Exclusive Interview With Henry Kissinger

US News + World Report
Nov. 19, 1979

# "We Must Not Submit to Blackmail"

How to deal with Ayatollah's Iran? Is this country increasingly vulnerable to challenges around the globe? In a wide-ranging interview, Kissinger discusses critical issues facing the U.S.—and sizes up Carter's foreign policy.

**Q** Mr. Kissinger, how should the United States deal with the problem of Iran?

A I believe that our conduct was a major contributing factor in the collapse of the Shah. At the same time, I believe that Iran is an important enough country for us so that we should attempt to have the best possible relations with whatever government is in power.

But this must not take the form of submission to mob rule or acquiescence in insolent verbal assaults. So I am not advocating pressures to overthrow the existing government in Iran—however much I may regret the method or maybe even the fact that it came into power.

The margin by which our relations with that government can be improved is regrettably very narrow, and it should be used. But no country is so important that we must submit to its blackmail. No nation must be led to believe that assaults on Americans are free.

**Q** What can this country do to insure continuing access to Middle East oil?

A The supply of oil to us and to other industrial democracies is a vital interest. Obviously, a cutting off of it or political manipulation of it would threaten vital interests. What you do to protect vital interests is something that I think it would be irresponsible for me to speculate about. But there's no question that it represents a vital American interest.

**Q** How far should U.S. dependence on Middle East oil influence our policies vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict?

A That's a different proposition. It is generally unwise for the United States to link, by its own actions or assertions,

## 8 Key Points Made by Kissinger

**Carter's foreign policy.** This administration's approach lacks coherence. It's "highly likely" the White House will stumble into a crisis with the Soviet Union "if present trends continue."

**Iran.** The U.S. should try to have the best possible relations with the Ayatollah's regime, but "this must not take the form of submission to mob rule."

**Soviet-Cuban adventures.** The status quo can't continue. "We have here a design extending from Central America to Yemen that is ineffectively opposed or totally unopposed."

**Dispute over Russian troops in Cuba.** It is "the first time in the postwar period that the United States has directly told the Soviets that something was unacceptable—and the Soviets told us to go to hell."

**Threat posed by U.S.S.R.** A confrontation seems unavoidable if the U.S. fails to make an immediate effort to correct the military imbalance.

**SALT.** Senate rejection at this point probably "would reinforce the already existing uneasiness about the soundness of our institutional processes."

**Arab oil and Mideast peace.** Linking American access to oil to Arab-Israeli peace is "unwise." On that point, "I disagree with Governor Connally."

**China.** "I don't think we can play the China card as a sort of needling of the Soviets every time the Soviets do something that annoys us."

access to oil to the Arab-Israeli conflict for two reasons:

One, I do not think it is in the interest of the moderate Arabs to get themselves so closely involved in the nuances of the Arab-Israeli conflict that they become, in effect, hostage to the success and failure of negotiations in which they do not participate.

Secondly, it will be almost impossible for governments that do not have the means to protect themselves against radical neighbors not to raise their political demands unless there is a dissociation of the oil from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Now, maybe we do not succeed in delinking it, but it is not in our interest to establish an explicit linkage between those two: The oil and the conflict.

**Q** Didn't you approve a speech by Governor John Connally proposing just such a linkage—calling for American pressure on Israel as a means of protecting oil supplies?

A I disagree with Governor Connally on that and several

Kissinger, 56, served as President Nixon's national-security adviser from 1969 to 1974 and as Secretary of State from 1973 until 1977. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. A former professor of international affairs at Harvard, his latest book, *White House Years*, has just been published by Little, Brown.

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other points. I read a draft but did not "approve" the final version, which I did not see before delivery. I have very high regard for Governor Connally. He's a good friend of mine. I disagree with him on some aspects of the Middle East.

Q Mr. Kissinger, we keep hearing that the United States is losing out in the competition for strategic power. Do you share that view?

A Our relative position is declining for three fundamental reasons:

First is the effect of the doctrine of assured destruction developed in the 1960s. Under that doctrine, the size of the Soviet force aimed at us is irrelevant so long as we are able to destroy a given percentage of the Soviet population and industry. Therefore, the proponents of that school of thought saw no need to react to a massive Soviet buildup of strategic forces.

Second were the assaults by Congress on the defense budget during the Nixon administration, which made it impossible to deal adequately with the Soviet threat in those years. In the first four years of the administration, the Congress cut 40 billion dollars out of the defense budget from the figures recommended by Nixon, which already were marginal precisely because of fear of congressional cuts.

Third were the decisions of the Carter administration when it came into office either to cancel or slow down the MX, the B-1, the Trident and the cruise-missile program. These programs had been spurred under President Ford.

The cumulative effect of all of these actions over a period of 15 years—at a time when the Soviets were increasing defense spending by 5 percent a year compounded—created a situation which, if not decisively remedied, will create an increasing military imbalance in the '80s, and this will cause a growing political weakness.

Q What can this country do to reverse that adverse trend in the balance of power?

A The United States must commit itself immediately to a major protracted military effort to close the gaps in strategic forces, in theater nuclear forces and in conventional forces. Otherwise, some sort of debacle is mathematically inevitable. The buildup is necessary not—as the conduct of the administration sometimes implies—as some sort of payoff for the passage of SALT; it is imperative for our national security and that of our allies.

Just as economists can predict a recession without necessarily knowing the month in which it will hit, so I think students of international affairs may be able to predict crises without knowing exactly what year they're going to happen.

The present situation seems to me to be as follows: First, we are barely equal with the Soviet Union in strategic forces. Second, they are clearly ahead of our theater nuclear forces. Third, they are vastly superior in conventional forces. Fourth, they are probably superior to us in the capacity to intervene in most key areas through the presence of proxy forces and the pre-positioning of substantial stockpiles.

This means that even if the Soviet Union does not have a detailed plan for expansion, its capacity to shape crises that may have local origins will exceed ours, not to speak of Soviet capacities to blackmail European and other countries.

Q Isn't this already happening?

A The process has already started. If this continues—if the side that is armed by the West always loses to the side armed by the Soviet Union—then a potential crisis in the world balance of power is inevitable.

If you look at the global situation today, you see Soviet-armed guerrillas attacking Moroccan forces in the Sahara. If they prevail and the King is overthrown, the southern shore

"The administration needs a more coherent view.... Too frequently we move in one direction and make a contradictory move in the opposite direction."

of the Strait of Gibraltar will be in unfriendly hands. Can we then keep the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean?

Soviet proxy forces are already on both sides of the Gulf of Aden in Yemen and in Ethiopia. Iran is, if not pro-Soviet, violently anti-West. So the security of the Strait of Hormuz is problematical. Saudi Arabia is substantially encircled by radical or Soviet-dominated forces.

Afghanistan has had a Soviet-supported coup. Cambodia has been taken over by Vietnamese forces—with Soviet encouragement—and therefore there is pressure toward the Strait of Malacca. Central America is in ferment, abetted by Cuba and accelerated by our misconception of the extent to which we can manipulate domestic structures.

The Soviet effort to blackmail Europe also has begun to have its effect at least subconsciously—partly through disenchantment with the United States, partly through explicit threats, partly through the Soviets' holding out the promise of improved relations through a kind of selective détente in which Europe is favored over the United States. The process can still be arrested, but it has already made considerable strides.

So if you look at this overall picture, you see that those countries that have relied on us are under pressure in almost every area, and the global equilibrium is being systematically threatened.

Q Are you saying the U.S. must be ready to intervene directly to support friends or allies threatened by Soviet-backed forces?

A The art of foreign policy is to prevent situations from occurring in which we have to choose between intervention and surrender. At the same time, the present pattern cannot continue. It is not possible that Soviet proxy forces remain the decisive element in so many parts of the world.

It cannot be acceptable that major decisions in such areas as southern Africa, for example, are influenced by the threat of Cuban intervention. We are dealing here with a little country of 9 million, 90 miles off our shore, from which we accept the dispatch of an expeditionary force of close to 50,000 men into distant parts of the world athwart our lifelines. And we accept the presence of a Soviet combat brigade on its territory, the effective fortification of the island, plus active subversion in Central America.

We have here a design extending from Central America to Yemen that is either ineffectively opposed or totally unopposed. If present trends continue, we will wind up in a position where only the most brutal actions can save our friends, and that must be avoided.

Q How can we oppose this Soviet-Cuban design?

A There must be a penalty for expansionism; in other words, we need some linkage—a concept systematically rejected by the administration. The Soviet Union and the Cu-

Copyright © 1979, U.S.News & World Report, Inc.

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bans were permitted to intervene in Ethiopia without any penalty whatsoever by the United States. There was no reaction to Communist coups in South Yemen and Afghanistan. We have ignored the Soviet fortification of Cuba.

**Q What can we do to penalize them?**

A For example, in the same week that President Carter acquiesced in what he had declared as unacceptable two weeks earlier—namely, the presence of the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba—we sold 25 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union. That was clearly unnecessary.

**Q Perhaps our reprisal should be economic, not military?**

A I can't give an abstract blueprint of what our reaction should be to hypothetical cases. I'm saying that there must be a penalty for assaults on international stability and on our vital interests. After all, it is not asking too much of the Soviet Union not to engage in foreign adventures. I'm not suggesting that we demand the domestic transformation of the Soviet system; I'm saying that they should not have both the fruits of détente and the benefits of systematically undermining international peace and security.

**Q Would you rule out a military response by this country?**

A A military response should be a last resort. To rule it out in principle is to invite attack on our vital interests and on our friends. Wherever possible, we should support local forces in the first instance. But you cannot rule out that if all else fails we shall defend our vital interests.

**Q Do you think the American public and Congress are prepared to support such a policy?**

A I think we have now learned by experience that if you do not resist in an early phase of expansion, when it is relatively easy to do it, the price goes up and the problem gets worse. Strong leadership can convince the American people to defend its values, its security and our friends. At any rate, I believe it is the duty of leaders to put what is necessary before the American people. If we then fail, if the public will not support it, then we have failed by the democratic process.

**Q Is the administration providing that kind of leadership?**

A The administration needs a more coherent view. I do not think that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national-security adviser, have the same geopolitical conception—or convey the same conception to others. Either one of them might be right, but both of them can't be right at the same time.

As a result, I believe that too frequently we move in one direction and make a contradictory move in the opposite direction. For example, in the same week that a mission went to Europe to convince our allies to accept theater nu-

clear forces, we announced the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads. Certainly, these two can be reconciled by experts—but not so easily in the public mind.

Within two weeks of agreeing to sell arms to Morocco, one of our highest officials attends the national-holiday celebration in Algeria, which is encouraging the attacks on Morocco. The official explanation is that he was sent to warn Algeria. If so, it was an odd choice of dates—the anniversary of Algeria's revolution, when Algeria's leaders would be filled with national fervor and surrounded by allies. And how is the mission perceived in Morocco? As reinforcement, as confusion or as deliberate undercutting?

Yet another example of contradictory moves is the administration's handling of SALT. A plausible case for SALT can be made on the ground that it is a necessary safety valve in a situation of growing tension; that I could support I cannot accept the proposition that the alternative to SALT is nuclear war, for this turns SALT into an instrument of nuclear blackmail against us and delinks it from anything else that goes on in the world. Of course, foreign policy is complex, but there has to be some coherence in the perception of what we are trying to do.

**Q Does this lack of coherence or leadership tempt the Russians to become more adventurous?**

A Well, yes, and strangely enough, I think it makes the Russians extremely uneasy, too, because it tempts them into probing and at the same time inhibits us from resolving the issues that arise as a result of their probing. It creates the enormous danger that the process of erosion will go on until we decide—unpredictably to the Soviets—to resist at some point late in the process. Then the price may be enormous.

**Q You think the administration might stumble into a major crisis with the Soviet Union?**

A I think, if present trends continue, that's highly likely.

**Q Who is responsible for this lack of coherence in U.S. policy?**

A The President has to give the leadership. But I think it is dangerous for a President to confuse leadership with trying to give tactical direction on every detail.

The President is head of state, head of a party, head of the government. He has large numbers of representational functions and political functions. He does not have the time to give the day-to-day attention to the tactical management of foreign policy. If he is wise, he will therefore delegate it to somebody or to some group. What the President can do is to define the philosophy, to set the course and to reserve himself for the fundamental decisions that only he can make.

Ideally—even though when I was in office in the first four years this was not followed—the principal representative of the President in the management of foreign policy should be the secretary of state. I do not believe it can work to have a strong security adviser and a strong secretary of state operating simultaneously. I know I was certainly assertive enough as security adviser, but it was demoralizing for the State Department. Those who are professionally charged with carrying out our foreign policy are thereby pushed to the periphery of events and become inherently irresponsible.

If the President does not trust his secretary of state or if he has doubts about him, he ought to get somebody he trusts. I'm not saying this as a criticism of this administration alone, because when I was security adviser I, also, violated this principle. The ideal situation would be the sort of relationship that Acheson had with Truman, that Dulles had with Eisenhower and that I had with Ford.

**Q How much of the problem with foreign policy lies with Carter himself—particularly his lack of experience in this field?**

A I think you have a combination of a President with little experience and extreme conscientiousness who believes that unless he's done it himself, it has not been done at all.

**Q Given his string of successes—the Panama treaties, China**

> "The present pattern cannot continue. It is not possible that Soviet proxy forces remain the decisive element in so many parts of the world."

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U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 19, 1979

normalization, the Camp David peace agreement—why is confidence lacking abroad in the President's foreign policy?

A. Even though there have been individual successes—some of them considerable—the perception around the world is of a lack of direction, of conception and of strength in the administration's foreign policy.

Q. In that context, how do you rate the administration's handling of the dispute over a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba?

A. Erratic and without conception other than to save SALT. What bothers me about it is that it is the first time in the postwar period that the United States has directly told the Soviets that something was unacceptable—and the Soviets told us to go to hell.

"If the President does not trust his secretary of state, he ought to get somebody he trusts."

Q. Were we wrong in saying it was unacceptable—or in letting them tell us to go to hell?

A. It is conceivable that we were wrong in both. Having told the Soviets a combat presence in Cuba was unacceptable, we could not simply acquiesce without paying a serious price in credibility later on.

I believe that the administration was right in its original perception that the presence of an organized Soviet combat force in Cuba is a qualitative change in the situation. It then became worried about the implications of its own analysis and started backpedaling. Pretending that it faced a longstanding Soviet involvement is no solution; the Soviets and Cubans, after all, know the facts. One shouldn't challenge the Soviets if one is not willing to see it through.

Q. Getting back for a moment to the strategic-arms-limitation treaty: Would its ratification help or hinder our efforts to meet the Soviet military challenge?

A. The strange thing is that a document which, by almost all accounts, is almost irrelevant to the strategic situation should have achieved such symbolic significance. It is defended by the administration as making the difference between war and peace, confidence or lack of confidence in us. It is assaulted by some of its critics as undermining our security. In fact, except for the protocol—about which I have profound questions—the agreement as such does not affect any of the things that we ought to do.

The only danger in the SALT agreement—and I think the debate is taking care of that substantially—would be if it lulled us into a false sense of security. This is why some of us are so insistent that SALT be accompanied by a serious new defense program. And our definition of seriousness is not simply items in a budget, which can always be changed, but some articulation of strategic doctrine which defines our long-term national purposes.

Q. Would defeat of SALT undermine the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as the administration claims?

A. The Europeans are not particularly enamored of SALT on its merits; they are concerned about the symbolic aspects of a rejection. In these terms, it is probably correct that if SALT fails now at the very last hurdle—after three Presidents of two parties have negotiated on it for seven years and our allies have been briefed at great length about it at all stages—it would reinforce the already existing uneasiness about the soundness of our institutional processes.

Q. What about the administration's argument that the defeat of SALT would lead NATO Allies to reject the American plan to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe?

A. That argument shows how far the demoralization of the alliance has proceeded. On the face of it, it is absurd. If SALT fails, theater nuclear forces ought to be more rather than less necessary. To tie theater nuclear forces to the ratification of SALT shows the extent to which governments cannot any longer do what they know is necessary for defense unless they also do something else which they may not really believe in. And it is far from clear what strand will predominate.

If the United States states the issue correctly, theater nuclear forces will be accepted at the next NATO meeting, even though failure to ratify SALT would undoubtedly add a complication. For an administration that has refused to link SALT to Soviet conduct to insist on linking it to NATO conduct is to me unacceptable.

Q. Turning to China, Mr. Kissinger: Is the U.S. playing a dangerous game by moving too close to Peking?

A. First of all, China has not survived for 3,000 years as an independent state with the longest continuous history of self-government in the world by permitting itself to be used by foreigners for their own purposes. Therefore, the art of dealing with China is to make sure that our long-term interests are congruent. It is a mistake to try to use China to needle the Soviet Union.

For example, I think it was a mistake to link the visit to China of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown—which I otherwise favored—to the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba by announcing it in close conjunction with the acceptance of the Soviet brigade. This raises the false premise that maybe if the Soviets make a concession to us in Cuba, we will make a concession to them on China. It is in our national interest that China be secure and independent. Now, its own weight and its own reality will create certain necessities for the Soviet Union. In that sense we can cooperate. But I don't think we can play the China card as a sort of needling of the Soviets every time the Soviets do something that annoys us.

Q. How far should we go toward insuring China's independence and security by helping it build effective defense forces?

A. I think that as China modernizes its industries, its own capacity to insure its defense will also increase.

Q. That's long term, though—

A. I am not prepared to go into this with the specificity you are inviting. But I think we have to understand that an unopposed Soviet assault on China would have almost as serious an impact on the international equilibrium as an unopposed Soviet attack on Europe or the Middle East. Now, what form our opposition should take, what specific measures should be taken—that, I think, would require very careful study.

Q. How much danger is there that China might again reverse alliances and close ranks with Russia against the U.S.?

A. I believe that the fundamental foreign policy of countries is affected by their geographic location, by ideologies, by considerations of security.

China is not conducting its Soviet policy as a favor to us. Therefore, the margin of maneuver is not unlimited. I con-

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sider it improbable that China will reverse course and link up again with the Soviet Union. Whether China will attenuate its hostility to the Soviet Union depends on the Chinese perception of the balance of power.

The Chinese now clearly believe that the gravest threat to their security is the Soviet Union. Hence, their relationship to us is based on their expectation that we are the guardians of the general world balance of power within which they can find their security. Finally, they hope that, through better relations with the West, they can speed up the process of modernization—and therefore of the moment when they can increase their own capacity to defend themselves.

Should China come to the conclusions, first, that we are not effective guardians of the world equilibrium and, second, that they are being doomed to impotence—for a variety of reasons, including Western fear of the Soviet Union—then I do not exclude that they will decide that they will make their own arrangements directly rather than let the West do it for them. That possibility cannot be excluded.

**Q. Turning back to the Middle East: How can we resolve the mess we seem to be in with respect to Arab-Israeli peace talks?**

A First, I do not think that "mess" is an accurate description. We have to define what the difficulty is. Generally, it is defined as the stalemate in Israeli-Egyptian or Israeli-Arab negotiations, but I think the real cause of the difficulties is the collapse of the Shah of Iran.

That has led to a change in the regional balance of power both in reality and in perception. Moderate countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan now question the ability of the United States to protect its friends. This affects not just their day-to-day foreign policy; it affects even their oil policy.

**Q. How?**

A A correct description of the oil policy of the moderate Arabs now is that they adopt the most moderate price which they can sell to the radicals, because none of them are willing to face a confrontation with the radicals. This is the fundamental problem. It is even the fundamental Palestinian problem. To the extent that the Palestinians become an expression of radicalism in the Arab world, the problem becomes intractable.

**Q. Wouldn't there have been the same Israeli-Egyptian stalemate over the Palestinians had the Shah not been deposed?**

A To some extent. But I believe that the consequences of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement would have been much different. And I believe that the moderate Arab states would have found it much easier to support us and to explore negotiating options than was the case.

**Q. How can the U.S. restore its credibility in the Middle East?**

A All the problems that I have described will take months and years to deal with.

First, I think it is important that the moderate Arabs see a physical American presence in the area—preferably at sea—that reassures them against radical pressures. Second, it is imperative that the proxy operations by Cubans in those areas be decisively stopped. From that platform, I think, we can then look at the negotiating process again.

**Q. Is a settlement of the Arab-Israeli talks feasible without bringing in the Palestine Liberation Organization?**

A Right now, enlightened opinion is that we must talk to the PLO. Very few people say just what they are going to negotiate with them. What are the PLO likely to demand? The most moderate members of the PLO will not ask for less than the '67 borders and the return of the Old City of Jerusalem. That's the absolute minimum. The other wings will ask for the '47 borders, and the extreme wing is going to ask for a secular state. There can be no dispute about this.

Moreover, I believe that a Palestinian state governed by the PLO cannot simply remain an insignificant agricultural ministate on the West Bank. Such a "solution" would only

be a first stage. It will inevitably undermine the position of Jordan, and therefore will complete the encirclement of Saudi Arabia by radical states.

So let us not confuse what some leaders in the area say for domestic reasons, with their real preferences. My view has always been that the negotiation should be between Jordan and Israel, and to turn the PLO into an Arab rather than an international problem.

**Q. Can the Egyptian-Israeli peace survive if there is no progress toward a wider settlement in the near future?**

A I think some progress has to be made, but it's also important to define the nature of progress. The difficulty with the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations for autonomy of the West Bank is that, at their extremes, they will lead either to a PLO state—with the problems that I've described and that Israel won't accept—or to a sort of Israeli-dominated client state which no Arab will accept. I don't think one can navigate between these extremes without getting Jordan involved.

Q Mr. Kissinger, throughout your remarks you have emphasized

"A military response should be a last resort. To rule it out in principle is to invite attack."

the dangerous Soviet challenge we face. Will that threat change—become more dangerous or less—after Leonid Brezhnev leaves the scene?

A I think that Brezhnev in his way is probably interested in an extended period of peace—partly because he has had a long and turbulent life and probably has had as much excitement in that life as can be reasonably expected for a man to have to absorb; partly because he is of a generation of Russians that feels in their bones that the West is technologically and materially superior no matter what his statistics show, and partly because, from my own observation, he probably has some more-human qualities than other of the Soviet leaders that one could mention.

It is more likely that his successors are going to have a higher level of energy and that they will have done their calculations with greater conviction than Brezhnev has. Therefore, it is more likely that our relations with the Soviet Union will get more difficult with more-assertive successors—all the more so as somewhere in the '80s the Soviets will face the inherent dilemma of all Communist countries.

**Q. What dilemma is that?**

A That you can't run a modern society by total planning. Yet if you give up the system of total planning, you have to move millions of bureaucrats and absorb many vested interests—and therefore weaken yourself for many years. At the same time, the Soviets' present military equipment will be getting obsolescent. The temptation to clean up the international environment before taking on that domestic dilemma may be very great. This is one of the dangers that I see. ☐

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