86

# MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL, FY 1971

## 1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

<table><tr><td>February 20, 1970</td><td>Defense Secretary Laird makes annual Defense Posture Statement to Congress. Administration request for defense procurement is $ 20,605,489,000.</td></tr><tr><td>April 24, 1970</td><td>House Armed Services Committee reports a bill recommending an authorization of $ 20,237,489,000.</td></tr><tr><td>May 6, 1970</td><td>House passes Military Procurement Authorization Bill at Committee-recommended level. The vote was 326-69.</td></tr><tr><td>July 14, 1970</td><td>Senate Armed Services Committee reports a bill recommending an authorization of $ 19,242,889,000.</td></tr><tr><td>September 1, 1970</td><td>Senate passes Military Procurement Authorization Bill at Committee-recommended level. The vote was 84-5.</td></tr><tr><td>September 26, 1970</td><td>Conference Report on Military Procurement Authorization Bill is filed with an authorization level of $ 19,929,089,000.</td></tr><tr><td>September 29, 1970</td><td>House approves Conference Report. The vote was 341-11.</td></tr><tr><td>October 1, 1970</td><td>Senate approves Conference Report. Voice Vote.</td></tr><tr><td>October 7, 1970</td><td>President signs bill. (P.L. 91-441)</td></tr></table>

## MAJOR PROVISIONS

As finally enacted, the FY71 Military Procurement Bill authorized $676.4 million less than the President had requested and approximately $781.4 million less than the FY70 authorization bill. It contained authorizations for such major programs as the Safeguard (ABM) system, the C-5A cargo plane, multiple warhead (MIRV) missiles, the F-14 and F-15 fighter planes, naval ships and submarines as well as continued operations in Southeast Asia.

Significantly, the major changes to the Administration-requested programs occurred in the Senate and House Armed Services Committees rather than during floor action. Among the most significant of committee changes were an additional $425 million over the Administration request for Naval shipbuilding added by the House Armed Services Committee and a cutback in the President's program for an expansion of the ABM system and authorization (by sale or transfer) of an unlimited amount of military equipment to Israel made by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The ABM restriction in effect rejected the President's request for initiation of a nationwide area ABM defense and limited ABM operations to defend Minuteman retaliatory missile sites.

88

- Prohibited the U.S. payment of special combat or overseas duty pay to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia which was higher than that received by U.S. servicemen for the same purpose, except where agreements had been entered into prior to July 1, 1970.

- Imposed a $2.8 billion ceiling on U.S. aid to the Vietnamese and to other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces and local forces in Laos and Thailand.

- authorized the additional $425 million for Naval shipbuilding.

- Limited the Safeguard ABM expansion to two sites defending Minuteman Missile batteries at Whiteman Air Force Base(Missouri) and Warren Air Force Base (Wyoming).

- Transferred $334 million in ABM construction funds which the House had included in the military construction authorization bill to the military procurement authorization bill. The Senate had considered all ABM funds in the procurement bill.

ground combat troops in Laos, Thailand or Cambodia without the prior consent of Congress except when the President deemed it necessary to protect U.S. troops in Vietnam and reported the action promptly to Congress. Teller, 171-144. Substitute subsequently failed with rejection of Reid amendment (below).

Ogden R. Reid (R N.Y.)—As amended by the Findley substitute (above). The original Reid amendment would have prohibited funds for the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. Voice teller, 32-221.

Moorhead—Delete $152 million for long-lead-time items on the CVAN-70 nuclear carrier. Voice.

William F. Ryan (D N.Y.)—Delete the authority for funds to support allied and local forces in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. Voice.

Charles W. Whalen Jr. (R Ohio)—Delete the $435 million added by the Committee for shipbuilding. Standing, 22-55.

Arnold Olsen (D Mont.)—Delete $101.7 million for the Navy and Marine S-3A aircraft. Voice.

91

As passed by the House, the bill authorized the following amounts for military procurement in FY 1971:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Request</th><th>Approved</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Procurement</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Aircraft:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>$ 296,900,000</td><td>$ 294,500,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy and Marine Corps</td><td>2,487,700,000</td><td>2,452,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force<sup>1</sup></td><td>3,374,300,000</td><td>3,314,900,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, aircraft</strong></td><td><u>6,158,900,000</u></td><td><u>6,061,600,000</u></td></tr><tr><td>Missiles:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>1,094,600,000</td><td>1,086,600,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>983,000,000</td><td>946,600,000</td></tr><tr><td>Marine Corps</td><td>27,600,000</td><td>27,600,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>1,544,600,000</td><td>1,505,300,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, missiles</strong></td><td><u>3,649,800,000</u></td><td><u>3,566,100,000</u></td></tr><tr><td>Naval vessels</td><td>2,728,900,000</td><td>3,013,900,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><tbody><tr><td><strong>Tracked combat vehicles:</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>$ 207,200,000</td><td>$ 206,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>Marine Corps</td><td>48,700,000</td><td>48,700,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, tracked vehicles</strong></td><td><u>255,900,000</u></td><td><u>254,900,000</u></td></tr><tr><td>Other weapons:<sup>1</sup></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>69,200,000</td><td>68,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>2,789,000</td><td>2,789,000</td></tr><tr><td>Marine Corps</td><td>4,400,000</td><td>-4,400,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, other weapons</strong></td><td><u>176,389,000</u></td><td><u>175,389,000</u></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, procurement</strong></td><td><u>12,869,889,000</u></td><td><u>12,971,889,000</u></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Research, development</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>1,735,900,000</td><td>1,647,900,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy and Marine Corps</td><td>2,212,300,000</td><td>2,197,300,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>2,927,700,000</td><td>2,909,700,000</td></tr><tr><td>Defense agencies</td><td>475,700,000</td><td>460,700,000</td></tr><tr><td>Emergency fund</td><td>50,000,000</td><td>50,000,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, research</strong></td><td><u>7,401,600,000</u></td><td><u>7,265,600,000</u></td></tr><tr><td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td><td><u>$20,271,489,000</u></td><td><u>$20,237,489,000</u></td></tr></tbody></table>

The bill also:

- Prohibited the use of funds in the bill for shipbuilding until after the National Security Council decided upon plans for the CVAN-70 nuclear carrier.

- Authorized the use of funds in the bill and other measures for the support of Vietnamese and other free world forces in South Vietnam and local forces in Laos and Thailand.

- Required that contracts for the DD-963 destroyer be granted to at least two U.S. shipyards.

92

# SENATE ACTION

## Senate Armed Services Committee

The Senate Armed Services Committee July 14, 1970 reported a bill authorizing $19.2 billion in defense procurement and research funds for FY71 - more than $1 billion less than the House-passed bill.

In addition to funding reductions, the Senate Committee also added legislative provisions not included in the House bill. Among these were a proviso that financial support of Vietnamese forces in Cambodian border areas not be intended to bolster the Cambodian Government, a restriction on ABM development, continuing restrictions on research programs and chemical-biological operations and an authorization of sale of jets to Israel. In making reductions, the Committee cut the House-added $435 million for shipbuilding, eliminated funds for a nuclear aircraft carrier, reduced the amount for the B-1 bomber and placed restrictions on spending for the C-5A and F-111 fighter.

A summary of Committee action on major weapons systems follows:

### PROCUREMENT

The Committee recommended a total of $11,892,389,000 for procurement, compared with the House authorization of $12,971,889,000 and an Administration request of $12,869,889,000.

### Aircraft

For the services' aircraft purchases, it recommended a total of $5,855,300,000 compared with the House's $6,061,600,000 and the requested $6,158,900,000. That included $292,100,000 for the Army, $2,337,700,000 for the Navy and Marine Corps and $3,225,500,000 for the Air Force.

**C-5A.** The Committee approved the entire amount requested on the grounds that to reduce the funds would actually increase the per-plane costs and because there seemed to be no other aircraft available to fulfill the C-5A role. But the panel added language requiring that before the Air Force spent a special $200-million fund set aside to finance added costs the Secretary of Defense had to explain the action to the Congressional Armed Services Committees. A similar proposal had been defeated on the House floor. The Committee also specified that the $200 million go specifically for the C-5A program and not for other company (Lockheed) operations.

**F-111.** The Committee approved the request for the F-111 on condition that prior to the spending of the funds the Secretary of Defense certify to Congress that tests assured that the aircraft was airworthy and structurally sound.

In other aircraft procurement programs, the Committee recommended that $79 million of the procurement request for the S-3A carrier antisubmarine aircraft be transferred to research and dropped the entire $30 million for the Free World Fighter program for export because the fiscal 1970 appropriations had not yet been obligated.

### Missiles

For the various missile programs, the Committee allocated $3,456,200,000, compared with the $3,566,100,000 passed by the House and the $3,649,800,000 requested by the Administration. The Committee recommendation included $1,031,600,000 for the Army, $932,400,000 for the Navy, $12,800,000 for the Marines and $1,479,400,000 for the Air Force.

**Safeguard.** The Committee action in limiting the Safeguard ABM program to a missile defense eliminated only $10 million from HR 17123. That amount had been requested by the Administration for early site surveys for five additional area defenses.

The Committee argued that the Chinese threat against which these ABM facilities would be designed was less urgent. But the Committee report registered full support for the Safeguard missile defense role. And it approved the portion of the President's request calling for an ABM site to protect missiles at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, and early work on a site at Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming.

The Committee continued to show particular interest in possible duplication or development problems connected with tactical missile programs. In this area, the Committee eliminated funds for the modification of the Air Force Falcon and cut funds for the Air Force short-range and Maverick missiles and the Navy Condor and Sparrow. The Committee did not go along with the House requirement that the Army conduct a competition between the TOW antitank missile and the Shillelagh missile.

### Naval Vessels

Although the Committee noted the need for substantial financing for ship modernization, it said the need for austerity justified the deletion of $435 million added to

93

## RESEARCH

the bill by the House Armed Services Committee for shipbuilding. The Committee denied the request of $152 million for a new nuclear carrier on grounds that the Executive Branch had yet to finish a study of the need for the carrier. And it eliminated House language requiring that the carrier study be completed before any shipbuilding funds were spent.

It deleted House language requiring that $600 million of the shipbuilding funds be spent in naval shipyards and requiring that the DD-963 destroyer contract be handled in at least two different yards.

### Tanks

The Committee recommended $182,200,000 for the Army tracked combat vehicle program, compared with the House total of $206,200,000 and the request of $207,200,000.

### Other Weapons

The Committee deleted $1 million from the request for other weapons in approving $74,389,000. It also deleted a House requirement that the Defense Department use at least three different production sources for the M-16 rifle.

The Committee recommended an authorization of $7,016,500,000 for research, development, testing and evaluation for all the services and defense agencies. The amount was $249,100,000 less than the amount approved by the House and $385,100,000 less than the Administration request. The reduction resulted from cuts totaling $464,100,000, partially offset by the transfer of $79 million from the procurement program for the S-3A aircraft.

Among the major research programs cut by the Committee were the Army Cheyenne helicopter ($17.6 million), the B-1 bomber ($50 million), the subsonic cruise armed decoy ($33.6 million), the Air Force SAM-D missile ($15 million), the Air Force advanced ballistic missile defense program ($20 million), the Navy Harpoon missile ($14 million), the Navy point defense system ($13.5 million), the Air Force short-range air-to-air missile ($29.2 million) and the Minuteman hard-silo program ($27 million).

The Committee decided to carry over 1969 language barring research that was unrelated to defense needs. And it reapproved language similar to a 1969 provision limiting the amount of contractor independent research financed by the Defense Department. Other restrictions continued a $45,000 ceiling on the salaries of employees of Government-sponsored research centers and created an intergovernmental group to study the application of military research to domestic civilian needs.

## Floor Action

The Senate on September 1, 1970, after over five weeks of debate, passed the FY71 Military Procurement Authorization Bill. The final vote was 84-5. Fourteen amendments were accepted and fifteen rejected.

The extended debate over the bill focused primarily on the Safeguard ABM system and its proposed expansion, the C-5A and the overall issue of cost overruns, and Administration policy in Southeast Asia and various proposals - most notably the McGovern-Hatfield amendment -- to restrict or limit U.S. operations in Indochina.

A summary of significant aspects and comments during the debate follows:

### July 24

The debate on HR 17123 opened with statements from Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D, Miss.) and several Committee members on the main contents of the bill, and from defense critic William Proxmire (D Wis.) challenging some of its provisions.

Stennis acknowledged that expenditures had to be restrained and said the Committee therefore had cut authorizations by more than 6 percent. But he added that in the face of the "grim fact of rapidly increasing Russian strategic forces" any further cuts could endanger national security.

Focusing on the Safeguard ABM system, Stennis noted the Committee's rejection of the President's proposed anti-Chinese ABM defense plan. To cut the ABM further or to block it entirely, he said, "would deny to our President the very item—the major item I believe—of the bargaining arrangement" at the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms negotiations under way in Vienna. The Safeguard ABM, he added, was the most effective defense of U.S. missiles.

Proxmire introduced the opposition arguments, saying the over-all $72-billion defense budget could be cut by about $10 million without harming national defense. Contrary to the impression created by the Administration and the Armed Services Committee, he said, the United States would continue to have a commanding lead in strategic forces and could trim its nuclear spending by $4 billion. Proxmire said that although the Administration had reduced defense strategy from the need to cope with two and a half wars simultaneously to a one-and-a-half-war strategy a commensurate reduction in spending had not been made.

### July 27

Proxmire discussed cost overruns in major military weapons, stressing that Defense Department cost figures were either unreliable or classified.

94

July 30

Stennis and Assistant Majority Leader Edward M. Kennedy (D Mass.) took opposing sides in speeches on the ABM deployment.

Stennis noted that the Committee already had cut out the beginning of the proposed area defense plan which, he said, would result in significant savings in the long run.

He stressed a Soviet arms buildup and added, "...th time it would really upset the balance of power if we fail to proceed. It would destroy our deterrent and confron us with a situation we could not tolerate. Our very survival may hinge on the decision we make this year—I repeat, this year—on Safeguard." He also said the decision to be made was not a scientific one based on technical and economic considerations, but one of policy.

Kennedy challenged assertions that the United State was becoming a second-rate military power. He said the nation had continued to build up its arsenal with MIR missiles, an ABM expansion and other weaponry.

July 31

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.), a leader of the anti-ABM forces for years, introduced the 1970 amendment against ABM expansion, which he cosponsored with Philip A. Hart (D Mich.) and others. The proposal limited the authorization in the bill to expenditures for the two original ABM sites, approved by one vote in the Senate in 1969, and for continued research and development

The proposal reduced the Committee-approved recommendation by $322 million, to slightly over $1 billion.

The Hart-Cooper amendment, along with the Committee cutback, would have eradicated all the President's 1970 requests for ABM expansion.

Cooper said the amendment would still leave the United States with enough bargaining strength at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), then in process and would reinforce the widespread feeling that the system was of dubious merit. He added that it would make it start at implementing the new Pentagon policy of assuring a system worked before fully paying for it.

Aug. 5

The ABM debate gained momentum as Hart and Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.) clashed on the subject.

Jackson, a floor leader of the ABM program in previous years, cited the alleged Soviet nuclear buildup and an argument that previous ABM procurement authorizations may have spurred disarmament progress as reasons for defeat of the Hart-Cooper amendment.

"I remain convinced that deployment of Safeguard is an essential condition for the SALT talks to succeed," Jackson said, adding that the experience gained with Safeguard in previous years had been fruitful and had indicated no major difficulties. He said that alternate research into ABM problems had been conducted for years and was not unusual. The transfer of all research funds to Safeguard from the other ABM programs would result in chaos, Jackson said, and the alternate-approach research on an ABM system could not absorb the increased funds. The cutoff of Safeguard research funds would stop Safeguard deployment dead in its tracks, he warned.

Hart answered that the Hart-Cooper proposal was "not so much a compromise as a rational, modest, but important effort to stem the ever-escalating arms race and, specifically, to stop the momentum of this particular weapons system." To the argument that the Safeguard

program approved by the Committee was not provocative and was necessary for the success of the SALT talks, Hart countered, "Either Safeguard is provocative and a bargaining chip, or it is not provocative and is not a bargaining chip."

He noted that even Pentagon witnesses admitted that the Safeguard system could be overwhelmed and land-based missiles destroyed.

Aug. 7

Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.) consumed most of the day's debate with a rebuttal of points in the report of the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law group, which advocated major defense cuts.

Goldwater accused ABM opponents of proposing self-fulfilling prophesies by arguing that since the U.S. land-based deterrent missile force was vulnerable it should not be defended. He asserted that such weapons as the multiple warhead (MIRV) Minuteman III missiles were not an escalation of the arms race, but were merely a required technical improvement.

In reference to liberal opponents, Goldwater said, "They call me a hawk and a warmonger and all that. But we are peacemongers because we have lived through it. We are not daydreamers.... We realize that force is the only kind of thing the Communists respect."

John G. Tower (R Texas) also rejected anti-ABM scientists' contentions and arguments as inconsistent and said that all missiles, radars and other components had been built and tested for the Safeguard ABM system.

Aug. 10

The ABM debate livened up as both sides took the floor.

Thomas F. Eagleton (D Mo.) claimed the Hart-Cooper proposal did not go far enough. He said he would support a proposal of Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa) to eliminate the Safeguard system entirely, which, he said, would be the best incentive toward an arms agreement since the Soviet Union knew that if the talks failed the United States would take any measures needed to protect itself.

Albert Gore (D Tenn.), another anti-ABM leader, reviewed the contention of some scientists that the Safeguard system, when fully deployed, would be effective in saving a sufficient number of retaliatory Minuteman missiles only against a limited number of Soviet missiles. After that, the Soviets could overcome the U.S. defense by easily increasing their missile force. Gore also argued that the Senate Armed Services Committee, in denying the President's request for the start of a thin national ABM defense, already had denied the President the "bargaining chip" provided by the ABM for the arms talks.

Hughes then introduced his amendment to eliminate the Safeguard entirely. He said the year since the 1969 ABM vote had reinforced his opposition and that the Administration had seemed to accept most of the technical arguments of the year before by working on a radar system smaller than the vulnerable missile site radar and by studying an advanced defense of Minuteman sites. He added that should the arms talks fail there were better ways to spend the money to defend U.S. missiles.

Defenders of the ABM countered, with Jackson introducing a letter from Secretary of Defense Laird claiming that the Hart-Cooper amendment "would preclude completion of Safeguard development and would bring to an immediate halt our test and evaluation program at Mecklenburg Island in the Kwajalein Atoll." Cooper replied that neither the amendment nor its sponsor had that intention.

95

Robert Dole (R Kan.) refuted many of the opposition arguments and urged Congress not to intervene to upset the President's plans. "He is winding down the war in Southeast Asia. We do have a ceasefire in the Middle East. We are making some progress at the SALT talks. Why should we in Congress, in view of these accomplishments, seek to impose our judgment on the country when it comes to the ABM or some other weapons system?" Dole asked.

Aug. 11

Cooper summarized the opposition views and cited the findings of an ad hoc Pentagon study committee of outside experts on the ABM. This panel found, among other things, that the ABM's Phase I, approved in 1969 to protect the first two sites, would not be worth its cost. It also stated that if the only role of Safeguard was to protect the Minuteman sites the second phase as planned in 1969 should not proceed.

During that debate Jackson produced a letter from a group of pro-ABM scientists saying opposition arguments that the Safeguard would be effective only against a "narrow band" of threats contained "very gross errors." The letter said the contention of the opposition scientists was based on the "absurd" premise that the Soviets would not launch a full-scale attack.

Aug. 12

The Senate turned back two attempts to block the ABM system as approved by the Committee. The chamber majority first rejected the Hughes amendment by a 33-62 roll call. Then it narrowly rejected, by a 47-52 roll-call vote, the Hart-Cooper amendment denying funds for the additional two sites.

Victory for the Administration forces came mainly from the votes of a majority of Republicans and southern Democrats. It upheld contentions of Presidential supporters that continuation of the ABM was absolutely necessary for success at the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations.

This argument became the main controversy on the day of the votes. Jackson, McIntyre and James B. Pearson (R Kan.) all asserted that rejection of the amendment was needed to have the strongest negotiating tool at the Vienna arms talks. Pearson and McIntyre, who voted against Safeguard in 1969, both said their conversion resulted from contacts with high sources who substantiated this claim. McIntyre stated a member of the U.S. negotiating team, later identified as Ambassador Gerard Smith, said it was vital that the United States not remain "static" on the ABM program. Jackson agreed, claiming there was "virtual unanimity" by the Government and U.S. arms negotiating team in Vienna on the need to maintain momentum on the ABM for further progress at the arms talks.

ABM opponents, led by Cooper, Fulbright, Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Mike Mansfield (D Mont.), challenged the assertions. They requested that such announcements be made public if they were really authentic.

During consideration of the Hughes amendment, Hughes and Eagleton both contrasted the vote on the ABM with President Nixon's veto the previous day of the education and housing bills on the grounds that they were inflationary. Of the ABM program, Eagleton asked, "Why is it not inflationary and dangerous? Why is it fiscally prudent? Why will it not have an impact on our economy? Why are appropriations for HUD and education inflationary and the ABM, in all of its sanctified glory, not?"

Although the Hughes amendment to eliminate Safeguard funds totally was handily defeated on a 33-62 vote, it showed increased support over a similar 1969 amendment by Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine) which also would have completely eliminated funds for the programs.

But the vote rejecting the Hart-Cooper amendment was not as close as in 1969, coming after a debate spreading over 20 calendar days, whereas the previous year's ABM debate took a month. The debate in 1970 also was not accompanied by as much publicity and lobbying as the 1969 controversy. Then, massive letter-writing campaigns, full-page newspaper advertisements and suspense hung on every vote until the narrow one-vote margin went in favor of the ABM.

Stennis, Jackson and Tower provided the leadership during the debate on behalf of the ABM system. Tower argued the United States needed the defense system in order to negotiate from strength. Otherwise, he contended, the United States would find itself a second-rate power subject to nuclear blackmail by the Soviet Union and isolated by other nations. Although the White House had made no official statement on the Committee and floor ABM amendments, Tower said he had been informed that the Administration felt the Armed Services Committee cutback of the program already represented a compromise, and that all other amendments were unacceptable.

Aug. 14

A Proxmire amendment which would require by law implementation of the Pentagon's recently announced "fly before you buy" weapons policy sparked a lengthy debate.

Proxmire said his proposal would not cut off any funds or programs but merely would require reports advising Congress of the Pentagon's compliance with the policies suggested by the Fitzhugh study group. The Fitzhugh report concerned the need to avoid acquiring costly weapons systems before they were thoroughly planned and tested, encourage competitive prototypes, end total-package procurement contracts and avoid "gold plating" (the addition of costly extra equipment) on weapons. The report included recommendations to achieve several other aims.

Committee Chairman Stennis and other Committee members argued against the amendment on the grounds that it needed thorough examination before enactment. They said its implementation could be far-reaching and seriously hamper defense procedures. They introduced a letter from Laird opposing the amendment.

Aug. 17

The debate over the Proxmire amendment continued with the sponsor charging that the Pentagon's new "fly before you buy" policy "is a public relations gimmick and not a get tough policy." Proxmire suggested that this was the reason for the "exaggerated" opposition to his minor reporting requirement. His proposal was easily defeated by a 22-43 roll-call vote.

Aug. 18

Debate centered on another anti-ABM amendment sponsored by Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.) and Vice President Agnew's Aug. 17 attack on the McGovern-Hatfield antiwar amendment. (I)

Brooke's amendment would have allowed all the funds requested by the Administration for four ABM sites to be spent, but only on the original two sites authorized in 1969.

Taking the Administration side in both debates was Robert Dole, who said the intent of the Brooke proposal was unclear but that under any implementation it would provide less defense and cost more than the ABM plan in the tilt. The amendment "makes sense only to those who seek to reduce the effectiveness of America's defenses," he charged. He called the McGovern-Hatfield amendment "the amendment to lose the peace—or perhaps the amendment to extend the war" because its sponsors had extended the amendment's deadline for withdrawal of U.S. troops by six months.

96

Stennis initiated the attack against an amendment cosponsored by Hatfield and Goldwater to institute an all-volunteer army. The proposal would end the draft at its June 30, 1971 expiration date and raise service pay as recommended by a special Presidential study group.

Stennis observed that although the amendment for a volunteer army might seem appealing it would increase costs by an estimated $4.3 billion annually. He added there had been no Presidential request or formal Congressional consideration of the plan. To enact a proposal under such circumstances, Stennis noted, "is to repudiate the fundamental legislative processes." He said he had mixed feelings about the all-volunteer army, that the influx of civilians into the military was a desirable process and that it provided the opportunity for training and discipline for some who would not otherwise receive such benefits. "It seems clear to me," he commented, "that the idea of an all-volunteer force at this time holds out only false hope to the mothers of the young men of America." He said the President had stated the draft would have to be retained in 1971 and that the Armed Services Committee would study the volunteer concept when it considered the draft extension.

### Aug. 19

In its third confrontation in a week on the ABM, the Senate by a 45-53 roll call again rejected a bid to block expansion of the system beyond the two sites authorized in 1969.

The proposal by Brooke would have prevented expansion beyond the North Dakota and Montana sites, but allowed the use of all funds in the bill for the two sites authorized in 1969. Brooke said the money could be used either to add more missile-site radars or interceptor missiles. He was supported by McIntyre and Marlow W. Cook (R Ky.), both of whom had voted the previous week against the Hart-Cooper amendment to block the ABM.

The amendment was opposed by Stennis and Jackson, who cited the views of Defense Secretary Laird and contended that implementation of the Brooke amendment would result in a year's delay in deployment of a third site and would cost at least $500 million more than the existing plan. Both agreed that the additional site requested for Missouri would give greater protection to Minuteman missiles, nearby U.S. population centers and strategic bomber bases.

Stennis also contended that the Senate the week before had already gone on record as approving four ABM sites and that to reverse the decision would be both nonsensical and detrimental to the U.S. arms bargaining stance.

The defeat of the Brooke proposal was by a larger margin than many sources expected. It resulted from the shift of four votes by Senators who had supported the earlier Hart-Cooper amendment but voted against the Brooke amendment: Percy. Jennings Randolph (D W.Va.), Margaret Chase Smith and Allen J. Ellender (D La.). In addition, William B. Saxbe (R Ohio), who had voted earlier with the anti-ABM forces, did not vote. These switches more than made up for the decision of McIntyre, Cook and Clinton P. Anderson (D.N.M.), all of whom had voted against the Hart-Cooper amendment, to side with Brooke.

### Aug. 20

The Senate considered restrictions on U.S. involvement in the Indochina conflict and continued debate on the volunteer army proposal.

The Southeast Asia conflict was the subject of a pair of amendments offered by Fulbright. The first, accepted by the Armed Services Committee and adopted by voice vote, prohibited U.S. payment of special battle or over-

seas allowances to U.S. allies in Vietnam that exceeded the rates received by U.S. troops. The other Fulbright amendment, debated but not decided upon until the next day, barred the United States from financing South Vietnamese or Thai military actions in support of the Cambodian or Laotian governments.

Explaining his first amendment, Fulbright said the United States had been paying South Korean, Thai and Philippine soldiers in Vietnam supplementary pay higher than U.S. soldiers received for the same duty. The highest U.S. combat allowance for American troops was $65 a month, he said, but the United States was paying Thai lieutenants an additional $120 a month in excess of their base pay of $50 a month supplied by the Thai government. "This system leads to distortion of both the recipients' and our own values," Fulbright commented, and added, "The American people for years—unaware of the existence of these bonuses—were continually told by their leaders that the free world forces represented recognition that all Asian nations had a stake in the outcome in Vietnam. That stake—it now turns out—was in good part money.... I believe it is time that we stop making mercenaries out of our allies and allies out of mercemics."

Although Stennis, the floor manager of the bill, expressed opposition to the abrogation of any standing U.S. agreement with its allies, he and other Armed Services Committee members agreed they would accept the amendment and take it to conference with the House. Strom Thurmond (R S.C.) expressed concern that ending such arrangements might cause U.S. allies to leave Vietnam and slow the U.S. withdrawal.

In behalf of his other amendment, Fulbright said he was seeking to clarify the Committee's intent in allowing allied incursions into Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries but opposing invasions not connected to the war in neighboring Vietnam. The Committee had modified a provision authorizing $2.5 billion for U.S. aid to Southeast Asian allies by adding language to allow the allies to operate in Cambodian enemy sanctuaries. But the accompanying report had stated the new language was not intended to authorize unlimited operations in support of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia. Fulbright said his amendment merely would assure this restriction through statutory language, and would extend the restriction to Laos. He said the amendment would not restrict U.S. air operations, aid or limited strikes at the Cambodian sanctuaries or the Laotian portion of the Ho Chi Minh infiltration trail.

At first Stennis expressed concern about the possible effect of the amendment on U.S. bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Fulbright assured it would have no impact since its aim was limited to U.S. financial aid.

The Senate also plunged into the volunteer army controversy. Initiating the debate, Stennis firmly stated that the White House opposed the Hatfield-Goldwater amendment, that he objected to a time limitation on debate on the matter and that it was no mere amendment but "a basic, sweeping change" affecting national security. Stennis promised that the issue would get a thorough hearing in the near future when extension of the expiring draft law was considered by the Committee.

Hatfield said the amendment did not in itself end the draft but merely set in motion the pay raises and machinery to make an all-volunteer force possible.

He pointed out that although the volunteer army plan might cost about $4 billion yearly that cost could be offset by the savings resulting from an end to the draft, and from less training and frequent turnover costs. The issue was debated by Kennedy and others who contended that voluntary enlistments might not be sufficient to provide manpower and that such a system would result in a

military composed primarily of black and poor volun-
teers.

Aug. 21

The Senate by voice vote agreed to the Fulbright
amendment barring U.S. funds for Vietnamese and Thai
military support of the Cambodian and Laotian govern-
ments.

Then it overwhelmingly passed two amendments deal-
ing with military manpower and personnel matters. A
bitter exchange later took place over the controversial
amendment to end the war in Vietnam.

The way was cleared for acceptance of the Fulbright
restriction when Stennis and other Committee members
said they had been reassured the proposal would not
restrict U.S. and allied protective measures. They agreed
to accept the amendment, which was then adopted by
voice vote.

The Senate by a 69-0 roll-call vote then adopted an
amendment by Percy to impose a 25-percent cut in expen-
ditures by fiscal 1972 for most military job rotation
positions. Percy's amendment exempted rotations in com-
bat areas or for training, promotions or separation. Percy
said his amendment would result in a cut of $140 million
from the total $1.3 billion for such expenditures. He argued
that the U.S. military policy of frequent rotation of assign-
ments resulted in excessive costs, inconvenience and re-
duced efficiency and morale. After limited discussion the
amendment was adopted by the 69-0 vote.

Another manpower amendment, offered by Birch
Bayh (D Ind.), to require that Congress fix yearly per-
sonnel ceilings for the military services, was quickly
approved by voice vote. The proposal also required the
President to submit an annual report recommending the
ceilings. Bayh and Armed Services Committee members
agreed the amendment was a logical step toward Congres-
sional rights in such matters.

Robert Dole introduced an amendment aimed at
requiring Senators promoting the McGovern-Hatfield-
Goodell amendment to end the war to register as lobby-
ists. Dole expressed concern about the need for high
ethical standards in Congress and for strict adherence to
lobbying, income and solicitation laws. He wondered
whether or not the Senators had declared the funds they
had received as income or as political gifts, and if they
had complied with the disclosure or lobbying laws. He
said regulations "strongly suggest that participation by
Senators in lobbying activities is highly questionable."

In a sharply worded reply, McGovern assured that
the amendment supporters had "neither violated any laws
nor jeopardized a proper sense of ethics and propriety."
He said the group had accounted for every penny through
published reports in the *Congressional Record*. "I was im-
pressed with the purity of his (Dole's) purpose," Mc-
Govern stated, "and his remarkable awareness of the
danger of sin in others." He said the Justice Department
was already investigating the situation and that a tax
ruling had been sought.

Aug. 25

The Senate by a roll-call vote of 35-52 rejected the
Hatfield-Goldwater amendment aimed at establishing a
volunteer army.

The voting and debate on the measure cut across
party and ideological lines with Senators of both liberal
and conservative persuasions supporting and opposing
the proposal.

In the windup debate Stennis called the amend-
ment, which had not been studied by the Armed Services
Committee, "an illegitimate child just wandering around
the Chamber." He discounted the belief that the extra
pay in the amendment would be sufficient inducement to
attract adequate military manpower. "We are not going
to get men for $160 a month in extra pay to volunteer to

become riflemen and to go to those jungles (in Vietnam)."
he observed. Also speaking against the amendment were
Tower, Margaret Chase Smith, Thurmond, Eagleton,
Thomas J. Dodd (D Conn.) and Kennedy.

Kennedy and Eagleton argued the economic inducement of a volunteer army could lead to a force made up of poor and minority persons. "It is inequitable to permit the risks of battle to fall only on those less affluent Americans who are induced to join the army by a pay raise." Kennedy said. "Second, it is unwise to insulate from the horrors of war middle and upperclass Americans who might lead the protest against senseless foreign adventures."

Supporters of the bid rejected this contention, saying
that historically volunteer armies had not led to such
socio-economic patterns and that some 20,000 service
personnel were already on welfare rolls. They noted that
the United States during most of its existence had a
volunteer army. McGovern, on behalf of the amendment,
rejected the charges that such a military force would
become detached and undemocratic, or lead the country
into foreign wars. He said such a force would still be under
civilian control.

Aug. 26

By substantial margins, the Senate rejected amend-
ments to ban the use of herbicides in warfare and to
restrict a special $200-million contingency fund in the
bill for the C-5A aircraft. The contingency fund was in
addition to an authorization of $344.4 million for con-
tinued procurement of the C-5A.

In addition, supporters of an amendment to cut off
funds for the Vietnam war introduced a revised version
of their proposal.

An amendment against environmental warfare was
introduced by Gaylord Nelson (D Wis.) and Charles E.
Goodell (R N.Y.) and was rebuffed on a 22-62 roll-call
vote.

Nelson argued that the U.S. military's use of chemical defoliants in Vietnam might be doing incalculable harm to the ecological conditions there. He added that most nations, through an 80-3 vote in the United Nations, had deemed the use of such herbicides to be outlawed by a 1925 treaty against chemical and biological warfare. In reply to arguments that defoliation had stripped away enemy hiding places and thus saved U.S. lives, Nelson commented, "If the question is that pure and simple, and the only test of the conduct of the American military is the safety of American boys, why do we not drop the nuclear bomb? That would finish it in a hurry."

Goodell charged the United States was following a
policy of destroying Vietnam in trying to save it. He said
the environmental warfare program, with resulting crop
destruction, was very unpopular in that country.

Leading the defense against the amendment, Sen.
McIntyre replied that such methods saved American lives,
but added that the use of chemicals had been curtailed.
He claimed that the danger of such usage had not been
firmly established but that the Committee had taken steps
to obtain conclusive data by ordering a study by the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences. In support, Peter H. Dominick
(R Colo.) said, "I am not going to send my boy over to
Vietnam and say, 'we are not going to use herbicides
because they will kill trees,' knowing that the enemy can
get behind those trees and kill my boy."

The C-5A amendment, introduced by Proxmire and Schweiker, would have required certain conditions to be met before the special $200 million in the bill for the C-5A could be spent. The amendment was rejected by a 30-48 roll call.

Under the amendment, the $200 million, which was
part of a sum the C-5A manufacturer, Lockheed, said the
Air Force owed it because of added costs, could not be

97

98

spent unless one of three conditions was met. These were: (1) that the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals reached a decision on the contested claim; (2) that the firm went into bankruptcy; (3) that the Comptroller General advised the payment was necessary to complete delivery of the planes. Though the Air Force contested Lockheed's claim, the Department had opposed the amendment.

Proxmire emphasized that the amendment had no intention of forcing the firm into bankruptcy or cutting off production of the plane. But he said the $200 million was only part of the amount Lockheed said the Air Force owed and that close scrutiny had to be kept on future C-5A spending.

Opposition to the amendment, led by Herman E. Talmadge (D Ga.), countered that the amendment would lead to the company's bankruptcy. This would result in failure to produce the vital C-5A and numerous other Lockheed projects and throw thousands of employees out of work, Talmadge said.

Sponsors of the amendment to end the war then introduced a new version of their proposal which would have fixed the U.S. manpower level in Vietnam at 280,000 by April 30, 1971, the ceiling set by President Nixon in his April 20 announcement. It also would have cut off funds for the war after Dec. 31, 1971, except for completing the troop withdrawal and prisoner releases or for aid to South Vietnam for the above purposes and asylum for possibly endangered South Vietnamese. It also would have allowed the President to extend the Dec. 31 cutoff date by 60 days on his own authority if he found U.S. troops were in danger. He was authorized to seek a further extension from Congress if necessary.

Earlier versions of the amendment did not contain the April 30 ceiling or the Presidential waiver authority. The original version also placed the fund cutoff date at June 30, 1971.

Proponents said the proposal would assure the safety of U.S. troops and their Vietnamese supporters and would maintain Presidential control of the withdrawal.

Aug. 27

The Senate rejected another attempt to restrict the use of chemical warfare in Vietnam, but accepted two other amendments curbing disposal and storage plans for such weapons. In addition, it approved a proposal to authorize a single warhead to replace the multiple (MIRV) missile warhead in the event of an arms control treaty banning MIRV warheads.

Nelson and Goodell, after being rebuffed on their more sweeping amendment the day before, offered an amendment prohibiting the destruction only of crops by chemical agents. They argued that although some U.S. defoliation programs in Vietnam could be supported because they helped save American troops, no such excuse could be made for the destruction of crops. The only parties affected by this operation were civilians, they said. Opponents of the amendment replied that crops were ruined only in enemy-held areas and that this forced the diversion of enemy soldiers to replace the destroyed food supply. They said the program was carefully controlled and that the Committee had already requested a scientific study of the program's results. The amendment was defeated on a 33-48 roll-call vote, a narrower margin than the Aug. 26 herbicide amendment, rejected by a 22-62 roll call.

The Senate then agreed to prohibit funds for the disposal of chemical-biological warfare (CBW) agents unless the CBW agents had been detoxified first. The proposal, by Charles H. Percy, was accepted by an 82-1 roll-call vote, with Henry Bellmon (R Okla.) the only dissenter.

Before passage, Percy agreed to modify his amendment to allow exceptions in emergency situations. He said the Department of Defense had already accepted such a policy and did not object to the amendment.

Edward W. Brooke, a long-time critic of the MIRV missile program, proposed two amendments. One, to give the Secretary of Defense discretionary authority to develop a single warhead for the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles, was adopted by voice vote; the other, to prohibit development of MIRV warheads with a hard-target, first-strike capability, was withdrawn by Brooke after strong opposition arose.

In defense of his single-warhead amendment, Brooke said it might improve the chances of negotiating an accord with the Soviet Union on curbing MIRV weapons. Stennis did not oppose the amendment since it merely authorized and did not require such a development. But some Armed Services Committee members opposed the prohibition of a first-strike capability, arguing that the permanent, one-sided restriction would be unwise. They rejected Brooke's contention that the move might aid arms control efforts. "I think we are fools if we think that simply by taking unilateral action to reduce our capacity, we will convince the Soviets and that they will do the same," Jackson observed.

Jackson promised that his Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Arms Limitation would carefully consider the MIRV warheads' impact in 1971.

Brooke argued that his amendment would simply put into legislation the Administration's policy of not seeking a first-strike capability.

However, when faced with strong disapproval, Brooke withdrew his proposal, saying he feared a strong rejection might indicate to the Soviet Union a U.S. intention to hold on to a first-strike possibility.

During the day, there was also discussion of pending amendments to set a deadline for withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and to impose a $5.2-billion cut in defense spending.

Stennis, in opposition to the defense spending cut, said the proposal, if passed, would create "chaos" in defense plans because it would come late in the fiscal year and have to be applied in the remainder of the year.

Arguing for the antiwar amendment, Goodell said the Administration policy would prolong the conflict. "The price of this American commitment will be from 5,000 to 10,000 or more American dead by the end of 1972. It will be from 25,000 to 50,000 or more American wounded by that time—the most serious casualties of any war in our history. And the cost will be $30 billion to $50 billion or more—a cost that must be measured in the opportunities foregone to respond to urgent domestic needs." Goodell stated. He was debated by Dole, who said the proponents of the amendment had changed it so radically and frequently that it was "in effect an endorsement of President Nixon's Vietnamization program...."

Aug. 28

In one of its major actions on the bill, the Senate on a 31-42 roll call blocked the amendment to limit fiscal 1971 defense spending to $66 billion, a cut of $5.2 billion.

The amendment was sponsored by Proxmire and Charles McC. Mathias Jr. Mathias charged that the vast sums spent on defense had been misapplied rather than spent wisely on sound research. He pleaded for a "balanced" spending program rather than crash projects. Proxmire called the amendment "the test vote of 1970 on economy in government."

Other supporters pointed to the four 1970 Presidential vetoes of domestic spending bills on the grounds they were inflationary, and to U.S. spending on overseas bases and commitments as justifying a defense cutback.

Many Armed Services members attacked the proposal as disruptive and potentially harmful to national security. They said that the Committee had already cut the bill as much as possible, that the Nixon Administration was already altering spending priorities and that the cut proposed in the amendment would lead to serious economic

99

upheavals. It was also charged that taking such action on the Senate floor would run counter to orderly legislative processes through committee action. "The pending amendment is nothing more than a substitute for the failure of sponsors to convince the Senate that there are programs that deletion would leave our national security unimproved," Jackson said.

The Senate then approved a pair of amendments dealing with scientific and other types of research. One, proposed by McIntyre, expressing the sense of Congress that the National Science Foundation budget for fiscal 1972 be increased by 20 percent, was approved on a 68-0 roll call.

The other, by Fulbright, guaranteeing access by the Congressional military and foreign affairs committees to Federally financed studies, was adopted on a voice vote.

Still another amendment, offered by Bellmon, encouraging the use of idle military facilities and employees by defense contractors, was approved on a voice vote.

Aug. 31

Debate on the McGovern-Hatfield amendment to end the Vietnam conflict reached a peak on the eve of the vote. A number of Senators took the floor on the issue, which had occupied the Senate intermittently for much of the year. The amendment to set an intermediate Vietnam troop ceiling of 280,000 by April 30, 1971, and order a complete troop withdrawal by Dec. 31, 1971, was defended by several of its sponsors. A large part of the Administration's rebuttal was handled by Robert Dole.

Supporters said the U.S. withdrawal would pave the way for peace by meeting a condition for progress at the Paris peace talks and by forcing the South Vietnamese government to adopt a more flexible policy toward broadening its base of support. Under the President's Vietnamization policy, they said, the Saigon government had a virtual veto over U.S. withdrawal plans. They frequently expressed the need for Congress to assert its constitutional role in the formation of foreign policy and the conduct of wars.

Senators Eagleton and Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.) said the Nixon policy of gradual de-escalation was leading to a wider war in Indochina and Laos. Javits added that the Senate had twice gone on record in 1970 as favoring the repeal of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorizing U.S. Vietnam intervention and said positive Senate action to implement a disengagement policy was needed.

Frank Church (I) Idaho) said Congress needed to keep the pressure on the President to hasten the withdrawal and to prevent a Korean-type involvement which would leave a significant residual U.S. force in Vietnam.

McGovern asserted that a Government poll, which he said had been classified because of its results, had indicated that 65 percent of the Vietnamese population wished to see a U.S. withdrawal, 30 percent had no opinion and 5 percent desired U.S. forces to remain in their country. Dole disputed the existence of such a poll.

Dole repeatedly questioned supporters of the amendment on its content and impact. He objected to the withdrawal deadline, saying that since the President's policy had been successful there was no need for Congress to intervene. He and other opponents of the amendment suggested the withdrawal would undermine the Paris peace talks by removing a crucial bargaining chip and would endanger U.S. forces. Dole decried the growing isolationism which he said prompted the amendment and added that it would tend to compromise the credibility of the U.S. commitments to it allies.

Strom Thurmond and Hugh Scott expressed concern about the fate of U.S. prisoners of war held by North Vietnam if U.S. troops were removed. They said the withdrawal was a bargaining leverage which could be used to secure the release of the prisoners. Stennis also opposed the measure: "I do not believe...that we should cut and run from Vietnam by a legislative termination date which will broadcast to the enemy and the world the precise nature of our plans. When we leave South Vietnam—and I hope this will be soon—I believe we should leave with the American flag flying proudly and not dragged in a disorderly retreat."

On the same day the Senate approved by voice vote an amendment by Theodore F. Stevens (R Alaska) to require a 60-day delay after the beginning of the 92nd Congress before any of the recommendations of the Defense Department (Fitzhugh) review panel could be implemented.

Sept. 1

Completing almost six weeks of debate, the Senate first turned back a bid to impose a deadline for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and then passed the $19.2-billion defense procurement bill.

On the same day, the Senate rejected amendments to prevent draftees from being sent to Vietnam, to split a prized destroyer contract between two shipyards and to delay the bill's authorization of arms for Israel.

Defeat of the McGovern-Hatfield Vietnam withdrawal amendment occurred on a 39-55 roll-call vote and final passage came on an 84-5 roll call. (Votes 258, 262,

The vote on the Vietnam war amendment came after final debate during the morning of Sept. 1. The outcome was interpreted as "a solid vote of confidence in his (the President's) policy of working toward peace in Vietnam," according to a White House statement issued afterwards by Press Secretary Ron Ziegler. He called the vote an "overwhelming" victory.

After the vote, McGovern observed that "it is remarkable that for the first time in history more than one-third of the U.S. Senate has voted to cut off funds for a war while we are still in battle." Others expressed satisfaction at the number of supporters for the measure.

On the final day of debate on the war amendment two key Senators who had previously been uncommitted on the issue, John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.) and George D. Aiken (R Vt.) emerged as opponents. Aiken said passage of the amendment would bring no assurance that its objectives could be attained. Cooper, frequently at the forefront of liberal antiwar efforts, issued a statement saying the negotiations toward peace in Vietnam would have a "better chance" if the amendment were not adopted.

Minority Leader Scott called the amendment "unnecessary and mischievous." He added, "The amendment does serve to advance, of course, the popularity of individuals who can manage considerable full-page publicity out of it; but aside from the ointment which it points upon the individual and the aroma which may be scattered by the public, the amendment does harm and no good." Robert P. Griffin (R Mich.), Minority Whip, said that the only point of the debate had been its psychological impact since it was obvious the amendment, if passed, would never survive a conference with the House on the bill.

Senate action on major amendments:

Amendments Accepted

Aug. 4—John J. Williams (R Del.)—Prevent the disclosure of defense contract awards by any person until after announcement had been made by the Secretary of Defense. Roll-call vote, 77-0.

Aug. 13—Harrison A. Williams Jr. (D N.J.)—Raise the authorized number of officers and men in the Coast Guard Reserves from 10,000 to 15,000. Voice.

Hugh Scott (R Pa.)—Express the sense of Congress that career Federal employees displaced from their posts because of economy measures be given priority consideration in filling other positions and urge heads of Federal agencies to comply with Presidential and civil service policies to this effect. Voice.

Aug. 20—J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.)—Prohibit U.S. payment of special combat or overseas pay to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia which was higher than that received by U.S. servicemen for the same purposes. Voice.

Aug. 21—Fulbright—Prohibit financing of military operations by South Vietnamese or other allied nations' troops in support of the Cambodian or Laotian governments. Voice.

Charles H. Percy (R Ill.)—Encourage longer tours of duty for military personnel and direct a cut of 25 percent in expenditures, compared with fiscal year 1970 expenditures, for most personnel rotation, beginning with fiscal 1972. Roll call, 69-0.

Birch Bayh (D Ind.)—Require yearly Congressional approval of personnel strengths for the armed services and require the President to submit an annual request. Voice.

Aug. 27—Percy—Prohibit the disposal of chemical or biological warfare agents unless such agents had been detoxified or rendered harmless to man and the environment, except in emergencies. Roll call, 82-1.

Claiborne Pell (D R.I.)—Prohibit funds for the transportation, testing, storage or development of any lethal chemical or any biological warfare agents outside the United States unless the Secretary of State had determined such action would not violate international law. Voice.

Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.)— Authorize the Secretary of Defense to initiate a program of research to develop a single warhead for the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles. Voice.

Aug. 28—Henry Bellmon (R Okla.)— Authorize the Secretary of Defense to encourage recipients of defense contracts to use military installations being closed and to employ former employees of such bases. Voice.

Fulbright— Authorize the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee to have access to all private reports, studies or investigations financed by Federal funds except when the President exercises the right of executive privilege and forbids such access. Voice.

Aug. 31—Theodore F. Stevens (R Alaska)—Prohibit changes in the command structure of the military services until the Congressional Armed Services Committees of the 92nd Congress had 60 days to study the Fitzhugh defense study commission report. Voice.

Amendments Rejected

Aug. 12—Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa)—Prohibit the use of funds in the bill or any other bill for the deployment of the Safeguard system. Roll-call vote, 33-62.

Philip A. Hart (D Mich.)—John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.)—Delete $322.2 million from the bill for deployment of the Safeguard ABM system at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., and Warren Air Force Base, Wyo. Roll call, 47-52.

Aug. 13—William Proxmire (D Wis.)—Require the Defense Department to comply with the reporting requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act regarding the use of weapons systems and their effect on the human environment. Roll call, 26-59.

Aug. 17—Proxmire—Require reports from the Secretary of Defense on major weapons systems detailing the degree of compliance by the Department to adopt the recommendations of the Fitzhugh defense panel concerning the need for thorough testing before acquisition of weapons, competitive prototypes, the abolition of total package procurement contracts, elimination of "gold plating" and other proposals. Roll call, 22-43.

Aug. 19—Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.)—Limit Safeguard ABM funds to the two original sites at Malmstrom and Grand Forks Air Force Bases. Roll call, 45-53.

Eugene J. McCarthy (D Minn.)—Prohibit the use of live ammunition by National Guard troops except when a Governor had obtained permission from the President in each specific situation. Roll call, 2-87.

Aug. 25—Mark O. Hatfield (R Ore.) and Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.)—Implement pay raises for military personnel and declare that an all-volunteer army should be instituted as soon as possible. Roll call, 35-52.

Aug. 26—Gaylord Nelson (D Wis.) and Charles E. Goodell (R N.Y.)—Prohibit the use of funds for the military application of defoliant chemicals. Roll call, 22-62.

Proxmire and Richard S. Schweiker (R Pa.)—Establish limitations and conditions for the use of a $200-million contingency fund for procurement of the C-5A aircraft. Roll call, 30-48.

Aug. 27—Nelson and Goodell—Prohibit the use of funds for antiplant chemicals in warfare to destroy crops or for the transfer of these chemicals for such purposes. Roll call, 33-48.

Aug. 28—Proxmire and Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R Md.)—Reduce fiscal 1971 spending for military functions of the Department of Defense by $5 billion, to $66 billion from $71 billion. Roll call, 31-42.

Sept. 1—George McGovern (D S.D.) and Hatfield—Limit U.S. troops in Vietnam to 280,000 by April 30, 1971; limit the use of funds after that date to finance the complete withdrawal of remaining troops by Dec. 31, 1971, to secure release of prisoners of war, to provide asylum for endangered Vietnamese and to provide aid to the Republican of Vietnam for such activities; and authorize the President to extend the withdrawal date for a period not exceeding 60 days in case of clear and present danger to U.S. troops, and permit him to submit for Congressional approval a recommendation for a new withdrawal date. Roll call, 39-55.

Proxmire—Prohibit the use of draftees in South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia unless they had volunteered for such duty or had voluntarily extended their enlistment. Roll call, 22-71.

Edmund S. Muskie (D Maine)—Require the prime contractor of 30 DD-963 destroyers to divide equally with a subcontractor the contract for construction of the ships. Roll call, 29-62.

Fulbright—Prohibit the implementation of the bill's provision providing an open-ended authorization for the transfer of military equipment to Israel by sale, credit sale or guaranty unless the Foreign Military Sales Act (HR 15628) failed to be enacted within 15 days after the adjournment of the current Congress. Roll call, 7-87.

100

101

Provisions of the Military Procurement Bill, as passed by the Senate:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Request</th><th>Approved</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Procurement:</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Aircraft:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>$ 296,900,000</td><td>$ 292,100,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy and Marine Corps</td><td>2,487,700,000</td><td>2,337,700,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>3,374,300,000</td><td>3,225,500,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, aircraft</strong></td><td><strong>6,158,900,000</strong></td><td><strong>5,855,300,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Missiles:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>1,094,600,000</td><td>1,031,600,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>983,000,000</td><td>932,400,000</td></tr><tr><td>Marine Corps</td><td>27,600,000</td><td>12,800,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>1,544,600,000</td><td>1,479,400,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, missiles</strong></td><td><strong>3,649,800,000</strong></td><td><strong>3,456,200,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Naval vessels</td><td>2,728,900,000</td><td>2,276,900,000</td></tr><tr><td>Tracked combat vehicles:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>207,200,000</td><td>182,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>Marine Corps</td><td>48,700,000</td><td>47,400,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, tracked vehicles</strong></td><td><strong>255,900,000</strong></td><td><strong>229,600,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Other weapons:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>69,200,000</td><td>67,300,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>2,789,000</td><td>2,789,000</td></tr><tr><td>Marine Corps</td><td>4,400,000</td><td>4,400,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, other weapons</strong></td><td><strong>76,389,000</strong></td><td><strong>74,389,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, procurement</strong></td><td><strong>12,869,889,000</strong></td><td><strong>11,892,389,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Research, development:</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>1,735,900,000</td><td>1,609,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy and Marine Corps</td><td>2,212,300,000</td><td>2,194,300,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>2,927,700,000</td><td>2,718,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Defense agencies</td><td>475,700,000</td><td>445,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Emergency fund</td><td>50,000,000</td><td>50,000,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Total, research</strong></td><td><strong>7,401,600,000</strong></td><td><strong>7,016,500,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Safeguard construction</td><td>325,200,000</td><td>325,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>Safeguard housing</td><td>8,800,000</td><td>8,800,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td><td><strong>$20,605,489,000</strong></td><td><strong>$19,242,389,000</strong></td></tr></tbody></table>

¹ Authorization and required in prior years.

The bill also:

* Prohibited the obligation of $283 million for the F-111 aircraft until the Secretary of Defense gave assurances the plane had passed certain tests.

* Required the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to approve beforehand obligation of a special $200-billion additional expenditure for the C-5A aircraft.

* Required a special authorization for naval torpedo procurement beginning in the fiscal 1972 authorization bill.

* Required that research and development programs have a direct and apparent relationship to a defense mission.

* Required that Congressional military and foreign affairs committees be given access to all private reports, studies and investigations financed by Federal funds, except when the President prohibited such access.

* Created an interdepartmental group to study the possible domestic, civilian uses of military research projects.

* Established a ceiling of $625 million for fiscal 1971 for defense-sponsored independent research by defense contractors and required advance negotiations with contractors receiving more than $2 million in independent research payments.

* Prohibited procurement of delivery systems for lethal chemical-biological (CBW) agents; required special safety precautions for disposal of lethal CBW agents, including their detoxification, except in emergencies; required a finding by the Secretary of State that no international laws would be violated before any foreign testing, dumping or storage of CBW; and directed a study of ecological and physiological impact of herbicides.

* Placed a ceiling of $2.5 billion on U.S. aid to the Vietnamese and to other free world forces in support of Vietnamese forces and local forces in Laos and Thailand.

* Prohibited the financing of military operations by the South Vietnamese or other allied troops in support of the Cambodian or Laotian governments.

* Prohibited the U.S. payment of special combat or overseas duty pay to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia which was higher than that received by U.S. servicemen for the same purpose.

* Prohibited the transfer to third parties of weapons or military equipment furnished to Southeast Asian allies, without the approval of the United States.

* Authorized the Secretary of Defense to initiate a program to develop a single warhead for the Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles.

* Prohibited the implementation of changes in the armed forces structure until the Congressional Armed Services Committees had 60 days after the start of the 92nd Congress to study recommendations for such changes.

* Encouraged longer tours of duty for military personnel and directed that a cut of 25 percent be made in expenditures for most personnel rotation in fiscal 1972.

* Required yearly Congressional approval of personnel strengths for the armed services, based on an annual Presidential request.

* Authorized the transfer of aircraft and supporting equipment to Israel by sales, credit sales or guaranty as a means of assistance in providing for the security of that nation.

* Authorized the Secretary of Defense to encourage recipients of defense contracts to use idled defense personnel and installations.

* Prohibited the disclosure of defense contract awards by any person until after an announcement had been made by the Secretary of Defense.

102

CONFERENCE ACTION

House and Senate conferees filed a Conference Report on the FY71 Military Procurement Bill on September 26, 1970. The compromise bill contained a funding level of $19,929,089,000 -- $308.4 million less than the House-passed amount and $686.2 more than the Senate-approved sum.

The House adopted the Conference Report on September 29, 1970 by a vote of 341-11 and the Senate adopted the Report on October 1, 1970 by a voice vote.

A summary of conferee action on significant provisions follows:

The Senate-approved restrictions limiting the Safe-
guard ABM expansion to two sites defending Minuteman
missile batteries at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., and
Warren Air Force Base, Wyo., were agreed to. The bill
thus confined work to those bases and to the two original
sites, in North Dakota and Montana, approved in 1969.
Adoption of the Senate version denied the President's
request for beginning work at other sites, including a
proposed ABM base near the nation's capital. The addi-
tional sites recommended in the House version were de-
signed to give broad area population protection against
Communist Chinese attacks rather than to protect mis-
sile bases against a Soviet attack. House conferees, in
their statement issued with the conference report, said
their action did not alter their belief that protection
should be granted in the future to Washington, D.C.

The House-passed version of HR 17123 had not in-
cluded $334 million in ABM construction funds which the
House had passed separately in the military construction
authorization bill (HR 17604). House conferees on HR
17123 agreed to the Senate transfer of the $334 million
from HR 17604 to HR 17123.

Senate conferees agreed to an additional $435 mil-
lion added by the House for expansion of the Navy ship-
building program. This amount was in addition to $2.7
billion requested by the Administration for such projects.

House conferees agreed to accept the Senate provision deleting $152 million for advanced procurement for a third CVAN-70 nuclear aircraft carrier. The Administration had not made a final decision on the need for the carrier. House conferees also backed down from their requirements that $600 million worth of ship construction be handled only in naval (not commercial) shipyards and that the DD-963 destroyer construction project be handled by two different shipbuilders.

House conferees consented to most of the Senate's
provisions dealing with Southeast Asia. These included
restrictions on additional battle pay for U.S. allies,
prohibitions against allied military operations in aid
of the Cambodian and Laotian governments, curbs
on the transfer of U.S. military equipment to third parties,
relaxation of language to enable attacks by South Viet-
namese troops into Cambodian enemy sanctuaries and
limits on the amount of aid to Asian allies. Only two
changes were made in these Senate provisions. One
increased the ceiling on aid to Asian allies to $2.8 billion
from the $2.5 billion imposed by the Senate. The other
modified the language of the Senate provision to permit
payment of battle pay to allied troops if such agreements
had been made prior to July 1, 1970.

A Senate provision authorizing the transfer of military equipment to Israel was approved in conference

with only slight change. As agreed to, the authority to
transfer equipment was given an expiration date of Sept.
30, 1972; the Senate version had provided an open-ended
authorization without an expiration date.

Conferees agreed to a number of changes affecting
the funding of independent research by defense con-
tractors. At the House conferees' insistence, the Senate
ceiling of $625 million on such activities as well as a
requirement that defense research have a "direct and
apparent relationship" to a military mission were deleted.
The new language allowed such projects if the Secretary
of Defense found a "potential relationship" to military
requirements. The conference version would require
advance contracts with most contractors for independent
research and require a report to Congress. The conference
report said that the $625-million ceiling would be "ad-
ministratively impractical" and that the relevancy require-
ment "would unduly inhibit the conduct of needed basic
research."

In other research-related actions, conferees amended a Senate provision urging a 20-percent increase in funds for the National Science Foundation. The compromise called for only an unspecified increase. They dropped Senate amendments authorizing the development of a single warhead for the Poseidon and Minuteman III multiple re-entry (MIRV) missiles and requiring Congressional access to all Government-funded reports.

**General Provisions.** The conferees accepted a Senate provision blocking funds for the F-111 aircraft until the Secretary of Defense had determined the plane had successfully been tested. But the House Members stressed they did not feel the acquisition of the F-111 should end with a fourth wing.

The conferees amended slightly a Senate provision requiring Congressional approval of a financial settlement with the Lockheed Aircraft Company before a $200-million fund for the C-5A plane could be spent. The change required that the settlement plan be presented to Congress before the funds could be spent (rather than requiring specific approval for the plan).

A Senate provision requiring a cut in spending for military personnel duty rotation was amended to direct new procedures for reduction of such expenditures and to lengthen tours of duty wherever possible.

Conferees approved in amended form Senate restric-
tions on the use and disposal of chemical-biological war-
fare agents and requirements for annual authorizations
for Navy torpedoes and for the total manpower strength
of the Armed Services. They dropped two Senate pro-
visions designed to encourage the use of idled defense
plants and unemployed defense workers. Also dropped
was a Senate amendment to block changes in the mili-
tary command structure until the Congressional Armed
Services Committees had had 60 days during the 1971
session of Congress to study recommendations of the Fitz-
hugh report on defense reorganization.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 1970, page 395

103

MCPL and Defense Spending

Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (MCPL) was only one of several groups which operated outside the formal committee structure and leadership on Capitol Hill in 1970, but it was unique in that it was both bipartisan and bicameral.

A total of 28 Senators and 70 Representatives were members of MCPL, one-third of them Republicans and the rest Democrats. The organization was formed in 1967 to serve as an information clearinghouse keeping its members abreast of legislation, undertake and promote research through contact with outside experts, arrange formal discussion meetings and provide a liaison with citizens' groups.

In four years, the group had become a well-established permanent organization with a staff of eight full-time and part-time professionals.

Military Spending. On July 2, 1969, MCPL's 15-member military spending committee, headed by Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R Ore.), issued its first report on the defense budget recommending an over-all reduction of $3 billion. More than 50 members, as well as some Congressional defense critics who were not MCPL members, supported the report.

The MCPL military spending report for 1970 was issued on the eve of Senate debate on the defense procurement bill (HR 17123) and a few hours after the Armed Services Committee released its report recommending a $1.3-billion cut in defense procurement. The MCPL report was signed by 27 Members of Congress, including Hatfield and Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.). (Proxmire, a leading advocate of defense cutbacks, became associated with the group's work in late June and subsequently was named co-chairman of the committee.)

The committee recommended cuts of $4.4 to $5.4 billion in the fiscal 1971 bill, excluding recommended manpower cuts (which brought the total reduction to around $10 billion). The 150-page document covered weapons systems, program by program, and discussed over-all strategic objectives as well. It represented a six-month effort by the Congressional offices of 20-25 Members and MCPL staff consultant Ron Tammen.

Proxmire July 14 called the report "one of the most useful documents that's been put together.... It contains more pertinent information than was brought out in last year's lengthy Senate debate. It represents painstaking work by the staff people."

MCPL chairman F. Bradford Morse (R Mass.) said he felt the major Congressional impetus to reduce military spending had come from MCPL, which served to initiate action and develop an awareness of the issue among both legislators and the Administration. Because the issue had aroused public attention and formal Congressional committees had themselves assumed a budget-cutting role, there was no longer such a great need for an independent MCPL study, he said. As a consequence, the group might not work on a military spending report in 1971.

104

# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, FY 1971

## LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

<table><tr><td>February 20, 1970</td><td>Defense Secretary Laird makes annual Defense Posture Statement to Congress. Reaffirms Administration request for $68,745,666,000 in defense appropriations for Fy71.</td></tr><tr><td>October 6, 1970</td><td>House Appropriations Committee reports a bill recommending appropriations of $66,656,561,000.</td></tr><tr><td>October 8, 1970</td><td>House passes the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill. The vote was 274-31.</td></tr><tr><td>December 3, 1970</td><td>Senate Appropriations Committee reports a bill recommending appropriations of $66,417,077,000.</td></tr><tr><td>December 8, 1970</td><td>Senate passes the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill. The vote was 89-0.</td></tr><tr><td>December 15, 1970</td><td>Conference Report is filed with an appropriation level of $66,595,937,000.</td></tr><tr><td>December 16, 1970</td><td>House adopts Conference Report by a vote of 328-30.</td></tr><tr><td>December 28, 1970</td><td>Senate agrees to a motion to table (reject) the Conference Report. Asks new conference with House over provision regarding Cambodia.</td></tr><tr><td>December 29, 1970</td><td>House adopts second Conference Report 234-18. Senate adopts second Conference Report 70-2.</td></tr><tr><td>January . 1971</td><td>President signs bill into law.</td></tr></table>

## MAJOR PROVISIONS

As finally enacted, the bill appropriated a total of $66,595,937,000 for DOD operations in FY71. This sum which was $2.1 billion below the Administration's request represented the smallest defense appropriation since FY 1967. It was over $3 billion less than the FY1970 bill for the same purposes.

The tables below show a comparison of the FY 1971 Defense appropriation with previous years as well as a breakdown of the major items contained in the FY71 bill, as enacted.

105

Defense Budgets and Appropriations
Fiscal Years 1950-1971

(in thousands)

<table><thead><tr><th>Fiscal Year</th><th>Budget Estimates</th><th>Approved by House</th><th>Approved by Senate</th><th>Appropriation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1971</td><td>$68,745,666</td><td>$66,806,561</td><td>$66,417,077</td><td>$66,595,917</td></tr><tr><td>1970</td><td>75,278,200¹</td><td>69,960,048</td><td>69,322,656</td><td>69,640,568</td></tr><tr><td>1969</td><td>77,074,000</td><td>72,239,700</td><td>71,886,893</td><td>71,869,828</td></tr><tr><td>1968</td><td>71,584,000</td><td>70,295,200</td><td>70,132,320</td><td>69,936,620</td></tr><tr><td>1967</td><td>57,664,353</td><td>58,616,445</td><td>58,189,872</td><td>58,067,472</td></tr><tr><td>1966</td><td>45,248,844</td><td>45,188,244</td><td>46,877,063²</td><td>46,887,163</td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>47,471,000</td><td>46,759,267</td><td>46,774,401</td><td>46,752,051</td></tr><tr><td>1964</td><td>49,014,237</td><td>47,082,009</td><td>47,339,707</td><td>47,220,010</td></tr><tr><td>1963</td><td>47,907,000</td><td>47,839,491</td><td>48,429,221</td><td>48,136,247</td></tr><tr><td>1962</td><td>42,942,345</td><td>42,711,105</td><td>46,848,292³</td><td>46,662,556</td></tr><tr><td>1961</td><td>39,335,000</td><td>39,337,867</td><td>40,514,997</td><td>39,996,608</td></tr><tr><td>1960</td><td>39,248,200</td><td>38,843,339</td><td>39,594,339</td><td>39,228,239</td></tr><tr><td>1959</td><td>38,196,947</td><td>38,409,561</td><td>40,042,992⁴</td><td>39,602,827</td></tr><tr><td>1958</td><td>36,128,000</td><td>33,562,725</td><td>34,534,229</td><td>33,759,850</td></tr><tr><td>1957</td><td>34,147,850</td><td>33,635,066</td><td>34,783,734</td><td>34,656,727</td></tr><tr><td>1956</td><td>32,232,815</td><td>31,488,206</td><td>31,882,915</td><td>31,882,815</td></tr><tr><td>1955</td><td>29,887,055</td><td>28,684,250</td><td>29,217,106</td><td>28,800,125</td></tr><tr><td>1954</td><td>40,719,931</td><td>34,434,140</td><td>34,511,302</td><td>34,371,541</td></tr><tr><td>1953</td><td>51,390,709</td><td>46,207,177</td><td>46,403,000</td><td>46,610,938</td></tr><tr><td>1952</td><td>57,679,625</td><td>56,034,717</td><td>61,103,856</td><td>56,939,568</td></tr><tr><td>1951</td><td>13,078,675</td><td>12,910,702</td><td>13,294,581</td><td>13,294,299</td></tr><tr><td>1950</td><td>13,248,960</td><td>13,272,815</td><td>12,731,834</td><td>12,949,562</td></tr></tbody></table>

¹ Original Johnson request was $2.5 billion higher.

² Senate considered Budget estimate of $46,972,844,000.

³ Senate considered Budget estimate of $46,396,945,000.

⁴ Senate considered Budget estimate of $38,786,970,000.

Note: Above amounts do not include any supplemental estimates or appropriations not considered or made in the regular annual Defense Appropriation Acts.

SOURCE: House Appropriations Committee (1960-1971), Congressional Quarterly (1950-1959)

DOD APPROPRIATIONS BILL, FY 1971

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Budget Request</th><th>Final Appropriation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Military personnel</td><td>$ 21,032,800,000</td><td>$ 20,731,800,000</td></tr><tr><td>Retired military personnel</td><td>3,194,000,000</td><td>3,194,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Operation and maintenance</td><td>19,512,015,000</td><td>19,359,606,000</td></tr><tr><td>Procurement</td><td>$ 17,358,600,000</td><td>$ 16,029,110,000</td></tr><tr><td>Research, development</td><td>7,345,600,000</td><td>6,975,800,000</td></tr><tr><td>Vietnamization</td><td>300,000,000</td><td>300,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign currency program</td><td>2,621,000</td><td>2,621,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td><td><strong>$ 68,745,666,000</strong></td><td><strong>$ 66,595,937,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>Breakdown by Services</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>$ 20,210,665,000</td><td>$ 19,629,187,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>21,200,700,000</td><td>20,406,003,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>22,055,600,000</td><td>21,361,086,000</td></tr><tr><td>Defense agencies/OSD</td><td>2,084,701,000</td><td>2,005,661,000</td></tr><tr><td>Retired military personnel</td><td>3,194,000,000</td><td>3,194,000,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td><td><strong>$ 68,745,666,000</strong></td><td><strong>$ 66,595,937,000</strong></td></tr></tbody></table>

106

As enacted, the bill also:

- Authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, to transfer up to $700,000 of the funds among various programs funded in the bill provided he notified the Congress.

- Prohibited the U.S. payment of special combat or overseas duty pay to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia if the payment was higher than that received by U.S. servicemen for the same purpose, except to fulfill agreements entered into propr to July 1, 1970.

- Prohibited the financing by the United States of military operations by the South Vietnamese or other allied troops in support of the Cambodian or Laotian Governments, except to support actions to promote the safe and orderly dis-enagement of U.S. troops from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of American prisoners of war.

- In line with the expressed intention of the President, prohibited the use of funds in the bill to finance the introduction of U.S. ground troops into Laos or Thailand.

- Prohibited the use of funds in the bill to support more than 138,000 defense intelligence or security personnel past June 15, 1971.

107

## HOUSE ACTION

### Appropriations Committee

On October 6, 1970, the House Appropriations Committee reported the DOD Appropriations Bill for FY 1971 recommending an appropriation level of $66.6 billion, approximately $2.1 billion below the Administration's request.

During its consideration, the Committee approved:

- full funding for the F-14 fighter aircraft and the Poseidon multiple warheard (MIRV) missile program, and for the F-111, and the $75 million authorized for the B-1

- the full $1.07 billion for the Safeguard (ABM) system.

- the full $200 million in contingency funding for the C-5A.

- $417.5 million in additional funds for shipbuilding (the House Armed Services Committee had initiated an increase of $435 million in the procurement authorization bill).

Reductions made by the Committee included:

- $38.2 million from the HAWK missile program

- the entire $30.8 million requested for the LANCE missile

- $40 million from the $112.5 million requested for the A-6E Intruder

- the entire $92.3 million requested for production of the E-2C early warning aircraft

- $32.2 million from the $96.2 million requested for the British Harrier aircraft

- $49.5 million from the $99.5 million requested for SRAM

- the entire $33.6 million requested for the SCAD missile

In submitting its report, the Committee included critical commentary on Defense Department practices, calling them inefficient, redundant and wasteful. The report stated that although the Committee was:

> dedicated to maintaining the military superiority (of the U.S.) there is no room for American bungling in the field of defense...... Unlimited resources do not overcome inefficiency and mismanagement. Instead, excessive funding produced more inefficiency and mismanagement. What this country needs is more defense for the dollar, not necessarily more dollars for defense.

### Floor Action

On October 8, 1970, the House passed the DOD Appropriations bill appropriating a total of $66,806,561,000 for FY 1971 -- a sum approximately $150 million more than the Committee-recommended level. The vote was 274-31.

The additional $150 million was added upon the recommendation of Chairman Mahon and was to be spread among the three services to finance operations and maintenance connected with U.S. activities in the Middle East during September 1970. All other efforts to cut funds or restrict defense activities were rejected.

Debate on the bill focused primarily on various allegations of Pentagon mismanagement and on the major amendments to delete or reduce funding of specific programs.

108

The latter were aimed at the ABM system, the F-111 and F-14 aircraft, the C-5A as well as at the maintenance of troops in Vietnam and Western Europe. In addition, the was an effort to reduce overall funding to a $65 billion level.

## A summary of major amendments rejected:

- Cohelan (D-Calif.) amendment to delete $651 million of the $1.07 billion for procurement of the Safeguard ABM system. Voice Vote.

- Bingham (D-N.Y.) amendment to delete the full $389 million for procurement of the F-14 aircraft. Voice Vote.

- Yates (D-Ill.) amendment to delete the $200 million contingency fund for the C-5A. Standing vote: 11-44.

- Minshall (R-Ohio) amendment to delete the full $548 million for the F-111. Standing: 28-89. (the amendment was stimulated by another F-111 crash)

- Bingham (D-N.Y.) amendment to impose a $15 million ceiling on public relations spending by the Pentagon. Voice Vote.

- Biester (R-Pa.) amendment to prohibit funds for maintaining more than 280,000 troops in Europe. Standing: 32-77.

- Riegle (R-Mich.) amendment to place a $15 billion ceiling on Vietnam operations. Voice.

- Fraser (D-Minn.) amendment to specify that funds for Vietnam could be used only for the safe and orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops. Standing 23-65.

- Riegle (R-Mich.) amendment to prohibit funds for U.S. ground combat troops in Vietnam beyond June 20, 1971. Voice.

- Moorhead (D-Pa.) amendment to limit appropriations to $65 billion. Standing: 33-72.

## SENATE ACTION

### Appropriations Committee

On December 3, 1970, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported the DOD Appropriations Bill recommending an appropriation level of $66.4 billion --approximately $389 million less than the House-passed amount. This net reduction stemmed from reductions of some $1.2 billion in House-approved amounts offset by restorations of about $766 million in House cuts.

Thus during consideration, the Committee restored:

- $38.2 million for the HAWK missile

- $30.8 million for the LANCE missile

- $40 million for the A-6E Intruder

109

- $92.3 million for the E-2C early warning aircraft

- $32.2 million for the British Harrier

- $27.7 million of the House cut for the SRAM

- $33.6 million for SCAD missile R&D

The major reduction made by the Senate Committee occurred when it eliminated the full $417.5 million approved by the House for additional shipbuilding funds. The Committee made this cut on the basis that the Administration had never requested this sum and the Senate had not formally authorized it. (The original $435 million in additional funds had been added to the authorization bill by the House and accepted by Senate conferees in conference.)

In addition to funding levels, the Committee also recommended numerous legislative provisions not contained in the House-passed bill. The most significant of these dealt with Indochina. Thus the Committee added Cambodia to the list of countries barred to U.S. ground troops by the FY70 appropriations bill. It also added language enacted in the procurement authorization bill prohibiting the financing of allied support to the Governments of Laos and Cambodia. Finally, the Committee imposed a $2.5 billion ceiling on aid to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia.

## Floor Action

On December 8, 1970 after a relatively brief debate, the Senate passed the DOD Appropriations Bill at the Committee-recommended level. The vote was 89-0.

During debate on the bill, most of the Senate's defense spending critics expressed satisfaction with the reductions made by the Appropriations Committee as well as with the legislative restrictions imposed. Senator Cooper (R-Ky.), a cosponsor of the 1970 amendment to bar U.S. troops from Cambodia applauded the inclusion of similar language in the defense bill stating that it was "an affirmation of the constitutional principle that the President cannot commit troops to war in support of another country without the approval of Congress". Senator Mansfield, while expressing general approval of the bill, did complain about recent Administration statements that it did not intend to withdraw U.S. troops from NATO in the near future and warned that he would renew attempts to effect such a reduction in 1971.

Only one amendment was offered to the bill on the floor. This was offered by Senator Fullbright to place a $20 million ceiling on DOD public relations activities (the Committee recommended $30.4 million). The amendment was rejected by a vote of 44-46.

A table comparing House and Senate approved funding levels follows:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>House</th><th>Senate</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Military personnel</td><td>$20,689,300,000</td><td>$20,778,575,000</td></tr><tr><td>Retired military personnel</td><td>3,194,000,000</td><td>3,194,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Operation and maintenance</td><td>19,363,630,000</td><td>19,211,671,000</td></tr><tr><td>Procurement</td><td>16,243,810,000</td><td>15,970,110,000</td></tr><tr><td>Research development</td><td>6,954,700,000</td><td>6,960,100,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>House</th><th>Senate</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Vietnamization</td><td>$ 358,500,000</td><td>$ 380,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign currency program</td><td>2,621,000</td><td>2,621,000</td></tr><tr><td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td><td><strong>$66,803,361,000</strong></td><td><strong>$66,417,077,000</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>Breakdown by Services</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>$19,642,471,000</td><td>$19,699,472,000</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>20,380,503,000</td><td>20,288,503,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>21,630,386,000</td><td>21,301,361,000</td></tr><tr><td>Defense agencies</td><td>2,059,361,000</td><td>2,017,361,000</td></tr><tr><td>Retired personnel</td><td>3,194,000,000</td><td>3,294,000,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

TOTAL $66,803,361,000 $66,417,077,000

110

CONFERENCE ACTION

The Conference Report on the DOD Appropriations Bill was filed on December 15 1970 appropriating a total of $66,595,937,000. With respect to funding levels major conferee actions included:

--$58.2 million for the HAWK missile. This represented a partial restoration of the House cut of $38.2 million; the Senate had approved $81.4 million

--full funding of the LANCE missile. The House had deleted this; the Senate had restored it.

--the full $112.5 million for the A-6E Intruder. The House had cut this by $40 million; the Senate had approved the full amount.

--$64 million for the British Harrier thus accepting the House cut of $32 million

--$43 million for the E-2C early warning aircraft. The Senate had approved the full $92.3 million requested; the House had deleted it.

--$188.5 million in additional funds for shipbuilding. The House had approved $417 million; the Senate none.

--$18 million for the International freedom fighter aircraft intended for export. House had approved the full $30 million requested; the Senate had deleted it.

--$99.5 million for the SRAM thus accepting the Senate restoration of a $49.5 million House cut.

--accepted the deletion of R&D funds for the SCAD as approved by the House.

With respect to the legislative provisions regarding U.S. activities in Indo-
china, House conferees insisted upon modification of the Senate-passed provision
adding Cambodia to the list of countries barred from the introduction of U.S.
troops. A proviso was added stating that this restriction did not prohibit the
President from taking action in said areas designed to "promote the safe and
orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to
aid in the release of U.S. prisoners of war".

Conferees added the same modification to the Senate provision prohibiting U.S. support of actions assisting the Governments of Laos or Cambodia.

The Conference Report went to the House floor on December 16, 1970 where it was
adopted by a vote of 327 to 30. It went to the Senate floor on December 28, 1970
where a motion was offered by Senator Ellender to recommit the bill to conference
This passed by voice vote. Many of the supporters of the motion to table the
bill opposed the modifications made in conference to the Indochina restrictions.
Additional support was provided by those who opposed other aspects of the bill
or normally voted against defense spending.

A second conference was convened the same day and a further compromise was

111

reached regarding the Indochina provisions. The House conferees agreed
to delete their modification permitting entry of U.S. ground troops into
Laos, Thailand or Cambodia when this supported the safe and orderly withdrawal
of U.S. troops or aided in the release of POW's. In return, the Senate conferees
agreed to drop Cambodia from the list of countries barred from U.S. ground troops.

The second conference report was approved in the House on December 29, 1970 by a vote of 234-18. It was approved on the same day in the Senate by a vote of 70-2.

AVIATION WEEK

4 JANUARY 1971 (8)

113

The TFX Verdict

The report on the TFX contract of the Senate Com-
mittee on Government Operations made by its perma-
nent subcommittee on investigations chaired by Sen.
John L. McClellan (D.-Ark.) is a monumental work of
legislative probing. It took eight years and covered the
history of the TFX (now the F-111) development from
contract award to service use. The full report (No.
91-1496) is available from the Government Printing
Office in Washington, D. C. We recommend it as re-
quired reading for anybody dealing with the military
procurement process and also for students of the Penta-
gon management policies of former Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara. Chairman McClellan deserves the
appreciation of the taxpayers whose interests he so ably
represented for his dogged, thorough and lucid pursuit of
the facts in the face of equally dogged Pentagon obfusca-
tion. The subcommittee counsel, Jerome S. Adlerman
and staff members John Brick, Charles Cromwell, John
J. Walsh and Thomas A. Nunnally also did noteworthy
work.

We present the conclusions of this report below and
will have further comment on them at a later date. In
addition to Chairman McClellan, the report was signed
by Sens. Henry Jackson (Wash.). Sam Ervin (N. C.);
Abraham Ribicoff (Conn.) and Lee Metcalf (Mont.);
all Democrats, and by Republicans Karl Mundt (S. D.);
Charles Percy (Ill.) and Edward Gurney (Fla.). Sen.
Edmund Muskie (D.-Me.) filed a dissent defending Mr.
McNamara's integrity and Sen. Jacob Javits (R.-N. Y.).
added a demurrer that the conflict of interest judg-
ment on Mr. McNamara's former deputy Defense Secre-
tary Roswell Gilpatric was too harsh.—R.B.H.).

The TFX program has been a failure. The federal
government will spend more than $7.8 billion to pro-
cure about 500 aircraft, although the original pro-
duction schedule called for more than 1,700 aircraft
to be purchased for less money. Of the 500 planes we
will have, less than 100 (the F-111Fs) come reason-
ably close to meeting the original standards. Spend-
ing so great a sum for so few aircraft represents a
fiscal blunder of the greatest magnitude. It is clear
that vital financial resources were squandered in the
attempt to make the TFX program produce satis-
factory results.

The billion-dollar savings in the TFX program, so
grandiloquently promised by Secretary of Defense
McNamara, became instead a directly accountable
waste of more than one-half billion dollars spent on
the F-111B, the F-111K and the RF-111 versions of
the plane, all of which are unacceptable and had to
be canceled and abandoned before production. The
total failure of the attempt to produce a satisfactory
F-111B has caused a long and unnecessary delay in
filling the Navy's requirement for a new carrier-based
fighter. The lack of fighter maneuverability in the Air
Force versions of the F-111 plane made it necessary
to undertake the development of another fighter—the
F-15—-to fill this role for the Air Force in the 1970s.
The excessive costs of the Air Force versions forced
drastic cutbacks in the numbers of aircraft which can
be procured to fill the tactical and strategic inventory.
The long delays in getting the F-111s into opera-
tional use certainly have had an adverse impact on
our defense posture.

Aside from the serious impact which the TFX
program has had upon our national security and aside
from the obvious waste of scarce resources, the TFX
case also has affected public confidence in our de-
fense establishment. As this report makes clear, the
primary cause of the TFX fiasco was mismanage-
ment. A series of management blunders made for
various reasons, compounded errors with more errors
and caused the failure of the program. The manage-
ment blunders were made at the highest echelons of
the government. Top presidential appointees in the
Dept. of Defense during the McNamara era over-
rode expert advice to impose personal judgments
on complex matters beyond their expertise. These
same officials then made extraordinary efforts to con-
ceal the results of their errors in the TFX case. These
efforts included deliberate attempts to deceive the
Congress, the press, and the American people. Un-
derstandably, this sorry record has done nothing to
enhance public confidence in the integrity and com-
petence of the people who are charged with pre-
serving the national security. Nor has it improved the
public image of the Dept. of Defense.

What should be done to correct these conditions?
Announcements have already been made of greater
decentralization of the management system within the
Pentagon so that technical aspects of weapons de-
velopment programs would be managed where they
should be—by the individual services which eventu-
ally will be responsible for using in combat the
weapons that they develop. There is stated to be
increased awareness of the need for current and valid
assessments of program status and progress. There
also is stated to be concern with the problems of con-
ducting research and development concurrent with
early production.

The subcommittee believes that these trends in
management policies, if diligently followed, could
lead to improvements in the weapons acquisition
process and in management effectiveness within the
Pentagon.

The subcommittee is hopeful that the civilians who
now run the Dept. of Defense, as well as those who
will follow, will be committed to a policy of candor
and truthfulness in their relations with the press, the
public, and the Congress.

Such a policy, if observed, should do much to im-
prove public confidence in the credibility of the
Pentagon.

It would be foolhardy, however, to assume that
such errors as are exemplified in the TFX program
could not be repeated. A major lesson of the TFX-
case is that the Congress must not hesitate, in the
exercise of its oversight function, to examine major
procurement procedures, decisions, and programs.
particularly whenever there is obvious deviation from
established practices. The Congress must be ever
watchful, because there could be recurrences of the
serious and damaging mismanagement that attended
the TFX program from its inception, as reflected in
the subcommittee's hearings and as summarized in
this report.

113

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

MONITOR 4 JAN 71

How much Pentagon economy?

That eternal vigilance is the price of
economy at the Pentagon, Congress is well
aware. Hopefully, it will not forget this
when the Pentagon's new budget is car-
ried up Capitol Hill early next year, with
a requested spending boost of perhaps $3
billion.

Already the Department of Defense is
putting forth suggestions that its capacity
for economizing is pretty well exhausted
— that the nation's allegedly short-
changed defenses will suffer seriously if
the trend is not reversed. Any such declar-
ations should be ruthlessly examined, at
a time when the United States is annually
spending some $75 billion of its treasure
on defense.

The other day the Pentagon's comptroller said that inflation, plus pay increases, already had eaten up much of that "peace dividend" which was supposed to result from the winding down of the war in Vietnam. Vietnam costs have been cut back by about $10 billion so far. But undeniably pay raises for military and civilian workers have eaten up $4.6 billion of this. Add in the inflated costs for new hardware and the $10 billion just about vanishes.

One should credit the general efforts of
President Nixon and Defense Secretary
Laird to pare the defense budget. The size

of the armed forces has been reduced
from 3.5 million, when Mr. Nixon took
office, to about 2.9 million. There will be
a further drop to perhaps 2.5 million.
Meanwhile defense officials have post-
poned some new weapons: the new
manned bomber and the new super-
Polaris submarine

But the Pentagon is arguing that there
has to be more money in the new budget
for research and development, and for
sprucing up the nonnuclear deterrent.
And that there must be more money for
foreign military aid, to implement the
Nixon doctrine — i.e., to help other coun-
tries man their own defenses.

Credit all of these arguments, and there
is still reason to ask: How much money is
going into weapons systems that will yet
be discarded? How seriously has Washing-
ton modified its overstrenuous objective of
being able to fight two major wars and
one minor war, all at the same time? And
how much waste has been squeezed out of
defense contracting?

Congress and the public expect to see
Pentagon spending continue its down-
ward trend. They expect to see a legiti-
mate "peace dividend" derived from Viet-
nam. The Pentagon will have a lot of ex-
plaining to do if it spoils these expecta-
tions.

WASHINGTON POST

5 JAN 1971 Pg 1

# Pentagon
Budget
To Go Up

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon budget request that goes to Congress later this month will call for defense spending of about $75.5 billion in the fiscal year beginning next July, according to reliable Pentagon sources.

The request, worked out with the President's Office of Management and Budget but still subject to last-minute changes by the White House, represents the first upturn in military expenditures since the Nixon administration took office. It includes sizable increases for work on a new bomber and a missile-firing submarine.

However, Pentagon officials say that because of continued inflation and the soaring costs of increased pay and allowances for military manpower, the higher budget in Fiscal 1972 will not stem the continuing decline in the number of ships, planes and men in the armed forces next year.

Final spending for the current fiscal year has not yet been released by the Pentagon but officials place it at some where between $72 billion and $73 billion. Spending totaled $77.8 billion in Fiscal 1970 and a high of $73.7 billion in Fiscal 1969.

The new defense budget will include the first big jump in several years in the amount the Pentagon spends on research and development of new weapons that may be needed in the future.

Officials say an increase of about $800 million is planned in this category above the roughly $7 billion this year.

Big increases are planned for development work on a new Air Force bomber, the B-1, that may eventually replace the aging fleet of B-52s, and on the Navy's Underwater Long Range Missile System (ULMS), a potential replacement in the 1980s for the Po

laris/Poseidon submarine fleet

The B-1 program, which will get about $75 million this year, is slated to cost about $350 million next year, according to informed officials.

The present ULMS budget of 344 million is due to be expanded to more than $100 million.

Decisions on actual mass production of both these new strategic weapons are still a few years away. However, in discussing these projects, defense officials now tend to emphasize their value as eventual replacements for obsolete bombers and submarines rather than strictly as reactions to the huge Soviet nuclear weapons buildup of recent years.

Thus, officials explain that even if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. each agreement on limiting strategic armaments, it will eventually be necessary to replace aging existing weapons in order to prevent any unilaterial concessions through obsolescence.

Within the Pentagon it is argued that because both the new bomber and proposed new missile-firing submarine will be so much more efficient than their present-day counterparts, it will be possible to replace older weapons with a smaller number of new ones. In this manner, they believe, a SALT agreement that would limit the number of weapons on each side would not be upset.

To build and put to sea a new fleet of 15 to 25 ULMS submarines might cost between $10 billion and $15 billion over eight to ten years, it is estimated. Despite the costs, the concept has considerable high-level support both in the White House and the Pentagon as a means of keeping the U.S. nuclear retaliatory force virtually invulnerable to attack for the foreseeable future.

The need for a new bomber has been more controversial.

According to well informed officials, however, the B-1 advocates have recently won a major battle within the administration and the future of the craft seems more assured.

The major argument against the B-1, sources say, was not centered on whether it could escape a surprise attack on U.S. bomber bases or penetrate heavy Soviet air defenses, but on its cost.

The Air Force has estimated that a fleet of perhaps 240 B-1s could be developed, built and supported for about $12 billion, with production models costing about $25 million to $30 million each.

and Budget, reportedly concerned about the accuracy of the cost estimate, favored further study of the plane—which has been studied since 1962—with an eye toward a less expensive version.

One suggested alternative was to use a very large but relatively slow-moving jumbo aircraft that could fire missiles and decoys already under development for the B-1, at in-land targets, from beyond Soviet defenses. This would remove the need for a high-speed, high-performance plane like the B-1, which is also designed to slip through the defenses and carry additional bombs directly over inland targets.

The B-1, has undergone lengthy reviews by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and other top-level civilian officials and in its proposed form is said to have solid support. This view is said to have prevailed in the most recent confrontation.

The new budget will also include increases for U.S. conventional weaponry and military assistance programs, but officials say that in terms of actual purchasing power the higher spending figures in general will at best hold the line at about this year's level.

The $75.5 billion figure for next year includes some additional military pay raises, officials say. But they leave the door open to still others that may be proposed separately as the Pentagon attempts to make service life more attractive in the hopes of reaching an all-volunteer force and eliminating the draft by mid-1973.

Secretary Laird has said that 53-54 per cent of the entire defense budget next year would go to manpower costs.

114

WASHINGTON POST - 9 JANUARY 1971

# Soviets Propose ABM Limit

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has proposed a limited, first-step strategic arms agreement that would bar rival antimissile (ABM) systems other than for the protection of Washington and Moscow.

This would leave until later an agreement on limiting rival land and sea-based missiles.

The Soviet proposal came toward the end of round three of the SALT talks that wound up in Helsinki last Dec. 18, it has now been learned.

But the Nixon administration opposes an ABM-only agreement despite the fact that the United States, under President Johnson, originally sought the SALT talks in order to curb ABMs. It was the Soviet Union that insisted on including offensive nuclear weapons as well as defensive systems before Moscow would agree to SALT.

The reversal of position on Moscow's part came about this morning the Helsinki round, from Nov. 2 to Dec. 18, the Soviet delegation placed major emphasis on a 'demand that in any overall agreement covering both offensive and defensive weapons, the United States must include its aircraft in Western Europe and aboard carriers in both the Atlantic-Mediterranean area and in the Pacific, since such planes can deliver nuclear weapons to Soviet soil.

But the American delegation was under presidential instruction to reject the inclusion of what are known as

FBS, forward based systems. In essence, the United States stood pat on its proposal put forward at the Vienna round last July 24.

In turn, the Soviets refused to put forward a counterproposal covering both offensive and defensive weapons until the United States agreed in principle to include FBS. But finally, in December, in the face of this deadlock the Soviets suggested breaking out the ABM issue from the larger package.

Gerard C. Smith, the chief American negotiator, was forbidden by Washington to consider this proposal. Hence the Helsinki session ended in disappointment with the next round due to open in Vienna on March 15.

It is now conceded within the administration that pressure can be expected from the new Congress, especially in the Senate, to accept the idea of an ABM-only agreement as a first SALT step. The Federation of American Scientists recently called for just such a step.

The argument here is that the two destabilizing steps in the arms race are the creation of rival ABM systems and the development and deployment of multiple warheads, MIRVs. It is generally agreed that control of MIRVs is now impossible, given their deployment by the United States and testing with a view to deployment by the Soviet Union.

The Pentagon said yesterday that the Air Force has completed installation of the

first 50 Minuteman III intercontinental missiles with MIRV warheads. The installation began last June at Minot Air Force Base, S.D.

The unit is designated as the 741st Strategic Missile Squadron, part of the 91st Strategic Missile Wing. Each of the 50 missiles carries three warheads, and each of these a nuclear punch of around 170 kilotons compared to the 20-kiloton warhead of the Hiroshima bomb. About half the 1,000 Minutemen are due to be converted to MIRV warheads.

In addition, the first American Poseidon submarine with up to 14 missiles, each with an 18-kiloton punch, is due to become operational in a few days. The Soviet MIRV program is thought to be about a year and a half behind the American development.

Thus with MIRVs so far developed and deployed that control is rated next to impossible, there is bound to be increased pressure in Washington to control the other destabilizing development, the ABMs.

But thus far the Nixon administration flatly opposes an ABM-only agreement. The desire, and still the hope, is that a way can be found around the FBS issue so that an ABM limitation can be linked in a SALT treaty to a numerical

limitation on rival missile systems, including a sub-ceiling on the giant Soviet SS-9s.

In proposing an ABM-only agreement, the Soviets offered to give details on how it might be done if the United States would accept the principle. But since Smith was foreclosed on that, the details were not forthcoming at Helsinki.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on Dec. 16 announced that Moscow had begun to slow its SS-9 program, an announcement that followed Soviet hints that this somewhat was related to SALT. The Soviets also have complained that the United States missed their "signal" in late 1969, at the start of SALT, when they first halted SS-9 construction.

However, in order to win Senate approval for phase two of the Safeguard ABM system last August, the administration argued that continuation of the program would be a "bargaining chip" in winning Soviet agreement to an SS-9 limitation by treaty.

Between now and March 15 the administration will have to decide whether to go back to the Johnson administration position, which was an ABM-only agreement, or to find some solution to the FBS issue in order to get a formal SS-9 limitation agreement.

115