TELECON (Tape)

Secretary Laird

Brought in 3/22

L: Yes, Henry.

K: Hello, Mel. I was just talking to the President and he thinks things are under good control out there now. You know, the problem was we've been... he'd been under the impression that they were moving out through base area 611 down Route 914 and that on Wednesday he was told... You know, he calls Moorer almost every evening just to find out about the military operation, and he had been told that Phase V was starting on April 15th.

L: I know, but you see...

K: No, I'm just trying to tell you what the problem with him was.

L: I know; I know. But sometimes Tom -- his hope runs away with his...

K: Yeah, but you see, the point was when he first hears they are pulling out, and then he sees all these headlines in the Star, then he figures 'well, God-damn it, maybe it's a rout. It's your impression that it isn't, is it?

L: No, no. It's tough fighting. As they withdraw, they've decided to withdraw and they are in contact as you withdraw, and it's always going to be tough that way.

K: But they must be inflicting heavy casualties.

L: Heavy casualties.

K: The one thing he feels very, very strongly about, and he really wants to happen is that raid on Muong Nong that they are talking about. And anything you can do to make sure that that happens would really be very important; he specifically asked me now to make sure that you put everything behind that. Because he feels also for Thieu politically that if he could end this on an upbeat note and so that our critics here get a bit confused and so that we give them one more wallop before he gets out completely... What do you think?

L: I think that's right. I think that Ky is giving Thieu a bad time on this whole operation, and this has kind of got him a little punchy. And you know, he is not as sure of himself as he should be, but I think we can bring that off.

K: Well, if you can use your influence on that, Mel, I think the President would appreciate it enormously, and I told him that you were happy to do the briefing and that you also thought that Colonel might be a good fellow to have along there. And he's very pleased, and he feels that in a pinch you are always there.

DECLASSIFIED
MWO E0 12958
Authority
By - NARA Date 6/4/04

TELECON (Tape)

Secretary Laird

Brought in 3/22, page 2

L: Oh, no; there's no problem there. I just don't want to panic over some of these operations.

K: Oh, no; there's no panic. There was no panic to begin with. There was just a concern to make sure that he wouldn't say the wrong thing on television and then find out the next day that 5,000 South Vietnamese were trapped, or something like that.

L: The only trouble when you are dealing with these people, you'll always have that problem and you've got to be a little bit... You don't want to predict too far in advance what they are going to do because, by God, you know...

K: That's right. But if it hadn't been... He called in a bunch of friendly Senators on Thursday morning, and he was going to brief them that we were interdicting the base area. He had Moorer over at 9:14...

L: Well, I told Tom not to tell them for sure that that was going to be done, too.

K: Luckily, then you turned it off.

L: I told Tom to be careful about that always -- predicting in advance what those South Vietnamese were going to do because all you can do is get yourself screwed.

K: Well, that turned out to be good advice, and I had gotten some information just about an hour before, so I reinforced what you had said. But I think we are in good shape now. And everybody is now relaxed. It's good to know you are back in town, Mel.

L: Very good.

K: And I'll be checking in with you from now on on any of these questions.

L: Very good. Take care.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/1/64

TELECON (Tape)

Admiral Moorer -- March 21, 1971, 10:00 a.m.

Brought in 3/22

K: Tom

M: Yeah, Henry.

K: How are you?

M: Fair. We just got the Op Rep 5 from the Navy, we haven't gotten a
full one from the Air Force yet but it looks good, real good.

K: Any losses?

M: No, they don't report any losses but they raised hell with missiles, bridges, trucks and every other damned thing.

K: Oh, really.

M: Mel Zais will tell you about it, he's coming over to see you now.

K: Who is?

M: Mel Zais, he is going to bring that young helo pilot.

K: Oh, okay.

M: And I think you will find him very interesting.

K: Good. I just talked to the President and he feels that he absolutely now feels we must have that operation we were talking about.

M: Yeah.

K: Got to end it on a up-beat note and he says Thieu just has got to deliver on that one.

M: All right, why don't you go to Bunker on that and I will go to Abrams again.

K: Right.

M: I think they -- they look like to me they really intend to do it although I am -- you know you said the other day you would believe it when you saw it and -- but both Weyand (sp?) -- I talked to him last night and Abrams this

M/W FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

Brought in 3/22 -- page 2

morning, they are going right ahead with it, they are going to use
some special battalions they have and they are planning it as hard as
they can go.

K: Okay. We would like that -- I mean he practically insists on that.

M: Yeah, fine.

K: So that we can reverse some of that news float. Secondly, he has to
make sure he doesn't say anything tomorrow which is then followed by a panicky
retreat the next day.

M: Um-hum.

K: So you make sure that Abrams keeps him fully informed.

M: Right, we will have to do that right up to the -- fortunately he is going
to make his talk at night isn't he?

K: Right.

M: Uh-huh. And so that will give us -- you know during the --

K: It's not a talk, it's a session.

M: I know what it is, yeah.

K: Well, I gave him a very confident account of Abrams, that was correct
wasn't it?

M: Yes, that's what he told me. I've got it in writing right here and I think
that when the President sees the results of this air operation too he will be
pleased.

K: Okay. If you can get those written up in a language we understand, you
know not all that jargon.

M: (laughter) Okay, right. Yeah, we will do that.

K: And let me see what else he wanted. Yes, do you think Weyand (sp?)
could go up to I Corps and brief those jackals up there about the big picture?

M: I don't see why not, yeah I will talk to him about it.

MJD FE 012958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. What's the morning report?

K: Right. I've been talking to Moorer.

P: The Star(?) is going to say one thing. The Times and the Post weren't
too bad, actually.

not

K: No; they are/handling it badly.

P: What it is is whoever writes the overnight for the AP out there is really
the one that's putting the hook into this thing, and of course the TV.

K: No question about it. In fact, if you read the Star yesterday, there's a
rather good interpretive account on the front page, too.

P: Let's come back to Moorer. What did he say?

K: Moorer says they did get the strike off last night and the preliminary
results indicate that very large success -- that the weather was fairly good,
and they didn't lose any Air Force planes. They don't about the Navy yet
because they were just landing when I was talking to him. But they think that
they got back.

P: Are there any reports of that on the radio on the strike?

K: Not on the radio yet. There were some twitches in news bulletins. But
we are putting it entirely on the basis of protective reaction.

P: Just absolutely low-key, and don't have Air Force or Navy say anything
about how many planes or anything of that sort. Just play it, you know... I
know some of it will leak out, but this is one where I just say it's routine.

K: Exactly.

P: And incidentally, I thought about it a lot last night after we talked. I'm
convinced that it was exactly the right thing to do. You don't change your plan
on a thing like this solely because of a twitch in a battle situation. If you do,
you've forgotten your main goal. Our main goal is really along has been, well
not only the psychological, but also the one of knocking out some of those supplies

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President -- March 21, 1971 10:00 a.m.

Brought in 3/22, page 2

so that they won't get down there. It's going to make a hell of a difference.
Those strikes are going to be... I bet you they had to do some good.

K: Oh, no question about it, and waiting for good weather, and they are piled along this road. At this stage in the dry season, if it takes them even two or three weeks to get stuff back down from Haiphong, that's that much closer to the rainy season. So it's got to do some good.

P: What about the...

K: On the withdrawal situation, he had just hung up from Abrams -- in other words that was about an hour and a half ago.

P: And Abrams had had his conference already?

K: Oh, yes. First, on the conference, Abrams said it went very well. He's sending us a transcript.

P: Did you talk to Abrams?

K: I did not talk to Abrams. Moorer did. And I don't like to bug the military.

P: No, I don't want you to. I got you the impression... It's better to have Moorer to talk to him.

K: That's right. Now, Moorer read me the transcript of his conversation with Abrams. And Abrams said that... he put it into perspective; he gave them some indication... I told him after our conversation last night -- I got word out there -- that he should give them some indication of what was coming so that we wouldn't get in the way of everything every day a report of a new rout, and if people expect us to displace over a period of days...

P: In other words, just say we are withdrawing forces and will continue to withdraw from the bases.

K: Which is exactly what he did.

P: He did?

K: Exactly.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/10/19

TELECON (Tape)

The President -- March 21, 1971, 10:00 a.m.

Brought in 3/22, page 3

is

P: This/the thing about the news stories. They indicate the South Vietnamese retreated from two more bases today. Well, for God's sakes, we had said it two days ago, Henry, which is what we should have done, there wouldn't have been any problem. We would have said they are going to leave eight bases. All right, so you are going to leave eight bases. Period.

K: Yeah, that's where we had the problem in not knowing.

P: Abrams covered that today, didn't he?

K: Abrams covered it today. He gave them some indication of an overview of success, and I must say now the bastards out there are writing it much better. In the News of the Week section of the Times, there's an interpretative article from Saigon which, while it isn't glowing, does say we set them back by many months and is, on the whole, a very positive one.

P: It does say that we set them back?

K: It does say that we set them back several months. It's on the whole a very positive one.

P: Well, that was written, you can imagine, before all these scare stories about...

K: No, it mentions their withdrawing and they're withdrawing earlier than some people had expected. It's sort of a sum-up. It takes into account the withdrawal. And they are still planning that other operation further south which would go towards the end of the week.

P: The Ashau Valley?

K: No -- I won't mention the name.

P: Yeah, yeah. I know -- that initial base.

K: Yeah, and if they do that, then towards the end of the week, there'll be some upbeat news again.

P: That would be great. And, incidentally, one thing I was going to mention today. I really feel that, under the circumstances, Thieu for his own, and I want this to go back to them -- that for his situation here, but probably he might could look for a way out of the situation there, they must not go out on a retreat note. They've got to go back in and give them another whap -- that

MVD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Autbor:
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

Brought in 3/22, page 4

they just must do it and they've got to go through with that; that is, that I strongly urge that they do it. Now, let's find a way to do it -- go in with a thousand men even, or whatever they are going to do.

K: That's right.

P: Now, can that be... Can you tell them how strongly I feel that they must do it. Put it not on the basis of the situation here, but on the basis of his own political situation that the news here will eventually filter back there and that that will make his people think that they suffered defeat. So the thing you've got to do is to give them another whap.

K: Right; it would totally confuse our critics here, and it would give the other side a shock, Mr. President.

P: HELL, YES. They've moved a lot of stuff there.

K: Oh, yes; that's where they should have gone to begin with, but that was probably a mistake for them to head for Tchepone. That's where they should have headed; it would have given them more debts, but that's all water over the dam.

P: Yeah, yeah. But Abrams... Now, how does Abrams actually feel about.. How does he personally feel?

K: Moorer's view is Abrams feels very confident. He asked him is there any panic; is there any defeatism; has the combat capability... all the questions you asked me to put yesterday, and that I had already put to Bunker. He said none -- that the morale is very high; they haven't the slightest sign of defeatism. He said he was worried about our end here.

P: God, there's none here. It's only the crap that comes out of there.

K: Exactly. And so...

P: But he knows these stories are pouring back in here about running and panic.

K: Oh, yeah. Moorer has kept him... That's what he was referring to. He wasn't referring to the leadership here. He mentioned a number of units that they had moved back during the day (their day, our night), and he said everything had gone in good order. So as of 8:15 this morning, he seemed very confident. And actually the news stories aren't running so badly.

P: That's all we want to know. Well, these news stories go up and down. Television will be taking a whapping, but nevertheless, Henry, it's how it

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 29 1971
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/71

TELECON (Tape)

Brought in 3/22, page 5

comes out. I just... If Abrams feels confident, then I'll be a little more confident tomorrow night. You see my point?

K: I think you should give an impression of confidence and serenity, Mr. President.

P: Well, I'll do that, but I mean if I know it's going to come off pretty well -- let me put it this way: the thing that we always forget here is that we are so God-damned honest -- Johnson, of course, just lied, deliberately lied about the whole thing. And McNamara lied at Johnson's direction. Now, we have never lied. I will never lie; I can't live with that. On the other hand, I know psychology and, therefore, we've got to look ahead and point out this thing. And we've also got to knock down the lies of the other side. They are lying all the time about this.

K: Absolutely. I think that Abrams believes, Moorer believes that this operation in total was a considerable success for us and I think we ought to stress that. Even that New York Times writer says it set the other side back by several months.

P: That might be a good XEX thing to quote, 'as so and so wrote in the New York Times, and he's probably correct, XEXXEX that it set the other side back several months.

K: I'll get you the correct quote. I'll get you the right reference.

P: Get the name of the fellow -- as he said in the New York Times. Quoting the New York Times is a real slap in the face at the leftists.

K: Right. I'll get that typed up for you and send it.

P: If it's any good, we'll use it. All right, now, as far as anything else is concerned, the main thing is I think the psychological -- Thieu has a psychological victory to win. He's got to give them one more whap -- you know, another whack. And Abrams does not foresee a debacle this week then?

K: Absolutely not. As of this morning, absolutely not, but I'll make triply sure...

P: Before Monday.

K: ...before Monday evening.

DECLASSIFIED
MWO EO 12958
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELECON (Tape)

Brought in 3/22, page 6

P: Well, I will discount that. I'll say they are going to have some hard battles coming on out. That's part of the deal, but you want to remember that in all cases like this, the offense is taking many more casualties than the defense.

K: Right, and given the difference in firepower, they've just got to.

P: God Almighty, if those planes are KAWX worth one damn, I don't know, I...

K: Well, Mr. President, it's almost inconceivable ...

P: I can't believe the radio. I have no faith in the Air Force. Those little Navy planes -- those attack planes -- they must be getting something, Henry. Those guys are really pinpointers.

K: And when they know where the enemy is; this isn't a case of just guessing. When they are attacking a hill, you know where they've got to be, and every time they've entered these areas after a strike they found a lot of bodies.

P: Yeah, yeah, I would imagine that the -- but he says that the ARVN morale is not low and has not been reduced.

K: That is right.

P: Second that the morale in the city of Saigon is good.

K: Very good.
Third,

P: Is Thieu's morale good.

K: Thieu is very firm.

P: Fourth, as far as the other thing is concerned they will continue to rack up the little -- what they need to do, we need a day-to-day operation out there to knock down the reporters from the scene up there. Now, they better get a good PR man up there, and I guess, and just sit there. And every time he hears some -- and he should watch the copy -- then he should call in there and try to get copy going out the other way.

K: Right.

P: That's what they ought to do.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELECON (Tape)

Brought in 3/22 -- Page 7

K: They out to send Weyandt up there and maybe give a conference for these jackals up in I Corps.

P: That's right, that's right, that's right. But mainly -- mainly is watch their daily coverage and say "Look, I'm available here. If you've got any question we'll confirm or we will be perfectly honest with you but we want you to know."

K: Right.

P: "We would be completely open about it." And tell them, "Look, we've got nothing to hide."

K: Right.

P: All right. Well if that's all we can do, we'll let her go then.

K: Right, Mr. President. I'll keep you informed, I'll be getting the actual reports from the bombing and I'll call you as soon as I have something.

P: Good, okay, thanks.

K: Right, Mr. President.

MJD F.O. 12558
DECLASSIFIED

Authorized
By ____ NARA Date 6/1/04

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

The President/Mr. Kissinger

March 21, 1971 11:30 a.m.

jlj

P: Have you had a report on the strike yet?

K: [Mr. Kissinger asking for morning reports on this subject and a map from which he could talk] They had a lot of SAM sites in there before ???? [Difficult to concentrate because trying to tell people what HAK is talking about and what he wanted.]

P: You don't have the Navy report yet?

K: Yes. We have the Navy report. That is what I have been reading to you. We do not have the Air Force yet. There is another report which says (reading) 50 .... numerous large fires .... with smoke rising .... around the Mugia Base .... 20 17 trucks hit 1 railroad line cut. I am just reading these off to you Mr. President. We are getting more in when we get additional reports.

P: Action in Laos within the next week. In terms of evaluation of the whole project and its effect on the enemy. Combined with this air strike. Air strike coming at this time is important. It is important that we are still hitting them. Keep them guessing.

K: We are making major uses of this strike. I have gotten a cable to Bunker and Moorer got a cable to Abrams urging necessity of the Muong Nong plan. Moorer said that Thieu was planning to do it with some special troops.

P: That operation would take news right out from under them. This kind of thing effects the enemy. were

K: They are one week away in my view from having to quite themselves in that area. I have a cable in from Bunker which I am sending to you which says [HAK reading] Only about 80 survivors came out -

P: How many are in a battalion ?

K: About 300. [HAK goes on reading]

P: That is good. That is an honest thing. I can use this and it gives me a chance to hang the press.

K: I talked to the Col. who had charge of the helo squad who were doing the moving of the troops.

By. 0

NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

P: What kind of a guy was he?

K: He is the kind of a guy that makes you proud to be an American.

P: Did he fly much?

K: He flew every day. He said the morale was high and they improved as they flew more. He said that the pilots from the helos from Quang Tri province are occasionally used and when there is an emergency these guys are called in and then the pilots come home and say to their buddies that these guys were running hard but we got them out. He said no one in his unit would make remarks like that.

P: He sounds like a wonderful guy. We should have him talk to some Senators. Tell Laird to have him go up and talk to some of the people on the Hill.

K: I think we ought to do that on Tuesday. He is not the most articulate guy in the world.

P: Hell with that. He has seen it.

K: He has seen it and been in there and could tell them the straight KILL story. He said that the enemy must be taking fantastically heavy losses. He said ... so he gave me bad as well as the good. Said the enemy had high tank losses. Said that coordinating was an initial problem. They had not worked without American observers in there before and it was hard to get used to. Said among ARVN units the 1st division was outstanding. Air Force was good and Rangers were not really used to that type of intense fighting and when he got there he did see some panicking among the Rangers who were under very heavy fire.

P: What does he think of reports he sees in the paper here? I mean the origin Henry - who the hell is saying this kind of thing?

K: He is shocked by it. He says that a 19 or 20 year old from a helicopter crew comes back and says to his buddies they were running but we saved them in time and the newspapers just follow them around and eat it up.

P: Goddammit, I do not think we should have put the press in. I would not have done it and taken all the heat. I mean it Henry.

K: Abrams has a report in. It says [HAK reading Abrams report] (something about the guys not being able to see what they have accomplished because of TACAIR etc.)

P: In conventional warfare you do it yourselves and here somebody

By. NAFA, Dato 5/26

R 3

else is doing it for you and you do not know what a good job you are
doing.

K: Mr. President, if those regiments had gone into II Corps ....
(talking about the Laotian operation cleaning out troops that would have
been used in II Corps against American troops) and we would not have
the crack ARVN troops in there to fight against them. As you said,
they were not sitting there to enjoy the scenery.

P: I want them to get going on that second operation. Any kind of
second operation would be good. It would have a good psychological
effect on the North Vietnamese and let them know that we are not
defeated there. This was the plan.

K: . . . using this as one climatic effort. I do not think they have
enough steam to keep it up themselves. I sent a very strong cable to
Bunker.

P: I want them hit again. Even Abrams doesn't realize the significance
of hitting them again while we are pulling out.

K: I want to make sure you know this Mr. President. They are authorized
to make one more strike.

P: Yes I know that. If the weather is good.

K: Yes and they think the weather will be good and they are going to
use the authority before it runs out. Tomorrow morning we will announce
that this is now terminated and was protective reaction.

P: Is there any press reaction?

K: There is some. There is a ticker item but they call it air interdiction
and don't seem too upset about it. [Hak reading ticker item] . . .
response to attacks on our forces.

P: That will follow up my saying that this is not tit for tat.

K: Navy reporting seems accurate . . .

P: If it is 1/10 of the truth it is pretty good. But the shock has to be
pretty substantial for them. Well, since you have your message off I just
wanted to be sure that they would run that second think in Laos. They
really don't have to do much.

K: Just in a 4 (few?) days and then get out. . . . Their units have taken
a pretty bad shallacking (?) too.

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22

[Beginning of tape]

K: He's back, Mr. President. I can find that out for you.

P: No, no; hell, no.

K: And I can let you know, but I've sent up to you in the Bunker cable -- I don't know whether you've received it yet -- the one in which he talked about the state of the units. I talked to Moorer again at noon, and he said again his latest reports from Abrams were that they were retreating in good order, and that's what Laird's view is. And Laird said -- you know, he's a politician -- Thieu has his own political problems, and we have to look at it this way. And he's bouncy about it.

P: You think that's why he's getting out, in other words.

K: Oh, yeah. I think that's why he's getting out, too.

P: Sure.

K: I think he could have... If he had been willing to pay the price, he could have stayed in there.

P: Sure, but he just figures that too many casualties could hurt him politically.

K: Too many casualties can hurt him, and he needs these divisions to control...

P: Did you mention to Mel the urgency at all of going forward on one more raid?

K: Oh, yes; that's done. Oh, you mean the one ... that land raid.

P: Yeah. One more raid.

K: No, that I'm going to get... I was in the middle of my conversation with him when you called.

P: Good; fine.

K: And I'm going to call him right back.

P: Just say the land raid thing... I think for Thieu's political purpose so that it puts the frosting on this thing, and so that it doesn't appear that the

DECLASSIFIED
MJO FO 12558
 Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22, page 2

ARVN was driven out and still has no punch. It's symbolic. Incidentally, one other thing -- what is your... and we'll decide this the end of next week, maybe Friday -- what is your feeling about rather than having Bunker and Abrams, of just having Bunker come back to San Clemente for a day or two -- for a day.

K: I... in fact, this afternoon, was beginning to think that maybe Abrams ought to come back, too.

P: Well, then if we do, we have to have Mel and Bill, too.

K: Well, you almost have to have them anyway.

P: Well, then if we do...

K: It makes it a little bit...

P: We'll have to fuzz up the troop thing and discuss it.

K: Unless I take the two fellows off and tell them privately. Which we can do.

P: Which you can do. That's right. Well, maybe we'll have them both come back. We may do that. I just think that doing that about Friday isn't bad to sort of build up...

K: A week from Friday.

P: That's about the right time.

K: I think that's about right.

P: That would be... that would build up the troop announcement the following Wednesday, you see -- four days away.

K: That's right.

P: Okay; fine. You go back and talk to Mel.

K: Right, Mr. President, and I'll keep you posted of anything that happens.

TELECON (Tape)

Director Helms

Brought in 3/22

K: Hello.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: This is one of these days when Harvard looks good to me.

H: I'm sure of that.

K: Where did I get you? I hope I interrupted something worthwhile.

H: I'm at home. I was just having dinner.

K: I see. Give my affection to your wife.

H: I will, indeed, and I'm behaving myself tonight.

K: Dick, I've been talking to the President off and on for several hours, and you know these various reports as well as I do. I suppose you do -- on what's happening in Vietnam. Well, first of all, he wanted me to get your judgment of what you think this all adds up to. Do you have one?

H: Well, I really don't have a good judgment, Henry. It wouldn't be helpful to him; it wouldn't be helpful to you. Is this something that is pretty immediate as far as he is concerned?

K: Well, no, he just wanted your quick reaction. Now, one thing he does want to do insofar as you have any outlets in Vietnam among the population. If they could help feed out stuff on the positive achievements of the operation, that we would appreciate your getting done.

H: That we can do.

K: Through your channels.

H: Right.

K: And I think it would help -- there's no sense getting your reaction off-the-cuff. Can you get, say, by the opening of business Monday some assessment of what you think this means to the South Vietnamese, to the North Vietnamese, and to us, particularly to those two -- South and North Vietnamese.

H: And the United States.

MMD FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

Director Helms

Brought in 3/22, page 2

K: Yeah. Assuming that there is a fairly orderly withdrawal, but a fairly rapid one, and assuming that what we know of the other side's losses and interruptions in the totality of the supply system, if you assume the consumptions and so forth. Do you think you can do that?

H: Yeah, we can get something together, I'm sure.

K: Now, can you do that for the President alone and not show it all over town first?

I'm so

H: You know, XXXXX, terribly good at sending those things just to you and/or finding out what the distribution should be afterwards.

K: No, listen, if everyone else in this town had kept his word as well as you did at the beginning of this thing, my job would be a piece of cake.

H: Well, Henry, I will get on to this, and we will send it down to you the first thing Monday morning -- a couple of copies just for you.

K: Good.

H: Okay.

K: Thank you.

H: And I'm sorry I don't have this immediate appraisal, but you know I just think that's terribly unhelpful. I mean I'm no...

K: Listen, there are a lot of guys in town who are eager to give immediate appraisals that may not stand up. That's a tribute to you. After all, who the hell knows at this moment t. In fact, who the hell even knows what's going on.

H: That's right -- precisely. XXXXX Okay, sir.

K: Right.

H: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/10/64

TELCOM (TAPE)

Ambassador Bunker/Mr. Kissinger

March 20, 1971

K: Hello, Ellsworth.

B: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

B: All right, fine.

K: Hello --

B: Yes, hello, Henry.

K: The President wanted me to call you and we want to get some feel for what there is to these stories about the panic among some of the troops coming out.

B: Oh, I don't think so.

K: Could you send me a cable that gives me some answer to that question.

B: Yes, I will. ?? heard of any but I'll check into it and see if there is anything to it.

K: Well, the television here is full of it.

B: Is it?

K: And of the stories of the pilots and so forth.

B: Well, they get some wild stories from the pilots but that's been one of the problems all along of course.

K: Yeah. Right.

B: But I will check into it and see what --

K: Can you send me a backchannel?

B: Yes, sure.

K: Okay. Thank you, Ellsworth. Keep up the good fight.

B: Yeah, you bet, so long.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCONE (TAPE)

Colonel Kennedy/Mr. Kissinger

March 20, 1971

RK: You got through to Haig all right.

K: Yeah, I did talk to him, thank you.

HK: Everything all right?

K: Yes, as well as it can be. The President is calling every ten minutes

RK: I know, I'm sure.

K: You know it won't change the basic situation, he can tell me as much as he wants to how great it is. I know it is a net gain and it is the best thing we could have done. Of course, I also know that these guys put us into a hell of a fix.

RK: Yeah, I again pointed out to him he should keep in mind the public posture problem.

K: And the surprise.

RK: Yeah.

K: Okay, now look would you have the guy that's picking me up for dinner send out some tapes here?

RK: Tapes?

K: Tapes for my machine.

RK: Right, will do.

K: Can you have it done right away?

RK: I'll see if I can catch him if he hasn't already gone.

K: Well, then have another car bring them out.

RK: Will do.

K: Thank you.

MFD EO 12958
By. NARA Date 6/1/91

3/21/71

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Very good; how are you?

K: Okay.

L: Say, I've gone over these logs here on the telephone calls, and so forth. Evidently, the President must have been a little exorcised, huh?

K: Oh; yeah. I mean, what calls -- to Moorer?

L: Yeah.

K: Well, we didn't have much advance warning of these withdrawals.

L: Yeah.

K: And, with him going on television, he just wanted to be sure that he knew what the facts were, and then when all these stories hit with panic there, he just wanted to find out for himself; or are you talking about my conversations with Moorer?

L: Well, I got a list of all of them here. I thought, Jesus, things must have really gone to hell around here.

K: No, no; look, what happens is the President will call me four or five times and repeat essentially the same order. Then I call Moorer and say, you know, this is what the President wants to know. And you weren't available, but...

L: Just so we keep on the right track because I think it almost got off the track on Abrams going out on a... just going over these briefs on the messages and conversations, it looks like Abrams damn near went off and had a public press conference, and I don't think we want to start him on public press conferences. He handled that thing right.

K: Well, that was initially a Presidential order, and then I changed it to a backgrounder when I realized that.

L: Yeah, but on things like that, let me know about those things...

K: Well, I let Packard know.

L: Yeah, we can save some problems there on things like that because that almost got off the ... You know, I think that... well, of course, what you

MJD FEO 12958
 Authority
By NARA Date 6/4/04
DECLASSIFIED

Thieu

have here, is you've got X trying to run the thing down in Saigon, and he's
looking at his political problems, you know; and he's concerned about the
election coming up. I believe he probably will announce a reduction in his
forces within four months, and he's going to do that for political purposes,
too, because you know he brought that up to me, and I asked him not to do it.
In my memorandum of conversation...

K: Yeah, I remember it very well. You said this would be very damaging and I think you are right.

L: And he also is... when he talked at that time was always wanting to limit his operations from five to eight weeks. You remember...

K: No, no; you told me.

L: And he is staying according to his plan -- and it may be not Binh's plan -- but he is staying according to his plan.

K: No, Mel, the trouble was, as I reconstruct it, if these guys had told us, or if we had understood as well as you understood, that he meant to get out after eight weeks -- five to eight weeks -- and you never had any doubt about it. I have to say this to you.

L: And I tried to get that in the order because I didn't want to mislead the President or anybody. You remember me fighting that rule?

K: I remember it very well, but if we had understood this, then after the fall of Tchepone, we could have sort of announced that they were getting out or this sort of achieves our objective. For example, Bill had to go on television on Thursday -- on Tuesday -- we could have positioned him to carry the ball on that a little bit. Instead, as late as Wednesday afternoon, I was told that Phase V of the operation wouldn't start till April 15th. And then the very next day, we are told they are getting out over the weekend. And this is what got the President so concerned whether there was a rout here.

L: Well, it's probably my fault because I didn't insist upon getting that through.

K: That was his problem.

L: Coming out, they are having heavy fighting there today, and the strikes are going along pretty well.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 12958
Authorized

By. NARA Date 6/10/04

TELECON (Tape)

Secretary Laird

Brought in 3/22, page 3

K: Well, he's going on television, you know, tomorrow night with Howard K. Smith, and he wanted to make sure he wasn't out in left field. On the whole, he thinks -- and I think, and I believe you agree -- that the operation has been a considerable success.

L: Oh, yeah.

K: Don't you think?

L: Right; it has been a success and we'll know fully how successful it is in September and October.

K: Exactly.

L: And that's where we have to stay, and I think it's going to show up as a greater success than we could even imagine now.

K: Well, that's what I think. Now, what the President wants ... I was waiting for you to come back, Mel. I knew you were coming back at 1:30 this afternoon, and I didn't want to bug you out there because you couldn't do anything about it. There weren't any operational orders given. This was all stuff where the President said, "Are they panic-ing?" I'd say, "I don't know; I'll check with Moorer." You know, it was that sort of question.

L: I just want you to know that, hell, we'll do everything we can, Henry; and I think the thing is going to prove out to be a very successful operation. Now, when you withdraw and you are in contact withdrawing, it's a hell of a problem.

K: Mel, what the President would appreciate is if you and Moorer would go and brief some Senators and lay that on on Tuesday, in terms of an evaluation of the operation; what you think it did...

L: We will briefing the Appropriations Committee tomorrow, too. As you know, Moorer and I are there all day tomorrow.

K: Right, but if you could broaden it beyond that on Tuesday.

L: We'll do that.

K: And, you know, not just... I think the CIA is really screwing us.

L: Well, on their evaluations, they are, you see, because they leave us... they really are not helpful right now at times.

MJD F.O. 2958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/1/04
DECLASSIFIED

TELECON (Tape)

Secretary Laird

Brought in 3/22, page 4

K: And you know that -- Dave must have told you -- we went through all these DIA figures and I must say they are pretty impressive to me.

L: Well, now, you know DIA is coming along a lot better than people give it credit. This Bennett is a good man, and that's been reorganized and it's a good operation now.

K: And CIA doesn't have any figures to contradict it. All they have is moaning and groaning.

L: Sure.

K: And being negative. And if you consider that they had to supply 40,000 people in southern Laos, that they had to consume rice, that they lost the rice that they purchased in Cambodia, that they lost the port of Sihanoukville, that the gunships have improved, and that they had to supply this operation logistically -- just forget about the roads being cut -- it must have cut into their system don't you think?

L: Oh, sure; it's cut into the system considerably, and it's really raised hell with some of their units. Now, if you'll notice, there's not an awful lot of AA fire going on over there today.

K: Yeah, I noticed that.

L: And that's simply because they've had to be doing so much moving around there.

K: Well, the President has given them one more strike, and then we'll call it off. If the weather holds up...

L: Yeah, well, the weather looks good, so it'll be "go" for another 24 hours.

K: Good. Mel, and you will then, whenever it's finished, announce from the Pentagon or from Saigon -- wherever you think it's better -- as you did in May that it's now terminated.

L: Right, Henry; we will.

K: I don't know whether you've met this fellow -- that Colonel who commanded some of the helicopter operations, and the President wondered whether, when you brief the Senators on Tuesday or the Congress on Tuesday, if you thought it a good idea if he could answer a few questions.

MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04
DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE (Tape)

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello, Tom. I am just relaying things that the President has
kept telling me. Many of them -- all of them repeat what we've
already told you.

M: Yeah, okay.

K: Is my understanding correct that it is Abe now who is going to
give the backgrounder.

M: Abe -- yeah, it is my understanding he will. And I am going to
talk at 11 o'clock again so I can give any kind of instructions.

K: All right. Well, the President would prefer if Abe could do it -
if Abe did it but it should be on a background basis.

M: Yeah, we've already got that set up.

K: Okay. And to give the big picture. Now the thing that concerns
the President very much right now are all these stories of panic.

M: Well, I've been over that with him and pointed up the morale aspects
and to treat that on an overall basis.

K: Right. Now our television tonight -- I don't watch the goddamn
stuff -- but apparently television gave a horror story tonight.

M: Well, I heard one program at 6:30 which wasn't so bad, I mean I
don't know which network ...

K: I don't know which one he saw.

M: Well, I've covered that and I'll emphasize it.

K: Also we want to make absolutely sure that everybody understands
that this other business on protective reaction.

M: Yeah, I've done that too. Right, and we've got plenty of recent
examples to make the case.

K: Right.

M: And I've pointed those out and that's what he will do.

K: All right. Now, do you think Defense understands it too.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD EO 12958
Author

By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCOM (Tape)

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

M: I'll see to it that they do.

K: Will you talk to Henkin?

M: Yes.

K: And tell him there is to be nothing else.

M: Right.

K: And as soon as you are through with these things -- I mean if there is to be follow-up, we ought to say it is over just as we have done in the past.

M: Yes, I'll do that too.

K: See what I mean. As soon as you have done with the restrike, you just say it is terminated -- it was protective reaction.

M: I can handle that.

K: Okay, thank you.

M: I'll be home and I'm going to call again at 11:00.

K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
 Authority
By ____ NARA Date 6/1/64

TELECON
Admiral Moorer
(Brought in 3/21/71)
(Taped 3/20/71?)

K: Tom?

M: Hey Henry?

K: How are you?

M: Fine. Say I want to tell you that we got the what we
they call the OpRep 1 now and we got the firm time which is mid-
night tonight our time.

K: They are going?

M: Yeah.

K: For a couple of hours or what?

M: Well, they'll go till dark, then they'll come back
on according to their current instructions they'll tell us
whether they can go again, I mean what the targets are and so
on.

K: Yeah, has the ceiling lifted?

M: Yes, it's going to be all right in the afternoon they
think. In other words, start at noon you see.

K: Right.

M: And will be good during the afternoon. I checked on
that; I called out to Hawaii and they have the same information.
I'm watching it very closely but they have started the reporting
procedures associated with this now.

K: I see.

M: WXXXXXXXXX Which has given us ... the
first thing they do is to give you the time on target, see?

K: Right.

M: And we've got that now. And it'll be ... Tonght it wi
be ...

K: Yeah, of course our critics now are gonna say we're doing
it out of desperation. But, I don't give a damn what we do it
out if.

M: Yeah, they'll say one thing or another.

M/W F.O. 12958
AUTHORitat
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON
Admiral Moorer
3/21/71 (Brought in)

(Taped 3/20/71?)

page 2

K: That's right. I don't give a damn about that.

M: Now, one other thing. I'll keep you informed. One other thing, Abrams came back in you know. We asked him to give that briefing.

K: Yeah.

M: And he's never given one.

K: Well Weyand can do it.

M: We can have Weyand do it. I don't think either one of them has done it, but he said "What do I say if they ask me why this departure from routine?" And I said well . . .

K: Hasn't he ever had a backgrounder?

M: Yes, yes, Henry, the President's calling me. Let me call you right back.

K: Okay.

K: Hello.

M: Hey Henry.

K: Hold on a second. My other phone is ringing; it may be the President.

M: All right.

K: Hello.

Operator: The President is calling you sir.

K: Hold on a second. I have someone else on the line. I'll just get him off. Tom, I just want to show you, you're not the only one he calls. Did anything come up I ought to know, because he's on the other line.

M: Oh, go ahead I'll call you back in a few minutes. No, we just had a chat.

K: No, I'll call you back.

M: All right. I'll be right here.

K: Right.

M: Thank you.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

Admiral Moorer

Brought in 3/22

M: Henry.

K: Hello, Tom.

M: Good morning, how's -- I had to make a lot of telephone calls, I'm just trying to get it all shaped up.

K: Right, that's okay.

M: Alright, first -- the A operation, of course, we don't have all the information because the Navy planes have only been on the deck 20 minutes.

K: Right.

M: That's one of them but we are accumulating all this for you -- we are getting bits and pieces in.

K: How does it look?

M: It looks good, all the Air Force planes are out, no losses. -- We don't have a report yet on the Navy planes because they are just landing now. We will have that this morning of course.

K: Right.

M: They seemed to have wiped out all those missile sites in good fashion which will be helpful and of course supports our press statement on the subject.

K: Right.

M: And now then I just been talking to Abrams not less than 5 minutes ago about the next step. -- It looks like they will have a repeat on the weather so I just think if they -- after they look at the targets, they want to evaluate the targets to see whether it is worthwhile.

K: Let's do one more and that would be it.

M: Yeah, all right. Now, so I will be feeding you this information when I get it all together.

K: Excellent.

M: Now, I asked him about the backgrounder -- he said he thought the backgrounder went well, he said that he answered all the questions -- no one

M/W E.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)
Admiral Moorer

Brought in 3/22/71 -- page 2

asked him about why or anything -- never even -- he said they didn't
notice me too much is the way he -- no, he said they didn't pay much
attention to me although he was there answering their questions so that
hurdle is over.

K: Right, now he did give it some indication of what the future would be?

M: Yes, he is going to send us a transcript.

K: Right.

M: He had instructions to do that.

K: Good.

M: Then I said, how are the operations going up North? And he said in his opinion they went well last night, in other words everything is being held well and he said it's a hellva fight but he is satisfied. Then I asked him about the helo proposition, was he think the helo damage was manageable and was it a problem. He said, no, not at all because he could handle it. Then I asked him what are you going to do about this operation down South. He said that the boss out there, the head man, insists on it and he thinks he is going ahead. And I said, when. He said, during the next week. Then I asked him, I said we are really getting flailed around here by the papers and so on, I said, do you get any indication that our boys are folding up. He said, absolutely not and he says some of the battalions have been hurt but says the other side has really been hurt and he says he sees nothing whatever in the overall attitude to indicate any weakening of the heart so to speak.

K: Right.

M: And that was --

K: But why are they getting out so fast then?

M: Well, I tell you once you start that kind of operation, they have had to
move like that. That's the most difficult thing in the world to do particularly
when these caches of -- if you are going to do that, you got to do it fast.

K: Yeah.

M: And they are particularly in view of the fact that they have put just about every damn thing they've got in it.

DECLASSIFIED
Autofill
By: NARA Date 6/2/71

TELECON (Tape)

Admiral Moorer

Brought in 3/22/71 -- page 3

K: The other side.

M: The other side, yes. Just about everything they've got and I think that in the interest of cutting down caches, they try to do it without breaking up their organization, their tactical units and at the same time inflict maximum damage to the other guy in getting out so that they don't get anybody caught out on a limb. I think once you start that, then that's the end of the operation.

K: Right, right, right.

M: I think --

K: How does he foresee them coming out, over what period of time?

M: This operation down Highway 9 I think will take another 4-5 days at least. Now the Marines that are down in the South, they will be probably working in that area for a long time so when you say out in the sense of --

K: You mean along Route 922?

M: Down in that base area 611 I think, yeah. Then back towards what they call the Laos salient. Now, I think that these guys have got two options -- I mean the enemy.

K: Yeah.

M: I think that they have got the option of kinda fighting at our heels, nipping at our heels and so on with a few tanks ______ and so on. I think that would be a sign of weakness on their part. The other thing they could do since they are there, try to put everything they have got together and move into say against Khe Sanh or something like that. I don't think they have the capability of that because people out there are looking -- ready for this in other words and this was I think again would chew them up pretty heavily. I think now that they are bound to be and Abrams says that they are -- the words he used "badly hurt" he said, "badly hurt". And so I think when the smoke clears you are going to see these people have lost a hell of a lot of flexibility and lost a hell of a lot of time.

K: Well, I have no question that the operation was a plus, I have no doubt about that at all. And a big plus, the problem is how are we going to handle it in the next few weeks when the jackals start screaming.

M: Yeah, well, we'll just scream back.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Authorized NARA Date 6/1/04
By --

TELECON (Tape)

Admiral Moorer

Brought in 3/22/71 -- page 4

K: I mean the major thing now is to keep everybody cool enough so that they don't stampede this into a Dien Bien Phu.

M: That's right.

K: You know in Dien Bien Phu actually, they were on the roads too. I mean the North Vietnamese were and the French just folded up.

M: Yeah, well, I used that word. I said is there any sign of anybody. He said, absolutely not, he said the attitude is good. I don't think they will either, I think that --

K: Well the problem is here, not there.

M: Here not there, that's right. Well, we will just stay with it, I think that every day now our position should start improving.

K: Well, that's what I -- Look, I think we have set them back several months, how many months only the future can tell.

M: There's no question about it.

K: And these units that fought there would have fought later somewhere.

M: Yeah, they would have fought -- not only that it's our time to choose.

K: Exactly.

M: I think the South Vietnamese for the first time have the initiative. These people are reacting for the first time.

K: That's right. Well, hell, you know my instinct tells me if we could have thrown in an American Division at this point, we would have cracked the whole outfit on the other side.

M: You're right, I was talking about that last night.

K: I mean that's what breaks your heart, I think we were within a division of somebody's division of ending this goddamn thing.

M: Chewing up those people pretty heavily, what they would have done of course is recede into the hills.

K: Yeah but that would have been -- enabled us to sit on the loot.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/10/71

["TELECON (Tape)\nAdmiral Moorer", "Brought in 3/22/71 -- page 5", "M: Exactly.", "K: Well, Thieu must have known why he didn't want to put another division in.", "M: Well, I think -- you know he's got a lot of pressures already.", "K: Yeah, I don't want to argue with them -- I'm not out there.", "M: I mean it's kind of hard you know to fight a --", "K: No, no, we can't do it from here and he has got a complex situation.", "M: Yeah, it's hard enough to handle your own people.", "K: (laughter) We haven't managed that yet, have we?", "M: Well, we can do pretty good in a --", "K: But at any rate Tom, the thing now is just to try to hold it together here. And we will do our damnedest on our end and we always can count on you.", "M: Absolutely.", "K: And I think that will put things into perspective.", "M: Well, the President yesterday wanted Laird and me to brief some additional Congressional people Tuesday and I am going to testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee Monday and I know that I will get a lot of questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELECON (Tape)
brought in 3/22

The President

K: Mr. President

P: Hi Henry, any late reports?

K: Yes, Mr. President, we got some more of the bomb damage assessment and I've had it sent to you.

P: Wait just a minute . . . . . . Yes.

K: We now have the Air Force report in, too, and . . .

P: How does theirs look?

K: Comparable to the Navy except theirs is more on supplies and they had.

P: Do [or did] we use B-52s?

K: No, no they have never been used in North Vietnam.

P: Is there any reason not to?

K: Well except that it would be something new, no particular one.

P: Well, we're not too late now. We'll take a look at it next time. I see no reason not to.

K: I see no particular reason not to.

P: What the hell, I mean, just use them.

K: And they have the advantage of all-weather capability.

P: That's right, that's what I meant that when I heard you could have had . . 52s don't use any visual bombing at all, do they?

K: Not at all, no Mr. President.

P: They just go right in there. They could have just clobbered this damned place, couldn't they?

K: They could certainly have taken out all the supply areas no matter what the weather . . .

P: But all in all you feel it's a very successful . . .

K: Oh that, they are delighted. Altogether, if you add the [Army and the] Air Force and the Navy they are close to two hundred secondary explosions,

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 12958
Authority
By - NARA Date 6/10/04

3/24/71

TELECON (Tape)
brought in 3/22, p. 2
The President

about a hundred large fires, 74 medium fires, some of them. . .

P: That kind of thing Henry we used to say in the Menu it had some effect (?)
in this case I think it's going to have some effect on these people. It's got to
affect them.

K: It's got to affect them and even if you have [halve?][[ the claims --
I mean when they say the smoke went up 14,000 feet, they must have seen
something.

P: There's no question about that and also we're pretty . . . it shakes
the hell out of you to see those planes come over there.

K: That's right and . . .

P: They on the news yet?

K: It's been on the news ticket. I haven't seen it on the television news,
but I haven't watched any television news.

P: That's all right. Ticket handles it low-key though.

K: But the ticker handles it in an absolutely low-key manner and as a
protective reaction strike. And they've gone after enough SAM sites to make
this plausible and they seem to have taken out enough of the SAM sites to . . .

P: Good.

K: . . . to have hurt the other guy. One of the things -- I don't/whether
I mentioned this to you -- that they all noticed is that there's been ads anti-
aircraft fire than on any previous raid, and they're assuming that this is because
they've pulled their anti-aircraft into Laos.

P: Oh, to fight over there. Yes.

K: To fight over there, which shows how.they . . .

p: I'll tell you they're going all out there, and that's why I hope the hell
we're just clobbering them there in the air, too. We are, aren't we?

K: Oh yes, and I've read the transcript of . . .

P: I'm just trying to be sure that there's no budgetary . . . I've talked
Moorer about this and I also hit Vogt on it because I want them to get it from me
as well as from you. I said if there's any budgetary reasons you're to tell me.

MAY 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)
The President
Brought on 3/22, page 3

K: I've read the transcripts of the Abrams news conference and I'm getting some of it excerpted for you. And he's had his G-2 and G-3 there. It was a very effective . . . It was low-key . . .

P: That's very way he should . . . that's the way he talks.

K: They asked him for example 'How did the ARVN units fight?' He said some fought excellently; some fought moderately well, and one or two of them didn't do so well. But I think that's a lot more impressive than if he had said they were all equally . . .

P: That's right. On balance, though, very well.

K: And he said on balance they are very satisfied. He said we've spotted a few weaknesses in one or two units on communications and so forth which we're going to correct. He said but they feel they have fought the best of the North Vietnamese army, and they fought them to a standstill, and they are coming out with their heads high and feeling that they have . . .

P: That's the kind of thing I want to quote back, see. I want just the things like . . . . coming out . . . . if he said that 'coming out with their heads high' or you're saying that. That's the kind of thing I'd like . . . . . . . . . you're paraphrasing.

K: I have the precise text. He said something analogous to that if he didn't use those exact . . .

P: Take out the best. . . . . Just a second. Go ahead.

K: I'm getting it excerpted and I'll have it for you first thing in the morning, particularly about troop morale and matters like this.

P: Particularly about what?

K: Particularly about troop morale and the overall impact . . .

P: That's the kind of thing I want.

K: And he said "in the next few months the impact of this will become more and more evident" -- he doesn't make any rash claims. He's still assessing all the impact but it was low-key and confident. Mel also feels that you should tomorrow without making any particular figures, be very confident . . .

P: But without indicating what's going to happen; yes.

K: I mean without saying necessarily that . . . without going into precise tonnages and things like that that people can . . .

MVD FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Autobiography
By NARA Date 6/1/64

TELECON (Tape)

The President
Brought in 3/22, page 4

P: Yeah, I agree. I think we should avoid any percentages or tonnages. I'm inclined even not to give the count as to how many tons of rice and all that sort of thing. I'm inclined to think that doesn't mean too much. In a sense it
What do you think?

K: Well you could just give that as an example and say I'm not claiming too much for that but just the sort of example of what was picked up. But the overall impact of it . . . you could certainly safely say had set them back by many months.

P: XX Guarantees withdrawal; guarantees Vietnamization; guarantees also a reduction in casualties. You know what's going to happen here. In about a month our casualties are going to really drop down in my opinion.

K: That's right.

P: What do you think?

K: I think that's right. We can't be sure that they won't make one peak effort to step them up but basically starting in a few weeks their combat capability is going to go way down again.

P: Well, good.

K: Because the fact is that . . . particularly in the next few months the shortage of supplies is going to be telling. In about 6 to 8 months, they can always choose between making one peak effort and then petering out or stretching it over several months. But until they build up some supplies, their combat capabilities are going to be very low.

P: Right.

K: I tried to reach Bill Buckley but he's skiing in Switzerland, and I didn't know whether I should call him there. I could do it.

P: I tell you -- ask MacGregor tomorrow after he's had his meeting to see. They are working on Jim Buckley. If he wants you to do it, then you do it. Okay?

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: I had a nice call from Rockefeller.

K: Oh, did you?

P: On his own. He was saying, 'I just want you to know that an awful lot of people know what you are doing in Laos; we understand it and admire your

DECLASSIFIED
MWO EO 12958
Authority
By - NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22, page 5

guts. We're back of you. I just wanted you to know.

K: Isn't that nice.

P: It may be, you know, that a few people are seeing through this God-damn press.

K: Well, that's what I think, Mr. President.

P: I don't know... You know, the polls and everything go down. But that doesn't bother me. That's purely the people that don't know anything. There are a lot of people that count who may begin to see that we are doing what we think is right.

K: And what is right which is equally as important.

P: What?

K: Not only what you think is right but that what you think is right turns out to be right.

P: Oh, yes. But Rockefeller said, "I know why you did this. I think it's going to work; I'm for it."

K: Isn't that nice?

P: I believe, you see, that a reaction sets in, too, when the press goes overboard in saying, "Oh, Christ, everything's going to hell," and all that, and they attack the President. People tend to say, "Oh, for God's sake, what's all this." He says, of course, there isn't as much reaction against this as there was against Cambodia, but in terms of our public standing, there is more of a drop here than in Cambodia. And the reason is we didn't go on television.

K: That's right. In Cambodia, you went on national television, and all the things they had told you then were a mistake turned out to be great pluses.

P: Absolutely. The best thing we did was the April 30th thing.

K: Absolutely.

P: They can all second-guess it, but that was a hell of a speech.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958

By NARA Date 6/10/87

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22, page 6

K: It was a great speech, and the events prove it. It rallied the people, and has rallied your friends.

P: As it turned out, of course, we couldn't have done this one on television because it wasn't our operation.

K: Exactly.

P: But, on the other hand, I notice that Reston made some... Did you get back -- I put a little note on the brief. He spoke at the Rippon Society; he's really tearing us up on...

K: Oh, yeah, well, he's been hacking away at us for weeks.

P: But, his whole point was that the President misled the American people. He didn't tell them that he was going into Laos. No, for Christ's sakes. Rogers said it; Laird said it; everybody else said it.

K: Rogers said it; Laird said it. We backgrounded it at the White House. You held a television office press conference within a week afterwards. You did exactly what all the liberals...

P: What I should have done on the other. That's what I marked on the news summary. You'll get it; it'll probably be there, I suppose, in two or three days.

K: Well, but Scotty has been hacking away at this for weeks.

P: I don't know what... He's probably... I think he was probably irritated by the Sulzberger thing, don't you?

K: Well, partly irritated by the Sulzberger thing, and partly... The liberal community cannot bear the thought... Joe Alsop was saying that today -- I saw him.

P: Did you see him? How's his spirit? I hope he's not getting discouraged.

K: Oh, no, no. He's going to write a very decent... He has a very strong...

P: Does he realize that there's no reason to be discouraged?

K: Oh, yes. Interestingly enough, he made his own calculations of what this did, and he came out very close to ours -- of tonnages and so forth. It's too complicated to use on television, but he feels that they couldn't, by any calculation, get more than one-third -- to at most a half -- of what they need through the pipeline this year. If you add in what they have to consume in Laos,

DECLASSIFIED

CMI 9012958
Autumn

By NARA Date 6/1/01

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22, page 7

what was interdicted, and what they lost through Sihanoukville -- they just
can't meet their requirements. And we have an intelligence report, for
example, that in Cambodia and in III Corps, they have cut their munitions
expenditures by half. They put orders out to their units to conserve ammunition.

P: Henry, you know, the biggest accomplishment is the fact that Cambodia survived a year after.

K: Exactly.

P: It wouldn't have happened otherwise.

K: And it's guaranteed now to survive until -- well, for almost another
year because they can't start hitting them now.

P: You don't think so, huh?

K: No. It's impossible for them to attack in Cambodia before the wet
season. So it can't start up there again until next January.

P: What was Alsop's general feeling about the liberal community?

K: Well, his feeling about the liberal community is that they cannot bear
the thought that you may be right and they may have been wrong.

P: Is that it? He said that?

K: Oh, yes.

P: You know, he used to be one of them.

K: Exactly, and he said, another thing that's...

P: You know, he was a very strong Kennedy man.

K: That's right, and he said that what gets them on top of everything else
is that you are not one of the establishment -- that you are lower middle-class
and have more patriotism and insight than they do.

P: That kills them, doesn't it?

K: That absolutely kills them. And he speaks with great affection. He says
-- well, he's also told you -- you have more guts than anyone he's seen, and
so on, and so forth.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President

Brought in 3/22, page 1

K: Mr. President.

P: Well, anything later to report today?

K: Well, we've got some more of the bomb damage assessment, and it looks very good. And tomorrow, they are going... yesterday, they went... they split it between SAM sites and supply depots. Tomorrow, it will be all supplies -- or tonight. So that figure will go up considerably. But even as it is, they've...

P: They've got a good one.

K: They've got a good one. They are very pleased.

P: Very good.

K: I just talked to Mel. He's pleased with it.

P: Good; good.

K: And he feels... He's going to brief on Tuesday with Moorer...

P: Publicly?

K: He's going to brief the Appropriations Committee, I think publicly tomorrow.

P: Publicly, well that's the main thing. Oh, good.

K: But Tuesday, as you suggested, he's going to bring in groups of Senators and Congressmen and give them a sort of wrap-up on the operation.

P: Good. You told him I thought it would be well for him to follow up on what I've been doing.

K: Exactly. He's delighted. You know, Mel is a good fellow.

P: You're damn right. And he realizes that we've been getting a bad rap in the news stories.

K: Oh, yes; but he says the reason he is so eager to do it is because with every passing month -- according to him -- he thinks this operation is going to

MJD F-O 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/64

TELECON (Tape)
The President
Brought in 3/22, page 2

look better.

P: Well, you know, his judgment was awfully good on Sontay. Maybe his judgment might appear good here. Mel's seldom wrong on a political judgment.

K: That's right. He says that the disruption of the other side's communications and supplies is just going to tell more and more as time goes on and the damage to his units.

P: Yeah. In other words, he really feels optimistic?

K: He feels very bouncy.

P: Good; good.

K: And so he said... And he's also going to produce... I suggested to him that I was very impressed by that Colonel.

P: Good. And he's going to produce him?

K: And he's going to produce him. He thinks it's a good idea. That Colonel -- just because he's a little inarticulate, Mr. President, is really damned impressive.

P: Right. Well, that's great. As you said, he's the kind of a guy that makes you proud to be an American. Put him on.

K: That's right. And after all that baloney one heard about the helicopter operations, he's says they were rough at the beginning. And he doesn't give ... make it sound as if it had been a picnic. But, above all, he says that the ARVN units fought well, and that that bitching one hears is usually from extra pilots that are brought in from other operations -- not from the ones who had the regular run there.

[End of tape]

MMD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

Colonel Kennedy

Brought in 3/22

K: Colonel Kennedy, sir.

HK: Dick, they told me you weren't in the office.

K: I never left. I don't think the phone ever rang.

HK: I don't know what that God-damn White House Board thinks it's doing.
They probably called your other office.

K: Oh, I bet that's exactly what they did. No, I've been here all the time.

HK: No, that's what I figured. I exchanged one maniac for another.

K: We got the latest assessment.

HK: What is it?

K: It's really very good.

HK: Can you read a few...

K: Sure. It's in two pieces. The Air Force got 13 trucks, 2 roads, 115 secondary explosions, 10 small fires, 35 sustained fires, damage to bridge, 3 very large explosions, 3 medium fires, 1 missile, 1 SAM launcher destroyed -- each destroyed.

HK: I liked that SAM that was running around on the ground.

K: Well, there were three of them. It must have been quite a sight.

You know, when you were talking to the President, I was desperately trying to find that particular report so I could give it to you, and I couldn't put my hands on it. As soon as you finished, I found it. It was the funniest thing -- I could just see them. Well, they got two SAM launchers destroyed, two SAM launchers damaged, 1 Fansong(?) radar damaged, 6 support vans damaged, 5 structures destroyed. That was the Air Force. The Navy got 4 SA-2 missiles on transporters destroyed.

HK: Why does the Navy have more... Were there more Navy planes?

K: There were more Navy planes. They had a total... The Air Force had 98 airplanes, and the Navy had 111. They got 34 large explosions, 76 other

TELECON (Tape)

Colonel Kennedy

Brought in 3/22, page 2

explosions, a railroad tunnel and train damaged.

HK: Yeah, those figures I have.

K: Right, the same things you had this morning.

HK: Are you writing this up for the President?

K: Yes, sir; we are going to summarize the whole thing in one piece.

HK: But don't split it up Navy and Air Force.

K: No, we'll combine it all.

HK: And send it over to him. You don't have to wait for me.

K: Right. Are you going to come back in?

HK: I doubt it.

K: All right; fine.

HK: Have you got the Abrams transcript yet?

K: No, it's coming in. They took it on tape, you see, over the radio, and they've had to transcribe it all. But it'll be in, and we are going to summarize that also.

HK: Why don't you leave a few of these things for me in the Situation Room, and when I'm ready for it, I'll call for them and ask them to be sent out here.

K: All right. Fine.

HK: I've been on the phone with the President a few times. He's nervous as a cat.

K: I'm going to ask them... I asked them last night and they missed the signals. They thought I'd known it was already under way, and because I left late, they thought it was already going.

HK: They should let you know when it's on.

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON (Tape)

Colonel Kennedy

Brought in 3/22, page 3

K: Yes, they will. I want them to let me know tonight if it actually gets off again, and I'll call you right away. But Moorer, I think, called you last night the minute he had the word, so it was okay. But I'll make sure again tonight. It was just a slip last night. They thought I already knew.

HK: It's pretty likely they'll go tonight, isn't it?

K: I think so. The weather seems to be all right. You know, in the Navy thing yesterday, there was a very large part of the area they couldn't hit from 1805 up to 19, it was all solid cloud cover, and they couldn't get up there. But, also, I noticed that in the recce's they said -- and the pilots, too -- said that there were additional opportunities in the area that they had already hit. This ought to get their attention, at least.

HK: They haven't squealed yet, have they?

K: Not a sound yet that I can see.

HK: Good.

K: So far as I can see there's been no great press stuff. They're pretty factual. We've gone over some Q's and A's -- some rough notes that people made from the radio transmission of the press conference. Abrams was very flat and very factual.

HK: But did he give some assessment of the whole operation?

K: Yes. He -- let me get the notes here. "Has it gone as you envisioned it?" He said we knew that we had to conclude all the phases by the rain, and the rain date is variable from year to year and not totally predictable. The question of exactly when the monsoon shift comes too late for tactical considerations, you've got to be away before it actually occurs. And he said the current timing of withdrawal or movement is well within our planning limits. Some of the ARVN did very well; some not so well. It was a mixed bag; we'll continue to work on improved communications and liaison between ARVN forces on the ground and air units. He said... They asked whether he was disappointed with the ARVN. He said I am not; one of the biggest and toughest battles since Tet 68. Tet 68 was worse, but this was tougher than Cambodia last year, and I'm very satisfied with our operation. They asked him whether it was a retreat or a rout. He said no, some of the weaker ARVN battalions less well-led have withdrawn under enemy pressure. Major units have not routed and will come out with higher confidence. They've done the job well, and they know it.

MJD F.O. 12958
AUTHORitatY
By NARA Date 6/1/04
DECLASSIFIED

TELECON (Tape)

Colonel Kennedy

Brought in 3/22, page 4

They believe they have defeated the top enemy units, and they have. The J-2 and the J-3 actually did all the briefing. They said it's too soon to fully assess it. It'll be several months before we know how fully we've upset the situation, but we've upset a short-term schedule and objective, disrupted logistics, pre-empted their plans for future aggressive action into South Vietnam and Cambodia. And they say... One of them said the supply-through-put this year is only one-fifth of last year. I don't know how they came to such precision when we've been working at it for a week.

HK: Well, that's the official figure. Okay, good.

K: Well, we'll get all this stuff summarized.

HK: Well, are you going to have some of this material ready for me so that I can get it to the President? As long as I get to him by noon tomorrow.

K: Oh, yes; now we've got something on the figures. We are not exactly sure -- you know, you wanted to look at it. We've got it all ready. Maybe I could just give you a feel for it and if you've got some thoughts, we can do some more work on it.

HK: Like what?

K: Tanks -- nearly 100. This is the first large-scale use of tanks by the North Vietnamese and resulted in destruction of an estimated one-third of their total tank force. Ammunition -- more than 550,000 rounds, including an estimated 3500 large rocket rounds, many more large rocket rounds than were captured during the Cambodian operation last year.

HK: Well, why don't we say how many more -- three times as many?

K: We can get a figure. I know we can. More than 4500 individual and 1600 crew-served weapons, most of which were captured from NVA fighting units.

[End of tape]

MVD FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
By NARA Date 6/1/04

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
9:30 a.m. 3/22/71

P: Anything new this morning?

K: They got off part of the strike before the weather closed in yesterday. They only got 60 planes up. We haven't got the results yet. The psychological impact of the first day's strike was good.

P: How about the other operations?

K: Goin out in orderly say. Another calbe on from Bunker. Nothing changed that he said earlier.

P: Among the SVN population?

K: No, troops. Operation is good. Haig is back and given me a preliminary report. We have had command problems out there. In retrospect you can say see things that went wrong but that doesn't help now. Southerland in I Corps is not on top of that action.

P: You could sense that from Abrams briefing.

K: They wasted two weeks at the beginning as they were floundering around and then going to Tchepone.

P: That's done now. They are moving out in good order?

K: Yes, with isolated incidents where they get a shelling and want to get right out of there. But the British did that at Dunkirk.

P: American troops get scared when they are under fire and especially when they are moving out. Any idea ? ? ? ?

K: I will have it in an hour. You should get that into your comments this evening so it won't be a surprise when it happens.

P: A week to 10 days.

K: I got another cable from Bunker saying that ________ talked to Thieu and Thieu "(quoted from cable)".

P: OK.

K: I briefed some of our senior staff to give them a line on your performance tonight. I will talk to other WH people so we will track on the same line. We will stress distributions of enemy supplies, preemption of enemy action and so forth.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

P: I don't know if they will have much opportunity.

K: Hey are talking around the press and they should say the same thing.

P: I didn't know they were talking around. They should know what they are talking about. But generally speaking I didn't think they were talking with the press.

K: Just so they are properly positioned.

P: OK for tomorrow?

K: Laird, Moorer and that colonel are all set up. Laird is a good fight. I had a good talk with him this morning.

P: Going all out?

K: Yes.

P: When he gets cornered, no question how he will go.

K: I don't doubt that in the months ahead this will vindicate ourselves. Without that they would have taken Hue by Aug, which would have been a disaster.

P: And we have truned up a lot of stuff there. We have taken the pressure off the southern half of SVN and Cambodia.

K: And First and Second Corps will die down soon. They are shooting their wad now.

P: Takes a lot of time to mount it again. What About Bunker and Abrams.

K: I am wondering if it gives the impression of panicky reassessment.

P: You should have thought of that last night.

K: I go back and forth. We haven't done anything on it.

P: Maybe we should wait until Monday.

K: Or Friday.

P: No, Monday and hold the meeting on Friday. I think we should wait -- too tied in to talking about troops plans.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. 3/22/71

P: In reading the entire Abrams thing, I think it's impressive thing. I don't think much got through in the press.

K: That's right.

P: I suppose you are writing everything up and the Saigon press didn't get it.

K: I asked that Weyand do the same thing for I Corps press.

P: Our people do get on the back of Cambodia. They do seem to be inept at getting it to the people who print it in the right way. It's a very reassuring report. Says they are inadequate in some areas -- 4 of 22 were below par. That's a good average. The whole balance was extremely effective. As far as I can see the press hasn't been --

K: Not as vicious as I thought.

P: They can see something happened at the end.

K: I hear Mansfield this morning say he would not say it was a failure.

P: He did? They better not say it's a failure. That'll put them out on a limb.

K: I am meeting at a lunch with John Chanceloor today and I thought I would take a positive line that's off the record.

P: I would use the Abrams report. Say here it is. As if they have never seen it.

K: Which I can safely assume.

P: Report I received from Abrams. Don't assume they have seen a thing. Pretend it's secret. It can be taken as something new and will take as the general gospe It's probably the most important decision taken during the war because of the decisive impact because if not taken we would have a real disaster this fall.

K: Without question. This summer or early fall and I still believe that analysis we made before this was clear. I told you I felt good about the impact. They will only get 50% through that they need.

P: Make that to the press people. The main point is not to indicate there's any doubt. No pessimism. It's all psychological. The only military pinch we can give them. Don't tell them that. We might give them a boot in the north but difficult so now it's a battle of psychology, wits and morale. Whoever plays up

By NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

9:50 am. 3/22/71

-2-

P: (cont) beat line. Did Helms do the black thing on how many killed?

K: I will check.

P: It seems the psychological ______ is doing poorly.

K: In SVN Thieu is sitting on the press and morale is high.

P: His own judgement is --

K: It's roughly what I gave you because I have had daily reports from him. (Haig)

P: What did he think of the last couple of days.

K: They are not as surprising to him as us because in I Corps he saw the situation. The withdrawal is as orderly as it can be under the circumstances.

P: One story indicated that the NVN might attack our people in I Corps.

K: They would have done it anyway. One cannot exclude it will spill over a couple of weeks.

P: I will guard what I say.

K: You can be confident.

P: But not indicate the fighting is over. Even on casualties we will have to be careful.

K: This week they will be about 50. That's what it is today.

P: Still holding low. One thing we have particularly to fight against this movement in House Democrats to end the war before Dec. of this year. In my opinion we can get a majority for that but it really is, in advance, to come out for ending it now which would hurt Vietnamese but make what we do seem impotent. That's scheduled for the 31st and we can't beat that. I will do the press earlier next week and pull the teeth on that.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Haldeman/Kissinger

11:43 a. m.

3/22/71

K: Are you arranging a meeting with the SH staff for some time?

H: Do you want me to? Do we have enough to say?

K: Just so they can act with confidence and calm. Otherwise they will flap.

H: Stay on the positive side. You have your cover negatives. They don't meet expectations.

K: It's better than improvising answers. How about 3 or 4:00?

H: Will do it.

K: I think we should do it.

H: How about 4:00?

K: Fine. I can make it positive. At least it will give them something.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
3/22/71 12:45 p.m.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

R: I'm calling because I got a call from Gerry Smith; he was asking me my interpretation of the letter. He said the President said I would be back to him about it. The question he raised was, the President said he wanted this presented at least on equal terms with the other two. He wanted to know if he should use that "at least."

K: No.

R: I said I didn't think that was the President's intention. I said the idea was that it should be presented forcefully as if it's a serious issue.

K: That's exactly right.

R: Then he said he wondered if he should present it now before the other fellow left.

K: Yes.

R: I said yes.

K: That's right.

R: The other thing: Phil Farley regarding the backstopping group. What he has in mind was that the backstopping group will think Gerry didn't follow the NSDM.

K: I think he should just tell the backstopping group what the facts are.

R: I said he should tell them that Gerry has presented this in accordance with the President's wishes. I told him not to show the letter around, just to say the President conveyed his wishes to Gerry. I don't want the letter to be floating all around.

K: I think that's absolutely right.

R: Okay, thank you Henry.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Brian McDonnell

3/22/71 3:00 p.m.

M: I was thinking if you would have a chance to have dinner this week . . .

K: This week is impossible because the President is going to the West Coast.

M: Okay.

K: But we get back the week of the 6th and I'd be delighted.

M: I will give you a call then.

K: What did you decide to do about that interview?

M: I didn't do it . . . . Which interview Henry?

K: The TV one.

M: What? Oh God no.

K: No, no, not TV. The one for the Bulletin.

M: No. What happened was Sandy Grady asked me if I'd do it. I said why did you call. He said he knew Winston Lord. I said if Winston thinks I should I would like him to call me.

K: Oh. There must have been a misunderstanding. Brian I have a 3:15 meeting I must prepare for.

M: You prepare for it then. Henry, about that . . .

K: No, I'm relaxed about it. My word to him was that it was up to you.

M: And I said no.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Dr. Lincoln Gordon/Kissinger

3:21 p.m.

3/22/71

G: Sorry to bother you. I know you have things to do. You have read I resigned from here. I am going to Washington in April temporarily and taking a desk at SAIS. The first discussions I have had in NY and Washington suggest that I would make a candidate as Paul Hoffman's job.

K: That's a good idea.

G: I don't know if it's good for UNDP or me.

K: They have made tentative judgements but let me see what I can do about it.

G: I heard you were in train.

K: I will make an attempt at it. Let me know when you are coming down.

G: About the 12th of April.

K: Call me when you have a base and let's have lunch.

G: I most certainly will.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger
3:35 p.m. 3/22/71

P: How did your meeting go?

K: Well, I was on the defensive. I said I was in the Battle of the Bulge and if someone asked what was going on I would have said it was two armored divisions but in fact it was two tanks. We achieved the logistics of what we want after. The fighting was harder than we expected but the achievements for a variety of reasons were considerable and a period where it will be obvious that we are ending the war. I used what you used earlier that we are close to doing it with our heads high. They didn't harrass me. Chancellor was a little prissy and Kraslow was there. I told them that the reporting was one-sided. I asked said the reporters only saw one side and not what casualties we inflict. They are Americans and they don't like to run down -- they didn't harrass me. I took the line we talked about before I went. I thought it went well.

P: That's good. We will keep after them. I talked with Laird, He is tough.

K: When the chips are down --

P: When he is cornered -- he knows it's a big deal. If only a way to get a little more ____. All reporters are competing to get the bad news in. They don't believe the ARVN.

K: I quoted from Abrams backgrounder and you were right, they hand't heard of it.

P: I will be careful not to use victory or success so it won't look like whistling in the dark. I will use confidence but not a word that x they can grab. Just a shade difference.

K: Don't use a phrase that can haunt you with. They asked about the President's phrase -- apparently Vogt gave an optimistic briefing the day we went in there. You said we expect them to stand and fight there. I said of course because they were standing and fighting and we knew it wasn't Cambodia. I said the President made that judgment and it turned out 100% right. It was quite interesting -- (not much) copping. When I spoke of achievements and I went through what we had done in interrupting supplies, they didn't harrass me on that.

TELECON
Ambassador Rabin

3/22/71 5:38 p.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: Let me tell you -- you are a good general. When I saw you at Joe Alsop's you said 'I don't understand why they don't come up from the south.' They did.

R: They did?

K: Yes.

R: The situation there is not very encouraging.

K: That's not completely correct. I don't think they defeated the South Vietnamese, but in order to stay they would have had to pay a price inordinately high for what could be achieved.

R: It doesn't seem that way to one who doesn't know everything and only reads the papers.

K: The papers are vicious.

R: It seems then at the beginning it was done not taking into account all the possibilities.

K: That's true.

R: That's a problem for you.

K: I have got few periods without problems.

R: For Israel it is a period without problems

K: Without problems?

R: Some minor problems. Everyone says no attempt to twist the hand and no pressures will be applied. I phoned you for two/ purposes: one, in the talk we had with you according to our talk by saying you understand that Israel is ready to discuss a special settlement in the Canal Area which is true. Second, that Israel is ready to present to the U.S. our territorial demands . . .

K: No, I didn't.

R: I didn't remember this, but Argov wrote it down. The Foreign Minister gave a positive answer about the readiness to discuss a special arrangement about the Canal . . . . . . . . We would spell out either to you or Jarring what our demands are in positive terms . . . . . . . Not saying we will now withdraw to '67 lines. We didn't commit ourselves to answer it.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON
Ambassador Rabin

3/22/71 5:35 p.m.

K: Let me check our records to make sure they are consistent with that.

R: This was the position that was decided, but since Argov cabled back home that this was left obscure. . . . I would like to make it clear that the Foreign Minister has not committed the Israeli government to spell out our detailed territorial demand.

K: I understand that.

R: All he said was that he would transmit it back home.

K: Don't worry. I understand.

R: Fine. Second, when you have more time during the week I would like to come and talk about certain things -- not urgent.

K: I will set a time for Wednesday or Thursday.

R: Good.

K: I look forward to seeing you.

TELECON
Secretary Laird
3/22/71 5:45 p.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

L: On this briefing matter we discussed yesterday. We've been briefing the Appropriations and Armed Services committees. These guys aren't running out with joy over the operation. They are keeping their mouths shut -- playing tooy. Who else should be briefed in the Senate?

K: I don't know. I was just transmitting what the President said.

L: Should we just make a general offer?

K: You got Stennis didn't you?

L: Yes and Mansfield. Case was there. Haven't got Fulbright yet.
Should we brief him?

K: I wouldn't brief him, would you?

L: I don't think it would be a plus. He'd use it as a vehicle to make
another statement. We got in touch with MacGregor.

K: Why don't you work with him on this. I just don't have a lot of
suggestions.

L: We got Ellender today.

K: You got Jackson didn't you?

L: No, we didn't, but we can -- he was not in town.

K: I would do Jackson. What is the mood on the Hill?

L: Rather restless. These guys are going home and getting a little
heat, and they are a rather restless bunch. They don't want to say too much
in support of our policy. They're watching out for themselves.

K: Yes.

L: Okay, I just wanted to get your ideas.

K: Okay. I wish I could be more helpful.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Collier/Kissinger

5:55 p. m. 3/22/71

C: I wonder if we might arrange a few moments to discuss Mr. Alsop.

K: How long will you be in town?

C: I live here.

K: It's hectic now. Could I call you in a few days? I will call you by the end of the week.

C: You have the number.

K: I will call you because I think it would be good for us to talk.

C: I will await your call.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

5:57 p.m.

3/22/71

P: Are you through with your stuff today? Nothing new?

K: Nothing new of any consequent. That figure I gave you earlier of huge
amount of ammunition captured is confirmed.

P: Let that build up over the week. Laird can put it out. I am playing more
for the broader strokes.

K: I think it's required. I g briefed the WH staff to get them positioned
properly. McGregor will bring in some Congressmen tomorrow who want
a briefing. Ford and Ahrens.

P: We won't di it at the Leader's meeting then. That's better. It should be
done another way. The thing we want to follow up on is the situation with
regard to their actions for the balance of the week. It seems to be in the
best shape we can do.

K: Nothing more we can do right now. From a publicity point of view we will
have to plug away for the rest of the week.

P: But with some credibility. To be sure we are credible. The problem
we have is this -- when you are telling things they are true if it's against
a barrage of material in another direction it cannot be sound at the time. (?)
Next week we will have it. We have to do it as a counter attack on a lower
key and step it up. We figure it at the end of the week it will calm down some.

K: It depends on SVN making another strike. I wouldn't bet on that.

P: Of course not.

K: It could build us up a few days. I think the doves will be out in full
cry.

P: I imagine they are today.

K: They have been constrained but I think they will come out.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President

3/22/71; 6:35 p. m. (Conversation had already begun)

P: I don't plan to say anything about it particularly.

K: That was something we always knew they could do. The only thing that restrained them was reverence for the King. It is possible, Mr. President, that as an outgrowth of this operation they may want to flex their muscles. Attack on Long Thien could come about. We had a good B-52 strike there lately which has probably set them back. If you remember, we expected that attack on Long Thien in February. . . . That's the royal capital -- has not been heavily defended.

P: Okay. Now the other thing which gets back to my talk about Helms. I noticed Hanoi Radio -- U. S. losses biggest -- Helms, is really pounding our own stuff in there, isn't he?

K: Yes.

P: He should hit that really hard. A lot of this is psychological warfare.

K: I was interested, Mr. President, in talking to Chalmers Roberts -- just to bring him up to date on some of the things -- he had a report from David Broder about my luncheon meeting -- a good report -- of course, he may just be buttering me up. I think we came out alright on that.

P: Let's not indicate it ourselves. You understand we have two different problems -- we have to remember that about 2/3 of it is what somebody claims. . . . the enemy casualties that have been inflicted -- chocked off supply is going to have its effect. The other thing I was going to ask -- report out of Saigon said ARVN had 25% casualties -- that seemed to be higher.

K: They have suffered about . . .

P: That's killed and wounded. That's not too high.

K: About 4,000 wounded and 1,000 killed.

P: That gives us some indication of what casualties the other side has.

K: If you assume five to one -- that would be between 25,000 and 30,000 -- which is only about 1/2 of what we claim.

P: I think sometimes the claims are so high they are not credible.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: We should not make claims ourselves.
as

P: Okay. Anything else as far we know?

K: No, it is just turning daylight. I just checked with Admiral Moorer's liaison man -- no sign of panic or withdrawal. Almost all of those came from battalions that were hit.

P: I noticed one story here that it says that tank column are following
one \_as it goes up\_ It certainly seems that our aircraft could be
there.

K: I don't know which tank column they are talking about. Vietnamese
Marines got under heavy attack in that area -- today. They lost 85 dead
but they claim 350 dead and picked up weapons.

P: They are now coming within artillery range of Khe Sanh?

K: Yes. If they come on over they are going to suffer quite a lot in casualties.

P: Well, we want to remember that Freidheim has taken a stronger line on the successes. Let's get some of our guys talking those terms. I won't go that far tonight because I have to be more credible.

K: It is more to show confidence than how much you claim was done.
We have been flying air strikes but there aren't any troops we could put
up there -- it is not in the area of Long Thien. They might now begin
to flex their muscles. They might go for broke in the next month or
two

P: Our troop withdrawal will seem somewhat strange, won't it?

K: That won't affect anything, Mr. President, because it won't start until
May 1. I think we should stick with it. I would not call Abrams and
Bunker back. I think the more calm we can appear the better -- the less
Vietnam is on the front page. . . .

P: Agreed.

By.

D

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler (I. O.)

7:15 p.m., March 22, 1971

Z: I wondered what your views were about John Scalli coming in.

K: I think it is too far down the road to have any views.

Z: Than you are not concerned about it.

K: I rather like him.

Z: Well, I just wondered what your thoughts are.

K: If they need a TV image, he is as good as anyone.

Z: The overall counsel from foreign policy is what Scalli has in his head.

K: Bob tells me it would be on domestic also.

Z: It would be an additional point of view. You feel comfortable though don't you?

K: They won't get rid of my job for another 6 months.

Z: You don't have to worry about that Henry. You would be the last to go.

K: I am not worried, look how pretty I would have sat if I had gotten out in January.

Z: I know. I just hope .... Khe Sanh ....

K: I wouldn't say this to anybody else but the military screwed us. They were a selfish bunch of incompetents.

Z: Just between you and I, I share your view. I sensed it when Moorer kept coming in and giving the same briefing and the arrows on the charts never changed.

K: Moorer -- Haig is right, we should never have had a Navy guy in charge of a ground operation.

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