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PR 482

-- because upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being of the industrial nations and the hopes of the developing world; and

-- because tension in the Middle East increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk.

Each successive Middle East crisis has presented us with painful choices between our many commitments and interests. And each successive crisis accelerates the trends of radicalism in the area, putting greater pressures on America's friends in the moderate Arab world, and heightening all the tensions and dangers.

The stake of every American in peace in the Middle East was dramatically and concretely illustrated by the Middle East war of 1973:

-- The oil embargo, coupled with the OPEC price increases, cost Americans half a million jobs and over ten billion dollars in national output. It added at least five percentage points to the price index, contributing to the worst inflation since World War II. It set the stage for a serious worldwide recession, from which we are only now recovering two years later.

-- Partly because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil, our principal allies in Western Europe and Japan separated from us over Middle East policy, in the most serious strain in our alliances since they were founded.

-- The 1973 crisis tested the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, leading us briefly to the verge of confrontation in the October 24 alert.

The October War also set in train momentum that is now irreversible. Events can be channeled toward diplomatic progress, or they can pull us headlong towards another war.

This is why the United States since October 1973 has been actively engaged in promoting a peaceful solution.

We have no illusions about the difficulties. The Middle East has seen more than its share of dashed hopes and disappointment. But progress depends crucially -- even decisively -- on the United States. Time and again, the parties have turned to us for mediation. Time and again we have acceded to these requests because we are convinced that stagnation invites disaster. The next Middle East war will pose greater risks, complexities and dangers and cause more dislocations than any previous conflict.

What, then, has been our approach?

For nearly three decades it was axiomatic that *all* issues pertaining to *all* the countries involved had to be addressed comprehensively: the final frontiers of Israel and the reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab states, the future of the Palestinians, the status of Jerusalem, and the question of international guarantees should all be considered together.

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PR 482

But for 30 years it proved nearly impossible even to begin the process of negotiation. Every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed -- from the Partition Plan, to the Lausanne Conference, to the Rogers Plan, and the Four Powers talks of 1969 and 70, to the UN Security Council deliberations. To discuss simultaneously issues of such complexity, between countries whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even the concept of compromise, was futile until a minimum of confidence had been established. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel, and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant dream.

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The United States therefore concluded that instead of seeking to deal with all problems at once we should proceed step by step with the parties prepared to negotiate and on the issues where some room for maneuver seemed possible. We believed that once the parties began a negotiating process, they would develop a stake in success. Solutions to problems more easily negotiable would build mutual confidence. On each side a sense would grow that negotiations could produce benefits and that agreements would be kept -- agreements that could become building blocks for a final peace.

Ultimately we expected that the step-by-step process would bring about, for the first time, the basic political conditions needed for the overall settlement called for by Security Council Resolution 338. This remains our goal.

Progress since the October War has been without precedent since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council Resolution 338 launched a negotiating process and the first Geneva Conference. Agreements to separate the opposing forces and establish UN buffer zones to strengthen the ceasefire were successfully negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Syria and Israel in May 1974.

The role of the United States was crucial in helping the parties reach these agreements. It reflected the fact that only we had developed strong relationships of trust with all parties. Major Arab countries that broke diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore their ties with us, creating a new climate of confidence and thereby the conditions for progress. And our traditional friendship with Israel has been reinforced in the crucible of crisis and the long months of close association in negotiations.

The momentum of progress was interrupted in the summer and fall of 1974: first by our Presidential succession; then by the decision of the Arab Summit at Rabat which made negotiations over the West Bank impossible.

When negotiations were resumed in March of this year, they first ended in deadlock. We therefore reexamined our approach asking whether we should continue the step-by-step strategy or move directly to the Geneva Conference and a comprehensive approach. The imminent crisis we feared as a result of the March deadlock did not materialize -- almost solely because everyone expected that the United States, in one way or another, would resume its effort.

The President consulted widely -- with Congressional and civic leaders, with our Ambassadors from the area, and with the Middle East parties. He met with King Hussein, President Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin, and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. We benefitted from the views of the new Saudi leadership which is continuing the policy of the highly respected late King Faisal.

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The President concluded that the time was still not ripe for a compre-
hensive approach. In the wake of an apparent failure, the intractability
of the issues would only be compounded by their being combined. Bringing
all the parties, including the most irreconcilable, together in one
dramatic public negotiation was an invitation to a deepened stalemate.
This could discredit the whole process of negotiation and create a slide
towards war. It was widely understood that the momentum of diplomatic
progress had to be restored before Geneva was convened to consider the
broader issues.

Therefore, at the request of both sides the United States resumed its
step-by-step effort. The result was the new agreement between Egypt and
Israel which was signed in Geneva on September 4.

The agreement is fair and balanced.

-- Territorially, it provides for withdrawal of Israeli forces from
the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic Sinai
passes. Egypt recovers a significant portion of its territory,
including the economically important oil fields.

-- Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the ceasefire. It widens
the buffer zone and extends the limitations of forces that were
negotiated in the Disengagement Agreement of January 1974. These
balanced provisions markedly reduce the danger of surprise attack
that figured centrally in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

-- Politically, the agreement -- which remains in force until it
is superseded by another one -- commits both sides to a peaceful
solution to the Middle East conflict, and to refrain from use or
threat of force or of military blockade. It permits non-military
Israeli cargoes to go through the newly reopened Suez Canal.

Both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have hailed the agreement as a possible turning point. It represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace -- political, military and psychological -- in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, Israel and an Arab state have taken a step, not just to halt fighting or to disentangle the forces but to reduce the danger of future war and to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of the conflict. The effort that went into it and the inhibitions that both sides had to overcome reflect a serious determination to end a generation of violence. And both sides have affirmed that the agreement is a significant step in a process that must be continued toward a just and durable peace.

The achievement owes much to the courage of leaders on both sides.
President Sadat and his Government moved Egypt on the path of moderation
and development; they have understood that a political process offered
the only realistic hope for the achievement of <u>all</u> Arab interests.

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Credit is due equally to the courage of Prime Minister Rabin and the Government of Israel. Israel's dilemma is that to obtain peace it must give up tangible assets such as territory for intangible concessions such as assurances and recognition. Israel's leaders realized that only negotiation offered a hope to achieve what Israel has sought for 27 years -- new political conditions that would mean acceptance by its neighbors, in return for withdrawal from territory. They had the wisdom to recognize that the time had come to start this difficult, even painful process.

The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the early-warning system in the small area of the passes is a limited -- but crucial -- American responsibility. It was not a role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides only when it became totally clear that there would be no agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the United States.

In the aftermath of Indochina the concerns of some Americans about this presence are understandable. But the two cases are totally different. The American presence in the Sinai is not a step into conflict; it is a move which gives added insurance against conflict. It is limited to 200 volunteer civilians by agreement with both sides. They will be stationed in a small but important sector of the UN neutral zone. They are not combat personnel or advisors engaged on one side of an ongoing war. They serve both sides at their request and complement the UN presence from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria and Finland.

Our presence in the area is not new. Indeed 36 Americans are at this moment serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The agreement provides the President the right to withdraw the American personnel if they are in jeopardy. We are prepared, as well, to accept a Congressional proposal making the withdrawal mandatory in case of hostilities.

In short, what we have proposed to the Congress and the American people is not an engagement in war, but an investment in peace.

There will also be deliberation in the Congress over military and economic assistance to the parties. We will submit our recommendations within a month. This assistance is not part of the agreement, itself. Indeed, most of the assistance we shall request would have been sought even if there were no agreement. But in the present context our aid takes on new significance; it is central to our policy and vital to the chances for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Economic and military support for Israel's security has been American policy during five Administrations. Last May, 76 US Senators wrote to President Ford urging that the United States "be responsive to Israel's

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PR #482

urgent economic and military needs." The Administration's request for new assistance to Israel is responsive to this call; it will reflect long-standing criteria of assistance; only a small part grows out of new requirements arising from the agreement.

The case for aid to Egypt is equally strong. Egypt has taken important steps towards peace and closer relations with the West. Egypt deserves our encouragement. American technology and capital, public and private, can strengthen all the constructive tendencies in the Middle East. The symbolic and substantive significance of American support to Egypt is immeasurable.

Thus, the additional burden of US assistance is modest -- infinitely smaller than the demonstrated costs of another war which in 1973 required direct appropriations to Israel of $2.2 billion in addition to the indirect costs. But its role is crucial. It reduces the incentives for war; it, too, is an investment in peace.

Where do we go from here?

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step in a continuing process. The agreement states explicitly that the parties shall continue the negotiating efforts to reach an overall, final peace settlement in accordance with Resolution 338.

The path ahead will be difficult. In the immediate future, we must begin the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. This must await the deliberation and decision of the Congress. When this is settled and if the agreement goes into effect, we will start our consultations with all concerned to assure that there is consensus on the next step. We will not move precipitously, because we want confidence to build. We will not move without careful preparation, because we want the process to continue to succeed.

But the effort to achieve a lasting peace must resume. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement has created new opportunities for the future -- but these opportunities must be seized, or they will disappear. The United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace but to give it new impetus. There can be no stagnation for the area remains tense and volatile.

For our part, we stand ready to assist as the parties desire. We will seriously encourage a negotiation between Syria and Israel. We are prepared to consult all countries concerned including the Soviet Union, about the timing and substance of a reconvened Geneva Conference. And we are fully aware that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

The United States seeks no special advantage in the Middle East. It has always been our policy that the nations of the region should be free to determine their own relationships with any outside power. Therefore

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the United States would not understand and would be obliged to oppose efforts by any outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

In the search for a final peace, the United States is prepared to work with the Soviet Union. We are co-sponsors of the Security Council Resolutions that launched this hopeful course of negotiation; we are co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference which met at an early crucial phase. While we have had important differences with the Soviet Union over the substance of a settlement, our two countries have held parallel views that the Middle East situation poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of, and contribute to, progress towards a comprehensive solution.

In the Middle East there is a yearning for peace surpassing any known for a generation. Let us seize this historic opportunity. The suffering and bravery of the peoples of the Middle East demand it; the highest interests of the United States require it.

This is why the American people, their Congress, and the President are, to an extraordinary degree, united on the course of our Middle East policy. And this is why we will not cease our effort.

## Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, we Americans have spent the better part of a decade apologizing to ourselves and the world for what we thought we had become. We have spent most of the last three years enmeshed in a national tragedy that caused many to lose sight of what our country has meant, and continues to mean, to the billions abroad who look to the United States as a beacon of freedom and hope.

Today, the issues that threatened our unity and confidence are in the process of being put behind us. A world of turmoil, danger and opportunity cries out for our purposeful leadership. There is no doubt of our physical capacity and technical skill. But we must put them in the service of a common purpose.

After a decade of challenge and crises, we must strive to ensure that our Government will be united, that our people will have confidence, that our country will be strong, and that our freedoms will flourish. As we enter the year of a political campaign at home -- and an era of unprecedented challenge abroad -- a spirit of unity and bipartisanship becomes our international as well as national duty. We cannot afford a year and a half of partisan warfare. Our foreign policy must be a common enterprise of all Americans, for what we do -- or fail to do -- will inevitably affect events for many years to come.

If the past two years of effort in the Middle East have lessened the dangers of war and set that part of the world on the road to peace -- as I pray they have -- it is the United States that has made the difference. It is the United States alone among the world's nations that Israel and its Arab neighbors were prepared to trust. It has been

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deeply moving for me to observe, after all the travails and self-doubts
of the last decade, the confidence that others have in us. The nations
of the Middle East have thus done us a service, in reminding us of how
in serving our international responsibility we also serve our own highest
goals.

In the final analysis it is our own principles and hopes that define our
obligation. America has always stood for something beyond our own
material success: we have always believed -- correctly -- that we meant
something to others. Our Founding Fathers spoke of the rights and hopes
of all men. Our belief in the inalienable rights of man is no less com-
pelling today -- no less worthy of sacrifice -- than it was 200 years
ago when a few dreamers came together in Philadelphia to proclaim
history's only truly permanent revolution.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

Speech

September 16, 1975

Cincinnati, Ohio

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

GLOBAL PEACE, THE MIDDLE EAST,
AND THE UNITED STATES

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce.

As America enters its 200th year as a free
nation our role has grown central to the peace and
progress of the world. We have become the engine
of the global economy, the rock of security for
those who share our values, the creative force in
building international institutions, and the pioneer
in science and technology.

Americans have carried the burdens of world
leadership for a generation. They have done so
with dedication and good will, but understandably
they ask when and if their labors can cease. They
want to know what our purposes are in
international affairs. They sense that the world
needs us, but they ask: Do we need the world?

The past three decades have taught us that
our commitment to global leadership is not an act
of choice but a recognition of reality. Awesome
weapons can span continents in minutes. The
international economic system thrives or declines
as one. Conflict in faraway regions has vast
political, security, and economic repercussions here
at home. Communications make us instantly aware
of developments in every corner of the globe-of
the travel of diplomats, the movement of troops,
or the hunger of little children. World peace and
American security, global well-being and American
prosperity have become virtually inseparable.

The past three decades have also taught us
that our contribution is indispensable. We cannot
solve every problem, but few solutions are possible
without us. Other countries must do more, but we

cannot ignore the responsibility that rests on us. If
we do not help resist aggression, if we do not work
for a dynamic world economy, if we do not
promote liberty and justice, no other nation can—at
least no other nation that shares our values.

Americans have a right to be proud of how
they have met this challenge. Through five
administrations of both political parties we led in
assisting Europe and Japan recover from the
devastation of the Second World War. We helped
create a trading and monetary system that has
spread prosperity in our own land and around the
world. We forged alliances with the major
democracies that have kept the global peace for a
generation. We have mediated and helped resolve
conflicts. We have fed the hungry, educated men
and women from other lands, and welcomed those
who flee oppression to our shores. With all
humility we can say that no other nation in history
has made comparable efforts on such a scale.

But history has rewarded our exertions with
new challenges. The world has been transformed
over the 30 years since World War II partly because
of the success of this nation's policies.

The Design of Global Peace

In the early years of the postwar period we
were militarily and economically the world's
predominant power. Our allies were recovering;
new nations were just coming into being; potential
adversaries were restrained by our nuclear
supremacy.

Today's world is radically different. The
industrialized nations are strong and self-confident;

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our alliances are cooperative endeavors between equals. We have preserved the world balance of power; but in the process both superpowers have acquired the capacity to destroy civilized life in a matter of hours. The growth of the world's economic system has spread economic power more widely among the new nations; they seek a greater role in international affairs and a larger share of the world economy.

The United States remains the largest single factor in international affairs. But we must learn what most other nations in history have known: that one country can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. We can no longer overwhelm problems with our resources. We no longer have the luxury of simple choices.

Thus, beyond the issues that make daily headlines, we have sought to conduct a foreign policy that takes account of the fundamental changes in the international order. We cannot afford oscillation between extremes of crusading and isolation. We must maintain a steady course which offers hope for long-term international stability and progress—a course which Americans can support, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries.

Our first priority is the vigor of our alliances with the great democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. We formed these ties a generation ago to protect weaker friends against military danger. Today we work together as equals on issues going far beyond security. We have coordinated our efforts to ease tensions with the East; we have built new institutions of energy cooperation; we have developed common approaches to the developing countries; and we have begun to harmonize our economic policies to move together toward noninflationary economic recovery. The vitality of Western democracy and the solidarity of our alliances is an essential factor of global stability.

On the basis of allied cohesion and strength, we have also sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. For 30 years, mankind's hopes for peace and its fear of war have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today strategic nuclear parity has transformed international politics. Your government—in any administration—must manage a basic conflict

of values and interests with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history have the weapons of war been so devastating and so ill-suited to the pursuit of specific policy objectives. Therefore the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We have solved political disputes, such as Berlin, and restrained great-power conflict in the Middle East to give both sides a continuing stake in positive political relations. We have begun more normal contacts in trade and scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. And we have regularized our consultations at the highest level.

The necessity of coexistence in the shadow of nuclear peril does not mean a coincidence of moral purpose. This country knows the moral difference between freedom and tyranny. But we shall also never lose sight of the fact that in the age of nuclear weapons, peace, too, is a moral imperative. We shall insist on reciprocity but we believe that incentives for cooperation and penalties for intrasigence are more effective than rhetorical posturing. We shall keep up our military strength second to none; but we will not succumb to the illusion that military power offers the final answer to international problems. On the basis of firmness and flexibility, strength and willingness to negotiate, we shall strive to moderate conflicts and to bring a more secure world to future generations.

As we have maintained alliance cohesion and begun to ease tensions with the Communist powers, a new dimension has been added to the spectrum of international issues before us: the future of the relationship between developed and developing countries. The vast and growing problems of energy, food, raw materials, and economic development now face us in all their complexity as the fundamental issues of the last quarter of the 20th century.

These problems are not technical or, at bottom, even economic. They go to the heart of the question of international order: whether the world can accommodate the needs of all nations; whether countries will regulate their affairs by cooperation or by confrontation; whether international relations will reflect the search for mutual benefit and common progress or turn into tests of strength. The United States is in a better position than any other nation to go it alone or to face such a test of strength; but we know that ultimately the