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trary to those of a lifetime. Even granting
Arafat's unreserved commitment to peace,
the pressures he faces will make him an
increasingly complicated partner. If he pur-
sues a PLO or radical consensus, he will be
forced to be ambiguous; if he goes beyond
his constituency, he may be removed or
become irrelevant.<-

[18]

When the Palestinians recognized Israel,
did they mean that they have become genu-
inely reconciled to its existence? Or was it
with the same attitude that France re-
nounced Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in
1871, as a stage in a continuing struggle? I
asked this question of a PLO representative
after the signing. He answered: ``I consider
myself as coming from Jaffa. My children,
who have never lived in Palestine, will also
tell you they are from Jaffa.'' At the same
time, he was voluble—and I believe sin-
cere—in protesting his yearning for peace. <-

[13]

The follow-on negotiations must strive to
remove this ambivalence. They must make
clear that there is a point beyond which
Israel should not be asked to make conces-

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sions, and that Israel's international support has been enhanced by the risks it is taking for peace. They must also convince the Palestinians that their dignity is an essential aspect of a final settlement. <-

[9]

It will be painful for each side to accept the consequences of its own decisions. After the elections in the occupied territories, which must be held in nine months time, the Israeli recognition of the Palestinian entity will be irrevocable, as will the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Israeli politicians who speak blithely of abrogating the agreement or of reoccupying vacated areas are deluding themselves. The international isolation such acts would produce would prove unsustainable. And even if Israel should withdraw its recognition of a Palestinian entity, the rest of the world would not follow.<-

[17]

At the same time, the Palestinians must not delude themselves that they can resort to their traditional pres-

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sure tactics. The follow-on negotiations cannot succeed and coexistence in the occupied territories would be thwarted if the PLO returned to harassment, not to speak of terrorism. <--

[8]

In the immediate future, Israel will gain considerable benefits. It will no longer need to deal with the nearly half of the total Arab population of the occupied territories living in Gaza. It will be able to withdraw its forces from the population centers in the rest of the occupied territories and thus reduce, perhaps even eliminate, the impact of the intifada. Cooperative patterns between Israeli and Arab authorities on the West Bank are sure to develop. Relations with other Arab countries will improve, though I would expect full recognition to be withheld pending an overall settlement.--

[14]

The Palestinians' major achievement in the initial period is the de facto recognition of a Palestinian entity and the establishment of the PLO as the governing authority in the occupied territories. After a while, this fact is bound to alter the negotiating

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["POSTE APPELE: PAS D'IDENTITE 1993-09-18 00:53 63-96 S BIEN RECU #11", "LJ", "IN0413 henry", "DEPT. in PAGE-10", "pattern fundamentally. Once follow-on\ntalks begin, the continuing presence of Is-\nraeli settlements, military bases, and unre-\nstricted use of roads is certain to be chal-\nlenged-perhaps even in the interim period\nof two years and surely after that.<-", "[12]", "An even more serious challenge may\ncome from within the Muslim world. Since\n1948, every major step toward peace in the\nMiddle East has been followed by an in-\ncrease in terrorism. Dissident groups have\ntried to interrupt the process either by as-\nsassinating those who carried it forward, as\nhappened to Sadat, or by triggering Israeli\nretaliation. Some leading Israelis seem to\nbelieve that Arafat and the police force that\nthe PLO will be permitted to organize will\nhelp keep the West Bank quiet. But the\n``strong'' Palestinian police force envi-\nsioned in the agreement is likely to become,\nat best, a study in ambivalence. With what\nenergy will they resist acts aimed at sub-\nverting the Israeli presence? With what\nconviction will they pursue terrorists re-\nturning from Israel? When will they be-\ncome the problem rather than the solution?<-", "[20]", {"bbox": [749, 1380, 880, 1400], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))", "P.11", "SEP 17 '93 05:57PM 2123505146"]

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The most serious danger is that the dissi-
dent groups will try to create Lebanese-
style conditions in the occupied territories.
The central authorities may not be able to
prevent terrorism, either against moderate
Arabs or against Israelis. If conditions be-
come too chaotic, Israel may intervene, or
outside Arab forces may try to infiltrate the
West bank, or both. The same result could
occur if the PLO entity seeks to intervene in
Jordan. All these developments could usher
in another Middle East war.<-

[12]

The prospects of a permanent peace thus
depend on how well the interim arrange-
ments can be made to work, and after two
years whether the follow-on negotiations
on Jerusalem, borders, settlements, etc.
will show progress. In this respect, the out-
side world has a major responsibility.
While the role of economic development is
often exaggerated, in this case rapid pro-
gress in that field is one of the few tools
available to give the parties-especially the
Palestinians-a stake in an evolutionary
approach. A substantial aid program is nec-
essary. America has quite properly taken

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