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# CHAPTER V
## THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR CONTROL--THE MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF)

### A. History of the Multilateral Force

Few major innovations of American policy have produced the conflicting emotions of the NATO Multilateral Force (commonly referred to as the MLF). Though its fate is still uncertain, so much American prestige has been invested in this project for so long that regardless of whether it succeeds or fails, it will affect the shape of the Alliance. It is therefore important to understand how the MLF was conceived and what goals were sought to be accomplished.

The MLF which emerged in February 1963 as America's principal effort to restore the cohesion of NATO, had previously been treated at arms length by the Kennedy Administration. After De Gaulle's veto of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it was resurrected and pushed with increasing passion. The United States concentrated its energies on the problem of nuclear control partly because the French challenge seemed to relate political autonomy to nuclear independence, partly because Washington feared the twin specters of a German national nuclear program and Franco-German collaboration in the nuclear field.

The original proposal for a NATO multilateral force grew out of a military "requirement" which had been generated in accordance with the NATO doctrine prevalent in the late Fifties. According to this concept, SACEUR was to have the capability to destroy whatever weapons might be aimed at Europe. Thus when the Soviet Union began to deploy large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Russia, two NATO requirements emerged: a modernization program to replace vulnerable

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tactical aircraft with missiles; an interdiction mission giving NATO the capability to destroy the Soviet MRBM's.

When the issue of counteracting the Soviet MRBM's was raised in 1959, the first impulse of the Eisenhower Administration was to go along with a proposal of SACEUR (then General Norstad) which envisaged the installation of a mobile land-based version of the Polaris missile in Europe under the double-veto system. Upon further consideration this proposal was rejected. It was argued that large numbers of missiles constantly moving on European roads might disquiet the populations and thus encourage neutralist tendencies. The double-veto system was believed to provide inadequate safeguards against the ultimate control of nuclear weapons by Germany. Accordingly, a State Department study group headed by Professor Bowie proposed that NATO's MRBM requirement be met by Polaris missiles installed on ships (in the early version, submarines). These ships were to be jointly owned, operated and financed by the participants and were to remain under SACEUR's control at all times. To prevent the withdrawal of national contingents, each ship was to be manned by crews of mixed nationality. Each participant was to have a veto. The multilateral scheme was submitted to the NATO Council by Secretary of State Herter in December 1960 for study. A final decision was delayed until the new Administration could assess the problem.

There occurred a hiatus of several months while the new Administration reconsidered NATO strategy. Having concluded that greater reliance should be placed on conventional forces and that control over nuclear weapons should be centralized, the Kennedy Administration did not look with particular

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favor on the creation of any new nuclear force within NATO. Thus, on
May 17, 1961, in a speech on NATO's nuclear arrangements, President
Kennedy mentioned the MLF only very indirectly. He urged the European
allies to meet the conventional goals of NATO before "... we look
to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO seaborne force,
which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should
be desired and found feasible by our allies, once NATO's nonnuclear goals
have been achieved." In the course of the next year, Administration
spokesmen invited our allies to analyze the problem and to develop a
satisfactory control plan.

The two conditions put forward by the United States--a prior
conventional build-up and European agreement about a control plan--suggested
that the MLF could not have very high priority. Most of America's allies
doubted the need for a conventional build-up. They could not afford both
to strengthen their ground forces and to contribute to a NATO nuclear
force. Moreover, none of our allies possessed a sea-borne nuclear system.
Since a command and control system for even a national nuclear force is
far from a simple matter, the probability that our allies would come up
with a meaningful control system for a multilateral sea-borne force was
not great. Indeed there were many in the Administration who believed that
the problem would be found insoluble. It was expected that the allies would
then ask the President to act as Executive Agent for the Alliance on
nuclear matters. Central control over nuclear weapons would be established.

1
John F. Kennedy, "The Common Aims of Canada and the United States,"
Speech at Ottawa, May 17, 1961, _DOSB_, Vol. XLIV, No. 1145 (June 5, 1961),
p. 841.

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When this did not happen, the United States in 1962 continued its gingerly approach to the multilateral force. In September 1962, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, spoke hedgingly of a multilateral *European* force.

> It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which we feel with respect to individual, ineffective, and unintegrated forces would be extended automatically to a *European* force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of the alliance. Any possible arrangements for assistance and cooperation in such an enterprise would, of course, require full consultation and approval by all appropriate agencies of our Government.²

The speech said nothing about what the United States meant by "multilateral," "unified" or "integrated."

A month later Under Secretary of State Ball returned to the theme of a NATO nuclear force. He insisted that it was militarily unnecessary and he continued to stress the priority placed by the Kennedy Administration on the build-up of conventional forces. But he added:

> . . . should other NATO nations so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuinely multilateral medium-range ballistic missile force fully coordinated with the other deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³

2. McGeorge Bundy, "Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons from the Past," speech on September 27, 1962, *DOSB*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1217 (October 22, 1962), pp. 604-5.

3. George W. Ball, "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," speech on November 16, 1962, *DOSB*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1223 (December 3, 1962), p. 835.

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In the following weeks an American briefing team toured Europe to explain the American concept of a multilateral force, including the provision for crews of mixed nationality. It did not elicit a significant European response.

In December, Secretary Rusk spoke vaguely of a force "not . . . so heavily dependent upon the United States alone." But he stressed that it was up to the Europeans to formulate a concrete proposal:

> We also have expressed our willingness, if our allies wish to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone. Now, we have not ourselves put forward a precise plan in this regard. This is something that our friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do if they conclude what it is they would like to propose in this field.⁴

At the regular NATO ministerial conference in December 1962, the United States took no initiative with respect to the NATO multilateral force. A week later at Nassau the United States and Great Britain decided to subscribe part of their national nuclear forces to a NATO multilateral force:

> Returning to Polaris the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of Polaris missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies. They will use their best endeavors to this end.⁵

Dean Rusk, News Conference on December 10, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVII, No. 1227 (December 31, 1962), p. 995.

Text, Joint Communique and Attached Statement on nuclear defense systems issued on December 21, by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 (January 14, 1963), p. 44.

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This was one of the many ambiguities in the Nassau Agreement and an exegis of it absorbed energies on both sides of the Atlantic for many months. Did "multilateral" mean the assignment of national contingents to NATO as Great Britain argued? Or did it involve a commitment to create a mixed-manned, sea-borne force as the United States urged? For a few weeks after the Nassau Agreement, the term multilateral was in fact used interchangeably for either arrangement. Whatever the answer, it is obvious that until De Gaulle's press conference on January 14, 1963, what came to be known as the MLF was far from a high priority goal of American foreign policy. In the face of indifference at the highest level, it had in fact been kept alive in the government only by a very small group of enthusiasts who, in the words of one acute observer, engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe . . ."

Whatever the hesitations of the Administration, they were resolved by De Gaulle's press conference. Within a week, Secretary Rusk said in a television interview that the United States would proceed with the NATO Multilateral Force even without France (though he did not make clear whether he was using multilateral in the American or the British sense). On February 9th, the Legal Counsellor of the State

6. Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?" *The New Republic*, Vol. 151, Nos. 6-7 (August 8, 1964), pp. 19-21.

7. Dean Rusk, "Today," NBC Television, January 21, 1963, *DOSB*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1233 (February 11, 1963), p. 206.

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Department, Abram Chayes, explicitly advanced the Multilateral Force as an alternative route to the Grand Design which De Gaulle had sought to block with his veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market.

By March 1963 the United States had dropped the conditions of a non-nuclear build-up and of a prior European agreement to a control plan. Indeed, it now argued that a final decision on the control problem should await the actual creation of the Multilateral Force. Ambassador Livingston Merchant was assigned to carry out the negotiations to bring the Multilateral Force into being. On April 27, 1963, Under Secretary Ball laid down four criteria for the Multilateral Force: (a) there must be many participants; (b) the force must not be based predominantly in one country; (c) through mixed manning the components must be made unavailable for withdrawal; and (d) the decision-making must be collective.

He went on to describe the MLF in glowing terms:

> The kind of multilateral force I have described has much to commend it. Not only is it the best means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity to work toward greater unity in Europe and closer partnership between Europe and the United States.

8. Abram Chayes, "European Integration and American Foreign Policy," February 9, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1236 (March 4, 1963), p. 321.

9. George W. Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," speech April 26, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1246 (May 13, 1963), p. 739.

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During 1963 the Multilateral Force became the main focus of American NATO policy. The original posture of responding to European wishes was abandoned. American spokesmen ever more insistently urged the MLF as a major contribution to restoring Allied cohesion--indeed as the principal available step. Thus, on October 27, Secretary Rusk, speaking in Frankfurt, said:

> Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective. Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward the total needs of Western deterrence.

> It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could not be unilaterally withdrawn.

> And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the presently nonnuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership, manning, and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis as other members of that force.¹⁰

The full apparatus of American persuasion--official, semi-official and unofficial--pressed the MLF on our European allies. In September 1964 Thomas K. Finletter, United States Representative at the NATO Council, went so far as to say: "As goes this fleet, so may go the defense of the West and our efforts to prevent war." There were strong intimations that if the other allies procrastinated the United States would go ahead with the MLF as a German-American project--a position supported by Chancellor Erhard on October 6, 1964.

TO

Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in Atlantic Partnership," speech at Frankfurt on October 27, 1963, _DOSB_, Vol. XLIX, No. 1272 (November 11, 1963), p. 730.

11

_New York Times_, September 11, 1964.

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This onslaught overcame the initial reserve of many of our allies. After a brief period of hesitation, the government of the Federal Republic agreed to the scheme. While its original motive may well have been to prove that the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship was not inconsistent with continued loyalty to the American Alliance, the Federal Republic soon became nearly as enthusiastic an advocate of the MLF as the United States. Greece, Turkey and Italy agreed in principle to participate. Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands joined the other countries in a study of the technical feasibility of mixed manning. France refused any degree of participation.

However, the large number of participants in the technical studies was deceptive. United States insistence has made it difficult for allied governments to face the issue of the MLF on its merits. The Defense Ministries of our allies (except Bonn)--which might be thought to have a vested interest in the MLF--were opposed or lukewarm while the Foreign Offices, fearful of the political consequences of a refusal, were pressing it. The scepticism or indifference of the military was countered by the concern that rejection of this American overture might jeopardize the American commitment to the defense of Europe.

Moreover, American negotiating tactics were deliberately designed to avoid all difficult political issues. During 1964, American diplomacy concentrated on studies regarding the technical feasibility of mixed manning. Efforts were also made to draft a charter for the operation of the MLF if the governments concerned later agreed to join. The negotiations thus had a curious aspect. Some governments participated in order to be

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informed about a project to which they were at best indifferent or in order not to offend their senior ally. The United States and other advocates of the MLF, in turn, took the view that joining the technical discussions implied a commitment in principle to the MLF. The confusions engendered by this process were amply demonstrated when after having taken part in all the technical discussions, Belgium announced in November 1964 that it would not join the MLF after all.

Thus, the MLF--ridiculed by many when first appeared, doubtfully received even under American pressure, perhaps accepted, except in Bonn, with the *arrière pensée* that it would never come to pass--took on increasing substance. By the end of October 1964, discussions had reached the following point: The MLF was to be composed of twenty-five surface ships, each carrying eight Polaris missiles of the type A-3 with a range of 2,500 miles. Each ship was to be manned by crews drawn from at least three nationalities. No nation was to contribute more than forty per cent of the total. Command of the ships was to be in proportion to the financial contribution. (In practice this would have meant that the Federal Republic and the United States would each contribute forty per cent, leaving twenty per cent to be divided among the five or six other participants.) The control system had not yet been decided, but it seemed certain that an executive body comprising the total membership was to make decisions--at least initially on the basis of unanimity. The timetable called for signing a treaty on the MLF by the end of 1964, with ratification taking place sometime during 1965. The new British government was expected

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not to refuse a project which had already advanced so far. The smaller
European countries would follow the British lead. France would be
isolated.

But the expectation that so far-reaching a scheme as the MLF could
be pushed through without facing the central political issues proved to be
mistaken. The notion that France would stand idly by while a project
which had the practical consequence of isolating her was being implemented
emerged as an illusion. As American pressure increased the opposition of
France came into the open. The Federal Republic found itself caught between
the conflicting views of its closest allies. The new British government
began to make explicit those misgivings about the MLF which had been previously
obscured only by the imminence of elections. It fought the project not openly
but indirectly by seeking to redefine the meaning of multilateral. The
Secretary General of NATO, Brosio, announced that in his view so radical
a step toward integration as the MLF required unanimous consent even of the
countries not participating thus giving France an effective veto. The
MLF which was supposed to restore allied cohesion became an additional
element of discord. At this point, President Johnson wisely removed American
deadlines to permit a calmer consideration of NATO's nuclear
problem. Whatever its ultimate fate, it is already clear that many of the
extravagant claims made for the MLF are unfulfillable and that what will
finally emerge may have little relationship to the original project.

B. <u>The Case for the MLF</u>

How did it happen that for nearly two years the MLF became the
focus of United States NATO policy? What were the reasons that caused the
United States to stake so much on the issue of nuclear control?

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As happens so often, the MLF emerged as the keystone of United States NATO policy because several conflicting pressures and points of view in our bureaucracy suddenly coalesced. The immediate impetus, as we have seen, was supplied by SACEUR's requirement for medium-range missiles to counteract Soviet missiles aimed at Europe. This military requirement acquired a symbolic significance because of German uneasiness about the early versions of the doctrine of flexible response. Though German demands for reassurance about the continued validity of the American nuclear guarantee generally concerned the disposition and use of _tactical_ nuclear weapons on German soil, they were interpreted in Washington as the forerunner of more sweeping proposals which the MLF was designed to deflect.

Another motive behind the MLF was to prevent other allies from embarking on national nuclear programs with the arguments used on behalf of the British and French nuclear forces. To the extent that national weapons programs were justified by the unreliability of American assistance, they gave an incentive to other allies to develop nuclear arsenals of their own. According to the line of reasoning, the British nuclear program had produced the French effort and the French program would inevitably evoke similar aspirations in Germany.

12

Indeed President Kennedy saw prospects of nuclear spread to countries which must have been startled to find themselves listed as possible candidates for the nuclear club. Thus in his television interview of December 17, 1962, President Kennedy said: "The question is whether the United States should join in helping make France a nuclear power, then Italy, then West Germany, then Belgium. How does that produce security when you have 10,20,30 nuclear powers who may fire their weapons off under different conditions?" (The CBS Television Network, Transcript of an Interview with President John F. Kennedy, December 17, 1962, p. 13).

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The MLF was given additional impetus by the reluctance of the NATO
nuclear powers to share their planning and strategic decisions with their
non-nuclear allies. The Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council, which
was created in April 1962 to provide a forum for the nuclear powers to
discuss their strategic policy, remained dormant. Proponents of joint
planning hoped to fill this gap through the MLF.

Another pressure for the MLF came from American strategic doctrine.
Though the United States Defense Department would have preferred that all
nuclear weapons of the Alliance remain under American control, it accepted
the MLF as the next best expedient so long as the American veto remained
unimpaired. The Pentagon was further attracted by the proposition that
the MLF might provide a "safety net" into which the nuclear allies might
jump in order to dispose of their nuclear arsenal.

An opposite view was taken by the advocates of European integration.
Their objection to the nuclear programs of France and Britain was less
that they divided the Alliance than that they divided Europe. Too weak to
encourage self-reliance, too nationally oriented to provide a focal point
for European loyalties, these programs prevented both European integration
and the "dumbbell concept" of Atlantic partnership. It would be different
with a European nuclear force. According to the European integrationists,
both in the State Department and overseas, a European nuclear force would
have the advantage of promoting European unity, and it would be strong
enough to become a respectable partner for the United States. The MLF
was accepted by Jean Monnet's influential Action Committee for a United
Europe for precisely the opposite reason that the Pentagon resigned itself

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to it: The European integrationists (and their allies in the State Department) saw in the MLF the kernel of a separate European nuclear force. They supported the MLF because they wanted to provide another basis for a united Europe than French nuclear claims and at the same time build a bridge for Britain to enter this united Europe.

These motives might have canceled each other out had it not been for President de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. Many American policymakers reacted with a sense of personal outrage and began to cast about for some suitable response. They chose the MLF partly because the French challenge seemed to them to base itself on nuclear autonomy, partly because the MLF happened to be the one "integrationist" project which was available and had a strong group of supporters within the government. In other words, conversion of the United States government from aloof receptivity to European initiatives to passionate advocacy of the MLF was less the result of positive conviction than a reaction to French intransigence. Nothing had changed between December 10, 1962 when Secretary Rusk stated in effect that it was up to the Europeans to formulate a plan with respect to the MLF and January 21, 1963 when he first committed the United States to pressing it except De Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market. The MLF was an attempt to implement the Grand Design without France and, if necessary, against it.

13

For a splendid historical account of the MLF see Alastair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective," Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Number Thirteen (October 1964).

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Once the United States committed itself to the MLF, the official arguments on behalf of it went something like this: The issue of nuclear control is the fundamental problem before the Alliance and the one in which American leadership has been most explicitly challenged. The cohesion of the Alliance therefore requires that it be "solved." Only three solutions are conceivable: American hegemony which is psychologically unacceptable; proliferation to other countries of NATO which is politically divisive and strategically dangerous; the MLF. The MLF moreover will give the Federal Republic equal status; it will give new impetus to European integration; it will strengthen Allied cohesion.

There were, however, several difficulties with this policy. The first was the lack of clarity about our real objectives. The MLF became the focus for many diverse hopes and the support for it was drawn from many contradictory motives. It was supposed to revitalize NATO, yet reduce the role of France in Europe. It was to prevent nuclear proliferation and yet satisfy alleged German desires for a share of nuclear control. It simultaneously sought to meet the requirements of the Pentagon for central control over nuclear weapons and the hopes of many Europeans for the emergence of a European nuclear force. Perhaps these aims were not irreconcilable. But, because an explicit consideration of them was avoided in favor of the technical problem of mixed manning, the final debate when it occurred in the winter of 1964 was mortgaged by many previous evasions and ambiguities, some of them deliberate,

These inconsistencies became all the more serious because the issue of nuclear control was inherently divisive. A project which involved giving Germany access to the ownership of nuclear weapons was bound to bring on

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almost instinctive reactions of disquiet which were magnified by the hints
from Washington and Bonn that, if necessary, the MLF might be turned into
a special German-American relationship. French hostility compounded the
uneasiness of almost all the other allies. To be sure,
if the need was urgent the United States might well have been justified
to vindicate its leadership position by pressing on despite the doubts
of its allies. A great deal, therefore, turns on the answer to two related
questions: How good was the analysis which produced the MLF? How good
was the remedy?

### C. The MLF--Wrong Problem; Wrong Answer

The military case for the MLF has usually been put in terms of the
MRBM "requirement" developed by SACEUR in the late Fifties. However, this
"requirement" reflects many of the unsolved problems of NATO doctrine.
Whether the MLF contributes to the cohesion of NATO or becomes merely
another forum for articulating existing disagreements depends in part on
whether its military mission makes sense and commands a consensus. But
there is reason to believe that the American and British view of the
military role of the MLF differs from that prevalent in the Federal Republic
and at NATO headquarters.

Existing NATO doctrine assumes that all the missiles necessary to
eliminate the Soviet MRBM's should be under SACEUR's command. But should
a counterforce mission deep into Soviet territory really be a top priority
task of SACEUR? Indeed does it make any strategic sense when missiles on
both sides are numbered in the hundreds and can be either hardened or
made mobile? In any event, the MLF as originally conceived is much too

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small for dealing by itself with the Soviet MRBM's. Those who cite the SACEUR "requirement" on behalf of the MLF encourage later pressures for increasing the size of the MLF so that it can conduct effective counterforce operations. This would require many more missiles than the two hundred projected in the initial MLF plans.

If, on the other hand, the task of neutralizing the Soviet MRBM's is to be given to the MLF in conjunction with SAC, it becomes relevant to inquire why it is necessary to have two nuclear forces in the Alliance in both of which the United States has the final say. Since SAC would be the key element in any coordinated strategy, the MLF is at best a cumbersome and costly device to accomplish what remains a necessity in any event: to give our allies greater access to American strategic planning. In other words, if joint planning is confined to the MLF, it will be inadequate; if it is extended to cover all relevant strategic forces, the MLF is unnecessary.

However, the military case for the MLF has never been decisive. Successive SACEURs have been at best lukewarm about the project. And until six weeks before it emerged as a principal objective of American NATO policy, our highest officials had declared the MLF militarily unnecessary.

The key argument on behalf of the MLF has always been political. Specifically, the MLF was supposed to contribute to preventing nuclear proliferation by providing a framework within which our nuclear allies could abandon their nuclear programs. It was to discourage other allies from entering the nuclear field. Above all, it was to give equal status to the Federal Republic in nuclear matters.

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The first objective has been negated by the refusal of France and, to a lesser extent, of Great Britain to abolish their national forces. As for the other allies, none except the Federal Republic has either the resources or the motivation for a national nuclear program. The issue then becomes whether the MLF is a good device for absorbing Germany's nuclear ambitions.

There is no doubt that the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance depends importantly on the long-term orientation of the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic must be treated as an equal partner and must be able to participate fully in developing common policies. It is another question whether access to nuclear weapons should have been made the criterion of equality. It will never be known whether a subconscious desire for the possession of nuclear weapons did exist in Germany or what form it could have taken if it had. Was there a nuclear problem in Germany or did the United States create it--in the words of the former Defense correspondent of the London *Times*--by the passionate advocacy of its solution?

The trouble with self-fulfilling prophesies is that in retrospect it is impossible to demonstrate whether what happened was predicted or caused by the prophecy. The fact is that once the theory of a German appetite for nuclear weapons had become established, every German proposal was interpreted to become consistent with it. Thus, in 1960 Chancellor Adenauer stated that French and British possession of nuclear weapons should not give these countries a privileged position within NATO. The advocates of the MLF used this to demonstrate a veiled German desire for nuclear weapons. It is more likely that Chancellor Adenauer was concerned lest the

continue on page 18a

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Directorate proposed by President de Gaulle exclude the Federal Republic. It
was a demand for political equality not necessarily for nuclear weapons.

A similar interpretation was put on the strategic views of former
Defense Minister Strauss. He argued for more information about the nuclear
stockpiles in Germany, for a guarantee that these would not be withdrawn
without the consent of NATO and for a degree of unspecified joint control

continued on page 19

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14
over weapons fired from German soil. But Strauss' concern was primarily
with control of tactical nuclear weapons already in the NATO stockpiles
and of a range not suitable for a retaliatory strategy.

Whatever the *arriere pensées* of Chancellor Adenauer and Minister
Strauss, the question remains whether it would not have been wiser to
take their statements at face value rather than gear our policy to guesses
about their unstated desires. The spread of nuclear weapons to Germany
was much more complicated than simply applying British and French precepts.
It was a grave error to act as if Germany by a unilateral decision could
enter the nuclear field. No country faced greater obstacles in developing
a national nuclear program. In the treaty establishing the Western European
Union which made German rearmament possible the Federal Republic renounced
the production or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory. There is a
curious inconsistency between the proposition that the Federal Republic
wanted nuclear weapons so badly that it might break that treaty, and the
argument that another treaty could then restrain this desire.

Moreover, the issue was hardly urgent. At least until the elections
of 1969, it would have been impossible to mobilize domestic support within
Germany for a national nuclear program. This was all the more true because
any attempt to develop German national nuclear weapons would have awakened
latent distrust all over Europe. It is doubtful that NATO could have
survived if the Soviet Union had used the existence of a German national
nuclear program as a pretext to unleash a series of crises. No European

14
See for example, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 21,
1962.

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country would have run major risks so that Germany might have nuclear weapons under national control. Whatever Germany's real desires, it would have been wiser to give Germany fuller access to political decision-making in the Alliance than to become an advocate for German claims in the nuclear field which the Federal Republic could not have articulated for itself.

Such a course would have dealt with the real pressures behind the spread of nuclear weapons within the Western Alliance. Was the French nuclear program--begun by De Gaulle's predecessors--really inspired by the example of Great Britain as so many of our policymakers seem to believe? It is likely that the experience of Suez, with its dramatic demonstration of how American and European policies and interests might diverge, was a more powerful catalyst than speeches in the House of Commons. The fact that we gave Britain a special status in East-West negotiations did more to emphasize the political utility of Britain's nuclear arsenal than the claims of British Defense Ministers. Thus, whether the Federal Republic in fact felt a sense of discrimination would depend above all on its political role. A scrupulous concern for German interests--especially in the conduct of East-West negotiations--and an intimate system of political consultation might well have met the demands likely to be advanced by any foreseeable German government in the Sixties.

Instead, a vicious circle was created. The United States put forward a proposal based on a theoretical conception of German desires which the Germans felt obliged to accept because they did not want to thwart American wishes. What was originally intended as a device to tie

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the Federal Republic to NATO and the United States to Europe became
an end in itself.

Regardless of whether the MLF responded to German nuclear appetites
or whether it stimulated them, it is unlikely to contain whatever nuclear
aspirations exist in Germany. Its primary role will be to shift the
debate from the issue of the ownership of nuclear weapons to the issue of
control of a force in which the Federal Republic is the largest European
shareholder. Indeed since the MLF has overcome the political and
psychological hurdles to German ownership of nuclear weapons, the way is
open for the Federal Republic to seek alternative arrangements either if
the MLF fails or if it comes into being with control arrangements which
prove unsatisfactory. Then we may yet see two MLFs, one sponsored by the
United States and one by France, or perhaps even a national program based
on competence acquired through membership in the MLF.

A great deal depends therefore on the ability to solve the complex
issue of control of the MLF. Heretofore, strangely little attention has
been paid to this problem in MLF negotiations. The United States has taken
the view that since the Multilateral Force does not yet exist the issue
of nuclear control need not be faced until later. Official spokesmen have
also implied that the United States would be willing to consider a modification
of the initial control arrangements, including giving up the veto.

Both of these arguments raise serious questions. Physical operation
of the MLF will offer next to no insight into the problem of political
control. Knowledge of how to operate a missile-carrying ship is irrelevant
to the complex issue of how a coalition of sovereign states decides to enter

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a nuclear war. The problem will not become easier as time goes on--the primary change the passage of time will bring is to buttress the bargaining position of countries which will by then have made a major financial contribution to the MLF and whose interests with respect to its control arrangements are likely to diverge from ours.

The complexity of the issue of nuclear control is demonstrated by the three kinds of nuclear forces which will exist in NATO if the MLF comes into being. They are: (a) national nuclear forces such as SAC, the French *force de frappe* and, depending on its ultimate disposition, perhaps the British deterrent--these would remain under exclusive national control; (b) nuclear forces "assigned" to NATO which, depending on the meaning attached to the word "assignment," will be available to NATO for planning purposes even though they are also subject to national decisions; and (c) the MLF, whose employment would require unanimity at least in its early phases.

An MLF in which each contributor has a veto will not fundamentally change the situation with respect to nuclear control in NATO. No country which is presently unable to initiate nuclear war will be able to do so as a result of the MLF. No country able to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so because of the existence of the MLF. No country can be made to enter nuclear war through membership in the MLF.

In case of disagreement with our European allies, one of two things would happen. If we decided to resort to nuclear weapons against the wishes of our allies, the MLF would be inactive; but we could use SAC and the Polaris submarines assigned to NATO. If the situation were reversed--that is, if

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our allies wished to use nuclear weapons and we disagreed--neither the NATO force nor SAC could operate. A force which multiplies safety catches and is too small for its mission is certain to produce two sets of pressures: (a) to turn it into a militarily more significant instrument by increasing its size at least to the level of the Soviet MRBM's in Western Russia; and (b) to dilute the unanimity principle to avoid paralysis in times of crises. These pressures are likely even among allies initially indifferent or hostile to the MLF. Defense ministers will be forced to justify continuing expenditures. They will feel obliged to make the MLF a significant institution.

There have already been hints of things to come. The German Defense Minister von Hassel has stated that the veto of all the participants, while acceptable initially, will have to be reconsidered once the MLF has come into being. In the United States two possible solutions have been proposed: an eventual surrender of the United States veto and a less radical solution according to which the United States veto is retained but that of the smaller contributors is eliminated.

Can the United States seriously consider giving up the veto, as American spokesmen for the MLF have occasionally stated? Robert R. Bowie who originated the concept of the MLF and who has been one of its most influential defenders has written:

> We should be ready to concede to a multilateral force the same degree of ultimate autonomy as has already been granted the British national force. The final outcome might take the form of either (1) an integrated NATO force in which the United States, without a veto, would be one member, [Emphasis added] or (2) an integrated European force

Interview in *Christ und Welt*, (October 23, 1963), p. 7

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(without the United States as a member), closely coordinated with United States forces, but under ultimate European control.¹⁶

It is not easy to see how so fateful a decision as the use of nuclear weapons can be abdicated to a majority vote of even very close allies. The Constitutional provision that a declaration of war requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate may well prove insurmountable. The Congressional debate on such a proposition could not avoid discussing the circumstances in which a nuclear war might break out. This would force the Administration to define contingencies in which in its judgment the use of nuclear weapons would *not* be appropriate. The doubts generated by such a debate would do more damage than any benefit that it could possibly bring.

For precisely what would giving up the veto actually imply? Does it mean that when requested by a majority of our allies we would agree to go to war with the small part of the total nuclear arsenal of the Alliance represented by the MLF while SAC remained inactive? Or does it mean that we would be prepared to go to war with our entire nuclear arsenal? The former interpretation would be utterly contrary to the strategic doctrine elaborated so persistently by Secretary McNamara and his associates. To enter nuclear war with only the MLF, which is a small part of the total nuclear force of the Alliance and one not exceptionally well-suited to discriminating targeting, would make no military sense. It would prevent a strategy of flexible response. And Soviet retaliation against

16.

Robert R. Bowie, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, Vol. XVII, No. 3 (1963), p. 728.

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a blow by a force in which we participate will surely not take into account
our negative vote on the control body.

But if the second interpretation is correct--that we would be
committed to go to war with our _entire_ strategic force--it is not clear
why a special multilateral force must be set up. Then it would be wiser
to create a political control body for the Alliance as a whole and agree
to go to war on the basis of whatever majority vote seems indicated.

Difficult as it will be to decide on a control mechanism for
entering nuclear war, the political control over the actual military
operations of the MLF will be even more complex. Who is to be responsible
for the decisions to change planned targets (retargeting in strategic
jargon) or for determining the scale of individual attacks? How is the
MLF to fit into wartime negotiations? How does one go about ending
hostilities? On the basis of one vote or unanimity? With whom would
the Soviet Union deal when nuclear operations are to be stopped? To
evade these questions until irrevocable decisions are made is to invite
endless controversy later on.

A final problem of control is raised by the attribute of the MLF
which attracts many of its advocates: the international status of the
crews produced by mixed-manning. If each national contingent is to
remain responsive to national direction, the only problem is one of
communications and the difficulty inherent in control by the threat of
mutiny. If, however, the crews are to develop a real international status
and if their loyalties are to transcend national considerations--as the
proponents of the MLF urge--serious control problems may develop in time.

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The unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by national military units which has produced so much dubious fiction is restrained by long traditions of civilian supremacy and by habits of obedience. International crews separated for long periods from their societies may be less subject to such restraints. To start integration in the nuclear realm before a corresponding political framework exists may thus create a dangerous imbalance.

What about the other claims being made on behalf of the MLF by its advocates? Will the MLF promote European integration or eventually develop into a European nuclear force? Secretary Rusk has praised the MLF because of its potential contribution to European cohesion. Deputy Assistant Secretary J. Robert Schaetzel has argued that:

> The multilateral force would also inevitably make easier the eventual development of a European nuclear force, should this be the desire and within the grasp of the Europeans.¹⁸

The then Vice President Johnson said much the same thing:

> The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this (MLF) possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable--as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.¹⁹

17. Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in the Atlantic Partnership," DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1272 (November 11, 1963), p. 730.

18. J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-4), p. 567.

19. Lyndon B. Johnson, address at Brussels on November 8, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1275 (December 2, 1963), pp. 853-4. See also Robert R. Bowie, speech before the Western European Union Assembly, December 3, 1963, op. cit., pp. 127-8.

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The influential Action Committee for a United Europe headed by Jean Monnet has endorsed the MLF as the precursor of a European nuclear force.

Two problems are raised by the prospect of transforming the MLF into a European force: (a) the relative role of Germany and (b) the relationship of the United States to the emergence of such a force.

The problem of Germany is acute because as the MLF was originally conceived the Federal Republic was to be by far the largest European contributor paying close to seventy per cent of the European share.

Participants were promised influence in the control body and command over a number of ships proportionate to their financial contribution. Thus, if there was to be a European point of view within the MLF, its spokesman was likely to be the Federal Republic.

Such a prospect is not in the interest of NATO, of European cohesion, of the Federal Republic or of international stability. It would push the most exposed ally into the forefront of every dispute. It would make the Federal Republic which already has the largest conventional army also the most significant nuclear power in Europe. This would again raise fears that a decade and a half of farsighted German policy have only begun to erase. It might fuse anti-nuclear feelings into a dangerous wave of neutralism.

Some of the advocates of the MLF argue that the prospect of German domination will make Britain and France more eager to join. This may be the case. But it is also possible that Britain and France will in time move away from an alliance that threatens to turn into a special German-American arrangement. Even if the assumption proves correct, however, such a process of solving NATO's nuclear problem would be extremely worrisome.

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It would be better for the long-term stability and cohesiveness of Europe for the Federal Republic to join an institution in which France and Britain are the senior partners, than for Britain and France to be obliged to seek membership in a grouping to which Germany is the largest European contributor and in which ultimately it may play the same role as France does in the Common Market. History has been altered by smaller nuances.

The fear of German domination apart, the MLF is a poor chrysalis for a European nuclear force. Such a force could grow out of the MLF in only one of two ways: (a) by an American decision to withdraw from the MLF, or (b) through a European request that we leave it. Either course will be divisive in the extreme. It is one thing for a European nuclear force to develop from the present national programs which have existed for many years. It is quite another for a European force to come about through a United States withdrawal, voluntary or forced, from a joint Atlantic enterprise. Such an act might raise serious doubts about the continued validity of America's commitment to the defense of Europe.

In short, to leave open the two most important and interrelated problems of the MLF--that of control and that of evolution of the force--will magnify tensions later. If the MLF comes into being, the United States may, in fact, be haunted for years to come by the inconsistencies of its arguments on behalf of it. To the Federal Republic, the MLF has been represented as a device to give non-nuclear countries an increased participation in nuclear matters. To Soviet and European critics, the MLF has been advocated as decreasing, if anything, the role of its members in the decision to go to nuclear war. Thus Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

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> Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be
> by multilateral agreement, rather than by bilateral
> agreement as in the case of these earlier strategic
> missiles. The MLF will thus increase the number of
> states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than
> on the nuclear trigger. /Emphasis added./

> There would be no increase of risk of compromise
> of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral
> custodial procedures would assure that individual
> countries had no greater access to information about
> how to design and manufacture weapons than at present
> under the NATO atomic stockpile.²⁰

> The dilemma of how to reconcile the requirement of central control
> over nuclear weapons with the sovereignty of our allies is real. But for
> the long-term vitality of the Alliance it would have been better to face
> this issue honestly than to present different versions of the control
> problem to different audiences. If there is a German demand for nuclear
> weapons--as the advocates of the MLF have alleged--it is unlikely to be
> satisfied by "increasing the number of states with fingers on the safety
> catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger." If other countries do wish to
> enter the nuclear field, they are not likely to be put off by a device
> which creates the illusion of participation while giving "no greater access
> to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present."
> The MLF cannot at one and the same time satisfy demands for nuclear sharing
> and assuage concerns about nuclear proliferation.

20

Gerard C. Smith, "The Nuclear Defense of NATO," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1299 (May 18, 1964), p. 785.

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Originated to fulfill SACEUR's military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem which it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions which gave rise to the military requirement. Rather than create a structure to heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multiply divisions.

French policy has chosen to make the MLF a symbol of its disagreements with the United States. All over Europe--and especially in the Federal Republic--Gaullist and American factions have begun to struggle over the symbol of the MLF. While this conflict has always been latent, it would not have crystallized so rapidly (or at all) if it were not for the pressure created by the MLF. French policy could not by itself have forced this decision. If, as a result, impetus toward European unity should be lost or if Franco-German relations should deteriorate further, many even among those now paying lip service to the MLF may turn against us.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every measure to strengthen the Alliance. But Franco-German friendship so painfully achieved should be hazarded only for a great gain. Before embarking on a collision course, we should be sure that a disputed scheme commands wide support and that it will in fact bring about a structure which enhances the long-term vitality of the Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of these conditions. Though the proponents of the MLF have tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of shortsighted men, the opposition of France, Belgium and

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the Secretary-General of NATO, the indifference of most other NATO allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be simply shrugged off. Outside of the Federal Republic there is not a single country whose agreement to the MLF represents something more than acquiescence to American pressure.

Proponents of the MLF often compare their project to the Schumann Plan which despite heavy initial criticism laid the basis for European economic integration. Unfortunately while many constructive innovations have had to withstand criticism when first proposed, not everything that is criticized is necessarily constructive. The Schumann Plan promoted Franco-German cooperation in areas where long-term interests were parallel. The longer the Coal and Steel Community lasted, the more obvious grew the benefits of common action.

The opposite is likely to be the case with the MLF. Once established, the conflicting motives of the participants will become increasingly apparent. There is a latent difference of opinion between the Federal Republic and the United States and Great Britain about the size of the force as well as about its composition, specifically about whether land-based missiles should supplement the sea-based MLF. It is likely that the Federal Republic regards the MLF as a first installment in meeting SACEUR's MREM requirement while the United States and Britain considers it a final satisfaction of existing needs. Though this will not become apparent in the early stages of the project, it is bound to lead to difficulties later on.

continued on page 31a

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Another potential dispute derives from the fact that the Federal Republic favors the Multilateral Force partly to increase its share of nuclear control. Most other countries--especially Great Britain--participate in order to prevent an increase of German control. This difference too can be obscured in the early stages of the MLF; it, too, will become more and more acute as time goes on.

continued on page 32

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Yet another cause of dissension will be the continued existence of national nuclear forces. If possession of nuclear weapons is in fact a sign of equal status, the MLF will not end discrimination against the Federal Republic unless Britain and France renounce their nuclear programs. But if German pressures in this direction are added to those of the United States a very unfortunate reaction could occur.

Finally, an extremely divisive debate in the Federal Republic can be avoided only if the MLF treaty contains a "European" clause providing for the possibility of transforming the MLF into a European nuclear force once European political integration is further advanced. The Italian government (whose Parliamentary support for the MLF is dubious in any event) has taken a similar position. Great Britain, on the other hand, will not agree to such a prospect; indeed its participation in any new nuclear arrangement is conditional on a British veto over any structural changes. It is one thing to create an institution whose evolution is likely to strengthen common objectives; it is quite another to stake so much on a device where conflicting interests have been kept from becoming obvious only by avoiding a consideration of the key issues.

The MLF may therefore strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to combat. For in its advocacy of the MLF, the United States has granted almost all of the propositions of its European critics. It has agreed that possession of nuclear weapons is a criterion of equality. It has granted that ownership of some strategic forces is essential for participation in strategic planning and political decisions. It has admitted that influence in the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic nuclear arsenal.

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It has differed only about the nature of ownership and the way control should be exercised. But since the control procedures of the MLF patently favor United States hegemony, they can be used by the nationalists and extremists as a proof of American duplicity. If the Federal Republic finds itself at odds with the United States about control, or with its other allies about the evolution of the force, a serious backlash could develop.

Advocates of the MLF often argue that it is easy to pick holes in any existing nuclear control plan but much harder to offer a constructive alternative. To be sure if the issue of nuclear control is, in fact, the cause of Allied tensions, the MLF proponents have a point. However, the issue of nuclear control is a symptom, not a cause of NATO's difficulties. There exists no neat solution for it as long as NATO is composed of sovereign states. Nor does the MLF "solve" it. The basic problem in the Alliance is political and not strategic. There is something incongruous about the absorption in technicalities of mixed manning while the West lacks a common policy toward the Communist world, flounders dividedly in the former colonial areas, and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine. To devote so much energy to the problem of who pushes the button in the remote contingency of nuclear war, while neglecting the issues which confront the Alliance daily, comes close to being escapism. The imagination and dedication expended on the MLF would have been better spent in creating structures to assure each ally that its interests will be taken seriously not only during the improbably eventuality of general nuclear war but during the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and in crisis situations.

Insofar as the German conversion to the MLF was not the result of American

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missionary zeal, it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be excluded from further East-West negotiations.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve this result. American policy would have been better advised to have worked directly for an Atlantic political structure. It would have been wiser to set up a body to develop common policies for the many unsolved problems of the Alliance in East-West relations, strategic doctrine, trade policy, arms control or relations with the emerging nations. If France had refused to participate, the disruptive intent would have been obvious. France would have stood aside from an effort which commanded a real consensus. Moreover, it would have been much easier for a later French government to join such a group than the MLF where eventual French participation could easily be precluded by financial considerations alone. If such a group had then decided that some way must be found to relate the Federal Republic to the ownership of strategic weapons, the political context would have been entirely different. It would have represented the common view of all allies rather than the pressure of one. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the MLF, a political body to coordinate Alliance policy and to manage crises remains essential.

The MLF, as originally conceived, is not likely to be realized. Too much opposition exists so that even the most passionate advocates will have to modify the scheme. It may be useful, however, to inquire what lessons can be drawn from the experience.

21 For an elaboration of such a policy-making body, see below Chapter VIII.

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The most important lesson is to avoid solving political problems with technical expedients. Confronted with a political and philosophical challenge in De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, American policymakers reacted by staking everything on a scheme of nuclear control about which they had previously been lukewarm. They then spent two years negotiating its mechanical aspects. In the process the deeper causes of NATO's disarray were neglected. The ends and means became confused.

De Gaulle's question had been addressed to a future ten or fifteen years hence. The American response was in terms of a technical expedient to an immediate dispute which commanded no real support outside of Washington and Bonn and which largely avoided the fundamental political issues. At its best, the MLF was irrelevant to the deepest problems of NATO. It would have repeated within its framework many of the disputes which it was supposed to overcome.

In Washington, this was obscured because one group in the government had become so deeply committed to the MLF that it acted as a lobbyist rather than an organ for calmly weighing alternatives. This has made it difficult to determine whether what was represented as European views did not really reflect European acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of one segment of our bureaucracy. The result was a whole series of misjudgments. European support for the MLF has been grossly overestimated. Despite the repeated criticisms of the MLF by British Labor leaders when in opposition, it was expected that the new British government would agree to a treaty setting up

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the MLF within two months of coming into office. The divisive impact of the threat of a German-American nuclear partnership was misjudged. Throughout, some American officials acted as if selling the MLF was an end in itself. By using whatever argument was convenient to this purpose a whole list of partially inconsistent promissory notes have been handed out. Sooner or later, some of these may fall due.

The pressure of a relatively small group of officials in the State Department gave an impression to our allies of a monolithic American point of view which was misleading. The Pentagon had accepted the MLF only on the assumption that ultimate American control would remain unimpaired. The group in the State Department which originated the MLF proposal and pressed it on our allies was much more sympathetic to the ultimate emergence of a separate European nuclear force. Indeed, it occasionally urged the MLF as a means to this end. Although the cohesiveness of our society depends on understating conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major international innovations unless we are clear about our ultimate direction.

All of this suggests the need for a re-examination of some governmental procedures. There is required a focus for planning less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures. Some means must be found to chart a clear course before we commit our prestige rather than use the process of negotiations to clarify our views. Not to reveal what we intend is a question of tactics; not to know is to mortgage the future.

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Fortunately, partly because of the initiative of the new British government, partly because of President Johnson's removal of previous time limits, an opportunity exists to take a new approach to the MLF project. The British proposal for an Allied Nuclear Force has the dual advantage of relating existing nuclear forces to each other and of reducing the relative importance of the mixed-manned element. 22 Both of these objectives are desirable. The MLF hides so many contradictions and evasions that it cannot be the keystone of NATO. A new approach to the nuclear issue would enable the Alliance to reconsider its priorities. The Alliance should begin with a definition of political needs and then develop strategic devices to serve these rather than the other way around.

President Johnson has wisely reduced the pressures for the original MLF project and has thus smoothed the way for a new study of the entire problem. In this reassessment, we must, of course, keep in mind that in many countries, notably in the Federal Republic, leaders have staked their careers on our previous proposals. Though another approach to the issue of nuclear control would have been preferable, future policy must consider that simply abandoning the MLF now would have a different significance than earlier. Moreover, some of the objectives which the MLF has sought to realize are important. For example, the goal of political equality for all members of the Alliance is crucial. Means must be found to satisfy those objectives of the MLF project which are essential to Allied cohesion. The controversy about the MLF will have served some useful purpose if it

22 For a fuller description of the British proposal, see below Chapter VI.

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permits the Alliance to return to fundamentals: the definition of
common purposes and an answer to the question of what the members of
the Alliance really want in the nuclear field.