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Originator: Possony

DRAFT REPORT -- AUGUST-OCTOBER PANEL

III. DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY

1. General

The United States is confronted by a series of short-range and long-range dangers and opportunities. Both dangers and opportunities may be described geographically, in terms of security, "functionally", in the context of world public opinion, and with respect to American strategic policies.

Dangers and opportunities in their geographic context.

2. The Soviet Bloc

a. The main dangers are that the Soviet government:

(1) Sticks to its aggressive and militant communism;

(2) Streamlines and improves its methods of political warfare and military expansion;

(3) Succeeds in enlisting the wholehearted support of the many peoples in Russia, the satellite countries, China, and in communist political groupings outside the Iron Curtain, and specifically succeeds in obtaining support for oppressive communism and aggressive operations;

(4) Is successful in improving the efficiency of the Iron Curtain and in winning the "intelligence battle";

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(5) Continues the growth of its military and economic power and accumulates strength at a faster pace than the United States;

(6) Succeeds in integrating the economies and military structures of all countries within the Soviet bloc and particularly of China and Russia; and, in general,

(7) Proves to be far more successful than their opponents, including the United States.

b. In the short run, the main danger consists in the Soviets being able to carry out a massive maneuver of deception, for the purpose of disarming the Free World by political and psychological means.

c. The long-range threat is that, in the absence of war, the Soviet bloc will be able to overtake the United States and its Allies, become the strongest and most solid politico-military power, assume world leadership and impose a communist system.

3. a. The main opportunities are that the Soviet government will:

(1) Gradually abandon the militant brand of communism;

(2) Eliminate aggressiveness, and abandon any plans of world revolution or conquest;

(3) Adopt a moderate course in most of its policies, and ultimately modify the communist ideology to the extent of no longer pushing forward with its program but instead allowing the adoption of non-dogmatic, pragmatic solutions;

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(4) Within the Soviet structure a process of re-democratization may be set in motion which would lead to a modification of the present dictatorship and to the emergence of an authoritarian, semi-democratic government, with some separation of powers and increasing influence of the "middle classes;"

(5) The interrelationships between the member states of the Soviet bloc may become more "federal" in character;

(6) The increase in the economic strength of the Soviet economies may be used to improve standards of living rather than military striking power;

(7) The improvements in education may serve to undermine the historical dogmatism of the Russian peoples and lead to a more objective approach to political problems.

b. There are very few short-range opportunities beyond the possibility that the Soviets may be willing to transform their present _deceptive_ moderation into a true course of gradual adaptation.

c. In the long run, the main opportunity is that the Soviet government and other forces within the Soviet bloc can be stimulated in their evolution toward a less aggressive and doctrinaire policy and toward a more cooperative and progressive socio-political structure.

NATO

4. a. The main _dangers_ concerning NATO are that:

(1) The alliance will remain weak and vacillating;

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(2) Some of the present NATO members will secede, with the
possibility that the entire structure may collapse, and that the U.S. may
become encircled and isolated;

(3) The alliance will remain unproductive in the social, economic,
psychological and cultural fields, with the various members pursuing
strictly nationalistic courses of action;

(4) The peoples under NATO will remain poorly motivated, continue to misunderstand the purpose of the alliance and prove unable to develop adequate morale.

(5) In some of the NATO countries there is the danger that the present stagnation of social and political institutions and management will continue; that neutralism will make considerable progress to the extent of controlling national policies; and that unrest in overseas possessions will have repercussions in the metropolitan areas.

b. The main short-range danger is that NATO will cease to be a
proper instrument of common defense and yet provide a sense of false
security.

c. The main long-range danger is that NATO will lose its military
meaning and fail in its purpose of ever closer non-military cooperation
and possibly limited integration. (These statements are not supposed to
prejudge the possibility that NATO might be replaced by, or be developed
into, a different but more satisfactory structure, or that its present
membership cannot be increased or reduced.)

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5. The main opportunities with respect to NATO are that:

a. Cooperation between member states will grow in all areas;

b. Many activities will be undertaken jointly and lead to mutual confidence;

c. Some areas of public life, especially in the economic domain will be integrated, or at least closely coordinated;

d. Above all, political stagnation will be replaced by dynamism and reform, to the point that peoples living within the NATO area will become properly motivated, acquire confidence in their future, and cooperate wholeheartedly among themselves and with the U.S.

Free World Outside of NATO

6. a. Since the situation in these countries is varied, it is difficult to generalize. However, the main dangers in all of these countries are that:

(1) Democratic institutions may be eroded;

(2) Wherever there are authoritarian and semi-feudal structures, these regimes may prove to be unstable and susceptible to communist infiltration;

(3) The economic systems in many of those countries may lag in productivity, especially if they are under strongly nationalistic management;

(4) The intellectual commitments of these countries to the causes of freedom and national independence as well as their pro-democratic

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motivations may weaken, with the result that some of them may fall
to the side of the Soviet bloc.

b. In the short-range there is the specific danger that communist
parties may be able to undermine free world cooperation and that in
some instances they may gain significant electoral victories.

c. The main long-range danger is that, in some way or another,
these countries may fall under communist or at least anti-American
leadership.

7. As to opportunities, they are the same as in the case of the NATO
countries. In addition insofar as the authoritarian and semi-feudal regimes
are concerned, there is the possibility that a process of gradual
democratization and reform can be put into motion. The opportunity exists
that many of these countries can be brought into closer cooperation with
NATO and the United States and that they will participate in the dynamic
processes leading to the growth of freedom in the non-Soviet world.
This opportunity exists particularly in the European nations not tied to
NATO, in most countries of Latin America, and in the dominions of the
British Commonwealth, with the exception of South Africa where
particularly acute short and long-range dangers are emerging.

Neutral and Neutralist Countries, Especially in Asia

8. In addition to the dangers outlined under the two preceding categories,
these countries may develop into full-fledged socialist and perhaps

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semi-communist regimes and, in many issues, may be siding with the
Soviet bloc. Moreover, some of these countries may prove to be
domestically unstable.

9. The main opportunity, of course, is that the free world will succeed in tying these countries to pro-democratic policies and in persuading them that it would be more advantageous to support the free rather than the Soviet orbit. In practically all of these countries there are ample opportunities for the gradual solidification, or for the establishment of suitable governments, although some of these regimes, at least temporarily, may have to assume a more authoritarian character than is desirable in older democracies.

Underdeveloped Areas

10. In addition to the dangers outlined under these three preceding categories, the underdeveloped areas suffer from too much and from too immature a nationalism, often leading them to unreasoned opposition to the erstwhile "imperialist" countries. The fight against "colonialism" often places the U. S. in the highly embarrassing position either to oppose independence movements or to alienate major European allies -- a quandary from which a do-nothing attitude or a vacillating policy rarely offers a suitable escape.

11. In many of the underdeveloped areas there exists great dangers for racial strife and even racial war.

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12. Development inevitably must lead to the break-up of existing social structures and therefore produce a great deal of psychological frustration and social unrest. Hence, opportunities arise for the communists to take advantage of numerous cleavages and "insoluble problems."

13. There is the danger of self-defeating, inefficient and anti-western economic management, including the possibility that access to much needed raw materials may be curtailed, that foreign capital be penalized or confiscated, that investment and trade be discouraged, and that therefore underdeveloped countries may fall victim to perennial and explosive crises of all kinds.

14. Insofar as opportunities are concerned, the dangers listed above are as yet in their infancy and therefore are susceptible to preventive solutions.

15. The economic development of the underdeveloped areas should prove entirely feasible, at moderate cost, albeit over a long period of time, and result in improved standards of living both in the underdeveloped areas themselves and in the free world.

16. There is a willingness to cooperate with free nations, at least in some of these areas. Therefore the opportunity exists to expand the spirit of cooperation into this region.

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Security Dangers and Opportunities Confronting the United States

17. a. In the short run, the United States is confronted by the great danger that it may fall behind in the armaments competition, at a somewhat later date, may lose many of its present technological advantages, and subsequently the effective support of many of its allies. This danger of losing the technological and armaments competition is a derivative of:

(1) budgetary starvation and improper budgeting methods, laps and deficiencies in the U.S. educational system

(2) poor organization in the R&D area

(3) poor security and inadequate intelligence

(4) confused, protracted, and timid decision-making loss of time and tempo since 1945

b. Both in the long and short-range this danger results in the additional grave danger that the United States, due to its rejection of preventive war, will be subject to surprise attack and in the process of the ensuing war not only be defeated but also be devastated.

c. This danger, in turn, would be enhanced if U.S. strategy were to:

(1) maintain offensive forces at minimal levels

(2) fail to develop defensive strengths to a high point of reliability

(3) maintain the over-all military posture of the U.S. without broad margins of security.

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d. There is a correlated danger, namely that loss of the technological and armament competition may place the U.S. before the alternative either to strike first and remedy the situation by capturing the advantage of strategic surprise, or to give up its security without fighting. It is not always realized that a security policy predicated on the humanly admirable but militarily luxurious concept that the opponent must be allowed to strike the first blow has a price tag attached to it, and that, so far, the U.S. has been unwilling to pay the price of its military policy.

e. There exists the other danger that, due to an overcommitment to the ideals of peace, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to use force when this should become necessary for the safeguard of its interests, to induce other nations to join it in defensive military operations, and to fight without undue restrictions on military decisions. Hence, it may prove impossible to prevent the outbreak of peripheral or other types of limited wars, which while exceedingly costly and often morally counter-productive may not be easy to win. Such wars and the complications arising from them hardly would enhance the security position of the free world.

f. The character of nuclear weapons may put the United States into the bad quandary of imposing upon itself limitations on weapons and weapons use without acquiring any assurance that the Soviet Union would observe similar restrictions.

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g. The danger of a big global war, including the possibility of excessive loss and devastation even in case of nominal victory, will persist so long as the Soviet regime has not been modified substantially.

h. The threat of nuclear devastation may lead to demoralization in the U.S. and especially in some allied countries, while due to their control of public opinion, the Soviets may encounter a less severe handicap in this field.

i. Even in case of a political change within Russia, the world situation still would be characterized by the power competition of only two excessively strong states or "super-powers." Such a competition between two military blocs is inherently unstable and may lead to catastrophe, despite the contrary intent of the rulers in both camps.

j. Lastly, there is the danger that free world security positions may be eroded by cold war operations, including the growth of anti-Americanism, pro-communism, lack of morale, governmental instability, inadequate armaments, coups d'état, and local revolutions.

k. All these dangers can be summarized as follows: the U.S. is threatened by:

(1) demoralization

(2) isolation

(3) encirclement and

(4) destruction through political and technological warfare, limited aggression and global war.

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18. a. Against this formidable array of dangers there are not too many promising opportunities. However, it should be possible to stay ahead both in the armaments and technological competitions and therefore reduce the possibility of the other dangers materializing.

b. There also is the opportunity of reducing Soviet capabilities of surprise attack through extensive and costly defense measures (although the development of intercontinental guided missiles raises grave doubts on this score, and may lead to a period of utter defenselessness between 1960 and 1975).

c. The proper development and strengthening of the free world alliances to the point of clear and unequivocal power supremacy.

d. Through the development of a combined deterrent-defensive posture depriving the Soviets of any hope of winning minor and major conflicts, let alone of escaping devastation and political ruin.

e. Insofar as the use of force for defensive purposes is concerned, this should be facilitated if and when a stronger free world motivation emerges, and if and when the fears of nuclear devastation can be allayed.

f. An imposing defense posture of the U.S. also will be the pre-condition for undermining the Soviet capability of nuclear blackmail provided, of course, it is tied to a policy which would react very strongly to blackmail attempts anywhere.

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19. As nuclear technology becomes available to many of the industrialized nations, the present unhealthy two-power competition may be replaced by a more genuine balance of international strengths. Differences between nations -- in terms of military power -- may be reduced in favor of small and presently powerless countries, if nuclear capabilities were to emerge in a maximum number of geographical areas.

20. Lastly, there exists the great opportunity that the Soviet Union can be persuaded to accept a proper system of armaments inspection and control, and ultimately of arms limitations which, while providing reliable security for all nations, also eliminates the dangers of technological and armament races, as well as of unmanageable surprise attacks. However, the possibility of devising a truly reliable inspection and control scheme should not be overrated. It should not be assumed that such a scheme can become operative reliably and globally in the short run. The danger arises that such a scheme may be "oversold" and may be substituted for true military defense before it has been installed and tested.

Dangers and Opportunities in Various Functional Fields

General Evolution:

21. The main danger is that there will be a continuing political and intellectual evolution away from free world principles and practices and that the main trends will be toward communism and other non-democratic ideologies. For the last 40 years, world evolution in general has gone against freedom and democracy, to the point that more than one-third of humanity has become hostile. Continuation of this trend is a strong possibility, especially if the underdeveloped areas cannot be tied to the free world and if the free world's material and moral strength should wane, relatively or absolutely.

22. On the other hand, the opportunity exists that this trend can be reversed and that the evolution toward a free system of politics, interrupted in 1914, can be resumed. Naturally, such a resumption of evolutionary progress will not come by itself but can only be the result of deliberate and adequate policies of the United States, supported by its main allies. Moreover, it must be realized that no permanent reversal of this trend can be achieved unless material programs will be better integrated with each other and be accompanied by programs in the mental sphere aiming at a change in thought patterns. The reversal of trend must take place, primarily, in peoples' thinking. Within this overall field of evolution specific dangers and opportunities may be singled out:

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## The Ideological Field:

24. The danger is that communism and other undemocratic systems will gain the upper hand, while the opportunity, of course, is that free world principles will be redefined, modified, modernized and streamlined to apply to current and future situations, and that if set forth persuasively, the principles will win out in the end. Within the ideological sphere there also is the broad area of education where U.S. leadership has become necessary and promising. To the extent that the U.S. succeeds in developing techniques for the international and intranational transfer of knowledge, an entirely new intellectual climate, including a readiness to apply problem-solving techniques, could be created.

## The Economic Field:

25. The danger exists that the economies of the free nations will be subject to instability and crises and will be lagging in productivity, as well as failing in giving adequate satisfaction to the population.

These dangers may arise from wrong and misapplied economic policies, inadequate economic organization, anomy of economic institutions, poor management, overly restrictive trade, investment and distribution practices, and, above all, false notions about the potentialities of a modern economic system, including failure to comprehend the nature of a dynamic growth economy.

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The History of the American Law Institute

The American Law Institute was established in 1910 to develop a set of standards for the administration of justice. The organization's mission is to promote the highest quality of justice through the development of standards that can be used by judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals to provide a consistent standard of legal practice. The organization's work is focused on four areas: Administration of Justice, Professional Standards, Legal Education, and Consumer Protection.

The American Law Institute is a non-profit organization and its mission is to promote the highest quality of justice through the development of standards that can be used by judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals to provide a consistent standard of legal practice.

## The American Law Institute

26. The opportunities are defined by the obverse of these dangers. Moreover, there exists the opportunity of making full use of the new nuclear technology, of many recently created international economic organizations, of the large amounts of investment capital available, of new techniques of technical assistance, of developing expanding and accessible markets, and of stimulating large-scale educational travel.

## The Political Field:

27. The main danger is posed by the stagnation in many countries of administrative and governmental institutions. This stagnation -- or at least lack of discernible progress -- produces a sense of frustration, alienation and hopelessness. There also exists the danger that elections in free countries (as well as within the Soviet bloc) may introduce elements of instability into the free world and work against free world interests. There is the third important danger that the diplomatic services and the makers of foreign policy within the free world have an inadequate understanding of current problems and are applying out-of-date diplomatic techniques.

28. Conversely, the opportunity exists to carry out proper and desirable reforms which however, must be preceded by the emergence of suitable motivations. It also should be possible, in many instances, to exploit elections for the benefit of free world purposes (e.g. re-unification of divided countries) and in particular to use elections as a means of pushing the evolution within the Soviet bloc into the

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right direction. The development of a truly effective diplomatic
technique is entirely within free world capabilities.

The Social Field:

29. The alienation of individuals in free societies has been a disturbing factor for many generations. It is possible that this alienation will continue and that, especially under the impact of nuclear threats accompanied by economic crises, political and economic stagnation, cultural and intellectual unproductivity, it will be accentuated. The alienation is due in part to poor understanding of the meaning of freedom, to economic insecurity, and to more and more leisure and boredom which cannot be filled with truly satisfying activities.

30. By contrast, there now exists the great opportunity of using the
enormous resources of the free world to put an end to this situation
and to provide most individuals in the free societies with a true and
consciously felt stake in their way of life and in a creative economy.
One method to achieve this is to make it possible for individuals to
acquire economic security through ownership and to provide for con-
tinuous growth of personal property and "wealth." Other methods
include better participation in education, stimulation of satisfying
cultural activities and travel, development of healthful recreation,
etc., and above all, the provision of a better understanding of the

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issues of the world conflict. Not only should it be possible to give
more convincing arguments for freedom, especially if the words
were based on concrete achievements in the ownership area (with-
out forgetting progress in fields like public health), but also to
instill a sense of direction and progress into common thinking which
will kill the hopelessness which is the psychological root of most of
alienation.

Culture:

31. In many aspects the free world has been suffering from cultural decadence, which has lead to a deterioration of morale and of the spirit of cooperation. The danger persists that cultural decline will be continuing and that cultural activities will become ever more overlaid with nationalistic motivations and thus operate against international mutuality and progressive evolution.

32. Opportunity-wise, there is no need why free world culture should not be progressing. Many possibilities exist to stimulate creativeness and cultural exchanges on a very large scale, and thus to create a powerful spirit of freedom and friendship on a most basic level of human endeavor.

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Public Opinion

33. The dangers and opportunities which arise in the field of world public opinion are almost equal in scope to those which characterize military security problems. Whether the many practical regional and functional problems can be solved depends essentially on the climate of opinion and on attitudes. Many of the difficulties which the United States has found impossible to overcome were caused, in large measure, by unfriendly attitudes concerning economic, political and security developments and misunderstandings of American motivations and policies, as well as by poor motivation and pessimism. The taste for initiative and active self-help and the desire for self-reliance have been submerged by expectations of help from the state and even from foreign nations -- "the rich uncle cannot afford to let me go under" -- and the spirit of planned self-improvement frequently has given way to the desire of carefree day-by-day enjoyment. "After us, the deluge." In a period of recurrent wars and revolutions nothing else could have been expected.

34. It must be stressed that this public opinion trend will have to be reversed in a fundamental way lest many American policies will founder in futility. This reversal of trend must aim at the production of positive attitudes toward problems which must be conceived of as

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soluble through the application of scientific methods. The new trend
must lead to a spirit of determination rather than improvised
muddling-through, and to a willingness to assume responsibilities
and to pay the costs of the solutions. The new approach to current
problems must include awareness of the time requirements of
solutions. A whole range of expectations must be opened up to
reorient peoples' thinking, but there should be no phoniness about
such an effort. In this area the United States must assume determined
leadership, in such a way that thought patterns everywhere will be
influenced to positive stances.

35. Specific *dangers* confronting American policies in the public
opinion area include the convictions that:

a. Present situations cannot be solved except by the application of force and violence;

b. Serious socio-political problems cannot be solved by gradual, systematic steps carried out in a long range program;

c. Speedy, satisfactory and not self-defeating solutions are avail-
able at cheap cost, except that the United States is the main obstacle
to the application of those solutions;

d. Progress is an illusion, because the progressive advance of
the social system has stopped and can be resumed only after a revolution
or other drastic breaks with the past have been accomplished;

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e. The free way of life is a failure in most of its aspects; *

f. Even though political freedom may offer many advantages, it is a luxury which cannot be afforded under the pressure of economic insecurity;

g. American military and security efforts enhance rather than reduce the dangers of war and expose the free world to nuclear extermination;

h. Economic cooperation on an international scale benefits the profiteers in the United States, local capitalists or white imperialists, and therefore must be resisted in favor of economic nationalism and

*NOTE: A little over a century ago, when John Stuart Mill issued the first edition of his *Principles of Political Economy* in 1847, he summed up the then Industrial Revolution in the following terms:

> "Hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being. They have enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment."

By contrast, a quarter of a century later, his successor as the influential theorist of economics, Alfred Marshall, in a paper on "The Future of the Working Classes" that was read to the Cambridge Reform Club in 1873, posed the problem of political economy as follows: "...whether there be valid ground for the opinion that the amelioration of the working classes has limits beyond which it cannot pass." The answer which he then gave and the hope he then expressed have now become a fact. That answer was as

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even antarchy;

i. Communism and other "isms" hold the key to a better future;

j. The Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc will win the present contest;

k. The example of China is to be imitated by other colored nations;

l. The United States is immature and uncultured and will lead the
civilized world to "soul-less" machine barbarism

m. There are many additional themes with various pro-communist, anti-American, anti-democratic and "anti-capitalist" implications which endanger the purposes of the United States.

36. The greatest opportunities arise from the fact that many nations, and particularly those of western Europe, have been over-saturated with ideological propaganda and stand ready to abandon many of the mental patterns characteristic of the period in which communism was able to flourish. In general, European youth no longer turns spontaneously to radicalisms. However, finding no adequate intellectual haven, it embraces "neutralism" -- "a plague on both your houses" -- and fellow-traveling.

follows: "The question is not whether all men will ultimately be equal --
that they certainly will not -- but whether progress may go on steadily,
if slowly, till by occupation at least, every man is a gentleman. I hold
that it may, and that it will."

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In Asia, nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism as well as "power politics" in alliance with the Soviet Union are the additional expedients which satisfy the quest for mental refuge.

37. A great deal of anti-Americanism is nourished by fears and uncertainties about the United States, its purposes and methods, and cannot be considered as anti-Americanism as such, let alone as a commitment to the hostile side. In fact, Russia and Sovietism command very little genuine popularity. Anti-Americanism usually is little more than a derivative of doubt and perhaps envy, caused partly by the circumstance that the structure of the American society and of the American economic system is poorly understood, that peoples overseas interpret it either according to their own local conditions or according to their presumed historical knowledge reflecting situations of the last century, and that they do not comprehend the pertinence of the American experience to their own difficulties.

38. A great opportunity exists in the ability of the United States, to convince world public opinion of:

a. The moderation, firmness, and intelligence of American leadership;

b. U.S. determination to carry out, step-by-step, a long-range program aiming at the gradual reform of world society;

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c. The possibility of continuing, at an accelerated pace, progress in all spheres of human interest;

d. The advisability to proceed by evolution rather than revolution or war, and to apply effective problem-solving techniques rather than present unscientific and inaccurate notions;

e. The need to allow for adequate time to make the proper solutions work;

f. The possibility that, through cooperation, some substantial results can be achieved in each time period;

g. The free world's capability to employ its large resources for the development of national economies and for the improved well being and economic security of individuals;

h. The overwhelming probability that the United States and its allies will come out on top in the present world struggle.

39. Since people everywhere desire freedom and accept dictatorship only as a lesser evil, there should be no major difficulty in convincing audiences that:

a. Freedom has not failed wherever it was applied properly;

b. Freedom is a most precious good which cannot be abandoned without grave consequences;

c. The scope of freedom can be enlarged, especially in areas where free institutions are yet in their infancy;

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d. Freedom must not be bought by economic insecurity but, on the contrary, freedom and economic well-being, and security, go hand-in-hand;

e. The methods of democracy and cooperation are far superior to dictatorship which is not a lesser, but the greatest evil in political life.

40. It must be born in mind that the creation of a climate of world opinion which accepts the above points will require several years of considerable effort. While many specific American policies are jeopardized by the reluctant foreign opinions, the real danger to American security in the public opinion area will arise only at a later date unless, of course, a reversal of trend is achieved in the meantime. In its skillful preoccupation with "public relations" programs, the United States in the past has been able to overcome short-range propaganda threats with a remarkable measure of success. In so doing, however, it has neglected the long-range dangers and opportunities. Advance planning of opinion trends has become inevitable and henceforth must supplement efforts dealing with specific aspects of opinions. U.S. policies must concern themselves with the foundations of political thinking in addition to its fleeting and outward manifestations.

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Principles of American Strategic Policy:

41. The main dangers confronting American strategic policies in all areas are as follows:

a. unrealistic and over-optimistic under-estimation of the threats;

b. negative attitudes and skepticism toward the opportunities;

c. under-estimation of the capabilities of a growth economy;

d. misevaluation of the possibilities of combining prosperity with security, including the erroneous assumption that, to a large extent, prosperity and security are incompatible;

e. fluctuations in decision making and strategic concepts;

f. oversensitivity to foreign criticism and propaganda;

g. lack of long range planning;

h. frequent interference of domestic politics with security programs;

i. inadequate methods of making American policies understood abroad, including speaking with too many voices;

j. poor harmonization of all security and prosperity programs;

k. reluctance to make available the resources necessary for security programs;

CONFIDENTIAL

26

CONFIDENTIAL

1. lack of proper time perspectives;

m. misconceptions about, and disregard for, the intellectual
or conceptual factor.

42. All these difficulties arise essentially from a lack of overall direction, from a time lag in understanding the world problems confronting the United States, and from fear of assuming world leadership with firmness and energy.

Opportunities arise in the following areas:

43. In the past the American peoples always have supported policies once they understood their meaning. They would be happy to see their government adopt a long range strategy which will lead to the solution of the world crisis through gradual evolution. By temperament and habit the American people would favor the adoption of problem solving techniques as a main tool of foreign and strategic policies. They also would accept the notion that solutions cannot always be applied forthwith, nor produce immediate results, but that there are time lags between different cultures which must be taken into account by any long range policy.

44. The American people realizes that economic, military, social, cultural, educational, psychological, intellectual, and political programs are interdependent and mutually supporting (or mutually destructive). Therefore they would agree to the proposition that henceforth, the various U.S. programs in all these diverse fields

-27-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

should be harmonized and integrated; that this overall U. S. program
should have no major gaps; that each part of the program should be
undertaken on a scale of organizational adequacy, be endowed with
sufficient resources; and that it should neither call for over nor
under-investments (threshold concept).

45. The American people also are wedded to the idea that the many
solutions to the world crisis cannot be broiled about by unilateral
attempts of the United States but must take the form of cooperative
efforts.

46. In fine, the American nation will be enthusiastic about a policy
which does not jeopardize security in the slightest but incorporates
into security efforts programs for the development of culture, personal
and national freedom, institutional reform, individual ownership,
world-wide prosperity, intellectual maturity, and personal happiness.
It will leap to the opportunity of safely avoiding war through imposing
strength, while simultaneously bringing about the evolutionary modif-
ication of the Soviet system, of combining the security effort with
prosperity, both world-wide and at home. To the extent that peace
can be assured for a long time, perhaps two generations -- and this
assurance is a function of military strength -- prosperity on an
unprecedented scale can be created. Thus, peace and prosperity
must be the pillars of American security strategy.

-28-

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT/4

HAK 9/13/56

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT OF THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.

PURPOSE
---

The purpose of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund is:

1. To seek to define the problems and opportunities that the United States may face over the next ten to fifteen years.

2. To re-evaluate our national beliefs and purpose in relation to these problems and opportunities.

3. To develop concepts and considerations on which the policies (decisions) to implement our purpose might be based.

PROCEDURE
---

The Special Studies Project proposes to proceed in three stages:

1. The commissioning of papers by experts outlining the trends in their special fields of competence and the alternative measures for dealing with them. These papers (the substance of which is discussed on page ___) are conceived as analyses which can form the nucleus for subsequent discussion.

- 3 -

DRAFT/3

The panel would undertake this by participating in the future
development of the study, by guiding the work of the subpanels,
by discussing the reports prepared by them, and by considering a
report designed to integrate and harmonize the deliberations of the
subpanels as an overall conceptual panel way

Because our sense of national purpose is inseparable from
our attitude toward the moral and philosophical challenge of our time,
the Specials Studies Project has established a close relationship with
the Institute of Religious and Social Studies. This is an interdenominational
group of theologians and philosophers whose members last year included
Louis Finkelstein, F.E. Johnson, John LaFarge, I.I. Rabi, Lyman Bryson,
Robert M. MacIver, Ernest Negel and Dorothy Lee. During the coming
year this group will consider the topic "The Problems of the Relation of
Moral Insights to the Growth and Survival of Democracy". From time
to time it is prepared to meet with members of the overall panel and to
discuss with them its conclusions or problems raised by members of the
overall panel.

## The Subpanels

In order to facilitate consideration, problems have been grouped into
six categories, each covered by a separate subpanel as follows:

DRAFT/3

The subpanels will be composed of three categories of participants:

1. Some of the authors who have prepared papers which will be on the initial agenda of the subpanel.

2. Specialists in the field with which the subpanel deals.

3. Those members of the overall panel who desire to participate in the work of the subpanel. (Members of the overall panel will have the option of joining the subpanel of their choice.)

The Chairman of the subpanel will be in every case a member of the overall panel. Each subpanel will have a Secretary who will write a report based on its deliberations for the overall panel.

Summaries of pertinent documents will be made for the convenience of panel participants and the full text will be made available upon request.

To keep all members of the overall panel informed of the progress of the various subpanels a monthly status report will be circulated.

## Schedule of Meetings

It is anticipated that the overall panel will meet four times between October 15 and April 15.

Each subpanel probably will meet between three and five times during this same period.

Thus, the attendance of those members of the overall panel who join a subpanel is not anticipated to average more than once a month.

## ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF PAPERS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUBPANELS

DRAFT/3

The papers are 30-50 page analyses outlining the authors assessment of
trends and over the longer , the objectives which we might set ourselves,
and the laternative ways of thinking about the problems. Where appropriate
this includes his recommdations of the basic concepts should underlie

ROOM 5600
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

Friday 195

To: Henry
FROM: Nancy

Copies out at two to all brothers,
all planning committee, Mrs. Hobby
Frank Jamieson.

Doubt that we will meet with NATR
on the letters until Monday.

Excuse short note but must run.

September 14, 1956

DRAFT

PURPOSE
---

2. To review our national beliefs and purpose in terms of these problems and opportunities.

3. To develop concepts and considerations on which policies and decisions to implement our purpose might be based.

PROCEDURE
---

1. The commissioning of papers by experts outlining the trends in their special fields of competence and the alternative measures for dealing with them. These papers (the substance of which is discussed on page 5) are conceived as analyses which can form the nucleus of subsequent discussion.

The formation of a panel of outstanding Americans who can bring
their experience and imagination to bear on the implications of the
papers prepared by the experts and who can develop an integrated
approach to the challenges of the next decade. In view of the
scope of the study, it is proposed that at its initial meeting the
overall panel (in order to focus the discussion) form the subpanels
described below.

3. The writing of a report based on the deliberations of both the sub-panels and the overall panel.

# ORGANIZATION OF STUDIES

## The Overall Panel

The overall panel will be composed of leaders experienced in education, business, labor, law, science, publishing and government. The aims of the panel would include:

1. Outlining the nature of the problems and opportunities which, in its judgment, will confront the American people over the next decade.

2. Analyzing American purposes and objectives in relation to these problems and opportunities.

3. Developing the considerations on which policies and decisions designed to secure these values and to attain these objectives might be based.

The panel would undertake this by guiding the work of the subpanels and by considering a report designed to integrate the deliberations of the subpanels into an overall conceptual framework.

Because our sense of national purpose is inseparable from our attitude toward the moral and philosophical challenge of our time, the Special Studies Project has established a close relationship with the Institute of Religious and Social Studies. This is an interdenominational group of theologians and philosophers whose members last year included Louis Finkelstein, F. E. Johnson, John La Farge, L. I. Rabi, Lyman Bryson, Robert M. MacIver, Ernest Nagel and Dorothy Lee. During the coming months it is hoped that this group will consider the topic, "The Problem of the Relation of Moral Insights to the Survival and Growth of Democracy". The group is prepared to meet from time to time with members of the overall panel and to discuss with them its conclusions or its views on problems raised by members of the overall panel.

- 3 -

The Subpanels

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I. International Security Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the implications of modern weapons systems for our strategic planning, our budgetary policy and our diplomacy.</td></tr><tr><td>II. International Political Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will attempt to discuss the trends in various areas over a 10 to 15 year period, the long term objectives the U.S. can reasonably achieve, and what instruments are available to achieve them.</td></tr><tr><td>III. International Economic Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the relationship between economic and political stability and the considerations that might underlie our aid policy, as well as our international trade policy, over the next 10 to 15 years.</td></tr><tr><td>IV. U.S. Economic and Social Policy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will cover such topics as governmental responsibility for economic growth and stability and for individual and social welfare, taxation policy, farm policy, utilities policy and the problems of resources.</td></tr><tr><td>V. U.S. Utilization of Human Resources</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the problem of our utilization of manpower, particularly the problem of creating and training the leadership groups we will require for various fields, and a projection of which are likely to be most critical.</td></tr><tr><td>VI. U.S. Problems of Leadership and Organization</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the problems of our government in arriving at long range decisions in view of its world-wide responsibilities, with particular emphasis on the relation among the Departments and between the Executive and Congress.</td></tr></tbody></table>

- 4 -

The Chairman of the subpanel will be in every case a member of the overall panel. A report based on the deliberations of each subpanel will be prepared for the overall panel.

## Schedule of Meetings

Thus, those members of the overall panel who join a subpanel will, on the average, only attend about one meeting a month.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PAPERS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUBPANELS

The papers are 30-50 page analyses outlining the author's assessment of trends over the longer term in his field, the objectives which we might set ourselves, and the alternative ways of thinking about the problems. Where appropriate, they include recommendations concerning the basic concepts that should underlie our policies in the area.

5

SUBPANEL I - INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the implications of modern weapons systems for our strategic planning, our budgetary policy and our diplomacy. Papers commissioned for it include:

<table><thead><tr><td>TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER</td><td>AUTHOR</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Problems of integrated strategic planning (weapons & missions)</td><td>General James McCormack, Assistant to the President Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Impact of technological trends on political requirements</td><td>Ellis A. Johnson Director, Operations Research Office Johns Hopkins University</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of protracted or limited war</td><td>William R. Kintner Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of guerrilla and civil war</td><td>James Cross Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Budgetary implications of various levels of defense projected over a 10-15 year period.</td><td>Roswell Gilpatric Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Former Undersecretary of the Air Force)</td></tr><tr><td>Naval strategy</td><td>Willard Bascom National Research Council National Academy of Sciences</td></tr><tr><td>Non-military defense</td><td>N.E. Halaby (Formerly Director, Office of Military Assistance Program, Department of Defense)</td></tr><tr><td>Theory of Alliances</td><td>Roger Hilsman Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress</td></tr></tbody></table>

6

SUBPANEL II - INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will attempt to discuss the trends in various areas over a 10 to 15 year period, the long term objectives the U.S. can reasonably achieve, and what instruments are available to achieve them. Papers commissioned for it include:

<table><thead><tr><td>TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER</td><td>AUTHOR</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Nature of American interests in the world</td><td>Walt W. Rostow<br>Center for International Studies<br>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr></tbody></table>

Colonialism and the emergence of dependent peoples

What is a nation? What are our obligations?

Froelich Rainey
Director of the University Museum, University of Pennsylvania

Prerequisites for political stability in backward countries (Africa)

Max F. Millikan, Director
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Europe

Present and future relationships between US & Western Europe

Lloyd A. Free
Institute for International Social Research

Trends in NATO (political)

Robert Strausz-Hupe, Director
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania

Trends in NATO (military)

H. A. DeWeerd, Associate
RAND Corporation, California

Far East

Trends & US policy in Japan

Edwin O. Reischauer
Professor of Harvard University

Trends & US policy in China

Howard Boorman
Professor of Columbia University

SUBPANEL II (continued)

| TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER | AUTHOR |
|---|---|
| **Southeast Asia** | |
| Trends & US policy toward Southeast Asia | Edwin F. Stanton<br>Former Ambassador to Thailand |
| **Soviet Orbit** | |
| Trends in Soviet Orbit | Philip E. Mosely<br>Director of Research<br>Council on Foreign Relations<br>(Formerly Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University) |
| Impact of internal trends on Soviet foreign policy, etc. | Frederick C. Barghoorn<br>Professor of Yale University |
| Extent to which US policy can affect Soviet development | Merle Fainsod<br>Professor of Harvard University |

Papers are also being prepared
on Latin America, Africa and
the Middle East.

-9-

SUBPANEL IV - UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

Within the framework established by the overall panel this sub-panel will cover such topics as governmental responsibility for economic growth and stability and for individual and social welfare, taxation policy, farm policy, utilities policy and the problems of resources. Papers commissioned for it include:

<table><thead><tr><th>TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER</th><th>AUTHOR</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>The nature of growth, its consistency with stability, and the role of monetary compared to fiscal policy</td><td>Dexter M. Keezer, Vice President<br>McGraw-Hill Publishing Company</td></tr><tr><td>Trends in American economy (changing technology and energy requirements)</td><td>Grover W. Ensley, Staff Director of Research, Joint Economic Committee, Congress</td></tr></tbody></table>

Taxation policy

Effect of taxation policy on economic growth and stability at various levels
William J. Fellner, Professor, Yale University
Richard A. Musgrave, Professor, University of Michigan

Farm problem

Farm policy
Theodore W. Schultz
Professor, University of Chicago

Relationship to world food problems
J. Norman Efferson
Dean, Louisiana Agricultural and Mechanical College

Utilities and power:

Trends and concepts for power development, including nuclear
Edward Morehouse
President, General Public Utilities, New York City

Individual and Social Welfare

Political implications of social welfare
Robert A. Dahl
Yale University

Relation between industrialization and social welfare
Lester B. Granger
National Urban League

-11-

SUBPANEL VI - UNITED STATES PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the problems of our government in arriving at long range decisions in view of its world-wide responsibilities, with particular emphasis on the relations among the Departments and between the Executive and Congress. Papers commissioned for it include:

<table><thead><tr><th>TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER</th><th>AUTHOR</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Role of Executive</strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Relationship of Congress and the Executive in the formulation of policy decisions</td><td>Stephen K. Bailey, Dean Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University</td></tr><tr><td>Role of budgetary process to national policy</td><td>Arthur Smithies Professor of Harvard University</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Department of Defense</strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Fitness of our governmental apparatus to produce long range strategic decisions</td><td>General C. H. Bonesteel (Formerly Director, Office of National Security Council Affairs Department of Defense)</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of strategic planning</td><td>N.E. Halaby Formerly Director, Office of Military Assistance Programs, Department of Defense</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Department of State</strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Avra Warren Former Ambassador to Turkey</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Wallace S. Sayre Professor, Columbia University</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

- 3 -

DRAFT/7

9/12/56

I am aware of the heavy demands on your time. However, a
project designed as ours is to make a contribution to the sense of
direction of this nation can only succeed if it enlists the assistance
and best thinking of our most eminent citizens.

If you agree to participate, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who is
acting as Director of Special Studies will arrange a convenient time
for the first meeting of our panel. We are aiming for ________.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Chairmen's Letter -3-

DRAFT/7 9/12/56

In order to deal most effectively with the large number of
memoranda already prepared it has seemed useful to operate initially
through task forces or subpanels. Each such group is to be composed
of a few members of the overall panel assisted by several specialists
including some of the authors. Obviously the success of these groups
will depend to a large extent on the chairmen who guide their discussions.
I hope very much that in addition to serving on the overall panel you might
agree to act as the chairman of the subpanel dealing with ________.
The subpanels are planned to meet perhaps three times and no meetings
of the full panel would be scheduled while the smaller groups are working.
Each subpanel will have a Secretary who will prepare a report of its
conclusions, so that the work of the chairman should not prove too
burdensome.

If you agree to participate, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who is
acting as Director of Special Studies will be in touch with you to
give you further information about the studies program and to arrange a
convenient time for the first meeting of our panel.

DRAFT LETTER TO INDIVIDUALS WHO
HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROACHED

DRAFT/6

HAK:DM:hmo 9/12/56

Dear ____________

Henry Kissinger has told me of his conversation with you regarding the Special Studies Project undertaken by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

I am delighted by the interest you have shown.

Our consultation with you and with some other leaders from business, labor, education and government have encouraged us to proceed with a number of studies which you will find more fully described in the enclosed memorandum.

You will notice that we have commissioned some of the most thoughtful experts in various fields to outline the trends and possibilities in their special area of competence. At the same time, the ultimate purpose of our effort is less to come up with good ideas in any one field than to integrate them into operating concepts and to develop among the different analyses and proposals a consistent pattern and a charter for the future.

In this task of giving perspective to our national experience, your contribution will be invaluable. I would therefore like to repeat formally the invitation already extended to you by Henry Kissinger to join a panel which would meet from time to time over the next few months starting in mid-October, but no more frequently than once a month. Its task would be to consider the implications of the reports prepared by the Special Studies Project, to relate them to each other

DRAFT/6 - 9/12/56

and to guide the future development of the study. Our concern is not
with current policy but with the considerations on which a sound and
consistent policy can be based.

I am aware of the heavy demands on your time. However, a
project designed as ours is to make a contribution to the sense of
direction of this nation can only succeed if it is able to enlist the
assistance and best thinking of our most eminent citizens. I am
therefore doubly grateful that you have tentatively agreed to participate.

Henry Kissinger will be in touch with you to arrange a convenient
time for the first meeting of our panel. We are aiming for ________.

I look forward to seeing you then if not before.

PROCEDURE

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT
ROCKETTER BROTHERS FUND

<table><tr><td>Brothers Fund.</td><td>3.</td><td>Overall Panel considers Final Report and forwards it to Rockefeller and suggests in work of Subunits.</td><td>4.</td><td>Staff monitors presentation of papers to Subunits, supervises.</td></tr><tr><td>Overall Panel submit reports to Staff.</td><td>6.</td><td>Staff prepares Final Report based on deliberation of Overall Panel.</td><td>3.</td><td>Authors submit papers to Staff, which directs necessary revisions.</td></tr><tr><td>Overall Panel considers Subunits and considers approval of reports and forwards approved</td><td>7.</td><td>Overall Panel considers Subunits and considers exchange views periodically with one another.</td><td>2.</td><td>Staff determines coverage of Project.</td></tr><tr><td>Overall Panel and Institute</td><td>8.</td><td>Overall Panel and Institute</td><td>1.</td><td>Guidance on nature and scope of Planning Committee provides</td></tr><tr><td>Overall Panel.</td><td>2.</td><td>Subunits submit reports to</td><td>1.</td><td>Planning Committee provides</td></tr></table>

Draft/7

10/24/56

# SECTION 1 - INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Questions: We may well ask ourselves:

1. What are the basic factors which determine American interests abroad and what are the natures of these interests? Do they derive largely from a desire for self-preservation? From a sense of mission? From a wish for isolation?

2. Is there an irreconcilable antagonism between the U. S. and the Communist bloc, or is a policy of accommodation both possible and feasible in terms of basic U. S. interests? What is the meaning and future possibility of recent developments within the Soviet orbit? What is the relationship between internal developments and foreign policy? What changes in policy may we expect once the Soviets have attained relative nuclear parity?

3. Considering both military and political factors, what should be the role and nature of alliances in which we engage? Can we, and to what extent should we, seek to establish with our allies common goals and objectives in foreign affairs? To what extent are alliances valuable for other than military reasons and how can this value be enhanced?

Draft/6

10/22/56

4. Can the American values and institutions continue to flourish in a system of nation-states? Is a different vehicle both more desirable and more suitable for the attainment of American objectives? Specifically, should we seek truly to promote regional and international political and economic organizations in which the U. S. would be only "first among equals"?

5. What are the implications for the United States of the emergence into statehood of former colonial peoples? To what extent is it in the U. S. interests to support national independence movements? Is the attainment of statehood by colonial peoples a most desirable form of self-determination? What alternatives may be developed?

6. What specific problems and opportunities may confront us in Europe? In Asia? In Africa? In Latin America? To what extent can or should the United States temper its policies in one area to accord with those in another? Can the U. S. pursue divergent regional policies and still operate successfully?