KISSINGER, HENRY

Ae/H* [Y]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3:45

March 29

Mr. Kissinger:

Henry Hubbard called to say that Newsweek would run a feature article next week on Laos and he would like to see you in the next few days to discuss the "psychological and physical disposition of North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese and U.S. forces". Do you wish to schedule an appointment in the next few days?

Yes ✓ No ___

Dad

Newsweek

1750 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 • SUITE 1220

January 30, 1973

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Your complaint is well-taken. The magazine does make reference to
President Nixon's redemption of his pledge not to preside over a defeat,
and to his steadfastness, but full of praise we are not.

I take things relatively. I have noted in our copy in recent months,
including the period of bombing in December, a considerable calmness,
and a balance, and an absence of declaration. I am not about to bad-mouth
my magazine because I think it does respond, if somewhat slowly at times,
to facts and logic even in the most complex and emotion-ridden of issues.

I am sure that you have felt at times that your efforts to zixit put
forward the President's case to me were a futile exercise. Believe me,
you are wrong. Files based on talks with you have an irresistible way
of adding dimension to Presidential policy statements and to Presidential
actions, not to mention understanding.

I suspect it will take some time before positive reactions to the
President's Vietnam policy begin to be more visible in the press. But
I take the absence of negatives as a positive. And you have been
responsible for dispatching a great many negatives. Now if you will
only break down and tell me whether you plan to get married, then I'll
guarantee you'll see the results in the magazine.

RECEIVED
FEB 10 1973

CENTRAL FILES

QUAKER RIDGE ROAD, CROTON-ON-HUDSON, N. Y. 10520 • CABLE ADDRESS HUDINST • 914 RO 2-0700

December 20, 1969

To the Fellow Members:

This is your formal notice of a Class Meeting of Fellow Members and a General Meeting of all the Members of Hudson Institute to be held in succession at the offices of the Institute in the Town of Cortlandt, New York, beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, December 31, 1969. It is not anticipated that the Members will attend in person and you will be able to participate fully at these meetings by filling in and returning the enclosed ballot.

Two items of business will come before the Class Meeting of Fellow Members:

First, the re-election of seven Members whose terms will expire this year and who have been nominated for re-election by the Board of Trustees. Their names are given on the enclosed proxy ballot. I have not enclosed biographical material as they are all well known to you.

Second, the re-election of Roger Fisher whose term as Trustee expires this year. A report by your Class Committee nominating him for re-election is enclosed.

Two pieces of business will come before the General Meeting of Members (Public, Fellow and Employee):

First, as you know, the By-laws provide for annual election of the Institute's principal officers, Director and President. The By-laws also provide that the Board of Trustees nominate one person for election to each of these positions. At its meeting on November 14, 1969, the Board of Trustees nominated Herman Kahn for re-election as Director-Trustee and Max Singer for re-election as President-Trustee.

Second, the Annual Report (which will be sent to you under separate cover) will be presented, as required by New York Law. No action on it will be necessary.

We all hope you will fill in and return your proxy. Doing so will insure that we have the necessary quorum to transact the required formalities.

RECEIVED
JAN 9 1970
CENTRAL FILES

You will be interested to know that Hudson has been awarded a rather
large contract by the State of New York to do an analysis of what New
York's policy regarding narcotics drug abuse might be. I'm committed
to spend three-quarters of my time for the next five months as the Project
Leader for this study. In order to do this I have temporarily turned most
administrative responsibilities over to Raymond J. Wilson, Jr., who was
elected Secretary by the Board of Trustees on November 14, 1969. One of
the functions which Ray will be handling during the next few months will
be Board and Members Minutes and correspondence. Ray has been on the
research staff of the Institute since 1967 and will continue to contri-
bute to the research program.

Earlier we wrote you about the Corporate Environment Study. I am
happy to report that the response continues to be very enthusiastic.
Partly because of this we have sharply reduced the percentage of our
total effort that is being funded by the Department of Defense.

You will, I am sure, be pleased to hear that a December fund raising
by Trustees Robert Sprague and Robert Barker has so far resulted in five
generous gifts totaling approximately $200,000. This infusion of capital
will greatly improve the operations of the Institute.

We are happy to announce that Mr. Kenneth T. Young joined our Board
of Trustees, having been elected by the Trustees. His biography is
attached.

As you know, we have tried both semi-annual and annual Members'
Meetings (apart from these formal meetings with attendance by proxy).
It is not clear which scheme the Members prefer. At the last meeting
some Members said that they would like one meeting in the Spring and
another in the Fall. We would like to get a better sense of the over-all
desires of the Members. To this end, we have enclosed a form on which
your preference can be indicated. You can also indicate a preference for
a mid-week or weekend meeting.

We were all deeply grieved by the death of Fellow Member and Trustee
Max F. Millikan, who died at Cambridge on December 14th. As a Trustee
almost from the inception of the Institute in 1961, he was always most
helpful in the affairs of the Institute and had given wise counsel to the
Board and to the work of the Institute.

MS/ah
Attachments

September 1969

YOUNG, The Honorable Kenneth T.

Present Position: President, The Asia Society

Born: 1916 - Canada; grew up in Massachusetts. Education: Studied in Lingnan University, Canton, China, in 1935-36 and at the Sorbonne, Paris, France, in 1937; B.A., Harvard University, 1939; M.A., Harvard University, 1942; LL.D., Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1967.

1940-42 Teaching fellow, Harvard University

1942 Research Assistant, National Resources Planning Board

1942-43 Economist, War Production Board

1943-46 United States Army Air Force, Captain, Pacific Theatre

1946-49 Political Intelligence Officer, Department of State

1949-52 Far Eastern Specialist, Office of the Secretary of Defense

1952-54 Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, State Department

1954-58 Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, State Department

1958-61 Standard Vacuum Oil Company

1961-63 Ambassador to Thailand and SEATO Council Representative

1964- President, The Asia Society, New York City

Participated in Japanese Peace Conference, Panmunjom Political Talks as Deputy Representative, Geneva Conference of 1954 on Korea and Indochina, Summit Conference of 1955, and 1964 Plenary Session of UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East as Chief of U.S. Delegation. Chairman, Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group of The Asia Society and AID; Vice Chairman, Visiting Committee for East Asian Civilizations, Harvard University; Member of: Department of State Panel of Advisers on East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Council on Foreign Relations; Century Association; Harvard Club of New York; Lotos Club of New York; Council of Harvard Graduate Society for Advanced Study and Research; Trustee of: Harvard-Yenching Institute; The Asia Society; Lingnan University, Hong Kong; the JDR 3rd Fund; a Columbia University Associate on South and Southeast Asia.

Author: Books:

The Southeast Asia Crisis, 1966; Negotiating With The Chinese Communists 1953-57, 1968.

Articles:

New Politics and New States, Foreign Affairs, 1961; Vietnam and Southeast Asia: A New Approach, Chicago Daily News, March 18, 1965; The American Encounter with Vietnam, Asia Society Journal, 1966; Asia's Challenge to American Education, State University College, Oswego, N.Y., 1966; American Dealings with Peking, Foreign Affairs, 1966; Diplomacy and Power in Washington-Peking Dealings, University of Chicago, 1967; The Stakes in Vietnam, Current History, January 1968; The Hidden Problems in Negotiating with Asia's Reds, Look Magazine, March 5, 1968; Hanoi's Waiting Game, Look Magazine, November 12, 1968; Thailand and Southeast Asia, Current History, February 1969; The Special Role of American Advisers in Thailand 1902-1949, Asia Society Journal, Spring 1969; Asia and America at the Crossroads, The Annals, July 1969.

Home: 24 Bonnett Avenue, Larchmont, New York 10538

Office: 112 East 64th Street, New York, New York 10021

THIS MONTH

Partridge in a Missile Tree

It is not intentional that this month's cover art by Robert Oshorn has the aspect of a Christmas tree. The drawing is Osborn's interpretation of the arms race, made two weeks after the end of World War II for a book called, *War Is No Damn Good*. We will, however, take advantage of this subliminal effect to extend best holiday wishes to our readers.

Osborn's prescience of the arms race at the time was frighteningly accurate. In the more than two decades since then, the nuclear contest has escalated steadily through new levels of expense, complexity and potential destruction. In the period ahead, it seems, the arms race may move to still higher levels—and perhaps wider ones too, through the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries—unless nations can agree on effective inhibitions on new armaments. This situation has given rise to **The Great Nuclear Debate: Parity vs. Superiority**. These two general approaches to the arms race between the Big Two are discussed beginning on the opposite page by four experts on military and foreign policy: Jerome Wiesner, Adam Yarmolinsky, Donald G. Brennan and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé. We taped the discussion November 1, at Cambridge, Massachusetts, in Dr. Wiesner's office at M.I.T.

One of the central figures in determining the course of the arms race will be the new U.S. president-elect, **Richard M. Nixon**, and for that reason we publish (p. 10) his most definitive statement so far on arms control (made on October 26), **Towards Peace Through Arms Control**.

**What Kind of Foreign Policy Under Nixon?** (p. 14) is our principal editorial. Conclusion: That we will keep our fingers crossed in the hope that things aren't as bad as they look. But here is how they look: the strengthening of NATO will take precedence over building the détente with the U.S.S.R.; the United Nations will be downplayed as a factor in U.S. policy; dictatorships, of the right only, will continue to be supported, and the military budget will continue to grow.

**Professor Lynn Turgeon** of Hofstra University gives a scholarly appraisal of Gunnar Myrdal's huge work, *Asian Drama, An Inquiry Into The Poverty of Nations*, in his review essay, *The Drama of Development* (p. 16). Turgeon reenacts Myrdal's drama, with the underdeveloped countries of South Asia floundering in Act I—and muffing their lines—in what is termed a long-drawn-out three-act play.

Though the World Constitutional Convention and People's World Parliament met recently in Switzerland and Germany to draft a world constitution, Arthur Brackman, who attended the meeting, reports that many of the delegates got sidetracked in other directions. In **World Government: An Outside Route** (p. 19), Brackman tells of their proposals for a World University, a World Peace Corps and a world newspaper.

A HOLIDAY GIFT SUGGESTION

Why not give subscriptions to *War/Peace Report* to your friends and family during the coming holiday season? You'll solve some of your own gift problems, the recipients will find the magazine interesting and useful during the coming year, and *War/Peace Report* will gain in circulation. Use the handy holiday order form bound into this issue—the first subscription is $5 per year (it can be your own renewal), all additional are $4 each. We'll reply by air mail.

WAR/PEACE
REPORT

Fact & Opinion
On Progress Toward
A World of Peace With Justice

Published by The Center for
War/Peace Studies

EIGHTH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

December, 1968

Vol. 8, No. 10

BOARD OF SPONSORS

Roger N. Baldwin
Founder, American Civil Liberties Union

Donald G. Brennan
Hudson Institute
Stuart Chase
Author

Brock Chisholm, M.D.
Former Director General, WHO

Arthur N. Holcombe
Honorary Chairman,
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

Amrom H. Katz
The RAND Corporation
Arthur Larson
Director, World Rule of

Philip Noel-Baker, M.P.
Nobel Peace Prize Winner
Law Center, Duke University

Charles S. Rhyne
Chairman, World Peace Through Law Center

James N. Rosenberg
Lawyer, Painter
C. Maxwell Stanley
President, Stanley Engineering Co.

Jerome B. Wiesner
Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Editor: Richard Hudson

Managing Editor: Pat Reilly

Consulting Editors: George A. Beebe, Roy Bennett, Laurence R. Birns, Arthur Blaustein, William W. Cowan, William H. Honan, Jack Voelpel

Business Manager: Charles Bloomstein

Advisory Board: Mel Dubin, chairman; Thomas Yoseloff, vice chairman; Herbert Barchoff, James Boyd, Michael Erlanger, Irving F. Laucks, Jonathan D. Levine, Leon Schneider, Norman Seiden, Isaac Wiener.

President, Center for War/Peace Studies:
Robert W. Gilmore

*War/Peace Report* is published monthly, except for June/July and August/September when it is bi-monthly, by The Center for War/Peace Studies of New York Friends Group, Inc., 218 East 18th St., New York, N. Y. 10003; John Hughes Hall, chairman; Dikram P. Donchian, treasurer. Copyright by New York Friends Group, Inc., 1968. The opinions expressed in *War/Peace Report* are those of the contributors or editors and do not necessarily express the views of the New York Friends Group, Inc., or others associated with the publication. All editorial and advertising correspondence should be addressed to *War/Peace Report*, 301 E. 48th Street, New York, N. Y. 10017. Telephone: 212-753-8870. Cable address: WARPEACE, New York. All subscription correspondence should be addressed to *War/Peace Report*, 218 East 18th Street, New York, N. Y. 10003. Telephone: 212-GR 5-0850. Subscription price is $5 per year for all countries of the world. Single copies, 50 cents each. U.S. student rate, $3.50. Please allow six weeks for change of address and start of new subscriptions. Change of address should be accompanied by old address as well as new, including zip code. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. *War/Peace Report* is indexed in the Public Affairs Information Service.

2

WAR/PEACE REPORT

THE GREAT NUCLEAR DEBATE:
PARITY VS. SUPERIORITY

Should the U.S. strive to stay ahead in the nuclear arms race or is it
now meaningless to speak of atomic superiority? Here four experts of
varying views discuss this crucial question facing the new administration.

The Discussion:

HUDSON: Let's discuss two questions: First, should the U.S. seek a military posture based on parity or superiority toward the Soviet Union? Second, should the U.S. seek an agreement with the Soviet Union placing limitations on the missile systems of the two sides? If so, what might be the nature of the agreement?

YARMOLINSKY: At the start, I would
take the position that there is no such
thing as nuclear superiority.

WIESNER: The question is: do you seek it?

YARMOLINSKY: You can seek things
that you cannot find. Then we have a
philosophical question.

WIESNER: I think that one could
maintain some kind of numerical su-
periority. In other words, if we made
a decision to buy an extra thousand
missiles, it might take the Russians a
couple of years of arguing to decide
whether they are going to do the same,
so there might be a period of time
when we had 300 or 700 missiles more
than they had. But this numerical su-
periority is not militarily significant,
and would just make matters worse
since the Soviet Union would begin to
respond by building more missiles to
equalize the situation. Then we would
react again, and we would be back in
a position of numerical superiority at
one higher level.

YARMOLINSKY: Superiority beyond
that amount necessary for a second
strike is meaningless superiority. That
kind of superiority is something that
both sides can and do have, and there-
fore it is even more meaningless.

WIESNER: Related to this question of
superiority is the question of whether
to seek any agreement with the Soviet

Union limiting missile systems. You
can't go both routes: you can't have it
both ways. The Russians apparently
are not willing to accept a numerically
inferior position or a freeze in a
world in which once a year the U.S.
administration goes to Congress and
demonstrates that we've got four times
the number of missiles that the Soviets
have. I suspect that for the Soviet
Union this is a politically unacceptable
situation, both at home and for their
world position.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I would say that you
can't *seek* parity either.

WIESNER: That's a more subtle point.
The Soviets have sought parity.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I do not think they
seek parity. They simply seek to ac-
quire a position which is not inferior
to ours.

YARMOLINSKY: So long as politicians
in both countries talk in what are in
fact meaningless—though sonorous—
terms about the value of superiority,
it is awfully difficult if not impossible
to pursue the policy of seeking parity.
You can be out-missiled or out-mega-
tonned easily by a politician who either
doesn't know or doesn't want to know
the real situation.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I don't think that
the Soviets would abide, for a moment,
the concept of parity. From my read-
ing of Soviet military literature, I
would be inclined to say that they con-

ceive of their strength in ICBMs as
simply an integral factor of their over-
all position, political and military.

WIESNER: I would say that that was
their policy for a long time, but I be-
lieve that something has happened to
them and that they have changed their
goals. One cannot really tell because
we don't talk to them about their poli-
cies. It is uncertain whether the change
was caused by an actual feeling of in-
feriority at the time of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis or the continuing political
embarrassment of having a nuclear
force so clearly inferior.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I believe that the
Russians are much more political about
these matters than Americans. I mean
political in the sense that they are very
much aware of their position of lever-
age in Europe vis-a-vis the United
States. They are fully conscious, that
in any missile confrontation in West-
ern Europe, they have an asymmetrical
advantage over the U.S. If you discuss
parity or superiority in terms of some
sort of symmetry or asymmetry as be-
tween the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, you leave out the essentially asym-
metrical geopolitical strategic relation-
ship between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union.

YARMOLINSKY: But that is why, it
seems to me, that talking in terms of
parity, superiority, numbers, is really
not a meaningful way to talk. If you
have twice as many nuclear weapons,
it doesn't mean that you are twice as

THE PARTICIPANTS: Donald G. Brennan, a long-time participant in the Pugwash movement, and now a senior member of the professional staff (and former president) of the Hudson Institute; Robert Strausz-Hupé, director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the University of Pennsylvania; Jerome B. Wiesner, former science adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, now provost of M.I.T.; Adam Yarmolinsky, former special assistant to the secretary of defense and now a professor of law and member of the Institute of Politics in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. WPR Editor Richard Hudson acted as moderator.

DECEMBER, 1968

3

strong. The situation with nuclear weapons is completely different from the case of non-nuclear weapons. The reason you want nuclear weapons, if you want them at all, is to be able to inflict so much damage on the enemy after he has inflicted the most damage he can inflict on you with a surprise attack, under the conditions most favorable to him, that the damage that he will suffer will be unacceptable to him, and therefore he will be deterred from initiating the attack in the first place. Now you've got to have that much, whatever that much is, and clearly this is not a point that can be defined with mathematical precision. Whether the Russians would be deterred by the knowledge that 40 per cent of the population would be killed, or 38 per cent, or 33 per cent, or that half their industrial capacity would be destroyed, or three-fourths of it, is something that you have to guess about; so you guess high. But once you have made the guess, and fixed the amount, decided what the figures mean for your purposes, then anything less than that destructive capacity is worth nothing, and any increment over that is worthless. This situation is unique to nuclear war.

**WIESNER:** It is not really that simple. The whole thing is psychological—it's based on somebody's estimates and calculations.

**YARMOLINSKY:** And because there is this psychological element, there can be an awful lot of political pulling and hauling about how much is enough. For example, it might be argued that because the Soviet Union has weapons, nuclear and non-nuclear, death rays, or whatever, trained on the cities of Western Europe, that the U.S. should right the "imbalance" by training more weapons on the Soviet Union. But this is nonsense.

**WIESNER:** Unless there is an unspoken strategy which includes the possibility of a pre-emptive strike to wipe out those missiles aimed at Western Europe.

**YARMOLINSKY:** But how does that enter into the calculations of how much is enough?

**WIESNER:** If what you want is enough weapons to wipe out in your initial strike as much of their missile capacity as you can, you must make a very different kind of calculation.

**YARMOLINSKY:** I just don't see the logic of that. Because if you do that then you invite a retaliatory strike that

will be, by definition, unacceptable to you.

**WIESNER:** Suppose you decide that in any event the exchange is going to take place.

**YARMOLINSKY:** But you don't ever know that an exchange is going to take place.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I think it is precisely this reciprocal assumption about this kind of superiority that has operated over the last 15 years in international politics. In fact, this assumption must have been behind Mr. Khrushchev's withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.

**YARMOLINSKY:** I don't see how that is related to the previous point.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I think it does relate. If the Russians had not thought that we could inflict unacceptable damage on them, and if they had not thought that they would not be able to do quite the same thing to us, I don't think Mr. Khrushchev would have drawn back.

**WIESNER:** I don't agree with that. His logic could have been very different. He may well have looked at the Cuban affair as a very interesting and marginal adventure, one he wasn't prepared to let go very much further.

**BRENNAN:** I would like to draw some distinctions here. There are various kinds of superiority, and the easiest one to discuss has to do with outcomes of war that look, roughly speaking, inexpensive to one side or the other. Wiesner alluded to the possibility of a first strike counter-force attack that might limit the retaliatory strike to something relatively modest. And both Wiesner and Yarmolinsky suggested that this is not something that is in the cards as a realistic possibility for the U.S. to achieve vis-a-vis the Soviets or

the Soviets to achieve vis-a-vis the United States. Then there could be a sort of marginal, technical superiority that would be based on questions of who had better control of the forces themselves, or who had better defenses of one kind or another. Thirdly, there is the kind of superiority politicians pay attention to—and this has to do with numerical relationships between missile forces. As Yarmolinsky pointed out, it is rather meaningless once you get above a certain level—I think the professional analyst would agree that there is some phenomenon like a saturation deterrent. But the world is not run by us analysts, and people in charge of political events have their own perceptions about the relationship of these forces.

**HUDSON:** There is now talk by the Air Force people that technologically it could be possible for the Russians to develop their missiles to the point where they are so accurate that they could knock out our hardened missile sites. Also, they say that the Russians might find techniques to search out and destroy our Polaris submarines. And they say that the Russians may be able to develop bombs that will explode over their own skies, making it impossible for any of our weapons to get in, thus eliminating the U.S. deterrent. In short, they seem to be saying that the Russians might be able to build a first strike capability. Thus, the argument may be very strong in Congress now to continue all kinds of research and weapons building, to make sure the U.S. stays ahead.

**WIESNER:** Until you've really got the arms race nailed down, I think you have to maintain a very high level of research and development, so that you know what is possible. If the other side threatens you with something, if you have a good technical understanding of the possibilities, you can react fast. In the specific case of anti-submarine warfare, I believe that if the U.S. were prepared to spend, not the amount of money we've been spending, but tens of billions of dollars for development, hundreds of billions for deployment, and several billion dollars a year to operate it, we probably could develop a fairly effective anti-submarine system. I think the Soviet Union could do the same. But these would be very large and expensive systems which could not be built clandestinely. This is the key to the problem. It is not generally recognized by the alarmists who worry about clandestine R. & D. that the time element is so great that if you discover that things are moving in a dangerous

4

WAR/PEACE REPORT

direction, you've got a long time to recover. The Russians can't snap their fingers and wish new weapons into existence any more than we can. And as weapons get more and more complicated, they will take longer to bring into existence, so both sides will always have ample time to react to any major development and deployment decisions made by the other side.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** But I don't think this situation makes superiority undesirable. May not the concept of superiority be of considerable validity for a time, precisely in this field of research? According to published information, the Soviets are spending as much on their strategic forces and research and development as we do, and this despite the fact that their gross national product is less than half of ours. Since 1962, our expenditure on strategic forces has declined from $11.2 billion to $7.8 billion this year. Although $9.6 billion has been allocated to our strategic forces in the fiscal year 1969, this figure, too, is well below that for 1962. From 1962-1968 our allocation to research and development has remained relatively constant. Because of inflation, the purchasing power of our defense dollar has declined, resulting in a very real, and marked decrease in our expenditure for both strategic forces and research and development—and this notwithstanding the fact that our gross national product has increased substantially over this period.

**WIESNER:** I agree that it's important not to have our normal reaction when budgets get tight, that is, to halt the R. & D. rather than the procurement. As long as our missiles are capable of hitting a few Russians cities, we have a substantial deterrent. Different psychological attitudes will arise as these force levels move back and forth, as happened to the Soviets when our strategic forces were so much bigger than theirs, and for us when we wrongly believed they had a ballistic missile that we didn't, after the Air Force had decided ballistic missiles had no future and wouldn't back them.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I wouldn't like to see that kind of error made a second time.

**WIESNER:** I wouldn't either, but I'm arguing that you have to recognize that this is the character of the arms race.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I think that because of the possibility of such errors the concept of strategic superiority makes a great deal of sense.

**WIESNER:** Except for one thing: it would take a major—several major—developments on the part of the Soviet Union to make a decisive difference. If somebody could invent an absolutely fool-proof anti-ballistic missile system, for example, it would cause an important change in the strategic situation. But we must remember that there are still airplanes. People forget that bombers carrying nuclear weapons still exist and that, in my opinion, the strategic air force is, several times over, a deterrent all by itself. Furthermore, the tactical air force in Europe is probably, all by itself, a major deterrent.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I agree with you, but it's really this sort of package that may or may not constitute strategic superiority. I'm not saying that it does so in all circumstances, but it can under certain circumstances.

**WIESNER:** It can constitute a deterrent at all times, which is different from constituting strategic superiority. This is what I'm arguing.

**YARMOLINSKY:** Let me make a different point. One of the reasons why this concept of superiority troubles me is that, as Herman Kahn is fond of pointing out, one of the advantages of not being militarily superior is that you know that you are really up against it and you really have to use your brains. One of the disadvantages of having the kind of superiority that we talk about in the non-nuclear field, in Vietnam, for example, is that there is a very dangerous tendency to say, "We've got the bombs, we've got the tanks, we don't need to use our ingenuity." And look where we end up.

Now translate this into the area of strategic planning. If we think in terms of superiority, what are we going to

do? We're going to spend our money on R&D. But it is not just research and development; it is research, development, test, and evaluation. If you graph the way the money is spent, $10 goes into evaluation for every 10 cents at the pure end of the research spectrum, which is where the pay-off is. To seek superiority leads to multiplications of existing missiles, multiplications of existing airplanes. The need to keep up in research, in a very deep psychological way, runs counter to the notion that we've got superiority and we must maintain it in numbers.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** It does not run counter in my mind.

**YARMOLINSKY:** But it does in the minds of the people who are making the operations decisions and spending the money. When you talk superiority, you talk a language which induces in the makers of budgets and the makers of programs a dangerous tendency to fall behind in what I must say I consider a very crucial race, the race to keep up and to be open and loose and flexible on the technological innovations.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I fully agree...

**YARMOLINSKY:** If you fully agree then you shouldn't talk the language of superiority.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I think that it is the only frame of reference in which superiority may conceivably make sense, in that if you can achieve a breakthrough...

**WIESNER:** But I maintain that breakthroughs will not give you superiority either, in any meaningful sense, because of the time constants of development, testing, deployment...

**YARMOLINSKY:** The on-your-toes posture, which is the posture you need to maintain in order to pluck the flower of safety from the nettle of danger, is quite different from this notion that you get superiority and then you've got it. And then you turn on the production lines full blast and relax.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** But I don't think anybody, except for naïve people, holds that if you deploy so much hardware then you have superiority.

**YARMOLINSKY:** I could cite you case after case of respectable military men, and even respectable politicians saying, "we gotta get more," not "we have to move ahead and keep up," but "we gotta get more of what we've got."

**WIESNER:** I think it was very ques-

DECEMBER, 1968

5

tionable that it was necessary to devel-
op and deploy a new Minuteman. Yet
this was done, diverting tremendous
research and development resources
that might very well have gone into
longer-range investigations.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: In both of these con-
texts I think the concept of superiority
makes sense. First, to be on your toes,
so that you can get off to a start and
run faster than the other guy. The
other context, which I would rather
talk about, is strategic superiority in
the sense of political objectives, which
is a very different thing. I'll give you
an example. Gen. Maxwell Taylor talk-
ed a few days ago about the war in
Vietnam. The gist of his remarks was
that we could not escalate this war,
we could not extend the bombing all
over the North because if we do so, we
would trigger off the third world war.
Now that indicates that as far as the
war in Vietnam is concerned, we do
not have the strategic posture sufficient
to isolate this war as a limited war.
That is, if we did not isolate it, we
could win, but then we would provoke
a third world war—that is, the Soviet
Union would escalate the war by strik-
ing at us. Now I believe strategic pos-
ture in the sense of superiority does
make sense here. If you have the stra-
tegic posture such that you can en-
capsule this war, and thereby deter the
Soviet intervention in terms of escala-
tion, then you have superiority.

WIESNER: I think we would agree
with that. What we would debate is
whether you can achieve that kind of
superiority. My concern is not that you
would get a third world war from an
escalation of the bombing. What you
would get is a bigger war that would
perhaps make the possibility for a
third world war likely, but not in one
jump. I think the reaction we would
get in response to enlargement of our
bombing in Vietnam would not be a
nuclear attack on the U.S. It would
probably involve a variety of more
traditional steps. And I can't conceive
of a position of nuclear superiority
which would prevent this.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: We had it in Leb-
anon and the Taiwan Straits.

BRENNAN: The Soviets didn't per-
ceive their interests as being involved.

YARMOLINSKY: Let's analyze what
you have said. I think there are two
elements in it. One is, if the Soviets
perceive that their vital interests are
involved, for whatever silly reason,
what can they do about it? The answer
is that they can bring down the pillars

of the temple on both of us and there
is nothing we can do in the present or
foreseeable states of technology or
spending that can prevent it. The other
question is, how do they perceive the
situation? Well, we have to make our
best guess, and we'd better be reason-
ably cautious about making it, because
if we guess wrong, it's the end of the
world.

WIESNER: If we could achieve a stra-
tegic superiority that would deter the
Chinese or the Russians or anyone
else from making moves we don't like,
then I think it's worth finding out
how to do so. I myself am convinced
that this is not possible.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I think it is. We must
calculate perceptions of interest. For
the Soviets, Vietnam is not a primary
strategic area; it's not like Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, or the ex-
treme Far East. Now if we assume that
we cannot risk isolating an area that is
of primary strategic importance to us,
and that is of secondary importance
to the Soviets, if we cannot do that
because if we were to try to do it we
could provoke a third world war, then
I would say there has been a very sub-
stantial deterioration in our strategic
posture. I believe that this whole idea
of superiority is relevant only if it is
reduced to specific political and stra-
tegic issues. In this particular case,
we apparently no longer have the
strength we had in previous crises.

YARMOLINSKY: Ever since the Rus-
sians attained a second strike capabil-
ity, which they were bound to obtain,
the world has been different.

WIESNER: I think you're using the
word strategic in a different way than
we're using it. I am talking about the
strategic nuclear balance when I talk
about superiority, not about the num-
ber of ships, planes and materiel we
can bring to bear in Vietnam. You're
talking about the total military capa-
bility rather than the nuclear capa-
bility.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I am talking about
the total military capability that is
needed in order to obtain certain spe-
cific political objectives. That is the
only way in which strategic superiority
makes any sense.

WIESNER: In this context, the U.S.
could afford, if it felt that its primary
security was in danger, to put five or
10 times more resources into Vietnam
than we're now putting in. I don't
think that we feel this is a primary
area any more than the Soviets do. I
think we are caught in the same sort

of secondary relations that they are.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: Which would not
mean that we would not like to win it
if we could.

WIESNER: The fundamental commit-
ment to an ally is just as strong for the
Soviets as it is to us. They have told
the North that they would not let them
lose this war, and this is probably as
meaningful a strategic commitment
from their point of view as ours is to
the South. I don't see that it is less im-
portant to the Russians than it is to us.
I think the Russian problem is much
more complicated. It's complicated by
the Chinese, it's complicated by the
fact that the North Vietnamese are just
as frightened of the Chinese as they
are of us, maybe a little more so, so
that they are having to play a very
complicated game.

YARMOLINSKY: Let's get back to the
experience of Lebanon. You said that
at the time, the U.S. could afford to
step into the situation because it had
military superiority, which now we
couldn't afford to do.

WIESNER: The reason we were able
to step in was that it was impossible
for the Russians to respond directly in
any way except with nuclear weapons.

YARMOLINSKY: And the U.S. decided
this was a situation in which the Rus-
sians would not respond with nuclear
weapons. The Soviets' capability to
respond, if they chose to, was undoubt-
able then, as it is undoubtable now.
Their capability to destroy themselves
and us, perhaps not destroy, but
change the world so that we would
never recognize it for several hundred
years, was undoubtable then, and is
undoubtable now. And there is noth-
ing that Richard Nixon or Hubert
Humphrey or Curtis LeMay could do
to change that.

BRENNAN: I think there would be
situations in which people would look
at the nuclear balance before they
would maneuver in a crisis. They may
not look very long or hard, but in a
context like that of the Cuban missile
crisis, which people perceived as being
linked to Berlin, it isn't impossible to
conceive that the Soviets might have
taken a stronger stance, and perhaps
made counter-threats to Berlin, if their
strategic nuclear posture had looked
better in relation to the U.S.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I'm quite sure that
they made that calculation, recogniz-
ing that their position was not as
strong as that of the U.S.

WIESNER: But crises like those in

6

WAR/PEACE REPORT

Lebanon and Cuba are different. When you're in a crisis like the Cuban one, where the next stage may be at the nuclear level, then people may count missiles, perhaps irrationally or naïvely. In a case like Vietnam it's difficult to imagine that if we started dropping nuclear bombs on North Vietnam, the next stage of escalation by the Soviets would be a strategic attack on Omaha and New York.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** Perhaps what General Taylor was saying was that the threat of the Soviets, implied or explicit, to do so would be more plausible than it seemed in the past. It's a matter of perception. In question here is the very concept of limited war. Limited war was suggested to be one "safe" area within which we were free to operate.

**WIESNER:** Most people who have studied this have come to the conclusion that limited wars between the superpowers are not any more practical than nuclear wars.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** But this is supposed to be limited war between one of the superpowers and one of the satellites of the other.

**WIESNER:** But it becomes limited war between us and a satellite plus the technical capability of a superpower.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** Our posture was supposed to have been that we were capable of isolating this war.

**BRENNAN:** I believe we would be deterred from escalating in Vietnam even if all the nuclear reactions in the world suddenly ceased to work, so that bombs wouldn't work. I cannot imagine that the U.S. would feel more free to do this.

**HUDSON:** If we looked at the other side maybe we could get some insight into this superiority question. Dr. Wiesner, you said that for quite a few years the Russians seemed to be satisfied with a kind of minimum deterrent, and that somewhere along the road they made a decision to build more missiles, leading it toward parity. Do you suppose that change was influenced by their experience in the Cuban missile crisis, or that the politics of this missile balance affected their decision to build more missiles? Also, what do you think their guiding principles are now in approaching the arms race? Are they for parity or superiority? Have they discarded the minimum deterrent, the force de frappe kind of deterrent?

**WIESNER:** I really couldn't say with

any feeling of confidence where they are going. I wouldn't even want to defend my original statement that they made a decision to have a minimal deterrent force. In the nuclear bomber field, they may have made a decision quite early in the game that it was a losing race, in view of the fact that U.S. bomber bases surrounded them. This may have led them to an early decision to depend upon ballistic missiles. What is hard to understand is the decision to deploy such small numbers of missiles. Here again I can make technical arguments for them which wouldn't require a minimal deterrent philosophy. They started in the ballistic missile business before we did, and their first missiles turned out to be very poor weapons. They were very large and soft, so large that they would have been impossible to harden. They probably had very long response times, because of fueling problems. Also, they probably didn't anticipate the fantastic development of reconnaissance by the U.S., which changed their whole strategic requirement. So they probably made the decision very early not to deploy many of the first generation missiles. Now they didn't deploy very large numbers of the next couple of generations of missiles either, and that is still a harder decision to understand because those appear to have been reasonably good missiles. That decision must have been based more on what they thought they needed militarily than on technical considerations, which may have forced the earlier decisions. I don't have any feeling about how strong the arguments were within the Soviet Union on missile deployment, but I don't think that numbers were kept limited because somebody felt that they couldn't spend the money.

At some point, about the time of the Cuban missile crisis, it is clear that the Russians made a decision to change the numbers. Whether Khrushchev discovered that he felt uncomfortable strategically, I don't know. We have had both informal and formal discussions with the Russians on limiting strategic weapons, and the U.S. approach has been to suggest that a freeze be put on the present ratios, even though there is an imbalance in the U.S. favor. Then, as missiles are cut down, we have suggested that we stay with those ratios. The Russians have always argued for parity, and we got absolutely nowhere. Neither side was willing to give.

The original Soviet decisions were made at a time when their military, I believe, was in a fairly strong position. One of the great unknowns as far as I'm concerned is the relationship be-

tween the military and the civilians in the strategic debate within the Soviet Union. No one among my Soviet acquaintances is willing to talk about this very much. They will only point out that they have their hawks to deal with, too.

**BRENNAN:** I believe that the Cuban missile crisis probably did trigger the Soviet expansion.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** What triggered it was that the Soviet perceived, correctly, an American strategic superiority.

**BRENNAN:** The nuclear balance may have influenced Soviet political decisions in the Cuban crisis, and I agree that the Soviet decision process is very opaque on these matters. It is very hard to sense their current strains of strategic thought. They're getting much more open about some of the technical details of their systems. You can see in *Red Star* photographs of missile sites. They are not as open in debates of the kind we're having here now.

**WIESNER:** I think we should ask ourselves a different question, which I did during the Cuban missile crisis and which I have continued to ask myself. That is: what would Kennedy have done had the nuclear balance been reversed? I don't believe he would have behaved any differently and I don't think Khrushchev would have behaved any differently. I think Kennedy, had the Russians had a four-to-one numerical superiority, would have asked, "Do we have enough force to *deter* a Soviet nuclear strike, or do we destroy Moscow and Leningrad?" Kennedy recognized that he was running the risk of having some American cities destroyed during the Cuban missile crisis, and the fact that we had more missiles than the Soviet Union didn't change his perception of that reality.

**YARMOLINSKY:** Nor did he regard the placement of missiles in Cuba as a military problem. It was a political problem.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I agree precisely, but may I now put this argument the other way around. President Kennedy saw that the Soviets, by virtue of having placed missiles in Cuba, had increased their political-psychological status, which was intolerable to Kennedy, and rightly so. Forget about the number of missiles in Cuba; it was irrelevant. But it was a one-up for the Soviets and would have been one-down for us. The numbers of hardware must be adequate to produce the desir-

DECEMBER, 1968

7

ed political-psychological response. This may be one missile, it may be a thousand.

**BRENNAN:** What we're saying is that when you get to a certain point, the numbers don't really matter. There is a story about McNamara, perhaps apocryphal, which illuminates nicely both sides of this question. Someone is said to have asked him after the Cuban missile crisis was well past: "Do you think that the U.S. strategic superiority was a factor in the outcome?" McNamara is reported to have said: "Hell no." And then the other person asked: "Well, how would you have liked to have been in Mr. Khrushchev's shoes?" Again McNamara said: "Hell no." Wiesner's point that the president probably would have taken the same action and the Soviets probably would have followed the same course, even if the nuclear balance had been reversed, is more or less right, but Kennedy would have felt less comfortable about it.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** The Soviets are past masters at this game. I think they have a much higher appreciation of what I call the political fall-out from the confrontation of hardware. And I wouldn't at all be surprised if the chief objective of the tremendous effort they are making—in terms of percentage of their G.N.P. they are spending twice as much as we are—is for political-psychological objectives, and never mind which of us is right or wrong about what strategic superiority really is. I will even go so far as to say that the anti-ballistic missile deployment they have made was not for the purpose of defending Moscow and Leningrad; it was made in order to get us into conversation with them about mutual concessions. It was a diplomatic ploy, and a very successful one.

**WIESNER:** We came within an ace of making the same kind of deployment they did. One of the things you have to remember is that very frequently the Soviets are following our lead. And I think in the ABM we were clearly the technical leaders, although their system doesn't look a lot like the Nike-Zeus.

**BRENNAN:** I'd like to get back to one thing that Wiesner and I were speaking about a moment ago—that you'd have felt slightly less comfortable in handling the Cuban missile crisis if the balance of forces had been the other way. This suggests strongly that there is at least some hypothetical, narrow range of cases in which your actual handling of a crisis would change be-

cause of your perception of the nuclear relationship.

**WIESNER:** I don't think the range is so narrow. As a matter of fact, I suspect there could be some level below which your handling of it would change. We could have enormous debates on what constitutes a deterrent. I've always felt that the Air Force view that we'd have to kill 40 per cent of the Soviet people and destroy 90 per cent of their property to have a sure deterrent vastly exaggerates the need. Suppose the situation that we expected in '58 and '59 had come true—that the Soviets had 200 ballistic missiles at a time when we had no operational missiles. I think we would have been at a major psychological disadvantage in spite of the fact that we had 600 bombers that could have retaliated. But I think the numbers have to be that disparate before they can really make a difference.

**HUDSON:** The present balance seems to be about like this: Both sides have around 1,000 missiles, land-based missiles in silos, excluding submarines, and the U.S. has a substantial superiority of missiles carried in submarines. We're talking about making an agreement with the Soviet Union to put some kind of lid on the race as it stands now. So the current question is: Should we proceed with this idea? And what kind of an agreement might we get?

**BRENNAN:** I have had the feeling for some time that it might be feasible to get an agreed ceiling on offensive forces that would be based on something like parity. Now I may be wrong in judging that the government is going to accept this. It becomes mixed up with the perceptions that prevail in political quarters about what constitutes strategic superiority. McNamara has said repeatedly that strategic supe-

riosity is on the one hand meaningless and on the other hand something that he was determined to maintain. I suspect the meaningless part of it reflects the kind of thinking that we're expressing around this table, and the determination to maintain it reflects an awareness of the way many political leaders, both in the Congress and the administration, view these issues. One of these strands of thought has to win over the other.

**WIESNER:** But if the Soviets have made up their minds that they want parity, you're going to have it at some level.

**BRENNAN:** Unless we are willing simply to outspend them.

**WIESNER:** I don't think we can. If they've made up their minds to obtain parity, I don't think the U.S. can outspend them.

**BRENNAN:** If they have made up their minds to have parity just with the offensive forces, I myself would think it foolish for the U.S. to try to pursue a numbers race.

**STRAUSZ-HUPE:** I think the Soviets' expenditures are very much geared to what they believe is politically acceptable in the U.S., as well as what is politically acceptable in their own country.

**WIESNER:** That's a good point; we may be able to force a parity.

**HUDSON:** But isn't this debate about putting limitations on offensive or defensive forces over? The Russians used to feel that their ABM system was purely defensive and that the U.S. therefore need not be concerned about it. Now they've given up that position and seem to agree that limitations could be made on both offensive and defensive missiles.

**WIESNER:** I think what the U.S. has managed to do is to convince the Soviet leaders that there is a coupling between these which, prior to some recent point in time, they were unwilling to admit. They do not appear ready to agree that it is foolish to build ABMs. The Soviets do not take that position—actually they are coming closer to Brennan's position. What they are prepared to do now, as best as I can guess from what I know of both informal and formal discussions, is to talk over the whole matter of offensive and defensive arrangements. I would hope that the defensive freeze could include the number zero. One of the troubles in trying to cope with missiles is that there is no way to deal

8

WAR/PEACE REPORT

with the small numbers which might
be part of a clandestine force, except
with active defenses. But even that
would not be foolproof. Even if the
country spent $15-20 billion on a de-
fense system, one would not be able
to guarantee that not a single one of
15 clandestine missiles wouldn't get
through it. I think defense is that hard.
If there were ABM systems on both
sides, you might be able to convince
yourself that the clandestine weapon
problem was tolerable and then get
rid of the strategic forces.

BRENNAN: I would like to quote a
Russian who told me recently that the
Soviet Union was prepared to discuss
limitations on both offensive and de-
fensive forces, but with priority on of-
fensive forces. Of course, he did not
spell it out, but my guess is that what
he had in mind would be more or less
the kind of thing that I am interested
in. I will state my position, to have a
ceiling on offensive forces and not to
get very explicit about defensive forces
at all, for a battery of reasons, some
technical, some for insurance reasons.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: If we think of parity
in terms of missile ceilings, the first
thing we have to get rid of is numbers.

BRENNAN: I would suggest the gross
weight of all the strategic forces.

WIESNER: But even that may not
constitute parity in your political
sense. Let me say why I disagree. It's
easy to agree to parity in principle, but
whenever you're faced with the other
fellow's weapons you have to be con-
servative in your estimates. If you
have this nice freeze on offensive
weapons, and we then begin to build
ABM like mad, since we can't spend
as much money as we might otherwise
have spent on offensive weapons, the
day will come when no one will trust
these offensive systems any more be-
cause the defense is too good and we
can't be sure that we have a deterrent
force or a second strike force. I think
that this is inevitable, and I don't
know how to deal with the problem.

BRENNAN: Why do you think people
are bent on killing 100 million Rus-
sians? I don't think they are.

YARMOLINSKY: I think that's an un-
realistic way of looking at it. May I
take a more pragmatic view? I don't
see this agreement as being any sort of
a panacea, I don't see it as being per-
manent, but I can conceive that we and
the Russians could reach an agreement
that isn't going to hurt either of us
significantly. And it may actually bene-
fit both of us in terms of saving peo-
ples' lives.

WIESNER: A defensive build-up while
freezing the offense is a blueprint for
nervousness.

YARMOLINSKY: I agree. We'd have to
have a comprehensive agreement, and
we'd have to allow complete freedom
for R&D. You don't want to create the
kind of agreement that because it
won't bend, it will break, putting you
closer to war. But you can say, "Well,
for a while, fellows, let's both not do
this kind of thing and if one of us
suspects that the other is doing it any-
way, then we'll talk about it." This
would perhaps seem like a cynical
agreement, but it's one that might save
us a little money, money we can spend
on preventing internal explosions.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: There is another
reason for my skepticism as regards
the efficacy of arms control and arms
limitations agreements. The predilec-
tion for arms control and disarmament
agreements as approaches to détente
and peace reflects the trend toward
reification which is characteristic of
our civilization. Things are vested with
a meaning which can be attributed
only to human thought and action. In
themselves, a given quantity of weapons
does not make for war, and a given
reduction in this quantity does not
make for peace. Weapons are used as
means to resolve political issues which
the parties to the issue perceive as
being soluble only by going to war.
If the political issues can be resolved
peacefully, then arms become redund-
dant—and so do agreements for the
control and limitation of arms. For
example, I've always felt that the pas-
sion for the test ban was unnecessary.
It was concluded at a time when, for
good reasons, we were sure that nei-
ther the Soviets nor ourselves would
make any more tests in the atmosphere.

WIESNER: I think that's wrong.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: Since they had com-
pleted a series of tests which yielded
new knowledge, and since we had not
completed the same kind of tests, they
readily agreed to a halt of all testing.

WIESNER: That's not certain. I think
the pressures to test for ABMs must
be as strong in the Soviet Union as
they are in the U.S.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: If the pressures were
so strong, the Soviet Union would not
have concluded the treaty.

BRENNAN: I agree completely that
informal arrangements are much pre-
ferred in those cases in which the prin-
cipal objective of the arrangement is
purely bilateral, concerning only the
United States and Soviet Union. How-

ever, other arms control arrangements
are intended to have symbolic and po-
litical impact, and for these, a well-
publicized formal treaty may often be
the best way of achieving that impact.
This would be true, for instance, for
measures chiefly intended to inhibit the
spread of nuclear weapons. I believe
the test ban treaty, in the minds of
most of its architects, was basically a
non-proliferation measure.

WIESNER: I'm not sure that's cor-
rect. With the test ban treaty we had
the advantage of making a clearcut
statement—we aren't going to test in
the atmosphere. However, when we be-
gan to draft the treaty, it turned out
that it wasn't quite that simple, for
there can be venting from under-
ground tests.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I am now looking
toward the future, and would like to
say that in general, especially in re-
gard to ICBMs, there should be an
effective cessation of building them,
an informal understanding that you're
not building any and we're not build-
ing any. We might even phase out
some missiles which are obsolete. In
the absence of any solution of major
political issues, this would be the much
better route.

BRENNAN: I don't know if it is a
feasible political route because Con-
gress is very sensitive to having the
administration undertake agreements
that they cannot control. Did I under-
stand that Wiesner disagrees that the
test ban was chiefly a non-proliferation
matter?

WIESNER: Yes, I disagree. I think
that was one of many considerations.
President Kennedy saw it more as a
restraint on the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
and also, I think he had a genuine in-
tuitive concern about fallout. I think
the data that's been accumulated since
indicates that this instinct was right,
that the effects of strontium 90 were
very substantial.

HUDSON: Some weeks ago I had a
conversation with a well-placed Soviet
diplomat on the question of a missile
agreement. I raised with him the many
difficulties of reaching a precise, nu-
merical agreement on missiles. Our
populations are of different size; be-
cause of our bigger cities, we are more
vulnerable; the missiles and warheads
of the two sides are of different kinds
and sizes; one would have to figure
some way to equate IRBMs, ICBMs
and airplanes; we now have more mis-
siles than you do—would you therefore
permit us to retain some advantage?
No matter what kind of agreement is

DECEMBER, 1968

9

devised, aren't the hawks on both sides
going to see in it disadvantages for
them?

His answer, which surprised me with
its flexibility, went like this: "Look,
we've got enough to hit you back hard
if you hit us, and you know it. You've
got enough to hit us back hard if we
hit you, and we know it. So as a first
step, let's make a simple agreement
just to stop building more."

What would you think of making
an agreement simply not to build any
more missile emplacements, and per-
haps not to build any more subma-
rines? This kind of agreement could
be inspected without physical access,
by reconnaissance satellites. If either
side broke the agreement, the other
would know, and it would be nullified.

YARMOLINSKY: The MIRV (Multiple
Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehi-

cle) would make such an agreement
useless. If both sides put in MIRVs—
and if one side does the other is likely
to—the number of holes we already
have is more than adequate.

STRAUSZ-HUPE: I believe that on
certain things the Soviets are never
going to see things our way. One of
these is inspection. Perhaps over time
mutual confidence could be built up,
or the international situation could
change.

WIESNER: It comes down to what I
said earlier, that there is a spectrum
from very clear-cut superiority to very
marginal deterrents. What we should
do, in making agreements, is to seek
to establish a parity that gives us a
comfortable position—one that gives us
confidence that no matter what happens
with the numbers, we never get down
close to the point of a very insecure

deterrent—no matter what kind of
clandestine actions take place, no mat-
ter what kind of errors we might make.
And I think we ought to be willing to
live in that situation. I have felt that
in fact we have been trying to live at
the top side of the spectrum, and we've
been pulling the Russians along. It's
not at all inconceivable that if we
worked our way in the other direction,
saying let's get along with fewer mis-
siles than they, then they might match
us. There was a time when people said
the Russians were mad, that they would
take the destruction of their real estate
and half their people in order to domi-
nate the world. We now say the Rus-
sians are very careful, but the Chinese
are mad. Maybe neither the Russians
nor the Chinese are mad, and by treat-
ing them as sane people we may be
able to work out a rational agreement,
either tacit or formalized.

WHERE NIXON STANDS ON
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Nixon got wide notice in the recent campaign on his charge that President Johnson had fostered a "security gap." But a companion speech on arms control, here published, received much less attention.

During the 1968 presidential cam-
paign the oratory of the candidates
seldom elucidated sharp lines between
them on major issues. Certainly this
was the case on Vietnam. However, on
one issue—U.S. military posture vis-a-
vis efforts to achieve arms control and
disarmament—there was a sharp and
instructive exchange running over
three consecutive days, October 24, 25
and 26, between Richard Nixon and
Hubert Humphrey. The dialogue shed
particular light on the views of Presi-
dent-elect Nixon.

The exchange was opened by Nixon
with a nationwide radio speech that
was in effect a position paper on de-
fense policy. The Republican candidate
charged that "the present state of our
defenses is much too close to the peril
point, and our future prospects are in
some respects downright alarming."
He accused the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations of permitting a "grave-
ly serious security gap" to develop.
Scoring "the peculiar, unprecedented
d doctrine called 'parity,'" Nixon de-
clared that "this parity concept means

superiority for potential enemies." Re-
ferring specifically to the Soviet Union,
the man who went on to win the elec-
tion declared that "for us deliberately
to let a weaker but basically expan-
sionist nation achieve parity indicates
an erosion of our commitment and
will."

That night the Pentagon burned the
midnight oil, and by the following day
Humphrey was equipped to answer
Nixon's charges item by item. The es-
sence of the vice president's argument
was that the U.S. still does, in fact,
maintain superiority over the Soviet
Union. Humphrey blasted his oppo-
nent's position as an "ill-tempered,"
"ill-considered" and "irresponsible dec-
laration reflecting concern not for na-
tional security but only for votes."

The next day, October 26, Nixon
made another nationwide radio address
in which he dealt with "the other essen-
tial [in keeping the peace]." (The
first essential, he reiterated, is that
"America must stay both resolute and
strong.") The second essential, Nixon
said, requires "the era of negotiation."

He did not respond directly in any way
to Humphrey's speech of the day be-
fore, and according to Nixon's head-
quarters this second address had al-
ready been prepared, although the date
of delivery might have been changed
to meet the circumstances. In any
event, Nixon's second speech was wide-
ly considered to be more dovish than
the one he delivered two days earlier.
Since this latter address is the most de-
finitive position on arms control and
disarmament that Nixon has taken
(and since it did not get wide cover-
age in the press), we publish it below
in full.

The text of Richard M. Nixon's
address, "Towards Peace Through
Arms Control," carried on C.B.S.
Radio Network, Oct. 26, 1968:

Last Thursday evening, I discussed
with you our first essential in keeping
the peace. Tonight we discuss the other
essential.

I spoke of some of the problems and
urgent needs of our national defense.

10

WAR/PEACE REPORT

I talked of my conviction—which I believe you share—that, in the current state of the world, if we are to keep the peace, America must stay both resolute and strong.

But military strength is not enough. A peace that will endure cannot come from a continuing fighting-cock stance between the United States and the Soviet Union, each intimidating the other with weapons of apocalyptic power.

A precarious peace that is the product of a continuous confrontation between the world's two super powers will always be subject to a sudden, catastrophic end. We must move away from confrontation in this nuclear age into a new era—the era of negotiation.

Let us understand, first of all, that the awesome thermonuclear weapons have radically changed international affairs. Everyone of us knows that these weapons are both wasteful and costly—and also that nuclear missiles and submarines and other weapons of mass destruction endanger human survival.

Yet, history tells us it is not weapons but men who bring on wars. That is why last Thursday I said, “If we let those who threaten world peace outpace us, in time we will generate tensions which could lead to war.”

We prayerfully hope that reason will prevail among leaders of the Soviet Union and Communist China. We hope that through patient dialogue we and our opponents can one day arrive at meaningful and trustworthy ways to limit arms and other paraphernalia of war and ultimately dispose of them entirely.

In the meantime, we must urgently concern ourselves with the control of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, arms control does not eliminate the military balance—it attempts to create a new and safer balance. Even if we and our adversaries were to destroy all weapons, we would not have eliminated the balance of war-making capabilities. We would simply move to a new balance, with the advantage moving to the side best able quickly to adapt its civilian resources to military purposes.

Our Department of Defense and our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency share the same objective—the enhancement of our national security. Their perspectives, while different, are complementary.

There are two kinds of arms control measures. First are those measures we take independently on our own—measures we take because they are in our own interest, even though they also

benefit our adversaries.

For example, we have established elaborate safeguards to prevent an accidental launching or detonation of a nuclear weapon. Our precautions to reduce the danger of accidental war are in our own interest, but they are no less in the interest of our allies and our adversaries as well.

The second kind of arms control measures requires reciprocal action. This requires an agreement and enough exchange of information to assure each side of the other's compliance. The greater this informational exchange, the greater are the prospects for mutually advantageous arms control agreements.

For this reason, one of our major goals must be to convince the Soviet Union that its obsession with secrecy does not bring security. On the contrary, it impedes measures that would increase the security of everyone. The more openness we can achieve, the more extensive will be the agenda of possible arms control measures, and the greater our prospect of reaching larger agreements that will advance the security of all.

But progress will escape us entirely unless we set our priorities straight.

Our first priority must be to convince actual and potential troublemakers in the world that aggression will not pay. Once they are convinced of this, they will be better disposed to

work with us toward international stability.

Since the end of the second World War, we have reached two constructive agreements with the Soviet Union. One—the Austrian State Treaty concluded in 1955—removed Soviet and Western forces from occupied Austria. This treaty was the product of the prudent but firm diplomacy of the Eisenhower years, when our power was adequate and our commitments were credible.

The next administration initially had the same objectives as the Eisenhower administration. But its priorities were wrong. It attempted to reach for a relaxation of tensions and constructive negotiation without maintaining the credibility of American commitment and power. The result was not an immediate improvement of relations, or even fruitful negotiations, but the most dangerous Soviet offensive of the Cold War, which began over Berlin and was finally stopped in the perilous Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Then, after the Soviets were convinced that their tactics of intimidation had become too risky, we moved on to negotiate the partial nuclear test ban treaty.

A new administration will establish at the outset the prerequisites and incentives for realistic negotiation on arms control and other outstanding issues. We will do this not through dan-

DECEMBER, 1968

11

gerous confrontations, but through
alert, quiet, preventive diplomacy.

Always, in considering these agree-
ments, we must focus on our ultimate
objectives, and not become obsessed
with the means. A reduction of arma-
ments on both sides is desirable only
if it produces a more stable military
balance; it is clearly not desirable if
it produces instability and hence threat-
ens to breach the peace.

We must also distinguish between
conventional and nuclear weapons,
seeking always to reduce the chances
of a nuclear exchange. But our over-
riding purpose must be to eliminate
all temptation to war, nuclear or con-
ventional.

In short, for arms control to be suc-
cessful, we must first establish pre-
requisites and incentives, and this re-
quires a cooperative pursuit of com-
mon objectives. We will succeed, first,
to the extent that we can convince our
adversaries to share our interest in
stability and to rely on peaceful, not
military, means for effecting change.
Second, our success will depend not so
much on mutual trust as on mutual
knowledge, so that each side can know
with reasonable assurance what the
other is about.

Perhaps our most difficult choice is
not the one most often mentioned—the
argument between the hard line and
the soft line, or between the so-called
hawks and doves. Rather, the choice
is between arms control agreements
that are sensible and realistic, and
those which in the end might prove to
be illusory and deceptive.

The choice is not between the pres-
ervation of the present world order and
some quick and easy alternative, but
rather between attempting to main-
tain peace and failure to do so.

I therefore pledge continuation of
efforts to reach meaningful arms con-
trol agreements with our adversaries.
We will build upon those initiated by
President Eisenhower—particularly his
dramatic "Open Skies" proposal—and
those also advanced by his successors.

In the final analysis, the essential
condition for a more stable world of
law must be the settlement of the basic
issues that divide the world. Once this
is accomplished, no nation would need
to engage in an arms race to ensure
its own security.

To achieve a stable world order we
must synchronize our national security
programs and the search for arms con-
trol and disarmament agreements—all
the while seeking the settlement of the

A Gift for Christmas

Three spacemen will circle the Christmas moon,
This cold November morning's headlines read.
Forgive me if I am less than pleased,
But it seems a flagrant thing so soon
To circumscribe the neutral moon,
Stake out that lava as our own.
If giving is your wont, forget that distance
And think again of simple things.
The gift is in the giving still,
And few men want the stars or moon,
But something here, to use at home.
Yet like the child that never finds
The one thing longed for, we will wake
To parcels wrapped in tinsel charms,
And underneath cut trees pretend our pleasure
As we unwrap the conquered moon, and weep
For men, for Christmas, for gifts not given,
Like sharing of food, or laying down of arms.

MARY OLIVER

deep-rooted political issues which di-
vide us. For success, all of these ele-
ments must be pursued simultaneously.

Tonight I wish to set forth the ob-
jectives and principles which I will
follow in the search for meaningful
arms control agreements.

My program will be based on the
assumption that East and West will
continue to carry on technological
competition, for we live in a world of
dynamic scientific and technological
innovations. Today, as never before,
sudden technological breakthroughs
can rapidly alter the balance of power.
Clearly, the cause of peace is not
served by sudden and decisive changes
in this balance, which generate fear,
distrust and misunderstanding.

In a very real sense, we are con-
stantly arming and disarming at
the same time, as new weapons are phased
in and older ones phased out. Tech-
nology will not stand still for the arms
controller any more than it does for
the military planner. The initial pur-
pose of arms control is not to deliver a
final "package," but to establish a
framework of consultation which will
enable us, our allies, and our adver-
saries to cope with the onrush of tech-
nology in a cooperative way.

This bears on the kind of inspection
system and information exchange we
should press for. It is important for

us to know as accurately as possible
the quality and quantity of the Soviet
weapons inventory.

But it is even more important for us
to know at least approximately what
kinds of weapons they have in produc-
tion at any given time. The real ques-
tion in an environment of dynamic
technological change is which side will
achieve something new.

Thus, a general openness which will
permit rapid cooperation in coping
with new developments in military
technology is ultimately more impor-
tant than detailed inspection agree-
ments for existing armaments which
may quickly become obsolete.

Hence, in an environment of contin-
ing technological innovation, the U.S.
and the Soviet Union must strive to
attain reliable arms control agreements
which serve their mutual interests.

I have repeatedly stated in this cam-
paign that not only do I favor the
treaty on the non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, but I fully expect to
implement it in my new administration.

I remain convinced that Senate ap-
proval and ratification of this treaty
were properly delayed because of the
sudden, brutal Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia—a delay also favored
by our European allies. In January the

12

WAR/PEACE REPORT

Senate will undoubtedly reassess Soviet intentions in Central and Western Europe; I am hopeful that we can then proceed with this important treaty.

We share the world's hope that the spread of nuclear weapons will be arrested. We cannot count on it. Even the most successful conclusion to the non-proliferation treaty cannot automatically prevent other nations from seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities.

At the present time, one of the minor nuclear powers (Red China) is following an irresponsible and mischievous foreign policy. In the near future, other nuclear-armed states might display a similar inclination. The possible use of nuclear weapons by third parties threatens instability in all the rest of the world. These are matters which transcend the common interests of the major powers and go to the heart of the problem of world peace.

Beyond the non-proliferation treaty—and utilizing the channels of diplomacy, our existing arms control machinery and where appropriate, the United Nations—I will undertake these initiatives:

1. In the spirit of President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal, I will seek agreement for the exchange of information with the Soviet Union regarding the location of our respective offensive and defensive forces. I propose the establishment under appropriate international auspices of a reconnaissance satellite agency to gather and to make available such information to both parties.

2. I will work for administrative, technical or political arrangements to minimize the risk of a nuclear accident, unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, precipitate response to an apparent crisis, or stategic miscalculation of an adversary's intentions.

3. There will be a program of weap-

ons research, development and deployment, as well as the evolution of a strategic doctrine, stressing the non-belligerent aspects of our national security posture.

4. We will effectively use modern technology to improve facilities for emergency communications between us and our adversaries, and between the U.S. and our NATO allies.

5. We will maintain the critical distinction between nuclear forces and strategies on the one hand, and conventional forces and strategies on the other.

6. We will seek international agreements to restrict the sale or transfer of conventional arms and delivery systems to countries in "tinderbox" areas.

7. Most important, we will press for long-needed changes in the neglected machinery for consultation on arms control measures with our European allies.

Specifically, I will propose the formation within NATO of an arms control body. This group would coordinate national arms control and security policies within the framework of Alliance responsibilities.

It would also develop joint arms control proposals. These proposals, developed in partnership under NATO auspices, might lead to a real reduction of our military force levels in Europe, with comparable reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

Our search for peace will require patience, skill and determination. Negotiations on the limitation of weapons will span months, even years. But they will not take place in a vacuum, as both sides—in the absence of effective agreements—continually labor to improve their offensive and defensive capabilities.

While negotiations proceed, then, we cannot allow our strength to undergo a radical downward change. The maintenance of U.S. superiority in a world still ruled by force will remain a requirement for our security and for the undergirding of peace. It is for this reason that I must again emphasize the necessity of maintaining our strength.

The vast resources of the industrialized nations must be diverted from the nonproductive and wasteful channels of war-making capabilities and harnessed to a full-scale attack on the aged, old problems of hunger, disease and poverty.

For the U.S. as well as the Soviet Union, there exists an urgent and objective need to improve the quality of life not only for our own citizens but also for the entire underdeveloped world.

Science and technology are the keys to the solution of this task. How much more secure the world would be if competition between the superpowers were focused primarily upon man's most pressing problems.

I do not suggest that, were arms control and disarmament measures to succeed, all problems would at once disappear.

But a dampening of the arms race would provide both resources and time to cope with pressing domestic problems.

Here at home, we must press on with the urgent task of rebuilding our cities, maintaining full employment, and bringing opportunity and hope to the disadvantaged.

The Soviet Union has its domestic problems, too. Soviet citizens do not enjoy the high standard of living typical of the industrialized Western democracies.

On more than one occasion the Soviet leadership has stressed the need to improve the quality of life, to eliminate shortages in the agricultural and consumer sectors and to alleviate the acute problem of transportation to and from remote areas.

Reductions in defense burdens would clearly assist in the meeting of such human needs.

Thus, the incentives on both sides for meaningful arms control and disarmament exist right now; they do not have to be created.

Let us, then, take that as our goal, as simultaneously we guard peace through strength and use that strength to remove its need.

DECEMBER, 1968

13

EDITORIALS

Lyndon Johnson had been president of the United States for almost a year when he was elected to a term in his own right. Most people thought they knew what he was going to do after the 1964 election: he would end the Vietnam War and build the Great Society. Of course, he didn't. Now Richard M. Nixon will succeed to the presidency, and speculation abounds over what his policies will be. Certainly there is even less to go on than there was with Johnson. Nixon has not had to vote or take executive action on public issues for eight years, and while his speeches offer some clues as to what he may actually do, they are at the same time vague and contradictory enough to make predictions of his behavior difficult. Could it be that Nixon will turn out to be better than we expected, as Johnson was worse than we anticipated?

Time will give the answer, but it must be said now that the outlook is not good for an enlightened U.S. foreign policy under the Nixon administration. He comes into office with a clean slate, relatively unencumbered by commitments either to individuals or policies. But his basic operating premises, judging by his record in office and his campaign speeches, are simply the clichés of the Cold War. To capsulize them: America and capitalism are always and totally good; the U.S.S.R. and communism are always and totally bad, and the way for the good to deal with the bad is to maintain military superiority over it.

In specific terms, we would guess that Nixon's foreign policy will look something like this: The strengthening of NATO will get priority over building the détente with the Soviet Union. The United Nations will not be a focal point of U.S. foreign policy; opposition to the entry of Communist China will continue. The U.N. will be used only as a last resort, when unilateral action has failed. Economic aid to developing countries will continue, but it will be too small in amount, too military in its composition, and too tied to the wrong kind of strings. Dictatorships, so long as they are of the right and not of the left, will continue to be supported in the name of "freedom." The U.S. military budget will continue to grow; many billions will be spent on the ABM, the MIRV and who knows what else. As to Vietnam, we can't guess with any confidence how Nixon may move.

Lest this prognostication sound too gloomy, two points should be made. First, the Nixon foreign policy we foresee is not much different from what we have had for more than 20 years, and we have lived through that. Second, Nixon has given some indication that he has learned a few things over the years. He hardly sounded like a super-hawk, for example, in this passage from his speech accepting the G.O.P. nomination:

What I call for is not a new isolationism. It is a new internationalism in which America enlists its allies and its friends around the world in those struggles in which their interest is as great as ours.

And now to the leaders of the Communist world we say, after an era of confrontations, the time has come for an era of negotiations.

Where the world superpowers are concerned there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful negotiation. Because this will be a period of negotiations, we shall restore the strength of America so that we shall always negotiate from strength and never from weakness. . . .

We believe this should be an era of peaceful competition not only in the productivity of our factories but in the quality of our ideas. We extend the hand of friendship to all people. To the Russian people. To the Chinese people. To all the people in the world. And we shall work toward the goal of an open world, open sky, open cities, open hearts, open minds. The next eight years, my friends. . . .

A few paragraphs after this benign rhetoric, however, Nixon said this:

> "And I say to you tonight that when respect for the United States of America falls so low that a fourth-rate military power like Korea will seize an American naval vessel in the high seas, it's time for new leadership to restore respect for the United States of America. . . .

> "My friends, America is a great nation. It is time we started to act like a great nation around the world."

Nixon gave no hint as to how he would suggest this great nation act in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo and its crew. Would he bomb or threaten to bomb Pyongyang if the North Koreans did not release the ship and its crew? Would he order an invasion of North Korea? (One recalls uncomfortably that in 1954 Nixon urged that American troops be sent into North Vietnam to help the beleaguered French, but President Eisenhower did not take his advice.) Would he have the U.S. apologize to North Korea for having sent a spy ship into its territorial waters (as seems to have been the case, although the evidence is not altogether conclusive yet)? Or would he just temporize, as the Johnson administration is doing? We don't know how Nixon will deal with the detention of the Pueblo and its crew, or how he will perform in the face of the many other foreign policy problems that inevitably will arise during his presidential tenure.

Probably the single most important foreign policy issue that Nixon will encounter is the one discussed in the preceding pages: Will the U.S. give priority to maintaining or

14

WAR/PEACE REPORT

gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union, or will it stress efforts to slow down and eventually turn around the arms race? Nixon's statements so far, including the one on arms control and disarmament in this issue, seem to show that he feels both aims can be sought simultaneously. At the same time, however, it seems clear that his first interest is on the military side. Confirmation that this is the case would appear to come from Nixon's selection of his foreign policy advisers. Among those whom Nixon has on his staff or has been consulting recently are Robert Murphy, Richard V. Allen, Henry A. Kissinger, William R. Kintner and Robert Strausz-Hupé, all of whom would be classified as "hard-liners" on the Cold War. (The views of Strausz-Hupé, who argues for U.S. military superiority in the discussion earlier in this issue, are fairly representative of this group.)

On the disarmament side, a similar conclusion on Nixon's priorities emerges from one action and one non-action. The action was Nixon's call for a delay in American ratification of the non-proliferation treaty (N.P.T.) because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. His move was undoubtedly a major factor in causing the Senate to hold off ratification, which in turn brought about a worldwide slackening in the effort to get nations to sign and ratify the treaty. The non-action is Nixon's failure ever to mention, much less endorse, the proposed strategic arms limitations talks (now becoming known as SALT in arms control jargon) between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Despite the fact that it is generally recognized that SALT is now the No. 1 item on the arms control agenda, it is conspicuously missing from Nixon's seven point arms control program (page 13). The missile talks were given high priority by the Johnson administration and were all set to go ahead just when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. Up until now the administration has declined the Russians' repeated invitations to proceed with SALT, on the basis that this is not an appropriate time because of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. We would suggest that the U.S. should continue to condemn the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia (just as the Russians should remain critical of American intervention in Vietnam), but that both should immediately ratify the N.P.T. and begin the missile talks. If SALT could lead to a Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty, this would almost certainly be the most important arms control agreement since the end of World War II and could lead to a reversal and eventually an end of the arms race. Moreover, without such an agreement, the non-proliferation treaty may never become a serious impediment to the spread of nuclear weapons. The N.P.T. requires the nuclear powers to take steps to limit their own "vertical" arms race, and if this is not done the near-nuclear powers may refuse to ratify the N.P.T. and instead go ahead with their own atomic weapons programs. Thus, the decisions made in the Nixon administration could chart the course of world security (or insecurity) for a long time ahead.

In sum, the augury for foreign policy in the Nixon administration is not good. We are crossing our fingers for the next four years.

## Vietnam: Serious Talks

At last, after a waste of several years, a hundred billion dollars, and hundreds of thousands of lives, negotiations are about to begin on the real issue of the Vietnam War: Who is to rule in South Vietnam? Even so, optimism must be sharply tempered. The issue is far from settled, and it is quite possible that much hard fighting remains in South Vietnam. It is even conceivable—although it seems that the trend toward peace, however slow it may develop, is now irreversible—that the talks could blow up altogether.

In the end, the United States gave in on the main issues. After insisting since the beginning of the bombing of North Vietnam in February, 1965, that some reciprocal military concession be made by Hanoi before the bombing could stop, the U.S. ended the bombing instead on the basis of its own statement that Hanoi had made concessions—that it would stop action in the DMZ and cease shelling cities in South Vietnam. Hanoi, on the other hand, steadfastly asserted that the cessation of the bombing had been unconditional. What seems to have happened is that Washington told Hanoi its conditions and the North Vietnamese replied, "Yes, we understand," but not, "Yes, we accept."

The North Vietnamese effort has, in fact, been reduced, but no more than it was in the late spring and early summer when Hanoi seemed to be sending a clear signal to Washington that it would tacitly reduce hostilities in return for a cessation of bombing of the North. It is hard to imagine any other reason for the bombing cessation than President Johnson's desire to help Hubert Humphrey win the election. And it is ironic that top Saigon officials could boast privately (and probably correctly) that by stalling Johnson's announcement of the cessation for 11 days, they assured Nixon's election (New York Post, Nov. 11).

Washington's greatest concession, regardless of all the face-saving ambiguities, was in agreeing that the National Liberation Front could have its own delegation at the peace talks. The only concession that Hanoi gave was that it would sit down at the same table with representatives of Thieu and Ky. This is a concession that we suspect will in the long run be meaningless since these two individuals will probably fade from the picture if the talks succeed in their major objective—agreement on a broadly-based government to rule in South Vietnam.

## Half a Yawn for China

Exactly a year ago we published an editorial, "A Yawn for China," in which it was noted that the *New York Times* gave only a one-column headline on its front page to the news that Communist China had again been denied entry to the United Nations. This was a come-down in treatment of the story from previous years.

Well, this year the story rated only page five in the *Times*. The *Times*, of course, was quite right in playing the story this way; everybody had known how the vote would go.

But that doesn't change the essential fact: it's ridiculous to have a *world* organization that bars about a quarter of the world's population from representation.

DECEMBER, 1968

15

# The Drama of Development

In his monumental study of development in South Asia, Gunnar Myrdal finds no villains—neither the population explosion nor colonialism—other than the Asian elites themselves. His remedies reject both Keynes and Marx.

By Lynn Turgeon

It is possible to examine contemporary economic problems from at least two general viewpoints. The aggregative approach, which bears the strong imprint of Keynesian economics, views the solutions to economic problems primarily through the regulation of so-called "aggregate demand," the total demand for "consumption" and "investment" goods. The structural approach, which is much more institutional in flavor, stresses the need to attack or rectify particular defects or bottlenecks which are holding back economic progress. Gunnar Myrdal's *Asian Drama* largely rejects the applicability of the blunt instruments of the Keynesian approach to the development problems of South Asia, and instead attempts to probe these economies in much the same manner that Adam Smith dissected England's development problems 200 years ago.

Those who favor the aggregative approach tend to depict economic development in terms of a fairly uncomplicated one-act play. According to this script, substantial improvements in levels of living—which are the rational goal of any theory of development—must be postponed for some time to come in order to permit capital accumulation and even higher productivity and levels of living in the future. Thus, there is ordinarily assumed to be a partial conflict, at least in the short run, between higher consumption and higher production. Myrdal feels—in contrast to the conventional view he attributes to Marxists and non-Marxists alike—that improvements in levels of living are a precondition for higher labor input and efficiency. As a result, increases in consumption reinforce, rather than retard, increases in production.

Lynn Turgeon is an associate professor of economics at Hofstra University. A revised edition of his book, *The Contrasting Economies, (Allyn & Bacon)* will come out in March, 1969.

> ASIAN DRAMA, AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS. By Gunnar Myrdal. 2,284 pp. Twentieth Century Fund, hardcover, $25.00. Pantheon, paperback, $10.00.

In the more advanced Western countries, there is little "feedback" or mutual interdependence between levels of living and productivity. Although improvements in productivity should eventually be reflected in higher levels of living—provided the improvements are not confined to the nonconsumption or defense sector—there is little evidence that improved levels of living contribute significantly to greater productivity. In South Asia, on the other hand, where the population is undernourished, and subject to high morbidity and mortality rates, improvements in food intake, health care and education should have a very positive impact on productivity. Furthermore, since the productivity effects of rising consumption should be greatest in the lowest economic strata, Myrdal believes that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, what is needed is greater egalitarianism at this stage in their development.

## First of Three Acts

In other words, the underdeveloped countries of South Asia are still floundering around (and muffing their lines) in Act I of what is essentially a long, drawn-out, three-act drama. During this first act, the line between consumption and investment is extremely fuzzy, and a great deal of collective consumption is, in reality, investment. According to Myrdal, the whole conceptual apparatus of the Keynesian approach assumes the absence of the productivity effects of increased consumption. To remedy this situation, Myrdal would re-define investment so as to include all expendi-

tures having a positive impact on productivity.

The present situation in South Asia is thus considered to be different from that which faced Soviet planners after 1917 and most of Eastern Europe after World War II, although presumably Myrdal's ideas would have some relevance for Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese non-capitalist development. At an early stage, the U. S. S. R was more or less able to follow the scenario of Act II, where increases in consumption have little impact on productivity. As a result, investments in human resources could occur concomitantly with an overall withholding of immediate increases in consumption. Myrdal interprets Soviet economic development as representing essentially a savings squeeze accompanied by a "consumption twist." The real planning problem is thus one of squeezing and twisting consumption in such a way as to accelerate development. Accordingly, Myrdal speaks approvingly of the ability of Soviet planners to save resources by severely restricting the consumption of both housing and clothing.

South Asian developing countries are therefore advised to accord consumption policies an integral and important role in their economic planning, the objective being to steer the various components of consumption in a more productive direction. Bluntly speaking, there must be a break with the Western policy of allowing the free choice of consumers to be decisive in determining production decisions. Presumably, Act III, which is now being played out by the advanced capitalist countries, and which is at least on the horizon for the more advanced noncapitalist ones, allows for more freedom of choice for consumers and greater feedback from consumers to the producers of consumers' goods.

Throughout the book, there are a number of other interesting examples

16

WAR/PEACE REPORT

of the danger of dealing with broad, aggregative concepts, rather than with the underlying structure. For example, the conventional treatment of a poor country's export surplus as part of aggregative investment in national income accounting may give an unjustifiably optimistic picture of the rate of saving or investment which is taking place in the countries of the Third World. Thus, it is not the building up of sterile credits overseas as a result of this export surplus that represents development, but rather it is the use of these credits, especially to import machinery which is crucial to development. Rather than looking at the aggregate export surplus, it might therefore be more meaningful to focus attention on the structure of imports.

The same principle applies to Myrdal's discussion of "deficit financing" —the deficiency of government income in relation to expenditures. In this case, the effect of a budget deficit depends more on the direction of the various items of expenditure, the incidence of the taxes levied, and the sources of the loans, rather than on the aggregate net difference between income and expenditures.

## Built-in Inflation

In analyzing international trade problems, Myrdal makes the useful point that devaluation is no substitute for exchange controls. Devaluation—which represents an aggregative worsening of the terms of trade for the country that is forced to pursue this step—compels a country to reduce its total purchases of imported products. Instead, what is required in the developing country is control over the structure of imports, and here exchange control is the logical tool to effect the needed change. Thus, the overvaluation of an underdeveloped country's currency may actually be functional in that it creates the necessity to ration the scarce foreign exchange for the purchase of the most urgent items.

A final example of Myrdal's denigration of the usefulness of aggregative concepts or policies has to do with inflation. In this connection, Myrdal feels that most of these developing countries are what he calls "quasi-full employment economies." Even though there may be overall underutilization of capacity and resources generally, specific bottlenecks will guarantee that a certain amount of "developmental inflation" will occur once the government begins to accelerate economic growth. In other words, inflation in most instances is largely structural and inevitable.

A second broad category of generalization covers certain features of the historic development of the advanced capitalist countries which are also currently observable in South Asia. But in the latter countries, instead of representing progress, Myrdal shrewdly finds that these developments are more likely a reflection of stagnation. Thus, the rapid growth of the urban population in some of these countries has been accompanied by insignificant industrialization and stagnation of agricultural productivity. According to Myrdal, much of this urbanization is actually due to factors inhibiting economic development, such as civil wars, instability, and crop failures, as well as to excessive rates of population growth. Instead of representing a symptom of growth, as it was in the West, urbanization in South Asia is an aspect of continued poverty.

Similarly, the growth of the percentage of the population engaged in so-called tertiary occupations—those engaged in services and commerce—in South Asia is a reflection of stagnation rather than increasing wealth. Given the rapid growth of the labor force, the relative stagnation in agriculture, and an inability of the as yet tiny industrial sector to absorb much of the increase in personnel, the excess labor force is pushed into areas of employment or self-employment (such as petty trading), where the barriers to entry are insignificant. The absence of a dole or unemployment insurance in any of these countries no doubt also contributes to this phenomenon. At any rate, this particular trend, which ordinarily accompanies economic development in the West, is much more symptomatic of the failure to achieve rapid growth in South Asia.

A third example of a misleading indicator of development lies in the area of income distribution. In the past industrialization of Western Europe, the income distribution became more unequal and this inequality was thought to be symptomatic of economic growth and dynamism. However, the apparent growth of inequality in South Asia has not accompanied rapid growth, but rather is thought to be the result of the failure to develop rapidly.

Myrdal is especially good at comparing and contrasting the different institutions in the various countries of South Asia. Although he goes into the greatest depths in analyzing Indian institutions and problems, he has interesting contrasting observations to make with regard to its neighbors. Pakistan

is undoubtedly the poorest of the 11 countries studied, while Ceylon, Malaya and the Philippines are comparatively well off by Asian standards. Health and educational facilities are usually better in the latter less poor countries. Plantations, which are the most industrialized and efficient form of agricultural organization in this area, tend to be more prominent in the economies of Malaya, Ceylon and Indonesia than they are in the other countries. Under-nutrition is most serious in India and Pakistan, although qualitative deficiencies are present in all of the countries studied.

## India's Progress

Despite India's tremendous deficiencies, it is furthest along the road to an indigenous industrialization—it is the only country with a significant steel and machine-building sector. Furthermore, national consolidation, political life and administration are marked by a higher level of efficiency and honesty here than in most of the other South Asian countries. It is true that India's social stratification is more egalitarian and rigid. However, there is at least a more or less egalitarian ideal or goal, in contrast to the Philippines, Malaya and Thailand, where there is a greater regard for private enterprise and the resulting income inequalities. The status of women varies considerably from country to country, being the highest in the Philippines and the lowest in Pakistan. Throughout the area, the educational system, even at the primary level, is heavily biased against girls, and the literacy rate is lower among women than among men.

Despite the considerable differences among the countries of South Asia, all 11 have one common denominator: lack of significant economic progress since most of them obtained their political independence after World War II. Incidentally, Myrdal—as a cool, detached Swede—is very objective and almost laudatory on the positive role played by the Japanese occupation in many of these countries during World War II. Thus, he credits the Japanese with the creation of indigenous military forces, accelerating the political organization of local nationalist movements, and providing greater administrative experience and opportunities to persons previously denied positions of responsibility by their European masters. This was especially the case in the Netherlands Indies and Burma. Both the cutting off of imports and the demands of the Japanese occupation forces also stimulated the output of certain manufacturing enterprises.

All good dramas seemingly must

DECEMBER, 1968

17

have their villain, but it is most diffi-
cult to pinpoint Myrdal's *bete noire*.
It is clear that the author does not feel
that the woes of South Asia are due
primarily to Western imperialism.
Thus, he feels that Holland provides
the clearest example available of the
combination of a rising standard of
living along with the dissolution of its
empire. According to Myrdal:

This rapid economic growth [of
Western Europe] bluntly contradicts
the belief that the critics of im-
perialism, following the theories of
Hobhouse [sic], Hilferding, Luxem-
burg, and Lenin, and the supporters
of imperialism shared in common,
particularly in Britain and even in
recent decades, namely, that a metro-
politan country was bound to suffer
a decline in its standard of living if
it lost its empire. Certainly today it
never occurs to anyone to ascribe the
relative economic stagnation of Brit-
ain or the United States in recent
years to the loss of colonial posses-
sions.

Still, this reviewer wonders what the
economic record of the Netherlands
would have been in the absence of the
need for postwar capital rebuilding in
Western Europe and the subsequent
creation of investment demand through
the Common Market. It might also be
pointed out that the achievement of a
certain amount of political indepen-
dence after World War II was accom-
panied by a continuation of many of
the same economic relationships—in-
cluding the international "price scis-
sors" (the worsening of the terms of
trade)—which had been institutional-
ized during the years when imperialism
was the rule.

Myrdal also emphasizes the fact that the educational system inherited from prewar imperialism a great deal to be desired. The almost universal negative attitude towards manual labor; the continuation of the pre-independence system of private education in lieu of the nationalization of the educational establishment; the lack of relevance in the curriculum and antiquated educational techniques—all lead Myrdal to one major conclusion: there is a “need for a radical change in the entire educational system.” More emphasis must be placed on overcoming massive illiteracy and less emphasis on the creation of an educational elite whose qualifications bear little resemblance to the developmental needs of these countries, and whose interests lie in attempting to maintain their exclusive status and unnecessarily high salaries.

Nevertheless, Myrdal maintains that,

despite all of the shortcomings of co-
lonialism, this earlier period provided
the South Asian countries with more
"development" than they had ever
known. Thus, "it may be doubted
whether there would have been an in-
dustrial development in the South
Asian countries had there been no co-
lonial domination."

Population Downplayed

Myrdal is not inclined to exaggerate unduly the influence of "overpopulation" on Asian problems. Although he feels that the so-called "population explosion" constitutes the most important social change in South Asia—and its general effect has been to delay the advance of the masses of the people—he recognizes the fact that these countries' man-land ratio is not strikingly high in comparison with other major areas of the world. While there is undoubtedly a poor distribution of population within the area, Myrdal finds it "impossible to see the poverty among the peoples in the region as merely, or even mainly, an effect of population density."

Myrdal tends to deemphasize the im-
portance of the tendency of the terms
of trade to move against the best inter-\ESTS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Strangely, there does not seem to be
even a reference to his former United
Nations compatriot, Raul Prebisch,
whose pioneering studies emphasized
the importance of this phenomenon.
However, he does recognize the fact
that competition from Soviet exports
has tended to reduce the cost of
needed imports by the developing coun-
tries. In addition, there is some under-
standing of the ability and willingness
of the noncapitalist world to import
manufactured products from the Third
World—a characteristic which con-
trasts sharply with the position of the
Western countries. According to Myr-
dal:

The Western countries often act
as if they give grants and loans in
order to avoid having to open up
their markets to the products of un-
derdeveloped countries, particularly
manufactures. On this particular
point the Communist countries un-
doubtedly have logic and reason on
their side.

Actually, it is much more than
"logic" or "reason" that the Commu-
nists have working for them. Their en-
tire economic system operates on "em-
ployment saving" rather than "employ-
ment creating" principles. Thus, their
foreign trade is designed primarily to
reduce the need for quite so much do-
mestic labor, rather than as a stimulus
to fuller employment of resources, as

is ordinarily the case in the advanced
Western world. This same general
point is recognized by Myrdal when
he notes that Communist credit to un-
derdeveloped countries represents a
sacrifice by the noncapitalist system
since so much capital is still needed at
home. It is therefore puzzling to find
an earlier footnote to the effect that
the Soviet Union would gain consider-
able advantage if it could turn Afghan-
istan into a Russian satellite. Surely the
Soviet Union is not anxious to add to
its underdeveloped economic dependen-
cies since credit to such areas would
have to increase and thereby enforce
further nonconsumption at home.

Since so much of Myrdal's analysis,
assumptions and conclusions runs coun-
ter to the positions which have normal-
ly been taken by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
it is strange to find so little criticism
of these organizations. In a postscript
written before the book went to press,
Myrdal does admit that India's devalu-
ation in 1966 was largely engineered
by these two organizations as a result
of United States pressures. However,
he merely criticizes the timing and the
lack of other accompanying policies.
Considering the frequency with which
Myrdal criticizes both the Keynesians
and the Marxists, one is struck by the
lack of criticism of the pre-Keynesians
holding out in the international mone-
tary community. Perhaps Myrdal's
"softness" here reflects his earlier 10-
year experience with the Economic
Commission for Europe and the diplo-
macy frequently encountered in the
writings of dedicated international civil
servants.

If there are no clearcut villains in
*Asian Drama*—other than the Asian
elites themselves—there are no heroes
either. Myrdal's prescriptions are mod-
est and the general impression one gets
is that the future for South Asia looks
bleak indeed. More attention, he holds,
must be paid to agriculture, education
and public health. In other words,
there must be an investment in human
resources before there is an investment
of human resources. In this connection,
Myrdal detects a small ray of hope in
Pakistan—which has emphasized pre-
cisely these areas—following the col-
lapse of its parliamentary democracy
in a military coup in 1958. Generally
speaking, Myrdal has few illusions
about the need for political democracy
in these areas. In his words, "few
things in the outcome of this study
have been more disturbing to him, in
view of his own personal valuations,
than the conclusion that political de-
mocracy is not a necessary element in
the modernization ideals." In the case

18

WAR/PEACE REPORT

of India, which has had a distinctly poorer development record than Pakistan, it may be an example of premature political maturity without a social revolution. At one point, Myrdal suggests that in the future there might be planned import substitution on a regional basis, but in general, there is a marked lack of original suggestions to help the South Asian countries break out of their institutional bind.

Although there is a general lack of Asian opposition to “planning” and “socialism” as terms, there is an unwillingness on the part of the ruling elite to follow the Communist model, at least that version operated by the U.S.S.R. According to Myrdal, most South Asians want a planned economy without a state monopoly of international trade and finance and without the nationalization of the means of production. In this respect, Cambodia is an exception since it at least nationalized its foreign trade and banking in

1964. Although Myrdal admits that all effective planning is physical planning, he fails to inform his readers how this will be possible in the absence of state monopolization of international trade, finance and capital.

Early in the study, Myrdal recognizes the fact that comparisons with the experience of the Communist world would be relevant to his discussion of South Asian development, but pleads that his scanty knowledge precluded such contrasts. Nevertheless, throughout his work, Myrdal shows that he is quite aware of the strengths of the authoritarian, noncapitalist system to handle precisely the major problems confronting South Asia. Why is it that comparatively high rates of population growth can be absorbed by the alternative economic system, judging by the experience in the Soviet Central Asian Republics (which Myrdal personally

visited), North Korea, Albania, China and North Vietnam? What is there about the administration of the same noncapitalist regimes which has eradiated the corruption that formerly plagued these same areas and that still thrives in South Asia?

Myrdal points out that “we may search in vain for important and original contributions by social scientists in the Communist countries to the scientific discussion of development problems in the poor countries.” There is undoubtedly some justification for his explanation that this is a result of the “cramped situation of the social sciences in the Communist countries.” Nevertheless, Communist theoreticians must undoubtedly feel that practical experience and results speak louder than would the analyses of social scientists, particularly the mathematical modeling type which Myrdal criticizes for the substitution of “elegance for relevance.”

# WORLD GOVERNMENT: AN OUTSIDE ROUTE

Impatient and discouraged at the lack of progress toward world order made by the United Nations, individuals from 30 countries gathered to draft a world constitution. Some of them, however, had different priorities.

By Arthur Brackman

The World Constitutional Convention and People's World Parliament, held in Interlaken, Switzerland, and Wolfsburg, Germany, August 26 to September 14, was the high point of 10 years' planning. The 300 delegates from 30 nations included a shawled lawyer from Nigeria, a diplomat from Ghana, a West German banker, an Indian industrialist and a French literary figure; delegates from Socialist countries, marooned by the Czechoslovak invasion, did not arrive.

Although World Constitutional Convention Secretary General Philip Isely hewed doggedly to W.C.C.'s main line and insisted that forging a world constitution was the principal order of business, delegates went off into a dozen other alluring fields. They planned a World University, a World Peace Corps and a world newspaper. They organized peace research, and compiled figures on world hunger and

national resources. One group even proposed by-passing the United Nations and setting up an Emergency World Government, to be proclaimed as "a higher political authority than that of national governments."

Thus, W.C.C.'s mosaic of peace and world government committees provided a spectrum of opinion, with their only common denominator being fervent opposition to international anarchy and war.

One of the approaches to this central problem of world order was German pastor Martin Niemoller's call for voluntary rationing in the "have" countries. "The crisis of the population explosion and hunger in the 'have-not' nations cannot wait," Niemoller told the delegates. "Emergency measures are needed to avoid catastrophe until longer-range measures begin to show results. I appeal to the affluent peoples of the West to voluntarily forego some food so it can be shipped to those areas where people are starving. And I don't mean merely spectacular spots like Biafra."

Delegate R. K. Nehru, a relative of

India's late prime minister and a former ambassador to the U.S. and the U.N., stressed the need of ending the nuclear danger and arms race. "What is needed," he said, "is a practical approach. The disparity between the minority of rich nations and the majority of poor nations is critical. Each nation thinks more of its immediate and vested interests than of the long-term interests of the world. Rich countries become even more affluent; poor nations stagnate. Yet, although the U.N. has failed to solve the world's two major problems, we must not expect swift changes. Let's keep in mind the facts of international life and not attempt to abolish sovereignies, but rather to pool them, and to provide safeguards that respect the rights of individuals and nations."

Dr. Max Habicht, law professor at Zurich University and a former legal adviser to the U.N., told delegates that the U.N. must either be revised or replaced by a new world authority better able to enforce its recommendations. He proposed a tax on individual incomes, payable directly into a world

Arthur Brackman, a former newspaper man and photography agent, is seeking to found an international peace newspaper.

DECEMBER, 1968

19

peoples' parliament. Habicht headed a committee which plans to persuade governments themselves to underwrite an international peace research organization.

The time has come,” said Habicht, “to abolish anarchy between sovereign states by giving to all mankind the same quality of order we enjoy in our villages, cities and nation states.”

The major fireworks of the conference centered around a report by Rev. Guy Meyer of Dobbs Ferry, New York, whose Political Action Committee called for scrapping existing peace machinery and setting up a new World Government now. Spearheaded by Douglas Mattern of Palo Alto, California, and Lyman Hinkley of San Francisco, Meyer's group conducted a two-day filibuster. At one point the debate was so heated that Eric L. Robinson of Portland, Oregon, acting chairman, threatened to eject one delegate, Marion Mushkat, a professor of political science at Tel Aviv University. Mushkat had called Meyer's proposal “preposterous” and joined the Indian delegation in assailing it. Although the Political Action Committee's report was rejected, rebellious members announced their intention to set up their own organization during the winter to implement the report.

## Two-Day Filibuster

A major battle shaped up also over the nature of the chief document to come out of the convention. Delegate Nehru sought to keep its terminology general and exhortatory, while Secretary General Isely, backed by Prof. John Sullivan, president of the American delegation, wanted to make it specific and activist. Prof. John Logue, a political scientist from Villanova University, conducted an eight-hour floor campaign supporting Nehru's views.

Delegates Aake Anker-Ording of Norway and Arthur Armstrong of Atascadero, California, helped negotiate a compromise. A call for a second World Constitutional Convention conference in 1970—one of Isley's main points—was to be included.

But the hallmark of the convention was diversity. Delegate Thane Read of Tempe, Arizona, for instance, proposed plans to found a World Political Party. Delegate Glen P. Turner, an ex-state senator from Middletown, Wisconsin, urged that Esperanto be the key to world community. Delegate Watana Keovilam, a Thailander, distributed a paper entitled, “The Spirit of Love Through God and Religion.” A report by delegate Victor Welch, a London newspaperman, urged that a new non-

## From the Wolfach Declaration:

> "... We make the following declaration to the people and governments of the world:

> "We call upon all mankind, especially the people of developing nations and the young people of the world, to join in this effort to put an end to world anarchy and want...."

> "We believe that the present state of world affairs requires the prompt establishment of world government with powers adequate to secure peace and to promote social and economic justice...."

> "Despite the excellent work of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, it has been unable to keep the peace.

> "Because of the slowness or inability of national governments to cope with this situation, a popular initiative was organized to convene the first working sessions of a World Constitutional Convention and People's Parliament during the summer of 1968. At these first sessions, the work on the principles and details of a constitution for world government was begun, and other approaches and actions were formulated to serve the welfare of humanity."

> "To carry forward this initiative, we appeal now to all people of the Earth and to those national governments willing to explore new ways towards peace, to prepare for the summer of 1970 when the second working sessions of the World Constitutional Convention and People's World Parliament are hereby called."

> "Before the sessions in 1970, we instruct the World Constitution and Parliament Association to ensure the completion of a draft or drafts of a world constitution for preliminary debate during 1969, and for submission to the World Constitutional Convention in 1970. We also charge the World Constitution and Parliament Association with the task of arousing popular forces around the world, as well as national governments or national legislatures, for participation in the sessions in 1970, and of working out details...."

(Headquarters of the World Constitution and Parliament Association are at 8300 West 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80215, U.S.A.)

territorial nation be formed under United Nations auspices. "Any person anywhere should be able to apply for membership in the new nation (Nation 125)." said Welch. "He should be able to proclaim his allegiance to Nation 125 over and above his existing allegiance to his nation or origin."

The conference adopted reports looking toward creation of a World University and also a world newspaper. To be called Man, the monthly paper would cover world events through simultaneous presentation of reports from competing capitals.

I

In this atmosphere, the convention's primary task, to draft a world constitution, proved to be the least conspicuous activity. The work was carried on in closed sessions of a Consultative Council, which included Mrs. Elizabeth Mann Borgese, a fellow at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California; Prof. Lucile W. Green, San Francisco; Dr. Masanobu Konishi, Japan; L'Abbé Pierre, founder of the Emmaus Communities and a former member of the French Parliament, and Henrique Goldkorn, Brazilian economist.

Only a small part of the constitution was actually drafted and more sessions of the drafting group will be held during the months ahead. Secretary General Isley said he hopes the work will be well along by the 1970 meeting. During the interim, Isley, who operates a health food store in suburban Denver, Colorado, plans to conduct continuing consultations by mail.

The convention closed on a note of qualified optimism. The experience helped to pinpoint the main problems that plague most of the world's 2,000 peace and world government movements: shortages of funds and personnel, confusion of aims, isolation from similarly-oriented groups, and remoteness from the main currents of their respective countries' cultural and political life.

Upon his departure each delegate received an officially sealed letter from Wolfach's Mayor Arthur Martin, addressed to the mayor of the delegate's home community. (Wolfach was the first city in Germany to officially fly the United Nations flag.)

"I look forward to the time," he wrote, "when all we mayors function in a united world."

20

WAR/PEACE REPORT

ON THE PEACE FRONT

Position Problems on Czechoslovakia

Two international peace groups that traditionally have given unequivocal backing to the policies of the Soviet Union have not followed this practice in the case of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, it was shown in a survey made by *Czechoslovakia International*, a new publication of the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace.

The survey quotes the World Council of Peace in a rather noncommittal statement urging mutual cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R., and a quick return to "normalization" of Czechoslovakia. Although the group deplored the "misunderstanding," it refused to take sides.

The Christian Peace Conference, on the other hand, openly showed a disparity of views within its own ranks. The C.P.C., which has its headquarters in Prague, issued a communique taking both sides, with each delegate choosing his own side. The president of the Christian Peace Conference, Dr. J. L. Hromadka, himself a Czechoslovak, could not participate in the discussion, but the magazine quotes from his letter to the Soviet ambassador in Prague, in which he says: "In my life I have known no greater tragedy than this event. . . . The [Czechoslovak] loss of love for the Soviet people will not be undone for many decades. . . . The moral status of socialism and communism has been shattered for a very long time. . . . Only an immediate withdrawal of the occupying armies could at least partly mitigate our common tragedy."

As for the peace groups and other organizations in countries of the Western Alliance, the survey indicates that the reaction was overwhelmingly negative towards the Soviet intervention. Even the Communist parties of most of these countries denounced the Russian action.

The I.C.D.P. is an international group of peace-concerned organizations that are nonaligned in the Cold War. Its new publication is intended to keep alive concern over Czechoslovakia and to contribute to dialogue between the East and West.

U.W.F. ON U.N. MARCH

Carrying signs such as "We Want U.N. Power," some 300 United World Federalists recently marched to the United States Mission to the United Nations, where they presented a petition to Ambassador Arthur E. Goldschmidt urging the U.S. to make more effective use of the United Nations and its agencies.

The marchers represented U.W.F.

chapters from 10 states, and ranged from the young to the old. College representation included Ursinus College, University of Connecticut, Skidmore, Antioch, Harvard, Seton Hall, Princeton, Vassar, and Fairleigh Dickinson.

A rally was held following the procession at Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, with William Rand, Jr., president of the Metropolitan New York U.W.F., as master of ceremonies. The speakers included Congressman Jonathan Bingham of New York; Mrs. Glenna Johnson, executive director of Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; U.W.F. President James G. Patton; Robert King, vice chairman of Student World Federalists from Princeton University; James B. Carey, director of labor participation, U.N.A.-U.S.A.; Dr. Alan Levy, president of New Jersey U.W.F., and Sheldon Malev, instructor at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

The main purpose behind the march was to spearhead a nationwide movement of sympathetic organizations to declare their support for a stronger United Nations. Organizations which supported the objective of the march included Women Strike for Peace, Friends Meeting Peace Committee, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Quaker Meeting, Chappaqua, N. Y., and the American Friends Service Committee.

RESEARCH IN ARMS CONTROL

The National Academy of Sciences has established a new program of grants in support of social and behavioral science dissertation research in arms control and disarmament.

The three-year program, initiated and funded by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is intended to increase understanding of the fundamental factors bearing on the creation of a suitable environment and viable structure for the resolution of international conflict and the limitation of arms, and to encourage research that will "contribute to fundamental knowledge . . . and broaden and deepen understanding of critical problems of arms control and disarmament."

Support may be requested for research in any of the disciplines of social and behavioral sciences—it may be either theoretical or applied. These disciplines include anthropology, economics, geography, history, linguistics, political science, psychology, behavioral psychiatry, and sociology. The fields of law and philosophy will also be eligible.

The program will provide for dissertation research in amounts extending from small sums up to $6,000 per year. Awards will be made twice during 1969. Further information is available from the Committee on A.C.D.A. Support of Dissertation Research in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418.

STUDENTS TO WEIGH POLICY

A student symposium on U.S. foreign policy, sponsored by the Council on International Relations and United Nations Affairs, will be held December 19-22 at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C. All student recommendations and opinions adopted during the symposium will be compiled into a report which will be presented to the new administration and Congress in January.

The 32 discussion topics will include: Black, Independent Africa; Czechoslovakia and Policy Toward Eastern Europe; the Middle East; Settlement of the Vietnam War, and the Student Role in World Affairs and U.S. Foreign Policy. For information contact the Symposium Coordinator, United Nations Association, 1325 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C.

TO AMEND U.N. CHARTER

The Second Dublin Declaration, signed in 1965 by 52 participants at the Second Dublin Conference on the essentials of an effective world organization to prevent war, now has 915 signers and adherents, George Holt, executive director of the Grenville Clark Institute, announced in the current issue of *World Federalist*. This includes 67 members of national legislatures, 32 top government officials, 43 college presidents and 16 Nobel Prize winners. The declaration outlines a program to amend the U.N. Charter to make it a more effective organization for the prevention of war.

Holt also announced that the Institute will continue to present the declaration to heads of government around the world to bring about its implementation.

DECEMBER, 1968

21

LISTENING POST

WAR AND PEACE IN THE GLOB-
AL VILLAGE. Marshall McLuhan
and Quentin Fiore. McGraw-Hill.
190 pp. $5.95.

"All social changes are the effect of new technologies (self-amputations of our own being) on the order of our sensory lives. It is the shift in this order, altering the images that we make of ourselves and our world, that guarantees that every major technical innovation will so disturb our inner lives that wars necessarily result as misbegotten efforts to recover the old images."

With this thesis, Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore thrust fresh concept after fresh concept on war and technological change before us. Almost every page is a surprise: an arresting advertisement designed to underscore the thesis, a sweeping generalization or mirthful comment, a meaty quotation from a profound work, a puzzling quote in the margin excerpted from James Joyce's *Finnegan's Wake*.

The book can be read solely for entertainment. In a book-wide illustration of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, a large-type caption states simply, "Jehosphat, what doom is here!" McLuhan observes crisply that the world of advertisements has been a frank declaration of war on the community of customers. AVCO's ad in the *Wall Street Journal* heralds its role in the missile age: "We are 25,000 people changing the way you live..." Advertisers, McLuhan notes, have discovered that bad news concerns only a few, but good news can upset a whole culture! Much of the initial section of the book deals with the efforts of—of all things—the stirrup. Ancient and modern history come alive through McLuhan's imaginative interpretation.

Precisely because of the bold sweep of his interpretations, McLuhan helps us see the relationship between education and war. War is education, "a form of compulsory education for the other guy." A new technology generates "vast new environments against which the individual organism is quite helpless." The individual often responds by warring against change, using drugs and draft-card burning to turn off the electronic culture or seeking a simple monastic life style.

McLuhan is not only concerned with war in its literal sense, a destruction of people. He uses the concept of war to show education as a form of imperialism, fashion as a response toward creating an anti-environment.

The book's messages leap withodenning pace, like a TV documentary which must be fitted into a one-hour time slot. Its focus shifts quickly from light-hearted observations to profound insight. The bad news of our rapidly changing technology may be made less disastrous if we can utilize McLuhan's new massage.
—Norman H. Wilson

THE WAR PRAYER. By Mark Twain, with drawings by John Groth. Harper & Row. 66 pp. $5.95

Mark Twain's War Prayer, first published in 1923, carries a contemporary message. The poem is a bitter protest against all war, and the reader of this new edition, dramatically illustrated by John Groth, can well imagine Twain himself among the passionate throng protesting the war in Vietnam. Twain derides those who see war merely as a confrontation between the worthy patriot and the wicked enemy, instead of one human pitted against another in devastating battle.

As a group of patriots are gathered in church hearing an inspiring prayer for victory an old man rises to explain the full import of this prayer:

"When you have prayed for victory
you have prayed for many unmen-
tioned results which follow victory.
... Help us to tear their soldiers to
bloody shreds with our shells. ... Help
us to lay waste their humble homes
with a hurricane of fire. ... Blast their
hopes, blight their lives. ..."

Thus Twain tells the agonizing truth about war, that all soldiers are at once enemy and patriot, and that the true enemy is war itself.

LET US EXAMINE OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD PEACE. World Law Fund. 47 pp. $1.00.

The title of this booklet, *Let Us Examine Our Attitude Toward Peace*, is taken from an address given by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 entitled, *Toward a Strategy of Peace*. His writing is one of seven important statements on war and peace included in this collection published by the World Law Fund as "an inquiry into some of the political and psychological barriers to world peace." The other authors are Jerome D. Frank, Kenneth Boulding, George F. Kennan, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Lin Piao and Pope John XXIII. Intended as a reading unit for junior college and senior high school students, this is the first in a series of readings that the Fund will publish on world order. Included is a helpful program and discussion guide.

HANDBOOK ON COMMUNIST
CHINA. National Committee on
United States-China Relations. 65
pp. 50 cents.

Students of China, as well as the average reader, can get solid background and resource information from this booklet made available by the National Committee on United States-China Relations. Reprinted from the current issue of *Intercom*, it gives a capsule survey of the Cultural Revolution and a discussion of U.S. policy toward China. It also offers a listing of films, a bibliography of recent books on China, and a curriculum guide to aid teachers in selecting and interpreting units on China.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

The Quarterly of the Israeli Institute of International Affairs, Political Doctrine and Problems of Developing Countries—the only independent body of this kind in the Near East. Carries articles in English, French and Hebrew on the above topics and related questions in the field of international law and international relations, aiming at fostering their study and promoting the establishment and maintenance of peace on the basis of law and justice.

IN ISSUE No. 3-4 OF 1968

THE INDEPENDENCE OF ISRAEL AND ISRAEL LABOUR,
by Z. Haring

INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,
by R. Cohen

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL SOCIALIST STATE,
by Professor M. Bartós

SINGLE-PARTY SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN
TROPICAL AFRICA, by Professor H. Glickman

EUROPE: THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL REVOLUTION, by
J. P. Poullier and Joseph Harned

And other articles in English, French and Hebrew.

Annual subscription, $6.00; single copies, $1.50

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
P.O.B. 17027, Tel Aviv, Israel

22

WAR/PEACE REPORT

# LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

## For a World Communications Forum

To the Editor:

I read with intense interest Richard N. Gardner's article, "Space Communications: A New Instrument for World Order" (October issue), since I have long been impressed by the potentialities of world broadcasting.

As Mr. Gardner undoubtedly knows, the third U.N. General Assembly, in 1948, approved "in principle" a rudimentary United Nations broadcasting network to cost $16 million (Resolution 240, passed Nov. 18, 1948). Two years later the amount was cut to $1.9 million, and shortly thereafter it was decided that "no funds" were available for the project. In contrast to the billions wasted in national budgets, this penury would be comical if it were not so tragic.

Let us hope that Mr. Gardner's excellent article and the studies under way at the U.N. and in Washington will lead to the adaptation of some of these earlier ideas to the satellite broadcasting that is on the way.

Mr. Gardner's emphasis on worldwide U.N. programs is similar to a suggestion developed in an article of mine "Station WORLD" (Common Sense, July, 1943), proposing that a broadcasting system, under world control, be built after the Second World War with the equipment then being used to broadcast war propaganda. But another approach besides centralized control is possible, and may even be preferable.

Adlai Stevenson, in a 1955 Harvard lecture, remarked: "I sometimes think that what America needs most is a good hearing aid." In contrast, the voting structure of the Intelsat satellite operation—involving 53 per cent U.S. control—seems to be based on the theory that what America needs is a louder worldwide public address system.

Pending the logical correction of this imbalance through U.N. control of Intelsat, the United States could take action to establish at least temporary equality of satellite broadcasting.

This could be accomplished through an even-handed exchange of radio programs by the United States with as many of the 87 developing nations as cared to enter the arrangement. In my opinion this is more important than a television exchange with the Soviet Union—good as that would be—because of what America has to offer the developing countries and what they can teach Americans about world realities, and in view of the already apparent temptation for Washington and Moscow to divide the world into great power spheres of influence.

The U.S. could initiate negotiations for radio program exchanges with the developing nations using Intelsat facilities—under financing arrangements that would ease the burden on those coun-

tries—and through a voluntary agreement with one of the major U.S. radio chains.

A half-hour series in the U.S. every week night for 13 weeks would accommodate 65 different countries. To such a forum of nations could be added touches of the various nations' music and culture. It seems to me such programs would have wide appeal. In return, the United States would have access to a half-hour on the domestic broadcasting system of each country involved.

This arrangement for encouraging the strong to listen to the weak has vast potentialities for understanding, and for world peace. The American public would gain from a more sensitive and realistic

view of the developing world, where some of the most significant changes in human history are going to occur.

WM. BROSS LLOYD, JR.
Winnetka, Ill.

### W.A.W.F.: A WORLD PARTY?

To the Editor:

Your idea of a world political party (editorial, May, 1968) I would view in much the same terms as projects for a world constitution. Both are propaganda devices at best. I cannot imagine any of the "Powers" submitting themselves to the authority of a real world government. I suppose my pessimism on this issue runs parallel to Marx's. Just as he felt in the 19th century that one could not count on the bourgeoisie to cooperate in the elimination of "exploitation," except for a few isolated, enlightened individuals, so in the 20th century I do not look to the national governments for cooperation in the elimination of national sovereignty.

A world political party might do a great deal to educate people and provide martyrs and arouse public interest, but I would not expect it to be able to win world political power in the way Democrats, Republicans, Gaullists, Christian

## The Journal of

### conflict

### RESOLUTION

*A quarterly for research related to war and peace*

DECEMBER 1968 (XII, 4): SPECIAL REVIEW ISSUE

<table><tr><td>Introduction</td><td>Kenneth Boulding</td></tr><tr><td>Some Conceptual Difficulties in the Theory of Social Conflict</td><td>Clinton F. Fink</td></tr><tr><td>Prospects for Experimental Games</td><td>Anatol Rapoport</td></tr><tr><td>The War of All Against All: A Review of The Journal of Conflict Resolution</td><td>Elizabeth Converse</td></tr></table>

TWELVE-YEAR INDEX OF AUTHORS, 1957-1968

$7.00 per year for individuals; $10.00 for institutions; single issues $3.00

Published by The Center for Research on Conflict Resolution
The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104

DECEMBER, 1968

23

Democrats, and so forth, win power today. As a matter of fact, we already have a world political party, if you look at the various world federalist organizations around the Western world and parts of Asia. They have tens of thousands of members, quite a few of them practicing politicians, who often introduce the issue of world government into their campaigns. There is a Parliamentary Group for World Government in the U.K., for example, consisting of perhaps a hundred M.P.'s of both major parties, which has been quite active, especially in education, for many years. Former United World Federalists head Alan Cranston has just won a seat in the U.S. Senate in California against arch-conservative Max Rafferty, and world federalism was an issue in that campaign. Since nearly all the federalist groups at the national level are affiliated with the World Association of World Federalists at the international level, this means that we already have the nucleus, at least, for a world political party.

W. WARREN WAGAR

Associate Professor of History
University of New Mexico

Albuquerque, N. M.

EDITOR'S NOTE: It does seem improbable that the nation states will voluntarily turn over their sovereignty, or areas of it, to an international authority even though logic indicates that this is the way to keep international peace. This is precisely why I think an outside force—a World Political Party, or Movement, of individuals—is needed to push on the nation states and international organizations. I doubt that W.A.W.F. could serve this function because its ideology—world federal government now—is too narrow and too Western to become a real political World Movement seeking to influence international relations and organizations on almost a day-by-day basis and finally to achieve some power on the world level. I would think it essential that the common denominator of the World Movement be low enough to permit individuals from Western, Communist and nonaligned countries to take part. My guess is that this common denominator would be by no means so low as to make the effort useless. I would expect that such a Movement could take far more specific and advanced positions on such questions as arms control and disarmament, economic development, and even crisis areas such as Vietnam and Czechoslovakia than can bodies controlled directly by governments, such as the U.N. Even if in the end this Movement can only "educate people and provide martyrs and arouse public interest," as you suggest, I still think it is worth trying.—R.H.

Addressee:

## WPR INDEX: August-December, 1968

The following articles appeared in War/Peace Report from August/September to December 1968. (Indexes appear in June and December each year. Back copies are available, 50 cents each.)

**AUGUST/SEPTEMBER**—The Sea Bed: Common Heritage of Mankind, by Arvid Pardo and Victor J. Gauci; The Politics of the Ocean Bottom, by Pat Reilly; An Arms Race on the Sea Bed?, by Seymour M. Hersh; We Must Contact Our Opponents, an interview with Dr. Phan Quang Dan; An Election Committee?, Nomination for "Boob of the Year," Bravo, Academician Sakharov!, editorials; Can the U.S. Win the Vietnam War?, three leading U.S. correspondents in South Vietnam answer questions put to them by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

**OCTOBER**—Emerging New Power: The World Corporation, by Arthur Barber; Making World Corporations into World Citizens, by George W. Ball; Space Communications: A New Instrument for World Order, by Richard N. Gardner; What Big Powers Do to Little Powers, The World Corporation, Political Potluck, '68 Style, editorials; How Best to Limit Arms?, review essay by I. S. Glagolev; Talking With Peace Activists, review essay by Arthur Springer; Uppsala: The Churches and Peace, by Homer A. Jack.

**NOVEMBER**—A Vietnam Settlement: The View From Hanoi, by Richard A. Falk; A Plan to Neutralize Vietnam, by Cyril E. Black, Klaus Knorr, Oran R. Young and Richard A. Falk; Vietnam: Perceptions of Insanity, review essay of three books by Stanley Millet; For a New U.N. Human Rights Agency, by Louis B. Sohn; On Causes and Cures of World Crises, editorial; Needed: A World Currency, by Byron Johnson; Can Propaganda Be Controlled?, a review essay by John B. Whitton; World Law and Justice—When?, a review essay by Urban Whitaker; Who Hankers After Civil Defense?, a review essay by John E. Ullmann.

**DECEMBER**—The Great Nuclear Debate: Parity vs. Superiority; participants, Jerome B. Wiesner, Adam Yarmolinsky, Donald G. Brennan, Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; Where Nixon Stands on Arms Control and Disarmament, text of Nixon policy statement; What Kind of Foreign Policy Under Nixon?, editorial; The Drama of Development, by Lynn Turgeon; World Government: An Outside Route, by Arthur Brackman.

## *the* Humanist

### a journal of humanist and ethical concern with a modern viewpoint

Topics treated in
recent issues:

* legalized abortion

* conscientious objection

* civil disobedience

* the sexual revolution

* the future of integration

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Contributors to
recent issues:

Leslie Fiedler, B. F. Skinner, Allen Ginsberg, Benjamin Spock, Martin Luther King, James E. Groppi, Charles Frankel, Barbara Ward, Kenneth Boulding, Staughton Lynd, Corliss Lamont, Sidney Hook, Algernon D. Black, Edgar Friedenberg, Dick Gregory, Bertram Wolfe, Willard Wirtz, Harold Taylor, James Farmer, A. A. Berle, Louis Sohn, and many others.

THE HUMANIST is a publication of the American Humanist Association

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Name

Address

City

State Zip

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

COORDINATOR, OVERSEAS PROGRAMS
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

Via Airmail

March 17, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I want to thank you for the excellent cooperation the UCLA-Brazil Student Leader Seminar received from your office on the occasion of its recent visit to our Nation's Capital.

The discussion led by Mr. Ashley Hewitt on the many facets of the relations of Brazil and the United States was very well received by all those present. Indeed, numerous comments were subsequently made by the Brazilian students about the extraordinarily fine control Mr. Hewitt has of the facts, figures, and character of the Brazilian reality. I am not exaggerating when I say that that meeting was almost unanimously considered to be the high point of the Seminar's visit to Washington, D. C.

CLH: lrc

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

February 15, 1972

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

AIRMAIL

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The 11th Annual UCLA-Brazil Student Leader Seminar is now in session on this campus. The 15 handpicked Brazilian university students are now immersed in American university life and are participating in a four week intensive seminar on American civilization and culture. They will continue their immersion in American life through special programs prepared for them in San Francisco, New York, and Washington, D. C.

The Washington, D. C., phase of the Seminar's program is of the utmost importance; indeed, it is the capstone. It is there that on February 28, 29, March 1 and the morning of March 2 that this fine group of future Brazilian leaders will have the opportunity to come into direct, personal contact with high ranking officers of all three branches of our government. Inasmuch as these bright young Brazilian university students will in the not too distant future be occupying positions of responsibility and importance on the Brazilian scene, contact with American leaders can have a very significant effect on future U.S.-Brazil relations. It would be particularly fitting if they could have the opportunity to meet briefly with you during their visit to our Nation's Capital.

I enclose herewith for your information a UCLA press release concerning the Seminar, a list of the names of the participants, and a copy of the core academic program now in progress here.

The Seminar is sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State. Arrangements for our Washington, D. C., visit are made through the Foreign Student Service Council in Washington, D. C.

The Brazilian students and I are sincerely hopeful that you will look with favor upon this request and that you will honor us with a brief interview on one of the days indicated.

Coordinator, UCLA-Brazil Student Leader Seminar
Professor of Spanish and Portuguese

RECEIVED
MAR. 2 1972

UCLA

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
*Office of Public Information*

1100 N. Market Street, Los Angeles, California 90024

Dial: "UCLA-585"

Release

Thursday, January 20, 1972

Ward - 825-2585

BRAZILIAN STUDENTS TO SAMPLE AMERICANA

Disneyland, Watts, the Kings hockey team, the County Museum of Art, the L.A. Philharmonic and the rock opera "Tommy" have something in common other than that they are all in Los Angeles---each will offer an example of U.S. culture to 15 visiting students from Brazil.

The students are the eleventh such group to visit Los Angeles as part of a special four-week study program held at UCLA each year.

While here, they will live with U.S. roommates in UCLA dormitories, and besides attending classes on campus, will see many of Los Angeles' cultural sights and attend a number of entertainment events.

Guests of UCLA and the U.S. State Department, the students were chosen for the program for their outstanding scholarship, leadership and ability to speak English.

Their program of study will cover a variety of topics on U.S. culture and civi-lization, including literature, the influence of jazz, the educational system, eco-nomics and ecology, civil liberties and minority groups, political parties and the electoral process, U.S. foreign policy, advances in communication and many other subjects that will give them a picture of life here.

Dr. Claude L. Hulet, professor of Spanish and Portuguese at UCLA, coordinates the project. It is conducted under the auspices of the Office of Overseas Programs at UCLA and sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

The students will arrive Saturday, January 22, after a four-day inspection of "Operation Bootstrap" in Puerto Rico. (Arrival time at Los Angeles International Airport is 8:02 p.m. on National Airlines Flight 51). They will return to Brazil following a twelve-day study tour of the San Francisco Bay area, New York City and Washington D.C.

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF OVERSEAS PROGRAMS

UCLA - BRAZIL STUDENT LEADER SEMINAR

CORE PROGRAM - 1972

January 22 Saturday 8:02 p.m. Arrival at Los Angeles
International Airport

January 23 Sunday 11:00 a.m. Orientation Meeting
Sproul Hall

3:00 p.m. Dorothy Chandler Pavilion
L.A. Symphony Orchestra
Symphony Concert

Evening Open

January 24 Monday 10:00 a.m. Objectives of the Program
(C.L. Hulet)

2 - 4 p.m. The American University System -
Strength and Weakness
(P.C. Smith)

Evening Movie: "The Sicilian Clan"
Sproul Hall

January 25 Tuesday 9:00 a.m. The Cultural Geography of
Los Angeles - a Social History
of a Heterogeneous Community
- Includes a Tour of the Metro-
politan Area -
(J. Frierman)

Evening Open

January 26 Wednesday 9 - 11 a.m. English
(A.H. Wingate)

3 - 5 p.m. Jazz and its Influences
(P. Tanner)
Schoenberg Hall: Room 1344

8:00 p.m. U.S. - Brazil, Diplomatic
Relations
(E.B. Burns)

2

<table><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">January 27</td><td rowspan="4">Thursday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br>(A.H. Wingate)</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Education in the United States<br>of America<br>(T.G. Robischon)</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>The Role of the United States<br>in the International Monetary<br>System<br>(J. Pippinger)</td></tr><tr><td>8:00 p.m.</td><td>Reception at the<br>International Student Center</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">January 28</td><td rowspan="5">Friday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br>(A.H. Wingate)</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>American Political Parties and<br>the Electoral Process<br>(H. Baerwald)</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td>Evening<br>8:30 p.m.</td><td>An Organ Trilogy:<br>Catherine Crozier<br>Royce Hall, UCLA</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Visit to Marineland</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">January 29</td><td rowspan="3">Saturday</td><td>10:00 a.m.</td><td>Visit to Museum of Science<br>and Industry</td></tr><tr><td>Evening<br>8:30 p.m.</td><td>Art of Dance Series:<br>Rudy Perez Dance Theater<br>Royce Hall, UCLA</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Visit to Marineland</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">January 30</td><td rowspan="3">Sunday</td><td>9:30 a.m.</td><td>Trip to Disneyland</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Disneyland</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">January 31</td><td rowspan="2">Monday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>American Literature - Selected<br>Authors and Subjects<br>(R. Rees)</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>America in Southern California<br>(K.B. Berwick)</td></tr></tbody></table>

3

<table><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">January 31</td><td rowspan="2">Monday</td><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Congress and the Power of the Executive ( L.M. Snowiss )</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Movie: "Flight of the Phoenix" Sproul Hall</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">February 1</td><td rowspan="4">Tuesday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English ( A.H. Wingate )</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Change and Continuity in Post World War II America ( A.L. Yarnell )</td></tr><tr><td>2:00 p.m.</td><td>Visit to the County Museum of Art</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Ice Hockey: Los Angeles Kings vs Chicago Black Hawks The Forum, Inglewood</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">February 2</td><td rowspan="4">Wednesday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>American Literature - Selected Authors and Subjects ( R. Rees )</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Toward a White Man's Country - Patriotism, Race and Sex in America ( R.T. Takaki )</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Changing Perspectives in U.S. Foreign Policy ( W.P. Gerberding )</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">February 3</td><td rowspan="4">Thursday</td><td>9 - 11 a.m.</td><td>New Advances in Communications - Heredity and Genetics ( I.S. Bengelsdorf )</td></tr><tr><td>11-12 noon</td><td>English ( A.H. Wingate )</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>American Constitutional Law - The Federal System ( R. Alleyne )</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>7:00 p.m.</td><td>Dinner with Visiting Fulbright and Nasa Scholars in S. California<br/>Lecture: Search for an American Hero - Presidential Image Making ( K.B. Berwick )</td></tr></tbody></table>

4

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="4">February 4</td>
      <td rowspan="4">Friday</td>
      <td>9 - 11 a.m.</td>
      <td>The Supreme Court and the Rights and Liberties of the Individual ( R.S. Gerstein )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>1 - 3 p.m.</td>
      <td>English ( A.H. Wingate )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>3 - 5 p.m.</td>
      <td>New Directions in American Art ( J. Kaplan )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Evening 8:30 p.m.</td>
      <td>Dickson Hall 4260<br>Play: "The Man Who Came to Dinner"<br>Ralph Freud Playhouse, UCLA</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>February 5</td>
      <td>Saturday</td>
      <td></td>
      <td>Home Hospitality</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>February 6</td>
      <td>Sunday</td>
      <td></td>
      <td>Home Hospitality</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Evening 8:30 p.m.</td>
      <td></td>
      <td>Chamber Music Series:<br>Juilliard String Quartet<br>Royce Hall, UCLA</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 7</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Monday</td>
      <td>10-12 noon</td>
      <td>American Revolutionary Tradition ( K.B. Berwick )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 - 4 p.m.</td>
      <td>A Contemporary View of Agriculture in the U.S. ( C.A. Schroeder )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Evening</td>
      <td>Movie: "The Ghost and Mrs. Muir"<br>Sproul Hall</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 8</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Tuesday</td>
      <td>9:30-11.30 a.m.</td>
      <td>Economics of Ecology ( Th. Sowell )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 - 4 p.m.</td>
      <td>Red, White and Black - the Confrontation of Cultures in America ( G.B. Nash )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Evening</td>
      <td>Open</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 9</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Wednesday</td>
      <td>9 - 11 a.m.</td>
      <td>Minority Group Politics ( H.M. Scoble )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 - 4 p.m.</td>
      <td>Geographic Overview of the U.S. ( H.J. Bruman )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>4:15 p.m.</td>
      <td>Visit to Campus Computing Network Facility</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

5

February 9 Wednesday Evening 7:30 p.m. Sproul Hall, TV Room: Latin American - U.S. Relations ( E. Gonzalez )

February 10 Thursday 9 - 11 a.m. New Advances in Communications-Heredity and Genetics ( I.S. Bengelsdorf )

2 - 4 p.m. Criminal Law Reform in the United States ( G.P. Fletcher )

Evening 8:00 p.m. UCLA-Semana de Arte Moderna Symposium Schoenberg Hall

February 11 Friday 10-12 noon American Literature - Selected Authors and Subjects ( Ph. Durham )

2 - 4 p.m. Evaluation of Phase II; Economic Policies ( Ch.W. Baird )

Evening 8:00 p.m. Basketball Game: UCLA vs Washington State Pauley Pavilion, UCLA

February 12 Saturday 9:00 a.m. Trip to Imperial Valley via Palm Springs and Indio, including Visit to Mt. San Jacinto

Overnight in Imperial Valley - Home Hospitality

February 13 Sunday Home Hospitality in Imperial Valley

February 14 Monday 9:00 a.m. Imperial Valley Irrigation District, El Centro

10:00 a.m. Return to Los Angeles via Old San Diego, UC San Diego Campus and Pacific Coast Highway

Evening Movie: "Joanna" Sproul Hall

6

<table><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">February 15</td><td rowspan="3">Tuesday</td><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Religion in the United States ( R. Dallek )</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Labor in the United States ( L. Levy )</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Art Festival<br/>Film: "Carnival In Rio"<br/>Sproul Hall</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="5">February 16</td><td rowspan="5">Wednesday</td><td>9:00 a.m.</td><td>Visit to the Medical Analysis and Retrieval System (MEDLARS)<br/>Biomedical Library, UCLA</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Trends in Environmental Health in the United States ( E. Flowers )</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Individual Class Attendance<br/>Visit to UCLA Hospital</td></tr><tr><td>Evening<br/>8:30 p.m.</td><td>Rock Opera: "Tommy"<br/>Aquarius Theater, Hollywood</td></tr><tr><td>9:30 a.m.</td><td>Visit to Los Angeles County Municipal and Superior Court</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">February 17</td><td rowspan="4">Thursday</td><td>Noon</td><td>Luncheon</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Visit to Watts: Martin Luther King Hospital<br/>Watts Labor Action Committee</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Sproul Hall Talent Show</td></tr><tr><td>Morning</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">February 18</td><td rowspan="3">Friday</td><td>1 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Final Meeting with Dr. C.L. Hulet and Staff</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td>11:00 a.m.</td><td>Bus Departure from Sproul Hall for International Airport and Flight to San Francisco</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>Salvador</td>
    <td>9. Mário de Macedo Costa Calmon<br>De Bittencourt<br>Federal University of Bahia<br>Business Administration</td>
    <td>June 1, 1952</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Maceió</td>
    <td>10. Paulo Luiz Neto Lôbo<br>Federal University of Alagoas<br>Law and Business Administration</td>
    <td>July 30, 1949</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Recife</td>
    <td>11. Ana Maria Cavalcanti Lyra<br>Institute of Higher Education<br>of Pernambuco<br>Medicine (Psychiatry)</td>
    <td>March 17, 1949</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Natal</td>
    <td>12. Marcio Luiz Tassino de Araujo<br>Federal University of<br>Rio Grande do Norte<br>Medicine</td>
    <td>June 10, 1949</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Fortaleza</td>
    <td>13. Luiza Brasileiro Alcântara<br>Federal University of Ceará<br>Letters and Economics</td>
    <td>January 18, 1951</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Belém</td>
    <td>14. Haroldo Guilherme Pinheiro da Silva<br>Federal University of Pará<br>Letters</td>
    <td>July 29, 1948</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Manaus</td>
    <td>15. Luiz Carlos de Lima Ferreira<br>University of Amazonas<br>Medicine</td>
    <td>August 15, 1948</td>
  </tr>
</table>

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

February 9, 1973

GENERAL

FEB-11-73 KISSINGER, HENRY A.
KISSINGER, HENRY A./H

Dr. Henry J. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The twelfth annual UCLA-Brazil Student Leader Seminar is now in session on this campus. The fifteen hand-picked Brazilian university students are now involved in American university life and are participating in a four-week intensive seminar on American civilization and culture. Their immersion in American life will continue through special programs prepared for them in San Francisco, New York, and Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C. is the capstone of the Seminar's 45-day program. It is there that on February 26th, 27th and 28th this fine group of future Brazilian leaders will have the opportunity to come into direct, personal contact with high-ranking officers of all three branches of our government. Such contact with American leaders can have a very significant effect on future U.S.-Brazil relations, inasmuch as these bright young Brazilian university students will be occupying positions of responsibility and importance on the Brazilian scene in the not-too-distant future. It would be especially fitting if they could meet briefly with you during their visit to our Nation's Capital.

Enclosed for your information are a UCLA press release concerning the Seminar, a list of the names of the participants, and a copy of the core academic program now in progress here.

The Seminar is sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State and arrangements for our Washington, D. C., visit are made through the Foreign Student Service Council there.

The Brazilian students and I are sincerely hopeful that you will favor this request by honoring us with a brief interview on one of the days indicated.

CLH:mrk
Enclosures

RECEIVED
FEB 24 1973
CENTRAL FILES

UCLA

Office of Public Information

405 Hilliard Avenue · Los Angeles, California 90024

Dial: "UCLA-585"

Release

Thursday, January 18, 1973

C. Harris - 825-2585

BRAZILIAN STUDENTS ARRIVE AT UCLA FOR FIRST HAND STUDY OF U.S.

Fifteen Brazilian students will have a better idea of the United States after their month-long stay at UCLA beginning Saturday (January 20) as guests of the university and the U.S. State Department.

Making UCLA as their base, they will examine U.S. culture at first hand, visiting such locations as Disneyland, Watts, and the County Art Museum and attending performances of the Los Angeles Philharmonic and Bernstein's "Mass" and a hockey game of the Los Angeles Kings.

Their academic studies will include such topics as U.S. literature and music, the educational system, economics and ecology, civil liberties and minority groups, domestic and foreign politics, and advances in science and communications.

The students will live with U.S. roommates in UCLA dormitories while in Los Angeles.

The program for the visitors is coordinated by Dr. Claude L. Hulet, professor of Spanish and Portuguese at UCLA, under the auspices of the Office of Overseas Programs at UCLA. The visit is sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

After the UCLA course, the students will return to Brazil following a twelve-day study tour of the San Francisco Bay area, New York City, and Washington, D.C.

(The students will arrive at Los Angeles International Airport at 7:50 p.m. Jan. 20, on National Airlines Flight 51.)

-UCLA-

PARTICIPANTS
1973 UCLA-BRAZIL STUDENT LEADER SEMINAR

<table><thead><tr><td>City</td><td>Name</td><td>Date of Birth</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Pôrto Alegre</td><td>1. Celso Giannetti Loureiro Chaves<br>Federal University of<br>Rio Grande do Sul<br>Architecture and Music</td><td>September 14, 1950</td></tr><tr><td>Curitiba</td><td>2. Manoel Antônio Nogueira<br>Federal University of<br>Paraná<br>Electrical Engineering</td><td>April 18, 1952</td></tr><tr><td>São Paulo</td><td>3. José Gatti Junior<br>Catholic University of<br>Santos<br>Architecture and Communications</td><td>September 1, 1951</td></tr><tr><td>São Paulo</td><td>4. Paulo Lollato<br>Getúlio Vargas Foundation<br>Public Administration</td><td>October 10, 1948</td></tr><tr><td>Belo Horizonte</td><td>5. Jaques Rodarte<br>Federal University of<br>Minas Gerais<br>Economics</td><td>February 4, 1951</td></tr><tr><td>Belo Horizonte</td><td>6. Lúcia Regina de las Casas<br>Federal University of<br>Minas Gerais<br>Psychology</td><td>August 9, 1952</td></tr><tr><td>Brasília</td><td>7. Esdras Neves Almeida<br>University of Brasília<br>Economics</td><td>September 16, 1951</td></tr><tr><td>Rio de Janeiro</td><td>8. Antônio Herculano Lopes<br>Rio Branco Institute<br>Diplomacy<br>University of the State of<br>Guanabara<br>Law</td><td>January 1, 1951</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>Salvador</td>
    <td>9. Manoel Pires Gomes<br/>Federal University of Bahia<br/>Public Administration</td>
    <td>January 1, 1949</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Recife</td>
    <td>10. Pedro Pereira do Canto Filho<br/>Pernambuco School of Medical<br/>Sciences<br/>Medicine</td>
    <td>August 27, 1949</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Natal</td>
    <td>11. Maria Goretti de Barros<br/>Federal University of Rio<br/>Grande do Norte<br/>Letters and Arts</td>
    <td>February 3, 1951</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Fortaleza</td>
    <td>12. Heliane Lima Leite<br/>Federal University of Ceará<br/>Civil Engineering</td>
    <td>January 7, 1950</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Belém</td>
    <td>13. Armando Sawada<br/>Federal University of Pará<br/>Law</td>
    <td>September 17, 1949</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Belém</td>
    <td>14. João Cláudio Dantas de Carvalho<br/>Federal University of Pará<br/>Electrical Engineering</td>
    <td>September 8, 1951</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Manaus</td>
    <td>15. Manoel Gomes Henriques<br/>University of Amazonas<br/>Medicine</td>
    <td>December 1, 1948</td>
  </tr>
</table>

CORE PROGRAM - 1973

<table><tr><td>January 20</td><td>Saturday</td><td>7:50 p.m.</td><td>Arrival at Los Angeles<br/>International Airport</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">January 21</td><td rowspan="3">Sunday</td><td>11:00 a.m.</td><td>Orientation Meeting<br/>Sproul Hall</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Tour of UCLA Campus<br/>and Westwood Village</td></tr><tr><td>7:30 p.m.</td><td>Mark Taper Forum<br/>Music Center<br/>Leonard Bernstein's<br/>"Mass"</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">January 22</td><td rowspan="3">Monday</td><td>9:15 a.m.</td><td>Objectives of the Program<br/>(C.L. Hulet)</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>America in Southern California<br/>(K.B. Berwick)</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>The American University System -<br/>Strength and Weaknesses<br/>(P.C. Smith)</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">January 23</td><td rowspan="3">Tuesday</td><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td>9:00 a.m.</td><td>The Cultural Geography of<br/>Los Angeles - a Social History<br/>of a Heterogeneous Community;<br/>Touring the Metropolitan Area<br/>of Greater Los Angeles<br/>(J. Frierman)</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">January 24</td><td rowspan="3">Wednesday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br/>(V.L. Brown)</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Visit to UCLA Research Library<br/>and Franklin D. Murphy<br/>Sculpture Garden</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>American Jazz and its Influence<br/>(P. Tanner)<br/>Schoenberg Hall: Room 1439</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>8:00 p.m.</td><td>Ice Hockey: Kings vs. St. Louis<br/>The Forum, Inglewood</td></tr></table>

3

<table><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4">January 30</td><td rowspan="4">Tuesday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br>( V.L. Brown )</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>America in the 20th Century:<br>a Historical Perspective<br>( R. Dallek )</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Development of the World<br>Monetary System and the Future<br>of the Dollar in that System<br>( R.H. Mason )</td></tr><tr><td>Evening<br>7:00 p.m.</td><td>Dinner with Visiting Fulbright<br>Scholars in Southern California;<br>Lecture:<br>In the Varicose Vein: the Anæ<br>tomy of American Humor<br>( K.B. Berwick )</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="4">January 31</td><td rowspan="4">Wednesday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br>( V.L. Brown )</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>The Supreme Court and the Rights<br>and Liberties of the Individual<br>( R.S. Gerstein )</td></tr><tr><td>2 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Race Relations in Brazil and<br>the United States - A Compara-<br>tive View<br>( G.B. Nash )</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">February 1</td><td rowspan="3">Thursday</td><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br>( V.L. Brown )</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>American Literature -<br>Selected Authors and Subjects<br>( P. Durham )</td></tr><tr><td>2:15 - 4 p.m.</td><td>American Constitutional Law<br>( G.T. Schwartz )</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">February 2</td><td rowspan="3">Friday</td><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td>9 - 10 a.m.</td><td>English<br>( V.L. Brown )</td></tr><tr><td>10-12 noon</td><td>Changing Perspectives in U.S.<br>Foreign Policy<br>( W.P. Gerberding )</td></tr></tbody></table>

4

February 2 Friday 2 - 4 p.m. Contemporary American Art ( J. Kaplan )
8:30 p.m. Dorothy Chandler Pavilion Symphony Concert
Conductor: Zubin Mehta
February 3 Saturday Home Hospitality
February 4 Sunday Home Hospitality
February 5 Monday 10-12 noon American Literature - Selected Authors and Subjects ( R. Rees )
2 - 4 p.m. Interest Group Politics on the Contemporary Scene ( K. Orren )
Evening Open
February 6 Tuesday 10-12 noon A Contemporary View of Agriculture in the United States ( C.A. Schroeder )
1 - 4 p.m. Class Attendance: Latin American Social History ( E.B. Burns ) Dickson Hall Auditorium 2160 E
Evening Visit to Northridge Fashion Center and to the Home of Dr. Claude L. Hulet
February 7 Wednesday 9-10 a.m. A Comparative View of University Administration in Brazil and The United States ( R.A. Rogers )
10-12 noon Geographic Overview of the United States of America ( H.J. Bruman )
2:00 p.m. Visit to the Los Angeles County Museum of Art
7:30 p.m. The New Nixon Administration and Latin American Policy ( E. Gonzalez ) Sproul Hall: TV Room

5

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 8</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Thursday</td>
      <td>9-11 a.m.</td>
      <td>Individual Class Attendance<br>Visit to the Medical Analysis<br>and Retrieval System (Medlars)<br>Biomedical Library, UCLA</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>11-12:15 p.m.</td>
      <td>Class Attendance:<br>Lecture: "Brazil" Bunche 2209 A<br>( H.J. Bruman )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 - 4 p.m.</td>
      <td>Recent Advances in Science<br>(I.S. Bengelsdorf)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td>Evening</td>
      <td>Open</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 9</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Friday</td>
      <td>10-12 noon</td>
      <td>Labor in the United States<br>( L. Levy )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 - 4 p.m.</td>
      <td>The Chicano Experience in<br>American Society<br>( R.A. Rocco )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>8:30 p.m.</td>
      <td>"The Country Wife"<br>Ralph Freud Playhouse,<br>MacGowan Hall, UCLA</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 10</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Saturday</td>
      <td>9:00 a.m.</td>
      <td>Trip to Imperial Valley via<br>Palm Springs and Indio,<br>including Visit to Mt. San<br>Jacinto</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Overnight in Imperial Valley -<br>Home Hospitality</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Home Hospitality in Imperial<br>Valley</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="3">February 11</td>
      <td rowspan="3">Sunday</td>
      <td>9:00 a.m.</td>
      <td>Imperial Valley Irrigation<br>District, El Centro</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>10:00 a.m.</td>
      <td>Return to Los Angeles via<br>San Diego and UC San Diego Campus<br>in La Jolla</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Evening</td>
      <td>Movie: "St. Valentine's Day<br>Massacre"<br>Sproul Hall</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td rowspan="2">February 12</td>
      <td rowspan="2">Monday</td>
      <td>10-12 noon</td>
      <td>Drug Use in America - A Psycho-<br>logical Perspective<br>( J. Shannon )</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 - 4 p.m.</td>
      <td>Computers, Present and Future<br>( L. Levine )<br>Visit to Campus Computing Net-<br>work Facility</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

6

<table><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">February 14</td><td rowspan="3">Wednesday</td><td>Morning</td><td>Individual Class Attendance</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Visit to Los Angeles County Municipal and Superior Court</td></tr><tr><td>8:30 p.m.</td><td>U.S.-Brazil Diplomatic Relations (E.B. Burns) Home of Dr. E.B. Burns</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">February 15</td><td rowspan="3">Thursday</td><td>Morning</td><td>Visit to Watts: Martin Luther King Hospital</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon</td><td>Watts Labor Action Committee</td></tr><tr><td>Evening</td><td>Open</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">February 16</td><td rowspan="2">Friday</td><td>1 - 4 p.m.</td><td>Final Meeting with Dr. C.L. Hulet and Staff</td></tr><tr><td>8:00 p.m.</td><td>Basketball Game: UCLA vs Washington State Pauley Pavilion, UCLA</td></tr><tr><td>February 17</td><td>Saturday</td><td>11:00 a.m.</td><td>Bus Departure from Sproul Hall for International Airport and Flight to San Francisco</td></tr></tbody></table>