Speculations on the
International Implications of Advancing
Space Technology

Klaus Knorr

Prefatory Notes:

(1) The following remarks are in the nature of specula-
tions which -- certainly regarding knowledge of science and
technology -- are less educated than they might be. I often
felt that I would have done better if I could have put
questions and propositions up to such experts as astronomers,
high-altitude photographers, and meteorologists. In other
words, I do not take my conclusions or predictions seriously.
But some of the questions I raise may deserve further study.

(2) I am concerned with _outer space_; i.e. with develop-
inaugurated by Sputnik rather than by the first ICBM's. I
realize that the distinction is hard to define. Perhaps we
could say that I am concerned with shots into or from outer
space rather than with shots from one point to another point
on the earth.

(3) The future envisioned is about 25 years. Regarding
it, I have made the following general assumptions -- on outer
space developments -- assumptions which though not wholly
arbitrary (i.e. they are based on my reading of the available
literature) -- may turn out to be false predictions. I
assume that many kinds of satellites will be developed, and
that some degree of travel _within_ the solar system may well
occur, including travel by manned vehicles to, say, the
moon and possibly the nearer planets. For what seems

[LC]

-2-

to be good scientific and engineering reasoning, I do not assume that, during the period, there will be interstellar travel by manned vehicles. Hence, such problems as the following are excluded: the encounter of other than the most primitive forms of life in outer space; the colonization of other stars, except possibly for small stations on the moon and the nearer planets.

(4) My speculations will involve economic and military as well as international political implications, since all of these are interdependent.

## The Analytical Objective

The international system is a system of state actors with certain characteristics, that is, capabilities and intentions, who act within a given setting, or arena, or environment. We are concerned here with effects on this system which will or may result from advancing space technology and advancing exploration of outer space. More precisely, we are concerned with possible changes in actors' intentions and/or capabilities brought about by the specified changes in environment. During the next twenty-five years, of course, the capabilities and intentions of the actors may undergo many and substantial changes which have nothing to do with outer space activities. We are not concerned here with speculating about such changes although these might impinge very much on consequences of space technology and exploration (as would, for instance, the collapse of the Soviet system of government, or the outbreak of thermonuclear

[LC]

war, or any number of other events). In other words, we
assume for analytical purposes that the present structure of
the international system will stay roughly as it is during
the next twenty-five years although we allow some gradual changes
in the capabilities of actors (i.e. we assume that some
recent trends will continue). Our question then is: how
much will advancing space technology and development affect
the intentions and/or capabilities of actors in the system,
and hence perhaps also the operation of the system itself?

**Space Race?**

It is probable that, in the course of the next two or
three decades, the United States and Soviet Russia will run
a "space race" very similar to the arms race they are
engaged in now. In fact, the space race has already begun.
Both races are in a crucial sense R & D races. In the
competitive cold war situation, military and prestige
considerations will propel both nations to press ahead with
space activities, with neither being able to afford quitting.

The chances are that the efforts of the two countries
will yield approximately equal national capabilities, i.e.

1. Thorough procedure would require that, first, we treat the present international system as being incapable of any changes except those resulting from space development (this as the only independent variable) and, second, run various *other independent* changes successively through the analysis.

2. It would be possible to spell out the present operation (or rules of the game) of the international system, as Morton Kaplan does in Chapter II of his *System and Process in International Politics* (1957), especially his analysis of what he calls the "loose bipolar system" — and then speculate systematically about changes in the actors and modes of operation that might be induced by space development.

[LC]

-4-

that neither will forge ahead of the other all across the board in space capability. Though improbable, it is nevertheless possible that one country will outclass the other in outer space. If so, the USSR is at present the more likely candidate for preeminence, and this for the same reasons that seem at present to make a Soviet lead in military capability a distinct possibility. Among these reasons are notably: effective concentration of specific resources (e.g. scientists) to particular tasks centrally determined, effective allocation of general resources to the rapid accumulation of certain special resources (e.g. scientists), relative short lead times in R & D.

If pursued with a competitive vigor similar to that shaping recent defense programs, space programs will obviously be very expensive, with R & D expenditures even a larger proportion of the total than in recent defense expenditures, with a high rate of equipment obsolescence, etc. If space activities are conducted on a large scale and on top (and actually as part of) the arms race, it is clear that only few individual countries can muster the resources for effective participation in the outer space race.

For some time to come, it will again be the Big Two (and even they may to some extent exploit the capabilities of a coalition.) However, since national economic capability for participation in the space race is a function not only of a nation's aggregate economic capacity but also (a) of the proportion of that capacity diverted to space activity (involving a political decision), and (b) of the efficiency

-5-

with which the resources so allocated are employed, a country
such as China may well become a formidable participant before
the 25-year period is over, while the United Kingdom, say,
will remain a lesser "space power." For the reason indicated
under (a) a few lines above, a Communist country is more
likely to emerge as a full-fledged third or fourth participant
than a western democratic country. (At this point, it is
difficult, however, even to speculate about a possible
fourth within 25 years. Neither Japan or India are likely
to have a sufficient resource base; that would leave some
west-European combine as a stronger possibility.)

I do not mean to say that outer space activities are
likely to be monopolized by the Big Two and eventually perhaps
by a Big Three or Four. There will be "fourth countries" all
along which will be able to participate in outer space
activities on a small scale, which will have varying
capabilities of using space. But a comprehensive and
complex outer space system (or series of systems) will be
too costly for all but a few nations or coalitions.

There is, of course, one major alternative to the
competitive outer space race, and that is the international-
ization (or supranationalization) of outer space development
under the United Nations, or rather under, or in, a
specialized agency of the United Nations. Should this
happen, the pace of outer space development would no doubt
be slower than under competitive conditions even though
internationalization might eliminate some of the duplicative
wastes of inter-nation rivalry. Development would be slower

[LC]

-6-

because the big nations would be loath to allocate as large
financial outlays to an international program as they would
to national programs. And they would be apt to spend less
on international programs because these would serve some of
their real or imagined *national* interests (e.g. military
superiority, prestige) less than national programs might.

If the development of outer space activities were inter-
nationalized, nearly all the problems mentioned in this paper
would not arise or appear with a quite different complexion.
As a side-effect, it would also serve to enhance the position
of the United Nations and the chances that other than outer
space activities would be internationalized or supranational-
ized. In fact, the history of mankind would be grossly
different under this alternative from what it is likely to be
under the competitive assumption.

I will not, however, speculate further on the implications
of the international alternative (but somebody should!) because
I feel that it is likely to be shunned by the Big Two. This
is *likely* to happen because either or both may hope to outdo
the other under competitive conditions and because, even at
this early stage of outer space development, it would be
difficult (though not impossible) to separate outer space
R & D from military R & D; and a decision to internationalize
outer space development would therefore presuppose a far-
reaching agreement on arms control and arms-development
control.

On the other hand, my initial assumptions on scientific
and technological (tacitly also economic!) feasibility exclude

[Lc]

-7-

very powerful pressures toward internationalization, if not supranationalization. For instance, if it became possible within the envisaged time period, for one or several nations to manipulate substantially the weather visited on other countries, the competitive situation would hardly remain tolerable for long (unless some powerful deterrent inhibited nations from using their weather-changing capability.)

There would then emerge a strong pressure either toward supranationalization by voluntary agreement or toward one power achieving supremacy in the system and becoming the single organizer.

## Economic Costs and Gains

The question arises of whether substantial economic implications of advancing space technology might have important international political consequences. Here, the possibilities range from the receipt of vast net gains from space activities, at one extreme, to the economic exhaustion of the main contestants for space supremacy, at the other extreme. My conclusion is that, after about 25 years, the more likely outcomes will be far from the extremes and not too far from the middle of the range, at which neither net gains or losses accrue from space activities. Over the entire period, the most likely economic outcome is substantial but bearable net losses to mankind or to the main rivals for outer space supremacy. (Under the competitive assumption, the economic benefits would tend to be more diffused throughout mankind than the costs.)

-8-

While space activities under competitive conditions will be rather costly to the main rivals, costs will surely fall short of anything disastrous. Economic exhaustion, after all, could mean only that the costs were substituted for investment to an extent that economic stagnation occurred, or for private consumption to an extent that popular dissatisfaction would endanger internal political stability. The governments of the Big Two are unlikely to choose such a level of outlays even though total expenditures on defense and space activities (partly inseparable categories) were to exceed current proportions of gross national products.

On the other hand, I am unprepared, on the basis of present evidence, to credit the outer space enthusiasts who promise vast economic benefits. Colonization of other stars I have ruled out by my initial assumptions. Fantastic transportation costs will rule out anything like "mineral" or "agricultural" exploitation in outer space. Improved weather forecasting through satellites should be a great boon to farming and some other economic activities, and reduce losses caused by storms. In view of all the determinants of agricultural productivity, however, the eventual net gain, though substantial, is unlikely to be revolutionary. It will compare with the results of pest control. (I do not hold active weather manipulation to be feasible within the

3. However, the effect of improved weather forecasting on the "vacation industry" would probably be to raise costs. There may be other instances of such effects.

-9-

period concerned.) Similarly, I can see that communication satellites may cut the costs of telephonic, radio and television communication over and between continents. However, during the next two or three decades at least, these and other economic benefits may not turn out to be net advantages to mankind (or certainly to the main space powers); and if there should be net economies, they will most likely be marginal in relation to the production of national incomes (or of world income).

The greatest economic advantages from advancing outer space activities may be eventually derived from the facilitation of scientific breakthroughs which may lead to vastly cheaper energy. But even if gross energy were virtually costless, it is hard to see how the economic results the world over could be revolutionary. (But much would depend on the form, place and other conditions under which cheap energy would become available.) Yet it is not worthwhile to speculate about such "windfalls" since true scientific breakthroughs are unpredictable before they occur.

## Military Change

Conceivably, changes in military capabilities brought about by space technology could profoundly affect international relations during the next thirty years. Some military representatives have made strong but exceedingly vague statements about the importance of "space power". According to some statements, that nation will become the dominant power on earth which becomes the dominant power **farthest out** in outer space. But as long as the term

[L]

-10-

"space power" is left undefined, all this sounds like a vacuous myth, or at best like a mechanical extension of air power doctrine at its most vacuous.

(On these military matters, speculation without access to military "experts" seemed especially hazardous and probably fruitless. Indeed, my reading of the "evidence" found in articles and reports may be completely wrong.)

Among the kinds of military questions that could be raised, perhaps the most important from our point of view are the following two (or three): (a) Would a lead in space technology by one of the Big Two (later on perhaps "Big Few") confer on it decisive military superiority over the other (others)? (For reasons stated above, especially expense, the chances are slim for a smaller country to outflank the "Big Two" militarily by means of some successful and yet cheap R & D in space technology.) (b) Would military space power (whatever that means) consolidate or diminish the present state of the "balance of terror" which is based on the convincing threat of mutual annihilation? A related but somewhat different question would be (c): Are there promising military uses of space technology which reduce the advantage of offensive over defensive weapons (i.e. delivery of nuclear bombs)?

At this point I am in no position to consider question (c). My tentative answer to question (a) is negative and twofold. First, and as mentioned in the foregoing, it is improbable that one of the main contestants for space power will forge ahead of the other substantially and clearly

-11-

(meaning visibly to all) in space R & D and in operational
systems (although, to repeat, I also believe that, should
the improbable happen, it is more likely to be the Soviet
Union than the United States unless we manage to improve
our R & D performance, etc.) Second, at this point I fail
to foresee military uses of space technology that could be
of decisive importance, i.e. that, if possessed by one only
of the Big Two, would give it clearcut military supremacy
over the other.

The main military uses foreseen at present are three.
First, satellites are expected to improve weather fore-
casting, earth mapping, and communications facilities.
These advances would obviously upgrade military planning
and operations, but they would scarcely do so with
revolutionary military effects. (One fairly important
consequence of better communication might well be an
appreciable reduction in the danger of _accidental_ war.)⁴
Second, there are expected to be reconnaissance satellites
for purposes of military intelligence and especially early
warning of surprise attacks. Such satellites seem to me
unlikely to be of great military importance. Virtually
instantaneous warning of a thermonuclear missile salvo

4. On the other hand, it has been asserted that space craft might be mistaken by a nation for hostile ICBM's, and thus, in the absence of international filing or registration, space travel will increase the risk of accidental war. This assertion seems far-fetched to me. What is in question here is the mistaken assumption of an attack. But would an aggressor fire off _one_ ICBM to attack another country?

[L.C]

-12-

can be obtained by less elaborate means now under develop-
ment and apparently nearing completion. And continuous
military surveillance of a country from satellites will
hardly give advance warning of an *impending* thermonuclear
attack. Knowing that it was under surveillance, an
aggressor would not give away his plans by such things as
visible evacuation of urban populations. The type of
military attack of which such reconnaissance satellites
might give advance warning are conventional ones; and of
preparations for these it is comparatively easy to get
intelligence by other means. (Reconnaissance satellites
would seem to have good intelligence value *during* war.)
On the other hand, it is unlikely that such satellites
will afford us good intelligence on missile sites already
installed or in the process of being installed (i.e.
intelligence on certain kinds of military *capability*.)
The former can be camouflaged; and an opponent, knowing
to be under surveillance, would install new missile bases
in areas and in ways which would make them hard to detect
from a satellite. (Why should the opponent cooperate with
us by, say, putting new missile bases into virgin
territory?) For these reasons, incidentally, satellites
would have only limited utility as internationally
established means for obstructing surprise attacks or
for other kinds of arms control.

Third, there is the touted possibility of firing
thermonuclear warheads from satellites. The advantages

[L]

-13-

of such uses are unclear to me. To be sure, warning time
could be cut greatly if missiles were ejected straight
down from above the target (say, from 300 miles up), and
accuracy should then be formidable; but shooting straight
down seems to make the propulsion requirements very severe,
and it seems uneconomical to lift the propulsion facilities
first into orbit. On the other hand, warning time is not
shortened if a gradual descent range of 5,000 or 6,000
miles is used (which makes the propulsion problem easy),
and accuracy requirements should then be comparable to
what they are for missile firings from the surface of the
earth. In general, it should be more expensive, and
require equipment of great reliability, to substitute
space delivery for delivery from earth surface bases.

There remains question (b). Bomb satellites might
be very important if they were invulnerable, or decidedly
less vulnerable, to surprise attack than missiles launched
from the earth surface. If they were less vulnerable
satellites could become a sort of "space-borne alert"; and,
in addition, might be superior to the Polaris-type system
in terms of accuracy, range and payload. But is there any
reason to expect satellite bases to be less vulnerable to
surprise attack than earth bases are? They are, of course,
moving. But are they not moving like horses on a merry-go-
round?

(Bomb satellites would be preferred if they were
slightly less vulnerable to destruction by enemy action than,
but in the sum of all other respects equal to, land-based

[LC]

-14-

facilities. This would be so because attack on land-based
facilities would lead to population losses or damage.)

Prestige

Scientific and technological prestige will be one objective motivating nations to participate in, and indeed try to excel in, space activities. In the present age, scientific and technological achievement is valued highly. And it is valued increasingly in the sense that, as additional societies modernize themselves, they modernize the relevant parts of their value patterns. Such achievement is taken as a sign of national "vigor" and — because of the exceedingly close (actual or assumed) relationship between such achievements and military potential, if not military capability — also as a symbol, if not the substance, of military power.

Space activities being especially glamorous, considerable
advantages of international prestige are likely to accrue
to the nation which assumes leadership in this enterprise.

Such prestige is an important factor in the creation and
leadership of coalitions (and, in democratic as well as in
non-democratic countries, in the domestic political strength
of governments.) Indeed, nations may compete for space
stations just as in the past they competed for colonies,
even at times (say, during the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century) when colonies seemed hardly to confer any
important military or economic advantages (except to certain
groups; and there will be groups which will find space
development highly advantageous to themselves.) Nations

[1c]

-15-

then did so compete largely because (as some interested
groups had successfully suggested) colonies were accepted
as symbols of status and power. Preoccupation with the
prestige effect would be greatly reinforced if leadership
in space exploration were widely equated with preponderant
military strength. Space success might thus stiffen the
negotiating attitudes of governments even though this is
not warranted by the hard military facts. The USSR and
the United States, and perhaps some other countries, for
these reasons may well continue to vie for outer space
supremacy even though this were economically a net drain
on resources and insignificant in terms of real military
strength.

UN and International Regulation:

As stated previously, it seems at present highly
improbable to me that outer space activity will be inter-
nationalized in the sense that all or most of such activity
would be the monopoly of an operating specialized agency
under the United Nations, an agency which would of course
draw personnel and finance from member nations on some
such basis as that developed by the International Bank or
the IMF. For the Great Powers it would be somewhat more
economical to favor such an arrangement; the great
advantage would be, of course, that of minimizing inter-
national conflict resulting from outer space activities.
I hold such a development to be highly improbable because
the Great Powers would probably expect themselves to forego

-16-

prestige advantages, possible military advantages, and at
least some degree of military privacy, if they internation-
alized.

However, it is of course possible for the UN or some
other international body to regulate to some extent the
space activities carried on by individual nations. Indeed,
concerning some of these activities, regulation and coopera-
tion should confer such obvious net benefits to all that
international regulation and cooperation is probable, if
not certain. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we
expect this to be the case the more some combination of the
following conditions is given:

(a) the purpose of the activity is peaceful
(non-military)

(b) the activity is very expensive

(c) the activity is not particularly prestigious,
but rather routine

(d) cooperation is an operational requisite
(television)

The operation of weather satellites; communication of
weather information; the non-military use of communications
satellites; perhaps certain scientific activities; such
outer space activities might well be readily regulated.
Similarly (and concurrently), some kind of international
space code or law is likely to develop concerning at least
certain aspects of space activities, such as radio communica-
tion, satellite tracking, space navigation, re-entry,
accidents, satellite broadcasting, etc.