Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KLC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

Telecon
Joseph Alsop
1/3/70 1:13 p.m.

A: There's something of a personal nature I'd like to talk to you about. I advise you to find time as soon as you come home to talk with Charlie Whitehouse.

K: I've never heard of him.

A: He is the Mister 3-corps as Vann is Mister 4-corps.
And he'd just as courageous and just as efficient.

K: Will he be there still when I get back?

A: When are you coming back?

K: During the week some time.

A: He could stop and see you en route to Vietnam. He's supposed to leave on Tuesday. I think you could benefit by seeing him. He's one of the 3 or 4 ablest people out there. I'd far rather talk to Charlie than to Vann. The second thing is for your ear only. Don't take any action on it till you've talked to me. He's very angry about the whole business.

K: What business?

A: Well I'm going to give you the background. He's 48 now, he's a class 1 officer. He served with distinction in Guinea. After that he was decorated for it. He was made charge in Guinea, a very difficult post. Then he came back to Washington--

SANITIZED

, but being patriotic, he did it. He went out there and no matter who you talk to, you get a glowing report--a combination of wisdom, energy and courage. He is ruling a vast empire: 14 provinces . . . He has to deal with the Vietnamese, the American Army. It's an enormous enterprise. And when he got back he was told by State that he is going to be rewarded by being plunged back into darkest Africa, Nigere, which

SANITIZED

and now he doesn't know what he's going to do.

K: I will look into it.

A: Well, see the man first. He's going to Tommy Thompson. You know some of these people deserve more real credit for their hard

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

page 2

service. He has a bigger job than most ambassadors know. They
were put out to find that he regarded Ambassador to Nigere as not
a promotion.

K: It's not the most choice of posts.

A: It's an abominable damnation. He has these people
risking their lives. He spends 14 hours a day in helicopters. Are
they never going to get any credit?

K: I agree. I will look into it.

A: But without specific reference to me.

K: No, I'll meet him and whatever action I take I will
take on my own.

A: He has just as much courage as Vann. He's leaving
for the West Coast and then Vietnam on Tuesday.

K: I'll see him here.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
1:20 pm., 1-3-70

L said hello Henry. I just got a call from Dan Murphy. He was concerned about a call that he had gotten from Al Haig about a request that Moot had made asking if we would object to combining figures in the budget. K said I will tell you what happened Mel and this affects both of us. L said Mayo told Moot this was something the White House wanted done.

K said Mayo suddenly said in the meeting with the President today that Henry failed as intermediary with Laird so I (Mayo) worked it out directly with Packard and we can now show a decrease in employment. L said I have Packard on the other line and I want to trace this down.

K said we didn't mind but it would have been more effective if you and I had presented it and you would have gotten credit for it. Thazt was the problem. L said Packard thought he was doing something that had all been approved. K said the President told Mayo if Henry couldn't get it done, it could not be done. L said you know what he is doing - he is just shifting people to temporary positions. K said it was the way he presented it (missed some - had to answer another phone).

L said I am going to have Packard call you about it. He should have called you as soon as he got the call from Mayo. The thing here is entirely different than he suggested to you. The thing that bothers me is that he tried to present it that way. K said I think in the future if he makes a deal with Mayo, if he could call me it would be good. L said I will have Packard call you on this one. K said having Haig call Murphy was just a friendly way of keeping you informed.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASER
By CHNARA Date 9-1-79

*

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 6, 1971 8:45 a.m.

jlj

D: You sleep too late Henry.

K: I am in California what do you mean?

D: I called your office and they said you were in a deep sleep.

K: I was just wondering. Did Vorontsov call me?

D: No Henry. I asked Vorontsov to call to Mr. Young and give him a
special message to you. This is really in terms of our confidential channel.
I thought it would be all right because the message is in an envelope so that
only the two of us would know what it was. It is from the top to top.

K: Can an answer wait until I see you on Monday? I have not read the
message so I cannot tell you what I think.

D: It is a continuation of the talk between the President and Gromyko. In
line of the discussions which took place at the White House. The consultation
of the President and Gromyko at one point.

K: We are in the process of reviewing that whole issue anyway so I will
be glad to get this message. I am almost certain. . . I cannot give you an
answer now because I have not seen the message.

D: Continuation of what they discussed at the White House. That was a
continuation of what we discussed before.

K: I was just wondering when Vorontsov called if this was something you
were planning to delivery someplace else later in the day.

D: No. Not at all. This is in our channel. It is not going anywhere else.
That is why I wanted to call and tell you what these arrangements are. I did
not think it would hurt to have Vorontsov call Young.

K: Now I understand. This is only a technical problem.

D: I will see you on Monday.

K: Oh by the way. Would you mind if we made it 1/2 hour earlier?

D: You mean - Any time you say is fine with me.

K: It is now scheduled for 1 p.m. and I may have to leave earlier so if
is all right with you I may want to shift it to 12:30. Let's leave it at 1 and
if I have to leave earlier I will let you know and we will make it 12:30.

D: Fine.

By: KCLN NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
General Walters
1/6/70 9:15 a.m.

W: I wanted to confirm that I received it and that it's you who sent it to me. I wanted to make sure it came from you.

K: Yes, it came from me.. You'll do it next week. Don't ask for it until after Friday. Ask for it Saturday or Monday.

W: I'll call on Friday and ask for it Saturday

K: No call on Saturday and ask for it Monday or Tuesday.

W: Okay, very good.

By KCL- NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
1/6/70 9:47 a.m.

P: What's new today?

K: There's been a noticeable step-up of activity in the I-corp; attacked an American batallion last night; killed 13 people. Otherwise I headed off the Middle East initiative yesterday, but only had 3 hours to play with. I think I toned it down. I worked with Sisco last night. The French are going to turn it down anyway. I think they managed to take out the most offensive paragraph. There's one matter before us: the request that you talk to Hassan regarding the satellite. You turned that down. But somebody must have given word to him that it was a possibility and he's pushing for it now. Our Charge told him that the only reason we haven't agreed to it is because of your vacation, which puts the burden entirely on you. I was wondering if you shouldn't reconsider it.

P: What is this?

K: just a telephone call between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. tomorrow.

P: I don't see any harm in that.

K: I think it will do a little good. The symbolism is good.

P: No harm in that. Are we inviting him here?

K: I'll check.

PL Well, Mobutu is on the list.

P: Let's see about that--then we'd have something to talk about.

K: And you have talked about going there.

P: That's right. That's okay; you can schedule the call.

K: Okay, we have ABM coming up again. We'll have the same old battle lines drawn again. It's in the budget going in for $____ for one complete Safeguard 1 and going into Safeguard 2. If we are going to pull off what we are talking about, we need to have it moving so the Russians can see it. If that stops, the Russians can't see it. Over the weekend

Telecon
The President
1/6/70
page 2

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

10 scientists were invited to Defense. Most of them are
opposed. There's a memo on your desk about this, but
you haven't seen it yet. We ought to get a game plan
set on ABM for this year.

P: Yes. It can be won. I don't want to call
Senators this time. We'll give it right to Harlow.

K: Packard should put 6 or 7 choices in front of
the scientists--confuse them completely. Put what you choose
in the middle. We will work out a game plan.

P: Yes. Congress came through this year in the
second vote, and will again. I just don't want Smith and
Thompson to put out this nonsense.

K: Well, Mr. President, we're better off planning
for 600 and getting 200.

P: Right. Let's be sure ACDA knows that and doesn't
give up the game beforehand. I want to be able to bargain for
something.

K: You might want to tell Smith nothing comprehen-
sive; we will work out something more limited. I'll tell
him that ABM is negotiable.

P: We are ready to negotiate, but we mustn't give
it away in advance.

K: It isn't yet anything like earlier this year.
Maybe. Maybe Mylai will take the curse of that.

P: Well that has . . .

K: It has petered out.

P: The Los Angeles Times is trying to run a story
on that, but they are a little late. The trial is going on.
There's going to be all sorts of nonsense. We can expect
the atrocity thing to come in. Agnew has been doing well.

K: Yes, not only in the newspapers but from our
own reports.

P: He's getting the nuance of everything we talked
about.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
The President
1/6/70

page 3

K: As he reached each point, I'm sending him talking points.

P: He's handling it beautifully. USIA is complaining because he won't let TV cameras in there. I give him a brownie point for that.

K: John Scalli was in the other day. He was really defensive. Really apologetic for his treatment of your Nov. 3 speech.

P: He was rough, wasn't he?

K: He had Harriman in. He said not that Harriman is just a senile, bitter old man. And Oberdorfer is doing a one-year-after-the-inauguration piece; seemed good.

P: You can be sure he wouldn't be doing the piece he is if Agnew hadn't taken them on. They wouldn't be so apologetic if he hadn't taken them on.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Rogers

10:02 a.m., January 6, 1970

R said on K's call to Sisco last evening, R agrees with him. K said he didn't think he should get Rogers out of bed and therefore had called Sisco. R told K that on the discussion of economic matters, he had seen Rowland Evans who is writing an article which says it is being taken away from XXX State and given to K. R said on the Committee, he wonders whether K would be well advised to have Elliot Richardson chair it in view of this. K said he has no interest in chairing it, but he wants to mention it to the President. Elliot can chair it and he and K can work out procedures. K said he really prefers not to chair it. R said he thought it was better. K said he would talk to the President about it -- he wanted it that way when Laird was in one day. K will recommend to him that it be given to Richardson.

R said Franklin Lincoln was in to see him this morning. He was talking about the President's asking him to take a trip, which R believes the President may want to think through again. If Lincoln goes to Cairo, Jordan and Lebanon now, it cannot possibly be done as an ordinary citizen. K explained that the President tossed this thing out at a FIAB meeting. K had been sitting on it in the hope that it would be forgotten; he hadn't wanted to countermand an order. K said he doesn't think Lincoln should go. R said Lincoln would be identified as a former law partner of the President's. K said some people had already gone to the area but not to these hot countries. R mentioned a trip scheduled for Admiral XAM Anderson to Italy, Greece, Turkey. K said he has already finished the trip and it was handled discreetly. R said if Lincoln goes to these hot spots, it will be interpreted as a move by the President in this whole Middle East area. R said he thinks our position is pretty sound; even though we are at the moment taking a beating domestically, our position is all right. George Brown has said he thinks our position is sound. K said we should XXXX stick to it and not allow ourselves to be driven off. If we don't, we will get sucked into an endless process.

R said he had a discussion on January 5 with Rabin which was acrimonious. He said launching this major attack was wise. R told him we didn't think our relations were deteriorating. On this business of our not letting them see every piece of paper before we submit it, we want to consult and get their views as we have done, but we don't have to show the papers. K said except for the heat we are taking now, which he thinks was inevitable at some stage, he thinks we are better positioned even in their interests.

By KHC NARA, Dalo. 5/12/04

*

R said he had seen a lot of Presidents of Jewish organizations and would be seeing more which Max Fisher is working out. They may not completely agree with us, but their temperament is better after they leave. R said Israel is suspicious we may do something else and they are applying pressure so we don't. K said it was highly desirable that the point was reached separate from Israel. R agreed and said we don't have to give any. Our position is a very sound one, and we should stand on it.

K said he would work out with Richardson the Committee item. R said, would you talk to the President about the Frank Lincoln item also.

K said there has been a flap back and forth about the President talking with King Hassan. The President has now agreed to do it. K said Rogers need not get involved; he (K) would get in touch with either Sisco or Ted Eliot. As background, he told R the President first said no; in the meantime, Hassan has been pressing. We might as well go through with it, and the President has agreed.

R added that Lincoln is very relaxed about his trip -- Lincoln himself had some doubt about it so he isn't pressing it. Some of the places -- like France, Belgium, London, and even Lebanon, are all right. K agreed. Lincoln, given all the difficulties, should stay out of the hot spots. R said it would be interpreted as some sort of plot. K said we should quiet down now rather than keep the speculation going.

lds

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Loory

1/6/70 10:22 a.m.

K: On the meeting with your people. My question is this. In principle I'm willing to do it. But I have a dinner date in Los Angeles tomorrow wvening. If it could be later in the day I'd be willing to come to Los Angeles.

L: Fine; that might be better.

K: How about 5 or 5:30? I have a dinenr date at 7:30.

L: 5 or 5:30?

K: Yes, how about 5:30 to 7:00?

L: Fine. How are you getting there?

K: I'm taking a helipopter. You're welcome to come up with me.

L: That would be good, except I won't have a way of getting back here. Well, I have relatives in Beverly Hills--do you know where you're going?

K: Yes.

L: Well, maybe I dould go to dinner and then fly back with you.

K: Yes, but I'm not sure I want to be tied to your schedule.

L: Okay, well, we'll get you to Beverly Hills.

K: Okay, you'll call me about those arrangements?

L: Yes.

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Gerard Smith

1/6/70 11:05 a.m.

K: Two things: About your letter to the P about Safeguard. Here is the P's thinking. He would appreciate your cooperation. He has little trouble with the basic philosophy that you and Tommy developed. But it would be useful to put money for Phase 2 into the budget to strengthen the negotiating position. He's appreciate it if your agency could be kept from running amok against it.

S: We haven't run amok before and won't now. I haven't shown it to anybody, but Elliot. Nobody in my agency knows anything about it.

K: If you would keep in mind that he's in principle willing to move in the direction you are heading in. But he WANTED TO DO IT, VETOED PHASE 2, won't jump into Phase 2.

S: Okay, can't ask for more than that.

K: Secondly, your letter on passing things along to Dobrynin. There's no problem with that in principle, but he doesn't want things passed till he has another look.

S: I wouldn't pass anything along unless I had checked it out with everybody.

K: OK. We should certainly be receptive to anything he wants to pass along to us.

S: OK. When are you coming back?

K: Thursday or Friday.

S: See you then.

K: I think we've gotten this thing on a good track.

S: I think so, and I'll keep the animals in my agency from growling.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASER
By C. NARA Date 5/20/81

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin (not verbatim)

January 6, 1971 12:35 p.m.

jlj

K: I have just talked about that document with the President and I will be prepared to discuss it with you on Monday but I wanted to be sure I knew what the precise question is to which you want an answer. The question is not clear. You said there is one question in particular to which you want an answer and I was calling to make sure I knew what it was.

D: About the first page, to speed up the whole process. Secondly, from our side and from your side point of view - you remember Gromyko's discussion with the President.

K: That you are prepared to go forward on this basis.

D: How it was handled there --

K: I understand, I understand. We are looking at this with a very constructive attitude.

D: Constructive position. We are quite prepared to - I have instructions which I did not want to put in writing in that message - if President OKs we could have some talks between you and I. I have instruction to tell the President . . . details of the major issues - we are prepared to go but both of us should talk -

K: For your information I think I will be prepared to talk with you. Perhaps on Monday we will not be able to deal with all of it but get the basis for which our discussions will take place.

D: This one and maybe the next two can discuss most useful things to do to speed up.

K: At least I could explain to you how I think it can be done.

D: It probably can be taken care of in 2 or 3 meetings and then see the President -

K: 2 or 3 meetings to narrow the thing.

D: Not how to solve but direction where we go.

K: What we think our needs are and what you can do about them and then we will treat your needs in the same way.

D: Two things - speeding up two major points which was discussed with the President.

K: I thought that is what you were saying but I wanted to check. Now that

- 2 -

is taken care of all I have to worry about is what you will do to my
wasteline.

D: Don't worry about that. I have been reading with pleasure about your adventures there. It sounds as if you have been having a good time but it is good for you.

K: Once we get to know each other better perhaps you will show me the file you have on me.

D: No. We don't have a file seriously. Is our meeting 1 or 12:30?

K: Let's leave it at 1 p.m. then I will not keep you waiting.

D: 1 p.m. then.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

*

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
1/6/70 1:35 p.m.

P: I just had a call from Julie; she's just back from Europe. She made an interesting point. She talked to our Ambassador to the Common Market Schäfer. He made an interesting point. He thinks it's disgraceful that Schröder is coming over with Pompidou. Schröder is planning privately as soon as he finished the visit to resign, probably within a month.

K: I talked to Ehrlichman about that yesterday. I read some afticles suggesting he is going to resign after the Pompidou visit.

P: He made the point that the new Ambassador ought to be able to get points on it. I talking about Aurther Watson, a great guy.

K: Who was with Rockefeller?

P: This is the guy. He's been a Nixon man for many years. He's a Republican; speaks perfect English and French. The point is we ought to let it be known beforehand that he's going to resign.

K: And announce the replacement.

P: Exactly.

K: You know he's thinking of running for Governor of Mayland.

P: Right. I think we've played too much into his hands. Bill took him in on the UN thing. Thank God we didn't get him there.

K: Since then we've let it slide.

PL We had to. I didn't want to make a big issue. The Kennedy clan has got to have somebody to carry the torch. They turned to him. We've immobilized him.

K: Flanigan is checking with Watson now. We ought to get Ehrlichman in on it.

P: We should announce that Schröder is hoing to be going. He may give us a kick in the back when he goes.

K: I don't know if he'll do that right away. But there's no way we can stop him even if he does.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

The President
page 2

There's one other problem: as a result of your comment to
FIAB, they've been sending ... . Lincoln is thinking
of going to Cairo, Jordan, Beirut.

P: He shouldn't go to Cairo; Jordan and Beirut wouldn't bother me, but we shouldn't do anything with Nasser. The problem is I don't know whether Frank has the sophistication to make such a trip.

K: That's what I'm worried about, and Bill has his
doubts.

P: Let's let those doubts prevail. That Nasser can
charm people out of their shoes. Let's agree with Bill for
once.

By: KHC
NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Freeman

1:50 p.m., January 6, 1970

Ambassador Freeman said he was going to back to London on
January 7 (in the evening) for consultations prior to the
Prime Minister's visit to Washington. He said he had been
working with the State Department on the visit, but there
was one point he wanted to mention privately to K. He said
in his view the more the two great men talk together and
get to know and understand one another, the better. K said
that is exactly the President's thought; therefore, he suggests
that he and the Ambassador work together on these talks. The
Ambassador asked, when the Prime Minister meets absolutely
along in the room with the President, does that mean literally
just the two of them, or could K and the Ambassador be present.
K said he thought they could be present. The President doesn't
usually want to raise bureaucratic xxx problems, so K and
the Ambassador could join them after the 15-minute private
meeting. The Ambassador said his concern was that it is
important that there shouldn't be misunderstandings or that
the understandings are not recorded properly. K said he would
settle for one of them being there if he gives the other notes.
Ambassador Freeman said he would like to be with the Prime
Minister as much as possible. Freeman said when things con-
cerning the Prime Minister's visit come to K for decision, he
would appreciate K's bearing this in mind, for which he would
be grateful.

K told Freeman when he got back, they should talk about the
shape and content of the talks. He said the President's talks
are most successful if the President knows what will be raised.
We will tell Freeman what we will raise, and vice versa. K
said for Freeman's private information (and he could pass on to
the Prime Minister privately) we are planning to hold an NSC
meeting the day the Prime Minister is here, and we are planning
to invite him to attend. This has never been done before.
Freeman said the PM would be delighted. K said it hasn't been
completely worked out, but Freeman could be sure that it will
be done. Freeman said he would call K when he returns to
Washington.

lds

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Don Oberdorfer

11:05 a.m., January 7, 1970

K said he wasn't sure this was necessary, but he wanted to make sure he hadn't left a misleading impression with Oberdorfer about his future plans. He took a two-year leave of absence because that is what Harvard gives. He doesn't have to decide anything further until later. O said he was under no misapprehension. K said there are no cosmic problems one way or the other. O said you will have' to decide by 1971 whether to resign or go back, and you haven't yet made that decision. K said that was right. O said he would make sure Murray Marder wouldn't read anything into this. O asked K if he had gotten the letter, and explained that Murray Marder had written K but had sent it to the Washington White House -- the letter includes K's quotes from the session at lunch. K said Marder isn't to use the quotes without his prior approval. O said he had a copy of Marder's letter and would get a copy of it to K at the Western White House that same day.

K said when they had been talking machinery, O asked about the President's role and K's. K had said the President states objectives with great precision -- that he didn't care too much about machinery. K said, however, in the original design of the NSC system, the President had played a major role. K referenced the Eisenhower-type NSC system and said the difference with the present system is that it produces options. Secondly, the President wanted no agency put above any other agency and gave as an example, he didn't want the State Department in charge of other departments. He didn't want interdepartmental rivalries which he recalled from the Eisenhower however Administration. Third, the President wanted a procedure which would avoid as much as possible fixed departmental positions through evolution, -- an enormous number of appeals from the bureaucracy. K said he had checked this with the President who said K could give this to O. K said this is one area in setting up the machinery of this Administration, the President had stated what he wanted -- also in contingency planning. A theoretical system would be maintained whereby the State Department was executive agent. The State Department is the senior department in the conduct of foreign policy. This gives State the opportunity to get in on some issues like Defense policy which it didn't get into before.

Oberdorfer said he had meant to ask K something. They have gotten a fairly good rundown in his absence overseas about chemical warfare. He knows K had something to say in the backgrounder. Somebody

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

(he thought outside of Government) had given the rundown. O said it seemed to him this would be a good case -- perhaps the only one available in the foreign field -- to give a flesh and bones example of what the President's role in all of this was. O said they have some inferences from people who talked about the process in coming to this decision., and indicated he would like the opportunity of talking with K about it. K asked when he would like to do this -- he would prefer not to handle it on the telephone. They agreed on a Friday afternoon appointment after K returned to Washington.

[Oberdorfer subsequently obtained K's approval for Murray Marder to accompany him.]

lds

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Marshall Green
1/7/70 11:12 a.m.

K: I wanted to talk about this matter tomorrow. I know
your reservations about what the P wants to do. But the P feels that
having indicated that we want to say something, there is nothing wrong
with saying what we have already said to others. He's worried about
puching hard for regular procedures for meetings. What it comes up
to is he'd like something along the lines of what we've said. Get Stes-sel
to say this is our feeling . . .

G: ...

K: He'd like to go further on the condominium idea.

G: As we understand the meeting tomorrow is only a
procedural one, as to when and where to meet next.

K: To let Walt say I've been asked to tell you what our
general philosophy is. Last time we said we wanted a new approach. I have
just spend an hour with the P. What I've just conveyed to you is almost
verbatim what he said to me. We will have to you in half an hour some-
thing he's already said to foreign leaders. We're looking through
memcons to find something he's said that lends itself.

G: We have something going out.

K: To us?

G: No, a telegram to Warsaw in which we simply answer
questions raised. We'll send you a copy.

K: Good. The P is intensely interested.

G: What we said is really just ritualistic. It's had John
Holdridge's clearance.

K: I'll get it from Holdridge, just so we can show it to
the P.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin
1/7/71 12:05 p.m.

D: I have just received a telegram from Moscow and they have asked me rather urgently to come to Moscow for consultations -- tomorrow or the day after. I'm checking now on what kind of planes can go. In this case [there will be a meeting on Monday].

K: I just spent three hours with the President.

D: Maybe you could give me it in writing.

K: I can't discuss it on a call.

D: Maybe the points the same way as I gave them to you, through Mr. Young I could get them.

K: Can you put it off as late as Saturday? I am coming east tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow evening?

K: Yes, but I'm doing something in the evening which I cannot change. But I could see you first thing on Saturday morning.

D: I have to check on planes. My impression is there are none on Saturday.

K: When will you be back?

D: I don't know -- no specifics. Couldn't you just give ideas in this kind of paper?

K: It's not technically very easy from here. By the time I got it written...

D: I believe it very important.

K: I believe it important too and I have a number of very concrete propositions to make to you.

D: Tomorrow not possible?

K: No.

D: American plane leaves at 7:00 from New York. Latest I could leave maybe 4:00 from Washington.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASSE
By CAPARA Date 5/20/71

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

1/7/71 12:05 p.m. page 2

K: In other words, you are definitely leaving tomorrow?

D: As of now the only plane leaving is tomorrow.

K: Canot you go by London or Paris?

D: It is difficult.

K: You are the best judge of that and you know what your instructions are and I don't. But I personally believe . . . I am a little reluctant to put it in writing because it depends on a number of explanations. But I wanted to make very concrete proposal on how to proceed on the subject you made yesterday and another concrete proposal in another area. If our relationships are going to be part of your conversation this will be not at all unuseful. But if I put it in writing it will have to be very carefully drafted because you will study every word of it.

D: I know our relationship will be part of the conversation.

K: I consider this conversation to be in the spirit of what we discussed on putting something into this channel.

D: So you think it would be worthwhile.

K: You will have to be the judge of that. This shows in at least two of the three points concrete steps and possible in the third. So if we could have an hour together on Saturday morning it would be quite useful.

D: I am sure this will be one of the subjects. In general what to do in the next few months.

K: In that case, you will want to wait for our discussion.

D: I will give you a call tomorrow.

K: Okay, I will arrive about 4:00, so I could see you about 6:00 or I could see you on Saturday morning.

D: If I am staying Saturday morning I understand. Tomorrow morning I will call you. You will still be there?

K: No, I am leaving at 8:00 my time. What time will you know?

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

1/7/71 12:05 p. m. page 3

D: Around 10:00 this time.

K: I will leave my house at 10:30 your time.

D: By then I will know.

K: Okay, you call me any time from 9:30 Washington time on.

D: All right. I will call you tomorrow morning.

K: And my own judgment is that this could be one of the more important
conversations we have had.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01255
By CNARA Date 01-01-91

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Laird

1:06 p.m., January 7, 1970

L asked if Dave Packard had gotten in touch with K and straightened out that matter, and said he was sorry about the way it was presented by Mayo. K said Packard had called the day before, that he understood, and that it was done in good faith. The way Mayo presented it to the President, it sounded as if he had pulled off something K and L hadn't been able to arrange. L said that one XXXXX table didn't mean a damn thing. He was being pressured to agree with State on the toxins thing -- he wanted K to know this in case he got complaints. K said L was doing what we want. L said he XXXXX thought it should be held for a while to which K responded, "absolutely."

L said he is going ahead with this backup group for Paul Nitze. In response to a query from K, L said he had a special group of backup people who shaped various SALT papers which he wants to continue. He didn't want K to think he wasn't keeping him fully informed. Gardner Tucker will head it up. K said excellent; L knows what K thinks of Gardner; K is all for it. L said they were trying to lay out the next moves to be made; they hadn't thought enough work was being done on it. K said what L has been doing saved our lives.

L told K he has been pressured, like K, for weeks to see Cyrus Eaton. K said he has been refusing to see him. Eaton had told L he saw Rogers and Richardson for two hours. K said Rogers had seen Eaton for 10 minutes, and then Marshall Green had seen him. Richardson had seen Eaton before he left on his trip. K said we have no objection to Laird's seeing him. Laird said he didn't want to see him but he didn't want the President or anyone to think he was merely refusing to see him. K said Eaton has absolutely nothing to say; we didn't want him in the White House and that is why we sent him to State. L said Eaton seems to give the impression that the President wants Laird to see him, to which K responded "nonsense."

K said, for L's information, (and we are holding this very close for the moment) there is to be another meeting in Warsaw on January 8. The other side just requested it today. K said he would keep L posted on a personal basis about it. On Safeguard, K said the President would like for Him and L to sit down after the return to Washington and work up a game-plan on how to present it, so the WH and DOD present the same thing. L said he was telling people there has been no decision;

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

that it will go through the regular Security Council review. L said
he would be on "Face the Nation" on Sunday, January 11, and asked
K if there were anything he should get across. K suggested the
points about Vietnamization, and also that ABM had certainly been
helpful in the SALT talks. L said he would. K added that L might
mention that the threat has been growing heavily in the last year.

K told L he had signed a memo to Laird, among others, based on an
approval by the President of the memo Laird had sent K, making it
obligatory to split the biological and chemical things. K referred to
L's memo in his guidance to the departments.

lds

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin
1/7/71 1:35 p. m.

K: I wanted to mention one thing on a semi-personal basis. I think it would be very hard to be understood by the President if you were pulled out in light of the communication of yesterday without waiting for an answer. We have not gotten _______________ but had geared ourselves.

D: I understand and will check with Moscow.

K: I understand that.

D: Because they didn't know specifically about it.

K: To me Monday is easiest.

D: That is completely out of the question, but maybe on Saturday.

K: In that case I will clear Saturday morning.

D: I will check with Moscow with indication then and leave Saturday evening.

K: Saturday noon is possible as far as I am concerned.

D: Saturday evening having in mind I will talk with you during the day.

K: It would simply have been hard to explain why that had to be.

D: I will check.

K: Okay, and you will call me in the morning?

D: Yes, that is a promise.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E1038E
By L/P. MARA Date 9/7/71

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Jim Cannon

1:46 p.m., January 7, 1970

Cannon said he wanted to bring K quickly up to date on the calls from his friend in Panama. K said he wanted to make sure it was from the friend directly and not from a lobbyist making points.

Cannon said he had found that the Huey helicopters would not be available for two years. K said this was because we are using them in Vietnam. C said this puzzled him -- you can buy the civilian version and have it in a month. C said if an export license could be obtained, there is a way they could be bought now. Cannon suggested to the 'friend' that the smaller helicopter the WH is willing to give (Fairchild) could be available in 4-8 months; but the Huey would take two years. Cannon had suggested that he talk to the General and tell him what these lead-times are and then come up to New York. Cannon said Randy Carpenter, who runs the Governor's airline, knows how to procure the civilian helicopters which the General can afford. This may solve the problem. C nnon said they are trying to get this out of the State Department bureaucracy. K said we will be willing to use some muscle if necessary -- we will hold up on this, however, until we hear from Cannon. Cannon said he wanted to give three options and let the General decide. He, and he is sure K also, would like to get this over with. K agreed. The problem apparently is financing for the civilian version which is more readily available than the military version -- Panama doesn't have the money. Cannon mentioned the possibility of Mobil Oil getting into the picture -- Mobil is dickering on a contract with Panama selling and buying oil. One of the conditions that might be worked out is that Mobil, which operates helicopters in Panama in connection with its own explorations, might bring another one or so in and work out a lease arrangement as part of their overall contract with the Panamanian Government. However, Cannon did not go into these details with Glicksburg(?) on the phone. K asked if they needed government money, to which Cannon responded that he didn't know. He wanted Glicksburg to outline for the General the options and possibilities and then have him come to New York where Carpenter could work it out with them. K said he would not do anything until he heard from Cannon. Cannon said he would keep K posted.

Ids

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON
President Johnson
2:00 p.m., January 7, 1970

Mr. Kissinger told President Johnson that the President would like the three astronauts to call on him before they go on their world trip. K wondered if January 21, 22, or 23 would be convenient, or if there were another date which would be more convenient for him. President Johnson said he and Mrs. Johnson had planned to be out of the country from Jan 15th to approximately the first week in March. President Johnson said General Schultz had talked to his people and arranged for the three astronauts to see him after they return from the world trip in March. He wondered if he had misunderstood -- he wants to do anything the President wants him to. He suggested anytime between now and the 15th if the President wants him to see them before they leave on the trip. K said the President intended this as a sign of respect for PJ's involvement in the space program. LBJ appreciated that, but said it had been tentatively set up for him to receive them at the Ranch in March after their return.

Mr. Kissinger said he had talked with Walt Rostow last week. LBJ said he hadn't seen Walt since he returned. K said the President is eager to have K bring LBJ up to date on some of the operational material. LBJ said anytime K thinks it is justified. K said it would probably be best before LBJ departs on the 15th. LBJ asked that Tom Johnson be called to set up a time before the 15th. K said he would do this after we get back to Washington -- he would make it his business to come to see LBJ before he departs (for Mexico), and will work out the exact time with Tom Johnson. K said he looks forward to the pleasure of seeing LBJ soon.

lds

*

By KHLW NARA, Dalo. 5/12/04

Telecon

H: On the Pompidou visit: The French put great stress on the significance and importance of the President's attending the dinner, pointing to the precedent created by De Gaulle.

K: When you say the French I know it's that pain the in the neck, Lucet. He's made that point to me to excruciating lengths. I told him I would present that to the President at the best time for the most favorable decision. I think we can swig it if they don't force my hand.

H: There are 2 precedents: President Eisenhower did it when DeGaulle came the first time and DeGaulle did it in Paris. Of course it presents a precedent other countries may wish to emulate.

K: That's what's on the P's mind right now.

H: But of course this is a special thing it could be pointed out. The Chief of State and head of Government.

K: I am planning to firm it up on the trip back. I've seen it sounded him out and I think he's favorable.

H: Second, in connection with the telegram from Madrid

K: I was furious about that.

H: I can imagine.

K: Burchinal requested an appointment with me. I saw him for 10 minutes and said the P was interested in the bases. That's all I said.

H: Lest one be confused, I assume you don't want to correct the record by an official message. If we could say we've gotten your permission to...

K: The P would like a successful correction.

H: Everybody would like that.

K: But this isn't essential to our security. That would went

By KHC NARA, Dalo. 5/12/04

Telecon

1/7/70

page 2

further than I did. I didn't consider it a functional meeting. I thought Burchinal just informing me of his views. I didn't think he'd go telling it all over.

H: I would like to correct __________ impression, at your request.

K: I wish you would. I think that should be done. Otherwise it may leave the wrong impression.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Rogers

11:38 a. m., January 8, 1970

R said on the question of the announcement of our talks with the Chinese in Warsaw he has reservations about (1) whether it should be announced from the White House (as presently planned), and (2) whether the news could be held until January 9. He had thought (the last time) that the President didn't want to emphasize the significance of this -- it may not be significant. R said when it had been planned to announce it from the State Department, he wasn't even going to have his name tied directly to it. It would have been a routine State Department announcement. K said he had talked with the President about 15 minutes before. In response to a query from Rogers, K said the President thought announcing this from the White House would show some leadership. R said this is just the opposite from what State has done -- these are very minor preliminary talks.

K asked when the other side was going to make their announcement. R said it was left for each side to decide. State thought if this could be held until 6:00 p. m. today, we would be lucky -- it might leak. R said he thinks it is wrong to announce it from the White House. K said he tends to agree, and said he would go back to the President and appeal it. R read him the proposed announcement. K agreed if the whole thing blew up, the danger was too great having it as a WH announcement.

12:05 p. m., January 8, 1970

Kissinger to Rogers

K said he had just talked to the President and he agrees. The President had thought the announcement would be more formal. R said for obvious reasons, he is glad. The Chinese might not even show up at the meeting. K said he also thought it needlessly infuriates the Russians. He said he was glad R gave him a chance to appeal it. R said they have to get word from Warsaw, but he will try to do it at 6:00.

lds

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger
Senator Javits
1/8/70; 10:55 p.m.

J said he got a bad reaction from all the shots. J said he didn't want to come to Washington unless K thought it was vital. J said he had a suggestion -- he wanted to know if K could send his assistant up to see J. J said he would greatly appreciate it. K said the only trouble is that I am not sure my assistant has my point of view. J wanted to know what flexibility there was in getting there during the day. K said it was a bad day. J asked when he should call. K said call me about 10:00 a.m. if you can't make it -- maybe I can talk to you on the telephone. J said he was very anxious on having K's thoughts. J asked if they could play it by ear the first thing in the morning. K said okay and added if I send up my assistant he will tell you essentially what Sisco told you -- and what I have to say won't be that much different.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telcon

Elliot Richardson, Under SecState

8:35 a.m., 9 January 1970

K: I will be seeing you later on today and everything can wait except one thing. I have been disturbed about a number of stories I am told have come out of your building that I have been opposing these negotiations on the Mid East. There was one on the UPI ticker yesterday that State said I had opposed the Sisco-Dobrynin talks. That wasn't true. What we asked the Soviets be prepared to do to the Arabs would be what we were supposed to do to the Israelis. I have had my serious doubts about four-power talks, but I have conceptually no opposition to the Sisco-Dobrynin talks.

R: I don't know what the story is. I will see if I can run it down.

K: I wonder if the people who put it out could tie it down.

R: I will talk to Joe.

K: There was a concluding paragraph in a UPI story yesterday that I had opposed the meetings all along.

R: That was written by Hensley. I saw him later in the day and he told me he wrote it. I took the occasion to tell him that this was not true and told him that on the present policy of the US government there was no State-White House disagreement whatsoever. There were a number of questions under discussion on which there was no White House-State diversions as such.

K: That is exactly right.

R: I will talk to Joe. K: I don't think it is in such great shape -- our policy -- that State wants to take credit for it. I am in favor of US-Soviet talks on the Mid-East so long as we don't wind up having to make all the proposals. There is no disagreement on that between the three of us, and on the four-power talks I don't think there is any real disagreement.

R: The only possible disagreement might have been with Yost, but even on that I don't think Yost at this point is in any --

K: In any event I haven't tried on this one to be very aggressive about my views.

R: No, I know. I remember one or two conversations. I will see what we can do.

K: OK. I will see you at 6:00.

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Nancy Dickerson
1/9/70 2:25 p.m.

D: There have been comments that we can't withdraw all our combat troops before the end of the year. Is Vietnamization failing?

K: No, we're relaxed. We never said we'd withdraw before the end of the year.

D: I know, but having him (?) say this, there is some feeling Vietnamization isn't working on schedule?

K: No, we don't feel that at all.

D: Is Saigon trying to dictate withdrawal policy?

K: They have an interest, but there's no disagreement between us. We're not worried.

D: Is this a chance for the doves to say 'we told you so?'

K: They would be as ill-advised on this as they have been before. But I'm not going to tell them what to say. None of this is for attribution, right?

D: Right.

K: Nothing has changed. We're relaxed. We're on course, that's all.

D: This is not an embarrassment?

K: No.

D: Were you surprised?

K: Well, he doesn't clear his statements with us.

D: Would your life be easier if he didn't make comments like this?

K: Nancy I like you very much, but you can't make me make statements like this.

D: I like you too, but we're both at work, not at a dinner party. And I didn't quote you from *ABC* a dinner party and I'm not going to quote you now.

*

By KCL- NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon

U. Alexis Johnson

1/9/70 4:30 p. m.

J: We're having some rough sailing on textiles in Japan.

K: God Dammit, really?

J: Yes. I've never referred to the existence of that piece of paper.
Shimoda is getting back not . . . All was going according to script, but
it's falling off somewhat now.

K: When are you seeing him again?

J: I've just finished seeing him. Having a problem on how to handle
this. Some of the things I'm getting back . . . on the question of compre-
hensiveness and other details. What Sato is saying, he is saying to him
that there is no agreement. We are going to go as far as we can on com-
prehensiveness.

K: Wasn't there some formula?

J: I've given them a formula that doesn't contain the word "compre-
hensive" but has the substance.

K: It's my understanding that that's what they agreed to.

J: Yes, that's my understanding also. Are you satisfied as to the
authenticity of that piece of paper?

K: Yes. Do I have to do something?

J: Not yet.

K: Well, don't acknowledge a deadlock before you throw me in.

J: I won't. I have come back at them hard today. We'll see what
happens. I get back to you.

K: Good. I'm convinced it is authentic, and can get back to its
authenticator. He's been demonstrated to be reliable.

J: Good. I'll get back to you early next week.

K: Thank you.

By KCL- NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
C.D. Ward

1/9/70 4:52 p.m.

W: There's a gentelman in town by the name of Morris Thompson. He was formerly with State, he's been in Thailand for 10 years with IBEK (?). He is an exceptional person, has strong Republican leanings. I think it would be well worth your having someone on your staff talk to him and maybe with the idea of using him somehow on your staff some time.

K: How long will he be here?

W: Through next week.

K: We can get someone to talk with early next week. What's his field?

W: Economics. He went to IBEK, to a special school, to Harvard.

K: Let me get somebnt to talk to him.

W: I'll send you a memo.

K: Good. I think your boss is doing a great job.

W: I'll be talking to him; I'll tell him you said that.

K: Good. Give him my warm regards and tell him I think he's doing a great job.

W: He's one of your great fans. I remember when he was on Meet the Press, you said you thought he did a great job--he was elated.

K: That was at a time when it wasn't fashionable to defend our policy, and I thought he did a great job.

By KCLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Governor Dewey
1/9/70 5:00 p.m.

D: Lucius and I were comparing calendars for that day of reading in the White House. We think the best day is January 30, unless you think there is any reason to come sooner.

K: No, January 30 would fit in well.

D: It's convenient from your standpoint?

K: Yes. It would be good if after your reading I could be available to answer questions.

D: The only day I can do it without worrying about getting back for dinner commitment is the 30th.

K: Will you do it during the day?

D: Yes, and stay until we both are through.

K: Let's say the 30th. My schedule is always a little unpredictable this far ahead, but the day looks good now.

D: Find, and there's no reason for meeting sooner?

K: Not right now.

D: I promised Dean Acheson I'd call him &.

K: I believe Dean will be in Antigua

D: Then I'm off the hook.

K: Why don't we have lunch, the three of us?

D: ~~Dean wants to have lunch with his son.~~

K: Then the 2 of us.

D: Fine. I'll check with ~~Dean~~, but the 2 of us for sure.

K: Good.

D: How's everything with you.

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon

Dewey, 1/9/70, page 2

K: As good as can be. That's a meaningless remark, but I think we are getting on top of it. I think in Vietnam We are getting to a point where we might make it.

D: I have only recently, and with great reluctance been convinced that nothing but drastic and immediate action will stop us from an enormous inflation this year.

K: Well, both inflation and depression at the same time would be novel, but could happen.

D: That's right.

K: That's my nightmare.

D: I think talk with those people--not the nuts who insist on wage control. I think the country is ready for it. . . I know it's not in your area and I don't volunteer on things I'm not asked for.

K: You're right--you write it to me and I'll volunteer it for you.

D: No, I don't want to. They have the figures more than I do. But the wage situation is a monster that I think has conquered us.

K: Let me mention it to Ehrlichman--maybe he'll call you.

D: I don't know enough to be called. But I fear things may be slipping away from us.

K: He may want to talk to you. Well, I'll see you no later than the 30th, and on the 30th for lunch, whether we join us or not.

By: KML NARA, Dato

Telecon
Laird
1/9/70

K: No, we aren't gunning for DIA.

L: This was turned off in the Embassy. I will give you times and dates of notifications. I weth into this thoroughly. The Embassy and the Ambassador were notified.

K: That's what we suspected. Could you give me that? The P is greatly interested.

L: Yes. The next item: military assistance. We're going to have to contract tremendously. When I left the figure for 71 at 4 hundred, than they knocked off 50 million. Now at 350 -- we will have to cut off a lot of financial assistance.

K: This never came to me. I'd have gotten you the 4 hundred.

L: Well, it never came to my attention either. State agreed to it at the last minute. My problem: It affects what we're trying to do in Asia. We will have to be careful. I'd like to bring it up at a meeting.

K: Why don't you send out a memo for me to show the P.

L: People make commitments with Military Assistance funds and I can't have the money to pay for it. I've got to meet it in Korea and Spain, there are several things we can't get out of. I just want to alert you to that.

K: I could have helped you.

L: They didn't notify me.

K: Me either. All I remember is Mayo sneaking in and saying everybody agreed on 350X million. Do you have any objections?

L: They never brought it to my attention.

K: The bastards.

L: I'll have to live with it now. But now I've got to find places to save money.

K: I'm sorry. When he said everybody agreed I thought he meant you and State.

By KCLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Laird

1/9/70 5:20 p. m.

L: I have a couple of things. Do you have a minute?

K: Sure.

L: One is this balance of forces proposal to the Soviet Union to get that balanced force reduction proposition that Elliot Richardson approached Dobrynin on on December 30 and he said he did so on your proposal.

K: H didn't have any right to do that. He never cleared it here. We want to put it before NSC.

L: That's what I thought.

K: They were the orders of the P to put it before the NSC.

L: They wanted to send the memcon to NATO. I told my people to hold up on it. I didn't want the NATO people to see it.

K: I agree.

L: I'm glad; if you hadn't I was going to argue with you. Okay, fine the next item is Panama. I know you've had someone here looking around on it.

K: No I haven't. I've sent some questions over that the P wanted me to ask/

L: Well, someone was over here; I've got his name. He was talking with _________ on DIA.

K: I don't know who that could be.

L: There are some questions about the mission of that intelligence group. But they reported to the Ambassador--said he shouldn't tell the Prime Minister (President?) of Panama. These reports were given to our Ambassador.

K: He swears they weren't.

L: I can give you details and times. It was decided in the Embassy they wouldn't go to the President of Panama. There are a lot of things you can blame on DIA . . .

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

*

Telecon
Joe Alsop
1/9/70 p.m.

A: You gave a good time to Charlie Whitehouse I hear
from his wife.

K: I liked him; he's an impressive fellow.

A: I long to see you some time during the week.

K: Let me get my head above water; it would be during
the week some time.

A: I'll call you Monday when. When will I know for
sure if Miss Maginnes will be coming with you on the 17th.

K: Jesus Christ, my office drives me to tears. You
were to be told that she will be pleased to come to your home for dinner
on the 17th.

A: Well I think the confusion was at my end rather than
yours.

K: WIII I'm looking forward to it. It's always a joy to
see you and I'm doing it for that and out of respect for a great human
being. I think Dean Rusk needs all the demonstrations of respect he
can get.

By: KHC

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Joe Sisco
1/9/70 p.m.

S: There's something I want to send you. A package I just sent to the Secretary as to how I think we should proceed--how we hold the line about where we are. I would like to send you the whole package--though I want you to understand it hasn't been cleared anywhere. It includes an instruction for Charlie in which we say "not one inch."

K: That's the P's instruction to me.

S: Well, this is for the P's approval.

K: No, this is a Presidential instruction, no matter what you say.

S: Well, after you get this I want you to add something.

K: I'm dealing with a great bureaucrat I see.

S: A great bureaucrat who has seen something saying we are in great disagreement on the 2-power talks. I asked ______ where he was getting this stuff.

K: I've never been a great enthusiast for the 4-power talks.

S: Nor have I.

K: But I've had no problem with the 2-power talks.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon

Elliot Richardson

1/10/70; 10:00 a.m.

K: I am just checking to see where are all the senior people. Have you seen the cable from Shriver on Biafra?

R: I have just heard about it -- I haven't read it. I gather that the collapse is imminent.

K: Yes, they are asking for a joint appeal to U Thant so that the Biafran people aren't slaughtered. And they have asked the Cameroon to open their borders. Pompidou has sent an urgent appeal to open the Cameroonian border. Have offered aid to refugee camps. I know Bruno DeLuca and he is not an alarmist. He is basically a decent, thoughtful guy.

R: I think the problem on the face of it is how far publicly and in what manner publicly to -- how to put it so that it did not on its face imply --

XX (Missed portion of telcon because had to answer another phone)

K: He would be the first African head of state to have control over his army. We don't want to put it exactly in those words.

R: If he can't control his army __________ can't either. What do you think is the best way of handling this as a matter of communications. Ferguson was in London talking about the problems of relief assuming the collapse of Biafra and assuming that in order to provide this relief the cooperation and ultimate control on the part of the FNG is necessary and a good deal of work has been done on that side of it. I think probably we had better have him go to Paris; meanwhile we can of course at this end on the question of an appeal.

K: Yes, let Ferguson to Paris and appeal to U Thant stressing the humanitarian aspects and offering to do what can be done for relief and to ease suffering.

R: OK, we will get to work on it.

K: OK, should I tell that to the President that we are doing that?

R: Yes.

K: OK. We will be in touch.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Ambassador Sullivan
Mr. Kissinger
10:37am, 1-10-70

S said Henry I have two or three things - first is the paper we sent over on consultations with the Australians. K said that has been approved - I think on Wednesday - by the President. S said find. The second thing is I don't know whether Phil called you. He has two questions on his mind. In this ploy about restricted sessions and the question of frequency, he needs guidance as to how much the President wants to string it out. K said what is your thinking? S said I told Phil maybe four or five weeks. He (Phil) raised another question of whether Ellsworth is coming back and the two of them being here. K asked "is Ellsworth coming back?" S said not for good but to talk about for good. That is what he wants to talk about. K said I don't think there is a great urgency to discuss it now. The President is thinking in terms of June for Ellsworth. We will be delighted to see Phil at any time regardless. S said if he comes in at the end of the month it wouldprovide him context of the meetings and then when he goes back we can make a decision. I will tell him that.

K said I don't think we want to encourage Bunker to come back at this time. The President would like Bunker to stay at least through June. S said if we don't hear anything from him, I assume we will not push it.

S said, finally Henry, I wanted to mention the story on Korean atrocities. The line we are going to take is that there is not any unified command there and the matter should be referred to the Koreans and Vietnamese for comment. They are getting language together for Laird tomorrow - there were accusations that U.S. troops were involved. K said, can we see the language. Haig or I should see it. S said I will ask them to get in touch with you or Haig.

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By KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

TELCON
Under Secretary Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
11:40 a.m., 1-10-70

K said I just wanted to tell you. I have checked on this Schwartz matter and I think we ought to go ahead with our directive as it stands. R said OK, I talked to Alex in the meanwhile and our independent conclusion was to the same effect.

K said I think it is a help anyway to you if anything goes wrong with Schwartz. R said I am concerned with Schwartz's effectiveness. K said we have no intention of doing anything except with the one Turkish enterprise. R said do you have any idea what kind of a job Schwartz has been doing. K said no, but I could look into it. R said well, I would not make a production about it but it would be useful. K said tell me what has happened on this UN thing. R said following your call to me, I asked the people here to get together and review it and come to me with their recommendations. We are going to have a meeting at 2:00 p.m. - is that right - and Alex and I agreed that I would come with Bob Moore. By that time we will have a fairly clear picture and a set of recommendations. K said fine.

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*

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Elliot Richardson

1/10/70; 5:15 p.m.

K: Are you in your office?

R: No.

K: Just running my bed check. I just wanted you to know that the President has called Wilson and has just told him that what we are doing in a very general way. He said to him that we are contacting U Thant and we are readying various contingency plans and we are standing available to make helicopters available for relief and we hope the British will use their influence to provide assistance and to encourage relief, and then a lot of other stuff about two great powers working together.

R: Good. Did Wilson tell him anything we don't know already?

K: No. He said it was a very hopeful situation, is what Wilson said.

(Laughter) And also Wilson said don't deal with Pompidou on the subject. He doesn't have much influence on dissuasion. ________ has asked the Advisory Council fellow to sue for peace for him.

R: No, I don't see that. It looks like the end is near. Henry, I hope you can take a few hours of rest off now.

K: Well now that I know you are, I will stay here and call the President. One thing the President has done for purely cosmetic reasons is the helicopters on alert. How many are there?

R: About 10 or 12. We have a specific list of them in the Department and I am sure the Pentagon has too.

K: No, I just wanted to know roughly. I know my Admiral (Johnson) is inadequate. He is not one who would be called one of the Defense intellectuals.

R: He looks like a son of Hugh "Iron Pants" Johnson.

K: It would have been a great show for the Harvard Lampoon -- for weeks Johnson told me he was bringing two destroyers up into the Sea of Japan to leave for our air cover. And so weeks later I was at a WSEG meeting and told him I assumed the destroyers were still there.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telcon

Ehrlichman

1/10/70; 5:30 p.m.

E: Your friend Ross Perot is going to be on ISSUES AND ANSWERS tomorrow and then after that he is going by to talk to Averell Harriman.

K: Hasn't anybody got this guy under control?

E: What he wanted to know was if you had anything he should diplomatically probe.

K: No, he should just please get back to making money.

E: Have your General Haig call him, please.

K: Harriman will make mince meat out of him.

E: OK, so tell him to just go and play the dumb Texan.

K: What does he think he is up to?

E: He is in the big time.

K: Well, can't we put him into the big time?

E: We have tried, but it just wasn't big enough.

K: Well, OK, thanks.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Mr. T. Anthony K. Elliott (British Embassy)
Mr. Kissinger
5:30 p.m., 1-10-70

K said I was calling the Ambassador on a personal basis on behalf of the President. I don't want to throw lots of machinery in motion. The President may call the Prime Minister tomorrow about Nigeria. We have no specific proposal. He just wants to discuss the situation. E asked if he would be calling at any particular time. K said we have not set a time. The President wants to discuss the situation and what steps could be taken by both governments either separately or together. E asked again if K could give him any idea of the time. K said I am not 100% sure that he will do it. I would think it would be your afternoon between 4 and 10. It would be a personal communication. K said you should not discuss it with anyone but the Prime Minister.

Note: President Nixon called the British Prime Minister at approximately 6:15 p.m. EST.

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By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Ron Ziegler
Mr. Kissinger
1-10-70

K said Ron, on this business of Murrey Marder using quotes from the backgrounder. What is your thinking? Z said I mentioned this to Oberdorfer but Oberdorfer said I understand and I am sure Marder would understand why Henry would not want him to use quotes out of the backgrounder. K said I have come to that view also. Z said you might want to give him something for direct quotation. K said I have given him some other things. Z said once you begin to let Murrey Marder of the Post quote you directly you would have a problem. K said well, it is only about system and not substance. He is doing an article on the operation of the NSC system and all the quotes are related to that. Z said I would kill the substantive quote. K said there is no problem about that. Z said what I would do - I would let him quote you, i.e., rephrase it different than you did in the backgrounder. K said I will get Tony Lake to rephrase it and he will have it Monday. You see, the difficulty is to make me understand, Ziegler. K said that was a great quote the President made about me yesterday. It gives me great stature.

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