President Nixon wrote, "the delicacy and tact with which you have handled these
important exchanges."

b. <u>Hitchens</u> asserts that the U.S. should have used Romania's President Nicolae Ceausescu as its intermediary with China rather than President Yahya Khan, because (according to Hitchens) Yahya was "a blood-soaked... despot" and Ceausescu was not. Hitchens denounces Kissinger for using "authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes as channels for America's approaches to China.

**Fact:** Because the US and China lacked any diplomatic means of approaching each other, the cooperation of a third-party government which had normal diplomatic relations with both the US and China was required.

In addition, the intermediary would need to be capable of keeping
information about the US-China contacts from reaching the Soviet Union.
Soviet troops had recently exchanged fire with Chinese forces, and Moscow had
deployed over 40 divisions along the Chinese border. Should Moscow learn that
a new US-China relationship was taking shape, the already dangerous tensions
could worsen.

The US and China attempted to communicate through France, Norway, the Netherlands, and Poland. These channels did not flourish due to concerns about Soviet intelligence penetration. In the summer of 1969, President Nixon had approached the leaders of both Romania and Pakistan. China reacted coolly to the idea of a Romanian channel, perhaps fearing Soviet penetration of the Ceausescu government.

Pakistan appeared best placed for the third-party role because of its
geographic proximity to China and because it had no ties to the Soviet Union. In
November 1970, a Chinese message to President Nixon via President Yahya
Khan noted that this was the first communication "from a Head (Mao Zedong)
through a Head (Yahya Khan) to a Head (Richard Nixon). The United States
knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach
importance to the message." Thereafter, the US and China used Pakistan as their
intermediary, including during the arrangements for Nixon's 1972 trip to China.

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## 2. The US Position on the Pakistan Civil War

a. Hitchens further asserts that President Yahya Khan's role as the US-China intermediary “freed the Pakistani general of such restraints as might have inhibited him.” According to Hitchens, President Khan told his minister of information, G.W. Choudhury, that Khan's “private understanding with Washington and Beijing would protect him.” Hitchens claims that Choudhury later wrote, “If Nixon and Kissinger had not given him that false hope, he'd have been more realistic.” Hitchens then asserts that “the collusion” of the US with President Yahya Khan regarding the US-China opening “increases the direct complicity of Nixon and Kissinger in the massacres.”

**Fact:** G.W. Choudhury's statements were exactly the opposite of Hitchens' assertions. In the book that Hitchens cites, Choudhury actually states:

> "Nixon never condoned the Pakistan Army's action in East Bengal; indeed he put the strongest Nixon never condoned the Pakistan Army's action in East Bengal; indeed he put the strongest pressure on Yahya to make a political settlement of the crisis and to give up the path of repression and suppression.... [Yahya] showed me the contents of Nixon's letters to him, and I can say without fear of contradiction that Nixon did his best for a political solution of the crisis. Most probably the Nixon-sponsored efforts would have averted the Indo-Pakistani war on Bangladesh, which destroyed not only the economic infrastructure of Bangladesh but also its social fabric."⁵⁰

Choudhury elaborated in a subsequent volume:

> "[N]either the American government in general nor Richard Nixon in particular condoned Pakistan's military atrocities in East Bengal [or] opposed the aspirations of the Bengali nationalists. It was Nixon's intervention that saved the life of Mujib, whom the hawkish Pakistani generals, backed by Bhutto, were planning in August and September 1971 to execute; Bhutto told me in September that Yahya should execute Mujib before departing the following month for Tehran, where President Nixon would also be in attendance at the two thousandth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. Yahya withstood the severe pressure to do away with the Awami League leader only because of Nixon's strong pleas to refrain from such a course. Similarly, President Nixon pressed Yahya to make a political settlement with the Awami League leaders exiled in India, and Yahya agreed. It is not certain that even if all parties had fully cooperated Nixon's efforts for a political settlement would have been successful, but those who know the inside story, as I do as a result of my private visit to

⁵⁰ Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, pp 219-220.

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[the Pakistani Military's General Headquarters at] Rawalpindi in September 1971, realize that the Nixon administration was doing its best both to avert Indo-Pakistani war and to achieve in the shortest possible time the goal of the Bengali nationalists.⁵¹

b. *Hitchens* asserts that on March 6, 1971 Kissinger convened a National Security Council meeting “and – in advance of the crisis in East-West Pakistan relations that was then palpable and predictable to those attending – insisted that no preemptive action be taken” and opposed those present who suggested that a warning to Yahya Khan be issued.

*Fact:* The meeting in question was of the Interdepartmental Senior Review Group, convened by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. The consensus was that the US should not become involved in the Pakistan civil war and political crisis. Kissinger was present, and asked whether the US might “as a friend” tell President Yahya Khan that “the use of force would be unwise.” The response in the meeting to this suggestion was negative.

c. *Hitchens* asserts that Kissinger tried “to divide the electorally victorious Awami League and to dilute its demand for independence.” Hitchens claims that as a “favor” to President Yahya Khan, Kissinger authorized a covert approach to the leader of a minority faction of the Awami League who were willing to compromise on the issue of Bengali statehood. Hitchens refers to a meeting on August 11, 1971 at the White House at which Under Secretary of State John Irwin reported on the possibility that some Awami League leaders wanted to negotiate with Yahya Khan about giving up their goal of independence. According to Hitchens, this demonstrates that Kissinger made a “clumsy approach” to “circumvent” the leadership of the Awami League.

*Fact:* After Islamabad's crack-down on the Awami League, the acting Foreign Minister of the Bangladesh government-in-exile sent a message to the US

⁵¹ Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent*.

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requesting American help in arranging an agreement under which formal
independence for Bangladesh would be given up in return for a prisoner release
and Islamabad's acceptance of an Awami League plan for self-rule in East
Pakistan. Undersecretary Irwin reported this approach to the August 11, 1971
meeting of the Interdepartmental Senior Review Group. Irwin raised the
question of whether the American Ambassador to Pakistan might "just suggest"
to President Yahya Khan that, "if the Awami League is serious about
withdrawing its claim to independence, Yahya might consider talking with them."
Kissinger argued against Under Secretary Irwin's proposal, stating that to ask
Yahya Khan to deal with the Awami League would be "like asking Abraham
Lincoln to deal with Jefferson Davis." President Nixon did authorize the
American Ambassador to make such a suggestion to President Khan, whose
reaction was "surprisingly favorable."⁵² The initiative soon collapsed, however.
India placed the Awami League representatives under house arrest and warned
against any further contact with the US government. Within weeks, India and
Pakistan were at war.

3. The India-Pakistan War and the wider global crisis

a. Hitchens asserts that after returning from China in July 1971, Kissinger "began to speak in almost Maoist phrases about a Soviet-Indian plot to dismember and even annex part of Pakistan, which would compel China to intervene on Pakistan's side." Hitchens derides this "bizarre prediction" as evidence of Kissinger's alleged "fantasy of confrontation."

**Fact:** Since the mid-1960s the Soviet Union had been India's major military supplier. Now, in the summer of 1971, it assured India that Soviet arms shipments would continue in the event of an India-Pakistan war. This was provocative, as Pakistan was already barred from receiving further American military aid. Moscow further assured India that if an Indian attack on East Pakistan triggered Chinese intervention, the Soviets would launch a diversionary strike against China on its northwest border. Moscow also promised to use its

⁵² Kissinger, *White House Years*, p 870.

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veto in the UN Security Council should India be condemned for aggression
against Pakistan. The Soviet Union and India codified these assurances in their
August 9, 1971 "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." At this point, the
possibility that India might seek to annex part of Pakistan could not be
discounted.

b. <u>Hitchens</u> asserts that "in pursuit of this fantasy of confrontation, [Kissinger] annoyed Admiral Elmo Zumwalt by ordering him to dispatch the aircraft carrier USS <u>Enterprise</u> from the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal, while giving it no stated mission."

**Fact:** In the autumn of 1971 high Soviet officials visited New Delhi and an airlift of Soviet military equipment for India began. On November 22, India's military launched a major attack on Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, inflicting a swift defeat. Soviet warships were now in the Bay of Bengal and appeared to be assisting India's military operations. At this point the US sought to deter India from attacking West Pakistan. President Nixon ordered a US Navy carrier task force to the Bay Bengal. The USS *Enterprise's* formal mission was to evacuate American citizens from the war zone, but its presence was also a signal to Moscow and New Delhi that the US would not permit the total destruction of Pakistan as a state. On December 16, 1971 India offered an unconditional ceasefire in West Pakistan. On that same day Bangladesh became an independent state.

4. <u>American policy toward Bangladesh</u>

a. <u>Hitchens</u> asserts that later, as Secretary of State, Kissinger displayed "unremitting hostility and contempt" toward Bangladesh and, in 1974 "inflicted a series of snubs on [Sheik Mujibur Rahman], then on his first visit to the United States as a head of state." Hitchens claims that Kissinger "boycotted" Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman's meeting with President Gerald Ford and opposed his requests for food aid and debt relief.

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