Full

CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>2</td><td>STATEMENT OF:</td><td>PAGE NO.</td></tr></table>

3 HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, former Secretary of State 297

5 HON. BOB CARR, a representative in Congress from the State of Michigan 394

PANEL

7 PROFESSOR DANKWART A. RUSTOW, Professor, Political Science, City University of New York 402

9 STEPHEN KAPLAN, Research Associate, Brookings Institution 411

11 STEVEN ROSEN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brandeis University 419

12 JOHN SULLIVAN, American Friends Service Committee and Friends Committee on National Legislation 429

14 DR. WILLIAM SMALL, President, Federation of American Arab Organizations 436

15 DR. DALE R. TAHTINEN, Assistant Director for Policy and Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute 449

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1 RPTR HANBACK

2 10:05 a.m.

3

4 PROPOSED AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL, EGYPT, AND SAUDI ARABIA

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6 WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1978

7

8 House of Representatives

9 Committee on International Relations

10 Washington, D. C.

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12 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in

13 Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Clement

14 J. Zablocki (chairman of the committee) presiding.

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16 The Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

17 This morning we meet to continue hearings on the

18 President's proposed sales of aircraft to Israel, Egypt and

19 Saudi Arabia.

20 The committee is honored to have with us today the

21 distinguished former Secretary of State, the Honorable Dr.

22 Henry A. Kissinger, to present testimony on the sales to the

23 Middle East.

24 Dr. Kissinger, as soon as the committee will have a

25 quorum, I hope you would agree if we would interrupt the

26 hearings to take legislative action on a very non-

27 controversial bill, H.R. 2589, and if you will bear with us

28 that will be very helpful.

29 Secretary Kissinger, we appreciate your coming here. We

30 know how busy you are. We read about the testimony you had

31 presented in the other body and we understand that you must

32 leave by noon today and, therefore, we will try to

33 accommodate your request.

34 All of the Members are anxious to hear your testimony so

35 without further delay you may proceed with your statement

36 or, if you prefer, you may summarize it and insert the

37 entire text into the record, whichever way you desire.

38 If you will proceed, Mr. Secretary, please?

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40 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER

41 SECRETARY OF STATE

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43 Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me express

44 my pleasure at meeting again with this committee which

45 played such a constructive role when I was in office, and

46 which I know does the same thing with the present

47 Administration.

48 I do not have a formal statement. I will make a few

49 general observations, with your permission, and then respond

50 to your questions.

51 I would like to deal with these issues:

52 The nature of our commitments; my view as to the package

53 approach; the timing; where do we stand, and where should we

54 go.

55 First, with respect to our commitments, let me deal first

56 with our relationship to Israel.

57 The United States, under seven Presidents, has had a

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58 historic commitment to the survival and security of Israel
59 based on common moral bonds and on shared interests.

60 The Congress has expressed its views on this subject in
61 repeated resolutions and appropriations. And I believe that
62 this commitment is at the basis of whatever is done with
63 respect to Israel.

64 I stress this because even without specific memoranda of
65 understanding, the Presidents then and now in office would
66 v^ hae undertaken a program of military support for Israel.

67 Now, this historic commitment has been expressed from time
to time in special memoranda of understanding that were
68 related to particular events. And these events, such as the
69 second Sinai Agreement, must be seen within the context of
70 the complicated problem of a small nation of 3 million, with
71 a narrow margin of survival, which when it gives up
72 territory gives up something irretrievable and receives in
73 return assurances which are more easily revocable.
74 by their nature
75 Therefore, the United States has tended at those times not
to purchase the concessions by military undertakings but to

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77 express those supply arrangements that flow out of our
78 historic commitment in a way that gives psychological
79 assurance. ~~for a person~~

80 The most recent appeal, as I pointed out, was in the
connection with the Sinai Agreement in 1975 when the United
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States agreed to consider sympathetically Israeli requests,
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including its request for advanced and sophisticated
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weapons.
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85 There were no specific numbers associated with this
86 proposal, but it is important to keep in mind that this
87 understanding was reached at a time when the so-called
88 confrontation states were being armed substantially by the
89 Soviet Union, when at least as far as Israel was concerned
90 it had no reason to suppose that the United States would
91 supply advanced weapons to Arab countries.

92 From this history I draw two conclusions: One, the size
93 of the Israeli part of the package must inevitably be
94 affected by the level of arms of other countries in that
95 area, especially if that level is the result of American

96 actions.

97 Second, I regret that what had been a separate commitment
to Israel has been put in a package with other essentially
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unrelated programs, however worthy their objectives.
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100 Now, in addition, I have already publicly regreted the
timing of this proposal, coming as it did in the midst of
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stalled peace negotiations.
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103 However, we now confront a situation where a formal
proposal is before the Congress and it has to be assessed in
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terms of the consequences of rejecting it.

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106 Let me, therefore, now consider the situation where it
stands today. With respect to Israel's side of the package,
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I have already explained the nature of our commitment.
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109 I would only like to stress again that the numbers of the
package for Israel are at the lowest end of the spectrum
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111 that was ever discussed with Israel, that when Israel made
its proposals to the preceding Administration the numbers
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113 were many orders of magnitude larger than the ones that have
now been approved and I think this has to be kept in mind
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115 when one considers what the appropriate numbers would be in
116 the light of the new situation.

117 With respect to Egypt, I believe history will record that
118 President Sadat has undertaken a historic role in moving the
119 nations of the Arab world from a position of unremitting
120 hostility towards Israel to a position of negotiation, and
121 ~~in~~ to moving his country from a position of dependence on
122 radical forces hostile to our principles to a course of
123 moderation and cooperation with the United States.

124 His trip to Jerusalem had a spiritual quality, and I
125 believe that the peace process that has originated from it
126 and to which Israel has also responded in a positive manner
127 should be brought to a rapid conclusion with flexibility by
128 all sides.

129 But we have to recognize that Egypt has broken its
130 military relationship with the Soviet Union, a relationship
131 which had contributed so much to the tensions in the Middle
132 East, and that it did so without asking at that time for any
133 quid pro quo from the United States.

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134 I would, therefore, say that the sale of the planes that
135 is now being proposed will only have a marginal impact on
136 the military balance in the Middle East, the sale of planes

137 to Egypt. But it will have a profound symbolic impact on
138 Egypt's perception of its relationship with us and of the
139 perception of other Arab countries and of their relationship
140 to us.

141 I, therefore, would respectfully recommend to this
142 committee that on its merits and not because of a package
143 approach that the request for Egypt be approved.

144 Now, let me turn to Saudi Arabia. With respect to Saudi
145 Arabia, there were technical discussions in the previous
146 Administration about the type of replacement aircraft for
147 the British Lightnings that Saudi Arabia might require.

148 Saudi Arabia was permitted to look at a number of planes,
149 the F-14, F-15, and F-18, and it chose to proceed with the F-
150 15. These discussions did not go beyond the level of the
151 Deputy Secretary of Defense, and they were substantially in
152 the nature of technical discussions.

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153 There was no formal request by Saudi Arabia for airplanes in the previous Administration, but there was, of course, the presumption that since we permitted them to proceed with considering the plane, that in time it would be looked on favorably.
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158 The formal request was made in the present Administration on the occasion of the visit of Prince Fahd in May of 1977.
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160 There was no commitment as to timing, numbers or related circumstances in the previous Administration.
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162 Nevertheless, apart from whether or not there was a formal commitment and what the nature of it was, I would like to stress that the significance of Saudi Arabia to the economic well-being and the long range security of the industrial democracies, the United States, and to the stability of the area is fundamental, and that the policies of the government of Saudi Arabia have been in their major line supportive of American objectives and restraint in the application of their undoubted power.
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171 My distinguished successor will be able to brief this

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172 committee on the role that Saudi Arabia has played in the

173 present Administration. I can say when I was in office

174 Saudi Arabia was a force for moderation in the conduct of
negotiations in the financial handling of its surpluses and
with respect to oil prices.

177 In addition, Saudi Arabia is now in grave danger than
ever before. It faces a gigantic pressure from the Soviet

179 Union in the supply of large quantities of very
sophisticated equipment to Iraq, and the building up of a
Soviet military base in the Horn of Africa.

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182 To refuse the request now would be a very serious blow.

183 For all of these reasons, I recommend you with all of the
doubts that I have expressed earlier about the wisdom of the
original approach, I recommend against turning down the
sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

187 At the same time I would like to add two qualifications to
this. I would like to emphasize that the original
discussions with Israel were in a context that did not
foresee the delivery of high performance aircraft by the

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210 the area (and on their associated equipment) to reduce the
211 possibility of their being used for air to ground action.

212 It is my understanding also that Saudi Arabia might be
213 prepared to state its intention with respect to other
214 airplanes it might purchase in the same time period from
215 other sources.

216 I would like to urge this committee that it would be in my
217 view in the national interest to avoid a confrontation and a
218 divisive debate on this problem. I would make that same
219 request to the Administration, and so I hope that the
220 Congress and the Administration can work out an agreement
221 that prevents a divisive debate and the kind of
222 questioning of our friendship to countries that are central
223 to our security, and also to a country with which we have
224 had a historic relationship and to whose security and
225 survival in Israel we will, of course, also remain
226 committed.

227 Thank you.

228 The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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229 First, you have dealt, Mr. Secretary, with the
230 commitments, and throughout these hearings we have heard a
231 great deal about commitments.

232 Supposedly, the United States has commitments to Israel
233 and commitments to Saudi Arabia. Now, these commitments are
234 repeatedly referred to as binding the United States in
235 varying ways and varying degrees to supply certain military
236 equipment, sometimes in allegedly specific numbers, and
237 before we are finished with this matter of selling aircraft
238 to the Middle East countries, we may have even some more
239 commitments.

240 As a matter of fact, you have suggested what an additional
241 commitment should be to Israel in additional planes.

242 Now, it is contended you may have made some of these
243 earlier commitments supposedly with little if any
244 consultation with Congress.

245 One of our earlier witnesses has stated that a commitment
246 is, as a matter of fact at the time the commitment was made,
247 it was part of the overall agreements under which Israel

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248 agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Passes.

249 Others said there were commitments made of military
assistance at the time of the Sinai Accords, and I recall

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251 very vividly asking you, Mr. Secretary, at that time whether

252 there was any linkage with the agreements to any promises

253 made of military assistance, and you unequivocably said

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''no'', as I recall.

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I believe you then and I believe you now.

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My question to you is this:

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Mr. Secretary, in looking at the past, do you regret

having made some of these commitments but, more importantly,

in looking to the future, do you believe such commitments

should continue to be made? Where in all of this does

Congress fit?

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Let me just refer to your specific commitment of

additional planes to Israel. One of the greatest criticisms

is that for the first time our country has linked the sale

of planes to Israel with the sale of planes to other
countries and yet today, this morning, you say as far as

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I believe you now.

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My question to you is this:

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Congress fit?

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I believe you now.

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My question to you is this:

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267 Israelis concerned, Israel should be given an additional 20
268 F-15's in the time frame to equal the Saudi number. That is
269 the linkage, in my understanding.
270 Now, I wonder if you could explain it.
271 Dr. Kissinger. With respect to your first question, Mr.
272 Chairman, I am probably too advanced in years by now to
273 begin admitting fallibility.
274 The Chairman. I wish you had not said that, because I am
275 older than you are.
276 Dr. Kissinger. But to answer the question seriously, with
277 respect to the Sinai agreement, every understanding that was
278 reached was submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations
279 Committee and to this committee at the time. They were
280 published at the time, I think, by both committees, but I
281 know for sure by the Senate Committee and, therefore, the
282 record of what it was that we had agreed to do was publicly
283 available at the time of the Sinai agreement.
284 With respect to Saudi Arabia, the procedure has always
285 been that when one is at the level of technical discussions,

286 these have not been submitted to the Congress. When there
287 is a decision by the President to sell arms, then there is
288 first a preliminary period in which the Congress is informed
289 and then a formal period of 30 days in which the Congress
290 acts.
291 Since no formal decision was made in the previous
292 Administration with respect to the sale of planes to Saudi
293 Arabia, and since it was handled at that time substantially
294 by the Defense Department with respect to the technical
discussions, there was, in fact, no discussion with this
295 committee. But we followed exactly the procedures that have
296 been used with respect to all arms sales; that is to say,
297 the committees are not consulted after the President
298 has decided formally to approve a specific request. So this
299 is the status of the commitments.
300 Now, with respect to the Sinai II Agreement, I think we
301 ought to make clear that we should not leave the impression that
302 an Israeli agreement to any specific understanding it
303 reaches with Egypt is purchased by the sale of American
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305 arms. Rather what happened is that there was an Israeli

306 request for us for a 10-year program, with respect to which

307 we would have had to act in some sense on the basis of our

308 historic commitment, which was connected and we used the

309 occasion of the second Sinai agreement to express it in a

310 memorandum of understanding that, however, had no specific

311 result.

312 Finally, with respect to the package, I think now that it

313 has been put forward as a package it is inevitable that one

314 would look at each the relationship of the various parts to

315 each other, and I can only point out the historic fact

316 that the numbers put forward for Israel are substantially

317 lower than those that had been discussed previously and

318 that I think that the uneasiness that has been created could

319 be reduced by the measures that I have proposed.

320 The Chairman. If I may use my remaining 30 seconds, Mr.

321 Secretary, you have brought up a very interesting point.

322 That is, a technicality that the commitment to Saudi Arabia

323 was in the last Administration not really a commitment

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324 because it was on the level of technical discussions with

325 the Defense Department. Likewise, we have heard there were

326 commitments to Israel of 126 planes, but was there a memo

327 also in the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

328 and not really to the point of any commitment on numbers at

329 the State Department level.

330 Dr. Kissinger. That is correct; there was no formal

331 commitment as to numbers in the previous Administration to

332 Israel either. But the numbers that were being discussed-----

333 The Chairman. Where do you get to the lowest end of the

334 spectrum that is now offered as to numbers to Israel, what

335 is the number?

336 Dr. Kissinger. The number that was being discussed in the

337 previous Administration, was something the Israeli request,

338 was something like 250. The reason we did not proceed at

339 that time or the reason the discussions were prolonged at

340 the time was less in relation to the number than it was in

341 relation to an Israeli request for co-production, which

342 raised the fundamental questions whether we wanted to have a

343 plane as advanced as this produced in an allied country.

344 This was the major hold-up about agreeing to a number.

345 I am not saying we would have necessarily agreed to 250,

346 but on the other hand, 75 is considerably lower than any

347 numbers we were thinking about.

348 The Chairman. I am interested in the explanation of the

349 lowest spectrum. What is the proper spectrum?

350 Dr. Kissinger. I would have thought that in relation to

351 what was being discussed previously, 75 was at the low end

352 of that number.

353 The Chairman. And in your opinion, what would be the

354 proper number?

355 Dr. Kissinger. That I don't think I am competent to say.

356 I think that should be worked out by technical people and in

357 between Israel and consultation with the United States.

358 The Chairman. We have technical people in Congress that

359 are trying to figure that out, sir.

360 Dr. Kissinger. I am not competent to do that.

361 The Chairman. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr.

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362 Broomfield.

363 Mr. Broomfield. Mr. Secretary, I want to express my

364 appreciation for your appearance before this committee

365 today.

366 I know I share the feeling of all of the Members, we are

367 very fortunate to have your counsel on this very important

368 subject.

369 I would like to ask you to comment regarding one of your

370 earlier statements with respect to timing of this sale. It

371 bothers me a great deal that the peace negotiations have now

372 been off the track for about four months, and yet we have

373 this massive aircraft sale for the Middle East, and I am

374 wondering, in your judgment, will this sale to Israel and

375 Egypt and Saudi Arabia have a positive effect on the peace

376 negotiations and also does this tie in with the problem of

377 the Soviet intervention in Africa?

378 Dr. Kissinger. I think refusal of the sales would have a

379 very bad effect on the peace negotiations, because it would

380 undermine the positions of governments that have been

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381 friendly to the United States and moderate in their conduct.

382 Second, the danger to Saudi Arabia in particular, but in the
longer term also to the Sudan and Egypt, of the events in the

384 Horn of Africa emphasizes the impact that a refusal would

385 have, especially on Saudi Arabia.

386 There is no question that the events in the Horn of Africa
have been deeply disturbing to our friends in the Middle

388 East. Our inability to deal with it

389 there, and if that is now coupled with a refusal of this

390 plane sale, would or could have very profound consequences on

391 the future orientation of Saudi Arabia.

392 I want to make clear here I am not talking of the threat
of specific policy actions, I am talking about the

394 perception of leaders over a protracted period of time, and

395 not about specific retaliatory measures.

396 Mr. Broomfield. Do you feel that the Saudis, if this sale
does not go through, would probably move quickly to have

398 some kind of arrangement to purchase planes from the French?

399 Dr. Kissinger. Without any question.

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400 Mr. Broomfield. And would this also have an adverse
effect on the leverage that we might have over the Saudis
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402 where the planes would be located?

403 Dr. Kissinger. It would certainly be the case that the
404 assurances that we might be able to obtain from Saudi Arabia
405 would not be sought with the same intensity by the French
406 Government.

407 Secondly, if Saudi Arabia does not have the military
408 relationship with us that is foreseen, it would affect our
409 general ability to influence the policy of that country.

410 Mr. Broomfield. One of the arguments we have heard so far
411 from people who are opposed to this plane sale is that the
412 Saudis could not be trusted as far as the security of the
413 technology involved in the F-15's and eventually it would
414 fall in the hands of the Soviet Union.

415 Do you feel that to be a true statement?

416 Dr. Kissinger. My impression on my visits to Saudi Arabia
417 has been that the admiration of Saudi Arabia for the Soviet
418 Union was extremely limited. I would not think that that is

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419 the most immediate danger, and also, what the Congress ought

420 to keep in mind is that these planes will not be delivered

421 until 1981 to 1983, by which time, if the peace process in

422 the Middle East has not advanced very far, we will face a

423 very new situation anyway. But I think the danger of Soviet

424 penetration of Saudi Arabia and its present government is

425 not the most acute concern we face as a nation.

426 Mr. Broomfield. Thank you very much.

427 The Chairman. Mr. Fountain?

428 Mr. Fountain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

429 I want to join my colleague, Mr. Broomfield, in welcoming

430 you back to the committee and commend you for the great job

431 you did in the previous Administration and thank you for

432 giving us the benefits of your knowledge and experienced

433 thinking here this morning.

434 I don't have any questions.

435 I do want to say to you I rather resented the package

436 approach. I think the timing of the proposal was most

437 inappropriate. I think you have given information and

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438 opinions to which we should give very careful consideration,

439 but I think you hit the nail on the head when you said we

440 must very seriously assess in terms of the consequences of

441 rejection whether we originally would like to have done this

442 or not.

443 And in connection with Saudi Arabia's own thinking, I had

444 the pleasure of meeting and talking with King Saud before

445 his death on a number of occasions and with King Faisal, and

446 I have not had the pleasure of speaking with the present

447 leader there, but would you agree that their opposition is

448 primarily toward Communism, that they are strongly,

449 vehemently anti-Communist?

450 Dr. Kissinger. Strongly, vehemently, and vociferously

451 anti-Communist.

452 Mr. Fountain. I appreciate your adding the additional

453 word. I could not quite think of it, but in all of our

454 conversations I never heard them indicate any intention of

455 or designs toward Israel, because we know the extent to

456 which the Arab countries will all help one another when

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457 Israel has been involved. But, as I recall, you said just a
458 few moments ago that if the sales are not made, that the
459 consequences of peace in the Middle East will be seriously
460 affected.

461 Dr. Kissinger. Well, if these sales are not made, the
462 moderate forces in the Middle East will be weakened, and
463 this is bound to affect the peace prospects.

464 Mr. Fountain. And that relation between ourselves and the
465 Saudis and possibly others would be seriously impaired?

466 Dr. Kissinger. That is my view, in the light of the
467 circumstances we now face, that is, with a package before the
468 Congress.

469 Mr. Fountain. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

470 Mr. Findley. Would the gentleman yield?

471 Mr. Secretary, I am very concerned about the existence of
472 the embargo against Turkey, and I know you share my concern.

473 Would you speculate on what may happen to Greece, its own
474 independence, its own well-being and welfare if Turkey
475 should continue its drift away from the Western Alliance,

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476 from its Western attachments? What effects could this have

477 on the well-being and future of Greece itself?

478 Dr. Kissinger. I had hoped that being out of office I

479 could avoid antagonizing the various groups as much as I did

480 in office, but I think my destiny is otherwise.

481 I believe that if Turkey should move into a neutralist

482 position, leaning more toward the Soviet Union or the more

483 radical Arab states in order to get the funds to purchase its

484 arms, that in the long term this will also affect the

485 security of Greece.

486 I can understand the anguish of Greek leaders with respect

487 to Cyprus. I have always thought the embargo was

488 counterproductive and, therefore, opposed it when it was put

489 in, and I would hope it will be lifted now.

490 Mr. Findley. Thank you for yielding.

491 Mr. Fountain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

492 I have no further questions.

493 The Chairman. Mr. Rosenthal?

494 Mr. Rosenthal. I am going to forego the opportunity to

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495 continue the last part of the discussion.

496 Mr. Secretary, could you elaborate just a little bit on

497 why you said you thought it was important that if there were

498 any additional planes allocated to Israel why it should be

499 done within the five year framework of the package, so-

500 called package?

501 Dr. Kissinger. I believe, first of all, I believe Saudi

502 Arabia when it says that it wishes to acquire these planes

503 in order to defend itself against threats that are

504 essentially generated from outside of the area.

505 At the same time, it is also clear that as far as Israel

506 is concerned, it must base its security calculations on the

507 worst contingency that could arise and on changes of mind of

508 some possible future Saudi Government.

509 Therefore, there should be a strategic equivalent

510 maintained. That is to say, ~~it~~ precisely because Saudi

511 Arabia has declared it does not intend these planes to be

512 used against Israel, it cannot be threatened by any

513 additional numbers that Israel might get to protect itself

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514 against the worst contingency, and there is no doubt that

515 the acquisition of the aircraft by Saudi Arabia will affect

516 the Israel perception of its security threats.

517 It is my view, since the other means that might be

518 available to deal with this would all be from a foreign

519 policy point of view very unfortunate, the best way to

520 deal with it is to make sure that Israel, within the same

521 time period as Saudi Arabia, acquires this additional

522 capability, that it acquires what would maintain both a

523 symbolic and an actual balance, symbolic in the sense that

524 its advanced aircraft equal the number that is in Arab hands

525 of this type and substantially in relationship to the

526 previous discussions we had with Israel which were conducted

527 prior to any idea of sales.

528 Mr. Rosenthal. So if by any chance there is an

529 arrangement made whereby Israel would receive additional

530 aircraft, it is your view that they should be delivered to

531 them within the five-year framework of the so-called

532 package?

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533 Dr. Kissinger. That would be my recommendation, yes.

534 Mr. Rosenthal. Could you tell us a little bit about what

535 kind of government Saudi Arabia has?

536 Dr. Kissinger. Well, I don't quite know how to answer

537 that question. Saudi Arabia is governed by the Royal

538 Family. In my experience their policy has been one of

539 friendship for the United States and moderation.

540 Mr. Rosenthal. That is not my question, Mr. Secretary.

541 My question is if you were teaching a high school civics

542 class, how could you describe the government?

543 Dr. Kissinger. Well, I would describe the government as

544 one in which the country is run by a royal family. It was

545 originally, before the discovery of oil, a society based on

546 Bedouin tribes, which is now in the process of

547 modernization. And I think that they are going through a

548 very complicated process.

549 Mr. Rosenthal. When did they have their last election?

550 Dr. Kissinger. They have not practiced elections in

551 recent centuries.

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552 Mr. Rosenthal. I don't mean to be facetious. Do you
553 think that the United States ought to take, in allocating
554 arms deliveries and committing itself to arms sales, ought
555 to in any way take into account the style of government of
556 the recipient of the arms?

557 In other words, should we give more consideration to a
558 country that is a democracy, a full fledged democracy and/or
559 should we give more or less consideration to a royal family
560 type of government? Should this play any role at all?

561 Dr. Kissinger. Well, I clearly don't say one should give
562 more consideration to a royal family, but I think one should
563 give ~~some consideration~~, one should give ~~important~~
564 consideration to the importance of the country to the
565 security of the United States, the importance of the country
566 to the security of ~~other countries~~ of the industrial
567 democracies and to moderation in the area, and ~~by all of~~
568 these criteria, Saudi Arabis is extremely important for the
569 United States.

570 I am not sure that if they had elections in what direction

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571 their government would go.

572 Mr. Rosenthal. We would prefer they not have elections so

573 long as they stay in a moderating position.

574 Dr. Kissinger. No. Obviously we favor a democratic
government, but I do not think this particular sale should

576 be looked at primarily from----

577 Mr. Rosenthal. I didn't ask that. I would like to know,

578 generally, I am looking to you for advice and guidance for

579 the future. Should we consider whether a government is a

580 democracy or if they are a totalitarian government of the

581 worst kind, if they are friendly, we will give them whatever

582 they want. Which is the course to follow?

583 Dr. Kissinger. I would not call the Saudi Government a

584 totalitarian government.

585 Mr. Rosenthal. I didn't either. I am asking a

586 hypothetical question.

587 **************

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588 RPTR CANTOR

589 [10:45 a.m.]

590 Dr. Kissinger. I would say we have to consider first, the

591 security, what is the impact of that country on the security

592 interests of the United States and of the industrial

593 democracies? In World War II Churchill supported the Soviet

594 Union against Hitler because he thought that was the lesser

595 danger.

596 Secondly, of course, if we can, we should use our

597 an
relationship to promote evolution which is consistent with

598 our own value. But I think one fundamental consideration

599 has to be the importance of the country to the security

600 interests of the United States.

601 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

602 The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Buchanan.

603 Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

604 Mr. Secretary, it is very reassuring to hear one of the

605 strongest Secretaries of States in American history,

606 certainly with as fine a mind as any, to which I have been

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[Y]

607 exposed on this panel, have some of my own feeling so

608 precisely on this matter; you are either slipping or I am

609 getting smart.

610 I wonder if you would comment a little further upon the

611 Saudi Arabian's perception. We have had some questions

612 raised rather strongly that it was a foolish idea that Saudi

613 Arabia had any kind of security threat or that the desire of

614 that country for aircraft was anything other than pointed

615 towards Israel.

616 Would you comment on your perception as to their security

617 considerations and your evaluation of their perception?

618 Dr. Kissinger. First of all, in the past Saudi Arabia has

619 not participated in wars against Israel, even when it

620 supplied token forces, they were not in the most advanced

621 front-line position, so that I believe that Saudi Arabia's

622 perception of its danger is real.

623 And if you look at a map and you see Iraq to the north and

624 the advanced equipment that is pouring in there from the

625 Soviet Union; and the Horn of Africa to the south which

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626 received, as I undersand it, about a billion dollars' worth

627 of Soviet equipment in a period of 9 months; and if you

628 consider that the Horn of Africa is linked with South Yemen

629 which borders on Saudi Arabia, I think that they believe

630 that they are in a pincers. Then here is a country of vast

631 size and a relatively small population, with enormous

632 economic power and great economic resources, but at the same

633 time militarily rather weak.

634 For all these reasons, I believe that the Saudi perception

635 of its security threat is not unreasonable, and that the

636 administration is not unreasonable to respond to it.

637 Whatever qualifications I may have raised as to the package

638 approach and to the timing approach, and if the United

639 States conspicuously disassociated itself from Saudi Arabia

640 which would be implied in a congressional rejection of this

641 proposal, this would be bound to have an unfortunate effect

642 in Saudi Arabia and indeed on Saudi Arabia's security.

643 Mr. Buchanan. Like others, I find the package approach

644 absolutely unacceptable. One of the defects of this

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645 approach, it seems to me, is a simplistic concept of balance

646 that I also see in some of the responses of those who oppose

647 the sale, and that is a perception of the Middle East as if

648 there were only three countries--Israel, Egypt, and Saudi

649 Arabia.

650 While the influx of sophisticated aircraft, as you have

651 said, does add a new dimension in terms of security

652 considerations and risk for Israel, it would appear to me

653 that each country faces an overall security situation that

654 goes far beyond the three countries here involved.

655 Would you comment on Israel's basic security situation and

656 Egypt's as well?

657 Dr. Kissinger. Israel's special security situation arises

658 from the fact that it is a country of less than 3 million,

659 that has not known a day of formal peace in its (life, in it's) existence, and (which) a mistake in its calculation is

660 irrevocable, and even though this sometimes injects

661 considerable elements of seeming inflexibility into the

662 Israeli position, one has to understand the extremely narrow

663 Israeli position, one has to understand the extremely narrow

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664 margin of maneuver that is available for Israel. So I think

665 the United States ought to show understanding for this.

666 At the same time, of course, Israel has to balance

667 military security against acceptance by the other states,

668 and this is exactly what the negotiations are now about.

669 And I am basically optimistic that the initiatives that

670 started with President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem will lead

671 to a positive conclusion, as indeed it must.

672 Egypt's security is affected in part by Israel, but since

673 the second Sinai Agreement, there have been no military

674 incidents of any kind between Israel and Egypt. It is

675 affected however also by what happens in the Horn of Africa.

676 If we remember that the headwaters of the Nile are in

677 Ethiopia, that the pressures of guerrilla activities from

678 Ethiopia on the Sudan and therefore have a ripple effect on

679 Egypt, I have looked at the Soviet maneuver in the Horn of

680 Africa as a device to outflank the Middle East, and then, of

681 course, Egypt has had a problem from Libya, which has called

682 for the overthrow of President Sadat. So Egypt has more

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683 security problems than the one with Israel, And I have great

684 hopes that there will be a settlement between Israel and

685 Egypt, or that there will be a settlement in the Middle East

686 in which the prospect of war between Egypt and Israel will

687 be, as both President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin said at

688 Jerusalem, be excluded for the future.

689 Mr. Buchanan. Thank you.

690 The Chairman. Mr. Wolff.

691 Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

692 Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you back here again.

693 Mr. Secretary, part of the thrust of the questioning that

694 the chairman put to you is with relationship to commitments

695 that have been made. We do know that in the past there have

696 been some secret agreements that have been made. We do know

697 as well, perhaps not in this area, there were secret

698 agreements, but maybe you could confirm some of the things

699 we have heard in this committee.

700 Mr. Dickinson, who is the ranking member on the Armed

701 Services Committee, came before this committee and said that

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702 an agreement with the Saudis took place in 1975. Mr. Vance

703 said that talks started in 1974, and we have requested that

704 the memorandums of conversation be made part of the record

705 of this committee.

706 Mr. Brown came before the committee and said that the

707 Department of Defense conducted surveys in 1974, recommended

708 the replacement of Lightnings with advanced fighter aircraft.

709 I also have a copy of a statement that was made by Fred

710 Dutton, who is the lobbyist, recognized lobbyist, for the

711 Saudis. He said "U.S. officials indicated as early as 1975

712 that the Saudi Arabians could purchase F-15s. President

713 Ford in 1976 specifically affirmed the sale of the planes to

714 the Saudis."

715 Now can you recall in your memory as to what role you

716 played in this?

717 Dr. Kissinger. First of all, the documents, of course,

718 are in the State Department and in the executive branch, and

719 you can get their formal----

720 Mr. Wolff. We have requested those documents, I think,

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721 yesterday.

722 Dr. Kissinger. You can get the formal documents. My best
723 recollection is as follows: The discussions with the

724 Saudis, with the Saudi Government, started in 1973 about the
725 replacement of the Lightning fighter that they had. The
726 first idea was that they be replaced by F-4s. Then most of
727 these discussions were conducted, in fact, to the best of my
728 recollection, all of these discussions were conducted by the
729 Defense Department, and then it escalated in 1974 to
730 permitting the Saudis to look at four advanced fighters.

I do not specifically recall giving approval, but
731 That must have been done with my approval, though if you ask
732 me for my specific recollection, this could not have
733 happened without the approval of the State Department.

734 They then looked at four of these fighters, and in late
735 1976 apparently concentrated on the F-15.

736 Mr. Wolff. But the point that is made by Dutton, Mr.

737 Secretary, is the fact that this was specifically affirmed,
738 the F-15 was specifically affirmed by President Ford in

739 1976.

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740 Dr. Kissinger. I have no specific recollection of that,

741 but it is conceivable that this happened. I just have no

742 specific recollection of whether President Ford personally

743 got involved in affirming the F-15. My recollection is that

744 the Deputy Secretary of Defense visited Saudia Arabia in

745 October 1976, and that at that time the Saudis indicated

746 that they preferred the F-15 over the other types that they

747 had seen, and that they were told that they could proceed on

748 that basis. I am not sure that President Ford personally

749 got involved in this, but it ought to be checkable.

750 Mr. Wolff. One other aspect of this. In the event that

751 this committee separated out the sale as the President has

752 indicated, that it is not a package any longer, but one part

753 was tied to the other--I don't know how you get something

754 tied together without it being in some sort of a package--but

755 in the event that this committee were to turn down the Saudi

756 sale, would you recommend the affirmation of the sale to

757 Egypt and to Israel?

758 Dr. Kissinger. I have not considered that. I think that--

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Y

759

760 Mr. Wolff. Excuse me. You did say that you don't like

761 the package idea?

762 Dr. Kissinger. No. I think it would have been better to

763 proceed with each of these sales separately, on their

764 merits, and I would have supported each of them on their

765 merits. I hope very much that the contingency which you

766 mentioned does not arise. I think it would be against the

767 national interests of the United States to reject the Saudi

768 proposal.

769 Mr. Wolff. Even if the proposal is as it stands today

770 without the addition of the aircraft to the Israelis?

771 Dr. Kissinger. I hope that ~~the administration, that~~ if

772 the Congress is prepared to move in that direction, ~~that~~ the

773 administration will show flexibility on its part. I simply

774 do not think that a confrontation on this issue can possibly

775 be in the national interests of the United States, and both

776 the Congress and the administration should come together on

777 a common program, in my view.

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778 Mr. Wolff. One point. When the discussions were held on
779 both the Saudi aircraft and on the Israeli aircraft, you are
talking about the low end of the spectrum and the high end
780 of the spectrum, were the Saudi aircraft factored into the
781 considerations at that time?
782 considerations at that time?

783 Dr. Kissinger. No, because the timing, the numbers were
784 not discussed with the Saudis when I was in office. What
the subject of discussion with the Saudis was the type of
785 airplane. The Israeli requests at that time were handled (see)
786 airplane. The Israeli requests at that time were handled
787 totally separately.
788 totally separately.

788 Mr. Fountain. The gentleman's time has expired.

789 Mr. Bingham.

790 Mr. Bingham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

791 Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to welcome you back to the
792 committee once again.

793 What is your conception of the nature of the assurances
794 that the Saudis will give us if this sale proceeds that
these aircraft will not be used against Israel?

796 Dr. Kissinger. I think that the nature of the assurances

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797 should really be discussed with the administration. My
798 understanding on which you, however, should not rely, is
799 that the Saudis ~~might be prepared to~~ would be prepared to
800 give assurances as to the basing of these aircraft, as to
801 the equipment of these aircraft, and maybe also with respect

802 to their intentions as to what comparable airplanes they
803 might forego buying in the time period of this sale. So
804 that this does not become just an addition. But the

805 assurances you should get specifically from the
806 administration.

807 Mr. Bingham. I was asking you though more with respect to
808 the assurances or the agreement that is entered into with
809 any recipient of FMS sales, that the equipment will not be
810 used except in terms of defense.

811 What is your understanding of that typical agreement?

812 Let me put the question this way: I understand that the

813 Saudis feel that this is not only an agreement not to use,

814 that the equipment will be used in their own defense, but

815 that it could be used in regional defense, which they would

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816 interpret as defense of the Arab Nation as a whole, which

817 would change the complexion very substantially.

818 Dr. Kissinger. I am just not familiar with the Saudi's
819 interpretation. I really think the authoritative statement
820 of this should come from the administration and not from me.

821 I have not discussed this with the Saudis myself, and it
822 wouldn't be appropriate for me to discuss this degree of
detail with the Saudis.

824 Mr. Bingham. Apart from this particular transaction, many
825 of these sales were entered into under your leadership.

826 What was your understanding of the nature of the
827 commitment that was made by the recipient with regard to the
828 use of American equipment?

829 Dr. Kissinger. Well, we did not as it happened, we were
830 not in a position to sell advanced airplanes to Arab

831 countries. So the question of the definition of regional
defense did not arise with respect to Saudi Arabia and

832 or
833 Egypt, and how it was handled. We did sell F-5s to Jordan,

834 and I frankly don't know what specific additional agreements

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835 were made. I have the impression that this issue never

836 arose with Jordan, but I frankly don't remember.

837 Mr. Bingham. Thank you.

838 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

839 The Chairman. Mr. Gilman.

840 Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

841 Dr. Kissinger, we certainly welcome having you back here.

842 We appreciate your expertise opinion on this very difficult
843 and complex issue.

844 With regard to the prior discussions with Israel, under

845 the Sinai II Agreement negotiations, when they discussed with
846 the Ford Administration the delivery of advanced,

847 sophisticated weaponry, were the discussions reduced to some
848 memorandum or letter of understanding?

849 Dr. Kissinger. There was a letter of understanding. There

850 was a memorandum of understanding which was published in

851 connection with the congressional hearings on the Sinai II

852 Agreement, and all the undertakings were submitted to the

853 committees. The relevant ones on military supply were all

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854 published, so that there are no agreements or commitments

855 that are not in the public domain.

856 Mr. Gilman. It was my impression, I think the Secretary
857 yesterday recited the fact that F-16s were contemplated as
858 part of the sophisticated weaponry that would be supplied.

859 Dr. Kissinger. Yes, there was a specific reference to F-
860 16s in the memorandum of agreement. We talked about the
861 request for advanced and sophisticated weapons, We said
862 such as F-16s. In the memorandum there was no specific
863 reference to numbers and timing, but the Israeli request
864 when I was in office was for 250 F-16s. We had not
865 addressed the numbers in detail, but the biggest hang-up at
866 the time was the request for co-production and not the
867 numbers.

868 Mr. Gilman. This was a further assurance to induce Israel
869 to give up some of the Sinai territory under Sinai II?

870 Dr. Kissinger. Well, it was a device to assure Israel
871 that it would in any case have needed more modern equipment,
872 and the fact is that Israel requested this sophisticated

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873 equipment prior to the Sinai Agreement, and given the past

874 history, it would certainly not have been all turned down.

875 But in connection with the Sinai Agreement, one was then

876 able to address the security problem in the new strategic

877 situation.

878 Mr. Gilman. Did our experts at the Pentagon review the

879 Israeli request and assess its validity? Did they place any

880 assessment?

881 Dr. Kissinger. They were in the process of reviewing it,

882 and I don't know what numbers, I don't remember what numbers

883 they came up with. My impression was it would have been

884 higher than 75.

885 Mr. Gilman. There have been some statements made with

886 regard to the present proposals that we are considering.

887 The Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Israel's more recent

888 request and have recommended 125 F-16s.

889 Had that number been discussed at all under the Sinai II

890 Agreement?

891 Dr. Kissinger. No. The only number that I heard was the

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892 Israeli number for 250 over--I forget what--7 or 8 years. I

893 do not remember that there was an independent assessment

894 from the Joint Chiefs, but there would have been one before

895 we completed the arrangement.

896 Mr. Gilman. At that time there was no proposal or any

897 request with regard to Saudi Arabia; is that correct?

898 Dr. Kissinger. Well, there were the technical discussion

899 that I have mentioned to Mr. Wolff. There was no formal

900 request from Saudi Arabia for a specific number or for

901 specific timing. As far as the Israelis were concerned,

902 their requests were certainly made without reference to any

903 potential sales to Saudi Arabia.

904 Mr. Gilman. And just so the record is quite clear, there

905 was no letter of understanding and no memorandum passed on

906 to the Saudi Arabian Government from our government with

907 regard to their request; is that correct?

908 Dr. Kissinger. That is correct, but at the same time, of

909 course, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense told them they

910 could proceed with the consideration of the F-15, there was

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911 sort of a moral commitment. But there is no memorandum of

912 understanding with which I am familiar.

913 Mr. Gilman. There was discussion in the newspaper

914 yesterday that the administration had proposed some

915 additional F-15s for Israel, 20, I believe, one squadron, to

916 be delivered subsequent to the time frame of the present

917 package, I believe in 1984-1985. And in listening to your

918 testimony today, I get the impression that that is wholly

919 inadequate with regard to the Israeli request.

920 Dr. Kissinger. I have no reason to say it is inadequate.

921 If the Israelis were to consider it adequate, I would

922 certainly not substitute my judgment here. I would think

923 that it would be better, now that the package route has been

924 taken, to complete the understanding in such a way that the

925 deliveries, at least in their greater part, are of the same

926 time frame as the deliveries to Saudi Arabia. But again I

927 would urge both the Congress and the administration to work

928 this out in a constructive spirit and not to let this whole

929 enterprise fail. I think it would really be very

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930 unfortunate for the United States.

931 Mr. Gilman. And in recommending an additional number of F-

932 16s, do you have any suggestion at all for our committee to

933 consider?

934 Dr. Kissinger. No. I think this is something that should

935 be discussed with the Joint Chiefs, with the Secretary of

936 Defense, and with the administration. I have no judgment of

937 my own.

938 Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

939 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

940 [Recessed to take up H.R. 12589.]

941 The Chairman. We return to our hearings.

942 Mr. Ryan.

943 Mr. Ryan. Discussing the Saudi arms sales, did not in

944 fact these arms sales discussions begin while you were

945 Secretary of State?

946 Dr. Kissinger. Oh, yes, definitely.

947 Mr. Ryan. And at what point did they become commitments

948 from the United States to the Saudis?

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949 Dr. Kissinger. This gets into a fine distinction as to
950 what you consider a commitment. I would certainly say there
951 as a more presumption that as the discussions proceeded and
952 as they moved into greater specificity, that the more
953 specific the discussions became, the more the presumption
954 was that ultimately a favorable decision would be taken. The
955 fact is there was no formal request by Saudi Arabia for a
956 specific number of planes until after our administration
957 left office.

958 Mr. Ryan. In January, if I recall, there are those here
959 on the committee who were there at the time, Prince Fahd
960 said to us when we met with him on our tours of the Mideast
961 that he had been requesting the same airplanes for 4 years,
962 and they could wait no longer. That would clearly, in my
963 mind, place that back into---

964 Dr. Kissinger. No, it is clear that he had been
965 requesting it for 4 years. The question is at what point
966 can you speak of a commitment? I am supporting the sale of
967 these planes, so I do not want to create----

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968 Mr. Ryan. I am just curious as to at what point they
969 began to speak of and to make the assumption there was a
970 specific commitment on our part for X number of airplanes to
971 their country.

972 Dr. Kissinger. If you are talking about a specific number
973 of airplanes, that could not possibly have arisen until the
974 current administration. That we would look favorably on
975 their request was a presumption that they had reasonably the
976 right to make on the basis of the discussions that took
977 place in the previous administration.

978 Mr. Ryan. What about the commitments to the Israelis, as
979 far as these same jets are concerned? When did that
980 discussion begin?

981 Dr. Kissinger. The discussion with the Israelis began
982 shortly after the Sinai Agreement in September 1975.

983 Mr. Ryan. Were those commitments made public at the same
time?

985 Dr. Kissinger. Substantially at the same time, within a
986 month. These commitments, these agreements, were put before

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987 the Congress, and hearings were held before this committee

988 and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in

989 connection with those hearings all the documents that are

990 relevant to the arms sales question were put before this

991 committee.

992 Mr. Ryan. The reason I asked the question is because

993 there has been substantial criticism within the House itself

994 here about the timing of these requests from Mr. Carter, and

995 I was surprised in January to hear that there had been

996 expectations from the Saudis for more than 4 years. I

997 wasn't aware of that, and I wonder if we are not getting

998 over into the area where the administration makes and has

999 made commitments on behalf of the Congress without informing

1000 the Congress.

1001 Now would you say there was anything like that that

1002 occurred during the time you were here?

1003 Dr. Kissinger. The procedure that has been followed in

1004 all arms sales, to the best of my knowledge, in the previous

1005 administration, as well as in this administration, is that

["NAME: HIR130000", "1006 the requests are not put before the Congress until the\n1007 administration has made a formal political decision to go\n1008 ahead with a specific number at a specific time and a\n1009 specific type.", "1010 Now this is usually preceded by extended, sometimes over a\n1011 period of years, discussions with the potential recipient as\n1012 to what type of plane they might wish. In the past these\nto what

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1025 of even the technical discussion
1026 Mr. Ryan. You are then flatly in favor of the package
1027 that has been presented by the President?
1028 Dr. Kissinger. With the additions that I have proposed,
1029 yes.
1030 Mr. Ryan. In the event that this package is not accepted
1031 by the Congress, I am going to ask you the same question I
1032 asked Secretary Vance yesterday.
1033 What do you anticipate will be the long-range effect if
1034 the Saudis do as they have said they will do and purchase
1035 the French airplanes instead?
1036 Dr. Kissinger. I think---
1037 Mr. Ryan. How it affects the U.S. and our relationship
1038 with them.
1039 Dr. Kissinger. I think, first of all, the restraints on
1040 the use of the planes would be much less in the case of
1041 France than they would be in the case of the United States.
1042 Secondly, symbolically I believe that the present
1043 orientation of the Saudi Government would be affected over a

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1044 period of time in the hundred little decisions that have to

1045 be made on an almost daily basis.

1046 Third, it would affect their perception of their security

1047 to the extent that they would be protected against threats

1048 from outside the area. Considering the tremendous economic

1049 and political influence of Saudi Arabia, I believe these

1050 would be extremely unfortunate consequences, and I hope the

1051 Congress will see fit not to reject this.

1052 Mr. Ryan. Thank you.

1053 The Chairman. Mrs. Collins.

1054 Mrs. Collins. Mr. Secretary, I have been receiving

1055 volumes of mail from many of my constituents in my district,

1056 and the central question that is raised by this mail is that

1057 some of them have suggested that by agreeing to sell these

1058 planes when a peace agreement has not yet been reached with

1059 Israel's neighbors would seem to be giving away our means of

1060 influence in the region.

1061 Do you agree with this?

1062 Dr. Kissinger. No, I would think that now rejecting it

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1063 would give away our influence in the region. I have already

1064 indicated doubts about the original timing, but in the

1065 circumstances in which we now find ourselves, if this is

1066 rejected by the Congress, our influence on the moderate

1067 states in the region would decline, and therefore our

1068 ability to affect the peace process would be reduced.

1069 Mrs. Collins. Another question that they have asked, they

1070 say that the administration contends that Saudi Arabia is

1071 not a confrontation state in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

1072 Do you agree with that?

1073 Dr. Kissinger. Saudi Arabia has not in the past acted as

1074 a confrontation state, nor has it been treated by Israeli

1075 a confrontation state.

1076 Mrs. Collins. If that is the case, why do you not agree

1077 with this? The next question is, why does approval of the

1078 Saudi sale require an increase in the number of planes for

1079 Israel?

1080 Dr. Kissinger. Partly because this has not been made a

1081 package, partly because even though, as I have pointed out,

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1082 the Saudis are undoubtedly sincere in the purposes that they
1083 assign to the airplane, the Israelis for purposes of their
1084 planning have to assume the worst contingency, and it seems
1085 to me we can therefore meet both of their concerns by the
1086 compromise which I have proposed.

1087 Since the Saudis do not perceive their primary threat to
1088 come from Israel, it will not concern them fundamentally
1089 whether there is an increase for the Israelis, and since the
1090 Israelis are worried about the worst contingency, they can
1091 be reassured by this additional number.

1092 Mrs. Collins. What is your response to questions that by
1093 selling these planes we will be contributing to the next
1094 Middle East war?

1095 Dr. Kissinger. I don't think that the next Middle East
1096 war depends on the sale of these planes. Whether there is a
1097 Middle East war or not depends on whether the peace process
1098 that is now underway will come to a successful conclusion.

1099 Mrs. Collins. Do you think that they will contribute to
1100 the peace process?

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1101 Dr. Kissinger. I think where we now stand it would be
1102 more inimical to the peace process to turn this request down
1103 than to support it.

1104 Mrs. Collins. Thank you very much.

1105 The Chairman. Mrs. Pettis.

1106 Mrs. Pettis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1107 Mr. Secretary, I have always considered you a very adroit
1108 negotiator.

1109 What assurances to the proposed sales do you believe would
1110 make the sales palatable to this Congress?

1111 Dr. Kissinger. I believe that if we could get assurances
1112 as to deployment of the planes so that they are clearly
1113 deployed in a manner that is directed against the threats
1114 that the Saudi Government has identified; secondly,
1115 equipment limitations that relate them to their air defense
1116 mission rather than to an attack mission; thirdly,
1117 assurances with respect to transfer to other countries in
1118 the region; and to the extent that it is possible,
1119 assurances that these are not part of a total package of

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1120 advanced aircraft, but that they may be in fact the only

1121 advanced aircraft that Saudi Arabia intends to buy during

1122 the period of delivery, I think these would all be positive

1123 contributions.

1124 Mrs. Pettis. What, in your opinion, would be the impact

1125 upon the Soviet intervention in Africa to the sale of combat

1126 aircraft in the Middle East?

1127 Dr. Kissinger. I don't think there would be any direct

1128 impact on the Soviet intervention in Africa, but the

1129 benefits that the Soviet Union might hope to derive from its

1130 intervention in Africa as far as the Middle East is

1131 concerned would be reduced.

1132 Mrs. Pettis. Do you believe that the potential French

1133 Mirage F-1 and Mirage 2000 sales to Saudi Arabia pose a

1134 greater security threat to Israel than the U.S. F-15 sale?

1135 Dr. Kissinger. In the sense that if Saudi Arabia is

1136 forced to purchase these airplanes, it would be within the

1137 context of a rebuff by the United States and therefore of a

1138 general reduction of our political influence, coupled with

NAME: HIR130000

1139 the fact that France would certainly not be able to exist on

1140 some of the sale limitations that I have discussed here.

1141 I think in the long run it would be a more severe threat,

1142 yes.

1143 Mrs. Pettis. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

1144 The Chairman. Mr. Solarz.

1145 Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1146 Dr. Kissinger, as you know, an effort has been underway in

1147 the last several days to see whether or not an accommodation

1148 can be worked out more or less along the lines which you

1149 have indicated you thought would be in the national

1150 interest.

1151 I would like to ask you briefly a number of questions

1152 designed to elicit your judgment, what would seem to me to

1153 be the cutting edge of that effort.

1154 I gather, first of all, your position is it is important

1155 for us to obtain some assurances that there will not only be

1156 additional F-15s available to the Israelis, but also

1157 additional F-16s as well.

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PAGE 356

1158 Dr. Kissinger. I would support this, yes.

1159 Mr. Solarz. How important is it in the context of this

1160 accommodation to get a commitment that the additional 15s

1161 and the additional 16s will be delivered to Israel within

1162 the time frame that has already been set out for the

1163 existing administration letter of offer, which would result

1164 in the 15s being delivered to Israel by the end of 1982 and

1165 the 16s by the end of 1983? Is it important to get the

1166 additional 15s and 16s within that time frame, or would it

1167 be acceptable if we had a commitment for the additional

1168 planes that would come in a year or two thereafter?

1169 Dr. Kissinger. To me it would seem the easiest solution

1170 to do it in the same time frame, because then any concerns

1171 that might exist about the balance would be reduced. If

1172 there are strong arguments why slipping it by a year would

1173 that is for technical reasons important, I think that should

1174 be discussed with the administration in a constructive

1175 spirit.

1176 I hope that neither the administration or the Congress

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[Y]

1177 will approach this with the attitude of who is going to win

1178 or lose, but with the attitude of solving a problem which is

1179 overwhelmingly in our national interests.

1180 Mr. Solarz. How important would it be to get some

1181 assurances designed to facilitate the financing and the

1182 purchase of these additional planes by the Israelis? As you

1183 know they have some difficult economic circumstances.

1184 Dr. Kissinger. I have frankly not reviewed the Israeli

1185 financial situation in order to make an adequate judgment.

1186 Mr. Solarz. We have gotten so far a commitment from the

1187 administration that the Saudis would not purchase additional

1188 foreign advanced aircraft until such time as deliveries of

1189 the F-15s were complete, and that we would not sell them

1190 additional advanced aircraft ourselves through the end of

1191 roughly 1983 when the last of the 15s would be delivered.

1192 How important is it, do you think, to get an additional

1193 assurance that in the past-1983 period, in the absence of

1194 any significant changes in the regional balance which would

1195 adversely affect the Saudis, there also wouldn't be any

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PAGE 358

1196 additional sales of advanced combat aircraft to them?

1197 I ask the question because within the framework of the
1198 existing commitments we have got from the administration, it

1199 wouldn't at all be inconceivable for the Saudis to place an
1200 order for 100 or so Mirage 2000s, which won't be ready in

1201 any case until 1984, and they would then be in a position to
1202 have gotten the 60 F-15s plus X number of additional

1203 Mirages, even in the absence of any changes in the threat to
1204 their security.

1205 Dr. Kissinger. Of course, again this is something in
1206 which the judgment of the administration would be much more
1207 valuable than my own, because they are presumably in daily

1208 contact with the Saudi Government. My *instinct* is that
1209 we are reaching the limit of what we can ask the sovereign

1210 government to do in return for one sale, and there is a
1211 danger that if we overstrain it, *that's* the request for
1212 assurances is going to undermine the purposes that one

1213 intends to serve.

1214 Mr. Solarz. How important would you say it would be for

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1215 us to get an assurance from the President that in the future

1216 arms sales will be submitted to the Congress on their own

1217 merits, and there will not be any effort to link arms sales

1218 in the future the way the administration attempted to in

1219 this instance?

1220 Dr. Kissinger. I think in the Middle East it is not in

1221 our interests in any event to link Saudi Arabia into the

1222 same military system as Israel, and I would think it would

1223 be better if, in the future, these requests were submitted

1224 on an individual basis so that they could be looked at on

1225 their merits, especially since the security threats as I

1226 have already discussed in relation to the question by Mr.

1227 Buchanan are really quite different for the various

1228 countries.

1229 Mr. Solarz. So you think it would be useful for us to get

1230 that kind of assurance from the President.

1231 Dr. Kissinger. Yes. I don't want to say that I would

1232 make the thing conditional on this, but it would certainly

1233 be helpful to discuss.

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PAGE 360

1234 Mr. Solarz. Now what do we do about the problem of
1235 getting assurances with respect to the assurances? What I
1236 have in mind is how important it is for us to have an
1237 assurance that in the event the Saudis renege on any of the
1238 assurances they have given us, which in a sense have been
1239 the condition for congressional approval, that we would then
1240 seek to utilize the ability we have to either terminate the
1241 supply of spares or to terminate the supply of the planes
1242 which haven't yet been delivered? In the absence of
1243 assurances on assurances, how much value does the original
1244 assurances have?

1245 Dr. Kissinger. I must say I have found that the Saudi
1246 Government has been meticulous in carrying out whatever
1247 agreements they have made in the period that I was in
1248 office, so I think Saudi assurances would be valuable.

1249 Now as to assurances on assurances, this is really
1250 something in which, if I went into great detail, I would be
doing something that I really shouldn't do, namely, trying
1251 to conduct the tactics of my successors. I think this is
1252 to conduct the tactics of my successors. I think this is

NAME: HIR130000

1253 something in which I would think that the Secretary of State

1254 would have the same interests as the committee in working to work it

1255 out in a constructive way.

1256 Mr. Solarz. One final question, if I might.

1257 During the course of the hearings yesterday, the committee

1258 was given a number of assurances by Secretary Vance and

1259 Secretary Brown that were not explicitly spelled out in the

1260 draft letter from Secretary Brown to the committee that

1261 would contain the assurances we had been asking for.

1262 My question is, in your judgment, how important is it for

1263 us to have the assurances which we have been seeking, in

1264 whatever letter is ultimately sent containing the

1265 assurances, or is it satisfactory for us to get assurances,

1266 some of which are given in the context of public hearings

1267 and others of which are given in the context of this kind of

1268 letter?

1269 Dr. Kissinger. I think we have seen in the Panama

1270 hearings that if assurances are pushed beyond a certain

1271 point, they can have a counterproductive effect, and so I

NAME: HIR130000

1272 think one ought to be sure that the administration doesn't

1273 give assurances that are not backed up by the government

1274 concerned, and isn't pushed to give assurances.

1275 My impression is that we are approaching the limit of what

1276 can reasonably be asked. I don't know what assurances you

1277 are referring to that go beyond what I have mentioned. As a

1278 general rule it is better to express them in writing, but I

1279 am sure that some formal record exists of what has been

1280 said. And how that is expressed between the administration

1281 and the committee, I really haven't thought through.

1282 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

1283 Mr. Danielson.

1284 Mr. Danielson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1285 I have no questions. I came in late and missed out on a

1286 great deal of the testimony.

1287 The Chairman. Mr. Findley.

1288 Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, this committee just reported

1289 a bill on foreign assistance, which involves the Middle

1290 East. During your term as Secretary of State, this

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1291 committee eliminated its earmarking of funds to just one
1292 state, Israel. It has seen fit to earmark each of the funds
1293 for each country in the Middle East. I am concerned about
1294 that heavy earmarking for fear it may limit the ability of
1295 our President to use whatever resources are represented in
1296 that authorization to advance the peace process.

1297 Would you have any comment on the effect of earmarking
1298 from the standpoint of the executive branch in being an
effective influence on negotiations?

1300 Dr. Kissinger. I really haven't addressed this question.

1301 As a general rule, I prefer a considerable amount of
1302 executive latitude on these issues, but I really have not
1303 addressed this question specifically.

1304 Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, I know you may not be eager
to comment publicly in further detail on the issue of the
1305 Turkish arms embargo, but this may well be your last
1306 appearance before this committee prior to the very fateful
time when the House does vote on the question. Thanks in
1307 part to your own expression of support, this committee by a
1308 part to your own expression of support, this committee by a

NAME: HIR130000

1310 vote of 18 to 17 adopted an amendment that I am sure will be

1311 tested on the House floor.

1312 I view that issue as having very high importance for our

1313 national security.

1314 Would you comment on how important you rate the repeal of

1315 the embargo from the standpoint of U.S. security interests?

1316 Dr. Kissinger. First, let me say I consider both Greece

1317 and Turkey important to the security of the United States

1318 and the Eastern Mediterranean. I believe that a

1319 continuation of the embargo will, first of all, irrevocably

1320 end the intelligence facilities we have in Turkey, which

1321 have proved almost indispensable, at least when I was in

1322 office, for monitoring of the SALT agreements, and for

1323 certain intelligence information during especially Middle

1324 East crises.

1325 Secondly, Turkey is a country in a crucial strategic

1326 position, which if it moved towards neutralism and some form

1327 of radical Pan-Islamic approach, which would be its

1328 alternatives, would change the security map of NATO and of

NAME: HIR130000

1329 the Mediterranean in an absolutely fundamental way, and

1330 therefore I support the proposal to end the embargo.

1331 Mr. Findley. If you were, say, the Senator from New York,

1332 called upon to explain to a Greek-American constituent that

1333 position, would you add any other comments?

1334 Dr. Kissinger. My ability to convince Greek-American

1335 constituents has not been the most outstanding attribute of

1336 my public career.

1337 Mr. Findley. We have all encountered that problem,

1338 although I have found that a number of Greek-Americans do

1339 support the repeal of the embargo, and I wish they would

1340 speak up more forcibly than they have. They perceive I

1341 think that a larger threat to their interests lies in the

1342 Soviet Union to whose pressures they would be much more

1343 greatly exposed if the Turkish drift-away from the West

1344 continues.

1345 Would you agree with that assessment?

1346 Dr. Kissinger. I have always believed that the embargo

1347 prevented a settlement of the Cyprus issue in 1974, and

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PAGE 366

1348 therefore was in the long term against the interests also of

1349 Greece. I am bound to add, of course, that a neutralist,

1350 extremely nationalistic Turkey would also be in the longer

1351 term a greater threat to the security of Greece.

1352 Now I have not been able to persuade all the Greeks to

1353 whom I talked about it when I was in office to my point of

1354 view in this matter, but this would be my perception of it.

1355 Mr. Findley. Mr. Secretary, we have great need as a

1356 Nation for a dependable military base in the Mediterranean

1357 area, and I have noticed with interest that occasionally

1358 there will surface the idea that as a part of a

1359 comprehensive settlement of the Middle East the U.S. might

1360 acquire base rights in that region, Israel, Sinai perhaps.

1361 Would you have any comment upon the utility of a U.S.

1362 military base as an element of a comprehensive settlement?

1363 Dr. Kissinger. I have not thought this through

1364 completely. My initial feeling with respect to it is that

1365 we should be very *leery* about putting a military base in any

1366 of the countries that are now in confrontation, especially

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PAGE 367

1367 if we then intend to use this base for purposes outside the

1368 region. It will focus all of the international pressures on

1369 these bases. It will create a high incentive to undermine

1370 it. It ~~will~~ eventually has a potential of turning ~~our~~

1371 nationalistic feelings against us. And I would be very

1372 uneasy about establishing a base merely in order to get a

1373 settlement facilitated at one particular point of time.

1374 Now if all the parties asked us to do it, and if we have

1375 fully talked out the long-term implications, I might be

1376 persuaded. But my initial impression is that this would be

1377 an unwise move to make.

1378 Mr. Findley. Thank you.

1379 The Chairman. Mr. Fascell.

1380 Mr. Fascell. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

1381 Mr. Chairman. Mr. Pease.

1382 Mr. Pease. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1383 Mr. Secretary, I just have a couple of questions. There

1384 was some discussion before, during the question and answer

1385 period, about limitations on the F-15s.

NAME: HIR130000

1386 Were you referring to limitations on the F-15s for the
1387 Saudis or also would you contemplate limitations on the F-
1388 15s for Israel?

1389 Dr. Kissinger. I have already addressed that question. I
1390 have been talking in terms of the context of the limitations
1391 on the Saudi planes.

1392 Mr. Pease. Then you would see no need to limit the
1393 offensive or defensive configuration of the planes going to
1394 Israel?

1395 Dr. Kissinger. I do not know what the configuration is
1396 of the planes going to Israel. I remember when I was in
1397 office I favored giving the F-15s an air-to-ground
1398 capability, the F-15s that were going to Europe. I thought
1399 it was in our interest. At that time that concept was
1400 resisted by the Air Force, which preferred to keep them in a
1401 defensive mode. So I tend to associate in my own thinking
1402 the F-15 with an air defense role. But again on this, you
1403 would have to get technical advice to know whether my
1404 impression is correct. I think this is inherent in the F-

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[Y]

1405 15, and they would have to be modified in order to do a

1406 ground support role. I do not know whether the planes being

1407 sold to Israel are being modified.

1408 Mr. Pease. I see. Recently I had occasion to talk with

1409 an official of Israel who came to see me in my office, very

1410 concerned about the sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia. His

1411 point was that if Saudi Arabia had F-15s, and if Israel got

1412 involved in another shooting conflict with any of the other

1413 Arab States, Jordan or Syria or Egypt, that Israel would

1414 have no choice but to make a preemptive strike against the

1415 Saudi F-15s to make sure they never got off the ground,

1416 whether or not Saudi Arabia entered into a conflict with

1417 Israel.

1418 Would you consider that that would be a violation of our

1419 arms sales agreements with Israel, and do you think that, as

1420 part of this whole package, we ought to seek assurances from

1421 Israel that that won't happen?

1422 Dr. Kissinger. The question of what constitutes a

1423 defensive use of weapons is one which it is very difficult

NAME: HIR130000

1424 to define, and whether in an extremity a nation that feels
1425 there is a danger of attack and then preempts, whether that
it
1426 is defensive or technically an offensive use, that I would
1427 consider it very difficult for the Congress to prescribe.
1428 This should be left to the administration which will be in
1429 office when that contingency arises, which I hope it will
1430 not, but, of course, it works both ways.
1431 Mr. Pease. Well, would you say that there would be
1432 situations then under which Israel would be justified in
1433 carrying out a preemptive attack on the Saudi F-15s in the
1434 absence of any threat, any overt threat at all, from the
1435 Saudis?
1436 Dr. Kissinger. In the absence of an overt threat by the
1437 Saudis, I would think that it would be hard to imagine a
1438 justification for a preemptive strike, and I would hope in
1439 any event that we will address our creative thinking to how
1440 peace can be achieved in the area. If no peace is achieved
1441 within the context of the negotiations which the initiative
1442 of President Sadat opened last year, then we will, in any

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PAGE 371

1443 case, face a situation in which a lot of things will have to

1444 be thought through.

1445 On the other hand, if peace is achieved, or major progress

1446 towards peace is achieved, many of these questions will have

1447 a completely different connotation, and this, I hope, will

1448 be the situation when these planes are being delivered.

1449 Mr. Pease. Thank you.

1450 Mr. Secretary, I have just one other question.

1451 You said in response I believe to a question from Mr.

1452 Rosenthal that great consideration needs to be placed on the

1453 importance of Saudi Araba, I think Egypt but at least Saudi

1454 Arabia, to our own national security and the national

1455 security of other nations in terms of approving the Saudi

1456 sale.

1457 Obviously, in relation to Israel we have a great many ties

1458 and a great many loyalties historically.

1459 Are there, in your mind, national security considerations

1460 vis-a-vis Israel that come into play here, our national

1461 security?

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PAGE 372

1462 Dr. Kissinger. Yes, I believe that the destruction of a

1463 friendly democracy in the Middle East whose purposes have

1464 been supported by seven succeeding administrations, ~~that~~

1465 that too would raise the most grievous doubts about the

1466 possibilities of support by the United States, ~~Therefore,~~ and I

1467 consider that the continued support of the security and

1468 survival of Israel must be a fixed ~~aspect~~ of our policy.

1469 RPTR HANBACK

1470

1471 Mr. Pease. Very good. Thank you very much.

1472 The Chairman. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Winn.

1473 Mr. Winn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1474 Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that this whole problem

1475 might have been much easier to solve if the Administration

1476 had not sent us a package deal and testified several times

1477 that we wanted to keep all of these sales together.

1478 Immediately, they are waving a flag in the front of the

1479 eyes of the Members of Congress because that does not give

1480 us a thorough chance to work our way and our will on each of

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PAGE 373

1481 the three packages. I don't know exactly how exactly how we
1482 will receive this now, probably separately.

1483 I signed the so-called Fascell Resolution for another
1484 reason, hoping that if we postponed or put on the back
1485 burner for some time, for a while, the sale to all three
1486 countries that possibly we could use that time period to
1487 take advantage of any openings with the peace talks.

1488 Do you feel that if we did postpone it, the second
1489 question would be say until the first of the year, 1979, do
1490 you think we could use that time to our advantage to get a
1491 start, open up the peace talks again in a real industrious
1492 way?

1493 Dr. Kissinger. One has to balance what one really has to
1494 judge is whether rejecting it, which is what it would amount
to, postponing to the first of January, would improve the
1495 atmosphere for peace talks or make them more difficult.

1497 I think in the frustration and bitterness that would be
1498 engendered by such a rejection or postponement the prospect
1499 for the peace talks would be weakened. This is why I hope

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PAGE 374

1500 the Congress will proceed with it within the time period

1501 that is now before it.

1502 Mr. Winn. Don't you think there could be some type of an

1503 understanding with the three countries involved that after

1504 the first of the year possibly we would take each individual

1505 sale separately and that we would bring it up and do

1506 something shortly after the first of the year?

1507 Dr. Kissinger. Again, I think the Administration's

1508 judgment on this would be better than mine, since they are

1509 in contact on a much more regular and certainly much more

1510 formal basis than I with all of the parties concerned. My

1511 instinct would be based on some previous experiences that

1512 several of the countries would consider such postponement a

1513 very uncertain commitment, and that they would treat it as a

1514 rejection rather than as a postponement.

1515 Mr. Winn. That being the case, the other alternative is

1516 to do what you have mentioned, and what has been discussed

1517 by Members from the other body in meetings at the White

1518 House and between some Members of this committee in the

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PAGE 375

1519 behind the scenes negotiations for the last few days, is to

1520 vote the package deal out with an understanding or including

1521 additional sales of airplanes to the Israelis.

1522 I think that probably is about what is going to happen.

1523 But that does not seem to me to bring forth any additional

1524 pressures or anybody to resume the peace talks, to me just

1525 the opposite.

1526 Dr. Kissinger. I don't think the opposite. I think under

1527 present circumstances it will be encouraging, at least the

1528 moderate Arabs, and with the additions I have indicated it

1529 would contribute to the Israeli sense of security, which is

1530 in turn helpful to any territorial changes in any peace

1531 negotiation makes inevitable. So, the pressures that make

1532 for a settlement will not come primarily in the arms area.

1533 They will come from what the various parties consider their

1534 risks to be as this uncertain situation continues.

1535 Mr. Winn. There is bound to be a linkage there

1536 somewhere.

1537 Dr. Kissinger. To some extent, but the deliveries of

NAME: HIR130000

1538 these planes for any of the countries will not really start

1539 before 1980, and if these negotiations were still bogged

1540 down in 1980, then I think serious developments could occur.

1541 Mr. Winn. I am not one of those who thinks or is too

1542 concerned about the arms sales to Saudi Arabia because they

1543 would then become aggressors, but I am concerned about their

1544 tie with Syria, and I don't know, I suppose it's possible,

1545 although I doubt they would do it, somehow get those

1546 airplanes, even though they could not transfer them, they

1547 might do it illegally somewhere or make them move, transfer

1548 those airplanes to Syria.

1549 Dr. Kissinger. As I understand it, and again there are

1550 other people with greater technical competence, as I

1551 understand it, these airplanes really require very expensive

1552 ground support equipment, and I have been told it is not

1553 really possible to fly these airplanes unless you have the

1554 supporting structure behind them. So I would think

1555 transferring them to Syria is unlikely.

1556 Again, I must say my experience during the disengagement

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PAGE 377

1557 negotiations with Syria, Saudi Arabia, played an extremely *that*
reaching
1558 helpful role in the disengagement agreement. After all, one
*that agreement*
1559 forgets now, will have lasted four years in just a few
*time,*
1560 weeks, and has had quite a stabilizing effect too. So that-
1561 the Saudi relationship to Syria has also on *occasion, on*
1562 most occasions been one of restraint.

1563 Mr. Winn. Thank you very much, Doctor.

1564 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1565 The Chairman. Mr. Danielson?

1566 Mr. Danielson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1567 Dr. Kissinger, I am going to ask you to use your crystal
crystal
1568 ball, if you choose to do so.

1569 I have noted in this discussion in the last few weeks a

1570 great deal of Israeli opposition to the sale of aircraft to

1571 the Arab states, but practically none on the other way

1572 around.

1573 From that I obviously infer that the Israel sense of

1574 security is offended by this sale. But that the Saudi and

1575 Egyptian people do not have that same fear, perhaps, of an

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PAGE 378

1576 attack from Israel.
1577 Now, make one assumption: Let's assume that our goals are
1578 realized and we have a real peace in the Middle East between
1579 all of these parties. Can you foresee a time, after peace
1580 is established, when there will be enough amnity between
1581 these parties so the Israelis would not fear attack from the
1582 Arab states, where they can get together, let us say, as
1583 friends?
1584 Dr. Kissinger. If you look at the history of these
1585 peoples, it's understandable that after 30 years of non-
1586 recognition, after four wars, there would be very profound
1587 suspicions.
1588 On the other hand, who would have thought that within less
1589 than a year of the Sadat visit to Jerusalem there could
1590 already be such a change of atmosphere that it has happened
1591 between those two people in the sense that the Israeli Defense
1592 Minister can take a plane and fly to Cairo? It would have
1593 been considered unthinkable.
1594 I believe one of the incentives Egypt has for its peace

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1595 initiative is to reduce its military expenditures. I am
1596 positive Israel has the same motivation, when a really
1597 extraordinary percentage of its GNP has to be devoted to
1598 defense, so I can envisage that there will be a reduction of
1599 military expenditures in conditions of peace.
1600 Now, what makes the Israeli problem somewhat more
1601 complicated is that even if they make peace with some of the Arab
1602 states, there will still be the so-called rejectionist front.
1603 Iraq, Lybia, and it is not clear where Syria stands, as
1604 Syria has not joined them really. And so Israel will live
1605 for a while in a twilight world. But I think if progress is
1606 made towards peace with respect to several of the other of
1607 the Arab countries, that this will have a calming effect on
1608 the whole area and lead to a reduction of military
1609 expenditures.
1610 Mr. Danielson. I appreciate your comments there. As I
1611 see this picture, I don't think we will ever have a real and
1612 lasting peace until all of these countries recognize and
1613 accept the fact, mutually accept the fact of the existence,

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PAGE 380

1614 the continuing existence of each of the other countries and,

1615 hopefully, can work out some economic cooperation.

1616 The economic problems of Egypt, of Israel, or of Saudi

1617 Arabia or of Jordan are such that I feel they are going to

1618 have to work together almost closely, and that is why my

1619 concern. If we do work out a peace, perhaps the Israeli

1620 sense of security will not be so acute, in that they accept

1621 the fact that the Arab states likewise have problems.

1622 Dr. Kissinger. I agree with you that peace in the Middle

1623 East is overwhelmingly in the interest of all of the

1624 countries concerned, and I think that Israel really

1625 understands this as well as the Arabs.

1626 They have just lived under the conditions of seige for so

1627 long that for them the adjustment is complex. But there is

1628 no people that can want it more.

1629 Mr. Danielson. Thank you very much.

1630 The Chairman. The Chair has promised that the Secretary,

1631 former Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, would be excused

1632 at twelve o'clock.

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PAGE 381

1633 I see Mr. Cavanaugh now. The Chair will recognize Mr.

1634 Cavanaugh.

1635 I understand Mr. Solarz has another question or questions,

1636 but before recognizing Mr. Cavanaugh, I might preempt with

1637 an expression I want to share with the Secretary.

1638 Yesterday when we had Secretary of State Vance here some

1639 Members expressed their esteem, admiration, unbounding

1640 respect and affection for Secretary Vance, and I want to at

1641 this time, and I am sure I speak for most of the Members,

1642 certainly for the Chairman, that we likewise have the

1643 greatest esteem, admiration and unbounding respect and

1644 affection for you, Dr. Kissinger.

1645 Mr. Cavanaugh?

1646 Mr. Cavanaugh. Mr. Chairman, having just arrived, I

1647 would, if the Chair would indulge me, yield to Mr. Solarz

1648 for a minute, and reserve my time following.

1649 Dr. Kissinger. I will stay until ten after.

1650 The Chairman. I was about to say until the Secretary

1651 would agree to stay a bit longer, you would be preempted.

NAME: HIR130000

1652 The opportunity of asking a question, knowing Mr. Steve
1653 Solarz probably has more than one question, but do you want
to take the chance?
1654
1655 The Chair recognizes Mr. Solarz.
1656 Mr. Solarz. I will limit myself to two brief questions,
1657 Mr. Chairman.
1658 First, Dr. Kissinger, to your knowledge, did the Ford
1659 Administration in any way, shape, manner or form make a
commitment to the Saudis to provide them with F-15 aircraft?
1660
1661 Dr. Kissinger. I would think that there was certainly a
1662 moral presumption created by the technical discussions. I
don't want to get into a debate on what is or is not a
commitment. It was certainly not on the same level as the
formal
1664
1665 commitments to Israel.
1666 At the same time, when you engage in discussions extending
1667 over a period of time, you create a presumption, that
1668 creates a moral obligation, whatever the legal situation is.
1669 There was, however, an explicit not an understanding as to
timing and numbers, which is always left to political

NAME: HIR130000

1671 discussions.

1672 Mr. Solarz. My last question is this:

1673 As you know, the Saudis participated on a somewhat token
basis in both the 1967 and 1973 Wars. Of course, at that

time their military establishment was not the most powerful

1676 armed force in the Middle East.

1677 Do you think if another Arab-Israeli War should break out

1678 say sometime in the 1980's after the delivery of these 15's,

1679 after the Saudis have acquired literally billions of dollars

1680 of military equipment that they didn't have previously and

1681 became a somewhat more significant military force in the

1682 region, that even if they would privately prefer to avoid

1683 getting involved in a very significant way in another Arab-

1684 Israeli war that they will be able to politically resist the

1685 demands of the confrontation states to commit their forces,

1686 including the 15's and other military equipment they have

1687 got in the interim to the struggle against Israel?

1688 Dr. Kissinger. It depends really on the circumstances at

1689 the time. I am convinced that the present Saudi Government

NAME: HIR130000

PAGE 384

1690 perceives its security threat to come primarily or almost
1691 exclusively from either radical Arab states or from outside
1692 of the area.

1693 What might happen in the '80's, if either that government
1694 were to change or pressures multiply, I would not want flatly
to say, but this depends partly also on our policy, and it
depends on, I hope very much that another Arab-Israeli war
can be avoided, because if it is not, whether or not Saudi
Arabia participates militarily, the economic and other
consequences of it for the industrial democracies would be
extremely severe.

1701 There is no question Saudi Arabia would be under severe
pressure to join.
1702 It would be wrong to pretend it would not be.

1703 Mr. Solarz. Thank you very much.

1704 The Chairman. Mr. Cavanaugh?

1705 Mr. Cavanaugh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1706 Mr. Secretary, I apologize for not having been here before
1707 for all of your testimony and, therefore, my questions may
have been covered previously.

NAME : NIK130000

PAGE 385

1709 But I, too, am concerned about the nature of the
1710 commitment of the Ford Administration and during your tenure
1711 as Secretary of State to the Saudis.
1712 Would you have considered a failure of the Carter
1713 Administration to make the proposal that they have regarding
1714 the Saudi sale a repudiation of commitments or obligations
1715 which you andn the Ford Administration had extended to the
1716 Saudis?
1717 Dr. Kissinger. I would think that the issue is not
1718 whether the Administration was legally obliged to continue
1719 on this procedure. After all, there are other things that
1720 were done in the previous Administration that ~~they~~ did not
1721 necessarily feel ~~in~~ the present Administration had to be
1722 continued, which is perfectly proper when a new
1723 Administration comes in.
1724 I would have thought that it would have been unwise to
1725 reject it totally. I would have, however, believed that the
1726 ~~timing~~ and the numbers would have to be left to the judgment
1727 of the people that are in office, and I have not, in fact,