-20-

South Africans have a right to ask for some patience with respect to the special complexities of their situation. But that time is not unlimited. Those who wish South Africa well, and would like it to take its full place in international affairs, will not be able to find common ground with you as long as the system of institutionalized racial discrimination persists.

The steps that have been taken to ease petty apartheid, the measures to broaden the political rights of coloureds and Indians and the economic conditions of blacks--and the signs that your government is trying to think creatively and promote change (and paying a political price for it)--these are noted, and appreciated. But your friends would render you no service if they implied that these were anything but the first steps on a long journey.

The present policy will *not* provide the ultimate solution to the problem of power sharing, either in political arrangements or homeland policy. Devising a more equitable form of federalism or confederalism--or some other just political institutions--depends on the creativity and determination of all the peoples of South Africa. I can only say that a system which respects human dignity, extends due process, provides for equal individual rights and protects the principle of citizenship will garner sympathetic outside support in many quarters.

The efforts being made to improve the economic and educational status of blacks, moreover, imply their own political logic. As the black population rises in its skills and capabilities, it will increasingly develop its own articulate leadership and consciousness of its condition--and its potential. Thus, as so often before in history, the more genuine the material progress being made by the black community, the more it creates the need for an appropriate political framework.

I do not pretend to know the details of the final destination. Too many outsiders have offered facile slogans drawn from the experience of homogeneous societies and different historical circumstances. Clearly South Africa will have to find its own path. South Africa's friends would eagerly extend support to any constructive solution that embodies the fundamental principles of human dignity, civil rights, and full political participation. The best advice a friend can offer now is to plead urgently for a heroic effort to take the initiative in consultation with

[c]

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all the peoples of this country, to devise new structures
and concepts compatible with the fundamental values of
other Western societies. History is kind to political
leaders who use a margin of choice while it is still
available; those who wait on events are usually overwhelmed
by them.

The period before pressures become overwhelming should
be used for an act of constructive statesmanship. The
best way to keep Soviet influence out of the region is first
to ameliorate and then to eliminate the conditions which
facilitate its entry.

In this context I must mention the negotiations over
Namibia, which have now reached a critical stage. They are
an essential first step. If this festering problem is
resolved there is a chance for a period of calm and restraint
which could give diplomacy an opportunity to ameliorate the
tensions encumbering southern Africa's future. A diplomatic
settlement offers hope of containing or reducing the spiral
of cross-border violence and establishing a more secure
future for all the states of the region.

Ending cross-border violence by all sides clearly requires
as well the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces from Angola.
Such conditions will make it possible for the United States
to recognize the Angolan regime.

I do not know whether southern Africa is heading for
further tragedy, or for a future of progress and
reconciliation. I know only that the history of the re-
mainder of this century will be full of dramatic events,
and much of the history of that period will be made on
this continent. Your beautiful and dramatic country will
be a major actor in the unfolding drama. Your friends can
only wish you well in any efforts to provide that the
continent on which you live can be a showplace for the
peace of the world and the reconciliation of the races.

SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK CONFERENCE - September 6, 1982

The emergence of the developing countries no doubt
will one day be seen as one of the seminal events in world
history. In 1945 there were some 50 sovereign states; after
a generation of decolonization the number had tripled. Never
before had foreign policy to be conducted with such a
multiplicity of states, under conditions of instantaneous
communication, shadowed by the specter of nuclear war and
under the pressures of economic necessity. For while the
developing nations could not hope to achieve their aspirations
without the assistance of the industrialized states, the
latter in turn could not sustain their prosperity without the
assured supply of energy and raw materials at a fair price.

Mutual need did not necessarily--or at least immediately--
produce mutual understanding or even serious dialogue. A vast
philosophical gap separated the two sides. Many in the West
saw in the developing countries a replica of their own
constitutional evolution; it was in fact quite often a rebellion

2

[Lc]

not only against the tutelage but the institutions of the
colonial powers. There was the Western assumption that the
challenge to political stability was largely economic; economic
growth would more or less automatically produce political
stability. In fact, in many countries economic development under-
mined the residues of political order. Iran is a good example.

The Shah--for many years considered a secular reformer--was
overthrown by a coalition of forces threatened by social
change: mullahs deprived of their traditional monopoly over
water; landowners and land reform professionals whose
life style was threatened by the inflation inseparable from
industrialization. And the same process may yet repeat itself
precisely under conditions of extremely rapid economic advance.

Many of the new nations after an initial flirtation with
parliamentary democracy chose some version of Marxism as their
model. They did so ironically not because of the persuasiveness
of Marxist economies but rather because its political theory

3

[Lc]

provided a kind of answer to the riddle of political legitimacy.
Marxism provided a justification for oligarchic and occasionally
one-man rule without the inconvenience of elections. But
it brought with it as well the usual baggage of Marxist
planning with the well known consequences of stajuction
corruption and administrative corruption. For a while these
Marxist regimes sought to use the so-called non-aligned movement
to exact by political pressure the economic cooperation that their
system wasted and their politics made meaningless. The
secretarial of the so-called group of 79 fell more or less
into their hands. I once reviewed the declarations of the
non-aligned conferences between 1973 and 1979 and I found
not a single statement of approbation for anything done by
the United States nor any criticism of actions by the Soviet
Union. Now it is statistically impossible for the United
States to be always wrong and for the Soviet Union to be ever
right.

4

Something deeper, more intangible was involved. There existed, to be sure, a certain ideological affinity for the Soviet Union. More important was the consciousness that criticism of the United States involved next to no risk while the penalties for opposition to the Soviet Union could be severe. This was all the more true because many developing countries and almost all of those of Africa faced exactly the opposite problem of their Western counterparts at a comparable stage of historical evolution. The Western states were nations before they formed states. In Africa--and elsewhere in the developing world--the state precedes the nation. Boundaries are frequently artificial reflecting the convenience of former colonial rulers. In these circumstances the concept of a loyal opposition--the essence of modern democracy--is difficult to implement for reality supports the natural temptation of political leaders to consider an assault on their personal position as an assault on domestic cohesion. By the same

5

[L]

token an outside power known to have a considerable capacity
for subversion can gain a disproportionate influence.

And yet sooner or later reality will impose itself.

The Soviet Union can threaten subversion but offer no positive program. It exports weapons and proxy troops but no positive program. Developing countries relying on it for progress are in a shambles. The non-aligned movement may at last begin to live up to its name. We are thus in a position to think of a serious and realistic economic and political dialogue with the developing nations of Africa and elsewhere based on true reciprocity and without ideological blinders.

The following principles should govern this dialogue:

As a superpower the United States has an interest—together
where possible with its allies—to prevent the Soviet Union
from exploiting the uncertainties, dislocations and occasionally
turmoil of the process of development. We recognize that the

6

process of subversion or of exploiting local discontent
operates more rapidly than even the best designed process of
development and reform. Americans have come to understand that
they cannot pay in the coin of enslavement of a continent for
the failure to see implemented all at once the most desirable
programs of reform. For we know that once Soviet totalitarianism--
or its various proxy forms is established the process is
irreversible. Indeed under the Brezhnev doctrine the Soviet
Union claims the right to impose this irreversibility by
force. The United States will not abdicate its strategic
interests or be told by third parties who its friends should
be. We will not fail to respond if the Soviet Union or its
proxies show no restraint in areas of vital concern to us.

At the same time the developing world, and Africa especially,
should not be viewed simply or even primarily as an area for
superpower confrontation. The United States can have no desire
to conduct its policies entirely from the vantage point of

7

its undoubted strategic interests. For the art of foreign
policy is to create an international system that most of
its members wish to maintain. A world of peace, progress
and prosperity requires that the more than 100 new and
developing nations be made part of the international system.
No international order can survive unless they feel a stake
in it. In an increasingly interdependent world economy, this
is in the general interest. The true challenge to the West is
not to our economic capacity, but to our political understanding.

We should not let ourselves be blackmailed; but we cannot
make our contribution to peace and to hope unless we identify
ourselves with the hopes and aspirations of the responsible
members of the developing world. America can therefore never--
in Africa or elsewhere--consult only its strategic interests.

These must be related to the wellspring of motivation of our
people and to the values and aspirations of those new nations
willing to work for a better world by consensus and not pressure.

8

The conditions for such a dialogue have improved considerably in recent years. Developing countries especially in Africa need no western preachments about the hopelessness of the Marxist system: all they have to do is survey the results of African experiments with it. In country after country where one form or another of "national socialism" has been tried, it is failing miserably. A number of otherwise abundantly endowed countries--with almost limitless natural and human resources and potential--are verging on bankruptcy, the people having forfeited the once rich promise of independence. This need not continue to be so, but to reverse the trend toward stagnation and decay will require a new look at reality--an attitude more than one hundred years ago by President Lincoln, speaking about a similar trial in his own nation's history:

> The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high

9

with difficulty, and we must rise to the occasion.
The fiery trials through which we pass will lead
us down in honor or dishonor to the latest generation.
As our cause is new, so we must think anew, and act
anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we
shall save our country.

It is also becoming clear that tactics of confrontation
are self-defeating. Developing nations--especially in
Africa--are increasingly learning that if they make themselves
part of the East-West conflict they will mortgage their
independence. And more and more members of the so-called
non-aligned grouping are coming to the realization that they
must find some relationship between their political rhetoric
and their economic and social aspirations. Developing nations
are sovereign states; they have a right to whatever domestic
system and foreign policy they choose. But the industrial
democracies are also sovereign, and have a right to give
assistance as we choose. We have political, economic, and

[d]

10

moral reasons to give such aid, but Third World nations
cannot expect both to receive our economic support and to
conduct foreign policies consistently hostile to us. More
and more third world nations recognize the need to choose.

Finally in a period of austerity in the industrialized
world official aid budgets cannot be substantially increased.
Developing countries will have to adjust to the reality that
foreign private investment is the most promising source of
development capital. And they will have to reflect about the
political and economic incentives to attract such capital.

As for the United States there is every reason to
hope that we have transcended our oscillation between
considering the developing nations simply as cold war pawns
and the sentimentality of seeking to win over radicals by
pretending to share their slogans. Revolutionaries will
not be charmed out of the belief of a lifetime by invocations

11

of abstract good will. We are at last prepared for a mature
partnership based on mutually realistic expectations. We
must find the means to help the developing countries toward
sustainable economic growth and to expand the world trade
which is the key to the well being of all societies. There
exists an unusual opportunity for a new constructive
relationship if both sides abandon ideological blinders and meet
on the basis of mutual need which is the final guarantor of
any lasting relationship.

## South Africa

And so I come at last to our host country, South Africa.
I am not here with a blueprint of how to solve problems that
the centuries have spawned and decades have made intractable.
I want to describe how the international situation of your
country appears to a well-disposed outsider. There seem
to me four fundamental realities affecting the position of
South Africa.

12

One: In terms of resources and technical skill South Africa is in a unique position to play a crucial role in the evolution and progress of the Continent. There would be extraordinary prospects were South Africa able to achieve a fair, acceptable and binding accommodation with its neighbors.

Two: Black Africa has an immense stake in the shared enterprise of building a secure and prosperous continent; it needs a new relationship with its neighbor to the south.

It pays an enormous price when its countries are occupied by tens of thousands of non-African troops--irrespective of the pretext for their being there. There is no profit to Africans for the continent becoming a battleground; those in Moscow and Havana who seek to perpetuate the presence of foreign combat troops in Africa do not have the continent's interests in mind. All African states have a shared objective in cooperation and mutual security for their

[Lc]

13

continent. There are realities both sides need to
accommodate.

Three: South Africa is of the greatest strategic
importance to the non-Communist world, not only geographically
but in terms of resources some of them nearly irreplacable
elsewhere.

Four: These hopeful prospects have however one
limiting condition. Even the best disposed Americans are
bound by the fundamental values of their society; strategic
considerations cannot override deeply felt principles in
a society so based on idealism as America. Nor can even the
most geopolitically oriented American statesman fail to
take into account the deeply held beliefs of the preponderant
majority of this Continent.

South Africans have a right to ask for understanding
of the special complexities of their situation. But the need

14

to bear in mind the imperatives of their friends: They
must not make it impossible for potential friends to work
with them. And they must not deceive themselves, by reciting
comforting thoughts about strategic geography and resources,
into believing that these alone will override politically,
ethnically, and morally unacceptable differences. Those
who wish South Africa well and wish it to take its full
place in international affairs will watch carefully what
decisions South Africa's political leadership take. Their
ability to understand and support with sympathy South African
decisions will in turn depend on the capacity of South
Africa's leadership to incorporate into its decisions South
Africa's fundamental values, character, courage and
achievements of all its people--black and white. Institu-
tionalized discrimination will prevent long term cooperation.
A system which respects dignity, extends due process, provides
for individual rights and protects the principle of citizenship

[c]

15

will engender sympathetic and useful support.

Any fair assessment must emphasize that serious steps have been taken toward some of these objectives by the South African government. Steps that have been taken to ease petty apartheid, the measures to broaden the political rights of Coloureds and the economic conditions of blacks-- and the signs that your government is trying to think creatively and promote change (and paying a political price for it)--these are noted, and appreciated.

But your friends would render you no service if they implied that these were anything but the first steps on a long journey. The efforts being made under your government's policy to improve the economic and educational status of blacks imply their own political logic. The lessons of Tocqueville do not stop at the borders of this Republic. As the black population rises in its skills and capabilities, it will more and more develop its own articulate leadership

16

and be conscious of its condition--and its potential.

Thus the more genuine the progress being made, the more
it may contain the seeds of turmoil down the road, unless
an appropriate political framework is found.

I do not pretend to know what the final destination
should be. Too many outsiders have offered facile slogans
drawn from the experience of homogeneous societies and
uniform historical evolutions. Clearly South Africa will have
to find its own way so long as it is recognized that the
principles of human dignity, equal human and political rights
and full citizenship are protected. The present homelands
policy does not meet that test. Whether other forms of
federalism or confederalism can be devised depends largely
on the vision and courage of a people that has survived the
centuries in a difficult continent by dedication and bravery.
South Africa's friends would eagerly extend support to any

[L]

17

constructive solution that embodies these fundamental
principles. And the best advice a friend can offer now
is to plead urgently for a heroic effort to take the
initiative, to come up with concepts compatible with the
fundamental values of other Western countries.

Of course time will be needed; but it is not unlimited.
The period before outside pressures become overwhelming
should be used for an act of constructive statesmanship.
One way to gain time is to conclude the negotiations over
Namibia which have now reached a critical stage. It is of
vital importance that they succeed, because without resolution
of this festering problem, South Africa will not be able
to gain the time it needs to work out relationships in the
region which meet South Africa's interests and protects
its future. The closing of the Namibian issue may usher in a
period of calm and restraint to give diplomacy an opportunity
to ameliorate the tensions encumbering relationships

18

in Southern Africa. A settlement in Namibia makes it
possible to turn the corner toward a new regional pattern
in which the spiral of cross-border violence is reduced,
and a more secure future is established. Clearly calming
cross border violence requires the withdrawal of Cuban
combat forces from Angola.

I do not know whether we are heading for tragedy or for
peace and progress. I do know that this country will be a
major actor in the unfolding drama. Your friends wish you the
best so that the Continent on which you live can be a
showplace for the peace of the world and the reconciliation
of the races.

[L.C]

I AM HONORED BY THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THIS DISTINGUISHED GROUP, IN A COUNTRY WHOSE FUTURE EVOLUTION IS OF GREAT, PERHAPS DECISIVE IMPORTANCE FOR THE PROSPECTS OF THE ENTIRE CONTINENT, IF NOT OF WORLD POLITICS.

AND IT IS, AS WELL, A DAUNTING ASSIGNMENT. FOR SOUTH AFRICA IS GEOGRAPHICALLY ALMOST AS FAR FROM AMERICA AS IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE ON THIS GLOBE. ITS PROBLEMS REFLECT A DIFFERENT HISTORY AND ITS DOMESTIC STRUCTURE A CONTRASTING SET OF VALUES. AT THE SAME TIME SOUTH AFRICA HAS MANY TIES TO THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE FREE WORLD IS UNDISPUTED. THUS AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TO YOUR COUNTRY IS INEVITABLY AMBIVALENT-- A CONSTANT TUG OF WAR BETWEEN GEOPOLITICAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS.

AS I SHALL POINT OUT LATER, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF FREEDOM EVERYWHERE THAT THIS GAP BE PROGRESSIVELY NARROWED AND ULTIMATELY ELIMINATED.

2

MY ASSIGNMENT HERE IS TO DESCRIBE THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION AS IT APPEARS FROM AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE.

IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF THE
UNITED STATES, AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA ARE PART OF A
LARGER PICTURE OF GLOBAL CONCERNS, AND OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD
THIS CONTINENT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE OTHERWISE. I WILL

TRY TO TRACE SOME OF THOSE BROAD PERSPECTIVES; THE AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL; EAST-WEST RELATIONS; AMERICA AND
WESTERN EUROPE; AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

ONLY IN THIS CONTEXT CAN ONE SPEAK MEANINGFULLY ABOUT HOW
AMERICA REGARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THIS COUNTRY.

THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON WORLD EVENTS HAS UNDERGONE
DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE LAST GENERATION.

AMERICANS DO NOT HAVE A LONG EXPERIENCE WITH FOREIGN
AFFAIRS. OUR FOUNDING FATHERS WERE QUITE SOPHISTICATED
IN MANIPULATING THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER TO SECURE

3

OUR INDEPENDENCE. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, A CENTURY AND A
HALF OF ISOLATION ENCOURAGED THE ILLUSION IN AMERICA THAT
WE DID NOT REALLY NEED A FOREIGN POLICY--OR RATHER, THAT
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WAS PURELY A MATTER OF CHOICE FOR US:
WE COULD INVOLVE OURSELVES, OR NOT, AS WE PREFERRED. IT
TOOK TWO WORLD WARS IN THIS CENTURY TO SHATTER THIS ILLUSION,
BUT CERTAIN PRECONCEPTIONS LINGERED IN THE AMERICAN PSYCHE
FOR SOME DECADES AFTERWARD.

AMERICANS IN THE ISOLATIONIST PERIOD TENDED TO LOOK
DOWN ON WHAT THEY CONSIDERED THE SORDID POWER POLITICS OF
EUROPE. OUR AVOIDANCE OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALANCE OF
POWER APPEARED TO US NOT AS A BOON CONFERRED BY DISTANCE
AND THE PROTECTION OF THE BRITISH NAVY, BUT AS A VIRTUE, AS
A SIGN OF OUR MORAL SUPERIORITY. SINCE 1945, WE ARE PERMANENTLY
ACTIVE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND HAVE RELUCTANTLY HAD TO FACE THE
REALITIES OF POWER. NEVERTHELESS, WE STILL TEND TO VIEW THE
WORLD IN MORAL TERMS AND TO HOLD OURSELVES--AND OUR FRIENDS--

[Y]

4

TO A HIGH STANDARD OF MORAL CONDUCT AS WE SEE IT. WE FALL SHORT OF IT FROM TIME TO TIME BUT ONLY AT HEAVY COST: THE SACRIFICE OF THE DOMESTIC SUPPORT NEEDED TO SUSTAIN AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD.

FOR A TIME AFTER 1945, IT SEEMED RELATIVELY EASY FOR US TO EQUATE POWER AND MORALITY--THE SECRET AMERICAN DREAM, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THE UNITED STATES PRODUCED THE AMAZING FIGURE OF OVER HALF OF ALL THE GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE WORLD. WE WERE SO OVERWHELMINGLY POWERFUL THAT OUR ALLIES TENDED TO FOLLOW OUR PRESCRIPTIONS; SINCE WE OFFERED THEM MILITARY PROTECTION AND SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID, IT WAS A RELATIVELY HARMONIOUS PARTNERSHIP. THE PRINCIPAL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES LOOKED TO US AS THE SOURCE OF CAPITAL FOR THEIR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. ALL THIS GAVE AMERICANS A DISTORTED PICTURE OF WHAT FOREIGN POLICY WAS ABOUT; IT CAUSED US TO IDENTIFY A FORTUNATE AND TEMPORARY CONCATENATION WITH A PERMANENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. THE

CYJ

5

MARSHALL PLAN WAS IN EFFECT A PROJECTION OF OUR DOMESTIC EXPERIENCE--AN OVERSEAS APPLICATION OF THE NEW DEAL, IN WHICH ECONOMIC PROGRESS BROUGHT WITH IT POLITICAL STABILITY ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY. AND THE SECURITY PROBLEM REPRESENTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH PROMPTED THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND THE FOUNDATION OF NATO, SEEMED ANALOGOUS TO THE PROBLEM OF HITLER--THAT OF UNAMBIGUOUS AGGRESSION BY ORGANIZED UNITS ACROSS RECOGNIZED FRONTIERS.

IT WAS A CREATIVE AND BRILLIANTLY SUCCESSFUL PERIOD OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, YET NEVER TO BE REPEATED. FOR OUR WORLD LEADERSHIP THEN WAS GROUNDED IN AN INHERENTLY EPHEMERAL SET OF CONDITIONS.

SINCE THEN WE HAVE SEEN THAT ECONOMIC PROGRESS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY PRODUCE POLITICAL STABILITY--SOMETIMES QUITE THE OPPOSITE. AND THREATS TO SECURITY CAN BE MUCH MORE MANIFOLD THAN ATTACKS ACROSS NATIONAL BORDERS. ABOVE ALL, FROM THE LATE 1960'S, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE UNITED

6

STATES WAS IN THE POSITION THAT IT HAD TO CONDUCT A FOREIGN POLICY AS MOST OTHER NATIONS IN HISTORY: AS ONE COUNTRY AMONG MANY, UNABLE EITHER TO DOMINATE THE WORLD OR ESCAPE FROM IT; FORCED TO SEEK BY PERSUASION, ACCOMMODATION, NEGOTIATION WHAT IT COULD NO LONGER ACHIEVE BY UNILATERAL FIAT; OBLIGED TO LEARN THE TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES OF BALANCING INCENTIVES AND PENALTIES REQUIRED TO BE STEADY, RELIABLE, SENSITIVE TO MARGINAL SHIFTS IN THE BALANCE OF POWER AND AWARE OF THE INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN EVENTS. TODAY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY POWER ARE MUCH MORE WIDELY DIFFUSED AND THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTS ONLY ABOUT 21 PERCENT OF WORLD GNP--POWERFUL BUT NO LONGER DOMINANT.

THE VERY BALANCE OF POWER WHICH WE HAVE DEPLORED THROUGH MOST OF OUR NATIONAL EXPERIENCE MUST HENCEFORTH BE ONE OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. OUR POSITION TOWARD THE REST OF THE WORLD HAS BECOME

C Y J

7

ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF BRITAIN TOWARDS EUROPE FOR THE BETTER PART OF THREE CENTURIES. BRITAIN COULD NOT PERMIT EUROPE TO BE DOMINATED BY ANY SINGLE POWER REGARDLESS OF ITS PEACEFUL PROFESSIONS. BRITAIN KNEW THAT ITS RESOURCES COULD NOT MATCH THOSE OF THE ENTIRE CONTINENT; THEREFORE A EUROPE UNITED AGAINST IT WOULD SOONER OR LATER BE ABLE TO IMPOSE ITS WILL. AMERICA'S GLOBAL POSITION IS NO DIFFERENT. IF MOST OF THE REST OF THE WORLD FELL UNDER HOSTILE CONTROL--DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY--WE WOULD BE OUTMATCHED. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER IS NOT A FAVOR WE DO OTHERS BUT AN IMPERATIVE OF OUR SURVIVAL.

THIS CONFRONTS US WITH THREE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES. DESPITE THE CLAIMS OF ITS DETRACTORS, AMERICA IS, AS I POINTED OUT, RELUCTANT TO BASE ITS CLAIMS ON ITS POWER, REFERRING TO PREVAIL BY THE PURITY OF ITS MAXIMS. AMERICANS ALSO ARE UNEASY WITH --INDEED THEY RESENT--RELATIVE ANSWERS, WHICH ARE THE ESSENCE OF A POLICY OF EQUILIBRIUM. THROUGHOUT

8

OUR HISTORY EVERY PROBLEM WE HAVE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH
PROVED SOLUBLE--THAT IS TO SAY, WE FOUND A FINAL ANSWER--
IF ONLY TO OVERWHELM IT WITH RESOURCES. A WORLD IN WHICH
PART OF OUR TASK IS MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER IS BY
DEFINITION RELATIVISTIC, INCONCLUSIVE, MORALLY UNSATISFYING.

THEREFORE, IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THE MAIN LINES OF
THE FOREIGN POLICY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONDUCTED
CONSISTENTLY FOR MOST OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD HAVE BEEN
ATTACKED CONSISTENTLY BY THOSE ON BOTH ENDS OF THE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM ON THE GROUND THAT IT DID NOT LIVE UP
TO AMERICAN IDEALS AND OFFERED NO FINAL ANSWERS--BY LIBERALS
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CONCILIATORY, BY CONSERVATIVES
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ADEQUATELY PRINCIPLED. ONE EXTREME TENDS
TO VIEW FOREIGN POLICY AS A BRANCH OF PSYCHIATRY: THE
BASIC REQUIREMENT OF DIPLOMACY, IN THIS VIEW, IS TO GENERATE
GOODWILL. ADVERSARIES ARE HOSTILE BECAUSE THEY FEAR OR
RESENT US, BECAUSE WE HAVE FAILED TO REASSURE THEM THAT OUR

9

OBJECTIVES CAN BE HARMONIZED WITH THEIRS. CONFLICTS ARE AN ABERRATION FROM AN OTHERWISE NATURAL STATE OF HARMONY.

THIS SCHOOL OF THOUGHT EMPHASIZES UNILTERAL GESTURES OF CONCILIATION, SEEKS NEGOTIATIONS REGARDLESS OF SOVIET ACTS OF INTRANSIGENCE--AND SOMETIMES ESPECIALLY THEN. COMMUNISTS IN THEIR VIEW SHARE SOME SIMILAR OBJECTIVES; THIRD WORLD NATIONS--NO MATTER HOW RADICAL THEIR PROFESSIONS--WILL RALLY TO OUR STANDARD IF WE ONLY CLEANSE OURSELVES OF OUR PAST ERRORS.

THE OPPOSING SCHOOL OF THOUGHT TENDS TO TREAT FOREIGN POLICY AS A BRANCH OF THEOLOGY. COMMUNISM IS CONSUMMATE EVIL; THERE IS NO COMPROMISE WITH THE DEVIL. THE NEW NATIONS ARE EITHER ADVERSARIES OR COWARDS. IN THIS VIEW NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION ONLY CONFUSES THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND IS ITSELF A FORM OF MORAL DISARMAMENT. AND THE NEW NATIONS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH INDIFFERENCE UNTIL THEY RALLY TO OUR SIDE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS TO SOUND THE TRUMPET,

10

CONFRONT OUR ENEMIES--AND THE WALLS OF JERICHO PRESUMABLY
WILL CRUMBLE.

BOTH THESE STRAINS IN AMERICAN THINKING, OF COURSE,
SHARE SOME FEATURES IN COMMON. NEITHER IS COMFORTABLE
WITH THE NOTION OF A LONG-TERM STRUGGLE WITHOUT A FINAL
RESOLUTION; WITH A WORLD IN WHICH IDEALS CAN BE REALIZED,
AT ANY POINT IN TIME, ONLY IMPERFECTLY AND ALWAYS GRADUALLY.
AMERICANS ARE, IN SOME SENSE, IN A STATE OF PERMANENT
REBELLION AGAINST THE CONTEMPORARY REALITIES OF WORLD AFFAIRS.

SECONDLY, THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES ARE COMPOUNDED
BY THE INHERENT COMPLEXITY OF ASSESSING THE BALANCE OF
POWER IN THE MODERN PERIOD. HISTORICALLY, MILITARY, ECONOMIC,
AND POLITICAL POWER WERE ROUGHLY CONGRUENT. IN OUR TIME, *SOME COUNTRIES ARE STRONG MILITARILY BUT STAGNANT POLITICALLY, FOR EXAMPLE THE SOVIET UNION. SOME COUNTRIES, SUCH AS SEVERAL OIL PRODUCING STATES, ARE POWERFUL ECONOMICALLY BUT WEAK MILITARILY.*

11

SOME THIRD WORLD NATIONS HAVE AT TIMES HAD A POLITICAL
INFLUENCE OUT OF PROPORTION TO THEIR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
STRENGTH: INDIA IN THE FIFTIES AND EARLY SIXTIES IS A GOOD
EXAMPLE.

AND THE TIME SCALE FOR REDRESSING THE VARIOUS BALANCES
IS NOT IDENTICAL. RESTORATION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IS
OCCURRING MORE RAPIDLY THAN THE ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL ONE.
BUT SUCCESS IN ONE CATEGORY OF POWER DOES NOT GUARANTEE
SUCCESS IN OTHERS.

THESE TENSIONS PRODUCE A THIRD OBSTACLE TO A CONSISTENT
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: OUR TENDENCY TO DECIDE FOREIGN POLICY
ISSUES BY ANALOGY TO DOMESTIC DISPUTES. THIS CAUSES PROBLEMS
TO BE SEGMENTED INTO A SERIES OF INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS
RESOLVED BY COMPROMISES BETWEEN ADVERSARIAL POSITIONS.
IN DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, WHERE EACH ISSUE IS ESSENTIALLY
DISCRETE AND COMPLETED WITH THE PASSAGE OF A LAW, THIS
HAS PROVED QUITE EFFECTIVE--ESPECIALLY AS IN THE DEMOCRATIC

12

POLITICAL TRADITION, THE LOSER ACCEPTS HIS SETBACK WITH
GRACE (ALSO WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT HE HAS A CHANCE TO
RENEW THE BATTLE AND PERHAPS PREVAIL ON ANOTHER OCCASION).

BUT FOREIGN POLICY IS A SEAMLESS WEB. COMPROMISE BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHICAL POSITIONS MAY YIELD THE LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR,
NOT THE BEST CONCEIVED OUTCOME IN TERMS OF A COHERENT,
CONSISTENT LONG-TERM NATIONAL STRATEGY. THE CONTINUAL
RENEWAL OF OUR DOMESTIC DEBATE PRODUCES THE LACK OF
CONTINUITY ABOUT WHICH SOME OF OUR ALLIES ESPECIALLY HAVE
COMPLAINED. EACH NEW ADMINISTRATION SEEMS TO PRIDE ITSELF
ON REPUDIATING THE METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF ITS PREDECESSOR.

LEAVING ASIDE THE MERITS, SUCH A PRACTICE MAKES FOR NO LITTLE
UNCERTAINTY ON THE PART OF OTHER NATIONS. IT CAUSES
FRIENDLY NATIONS WHICH DEPEND ON US TO HEDGE THEIR BETS;
IT LEAVES ADVERSARIES CONFUSED.

FOR AMERICA, VIETNAM WAS THE CATHARSIS THAT TAUGHT US
OUR LIMITS; BUT REALITY WOULD HAVE IMPOSED ITSELF IN ANY EVENT.

13

THE TRAUMA OF HAVING TO COME TO GRIPS WITH A WORLD OF INCOMPLETE SOLUTIONS AND RELATIVE POWER IS THE MARK OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IN THE SEVENTIES. AND WE ARE EMERGING FROM IT CONSIDERABLY WISER. THE REFLEXIVE AVERSION TO THE BALANCE OF POWER HAS GIVEN WAY TO A RECOGNITION OF ITS ESSENTIALITY. THE PERIOD OF SELF-DOUBT HAS COME TO AN END. WHILE TACTICAL OSCILLATIONS CONTINUE, THE MAIN TREND OF THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY HAS WIDE SUPPORT.

BUT OUR FRIENDS MUST NEVER FORGET THE DUAL STRAINS OF AMERICAN POLICY AND THE POWERFUL IMPACT OF OUR HISTORICAL CONVICTIONS. WHATEVER THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOPOLITICS AND EQUILIBRIUM, HOWEVER SALIENT THEY MAY BECOME IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DELIBERATIONS, THE MORAL DIMENSION OF OUR NATIONAL TRADITION WILL NEVER DISAPPEAR. AT SOME POINT OUR FOREIGN POLICY WILL ALWAYS RETURN TO THE WELLSPRING OF AMERICA'S ASPIRATION TO PROMOTE JUSTICE, HUMAN DIGNITY, AND和平, AND IT WILL ALWAYS GIVE THESE TERMS A UNIVERSAL CAST.

14

THE TASK OF AMERICAN STATESMANSHIP IS TO COMBINE THESE
TWO STRANDS INTO A CONSISTENT, COHERENT, AND EFFECTIVE
FOREIGN POLICY.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS

WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, LET ME TURN TO THE EAST-WEST
CONFLICT. THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTS US WITH A MULTIFACETED
CHALLENGE: A SUPERPOWER MILITARILY, STAGNANT POLITICALLY,
IN A CRISIS ECONOMICALLY. THE SOVIET UNION IS CLEARLY
MILITARILY EXTREMELY POWERFUL. EVEN AS THE MORAL CLAIMS OF
ITS IDEOLOGY PROVE MORE AND MORE HOLLOW, THE SOVIET SYSTEM
IS GROWING IN MILITARY STRENGTH AND GEOPOLITICAL REACH.

HISTORICALLY, THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POWER USUALLY PRODUCED
A COALITION AGAINST IT, AND A NEW EQUILIBRIUM COULD BE
ACHIEVED ONLY AFTER A TEST OF STRENGTH. IN THE NUCLEAR AGE,
SUCH A WAR WOULD THREATEN GLOBAL CATACLYSM.

THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IS THEREFORE A TASK OF

15

UNPRECEDENTED COMPLEXITY. IT IS OBVIOUSLY THE DUTY OF THE WEST TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY BALANCE AND TO RESIST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. THE SOVIET UNION **MUST** LEARN--THROUGH THE WEST'S VIGILANT RESISTANCE--THAT ENCROACHMENTS ON THE GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM WILL NOT BE TOLERATED. IT CANNOT BE BEYOND THE WEST'S CAPABILITY--SUPERIOR AS WE ARE IN ECONOMIC STRENGTH--TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.

HOWEVER, A GREAT CHANGE HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE NATURE OF MILITARY POWER. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POWER IS NO ASSURANCE THAT CHALLENGES WILL BE DETERRED, OR COUNTERED, LOCALLY.

IN THE FIFTIES THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES RELIED ON THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENAL, SUBSTITUTING TECHNOLOGY FOR THE BURDEN OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENT. BUT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY BEGAN TO DISAPPEAR IN THE SIXTIES. TECHNOLOGY TENDED TOWARD EQUALITY, AND NUMBERS APPROACHED LEVELS BEYOND WHICH ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS OF DESTRUCTIVENESS LOST

16

ALL RELATIONSHIP TO THE OBJECTIVES LIKELY TO BE IN DISPUTE.

ARMS CONTROL THEORY AND PRACTICE, WITH THEIR FORMAL

EMPHASIS ON EQUALITY, **ONLY** ACCELERATED AND LEGITIMIZED

THIS TREND.

LOGICALLY, ONCE THE SOVIET UNION ACQUIRED THE CAPACITY
TO THREATEN THE UNITED STATES WITH DIRECT NUCLEAR
RETALIATION, THE AMERICAN PLEDGE TO LAUNCH AN ALL-OUT NUCLEAR
WAR ON BEHALF OF EUROPE WAS BOUND INCREASINGLY TO LOSE ITS
CREDIBILITY AND PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE--AND SO WOULD NATO'S
DEFENSE STRATEGY. FOR THAT STRATEGY NOW RESTED ON THE
THREAT TO INITIATE MUTUAL SUICIDE. BUT GOVERNMENTS WERE
RELUCTANT TO FACE THE FINANCIAL AND DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS
OF THE CONVENTIONAL-FORCE BUILDUP THAT WAS REQUIRED. THEY
CONTINUE D THE EXISTING STRATEGY, SEEKING TO COMPENSATE FOR
THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALL-OUT NUCLEAR DEFENSE
BY MORE EMPHATIC REITERATION OF IT.

THE LEGACY WE ARE LEFT WITH IS A PRECARIOUS COMBINATION

17

OF A RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE, TRENDS TOWARD NUCLEAR STALEMATE, GROWING NUCLEAR PACIFISM, AND CONTINUED DEFICIENCIES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. IF THE DEMOCRACIES ARE RELUCTANT TO RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND IF THEY CONTINUE TO EVADE THE NECESSITY OF BUILDING UP THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THEN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS LEFT WITH NO DEFENSE POLICY AT ALL, AND WE ARE RISKING THE COLLAPSE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE THAT HAS MADE POSSIBLE THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF WESTERN SECURITY, PROSPERITY, AND DEMOCRACY.

WE WILL IN EFFECT HAVE DISARMED OURSELVES UNILATERALLY WHILE SITTING ON THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE STOCKPILE OF WEAPONS THAT THE WORLD HAS SEEN.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE WEST FACES A PROFOUND MORAL AS WELL AS PRACTICAL CHALLENGE. THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR PRODUCE A FEELING OF REVULSION VERGING ON ABDICATION. YET IF IN THE DEMOCRACIES, AVOIDANCE OF WAR BECOMES THE SOLE OBJECTIVE OF FOREIGN POLICY, THE WORLD IS OPEN TO THE

18

DOMINATION OF THE MOST RUTHLESS. THE DEEPEST CHALLENGE
TO THE DEMOCRACIES IS TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSITION
 THAT PEACE MUST BE BASED ON FREEDOM AS WELL AS RESTRAINT;
THAT LEAVING THE WORLD TO THE TOTALITARIANS CAN PRODUCE
HORRORS EVEN GREATER THAN THE RISKS OF RESISTANCE: WITNESS
INDOCHINA.

THUS THE WEST, WHILE MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER,
MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE MORAL AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK THAT
GIVES IT MEANING. IT IS CLEAR THAT PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONS WILL NOT SUSTAIN A POLICY OF EQUILIBRIUM
WITHOUT A PARALLEL EFFORT TO END OR REDUCE CONFLICT.
ELECTORATES WILL NOT SUPPORT DEFENSE PROGRAMS OR A VIGOROUS
FOREIGN POLICY IF THEY IMAGINE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE THE
CAUSE OF TENSIONS OR IF SERIOUS EFFORTS ARE NOT BEING MADE TO
PUSH BACK THE SPECTER OF NUCLEAR WAR.

IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT ARMS CONTROL AND EFFORTS TO
REDUCE TENSIONS HAVE BEEN ON THE AGENDA OF US-SOVIET

19

RELATIONS FOR MOST OF THE LAST FIFTEEN YEARS. ARMS CONTROL IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A SECURE MILITARY BALANCE, BUT IT CAN BE A WAY OF MAINTAINING IT AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES OR OF REDUCING THE RISKS OF THE OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT BY MISCALCULATION OR PANIC. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS MADE FORTHCOMING PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS. HE HAS WISELY FOCUSED NOT ONLY ON REDUCING THE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT ON THOSE TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS THAT MOST POSE THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK OR FIRST STRIKE. AND HE HAS STRESSED AS WELL THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN SUPERPOWER CONDUCT.

THUS A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION MUST COMBINE POWER AND DIPLOMACY; BOTH RESISTANCE TO CHALLENGES AND A WILLINGNESS TO RESOLVE POLITICAL PROBLEMS THROUGH NEGOTIATION; BOTH DEFENSE OF WESTERN VALUES AND A RECOGNITION THAT WE ARE FORCED TO COEXIST ON THIS PLANET IN AN ERA OF THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS.

20

THIS BECOMES ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT, BECAUSE THE INHERENT INSTABILITIES OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL MAKE NEGOTIATIONS INEVITABLE SOONER OR LATER.

BOTH SIDES IN THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION ARE BETTING ON HISTORY. AND ONE OF THE IRONIES OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD IS THE EXTRAORDINARY STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS THAT IS NOW SEEN TO LIE BENEATH THE IMPRESSIVE SURFACE OF SOVIET POWER.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS A VAST CUMBERSOME MACHINE BURDENED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE BOTTLENECKS, PERVASIVE INEFFICIENCY, AND A LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE THAT TENDS TOWARD STAGNATION. IT SEEMS TO REQUIRE A BLACK MARKET, THAT IS, A SECRET FREE MARKET, TO FUNCTION AT ALL. THE DILEMMA OF COMMUNISM IS THAT IT SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE TO RUN A MODERN ECONOMY BY A SYSTEM OF TOTAL PLANNING; YET IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN A COMMUNIST STATE WITHOUT A SYSTEM OF TOTAL PLANNING.

IN THE 65-YEAR HISTORY OF THE SOVIET STATE, IT HAS NEVER MANAGED A LEGITIMATE, REGULAR SUCCESSION OF POLITICAL

21

LEADERSHIP. THE SYSTEM HAS FAILED TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH
THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE INTELLECTUAL AND MANAGERIAL ELITE
THAT INDUSTRIALIZATION INEVITABLY SPAWNS; INSTEAD THE
SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA IS A CYNICAL, CAREERIST "NEW CLASS"
CORRUPTED BY PRIVILEGE, ITS CREATIVITY STIFLED BY HEAVY-HANDED
POLITICAL RIGIDITY. AND THE SYSTEM HAS YET TO COPE WITH THE
REALITY OF ITS GROWING NON-RUSSIAN POPULATION, SOON TO BE A
LOOMING MAJORITY, WITH THE SEVERE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
TENSIONS THIS WILL ENTAIL.

FINALLY, IN EVERY COMMUNIST STATE--IT IS ALMOST AN
HISTORIC JOKE--THE ULTIMATE SYSTEMIC CRISIS, LATENT IF NOT
EVIDENT, IS OVER THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. WHAT IS
THE FUNCTION OF A COMMUNIST PARTY ONCE IT IS ENTRENCHED
IN POWER? IT IS NOT NEEDED TO RUN THE GOVERNMENT, OR THE
ECONOMY, OR THE MILITARY. IT IS THE GUARDIAN OF AN
IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY THAT HAS LONG SINCE LOST ITS MOTIVATING
APPEAL. THE PARTY'S FUNCTIONARIES SPECIALIZE IN DEALING WITH
INTERNAL CRISES WHICH THEIR CENTRALIZED SYSTEM HAS CREATED

22

AND EXTERNAL CRISES INTO WHICH THEIR AMBITIONS TEMPT THEM.

IN POLAND, THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS NEARLY SWEPT AWAY BECAUSE
OF ITS IRRELEVANCE, IMPOTENCE, AND TOTAL REPUDIATION
BY THE POLISH WORKERS IN WHOSE NAME IT CLAIMED TO RULE.

IT IS ANOTHER HISTORIC JOKE THAT THE ONLY SPONTANEOUS
REVOLUTIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN AGAINST
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS. THE PARTY'S REPLACEMENT BY MILITARY
RULE COULD BE A PRECEDENT FOR THE FUTURE OF OTHER COMMUNIST
SOCIETIES.

AND WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF THAT PROCESS OF
TRANSFORMATION. IF MOSCOW IS PREVENTED BY A FIRM WESTERN
POLICY FROM DEFLECTING ITS INTERNAL TENSIONS INTO
INTERNATIONAL CRISES, IT IS LIKELY TO FIND ONLY DISILLUSIONMENT
IN THE BOAST THAT HISTORY IS ON ITS SIDE.

THEN THE TIME FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON A BROAD
FRONT WILL HAVE ARRIVED. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MUST
CONVEY NOW THAT THEY STAND READY TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY,

23

AND THAT THEY WILL RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS
OF A SOVIET UNION CONDUCTING THE POLICIES OF A NATIONAL
STATE AND NOT OF A REVOLUTIONARY POWER SEEKING TO
OVERTHROW OR SUBVERT THE EXISTING ORDER. BUT DIPLOMACY
TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION IS AT THE CORE OF SOME CURRENT
DISPUTES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES.

AMERICA AND EUROPE

RELATIONS BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE HAVE UNDERGONE
MANY PERIODS OF STRESS IN THE PAST GENERATION. TO A SIGNIFICANT
DEGREE, THIS IS THE RESULT OF ONE OF THE GREAT SUCCESSES
OF AMERICAN POLICY: OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY
OF EUROPE AND JAPAN, AND FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. TO SOME
EXTENT, AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS WERE EXUBERANT AND: PERHAPS
SOMEWHAT NAIVE. IT WAS THOUGHT BY SOME OF THE SPONSORS OF
EUROPEAN UNITY THAT A REVIVED AND UNIFIED EUROPE WOULD SHARE
OUR BURDENS AND CONTINUE TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD; IT WAS NOT
CONSIDERED THAT A STRONGER EUROPE WOULD INEVITABLY assert

24

ITS OWN IDENTITY AND ROLE. HENCE THE OCCASIONALLY PETULANT REACTION. IN FACT, A STRONGER, UNIFIED EUROPE IS IN AMERICA'S INTEREST EVEN IF ITS PERCEPTIONS AT TIMES DIFFER FROM OURS.

IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES HAVE ARISEN OVER AN EXORBITANT NUMBER OF ISSUES. SOME DIFFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVE IS, OF COURSE, INEVITABLE IN ANY COALITION OF SOVEREIGN STATES. BUT TODAY THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS AT ODDS OVER CENTRAL ISSUES OF EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, THE MIDDLE EAST, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD. INDEED, IT IS HARD TO FIND AN IMPORTANT ISSUE ON WHICH THE ALLIES ARE UNITED. SOONER OR LATER SUCH DIVISIONS _MUST_ AFFECT THE FIELD OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AS WELL. FOR TOO LONG THE ALLIES HAVE EVADED UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTIONS THAT DIVIDED US; OUR EVASIONS ARE NOW COMING HOME TO ROOST.

25

IN TOO MANY NATO COUNTRIES, THE IMPRESSION IS CREATED THAT IT IS AMERICA'S ATTEMPT TO RESTORE THE MILITARY BALANCE WHICH THREATENS THE PEACE AND MUST BE RESISTED. LITTLE ATTENTION IS PAID TO THE COLOSSAL SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OR TO A WHOLE SERIES OF AGGRESSIVE SOVIET ACTIONS, FROM THE DISPATCH OF CUBAN TROOPS TO AFRICA THROUGH THE OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE REPRESSION OF FREEDOM IN POLAND, WHICH THREATEN THE GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM.

EVEN LESS ATTENTION IS PAID TO SOME BASIC FACTS OF POSTWAR HISTORY: THAT BUT FOR STALIN'S PRESSURES IN THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD AMERICAN TROOPS WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE IN THE FORTIES, AS INDEED THEY WERE FROM KOREA: THAT BUT FOR THE KOREAN WAR THE US MILITARY BUDGET WOULD HAVE SHRUNK TO DERISORY LEVELS; THAT IT WAS THE THREAT TO THE FREEDOM OF BERLIN IN THE LATE FIFTIES WHICH ACCELERATED THE AMERICAN MILITARY BUILDUP; THAT FOR

26

A VARIETY OF REASONS THE UNITED STATES STOPPED EXPANDING ITS STRATEGIC ARSENAL IN THE LATE SIXTIES AND SLOWED ITS MODERNIZATION FOR THE BETTER PART OF THE SEVENTIES; AND THAT _ALL_ WARS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD HAVE BROKEN OUT WHERE THERE WERE _NO_ AMERICAN FORCES AND _NO_ NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHILE EUROPE UNDER AMERICAN NUCLEAR PROTECTION HAS ENJOYED THE LONGEST PERIOD OF PEACE IN ITS HISTORY.

THE CLAMOR IN MUCH OF THE WEST IS THEREFORE ADDRESSED TO THE WRONG GOVERNMENTS. UNMATCHED AS IT IS BY COMPARABLE AGITATION IN THE EAST, IT POSES THE DANGER THAT A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMBALANCE, INDEED A FORM OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT, WILL COMPOUND THE REGIONAL MILITARY IMBALANCES WHICH HAVE ALREADY PRODUCED SUCH A SENSE OF INSECURITY IN ALMOST ALL COUNTRIES AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

BUT THE BASIC PROBLEM WITHIN THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT DERIVE FROM PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS; IT RESIDES IN THE ATTITUDES OF GOVERNMENTS. THREE MAJOR DIFFERENCES HAVE

27

ARISEN: OVER MILITARY STRATEGY AND ITS COROLLARY OF ARMS CONTROL, OVER THE NATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND OVER EAST-WEST TRADE.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE HAS AFFECTED EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS ACUTELY. SO LONG AS AMERICA POSSESSED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY, THE AGREED STRATEGY RELYING ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE COINCIDED WITH THE DETERMINATION TO BANISH WAR FROM EUROPEAN TERRITORY. BUT THE GROWTH OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR STOCKPILE PUTS A PREMIUM ON THE WEST'S CAPACITY FOR LOCAL, CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE.

MANY IN EUROPE RECOIL BEFORE THAT PROSPECT, AND NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC BURDEN INVOLVED. THEY SHY AWAY FROM BUILDING A CREDIBLE EUROPEAN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE FOR FEAR THAT AMERICAN TROOPS WILL FEEL FREE TO GO HOME, AND THEY SHY AWAY FROM ANY SERIOUS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY FOR FEAR THAT IT WILL WEAKEN THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO RESORT TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RETALIATION. YET EVASION OF CONVENTIONAL

28

DEFENSE IN THE LONGER TERM ONLY MAKES THE CURRENT AMERICAN
DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE UNTENABLE. TOO STRONG FOR A TRIP
WIRE, TOO WEAK FOR LOCAL RESISTANCE, THE CURRENT NATO
MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT PERSISTS IN A NEVER-NEVER LAND WHICH
ENCOURAGES PUBLIC ESCAPISM AND INTER-ALLIED QUARRELS OVER
SECURITY.

SOME ALLIES SEEK IN ARMS CONTROL AN ESCAPE FROM THIS
DILEMMA. BUT ARMS CONTROL CAN STABILIZE OR REDUCE ONLY
THOSE ARMAMENTS WHICH EXIST; IT CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR AN
ADEQUATE DEFENSE POLICY. IF USED TO EVADE COMPLEX CHOICES,
IT CAN HAVE A DOUBLY HARMFUL IMPACT: FREEZING AN
UNTENABLE STRATEGY WHILE CREATING THE ILLUSION OF POLITICAL
PROGRESS. THE ALLIANCE MUST AGREE ON A COHERENT STRATEGY
IF IT IS TO GIVE MEANING TO ITS DEFENSE POLICY AND DIRECTION
TO EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMS.

THE SECOND PROBLEM CONCERNS EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN
GENERAL. THE MYTH HAS DEVELOPED IN MANY QUARTERS IN

29

EUROPE THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IS NEEDLESSLY
CONFRONTATIONAL, TOO OBSESSED WITH THE MILITARY BALANCE,
AND TOO LITTLE INTERESTED IN DETENTE. IT IS AN INTERESTING
AND IRONIC REVERSAL OF HISTORICAL ROLES. IN THE CLOSING
YEARS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES OF PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN AMERICA AND BRITAIN. MANY
AMERICANS THOUGHT CHURCHILL NEEDLESSLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE
POSTWAR BALANCE OF POWER, TOO RIGIDLY ANTI-SOVIET, TOO
"COLONIALIST" IN HIS ATTITUDE TO WHAT IS NOW CALLED THE
THIRD WORLD, AND TOO LITTLE DEDICATED TO BUILDING THE
FUNDAMENTALLY NEW, PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL ORDER TOWARD WHICH
AMERICAN IDEALISM HAS ALWAYS TENDED. CHURCHILL UNDOUBTEDLY
SAW THE AMERICANS AS NAIVE, MORALISTIC, EAGER TO EVADE
THE REALITIES OF SECURITY AND THEIR OWN SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR MAINTAINING THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER. WHILE THE
UNITED STATES HAS NEVER ABANDONED ITS EARLIER MORALISM, IT
HAS BEEN FORCED BY POSTWAR REALITIES TO DEAL, HOWEVER

30

RELUCTANTLY, WITH THE PROBLEMS OF EQUILIBRIUM. CONCURRENTLY,
MANY IN EUROPE SEEM PARADOXICALLY TO HAVE MOVED TO THE
POSITIONS THAT AMERICA VACATED AND TO HAVE ADOPTED SOME
OF THE ILLUSIONS TO WHICH AMERICANS CLUNG IN YEARS OF
ISOLATION FROM GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY.

WHETHER THE US GOVERNMENT'S TACTICAL JUDGMENTS ARE
ALWAYS CORRECT NEED NOT BE DEBATED IN THIS FORUM. BUT, IN
MY VIEW, AMERICA'S INSISTENCE THAT TRUE DETENTE BE BASED ON
MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF POWER IS CORRECT; I BELIEVE THAT
ANY ATTEMPT TO BASE EAST-WEST RELATIONS ON GENERAL GOODWILL
OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS IS DOOMED. THE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE
HAS NOT BEEN AMERICAN RHETORIC--EVEN IN ITS MOST EXUBERANT
VERSIONS--BUT THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND THE SOVIET
GEOPOLITICAL OFFENSIVE FROM ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA, SOUTH YEMEN
AND AFGHANISTAN, TO THE CRACKDOWN IN POLAND, AND THE
SOVIET UNION'S CONTINUING SUPPORT TO VARIOUS TERRORIST
SUBVERSIVE GROUPS AROUND THE WORLD. OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT

31

TO PROMOTE CONFLICT, BUT TO BRING AN END TO SOVIET
ASSAULTS ON THE GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM THROUGH A SUBSTANTIAL
REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES AND A CODE OF RESTRAINED
INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT.

AS I HAVE SUGGESTED, I EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEM
WILL HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ITS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
STRESSES, AT THAT POINT A MAJOR RESPONSIBLE NEGOTIATION
CAN AND MUST TAKE PLACE. BUT SUCH A NEGOTIATION CAN
SUCCEED ONLY IF THE WEST DOES NOT GIVE UP ITS ASSETS
UNILATERALLY AHEAD OF TIME.

THIS IS AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE OVER EAST-WEST TRADE,
OF WHICH THE RECENT EUROPEAN UPROAR OVER PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
DECISION TO BLOCK CONSTRUCTION OF THE SIBERIAN NATURAL GAS
PIPELINE IS SYMPTOMATIC.

THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM CAN BE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
THEORETICALLY, TRADE REFLECTS THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH
PARTIES. BUT EAST-WEST TRADE IS DISTORTED BY TWO FACTORS:

32

BY ANY OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SATELLITES ARE INFINITELY MORE DEPENDENT ON EAST-WEST TRADE THAN THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES. THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT FEED ITSELF WITHOUT THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD'S GRAIN; IT CANNOT DEVELOP WITHOUT WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL.

THE TYPICAL WESTERN PRODUCT: FOR SALE IN THE EAST CONTAINS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, HENCE NEW IDEAS; WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS TO OFFER IN RETURN IS RAW MATERIALS--PRODUCTS WHICH CONTAIN NO CONCEPTUAL INPUT. THE INEQUALITY IN BENEFITS WOULD LONG SINCE HAVE REDUCED TRADE TO A TRICKLE HAD NOT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS STEPPED IN WITH DIRECT OR HIDDEN CREDITS, WHICH NOW AMOUNT TO NEARLY $90 BILLION FOR THE COMMUNIST WORLD. IN ADDITION, MANY EXPORT PRICES ARE SUBSIDIZED BY WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY. THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES THUS ARE NOT ONLY GAINING A RELATIVE ADVANTAGE IN TRADE; THEY ARE BEING FINANCED BY THE NATIONS AGAINST WHOM THEY ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTING A

33

GEOPOLITICAL OFFENSIVE. LENIN'S DICTUM THAT CAPITALISTS
WOULD COMPETE TO SELL THE ROPE WITH WHICH THEY ARE TO
BE HANGED IS COMING TRUE WITH A VENGEANCE--FOR LENIN NEVER
GUESSED THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD PROVIDE THE MONEY
TO BUY THE ROPE AND SUBSIDIZE THE PRICE TO FACILITATE THE
PURCHASE.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE ISSUES RAISED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN
WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET PIPELINE ARE CENTRAL-- IF THE
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES SUBSIDIZE EXPORTS AND CREDITS AND
PROVIDE LARGE FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNINGS TO THE SOVIET UNION
DURING A PERIOD OF A SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP, PROXY FORCES
IN AFRICA, BRUTAL PRESSURE ON POLAND, AND OCCUPATION OF
AFGHANISTAN, WHAT POSSIBLE INCENTIVE CAN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
HAVE FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS I OUTLINED EARLIER?

TRADE JUSTIFIED BY COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS IS ONE
THING--THOUGH EVEN THERE I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN TOO PROFLIGATE IN THE USE OF ITS

34

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES. BUT SUBSIDIES OR CONCESSIONARY CREDITS OR BARGAIN PRICES DETERMINED BY OTHER THAN STRICTLY COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD CERTAINLY BE MADE THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. SO FAR AS ONE CAN TELL, NO SERIOUS STUDY WAS MADE OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY FOR WESTERN EUROPE, SUCH AS THE LARGEST DEPOSITS OF NORWEGIAN NATURAL GAS. IF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES FEEL THE NECESSITY OF SUBSIDIZING THEIR EXPORTS BY EASY PRICING AND CREDIT POLICIES, THE CREATIVE AREA FOR SUCH EFFORTS IS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, PARTICULARLY IN THE MODERATE, MARKET-ORIENTED COUNTRIES, NOT IN THE SOVIET BLOC.

NOTHING IS MORE URGENT THAN THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES PURSUE A COMMON STRATEGY. THEY MUST DECIDE ON A UNITED APPROACH TO CREDIT, EXPORTS, AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SUPPLIES.

35

THE DEVELOPING NATIONS: AFRICA

THESE ISSUES MAY OR MAY NOT SEEM OF DIRECT INTEREST TO SOUTH AFRICA, BUT THEY DEFINE THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN VIEWS OF AFRICA AND OF YOUR OWN COUNTRY. AND THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON AFRICA IS PART OF AN OVER-ALL PERCEPTION OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NO DOUBT WILL ONE DAY BE SEEN AS ONE OF THE SEMINAL EVENTS IN WORLD HISTORY. IN 1945 THERE WERE SOME 50 SOVEREIGN STATES; AFTER A GENERATION OF DECOLONIZATION THE NUMBER HAD TRIPLED. NEVER BEFORE HAD FOREIGN POLICY TO BE CONDUCTED WITH SUCH A MULTIPLICITY OF STATES IN A WORLD

36

OF INSTANTANEOUS COMMUNICATION, SHADOWED BY THE
SPECTER OF NUCLEAR WAR AND UNDER THE PRESSURES OF A
COMPLEX ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE. FOR WHILE THE
DEVELOPING NATIONS COULD NOT HOPE TO ACHIEVE THEIR
AIMS WITHOUT THE AID OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATES,
THE LATTER IN TURN COULD NOT SUSTAIN THEIR PROSPERITY
WITHOUT AN ASSURED SUPPLY OF ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS
AT A FAIR PRICE.

MUTUAL NEED DID NOT NECESSARILY--OR AT LEAST IMMEDIATELY--
PRODUCE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OR EVEN SERIOUS DIALOGUE.
A VAST PHILOSOPHICAL GAP SEPARATED THE TWO SIDES. MANY IN

37

THE WEST SAW IN THE NEW NATIONS A REPLICA OF THEIR OWN
CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION; ON THE CONTRARY, THE NEW
STATES WERE QUITE OFTEN IN ACTIVE REBELLION AGAINST NOT ONLY
THE TUTELAGE BUT THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE COLONIAL
POWERS. THERE WAS THE NAIVE WESTERN ASSUMPTION THAT THE
CHALLENGE TO POLITICAL STABILITY WAS LARGELY ECONOMIC;
THAT ECONOMIC GROWTH WOULD MORE OR LESS AUTOMATICALLY
PRODUCE POLITICAL STABILITY. IN FACT, IN MANY COUNTRIES
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDERMINED THE TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS
OF POLITICAL ORDER. IRAN IS A GOOD EXAMPLE. THE SHAH--
FOR MANY YEARS HAILED AS A MODERNIZING SECULAR REFORMER--
WAS OVERTHROWN BY A COALITION OF FORCES THAT FELT THREATENED
BY SOCIAL PROGRESS, LED BY REACTIONARY MULLAHS WHO RESISTED
LAND REFORM, AND OBJECTED TO MASS EDUCATION, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, AND THE CULTURAL INFLUENCES OF THE MODERN WORLD,
FACING THE LOSS OF THEIR ESTATES AND BY LANDOWNERS SUBJECTED TO ESTATE DEPRIVATION AND
PROFESSIONALS THREATENED BY THE INFLATION INSEPARABLE

38

FROM INDUSTRIALIZATION. AND THE SAME PROCESS COULD REPEAT
ITSELF ELSEWHERE, UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCE.

The corollary is of course that economic and
social progress advance not buttressed by

corresponding political adjustments makes an explosion inevitable.

CHANGE

MANY NEW NATIONS, AFTER AN INITIAL FLIRTATION WITH
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, CHOSE SOME VERSION OF MARXISM
AS THEIR MODEL THEY DID SO IRONICALLY NOT BECAUSE OF THE
EFFICACY OF MARXIST ECONOMICS BUT RATHER BECAUSE ITS
POLITICAL THEORY PROVIDED A KIND OF ANSWER TO THE RIDDLE
OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY. MARXISM FURNISHED A JUSTIFICATION
FOR OLIGARCHIC AND OCCASIONALLY ONE-MAN RULE WITHOUT THE
INCONVENIENCE OF ELECTIONS. BUT IT BROUGHT WITH IT AS WELL
THE USUAL BAGGAGE OF MARXIST ECONOMIC PLANNING WITH THE
WELL KNOWN CONSEQUENCES OF STAGNATION, ADMINISTRATIVE
RIGIDITY, AND CORRUPTION.

FOR A WHILE, THESE MARXIST REGIMES SOUGHT TO USE THE
SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO EXACT BY POLITICAL
PRESSURE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE THAT THEIR

39

SYSTEM WASTED AND THEIR POLITICS MADE MEANINGLESS. THE SECRETARIAT OF THE SO-CALLED GROUP OF 77 FELL MORE OR LESS INTO THEIR HANDS. I ONCE REVIEWED THE DECLARATIONS OF THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCES IN THE LATE 1970'S AND I FOUND NOT A SINGLE STATEMENT OF APPROBATION FOR ANYTHING DONE BY THE UNITED STATES NOR ANY CRITICISM OF ACTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION. NOW IT IS STATISTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BE WRONG 100 PERCENT OF THE TIME AND FOR THE SOVIET UNION NEVER TO MAKE A MISTAKE. AND IT IS ABSURD FOR A GROUP TO CALL ITSELF "NON-ALIGNED" WHILE PROFESSING SUCH ONE-SIDED VIEWS.

SOMETHING DEEPER, MORE INTANGIBLE WAS INVOLVED. THERE EXISTED, TO BE SURE, A CERTAIN IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY FOR "SOCIALISM" WHICH CAME TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AN UNDERSTANDABLE RESENTMENT OF HISTORICAL COLONIALISM. MORE IMPORTANT WAS THE CONSCIOUSNESS THAT CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES INVOLVED NEXT TO NO RISK

40

WHILE THE PENALTIES FOR OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET UNION COULD BE SEVERE. THIS WAS ALL THE MORE TRUE BECAUSE MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND ALMOST ALL OF THOSE OF AFRICA, FACED EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE OF THE PROBLEM OF THEIR WESTERN COUNTERPARTS AT A COMPARABLE STAGE OF HISTORICAL EVOLUTION.

MOST WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE NATIONS BEFORE THEY FORMED STATES; IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, THE STATE OFTEN PRECEDED THE NATION. BOUNDARIES WERE FREQUENTLY ARTIFICIAL, REFLECTING THE CONVENIENCE AND TERRITORIAL COMPROMISES OF FORMER COLONIAL RULERS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE CONCEPT OF A LOYAL OPPOSITION-- THE ESSENCE OF MODERN DEMOCRACY--IS DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT, FOR REALITY SUPPORTS THE NATURAL TEMPTATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS TO CONSIDER AN ASSAULT ON THEIR PERSONAL POSITION AS A THREAT TO DOMESTIC COHESION. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AN OUTSIDE POWER KNOWN TO HAVE A CONSIDERABLE CAPACITY FOR SUBVERSION CAN GAIN A DISPROPORTIONATE INFLUENCE.

41

AND YET SOONER OR LATER REALITY WILL IMPOSE ITSELF.

THE SOVIET UNION CAN THREATEN SUBVERSION BUT OFFER NO USEFUL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. IT EXPORTS WEAPONS AND PROXY TROOPS BUT NO HOPE FOR ECONOMIC OR DIPLOMATIC PROGRESS.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE LEARNED TO RELY ON IT FOR NEITHER. THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT MAY AT LAST BEGIN TO LIVE UP TO ITS NAME. WE ARE THUS IN A POSITION TO THINK OF A SERIOUS AND REALISTIC ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE DEVELOPING NATIONS OF AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE BASED ON TRUE RECIPROCITY AND WITHOUT IDEOLOGICAL BLINDERS.

THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES SHOULD GOVERN THIS DIALOGUE:

AS A SUPERPOWER THE UNITED STATES HAS AN INTEREST-- TOGETHER WHERE POSSIBLE WITH ITS ALLIES--TO PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM EXPLOITING THE UNCERTAINTIES, DISLOCATIONS, AND OCCASIONAL TURMOIL OF THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT. AMERICANS ARE BEGINNING TO LEARN THAT THE DANGER OF SUBVERSION OR OF EXPLOITED LOCAL DISCONTENT MUST BE DEALT WITH IN A TIMEFRAME

42

MORE IMMEDIATE THAN EVEN THE BEST DESIGNED PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM. WE KNOW THAT ONCE SOVIET TOTALITARIANISM--OR ITS VARIOUS PROXY FORMS--IS ESTABLISHED, THE PROCESS IS VERY DIFFICULT TO REVERSE. INDEED UNDER THE BRESHNEV DOCTRINE THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMS THE RIGHT TO IMPOSE THIS IRREVERSIBILITY BY FORCE. FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ABDICATE ITS STRATEGIC INTERESTS EVEN WHEN IT IS LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH ALL LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WILL NOT FAIL TO RESPOND IF THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS PROXIES SEEK TO DOMINATE AREAS OF VITAL CONCERN TO US.

AT THE SAME TIME THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND AFRICA ESPECIALLY, SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED SIMPLY OR EVEN PRIMARILY AS AN ARENA OF SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION. FOR THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM THAT MOST OF ITS MEMBERS WISH TO MAINTAIN. NO INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN SURVIVE UNLESS THE MORE THAN 100

43

NEW AND DEVELOPING NATIONS BECOME SUPPORTING PARTICIPANTS IN IT. AND THEY WILL FEEL THAT ONLY IF THEY HAVE A STAKE BY SHARING IN THE FRUITS OF PROGRESS. THE TRUE CHALLENGE TO THE WEST IS NOT TO OUR ECONOMIC CAPACITY, BUT TO OUR POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING. WE SHOULD NOT LET OURSELVES BE BLACKMAILED; BUT WE CANNOT MAKE OUR CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE UNLESS WE HELP FULFILL THE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD. IN A BROAD SENSE, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF AMERICA'S STRATEGIC INTEREST IN A STABLE AND PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL ORDER.

THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE HAVE IMPROVED CONSIDERABLY IN RECENT YEARS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA, NEED NOT LISTEN TO WESTERN PREACHMENTS ABOUT THE HOPELESSNESS OF THE MARXIST SYSTEM: ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS SURVEY THE RESULTS OF AFRICAN EXPERIMENTS WITH IT. IN CASE AFTER CASE, SOCIALIST MODELS HAVE BROUGHT

44

NEAR-BANKRUPTCY TO COUNTRIES RICHLY ENDOWED WITH NATURAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES AND VAST POTENTIAL. THIS NEED NOT CONTINUE TO BE SO, BUT TO REVERSE THE TREND TOWARD STAGNATION AND DECAY WILL REQUIRE A NEW LOOK AT REALITY.

IT IS ALSO BECOMING CLEAR THAT TACTICS OF CONFRONTATION
*in Africa*
ARE SELF-DEFEATING. DEVELOPING NATIONS ARE INCREASINGLY
LEARNING THAT IF THEY RELY ON SOVIET OR PROXY FORCES THEY
WILL MORTGAGE THEIR *independence* AND MORE AND MORE
MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED GROUPING ARE COMING
TO THE REALIZATION THAT THEY MUST FIND SOME RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THEIR POLITICAL RHETORIC AND THEIR ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS. THEY ARE SOVEREIGN STATES; THEY HAVE A
RIGHT TO WHATEVER DOMESTIC SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY THEY
CHOOSE. BUT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE ALSO SOVEREIGN,
AND HAVE A RIGHT TO GIVE ASSISTANCE TO OUR *rather than congenital* FRIENDS, *NOR*
WE
*SHOULD THEY BE TOLD BY THIRD* *PREFERENTIAL PARTIES WHO*
*DUE* THEIR FRIENDS *MIGHT BE*. WE HAVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND

45

MORAL REASONS TO GIVE AID, BUT THIRD WORLD NATIONS CANNOT EXPECT BOTH TO CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES CONSISTENTLY HOSTILE TO US AND TO RECEIVE OUR ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THEY WILL HAVE TO DECIDE.

FINALLY, IN A PERIOD OF AUSTERITY IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, OFFICIAL AID BUDGETS ARE NOT GOING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WILL HAVE TO ADJUST TO THE REALITY THAT FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IS THE MOST PROMISING SOURCE OF DEVELOPMENT CAPITAL. AND THEY WILL HAVE TO REFLECT ABOUT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO ATTRACT SUCH CAPITAL.

AS FOR THE UNITED STATES, THERE IS EVERY REASON TO HOPE THAT WE HAVE TRANSCENDED OUR TRADITIONAL OSCILLATION BETWEEN CONSIDERING THE DEVELOPING NATIONS SIMPLY AS COLD-WAR PAWS AND THE SENTIMENTALITY OF SEEKING TO WIN OVER RADICALS BY PRETENDING TO SHARE THEIR SLOGANS. REVOLUTIONARIES WILL NOT BE CHARMED OUT OF THE CONVICTIONS OF A LIFETIME

46

BY INVOCATIONS OF ABSTRACT GOODWILL. THE UNITED STATES
IS AT ~~LAST~~ PREPARED FOR A MATURE PARTNERSHIP BASED ON
MUTUALLY REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS. WE MUST FIND THE MEANS
BOTH TO HELP THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TOWARD SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TO EXPAND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
WHICH IS THE KEY TO THE WELLBEING OF ALL SOCIETIES. ON
THIS BASIS THERE IS AN UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR A NEW
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP.

## SOUTH AFRICA

AND SO I COME AT LAST TO MY HOST COUNTRY, THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA. I AM NOT HERE WITH A BLUEPRINT OF HOW TO
SOLVE PROBLEMS THAT THE CENTURIES HAVE SPAWNED AND DECADES
HAVE MADE INTRACTABLE. I WANT TO DESCRIBE HOW YOUR COUNTRY'S
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION APPEARS TO A WELL-DISPOSED OUTSIDER.
THERE SEEM TO ME TO BE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES.

FIRST: IN TERMS OF RESOURCES AND TECHNICAL SKILL,
SOUTH AFRICA IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO PROMOTE THE

47

CONSTRUCTIVE EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS OF THE CONTINENT.

THERE WOULD BE EXTRAORDINARY PROSPECTS WERE SOUTH AFRICA
ABLE TO ACHIEVE AN ACCOMMODATION WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

SECOND: BLACK AFRICA HAS AN IMMENSE STAKE IN THE
SHARED ENTERPRISE OF BUILDING SECURITY AND PROSPERITY
IN AFRICA: THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS
WITH ITS NEIGHBOR TO THE SOUTH SHOULD BE CLEAR. BLACK
AFRICA PAYS AN ENORMOUS PRICE, MOREOVER, WHEN ITS COUNTRIES
ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE OCCUPIED BY TENS OF THOUSANDS OF
NON-AFRICAN COMBAT TROOPS--IRRESPECTIVE OF THE PRETEXT
FOR THEIR BEING THERE. THERE IS NO PROFIT FOR AFRICANS IF
THE CONTINENT REMAINS A BATTLEGROUND FOR SUPERPOWER
CONTENTION IN ITS CRUDEST FORM. THOSE IN MOSCOW AND HAVANA
WHO SEEK TO PERPETUATE THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN
AFRICA DO NOT HAVE AFRICA'S INTERESTS IN MIND; THEY
UNDOUBTEDLY PREFER THE PERPETUATION OF TENSIONS AND SEEK TO
PREVENT CONDITIONS OF COOPERATION AND MUTUAL SECURITY AMONG

48

THE NATIONS OF THE CONTINENT.

ALL AFRICAN STATES NEED TO FACE UP TO THIS TRUTH. A BETTER ALTERNATIVE IS AVAILABLE.

THIRD: SOUTH AFRICA IS OF THE GREATEST STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD, NOT ONLY GEOGRAPHICALLY BUT IN TERMS OF RESOURCES, SOME OF THEM NEARLY IRREPLACABLE ELSEWHERE.

FOURTH: HOWEVER, THIS LAST REALITY HAS ONE POWERFUL LIMITING CONDITION. EVEN THE BEST-DISPOSED AMERICANS ARE BOUND BY THEIR COUNTRY'S DEEPLY HELD IDEALS OF LIBERTY. SOUTH AFRICANS MUST NOT DECEIVE THEMSELVES WITH COMFORTING THOUGHTS ABOUT STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCES, INTO BELIEVING THAT SEVERE MORAL AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WILL NOT OVERRIDE THEM. NOR CAN EVEN THE MOST GEOPOLITICALLY-ORIENTED AMERICAN STATESMEN FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ASPIRATIONS AND CONVICTIONS OF THE PREPONDERANT MAJORITY OF THIS CONTINENT, AS THEY HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED UPON ME IN RECENT DAYS IN ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE.

49

SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE A RIGHT TO ASK FOR SOME PATIENCE
WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIAL COMPLEXITIES OF THEIR SITUATION.
BUT THAT TIME IS NOT UNLIMITED. THOSE WHO WISH SOUTH AFRICA
WELL, AND WOULD LIKE IT TO TAKE ITS FULL PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH YOU
ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL PLANE AS LONG AS THE SYSTEM OF

INSTITUTIONALIZED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION CONTINUES. THE PRESENT
POLICY WILL NOT PROVIDE THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF POWER SHARING, EITHER IN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS
OR HOMELAND POLICY. WHETHER A MORE EQUITABLE FORM OF
FEDERALISM OR CONFEDERALISM--OR SOME OTHER JUST POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS--CAN BE DEVISED DEPENDS ON SOUTH AFRICAN
of all the peoples of South Africa.
CREATIVITY AND DETERMINATION, I CAN ONLY SAY THAT A SYSTEM

WHICH RESPECTS HUMAN DIGNITY, EXTENDS DUE PROCESS, PROVIDES
FOR EQUAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PROTECTS THE PRINCIPLE OF
CITIZENSHIP WILL GARNER SYMPATHETIC OUTSIDE SUPPORT IN MANY QUARTERS.

THE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO EASE PETTY APARTHEID,
THE MEASURES TO BROADEN THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF COLOREDS and Indians

50

AND THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF BLACKS--AND THE SIGNS THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO THINK CREATIVELY AND PROMOTE CHANGE (AND PAYING A POLITICAL PRICE FOR IT)--THESE ARE NOTED, AND APPRECIATED. BUT YOUR FRIENDS WOULD RENDER YOU NO SERVICE IF THEY IMPLIED THAT THESE WERE ANYTHING BUT THE FIRST STEPS ON A LONG JOURNEY.

THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF BLACKS, MOREOVER, IMPLY THEIR OWN POLITICAL LOGIC. AS THE BLACK POPULATION RISES IN ITS SKILLS AND CAPABILITIES, IT WILL INCREASINGLY DEVELOP ITS OWN ARTICULATE LEADERSHIP AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF ITS CONDITION-- AND ITS POTENTIAL. THUS, AS SO OFTEN BEFORE IN HISTORY, THE MORE GENUINE THE MATERIAL PROGRESS BEING MADE BY THE BLACK COMMUNITY--THE MORE IT CREATES THE NEED FOR AN APPROPRIATE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK.

I DO NOT PRETEND TO KNOW THE DETAILS OF THE FINAL DESTINATION. TOO MANY OUTSIDERS HAVE OFFERED FACILE SLOGANS

5I

DRAWN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETIES AND
DIFFERENT HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. CLEARLY SOUTH AFRICA
WILL HAVE TO FIND ITS OWN PATH. BUT I HAVE FAITH IN THE
VISION AND COURAGE OF A PEOPLE THAT HAS SURVIVED THE
CENTURIES IN A DIFFICULT CONTINENT BY DEDICATION AND BRAVERY.
SOUTH AFRICA'S FRIENDS WOULD EAGERLY EXTEND SUPPORT TO ANY
CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION THAT EMBODY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF HUMAN DIGNITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND FULL CITIZENSHIP

THE BEST ADVICE A FRIEND CAN OFFER NOW IS TO PLEAD
URGENTLY FOR A HEROIC EFFORT TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO
DEVISE NEW STRUCTURES AND CONCEPTS COMPATIBLE WITH THE

FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF OTHER WESTERN SOCIETIES.

THE PERIOD BEFORE PRESSURES BECOME OVERWHELMING SHOULD
BE USED FOR AN ACT OF CONSTRUCTIVE STATESMANSHIP. THE
BEST WAY TO KEEP SOVIET INFLUENCE OUT OF THE REGION IS FIRST
TO AMELIORATE AND THEN TO DOMINATE THE CONDITIONS

52

WHICH FACILITATE ITS ENTRY.

IN THIS CONTEXT I MUST MENTION THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER
Namibia,
(SOUTH WEST AFRICA) WHICH HAVE NOW REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE.

THEY ARE AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP. IF THIS FESTERING PROBLEM
IS RESOLVED THERE IS A CHANCE FOR A PERIOD OF CALM AND RESTRAINT
WHICH COULD GIVE DIPLOMACY AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMELIORATE
THE TENSIONS ENCUMBERING SOUTHERN AFRICA'S FUTURE.

A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OFFERS HOPE OF CONTAINING OR
REDUCING THE SPIRAL OF CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE AND ESTABLISHING
A MORE SECURE FUTURE FOR ALL THE STATES OF THE REGION.

CLEARLY ENDING CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE REQUIRES THE
WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN COMBAT FORCES FROM ANGOLA.

I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SOUTHERN AFRICA IS HEADING FOR
FURTHER TRAGEDY, OR FOR A FUTURE OF PROGRESS AND
RECONCILIATION. I KNOW ONLY THAT THE HISTORY OF THE REMAINDER
OF THIS CENTURY WILL BE FULL OF DRAMATIC EVENTS, AND MUCH OF
THE HISTORY OF THAT PERIOD WILL BE MADE ON THIS CONTINENT.

53

YOUR BEAUTIFUL AND DRAMATIC COUNTRY WILL BE A MAJOR
ACTOR IN THE UNFOLDING DRAMA. YOUR FRIENDS CAN ONLY WISH
YOU WELL IN ANY EFFORTS TO PROVIDE THAT THE CONTINENT
ON WHICH YOU LIVE CAN BE A SHOWPLACE FOR THE PEACE OF THE
WORLD AND THE RECONCILIATION OF THE RACES.

8/24/82

DRAFT III

South Africa Speech

I am honored by the opportunity to address this
distinguished group in a country whose future evolution
is of great, perhaps decisive importance for the prospects
of a continent. And it is as well a daunting assignment.
For South Africa is geographically as far from America
as it is possible to be on this globe. Its problems reflect
a different evolution and its domestic structure a contrasting
set of values. At the same time South Africa has many
institutions that tie it to the Western world and its strategic
importance is undisputed. These factors produce an
inevitable ambivalence in America's attitude to your country--
a tug of war between geopolitical and philosophical
considerations. It is, as I shall point out later, in the
interest of freedom everywhere that this gap be narrowed
and ultimately eliminated.

2

But I have not come here to speak primarily about
the policies of your country. My assignment is to discuss
the approach to international relations of my own. I will
try to describe the international situation as it appears
from an American perspective. From the vantage point of
the United States, Africa and Southern Africa fit into a
larger picture of global concerns. I will try to trace
some of those broad concerns: the East-West confrontation;
relations between America and Western Europe; and problems
of the Third World generally. Then I will venture a few
words about the role that Africa and Southern Africa play
in this larger context.

## The American Perspective

The American perspective on world events has itself
undergone dramatic changes in the last generation.

Americans do not have a long experience with foreign
affairs. Our Founding Fathers were quite sophisticated

3

in manipulating the European balance of power to secure
independence. Since then, however, a century and a half
of isolation encouraged the illusion in America that we
did not really need a foreign policy--or rather, that foreign
involvement was purely a matter of choice for us: We could
involve ourselves, or not, as we preferred. It took two
world wars in this century to shatter this illusion, but
certain preconceptions lingered in the American psyche
for some decades afterward.

Americans in the isolationist period tended to look
down on what they considered the sordid power politics
of Europe. Our avoidance of such involvement appeared
to us as a virtue, as a sign of moral superiority. Since
1945, now that we are permanently active in world affairs,
we have had to face the facts of power. But we also tend
to hold ourselves--and our friends--to a high standard
of moral conduct as we see it. We fall short of it from

4

time to time but only at heavy cost; it causes us to
sacrifice the consensus needed to sustain a strong foreign
policy.

For a time after 1945, it seemed relatively easy to
equate power and morality--the secret American dream. The
Soviet Union appeared as an aggressor in the Nazi mold.
The United States represented the amazing figure of half
of the world's Gross National Product. We were so over-
whelmingly powerful that our allies tended to follow our
prescriptions; since we offered them military protection
and enormous economic aid, it was a relatively harmonious
partnership. Even the principal developing countries saw
in us the source of their economic development. All this
gave us a distorted picture of what foreign policy was
all about; it caused us to identify a fortunate and temporary
concatenation with a permanent state of affairs. The Marshall
Plan was in effect a projection of our domestic experience--

5

an overseas application of the New Deal, in which economic
progress brought with it political stability almost
automatically. And the West's security problem which prompted
the Truman Doctrine and the foundation of NATO, seemed
analogous to the problem of Hitler--that of unambiguous
aggression by organized units across recognized frontiers.

It was a creative and brilliantly successful period
of American foreign policy, yet never to be repeated. For
our world leadership then was grounded in an inherently
ephemeral set of conditions.

Not until the late 1960's and 70's did the United
States have to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations
in history have had to conduct it: as one country among
many, unable either to dominate the world or escape from
it; forced to seek by persuasion, accommodation, negotiation
what it could no longer achieve by unilateral fiat; obliged
to learn the traditional techniques of maneuver instead

6

of the frontal assault; required to be sensitive to marginal
shifts in the balance of power and aware of the inter-
connections between events; no longer able merely to overwhelm
problems with resources. Today, political, economic, and
military power are much more widely diffused--partly as
a result of the success of some of our policies such as
European and Japanese recovery. Today the United States
represents about 21 percent of world GNP--powerful but
no longer predominant.

We are therefore faced towards the rest of the world
with the requirements of the very balance of power which
we have deplored through the centuries. Our position is
now analogous on a global scale to that of Britain towards
Europe for the better part of three centuries. Britain
resisted the domination of Europe by a single power regardless
of its professions; Britain felt that its resources could
not match those of the Continent. A Europe united against

7

it would sooner or later be able to impose its will.

America's position towards the rest of the world is no different. If all the rest of the world fell under hostile control--directly or indirectly--we would be outmatched.

Maintaining the balance of power is not a favor we do others but an imperative of our survival.

This confronts us with three major difficulties. America is--as I have pointed out--reluctant to face the role of power, preferring to prevail by the purity of its maxims.

Americans also are uneasy with--indeed they resent--relative answers, which are the essence of a policy of equilibrium.

Throughout our history every problem we have recognized as such proved soluble--that is to say, we found a final answer--if only to overwhelm it with resources. A world in which the balance of power plays a crucial role is by definition somewhat relativistic--and hence elicits in Americans a sense of rebellion. Thus both ends of our

8

political spectrum tend to attack the foreign policy of
the United States which has dominated US foreign policy
for most of the postwar period on the ground that it offered
no final answers.

One extreme tends to view foreign policy as a branch
of psychiatry: The basic requirement of diplomacy, in
this view, is to generate goodwill. Adversaries are hostile
because they fear or resent us, because we have failed
to reassure them that our objectives can be harmonized
with theirs. Conflicts are an aberration from an otherwise
natural state of harmony. This school of thought emphasizes
unilateral measures of conciliation; seeks negotiations
regardless of Soviet acts of intransigence and sometimes
especially then. Communists in their view share some similar
objectives--Third World nations will rally to our standard
if we only identify with them.

9

The opposing school of thought sees foreign policy
as a branch of theology. Communism is consummate evil;
there is no compromise with the devil. The new nations
are either adversaries or cowards. Therefore negotiation
with the Soviet Union only confuses the American public
and is itself a form of moral disarmament. And the new
nations should be treated with indifference until they
rally to our side. What is needed is to sound the trumpet,
confront our enemies, ignore the uncommitted--and the walls
of Jericho presumably will crumble.

Both these strains in American thinking, of course,
share some features in common. Neither is comfortable
with long-term struggle without a final resolution; of
a world in which ideals can be realized, at any point in
time, only imperfectly and always gradually. Americans
are in some sense in a state of permanent rebellion against
the aspect of contingency in world affairs.

10

These tensions produce a third obstacle to a consistent American foreign policy: the tendency to decide foreign policy issues by analogy to domestic disputes. This causes problems to be segmented into a series of individual decisions resolved by compromises between adversarial positions which in turn are stated in absolute terms to nudge the final outcome as close to each side's preference as the pressure of advocacy permits. In domestic legislation, where each issue is essentially discrete and completed with the passage of the law, this has proved quite effective--especially as in the American political tradition, the loser accepts his setback with grace (but also with the expectation to renew the battle at an early propitious moment). But foreign policy is a seamless web. Compromise between philosophical positions may yield the least common denominator, not the best conceived outcome in terms of national strategy.

11

The continuous renewal of the domestic debate leads to
the lack of continuity about which some of our allies
especially have complained. Each new Administration prides
itself on rejecting the methods and assumptions of its
predecessor. Leaving aside the merit of the position, it
makes for some uncertainty on the part of other nations
and produces a tendency by those that depend on us to hedge
their bets. It sometimes contributes to the confusion
of adversaries.

The difficulties are compounded by the complexity
of assessing the balance of power in the modern period.
Historically military, economic and political power were
congruent. In our time this is no longer necessarily
the case. Some countries are strong militarily but stagnant
politically, for example the Soviet Union. Some countries
such as several oil producing states are powerful economically
but weak militarily. Some third world nations have at

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12

times had a political influence out of proportion to their
military and economic strength; India in the Fifties and
early Sixties is a good example. And the time scale for
dealing with the various balances is not identical. Repairing
the military balance is occurring more rapidly than the
economic or political one. But success in one category
of power does not guarantee success in others; the problem
of synchronization of policy is thus a continuing challenge.

Vietnam was the catharsis that made these facts evident;
but reality would have imposed them in any event. The
trauma of having to come to grips with a world of contingent
solutions and relative power has marked the foreign policy
debate of America in the Seventies. And we have emerged
from it the stronger. The avoidance of the balance of
power has given way to a recognition of its essentiality.

The period of self-doubt has come to an end. While tactical
oscillations continue the main trend of the current foreign

13

policy has wide support. But our friends must never
forget the dual strain of American policy and the ultimate
impact of our domestic convictions. Whatever the importance
of geopolitics and equilibrium, however much it may become
an important factor in American foreign policy considerations,
the moral aspect of our national tradition will never disappear
completely. At some point our foreign policy will return
to the well spring of American motivations for justice,
human dignity and the quest for peace. The act of statesmanship
for America consists of combining these two strands.

US-Soviet Relations

With this as a background let me turn to the East-West conflict. The Soviet Union had presented us with a multifaceted challenge: a superpower militarily, stagnant politically, in a crisis economically. The Soviet Union is clearly a superpower militarily. Even as the moral claims of its ideology prove more and more hollow, the

14

Soviet system is growing in military strength and geopolitical reach. In the past, expansionist powers produced a coalition against them, and a new equilibrium could be achieved only after a test of strength. In the nuclear age, war threatens global cataclysm. The maintenance of peace is therefore both a moral as well as a political imperative.

This requires two seemingly contradictory courses. First of all, it is the duty of the West to maintain the military balance and resist Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union _must_ learn--through the West's vigilant resistance-- that encroachments on the global equilibrium cannot be tolerated. It cannot be beyond the West's capability-- superior as we are in economic strength--to accomplish this.

However, the same problem I mentioned earlier with respect to the various categories of power exists within

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15

the area of military power as well. Overall strength no longer guarantees power in specific circumstances. Strategic power is no assurance of the capacity to intervene locally.

In the Fifties the industrial democracies relied on the strategic nuclear arsenal substituting technology for numbers and sacrifice. They refused to face the fact that strategic nuclear weapons could continue to counter-balance local Soviet advantages only if the US strategic arsenal was clearly superior to that of the Soviet Union--superiority being defined as the ability to destroy the opposing nuclear capability at acceptable cost. That condition began to disappear in the Sixties. Technology tended toward equality, and to levels beyond which additional increments of destructiveness lose all relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute. Under current conditions superiority to be meaningful would require an edge so large that no opponent would tolerate it and calculations so esoteric

16

that few leaders will understand them or stake survival
on them. Arms control theory and practice, with their
formal emphasis on equality, only accelerated and legitimized
this trend.

Logically, once the Soviet Union acquired the capacity
to threaten the United States with direct nuclear retaliation,
the American pledge to launch an all-out nuclear war on
behalf of Europe was bound increasingly to lose its credibility
and public acceptance, if not its sense--and so would the
Alliance's defense strategy. For the strategy now rested
on the threat to initiate mutual suicide. But governments
continued the existing strategy, seeking to compensate
by emphatic reiterations of all-out nuclear defense for
the implausibility of their professions.

The legacy we are left with is a precarious combination
of a NATO reliance on nuclear defense, trends toward nuclear
stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism, and continued deficiencies

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17

in conventional forces. If we are reluctant to resort
to nuclear weapons, and if we continue to evade the necessity
for conventional forces, the Western Alliance is left with
no defense policy at all, and we are risking the collapse
of the military balance in Europe that has made possible
thirty-five years of European security, prosperity, and
democracy. We will in effect have disarmed ourselves uni-
laterally while sitting on the most destructive stockpile
of weapons that the world has seen.

In these circumstances the West faces a profound moral
as well as practical challenge. The risks of nuclear war
produce a feeling of revulsion verging on abdication. If
peace becomes the sole objective of foreign policy the
world is open to the domination of the most ruthless.
The deepest challenge to the industrial democracies is
to build support for the proposition that peace must be
based on justice as well as restraint; that leaving the

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18

world to the totalitarians can produce horrors even greater
than the risks of resistance--witness IndoChina.

Thus the West has two tasks: it must maintain the
balance of power in all its complexities. But maintaining
the balance of power is not enough. In the democratic
nations of the West--all of them--it is clear that the
public will not sustain a policy of confrontation without
some prospect of easing it. They will not support defense
programs or a vigorous foreign policy if they imagine that
their governments are the cause of tensions or if serious
efforts are not being made to reduce tensions and push
back the specter of nuclear war.

It is for this reason that arms control and efforts
to reduce tensions have been on the agenda of US-Soviet
relations for most of the last fifteen years. Arms control
is not a substitute for a secure military balance, but
it can be a way of maintaining it at lower levels of forces

19

or of reducing the risks of the outbreak of nuclear conflict
by miscalculation or panic. President Reagan has made
forthcoming proposals for strategic arms reductions. His
proposals have wisely focused not only on reducing the
numbers of nuclear weapons, but on those types and character-
istics of strategic weapons that most pose the danger of
surprise attack or first strike. And he has stressed as
well the need for restraint in superpower relations.

Thus a long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet
Union must combine power and diplomacy; both resistance
to challenges and a willingness to resolve political problems
through negotiation; both defense of Western values and
a recognition that we are doomed to coexist on this planet
in an era of thermonuclear weapons.

This becomes all the more important because the inherent
instabilities of the Soviet system will make negotiations
inevitable sooner or later. Both sides in the East-West

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confrontation are betting on history. One of the ironies
of the postwar period is the extraordinary structural weakness
that is now seen to lie beneath the impressive surface
of Soviet power. The Soviet economic system is glaringly weak;
its ideological appeal has faded; its political base and empire
are increasingly precarious. In the 65-year history of the
Soviet state, it has never managed a legitimate, regular
succession of leadership. The system has failed to deal
seriously with the aspirations of the intellectual and
managerial elite that industrialization inevitably spawns;
instead the Soviet intelligentsia is a cynical, careerist
"new class" corrupted by privilege, its creativity stifled by
heavy-handed political rigidity. And the system has yet to
cope with the looming reality of its growing non-Russian
population, soon a majority, with the severe social and
political tensions this will entail.

The Soviet economy is a vast cumbersome machine burdened
with administrative rigidity, pervasive inefficiency, and a
level of performance that tends toward stagnation. It seems

21

to require a black market, that is, a secret free market,
to function at all. But this only magnifies the classic
weakness of Communist economies: chronic shortages and
chronic surpluses existing side by side. The dilemma of
Communism is that it seems impossible to run a modern economy
by a system of total planning; yet it may not be possible to
maintain a Communist state *without* a system of total planning.

In every Communist state -- it is almost an historic
joke -- the ultimate systemic crisis, latent if not evident,
is over the role of the Communist party. What is the function
of a Communist Party once it is entrenched in power? It is
not needed to run the government, or the economy, or the
military. It is the guardian of a political legitimacy that
has long since lost its moral standing as well as its
revolutionary spirit. The Party functionaries specialize in
dealing with internal crises which their centralized system
has created and external crises into which their rigidity

22

tempts them. In Poland, the Communist Party was nearly swept away because of its irrelevance and impotence. Its moral bankruptcy was devastatingly revealed by the Polish working class which overwhelmingly repudiated it. It is another historic joke that the only spontaneous revolutions in industrialized countries have been against Communist governments.

And we are only at the beginning of that process of transformation. If Moscow is prevented by a firm Western policy from deflecting its internal tensions into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side.

Then the time for serious negotiations on a broad front will have arrived. The industrial democracies must convey now that they are ready for such a dialogue, that they are not seeking the collapse of the Soviet system but its self-restraint. But they must also husband their

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23

resources for that occasion and not piddle them away for
short-term benefits. This is at the core of some American-
European disputes.

Relations between America and Europe have undergone
many periods of stress in the past generation. To a significant
degree it is the result of one of the great successes of
American policy: our support for the economic recovery
of Europe and Japan, and for European integration. To
perhaps
some extent, American expectations were exuberant and/somewhat
naive. It was thought by the fathers of European unity
that a restored Europe would share our burdens and continue
to follow our lead. It was not considered that a stronger
Europe would inevitably assert its own identity and role.
Hence the occasionally petulant reaction. In fact a stronger
unified Europe is in America's interest even if its perceptions
at times differ from ours. A Europe asserting its own
identity should theoretically come to parallel conclusions

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as we on most issues of defense or international relations.

But such has not been the case. It would be idle to deny

that fundamental differences have arisen over an exorbitant

number of issues. Some difference of perspective is, of

course, inevitable in any coalition of sovereign states.

But today the Western Alliance is at odds over central

issues of East-West diplomacy, international economic policy,

the Middle East, Central America, and relations with the

Third World. Indeed, it is hard to find an important issue

on which the allies are united. Sooner or later such divisions

*must* affect the field of European security as well. For

too long the allies have evaded uncomfortable questions

that divided us; our evasions are now coming home to roost

in a public disenchantment with the main directions of

Alliance policy.

In too many NATO countries, protests and mass demonstra-
tions tend toward a unilateral psychological, and even
physical, disarmament. The impression is created that

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25

it is America's attempt to restore its military balance
which threatens the peace and which must be resisted.
Little attention is paid to a whole series of aggressive or
intransigent Soviet actions, from the dispatch of Cuban
troops to Africa through the occupation of Afghanistan
to the repression of freedom in Poland, which not only
threatened the global equilibrium but are the proximate
cause of the breakdown of strategic arms control negotiations
in the 1970s.

Even less attention is paid to some basic facts of
postwar history: that but for Soviet pressures in the
immediate postwar period American troops would have been
withdrawn from Europe in the Forties, as indeed they were
from Korea; that but for the Korean war the US military
budget would have shrunk to derisory levels; that it was
the threat to the freedom of Berlin in the late Fifties
which accelerated the American military build-up; that

26

the Soviet strategic arsenal has grown and been modernized relentlessly since the Cuban missile crisis twenty years ago; that for a variety of reasons the United States stopped its numerical build-up in the late Sixties and slowed its modernization for the better part of the Seventies; and that _all_ wars in the postwar period have occurred where there were _no_ American forces and _no_ nuclear weapons, while Europe under American nuclear protection has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its history.

For all these reasons, the clamor for peace in much of the West is in most respects addressed to the wrong governments. Unmatched as it is by comparable agitation in the East, it poses the danger that a psychological imbalance, indeed a form of unilateral disarmament, will compound the regional military imbalances which have already produced such a sense of insecurity in almost all countries around the periphery of the Soviet Union.