MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Sept 3, 1957

With: Harlan Cleveland

I explained to him that Dr. Kissinger was out of town and that we had tried to reach him last week to tell him that publication plans were such that we are now planning to publish his paper and would like to have his revisions.

Mr. Cleveland would like to talk with HAK re: 1) the details on plans for how the material will be used in book form, 2) how long his paper should be (it's too long now, he thinks) and 3) revising to bring paper up-to-date. He will be able to make the revisions before he goes abroad but would like above information before he begins on it.

He will be in town all week for the Political Science meetings, staying at Henry Hudson Hotel (CO 5-6100), and then will return to Syracuse until the middle of October when he goes overseas. I told him HAK would try to reach him in New York if at all possible.

Marjorie Martus

Sept 4, 1957

MEMORANDUM TO DR. KISSINGER

Re: Your appointments on Monday, September 9.

1) Research Institute of America
589 Fifth Avenue

Contact: Mr. Paul Shay, Foreign Affairs Editor, PL 5-8900 x 320.

They expect you at 12:15 and will call Monday morning to give directions for finding the office, etc.

Plan is for you to start off with a short introductory remark or two, to be followed by questions from the group which consists of about 20 editors. One question they had was: how is your analysis in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* of our own position and of Soviet intentions changed by the announcement of the Soviet achievement of the intercontinental missile. They will cover in their questions the strategic situation, our own defense policy and Russian intentions and capabilities. Questions are to elicit more information and not to be contentious. (?)

The meeting will be chaired by Leo Cherne, their boss, who is something of a specialist on Russian affairs as well as being a very good economist. Mr. Cherne would also like to join you for a quick lunch afterwards.

They will make you a small award as a token for your services to the community - a gift. It will be a comfortable and pleasant occasion.

2) Tex and Jinx.
Peacock Alley
Waldorf Astoria Hotel

Contact: Mr. Lipp
Ci 7-8300 x 3971

They expect you at 11:15 p.m. for getting acquainted prior to going on the air at 11:30. Program is from 11:30 to 12:30.

You will be on the air more or less continuously, interspersed by commercials and a 5-minute news break. You can bring guests if you wish, Mrs. Kissinger, friends, etc. They could arrange to send a car for you if they knew where you would be ahead of time.

Research Institute of America

Engaged primarily in reporting, analysis and interpretation
of government regulations and other factors affecting
business, coupled with recommendations to business
concerns on adjusting to developments. (Have big Wash. office)

Conduct surveys among their members (around 30,000)
on current problems, and report back on their analysis
of survey data. Also do special studies on request of
members for individual use.

Their president is Carl Hovgard but Leo Cherne is Exec.
Director and most well-known.

Re Cherne:

Lawyer and economist.

Exec. Sec., Tax Research Institute of America 1936-39

Exec. Director, Research Institute of America since 1939

Lecturer U.S. Military Academy 1940-42

Army Industrial College 1939

Member Faculty, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown 1939-41

Lecturer New School 1946-52

Director and V.P. Freedom House

Author, Adjusting Your Business to War, M-Day and What It
Means to You, etc.

Also served as advisor to McArthur for one year.

9/5/57

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Nelson A. Rockefeller
President

Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

September 23, 1957

Dear Henry:

Here is a very rough first draft of Subpanel V. I am having
it sent to you before I even proofread it myself so that you can have
a chance to think about its general outline. If the girls in the
Typing Department can read the incredible mess, it speaks well of
the utilization of human resources in general.

I am aware of several shortcomings of the present draft.
First and most easy to correct is the matter of style. The report needs
a careful second writing but I think this should properly await
Dr. Killian's material.

Secondly, the matter of substance. I feel, and no doubt you
will feel, that many parts need expansion and perhaps some could stand
deletion. Once again, I will need Dr. Killian's material, and over and
above this, there are certain substantive lacks in the working papers
themselves which we had best talk about.

Finally, I am not sure whether you will like the treatment of
the "philosophical" issues. These are matters which often straighten
themselves out in a second or third draft and so I am simply submitting
them to you as general indications of the kind of problems I think should
be raised. Parenthetically, you will notice that I have not used
Mr. Gardner's material on Optimism. I just don't think it fits in this
report but I suspect it can be put to good use in a chapter of the Overall
report.

With all the reservations, which I want to stress heavily, I hope
that this will at least provide a basic structure for the report itself. If
that much has been accomplished, it should not be too hard to produce
a finished product which will satisfy you.

I look forward to seeing you on Thursday or Friday or both.

(Dictated by telephone)

Nov. 8, 1957

Chester Bowles:

Telephoned to discuss a possible T.V. series on NBC using SSP material which he had suggested to Bob Graf who is in charge of educational programs for NBC. NBC has been concerned about the world situation and would like to make some contribution to public understanding. They might give Graf 4 full hours of programs to fill. Bowles feels Graf would be susceptible to SSP viewpoint and would welcome the chance to say whatever we may feel should be said. He will be back from Ottawa Tuesday morning and HAK should call him then.

Bowles then described the formula he felt would be best for these programs. It would start with a picture of America's strength - a big country with enormous resources, high living standards, military power, etc. This country is suddenly faced with a situation where it finds itself afraid and uncertain. Other empires have gone into oblivion because some have been able to overcome these difficulties and others not. The question is how a country reacts to difficulties. A whole new world of science and communications faces us and we have to find a way to readapt ourselves and face challenges - all the way from military challenges to Little Rock and to the challenge of potential abundance - the school problem, etc. Then, and only then, bring in the Soviet Union, saying, all of this would have been challenging in any event - the challenge has always been here, but to make it all the more ominous (???) we are faced with a great new power who is taking advantage of our unrest and confusion. Then, go on to what has to be done to meet the challenges - in the military, scientific, educational fields, in the underdeveloped areas, answers on racial harmony.

HAK told him he thought this was an exciting approach and very closely paralleled the development of the overall report. He asked Bowles his opinion of the overall report and the other material sent to him. Bowles thinks it is very good and has some general notes which he didn't have with him. He will try to arrange to see HAK sometime in the next weeks and will call back here to make an appointment.

Mr. Bowles also remarked that his concern for this program was underscored by what he heard during his visit in Washington and his conversations with people there.

December 17, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

From: Charles Kline

Please refer back to page 59 of the report from Subpanel II dated December 4.

The particular reference does *not* reappear in the draft dated December 14 and may not be of much moment to the finished document, especially if the finished document has to be made ready for public use by January 2 instead of January 10 and all energies have to be concentrated on far more important phases.

Yet the material does bear with considerable weight on the popular question as to how another war can, in fact, be a limited war. In other words, it does, I believe, have utility in answering letters or preparing speeches.

The validity of arguing that nations would obey some sort of ground rules is supported by this:

The U.S.S.R. did not attend nor ratify the convention worked out at Geneva in 1929 by 47 nations. But Molotov found it desirable in the Soviet interest on November 30, 1941, to notify Nazi Germany, through the medium of the Swiss Ambassador, that the Communists relied upon observance by both Germany and Russia of the Hague Convention of 1907, which, while not as complete and thorough about treatment of prisoners of war, nevertheless, did establish a set of ground rules for the treatment of such prisoners.

Japan, too, did not attend the 1929 Geneva Conference nor ratify its convention, yet not long after Pearl Harbor, January 1942 to be exact, Japan announced that it would abide by the terms of the Prisoners of War Convention. Of course, among the inexcusable things done by Japan was the beheading of one or more Australian pilots after their capture, but the point at issue really is that both of these countries seemed to think that something was to be gained by each of them in projecting themselves before the world as *subscribers* to *rules of war*.

December 18, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Release and Publication of Special Studies Project Material

The Public Relations Staff will take the responsibility of
handling the details and arrangements in connection with publication
of the Special Studies Project material. For this purpose they have
contracted with:

Mrs. Amelia Lobsenz
60 East 96th Street
New York 28, New York

Fillmore 8-4248

Mrs. Lobsenz will work under the direction of Mr. Kerk Burbank and
Mr. Jamieson. Coordination with this office will be handled through
Mr. Kennedy.

Material, such as draft subpanel reports, should be sent
directly to Mrs. Lobsenz, at the same time copies are sent to
Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Burbank. She already has Subpanel II
and Subpanel VII. For example, when the IV Report is redrafted by
early next week, copies will go to them when they are sent to the
panel for clearance.

Until further notice, all press requests for information, etc.,
should be transferred to Mr. Burbank.

Nancy Hanks

REPORT STATUS

December 19, 1957

Subpanel

I. Mr. Berle prepared draft. Final section received 12/19.

II. Being prepared for release on January 2, 1958.

III. Richard Gardner drafting - should be prepared by January 15.

IV. Draft incorporating Subpanel members comments should be finished by December 24.

V. Also reviewing Heilbroner Draft. First section good; second needs work.

VI. Dickey reworking. (Cantril leadership piece has been received.)

VII. Final editing only needed.

**Overall Panel** - HAK knows and maybe a higher being!!!

December 23, 1957

From Charles Kline

Of course I won't attempt to comment on sections VIII and IX because I submitted drafts on each. I will say that there are "typos" in those drafts which need correction even if you accept the substance.

As to the whole mimeographed material dated December 22nd, I again say that there are far, far too many words of many syllables in places where shorter words are just as apt and infinitely more likely to be quoted for a longer time.

There remains an excessive use of military jargon. The words "capabilities" and "ambiguities" are debased by being so greatly over-worked.

At this point and despite the lateness of the hour, I insist that, as much as anyone else, I want to see dignity in the finished document, but surely nothing will be served by obscurantism. Justice Holmes was well thought of at Harvard, and it was he who said: "Words mean what people think they mean." Usage did and does count for something.

In a quick run through I do not find any application of the Dean Rusk language.

On page 5 of the December 22 effort you refer to the Berlin airlift. In the context in which Russian misdeeds are being listed, it should be the Berlin blockade. It was the airlift in Berlin which helped very importantly to <u>break</u> the blockade.

Yaisc

-2-

Frequently the words "states" and "powers" appear. The word "nation" or "nations" as the case may be, is far better. Within the United States there is an explicit connotation to "state" or "states". We heard at great length on December 20th the wish of the panel members to minimize the appearance of the word "power in any sense, whether it was used to express strength or to describe a geographic area.

On page 7 of the December 22nd version, I suggest that the sentence in the first paragraph should read: "Aggression hitherto...etc." and the next sentence should start: "Remote from other major centers...etc."

Indeed this is not hair splitting, but it is truly important to a fluid document with smooth transitions and the highest dignified degree of readability that can be obtained.

At the end of the first paragraph on page 8 of the December 22nd version there exists a splendid place to define "the ambiguity of the Soviet strategy". This might be well done by some such sentence as: "The ambiguity of Soviet strategy lies in its deceptive mixture of occasional action, frequent bluffing, and great deceit."

(This is just a first installment of many more suggested revisions.)

December 23, 1957

From Charles Kline

Page numbers below refer to December 22.

It is inaccurate to say in the ultimate sentence of the first
paragraph on page 7 that in the past the U. S. relied on "allies" per
se to hold a forward line, because alliances did not exist between the
U. S. and other nations until the U. S. entered World War I and World
War II. The senate failed to ratify Wilson's French treaty.

It is incorrect to talk, at the top of page 9, about a few weapons
relatively simple to manufacture. They can, of course be rapidly
assembled, but the research, engineering and production times are lengthy.

As to the assertion on page 9 that the social structure is likely to have
collapsed you will, naturally, recall Dr. Teller's claim that such a
structure would be badly damaged rather than made to collapse. I see
that the earlier sentence regarding victory in all-out war has been removed.
As I understood the consensus on December 20th, it was to remain, but
to be toned down, possibly along these lines:

"Today victory in all-out war is likely to have far, far less
meaning than in any past wars because even the side which inflicts
greater devastation than its opponent will be faced with the very hard
task of retaining sufficient resources to impose its will."

On the same page I don't grasp the insistence on the use of
the word "spectrum" as to weapons when surely the more readily under-
stood word "variety" is more appropriate. As to the ultimate sentence in
the penultimate paragraph, should it not end by saying "to promote
long term growth and attractive opportunities for scientists." Is the use
of the word "stability" intended to have some meaning as to checking
inflation? If so, it is not very visible.

On page 10 in the first paragraph, the phrase, "Soviet moves at
their periphery" is to me unnecessarily imprecise. Do we not mean
Soviet moves just beyond the border of the USSR and its satellites?

-2-

I note at the top of page 13 a major role is given to contramissiles or anti-missile missiles for defense purposes. This is not in accord with the scientific views of Dr. Teller unless you wish to regard as overriding the opinion of Ellis Johnson that a very high cost system of defense of the U. S. would involve contramissiles.

In the third paragraph, still on page 13 of December 22nd, my own recollection is that it was agreed December 20th that this should read: "Submarines, already an extremely powerful weapon, will become an even more important one." I think the phrase "as nuclear propulsion comes of age" was to be stricken. Surely the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics, at least insofar as expressed by Mr. Dean, is ready and eager to build more nuclear driven submarines.

(This is the second installment in sequence of other suggestions.)

December 24, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

From Charles Kline

The page numbers which follow refer to the December 22nd draft.

To revert to page 13 where the statements are made: "Earth satellites are a special adaptation of missiles which explore a new frontier. To develop them, new technologies are required which will have important military applications." It strikes me that this presupposes too much knowledge on the part of a lay reader and both the importance of the power of initial propulsion and the so called "re-entry" problem as respects ballistic missiles should be explained somewhat.

I do not believe that it is relevant to go into the pros and cons of General Dynamic's "Atlas" as was done by Stewart Alsop, a copy of whose column of December 22nd is simply attached in the event that it was overlooked.

However, I believe we should say that both a Sputnik and a ballistic missile, whether the latter be an ICBM or an ICBM, or certain defined characteristics, each of the missiles, of course, functions by reaching as high a speed as possible at the outset and then, by virtue of its momentum, goes as far as it can before gravity pulls it to earth. The air is merely a nuisance because it reduces the speed and hence the distance covered. The scientists, I gather, calculated that the Sputnik initially travelled at a rate close to five miles a second. We could go on from there to treat the re-entry problem of an ICBM. I regard it as useful too, to say that ballistic missiles long have been prominent in war time -- stones flung from a catapult, cannon balls, the Big Bertha Shells into Paris in World War I and the German V-2 in London in World War II. I think such treatment is useful in the sense of showing that the basic science of ballistics long has been known generally and that the Russian application, engineering, and special priority for propaganda purposes comes closer to explaining the phenomenon rather than any scientific "break through", in the purest sense of the word, as was shown by Bohr, Fermi, and Teller in nuclear and thermo-nuclear energy.

(This is the 4th in a sequence of a series of suggestions.)

# MATTER OF FACT

By STEWART ALSOP

## The ICBM That Isn't

WASHINGTON.

When is an ICBM not an ICBM? The conundrum is prompted by the proud Air Force announcement that the Atlas inter-continental missile had been successfully fired.

The firing was certainly a notable achievement.

There should be no mistake about that. Sending a thing weighing a hundred tons, twenty feet higher than Cleopatra's Needle, and stuffed with incredibly complex equipment, through space for five hundred miles or so is nothing to sneeze at. Since serious work on Atlas started only in 1954, the Air Force and the Convair company which is the prime contractor for the "beast"

Stewart Alsop

(as it is known among those who work on it) can no doubt take a bow.

Yet the question remains, when is an ICBM not an ICBM? And the answer is that the Atlas missile test-fired last week is not an ICBM. It has about the same relationship to an operational ICBM as a five-year-old boy has to a full-grown man. And it is important to understand this, lest the Atlas firing be used to lull the country back into the slothful sleep which it was enjoying before the Sputniks so rudely awakened it.

The "beast" that was fired last Wednesday is, in the words of one who knows, "just a helluva big rocket." A true ICBM is a lot more than a "helluva big rocket." To be sure, the initial stage of an ICBM is just that. But getting the "helluva big rocket" into space is only the first, and in some ways the easiest part of the job of creating a true ICBM.

Consider what the Air Force and the Atlas people still have left to do. First, they must marry the second stage missile to the "helluva big rocket," and what is more difficult, they must arrange for an amicable divorce between the two. The divorce must take place hundreds of miles in space, at a speed totally unimaginable to the finite human mind. The divorce must be so smooth and friendly that the second stage will continue on its predetermined course without being deflected so much as a hair's breadth from its predestined target.

The nose-cone of the second missile must then swoop down from space through the atmosphere toward its target, like a meteor. But unlike most meteors, it must not be burnt up on the way by the friction of the air, which covers our earth like a protective blanket.

The problem of getting the warhead in the

nose-cone down to earth without burning up is the problem of "atmospheric re-entry," of which the President talked in his "chins-up" speech on Nov. 7. The President was conned —the word is not too harsh—into claiming in that speech that "our scientists and engineers have solved" the re-entry problem, and into showing the nose-cone of a Jupiter missile to "prove" it.

In fact, the problem has not really been fully solved at all, certainly not as regards the ICBM. The problem of re-entry revolves entirely around the speed at which the nose-cone re-enters. The nose-cone the President so proudly displayed to the television audience re-entered at less than 10,000 miles an hour. An intercontinental ballistic missile, to achieve its vast range of 5,000 miles or more, must travel at speeds greater than 15,000 an hour. It is a very rough rule of thumb that the problem of successful re-entry just about doubles with every additional thousand miles of speed.

So that is another hurdle that must somehow be overleaped before we can claim to have an ICBM that really is an ICBM. And perhaps the toughest of all the hurdles ahead is truly accurate guidance. For the range of destruction even of a hydrogen warhead is not unlimited. To be truly effective, the warhead must be brought down within five miles of the target. To do this, at a range of 5,000 miles, is distinctly more difficult than, say, to hit the exact center of home plate with a baseball thrown from way out in centerfield.

We cannot be absolutely sure that the Soviet ICBMs already tested are wholly accurate, or even that their warheads have been successfully re-entered, although we do know that the Soviet missiles, unlike the Atlas, are staged missiles with an "operational configuration." But the available evidence — including the astonishing Soviet technical proficiency as demonstrated in the Sputniks—suggest that the Soviet ICBMs will be operational very soon, if they are not already.

Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas expressed a hope—which sounded more like a slip of the tongue—before the Johnson committee that we would have operational ICBMs before 1960. If Douglas' hope comes true, those closest to the situation will be jubilantly flabbergasted. Indeed, they are more inclined to agree with Gen. Curtis LeMay's doubts, also expressed before the Johnson committee, that we can ever catch up at all. The Atlas firing last week may be taken as evidence that LeMay's view is very probably too gloomy, if this country has the will to roll up its sleeves and get down to work. But the Atlas firing was no more than that.

© 1957, New York Herald Tribune Inc.

December 24, 1957

MEMORANDUM TO DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

I have now seen the mimeographed copy of your December 23rd presentation of your Chapter entitled "The Reduction And Control Of Armaments."

I do not wish anything hereunder to reflect any pride of author-
ship as to the draft I submitted on Section IX and had no intention of
making any explanatory comments until I saw the Section IX which you
had mimeographed December 23rd.

Referring now to your page numbers as of December 23rd, I would
make these remarks, after refreshing my memory from the verbatim tapes
of the December 20th meeting; reading

I do believe "Reducing tensions and arms" more nearly reflects
the sense of what was then said. There are again many statements in
the tapes in which NAR accepted the Berle-Rusk thesis that a reduction
of international tension had to come first, and genuinely precede any
successful negotiations for control of arms much less their reduction.

I notice that both of us used the settlement over Trieste as an
example of lowering tensions. Certainly it is an example in the sense
of persevering and secret negotiation. But it was achieved with the
Tito Communists and the Italians and Austrians of course, rather than
with the Moscow Communists. It happens that I am somewhat familiar
with these negotiations and it was handled by Llewlyn Thompson who
moved from Vienna to London more or less incognito and Julius HOlmes
who was responsible on the Washington end of the American side. What
I would suggest is a melding of your mimeographed treatment of Section
IX and my draft of IX at whatever time you find convenient.

The verbatim tapes for December 20th are overwhelmingly clear
that, with the exception of Teller, McCormack and Clay, the burden of
opinion inclined toward a most careful handling of Section IX.

As to the issue of testing I believe it would be best to refer specifically to what President Eisenhower said about clean bombs in his speech of November 7, 1957 and perhaps also to what Dr. Libby said at the end of April, 1957. You have another memorandum from me on this but a copy is available.

As to the issue of hidden testing, of course, that involves a lot of highly classified information to which you have access and I do not. Publicly, Prime Minister McMillan of Britain has said that hidden testing is feasible especially by a nation such as the USSR which extends over a hundred and fifty degrees of longitude. At the same time Ellis Johnson is particularly emphatic that concealed testing cannot occur and that he set up himself the intelligence system for detection.

I understand fully the desirability of the sub-section entitled, "The Problem Of War Limitation."

March 18, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO MRS. RUEBHAUSEN

FROM: Harriet A. Flinn

SUBJECT: Transportation to Atlantic City for Dr. Kissinger, April 24th.

Via EASTERN AIRLINES (MU 8-8000)

COST: $2310 roundtrip

A. Leaves Newark Airport - 3:20 p.m.
Arrives Atlantic City - 4:00 p.m.

Return trip (one flight only)

Leaves Atlantic City - 3:00 p.m.

Arrives Newark Airport - 3:38 p.m.

B. Leaves Boston - 7:50 a.m.
Arrives Atlantic City - 10:15 a.m.

(one flight daily)

Return trip (one flight only)

Leaves Atlantic City - 10:40 a.m.

Arrives Idlewild Airport - 11:20 a.m.

HAK booked on Flight #563;

Pickup Deadline, 8 p.m., April 10.

(80 E. 42nd St. or Rockefeller Plaza)

Via ALLEGHENY AIRLINES (LO 3-7373)

COST: $20.90 roundtrip

A. Leaves Newark Airport - 11:00 a.m.
Arrives Atlantic City - 11:41 a.m.

HAK booked on Flight #201;

Pickup Deadline is 6 p.m., April 11.

(80 E. 42nd St.)

Return trip (one flight only)

Leaves Atlantic City - 8:21 p.m.

Arrives Newark - 9:06 p.m.

Return trip (one flight only)
No service from Boston to Atlantic City

B. No Service from Boston to Atlantic City.

Via PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD (PE 6-2000)

COST: $8.28 one way, plus $1.14 seat to
North Philadelphia

Leaves Penn Sta. - 3:00 p.m.

Arrives No. Phila. - 4:35 p.m.

Leaves No. Phila. - 4:55 p.m.

Arrives Atlantic City - 6:10 p.m.

To reserve chair, call PRR April 1st;

schedule not made up at present.

All coach.

Via BUS - LINCOLN TRANSIT (LO 4-8484)

COST: $5.72 roundtrip

NY Port of Authority, 40th St. & 8th Ave.

Leaves Port of Auth. - 3:00 p.m.

Arrives Atlantic City - 5:30 p.m.

Pick up ticket at Window 16-17, Main Floor,

one-half hour before departure.

Via HERTZ Driv-ur-self Car (MU 8-7744)
310 East 48th Street.

COST: $10 per day, plus 10¢ per mile;

125 miles to Atlantic City.

Via CAREY Limousine (PL 5-6400)

COST: $81 plus tolls one way.

2-1/2 to 3 hr. drive.

Overnight: $6.50 per hr. or

.32 per mile

15.00 Chauffeur expenses

Car storage

Refers to Quarles' statements re "pressing ahead" with
programs

AF shortages in manned aircraft & R&D

Ref to Mr Bundy (CIA)

Readiness - forces in being

Ref to Sen. Russell re 1.5 bill

Increase of UE from 30 to 45 of B-52's

Believes R&D, M&O and Procurement would be AF solution to 1.5 bill

Estimates additional 1-3 bill would be easily absorbed in dispersal

Total: 3 to 6 bill would be net add. to Def Budget -- diff. but
must be faced up to.

Kintner: What consid. an optimum air def. in A. or AF.

Kelly: How equate costs of DEW, etc.

Most of capital exp. will be completed in next year or year and a
half. Operating costs will be high.

: Missile systems improvements

Kelly : C-missile effects

Kelly: Rep Navy: will probably want additional subs and ship modernization

SCHAUB: Gilpatrick is conservative

Framework: Role of BOB. Components of National Defense Budget

AF on Rec: 21-22 bill to maintain 137 wg prog

A & N have increases, too

Pub Def limit at 275 bill

Polit obstacles to increase

Effect of increasing GNP: inflation

Collective security

"High level of R&D"

Long lead times. 5-8 years

Hard to see - mobil. reserves

Housing - skilled workers

Comps. for individuals. Science and engineers.

Govt responsible!

Has discussed with NACA

Cut defense contracts!

Must understand economic impact

Mechanics of processing Mil budgets

BOB (1) Adequate info when policy being made

(2) Cost and feasibility are recog and related

(3) Implementing plans adequate and feasible

Cycle:

Comments:

AF

Army new look

Navy - 1 going to 2 bill in ship construction

Military Construction Program
MCP up to 2 bill for all

Areas of competition:

R&D: running at 5.5 bill

Cont Def: bal. with combat forces

dew line - expansions

A-AF controversy in Air Def

SAC expansion

EXTREMES!

Ballistic Missiles!

Bases, Ind facilities, metals, etc

$20 bill in installations - adding 2 bill/Am

Many stations should be de-activated

Armed forces strengths

Adjustments should be made as conditions change

Sum of each services feeling for reqs is unmanageable!

[cc]

Rabi: One vs. two proj. in same field
O'Meara: Objects to constant level of R&D
Burden: Let's not limit ourselves to R&D
Lewis: Concerned about impact of incl B-52 prog on B-110 and B-125
L: Is there competition between development & production
Lewis & others: Yes
Lewis: Must guide on own capacity
Price: Refers. of log. in intel. estimates
Schaub: Intel. assumed the worst and was still overtaken!
Kissinger: On rationale: offensive vs. defensive
Schaub: X no. of B-52's 4-11-17/was 25% more?
What will industries perform. be?
Lewis: Offsetting pressures between prod. and R&D in industry
Halaby: What is relationship between prod. capability and R&D?
Lewis: Comp. is imperative!
Burden: Airborn capability for local wars?
Kelly: Believes we could place peripheral wars in low priority
Kintner: What is Russian strat. choice?
U.S. is on the defensive
O'Meara: Refers to mutual deterrence
Schaub: Peripheral war in Iran? Redic.

Halaby: Should define alternative to deal with major and minor war
Kelly: All items required are in program: req. is to sift out lesser items. Russ. haven't exceeded us in "bangs"
Kissinger: Perhaps the Russ. bang is large enough to translate it into an effective aircraft
Burden: Peripheral war capabilities
Schaub: Describes mil. posture as now reported for mobilization purposes
Kintner: We still must recognize Sov. Sino capabilities
Kelly: We can't be strong all over!
Kintner: We need national machinery to determine what to do?
Is what we should do, to seek mil. isolation?
Rabi: No
Lewis: Must differentiate between Russ. and own situations
Russ. is offensive. US is defensive
We must seek quality
McCormack: What is answer to not degrading current production by exped. devel. of follow-on?
Lewis: Competition between various manuf. in develop.
Kissinger: One doesn't answer each tech. devel. of Russ. with simil. devel. here
Schaub: Supports Quarles theme. What do we do five years hence?

Schump: Supports Charles theme. What do we do five years hence?
devel. here

Kissinger: One document answer each tech. devel. of Russia with similar

Lewis: Competition between various manu. in develop

exped. devel. of follow-ou.

McComack: What is answer to not degarding current production by
we must seek quality

Russia. is offensive. US is defensive

Lewis: Must differentiate between Russia and own situations

Kapf: No

Is what we should do, to seek unit. isolation?

Kinnet: We need national machinery to determine what to do?

Kinnet: We still must recognise Sov.ino capabilities

 purposes

Schamp: Describes mill. postulates now reported for mobilization

Burden: Ilephers I was capabilities

into an effective unit

Kissinger: Does shape the Russia. bug is large enough to translate it

Teaser items. Russia. haven't exceeded us in "bugge"

Kelly: All items required are in program. red. is to shift out

Halaby: Better scheme for evaluating schemes in an increased R&D effort

Lewis: Let's have greater continuity of decision element

Kelly: There has been solid planning

Halaby: We haven't found a solution to solving M.E. mess

Kelly: Believes way pie is cut has been right

Lindsay: Re AF mobil. concept?

Schaub: AF is for 90 day mobil. Navy is for balance

Burden: Has AF cost been looked at carefully?

Schaub: Program sold before dollars considered

Lindsay: Resume of devel. of '57 AF budget 24 to 16.5 bill.

McCormack: Emphasizes element of priorities with resultant fall out

McCormack: Empirical element of priorities with respect to full out
Lindsey: Resume of deal, of 87 AF budget $4 to $6.5 bill.
Schenk: Program sold before dollars considered
Burden: Has AF cost been looked at carefully?
Schand: AT is lot 30 day mobil. Navy is lot balance
Lindsey: Best AF mobil. concept?
Kellay: Believes why it is cut has been right
Harshy: We haven't found a solution to solving M. E. meas
Kelly: There has been solid planning
Lewis: Met's have greater continuity of decision element
R&D effort
Halaby: Better scheme for evaluating schemes in an incised