FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 13, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
MAJESTIC HOTEL, PARIS, FRANCE

12:40 P.M. EDT

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, I want to thank those of you who have been following me around in these many sessions in November, December, January, February and now, for your patience, sometimes for risking your necks. I regret I haven't been able to be more communicative at the end of each session, but these negotiations are somewhat complex and involve many parties.

I understand that there has already been a previous briefing which went to the details, but let me say very briefly what we consider to be the significance of this communique, what is in the communique, and then I will take your questions.

As you know, during the course of March and April the United States became quite concerned about the manner in which the cease-fire agreement was being implemented. We were specifically concerned about the following points:

One, the inadequate implementation of the cease-fire.

Secondly, the continued infiltration into South Vietnam and the continued utilization of Laos and Cambodia as corridors for that infiltration.

Three, we were concerned about the inadequate accounting for the missing in action.

Fourth, we were concerned about the violations of the demilitarized zone.

Fifth, we were concerned about the inadequate cooperation with the International Control Commission and the slow staffing of the two-party Military Commission.

Sixth, we were concerned about the violations of Article 20 requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia.

Needless to say, the other side had its list of complaints, and in these circumstances, we proposed that Mr. Le Duc Tho and I meet again to review the implementation of the agreements that had been so painfully negotiated last fall.

There was a preliminary meeting between Ambassador Sullivan and Vice Minister Thach, and then on May 17th Le Duc Tho and I met again and reached some preliminary conclusions. We were in daily contact with the Government of South Vietnam through its delegation here, and through our embassy in Saigon. We then sent Ambassador Sullivan to Saigon for further consultations. I returned here. The negotiations continued. There wss a slight interruption last Saturday, and we reached a final conclusion today.

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As far as the content of the joint communique is concerned, we believe that we have achieved a satisfactory conclusion of the points that were of principal concern to the United States. There is, as you know, to be issued a new order on the cease-fire, which is to go into effect roughly 36 hours from now, which we hope and expect will be implemented fully.

Second, there is a clear repetition of the prohibitions against the infiltration of personnel and materiel into South Vietnam, except as replacements under Article 7 of the original agreement and according to procedures agreed to by the two parties with reference to respect for the demilitarized zone and to the prohibition of transiting the demilitarized zone except in accordance with the replacement provisions of the agreement.

Under the provisions for missing in action, all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States.

The two-party Military Commission is to be fully staffed and special assurances have been given in paragraph 12 about cooperation with the International Control Commission by all the parties to grant them reasonable freedom of movement.

With respect to Laos and Cambodia, the communique says that the provisions of Article 20 are to be scrupulously observed, and there have been long discussions about the whole complex of issues raised by Laos and Cambodia. However, since the final results depend on the sovereign decision of other parties, we will not discuss this subject here, and we will leave it to the results and to events to testify to progress.

The other subject which has been discussed and which I have left separately is that of political evolution in South Vietnam. As you know, the United States has always taken the view that the political evolution of South Vietnam is to be decided by the South Vietnamese.

Therefore, the United States has always believed -- and that is reflected in the communique -- that the political future of South Vietnam should be determined by a process of free and democratic general elections. The other provisions regarding political evolution reaffirm what is said in Chapter IV of the cease-fire agreement.

Now, we have today signed the communique, ladies and gentlemen, and the history of Indochina is replete with agreements and joint declarations. I am not naive enough to pretend to you that the mere fact of having again agreed to certain words in itself guarantees peace, but I will also say that since all parties have worked so seriously for the last three weeks, we have every hope that they will match this effort with performance and, therefore, there is fresh hope, and we hope a new spirit, in the implementation of the agreement, which in itself is maintained.

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What was signed today is an amplification and a con-
solidation of the original agreement. It is not a new agree-
ment. Now, the people of Indochina, and especially the peoples
of Vietnam, have suffered conflicts for a generation, and our
greatest ambition has been to end their suffering and to
restore peace, and it is our hope that by what has been done
today, a significant step has been taken in the consolidation
of peace in Vietnam and in Indochina.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions. For
my own education, will you identify yourselves.

Q What were the changes in the communique in the
last few days that made it acceptable to the South Vietnamese
government?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think it is useful to go through
all the details of the negotiation and to provide a score card.
In any negotiation there are sometimes impasses reached
that afterwards are rather complex to explain.

I will be glad to explain one difficulty that existed
which was perhaps not of monumental substantive significance
but which was extremely time consuming and which concerned
the formal signing of the communique.

The United States began by proposing that it should
be a two-party communique between Hanoi and the United States
as a recommendation to the South Vietnamese parties. The North
Vietnamese proposed that it should be a two-party communique
signed with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties.
The South Vietnamese proposed that it should be a four-party
communique.

We accepted a four-party communique, at which point
Saigon proposed that it should be a two-party communique with
recommendations to the two South Vietnamese parties, which in turn
ended Hanoi to accept the four-party communique. We then,
as a compromise, accepted Hanoi's proposal of a two-party communique
with the concurrence of the South Vietnamese parties.

So there was one fleeting moment where Saigon had
our position, we had Hanoi's position and Hanoi had Saigon's
position. So you must not believe that every time that a great
deal of time is spent, it always concerns final issues of war
and peace. This was one of the issues that took some time, but I
will not discuss every issue that arose.

Lou.

Q Lou Cioffi, ABC News. Besides the fact that the
other parties did negotiate seriously, what else makes you think
that they are now willing to work together seriously for a political
solution in Indochina and not a military one?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, Mr. Cioffi, that the whole
evolution of the Indochina tragedy and of the Vietnamese war
has been a slow realization by all the parties that they could not
impose a military solution on ecch other.

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This has been a very painful process for all concerned, because I think it is safe to say that the art of compromise is not the most highly developed quality in Vietnam.

I believe that the realities of the situation, both before the cease-fire agreement, and I think it is fair to say since the cease-fire agreement, may have brought home to the parties concerned the necessity of first peaceful coexistence and eventually some political solution.

I repeat, I did not say that this was guaranteed. It is undoubtedly a process which will have its ups and downs. But we are entering this new phase with the intention of contributing what we can to easing the situation and promoting the peace.

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Q The communique today deals with the two sides' military leaders getting together to agree on what areas are controlled, if since the January agreement of the 27th they have not been able to agree even on an agenda in the political discussions, why is there reason to believe they will be able to agree on what areas the military control?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, of course, events will show very quickly whether they will be able to agree. One of the reasons why the two-party Military Commission has not worked as efficiently as was originally hoped was because of the difficulty of agreeing on location, and immunity, and that problem has been substantially resolved by this agreement or should have been substantially resolved by this agreement.

With respect to areas controlled, and modalities of stationing, it is our view that this is determined by the military presence, and on that basis, both sides after a clear cease-fire is achieved, should be able empirically to determine where the forces are located and on that basis delimit the zones of military control.

One reason it has not worked previously is because the cease-fire was not fully observed. To the extent that this new cease-fire order -- which will go into effect at four o'clock Greenwich Mean Time on the 15th -- to the extent that that is observed, the delimitation of areas of control should be substantially eased.

Q Do you feel now that with the signing of the document you have more or less ended your work in the Indochina area or that you will still have a lot of difficulties, especially concerning Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: The remaining issues in Indochina will still require significant diplomatic efforts, and we expect to continue them. Of course, we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement, and we will maintain our interest in it. I hope to be able to reduce my own participation in this process in order to preserve my emotional stability. (Laughter.)

Q If the question that was just asked had to do with American aerial military operations in Cambodia, that is what I was going to ask also. If it was not, what I would like to ask is, is there anything in this agreement, this communique, which substantially commits the United States to cease such operations?

DR. KISSINGER: There is nothing in this communique that commits the United States to cease such operations. It is our hope, and we will make major efforts in that direction, to continue the diplomacy that will produce a cease-fire in Cambodia.

Q Jim Browning, Westinghouse Broadcasting. Can I ask you what there is in the communique that was released today besides the good will and seriousness of the people who negotiated it, that will make it work better than the agreement that was negotiated on January 27th?

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DR. KISSINGER: There is nothing in any communique that makes a communique work. A communique works because the parties concerned intend to implement it, and, therefore, all a communique can do, or an agreement can do, is to prescribe what the obligations of the various parties are.

To the extent that this communique prescribes the specific obligations and reaffirms them, it can contribute to the consolidation of peace. But it is never words alone that produce peace; it is the combination of words, the intention and the consequences of performance.

Q I am with Economic Review, Dr. Kissinger. I find in the communique one new point, and that is that your government has agreed to conclude the first phase of the talks on the Joint Economic Commission with the North Vietnam-ese within 15 days after the signing of the accord.

If I understand the American negotiation process correctly, I was under the impression that in fact the negotiations on the joint economic aid were to some extent meant to be a guarantee that North Vietnam does apply the accords.

Have you managed to obtain some understanding or some guarantees from the North Vietnamese apart from what we have found in the communique, that they will apply the accords because I am rather surprised by this concession, if we can call it that.

DR. KISSINGER: The Joint Economic Commission had substantially completed its work at the point when we suspended negotiations. So that the schedule which is indicated in the communique is inherent in the resumption of negotiations.

The United States has always made clear that the final implementation of the economic clauses of the agreement has to be seen as part and parcel of the total implementation of the agreement.

Of course, many of you know that even after the Joint Economic Commission completes its work, its results will first have to be submitted to the Congress and, secondly, will have to be approved by the Congress, which is not an automatic process.

So, there will be sufficient time in which to assess the implementation of the agreement. This Administration has left no doubt that its support for the program in the various forums is related to the overall implementation of the agreement.

Q May I ask you a question off the subject of the immediate subject of the Vietnam communique?

DR. KISSINGER: Preferably not.

Q Preferably not, but I may?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you can ask it, and then I will determine whether I will answer it.

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Q I wondered if you would be prepared to say why you went to see Mr. Chi Peng-fei today, and at whose initiative, and what you talked about.

DR. KISSINGER: The Foreign Minister of China is an old friend whom I have seen repeatedly in Peking, and since we found ourselves in the same town, a courtesy visit was arranged. It lasted 50 minutes, but you have to allow time for translation. (Laughter)

Q I am with the Los Angeles Times. I would like to ask, Dr. Kissinger, what kind of an estimate you have over the last few months in connection with the cease-fire violations, the extent to which they are intentional or accidental; that is to say, controlled or uncontrolled, on the other side, naturally.

DR. KISSINGER: In a situation, as in Vietnam, where many of the forces are mingled together in very close contact, an implementation of the cease-fire is, of course, extremely difficult. The first thing to remember is that the level of violence since January 27th has dropped very markedly and is at the lowest level that it has been in a decade.

I would say that there are daily reports of major and minor violations. I think it is safe to say that, of the minor violations, a significant percentage is produced by the proximity of the forces and not necessarily by a deliberate design.

In the case of the major violations, which have averaged around 15 a day, I think it is safe to say that a significant majority are produced by the deliberate decision, often of local commanders, but in any case by deliberate decisions.

Q Scott Sullivan, Newsweek. Both the Saigon Government and I believe the American Government have said they were very eager to tie down a date for free and democratic elections in South Vietnam. On the surface of the communique, there doesn't seem to be any such tieing down or linking. Are you satisfied that significant progress has been made in that particular direction?

DR. KISSINGER: We have two separate problems. One is the desirability of the dates for general elections and the suitability of a four-party document to tie such a date down. Last fall, when we negotiated this agreement, the Saigon Government very properly took the view that it would be inappropriate for the United States or for an international document to prescribe the specific date for elections, and we spent many days on that issue, because it was at that time that the North Vietnamese wanted to tie down the date, and it was we who, following the recommendations of the Saigon Government, did not do so.

In these circumstances, it is impossible for the United States to insist now on what it refused in December. Nevertheless, we have always taken the view that the political future of South Vietnam should be left to the South Vietnamese and that free and democratic general elections should be a central element in determining that future.

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Individually, we support the South Vietnamese pro-
posal that a time should be fixed for that election. We think
it is a reasonable proposal. But in the light of the negotiat-
ing history, it was not appropriate to introduce into a com-
munique which is supposed to bring about the implementation of
the agreement a clause which was not part of the original agree-
ment and which was not part of the original agreement at the
request of the South Vietnamese Government.

But nevertheless, as far as the internal negotiations
are concerned, we think the South Vietnamese demand is reason-
able, and we hope it will be accepted.

Q John Harris, Hearst Papers. If this agreement
doesn't work out, do you envisage negotiating a third agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: It is a prospect I cannot face today.
(Laughter) When we sign an agreement, we hope that it will be
implemented, and whatever difficulties arise should be prin-
cipally discussed between the Vietnamese parties, and I don't
want to address now the question of what happens if there
should be violations before we have even concluded the two-
party signature.

We have negotiated this in good faith, after a long
war and a great deal of suffering, with the hope that at last
the parties concerned will draw the conclusion from the over-
whelming reality in Vietnam that nobody can have his way by
force.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

END (AT 1:09 P.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 14, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ROOM

3:08 P.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: A number of you asked for the opportunity to see Dr. Kissinger before the Soviet summit begins next week, so Dr. Kissinger is here to give you a general rundown on the activities next week and to discuss it with you and to take some of your questions on the summit, but also will be prepared to take your questions on the recent meetings and the agreement that was reached in Paris, the communique specifically. Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: I thought of you all with nostalgia yesterday when I met the much tamer press corps in Paris. (Laughter) But Ron wouldn't let me off that easily.

I thought I would speak to you about our expectations with respect to the forthcoming summit between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, try to give you our preparations for it, what we expect to come out of it, and then I will take your questions on that or any other subject.

The President and the General Secretary agreed that there would be another summit about a year after the conclusion of the last one when they last met in Moscow in May of last year. They then discussed in general terms what the objectives should be, and how we might go about realizing them.

Since then there has been a meeting between the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko, which was quite extensive, both here in Washington and continued at Camp David. There have been frequent exchanges between the General Secretary and the President. There have been exchanges in Washington between Ambassador Dobrynin and American officials.

So the meeting that will take place next week has been carefully prepared for a period of more than a year, and it follows in outline the direction that was established at the May summit in Moscow.

We have consulted closely with our allies and we will, of course, keep them and other interested parties fully informed as these discussions proceed.

Now, let me say first what our approach is and what we expect could emerge from the summit.

With the humility that is so characteristic of me, I forgot to mention my visit to Zavidovo, in which very considerable progress was made in defining the agenda and some of the substance of these talks.

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Throughout almost the entire postwar period, with
only brief interruptions, the relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union were characterized by an atmos-
phere of hostility, compounded of ideological opposition, of
geopolitical rivalry, and of the fact that we and the Soviet
Union represented two great nuclear powers in the world on
which the security of many other countries depended.

The interruptions that occurred were very fre-
quently largely on atmospherics, and while we early in this
Administration made it very clear that we were prepared to
change course, expressed in the President's first Inaugural
in which he called for an era of negotiation instead of con-
frontation, and in his press conference statement early in
the Administration that we wanted to proceed on a broad front,
it is nevertheless true that the first two years of the first
term were characterized by many of the same attitudes or at
last by many of the same tensions that have characterized the
entire postwar period.

We had the building of a Soviet naval base in Cienfuegos.
We had a crisis in the Middle East. We had tensions in many
other parts of the world. But as a result of developments in
these crises, as well as of the intensive exchange that was
always going on between the President and other levels of
our Government and the Soviet leaders, a change of course
began to emerge early in 1971.

This change of course reflected the reality that in
the nuclear age there is no alternative to peace between the
great nuclear countries. Not only do they have an obligation
to avoid conflict; but they have an obligation to exercise
restraint in their relations to each other and their relations
to third countries, and ultimately they should strive to move
from the easing of tension to the achievement of positive
goals for the benefit of their peoples and the peoples every-
where.

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This process which started hesitantly and slowly
in 1971 over the negotiations on Berlin accelerated in the
second half of 1971 and culminated in the Moscow Summit of
May, 1972.

You are all familiar with the principal achievements of the Moscow Summit of May, 1972. There were a series of bilateral agreements in various fields. There was the SALT agreement in which the two nuclear countries for the first time agreed to place their central armaments on which their security and survival depended under restraint and finally, and perhaps in historical perspective as important as the complete agreement, was the Declaration of Principles in which the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to lay down a code of conduct for each other in relation to each other and in relation to third countries.

Since then, we have attempted to consolidate this
progress, and this summit between the General Secretary and
the President will be an opportunity to take stock and to
attempt to see what further progress can be made; not just
in the avoidance of war, but in the building of an inter-
national system in which the fear of war comes to play a
less and less crucial role and in which the positive aspir-
ations of mankind can become the central focus for the
concerns of all the countries, and especially of those
countries who have it in their power to bring such untold
suffering to mankind.

Now, let me tell you first a few things about the
schedule, and then let me say something about the content.
I will give you the rough outline of the schedule. The
detailed schedule will be made available over the
weekend.

The General Secretary, as you know, is arriving
on Saturday, and he will be resting at Camp David on
Sunday. He will be received at the White House by the
President on Monday. On that day, the conversations between
the President and the General Secretary will begin. There
will be a State Dinner that evening.

The conversations will continue on Tuesday. On
Wednesday and part of Thursday, the President and the
General Secretary are planning to go to Camp David to con-
tinue their conversations.

On Thursday afternoon they expect to return to
Washington. There will be a dinner at the Soviet Embassy
on Thursday night. On Friday afternoon the President and
the General Secretary will go to San Clemente. They will
be able to continue their conversations on the plane.

The General Secretary is planning to leave San
Clemente on Sunday, probably spend overnight at Camp
David Sunday night and return to the Soviet Union on Monday.
The General Secretary will have an opportunity to meet
with key congressional leaders, including the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and also with leaders of the business
community and with any other group that he may choose to
invite.

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As you know, he is planning a television address
during his stay here, probably from San Clemente.

Now, so much for the rough outline of the schedule.
Now let me talk about the substance. First, the occasion
of the Summit will mark the completion of a series of
bilateral agreements that have been intensively negotiated
over recent months and have been covered in some of the
national newspapers.

They will deal with the fields of oceanography,
transportation, agriculture, scientific exchanges and other
fields. Now, we will not pretend to you that these meetings
directly produce these bilateral agreements.

Many of these agreements, as always, were in the
process of negotiation in any event, but what the meetings
do is to raise the discussion from the level of experts
to the political level. They accelerate the negotiations.
They make it possible to achieve a rapid solution. They
enable us to move forward simultaneously on a broad front.
They give the two leaders an opportunity to commit themselves
personally to many fields of direct benefit to their two
peoples from a broad perspective and just as some of the
agreements that were achieved last May could not have
occurred, at least so rapidly, and almost certainly not in
that form, but for the meeting in Moscow, so some of the
agreements that will be signed next week have received an
impetus as the result of the meeting between President
Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev.

The second category of problems with which we
shall deal concerns means of mitigating the arms race and
of dealing with the control of the most dangerous weapons.
Last year the two leaders met at the end of nearly three
years of negotiation on SALT, and they achieved a permanent
agreement on the limitation of defensive weapons and an
interim agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons.

The limitations agreed upon last year were quantitative. They concerned the numbers of weapons each side could have in specified categories, and in the case of offensive weapons, this agreement was limited to five years. Since then, negotiations for a permanent agreement on the limitation of strategic arms have started and have been in progress for about six months.

They are more complex than the negotiations that
led to the SALT agreement last May on two counts. They
are more complex because we are now talking about a
permanent agreement that will affect, therefore, the
security of ourselves and of those countries that depend on
us for the indefinite future.

They are more complex, also, because in the last
year it has become ever more evident that the arms race now
is fueled not so much by quantitative but by qualitative changes.
Improvements in accuracy, changes in the number of warheads on
individual missiles, and similar technological changes can have
a more profound impact on the strategic balance than a mere
change in numbers. We are, therefore, involved in extraordinarily
complex negotiations. We do not expect, indeed, we do not
aim for a settlement of these questions at this meeting. We
will not force the pace of any negotiation to fit a particular
schedule that has been established.

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What we do expect is that the President and the General Secretary will have very extensive discussions as to the nature of the problem and as to the direction in which a solution might be sought, discussions which might open the way to more harmonious instructions, for more compatible instructions to the two negotiating teams in Geneva.

We expect that one result of this meeting will be an acceleration of the SALT negotiations, and we hope that this meeting will be seen in retrospect as having marked a turning point in these negotiations, much as an earlier agreement in 1971 marked the turning point in SALT-I.

The second area of arms limitation that has been much discussed is that of mutual balanced force reductions. Now, this is a subject in which we are involved in a negotiation together with our allies, and in which we will not make any agreements or arrive at understandings without the full concurrence of our allies, and in forums in which our allies participate. If the subject should be discussed, and of course it will be, the results of these discussions will be fully communicated to our allies and they will be negotiated in the forums established for that purpose. So on that subject, the talks can only be exploratory.

Another range of subjects that will be discussed will be a general review of the international situation as it presents itself to the two leaders a year after their last encounter from the particular point of view of what can be done to reduce the dangers of war and to ease tensions. If past experience is any guide, these discussions will be free-ranging. They are not expected to lead to any special agreements, but they will constitute a very major element, as one of the prime utilities of such a meeting, because they enable both leaders then, in the period ahead, to avoid misunderstandings and avoidable tensions, and to gear their actions to the expectations of a lasting peace.

Finally, there will no doubt be thorough discussions as to how the principles that were agreed to in Moscow last year calling for mutual restraint can be strengthened and how they can guide the actions of the two countries toward each other and toward other countries in the world.

Now, last year was the first summit meeting between the President and the Soviet leaders. We expect that these meetings will become more regular features of international diplomacy and, therefore, the breakthroughs that were achieved last year will, in this and future meetings, be consolidated by a series of concrete steps, but along a route now that we hope will become increasingly familiar and will be considered increasingly regular.

One of the principal goals of the President since he came into office has been to create a structure of peace based on the recognition by all countries that they have a stake in the preservation of the international order; that energies could be turned to the achievement of human aspirations, and the recognition that the two great nuclear powers, precisely because they have the capability of inflicting such untold damage, have a special obligation to their peoples and to history to make a special effort in this direction.

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This is how we view the visit of the General Secretary which begins officially next Monday. This is the spirit in which we will conduct it, and we will brief you regularly during the week to let you know about results as they emerge.

Now I will be glad to answer questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you didn't mention commercial or economic issues. Is there any reason why you didn't?

DR. KISSINGER: I wanted to leave something for
Bernie to extract from the bureaucracy. (Laughter)

Commercial and economic issues are, of course, a
central part of this new relationship, and we will discuss
at greater length and in greater detail some of the projects
that were started last year in Moscow and which were further
discussed during my visits in September and May, during the
visit of Secretary Peterson, and Secretary Shultz. So economic
and commercial discussions will play a very important role.

Q Dr. Kissinger, one of the pending agreements that has not yet been extracted involves scientific cooperation, and that is the extent of the extraction so far. Could you amplify that and tell us a little bit more about the pending agreement on scientific cooperation?

DR. KISSINGER: I did not intend to give a full
account of all of the agreements, some of which are still
under negotiation. I wanted to give you a sense of some of
the areas that are covered without meaning to exclude any.
I just wanted to give you a feel for the situation. I don't
think it would be appropriate for me to go into the details
of various subjects that are still under discussion. As the
agreements are completed, we will brief you fully on them and
we will have the experts on each agreement before you to give
you the details.

Q Henry, two unrelated questions --

DR. KISSINGER: May I make this suggestion? Could we finish the summit questions first?

Q These are summit questions.

DR. KISSINGER: I am sorry, but in general I will
take summit questions first, and then if there are questions
on other subjects, which is hard for me to conceive, I will
take them, too. (Laughter)

Q These are both summit questions, but unrelated.
First of all, if it is the case that you do not expect a
SALT-II agreement out of this meeting and only further direc-
tions to the negotiators, and so forth, why did the President
say in his TV speech last night that he expected very sub-
stantial progress on the arms control negotiations with Mr.
Brezhnev? What was he talking about in comparison with what
you are talking about?

Secondly, you made no mention in the schedule part
of any stops by Mr. Brezhnev in Houston at the Space Center,
or Chicago or any other places he has been reported going.
Can you address yourself to that after the first one?

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DR. KISSINGER: May I address myself to that
technical question first?

Q All right.

DR. KISSINGER: There were various ideas for various
possible stops, but given the fact that a maximum amount
of time was always intended to be devoted to discussion, given
the fact that the General Secretary also wanted to meet with
a number of nongovernmental groups, both congressional and
private, it simply proved impossible to fit into the schedule
what in any event would only have been a two- or three-
hour stop.

That stop, incidentally, would have coincided with
the splashdown of the Skylab, which is supposed to take
place the same day. So, for a combination of all these reasons,
it was decided to eliminate the projected stop in Houston
and if, as I said, it should be the case that visits between
the leaders of the two countries should take place on a more
regular basis than heretofore, there is a possibility of
making up for it on some future visit.

Now, what the President may have in mind is exactly
what I have described to you, and it is his belief that
by making progress in the direction of these talks and by
perhaps discussing other areas, that this will constitute
a significant progress, but I repeat, there will not be an
agreement on the substance of SALT other than of the kind
that I have described to you. But each person chooses his
own adjectives.

Q Can you explain how commercial and economic
questions are going to play a very important role, given the
very strong and continuing opposition in Congress, to granting
both MFN and credit to the Soviet Union.

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, the programs that are
planned depend on congressional authority, especially with
respect to MFN. We can discuss the goals that the two
countries can reasonably set for themselves assuming congress-
ional authority.

And we can discuss the kind of projects that would
be appropriate both in economic terms and also from the point
of view of the impact of the commitment of both sides to a
period of peace, if some parts of their economy become to
some extent linked to each other.

Of course, this is dependent upon congressional
authority to grant most favored nation status. We believe
that the Congress, as it becomes fully informed, and as it
studies in detail the relationship of the economic discussions
to the general structure of our foreign policy, that the
Congress will come to see that it is an important contribution
to the whole effort to bring about these, to grant this
authority.

We understand some of the congressional concerns,
and we are willing to discuss with congressional leaders
how some of these concerns can be met without jeopardizing
the basic objectives of the Administration's proposal.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you spoke about the Soviet naval base at Cienfuegos. Do you hope to negotiate or would you like to negotiate a lowering of the Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean during this summit?

DR. KISSINGER: Our concern with respect to the Soviet naval base at Cienfuegos concerns the presence of a submarine base containing particular categories of weapons. This problem was satisfactorily settled in 1970, and we do not believe that this is a subject that will come up at the summit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in relation to your discussion of MFN, may I ask two questions? Question one, among the private groups that the General Secretary will see, will any of those groups be Jewish-American groups with whom he will discuss the problem of Jewish immigration from Russia, and the second question is were any of the stops restricted because of the fear of demonstration by Jewish-American groups?

DR. KISSINGER: The reasons for the itinerary of the General Secretary are precisely what I gave, and has evolved exactly as I described it. With respect to the Jewish leaders, some are invited to the State Dinner on Monday night at the White House, and, of course, the General Secretary, as I said, is free to see any group which he wishes to take up contact. But no formal meeting as of now has been set.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you at all concerned at the time Brezhnev is going to be here that the Watergate hearings are going to be in progress, and especially that former counsel John Dean is going to be testifying that very week with disclosures or accusations that could be very serious in terms of the Presidency?

DR. KISSINGER: When the summit was planned, the domestic evolution was not considered. But at the same time, it was our view that we should proceed with a program that had evolved on the basis of careful negotiation over an extended period of time, that attempts to achieve a peace of benefit to all Americans and the consequences of having it take place at the same time as the hearings, I will leave to the others to judge. There was no reason for us to change the summit.

Q Do you plan any special discussion on the Middle East situation?

DR. KISSINGER: It would seem to me probable that as the leaders review areas of tension in the world, that the Middle East will be one of the areas discussed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on disarmament two points: Are we going to propose a mutual limit on MIRVs, and also is the time right to propose a total test ban?

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DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the total test ban, we are now undertaking extensive studies within the Government, which will not be completed by the time of the summit. With respect to the MIRV issue, we have made certain proposals in Geneva, which are now the subject of negotiation.

The MIRV issue is one of the most complex and one of the most baffling before governments, because of the different rate at which the development has proceeded in the two countries, the different philosophy that has underlaid the evolution of their strategic forces and also because of the difficulty of defining what adequate control for any of these limitations might be.

We expect that the subject will be discussed, but that it is technically so complex that the leaders will be able to do no better than to give guidelines to their negotiators.

Q Will you tell us who will be coming with the General Secretary; his family, any other Soviet officials?

DR. KISSINGER: No member of the family is coming with Mr. Brezhnev.

Q Why?

DR. KISSINGER: I will put that question to him when I see him at Camp David on Sunday. (Laughter)

Q Please do.

DR. KISSINGER: As to Soviet officials, I know that, of course, Foreign Minister Gromyko is coming with him, but we will release the full list within the next day or so.

Q Did I understand you to say that the General Secretary was leaving on Monday, and if so, why is he leaving a day early?

DR. KISSINGER: Why is he leaving a day early?

Q I thought the visit lasted until the 26th.

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Q You said Monday.

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct. It is a day earlier
than had been planned. This was a change in the schedule
that was dictated by the pressure of business in Moscow and
has no significance.

Q Can you be a little more specific on the TV
speech, whether it will be Saturday night or Sunday night,
Henry?

DR. KISSINGER: My impression is, it will be Saturday night, but that is not yet final.

Q You said that you had hoped that a turning
point might be reached in SALT. Does that imply that the
negotiations have been stalemated up to this point?

DR. KISSINGER: If you look at the history of SALT
negotiations, you will find that they inevitably go through
certain phases. There is an initial phase in which both sides
put forward what look like maximum positions, but whose real
purpose is to put before each other their general considera-
tions, because I think it is safe to say that neither side in
SALT-I or in SALT-II ever expected that the opening proposals
would be the final ones.

The opening proposals are really basic categories
which permit a consideration of the various items. There
then comes a second phrase in which a conscious effort is
made to accommodate the point of view of the other, and to
search for common ground. That, too, is very rarely the con-
clusive phase. We are now in that second phase. It is a
phase which requires very detailed and very thoughtful dis-
cussions, which then provides the raw material out of which
a breakthrough can be fashioned.

So I think it is incorrect to say that there is
a stalemate. I think we are at a relatively earlier phase
of the negotiations on SALT-II than we were at a comparable
time before the summit in SALT-I, but we believe that it is
following a normal course and that, in fact, the total nego-
tiation period of time for SALT-II will be shorter than it was
for SALT-I.

Q Just to follow that up, when would you antici-
pate, or what kind of a time frame are you thinking of in
terms of possible final agreements?

DR. KISSINGER: I want to wait until after the
President and the General Secretary have met, and have discussed
some of these issues, say about a week or two from now, and
then I will be able to answer that question with much greater
confidence and I will make an effort to answer it then.

Q Is there a private understanding on the Vietnam
communique that gives you confidence it will be carried out
better this time than the original signing?

DR. KISSINGER: Can I save Vietnam questions until
I have taken the summit questions? I will take the summit
questions first.

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I wanted to ask if the President's proposed foreign export licensing plan has been conveyed to the Soviets and what has been the reaction and the impact on the grain deal, for example.

DR. KISSINGER: The export license plan depends, of course, on the type of control that will be established, which is still under consideration. Now, we will have very much in mind the impact of restrictions on exports on particular countries. I think the time for the full consultation on this will be before the final program is developed and put before Congress, rather than now. There has not yet been a formal Soviet reaction to the President's speech, nor do we expect one before the arrival of the General Secretary.

The question was put to you rather specifically before: Do you expect that the two leaders will be calling for mutual limitations on MIRVs? Your answer, as I recall, came back generally that they will have to instruct their negotiators on this matter.

Can you be a little more precise? Are the two leaders going to try to put limitations on MIRVs in some way in this statement that will be coming out?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, as I have pointed out to you, that you cannot expect any precise solution of any one problem. What you can expect is a general direction that might emerge, but I don't want to be more specific until they have talked.

Dr. Kissinger, will the President bring up with the General Secretary the matter of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: We have, on previous occasions, dealt with the question of Jewish emigration within the framework consistent with the Soviet sovereignty, and as a result, we received a communication in April in which the Soviet Government informed us that the emigration tax, which was, after all, the reason for the specific congressional restrictions, would be waived.

We will certainly, in the appropriate manner, discuss the subject, but I don't think any useful purpose is served by making it a public issue at this time.

Dr. Kissinger, was that a written communication or a verbal communication?

DR. KISSINGER: We have a procedure by which verbal communications are sometimes handed to us in written form so that we are sure to understand it. So its technical status is an oral communication which, however, has been conveyed to us in a form that its precision is unmistakable.

You don't mention Vietnam or the balanced force reduction or European Security Conference as subjects to be taken up. Will they be taken up, and do you expect any results on those subjects?

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DR. KISSINGER: I mentioned that all significant international problems will be reviewed. Of course, the European Security Conference is an important issue between our two countries, and it will be discussed. Vietnam undoubtedly will arise, and Indochina, in the context of the communique that was achieved yesterday.

I did not mean to present an exhaustive list of the entire agenda. The purpose of this meeting is to give you a feel for the directions in which we are going, rather than give you a point-by-point agenda of every individual item.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in view of the state of the Government now, does that mean you are going to turn down the Senate Foreign Relations Committee resolution which proposes a ban on underground testing during the summit talks, and also, I take it you are going to Camp David on Sunday. Will you be the welcoming --

DR. KISSINGER: I will just stop by briefly on the way back from Key Biscayne. (Laughter) As far as the complete test ban is concerned, we have not, as I said, completed our studies and, therefore, it is certainly not going to be an outcome of the conference, which does not mean that we will necessarily turn down the recommendation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee forever.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is the United States Administration in favor of including strategic bombers and forward-based systems in negotiations in the SALT-II talks?

DR. KISSINGER: I really don't want to go into the details of the negotiations. Of course, strategic bombers are part of the central strategic systems. With respect to forward-based systems, our position has been that this involves the central concerns of our allies, and that they are in a different category. This position is different from SALT-I and it has not changed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if we may go on to Vietnam, did you reach any secret understandings with Hanoi of a cease-fire in Cambodia; and on the second question, Dr. Kissinger, did you sense any impact of Watergate on Hanoi's negotiating style or approach in the negotiations with the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: I like a question that says, "Did you reach a secret understanding?" If I tell you in confidence, will you promise me not to repeat it? (Laughter)

I will answer this question, and then I will answer the gentleman who asked that question over there.

Q Would you entertain another question on the summit before going on to other subjects?

DR. KISSINGER: I will take two more on the summit, and by that time I will have thought of an answer to Mr. Kalb's question. (Laughter)

Q There were indications before coming here that Mr. Brezhnev would make some sort of gesture to the Jewish activists in the Soviet Union. Especially there was a list that was believed given to you of people waiting who have been in jail, et cetera. Is there any sign of such a gesture?

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DR. KISSINGER: That is a decision for the Soviet Government to make. We have expressed our view, and again, I must say it is not a matter that is fruitfully handled by public demands on our side.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you expect any kind of new agreement on trade to emerge in the talks next week, or will it be simply a discussion of goals?

DR. KISSINGER: We concluded an economic agreement last October, and at this time it is difficult to conclude a very precise agreement until the Congress has acted. So it will be more a discussion of goals and a more precise discussion of projects, rather than a definite agreement of the kind that was made last year.

Now let me answer the question of Mr. Kalb. As I recall it, it was: Were secret agreements reached on Laos and Cambodia, and -- what was the second part?

Q Did you sense --

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. Did I sense any differences in the negotiating style as a result of Watergate.

The Vietnamese negotiating style is one that would be difficult to complicate by any human events. (Laughter) I, therefore, would not presume to ascribe any particular complexities to any particular event. But as I said in Paris yesterday, for the sake of my emotional stability, I trust that this will be my last Vietnam negotiation. (Laughter)

Now, with respect to the first question, obviously the way it was put it cannot possibly be answered, but let me try to express our considerations as carefully as I can.

The evolution in Laos and Cambodia depends not only on the decisions taken by Hanoi and Washington, but on decisions taken by other sovereign parties. Therefore, one can only make judgments about the impact of certain events, such as the signing of the communique, on the developments in these countries. On that basis, we hope that progress will be made first toward bringing about a political solution in Laos through the negotiations among the parties; and secondly, that an impetus will be given to the efforts to bring about an end to hostilities in Cambodia, and a political solution.

The negotiations that are involved there are extremely complex, and I must say that no useful purpose would be served by engaging in a detailed discussion. But it is our belief that the communique that was agreed to yesterday will make a positive contribution, and events over the next weeks should testify to whether this hope is well taken.

I still owe this gentleman an answer: Was there any understanding which makes one believe that this agreement will work better than the previous agreements?

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Let me answer that in two parts.

First, the war in Indochina has been going on for 25 years. The American role in it has been significant for nearly 12 years. Under these circumstances, it is too much to expect that one would have a transition from war to peace in one day and as a result of one decision.

Given the hostilities that have existed, and the distrust among the parties, the agreement that was signed on January 27th has worked reasonably well. It is probably also true that some of the signatories, at least, entered this agreement with the intention of looking at it as a continuation of the struggle by other means.

I have the impression that the realization that military victory cannot be achieved within Vietnam by either of the contending sides is becoming clear. So as a result, while words themselves are never an ultimate guarantee, we hope that the peace can now be consolidated and the ceasefire more strictly observed, and also that this communique marks one further step on the road to the military disengagement of the United States from the conflict in Indochina.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, I believe you said what you accomplished in respect to Cambodia would be evident in a matter of weeks. That being the case, what is your comment on Senator Scott saying that he will no longer support bombing in Cambodia after the end of June?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to comment on individual Senators. Our view is what I expressed, that we are engaged in a complex negotiation which requires an opportunity to mature. Each Senator must make up his own mind.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you see the possibility at any time in the future of us having a summit with different nations on the oil question?

DR. KISSINGER: The energy problem is one of the most important issues, not only before our country, but before every industrialized nation, and it is one to which we are giving very high priority attention. As I have said in a previous press conference, it is a subject that really requires a whole new order of thinking.

When the President met with President Pompidou, as in his meetings with Chancellor Brandt and with Prime Minister Heath, as well as the Italian Prime Minister, Andreotti, that was one of the subjects which was discussed at some length.

I think it would be premature to have a high level meeting at this time, but as an ultimate objective, it cannot be ruled out.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what assurances can you give to a Senator or a Congressman that your negotiations can lead to an end of the bombing in Cambodia within a definite time? Can you give any assurances?

DR. KISSINGER: We can only give a judgment, and the record has been in the past that the judgments have not always been wrong and, therefore, it is our best judgment that the possibilities for peace in Indochina have been strengthened.

It is our objective to bring about the military disengagement of the United States as rapidly as we can, an objective we have consistently pursued, which we will continue to pursue. In all of these negotiations there are elements of uncertainty. This is our best judgment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you foresee any reduction in the exploitation by the North Vietnamese of positions and forces that they now have in Laos and Cambodia? I am thinking particularly of the use of the trail and in building up garrisons or withdrawing them?

DR. KISSINGER: As you know, the communique that was signed yesterday provided for the scrupulous implementation of Article XX. Article XX provides for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Laos and Cambodia.

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Secondly, if the hope I expressed is correct that the political settlement in Laos will receive an impetus as a result of the communique that was signed yesterday -- if that hope should turn out to be correct -- then another obligation will be added to that of Article XX; namely, the Laos agreement, which also provides for the removal of foreign forces after a political settlement.

That would, in turn, take care of the problem of infiltration and could also have a significant impact on Cambodia.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say on the question of Cambodia whether negotiations currently are underway or if what you are talking about is in terms of initiating negotiations; and secondly, given the climate of opinion in Congress in the negotiations you conducted, was the prospect raised and approved at all for going forward with the reconstruction program of North Vietnam? In other words, does the general pattern of the negotiations lead you to believe the original premise has been enhanced in any way of the original agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not think any useful purpose would be served by going further into the prospect of negotiations than I have gone except to say that my remarks were very serious.

Now, with respect to reconstruction aid, as you know, we suspended the work of the Joint Economic Commission when we believed the other side was systematically violating the agreement, and we made clear by this act that we consider that the granting of reconstruction aid is part and parcel of the strict implementation of the agreements.

As a result of yesterday's communique, we have agreed to resume the work of the Joint Economic Commission and to complete it within the time frame that was foreseen, in any event at the time its work was suspended, which is to say something like 15 days.

After the Joint Economic Commission has completed its work and submitted it to the governments concerned, there are still two problems. We will have to decide to submit it to Congress, and the Congress will have to decide whether to appropriate the funds.

My impression has been that there is not complete unanimity on that subject in the Congress. Now, with respect to the first hurdle, whether we will submit it to the Congress, it is quite clear that unless the agreement is strictly implemented, the United States Government will have no basis to recommend such a program to the Congress.

The United States Government cannot be asked to finance the military operation of North Vietnam in Indochina and, therefore, while we will proceed with the work in good faith, it is also clear that it is part of the general implementation of the agreement, and I noted that Hanoi Radio today pointed out that there would be a strict implementation of the new document.

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Secondly, congressional action will be to some extent affected by the conviction of the Senate and the House, as to the degree to which peace has returned to Indochina, and I don't want to speculate on that until we have passed the first hurdle.

I will take one or two more questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have on other occasions addressed yourself to the activities of a group that operated here known as the plumbers. There has been a report recently -- today in fact -- that said that the plumbers -- I believe I am quoting correctly -- had been operating before the Pentagon papers were actually leaked.

Is that correct? Was there a precursory group of the plumbers that had operated before the Pentagon papers were leaked and, if so, why?

The second part, if I may, can you address yourself to whether Daniel Ellsberg, Neil Sheehan and Ted Szulc were in fact wiretapped during this time and, if so, why?

DR. KISSINGER: I have previously said to this group -- I will repeat it once more, but not again -- that I knew nothing of the group that has been called the plumbers, nor of its activities, nor of any of the conclusions which they reached, and I, therefore, have no knowledge whatever of what they did, who their targets were, and by what criteria they were selected.

I would, therefore, have to apply that also to the specific names you gave, all of whom were connected with the Pentagon papers, and with the investigation, of which I had nothing whatever to do.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END (AT 4:15 P.M., EDT.)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL

3:30 P.M. JUNE 21, 1973

JUNE 21, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ROOM

1:57 P.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: As we mentioned to you this morning, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev have reached agreement on the basic principles of negotiation of further limitation for strategic offensive arms. The final agreement of those principles was reached in the meeting yesterday evening.

Also, an agreement will be signed today between the United States and the Soviet Union on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. The signing of both of these matters will take place at 3:30 in the East Room, which we have already announced.

Before Dr. Kissinger briefs you on the matters I have just referred to, together with Ambassador Johnson, I should tell you that the morning meeting between the President and General Secretary lasted for slightly over an hour. It began at 11:30 and ended at 12:30. Dr. Kissinger participated in most of that meeting.

The President and General Secretary then took a brief break and resumed their meetings at 1:20 and are still meeting at this time and plan to return to Washington for the signing ceremony at 3:30. With that, I will present to you Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I will go over the agreement on SALT principles with you. Due to some misunderstanding between Camp David and my office here, the actual text hasn't been distributed to you, but it will be at the end of the meeting. I thought that in order to explain it adequately, I would read to you each of the principles and then explain what they mean.

There is no need for you to take down the text itself, because we are going to distribute it right after the meeting, together with a Fact Sheet, and my apologies for not having gotten it to you before this briefing.

Let me first give you some background on the principles that have been agreed upon and what they are intended to achieve.

As you know, the second round of SALT started last November, and as you know also, our representative is Ambassador Johnson, who is here to help with the briefing.

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The objective of these talks has been to consider
a permanent agreement limiting offensive weapons to replace
the interim agreement that was signed in Moscow last May
and which came into effect last October to run for five
years.

Now, in negotiating a permanent agreement, one
faces problems that are more complex than those in an
interim agreement. The essence of the interim agreement was
that both sides froze their offensive weapons at the levels
they had achieved last May, and frankly at the levels that
were foreseeable over the terms of the interim agreement,
for a period of five years.

And as you know, we have always rejected the argument
that we had agreed to a numerical inferiority in the interim
agreement precisely because there was no possibility of over-
coming that numerical inferiority in the five years for
which the interim agreement was designed.

On the other hand, when you are dealing with a
permanent agreement, you are affecting the long-term strategic
interests of both countries and, therefore, numbers that are
acceptable in an interim agreement will have a different
connotation in a permanent agreement, and safeguards will have
to be looked at in a different context.

Secondly, with respect to a permanent agreement,
we now face the situation that the numerical arms race,
quantitative arms race, has been in some respects eclipsed
in significance by the qualitative arms race.

Throughout the 1960s, it was considered that the
build-up was the greatest threat to the stability of the
arms race, and hence to international peace. In this period
we have to consider as well that the improvement, refinement
of arms, in terms of accuracy, in terms of throw-weight,
in terms of multiple warheads can be profoundly unsettling
to this strategic equation, even when the numbers on both
sides are kept fairly constant.

And thirdly, when one is talking about a permanent
agreement, one has to consider the question not only of
limiting arms, but the objective of reducing arms. It was in
this context that the negotiations started last November and
have been conducted for the last six months.

The negotiations went through the usual phase of
some exploratory discussions, followed by some more concrete
proposals by both sides. However, we faced the situation in
April, where it became clear that a comprehensive agreement
of a permanent nature would require more time than the
interval before the summit allowed and, therefore, the President,
General Secretary Brezhnev, in their communications with
each other, decided that perhaps the approach of agreeing on
some principles that could guide the negotiators, coupled
with some full discussions while they were meeting in the
United States, could give a new impetus to the talks on
strategic arms limitation. This is what was done.

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In the closest consultation with Ambassador Johnson and with the allies most concerned, we developed a set of principles on a preliminary basis, which we have further discussed since the General Secretary has arrived in the United States, and which led to the agreement which we are releasing today.

Now, since you don't have the text, I think the best thing I can do is read it, and then attempt to explain its significance, what we understand by it. It isn't very long. I see somebody is looking at his watch. (Laughter.)

The preamble says, "The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, having thoroughly considered the question of the further limitation of strategic arms, and the progress already achieved at the current negotiations, reaffirming their convictions that the earliest adoption of further limitation of strategic arms would be a major contribution in reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening international peace and security, have agreed as follows:"

The primary significance of the preamble is the emphasis that both leaders give to their conviction of the importance of the earliest adoption of further limitation of strategic arms, not only with respect to reducing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, but with respect to the strengthening of international peace in general and, therefore, the personal backing that they are giving to a sense of urgency in the conduct of these negotiations.

The first principle is as follows: "The two sides will continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms as well as their subsequent reduction, proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Moscow, May 29, 1972, and from the interim agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. of May 26, 1972."

"Over the course of the next year, the two sides will make serious effort to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing in 1974."

The first principle substantially speaks for itself. It commits both sides to accelerate their efforts, and it commits both sides to make a major effort to achieve an agreement in 1974, or during the course of 1974. The two leaders would not have made this formal statement if they did not believe that this goal was within reach and was attainable.

Therefore, it represents a commitment by both sides to bring about, to do their utmost to bring about a permanent agreement of the limitation of strategic arms during the course of next year. This agreement is to be based on the basic principles of international relations that were established last year in Moscow and on the interim agreement. However, the United States' position has been clear that the agreement has to be more comprehensive, and that the numbers that last governed the interim agreement would not be the numbers of a permanent agreement.

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The second principle is:

"New agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments will be based on the principles of the American-Soviet documents adopted in Moscow in May 1972 and the agreements reached in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Societ Socialist Republics."

This article attempts to set out the basic guidelines in which the two sides will approach the negotiations. It makes it clear that neither side can attempt to achieve, through these negotiations, a unilateral advantage; and secondly, that we have always maintained the position that we did not separate our security interests from those of our allies.

I must mention one other point with respect to the first principle, which is to say that both sides have agreed that the negotiations should include not only limitations on strategic arms, but measures for the reduction of strategic arms.

The third principle states:

"The limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement."

This is one of the essential differences between SALT-I and SALT-II. SALT-I concerned primarily exclusively the question of numerical limitation. SALT-II will include, as well, qualitative restraint. That will involve discussions on MIRVs, on throw-weight, and issues introduced by the other side with respect to specific types of armaments; for example, on airplanes.

The fourth principle states: "Limitations on strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means," which is a familiar principle from the previous SALT discussions and which the negotiating record makes it clear that we include also the imperative that both sides will maintain practices which facilitate monitoring the agreement.

The fifth principle applies to the modernization of arms and states:

"The modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms would be permitted under conditions which will be formulated in the agreements to be concluded."

The essence here is that on the one hand there will be some provision for modernization and replacement. On the other hand, it also makes clear that the modernization and replacement cannot take place except under agreed conditions that do not threaten the purposes of the agreement.

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The sixth principle is:

"Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972."

The significance of this principle is that, with respect to some issues that are time-urgent, in which the interval between now and the time in 1974 when we expect the permanent agreement to be concluded, that this interval might have a major impact on the existing strategic situations, both sides have agreed that they would be prepared to negotiate supplementary or separate measures to the interim agreement which would probably be of shorter duration and which would, of course, be absorbed by the permanent agreement.

The seventh principle is a reaffirmation of the accidental war agreement, which is to say that each side will continue to take necessary organizational and technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control in accordance with the agreement of September 30, 1971, between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

To sum up, the statement of principles which will be signed today, first, formally commits the two principal leaders to the urgency of completing a permanent agreement and the relationship between international peace and security and the completion of such an agreement.

Secondly, it states a deadline for the completion of the agreement in 1974.

Thirdly, it includes reductions as one of the objectives of the agreement and not simply limitation.

Fourth, it defines a permanent agreement as one that will limit the number of weapons systems as well as to limit their qualitative improvement and, therefore, opens a dimension to the negotiations that was not covered by SALT-I, and it defines some general principles as yardsticks against which the negotiators can measure progress.

Now, these principles have to be seen also in terms of the negotiating record at Geneva, where both sides are now discussing concrete proposals and where it is, therefore, perfectly clear what both sides mean by such phrases as "qualitative changes" and other phrases.

It must also be seen in the light of the extensive discussions that took place yesterday between the President and the General Secretary which dealt with how to give effect to these principles, and how to move forward to these negotiations so that the timetable that has been set out in these principles can be realistically met.

These, then, are the principles which will guide our actions over the next year. We expect that they will be seen as a major step in developing a permanent agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons, the ultimate reduction,

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as a move toward bringing under control not only the pace of
the arms race, but its nature, and, therefore, will contribute
to long-term prospects of peace.

Now I will be glad to answer any questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, why do you find the need to
provide for further interim agreements if you think you are
going to have a permanent agreement within 18 months?

DR. KISSINGER: This issue will, of course, be left
in detail to the negotiators. The need could arise, for
example, in the case of certain technological developments,
where restraints on the pace of testing could affect the situa-
tion in the space over the next 12 to 18 months. It would
be applied to those issues which are sensitive to the time
interval that has been outlined in this agreement. It would
not, obviously, apply to such issues as the numbers of
weapons to be deployed because that would not arise in the
12- to 18-month period.

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Q Does the United States seek parity in numbers in the permanent agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: The issue of how you define equal security and no unilateral advantage is one of the most complex. As you know, with respect to the interim agreement, we believe that the larger number of our warheads compensated for the somewhat larger number of their missiles, and also the larger number of our airplanes, and we also concluded that in the five-year period of this agreement we were not going to increase the number of these weapons anyway.

With respect to a permanent ban, the limitations must be equitable; that is, they must take into account the numbers of weapons and the numbers of warheads, and we will certainly seek and we will obtain what we consider strategic parity.

Q So you don't have to have exactly the same numbers in terms ---

DR. KISSINGER: It depends what other limitations exist and, therefore, it is very difficult to answer it in the abstract. In general, our objectives will be equality, but how you calculate this equality, we have to leave open to the negotiators.

In effect, though, the total compositions of the forces should be substantially equal.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said in reading this over, I don't know if you meant it, that in Principle Three ---

DR. KISSINGER: If I said it, there is a chance I meant it. (Laughter)

Q You said this is qualitative as well as quantitative, and later on you said the agreement will deal with qualitative. In relation to that, if you mean that it will deal with qualitative matters, can you relate Principle Four on the use of national technical means of inspection to the control of MIRVs? Are you announcing that the United States is prepared to use national technical means of inspection to verify any kind of MIRV agreement that might be forthcoming?

Q Can we have the question, please?

DR. KISSINGER: I will repeat the question, but not the introduction to the question. The question is that the Third Principle says that the agreement can apply both to qualitative and to quantitative aspects and then the Fourth Principle says that the limitation must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means.

Miss Berger's question was how these two principles could be reconciled and specifically whether we were saying that we were prepared to accept national verification for any kind of MIRV agreement.

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I think I would put it another way. I would say any kind of MIRV agreement that may be reached will have to be one that can be verified by national technical means and, therefore, that those MIRV agreements that are not verifiable by national technical means would be difficult to reconcile with these provisions and, therefore, the question depends on the nature of MIRV limitations that we are talking about, but as I have made clear, we consider the development of multiple independent warheads one of the major factors of concern in the arms race. And that is clearly understood by the other side.

Q: You are aware that there are stories circulating that the President and Mr. Brezhnev are working on a so-called surprise agreement also in the nuclear field. Can you tell us whether in fact this is the only agreement going to be reached at the summit that has anything to do with nuclear weapons or in a more general way whether they are working on some more major surprise agreement; to be announced here, I mean?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to comment on everything that they may be working on. I would not characterize anything as a surprise agreement, and I would say that there is nothing that they are working on that is directly relevant to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, is there any understanding about whether forward-based systems will be considered in these negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: The basic position of the two sides have been elaborated in previous negotiations. We have left no doubt that we consider our security interest and those of our allies inseparable, and that we believe that the central strategic systems should be the principal concern of this phase of the negotiations; that is to say, the ICBM's, bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union has taken a different view in the past. It is a view that we managed to avoid having to address in the first phase of SALT, and it is something which we believe can be negotiated in the second phase of SALT.

But we can state now that with respect to forward-based systems, we will make no agreement that separates our security interests from those of our allies and that we believe that in this phase the central strategic systems should be the principal focus of negotiation.

Q: What can you tell us of the changes the Soviets have made in the last year in their missile programs and whether they have been completely in accordance with the agreements reached in Moscow?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet Union, to the best of my information, has pursued an active program within the terms of the agreement. If we should receive any information that is contrary to that, we will actively pursue it in the Standing Committee and in other channels. Up to now, they have pursued an active program, which is, however, to the best of our current information, within the terms of the agreement.

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Q Could you give just a general outline of what that active program constitutes?

DR. KISSINGER: I reveal Soviet strategic deployments only in bars in the Soviet Union. (Laughter)

Q Henry, I am having a little trouble here with the qualitative principle. What is new about the qualitative principle? I thought it was understood right along that SALT-II would be qualitative as well as numerical. Are you saying here there is something in this that now permits the Soveit Union to place a freeze on MIRVs? Is that what is new here? If not, what is the change?

DR. KISSINGER: I am saying this is the first time that there is a formal statement to this effect by both sides. Our position on it has been made clear, and I have enunciated it to this group. This is the first time that an agreed guideline signed by the two leaders, or an agreed guideline by the two sides, to this effect has been enunciated.

Q So it is that the Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate on MIRV?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speak to the Soviet position because qualitative can include many things in addition to MIRV.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is the final agreement on SALT contingent on any agreement or understanding of any kind, and if not, what is all this talk about SALT not being reachable if the Soviet Union does not get most favored nation treatment?

DR. KISSINGER: The SALT agreement is independent of other agreements, but it is, of course, dependent on the general climate of U.S.-Soviet relations. We have always held the view that the relationship between the general political climate and progress in SALT was close.

It is not, however, linked as a condition to progress in any other negotiation; it has not been stated as such by us.

Q Dr. Kissinger, may I follow that up? In the event the Jackson amendment is adopted, will SALT go down the drain?

DR. KISSINGER: I would not speculate on any particular agreement. We have said that in the event that the Jackson amendment is adopted in its present form, that it would have a serious impact on Soviet-American relations. What the particular impact will be on any specific negotiation, I would not want to go into.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what can we say to our readers in the area of the prospects for reductions? Aren't you kind of dangling out the proposition here that the world can look forward to a reduction in the spending for nuclear armaments? What can we tell them the real prospects might be? When would it come, the lower number of missiles? Would it involve large amounts of savings on either side?

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DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into specific proposals that are being negotiated. I will only say that our proposals will be consistent with these principles, and they will include proposals for initial limitations to be followed by ultimate reductions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the linkage was not stated by us, with any other agreements. Have the Soviets raised the question of a linkage?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet Union also has not raised any particular linkage.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said the numbers in the temporary agreement would not be the numbers in the permanent agreement ---

DR. KISSINGER: Not necessarily.

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Q -- is it our side's position that the Soviet Union's numbers will have to be decreased more than our numbers have to, to reduce or eliminate the apparent disparity between the numbers agreed upon in the temporary agreement, and if so, do they accept that as a general proposition?

DR. KISSINGER: How you set these limits, and what weapons you include in these limits is, of course, one of the key issues in the negotiations. For example, if you include bombers in the limits, the inequality in total numbers is different than if you are only talking about missiles.

Therefore, at what figure you set the limit, whether you set it at one below both sides' current strength, at the strength of one side, or somewhere in between, that remains to be determined through the negotiations, and I don't want to speculate on that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us, sir, if an attempt was made to reach an agreement in principle here on a MIRV freeze, but that was found to perhaps be too complex to achieve at this stage of the negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into the details of any particular negotiation. I don't think that would be appropriate for me to do.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any news about a ban on underground testing?

DR. KISSINGER: We have stated this is a subject under very active review in our Government now, and one on which we will make a decision as soon as the studies are completed, but not during the summit.

Q I have a double question. The first is: The implication of your earlier comment about national means and MIRVs, does that mean you will have to have a limitation on flight tests, a test ban on MIRVs, and you cannot get into a production ban; and the second question is, if the two leaders are confident enough to set a deadline for the negotiations, why couldn't the other principles be more specific on such questions as MIRV and the numbers than you have been able to be today?

DR. KISSINGER: Because, first, with respect to the question of what sort of limitations are verifiable by national means, it is obvious that flight testing is more easily verifiable than production, and this has been an issue we have covered in previous discussions on MIRV.

With respect to the principles, our objective is to have the permanent agreement, and not have a spectacular announcement. Many issues that can be agreed to in principle nevertheless leave a margin -- a narrow margin, but nevertheless a margin -- for subsequent discussion, such as numbers, such as the type of qualitative limitations, and such as the procedures to be followed in eliminating the remaining margins, and for that reason, it was thought to be best if we went no further, then, now. But there have been discussions on how to proceed from here to meet this objective with some confidence.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, when you talk of quality, are
you including limitations on technical improvements of
accuracy of warheads?

DR. KISSINGER: When I speak of quality, these are
all permissible issues to be raised. They have to be seen,
however, in the context of verifiability, and the more eso-
teric the problem the more complex the problem of verifica-
tion becomes, and it is not in the interests of either side
to have agreements, particularly of a permanent nature, in
which both sides feel they are at the mercy of developments
that they cannot control.

So I would say, in principle, this is something that
can be included in these discussions probably by means of
restrictions on testing. In practice, however, it is getting
into the more esoteric areas.

Q Can you express confidence that we will have
some kind of limitation, particularly on land-based MIRVs,
within the next 18 months?

DR. KISSINGER: I have confidence that we will
achieve an agreement consistent with the principles enunciated.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 2:37 P.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 22, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ROOM

10:42 A.M., EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: While we are waiting for Henry, I think you have had a chance to read the agreement. Just let me give you this very quickly, because we are asked this, from time to time, a rundown on the amount of time that the President and the Secretary have spent together, according to our calculations.

Total time spent together is 26 hours and 15 minutes. This includes all of the time together in the cars, helicopter and dinners and so forth. Formal meetings, 11 hours and 57 minutes. They have spent, during this time together, about five or six hours in head-to-head private discussions.

They, of course, will have an opportunity to meet further on the plane to California, later this afternoon, about 4 or 4:15, and then will spend the weekend in California together.

Q Is the five to six hours included in the 11 hours?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, that is included. The question is were there any meetings this morning, and no, there were not.

Q Do they intend to meet in California?

MR. ZIEGLER: They are due to meet only at the signing ceremony today and then they will have five hours on the plane together.

Q Could you clarify what the five and six hours are included in? I didn't hear the question.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is the time the two leaders have spent together.

Q Is that included in the 11 hours and 57 minutes?

MR. ZIELGER: Yes, it is.

Q Can you tell us anything about the schedule?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me do that later, Jim.

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I think all of you know that the President and
General Secretary will sign an agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear
war at 12:30. You have that material, and Dr. Kissinger
is here to discuss the agreement with you.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me put
this agreement first in its context, describe what it is
seeking to achieve, and then go through its specific
provisions, a little bit of its history, and then I will
take your questions.

The principal course of the foreign policy of
this Administration ever since 1969 has been to set up
what the President has called a structure of peace, by
which we mean an international system less geared to the
management of crises, less conscious of constant eruptions
of conflict, in which the principal participants operate
with a consciousness of stability and permanence.

This requires that all of the nations operate
with a sense of responsibility, and it puts a particular
obligation on the two great nuclear powers that have the
capacity to destroy mankind and whose conflicts have
produced so many of the crises of the post-war period.

In achieving this objective, the United States
has operated on many levels. We have always believed
that it required adequate strength to deter aggression.
But we also have believed that we have to move from the
period of military confrontation to a period which is
characterized more by restraint, and eventually cooper-
ation in our dealings with the other great nuclear super-
power. The President, from the day of his first Inauguration,
has emphasized that we wanted to move from confrontation
to negotiation.

In those negotiations we have operated on many
levels. We have attempted to remove specific causes of
tension. We have attempted to forge specific instruments
of cooperation. And finally, we have attempted to develop
certain principles of conduct by which the two great
nuclear countries could guide their expectations and by
which both relations to each other and in their relations
to third countries, they could calm the atmosphere and
replace purely military measures by a new attitude
of a cooperative international system.

It is in this spirit that last year in Moscow
the United States and the Soviet Union signed certain
principles of conduct which were described then as a
roadmap on a road that no one was forced to travel, but
that they wanted to travel, and was there for the two
major countries.

I believe we have traveled on this road in the
last year, and, therefore, it was decided to formalize
some of these principles in an agreement, to extend them
in some respects, particularly concerning consultation.
The origin of the negotiation, as it turned out, was at
the last session of the Moscow Summit meeting when there
were some general exchanges with respect to how to control
nuclear weapons in a political and diplomatic sense, beyond
the negotiations going on in strategic arms limitations.

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These discussions were continued between the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko on the occasion of Gromyko's visit to the United States last October. They were continued in exchanges between the two leaders. There was some discussion when I visited the Soviet Union in September of last year, and the discussions continued this spring and were extensively pursued in Zavidovo and finally concluded here.

Throughout, the United States has held the view that any obligations with respect to international conduct that applied to the two great nuclear powers, also had to apply to their relations to other countries, and we have held the view which was shared by the Soviet leaders that the principal problem was how to prevent a war and not how to conduct it.

Therefore, this is an agreement which is designed to regulate the relations of the two nuclear powers to each other and to other countries in time of peace. It is an attempt to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war, and to the extent that it contributes to this task, it can be a significant landmark in the relationships of the United States to the Soviet Union and in the relationships of the two great nuclear countries towards all other countries of the world.

Now, let me run through the articles, which are largely self-explanatory. Article I states that it is an objective of both the policy of the United States and the policy of the Soviet Union to remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. This has been a consistent goal of American foreign policy, and is a goal shared by all of mankind.

Article II applies this objective to the general conduct of both sides; that is to say, the prevention of nuclear war presupposes the avoidance of situations capable of an exacerbation of relations, avoidance of military confrontation, and it is in that context that the outbreak of nuclear war can be excluded.

The second article states this more concretely, by elaborating that the prevention of nuclear war presupposes the avoidance of force, for us, or threat of force by the two nuclear countries to each other and to the other countries.

Article III is a general article that simply states that the two nuclear countries have to develop their relations with each other and with third countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this agreement, and it makes it clear that while it is a bilateral agreement, the obligations are multinational.

Article IV states that in any situation in which the two great nuclear countries might find themselves in a nuclear confrontation, or in which either as a result of their policies toward each other or as the result of developments elsewhere in the world, there is a danger of a nuclear confrontation between them, or between them or any other country, they are obligated to consult with each other in order to avoid this risk.

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Article V permits the consultation, that these consultations be communicated to the United Nations, and to other countries, a clause which we would, of course, apply to our allies.

Article VI makes clear that this agreement deals with the prevention of war, and that if it fails the existing obligations in existing documents, treaties and alliances will be maintained.

Now we see the basic significance of this agreement as a step, a significant step toward the prevention of nuclear war, and the prevention of military conflict. It is a formal obligation that the two nuclear superpowers have taken towards each other, and equally importantly with all other countries, to practice restraint in their diplomacy, to build a peace that is permanent, to pursue a policy whose dedication to stability and peace will become, as General Secretary Brezhnev said last night at the banquet, irreversible.

Of course, anyone who has studied the history of the last 30 years must recognize that agreements are not always maintained, and that there is nothing self-enforcing about this document. However, if the two great nuclear countries continue to be animated by the spirit in which they have conducted their policy of the last two years, then this document could mark a landmark on the record toward the structure of peace of which the President has been speaking and can be seen as a step towards a new era of cooperation in the relations of all nations and of lifting from them increasingly the fear of nuclear war and of war in general.

Q Dr. Kissinger, please, does Article II have any relation to our bombing of Cambodia and does Article II have any relation to the supply of the belligerents by both the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries, of military support?

Q What is the question?

Q Does Article II have any bearing or any relation to our bombing in Cambodia or to the military supply of the Indochina belligerents by both the United States and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, in interpreting this agreement we could go around the world and see how it specifically applies to each individual country and to each conceivable situation.

Let me answer first as to Cambodia. The military operations now going on in Cambodia were in process when this agreement was being negotiated, and it was not raised as applying to that particular situation. Now, I don't want to go into the relationship of particular articles to particular events. I don't think it would be appropriate at this point.

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Let me say as a general proposition this: It
is not possible under this agreement for either side, and
I was specifically ex mpting Cambodia for the reason that
this is an operation that was in progress at the time,
but it is not possible for either side to use force in
circumstances that can threaten international peace and
stability, as is said in Article II, without breaching
the letter and the spirit of this agreement.

Now, one then has to decide to what extent
the clauses of Article VI apply and to what extent
particular operations threaten international peace
and stability, and I don't think this is the appropriate
time to discuss it.

The purpose of this agreement is to legalize,
to symbolize and to bring about restraint on the part
of the two nuclear superpowers in their international
relationship so as to produce, at least contribute, to
the preservation of peace, and it cannot be approached
from the point of view of a sharp lawyer pushing against
the limits of every clause because if that is going to
be the attitude, the agreement will not have any
significance.

Q I would like to ask a naive question, if
I could. It seems to me that we agreed on the desirability
of motherhood here. I don't see why it took so long to
reach this agreement and what the disputes were. I wonder
if you could outline some of the negotiations that went
on and what were the issues in this discussion.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't agree, first of
all, with your premise because this agreement was made
by two countries whose conflicts and confrontations have
characterized the entire postwar period. For them to
formalize these series of restraints, the willingness
to consult, was a very major step.

Secondly, I don't think it is useful at the
conclusion of the negotiation to go through all of the
debates and provide a scorecard. I have indicated the
general approach that we took, which was to extend the
applications to the international system in general and
not just of them applying to the United States and to the
Soviet Union, and to put the emphasis on the prevention
of war rather than on how wars might be conducted.

But I don't think any useful purpose is served
by going through all of the complexities.

Q I have a two-part question. According
to Article II, would China be regarded as an ally of
the Soviet Union. And secondly, to what degree would
this document be conceived as an effort to forestall any
kind of military action against China?

DR. KISSINGER: What Article II says is that
force and the threat of force cannot be used against the
ally of another country, and it doesn't say anything abut
about one'sown allies, but it also says force and the
threat of force cannot be used against any other country,
so clearly under this agreement the use of force against
any country under circumstances that would have wide
international repercussions would be precluded.

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It was not conceived as a protection for
any particular country, but I think its practical con-
sequences that if it were observed, as we, of course,
expect it will be, it will have the practical conse-
quence of applying both to the situation you described
as well as to many other conceivable situations.

Q May I follow that up, Dr. Kissinger, please?
Did you have prior consultations when you met with the
Chinese representatives several days ago about any form
of this document, and would you at some point this year
or next like to broaden the document to include China
as a signatory?

DR. KISSINGER: The United States consulted
several countries prior to the completion of this
document, but I don't want to go into an enumeration
of which countries were consulted. I do not discuss my
conversations with the head of the Chinese liaison office,
but I have no particular reason to suppose that they
will necessarily approve a bilateral agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union, whatever its
consequences. I will let them speak for themselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there is one qualifier in
Article II, where it says that both parties will refrain
from the use or threat of force in circumstances which
may endanger international security. When the Soviets
went into Czechoslovakia, they obviously thought it didn't
endanger international peace and when the United States
went into North Vietnam, they felt it didn't endanger
international peace. Isn't that a large hole for a truck
to go through?

DR. KISSINGER: If either of the two signatories
wants to find an excuse to go to war, it will find an excuse
to go to war. This has been the history of the postwar
period. We are talking here restraint on significant
military actions, and what endangers international peace
and security is not determined by the unilateral declara-
tion of the country going to war but also by the reactions
of other members of the international system, because this
is what produces the threat to international peace and
security.

Therefore, again, I can only repeat, if any of
the signatories deal with this like sharp lawyers pushing
against the edges of the agreement, they will, of
course, then find ways of doing so.

On the other hand, the movement into sovereign
countries of large forces would not be in our view
consistent with the spirit of this agreement, but I really
do not want to go into a detailed analysis of every
conceivable situation.

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, while realizing you cannot go into specific circumstances, could you discuss in a general way what your expectations are for applying this principle, for example, to the Middle East area or Asia to reduce the dangers of nuclear war in either of those areas?

DR. KISSINGER: I really do not want to go into specific places. Obviously, if we did not believe that this agreement could make a contribution to bringing about international restraint in areas which have been demonstrable sources of international tension, we did not believe it could make a major contribution to this, we would not have agreed to proceed with it.

So, as a general answer to your question, I would say that it is our intention to proceed on the basis that the restraints foreseen by this agreement will become an increasingly vital factor in international affairs. But I think that you can understand why one cannot at this moment give a precise description of every situation which might arise.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have two questions. You have said it would be impossible to indicate in every situation what this might tend to prohibit or inhibit. Could you give us an example looking back over the past 20 or 25 years of any situation in which force has been applied which you think it would be inhibited in the future? That is the first question.

The second question is, this is the kind of agreement which the Russians have been inclined to sign with a number of countries, and I wonder whether or not it was they who were the ones who originally raised the idea back in Moscow last May?

DR. KISSINGER: As to the agreement as it has now emerged, it would be difficult to say who raised the particular nature of this agreement. When the discussions were first raised in Moscow last year, it was indeed by the Soviet Union, but in a different context.

The original discussion that gave the impetus to this has been transformed into an agreement in which I think the contribution of both sides can be said to be equal.

Q. You are particularly talking about the broadening aspect to other countries?

DR. KISSINGER: And the emphasis on the prevention of war in general. But again, on the approach, I think at this point it can be said that both parties made a substantially equal contribution to this agreement.

Now, secondly, with respect to situations that might be prevented, I can think of several crises in this Administration, and I would have thought in previous periods, the Cuban missile crisis would be one example.

Several Berlin crises that we have had would be other examples that would have been avoided. I can think of some in this Administration, but again we are talking about restraint. We are talking about things that do not happen.

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It is never very easy to demonstrate why something
has not happened. I think it reflects the changes that have
occurred in the international environment. Such an agreement
which would have been inconceivable, say the visit 15 years
ago of Khrushchev can now be described in answer to one question,
as simply affirming the motherhood that was referred to. It is
not the virtues of motherhood or desirability of motherhood.

Q Dr. Kissinger, this agreement obviously will have a long-term effect within the United States and other countries. I wonder why this was not written in a treaty form so that the Senate could get a chance to discuss it in its entirety and question you about it. And two, has there really been discussion with the NATO allies? I know you didn't want to discuss that, but obviously in Europe there will be concern about the American credibility in case of large-scale conventional attacks in central Europe.

DR. KISSINGER: There can be no concern because Article VI fully covers existing NATO obligations, and because if war is not prevented, there is no particular restraint then about how it is conducted.

Secondly, several NATO allies were closely consulted
over an extended period of time, but I don't want to go into
details.

Q As to the first part of the question, on the
treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: Excuse me. With respect to why it was not made in treaty form, it does not involve any particular positive actions that the United States has to take, and it is a general statement of policy.

The President, however, is meeting with the Congres-
sional leaders at 11:30, and he will discuss with them ways
in which possible Congress can register its support if it
wishes to do so.

Q You have now signed a new document of detente,
and yesterday you pledged to go for new strategic arms agree-
ments by 1974. Can you explain how the Administration will
then be able to ask Congress for more arms in the strategic
arms field, and will you discuss some idea how you will argue
your case?

DR. KISSINGER: We have believed that the limitation
of strategic arms should be achieved by agreement, and of
course, we will scrupulously observe the limitations that the
agreement we hope to sign in 1974 will be carried out.

However, it would be destructive of the negotiations
if we now unilaterally imposed on ourselves the limitations
that we are attempting to negotiate. We believe that one of
the elements that has brought about the present situation is
the military balance that exists between us and the Soviet Union.

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However, we believe that this document can contribute to an atmosphere that will accelerate the discussions on strategic arms limitations, and as I said yesterday, we consider the reduction of arms an important element of the strategic arms limitation talks. And it has been so expressed in the principles that were signed yesterday.

But we cannot anticipate what may be negotiated by unilateral actions on our part.

Q Dr. Kissinger, --

DR. KISSINGER: Haven't you asked a question already?

Q I reminded you of part of Burnie's question.

DR. KISSINGER: You are only entitled to short versions.

Q My question, your explanation of not putting it in treaty form is based in part on it not involving any positive obligations on the United State's part.

How is it different from alimited nuclear test ban treaty in that respect? Could you expand on why it didn't need to be a treaty or shouldn't be one?

DR. KISSINGER: The limited nuclear test ban reflected a significant change in our arms policy that has been carried out until this time. This is really a statement of policies that we intend to pursue and have to be applied in individual cases.

It is, therefore, more in the nature of a formalization of a declaration of principles rather than of a specific set of obligations that can be applied automatically to create specific circumstances.

Q In your expose today, you used the word, "super power". Ambassador Zamyatin spoke to him about this. He said the Soviet Union is not a super power, and they are only big powers. He said this was invented by the Chinese.

My other question is about Isreal. When we come to the agreement, we are concerned that Isreal has so far not signed a partial nuclear treaty. There was an article by Flora Lewis, which referred to you, saying you had a study made by the Rand Corporation on how we can protect Isreal with the atomic bomb. Within Articles IV and VI, will you as an ally of Isreal, plan to try to bring Zamyatin to sign this treaty, or a partial treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, with respect to the comments of Ambassador Zamyatin, I welcome the humility that he has expressed, and it was not adequately reflected due to certain personality problems in my own comment.

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With respect to the Rand study, I have never seen such a study, and I know it has been written about although this is a big government and there are many studies floating around in it. They don't necessarily mean, however, that they have any connection with American foreign policy.

Thirdly, the implications of the agreement on the actions of other countries with respect to existing multilateral agreements, I do not want to speculate about. We could not assume that this agreement imposes on the United States a particular additional obligation with respect to treaties whose obligations are already clear.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you interpret this document as one that supercedes the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine?

DR. KISSINGER: This document makes no distinction in its application between the domestic structure of various forms of countries.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is this document a renunciation of atomic war, and if not, why not?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I will take you along on future negotiations to fill in gaps that we leave. But this document is designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by imposing restraints on the major countries with respect to nuclear war, and with respect to the use of force in general.

Therefore, it does not address the question of what happens if war cannot be prevented, because that is not its purpose. Its purpose is to prevent wars. It is not a renunciation of a particular form of war if war cannot be prevented, but we hope that it will make a major contribution to the prevention of war, and therefore, your question will not have to be addressed.

Q Did you discuss the concept of not using nuclear force first against each other, and why wasn't that included?

DR. KISSINGER: We cannot discuss many things that individual members of the press corps would like to have as part of other agreements.

Q That is a recognized international concept, how to prevent nuclear war, isn't it, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: There are two ways you can look at how to prevent nuclear war. One is first by preventing war, and the second is by imposing upon ourselves on specific restraints with respect to particular categories of weapons if war cannot be avoided.

We choose to go the road of attempting to prevent war, and thereby nuclear war, because many other countries depend upon what actions will be taken in case an agression occurs. Therefore, we did not believe it would contribute to peace if we made particular distinctions as to categories of weapons in case of war.

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The overriding problem is to preserve the peace,
and to prevent war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does Article IV oblige the
United States to act as sort of an arbiter or mediator of the
Sino-Soviet conflict if it should get worse?

DR. KISSINGER: What Article IV provides that if
either of the two countries contemplates nuclear war with
any other country, or, of course, with the other nuclear
country, it has an obligation to consult the other signatory
with the purpose of avoiding the situation that would produce
such a war.

We have no intention of being an arbiter between
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and we
look at this consultation as a mutual restraint rather than
as one that creates a right of intervention all over the
world.

END (AT 11:30 A.M., EDT)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
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JUNE 22, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and international security,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for man-kind,

Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated,

Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with the agreements to which either Party has subscribed,

Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972,

Reaffirming that the development of relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not directed against other countries and their interests,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that an objective of their policies is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, the Parties agree that they will act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the Parties and other countries.

ARTICLE II

The Parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to realize the objective stated in that Article, to proceed from the premise that each Party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other Party, against the allies of the other Party and against other countries, in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security. The Parties agree that they will be guided by these considerations in the formulation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the field of international relations.

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## ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

## ARTICLE IV

If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nuclear war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or between either Party and other countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk.

## ARTICLE V

Each Party shall be free to inform the Security Council of the United Nations, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied or other countries of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.

## ARTICLE VI

Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:

(a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,

(b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including those relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and

(c) the obligations undertaken by either Party towards its allies or other countries in treaties, agreements, and other appropriate documents.

## ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

## ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

DONE at Washington on June 22, 1973, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President of the United States
of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee, CPSU

# # #

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 12:30 P. M., EDT
EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION
UNTIL 11:30 A. M., EDT

JUNE 22, 1973

FACT SHEET

Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Nuclear War

Background

This agreement is an outgrowth of the Basic Principles of Relations, signed in Moscow by the President and the General Secretary on May 29, 1972; the second of those principles is particularly relevant. It states that: "The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war."

It was on this basis that the two leaders have discussed what further steps might be possible to reduce the danger of war, and of nuclear war in particular. The result of their discussions is the agreement signed today, an agreement that is a significant step not only in improving US-Soviet relations but in strengthening the stability of international relations.

## Outline of the Agreement

Preamble:

This highlights the general context of the agreement: the desire of both sides to create conditions in the world in which the outbreak of nuclear war anywhere would be reduced and ultimately eliminated.

Article I:

sets forth the main purposes of the agreement: (a) that an objective of the policies of the US and of the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons; (b) that in accordance with this objective both sides will act in such a manner

- as to avoid the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations,

- as to avoid military confrontations, and

- as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them, and between either of them and other countries.

Thus, each side accepts in this Article both a general aim and a mode of conduct that applies not only to their mutual relations, but to their relations with other countries.

Article II:

defines conditions which must be realized in order to achieve the purpose of the agreement as described in the first Article. These conditions are that each party, the US and the USSR, will refrain from the threat or use

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of force (a) against each other, (b) against the allies of the other party, and (c) against other countries. Moreover, these considerations will be the guide for both the US and the USSR in formulating their foreign policies.

### Article III:

Both parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with this agreement. The obligations and rights of third countries are not infringed, and the same standards and obligations in US-Soviet relations, as defined in this agreement, also apply to the conduct of the US and the USSR toward other countries.

### Article IV:

deals with situations in which both sides would undertake consultation to avert the risk of nuclear war; these situations are defined: (1) if there is a risk of nuclear war between the US and the USSR; (2) if there is a risk of nuclear war between either of them and other countries.

Consultations would not be called for under this Article in the event of a risk of nuclear war between two countries not party to the agreement, unless the situation in question created simultaneously a risk of nuclear war involving either the US or the USSR or both.

### Article V:

permits each side to inform its allies, other countries, the UN Security Council and the Secretary General of the progress and the outcome of the consultations initiated under Article IV of this agreement.

The US is thus free to consult simultaneously with its allies, or with other countries, while consultations with the USSR are in progress; secret bilateral consultations are thereby not involved.

### Article VI:

states that nothing in this agreement affects or impairs: (a) our inherent right of self-defense, as envisaged by Article 51 of the UN Charter, (b) the provision of the Charter relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and (c) the obligations by either party towards its allies or other countries in treaties, agreements and other appropriate documents.

The Alliance and other commitments of the US are thus untouched, as is our right of self-defense.

### Articles VII, VIII:

state that the agreement is of unlimited duration and enters into force upon signature.

### In sum, this agreement:

-- is a further step toward reducing the dangers of nuclear war building on the Basic Principles of May, 1972;

-- prescribes a manner of conduct for the US and the USSR to achieve the aim of removing the danger of nuclear war;

-- applies this standard of behavior to relations with other countries;

-- protects the rights of third countries;

-- conforms to our commitments and obligations as allies;

-- reinforces the UN Charter provisions on the non-use of force or the threat of force.

#

#

#

JUNE 22, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for mankind,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

ARTICLE II

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## ARTICLE III

## ARTICLE IV

## ARTICLE V

## ARTICLE VI

## ARTICLE VII

## ARTICLE VIII

# # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 25, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

SAN CLEMENTE INN

9:15 A.M. PDT

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the communique, which is
embargoed until 1:00 o'clock Eastern time and 10:00 o'clock
Pacific time. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss that with you
and take your questions on the communique and also on the sum-
mit between the President and General Secretary.

For the statistics buffs in the Press Corps, the
President and General Secretary spent a total of 47 hours
together. They met in formal sessions with advisors or
alone for 18-1/4 hours. In addition, the President and
General Secretary were together 28-3/4 hours at informal
gatherings, social functions and signing ceremonies, and
events of that sort.

Q How much alone, face to face?

MR. ZIEGLER: Almost 10 hours. 9-1/2 hours.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: I will not go
through the communique because I understand you have already
had a chance to read it. Let me make a few general observa-
tions about the summit and how it fits into the general develop-
ment of our foreign policy, and then I will take questions
about the communique or any other part of the summit which
you may wish to raise.

One good way of assessing the results of the summit
is to compare last year's communique with this year's communi-
que. Last year's communique spoke about the desirability of
peaceful coexistence. It said:

"Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S. -
Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement
in relations is possible and desirable."

This year we say that: "Both Sides are convinced
that the discussions they have just held represent a
further milestone in the constructive development of
their relations.

"Convinced that such a development of American-
Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their
peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further
major steps to give these relations maximum stability and
to turn the development of friendship and cooperation
between their peoples into a permanent factor for world-
wide peace."

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In other words, what marks the turning point last year, in which the fact of peaceful coexistence required special affirmation and possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, was thought deserving of special note, and this year we are speaking of a continuing relationship.

As a result, as relations between the Soviet Union and the United States proceed along the course that was charted last May, and accelerated this June, we cannot expect that these meetings, which we have affirmed should become a regular part of U.S.-Soviet relationships, will produce a dramatic new departure. It is the strength of this relationship as it develops that the road is charted and that what we expect to see is a further evolution along a path which will be increasingly free of confrontations, and which will become increasingly a part of a stable international system. This is the context in which we see the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

If you look back over previous summit meetings between Soviet and American leaders, they almost invariably occurred in the shadow of some crisis, and they were inevitably directed to removing some source of tension and some cause of confrontation.

In May 1972 we still met in this shadow of the Vietnamese war, and the recent decisions that had led to an expansion of military operations in Indochina, but even then, before the first talk, enunciated some common principles of conduct and affirmed the desirability of a long-term evolution toward a peaceful and ultimately cooperative relationship between the two States and the two peoples. These expectations were fulfilled over the course of the year and, therefore, what this summit intended to do was to strengthen the cooperative bonds that had developed in particular areas, to give a new impetus to the key areas of negotiations, especially strategic arms limitations and mutual force reductions, and thirdly, to take the joint principles one step further by embodying them in a formal agreement designed to prevent war, and especially nuclear war.

There is nothing I can add to the particular agreements that are enumerated in the communique that deal with the cooperative relationships in various fields and that represent a continuation of a process that started last year.

I can only say from my personal experience in participating in many of these negotiations that what I told you ladies and gentlemen before the summit has been reinforced by the experience of the summit. Many of these agreements do not themselves take the attention and time of the top leaders, and it would be absurd to pretend to you that the General Secretary and the President sit down and discuss the details of the civil aviation agreements, but it is also true that the imminence of their meetings, and the fact that they have determined to give a symbolic expression to this relationship gives an impetus to negotiations that otherwise would drag on for months, and permits the quick resolution of particular issues which, if left to the expert level, could produce extended stalemate and there is some significance in having the relationship develop on such a broad front, developing on both sides a commitment that is becoming increasingly difficult to reverse.

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The Indochina problem, which last year was a source of contention, has received a common expression in this document.

And finally, there has been the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I have seen several comments to the effect that it is non-binding, that it is not self-enforcing, and no doubt I have contributed to this by comments that reflect my former professional profession, so let me state our position: That no agreement in history has ever enforced itself. Every agreement in history that has been observed has depended either on the willingness of the parties to observe it or on the willingness of one or the other parties to enforce it, or on the rewards for compliance and the risks of non-compliance.

This agreement is no different from any other agreement in that respect. When great powers make an agreement with each other, they, of course, have the capability of not observing it unless the other side is prepared to draw extreme consequences. But the violation of this agreement would have serious consequences for the whole context of U.S.-Soviet relations and, conversely, the observance of this agreement can mark, as I said on Friday, a milestone in the achievement of self-restraint by the major countries, a self-restraint which is by definition the essence of peace and which we intend to observe, which we expect the Soviet Union to observe, and which can therefore provide the foundation for a new international relationship.

Of course, history is replete with changes of course and we must be vigilant and prepared for such an occurrence, unique opportunity to create a new and more peaceful system. It is an opportunity that has come about partly as a result of the enormity of the weapons that would be used in case of a conflict: partly by the depth of human aspiration towards peace: partly as a result of the complexities of a world in which the ideological expectations of any side have not been fully met.

But whatever the reasons, we consider the summit as a further advance along that road, that as these meetings become a regular feature of international life, and as we come to take them more and more for granted, the results will follow paths that will come to seem more and more natural and we would consider that one of the best signs that a peaceful world is coming into being.

So this is our assessment of the summit and I will be glad to answer any questions on this, or on what I have said, or on the communique, or anything else related to the summit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the communique says positive trends are developing in international relations toward the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of cooperative relations in the interest of peace. I wonder if you would apply that sentence specifically to the Middle East situation and what transpired on it in the summit?

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DR. KISSINGER: As you can see from the communique, the Middle East is one of the most complex areas and it is one in which one has to separate tow problems: One, the local tensions; that is, the tensions between the Arab states and Israel, from the so-called great power rivalry in that area. When this Administration came into office, they were inextricably linked. In 1970, the world came close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps was realized generally at the time, over the invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at that time, every conflict in the Middle East became immediately and inextricably a part of the great rivalry. Even the selection of words by White House briefers was picked up by local newspapers and became a matter of attention in the context of East-West relationships.

Now, I think it is safe to say not that the Soviet Union and we agree on the evolution of the Middle East and how it should be resolved, as the communique makes clear, but I think both sides will make an effort not to become inextricably involved in its conflict with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict.

The communique states that both sides recognize the importance of the solution and that both sides will make efforts to help promote it and therefore, we hope that some progress will be made over the course of the year.

Q Is there any significance in the dropping of the word balance from mutual balanced force reduction in the communique and I notice that you used it once and didn't use it another time.

DR. KISSINGER: That is because I usually speak extemporaneously. No, there is no significance in the dropping of the word "balance".

In the preparatory discussions in Vienna, there was some discussion about it, but since it concerned entirely procedural matters, it has no substantive significance. The United States' position with respect to the mutual balanced force reduction negotiations has been submitted to our allies. We think that is has received substantial support from our allies. We will enter the negotiations, we are convinced, with a reasonable and united position.

What particular adjective one gives to describe it is really less important, but the substance of it will be that it must be balanced, and that it must reflect the principles of this communique and of May 29th last year, that no negotiation can succeed that attempts to give a unilateral advantage to one side or another.

Q Is there any significance in the brief material on the Middle East to the omissions of the word "security" in the phrase "be consistent with their independence and sovereignty"?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I think it is safe to say that both sides recognize that no solution is possible that does not assure the security of the countries concerned. And there is no dispute about this.

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Why didn't the communique then say so?

DR. KISSINGER: The truth is that I don't remember any discussion about the world "security," if somebody there thought of it, it almost certainly would have said so.

Dr. Kissinger, do you plan soon to go to China or do you plan to invite a Chinese leader to visit the United States in order to assure them that what they witnessed this past week was not the beginning of some kind of super power condominium?

DR. KISSINGER: We are, of course, always in touch with all interested countries, and it is a fixed element of our policy not to participate in any condominium directed either at our allies or at other interested parties.

We believe that we have a common interest with the Soviet Union in promoting a peaceful order. We believe also that to the extent that a more peaceful conduct emerges by all parties, emerges from our discussions, that all nations benefit.

We have not agreed and we shall not agree nor were we asked to agree, to anything that smacks of super power condominium and our views on this are well known to all interested countries.

We have no specific plans at this moment for any of the visits that you have described and if any should develop, we will, of course, announce them immediately. But we don't have to have such a visit to make that particular point clear.

Dr. Kissinger, there has been a considerable amount of confusion in connection with the SALT agreement about MIRVs. In the agreement it states that national means of inspection will be the only possible means. Is it possible to control MIRV through only national means of inspection or should we read into the wording there that in effect, you have abandoned the notion of being able to control MIRVs?

DR. KISSINGER: First, the agreement does not say national means are the only possible means. It says that both sides agree that they must be verifiable by national means. If both sides should decide to have other than national means that wouldn't be precluded, but I think that is extremely unlikely.

So, the realistic assumption has to be that any agreement that will be made is one that will be monitored by national means. Now then, the question is, does that principle really exclude any control of MIRVs.

First, let me say that we believe that MIRVs are an important part of this negotiation and therefore, we believe that it is possible to have some restraints on MIRVs that can be monitored by national means, and therefore a great deal depends on what restraints we are talking about.

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If you are talking about bans on production, those
would be next to impossible to monitor by national means.
If you are talking about deployment, then they are possible
to monitor within a margin of error which is larger than is
the base in more quantities, than if you are monitoring
quantities, but that is finite. If you are talking about a
combination of deployment and improvements in accuracy and
so forth, so that you could add certain testing restraints,
then you have ever greater possibilities of inspection.

I am not saying that these are our specific
proposals. I am saying that you cannot just look at this
in terms of one category of restraints and assess the relationship
of national means to that one category. You have to do
it in the whole complex of MIRV technology and of the kinds
of restraints you want to employ and we think it is possible
to put together a package by combining several restraints
verifiable by national means.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 12 of the communique,
it says they set the goal for trade over the next three years
$2 to $3 billion. This is the figure for the entire 3-year
period, as I understand it; is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Since the current trade is running at, I think,
$1.3 billion annually now, '73, would not this be --

DR. KISSINGER: The $1.3 billion includes agricultural.
This is excluding agricultural commodities.

Q Do you have any figure including agricultural
commodities?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not have it including agricultural.
I think excluding agricultural, it runs at about $600 million
now, and I think this envisages an increase of about 50 percent.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the communique hint, or
more than hint, at an East-West summit at the end of the
European Security Conference?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it obviously mentions it.
The position of the communique with respect to the East-West
summit is one that we have taken before; that is to say, that
the level of the concluding phase of the European Security Conference
will be determined by progress that is made in the first two phases,
the first of which begins on July 3rd at the Foreign Minister level.
Then there will be commission meetings, and upon the conclusion of the
commission meetings, one can determine first the final phase of the
conference, and secondly, the appropriate level of participation.

We are, in principle, prepared to consider a summit
if the results of the first two phases warrant it.

Q May I ask you to enumerate as briefly as possible
the total package of benefits that will accrue to the United States
as a result of the past few days' activities?

DR. KISSINGER: I can see this is not somebody who has
attended previous briefings or he wouldn't have made a demand for
brevity. (Laughter)

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The benefits that accrue to the United States are the benefits that will accrue to all participants in the international system from an improvement in the prospects of peace. To the extent that we live in an atmosphere of confrontation, the United States, as the strongest country in the non-Communist world, and as the one on which the security of most others depends, is immediately drawn closer to the brink of war than almost any other participant.

Secondly, we expect that as a result of many of these cooperative efforts, both peoples will benefit in a concrete way.

With respect to the economic relationships, about which this question is often asked, they have to be seen in the whole context of the web of relations that is developing between the two countries. Most of the large deals that are being talked about will have to be made by private American industry, and they would presumably not be made unless they were thought to be made unless they were thought to be of mutual benefit.

We have taken the view, from the beginning of this Administration first that negotiations with the Soviet Union should not be conducted on the basis of atmospherics, but on the basis of very concrete negotiation; and secondly, that the economic and political matters should be linked together so that the progress would take place on a broad front, and I must say it is a little ironic that early in the Administration we were all accused of delaying the progress of negotiations, and now many of the same people who accused us then of being too slow are discovering that the benefits may be too one-sided.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the reason for including a proposal for a world disarmament conference to be held at an appropriate time? What is your definition of an appropriate time? Does it mean after the treaties on the strategic arms, or what?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you know that the proposal for a world disarmament conference is one that the Soviet Union has repeatedly made. It was included in last year's communique, and it was repeated in this year's communique, and I think it is safe to say that if our Soviet colleagues and we were pressed to the wall, our definition of the appropriate time might differ. (Laughter)

Q Dr. Kissinger, what we have been listening to is an anthology of the positive results of the summit. Were not there some things that you had hoped to achieve at this particular summit that you have not?

DR. KISSINGER: Either due to lack of imagination or magalomania, I can't really tell you anything that we were hoping to achieve that we didn't. These summits are prepared over a long period of time. This particular summit is the result of many exchanges with the Soviet Union: Secretary Peterson's trip in July, my trip in September, Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to the United States in October, Secretary Shultz's trip in March, my trip in May, many exchanges between the two leaders.

So it really is organically almost impossible for those summits to occur with a long agenda in which you will say we will try this and see what happens. It is impossible, and also undesirable, because when you have the two leaders of the most powerful nations in the world confronting each other, you do not want to have a situation in which a totally unpredictable clash can occur.

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So in this meeting, the range of what was attainable was clearly understood by April or May, and the results were within the range that had been previously agreed to.

Now, at the end of each summit, there is always a very extensive meeting between the two leaders in which they decide the sort of problems they can be working on over the next year. We had such a meeting in the Kremlin on the day of the President's departure in 1972, and that was the third time that this agreement on the prevention of nuclear war in a slightly different context was raised.

As you all know, the President and the General Secretary met for three hours on Saturday night, and there was a discussion of the sort of problems that could be worked on in preparation for next year's summit, and, of course, there is an unfinished agenda. Obviously, the Middle East is part of the unfinished agenda, but we didn't expect to settle it at this meeting. SALT is part of it. MBFR is part of it. This is where we stand now in relation to next year's summit.

Q General Secretary Brezhnev said, as he was departing, that he believed that President Nixon could be returning to the Soviet Union as early as six to eight months. He also said that he expects that there will be more important agreements, or equally important agreements, signed there, indicating to some that he was possibly projecting perhaps an interim agreement on SALT.

On those two points, could you give us the United States view on the timing of a visit, and also on possibilities of an interim agreement on SALT which was referred to in an earlier statement by the principals?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, as you saw, the General Secretary was speaking without notes, and in the exuberance of the moment. (Laughter)

We don't foreclose a meeting earlier than 12 months, that has been customary between the two recent summits, but if we had been asked on that occasion to give our estimate, we would have been somewhat more cautious. So if it is more rapid, then this would indicate a more rapid pace of negotiation than we have foreseen, which we do not exclude, but which we think is unlikely.

Now, it is not at all excluded, as the principals made clear, that there would be an interim agreement on SALT in a period less than the 12 to 14 months that I would have given you as an estimate, and this is one of the matters to which we will now turn.

Q A follow-up on Mr. Kalb's question. Was chemical weapons control one of the things that had been dropped by April or May, or was that actively under consideration at this summit?

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DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q You suggested that most things had been decided on the agenda by April or May. I wondered if this matter had been excluded at that point for possible agreement, or was under active consideration for agreement here?

DR. KISSINGER: When I say "had been decided by April or May," let me make clear what I mean. By the end of my visit to Zavidovo, it was not that everything had been decided, but that the range within which the negotiations between the two leaders would take place had been essentially determined, and, therefore the shape of probable agreements had become fairly clear. By that time it was clear that there would be no agreement on chemical warfare.

Q It used to be a theory that it would be a good idea for the top Soviet leaders to come to this country to get an idea of our strength; that is, the size of the country, what the people are like, the size and scope of our production, that kind of thing. This summit conference could have been held on a rock in the Atlantic Ocean for as much or as little that Mr. Brezhnev saw of America and Americans. Did he have at any time any desire to see anything of us and our country outside of the Presidential Compound?

DR. KISSINGER: The nature of the travel of the General Secretary was left to him. We made it clear that he could go anywhere he chose and for as long as he wished, so the General Secretary's itinerary was not determined by us. However, it seemed logical to us, as well, that the General Secretary wanted to follow the summit in Moscow, that had been devoted entirely to work with just two very brief side trips, with another summit in the United States of a more or less similar nature, in which the two leaders would spend most of their time in accelerating the momentum of their previous conversations.

I think, however, it is safe to say that now that the basic course has been established, and many of the major agreements have been achieved, that the purpose to which you referred will be realized in future summits. For example, the General Secretary has pointed out to the President that when he reurtrns to the Soviet Union in 1974, the Soviet Union would like it very much if we would agree to a greater exposure to various aspects of Soviet life, and also to see more of the Soveit Union than proved to be the case last year. We have agreed to this.

If these summits become annual events, and the General Secretary returns here in 1975, it can be taken for granted that much more extensive travel would be included in his program.

Q Dr. Kissinger, concerning Indochina on page 8, the last sentence on page 8 says that the leaders may also reaffirm their stand that the political futures of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free of outside interference.

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Have you detected any change, perhaps, in the Soviet attitude concerning the current fighting in Cambodia, and particularly, do the Soviets disapprove at all of any activities that Hanoi may be undertaking in Cambodia, either supply or military?

DR. KISSINGER: First, let us get the Cambodian problem into perspective. We are talking here of the very last phase of a very prolonged war. We are not talking here of the beginning of another Indochina conflict. I don't want to characterize the Soviet attitude toward Cambodia. I think the Soviet Union should speak for itself.

I think that this sentence here states our view exactly: that we agreed that the future of Cambodia should be left to the Cambodian people, and that peace should come consistent with the sovereignty and the rights of self-determination of the Cambodians. We are actively engaged in attempting to bring this about at this moment, and we believe, as I said previously, that as the realrelationships among the great powers fall into clearer focus, as one looks at these areas less from their symbolic aspect of either being the spearhead of wars of national liberation or of being a conspiracy directed, it was thought once, from Peking, I think that all countries can adopt a more responsible attitude toward the conflict in Indochina and a more diassociated attitude than was the case in the 1960s.

Q My impression is that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, whether or not it is granted is no longer a serious obstacle to the development of long-term trade. Is that the case?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we believe that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union is important for the development of large-scale trade, and it is extremely important to the development of Soviet-American relations. This was part of the series of understandings in a whole complex of relationships between us and the Soviet Union last year, and it would cast serious doubt on our ability to perform our side of understandings and agreements if, in each case, that part of an agreement that is carried out later by one side or the other is then made the subject of additional conditions that were not part of the original negotiation and, therefore, I would say that for both symbolic and substantive reasons, and substantively both economic and political, it would be very unfortunate if the request to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, which means nondiscriminatory status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were not granted.

Q Can you address yourself to two impressions?

DR. KISSINGER: Impressions or questions?

Q However you like; impressions and a question. First, is there here a signal to the Russians that they have a free hand where China is concerned, as a follow-up to an earlier question; and the second impression, Dr. Kissinger, in the 89 words devoted to the Middle East, one gets the impression that the Soviet Union and the United States are as far apart as before?

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DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, as I said on Friday, I do not want to go into hypothetical cases addressed to particular countries. However, since you raised the question, let me say this: I don't know what a free hand vis-a-vis China means. The Soviet Union has declared officially that it has no military intentions vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive a military attack by anybody on the People's Republic of China that would not endanger international peace and security and, therefore, it would be thought to be, from whatever direction it came, not consistent with our view of this treaty, but I repeat: This does not imply that we have any reason to believe that any such attack is contemplated or that any of this subject was discussed at all between them.

With respect to the Middle East, the communique makes clear that there is no unanimity of views. Whether that is as wide as before or narrower, I think we should let the future decide, but obviously the subject was discussed at some length.

Q The glowing manner in which the two leaders have described their past weeks --

DR. KISSINGER: What manner?

Q Glowing manner, the euphoric manner.

DR. KISSINGER: Don't top yourself. (Laughter)

Q -- carries with it the impression that we can now expect an acceleration of demands or requests or proposals, at least within our own country, for the reduction of armaments. A moment ago you talked about the necessity of maintaining vigilance. Would you discuss that in context with the summit meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: This period requires great sophistication on the part of the American people. We have reached this point because we have proceeded from the basis of adequate strength, and because we have consistently taken the position that we would reduce our strength only by agreement with the other side in some agreed relation to the reductions by the other side.

This must remain an essential part of our policy, and we cannot do, as a result of this agreement, unilaterally those things that the Soviet Union will not do. We have made it clear in the communique and we have made it clear in the conduct of our policy that the principal goal of this Administration in the field of foreign policy is to leave behind it a world that can be said to be safer, more peaceful, and more permanently free of crisis than the one we found.

But we, in our view, cannot achieve this by unilateral reductions of American strength, and we believe that the course on which we are, which has made, in our judgment, significant progress, can be maintained only if we were to continue to pursue it on the basis of strict reciprocity.

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Q If I may, I would like to come back to this
not so important adjective balance. Isn't it true that the
Soviets have quite a different interpretation of balance
than you have, and is this one of the reasons why not even
the formal title of MBFR talks was spelled out in the com-
munique?

DR. KISSINGER: What was spelled out in the com-
munique is, I believe, consistent with what was agreed to in
Vienna. The future of force reductions in Europe will not be
determined by adjectives. It will be determined by concrete
programs. It will not be determined by constant insinuations
of some dark American design.

The United States has taken the view and has stated
publicly that our security is integrally linked to the
security of our Eurppean allies. Therefore, we are prepared
to work with our European allies on working out a concrete
program that reflects the common conception of security.
We have invited our European allies to participate with us
in developing this program, and we think the time has come
to discuss the program, rather that the adjectives of a title
of a conference.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did they give us to understand
that they would play a useful role in seeking a cease-fire in
Cambodia, and did we give them to understand that we will be
winding down our bombing there in the meantime ?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think any useful purpose is
served if I go into the details of these discussions with
respect to Cambodia. The primary problem with respect to
Cambodia now is whether it is possible in a finite period of
time to bring about a negotiation that leads toward a politi-
cal settlement and produces a rapid cease-fire. The particu-
lar tactics of particular operations are subsidiary to that
overriding issue which was the subject of discussions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the agreement to prevent
nuclear war mean that we would have to enter into consultations
with the Russians before we would come to the defense of an
ally under attack?

DR. KISSINGER: The agreement for the prevention
of nuclear war, in Article 6, makes clear that allied obli-
gations are unaffected. Secondly, the significance of
Article 4 is that in case of situations that might produce
the danger of nuclear war in general, consultations have to
be undertaken. It should, therefore, be seen as a restraint
on the diplomacy of both sides, and as I pointed out on
Friday, not a guide to action in case those restraints break
down and war occurs.

Q Dr. Kissinger: on the economic front, here
you talk about that serious and sympathetic consideration
should be given by the U.S. Government. Earlier you stressed
in your discussion --

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DR. KISSINGER: Consideration to what?

Q To proposals that are in the interests of both sides. These are business proposals, presumably. Earlier you stressed the importance of the private corporations in the negotiations. What happens when they conflict, and a corpora- tion says this is in our mutual best interest, but perhaps you do not? A case in point right now is the natural gas deals. There are two of them that were discussed before. One corporation went out and made a deal. How do you resolve this question?

DR. KISSINGER: To the extent that corporations can implement their deals without the aid of the Government, we can do no more than express our views to their directive. To the extent that the corporations require the assistance of the Government, or the guarantee of the Government of their investment, we have the possibility of gearing the decisions to our national policy.

Now, with respect to the natural gas deal, we are not under the impression that these companies have the resources to do them entirely on their own and, therefore, we can relate them to national policy, but as the communique says, we are looking on them favorably, but it is hard to discuss in the abstract.

Q There is a reference in the communique to a meeting at the highest level to complete the ESC. What sort of time frame do you have in mind?

DR. KISSINGER: As you notice, the communique makes no particular reference to a specific time frame and, therefore, this question will be easier to answer after the Foreign Ministers have met, and particularly after the commissions have started their work. It will depend to some extent on whether the European participants will decide to take a summer vacation and the commissions will decide to take a summer vacation in August or not. The time frame is, as the communique says, the quickest possible time, but there is no particular time limit.

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Q We are talking about some period within less
than a year, aren't we?

DR. KISSINGER: That would be a reasonable assumption. But it depends on the progress of the conference, but that is a good working hypothesis.

Q On the Watergate, the inevitable question as to whether Watergate in any way was discussed between the President and the General Secretary, and would you, Dr. Kissinger, be prepared to comment on published speculation that the pressures of Watergate applied a more modest negotiating technique on the part of the President in his expectations on the Summit?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, Watergate was not discussed. And I don't think the point has yet been reached where our domestic travails are discussed with foreign leaders.

Second, the negotiating frame for the Simmit was established last year and was in no way affected by Watergate.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet side, coming back to the natural gas deals, ask for a more specific, more categorical American endorsement of these particularly the latest Occidental Petroleum deal, and a promise of guarantees on the credits than is in the communique?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the specific status of the gas deals is now that they have to be moved from these abstract declarations of intent to some concrete propositions. These concrete propositions have to be developed, in the first instance, by the companies concerned that have to make a judgment of the degree of investment that is required and also on whether it is an economic proposition.

At that point, one will have to determine whether this can be done entirely by private capital or if it requires, at least in some of its aspects, some U.S. governmental guarantees. That point has not yet been reached because the projects have not yet been formulated into precise economic propositions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in what way are the documents and agreements signed by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party binding in any respect on the Soviet Government and another rather petty question, is there any connection between the timing of this week's events or at least the communique, this press conference this morning and your press conference Wednesday, if you have one -- is there any connection between that timing and the Watergate events going on in Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, whenever the General Secretary of the Communist Party signs a document, we are given -- it is actually legally a very good question -- we are given a document by the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointing out that he has full powers to sign that document because, as you know, Mr. Brezhnev has no official governmental position, so that legally the documents which he signed this year and the documents which he signed last year are fully within Soviet constitutional processes and we have also an official Soviet statement that he has full governmental powers to sign the document.

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Secondly, with respect to my briefings, our view here has always been that the necessities that produce foreign policies are of a permanent nature, and that our objective is what I described at the beginning, to bring about a more peaceful world. They are not geared in any respect to any of the domestic situations.

This schedule was determined at a time when it was believed that Dean would testify last week and it was agreed then that in view of the fact that the General Secretary's speech was on television yesterday, that his departure statement would be on television yesterday, and in view of the fact that it is more appropriate to release communiques at a time he is leaving the country, that the release of the communique would be on Monday and therefore, the briefing of the communique would be on Monday. That is a schedule that was determined, I repeat, at a time when we did not know that the hearings would be postponed.

If I have another briefing on Wednesday, it is in response to the repeated request of many of you ladies and gentlemen that we have a more informal session, less geared to the words of the communique, to set this in better perspective.

But, since you have raised the issue, I will say now, I will move you to Thursday, to remove any question about it. The thought had never crossed our mind and we will now, if there is one, have it on Thursday.

Q Could I suggest that the day is less important than it be sometime later in the afternoon, California time.

DR. KISSINGER: Work it out with Ron. If there is another briefing, the purpose is to permit a somewhat more philosophical discussion of where we are going. The timing should be left to what produces the best philosophical discussion.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the proposal for a world disarmament conference has been mentioned many times over the years and has not been a subject necessarily of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States as to its usefulness. I wonder whether the mention of it here in the communique, whether you would characterize it as one of the accomplishments of the summit?

DR. KISSINGER: The world disarmament conference was mentioned in last year's communique and therefore, to have it mentioned again cannot be considered a radical departure and one of the principal accomplishments of the conference.

We have said that we would be prepared to discuss it at an appropriate time, and I suspect that this will lead to several exchanges on that subject.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 25, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

SAN CLEMENTE INN

9:15 A.M. PDT

"Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S.-
Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improve-
ment in relations is possible and desirable."

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In May 1972 we still met in this shadow of the Vietnamese war, and the recent decisions that had led to an expansion of military operations in Indochina, but even then, before the first talk, enunciated some common principles of conduct and affirmed the desirability of a long-term evolution toward a peaceful and ultimately cooperative relationship between the two states and the two peoples. These expectations were fulfilled over the course of the year and, therefore, what this summit intended to do was to strengthen the cooperative bonds that had developed in particular areas, to give a new impetus to the key areas of negotiations, especially strategic arms limitations and mutual force reductions, and thirdly, to take the joint principles one step further by embodying them in a formal agreement designed to prevent war, and especially nuclear war.

I can only say from my personal experience in participating in many of these negotiations that what I told you ladies and gentlemen before the summit has been reinforced by the experience of the summit. Many of these agreements do not themselves take the attention and time of the top leaders, and it would be absurd to pretend to you that the General Secretary and the President sit down and discuss the details of the civil aviation agreement, but it is also true that the imminence of their meetings, and the fact that they have determined to give a symbolic expression to this relationship gives an impetus to negotiations that otherwise would drag on for months, and permits the quick resolution of particular issues which, if left to the expert level, could produce extended stalemate and there is some significance in having the relationship develop on such a broad front, developing on both sides a commitment that is becoming increasingly difficult to reverse.

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With respect to the other areas, I have talked to you at some length about the decisions with respect to strategic arms limitation talks. I think you can assume that in addition to what has been stated formally in the agreement on principles, that the two leaders had extensive discussions as to how the process can be accelerated so that a meaningful agreement can be achieved consistent with the deadline that they have set themselves. Therefore, we believe, with considerable hope, that a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms, which would be one of the historic achievements in the field of arms control, can and will be negotiated during the course of 1974.

With respect to the mutual balanced force reductions, we told you before this summit conference that this was not the forum in which to negotiate the specifics. This is a matter of the profoundest concern to our allies, and it had never been intended to discuss the specifics, the specific schemes, at this meeting.

However, as those who have followed the discussions realize, there had been some uncertainty about when these discussions would begin. Prior to the meeting, in the preparatory conferences in Vienna, the Soviet position had tied the opening of the MBFR conference to the ending of the European Security Conference. At this meeting, it was decided that the MBFR conference would begin unconditionally on October 30th, and, of course, both leaders agreed that they would make a serious effort to deal with the question of armaments in Central Europe.

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And finally, there has been the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I have seen several comments to the effect that it is non-binding, that it is not self-enforcing, and no doubt I have contributed to this by comments that reflect my former professorial profession, so let me state our position: That no agreement in history has ever enforced itself. Every agreement in history that has been observed has depended either on the willingness of the parties to observe it or on the willingness of one or the other parties to enforce it, or on the rewards for compliance and the risks of non-compliance.

Of course, history is replete with changes of course and we must be vigilant and prepared for such an occurrence, but it is the belief of the President that this period has a unique opportunity to create a new and more peaceful system. It is an opportunity that has come about partly as a result of the enormity of the weapons that would be used in case of a conflict: partly by the depth of human aspiration towards peace; partly as a result of the complexities of a world in which the ideological expectations of any side have not been fully met.

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DR. KISSINGER: As you can see from the communique, the Middle East is one of the most complex areas and it is one in which one has to separate two problems: One, the local tensions; that is, the tensions between the Arab states and Israel, from the so-called great power rivalry in that area. When this Administration came into office, they were inextricably linked. In 1970, the world came close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps was realized generally at the time, over the invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at that time, every conflict in the Middle East became immediately and inextricably a part of the great rivalry. Even the selection of words by White House briefers was picked up by local newspapers and became a matter of attention in the context of East-West relationships.

In the preparatory discussions in Vienna, there was some discussion about it, but since it concerned entirely procedural matters, it has no substantive significance. The United States' position with respect to the mutual balanced force reduction negotiations has been submitted to our allies. We think that it has received substantial support from our allies. We will enter the negotiations, we are convinced, with a reasonable and united position.

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Q Why didn't the communique then say so?

DR. KISSINGER: The truth is that I don't remember any discussion about the word "security, if somebody there thought of it, it almost certainly would have said so.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you plan soon to go to China or do you plan to invite a Chinese leader to visit the United States in order to assure them that what they witnessed this past week was not the beginning of some kind of super power condominium?

Q Dr. Kissinger, there has been a considerable amount of confusion in connection with the SALT agreement about MIRVs. In the agreement it states that national means of inspection will be the only possible means. Is it possible to control MIRV through only national means of inspection or should we read into the wording there that in effect, you have abandoned the notion of being able to control MIRVs?

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If you are talking about bans on production, those
would be next to impossible to monitor by national means.
If you are talking about deployment, then they are possible
to monitor within a margin of error which is larger than is
the base in mere quantities, than if you are monitoring
quantities, but that is finite. If you are talking about a
combination of deployment and improvements in accuracy and
so forth, so that you could add certain testing restraints,
then you have ever greater possibilities of inspection.

I am not saying that these are our specific
proposals. I am saying that you cannot just look at this
in terms of one category of restraints and assess the relation-
ship of national means to that one category. You have to do
it in the whole complex of MIRV technology and of the kinds
of restraints you want to employ and we think it is possible
to put together a package by combining several restraints
verifiable by national means.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 12 of the communique,
it says they set the goal. for trade over the next three years
$2 to $3 billion. This is the figure for the entire 3-year
period, as I understand it; is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

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With respect to the economic relationships, about which this question is often asked, they have to be seen in the whole context of the web of relations that is developing between the two countries. Most of the large deals that are being talked about will have to be made by private American industry, and they would presumably not be made unless they were thought to be of mutual benefit.

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We have taken the view, from the beginning of this Administration, first that negotiations with the Soviet Union should not be conducted on the basis of atmospherics, but on the basis of very concrete negotiation; and secondly, that the economic and political matters should be linked together so that the progress would take place on a broad front, and I must say it is a little ironic that early in the Administration we were all accused of delaying the progress of negotiations, and now many of the same people who accused us then of being too slow are discovering that the benefits may be too one-sided. But the benefits of peace in this period cannot be one-sided.

DR. KISSINGER: Either due to lack of imagination or megalomania, I can't really tell you anything that we were hoping

achieve that we didn't. These sum its are prepared over a long period of time. This particular summit is the result of many exchanges with the Soviet Union: Secretary Peterson's trip in July, my trip in September, Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to the United States in October, Secretary Shultz's trip in March, my trip in May, many exchanges between the two leaders.

So it really is organically almost impossible for these summits to occur with a long agenda in which you will say we will try this and see what happens. It is impossible, and also undesirable, because when you have the two leaders of the most powerful nations in the world confronting each other, you do not want to have a situation in which a totally unpredictable clash can occur.

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We don't foreclose a meeting earlier than 12 months. that has been customary between the two recent summits, but if we had been asked on that occasion to give our estimate, we would have been somewhat more cautious. So if it is more rapid, then this would indicate a more rapid pace of negotiation than we have foreseen, which we do not exclude, but which we think is unlikely.

Q A follow-up on Mr. Kalb's question. Was chemical weapons control one of the things that had been dropped by April or May, or was that actively under considera-

DR. KISSINGER: No.

DR. KISSINGER: When I say "had been decided by April or May," let me make clear what I mean. By the end of my visit to Zavidovo, it was not that everything had been decided, but that the range within which the negotiations between the two leaders would take place had been essentially determined, and, therefore, the shape of probable agreements had become fairly clear. By that time it was clear that there would be no agreement on chemical warfare.

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I think, however, it is safe to say that now that the basic course has been established, and many of the major agreements have been achieved, that the purpose to which you referred will be realized in future summits. For example, the General Secretary has pointed out to the President that when he returns to the Soviet Union in 1974, the Soviet Union would like it very much if we would agree to a greater exposure to various aspects of Soviet life, and also to see more of the Soviet Union than proved to be the case last year. We have agreed to this.

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attempting to bring this about at this moment, and we
believe, as I said previously, that as the relationships
among the great powers fall into clearer focus, as one looks
at these areas less from their symbolic aspect of either
being the spearhead of wars of national liberation or of
being a conspiracy directed, it was thought once, from Peking,
I think that all countries can adopt a more responsible
attitude toward the conflict in Indochina and a more dis-
associated attitude than was the case in the 1960s.

Q My impression is that the granting of most-
favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, whether or not it
is granted is no longer a serious obstacle to the development
of long-term trade. Is that the case?

Q However you like; impressions and a question.
First, is there here a signal to the Russians that they have
a free hand where China is concerned, as a follow-up to an
earlier question; and the second impression, Dr. Kissinger, in
the 89 words devoted to the Middle East, one gets the impres-
sion that the Soviet Union and the United States are as far
apart as before?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question,
as I said on Friday, I do not want to go into hypothetical
cases addressed to particular countries. However, since you
raised the question, let me say this: I don't know what a
free hand vis-a-vis China means. The Soviet Union has de-
clared officially that it has no military intentions vis-a-vis
the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive a
military attack by anybody on the People's Republic of
China that would not endanger international peace and security
and, therefore, it would be thought to be, from whatever direc-
tion it came, not consistent with our view of this treaty,
but I repeat: This does not imply that we have any reason to
believe that any such attack is contemplated or that any of
this subject was discussed at all between them.

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With respect to the Middle East, the communique
makes clear that there is no unanimity of views. Whether
that is as wide as before or narrower, I think we should
let the future decide, but obviously the subject was dis-
cussed at some length.

DR. KISSINGER: What manner?

Q -- carries with it the impression that we can
now expect an acceleration of demands or requests or proposals,
at least within our own country, for the reduction of arma-
ments. A moment ago you talked about the necessity of main-
taining vigilance. Would you discuss that in context with
the summit meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: This period requires great sophis-
tication on the part of the American people. We have reached
this point because we have proceeded from the basis of ade-
quate strength, and because we have consistently taken the
position that we would reduce our strength only by agreement
with the other side in some agreed relation to the reductions
by the other side.

This must remain an essential part of our policy,
and we cannot do, as a result of this agreement, unilaterally
those things that the Soviet Union will not do. We have made
it clear in the communique and we have made it clear in the
conduct of our policy that the principal goal of this Admin-
istration in the field of foreign policy is to leave behind
it a world that can be said to be safer, more peaceful, and
more permanently free of crisis than the one we found.

But we, in our view, cannot achieve this by uni-
lateral reductions of American strength, and we believe that
the course on which we are, which has made, in our judgment,
significant progress, can be maintained only if we were to
continue to pursue it on the basis of strict reciprocity.

The United States has taken the view and has stated
publicly that our security is integrally linked to the
security of our European allies. Therefore, we are prepared

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to work with our European allies on working out a concrete
program that reflects the common conception of security.
We have invited our European allies to participate with us
in developing this program, and we think the time has come
to discuss the program, rather than the adjectives of a title
of a conference.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did they give us to understand
that they would play a useful role in seeking a cease-fire in
Cambodia, and did we give them to understand that we will be
winding down our bombing there in the meantime?

Q Dr. Kissinger, on the economic front, here
you talk about that serious and sympathetic consideration
should be given by the U.S. Government. Earlier you stressed
in your discussion --

Q To proposals that are in the interests of
both sides. These are business proposals, presumably. Earlier
you stressed the importance of the private corporations in the
negotiations. What happens when they conflict, and a corpora-
tion says this is in our mutual best interest," but perhaps
you do not? A case in point right now is the natural gas
deals. There are two of them that were discussed before.
One corporation went out and made a deal. How do you resolve
this question?

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DR. KISSINGER: As you notice, the communique makes
no particular reference to a specific time frame and, there-
fore, this question will be easier to answer after the Foreign
Ministers have met, and particularly after the commissions
have started their work. It will depend to some extent on
whether the European participants will decide to take a summer
vacation and the commissions will decide to take a summer
vacation in August or not. The time frame is, as the com-
munique says, the quickest possible time, but there is no
particular time limit.

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Second, the negotiating frame for the Summit was
established last year and was in no way affected by Watergate.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet side, coming back
to the natural gas deals, ask for a more specific, more
categorical American endorsement of these, particularly
the latest Occidental Petroleum deal, and a promise of
guarantees on the credits than is in the communique?

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Secondly, with respect to my briefings, our view
here has always been that the necessities that produce foreign
policies are of a permanent nature, and that our objective is
what I described at the beginning, to bring about a more peace-
ful world. They are not geared in any respect to any of the
domestic situations.

This schedule was determined at a time when it was
believed that Dean would testify last week and it was agreed
then that in view of the fact that the General Secretary's
speech was on television yesterday, that his departure state-
ment would be on television yesterday, and in view of the fact
that it is more appropriate to release communiques at a time
he is leaving the country, that the release of the communique
would be on Monday and therefore, the briefing of the communique
would be on Monday. That is a schedule that was determined,
I repeat, at a time when we did not know that the hearings
would be postponed.

But since you have raised the issue, I will say
now, I will move you to Thursday, to remove any question about
it. The thought had never crossed our mind and we will now,
if there is one, have it on Thursday.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the proposal for a world dis-
armament conference has been mentioned many times over the
years and has not been a subject necessarily of agreement
between the Soviet Union and the United States as to its use-
fulness. I wonder whether the mention of it here in the
communique, whether you would characterize it as one of the
accomplishments of the summit?

MORE

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL

1:00 P.M., EDT

10:00 A.M., PDT

JUNE 25, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(San Clemente, California)

JOINT US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, extended during his official visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 25. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee, CPSU; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. A. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; G. E. Tsukanov and A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistants to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS; E. I. Chazov, Deputy Minister of Public Health of the USSR; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; G. A. Arbstov, Director of the USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

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[LC]

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev held
thorough and constructive discussions on the progress achieved
in the development of US-Soviet relations and on a number of major
international problems of mutual interest.

Also taking part in the conversations held in Washington,
Camp David, and San Clemente, were:

On the American side William P. Rogers, Secretary of State;
George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

On the Soviet side A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Politbureau of the Central
Committee, CPSU; A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA;
N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. P. Bugayev,
Minister of Civil Aviation; A. M. Aleksandrov and G. E. Tsukanov,
Assistants to the General Secretary of the Central Committee,
CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

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I. THE GENERAL STATE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Both Sides expressed their mutual satisfaction with the fact that the American-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972 and the joint decisions taken there have resulted in a substantial advance in the strengthening of peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR and have created the basis for the further development of broad and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of mutual interest to the peoples of both countries and in the interests of all mankind. They noted their satisfaction with the mutual effort to implement strictly and fully the treaties and agreements concluded between the USA and the USSR, and to expand areas of cooperation.

They agreed that the process of reshaping relations between the USA and the USSR on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security as set forth in the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USA and the USSR signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972 is progressing in an encouraging manner. They emphasized the great importance that each Side attaches to these Basic Principles. They reaffirmed their commitment to the continued scrupulous implementation and to the enhancement of the effectiveness of each of the provisions of that document.

Both Sides noted with satisfaction that the outcome of the US-Soviet meeting in Moscow in May 1972 was welcomed by

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[L.C.]

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other States and by world opinion as an important contribution to strengthening peace and international security, to curbing the arms race and to developing businesslike cooperation among States with different social systems.

Both Sides viewed the return visit to the USA of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, and the talks held during the visit as an expression of their mutual determination to continue the course toward a major improvement in US-Soviet relations.

Convinced that such a development of American-Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further major steps to give these relations maximum stability and to turn the development of friendship and cooperation between their peoples into a permanent factor for worldwide peace.

## II. THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS

Issues related to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace were a central point of the talks between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev.

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Conscious of the exceptional importance for all mankind of
taking effective measures to that end, they discussed ways in
which both Sides could work toward removing the danger of war,
and especially nuclear war, between the USA and the USSR and
between either party and other countries. Consequently, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Basic
Principles of Relations of May 29, 1972, it was decided to conclude
an Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention
of Nuclear War. That Agreement was signed by the President
and the General Secretary on June 22, 1973. The text has been
published separately.

The President and the General Secretary, in appraising
this Agreement, believe that it constitutes a historical landmark
in Soviet-American relations and substantially strengthens the
foundations of international security as a whole. The United
States and the Soviet Union state their readiness to consider
additional ways of strengthening peace and removing forever
the danger of war, and particularly nuclear war.

In the course of the meetings, intensive discussions were
held on questions of strategic arms limitation. In this connection
both Sides emphasized the fundamental importance of the Treaty
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed between the

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[Lc]

USA and the USSR in May 1972 which, for the first time in history, place actual limits on the most modern and most formidable types of armaments.

Having exchanged views on the progress in the implementation of these agreements, both Sides reaffirmed their intention to carry them out and their readiness to move ahead jointly toward an agreement on the further limitation of strategic arms.

Both Sides noted that progress has been made in the negotiations that resumed in November 1972, and that the prospects for reaching a permanent agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive armaments are favorable.

Both Sides agreed that the progress made in the limitation of strategic armaments is an exceedingly important contribution to the strengthening of US-Soviet relations and to world peace.

On the basis of their discussions, the President and the General Secretary signed on June 21, 1973, Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The text has been published separately.

The USA and the USSR attach great importance to joining with all States in the cause of strengthening peace, reducing the burden of armaments, and reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures.

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[LC]

Considering the important role which an effective international
agreement with respect to chemical weapons would play, the two
Sides agreed to continue their efforts to conclude such an agreement
in cooperation with other countries.

The two Sides agree to make every effort to facilitate the
work of the Committee on Disarmament which has been meeting
in Geneva. They will actively participate in negotiations aimed
at working out new measures to curb and end the arms race. They
reaffirm that the ultimate objective is general and complete
disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under strict
international control. A world disarmament conference could
play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

### III. INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS: THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev reviewed
major questions of the current international situation. They gave
special attention to the developments which have occurred since
the time of the US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow. It was
noted with satisfaction that positive trends are developing in
international relations toward the further relaxation of tensions
and the strengthening of cooperative relations in the interests
of peace. In the opinion of both Sides, the current process of
improvement in the international situation creates new and
favorable opportunities for reducing tensions, settling
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[Lc]

outstanding international issues, and creating a permanent
structure of peace.

## Indochina

The two Sides expressed their deep satisfaction at the
conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Vietnam, and also at the results of the International
Conference on Vietnam which approved and supported that
Agreement.

The two Sides are convinced that the conclusion of the
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,
and the subsequent signing of the Agreement on Restoring Peace
and Achieving National Concord in Laos, meet the fundamental
interests and aspirations of the peoples of Vietnam and Laos
and open up a possibility for establishing a lasting peace in
Indochina, based on respect for the independence, sovereignty,
unity and territorial integrity of the countries of that area.
Both Sides emphasized that these agreements must be strictly
implemented.

They further stressed the need to bring an early end to the
military conflict in Cambodia in order to bring peace to the
entire area of Indochina. They also reaffirmed their stand
that the political futures of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia
should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free
from outside interference.

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Europe

In the course of the talks both Sides noted with satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing tensions and developing cooperation is actively continuing and thereby contributing to international stability.

The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the further normalization of relations among European countries resulting from treaties and agreements signed in recent years, particularly between the USSR and the FRG. They also welcome the coming into force of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971. They share the conviction that strict observance of the treaties and agreements that have been concluded will contribute to the security and well-being of all parties concerned.

They also welcome the prospect of United Nations membership this year for the FRG and the GDR and recall, in this connection, that the USA, USSR, UK and France have signed the Quadripartite Declaration of November 9, 1972, on this subject.

The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire, guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint US-USSR Communique adopted in Moscow in May 1972, to continue their separate and joint contributions to strengthening peaceful relations in Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies.

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In this connection satisfaction was expressed with the fact
that as a result of common efforts by many States, including the
USA and the USSR, the preparatory work has been successfully
completed for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. The USA and
the USSR hold the view that the Conference will enhance the
possibilities for strengthening European security and developing
cooperation among the participating States. The USA and the
USSR will conduct their policies so as to realize the goals of
the Conference and bring about a new era of good relations
in this part of the world.

Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward the
Conference, both Sides will make efforts to bring the Conference
to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible time. Both
Sides proceed from the assumption that progress in the work
of the Conference will produce possibilities for completing it
at the highest level.

The USA and the USSR believe that the goal of strengthening
stability and security in Europe would be further advanced if the
relaxation of political tensions were accompanied by a reduction
of military tensions in Central Europe. In this respect they
attach great importance to the negotiations on the mutual
reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures
in Central Europe which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both

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[L.C.]

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Sides state their readiness to make, along with other States, their contribution to the achievement of mutually acceptable decisions on the substance of this problem, based on the strict observance of the principle of the undiminished security of any of the parties.

## Middle East

The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East.

This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty and should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

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[d]

#### IV. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The President and the General Secretary thoroughly reviewed the status of and prospects for commercial and economic ties between the USA and the USSR. Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the past year in the normalization and development of commercial and economic relations between them.

They agreed that mutually advantageous cooperation and peaceful relations would be strengthened by the creation of a permanent foundation of economic relationships.

They recall with satisfaction the various agreements on trade and commercial relations signed in the past year. Both Sides note that American-Soviet trade has shown a substantial increase, and that there are favorable prospects for a continued rise in the exchange of goods over the coming years.

They believe that the two countries should aim at a total of 2-3 billion dollars of trade over the next three years. The Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission continues to provide a valuable mechanism to promote the broad-scale growth of economic relations. The two Sides noted with satisfaction that contacts between American firms and their Soviet counterparts are continuing to expand.

Both sides confirmed their firm intention to proceed from their earlier understanding on measures directed at creating more favorable conditions for expanding commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the USSR.

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It was noted that as a result of the Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters signed in October 1972, Soviet and American commercial ships have been calling more frequently at ports of the United States and the USSR, respectively, and since late May of this year a new regular passenger line has started operating between New York and Leningrad.

In the course of the current meeting, the two Sides signed a Protocol augmenting existing civil air relations between the USA and the USSR providing for direct air services between Washington and Moscow and New York and Leningrad, increasing the frequency of flights and resolving other questions in the field of civil aviation.

In the context of reviewing prospects for further and more permanent economic cooperation, both Sides expressed themselves in favor of mutually advantageous long term projects. They discussed a number of specific projects involving the participation of American companies, including the delivery of Siberian natural gas to the United States. The President indicated that the USA encourages American firms to work out concrete proposals on these projects and will give serious and sympathetic consideration to proposals that are in the interest of both Sides.

To contribute to expanded commercial, cultural and technical relations between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides signed a tax convention to avoid double taxation on income and eliminate, as much

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[L]

as possible, the need for citizens of one country to become involved in
the tax system of the other.

A Protocol was also signed on the opening by the end of October
1973 of a Trade Representation of the USSR in Washington and a
Commercial Office of the United States in Moscow. In addition a
Protocol was signed on questions related to establishing a US-Soviet
Chamber of Commerce. These agreements will facilitate the further
development of commercial and economic ties between the USA and the
USSR.

V. FURTHER PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS OF BILATERAL
COOPERATION

The two Sides reviewed the areas of bilateral cooperation in such
fields as environmental protection, public health and medicine, explora-
tion of outer space, and science and technology, established by the
agreements signed in May 1972 and subsequently. They noted that
those agreements are being satisfactorily carried out in practice in
accordance with the programs as adopted.

In particular, a joint effort is under way to develop effective
means to combat those diseases which are most widespread and
dangerous for mankind: cancer, cardiovascular or infectious diseases
and arthritis. The medical aspects of the environmental problems are
also subjects of cooperative research.

Preparations for the joint space flight of the Apollo and Soyuz
spacecraft are proceeding according to an agreed timetable. The joint

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flight of these spaceships for a rendezvous and docking mission, and
mutual visits of American and Soviet astronauts in each other's
spacecraft, are scheduled for July 1975.

Building on the foundation created in previous agreements, and
recognizing the potential of both the USA and the USSR to undertake
cooperative measures in current scientific and technological areas,
new projects for fruitful joint efforts were identified and appropriate
agreements were concluded.

## Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Bearing in mind the great importance of satisfying the growing
energy demands in both countries and throughout the world, and recognizing that the development of highly efficient energy sources could
contribute to the solution of this problem, the President and General
Secretary signed an agreement to expand and strengthen cooperation in
the fields of controlled nuclear fusion, fast breeder reactors, and
research on the fundamental properties of matter. A Joint Committee on
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will be established
to implement this agreement, which has a duration of ten years.

## Agriculture

Recognizing the importance of agriculture in meeting mankind's
requirement for food products and the role of science in modern
agricultural production, the two Sides concluded an agreement
providing for a broad exchange of scientific experience in agricultural
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[Lc]

research and development, and of information on agricultural economics,
A US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation will be
established to oversee joint programs to be carried out under the
Agreement.

## World Ocean Studies

Considering the unique capabilities and the major interest of both
nations in the field of world ocean studies, and noting the extensive
experience of US-USSR oceanographic cooperation, the two Sides have
agreed to broaden their cooperation and have signed an agreement to
this effect. In so doing, they are convinced that the benefits from
further development of cooperation in the field of oceanography will
accrue not only bilaterally but also to all peoples of the world. A
US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies will
be established to coordinate the implementation of cooperative programs.

## Transportation

The two Sides agreed that there are opportunities for cooperation
between the USA and the USSR in the solution of problems in the field
of transportation. To permit expanded, mutually beneficial cooperation
in this field, the two Sides concluded an agreement on this subject. The
USA and the USSR further agreed that a Joint Committee on Cooperation
in Transportation would be established.

## Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

Recognizing the general expansion of US-USSR bilateral relations
and, in particular, the growing number of exchanges in the fields of
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science, technology, education and culture, and in other fields of
mutual interest, the two Sides agreed to broaden the scope of these
activities under a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and
Cooperation, with a duration of six years. The two Sides agreed to this
in the mutual belief that it will further promote better understanding
between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and will
help to improve the general state of relations between the two countries.

Both Sides believe that the talks at the highest level, which were
held in a frank and constructive spirit, were very valuable and made an
important contribution to developing mutually advantageous relations
between the USA and the USSR. In the view of both Sides, these talks
will have a favorable impact on international relations.

They noted that the success of the discussions in the United States
was facilitated by the continuing consultation and contacts as agreed in
May 1972. They reaffirmed that the practice of consultation should
continue. They agreed that further meetings at the highest level
should be held regularly.

Having expressed his appreciation to President Nixon for the
hospitality extended during the visit to the United States, General
Secretary Brezhnev invited the President to visit the USSR in 1974.
The invitation was accepted.

June 24, 1973

RICHARD NIXON

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CPSU

#

#

#

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PRESIDENT OF THE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CUB
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE

RICHARD NIXON

JOEY I. BRENNA

June 54, 1973

The invitation was accepted.
Secretary Brezden invited the President to visit the U28 in 1974.
Hospitals extended during the visit to the United States. General
Having expressed his appreciation to President Nixon for the
should be held regularly.

They agreed that further meetings at the highest level
May 1973. They reaffirmed that the practice of consultation should
be facilitated by the continuing consultation and contacts as agreed in
the discussions in the United States will have a favorable impact on international relations.

between the USA and the U28. In the view of both sides, these talks
important contribution to developing mutually advantageous relations
held in a frank and constructive spirit, were very valuable and made an
Eoth Sides believe that the talks at the highest level, which were
help to improve the general state of relations between the two countries,
between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and will
in the mutual belief that it will further promote better understanding
Cooperation, with a duration of six years. The two sides agreed to this
activities under a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and
mutual interest, the two sides agreed to provide the scope of these
science, technology, education and culture, and in other fields of

-11-

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 29, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
AND
MICHEL JOBERT, FOREIGN MINISTER OF FRANCE

AT THE COMPOUND

(1:27 P.M. PDT)

MR. WARREN: As you know, the President met with Mr. Jobert this morning. Most of you saw Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Jobert meeting on the patio. The President then met with Mr. Jobert for 40 minutes and then Dr. Kissinger and Minister Jobert met again.

I will turn it over to Dr. Kissinger for a brief statement and then both gentlemen will be glad to take your questions.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Foreign Minister and I continued the discussions we had started in Paris. We talked about the summit between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev and the Foreign Minister spoke to us about the meeting between President Pompidou and General Secretary Brezhnev.

Then we reviewed the whole range of European-American relations and we did so in the spirit of friendship and constructive cooperation that have marked all of our talks.

We will continue these conversations at lunch and in the afternoon.

I want to express the appreciation of the President and of all of us that Mr. Jobert took the trouble to come here and we all feel that the meeting has been very constructive.

Thank you.

MINISTER JOBERT: First of all, I want all who are listening to what I say to excuse me for my bad English which I learned in books when I was a child, under the lamp shade with the help of my mother, who did not speak English at all, and who learned, too, English in books for her children.

So what Dr. Kissinger told you is quite accurate and quite wise. Moreover, I may say that I came here to convey to President Nixon the best wishes of President Pompidou and the expression of a very warm, constant friendship. That was the main purpose of my travel here.

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[L]

Moreover, I am going now to speak with Dr. Kissinger as we did this morning. We are going to have a lunch devoted to work and devoted to good American cooking, I think, and during the afternoon we are trying to see what could be the future of the relations between America, the United States, and Europe, and especially the future of the relationship between France and the United States, which is, in any case, a very easy and friendly future, I may say.

I think I have exhausted all my possibility in the English language, and if you want to put some question forwards, that will be of much help for me.

Q Mr. Foreign Minister, did you discuss the possibility -- we understand that France will not participate in the mutual reduction of forces meeting in October. Has Dr. Kissinger or the President tried to persuade you to reconsider?

MINISTER JOBERT: Yes, it is always a very constant and main topic in our conversation, Dr. Kissinger and I, and he knows perfectly what is the French position, which is not new, and which will not change in the future, I can say.

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is fair to say that we made no effort to ask the Foreign Minister to reconsider that position.

MINISTER JOBERT: Yes, of course.

Q What specifically have you been discussing in this range of future US-European relations?

DR. KISSINGER: We have just started that exchange and we will be discussing how to proceed on what we have called the Year of Europe, and how to conduct the dialogue between Europe and the United States and between France and the United States over the next year, and also what some of the contents of it may be.

Q Is the Deputy Foreign Minister level meeting any closer now than it was in Reykjavik?

DR. KISSINGER: We haven't had an opportunity to discuss the next steps yet. We will know more after this afternoon.

Q Did the Foreign Minister give the President a report on Brezhnev's visit to France?

MINISTER JOBERT: Of course we had a few talks, first with Dr. Kissinger and after with President Nixon, about this subject. And Dr. Kissinger gave me some information, some more information about the conversations which took place here a few days ago.

Q Mr. Minister, is your government against any form of summit meetings if President Nixon comes to Europe later this year, or would you see a possibility for a summit meeting in connection with Helsinki and the European Security Conference, if not an exclusive western summit?

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MINISTER JOBERT: That is a very wide question. What I may say is that during the summer and the autumn, each day has its own importance and we will see what we could do and what we can't do. For the present moment, we have decided not to speak of those kind of subjects, because as we say in France -- I will try to translate -- don't put the cart before the horses.

DR. KISSINGER: I think we will let the Foreign Minister have some of that good American food, because he won't be saying it an hour from now. (Laughter)

Q When will you be going back to France?

MINISTER JOBERT: I am going back tomorrow by Pan Am.

Q Directly to Paris?

MINISTER JOBERT: It is not a direct flight because I have to stop in London and then Paris.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END

(AT 1:36 P.M. PDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 29, 1973

Peter R.

[1d]

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF

AT THE COMPOUND

(1:27 P.M. PDT)

Thank you.

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Moreover, I am going now to speak with Dr. Kissinger as we did this morning. We are going to have a lunch devoted to work and devoted to good American cooking, I think, and during the afternoon we are trying to see who could be the future of the relations between America, the United States, and Europe, and especially the future of the relationship between France and the United States, which is, in any case, a very easy and friendly future, I may say.

MINISTER JOBERT. Of course we had a few talks, first with Dr. Kissinger and after with President Nixon, about this subject. And Dr. Kissinger gave me some information, some more information about the conversations which took place here a few days ago.

Q Mr. Minister, in your government against any form of summit meetings if President Nixon comes to Europe later this year, or would you see a possibility for a summit meeting in connection with Helsinki and the European Security Conference, if not an exclusive western summit?

- 3 -

Q Directly to Paris?

END

(AT 1:36 P.M. CET)