PLEASE CREDIT ANY QUOTES OR EXCERPTS FROM THIS ABC NEWS TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "ABC NEWS' THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY."

ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, November 9, 1986

GUESTS:

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR (R., Ind.)
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee

SENATOR SAM NUNN (D., Ga.)
Armed Services Committee

HENRY KISSINGER
Former Secretary of State

GEOFFREY KEMP
Former Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

BARRY RUBIN
Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies

INTERVIEWED BY:

David Brinkley - ABC News

Sam Donaldson - ABC News

George F. Will - ABC News Analyst

© Copyright, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
All rights reserved.

Transcript by:

RLS Reporting Associates
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(202) 347-2321

ABC News Press Contact: Joyce Kravitz (202) 887-7245

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MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Geoffrey Kemp, formerly National Security Assistant to the President; and Barry Rubin, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a specialist in the study of terrorism. And, shortly, Henry Kissinger and Senators Lugar of Indiana and Nunn of Georgia. In a moment.

(Announcements.)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kemp and Mr. Rubin, thank you both very much for coming in today. Pleased to have you with us. Here in the studio with us are George Will of ABC NEWS, and Sam Donaldson, ABC NEWS White House correspondent. Now, first, this question for both of you: What do you make of this? You've heard all of the charges, the denials, the reports, and so on. What do you think happened, and what do you think of it?

MR. KEMP: Well, I think on the big picture, should we have had contacts with the Iranians of any description, I think that's good. That's a good strategic objective, and one that not only I think we should approve of, but as I understand it, the Iraqis have approved of it because it could lead to an end to the war. I think, however, the more specific issues is, did for tactical reasons we confuse the strategic goals we have in Iran with the release of hostages, and in doing so, break our arms embargo code? And if we did, and if the arms that were transferred were substantive, then I think we have a very serious problem indeed.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Rubin?

MR. RUBIN: I think the Administration must have calculated that the amount of arms involved was not going to turn the tide in the war. And as Geoff points out, we do have strategic interests with Iran in keeping the door open. So I think if the amounts involved were relatively small --

MR. BRINKLEY: What door? What door?

MR. RUBIN: The door of relations with specific Iranian political and military leaders, because in the future, we're going to have to worry about the relationship they're going to have with the Soviets, with potential instability in that country.

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MR. DONALDSON: Do we have any interest in being honest with our allies and honest with the American people?

MR. RUBIN: Actually, I think it raises two very interesting questions. One of them is, there's a remarkable parallel between what's happening now and the hostage rescue mission. We had a situation when Secretary of State Vance was telling Europeans that, in exchange for their embargo, we weren't going to use force, and then we went ahead and did. Vance resigned. The second question it raises is one for the American people. If the American people are going to tell their government that they put release of the hostages first, then they're going to have to face up to the costs. And I think it would be proper for people to realize that American strategic interests have to come first. For we do have some strategic interests in keeping relations with Iran.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, Mr. Kemp, do you agree that American strategic interests, as defined by a narrow portion of this Administration, ought to come first at the expense of the credibility of this country?

MR. KEMP: Oh, no. I agree with the strategic objectives. I disagree with transferring arms that violates our own arms embargo. Now, if this had been a policy agreed to by the entire Administration, and had been told to the allies in Europe and to the Iraqis, and to the other Arab governments that we deal with, then it's one thing. But to have this done in camera, so to speak, I think leads to most profound problems.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kemp, you seem to be saying that the strategic objective was the long-term improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations. But when the rationale is given as follows -- it's all right to send the arms because they won't be decisive in any way in the war -- it looks as though the reason for the arms, then, was to buy the hostages out.

MR. KEMP: Yes.

MR. WILL: So, that this was -- this is simply about hostages, not about a long-term relationship.

MR. KEMP: Exactly. I would imagine that at some point along the line tactical importance of getting the hostages out subsumed the more long-term strategic objective of having relations with Iranian dissident

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groups inside and outside the country.

MR. WILL: You've worked in this Administration. When Shultz and Weinberger are opposed to it, how does it go ahead? Does that mean, by necessity, that the President is the prime mover in this?

MR. KEMP: I'm confused about what happened in this case. But it seems to me that everything that George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger have said and done over the past two years has been completely contradictory to what is coming out now in the press.

MR. WILL: Mr. Rubin, it seems as though Syria wanted to stick its oar in in this and embarrass the Iranians and the United States and everyone else. Is it a fair inference that Syria knows where our hostages are; that hostages are held at their sufferance in Lebanon; and that they could release them tomorrow if they wished?

MR. RUBIN: In general, I think what you're saying is true. The problem from the Syrian point of view is, if they tried to release them, it is possible the hostage would end up dead. But I think one could clearly say that in general terrorism has gone on in Lebanon and from Lebanon at Syrian sufferance.

MR. DONALDSON: Should foreign policy of this type, whether it's right or wrong, be run from a boilerroom operation in the basement of the NSC? Is this something that a National Security Adviser and his aide, let's say Colonel North, should be able to do when other portions of the government are opposed?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think they're going to be able to do it if they're doing it at the direction of the President of the United States. But the point you raise is a very important one. And this Administration has some serious structural problems in its policy process. There is no one who is clearly in charge. There is no clear chain of command. And so when the President does choose to intervene, his intervention gets done in a very sporadic fashion and --

MR. DONALDSON: But if he intervenes -- if he intervenes this way, doesn't he have an obligation to at least inform all of the other principal players? There is some doubt in the public mind, at least, on the public record, as to whether Secretary Shultz, who knew about the operation to begin with -- that's clear -- knew about it at the

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end, too.

MR. KEMP: Well, I think here, there -- invariably you always have fear in any operation that your colleagues at State, Defense or CIA are going to lead the story. But here, I think, they made the mistake of believing that this could remain covert when you're dealing with the Iranians and the Syrians.

MR. DONALDSON: Will Shultz resign?

MR. KEMP: I don't know.

MR. RUBIN: I don't know. I don't think so.

MR. WILL: The fact that the Iranians evidently wanted to keep the secret, what does that -- what inference should we draw from that?

MR. KEMP: That they wanted to keep the secret?

MR. WILL: Yes.

MR. KEMP: I don't know that they did.

MR. WILL: Well, it was the Syrians who lifted the cover of the tent.

MR. KEMP: But how did the Syrians know about it in the first place, if the Iranians really wanted to keep the --

MR. WILL: Well, there may be leaks in the Middle East as well.

MR. RUBIN: But I think the point here is that if any Iranian leader is involved in covert negotiations with the United States, he has a very strong vested interest in keeping it secret, because he can lose his entire position. And I'm sure that Ayatollah Khomeini's appointments secretary is being deluged by calls from different people who want to give their version about how they weren't responsible, and how their rivals were.

MR. DONALDSON: Wasn't Rafsanjani's opposition in Iran that we are told leaked it to the Middle East newspapers?

MR. KEMP: Well, look, I think -- I mean, this is pure speculation, but so long as you just had a dialogue, people visiting Tehran and other capitals to talk, you can keep it secret. Once the arms started to be transshipped through God-knows-what channels, and landed physically in Iran, there's no way that's going to be kept secret. Everyone's going to know about it, because planes are going to start flying again. And I presume that's when the story began to filter down.

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MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kemp and Mr. Rubin, thank you. Thank you both very much for coming in today. Happy to have you with us. Coming next, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State. And, shortly, Senator Lugar Of Indiana and Senator Nunn of Georgia. In a moment.

(Announcements.)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, thank you very much for coming in today.

MR. KISSINGER: Glad to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: Pleased to have you.

MR. KISSINGER: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, you've heard what has gone before. What would you like to add to it? What can you tell us about all of this?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I agree that improving relations with Iran, as a general strategic move, is desirable. Iran is the largest, perhaps the most developed country in the area and should be a natural friend of the United States since it has a long border with the Soviet Union, and we are very far away. So that part of it, I think, was well conceived and was a good idea. When it degenerated, or when it developed, into an arms trade for hostages, I have the greatest doubt, with all my understanding for the anguish this must have caused the President, nevertheless, to negotiate for hostages makes it more likely that other hostages are going to be taken. To trade arms in a war in which a victory of Iran is against our national interest is unwise. So I am -- above all, I'm deeply concerned about announcing one policy in public, pressuring other countries to follow it, and then in private, carrying out another policy. That must affect our friends in Europe. And it must those countries in the Middle East that have relied on us like Saudi Arabia and others.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kissinger, you mention the anguish of the President. Is it a safe inference, from what you've said, or from the evidence, that this policy, which seems to have been opposed by the two senior national security officials in this government -- the Secretaries of State and Defense -- derives from the President's intense personal anguish about hostages? What is it that causes hostages to drive our policy so?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, my impression is that the President has to

[L]

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meet with the hostage families; that the President is a compassionate man who is deeply concerned about the suffering of the victims. And, therefore, he probably is impelled, or feels impelled, to explore every avenue that he sees. I believe in the long-term interest of the United States, the decision to trade arms for hostages is unwise, even though if I were a hostage, I might well say exactly the opposite.

MR. WILL: That's your view on the substance. I'd like your view on the process now. There have been lurid stories around this town about how in the late sixties and early seventies the National Security Adviser could operate on his own without perhaps the knowledge of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

MR. KISSINGER: That's correct. I was the Security Adviser.

MR. WILL: I understand. Do you think this is healthy? I mean, is this not at some point a resigning issue for a Secretary of State?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, if I were teaching a course in political science at the university, I would say it is not healthy. If I remember the practicalities, and if I imagined the practicalities here, what is a President going to do if he feels very strongly, charged as he is with the ultimate responsibility, and his senior advisers disagree? In the end, he will have to follow his own convictions, because that's where he was -- that's how he was elected. In this particular case, I can't fully make out whether the Secretaries of State and Defense knew what was being done and choose to dissociate themselves from it, or whether they didn't know that it was being done at all.

MR. WILL: That's really what I was trying to get at. Is there a problem, does a President have to make a decision that he can't even tell them because our government by now is so porous that the story will be in the Washington Post in 48 hours?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I -- I must say, I'm in a poor position to talk about it. Because I was involved in both of those types of situations. In this particular case, my impression is that the Secretaries of State and Defense knew what was being done, disagreed with it, and chose to dissociate themselves from it in its execution, which is a rather strange procedure. But in the end, when the President, having heard their views, decides to go ahead, I don't find that outrageous.

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MR. DONALDSON: All right, the President went ahead --

MR. KISSINGER: I disagree with him, but I don't find it procedurally
outrageous.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, the President went ahead because he is,
after all, the President. Where does that put the Secretary of State,
though? He has been the one who has told our European allies that we
want an arms embargo enforced against Iran. Now he is shown to have
said that at a time, whether he knew about it or not, that he was being
undercut by this government. Where does George Shultz stand? Must he
now resign?

MR. KISSINGER: My view -- my view is, I agree in substance with
the Secretary of State's views. If he knew about the decision when it
was made, and chose to dissociate himself from it, he should not now
resign just because it has become public. If he didn't know about it,
then it's a different problem. But I am sort of allergic to resigning
when a President is under fire. That's when his associates ought to
rally to him. But in the -- the key issue is, did he know about but
didn't participate in it? In which case, the fact that it has become
public just added an embarrassment, but not a --

MR. DONALDSON: Let me see if I understand your position. Are you
saying it's all right, as long as George Shultz knew about it, for him
to go and see Helmut Kohl, for him to go and see Margaret Thatcher, for
him to go and see Francois Mitterand, and tell them one thing when he
knows it's a lie?

MR. KISSINGER: No. My point -- you're addressing -- I'm addressing
the question of whether he should resign. If, knowing about it, he did
all of this, then the only additional fact that is added is the public
embarrassment. He did it knowing what the facts were. If he didn't
know about it and was put into a position to lie out of ignorance, then
he has a different decision to make.

MR. DONALDSON: But should this government lie to its allies?

MR. KISSINGER: No, I'm deeply worried about the fact that we have
-- we announced one policy, castigated our allies in the name of that
policy, and secretly carried out the opposite policy.

MR. WILL: But knowing what you --

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MR. KISSINGER: That, independent of Secretary of State Shultz' personal position, is perhaps the most worrisome of the situation.

MR. DONALDSON: Did you ever do that, Dr. Kissinger, when you were Secretary of State? Did you ever tell our allies one thing while at the same time actually trying to conduct some other policy?

MR. KISSINGER: I don't remember that I ever did anything --

MR. DONALDSON: Your critics charge that you were able to find the same sort of situation ethics?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, if I did, it was wrong. I can't think -- I sometimes didn't tell them everything we were doing. But I don't remember ever being in a situation where I urged them on -- in one direction while we in our government actually did the opposite of what we were recommending. But it doesn't make any difference. If I did it, it was wrong, too. But I don't remember that it was ever done in my period of government.

MR. WILL: Secretary Kissinger, if we could swerve to a different topic for just a moment, it seems to be the policy of the United States government to get rid of ballistic missiles as soon as possible, as it was expressed on this show last week by Mr. Regan. Can we live safely in a world very quickly without ballistic missiles, relying solely on air-breathing penetrating weapons of the Soviet Union?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I think the proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles is one that is causing enormous strains in the alliance, because it puts us into a situation where all the retaliation has to take place from the United States. And I am extremely uncomfortable with that proposal. And I believe, and I'm convinced, that our friends in the alliance, those who have fought to neutralists in Europe, are also extremely uncomfortable with it.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, thank you very much. Thanks for coming in, being with us today. Happy to have you.

MR. KISSINGER: Nice to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Senator Richard Lugar, Republican, Indiana, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat, Georgia, of the Armed Services Committee, and in the new Congress, its Chairman. In a moment.

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(Announcements.)

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Lugar, Senator Nunn, thanks very much for coming in. Happy to have you with us. Now, as best you can tell at the moment -- it's a little early, I know -- as best you can tell, what is going to be the Congressional reaction to this business in Iran? Senator Lugar?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, great curiosity, to begin with. A desire to find out as much as we can. I visited with Admiral Poindexter and Secretary Shultz just on my own, out of curiosity.

MR. BRINKLEY: And what did they tell you?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, essentially, Secretary Shultz does not have a great deal to say about the events; does not know a great deal about the events.

MR. DONALDSON: He's been muzzled. I mean, did he tell you something?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, he indicated that he really is not conversant. And so he was not a helpful source of information. Admiral Poindexter did visit with me at some length about it. And I would just, supplementary to what I've heard on the program already, that without naming countries, our country has informed a great many people about our activities. There has been a concerted attempt made to make certain that our diplomacy in the Middle East, as well as with our allies, was advanced by all of this. And I think that's an important point to make. As opposed to an impression that somehow we're a loose player out there creating diplomatic waves.

MR. BRINKLEY: When you say, a great many people, do you mean, such as Britain, France, Germany; so on?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I can't enumerate the countries. But I would say, they include our allies and they include Middle Eastern countries who would be affected.

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, Dick has more up-to-date information. I have tried to get information and have not succeeded in getting any thus far. It seems to me Congress is going to be asking a lot of questions. I think the newspapers reports -- and they have not been denied -- indicates that the Reagan Administration is not standing tall on this

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one. And I believe that we have some profound policy decisions to make. We have some profound legal inquiries as to whether any laws have been violated. And we really have another question, and that is, the decision-making process in this Administration. In an effort to cut Congress out, have they also cut out the CIA, the Joint Chiefs, the State Department and the Defense Department. And if so, who's making the decisions?

MR. WILL: Senator Nunn, this comes on the heels of the Iceland summit, where there seemed to be an awful lot of improvising late at night in the middle of the North Atlantic. What does this tell you about the orderliness? I mean, who's making foreign policy in the Reagan Administration?

SENATOR NUNN: I can't answer that question. I think there was a great deal of shooting from the hip in Iceland. I don't think the United States was ready for the end game. The Soviets clearly were prepared to make offers that involved the end game. I think we were not prepared, and I think we tabled proposals on our own, and perhaps agreed to proposals, that would be profoundly injurious to the Western defense.

MR. WILL: Senator Lugar, when you said -- when you talked to Secretary Shultz, he seemed not conversant with parts of this. Does that mean that he did not know? We just heard Mr. Kissinger making a distinction: Did he not know about this, or did he not acquiesce in it? Does that indicate that he did not know about it, and therefore, was unwittingly misleading our allies?

SENATOR LUGAR: I don't believe that Secretary Shultz has ever misled anyone in the process.

MR. WILL: I said, unwittingly.

SENATOR LUGAR: I have no knowledge precisely what he has told our allies. In other words, I suppose I'm implying that all of the statements made to our allies may have been public, and some may have been private. That would not be unusual in diplomacy. It just seems to me, you know, there are two questions here. One, I would agree with Sam, in terms of the form of how foreign policy ought to be created, I think the Secretary of State ought to be heavily involved. And this is one query I had to

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him which he could not respond to. You know, why aren't you right into
the thing, and trying to help save it? And the other, the substance of
it --

MR. BRINKLEY: He couldn't answer that, or didn't? What --

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I think the point simply is that it was
closely held, closely done.

MR. WILL: Held from the Secretary of State?

SENATOR LUGAR: Not from him, but in terms of aspects and operations,
some of them obviously apparently were. In other words, not -- but,
still, we're dealing in the Middle East, it seems to me, an important
future. Ties with Iran and the future of Iran, not only to terrorists,
but to Syrian, to Israel, to Lebanon and what have you, are profound.
This is an appropriate area for foreign policy. So we might have a
disagreement over the form as opposed to the substance of what has occurred.

MR. DONALDSON: But don't you --

MR. BRINKLEY: Let me -- one thing, Sam. What do you think they
were afraid of, Congress? Or leaks to the press?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I think --

MR. BRINKLEY: I mean, why such secrecy?

SENATOR LUGAR: Probably both. I think in all honesty, there is a
feeling with regard to close operations of this variety that once it
gets beyond a few people, that's too many. So there was a conscious
attempt to keep it very close.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, it's a fact that after these hostages began
coming out -- Benjamin Weir and Father Jenko -- more Americans have
been kidnapped? Does that suggest that in the lesson that the kidnappers
are learned is that it pays? It pays.

SENATOR NUNN: Let me say this. I think that we have had more
hostages taken, and I'm afraid that the message may be implicitly that
taking American hostages pays because we have an obsession, to the
exclusion sometimes of our own strategic interests, in trying to get
back our people. Now, that is understandable from a point of view of
humane concern about individuals. But from the point of view of American
strategic interests, we have to understand what those are. I remember
when the Saudia Arabian AWACs sale came up. And I happen to have voted

[L]

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for that. The reason was that we were given a strong, strong position
by this Administration that not to sell those AWACS would leave the
Saudi Arabians and the Persian Gulf undefended against the Iranians.
Now, I don't know what arms we may have sold. But if we are sending
spare parts for F-4s and F-14s at the same time we're selling AWACS to
Saudi Arabia to defend against those, then obviously, we have to ask
where are we coming from in our strategic interest. The Carter doctrine
on the Persian Gulf: We would send our own American boys over there.
We have a rapid deployment force designed for that. To protect, not
just against the Soviet Union, but against the Iranians. Now, if we're
selling them arms, what is the Rapid Deployment Force going to do? Are
we going to have American boys dying because we're shipping arms to
Iran? These are profound strategic questions that go far beyond the
question of terrorism.

MR. DONALDSON: And they may be contradictions in our policy. But I want to ask you about the impact on Secretary Shultz. There are reports today that he may be considering resigning. Do you think he will? Ought he to resign?

SENATOR LUGAR: You should not resign, and in my judgment, he will not resign. And at least the conversation I had with him, and there were a lot of other subjects, he sounded very lively and on top of it.

MR. DONALDSON: Wait, wait. When was this conversation?

SENATOR LUGAR: Yesterday afternoon.

MR. DONALDSON: And your sense was that he was not thinking --
that he was so frustrated or upset that he was going to turn in his
resignation?

SENATOR LUGAR: No, I think this is purely press speculation
attempting to drive this story onward a few more notches.

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Nunn, would you address that question?

SENATOR NUNN: He's an honorable, decent man. He's a valuable
member of this Administration, a valuable public servant. He'll have
to make his own decisions on that. I don't know what he was told. I
don't know whether he was misled. So I can't answer that for George Shultz.

MR. WILL: Senator Lugar, on another matter, quickly, Mr. Pell
who's replacing you as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has

[L.C.]

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indicated that one of his great desires is to kill aid to the contras.
Will he succeed?

SENATOR LUGAR: No, he won't. Claiborne has felt that way along while. But it seems to me that we're going to have to examine, both his majority -- the new majority and the new minority, what our options are. There are -- there's money for the contras through the 30th of September. There'll have to be movement, it seems to me, and I would hope much more of a bipartisan consensus. If I have one regret about the whole situation, it is the last time we voted, we got 53 votes. Now Sam Nunn was very helpful trying to extend that. I think we're going to listen to voices on both sides and try to get a program that has sustaining power as opposed to being up for grabs each time we have a vote.

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Nunn, may I ask you about one other subject? The 131st B-52 will be armed with cruise missiles this week. And as far as we can see, the Administration has no intention of removing some other missile system to offset it. We'll break the SALT II sublimits. Is that wise?

SENATOR NUNN: I don't think it's wise. I think it's going to cause a great deal of difficulty here, domestically, in forming any kind of consensus on arms and arms control. And it's going to cause a great deal of difficulty with our allies. I don't think it's fatal to the arms control negotiating process. I think if the Soviets and the United States can find a way to reach an agreement, in the interests of both, that this will not be the decisive factor. But it will give the Soviets a great deal of opportunity to further the splits within the alliance and the confrontation here at home.

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Lugar.

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar, thank you both very much.

SENATOR NUNN: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Pleased to have you with us today.