Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

2

find ourselves isolated in the next round in Asia where also the status quo will not be maintained.

All this is clear to the Soviets. It is therefore eminently to their advantage to give the impression that the present lines of division between it and the Free World are rigid because this represents their best means to transform the situation in their favor. Adenauer pushed through his policy with the argument that the way to unity lay through strength and that in any case, in a world divided into two camps, the Federal Republic had no option but to choose the West. [It is significant that the USSR has exerted all its efforts to undermine the psychological basis of this policy.]

But at the very moment when West Germany is in a position to become strong, the USSR has made clear that it will never agree to German unity except on its own terms and this decision is all the more impressive to West German opinion because it is given the symbolic form of forcing the diplomatic recognition of two Germanies. And just as Adenauer was facing the most serious test of his foreign policy, the "Geneva spirit" deprived him of any effective negotiating basis because in any negotiation the side which can not risk failure is in a weak position. When the meeting of the Big Four ended with declarations of amity without a single concrete Soviet concession and without the slightest progress toward German unity, Adenauer could not afford to let the Moscow meeting break up. He could not be more intransigent than Eisenhower: a country in the center of the continent cannot have worse relations with the USSR than its strongest ally.

The Soviet strategy is therefore plain. Since they can only lose through German unity they prefer to keep Germany divided. Since they have been given time to do so with impunity, they are using it to create a frame-work in which to take the omus for the failure of unity off themselves.

Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

3

They are doing this by an attempt to force the recognition of two Germanies. At the worst, it will give them control of the pace of future negotiations; in any case it will gradually eliminate the Western allies from any discussions about German unity; at best, from the Soviet point of view, it would continue their salient into the Center of Europe. To achieve these ends, they have moved with great skill. They have brought about a general detente through measures which cost them nothing much such as change of tone or visits of farm delegations, thus eroding the psychological basis of any firm policy. They have refused to talk about German unity, thus making clear that the achievement of unity will depend on their good-will and mortgaging the future of Adenauer's policy. All this, it must be added, has been made possible by a confusion on the part of the U.S. of the form of stability with its cause.

As a result, Adenauer finds himself in a desperate position: German unity is the key political issue in Germany. Although one can doubt that Adenauer considers it an overriding concern, he nevertheless has had to legitimize his Western orientation as a means to achieve it. But now, at the crucial point, for his Foreign Policy, Adenauer may find that unity has been removed from the control of the Big Four and that pressure mounts for direct talks between the East and West German regimes. His decision to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR can only lead to a demand that the Western allies now recognize the East German regime. And even if this is refused - which will not be easy - the Soviets will make certain that they are always negotiating with both regimes concurrently. In order to force the Soviets to cease doing what they never had a right to do (that is, detain German prisoners ten years after the end of hostilities), Adenauer has had to agree [see F.e. Grohwell's visit the day after Adenauer left]

[Y]

Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

4

Conference

to an act which symbolizes the semi-permanent division of Germany, thus demonstrating that progress on any political issue can only be made through direct German-Soviet talks, not by means of U.S. support. He will be in a difficult position now to push rearmament. And if the next Foreign Minister's ends without results, Adenauer will have difficulty justifying his Western orientation, particularly since he has announced that there that German unity will be

The U.S. can counteract these trends only by becoming clear about its objectives and above all by capturing the symbol of German unity. The measures to do this have been discussed at length and will not be repeated here. It may be useful to make one general statement: We must avoid any gimmick even if it temporarily embarasses the Soviets. Gimmicks play into the Soviets' hands because they trade them for time, the most valuable commodity from their point of view. It will enable them to shift the discussion onto a plane where it will soon be deprived of all meaning. Such a gimmick would be an invitation to Adenauer to attend the Big Four meeting. Even if it embarasses the Soviets-and this is doubtful-it would be undesirable for these reasons:

a. It would not help Adenauer even if accepted. The only strategy which may succeed at Geneva is one which poses the refusal to continue to negotiate as the sanction for a failure of negotiation. But this is the one sanction Adenauer cannot afford to associate himself with personally because the domestic pressures for unity are too strong.

b. If the conference is unsuccessful, Adenauer's prestige would be diminished even more. This is why he has dissociated himself from its results by stating that German unity is in the hands of the Big Four.

Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

5

If it is successful-even in creating symbols-his presence there is not required.

c. The Soviets will undoubtedly reply by asking for an invitation to the East German regime.

Adenauer's Moscow visit has thus put both U.S. policy and his own on the spot. It was not caused by his weakness, however, but ours. Unless we quickly adapt our tune and our policy to the new circumstances, Adenauer's visit will only be an augury of things to come. The forthcoming foreign ministers' conference may represent our last chance.

The Adenauer visit to Moscow is the first fruit of the "Geneva spirit."
To be sure, it was arranged before the summit conference. But it was made
inevitable by our agreement to a summit conference and foredoomed by its
course. For when the President of the U. S. agreed to confer with the Soviets,
the Chancellor of the Federal Republic whose aspirations for German unity
depend at least, in part, on Soviet good will was in no position to reject an
invitation to Moscow. And in an atmosphere of seeming conciliation, in which,
moreover, the issue of German unity had seemed to fall under the table, Adenauer
could hardly afford to return from Moscow without any results. To be sure, Geneva
was a necessary stage in our diplomacy. But the manner in which it was con-
ducted (except perhaps for our aerial inspection proposal) has severely mortgaged
the future course of our policy.

The first thing the Adenauer visit did was to explode the idea that the
maintenance of the status quo is inevitable because the risks of German unification
are too great for either side. However valid this argument is in the abstract, it
is contrary to all historical experience and contrary to the dynamics of the current
situation. Whatever will occur in the next decade, the one contingency which
will surely not come to pass is a continuation of the status quo. If the lines through
Europe remain as they are now, Western Europe will drift into neutrality and the
Federal Republic will disengage itself from NATO and become increasingly attracted
to a direct deal with the East. If a real detente occurs, we will find ourselves
isolated in the next round in Asia where also the status quo will not be maintained.

All this is clear to the Soviets. It is therefore eminently to their advantage to give the impression that the present lines of division between it and the Free World are rigid because this represents their best means to transform the situation in their favor. Adenauer pushed through his policy with the argument that the way to unity lay through strength and that in any case, in a world divided into two camps, the Federal Republic had no option but to choose the West. It is significant that the USSR has exerted all its efforts to undermine the psychological basis of this policy. At the very moment when West Germany is in a position to become strong, the USSR has made clear that it will never agree to German unity, except on its own terms, and this decision is all the more impressive to West German opinion because it is given the symbolic form of forcing the diplomatic recognition of two Germanies. And just as Adenauer was facing the most serious test of his foreign policy, the "Geneva spirit" deprived him of any effective negotiating basis because in any negotiation the side which cannot risk failure is in a weak position. When the meeting of the Big Four ended with declarations of amity without a single concrete Soviet concession and without the slightest progress toward German unity, Adenauer could not afford to let the Moscow meeting break up. He could not be more intransigent than Eisenhower: a country in the center of the continent cannot have worse relations with the USSR than its strongest ally.

The Soviet strategy is therefore plain. Since they can only lose through German unity they prefer to keep Germany divided. Since they have been given time to do so with impunity, they are using it to create a frame-work in which to take the onus for the failure of unity off themselves. They are doing this by an

attempt to force the recognition of two Germanies. At the worst, it will give them control of the pace of future negotiations; in any case it will gradually eliminate the Western allies from any discussions about German unity; at best, from the Soviet point of view, it would continue their salient into the Center of Europe. To achieve these ends, they have moved with great skill. They have brought about a general detente through measures which cost them nothing more than a change of tone or visits of farm delegations, thus eroding the psychological basis of any firm policy. They have refused to talk about German unity, thus making it clear that the achievement of unity will depend on their good-will and mortgaging the future of Adenauer's policy. All this, it must be added, has been made possible by a confusion on the part of the U. S. of the form of stability with its cause.

As a result, Adenauer finds himself in a desperate position. German unity is the key political issue in Germany. Although one can doubt that Adenauer considers it an overriding concern, he nevertheless has had to legitimize his Western orientation as a means to achieve it. But now, at the crucial point, for his foreign policy, Adenauer may find that unity has been removed from the control of the Big Four and that pressure mounts for direct talks between the East and West German regimes. His decision to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR can only lead to a demand that the Western allies now recognize the East German regime. And even if this is refused - which will not be easy - the Soviets will make certain that they are always negotiating with both regimes concurrently. (See J. E. Grotewohl's visit the day after Adenauer left). In order to

for unity are too strong.

b. If the conference is unsuccessful, Adenauer's prestige would be diminished even more. This is why he has dissociated himself from its results by stating that German unity is in the hands of the Big Four. If it is successful - even in creating symbols - his presence there is not required.

Adenauer's Moscow visit has thus put both U. S. policy and his own on the spot. It was not caused by his weakness, however, but ours. Unless we quickly adapt our tone and our policy to the new circumstances, Adenauer's visit will only be an augury of things to come. The forthcoming foreign ministers' conference may represent our last chance.

Reflections on Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

The Adenauer visit to Moscow is the first fruit of the "Geneva spirit". To be sure, it was arranged before the summit conference. But it was made inevitable by our agreement to a summit conference and foredoomed by its course. For when the President of the U.S. agreed to confer with the Soviets, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic whose aspirations for German unity depend at least in part on Soviet good will was in no position to reject an invitation to Moscow. And in an atmosphere of seeming conciliation, in which, moreover, the issue of German unity had seemed to fall under the table, Adenauer could hardly afford to return from Moscow without any results. To be sure, Geneva was a necessary stage in our diplomacy. But the manner in which it was conducted (except perhaps for our aerial inspection proposal) has severely mortgaged the future course of our policy.

Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

5

Adenauer's Moscow visit has thus put both U.S. policy and his own on the spot. It was not caused by his weakness, however, but ours. Unless we quickly adapt our tone and our policy to the new circumstances, Adenauer's visit will only be an augury of things to come. The forthcoming foreign ministers' conference may represent our last chance.