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* We have defended our values and interests around the globe.

But an agenda of such scope inevitably remains unfinished. Great opportunities lie before us.

* The industrial democracies can usher in a new and dynamic period of creativity in their relations with each other and lay the foundation for a new approach to the developing world.

* We have an early opportunity to place a ceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and move on from there to reduce them.

* We can build on the promising foundations of the new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

* We have the possibility of major progress toward peace in the Middle East while strengthening our commitment to the security and survival of Israel.

* We can help the peoples of Africa reach for conciliation, human justice, and development rather than violence and hatred.

* We can see to it that the atom is used for mankind's benefit, not its destruction.

* The developing countries can become true partners in the international community.

* All countries can work together to fashion a global community both on land and in the vast domains of the oceans.

In pursuing these goals we must have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; we must be prepared to look behind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only be reached by patience and often only in gradual stages.

A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The times summon a steady, resolute, purposeful, and self-assured America. This requires confidence—the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its Government, and the Nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives. It is time to remind ourselves that while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all share the same dreams—peace, prosperity, and justice in our Nation and throughout the world.

Many years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that no nation could long endure "half slave and half free," and touched the conscience of a nation. Today people the world over cry out for liberty, dignity, respect; and they look with hope and longing to America—for we have touched the conscience of all mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we set our sights high but without self-indulgence, the generations that come after us may at last be able to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

The Secretary
of State

PP. S-7

[LC]

Speech

October 19, 1976

New York, N.Y.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

MORAL PROMISE AND PRACTICAL NEEDS

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Synagogue
Council of America 50th Anniversary Jubilee
Dinner.

Americans are today in the midst of the quadrennial debate about our past, our present, and the future we hope to create. It is a dramatic demonstration of the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our Nation. Whatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that they have once again shown the vigor of a free society which gives hope to the countless millions around the world who are dominated by oppressive regimes and intolerant ideologies.

It is also—let us be frank—a time of confusion and of exaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are strong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert that our global influence for peace and progress has never been greater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world; others tell us we have never been more respected, more successful abroad than we are today.

As Secretary of State I am, of course, detached from partisan debate, although I seem to find my sympathies, for some reason, lying with "others" rather than the "some."

But no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on specific issues, the history of the post-war period has left no doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without America's commitment there can be no real security in the world. Without our dedication there can be no progress. Without our strength peoples all over the world will live in fear. Without our faith they will live in despair.

America's contribution to world affairs has derived from our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate can be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has enabled us to understand that the greatest achievements were a dream before they became a reality. We have learned through experience, as few people have, that all that is creative is ultimately a moral affirmation—the faith that dares in the absence of certainty; the courage to go forward in the face of adversity.

All of us here are deeply concerned about the survival and security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even our closest friends cannot be assured in a vacuum. Peace, progress, and justice will not be securely won for America or Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, progressive, and just international order. The task of building such an order is the fundamental challenge of our time.

No people has experienced more of man's exaltation—and man's depravity—than the Jewish people. The Jewish people know that survival requires unending struggle. But they know as well that peace, if it is to be more than a prophet's dream, must rest on the conscience of mankind made real by the concrete efforts of all peoples and all nations.

America, because of its own heritage, is perennially engaged in such a search of its conscience. How does our foreign policy serve moral ends? How can America carry forward its role as a humane example and champion of justice in a world in which power is still often the final arbiter? How do we secure both our existence and our

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values? How do we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?

These questions have been asked throughout our history; they are being posed again today, as they should. But they require more than simple answers and easy slogans.

There is no doubt that policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder, drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure calculation will be empty of both vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction but also roots and heart. Americans have always held the view that America stood for a moral purpose above and beyond its material achievements.

But we must recall as well that policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative. We live in a world of 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences, and nuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still finite. A truly moral policy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities. America, to be true to itself, must keep its eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep our feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish morality from moralizing. We must remember that the invocation of lofty principles has led, in our history, as frequently to abdication as to overcommitment. Either tendency would be disastrous for international order and our well-being.

The challenge of American foreign policy is to live up to America's moral promise while fulfilling the practical needs of world order. How we meet it will determine the peace and progress of America and of the world.

This is the subject I would like to discuss with you today.

## Ideals and Foreign Policy

From its beginning, Americans have believed that this country had a moral significance that transcended its geographic, military, or economic power. Unique among the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious act by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles they believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder, then, that Santayana concluded that: "Being an American is, of itself, almost a moral condition."

But this idealism has also been in constant tension with another deep-seated strain in our historical experience. Since De Tocqueville, it has

been frequently observed that we are a pragmatic people—common-sensical, undogmatic, and undoctrinaire—a nation of practical energy, ingenuity, and spirit. We have made tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic political life. We have defined our basic goals—justice, liberty, equality, and progress—in open and libertarian terms, enlarging opportunity and freedom rather than coercing a uniform standard of conduct.

America has been most effective internationally when we have combined our idealistic and our pragmatic traditions. The Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment in human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the world; they understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence. For a century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of our continent, content to influence the world by moral example. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy and blessed by a bountiful nature, we came to believe our special situation was universal, valid, even for nations whose narrower margins of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong; we tended to see our successes as the product not of fortunate circumstances but of virtue and purity of motive.

As our power grew we became uncomfortable with its uses and responsibilities and impatient with the compromises of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status of a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who foresaw only a process of deepening involvement in a morally questionable world.

In the early decades of this century we sought to reconcile the tension between ideals and interests by confining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort to our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered in relief programs; we championed free trade and the cause of foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions to international conflicts—we experimented with arbitration, conciliation, judicial arrangements, treaties to abolish war, neutrality legislation, collective security systems.

These efforts to banish the reality of power were aborted by our involvement in two World Wars. While we had a clear security interest in a Europe free from domination by any one power we clothed that interest in assertions that we

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would do battle for universal moral objectives—"a war to end all wars" or the unconditional surrender of the aggressor.

Disillusionment set in as the outcome of both World Wars necessarily fell short of expectations. After the first war, a tide of isolationist sentiment rose, in which moral proclamations were coupled with an unwillingness to undertake concrete commitments. We were loath to face a world of imperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent crises, and the need for a political structure that would secure the peace.

We undertook our first sustained period of peacetime world leadership in the decades after World War II, with a supreme self-assurance fortunately matched by overwhelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist whose political system and actions on the world scene explicitly threatened the very existence of our most cherished principles.

In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our traditional approach. We saw economic problems around the world—which we had solved successfully in our own country—and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer weight of resources, often with startling success. We projected our domestic experience overseas and assumed that economic progress automatically led to political stability. And in the process, without making a conscious decision to do so, we were trying to shape the world to our design.

## Complexities of the Contemporary World

Our postwar policy was marked by great achievements—the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the resistance to aggression, the encouragement of decolonization. But we no longer live in so simple a world.

We remain the strongest nation and the largest single influence in international affairs. For 30 years our leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and justice. Our leadership is no less needed today, but it must be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours is no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly but one of substantial clear equivalence. Ours is no longer a world of two solid blocs and clear-cut dividing lines but one of proliferating centers of power and influence. Ours is no longer a world amenable to national or

regional solutions but one of economic interdependence and common global challenges.

Thus for the first time in American experience, we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Rather, we—like all other nations in history—must now conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, persistence, and imagination if we are to preserve and forward our national goals.

We can no longer impose our own solutions; yet our action or inaction will influence events, often decisively. We cannot banish power from international affairs, but we can use our vast power wisely and firmly to deter aggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can help construct more equitable relations between developed and developing nations and a wider community of interest among all nations. And we must continue to stand for freedom and human dignity in the world.

These are worthy goals. They can be achieved. But they summon a different dimension of moral conviction than that of a simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid ambiguity and endless exertion—the courage to hold fast to what we believe in while recognizing that at any one time our hopes are likely to be only partially fulfilled.

We must always keep in mind that it was precisely under the banners of universal moralistic slogans that a decade and a half ago we launched into adventures that divided our country and undermined our international position. It is only in the last few years that we have finally begun to bring our commitments into line with our capabilities.

Clearly we must maintain our values and our principles; but we risk disaster unless we relate them to concepts of the national interest and international order that are based not on impulse but on a sense of steady purpose that can be maintained by the American people for the long term.

This is not a choice between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either and still remain true to our national character or to the needs of the world community. Our cause must be just, but it must prosper in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills. We can achieve no positive ends unless we survive, and survival has its practical necessities. Neither moralistic rhetoric nor obsession with pure power politics will produce a

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foreign policy worthy of our opportunity—or adequate for our survival.

## Morality of Ends and Means

America—and the community of nations—today faces inescapable tasks.

* We must maintain a secure and just peace.

* We must create a cooperative and beneficial international order.

* We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.

Each of these challenges has both a moral and a practical dimension. Each involves important ends—but ends that are sometimes in conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral dilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid ends and to relate our ends to means.

Peace. In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's very survival, peace is a fundamental moral imperative. Without it nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have meaning. Let there be no mistake about it: Averting the danger of nuclear war and limiting and ultimately reducing destructive nuclear arsenals is a moral, as well as political, act.

In the nuclear age traditional power politics, the struggle for marginal advantages, the drive for prestige and unilateral gains must yield to an unprecedented sense of responsibility. History teaches us that balances based on constant tests of strength have always erupted into war. But common sense tells us that in the nuclear age history cannot be permitted to repeat itself. Every President, sooner or later, will conclude with President Eisenhower that "there is no alternative to peace."

But peace, however crucial, cannot be our *only* goal. To seek it at any price would render us morally, defenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most ruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than make a desert and call it peace.

There will be no security in a world whose obsession with peace leads to appeasement; but neither will there be security in a world in which mock tough rhetoric and the accumulation of arms is the sole measure of competition. We owe our

people a convincing justification for their exertions; we can spare no effort to bequeath to future generations a peace more hopeful than an equilibrium of terror.

Barely four years ago demonstrations in the streets demanded "peace" as overriding all other considerations; today policies of conciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions. Both extremes falsify our challenge. In the search for peace we are continually called upon to strike balances—between strength and conciliation, between the need to defend our values and our interests and the need to take into account the views of others, between partial and total settlements.

The task of foreign policy is to find that balance between competing ends and between ends and means. The problems of timing, method, feasibility impose themselves on any conscientious policy decision. There are certain experiments that cannot be tried, not because the goals are undesirable but because the consequences of failure would be so severe that not even the most elevated can justify the risk.

The Middle East provides a vivid example. No people yearn for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel, whose existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli issues—borders, peace obligations, refugees—should have been approached simultaneously at one conference. But the proponents of this course ignore the fact that at the time it would probably have proved disastrous—the United States had no diplomatic relations with several of the key Arab countries, the Soviet Union was in effect the lawyer for the Arab cause, an oil embargo was still in effect, and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at the flashpoint.

Under such conditions the chances for success of a comprehensive approach were slight and the penalties for failure were far-reaching—a continuation of the oil embargo, a prolonged freeze in U.S. relations with the Arab world, the corresponding growth of Soviet influence, strains with our allies in Europe and Japan, the increased isolation of Israel and the likelihood, therefore, of a result of the Middle East war in even more difficult circumstances.

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We chose to proceed step-by-step on those issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship with the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions, and to build a new sense of confidence in the parties directly involved so that overall solutions would someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with the intention of ultimately merging individual steps into a comprehensive solution.

In the brief space of 18 months three agreements were reached—two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria and Israel. As a result the possibilities of achieving a genuine peace are greater today than they have ever been.

Deep suspicions remain, but the first important steps have been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust—never before in evidence—are emerging. Some Arab states, for the first time, are openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict. The capacity of outside countries to exacerbate tensions has been reduced. The step-by-step approach has thus brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. The decision before us now is not whether but how the next phase of negotiations should be launched. And we will engage in it—together with our Israeli friends—with new hope and confidence.

### International Cooperation.
America's second moral imperative is the growing need for global cooperation.

We live in a world of more than 150 countries, each asserting sovereignty and claiming the right to realize its national aspirations. Clearly no nation can fulfill *all* its goals without infringing on the rights of others. Hence, compromise and common endeavors are inescapable on some issues, at least. The growing interdependence of states in the face of the polarizing tendencies of nationalism and ideologies makes imperative the building of world community.

We live in an age of division—division between East and West and between the advanced industrial nations and the developing nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations constitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease, and despair is fundamentally insecure and morally intolerable. Those nations that consider themselves dispossessed will

become the seedbed of upheaval. But the tactics of confrontation with which some of the developing nations have pursued their goals are also both intolerable and unsafe.

The challenge of world community will require realistic assumptions and actions by North and South alike. The industrial nations should not be obsessed with guilt or wedded to the status quo. The developing nations should not seek to gain their objectives through extortion or blackmail. What is required all around is a serious dedication to the requirements of cooperation without which neither group can achieve its goals.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear: They want economic development, a role in international decisions that affect them, and a fair share of global economic benefits. The goals of the industrial nations are equally clear: widening prosperity, an open world system of trade and investments with expanding markets for North and South, and reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials.

The goals of both sides can be achieved only if they are seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The process of building a new era of international economic relationships will continue through the rest of this century. If those relationships are to be equitable and lasting, negotiation and compromise among diverse and contending interests will clearly be required. Above all a moral act will be necessary: on the part of the industrial nations, a willingness to make—while there is still time for conciliation—the sacrifices necessary to build a sense of community; and on the part of the developing nations, a readiness to forego blackmail and extortion—now, before the world is irrevocably split into contending camps—and to seek progress through cooperation.

For its part the United States is committed to the path of cooperation, to build a stable and creative world which all nations—new and old, weak and strong, rich and poor—have a stake in preserving because they had a part in its shaping.

### Human Values.
Our third moral imperative is the nurturing of human values. It is the tragedy of our times that the very tools of technology that have made ours the most productive century in the history of man have also served to subject millions

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to a new dimension of intimidation and suffering and fear.

Individual freedom of conscience and expression is the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in the search for peace, in the struggle for greater political cooperation, and for a fair and flourishing international economy is rooted in our belief that only liberty permits the fullest expression of mankind's creativity. We know that technological progress without justice mocks humanity, that national unity without freedom is a hollow triumph, and that nationalism without a consciousness of human community—including a concern for human rights—is likely to become an instrument of oppression and a force for evil.

It is our obligation, as the world's leading democracy, to dedicate ourselves to assuring freedom for the human spirit. But responsibility compels also a recognition of our limits. Our alliances—the political relationships built up between ourselves and other nations over the years—serve the cause of peace by strengthening regional and world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to others but a recognition of common interests. They should be withdrawn when those interests change; they should not, as a general rule, be used as levers to extort a standard of conduct or to punish acts with which we do not agree.

In many countries—whatever our differences with their internal structures—the people are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in others the process of American disengagement has eroded the sense of security, creating a perceived need for greater internal discipline, while at the same time diminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices we criticize.

There is no simple answer to the dilemma a great democracy faces under such circumstances. We have a moral, as well as a practical, obligation to stand up for our values and to combat injustice. Those who speak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of repressive regimes do so in the best American tradition. They can have—and have had—a dramatic and heartening impact. But there are also times when an effort to teach another country a moral lesson can backfire on the values we seek to promote.

This Administration has believed that we must bend every effort to enhance respect for human rights but that a public crusade is frequently not the most effective method. Our objective has been results, not publicity. We were concerned—and with good reason—that when such sensitive issues are transformed into tests of strength between Governments, the impulse for national prestige will defeat the most worthy goals. We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive international human rights issues through legislation—not because of the moral view expressed, which we share, but because legislation is almost always too inflexible, too public, and too heavyhanded a means to accomplish what it seeks.

Through quiet diplomacy, this Administration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries. But we have seldom publicized specific successes.

The most striking example has been the case of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. To the number of Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in 1968 was 400; by 1973 that number had risen to 35,000. The reason for this quantum leap lies largely in persistent but private approaches to the Soviet Government and the parallel overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal discussions by the President or his senior officials. No public announcement or confrontation ever took place. But the results were there for all to see. When even greater advances were sought by confrontation and legislation, the result was tragic. Today Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has dropped to approximately 10,000 a year.

I stress this not to score debating points against men whose seriousness of purpose and dedication to Jewish emigration I greatly respect. Rather it is to indicate that moral ends are often not enough in themselves. The means used also have a moral quality and moral consequences.

And whatever honest differences of opinion may have existed between concerned individuals about the problem of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, this Administration remains dedicated to the objective. It will spare no effort to increase the flow of emigrants once again and will

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cooperate with the relevant organizations in that
effort.

The issue of human rights is not—as I have
said—an easy one and it should be presented with a
full awareness of its complexity. The experience of
the last decade should have taught us that we
ought not to exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let
alone to shape, social and political change in other
societies. With this painful lesson in mind, let me
state the principles that guide the actions of the
Ford Administration.

* Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

* The United States will further the cause of human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other Governments. We will use all our influence to encourage humane conduct within and between nations.

* We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

* We will never forget that the victims of our failures—of omission or commission—are human beings and thus the ultimate test of all we do.

We thus return to the central problem of ends and means. If every nation of the world presses for the immediate implementation of all of its values, hopes, and desires, eternal conflict is inevitable. If we insist that others accept all our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military force to protect those who do as we urge? And if those who refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what will we do if the isolation of these Governments tempts external pressures or attack by other countries even more repressive? Will we have served moral ends if we thereby jeopardize our own security?

If we back up universal moral claims with power, we take upon ourselves the role of the world's policeman—a role which the American people have rejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up these claims, we will lose relevance and credibility; we will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without effectiveness and ultimately without stature. Is it more moral to attempt what cannot be accomplished and fail than

to make only those commitments that we know we
can keep?

There is nothing more essential for Americans
today than the need to recognize the inevitable and
inescapable tension between our moral aims—
which of necessity are stated in universal terms—
and the constant imperative of choice that is
imposed upon us by competing goals and finite
resources. The making and implementing of foreign
policy is, like life, a constant effort to strike the
right balance between the best we want and the
best we can have, between the ends we seek and
the means we adopt. We need moral strength to
select among often agonizing choices and a sense of
ethical purpose to navigate between the shoals of
difficult decisions. But we need as well a mature
sense of means, lest we substitute wishful thinking
for the requirements of survival. The ultimate test
of morality in foreign policy is not only the values
we proclaim but what we are willing and able to
implement.

## Conclusion

I have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice
not to counsel resignation but as a message of
hope. Fond as we are of self-flagellation—especially
in years divisible by four—Americans can take
pride in the achievements of their foreign policy in
recent years, which have both a moral and a
practical foundation.

* We have ended the war we found and preserved the peace.

* We have restructured and strengthened our partnerships with the industrial democracies and our sister republics in this hemisphere.

* We have opened new relationships with adversaries.

* We have begun to curb the nuclear arms race.

* We have helped to sow the seeds of peace in the Middle East and begun the process of conciliation in southern Africa.

* We have put forth and begun to implement a comprehensive agenda for cooperation between the industrial and developing worlds to combat poverty, ignorance, disease, misery, and hunger.

* We have worked with others on new global challenges that transcend boundaries and ideologies—the problems of pollution, of sharing the resources of the sea, of the transfer of technology.

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Many years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that no nation could long endure “half slave and half free,” and touched the conscience of a nation. Today people the world over cry out for liberty, dignity, respect; and they look with hope and longing to America—for we have touched the conscience of all mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we set our sights high but without self-indulgence, the generations that come after us may at last be able to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.

October 22, 1976

REMARKS TO THE PRESS
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER CHATTI OF
TUNISIA

Q: Could we get a brief report on how your talks went, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had a very good cordial conversation. First about Tunisian-American relations and them about the situation in the Middle East. The Foreign Minister has just attended the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League in Cairo and is returning to the Summit in Cairo. We had very useful discussions and we are going to stay in contact with each other.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could I ask you about reports that the Israelis are sending American arms to the Lebanese Christians along the border area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had no such reports and no such information that any of our recipients is violating our laws.

Q: Senator Aboureszk today is saying that the State Dept is violating the law by allowing or knowing about such a transfer of American arms to a third country. Do you have any comment on that, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have no knowledge of the transfer of American arms given under our law to another country.

Q: We have no such reports?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We occasionally get reports but they are very often -- we have not had any confirmed reports.

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**Secretary Kissinger:** Mr. Foreign Minister, it is not often that I meet a colleague who is engaged in shuttle diplomacy. Since I saw you last, two weeks ago in New York, you have been presiding over a meeting of the ministers of the Arab League and, indeed, you had to postpone your return here because of your duties in the Middle East. I want to express my appreciation to you for the importance that you obviously attach to our Joint Commission by returning here to sign together with me these documents and to give me the opportunity to benefit from your views on the bilateral relations between our two countries and developments in the Middle East.

In a world in which irrationality and passions are dominant, it means a great deal to the United States to have as a trusted friend a country like Tunisia. Throughout its history, Tunisia has stood for balance, progress and good sense in its dealings with its neighbors with respect to peace in the Middle East and with respect to its own development. The United States attaches great importance to the independence of Tunisia and does what it can to encourage the progress and economic development of that country. We have had distinguished visitors from Tunisia here this year, the son of President Bourguiba. We have had visits of our Sixth Fleet to Tunisia. We have contributed substantially to the economic development of Tunisia, and we have in this Joint Commission an instrument by which these ties are institutionalized.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I look forward to our talks. I am glad about the progress made by our Commission, and I welcome you here as a personal friend and as the representative of a country whose friendship we value, whose independence and progress we consider very important.

**Foreign Minister Chatty (in French):** Mr. Secretary, I was very touched by the words you have just expressed concerning my country. The relations between the United States and Tunisia are very good. They go back to the very first years of the independence of our country and there have never been any clouds over those relations. Even before independence and in spite of the alliances in which the United States and France were engaged and in spite of the vicissitudes of the Cold War, we enjoyed the benefit of the friendship and the sympathy of the United States.

Following independence you supported us greatly. Tunisia went through some very painful moments with the bombing of Sahyket. All of this was caused by the Algerian war then raging. During this very serious period, the United States stood by our side and it was through the good offices of the United States

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that we were able to resolve the problem of the stationing of French troops on our territory. From an economic standpoint, the aid extended to us by the United States has been most significant, and it has been the most important aid of all of the assistance that we have received from other countries. As you yourself have stressed, Mr. Secretary, this aid has been well used. There are a number of major achievements in Tunisia that testify to this.

We could say that the relationship between the United States and Tunisia stands out as an example, from the political as well as the economic standpoint. From the political standpoint, the United States has always respected our positions on the Middle East and in other areas. The United States has never attempted to exert an influence upon any political decision taken by Tunisia. From the economic standpoint, the technological and economic aid extended has been most fruitful.

Tunisia is known for its moderation, its realism and its spirit of conciliation. In this Mediterranean area which is so seriously beset by problems today, we have endeavored to be an agent of moderation, of dialogue and to foster the settlement of differences through a dialogue. And in this we share many viewpoints with you personally, Mr. Secretary, because since you came to the Department of State you have brought with you a new spirit, a new style in the Middle East, that of direct and indirect dialogue as a means to settle problems.

Concerning now the Joint Commission, I am satisfied with the results as stated. I want to thank you and all your associates for the welcome extended to our side and for the spirit of understanding that was extended to them on this occasion. But, in spite of all that is being done, Tunisia is being forced to make very special efforts for its development, at a time of the economic takeoff of the country. We need the assistance of all of the friends that we have in the world, and the United States occupies a leading place among our friends. We know what problems you face, having to spread your assistance throughout the world, but as we near takeoff American assistance is truly indispensable. The experience we have had so far would be hampered if we were to fail to receive this assistance.

I hope that the Joint Commission has been helpful in enabling the United States to understand the meaning and significance of our Fifth Plan and the projects which will be carried out in the coming years. Thus, aided by this fuller understanding, the United States, we hope, can make a more meaningful contribution to our Fifth Plan. And I look to the day, next year at the

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forthcoming meeting of the Joint Commission, when we shall
have the pleasure to have you with us in Tunisia, Mr.
Secretary, and to have you sign documents which will reflect
a greater contribution of the United States to our plan.

Again, thank you for your welcome, for the spirit you are
extending to me personally, to my President and to my country.
And I rejoice in this unbreakable friendship between the
United States and Tunisia, a friendship of which we shall
take very good care.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 24, 1976

No. 528

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
PRIOR TO THE UN DAY CONCERT AT THE KENNEDY CENTER

OCTOBER 23, 1976

Mr. Casey, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Long ago, Sir Francis Bacon envisioned a new human community which would cause men's minds to move in charity, to rest in providence and to turn upon the pulse of truth. In the more than three and a half centuries since then, men and nations all too often have been vengeful rather than charitable, shortsighted rather than provident, mendacious rather than truthful. But the failings which have clouded mankind's hopes since the dawn of time have, in our era, a new and fearful dimension. For ours is an age of potential nuclear cataclysm and of wars that can afflict entire populations. Ours is a time when the hope of millions for a better life seems perpetually elusive, as the fortunate seem to prosper while the destitute founder. And ours is a world in which too often truth and those who speak it are the objects of repression and regimentation.

Our task and our necessity is to turn back the tides of hatred, discord and fear, and to weave from our effort a new story of shared human progress. The obstacles before us are massive but the chance for achievement is great. As the world organization we honor tonight dramatically symbolizes, the nations have become for the first time in history an almost universal community, and the shared experiences of the modern age have heightened our awareness of each other and of our common predicament.

We are coming to share an abhorrence of war, of the absolute injustice it brings to the innocent who are brutalized or uprooted, and of the catastrophe it could bring to civilization and, indeed, to all of life on our planet. We can recognize now that ours has become a single global economy bringing complex problems but also the potentiality for the first time in history of eradicating poverty, hunger and needless human misery. And we can perceive the need to strengthen the institutions and procedures of reason to form a bulwark between humanity and the crude and degrading applications of coercion.

For further information contact:

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But let us be honest. While the imperatives of community
are emerging, the practices of confrontation persist.
Too often we witness coercion rather than conciliation,
the resort to pressure rather than the search for coopera-
tion, and one-way morality rather than the universal
conscience of humanity. Thus, it is ours to choose how
we will reflect our interdependence. It is ours to
choose how we will reflect our interdependence. It is
ours to choose whether nations will make the last quarter
of this century a time of spiralling conflict and chaos
or the dawn of a true human community.

Surely, we have the means to surmount our problems. The
reach of technology can conquer all but the most malevolent
forces of nature; and our learning, our sense of history
and place continuously advance. What we now have need of
is the strength to persevere and the vision of where we
are going. For success is a process and not a final
condition, and great achievements are dreams before they
become realities. In the words of Homer, "It is a thing
possible to do if our hearts bid us to do it."

So, let us learn to distinguish truculence from strength,
and build a peace more promising than an equilibrium of
force. Let us reconcile the national interest and the
world interest so that we may increase the bounty of our
planet to the benefit of all. And in all our labors let
us extend the horizons of liberty and thus unshackle the
oppressed and the despairing.

Pablo Cassals once said, "The first thing is to do what
you must do, with purpose." No generation in history
has had so much to do nor such noble purposes to fulfill.
Striving together we can harvest our hopes, shaping that
community of which our ancestors dreamed and to which
the United Nations is devoted, a human family in which
all people can find peace, our children can peruse their
dreams, and the human spirit can find a new day of freedom.
Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L.C]

October 24, 1976

No. 529

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON
"FACE THE NATION"

OCTOBER 24, 1976

MR. HERMAN: Mr. Secretary, last July you said publicly what you had, I gather, been saying privately for some time--namely, that Jimmy Carter's policies to that point were fairly consistent with the policies of the Ford Administration. I believe you called the policies of the Carter and Ford people "compatible." Do you still think, these many months later, that the two policies are compatible?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first, I made that comment when Governor Carter had given exactly one speech on foreign policy, and he had not yet exposed the full complexity of his thought. I would say now that there are significant areas of difference between his statements and our policy.

MR. HERMAN: Well, Mr. Secretary, I guess I'm in the position of a questioner whose next question has been pretty well determined by your first answer. You say there are a number of differences now between the Ford Administration policies and those enunciated by Governor Carter, and I guess the next thing to do is to fairly quickly list them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We would have a difference in attitude towards communist participation in the governments of Europe. We would have a difference with respect to arms sales to many countries, because our view would be that if we cannot be the world's policeman and if we cannot sell arms to threatened countries, then there is bound to be a vacuum that somebody is going to fill.

There is a difference in the attitudes towards countries--for example, like Kenya and Zaire. There is a difference with the degree of explicitness with which we should state what we will or will not do in the case of certain contingencies, such as came up with respect to Yugoslavia. And there is a difference about the level of the defense expenditures.

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MR. BRADSHER: Do you think that the suggestion of not being
willing to defend Yugoslavia in case of a Soviet attack really
increases the danger of an attack? You mentioned this as one
of the problems. How can you draw a line around the world and
say that we will stand at certain places, or not draw the line,
as has been suggested--as Governor Carter did?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is dangerous to state
that certain countries are outside the American defense per-
imeter if these countries are of a great strategic importance
and when it is generally recognized that their change in
alignment would have serious consequences.

In 1949, a number of then administration officials were drawing
a line this way which left Korea outside the perimeter. Whether
that in fact contributed to the attack on Korea, we do not know.
What we do know is that in 1950, when the attack occurred, the
administration had to change its view.

My concern is that no miscalculation arise. Six administrations,
starting with President Truman--three Democratic and three
Republican--have declared that the independence and integrity
and non-alignment of Yugoslavia are major American interests.
This is a view unanimously shared by all of our West European
allies, and I believe that it is important that the other side
understand that pressure on Yugoslavia would have grave con-
sequences for the relationship with the United States, without
spelling out what exactly we would do, and that the bipartisan
consensus that has existed with respect to this issue be
restored as rapidly as we can do it.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting then that by
saying that an invasion of Yugoslavia would not directly threaten
the security of the United States, that Governor Carter was
issuing an invitation to the Soviet Union --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

MR. SCHIEFFER: -- to take some action there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am sure that that was not his intention,
and I'm positive that if he were to be elected and looked at the
facts that he would reconsider that statement. I believe that
if the statement were left to stand it would raise serious
ambiguities. It is inconsistent with the entire postwar policy
of every Democratic and Republican Administration, incompatible
with the views of our West European allies, and would be
dangerous if it became American policy.

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MR. BRADSHER: Well, sir --

MR. SCHIEFFER: Let me just follow up a minute, Henry.

You're not suggesting that in some circumstance the United States
would actually send troops to Yugoslavia if something like that
arose?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'm suggesting that for the United States
to spell out exactly what it will do in circumstances which no
one can yet foresee is unwise. I'm saying also that to declare
a country of the geographic and strategic importance of Yugo-
slavia as lying outside an American security interest, how-
ever we may want to vindicate that interest, is dangerous,
inconsistent with our NATO policies. In foreign
policy, the art of foreign policy, is to prevent crises from
arising and not to create ambiguities which the opponent might
be tempted to probe.

MR. HERMAN: Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about--you were going
down a list of differences between the Ford Administration, as
you see it, and in Governor Carter's positions. Two that are
of some interest to me and that you had not mentioned were
Governor Carter on preventing an Arab oil embargo and Governor
Carter on using American economic leverage to get the Soviet
Union out of places like Angola. Are those not--was that
omission inadvertent?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, but I wanted to keep my answer short.

On an Arab oil embargo, of course, the United States should oppose
it firmly.

I believe, in general, it is unwise to be excessively precise
about everything that you might do--especially if the threat is
one that, according to all the experts, is going to have ex-
tremely limited effectiveness. For almost all of the items in
our trade, particularly as Governor Carter has specifically
excluded grain, there are substitute sources in other countries.

Again, the art of foreign policy is to prevent an embargo from
happening and not to stake everything on what you will do when
the embargo in fact occurs. So our policy has been to attempt
to avoid an embargo, and we should also keep in mind that there
are many things that the oil producers can do between doing
nothing and a total embargo. And then we have to have policies
to deal with those contingencies and not just for the most
extreme one.

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MR. BRADSHER: Governor Carter has criticized your policies as lacking what he considers to be morality--that you've been willing to deal with dictatorships rather than deal with matters of principle and standing up for liberals in some countries. Does this really enter into your mind as a consideration in dealing with a country--whether it's dictatorial, whether it's accused of torturing people?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In foreign policy, the United States has two objectives--at least two objectives. One is to maintain our security and the security of our allies. The second one is to live in a world which is compatible with our values.

Both of these objectives are important. We, therefore, wherever we possibly can, try to encourage political forces that represent the humane values and the democratic values for which we stand. And, therefore, in Santiago, Chile, at an OAS meeting, I made an extended statement on the problem of human rights. I did so again before the United Nations.

At the same time, there are certain security requirements. And you cannot implement your values unless you survive.

In World War II, we supported communist Russia against Nazi Germany--not because we agreed with its values, but because we considered it essential for our survival at the time. And there are governments around the world whose independence, the independence of whose countries, is essential for American security and which we, therefore, support. Wherever we can, we are trying to nudge them in a direction that is compatible with our values. But to pretend that we can simply declare our values and transform the world has a high risk of a policy of constant interventionism in every part of the world and then sticking us with the consequences.

So, we are trying to conduct a policy in which our commitments are put into some relationship with our capabilities.

MR. BRADSHER: We haven't really succeeded in nudging anybody though, have we?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No; I don't think that is correct. I think through quiet diplomacy we have managed in many --

MR. BRADSHER: Can you give an example, sir?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I can. For example, in Chile, we have been responsible for the release of hundreds of prisoners.

MR. BRADSHER: Have we prevented the arrest of many more, though?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that, on the whole, we have contributed to an evolution that has not gone as rapidly as we would wish. But, again, we have to look at the alternatives of what happens if we throw our weight around too much. The end result will be that we lose all influence.

In the case of the Soviet Union, we managed to increase emigration of Jews from 400 to 35,000 a year, as long as it was done by quiet diplomacy. As soon as it became a matter of confrontation and the national pride of the states was involved, it went down again to 10,000.

MR. HERMAN: Let me try nudging you in a different direction, Mr. Secretary. A Soviet--I guess you'd call him a propagandist, Victor Louis--said, on the 15th of this month, that unless China adopts a more conciliatory attitude within a month, it will face an irreversible decision in Moscow.

It was taken by some people to be sort of a--kind of a Soviet indirect threat to the new government in China. And you responded in your statement, your news conference at Harvard, with a sort of a counterpressure.

How do you evaluate the situation? What was the meaning of that Soviet threat, if in fact it was a Soviet threat?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, we don't react to newsmen--at least, not to foreign newsmen. (Laughter)

MR. HERMAN: Even when they are arms of the government, if they are?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My statement at Harvard was made in the context of which perhaps Victor Louis' statement was one relatively minor part, of a situation that might be interpreted as turmoil and might give rise to some temptation.

Now, it is clear that China--a country of vast historical and political importance, of large size --if it were the subject of a massive assault, that this would set a pattern for the security of the world that would be extremely unfortunate. And we, therefore, made more explicit what we had really said in a more guarded forum earlier, that an attempt to upset the world equilibrium by a massive assault on China would not be taken lightly by the United States.

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Now, I am not saying that this is likely, and I think, in any
event, one shouldn't conduct foreign policy on the basis of an
assessment of other countries' intentions. One has to create
the obstacles in a preventive fashion.

MR. HERMAN: Have you?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that we have made clear that it would be a matter of the most serious complications if such an event occurred. But I am not saying such an event is likely. But, insofar as our views affect other countries' calculations, we wanted to make that clear.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, Mr. Secretary, exactly what does that mean, though, and what does that entail when you say we would not take it lightly. Obviously there would be intense diplomacy, but does that mean that we would consider some sort of arms sales to China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, China has prided itself on its self-reliance, and we have never had any military discussions with China. We have never had any request for the purchase of arms from China. So that issue has never been formally considered by the United States Government.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Mr. Schlesinger, the former Defense Secretary, when he came back from China recently, said we should not reject out of hand any request for arms sales to China, if that should come about. Would you agree with that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is one of those issues that is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It would depend on the circumstances, on the imminence of the threat, on how important we thought the threat was to our security.

But certainly we would take an extremely dim view of a military
attack, or even military pressure, on China.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, do you really see any possibility of that,
any real possibility of that coming about?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is the task of foreign policy to prepare against contingencies and to lower temptations on the other side. I do not think it is a probability. I think that any American policymaker, given the importance of the issues that would be raised, would have to take it into account.

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MR. BRADSHER: Is this the same category as Yugoslavia? Can you relate the two?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think there are two kinds of American interests in the world. There are interests where we have a formal legal obligation, like in NATO. Then there are interests where the importance of a country is such that whether we have an obligation or not, we might feel our security affected.

I think the problem is comparable as between China and Yugoslavia in the sense that an attack, a successful attack on either, would affect the world equilibrium and would affect the calculations of other countries, and therefore could in time affect American security, even if it didn't do so immediately. And it is the task of our foreign policy not to plan now how we are going to conduct military operations, because that is what we are trying to avoid, nor have we ever said that that is what we would do. What we are trying to do is to prevent the situation from coming about.

MR. HERMAN: Let me turn you towards one of your own more personal pieces of work, and that has been to negotiate a settlement of the struggle in Rhodesia. That matter is now in the forum at Geneva, and a number of comments have been made by one side or another that the Kissinger plan, as it has sometimes been called--I think you prefer to call it the Kissinger-Callaghan, or the Callaghan-Kissinger--but in any case that the Kissinger plan is dead.

Is it? Have we lost out on that, whatever share or interest we had in it?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: First, let us get clear what it is
we were trying to do.

We were trying to stop the drift towards racial conflict.
We were trying to bring about a peaceful transition towards
majority rule that in the judgment of all knowledgeable
people was inevitable in any event, except with much more
bloodshed. We were trying to limit the influence of all
outside countries, including our own, on the evolution in
Africa.

I believe we have a good chance of achieving all of these
objectives.

The particular terms that may have been worked out in order
to get the process started could well be modified in the
process of negotiations.

MR. HERMAN: You do not take Mr. Smith at his word when he
says it is the Kissinger plan, all or nothing?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that you have here five
parties negotiating with each other that have been fighting
each other for eleven years, between whom there is enormous
distrust, each of which has a constituency to which they must
appeal.

I believe that the negotiations haven't even started yet. It
is clear that there must be some room for negotiation. There
will be many exalted statements of an epic nature in the pro-
cess of the negotiation. I think the chances are better than
even that they will succeed unless some radical elements take
over the process and make demands that cannot be met.

MR. HERMAN: Let me ask you about one not so exalted set of
statements that has been made; that is, the -- well, I have
to back into it a little bit.

You have told us that you consulted with the Presidents of
the black countries on the borders of Rhodesia and that the
plan was worked out in full consultation, at least as I under-
stand it, with them.

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They are now saying -- or some of them are now saying, their leaders are now saying -- that that is not so, that the plan that you discussed with them is not the plan as outlined by Mr. Smith, and the question comes up as to who struck John? Who is telling the truth? Did you present them with a plan? Are they exaggerating the differences?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think everybody is telling the truth. We had three American and two British missions in Africa before I went there on that last shuttle.

The main lines of the ideas to be presented to Smith were discussed with at least those African Presidents that were reached by these missions and that I had a chance to talk to personally.

In addition, Mr. Smith added a few considerations of his own which it seemed to us it would be better for him to put forward formally and permit them to be the subject of discussion, rather than wait until the Geneva conference, or wherever the conference would have taken place, and then create the impression that there was some sort of secret understanding.

We did our best to check the framework of the proposals. And the essence of the framework has been accepted. There are several details about which there is dispute, as you would expect.

So, I think that everybody is telling the truth and everybody has different constituencies to whom they must appeal in the process of reaching a settlement.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Dr. Kissinger, Governor Carter seems to agree with your efforts in Africa, but he suggested that perhaps the timing of your trip there and your shuttle had a little something to do with an election coming up in the United States. Is that a valid criticism to make?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When I first went to Africa in April, I think it is safe to say that it did not have the unanimous approval of many members of the Republican Party, and it was in the middle of the primary campaign, and there was much criticism that we did this.

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We did it because we thought it was in the national interest. If matters had been permitted to drift, it was our judgment, it was the judgment of every knowledgeable person, that things would be out of control by the middle of next year, which would have been the next time anybody could have gotten ahold of it, or by early next year, since the time after the election, whoever wins, will have to be devoted in part to restructuring administrations, and so forth. It had nothing to do with the election campaign. And it hasn't been used in the election campaign, either.

MR. BRADSHER: Mr. Secretary, six months or so ago, you used to make little jokes and quips about how your time to retire might be coming, that you were looking forward to relief from the job -- the type of job you have held for about eight years now. More recently, your little quips seem to be going the other way. You talk about going on until 1981. Is this showing your loyalty to the President in assuming in your quips that he is going to be elected, or does this mean a change in your own personal attitude?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have to give a terminal date, or give some hope of a terminal date, to my colleagues in the State Department or their morale will break completely. Then, as that date approaches, I tend to push it a little bit more into the future, to spur them to new efforts.

I have not made a final decision. When the President is re-elected, I will discuss it with him at that time.

MR. SCHIEFFER: The President has said that you can have the job as long as you want. He is on the record on that. How long do you want it, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to deprive my colleagues in the State Department of all hope of a termination of their suffering.

MR. HERMAN: I guess that is what is called a diplomatic answer.

Let me ask you sort of a non-diplomatic question. We have been asking you for I don't know how many years to be a guest on *Face the Nation*, and you have always turned us down.

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Now, all of a sudden, a week before Election Day, you accept us, and I am reminded of your many statements that the Secretary of State job is a non-political job.

Was there any little element of politics in your accepting our offer this morning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. As you said, you have been asking me for several years, and I seemed to have been doing one of these shows a year, and I don't consider a press conference in which I don't control the questions -- have any idea what the questions will be -- a political activity.

MR. HERMAN: Thank you, very much, Secretary Kissinger, for being our guest on *Face the Nation* today.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 26, 1976

No. 530

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
AT THE
DEDICATION OF THE
DEAN ACHESON AUDITORIUM
AND THE

LOY HENDERSON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ROOM
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1976
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. Acheson, Ambassador Henderson,

Distinguished Guests, Colleagues of the Department of State,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are here to honor two men whom we hold in special esteem -- Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Ambassador Loy Henderson. It is a tribute to both that so many distinguished people -- friends and associates over the years -- have come to participate in this ceremony.

The diplomatic reception rooms above us on the Eighth Floor bear the names of the founders of our nation. Today we dedicate the two major remaining public rooms in the Department to two giants of post-war diplomacy. Their greatness reflects the twin pillars of our diplomacy -- the professionalism of the Foreign Service and the creative vision of the statesman.

Loy Henderson is the "insider", the quintessence of what makes our Foreign Service a great and dedicated instrument of national policy. And Dean Acheson, lawyer and public servant, was the inspiration of our post-war policy -- a gallant leader who saw the ship of state through a decisive time of turbulence and creativity.

These two men, by the magnitude of their accomplishments have set the standard against which their successors inevitably will be judged.

Theirs is an impressive record.

It is the national awareness Secretary Acheson evoked of the reality of our permanent involvement in world affairs, and the global dimension that he gave to American foreign policy for the first time in our history.

It is the strength and vitality of a Western Europe risen from the ashes of war, and the beginnings of the journey toward a better life for the world's poor and dispossessed.

For further information, contact:

PR #530

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It is the integrity and competence of the Foreign Service of the United States, which Secretary Acheson so courageously led and defended during a terrible time of trial, and which Ambassador Henderson made a living reality throughout a long and distinguished career.

Ambassador Henderson has been called "Mr. Foreign Service", and justly so, for he epitomizes the professional quality, the resolute and principled achievement of this extraordinary body of men and women. What Secretary of State has not developed a relationship of keen ambivalence with this club of experts who go where duty calls, who communicate with each other in strange and wondrous ways, and who underneath their polished manner show a marvelous -- and at times perverse -- persistence? What Secretary of State has not experienced that blend of efficiency, awe, patience and superciliousness they reserve for the head of their department -- born if not of superior wisdom then of confidence in exhausting procedures -- and carried out with an ultimately disarming grace and style? What Secretary has avoided being maddened by the skill of the Foreign Service in presenting options that leave no choice, and being tamed by clearances that fix no responsibility? And yet, what Secretary has not, in the end, yielded in admiration and affection to perseverance born of deep patriotism, procedures designed to arrest ill-considered judgment and dedication to great ideals tirelessly pursued?

Like other Secretaries of State, I have not always lived in perfect harmony with the Foreign Service. As with most marriages of convenience, there is an inevitable tension between the two institutions, in part because the Foreign Service has long opposed "lateral entry" -- and in part because each believes he knows more than the other about foreign policy. But it is a dynamic tension, for it hones the abilities and mutually reinforces the performance of each. Every Secretary of State, I suspect, takes satisfaction -- except at election time -- in accusations that his is a one-man performance. But just as certainly, every Secretary of State knows that while his failures may in fact be his own, his successes rest on the Foreign Service that advises him, and that, if properly led, will always be the dedicated instrument of the national purpose.

In the three years I have been Secretary of State, I have witnessed the return of the bodies of three Foreign Service Officers killed in the performance of duties accepted without question. Each has been replaced by a colleague

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equally devoted to his Service and to his country. And for each Officer who went, there were many who were prepared to go equally unquestioningly if called. I can truthfully say -- although I may retract it at tomorrow's staff meeting -- that I have never known nor worked with a more competent, devoted and able group of men and women or one for which I developed a deeper feeling.

In an age of potential nuclear holocaust and growing international interdependence, at a time when America can no longer overwhelm its foreign problems by a massive expenditure of resources, consistency in the thrust and execution of our foreign policy is essential. And it is to the Foreign Service that America must look for the sense of the national interest, the impartiality, the expertise -- in a word, the continuity -- that will assure a steady course. Presidents and Secretaries of State come and go, if not always as rapidly as some wish, but the values and goals of the United States, the dreams of our people for a life of peace and freedom, the hopes mankind has reposed in America, remain constant. The Foreign Service, at its best, has served those interests, dreams and hopes with inspired dedication. It did so under Secretary Acheson; it has done so with me; it will do so with my successors. The country is in its debt.

It is this tradition that Loy Henderson exemplifies. From the beginning of his long career he has been a model of integrity, skill and courage. As Vice Consul in Dublin in 1922; as Charge in the Soviet Union in the bad early days of the war; as Ambassador in India and later Iran, Loy Henderson served his country with dignity and distinction. By his example he showed that ours is the Foreign Service of the United States, not the Foreign Service of the Department of State and even less the Foreign Service of the Foreign Service.

And then he took a great risk -- he accepted appointment as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. He did so out of a sense of duty against his personal desires, for he agreed with Secretary Acheson's observation that anyone who would take the job is either a fool or a saint.

As we all know, Loy Henderson is no fool, and I can only pray that Dean Acheson is wrong -- was wrong for once -- because I know that the present incumbent in the position is no saint. (Laughter). Loy Henderson inaugurated an era of management within the Department which, in the judgment of the most experienced officers in the Service remains the hallmark of efficiency, equity and integrity.

Loy Henderson, like Dean Acheson, enjoys a living memorial that extends far beyond this building or this city. Wherever

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there is an embassy or consulate that is doing its job well, it is probably because he trained the officer in charge; it is certainly because that post is measuring up to the standards he set in almost 40 years of service and example.

To more than a generation of Foreign Service Officers. Ambassador Henderson has symbolized the highest standards of professional conduct and performance. We welcome him back with us here today, on behalf of his countrymen and his thousands of colleagues, friends and admirers we thank him for his service to his country and to his profession.

* * * * *

I cannot express how much I regret not being able to pay a tribute in person to my great predecessor Dean Acheson -- he of the stout heart and the acerbic tongue. It has been said that my capacity to admire others is, at best, under-developed. That may or may not be an accurate description, but let me state now that Dean Acheson has long been the object of my admiring affection and deep respect. He is, as far as I am concerned, the greatest Secretary of State of the 20th Century.

The shape and the design of American foreign policy for the better part of the past three decades is sprung largely from his genius. He and the President he so loyally served set the course we have all followed since, and in so doing ushered in the most creative period in the history of American foreign policy. The North Atlantic Alliance, the building of new and productive relations with former enemies, the economic assistance which launched a war-torn world toward peace, security and unprecedented prosperity -- all this was in large measure the product of his inspiration. He changed America's attitude toward foreign affairs, leading us away from comfortable isolation to the understanding that without America's strength the world would know no peace, and without our commitment it would know no hope. Dean Acheson gave himself too little credit when he entitled his autobiography "Present at the Creation" for he was, himself, very much the architect of that creation.

But we remember Dean best not solely for what he did but also for how he did it. He was a towering personality but his efforts were always at the service of ideals that transcended the individual. He prized moral integrity above all, but he despised those who used the ideal as a device for avoiding the attainable. He would often mock the foibles of man, but he

PR #530

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never denigrated the values of his nation. He strove
mightily for peace, justice and liberty but he was too
wise to believe that any one man's efforts could mark
more than a stage of an endless journey.

Dean was one of the most eloquent men of his time. He was
warm and witty. He was a man of total and uncompromising
integrity and of monumental courage. This is why this room
is filled with men and women to whom his policies were more
than abstract statements; he moved us and changed
our lives. Dean Acheson stretched the minds and above all
he extended the souls of those who worked with him or knew
him. He gave to this institution a sense of excellence,
pride and purpose that is still our standard of quality.
A quarter century after his departure from office, he remains
the example that all who have come after him still strive to
emulate.

And on a personal level, I shall always remember the graceful --
I might almost say gentle -- way in which Dean Acheson welcomed
me to Washington almost eight years ago, and the wisdom
and patience with which he sought thereafter to bridge the
gap between the perceptions of a Harvard professor and the
minimum requirements of reality.

He could, like few men I have known, illuminate with a pungent
phrase, and I mention a few only because if Dean were here,
excessive solemnity would make him extremely uneasy and
therefore slightly belligerent. "Can I put it this way," I
said to him once in presenting a particularly ponderous
proposal. "Certainly you can put it that way," said Dean,
"but not if you want to get anywhere." And I shall never
forget a remark I have quoted previously which he once made
about a contemporary: "He reminds me of an amateur boomerang
thrower practicing his art in a crowded room."

A few years ago, before Mr. Acheson's death, Scotty Reston
captured the essence of the man. "He is," Reston said,
"the most active, interesting and pugnacious character in
town -- a poet among the mechanics, a believer among the
skeptics, and almost the last of our contemporaries
who believes that history and power have a future. He is
not a mild man, but he is a man. He says what he thinks,
which is a bold and rather old-fashioned thing to do in
Washington these days. He does not suffer fools gladly,
which is rather awkward in a capital where fools are not in
short supply."

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I have said that Dean Acheson was a man of courage and integrity. Yet how many of us will ever really understand how difficult it was to maintain those virtues in the late 1940s and early 1950s? For the creativity, excitement, and achievement that so marked his time as Secretary of State were shadowed by a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, with the Secretary of State as one of its principal targets. But he faced adversity quantily with determination and without compromise. And history has given Dean Acheson its highest accolade -- it has proved him right.

Two years ago Mrs. Acheson spoke so eloquently of her husband that I should like to repeat it now. "The end sought," she said, "is to preserve and foster an environment in which free societies may exist and flourish. Our policies and actions must be tested by whether they contribute to, or detract from, achievement of this end. They need no other justification, or moral or ethical embellishment."

At that same ceremony commemorating Dean Acheson I referred to a quote from Mr. Justice Holmes, in a speech that Dean often cited: "Alas gentlemen, we cannot live our dreams. We are lucky enough if we can give a sample of our best and if we can know in our hearts that it was nobly done."

Dean Acheson more nearly lived his dreams than any man I know. He gave us his best throughout a lifetime of public service. And it was, indeed, nobly done.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is with pride and humility that I today dedicate the Dean Acheson Auditorium and the Loy Henderson International Conference Room. I do so in the knowledge that their names will inspire those who pass this way in the years to come as they have all of us who have been honored to be a part of the Department and the nation which they served so well.

May these halls witness a history worthy of the names they bear.

Thank you.

* * * * * *

3

Mrs. Acheson, Ambassador Henderson, distinguished guests, colleagues of the Department of State, ladies and gentlemen:

We are here to honor two men whom we hold in special esteem—Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Ambassador Loy Henderson. It is a tribute to both that so many distinguished people—friends and associates over the years—have come to participate in this ceremony.

The Diplomatic Reception Rooms above us on the eighth floor bear the names of the founders of our Nation. Today we dedicate the two major remaining public rooms in the Department to two giants of postwar diplomacy. Their greatness reflects the twin pillars of our diplomacy—the professionalism of the Foreign Service and the creative vision of the statesman.

Loy Henderson is the “insider,” the quintessence of what makes our Foreign Service a great and dedicated instrument of national policy. And Dean Acheson, lawyer and public servant, was the inspiration of our postwar policy—a gallant leader who saw the ship of state through a decisive time of turbulence and creativity.

These two men, by the magnitude of their accomplishments, have set the standard against which their successors inevitably will be judged. Theirs is an impressive record.

It is the national awareness Secretary Acheson evoked of the reality of our permanent involvement in world affairs and the global dimension that he gave to American foreign policy for the first time in our history.

It is the strength and vitality of a Western Europe risen from the ashes of war and the beginnings of the journey toward a better life for the world's poor and dispossessed.

It is the integrity and competence of the Foreign Service of the United States, which Sec-

4

tary Acheson so courageously led and defended during a terrible time of trial and which Ambassador Henderson made a living reality throughout a long and distinguished career.

Ambassador Henderson has been called "Mr. Foreign Service," and justly so, for he epitomizes the professional quality, the resolute and principled achievement of this extraordinary body of men and women.

What Secretary of State has not developed a relationship of keen ambivalence with this club of experts who go where duty calls, who communicate with each other in strange and wondrous ways, and who underneath their polished manner show a marvelous—and at times perverse—persistence? What Secretary of State has not experienced that blend of efficiency, awe, patience, and superciliousness they reserve for the head of their department—born if not of superior wisdom then of confidence in exhausting procedures—and carried out with an ultimately disarming grace and style? What Secretary has avoided being maddened by the skill of the Foreign Service in presenting options that leave no choice and being tamed by clearances that fix no responsibility? And yet, what Secretary has not, in the end, yielded in admiration and affection to perseverance born of deep patriotism, procedures designed to arrest ill-considered judgment, and dedication to great ideals tirelessly pursued?

Like other Secretaries of State, I have not always lived in perfect harmony with the Foreign Service. As with most marriages of convenience, there is an inevitable tension between the two institutions, in part because the Foreign Service has long opposed "lateral entry"—even at the top—and in part because each believes he knows more than the other about foreign policy. But it is a dynamic tension, for it hones the abilities and mutually reinforces the performance of each. Every Secretary of State, I suspect, takes satisfaction—except at election time—in accusations that his is a one-man performance. But just as certainly, every Secretary of State knows that while his failures may, in fact, be his own, his successes rest on the Foreign Service that advises him, and that, if properly led, will always be the dedicated instrument of the national purpose.

three Foreign Service Officers killed in the performance of duties accepted without question. Each has been replaced by a colleague equally devoted to his service and to his country. And for each officer who went, there were many who were prepared to go equally unquestioningly if called. I can truthfully say—although I may retract it at tomorrow's staff meeting—that I have never known nor worked with a more competent, devoted, and able group of men and women or one for which I developed a deeper feeling.

In an age of potential nuclear holocaust and growing international interdependence, at a time when America can no longer overwhelm its foreign problems by a massive expenditure of resources, consistency in the thrust and execution of our foreign policy is essential. And it is to the Foreign Service that America must look for the sense of the national interest, the impartiality, the expertise—in a word, the continuity—that will assure a steady course. Presidents and Secretaries of State come and go—if not always as rapidly as some wish—but the values and goals of the United States, the dreams of our people for a life of peace and freedom, the hopes mankind has reposed in America, remain constant. The Foreign Service, at its best, has served those interests, dreams, and hopes with inspired dedication. It did so under Secretary Acheson; it has done so with me; it will do so with my successors. The country is in its debt.

It is this tradition that Loy Henderson exemplifies. From the beginning of his long career he has been a model of integrity, skill, and courage. As Vice Consul in Dublin in 1922, as Chargé in the Soviet Union in the bad early days of the war, as Ambassador in India and later Iran, Loy Henderson served his country with dignity and distinction. By his example he showed that ours is the Foreign Service of the United States, not the Foreign Service of the Department of State and even less the Foreign Service of the Foreign Service.

And then he took a great risk—he accepted appointment as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. He did so out of a sense of duty against his personal desires, for he agreed with Secretary Acheson's observation that anyone who would take the job is either a fool or a saint.

As we all know, Loy Henderson is no fool. He inaugurated an era of management within the Department which, in the judgment of the most ex-

5

experienced officers in the service, remains the hallmark of efficiency, equity, and integrity.

Loy Henderson, like Dean Acheson, enjoys a living memorial that extends far beyond this building or this city. Wherever there is an Embassy or Consulate that is doing its job well, it is probably because he trained the officer in charge; it is certainly because that post is measuring up to the standards he set in almost 40 years of service and example.

To more than a generation of Foreign Service Officers, Ambassador Henderson has symbolized the highest standards of professional conduct and performance. We welcome him back with us here today; on behalf of his countrymen and his thousands of colleagues, friends, and admirers we thank him for his service to his country and to his profession.

I cannot express how much I regret not being able to pay a tribute in person to my great predecessor Dean Acheson—he of the stout heart and the acerbic tongue. It has been said that my capacity to admire others is, at best, underdeveloped. That may or may not be an accurate description, but let me state now that Dean Acheson has long been the object of my admiring affection and deep respect. He is, as far as I am concerned, the greatest Secretary of State of the 20th century.

The shape and the design of American foreign policy for the better part of the past three decades is sprung largely from his genius. He and the President he so loyally served set the course we have all followed since and in so doing ushered in the most creative period in the history of American foreign policy. The North Atlantic alliance, the building of new and productive relations with former enemies, the economic assistance which launched a war-torn world toward peace, security, and unprecedented prosperity—all this was in large measure the product of his inspiration. He changed America's attitude toward foreign affairs, leading us away from comfortable isolation to the understanding that without America's strength the world would know no peace, and without our commitment it would know no hope. Dean Acheson gave himself too little credit when he entitled his autobiography *Present at the Creation* for he was, himself, very much the architect of that creation.

towering personality but his efforts were always at the service of ideals that transcended the individual. He prized moral integrity above all, but he despised those who used the ideal as a device for avoiding the attainable. He would often mock the foibles of man, but he never denigrated the values of his Nation. He strove mightily for peace, justice, and liberty but he was too wise to believe that any one man's efforts could mark more than a stage of an endless journey.

Dean was one of the most eloquent men of his time. He was warm and witty. He was a man of total and uncompromising integrity and of monumental courage. This is why this room is filled with men and women to whom his policies were more than abstract statements; he moved us and changed our lives. Dean Acheson stretched the minds and above all he extended the souls of those who worked with him or knew him. He gave to this institution a sense of excellence, pride, and purpose that is still our standard of quality. A quarter century after his departure from office, he remains the example that all who have come after him still strive to emulate.

And on a personal level, I shall always remember the graceful—I might almost say gentle—way in which Dean Acheson welcomed me to Washington almost eight years ago and the wisdom and patience with which he sought thereafter to bridge the gap between the perceptions of a Harvard professor and the minimum requirements of reality.

He could, like few men I have known, illuminate with a pungent phrase, and I mention a few only because if Dean were here, excessive solemnity would make him extremely uneasy and therefore slightly belligerent. "Can I put it this way," I said to him once in presenting a particularly ponderous proposal. "Certainly you can put it that way," said Dean, "but not if you want to get anywhere." And I shall never forget a remark I have quoted previously which he once made about a contemporary: "He reminds me of an amateur boomerang-thrower practicing his art in a crowded room"

A few years ago, before Mr. Acheson's death, Scotty Reston captured the essence of the man. "He is," Reston said, "the most active, interesting and pugnacious character in town—a poet among the mechanics, a believer among the skeptics, and almost the last of our contemporaries who believes

6

I have said that Dean Acheson was a man of courage and integrity. Yet how many of us will ever really understand how difficult it was to maintain those virtues in the late 1940's and early 1950's? For the creativity, excitement, and achievement that so marked his time as Secretary of State were shadowed by a pervasive atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, with the Secretary of State as one of its principal targets. But he faced adversity jauntily with determination and without compromise. And history has given Dean Acheson its highest accolade—it has proved him right.

At that same ceremony commemorating Dean Acheson I referred to a quote from Mr. Justice Holmes, in a speech that Dean often cited: "Alas, gentlemen, we cannot live our dreams. We are lucky enough if we can give a sample of our best and if we can know in our hearts that it was nobly done."

Ladies and gentlemen, it is with pride and humility that I today dedicate the Dean Acheson Auditorium and the Loy Henderson International Conference Room. I do so in the knowledge that their names will inspire those who pass this way in the years to come as they have all of us who have been honored to be a part of the Department and the Nation which they served so well.

Thank you.

7

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger, Ambassador Henderson, Secretary Habib:

It is very hard for me to find a way to thank this group and the Secretary for this very moving arrangement that is happening today. I, myself, am deeply moved, as is my family with me.

Dean Acheson himself would be most immensely grateful and very touched, indeed. He was so devoted to this group, to this service. I think you would all be really surprised to know how sentimental and softhearted he was about the Foreign Service—along with the immense pride that he had for them.

I think some of you would feel that it was particularly appropriate that an auditorium be named in his honor, because he was never too reluctant to take to a platform himself when the occasion warranted it. He even enjoyed, sometimes, hearing other people on a platform [laughter] if they were very, very good and spoke to the point and the subject matter was important to him.

But he most definitely and vehemently did believe in using a platform to put over what he thought was important and useful and persuade people to follow him—persuade other leaders and decisionmakers to follow the course that was right. This was a very important thing to him, and I suppose it was one of his most effective works and valuable services.

This auditorium, I don't believe, ever saw him—I think perhaps because it wasn't here. [Laughter] And I don't remember about that,

really, but I do remember very, very vividly a time when he appeared not here, but outside there. somewhere—when the time came to say goodbye to the Foreign Service, to say goodbye to the Department at the end of his service.

It was the middle of January, and fortunately it was a very warm day. It had been considered that no room in the Department was big enough to hold the people who might come, and so it was outside.

And I went out with him and saw an immense group stretching on and on. I wouldn't have thought there were that many Foreign Service people in the entire world—but there they were— and my husband was very moved by this and, of course, leading the group. Really, it was the most poignant moment for him, in perhaps his whole life. He really was devastated by this.

But he did say, among other things, something I would like to read to you:

> "Through the long years in which we have been friends and companions, I have grown every day to know more and more that you are a part of a great and goodly company which stretches back through the years to the very beginning of our Nation and that today, as always, there is here that devotion to country, that loyalty to your work, that wisdom which is so necessary for our State."

I am sure it is that way today, and I hope it will be that way for a long, long time to come.

And may I offer the best wishes from me and my family to all this wonderful service—and theirs and my most deepfelt, heartfelt thanks.

9

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Acheson, former colleagues, friends, ladies, and gentlemen:

I am so overwhelmed at the kind words which I have just heard from you, Mr. Secretary, and also at the thought that a major room in this Department—the Department for which I have so much affection—is to bear my name, that I am really unable to find words adequate for the expression of my feelings.

My emotions are heightened by the presence here of one of the great Secretaries of State and by that of the gracious widow of another great Secretary, under whom I had the privilege of serving and whom I remember with an affection bordering on reverence.

This day might be considered as the culmination of a love affair that I have had with the Department of State and the Foreign Service for over more than 50 years. The Foreign Service came into existence on July 1st, 1924, as a result of the merger of the former Diplomatic and Consular Services.

I can still recall the solemnity with which on that day, I, a Vice Consul—weathered by two years of service in a rather turbulent Ireland—stood stiffly before my chief, our Consul General in southern Ireland, raised my right hand and took the oath that made me one of the charter members of the Foreign Service of the United States.

Not many of the more than 500 Diplomatic and Consular Officers who took the same oath on that day in some 50 different countries are still in the land of the living.

I note with pleasure, however, that a few of them are with us here this evening.

Six months after my entry into this "new" service, I received my first detail to the Department of State which, over the years as my assignments alternated between it and a series of foreign countries, I gradually came to consider as my "home town." Although a newcomer and a stranger, I was warmly welcomed by the members of the Department and made to feel almost instantly that I was one of them.

The friendships that developed during my several assignments to Washington with my co-workers in the Department, and during my tours in foreign countries with my colleagues in various diplomatic missions and consular offices, have contributed to the richness of my Foreign Service life. It gives me a warm glow this evening that so many of my former Departmental and Foreign Service colleagues, whose friendships I continue to value, are here with us.

The Foreign Service was established to serve as an instrument of the President and the Secretary of State—an instrument to be used in the conduct of our foreign relations.

10

According to my understanding, it was the hopes of its founders that the future members of this service would develop into true professionals in the practice of foreign affairs—that the knowledge and skills which they would acquire during their years of actual experience and study would contribute to the development of a service competent to assist in the formulation and the execution of foreign policies and to assume many of the burdens incident to international intercourse.

The kind of service envisaged by its founders could not, of course, be fully effective unless its members should be imbued with the spirit of Foreign Service, with a degree of selflessness that gives first priority to public interest and derives the highest satisfaction from the consciousness of service to the community, the country, or mankind in general.

One of the features of Foreign Service which sets it apart from most other civilian governmental services has been that its members are expected to be prepared to go at any time, to any place, and to occupy there any position of a Foreign Service character to which the President or the Secretary of State may assign them. They are expected to welcome as a challenge and as an opportunity for service any assignment that comes their way. Without this feature, the service could not be depended upon to meet the unanticipated international problems that inevitably present themselves from time to time.

No matter how high their motivations might be, the members of such a service, as human beings, would find it difficult to maintain the level of enthusiasm necessary for the satisfactory discharge of their grave responsibilities unless they were given to feel that their contribution to the national welfare was appreciated by the Government and public, and due consideration was being accorded to their personal and family problems.

Since its birth in 1924, the service has undergone many changes. Its membership, for instance, has more than quadrupled in consequence of the steady increase in its responsibilities. Certain alterations have been made from time to time in its structure, its methods of management and operations, and its approaches to problems. At times there have been sags in the enthusiasm and the morale by some of its members. Some of them

have found it difficult to adjust to the disciplines required by the service which, like a fire department, must always be prepared to meet unforeseen emergencies. Others have come to feel, sometimes unfortunately with a certain amount of justification, that their work was not being fully appreciated by the Government or by the public in general. Still others have become discouraged at the slowness of promotions or at what they considered to be the lack of challenge at the post of their assignment.

In my opinion, however, as a result of their devotion to duty, of their personal integrity, of the manner in which they have faced dangerous situations and difficult problems, and of their loyalty to the Administration, brought into power through our democratic processes, they have merited the trust and confidence of the President and the Secretary of State whom they have been endea-voring to assist.

The postwar years have been exceptionally troublesome. The power structures of the world have undergone awesome changes. Some of our basic concepts of personal, family, and interna-tional relations have been questioned.

Throughout the world, including the United States, there has been a social restlessness that has been expressing itself at times in stridency and even, on occasions, in violence. This restlessness has pervaded some of our most stable institutions.

Nevertheless, I have confidence that the Foreign Service, with its more than 50 years of public service traditions, will weather the storm and will continue for many years to serve our country with selflessness, loyalty, and effectiveness.

May I add that it is my hope that the Loy Henderson Room, during future years, will be the scene of many international conferences that will succeed in efforts to promote peace throughout the world—a peace based on justice, linked with compassion.

I may add in a personal way, that it is my hope also that in the years to come when the question is asked: "Who was this Loy Henderson for whom this room was named?" the reply would be "Oh, he was a Foreign Service Officer on duty during the early days of the service, and we understand that he was supposed to have tried to do his best."

PR # 533

Q: Mr. Secretary, the other day an authoritative Iranian source, namely the Shah, was interviewed by CBS, and he said that he has SAVAK secret service agents, or secret police agents, on duty in the United States and they are there, he said, quote, "checking up on anybody who becomes affiliated with circles, organizations held hostage by a country, which is the role of any intelligence organization", and he went on to say that "they are there with the knowledge and consent of the United States Government". First, is that true? And, second, if it is true, is that in conformity with American law?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is true, undoubtedly, that there are members of the Iranian intelligence services attached to the Iranian Embassy, just as there are members of the intelligence services of other countries attached to the embassies of their country. It is not the practice in diplomacy to challenge the credentials that a country gives to its diplomatic personnel. It is not correct that the United States is aware of the fact that Iranian intelligence personnel are checking on individuals living in the United States or keeping them under surveillance. We are making inquiries about this matter, and if it is correct, we are going to ask that it be stopped.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Geneva talks open tomorrow on the future of Rhodesia. Can you tell us if you had the explicit approval of the front-line African states -- and, indeed, of the Rhodesian nationalists -- for the six-point package that Ian Smith says cannot be broken apart, has to be swallowed whole or not at all?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have pointed out before that the negotiation about Rhodesia is an extremely complicated one. It involves four nationalist participants in Geneva. It involves Ian Smith. It involves the British. In addition, the so-called front-line states have observers there. So we're dealing with an extremely complicated situation.

The five points that Ian Smith presented grew out of discussions that he and I had in Pretoria; and they, in turn, grew out of five missions -- three American and two British -- that had gone to Africa to determine what a possible basis for a settlement would be.

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Obviously, the conference is assembled for the purpose of negotiation. The five points included items which we believe could form the basis for discussion and which, in their major part, might be acceptable. However, one cannot prejudge the outcome of a negotiation; and I think we have to wait now until the negotiations actually get going before we can determine what the outcome will be.

Q: If I may follow up, are you saying then that the African states and the Rhodesian nationalists understood at the time that the five points would be negotiable in Geneva, and did Smith understand that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The genesis of the five points is a rather complicated one, with a central core of it and some points that were added in the course of negotiations.

In the course of these negotiations, it was not possible to assemble all of the front-line Presidents nor did we talk to any of the nationalist leaders because we were following an agreement we had made with President Nyerere of Tanzania that we would not deal directly with nationalist leaders and let the front-line Presidents do it. Now, therefore, each of the participants must be given an opportunity to express himself before any final determination can be made.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if the talks stalemate in Geneva, will you intervene directly? If not, will that give credence to critics who say that your African shuttle diplomacy was political for Presidential politics, *per se*?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's remember now, when this African policy started, we took the first steps in March. I took my first trip to Africa in April at a time when it was the common wisdom of everybody that it would be a liability to President Ford in his primary campaign. At that time we had no idea of when it would culminate. On the other hand, it would have been very strange for the United States not to take a step towards peace in South Africa just because a campaign was going on in this country -- all the more so since this is not a controversial item in American politics as between the two parties. So the United States is pursuing its policy in Africa for the peace of the world, to prevent a race war in Africa, and to make its contribution towards a peaceful evolution based on justice. If the negotiations in Geneva stalemate, which I do not expect,

PR # 533

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the United States will do its best to get them
started again. We have an observer in Geneva now. We
will -- next week, when the talks start in earnest --
we will reinforce our delegation in Geneva, which is there
not technically as an observer but as a contact point.
We will do what we are asked by the parties and what
can be helpful to bring the negotiations to a successful
conclusion.

Q: I include the portion about the Presidential politics because of the fact that it was thought that this road was taken because of the election that's coming up for the black Americans who are going to vote.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The road was taken -- first of all it was started about eight months ago. The route was taken because it seemed to us -- and it was a judgment confirmed by everybody -- that a race war was imminent in southern Africa, that it would lead to tremendous loss of life, that it would have global consequences. And, we wanted to bring about an evolution towards justice, majority rule, minority rights in southern Africa by an evolutionary process, including negotiations. It was the judgment of all the people, including foreign leaders, that if it were not done now the situation might get out of control. There were no political intentions and it hasn't been used politically.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Soviet newspaper Pravda has accused you of trying to obstruct normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China. And I cite your recent remarks that the U. S. would view with great concern the outside pressures or intervention in China. Pravda called the remarks "a clumsy invention", and said you were doing this for reasons of Presidential politics. Two questions: What's your general reaction to that? And, secondly, have the Soviets totally misread your warning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I suppose it's going to be impossible for me to do anything until November 2nd which isn't going to be charged to Presidential politics. I don't know whether the Soviet Union, with its record of elections, is the best to judge what affects American politics. The statement was made in response to a question, was not volunteered. I pointed out, in the unsettled

PR # 533

- 4 -

conditions which were then existing, and which were
in part generated by Soviet newspaper articles, that
an attack by the Soviet Union on China would be a
grave matter. The Soviet Union knows better than we
whether it has any intention of attacking China. We
did not say that they were intending to attack China.
We simply stated our position in case this happened.
We are not attempting to obstruct normalization of
relations between these two countries. That is beyond
our capacity to do and it isn't our policy. We
pointed out the consequences of actions which we did
not necessarily predict in order for there to be no
misunderstanding during conditions that were, after all,
somewhat unsettled.

Q: Mr. Secretary, if President Ford is elected on Tuesday, will you continue as Secretary of State? If Jimmy Carter is elected, what will you do?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made no plans for what I will do in the improbable event that your second question raised (laughter).

In case President Ford is elected, I have indicated for
many months that I would then discuss my plans
with him. And, of course, I would want to hear his
reactions and his views before I make any final decision.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there was a report last week that you might continue for a year. Is there any truth to that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had any discussion with the President. You know his public statements about his views on the matter, but I have had no discussion with him about it.

Q: Let me ask you a question about Connecticut. Several months ago a Colt firearms employee was sentenced to a prison term for his part in illegally selling guns to South Africa. There's a grand jury investigation continuing in Connecticut involving both Colt and Winchester. Part of the evidence developed is that both companies had open dealings with gun dealers in South Africa in violation of the United States embargo.

Does the State Department tacitly approve these sales?
And they went on for five years before there was any
action. Doesn't the State Department --

PR # 533

- 5 -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You're asking me whether --

Q: Wasn't the State Department aware of the sales? Did it tacitly approve them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have to tell you candidly I don't know this case. It is inconceivable to me that the State Department tacitly approved the sale of arms when it is American policy to embargo the sale of arms to South Africa. So, without knowing the facts of the case, which I'll have to look into --

Q: Even so, the case went so far that at least one gun dealer to South Africa visited the companies in Connecticut to arrange the sale.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, South Africans are free to travel in the United States. The question is, did the Department of State cooperate with them or did anyone close his eyes to their purchases? And it is the policy of the Department of State to enforce the arms embargo against South Africa.

Q: I had one other question about South Africa. The United Nations, in the General Assembly, voted yesterday, 134 to 0 to, in effect, ignore the new Republic of Transkei. The United States abstained. Do you approve of that abstention?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is safe to assume that I instructed our delegation to abstain (laughter). Now with respect to the Transkei, the United States will not recognize the Transkei, will not establish diplomatic relations with it. Our objection did not concern the essential points of the resolution. And, in fact, if the resolution had been checked with us ahead of time, I am certain we could have modified it to a point so that we would not have had to abstain. The difficulty with the new resolution was that, on the one hand, they refused to recognize -- called on members not to recognize the Transkei; and that part we agreed with. On the other, they called on all members not to have any dealings with anybody in the Transkei, which had the consequence almost of recognizing it. And the United States, precisely because it will continue to deal with Transkei as if it were part of South Africa, cannot accept the proposition that we cannot deal with people that live in the Transkei just because South Africa has declared it an independent state. So our objection was a technical one, and if the United Nations had separated that one part of it from the rest of it, we

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would have voted for it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Canadian press has expressed its concern about Arab boycott policy to the effect that American-owned companies in Canada (inaudible). Now, are there other allies who share the same concern?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had, over a period of years, consistently, difficulty with American laws that we are attempting to apply in other countries -- to American subsidiaries domiciled in foreign countries or to corporations of foreign countries that have a large number or a significant number of American directors. We had this problem in connection with the Cuba boycott, and we have it now in connection with the Arab boycott. This is a matter which we are studying and which has no easy solution, because if we exempt the American subsidiaries abroad then any American company can avoid a great deal of American legislation simply by letting its subsidiaries abroad handle those matters that are the subject of the legislation. On the other hand, we can understand the concern of a country about the attempt to apply American legislation in its own jurisdiction. I discussed this subject with the Canadian foreign minister when he visited me two weeks ago, and we're going to pursue these discussions in order to find an amicable solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, President Ford has made the most of Governor Carter's remarks on Yugoslavia, and Governor Carter has done the same with the President's remarks on Eastern Europe -- and you yourself have joined and jumped in on the remarks that the Governor made about Yugoslavia. Do you seriously believe that these observations are prompted by reactions of substance, or is the Governor, the President and you yourself making the most of this for political reasons?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I made my comments in response to questions. I was not volunteering any comment. Secondly, I would make a distinction between what the President said and what the Governor said. What the President said was a statement of fact, which was correctable. What the Governor said concerned an issue of policy, which could affect the calculation of foreign countries. It is my responsibility as Secretary of State that foreign countries not misunderstand what America considers to be its security interest -- which concerns

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me more than the practical measures we might take
to implement our security interest. And therefore
I stated what six other Administrations have
stated, namely, that the United States has an interest
in the independence and non-alignment of Yugoslavia.
Now, I do not believe that it is fruitful to pursue
this matter in the middle of a political campaign.
I have noticed that Governor Carter yesterday modified
his original statement. I think this is too serious
an issue; it does affect the security of the
United States; I do not believe that it is useful to
belabor it in a political campaign, and it should be
addressed again after the campaign is over. There
are only four more days.

Q: Since it has come up, may I ask you whether you from
your position, in the event of Soviet action against
Yugoslavia, would recommend that the United States send
troops to Yugoslavia's support?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think this is a totally wrong way to state the issue. I do not believe that the United States should give a check list ahead of time, in areas where it does not have any formal commitments, about what precisely it would or would not do. I have stated, as have six Administrations before this one, that the United States would consider a threat to the independence and sovereignty and non-alignment of Yugoslavia a matter of grave concern. How we would implement this concern depends on the circumstances that will arise, and it is the purpose of our policy to prevent this threat from arising and not to give a check list ahead of time of how we will meet it.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the latest edition of _New Times_ magazine there is a story, I think --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What magazine?

Q: _New Times_ -- suggesting that you may have played more
than a passive role in the wiretapping of Morton
Halperin, among others. What exactly was your role in
that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This is a subject that has been exhaustively gone into before Congressional committees. It is now before the courts. There is voluminous testimony going into the thousands of pages by now, and it is impossible to answer it in a press conference. I stand

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on everything that I have said before Congressional committees and in depositions before the courts.

Q: Mr. Secretary, speaking of November 2nd, as you just did, what do you think about the propriety of a Secretary of State making a public appearance, talking about foreign policy only four or five days before the election, while the Administration is making foreign policy and the lack of experience on the other side a major campaign issue?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't drawn any issue in foreign policy with respect to Governor Carter in this appearance. I'm answering questions by the press, and my speech here is on an off-the-record basis to a group of leading citizens of this area who invited me in July to come to this affair. For the last two years, I have spoken at intervals of about two to three weeks in various parts of the country. And during the campaign I have made most of my appearances on an off-the-record basis before selected groups.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can I follow that with a somewhat more philosophical question? Every four years it seems that we have a semi-paralysis effect partly because of political reasons and partly because of the uncertainties in a Presidential election. Obviously, there are obvious hazards. Can you see any solution of separating the conduct of foreign affairs and making it relatively stable and continuous, despite our democratic political system?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't completely agree that there's a paralysis in foreign affairs. After all, we conducted the African initiative in the middle of the electoral campaign. But it is true that the American election tends to create a major factor of uncertainty in international affairs at regular intervals, and I think it is important to keep in mind that the interests of the United States and the values of the United States do not change every four years. I have always believed that the foreign policy of the United States should be non-partisan. I would certainly cooperate with any effort -- whether I'm in office or out of office -- to put it on a non-partisan basis and to insulate it as much as possible from the ordinary political campaign, unless there is a fundamental issue of principle involved, which can happen occasionally.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, William Seidman, the President's economic adviser, was here this morning, and he said that talks were going on in an effort to persuade the Arabs not to raise the prices of oil in December. I want to ask you a two-part question: what is the likelihood of persuading the Arabs to do that, to hold the line on oil prices? And if that persuasive talk fails, is there any counteraction that the United States could take to force a roll-back of prices?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, it's technically not correct to speak only of the Arabs. It's OPEC -- which includes Iran, Venezuela, and several other major producers that are not part of the Arab countries. With respect, however, to American actions in case present efforts -- which are extensive -- fail, the most effective method is a major American energy program. That is, a significant program of conservation, a significant program to develop alternative sources of energy. Until we reduce our dependence on imported oil, our bargaining position with respect to oil prices is likely to remain not as strong as it should be. And, therefore, in the new Congress it will be extremely important that a comprehensive energy program be passed because that, over the long term, is our most effective way of bringing a pressure on oil prices.

Q: What about Mr. Carter's comments about a possible economic boycott if there were another Arab oil embargo?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, Mr. Carter applied that to the case of an embargo, not to the case of an individual action such as the oil price rise. We have our questions whether an economic embargo will work, particularly as it exempted, in Mr. Carter's formulation, grains, which is the one irreplaceable item that we are supplying. But, again, we are dealing here with a case in which we're attempting to prevent such a situation from arising, and in which the gravest dangers are not the dangers of a total embargo but of many intermediate steps that can be taken short of an embargo. We have improved our relationships with the Arab countries to a point where an embargo is conceivable only in the most extreme circumstances of a total collapse of all Middle East efforts, which we do not foresee.

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Q: Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that America intervened diplomatically in South Africa was to restore basic human rights and dignity to the black majority there. In the same diplomatic breath, however, we have extended a friendly hand in terms of economic and political gains (sic) to Communist and military dictatorships where these basic human rights are only a dream. Does this mean that our foreign policy has a double standard?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Our foreign policy has to set first of all, it has to set priorities. Secondly, with respect to Communist countries, the United States has always used its influence to promote emigration, to promote a greater liberalization to make it easier for families to be reunited, to give press greater access. In the Helsinki document, in the so-called Basket III, for the first time there has been an international acceptance by the Communist countries that participated that certain essential human rights were part of an international agreement. Now, to be sure, they have not lived up to all its provisions and even most of its provisions; but it does give us criteria to which to appeal and criteria to which we will appeal in the 1977 review conference of the European Security Conference that will take place in Belgrade. So we pursue the same principles in other countries, but the method of application will have to differ with circumstances.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us the degree of accuracy to reports that South Korea has been engaged in a campaign of bribery here in the United States on Capitol Hill?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to these stories, they are now being investigated by the Justice Department. The Department of State has made available all its information over a period of months to the Department of Justice, which will have to make the final decisions as to the validity of these charges.

Q: Mr. Secretary, Arab leaders have announced agreement on what they call a peace plan for Lebanon after a two-day conference in Cairo. Can this be a true step forward for peace in the Middle East, and especially for Lebanon, with Syria insisting on maintaining most of its twenty or so thousand troops as about two-thirds of a peace force there?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There have been, of course, I believe, sixty cease-fires in Lebanon. And, therefore, to predict that any one agreement is going to mark the end of the conflict is hazardous. It's interesting that we had a report from Beirut yesterday that, for the first time in months, there was a traffic jam, which meant that the population felt secure enough to go out into the streets. I believe that the Riyadh accord, as ratified by the Cairo summit, might well mark the beginning of a peaceful solution for Lebanon. The composition of the Arab force has not yet been agreed upon, but one would assume that it would have a preponderance of Syrians, since they are the largest number of troops that are there now. The problem that now awaits solution is the relationship between the Christian and the Moslem communities in Lebanon. The United States has always supported the independence and unity of Lebanon, but it also favors the ability of each community to lead its own life according to its own traditions. And this remains to be worked out.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, is it true the United States is (inaudible) on international affairs, as charged by Jimmy Carter?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think in the last week of a campaign many things are said in which the candidates get carried away with themselves. The United States attempts to make no promises that it doesn't keep and to make no threats it doesn't intend to execute.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, along those lines, the major foreign policy issues in this campaign appear to have been the President's mistake on Eastern Europe and Jimmy Carter's reluctance to send troops to Yugoslavia. In view of the fact that there are some very important foreign policy questions -- I think you have SALT, what to do next in the Middle East, what to do next in China -- questions which will face any new Administration, what is your feeling about the quality of the foreign policy debate in this campaign?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, since I believe we have been correct in the foreign policy we've carried out, I'm assuming that the absence of more fundamental criticisms would tend to support this. As I pointed out before, I really do not think that foreign policy should lend itself to a detailed partisan debate. And, therefore, I think it is in the interest of the United States that

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at least major tactical questions not become the subject
of foreign policy disputes.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, I'd just like to follow up and mention the SALT talks. In view of the fact in the last ten years the USSR has spent ten billion dollars on civil defense and military armaments, isn't it a waste of time -- the SALT talks, that is?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The SALT talks on the limitations of strategic armaments derive from the fact that both sides are developing nuclear weapons of enormous destructiveness and that both sides, the Soviet Union and the United States, for the first time in history face a situation in which two countries would destroy all of humanity. That is an unprecedented situation that leaders of no country in the world have ever had to face before. What we're attempting to do in these talks is to put a ceiling on the strategic armaments of both sides, whatever they may have spent in the past -- to put a ceiling on these strategic armaments and then to use that ceiling as a point of departure from which to make reductions in these strategic armaments. We have a preliminary agreement to establish a ceiling that will be equal for both sides, and we are now negotiating what categories of weapons fall under each ceiling. This is what has held up the conclusion of the negotiations. I would think that the negotiations are about 85 to 90 percent concluded, that there are two issues that still remain to be settled. But whatever one thinks of what either country may have done in the field of armaments, it is in the interest of humanity that a ceiling be put on these weapons and that then they be reduced.

Q: I had in mind to sort of ask you a two-part question, if I could. Speaking of Lebanon as you were, first I'd like to ask you whether you have any information that Israel is actively involved in supplying arms or manpower to help the Christians in Lebanon; and, secondly, I would like you to comment on the provision of the peace agreement that authorizes the Palestinians to go back to their old positions across the border from Israel and do what they can -- I can't quote directly -- but do what they can to make trouble for Israel.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, we have no authenticated information that any provisions of the American law which prohibits the transfer of

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American defense equipment has been violated. With
respect to the second question, the United States has
always opposed terrorism as an instrument of national
policy. Whether in fact the Palestinians will
go back to exactly all the camps they had occupied before,
or whether that will no longer be technically feasible
for a variety of reasons that have happened in recent
weeks only the future can tell. But the United
States has never supported the concept of terrorist
warfare by any country or by any group.

Q: Thank you.

MODERATOR: I think in closing I should make it very clear
to everybody that Secretary Kissinger is here as a guest
of the Executive Forum and it is at our request that
he addressed this group. We wouldn't want our friends
in the press to have missed this opportunity. So that
is the specific purpose for his being here. Thank you
very much, Mr. Kissinger.

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