategic doctrine than in instruments more akin to an agreement among sovereign states. They have had the same ambiguity leaving each party free to interpret it largely according to its own preconceptions. The present assignment of roles and missions among the services dates from 1949 when Secretary Forrestal took the Joint Chiefs of Staff away from the pressures of the Pentagon to Key West in order to formulate a common doctrine. What emerged as the Key West agreement was little more than a reformulation of traditional roles: the primary mission of the Air Force was restated to be control of the air, that of the Navy, control of the seas, and that of the army to defeat the enemy ground forces. This formula missed the essential point of inter-service rivalry, perhaps deliberately.

The disputes arose not because the services sought to take over each other's primary mission -- although this too happened occasionally -- but because in pursuit of their own mission they were impelled by the pressures of new technology and the budget for overlapping weapons systems. The real difficulty was that the power, speed and range of modern weapons had obliterated the traditional distinctions between ground, sea and air warfare; it was no longer possible to derive a distinguishable strategic mission from different means of locomotion.

12

As a result, the Key West agreement could be given concrete meaning only in terms of the dispute that had produced the inter-service disputes in the first place: the disagreement over which service should control the nuclear weapons. This was an important issue because possession of nuclear weapons was the prerequisite to any claim to be able to contribute to an all-out strategy and therefore the best support for budgetary requests. The result was a compromise which confirmed that the neat distinctions of the general principles of the Key West agreement were inapplicable in practice: The Air Force was recognized as possessing the sole right to maintain a strategic air arm, but the Navy was granted the use of the A-bomb against specifically naval targets and it was also permitted to proceed with the construction of its giant aircraft carrier which was designed to handle planes capable of carrying the A-bomb. No effort was made to define what constituted a "naval" target or to distinguish the use of atomic bombs against port facilities from strategic bombing.

strategic pumping.

to distinguish the use of atomic bombs against port facilities from
No effort was made to define what constituted a "unval" target or
which was designed to handle planes capable of carrying the V-pomp.
to proceed with the construction of its giant aircraft carrier
A-pomp against specifically naval targets and it was also permitted
tain a strategic air arm, but the Navy was granted the use of the
The Air Force was recognized as possessing the sole right to main-
principles of the Key West agreement were insubstantial in practice:
compromise which confirmed that the next distinctions of the general
fore the beat and port for budgetary requests. The result was a
any claim to be able to contribute to an all-out strategy and there-
isane because possession of nuclear weapons was the prerequisite to
service should control the nuclear weapons. This was an important
service disputes in the first place: the disagreement over which
meaning only in terms of the dispute that had produced the inter-

---

The Air Force was recognized as possessing the sole right to main-principles of the Key West agreement were insubstantial in practice: compromise which confirmed that the next distinctions of the general fore the beat and port for budgetary requests. The result was a any claim to be able to contribute to an all-out strategy and there-isane because possession of nuclear weapons was the prerequisite to service should control the nuclear weapons. This was an important service disputes in the first place: the disagreement over which meaning only in terms of the dispute that had produced the inter-

(A)

15

of carrying the A-bomb. And like many diplomatic instruments signed
by sovereign entities, the Key West agreement contained an unwritten
understanding: the concept of balanced forces, in which the balance
significantly was achieved not by doctrine but by the budgetary process
with each service promised approximately the same yearly appropriation.
In short, the Key West agreement had not been the expression of a stra-
tegic doctrine but a means to postpone difficult choices.

Within six months even the vague division of functions estab-
lished by the Key West agreement disappeared in the explosion produced
by the "revolt of the Admirals" against the edict of Secretary Johnson
cancelling construction of the Navy's giant carrier. And within eighteen
months of the Key West agreement the Korean war revealed that our almost
exclusive concern with all-out war and the most destructive strategy has
obscured the most likely security problem: the attempt by the Soviets
to upset the strategic balance not at one blow but piece by piece. Most
of these rivalries and frustrations came to expression at some time in
hearings before Congressional committees. Impelled either by the need
to justify their request for appropriations, to vindicate the mission
of their service or to explain the conduct of a war, the service chiefs

of their service or to explain the conduct of a war, the service chiefs
to justify their request for appropriations, to vindicate the mission
hearings before Congressional committees. Impelled either by the need
of these rivalries and fratrations came to expression at some time in
to upset the strategic balance not at one blow but piece by piece. Most
opacured the most likely security problem: the attempt by the Soviet
exclusive concern with all-out war and the most destructive strategy has
months of the Key Weat agreement the Korean war revealed that our almost
cancelling construction of the Navy's giant carrier. And within eighteen
by the "revolt of the Admirals" against the edict of Secretary Johnson
ilaished by the Key Weat agreement disappeared in the explosion produced
within six months even the vague division of functions atop-
etic doctrine but a means to boatbone difficult choices.

In short, the Key Weat agreement had not been the expression of a stra-
with each service promised approximately the same yearly appropriation.
significantly was achieved not by doctrine but by the budgetary process
understanding: the concept of balanced force, in which the balance
by sovereign entities, the Key Weat agreement contained an unwritten
of carrying the A-bomb. And like many diplomatic instruments signed

and their civilian superiors found themselves obliged to engage in a
theoretical defense of their positions. While they may not always have
given expression to the full range of their views publicly, enough pub-
lic statements, particularly before Congressional committees exist to
permit a brief survey of the dilemmas of developing a strategic doctrine
adequate to the challenges of the nuclear age. It is with this quest
for doctrine that this chapter deals,

II

It has often been remarked that nothing stultifies military
thought as a victorious war because innovation then must run the gamut
of inertia legitimized by success. It was no different with U.S. mili-
tary thought after World War II. For the war had not only been won;
its course had run true to the notion of what a war should be. Its ag-
gression had been unambiguous and on U.S. territory. We had brought to
bear our superior resources and inflicted a terrible punishment. The
enemy had been utterly defeated by a strategy of attrition unencumbered
by political interference. No wonder that we tended to elevate a parti-
cular set of circumstances into universal maxims and the strategy for
defeating Germany into general military doctrine: "In case of another

detesting Germany into general military doctrine: "In case of another
cular set of circumstances into universal maxime and the strategy for
by political interference. No wonder that we tended to elevate a parti-
 enemy had been utterly defeated by a strategy of attrition unencumbered
 bear our superior resources and inflicted a terrible punishment. The
gration had been unambiguous and on U.S. territory. We had brought to
 its course had run true to the notion of what a war should be. Its ag-
tary thought after World War II. For the war had not only been won;
of inertia legitimized by success. It was no different with U.S. will-
thought as a victorious war because innovation then must run the gamut
It has often been remarked that nothing at all ties military

II

for doctrine that this chapter deals,
adequate to the challenges of the nuclear age. It is with this queat
permit a brief survey of the dilemmas of developing a strategic doctrine
itic statements, particularly before Congressional committees exist to
given expression to the full range of their views publicly, enough pup-
theoretical defense of their positions. While they may not always have
and their civilian enforcers found themselves obliged to engage in a

C 14

[v] 18

non-Soviet world will depend on the subtlety of our understanding
of our strategic interest in the world and our willingness to run
risks in the face of challenges presented in less than all-out form.

In the immediate post-war period this was not apparent how-
ever. Our strategy was based on resisting an overt attack; what con-
stituted an overt attack was rarely analyzed. In fact, because we
thought of war as inevitably all-out, there was a tendency to raise
the provocation we considered necessary ~~with every increase in the~~
horror of our weapons technology. Instead of adjusting our capabili-
ties to the likely challenges we tended to adjust our concept of the
challenges we would resist to the enormity of the new weapons. ~~Thus~~
~~permanently~~ the more absolute our weapons technology became, the
~~more reluctant we grew to employ it~~
higher grew the threshhold below which we would not act. The lessons
of the two world wars ~~had~~ convinced us that we would have to resist a
military onslaught on Western Europe. "The first line of defense,"
said Secretary Acheson, "is in Europe." But beyond this our con-
sideration of the strategic transformations we would resist by force
was inhibited by a doctrine which left no room between total peace

2/ Hearings on Military Assistance Program (1949), Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 7.

(4)

19

and total war. The more fearful the consequences of war with which
our strategic doctrine presented us, the more it was tempted to re-
serve it only for the most explicit threat, and the most overt danger
is a surprise attack on the United States: "Any nation seeking domin-
ation of the world" said General Eisenhower in 1947 "must defeat the
United States and must defeat us before we achieve our maximum strength.

Therefore if global war comes to us again, the first blow will/not at
Warsaw but at Washington, not at London but at Los Angeles; not even
at Pearl Harbor, but at Pittsburgh." ³/ "It is inconceivable," said
General Weyland"that the United States will start an aggressive war.
Hence it is obvious that at the start of a war we will be the recipient
of an all-out surprise attack. This attack will be directed against
the industry and economy of the continental United States." ⁴/

The notion that a new war had inevitably to start with a sur-
prise attack on the United States has been basic to post-war United
States strategic thought. Reinforced by the memory of Pearl Harbor,
it has provided the background for our preponderant concern with the
problem of all-out war. Thus a vicious circle was set up: The more

3/ House Appropriations Hearings for Fiscal Year 1948, p. 111.

4/ Op. cit., p. 642.

4/ *Op. cit.*, p. 645.

The problem of all-out war. Thus a vicious circle was set up: The more it has provided the background for our preponderant concern with the States strategic thought. Reinforced by the memory of Pearl Harbor, brieze attack on the United States has been basic to post-war United States strategic doctrine. The more it was tempted to re-serve it only for the most explicit threat, and the most overt danger our strategic doctrine presented us, the more it was tempted to re-and total war. The more fearful the consequences of war with which

of an all-out surprise attack. This attack will be directed against
Hence it is obvious that at the start of a war we will be the recipient
General Weyland"that the United States will start an aggressive war.

at Pearl Harbor, but at Pittsburgh." said
Warren put at Washington, not at London but at Los Angeles; not even
Therefore if global war comes to us again, the first blow will not at
be struck

is a surprise attack on the United States: "Any nation seeking domin-
serve it only for the most explicit threat, and the most overt danger
our strategic doctrine presented us, the more it was tempted to re-
and total war. The more fearful the consequences of war with which

19

(4)

20

total the sanctions of our weapons technology, the more absolute
we imagined the provocation that would unleash it. The more we be-
came convinced that a war would start with an attack on the contin-
ental United States, the more fearful the strategy we devised to re-
sist it. In the process, we failed to realize how abstract and one-
sided the notion of a surprise attack was and how it left us vulner-
able to the preferred form of Soviet aggression: internal subversion
and limited war. By concentrating on how to avert a Soviet attempt
to neutralize us physically, we gave the Soviets an opportunity to
seek to neutralize us psychologically by so graduating their actions
that the provocation never seem "worth" an all-out war, the only
form of war our doctrine considered.

form of war on our doctrine considered.

that the provocation never seem "worth" an all-out war, the only
seek to neutralize us psychologically by so gradually reducing their actions
to neutralize us physically, we gave the Soviets an opportunity to
and limited war. By concentrating on how to avert a Soviet attempt
spare to the preferred form of Soviet aggression: internal subversion
aided the notion of a surprise attack was and how it left us vulnerable
totally. In the process, we failed to realize how abstract and one-
entire United States, the more fearful the strategy we devised to re-
come convinced that a war would start with an attack on the contin-
ued the conversation of our weapons technology, the more spaceleft
we imagined the provocation that would release it. The more we be-
total the sanctions of our weapons technology, the more spaceleft

was and how it left us vulnerable to the preferred form of Soviet
aggression, internal subversion and limited... Moreover, in
the immediate post-war period the almost exclusive concern with
surprise attack addressed itself not only to the most abstract but
also to the most remote danger. Given the fact that the Soviet did
not yet possess nuclear weapons, it would have taken a staggering
number of planes -- far beyond any foreseeable Soviet capability --
to reduce our industrial potential significantly. However, if any
war would inevitably start with a surprise attack on the United States,
it might have been argued that we could not afford to let any power
break our atomic monopoly. Britain's security for 200 years had not
been assured merely by her insular position, but also by her willingness
to fight for the supremacy of the seas without which her insular
position would have become a liability. But confronted by a power
which never tired of proclaiming the irreconcilability of its system
with ours, we saw no means to prevent it from developing a capability
to destroy us. Again, since the U.S.S.R. was already in possession

of the satellite orbit and because it extended its control by quasi-
legal means, we had difficulty fitting Soviet expansion into our
concept of aggression or to understand how the satellite orbit could
affect the security of the United States. in the face of our atomic
~~Our objections to Soviet~~ MONOPOLY post-war expansion, therefore, tended to turn on ethics rather than strategy. Thus our reaction to our own doctrine of suprise attack illustrates the gap in our thinking between startegy and diplomacy;

was
strategy/assigned the task of protecting the United States against overt
aggression and diplomacy of settling all other disputes byMaguarii
negotiation. Neither could reinforce the other. The objective of
war was victory, that of diplomacy peace and each began where the
other left off. "I would be loath," said General Marshall "to g
hazard American lives for purely political purposes."

If our military doctrine had difficulty in establishing a
relationship with our diplomacy, it had few doubts about the strategy
for conducting any war that might break out. War would be kamikaze

51 Quoted in Osgood, p.

global and it would be won by our superior industrial potential. We would gain the
victory both because of superior technology and through our ability to eliminate the industrial base of our enemy. Since war would start with a surprise attack, our best defense lay "in our ability to strike back quickly with a counter offensive, to neutralize the hostile attack at its source or to discourage its continuance by striking at the vitals of the aggressor." The doctrine of instant retaliation was not new when Secretary Dulles proclaimed it; it has been the basis of all post-war U.S. military policy. The postulate that deterrence was achieved by offensive striking power and that victory depended on maximum destructiveness was never questioned. On the contrary, each service justified its requirements by the contribution it could make to a strategy of strategic bombing. "At the beginning of hostilities," said Secretary of the Navy Sullivan in 1948 "and until the Air Force

6/ Among many examples, see Forrestal testimony on National defense establishment, p. 21 ff.

7/ General Spaatz before the House Committee on Appropriations, 1946, p. 401.

Even our alliances were primarily justified in terms of the air bases they afforded us.

Thus, the strategy developed in the immediate post-war period did not depend on nuclear weapons; rather it added them almost as an afterthought to a familiar military doctrine, as a more efficient explosive to destroy enemy industrial centers. There were several reasons for this: a feeling of moral revulsion about the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a fear that the weapons, if flaunted, would make any understanding with the U.S.S.R. more difficult, and real uncertainty about the meaning of the new technology. Above all, the nuclear weapons were used as a means of escaping harsh realities. For at least sub-consciously they were taken as another indication of our inherent technological superiority and as long as we retained the ability to be faced with an overt challenge, we could not be.convinced that our monopoly would be fleeting. But there was also

the
See for example testimony by General Eisenhower before the House
Appropriations Committee, 1947, p. 182.

an air of unreality about these prophesies. It was said in 1945 that
the Soviets would break our atomic monopoly within 5 years, and the
prediction remained 5 years with each passing year.¹¹¹
Hanson Baldwin's
estimate in 1947¹²⁴ that the Soviet Union would produce one atomic bomb
sometime between 1950 and 1957, that it would then take her another
20 years to build up a significant stockpile and that in any case the
U.S.S.R. was not likely to develop a delivery system for a long time but
reflected the realities of the national psychology, if not necessarily
the intelligence reports. (On the other hand, intelligence estimates
often exaggerate perils because their author is not likely to get into
trouble if a pessimistic prediction turns out wrong.) Our complacency
with respect to the Soviet Union in the nuclear field, coupled
with the notion that war was likely to start with a surprise attack on
us, lent a quality of abstractness and unreality to all thinking about
military problems in the immediate post-war period. For it gave rise

¹¹ See testimony by Dr. Rabi at the Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 452 ff.

¹²⁴ N. Y. Times, November 9, 1947.

service had a role to play in this task, the navy that of precision
bombing and projecting our power visibly; the army throughholding and
garrisoning the bases from which strategic strikes could be launched.

*services*

Both assumed a prolonged period of nuclear monopoly; the army statement
thought it would last from between 8 to 15 years. Neither service
considered that nuclear weapons would affect its tactics
fundamentally. The Navy, in particular, *nayxunka* deprecated the
implication of the new technology. A 1,000 mile missile, it argued,
was almost impossible. Such a weapon represented not simply an
extension of the German experience with rockets in World War II; it
required a new order of physics altogether. This merely reflected
a statement previously made by Admiral Nimitz that he did not expect
to see intercontinental ballistic missiles in his life-time.¹⁴/

In
short, any new war for the next 10 to 15 years would not only be *gamik*
fought with a World War II strategy, but with World War II weapons
with the atomic bomb added to increase the power of our strategic arsenal.

14/

*House Appropriations Committee, Navy, p. 9 (1947)*

15/

*House Appropriations Committee, Navy 1949 (Admiral Noble) p. 743.*

*Many similar statements exist by army and nayxunka spokesmen.*

¹⁴/ House Appropriations Committee, Navy, p. 9 (1947)

15/ House Appropriations Committee, Navy 1949 (Admiral Noble) p. 743.
Many similar statements exist by army and nayyxma spokesmen.

Had technology remained static and had we not been challenged
in Korea, an uneasy equilibrium might have been established between
the claim of the Air Force that it possessed the decisive weapon and
that of the other services that they were essential to make this
weapon effective. But the advent of the long-range homber, the B-36,
upset the finely wrought concept of the "balanced forces" which per-
mitted each service to do what they had always done only with ax more
powerful weapons. For if deterrence was achieved by retaliatory power
and if retaliatory power was identical with offensive air power, the
only justification for the other services was their utility in providing
or holding bases. If it was possible to launch long-range attacks
from the United States, theBalanced forces might
represent a diversion of resources.

Had defense appropriations been larger this argument might not
have been pressed to its logical conclusion. But with a new Secretary
of Defense, Louis Johnson, dedicated to the proposition that one of
Stalin's aims was to force the United States into bankruptcy the

16/ MacArthur Hearings, p. 2626.

30

allocation of missions and with it the availability of scarce defense
dollars became a matter of overriding concern. When the Defense Depart-
ment ordered cessation of the construction of the navy 65-thousand ton
aircraft carrier United States and the procurement of an additional quan-
tity of B-36's, the first important post-war debate on strategic doctrine
was inevitable. We no longer restrained by an uneasy partnership with the
Air Force in the possession of long-range airpower, the Navy gave full
expression to the disagreement among the services about the nature of
strategy, the definition of essential targets and the best means for
attacking them.

The debate about the B-36 would have gained in significance had
it not been connected so intimately with the battle for appropriations.
As it was, the Navy case which attacked the efficacy of strategic bombing
gave the impression of having been constructed out of pique at the decision
to end its equivalent of long-range aviation: the giant carrier United
States. And the Navy case was further weakened by the fact that the Chief
of Naval Operations had not dissented from any of the formulations of
strategic doctrine during the post-war period. Nevertheless, the Navy
case, ably marshalled by Admiral Radford, for the first time raised issues
which have become the core of present disputes about military policy.

A case, apply mished by Admiral Radford, for the first time raised issues of strategic doctrine during the host-war period. Nevertheless, the Navy of Naval Operations had not disseminated from any of the formulations of the States. And the Navy case was further weakened by the fact that the Chief to end its equivalent of long-range aviation: the giant carrier United gave the impression of having been constructed out of bidge at the decision As it was, the Navy case which attacked the efficacy of strategic bombing it not been connected so intimately with the battle for appropriations.

The debate about the B-30 would have gained in significance had attacking them.

The definition of essential targets and the best means for expression to the disagreement among the services about the nature of Air Force in the possession of long-range airpower, the Navy gave full was inevitable. We longer restrained by an uneasy barterhand with the title of B-30's, the first important host-war debate on strategic doctrine aircraft carrier United States and the procurement of an additional denu-ment ordered cessation of the construction of the navy CP-thousand ton dollars became a matter of overriding concern. When the Defense Debar-t-allocation of missions and with it the availability of scarce defense

in which
with ~~three~~ service chiefs whose primary task is the maintenance of the
morale and efficiency of their service, are
required to make over-all
~~task~~ ~~mission~~ strategic judgments which may run counter to this ~~mission~~. As long as
the views of the three services concerning the most effective strategy
is in accord this presents few problems. If, however, they are at
variance -- as they have been since 1949 -- only two solutions are
possible: in periods of budgetary plenty, as between 1951 and 1954,
they will cause each service to build up the weapons system it con-
siders appropriate for its mission without a too careful concern with
doctrinal harmony or duplication of functions. In periods of relative
budgetary scarcity it will lead to bitter rivalry about the assignment
of missions. And since the presentation of a budget is facilitated
by the appearance of inter-service harmony, there occurs usually just
enough compromise to prevent a resolution of the doctrinal conflict;
the necessity of fighting doctrinal battles at budgetary intervals
with appropriations as the prize, almost insures the perpetuation of
the doctrinal disagreements behind the scenes.

"RESULT OF THE ADMIRALS"

(4)

33

To be sure, the Navy position did not more than raise these issues; proposed solutions were not adequate to the boldness of the challenge. They demonstrated that the Navy's disagreement was not so much with doctrine as with the technical implementation of a strategy which could not envisage anything but all-out war. The Navy posed the question of the relationship between political and military objectives -- but not because it doubted that every war would be a war of unconditional surrender. Rather it insisted that the unconditional surrender should be achieved by a strategy which did not inflict so much devastation that the victor would be forced to rehabilitate occupied enemy territory.

It raised for the first time the issue whether our strategy should be nuclear or conventional and it opposed what it considered the over-emphasis on strategic airpower; but it did so primarily because carrier planes said to be able to perform the same missions more effectively and more economically. The B-36 was termed a billion dollar blunder, but only because Navy fighters and therefore presumably the Soviet defense could outmaneuver it.

The B-36 controversy therefore did not, as suggested by the only hint at

administration as ex-President Hoover. Secretary of the Air Force

Symington denied that the Air Force was putting all its eggs in one basket. He insisted that the United States could not hope to match the Soviets man for man and that it would have to place reliance on superior technology, the best instrument of which was the Strategic Air Force. He did not deny that such a policy would cause a heavy loss of civilian life but he defended it with the statement that "if civilians are to be killed, I would rather kill theirs than ours."

This too was the argument of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley. He insisted that our military policy was entirely defensive, a view which hardly required reiteration in view of the national objectives he defined: the preservation of peace and of our way of life; the raising of our standard of living and the

18/ B-36 Hearings, p. 397ff.

19/ Symington's testimony was noteworthy also for the rather disarming statement that the moral aspect of war concerned the Secretary of State not for the Airforce.

achievement of world prosperity. His statement *underlying* was notable
for the fact that it listed the collapse of our economy under the burden
of defense budgets of $14.5 billion as *as real a danger* as the Soviet
threat. Add it contained perhaps the fullest exposition of our
strategic doctrine yet made. All the truisms of American strategic
thought were reiterated: the concern with Europe, *especially* the war won
by superior productivity, the identification of deterrence with maximum
destructive power: "We have assumed...that the only dangerous force
in the world today is Communism, and the only nations whose post-war
actions have indicated an opposition to the tranquility we seek are
the Soviet Union and her satellites.... Opposing this the North Atlantic
powers...now combine in natural resources more of the vital factors
for defense than the Soviet combination, except in the case of manpower....
Geographically Russia and her satellites stand next door to Western
Europe and which is undoubtedly a desirable commercial; industrial
and cultural prize. The American people have joined with allies
to keep this prize from interests opposed to our own..."

"Let us first discuss the basic concept of our defense planning....

(4)
38

with disaster, to which a foreign danger, however well understood in
theory, is always somehow unreal. Our preoccupation with domestic
problems was a symptom of our desire to project the pattern of our
domestic affairs abroad, to construct an international order animated
uniquely entirely by the consciousness of the evident advantages of
harmony. But the tragic element of our contest with the U.S.S.R.
resided in the insistence of the Soviets to treat the protestations
of our peaceful intentions as either ignorance or hypocrisy and to seek
by all means to neutralize us. Thus the more we protested our horror
of war, the more we removed Soviet inhibitions in expanding their
influence. Because we could think of no positive goals for which to
contend (two of the national objectives listed by General Bradley con-
cerned the preservation of the <u>status quo</u> and the other two dealt with
economic matters).

There was a quality of abtractness about our military
planning which was only barely obscured by our concern with technical
matters. Thus during the <u>soviet</u> hearings, Secretary <u>Symington</u>
drew reassurance from the fact that the B-36 was the world's best

it was one of maximum destructiveness. By the same token, when the
risks of war were so fearful the task of diplomacy was to attempt to
settle disputes by the process of negotiation and this, in turn, was
conceived as a legal process in which force played a small role. The
separation of force and diplomacy thus was accomplished to the detriment
of both: our military policy was sometimes reduced to empty posturing
and our diplomacy inhibited by an overconcern with finesse. Our
diplomacy and our military policy, therefore, tended to reinforce each
other's abstractness. This came to expression in our key post-war
policy, the policy of containment, which was based on the assumption
that military strategy and diplomacy represented successive phases of
national policy: it was the task of military policy to build strength
and thereby to contain Soviet aggression. After containment had been
achieved, diplomacy would take over: "I have often said, "testified
what we must do
 Secretary Acheson at the MacArthur Hearings "that we must create
situations of strength, we must build strength, and if we create that
strength then I think the whole situation in the world begins to change....
With that change there comes the difference in the negotiating positions

of the various parties and out of that I should hope that there would be
a willingness on the side of the Kremlin to recognize the facts...and to
begin to solve at least some of the difficulties between East and West."

But international relations do not permit such absolute divisions.
Secretary Acheson's definition of containment implied that strength was
self-evident, that power would supply its own rationale. It did not deal
with the question of how the position of strength was to be conveyed in
the absence of a direct attack on us or on our allies; it did not supply
a doctrine for translating our power into policy except as a response
to Soviet initiative. Nor did it make clear what would happen if the
Soviets refused to negotiate after we had achieved a "position of strength"
and instead concentrated on eroding it or turning its flank.

Moreover, the identification of a position on strength with a
military position and of resistance to aggression with all-out war led
to a psychological distortion in two ways: On the part of our allies,
an all-out strategy reinforced the sense of impotence which was one of

22/ MacArthur Hearings, p. 2083.

our concern with building defensive barriers and our preference for
military alliances over other forms of cooperation began to run
counter to the public opinion of our allies. Their reluctance to
believe in unbridgeable schisms was due in part to an attempt to escape
reality be denying it, in part, it was caused by our military doctrine
with its implicit threat of nuclear devastation. Heretofore a nation
threatened with attack would generally resist because the potential
destruction was insignificant compared with the consequences of surrender.
But when the outbreak of a war came increasingly to be considered w
equivlent to national catastrophe, neutrality -- *this* defense by denying
a potential enemy the "right" to enter -- became more and more attractive.

Communist strategy has been skillful at exploiting this *this* dilemma. In the face of our concern with military pacts, American pressure could be represented to be almost as pervasive as that of the U.S.S.R. and American intransigence became the shibboleth of the very people who would have *this* blanched at the prospect of being left alone in Eurasia with the U.S.S.R. Our *strategy* thus put the cart before *this* the horse. It conceived its task as primarily

technical: to create an adequate defense force. But in fact the
problem proved to be primarily psychologicalP to bring about a climate
of opinion which would support such a force. On the other hand, we never
tired of declaring we would not use force except in resistance to
aggression and we thereby removed any Soviet incentive for concessions
on the issues actually in dispute: the satellite orbit, German unification
and above all, international control of the atom. In short, our posture
was bellicose enough to lend color to Soviet peace offensives, but not
sufficiently so to induce Soviet hesitations.

These then were the dilemmas of our military doctrine in the
immediate post-war period; they are still our dilemmas today. They
were caused by a belief in final answers, by an over-emphasis on tech-
nology and above all by a concern with "pure" solutions both in our
diplomacy and in our military policy. But the test of a doctrine if
the marginal case -- the situation for which doctrine does not provide
and which has to be improvised under the pressure of events. A strategic
doctrine is successful to the extent that it provides for the widest
range of challenges and whose marginal case is in fact an unusual

situation. The difficulty with United States military doctrine was that all situations actually indispute were marginal to it. The only contingency for which it provided was all-out war and even there its goal was modest: to prevent disaster: "Our forces," said General Bradley in 1950 less than three months before Korea "are not sufficient to fight a major war. Our present thinking regarding our own contribution is to build up gradually our forces in being to a strength which can prevent disaster and which can strike a retaliatory blow that will be strong enough to slow down the aggressor while we mobilize."

So it came about that the only time we resisted aggression did so in an area which our doctrine had hardly considered and by means of a strategy it had explicitly rejected less than a year before. The problem of the limited war was forced on American strategic thought despite itself.

#### IV.

When reality clashes with our expectations of it, frustration is the inevitable consequence. For Korea caught us completely unprepared

war fitted no category of our strategic thought. Here was a war not
initiated by surprise attack on the United States, not directed against
Europe, not involving the U.S.S.R. -- a war to which an all-out strategy
seemed peculiarly unsuited. It has been remarked that had the Korean
war not actually taken place we would never have believed it--in its-
have 24
possibility.

It was a courageous decision to resist an aggression so totally
at variance with all previous planning. The penalty we paid for the one-
sidedness of our doctrine, however, was need to improvise a strategy
under the pressure of events and an increased difficulty in harmonizing
political and military objectives. Throughout the Korean war we were
inhibited by the consciousness that this was not the war for which we
had prepared. The result was unending conflict between the commanders
responsible for fighting the war and seeking to apply literally the
doctrine that defeat was equivalent to exacting crushing the enemy -- the

24/ William Kaufmann, "Policy Objectives and Military Action in the Korean war." The Rand Corporation Memorandum No. P-886, p. 1.

only doctrine we had -- and the responsible officials in Washington who
in the light of their preconceptions and the global nature of their
responsibilities could only consider the Korean war a strategic diversion.
It is with these disputes and not with the strategy of the Korean war
that we are concerned here.

It would be a mistake to consider the disputes produced by the
Korean war as a dispute about the efficacy of an all-out strategy. On
the contrary, both the advocates and the opponents of a greater effort
in Korea agreed that war was by its nature all-out, that it could
be won only by crushing the enemy totally. Where they differed was not
in their notion of the nature of war, but in their interpretation of
the significance of the Korean war. MacArthur was advocating a showdown
in the Far East and with China; his critics wished to conserve our
strength for an all-out war test with the U.S.S.R. and over Europe. The
frustration of the Korean war was produced in MacArthur because it was
not enough of a war in terms of our notion of war; in his opponents
because it was too much of a war in terms of the strategy we had
developed. The dispute produced by the Korean

was directed not against us or our installations in the first instance
but against a remote area from which not a year before we had withdrawn
our troops. In such a situation, it is little wonder that our pre-
occupation with an all-out strategy caused us to consider the Korean
war as an aberration and a strategic diversion.

If the notion of a principal enemy caused us difficulty in defining a concept of aggression addressed to the most likely dangers, the reliance on "purely" military considerations compounded the inherent conservatism of our strategic planning. It is almost axiomatic that military planners are never satisfied with their "readiness." War always has an element of uncertainty because victory depends not only on power but on the manner in which the factors of power are combined. Within limits, superior leadership and doctrine can compensate for inferior resources. It is the temptation of military planning to seek to escape this element of uncertainty by assembling overwhelmingly pre-punderant force, to substitute power for conception. But overwhelming force against a major enemy is difficult to assemble in peace-time particularly with a defensive strategy which concedes the first blow.

point where we were weakest psychologically, at the inconsistency
between our all-out strategy, our forces-in-being and our inhibitions.

It is remarkable that all Administration spokesmen were unanimous
but
about our strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc; they were
also agreed that we must avoid an all-out war. The postulate that an
all-out war had to be avoided short of an overt attack by the U.S.S.R.
on us or on Europe was the reverse side of our inability to conceive
goals of war other than the total defeat of the enemy. It
represented an effort to elaborate a cause of war commensurate with
the enormity of our weapons technology and with the strategy we
proposed to pursue. Given the threat which we knew the Soviets
must soon pose when they developed their nuclear capability further,
it is possible to doubt the premise behind the desire to avoid all-out
war that time was on our side or at least to raise the question whether
the U.S.S.R. did not have more to lose from an all-out war than we.
Be that as it may, our announced reluctance to engage in all-out war
gave the Soviet bloc a psychological advantage, but in the face of the
inhibitions produced by our strategic doctrine, we tended to be more

59

of purely military considerations. After Inchon, at a moment of
maximum strength, we proved unable to create a political framework for settling the Korean war and thereby provided the enemy an incentive, if any was needed, to seek to restore the military balance as a prerequisite to any negotiation on his part. It is not clear that
> *and to demilitarize the rest of Korea under United Nations supervision*
> an offer to stop for example at the narrow neck of the peninsula would have been accepted; for our present purposes it is sufficient that it was never made. The attempt by both sides to achieve a position of strength prior to negotiation resulted in a vicious circle of gradually expanding commitments which was stopped only because an equilibrium was established between the physical inability of the Chinese to invest more resources in the conflict and our psychological unwillingness to do so.

The same attitude towards power which prevented our diplomacy from setting limits to our military effort when we had the upper hand after Inchon also kept us from drawing strength from our military posture when we started negotiating the armistice. Our decision to stop military operations, except of a purely defensive nature, at the

between the United States and the Soviet bloc. In the former contingency
allied support would have been unnecessary; at a war in the Pacific/which our
European Allies remained aloof would have achieved through an illegal device what
we strained every effort to accomplish by force: Europe would have been
protected by its neutrality instead of through our alliance, but the accretion
to Soviet power represented by Europe's industry and skilled labor — the contin-
gency we feared most — would have been prevented nonetheless. In an all-out
war, on the other hand, our allies would not have had the simple choice of
neutrality or commitment. It was one thing for them to refuse to support us
in a limited war; it was quite another to stand by while we lost a total war,
for this would have left them at the mercy of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, had
the war become all-out through a Soviet attack on Europe, NATO would have become
operative automatically and our allies would have been confronted by a naked
threat to their
choice of survival.

This is not to say that it would have been wise to expand the war in
Korea. It is simply to indicate that by leaving no room between total war or stalemate
and between complete Allied support and their neutrality we posed alternatives
for ourselves which did not exhaust our options.

In a limited war we did not

In a limited war we did not
for ~~ennem~~ ourselves did not exhaust our options.

and between complete Villed anholt and their neutrality we based aftermaths
~~b~~

Kores. It is simply to indicate by leaving no room between total war or aftermath
that
This is not to say that it would have been wise to expand the war in
~~therefore~~ aftermath of survival.

operative automatically and our life would have been controlled by the naked
the war become all-out through a Soviet attack on Europe, NATO would have become
for this would have left them at the mercy of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, bad
in a limited war; it was quite another to attend to them to refuse to subvert us
neutrality or commitment. It was one thing for them to refuse to subvert us
war, on the other hand, our allies would not have had the simple choice of
Benoy we learned most — would have been prevented nonetheless. In an all-out
to Soviet power rerepresented by Europe's industry and skilled labor — the continu-
projected by its neutrality instead of through our alliance, but the accretion
we attained every effort to accumbit by force: Europe would have been
~~European~~ Villes remained afoot would have achieved through effective devices what
silled anholt would have been unnecessary; at a war in the Pacific/which our
from
between the United States and the Soviet bloc. In the former contingency

between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the former contingency
silled anholt would have been unnecessary; at a war in the Pacific/which our
from

need the increment in strength represented by Allied support, while the attempt
to obtain it might undermine the psychological framework for dealing with an
all-out threat.

VI

But our reactions to the frustrations of the Korean war demonstrated
the persistence of concepts ~~after~~ they have outlived their usefulness.

predominant
Instead of reassessing our strategic doctrine, our preconceived tendency was
to ascribe our difficulties to a departure from our traditional policy.

Limited war came to be identified with a strategically unproductive holding
operation. We did not draw the conclusion that our strategic doctrine
had created a gap between our power and our policy; rather there grew up a
determination to reserve our power for contingencies in which it could be
utilized without restraint.

Whether these postulates of American strategic thought were interpreted
in Secretary Dulles' "massive retaliation" speech and subsequent article, 38)
in Vice President Nixon's speech of March 13, 1954, or in Mr. Finletter's lucid
book *Power and Policy*, they amounted to the assertion that the chief deterrent

38. John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. April 1954, p.

39. *Nixon*

40. Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1954), p.

to Soviet aggression resided in United States nuclear superiority. From this
reaffirmation of our orthodoxy we drew the conclusion that the United States
should not exhaust itself in a war of attrition over peripheral areas or keep in
being forces so large as to drain our economy without adding to our effective
strength on A-day (the hypothetical date of the outbreak of the nuclear war). (4)
Since maximum only the threat of "massive retaliation" could deter Soviet
aggression, major reliance was to be placed on the development of our Strategic
Air Force and on increasing the power of our nuclear arsenal. Since the Sino-
Soviet bloc possessed interior lines of communication and was therefore able to
choose the point of attack, we should not let ourselves be lured into areas
where we would be strategically at a disadvantage. Instead we should inhibit
aggression at its source by the threat of general war. To be sure, there
were some areas where we would resist aggression on the ground, the NATO region,
for example, and for the defense of these, it was argued, ground forces perhaps
backed by nuclear weapons were essential. But in the remainder of the world,
the part which Mr. Finletter called the "grey areas," Sino-Soviet moves could
be prevented only by the threat of a general war.

Same, p. 231.

68

The distinguishing feature of this strategic doctrine was not its novelty but its orthodoxy. Here was the pro-Korea U.S. military doctrine buttressed by the lessons we drew from the Korean conflict which came to symbolize the frustrations to be experienced in waging peripheral wars. And it contained all the inconsistencies of the pre-Korean thought, sharpened by a renewed budgetary squeeze and the fact that another technological revolution--the discovery of thermo-nuclear weapons-- had occured.

Thus the most recent hearings on United States security, the hearing on air power of a Senate sub-committee headed by Senator Symington, turned into a restatement of familiar doctrine. All the services, except the Army agreed that the next war would start with a suprise attack; all agreed that it would be won by maximum offensive power. It was little wonder therefore that deterrence was again identified as a force, as if the Korean war had never taken place: "We must carefully weigh the proportions of our defense effort," said Secretary Wilson " that we put in forces and weapons of a defensive nature as compared to the portion of

42 U.S. Senate, *Study of Air Power*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 50 (General Spaatz); p. 184 (General Le May); p. 1055 (Admiral Griffin); p. 1845 (General Twining); p. 21 (General Bradley).

41. See (Study of Air Power). 42. (General Staff); b. 1842 (General Twining); b. 51 (General Le May).

For the most recent hearings on United States security, the
 hearing on air power of a Senate and-committee headed by Senator Symposium, turned into a restatement of familiar doctrine. All the services, except
the Army agreed that the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
agreed that it would be won by maximum offensive power. It was little
the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
agreed that it would be won by maximum offensive power. It was little
the Army agreed that the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
It was little
the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
the Army agreed that it would be won by maximum offensive power. It was little
the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
It was little
the Army agreed that it would be won by maximum offensive power. It was little
the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
the Army agreed that it would be won by maximum offensive power. It was little
the next war would start with a surprise attack; all
It was little

the weapons-- had occurred.

that another technological revolution--the discovery of thermo-unclear
Korean thought, sharpened by a renewed budgetary squeeze and the fact
which came to symbolize the frustrations to be experienced in waging
doctrine putthrough by the lessons we drew from the Korean conflict
its novelty but its orthodoxy. Here was the pro-Kores U.S. military
The distinguishing feature of this strategic doctrine was not

68

69 (4)

our effort that we plan in forces and weapons of a deterrent or retaliatory nature.

The identification of deterrence with retaliatory striking power caused security to be equated with the ability to inflict a greater amount of damage than the enemy could: " The key to the enemy decision [to attack] said the strategic Air Command briefing " is our relative strength in 1958-65. We use the term "relative" because our strength as compared to his determines what he has to pay in excess costs as whatever action he undertakes. The notion that the decision between peace or war depended on the ability to inflict disproportionate damage demonstrated the traditionalist of our military thought. When the power of individual weapons was relatively small, it was true that the side which could deliver the greater weight of offensive effort would generally win because damage would not

43 Same, p. 1616

44
43b Same, p. 185

43. Same, b. 182
44. Same, b. 1916
45. Same, b. 1916

offensive effort would generally win because damage would not
it was true that the side which could deliver the greater weight of
thought. When the power of individual weapons was relatively small,
proportionate damage demonstrated the traditional lack of our military
decision between peace or war depended on the ability to inflict die-
coats as whatever action he undertakes. The notion that the
strength as compared to his determines what he has to pay in excess
relative strength in 1928-33. We use the term "relative" because our
decision to attack said the strategic Vir Command briefing "is our
greater amount of damage than the enemy could: " The key to the enemy
power caused security to be equated with the ability to inflict a
retaliatory nature.

The identification of deterrence with retaliatory striking
retaliatory nature.

be so drastic as to affect the ability of the stronger side to continue the war.
reflect the relative strength at the end of the war. But the strategic trans-
formation caused by the nuclear weapons comes from the fact that relative damage may
be meaningless, because even the side which has mounted the stronger offensive
may have absorbed a level of damage which drains its national substance. With
thermo-nuclear weapons even an inferior retaliatory capacity may deter, not
because it can inflict disproportionate damage, but because it can inflict
unacceptable losses. This if anything should have been the lesson of the Korean war
which we refused to expand despite Soviet strategic inferiority.

To be sure, General Le May admitted that deterrence was achieved by
the capacity to inflict a level of damage an enemy would consider unacceptable.
But in practice, he could see no way of assuring an unacceptable level of
damage except through absolute numerical superiority of our long-range striking
force.
This in turn involved the following syllogism: (1) Deterrence is
produced by absolute superiority in long-range airpower. (2) Only one side
can deter: "I think I pointed out," said General Le May "that in 1958 the Soviet
long-range air force were going to be stronger, and from then on getting stronger...
and that the deterrent force would then transfer to Russia from the United States."

46. This should not be construed as an argument for inferior retaliatory capability; it is merely to indicate that we have to be clear about the nature of deterrence and the significant factors of military superiority. See below Chapter V.

47. Symington Hearings, p. 220.

48. Symington Hearings, p. 213.

But this definition of deterrence contained all the dilemmas of our pre-Korea doctrine: it did not consider whether a deterrent force adequate to prevent all-out war could also deter limited aggression. It did not deal with the question of what constituted aggression short of a direct attack on the United States. Above all it contained the seeds for endless inter-service rivalry for the only war this doctrine of deterrence was comfortable with was a contest of strategic striking forces. "All modern military men, whether they be airmen, soldiers or sailors agree that no surface military tasks can be undertaken until air superiority is achieved," General Le May testified. "Therefore, the first things that must be done in a modern war is to win the air power battle..."<sup>48</sup>

If land operations were impossible before victory in the air battle, however, they were unnecessary afterwards. Once it was possible to roam the nemy sky at will, there were more efficient ways to impose surrender than land warfare.<sup>49,50)</sup> By the same token, the carrier forces designed to hit shipyards and port facilities, could in terms of Air Force doctrine represent only a diversion of resources. For, as will be seen in the next chapter, the punishment which has to be inflicted to gain uncontested air supremacy makes it highly likely to

48 Irwin, p. 102.

49 See, e.g., this view was made explicit in the semi-official *Air Force*, May 1956.

50 Symington Hearings, cited, p. 1028.

unlikely that port facilities will still be strategically meaningful after
the air battle.

Thus KOREX the performance of the pre-Korea period was repeated. The
three services developed partially overlapping, partially inconsistent strategies
in the pursuit of appealing to their primary missions as laid down in the Key West agreement: the
Air Force spoke of winning the air battle, the Navy of keeping the sea lanes
open and the Army of conducting KOREX brushfire war. And because their force
levels were set on the basis of their primary missions, all the pressures
made for perpetuating a division of functions which the power of modern weapons
had made almost meaningless. In the absence of an agreed PXX doctrine, the
conflict of missions was irreconcilable. The Army request for more airlift
was correct in terms of its need for mobility in meeting brushfire war. But
the Air Force's reply that the resources could better

51 SC. Symington Hearings, cited, p.

52-53. Same, p.

25 Mar. Same, b.

21 Dec. Shingdon Hearnings, cited, b.

the Air Force's reply that the resumee could better
was correct in terms of its need for mobility in meeting
conflict of missions was irreconcilable. The Army request for more airfit
was made almost meaningless. In the absence of an agreed Air doctrine, the
made for perpetuating a division of functions which the power of modern weapons
technology were set on the basis of their primary missions, still thehras
open and the Army of conducting Air combat in air战 war. And because their force
Air Force arose of winning the air battle, the Navy of keeping the sea forces
according to their primary missions as laid down in the Key West Agreement:
the
in the present state of things
three services developed partially overlapping, partially inconsistent strategies
the Air Force the performance of the Air Force period was redefined. The
the Air Force.

(Y) 73

be devoted to procuring additional combat aircraft was equally justified in terms of its mission of winning the air battle. The Navy's insistence on a long-range airplane was wise, if bombing facilities would affect the course of a general war. It was unnecessary if the Strategic Air Command would decide the issue in a relatively short period.

As a result, the Symington hearings revealed an attempt by each service to hoard weapons of maximum range and destructiveness because in the absence of an agreed doctrine no service could rely on a sister service's interpretation of what constituted an essential target: "The Navy would have to change their doctrine [to engage in strategic bombing] "said General Twining, when it was pointed out to him that the new navy attack bombers had a combat radius in excess of 1500 miles. "...Admiral Burke has said his [mission] job is to get control of the seas, and that is what he is going to do. That is his job... His job is not to go in and strike strategic targets. Mine is.... so the Strategic Air Force has to be just as big, just as strong, just as ready, regardless of this Navy contribution on these targets. "The [primary] function of the army is the destruction of the enemy army," said General Taylor in justifying Army development of a 1500 mile missile, "the primary function of the Air Force is to destroy enemy air power and for the [mammoth] Navy to destroy enemy naval power... If you accept the fact that the [ Army exists to destroy hostile armies, then any missile which will destroy hostile ground forces should be available to the army." "To control the sea, "said Admiral Burke, "the Navy must be capable of destroying the source of weapons which threaten ships and operations at sea -- submarine bases, airbases, missile bases and any other bases from which control of the sea can be challenged." Thus each service seeks

(58) Symington Hearings, p. 1840. See also p. 178 (General Le May)

(54-58) same, p. 1285, p. 1287

(55-60) same, p. 1343

74

to get under its control every weapons system it requires to attack
the targets it considers essential even if such a weapons system already
exists in a sister service and despite the fact that a strict distinction
between essentail targets for air, land and sea - warfare is almost im-
possible. It is the measure of the doctrinal split among the services
that General Twining considered a duplication of efferts between the
Airforce and the Navy, a simpler course than an adaptation of either
strategic doctrine. "Each service," said Secretary Wilson, has its own
particular philosophy... for how wars should be fought." 56 But three
strategic doctrines, partially inconsistent, increase the dilemmas of
policy. At each crisis they force a resolution under the pressure of
events; the disagreements of military experts magnify the insecurity of
the policy makers because they symbolize the uncertainty of any proposed
solution.

The power and speed of modern weapons have made the rigid division
of function among the services and the literal interpretation of missions
almost irrevelant. A 1500-mile missile with a thermo-nuclear warhead
can destroy enemy armies; from present U.S. bases or from ships, it can

56) same, p.1618

2d) assume, b.1918

can destroy enemy armies; from present U.S. bases or from ships, it can almost irrevocably. A 1200-mile missile with a thermo-nuclear warhead of function among the services and the literal interpretation of missions The power and speed of modern weapons have made the rigid division solution.

the policy makers because they emphasize the uncertainty of any proposed
events; the disagreements of military experts magnify the insecurity of
policy. At each crisis they force a resolution under the pressure of
strategic doctrines, partially inconsistent, increase the dilemma of
particular philosophy... for how were should be fought." But three
strategic doctrine. "Each service," said Secretary Wilson, use its own
Airforce and the Navy, a simpler course than an adaptation of either
that General Twining considered a publication of efforts between the
possible. It is the measure of the doctrinal split among the services
between essential targets for air, land and sea - warfare is almost im-
exists in a sister service and despite the fact that a strict distinction
the targets it considers essential even if such a weapon system already
to get under its control every weapon system it requires to attack

75

also reach almost all of metropolitan Russia. A multi-megaton weapon
is an effective tool for cratering enemy airfields; in the process, it
is certain to obliterate an area which far transcends any ordinary defi-
nition of a target. In all these cases, the collateral implications of
the weapons system far transcends the primary mission which is the justi-
fication for its existence.

The setting of force levels on the basis of a service's primary
missions inhibits the consideration of these collateral effects. The
primary missions become ends in themselves and this in turn exaggerates
the abstractness of our military doctrine. Given the range of modern
weapons, the attempt to develop a weapons system capable of destroying
every enemy target that can affect a service's primary mission must lead
to an attempt by each service to develop a strategic striking force. And
it will inhibit a consideration of intermediary applications of power
which in the nuclear age may pay much higher returns than all-out war.

The notion that deterrence can be achieved by only one of the two
super-powers is no longer applicable, if it ever was. While the United
States enjoyed an absolute atomic monopoly even a small ...

atom-bomber is no longer applicable, if it ever was. While the United

The notion that deterrence can be achieved by only one of the two
which in the nuclear age may bay much higher returns than all-out war.

it will inhibit a consideration of intermediary applications of power
to an attempt by each service to develop a strategic striking force. And
every enemy target that can affect a service's primary mission must lead
weapons, the attempt to develop a weapons system capable of destroying
the aperpetuity of our military doctrine. Given the range of modern
primary missions become ends in themselves and this in turn exaggerates
misactions inhibits the consideration of these collateral effects. The

The setting of force levels on the basis of a service's primary
fication for its existence.

the weapons system far transcends the primary mission which is the justification of a target. In all these cases, the collateral implications of its certain to diluteate an area which far transcends any ordinary deficit is an effective tool for cratering enemy airfields; in the process, it also reaches almost all of metropolitan Russia. A multi-megaton weapon

There could protect many areas from the threat of magazine retaliation (4) number of nuclear weapons possessed a powerful deterrent effect. But with the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile the American strategic problem is transformed: Now matter how vast our remaining margin in number and refinement of ultimate weapons, henceforth not only *they* but *we* must fear them. In such a situation deterrence can no longer be measured by absolute power; it depends on a complex of physical and psychological factors in which the price to be paid, the importance the contenders attach to the objective in dispute and their ability to bring their power to bear become crucial factors. To seek safety in numerical superiority or even in superior destructiveness may come close to a Maginot line of mentality, to seek in magnitude a substitute for conception.

Moreover, in many fields where our present weapons system is already adequate for performing its mission, technological advances will add much less to our effective strength than to that of the Soviet bloc. This would seem to be true of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile or the atomic submarine. And when weapons can be made of any degree of destructiveness there must come a point where additional increments of power yield diminishing returns. What is the sense in a weapon that can destroy a city twice over?

Thus for the first time in military history there exists the
possibility of a stalemate despite an absolute superiority in numbers
and in technology. It is a stalemate not so much in power as in the
assessment of risks; an uneasy balance which shifts from region to
region with the importance the contenders attach to them and the alter-
natives their strategy and their weapons systems present them. The key
to survival depends on an adequate retaliatory force. Without a powerful
strategic Airforce no other measures are possible. But all-out attack
does not exhaust the range of our perils; although the greatest threat,
it may be in fact the least likely danger. Mastery of the challenges
of the nuclear age, depend on the ability to combine physical and psy-
chological factors; to develop weapons systems which do not paralyze
the will and strategies which permit us to shift the risks of counter-
action to the other side. Safety henceforth can no longer be absolute -
it will have to depend on the understanding of nuance. The pernicious
aspect of the lack of doctrinal agreement among the services is precise-
ly that it tempts each of the services to aim for absolute solutions
in purely military terms and therefore inhibits the attempt to bridge
the gap which has opened between power and the objectives for which to
use it.

78 (Y)

A revolution cannot be mastered until it is understood. The temptation is always to seek to integrate it into familiar doctrine: to deny that it is a revolution. Nothing is more important, therefore, than to attempt an assessment of the two technological revolutions we have witnessed in the past decade in order to determine their impact on our, by now, traditional notions of surprise attack, deterrence, coalition policy and the goals of war.

Axxanovian economics and nuclear strategy are mastered

XXIX. REVOLUTION, EMBARRASSMENT, AND WAR.

COALITION POLICY AND THE GOALS OF WAR.

ON OUR 'BY NOW' TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF AMBRISE ATTACK, DETERRENCE,
WE HAVE WITNESSED IN THE PAST DECADE IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THEIR IMPACT
THAN TO ATTEMPT AN ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS
TO DENY THAT IT IS A REVOLUTION. NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT, THEREFORE,
TEMPTATION IS ALWAYS TO SEEK TO INTEGRATE IT INTO FAMILIAR DOCTRINE:

A REVOLUTION CANNOT BE MASTERSBED UNTIL IT IS UNDERSTOOD.
THE

dispute. And he will be confirmed in his interpretations by the
menability between the coat of the war and the objective in
state. In any other situation he will be indebted by the incom-
tation short of an unambiguous attack on the survival of his
whether to unlesst all-out war: all precursors will make for real-
ignizing decision a statesman can confront is the problem of
psychological aspect of strategy and of deterrence. For the most
The reliance on all-out thermo-nuclear war neglects the
defeat in Korea.

could repress the revolution in Hungary and the Chinese escape
age in all-out war has been the anfield behind which the Soviet
ciently to overcome the physical defence. Our reluctance to en-
to run risks: the psychological education may favor it unless
opponent may gain an advantage because of its superior readiness
attaches greater importance to a particular objective than its
result of the thermo-nuclear atlatate may be that the side which
plea be by the balance of forces on the spot, the counteractive
thought "atlast" enough for the threat of all-out war to be credit-
in which an area may be protected as much by the fact that it is
and of the importance they attach to given region: an education
of the assessment by the contenders of each other's capabilities
reance depends above all on a psychological education, compounded
ponent that it will in fact be implemented. As a result deter-
the threat of all-out war will depend on the belief of the ch-
an over-all superiority in strength. But the effectiveness of
erance of course, that deterrence is best achieved by assembling
determined by the opponent's criteria, not ours. It can be
what is considered a loss will for purposes of deterrence be

1-15

VI-13

conviction that as long as the strategic retaliatory force remains intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant. Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend to paralyze action: the former because it will make few issues seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many disputes to seem irrelevant to the over-all strategic equation.

These inhibitions will be reinforced if the aggression takes place by proxy, for the sophisticated weapons systems suitable for all-out war are less useful against non-nuclear or underdeveloped powers and the military will always resist their employment for these purposes as a strategic diversion. Thus the psychological equation almost invariably operates against the side which can extricate itself from a situation only by the threat of all-out war. It is not that nations will no longer fight for what they consider their "vital" interests; it is that the line between what is considered vital and peripheral will shift if every objective has to be weighed against a thermo-nuclear holocaust. Who can be certain that faced with the catastrophe of nuclear war, even Europe, long the keystone of our security, will seem worth the price? And if all-out war will seem a less attractive method for protecting the status quo, it will be almost unthinkable to achieve strategic transformations.

As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses its credibility. Our capacity for massive retaliation did not prevent the Korean war, the loss of Northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal or the Suez crisis.

A deterrent before the implementation of which one recoils is a threat of deterrent. IS AFRID TO IMPLEMENT CEASES TO BE A VILLAGE-DETERRENT. Moreover, whatever the credibility of a contradiction in terms,

WHEN IT IS CHALLENGED

contradiction in terms, however, whatever the credibility of
A deterrent before the implementation of which one recovers if a
Indo-China, the Soviet-Latvian arms deal or the Soviet criteria.
isation did not prevent the Korean War, the loss of Northern
out war loses its credibility. Our capacity for massive retali-
ance is almost unthinkable to achieve strategic transformations,
and less attractive method for protecting the status quo, it will
will seem worth the price? And if all-out war will seem a less
benefit of unease war even Europe, long the keystone of our security,
clear holocaust, who can be certain that faced with the catastro-
shift if every objective has to be weighed against a thermo-nu-
clash which can exacerate itself from a situation only by the
the line between what is considered vital and peripheral will
fight for what they consider their "vital" interests, it is that
threat of all-out war. It is not that usages will no longer
alude which can exacerate itself from a situation only by the
the mathematical equation almost invariably operates against the
employment for these purposes as a strategic diversion. Time
dereloped powers and the military will always relief their
able for all-out war are less useful against non-unclear or un-
takes place by proxy, for the sophisticated weapons systems can-
dispose to seem irrelevant to the over-all strategic education.
These inhibitions will be reinforced if the application
seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many
to paralyze action: the former because it will make few issuance
Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend
mainly intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant
conviction that as found as the strategic retaliatory force re-
Ar-13

As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-
out war loses its credibility. Our capacity for massive retali-
ance is almost unthinkable to achieve strategic transformations,
and less attractive method for protecting the status quo, it will
will seem worth the price? And if all-out war will seem a less
benefit of unease war even Europe, long the keystone of our security,
clear holocaust, who can be certain that faced with the catastro-
shift if every objective has to be weighed against a thermo-nu-
clash which can exacerate itself from a situation only by the
the line between what is considered vital and peripheral will
fight for what they consider their "vital" interests, it is that
threat of all-out war. It is not that usages will no longer
alude which can exacerate itself from a situation only by the
employment for these purposes as a strategic diversion. Time
dereloped powers and the military will always relief their
able for all-out war are less useful against non-unclear or un-
takes place by proxy, for the sophisticated weapons systems can-
dispose to seem irrelevant to the over-all strategic education.
These inhibitions will be reinforced if the application
seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many
to paralyze action; the former because it will make few issuance
Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend
mainly intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant
conviction that as found as the strategic retaliatory force re-

These inhibitions will be reinforced if the application
seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes many
to paralyze action; the former because it will make few issuance
Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend
mainly intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant
conviction that as found as the strategic retaliatory force re-

VI-34

our threat of all-out war; it is clear that all-out thermo-nuclear
war does not represent a strategic option for our allies. Thus
a psychological gap is created by the conviction of our allies
that they have nothing to gain from massive retaliation and the
belief of the Soviet leaders that they have nothing to fear from
our threat of it; a gap which may actually encourage an all-out
war. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons having made it un-
likely that any responsible statesman will lightly unleash a
general war, one of the gravest dangers of all-out war lies in
miscalculation. This is the only war it is within our power to
avoid assuming we leave no doubt about our capabilities and our
determination. But even this "avoidable" war may break out if
the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally
and that our threats of all-out war are bluff. If that should
happen the Soviet bloc may then decide, as its nuclear arsenal
grows, to absorb the peripheral areas of Eurasia and to confront
us with the choice between yielding or the destruction of Ameri-
can cities. And because the Sino-Soviet leaders may well be mis-
taken in their assessment of our reaction to such a contingency,
the reliance on "massive retaliation" may bring about the total
war it seeks to prevent.

This is another way of saying that even if successful the threat of all-out war purchases deterrence at a fearful cost and at a potentially exorbitant risk. It either requires us in every crisis to stake our survival on the credibility of a threat we will be increasingly reluctant to implement or it will force us into the kind of war our strategy should make every attempt to avoid. The costs of thermo-nuclear war are too fearful for it

avoid. The costs of thermo-nuclear war are too fearful for it
into the kind of war our strategy should make every attempt to
will be increasingly reluctant to implement or it will force us
crises to take our survival on the credibility of a threat we
at a potentially exorbitant risk. It either requires us in every
threat of all-out war purchase deterrence at a fearful cost and
This is another way of saying that even if successful the
war it seeks to prevent.

the reliance on "massive retaliation" may bring about the total
taken in their assessment of our reaction to such a contingency,
can cities. And because the Soviet leaders may well be mis-
use with the choice between yielding or the destruction of Ameri-
growa, to abate the peripheral areas of Eurasia and to confront
happen the Soviet bloc may then decide, as its nuclear arsenal
and that our threats of all-out war are blunt. If that should
be the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally
deterrence. But even this "avoidable" war may break out if
avoid assuming we leave no doubt about our capabilities and our
misch calculation. This is the only war it is within our power to
general war, one of the gravest dangers of all-out war life in
likely that any reasonable statesman will lightly unleash a
war. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons having made it un-
our threat of it; a gap which may actually encourage an all-out
pallet of the Soviet leaders that they have nothing to fear from
that they have nothing to gain from massive retaliation and the
a psychological gap is created by the conviction of our allies
war does not represent a strategic option for our allies. This
our threat of all-out war; it is clear that all-out thermo-nuclear

VI-15

to be our only response to a challenge. Even if it could be won,
we should seek our objectives at smaller sacrifice. Thermo-nuclear
war has thus set our statesmanship a problem long familiar to less
fortunate nations: that absolute security is no longer possible.
Whatever the validity of the identification of deterrence with
maximum retaliatory power, we will have to sacrifice a measure
of destructiveness to gain the possibility of fighting wars that
will not amount to a national catastrophe. Policy, it has been
said, is the science of the relative. The same is true of strat-
egy and to understand this fact, so foreign to our national ex-
perience, is the task history has set our generation.

III

What strategic doctrine can avoid the dilemmas of all-out
war then? Two basic answers have been given: the first proposal
asserts the continued feasibility of all-out war but it would seek
to reduce its cost by confining it either to military installa-
tions or to a battlefield, however defined. The second solution
would seek to limit the objective of war and strive to establish
a relationship between the purpose of the war and the force em-
ployed. Each will be examined in turn.

The first position accepts the continued possibility of
all-out war but seeks to mitigate its horrors. The proposals
have taken several forms: to refrain from the use of thermo-
nuclear weapons unless the other side uses them first; to confine
an all-out war to specific targets again unless the other side
breaks the agreement, tacit or expressed, first; to retaliate by
a specific formula, for example, by inflicting double the amount

a specific formula, for example, by inflicting double the amount
prepaid the agreement, fact or expressed, first; to resuscitate by
an all-out war to specific targets again unless the other side
nuclear weapon unless the other side uses them first; to confuse
have taken several forms: to refrain from the use of thermo-
all-out war but seeks to mitigate its horrors. The proposals
The first position accepts the continued possibility of
played. Each will be examined in turn.

a relationship between the purpose of the war and the force em-
would seek to limit the objective of war and arrive to establish
fions or to a battlefield, however defined. The second solution
to reduce its coat by confining it either to military installi-
serts the continued possibility of all-out war but it would seek
war then? Two basic answers have been given: the first proposal
what strategic doctrine can avoid the dilemmas of all-out
III

perIENCE, is the task history has set our generation.

By and to understand this fact, so foreign to our national ex-
sis, is the science of the relative. The same is true of atrat-
will not amount to a national catastrophe. Policy, if she has been
of destructiveness to gain the possibility of fighting were that
maximum resiliency power, we will have to sacrifice a measure
whatever the validity of the identification of deterrence with
fortunate nations: that absolute security is no longer feasible.

War has thus set our statesmanship a problem long familiar to less
we should seek our objectives at smaller sacrifice. Thermo-unclear
to be our only response to a challenge. Even if it could be won,

VI-12

VI-12

Is limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the nu-
clear period? Here we must analyze precisely what is meant by
limited war.

It is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our
foreign involvements that we should have come to consider limited
war an aberration from the "pure" case and that we have paid little
attention to its strategic opportunities. In a sense this is due,
too, to the manner in which we legitimized the limited wars we have
fought. For every war in which we engaged in the Western Hemisphere
was a limited war in the sense that it did not involve a mobilization
of all our material resources. But since we generally justified them
as expeditions, punitive or otherwise, they rarely entered our na-
tional consciousness as part of the phenomenon of limited war.

Our wars in the Western Hemisphere illustrate, however, that
limited wars have been both more frequent and more productive than
the disputes produced by the Korean war indicated. The debate which
has since raged on the subject of limited war, tended to confuse the
issues, moreover, because it did not sufficiently distinguish be-
 tween the various forms of limited war. Some wars are inherently
limited, for example, because of the disparity in power between the
protagonists. A war between the United States and Nicaragua even if
engaged the full resources of Nicaragua would not require more than
a fraction of our strength whatever the objectives we set ourselves.

a fraction of our strength, whatever the objectives we set ourselves. It engaged the full resources of Nicaragua, would not require more than 100,000 men. A war between the United States and Nicaragua even if limited, for example, because of the disparity in power between the two various forms of limited war. Some wars are inherently issued, moreover, because it is not sufficiently defined what has since raged on the subject of limited war tended to confuse the diabetes pronounced by the Korean war indicated. The debate which limited wars have been both more fratricidal and more productive than our war in the Western Hemisphere illustrate, however, thatATIONAL CONSCIENCE as part of the phenomenon of limited war.

as expeditions, punitive or otherwise, they rarely entered our war of all our material resources. But since we generally justified them was a limited war in the sense that it did not involve a modification of thought. For every war in which we engaged in the Western Hemisphere too, to the manner in which we formulated the limited war we have attention to its strategic opportunities. In a sense this is true. War is an aberration from the "pure" case and thus we have said little foreign involvements that we should have come to consider limited. It is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our limited war.

clearly. Here we must analyze precisely what it meant by
It limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the un-

AI-33

China and one or more of the major powers, such as the Chinese move
belligerent areas, put which involves the prospect of abducting so-called
conflicts which are officially directed against a foreign power or a
Chinese spoliation of Central Asia such as Tientsin (P.)

or United States military action in the Western Hemisphere or perhaps
fierily. Examples would be Soviet intervention in the satellite states.

which are clearly unmatched and where, on the other hand, intervention is not
violating either the Western powers or the Soviet bloc against powers
situation three, process categories can be distinguished: (1) pure in-

If one applies these rules of limited war to the present

barity in power but from a concrete policy decision.
transfers from infiltration of technology or logistics or from a dis-
over a single-track railway. Finally there are the limited wars which
Russian commitment was limited to the forces that could be subordinated
to this kind of war is the Guanao-Tsambasian war of 1909 in which the
of subdue prevalence one also from asking a social effort. An example
of limited war is one between major powers in which the difficulty
limited our commitment for a variety of reasons. Still another kind
the maximum military effort of which they were capable while we
was the case in the Korean war in which the Chinese properly made
bureaucracy of command of the major powers joining in the
involvement of the Japanese in the war between the major powers

the maximum military effort of which they were capable while we
was the case in the Korean war in which the Chinese properly made
bureaucracy of command of the major powers joining in the
involvement of the Japanese in the war between the major powers
(2) War between two or more major powers is the most common
with respect to us. Another variation of this form of limited war
such a war would be all-out in relation to North Korea put limited

VI-53

VI-24

directed against the off-shore islands or the Anglo-French police action" against Egypt, or a Soviet military move into the Middle East.

Finally there is the problem of limited war which begins explicitly as a war between the major powers. It is clear that this is the most explosive situation. If a war between major powers can be kept limited, it is clear that the first two situations would stand a good chance of being kept from spreading as well.

Of course, limited wars between major powers have been frequent in the history of warfare. For a long time they were due to technological limitations. Before the industrial revolution the productive processes of a country yielded such a relatively small increment above bare subsistence, that wars tended to remain limited for lack of resources: manpower could not be kept in the field indefinitely so that a state had the choice either to hire mercenaries or to see its armies disband as the harvesting season approached. In neither case could the homefront produce sufficient weapons to sustain the kind of continuous campaign which characterized the two World Wars. Thus considerations of domestic policy, if not a strategic concept, could limit the scope of military action. In the 17th century, for example, Louis XIV employed almost his whole army constantly for a period of close to twenty-five years. Still, his military establishment utilized only a small proportion of the national resources. This was not due to self-restraint on the part of the French king, but to the nature of his domestic structure which made

French King, put to the nature of his domestic agriculture which makes
sources. This was not due to a self-restraint on the part of the
economical扶植 only a sort of provision of the national re-
for a period of close to twenty-five years. For the military

for example, Louis XIV employed almost all his whole army contractly
as strategic consultants, and he kept was financed. In the French company
World Wars. These considerations of domestic policy, if not a
sustain the kind of contracts can take which characterized the two
in neither case could the instruments provide sufficient weapons to
or to see its actions depend at the harvesting season approached,
deffinitely so that a balance had the choice either to give mercantiles
for lack of resources: manpower could not be held in the field in-
crement above part of subsistence, that was tombed to remain limited
by productive processes of a country. Yielded each a relatively small
to decimological limitations. Before the industrial revolution the
frequent in the history of warfare. For a long time they were one
of costs. Limited were between major powers have been

a good chance of being kept from approaching as well.
Most limited, it is clear that the fixed two situations would arise
most explosive situation. If a war between major powers can be
ly as a war between the major powers. It is clear that while it is the
(5) Finally there is the problem of limited war which begins expeof-
sion, against England, or a Soviet military move into the Middle East,
directed against the off-shore islands or the Anglo-French police

AI-SY

VI-25

made it impossible for him to conscript his subjects or to levy income taxes or to confiscate property. His military establishment was so weak, therefore limited by the availability of resources and with it the wars he fought. On the other hand, the wars of Prussia while they did not exceed those of France in scope involved an incomparably greater mobilization of national resources. This came about because Prussia's *inferiority in resources* enabled her to survive as a major power only by a domestic tour de force which organized the entire state for war. Still, Prussia's exertions only gave her a precarious parity with the other powers, *however*, she did not force them to emulate her. Wars remained limited because the major powers were able to mobilize only a small proportion of their national resources for war and because the one power which was not so *RESTRAINED* did not thereby gain a decisive advantage.

Since the French Revolution the domestic restrictions on the capacity of governments to mobilize national resources have increasingly disappeared. And this had occurred side by side with the industrial revolution which, *although* made it technically possible to devote a substantial proportion of the national product to war without bringing about the kind of privation which would shake the social order. To be sure, there still exist differences *not in the power, but in the willingness* to exact sacrifices: one of the sources of Soviet strength is *her* readiness to devote a much larger proportion of the

strength in war readiness to enforce a much larger proportion of the
the willingness to exact sacrifices: one of the sources of power
To be sure, there is still a difference not in the power, but in
ing about the kind of invasion which would arise in the social order,
superficial proportion of the national product to war without bring-
chemical revolution which made it technically possible to devote a
fully disappeared. And this has occurred side by side with the in-
capacity of governments to modify national resources have increase-
Since the French Revolution the domestic restrictions on the
gain a decisive advantage.

because the one power which was not so restricted did not thereby
only a small proportion of their national resources for war and
Naples remained limited because the major powers were able to mobilise
parity with the other powers, she did not force them to emulate her.
state for war. But France's exertions only gave her a precarions
power only by a domestic cost of force which organised the entire
France's a superiority in resources enabled her to survive as a major
Greater mobilisation of national resources. This came about because
did not exceed those of France in scope involved in incomparably
were he thought. On the other hand, the war of France while they
certainly limited by the availability of resources and with the
taxes or to collate the property. His military establishment was
made it impossible for him to conscript his subjects or to levy income

VI-32

VI-26

national income to military expenditures than the United States.
But for purposes of present strategy it is clear that no major
power will be forced to adopt a strategy of limited objectives be-
cause of insufficient resources. With modern weapons, a limited war
will be an act of policy, not of necessity.

What then is a limited war under modern conditions? One can
think of many models: a war confined to geographic area, a war that
does not utilize the whole weapons system (such as eschewing the use
of thermo-nuclear weapons), a war which utilizes the whole weapons
system but limits its employment of specific targets. But none of
these military definitions seems adequate: a war may be confined to a
geographically or in terms of targets and yet be total in the sense
of draining the national substance, as happened to France in World
War I. The fact that the most destructive weapons are not employed,
or that the destructive capability of the existing weapons is small,
is no more a guarantee against excessive suffering. In the Thirty
Year's War the power of weapons was negligible compared to modern
armaments and the number of men in each army was small by present-
day standards -- in fact the Austrian Field Marshall Montecucoli put
at 15,000 the absolute maximum number of men which would be effi-
ciently commanded in one army. Yet it is estimated that at least
30 per cent of the population of Germany died during the course of it.

7. Montecuccoli, p. 74 (He insisted that not even Wallenstein's armies exceeded 15,000 men).

armies exceeded 12,000 men).

V. Montecuccoli, p. 11 (He stated that not even Affermatin' a

30 per cent of the population of Germany died during the course of it.
cratically commanded in one army. Yet it is estimated that at least
at 12,000 the absolute maximum number of men which would be effi-
gency adverarda - In fact the Wartrian Field Marshall Montecuccoli put
armaments and the number of men in each army was small by present-
Year's War the power of weapons was negligible compared to modern
it is no more a guarantee against excessive suffering. In the Thirty
or that the destructive capability of the existing weapons is small.
War I. The fact that the most destructive weapons are not employed,
of draining the national appearance, as happens to France in world
Geographically or in terms of targets and yet be total in the same
these military definitions seem adequate: a war may be confined
system but limits its employment of specific targets. But none of
of thermo-nuclear weapons), a war which utilizes the whole weapons
does not utilize the whole weapons system (such as enemym the use
think of many models: a war confined to geographic area, a war that
what then is a limited war under modern conditions? One can
will be an act of policy, not of necessity.

cause of insufficient resources. With modern weapons, a limited war
power will be forced to adopt a strategy of limited objectives pe-
But for purposes of present strategy it is clear that no major
national income to military expenditures than the United States.

AI-S9

sovereign will of other states which may have different criteria of
differentia). But foreign policy takes another dimension: the
sources a consensus and a secret police; adjectives to indicate
acquiescence they institute; elaborate strategies to justify
limited by the source of justice at their citizens. To achieve
sensations asated in a democracy. (Even constitutional regimes
by recognized justice and by the sense of justice at the basis
of the majority domestic and colonial policy). Domestic policy is limited only
relations: the non-negotiability between a nation's approach to
an attempt to solve one of the differences of international
A strategy based on hereby military considerations is therefore
on the victor's will.

addition in which the conditions of peace are dependent entirely
ought to be fulfilled. The goal of each war is to bring about a
a relationship between cost of continued resistance and the terms
of enemy defeatless to survive him of any possibility of appeasing
consideration is certain to be all-out war, the attempt to render the
in military terms, the end result of a resistance on hereby military
In short, there exists no way to define a limited war in here-
ten-fold over World War II
the degradability of these weapons has increased between five and
fourfold. This would also produce a shifting tonnage because
And a new world war for the first time will come to be known as con-

A1-54

VI-23

justice and a different conception of its interests. Domestically
foreign policy is legitimized as all other policy by the domestic
AS DOMESTIC POLICY, for a nation has no other.
standard of justice, for a nation has no other. But internationally,
what is defined as justice domestically becomes an object of
negotiation. It is little wonder that the reaction of a nation like
ours which has never experienced the limits of its domestic
possibilities is a rebellion against this double standard which
treats what is defined as absolute domestically as contingent abroad.
NEGOTIABLE,
REPRESENTS AN EFFORT,
Our predilection for all-out war is a symptom of our quest to trans-
form foreign policy into an aspect of domestic policy, to bring
about a situation abroad where the will of other nations, or at
THAT
least of the enemy, is no longer a factor to be considered.

A limited war, by contrast, is fought for a specific objective
which, by its very existence, will establish a certain <u>commemorability</u>
between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects
an attempt to <u>affect</u> the opponent's will, not to <u>crush</u> it; to make
the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive than continued
resistance, but to strive for conditions and not for complete
annihilation.

Limited war presents the military with particular difficulties
however. An all-out war is relatively simple to plan because its
limits are set by military considerations and even by military
capacity. The targets for an all-out war are relatively fixed; the
force requirements determined by the need to assemble overwhelming

force requirements determined by the need to assemble overwhelming capacity. The targets for an all-out war are relatively fixed; the limits are set by military considerations and even by military however. An all-out war is relatively simple to plan because it

Limited war presents a more military with particular difficulties annihilation.

Reference, put to achieve for conditions and not for complete the conditions so imposed seem more attractive than continued an attempt to affect the opponent a will not to crash it; to make between the force employed and the goal co-operated. It reflects which, by its very existence, will eat up a certain commensurability. A limited war, by contrast, is fought for a specific objective least of the summa, is no longer a factor to be considered.

About a situation abroad where the will of other nations, or at form foreign policy into an aspect of domestic policy, to bring our projection for all-out war, is a symptom of our desire to trans-

treats what is defined as absolute domestically as contingent abroad. Possibilities is a repetition against this double standard which ours which has never experienced the limits of its domestic

negotiation. It is little wonder that the reaction of a nation like what is defined as justice domestically becomes an object of

standard of justice, for a nation has no other. But internationally, foreign policy is legittimated as all other policy by the domestic justice and a different conception of its interests. Domestically

AI-53

VI-30

This raises the question to what extent the nuclear age permits a policy of intermediate objectives. Do any of the factors apply today which in the past made possible a diplomacy of limited objectives and military policy of limited wars?

In the great periods of European cabinet diplomacy between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution and between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the first World War, wars were limited because there existed a political framework which led to a general consciousness of limited risks. This political framework was due to several factors: There was, to begin with, a conscious decision that the upheavals of the Thirty Year's War and of the Napoleonic wars should not occur again. This decision proved most effective in the period immediately following the wars, but it gave the international orders created by the Treaty of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna the breathing spell necessary to convince the major powers that none of the outstanding disputes involved their survival. More important was the fact that the international order did not contain a revolutionary power. No state was so dissatisfied with the peace settlement that it sought to gain its ends by overthrowing it and no power considered that its domestic notion of justice was incompatible with that of the other states. Finally, in an era of stable weapons technology, both the strength of the powers and the assessment of it were relatively fixed, the risks of surprise attack and of unforeseen technological developments were relatively small. All this did not make conflicts impossible, but it limited them to disputes within a given framework; wars occurred, but they were fought in the name of the existing framework and the peace was justified as the better arrangement of a basically unchanged international order.

287 For a fuller discussion, see the author's *A World Restored*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957.

VI-36

of the irresolution of her opponents. The task of creating a balance of power would therefore be far from hopeless if one considered nothing but the available resources. But the will to use this strength is lacking because of the memory of two world wars, the ambiguity of nuclear technology, and the almost uninterrupted expansion of Soviet influence. While a balance is attainable therefore along existing lines on the Eurasian Continent, it will always remain tenuous. As long as Soviet armies are poised on the Elbe, Western Europe will be insecure. As long as China strides unopposed through Southeast Asia, the uncommitted Powers will seek their safety in neutralism. The Soviet bloc presents to the outside world a vision of ruthless strength allied with artful cunning, of a constant readiness to utilize force coupled with the diplomatic skill to secure the fruits of such use. The United States, therefore, faces the task not only of stemming the Soviet tide but also of reducing the Soviet sphere and demonstrating the limitations of Soviet power and skills. The last is almost as important as the reduction of the Soviet sphere for to the extent that the Free World, now assailed by a sense of its impotence, realizes that the Soviet bloc, too, behind its facade of monolithic power shrinks from certain consequences, its resolution and its policy will both become stronger.

A strategy which admits the possibility of fighting limited actions is more likely to achieve this objective than the threat of a total nuclear war. The threat of an all-out war will be either considered bluff or it will transform every dispute into a question of prestige which will inhibit any concessions. Actions short of total war, on the other hand, may help restore fluidity to the diplomatic situation, particularly if we analyze precisely what is meant by reduction of the Soviet sphere. The Sino-Soviet bloc can be reduced short of waging general war in two ways: by a voluntary withdrawal or by an internal split. The former is unlikely and depends on many factors outside of our control.

["and then decide to defend one on the other side, or neither, depending on the\nsituation, try to find two states, put us on one side to learn of the other in time\nto info-CHins and then attack in Bums with the same name. They can't do\nanything we can't find one by now. The Chinese, for example, cannot draw us\ninto Info-CHins and then attack in Bums with the same name. They can't do\nanything we can't find one by now.

VI-49

point of view absolutely preclude fighting limited wars. Valid as this contention from the point of view of the present military situation, it is unrealistic psychologically. A limited war of any size would absorb so great a proportion of the present army that it would lose a great deal of flexibility to deal with any other threat. The unlikelihood that any Chief of Staff would commit an army of the present size is shown by the attitude of the then Chief-of-Staff General Ridgway with regard both to Indo-China and the Chinese offshore islands. And the doubts of the military will reinforce the inhibitions of the political leadership. Thus another vicious circle is set up: the civilian leadership will tend to make its participation in a limited war dependent on military advice, but the pressure of the military will in all good conscience have to be against involvement either because they do not possess adequate forces or because they lack an adequate doctrine or both. The circle is broken in practice only if a strong President assumes the responsibility for defining the limits of the conflict and the nature of our commitment as happened in the Korean war.

Nevertheless the inadequacy of forces is relatively easily remedied if we can adjust our notion of war to new conditions. Unfortunately we reacted to the frustrations of the Korean war with a determination never to be caught in such a predicament again. Accordingly, we set about to reduce the deployment of our troops overseas and to create a strategic reserve in the United States. As a concept this is unexceptionable. A strategic reserve, however, implies the precise meaning of the term: a reserve for a force which is holding the line. Unfortunately one of the basic facts of the post-war period is the inadequacy of many local forces for this mission or at least their inability to offer prolonged resistance. A strategic reserve which cannot move to threatened areas quickly enough to bolster local resistance as a contradiction in terms? It will be either too small or too irrelevant for a general war; and too immobile to redress the

VI-51

East, provided all air-transport units were in position when the crisis occurred-- a most unlikely contingency. Even the combat element of such a division weighs 7,000 short tons, and could therefore not be moved in less than 10 days.

It is clear that one means for improving mobility is to reduce the weight of army units. Fortunately substantial steps in this direction are taking place. The army has given up its traditional organization of a division based on the basis of three regiments and has substituted the Pentana concepts a division composed of five combat teams. This increases the number of self-supporting commands and thereby the flexibility of maneuver; it enables the smaller air force units to apply a more discriminating increment of force. In addition a new type of airborne division has been created designed for rapid air-transport. It would weigh 14,300 short tons and its combat element would weigh 35,000 short tons. This would halve the time required to move one division to the Middle East from the United States even with existing airlift.

But the existing airlift places us in a precarious situation from the point of view of limited war. Unless the combat element of a division can be moved almost simultaneously it may arrive too late to affect events or in such small driblets that it can be defeated in detail. But to lift the combat element of a new type division would require a fleet of 200 C-133's; to move the entire division within a period of 10 days would require a fleet of 272 C-133's at a cost of 2.6 billion dollars. After this unit were in position it would require 9,438 short tons of supplies to be airlifted over a 30-day period, at the end of which time surface transports would probably take over most of the logistics. To be sure, as the high speed nuclear powered ships which are being planned by the navy become operative in a decade or so, the requirement for airlift may decline. But in the interim period airlift is our only means for attaining strategic mobility for limited war.