ORIGINAL
TRANSCRIPT

INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

Washington, D.C.

October 31, 1979

Q Mr. Kissinger, we keep hearing over and over that the
U.S. is losing out in the competition for strategic power.

Do you share that view?

A Yes, for three fundamental reasons.

First is the effect of the doctrine of assured
destruction developed in the '1960s. Under that doctrine,
the size of the Soviet force aimed at us [is] irrelevant. And
so the United States did not react at all to a massive
Soviet buildup of strategic forces.

Second were the assaults by Congress on the defense
budget during the Nixon administration, which made it
impossible to react to the Soviet threat [then]. In the first
four years of the administration, the Congress cut 40
billion dollars out of the defense budget from the figures
recommended by Nixon, which probably were less than
minimal.

Third were the decisions of the Carter administration

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 2

when it came into office either to cancel or slow down the MX, the B-1, [the Trident], and the cruise-missile program.

We had initiated these programs under President Ford.

The cumulative effect of all of these actions over a period of 15 years -- at a time when the Soviets were increasing defense spending by 5 percent a year compounded -- created the present situation.

Q What can this country do to reverse that adverse trend in the balance of power?

A The United States must make a major protracted military effort to close the gaps in strategic forces, in theater nuclear forces and in conventional forces. Otherwise, some sort of debacle is mathematically inevitable.

Just as economists can predict a recession without necessarily knowing the months in which it will hit, so I think students of international affairs may be able to predict crises without knowing exactly what year they're

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 3

going to hit.

The present situation seems to me to be as follows:
First, we are barely equal with the Soviet Union in
strategic forces. Second, they are clearly ahead of our
theater nuclear forces, they are vastly ahead of us in
conventional forces, and they are probably superior to us
in the capacity to intervene in many of the key areas
through the presence of proxy forces and the pre-
positioning of substantial stockpiles.

This means that even if the Soviet Union does not have a
plan for specific military attacks, its capacity for
intervention in crises that inevitably will occur will
exceed ours, not to speak of Soviet capacities to blackmail
European and other countries.

Q Isn't this already happening?

A The process has already started. If this continues -- if
the side that is armed by the West always loses to the side

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armed by the Soviet Union -- then a potential crisis in the
world balance of power is inevitable. If you look at the
global situation today, you see Soviet-armed guerrillas
attacking Morocco or Moroccan forces in the annexed area of
the Spanish Sahara. If they prevail, they will threaten the
southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar.

Soviet proxy forces are already on both sides of the
Gulf of Aden in Yemen and in Ethiopia. Iran is not pro-
Soviet but anti-West. So the security of the Straits of
Hormuz is problematical. Saudi Arabia is substantially
encircled by radical or Soviet-dominated forces.

Afghanistan has had a Soviet coup, Cambodia has been
taken over by Vietnamese forces, and therefore there is
pressure toward the Straits of Malacca.

The Soviet blackmail of Europe also has begun
subconsciously -- partly through disenchantment with the
United States, partly through explicit threats, partly

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through holding out the promise by the Soviets of improved
relations through a kind of selective detente in which
Europe is favored over the United States. The process can
still be arrested, but it has begun.

So if you look at this overall picture, you see that
those countries that have relied on the West are under
pressure in almost every area.

Q Are you suggesting that the United States must be
prepared to intervene directly to support friends or allies
that are threatened by Soviet-backed forces?

A The present pattern cannot continue. It is not possible
that Soviet proxy forces remain the decisive element in so
many parts of the world. It cannot continue that major
decisions in such areas as southern Africa, for example,
are influenced by the threat of Cuban intervention.

We are dealing here with a little country of 8 million,
90 miles off our shore, from which we accept the dispatch

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of an expeditionary force of close to 50,000 men into
distant parts of the world. And we accept the presence of a
Soviet combat brigade on its territory, plus active
subversion in Central America. We have here a design
extending from Central America to Yemen that is either
ineffectively opposed or totally unopposed.

Q How can we oppose this Soviet-Cuban design?

A There must be a heavy penalty. This is what is meant by
linkage. The Soviet Union and the Cubans were permitted to
intervene in Ethiopia without any penalty whatsoever by the
United States.

Q What can we do to penalize them?

A For example: In the same week that President Carter
accepted what he had declared as unacceptable two weeks
earlier -- namely, the presence of the Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba -- we sold 25 million tons of grain to the
Soviet Union in a period in which they are obviously short

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of grain.

Q Are you suggesting our reprisal should be economic rather than military?

A I can't give an abstract blueprint of what our reprisal should be. I'm saying that there must be a penalty for assaults on international stability and on our vital interests.

After all, it is not asking too much of the Soviet Union not to engage in foreign adventures. I'm not suggesting that we demand the overthrow of the Politburo; I'm saying that they should not have both detente and the use of proxy forces.

Q Would you rule out a military response by this country?

A I do not rule out a military response, no -- nor can we rule it out without inviting attack. It should be an absolutely last resort, and it should be, wherever possible, done in the first instance by local forces. But

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you cannot rule it out.

Q Do you think the American public and Congress are prepared to support such a policy?

A I think we have now learned by experience that if you do not resist in an early phase of expansion -- when it is relatively easy to do it -- the price goes up and the problem gets worse. It doesn't get easier.

Strong leadership can convince the American people to resist expansion. At any rate, I believe it is the duty of leadership to put it before the American people. If we then fail, if the public will not support it, then we have failed by democratic means. But the inexcusable thing is not to put it before the public.

Q Is the Carter administration providing that kind of strong leadership?

A The administration has no coherent view. I do not think that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 9

Brzezinski, the President's national-security adviser, have the same geopolitical conception -- or convey the same conception. Either one of them might be right, but both of them can't be right at the same time.

I believe that every time we move in one direction, you can see a contradictory move being made. For example, in the same week that a mission is in Europe to convince our Allies to accept theater nuclear forces, we're announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads. Certainly, these two can be reconciled -- but not so easily in the public mind.

Another example of contradictory moves is the administration's handling of SALT. I am perfectly willing to have SALT defended on the ground that it is the best strategy for dealing with a continuing situation, which is partly confrontational. I cannot accept the proposition that the alternative to SALT is nuclear war, therefore

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turning SALT into an instrument of nuclear blackmail

against us and delinking it from anything else that goes on

in the world.

Of course, foreign policy is complex, but there has to

be some coherence in the perception of what we are trying
to do.

Q Does this lack of coherence or leadership tempt the
Russians to become more adventurous?

A Well, strangely enough, I think it makes the Russians
extremely uneasy, too, because it tempts them into probing
and at the same time deprives us of the means of resolving
any issue that arises as a result of their probing. It
creates the enormous danger that this process will go on
until we decide -- to the surprise of the Soviets -- to
resist at some point late in the process. Then the price
will be excessive.

Q You think the administration might stumble into a major

Lg

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 11

crisis with the Soviet Union?

A I think, if present trends continue, that's highly
likely.

Q Who is responsible for this lack of coherence in
American foreign policy?

A The President has to give the leadership. But I think it
is dangerous for a President to confuse leadership with
trying to give tactical direction on every detail.

The President is head of state, head of a party, head of
the government. He has large numbers of representational
functions, political functions. He does not have the time
to give the day-to-day attention to the tactical management
of foreign policy. He, therefore, has to delegate it to
somebody or to some group. What the President can do is to
set the philosophy, to set the course and to reserve
himself for the fundamental decisions that only he can
make.

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Ideally -- even though when I was in office in the first four years this was not followed -- the principal representative of the President in the management of foreign policy should be the Secretary of State. I do not believe it can work to have a strong security adviser and a strong Secretary of State operating simultaneously. I know I operated it on that basis, but it was demoralizing for the State Department. It means that those who are professionally charged with carrying out our foreign policy are pushed to the periphery of events and become more irresponsible.

If the President doesn't trust his Secretary of State, or if he has doubts about him, he ought to get somebody he trusts. I'm not saying this as a criticism of this administration, because when I was security adviser I, also, was probably excessively assertive. I was certainly excessively assertive at the wishes of the President I

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 13

served.

The ideal situation would be the sort of relationship
that Acheson had with Truman, that Dulles had with
Eisenhower and that I had with Ford.

Q How much of the problem with the administration's
foreign policy lies with President Carter himself --
particularly his lack of experience in this field?

A I think you have a combination of a President with
little experience and extreme conscientiousness -- who
believes that unless he's done it himself, it hasn't been
done.

Q Given the record of a considerable string of successes
-- the Panama treaties, China normalization, the Camp David
peace agreement -- how do you explain the lack of
confidence abroad in the administration's handling of
foreign policy?

A Even though individual cases may be solved properly and

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correctly, there seems to me to be a perception around the
world of a lack of direction, a lack of conception, in the
administration's foreign policy.

Q In that context, how do you rate the administration's
handling of the dispute over a Soviet combat brigade in
Cuba?

A What bothers me about it is that I think it is the first
time in the postwar period that the United States has
directly told the Soviets that something was unacceptable,
and the Soviets told us to go to hell.

Q Were we wrong in saying it was unacceptable -- or in
letting them tell us to go to hell?

A It is conceivable that we were wrong in both. Having
told them it was unacceptable, we couldn't let them tell us
to go to hell. I happen to believe that the administration
was not wrong in its original perception that the presence
of an organized Soviet combat force in Cuba is a

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qualitative change in the situation. Whether they should then have used the precise tactics if they were not willing to carry through with them, I question. One shouldn't challenge the Soviets if one is not willing to see it through.

Q Getting back for a moment to SALT: Would its ratification help or hinder our efforts to meet the Soviet military challenge?

A The strange thing is that a document which, by almost all accounts, is almost irrelevant to the strategic situation should have achieved such symbolic significance.

It is defended by the administration as making the difference between war and peace, confidence or lack of confidence. It is assaulted by some of its critics as undermining our security. In fact, except for the protocol

-- about which I have profound questions -- the agreement as such does not affect any of the things that we ought to

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do.

The only danger in the SALT agreement -- and I think the
debate is taking care of that substantially -- would be if
it lulled us into a false sense of security. But I think
that is very unlikely to happen now.

Q Would defeat of SALT undermine the cohesion of NATO, as
the administration claims?

A I think that, too, is vastly exaggerated. Nevertheless,
I think it is probably correct that if SALT fails now --
after three Presidents of two parties have negotiated on it
for seven years and our Allies have been briefed at great
length about it at all stages -- if it should fail at the
very last hurdle, it would reinforce the already existing
uneasiness about the soundness of our institutional
processes. But this does not mean that the Europeans
particularly want SALT on its merit.

Q What about the administration's argument that the defeat

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of SALT would lead NATO Allies to reject the American plan
to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe?

A That argument is really absurd, because if SALT fails,
theater nuclear forces ought to be more necessary rather
than less necessary. To tie theater nuclear forces to the
ratification of SALT shows how far the demoralization of
Western thinking has already gone -- in which governments
cannot any longer do what they know is necessary for
defense unless they do something else. It raises this
question: Since the Soviets obviously want neither the re-
armament of the United States nor theater nuclear forces,
why should they cooperate in the ratification of SALT in
order to make those forces possible?

I think that if the United States states the issue
correctly, theater nuclear forces will be accepted at the
next NATO meeting -- even though failure to ratify SALT
would undoubtedly add a complication. For an administration

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that has refused to link SALT to Soviet conduct to insist
on linking it to NATO conduct is to me unacceptable.

Q If we can turn to China, Mr. Kissinger: Is the U.S.
playing a dangerous game by moving too close to Peking?

A First of all, China has not survived for 3,000 years as
an independent state, with the longest continuous history
of self-government in the world, by being used by
foreigners for their desires. Therefore, the art of dealing
with China is to make sure that our long-term interests are
congruent. It is a mistake to try to use China to needle
the Soviet Union.

For example, I think it was a mistake to link the visit
of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown -- which I otherwise
favored -- to the Soviet brigade in Cuba. To announce it in
close conjunction with the acceptance of the Soviet brigade
in Cuba raises the premise that maybe if the Soviets make a
concession to us in Cuba, we will make a concession to them

LQ

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 19

on China -- which we should not do.

It is in our national interest, in this phase of
history, that China be secure and independent. Now, its own
weight and its own reality will create certain necessities
for the Soviet Union which are also China's interests. In
that sense we can cooperate. But I don't think we can play
the China card as a sort of needling of the Soviets every
time the Soviets do something that annoys us.

Q How far should we go in helping to insure China's
independence and security by helping them to build
effective defense forces?

A I think that as China modernizes its industries, its own
capacity to insure its defense will also increase.

Q That's long term, though --

A I am not prepared to go into this with the specificity
you are inviting. But I think we have to understand that an
unopposed Soviet assault on China would have almost as

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serious an impact on the international equilibrium as an
unopposed Soviet attack on Europe or the Middle East,
because it would be an event of such tremendous magnitude.

Now, what form opposition should take, what specific
measures should be taken -- that, I think, would require
very careful study, which I haven't yet made.

Q How much danger is there that China might again reverse alliances and close ranks with Russia against the U.S.?

A I believe that the fundamental foreign policy of
countries is affected by their geographic location, by
ideologies, by considerations of security. Therefore, the
margin of maneuver is somewhat limited. I consider it
improbable that China will reverse course and link up again
with the Soviet Union. It depends on the Chinese perception
of the balance of power. The Chinese now clearly believe
that the gravest threat to their security is the Soviet
Union. Rightly or wrongly, this is their perception.

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Second, their relationship to us is based on their hope,
expectation, belief that we are the best available
guardians of the general world balance of power within
which they can find their security.

And third, their relationship to us is based on the hope
that, through better relations with the West, they can
speed up the process of their modernization and therefore
of the moment when they can increase their own capacity to
defend themselves.

Should China come to the conclusions, first, that we are
not effective guardians of the world tranquillity, and,
second, that they are doomed to impotence -- for a variety
of reasons, including fear of the Soviet Union -- then I do
not exclude that they will decide that they will sell their
impotence directly rather than let us do it for them. That
possibility cannot be excluded.

Q Turning to the Middle East: How do we get out of the

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KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 22

mess we seem to be in there? How do we solve that?

A First we have to define what the mess is. Generally, the mess is defined as the stalemate in Israeli-Egyptian or Israeli-Arab negotiations. This is a nuisance -- it's unpleasant -- but it's not the real mess.

The real mess is the collapse of Iran. That has led to a change in the objective balance of power. And this in turn has led to an alteration in the perceived balance of power in the sense that countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan -- which are moderate -- now question the ability of the United States to protect its friends. This affects not just their day-to-day foreign policy; it affects even their oil policy.

Q How?

A A correct description of the oil policy of the moderate Arabs now is that it is the most moderate policy they can sell to the radicals, because none of them are willing to

LC

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 23

face a confrontation with the radicals. This is the
fundamental problem.

This is even the fundamental Palestinian problem. To the
extent that the Palestinians become an agent or an
expression of radicalism in the Arab world, to that extent
the problem becomes intractable.

Q But would we not have had the same stalemate between
Israel and Egypt over the Palestinians even if the Shah of
Iran had not been deposed?

A To some extent. But I believe that the consequences of
the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement would have been much
different. And I believe that the moderate Arab states
would have found it much easier to support us and to
explore negotiating options than was the case.

Q How does the United States go about restoring its
credibility in the Middle East?

A All the problems that I have described will take months

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and years to deal with. First, I think it is important that the moderate Arabs see a physical American presence in the general area that reassures them against radical pressures.

Second, it is imperative that some of the proxy operations by Cubans in those areas be decisively stopped. From that platform, I think, we can then look at the negotiating process again.

Q And what about Iran, which you indicate is the focus of the loss of U.S. credibility? What should we do there?

A I believe that our conduct during the collapse of Iran was a major contributing factor in the collapse. At the same time, I believe that Iran is an important-enough country for us so that we should attempt to have the best possible relations with whatever government is in power in Iran.

So I am not advocating an American-sponsored attempt to overthrow the existing government in Iran -- however much I

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 25

may regret the method or maybe even the fact that it came
into power. I think an American attempt to overthrow this
government would be counterproductive. The margin by which
our relations with that government can be improved is
regrettably very narrow. I also suspect that we have not
yet seen the last change in Iran -- that the revolutionary
process which has started is likely to continue and has a
better than even chance of leading in an even more radical
direction than we have so far seen.

Q This raises the question of security of oil. What
measures can we take to insure continuing access to Middle
East oil? What can we do if it is in jeopardy?

A Obviously, the supply of oil to us and to other
industrial democracies is a vital interest. Obviously, a
cutting off of it or an excessive political manipulation of
it would threaten vital interests.

What you do to protect vital interests is something that

LQ

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 26

I think it would be irresponsible for me to speculate about. But there's no question that it represents a vital American interest.

Q How far should U.S. dependence on Middle East oil influence our policies vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict?

A That's a different proposition. It is generally unwise for the United States to link, by its own actions, access to oil to the Arab-Israeli conflict for two reasons: One, I do not think it is in the interest of the moderate Arabs to get themselves so closely involved in every nuance of the Arab-Israeli conflict that they become, in effect, hostage to the success and failure of every negotiation.

Secondly, it will be almost impossible for governments that do not have the means to protect themselves against radical neighbors not to raise their demands with respect to oil unless there is a dissociation of the oil from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 27

Now, maybe we do not succeed in delinking it. But it is not in our interest to establish an explicit linkage between those two -- the oil and the conflict.

Q Didn't you approve a speech by Governor John Connally proposing just such a linkage -- calling for American pressure on Israel as a means of protecting oil supplies?

A I disagree with Governor Connally on that point. I have high regard for Governor Connally; he's a good friend of mine. I disagree with him on this point.

Q Looking at another aspect of the Arab-Israeli negotiations: Is a settlement feasible without bringing in the Palestine Liberation Organization?

A Right now, enlightened opinion is that we must talk to the PLO. Very few people say just what they are going to negotiate with them. What are the PLO likely to demand?

The most moderate members of the PLO will not ask for less than the '67 borders and the return of the Old City of

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 28

Jerusalem. That's the absolute minimum. The other wings
will ask for the '47 borders, and the extreme wing is going
to ask for a secular state. There can be no dispute about
this.

Moreover, I believe that a Palestinian state governed by
the PLO is a first stage. If that issue becomes the first
stage of the negotiations, it will inevitably undermine the
position of Jordan, and therefore will complete the
encirclement of Saudi Arabia by radical states.

So all I'm saying is, let us not confuse what people
say, for internal reasons, with their real convictions. My
view has always been that the negotiation should be between
Jordan and Israel, and then the PLO would become an Arab
problem. I'm not saying that at some point of this process
the Palestinians or the PLO should not negotiate. I'm
saying it is unwise to begin this process with the PLO.

Q Can the Egyptian-Israeli peace survive if there is no

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 29

progress toward a wider settlement in the near future?

A I think some progress has to be made, but it's also important to define the nature of progress. The difficulty with the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations for autonomy of the West Bank is that, at their extremes, they will lead either to a PLO state -- with the problems that I've described and that Israel won't accept -- or to a sort of Israeli-dominated client state, which no Arab will accept. I don't think one can navigate between these extremes without getting Jordan involved.

Q Mr. Kissinger, throughout your comments you have emphasized the dangerous Soviet challenge that we face. Will that challenge change -- become more dangerous or less -- after Brezhnev leaves the scene?

A I think that Brezhnev in his way is probably sincerely interested in an extended period of peace, partly because he has had a long and turbulent life -- and probably has

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 30

had as much excitement in that life as can be reasonably
expected for a man to have to absorb; partly because he is
of a generation of Russians that feels in their bones that
the West is technologically and materially superior -- no
matter what his statistics show; and partly because, from
my own observation, he probably has some more human
qualities than other of the Soviet leaders that one could
mention.

I think it is more likely than not that his successors,
first of all, are going to have a higher level of energy;
and second, they will have done their calculations with the
numbers with greater conviction than Brezhnev has.
Therefore, it is more likely than not that our relations
with the Soviet Union will get more difficult with more-
assertive successors -- all the more so as somewhere in the
'80s the Soviets will face the inherent dilemma of all
Communist countries.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 31

Q What dilemma?

A It is that you can't run a modern society by total planning. Yet, if you give up the system of total planning, you have to move millions of bureaucrats and absorb many vested interests, and therefore weaken yourself for many years. At the same time, the Soviets' present military equipment will be getting obsolescent. The temptation to clean up the international environment before taking on that domestic dilemma may be very great. This is one of the dangers that I see.

Q Finally: Do you harbor any ambitions to become Secretary of State again in a future administration?

A All I can say is: I am not conducting myself in order to be eligible for this. But I think I'd be a hypocrite if I said that I wouldn't take it extremely seriously if it were offered. It's awfully hard to refuse a President. But I won't be disappointed if it doesn't happen, nor will I bear

U. S. News & World Report

WASHINGTON

MARVIN L. STONE
EDITOR

2300 N STREET, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

November 2, 1979

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street
Room 1021
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The manuscript of our interview with you Wednesday has
been edited to size, and is enclosed. Please make any changes you
wish on this copy, preserving the conversational tone.

As you discussed with Joe Fromm, we will expect the
manuscript to be returned Tuesday, November 6. When it is ready,
please have someone call William Deeck at 333-7400, Ext. 513, and we
will have it picked up immediately.

I'm sorry that I was unable to attend the interview,
particularly since my staff reported afterwards that they found it
extremely stimulating. I have read the manuscript both in draft and
finished forms, and think it is well worth the number of pages we
will be devoting to it.

Magazines in quantity will be delivered to your office
upon publication.

MLS:c
Enclosure

ORIGINAL
TRANSCRIPT

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

Washington, D.C.

October 31, 1979

Do you share that view?

Our relative position is declining.
A Yes, for three fundamental reasons.

First is the effect of the doctrine of assured destruction developed in the 1960s. Under that doctrine, so long as we are able to destroy a given percentage of the Soviet population and the size of the Soviet force aimed at us is irrelevant, therefore the proponents of that school of thought saw no need to so the United States did not react at all to a massive Soviet buildup of strategic forces.

Second were the assaults by Congress on the defense budget during the Nixon administration, which made it deal adequately with in those years. impossible to react to the Soviet threat then. In the first four years of the administration, the Congress cut 40 billion dollars out of the defense budget from the figures recommended by Nixon, which probably were less than already marginal precisely because of fear of Congressional cuts. minimal.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 3

happen
A going to hit.

The present situation seems to me to be as follows:
First, we are barely equal with the Soviet Union in strategic forces. Second, they are clearly ahead of our theater nuclear forces, they are vastly *SUPERIOR* in conventional forces, and they are probably superior to us in the capacity to intervene *MOST* in many of the key areas through the presence of proxy forces and the pre-positioning of substantial stockpiles.

This means that even if the Soviet Union does not have a *DETAILED* *SPECIFIC* plan for *EXPANSION* its capacity *for* intervention in crises that *may have local origins* will exceed ours, not to speak of Soviet capacities to blackmail European and other countries.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 10

in the world.

A Well, strangely enough, I think it makes the Russians
extremely uneasy, too, because it tempts them into probing
and at the same time inhibits from deprives us of the means of resolving
any issue that arose as a result of their probing. It
creates the enormous danger that this process will go on
unpredictably to
until we decide -- to the surprise of the Soviets -- to
resist at some point late in the process. Then the price
May. enormous
will be excessive.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 11

crisis with the Soviet Union?

The President is head of state, head of a party, head of
the government. He has large numbers of representational
AND
functions political functions. He does not have the time
to give the day-to-day attention to the tactical management
IF he is wise he will
of foreign policy. He, therefore, has to delegate it to
somebody or to some group. What the President can do is to
~~defuse~~
the philosophy, to set the course and to reserve
himself for the fundamental decisions that only he can
make.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 12

Ideally -- even though I was in office in the first four years this was not followed -- the principal representative of the President in the management of foreign policy should be the Secretary of State. I do not believe it can work to have a strong security adviser and a strong Secretary of State operating simultaneously. I know WAS certainly assertive enough AS security adviser I operated it on that basis, but it was demoralizing for the State Department. It means that those who are professionally charged with carrying out our foreign policy are pushed to the periphery of events and become more inherently irresponsible.

If the President does not trust his Secretary of State, or if he has doubts about him, he ought to get somebody he trusts. I'm not saying this as a criticism of this administration, because when I was security adviser I, Violated this principle. also, was probably excessively assertive. I was certainly excessively assertive at the wishes of the President.

[Y]

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 13

served.

A I think you have a combination of a President with
little experience and extreme conscientiousness -- who
believes that unless he's done it himself, it hasn't been
done at all.

A Even though individual cases may be solved properly and considerable --

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 14

The correctly, there seems to me to be a perception around the is and or strength world of a lack of direction, a lack of conception in the administration's foreign policy.

A It is conceivable that we were wrong in both. Having Soviets A combat presence in Cuba told them simply A acquiesc without paying a serious price in credibility later on. to go to hell. I happen to believe that the administration was not wrong in its original perception that the presence of an organized Soviet combat force in Cuba is a

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 15

INSERT F

It then became worried about the implications of its own analysis and started backpedaling. Pretending that it faced a long-standing Soviet involvement is no solution; the Soviets and Cubans, after all, know the facts.

qualitative change in the sit
then have used the precise tac
to carry through with them, I-
challenge the Soviets if one i
through.

*in US*

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A That argument is really absurd, because If SALT fails,
theater nuclear forces ought to be more necessary rather

than less necessary. To tie theater nuclear forces to the
THE EXTENT TO WHICH PROCESS OF INDUSTRY
ratification of SALT shows how far the demoralization of

Western thinking has already gone in which governments
cannot any longer do what they know is necessary for

I think that If the United States states the issue
correctly, theater nuclear forces will be accepted at the
next NATO meeting -- even though failure to ratify SALT
would undoubtedly add a complication. For an administration

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A First of all, China has not survived for 3,000 years as
an independent state, with the longest continuous history
of self-government in the world, by being used by
foreigners for their purposes. Therefore, the art of dealing
with China is to make sure that our long-term interests are
congruent. It is a mistake to try to use China to needle
the Soviet Union.

For example, I think it was a mistake to link the visit to China
of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown -- which I otherwise
favored -- to the Soviet brigade in Cuba. To announce it in
close conjunction with the acceptance of the Soviet brigade,
Cuba raises the premise that maybe if the Soviets make a
concession to us in Cuba, we will make a concession to them

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on China, -- which we should not do.

It is in our national interest, in this phase of history, that China be secure and independent. Now, its own weight and its own reality will create certain necessities for the Soviet Union, which are also China's interests. In that sense we can cooperate. But I don't think we can play the China card as a sort of needling of the Soviets every time the Soviets do something that annoys us.

Q That's long term, though --

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Hence
Second, their relationship to us is based on their hope
expectation, belief that we are the best-available
guardians of the general world balance of power within
which they can find their security.

Finally
And third, their relationship to us is based on the hope
that, through better relations with the West, they can
speed up the process of their modernization and therefore
of the moment when they can increase their own capacity to
defend themselves.

Should China come to the conclusions, first, that we are
not effective guardians of the world tranquillity, and,
second, that they are doomed to impotence -- for a variety
of reasons, including fear of the Soviet Union -- then I do
not exclude that they will decide that they will make their
 arrangements the West's do it for them. That
possibility cannot be excluded.

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I do not think that mess is an accurate description. A First we have to define what the mess is. Generally, the it is defined as the stalemate in Israeli-Egyptian or

Israeli-Arab negotiations. This is a nuisance — it's unpleasant — but it's not the real mess.

The real mess is the collapse of Iran. That has led to a change in the objective balance of power — both in reality AND perception. has led to an alteration in the perceived balance of power

in the sense that countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan are now question the ability of the United States to protect its friends. This affects not just their day-to-day foreign policy; it affects even their oil policy.

Q How?

A correct description of the oil policy of the moderate Arabs now is that the most moderate policy (they can sell to the radicals, because none of them are willing to

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I believe that our conduct during the collapse of Iran was a major contributing factor in the collapse, at the same time, I believe that Iran is an important-enough country for us so that we should attempt to have the best possible relations with whatever government is in power, in take the form of submission to mob rule, Iran, or acquiescence in insolent verbal assaults.

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may regret the method or maybe even the fact that it came
into power. I think an American attempt to overthrow this
government would be counterproductive. The margin by which
our relations with that government can be improved is
regrettably very narrow. I also suspect that we have not
that we must submit to its blackmail. No nation must be
yet seen the last change in Iran that the revolutionary
led to believe that assaults on Americans are free,
process which has started is likely to continue and has a
better than even chance of leading in an even more radical
direction than we have so far seen.

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A That's a different proposition. It is generally unwise
for the United States to link, by its own actions, access
to oil to the Arab-Israeli conflict for two reasons: One, I
do not think it is in the interest of the moderate Arabs to
get themselves so closely involved in every nuance of the
Arab-Israeli conflict that they become, in effect, hostage
to the success and failure of every negotiation WHICH THEY DO NOT
PARTNER IN,

INSERT H

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I read a draft but did not "approve"
the final version which I did not
see before delivery.

Now, maybe we do not succeed
not in our interest to establi
between those two -- the oil &

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Moreover, I believe that a Palestinian state governed by
~~CAN NOT SIMPLY REMAIN AN IN SIGNIFICANT AGRICULTURAL MINISTATE ON THE WEST BANK,~~
the PLO is a first stage. If that issue becomes the first
~~SUCH A "SOLUTION" WOULD ONLY BE A FIRST STAGE.~~
stage of the negotiations, ~~IT WILL INEVITABLY UNDERMINE THE~~
position of Jordan, and therefore will complete the
encirclement of Saudi Arabia by radical states.

So all I'm saying is, let us not confuse what some leaders in the AREA say, for domestic preferences say, for internal reasons, with their real convictions. My view has always been that the negotiation should be between Jordan and Israel, and then the PLO would become an Arab state, rather than an international problem. I'm not saying that at some point of this process the Palestinians or the PLO should not negotiate. I'm saying it is unwise to begin this process with the PLO.

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I think It is more likely than not that his successors, first of all, are going to have a higher level of energy; and, second, they will have done their calculations with the numbers with greater conviction than Brezhnev has.

(Y)

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Q What dilemma?

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when it came into office either to cancel or slow down the MX, the B-1, the Trident, and the cruise-missile program.

-- created the present situation whereby, if not immediately remedied, will create an increasing military imbalance in the Eastern Europe + this will cause a growing potential weakness. Q What can this country do to reverse that adverse trend

in the balance of power?

necessarily knowing the month in which it will hit, so I think students of international affairs may be able to predict crises without knowing exactly what year they're

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southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar will be in unfriendly ends.
Can we then keep the Sertle Fleet in the Mediterranean?

Soviet proxy forces are already on both sides of the
Gulf of Aden in Yemen and in Ethiopia. Iran is not pro-
Soviet, but anti-West. So the security of the Straits of
Hormuz is problematical. Saudi Arabia is substantially
encircled by radical or Soviet-dominated forces.

Afghanistan has had a Soviet coup. Cambodia has been
taken over by Vietnamese forces, and therefore there is

The Soviet blackmail of Europe also has begun, as seen at least
by our reconnaissance of the coast, and while we can manipulate
domestic circumstances.

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A Well, yes, strangely enough, I think it makes the Russians extremely uneasy, too, because it tempts them into probing and at the same time inhibits their means of resolving any issue that arises as a result of their probing. It creates the enormous danger that this process will go on until we decide -- to the surprise of the Soviets -- to resist at some point late in the process. Then the price may be excessive.

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crisis with the Soviet Union?

The President is head of state, head of a party, head of the government. He has large numbers of representational functions and political functions. He does not have the time to give the day-to-day attention to the tactical management of foreign policy. He is wise and will delegate it to somebody or to some group. What the President can do is to set the philosophy, to set the course and to reserve himself for the fundamental decisions that only he can make.

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 served.

A Even though individual cases may be solved properly and
succeeds - some of them are considerable -

CYJ

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the
there seems to me to be a perception around the
at the end of strength
in
a lack of direction, a lack of conception in the
administration's foreign policy.

Enlist and will not accept other than that & save S.A.T.
What bothers me about it is that I think it is the first
time in the postwar period that the United States has
directly told the Soviets that something was unacceptable,
and the Soviets told us to go to hell.

A It is conceivable that we were wrong in both. Having
Soviets a unknown presence in Cuba / simply agreed without
told them it was unacceptable, we could not let them tell us
paying a serious price in credibility later on /
to go to hell. I happen to believe that the administration
might
was not wrong in its original perception that the presence
of an organized Soviet combat force in Cuba is a

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long standing Soviet involvement is no solution; 44
then have used the precise tactics if they were not willing

Soviets + when after all knew the facts.
to carry through with them, I question. One shouldn't

It is defended by the administration as making the
difference between war and peace, confidence or lack of
confidence in us.

cyj

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 19

Q That's long term, though --

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CYJ

serious an impact on the international equilibrium as an
unopposed Soviet attack on Europe or the Middle East,
~~because it would be an event of such tremendous magnitude.~~

Now, what form of opposition should take, what specific
measures should be taken -- that, I think, would require
very careful study, which I haven't yet made.

A I believe that the fundamental foreign policy of
countries is affected by their geographic location, by
China's not conducting its Soviet policy as a form
ideologies, by considerations of security. Therefore, the
margin of maneuver is ~~not unlimited~~, I consider it
~~not limited~~.

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Hence

> Second, their relationship to us is based on their hope,
> expectation, belief that we are the best available
> guardians of the general world balance of power within
> which they can find their security.

Finally

> And third, their relationship to us is based on the hope
> that, through better relations with the West, they can
> speed up the process of their modernization and therefore
> of the moment when they can increase their own capacity to
> defend themselves.

Should China come to the conclusions, first, that we are
not effective guardians of the world tranquillity, and,
second, that they are doomed to impotence -- for a variety
of reasons, including fear of the Soviet Union -- then I do
not exclude that they will decide that they will sell their
 arrangements
 Impotence directly rather than let us do it for them. That
possibility cannot be excluded.

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I do not think that mess is an enough description.
A First we have to define what the mess is. Generally, the mess is defined as the stalemate in Israeli-Egyptian or

Israeli-Arab negotiations. This is a nuisance -- It's unpleasant -- But I think the real mess is cause of the difficulties
The real mess is the collapse of Iran. That has led to a
regional the spread will in reality change in the objective balance of power. And this in turn has led to an alteration in the perceived balance of power
in the sense that countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan -- which are moderate now question the ability of the United States to protect its friends. This affects not just their day-to-day foreign policy; it affects even their oil policy.

Q How?

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This is even the fundamental Palestinian problem. To the extent that the Palestinians become an expression of radicalism in the Arab world, to that extent the problem becomes intractable.

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country for us so that we should attempt to have the best possible relations with whatever government is in power. in

Iran.

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may regret the method or maybe even the fact that it came
into power. I think an American attempt to overthrow this
government would be counterproductive. The margin by which
our relations with that government can be improved is
and it should be used. But we cannot
regrettably very narrow. I also suspect that we have not
is so important that we must submit to it
yet seen the last change in Iran -> that the revolutionary
process which has started is likely to continue and has a
better than even chance of leading in an even more radical

undertaken. No nation must be led to believe that
anarchies in American countries are free.

KISSINGER INTERVIEW - 26

A That's a different proposition. It is generally unwise for the United States to link, by its own actions, access to oil to the Arab-Israeli conflict for two reasons: One, I do not think it is in the interest of the moderate Arabs to get themselves so closely involved in the nuances of the Arab-Israeli conflict that they become, in effect, hostage to the success and failure of every negotiation.

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A I think that Brezhnev in his way is probably [sincerely] interested in an extended period of peace, partly because he has had a long and turbulent life -- and probably has

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Q What dilemma?

U. S. News & World Report

WASHINGTON

MARVIN L. STONE
EDITOR

November 2, 1979

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

MLS:c
Enclosure

ORIGINAL
TRANSCRIPT

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

Washington, D.C.

October 31, 1979

Do you share that view?

First is the effect of the doctrine of assured destruction developed in the 1960s. Under that doctrine, the size of the Soviet force aimed at us is irrelevant. And so the United States did not react at all to a massive Soviet buildup of strategic forces.

Second were the assaults by Congress on the defense budget during the Nixon administration, which made it impossible to react to the Soviet threat then. In the first four years of the administration, the Congress cut 40 billion dollars out of the defense budget from the figures recommended by Nixon, which probably were less than minimal.

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when it came into office either to cancel or slow down the
MX, the B-1, the Trident, and the cruise-missile program.
We had initiated these programs under President Ford.

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going to hit.

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armed by the Soviet Union -- then a potential crisis in the
world balance of power is inevitable. If you look at the
global situation today, you see Soviet-armed guerrillas
attacking Morocco and Moroccan forces in the annexed area of
the Spanish Sahara. If they prevail, they will threaten the
southern shore of the Straits of Gibraltar.

Afghanistan has had a Soviet coup. Cambodia has been
taken over by Vietnamese forces, and therefore there is
pressure toward the Straits of Malacca.

The Soviet blackmail (of) Europe also has begun to have its effect.
subconsciously -- partly through European disenchantment with the
United States, partly through explicit threats, partly

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We are dealing here with a little country of 9 million, 90 miles off our shore, from which we accept the dispatch

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of grain.

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you cannot rule it out.

A The administration [has no] coherent view. I do not think that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew

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Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, has the same geopolitical conception -- or convey the same conception. Either one of them might be right, but both of them can't be right at the same time.

(c) 1978

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in the world.

A Well, strangely enough, I think it makes the Russians
extremely uneasy, too, because it tempts them into probing
and at the same time deprives us of the means of resolving
any issue that arises as a result of their probing. It
creates the enormous danger that this process will go on
until we decide -- to the surprise of the Soviets -- to
resist at some point late in the process. Then the price
may be enormous.
will be excessive.

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crisis with the Soviet Union?

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If the President doesn't trust his Secretary of State, or if he has doubts about him, he ought to get somebody he trusts. I'm not saying this as a criticism of this administration, because when I was security adviser I, though also, was probably excessively assertive. I was certainly excessively assertive because of the wishes of the President I.

(L)

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served.

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correctly, there seems to me to be a perception around the
*alack of strength*,
world of a lack of direction, a lack of conception, in the
administration's foreign policy.

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do.

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Q That's long term, though --

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And third, their relationship to us is based on the hope
that, through better relations with the West, they can
speed up the process of their modernization and therefore
*through the moment when they can increase their own capacity to*
defend themselves.

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Q How?

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So all I'm saying is, let us not confuse what governments in the area say, for domestic reasons, with their real convictions. My view has always been that the negotiation should be between Jordan and Israel, and then the PLO would become an Arab problem. I'm not saying that at some point of this process the Palestinians or the PLO should not negotiate. I'm saying it is unwise to begin this process with the PLO.

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Q What dilemma?