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CHAPTER VII

Alliances and the Uncommitted

Nowhere are the dilemmas of the nuclear age more apparent than in the
attempt to construct a system of collective security against Soviet aggression.

It reveals once more all the inconsistencies between a policy of deterrence
and the strategy we are prepared to implement, between the temptation to
pose a maximum threat and the tendency to recoil before it. And they are
compounded by the greater vulnerability of our allies and the sense of impo-
tence produced by being (because our allies are) either junior partners in the atomic race or excluded
from it altogether. Moreover, we have never been clear about the strategy
behind our alliance policy, whether we meant to defend our allies against
invasion or whether we relied on an over-all strategy superiority vis-a-vis
the Soviet bloc to defeat aggression. To us this choice may represent a
strategic option, to our allies it is a question of national survival, for a
Soviet occupation would mean the collapse of their social structure. "I am
all for surviving" said Lord Winston at the House of Lords debate regarding
the British Statement of Defense for 1956 "and the fact that we may be
avenged has very little interest for me." ¹)

1. Hansard, House of Lords, March 21, 1956.

312

As a result, our policy of coalitions has suffered from the same difficulty as our strategic doctrine: in the absence of clarity about the kind of war we proposed to fight our alliances tended to inhibit the freedom of maneuver of all members. In every concrete instance from Korea to Suez the consequences of military action seemed to outweigh the goals to be achieved. There has been about our concept of alliances the same abstractness as about our concept of power; indeed, it was its reverse side. As in our strategic doctrine, we purchased destructiveness at the expense of the will to employ it, so in our system of alliances we have sometimes acted as if the existence of an alliance and not the resolution behind it were the guarantee of security. It is precisely this resolution, however, which is being sapped by the fact that our allies face a dual dilemma; they are in danger of losing their social substance either by the devastation of all-out thermo-nuclear war or by the ravages of Soviet occupation. They demand of an alliance therefore that it protect them against these contingencies or at least that it reduce the likelihood of this occurrence. And their ability to assess the meaning of the technology in relation to their fears is inhibited by a large measure of ignorance about nuclear matters - the product in part of our Atomic Energy Act - with the result that the strategic revolution of the past decade poses an even greater challenge to understanding among most of our allies than in the United States.

In the past, coalitions have generally been held together by a combination of three motivations: (1) to discourage aggression by assembling superior

313

power and to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces—this in effect
is the doctrine of collective security; (2) to provide an obligation for
assistance. Were the national interest unambiguous and unchangeable, each
power would know its obligations and the alignment of its potential opponents
without any formal part. But the national interest fluctuates within limits;
it must be adapted to changing circumstances. An alliance is a form of in-
surance against contingencies, an additional weight when considering whether
to go to war. (3) To legitimize the assistance of foreign troops or inter-
vention in a foreign country.

An alliance is effective, however, only to the extent that its power
appears formidable and its purpose unambiguous. They mere assembling of
overwhelming strength is meaningless if it cannot be brought to bear on the
issues actually in dispute. The strongest purpose will prove ineffective if
it cannot find a military expression in terms of an agreed strategic doctrine.

war
Thus the French system of alliances in the interwar period broke down when
put to the test because its political purpose and the military doctrine on
which it was based were inconsistent with each other. The political basis

To assure
of the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of
Central and Eastern Europe. This implied an offensive strategy on the part
Militarily, this implied an offensive strategy on the part
The only means for their independence resided

Central and Eastern Europe. The only means for their independence reached

by the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of
the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of
the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of
the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of
the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of

which it was based were inconsistent with him other. The political
 purposes each

but to the extent because its political purposes and the military doctrine on
which it was based were inconsistent with him other. The political
 purposes each

Alliance actually in dispute. The strongest purpose will have to be collective

overwhelming strength if it cannot be brought to bear on the

absence considerable and its purpose ambitious. They were attempting of

in a foreign country.

assistance against contingencies, an additional weight when considering whether

it must be adapted to changing circumstances. Unalliance is a form of in-

without any formal pact. But the national interest fluctuates within limits;

power would know its obligations and the assignment of its potential opponents

assistance. Were the national interest ambitious and unchanging, each

is the doctrine of collective security (5) to provide an obligation for

power and to leave no doubt about the assignment of forces—this in effect

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314

of France because only by forcing its in an offensive strategy which would force Germany into a two-front war in pressure on the Central European powers be eased. But with the building of the Maginot line the condition of military cooperation between France and her allies disappeared. For when France adopted the strategic defensive, Germany was enabled to defeat her opponents in detail. In every crisis both France and her allies were torn between their political commitments and military realities; and France's allies were forced to choose between suicidal resistance or surrender.

In the event, whatever course they chose—whether surrender as Czechoslovakia or resistance as Poland—proved equally disastrous. The French system of alliances, so imposing on paper, could not survive any of the tests for which it was designed. It did not discourage aggression because it could not in fact assemble superior power and in time its calls for assistance went unheeded because a legal obligation by itself will not impel common action if the requirements of kmx national survival seem to counsel a different course.

In short, it is not the fact of alliance which deters aggression, but the application it can be given in any concrete case.

Since then, end of World War II, the United States has created a vast which includes forty-four sovereign states. and complicated system of alliances. We have multilateral pacts in the

315

Western Hemisphere expressed in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; we have joined the North Atlantic Treaty, another multilateral instrument for the defense of Western Europe. We were instrumental in negotiating the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty which unites us with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom in a much loser defense arrangement. Then there is the ANZUS pact signed by us together with New Zealand and Australia. Finally we have entered into bilateral defense treaties with Japan, Nationalist China, South Korea and the Philippines. Moreover, we are indirectly connected with the Baghdad pact which unites two of our allies in NATO, Britain and Turkey and one of our partners in SEATO, Pakistan together with Iraq.

The chief purpose of this intricate structure is to surround the Soviet periphery with a system of alliances so that an attack on any part of it will always confront an aggressor with an alignment of powers which would make him hesitate. A world wide system of collective security is extremely difficult to implement, however. For if we examine the alliances on which U.S. policy is based in terms of the three criteria outlined above we find that either they do not share a common purpose or they add little to our effective strength,

they do not share a common purpose or they add little to our effective strength, if based in terms of the three criteria outlined above we find that either to implement, however, for it we examine the alliances on which U.S. policy heifies. A world wide system of collective security is extremely difficult

always confront an aggressor with an alignment of powers which would make him辨识with a system of alliances so that an attack on any part of it will The chief purpose of this intricate structure is to annound the Soviet

Pakistan accommodation with Iran.

two of our allies in NATO, Britain and Turkey and one of our partners in SEATO. Moreover, we are indirectly connected with the Baghdad pact which constitutes defense treaties with Japan, Nationalist China, South Korea and the Philippines.

together with New Zealand and Australia. Finally we have entered into pite of a much looser defense arrangement. Then there is the UNSCOM pact signed by us New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom in ratifying the Southeast Asia Defense Treaty which unites us with Australia, France, instrument for the defense of Western Europe. We were instrumental in negotiating; we have earned the North Atlantic Treaty, another multilateral Western Hemisphere expressed in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal

372

316

or both. To us the Soviet threat overshadows all else; but Pakistan
is more concerned with India than with the U.S.S.R. and China; Iraq
entered the Bagdad pact primarily for the military advantage it confered
over Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And in neither SEATO nor the Bagdad pact
are we associated with partners with whom we share the degree of common
purpose conferred by the cultural heritage which unites us with our
European allies. In such circumstances a system of collective security
leads in fact to a dilution of purposes and to an air of unreality in
which the existence of an alliance and not the resolution behind it is
considered a guarantee of security.

These problems are magnified, moreover, by the tendency of our
strategic doctrine to transform every war into an all-out war. For
while it is true that all our security arrangements are regional in
nature, they are given a world-wide application by our increasing ina-
bility both doctrinally and technically to fight any war except total
war. Thus the outbreak of any war anywhere becomes of immediate concern
to all our allies and causes them in every crisis to exert pressure

for a policy of minimyth risk. Nor will these pressures be avoided by
declarations that the United States reserves the right of unilateral
action such as Secretary Dulles' statement to the NATO council in
December 1956. As long as our military doctrine threatens to trans-
form every war into an all-out war, it becomes of inevitable concern to
our allies, whether by right or by self-interest and they will do their
best to prevent any action on our part that threatens to involve them.

Moreover our attitude with respect to collective action has been
highly ambiguous. During the United Nations debate on the Middle East
and on many other occasions previously, we have given the impression
that unless all allies (and sometimes even all Powers) resist any
aggression anywhere jointly no common action was possible

aggression anywhere jointly no common action was possible
that unless all allies (and sometimes even all Powers) resist any
and on many other occasions previously, we have given the impression
highly ambiguous. During the United Nations debate on the Middle East
Moreover our attitude with respect to collective action has been
peac to prevent <u>any action</u> on our part that threatens to involve them.
our allies, whether by right or by self-interest and they will do their
form every war into an all-out war, it becomes of inevitable concern to
December 1926. As long as our military doctrine threatens to trans-
action such as Secretary Dulles' statement to the NATO council in
declarations that the United States reserves the right of unilateral
for a policy of minimum risk. Nor will these pressures be avoided by

at all: "Power which is shared among a group of sovereign nations" said Secretary Dulles "cannot be used effectively unless the participating countries are in accord. Such accord would be totally unattainable except for collective self-defense. Because collective security responds to the needs and highest aspirations of mankind, it has been invoked by many nations. The United States which in 1914 and again in 1939 sought safety in neutrality has now learned by hard experience that security lies in collective action...So, the United States is today a party to mutual security treaties which bind us collectively with the defense of no less than forty-four countries. We are proud to have these multiple ties of trust and confidence."

A world-wide system of collective security is extremely difficult to implement, however. The acid test of an alliance is its ability to achieve agreement on two related problems: whether a given challenge in fact represents aggression and what form resistance should take assuming the answer to the first question to be in the affirmative. But differences in geographic position, history, power and domestic structure almost ensure that a consensus is almost impossible to attain except against a threat so overpowering that

1. June 24, 1955.

1.

318

it obliterates all differences both about its nature or about the strategy for dealing with it. Against any other danger united action is almost inevitably reduced to the lowest common denominator, for the essence of sovereignty is that Powers have or at least may have different conceptions of their interest and therefore also about what constitutes a threat. A North Vietnamese troop movement may be a mortal danger to Laos; but it can be of only marginal interest to Tunisia. A domestic upheaval in Syria may disquiet Turkey; it will seem much less dangerous to Portugal.

Against an aggressor skilled in presenting ambiguous challenges, the ambiguity of which resides precisely in their being presented either as the expression of limited aims or the result of a "legitimate" grievance, there will occur endless wrangling over whether a specific challenge in fact constitutes aggression and about the measures to deal with it even should it be considered a threat. For at least some

deal with it even should it be considered a threat. For at least some
challenge in fact constitutes aggression and about the measures to
siftle, there will occur endless wrangling over whether a specific
either as the expression of limited aims or the result of a "legitimate
challenges," whose ambiguity resides precisely in their being presented
against an aggressor skilled in presenting amorphous kiang

to Portugal.

unheaval in Syria may disquiet Turkey; it will seem much less dangerous

Laos; but it can be of only marginal interest to Laosias. A domestic
a threat. A North Vietnamese troop movement may be a mortal danger to
conceptions of their interest and therefore also about what constitutes
essence of sovereignty is that powers have or at least may have different
almost inevitably reduced to the lowest common denominator, for the
strategy for dealing with it. Against any other danger united action is
it оплитерее all differences both about its nature or about the

318

318a

of the powers interested in peace and the status quo will not believe
in the reality of a global threat until the aggressor has "demonstrated"
he is intent on world domination and he will not have demonstrated
it until the balance of power is already overturned.

As long as the challenge is not overwhelming, it may^ actually be
aided by a world-wide system of collective security. It is the essence
of an intermediary threat that it affects the interests of various
Powers differently -- therein indeed resides its ambiguity. No state can
negotiate about its survival -- this is the / limiting condition of dip-
lomacy. mBy the same token no state can expect another to run the same
risks for its vital interests as itself. To be sure, all states have
a symbolic interest in every dispute: not to permit the elaboration of
a set of rules which when applied to them might work to their disad-
vantage. They are therefore interested in elaborating a concept of
aggression which they may invoke for their own protection. But the

318c

the only consensus attainable. Even where there is agreement on the
symbolic aspect of collective security, on the nature of aggression er
on what constitutes a just claim, it will still be exceedingly difficult
to achieve a common stand on the consequences that should fadow from
this agreement. The difference in effectiveness between the United
Nations in Egypt and in Hungary illustrates this point. In both cases
the United Nations, which is the most inclusive organ of collective
security, expressed its disapproval. This symbolic act was effective
towards Britain and France primarily because it involved no assumption
of substantive risk. It worked because Britain and France recoiled
before the fact and not the consequences of united world opinion. By
contrast, United Nations resolutions proved ineffective in bringing
about the evacuation of Hungary or the unification of Korea. For in
these cases the majority which was willing to go on record to
to state its views on the merits of the case was not ready to assumes
risks to make this view prevail. This gap between the symbolic

318d

and the substantive aspect of collective security may therefore actually demoralize resistance. The statesman of a threatened country trying to decide whether to resist aggression will not be reassured by the fact that an attack on his state may be condemned. Unless he can be assured of more tangible guarantees, he may make the best terms he can.

Thus a world wide system of collective security in its quest for assembling maximum power, brings about a threshold below which common action is impossible and unilateral action is inhibited by the very doctrine of collective security. As with our military doctrine, the greater the force assembled the less the willingness to use it and the smaller its credibility. It leads to an inconsistency between the first and second purposes which have historically animated coalitions: between the attempt to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces and providing an added incentive for common action. For in every crisis the very magnitude and complexity of a world-wide system of alliances will supply a powerful incentive for inaction. It is

318e

not that the value of common action will be denied; it is simply that
many actions will not seem to warrant calling into action the machinery
of collective security or of drawing drastic consequences once it has
been set into motion.

been set into motion.

of collective security or of drawing drastic consequences once it has
many actions will not seem to warrant calling into action the machinery
not that the value of common action will be denied; it is simply that

3186

319

To insist on a world wide system of collective security may therefore
have the paradoxical result of paralyzing the Power or Powers capable
of resisting alone. The theoretical gain in strength is more than
outweighed by the dilution of a common purpose. At the same time, in
every crisis short of an overriding attack a world wide system of
collective security given a veto to the ally with least interest in the
issue at dispute and often with least power to make his views prevail.

From Korea to the Chinese off-shore islands through Indochina to Suez
some powerful members of our system of coalitions have found that the
alliance did not fit the particular contingency actually under dispute
or took positions which made unity attainable only by foregoing any risks.

And the result of each loss of position was a heightened determination
to "strengthen" the alliance, to seek to compensate for a loss of position
by escaping into a formal unity. Thus Korea led to the Anzus pact,
Indochina to SEATO, the Soviet incursion into the Middle East to the
Bagdad pact and the Suez crisis to an effort to tighten the bonds of NATO,

320

The fact that the alliance has seemed to inhibit the action of the powers with most at stake in a given dispute has caused it to become a whipping boy in all countries. If governments have acted outside the sphere of their primary interest, it has undermined their domestic support and if they did not it has strained the alliance. A vacuum has thereby been created in which governments see in the existence of a formal unity a substitute for common action or **unanimous** blame the alliance for failure to do what they never had any intention of doing in the first place. Thus Secretary Dulles implied that only lack of British support prevented our intervention in Indochina and the British Cabinet has given the impression that American vacillation was responsible for the failure of its policy in the Middle East.

II

The prerequisite for an effective system of alliances then is to get clear what purpose we wish coalitions to serve. We have given three basic answers: The first is a variation of our doctrine of deterrence; it asserts that aggression is deterred by assembling overwhelming **gunfire**

it asserts that aggression is deterred by assuming overwhelming force
basic answer: The first is a variation of our doctrine of deterrence;
clear what purpose we wish coalitions to serve. We have given three

The prerogative for an effective system of alliances then is to get
the failure of its policy in the Middle East.

has given the impression that American vacillation was reasonable for
support prevented our intervention in Indochina and the British Cabinet
first place. The Secretary Dulles implied that only lack of British
for failure to do what they never had any intention of doing in the
formal unity a substitute for common action or framework plane the alliance
thereby been created in which Governments see in the existence of a
subport and it they did not it has strained the alliance. A vacuum has
sphere of their primary interest, it has undermined their domestic
whipping boy in all countries. If Governments have acted outside the
powers with most at stake in a given dispute has caused it to become a

321

objective to protect the nation and to safeguard the future of its people...
The conviction grew that the best way to protect the security of our nation
and of our people was to prevent war and that the way to go about it was
through an *international* system of collective security. We have been building
our strength together with our allies."

The second argument asserts that we have a strategic interest in denying the peripheral areas of Eurasia and particularly Western Europe to the Soviet bloc because the accretion of strength represented by its industrial resources and trained manpower might tip the balance against us: "We estimate" said General Bradley "that the manpower of the countries of Western Europe is over 300 million. Their industrial capacity is very substantial and if that were added to that which Russia already has, it would make them even more formidable and increase their chances..." "If we should ever lose our allies completely and be confined to the Western Hemisphere, we would have an entirely different situation and different standards of living than we have at the present time."

The final reason advanced for our system of alliances has been in terms

2. ☑. Korean Hearings, p. 1715.

3. ☑. *Ibid.*, p. 883.

4. ☑. *Ibid.*, p. 745.

A. B. IPIG, b. 4/72

B. A. IPIG, b. 883.

C. B. Korean Herrings, b. 1/1/2.

The final reason advanced for our system of alliances has been in terms
have at the present time."

an entirely different situation and different standards of living than we
affiliates completely and be confined to the Western Hemisphere, we would have
comparable and increase their chances..."

The second argument is that we have a strategic interest in denying the
our strength together with our allies."

through an international system of collective security. We have been building
and of our people was to prevent war and that the way to go apart it was
The conviction grew that the best way to protect the security of our nation
objective to protect the nation and to safeguard the future of its people...

351

322

of the airbases they afford us. Our system of overseas bases is said to add to our deterrent because it complicates the Soviet defensive problem and because it represents a guarantee of swift and deadly retaliation: "In raising that feeling of freedom" said General Vandenberg "from that threat which they felt was hanging over their head went the freedom of allowing themselves the luxury of giving us air bases..."

5

The difficulty with these arguments is not that they are invalid but that they are partially inconsistent. At best they explain our interest in the system of allinances, they do not supply an inventive for allied assistance to us. In fact, our theory of deterrence tends to erode the psychological basis for collective action. For the only ally which represents a significant accretion to our strength in an all out war is Great Britain because alone of our allies it possesses nuclear weapons and a small

5. *Ibid.*, p. 1481.

P. <u>Ibid</u'. b. 1481.

unclear weapons and a small

all out war is Great Britain because alone of our allies it possesses
ally which represents a significant accretion to our strength in an
erode the bayological basis for collective action. For the only
alied assistance to us. In fact, our theory of deterrence tends to
interest in the system of alliances, they do not supply an inventive for
but that they are partially inconsistent. At least they explain our

The difficulty with these arguments is not that they are invalid
freedom of allowing themselves the luxury of giving us air passes..."

"from that threat which they felt was hanging over their head went the
talation: "In raising that feeling of freedom," said General Wandenberg
problem and because it represents a guarantee of swift and deadly re-
to add to our deterrent because it complicates the Soviet defensive

of the airpasses they afford us. Our system of overseas passes is said

355

323

strategic air force for delivering them. If deterrence is achieved by maximum retaliatory power most of our allies are dispiritable in a military sense and from the point of view of the equation for all-out war any attempt to strengthen them must represent a diversion of resources. This, indeed, is a belief held by many Air Force officers both in the United States and Great Britain.

To assure, we require bases in some countries both for our retaliatory force and to obtain early warning. But the location of our Strategic Air Force bases at the periphery of Eurasia, in Spain, in Morocco and in Saudi Arabia makes clear that from the point of view of all-out air-war we do not require allied support in the areas immediately contiguous to the Soviet periphery.

### Conviction

This is reflected in our military posture for nowhere around the Soviet periphery are there sufficient forces to resist a Soviet attack on the ground. The security of these areas against Soviet aggression is therefore achieved, if at all, by the over-all strategic balance between us and the Soviet bloc. (Such a strategy, however, removes any incentive for allied support.)

Our allies realize that in an all-out war they will add to our effective only strength or by serving as bases) by supplying facilities; they see no significance in us a military contribution of their own. A reliance on all-out war as the chief deterrent will sap our system of alliances in two ways then: either our Allies will feel that any

324

military effort on their part is unnecessary or they may be led to the conviction
that peace is preferable to war even on terms almost akin to surrender. "For
the Allied staffs, the twelve German divisions are less important than the
airfields and especially the radar stations in West Germany" wrote a leading
German newspaper. "This means nothing less than that our fate ... is dependent
on the calculations of the Allied staffs...If in a few years the General Staffs
should arrive at the conclusion that they no longer need the West German space
they may be ready to give it up."

Our attempt to take account of this feeling has led to a further
strategic distortion. It has caused us and Great Britain to build up forces
in Western Europe too small to resist an all-out attack and too large for
police actions, the feasibility of which in Western Europe, moreover, our strategic
doctrine explicitly rejects. Thus Great Britain has four of its
divisions in Germany and the United States five of its combat ready fourteen.
It is difficult to relate so heavy an investment in resources to an all-out
strategy, although various rationalizations have been attempted. It is said
for example, that one reason for stationing nearly half of the strategic

7. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 23, 1955.

6.

XEMENE reserve of the Western Alliance so close to the sources of Soviet strength is to prevent a Soviet attack with the garrison troops in Eastern Germany which vary between 25 and 30 divisions. A Soviet offensive against our present strength in Western Europe would require substantial reinforcements and this in turn would enable us to undertake diplomatic steps to avert the conflict or to give the most unambiguous warning to the U.S.S.R. divisions seem a heavy price to pay for an opportunity to repeat a threat that we have made repeatedly and presumably ineffectually if the U.S.S.R. is reinforcing for an attack.

Another argument which seeks to reconcile the commitment of such forces large forces in Western Europe with an all-out strategy asserts that NATO forces are not designed to defeat a Soviet attack but to hold a line long enough for the strategic bombardment of the U.S.S.R. to take effect. "We will still need troops on the ground" said the British White Paper on Defense of 1955 "to hold the enemy well to the East in Europe in the vital initial stages of a war. This would give time for the effects of our strategic air offensive to make itself felt."

78. See Chester Wilmot. "If NATO Had to Fight," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32, p. 203.

79. Statement on Defense, 1955, p. 8. See also a statement by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Viscount Haldane, "The nuclear weapon and the air forces which are the present means of delivering it...must be supplemented...by the ability of the forces of NATO to hold the line until the nuclear counteroffensive has broken the force of the enemy assault." Hansard (house of Lords), March 21, 1956. See also British Statement on Defense, 1956, p. 4.

326

would take place and the devastation if would cause it is difficult to
imagine concurrent land warfare of major proportions or to assign any strategic
significance to it should it take place. After a thermo-nuclear exchange
both sides are almost certain to be so exhausted that a major land-battle could
hardly be sustained. Conversely if the nuclear counter-offensive should succeed
in defeating the aggressor--in whatever meaning one may attack to defeat--
the ground forces which might be in the field would be strategically insignificant.

Another

a third argument maintains that the troops in position around the Soviet
periphery in Western Europe do not have any strategic significance by them-
selves. Their function is to serve as a token of our determination, as a trip
wire or a plate glass window the smashing of which would unleash all-out
thermo-nuclear retaliation. In many respects this is a most remarkable
argument though it has rarely been challenged. For it says nothing less than
that our repeated assertions that we would defend Western Europe by all-out
war will not be believed unless we demonstrate our determination by a screen
determination than the most solemnly repeated declarations,
of token forces. This is in itself a symptom of the low credibility of a
threat of all-out war even for the defense of Europe. We hardly have to
station ground troops in Maine or in Nova Scotia to make clear our determination
to the
NO. Sir John Slessor. Strategy for West, p.

8.

to resist an attack on the Western Hemisphere: it should be possible to
devise less elaborate means for showing our resolution to fight an all-out
war than the stationing of one third of our strategic reserve in an area where

Totally
they are both vulnerable and which they are not expected to be able to hold.

The creation of a plate glass window to unleash our strategic Air Command
Nor is it a particular incentive to our allies to make a military contribution

The very choice The term indicates that it may
of their own. It is the nature of plate glass windows to be shattered and
eventual victory will be small consolation to allies which have
the major concern of our allies is not victory in the last battle but in the
meanwhile suffered catastrophe.

first.

Moreover, it can be argued that the stationing of such large ground
forces in Western Europe is inconsistent with the "trip wire" theory. If
we rely on the deterrent effect of the threat of all-out war, the existence of
substantial ground forces in Western Europe may produce a Soviet miscalculation
which brings on an unnecessary total war. For the U.S.S.R. may interpret our
build-up as a determination to fight local actions while we may treat a Soviet
attack as the prelude to all-out war. A very thin screen of forces would
represent a more effective token of our determination to defend Europe by
all-out war for it would leave no doubt about our strategic options.

The above is not intended as an argument against attempting a local
defense of Europe. It is simply to indicate the inconsistency of our strategic

doctrines

to resist an attack on the Western Hemisphere. We have never been able to decide how to protect threatened areas: whether to defend them on the ground or whether to treat an attack on them as the cause of war. The former strategy would involve resisting aggression wherever it occurred or at least in areas we wished to deny to the Soviets. The second strategy would treat aggression as a cause of war, but it would involve no commitment about the area where we proposed to fight--it is in effect the doctrine of massive retaliation "at places of our own choosing." Because massive retaliation offers no protection against Soviet occupation, it is not really consistent with a policy of alliances for it removes any incentive for allied assistance. Our allies are not interested in furnishing a trip wire or in being liberated. Our strategic on the other hand, doctrine, however, with its emphasis on posing the maximum threat has never felt comfortable with a doctrine of local defense particularly in Europe.

The result has been a compromise which has sought to combine two incompatible courses of action: we have built up a force in Western Europe to reassure the Europeans and to serve as a warning against Soviet incursions. Our establishment in Europe is redundant in an all-out war, however, and insufficient for local defence. Because our European allies have seen no significance in a military contribution to an all-out strategy, they have made just enough of

widely contribution to an eff-ont strategy, they have made just enough of
local defence. Because our European allies have seen no significance in a

ment in Europe, it is redundant in an eff-out war, power, and insufficient for
enrichment

Europeans and to serve as a nucleus against Soviet innovations. Our effort-
comsue of action: (We have built up a force in Western Europe to resistance in order to learning our NATO rules.)

The result has been a compromise which was sought to combine two incompatible
left comfortable with a doctrine of local defense partially in Europe.

doctrine, however, with its emphasis on beating the maximum threat has never
not interested in furnishing a trip wire or in being fibered. Our strategic
affronts for it removes any incentive for allied assistance. Our efforts are
against Soviet occupation, it is not really consistent with a policy of

"at prices of our own choosing." Because massive retaliation offers no projection
we proposed to fight--it is in effect the doctrine of massive retaliation
as a cause of war, but it would involve no commitment about the area where
we wished to deny to the Soviets. The second strategy would treat aggression
would involve relating aggression wherever it occurred at least in areas
where to treat an attack on the Western Hemispheres we have never been able to

to react to an attack on the Western Hemispheres we have never been able to

a defense effort to induce us to keep our forces on the Continent but not enough of one to constitute an effective barrier to Soviet aggression. The result of all these half-measures and mutual pretenses has been the stationary stationing of substantial ground-forces in the one area where our strategic doctrine explicitly rejects the possibility of local war. While in the peripheral areas of Asia and the Middle East where the possibility of local war is admitted we possess neither local forces nor a capability to get them into position quickly.

The implications of the growing Soviet nuclear capability would seem to impose a measure of harmony, however, between the interest of the United States on over-all strategy and the concern of our allies with local defense. For the end of our invulnerability has altered our strategic options: until the development of the Soviet Long Range Air Force and thermo-nuclear stockpile we had a real choice between a strategy of massive retaliation and a strategy of local defense. The only inhibition to our action was then produced by the range of our heavy bombers. To the extent that these required overseas airbases, we had to provide the degree of security against foreign

11. See, for example, General Gruenther's final statement on leaving NATO.

9.

New York Times, Nov. 14, 1956

New York Times, Nov. 14, 1948
See, for example, General Rommelen, a final statement on leaving NATO.

overseas airships, we had to provide the degree of security against foreign
produced by the range of our heavy Bombers. To the extent that these required
a strategy of local defense. The only inhibition to our action was then
stockbile we had a free choice between a strategy of massive retaliation and
until the development of the Soviet long range Air Force and thermo-uncertain
defense. For the end of our invulnerability has altered our strategic options:
United States on over-all strategy and the concern of our allies with local
seem to impose a measure of harmony, however, between the interest of the
The implications of the growing Soviet nuclear capability would
into position quickly.

war is admitted we possess neither local forces nor a capability to get them
benevolent areas of Asia and the Middle East where the possessivity of local
docility explicitily rejects the possessivity of local war. While in the
attestation of an additional ground-forces in the one area which our strategic
reactant of all these past-measures and mutual pretenses has been thexxkxkxkxkx
enough of one to constitute an effective barrier to Soviet aggression. The
a defense effort to impose us to meet our forces on the Continent but not

329

invasion which alone could induce allies to furnish facilities. ¹⁰ In all other areas we had the option of defense by local or all-out war. But in the face of the horrors of thermo-nuclear war, it is in our own interest to seek to defend Eurasia by means other than all-out war: to devise a strategy which will enable us to achieve our objectives at less fearful cost than a thermo-nuclear exchange. In fact, the destructiveness of modern weapons has made all-out war the most costly strategy which should be invoked only if all else fails. ¹ⁱ

This applies even to the defense of Europe. We have insisted for so long that an attack on Europe would be the signal for an all-out war that we may well find ourselves engaged in the most wasteful kind of struggle because other alternatives have never been considered. It may be true that Europe is the chief strategic prize but it does not follow that we must inevitably adopt a strategy in its defense which is certain to drain our national substance at the beginning of any struggle over it. As the awareness of the destructiveness of modern weapons becomes more diffused it is not reasonable to assume that the United States and even more the United Kingdom would be prepared to commit suicide to deny an area, however important, to an enemy, all the more so if the Soviet Union shows its customary skill in presenting

¹⁰ 12. See Denis Healey. "The Atom Bomb and the Alliance," *Confluence*. April 1956.

10.12. See Della Heffey. "The Atom Bomb and the Alliance," *Confluence*, April 1962.

All the more so if the Soviet Union shows its autocratically skill in presenting
prepared to commit aside to deny an area, however important, to an enemy,
to assume that the United States and even more the United Kingdom would be
destruktiveness of modern weapons becomes more diffused if it is not reasonable
audacity at the beginning of such an struggle over it. As the awareness of the
adopt a strategy in its defense which is certain to drain our American
is the chief strategic prise but it does not follow that we must inevitably
other alternatives have never been considered. It may be true that Europe
may well find ourselves engaged in the most wasteful kind of struggle because
long that an attack on Europe would be the signal for an all-out war that we
This applies even to the defense of Europe. We have initiated for so
else falls.

made all-out war the most costly strategy which should be invoked only if all
thermo-nuclear exchange. In fact, the destruktiveness of modern weapons pas
which will enable us to achieve our objectives at least learning cost than a
to seek to defend Europe by means other than all-out war: to devise a strategy
in the face of the horrors of thermo-nuclear war, it is in our own interest
all other areas we had the option of defense by local or all-out war. But
invasion which alone could induce allies to turn to such facilities.

In
10

350

its challenge ambiguously: What if the Red Army attacks in Europe explicitly to disarm Western Germany and offers immunity to the United States and the United Kingdom from strategic bombing and a withdrawal to the Oder after achieving its limited objective? Is it clear that France would fight under such circumstances? Or that the United Kingdom would initiate an all-out war which, however it ended, would mean the end of British civilization? Or that an American President would trade 50 American cities for Western Europe? And even if he should be prepared to do so, it would still be the task of our strategy to develop less fearful options than national catastrophe or surrender.

It may be argued that the U.S.S.R. faces the same problem that it too may not be prepared to risk total devastation for a marginal gain. But the psychological bloc against initiating all-out war cannot be emphasized often enough. A stalemate occurs in chess only if neither King can move without placing itself into check or if neither side has enough pieces left to achieve a checkmate. The stalemate can be transformed into a checkmate if either side has an alternative move, even if it is of marginal importance by itself, so long as the next move of the opponent would result in his mate. In short,

Now as the next move of the opponent would result in his mate. In short,
has an alternative move, even if it is of marginal importance by itself, so
a checkmate. The stalemate can be transformed into a checkmate if either side
bypassing itself into check or if neither side has enough pieces left to achieve
enough. A stalemate occurs in case only if neither King can move without
bypassing pieces against initiating all-out war cannot be emphasized often
may be prepared to risk total devastation for a marginal gain. But the
not

It may be argued that the U.3.2.R. faces the same problem that it too
or surrender.

On strategy to develop less fearful options than national catastrophe means
And even if he should be prepared to do so, it would still be the task of
that an American President would trade 20 American cities for Western Europe?
which, however it ended, would mean the end of British civilization? Or
such circumstances? Or that the United Kingdom would initiate an all-out war
achieving its limited objectives? Is it clear that France would fight longer
United Kingdom from strategic bombing and a withdrawal to the Open after
to claim Western Germany and offer immunity to the United States and the
its challenge amply enough: What if the Red Army attacks in Europe explicitly

330

if the Soviets can pass the risk of initiating all-out war to us there is
great danger that soon no areas outside the Western Hemisphere will seem "worth"
contending for. And even should the assessment prove mistaken, it would still
not be in our interest to resort immediately to all-out war. It is not simply
that there are inherent limitations to the threat of suicide, it is above all
that the most useful and cataclysmic strategy should not be our only
possible riposte. There is a contradiction in conducting a war fought
presumably to maintain the historical experience and tradition of a people
with a strategy which is almost certain to erode its national substance.

Thus our alliances should not be considered as complementary to an
all-out strategy, but as an alternative to it. In an all-out war few of our
allies will add to our striking power and they will have no incentive to furnish
the trigger to unleash it. But our capability for all-out war can be used
as a shield to organize local defense and our assistance should be conceived
as a means to make local defense possible. In this resides our only chance
to avoid the impasse which has been the bane of our coalition policy: the gap
between the belief of our allies that they were already protected by our
thermo-nuclear capability to which they did not feel they had a contribution

thermo-nuclear capability to which they did not feel they had a contribution between the peeling of our allies that they were firm already protected by our to avoid the imbalance which has been the pane of our coalition policy: the balance as a means to make local defense possible. In this respects our only chance as a shield to organise local defense and our assistance should be conceived the strategy to release it. But our capability for all-out war can be made Trip-wise

Thus our alliance should not be considered as complementary to an
from the aspect of an
with a strategy which is almost certain to erode its national impactance.
broadly to maintain the historical experience and tradition of a people
hummant possible riposte. There is a contradiction in conducting a war taught
that the most vital, useful and catalytic strategy should not be our only
that there are inherent limitations to the limits of suicide, it is obvious all
Cladability of the strategy
not be in our interest to resort immediately to all-out war. It is not simply
contending for. And even should the assessment prove mistaken, it would still
Great danger that soon no areas outside the Western Hemisphere will seem "worth"

if the Soviets can pass the risk of initiating all-out war to us there is
force majeure to shoulder

337

332

to make and their terror of its consequences which made them reluctant to invoke it. Only by developing a strategy which admits the possibility of local defense can we escape the never-never land where our military contribution to the ground defense of our allies is greater than their own and where current investment in local defense cannot have any strategic return because our strategic doctrine does not feel comfortable with limited war and our allies have not yet considered an alternative strategy.

The sense of common purpose which has been lacking in our coalition policy can be conferred then by the interest we now share with our allies in avoiding all-out thermo-nuclear war. Thus our policy of coalitions should not be justified as an addition to our strategic thinking striking power, but as a means to enable us to pursue the least costly strategy. The incentive for our allies would not be to furnish a plate glass window or a trip wire, but their conviction that the best means of avoiding thermo-nuclear war resides in our joint ability to make local aggression too costly. Our task is to make it clear to them that they cannot avoid their dilemmas by neutrality or surrender, for if we are pushed out of Eurasia they will bring on what they fear most. Convinced to the Western Hemisphere, we would have no choice but to fight an

Continued to the Western Hemisphere, we would have no choice but to fight an

for it we are bashed out of Eurasia they will bring on what they fear most.

**concern**

**effort** to them that they cannot avoid their differences by neutrality or surrender,

their conviction that the best means of avoiding thermo-uncertain war resides

for our allies would not be to gun down a plate glass window or a trip wire, put

not be justified as an addition to our strategic striking striking power, put

avoiding all-out thermo-uncertain war. Thus our policy of coalition should

bolfck can be conferred then by the interest we now share with our allies in

**let considered an alternative strategy.**

investment in local defense cannot have any strategic return. Our strategic

**concern**

**effort** to the ground defense of our allies is greater than their own and where current

involve it. Only by developing a strategy which admits the possibility of

335

333

all-out war. To be sure, the Soviets have skillfully fomented U2EX neutralism by giving the impression that local resistance must inevitably lead to all-out war. But the Soviets can be no more interested than we in all-out war—at least if we behave effectively and maintain adequate retaliatory forces.

The fear of thermo-nuclear extinction would provide a powerful sanction against expanding a conflict.

Far from being inconsistent with a strategy of limited war our policy of alliances would represent a special application of it. But as in a strategy of limited war, it is less a question of physical resources than of understanding the strategic implications of the new technology. For neither the necessity of a strategy of limited war nor the conduct of it have been clarified either by us or by our partners. In NATO, for example, atomic cannons have been added to a force pomposed largely of conventional organizations with the traditional cumbersome supply system and with tactics essentially drawn from World War II. Indeed the very term atomic cannon testifies to the persistence of obsolescent concepts: to an attempt to add nuclear weapons to traditional strategy as simply a more efficient and more powerful explosive.

This has been compounded by the fact that among our Allies only the United Kingdom is a nuclear power and that as a result neither technology nor training

Kingdom is a nuclear power and that as a result neither technology nor training
This has been compounded by the fact that among our allies only the United
國 has been able to add nuclear weapons to its
additional strategy as simply a more efficient and more powerful explosive.

absence of opalescent concepts: to an attempt to add nuclear weapons to the
from World War II. Indeed the very term atomic bomb was borrowed from the
the traditional bombarding system and with tactics essentially drawn
have been added to a force composed largely of conventional organizations with
characterized either by use or by our partners. In NATO, for example, atomic bombs
the necessity of a strategy of limited war nor the combat of it have been
understanding the strategic implications of the new technology. For neither
strategy of limited war, if it is less a question of physical resources than of
of alliances would represent a special abdication of it. But as in a
far from being inconsistent with a strategy of limited war our policy
against expanding a conflict.

The fear of thermo-nuclear extinction would provide a powerful sanction
at least if we prove effectively and maintain adequate retaliatory forces.
out war. But the Soviets can be no more interested than we in all-out war—
by giving the impression that focal resistance must inevitably lead to all-
out war. To be sure, the Soviets have skillfully momentum neutralized

333

334

nor doctrine exist among our other partners to deal with the problems of
a nuclear war. Moreover, a nuclear fxx war fought with conventional tactics
and traditional supply systems would produce a fearful carnage. No progress
can be made in our policy of alliances for this reason until there has been
an agreement on strategic doctrine.

can be made in our policy of alliances for this reason until there has been
and traditional subly systems would produce a fearful carnage. No progress
a nuclear war. Moreover, a nuclear war would with conventional tactics
for doctrine exist among our other partners to deal with the problems of

335

EJ

II

It is in NATO that the confusion of military doctrine is most pro-
nounced. Torn between the desire to pose a maximum threat and their quest
for a strategy of minimum destructiveness, between a wish for absolute
security and an attempt to escape the economic burdens of armament, NATO
has emerged as a patchwork of military doctrines and capabilities. Unsure
about the implications of nuclear war, uncomfortable with a World War II
type strategy, NATO has attempted to combine elements of both and therefore
stands in danger of suffering the worst of both worlds. In every crisis it
has been inhibited by the inconsistencies of its strategic
doctrine and the ambiguities
it poses. What is the purpose of atomic cannons, as long as the majority of
the allies believe that the explosion of any nuclear device anywhere will be
tantamount to the outbreak of all-out thermo-nuclear war? What is the point
of conventional forces after the NATO Council decision of 8 December 1954
that any defense of Western Europe would involve the use of nuclear weapons?
Is the employment of nuclear weapons intended to be limited or all-out and
if the latter what additional sanctions to the threat of thermo-nuclear des-
truction are posed by a nuclear defense on the ground? Answers to these ques-
tions are inhibited with our Continental allies by a lack of knowledge about

the implications of the nuclear technology and in Great Britain by the same
ambivalence towards power, deterrence and the conduct of war which also char-
acterizes U.S. doctrine.

In no other country have the dilemmas of the nuclear period become
more apparent than in Great Britain. For here, contrary to the United States,
increasing vulnerability was not coupled with a corresponding gain in ~~relative~~ solute strength. By its own efforts Britain could never hope for an equi-
valence in destructiveness against a major enemy and particularly against
the U.S.S.R. Yet in no country had the "pure" doctrine of air-warfare taken
deeper hold. The notions that the airpower was best employed in the offensive,
are
that wars were won by destroying the enemy industrial plant and undermining
civilian morale have been cardinal tenets of British strategic thought. It
may be going too far to assert that the doctrine of massive retaliation was
originated in Great Britain and sold to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff by Sir John
Slessor, then Marshall of the Royal Airforce. The two points of view were
nevertheless almost identical. Both placed chief reliance on the deterrent
effect of strategic air forces; both sought to inhibit aggression at its
source by bombing production facilities. "The kernel of airpower is the

‡) See article in the *London Observer*, March 21, 1954.

337

bomber..." wrote Sir John Slessor. "Britain and the United States must main-
tain as a first charge on our military resources that force which is the
Great Deterrent, the real preventive of war, the only force, which if the
deterrent should fail can bring instantaneously overwhelming power to bear on
aggression at its source."

As a result, in Britain even more explicitly than in the United States
a distinction grew up in military doctrine between deterrent forces and other
military forces. "In a situation," said the British statement of defense for
1955, "in which the Communist world maintains...increasingly powerful armed
forces, the strength of our armed forces must also be developed and sustained
against the possibility of major war. To this end increasing emphasis must
be placed on the deterrent." "The increasing power of the deterrent," said
the British statement on defense for 1956, "that is the nuclear weapon and
the means of delivering it have made global war more frightening and less
likely. Our first and chief objective must be to prevent war by maintenance
of the Allied deterrent to which we have begun to make our own substantial
contribution." The identification of deterrent forces with nuclear striking
power underlined the basic problem of British Defense Policy. For if deter-
rence was achieved by retaliatory power, what was the point of maintaining the

12 (%) Slessor, *Strategy for the West*, p. 77.

13 (%) British Statement on Defense, 1955, p. 6.

14 (%) British Statement on Defense, 1956, p. 4.

338

British Army on the Rhine in Western Germany, numbering four divisions? Again, what was the purpose of a British strategic striking force which could never be decisive by itself?

Nuclear weapons had in fact revolutionized Britain's strategic position even more than that of the United States. For in a thermo-nuclear war the size of the United States and our geographic location offer at least a measure of protection against a Soviet attack. While they cannot confer immunity, they complicate the possibility of a surprise attack and therefore give the United States the opportunity to deprive the U.S.S.R. of the fruits of a sudden onslaught. As has been described in a previous chapter, the calculus of all-out war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. offers no calculable margin of advantage to either side particularly if we concede the first blow.

But while our early warning system, the geographic necessity that a Soviet attack must come across the Polar icecap and the dispersal of our airbases, *should* always enable us/to launch part of our retaliatory force, Great Britain is in no such fortunate position. In a crowded island dispersal of bases is very difficult and in any case a very few bombs -- no more than twenty of megaton size--could destroy half the population of Great Britain. Moreover, even under the best circumstances -- if all British planes were launched before Soviet bombs fell -- the British bombing force is not sufficiently powerful to inflict a mortal

339

blow on the U.S.S.R., while Great Britain itself would probably be elim-
inated as a major power and maybe even as a political entity in a thermo-
nuclear war. As a result, Great Britain cannot fight an all-out war with
the U.S.S.R. without U.S. assistance. But if the United States participates
in the war, the British strategic striking force, while useful, will not add
a decisive increment to our strength. The British contribution to the al-
liance would be in the category where the United States is already strongest.
Moreover, given the vulnerability of Great Britain, it would seem that all-
out war should be the last strategy invoked by it and then only if all else
failed. Why then the emphasis on strategic striking power? Why the reliance
on a threat which if implemented must lead to the collapse of Great Britain as
a world power, and perhaps even as a physical entity?

Part of the answer is of course that in Britain no less than in the
United States the air-doctrine of reliance on heavy bombers triumphed after
twenty years of bitter struggle at the precise moment when it was becoming
obsolescent. And just as in the United States, it has proved difficult to
assimilate two technological revolutions within a decade. The first of which
moreover, the discovery of the atom bomb, seemed through the monopoly posi-
tion of the United States to confirm the lessons of World War II, and therefore
Technological revolution

340

inhibited coming to grips with the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons which called for a different strategic doctrine entirely. For although Britain had been saved in 1940 more by its fighter than its bomber command, it had served through the rest of the war as a stationary aircraft carrier off the continent. Even more than the U.S. Airforce, the RAF grew dedicated to the concept of area bombing. Since its raids were always conducted at night, no attempt at precision was made; an area was marked out by flares dropped from pathfinder planes and bombs were deposited indiscriminately within it. In adopting this strategy, Britain was impelled not only by the Douhet theory of air-warfare but also by a desire to "get even" for the Blitz of 1940 and by a tradition of warfare which had always relied on the attrition of the enemy economy. Thus Britain employed its airforce in the same manner it had formerly used its sea-power: to exhaust the enemy's economy before coming to grips with him on the battlefield. This strategy was possible because after 1941 Britain did not have to fear similar German retaliation and because the (retaliatory) destructive power of weapons was relatively so small that even a massive raid on Great Britain could not do decisive damage either to the economy or to the social structure.

When the United States emerged from World War II with an atomic monopoly, the British predilection for an all-out strategy seemed confirmed. Nothing

seemed to stand in the way of the Soviet armies poised threateningly on
the Elbe save the American atomic monopoly. "If it were not for the stocks
of A-bombs," said Sir Winston Churchill, "now in the trusteeship of the
United States there would be no means of stopping the subjugation of Western
Europe by Communist machinations backed by Russian armies and enforced by
political police. Of one thing I am quite sure that if the United States
were to consent in reliance upon any paper agreement to destroy the stocks
of A-bombs which they have accumulated, they would be guilty of murdering
human freedom and committing suicide themselves." And he went on to say
that the Free World should use its temporary advantage to obtain a settle-
ment of disputed issues before the U.S.S.R. developed an atomic stockpile.

Thus both the experience of World War II and the U.S. atomic monopoly
contributed to the British identification of deterrence with nuclear stra-
tegic striking power. And it was this factor, too, which induced Great Brit-
tain to enter the atomic race. But whatever the validity of the proposition
that only the stockpile of atomic weapons stood between the Red Army and the
Channel ports, during the period of the U.S. atomic monopoly, a new dimension
was added with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. It is a measure
of the persistence of doctrines after they have been superseded by new

Llandudno speech, October 9, 1948.

developments, that even so great a figure as Sir Winston Churchill could see
in the growing Soviet strategic airforce soon to be equipped with thermo-
nuclear weapons only a confirmation of familiar doctrine. In his great speech
to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, he laid down the principles which
have animated British defense planning in the period since. It amounted to
*reformulation*
a reformation of the doctrine of deterrence through nuclear striking power,
and a restatement that the new weapons, by posing an even more fearful threat,
made Soviet aggression even less likely: "Unless a trustworthy and universal
agreement upon disarmament, conventional and nuclear alike, can be reached...
there is only one sane policy for the free world in the next few years. That
is what we call defense through deterrents. This we have already adopted and
proclaimed...To make our contribution to the deterrent we must ourselves pos-
sess the most up-to-date nuclear weapons, and the means of delivering them..."
Sir Winston was reinforced in his belief by his confidence in U.S. nuclear
superiority and he called for an effort to "stimulate the nuclear superiority
of the Western Powers in every possible way."

The strategic transformation brought about by the development of thermo-
nuclear weapons unfortunately has made it impossible to transform into strategic
advantage superiority beyond a certain point. But Sir Winston drew comfort

even from this realization: "The broad effect of the latest developments
is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of
mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Russia
by putting her enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality or
near equality of vulnerability with our small densely-populated island and
with Western Europe. I cannot regard this development as adding to our dan-
gers. We have reached the maximum already. On the contrary, to this form
of attack continents are as vulnerable as cities...The deterrent will con-
stantly grow in value."

The doctrine that deterrence resided in the capacity for mutual anni-
hilation, the British version of "massive retaliation" has been the core of
British Defense Planning since 1954. It has been the theme of every Defense
White Paper and it has not been shaken by the growing Soviet nuclear threat.
"It is sometimes argued, " said the Statement of Defense for 1956, "that
with the build-up of a stock of thermo-nuclear weapons by the Russians the
deterrent value to the Western Powers of building up a stock of bombs and
means of delivery will diminish. This is not so. The objective of the
Western powers is defensive. They will never be the aggressors, but they
must have...the power of instant and overwhelming retaliation if attacked.

Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1956.

It is the retaliatory power which is the vital factor."

The crucial strategic problem, of course, is to determine in what contingency retaliatory power is the vital factor. The defensive nature of British strategy coupled with a reliance on thermo-nuclear retaliation far from answering this question if anything complicated its solution. For it gave the U.S.S.R. an opportunity either to launch a surprise attack which, given the geographic realities, might well reduce the British counterblow to a level the U.S.S.R. could accept. Or it gave the Soviets the option of starting with a more limited threat, say a conventional or even low-yield nuclear attack on Western Europe and force Britain to decide whether this provocation was "worth" what amounted to national suicide. But even if it should be argued that either of these contingencies would immediately bring the United States into the field, two problems would still remain: why Britain should build up a nuclear striking force which admittedly could not be decisive by itself and why it should maintain substantial conventional forces and a large army on the Continent?

The decision to develop a retaliatory force of its own reflected two problems common to all our European allies: a desire to remain world powers and a lack of certainty either about American intentions or about American strategy. Heretofore a major power was one which could conduct a war on a

basis of relative equality with other major powers, or to put it another way, its survival did not depend entirely on the continual good-will of another sovereign state. With the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, however, an imbalance has been created between the vulnerability of states and their ability to pose a corresponding threat. All states have become equally vulnerable but only the United States and the U.S.S.R. possess the resources

Threaten similar retaliation

to pose an overwhelming threat because the combination of warning systems, delivery means and weapons which provide the sinews of strategic striking power are too sophisticated and expensive. It is understandable that a power long the center of world affairs should find difficulty in accepting the fact that even its maximum strategic effort could not be decisive. At any rate if world power was measured by nuclear technology, Great Britain proposed to establish its position by entering the nuclear race: "[We] must make a contribution to the Allied deterrent," said the British Statement on Defense, 1956, "commensurate with our standing as a world Power." The British strategic dilemma was however precisely that a commensurate contribution would be inadequate for total war but substantial enough to drain resources from an effort to prepare for other forms of conflict. It was the impossibility of being prepared for every contingency which caused the *Times* of British Statement on Defense, 1956, p. 4.

346

London to criticize the British defense program as producing weapons for prestige which might detract from the British ability to deal with the most likely threats. But more important still than Britain's desire to be a world power has been the uncertainty about American intentions and the absence of an agreed strategic doctrine. It reflected Britain's lack of assurance that in a crisis the United States would interpret a vital threat in the same manner as Great Britain or that in time of war it would attack a similar significance to targets considered essential for British survival.

This dual uncertainty about American intentions both with respect to what the United States would consider a casus belli and what it would consider a vital target, has caused the British strategic striking force to be conceived almost as much as a weight against the United States as a threat to Russia. It has been built on the assumption that without a nuclear establishment of its own Great Britain would carry no weight in Allied Councils. "There are those who believe or at any rate say," argued Sir Winston Churchill in his speech backing the British defense program cited above, "if we have the protection of the overwhelmingly powerful United States we need not make the hydrogen bomb for ourselves or build a fleet of bombers for its delivery. We can leave that to our friends across the ocean! Personally I cannot feel that we should have 21) Weapons for Prestige, The Times, March 9, 1956.

19

347

much influence over their policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are
largely dependent as we are today upon their protection. We, too, must pos-
sess substantial deterrent power of our own."

This doctrine could have only two meanings: that Britain would build
up a deterrent of its own capable of dealing alone with a Soviet attack or
if a British vital interest were threatened
that it was building a force capable/of unleashing a war of sufficient magni-
tude that the United States would be forced to intervene on Britain's side.
Since a capability to fight an all-out war alone was beyond Britain's economic
resources, only the second explanation is possible. No such explanation was
ever advanced for obvious reasons and the justification for building up the
British nuclear striking force has usually been in terms of obtaining control
over the targets which would have to be struck at the crucial initial stages of a war:
"There are big administrative and industrial centers behind the Iron Curtain,"
said Sir Winston Churchill presaging arguments made by every British State-
ment on Defense since, "and any effective deterrent policy must have the power
to paralyze them all at the outset, or shortly after. There are also the
Soviet submarine bases and other targets which will need early attention. Un-
less we make a contribution of our own...we cannot be sure that in an emergency

<sup>22)</sup> Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955.

20

348

the resources of other powers would be placed exactly as we would wish, or
that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we consider
the necessary priority, or the deserved priority, in the first few hours."

What had in effect occurred in Allied relationships between Great
Britain and the United States was the same rivalry to control essential mis-
sions which has characterized the conflict among the services in the United
States. And just as in the United States, the result has been an attempt by
each service to develop an over-all capability because only in this manner
would it be certain that each target essential to the performance of its mis-
sion would in fact be attacked, so it has induced Great Britain to duplicate
at heavy expense, the one strategic capability in which we are strongest. It
would seem that there must be more economical ways to achieve doctrinal har-
mony and agreement on which targets are to be hit than by a proliferation of
first missions just among our own services and then between us and our allies.

The *Regarded From another aspect, the* duplication of missions between us and the ally maintaining the
largest military establishment revealed above all a British willingness to
willingness to draw
share the full implications from the strategic doctrine on which NATO was
based. For there had always been this inconsistency in NATO strategy that

23) Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955. See also series of articles in the *Manchester Guardian* explaining British Bombing Force, December 13 and 14, 1955.

a) Manchester Guardian explaining British Bombing Force, December 13 and 14, 1922.
b) Heading (Common), March 1, 1922. See also series of articles in the
Times. For there had always been this inconvenience in NATO strategy that
there will implications from the strategic doctrine on which NATO was
millions to do (in) a war.

target military adaptation needed above all a British willingness to
CAN be considered as the Consequence of Britain's
This (conclusion) of the article is the last maintaining the
misera last among our own services and then between us and our allies.
First

misera last among our own services and then between us and our allies.
First
This (conclusion) of the
misera last among our own services and then between us and our allies.
First

and agreement on which targets are to be put than by a prioritization of
would seem that there must be more economical ways to achieve electrical par-
at head expense, the one strategic capability in which we are strongest. If
would it be certain that each target essential to the performance of its mis-
each service to develop an overall capability because only in this manner
States. And that as in the United States, the result has been an attempt by
alions which has characterized the conflict among the services in the United
Britain and the United States was the same rivalry to control essential mis-
What had in effect occurred in Allied relationships between Great
the necessary priority, or the desired priority, in the first few hours."

that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we consider
the resources of other powers would be placed exactly as we would act, or

349

the weapon on which it relied above all to resist Soviet aggression -- the strategic bombardment of metropolitan Russia -- was outside its control, for the sole means for delivering a strategic offensive against the U.S.S.R., the United States Strategic Air Command, was not part of the NATO structure.

*Decision whether to employ it* (doing so) Both the fact and the manner of its employment have remained within the discretion of the United States. Thus NATO has had an inherent imbalance between the vulnerability of its members and the fact that the United States alone controlled the weapon on which the NATO strategic doctrine relied for protection. This would have only one of two consequences: either our NATO partners saw no point in a military contribution on their part -- as witnessed by the slow pace of rearmament of the continental nations. Or else it led to an attempt to develop a nuclear establishment under national control thereby to reduce the dependence on the United States -- this in effect has been the course pursued by Britain. Both courses tend to reduce the effectiveness of the alliance: the former because it treats NATO merely as an instrument to define a cause of war for the United States; the latter because it is an attempt to make the United States dispensable. In neither case, however, does the alliance represent an accretion to Free World strength and determination.

Could NATO achieve a measure of control over the weapon its strategic

350

doctrine defines as the chief deterrent, there would be no need for a costly duplication of functions. Could the NATO strategic doctrine offer a different solution to Soviet aggression than all-out war, the continental nations would have a greater incentive to undertake local defense. As it is, the strategic doctrine of NATO offers an incentive for a military contribution only in the category where the United States is already strongest. This has caused the same ambivalence to appear in British strategic doctrine between a strategy which would treat an attack on NATO as a cause of all-out war and a strategy which would seek to defend the NATO area on the ground which has already been noted in U.S. doctrine. And as the United States, Great Britain too has retained conventional military forces, irrelevant for all-out war but unprepared doctrinally for other forms of conflict. For Great Britain, as the United States, has been confronted by the fact that the continental powers were not satisfied with playing the trigger to the strategic striking power of their nuclear allies. They have insisted on a defense on the ground to protect them against Soviet occupation.

Thus was born the British Army of the Rhine of four divisions just
as the American army in Germany comprising five divisions. The real difficulty
with these forces is not that they represent a strategic diversion -- although
in terms of an all-out war strategy they do this too -- but that they constitute
the expression of a strategic doctrine but a concession to European fears.

They are stationed in Europe as a symbol of the determination of Great Britain
and the United States that an attack on Europe would lead to all-out war as
a bait to our European allies to increase their own defense contribution.

Actually the force is sufficiently large to give rise to the opposite idea
that perhaps a ground defense would be attempted and it might therefore tempt
the Soviets into a probing action. In fact, vis-a-vis the European allies
the American and British forces are precisely intended to convey the idea
that a ground defense will be intended. The Allied forces in Western Europe
thus have a dual and partly contradictory role: to convince the U.S.S.R. that
an attack on Western Europe would mean an all-out war and to convince the
Continental powers that Soviet aggression could be contained on the ground.
Both positions are contained in British statements regarding the need for
substantial ground forces. The statements of defense for 1954, 1955 and 1956
all maintain that Great Britain require an army for the conduct of limited wars

all maintain that Great Britain require an army for the conduct of limited war
undispenstal ground forces. The statements of defense for 1924, 1925 and 1926
Both positions are contained in British statements regarding the need for
Continental powers that Soviet aggression could be contained on the ground.
an attack on Western Europe would mean an all-out war and to convince the
time have a dual and partly contradictory role: to convince the U.3.2.R. that
that a ground defense will be intended. The Allied forces in Western Europe
the American and British forces are precisely intended to convey the idea
the Soviets into a hoping action. In fact, via-s-via the European allies
that perhaps a ground defense would be attempted and it might therefore tempt
Actually the force is sufficiently large to give rise to the opposite idea
a part to our European allies to increase their own defense contribution.
and the United States that an attack on Europe would lead to all-out war as
They are stationed in Europe as a symbol of the determination of Great Britain
not the expression of a strategic doctrine and a concession to European idea.

1922
Man

which were identified with wars on the peripheries of Eurasia. The statement for 1954 spoke of the necessity to maintain an army for the conduct of the "broken-backed" warfare which would follow the initial nuclear exchange.

The subsequent statements have given up the reference to"broken-backed" warfare as also to the mobilization of reserve forces behind the shield of supplied by the active forces which was still a key doctrine of the 1954 Statement. But the dilemma of the British forces in Germany remained. For if the distinction between limited war and all-out war was the difference between war in Asia and war in Europe, it was difficult to justify so large a British contingent on the Continent. What was the meaning of a ground commitment in an all-out war that every Statement of Defense characterized as "short," "intense" and above all largely confined to an air battle? British statements have given answers as ambivalent as the strategic doctrine from which they derived.

It was argued that ground forces on the Continent permitted the holding of a line until the nuclear counter-offensive had broken the enemy's back; that the use of tactical nuclear weapons made possible a forward strategy which might assure the defense of Europe; that a defense of Europe was

22. Statement on Defense for 1954, p. 5.

23. Statement on Defense for 1955, p. 4.

24. Statement on Defense for 1955, p. 7.

24.

50. Statement on Defense for 1922, b. 1.

25.

51. Statement on Defense for 1922, b. 4.

26.

52. Statement on Defense for 1924, b. 2.

which might assume the defense of Europe;

53)

that a defense of Europe was
that the use of tactical nuclear weapons made possible a forward attack
a fine until the nuclear counter-offensive had broken the enemy's pack;

54)

It was argued that ground forces on the Continent permitted the holding of
have given answers as amply sufficient as the strategic doctrine from which they derived.

"Intense" and spoke all fairly confined to an air battle. British statements
in an all-out war that every Statement of Defense characterized as "short,"

continuing on the Continent. What was the meaning of a ground commitment
war in Vols and war in Europe, it was difficult to justify so large a British
in the distinction between limited war and all-out war was the difference between
Statement. But the difference of the British forces in Germany remained. For

warfare as also to the modification of reserve forces pending the shelf
The subsequent statements have given up the reference to "proven-packed"
"Proven-packed" warfare which would follow the initial nuclear exchange.

55)

for 1924 aboke of the necessity to maintain an army for the conduct of the
which were identified with wars on the frontiers of Europe. The statement

essential so that Britain would not again have to undertake the grim business of liberation and to prevent the U.S.S.R. from using Europe "as a shameful pawn" in negotiations.

Each of these arguments raises as many questions as it answers. At the scale of devastation produced by an all-out thermo-nuclear war, it is difficult to visualize any substantial accompanying ground action or an ability to sustain it once the troops become aware of the devastation at home. If on the other hand, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons permitted a ground defense of Europe, what was the necessity of accompanying it with a thermo-nuclear exchange which might well lead to the social collapse of both sides and which would in any case inflict catastrophic losses on Great Britain. Again, if the nuclear counter-offensive was as lethal as British doctrine postulated, the U.S.S.R. would hardly have suffered resources left to hold Western Europe as a pawn in the negotiation. Moreover, a substantial body of opinion believed that the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to all-out war, so that the equipment of NATO with tactical atomic weapons was in Liddell Hart's words "piling absurdity on absurdity." For if they unleashed an all-out war the British homeland would be destroyed and the armies

29. Ibid., p. 8.

25

22

S. B. Pridg., p. 8.

unleashed an all-out war the British homeland would be destroyed and the armies
were in Liddell Hart's words "blinkenburgity on insanitary". For it they
to all-out war, so that the equipment of NATO with tactical atomic weapons
pays of opinion believed that the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead
to hold Western Europe as a beam in the negotiation. Moreover, a substantial
docility besetfused, the U.3.2.R. would hardly have any reasonable hope
Britain. Again, if the nuclear counter-offensive was as federal as British
both sides and which would in any case inflict catastrophic losses on Great
a thermo-nuclear exchange which might well lead to the socialist collapse of
a ground defense of Europe, what was the necessity of accompanying it with
it on the other hand, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons permitted
apability to sustain it once the troops become aware of the devastation at home.
difficult to visualise any unpatentiable accompanying ground action or an
fine scale of devastation produced by an all-out thermo-nuclear war, it is
Each of these arguments raises as many questions as it answers. At
in negotiations.

S.H.

of liberation and to prevent the U.3.2.R. from making Europe "as a shamefull beam"
esential so that Britain would not again have to undertake the grim business

354

would have lost their purpose. Thus Britain's attempt to develop a strategic
air force and a ground defense of Europe and to implement both courses
<u>concurrently</u> should war break out was to combine the maximum cost with the
minimum effectiveness.<sup>26</sup><br/><sup>28)</sup>

The most convincing argument in favor of stationing British troops
on the Continent is the proposition that the U.S.S.R. might seek to hold
Western Europe for ransom in negotiations following a thermo-nuclear exchange.
And since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would have sufficient
resources left for a major effort to liberate Europe, the net result of a
thermo-nuclear exchange might be Soviet domination of Eurasia unless the forces
on the spot were sufficiently strong to hold a line// Thus the outcome of an
all-out thermo-nuclear war would still be determined by the ability to
hold or to occupy territory. If this is true, however, reliance on all-out
war becomes not only costly but irrelevant. If the issue of even an all-out
war depends to such an extent on the outcome of the ground battle, it would
seem to be the task of strategy to <u>begin</u> a war with such a battle, to seek
less wasteful means than all-out war to determine the possession of territory.

The difficulty with British strategic doctrine as with that of the United States,

26. News Chronicle, "All Military Knowledge is Now Useless," March 1955 as one of many similar statements. See also *H. F. Times* editorial, January 4, 1956 against the employment of tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to all-out war. See also speech by Wilfred Fienburgh. *Hansard* (Commons) Feb.29, 1956.

P.1258

all-out war. See also beachhead, military. *Heward* (Commons) Rep. 53, 12.

against the employment of tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to one of many similar statements. See also *H.W. Times* editorials, January 7, 1932 and *News Chronicle*, "All Military Knowledge is Now Unleashed," March 1932 as London

The difficulty with British strategic doctrine as with that of the United States, feesal treatment means that all-out war to determine the possession of territory.

seem to be the task of strategy to put a war with such a battle, to seek war dependence to such an extent on the outcome of the ground battle, it would

war becomes not only costly but irrelevant. If the cause of even an all-out
hold or to occupy territory. It this is true, however, reliance on all-out

all-out thermo-nuclear war would still be attempted by the ability to
on the spot were sufficiently strong to hold a line. Thus the outcome of an
thermo-nuclear exchange might be Soviet domination of Europe unless the forces
resources left for a major effort to liberate Europe, the net result of a
And since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would have sufficient
Western Europe for room in negotiations following a thermo-nuclear exchange.

on the Continent is the proposition that the U.S.A.R. might seek to hold
The most convincing argument in favor of stationing British troops
minimum effectiveness.

minimum effectiveness.

concurrently among war preek out was to compine the maximum coat with the
air force and a ground defense of Europe and to intubement pop cornées

would have cost their purpose. Thus Britain's attempt to develop a strategic

then, is that in the absence of a resolution of some key issues defense policy
protecting itself against) is tempted into covering every contingency without an assessment of the
most probable danger or a reconciliation of partly overlapping, partly incon-
sistent strategies. Britain's strategic doctrine and its alliance policy is
bedeviled as that of the United States by the problem of finding a distinction
between global and limited war, by deciding whether the utilization of nuclear
weapons is compatible with a policy of limited war and above all by the relation-
ship between deterrence and the strategy for conducting a war should deterrence
fail.

For the British strategic dilemma in an all-out war must be viewed
against the catastrophe an all-out nuclear war must inevitably produce in
the crowded British isles. It is a measure of the toughness of the British
social fabric that nowhere in the public debate has the question been raised
whether Europe was "worth" an all-out war. But it is also a testimony to the
persistence of obsolescent doctrine that Britain should apply so literally
a military policy which staked its social structure on any Soviet aggression
on Europe. And withal the British dilemma is only a reflection of that of
the United States which too is committed to an all-or-nothing showdown should
war start in Europe.

war start in Europe.

the United States which too is committed to an all-or-nothing showdown should
on Europe. And without the British dilemma is only a reflection of that of
a military policy which asked its social structure on any Soviet aggression
perpetrality of opacivecent doctrine that Britain should apply so literally
whether Europe was "worth" an all-out war. But it is also a testimony to the
social fabric that nowhere in the public debate has the question been raised
the crowded British area. If it is a measure of the toughness of the British
against the catastrophe an all-out enemy war must inevitably produce in
For the British strategic dilemma in an all-out war must be viewed
as well.

ship between deterrence and the strategy for conducting a war should deterrence
weaken is compatible with a policy of limited war and above all by the relation-
ship between global and limited war, by deciding whether the utilization of enemy
penetration as that of the United States by the problem of finding a distinction
in state strategies. Britain's a strategic doctrine and its alliance policy is
mostropsip danger or a reconciliation of partly overlapping, partly incon-
justified into corresponding every contingency without an assessment of the
to be determined against itself

322

356

In short, Britain has been brought up against the same problem which has confronted the U.S. policy of deterrence and which can be expressed in the query what it is that is deterred by a thermo-nuclear capability. The British Defense White papers and much of U.S. doctrine assert that any aggression will be so deterred. But the psychological balance between the contenders would indicate that what is deterred is a thermo-nuclear attack on another thermo-nuclear power and that against any other provocation the thermo-nuclear deterrent will either magnify the inhibitions to decisive action or produce an all-out war without having exhausted all intermediary alternatives. Given Britain's vulnerability it is not surprising that this realization should have been more explicitly formulated in Great Britain than in the United States although the basic argument of the advocates of "graduated deterrent" as the quest for intermediary solutions is called in Great Britain applies equally to the United States.

The main thrust of the advocates of "graduated deterrent" is directed against the deliberate ambiguity of British Defense Policy which combines tactical atomic weapons with conventional ground forces supplemented by the threat of massive retaliation without making clear under what contingencies the most extreme form of retaliation would be adopted and whether gradations

the most extreme form of retaliation would be adopted and whether graduations
threat of massive retaliation without making clear under what contingencies
tactical atomic weapon with conventional ground forces supplemented by the
against the deliberate ambiguity of British Defense policy which compels

The main thrust of the advocates of "graduated deterrence" is directed
to the United States.

dread for intermediary solutions is called in Great Britain abbrives equally
although the pate argument of the advocates of "graduated deterrence" as the
have been more explicitly formulated in Great Britain than in the United States
Britain's vulnerability if it is not am Times that this realisation should
an self-out war without having expended all intermediate alternatives. Given
deterrent will either magnify the implications to decimate action or produce
thermo-nuclear power and that against any other provocation the thermo-nuclear
would indicate that what is deferred is a thermo-nuclear attack on another
will be so deterred. But the psychological balance between the contenders

British Defense White papers and much of U.S. doctrine assert that any aggression
in the dury what it is that is deterred by a thermo-nuclear capability. The
which has contronted the U.S. policy of deterrence and which can be expressed
In short, Britain has been brought up against the same problem

32c

357

in the application of power were being considered. The advocates of graduated
deterrence admit that the ambiguity of the British (and for that matter the
American) position might increase Soviet hesitations, but they assert that
it may as well induce the Soviets either to disbelieve the threat or to estimate
its ambiguity as implying a decision to undertake local defense. In the
latter contingency the failure to consider alternatives in advance and to
convey them to the enemy would have contributed to bringing on an unnecessary
all-out war. These were the arguments advanced by Denis Healy, one of the
ablest young members of Parliament, in his reply to Sir Winston Churchill's
speech of March 1st, 1955: M

"...If we are relying, as the Prime Minister suggested, on the
deterrent of mutual terror, the greater the terror the greater
the deterrent. The appalling xxx ambiguity of the White Paper
in this respect is that it does not make clear whether full-
scale thermo-nuclear war must be the inevitable consequence
of aggression in Europe...The real question we must ask our-
selves is: does the White Paper mean that we must be pre-pared
to use thermo-nuclear weapons from the word 'go' against a
strategic target, such as a centre of population inside the
Soviet Union or does it simply mean that we must use whatever
weight of nuclear power is required in tactical area that is to
say an area where land fighting is going on upon the continent.
If the Russians even think that it is our intention to drop
thermo-nuclear weapons upon their cities the moment fighting
begins in Europe, then certainly the moment anything approaching
a state of war develops in Europe, Russia will start by dropping
these weapons upon us...It seems to me that the appalling am-
biguity of the White Paper immensely increases the danger of a
completely unnecessary thermo-nuclear war which might lead to the
destruction of mankind...The second great danger if the Government
really mean that any aggression in Europe will result in full-scale
thermo-nuclear war is that any local incident in Europe will leave

thermo-unclear war is that any local incident in Europe will leave
really mean that any aggression in Europe will result in full-scale
destruction of marking... The second great danger it the Government
completely unnecessarily thermo-unclear war which might lead to the
ignority of the White paper immensely increases the danger of a
these weapons shown us... It seems to me that the staffing am-
sate of war develops in Europe, Russia will start by drobbing
begin in Europe, then certainly the moment any such abrogating
thermo-unclear weapons show their face the moment lighting
It the Russians even think that it is our intention to drop
any area where land lighting is going on show the CONTINUE
weight of nuclear power is required in tactical areas that is to
Soviet Union or does it independently mean that we must use whatever
strategic target, such as a centre of population inside the
saves us: does the White paper mean that we must be me-bared
of aggression in Europe... The real question we must ask om-
scale thermo-unclear war must be the inevitable consequence
in this respect is that it does not make clear whether full-
the deterrent. The aberring xxx ambiguity of the White paper
deferent of mutual terror, the greater the terror the greater
"...It we are relying, as the Prime Minister suggested, on the

speech of March 1st, 1932:

spare young members of Parliament, in his reply to Sir Winston Churchill's
all-out war. These were the arguments advanced by Winston Churchill, one of the
convoy them to the enemy would have contributed to thinking on an unnecessarily
after contingency the failure to consider alternatives in advance and to
its ambiguity as implying a declaration to undertake local defense. In fine
it may as well induce the Soviets either to disbelieve the threat or to estimate
American) position might increase Soviet attentions, but they assert that
deterrence admit that the ambiguity of the British (and for that matter the
in the abrogation of power were being considered. The advocates of graduated

323

358

us with no alternative between self-destruction...and appeasement...
If it becomes a question of competitive mutual blackmail at this
level between a Communist <u>communist</u> dictatorship and a Western
democracy, the Communist dictatorship is likely to win every time...
It has always been a fact in warfare that when war begins fighting
goes on where the war begins and this will be so in another war.
I am suggesting that it is in our interest if the deterrent
fails to limit the area and mode of the fighting to the greatest
possible extent." ²⁷

The difference between the advocates of "graduated deterrence"
and the Government position thus resolved itself into the aspect from which
they viewed the British strategic problem. The Government looked at it from
the point of view of achieving maximum deterrence and they identified this
with the threat of maximum destruction. But the advocates of graduated
deterrence were concerned with the strategy to conduct a war, they sought
<u>above all</u> to insure that it would be fought in a non-catastrophic manner.

They argued that deterrence was achieved above all by the certainty of reta-
liation. A threat, however ominous, that was not likely to be carried out
would be ineffective. A strategy, so *their* argument goes, that inevitably
involves destruction of the national substance would be self-defeating. As
a result, the advocates of "graduated deterrence" have proposed a strategy that
would return war to a battlefield, however defined, and directed against
hostile military forces and not against civilian morale or industrial facilities.

There is a disagreement within this group whether the limitation should include
²⁹. Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955. See also Healy, "The Atom Bomb and
the Alliance," *Confluence*, March 1956. Healy, "The Bomb that Didn't go off,"
*Encounter*, July 1955.

359

a distinction between "conventional" and "nuclear" weapons or whether if "unconventional weapons" are used these should not be gas rather than nuclear weapons. This group believes that the distinction between the tactical and strategic employment of nuclear weapons is so difficult to draw that any employment of nuclear weapons <u>will</u> inevitably lead to all-out war. Graduated deterrence in this view involves the renunciation of nuclear weapons.

The majority group, on the other hand, starts from the premise that with the spread of nuclear technology a renunciation of nuclear weapons is illusory and ultimately disadvantageous for the West because of the Soviet superiority in conventional armaments. They, therefore, advocate two steps as a means to mitigate the horrors of nuclear war: the development of a strategy and a military capability which permits an intermediary course between all-out war and surrender. As indicated in the speech by Denis Healy, they suggest a distinction between military and civilian targets. "There are no strategic or tactical weapons" said Denis Healy "only strategic and tactical targets."

J. R. Harvard (Commons), March 1, 1922.

In their view axxixth infinitesimal declaration that the West would resultate or tactical weapons" said Denis Healy "only strategic and tactical targets." 36) 38) a distinction between military and civilian targets. "There are no strategic war and surrender. As indicated in the abovementioned Denis Healy, they sought a military capability which permits an immediately convenient between all-out to mitigate the horrors of nuclear war: the development of a strategy and in conventional armaments. They, therefore, advocate two steps as a means and ultimately disadvantageous for the West because of the Soviet underpriority the abovementioned technology a remuneration of nuclear weapons is insufficient. The majority group on the other hand, starts from the premise that with of the advocates of Graduated Delivrance (Harden) of nuclear weapons.

out war. Graduated deterrence in this view involves the remuneration of employment of nuclear weapons xxxxxxxx will inevitably lead to all-strategic employment of nuclear weapons is so difficult to draw that any weapon. This group believes that the distinction between the tactical and "unconventional weapons" are used these should not be gas rather than nuclear a distinction between "conventional" and "unclear" weapons or whether it

360

only against military targets explicitly defined and that only *at* targets in
a battlezone of a specified width would be attacked, would suffice to limit
a war. They admit that such a course would reduce the extent of the threat
of retaliation but they believe it would be outweighed by the greater like-
lihood of its being applied. The course advocated amounts to a strategy of
limited nuclear war even for the defense of Europe. 29
31)

By contrast, the British government has insisted that deterrence was
achieved by posing an ambiguous threat which left open the possibility of
unlimited retaliation. The proponents of the predominant strategic school
in Great Britain, just as their counterparts in the United States, attack
graduated deterrence for two contradictory reasons: that a distinction between
the tactical and strategic uses of weapons was difficult to make and impossible
to enforce; and that an intermediary course by reducing the Soviet dangers
would increase its willingness to run risks. "Much has been said and written
about the proposal for so-called graduated deterrence," said Sir Walter Monckten,
then British Minister of Defense. "...I am far from saying that any aggressive
move would inevitably be countered by the use of the hydrogen bomb. One cannot

See Sir A. W. Buzzard, "Graduated Deterrence," *World Politics*, January 1956.
For an American view see, Leghorn, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars,"
*U.S. News and World Affairs*, . See below chapter ____ for
fuller development of these points.

Under development of these bounds.

H.2. News and World Affairs.
For an American view see, 'Leghorn,' "No Need to Pump Cities to Win Wars."

St. See Sir A. W. Brussell, "Graduated Deterrence," *World Politics*, January 1950.

move would inevitably be countered by the use of the hydrogen bomb. One cannot
decide British Minister of Defense. "...I am far from saying that any aggressive
apart the proposal for so-called graduated deterrence," said Sir Walter Monckten,
would increase its willingness to run risks. "Which has been said and written
enforce it and that an immediately convenient means of weapons was difficult to make and indestructible

the tactical and strategic needs of weapons was difficult to make and indestructible
graduated deterrence for two contradictory reasons: that a distinction between
in Great Britain, that as their counterparts in the United States, attack
unlimited retaliation. The proponents of the predominant strategic school
achieved by basing an enormous threat which left open the possibility of

By contrast, the British Government has initiated that deterrence was

limited unless war even for the defense of Europe.

In proof of its being abridged. The course advocated amounts to a strategy of retaliation but they believe it would be outweighed by the greater like- a war. They admit that and a course would reduce the extent of the threat a passes one of a specified width would be attacked, would suffice to limit only against military targets explicitly defined and that only targets in

361

be specific in matters of this kind but one can imagine circumstances in
which local aggression might be dealt with quite effectively by local reta-
liation. One cannot say that local retaliation would not involve the tactical
use of atomic weapons...Nevertheless, I do not think that it would be a
practicable policy for any government to define precisely in advance the
circumstances in which it would use some weapons and not others. Any attempt
to make a definition of that kind in advance...might help others who might
be pondering on the question of whether they could take risks, to see how
far they might go without bringing down upon them, the ultimate deterrent...
Moreover there is the further consideration that even if it were assumed that
the policy of graduated deterrence was right in itself, would there be any
reasonable ground for believing that its adoption would ensure the adoption
of a similar policy by other parties to the argument. I think there are solid
grounds for taking the opposite view."

Graduated deterrence was therefore rejected as both impractical and unwise, as making aggression more likely by reducing the threat to the aggressor and as being unable to prevent all-out war because of the impracticability of making any distinctions. These arguments were not only inconsistent

32. Hansard (Commons), February 28, 1956, p.10-24 f8.
30

["30", "Heward (Commons), February 58, 1926, p. 1024 ff.", "capital of making any distinctions. These arguments were not only inconsistent with the statement of the arguments of the aggressor, but as being made to prevent all-out war because of the impracticability of making aggression more likely by repressing the threat to the universe, as making aggression more likely by repress

362

with each other but also with British defense policy. For if it was impractical to make distinctions, it would be impossible to employ nuclear weapons even in the local peripheral wars which both the White Paper on Defense and Sir Walter Monckton's statement admitted, While if it was unwise to make distinctions between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, it could be so only because of its practicality. Moreover the deliberate obscurity of Sir Walter Monckton's statement had explicitly left open the possibility even in Europe, of a less than all-out response. And equipping the British army with tactical been another symptom of nuclear weapons had given this possibility, a concrete expression. But if there was any point in the ambiguity of the British (and American) position, it could only be that aggression might be dealt with by means other than all-out war while leaving open the threat of what Sir Walter Monckton called the "ultimate deterrent."

Such a course seems to combine the disadvantages of both massive retaliation and graduated deterrence. If it is true that aggression is best deterred by the threat of maximum destructiveness the ambiguity of the announced British position and the existence of tactical atomic weapons might encourage aggression by giving rise to the notion that aggression would be dealt with locally. On the other hand, given the prevalent British strategic views such

focally. On the other hand, given the prevalent British strategic views and
aggression by giving rise to the notion that aggression would be dealt with
Britishition and the existence of tactical atomic weapons might encourage
deterred by the threat of maximum destructiveness the ambiguity of the announced
retaliation and graduated deterrence. It is the true that aggression is dealt
such a course seems to combine the disadvantages of both massive
called the "ultimate deterrent."

Belligerent while leaving open the threat of what Sir Walter Monckton
only be that aggression might be dealt with by means other than all-out war
was any point in the ambiguity of the British (and American) position, it could
nuCLEAR weapons had been thus this ambiguity a concrete expression. But it there
been another symptom of
that a less than all-out response, And describing the British army with tactical
given in Envoys
of Sir Walter Monckton's statement had explicitly felt open the feasibility
that be so only because of its practicality. Moreover the deliberate opacityity
distinctions between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, if
Sir Walter Monckton's statement admitted, While it waswise to make
even in the local peripheral areas which both the White Paper on Defense and
on the peripheries of Europe
tical to make distinctions, it would be impossible to embed nuclear weapons
with each other put also with British defense policy. For it was impre-

305

363

an attack on Western Europe was certain to lead to all-out war. Thus it would seem that the clearest kind of warning would provide the most effective deterrent. The British Statement on Defense sought to reconcile this inconsistency by implying that tactical nuclear weapons might be utilized in localized conflicts. If tactical nuclear weapons, however, were suitable to deter or defeat aggression outside of Europe, it was difficult to see why they should not prove equally effective on the Continent. And if a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons was possible in peripheral wars, it seemed only logical that the same distinction could hold in Europe.

Nor was the notion that only the threat of total destruction could deter aggression in Europe a foregone conclusion. In areas other than in an attack on Western Europe, To be sure, aggression might be deterred by the threat of total devastation; but equally it would be deterred if an aggressor saw no possible gain by an attack. As long as the U.S.S.R. could not calculate a reasonable margin for success in an attack on Western Europe, it would presumably refrain from undertaking it. Finally, the argument that Europe might be defended by limited nuclear war does not eliminate recourse to all-out

33. See Sir John Slessor. "The H-Bomb or Graduated Deterrence," *International Affairs*, April 1956. Also Sir John Slessor in *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May or June 1956, and General Gruenther's statement in *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1956.

31 Affairs, April 1956. Also Sir John Slessor in *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May or June 1956, and General Gruenther's statement in *New York Times*, Nov. 14, 1956.

May or June 1962, and General Grenadier's statement in New York Times, Nov. 14, 1962, 31

might be defended by limited nuclear war does not eliminate recourse to all-out
breachually retain from undertaking it. Finally, the argument that Enrobe
a reasonable margin for success in an attack on Western Europe, if would
no feasible gain by an attack. We took as the U.2.S.R. could not calculate
of total devastation; but equally if would be deferred if an aggressor saw
on Western Europe. To be sure, aggression might be deferred by the threat
aggression in Europe a foregone conclusion, in areas other than in an attack
Nor was the notion that only the threat of total destruction could deter
war, it seemed only logical that the same distinction could hold in Europe.

a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons was possible in peripheral
to see why they should not prove equally effective on the Continent. And it
suitable to deter or defeat aggression outside of Europe, it was difficult
localized conflicts. summing up outside Europe
statutory by implying that tactical nuclear weapons might be utilized in
deterrent. The British statement on Defense sought to reconcile this incon-
would seem that the greatest kind of warning would provide the most effective
an attack on Western Europe was certain to lead to all-out war.

June it

364

war should graduated deterrence fail. Graduated deterrence simply represents an attempt to avoid having the most catastrophic strategy as the only recourse to Soviet moves and as the initial riposte to any challenge.

Thus British strategic doctrine suffers from the same ambiguities as that of the United States. Even more incongruously than in our case, it represents a nostalgia for a period when security could be absolute and threats were unambiguous. It is therefore an attempt not only to deal with the Soviet danger, but also to escape too close a dependence on both Britain's American and Continental allies. In the process, it attempts to apply the lessons of World War II and the period of the atomic monopoly when strategy needed to consider only the damage it could inflict and not the blows it might suffer.

In exalting the physical component of deterrence, it disregards the psychological element above all that strategy must seek to harmonize power with the willingness to use it. And for this reason, the British strategic doctrine, just as that of massive retaliation is inconsistent with a policy of alliances.

Vis-a-vis the United States, the British striking force does not give the United Kingdom a stronger negotiating position because it represents only a marginal increment to the capability where we are strongest. The bases afforded us by Britain are more important for our strategy and more useful to British

na dy Britain are more important for our strategy and more useful to Britain
marginal increment to the capability where we are strongest. The passage allowed
United Kingdom a stronger negotiating position because it represents only a
Vice-a- via the United States, the British striking force does not give the
just as that of massive refutation is inconsistent with a policy of alliances.

Alliances—so-called. And for this reason, the British strategic doctrine,
logical element, states all that strategy must seek to harmonize power with the
In existing the previous component of deterrence, it distinguishes the bataillon—
consider only the damage it could inflict and not the flows it might suffer.
World War II and the period of the atomic monopoly when strategy needed to
and Continental allies. In the process, it attempts to addity the reasons of
danger, put into to escape too close a dependence on both Britain's American
were unimportant. It is therefore an attempt not only to deal with the Soviet
represents a noose for a period when security could be spastic and threats
that of the United States. Even more incongruously than in our case, it
Tina British strategic doctrinebullers from the same ambiguities as
to Soviet moves and as the initial rationale to any challenge.

an attempt to avoid having the most catastrophic strategy as the only recourse
war should bequated deterrence itself. Graduated deterrence simply represents

307

diplomacy than the British strategic air force. And with respect to Europe
the emphasis on an all-out strategy undermines the willingness of the conti-
nental powers to undertake a substantial military effort. The primary use
of the British bomber force is that if frees Britain in a small degree from
its dependence on the target selection of the U.S. Strategic Air Force in an
all-out war; to a small degree only because it could not hope to win an air-
battle by itself.

Thus the British defense effort reveals an absence of an agreed strategy
with the United States on the one hand and with the Continental powers on
the other. And the absence of this agreement is a reflection of our own
strategic doctrine; indeed it represents logical application of it. The crisis
of NATO is therefore in one sense caused by the fact that NATO for many of
its components serves no useful military purpose.

its components serve no meaningful military purpose.

of NATO is therefore in one sense caused by the fact that NATO for many of
strategic doctrine; indeed it represents logical application of it. The criteria
the other. And the absence of this agreement is a reflection of our own
with the United States on the one hand and with the Continental powers on

Thus the British defense effort reveals an absence of an agreed strategy
pattress by itself.

all-out war; to a small degree only because it could not hope to win an air-
its dependence on the target selection of the U.2. Strategic Air Force in an
of the British Bomber Force is that it trees Britain in a small degree from
mental powers to undertake a substantial military effort. The primarily nae
the emphasis on an all-out strategy underlies the willingness of the confi-
diplomacy than the British strategic air force. And with respect to Europe

by the conviction that whatever the outcome of ann all-out war, they would
in the meantime have suffered the ravages of Soviet occupation. And impotence
was compounded by ignorance for the Continental powers did not possess a
nuclear establishment of their own and the United States Atomic Energy Act
made it extremely difficult if not impossible for them to profit from our
technology.

Thus decisions on nuclear strategy were taken in an atmosphere that
would only emphasize the sense of impotence of the Continental powers; it
made both for a proliferation of inconsistent strategies as well as for a
reduced willingness to undertake any military effort. Not without justice
could a leading German newspaper comment editorially on the NATO decision of
December 17, 1954 to base its defense on nuclear weapons: "Allied atomic
strategy already exerts an influence on our political destiny, such as the
Prussian General Staff never dared contemplate." There are many reasons
for the lagging build-up of NATO, not all of them connected with United States
strategy. But the difficulty of assigning a strategic significance to a
Continental defense contribution has been perhaps the single most important
factor.

32 FAZ 23 June, 1955.

The inconsistencies and ambiguities of NATO strategy have reacted perhaps most strongly in Germany, the country which would have to bear the first impact of a Soviet attack and the defense contribution of which has been considered to be the keystone of NATO. This impact was all the greater because for the first eight years of the post-war period very little discussion of military problems took place in Germany. This was due in part to the shock of total defeat, in part to the conviction that Germany would be protected if at all by the United States atomic monopoly. Moreover although the German officer corps contained some extremely able strategists, their complete subjugation by Hitler, the loss of the war and the attack on the officer corps in the immediate post-war period caused most of Germany's military experts to devote their writings to a study of the past or to a defense of their actions.

Many felt no doubt that out of military developments for nearly ten years they were lacking the necessary information to venture into new fields such as atomic warfare. As a result, except for reprinting without comment a few articles by Western experts, such as J. Robert Oppenheimer and Sir John Slessor, only about a dozen articles on the subject of the influence of nuclear weapons on political and military affairs appeared in Germany

between 1950 and 1954. Most of them were simply restatements of the Anglo-
American theory of deterrence and thus explanations that the defense of Germany
depended on the issue of an all-out war. Others represented the overt or
disguized Communist view toward atomic weapons which emphasized their horror
while playing down their impact on strategy.

In the absence of a German defense contribution German military thinking had perforce to remain academic. And it was reinforced by the German conviction that in an all-out war the decision would be reached before German forces could intervene effectively. When the United States began to press for German membership in NATO, however, and German rearmament became a reality, Germany was immediately confronted with the question of the purpose of its military contribution and the place of it in over-all Western strategy.

From the very beginning it became apparent that German rearmament would be justified within Germany not in terms of its contribution to an over-all

33. Oppenheimer's article "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," Foreign Affairs, July 1953, was reprinted in *Aussenpolitik*, IV 1953, p. 703.

34. Russell Grenfell "Die Atombombe als Abschreckungsmittel," *Aussenpolitik* 1954, p. 554. Axel von dem Busche "Moderne Waffen-Atomare Strategy," *Die Zeit* VIII (1953) No. 45, represents the first of these categories; Kampf der Wölker um das Verbot der Atomwaffe und die friedliche Anwendung der Atomenergie," *Berichte des deutschen Wirtschaftsinstituts*, Berlin, V (1954) p. 20 represents the second category.

strategy but only as a means to defend German territory. German newspapers commented critically about the early efforts of NATO to turn the Rhine into a defensive bastion and on the construction of fortifications, depots and airfields on its west bank. And the former German military attaché in London, Geye von Schweppenburg who had commanded an armored division in the last war no doubt gave expression to the predominant feeling in Germany when he stated: "The Germans are not interested in winning the last battle. They want to be defended not liberated."

As a result Allied pronouncements urging German rearmament increasingly advocated it in different terms within Germany than did the prevailing strategic doctrine in the United States and the United Kingdom. In Germany the Allies did not talk of the trip-wire or the plate glass window. On the contrary, General Eisenhower told New York Times correspondent Drew Middleton that the most striking result of the addition of 12 German divisions would be "the extension of the field of practical operations eastward from the Rhine." General asserted that the addition of German troops permitted NATO to give up its earlier strategic concept of a withdrawal behind the

35. 37. See Nüremberger Nachrichten, October 22, 1955.

36. 38. Sueddeutsche Zeitung, October 22, 1955.

37. 39. Foreign Affairs, "Nato Changes Direction", Vol. 31 (1952-53), p. 438.

Rhine and to defend Western Germany. And this was reiterated several times
by General Gruenther.

But Germany's geographic position was so precarious that not even a
strategy that sought to defend the Federal Republic was sufficient to
overcome German hesitations; the next concern was a tactical doctrine which would
hold a Soviet attack on the zonal boundary with the U.S.S.R. In short, even
a defense of Germany which involved a war of movement would face severe
opposition within Germany. The attack on this interpretation of Allied stra-
tegy was led by Adelbert Weinstein perhaps the leading military commentator of
Western Germany in the highly respected and generally pro-Western Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung. And it was supported by Colonel von Bonin one of
the chief planners in the embryo German Defense Ministry who resigned on the
issue of how Germany could best be defended. Weinstein in a brochure appro-
priately entitled "No One Can Win the War" asserted that NATO forces would not
hold the Elbe against the preponderance of Soviet armor and artillery.
Western planners had therefore developed a strategy which envisaged using
German troops as a screen while the main Allied force withdrew to fortified

Sueddeutsche Zeitung, April 13, 1955.

372

positions on both sides of the Rhine from which it would attempt to cut
Soviet communications and trap Soviet troops through a series of encircling
maneuvers. This strategy of elastic defense, according to Weinstein,
would transform Western Germany into a battlefield and in practice amount
to a defense of the Rhine, after all. Such a course was highly alarming
to Weinstein. "Must not every German be deeply shocked by such considerations? We must ask ourselves whether we are the remainder of a nation
fighting for its existence or if we want to become the testing ground for
unrealistic strategists determined to apply dogmatically in our territory
a kind of warfare that can lead only to chaos, and not to victory. The
idea of a bridgehead in the Frankfurt area shows a strangely abstract form
of strategic thinking and a surprising lack of political instinct."

Weinstein accordingly proposed the creation of a static defense belt
along the Soviet boundary 30 miles wide, heavily equipped with anti-tank
weapons and backed by a highly mobile reserve to seal off Soviet breakthroughs.
This too was the essence of a plan developed by the former chief of the
operations section of the German High Command and later head of the planning
section of the embryo German Defense Ministry, Arnt Blank. The plan was

39. Weinstein. *Keiner Kann den Krieg gewinnen*. Bonn, 1955, p. 7-10. Although no authoritative pronouncements regarding allied strategy exists there can be little doubt that Weinstein's version is substantially correct.

40. Weinstein, *ibid.*, p. 12.

first presented by Colonel von Bonim to the German Defense Ministry in
July 1954 and was rejected by the other planners. When Colonel von Bonim
advocate his theories
continued to press his plan through unofficial media he was dismissed. His
plan was subsequently published in the press and caused considerable excite-
ment and discussion. Its salient features reflected the same concern as
Weinstein's plan with preventing not only the occupation of Western Germany
but also the transformation of Western Germany into a battlefield!

Rearmament

> "Rearmament cannot have the purpose of constituting Germany an area of an elastic defense of Western Europe. Nor can its purpose merely be to deter the Soviets from aggression . . . We view rearmament as a means to defend our country on its borders and to spare it, as far as possible, the horrors of a land war . . . We see the only solution of this problem in a program under which aside from a few armored divisions, the overwhelming mass of the new army is organized as blocking formations (Sperverbaende) of the most modern kind. Equipped with large quantities of anti-tank guns and automatic weapons, provided with strong engineer forces . . . fully motorized and hence highly mobile in any kind of terrain . . . and adequately

motorized and hence highly mobile in any kind of terrain ... and adequately
adequate and automatic weapons, provided with strong engineer forces ... fully
of the most modern kind. Equipped with large quantities of anti-tank
programs under which aside from a few armored divisions, the overwhelming
horrors of a land war ... We see the only solution of this problem in a
to defend our country on its borders and to share it, as far as possible, the
be to deter the hostels from aggression ... We view rearmament as a means
of an elastic defense of Western Europe. Nor can its purpose merely

was of the new army is organized as blocking formations (Serverbsende)
program under which aside from a few armored divisions, the overwhelming
horrors of a land war ... We see the only solution of this problem in a
to defend our country on its borders and to share it, as far as possible, the
be to deter the hostels from aggression ... We view rearmament as a means
of an elastic defense of Western Europe. Nor can its purpose merely

Disarmament cannot have the purpose of settling Germany as the forward
stream into the sea.

Weinstein's plan with preventing not only the occupation of Western Germany
ment and discussion. Its salient features reflected the same concern as
plan was immediately published in the press and caused considerable exultation
continued to press his plan through official media he was dismissed. His
advocate was General H. Z. Killeen.

July 1957 and was rejected by the other planners. When Colonel von Bonim
first presented by Colonel von Bonim to the German Defense Ministry in

343

supported by atomic artillery tank blocking units . . . cover a defensive zone
about 30 miles deep along the border of the Red Army and its armored masses.

In other words, it is necessary to view the future German forces not . . .
from the aspect of a defense of Western Europe but from that of a tactical
defense close to the border."

The remarkable thing about these plans is not their revolutionary
quality on which Bonin and Weinstein prided themselves but their conven-
tionality. What was proposed was in effect a World War II type of defense
to which atomic weapons had been added literally as an afterthought,
for
in fact the first draft of Bonin's plan had not contained any reference to
atomic artillery and it had been added to it only after it was decided to
publish it in the press. It was a symptom of the barenness of German
strategic thought that the chief planner of the Defense Ministry could propose
a defensive zone of only 30 miles in a nuclear war and a tactical organization
even more cumbersome than the World War II type of division; indeed the chief
claim advanced by Bonin for his plan was the rigidity it would impose on
military operations. But although Bonin's plan was militarily obsolescent it

43. Der Spiegel, IX (1955), No. 14, pp. 8-9.

42. Parlementarisch-Politische Pressedienst (PPP), April 1955.

375

and was in fact rejected, it reflected the realities of the psychological
situation within Germany. German rearmament could be made acceptable domesti-
cally only if it assured the defense of German territory. In the discussion
about German rearmament the deterrent power of the strategic bombing or its
efficacy were
efficiency for deciding a war was rarely mentioned, partly because of a
large measure of ignorance about the nature of all-out atomic war, but above
all because all-out thermonuclear war does not represent a strategic
option for Germany. Even Bonin's critics accepted his aim; they rejected
his plan either on technical grounds or because current Allied strategy
already encompassed its objectives: "Once Germany was included in NATO"
wrote the official organ of the Association for Military Science, an orga-
nization of prominent former officers, "no military commander could do
anything but to attempt a defense as far forward as possible, that is to
say, at the zone borders. Even if it did not coincide with German
interests as happens to be the case, he would have to do so because of the
insufficient depth of the free Western European area. On the issue of
forward defense Allied and strategic interests are in harmony . . . "

Joachim Rogge. "Strategie des Wunschtraums," *Wehrkunde*, IV, 1778. 1955.
Similar arguments were also advanced by a former chief of staff, Rundstedt.
See Georg von Sodenstern. "Strategie oder Sicherheit," *Weltwissenschaft-
liche Rundschau*, 1955, V, p. 2894.

376

It is against this background that the realization of the nuclear age burst upon Germans. All strategic discussions until the end of 1954 had assumed either an atomic war fought as a strategic airbattle between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and it was therefore irrelevant to Germany's strategic problem; or they had been based on the proposition that atomic weapons were so costly and difficult to manufacture that they would be employed only against strategic targets. But when the NATO council on December 17, 1954 decided that tactical atomic weapons would be used in the defense of Europe, the problem of the nature of nuclear war became of cardinal importance for German strategic thought. Even then most German military men continued to insist that atomic weapons had not affected the basic principles of strategy or tactics, as they had been applied in the two World Wars.

German strategic thought had thus occurred in a vacuum impelled more by the desire to avoid Soviet occupation than an understanding of the implications of Allied strategy and compounded by a lack of comprehension of

44 46. Otto Wien. "Gedanken über den strategischen Luftkrieg," *Wehrkunde*, 1954, III, p. 352.

45 47. Eberhard Schmid-Krusemarck. "Zur Anwendung der Atomwaffen im Felde," *Wehrkunde*, 1954, III, p. 355.

nuclear matters. It was inevitable that the first exposure to the real
NATO strategy would come as a severe shock to German public opinion, all
the more so because it was psychologically unprepared for the Anglo-
American emphasis on air strategy. The occasion for the German awakening
to the nature of Allied strategy was a tactical exercise conducted by the Allied
Air Forces in Central Europe between June 20 and 28, 1955 and code named, somewhat
inappropriately, Carte Blanche. Based on accepted air doctrine that the
key to success was the elimination of the hostile airforce by bombing enemy
airfields, with the greatest possible power and in the shortest span of time,
Carte Blanche for the first time involved the simulated mass drop of atomic
bombs over Western Germany, the Lowlands and Eastern France. The exercise
was conducted in a north-south direction not only because of political
considerations but mainly to afford sufficient space
for maneuver for high speed jet aircraft. True to the U.S.-U.K. doctrine,
the exercise began with a surprise attack by Northland (N.W. Germany,
Holland and Belgium) on air bases and other installations in Southland
(South Germany, Eastern France). In the first attack 25 nuclear weapons were
dropped. On the following day forces of Southland dropped 55 bombs on

378

Northland targets, half of them on airfields. Altogether 335 bombs were dropped within 48 hours, 171 on Southern and 164 on Northern targets.

Thus Germany was exposed for the first time to a demonstration of what had heretofore been an abstract and esoteric doctrine, however well developed it had been in Great Britain and the United States. Here was the surprise attack on airfields, the quick retaliation, the emphasis on maximum destructiveness. The impact of Carte Blanche was all the greater because it took place before an audience composed of a large number of German journalists who had been invited as observers and who had been flown all over the exercise area in Allied military aircraft. It was therefore certain that the full realization of the meaning of nuclear war would be brought home to a psychologically unprepared population. In their extensive accounts of Carte Blanche, the journalists combined praise for the realistic execution of the exercise with warnings about the grim prospects posed by atomic warfare for Europe and its peoples. All accounts stressed that in an atomic war it would make little difference whether it would be fought with tactical or strategic weapons. For what could victory mean in a war that would have brought total devastation to the area between Heli-

379

goland, Salzburg, Dunkirk and Dijon?

As a result German strategic thinking only recently striving for an
an adaptation of World War II doctrine to the ground defense of the zonal
border came full circle against the realities of the nuclear period. And
because the exposure had been so sudden the conclusion drawn lacked any
differentiation. For what emerged in Germany first crudely and then in
more sophisticated formulations was the assertion that any employment of
nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to all out war thus bringing into
question the whole basis of German rearmament. "Against the background
of the air-war test the defense debate in Parliament strikes us as
somewhat stale," wrote a leading South German newspaper. "... If it is
true that the NATO maneuvers have revealed a strategic revolution the effect
will be to blur the line between atomic and conventional weapons which so
far has furnished the rationale of the 12 German divisions. The benefits
supposedly derived from rearmament would become meaningless and obsolete
while it was still in progress. "Much that has been said in the past
about the German defense contribution," wrote Weinstein "must be considered dated.

46. ~~47.~~ *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, July 2, 1955.

47. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1955.

At the time the German divisions were first being planned the Americans in Korea were -- for six months -- vainly trying to find a worthwhile target for an atomic bomb. The development of atomic production then made the bomb a precariously scarce weapon, demanding that it be used only against decisive targets. Today, however, so many atomic weapons can be employed that total A-warfare has become a reality and the strategy of 1951 is therefore obsolete in 1955."

Carte Blanche had been designed as a warning to the Soviets and a means to reassure the Germans that NATO, by using tactical nuclear weapons, would be able to protect them. In fact, it became a demonstration that the power of nuclear weapons inhibits their use unless they are coupled with a doctrine for their employment which poses less stark alternatives than total devastation and unless this doctrine is well understood by public opinion. "From the point of view of psychological warfare," wrote the Bonn correspondent of the leading Swiss newspaper, "the outcome of the air battle was indecisive as far as the German public was involved. The element of alarm that Carte Blanche produced has been systematically kept

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 27, 1955.

381

alive by some publicists. Their aim obviously was to interpret Carte Blanche
in a way that would make the 12 German divisions appear hopelessly out of
DATE . . . Now the political aim of CarteBlanche undoubtedly was to give
the enemy a convincing demonstration that the West possessed enough tactical
atomic weapons to destroy his airbases and assembly areas . . . However the
danger that the strategic content of NATO is being undermined in the public
consciousness of the Federal Republic by fears of atomic war is not to be
taken lightly. It will have to be dealt with sooner or later."

Unfortunately the government of the Federal Republic has not been able
to deal with this problem because it was beset by the same ambivalence
towards nuclear weapons which we have already seen to characterize the
strategic thought of Great Britain and the United States. No more than the
long established nuclear powers has the German government been able to decide
on the feasibility of limited nuclear war in Europe or on the meaning purpose
of conventional forces if an attack on Western Europe inevitably unleashed
all out war. In the absence of doctrinal clarity it has therefore sought to
justify its defense effort as affording protection for every contingency --

50. Neue Züricher Zeitung, July 13, 1955.

20. Neue Wurzacher Zeitung, July 13, 1922.

Inarity its defense effort as attempting protection for every contingency -- all out war. In the absence of doctrinal clarity it has therefore sought to of conventional forces an attack on Western Europe inevitably unleashed on the susceptibility of limited nuclear war in Europe or on the�ching B nappe long established nuclear powers has the German Government been able to decide strategic thought of Great Britain and the United States. No more than the towards nuclear weapons which we have already seen to characterize the to deal with this problem because it was dealt by the same impatience

Unfortunately the Government of the Federal Republic has not been able taken lightly. It will have to be dealt with sooner or later."

conscience of the Federal Republic by force of atomic war is not to be danger that the strategic content of NATO is being undermined in the radioactive weapons to destroy his airbases and assembly areas . . . However the enemy a convincing demonstration that the West possesses enough tactical date . . . Now the political aim of Carle Blanche undoubtedly was to give in a way that would make the 15 German divisions appear hopelessly out of

five by some belligerents. Their aim obviously was to interpret Carle Blanche

381

guerilla war, conventional war, limited nuclear war and all out nuclear war --
in
and/this too they have followed the model of the United States and the United
Kingdom. Thus the ten Defense minister Blank replied to the critics of
Carte Blanche by a *mélange* of partially inconsistent statements: that the
tests in Nevada had demonstrated that ground troops if properly dispersed
could survive an atomic attack; that both sides, in a period of nuclear
plenty, might abstain from using any nuclear weapons thereby making conven-
tional war more likely; that in any case ground troops were required to defend
airbases and to occupy territory. And the same arguments were repeated
in the debate about conscription by an official spokesman for the govern-
ment party.

But to seek to be prepared for every contingency is to be prepared
for none. It is true that ground forces can survive an atomic attack, but
only if they have been properly prepared and if they use the tactics appropriate
for nuclear war. The root fact of German rearmament, however, has been that
until well into 1966 the German army was conceived entirely as a conventional
force while the British and American troops were equipped with atomic weapons
and NATO had explicitly decided that nuclear weapons could be used in the
defense of Western Europe. It may be possible to use the nuclear stalemate
as a shield behind which to fight a conventional war. But the nature of a
*Trained
would


51. *Bulletin des Bundespresseamtes*, July 19, 1955, p. 113; see also p. 42.

52. *Das Parlament*, July 11, 1956.

383

war depends not only on one's intentions but also on the assessment of these
intentions by the other side. And the presence of atomic cannons, the Carte
Blanche exercise and the frequent pronouncements of Allied military leaders
seem to insure, that if the Soviet army launches itself into Europe it is
likely to do so with the expectation of a nuclear war. Finally in an
all-out war, the protection of air bases is undoubtedly of crucial impor-
tance. It is more than doubtful however whether these air bases should or
would be located on German territory or whether German public opinion would
consider the protection of Allied air bases a sufficient justification for a
defense effort.

The problem in Germany, therefore resolved itself, as it had in the
other countries of the Alliance, into a question of the feasibility of local
nuclear war and the meaning of a German defense effort should the answer to
the former question be in the negative. Chancellor Adenauer obviously
believed in the possibility of a local war in Europe because he used it as an
argument in favor of conscription: "It is unrealistic always to imagine that
a future war will be fought in the largest scale. I am of the opinion that
it is essential to confine any potential conflict to one of local character ...

it is essential to continue any potential conflict to one of local character...
a future war will be fought in the largest scale. I am of the opinion that
argument in favor of consideration: "If it is unreasonable always to imagine that
believed in the feasibility of a local war in Europe because he need it as an
the former question be in the negative. Chancellor Adenauer optionally
unclear war and the meaning of a German defense effort should the answer to
other countries of the Alliance into a question of the feasibility of local
The problem in Germany, therefore resolved itself as if had in the
defense effort.

consider the protection of Allied air passes a sufficient justification for a
would be located on German territory or whether German public opinion would
fiance. It is more than doubtful however whether these air passes should or
all-out war, the protection of air passes is undoubtedly of crucial import-
likely to us do so with the expectation of a unclear war. Finally in an
seem to insure, that if the Soviet army launches itself into Europe it is
Blenche exercise and the trendent pronouncements of Allied militarily leaders
intentions by the other side. And the presence of atomic canons, the Carte
war degends not only on one's intentions but also on the assessment of these

383

so as to prevent the outbreak of a continental war with rockets."

But if Dr. Adenauer believed in the theoretical possibility of a local war in Europe neither his policy and even less than of his chief allies had prepared the political or psychological framework for it. For limited war presupposes an understanding by the opponent of one's intentions; it cannot be improved in the confusion of combat. But the deliberate ambiguity of Allied defense policy, the explicit rejection of Graduated Deterrence, the constantly repeated warning of instant, massive retaliation, while perhaps useful for deterrence also force the U.S.S.R. to calculate that any military adventures in Europe would be tantamount to an all out war. In the absence of generally understood rules any utilization of nuclear weapons is likely to lead to all out war.

It is crucial that the nature of limited nuclear war be understood in Germany for public opinion and even the views of political and military leaders have come to identify nuclear war with all out war. In such a situation the stationing of atomic cannons in Western Europe, the NATO decision of

52.

53. *Bulletin des Bundespresseamtes*, August 21, 1956.

385

17 December 1954 to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe far from
and
reassuring German opinion is likely to confirm a feeling of futility to
inhibit any German defensive effort. No final formal announcements of a
forward strategy are likely to shake the conviction that in an all out war
the territory of Germany is of marginal importance and a local defense
inelevant
largely inelement. "As conventional weapons are losing their importance,
Dethleffsen
the West will be less dependent on German soldiers" wrote Erich Settleffen, a
former general and now head of an influential group of industrialists and
scientists \*Wirtschaftspolitische Vereinigung von 1947\*. 7.
"West Germany will become less significant for the Americans . . . as the
center of gravity of warfare shifts to atomic weapons . . . The radar
manning net reaching from North Africa over Spain and France to England
and including Germany could provide adequate protection of the American
continent against atomic attack." 54, 53.

While for Great Britain and the United States the ambivalence with
respect to limited nuclear war leads to the adoption of the costliest
strategy in case deterrence fails, for the Continental nations and for

53.

54. Erich Dethleffsen. "Apathie des Grauens," *Offene Welt*, No. 38, July 1955

386

Germany above all it is a question of life and death. Carte Blache and the
NATO decision to use nuclear weapons could be reassuring for Germany only if it
were coupled with a doctrine that takes account of the primary fears of Ger-
many: that its territory would become a battleground or that it would suffer
Soviet occupation. Carte Blanche demonstrated that the Allied airforces
in Europe could in effect fight only with atomic weapons or so at least
responsible Germans interpreted it. But it did not show the relationship
of the reliance of nuclear weapons to the strategic problems of Germany.
In the face of the generally held notion that the employment of nuclear
-weapons would inevitably lead to all out war, the military purpose of the
alliance seemed to disintegrate. Fritz Erler, one of the leaders of the
Soviet Democratic party expressed the German disquiet over an allinace in which
Germany seemd to have no military function in a bitter speech before the
German Parliament: "We are about to become an ally who is no longer
acceptable, as the belated echo of a policy about to be discarded. We should
heed the warning furnished by such examples as Syngman Rhee, Chiang-Kai shek

54.

55. See an assessment in the professional Wehrkunde, 1955, IV, p. 351.

387

or Bao Dai. The damage which would result from such a development would
have to be borne by the entire German nation.

Thus at the precise moment that the legal obstacles to German
rearmament had been removed through German membership in NATO and the
passage of the conscription law, all the strategic presuppositions of the
German defense effort were brought into question because of the inability
of the Western alliance to develop a strategic doctrine equally meaningful
for all its members. Germany was not interested in being a trip wire;
indeed it would interpret the trip wire theory only as a symptom of a lack
of resolution on the part of its allies. It is paradoxical that this should
have occurred when the advent of low yield nuclear weapons in quantity makes
possible a ground defense of Western Europe for the first time since the
creation of NATO. Such a strategy is inhibited, however, by the doctrinal
confusion among the allies, the nostalgia on the one hand to return to
conventional warfare and the insistence on the other on the total solutions
of all out war. Nothing illustrates the plethora of proposed solutions better
than the military establishment that has grown up on German soil: tactical
airforces based on the use of nuclear weapons and wedded to a doctrine of

55

56. Das Parlament, July 7, 1956.

Das Parlament, Jgk 1, 1936.

Airforce based on the use of nuclear weapons and wedged to a doctrine of
than the military establishment that has grown up in German soil: tactical
of all out war. Nothing illustrates the cleavages of proposed solutions better
conventional warfare and the inconstance on the other hand to return to
conclusion among the allies, the anomalies on the one hand to return to
possible a ground defense ofxxx Europe for the first time since the
creation of NATO. Such a strategy is indigested, however, by the doctrinal
have occurred when the advent of low yield nuclear weapons in quantity makes
of resolution on the part of its allies. It is paradoxical that this should
induce it would interpret the third wire theory only as a symptom of a lack
for all its members. Germany was not interested in being a third wire
of the Western alliance to develop a strategic doctrine equally meaningful
German defense effort was brought into question because of the inaptly ty
have been
basque of the conscription law, all the strategic breachpoints of the
rearmament had been removed through German membership in NATO and the
Thus at the precise moment that the legal obstacles to German
have to be borne by the entire German nation.

or Bao Det. The核 damage which would result from such a development would

387

air superiority which bids fair to transform any war into an all out slugfest;

American and British divisions of essentially World War II structure but backed by atomic cannons, which are themselves a hybrid weapons; a logistic structure dependent on a very small number of supply centers which would be evaporated by a few well placed nuclear weapons. And all this is backed up by the United States and British strategic airforces capable of fighting a war without any reference to NATO and outside its direct control.

Against this background and given their lack of knowledge of nuclear matters what is surprising is not the nature of German criticism of NATO strategy but its moderation. Nevertheless it is clear that the psychological basis of a common effort is disintegrating (the power of the alliance is growing). There seems little sense in developing conventional German divisions when the doctrine of its chief allies is based on a nuclear strategy. But even a German army equipped with the most modern weapons and trained with the most up-to-date tactics will lack a sense of direction unless it can be given a place in a coherent strategy. NATO has become an organization in search of a purpose.

was become an organization in search of a purpose.

direction unless it can be given a place in a coherent strategy. NATO weapons and trained with the most nu- to-date tactics will lack a sense of a nuclear strategy. But even a German army equipped with the most modern functional German divisions when the doctrine of its chief allies is based on the alliance is growing. There seems little sense in developing conven-
in sums carelessness.

be psychological basis of a common effort is disintegrating (the power even while

unclear matters what is appealing is not the nature of German criticism
Against this background and given their lack of knowledge of
a war without any reference to NATO and outside its direct control.

by the United States and British strategic airforces capable of lighting
emphasized by a few well placed nuclear weapons. And all this is packed up
atmosphere dependent on a very small number of sub parity centers which would be
packed by atomic weapons which are themselves a hybrid weapon; a logistic
American and British divisions of essentially World War II atmosphere put
air superiority which pides fair to transform any war into an all out single leaf!

388

IV

If in Great Britain and the United States the impact of nuclear weapons
has produced a debate between the advocates of massive retaliation and of
graduated deterrence and if in Germany it resolved itself into an inquiry
into the feasibility of limited defense, in France the problems of the nuclear
age have taken the form of a discussion whether it is possible to escape the
dilemmas of nuclear strategy by refusing to participate in it. Alone of the
great powers of the West, France took the position that she refused to
acquire an atomic stockpile at least in the short run. Withal, the decision
served only to postpone France's dilemma. Although the decision to substitute
the peaceful for the military uses of nuclear energy was couched in terms of
high principle, cynics may be forgiven if they assert that the road chosen by
France was her only option, that it represented the most effective means to turn
France into a substantial nuclear military power. For the nuclear age permits
no irrevocable choices. The decision to concentrate on the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy raised as many problems as it solved: the distinction between
military and civilian uses, the role of France in a world of nuclear powers
and the nature of security. And towering above it all was the end-product of

and the nature of security. And towering above it all was the end-product of
military and civilian needs, the role of France in a world of nuclear powers
nuclear energy raised as many problems as it solved: the distinction between
no irrevocable choices. The decision to concentrate on the beautiful needs of
France into a substantial nuclear military power. For the nuclear age permits
France was her only option that it represented the most effective means to turn
high brinche, which may be forgiven if they assert that the road chosen by
the beautiful for the military needs of nuclear energy was conceived in terms of
served only to bovine France's dilemma. Although the decision to abrogate
acquire an atomic stockpile at least in the short run. With that, the decision
Great powers of the West, France took the position that she refused to
diffuse of nuclear strategy by refusing to participate in it. Vione of the
age have taken the form of a discussion whether it is possible to escape the
into the leastability of limited defense, in France the problem of the nuclear
gratified deference and it in Germany it received itself into an industry
has produced a debate between the advocates of massive retaliation and of

It in Great Britain and the United States the impact of nuclear weapons

IV

289

over the peaceful energy program: the constantly growing pile of plutonium which served as a constant temptation to enter the military field, after all, a standing reminder that the nuclear age cannot be solved a priori.

Thus the French reaction to the nuclear period illustrates above all that a nostalgia for conventional technology does not suffice to avoid the dilemmas of the nuclear period because the more France sought to escape these dilemmas the more they abtruded themselves. But while the French decision of April 13, 1955 not to produce nuclear weapons for all its seeming irreversibility did not solve either the French strategic or its political problems, it did cause the debate regarding nuclear matters to be carried on on two incommensurable planes, that of strategy and that of abstract moral principles.

"It is necessary to speak frankly" wrote Paul Gerardot, an advocate of nuclear armaments. "Do we want France to possess, as is possible, the modern and effective arm which can guarantee the defense of her independence and her sovereignty? Or do we really want to resign ourselves to France's having nothing but arms which are outdated and without value, worthy at best of a colonized nation which France incidentally is beginning to become? If we do not want to produce the nuclear arms which are indispensable, it is a waste of resources.

www.gerhard-henrik-dollinger.com

not want to produce the nuclear arms which are indispensible, it is a waste
colonized nation which France incidentally is beginning to become? It we do
nothing but arms which are outpaced and without value, worth at best 4½ a
sovereignty? Or do we really want to reach our selves to France's paving
effective arm which can guarantee the defense of her independence and her
armaments? "Do we want France to possess, as in possible, the modern and
"If it is necessary to ask Frankly, wrote Paul Gerardot, an advocate of nuclear
incompossible planes, that of strategy and that of apятact moral principles.
it did cause the debate regarding nuclear matters to be carried on on two
capability did not solve either the French strategy or its political problems,
or April 13, 1952 shot to produce nuclear weapons for all its existing irrevoc-
these dilemmas the more they attracting themselves. But while the French decelerated
optimum

dilemma of the nuclear period because the more France sought to escape
that a nostrums for conventional technology does not suffice to avoid the
These the French reaction to the nuclear period illustrates above all
a standing reminder that the nuclear age cannot be solved a priori.
which served as a constant temptation to enter the military field, after all,
the beautiful energy program: the necessarily growing life of
butionism
on the
3800

of time to speak about French independence, for economic and political
independence do not exist without a minimum of military independence..."

"So far as the diplomatic aspect of the problem is concerned the response
is clear," replied a spokesman of the Socialist party echoing similar
comments by all parties except the Gaullist. "We should instantly lose the
incontestable prestige which we have acquired as the sole great power having
opted for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We should be classified
immediately as protagonists of the armaments race, alas without even possessing
the bomb."

It was a remarkable argument that France could avoid the impact
of the nuclear period by refusing to participate in its military applications --
a symptom also of a large measure of ignorance about atomic matters. It was
the almost instinctive reaction of a power which saw its influence in the
world decline after centuries of playing the first role and which sought
to substitute prestige for its lack of power. And yet the decision not to
produce nuclear weapons left a vague feeling of uneasiness. For how would
France play the mediating role which was one of the main arguments in
favor of recoupling the production of nuclear weapons, if she did not possess

57. General Paul Gerardot. "Pour des armes atomiques," *Le Monde*, Feb. 2, 1955.

58. Marcel Roubault. "Socialisme et energie nucleaire," *Revue Socialiste*, May 1955, p. 456.

May 1923, p. 420.

21. Marcel Rombout. "Société et énergie nucléaire," *Nouvelle Société*, 2/2.

22. General Paul Gerardot. "Pom des armes atomique," *Le Monde*, Sep. 5, 1922. Favor of recognizing the production of nuclear weapons, it is did not beseas

France play the mediating role which was one of the main arguments in
bruce nuclear weapons felt a negative feeling of uneasiness. For how would
to supplant breathe for its lack of power. And yet the decision not to
world decline after centuries of playing the that role and which sought
the almost inoperative reaction of a power which saw its influence in the
a symptom of a large measure of ignorance about atomic matters. It was
of the unclear period p referring to belligerent in its military applications --
If was a remarkable argument that France could avoid the impact
the pomp."

23 immediately as broCADEATE of the armaments race, since without even possessing
obtained for beautiful use of unclear mm energy. We should be classified
inconclusive BREATH which we have acquired as the sole great power having
commenta p all parties accept the Conflit. "We should instantly lose the
its clear," replied a spokesman of the Société partly echoing similar
"So far as the chibaticolic aspect of the problem is concerned the reasonableness
do not exist without a minimum of military independence..."

24. May time to break apart French independence, for economic and political
independence do not exist without a minimum of military independence...
25.

390a

sufficient strength to give weight to her opinion. "If France and Western Europe wish to be respected and to play an important role in the world," wrote a French deputy "they must possess nuclear arms which cost less than the useless conventional arms with which we are equipped at present...How can Western Europe play the role of a peaceful third force to which she aspires if her defensive organization remains at the mercy of a simple atomic threat." 58)

The French ambivalence was best demonstrated by an editorial in the influential *Le Monde*, supporting the decision not to engage in the production of nuclear weapons, but at the same time warning France's allies against interpreting this as a renunciation of French influence: "The statements by Edgar Faure announcing the French decision to concentrate on peaceful uses of atomic energy⁷ constitute an important political act...France's position, far from undermining her prestige will be able to command respect... Certain commentators in Great Britain have interpreted this renunciation as evidence of 'harmonious cooperation' among the powers in NATO. If by the latter phrase it is to be understood that France has resigned herself to being the 58. Phillip Andre. "Letter to the Editor," *Le Monde*, July 8, 1954.

28. *Briffith Under*. *A letter to the Editor*, " *Le Monde*, July 8, 1967.

bause it is to be understood that France has resumed herself to doing the
enquiry of 'harmonious cooperation', among the powers in NATO. It is the latter
Certain commentators in Great Britain have interpreted this remonstrance as
boastion, tar from underpinning her BREAST will be able to command respect...
name of atomic energy] constitute an important political act...France's
[à la Éggar Laube announcing the French declaration to concentrate on peaceful
against interpreting this as a renunciation of French influence: "The statements
production of nuclear weapons, put at the same time warning France's allies
the influential *Le Monde*, supporting the declaration not to engage in the
The French hegemony was best demonstrated by an editorial in
atomic threat." 29)

abates it per degenerative organization remains at the mercy of a simple
can Western Europe play the role of a benevolent third force to which she
the useless conventional army with which we are equipped at present...How
wrote a French deputy "they want beseas nuclear arms which cost less than
Europe wish to be respected and to play an important role in the world."
insufficient strength to give weight to her opinion. "It France and Western

330

391

tail-end of the alliance, it is necessary to demonstrate that...we intend to
place ourselves at the head of those who wish to eliminate the terrifying
menace which weighs upon the destiny of humanity." 39 Thus France wanted
to have the best of both worlds: she wanted to play a primary role in allied
councils, but without assuming the responsibility for effective defense; she
wanted to remain a great power, but though a policy of minimum risk. It
was little wonder that a French officer replied with exasperation to these
efforts to avoid a problem by denying that it existed:

"It is...normal that the voices of military men in France are calling for atomic armament. What is surprising is that certain circles have been irritated by such a call. These are no doubt the same circles which criticized the military men after June 1940 for preparing for the last war and who sought to explain the causes of our defeat by the lack of imagination of bur higher officers and by a serious backwardness in our armaments.

Today it appears that the military are alone in drawing the lessons of our defeat." 60

But while the French military may have been more realistic than their
political colleagues in insisting on the production of nuclear weapons, the
strategy they proposed for utilizing them became a contributing factor in

producing the inhibitions against proceeding with an arms program. For the
69. *Le Monde*, April 15, 1955.

70. General Paul Gerardot. "La guerre atomique et l'occupation du terrain."
*Revue de Défense Nationale*, April 1955, p. 391.

French military, awakening late to the possibilities of nuclear weapons, integrated them into the only strategic doctrine at hand: the Anglo-American theory of deterrence. As their colleagues across the oceans and the Channel, they asserted that the classical doctrine of the primacy of the ground troops was no longer valid. On the contrary, the air force equipped with nuclear weapons "destroys infallibly and totally the power of the enemy and thus gives to the problem of the occupation of terrain an entirely new aspect." 61)

In fact, in future wars they argued (there would be no need to occupy territory, because the defeated population could be made to obey by the mere threat of nuclear bombings). As a result many French officers are highly critical of the French Defense Ministry for continuing to plan France's defense around the ground forces. "It is in the air that victory must be won" wrote General Gerardot. "It is around the air force that our national defense must be built. It is in the realm of air power that our military and technical effort must be made." 62)

It is not surprising that this school of thought should consider the defense of Europe in terms largely of the ability to effect an immediate retaliatory attack. In the past, it argued, France could usually absorb the

61. Colonel E. J. Debeau. "Les Armes Atomiques et la Défense Nationale," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, July 1955, p. 4.

62. Ibid., p. 396.

394

by France's military men became the rationale for the advocates of French disarmament and French refusal to enter the nuclear race. And in this France was only true to her genius of pressing arguments to their most logical conclusions. The same inhibitions were implicit in the U.S. theory of deterrence and they were kept from reaching the surface only by the persistence of well-established doctrine, the consciousness of greater strength and a social tradition which could live with paradox.

The most eloquent advocate of the position of the French Government has been Jules Moch, the Socialist leader and deputy who has represented France in disarmament negotiations at the U.N. through all changes of French Government, since 1952. Moch, however controversial his views, is not simply a lay politician. A graduate of the famous Ecole Polytechnique and a naval reserve officer, his views command wide respect in official and scientific circles in France. In a book entitled *Human Folly: To Disarm or Perish?*, Moch summed up his views and that of the dominant current of French opinion. Taking the prevailing strategic doctrines as his point of departure, Moch agreed that thermo-nuclear weapons had effected a strategic revolution. But while most advocates of the fersch in London抵d alligney 1955, p. 65, Jules Moch, *Human Folly: To Disarm or Perish? London: Gollancz, 1955.*

Moch

395

revolution in the increased power of the offensive, emphasized Moch the
complete vulnerability of all contenders. In the past, he argued, every
technological advance in the offense had been followed by a corresponding
gain of the defense. Against a determined thermo-nuclear attack, however,
even the most effective defense would not prevent devastating damage. As a
result, thermo-nuclear war could only produce catastrophe. Moch does not
believe that peace could be insured by a "balance of terror," through the
possession of thermo-nuclear weapons by all sides. On the contrary, the fear
of thermo-nuclear war was more likely to create ever greater pressures to forestall them by surprise attack: "How can
the tragic eventuality of nuclear war be avoided," he wrote. "The choice
seems evident. Either nations will continue to run the risk of perishing
in a sudden attack or they will demonstrate sufficient composure, courage and
reason to disarm under international control, in prohibiting under such control
the production for military purposes of fissionable matter...There is no
intermediate solution." (66)

Whatever the validity of Moch's arguments they seemed to reflect the
predominant trend of French opinion. All political parties except the Gaullist

(66) Ibid., pp. 177-178

pp. 131-138. CH. 11-18. 1948.

broadest trend of French opinion. All political parties except the Gaullist
Whatever the validity of Moch's arguments they seemed to reflect the
intermediate solution."

the production for military purposes of treasonable matter... There is no
reason to diamant under international control, in broadening under more control
in a sudden attack or they will demonstrate an insufficient composure, courage and
seems evident. Either nations will continue to run the risk of berating
the tragic eventuality of nuclear war be avoided," he wrote. "The choice
create ever greater breaches to forestall them by surprise attack: "How can
of thermo-unclear war be avoided?"

boastage of thermo-unclear weapons by all sides. On the contrary, the fear
believe that peace could be insured by a "balance of terror," through the
result, thermo-unclear war could only produce catastrophe. Moch does not
even the most effective defense would not prevent devastating damage. As a
gain of the defense. Against a determined thermo-unclear attack, however,
technological advance in the offense had been followed by a corresponding
complete vulnerability of all contenders. In the best, he argued, every
revolution in the increased power of the offensive, emphasised Moch, the
Moch

365

396

party (the RPF) united in opposition against the military applications of
nuclear energy. Their arguments ranged from the great economic benefits of
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, ⁶⁶ to the proposition that France could
promote the relaxation of tensions by not entering the nuclear race; ⁶⁸ to
an appeal that a nuclear military program was inconsistent with the principles
of Christianity. ⁶⁹ And the near unanimity of France's political parties
was reflected in popular opinion. In a public opinion poll conducted in
February 1955 by the *Institut Francais d'Opinion Publique* only thirty-three
per cent of those polled favored the production by France of atomic weapons.
Forty-nine per cent of those polled opposed the production of such weapons.
Eighteen per cent did not indicate a preference. Seventy-nine per cent of
those who opposed a French nuclear military effort did so because they believed
that the possession of nuclear weapons would not strengthen France's hand in
international affairs. It is symptomatic of France's ambivalent attitude towards
the decline of its power that of those who favored a French nuclear arms program

⁶⁶ This was more or less the position of the Radical-Socialist party. See Felix Gaillard, *La France et l'Energie Atomique dans la Paix* et dans la Guerre. Paris: Parti Republicain Radical et Radicale Sociale, 1954, p. 15.

⁶⁷ This was the position of the Socialist party. See *Franc-Tireur*, April 14, 1955.

⁶⁸ This was the position of the Catholic MRP. See Andre Piettre. "Armes Nucleaires et Conscience Chretienne," *Le Monde*, April 16, 1955; also G. Morel "Options Atomiques," *Revue de l'Action Populaire*, May 1955.

397

seventy-six per cent were more interested in the impact of the possession of nuclear weapons on France's allies than on the U.S.S.R. They favored a military program because it "would assure France more independence vis-a-vis her allies." The result of this combination of public and political attitudes was the decision of the French Government of April 13, 1955 in which France recounced the construction of nuclear weapons.

But the problems of the nuclear period cannot be solved so simply. For immediately the question came up about the relationship between military and civilian uses of nuclear energy. Was a ship's engine a military or a civilian instrument? To press to its ultimate conclusion the predominant views about France's role as a conciliator and its duty to renounce the military applications of nuclear power would have been to reduce the French nuclear energy program to absurdity. Thus France, from the very beginning, distinguished between the uses of nuclear energy for propulsion and for explosives. Even before the Government's declaration with respect to nuclear weapons, the Chief of Staff of the French Navy, Admiral Nomy, had revealed that the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine was under study. And less than nine months

70. "La France et les Questions Internationales," *Sondages*, No. 1, 1955, p. 20.

71. Speech by Admiral Nomy to the Federation des amicales d'ancien marins et marins anciens, quoted in *Le Monde*, March 24, 1955.

of marine anclages, dotted in Le Mâge, March 31, 1922.

(1) Speech by Admiral Migny to the Federation des anclages d'ancien marines
(2) "In France of the Creations Internationales," *Soudanoise*, No. 1, 1922, p. 50.

of a nuclear-bombed submarine was under study.

And less than nine months

of attack of the French Navy, Admiral Migny had revealed that the construction
before the Government's declaration with respect to nuclear weapons, the Chief
between the needs of nuclear energy for propulsion and for explosives. Even
energy program to spurdity. The France, from the very beginning, distinguished
substances of nuclear power would have been able to reduce the French nuclear
apart France's role as a confluence and its duty to renounce the military
loan instrument? To press to its ultimate conclusion the predominant views
and civilian needs of nuclear energy. Was a sub's engine a military or a civil-
for immediately the question came up about the relationship between military
But the problems of the nuclear period cannot be solved so simply.

reconciled the construction of nuclear weapons.

was the decision of the French Government of April 13, 1922 in which France
suffrages."

The result of this computation of buppie and political attitudes
fancy program because it would seem that France more independence ais-s-ais per
nuclear weapons on France's suffrages than on the U.S.A.R. They favored a diff-
seventy-six per cent were more interested in the impact of the possession of

367

398

after its decision renouncing the military applications of nuclear energy
the Government announced the construction of a submarine powered by nuclear
energy, the engine of which could serve as a prototype for surface vessels
as well. 72)

The "purely" peaceful uses of nuclear energy raised even more serious
problems, foreshadowing similar dilemmas all over the world as nuclear energy
becomes diffused. For the choice between peaceful and military uses is not
a single decision, nor an irrevocable one, even within the framework of
"peaceful" technology. The final product of any peaceful program is plutonium,
the core of nuclear weapons. Thus the more extensive the peaceful energy program,
the greater will be the temptation and the opportunity to enter the military
field. By 1957, the French peaceful atomic energy program will produce over
15 kilograms of plutonium a year and its stockpile will approach 100 kilogram,
sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons.

Withal, the French position was not as contradictory as it appeared.
The most difficult step for a nation seeking to enter the nuclear field
is to master its technology and to develop a pool of scientists capable of
supporting a diversified program. It does not make a great deal of difference

72. *Le Monde*, November 12, 1955.

27. Le Montagne, November 15, 1922.

undergoing a dissatisfied program. It does not make a great deal of difference
is to matter its technology and to develop a new type of scientists capable of
the most difficult step for a nation seeking to enter the next nuclear field
With this, the French aviation was not as contradictory as it appeared,
enough to produce several nuclear weapons.

12 kilogرامs of beryllium a year and its stockpile will add up to 100 kilotons,
total. By 1965, the French bomb atomic energy program will produce over
the greater will be the temptation and the opportunity to enter the military
theory of nuclear weapons. Thus the more extensive the bomb energy program,
"bombardment technology". The first program of such bomb program is beryllium,
a single decision not an irrevocable one even within the framework of
becomes utilized. For the choice between bomb and military uses is not
problems, foreseen, giving similar differences all over the world as nuclear energy
The "bomb" bombardment uses of nuclear energy related even more serious
as well.

The engine of which could serve as a prototype for surface assets
the Government announced the construction of a submarine powered by nuclear
after its decision renouncing the military applications of nuclear energy

338

399

whether this knowledge is acquired by means of peaceful or military application of nuclear energy. In fact, the peaceful applications of nuclear energy may permit the building up of a cadre of technicians on a more solid basis and enable public opinion to become familiar with the nature of nuclear energy in a less cataclysmic form than that of thermo-nuclear bombs. That such considerations were present in French minds is shown by an article of a distinguished French physicist: "Let us take advantage of the years ahead to improve our general situation, to catch up on our backwardness by training engineers and scientists, by increasing our mining, technical and industrial potential...and by carrying through the experimental industrial projects which are indispensable in a program which is ambitious and reasonable...

The decisions we may have to take later can then be carried out very rapidly."

Thus France had taken a circuitous route towards building up its own nuclear industry and for all protestations of high principle it had not avoided any of the basic problems of the nuclear period. For, as French nuclear technology developed and there grew up a more general understanding of its nature, the problem of its military application almost inevitably was reopened. This

79. Louis Le Prince-Ringuet. "Prestige de la France et Armament Atomiques," Le Monde, March 19, 1955.

Le Monde, March 10, 1982.

"Breathe de la France et Armament Avionique."

The problem of its military application almost inevitably was reopened. This
not only developed and there grew up a more general understanding of its nature,
and of the past problems of the nuclear period. For, as French nuclear tech-
nology industry and for all protestations of high principle it had not avoided
the France had taken a circumspect route towards building up its own

which are indubitable in a program which is ambitious and reasonable...
potential...and by carrying through the experimental industrial projects
engineers and scientists, by increasing our mining, technical and industrial
improve our general situation, to catch up on our packmarters by training
tooktained French physicists: "let us take advantage of the years ahead to
considerations were present in French minds to show by an article of a dis-
in a less catalytic form than that of thermo-unclear pompe." That one
engineer & public opinion to become familiar with the nature of nuclear energy
permit the building up of a cadre of technicians on a more solid basis and
of nuclear energy. In fact, the beautiful applications of nuclear energy may
whether this knowledge is acquired by means of beautiful or military application

366

400

was compounded by French difficulties in North Africa and the increasing
belief that without nuclear weapons France would be relegated to the status
of a second-class power. Little more than a year after the decision to eschew
MN the building of nuclear weapons, the parliamentary correspondent of Le
Monde reported: "With the exception of the Communists...all the speakers
have shown themselves to be in accord that the choice is between the possession
of a nuclear armament and the abandoning of national defense."

French thought had come full cycle. France had come to realize that
in the nuclear age, national defense must begin with nuclear weapons. Under
their protection, other forms of conflict, even of the "conventional" kind,
may be possible although in vital areas extremely unlikely. But without
nuclear weapons any country is at the mercy of a neighbor who possesses
them. Prime Minister Mollet was merely restating the realities of the situation
in a debate in the French National Assembly: "The position of the Government
is as follows: France commits herself not to explode a bomb of the MX atomic
type before January 1, 1961. Taking into account the delays for research
and for construction... this moratorium will not occasion any delay in France's

72. Le Monde, July 12, 1956.

Je le MONDE, il est, 1926.

and for construction... that a moratorium will not occasion any delay in France's
the Before January 1, 1926. Taking into account the delays for research
is as follows: France commits herself not to explode a bomb of the MM atomic
in a debate in the French National Assembly: "The position of the Government
them. Prime Minister Moffet was merely restating the realities of the situation
unclear MM weapons and country is at the mercy of a neighbor who possesses
may be possible although in vital areas extremely unlikely. But without
their protection, other terms of conflict, even of the "conventions" King,
in the nuclear age, national defense must begin with nuclear weapons. Under
French thought had come full cycle. France had come to realize that
of a nuclear armament and the spending of national defense."

have shown themselves to be in accord that the choice is between the possession
**Mondé** reported: "With the exception of the Communists...all the adeqaires
MM the building of nuclear weapons, the basically correspondents of **Le**
of a second-class power. Little more than a year after the decision to end
perfect that without nuclear weapons France would be relegated to the status
was compromised by French difficulties in North Africa and the increasing

400

401

nuclear program. At its termination we will be at liberty to pursue inde-
pendent policies... During the period of the moratorium she can pursue research
with respect to military applications. Nothing prevents her from orienting
her efforts towards military purposes..." [75] Mollet thus made clear that
France was already engaged in research on the military applications of nuclear
weapons. What had been announced hardly a year previous as a French effort
to set the example for a reconciled humanity had become an essentially technical
problem of priorities: whether it was wiser to build up a nuclear technology
by stressing the peaceful or the military applications of the atom.

The experience of France demonstrates that the nuclear age brooks no
ambiguity: it will tempt its volatiles into military applications through its
peaceful processes and it leaves no margin of choice for powers eager to main-
tain their independence. But if France had learned that she would have to
confront the nuclear age and that her only choice was between a nuclear strategy
or complete impotence, the question of the nature of nuclear strategy remained
unresolved. An all-out thermo-nuclear war would mean national catastrophe
for nations with the density of population as those of the Continent. The

75. *Le Monde*, July 13, 1955.

42. La Nongé, 17th July 1932.

for nations with the demography of population as those of the Continent. The
unresolved. An all-out thermo-nuclear war would mean national catastrophe
or complete impotence, the question of the nature of nuclear strategy remained
contrary to the unclear, and that per only choice was between a unclear strategy
or clear independence. But if France had learned that she would have to
behave processes and it leaves no margin of choice for powers eager to main-
stain it will tempt its November into military abstractions through its
ignorance: it will tempt its November into military abstractions through its
ignorance of the nuclear age prokes no

by addressing the useful or the military abstractions of the atom.

problem of priorities: whether it was wiser to build up a nuclear technology
to settle the example for a reconciled humanity had become an essentially technical
way of life. What had been announced partly a year before as a French effort
France was already engaged in research on the military abstractions of the unclear
per efforts towards military purposes...

Moffet thus made clear that
with respect to military abstractions. Nothing prevents per from orienting
bendent policies...During the period of the moratorium are can be made research
unclear program. At its termination we will be at liberty to pursue inde-


401

402

attempt by France to avoid this impasse by refusing to enter the nuclear race
was certain to fail, because the choice depended not only on the will of
France but also on that of other powers and because economic necessity impelled
France into the very peaceful pursuits which ultimately make a military
technology unavoidable. However, the adoption of nuclear strategy did not
solve the problem of French vulnerability either. Whenever the deterrent
value of France's nuclear establishment would be seriously challenged, France,
as Great Britain and the United States before her, would face the next paradox
of the nuclear age: that the increase of military power is accompanied by
a growth of inhibitions against the use of power. Thus for France, as for her
allies, the problem becomes how to find an intermediary course between
Armageddon and surrender.

V

From a military point of view then the difficulties of NATO are due
to the inability to resolve two issues in terms which are meaningful to our
allies as well as to ourselves: the purpose of a military establishment on
the Continent and the implications of nuclear weapons for Allied strategy.
As long as the United States bases its strategy on the assumption that any war
in Europe will inevitably lead to all-out war and that all-out war will

403

necessarily be fought as an intercontinental, exchange of thermo-nuclear blows
there is an inherent imbalance between our interest in the ix alliance and
that of our NATO partners. No soothing statements can bridge the gulf between
the concern of our allies with local defense and the requirements of an all-
out strategy in which the very location of our airbases testifies to the dis-
pensability of the Continental powers. This imbalance has caused the military
strategy of NATO to be built on a series of compromises, concessions on our
part to European fears which were not integrated into our strategic doctrine
and concessions by the European powers to our insistence on a military contri-
bution on their part without any real belief in the validity of such an effort.
The result has been a proliferation of military establishments on the Continent,
too strong to serve as a "trip wire," too weak to resist a Soviet onslaught,
and in any case, not really designed for that purpose. NATO has been conducted
in a never-never land where our strategic doctrine has removed the European
incentive for a substantial military effort while the Europeans have been
reluctant to make their hesitations explicit lest we withdraw the guarantee
of their frontiers which, in terms of an all-out strategy, has been the only
really meaningful part of NATO.

of their frontiers which in terms of an all-out strategy has been the only
refuant to make their justification explicit least we withdraw the guarantee
incentive for a substantial military effort while the Europeans have been
in a never-never land where our strategic doctrine has removed any European
and in any case, not really designed for that purpose. NATO has been combated
too strong to serve as a "trip wire," too weak to resist a Soviet onslaught.

The result has been a proliferation of military adjustments on the Continent,
pulation on their part without any real benefit in the validity of such an effort.
and concessions by the Europeans batters to our instance on a military court-
bar to European terms which were not integrated into our strategic doctrine
strategically of NATO to be built on a series of compromises, concessions on our
benevolence of the Continental batters. This imbalance has caused the military
out strategy in which the very location of our airbases teardles to the dis-
the concern of our allies with local defense and the requirements of an all-
that of our NATO partners. No soothing statements can bridge the gap between
there is an inherent impedance between our interest in the FM alliance and
necessarily be thought as an intercontinental exchange of thermo-uncertain pions

403

404

Nothing is more important, therefore, than to get clear about the
role we wish NATO to perform. Is it a device to elaborate a cause of war:
that is, is its function to serve a warning on the Soviet bloc that an attack
on Europe will inevitably unleash all-out war? Or is it an instrument to
assure the integrity of Europe against attack? If the former, there is little
point in maintaining such large British and U.S. forces on the Continent and
the European military build-up in turn will be ambivalent, hesitant and meaning-
less. If the latter, a radical adjustment is required both of our strategic
doctrine and the policies to support it. For whatever the feasibility of
a local defense of Europe, it is clear that it cannot be improvised under
the pressure of military operations.

Ever since World War II, one doctrine has been repeated so often that
it has virtually become dogma: that only the atom-bomb and our retaliatory
power stood between the Red Army and the occupation of Europe, that any attack
on Europe would inevitably unleash all-out war. And all-out war has been
equated with a strategic bombing campaign in the style of World War II. Several
reasons are advanced for this proposition. It is said that Europe is a "vital"
interest and therefore under the protection of our massive deterrent while

interest and therefore under the protection of our massive deterrent while
reasons are advanced for this proposition. If it is said that Europe is a "vital"
edUCATED with a strategic bombing campaign in the style of World War II. Several
on Europe would inevitably release all-out war. And all-out war has been
powerful between the Red Army and the occupation of Europe, that and attack
it has virtually become dogma: that only the atom-pomp and our retaliatory
Ever since World War II, one doctrine has been rebeated so often that
the breath of military operations.

a local defense of Europe, if it is clear that it cannot be improved under
d doctrine and the policies to support it. For whatever the leeway of
fear. If the latter, a radical adjustment is required both of our strategic
the European military build-up in turn will be ampedent, resultant and meaning-
point in maintaining such large British and U.S. forces on the Continent and
seems the integrity of Europe against attack. If the former, there is little
on Europe will inevitably release all-out war? Or is it an instrument to
that is, its function to serve a warning on the Soviet front that an attack
role we wish NATO to perform. Is it a device to evaporate a cause of war:
Nothing is more important, therefore, than to get clear about the

407

405

local wars are appropriate only for objectives of peripheral importance.

It is argued that strategic air war is our only possible riposte to a Soviet
attack on Europe because we cannot afford to match Soviet manpower or engage

It has been maintained, finally, that we
have no choice but to fight an all-out
in a war of attrition with the Red Army. War because our NATO partners would
100% askance at any defence of their territories which involved nuclear weapons

Often the most unchallenged arguments most inhibit clear thought,

however. It is a strange doctrine which asserts that vital interests can

be defended only by the most catastrophic strategy. To be sure, we must be

prepared to defend our vital interests by all-out war, if necessary. But this

is far different from asserting that we must _begin_ the defense of them with

a thermo-nuclear holocaust or that it is not to our interest to develop alter-

native strategies. Less catastrophic strategic options are all the more

important because of the very reason formerly advanced for an all-out strategy:
that all-out war would prevent a long drawn-out war of attrition. For with the
power of modern weapons,

an (all-out war is) a war of attrition par excellence. It makes inevitable what
(has become the)

our reliance on an all-out strategy in the immediate post-war period sought
to prevent: whatever the outcome of an all-out war it will drain the national
substance. And if the Red Army takes over Europe in the early stages of a
war we will not possess sufficient resources to liberate our allies after a

thermo-nuclear exchange. Thus an all-out war may prevent neither
attrition nor the Soviet occupation of Europe.

406

Nor is the argument based on our inadequate manpower conclusive, for the combined manpower of the United States and its European allies has always exceeded that of the Soviet bloc. The disparity has not been in the availability of manpower, but in the willingness to mobilize it. In any case, the advent of tactical nuclear weapons in quantity makes the difference in mobilized manpower strategically less significant, provided we and our allies are prepared to draw the consequences from the strategic revolution that has occurred and face the problem of limited nuclear war. For on a nuclear battlefield where dispersal is the key to survival there is an inherent upper limit to the number of troops that are strategically significant. While this number is larger than the present NATO force, it is not so large to be beyond possibility. It presupposes, however, an understanding of the nature of limited nuclear war on the part of our allies and a political framework which conveys its options to the other side.

But will a limited nuclear war in Europe not cause such widespread devastation that it will defeat its purpose? Is not the lesson of *Carte Blanche* that a limited nuclear war would mean the end of European civilization as surely as an all-out war? An all-out strategy is advocated by many because of the belief that limited nuclear war would reduce at least the

many because of the pilot that limited nuclear war would reduce at least the
fissile as surely as an all-out war? An all-out strategy is advocated by
**Europe** that a limited nuclear war would mean the end of European civil-
devastation that it will defeat its purpose? Is not the lesson of *Gulf*

But will a limited nuclear war in Europe not cause such widespread
framework which convicts its options to the other side.

nature of limited nuclear war on the part of our allies and a political
to be beyond feasibility. It breamboses, however, an understanding of the
while this number is larger than the present NATO force, it is not so large
number limit to the number of troops that are strategically significant.
pattition field where diarrhea is the key to arrival there is an inherent
occurring and face the problem of limited nuclear war. For on a nuclear
are prepared to draw the consequences from the strategic revolution that has
modified manpower strategically less significant, provided we and our allies
the advent of tactical nuclear weapons in quantity makes the difference in
lability of manpower, but in the willingness to modify it. In any case,
exceeded that of the Soviet Union. The disparity has not been in the avia-
the combined manpower of the United States and its European allies has always
nor is the argument based on our inadequate manpower concerns, for

400

407

battle zone to radioactive rubble and (therefore inhibit the will to
resist of our allies. It must be admitted that the limitation of a
limited nuclear war is a relative one. It is limited only in relation to the
capability of the contenders to obliterate each other; it would still be very
costly in absolute terms. Nevertheless, it is contradictory to argue that
our allies will be inhibited by an intermediary course of action while we
would be prepared to implement a strategy, the destructiveness of which by the
claim of its own advocates, is inifinitely greater than that of limited nuclear
war. Why should Great Britain and the United States be ready to accept com-
plete devastation in defense of other areas when the countries concerned
much less drastic in shrink from the consequences of their own defense? Nor is it clear what
reassurance those allies, which makes critics assert would be reduced to radio-
active rubble, could derive from the fact that as the result of an all-out war
we would share their fate.

Moreover the argument in favor of a strategy of limited nuclear war
is precisely that it would keep the world from being turned into radioactive
rubble. A limited nuclear war would approach an all-out war in destructiveness

75. See Sir John Slessor. "Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence," *International Affairs*, April 1956. Also Slessor in *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May or June 1956.

408

only if it were conducted with the tactics of World War II, with rigid lines,
massive attacks on communication centers and an attempt to wipe out the
enemy industrial potential. It seems high time, however, to break loose
from the doctrines of the recent war. The tactics appropriate to nuclear
war cannot be constructed on the analogy of World War II. On the contrary,
they should be based on small self-contained, highly mobile units, much
less dependent on rail transport than their World War II counterpart. A
stabilized line is the least likely eventuality in limited nuclear war; rather
one can foresee a series of hedgehog positions which can be formed very
quickly and which cannot be reduced short of the concentration which is in
itself an invitation to nuclear attack. The lessons of *Carte Blanche* are
therefore somewhat deceptive. In the near future, as strategic doctrine goes,
-- within 10 years -- the massive attack on opposing air installations will
become strategically unproductive or unnecessary. (*There would be no need to*
*drop some 400 atomic devices within 3/48 hours in order to destroy the opposing*
*missile force because the opposing missile force could in all probability not*
*be so destroyed. Nor will it make sense to seek to eliminate enemy communi-*
*cation centers if the major movement does not occur by road or rail. The key*
*elements in a limited nuclear war would be combat groups of regimental size,*

409

completely transportable by air and equipped with nuclear weapons. Their
task would be to prevent an enemy from controlling territory by preventing
the maintenance of large bodies of troops in the contested area. And they
should do so by using weapons of minimum destructiveness. Thus a limited
nuclear war would not be a ground war in the traditional sense. Its units
ideally should approximate the mobility of an air force but ~~they should~~
be capable of forcing the enemy either to concentrate his forces to present
a target or so to disperse his forces that he will not be able to control
territory.

Other proponents of an all-out strategy have argued that an attempt
to undertake local defense would serve Soviet interests because it would
deliver the great prize of Western Europe into its hands undestroyed. "If
we say that atomic weapons would be used only in the front lines," wrote Sir
John Slessor "it will not ring a very cordial bell with our new NATO allies
and Russia herself would be immune except possibly for towns in the immediate
neighborhood of airfields. That seems to be a great bargain for the Russians
who would surely rather capture places like Paris or the Channel ports intact
than as masses of radioactive rubble."

767 It is a strange argument which

776 Sir John Slessor. "The H-bomb: Massive Retaliation or Graduated Deterrence."
*International Affairs*, April 1956, p. 160.

International correia, April fete, b. 100.

Sir John Fieser. "The H-pomp: Massive Refutation or Graduated Deference."

than as masses of radioactive rubble." It is a strange argument which
who would surely rather capture places like Paris or the Channel ports intact
neighborhood of airfields. That seems to be a great bargain for the Russians
and Russians herself would be immune except possibly for some in the immediate
to whom Fieser "it will not ring a very cordial bell with our new NATO allies
we ask that atomic weapons would be used only in the front lines," wrote Sir
 deliver the great prize of Western Europe into its hands undestroyed. "It
to undertake local defense would serve Soviet interests because it would
Other proponents of an all-out strategy have argued that an attempt
territory.

a target or so to diffuse his forces that he will not be able to control
be capable of forcing the enemy either to concentrate his forces to present
ideally should approximate the modify of an air force but mark they should
unclear war would not be a ground war in the traditional sense. Its units
should do so by using weapons of minimum destructiveiveness. Time a limited
the maintenance of large bodies of troops in the contested area. And they
talk would be to prevent an enemy from controlling territory by preventing
completely transportable by air and equipped with unclear weapons. Their

408

410

asserts that it may be to our interest to bring about a widespread devas-
tation of the areas we seek to protect by the deliberate choice of our strategy.

And it is remarkable because it assumes that we could force the U.S.S.R. into
accomplishing this devastation for us. But it is not apparent why the adoption
by the West of a strategy of massive retaliation would force the U.S.S.R. into
destroying Paris or the Channel ports. On the contrary, in an all-out war
the important targets would seem to be the United States and perhaps the
British strategic air bases. It can even be argued that an all-out war would
be certain to leave Europe defenseless. In the absence of a capacity for
local defense, the Red Army would be able to occupy Europe in the early stages
of a war and the United States and the United Kingdom would hardly possess
sufficient resources after an all-out thermo-nuclear exchange to undertake
the liberation of Europe. Or else, the U.S.S.R. will inherit Europe
and the peripheral areas of Eurasia as a result of the exhaustion produced by
all-out war. But if the defense of Europe will resolve itself into a problem
of stopping the Red Army ultimately, it would seem to make more sense to begin
the defense by local action and to employ all-out war only as a last resort.

Still others maintain that an attempt to undertake a local defense of

impossible without a better understanding by our allies of the nature of
nuclear technology and therefore of the nature of limited nuclear war. One
of the banes of our alliance policy has been the exclusion of the Continental
Powers from the nuclear race, in part because of the restrictions imposed on
the exchange of information by the American atomic energy act. But it
will not prove possible to maintain for long a strategy the chief weapon of
which is in the exclusive control of two allies geographically remote from
the first line of Soviet advance. Since our allies possess neither a substantial
nuclear technology nor an arsenal of nuclear weapons, they are assailed by
a sense of their impotence and become easy prey to Soviet propaganda which seeks
to present nuclear weapons in a category of special horror. One of the chief
tasks of U.S. policy towards NATO will therefore have to be to overcome the
trauma attached to the use of nuclear weapons. Unless the European Powers
become familiar with the use of nuclear weapons, they will be subject to Soviet
atomic blackmail and their own defensive effort will lack a sense of direction.

413

war alone and their nature of their military organization may actually handicap us on a nuclear battlefield.

Nothing would dispel the air of mystery that surrounds nuclear weapons like the possession of them by the Continental Powers. Nothing would help restore a measure of consistency in allied military planning. Almost as important would be the acquisition by our NATO partners of missiles, at least ~~for most~~ of intermediary range. ~~Almost all~~ of European Russia is vulnerable to a missile with a range of 1500 miles. The existence of~~ such a missile capability ~~would place Europe into a better position~~ to withstand the threat of a Soviet rocket attack which proved so effective during the Suez Crisis. Nevertheless, the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles ~~will not solve the problems of~~ a strategic doctrine, which poses less absolute sanctions than all-out war. ~~We therefore~~ must bring home to our allies not only the power of the new weapons, but also the possibility of an intermediate application of them.

Leadership and effort

The first step in this direction must be taken by the United States. Only the United States possesses the technical know-how to give meaning to a European defense contribution only the United States possesses the retaliatory force without which limited war is inconceivable.

Unless the United States takes the lead, however, in developing a doctrine for the local defense of Europe, the military effort of NATO will be beset by inconsistencies in peace time and ineffective in a crisis. There is no point in adding 12 conventional German divisions to an Anglo-American army equipped with nuclear weapons and backed by a tactical air force based almost exclusively on a nuclear strategy. There is no sense in a logistics system of World War II vintage based on a few supply centers completely vulnerable to nuclear attack, if our strategy even envisages the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons. The present cumbersome structure of NATO is hardly suitable for the rapid reaction required by nuclear war. The conventional armies of our Continental armies may actually prove an impediment on a nuclear battlefield. NATO will therefore have to be adapted to the nuclear period both doctrinally and organizationally. The armies of our allies, or at least that part of them earmarked for Europe, should be equipped and trained for nuclear war. And the alliance should strive to gain acceptance for a strategic doctrine which does not identify nuclear war with all-out war. NATO, in short, must seek to escape its ambiguities: it is either a device to defend Europe locally or an instrument to unleash the British and American strategic air force. It cannot be both and it cannot be the former without a more realistic defense effort by our European allies.

Should our allies prove reluctant to support even a militarily revitalized

Should our allies prove reluctant to ambuscade even a militarily revitalised
European allies.

and it cannot be the former without a more realistic defense effort by our
to unseem the British and American strategic air force. It cannot be both
its amplitude: it is either a device to defend Europe locally or an instrument
not identify nuclear war with all-out war. NATO, in short, must seek to escape
alliance should strive to gain acceptance for a strategic doctrine which does
market for Europe, should be equipped and trained for nuclear war. And the
organisationally. The armies of our allies, or at least that part of them ear-
will therefore have to be adapted to the nuclear period both doctrinally and
mental armies may actually prove an impediment on a nuclear paffletield. NATO
rapid reaction required by nuclear war. The conventional armies of our Conti-
weapons. The present ampirsome structure of NATO is hardly amiable for the
it our strategy even envisages the boidadity of the employment of nuclear
infantry based on a few subly centers completely ampirable to nuclear attack,
on a nuclear strategy. There is no sense in a logistics system of World War II
with nuclear weapons and packed by a tactical air force based almost excomatively
in adding its conventional German divisions to an Anglo-American army equipped
inconsistencies in base time and inellective in a crisis. There is no point
for the focal defense of Europe, the military effort of NATO will be least by
Unless the United States takes the lead wherever in developing a doctrine
a capability and

initiative, however, in developing a doctrine

JTT

415

NATO, it would seem time to put an end to the half-measures that have
based the military effort of the allies. If our allies are not willing to
make the effort necessary for local defense, it may be necessary to put an
end to illusions which seek to combine two incompatible strategies: the
doquence of massive retaliation and the pretense of a local defense of
In the absence of a more substantial European defense
Europe, five American and four British divisions are too heavy an investment
in a tripwire. They are not sufficient to insure local defense, but too
large for internal security purposes. Less than half that number would
amply demonstrate our determination and insure our participation in an all-
out war. In the absence of a military structure capable of achieving local
defense, the protection of Europe resides essentially in the willingness of
the United States and, to a lesser degree of Great Britain, to undertake all-out
war in case of Soviet aggression. This determination could be conveyed with
less ambiguity by a reduction of United States and British strength in Europe,
for it would remove any doubt that an attack on Europe would be dealt with
locally. Such a course would not preclude political cooperation although it
would inevitably reduce the political weight of Europe in international relations.

would inevitably reduce the political weight of Europe in international relations. Such a course would not preclude political cooperation although it for it would remove any doubt that an attack on Europe would be dealt with less ambiguity by a reduction of United States and British strength in Europe, war in case of Soviet aggression. This determination could be conveyed with the United States and, to lesser degree of Great Britain, to undertake all-out defense, the protection of Europe requires essentially in the willingness of out war. In the absence of a military attitude capable of achieving local ambly demonstrated on determination and insurance on participation in an all-out take for internal security purposes. Less than in the past that number would in a trip-wire. They are not sufficient to insure local defense, but too immune to American and four British divisions are too heavy an investment. In the absence of a more suppletive European defenseicine of massive retaliation and the presence of a final defense of end to influences which seek to separate the two incompatible strategies: the make the effort necessary for local defense, if may be necessary to put an end to military effort of the after. It our efforts are not willing to pass the military effort of the after, our efforts are not willing to pass NATO, if would seem time to put an end to the half-measures that have

412

[Y]

416

The return to an all-out strategy can only be a last resort, however.

A militarily impotent Europe would become an insignificant appendage of Eurasia and impotence breeds political irresponsibility. Moreover, an all-out war is likely to be more catastrophic for the United States than even of our because in it we would be the chief target.

Allies, it is therefore to our interest, perhaps even more than to that of our NATO partners, to seek to defend Europe locally. But in order to achieve this NATO will have to give up its illusions. It can no longer seek to reconcile an all-out strategy with an inadequate effort of local defense. It can no longer maintain the hodge-podge of conventional units, atomic cannons, nuclear air force and a supply system which could be obliterated by a very few well-placed nuclear weapons. The result of an effort to obscure these inconsistencies can only be catastrophe either in war or, more likely, in a steady deterioration of the cohesiveness of the alliance. It has already caused the stationing of nine British and American divisions -- or almost half of our strategic reserve -- in an area where we have explicitly rejected the possibility of limited war while in the peripheral areas of Eurasia, where our doctrine does admit the possibility of local defense, there exists no strategic reserve which could intervene sufficiently quickly to forestall Soviet occupation.

quickly to forecast Soviet occupation.

neither U.S. troops nor a strategic reserve which could intervene sufficiently
our doctrine does admit the feasibility of local defense, there exist no means
beauty of limited war while in the peripheral areas of Europe, where
our strategic reserve — in an area where we have explicitly rejected the
defending of nine British and American divisions — or almost half of
already deterioration of the conditionness of the alliance. It has already caused
inconvenience can only be catastrophe either in war or, more likely, in a
few well-placed nuclear weapons. The result of an effort to opuscate these
nuclear air force and a superbacy that can be opiliated by a very
can no longer maintain the hedge-bodge of conventional units, atomic cannons,
reconcile an all-out strategy with an inadequate effort of local defense. If
this NATO will have to give up its influences. It can no longer seek to
our NATO barriers, to seek to defend Europe locally. But in order to achieve
suffice. It is therefore to our interest, perhaps even more than to that of
because in it we would be the only target.

war is likely to be more detrimental to the United States than areas of our
corresponding for
Europe and impropriety precludes political irreversibility. Moreover, an all-out
A militarily impotent Europe would become an insignificant appendage of
the return to an all-out strategy can only be a fast resort, however.

TUP

417

Our NATO policy has therefore come to a fork in the road: we must decide soon whether NATO is a variety of the Monroe doctrine protected essentially by a unilateral declaration or whether it can be made to serve what has become the most productive and least costly strategy, a strategy moreover which has the added advantage that it serves both United States and European interests: Much has been made of strengthening the non-military side of NATO. But such efforts will remain palliatives until NATO faces the military facts. A defensive alliance cannot be maintained unless it develops some notion of the nature of common defense. As for us while we should do everything to assure an adequate basis for graduated deterrence in Europe, anything less than the possibility of local defense will amount to a dispersion of resources.

VI

If we should succeed in establishing the principle of limited war in Europe, it will follow almost inevitably as a strategy for assuring the defense of other threatened areas. And it will afford the best means for dealing with one of the most difficult problems of our coalition policy: the possibility of independent action by the partners of our alliance system. One of the problems of our alliance system has been the belief that unless all allies

418

V

If we could succeed in establishing the principle of limited war in Europe it will follow almost inevitably as a strategy for assuring the defense of other threatened areas. At present our alliance policy is caught on the horns of a two-fold dilemma: the emphasis of our military policy on all-out war is inconsistent with a system of alliances while the concern with a world-wide system of collective security is inconsistent with a policy of limited war. As long as our military policy threatens to transform every war into an all-out war, we will suffer the inhibitions of a general collective security system described earlier in the chapter whatever reservations we may make about our freedom of action in case of emergency. For all-out war is of direct concern not only to every ally but also to every neutral. In every crisis their pressures will therefore be directed in favor of a policy of minimum risk. And while a military policy of massive retaliation entails all the disadvantages of a general system of collective security it affords none of the corresponding gains. It does not bring about an accretion to our military strength because it removes the incentive for an allied defense effort except to afford bases to us.

to us.

it removes the incentive for an armed defense effort except to afford passage
for战略. It does not bring about an accession to our military strength because
of a general system of collective security it allows none of the corresponding
And while a military policy of massive retaliation entails all the disadvantages
their breaches will therefore be directed in favor of a policy of minimum risk.
concern not only to every ally but also to every敵友 neutral. In every case
our freedom of action in case of emergency. For all-out war is of direct
system described earlier in the chapter whatever reservations we may make about
an all-out war, we willutter the implications of a general collective security
war. As long as our military policy threatens to transform every war into
system of collective security it is maximum inconsistent with a policy of limited
its inconsistent with a system of alliances while the concern with a world-wide
hence of a two-world dilemma: the embattles of our military policy on all-out war
of other threatened areas. At present our alliance policy is caught on the
era of the war will follow almost inevitably as a strategy for assuming the defense
If we could succeed in establishing the principle of limited war in
the world.

V

718

419

The prerequisite of a policy of alliances then is a readiness on our part to undertake local defense and a military doctrine and capability to give it effect. A strategy looking to local defense is inconsistent, however, with a generalized system of collective security. A world-wide *xykhum* system of collective security would expand the war politically while we are striving to limit it militarily. To the extent that we involve a maximum number of allies in a conflict we multiply the opportunities for Soviet pressures against them.

In turn, the wider the allied support, the more various the motives which animate the coalition and the more diluted the common purpose. The most effective coalition policy would therefore be based on regional cooperation *politically* and a strategy of local defense *militarily*. Within this *xxxkhumxgaxx* regional grouping we should concert our efforts with our allies. Outside that region we must be free to act unilaterally or with a different grouping of powers if our interest so dictates.

Such a policy would take account of the fact that the United States alone of the Powers of the non-Soviet world is strong enough physically and psychologically to play a global role. It would also supply an answer to the question of the relation of members of a regional alliance to problems in other parts

["of the relation of members of a regional alliance to problems in other areas\nlogically to play a global role. It would also supply an answer to the question\nof the powers of the non-Soviet world if strong enough hydrographically and bauxite-\nBog, a policy would take account of the fact that the United States alone\nso dictates.", "free to act unilaterally or with a different grouping of powers if our interest\nwe should concert our efforts with our allies. Outside that region we must be\na strategy of local defense militarily. Within this xxxxxxxxx regional grouping\ncoalition policy would therefore be passed on regional cooperation political; and\nthe coalition and the more diluted the common purpose. The most effective", "In turn, the wider the allied band, the more various the moieties which animate\nin a conflict we multiply the opportunities for Soviet breaches against them.\nlimit it militarily. To the extent that we involve a maximum number of allies\ncollective security would expand the war politically while we are arriving to\na generalized system of collective security. A world-wide maximum system of\nit effect. A strategy looking to local defense is inconsistent, however, with\npart to undertake local defense and a military doctrine and capability to give\nThe

420

of the world. The simplest answer is that alliances should be confined only
to purposes shared by its members and that each partner should be free to act
in areas of greatest concern to him. This indeed has been the historic pattern
of coalitions. But modern technology presents substantial obstacles to such
a course. Historically, partners of an alliance were free to act unilaterally
outside the area of their common interest because the consequences of their
actions could not endanger the security of the ally. Unilateral action was
possible because conflicts could be localized geographically either because
of the difficulty of access of other major powers or through a division of
the world into spheres of interest. Thus during the French-British entente,
it proved possible for France to take independent actions in Central Africa
and for Britain in Southeast Asia almost without consultation because these
actions did not threaten to involve the ally in a major war. But with modern
technology isolated areas no longer exist, and any military action will always
be overshadowed by the threat of the intervention of a major power. This is
complicated further by the fact that none of our allies can undertake unilateral
action and keep it limited by their own efforts. For without capability for
an all-out war they are at the mercy of an opponent that possesses it. Thus

an all-out war they are at the mercy of an opponent that possesses it. Thus an all-out war can be prevented by the threat of the intervention of a major power. This is technology isolated areas no longer exist, and any military action will always be overawarded by the threat of the intervention of a major power. But with modern and for Britain in Southeast Asia almost without consultation because these if proved possible for France to take independent action in Central Africa the world into spheres of interest. Thus during the French-British encirclement, of the difficulty of access of other major powers or through a division of possible because conflicts could be localised geographically either because actions could not endanger the security of the ally. Unilateral action was outside the area of their common interest because the consequences of their a course. Historically, partners of an alliance were free to act multilaterally of coalitions. But modern technology presents substantial obstacles to such in areas of greatest concern to him. This indeed has been the historic pattern to purposes shared by its members and that each partner should be free to act of the world. The simplest answer is that alliances should be continued only

4750

421

our allies can fight alone only with the support of the United States or the
forbearance of the U.S.S.R. Their dilemma is that they do not have the resources
with for all-out war and they cannot fight limited wars except with our con-
currence or under our protection. This, if anything, was the lesson of the
British and French intervention in Egypt.

The growing dependence of our allies on our support has two consequences:
it means that resistance on their part outside their most immediate sphere of
interest becomes increasingly unlikely and this sphere, in the case of our
European allies at least, is constantly shrinking. But even within the area of
most direct concern to them decisive action by our allies is inhibited by their
awareness that they cannot sustain such an effort without U.S. support. Thus
a gap is created between the increasing inability of our allies to play a global
role and the doctrine of collective security. In many areas of the world, even
will reflect
regional defense depends on the willingness of the United States to support
it and in the remainder no kind of defense is possible unless the United States
undertakes it unilaterally. In these circumstances, we cannot give the impression
that defense against Soviet aggression presupposes the consensus of humanity;
because the consensus of humanity depends importantly on American leadership.

because the conscience of humanity debends importance on American leadership.

that defense against Soviet aggression breaches the conscience of humanity;

undermines it militarily. In these circumstances, we cannot give the impression

it and in the reminder no kind of defense is possible unless the United States

with respect.

a cab is created between the increasing insufficiency of our allies to play a global

most direct concern to them decisive action by our allies is indicated by their

interest becomes increasingly unlikely and this sphere in the case of our

oneness or under our protection. This is anything was the reason of the

why for all-out war and they cannot fight limited war except with our con-

goroterssance of the U.S.A. Their dilemma is that they do not have the resources

V.S.T.

Eh

42la

The United States attitude towards unilateral action and towards
regional defense therefore reveals two sides of the same coin. We must be
prepared to act unilaterally because we alone of the Powers of the non-Soviet
world are strong enough physically and psychologically to take a global view.
The operational expression of this is that some areas may strike us as more "vital"
than they do our allies so that the attempt to gear our policy to theirs would
lower action to the level of the ally prepared to run the fewest risks. Conversely,
within their sphere of primary interest, which is more and more becoming identified
with a limited geographic region, our allies may well be more sensitive than we.
Here we must be prepared to make some concessions to our allies' view of their
essential interests if we want to maintain the alliance. As leaders of the
alliance we cannot insist on defining all the issues for which to contend; unless
our allies see some benefit for themselves on problems they consider vital, their
sense of impotence may turn into neutralism. This does not mean that
we must support our allies, however arbitrary their behavior. It does imply
that both partners must become aware of the potential disparity between their
views of their essential interests. Our allies must be willing to let us act
unilaterally outside the area of regional cooperation and we cannot be too purist
in assessing the interests of our allies within that region. Any other approach
would make for paralysis: it would cause the alliance to hamstring us outside
the area of mutual concern and it would cause us to paralyze our allies within it.

the area of mutual concern and it would cause us to clarify our allies within that region.

Any other approach unilaterally outside the areas of regional cooperation and we cannot be too bonus views of their essential interests. Our allies must be willing to let us act that both parties must become aware of the potential disparity between their we must arbitrate our allies' policies arbitrarily their behavior. It does imply sense of commonality of importance may turn into neutrality. This does not mean that our allies see some benefit for themselves on the basis they consider optimal, their alliance we cannot instant on defining all the issues for which to contend; unless essential interests if we want to maintain the alliance. As leaders of the

Here we must be prepared to make some concessions to our allies' view of their with a limited geographic region, our allies may well be more sensitive than we.

within their sphere of primary interest, which is more and more becoming identified lower actions to the level of the ally prepared to run the fewest risks. Conversely, than they do our allies so that the attempt to gear our policy to their would

The operational expression of this is that some areas may strike us as more "ally" world are strong among biologically and behaviorologically to take a global view.

prepared to act multilaterally because we alone of the powers of the non-Soviet regional defense therefore reveals two sides of the same coin. We must be

The United States attitude towards multilateral action and towards

TIS

Since resistance is impossible or unlikely without our assistance, a great
deal depends on our own answer to the two problems posed at the beginning of
this chapter: the nature of aggression and the consequences flowing from the
determination that a given fact is in fact aggression.

In the task of elaborating a concept of aggression which addresses to
the most likely dangers, the United States faces peculiar difficulties, however,
our concept of aggression was formed during our period of invulnerability when our
objectives with respect to the rest of the world were primarily motivated by
a desire to be left alone by it. Foreign policy, with the exception perhaps
of Western Hemisphere relations was not conducted as long-range strategy, but
as a response to a developing situation. Until the end of World War II, the
security conferred by two great oceans contributed to the illusion that the
extent of our foreign commitments was entirely up to us. In these circum-
stances it was natural that we developed a concept of aggression as an armed
attack across a sovereign boundary. Moreover, even though we disapproved of
such actions, our concept of aggression did not enjoin us to resist all forms
of it, but only overt challenges to our national existence.

This essentially legalistic notion of aggression always had the drumback

This essentially legislative notion of aggression always had the ramification given to it, but only overt challenges to our national and existence.

such actions, our concept of aggression did not enjoin us to resist allonne
attack across a sovereign territory. Moreover, even though we disapproved of
aggression it was natural that we developed a concept of aggression as an armed
exert of our foreign commitments was entirely up to us. In these circum-
security concerned by two great oceans contributed to the illusion that the
as a reason to a developing situation. Until the end of World War II, the
of Western Hemisphere relations was not conducted as long-range strategy, but
a desire to be left alone by it. Foreign policy, with the exception perhaps
objectives with respect to the rest of the world were primarily motivated by
concept of aggression was formed during our period of inamnuerability when our
the most likely danger, the United States faces beneficial circumstances.

Foreign policy

In the task of evaporating a concept of aggression which addresses to
the determination that a given fact is in fact aggression.

This chapter: the nature of aggression and the consequences flowing from the
degradation on our own answar to the two problems based at the beginning of
Since resistance is impossible or unlikely without our assistance's great
in our own hands or through our national action

TSS

423

that it left us defenseless against strategic transformations by increments,
any one of which would not threaten our survival, but the cumulative impact
of which might well upset the strategic balance. In the past, this was obscured
by the fact that there existed many intermediary powers which would be threatened
by transformations not large enough to be a memex menace to us. They would be
certain to resist and therefore acted as safety indicators. We could afford
a "purist" concept of aggression which insisted on an unambiguous threat,
because other powers accomplished the indispensable function of a policy of
precaution for us. For instance that aggression had to be overt, which denied
the prequestionary element of policy was always somewhat misleading. It fitted
the circumstances of a particular period when we could concede the first blow
secure in the knowledge that it could not be decisive and that we would have
time to mobilize our resources undisturbed. Less fortunately situated nations
have never been able to afford so "purist" a concept. A state, the fate of
which, may be decided by a single battle and which may be fundamentally
threatened by a slight shift in the balance of power cannot regard a gm build-up
on its borders with equanimity. If it permits the threat to become unambiguous
it may jeopardize its existence. Or put another way, it considers a challenge
unambiguous which may be much more obscure to Powers with a wider margin of safety.

mammothine which may be much more opacous to powers with a wider margin of safety.
it may jeopardize its existence. Or but another way, if considers a challenge
on its borders with equality. If it permits the threat to become mammothine
threatened by a slight shift in the balance of power cannot regard a km build-up
which, may be decided by a single battle and which may be unduly strength-
ened by a well-justified policy. In the past, it has happened in the case of
thecircumstances of a particular period when we could conceive the first blow
the brazenly element of policy was always somewhat misleading. It lifted
breathing for na. For ininistance that aggression had to be overt, which denied
it. Because other powers accomplished the indubitable function of a policy of
a "buniat" concept of aggression which initiated on an unmagnificent threat,
certain to result, and therefore acted as safety indicators. We could afford
by transformations not large enough to be a serious menace to na. They would be
by the fact that there existed many intermediate powers who would be threatened
of which might well-justify the strategic balance. In the past, this was opacous
only one of which would not threaten our arrival, but the cumulative impact
that it felt was deleterious against strategic transformations by increments,

because other powers accomplished the indubitable function of a policy of
a "buniat" concept of aggression which initiated on an unmagnificent threat,
certain to result, and therefore acted as safety indicators. We could afford
by transformations not large enough to be a serious menace to na. They would be
by the fact that there existed many intermediate powers who would be threatened
of which might well-justify the strategic balance. In the past, this was opacous
only one of which would not threaten our arrival, but the cumulative impact
that it felt was deleterious against strategic transformations by increments,

that it felt was deleterious against strategic transformations by increments,
only one of which would not threaten our arrival, but the cumulative impact
of which might well-justify the strategic balance. In the past, this was opacous
only one of which would not threaten our arrival, but the cumulative impact
that it felt was deleterious against strategic transformations by increments,

453

424

This, in fact, has been precisely the history of our participation in the two
world wars. In both wars, the European powers took up the gauntlet against
an aggression which to us was not sufficiently unambiguous, they had to fight
alone until the threat to us became more overt or their defeat threatened us
with isolation.

But in the nuclear age we no longer possess this margin of safety; we
no longer possess the "safety-indicators" of our more secure past. The inter-
mediary powers having lost either the ability or the will to resist alone, our
insistence on an unambiguous concept of aggression will ensure that in many
areas no resistance will take place at all. Henceforth, we cannot afford to
stand apart while we assess the meaning of events. Any conflict will involve
us in the first instance or it will lead to surrender. Moreover, as our margin
of safety has shrunk, the forms of aggression have multiplied. In the past,
a nation could dominate another only by annexation or defeating it in war.

But in the age of "volunteers" and "arms bases", of internal subversion and
economic penetration, the strategic balance may be upset without a clear-cut
issue ever being presented. Is Soviet repression of satellite revolts aggression?
Is a Soviet base in the Middle East aggression when it is stocked with weapons
or only when Soviet troops appear against the will of the indigenous

["or only when Soviet troops appear against the will of the indigenous\nor only

425

government? Is a Communist uprising in Burma aggression or civil war?

None of these questions can be answered on the basis of fact alone; they
depend on a concept of aggression. To adopt too purist a notion of aggression
aids the Soviet strategy of upsetting the strategic balance by increments.

It plays into Soviet hands because in everyioxixccctxe crisis it will provide
an argument for deferring a show-down to a more propitious moment. To limit
aggression to an attack across a sovereign boundary may leadto a gradual trans-
formation of the strategic balance through internal subversion without any
possibility of effective counter-action, as has indeed happened in the Middle
East. To reject completely the precautionary element of policy is to resign
the initiative. It will ensure that we will always have to fight our military
actions at moments of maximum disadvantage. And it is far from clear that
it is possible to hold a perimeter of twenty thousand miles entirely on the
defensive, either physically or psychologically. In a short, with the end
of our invulnerability we have lost the opportunity to make simple moral
choices; we can no longer count on clear challenges to impel our actions.

It is therefore imperative for the United States to become clear in our own
minds about the nature of aggression and then to convey our conclusions and
m

minds about the nature of aggression and then to convey our conclusions and
If it is therefore imperative for the United States to become clear in our own
choices: we can no longer count on clear challenges to impel our actions.
of our invulnerability we have lost the opportunity to make simple more
defensive, either physically or bathologically. In *Xa* sport, with the end
if it is possible to hold a bermejer of twenty thousand miles entirely on the
actions at moments of maximum disadvantage. And if it is far from clear that
the initiative. It will ensure that we will always have to fight our military
Eat. To reject completely the preconventionally element of policy is to reach
possibility of effective counter-action, as has indeed happened in the Middle
formation of the strategic balance through internal and external trans-
aggression to an attack across a sovereign territory may lead to a gradual trans-
an argument for deferring a show-down to a more prohibitive moment. To limit
If plays into Soviet hands because in everyxxxidequate criteria it will provide
ada the Soviet strategy of subverting the strategic balance by increments.
depend on a concept of aggression. To adopt too baneful a notion of aggression
None of these questions can be answered on the basis of fact alone: they
Government? Is a Communist ruling in Burns aggression or civil war?

T52

and the consequences we propose to draw from them to the outside world.

For the problem of resisting aggression is as much a question of concept as of power: even the best military establishment will prove ضروري futile in resisting aggression, if the political leadership cannot recognize aggression.

To be sure, we should seek the widest possible consensus both in defining aggression and in the resistance to it. But we must also be prepared to act alone if this is the only means ضروري of preserving the strategic balance.

We cannot permit the Soviets to achieve a predominant position for the sake of allied unity or

of allied units or

We cannot permit the Soviet to achieve a predominant position for the sake
to set alone it this is the only means of preserving the strategic balance.

to seek the widest possible consensus both in

of power: even the best military establishment will prove kmx futile in

for the problem of resisting aggression is so much a direction of concept as

TSP

for the approbation of the rest of the world. The penalty of our power may

for what else is leadership except the willingness to stand
well be leadership; a leader must resign himself to be alone part of the time?

at least while he starts the road. The failure to exercise leadership will
not result in a consensus of humanity; but it will lead to the creation of

a vacuum.

VII

But would not a more independent policy antagonize, if not our allies, at
least the uncommitted third of the world? The importance of the belt of newly
independent states streching across the southern borders of Eurasia x cannot be
doubted. It is equally beyond question that it is to the American interest
to identify itself with the hopes and aspirations of that area and to prevent
an alignment of the white against the colored races of the world. The son-
sequences that flow from this realization are much less obvious, however, it
provides an argument for deferring a showdown to a more propitious moment and
therefore aids the Soviet strategy of upsetting the strategic balance by
increment. For to master a revolution such as is _________ in the under-
developed third of the world, pop ularity may not be enough; indeed the attempt
be popular

to popularize may be self-defeating or aggravate the situation, both psy-
chologically and politically. The short-term swings of public opinion in
these areas may be much less significant than the ability to give them a
sense of direction over a longer period of time consistent with our values

and our interest. Any polity toward the uncommitted third of the world must
therefore begin with an understanding of the tendencies they represent.

The revolution that is taking place in the newly independent and still
dependent states can only be narrowly understood as a revolution against colonialism.
In a real sense it is a continuation of a revolution started by the colonial powers and
carried on under their aegis. Moreover, not all the protest movements of formerly
subjugated people are either of the same order or represent the same phenomenon:
there is a basic difference between areas in which colonialism ruled directly
and those in which it governed indirectly.

The remarkable aspect of colonialism from its beginning was the imposition of
rule by a very small group of Europeans over vast populations. This was possible
due
to
not so much because of it because of the military superiority of the West -- in
many respects it is greater today than it was in the 19th century -- as to the fact that
the European powers displaced an existing ruling group in a society where the mass
of the population neither possessed nor expected direct participation in government.
The structure of government in what is now the uncommitted third of the world had
been feudal for centuries and in their first appearance the Europeans appeared as
only a new governing group substituting itself for the existing one according to a
pattern which had characterized wars in these areas for many generations. The

pattern which had characterised wars in these areas for many generations. The

only a new governing group constituting itself for the existing one according to a
been целен for centuries and in their first adherence the Europeans adhered as
The structure of government in what is now the uncommitted third of the world had
of the population neither possessed nor expected direct participation in government.

the European powers replaced an existing ruling group in a society where the mass
many respects it is greater today than it was in the fifth century -- as to the fact that
not so much because of a because of the military superiority of the West -- in
XXXXXXX

rule by a very small group of Europeans over vast populations. This was possible
because of the military superiority of the West -- in

The remarkable aspect of colonialism from its beginning was the imposition of
and those in which it governed indirectly.

there is a basic difference between areas in which colonialism **only** directly
arisingated people are either of the same order or represent the same phenomenon:
carried on under their regime. Moreover, not all the protest movements of formerly
In a real sense it is a continuation of a revolution **started** by the colonial powers and
dependent states can only be narrowly understood as a revolution against colonialism.

and **en-interferer**. Any positively toward the uncommitted third of the world must

government of vast territories by small groups of Europeans was possible precisely because they were not considered as "foreign"; the notion of their foreignness was introduced in the first instance not by the *governed* but by their rulers. For the Europeans were not content with displacing a feudal upper class. They brought with them the twin doctrines of rational administration and popular participation in government which in time had inevitably to prove inconsistent with this their continued domination. The rationalizing of administration led to the consolidation of many areas into viable units for the first time in their history; Indonesia for example was nothing but a geographic expression until the Dutch found it more efficient to consolidate the islands of the Indies into a single administrative unit. At the same time *the* colonial powers trained a group of indigenous leaders in European universities where they absorbed the doctrines of the right of self-government, human dignity and economic advancement which had been the rallying points for European revolutionary and progressive movements throughout the nineteenth century.

The result was two sets of paradoxes: in its revolutionary aspect colonialism represents one of the greatest conversions of history. Almost without exception the leaders of the newly independent states as well as the heads of

anti-colonial uprisings in still dependent countries are opposing the present or former powers in terms of values they have learned from them. Their challenge to the West is not in terms of a different set of beliefs; it is for the West to live up to its own principles. The leaders in the uncommitted third of the world are playing a role drawn from a Western script. As the ideals of the British, French and American revolution became diffused partly through the very spread of colonialism, the seeds were sewn for the destruction of colonialism itself. The more successful the teachings of the colonial powers, the more untenable their positions became. What is taking place in the areas once under direct colonial rule is the second stage of the revolution started by the colonial powers; it is an attempt by the leaders of the newly independent states to spread among the masses of their people the values which they themselves acquired from the colonial power and which furnished the original impetus of the revolution.

This leads to the second paradox of the uncommitted third of the world: that the position of areas which had been under direct colonial rule is more advantageous than that of countries where the colonial powers exercised their influence only indirectly. The territories governed directly benefitted through administrative consolidation and the overthrow of the old feudal order, by an

administrative consolidation and the overthrow of the old colonial order, by an
influence only indirectly. The territories governed directly benefited through
advantageous trade that the colonies where the colonial powers exercised their
power had been under direct colonial rule is more
than the position of areas which had been under direct colonial rule is more
This leads to the second paradox of the uncommitted third of the world:

revolution.

arised from the colonial power and which turned the original inhabitants of the
states so abrad among the masses of their people the privileges which they themselves
by the colonial powers; it is an attempt by the leaders of the newly independent
once under direct colonial rule is the second stage of the revolution started
the more intangible their positions became. What is taking place in the areas
colonialism itself. The more successfully the teaching of the colonial powers,
very abrad of colonialism, the seeds were sewn for the destruction of
British, French and American revolution became diffused barfly through the
world are playing a role drawn from a Western script. As the ideas of the
to five up to its own principles. The leaders in the uncommitted third of the
to the West is not in terms of a different set of beliefs; it is for the West
or former states in terms of values they have learned from them. Their challenge
anti-colonial springs in a still dependent countries are obsoiling the present

outside force. The countries controlled indirectly suffered the demoralizing
influence of foreign rule without a corresponding gain in the training of
leadership groups or of administrative cohesion. On the contrary, while in areas
governed directly boundaries were drawn with an eye to what constituted a viable
unit, in other territories they were drawn precisely because the countries
would *not* be viable. Thus the only reason for the existence of what came to
be known as Trans-Jordan was its need over an indefinite period of time of a
British subsidy. And so it was throughout the Middle East. Boundaries
reflected neither a common history nor a common language nor an economic or
administrative necessity; they were drawn to guarantee weakness and rivalry.
In these areas several revolutions are going on concurrently: there is to
begin with the revolt by a small Western educated élite against feudal rule,
accomplished elsewhere by the colonial powers; there is the quest for adminis-
trative, political and economic cohesiveness which in areas mix of direct rule
is also the legacy of colonialism; there is finally the attempt to raise the
economic and educational level of the masses. For this reason the revolutionary
urgency is much greater and the problems more nearly insoluble in areas which
had been governed indirectly because here there is a confluence of all the
upheavals which in the countries under direct rule were accomplished by fiat

and

over and in a long period of time. There, too, while a legalistic concept of
sovereignty and aggression may be a stabilizing element in South-East Asia,
it is a revolutionary force in areas like the Middle East because it works
volatile counter to the consolidation of inherently worthwhile and economically unviable
unity.

It is the revolution occuring in these countries, however different in its
nature, which makes the quest for popularity and ^a treacherous course. A revo-
lution is usually characterized by a coming together of all dissatisfactions which
join in protest against the existing order but which cannot necessarily offer a
clear substitute. The history of revolutions indicates moreover that after the
initial phase of sweeping away the prevailing institutions,/government usually
falls into the hands of a small minority which can give a sense of direction to
popular resentments and aspirations. And the same may be true of the interna-
tional revolution now taking place on a global scale. The United States will have
to give it a sense of direction or be engulfed by it eventually. It cannot do
so, however, by basing its policy on an inquiry into what people desire; the
situation is revolutionary precisely because old orders are desintegrating and
millions are groping for a new orientation. In the uncommitted areas, popularity
may therefore prove less important than respect.

millions are growing for a new orientation. In the uncommitted areas, bopularity situation is revolutionarily unprecedented because old orders are deintegrating and so, however, by passing its policy on an industry into what people desire; the to give it a sense of direction or be engulfed by it eventually. It cannot do formal revolution now taking place on a global scale. The United States will have bohemian resentments and aspirations. And the same may be true of the interna- tional phase of sweeping away the prevailing institutions, Government namely clear sapitude. The history of revolutions indicates moreover that after the join in protest against the existing order put which cannot necessarily offer a tion is namely characterised by a coming together of all dissatisfactions which nature, which makes the great for bohemarity and a utopianism. A revolu- tionary

It is the revolution occurring in these countries, however different in its nature, which makes the great for bohemarity and a utopianism. A revolutionary is the revolution occurring in these countries, however different in its nature, which makes the great for bohemarity and a utopianism. A revolu- tionary

counter to the conolidation of inherently workahorse and economically unstable volatiles
if it is a revolutionary force in areas like the Middle East because it works
sovereignty and aggression may be a stalling element in South-East Asia,
and even a long period of time. There, too, while a legislative concept of
over.

435

The importance of United States leadership is all the greater because of the unfamiliarity of many of the leaders of the newly independent nations with the elements of international stability, and occasionally their irresponsibility. Many of the leaders of the newly independent states have found the temptation to play a major role in international affairs almost overwhelming. Domestically, their problems are intractable; even a major economic advance would still probably fall far short of the aspirations of their peoples and in many countries will have a serious problem to keep up with rising birth-rate. In domestic policy each action has a price and sometimes a high one; even so well-established a leader as Nehru found that so relatively technical a problem as reshaping the boundaries of the Indian states could provoke major communal riots. But in the international field the division of the world into two contending camps exalts the role of the uncommitted and the collapse of the structure of the old international system creates a fertile field of manipulations for ambitious men. This produces an overwhelming temptation to defer the solution of difficult domestic problems by entering the international arena, to solidify a complicated domestic position by triumphs in the international field.

This attitude might be more constructive were it not combined with

xxx

This attitude might be more constructive were it not confined withxxx life.

situations for ambitions men. This produces an accumulating sense of temptation to
attract the old international system into a terrible field of man-
tending camps excite the role of the uncommitted and the collusive of the
rotors. But in the international field the division of the world into two con-
fronting the boundaries of the Indian states could provoke major communal
self-esterified a leader as well found that so relatively weak a power-
domestic policy each action has a price and sometimes a high one: even so

tries will have a serious problem to keep in mind with raising price-rate. In
propably full far apart of the aspirations of their beacons and in many comm-
their problems are insurmountable; even a major economic advance would affill
play a major role in international politics almost overwhelming. Domestically,

Many of the leaders of the newly independent states have found the temptation to
the elements of international stability and occasionally their truebeauty-
the unanimity of many of the leaders of the newly independent nations with

The importance of United States leadership in all the greater because of

433

434

a lack of understanding of the nature of modern power relationships, indeed with a

denial of this reality. The leaders of the newly independent states achieved their

positions by distinguishing themselves in the struggle with the former colonial

powers. But the independence movements almost without exception provided a poor

preparation for an understanding of the element of power in international relations.

Based on the dogmas of late nineteenth century liberalism, especially its paci-
fism, the independence movements relied more on ideological agreement than on

an evaluation of power factors and to this day the claim to superior spirituality

remains the battle cry of Asian nationalism. Moreover, the bad conscience of the

colonial Powers and their preoccupation with European problems gave the struggle

for independence more the character of a domestic debate than of a power dis-

pute. To be sure, many of the leaders of the newly independent Powers spent

years in jail and suffered heroically for their cause. It is not to deny the

measure of their dedication to assert that the results achieved were out of

proportion to their suffering. Empires which had held vast dominions for

hundreds of years disappeared without a battle being fought.

And if it is difficult for the leaders to retain a sense of proportion,

it is next to impossible for the mass of the people. On the whole, they were

involved in the struggle for independence only with their sympathies; to them

involved in the struggle for independence only with their sympathies to them
it is next to impossible for the mass of the people. On the whole, they were
and it is difficult for the leaders to retain a sense of proportion,
numbers of peoples disassembled without a battle being fought.

proportion to their antlering. Empires which had held vast dominions for
measles of their dedication to assert that the results achieved were out of
hearts in jail and sufftered periodically for their cause. It is not to deny the
bite. To be a man, many of the leaders of the newly independent powers absent
for independence more the character of a domestic despot than of a power dis-
colonial powers and their preoccupation with European problems gave the struggle
remains the battle cry of Asian nationalism. Moreover, the pad consequence of the
an evaluation of power factors and to this day the claim to anterior spirituality
liam, the independence movements relied more on ideological agreement than on
Based on the dogma of late nineteenth century lipophilism, especially its bac-
preparation for an understanding of the element of power in international relations,
bowers. But the independence movements almost without exception provided a boor
boastful pyg diamictating themselves in the struggle with the former colonial
denial of this reality. The federalist the newly independent states achieved their
a lack of understanding of the nature of modern power relationships, indeed with a

434

the disappearance of the colonial Powers must seem nothing short of
miraculous. Moreover, Most of the people of the newly independent states
live in pre-industrial societies. It would be difficult enough for them to
grasp the full impact of industrialism; it is too much to expect them to
understand the meaning of nuclear technology. It is therefore understandable
that in most former colonial areas there is an overestimation of what can be
accomplished by the power of words alone. Nor is this tendency diminished
by the rewards that fall to the uncommitted in the struggle for allegiance
by the two big power centers.

But however understandable, it is a dangerous trend. If this were
a tranquil period, nothing would be involved but minor irritations. In the
present revolutionary situation, however, the degeneration of the newly
independent states makes them susceptible to Soviet "peace offensives" and
their lack of appreciation of power relationships causes them to over-
estimate the protection afforded by moral precepts. Indeed their very
insistence on principle contributes to the demoralization of international
politics for it tempts them to accept at face value protestations of peaceful /
or legitimate grievances with which the Soviets inevitably accompany their ag-
gressive moves. It reinforces the quest for a "pure" case of aggression

creative moves. It reinforces the dread for a "pure" case of aggression
or legitimate grievances with which the Soviets inevitably accompany their ag-
bolitics for it tempts them to a coopt at least some protestations of benevol-
intention

instance on plausible contributes to the demoralization of international
estimate the protection afforded by moral precepts. Indeed their very
their lack of appreciation of power relationships causes them to over-
independent a state makes them unacceptable to Soviet "benevolent powers"
and
present revolutionary situation, however, the degeneration of the newly
a turbulent period, nothing would be involved but minor irritations. In the
But however understandable, it is a dangerous trend. If this were

by the two pig power centers.

by the rewards that fall to the uncommitted in the struggle for allegiance
accomplished by the power of words alone. Nor is this tendency diminished
that in most former colonial areas there is an overestimation of what can be
understand the meaning of nuclear technology. It is therefore understandable
grab the full impact of industrialism; it is too much to expect them to

five in pre-industrial societies. It would be difficult enough for them to
miraculous. Moreover, Most of the people of the newly independent states
the disappearance of the colonial powers must seem nothing short of

which almost insures that the actual aggressions which may take place will not be dealt with and in many instances not even be recognized as aggression.

Against the masters of ambiguity in the Kremlin and in Peiping, the insistance on absolute answers makes it likely that no answers will be given at all. And this in turn will react on the willingness to resist of threatened countries. They know that in any concrete case the pressure of the uncommitted part of the world will be exerted in favor of a policy of minimum risk and they will not be reassured by homilies which may be proclaimed at their wake.

Moreover, such understanding of power as the newly independent states do possess does not favor the United States. The power chiefly visible to the newly independent states are the Chinese or Soviet armies on their borders. This is a category of power which is both concrete and in keeping with their historical experience. By contrast the power of the United States is highly abstract and nearly invisible. Two hundred Chinese divisions represent a familiar element of power; by comparison the destructive capability of a B-52 and or the strategic impact of ballistic missile is esoteric and difficult to grasp. Thus considerations of both power and principle combine to inspire the newly independent nations with caution. In every crisis they

to inspire the newly independent nations with caution. In every crisis they
difficult to grasp. Thus considerations of both power and principle compine
of a B-25 and on the strategic impact ofWWII's sieges and
sent a familiar element of power: by comparison the destructive capability
is highly abstract and nearly inviolable. Two hundred Chinese divisions repre-
with their historical experience. By contrast the power of the United States
ponders. This is a category of power which is both concrete and in keeping
the newly independent states are the Chinese or Soviet armies on their
do business does not favor the United States. The power chiefly available to
Moreover, such understanding of power as the newly independent states
provoked at their make.

of minimum risk and they will not be reassured by pomification which may be
the uncommitted part of the world will be exerted in favor of a policy
threatened countries. They know that in any concrete case the pressure of
at all. And this in turn will react on the willingness to resist of
instance on absolute answers makes it likely that no answers will be given
Against the West of ambiguity in the Kremlin and in Beijing, the
be dealt with and in many instances not even be recognized as an aggression.

which almost insinuate that the actual aggressions which may take place will not

443

super powers, they chose in every crisis to direct their pressures against us as a means to preserve the peace or to resolve an issue. To the degree that we can project a greater sense of purpose some of these pressures may be diverted against the Soviet bloc. A revolution like Egypt's or even India's cannot be managed by understanding alone; it also requires a readiness on our part to bear the psychological burden of difficult decisions.

VIII

The problem of American relations both with our allies and the uncommitted therefore depends on a close relationship of power and policy. Without a military policy which poses less fearful risks than all-out war, our alliances will be in jeopardy, and the uncommitted areas will vacillate between protestations of principle and a consciousness of their impotence. But even if the wisest military policy will prove sterile, if our diplomacy cannot elaborate a concept of aggression which is directed to the most likely dangers. In our relation to both our allies and the uncommitted, we must realize that common action depends on common purposes and that it is the task of policy to set the frame-work of common purpose, if necessary by an act of leadership that permits no further equivocation.

Relations both with our allies and the uncommitted and the development of the proper strategy derive their particular urgency not so much from the revolution going on in the colonial areas or from the shrinking power of Europe

or even from the power of modern weapons. The particular urgency of the present situation is due to the existence of another revolutionary force which in contrast to the revolution of the underdeveloped third of the world derives its impetus from a desire to overthrow the liberal values of the West; the revolution of the Soviet bloc organized to exploit all dissatisfactions for its own ends and determined to prevent the establishment of any equilibrium. Without the Soviet interest in creating a maximum of instability many of the international tensions work could make themselves out at a more leisurely pace; the necessity faced by all nations to adjust to concurrent revolutions in ideology, technology and economic and political relationships would produce less of a sense of urgency. To the Soviet bloc the instability of one revolutionary period has become an opportunity to complete its task of destruction and domination. All measures in policy as in strategy have therefore to be viewed against the reality of the Soviet threat.

An opponent cannot be overcome until he is understood. It is therefore necessary to turn to an examination of Soviet modes of action, their strategy and their policy to determine the impact of the nuclear age on the behavior of the Soviet bloc.

The subsequent statements have given up the reference to"broken-backed" warfare as also to the mobilization of reserve forces behind the shield and supplied by the active forces which was still a key doctrine of the 1954 Statement. But the dilemma of the British forces in Germany remained. For if the distinction between limited war and all-out war was the difference between war in Asia and war in Europe, it was difficult to justify so large a British contingent on the Continent. What was the meaning of a ground commitment in an all-out war that every Statement of Defense characterized as "short," "intense" and above all largely confined to an air battle? British statements have given answers as ambivalent as the strategic doctrine from which they derived.

22. 21. Statement on Defense for 1954, p. 5.

23. 22. Statement on Defense for 1955, p. 4.

24. 23. Statement on Defense for 1955, p. 7.

Each of these arguments raises as many questions as it answers. At
the scale of devastation produced by an all-out thermo-nuclear war, it is
difficult to visualize any substantial accompanying ground action or an
ability to sustain it once the troops become aware of the devastation at home.
If on the other hand, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons permitted
a ground defense of Europe, what was the necessity of accompanying it with
a thermo-nuclear exchange which might well lead to the social collapse of
both sides and which would in any case inflict catastrophic losses on Great
Britain. Again, if the nuclear counter-offensive was as lethal as British
do doctrine postulated, the U.S.S.R. would hardly have suffered resources left
to hold Western Europe as a pawn in the negotiation. Moreover, a substantial
body of opinion believed that the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead
to all-out war, so that the equipment of NATO with tactical atomic weapons
was in Liddell Hart's words "piling absurdity on absurdity." For if they
unleashed an all-out war the British homeland would be destroyed and the armies

25. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

25. [Fig.'s, b. 8.

melted an all-out war the British homeland would be destroyed and the armies
was in Liddell Hart's words "bifling sparsity on inaccessibility." For it they
to all-out war, so that the equipment of NATO with tactical atomic weapons
bod of opinion believed that the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead
to hold Western Europe as a baw in the negotiation. Moreover, a subterranean
doctrine formulated, the U.3.2.R. would hardly have affected recommendations left
Britain. Again, if the nuclear counter-offensive was as lethal as British
both sides and which would in any case inflict catastrophic losses on Great
a thermo-nuclear exchange which might well lead to the social collapse of
a broad defense of Europe, what was the necessity of accompanying it with
it on the other hand, the employment of tactical nuclear weapons permitted
splify to sustain it once the troops become aware of the devastation at home.
difficult to stabilise any subterranean accompanying broad action or an
the scale of devastation produced by an all-out thermo-nuclear war, it is
Each of these arguments raises as many questions as it answers. At
in negotiations.

of liberation and to prevent the U.3.2.R. from making Europe "as a shamefull bawn"
esential so that Britain would not again have to undertake the grim business

would have lost their purpose. Thus Britain's attempt to develop a strategic
air force and a ground defense of Europe and to implement both courses
**concurrently** should war break out was to combine the maximum cost with the
minimum effectiveness. 26
28)

And since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would have sufficient
resources left for a major effort to liberate Europe, the net result of a
thermo-nuclear exchange might be Soviet domination of Eurasia unless the forces
on the spot were sufficiently strong to hold a line. Thus the outcome of an
all-out thermo-nuclear war would still be determined by the ability to
hold or to occupy territory. If this is true, however, reliance on all-out
war becomes not only costly but irrelevant. If the issue of even an all-out
war depends to such an extent on the outcome of the ground battle, it would
seem to be the task of strategy to begin a war with such a battle, to seek
less wasteful means than all-out war to determine the possession of territory.

28. News Chronicle, "All Military Knowledge is Now Useless," March 1955 as one of many similar statements. See also *H. Times* editorial, January 4, 1956 against the employment of tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to all-out war. See also speech by *Wilford Tienburgh* Hansard (Commons) Feb.29, 56.

all-out war. See also sheepish by. *W. of W. War* (Commons) p. 38, 39.

*News Chronicle*, "All Military Knowledge is Old U.S. News," March 1922 as
against the employment of tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to
one of many similar statements. See also *H.R. Times* editorial, "Terror 7, 1922 as

London

The difficulty with British strategic doctrine as with that of the United States, less careful means than all-out war to determine the possession of territory.

seem to be the task of strategy to begin a war with such a battle, to seek
war debuta to such an extent on the outcome of the ground battle, it would
war becomes not only costly but irrelevant. If the issue of even an all-out
hold or to occupy territory. If this is true, however, reliance on all-out
all-out thermo-nuclear war would still be axiomatic determined by the spillover to
on the spot were sufficiently strong to hold a line. Thus the outcome of an
thermo-nuclear exchange might be Soviet domination of Eurasia unless the forces
reasons felt for a major effort to liberate Europe, the net result of a
and since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would have sufficient
Western Europe for ransom in negotiations following a thermo-nuclear exchange.

And since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom would have sufficient
Western Europe for ransom in negotiations following a thermo-nuclear exchange.

on the Continent is the proposition that the U. S. B. might seek to hold

The most convincing argument in favor of stationing British troops
minimum effectiveness.

minimum effectiveness.

concentrately upon war break out was to complicate the maximum coat with the
air force and a ground defense of Europe and to implement joint corvettes

would have cost their burden. Thus Britain's attempt to develop a strategic

then, is that in the absence of a resolution of some key issues defense policy
protecting itself against
is tempted into covering every contingency without an assessment of the
most probable danger or a reconciliation of partly overlapping, partly incon-
sistent strategies. Britain's strategic doctrine and its alliance policy is
bedeviled as that of the United States by the problem of finding a distinction
between global and limited war, by deciding whether the utilization of nuclear
weapons is compatible with a policy of limited war and above all by the relation-
ship between deterrence and the strategy for conducting a war should deterrence
fail.

For the British strategic dilemma in an all-out war must be viewed
against the catastrophe an all-out nuclear war must inevitably produce in
the crowded British isles. It is a measure of the toughness of the British
social fabric that nowhere in the public debate has the question been raised
whether Europe was "worth" an all-out war. But it is also a testimony to the
persistance of obsolescent doctrine that Britain should apply so literally
a military policy which staked its social structure on any Soviet aggression
on Europe. And withal the British dilemma is only a reflection of that of
the United States which too is committed to an all-or-nothing showdown should
war start in Europe.

war start in Europe.

the United States which too is committed to an all-or-nothing showdown should
on Europe. And while the British dilemma is only a reflection of that of
a military policy which staked its social structure on any Soviet agreement
permanence of opposite doctrine that Britain should supply so literally
whichever Europe was "worth" an all-out war. But it is also a testimony to the
social fabric that nowhere in the public debate has the question been raised
the crowded British Isles. It is a measure of the toughness of the British
against the catastrophe an all-out nuclear war must inevitably produce in
For the British strategic dilemma in an all-out war must be viewed
fair.

ship between deterrence and the strategy for conducting a war should deterrence
measures be compatible with a policy of limited war and above all by the relation-
ship between global and limited war, by deciding whether the utilization of nuclear
pedestal as that of the United States by the people of funding a distinction
statement strategies. Britain's a strategic doctrine and its alliance policy is
mostropa! danger or a reconciliation of partly overlapping, partly incon-
fered into covering every contingency without an assessment of the
then, is that in the absence of a resolution of some key issues defense policy
protecting itself against
very good

356

✓ in the query; what it is that is deterred by a thermo-nuclear capability. The

although the basic argument of the advocates of "graduated deterrence" as the

-quest for intermediary solutions is called in Great Britain applies equally

to this country
to the United States.

The main thrust of the advocates of "graduated deterrence" is directed

Isn't
some
ambiguity
necessary.
Why tell
the

Soviets the price tag on each piece of real estate? (I should leave
read on.)

in the application of power were being considered. The advocates of graduated
deterrence admit that the ambiguity of the British (and for that matter the
American) position might increase Soviet hesitations, but they assert that
it may as well induce the Soviets either to disbelieve the threat or to estimate
its ambiguity as implying a decision to undertake local defense. In the
latter contingency the failure to consider alternatives in advance and to
convey them to the enemy would have contributed to bringing on an unnecessary
all-out war. These were the arguments advanced by Denis Healy, one of the
ablest young members of Parliament, in his reply to Sir Winston Churchill's
speech of March 1st, 1955: "

"...If we are relying, as the Prime Minister suggested, on the
deterrent of mutual terror, the greater the terror the greater
the deterrent. The appalling xxx ambiguity of the White Paper
in this respect is that it does not make clear whether full-
scale thermo-nuclear war must be the inevitable consequence
of aggression in Europe... The real question we must ask our-
selves is: does the White Paper mean that we must be prepared
to use thermo-nuclear weapons from the word 'go' against a
strategic target, such as a centre of population inside the
Soviet Union or does it simply mean that we must use whatever
weight of nuclear power is required in tactical area that is to
say an area where land fighting is going on upon the continent.
If the Russians even think that it is our intention to drop
thermo-nuclear weapons upon their cities the moment fighting
begins in Europe, then certainly the moment anything approaching
a state of war develops in Europe, Russia will start by dropping
these weapons upon us... It seems to me that the appalling am-
biguity of the White Paper immensely increases the danger of a
completely unnecessary thermo-nuclear war which might lead to the
destruction of mankind... The second great danger if the Government
really mean that any aggression in Europe will result in full-scale
thermo-nuclear war is that any local incident in Europe will leave

thermo-nuclear war is that any local incident in Europe will leave
really mean that any aggression in Europe will result in full-scale
destruction of marking...The second great danger if the Government
completely unnecessary thermo-nuclear war which might lead to the
greatness of the White Paper immediately increases the danger of a
these weapons now na...It seems to me that the abatement am-
s a state of war develops in Europe. Russia will start by grooving
begin in Europe, then certainly the moment arising abroading
thermo-nuclear weapons upon their arrival the moment lighting
It the Russia even think that it is our intention to drop
say an area where land lighting is going on upon the contact
weight of nuclear power is required in tactical areas that is to
Soviet Union or does it imply mean that we must see whatever
strategic target, such as a centre of population inside the
state is: does the White Paper mean that we must be prepared
of aggression in Europe...The real question we must ask om-
scale thermo-nuclear war must be the inevitable consequence
in this respect is that it does not make clear whether full-
the deterrent. The abatement xxx amplifies of the White Paper
deferent of mutual terror, the greater the terror the greater
"...It we are relying, as the Prime Minister anguishes, on the

abeen of March 1st, 1952: "

spare young members of Parliament, in his reply to Sir Winston Churchill's
all-out war. These were the arguments advanced by Denia Heafy, one of the
convene them to the enemy would have contributed to printing on an unnecessarily
fatter contingency the failure to consider alternatives in advance and to
its amplifies as implying a declaration to undertake local defence. In the
it may as well induce the Soviets either to disbelieve the threat or to estimate
American) position might increase Soviet expectations, put they assert that
deterrence admit that the amplifies of the British (and for that matter the
in the abrogation of power were being considered. The advocates of graduated

323

C42

358

us with no alternative between self-destruction...and appeasement...
If it becomes a question of competitive mutual blackmail at this
level between a Communist <u>communistic</u> dictatorship and a Western
democracy, the Communist dictatorship is likely to win every time...
It has always been a fact in warfare that when war begins fighting
goes on where the war begins and this will be so in another war.
I am suggesting that it is in our interest if the deterrent
fails to limit the <u>area</u> and mode of the fighting to the greatest
possible extent." 27

They argued that deterrence was achieved above all by the certainty of reta-
liation. A threat, however ominous, that was not likely to be carried out
would be ineffective. A strategy, so <u>their</u> argument goes, that inevitably
involves destruction of the national substance would be self-defeating. As
a result, the advocates of "graduated deterrence" have proposed a strategy that
would return war to a battlefield, however defined and directed against
hostile military forces and not against civilian morale or industrial facilities.

29. Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955. See also Healy, "The Atom Bomb and the Alliance," *Confluence*, March 1956. Healy, "The Bomb that Didn't go off," *Encounter*, July 1955.

Encounter, '93.

The Alliance, "Confrontation," March 10-12. Healy, "The Bomb that Diqu't Go out," 21. Hennard (Commons), March 1, 1922. See also Healy, "The Atom Bomb and There is a disagreement within this group whether the limitation should include

would return war to a battlefield, however defined and directed against a result, the advocates of "gratuated deterrence" have proposed a strategy that involves destruction of the national infrastructure would be self-defeating. As would be ineffective. A strategy, so the argument goes, that inevitably inflation. A threat, however ominous, that was not likely to be carried out they argued that deterrence was achieved above all by the certainty of respite and to insure that it would be sought in a non-catastrophic manner.

deterrence were concerned with the strategy to conduct a war, they sought with the threat of maximum destruction. But the advocates of gratuated the point of view of achieving maximum deterrence and they identified this they viewed the British strategic problem. The Government looked at it from and the Government positioned thus resolved itself into the aspect from which The difference between the advocates of "gratuated deterrence

boastful extent."

It is argued that it is in our interest that the deterrent goes on where the war begins and this will be so in another war. It has always been a fact in war that when war begins fighting democracy, the Communist dictatorship is likely to win every time...

328

359

a distinction between "conventional" and "nuclear" weapons or whether if "unconventional weapons" are used these should not be gas rather than nuclear weapons. This group believes that the distinction between the tactical and strategic employment of nuclear weapons is so difficult to draw that any employment of nuclear weapons <u>will inevitably lead to all-out war.</u> Graduated deterrence in this view involves the renunciation of nuclear weapons.

OF THE ADVOCATES OF GRADUATED DETERRENCE
THE MAJORITY GROUP, ON THE OTHER HAND, STARTS FROM THE PREMISE THAT WITH
THE SPREAD OF nuclear TECHNOLOGY, A RENUNCIATION OF nuclear WEAPONS IS ILLUSORY
AND ULTIMATELY DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE WEST BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET SUPERIORITY
IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. THEY, THEREFORE, ADVOCATE TWO STEPS AS A MEANS
to Mitigate the horrors of nuclear WAR: the development of a STRATEGY and
A MILITARY CAPABILITY WHICH PERMITS AN INTERMEDIARY COURSE BETWEEN ALL-OUT
WAR and SURRENDER. AS INDICATED IN THE SPEECH BY DENIS HEALY, THEY SUGGEST
A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY and CIVILIAN TARGETS. "THERE ARE NO STRATEGIC
OR TACTICAL WEAPONS" SAID DENIS HEALY "ONLY STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL TARGETS."

28
30. Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955.

360

only against military targets explicitly defined and that only ~~target~~ in
a battlezone of a specified width would be attacked, would suffice to limit
a war. They admit that such a course would reduce the extent of the threat
of retaliation but they believe it would be outweighed by the greater like-
lihood of its being applied. The course advocated amounts to a strategy of
limited nuclear war even for the defense of Europe. 29
31

By contrast, the British government has insisted that deterrence was
achieved by posing an ambiguous threat which left open the possibility of
unlimited retaliation. The proponents of the predominant strategic school
in Great Britain, just as their counterparts in the United States, attack
graduated deterrence for two contradictory reasons: that a distinction between
the tactical and strategic uses of weapons was difficult to make and impossible
to enforce; and that an intermediary course by reducing the Soviet dangers
would increase its willingness to run risks. "Much has been said and written
about the proposal for so-called graduated deterrence," said Sir Walter Monckton,
then British Minister of Defense. "...I am far from saying that any aggressive
move would inevitably be countered by the use of the hydrogen bomb. One cannot

31. See Sir A. W. Buzzard, "Graduated Deterrence," *World Politics*, January 1956.
29 For an American view see, Leghorn, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars," *U.S. News and World Affairs*, Jan. 28, 1955 p. 18. See below chapter ____ for fuller development of these points.

Under development of these points.

U.S. Navy and World Allies, 1921-1922. See below chapter — for

29 For an American view see, Leghorn, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars."

31 See Sir A. W. Bussard, "Graduated Defense," *World Politics*, January 1926.

move would inevitably be countered by the use of the hydrogen bomb. One cannot then British Minister of Defense. "...I am far from asking that any aggressive upon the proposal for so-called graduated deterrence," said Sir Walter Mometten, would increase its willingness to run risks. "Much has been said and written to enforce that an intermediate course of reducing the Soviet dangers the tactical and strategic means of weapons was difficult to make and imposable graduated deterrence for two contradictory reasons: that a distinction between in Great Britain, that as their counterparts in the United States, attack unlimited retaliation. The proponents of the predominant strategic school sequested the boast an ambitious threat which left open the possibility of

By contrast, the British Government was inactivated that deterrence was

limited nuclear war even for the defense of Europe. 31

limit of its being subordinated. The course advocated amounts to a strategy of retaliation but they believe it would be outweighed by the greater like- a war. They admit that such a course would reduce the extent of the threat a patteme of a abetted width would be attacked, would annul to limit only against military targets explicitly defined and that only targets in

320

361

Graduated deterrence was therefore rejected as both impractical and
unwise, as making aggression more likely by reducing the threat to the
aggressor and as being unable to prevent all-out war because of the impracti-
cability of making any distinctions. These arguments were not only inconsistent

Hansard (Commons), February 23, 1956.

p. 1024 ff.

capital of making any distinctions. These arguments were not only inconsistent
aggression and as being made to prevent all-out war because of the impracti-
unwise, as making aggression more likely by reducing the threat to the
Graduated deference was therefore rejected as both impractical and

grounths for taking the opposite view."

of a similar policy by other parties to the argument. I think there are solid
reasons ground for believing that the adoption would enquire the adoption
the policy of graduated deference was right in itself, would there be any
Moreover there is the further consideration that even if it were assumed that
tar they might go without bringing down upon them, the ultimate deterrent...
be wondering on the question of whether they could take risks, to see how
to make a definition of that kind in advance...might help others who might
circumstances in which it would use some weapons and not others. Any attempt
practicable policy for any government to define precisely in advance the
use of atomic weapons...Nevertheless, I do not think that it would be a
listion. One cannot say that local retaliation would not involve the tactical
which local aggression might be dealt with quite effectively by local reta-
be specific in matters of this kind but one can imagine circumstances in

30

362

with each other but also with British defense policy. For if it was impractical to make distinctions, it would be impossible to employ nuclear weapons even in the local wars which both the White Paper on Defense and Sir Walter Monckton's statement admitted, while if it was unwise to make distinctions between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, it could be so only because of its practicality. Moreover the deliberate obscurity of Sir Walter Monckton's statement had explicitly left open the possibility of a less than all-out response and equipping the British army with tactical nuclear weapons had given this possibility. But if there was any point in the ambiguity of the British (and American) position, it could only be that aggression might be dealt with by means other than all-out war while leaving open the threat of what Sir Walter Monckton called the "ultimate deterrent."

363

an attack on Western Europe was certain to lead to all-out war. Thus it would seem that the clearest kind of warning would provide the most effective deterrent. The British Statement on Defense sought to reconcile this inconsistency by implying that tactical nuclear weapons might be utilized in localized conflicts outside Europe. If tactical nuclear weapons, however, were suitable to deter or defeat aggression outside of Europe, it was difficult to see why they should not prove equally effective on the Continent. And if a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons was possible in peripheral wars, it seemed only logical that the same distinction could hold in Europe.

364

war should graduated deterrence fail. Graduated deterrence simply represents an attempt to avoid having **the most** catastrophic strategy as the **only** recourse to Soviet moves and as the initial riposte to any challenge.

Thus British strategic doctrine suffers from the same ambiguities as that of the United States. Even more incongruously than in our case, it represents a nostalgia for a period when security could be absolute and threats were unambiguous. It is therefore an attempt not only to deal with the Soviet danger, but also to escape too close a dependence on both Britain's American World War II and the period of the atomic monopoly when strategy needed to consider only the damage it could inflict and not the blows it might suffer. In exalting the physical component of deterrence, it disregards the psychological element above all that strategy must seek to harmonize power with the willingness to use it. And for this reason, the British strategic doctrine, just as that of massive retaliation is inconsistent with a policy of alliances. Vis-a-vis the United States, the British striking force does not give the United Kingdom a stronger negotiating position because it represents only a marginal increment to the capability where we are strongest. The bases afforded us by Britain are more important for our strategy and more useful to British

365

diplomacy than the British strategic air force. And with respect to Europe
the emphasis on an all-out strategy undermines the willingness of the conti-
nental powers to undertake a substantial military effort. The primary use
of the British bomber force is that it frees Britain in a small degree from
its dependence on the target selection of the U.S. Strategic Air Force in an
all-out war; to a small degree only because it could not hope to win an air-
battle by itself.

Thus the British defense effort reveals an absence of an agreed strategy
with the United States on the one hand and with the Continental powers on
the other. And the absence of this agreement is a reflection of our own
a
strategic doctrine; indeed it represents logical application of it. The crisis
of NATO is therefore in one sense caused by the fact that NATO for many of
its components serves no useful military purpose.

its components serve no useful military purpose.

of NATO is therefore in one sense caused by the fact that NATO, for many of
strategic doctrine; indeed it represents logical application of it. The criteria
the other. And the absence of this agreement is a reflection of our own
with the United States on the one hand and with the Continental powers on

Thus the British defense effort reveals an absence of an agreed strategy
pattise by itself.

all-out war to a small degree only because it could not hope to win an air-
its dependence on the target selection of the U.S. Strategic Air Force in an
of the British power force is that it frees Britain in a small degree from
mental powers to undertake a substantial military effort. The primarily mea-
the emphasis on an all-out strategy underlies the willingness of the confi-
diography than the British strategic air force. And with respect to Europe