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His letter arrived, dated April 15:

Dear Mr. President:

It is apparent to me that I shall not be well enough soon enough to continue to serve as Secretary of State. Accordingly, I tender my resignation to be effective at your convenience.

I am deeply grateful for the opportunities and responsibilities you have given me.

I was brought up in the belief that this nation of ours was not merely a self-serving society but was founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail. Today that concept faces a formidable and ruthless challenge from International Communism. This has made it manifestly difficult to adhere steadfastly to our national idealism and national mission and at the same time avoid the awful catastrophe of war. You have given inspiring leadership in this essential task and it has been a deep satisfaction to me to have been intimately associated with you in these matters.

If I can, in a more limited capacity, continue to serve, I shall be happy to do so.

Faithfully yours,

Foster

So now on April 16, 1959, I answered:

Dear Foster:

I accept, with deepest personal regret and only because I have no alternative, your resignation as Secretary of State, effective upon the qualification of your successor.

In so doing, I can but repeat what the vast outpouring of affection and admiration from the entire free world has told you. You have, with the talents you so abundantly possess and with your exemplary integrity of character, employed your rich heritage as well as your unique experience in handling our relations with other countries. You have been a staunch bulwark of our nation against the machinations of Imperialistic Communism. You have won to the side of the free world countless peoples, and inspired in them renewed courage and determination to fight for freedom and principle. As a statesman of world stature you have set a record in the stewardship of our foreign relations that stands clear and strong for all to see.

By this letter I request you to serve in the future, to whatever extent your health will permit, as a consultant to me and the State Department in international affairs. I know that all Americans join me in the fervent hope that you will thus be able to continue the important contribution that only you can make toward a just peace in the world.

With affectionate regard,

As ever,

D.E.

BERLIN

359

The announcement of Christian A. Herter's appointment as Secretary of State was made on April 18, 1959. Because of the delay brought about by his physical examination, it was not possible for me to announce his appointment at the same time as Foster's resignation; we had not then received the verdict of the Johns Hopkins physicians. A suspicion arose that I had someone else in mind. I regretted this; I had considered others, of course. We thought of giving the post to Robert Anderson and offering the job of Secretary of the Treasury to Douglas Dillon. But Mr. Herter was my choice, as well as Foster's, and it was only the question of his physical ability that took the extra time. Mr. Herter was sworn in on the 20th of April at Augusta, Georgia, and at Walter Reed Army Hospital, Foster soon took the oath in his new capacity as consultant.

Four days after Chris Herter assumed the post of Secretary of State, the scheduled meeting of the four foreign ministers was to begin. The issues outstanding were many. Apart from those mentioned earlier, they included restrictions on the deployment of IRBMs in Germany, assurances against surprise attack and, far from least, the principles for a peace treaty. Secretary Herter was intimately aware of my views on these complicated problems; as he departed for the conference, we had some hope but no huge expectations of constructive results.¹⁵

Unfortunately, soon after the conference began, it became obvious that little or no progress was to be expected. Gromyko, in the formal meetings, maintained his tiresome attitude of intransigence. This news reminded me of a cable we had received in early March from Llewellyn Thompson, our ambassador in Moscow. The cable predicted that if Gromyko were to represent the Soviet Union in these meetings, we could expect little progress. Apparently Gromyko did not enjoy the confidence of Khrushchev to the extent that he was empowered by the Kremlin to negotiate seriously on important issues; he was little more than a messenger and one, I often thought, whose every word and action, including his bad manners, were dictated by his Soviet master.

¹⁵ The first big difficulty that Secretary Herter encountered was not with the Russians but with the French. He had an unpleasant talk with Premier Michel Debre, who informed him that President de Gaulle was withholding permission for the basing of nuclear warheads on French territory pending our favorable action on three items: (1) full, public acceptance of a "Big Three" organization he had proposed, (2) our acceptance of proposals supporting the position of the French government regarding Algeria, and (3) the accomplishment of nuclear equality among the French, British, Americans, and Soviets.

These proposals were a little more than unrealistic, and they implied that France was far more concerned with obtaining endorsement of her own ambitions than in acting as a partner in seeking an East-West settlement.

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For two weeks the talks remained in a practical deadlock and so produced no surprises. The one potentially striking news story occasioned almost no comment. As the pages of the calendar turned and the clock ticked the seconds away, May 27 approached and finally arrived. This was the date which Soviet Premier Khrushchev some six months earlier had declared he would turn over to East Germany control of access to Berlin. It was the ultimatum that, only a few months before, many had feared would bring up the curtain of World War III. The day came and went—a day lost in history.

But for the Free World the day brought no cause for elation. The Berlin situation would continue to be a challenge. And on May 27 the four foreign ministers, including Gromyko, entered an airplane for a transatlantic journey to Washington, D.C. The occasion for their coming was, for me and one American family in particular, an event of almost unspeakable sadness: the funeral of John Foster Dulles.

WAGING PEACE: MAP PORTFOLIO

Maps by Rafael Palacios

[17]

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considered to be settled in full and the Allied and Associated Powers renounce any claims against Germany in relation to the further payment of reparations.

### Article 42

Germany, in those cases where it has not yet done so, obligates itself to return, in proper safekeeping, identified objects having artistic, historic, or archeological value which compose part of the cultural property of the Allied and Associated Powers and which were removed from their territory to Germany by force or by compulsion.

Demands concerning the restitution of the said articles can be presented in the course of 12 months from the entry into force of the present treaty.

Germany will transmit also to those states to whom were returned or under the sovereignty of which passed parts of former territories of Germany all historical, judicial, administrative and technical archives together with maps and plans relating to these territories.

## PART 6: CONCLUDING PROVISIONS

### Article 43

From the moment of the entry into force of the present peace treaty, Germany is freed of all obligations under international treaties and agreements concluded by the German Democratic Republic and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany before the entry into force of the present treaty which are in contradiction to the provisions of the peace treaty.

### Article 44

Any dispute relating to the interpretation or the fulfillment of the present treaty not settled by means of direct diplomatic negotiations or by another method according to an agreement between the disputing sides must be presented to a commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the case of failure to reach an agreement in the commission on the question of the solution of such a dispute in the course of 2 months, this dispute will, if the disputing sides do not come to a mutual agreement about other methods for its settlement, be transmitted to a commission composed of one representative from each side and a third member chosen by mutual agreement between the two sides from citizens of third countries.

### Article 45

1. The present treaty must be ratified and will enter into force immediately after the handing over for custody of the documents of ratification of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France, and Germany. In relation to each state which subsequently ratifies the present treaty or adheres to it, it will enter into force from the day of the handing over for custody by this state of the document of ratification or of adherence.

2. If the treaty does not enter into force during the course of 10 months after the handing over for custody of the documents of ratification of Germany, any state which has ratified it can put the treaty into force between itself and Germany by notification of this to Germany and to the depository state during the course of 3 years after the handing over for custody of the documents of ratification of Germany.

### Article 46

Any state in a state of war with Germany but which is not a party that has signed the present treaty can adhere to this treaty.

### Article 47

The treaty does not give any rights, legal grounds, or benefits to states which are not a party to the present treaty, and no rights, legal grounds, or interests of Germany will be considered infringed on by any provisions of the present treaty in favor of such states.

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### Article 48

The present treaty, and also all documents of ratification and adherence must be handed over to the custody of the Government of which will distribute true copies of the treaty to each of the signatories of the treaty or of the states which have adhered to it, and which will also report to these states about all ratifications and adherences.

In certification of this, the undersigned plenipotentiary representatives have signed the present treaty and affixed their seals.

Done in _______________ in the Russian, English, French, and German languages, in which all texts are equally authentic.

## 169. THE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON WAYS OF SETTLING THE GERMAN PROBLEM: Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Dulles) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, January 13, 1959 (Excerpts)¹

[With respect to a settlement of the German problem] we are standing of course on the proposal and statement which we made—the allied powers made—with the approval of all the members of NATO, which was made I think on the last day of December.² That proposal is not very old at the present time, and we are not at the present time submitting any alteration of that proposal.

There are certain basic aspects of those [1955] proposals which I think remain valid, and I would expect that they would continue to survive because of their basic validity. The basic proposition, as I recall, was, first, that Germany ought to be reunified; secondly, we could not expect reunification under conditions which would involve, or seem to involve, the Soviet Union in increased risks or losses. Therefore it would be appropriate to couple any reunification of Germany with security provisions and limitations which would make sure that the Soviet Union would not, through the reunification, seem to have weakened its strategic or political position.³

We believe in reunification by free elections, which was indeed the formula that was agreed to at the summit conference in 1955.⁴ It was agreed to by Khrushchev himself, who was of course a participant in that conference. There they spoke of the reunification of Germany by free elections consistent with the German national interests and European security. That is approximately the language of the agreement.

¹ The replies printed here are taken from pp. 156, 157-159, 160, and 161-162 of the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 2, 1959, reprint of Department of State press release No. 28.

² Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 616-619.

³ See the Western Powers' proposals of Oct. 27, 1955; text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 1897-1903.

⁴ See ibid., pp. 1896-1897.

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That [January 10, 1959, Soviet] proposal⁵ highlights what I just referred to as the two different philosophies about dealing with Germany. The Soviet Union has consistently believed that Germany should be isolated, segregated, to a large extent demilitarized and neutralized, and separated from close association with the neighboring countries.

We don't believe that that is a sound approach to the problem. On the contrary, we take the view that Germany and the German people are too great, vigorous, and vital a people to be dealt with in that way and that that way is fraught with very great danger for the future. We believe that the future is best served by encouraging the closest possible relations between Germany and other Western European countries which are peace-loving and having such a close integration—military, political, economic—that independent, aggressive, nationalist action by Germany becomes as a practical matter impossible and also something that would not be desired.

Now, that has been the basic philosophy not only of this administration but of the preceding administration. It was reflected by the EDC (European Defense Community);⁶ and when the EDC proved impractical, the basic philosophy was carried forward in terms of the Brussels treaty for Western European union,⁷ the bringing of the Federal Republic into NATO⁸—integration of its forces in that way—the further development of economic unity through adding to the Coal and Steel Community,⁹ the Common Market,¹⁰ EURATOM,¹¹ and measures of that sort with their common assembly behind them. We believe that that is the proper way to deal with the German problem.

Now, as I say, that reflects a philosophy which is totally different from that of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet proposal of this peace treaty, which is similar to the proposals made in '52¹² and also again in '54,¹³ reflects the Soviet approach. As Adenauer said yesterday, it's a "brutal" approach.¹⁴ But it's in our opinion worse than a brutal approach; it's a stupid approach, because we don't think it will work. We believe the other approach is the sound one. Now, whether we can on that basis reach a meeting of minds with the Soviet Union, I don't know.

We, of course, have in the Brussels treaty for European union very definite limitations on German armament which have been freely accepted, to some extent indeed proposed, by the Germans themselves—the Federal Republic of Germany. So that the concept of having limitations is not a concept which is in any way alien either to our thinking or to the thinking of the Federal Republic itself.

⁵ *Supra.*

⁶ See *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 1107-1201.

⁷ *Text ibid.*, pp. 972-989.

⁸ *See ibid.*, pp. 871-873.

⁹ *See ibid.*, pp. 1039-1097.

¹⁰ *See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1957, pp. 426-518.

¹¹ *See ibid.*, pp. 518-573.

¹² *See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 1797-1798.

¹³ *See ibid.*, pp. 1852-1855.

¹⁴ *Remarks made at a meeting of the executive of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union, Bonn, Jan. 12, 1959.*

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Now, you speak about [German membership in] military pacts. I don't think of these things as military pacts. I think of them as collective associations where people work together for peace and security, where they consult together, where they exchange views about their foreign policies, their political programs, and the like. The idea that these collective security associations are aggressive military alliances which are bad is a concept which we reject totally. We believe that this type of association of nations coming together for collective security is the modern way whereby the family of nations gets the same kind of association that you get within a community where people associate together for their security through common institutions.

It has been made clear that there was no intention on the part of the Soviet Union to have their [November 27, 1958,] note treated as an ultimatum with a fixed time limit. And that is encouraging because, as the Western allies said in their note of the end of December, we would find it very difficult indeed to negotiate under that kind of an ultimatum. So to that extent some progress has been made.

I would not say that there has been any indication, as far as the substance of the matter is concerned, of any alteration in the Soviet position.

[Assurances to the Soviet Union that, in return for free elections in Germany, the Western Powers would not extend their collective defense arrangements into East Germany] was part of the concept, as I recall, that was put forward in '55, although perhaps not as clearly or as dramatically as might have been done. In part it has been covered by my answer to a prior question where I said that I do not think that it is reasonable to expect that the Soviet Union will give up positions which it has if it thinks that by doing so it may be giving a strategic military advantage to those whom it regards—I think wrongly, but nevertheless which it regards—as potential enemies. We just can't expect that to happen. Therefore, if there is going to be any reunification of Germany, it has got to be under conditions which take into account realistically some of those very elemental, primitive facts of life. It was in order to meet that point of view that we tried to give reassurances to the Soviet Union along those lines, and it is still my view that we should be prepared to do that.

... I think that [at the 1955 Geneva conference] we recognized that, if events should move along the lines of the reunification of Germany, under these conditions there would almost automatically come about a lessening of the military requirements in the Western area and a consequent reduction of forces there. As far as the linking of the [NATO and Warsaw] pacts was concerned, I don't think that that was ever proposed. At least that is not my recollection. I think what was proposed was an overriding European security pact which would embrace perhaps the members of both NATO and the Warsaw pacts and which would contain assurances that, if any one of the group should take aggressive action against the other, all of the other

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members would unite to come to the defense of the victim of attack. That would be a sort of an overriding European security proposal which would be superimposed upon the Warsaw pact and the NATO powers. I still hold the view that that would be a sound way in which to proceed.

We have made a proposal to negotiate on the question of the reunification of Germany, Berlin, and European security. That proposal was made in our December 31st note. The Soviets have said that they are prepared to negotiate on the question of Berlin and on the question of a German peace treaty but not on the question of German reunification or at the same time on the question of European security.

Now there seems to be one common denominator which runs through all this, which is, there seems to be a desire on both sides to get together and talk. There is not a meeting of minds as to what we talk about. There seems to be a sharp difference of opinion as to what we talk about, but there is at least a common denominator, I think, in terms of a feeling that there should be discussions. You might say that it has gotten down to the point where it is a matter of agenda. We know that the question of agenda can be a very serious stumbling block in the way of meetings. It was so at the time of the Palais Rose conference (Paris session of deputies of Council of Foreign Ministers, March 5-June 21, 1951),¹⁵ and it has been a stumbling block in the way of a summit meeting.

I think that our ideas as to the possible subject of discussion are broad. It is the Soviet Union that is trying to narrow the subject of discussion. We would not be alarmed by the broadness of the agenda. The only thing that alarms us would be the narrowness of the agenda and to have a meeting which tried to deal with the question of a peace treaty and Berlin without being able at the same time even to discuss the question of the reunification of Germany or the question of European security. That seems to us unrealistic. It was recognized in the Geneva summit meeting directive that there was a close interrelationship between the question of Germany and European security. We still believe that there is that interrelationship. So what concerns us would be not the broadening of the agenda but being debarred from discussing what we considered to be vital things by a narrowing of the agenda before the talks start.

The formula of reunification by free elections was the agreed formula [at the 1955 Geneva Heads of Government conference]. It seems to us to be a natural method. But I wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification could be accomplished.

There are all kinds of methods whereby countries and peoples draw together, and I merely said that I did not feel that we should treat any one method as an absolutely exclusive one.

¹⁵ See *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 1784-1793.

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I believe that, if you try to isolate and segregate a great people like the Germans in the center of Europe, they will become a restive and dangerous force; they will attempt to gain advantages to themselves by trying to play off the East against the West. I don't think that you can put the Germans within the kind of a smothering blanket that the Soviet Union has in mind and expect that that will hold. That, in a way, was the approach of the Treaty of Versailles, and it just didn't work. And I don't think it will work again. I think that a so-called neutralized and largely demilitarized Germany, attempted to be demilitarized in the middle of Europe, is just something that won't work and that, instead of trying to isolate Germany, the best way is to tie Germany in.

Now that is the basic thesis of Adenauer. I believe that Adenauer's claim to greatness rests upon his effort to assure that Germany will not again follow the path which Germany followed in 1914 and again in 1939. He is the one who has invented, you might say, this solution. And I believe it is the most practical and sound solution for those who really want to end for all time the kind of danger that has come from Germany in the past.

## 170. UNITED STATES OBJECTIONS TO A COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF GERMANY: Reply Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at the Golden Jubilee Celebration of the National Press Club, January 14, 1959 (Excerpt)¹

As to the different proposals of the Soviets and ourselves respecting Germany and Europe, we think it is just an exercise in futility to try to demilitarize, neutralize, and completely disarm a people as strong, as important, and virile as is the German people.

On the other hand, that being the general tenor of the Russian proposals, we oppose to that concept this one: that we would say we don't believe in the free arming of Germany in the sense that Hitler tried to rearm it. We would like to see Germany so intertwine itself with other European nations in its economy and its thinking and its defense exercises, that it doesn't have to do this.

It [West Germany] is part of a community. Now, this has been started, insofar as the West is concerned, in Euratom, the Coal-Steel Community, and the Free [Common] Market—that kind of thing— and we think it is a very great development for the benefit and strength of Western Europe. The rest of Europe, at this point, of course, cannot get in.

But it is also a development that almost proves they [the Germans] cannot be aggressive. They couldn't move except with the consent of a whole bevy of nations. How can you make a surprise aggressive

¹ The reply printed here is taken from pp. 27-28 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*.

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We would consider it more advisable for the great powers to agree to a meeting of the heads of government of the powers concerned, who, since they have full rights and responsibilities for safeguarding world peace, could soberly examine and settle basic issues. ...

As a first step the heads of government should agree to the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, which would also mean a solution to the Berlin question, in the interests of European peace. The Western powers are evading a solution of these long over-ripe problems.

The position of the Western powers, which have proposed a four-power conference of Foreign Ministers to take up "the German question in all of its aspects," is obviously obsolete, since there is no longer one Germany, but two German states—one of which is capitalist, in which militarism is being revived and revanchist plans nurtured, and the other of which is socialist and is developing along the path of peace and of building a new social system. Their approach might have been justified 14 years ago, when Hitlerite Germany had just been defeated, and Germany still was one state with a single social and economic structure. In our day such an approach to the German problem is hopelessly outmoded.

A conference of the heads of government must also discuss the issues agitating the peoples, issues which must be solved if there is to be an improvement in the overall international situation. These issues include European security, the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, a disengagement of the armed forces of the two military alignments, disarmament questions, the reduction of armed forces, the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the discontinuation of tests of these weapons, and other matters.

If these complex issues, which have long been discussed without result through diplomatic channels, are turned over to the Foreign Ministers for consideration, I fear that instead of easing tension this may lead to greater tension. The Ministers will inevitably begin to bring up everything that has happened in the past. ...

## 180. THE PROSPECTS FOR A "SUMMIT" CONFERENCE IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET REJECTION OF A FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM: Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, February 25, 1959 (Excerpts)¹

The obviously, palpably intransigent attitude of Mr. Khrushchev [in rejecting the idea of a foreign ministers conference on Germany]² is, of course, not only—it has not only been well known, but it seems really to be emphasized. And at the moment when the logical purpose of Mr. Macmillan's visit³ was to try to create an atmosphere in which negotiations would be possible, this development is not one that, certainly, you could call hopeful.

This is the only logical attitude that the United States and the West, as I see it, can take: first, that we are not going to give one single inch

¹ The replies printed here are taken from pp. 209 and 210-211 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*.

² See *supra*.

³ See *post*, doc. 182.

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in the preservation of our rights and of discharging our responsibility in this particular region, especially Berlin. There can be no negotiation on this particular point of right and of retention of responsibility.

Now, the United States has always made clear [that] we are always ready to negotiate when the other person will give us the slightest area or region in which to negotiate, but if there is to be a positive answer and a negative answer to give to any question before you do attempt to negotiate, then I can't see very much use for conferences. Indeed, if the same kind of attitude is shown insistently and always, why, I must say the future doesn't seem to hold much promise for negotiation.

Now this, in spite of the fact that there have been a number of things that have occurred. You will recall way back, there was a refusal to negotiate respecting the reunification of Austria. Well, that was accomplished.⁴ And down the road with respect to West Germany and so on, there have been other concessions; but they certainly come very rarely, and, from our viewpoint at least, the refusals are so illogical that they do not promise a great deal for the establishment of a just peace. But, as I say, we have got to be ready, alert to opportunities to negotiate when there is any real promise of success, just as we are going to be strong and are strong and alert in making certain that others cannot take advantage of us or divide us by any kind of threat.

All of you people are quite well acquainted with the constitutional difficulties that a President incurs when he goes abroad for one of these long conferences. But, on top of that, there is this very great psychological reason: when the people of the world understand there is going to be a head-of-state or a head-of-government summit conference, they expect something to come out of it; and a feeling of pessimism and, in a way, hopelessness, I think, would be increased if you entered such a meeting and then nothing real came out of it—as, indeed, was the case at Geneva.

There was a great deal of talk about the "spirit of Geneva", but, frankly, before we went there, while we were there, and afterward, our Government said one thing: the proof of the sanity and the value of this Geneva meeting was going to be shown within the next few months, when we went down to the concrete problems. And there we went over, in October—the foreign ministers did—and we got exactly zero progress.⁵

Now, I think it would be a very grave mistake to go to a summit conference unless there was some kind of preparation so that you could know the world could recognize the progress made.

⁴ See *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, pp. 643-697 and 1822-1886.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 1886-1927 and 2841-2850.

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the first victims of Hitlerite aggression. With regard to the participation in the conference of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Government considers that at the summit conference in the examination of questions about a peace treaty with Germany and about West Berlin both the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany must be represented. ...

If the governments of the Western powers are not yet ready to take part in a summit conference, then the Soviet Government considers that for an examination of questions concerning the peace treaty with Germany and concerning West Berlin, there could be convoked a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Besides, the Soviet Government declares its agreement with the proposal of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France that at this meeting both German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—would be represented. Since both these concrete questions had long since matured, the Soviet Government considers it appropriate to set for the work of a meeting of Foreign Ministers a term of not more than two or three months.

As for the question about the time and place of a meeting of Heads of Government, the Soviet Government would consider it possible to convene such a conference in April of this year in Vienna or Geneva, if this is convenient for the Government of the United States of America, and also the governments of the state participants of such a conference, and if, of course, the Government of Austria or Switzerland would be ready to extend hospitality to the participants of such a conference.

If the Government of the United States of America is not ready for a meeting of Heads of Government, then the Soviet Government proposes at the above-noted time and place to convene a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs with the above-proposed composition.

The Soviet Government would like to express the hope that its proposal will meet support on the part of the Government of the United States of America, which, together with the Soviet Union and other state participants of the anti-Hitler coalition in the period of the Second World War, made its contribution to the cause of smashing Hitlerite Germany and now with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would further the removal of a military danger on the part of German militarism.

## 182. UNITED KINGDOM-SOVIET EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON WAYS OF EASING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AS A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD "INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS IN A WIDER CIRCLE": Communiqué Signed at Moscow by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Macmillan), March 3, 1959 (Excerpt)¹

At the invitation of the Government of the Soviet Union, Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, accompanied by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and official advisers paid a return official visit to the Soviet Union from Feb. 21 to March 3, 1959.

In the course of their visit, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd have had the opportunity to hold a series of discussions with Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and other members of the Soviet Government, including Mr. A. I. Mikoyan, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mr. A. A. Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹Text as printed in the New York Times, Mar. 4, 1959 (City edition), p. 3.

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² These discussions have ranged over some of the more important questions which are currently of general international concern. Both sides, however, took account of the fact that these questions concern many countries other than the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.

Although they did not hold negotiations, the Prime Ministers have been able in the course of their discussion during the past ten days to hold a valuable exchange of views on these questions.

They have taken advantage of this to explain their attitude and the reasons underlying it on all the questions discussed.

The free interchange of views and ideas which has taken place has created a better understanding of the respective attitudes of the two governments and has thereby made a useful contribution toward the forthcoming international discussions in a wider circle.

The Prime Ministers agreed that an advance toward a solution of the problem of disarmament would be a major contribution to the maintenance of peace. It would help to increase international confidence and to reduce the burden of military expenditure. They agreed to continue their efforts to make progress in this field.

Their common objective remains the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes.

They recognized, however, the great importance of achieving an agreement to stop nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of international inspection and control.

They reviewed the course of the work of the Geneva conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests² and resolved to continue their efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement.

They considered that such an agreement would reduce tension, would eliminate the possible danger to health and life resulting from nuclear weapons tests and would help to avert the further development of nuclear weapons.

The Prime Ministers exchanged full explanations of the views held by their respective Governments on questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.

They were unable to agree about the juridical and political aspects of the problems involved.

At the same time they recognized that it was of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world that these problems should be urgently settled.

They therefore acknowledged the need for early negotiations between the interested Governments to establish a basis for the settlement of these differences. They consider that such negotiations could lay the foundation for a stable system of European security.

In this connection they agreed that further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection.

In relation to all these matters, the Prime Ministers endorse the principle that differences between nations should be resolved by negotiation and not by force. They recognized that if such negotiations were to succeed, it was important that each side should make a sincere endeavor to understand the point of view of the other.

They agreed that the present visit of the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union had made a valuable contribution toward such an understanding.

The Prime Ministers also discussed a number of particular questions which are of direct concern to the governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.

³ See post, docs. 494-503.

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which brought about the setting up of bases by our collective security group is reduced.

I would further question the gentleman's reference to the elimination of bases by the Soviet Union because his statement that bases in foreign lands have been eliminated would be true only if East Germany, Poland, and Hungary were considered part of the Soviet Union.

The decision as to whether or not a visit should be made by Mr. Khrushchev to the United States and the timing of such a visit is the President's and his alone to make. For me to comment on that question would therefore be uncalled for.

I could comment in considerable detail on some of the technical reasons why trade between the Soviet Union and the United States is at the relatively limited level it presently is. For example, in the field of strategic materials we cannot expect any substantial trade or any change in policy, I should say, until the political tensions and political differences are solved.

Now, as far as peaceful trade is concerned, it has always been and is now the policy of the United States to encourage and favor such trade. But in this field it is not only necessary to have something to sell; it is necessary for the purchaser to have something to sell back, and the difficulty is that some products with which the Soviet Union could purchase commodities that they might want in the United States we no longer can buy from the Soviet Union.

Manganese and chrome, for example, are two commodities we used to buy from the Soviet Union, but this market was cut off by the Soviet Union several years ago. Consequently the United States had to develop new sources for these commodities. We now buy manganese, for example, from India and Turkey, among other countries.

This shows the difficulty in just one aspect of the whole complicated problem. But I emphasize again that we should explore ways in which peaceful trade can be indulged in between our two countries. But even with respect to peaceful trade, the settlement of political differences will contribute greatly to the possibilities in this field.

I think it is well known that our attitude toward the West German Government and toward Chancellor Adenauer differs from that of Mr. Khrushchev. I should emphasize that I know Dr. Adenauer personally and had the opportunity to talk to him at length on several visits and particularly on his recent visit to the United States. He is a man who is dedicated to peace and he is a man who speaks as eloquently and emphatically on disarmament as any man today, and I could only add, with regard to the comments made in reference to the German people generally, that it is difficult for me to see that the Germans who live in West Germany are all devils and the Germans who happen to live in East Germany are all saints.

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I recognize that there is a legitimate interest among members of the press in the subjects that I did discuss with Mr. Khrushchev and other leaders, but I have always followed the practice of not disclosing the substance of such talks or indicating the subjects covered. I think this is the only proper course to follow and this way, we encourage a very frank exchange of views when talks of this type do take place.

As far as [nuclear weapons] tests are concerned, I discussed that at considerable length in my speech last night. I think the record will show that both with regard to tests and the open-skies proposal, we have taken a position which is unassailable and the only one which will assure the real objective: not simply the writing of an agreement and signing a piece of paper, but stopping the tests. And I can only say what I said last night, that I trust that, in this area where discussions are going on and some progress has been made, we can make a breakthrough at some reasonable time in the future.

We can spend a great deal of time in discussing the proposals of the Soviet Union in these fields and the proposals of our Government. I can only say that, speaking for our Government, I believe that the proposals we have made have been put forward in good faith and that they are proposals that will accomplish the objectives in each instance—accomplish the stopping of tests and will not be merely the signing of a piece of paper which might not accomplish these results.

As those of you who witnessed our public discussions know, Mr. Khrushchev is a man who likes to get down to brass tacks early in a conversation. And I can assure you that in this instance the diplomatic language which is usually used to describe talks—full and frank—should be assumed to mean exactly that. And from that I think you can draw conclusions that we discussed a number of very controversial issues.

## 300. ANNOUNCEMENT OF AND BACKGROUND FOR CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES: Statement Read and Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, August 3, 1959 (Excerpts)¹

I asked this morning for this special press conference on the subject of the impending exchange of visits between Mr. Khrushchev and myself. Now, while in Europe this has been for the past few days one of the worst kept secrets of a long time, still, I think there may be enough special interest in the matter as to justify you people taking your time to come here this morning.

¹The statement and replies printed here are taken from pp. 560-562 and 563-564 of *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*.

619330—63—61

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First of all, a little bit of the history. Some time back, I suggested to the State Department that I believe in the effort to melt a little bit of the ice that seems to freeze our relationships with the Soviets, that possibly a visit such as I now have proposed would be useful. We studied this thing, and, early in July, I initiated the correspondence that finally brought about an agreement. Some of the details, exact details, are yet to be agreed between the diplomatic agencies of our separate, several governments.

Now, at this identical time, an identical statement is being issued in Moscow. The statement is as follows . . . :

"The President of the United States has invited Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., to pay an official visit to the United States in September. Mr. Khrushchev has accepted with pleasure.

"The President has also accepted with pleasure Mr. Khrushchev's invitation to pay an official visit to the U.S.S.R. later this fall.

"Mr. Khrushchev will visit Washington for 2 or 3 days and will also spend 10 days or so travelling in the United States. He will have informal talks with the President, which will afford an opportunity for an exchange of views about problems of mutual interest.

"On his tour of the United States, Mr. Khrushchev will be able, at first hand, to see the country, its people, and to acquaint himself with their life.

"President Eisenhower will visit Moscow and will also spend some days travelling in the Soviet Union. This will provide further opportunity for informal talks and exchange of views about problems of mutual interest with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. On his tour of the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower likewise will be able, at first hand, to see the country, its people, and to acquaint himself with their life.

"Both Governments express the hope that the forthcoming visits will help create better understanding between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and will promote the cause of peace."

We have, of course, been consulting for a couple of weeks through the foreign ministers about this possibility [of an exchange of visits]—our Western foreign ministers; they have, of course, agreed. And then, the heads of state were notified just recently about this impending visit, and some of them have been able to answer. All of them have agreed—I think all of them have been able to answer—all have agreed that the matter is one that should produce plus rather than negative values. In other words, on balance, they think it's a very good thing to do.

In the meantime, I might tell you that this morning I have taken considerable trouble to inform some of the leaders of Congress, and those that I've heard from have been quite favorably disposed toward this plan.

I want to make this clear: by no means am I intending to be or can I be any spokesman for the Western powers in my talks with Mr. Khrushchev.

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I can be a spokesman only for America and for its Government. Nevertheless, I have already suggested that, prior to these meetings, I go to meet our friends in Europe and to discuss with them problems of mutual interest.

The visit itself has no direct connection with any possible later summit meeting. I, of course, would hope that the mere announcement would inspire the foreign ministers to a greater activity and, probably, some greater effort at conciliation, so that there might be results before Wednesday [August 5], when they temporarily adjourn, at least, that would justify the scheduling of such a later meeting, at what time I don't know. But, in any event, even if they have to reassemble, I would hope that they could do that, if they found it reasonable and proper.

So, I merely want to make clear that this is a personal visit for the purposes that I have outlined and are given in the statement, but with the hope that it will do something to promote understanding and, possibly, progress toward peace in the world.

The holding of a summit meeting and negotiation, that would be, to my mind, absolutely impractical and, as the State Department says, counterproductive unless we could count on some positive results. But I would say these, so far as our discussions of mutual problems [are concerned], are exploratory rather than any attempt at negotiation.

I told the Vice President the day he left here—before he left, I guess—that these negotiations [for an exchange of visits between the President and Chairman Khrushchev] were in progress in written form and that the prospects were they would take place. Now I told him, I said, "so that you will not be astonished or surprised and feel let down by your Government, should they be opened up by the other side, you are not, yourself,—and, of course, will not—open this subject." But these off-hand remarks [of the Vice President in talks with Chairman Khrushchev during the former's visit in the Soviet Union]² about what would be a good thing, that, of course, was on his own initiative. There was certainly never any prohibition, because everybody else that's gone over there has said whether or not this would be a good thing, and I guess he had the same opportunity.

¹ See ante, docs. 297-299.

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No. 10 Downing Street is rather ancient. The British were planning to rebuild it on the inside. Because of the number of people and the amount of equipment necessarily present in the television room, some feared that the second floor, on which the program was to be held, might not be able to sustain the weight concentrated in the room. One British aide later commented wryly on the embarrassment that would have resulted if the floor had given way. It might have been curious, with both principals falling out of sight of the viewing public while expressing confidence in the future.

The televised talk over, we went to the dining room. Present that evening in addition to Harold were three men, who at various times had been British Prime Ministers: Winston Churchill, Clement Attlee, and Anthony Eden. Each made a short talk, which, together with the general after-dinner conversation, made it a most enjoyable and memorable occasion.

The next day I rested at the American Embassy residence, known as Winfield House, thought over my forthcoming talks with President de Gaulle, and caught up on correspondence. The only event planned for the day was purely personal. Ambassador Whitney had invited about thirty of my British wartime friends for supper. I had looked forward to this reunion. It fulfilled a deep ambition I had long cherished.

The following morning we left by helicopter from the lawn of Winfield House for the London airport. I said good-bye to Harold Macmillan and to Sir Frederick Handley Page, representing the Queen, and by nine o'clock the doors of the Boeing 707 were closed and we were bound for Paris.

On meeting President de Gaulle at the airport, I at once sensed important changes that had occurred since I had last seen him. The most notable of these was scarcely definable—it included a relaxed confidence that contrasted with his more aggressive attitude in the years when he was fighting for recognition as France's leader. All in all, he now appeared a more benign, less forbidding individual than the fiery division commander who had made himself the symbol of French resistance in World War II.

It was quickly apparent that President de Gaulle had left no stone unturned to make this visit a spectacular one. Upon meeting us, he took us into the Salon d'Honneur to meet dignitaries of his government. Then, passing through cordons of handsomely uniformed Gardes Républicaines, the party departed for Paris. The Garde Républicaine, incidentally, is a spectacular ceremonial warrior with a shiny brass helmet, dark blue

coat, white trousers (for certain occasions), knee-length boots, and a curved saber. He is a figure out of the past, standing guard in the present. As the motorcade approached Paris, the crowds progressively grew larger. Because our convertible top was in place, it was practically impossible to acknowledge the salutes of the crowd, even though both President de Gaulle and I sat hunched up in an attempt to peer through the small windows. I asked if we might have the top taken down, the President immediately told the driver to do so. The driver indicated that he would comply within a matter of moments, I supposed he was looking for a convenient place to stop. With nothing happening, the President, spoke again to the driver, who muttered something, unintelligible to me, and kept on going. Again the performance was repeated and I came to the conclusion that we had a single-minded chauffeur who had received prior orders to keep his proper place in the motorcade and would do nothing else. But at long last the driver stopped the car, apparently, without instructions, and nonchalantly lowered the top. We proceeded from there in relative comfort. I was later informed, that because our route had taken us through a district known to be a hotbed of Communism, the driver had been told by his commander to keep the top up as a protection from any thrown missile, regardless of any contrary instructions from the car's occupants. Since every uniformed individual is far more sensitive to the wishes of his immediate superior than those of any other person, I could now understand better the driver's seeming inability to comprehend the simplest instructions from the President of the French Republic.

Although I had at first planned to stay at the United States Embassy, my party and I stopped, at President de Gaulle's hospitable insistence, at the Quai d'Orsay guest house, a courtesy, I was informed, that was reserved for V.I.P.I.s.⁹ Having reached our living quarters, we looked over the schedule of events planned for us by the French government and learned that the visit was to be more formal and ceremonial than any other of the tour.

That night we attended a state dinner at the Elysée Palace in a beautiful setting and, the following noon, an equally splendid luncheon at the same place. We spent one night at the Quai d'Orsay and one night at the Palace of Rambouillet, some miles from Paris. These compliments were difficult to repay in the short time we were to be in Paris, but I did, on the second day, have President de Gaulle as my luncheon guest at the United States Embassy. During our two-day stay we participated in several other ceremonies, among them a placing of a wreath at the

⁹"Very Important Personage, Indeed," a popular expression in the governmental services.

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