The presence of Soviet troops at the German frontier on the other hand, would create an enormous pressure on an independent Germany.

With a local defense against Soviet attack impossible the weight of Soviet influence may grow proportionately even if NATO should be maintained based in the Low Countries and France -- a contingency which in the absence of careful study cannot necessarily be taken for granted. It may be argued, of course, that Germany would still enjoy the protection of NATO, that in fact the sanction against Soviet re-entry would be about the same as at present: the fear of an all-out war with the United States. This argument if pressed far enough would put into doubt the utility of NATO and counsel its transformation into a unilateral guarantee at the precise moment when the inhibitions to total war are constantly increasing.

On the other hand, if Germany is to assure her protection with her own forces -- a notion inseparable from that of neutrality -- the result would be a spiraling rather than a reduction of armaments. German forces would then have to approximate those planned for the NATO shield. But if NATO is alleged to disquiet the Soviet Union, a German force of approximate size under independent control would seem to give even greater cause for

IV - 4

[4]

worry. Moreover, a militarily strong Germany would surely disquiet the
Soviet satellites and drive them closer to the Soviet Union. The cohesion
of the Soviet bloc will as a result be, if anything, increased by a scheme
that involves the withdrawal of Soviet forces only into Poland and which is
conceived as giving Germany an opportunity to defend itself. If on the
other hand, German forces are limited severely, the result will be a
military vacuum in the center of Europe hazarding the security of the West.

The most persuasive proposal has therefore coupled the neutralization
of Germany with that of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary -- the original
Gaitskell plan. Here matters would seem to stand as follows: No doubt
it will involve some diminution of Western military security. At the same
time, there will be an undoubted political gain. A great deal would depend
on the ability of NATO to maintain a substantial military establishment in
Western Europe to back up Germany. In its absence the defense of the Continent
would rest entirely on the American retaliatory power -- a situation which
both we and our European allies have a common interest in preventing. 15

15. See the author's "Missiles and the Western Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958.

IV - 8

[Y]

to gain Germany a reputation for reliability. Retaining Germany as a
willing member of European political and economic institutions must be the
goal of any constructive Western policy.

A neutral belt, then, is a far riskier course than the one outlined
above. It is conceivable only in these circumstances: (1) If a careful
study shows that substantial United States and British forces can be
stationed in the Low Countries or France; for otherwise the "neutral belt"
would within a measurable time become a political appendage of the Soviet
Union. 17
(2) If a time limit is placed on the negotiations; for otherwise
the Soviet Union will be able to achieve the paralysis of NATO and the end
of European integration merely by engaging in endless negotiations. (3)
If there is firm agreement among the Western allies that neutralization
applies only to military relationships and that German membership in the
Common Market and the Coal and Steel Community is not negotiable; for if
German unity is purchased at the price of European integration the West

17. To be sure, Yugoslavia has managed to conduct a relatively independent foreign policy without membership in NATO and Turkey has not required ground forces for its protection. At the same time, their independence resides in the consciousness that military protection by the West was a high likelihood and that military assistance was within reach. Poland without these assurances has purchased a measure of autonomy in domestic affairs at the price of slavishly following the Soviet line in foreign policy and Finland has had to accord the Soviet Union a veto on its Cabinet.

IV - 9

[Y]

would have sacrificed the fruits of the most hopeful and constructive policy it has conducted since World War II. (4) If the remaining countries of NATO are confident that they can resist Soviet and domestic pressures against expanding the neutral zone to include all of Europe. (5) If the neutral belt is made part of a satisfactory plan on German unification on the basis of free elections.

To state these conditions is to recognize the extremely hazardous nature of the proposals for a neutral belt. It may be thought necessary in order to demonstrate once and for all Soviet intentions in Germany even though this constant need for demonstration is one of the symptoms of the weakness of the West. But if embarked upon, it should be without illusions and without begging all the principal questions. If the goal is stability, then both in the interests of the West as well as in the long-term interest of the Soviet Union we should strive for the Oder as the demarcation line between the Warsaw pact and NATO coupled with the various schemes for arms control described earlier.

cohesion and its sense of direction. It should take energetic steps to
make further advances towards European integration. The West must also become
clear about its security effort; about the relation of deterrence to the
strategy for conducting a war, the significance of nuclear weapons and
the necessity for local defense. [Then, too, it is highly important to
develop a common program of assistance to the under-developed regions along
the lines suggested by General de Gaulle.] Above all, it seems time to examine
carefully the possibility of creating some federal institutions embracing the
entire North Atlantic community, however attenuated these may be at first.

For neither strategic doctrine nor the attempt to develop common policies
for specific crisis situations is likely to protect the West against the
incessant pressure. It will be increasingly difficult to prevent the
disintegration of Western unity against Soviet overtures that promise
immunity in return for neutrality, a process which will not only leave the
West defenseless but perhaps make it impossible to deal creatively with its
constructive tasks. Unless the North Atlantic community comes to think of
itself increasingly as a unit which shares its perils as well as its opportunities,
it will be engulfed by the revolutions of our time.

V - 5

[Y]

leads to the preposterous argument that the brutalities of Stalin were
due to the failure to admit the USSR into the League of Nations in 1923
or that
is attributable
and the current hostility of Khrushchev to the failure to accept the
19
Soviet disarmament package of May 10, 1955. The aberrations of our
internal security system are equated with the Soviet police state; NATO
with the Warsaw pact; the British landing in Egypt with Hungary; our overseas
bases with the Communist repression of Tibet. The eagerness to establish
a moral equivalence deprives the West of the inward assurance which is
required to negotiate effectively.

To be sure, many of these reactions are an understandable,
indeed a healthy reaction to the popular tendency to see complicated
political problems in absolute categories of black or white. But in the attacking
such over-
on this simplification, the critics run the risk of reducing all issues to
a single shade of grey. They are confirmed in their tentativeness by the
fear that the alternative to the postulate of moral equivalence may be
nuclear war. But in the nuclear age it should be possible to find a
motive for peace other than denying our values. The more insecure we grow,

19. See broadcast by Philip Noel-Baker, the Norwegian Broadcasting Company, reprinted by the New England Regional Offices, American Friends Service Committee.

V - 7

after German troops reoccupied the Rhineland, "ought to be taken at
face value. Herr Hitler made a statement sinning with one hand but
holding out the olive branch with the other which ought to be taken at
face value. These may prove to be the most important gestures yet made....
It is idle to say these statements were insincere.... The dominant problem
is peace and not defence."

Partly because for reasons of domestic policy, partly because of
the inward uncertainty of the leadership groups, the democracies for over a
generation now have resolved their doubts by making the most favorable
assessment about the future and the intentions of the dictatorships. In
order to justify the negotiations they sought so earnestly, they have
refused to make moral distinctions and they have been driven to postulate a
moral equivalence between themselves and their sworn enemies: "I also
agree in welcoming so far as Europe is concerned the attempt of the
Government to establish contact with the rulers of Germany," a British
Labour leader said in 1937. "Any attempt to separate the sheep from the
goat and to have the world divided in two or more camps based upon ideological
grounds would be absolutely fatal to the future welfare of mankind."

20. Hansard 330, 21 December 1937, col. 1841.

V - 8

[Y]

To be sure, many of our difficulties reflect the fact that the stability of our society and that of the other Western democracies has been due to an environment in which statements could be taken at face value and appearances were at one with reality. But this only defines the problem; it does not solve it. It still leaves us the task of finding the spiritual elan to act with conviction in a world where the only certainty available is within ourselves. Our central problem is not how to react to this or that Soviet overture but to overcome the malaise which has made us the prisoner of petty calculations and small motives. A great deal of discussion has been directed to the problem of our ability to survive. It is likely, however, that the ultimate answer transcends technique and depends on our worthiness to survive.

4/29/59

BEYOND THE SUMMIT

Henry A. Kissinger

When on November 27, 1958 the Soviet Union by a unilateral act
threatened to sever the life-lines to Berlin, it brought into sharp focus
not only the issue of Western relations with the Soviet bloc but also the
relationships with our allies, the purpose of our diplomacy and the goals of
our strategy. In an alliance, disagreements are unavoidable and different
approaches may contribute to the vitality of a consensus finally achieved.
Since in democracies policies are dependent on popular support, they are
usually developed by a public debate which stresses conflicting approaches.

Even bearing this in mind, there is reason for serious concern.
The reaction to a clear Soviet menace to the very vitals of the Western
alliance has been tentative and unimaginative. There has been a curious
reluctance to admit that the cause of tension may be Soviet hostility or that
Soviet measures may be offensive and not defensive, that the Soviet Union
may be less interested in confirming the status quo than in consolidating
a base for a further advance. The current debate has confined itself far

before the Soviet overture when they could have become a symbol of Western
imagination.

The West's lack of a sense of direction and its concern with
negotiationg technique enables the Soviet Union to shift all disputes to our
side of the line. The West is asked to "solve" problems which the Soviet Union
creates and [applaud] to consider as a compromise a willingness by the Soviets to
settle for something less than originally demanded.

Thus when President Eisenhower indicated his willingness to attend
a summit conference he explained that the Soviet note of March 2 had been
"more reasonable," even though the note represented a reiteration of every
Soviet demand since the beginning of the crisis. Its only "concession"
was to drop the demand for an immediate summit conference. Similarly
the insolent Soviet proposal that Soviet troops might join those of the
NATO
West in West Berlin was hailed - against the background of the demand for
the complete evacuation of allied troops - as a sign of flexibility. In
this manner, the Soviet leaders can draw a double advantage from intransigeance:
they can increase the uneasiness of the West by extreme statement and gain
a reputation for being conciliatory without yielding anything of substance.

I - 7

the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting was a complete failure. Mr. Khrushchev
has not achieved a four power conference. He has done better. He has
arranged meetings with the President from which our allies are excluded.

(B) A demonstration of the lack of unity of the West. The
immediate reaction to the Soviet threat to Berlin was a public debate on
what concessions might be made and public accusations of bad faith and
irresolution among the allies. Three weeks before the foreign ministers'
conference there was still no agreed Western position, and the lack of
conviction with which the Western plan was presented revealed that the
West lacks a clear conception of the purposes for which it might strive.

or developing its own program,
Rather than concentrating on restoring its unity, the West has
been obsessed with determining Soviet intentions. Delegations of political
leaders from most countries of the Atlantic Community and from almost every
political party have descended on the Communist capital. The impression
has been created that an interview with Mr. Khrushchev is the prerequisite
to policy. Moscow has become the focus of diplomatic activity. The West
has hung on Mr. Khrushchev's erratic pronouncements as if it could discover
no purpose of its own save in reaction to Soviet moves. The Eisenhower-

III - 3

understand that the Cold War cannot be ended by a smile; that it requires
specific adjustments expressed in a concrete program. An improvement in
the atmosphere is a useful first step, but it will prove as ephemeral as
the "spirit of Geneva" if we use it as an excuse to relax our efforts and if
we are not vigilant before new dangers.

At the very least the Khrushchev visit will have gained time and
that in the nuclear age is a precious commodity. But time is neutral. It
is an ally only of those with the energy and conviction to use it properly.
If we employ it to change the attitudes which produced this crisis, the
exchange of visits may mark a turning point in post-war history.
If we use it to justify the continuation of our present course we will have
purchased a lull that will make disaster inevitable.

We must admit to ourselves that we are in grave danger. We have to
restore Allied unity. We must remedy the military weakness that invites
constant Soviet pressure. It simply does not make sense for NATO, comprising
twice the manpower and three times the industrial resources of the USSR to
assert that it is unable to afford what is so plainly required for its survival.

The ultimate problem far transcends that of Communism. Indeed we

III - 4

[4]

will be able to deal with Communism effectively only to the degree that we
act constructively with respect to tasks much more directly in our control

such as the cohesion and growth of the Western world and its contribution
to the development of the emergent nations. Here many opportunities await
only our dedication and imagination. A policy concerned primarily with
equilibrium and normalcy is not equal to the challenge of a revolutionary
period. Deeper values are at stake than the relative ability to produce

2Y

as that of every generation,

our task is to make our belief of freedom and dignity

necessary

relevant to our times. To do this, it is time that we end the obsession

with Soviet intentions and seek to become clear about our own.

[Y]

-35-

The essence of good administration is coordination among the specialized functions of a bureaucracy. The task of statesmanship is to impose purpose on routine. Administration can operate on the basis of hierarchy and discipline; statesmanship, at least in a democracy, must obtain assent. Administration is concerned with execution; policy making must in addition address itself to developing a sense of direction. Our future course as a nation depends (importantly) to a large extent on the ability to develop a style of life more conducive to creativity and inward independence; on the willingness of our leadership groups to spend as much energy on becoming familiar with the substance of national problems in the management of day-to-day affairs; on the degree to which we can produce a public philosophy which will supply us with criteria of decision.

The stakes could hardly be higher: the deepest cause of the inhumanity of our time is probably its "objectivity," the pedantic application of administrative norms. Its symbol may well be the "commissar," the ideal-type of a bureaucrat, who condemns thousands without love and without hatred

[Y]

-36-

simply in pursuance of an abstract duty. But we would do ourselves an injustice
if we ignored that the commissar is not a Soviet but a universal phenomenon -
the Soviet system has simply encouraged it in its most extreme form. He is
the administrator whose world is defined by regulations in the making of which
he had no part, to whom reality is exhausted by the organization in which he
finds himself. Our challenge is to rescue the individual from this process;
to escape from the pretentiousness and stultifying quality of an atmosphere
in which all sense of reverence for the unique is lost in the quest for re-
ducing everything to manipulable quantities. Not only the spontaneity of
American policy will depend on how well we solve this problem but also the
fate of human dignity.

V - 6

[Y]

the more we confirm Soviet expectations and the more temptations we create to use diplomacy to demoralize us further. Humility that takes the form of avoiding a point of view is an evasion of responsibility.

By depriving itself of conviction, the West finds it increasingly difficult to deal with the problem of conjecture in foreign policy. Any policy must be based on an assessment about the future course of events or the intentions of other countries or even merely the limits of the possible which can never be proved "certain." Because of this conjectural element, policy contains an inevitable precautionary element. Many measures are necessary not because the policymaker is absolutely certain of a given trend but in order to avoid the worst eventuality. The world will never know what horrors it avoided by taking decisive measures in time and therefore it can never be "certain" that these measures were in fact necessary. Had the West stood up to Hitler in 1936, it would probably still be in dispute whether he was a misunderstood nationalist or a revolutionary, and if a revolutionary whether he in fact represented a danger to world peace.

"Herr Hitler's statement (offering to negotiate)," said Arthur Henderson

Try hard to find a fresh idea which will express these familiar (to you) ideas

May 3, 1959

Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger

From: C. H. Owsley

Subject: Comments on "Beyond the Summit", draft of 4/29/59

I think this is a very fine, sense-making effort. I only wish I had written it myself since I am now engaged in a struggle to produce something in the same field.

If the comments that follow seem to have a minimum of constructive content this is essentially because I agree with so much of what you have said. I hope that out of the many nit-picks you may find some that will be helpful.

1. p. 1, lines 1 and 2. If anyone wanted to get technical on you they would dispute the assertion that the Soviet Union did actually threatened to sever the life-lines to Berlin, even if you only said the life-lines to West Berlin. You can of course defend the statement since the Soviet action may indeed turn out to have the effect you suggest.

2. p II-3, last sentence, ist para. Verb missing.

3. p II-3, 2nd sentence, 2nd para. "on the Elbe". If what you mean is the present dividing line, "on the Elbe" is inexact and may be confusing.

4. § II-3, 3rd sentence, 2nd para. "The attempt to base policy on ties to the West having failed". Has it failed in any other respect than to achieve reunification? If not, you might say, "having failed to achieve reunification", and leave out the qualifying remark about public opinion.

5. p II-7, ist sentence, 2nd para. "its political and moral position is strong." I don't know what you have in mind under "political position". In any event, there is an implication in your statement that our power position is not strong. Do you wish to leave this implication? Do you wish to make an explicit statement?

6. p II-8, 2nd sentence, 2nd para. Does this sentence belong right here: I don't think it connects too well with either the preceding or the succeeding sentences.

7. p II-9. Among face-saving arrangements that could be worked out I am rather attracted by the feature of the FDP plan which provides for approval of the constitution by a plebiscite. You might want to mention this. If you do I will have to get ahold of the FDP plan, which de Leusse has, and see exactly what the plan does envis-

approximate those planned for the NATO shield." I think this is highly
arguable. On the next page you speak of the possibility of a severe
limitation on German armed forces. But you don't anywhere mention
the possibility that (a) there might be agreed limitations at a level
which would neither leave Germany defenseless nor permit her to enter
an arms race, or (b) even left to her own devices she would not necess-
arily - or by necessity - enter into an arms race.

17. It seems to me that in this section someplace you should at least **make** mention the gain in stability that would result from German reunification - even in neutrality. This may not be entirely relevant to a discussion of Western Europe's ability to defend against the USSR, but it does have something to do with the broader problem of peace in Europe, which depends on other things than freedom from attack by the USSR.

18. p IV-4, last sentence on page. "...defense..would rest entirely on the American retaliatory power.." Isn't British retaliatory power relevant as part of the strategic deterrent?

19. p IV-5. You speak of the neutral belt as constituting a single bloc. This doesn't necessarily have to be the case, does it? I don't much like the idea of a bloc of Central European states either, for the reasons you mention, but I can conceive of a belt of states, cut off from NATO or Warsaw Pact alliances but not necessarily associated with each other in a neutrality pact. (Sorry. Reading on, I gather that you also have this possibility in mind.)

20. p IV-8, 1st sentence, 1st full para. "A neutral belt, then, is a far riskier course than **the one outlined above**." Which one?

21. pp V-4,5. I'm afraid I don't follow much of the paragraph beginning "The basic weakness..." At least, I don't recognize who it is in the West who is displaying this 'eagerness to establish a moral equivalence.'

Again, I think this is a very fine piece and very much needed writing. I hope it comes out soon.

C.H.O.

I-16

[Y]

our allies.

This view would be valid only if the increase in the range and destructiveness of modern weapons remained a monopoly of the War. But as the missile age develops, an inadequate limited war establishment may combine the worst features of every course of action. If we place only a little step between surrender and all-out war, we will still confront the principal problems described in the previous chapter. The Soviet opportunity to blackmail allies and neutrals would substantially remain. The dread alternative of surrender or suicide will even be compounded by the risk of a series of "small" defeats, none of which seems "worth" an all-out war.

The consequences may be positive Communist incentive to defeat small American limited war forces--if only to demonstrate our impotence. In the period of mutual invulnerability, the United States cannot impose on itself the burden of having to respond to any challenge with the threat of self-destruction. A limited war establishment is no longer a question of choices, but a necessity for the entire free world. Its cost must be weighed not against the price of an increased budget but of a national disaster.

II - 15

[N]

**that it will remain limited?** No other problem lends itself so well to scoring debating points. Since it is the essence of limited war among major powers that they do **not** commit all their resources, it is easy to "prove" how a conflict once started can expand. No one can "know" whether a country would accept defeat without expanding hostilities. No one can be certain that both sides would not add increment of power until a conflagration occurs. The limitation is psychological. War can be kept limited only if both sides want to keep it limited.

It is easy to understand the objection of the traditionalists to the concept of limited war. They do not believe in its utility either for deterrence or for the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism of some of the other groups is puzzling. They pretend that those who advocate a greater reliance on limited war wish to bring it about. They give the impression that the choice before us is peace or limited war and they then proceed to demonstrate the easy proposition that peace is preferable.

However, our alternatives are quite different. No responsible person advocates **initiating** limited war. The problem of local defense will

For the task before the West is to determine not the desirability of peace -
which should be taken for granted - but the possibility of a settlement which
does not hazard our security and which expresses our values.

III - 1

III

Few topics have roused as many passions with such vague definitions as the term disengagement. It is applied equally to a troop-freeze, to the reduction of troops, to the withdrawal of American, British and Soviet forces from Germany, Poland and Hungary, to a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. It has been advocated as a step to be undertaken side by side with reunification, as a measure that might lead to German reunification and as a device to bring about a relaxation of tensions in its own right. Moreover, because of the prevailing confusion about the purpose of NATO and the political goals of the Western alliance, we possess no yardstick against which to measure our policy alternatives.

In order to put into focus the military implications of the various proposals, it is essential to discuss the problem of NATO strategy. Unhappily the role of NATO is far from clear. It is argued for example that NATO has prevented a Soviet attack without ever meeting the force levels planned for it. Since Soviet ground strength has been preponderant throughout the existence of NATO, so the argument goes, peace has been maintained for one of two reasons or a combination of

III - 2

them: either because the Soviet Union never had any intention of
making a military attack on Europe in the first place or because it
was deterred from such an attack by the threat of a general war with the
United States. The corollary of this line of reasoning has been that a
limited war in Europe is "unthinkable." Disengagement in these terms
would merely shift the starting line for a Soviet advance 100 or 550
miles to the East without reducing the sanction against such a move.
To be sure, the Soviet Union might decide to reoccupy the territories
once vacated, but it could do so in Mr. Kennan's words "only once and
only for the highest stakes: in the contingency, that is, of general
war." Massive retaliation would furnish the deterrent against Soviet
attack whether on the Elbe, the Oder or the Bug.

These arguments have thus had the negative virtue of pressing
home all the inconsistencies of present NATO strategy: the reliance
for both deterrence and the conduct of the war on a weapon that is under
the exclusive control of the two extra-continental allies, the United
States and Great Britain; the demand by our European allies for a
substantial United States and British troop commitment coupled with a

substantial United States and British Troop commitment coupled with a
States and Great Britain's decision to end our European allies for a
the exclusive control of the extra-continental area, the United
for post deference and the combat of the war on a weapon that is under
home off the inoffensives of present NATO strategy: the reliance

These arguments have time and the negative virtue of blessing
attack whether on the Eupée, the Ober or the Rhine.

攻御 whether on the Eupée, the Ober or the Rhine.

NATIVE retaliation would unnerve the defient against Soviet
war." Negative retaliation would unnerve the defient against Soviet
only for the highest offices: in theategically, that is, of General
once activated, but it could do so in Mr. Reagan's words "only once and
To be sure, the Soviet Union might decide to reacquire the territories
miles to the beat without reaching the station against such a move.

would merely shift the existing line for a Soviet advance 100 or 220
kilometres war in Europe is "mussinapie". Disengagement in these terms
United States. The corollary of this line of reasoning has been that a
was deferred from such an attack by the threat of a General war with the
making a military attack on Europe in the first place or because it
from: either because the Soviet Union means and will, in the
NO

III - 5

III - 4

That It also explains why thoughtful people have seen the military establishment on the Continent as a bargaining counter: Since it was not expected to play a significant military role, it could be reduced for a political gain. And its symbolic function could be achieved by a more solemn U.S. commitment.

However, it is dangerous to assume that just because the confusions in NATO strategic doctrine have not been exploited by the Soviet Union in the past decade, this will be true when the Soviet nuclear arsenal is fully developed. Indeed, the challenge in Berlin would indicate precisely the opposite. And it would be a grave mistake to seek to apply the military lessons of the first decade of NATO to a future in which a great deal will depend on adjusting to a fundamental change in strategic relationships.

One of the difficulties of the nuclear age has been that no sooner has one set of technological and military factors been assimilated in doctrine and policy than these have been made obsolete by new developments. The doctrine of deterrence was based on the assumption that aggression could be deterred as long as risks were posed for the

8. See speech by Adlai Stevenson, *New York Times*, March 6, 1959.

III - 5

aggressor out of proportion to the objective sought. Because it was never
easy to determine how highly the aggressor might value any given objective,
deterrence came very rapidly to be equated with maximum destructiveness.

Every increase in the destructive power of weapons seemed also to call forth
a demand for an increase in their numbers. On this calculation nothing
short of complete obliteration of the opponent seemed to offer adequate
protection.

But however effective this conception may have been at the
beginning of the nuclear age, it failed to take into consideration the changing
technology which has caused strategy to pass through four phases: (1) the
period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and the monopoly
of the means of delivery, (2) the period when our monopoly of weapons was
ended but when we still possessed a monopoly of the means of delivery, (3)
the period when the Soviet Union began to develop a substantial delivery
system but our superiority in numbers and the strategic advantage of our base
system gave us a decided advantage in an all-out war, (4) the period when
both in numbers of weapons and in the means of delivery the capabilities of
the two sides begin to approach each other.