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MUSIC WITH OPENING TITLES

(FROST)

Richard Nixon came to power with strong ideas about how best to achieve order in the world. He saw order threatened by the continuing isolation of China; by America's rivalry with the other nuclear giant, the Soviet Union; and, by conflicts between their client's states. The controversy, both home and abroad which resulted from Richard Nixon's inability to end one conflict involving one client's state in Southeast Asia, South Vietnam, would overshadow the whole of the first term of his Presidency, and is one of the subjects covered in our next interview in this series. But tonight, we concentrate on big power politics, the area where Richard Nixon can reveal most about what has so far remained unknown: His dramatic dealings with the other super-powers; talking to Mao about bringing China in from the cold; and, hard dealings with Brezhnev over the major conflicts in the world which occurred during his Presidency. From the Middle East to his unique perspective on Henry Kissinger, the inside story of all this in just a moment.

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MUSIC INTO COMMERCIAL

COMMERCIAL #1

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(NIXON)

(SOF)

The announcement I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Peking and in the United States. Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon's express desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972.

(FROST)

Mr. President, whose idea was the initiative to China? Was it Yours? Henry Kissinger's? Or whose?

(NIXON)

Well, to answer that question, I do not know when Dr. Kissinger may have conceived of the possibility of an initiative toward China. I do know that I conceived it before I ever met him and that I pushed it very very hard from the first days of the Administration. I was the one, as he of course agrees, who raised the

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(NIXON) issue and kept pressing the issue, but he persuaded it with enormous enthusiasm.

(FROST) And, in that first conversation with Mao, ah, what was, what was Chairman Mao most concerned to talk about? Was he most concerned to talk about Taiwan or wider issues?

(NIXON) In the first trip, Chairman Mao left most of the, ah, substantive matters to Chou En-lai. What he was trying to do was to establish a personal relationship, ah, with the President of the United States, frankly, to take his measure, and I was naturally trying to take his. And, as far as Taiwan is concerned, the only reference was with their incomparable humor. He said, "I see where your friend, Chiang Kai-shek, ah, called me a bandit." Ah, and, after the translation, I said, "What does the Chairman call Chiang Kai-shek?" Ah, and he said, ah, "Well, ah, I call him a bandit too." And, then Chou En-lai interspersed the comment, he says, "We just abuse each other." Then they both threw back their heads and laughed. And, then Mao went on to say, "You know, ah, we have

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(NIXON)

been friends of Chiang Kai-shek much longer than you
have been friends." He did not mean that they were
friends now. He was referring to the fact that of
course, years before I ever met Chiang Kai-shek,
which was in 1953, he had of course been his ally and
friend. Chou En-lai, of course, had worked with him
and under him, ah, during the time that Chiang Kai-shek
was the leader of the Nationalist Chinese in World War
II. Now, what he did, however, have the greatest
interest in was in the attitude that the United States
would have toward the attempts of any country to
impose its rule, or its influence on Asia and that
particularly meant on China and on its neighbor.
Ah, the word, the code-word is Hegemony. It's what
they were referring to as far . . . on the Chinese
side, ah, was they didn't want the Soviet Union, ah,
to impose its force on them.

(FROST)

Do you think that there could ever be a rapprochement?
I mean, do you think, that in fact, China and Russia
are set for the next foreseeable future on opposing
courses, or could there become a new intimate closeness
between the two Communist super-powers?

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(NIXON)

Ah, I do not see a rapprochement. Ah, there's an interesting story . . . well, I can bring it more up-to-date than '72, which perhaps I should. In '76 this subject came up with Hua. Ah, he brought it up. He says, "Let me tell you what happened, ah, when ah, Premier Kosygin met with Chairman Mao back in 1965." He says, "They talked for days and hours on hours each day about their differences." And, at the conclusion, Chairman Mao told Kosygin, he said, "Our differences are going to continue for ten thousand years." And, Kosygin said, "Well, Mr. Chairman, after these long discussions we've had and the reassurances I've given you, don't you think you could reduce that number somewhat?" And, Mao, with that devilish sense of humor he has, ah, said, "Well, in view of the very persuasive arguments that, ah, the Premier has made, I'll knock off a thousand years. Our disputes will continue for nine thousand years." And, then Hua went on to say, "That's the way we look at it now."

(FROST)

Did you feel you had a tacit assurance that they would not ever use force on the issue of Taiwan or not?

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(NIXON)

No. I would not say that we had . . . we certainly did not have an express assurance. And, ah, not having an express assurance, ah, I would say I did not feel we had a tacit assurance, but I feel that as far as Taiwan is concerned, ah, that China's internal problems are so great, and the external threat . . . the only major external threat that they face from the Soviet Union is so immediate that the Chinese do not want to become involved in military action, even on an issue as sensitive as Taiwan.

(FROST)

After the enormous impact of the trip in '72, there was a general optimistic assumption that there would be rapid steps leading to full diplomatic relations between the United States and China and so on. But, the obstacle on the formal exchange of embassies is our recognition of Taiwan.

(NIXON)

Oh, absolutely. There will be no formal exchange of embassies unless the United States breaks relations with Taiwan. It will not happen. As far as my present view is concerned, I stand on the Shanghi Communique and I would suggest, however, that there

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(NIXON) may be areas and I would . . . I think it would be proper to discuss this publicly, even at this point, where in the field of trade, we could make some moves now like granting MFN, Most Favored Nations treatments to China. Ah, discussing and solving the problem of blocked assets. Here are areas, I'm not sure that this is the time to do it or not, but these are subjects that could be discussed which do not require normalization in order to discuss them.

(FROST) Well, let's take a look now at some films, some rare footage of that second trip . . . that last meeting with Chairman Mao.

(FROST) Chairman Mao very close there to the . . . to the
(SOF) end of his life. Was he still, ah, composition at that meeting? Was he still speaking clearly?

(NIXON) Well, I should point out that in 1972, ah, Chairman
(SOF) Mao had already suffered, in my view, a partial
stroke. He had to be helped to stand up for the
hand shake, but he was very proud that way. In
this case they were girl aides as you see . . . these
rather pretty Chinese girls that were his . . . lifted

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(NIXON)

(SOF)

him up and helped him walk over, and . . . but,
once they . . . once those lights turned on, ah,
he got . . . turned away. Another interesting
thing I noticed from that picture is that when I
went to visit him the first time, I noticed he
lived very simply. Ah, in the Soviet Union, every-
thing is enormously big. In fact, many things in
China are also enormously big. The Great Hall of
the People and the rest. As far as the offices are
concerned, however, Mao's office was . . . was a
relatively small office strewn all over with books
opened to pages here, there, every place. He
obviously was a man that did a lot of writing and
reading, ah, and so forth. When I came back the
second time, I noticed that four years had seen a
communications revolution. Because there were
television lamps set up in each corner, ah, of the
room. The first time when we had pictures taken,
they had to come in with the hand-held cameras to
take a picture, but this time there were television
lamps all set up and, ah, Mao was all prepared to
get the maximum publicity out of . . . out of the
picture.

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(FROST)

(SOF)

When the conversation began in '76, did you feel
it was still Mao talking or that the interpreter
was doing the work?

(NIXON)

(SOF)

No question about it. Ah, he talked, ah, almost
monosyllabically. But, I don't know Chinese, and
as you know, Chinese, ah, is, ah, as distinguished
from some of the more difficult, ah, languages,
which use consonants primarily, Chinese uses vowels
primarily. And, it's ... as he talked there were
... it was obvious that he was having terrible
problems of getting the words out. They were sort
of grunts and groans, but the interpreter took
things down. But, then, whenever the interpretation
was made, he would listen, and then he would nod his
head, 'no', and he would reach over and take a pad
from her and then he would write out the answer;
right to the last in that conversation, as of course
was true in 1972. Ah, while he had greater problems
... great problems in '72 and much greater ones in
'76 of communication, Mao was in charge of himself
and he was in charge in China. And, all of those
around him referred to him as being the one in charge.

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(NIXON)

(SOF)

Ah, he was a colossus as you can see in this last
picture, shriveled, old. But, if you watched his
hands, the things that I . . . the thing that I
remembered in both cases, in '72 and '76; his hands
never got old. They were very fine, delicate hands.
Ah, and yet, we must recognize here had been a tough,
ruthless leader, but it didn't show in his hands.
He knew he was going to die. He talked fatalistically.
He said, "How long will peace last?" Ah, ah, "One
generation?" He held his finger up like that, and I
said, "No, I think longer." And then he, without
saying, held up another. I said, "No longer than that."
And, then he smiled rather ironically, skeptically.
"No, I think maybe a hundred years." And, then he
. . . it would be very difficult, and I said, I quoted
one of his poems to him, I said, "Well, Mr. Chairman,
as you have written, 'Nothing is hard if one dares
to scale the heights.'" And, I said, "Of course, it
is difficult, but the stakes are so great here." And,
he reached over and grasped his cup at that point, as
you saw on the film and we raised our hands in a toast.
And, at the . . . he seemed to be quite moved by that
thought.

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MUSIC INTO COMMERCIAL

COMMERCIAL #2

MUSIC OUT OF COMMERCIAL

(FROST)

Détente. Détente was at the heart of your big power negotiations. But, there had been peaceful co-existence, so-called, before that, which had involved, ah, some treaties banning certain forms of nuclear testing, ah, attempting to deal with the problem of nuclear proliferation, and so on. Ah, how would you define at the . . . at the very heart, the difference between peaceful co-existence and détente as you conceived it?

(NIXON)

People talk about détente; and they talk about peace; ah, they talk about friendship; ah, and, they talk about co-existence. Now, what it really all gets down to is to how two great powers, the two major powers in the world are going to be able to talk about their differences, rather than fight about them. You've got to set-up a relationship on a personal basis, or in some fashion whereby the differences can be discussed and the areas of self-interest can be discovered, worked out, and then increased. And, that is what détente is about.

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(FROST)

So, that when, for instance in '73, ah, the Russians were supplying Egypt, ah, and leading up to the Yom Kippur October War, ah, would you have said that that was contrary to the, ah, intent of SALT, which refers to not increasing international tension, and so on? Or, what you would have expected as a Russian tactic towards what was then a client?

(NIXON)

Well, let us look at what led up to that particular event. Ah, at Summit II, which occurred in Washington at Camp David, and in San Clemente. Ah, there had been a very spirited, and I must say at times, heated discussion of the Mid-East. It started in my home, ah, where we'd had dinner for Brezhnev. For three hours, until past midnight, Brezhnev hammered me on the Mid-East . . . Mid-East. He said, "You must force the Israelis to withdraw from all of the occupied territories and they must do it soon." And, I told him, "We can't do that." I said, "We cannot impose a settlement," and I said, "You can't impose a settlement." Ah, I said, "It must be worked out between the parties." Now, I felt that the interests of Israel would be served by talking with their neighbors. I thought the interests would be served by negotiating.

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(NIXON)

with their neighbors in terms of adjusting the borders
in some way. And, I still believe that. And, they
know that. But, on the other hand, I knew that the
Israelis would not and could not simply withdraw to
the '67 borders, and that for me to tell Brezhnev and
to promise him that I would force the Isrealis to do
it; and that he go tell the Egyptians and the Syrians
that; would be a promise that I couldn't deliver on.
I refused to make it. I said to Brezhnev on this
occasion, "Let us clearly understand that both of us
must use our strength to restrain our friends. You've
got to restrain the Egyptians and the Syrians and
we'll restrain the Israelis, and we both must try to
push our friends to sit down at the conference table
and negotiate . . . negotiate out some of these
differences." Now, that happened in June. Then, as
the months wore on, ah, Brezhnev's prediction, which
he made at that time, proved true. Whether it was a
self-fulling prediction or not, I do not know. But,
he said, "It is my concern, that unless the Israelis
do withdraw that the Egyptians and Syrians are going
to attack and they're going to attack soon." I said,
"If they do attack," I said, "we will not let Israel
go down the tube." Or words to that effect. At

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(NIXON) least he got the message. Now, there's where we were then, when this war broke out. And, now let me tell you how I got the news of the war which shows you the brilliance of our intelligence, and in this case the Israeli intelligence. The Israeli intelligence, incidentally, is probably as good as any in the world, next to perhaps the Russian intelligence. But, in any event, I was going to go to Key Biscayne, ah, at the time . . . the week the Yom Kippur War broke out, I mean it was a holiday and all the rest. And, I got the intelligence report from the CIA that day. And, the intelligence report said that an armed attack is possible, but unlikely. The next morning I got a telephone call from Washington that Egypt had attacked. Ok, . . .

(FROST) So that we didn't . . .

(NIXON) Now on this point - - -

(FROST) . . . we didn't have any more hint than that? Just the CIA report the day before?

(NIXON) Well, all that we had in the way of a hint . . . all

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(NIXON) that I had was their conclusion. Now, what information they were basing it on, I do not know, but the critical point that I wish to make is: I was not surprised to see our intelligence drop the ball. Ah, and, I say this with all due deference to some of the good things they've done. Ah, but they had been . . . they hadn't for example, had any good information with regard to the Cambodian . . . the overthrow of Sihanouk; ah, they hadn't had any good information with regard to many of the things that happened in Vietnam. Ah, I thought basically, that our intelligence community needed a shaking-up. Ah, and this one of course, didn't increase my respect for their ability. But, what surprised me the most was, I knew they were cooperating totally with Israeli intelligence and the Israeli have fantastically good intelligence and their intelligence told them there was not going to be an attack. And, so that was the basis on which I concluded, 'Well, I can fly to Key Biscayne.' Then I had to fly back the next day.

(FROST) But, do you think the Russians knew in advance there was going to be an attack?

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(NIXON)
All that I can say is that we did not know it. As to whether or not the Russians did know it, I would say if they did know it, and did not inform us, that would have been, I think, a very great breach of all of the understandings we had. Regardless, of what we'd agreed on paper, even in Summit II.

(FROST)
Ah, there were a lot of reports in Israel that there was a key, you had a key conversation . . . phone conversation with Golda Meir soon after the war began over supplies?

(NIXON)
Oh, yes. I had several conversations with her. The main point of the matter was this: I can tell the story on the war very briefly. What happened was that because the Egyptians and the Syrians struck first; and also because they fought better, not as well as the Isrealis, but much better than they had in previous wars, they're learning to fight, and that's one thing the Isrealis have got to be worried about as far as the future. They won four wars, but each time they've had more casualties. And, they'll win the next one. But, in the end, 3 million Israelis cannot defeat a 100 million Arabs, 'cause Arabs can

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(NIXON)

also learn to fight. That's the problem. Now, as far as Mrs. Meir . . . here's the essence of what happened: Ah, her concern was that because of the strike, they were losing a great deal of equipment. She needed equipment. Then came the Russian airlift. It was then that I made a very critical decision in the early time of the war; that if the Russians were sending an airlift in, as they were, to help the Egyptians and to help the Syrians, that we would airlift to help Israel. I remember the conversation very well when, ah, I'd asked the Defense Department, and they prepared an option paper, what have you, for Kissinger to provide the, ah, method for doing it. At first, we wanted to cover the situation, or they did, and send the . . . paint some planes differently, and make it appear as if they were El Al planes, I mean, Israeli planes or something like that, or have a chartered plane. And, I finally cut through all of the red tape and I said, "Look, I mean, it isn't going to fool anybody."

(FROST)

But, what you're saying is that in the end, in terms of the delay in the airlift, you in a sense, had to overrule the views of both Dr. Kissinger and Mr.

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(FROST) Schlesinger on timing, on tactics.

(NIXON) Yeah. As far as Dr. Kissinger is concerned, I would have to say, I didn't overrule his views, The way that we worked was that he would come in with options, and the option that he presented was that the Defense Departments thought we should send three of these big cargo planes and then, of course, he gave his own opinion as to their reasons and reasons which he thought I ought to have before me; that politically it would be, ah, perhaps, ah, dangerous for us to send a greater number and that it would, ah, destroy the chances for negotiations in the future if our profile was too high. And, my view, I felt in the political area, ah, that, ah, my expertise was somewhat more than Dr. Kissinger's and he understood that, just as I understood that his expertise in certain diplomatic areas was considerably more than mine. And, I said, "Look, Henry, we're gonna get just as much blame for sending three, if we send thirty, or a hundred, or whatever we've got, so send everything that flies. The main thing is make it work."

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(FROST) Now, as the tide of the battle turned in the Isrealis'
favor, Henry Kissinger on October the 19th, went at
short notice to Moscow.

(NIXON) Yes.

(FROST) Ah, what was the background to his going?

(NIXON) In the early part of this war, the Isrealis begged us
not to support a cease-fire resolution. And, we didn't.
We didn't support it. We filibustered it. We did
everything to stop it. Why? Why didn't the Isrealis
want a cease-fire in the early part of the war?
Because at that point, they were losing. You never want
a cease-fire when the other guy's on your territory.
Ok. Now, comes Kissinger's trip to Moscow. Now, comes
the Israelis as a result of our help, and their good
fighting qualities and the rest, ah, our military air-
lift and their fighting qualities. Now they're on top.
It was then that the Egyptians made the move to ask

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(NIXON)

for a joint American-Soviet force to come in and
keep the peace. We rejected that. I said, "Look,"
I remember one day in the Cabinet Room, very clearly,
I said, "Henry," I said, "This idea of the Russians
having two Russian infantry divisions going to the
Mid-East and puttin' themselves down in Egypt and
Syria, and we send two American Marine divisions into
Isreal in order to keep the peace there." I said,
"This is sheer madness." I said, "It may keep the
peace, but it runs into the possibility of a big
power conflict." I said also, "You're not going to
get, ah, many American public support for sending in
Marines, or Army, or for that matter Airforce, I
don't care what it is, . . . into this . . . this
place, where nobody knows what's going to happen.
Regardless of what the Russians would do, what would
other people do? It would be a dangerous situation,
far more dangerous than the Marine landing in Lebanon
when the United States was so overwhelming powerful
that the Russians wouldn't have dared to move in."
So, I said, "We can't do it." It was then, however,
that Brezhnev sent a note to us. This note, to me,
had an ominous sound to it.

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(FROST) Was it a threat?

(NIXON) What?

(FROST) Ah, ah, I prefer my . . . ah, I prefer my words. Ah, he didn't use the word 'threat', ah, and, I'm not going to go . . . go to that point. The note had an om . . . omnious sound to it because he, in effect, said, that, ah, the United States and the Soviet Union should move in, as the Egyptians had requested. He knew we had rejected that. And, he said, 'If you do not move unilaterally, ah, if you do not move in, ah, and if you cannot restrain the Israelis, as seems to be the case at this point, or is the case at this point.' And, I'm paraphrasing, and it's my recollection. He said, 'It will be necessary for us to move unilaterally . . . unilaterally into the situation.' Now, that to me, was a code word. For the Soviet Union to move any kind of forces unilaterally into the Mid-East would; first, tip the balance, so that Israel would have been down the tube; but, even more important, it would have established the precedent, where the Soviet had a presence in the Mid-East, and unless, . . . and a predominant position, and one that would require us,

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(NIXON)

from our national self-interest to try to balance it off. And, so it ran the risk of a great power confrontation. So, it wasn't just because we wanted to save Israel, which we did want to do, we didn't ... we wanted to save Egypt too; we wanted to save Syria too. We wanted to keep peace in the area. But, it was because we did not want to have major powers rubbing together in a critical area of the world like the Mid-East, far ... where their interests were far more involved than they were in Vietnam. It was because of that, that I decided that we had to take a strong position, and that's why with Kissinger's, Schlesinger's, everybody else's approval, we decided on the course of an alert.

(FROST)

Now, is that what you said in your reply to him? Did you tell him you were going on a nuclear alert?

(NIXON)

No, no, I just said in my reply, we would not agree to go in. I indicated; second, we would be glad, of course, to participate in a U.N. group with a small number of advisors, and so forth, to supervise a cease-fire; and third, that we took a very dim view, I used stronger words than that, a very dim view of

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(NIXON) any unilateral action on their part of moving in.

(FROST) And, in fact - - -

(NIXON) I left . . . but you see, let me point out. Here, it shows you the inter-relationship of one event with another. It shows you, you say, 'What is détente?' Well, détente doesn't bring instant peace. You don't settle everything peacefully. You don't avoid every conflict. You set up a procedure whereby knowing each other, leaders may . . . even when they come into disagreement involving potential conflict, are able to settle it before the flashpoint. Brezhnev knew from that tough conference I had had with him in San Clemente, that three hours before midnight, in which I had taken a firm line that we would not tolerate action that would destroy Israel; that we would stand by our friends and he had to restrain his; and we would restrain ours; he had to remember that. And, the alert, therefore, in that context, and also in the context of what I had earlier done in Vietnam, I think meant a lot more to him that it would otherwise have meant, if we had not had the so-called détente.

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(FROST)

How much did we know at that point, at the time you issued the alert about the movements the Russians were making in terms of Soviet divisions and ships, and, ah, so on?

(NIXON)

All we have here is a collection of information, some of it may be misinformation. One bit of information was that a ship had certain nuclear components in it. We do know that several Soviet divisions, ah, were alerted. Ah, we do know that certain ships were in place; that the number of Soviet ships in that area was 85, the greatest number they'd ever had in that Black Sea, I should say, the Eastern Mediterrean, the Black Sea and, of course, the Straits. Ah, so under the circumstances, there was . . . we considered to be very substantial evidence that the Soviet had the capability in place, and might use that capability to move in unilaterally. This is why the note from Brezhnev, ah, had an ominous sound to it. Having in mind these items of intelligence, none of which I could be sure of, but all of which I had to take into account, in view of the previous record. I felt that we had to take a strong stand, and be alert, which as you know is at the third level of our alerts, ah, I

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(NIXON) felt would be a message which would get through.

(FROST) And, did the Russians also send SCUD missiles to Egypt? I mean, missiles capable of firing nuclear warheads?

(NIXON) There were reports to that effect. I am not able to confirm them. . . to confirm them.

(FROST) You don't know, or you can't . . .

(NIXON) I don't know, no. I mean, I'm not trying to hide anything. I can't recall . . . I can only recall that I read reports and heard reports at that time.

(FROST) But, didn't we have to put pressure on the Isrealis to agree to a cease-fire? I mean, I know they would have not wanted one earlier, but they must have been very tempted to wipe-out the Egyptian third army. How did we manage to persuade them to stop?

(NIXON) Well, the Isrealis, when you talk about pressure, ah, I would have to say, yes, they would have liked to have wiped-out the Egyptian third army. But, if the

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(NIXON)

Isrealis had insisted on capturing and destroying the Egyptian third army, that would have brought about, I predicted; a coup or worse as far as Sadat was concerned. Somebody would have come into power in Egypt, probably worse than Nasser, ah, oriented toward the radical point of view. Egypt would have become a total Soviet satellite state, and Isreal would have won a pyrrhic victory. They would have planted the seeds for a war of revenge such as you've never seen. And, therefore, we were right in restraining Israel; right from their own self-interest.

(FROST)

What was the bottom line then really? That, ah, you had the leverage? And, the bottom line, probably never stated was, 'If you don't go along with this cease-fire, the United States will not be able to . . . dot, dot, dot.'

(NIXON)

Well, no, we didn't put the Israelis in the spot where we were trying to threaten them, because they won't take it. I mean, they're . . . they're not . . . they'll never take it. And, we wouldn't put them in that spot. What we did was to reason with them, but to

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(NIXON)

reason with them in a way, well, we in effect, if I
may paraphrase from the "Godfather", 'We gave 'em an
offer, ah, that they, ah, could not refuse.' And,
the offer basically was: 'Look, the United States will
continue to stand by you. We have demonstrated that
we will come to you aid with arms if you come under
attack, but third, on your side, if we will take such
great risks, including, not only the airlift, but an
alert, in order to save you, you must listen to
us, at least, in terms of being reasonable in talking
to your potential enemies.'

MUSIC INTO COMMERCIAL

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(FROST)

In addition to the Middle East...there was another regional war during your Presidency that could well have embroiled the big powers and that was the war between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh. What had been East Pakistan...how closely was the United States involved in that particular conflict?

(NIXON)

With regard to...to Pakistan and India, and we can cover it very briefly. In the first phase of the Pakistan-Indian clash, Pakistan clearly, ah, was the party that was...has to take the major responsibility and blame. Ah, because of the cruelty with which they put down the Bangladesh, East Pakistan rebellion. As a result of that, ah, this brought India into the conflict, and India, despite warnings from us, and we think even from the Soviet Union, ah, declared war on Pakistan or they didn't declare war on Pakistan, they entered, ah, Bangladesh ah, fighting the Pakistan army in Bangladesh without a declaration of war. Ah, now, we have simply Bangladesh involved.

In the meantime, messages are going back and forth between the United States and Moscow. We ask... tell the Russians how important it is for them to restrain the Indians. Ah, they tell us how important it is for the Pakistanis to give up East Pakistan, and, ah, there were a number of issues. But, in any event,

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(NIXON)

we both got across to each other, ah, our points of view. And, our point of view was very strongly stated; that we thought that if the Russians allowed their client, India, using Soviet arms, ah, to destroy Pakistan, ah, both East and West, that this would imperil our future relationship. And, we put it down just as hard as that. Now, what happened was; that after the Bangladesh phase of it, ah, began to be worked out, even though India, as you recall, ah, would not adhere to a U.N. cease-fire resolution there. Then, from a source that we consider to be totally reliable, we learned that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in a meeting of her Cabinet, had directed that a military operation be put in place to attack West Pakistan and we had, as I said, information that we knew was completely reliable. It was then that we made the move that we did make. It was then that I ordered the carrier task force into the Indian Ocean. We sent a very sharp note, of course, to the Russians, ah, and, ah, the Indians, ah, ah, according to the Russians, ah, this was Brezhnev's, I thought very weak response, he says, "Well, they're very difficult to deal with. We find that our influence on them at this point, once they

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(NIXON)

have tasted the victory in East Pakistan, is very
little." But, I knew that we had to help try to
save West Pakistan. Now, unless we had brought
pressure to bear on the Russians; unless we had
basically conditioned our continued progress toward
the Summit, détente, et cetera; on their restraining
their clients, and we of course by the same token,
would restrain, to the extent we could, the Pakistanis,
who didn't need to be restrained; they were defeated.
Unless that had happened, I believe, ah, I believe,
that, ah, she would have taken West Pakistan. She
would have gobbled it up and that would have had
dramatic consequences; an effect on the Chinese;
an effect on Chin . . . on American-Soviet relations,
for reasons that I've mentioned, as well as of course,
the point is: It would have been wrong and totally
wrong. And, so basically, we saved West Pakistan
because it was right. We also saved it, it's true,
because it had something to do with our China initiative.
The Chinese were putting a lot of pressure on us to do
something. They couldn't do anything. They didn't
want to get involved in a war with India at that point,
although they had utter contempt for the Indians - - -

Show #2 - Page 31

(FROST) And they were test . . . they were testing the United
States a bit to see --

(NIXON) What we did in saving West Pakistan built up a lot
of credibility with the Chinese.

(FROST) And, we're really . . . you're really sure that your
source was right, that she was seriously planning to
invade West Pakistan?

(NIXON) I am totally sure.

(FROST) But, I mean, the numbers . . . the numbers that were
killed in . . . in Bangladesh were huge. Now,
obviously, at that moment, you had a tremendous
quandary. On the one hand, obviously, we ought to
have spoken out against what was being done by the
West Pakistanis to the East Pakistanis. But, on the
other hand, you couldn't really because . . . because
of the China initiative and because of all of this,
you had to tilt towards the pucks, as they say.
Now, that was a . . . it must have been a very difficult
choice between, ah, morality and pragmatism or what-
ever you --

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(NIXON)

Well let us understand, ah, that we didn't approve of Yahya's strong actions against the Bangladesh, ah, rebels, as they were then called, of course. Ah, ah, we, of course, ah, were not in disapproval of the efforts of the U.N., ah, and, ah, others as well, ah, to, ah, to do something to mitigate that situation. Ah, what we did disapprove of, and what we had to disapprove of, in the final analysis, when the chips were down, was any action on the part of India, infinitely stronger than Pakistan; supported by the Soviet Union, gobbling up West Pakistan, a friend of China's, and frankly a friend of the United States, ah, play . . . having played a very significant role in the China initiative. But, don't . . . let's not leave any impression that the government of the United States . . . that I personally, or Kissinger, or Rogers, Bill Rogers, or any of us condoned what the West Pakastani army was doing in Bangladesh. Ah, but, that is an area with a terribly sad history. It's like the Mid-East; there's gonna be more of it.

(FROST)

What I'm saying is: But for the China initiative and those considerations, we might have condemned it.

Show #2 - Page 33

(FROST) We would have condemned it.

(NIXON) Well, the point was, as far as that was concerned: Who . . . who suggests that we approved it?

(FROST) Nobody. Nobody. But, we never spoke out against it, did we?

(NIXON) We . . . but privately we did, of course. We took our . . . we . . . we tried to get our best possible advice to Yahya, and so forth. Ah, to . . . to condemn . . .

(FROST) Did we --

(NIXON) . . . to condemn the, ah, . . . to condemn it publicly, ah, would have served, in my view, ah, no particular purpose at that point. My answer always is: 'What works?' I get back to the problem of Jewish immigration because let me tell you, I have seen what happened to the Jews in Germany. I have visited some of those areas. I had members of my staff . . . Kissinger had many members of his family who were killed there, and I know how they feel. And, so, ah, there-

Show #2 - Page 34

(NIXON)

fore, I was strongly for Jewish emmigration. I knew that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, that they had a very restrictive policy. But, let me tell you, if I had gone out in my first year in office in 1969 or in 1970 or in 1971 and 1972 and made a big grandstand play, speaking to the B'Nai Brith or something like that, to the effect that the Soviet Union is horrible for what they're doing to the Jews, the Kremlin doors would have come down and none of 'em would have gotten out.

(FROST)

Now, when in '76 during the Presidential campaign, the word 'deténte' got dropped from President Ford's political vocabulary? Do you think that was because of a sense that détente had failed, or do you think that it was because the word was unpopular because it had aroused unreasonable expectations? Or do you think that was pure politics?

(NIXON)

I think that, ah, President Ford probably dropped the word because he felt that it was a political liability. But, in my view, he knew, and certainly Kissinger knew and feels this today very strongly as I do, that it

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(NIXON) was only because détente was misunderstood that Ford found it necessary to drop the word, necessary politically. Détente should not be thought of as peace in our time or peace for time to come. Détente simply is a process under which nations with great differences, ah, agree in effect, to discuss the differences, rather than to come into constant confrontation with a possibility of a flare-up, ah, into war. Now, that's détente. And, when you'd explain it that way, I think 90% of the American people would support it.

(FROST) We've talked a lot about your dealings with Brezhnev and we've talked about the various material confrontations and so on with him, but we haven't really talked about what your impressions and memories of Brezhnev as a man were. What sort of a man was Brezhnev to deal with?

(NIXON) Well, let me compare him with Khrushchev, because I think people have a more vivid picture of Khrushchev, even today, people of our generation at least, than they do of Brezhnev. Khrushchev was, ah, boorish, crude, brilliant, ah, ruthless, potentially rash,

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(NIXON)

terrible inferiority complex. I'll never forget
one time at Camp David when we were up there with
Eisenhower, that, ah, we were trying to make pleasant
conversation at lunch and Eisenhower asked Khrushchev
where he went for his vacations. He says, he went
to the Crimea, and Khrushchev. . . ah, and, ah, Eisen-
hower said, well he didn't like the seashore so well,
he liked to go to the desert. And, ah, Eisenhower
said, 'The only trouble with vacations is that you
have, ah, you can't get away from the telephone.
You've always got the telephone.' The translation
was made and Khrushchev blew-up, angry. He says,
'We've got telephones in the Soviet Union too. We've
got more telephones than you have.' Well, in any
event, that's typical of what we ran into. With
Brezhnev, you had a man, not as quick as Khrushchev,
intellectually; ah, a man far better mannered, ah,
than Khrushchev; a man who did not have the inferiority
complex, even though he knew they were inferior in
certain ways, he knew as Khrushchev did not know, that
the Soviet Union by that time, when Brezhnev was in
power, had . . . was, frankly, dealing equally across
the table, whereas Khrushchev knew he was behind, and

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(NIXON)

therefore, had to put on this big bravado act or
the big macho act to prove, ah, that he was ahead
of everybody and everything. Another difference
is . . . and this appears not to be too important,
but it's interesting, ah, Khrushchev tried to put
on the air of being just a common peasant-like
person. He would dress with the sloppy hat, and,
and, ah, collar wouldn't be too clear and this and
that, or clean. Ah, whereas, Brezhnev was somewhat
of a fashion-plate. He liked beautiful cars. He
liked beautiful women. Ah, a small thing. Brezhnev,
Podgorney and Kosygin all wore cufflinks. None of
the Soviet party in 1959 wore cufflinks. Ah, things
had changed. Ah, the new class in the Soviet Union
is doin' pretty good. Ah, now let's get to the kind
of a man he is: Ah, intellectually, not as quick
as Khrushchev, but smart. Ah, as far as his temperament
is concerned; not as rash as Khrushchev; more cautious;
one who consults with people before acting rather than
moving off impulsively on his own; not as volatile
as Khrushchev, and in that way, a much safer man to
have sitting there with his finger on the button than
Khrushchev. He is basically very much a, ah, physical

Show # 2 - Page 38

(NIXON)

kind of person. Ah, he has a lot of animal magnetism, as distinguished from Podgorney, or particularly from Kosygin who's rather cold, more aristocratic in bearing.

Ah, he's a man who's very earthy in his humor. I won't go into how earth he is, let's just leave it there.

Ah, but, also not as crude; not as boorish as Kruschev in some of the expletives that he would use; better mannered. When I said that he was cautious, I would not like to leave the impression that he was timid.

Ah, I think that he had read and practices the doctrine of Lenin. Which is, as you may recall, 'probe with bayonets, if you encounter mush, proceed; if you encounter steel, withdraw. And, that's the way Brezhnev will be. That's the way the Communist leaders will be all over the world. Because as Communists, they have to go forward spreading the 'gospel'. That's what they believe. They want just not a Communist Russia, or what have you; they want a Communist world. I'm not sure that's the Chinese view at the present time, but it may come that way in the future, and they may want to accomplish it in different ways. But, I remember one incident that perhaps tells Brezhnev's deeper sense better than anything else. I'll never forget the day that we were riding on his yacht. His yacht makes that old

Show #2 - Page 39

(NIXON) Sequoia, that President Carter's now put in moth balls, look like a row boat next to a 100 foot yacht. But, anyway, here's this marvelous Russian Navy yacht, and we had a beautiful luncheon on the yacht with the other members of the party; with caviar and champagne and everything else. And, as we were...went up the tour, up by the Black Sea, he pointed out Yalta; he pointed to where Roosevelt had stayed and where Stalin had stayed; and, where Churchill had stayed. And, we were sitting in the bow of the yacht. I'm an old Navy man, the bow is the rear-end isn't it?

(FROST) I, ah...probably.

(NIXON) That's right. No. The stern, we were sitting in the stern.

(FROST) Let's say 'end'.

(NIXON) All right. We were sitting down at the end of the yacht; in the back of the yacht together and as he pointed this out to me, all of a sudden impulsively, he reached over and grabbed me. He was kind of like Johnson that way; he likes to grab people. He and Johnson would have had a lot of fun.

Show # 2 - Page 40

(NIXON) They're much alike. And, he put his arm around me and he said, "You know, my friend, President Nixon." He said, "I only hope the day will come when every Russian and every American can sit together as we are sitting now, and we can be friends."

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MUSIC INTO COMMERCIAL

COMMERCIAL #5

MUSIC OUT OF COMMERCIAL

(FROST) When you first selected Henry Kissinger, ah, for
the NSC, did you expect him to become, and the NSC
to become, but did you expect him to become, ah,
as much of an international star as he did? I mean,
or did you intend it originally to be a back-room
role?

(NIXON) No. I don't think I expected, and I don't think he
expected it either. Ah, however, I knew that we were
going to deal with great events. I didn't know at
the time I met him, ah, I didn't know enough about
his background; I didn't know him enough personally
to know what a dramatic impact his personality would
have as he executed his role quite brilliantly.

(FROST) You must have had disagreements, I suppose. What
were the most important ones?

(NIXON) Ah, I'm a fatalist, basically. Ah, Kissinger is more,
despite his enormous intellectual capabilities, ah, one

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(NIXON)

who, ah, ah, is, ah, perhaps, ah, somewhat less
fatalistic, and, ah, . . . or determinist in his
views. More emotional, interestingly enough. Ah,
although, I too have emotions. I tend to hide them
perhaps more than he does, or submerge them, or
suppress them, ah, but, ah, be that as it may, we
won't try to psychoanalyze each other at the moment.
Ah, but Kissinger, I will remember, after we went into
Cambodia; he was for going in, ah, but here I made
a decision on the spot which we had not discussed
before. He wondered about it at the time, but he
totally supported it once it was made. We went to
the Pentagon and the day after the first movement
into two sanctuaries and I asked the people at the
Pentagon how many there were, and they said there
were six. And, I said, "Let's move into all of them."
I remember Westmoreland raised the point that he
didn't know whether or not we could even handle two.
However, the other Chiefs, and the rest felt maybe
we could handle all of them, particularly with the
way the, ah, South Vietnamese, in the early days
were fighting. So, right then, the decision was
made to go into six and it was one of the best
decisions we made. Then came Kent State which was

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(NIXON)

a terrible emotional shock to me, ah, and a very
great shock to Kissinger. And, of course, a torrent
of abuse because the implication was that because
we did Cambodia, three students were killed in Kent
State; that one followed the other, although the
student body president of Kent State pointed out
when he came to see me at the White House, that while the
Kent State tragedy partly was due to the disagreement
about the war, that long before the war there were other
issues that were stirring people up. But, I remember
right after that, Henry came in one day and he said,
"You know, I'm not sure that we should have gone into
this Cambodian thing, and perhaps now has come the
time that we should shorten the time and get out a
little sooner." Ah, he wasn't seriously considering
it, but he says, "I think," and he used to always
preface it by saying, "I must warn you, Mr. President,
that the situation that I hear from my colleagues
from the colleges and universities is very, very
serious, and, ah, Cambodia is . . . it could have been
a mistake." And, I said, "Henry," I said, "we've done
it." I said, "Remember Lot's wife. Never look back."
I don't know whether Henry had read the Old Testament
or not, but I had, and he got the point. Henry and I

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(NIXON)

often had a little joke between us after that. Whenever he would come in and say, 'Well, I'm not sure we should have done this, or that, or the other thing.' I would say, 'Henry, remember Lot's wife.' And, that would end the conversation.

(FROST)

In fact, you are different in the sense that he is, ah, probably more emotional, at least open ... publicly than you. Ah, how many times, for instance, did he say he might resign?

(NIXON)

Oh, to me, he would hint it on occasion. How many times, ah, ah, not many, not often. He would come in and say, "Well, I . . . I just wonder if my usefulness isn't finished. I wonder if I shouldn't resign." He had a tendency too, to get highly elated by some piece of good news and very depressed by something that he considered to be bad news. Ah, that doesn't mean that he was emotionally unstable; it simply meant that, that having the kind of wide-ranging mind that he was; he had the imagination that any genius, and he was a genius in this area, or intellectual has; and, ah, one of the, one of the characteristics of an individual with an exceptional

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(NIXON)

mind is that he can see the heights and also see the
depths, and he feels them both. And, Henry was that
way. Well, I of course, dont' contend that I'm a
genius, ah, and so forth. I usually could see the
heights, and could be . . . feel somewhat elated,
although I tried to restrain elation, because I always
know that the, ah, as Churchill once said, that the
brightest moments are those that flash away the
fastest. And, so that when you're up today, you may
be down tomorrrow, Ah, but, ah, many times I think
that the way that the instant historians write about
the Kissinger-Nixon relationship, that they misread
it to an extent because they, they take for example,
an emotional statement, ah, ah, which, ah, he may
not really mean. Like, his, you call, 'how many times
did he threaten to resign?' He would never come in
and threaten me to resign. He would come in and suggest
that maybe he should because he was no longer useful.
I, of course, then would say, "Now, look here, just
stop all that talk, I'm not . . .

(FROST) And, that's why . . . that's why - - -

(NIXON) . . . gonna want to hear any more of it, let's talk

{LC}

Show #2 - Page 46

(NIXON) about the real thing."

(FROST) Yeah, that's why I phrased the other way. How many
times did he come in and say that maybe, maybe he
should resign?

(NIXON) Maybe a half-a-dozen.

(FROST) Half-a-dozen times.

(NIXON) That's right. But, to others, more often. He would
talk to Haig and to, ah, Haldeman about this. And,
this would be when he would be in fights with the
bureaucracy. He couldn't stand the bureaucratic in-
fighting. He had differences, as you know, with
Secretary Rogers. And, incidentally, this was a
very painful thing for me because Rogers had been my
friend. He was a personal friend. Henry, of course,
was not a personal friend. We were, we were associates,
but not personal friends; not enemies, but not personal
friends. Rogers was a personal friend. But, ah,
Henry was fighting . . . first, they were . . . they
were two very proud men. They were two very intelligent

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(NIXON)

men. There could be only one person to handle some
of these major issues, and where secrecy was involved,
I mean, secret negotiations; it had to be Henry, ah,
in the areas like Vietnam, China, Russia and the Mid-
East. Now in the case of Rogers, on the other hand,
being a very proud man, ah, he did not resent Henry
handling such things, but he objected to the fact that
Henry got too much credit, and he felt was taking too
much credit, and also he objected, and here I think
he had a good case, and I think Henry would have to
agree; that he, Rogers, who had to make public state-
ments all the time and testify and answer questions
before the Congress, wasn't informed about things.
He wanted to be informed. Well, Henry would come
to me and we had several arguments about it. He
would say, "I will not inform Rogers, because he'll
leak." I said, "Henry, " and I must have told him
this a dozen times, I says, "Henry, the State
Department bureaucracy will leak. It always has.
It always will," I said, "but, Bill Rogers will never
leak, if we . . . if I tell him it's in confidence."
"Well, I'm not so sure." See, he didn't know Rogers
as well as I did. I knew that Rogers was a man of

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(NIXON) honor and I knew he wouldn't leak. And, that was why on the China initiative, for example, we had a very good ... we had quite an argument about that. Henry didn't want to tell anybody of course, except those on a need-to-know basis. And, I said, "Rogers has gotta know." And, he said, "Well, he'll leak, or he'll object to it." I said, "You cannot have the Secretary of State not be informed, because he has got to take off the day that announcement was made." Incidentally, that announcement took 3½ minutes when I announced that trip to China on July the 15th, 1971. But, Rogers immediately had to call ambassadors all over ... and heads of state all over the world and Henry, of course, made a few calls and I made two or three.

(FROST) Did ... did Henry say that he'd resign if, ah, John Connally was appointed Secretary of State?

(NIXON) Not to me. I, ah, I have read reports to that effect, and I do know that; ah, he, ah, ah, that his views with regard to Connally were mixed. Ah, he had ... he respected him as a political leader, however, I think Henry saw in Connally ... let's face it,

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(NIXON) a potential rival. Ah, Connally basically, ... everything that Connally touches, ah, in the political area, Connally controls. Henry's the same kind of a person. And, so Connally would be a very forminable fellow to have around. Ah, and also you have to remember that Henry, to his credit, was loyal to his former patron and still his patron, ah, Nelson Rockefeller. And, he felt that building Connally up, might, ah, not be in the interests of Nelson Rockefeller. But, as far as his discussion with me, he never said to me, 'Look, if ... if, ah, ... if Rocke ... if Connally's appointed Secretary of State, I'll resign, or if you name Connally as the Vice Presidential nominee, I'll resign.' or anything like that. Ah, I could sense that he would have preferred somebody else, let's put it that way.

(FROST) Were you actually considering John Connally as Secretary of State?

(NIXON) Yes. I thought he would have made a very good Secretary of State. However, in this case, while Henry did not have a veto power, ah, nobody can have a veto power

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(NIXON)

where the President is concerned, ah, any President.
But, while he didn't have a veto power, it was
indispensable that whoever was Secretary of State
be able to work with Henry and Henry be able to
work with him because he had his fingers in so many
pies, ah, which were in various stages of development,
ah, and consequently, we couldn't possibly have a
situation where he'd be at odds. In other words,
I'd gone through, ah, the Rogers-Kissinger feud for
four years, and I didn't want to buy another feud
with another Secretary of State for the ... for
the rest of the four years, and that's why I finally
made Henry ... gave Henry both hats, which I, ah,
in retrospect, probably would not have done, had, ah,
we ... could we have found some individual who would
be Henry's equal, or that he would consider his equal
intellectually, and yet, would ... Henry would not
feel was a competitor, who threatened his position
of being the President's major foreign policy advisor.
That position, he felt, ... incidentally, not just
ego, because frankly, he honestly felt he knew more
than anybody else did. He honestly felt that he was
the best advisor. That didn't mean that from time

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(NIXON)
as we did at the time of the May 8th bombing, when,
ah, we got advice from Connally and took his rather
than Henry's, ah, with regard to go ahead with the
bombing and don't cancel the Summit; rather than the
other way around which is the way Henry first
recommended it, and the way I first approved it.
But, nevertheless, Henry felt, that, ah, he had been,
... because of his experience, because of his
background, and also because he was personally involved
with so many leaders and they expected to deal with
him, that he had to be the major foreign policy
advisor, and he therefore, couldn't tolerate a
Secretary of State who would impinge upon that position.

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COMMERCIAL #6

MUSIC OUT OF COMMERCIAL

(FROST)

Now, you said, ah, that you were . . . you were not personal friends; you were not enemies, but you were not personal friends. Dustin . . . Dustin Hoffman once made a film called, "Who is Harry Kellerman and Why is He Saying All Those Terrible Things About Me?" Now, as you read accounts, knowing what a successful working relationship you had in many areas, of remarks attributed to Henry Kissinger, whether it's in the _New Republic_ or at that Ottawa banquet, or whatever, you must sometimes feel, ah, you know who Henry Kissinger is, but didn't you sometimes feel, 'Why is he saying all those terrible things about me?'

(NIXON)

Well, to answer the question quite candidly, it drives my family right up the wall. And, it's only because that it bothers them, that it would bother me at all. Ah, after such accounts appear, I know that, ah, I always get a call from Henry on the phone, ah, ah, explaining that, ah, that there's been either a misquotation, or misinterpretation, or what have

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(NIXON)

you. And, I have always said to him, ah, "Forget it."
I said, I said, ah, ah, "What your opinion of me is,
is, ah, not, ah, however you express it, it isn't
going to affect our relationship unless you express
it to me personally. I mean, what you say about me
to other people isn't going to bother me." That's
what I said. But, in all candor, I would have to
admit my family didn't share that, and I think what
we have to understand too, is that Henry likes to
say outrageous things. He's kind of like Alice
Longworth that way. She . . . as she puts it, she
says, "You know, I like to be naughty sometimes.

I like to say things that are devilish." And, ah, ah,
Henry was not really exactly that way, ah, in fact it
was quite different. Ah, but, he basically, as an
intellectual is . . . is not, is not typical in this
sense. Ah, most, ah, people with great intellectual
ability couldn't care less about the so-called
Hollywood celebrity set or celebrities of any kind,
I mean, basically they're only interested in a person's
brains, and not particularly whether or not they have
a lot of money or a lot of a . . . of good news
clippings, or what have you. But, Henry, on the other

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(NIXON)

hand, was fascinated first by the celebrity set,
and second, he liked being one himself. Not at
first, but people would start coming up for his
autograph and he was invited more and more to the
Hollywood parties and the rest. And, when you go
to these parties, ah, I used to be in that category
when I was Vice President and even when I was a
Senator and Congressman, a rather well-known one.
And, when the Georgetown hostesses had you in, they
don't have you there in order to feed ya, they have
ya there in order to . . . for you to entertain their
guests with some little tid-bit that has happened
that day. What Eisenhower said, or what had Dulles
said, or what kind of a man is Churchill? Did you
really talk to him? Well, anyway, that's Henry.
Henry, when he goes to these parties, and he likes
parties. I despise them because I've been to so
many. I used to like them, but Henry will learn to
despise them too after he's been through a few more.
But, be that as it may, so he goes to a party, and I
can see exactly what happened in Canada. He runs
into a lady who, ah, has a very low opinion of me,
and, ah, ah, so Henry feels that really he's defending

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(NIXON)

me and that the way best to defend is to concede that, 'Well, he's sort of an odd person. He's an artificial person.' And, so forth, and so on, and ah, the only problem was that didn't think to turn the microphone off, but on the other hand, I didn't turn it off either in the Oval Office on occasions, so I never held him for that.

MUSIC WITH CLOSING CREDITS