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three of Hanoi's Four Points are acceptable.

There is disagreement about the status of Hanoi's forces in the South; indeed Hanoi has yet to admit that it has forces in the South -- though it has prepared a "fall-back position" to the effect that North Vietnamese forces in the South cannot be considered "external." The role of the NLF is equally in dispute. Saigon rejects a separate political role for the NLF; the NLF considers Saigon a puppet regime. There is disagreement about what those propositions which sound alike really mean or how they are to be enforced.

In addition, to these negotiations by public pro-
nouncements, there have been many secret contacts which
have been described in many books and articles. 1 It has
been alleged that these contacts have failed because of a
lack of imagination or a failure of coordination within our
government. (There have also been charges of deliberate
sabotage). A fair assessment of these criticisms will not

1. The fullest account is to be found in Kraslow and Loory, *The Secret Search For Peace in Vietnam*, Random House, 1968.

[y]

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has meant to calculate -- almost instinctively -- the
real balance of forces. For the people of South Vietnam --
as almost surely for Hanoi and the NLF -- negotiations are
not a different stage but a continuation of the existing
process in a different dimension. If negotiations leave
the impression that they are primarily a camouflaged
surrender, there will be nothing left to negotiate.
Support for the side which seems to be losing will collapse.

Thus, all the parties in the war are aware -- Hanoi explicitly, we in a more complicated, bureaucratic way -- that the way things are done is almost as important as what is done. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first and in what manner is almost as important as the substance; in fact, it is inseparable from the substance of the issues.

Wannier is thus imposed on the negotiators, a series of deadlocks is difficult to avoid. There are from objective difficulties within South Vietnam and not "easy" issues for either side. The symbolic, necessarily from American unimaginativeness or North of deeper Vietnamese obstinacy. On its merits, the debate about the

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site of the conference -- extending over a period of six
weeks -- was trivial. Judged intellectually, the six
weeks were "wasted." But they did serve a useful
function: they enabled the United States to let Saigon
get used to the idea that there would be negotiations.
It would not be surprising if Hanoi had a similar problem
with the NLF.

year of
previous page

The situation confronted by Washington and Hanoi\internationally, is scarcely less complex. Much of the
bitter debate in the United States about the war in Vietnam
has been conducted in terms of the categories of 1961 or
1962. The failure to analyze adequately the geopolitical
importance of Vietnam thus has indeed contributed to the
current dilemma. But when over five hundred thousand
Americans are engaged after three years of war, Vietnam, as a
lessettled issue, has become important in the context of
For what is involved now is the degree to which other
nations believe they can rely on American premises.

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Other nations can gear their actions to ours only on the basis of our performance. However, "credibility" or "prestige" are not empty phrases; they are a nation's principal coin in relating itself to others. It is true that the Vietnamese war is highly unpopular in many countries, though the intensity of the criticism seems to increase with distance from the scene. It does not follow that we can remove the charge of bad judgment by a demonstration of incompetence.

Even critics are unlikely to be reassured by a complete collapse of the American effort in Vietnam. Those whose safety or positive goals depend on American promises could only be dismayed. Since world order depends on a significant American contribution, simply liquidating the war would therefore only lead ultimately to international isolation. It is not a responsible American option.

Hanoi's position is equally complicated. Its concerns are not global; they are, if anything, xenophobically Vietnamese. But for Hanoi, survival depends on a correct

### III. COMMITMENT AND RISK IN VIETNAMESE DIPLOMACY

No issue illustrates the difference in conceptions as to what constitutes a commitment than the problem of the bombing halt. It shows, too, the difficulty of encompassing intangibles of psychology and nuance in the practice of Vietnamese diplomacy.

The United States' position on the bombing halt has been expressed in the San Antonio formula of President Johnson. This states: "The United States is prepared to stop unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam provided this leads promptly to productive negotiations. It is assumed that Hanoi will not take advantage of such a halt."

Not unpredictably, Hanoi lost no time in pointing out that it could not guarantee "productive" negotiations since this depended on the attitude of both sides. The phrase "not take advantage" presented analogous difficulties. On the face of it, it seemed so vague -- especially to people so morbidly suspicious as the North Vietnamese -- that it

1. Interview with Burchett

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could then bomb "legally."

But would Hanoi in fact take advantage? This depends on the context of events. The reluctance to commit itself to reciprocity does not necessarily mean that reciprocity would not be extended. The question is whether Hanoi would be restrained by a formal, legally binding commitment or by some other factors. If Hanoi violates a bombing pause, no court to which Hanoi could be taken exists. The primary sanction is what the United States could do to Hanoi unilaterally in retaliation, not what Hanoi has formally promised. From this point of view, it is more important that Hanoi understands what the United States would consider "take advantage" than what Hanoi formally promises.

Clarity in our communication is more useful than a legally binding document.

But how do we know that Hanoi will not trick us?
The answer depends on what is understood by trickery. The record of Hanoi leaves little doubt that it would be prepared to trick the United States if it served its purpose.

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For the United States, this means that once the
decision to halt bombing has been taken, it is more
important to make sure that Hanoi understands the meaning
we attach to the no advantage clause than to elicit a
formal pledge. If we have communicated properly, the United
States can, in fact, stop bombing unilaterally even
unconditionally -- though in the relations of sovereign
states, these phases cannot limit future actions if the
context of events changes. A corollary is that Hanoi must
understand that the United States would, in fact, resume
bombing were Hanoi to take advantage. The issue of the
bombing halt thus essentially turned more on establishing
a reliable mode of communication than on formal pledges.

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proposals which are frequently advanced for the next stage of
negotiations: the ceasefire and coalition government.

It has become axiomatic that a bombing halt would lead -- almost automatically -- to a ceasefire. However, it is likely ~~to turn out that negotiating a ceasefire in tantamount to establishing the preconditions of a settlement. If~~ there existed a front line with unchallenged control behind it, the solution would be traditional and relatively simple. Were the conflict purely military, negotiating permissible actions under conditions of ceasefire would be straightforward. But there are no front lines in Vietnam; control is not territorial, it depends on the time of day. If a cease fire permits the government to move ~~at will within South Vietnam day or night~~ without challenge, it would define a Saigon victory. If Saigon is prevented from entering certain areas, it would mean in effect the partition of the country.

This would involve the following additional problems:

(1) it would lead to an intense scramble to establish predominant control before the ceasefire goes into effect; (2) it would

make next to impossible the verification of any withdrawal
that might be negotiated;
of North Vietnamese forces since the local authorities in
areas of preponderant Communist control would doubtless
certify that no external forces were present and impede any
effort at international inspection; (3) it would raise the
problem of the applicability of a ceasefire to guerrilla
activity in the non-Communist part of the country; in other
words, how to deal with the asymmetry between the actions of
regular and of guerrilla forces. Regular forces operate on
makes possible a scale which is reducible to a precise definition of what is
permitted and what is proscribed; guerrilla forces, by contrast,
effective through isolated acts of terror difficult to distinguish from normal criminal activity.

There are many other problems in the typical cases of
dual control: who collects taxes and how, who enforces the
ceasefire and by what means. In other words, a tacit de facto
ceasefire may prove more attainable than a negotiated one. By
the same token, formal negotiations for a ceasefire would, in
effect, predetermine the ultimate settlement. They are even more
a form of global arrangement.

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Where peace-fair negotiations would be a formula
for defining the frontiers approaching a final settlement without
This is even more true of the notion of a coalition
government so often advanced as the "solution" to the problems
preceding it, the very introduction of the subject of coalition government
of Vietnam. It is advocated by some as a face-saving prelude
would leave the political landscape of South Vietnam. There can be no
American objection, of course, to a coalition government fully negotiated between
government may be a step toward a compromise settlement. The
Saigon and North. The issue is whether the United States should be party to an attempt
to resolve a situation. We must be clear that such an effort may
well destine the existing political structure of South Vietnam, without it would be
likely the cause to lead to a face-Communist take-over. Few (if any) of us
notion that a government can bring about a political evolution
rather than reflect it, is drawn from the Western experience
where governments tend to be obeyed because they are legitimate.
In most new countries, the legitimacy of a government depends
on its ability to govern. Office confers no additional sanctity.
The image of a line of command extending from Saigon into the
countryside is hardly true of the non-Communist government in
Saigon. It would be absurd in the case of a coalition government.
Such a government would posses no authority other than
that of each minister over the forces he controls either through
personal or party loyalty.

N.D.P. Indeed, to solve the problems of Vietnam by means of a
coalition government makes as much sense as to attempt to overcome
an attempt

E
P34

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the problems of Mississippi through a coalition between the
SDS and Ku Klux Klan. It is beyond imagination that parties
that have been murdering and betraying each other for twenty-
five years could work together as a team giving joint
instructions to the entire country. To take just one example
of the difficulties: Communist ministers would be foolhardy in
the extreme if they entered Saigon without bringing with them
sufficient military force to protect them. But the introduction
of Communist military forces would change the entire political
complexion of Vietnam; it would deprive the government of the
one secure base which it now has.

Theoretically, of course, it is possible to conceive
of a coalition government in which each party can protect its
own interests but is unable to impose its will on its opponent.
But such a solution is extraordinarily improbable. The much
more likely outcome will be the continuation within the govern-
ment of the struggle that has taken place outside of it. And
since a coalition government is inconceivable with the present

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If this analysis is correct, the course for American negotiators is clear: they should **insofar as possible** avoid negotiating about the internal structure of South Vietnam and concentrate on the subject of the mutual withdrawal of external forces, i.e. Negotiations about the internal structure of South Vietnam should be left to the internal structure of South Vietnam. This will lead us into a morass of complexities where we would suffer two major disadvantages: (1) we would be the party in the negotiation least attuned to the subtleties of Vietnamese politics; (2) hence, our presence may wind up being directed against Saigon as the seeming obstacle to an accommodation. The end result may be the complete demoralization of Saigon, a prolonged stalemate or a resumption of the war.

But in the face of these prospects, why should Hanoi accept such an approach? The answer is that partly because it has no choice; it cannot bring about a withdrawal of American forces by its own efforts -- particularly if the United States adopts a less impatient strategy of **victory**, geared to the protection of the population and minimum casualties. It may

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also believe that being better organized and more determined,
the NLF can win a political contest. (Of course, the prerequisite
of a settlement is that both sides think they have a chance to
win but neither side is assured of it.) Above all, Hanoi may
not wish to give the United States a permanent voice in internal
South Vietnamese affairs. It may be reinforced in this attitude
by the belief that a prolonged negotiation about coalition
government may end no more satisfactorily from Hanoi's point of
view than the Geneva negotiations over Vietnam in 1954 and Laos
in 1962.

As for the United States, it cannot forever protect a
government with an army of 700 thousand men, a large airforce
and the most modern equipment against its domestic enemies. If
it brings about a removal of external forces and pressure, and
if it gains a reasonable time for consolidation, it will have
done the maximum possible for an ally, -- short of permanent
occupation.

In turn an approach
If these become the objectives of a negotiation, they
should shape the negotiating procedure. Indeed, the

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judgement of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential
for the peace of the world. It can be in nobody's interest to
unloosen forces that shake all prospects of international
order. The people of Vietnam have suffered enough not to have
to prolong their agony by being made the test case for
frustrations far away and little connected with local issues.

A new Administration must be given the benefit of the doubt and
a chance to move toward an objective which is finally in
everybody's interest: a peace of reconciliation which grants
the people of Vietnam what they have struggled so bravely to
achieve: an opportunity to work out their own destiny in their
own way.