Vietnam is that it is an extremely divided people. There are the Northerners, the Southerners in South Vietnam. He said the first thing to remember about I began the conversation with Giau pha asking him what he thought of it next to impossible to find out what they are really getting at.

Then they become so tentative and so unwilling to commit themselves that it
do not monologize the conversation, they feel they are extremely vulnerable.
the same coin. Vietnamese may be so naive of themselves that when they
role is to one long prepared monologue. These may really be two sides of
monologize the conversation and one has the impression that one's major
ampligonsa tenon or they are tremendously assertive and practically
one of two things happen. Either they will abeam in a most tentative
Great plasticity. I have also noticed that in conversations with Vietnamese
enormously expressive face and abeam French almost without accent and with
a very soft and gentle voice, a somewhat dreamy expression. Giau has an
to record the opposite. His very manner exuded amplexity--head thrown back,
so amplexus and because for every affirmative statement it would be possible
it is extremely difficult to summarize what he said, because some of it was
year. It was a very long conversation, put as in all meetings with Abbudate
Hue students--the chief organizer of student riots in Hue during the best
of the University of Hue. He was the leader of the militant faction of the
former student president and how a faculty member in the faculty of letters
I started the day with a conversation with Honang Van Giau, the

October 33 - Hue

end of each day.
Unedited notes written at the

PERSONAL AND COMBIDENTIAL

Henry V. Klaasen

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

Unedited notes written at the
end of each day.

those from the Central area, and the Southerners. The Northerners were a
pensive people; the Southerners were a reflective people (frankly, I don't
remember which he called which, and he absolutely refused to define what
he meant by those terms, saying that they were self-explanatory.) The
Centralists (those from Anaman) were the only ones who had a certain sense
of reality. They were the administrators who provided the political or-
ganization. Nevertheless he said it was important to grasp that Vietnamese
nationalism did not attach to the nation in the Western sense, but to the
people. There was a great sense of distinctiveness, but there was not a
strong sense of political solidarity. Quite the contrary; the people had never
been so divided.

I asked what was responsible for these divisions. Giau said that the
real problem was that in the last twenty-five years South Vietnam has never
had a government that was representative of the will of the people or that
had any legitimacy. The only legitimate government was that of Hanoi, which
had gained its legitimacy by the victory over the French. All others were
simply imposed either by foreigners or by themselves. He thought that the
major need was to get a government which had the moral right either to
prosecute the war or to make peace.

Asked about the war, Giau launched into a long monologue, which is very
hard to summarize. On the one hand he said that the pre-eminent requirement
was to achieve peace. On the other, he said that peace could have many meanings
and that one had to specify its conditions carefully. He argued that the present

and that one had to abecify its conditions carefully. He argued that the present
was to achieve peace. On the other, he said that peace could have many meanings
hard to summarize. On the one hand he said that the pre-eminent requirement
Aked about the war, Giau launched into a long monologue, which is very
prosecute the war or to make peace.

major need was to get a government which had the moral right either to
simply imposed either by foreigners or by themselves. He thought that the
had gained its legitimacy by the victory over the French. VII others were
had any legitimacy. The only legitimate government was that of Hanoi, which
had a government that was representative of the will of the people or that
real problem was that in the last twenty-five years South Vietnam has never
I asked what was responsible for these divisions. Giau said that the
been so divided.

strong sense of political solidarity. Quite the contrary: the people had never
people. There was a great sense of distinctiveness, but there was not a
nationalism did not attach to the nation in the Western sense, but to the
Sanitation. Nevertheless he said it was important to grasp that Vietnamese
of reality. They were the administrators who provided the political or-
Centralists (those from Unsan) were the only ones who had a certain sense
he meant by those terms, saying that they were self-explanatory.) The
remember which he called which, and he absolutely refused to define what
benign people: the Southerners were a reflective people (frankly, I don't
those from the Central area, and the Southerners. The Northerners were a

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kisauger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

Unedited note written at the
end of each day.

government had no right to make peace, any more than it had a right to make
war. And he, therefore, did not need to specify what the conditions of peace
might be, because the conditions of peace depended again on the kind of government
which would emerge if the popular will ever have a chance to register itself.

I asked what personalities or programs he had in mind for a government
that would have this legitimacy. He said that this was a very Western question.
He did not feel that he had to have a personality in mind and that in any case
to ask about personalities is to invite Ceasarism. It was not a question of
personalities but of giving the popular will a chance to express itself. I
asked whether he knew what the popular will was or whether he was simply
speaking about the opinion of students in Hue. Did he ever go into villages?
He avoided answering this question, but implied, just like the rector of the
university two evenings before, that what the villages thought was really
relatively less important than what the educated people thought.

He then said that the tragedy of Vietnam was that a global conflict was
being fought on its territory at the expense of the Vietnamese people. The
real issue was between China and the United States; not between North and
South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were, after all, still Vietnamese. Now
the war was decimating the Vietnamese people. The United States was reluctant
to bomb China and used its B-52s to destroy Vietnamese civilians. We are being
punished, he said, for our own extermination of the Khmers --of the people
that the Vietnamese replaced on the Vietnamese peninsula.

that the Vietnamese replaced on the Vietnamese benanula.
bunhated, he said, for our own extermination of the Khmer
--of the beogle
to popp China and used it B-23 to destroy Vietnamese civilians. We are being
the war was decimating the Vietnamese beogle. The United States was reluctant
South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were, after all, still Vietnamese. Now
real issue was between China and the United States; not between North and
being fought on its territory at the expense of the Vietnamese beogle. The
He then said that the tragedy of Vietnam was that a global conflict was
relatively less important than what the educated beogle thought.

university two evening before, that what the villages thought was really
He avoided answering this question, put implied, just like the rector of the
abbeaking about the opinion of students in Hue. Did he ever go into villages?
asked whether he knew what the bebular will was or whether he was simply
personalities put of giving the bebular will a chance to express itself. I
to ask about personalities is to invite Ceaasariam. It was not a question of
He did not feel that he had to have a personality in mind and that in any case
that would have this legitimacy. He said that this was a very Western question.
I asked what personalities or programs he had in mind for a government
which would emerge if the bebular will ever have a chance to regather itself.
might be, because the conditions of bebe debended again on the kind of Government
war. And he, therefore, did not need to abecify what the conditions of bebe
Government had no right to make bebe, any more than it had a right to make
relatively less important than what the educated beogle thought.

end of each day.
Unedited note written at the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry V. Kraegger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

He added that the United States was making beggars of the Vietnamese. He asked me what I thought of the Vietnamese people, and I said that I was struck by their dignity and by their grace. He said, yes, this is our outstanding quality because we have a great sense of individuality, but go to the garbage dump at Danang where the Americans dump their disposal and see the Vietnamese civilians scrouge around and you will realize what you are doing to us. Look at the prostitutes in the streets of Danang and see how you degrade us.

A minute later he was saying, however, that the prerequisite of stability in Vietnam was the closest understanding between the Vietnamese government and the Americans. He felt that the present government was especially deficient in never speaking frankly to Americans and never facing the future of Vietnam explicitly with the Americans.

I asked what he wanted us to face. He said, well, it was necessary to recognize the need for a social revolution and this revolution had to be undertaken jointly by Americans and Vietnamese. I asked whether there was not some danger that if we pressed too hard we would be charged with precisely what he was accusing us of: reducing the Vietnamese to a second-rate status. He replied, no, if we were defending the Vietnamese people against the government everyone would understand. I said that I thought he had said we should do it with the government. Giau said we should do it with a legitimate government, but this government, being non-representative of the people, could not do it and, therefore, the United States might have to impose it on this government. In other words, he was asking us to carry out a revolution against the existing government with very little indication of support if we did do it.

the existing Government with very little indication of support if we did do it. Government. In other words, he was asking us to carry out a revolution against not do it and, therefore, the United States might have to impose it on this Government, put this Government, being non-representative of the people, could not do it with the Government. Giau said we should do it with a legitimate Government everyone would understand. I said that I thought he had said we He replied, no, if we were defending the Vietnamese people against the what he was accusing us of: reducing the Vietnamese to a second-rate status. not some danger that if we pressed too hard we would be charged with precisely undertaken jointly by Americans and Vietnamese. I asked whether there was recognise the need for a social revolution and this revolution had to be

I asked what he wanted us to face. He said, well, it was necessary to explicitly with the Americans.

in never speaking frankly to Americans and never facing the future of Vietnam the Americans. He felt that the present Government was especially deficient in Vietnam was the closest understanding between the Vietnamese Government and A minute later he was saying, however, that the precedents of stability your degrade us.

going to us. Look at the broodmates in the streets of Danang and see how
see the Vietnamese civilians strange around and you will realize what you are
to the Barpage dump at Danang where the Americans dump their diabolical and
outstanding quality because we have a great sense of individuality, but so
atrocious by their dignity and by their grace. He said, yes, that is our
He asked me what I thought of the Vietnamese people, and I said that I was
He added that the United States was makingpegars of the Vietnamese.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kieisinger

- 4 -

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

I returned to the question of peace and asked him what he thought
would happen under conditions of ceasefire. He said that then we Vietnamese
can talk to each other. He said he had no fear about being unable to deal
with the Vietcong under conditions of peace. The fact that we were sparing
Hanoi and Haiphong indicated that we really wanted negotiations to turn
the war into a global problem overlooking the purely Vietnamese national
interest.

interest.

the war into a global problem overlocking the purely Vietnamese national
Hanoi and Hanoi indicated that we really wanted negotiations to turn
with the Vietcong under conditions of peace. The fact that we were aparting
can talk to each other. He said he had no fear about being mcluded to deal
would happen under conditions of cessation. He said that then we Vietnamese
I returned to the question of peace and asked him what he thought

CONFIDENTIAL
PERSONNEL AND COM

Henry V. Klaasen

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

14

He explained to me the organization of the Buddhist groups in his province.

They had a membership of 50,000 adults out of a total population of 350,000.

Each member has to contribute a minimum of 60 piastas a month, which amounts to 6 million piastas a year for the province. Considering that the monthly income of a professor is only 9,000 piastas, this is a considerable war chest.

The organization of the Buddhist Association is very similar to that of the VC organization, extending from the national level through the regions down to the province and the village. Each village has a youth section, a propaganda section, and an education section. This confirmed a view I had already heard to the effect that the Buddhists were trying very hard to set up a dominant political movement in the country.

This was followed by an almost monomaniac recitation of the usual Buddhist grievances against the government--all delivered with a beaming smile and a quick equivocal statement. For example, Don Hou said that they were very eager for peace, but not peace at any price. On the other hand, a strategic peace could never be permanent; it had to be peace gained

hand, a strategic peace could never be permanent; it had to be peace gained
they were very eager for peace, but not peace at any price. On the other
amile and a quick equivocal statement. For example, Don Hon said that
Buddhist grievances against the government--all delivered with a peevish
This was followed by an almost monotonous recitation of the usual
political movement in the country.

to the effect that the Buddhibata were trying very hard to set up a dominant
section, and an education section. This confirmed a view I had already heard
to the province and the village. Each village has a youth section, a protracted
VC organization, extending from the national level through the regional down
The organization of the Buddhist Association is very similar to that of the
income of a protektor is only 9,000 bisata, this is a considerable war chest.
monthly

amounts to 6 million bisata a year for the province. Considering that the
Each member has to contribute a minimum of 60 bisata a six month, which
They had a membership of 60,000 aduts out of a total population of 360,000.
He explained to me the organization of the Buddhist dromba in his province.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

14

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

15

in the hearts of men. In order to win a peace in the hearts of men, again
there had to be first physical peace so that the Buddhists could conquer the
hearts of men. In other words, statements which could only mean almost
anything.

I then called on Father Nguyen Van Thuan, the Chancellor of the
Hue XÃNH ARCHDIOCESE. He showed me his seminary and his school for priests, which also had a primary school for catholic children. We had a brief talk about the situation of the Catholics in the VC areas. He told me that priests were permitted to enter the VC areas, but that they were being subjected to increasing harrassment. He also told me that when he visited the VC areas, the cadres tried to proselytize him and urge him to go back into government areas to spread VC propaganda.

I then had lunch at the consular residence with General Nguyen
Van Chuan, Commander of the First Division which is stationed at Hue.
The 1st Division is the best Vietnamese combat division, the one that has
had most success against the VC. Chuan is a very tough and impressive

had most success against the VC. Cusan is a very tough and impressive
The 1st Division is the best Vietnamese combat division, the one that has
Van Cusan, Commander of the First Division which is stationed at Hne.

I then had launch at the conanjer residence with General Nguyen

do pack into dovermuts ut area to xuan Anh Sbresd AC brobsnds.

divided the AC area, the areas tried to broadcast him and urge him to
subjected to xuan Anh increasing harassment. He said told me that when he
that braeats were permitted to enter the AC area, but that they were being
ariet talk about the situation of the Catholics in the AC area. He told me
tor braeats which sao had a primary schoolor catholic children. We had
Hne Xuan Anh Archdiocese. He showed me his seminarily and his schoolx
I then called on Father Nguyen Van Tuan, the Chancellor of the
anything.

hearts of men. In other words, statements which could only mean almost
there had to be that physical peace so that the Buddhist could condner the
in the hearts of men. In order to win a peace in the hearts of men, again

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

19

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

16

soldier, who had already met briefly at the lunch given to me by General
military
Ky. Chuan began with the almost obligatory recitation of successes, which
in this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained
to me that the tactics he was using in holding an outpost in which three VC
battalions had been repulsed by one of his battalions--an event about which
General Ky had also talked to me the day before. He then said that he would
no longer tolerate student agitation in Hue. He said that the only reason there
was agitation was because the faculty was encouraging the students not to
have to fight and to have to stop talking. He said that the VC had amassed
about 6,000 troops in HUe and he would not be surprised if in the rainy
season they might attempt a sudden assault on Hue.

He then seriously criticized the strategic hamlet program of the
government--what is now called the new life hamlets. He felt that creating
fortifications around villages brought about the wrong psychological
attitude. For one thing the fortifications were meaningless against a

["For one thing the fortifications were meaningless against a\nattitude. For one thing the fortifications around villages were made\nstrong, and that was the main reason why the government--what is now called\nthe new life hamlet. He felt that creating\nfortifications around villages was a waste of time and money, and he would\nhave to stop talking. He said that the AC had made no\nsense because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortification was because the security was encouraging the students to\nleave the school and to have to stop talking. He said that the AC had made no\nsense because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he would\nnot because they didn't feel the government was doing the same\nas fortifications had been rebuilt by one of his battalions--an event that\nto me is the reason that the tactics he was using in holding an outboard in which three AC\nin this case I believe may be more justified than in most others. He explained\nthat the reason that he said before. He then said that he

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17

determined VC attack and they only had enabled the VC, if they overran
a village to defend it better from government troops. Also they created
a defensive mentality and a sense of ins security which added to the refugee
problem. This led him into the refugee situation. General Chuan said that
he thought the propaganda of the government was very double-edged. The
government was blaming that the flow of refugees indicated that people were
getting tired of living under VC rule; he said it might equally well be said
that
by the VC that it indicated by the government was withdrawing in the perimeters
and abandoning population to the VC. The refugees had the bad consequences
that they were in an area in which they then had no direct stake. The settle-
ment forced the government to take land away from others who then in turn
became disaffected. I asked him whether the problem was simply a
propaganda mistake or whether there was in fact the danger that the govern-
ment was becoming more concerned with holding perimeters than in
protecting the population. He gave me a slightly devious Vietnamese smile
and said that this was not an unreasonable conclusion. He also urged me to

and said that this was not an unreasonable conclusion. He also made me to
protecting the population. He gave me a slightly deviant Vietnamese smile
ment was becoming more concerned with holding beacons than in
propaganda mistake or whether there was in fact the danger that the govern-
ment was disaffected. I asked him whether the problem was thus simply a
mistake. The refugees had the bad consequence
and spreading population to the AC. The refugees had the bad consequence
by the AC that it indicated by the government was withdrawing in the beacons
that
detting tired of living under AC rule; he said it might easily well be said
government was planning that the flow of refugees indicated that people were
be thought the problems of the government was very double-edged. The
problem. This led him into the refugee situation. General Cunan said that
a definitive mentality and a sense of manliness which added to the refugee
a village to defend it better from government troops. Also they created
determined AC attack and they only want eulogized the AC, if they cover up

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18

go out and see some villages, but I think from all I have experienced it
is a most impractical suggestion, since they will merely put on a special
show for me.

He then urged me to see some imperial tombs which are at the out-
skirts of Hue, but it turned out in order to go there I would have to take
four platoons of soldiers with me and it didn't seem worth the effort.

In the afternoon I called on the provincial police chief in order to
get a view of the security situation as it appeared from the police point of
view. The policeman has 600 men under his control. He gave me the
following statistical breakdown: He said that in terms of
area 70% of the area is under VC control; 17% is contested; and 13% is
secure in the day time. At night 70% is under VC control; 20% is contested;
and only 10% is secure. In terms of population, in the daytime 5.5% are under
VC control; 37.7% are contested; and 56.8% is secure; but at night the
situation changes dramatically: at night 56.6% is under VC control; 18% is
contested; and only 26% is secure. In terms of hamlets, in the day time
46 hamlets are under Vc control, 168 are contested, 248 are secure. At

46 pamphlets are under AC control. 168 are contested. 248 are secure. At
contested; and only 26% is secure. In terms of pamphlets, in the day time
situation changes dramatically: at night 66.6% is under AC control; 18% is
AC control; 31.4% are contested; and 68.6% is secure; put at night the
and only 10% is secure. In terms of possession, in the daytime 6.6% are under
secure in the day time. At night 10% is under AC control; 20% is contested;
areas 70% of the area is under AC control; 14% is contested; and 13% is
following statistical presidown: He said: "...that in terms of
view". The policeman has 800 men under his control. He gave me the
det a view of the security situation as it appeared from the police point of
view in the afternoon I called on the provincial police chief in order to
four bistowns of soldiers with me and it didn't seem worth the effort.
skirts of Hne, put it turned out in order to do there I would have to take
He then asked me to see some imperial tompa which are at the out-
side for me.

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19

night 214 hamlets are under VC control, 50 are contested, and only 198 are
secure. In other words, **then** it is meaningless to speak of government control

in the daytime,

when 66.8% of the population is listed as secure/ but only 26% at night. Those

who are not secure at night will have their actions during the daytime determined

by the threat of assassination at night. The police chief also said that the

VC had infiltrated practically everywhere--even into his police, where they

were turning people against each other into double agents by the threat of reprisals

against relatives living in VC territory.

I asked the police chief what would happen in case of ceasefire. At
first he did not understand it and I explained it as the cessation of organized
military activity on both sides. He said that under present conditions the VC
would thrive because they could continue terrorism which would then appear
as homicide and there would be no doubt that they would soon take over the
country.

The police chief also said that there was no necessary relationship
between the military victories of General Chuan and the security area in the
villages with which he was concerned. The difficulty was that the villages

villages with which he was concerned. The difficulty was that the villages
between the military victories of General Cunun and the security areas in the
country.

The police chief said that there was no necessarily relientiail
as homicide and there would be no doubt that they would soon take over the
would thrive because they could continue terrorism which would then appear
military activity on both sides. He said that under present conditions the AC
that he did not understand it and I explained it as the cessation of arms race
I asked the police chief what would happen in case of cessation. At
against relatives living in AC territory.

were turning people against themselves into double agents by the threat of reprisals
AC had infiltrated practically everywhere--even into his police, where they
by the threat of assassination at night. The police chief also said that the
who are not secure at night will have their actions during the daytime determined
when 66.8% of the population is armed as security but only 26% at night. Those
in the daytime,

security. In other words, if he is mesmindless to ask of government control
night 214 packets are muger AC control, 60 are conteated, and only 188 are

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

19

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

were not so much conscious of the main force units as of the local and regional guerrillas and their actions were affected by the main force units only to the extent that the main force units were lying down regular troops. As long as the regular troops were not occupied in pursuing main force units even when the main force units were retreating, the security situation could not improve.

I then took a drive through the city and visited the imperial palace. The city is located along a very lovely river in a valley ringed by mountains of rising to an altitude/about 9,000 feet. It is the most beautiful city I have seen in Vietnam. My state Department escort and I walked through the town and we were the only Americans in the street. One has to be struck by the dignity of the average Vietnamese. One never sees the equalor and freenzy of India. Indeed, it is very rare. One never sees a vulgar Vietnamese. This is a tough and impressive people; if not necessarily an extremely attractive one. We bought some vases and then went to the CIA, where we were briefed about their activities.

There are four counter-terror teams and ten political action teams in the province. The CIA people thought that the counter-terror teams were

in the province. The CIA people thought that the counter-terrorism terms were
there are four counter-terror terms and ten political action terms

apart their activities.

one. We found some areas and then went to the CIA where we were briefed
is a tough and impressive people; it not necessarily an extremely attractive
of Indians. Indeed, it is very rare. One never sees a wider Vietnamese. This
difficulty of the swifter Vietnamese. One never sees the advisor and someone
and we were the only Americans in the street. One has to be a truck by the
seen in Vietnam. My state Department escort and I walked through the town
railing to an altitude of 8,000 feet. It is the most beautiful city I have
of

The city is located along a very lovely river in a flatly ringed by mountains

redem troopa were being occupied in burning main force units even when
extent that the main force units were being down redem troopa. As long as
the guerrilla and their actions were affected by the main force units only to the
were not so much concerns of the main force units as of the local and regional

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

21

the most effective ones because the VC were not psychologically keyed to
ambushes and they would panic when they were subjected to them. They
were geared to offensive, not to defensive action.

Of 10

I then asked about the ability of the district chief. /The districts
in Hue province three are considered totally incompetent by the CIA; four
are considered by good; the remainder were considered as just getting
by. Incompetent was defined as in the other provinces as district chiefs who
never leave their capital and who spend all their time staying within their
defensive perimeter. I asked them to estimate the number of the population
controlled by at night. They estimated that 80% of the population of Hue
province was controlled by the VC at night. They estimated also that of the
hamlets
170 are listed as pacified in at least half of them the authorities hole
up with their protective forces in their houses and pray that the VC will not
attack them. At the same time the VIA people felt that this was not necessarily
a meaningful criterion because the VC took take Hue if they wanted to make the
effort and they could not quite understand why they had not used the capability

effort and they could not quite understand why they had not need the capability
a meaningful criterion because the AC took take Hne if they wanted to make the
attack them. At the same time the AIV people felt that this was not necessarily
mb with their protective forces in their hands and bray that the AC will not
1.00 hours later as pacified in at least half of them the authorities hole
pameters

province was controlled by the AC at night. They estimated that of the
controlled at night. They estimated that 80% of the population of Hne
detennive perimeter. I asked them to estimate the number of the population
never leave their capital and who aband all their time staying within their
py. Incompetent was defined as in the other provinces as district chiefs who
are considered by default the remembered were considered as that defining
in Hne province three are considered totally incompetent by the CIA: four

I then asked spont the spiltly of the district chief. \The districts
Of 10

were desired to offensive, not to defensive action.

simplifies and they would panic when they were subjected to them. They
the most effective ones because the AC were not psychologically keyed to

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

37

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22

[N]

they did possess for terror and assassination. It is interesting also that the CIA *people* team is guarded by Phillipinos and Chinese, whole the consulate has three Vietnamese soldiers at the outside. One can never be sure with Vietnamese soldiers on whose side they really are.

I asked about some of the peace terms. For example, if there were an agreement where in return for a cessation of bombing the DRV would stop infiltrating men and materials, would the CIA have any way of checking on this. The unanimous conviction was that there would be no conceivable way that this could be checked. I asked about the consequences of a ceasefire.

Again the conviction was that this would led to a Communist takeover.

At the end of the day after dinner when the Germans had left I spoke with the American consul about my impressions and the American consul said wearily yes, only about 20% of the country is under government control and no progress is visible; but remember this is Vietnam--anything can happen.

For all we know the VC may be on the verge of collapsing and if they collapsed tomorrow morning it would not surprise me. I said to him, in other words,

tomorrow morning it would not appeal me. I said to him, 'in other words,'

For all we know the VC may be on the verge of colliding and it they collide
no progress is viable; but remember this is Vietnam--anything can happen.

merrily yes, only spout 30% of the country is under government control and
with the American variant spout my impressions and the American variant said
At the end of the day after dinner when the Germans had left I arose

Adoin the conviction was that this would led to a Communist takeover.

that this could be checked. I said spout the consequences of a ceasefire.
this. The maximum conviction was that there would be no conceivable way
infiltrating men and materials, would the CIA have any way of checking on
an agreement where in return for a cessation of pumping the DRV would atop
I said spout some of the peace terms. For example, if there were
Vietnamese soldiers on whose side they resist are.

has three Vietnamese soldiers at the outpost. One can never be sure with
CIA teams the team isdsrded by Philippines and Chinese, whole the consuls
they did bosess for terror and saasasination. It is interesting also that the

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23

[A]

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23

you have accepted the Vietnamese attitude which was described to us by
the psychiatrist in which a miracle becomes an ordinary event. He rather
wearily said, yes.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

27 October 65

at Hue University

AMERICAN FUND. I passed the room of the Dean of the Faculty/which was open when he and two others who had been at dinner two nights before were sitting over a huge organization chart which they immediately hid as we entered the room. One's mind becomes so attuned to deviousness here that I was wondering whether the organization chart concerned the distribution of ministries after a successful Buddhist coup. At any rate the Rector of the University then took me through the building as trailed by two or three of his professorial assistants. During this whole period he never once expressed the slightest appreciation for the fact that the building had been put up by American funds. On the contrary he complained about the architectural style which he claimed was inconsistent with Vietnamese tradition, with faulty construction since walls were already cracking and five or six other measures. At one point in the conversation we discussed the general problem of American aid and I told him that some Americans were of the view that really the major effort in Vietnam should be in the economic field and that economic assistance would create a sense of mutual appreciation. The Rector of the University therupon said the only American aid that the average Vietnamese is getting are American bullets and American shells. Whatever is reconstructed or constructed by Americans

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

is the result of if made necessary by what they have destroyed. We called
the Consulate and received a frantic phone call that Tri Quang was desperately
eager to see me at the pagoda where he was visiting from Saigon. The venerable

spiritual
Quang is the/leader of the Hue Buddhists. He was the chief organizer of the
Buddhist which movement which led to the overthrow of Diem. He is also the
person who was mostly responsible for every Buddhist agitation since then.

He was given asylum in the American Embassy for two months after Diem's police
raided the pagoda where he was installed in the main conference room and it
is fair to say charmed all Embassy personnel in contact with him.

Tri Quang received me in the pagoda at the outskirts of Hue where I
had seen the local leader of the Buddhists the day previously. On the way
there I told the provincial reporter who was accompanying me as interpreter
that if the VC were in fact as pervasive as the situation indicated
it would be an easy matter to knock us off on the way there. Negroponte replied
that (1) the VC never engaged in indiscriminate assassination, that if they
shot at us we would have the consolation of knowing that we had been singled out
for specified targets and that it was unlikely that they had time enough to plan
an attempt in the two days we were in Hue. They were meticulous organizers who

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 12 -

usually rehearsed their attacks several times before they carried them out.

Secondly, and most importantly, he said that if he had to be in a safe place in Hue he would go to Tri Quang's pagoda. The VC were reluctant to tangle with the Buddhists either because they had infiltrated them or because they thought the Buddhists were too powerful. He did not say which. Incidentally while I was at the University the Dean told me that I should visit the tomb of an Emperor which is located four kilometers outside of Hue which is supposed to be extremely beautiful. It also happens to be the area where the situation map at First Corps headquarters was the area of heaviest VC concentration.

I told the Dean that I understood the VC were particularly active in that area and that it might not be safe for me to go in there. In fact, the American sector adviser had told me that it would take three platoons of soldiers to get me into that area. I did not give him those figures but this is what was in the back of my mind. The Dean said that it might be true that there were VC in that area and that if I went with one of these students leaders he could guarantee my safety. As it happened, I did not have the time to test it and I am probably not heroic enough to have tested it in any event. But

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 13 -

it does illustrate that there is at least some **COMMUNICABILITY** kind of a tacit
understanding between the **Buddhists** students and the **VC**

Tri Quang received me in the reception hall of the pagoda. We sat around
a square a table--he facing me the interpreter at his side. Max Like most
Vietnamese he is a rather short and with an enormously impressive face constantly
smiling, a powerful personality as almost every demagogue is, very skillful at
answering questions and a maxxx more systematic mind that most Vietnamese. He
made not attempt as other Buddhists had done to assume a dreamy pose. He was
**maxxxx** precise when he chose to be and evasive when he chose to be. His
evasiveness did not take the form of deliberate ambiguity but of a deliberate
attempt to avoid the question much as somebody in the West would do. I had
been told by the American Embassy that Tri Quang was the Buddhist who best
understand the American mentality. When he had something to communicate to
the United States he would march into the Embassy or call up the Embassy to
sent somebody and he would then say I have the following three points: (1), (2)
(3), tick them off and refuse to say anymore except that his refusal took the
form of endless monologue to which one had to get used to. TXY

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Tri Quang began the conversation by saying that the Buddhists professors and students who had met me had been very impressed and had urged him to see me. He had been out of town the day before and he had been afraid he would miss me. In fact we called the pagoda several times the day before and we had been unable to get any answer as to his whereabouts. I asked him what the most important problem in Vietnam was and he said without any question the most important issue was that of peace. There was a moral weakness in the Western position in the sense that the Americans had several times indicated their readiness to engage in unconditional discussions. But unconditional discussions by definition were insincere. There had to be conditions and it was considered by many Vietnamese simply to be a trick to avoid negotiations altogether. For the Vietnamese people the most important problem was peace and not the war.

I asked Tri Quang to tell me what he would consider reasonable conditions. He then launched into a long discussion about the difference between conditions and outcomes and the point of which was not exactly clear. He said that, in fact, the President had stated some conditions but they were immersed in somuch

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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other verbage that the point wasn't clear. I asked him what conditions he
had in mind and he said end of Communist infiltration and end of subservience
of Hanoi to Peking. I told him that the latterxwak certainly could not be a
condition of a settlement because I don't know how one would formulate it and
how one would measure thatxcondition compliance. XXXXX Tri Quang said that
he was not formulating a negotiating position he was trying to formulate an
objective that we ought to achieve. I asked whether he was in favor of
prosecuting the war until these objectives were achieved. He then said that
we had to remember that for the Vietnamese the people from the North were
after all compatriots and that it was painful to see his country become the
arena for a war between China and American in which moreover both sides were
pulling their punches at the expense of the Vietnamese people. I asked him what
specifically he had in mind and he stressed that it was after all significant.
Hanoi and HAI PHING were not being bombed and that China had remained immune. It
would seem to him that China was a better target for American bombers than the
people of South Vietnam. This remark of course was consistent (a) with a ✓
prosecution of the war and (b) with an excuse to get out of the war
because the Americans were not prosecuting it energetically enough.

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I asked him then about the impact of American troops in Vietnam. He said there was no question that they had improved the military situation.

On the other hand, they had brought about difficulties in which many Vietnamese were losing the sense of responsibility and no longer felt that it was their war. In flat contradiction with that statement he then said that what was really needed was a more intimate collaboration between Americans and Vietnamese because he thought that the weakness of the present Vietnamese government made it impossible for them to collaborate honestly with the United States. On the other hand, he went on to say, the United States was taking very many unilateral decisions which were wounding to the Vietnamese sense of dignity. Indeed he said it was not an issue of sovereignty but an issue of dignity. I asked him to give me an example but he said the military payment certificates had been introduced without the knowledge and without consultation with the Vietnamese government. He did not blame Americans for this because the military who were running the government were so insecure and were so unfamiliar with civilian government that they neglected the most pressing needs. He said there was a crucial need for a social revolution to identify the people with the government. And he did not think that the military

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could carry it out. I asked him whether he had any idea as to who could carry it out. Tri Quang said he would not want to get into the issue of personalities but he was certain that once the military government had disappeared the appropriate individuals would appear. I asked him whether he was just stating a philosophical preference or whether he was really politically discontent with the existing government. Tri Quang said that if he were politically discontent, I could be sure that there would be demonstrations in the streets and I could therefore assume that the absence of demonstrations indicated that his discontent had not yet reached extreme proportions.

I told him that I had been told the Buddhists were organizing all over the country and said that I was ignorant enough to ask direct questions.

Did the Buddhists want to constitute a pressure group of political party?

Tri Quang then launched into along monologue about the basic character of Buddhism. He said, first of all to answer my question, the Buddhists were organizing in order to fulfill their aspirations and that they were trying to get into a position in every province where they could make their voice heard.

As to define the content of this aspirations Tri Quang said that he had to

[Y]

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admit there was a certain ambivalence in Buddhism. Buddhism was really not well suited for the prosecution of the war. Since the Buddhists were really concentrating on a contemplative life and on the life of the spirit, Buddhist political leaders were, therefore, suffering from a great ambivalence when they were entering the political field. I asked him whether he suffered from this ambivalence and Tri Quang smiled before my question was even translated from which I assumed that he understood English much better than he had pretended. At any rate, he smiled and said he was not a political leader and therefore this question was not relevant.

I told him that political opponents of his had pointed out to me that his motivation was in effect negative. He was, I had been told, above all concerned with preventing things from happening. Not with making them happen.

Was this charge justified? Tri Quang smiled again and he said the charge was absolutely justified. He had been concerned above all with preventing things from happening and this was perfectly natural. Vietnam had been torn for twenty years by war. The country had not had a legitimate government in the past century. The government was so corrupt that the major task he had had was to recall it to its duty. He did not feel that he needed to prescribe

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a positive program in order to criticize the disastrous programsthat were taking place.

I asked Tri Quang what he thought of the Buddhists students and professors. that I had met. He said that, of course, they were a little theoretical and abstract but I had to understand their bitterness. What future did they have in life? The military had all key positions, the was seemed to progress indefinitely. Everything depended on corruption and on influence and the society was rotten to the core. Tri Quang then suggested that we meet again in Saigon but I doubt that my schedule will permit this.

The overall impression that Tri Quang made on me was that of an extremely powerful very subtle mind. He avoided the extreme vagueness of Vietnamese Buddhists and the rather confused way of thinking of almost every Vietnamese with whom I have spoken. He was matter-of-fact and precise. He could become a very significant force in the country. If he or his group became dominant my judgment would be that their love of power might easily make them opposed to Communist expansion. They would surely be extremely nationalistic and probably very anti-American and in the process of achieving power they might well do irreparable damage to the American

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position in South Vietnam.

I returned from <del>Chi Quong</del> to the Consular residence where the secretary general of Hue University was waiting for me. He was a dandy little man who told me all the problems of his University which seem endless and who had otherwise nothing very significant to add.

We left at two o'clock from the same hairraising air strip at which I had landed except that the plane luckily took off in the direction away from the watch tower so that we did not repeat the difficulties of the approach. The flight to Pleiku was as beautiful as is possible in the little Beechcrafts that air American is flying here. In order to get there we had to fly along the sea along the <del>km</del> <ins>km</ins> coast and then turn inward and fly through a mountain pass where peaks of 10,000 feet were on both sides of the airplane. This is the monsoon season and thunderstorms break out late in the day <ins>xxx</ins> <ins>xxx</ins> rather suddenly and we had to go through one of those.

Pleiku is at a plateau of an elevation of about 3,000 feet surrounded by the mountain peaks on all sides that I have already described. The Laotian border is about fifty miles away. KKKK Pleiku is on the strategic road

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junction of Route 19. It is the headquarters of the Second Vietnamese Corps
was the scene of the mortar attack of the VietCong which led to the
American retaliation on North Vietna. Pleiku is the headquarters of the
Second Corps is the nerve center for the major軍事 operations that
have been conducted in the Central Plateau of Vietnam over the past six
months. There are two Vietnamese divisions. One American division and
one Korean division within the corps area of responsibility. The corps
area comprises 45 % of the entire land area of Vietnam and a population
of about 2.8 million. Despite the fact that Pleiku is the headquarters
of the Second Corps 我 controls a 军事 perimeter at a radius
of only ten miles from town and outside of this perimeter it is impossible
to drive at night. The American compound has its own perimeter of about
two miles. Every building is heavily sandbagged and on the outside there
is a mortar shelter in the center of the compound. And a barbed wire fence
which is constantly manned around the compound. Pleiku makes the impression
and it look slike one of these frontier towns inside a stockade of the movies
about the West on television. I will continue this evening.

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I was greeted in Pleiku by the American Embassy's provincial representative for the Central Highlands, by the Director of the special operations for the CIA for the Central Highlands and by the Director of Field Operations at the CIA for Vietnam. The reason the CIA personnel was present is that the Central Highlands is the location of several special forces x camps designed to stop infiltration routes and or at least to survey them and because I was asked to gain some impression of the nature of this task. The CIA personnel was going to accompany me to one of those outposts 70 miles north of Pleiku and 20 miles from the Laotian border. A visit which took place the next day. I was taken from the airport at Pleiku to the headquarters of the second corps where I got one of the usual deadening briefings. When I arrived at the airport, the place was swarming with helicopters and fighter planes because the battle of Pleime had just been fought. Pleime is located 15 miles south of Pleiku and had been attacked by two VC regiments x in a battle which I will describe in a little while. One brigade of the first calvary division had come to the rescue and also two battalions of Vietnam rangers, all of whom were sitting around the airstrip

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waiting to be airlifted to Pldime because the road was still being harrassed
by the Vietcong. There was also at the airport an absolutely absurd collection
of newspaper men who had been helicoptered to the battle field which was
absolutely secure and who were comporting themselves as if they had just been
saved from a horrible ordeal. They looked dirty, disheveled, unshaven and they
must have spent all of their time shoveling dirt, on each other because the combat
troops looked crisp and clean. I talked to several of the regimental

Commanders to General Cunard, the Commander of the First Calvary Division and

to General Knowles who shared a room with me inside the compound at Pleiku which he

was using as a command post.--all of whom looked infinitely fresher than the

newspaper men, whose caricatures of Ernie Pyle.

To return to the briefing at Second Corps Headquarters. XXXXXXXXXXXX

Since I have last had contact with it, the Army has degenerated. They have

produced a group of experts in giving briefings whose major

interest is to overpower you with floods of meaningless statistics and

to either kid themselves or deliberately kid you. I endured the briefing of

which I will summarize the salient points and then had a long discussion with

Colonel Mataxis, who is the Senior advisor to the American advisor to the Second

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Corps and Colonel Williams who is the Deputy Advisor.

The gist of the briefing was as follows. Second Corps comprises 45% of the land area of Vietnam XINH XANH XA has a population of 2.7 million of which 20% are montainyards MONTAGWAKLS, a backward tribe of people of Indonesian racial origin which have been pushed into the mountains by the Vietnamese in the several XINH XANH XA thousand years of Vietnamese colonization of the peninsula. The previous area that I had visited was an area of substantial VC infiltration. Second Corps has been until recently the area of most substantial VC military activity. In the Second Corps area the VC had at the beginning of the summer five regiments of which three were from the 325th North Vietnamese Division and two were VC regiments. These have been reinforced in recent months by at least two more regiments of the North Vietnamese Army and probably a third and they have also recruited two more regiments of VC mainforce units so that the XINH XANH total force of VC units in Second Corps at the end of the monsoon season is ten regiments or over two divisions. It has a total of 44,500 mainforce and North Vietnamese units. Each North Vietnamese unit K as it arrives in K Second Corps area is given a shake down period in Con Tomb province an area just

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North of Pleiku. This is another way of saying that after the shake down period the regiments are then infiltrated Southward for operations in various parts of the Second Corps area. Recently there has been a movement of regiments from the Second Corps area South and there are likely to be nine regiments in the Third Corps area which is the area just around Saigon.

This Vietn Cong build-up has occurred at a time when the United States had introduced the first cavalry division and a Korean division into the Second Corps area. The build-up on the Western side/has been matched by a build-up of twenty battalions of fifty battalions on the VC side and for reasons which I will explain a little later this means that a rough strategic balance has been maintained.

XXXXXXXX Since February, eleven regimental sixe operations have been conducted in the Second Corps area by the VC. The battle of Pleime was/something the equivalent of a division. At the result of this heavy VC pressure, all the available forces in the Second Corps area have been constantly engaged in combat and none have been able to engage in pacification work. As a result the effort of pacification has been almost entirely static. In the last three months, the VC have destroyed thirty new life hamlets and they have overrun

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towns
four district town--a problem which has been fudged by the Vietnamese by
simply changing the designation of this town from district capital to something
else and moving the district capital elsewhere. This has enabled the government
to maintain that no district towns have been lost. In other words, if present
operations continue, the problem of pacification can go on indefinitely. Since
January 1st the government has lost 283 towns out of 2,825 or in
other words 10% of the population it held January 1st. It has not regained
any of those except one district town which I visited the next day and which
is really a beleaguered outpost.

The briefers at the Second Corps headquarters claimed 68% of the population
was under government control but this followed the specail MAC V definition
of control. And then I asked in how much of the population which was
technically under their control was also under their control at night. The
answer was 30%. Even this I would doubt because it simply was not consistent
with what Had been told to me elsewhere. Even if the 30% figure is accepted
it indicates the enormity of the problem. It also indicates that we can go

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from technical victory to technical victory and not really advance in the
major problem of establishing control over the population. I asked the
briefers my now standard question about the quality of personnel. There
are twelve provinces in the Corps area and I asked about three categories
how many of the twelve were substandard, how many were just barely getting
by and how many were outstanding. One province chief had recently been
killed in a road ambush so I got answers for only eleven. Of the eleven province
chiefs four were considered substandard which was defined as lacking initiative

down in the Administration and probably being corrupt. Five were
in the category of barely getting by which meant some corruption and under
American pressure some initiative. Two were described as outstanding. Of
the district chiefs 100wx ten per cent were described as outstanding, eight
percent were described as bandits, the rest one could not give a clear description
and therefore considered in the category of barely getting by. I asked the
G-2 briefer whether we knew the infiltzation routes sufficiently well in order
to have a check on a deal whereby in return for their infiltration

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we would cease doing certain things. The G-2 briefer said that at the moment the VC were moving whole divisions through our area without our knowing it. MATTIX until months later, When these unites appeared in combat. They had managed to assemble six battalions or two regiments twenty miles from Pleiku at Pleime. We did not know it until they had attacked us. The terraine was such that it was simply impossible to check infiltration routes. I asked the briefers how long they thought it would take to finish the job they said a minimum of five and more likely ten years.

I had dinner with Genera Kinnard, General Knowles, Colonel Mataxis, and Colonel Williams. The two Generals were the Commander and Deputy Commander of the First Airborne division the two Colonels are the American advisors to the Second Corps. I have found that the formal briefings only give a very crude picture of what is going on and I, therefore asked these officers to reconstruct for me the battle of Pleime in order to let me understand how the VC were operating and what our military problems were. The reconstruction of the battle seems to be as follows: two months ago the VC attacked an American

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special forces camp at Duc Co about fifty miles from Pleiku on the Cambodian border. Duc Co like all special forces camps was manned by **zhaukx** a battalion or 650 men with fourteen American advisors. The VC attacked in regimental strength. One battalion assaulted the camp and the other two battalions set an ambush for any relief force that might be sent. The relief force was, in fact, sent and abused and **xunggukex** suffered heavy losses. Duc Co was finally relieved by a helicopter operation which broke the seige. Even though the attack on Duc Co was unsuccessful the camp the whole area around Duc Co

has since been controlled by the VC. The special forces whose job it is to interdict communications roads have been in effect confined to defending their own camp. Secondly the officers were of the view that the attack on Duc Co was a training mission for a new regiment and that it had never been designed to take the camp that the real purpose was to ambush relief forces. The VC had obviously studied Duc Co operations very well in preparing for the Pleime battle. This time they moved six battalions into action, five combat battalions and one battalion of **xehkx** porters. The battalions were positioned as fax follows: One battalion was stationed South of Pleime as an assualt force, another battalion was stationed on the most logical helicopter landing site and the same thing was repeated on the north bank of the river.

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corresponded almost exactly to the landing site at Duc Co. Three battalions
were put into an ambush along the road leading to Pleime. In other words,
*the attack on Pleime* the dispositions of forces indicated that overrunning
Pleime was not the primary objective indeed had it been the total force
available was more than sufficient to overrun Pleime. The attack opened
with the battalion force assault on Pleime and it was kept going until all
relief forces were in action. The second command advisor suspected that there
would be an ambush along the road into the camp but they had no choice except
to proceed into it. The only difference was that instead of sending a normal
three battalions they sent five battalions by stripping one provincial capital
of its defending forces. The five battalions fought their way through but at
a loss of 300 casualties which means 20% of the force. Simultaneously a
helicopter operation was launched to relieve Pleime however since our advisors
suspected that their might be a trap they landed their helicopters four miles
away or marched through the dense jungle that existed there. At any
rate, when the VC realized that the helicopter operation was not into the
area for which they had prepared they began pulling their forces out of the
Pleime area. They disappeared in groups of five to seven each and by the time

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the relief forces had reached Pleime the VC had completely disappeared. The
evening was spent by the First Calvalry Commanders planning operations to try
to bring the VC into combat but they were convinced that they would not
succeed.

The lessons of this operation seemed to me to be these: (1) The American
<u>advisors</u> were able and skillful. They avoided a disastrous defeat for
our relief force. (2) The press reports for a seige of Pleime and of a
defeat for the VC seemed to me grossly misleading. I do not believe that the
VC ever had any intention of taking Pleime nor do any of the officers who
actually conducted the battle. (3) The VC managed to assemble two <u>regiments</u> and
<u>died</u> them for six days in a area covering over thirty miles without any
detection. They then fought for four days in the <u>phase of 500 American</u>
air force sorties and a major assault before melting back into the <u>jungle</u>.
This does not indicate to me the action of a demoralized foe who does not
know what he is doing. (4) The entire force of Second Corps is engaged in
<u>clashing</u> VC and there is not a single battalion left for pacification missions.
(5) If the VC had had a reserved battalion ready they could have taken the

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from
provincial capital of Kontum which the reserve force was stripped.

In other words, the operation while successful can in all likelihood be
considered a draw. XXXXXXXX

I then talked to Colonel Mataxis and Colonel Williams about the military
and political situation in II Corps. They felt that the major change in the
situation was that the United States was no longer losing. They said that
we were far from turning the corner towards victory. They described to me
the events of the year. In the early part of the year the Vietnamese forces
had been put on so-called pacification missions. That is they were strung
out

in small units all along the coast and into capitals, The VC concentrated
and knocked off all the sea coast between Danang and Nha Trang including
a strategic valley in much of the rice harvests of Vin Din province
is grown. This valley is still under VC control as is most of the coast
Since then the government forces have been regrouped but practically nothing
of what was lost earlier in the year has been regained. Since July, four
district towns in Khontum have been taken by the VC. Only one of those has
been recaptured, the others have been abolished as districts by the government
in order to maintain the facade that no district towns had fallen into Viet Cong hands

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The JMX VC pressure now was so great that special forces were no longer deployed to stop infiltration but they were concentrated in some twenty base camps and they were always had to keep 1/3 of the force inside of the camp and 1/3 just outside the camp and only 1/3 available. for patrol. Even the figures on pacification were misleading according to Colonel Mataxis. In the province Ninh Thanh Thin was pacified because the VC had put no effort into dt. Similiarly, Da Lat which was in the second Corps area was being pacified because it was being used as a rest and recuperation area by both sides. I asked Colonel Mataxis about the quality of his district chiefs. He said three were outstanding, five were barely getting by, three were not worth the powder to blow them up and one had recently been killed. He estimated that only about twenty-five

of the population per cent/in II Corps was under government control at night even though the official statistics show sixty percent under governmental control.

We spoke about the security problem with respect to Vietnamese forces.

Colonel Mataxis said that not a single operation of larger than battalion size had ever been conducted with Vietnamese troops had ever been successful

[N]

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because the security had always been compromised. They had captured Viet Cong documents which contained details of information about operational plans that had to come directly from the highest headquarters. Colonel Mataxis said that ninety-five per cent of the contacts established between the government of Vietnam units and VC units were initiated by the VC and almost no large scale governmental operation established contact unless the VC had set up an ambush. This indicates another aspect of the problem here. If the VC can move undetected and if they initiate all military operations, it is difficult to see how the press reports and indeed the official MAC V reports of the destruction of main force units can possibly be accurate and how the objective can be realized. Because my room was being used as a command post for the first cavalry division, I sat around with a group of officers and with the chief of special operations of the CIA just talking about things in general. The morale of these people was a curious mixture of dedication to their job and exasperation with the problems they were facing here. The CIA men told about what happen when the so-called hob tac areas were established. These were so-called oil

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spots which were to be absolutely secured and from which government influence
would spread. Ho! tac was the fad, for operations last year. There seems
to be a fad for every year in Vietnam. This year it is the destruction of
mainforce units and pacification.

The CIA man said that the operation was supposed to begin with a
simultaneous arrest of eighty well-known, well-documented, VC agents inside
the Ho! tac area. In order to accomplish this it had to be gleamed with
about three governmental officers. And everyone checked out whether any
relatives of his might be on that list. When the opetion started/the first
of
eight people arrested, five were Buddhist, this h.m. got Tri Quang on the
telephone who called up the Prime Minister and said that unless these five
Buddhists were released on the street. Thereupon the Prime Minister decided to release all eight and
this was the end of the arrest of the known VC agents and it was symbolic of
what happened to Ho! tac. What ho! tac did was to establish the perimeter outside
which the units would not operate except for the 25th division which was brought
in as a kind of reserve and which was being marched inx around the perimeter

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by the VC according to the CIA agents to lure it away from their main areas
of attack. Be that as it may, Longan province, the province just south of
Saigon has been 80% under VC control ever since <u>hobtac</u> started.

Several others present had horror <u>xxx</u> stories to tell of inefficiency,
corruption and utter confusion. The consensus seemed to <u>h</u>ehat that the primary
hope was that the other side was equally as confused.

I did not get much sleep that night because of the military operations

Early the next morning I had breakfast which the provincial reporter who

at

was accompanying me. He said that/the official briefing there had been

a vast exaggeration of the amount of pacification. He pointed out what

Colonel Mataxis had already told me but he had not been present. That four

district capitals have been overrun, that many of the roadblocks in many of

the provinces were done through collusion between the VC and the provincial
governors. That in Kontum province thd American advisory team went out

only in twos not for fear of VC but because they were afraid that the GVN

people might assassinate it since considerable tension had developed between

them. In no town that he was aware of in Kontum province did anyone travel further

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than five miles from the town in which he was stationed at any time of the day.
And, of course, would not go out of his perimeter defense which meant his
house at night. On the other hand, he felt that the air strikes haddemoralized
the VC and that also the NorthVietnamese army units were getting demoralized,
through the air attakcs. He therefore found it hard to judge what the real
situaion was. He added that when he was at Stanford he was a strong supporter
of our Vietnamese operation and that he had been extremely unhappy with the
Xinhuixx teach-ins but that a year in Vietnam had made him almost despearte
about the course of events.

Continuation of October 28th.

After breakfast I was picked up by the two CIA people and taken to
the mountainyard training center for the political action teams. The
mountainyards are troops in Pleiku called mountainyards are a tribal
people of Indonesian racial origin who have been pushed into the mountains
by the Vietnamese despised by the Vietnamese because of their dark color
and because they are more primitive. The center seemed to me well run and

in Vietnamese installations
I took a tour of its installations. As always, it is hard to tell how

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much of it was eyewash and how much of it was real. In every classroom I visited, for example, the one where they were forging argitural tools people were working with a frenzy and a dedication which I have not found to be general in Vietnam but perhaps I am getting as suppicious as everybody else.

From the Montainyard training center we visited a Montainyard village where refugees had been resettled. The Montainyards live in a different fashion from the Vietnamese. Their houses are built on stilts and whole family groups live in one long house which may house as many as fifty people in separate compartments. One side of the house is a kind of veranda on which they grind rice and HAXEX dry tobacco leaves. Underneath the house there are pigs and other livestock. In the middle of the village there is a house with a very high gable also on stilts somewhat like an Alpine chalet which is called the happy house where all bachelors of the village live until they are married. The government and the American economic advisory team thought it would be a good idea to have another community center in this montainyard and they, therefore, built a very impressive concrete installation which was intended to be a market. In fact, it is the most impressive building in the

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village if not in Pleiku. It now stands utterly deserted because montainyards
never trade with each other. They prefer to wait for weeks until they can go
for
to another settlement to trade/what they need.

From the montainyard village I visited the special forces C detachment
which is attached to Phe II Corprs. Special forces as I have said before
are the units wearing green berets that are designed to operate behind enemy
lines. The ix purpose of stationing them in the highlands ix was originally
to harrass VC lines of communications or at least to keep them under
observation. They are now operating out of some twenty camps, each with
an American team of fourteen men. These are the so-called A teams and
650 either montainqrds or Vietnamese. In the highlands they are almost
entirely montainyards.

One of the results of the VC summer events has been to push these special
forces back largely into their camps and to make it very difficult for them
to do more than occasionally harrass the infiltration. routes. They can certainly
not keep them under constant observation and no camp patrols more than twenty
kilometers from its base.

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I paid a brief call on General Vin Loc, who is the Commander of the Second Vietnamese Corps. He is almost universally despised by the American advisers as dilletant, playful and erratic, and extremely emotional.

I cannot judge these qualities. He does have a huge office in II Corps Headquarters Building in the middle of which there is a replica of a Montagnard village built as a fireplace. General Vin Loc is tall for a Vietnamese and he wore a natty paratroop uniform with a blue scarf. Like very Vietnamese, with the exception of General Ky, he spoke entirely in terms of "I", and again one had the sense that his Corps was an autonomous region rather than part of a unified national system. He spoke of the battle of Dong Plei Me entirely as if it had been a victory brought about by his superior generalship. He said that the Americans did not always understand Vietnamese conditions. They did not have the smell for VC dispositions. He was particularly critical of the First Cavalry Division, which he thought was too bureaucratic, too slow, and too afraid to suffer casualties.--almost a mirrow image of the criticisms that the Americans make of him. He pointed out that in the last three months

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4b

50 hamelts have been lost and that there was a large no man's land in his mountainous II Corps region where no side operates or where whichever side operates id dominant. He confirmed that he had every battalion engaged in fighting VCs and that he had none available for clearing operations. Otherwise as that his analysis of the situation was essentially the same/of his American advisers-- for all I know he may have gotten it from his American advisors.

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I received the usual eyewahs briefing about the splendid accomplishments of the special forces teams which gave the impression that the war was being won. I then asked HOWWERY what the maximum radius of their patrols was. I was told 20 kilometers. I asked whether the situation was better worse or the same as this time last year. Major Terry the Commander of the Detachment thereupon said it would break my heart to think that we have not made any progress since last year. I asked him to give me some examples of progress he said he really could not think of any particular improvement.

In fact, he pointed out that in places like Duceo, which had been recaptured, the practical result had been that the VC had remained in control of the population and the routes around the camp. Major Terry said the fact was that they did not go as far as they used to from their camp and that many of the Vietnamese commanders of the special forces units were suffering from "campitis"; that is, staying in their camp and praying that they would not be attacked. I asked him how many of these special forces A teams are used in the role of advisors to Vietnamese camp commanders. I asked him how

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416

many of his camp commanders in his twenty camps were sub-standard, adequate and outstanding. He said 60% were sub-standard, 20% were out-standing and the remainder were in between. Sub-Standard commanders were those who did not move out of their camp unless they absolutely had to, and many of them had deals with food contractors, from which they received kickbacks. They mentioned the case of one camp commander who, when the special forces tried to stop his profitable sideline, refused to move out of his camp until his kickback was restored to him.

I asked them about the district chiefs with whom they rated them in terms of competence. They said 20% were very good, 33% were utterly incompetent, and the remainder were somewhat in between.

Dac Go

From the special forces camp I went to the air field to go to Dac Go, which is the northern-most outpost in Kontum Province, fifteen miles from the Laotian border on the main infiltration route of the Viet Cong. It contains a special forces camp and it contains a regimental headquarters of the Vietnamese Army. Dac Go had been overrun by the VC in June and recaptured

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only in August. It can be reached only by air since all the roads to it are closed. It is about 100 miles north of Plei Kau. When we arrived we found one of the L19 spotter planes circling the airfield to look for possible VC snipers. The airfield is right next to the special forces camp, which contains 14 Americans, at the moment 50 Seabees, and 650 Montagnards. The Seabees are there in order to dig underground installations, since all units will have to be sheltered underground, the post being constantly exposed to VC attack. The Americans there were an extremely impressive group, and as soon as one gets away from the really almost compulsive lying of the headquarters, one has to be moved by the dedication of these people--stuck out in an area as bait where they can be attacked at any moment by VC units of any size and who are almost certainly doomed if the VC ever consider it worth their while to take the camp. The Montagnards are living in little huts beside the American shelters; each Montagnard having an underground shelter near his hut in which he lives with his wife. The Montagnards will not fight unless their families are with them. Another attribute of the

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[Y]

Montagnards is that they are absolutely loyal for their term in service.
They fight strike strictly as mercenaries, and then at some point they will
simply put down their arms and leave. I looked at the camp and got a brief
description from Captain Ruehlin, the Camp Commander. Like We then
drove to the regimental headquarters, which is located two miles away from
the special forces camp. The nature of the situation is shown by the fact that
for this distance, even through there are 650 troops in the special forces camp
and 2,000 at regimental headquarters, the road between the special forces camp
and the Vietnamese regimental headquarters is impassable at night as it is
always infested by VC guerrillas. Also, no planes can land at the airfield
after 4 o'clock since the VC might shoot the plane down at dusk. The reason
they are reluctant to shoot planes down in the daytime is not because they
are unable to do it, but because they would give away their position and be
subjected to airiel bombardment. At regimental headquarters I first
spoke to the province chief, regimental commander and district chief, who
are Vietnamese, separately. The province chief, a Lieutenant Colonel,

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[Y]

told me the usual story that the population of Kontum was 80,000, that 80% of it was under governmental control and so on and so forth. I asked him how many hamlets he had lost since March. It turned out that 62 hamlets had been overrun since then and 39 since July. I asked him whether any roads were open in his province. He said uriously enough, only civilian buses are now operating in his province, that no military traffic can move. I asked him what he would need to move between Kontum, which is his province capital, and Dac Go, where we were, a distance of about 50 miles. He said it would require at least two battalions. I asked him how much force he would need to move from Kontum to Dac Go to Pleiku. He said that he would need at least three battalions. Since he did not have anything like this force available, it meant that all roads were closed. I asked him why civilian buses could operate then. He said that the VC were taxing them and he thought that this was the best solution to the problem. The province chief also told me that the Kho'Bakar Xa'Dac, the regional force commander and ex-head of the Kho'Bakar had a total of thirteen regional force companies at his disposal, or four battalions altogether, most of whom he kept in Kontum, and his provincial capital.

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[x]

I then talked to the regimental commander who told me that he had been fighting for fifteen years and was very tired and hoped that he would be transferred out of this region. I asked what his modus of operation was. He said that there were many VC in Kontum province that he could not send his patrols outside the range of his own artillery. The range of his artillery was of some of his batteries is fourteen kilometers, but the real range, I found out later, is 11 kilometers. I then asked the province chief what he did with his regional forces in Kontum and he said he also did not move them outside the range of his artillery, which, in his case, happened to be element kilometers. In other words, the Kontum province, which is shown as 80% pacified on the map, has abolished its two northern-most districts since they were taken over by the VC. In the two districts still held by the government, government forces move only at a maximum of fourteen kilometers from one district to two and ten kilometers from another district to one--and that is in the daytime. Vietnamese forces never move at night unless they are forced to by the VC.

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[y]

I then asked the province chief how many ~~villages~~ hamlets had a governmental apparatus at night. It turned out that only 90 out of the 252 hamlets, or about 30%, had governmental officials willing to stay there at night.

I then had lunch in the very primitive regimental mess. After lunch I took Major Tyler, who is the provincial adviser for Kontum Province; Major Allen, who is the adviser for the regiment; and Captain Ruehlin aside to discuss the situation with them. I asked them to tell me with frankly how they rated the ability of the Vietnamese whom they were dealing.

y
The said that the province chief was incapable; he did not react quickly, he did not do the job; he was unwilling to delegate responsibility--in fact there was a remarkable lack of interest on his part in prosecuting the war.

I then asked about the district chiefs. Major Tyler said there had been five districts in Kontum province; two had been lost, one had been combined with another. Of the two districts that were left, the district chiefs were juvenile, cowardly, incompetent and almost every other had adjective they could apply to them. Major Tyler, and Major Allen, neither one of whom

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seemed hysterical, said that they had the distinct impression that the Vietnamese had no interest in <u>contact</u> catching the VC. There was a tendency on the part of all Vietnamese units to avoid casualties. There was a stigma to losing troops. Major Tyler told me that he knew of many operations that had been conducted by the provincial chief with his regional forces south of Kontum when all the intelligence reports said that the VC were north of Kontum. I asked Major Tyler and Major <u>contacts</u> Allen what percentage of <u>contact</u> had been initiated by the Vietnamese. Major Tyler said that in his three months on the job not a single contact with the VC had been initiated by the Vietnamese units. All contacts had been initiated by the VC. Major Tyler added that all the operations conducted with Vietnamese units were penetrated; for example, he had run two road-clearing operations between Dac Go and <u>Kordung</u> with two battalion each. Before each of these road-clearing operations two bridges were blown. No bridge had ever been blown as long as the VC controlling the road and collecting taxes. Captain Ruehlin praised the Montagnards highly by comparison with the Vietnamese. In addition to the military incompetence, Major Tyler said

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that the civil administration in Kontum was a disgrace. The only food that the refugees have received has been through American travel, not a single Vietnamese airplane has landed at either Kontum or Dac Go in three months. Until they took out some Montagnards for the November 1st. I asked how much force it would take to open the road to Kontum. Major Tyler said that it would take three battalions to open it and five battalions stationed along it to keep it open, and those forces were simply not available. I asked about the possibilities of an agreement in which in return for an end of VC infiltration we stopped doing certain things, such as bombing North Vietnam. All the Americans agreed that monitoring VC infiltration through Kontum province was absolutely impossible. They pointed out that the elephant grass was twelve feet high and unless one physically stumbled on a man it was impossible to see him even from an airplane.

I had asked before arriving in Dac Go to see some village in the Montagnard area. When we, therefore, formed a convoy after we had been at regimental headquarters and set out a distance of ten kilometers.

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There must have been a slight amount of danger because the district chief
bowed out of the operation. We visited a village where Major Tyler had told
me the district chief had reported three weeks previously that 300 VC had
been seen and that the village had to be abandoned. The fact is that only 6
VC had appeared in the village and that the district chief had simply panicked.
At any rate he was not about to go on a trip with us in that direction. We formed
a convey with two weapons carriers, one in front and one in the rear and an
American L19 flying low over head and along the side of the road. I am sure
that the greatest danger to which we were exposed was the fantastic speed with
dirt
which we went over a road which was absolutely full of holes. We never went
below 50 miles. The village was a typical Montagnard village with a happy
house in the middle and house on stilts elsewhere. Of course at night the
village is completely exposed to VC infiltration. Unless one sees the country-
side one cannot understand the complexity of the problem. On both sides of
the road elephant grass grew higher than the jeep. If a VC patrol had by
accident been there and had decided to fake us out it could have fired on us

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and gotten away before anybody could possibly have reacted. Beyond the
elephant grass dense jungles start, and of course all the hills and countryside
no pretense is made of government control. AX I was met by the village chief
who gave me a bracelet, which is the Montagnard sign of friendship, and a
model of a "happy house". We then raise raced back to the airfield, because
it was getting late in the day and we had to get off before dusk.

After dropping our two escort officers off at Pleiku--airplanes being
used here the way taxis are in the United States--we had a harrowing flight
back to Saigon. This is the monsoon season and late in the day thunderstorms
are building up. Since the Beachcrafts in which we were flying have no radar,
the pilot had to fly low so that he could fly by visual observation, and since
we had to get through some mountain passes we had a rough, uncomfortable
time.

When we arrived in Saigon we hit the grand-daddy of all traffic
james. November 1st is a national holiday in Vietnam to celebrate the over-
throw of Diem and the troops were rehearsing a parade in the center of town.

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[Y]

It took us two hours to get from the airport to the Embassy residence and, since my car had not managed to get to the airport, I had to ride in an open jeep with the CIA man, who, all the way into town, was telling me harrowing tales of inefficiency, confusion, and general bungling. He told me about one eager Vietnamese First Lieutenant who wanted to arrest five VC whom he knew to be in a village. It then turned out they were all related to the village chief, who complained to the province chief, who instructed the First Lieutenant never to arrest anybody without first consulting him. He said that this was the end of another eager First Lieutenant.

When I came to the residence after this exhausting day I was told that the Embassy had arranged a dinner with the labor attaché, to which I had reluctantly to go. However, I was so exhausted that I don't really remember very well what was said, except that the labor attaché too complained about corruption and inefficiency and the inability of the government to get any popular base.