THE ELEMENTS OF A GERMAN SETTLEMENT

I. **Introduction:** The current tension over Germany has been created, of course, by the Soviet demand that the Western Powers get out of West Berlin, and that it--West Berlin--be declared to be a free city. This issue is separable from the broader questions of a German settlement because the question of rights, access, and so on are tied in with the Four Power Agreements on Berlin at the end of the war. The respective rights of the various parties presumably can be stated in terms of the Agreement, and much of the controversy undoubtedly will be a lawyer-like assertion of legal rights. On the question of legal rights, there is no dispute that the Western Powers occupy West Berlin by clear authority--that is, by clear authority in the Agreement so long as the agreement is valid.

But the Soviet Union proposes to abrogate the Agreement unilaterally, and if it does so, the issue then becomes the narrow one, whether the Soviet view or the Western view will prevail with respect to West Berlin, and there is no arbitrament of this issue except force ultimately, if both sides adhere to their incompatible and contradictory positions. If the Soviet line on West Berlin were a bluff, it might be called by steadfast insistence by the Western Powers on their legal rights. But it seems to be the consensus that the Soviet line on West Berlin is not a bluff, and that the Soviet is prepared to go to some lengths to enforce its view, not to the limit of general war, perhaps, but certainly to lengths that would give them advantages and make our position extremely difficult. This is not now 1948 and our countermeasures then are not now available to us.

The tough Soviet position on West Berlin is connected however with the whole German question, the position of East Germany, the status of the satellites, and so on. So that, although it can be regarded as separable (according to the argument of the first two paragraphs above), it is nevertheless part of the whole complex of questions that have divided the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in Central Europe since the end of the war. There is no German treaty, as in there is no Austrian treaty, and the Berlin matter is therefore only one of many items on the agenda of a German settlement. That the Soviet regards Berlin as only one item is clear from the way things have developed since last November. We have moved from the immediate threat of unilateral abrogation, to a preliminary exploration of broader questions through the Geneva Conference, to a possible Summit Meeting in the summer to deal with the whole question of a possible settlement.

Accordingly, the Berlin question and the broader questions involved in a German settlement are part of the same agenda, and the following paragraphs regard them so.

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It is sometimes said as Kennan said in the New Leader of May 11, 1959, that it is becoming increasingly evident that no one in the Soviet Union or in the Western countries wants the unification of Germany. I think that this may be wrong but even if it is right, the German people might decide this for themselves.

V. Neutrality This is the really hard part of the proposal mentioned in III above, because this would require some modification of our policy for the last ten years. It is made difficult because, in addition, it involves certain military considerations around which the Pentagon lobbies have been fighting. The proposal is that the United States and its allies consent to the neutralization of Germany. Please note that this is the whole of Germany and not the Western part, and this proposal is tied in with that described in IV above. This is important because the unification of Germany would create the occasion which would make reasonable and acceptable a change in our policy.

Neutrality would require the withdrawal of Germany from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have made much of the need to keep Germany in the NATO and to consent to withdrawal, might seem like a reversal. With unification, however, it would not necessarily be reversal but new policy dictated by changed conditions.

Now it is not enough to say that we favor a unified and neutral Germany, because there are sticky economic and political questions that neutralization involves, and there are certain diplomatic questions to which attention should be given, although these are not so sticky as the economic and military ones.

First, the economic-political questions. If the new policy is to be neutralization for a unified Germany, what about German participation in the Common Market and the Euratom? Would such participation be a violation of the principle of neutrality? The Soviet might so regard it but there are answers to the predicted objections. The aim of the Common Market is economic not military. The aim of the Euratom is the international development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. The proper fear of the Russians is from a militarily strong and unified Germany. Participation in peaceful economic cooperation with western Europe is not a threat. In fact, given the nature of modern warfare which requires a tremendous industrial base, the participation of Germany in the economic activities of western Europe is a military deterrent. In fact this is one of the arguments in the West for having the Germans in these European enterprises, because it is a kind of guarantee that the Germans cannot rearm for modern war without the knowledge of the West.

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Germany) in the western military force, contributing troops and supplies to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, becomes less acute. The neutralization of a unified Germany then becomes a more and more feasible policy so far as the American military position is concerned. We do not need this military alliance as much as we thought we did when it was first launched.

Fourth, there are some diplozatic aspects to the neutraliza-
tion of a unified Germany that should be taken into account. We
could be willing to guarantee all of the Soviet Union against attack
by a unified and neutral Germany. We could guarantee the whole of
Europe against such an attack. We could assuage the reasonable
anxieties of Poland and the Soviet Union about German adventures
over boundaries by guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse line. When I say
"we," I mean the NATO, and not just the United States unilaterally.

It should be recognized that the confinement of Germany
by western guarantee to the Oder-Neisse limit could release the
unfortunate hysterical tendencies always latent in the German people--
since 1870 anyway. It would be unfortunate to contribute to the
promotion of some new Hitler of the next generation. But we could
have dealt with the Hitler of the last generation if we had been
as bright in 1935 as we were to become four years later.

One further word is in order about the use of nuclear
weapons in Europe. We could usefully work towards the establish-
ment of a nuclear EDC in Europe, that is, the organization of
nuclear weapons and their control in a common pool. If we achieve
a unified and neutral Germany, it would, of course, have no access
to the pool since this would violate military neutrality. But the
case for a nuclear EDC is separate from and independent of whatever
is decided about Germany. There is some reason to think that we
have oversold ourselves and our allies on these weapons. Even if
no general settlement of the German question were to be made, the
proposal for a nuclear weapons pool would tend to curb any possibility
of independent German military action involving their use. The
possession of nuclear weapons on a national basis in Europe tends
to paralyze the countries that have or will get them. Something
like the Maginot mentality grows, and flexibility of policy and
action is inhibited.

Before leaving the subject of neutralization, it may be
remarked that something like the whole Rapacki concept is what
most people abroad would probably want. This proposal by the
Polish foreign minister on October 2, 1957 at the UN would have
prohibited the production or stockpiling of nuclear weapons in
East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In November
1958, Rapacki changed the proposal somewhat by describing two
stages. In the first, there would be a prohibition on the produc-
tion of nuclear weapons and no nation that did not have them at

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the time of the agreement would get them. This means West Germany. In the second stage, the Soviet Union and the Western Powers would eliminate all nuclear weapons in the area. This would occur with some reduction in conventional armaments in Central Europe.

The disadvantage of all this to us right now is that it would deprive one of the NATO members of nuclear weapons that our military people think we need. This dependence on Germany probably arises out of the relative stages of development in which we and the Soviet Union are in missiles. As this gap narrows the need for dependence on Germany for military values perhaps will lessen, as said above.

Please note that the remarks about neutralization are connected with the suggestion of Krushchev on March 2, 1959 that withdrawal of forces and the creation of an atom-free zone between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations might be on the agenda of a summit conference.

VI. **Arms for Germany** The third element for discussion as stated in III above is the question of arms for a unified and neutral Germany. The problem is how to allow the Germans to have enough arms without allowing them so much as to constitute a threat to Poland, Russia, and Czechoslovakia. This is manifestly a difficult problem. The limitation of German arms after the First World War did not prevent the Germans from developing para-military forces. Police forces have a way of becoming so strong and disciplined that they can be scarcely distinguished from the regular military.

But a country without adequate local forces is a prey to internal disorders and an invitation to more powerful neighbors to agress. If one can assume that the questions of unification and neutrality can be settled, the limitation of German arms will not be difficult. In any case, the limitation of arms for Germany would not be a separate issue but would be part of a general settlement.

VII. **Counsels and Caveats** In making proposals for the discussion of the Berlin and German questions, certain things should be kept in mind:

1. If the Russians were to make the proposals that have been outlined in these pages, we probably could not refuse them. On the other hand, if we were to make the proposals, the Russians probably could not accept them. But for the Russians to refuse them might put them at some disadvantage, because they are reasonable and could have some appeal abroad, especially with liberal elements.

I have been reviewing for the past few weeks the contingency
planning for Berlin and Germany. I will prepare a separate memorandum
on the subject. Mr. MacMillan's visit may provide an opportunity,
however, to deal with one of the major weaknesses in the Western
reaction to the last Berlin crisis: the different approaches advo-
cated by the various allies; or more specifically, the British
tendency not only to make concessions which seem to me extremely
dangerous, but also to adopt a posture which almost invites the
Soviets to seek to elaborate differences among the various allies.
The British attitude has taken these forms:

(a) A tendency to resist any contingency planning. This has the practical consequence that countermeasures may have to be improvised in situations which make it like that Western countermeasures will reflect the least common denominator. When there has been agreement on countermeasures such as in the economic field, there has usually been procrastination with respect to defining the event which would call them forth or with regard to establishing the mechanism to make them

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effective. In the military field the British have so far not agreed to Probe D (the Probe in division strength). Without passing judgment on the merit of think various schemes, the uncertain state of allied contingency planning will make it difficult to act with assurance during a crisis. The mere fact of improvising counterproposals to Soviet initiatives under Soviet pressure must encourage the Soviets to believe that a split among the Allies is possible and it enables them to appeal to each ally separately--as indeed has already been done (to Britain and the United States); the argument of the common wartime experience; to Germany the argument that the West might settle at its expense and that it may be better to deal directly with the USSR--see Khrushchev's note to Adenauer of February 16, 1961).

(b) The semi-official posture taken by Great Britain during the crisis that British "reasonableness" and "willingness to compromise" would moderate American impetuosity and Continental shortsightedness. Throughout the last Berlin crisis, British statements (and even more inspired stories to the press) gave the impression that one of the obstacles to a Berlin settlement was Western lack of ingenuity in finding a formula to "imrpove the status of Berlin." In December, 1958, the British government suggested informally that safeguarding the

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status of Berlin might be purchased at the price of recognition of
Eastern Germany. Though in the face of violent Western reaction this
proposal was never formally made, it has been at the basis of much
of British policy. Coupled with it has been an implication that
Great Britain could probably not fight over Berlin as such--a point
which was made to me explicitly in a "background briefing" by a high
British Foreign Office official in June 1959. Together with the
procrastination on contingency planning, this has produced recrimination
among the allies and a prevented decisive Western response to the
Soviet pressure.

(c) Another handicap for the West has been the different approaches
made to the Soviet leaders. Though every ally was equally guilty, it
was Mr. MacMillan who initiated the process by visiting Moscow in February
bilateral
1959. I am not opposed to such talks in principle. But in the
circumstances of the time, they were unfortunate. They arose in
response to what was a Soviet ultimatum--whatever we chose to call it.
They could not fail to give the impression that some Allies leaders would

They could not fail to give the impression that some Allied leaders would
reasons to what was a Soviet ultimatum--whatever we chose to call it.
circumstances of the time, they were unorthodox. They arose in

1929. I am not opposed to making some talk in principle. But in the
pilferal
was Mr. MacMillan who initiated the process by visiting Moscow in February
made to the Soviet leaders. Though every ally was equally guilty, it

(c) Another handicap for the West has been the different approaches
Soviet brieaux.

among the allies and a prevented decisive Western response to the
procrastination on contingency planning, this has produced recrimination
British Foreign Office official in June 1929. Together with the
which was made to me explicitly in a "Background briefing" by a high
Great Britain could properly not tight over Berlin as much--a point
of British policy. Coupled with it has been an implication that
proposal was never formally made, it has been at the base of much
Eastern Germany. Though in the face of violent Western reaction this
status of Berlin might be purchased at the price of recognition of

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act as brokers with their colleagues and therefore could not fail to create the impression that they were more reasonable, moderate or ingenuous. At least this was the common public opinion in Great Britain. The potentiality for distrust in this procedure is shown by the fact that after each visit with Khrushchev each allied head of state felt obliged to visit his colleagues, at least in part to prove to them that he had kept their interests in view.

This procedure is enormously wasteful of the time of the leading statesmen. It contains the maximum possibility for allied discord. It is not even well designed to moderate the Soviet leaders. For if the allied leaders come with separate proposals they will be encouraged to elaborate their differences. And if they act in concert, Mr. Khrushchev may feel advised and be impelled to the kind of outburst to which Mr. MacMillan was subjected in Moscow. Finally, such a procedure makes it almost impossible for the Alliance to negotiate as long as a unit. Of such Mr. Khrushchev is prepared to settle he will be enabled to make his concessions to the ally whose prestige or position he chooses.

to make his concessions to the ally whose prestige or position he chooses
as a unit. Of XXX Mr. Khrushchev has prepared to settle he will be enabled
procedure makes it almost impossible for the Village to negotiate as
to which Mr. MacMillan was subjected in Moscow. Finally, such a
Khrushchev may feel advised and be impelled to the kind of output at
to evaporate their differences. And if they act in concert, Mr.
the allied leaders come with separate proposals they will be encouraged
It is not even well designed to moderate the Soviet leaders. For it
statesmen. It contains the maximum possibility for allied discord.

This procedure is enormously wasteful of the time of the leading
to them that he had kept their interests in view.

state felt obliged to visit his colleagues, at least in part to prove
by the fact that after each visit with Khrushchev each allied head of
Britain. The potentiality for dialogue in this procedure is enormous.

At least this was the common public opinion in Great
create the impression that they were more reasonable, moderate or
act as brokers with their colleagues and therefore could not fail to

to enhance at the moment.

There are possibilities for separate approaches, either where interests are not equally involved as in Africa, or where one member acts as spokesman for the Alliance, as in the recent British demands on Laos. However, in Europe the former situation does not or at least should not, exist with respect to NATO. And the latter procedure--though not excluded--should be employed with great circumspection.

## II Recommendations:

The visit of Prime Minister MacMillan may provide an opportunity to state your general approach to the Berlin and German questions. I do not believe our contingency planning is sufficiently far advanced or sufficiently precise to make an issue of the existing delays--except possibly with respect to the machinery for economic reprisals and British concurrence with Probe D (in that case, the synchronization of that measure with political moves would have to be improved.)

It would seem to me useful, however, to explain the main lines of our approach to the problem and to convey now that pressure which which made us appear bellicose or Great Britain the broker would not be welcome.

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corrected
(unless for tactical reasons it is ~~recommended~~ in detail in advance--
as in the case of Laos.) These principles might be stated along
the following lines:

(a) The West will do everything it honorably can to avoid war.

In order to stabilize the situation, however, both sides must be pre-
pared not to press demands which can be achieved only by war.

(b) The West will be prepared to engage in negotiation in fact designed to "improve the situation in Berlin" (a favorite British slogan). At the same time, it is essential to recognize that the Soviets have hardly started this crisis to improve *our* position. It is also well to keep in mind that the margin for survival of Berlin is so narrow that the available concessions are extremely limited.

: (c) Recognition of Eastern Germany is not an adequate *quid pro quo*
for safeguarding Western rights in Berlin. To begin with, the prin-
ciple of self-determination must be as valid in Europe as in Asia
and Africa. At the same time, recognizing Eastern Germany is not even
an expedient device. For one thing, it is hard to understand the
phrase "safeguarding Western rights," since they can hardly be

made more explicit than they already are. For another, recogniz-
ing Eastern Germany would have catastrophic consequences in the
Federal Republic, where it would surely be interpreted as a defeat
for the Western-oriented policy. It would set up more rather
than fewer possibilities of harassment because of differences of inter-
pretation of the agreement. Finally, it may not even be
adquate to obtain "new" rights. Recognition once offered establishes
the xpm principle of two Germanies and is almost as useful to the
Communists as actual recognition. We will have moved from an issue
of principle to that of negotiating expedients. I am certain that
the State Department agrees with this view. I believe it should be
strongly made.

(d) In case of a new crisis, the West should react more decisive-
ly and with greater union than in the period of 1958-60. Above all,
the West should not take the posture of being terrified of the next
Soviet move. On the contrary, in Germany our position is strong.
The West should therefore now concert its possible countermeasures

and explore the possibility of forestalling a Soviet overture. Since
the Soviets are likely to call a peace conference on Germany, it may
be useful to concert Western measures in the interval, *before* and
*after* the
conference is convened, but after it is called. (The position to
be taken with respect to the actual signing of a treaty seems to me
adequately prepared. The interval after the conference is called
may however afford us the maximum opportunity to make our position
clear and thereby influence the conclusions the Communists are pre-
pared to draw from the so-called peace treaty.)

(e) Planning for Germany and Berlin must take place in the context
planning for NATO and its reorganization.
of planning for NATO and planning for Berlin. Here Britain and the United States
have a particular opportunity to act *hand* together.

(f) This is probably as far as it is possible to go at this stage.
My own thought on Germany--which I will set forth in greater detail in
a later memorandum--is that it may be wise to bring *him* home to the
Soviets now the serious consequences of raising the issue of Berlin
once more. I know that the prevalent opinion is to await the Soviet

once more. I know that the prevalent opinion is to await the Soviet
Soviets now the serious consequences of raising the issue of Berlin
at a later memorandum--is that it may be wise to bring that home to the

My own thought on Germany--which I will set forth in greater detail in
a little later memorandum--is that it may be wise to bring that home to the

(1) This is properly as far as it is possible to go at this stage.

have a particular opportunity to act in this together.

of planning for NATO and its reorganisation. Here Britain and the United States
planning for NATO and its reorganisation.

(2) Planning for Germany and Berlin must take place in the context
based to draw from the so-called peace treaty.)

clear and thereby influence the conclusions the Communists are bre-
may nevertheless afford us the maximum opportunity to make our position
adjudged prepared. The interval after the conference is called
be taken with respect to the actual signing of a treaty seems to me
conference is convened, but after it is called. (The position to
be useful to concert Western measures in the interval, demands the
before

the Soviets are likely to call a peace conference on Germany, it may
and explore the feasibility of forestalling a Soviet overture. Since

move. I believe this will have the result that the issue will
be raised at a moment of maximum embarrassment to us. Khrushchev
seems to me so committed that he cannot fail to raise it. He has
made this sufficiently clear in his conversations with Ambassador
Thompson and in his note to Chancellor Adenquer.

It would therefore seem to me that consideration should be given
to taking up Mr. Khrushchev's remarks to Ambassador Thompson in a
conversation with the Soviet ambassador. We might go beyond the
somewhat technical language of Ambassador Thompson with respect
to the nature of abnormality and develop the theme that neither
side should press demands it can realize only by war. If Berlin is
raised, we would have no choice but to press the issue of German
unification (and perhaps even the satellite orbit_much more aggressively.
This should be done privately and probably orally.

I will return to this problem and a review of our contingency
planning in an early memorandum.