ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

the depths that human depravity can reach. Here I am in a friendly
group today; I probably won't be able to handle it. I want to begin by
giving you a few impressions of mine -- particularly about China and
Vietnam -- and then take questions from the floor.

I think it is important to start by calling to mind how far this Adminis-
tration has come in the area of foreign policy. When we came to office,
the number of American troops in Vietnam was still increasing. We
couldn't claim the world when we came in, but we have made considerable
progress. Yet even those who criticized the escalation refuse now to
give us credit for our progress. They still criticize us, now on the rate
of our withdrawal. Similarly, when we came into the White House,
Communist China was totally out of the arena of foreign affairs. Addi-
tionally, no negotiations of substance were going on with the Russians at
that time. President Nixon said that he would pursue an unemotional
foreign policy; that he would negotiate with the Russians; that he would
end the war in Vietnam; and that he would open channels to China. He
promised the problems in the international sphere would be dealt with on
a broad front, and would be treated as interrelated phenomena. He has
done all this, gentlemen.

The _New York Times_ threatened that the Administration couldn't link such foreign policy goals without offending the Russians. But we have had progress with the Russians on SALT, and on Berlin matters; and there is more to come, gentlemen, in the future. The Russians find it easier to deal with people whom they see as cool and in pursuit of matters of mutual interest; good personal relationships do not produce results with the Russians. You can't charm the Russians. They insist on seeing their own self-interest and deal most comfortably in adversary situations with opponents who similarly see their own interests as paramount. We have had four crises in Berlin that brought us to the brink of war. This summer we have finally reached an agreement. This advance with the Russians, and others like it, would not have occurred without the China initiative.

Gentlemen, the Chinese are dedicated, idealistic, committed Communists.
They took us on in Korea when they had nothing; now they take on Russia
along the Sino-Soviet border. We entered the China initiative with no
illusions. We are seeking relationships with the Chinese and the Russians
which are based on self-interest from our perspective, and which reflect
the mutual interests of all powers concerned. There is no sentimentality
in our policy. Contrary to promises of high-ranking State Department

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

officials, our relationship with the Russians has improved following the
China initiative, not deteriorated. Shortly after the China trip, three
senior foreign service officers felt compelled to come to the White
House, meet with the President, and declare to him their convictions
that the China initiative would result in disastrous consequences for our
ties to the Russians. Just the opposite, in fact, has happened. Along
with the improvement of our ties to China, our relationship with the
Russians has similarly seen progress, not retrogression.

I anticipate some questions on China. The press seems to think that I
have a direct line to Peking. This press mentality on China is very
interesting. There was a publishers' convention in Washington a while
ago, and a publisher of a small local newspaper, circulation about
10,000 I believe, called me to say that he was going to China. I asked
him "how." He said he had simply placed a long distance call to Chou
En-lai. I called the telephone company to find out if this had become a
common practice and discovered that some 150 people had placed direct
calls to Chou En-lai. The Chinese let three calls in a day. Each call
was answered with a negative. The Chinese let the people pay for the
calls in order to find out that they couldn't get through to Chou.

Back to the current situation in China. We don't know exactly what the
situation is, but some of the facts are clear. The Chinese first stood
down civilian flights in China for three days. The flights were resumed
for two days; then they were stood down for three more days. Following
this, all military flights in China were stood down. And finally, the
Chinese have canceled their October 1 parade. The Chinese apparently
do not want the military in the city. They also appear not to want a huge
congregation of people in the city -- and the October 1 parade traditionally
draws between three and four million persons. Personally, though, I
do not believe, as some speculators would suggest, that Mao is dead.
The evidence of difficulties in China is staggered over too long a period
of time -- several weeks -- to be related to the death of Mao. The
Chinese can't hide the death of a man like Mao forever. The degree to
which they have been vehement in denying that Mao is either dead or
terminally ill leads me to believe that he is well. They have nothing
to gain by these vehement denials, and potentially stand to lose consi-
derable face if it turns out that Mao is in fact dead or dying. I do not
believe that Mao is any more ill than he has been in the past. There are
two other possibilities that come to mind regarding the current China
situation. The first is a possible military buildup on the part of the

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

Russians and the Chinese related to some threat from one side or the other, perhaps along the Sino-Soviet border. The second possibility is a domestic political upheaval in China. Such a crisis might reflect an effort on the part of the left-wing Cultural Revolutionists to purge Chou En-lai and his faction. Conversely, it could reflect an attempt on the part of Chou and his moderates to purge the Cultural Revolutionists in order to strengthen the consensus in China for Chou's foreign policy initiatives. My best guess is that there is domestic upheaval in China related to a purge by Chou of the left-wing Cultural Revolutionists. In China the Air Force is the most radical element of the Establishment. The stand down of civilian and military flights may reflect a desire to prevent trouble by keeping Air Force planes out of the sky. There is no evidence that the policy in China regarding the President's trip to Peking has changed. In fact, we have evidence that the contrary is actually the case.

People often ask what the Administration expects from the President's trip to Peking. We do not seek or expect dramatic gains on concrete issues. For instance, the Formosa issue is one on which we know the Chinese will not concede. But there are other areas, unlike the Formosa issue, where American policy does not clash directly with that of China. There China and the United States can well pursue parallel courses. In those situations we can try to work out some progress. So that is where we are headed in China.

Let me now make a few remarks about Vietnam. The Vietnam situation has degenerated to a point where everything is now articulated in the form of slogans. It is hard even to talk intelligently about the Vietnam war. Everyone is either for or against the war. This Administration has pulled some 400,000 troops out of Vietnam. It has promised an additional announcement on troop withdrawals in November. This is hardly an Administration that is "for" the war. The real issue in this war is whether we can end it with dignity, or whether we are forced to bug out and leave the country to Communism. The real substance of our negotiation with the North involves their demands that we virtually put the Communists in control in the South. This we will never do. But know one thing: a look at the history of foreign affairs in this Administration shows that our President talks after he has taken action. In Cienfuegos, Cuba, last year at this time the Russians were building a submarine base. The Administration acted so unobtrusively in forcing the Russians to stop the construction of the base that the news didn't even make the front pages until the following day. This time last year, when the Syrians invaded Jordan we were at the brink of war in the Middle East. The Administration

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

acted decisively at that time as well; and the talk came later. President
Nixon knows how to make the big play in critical situations. Is it possible
across the country, indeed among the members of the LA Times Editorial
Board, that people believe a person with his history of dramatic action
in foreign affairs is blundering along without direction in Vietnam? Isn't
it more plausible that he is setting something up now, and that after
success is had, he will be talking? Is it reasonable to know the gains
in China, Berlin, and Helsinki, and yet to think that nothing is being done
regarding the big issue of the Vietnam war? Isn't it more reasonable to
assume that this Administration can end the Vietnam war through nego-
tiations and talk about it after the end has been achieved? I met with
some POW families this week and they told me that they were going to
have to pass a resolution about withdrawal from Vietnam. I told them
to go ahead; but I told them, as I tell you, that we are not in a position
where the Administration can take cheap publicity shots on major issues
like the Vietnam war. We are not paid off in this Administration if we
get a glowing editorial in the New York Times for some grandstand play
we have made. We will be paid off only if our Vietnam policy succeeds.
In order for it to succeed, we must end this war with a dignity that does
not involve a mockery of all that has gone before in Vietnam. Thoughtful
observers of the Vietnam scene know we are on the track. Gentlemen,
five years from now I predict that when people look back on the divisive-
ness and rancor in the United States regarding the Vietnam war, they will
simply ask themselves, "What was it all about?" The President has said
that in Vietnam we owe things not only to the people who might be drafted
now and sent to Vietnam, but also to those who have already served there
and especially to those who have died there. If we were to bug out now
and leave the country to the Communists, this would undermine Presidential
authority and help to undercut general concepts of authority in our nation;
and this is one of the big problems in the United States today. We have a
crisis of authority. This Administration battles constantly against irre-
sponsible Senate pressures. Week after week, there is some hotshot
amendment in the Senate regarding a withdrawal from Vietnam. Now the
critics who wanted us out of Vietnam are trying to steal the Administration
thunder from the success of our withdrawal by passing some amendment
which happens to coincide with the actual withdrawal from Vietnam set
up by the Administration.

Turning for a moment to a slight overview, let me say that when President
Nixon came into office, we were at the end of an era in foreign policy. The
ideas of the immediate post-war period were strained and those that pursued
them, exhausted. The assumption that the United States unilaterally could

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

assume the full international burdens of the free world had been proved a folly. The policy of dealing with Communist nations as a single monolithic bloc had been shown to be false. Our nation was overextended psychologically and physically in its foreign policy commitments. Two choices, each undesirable, under the old system seemed possible. One would have been to continue to overextend until we collapse; the second, equally undesirable, would have been to return to fervent isolationism in the United States. This Administration is committed to a balance which precludes both overextension and isolationism; and we are succeeding, gentlemen.

There are no sure winners in foreign affairs. China could have chaos domestically which could cause the President's trip to fall through. The domestic political scene in South Vietnam could come apart overnight. But if these tragedies do not occur, we will have made, and we will continue to make, considerable progress in foreign affairs. We are seeking to build and maintain confidence in Government. This is the big crisis nationally in the United States. I believe we are moving forward.

**Question:** You made a reference to the left-wing in China. What can be to the left of a Communist?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Almost universally, Communist groups are divided between moderate and extreme factions. China is a peculiar nation. It is a nation with the longest continual government in the world, a nation of long-standing moral purity, and a nation dedicated to education. In 1965, Mao, feeling that the revolutionists of the past had become the privileged bureaucracy of the present, urged continuing revolution from the young generation to prevent the development of a new Mandarin class. He unleashed the students, the Red Guard, against the entrenched bureaucracy. What he didn't count on was the fact that in a nation of 800 million people there must be 20 to 30 million bureaucrats. Similarly, he did not count on Chinese subtlety. The Red Guard student groups attacked the bureaucrats, but the bureaucrats were no fools. They fought back on a very subtle basis. They organized their own groups, called them Red Guards, and sent them into the streets. The result was that in each town there were several youth groups. All were called Red Guards; all claimed to be fighting for continued revolution; all claimed to be Maoists. The result was chaos. Following the chaos, the Army had to take over. This was the last thing that Mao had wanted. In the

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

end, the government was compelled to do something which every frustrated professor thinks occasionally would be ideal. All the students were sent to the country to work on farms; all universities were closed for a two-year period. In the farm country, of course, the peasants abused the students enormously. Since that time there have been no Red Guard troubles in China! But the groups dedicated to continued revolution, the Red Guard factions, are the more extreme groups in China. Chou En-lai represents the more pragmatic, reasonable elements of the Communist Party in China. Chou is interested in efficiency and has the support of the bureaucracy.

[At this point, Dr. Kissinger confirmed the off-the-record status of the remarks he was making.]

**Question:** Thank you for your response. I guess it is very similar to the moderate and right-wing elements of the Republican Party here.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, the right-wing people are our Cultural Revolutionists.

**Question:** That's just what I meant.

**Question:** You expressed optimism about the progress in the SALT negotiations; yet with the missile gap and the defense gap as they are today, how can there be reason for optimism? How can we explain the Russian gains in strategic areas, and the decline in our strategic forces?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) There are some facts in the area of defense strategy that deserve to be stated. Since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Russians have made monumental strides in strategic areas. Following the Cuban crisis in 1962, elements of the American Establishment were fond of bragging how close to war we had come, how near to Armageddon we had been. But, in fact, at that time the Russians had only some 60 ICBMs. All were out in the open; each required 12 hours to be fired, since the missiles used a liquid fuel which could not be stored. At that time, we had some 600 ICBMs and some 1200 long-range aircraft, all capable of hitting Soviet Russia. If they had started trouble, we would have seen a war more decisively won by the United States than the 1967 war in the Middle East was won by the Israelis. Now the situation has changed. Russia has some 1500 ICBMs, and an increasing fleet of nuclear submarines. Every month new weapons in Russia are deployed. The development of Russian offensive capabilities is ominous. When we came to office we found that there had been no development of a new missile for some 8 years. The only missiles in the American arsenal had been

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

designed and built in the Eisenhower era. The Minuteman, the Polaris: those were Eisenhower concepts. Of course, there has been advancement in various areas, but the basic missiles remain the same. This theory was operational prior to our Administration: If you have enough missiles, it doesn't matter what the other people have. MIRV and ABM systems had not been examined. Today I would say that there is a rough strategic parity between the United States and Russia. They have more missiles; we have more warheads. But if the trends continue, there is no question that the Russians will surpass us in strategic capabilities. This Administration, however, has not been sitting on its hands in strategic areas. It has been the Nixon Administration that has pushed in the area of ABM, in the area of MIRV, and for the B-1. We are caught in an exhausting struggle on defense issues. We have done more than any reasonable person thought could be done in the defense area, fighting against enormous pressures -- especially those in Congress.

With the relative decline of our defense posture vis-a-vis the Russians, one may rightly ask, "Why the SALT negotiations for us?" First, let me say that a continued arms race with Russia would eat up enormous resources on the part of both nations, and the outcome of the buildup for us would be clouded with uncertainty. If the arms race mentality continues it will be increasingly possible for some madman to trigger a holocaust. Secondly, let me say that at this stage of advancement in strategic weaponry, often we find that we simply cannot predict the future. I asked one time for information on what a laser ABM system would look like for SALT inspection purposes. Nobody was able to tell me. In this situation of soaring resource allocation, questionable gains, and dramatic uncertainty about the nature of future developments, it makes sense to stop everything where we are now. What we are doing in SALT on the ABM systems is to propose a halt at the current stage of deployment in both the United States and Russia. Regarding offensive weapons, we have proposed a temporary freeze in order to provide time to make arrangements for a permanent cessation in such developments. The fact, gentlemen, is that today the United States is not building any new offensive weapons. If we agree to freeze offensive weapons, we promise to nothing; we are building nothing. They are the ones who are building offensive weapons. An offensive freeze would result in the cessation of their building program. It would not stop anything we are constructing. The Soviets started over one hundred missile complexes last year. Every month we see new construction in missile areas. This is what we want to stop. Of course, this information can't be made public or the Russians, knowing our posture, would then refuse to reach a SALT agreement on offensive weapons.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

**Question:** Will the Russians agree to this?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes.

**Question:** Will the Russians keep the agreement?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) For a while.

**Question:** They never do keep agreements.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) If they don't keep this one, we will see it. And I believe that if they do not keep it, and we discover it, that we will be in a better position then to press for development of the ULMS system than we are in now. 1977, 1978 -- those are the earliest years that the ULMS system would be operational anyway. All we have now is research and development.

**Question:** How do you assess the real willingness of the Russians to fight. I visited Russia not long ago and was surprised at the emphasis there on war memorials. It seemed to me that the Russian people would really hesitate to go to war. How do you assess...

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, of course, I am sitting at a table filled with Soviet experts.

**Question:** Well some of us have spent a few hours in Russia, at least.

**Answer:** Well, on the basis of 60 hours of experience, I became a China expert. (Laughter) I believe that the Russian people do not want war. But the tremendous and continued growth in Russian strategic power provides a potential for their leaders to blunder into a crisis in which war turns out to be the result. I have spent considerable time as a professor studying the Russians, and have spent three years now in this Administration dealing directly with them. They give the impression of being rather thuggish bureaucrats. They are the sort of people who, if you dropped a nickel on the floor, would kick you, throw you on the floor and hit you with a baseball bat, in order to pick up the nickel -- just to show that you can't throw a nickel on the floor and get away with it. They have provided us with a series of petty but serious foreign policy actions. Take the Syrian invasion of Jordan last year as an example. The Russians had advisers as far down as the company level with the Syrians. On a Friday night we received a message from the Russians saying that they

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

were restraining the Syrians. By the following Sunday morning, the Syrians were moving across the Jordanian border. If it hadn't been for the superb fighting ability, the unexpected fighting ability, of the Jordanian army, and for the fact that our relationship with the Israelis was strong enough to force them to keep a cool head -- unlike the situation in 1967 -- there could have been a major war. A week later, of course, Nasser died, and this was not something likely to increase stability in the Middle East. The danger of war with the Russians is not, I think, really a danger emanating from the threat of a deliberate act on the part of the Russians. But it is always possible that they will start a crisis that they think they can control, but, blundering and confident of their nuclear strength, then go too far. They are very unlike the Chinese. The Chinese would never make a petty grandstand play of the type that the Russians are famous for. The Chinese would not easily start a crisis. But if they do start a crisis they will take it to the absolute brink. They will not back down as easily as the Russians do, when their bluff is called. I do not believe that there is a war psychology in Russia; but the Russians in the past have exhibited a tendency to brutality, and this can always mature in the form of a war.

**Question:** From a foreign policy perspective, what is your view of increased trade with Russia?

**Answer:** Our relationship with the Russians must be cold-blooded. Relaxed trade is an inevitable incident of a relaxed political posture vis-a-vis the Russians. In the early days of our Administration, most requests for licenses to engage in business with the Russians were denied. Since May 20, however, with the advances on SALT at Helsinki and on Berlin, some $700 million in export licenses to Russia have been approved. These licenses, of course, must be granted upon a selective basis; but that basis is becoming increasingly wide. I think it clear that in the current foreign policy atmosphere we can anticipate more trade with the Russians.

[At this point, it being 2:20 p.m., Mr. Firestone called an end to the questioning session.]

-3-

Mr. Stanley Freeman
703 Hillcrest Road
Beverly Hills, CA 90210

regret

Mr. Elliott Handler
Mattel, Inc.
5150 West Rosecrans
Hawthorne, CA

Mr. Fred L. Hartley
Union Oil Co. of Calif.
461 South Boylston
Los Angeles, CA 90017

accept

Mr. Herbert S. Hazeltine, Jr.
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine
523 West Sixth Street
Los Angeles, CA 90014

accept

Mr. Roderick Hills
Republic Corporation
1900 Avenue of the Stars
Los Angeles, CA 90067

accept

Mr. Jack K. Horton
Southern Calif. Edison Co.
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue
Rosemead, CA 91770

accept

Mr. Thomas V. Jones
Northrup Corporation
1800 Century Park East
Los Angeles, CA 90067

regret

Mr. Earle M. Jorgensen
Earle M. Jorgensen Co.
10650 South Alameda Street
Los Angeles, CA 90002

accept

Mr. Herbert W. Kalmbach
Kalmbach, DeMarco, Knapp
& Chillingworth
550 Newport Center Drive
Newport Beach, CA 92660

accept

Mr. Ernest J. Loebbecke
The TI Corporation
433 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90013

accept

Mr. Glen McDaniels
Litton Industries
9370 Santa Monica Blvd.
Beverly Hills, CA 90213

accept

-5-

Mr. Harry L. Volk
Union Bank
760 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90014
regret

Mr. Jack Warner
1900 Avenue of the Stars
Century City
Los Angeles, CA 90067
accept

Mr. Jack D. Wrather
Wrather Corporation
270 North Canon Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
regret

Mr. John Flanigan
611 W. Sixth Street, #1998
Los Angeles, CA 90017
regret

Mr. Freeman Gosden
720 North Alpine Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
accept

Mr. Leigh M. Battson
1130 Schuyler Road
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
regret

Mr. Coleman Hicks
Mr. Kissinger's assistant
accept