extract new concessions from the city, and
package of cost-limiting agreements that has been nego-
tiated with other, more responsible municipal unions

10/1/76 [LC]
NEXT

Upbeat on Africa

It was a thoroughly upbeat analysis of the situation in southern Africa that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger gave the United Nations General Assembly yesterday on the basis of his recent shuttle diplomacy. He hoped for "the independence of Namibia (South-West Africa) within a fixed, short time limit," hailed "a historic break from the past" that could ease Rhodesia's transition to black majority rule, and flatly if cautiously predicted the end of apartheid in South Africa.

Most of what Mr. Kissinger had to say was not new, but his exposure to the area enhanced the authority of his projections. It was a carefully conceived effort to maintain the momentum his trip had generated—to keep all possible pressures on the involved parties to negotiate rapidly and realistically. It was also a clear and timely restatement of American policy and a warning to outsiders—meaning the Soviet Union—not to “doom opportunities for peace that might never return.”

With the massive Soviet and Cuban aid to the Popular Movement in Angola's civil war obviously in mind, Mr. Kissinger appealed for "an Africa seeking its own destiny," free of outside intervention. "The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination," he rightly observed.

At this particular forum it was important for Mr. Kissinger to emphasize that a constitutional conference on Namibia should take place at a neutral location under United Nations aegis, with the South-West Africa People's Organization participating. South Africa has rejected any United Nations role in Namibia, has insisted that any conference on its future be held in the territory, and has barred SWAPO—the only Namibian political group recognized by the United Nations—from participating in constitutional talks held over the last two years in Windhoek.

It was also important for the Secretary to say that the United States would "not seek to impose solutions" in Rhodesia or anywhere else. He obviously hopes for the emergence in Rhodesia of Joshua Nkomo, the most moderate of the black nationalist leaders; but any American blessing would compromise Mr. Nkomo and erode Washington's influence for a peaceful solution.

It was necessary for Mr. Kissinger to castigate South African apartheid as "a denial of our common humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind," while praising South Africa's white leaders for showing "wisdom" in facilitating a solution in Rhodesia. The Secretary urged them to display similar wisdom "while there is time," to establish racial justice in their own country. To have done less would have increased the suspicion of an enduring Pretoria-Washington axis in black Africa, or suggested that Mr. Kissinger was willing to overlook the most important long-run ingredient for a peaceful racial and political evolution in the subcontinent.

Kissinger, at U.N., Urges Africans
To Resist Any Outside Interference

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Sept. 30-
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
called on the leaders of Africa today to
seize this moment "to pull back from
the brink" of interracial war and to de-
vise their own political future without
the interference of outside powers.

Addressing the 31st session of the
General Assembly in the wake of his shutt-	le diplomacy in southern Africa, Mr.
Kissinger said: "We will back no faction,
whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We
will not seek to impose solutions any-
where. We call on all other non-African
states to do likewise."

Diplomats, mindful of unsuccessful
United States efforts in Angola last year,
interpreted this as a warning to the Sovi-
et Union and Cuba, whose partisans de-
feated American-backed Angolan fac-
tions. Cuban representatives ostentatiously
boycotted Mr. Kissinger's appearance
—they sat in the delegates' lounge
throughout—and, though the Soviet For-
eign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, was
in town, lower-level representatives filled
the Soviet table in the crowded Assembly
hall.

Secretary Kissinger's 75-minute foreign
policy review, delivered only a few days
after his return from mediation efforts
in Africa, touched on many other global
concerns, from the Middle East to Korea
to the deadlocked efforts to write a treaty
governing the world's oceans.

But it was his assessment of the emerg-
ing transition to black majority rule in

Rhodesia that the assembled heads of
state, foreign ministers and ambassadors
seemed most eager to hear.

"Many obstacles remain," Mr. Kissinger
said. "But let us not lose sight of what
has been achieved: a commitment to ma-

Continued on Page A7, Column 1

The New York Times/Don Hogan Charles

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations.

By WILLIAM E. FARRELL

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Sept. 30—The invited guests moved quietly and thoughtfully past the exhibition of photographs chronicling May 28, 1948, when the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem fell into the hands of Jordanian troops.

For a number of them the pictures were more than a rediscovered historical curiosity about an event when the state of Israel was but two weeks old. The guests were among the last of the 37 weary Jewish fighters in the Jewish quarter who, encircled, outnumbered and without arms, surrendered to the Arabs. For them the pictures on the walls of the Israel Museum represented a graphic and painful diary that resurrected long-submerged memories.

For years the photographs had languished in the New York apartment of John Phillips, who had traveled with the Jordanian force, the Arab Legion, on assignment for Life magazine. They are on exhibit here for three months, and large numbers of Israelis are viewing them.

Standing before a picture of the captive Jewish fighters, a smartly dressed, immaculately coiffed woman stared at the visage of a disheveled young woman whose face was filled with dismay. Leah Wultz, a teacher, checked her tears as she saw herself as she was nearly 28 years ago. "These pictures!" she said softly. "I have lived it all again. I feel my heart beating so hard. I didn't know that somebody had taken all these pictures."

## 'More Noise Than Harm'

"I was also a teacher then," she continued, "and a member of the underground, and I made bombs—just nails and cans filled up with powder with matches on the end. We lobbed them in. They made more noise than harm. But they were the last weapons we had. My students made noise with metal so it would sound like we had more arms and men than we did."

Like some of the others who fled through the Zion Gate from the Old City or were taken prisoner, Mrs.

Wultz returned in 1967 at the end of the six-day war.

Dr. Yigal Reiss, a cardiologist, was a young doctor treating the wounded in the old quarter and went with the Jewish prisoners when they were taken to Jordan. "Beautiful! Extraordinary!" he said as he stood before the pictures with his wife and two sons. "We were afraid of a pogrom, but Maj. Abdullah Tel, the Arab commander, behaved like a gentleman."

"So many sad memories," he said and then smiled. "But look, everyone got older except me."

Judge Moshe Hassan of Jerusalem commented: "These pictures—how I recollect my friends. It is interesting to know how we looked at that time."

## 'Time Stopped for a Few Moments'

Staring at the picture of the surrendered fighters, he said: "As a matter of fact we looked well enough. Time has stopped for a few moments and I see the last critical moments of the Old City. For me this picture signifies the end."

Moshe Rousnak, who commanded the Old City fighters, gazed wistfully at a picture of himself signing the surrender paper held by Moussa Husseini, an Arab official who was hanged for the murder of King Abdullah of Jordan in 1951. Avram Weinfeld, wearing the wrinkled fatigues of an army reservist, stood before a photo in which he appeared and said, "I look like the only one who has lost his spirit."

"In the Old City," Mr. Weinfeld said, "we didn't just look at the stones. We had the feeling the stones were looking at us—thousands of years of Jewish history that were demanding our attention. Now I see people come to the Old City and they just see old ruins. It doesn't talk to them. Twenty-eight years ago—for the Old City it's not a long time."

He was right. In another corner of the museum was an exhibit titled "Archaeological Discoveries in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem, Second Temple Period." It displayed what was salvaged from the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans 2,000 years ago.

See TRIAL, A8, Col. 1

Life Science Products Co. contest to 940 other claims

10-1-76 LU POST [LC]

# Kissinger Hits Soviet Policies

Special to The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 30—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger attacked the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues in his annual policy speech to the U.N. General Assembly here today. He focused in particular on what he called “crude attempts” by Moscow to sabotage the U.S. initiative for peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa.

“We have been concerned,” he said, “by the continuing accumulation of Soviet armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts,” a reference to the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola.

These actions, and the Soviet drive to “fuel the flames of war and racial hatred” in southern Africa, Kissinger warned, serve only to foster tensions and “cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations. And they will inevitably be resisted.”

While he accepted the requirements of Soviet American co-existence, and expressed the desire to pursue strategic arms limitation agreements with Moscow, the secretary of state in-

See KISSINGER, A10, Col. 1

United Press International

Secretary Kissinger: Cool to Moscow, warm to Peking.

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KISSINGER, From A1

sisted that there must be reciprocal restraint on a global scale, not just in bilateral relations. "There can be no selective detente," he said.

Kissinger also attacked the Soviet bloc for its "minimal" contribution to the economic development of the Third World and its "verbal assaults" on those who do contribute.

Afterwards, diplomats from both the West and the Third World commented on the harsh anti-Soviet tone of the Kissinger speech, and suggested that it was intended to be heard not only in the General Assembly chamber, but by the American voters in this presidential election year.

Kissinger's staff insisted, however, that the text reflected the secretary's own anger at the Soviet efforts to undermine his initiative in Africa—efforts that have drawn increasing official protests from the United States in recent weeks.

They said that each speech draft shown to Kissinger came back with the anti-Soviet barbs even stronger, and when Kissinger finally delivered the speech he named the Soviet Union explicitly at one point where the text had left the critical reference implicit.

The U.S. address was sandwiched between two meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko—the first here last night and the second scheduled for Friday in Washington, where the Russian is also due to see President Ford.

Kissinger's hard line on Moscow

contrasted sharply with his promise to "keep Chinese interests in mind on all international issues" and other stroking gestures aimed at Peking in the speech.

The United States and China "came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of military blackmail and the will to hegemony," Kissinger said.

Kissinger told the assembly that "an opportunity to pull back from the brink now exists" in southern Africa. He called for a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. auspices to arrange the independence of Namibia. All "autnentic national forces" including SWAPO—the South-west African People's Organization, now battling South African forces in the territory would be invited.

Kissinger specified that after a transitional government is formed, it would be up to a constitutional conference—and not that transitional government, as Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith had maintained—to "define the legal framework of an independent Zimbabwe," the African name for Rhodesia.

Kissinger made it plain that the American initiative in southern Africa does not include negotiations on change in South Africa itself. But he said that "change is inevitable" and expressed the hope that South Africa's leaders will show the same wisdom that they have shown on Rhodesia "to bring racial justice to South Africa while there is still time."

Kissinger reiterated American will-

ingness to resume the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East, and stressed the need for a preparatory conference to discuss the structure of future negotiations."

Kissinger did make new proposals on Korea and Cyprus. He suggested a preliminary discussion between North and South Korea that could lead to a wider conference involving the United States and China, and then to a still wider conference in which other countries could approve "arrangements that guarantee a durable peace on the peninsula."

On Cyprus, he said the United States would assist in revitalizing the talks, under U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

The outlined proposals that would reduce the area of the island controlled by the Turkish side and provide "security arrangements" that would permit the withdrawal of Turkish troops.

While Kissinger addressed African issues in soothing tones, he sounded tougher in his references to economic relationships between the rich and poor nations.

Third World nations "sometimes speak of new economic orders as if growth were a quick fix," he said, warning that change in the global economic system can come only through cooperation.

On the key economic issue of debt repayments, Kissinger said that the U.S. would propose guidelines under which debts could be renegotiated for "acute cases."

the floor

See SESSION, A5, Col. 1

[LC]

2d Blow Is Dealt
To Rhodesia Plan

By Robin Wright

SALISBURY. Rhodesia, Oct. 1—Hopes for a settlement in Rhodesia under the Kissinger plan have received a second major blow, with other serious complications looming in the background.

The Zimbabwe People's Army, the Rhodesian guerrilla force that has waged a rapidly escalating war for four years, rejected U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's plan yesterday and pledged to continue the war until "final victory."

This makes fulfillment of a precondition for the Rhodesian government's acceptance of majority rule within two years—an end to the war—appear doubtful.

The first blow to the Kissinger plan came last Sunday when the five "front-line" black African presidents voiced opposition to several of its provisions.

In a statement issued in Maputo, Mozambique, yesterday, the guerrilla group said: "We totally reject Kissinger's vicious scheme in its entirety which is aimed at sabotaging the Zimbabwe [African name for Rhodesia] struggle and simultaneously preserving Western interest in Zimbabwe.

"We are determined to fight Kissinger's proposals to the bitter end. We are determined to wage a resolute armed struggle until final victory. What we demand is unconditional surrender of political power to the people of Zimbabwe now."

The statement, read by Dzinashe Machinguara, was signed by Rex Nhongo, as "army commander and on behalf of the Zimbabwe People's Army."

See ZIMBABWE, A12, Col. 1

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Rhodesian Guerrillas Reject
Kissinger's Peace Proposals

ZIMBABWE, From A1

This is the major fighting force of
the black nationalists, comprising
about 5,000 troops based in Mozam-
bique and carrying arms from the
Soviet arsenal.

The statement, taken seriously
here, went on to condemn both the
British and American governments.
Establishment of majority rule by an
act of the British government was
"totally unacceptable," Machinguara
said.

"The United Kingdom is a colonial power and what we are fighting in Zimbabwe is British colonialism. The United Kingdom is an awoved enemy of the Zimbabwe people as evidenced by the role of the British government in the history of Zimhbabe."

The communique, also denounced
Robert Mugabe, who last month was
said to be the leader of the political
wing of the "liberation" army.

Both parts of the statement reveal
the divisiveness of the many African
nationalist factions, a situation that
could bog down movement toward
talks with white officials on the es-
tablishment of a multiracial transi-
tion government.

These talks are scheduled to be
held at a neutral venue outside Rhod-
esia within two weeks. But the status
of various leaders has become so
complicated over the past week that
it is now difficult to tell just how
many groups there are, and what
their strength is.

The bitter African rivalry is noth-
ing new. The feuding between factions
and leaders is one of the reasons that
the 270,000 whites have managed to
maintain power over 6 million blacks
for so long.

Even now, with the fundamental
and common objective of majority
rule accepted by the government of
Prime Minister Ian Smith, the dif-
ferent groups have not been able to
pull together.

There has been a flurry of meetings
among various leaders this week to
resolve differences, but at this point
it does not appear that any new,

strengthened alliance would include
all elements. This leaves open the
question of who truly represents the
black majority—and who should be
part of a multiracial government.

The three names most prominent
now are Joshua Nkomo, moderate
leader of the African National Coun-
cil's internal wing; Bishop Abel Muzo-
rewa, leader of the external wing,
Mugand, a militant whose political
alliance is uncertain. Mugabe has been
named in recent weeks as head of
the people's army, the Zimbabwe
African National Union, and the Zim-
babwe Reformed African National
Council.

Nkomo met Mugabe yesterday in Maputo. Today Nkomo met Muzorewa in Botswana, the two are scheduled to talk again Monday in Rhodesia after Muzorewa returns here for the first time in over a year. No statement on the outcome of the meetings has yet been made public.

The difficulties in forming an alli-
ance are further complicated by the
leaders' different positions on the Kis-
singer proposals. Even if a new alli-
ance emerges, it is not expected to be
lasting. As one of Nkomo's advisers
acknowledged: "He's working on a
marriage of convenience. After terms
are established, they all may go their
own ways again, forming separate po-
litical parties."

Now that the guerrilla army has
made clear that it is acting independ-
ently, even a united negotiating group
may not be able to achieve a real reso-
lution with white officials since ac-
ceptance depends on an end to the
war—over which none of the leaders
now appears to have any control.

But the divisions among blacks are
not the only threat to the Kissinger
proposals to settlement of Rhodesia's
constitutional and military crises.
There are also serious divisions crys-
tallizing between black leaders and
white officials.

The government reaffirmed today
that it will stick "rigidly" to the de-
mands of the Kissinger plan—going
no further.

But various black leaders are now
calling for further changes:

* That the next step, a meeting of blacks and whites, be a full constitutional conference, not just the signing of papers that will lead to a conference.

* That Britain, the colonial power until Rhodesia declared unilateral independence in November 1965, chair the meeting, not the Rhodesians.

* That the interim government—a council of state—be divided two-thirds black and one-third white, not with equal black-white representation as now stipulated.

* That Smith not attend the conference.

* That whites not be allowed to hold two key ministries—defense and justice—in the transition government.

But Smith announced yesterday
that he would lead the delegation.
And officials here seem to be ada-
mant about representation in the in-
terim cabinet, especially those key
positions, to insure an "orderly" trans-
ition—and to reassure other whites.

The growing divisions at all levels
led a liberal white Rhodesian journal-
ist to lament: "There are just too
many problems in the way. It will
truly take a miracle to resolve all
these problems, all so deep-seeded,
and get the plan off the ground. Kis-
singer's deal dealt with the facts. But
it did not iron out or take recognition
of the realities of feelings, and fears."

U.S., British Officials
In Mozambique for Talks

From News Dispatches

British special envoy Ted Rowlands
and William E. Schaufele Jr., U.S. as-
sistant secretary of state for African
affairs, arrived in Mobutu yesterday
for talks with Mozambique President
Samora Machel on the Rhodesian situ-
ation.

Rowlands said that he and Scha-
fele later would go to Dar es Salaam
for talks with Tanzanian President
Julius Nyerere.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

D29

Saturday, October 2, 1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

# Ford's Blunt Warning on Rhodesia

President Ford bluntly warned congressional leaders this week that the alternative to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's African diplomacy could be a bloody racial war.

With Kissinger filling in the details, the President explained behind closed doors that he had no option except "to proceed as we did or to face foreign interference and a bloody confrontation."

According to confidential minutes of the meeting, the President stressed that "the risk to our negotiations was very high." Kissinger echoed that the "situation might go out of control" by the end of the year. "during the rainy season," he added.

Unless the United States stepped in to resolve the Rhodesian crisis now, he said, the "insurgent forces in the front line (black) countries would in time exceed (Rhodesia's) conventional forces."

Kissinger, just back from shuttling between black and white leaders in Africa, said he took Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith aside after the formal discussions for a tough, "private 10-minute talk."

Smith "would have preferred to accept the principle of majority rule," said Kissinger. Smith was trying to draw a fine semantic line, but Kissinger wouldn't let him get away with it. "We had to have his acceptance of majority rule," said the Secretary.

He got it. Now the "big danger is to prevent hardliners in Rhodesia and guerrillas in other countries from blowing the agreement," he said.

Kissinger told how he walked the diplomatic tightrope in Africa. Because Rhodesia is still technically a British colony, he explained, the Brit

ish must play "the visible role." The United States "has no legal standing. The Black leaders also had objected strenuously to meeting with Smith and his colleagues inside Rhodesia. Kissinger resolved the imbroglio by wangling a "substantial agreement" not to meet in "Rhodesia or London." The parties involved, he said, would gather in Geneva or else in Livingston, Zambia, on the Rhodesian border.

As a condition of submission to majority rule, Kissinger said, Smith had demanded that United Nations economic sanctions against his country be lifted at once. The U.S.-British plan, said Kissinger, calls for Rhodesia's eventual black prime minister "to press in the U.N. for lifting the sanctions."

To help the white supremacit government make the transition to black rule, Kissinger said, would cost about $1.3 billion over the next five to ten years. "Our contribution could be $300 or $400 million," he said. Then he added hopefully: "We'd like to see a lot of it through private investment channels."

Reincarnated Nazis—Sometimes, we can almost hear the cries of unbearable pain appealing to us from the torture chambers of Brazil. We have written so much about it, yet so little is done by the American or Brazilian governments to end the madness.

We have heard most recently from a man whose identify we have carefully verified. We are withholding his name, however, to prevent reprisals. His letter reached us via intermediaries in an underground chain. One member of the chain urged, in a note, that the story be sent "to Jack Anderson."

The victim in this case was imprisoned without trial, and he has been tortured off and on for more than six months. The victim described his torturers as "men of a certain intellectual level—doctors, psychologists, and sociologists, in addition to the executioners."

"They studied our reactions when the instruments of torture were applied ... Everything they obtained from us was extracted in the torture chamber." The victim added bitterly that his Brazilian torturers were "reincarnated Nazis."

The writer enclosed a crude,avitheic drawing to show how a prisoner is strung up in the notorious "parrot perch." The naked victim is hung upside down from a bar that extends beneath his knees. The wrists are lashed over the ankles, thus exposing "the most intimate and sensitive areas of the body ... to the will of the torturers."

To the head-down victim the torturers then apply "electric shocks on the genitals" and "hot water on the genital organs." Water is dripped into the victims' upturned nostrils; they are stuck with needles. Some are castrated.

The torturers "rape the young women," the writer claims. "It is pure horror. Even the well-seasoned mind recoils at the thought that human beings could so degrade themselves."

**Footnote:** The Brazilian embassy insists its government does not torture. At the State Department, our sources complain secretly to us of the tortures. They blame Secretary of State Kissinger's policy of accommodation. Under this policy, it isn't considered polite to protest.

By Howard Post

DROPOUTS

D8

BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE

October 3, 1976

[LC]

KISSINGER: THE EUROPEAN MIND IN AMERICAN POLICY, by Bruce Mazlish, Basic books, 400 pp., $12.50.

by Arnold Beichman

Henry Kissinger is a complex man. Professor Mazlish, his psychobiographer, has written a complex book which seeks to explain the mystery of our Secretary of State. As a result of his researches, he claims that "I would go so far as to say that 'I know' Kissinger better now than does any single friend of his or person whom I interviewed, and perhaps better than Kissinger knows himself."

Had anybody else written this, one might respond with, "Some chutzpah!" But Professor Mazlish, a noted MIT political scientist, has written several other studies (Nixon, John Stuart Mill) combining psychodiagnostics with history and social science.

So we must take the Mazlish claim seriously and examine its documentation:

1. He tells us that Kissinger refused to see him. So did Kissinger's only brother. He "made no effort" to talk to Kissinger's parents and ex-wife mainly out of "feelings of delicacy."

2. He bases his conclusions on two kinds of sources: More than 100 personal interviews, unidentified with one exception, and on already published material by and about Kissinger.

3. On occasion, he concedes, he has engaged in "speculation on the basis of a few facts."

4. "In lieu of the free association," he writes, "that might emerge on an analyst's couch I must rely on my 'feel' of the man and on a variety of subliminal clues which he has offered."

What are Mazlish's findings about one of the most extraordinary Secretaries of State in our history?

First, the negative adjectives: Kissinger is (or has been) arrogant, boorish, ambitious, hated, morose, capricious, characteristically duplicitous, shy, insecure, excessively suspicious, a nail-biter and a male chauvinist for whom women are a "hobby" and "pastime."

He suffers from a deep strain of pessimism, resorts to subterfuge and evasion, eats excessively, is prepared "to pontificate" on any subject, is an intellectual "gun for hire," a loner with an intense desire for stability, alternates between depression and euphoria, eavesdrops and is an example of the classic submissive-dominance syndrome.

He suffers from tendencies to megalomania and a Napoleon complex. He also

suffers from paranoia: in some cases, the paranoia is described as "reputed", at other time, it is "admitted" or self-admitted paranoid suspicious."

Second, the positive side: Kissinger is endowed with "keen intellectual abilities", an ability to change and grow and to concentrate. He is shrewd, tenacious, works hard and is "scrupulously truthful" when he is not guilty of "frequent lying." Recently he has become less "compulsively arrogant."

When a psychobiographer is hampered by a dearth of essential personal information he can minimize the deficiency by using adverbs and phrases which promise more than they can possibly deliver. Examples of this technique are adverbs like "obviously" (as in, "obviously the Nazi experience must have left its mark on Henry Kissinger," or, "probably," "we can assume," "one must extrapolate," "apparently." Most useful of all is the word "interesting" since what follows becomes intriguing.

Thus Mazlish tells us that in the Kissinger first marriage there was a maid-servant and "most interesting, this live-in girl was from Germany and not Jewish." Had she been a Moroccan Jew or a Hotten-

The great Kissinger mystery

tot, that, too, would have been "most interesting." Perhaps, it meant nothing more than a German au pair was all the Kissingers could get in a tight servant market. After all, as Freud is supposed to have said, sometimes a cigar is a cigar. Not every phenomenon is a datum for the psychopathology of everyday life.

Psychodiagnostics is not an autonomous science. What emerges from any personality study depends not only on psychoanalysis but also on the value structure of the analyst because the value structure determines what the analyst selects as interpretationally significant in the analysand's life history.

In the case of a statesman, an insightful psych diagnosis can be valuable. And when the subject is a German Jewish refugee who has risen to the top in world diploma-

cy, such insights are particularly valuable especially when Mazlish implies pretty strongly that Kissinger has Nazi tendencies or that he has "worked hard to manipulate the Jewish community, seeing the presidents of various Jewish organizations every month."

A powerful verb like "manipulate" demands hard evidence. And the problem of evidence raises questions about sources and their reliability. Mazlish, for example, quotes "equally reliable sources" that Kissinger was a bottom-pincher and that he wasn't; that he had an affair with a secretary and that he couldn't have because of shyness. To which Mazlish adds, "whatever the ultimate truth of these matters... they do serve as necessary background to Kissinger's swinger image." I don't see how contradictory reports about bottom-pinching prove anything.

When Kissinger visited the Holocaust museum in Israel, "we are told only that Kissinger stood in silence and seemed grim." Some pages on, we are told that "at the Israeli monument for the Holocaust victims, Kissinger seemed profoundly moved." I can't tell whether I'm being told something or not, nor how these reports relate to Mazlish's finding that "in tones suspiciously like those of the Nazis, [Kissinger] has complained about America's lack of discipline..."

Mazlish is not a quidnunc but a serious scholar who has brought together some startling conjectures about this talented, if flawed, statesman.

But the author's treatment of Kissinger raises a serious question: Are conjectures about the intimate life of a public figure of any historical meaning? Unless he shows that a public figure's personal life is related to his career or to his public performance, a psychobiographer risks the charge of trivialization.

Mazlish has imposed such a burden on the fragile art of psychohistory that in the end you are left wondering how anybody can have functioned as well as Kissinger has all these years.

Arnold Beichman, associate professor of politics at UMass-Boston, recently presented a paper on Kissinger at the convention of the International Studies Assn. in Toronto.

LETTER

How Kissinger Rose

With reference to Stanley Karnow's
review of two books on Henry
Kissinger (October 10) it's about time
to set the record straight on Henry
Kissinger's "traits".

The accusation that Kissinger's
most significant trait has been "his
careful and astute cultivation and
adroit use of connections" is not only a
diabolical insinuation but also denotes
a failure to make an accurate assess-
ment of the man.

Patronage, according to my observa-
tion of the man, did not lift Henry
Kissinger out of the academic com-
munity into the realm of practical
politics and potential power.

It was Henry's ability and the
recognition of that ability by his
superiors and persons in authority that
are responsible for his less than
meteoric rise.

Typical of the "ability" process was
Kissinger's single handed accomplish-
ment of two analytical studies for the
U.S. Army's Office of Civil Affairs and
Military Government (OCAMG), as a
part-time employee of the Operations
Research Office back in 1955-56. The
studies were so good that they at-
tracted the attention of Lt. Gen. James
Gavin, then head of the Army's Office
of Research and Development.

Consequently, Kissinger was made a
special assistant to Gen. Gavin. Dur-
ing this period I was Chief of the
Military Plans and Policy Division of
OCAMG, as well as proponent and
reviewer of the Kissinger studies; I can
assure you Henry's new job was not
due to my "patronage."

The process of recognizing
Kissinger's ability continued. John J.
McCloy and David Rockefeller of the
Council of Foreign Relations recogniz-
ed it with the result that Kissinger was
employed by the council; similiar
recognition by William Elliott resulted
in Kissinger becoming director of the
Harvard International Seminar;
Department of State recognition took
the form of featuring him as guest
speaker to the Senior Seminar of
Foreign Policy from its inception
through the Johnson years; and
presidential recognition was expressed
by his entry, along with Nelson
Rockefeller, into the White House as
the foreign policy analyst to the Presi-
dent in 1969.

When it comes to Henry Kissinger's
personal traits it's: Patronage, No
Ability, Yes.

WILLIAM R. SWARM
Former Commandant
U.S. Army Civil Affairs School

© 1976 The Washington Post Company. All rights reserved.

OCT 17 1976

THIS WEEK'S NEWS FROM

Inside Washington

# Will Kissinger Keep Commitment to Rhodesia?

By JOHN A. DAVENPORT

In the uncertainties now surrounding a Rhodesian settlement, I submit that the time has come for an agonizing reappraisal of our entire policy towards that besieged country as it has developed over the past year, and for a possible unilateral lifting of the sanctions which we have maintained against Rhodesia since it declared its independence from Great Britain in 1965.

This is not only because those sanctions never should have been imposed in the first place (see HUMAN EVENTS, July 17, 1976, page 8) but because diplomatic developments have now reached a pass where unless the U.S. takes a powerful initiative to fulfill solemn commitments made to the present government of Rhodesia in late September by Secretary of State Kissinger, we may justly be accused of double-dealing and being party to a sell-out unparalleled since Neville Chamberlain sold out Czechoslovakia in 1939 in a fruitless effort to buy "peace in our time."

The danger of such a sell-out has, of course, always been present since the Soviet-Cuban conquest of Angola in 1974-75 and the loss of Mozambique to Communist influence. In the wake of these events Secretary of State Kissinger concluded that Rhodesia was indefensible against terrorist attack across its borders, and that to stop further Communist aggression he must at all costs cultivate the friendship of Zambia, Zaire, and Tanzania who had long wanted to see the overthrow of Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia.

In pushing this strategy Kissinger was able to enlist the grudging support of South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster who, though no friend of "majority rule," felt that some kind of settlement must be achieved in the north in South Africa's interest.

Over the weekend of September 18-19 this improbable team put it to Ian Smith in no uncertain terms that he could expect no support from the U.S. or South Africa unless he agreed, against all of his instincts and better judgment, to initiate a plan for bringing "majority rule" to Rhodesia within the next two years.

The terms were harsh, but at least specifically call for:

1. The dissolution of the present government of Rhodesia which has guided the country for the past decade, in favor of a so-called "interim" regime.

2. This government to be composed of a council of state wherein blacks and whites would have equal representation under a white chairman, and a council of ministers in which blacks would have a clear majority with a black prime minister but with whites reserving the portfolios of defense and internal security.

3. The drawing up by the council of state of a new constitution which would bring majority rule within two years—such constitution to be framed "by Rhodesians and for Rhodesians."

Faced by overwhelming pressures, Smith accepted these terms in return for a commitment that with the formation of an interim government sanctions would be lifted, and that terrorism would cease. Implicit in these promises was that the "package" deal had been

cleared with the British, who initiated sanctions in the first place.

It also could be assumed that the package had the assent of those African nations such as Zambia which could exert a restraining influence on the terrorists, as well as with the Rhodesian African leaders who were expected to participate in the new interim government. Indeed, such clearance would seem to have been the whole purpose of Dr. Kissinger's famous shuttling between London, Pretoria, Lusaka, Dar-es-Salaam and other African capitals.

But it now appears that these assumptions were

Rhodesia's Prime Minister Smith (shown above at an official opening of the nation's parliament) is rightfully quesy about Kissinger's diplomacy.

false. From London has come the announcement that it would convene a Geneva conference on the Rhodesian question but that all terms of the settlement would be subject to negotiation.

Even before, the so-called front-line presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana had let go a blast stating that the Kissinger package would be "tantamount to legalizing the colonist racist structures of power."

Finally, two of Rhodesia's nationalist leaders—Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe—have let it be known that in any forthcoming conference the legitimate government of Ian Smith, if represented at all, will be viewed as simply part of the British delegation, that a transfer of power from his government to a new government "must be immediate and total." And that "we reject the Kissinger proposals as the basis for any discussion."

It would thus appear that if and when the Geneva conference is held it will be on terms that are totally different from those agreed to by Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Vorster, and Mr. Smith at their Pretoria meeting. What the black leaders of Africa want, and what the nationalist leaders within Rhodesia are now demanding, is not an orderly transition to majority rule through the enlargement of the Rhodesian franchise but an immediate transfer of power to a relatively small black minority and thereafter a government founded on the one-man, one-vote principle which in other African countries has led to one-party rule or outright military dictatorship. This is surely not what Rhod-

desia's 300,000 whites have been bargaining for. Nor does it necessarily represent what Rhodesia's 6 million blacks really want. Of that population, it should be emphasized well over half live on tribal trust lands and their allegiance is to tribal leaders.

These leaders have never accepted the various nationalist splinter parties in Rhodesia as their true representatives. Yet apparently they are to be excluded from the coming conference and swept aside in any settlement reached. To call the probable result "majority rule" is an affront to the intelligence just as it is an affront to the intelligence to call terrorists "freedom fighters."

In those circumstances only a very powerful American initiative—an initiative based on the objective of reaching a decent and human settlement, can put present negotiations back on the rails. It will not do for the State Department, having dipped its feet so deeply in African affairs to sit back and say: "Well, let the British, the Rhodesian government, and the African leaders pick up the pieces." This might have been good policy in the beginning; it is surely not fair policy now.

The U.S. should at the least insist that commitments made to Ian Smith be honored, not fecklessly swept aside. In doing so it has not only the prestige of the U.S. to back up its influence but a powerful card to play which thus far has been left unused.

This is to suggest that if Britain and the African states continue on present course then the U.S. will have to reconsider its adherence to the whole system of sanctions and non-recognition of Rhodesia which we entered into in the '60s out of deference to Britain and the United Nations.

Even to suggest the immediate lifting of U.S. sanctions will, of course, bring anguished cries from the U.N., from liberal congressmen and the liberal press, and from all those who regard the present government of Rhodesia as a "racist" regime in which whites exploit blacks. For anyone who has troubled to visit Rhodesia this is, of course, an absurdity. Whatever its past hesitations, the Smith government is now committed to "responsible" majority rule and the road towards that has been outlined.

Even as laid down in the Pretoria agreement it is a dangerous road full of pitfalls. But at least that agreement involves orderly evolution rather than disruptive revolution which is what African leaders seem now to be demanding.

A lifting of sanctions would not stop the terror along Rhodesia's borders. It would, however, allow Rhodesia to earn the exchange needed to buy arms to protect itself against aggressive attack—the very kind of attack the U.N. was supposed to stop but has in fact winked at. It also would encourage, we may be sure, South Africa not to desert a long-standing ally. Sanctions are the lever by which the U.S. has sought for a settlement in southern Africa. But a lever can be pulled both ways, and the mere hint that the U.S. has this option might have a sobering influence on present negotiations. At the least such a move would be a reminder that the U.S. cannot be maneuvered with impunity into going back on her solemn commitments.

Mr. Davenport, a former Editor of Fortune magazine and Baron's National Business and Financial Weekly, recently returned from a visit to Rhodesia.

OCTOBER 23, 1976 / Human Events / 5

NOV 21 1976

am

Joseph Kraft

# The Kissinger Legacy

Forget about Bismarck, Metternich, Talleyrand and that crowd. Anybody who wants to assess the legacy Henry Kissinger is passing to President-elect Jimmy Carter need only look at the Secretary of State's latest, and probably last, big fling—the Rhodesian affair.

By a sudden stroke, Kissinger turned American policy toward Africa completely around in ways beneficial to this country and damaging to prospects of Soviet penetration. But he had no follow-through, except to fob off the hot potato on someone else.

The starting point was the so-called "tarbaby" policy followed by President Nixon and Kissinger from 1969 through 1975. By that policy Washington gave the wet mitten to radical African liberation movements, while doing more than a little business than usual with the white regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa.

"Tarbaby" came a cropper when Portuguese gave independence to Angola last fall. The Kissinger policy was to block a takeover by a Soviet-backed faction. To that end, in collusion with South African officials, he gave support and arms to two rival Angolan factions. But the Congress refused to back a policy conceived in secret, inadequately funded, and not exactly in keeping with traditional American ideas about self-determination.

In time the Soviet protégés came to

> "The Kissinger legacy is a good U.S. position almost everywhere in the world."

power in Angola. America got a black eye in Africa for joining with the unloved regime of South Africa in supporting bad guys who lost against better guys who won. The Ford administration, for the same reasons, lost prestige at home. The Russians scored a gain, and readied themselves for further penetration in the Dark Continent.

The next domino in the path of the African liberation movement was Rhodesia. Kissinger moved rapidly to avert a replay of Angola. In the spring, he visited black African leaders and announced—in a speech in Lusaka—that the United States would henceforth support majority rule in Africa, not white minority regimes.

He next sought out South African Prime Minister John Vorster and persuaded him that Rhodesia would be in trouble unless a compromise with black nationalists was effected by the white

government under Ian Smith Vorster began pressuring Smith to give way.

Kissinger then met Smith face-to-face and persuaded him that the sands were running out on white rule in Rhodesia. He won agreement from Smith to meet with black leaders in conference to consider a program for achieving majority rule under a new constitution in two years.

By the conversion—or selling out, if your prefer—of Smith, Kissinger achieved a veritable revolution in American policy. The United States switched its support from white minority regimes to black liberation movements. It wrung a major concession—a concession nobody else had been able to get—from the Smith regime. America was in the good guy camp.

But with that achievement, Kissinger had also shot his bolt. He had no means of enforcing agreement between Rhodesian blacks and whites and, since the U.S. had no vital interest at stake, he had no reason to do so. So he deftly handed over the working out of details to a conference of Rhodesian blacks and whites in Geneva under the leadership of Britain.

The Geneva conference is not apt to succeed. Nor is it likely that majority rule will come peacefully to Rhodesia. But Kissinger and the United States will not be blamed. On the contrary, Washington, far from being in the mid-

dle, is on the fringes, as it should be, given the lack of U.S. national interest in South Africa.

If anything, Washington will get credit for finally moving Smith off the dime. The Russians certainly will be in poorer position to exploit anti-white feeling against the United States than they were in Angola.

What this says to me is that the Kissinger diplomacy is essentially a diplomacy of movement. He is good at turning sudden crisis to the advantage of the United States and the disadvantage of its adversaries—he is good at seizing openings. He did that with China, in the Mideast, in dealings with the allies and even in Vietnam.

But he is much less good at solving problems, and there is not always a helpful ally ready to carry the ball. When big commitments are at stake, the absence of follow-through can have heavy costs. That is essentially the story of the debacle in Vietnam.

On the whole, however, the Kissinger legacy is a good U.S. position almost everywhere in the world—with respect to Russia, to China, to Europe and Japan, in the Mideast and even with the less-developed countries of the Third World. The task of the next administration is to exploit these favorable positions in a way that fosters long-term settlements.

©1976, Field Enterprises, Inc.

The
Director
General's
Letter

OPEN ASSIGNMENTS—
ONE YEAR LATER

At a recent meeting with the Open Forum, someone questioned whether the open assignments policy has really changed things. To him it looked like the same old game.

The answer is that things have changed, even though we recognize that we still have some way to go.

Here is the open assignment record:

Not surprisingly, open assignments got off to an uneven start last fall, although the record improved with time. Some in the Foreign Service did not use the opportunity to communicate their assignment preferences. This was due partly to late receipt of microfiche data and equipment at some posts, but also to a degree of skepticism about the new system.

It is worth noting, therefore, that a clear majority of employees expressing assignment preferences last year received one of their top five preferences. It is evident that your interests can be better served by registering assignment preferences with your Career Development Officers.

How do we reconcile your preferences with the obvious fact that Service needs must also be considered and, in the event of conflict with personal preference, they will take precedence? Resolving this dilemma is at the heart of personnel management and here is where our professionalism must be judged. We are proceeding on the assumption that if the balancing of

all the factors going into assignment achieves a reasonable result, and if we are open in our communications, then we can expect cooperation and support from the Service.

Reviewing last year's performance, we have already identified some areas for improvement by you and by us. Too many initial assignment preferences are unrealistic. For example, 26 officers requested one administrative officer position in Europe. Some of the candidates, who also refused initially to discuss other assignments, were serving in Western Europe or other developed areas. Every individual has a right to request any position for which he or she feels qualified in terms of skills, grade and timing, but realism is also called for.

Similar situations could be cited for other types of positions. Some people sought jobs only in advanced Western countries, ignoring even more important jobs elsewhere. We share the blame for that situation; we should have done better in explaining assignment prospects. This year's guidelines will request that employees list preferences in a broader range of geographic areas.

Naturally, most individuals sought jobs in their own function or in program direction, but cone imbalances required more out-of-function assignments than normally would have been sought. From the political cone almost half were assigned to jobs in other functions or to details, about double the rate in other functions. Until we bring functional needs and resources into balance, we plan to provide more comprehensive guidance on job prospects and an overview of the balance between skills by grade and anticipated position requirements.

Accuracy of microfiche data also caused concern. Obviously, in a fast-moving assignments cycle the microfiche data will never be completely current. However, we shall now provide updated data monthly, a step which will significantly improve its relevance.

Extensions which occurred well into the assignments cycle also caused problems. Sometimes they eliminated opportunities for which competition was underway. PER scrutinized extension requests carefully because of their impact on open assignments and disapproved a number of them. At the same time we recognize that clearer guidelines on the timing of extension requests are required. New guidelines, to be issued shortly, will require greater forward planning by all concerned to meet the twin demands of effective post/bureau staffing and equitable treatment of employees.

The transition to greater central direction has not been without a hitch. Habits acquired over the years are not shed overnight. What is required is a clear understanding of the role of each of us, together with a sense of teamwork and common commitment to our institutional goals.

I consider that operating officials should be in the best position to know the requirements of the job, and that equally each individual should be in the best position to guide us on career aspirations. But I believe we in PER are, or should be, in the best position to balance competing claims and factor these considerations into worldwide priorities. We certainly understand that this calls for the highest competence from us and we hope to prove to you that we have it.

I am also heartened by the spirit of understanding and cooperation we have received from the Bureaus and the Missions. This gives me hope that, working together, we will achieve a better record in the next assignment cycle.

Carol C. Lass

Department of State
# NEWSLETTER

The Newsletter is published monthly by the Department of State to acquaint its officers and employees, at home and abroad, with developments of interest which may affect operations or personnel.

The deadline for submitting material for publication is the 20th of each month.

Contributions from the field may be submitted by an Operations Memorandum with the subject title: Newsletter.

In the Department, contributions should be in writing and addressed to the Newsletter, DG/PA, Room 6808.

The Department of State Newsletter, primarily intended for internal communications, is available to the general public through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The domestic subscription rate is $15.30 a year. There is an additional charge of $3.85 for foreign mailing. A single copy sells for $1.35.

## EDITORIAL STAFF

**Editor** Gerson H. Lush

**Associate Editor** Catherine F. George

**Staff Assistants** Barnett B. Lester

Karen J. Corso

Alyce Fay Hawley

## OCTOBER 1976 • NO. 183

### SECRETARY ADDRESSES UNITED NATIONS 2

*He reviews global issues, challenges*

### PRESIDENT APPROVES SALARY INCREASES 6

*Employees get average 4.83% more*

### 10 FS SELECTION BOARDS CONVENE 8

*Director General discusses reforms*

### ROLE OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 12

*“A new cooperative relationship”*

### REGIONAL FINANCE CENTER IN PARIS 24

*Issues checks for posts in 84 countries*

### ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SYSTEM 27

*State sets new method for funding*

### DISSENT CHANNEL: WHO'S USING IT? 28

*An analysis by Neil A. Boyer*

### ON THE NEW GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 34

*Charles A. Schmitz reports*

## DEPARTMENTS AND FEATURES

Consumer Price Index, 7; Major Appointments, 16; New Directives, 26; Secretary's Open Forum, 28; FSI Courses, 42; EEO Highlights, 44; Awards 45; Bureau Notes, 49; Obituaries, 64; Personnel, 67; Books, inside back cover.

THE COVER—Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger are warmly welcomed on their arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on September 24 after the Secretary's historic visit to southern Africa. Among the greeters are Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson, left, and Ambassador Shirley Temple Black, Chief of Protocol. (Photo by Audio-Visual Services Division, OPR/VS.)

The Secretary addresses the United Nations

On September 30, Secretary Kissinger spoke before the 31st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. He discussed the problems of peace, particularly in southern Africa, the Middle East, Korea, and Cyprus, and the need for progress in economic development. He also set forth the challenges the world community faces in dealing with nuclear proliferation, claims to the oceans, terrorism, and abuse of human and civil rights.

A transcript of the Secretary's address follows:

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, Foreign Ministers, distinguished delegates:

Let me first congratulate this body for electing Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to preside over this Thirty-first session of the General Assembly. He is a diplomat of great international stature, who among his many distinctions, has provided indispensable leadership to the crucial negotiations on the Law of the Sea.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts on behalf of the world community. He successfully embodies the charter's principles of fairness, impartiality and dedication to the causes of global peace and human dignity.

The United Nations was born of the conviction that peace is both indivisible and more than mere stability, that for peace to be lasting it must fulfill mankind's aspirations for justice, freedom, economic well-being, the rule of law and the promotion of human rights. But the history of this organization has been in considerable measure the gradual awareness that humanity would not inevitably share a single approach to these goals.

The United Nations has survived—and helped to manage—thirty years of vast change in the international system. It has come through the bitterness of the Cold War. It has played a vital role in the dismantling of the colonial empires. It has helped moderate conflicts, and is manning truce lines in critical parts of the world. It has carried our unprecedented efforts in such areas

as public health, development assistance and technical cooperation.

But the most important challenge of this organization lies still ahead: to vindicate mankind's positive and nobler goals and help nations achieve a new understanding of community.

With modern communications, human endeavor has become a single experience for peoples in every part of the planet. We share the wonders of science and technology, the trials of industrialization and social change, and a constant awareness of the fate and dreams of our fellow men.

The world has shrunk, but the nations of the world have not come closer together. Paradoxically, nationalism has been on the rise at the precise time when the most serious issues we all face can only be resolved through a recognition of our interdependence. The moral and political cohesion of our world may be eroding just when a sense of community has become indispensable.

Fragmentation has affected even this body. Nations have taken decisions on a bloc or regional basis by rigid ideologies, before even listening to the debate in these halls; on many issues positions have been predetermined by prior conferences containing more than half the membership of the United Nations. The tendency is widespread to come here for battle rather than negotiation. If these trends continue, the hope for world community will dissipate and the moral influence of this organization will progressively diminish.

This would be a tragedy. Members of this organization are today engaged in a multiplicity of endeavors to find just solutions for complex and explosive problems. There is a fragile tranquility but beneath the surface it is challenged by fundamental forces of change—technological, economic, social. More than ever this is a time for statecraft and restraint, for persistence but also daring in the pursuit of peace and justice. The dogmas of perpetual strife produce only bloodshed and bitterness: they unleash the forces of destruction and repression and plant the seeds of

future conflict. Appeals to hatred—whether on the basis of race or class or color or nationality or ideology—will in the end rebound against those who launch them and will not advance the cause of freedom and justice in the world.

Let us never forget that the United Nations benefits the smaller and weaker nations most of all. It is they that would suffer most from its failure. For without the rule of law, disputes will be settled as they have been all too frequently and painfully in history—by test of strength it is not the weak that will prevail in the world of chaos.

The United States believes that this Thirty-first General Assembly must free itself of the ideological and confrontational tactics that marked some of its predecessors and dedicate itself to a program of common action.

The United States comes to the General Assembly prepared to work on programs of common action. We will offer concrete proposals. We will listen to the ideas of others. We will resist pressure and seek cooperation.

Let me now discuss the three principal challenges we face—the problem of peace, the challenge of economic well-being, and the agenda of global interdependence.

The problem of peace

The age of the United Nations has also been an age of frequent conflict. We have been spared a third world war, but cannot assume that this condition will prevail forever, or without exertion. An era of thermonuclear weapons and persistent national rivalries requires our utmost effort to keep at bay the scourge of war. Our generation must build out of the multitude of nations a structure of relations that frees the energies of nations and peoples for the positive endeavors of mankind, without the fear or threat of war.

Central to American foreign policy are our sister democracies—the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, the Southern Pacific and Japan, and our traditional friends in the Western Hemisphere. We are bound to these nations by the ties of history, civiliza-

2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE NEWSLETTER

tion, culture, shared principles and a generation of common endeavors.

Our alliances, founded on the bedrock of mutual security, now reach beyond the common defense to a range of new issues: the social challenges shared by advanced technological societies; common approaches to easing tensions with our adversaries; and shaping positive relations with the developing world. The common efforts of the industrial democracies are not directed at exclusive ends but as a bridge to a broader, more secure and cooperative international system and to increasing freedom and prosperity for all nations.

The United States is proud of its historical friendships in the Western Hemisphere. In the modern era they must be—and are—based on equality and mutual benefit. We have a unique advantage: the great dialogue between the developed and the developing nations can find its most creative solution in the hemisphere where modern democracy was born, and where cooperation between developed and developing, large and small, is a long-standing tradition.

Throughout history, ideology and power have tempted nations to seek unilateral advantage. But the inescapable lesson of the nuclear age is that the politics of tests of strength has become incompatible with the survival of humanity. Traditional power politics becomes irrational when war can destroy civilized life and neither side can gain a decisive strategic advantage.

Accordingly, the great nuclear powers have particular responsibilities for restraint and vision. They are in a position to know the full extent of the catastrophe which could overwhelm mankind. They must take care not to fuel disputes if they conduct their rivalries by traditional methods. If they turn local conflicts into aspects of a global competition, sooner or later their competition will get out of control.

The United States believes that the future of mankind requires coexistence with the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot obscure the necessity for a more constructive relationship. We will insist that restraint be reciprocal not just in bilateral relations

but around the globe. There can be no selective detente. We will maintain our defenses and our vigilance. But we know that tough rhetoric is not strength; that we owe future generations more hopeful prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces.

Peace requires a balance of strategic power. This the United States will maintain. But the United States is convinced that the goal of strategic balance is achievable more safely by agreement than through an arms race. The negotiations on the limitation of armaments are therefore at the heart of US/Soviet relations.

Unprecedented agreements limiting and controlling nuclear weapons have been reached. An historic effort is being made to place a ceiling on the strategic arsenals of both sides in accordance with the Vladivostok accord. And once this is achieved we are ready to seek immediately to lower the levels of strategic arms.

The United States welcomes the recent progress that has been made in further curtailing nuclear weapons testing and in establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions for the first time. The two treaties now signed and awaiting ratification should be the basis for further progress in this field.

Together with several of our European allies, we are continuing efforts to achieve a balanced reduction in the military forces facing each other in Central Europe. In some respects this is the most complex negotiations on arms limitation yet undertaken. It is our hope that through patient effort reciprocal reductions will soon be achieved that enhance the security of all countries involved.

The United States remains committed to the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. We welcome the progress there on banning environmental modification for destructive purposes. We will seriously examine all ideas, of whatever origin, to reduce the burdens of armaments. We will advance our own initiatives not for purposes of propaganda or unilateral advantage but to promote peace and security for all.

But coexistence and negotiations

on the control of arms do not take place in a vacuum. We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents. We have noted crude attempts to distort the purposes of diplomacy and to impede hopeful progress toward peaceful solutions to complex issues. These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations.

And they will inevitably be resisted. For coexistence to be something better than an uneasy armistice, both sides must recognize that ideology and power politics today confront the realities of the nuclear age and that a striving for unilateral advantages will not be accepted.

In recent years, the new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China has held great significance for global security.

We came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of military blackmail and the will to hegemony. We have set out a new path—in wide-ranging consultations, bilateral exchanges, the opening of offices in our respective capitals and an accelerating movement toward normalization. And we have derived reciprocal benefits—a clear understanding of the aspirations of our peoples, better prospects for international equilibrium, reduced tensions in Asia and increased opportunities for parallel actions on global issues.

These elements form the basis for a growing and lasting relationship founded on objective common interests. The United States is committed to strengthen the bonds between us and to proceed toward the normalization of our relations in strict conformity with the principles of the Shanghai Communique. As this process moves forward each side must display restraint and respect for the interests and convictions of the other. We will keep Chinese interests in mind on all international issues and will do our utmost to take account of them. But if the relationship is to prosper, there must be

—continued

OCTOBER 1976

3

"The United States wants no special position or sphere of influence. We respect African unity. The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination."

similar sensitivity to our views and concerns.

On this basis, the progressive development of our relations with the world's most populous nation will be a key element of the foreign policy of the United States.

The world today is witness to continuing regional crises. Any one of them could blossom into larger conflict. Each one commands our most diligent efforts of conciliation and cooperation. The United States has played, and is prepared to continue to play, an active role in the search for peace in many areas: southern Africa, the Middle East, Korea and Cyprus.

## Southern Africa

Racial injustice and the grudging retreat of colonial power have conspired to make southern Africa an acid test of the world's hope for peace and justice under the charter. A host of voices have been heard in this chamber warning that if we failed quickly to find solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia, that part of the globe could become a vicious battleground with consequences for every part of the world.

I have just been to Africa at President Ford's request, to see what we could do to help the peoples of that continent achieve their aspirations to freedom and justice.

An opportunity to pull back from the brink now exists. I believe that Africa has before it the prize for which it has struggled for so long—the opportunity for Africans to shape a future of peace, justice, racial harmony and progress.

The United Nations since its inception has been concerned with the issue of Namibia. For thirty years, that territory has been a test of this institution's ability to make its decisions effective.

In recent months, the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia with a fixed, short, time limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under United Nations aegis; and the participation in that conference of

all authentic national forces including specifically SWAPO. Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Less than a week ago the Rhodesian authorities announced that they are prepared to meet with the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe to form an interim government to bring about majority rule within two years. This is in itself an historical break from the past. The African Presidents, in calling for immediate negotiations, have shown that they are prepared to seize this opportunity for a settlement. And the Government of the United Kingdom, in expressing its willingness to assemble a conference, has shown its high sense of responsibility and concern for the rapid and just independence of Rhodesia.

Inevitably after a decade of strife, suspicions run deep. Many obstacles remain. Magnanimity is never easy, and less so after a generation of bitterness and racial conflict. But let us not lose sight of what has been achieved: a commitment to majority rule within two years; a commitment to form immediately a transitional government with an African majority in the cabinet and an African prime minister; a readiness to follow this with a constitutional conference to define the legal framework of an independent Zimbabwe.

The United States, together with other countries, has made major efforts; and we will continue to do what we can to support the hopeful process that is now possible. But it is those in Africa who must shape the future. The people of Rhodesia, and the neighboring states, now face a supreme challenge. Their ability to work together, their capacity to unify will be tested in the months ahead as never before.

There may be some countries who

see a chance for advantage in fueling the flames of war and racial hatred. But they are not motivated by concern for the peoples of Africa, or for peace. And if they succeed they could doom opportunities that might never return.

In South Africa itself, the pace of change accelerates. The system of apartheid, by whatever name, is a denial of our common humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind. Change is inevitable. The leaders of South Africa have shown wisdom in facilitating a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. The world community takes note of it, and urges the same wisdom—while there is still time—to bring racial justice to South Africa.

As for the United States, we have become convinced that our values and our interests are best served by an Africa seeking its own destiny free of outside intervention. Therefore, we will back no faction whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We will not seek to impose solutions anywhere. The leadership and the future of an independent Zimbabwe, as for the rest of Africa, are for Africans to decide. The United States will abide by their decision. We call on all other non-African states to do likewise.

The United States wants no special position or sphere of influence. We respect African unity. The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted. And it is a direct challenge to the most fundamental principles upon which the United Nations is founded.

Every nation that has signed the Charter is pledged to allow the nations of Africa, whose peoples have suffered so much, to fulfill at long last their dreams of independence, peace, unity and human dignity in their own way and by their own decisions.

## The Middle East

The United Nations, since its birth, has been involved in the chronic conflict in the Middle East. Each successive war has brought greater perils, an increased danger of

4

great power confrontation and more
severe global economic dislocations.

At the request of the parties, the United States has been actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East. Since the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides has produced unprecedented steps toward a resolution of this bitter conflict. There have been three agreements that lessen the danger of war; and mutual commitments have been made to pursue the negotiating process with urgency until a final peace is achieved. As a result, we are closer to the goal of peace than any time in a generation.

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The UN Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East, for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

The United States remains committed to help the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solutions seem possible. The decision before us now is how the next phase of negotiations should be launched.

The United States is prepared to participate in an early resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations, but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents an historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Since the General Assembly last met, overwhelming tragedy has beenfallen the people of Lebanon. The

United States strongly supports the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of that troubled country. We oppose partition. We hope that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All members of the United Nations, and all the conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obligation to support the efforts of the new President of Lebanon to restore peace and to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. And the agencies of the United Nations system can play an important role in the reconstruction effort.

## Korea

The confrontation between North and South Korea remains a threat to international peace and stability. The vital interests of world powers intersect in Korea; conflict there inevitably threatens wider war.

We and many other UN members welcome the fact that a contentious and sterile debate on Korea will be avoided this fall. Let this opportunity be used, then, to address the central problem of how the Korean people can determine their future and achieve their ultimate goal of peaceful reunification without a renewal of armed conflict.

Our own views on the problem of Korea are well known. We have called for a resumption of a serious dialogue between North and South Korea. We have urged wider negotiations to promote security and reduce tensions. We are prepared to have the United Nations Command dissolved so long as the Armistice Agreement—which is the only existing legal arrangement committing the parties to keep the peace—is either preserved or replaced by more durable arrangements. We are willing to improve relations with North Korea, provided that its allies are ready to take similar steps toward the Republic of Korea. We are ready to talk with North Korea about the Peninsula's future, but we will not do so without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

Last fall the United States proposed a conference including all the parties most directly concerned—North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China—to discuss ways of adapting the Armistice Agreement to new conditions and replacing it with more permanent arrangements. On July 22, I stated our readiness to meet immediately with these parties to consider the appropriate venue for such a conference. I reaffirm that

readiness here today.

If such a conference proves impracticable right now, the United States would support a phased approach. Preliminary talks between North and South Korea, including discussions on the venue and scope of the conference, could start immediately. In this phase the United States and the People's Republic of China could participate as observers or in an advisory role. If such discussions yielded concrete results, the United States and China could join the talks formally. This, in turn, could set the stage for a wider conference in which other countries could associate themselves with arrangements that guarantee a durable peace on the Peninsula.

We hope that North Korea and other concerned parties will respond affirmatively to this proposed procedure or offer a constructive alternative suggestion.

## Cyprus

The world community is deeply concerned over the continuing stalemate on the Cyprus problem.

Domestic pressures, nationalistic objectives, and international rivalries have combined to block the parties from taking even the most elementary steps toward a solution. On those few occasions when representatives of the two Cypriot communities have come together, they have fallen into inconclusive procedural disputes. The passage of time has served only to complicate domestic difficulties and to diminish the possibilities for constructive conciliation. The danger of conflict between Greece and Turkey has spread to other issues, as we have recently seen in the Aegean.

All concerned need to focus on committing themselves to achieve the overriding objectives—assuring the well-being of the suffering Cypriot people, and peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy, society, and government shall be reconstructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

The United States is ready to assist in restoring momentum to the negotiating process. We believe that agreeing to a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations.

—continued on page 36.

OCTOBER 1976

5

President approves salary increases

President Ford on September 29 approved a pay increase for Federal employees averaging 4.83 percent.

The increase went to some 1,400,000 Federal white collar employees—including some 12,000 in the Department and the Foreign Service—and some 2,000,000 military personnel.

The increase was effective on the first applicable pay period on or after October 1 (October 10 in the Department, to appear in the checks of November 4).

The increases ordered by the President were based on the recommenda-

tions of his Pay Agents—the Civil Service Commission and the Office of Management and Budget.

The increases in the General Schedule (GS) and Foreign Service grades varied from a little more than 4 percent in the lower grades to some 7 percent in some of the higher grades with a ceiling of $39,600.

Congress in a separate action excluded its own salaries from the pay increase as well as those of the Judiciary and top-level Executive Branch employees earning more than $39,600. Some adjustments will be made administratively in Ambassa-

dorial salaries, officials explained.

In signing the Appropriations Bill for the Legislative Branch for FY 1977, which limited the pay increase for top-level Federal employees, President Ford said on October 1:

> "... I am signing this bill because the Congress will have an opportunity to remedy the situation early next year when I present my recommendations after reviewing the proposals of the Quadrennial Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary Salaries."

The President said he also signed the bill because Congress eliminated the one percent cost-of-living kicker from increases provided Federal annuitants. See next page.

Department of State salary tables

Rates effective October 10, 1976

<table><thead><tr><th>Category and grade or class</th><th colspan="7">Step rates within grade level or class (dollars)</th></tr><tr><th>FSO/R/RU</th><th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>6</th><th>7</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><th>1</th><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><th>2</th><td>39,341</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td></tr><tr><th>3</th><td>30,674</td><td>31,696</td><td>32,718</td><td>33,740</td><td>34,762</td><td>35,784</td><td>36,806</td></tr><tr><th>4</th><td>24,308</td><td>25,118</td><td>25,928</td><td>26,738</td><td>27,548</td><td>28,358</td><td>29,168</td></tr><tr><th>5</th><td>19,601</td><td>20,254</td><td>20,907</td><td>21,560</td><td>22,213</td><td>22,866</td><td>23,519</td></tr><tr><th>6</th><td>16,096</td><td>16,633</td><td>17,170</td><td>17,707</td><td>18,244</td><td>18,781</td><td>19,318</td></tr><tr><th>7</th><td>13,478</td><td>13,927</td><td>14,376</td><td>14,825</td><td>15,274</td><td>15,723</td><td>16,172</td></tr><tr><th>8</th><td>11,523</td><td>11,907</td><td>12,291</td><td>12,675</td><td>13,059</td><td>13,443</td><td>13,827</td></tr><tr><th>FSS</th><th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>6</th><th>7</th><th>8</th><th>9</th><th>10</th></tr><tr><th>1</th><td>30,674</td><td>31,696</td><td>32,718</td><td>33,740</td><td>34,762</td><td>35,784</td><td>36,806</td><td>37,828</td><td>38,850</td><td>39,600</td></tr><tr><th>2</th><td>24,308</td><td>25,118</td><td>25,928</td><td>26,738</td><td>27,548</td><td>28,358</td><td>29,168</td><td>29,978</td><td>30,788</td><td>31,598</td></tr><tr><th>3</th><td>19,601</td><td>20,254</td><td>20,907</td><td>21,560</td><td>22,213</td><td>22,866</td><td>23,519</td><td>24,172</td><td>24,825</td><td>25,478</td></tr><tr><th>4</th><td>16,096</td><td>16,633</td><td>17,170</td><td>17,707</td><td>18,244</td><td>18,781</td><td>19,318</td><td>19,855</td><td>20,392</td><td>20,929</td></tr><tr><th>5</th><td>14,402</td><td>14,882</td><td>15,362</td><td>15,842</td><td>16,322</td><td>16,802</td><td>17,282</td><td>17,762</td><td>18,242</td><td>18,722</td></tr><tr><th>6</th><td>12,893</td><td>13,323</td><td>13,753</td><td>14,183</td><td>14,613</td><td>15,043</td><td>15,473</td><td>15,903</td><td>16,333</td><td>16,763</td></tr><tr><th>7</th><td>11,547</td><td>11,932</td><td>12,317</td><td>12,702</td><td>13,087</td><td>13,472</td><td>13,857</td><td>14,242</td><td>14,627</td><td>15,012</td></tr><tr><th>8</th><td>10,346</td><td>10,691</td><td>11,036</td><td>11,381</td><td>11,726</td><td>12,071</td><td>12,416</td><td>12,761</td><td>13,106</td><td>13,451</td></tr><tr><th>9</th><td>9,273</td><td>9,582</td><td>9,891</td><td>10,200</td><td>10,509</td><td>10,818</td><td>11,127</td><td>11,436</td><td>11,745</td><td>12,054</td></tr><tr><th>10</th><td>8,316</td><td>8,593</td><td>8,870</td><td>9,147</td><td>9,424</td><td>9,701</td><td>9,978</td><td>10,255</td><td>10,532</td><td>10,809</td></tr><tr><th>GS</th><th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>6</th><th>7</th><th>8</th><th>9</th><th>10</th></tr><tr><th>1</th><td>5,810</td><td>6,004</td><td>6,198</td><td>6,392</td><td>6,586</td><td>6,780</td><td>6,974</td><td>7,168</td><td>7,362</td><td>7,556</td></tr><tr><th>2</th><td>6,572</td><td>6,791</td><td>7,010</td><td>7,229</td><td>7,448</td><td>7,667</td><td>7,886</td><td>8,105</td><td>8,324</td><td>8,543</td></tr><tr><th>3</th><td>7,408</td><td>7,655</td><td>7,902</td><td>8,149</td><td>8,396</td><td>8,643</td><td>8,890</td><td>9,137</td><td>9,384</td><td>9,631</td></tr><tr><th>4</th><td>8,316</td><td>8,593</td><td>8,870</td><td>9,147</td><td>9,424</td><td>9,701</td><td>9,978</td><td>10,255</td><td>10,532</td><td>10,809</td></tr><tr><th>5</th><td>9,303</td><td>9,613</td><td>9,923</td><td>10,233</td><td>10,543</td><td>10,853</td><td>11,163</td><td>11,473</td><td>11,783</td><td>12,093</td></tr><tr><th>6</th><td>10,370</td><td>10,716</td><td>11,062</td><td>11,408</td><td>11,754</td><td>12,100</td><td>12,446</td><td>12,792</td><td>13,138</td><td>13,484</td></tr><tr><th>7</th><td>11,523</td><td>11,907</td><td>12,291</td><td>12,675</td><td>13,059</td><td>13,443</td><td>13,827</td><td>14,211</td><td>14,595</td><td>14,979</td></tr><tr><th>8</th><td>12,763</td><td>13,188</td><td>13,613</td><td>14,038</td><td>14,463</td><td>14,888</td><td>15,313</td><td>15,738</td><td>16,163</td><td>16,588</td></tr><tr><th>9</th><td>14,097</td><td>14,567</td><td>15,037</td><td>15,507</td><td>15,977</td><td>16,447</td><td>16,917</td><td>17,387</td><td>17,857</td><td>18,327</td></tr><tr><th>10</th><td>15,524</td><td>16,041</td><td>16,558</td><td>17,075</td><td>17,592</td><td>18,109</td><td>18,626</td><td>19,143</td><td>19,660</td><td>20,177</td></tr><tr><th>11</th><td>17,056</td><td>17,625</td><td>18,194</td><td>18,763</td><td>19,332</td><td>19,901</td><td>20,470</td><td>21,039</td><td>21,608</td><td>22,177</td></tr><tr><th>12</th><td>20,442</td><td>21,123</td><td>21,804</td><td>22,485</td><td>23,166</td><td>23,847</td><td>24,528</td><td>25,209</td><td>25,890</td><td>26,571</td></tr><tr><th>13</th><td>24,308</td><td>25,118</td><td>25,928</td><td>26,738</td><td>27,548</td><td>28,358</td><td>29,168</td><td>29,978</td><td>30,788</td><td>31,598</td></tr><tr><th>14</th><td>28,725</td><td>29,683</td><td>30,641</td><td>31,599</td><td>32,557</td><td>33,515</td><td>34,473</td><td>35,431</td><td>36,389</td><td>37,347</td></tr><tr><th>15</th><td>33,789</td><td>34,915</td><td>36,041</td><td>37,167</td><td>38,293</td><td>39,419</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td></tr><tr><th>16</th><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td></tr><tr><th>17</th><td>39,600</td><td>39,600</td></tr><tr><th>18</th><td>39,600</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

6

"It is an irony of our time that an age of ideological and nationalistic rivalry has spawned as well a host of challenges that no nation can possibly solve by itself."

*—continued from page 5.*

tions. We would suggest some concepts along the following lines:

- a settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

- the present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

- the territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

- a constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and

- security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

I have discussed this approach with the Secretary-General and with several Western European leaders. In the days ahead, the United States will consult along these lines with all interested parties. In the meantime, we urge the Secretary-General to continue his dedicated efforts.

## Economic development and progress

The economic division of our planet between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, between the industrial and developing nations, is a dominant issue of our time. Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress. We must commit ourselves to bring mankind's dreams of a better life to closer reality in our lifetime.

There are many reasons why cooperation has not made greater strides:

- The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lip service to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

- The oil-producing nations command great wealth, and some have been generous in their contribution to international development.

But the overall performance in putting that wealth to positive uses has been inadequate to the challenge.

- The countries with non-market economies are quite prepared to undertake verbal assaults, but their performance is in inverse ratio to their rhetoric. Their real contribution to development assistance has been minimal. Last year, for example, the non-market economies provided only about four percent of the public aid flowing to the developing nations.

- The developing nations are understandably frustrated and impatient with poverty, illiteracy and disease. But too often they have made demands for change that are as confrontational as they are unrealistic. They sometimes speak of new economic orders as if growth were a quick fix requiring only that the world's wealth be properly redistributed through tests of strength instead of a process of self-help over generations. Ultimately, such tactics lose more than they gain, for they undermine the popular support in the industrial democracies which is imperative to provide the resources and market access—available nowhere else—to sustain development.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear; a rapid rise in the incomes of their people; a greater role in the international decisions which affect them; and fair access to the world's economic opportunities.

The objectives of the industrial nations are equally plain: an efficient and open system of world trade and investment; expanding opportunities and production for both North and South: the reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials; a world economy in which prosperity is as close to universal as our imagination and our energies allow.

These goals are complementary; indeed they must be, for neither side can achieve its aims at the expense of the other. They can be realized only through cooperation.

We took a major step forward together a year ago, at the Seventh Special Session of this Assembly. And we have since followed through on many fronts.

- We have taken steps to protect the economic security of developing nations against cyclical financial disaster. The newly expanded compensatory finance facility of the International Monetary Fund has disbursed over $2 billion to developing nations this year alone.

- An IMF Trust Fund financed by gold sales has been established for the benefit of the low-income countries.

- Replenishments for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank will provide additional resources for development.

- Worldwide food aid has expanded. We have committed ourselves to expand the world supply of food. With a United States contribution of $200 million, we have brought the International Fund for Agriculture Development close to operation.

- The major industrial nations have moved to expand trade opportunities for the developing world. We have joined in a solemn pledge to complete by next year the liberalization of world trade through the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations. For its part, the United States has established a system of generalized preferences which have stimulated billions in exports from developing nations to the United States in 1975.

The United States continued this process by putting forward a number of new proposals at the Fourth Ministerial United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in May 1976. We proposed a comprehensive plan to improve the capacity of the developing countries to select, adapt, improve and manage technology for development. We committed ourselves to improvements in the quality of aid, proposing that a greater proportion of aid to poor countries be on a grant basis and united to purchases from donor nations. We agreed to a serious effort to improve markets of eighteen basic commodities.

These measures undertaken since we met here just a year ago assist—not with rhetoric and promises, but in practical and concrete ways—the peoples of the world who are struggling to throw off the chains of poverty.

Much remains to be done:

36

Workshops help supervisors understand their
role in Foreign Service grievance procedures

In the latter part of September two
interagency teams composed of repre-
sentatives of the Department and
USIA concluded a series of work-
shops developed for Foreign Service
grievance procedure training.

The workshops, conducted at vari-
ous EUR posts, drew to a close four
months of training, held to advise and
assist Department, AID and USIA
post managers and supervisors on
their responsibilities under the new
Foreign Service grievance procedure.

Other teams made up of State, AID
and USIA representatives had pre-
viously traveled to posts in Latin
America, Africa, East Asia and the
Middle East.

With the establishment in April of
the new Foreign Service grievance
procedures (see the Special NEWS-
LETTER Supplement #178, April
1976), the three foreign affairs agen-
cies recognized the need to
familiarize supervisors and post man-
agers with the new methods for han-
dling grievances.

The Department's Grievance Office
and the Employee-Management Rela-
tions staff developed, together with
the staffs of AID and USIA, a com-
prehensive program to acquaint per-
sonnel of the three agencies with the
proper steps for implementation of the
new procedure.

To assist the teams in their work-
shops a videotape, relating the tale of
four "typical" post grievances, was
prepared. Before the teams departed

the program was presented in ab-
breviated form to Department person-
nel in Washington.

The overseas program began in
May with a trip to Lima and Mexico
for personnel attending regional AID
and Department administrative meet-
ings. Subsequent programs brought
together DCM's, principal officers,
administrative and Embassy person-
nel officers, mission directors or their
deputies, AID executive officers,
public affairs officers or their deputies
and USIA executive officers. In all 25
separate workshops were held which
brought together approximately 800
to 900 Foreign Service personnel
from the three foreign affairs agen-
cies.

The workshops focused on the an-
tecedents to the new procedures and
explained that the legislation that es-
tablished the Foreign Service griev-
ance procedure resulted from the in-
ability of management of the three
foreign affairs agencies and the exclu-
sive employee representative to re-
solve their differences and agree
among themselves on a system to re-
place the old Interim Grievance Pro-
cedure.

The workshops also provided an
opportunity to explain to the partici-
pants the cost to the agencies of unre-
solved grievances and its impact on
employee morale. At the same time,
the participants were advised on the
responsibilities of supervisors in re-
solving problems before they surface

as formal grievances.

A frequent comment during the
workshops maintained that only mal-
contents and trouble makers filed
grievances, but the participants
learned that while to some extent this
may be true, there are many real prob-
lems which trouble employees and the
grievance procedure is the appropriate
and authorized mechanism for resolv-
ing these problems.

The procedure was also portrayed
as a useful device for bringing to
management's attention problem
areas to be investigated which may
lead to an improved working envi-
ronment.

Some of the participants questioned
the utility of regional workshops for
familiarizing supervisory personnel
with the new grievance procedure.
The detrimental impact of unresolved
problems on people's performance
was noted as was the importance of
resolving in a timely manner, through
the grievance mechanism, employee
problems.

The participants also learned that
local resolution of grievances was not
only the most effective means of deal-
ing with employee problems but also
the most cost-effective. The conclu-
sion of the discussion was a simple
one: to avoid greater problems and
promote harmony among employees,
grievances should, whenever possi-
ble, be resolved at the lowest possible
level.

The workshops also provided an
opportunity to discuss with post man-
agement the Foreign Service
employee-management relations pro-
gram and place in that context the new
grievance procedures.

In September, Employee-Management Relations Specialist Tony Kern conducted a grievance workshop in Copenhagen.

OCTOBER 1976

35