ROBERT L. HEILBRONER

Dear Henry:

Here is my Chapter VII -- The Challenge to the Democratic Process. I wish you would read it over for the ideas it contains, and not for the style. I know it is not well written, but my struggle has been to find the things to say. I shall be eager to have your criticism of its general orientation. Is it too "liberterian"? Is there too little specifically about the U.S. ? Are there important matters I have left out?

bob

Draft Chapter VII - Overall Report

December 16, 1957

CHAPTER VII

# THE CHALLENGE TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Our conspectus is nearly complete. What we have sought to present thus far is a panorama of the great challenges that America now confronts -- a panorama which has revealed itself not in terms of a single foreseeable future so much as in a series of tremendous alternatives, choices, and decisions. Yet the conspectus still lacks in one essential respect. It has called attention to the openness of the future, its essential double aspect as problem and opportunity. But it has not yet considered the means by which we will determine which of many possible courses will be the one we pursue, nor the effectiveness with which we will be able to marshall our resources, material, moral, and intellectual, for the support of the course we elect.

This all-important decision-making and decision-enforcing process will be the supreme test of our form of government -- which is to say that it will be the supreme test of the governing abilities of our people. Yet there is more at stake in the challenge to democracy than the effectiveness of a political instrumentality in ensuring our survival. For with the exception of all-out war the issues posed by our times are not those of brute survival. Short of a total catastrophe, something called the United States of America will exist fifty, and probably a hundred years hence. The great question is what sort of a United States that will be. Hence it is not merely the ability of our democratic process

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to meet the concrete challenges of the future, but the impact of those
challenges upon the democratic process itself which we must seek to
appraise. It is not only in the democratic process as a great source of
action, but in that process as an integral aspect of our way of life that
we must seek for the most meaningful of all challenges of the future.

II

No overall view of contemporary world civilization can fail to be
impressed by one central tragedy of our times. This is the fact that in an
age when man's intelligence has begun to control the fundamental powers of
nature, it is still baffled before the primitive power of man. We exist today
in a state of international disorder largely because humanity has been unable
to solve a problem which it has faced for ten thousand years. The problem is:

<u>Who shall rule, and how?</u> And the most common answer today as then is:

<u>The strong shall rule, and by force.</u>

Any overview of the majority of the world's political structures reveals
how faulty have been man's attempts to find a better answer to the basic
problem of government. Despotism and anarchy, the twin scourges of social
history since time immemorial, are still realities or immediate threats to the
greater part of humankind today. For most men the political process is still
thought to be not degraded by, but exemplified in intrigue or mutual suspicion

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between governors and governed. At least half -- perhaps more nearly three quarters -- of the globe today is ruled in a manner which is not significantly different in essence, although far more refined in technique, than that of ancient Egypt. The political problem of Who shall rule, and how is the one before which men must admit to their most dangerous failure.

To this profound and tragic problem the Western community of nations has come closer than any other in evolving a solution. In its broadest perspective, the political history of the last thousand years of the West has been the forging of a notion of legitimacy of government which would supercede that of *force majeure*. The gradual coalescence of independent feudal principalities into unified monarchies; the painful efforts to contain the prerogatives of monarchical power within explicit social contracts; the slow emergence of legal bodies of public opinion, consent, and control; the tentative but irreversible transfer of power to the broad masses of the national citizenry: this painful, often bloody, procession of events has constituted the greatest social achievement of the Western world. It has made of democracy a social reality which, however much it may fall short of an ideal, nonetheless offers an environment in which for the first time the political power of man over man has been made subject to rational social control.

The winning of democracy has not been a mere matter of devising suitable institutional frameworks. Parliaments and free suffrage, ministerial responsibility, and legal constitutions have accompanied the movement toward

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democracy, and each such new institution has marked the site of a victory
in the campaign. But essentially the contest has not been fought over
institutions, but ideas. The critical issue behind the democratic evolution
has been the degree to which individuals could be entrusted with the control
of their own collective existence. While the right of dissent, of private
political freedom, of the open accessability to political power are all indis-
pensible elements of a democracy, anterior to these is a faith in the capacity
of the private person to judge events, to estimate men, to obey the common
tradition, to accept self-imposed restraints. When this faith has weakened,
the institutions of democracy have proven themselves but frail buttresses
against the destruction of democracy. Indeed its very institutions have been
used as the avenues of incursion against democracy: fascism has risen and
communism may rise to power through legitimate channels. Essentially there
is no defense of the democratic process other than a continuing subscription
to and practice of its beliefs.

Because the essential condition of democracy is a matter of self-trust
rather than formal observance, democracy possesses some unique advantages
as a system of government. Of these the greatest is the strength that derives
directly from the underlying consensus. It is the strength of a community which
no longer has to solve the problem of legitimizing political power. The energies
of its people, freed of the necessity of defining the inner problem of power, can
be directed toward the constructive use of power. The problems of such a nation

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may be solved by debate rather than by polemic; for while the fate of its
particular governments may be at stake, the fate of government itself is not.
A democratic government is thus capable of great flexibility, adaptability,
resilience, because it does not need to waste its energies in defending its
own right to exist. A democracy, when it is secure, is the most secure of
all governments, for its political process is not imposed upon the people but
originates from them.

Yet a democracy has the defects of its virtues. Basing itself on the
judgment of individuals, a democracy must run the constant risk that individual
judgments will be faulty, not in some trivial and easily remediable respect,
but in regard to basic and irretrievable issues. The classic weakness of a
democracy is the inability of the governing populace to elevate itself beyond
the press of its immediate interests, and its propensity to act on the dubious
assumption that what looks best to each is necessarily best for all. But even
graver than the threat of direct mismanagement is the vulnerability of the
democratic faith itself. Because it derives from and rests on a tacit agreement
about the self-governing capacity of individuals, a democracy is the most
difficult of governmental forms to defend once that agreement is in doubt. For
once the democratic process is under the attack of disbelief, it has no wholly
legitimate means of self-defense. Forms of government which derive their
strength from force may add force when attacked. A democracy which seeks to
defend itself by force only further undermines its own foundations.

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Thus while the democratic form of political process disposes of the most dangerous problems of political power, it exposes itself to a crucial problem which an authoritarian government need not face. This is the problem of maintaining the consensus on which an open society is built. The critical problem for an authoritarian government is the proper exercise of power. The critical problem for a democratic community is the proper exercise of faith.

### III

In the community of Western nations the United States has played an important role in the shaping of the democratic process. To a considerable extent we have been the pioneers in the secure establishment of democracy. Our successful revolution which was controlled and guided with such masterful skill, the dignity and human quality of our great political figures, the inspired prose of our political documents -- all these have contributed beyond measure to the prestige of the democratic faith.

And yet our political contribution must be viewed in its proper perspective. If our democratic repute is great, we cannot take full credit for our accomplishment. For we have been the beneficial heirs of many centuries of preparation for democracy. Alone among the Western nations we have known nothing of the evolutionary agonies of transcending a non-democratic past. We began, at it were, with a clean historical slate.

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This tremendous initial advantage was put to good use in the founding documents drawn up by our early philosopher-statesmen. Unencumbered by the existence of an hereditary elite or by the immediate demands of a down-trodden people in revolt, they provided for an architecture of government designed to skirt equally the dangers of centralized and insulated, and of dissipated and diffuse power. Our institutions were thus planned to provide effective governance without tyranny and public responsiveness without mob rule. The ideal of the perfectibility of man runs through the mechanics of government which our founders provided, but the ideal was not taken as an actuality: our Constitution not only establishes safeguards against undemocratic government, but safeguards which democracy needs against itself.

The result has been one of the most successful definitions of political power the world has ever known. From the beginning our people have evidenced an extraordinary degree of consensus in the political solution of the American system, and the worst crises of our nation have failed to shake it. Our most grevious internal dissension -- the Civil War -- did not call into question the basic tenets of constitutional democracy itself. Our most crushing economic failure -- the Great Depression -- never subjected the political framework to the fundamental criticism it did the economic. Even the wars we have fought have never jeopardized our political faith. We have freely engaged in wide alterations of the formal institutions of democratic government without to any significant degree weakening the consensus which immediately reestablished them when the emergency had passed.

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Thus from its very inception, the American nation has been able to enjoy an exceptional political experience. Almost alone among the nations of the world we have never known an alternative to the democratic process which has served us so well. Although our origin lies in a resistance to ill-government, never again in our subsequent history have we had to deal with a political problem which exceeded the framework of our agreed consensus.

But this insulation of our political life, so fortunate in itself, poses a problem for Americans. The problem is that we are unused to thinking in terms of a total political challenge. The active and occasionally acrimonious political contests which traditionally play so important a role in our lives lead us to believe that we are a politically-minded people. But the fact is that our political disagreements, at their most extreme, do not trespass beyond the bounds of a tacitly agreed framework of discourse. Hence our political-mindedness conceals the fact that we are not, in a deep sense, politically mindful. The existence of alternative methods of government is only a textbook hypothesis for us. The very concept of total political challenge is an unfamiliar one.

Insofar as this is testimony to the continuing faith of the American people in their vehicle of government it is a sign of our political strength. But an inability to take seriously an alternative to the democratic process also blinds us to the existence of the challenges to that process. Because we dismiss as absurd or as repugnant the blatant challenge of a collectivist

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society with its authoritarian political structure, we may fail to see the
subtler but no less formidable challenges to the democratic process which
arises from the very resistance we may offer to collectivism. In a curious
sense our European sister nations, many of whom suffer from a far less secure
democratic consensus than we, are better prepared to meet some challenges
to the democratic process because of their awareness of the reality of
alternatives. We, on the other hand, in our political security, may be an
easier prey because we are unaware of the nature of the threat.

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IV

What is the nature of the challenge to the democratic process?

Essentially it is the pressure of a collectivist society against an open society. It may come as a shock to many Americans, but the existence of a highly successful collectivist society poses the same challenge to us today that our democratic society posed to the world at the end of the 19th century.

The first and most blatant level of that challenge is a simple competition between communism and democracy as a preferable form of political society. For most Western nations this is no longer a serious question. The initial idealistic appeal of communism has long since given way to a realistic appraisal of the conditions of a closed society. Twenty years ago, Soviet communism still presented itself to many eyes primarily as an alternative economic arrangement of affairs, quite compatible -- in a Western setting -- with the preservation of the political liberties to which the West had become accustomed. Today this illusion has virtually vanished. The direct challenge of communism as a preferable structure of government is waning among the democratic nations of the world. With us it is a negligible threat. The number of American citizens who sincerely believe in the political superiority of the communist system has shrunk to a handful of fanatical believers whose influence cannot be judged of importance.

This clear victory of the democratic ideal cannot be so easily acknowledged for many of the underdeveloped nations, however, Not having wrested for themselves the liberties of a democratic society, or only newly risen to freedom's estate, the most precious gains of a democratic society are apt to

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be lightly esteemed by many of them. Hence such nations may place little importance on the political price of adopting communism, and may judge between it and democracy solely on the basis of the effectiveness of each in carrying out social and economic tasks.

And in this competition of tasks a collectivist society has clear advantages over an open society. It can mobilize its industrial resources and direct them with greater effectiveness than a society of free enterprise. It can marshall its human resources, allocate its skills, and utilize its talents more efficiently than an individualistic society. It can more easily exact a degree of sacrifice from its people than a free community. It can practice diplomacy without the hindrance of public opinion, and it can speak in many different voices to many audiences. It need not scruple itself with too close a regard for the truth, since there are no embarrassments of free press. The undeniable fact is that an authoritarian society can do many things quicker, and more efficiently than a free society. To nations impatiently seeking to develop an effective social and economic apparatus, and unused to a democratic solicitude for the individual these advantages may seem overwhelming. Indeed in the overall competition of political systems it may seem that democratic societies can only do one thing better; that is, to govern justly. But if this goal seems less important than the winning of social and economic advantages, then communism may well seem the preferable choice.

Thus the first danger area for the democratic process comes in the rivalry of the open and closed societies as the pattern for the development of many uncommitted new nations of the world.

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But there is a second area of danger which carries the challenge
directly to the democratic nations themselves. This is the subversive infil-
tration of communism. The issue here is not the open conversion of an elec-
torate to the political philosophy of communism, but the destruction of the
democratic process by a communist minority which has established itself in
the saddle. Such anti-democratic tactics of communism are a matter of
record in every democratic nation, and have accounted for the demise of
several.

Although the subversive threat to democracy persists, its danger has
been increasingly offset by a wider knowledge of communist political tactics.
In most democratic nations the organs of popular representation, from local
parties and trade unions to national institutions have learned the impossibility
of working within a democratic framework with a militant group which does
not subscribe to the consensus. Hence a sharp eye is kept open for signs
of communist influence. Although the question of how to deal with a com-
munist minority presents very grave dilemmas, at least the alertness to the
threat is by now widespread.

But the question of subversion brings us closer to the heart of the
challenge to the democratic process. For the subtlest but most real of
dangers to democracy lies not in a direct competition with communism. It
lies in the inherent dilemmas of overcoming the challenge of communism
itself. For the quixotic nature of the communist challenge is that the actions

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which are necessary to meet it are themselves fraught with danger to the democratic process.

This self-generated danger to democracy assumes two major forms. One is the widening degree of government control over individual action brought about by the need to erect defenses against collectivist action. In the face of the economic, military, propagandistic and yet other organized threats of communism, it is impossible for an open society not to take measures of self-defense. Military conquest quite aside, a failure to match the social and economic achievements of the Soviet Union spells a major defeat for us. Inaction has already allowed Russia to surpass us in some aspects of science. Further inaction -- and our persistent undervaluation of the capacities of the USSR -- could lead to a situation where we were surpassed tomorrow in cultural achievement, and thereafter even in our standard of living. Should such a development come to pass -- and over a fifty year outlook it is by no means impossible -- then the first threat of communism, its "superiority" to a democratic system, would assume truly major proportions. We cannot afford to let that happen.

Yet behind the rehetorical "we" of such a statement lies the reality of a greatly expanded government responsibility. No way exists of matching the achievements of a collectivist society except to marshall our own resources under a central authority. Government action can only be met by government action.

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This poses a peculiarly difficult dilemma for the democratic process. Even without the competitive pressure of the collectivists, a widening of the role of government direction over the social and economic activities of an open society is virtually certain to come about. The revolution of rising expectations which plays such a central role in the history of our time represents to a large degree a collective shouldering of responsibility. The challenges of the future do not all require, nor would some of the most important yield to government action, but without a strong and active central government it would not even be possible to talk meaningfully of the possibility of meeting any of them. Hence a larger measure of public responsibility is a necessary course of action if we are to strengthen our democratic community.

Yet it may also be a source of weakness to our community. We do not clearly know the limits to which a democratic government may assume control over the pace, direction, and purpose of the lives of its constituency without ceasing to be an open society. If alarmist and irresponsible talk brands every widening of government action as destructive of individual liberty, there is yet a core of truth in the fact that government intervention into the economic and social process tests the democratic and open character of society. A highly integrated economic system cannot easily tolerate too large an area of economic nonconformist behavior. And to achieve the requisite degree of economic cooperation, political coercion may become necessary.

The outlook is thus indeterminate and the character of the future once again reveals itself to rest not alone on the inexorable march of events, but

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on the use which we make of them. It is possible to imagine -- and indeed we have experienced at times in our history -- a very considerable measure of public social and economic direction without an impairment of our political liberties. To a certain extent political and economic liberty have proven divisible. The extent to which this will be true in the future cannot now be foretold. As with the political institutions of the democratic process, the formal structures of planning in an open society are of less account than the spirit which infuses them.

Thus one threat -- or at least one potential threat -- to the democratic process comes from the centralized direction of economic and social life which is thrust upon us all the more inescapably by the challenges of a collectivist society. But another and even more insidious danger must be faced. This is the challenge to the openness of democratic thought which stems from our confrontation with a totalitarian society. For the truly subversive threat which a collectivist society offers to an open society lies in the undermining of the consensus of democratic faith. And it is not the totalitarian ideas themselves, but the democratic reaction to them which is the danger. For a democracy naturally fights for its beliefs. Faced with an ideological enemy which attacks its very core, it must defend itself. It must expose, rebut, refute totalitarian thought. But it cannot forbid or penalize such thought, and retain its own full self-confidence. Any curtailment of thought and opinion is necessarily a blow to the faith on which democratic process rests. Any censorship of ideas, even of the most dangerous, inevitably poisons the democratic faith.

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Of course this does not mean that a democratic society cannot protect
itself against espionage, or that it does not have the right to expose the sub-
versive process which may imperil it. But the very process of rooting out or
searching for undemocratic thought is an infectious and malign attitude for a
democratic community. Even when a democratic community seeks only to
alert its members to communist or fascist beliefs, the very act of the suspi-
cious examination of ideas is itself one which reflects on the validity of the
democratic ideal. It sheds doubt on the capacity of the individual to choose
a political faith consistent with the democratic consensus.

Thus in its attitude toward anti-democratic ideas, a democratic society
faces its most tragic and the most dangerous challenge -- tragic and dangerous
because the challenge of these ideas can neither be wholly ignored nor can it
be wholly answered. Democracy must live at bay, not only from the easily
identifiable challenges imposed from without, but from those subtle ones
which grow up within. Before this total political challenge there can be many
responses. That of a gradual narrowing of intellectual freedom, of a suspi-
cious examination of the political credentials of the citizenry, is perhaps the
most easily taken and the most tempting. It will recommend itself to many
who are unaware of the self-contaminating nature of such an attitude. A demo-
cratic society may thus become so unsure of its own consensus, so frightened
or paralyzed by the external and internal threats that it destroys its own inner
freedom in the very name of freedom -- exacting a political uniformity as the
only "answer" to a dangerous political heterodoxy, or demanding oaths of

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loyalty to a watery faith. Yet it need not be so. A democracy may use the
existence of the totalitarian challenge as a stimulus to reexamine the nature
of the democratic society, to reassess its risks, and in full cognizance of
these risks to reassert its trust in the ability of the individual to govern him-
self. Total political challenge may strengthen the democratic process by
making it aware of the element of faith which is its core.

V

No leaderless society, and particularly not the loosely organized
political entity of a democratic community, can assess or respond spontan-
eously to the internal and external pressures which assail it. The popular
will must be focused; and even more important, the popular will be brought
into being. The partial intelligence of the public must be filled in, the vaguely
sensed or unseen dangers of the present must be clarified, the obscure oppor-
tunities for the future must be brought into common view.

All societies demand this responsibility of leadership. Closed or
authoritarian societies solve it by entrusting the leadership function to the
rule of an elite -- a man or a class, to whom power is given to be exercised
in relative freedom. A democratic society essentially entrusts the function
of leadership to the people themselves, in that it asks them to choose their
own leaders, and allows them to withdraw from power those who disappoint
them.

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This places an extraordinary task before the democratic leader. Given access to more information than the public at large, and necessarily concerned with a wider panorama of issues, the decisions which intelligence and integrity may dictate to the democratic leader are likely to be at considerable variance from those which suggest themselves to a smaller scope of information and interest. Thus the democratic leader is placed in a quandary which is not that of the authoritarian leader. He must not only exercise the complex task of executorship itself, but he must compose a course which will gain the electoral assent of the nation at large.

Not that the leadership function is always that of command. Leadership is sometimes evidenced by following the popular will, sometimes by opposing it, sometimes by altering its direction. A leader is not only an innovator and a deviser of new responses to new situations. Equally important he is the symbol of tried values -- a source of moral and historical solidarity in a situation which threatens to be misinterpreted for lack of a feeling of continuity. A leader is as important as a link with the vital past as he is in his capacity of navigator into the future.

Thus leadership in a democratic community must tread an ill-defined path between responsiveness and restraint. When a government apparatus is solely and immediately responsive to the unreflecting wishes of the electorate it lacks character. It has no capacity for the exercise of its own initiative or for the design and carrying through of bold policies designed for long-term objectives. It may end in paralysis -- in a supine obedience to a public will

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which is itself shapeless and undisciplined. Yet a government apparatus
which displays too much restraint, which opposes or imposes its will to that
of the electorate is obviously athwart the democratic current itself.

The problem is rendered yet more complex by subsidiary but important
considerations.

The effective conduct of democratic affairs requires the highest order
of confidence in the qualities of its leaders. But this confidence is difficult
to attain in a country where politics has traditionally been considered second-
order business, and where the very term "politician" carries deprecatory
overtones. The American public is not suspicious of its leaders as regards
their thirst for power; it is suspicious of them as regards their qualifications
for office. It believes in minimal government, and therefore suspects the
unusually capable man. It looks for mediocrity in office as a kind of badge
of propriety, an assurance of the "democratic" nature of its officialdom.

A second complicating factor is the moral problem which democratic
leadership must face at every level. This is the problem of the degree to
which privy knowledge -- including knowledge of the risks involved in any
policy -- may be rightly shared.

Every responsible leader in his lonely moments knows this dilemma.
On the one hand, he is acutely aware of the limits of his knowledge and the
risks involved in any large undertaking. On the other hand, he must accept
the impossibility of fully communicating this knowledge of his own limitations
and of unpredictable risks without endangering or destroying confidence in the

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course he chooses to be pursued. The moral dilemma here arises from the
obligation of leaders in a democracy to be honest with everyone else who has
the same essential stake as the leader in the outcome of a national policy.
On the other hand, the inherent danger of imperfect communication in any
democratic situation is so great that it makes a policy of candor fraught with
a risk of destroying public morale. One of the great dangers is that the
leaders in a democratic society may become so fearful of this kind of honesty
that they may be drawn into a policy of "covering up" which ultimately will
be destructive of either the democratic process or of effective leadership or
of both.

Thus the democratic leader must face unusual handicaps in the exer-
cise of his leadership function. Without the confidence of the electorate his
ability to act is impaired or even negated. But the ability to win the con-
fidence of the public by a full sharing of information and facts is a risky
course. It is far more expeditious to win the democratic consent by a lulling
gloss of the facts or by an adroit facade of public relations rather than by a
hard confrontation with unpleasant realities. The moral requirements for
effective democratic leadership are high, and the temptations to compromise
with its stern requirements are great.

December 16, 1957

VI

If this resume of the difficulties of maintaining the democratic
process in the face of total political challenge seems to overstress the
weaknesses and to understate the strengths of the democratic process, it
is because a democratic people must learn to become politically mindful as
well as politically minded. There is no need to repeat here the values of
the democratic process or to reiterate its successes. We believe that the
values and successes of democracy are known and treasured by us. If
those values have not been learned or the successes appreciated, it is too
late to preach them now.

The task before us is to become alive to the dangers and weaknesses
which have hitherto been so largely ignored. Democracy has thus far been
successful in large part because it has never had to face a total challenge,
and because there was no real danger that it could not cope adequately with
the crises which presented themselves. That reassuring condition can no
longer be maintained. One need not be fearful of the ability of democracy
to triumph to point out the dangers it will have to surmount. Indeed the
more realistically the full threat to the democratic process is understood,
the better chance do we have to guard our heritage.

For democracy is always in peril: that is its price. The danger is
greater today, but it is not a danger which should inculcate despair, but
renewed dedication. By its nature democracy is an imperfect business and

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in 20th Century America the nature and pace of change have put the democratic
process under totally unprecedented demands. During such a period this im-
perfect operation is certain to appear even more imperfect than it is. But
taking everything into account, it can also be said that the American demo-
cratic process is as much to be admired for its adaptability and resiliency as
it is to be dispaired of because of its deficiencies. With all our growth in
size and with all our increased pace of life, there is not yet reason to feel
that democracy has lost its vitality. In those situations where it is in bad
shape, the poor condition stands out because of comparison with excellence
in other situations. A poor performance by any democratic institution in either
public or private life is soon a matter of public comment and private concern.
The organized educational system has never been more preoccupied with the
problems of democracy and it is certain that America has never been as well
served as she is today by agencies of adult education. The quality of our
mass media is justifiably under continuing criticism but, compared with the
past, even here the record is at least reasonably reassuring and there is little
comfortable complacency. Citizenship organizations, large business groups,
the united labor movement, the great private foundations and adult education
organizations -- all are carrying out relevant adult education activities that
for the first time in the history of any society reach into well-nigh every
household in the land. These activities are not directed to the same end nor
are all of them equally disinterested but, broadly viewed, these activities are

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all manifestations of the democratic process and, as such, they provide it
with the health and vigor that comes to any process only through being both
used and reviewed.

And in this connection there is a second fact to be recognized. There
is a persistent tendency on the part of observers of the democratic process to
underestimate the self-discipline of a people who have been adequately in-
formed and courageously led. It is encouraging to note that over the past
twenty years the American public has proved capable on a series of occasions
of giving understanding and support to measures of a subtlety (for example,
Lend-Lease, the Marshall Plan, NATO, long-term foreign aid) which
believes the simple image of democratic public opinion passed down to us from
Tocqueville and Bryce.

And then there is one final and greatest strength of all. This is the
hope that the democratic process represents the natural terminus of man's
struggle for enlightenment. It is not merely a wishful hope. In the long run,
the forces of men's aspirations point toward rather than away from self-govern-
ment. In the nations where democracy has been swept away, it has either
been reestablished -- as in Italy or Germany -- or struggles for recognition
beneath the totalitarian surface -- as in Poland or Hungary. The present
stage of world history, in which nations exist side by side at various stages
of cultural and political development, tends to obscure the fact that democracy
is a political goal whose appeal is as universal as that of material wellbeing.

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In the long run it is simply inconceivable that the monolithic state should
prevail. For a time it may satisfy men's desires for security. In the struggle
for economic development it may seem the proper or the only vehicle for
rapid advance. But the totalitarian governments have their seeds of decay.
Political power without social legitimacy is historically unstable. Economic
wellbeing, and scientific progress make for libertarian habits of thought. If
the whole trend of the past is an indication of the future, then eventually the
democratic ideal must triumph. But meanwhile it must learn to defend its
bastions, not only from the pressures from without but from a weakness of
heart within.

* * *

With the challenge to the democratic process we conclude our broad
conspectus of the issues confronting America at mid-century. It is by no
means a complete catalog, for the future is not a calculable equation. Its
problems are not precise or sharply delineated; indeed they are not always
identifiable. The purpose of such a conspectus as this one is not to narrow
our focus to a few issues, but to widen it to scan the entire horizon for
potential challenges.

Yet there is enough now in our focus to suggest one major considera-
tion. The issues we have presented are great with prospects for tranquillity
or turmoil, opportunities for achievement or defeat, but they all turn on a
common concern. This is the fact that the great issues are not technical so
much as moral. They ask us to consider not so much how to gain domestic
abundance as what to do with it; not how to negotiate with a world in

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revolution as how to help it find new standards and goals; not how to improve
the democratic structure so much as how to strengthen the democratic faith.
America will stand or fall by its actions -- by the wisdom, patience, and
understanding with which it meets the great challenges of our time. But there
actions will be empty of direction and purpose unless they are infused with
compassion, a love of justice, and a quest for truth. Hence before we turn
to a consideration of the alternatives of action open before us, we must take
account of our own moral standards -- of the moral resources that we possess.
It is to this question that we now turn.