HENRY KISSINGER

# The United States and Europe:
What Are We Trying to Do?

I was asked to talk about what the United States expects from Europe, but I
am not going to talk about that precisely, because I wouldn't know what the
United States expects from Europe right now.

No Settled View, Not Even a Real Debate

The American debate on foreign policy at this moment is the worst that I have
ever seen. I cannot understand, for example, how it is possible that
professional diplomats who served as ambassadors in Russia and people who
were organizers of the Cold War structure of alliances can now go to the
American Senate and urge it not to ratify NATO expansion when it has
already been signed. I can understand the argument three years ago, when it
was still open. But for many of the old establishment figures to disavow a
major policy of the United States that all its allies have agreed to, under our
urging, is a rather shocking description of what goes on in America today.
What worries me most about America today is that our debate is getting
polarized between quasi-isolationists on the left and hegemonialists on the
right—between people who want to withdraw from international affairs and
people who think we can impose everything by unilateral action, that every
other country is a bloody nuisance since we can have our way anyhow. And
the two tend to converge very often on practical policies.

So we in the United States not only don't have a settled view of what we
expect of Europe, we don't even have a real debate from which a settled view
can emerge. Our politics has reached the stage where if you attack the
Administration for anything, they will tell you they are already doing what
you are asking for; so there is never any clear-cut argument.

The orthodox view was expressed by an American participant this
morning in his question to Chancellor Kohl: the stronger Europe is the better
we like it, because a strong Europe will be able to help us carry our burdens.
That was a view appropriate to the '60s when there was a great community of
purposes, but I do not think it is axiomatic under present conditions that a
strong Europe will necessarily carry our burdens—or that carrying our
burdens is a motive for Europeans to organize themselves. They may want to
organize themselves *not* to carry our burdens. When one looks at Iraq, Iran,
and many other issues around the world, it is not self-evident to me that the
European perception is always identical with the American perception.

Now I am a great believer in an Atlantic Community. Our ability to
master the problems of fundamentalism, the impact of globalization, the long-
term implications of the rise of China or Asia, does require a common
Atlantic position plus Japan. *But we have to know what it is we are trying to do.*

NATO Membership, NATO Coherence

I am a great advocate of NATO expansion, up to a certain point, because I
believed it was essential for the countries that had been consigned to the

2

Soviet bloc, by the accident of military deployment at the end of the war, to be given an opportunity to return to their historic positions, to find their way in the structure of Europe and the Atlantic. But I am very uneasy with the argument that NATO is some sort of open-ended club that anybody can join if he meets certain democratic and commercial criteria. And I am very uneasy about the argument that we must not create new lines. It is the essence of an alliance that it creates a line. Somewhere (we should argue about where) there has to be a definition of what it is you are trying to organize. Otherwise we are in a mishmash that has no stopping point and no definition. Nor should we try to fob off of countries like Russia by saying, "You are eligible for NATO." The Russians can see through that.

We ought to distinguish between defense organizations, political organizations and economic organizations. There can be different groupings for each. What I expect from Europe, and what I expect from the United States, is that we begin defining what the hell we are trying to do and who belongs to what, and then be honest enough to say, "This is what we think; if somebody has another view, let's hear it and let's get it settled."

I fear that NATO is getting over-extended. There are so many groupings—NATO Council, Permanent Council, Cooperative Council, Euro-Atlantic Council, 42, 16, 19—all serviced by the same Secretary-General with the same staff. How is it possible to have coherence in such an organization? I am a great believer in having Russia participate in political decisions; I am strongly opposed to having Russia in the NATO Council. And I don't think this is something we can just fudge, because that will lead to an endless theological debate: Which issue goes into the NATO Council; which goes into the Permanent Council; when does the NATO Council vote; what cannot go into the Permanent Council? It is much easier to say there are certain political issues in which certain nations participate and there are defense issues in which they don't participate; and then create the appropriate institution for each purpose, with the appropriate secretary-general for each organization. I hope and pray that we keep those institutions separate and not pretend that they are serving the same purpose.

## Other Issues Needing Thought and Real Debate

We need not just to run organizations but to deal with a whole series of problems.

In the Middle East, for instance, what Europe should ask of us and what we should ask of Europe is some definition of what we are trying to do. On Iraq the question is not: Do we bomb or do we have sanctions? The questions are: What is the endgame? What is the purpose we are trying to achieve there? And how are we going to accomplish it? On the Israel-Palestinian question, again, the real debate, instead of grandstand plays by various groups, should ask: What are we trying to do? What do we consider a just end-result of this process? We talk forever about more consultation. It isn't a question of more consultation; it is a question of more thought which is then expressed in consultation.

In Southeast Asia, I believe the attempt to solve a currency problem with a huge program of economic reform has created a massive political problem that makes the economic problem insoluble. It means that every

economic proposal is seen through the prism of an attempted political
revolution by the outside world. Must every last economic institution of the
West be transported to other countries? When a country is in trouble, is it
really true that globalization requires that the first thing we tell the country is
to devalue its currency and increase unemployment? Is there no positive
message we can bring them, except that in three years you may be able to go
to the market again? I don't pretend to have the answer, but I do believe we
are seeing two things. One, we are making the problems less soluble. And
secondly, even in those countries where it looks as if we are solving them, like
Korea, we are creating a nationalist backlash that in the second round will
create a problem between Asia and the United States. That is an issue Europe
and America should discuss.

I agree completely that Russia has to be brought into this conversation. But is the way to do it to treat Russia like a psychiatric case or to treat it like a serious country with serious national objectives that get discussed. In my view, what we really want from Russia is for it to stay within its national borders. If we can settle that question, everything else will flow more easily.

We know we may see a meltdown in China at some point, or we may
see the emergence of a Chinese superpower. This is another topic we ought to
discuss from a conceptual point of view.

Toru Kusukawa has correctly identified the issues that will arise from
the creation of the Euro. Europeans are afraid to discuss them now because
they don't want us to interfere, and some Americans are reluctant to discuss
them because they don't believe the Euro will be very serious. So there is no
real dialogue on these issues.

* * *

Sooner or later these issues have to be faced. What I would like to see is that we Americans ask ourselves, what do we really want? And that the Europeans deal with us after defining what they want. I can see what will happen, for example, in the Middle East later this year. Many Europeans seem to think they can euchre us into lifting sanctions on Iraq and Iran without our noticing it. This will lead to a horrible explosion with the American political process if we do not achieve some degree of agreement on what we are trying to do.

Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is Chairman of Kissinger Associates.

1

HENRY KISSINGER

I was asked to talk about what the United States expects from Europe, and I
am not really going to talk about that precisely, because I wouldn't know
what the United States expects from Europe right now.

SUBHEAD

I think the American debate on foreign policy at this moment is the worst that I have ever seen. I cannot understand, for example, how it is possible that professional diplomats who served as ambassadors in Russia and people who were organizers of the Cold War structure of alliances can now go to the American Senate and urge it not to ratify NATO expansion when it has already been signed. I can understand the argument three years ago, when it was still open. But to disavow a major policy of the United States that all its allies have agreed to, under our urging, and that this should be done by many for many of the old establishment figures, is a rather shocking description of what goes on in America today. And what worries me most about America today is that our debate is getting polarized between quasi-isolationists on the left and hegemonialists on the right—people who want to withdraw from international affairs, and people who think we can impose everything by unilateral action, and every other country is a bloody nuisance since we can have our way anyhow. And they tend to converge very often on practical policies.

So I would say, it's not enough to say what does the United States expect of Europe, as if the United States had a settled view. We not only don't have a settled view, we don't even have a real debate in our country from which a

settled view can easily ~~emerge,~~ partly because ~~our~~ politics has reached the
stage where if you attack the Administration for anything, they will tell you
they are already doing what you are asking for; so ~~that~~ there is never any
clear-cut argument. ~~This is the American problem as I see it~~

Now the orthodox view was expressed by Henry Owen this morning in his
question to Chancellor Kohl; namely, ~~the stronger Europe is the better we like~~
it, because a strong Europe will be able to help us carry our burdens, ~~and~~
therefore ~~there will be a division of labor.~~ And that was a view appropriate to
the '60s when there was a great community of purposes, but I do not think it is
axiomatic under present conditions that a strong Europe will necessarily
carry our burdens—or that carrying our burdens is a motive for Europeans to
organize themselves. They may want to organize themselves *not* to carry our
burdens. And when one looks at Iraq, Iran, ~~many other issues around the~~
world, it is not self-evident to me that the European perception is always
identical with the American perception.

Now I am a great believer in an Atlantic Community. And I believe, in fact,
our ability to master ~~some~~ of the problems of fundamentalism, ~~the~~
globalization, the long-term implications of the rise of China or Asia, do
require a common Atlantic position plus Japan. But ~~before we can address~~
this, we have to know what it is we are trying to do.

SUBHEAD

Now I as you know, I am a great advocate of NATO expansion, ~~up to a certain~~
point, ~~because I believed it was essential for the countries that had been~~
consigned to the Soviet bloc, by the accident of military deployment at the

end of the war, we be given an opportunity to return to their historic positions, and to find their way in a structure of Europe and the Atlantic. But I am very uneasy, if my friend here will forgive me, with the argument that NATO is some sort of a club that anybody can join and that it's (open-ended) and anybody who is democratic and anybody can join, if he only meets certain democratic and commercial criteria. And I am very uneasy about this argument, we must not create new lines. It is the essence of an alliance that it creates a line. Somewhere, the Urals if you want to, but there has got to be a definition of what it is you are trying to organize. Otherwise we are in a mishmash of an alternative United Nations, that has no stopping point and no definition. So the argument "no dividing lines" makes me very uneasy. I am perfectly willing and we should argue about the dividing lines. And nor should we try to fob off of countries, quite frankly like Russia, by saying, "You are eligible for NATO. Russians are very smart—at least as smart as we are, whatever that is. And they can see through it."

And I think we ought to distinguish between defense organizations, political organizations and economic organizations. And there can be different types of groupings for each. And what I expect from Europe—and what I expect from us—is that we begin defining what the hell we are trying to do. And who belongs to what, And then be honest enough to say, "This is what we think, and if somebody has another view, let's hear it and let's get it settled." Instead, Strobe Talbott was here yesterday with the orthodox view—you would have been proud of him, Mr. Secretary General—and I asked him, "Well, how about Indonesia? Is it going to be eligible for NATO?" And so this is the question that I have about membership.

4

Secondly, with my enormous affection for the Secretary-General and I told him he is so charming that I would like to give him every assignment in the world—but I fear that NATO is getting over-extended. There are so many groupings that it's almost impossible to get a hold of, to define them. NATO Council, Permanent Council, Cooperative Council, Atlantic Council, 42, 16, 19—all serviced by the same Secretary-General, with the same staff. With all due respect, how is it possible to have coherence in such an organization? I am a great believer in having Russia participate in political decisions; I am strongly opposed to having Russia in the NATO Council. And I don't think this is something we can just pretend, because it will lead to an endless debate: Which issue goes into the NATO Council; which goes into the Permanent Council; then the NATO Council has to make a vote; what cannot go into the Permanent Council? It is an endless (theological) debate. And I think it is much easier to say there are certain political issues in which certain nations participate, and there are defense issues in which they don't participate; and then, each with the appropriate institution for that purpose, and then, with the appropriate secretary-general, for each organization, and get it accomplished this way. But I'm not fighting that issue. Now that it is done, I just pray and hope that we keep those institutions separate and not pretend that they are serving the same purpose.

SUBHEAD

Now, the fact however is that what we really need is not just to run the existing organizations with all the modifications, but that we deal with a whole series of problems that have been raised.

[D]

5

Then we have seen in Indonesia and in Southeast Asia, In Southeast Asia, I believe that the attempt to solve a currency problem by a huge program of economic reform has created a massive political problem that makes the economic problem insoluble. And which means that every economic proposal is seen through the prism of an attempted or a perceived political revolution by the outside world. And it would be an interesting discussion to know: Is it really true that every last institution in the economic field of the West must be transported to other developing countries? Is it really true that globalization requires that when a country is in trouble the first thing we tell the country is its unemployment and its devaluation. And there is no positive message we can bring them, except that in three years you may be able to go to the market again? I don't pretend that I have the answer, but I do believe that we are seeing two things. One, I believe, we are making the problems less soluble. And secondly, even in those countries where it looks as if we are solving

6

them, like Korea, we are creating a nationalist backlash that in the second
round will create a problem between Asia and the United States. That is an
issue.
discussion between Europe and America should discuss.

And then, of course, I agree completely that Russia has to be brought into this conversation. But I have a serious question whether the way to do it is to treat Russia like a psychiatric case or whether the way to treat it is like a serious country with serious national objectives that get discussed, and whether we can accept the fact that what we really want from Russia is to stay within its national borders, that if we can settle that question, everything else will may flow from it more easily.

We have talked to China. We know we may see a melting down in China at some point, or we can see an emergence of a Chinese superpower. And those are topics we ought to discuss from a conceptual point of view.

Tom Kunsukawa
And my Japanese neighbor to the left has correctly identified in my view all the issues that will arise from the creation of the Euro, which Europeans are afraid to discuss now because they don't want us to interfere, and the Americans are reluctant to discuss it because they don't believe the Euro will be very serious. So there is no real dialogue on that issue.

* * *

But sooner or later these issues have to be faced. So what I would say is that I would like to see it is that we ask ourselves, we Americans ask ourselves, what do we really want? And stop dealing with each issue as if where a sort of a political thing that we can maneuver by splitting the difference. That the

Europeans deal with us also after defining what they want. I can see what will happen, for example, in the Middle East, later this year. Many Europeans seem to think they can euchre us into lifting sanctions on Iraq and Iran without our noticing it. And I think this will lead to a horrible explosion with the American political process if we do not achieve some degree of agreement on what we are trying to do.

So, this is my basic approach that interrupts the perfect amity of this. And therefore say I think the Secretary General is doing such a good job at NATO that I want him to concentrate on it.

Thank you very much.

HENRY KISSINGER

I WAS ASKED to talk about what the United States expects from Europe, but I am not going to talk about that precisely, because I wouldn't know what the United States expects from Europe right now.

## No Settled View, Not Even a Real Debate

> THE AMERICAN DEBATE ON FOREIGN POLICY AT THIS MOMENT IS THE WORST THAT I HAVE EVER SEEN.

47

HAN SUNG-JOO

## Challenges for Asia-Europe Relations

I WILL TALK about challenges for Asia-Europe relations, which in shorthand form is now called ASEM—Asia-Europe Meeting. The second ASEM summit will be held in London shortly.

IT ISN'T A QUESTION OF MORE CONSULTATION; IT IS A QUESTION OF MORE THOUGHT WHICH IS THEN EXPRESSED IN CONSULTATION.

1998 BERLIN MEETING

49

The orthodox view was expressed by an American participant this morning in his question to Chancellor Kohl: the stronger Europe is the better we like it, because a strong Europe will be able to help us carry our burdens. That was a view appropriate to the '60s when there was a great community of purposes, but I do not think it is axiomatic under present conditions that a strong Europe will necessarily carry our burdens—or that carrying our burdens is a motive for Europeans to organize themselves. They may want to organize themselves not to carry our burdens. When one looks at Iraq, Iran, and many other issues around the world, it is not self-evident to me that the European perception is always identical with the American perception.

Now I am a great believer in an Atlantic Community. Our ability to master the problems of fundamentalism, the impact of globalization, the long-term implications of the rise of China or Asia, does require a common Atlantic position plus Japan. But we have to know what it is we are trying to do.

## NATO Membership, NATO Coherence

I am a great advocate of NATO expansion, up to a certain point, because I believed it was essential for the countries that had been consigned to the Soviet bloc, by the accident of military deployment at the end of the war, to be given an opportunity to return to their historic positions, to find their way in the structure of Europe and the Atlantic. But I am very uneasy with the argument that NATO is some sort of open-ended club that anybody can join if he meets certain democratic and commercial criteria. And I am very uneasy about the argument that we must not create new lines. It is the essence of an alliance that it creates a line. Somewhere (we should argue about where) there has to be a definition of what it is you are trying to organize. Otherwise we are in a mishmash that has no stopping point and no

> I AM VERY UNEASY ABOUT THE ARGUMENT THAT WE MUST NOT CREATE NEW LINES. IT IS THE ESSENCE OF AN ALLIANCE THAT IT CREATES A LINE.

48

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

The Trilateral Commission

345 EAST 46th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 • (212) 661-1180

Telefax: 212 949 7268 E-mail: 71230.3263@compuserve.com

Paul A. Volcker
North American Chairman

Yotaro Kobayashi
Japanese Chairman

Otto Graf Lambsdorff
European Chairman

Allan E. Gottlieb
North American Deputy Chairman

Shijuro Ogata
Japanese Deputy Chairman

Carlos Ferrer
European Deputy Chairman

David Rockefeller
Founder and Honorary Chairman

Charles B. Heck
North American Director

Paul Révay
European Director

Tadashi Yamamoto
Japanese Director

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Michel Albert
C. Fred Bergsten
Georges Berthoin
Jorge Braga de Macedo
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Hervé de Carmoy
Umberto Colombo
Jessica P. Einhorn
Koichiro Ejiri
Oscar Fanjul
L. Yves Fortier
Paolo Fresco
Toyoo Gyohten
Robert D. Haas
Miguel Herrero de Minon
Takashi Hosomi
Max Jakobson
Daniel Janssen
Sir Michael Jenkins
Henry A. Kissinger
Cees Maas
Minoru Makihara
Kiichi Miyazawa
Mario Monti
Minoru Murofushi
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Yoshio Okawara
Kiichi Saeki
Guido Schmidt-Chiari
Peter Shore
Myles Staunton
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Björn Svedberg
Niels Thygesen
Norbert Wieczorek
Otto Wolff von Amerongen

April 30, 1998

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue 26th floor
New York, New York 10022

MAY 0 1 1998

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I would like to join with Paul Volcker and others in thanking you most warmly for all you added throughout the Trilateral Berlin meeting, from the Europe session on the first afternoon to the concluding session on the third morning.

You will perhaps recall that we put out a publication on each annual meeting, gathering together the presentations made. We very much hope to include your Europe-session presentation in the Berlin publication. Enclosed are both a transcript of those remarks with my editing suggestions marked in by hand and a clean printing of the edited text. The aim of the editing suggestions is to change a spoken presentation into a piece for reading, including a title and subheadings and language as clear, direct and concise as possible. Please feel free to refine the text further in any way you wish. May we then have your permission to publish it?

It would be marvelous if you or someone on your staff has some moments to go through the text by May 15. We hope to go to the printer in mid-May.

With appreciation and best regards,

P.S. Enclosed is the Tokyo meeting publication from last year, to remind you of the nature of these publications.

EUROPEAN OFFICE: 35, avenue de Friedland, 75008 Paris, France
JAPANESE OFFICE: Japan Center for International Exchange, 4-9-17 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan