New York,

December 26, 1915.

My letter to the President is the most important document of the day, and Councillor Polk the most important caller. I arranged with Polk that the State Department should keep me informed by cable while I am absent. A special cypher is to be worked out in order that no one excepting himself and Lansing will know what is passing between us.

I tried to make it clear to Polk that my efforts would be minimized if they permitted me to grope around in the dark without actual information as to what was going on, not only in Congress and administrative circles, but between other governments and ourselves. I told him something of the jealousies I would encounter, particularly in London. I wished him to understand this as it may have a bearing on many incidents arising during my stay there.

We discussed at considerable length how I could guard these constant cables without letting Page and the Embassy know their contents. Polk is distrustful of Page and the Embassy staff because of their propensity to talk. It is not that Page talks more than others, but he is more trustful of his staff. Polk said he would put in each despatch something I might read to Page so as not to hurt his sensibilities.

A cypher is to be made in the Department tomorrow and will be sent over by special messenger so as to reach me tomorrow night. Polk spoke of the difficulties of my undertaking. We agreed the only thing our Government could do was to press the Ancona and Lusitania incidents to a conclusion, come what may. I spoke of the selfish outlook of all the belligerent nations and of their criticism of us for not doing what they wished us to do. Nations are not unlike individuals and we should not become Quixotic in order to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. Our people should not be sacrificed unless for a cause that is righteous.

Every hour of the day has been crowded. Mona and Randolph came from

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Boston to be with us until we sail, and the calling of many friends made the confusion worse.

December 27, 1915.

There was a disagreeable article in the World concerning my mission. It was not disagreeable as far as I was personally concerned, but it was very critical of our ambassadors abroad, stating that I was going akkamad over to re-primand some and teach manners to others. The Manager of the United Press asked if I cared to make any denial. I did not, but was entirely willing for him to do so upon his own responsibility.

A letter came from Gregory telling me that Burleson said there would perhaps be a resolution introduced in Congress inquiring as to what compensation I received for my last mission, and what it would be for this one. This is merely an effort, if indeed it should materialize, for I always mistrust such information, to hurt the President. It will be futile for I have never accepted compensation for my public services and, until my last trip, I never allowed my expenses to be paid. I told Roy Howard of the United Press of this and he is to forestall any possible action by a statement through his correspondents at Washington giving the real facts. Howard wished me to make another statement regarding my departure, but I declined to do so further than to ask the press and the public to accept my first statement as being the real reason for my trip.

Dudley Malone came to have a final discussion before I beft. I agreed to write the President asking him not to move in New York political matters without first consulting Dudley. My letter to the President explains this, as indeed, does another letter to him explaining the matter about which Gregory wrote.

Charles Willis Thompson of the Times staff called. I gave him an in-

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eight into my purpose in going abroad, and he is to write an article making it clear that the World story is pure fabrication.

Charles R. Crane called to bid us goodbye and to have a last word on current political affairs. Crane is a sweet tempered and generous, but his political judgment must be taken with some caution.

Lansing's secretary came over from Washington last night to explain the cypher he had worked out for Lansing, Polk and myself.

During the day I telephoned the State Department and started in motion the request Mrs. Astor made regarding the inspection of British prisoners by physicians rather than by secretaries of our Embassy in Berlin.

At Don Seitz' suggestion, I had Prof. Shepherd of Columbia appointed a delegate to the Pan American Congress convening in Washington today.

ON BOARD S. S. ROTTERDAM.

December 28, 1916.

Last night Mona developed an acute attack of laryngitis and is unable to leave her bed. This distresses us for we had counted upon her coming to the steamer to see us off. Gordon, Sidney and Nancy came down with us. When we reached the pier there was the greatest array of newspaper men with cameras and moving picture machines I have ever seen. There must have been fifty of them ranged up to do execution. I was perfectly pleasant, acceding to their demands, posing for them something like five minutes. After that, I allowed reporters and photographers to keep me busy until the ship sailed. There were a number of friends to see us off.

Before leaving the pier the General Manager of the Holland American Line had our things moved from the cabin we had engaged to the cabin de luxe consisting of a sitting room, two bedrooms and two baths. The party at our

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table consists of Mr. and Mrs. Brand Whitlock, Mrs. William H. Young, Miss Denton
Mr. Clifford Carver, Loulie and myself. The most interesting passenger on board,
other than Brand Whitlock, is Captain Boy-Ed of the Imperial German Navy, who
has been sent home by our Government for his activities since the war began. He
had a card of introduction to me from Dr. Cary Grayson and made himself known
soon after the ship was under way. I did not care to talk to him on deck and
therefore invited him to our cabin. I also invited Mr. and Mrs. Brand Whitlock.
The conversation was general, Whitlock and Boy-Ed doing most of it.

Falmouth, England.

January 5, 1916.

We arrived at Falmouth today after a tempestuous voyage. On Sunday the
wind became almost a hurricane and no member of the ship's company, with whom I
talked, had ever seen such a fearsome sea. I thought the climax had been
reached last January on the Lusitania, but this storm added something to the
fury of that. Other than the bad weather, the trip has been without incident.
Whitlock and I have had many conversations.

I can better understand now why Whitlock has made such a successfullk
in Belgium under such great difficulties. He has the kindly human instinct.
He is not given to hate or recrimination. He can see the other man's point of
view and he is not absorbed with his own ego. He knows literature and the fine
arts. He knows our political institutions and our people and their aspirations,
and he is in every way a worthy representative of the United States during these
troubrous times. When peace comes I think the President should send him higher
up.

Lloyd Griscom and Chandler Anderson were aboard, both coming over to repre-
sent the Beef Packers in their difficulties with the British Government. Cameron
Forbes is another passenger with whom I have talked and whose point of view on

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the Philippine Islands I have gotten. He tells an interesting story and I agree with many of his conclusions, though, here and there, our sympathies do not touch.

We arrived this afternoon at three o'clock. The British Government had made arrangements to di sembark our party. The balance of the passengers will not be allowed to leave the ship under twenty-four hours because of examinations incident to the war. The naval officers who came on board had our baggage taken by hand to the railway station, engaged taxicabs, sleeping car accommodations and did everything possible to make our journey to London comfortable.

London,

January 6, 1916.

We arrived in London this morning around seven o'clock. No one knew the train we would take and therefore no one met us. I found a note of welcome from Page and I telephoned him and took breakfast with him. Our conversation was of no especial interest.

I also took lunch with Page and we exchanged news and experiences since we last met.

Sidney Brooks called and we discussed many questions since he is sailing for New York tomorrow.

I sent word to Sir Edward Grey that I would call at 33 Eccleston Square at seven o'clock. I reached there shortly before seven and found him waiting. Brooks had told me how kindly and in-what a complimentary way Grey had spoken of me. Brooks thought he had a real affection for me. I hope he has for I feel as much toward him.

Sir Edward told something of the progress of the war and all the misadventures that have befallen the Allies since we met. He thought things were going better now and that Great Britain was never more resolute to win.

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I felt the resignations from the British and French Cabinets had had a
bad effect upon neutral opinion, and I deeply regretted that Delcassé had
left the French Cabinet. Sir Edward said it was for no other reason than
ill health; that he had completely broken down. I thought a Cabinet Minis-
ter ought not to resign in time of war because he might happen to differ from
his colleagues upon some policy, and I hoped the present crisis here would not
culminate in such a dénouement.

I touched lightly upon the British Ambassador at Washington and of his
temperamental unfitness for the position he occupies. I did not push this
further but will perhaps take it up later.

I explained somewhat in detail what I thought should be done toward
bringing the democracies of Europe in closer touch with the United States;
and intimated that we were ready to bring about such a union in the event a
workable plan could be formulated. The American people, I thought, would
sustain the President upon a great moral issue, and it was upon that plane I
should seek to bring our weight at the proper time.

I outlined the suggestion I made by letter regarding the United States'
intervention based upon a demand for the freedom of the seas and the curtail-
ment of militarism. I gave my views as to what the freedom of the seas
meant for England. It was gratifying to have Sir Edward meet me half way.
I thought that the suggestion which I have often expressed, that it would accomplish
more for Great Britain what her predominant naval power does for her now, but
it would be less costly, more effective, and would not irritate neutrals.
That is, if the freedom of the seas was agreed upon as an international pol-
icy, the nation breaking the agreement would have to reckon with every other
nation. If the pact I have in mind was in force, and Germany had broken
it, every subscribing nation would be aiding Great Britain in her effort to

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punish the offenders. On the other hand if Great Britain had broken
the pact, she would be the one facing united opposition.

He was gratified to hear me express my belief that public opinion in the United States had advanced to a point where it was reasonably certain we would enter some world agreement having for its object the maintenance of peace if a workable plan could be devised.

Grey asked which members of the Cabinet I would like to meet in
order to discuss such a plan. We agreed upon Balfour, but could not
think beyond him of anyone who would be in sympathy with our purposes.
I considered it extremely doubtful whether a workable plan could be de-
vised since too many people had to be convinced in order to make it pos-
sible. I did not believe some members of the Cabinet would appreciate
our motives. To this Grey assented, and it was decided that Balfour and
I should lunch with him Monday to talk the matter out.

I thought it far better for the democracies of the world
to unite upon some plan which would enable the United States to in-
tervene than for us to drift into the war by breaking diplomatic rela-
tions with the Central Powers. He concurred in this view.

I confessed having advised the President against an actual break
with Germany at this time, because I hoped we might come to some agree-
ment along the lines now contemplated. I told him the President was
in sympathy with this view. On the contrary, the Secretary of State
was insistent that we make an actual break with Germany. The govern-
ing factor with Lansing was the belief that if the Central Powers win,
we *shak* would have to reckon with them later. While I felt the weight
of this argument, still I believe the plan we have in mind will give bet-
ter results.

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Sidney Brooks invited Mr. Balfour, St Loe Strachey and A. H. Pollen to meet me at dinner at Brooks Club. I was nearly an hour late, being detained by my conference with Sir Edward Grey.

Everyone was in good form, especially Balfour, and we had a delightful evening. The conversation was mainly of passing interest. Balfour told of the activities of the British submarines in the Baltic. He said the German submarines were not as effective, either in construction or as well manned, as the British; that if they were, they would be a serious menace to Great Britain.

We discussed what would best constitute permanent peace, and Balfour mentioned a suggestion I gave him last year concerning the discontinuance of the manufacture of munitions of war for a certain period. This brought about general discussion and ended in an opinion favorable to the plan. I have never claimed, and did not claim tonight, that the plan was perfect, but merely the best so far suggested, faulty as it must necessarily be. I had an opportunity to tell Balfour that Grey expected him to lunch Monday, and I hoped he would be able to be there. He said he would and we would then have a real talk.

January 7, 1916.

Page lunched with me. He was full of the growing unpopularity of the President and United States in Great Britain. He questioned whether the President would ever take decisive action concerning the Lusitania or similar matters. He thinks the feeling against us here is caused by inaction over the Lusitania. He asked whether I thought the President would be opposed with what he had written and cabled him. I thought it quite likely.

I have been here but little more than twenty-four hours and already the entire two weeks I plan to stay is taken up with engagements for lun-

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cheons and dinners.

I have a note this morning from Sir Edward Grey which is a part of the record, unimportant though it is. A stream of telephone calls have kept me more than busy, but I shall not burden the diary with such matters.

January 8, 1916.

We received an invitation this morning to spend the week-end at Buckhurst with Mr. Robert Benson, a brother-in-law of Earl Grey. We had to decline as we had arranged to go down to Knole with the Sackville-West's.

Eric Drummond, Sir Edward Grey's secretary, lunched with me. He has Grey's entire confidence and I spoke very freely to him. There were many details I wished to firmly implant in his mind in order that he might work at odd times upon Grey and other members of the Government. I told him the present situation gave the best opportunity since the United States became a republic for a closer understanding between our two countries. I thought if this did not come about, it would not be the President's fault. The difficulties in the way of such an understanding were Great Britain's high-handed policy upon the seas-- a policy that was not only irritating to us, but to all neutral countries as well. He asked for specific instances, which I gave, adding that it increased our difficulties in bringing about a better understanding between the two countries. I did not express an opinion as to how important such actions were to Great Britain, but I could not conceive they were of as much moment as the friendship of the United States. Experience had taught me, I said, that one could never have everything, and it was better to look for the big and vital things when they might be purchased at the expense of the lesser ones. Great Britain desired all, and this she could not have. I believed if the Allies were not completely successful and there was an alignment after the war between Germany, Japan, and Russia, the resent-

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ment felt by many of the neutral nations on account of Great Britain's arro-
gant sea policy, would cause them to sympathise with such a triumviate rather
than with Great Britain.

H. C. Hoover called in the afternoon to tell of his tribulations in
Belgium. The Germans, according to him, are not keeping the spirit of their
agreement as to foodstuffs. They are levying tribute upon the Belgians and
with the money are buying Belgian cattle to feed their army. This is con-
trary to the understanding with the British and French Governments. Hoover
asked me to dine with him to meet some of the English pacifists, among them
Hirst of the Economist. He believes the belligerents are tired and would
welcome means of ending the conflict. I see no surface evidence of this.

Frederick W. Wile of the Daily Mail is eager to return to America, and
came to discuss an offer made him by Mr. Ochs of the Times. I advised ac-
cepting it. Wile generously placed himself at my disposal while I am in
London, and asked to be my man "Friday".

We dined with Lady Scott. These invited to meet us were:
Admiral and Mrs. Kerr, Captain Hall, head of the Naval Intelligence Department,
and General G. F. Ellison. I had an interesting time with Captain Hall and
General Ellison.

I received a cable from Lansing and sent one to the President.

January 9, 1916.

Lady Sackville-West asked us down to Knole to lunch. There is no
need to describe Knole, for its priceless treasures are too well known.
It is one of the most interesting places in the world; taking the exterior,
the historic associations and the art treasures into consideration. Lady
Sackville urged us to return another time to remain over the week-end, which
we shall probably not wish to do at this season of the year, because of the

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coldness of the house to which we are not accustomed.

I dined with Page to meet Bonar Law and Leverson Harris. There were only the four of us at the table and the conversation as usual drifted to the war, its cause, its probable end and its consequences. I do not believe anything was said of sufficient importance to record. Bonar Law is not a man whose mind runs *akang* in the same channel as mine, but I got along with him without undue argument.

January 10, 1916.

I received a cable from the President today. This taken in connection with my despatch to him, in which I ask him to define his position as to his willingness to participate in a world settlement of the war, is important. It marks a definite departure in the policy of our Government and for this, as well as for other reasons, is of historic value.

I lunched with Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Balfour to discuss the real purpose of my visit to Europe. My letter of today to the President epitomizes the conversation between us. It may lead to consequences of which all sidelights should be known.

Grey did little of the talking. He and I had threshed out the subject and were in more or less agreement. It was rather new to Balfour, particularly the thought as to the freedom of the seas. I had discussed this with him before, but he looked upon it then as academic. Today it assumed concrete form. I found him not very constructive, and analytical and argumentative. Time and again he would start with the wrong premises. I would gently touch him on the shoulder and ask for a word, and would bring back the discussion to the contention we had laid down and not what he was imagining it to be. For instance, he wished to discuss what would have happened had such an arrangement been in force between Great Britain and

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the United States at the beginning of the war, and where it would have led.
the United States. I stopped him at this point to remind him it was not
our intention to make a separate covenant with Great Britain, but a covenant
which would embrace all civilized nations, and that it also purported to make
a conference obligatory before war was actually declared between nations.

He wondered whether the President would be able to carry out such an agree-
ment. To this I replied that it was easier for him to do his part, than it
was for them to do theirs. They have a coalition Government to deal with,
having diverse opinions upon international relations, while we had a President
more powerful during his term of office than any sovereign in Europe. Balfour
admitted this. I told them it would be easier for me to persuade the Presi-
dent to accede to what I would be willing to agree to, than it would be for
them to succeed with their colleagues. I had only one man to convince and
I knew him sufficiently well to know what he would accept and what refuse.

Both Grey and Balfour appeared to be full of suppressed excitement
at the proposal, for it is of vital moment to Great Britain. I explained
the President's policy regarding submarine warfare, and admitted that I was
largely responsible for his not sending Bernstorff home and breaking off dip-
lomatic relations with Germany. I explained if this had been done, the plan
I proposed now would be impossible of success, and we would be merely in the
ruck of the war along with the balance of them, and with no hope of a satis-
factory solution unless militarism was completely crushed by force of arms.

A. G. Gardiner, of the Daily News, came and I talked to him
rather freely, because I wish him to retain his high opinion of the President
and to strengthen it if possible. I have confidence in Gardiner's discretion
but I did not tell him the full purpose of my visit to Europe, although I let
him sense something of its import. I did this to enable me to argue from the

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President's standpoint. Page always argues from the British viewpoint, and I can readily understand why he finds opinion so set against the President. Up to the present, I have not met a man who did not confess the President was right in his attitude, particularly where I have been able to tell more of what is in his mind than the public knows.

Mr. Skinner, American Consul, called and we talked of trade questions between Great Britain and the United States. He takes the American point of view as strongly as Page takes the British. He is a clear-headed, sensible fellow, and I believe is doing good work. When seeing my various callers I shut off the telephone and instruct that no cards be sent up, otherwise I would find it impossible to carry on a consecutive conversation.

We dined with Chalmers Roberts. The others present were Lady Paget and Mr. Cust. Lady Paget asked advice concerning her project of raising a million pounds in America to found schools in England, France and Belgium, to train blind soldiers of the war to become self-supporting. She had a letter from the King concerning my visit to London and asked why I changed my views after I returned to America. As a matter of fact, I have not changed my views, but circumstances were altered. She told of a remark made by Lord Curzon. He stated that at one time he was proud of his children's American blood, but now he was ashamed of it. If Lord Curzon feels anything like the contempt for the United States that the United States feels for him, the sentiment is indeed deep. I do not consider it worth my while to argue with such a man as Curzon.

January 11, 1916.

Clifford Carver invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mrs. McKenna and the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Runciman, for lunch. McKenna said he thought the Cabinet crisis was over. The Cabinet has yielded to Runciman's views, although it was done in a way to make it appear a victory

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for others.

I urged both McKenna and Runciman not to desert the ship in time of peril. They have a deep feeling that Great Britain will make a fatal blunder if she puts many more men in the army, taking them away from the industries and sapping the financial vitality of the country.

McKenna and I discussed the ever burning question of relations between Great Britain and the United States and the part we should play. He was generous enough to say we had done a noble part by the Allies, and that it would never be forgotten. That without the help we had already given them, it was quite possible the war would have ended last Autumn favorably to Germany. I expressed a hope he would say as much to the British people. Both McKenna and Runciman repeatedly asserted that all criticism of the United States was done by irresponsible and ignorant people. The King and Curzon flashed through my mind.

Lord Bryce called just after the luncheon party was over. I gave him a clear view of the purposes of my visit here and told of my interview with Grey and Balfour, and of my intention to use them as mediums to reach the Cabinet. He was very interested. I gave my views as to the possibility of Germany making a separate peace with Russia and France next year, and upon terms even more favorable than Great Britain could afford to consent, even if the Allies were successful in partially defeating Germany. He asked if I had any reason to believe Russia contemplated such a move. My answer to this was that I had no information upon the subject, but I had the habit of putting myself in the other man's place and arguing from his viewpoint. I believed if Germany was in danger of defeat, she would know it before others, and self preservation would lead her to offer Russia such terms as the Russian autocracy might easily be led to accept. The danger I saw there was in dealing with an autocratic government, and not with a democracy where questions of

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honor entered more largely into a discussion, and agreements had to be approved
by representatives of the people. With Russia out of the way, he recognized
the force of my argument as to France. Bryce is to come again Thursday at
ten o'clock for a further talk.
In the meanwhile, he will think over what I said and continue
the discussion then. I wish the benefit of his advice before I take up the
discussion again with Grey and Balfour.

Robert Donald of the Chronicle called and remained for an hour. He
told many incidents of interest relating to the Government, the French situa-
tion and the French Cabinet. His wife is French and he visits France fre-
quently, speaking the language like a native. We soon drifted into the in-
evitable argument over the President's submarine policy, etc. etc. I convinc-
ed Donald, as I have others, and he has promised to write an editorial in the
Chronicle and endeavor to set his public straight.

There were several callers after Donald among them Lloyd Griscom,
William Heinemann, the publisher, etc. but I did not see them as I wished to
read the mail that had come from America, and also to rest for a few minutes
before going to the Embassy for dinner.

Page had Lloyd George, Reginald McKenna, Austen Chamberlain and Lord Reading to meet me. It was very pleasant. The conversation was unimportant but interesting and each contributed his share. It was curious to find McKenna and Lloyd George at the same table, for they have not been on speaking terms during the past few weeks. It was even more curious to see Chamberlain with the other three, for until the advent of the war, it would have been impossible to have induced him to put his feet under the same table with them.

Page started the conversation by saying that Mr. Chamberlain and
others had asked him "what the United States wished Great Britain to do" and
he requested me to give an answer. I replied "the United States would like
Great Britain to do those things which would enable them to win the war."

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want to know the United States to help Great Britain win the war". Page generally said, "you have answered the question with more cleverness than I had the wit to do".

My reply brought general approval, as naturally it would, and then came the discussion as to what Great Britain must do to help the United States help her. I went into our shipping troubles at some length and told them of the burden their restrictions placed upon the President. The question of atrocities came up and I made the following observation: "England should be thankful for every act of frightfulness Germany has committed, for every man, woman and child that has died at sea or on land, has died for England just as much as the soldiers in the field".

Lloyd George was particularly enthusiastic over this remark and said he had noticed that recruiting on the East Coast, where such things had occurred, had been greater than in any part of England, and that he wished a Zeppelin raid or two might strike the Clyde. I suggested having a string of arc lights from the East Coast leading directly to the Clyde. This delighted Lloyd George and he added to it by remarking, "and we might have large electric signs saying, This way to the Clyde".

Before leaving, Lord Reading took me aside and expressed a wish that I should meet Lloyd George alone for a more confidential talk. He said he knew that neither George nor I would be willing to open our minds fully to one another unless we were alone. We made a tentative arrangement to meet Friday night.

January 12, 1916.

I have a cable from the President saying:

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This indicates that the situation is getting acute in Washington. It is
unfortunate we cannot work out the great policies we have in mind without
having them involved in trade disputes.

I also have a cable from Lansing which is attached.

I lunched with Page to meet Sir Edward Grey, Lord Robert Cecil, and Irwin Laughlin. Page asked me to repeat to Grey the reply I gave to Chamberlain last night regarding what the United States would like Great Britain to do at this time. When I gave the answer, Page again complimented it, but I added I had no doubt Sir Edward preferred the answer he made to mine. When the conversation had gone along further, Sir Edward harked back to my reply and asked me to repeat it, stating that it was a good thing to remember.

The conversation during the entire luncheon and afterward concerned the restriction of trade by Great Britain. Sir Edward is frankly willing to do what he can, but he has his difficulties much as the President has his.

My attention was called to the leading editorial in the Mail this morning demanding that the embargo be made stricter. This sentiment, Lord Robert and Sir Edward said, was prevalent throughout England. They receive many letters from widows and fathers who have lost husbands and sons, pleading that their lives shall not be given in vain, and demanding an embargo that will strangle Germany.

I went into the President's difficulties explaining that a large body of our citizens never lost an opportunity to emphasise the injustice of Great Britain's attitude. When Congress was not in session, the President was more or less his own master, but now Senators and Representatives are pushing him vigorously day by day. I said that perhaps a majority of the people of the United States were tired of the war, and had ceased to take a vital interest in it. War books were now a drug on the market, and people were asking one another what it was all about and why it could not end.

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I explained that the President understood the great issues at stake, and
desired to work them out fairly and intelligently, but he was restricted in his
efforts by those who did not understand and saw nothing but the small annoyances
the war brought from day to day.

We discussed the question of blockade at great length, and whether it
would be advisable to put the question squarely up to Germany as to whether, in
the event Great Britain would agree to permit foodstuffs to go into neutral ports,
she, in turn, would abandon her submarine policy, not only as to passenger ships
but also as to cargoes.

Sir Edward and I left together and he dropped me at the Ritz. On our
way we discussed the coming conference with Balfour Saturday.

Page, among others, was an afternoon caller and remained for more than
an hour. He wished me to meet a number of people at lunches and dinners, all
of which I declined. He criticized both Lansing and the President severely be-
cause of their sending notes for him to present to the Foreign Office, and making
demands they did not mean to have fulfilled. Page does not realize the con-
ditions which confront the President and Lansing, nor does he realize the neces-
sity for doing things in the way they are done. I wish he could go home for
awhile. He jestingly told Sir Edward yesterday that I had ordered him home last
September, but the President had countermanded it.

Many people are calling every day whom I cannot see, important as some
of them are.

January 13, 1916.

Lord Bryce called at ten o'clock and remained until noon. We had a
good talk. I feel как he knows America so well that he can understand and ad-
vise in the many perplexing questions confronting us. I suggested to Grey
yesterday that he ask Bryce to go to the United States. Bryce does not wish

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to make a winter voyage, but is willing to do so should it become necessary.
We agreed, when Grey speaks to him about it, he should not give a definite an-
swer but leave the matter for future consideration. Bryce sees as many diffi-
culties in a visit <u>from him</u> to America as I saw in <u>mine</u> to Europe. The wound-
ing of ambassadorial dignity would be not the least of them.

I asked Bryce how freely I could talk to the King, that is how much dis-
cretion he had. While the King is a voluble talker, Bryce did not think he
was a dangerous one and he had never heard of any serious indiscretion. This is
reassuring for Stamfordham has sent me word that the King would like to see me
tomorrow at eleven.

but
Bryce thought I should meet a number of public men whom he mentioned, nearly
all of them I have met already with the exception of the Archbishop of Canterbury
and I am to meet him Tuesday. We discussed possible peace terms, what
they should be in order to justify the war. Bryce thought evacuation of Belgium
and the elimination of the Turkish Empire were the two first two things to
consider. He did not lay much stress upon the elimination of militarism, believing
that could be done only through Germany herself, and could not be accomplished
by any mandate of the Allies, even though they were as successful as they
hoped to be.

I told Bryce of our difficulties with Spring-Rice. He counselled not tak-
ing them up here, stating if I did so and he was removed, it might lessen my in-
fluence and that, he thought, would be much more serious matter than any good
accomplished.

I went to lunch at Brooks' to meet Garvin of the Observer, Spender of
the Westminster Gazette and Captain Hall of the Intelligence Department. The
lunch was given by A. H. Pollen. I talked to Garvin mainly, or rather he talk-
ed to me, and there was nothing of more than passing importance discussed.

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We dined at the Embassy. The other guests were Lord and Lady Northcliffe and Mr. and Mrs. Irwin Laughlin. Northcliffe talked rather foolishly about the length of the war, the blockade, the Dardanelles, the Kaiser's health and gave us much misinformation.

January 14, 1916.

I called at Buckingham Palace at eleven o'clock and had a pleasant talk
hour with the King. He was not at all pessimistic as to the attitude of the
United States, but, on the contrary, as soon as I explained some doubts in his
mind, he cordially agreed with our position. I made my usual argument concern-
ing the submarine issue, the German-Americans, and our difficulties with Mexico
which are troubling us afresh. He said he understood quite well why the Pres-
ident did not intend to permit Germany to force us into war with Mexico.

Northcliffe said last night that the Kaiser was dying of tuberculosis of the throat. The King declared this was nonsense; that he merely had a carbuncle on the back of his neck. I favorably called his attention to Captain Hall of the Intelligence Department, and to Captain Gaunt, Naval Attaché in the United States. It was agreed that I should call again for another conference when I returned from the Continent. He desired me to see the right people while in London, but when I told him those I had seen, he had no one further to suggest.

We lunched with Lady Paget, the other guests being John Lane, the pub-
lisher, Professor Colby of Columbia University, Count , from Russia, Countess
Torby, wife of the Grand Duke Michael and two other ladies whose name I did not
catch.

A stream of callers came in the afternoon, among them Sir Gilbert Parker,
but there was nothing interesting to record.

I dined at the Savoy Hotel with Lord Reading and Mr. Lloyd George. They
had a private sitting dining room, "Princess Ida", Lloyd George had been to

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see "The Birth of a Nation" and was much interested in my account of the Recon-
struction period in the South. During dinner, while the waiters were present,
we discussed matters in general, such as the American political situation and the
coming campaign. I found George as ignorant as ever of our public men and af-
fairs. When the waiters withdrew, he began to state the purpose of our meeting.

I shall go into this in some detail in my letter to the President tomorrow,
and it will be a part of the diary. It was pleasant to find George able to look
at this ghastly war in an impartial way. His view of what may happen during
the spring and summer largely coincides with mine. The British, he tells me,
will have four million men fully equipped and trained and with guns larger than
any now in use. While he does not expect conclusive results, he believes the
Germans may be thrown back at many points, much to the advantage of the Allies.
He sees the necessity for the President to intervene at a time soon enough to
accomplish results, no matter how our National election may go. He thought by
September first, the big battles of the summer would have been fought and that a
forecast could then be made of what the final end might be.

George believes the war could go on indefinitely, and will do so unless the
President intervenes, but he does not think intervention, to be effective, should
be offered until around September first. He has a fantastic idea of the power
the President may exert at the peace conference. By his mandate, Russia is to
do this; Germany is to do that, and other nations do as he bids. He thinks the
economic force of the United States is so great that no nation at war could with-
stand its power if exerted against it.

He believes Great Britain will not come out of the war any the worse. Life
will be lengthened because of better habits and the training of youth. The pro-
ductive power will be enormously increased because the drones have all been put
to work and will probably continue there. He estimated this would add more than

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a billion dollars to England's wealth, and that untold millions will be saved
because of the simple lives people will lead from now.

Just here, he remarked, it was America that had set the pace for extravaganza, and Europe had merely followed our lead. This may or may not be true, but I told him I had known small towns in the United States to be almost wholly changed in their social life by the advent of one family, setting a pace faster than the people had been wont to follow, and it might be true that we had done this for Europe.

I tried to scare him as I have others regarding Russia making a separate peace and the sequences following. He thought if the United States would stand by Great Britain, the entire world could not shake the combined mastery we would hold over the seas. In this he is probably right.

In speaking of peace terms, I proposed stopping the manufacture of munitions for a certain period, and the governments taking over all munition plants. He seized upon this as a practical idea, and one which would better meet the requirements of the situation than any he had heard proposed.

I gave them an estimate of the President and of his capacity for staying "put", of his courage and of his statesmanship. I desired to let them know the manner of man they have to deal with. I spoke of the Pope and of how impossible it would be for him to act as mediator. I explained the Mexican situation and of how steadfast the President was in his purpose not to permit Germany to draw us into war with that country. If the President should propose mediation George thought each belligerent government would object, but would soon be brought to accept by public opinion.

It was laughable to hear him declare that militarism must go and in the same breath say Great Britain must retain the supremacy of the seas. I Preferred to convince him that this was impossible, and the one would have to go

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with the other. He had looked upon the freedom of the seas as a German pro-
posal. When he found it was mine and in accord with the President's views,
he seemed to think better of it.

He was insistent that the Turkish Empire must go, and that Poland should
again become a nation. We discussed all these matters at considerable length.
His mind acts quickly, largely upon impulse, and he lacks the slow reasoning of
the ordinary British statesman. He was interested in my forecast concerning
Asia, and in my conviction that Great Britain should make her plans to some day
leave that Continent. I thought that China in the future might play the
same role Turkey has in the past, and be the cause of innumerable bloody con-
flicts.

The Lord Chief Justice sat by and said nothing, leaving George and me to
thresh it out alone. What I was most interested in was George's insistence
that the war could only be brought to an end by the President, and that terms
could be dictated by him which the belligerents should never agree upon if left
to themselves. Fantastic as this may seem, there is some truth in it, and if
the President had taken my advice and increased the Army of the United States
in the early months of the war, as I strongly urged him to do, he would be in
a position today to do what George wishes him to do this coming Autumn.

January 15, 1916.

The Lord Chief Justice called this morning to say he had taken Lloyd
George to account last night for acquiescing in my view that navalism should
go, and that the freedom of the seas was a debatable question. I argued with
him sharply for a few minutes and he admitted that perhaps it was a debatable
subject. He thought someone should go to America, either with me or soon
after, in order to discuss with the President and me the questions George and
I talked of last night, and see what conclusions could be reached. He in-

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timated that he would like to do this himself.

At half past three o'clock I walked to No. 4 Carlton Gardens to meet Balfour and Grey. Grey arrived close upon my heels and we lost no time in getting deep into our discussion. A large map of Southeastern Europe and Anatolia was upon the wall. I stood before the map and told them the story of my last night's meeting with Lloyd George and Reading. I gave them in detail George the division of the world, as he outlined it, and of the extraordinary part he would have the President play. I asked if they had discussed the matter with him. They replied, "not at all, he has probably thought the thing out and seized upon your being in London to discuss it with you".

Grey and Balfour look upon George as brilliant and unstable. He jumps at conclusions quickly, but as quickly forms another. I asked how trustworthy he was, and how well he could keep a matter of this nature to himself. They thought he would be inclined to talk to his newspaper friends, and give them an inkling of what was passing in his mind. This, they thought, was the danger with him. I told them I had not been altogether open with him and had not informed him of the conferences the three of us have been having upon the same subject. I asked George to talk with them and with Asquith but not to let the matter go beyond the five of us and the Lord Chief Justice.

We dropped the subject of Lloyd George and began an active discussion of the matter in hand. We talked for an hour or more, but parted without reaching any definite conclusion. The difficulties are many. In the first place, they do not consider it prudent to discuss these questions with their colleagues, and of course it is not prudent to take their allies into their confidence. Even if they could do both, the people could not be told and without their knowledge of the advantage that would accrue to Great Britain, they would never endorse a policy necessary to be followed, particularly as

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to neutral commerce.

Balfour and I did most of the talking, I proposing, he always objecting. He has an argumentative mind and lacks the power of decision. Sir Edward was mostly silent, but when he spoke, it was to agree with me, and to present an additional argument in behalf of the position we had taken. We went through the international phases of what would constitute the freedom of the seas and the elimination of militarism, and what protection Great Britain would secure on the one hand and lose of the other. Balfour raised many supposititious cases, none of them having any real bearing upon the matter proposed. He is unalterably distrustful of Germany, and was forever coming back to whether Germany could be counted upon to keep a bargain or play a game fairly. That, I told him, was beside the mark. What should be done was to get all nations in league together and at least a majority of them would play fairly under the lead of Great Britain and the United States, and Germany would be the loser if she failed to keep to her agreement. Grey reinforced me here strongly. We parted with the understanding that they should think the matter over and discuss it with the Prime Minister and Lloyd George and take it up with me when I returned from the Continent.

I told them of Reading's suggestion that someone should go to America to bring back whatever decision the President might make, a suggestion which all of us endorsed.

Grey and I left together and walked up Pall Mall to St James Street where I left him at Brooks Club. During the walk we moralized upon how difficult it was to do the things that seemed best, because the people did not understand and would not permit free action. Again I wish to pay tribute to Grey's unselfish statesmanship. I wish the destinies of Great Britain were more nearly in his keeping.

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We invited for dinner tonight, Ambassador and Mrs. Page, Major General Ellison, Dr. and Mrs. Prothero, Lady Scott, Mrs. Young and Clifford Carver. After dinner Prothero and I talked of the vagaries of history, a subject I am fond of following.

January 16, 1916.

We lunched today with Mrs. Harry Marsh. The only notable guests were Sir Philip Burne-Jones and Mr. Joynson Hicks. There was nothing talked of worth recording.

Lady Paget dined with us and we went to the theater with her. She has been spending the week-end at a house party where Lord Curzon was also a guest. She said he spoke with great bitterness of the United States. She thought it would be a good thing if Lloyd George became Prime Minister and Lord Curzon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

January 18, 1916.

We lunched with Mr. and Mrs. Asquith today. Mrs. Asquith and I had considerable conversation. She can be delightful when she tries and she sees to try her best. Our conversation covered a wide range of men and measures and I found her well informed, alert and intelligent.

After luncheon Mr. Asquith and I had some private talk, but it was largely a replica of what I have told before and concerned features of the war in Southeastern Europe and of only passing interest. Mrs. Asquith showed us through the house. I was particularly interested in the Cabinet Room. Each Minister has a writing pad before him, and one of the curious habits of members is to make all sorts of drawings. Lloyd George and Austen Chamberlain seem to be the ones who cover their pads with the most numerous drawings.

My letters to the President Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7 were sent today, and cover much of my activity here.

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Page took tea with me. He is still harping upon the same subjects, that
is, the density of the Administration in dealing with the foreign situation,
particularly, as it relates to the Allies. He believes we should show a more
sympathetic attitude in notes and communications. I think he is right in this,
but he goes too far. He tires me with his everlasting reiteration. I find
Page generally liked in England. Mrs. Asquith who does not especially care for
him, spoke in the warmest terms of his services as Ambassador, and I find that
feeling everywhere.

I dined with St Loe Strachey. The other guests were the Archbishop of
Canterbury, The Lord Stamfordham, Captain Hall and Colonel Hankey of the Na-
tional Defence Board. Strachey sat at one end of the table and I at the other
with the Archbishop at my right and Stamfordham to my left. It was a quiet and
pleasant dinner. The conversation was not exciting and embraced many subjects
other than the war. We discussed Lincoln, the Civil War, and features of the
blockade during that time. We also talked of Mark Twain, Artemis Ward and
Josh Billings, and I found most of the company familiar with the writings. I
was surprised to hear Stamfordham say that the late King Edward read Artemis
Ward frequently.

One of the curious phenomena the war has developed is the childlike belief
which intelligent people have in stories circulated about spies, the cruelty of
the enemy and what not. One finds it here, in France, in Germany and elsewhere.
One such story has been going the rounds in London. It was told again at this
dinner. The substance of it is that a distinguished American writer, whose
sympathy was anti-German, went to Holland. The German Minister at the Hague
invited him to go to Berlin and interview the Kaiser. A Zeppelin was to come
for him, wait until the interview was over and bring him back to the Hague. The
American was delighted with the invitation and accepted. The Zeppelin called

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for him, and took him to an altitude which caused him to die of heart failure.

It was thought to be a dastardly plot and denounced in unmeasured terms.
I asked if they knew the name of the American and was told it was James Creelman.
I unfeelingly punctured the story by telling them I knew Creelman well; that he
had diabetes for years, and died in a hospital in Berlin of that disease and not
in a Zeppelin. After I finished there was a long silence and I felt guilty of
spoiling a favorite war pastime.

January 19, 1916.

Page took lunch with me and was as pessimistic as ever. It has
become a punishment for me to be with him because he is so critical of the
President, Lansing and people generally. I had to excuse myself shortly
after lunch in order to give attention to matter incident to getting away to-
morrow, and also to meet Lord Bryce at 3.30 when he is to call.

Bryce and I had a very satisfactory talk. He said Grey had asked him
to call on him tomorrow and it was agreed that he is to give him no definite
answer until my return. I told him of Lloyd George's proposal which he con-
sidered, as I did, fantastic. Nevertheless, I wish Lloyd George was Prime
Minister with Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Minister, for I believe we could then
do something. The Cabinet are all too conservative, and boldness is needed
at this time. George has this quality I believe.

Sir Lionel Earle called to ask my good offices in behalf of a wounded
and sick brother in Germany. There were also many other callers who need not
be mentioned.

At seven o'clock I went to No. 33 Eccleston Square. Sir Edward was
awaiting me. He said the Prime Minister was giving a dinner tonight in honor
of Aristide Briand, the French Premier, and he had been requested to invite me.
There is no one to be present excepting important members of the Government

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and ambassadors of the Allied countries, therefore I did not think it well to accept. I feel complimented at the invitation for it is an evidence of their feeling for me.

We agreed on what he should tell Briand concerning me and my trip to Europe. We thought it advisable to say but little excepting to state the purpose of my visit in such a way as to make it certain that Briand would give me a cordial welcome when I reached Paris. Grey concurred in my belief that it would be better to see the French officials on my return from Germany rather than before.

We discussed whom we should take into our confidence regarding the negotiations we have in mind. He thought the Lord Chief Justice should not be included as he is not a Cabinet official and it would make too many. We felt that Lloyd George was likely to talk and yet was essential. He must have talked to McKenna already, or to someone who has told him, since McKenna has expressed about the same views as to a settlement as Lloyd George has.

I felt some embarrassment because of Page and I suggested we take him into the conference. Grey willingly consented, expressing a high regard for him. I said the only reason I had not suggested it before was because of Page's trustful nature, and unless we impressed upon him that his so called "Cabinet" should not be told, it would be a dangerous experiment. I feel it necessary to tell Page because the circle we have drawn is now so large that it is almost certain he will hear of it and he would be deeply offended. Page is a man of high character and I am fond of him, but he is so so antagonistic to the American policy that I have a feeling he will retard rather than help in this matter. I also fear that British conservatism will make improbable any real accomplishment. They will delay decisions as long as they can, even as they delayed the proposal I made in June 1914 looking toward a better under-

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standing with Germany. I have always felt that the war might possibly have
been avoided if they acted with expedition.

I called Grey's attention to the danger of leakage with so many knowing
what was going on, and suggested that we frown upon any attempt to particularize
regarding a peace settlement at this time. This would take the danger from
the proposition, and if the Allies should hear of it, it could be stated that
it was nothing more than an attempt of Great Britain and the United States to
bring about a better understanding between the two countries. This thought
came to me while we were talking, since it seemed fairly certain we could not
get action otherwise. Grey is to ask Lord Bryce to go to the United States
and bring word back as to the President's position, provided an agreement can
be reached here before I leave.

I also suggested that the British Ambassador at Washington be included
in the negotiations. This pleased Sir Edward and it was for that reason I
made the suggestion. I wish I had but a single man to deal with here as at
home. That would simplify matters and a workable agreement might be arrived
at within a few days.

I told of some American newspaper men who had taken my picture, Boy-Ed's
and Whitlock's, and then grouped them as if we had all posed together on the
Rotterdam before we left New York. I had not even met Boy-Ed at that time.
This incident illustrates the worst phase of American journalism. However, I
think better of journalism than I once did. They have treated me more than
generously. Occasionally, one goes beyond the limit of fair play and distorts
facts or invents news, but it is the exception and not the rule. I am glad to
make this statement for the press wields such a powerful influence that I should
like to believe it is largely for good.

Both Sir Edward Grey and Lord Bryce thoroughly approve my trip to Berlin.

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I asked them the question direct because Page discouraged it and said it was a
mistake.

January 20, 1916.

We left this morning for Paris via Folkestone-Boulogne. A private car
was placed at our disposal. An army officer, a Scotland Yard man and the Com-
mander of the ship all looked out for our comfort and made it an easy passage.
There were hundreds of troops on the boat but no other civilians excepting our-
selves. Each soldier donned a life preserver before we left the dock and made
ready for any emergency. A torpedo boat destroyer accompanied us all the way.
Two boats had been sunk within forty-eight hours and extraordinary precautions
were taken.

A stiff gale was blowing which made the passage more dangerous because
of detached mines. The course is tortuous on account of the mine fields, and
we zigzagged in this direction and the other. It was a rough trip but inter-
esting. I remained on deck most of the time with the soldiers to hear them
talk and sing, and to laugh with them when the waves broke over the boat and
drenched some of the less fortunate.

Upon arriving at Boulogne we were met by the French Chief of Po-
lice and the British Provost Marshal. Military automobiles were waiting to
convey us to the hotel or to Paris, as we desired. The weather was so wild
that we preferred stopping the night at Boulogne. The hotel was filled with
British officers. There were no other civilian guests other than ourselves.
The town looks more British than French. I was told that as many as 22000
British wounded had been brought in here in one day. The entire city has the
appearance of a large military camp and arsenal. It would have been safer for
us to have come on a regular passenger boat via Southampton and Havre, but I
preferred the shorter route and to take chances with the troops.

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Paris, France.

January 21, 1916.

We left Boulogne this morning at eleven o'clock by train instead of
motor because the weather was not propitious. The British Provost Marshal of-
fered to send us by military motors if we desired to travel that way.

We reached Paris around seven o'clock. There was no one to meet us
and we drove to the Hotel de Crillon first. From there I telephoned the Ambas-
sador and found they had expected us khaxdayxhafixa yesterday and had been going
to meet trains at various intervals since. I had sent a telegram but it was
not delivered. We then drove to the Embassy and had dinner with the Ambassador
and Mrs. Sharp. I talked with Sharp during the evening. There were no other
guests.

January 22, 1916.

I have asked Sharp not to ask anyone to meet us during today and to-
morrow, leaving official dinners until I return from Germany. I do not wish to
meet members of the Government or be here officially until my return, and I sent
word to the Foreign Office to this effect.

In order to meet the requests of newspaper men I agreed to see them at the
Embassy today at twelve. They all assembled in the waiting room, and put such
questions to me as they desired. I answered what I thought advisable. I have
done nothing except to see different members of our Embassy and talk with the
Ambassador.

January 23, 1916.

Today has been a repetition of yesterday. A few people called in the
afternoon like Prince and Princess Lusinge. We are leaving tonight for Geneva.

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GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

January 24, 1916.

Gherardi is here and has told me in some detail of the plans of the German Navy as far as he can make them out, and of their proposed under-sea warfare. This information is important and of great interest at the moment, but will not be when the war is over, therefore I shall not give it in detail.

Minister Stovall came here to meet me and urged that I visit Berne to meet the Swiss Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the President. I told him that Switzerland and Holland are the two countries where I must be most careful, because of the intrigues of the belligerent nations in Berne and the Hague. Switzerland has become a huge whispering gallery and my movements are noted to the last detail, and if I said anything it would be twisted in the repeating and no end of trouble might follow.

Stovall went a part of the way with us to Bale which we reached in time for dinner.

BALE, SWITZERLAND.

January 25, 1916.

Our Consul, Mr. Holland, tells me that the greatest amount of curiosity has been evinced in Switzerland over my visit, and he has had numerous requests from people to be presented to me. Quite a crowd of curious people collected at the door of the hotel as we left. Our trip across the frontier was without incident. The German Foreign Office having made it as pleasant as possible. At Baden, a staff correspondent from one of the leading Berlin papers met me. I did not give him much that was worth while but, on the contrary, quizzed him obtaining what information I could.

American Embassy,
Berlin, Germany.

January 26, 1916.

We arrived in Berlin in the early morning on time. I was met at the

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station by some of the Embassy staff, including Secretary Crew. We drove directly to the Embassy. Soon after arriving Gerard and I exchanged confidences.

My first caller was Dr. Benj. F. Battin, the Quaker from Swarthmore College, who has been making the round of the belligerent governments endeavoring to promote good feeling. He told of his experience in each capital. He had but little of value to impart, for I could see he had been talked to with much caution.

Newspaper reporters, the Embassy staff, Americans, Germans and what not have kept me busy all day.

Gerard gave a dinner of twenty-four. The Chancellor, von Bethman Holwegg, was to have been at this dinner, but the Kaiser called him to the front, consequently, he will not be here until Friday. The Dutch Minister Givers was among the guests with whom I talked. He has been in Berlin for nine years and I assumed he was pro-German. He started the conversation in a way that would have indicated he was pro-Ally, but this did not disarm me and I gradually brought him around to a point where he expressed his real views and I obtained the information I was seeking regarding the relations between Holland and Germany, and Dutch sentiment as to the war.

Prince Munster interrupted my conversation with the Dutch Minister and expressed a desire to have a word with me. He was delightful and not at all bigoted. We talked of our former acquaintance, and of mutual friends, and had a pleasant quarter of an hour.

I have forgotten to mention that Count von Moltke called during the day. I find him more unreasonable and not at all the unprejudiced man he was before the war. He expressed the keenest desire for peace, and hoped we would be able to visit him and the Countess at their estate in Silesia during the coming summer, provided the wakka was over. Von Moltke believes me to be entirely without prejudice. He does not know that I feel that the guilt of this stupeful tragedy lies with the Prussian military autocracy.

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January 27, 1916.

The most important people seen today have been von Gwinner, of the Deutscher Bank, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Herr Solf, both of whom came to lunch.

Solf and I had an interesting talk. He is the fairest and broadest of all the German officials and largely, I take it, because he has lived a great part of his life out of Germany. He told me in confidence, "notto be repeated" he said "to the Ambassador or anyone, that there was a controversy in process between the Chancellor, on the one hand, and von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn on the other regarding undersea warfare". For the moment, the Chancellor holds the ascendancy, but von Falkenhayn is leaning more and more toward von Tirpitz, and Solf is uncertain as to the final outcome. He urged me to talk to the Chancellor as frankly and I had to him, and to let him know the danger of a break between the United States and Germany if the von Tirpitz idea should prevail.

He also desired me to speak to the Chancellor about peace, and to give him my views as to what was and what was not possible. He said he would see the other members of the Government himself and tell them of our conversation.

I talked to von Gwinner next. I found him fairly reasonable, much more so than Gerard had led me to expect. He, too, wants peace and has no illusions as to how it might be brought about. I complimented him upon the Deutscher Bank, of which he is the managing head, and expressed the opinion that other countries should model similar institutions after it. He explained its policies and gave interesting information concerning its workings. I was surprised to hear him say he thought the next German loan would go as readily as the last, giving what I thought a rather absurd reason.

Von Jagow has asked us to dinner Saturday evening, but we declined as I think it best to accept no invitations outside the Embassy. I do not

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wish to meet von Tirpitz by any chance, and this will be beyond my control if
I am entertained elsewhere. I feel that von Tirpitz is almost solely respon-
sible for German frightfulness upon the sea, and if he got his deserts he would
be hanged at the end of a yardarm like any pirate of old. I do not unduly
blame his subordinates, but it is a pity that justice can not be meted out to
him in all its severity.

Ambassador Morganthau wired Gerard from Constantinople indicating a
desire to come to Berlin to meet me. It is too late, however, for him to reach
here before I leave. Ambassador Thomas Nelson Page desires me to come to Rome
or, in the event I cannot come, he wishes to meet me in Switzerland or on the
Riviera. Frederic Penfield, our Ambassador at Vienna, is to meet me in Geneva
as I return.

Gerard told me today of his conversation with the Kaiser. The Kaiser
did not approve the sinking of the Lusitania, or killing women and children. He
thought the commander should not have done it. He takes this position now the
deed is done, but he must have known well in advance that it was contemplated.
He was very belligerent at first in talking to Gerard, but finally became more
reasonable as the discussion advanced. He harked back to the everlasting ques-
tion of our selling munitions to the Allies. Gerard had some figures which si-
lenced him, and which told the story of Germany's contention at the Hague Con-
ference of the right and duty of nations to follow the course we are pursuing.
Gerard gave him some figures as to the amount of munitions of war Germany sold
to Italy when she was at war with Turkey.

The Kaiser talked of peace and how it should be made and by
whom, declaring that "I and my cousins, George and Nicholas, will make peace
when the time comes." Gerard says to hear him talk one would think that the
German, English and Russian peoples were so many pawns upon a chessboard.

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He made it clear that mere democracies like France and the United States
could never take part in such a conference. His whole attitude was that war
was a royal sport to be indulged in by hereditary monarchs and concluded at their
will. He told Gerard he knew Germany was right because God was on their side,
and God would not *wink* be with them if they were wrong, and it was because God
was with them they had been enabled to win their victories.

I asked Gerard whether he was crazy or whether he was merely posing. He
thought the Kaiser looked badly and showed some indication of kidney trouble. In
this I think he is mistaken, for others have told me he is looking well.

The Chancellor desires me to see the Kaiser, and the Kaiser, I think,
wishes to see me, but the Army and Navy heads do not wish us to meet, so the
controversy is on. It is the purpose of the Army to keep the Kaiser out of
Berlin while I am here, knowing it would be impossible to prevent our meeting
otherwise. They need not worry for I have little more desire to meet the
Kaiser than von Tirpits, although I do not think of him in quite the same way.

I am wondering how long any part of the world will continue to be ruled
by such masters. Long ago in my inexperience I thought governments were con-
trolled by the great who were actuated solely by patriotic motives. Now that I
am playing the game with them I find that selfishness plays the major part. It
is apalling to me to see how heartless some are who are profiting in one way
or another by the war. I say this with knowledge, and I wish the world could
realize it. I feel like crying it from the housetops, but I dare not do so
as it would accomplish nothing, and would prevent me from trying to help the
poor bewildered pawns of the mighty.

January 28, 1916.

Joe Grew came in this morning with our Assistant Naval Attaché who is at-
tached to the Flying Corps. He had a weird story to tell which he asked me to

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consider as confidential, even with the Ambassador. The story in effect was
that there is a party in Germany desiring an alliance with Japan, and an oppos-
ing party wishing an alliance with the United States. By some hocus pocus he
thought we could aid the American party and overthrow the Japanese crowd. He
also had information that a high Russian official was then in Berlin with a
view to negotiating separate peace. He claims to have seen the Russian. I do
not attach any importance to the story because he failed to give his authority,
and because it does not harmonize with what I know of the facts from other
sources.

A member of the German Reichstag by the name of Hechscher came to say that the United States could easily change feeling in Germany toward us if the President would force Great Britain to conduct the blockade according to in- not ternational law. He thought Germany would be averse to a reasonable peace.

Many newspaper men and photographers called. Miss Dodd, President of the
Womans College at Constantinople came, She was on the Ryndam the other day when
she struck a mine in the North Sea and gave details of that disaster.

I had a long talk with our Military Attaché, Colonel Kuhn, whom I find
a fair-minded and intelligent soldier. He gave many interesting details of the
military situation. He thinks if the Allies stand together, Germany in time
must be placed at a disadvantage because of the lack of men. At the moment he
sees no lack of either men or munitions. He tells the same story as others
about the impossibility of a German soldier to do other than as directed. They
are welded together so completely, and are so dominated by their officers, that
there is no chance for them to do other than obey orders. He doubts whether it
is possible for either side to break through, unless some new and unknown device
is used when the spring campaign opens.

Minister Stovall wires an invitation from the President of Switzerland
and Minister of Foreign Affairs to come to Berne. I have declined.

(39)

Among the guests at dinner tonight were the Chancellor, von Jagow, the Turkish Ambassador and many others. There were twenty-two in all. After dinner the Chancellor and I went into the blue room alone and talked for an hour and a half. One of the first things he explained was the now historic remark concerning the Belgian Treaty being "a scrap of paper". He said the way it occurred was: Sir Edward Goshen called before hostilities began between Germany and Great Britain to discuss the critical situation. The Chancellor, according to his story, spoke with much feeling of the enormity of the crime which would be committed against civilization and the "white races" should Germany and Great Britain war upon one another. By the "white races" he meant English, Germans and Americans, for he believed that the peace, the civilization and the security of the world were in their keeping. When Sir Edward Goshen protested and argued against the invasion of Belgium, insisting if it were done Great Britain must necessarily declare war against Germany, the Chancellor explained that in comparison to the great harm that would result from war between these two countries, the Treaty with Belgium was "as a mere scrap of paper".

The Chancellor insisted that he did not intend to convey the idea which was
me
afterward ascribed to him, and he still contends he was right. He told, too,
that Germany had no alternative other than to declare war because of Russian mo-
bilization; that he had repeatedly requested them cease mobilization, but they
declined to do so, and there was no escape for Germany excepting war. I called
his attention to the fact that England had suggested a conference, and Russia ac-
quiesced while Germany declined. This he admitted, but insisted that Russia was
not playing fair and was continuing mobilization, and would have continued in
spite of the proposed agreement for a conference. He seemed weaker here than
in speaking of the breaking of the Belgian Treaty.

We talked of Sir Edward Grey, I in the most complimentary terms, and he
in terms not unfriendly. I have endeavored to make it clear to the German Gov.

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vernment that Grey is the most reasonable of English statesmen, and that it would
be a calamity if he should be displaced.

The most interesting part of our conversation related to peace. He said
he was the only one in authority among the belligerents who had spoken for peace,
and he could not understand why there was no receptive echo anywhere. He deplor-
ed the war and its ghastly consequences, and declared the guilt did not lay upon
his soul. I tried to make him see that his peace talk was interpreted merely
as Germany's desire to "cash in" her victories, and that the Allies did not be-
lieve she could hold her own from now on, and that another story would be told be-
fore the end. We went over this ground again and again, he maintaining that
he did not understand why the Allies were so stubborn, and I, on the other hand,
explaining the real situation.

I told him the British were a stubborn race and felt no concern as to
the ultimate result. I called his attention to the South African War when
everyone thought the British would be driven out. I knew at the time, I said,
that they would wage war until they had either won or had expended their last
guinea and last man. I also went over this same ground later in the evening
with von Jagow, and it did not seem to sit easily upon the chest of either.

They admitted that the British were a stubborn race, but added the word
"unreasonable" as being more descriptive of them. The Chancellor intimated that
Germany would be willing to evacuate both France and Belgium if an indemnity were
paid. That, I said, the Allies would not consider for a moment. He stated
it had been the dream of his life to bring Great Britain, Germany and America
closer together, and he indicated a hope that even now this might be brought
about. He spoke slightly of Russia and France, insisting that the three
great nations of the world were those mentioned.

The Chancellor drank copiously of beer which was served to us from time

(41)

to time. I contented myself with mineral water, matching him glass for glass.
The beer did not apparently affect him, for his brain was as befuddled at the
beginning as it was at the end. Into such hands are the destinies of the people
placed.

During the conversation the Chancellor said he had reached a condition
where he neither loved nor hated. He repeated this several times, just why,
I do not know. He blamed England for the war. I spoke of the folly of
group
alliances and how provocative of war they were. If Germany and England
had not been entangled in this way, there would have been no war today between
them. But with all the great powers of Europe linked together on one side or
the other, the least of the European States might precipitate a general conflict
as now. I thought that after this war, one of the necessary things was to
frown upon such alliances. The Chancellor approved this suggestion.

We talked of undersea warfare, of the blockade, and he said it was futile
for Great Britain to try to starve Germany. I told him Western Civilization
had broken down, and there was not a market place or a mosque in the East where
the West of today was not derided. He admitted this, but said the fault was not
Germany's.

ing
I was growing weary by now of the conversation, indicated it by silence,
and in a few minutes we arose and joined the other guests.

Von Jagow and I then went into the blue room and went over much of the
ground I had covered with the Chancellor. He was somewhat more reasonable than
the Chancellor, and argued Germany's position with more subtlety. We talked of
the undersea warfare as it relates to the United States. I spoke of the folly
of torpedoing the Lusitania and the Arabic, particularly the latter which was
westward bound without cargo and could by no possibility have carried munitions
of war. He admitted this, but said he had talked to the submarine commander

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who had sunk her, and he was convinced the captain believed the Arabic was trying to ram him. Had he been in the captain's place, he thought he would have done likewise.

Von Jagow spoke with much feeling of the criticism made of Germany for her undersea warfare, and tried to explain how difficult it was for commanders to properly discriminate. I insisted that it was as brutal and useless as their Zeppelin raids. The sum total of deaths were less than 200 at present— mostly women and children. The next result, I thought, was of enormous value to the Allies. This opinion was concurred in by a British Cabinet official, who regretted that the Zeppelins did not go to the west of England where recruiting was slack. I said I suggested to Lloyd George that a line of electric lights should be strung across England showing the way.

We talked, too, of the stubbornness of the English, and I made much the same remarks as I had to the Chancellor. In speaking of Sir Edward Grey, whom I eulogized, and in which von Jagow largely concurred, he said the main trouble with Grey was that he was provincial, a fact I had to admit. He thought if he had been less so, the war might not have been so probable.

The thought occurs to me time and again that this war is not so much a breaking down of civilization as it is of the failure of our statesmanship.

By the time von Jagow and I finished it was nearly midnight, and when we returned to the other guests they quickly dissolved. I went to bed with a feeling that not much had been accomplished by my discussions with the Chancellor and von Jagow. I hope for better results tomorrow with Zimmermann, who is, in some ways, the ablest, though not the most trustworthy, man in Germany in the Government.

A cablegram came from Lansing today concerning the Lusitania crisis. We did not get it deciphered until dinner time, and could give it but hasty consideration. This cable is a part of the diary, so also will be the answer

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which I may send him in the next few days.

January 29, 1916.

Hechsher said in my interview with him, that if care was not exercised
by those who desired a better feeling between the Western peoples, the situation
would get away from us, that an alliance would be made between Germany, Russia and
Japan; that even the Kaiser with all his antipathy to the yellow races; might be
forced into such a coalition.

A constant stream of callers kept me busy until lunch. The newspaper
men tell me that my visit had made a good impression throughout Germany, and that
the press is treating me kindly. They are cabling some of the comments back to
New York.

Because of constant interruptions, Gerard and I have not been able to
discuss the Lusitania controversy. It was agreed, though, that I should go
into it fully with Zimmermann after lunch.

Besides Zimmermann there were Dr. Rathenau and Mr. Goodman of the Dresner
Bank. I talked with Goodman during lunch, largely about economic and interna-
tional finance. Rathenau stopped me as we were leaving the dining room, and
kept me standing for fifteen minutes until Gerard interrupted to take me to
Zimmermann.

Rathenau, as I have stated before, is one of the broadest minded and most
intelligent men I have met in Germany. He believes the sentiment for peace is
growing rapidly, and soon it can be had upon terms reasonably satisfactory to all
parties. He recalled our conversation of last spring, and of the prediction s
we made which have been mostly verified. I was sorry not to be able to talk with
him longer, but Zimmermann was waiting, and it was with him that my important
conversation was to be.

We went into the question of the Lusitania apology at length, and he
said it was impossible for Germany to accept Bernstorff's draft of the note

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agreed upon by the President and Lansing as being satisfactory. He said Berns-
storff had stated privately in his cable that he did not believe the German Gov-
ernment could accept it. This was for the German Government's consumption, but,
I take it, it was not told to Lansing.

I asked Zimmermann to send me a letter outlining the objectionable sentences in the note, so I might take the matter up directly with the President by cable when I reached Switzerland or Paris. Later in the day, he sent the letter which is attached and which we cabled in full to the State Department, asking that decision be reserved until I could cable more fully after leaving Germany.

Zimmermann today, and von Jagow yesterday, expressed their keen appreciation
of my endeavors to promote peace. I gave Zimmermann perhaps the most earnest
talk I have made to German officials, for the reason he seems able to rise to it.
I urged him not to allow his Government to do any of the petty things that irri-
tate other belligerents and which have no military value. I said Germany was
too great a nation to descend to such practices. That he was one of the states-
men who might lead his country into better paths. That there were statesmen in
America, Great Britain and in France who had high ideals and who were not actuated
by selfish motives, and it was to them and those like them in Germany that the
world must look to for higher and better statesmanship. If it were not done by
such men, our civilization would move backward rather than forward.

Zimmermann spoke in emphatic terms of what he called the "white races"
meaning Great Britain, Germany and America and he hoped like the
Chancellor the
time would come when there might be a more sympathetic accord between them.

My cables and letters to the President, which will follow during the
next few days, will explain in more detail what was said concerning undersea war-
fare, and I shall not go into it here.

Zimmermann asked me to take up the question of better treatment for German
prisoners in Russia. He complained that our Ambassador in Petrograd were not
and Embassy staff

(45)

properly looking after German interests; that the prisoners were being held in cold un-healthy prisons, and were dying to such an extent that his Government had come to a point where they were unwilling to any longer submit to such treatment without protest. He is to write me a letter giving details which I shall take to Washington.

I have tried since the beginning of the war to better conditions for prisoners in every belligerent country. In this connection I saw Dr. Edelman during the day. He is an American doctor from Nashville, Tennessee, who went to Russia under the auspices of the American Red Cross. Edelman received no sympathy from our Embassy in Russia, consequently was unable to influence official Russia, and they refused to permit him to do the work for which he was sent. I asked him to put his statement in the form of a letter so I may convey it to the President.

Judge Gerard and I got together tonight and discussed the international situation in general, and the difficulties between the United States and Germany in particular.

While we were talking, Zimmermann's letter about the Lusitania came from the Foreign Office, and we decided to cable it in full to the State Department asking that nothing be done for the moment.

There were no guests invited for dinner as the Judge and I wished to have a last conference. We went to the train at nine o'clock and bade farewell to Berlin after four strenuous and not altogether happy days.

I have been under constant surveillance since I have been in Germany as, indeed, I was in both France and Great Britain. The German Intelligence Department picked me up at Bale and will not turn me loose until I am across the German border. I am not sure they will not see me out of Switzerland. In front of our Embassy here, a number of plain clothes men are always on duty, so I am told, as long as I remain. This was true during the last trip as well.

(148)

I took this feature up later with the President at lunch and he asked me to instruct Fletcher to see the Brazilian and Argentine Ambassadors and ascertain whether they were ready to sign without Chile, and if they were, to proceed to have them do so. Fletcher reported later in the afternoon that Ambassador Naon was ready to sign for Argentine, but da Gama wanted instruction from Rio before acting.

In discussing this with the President I suggested that Lansing supplément da Gama's cable and send one direct to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Also that he cable to Chile direct to ascertain whether they are willing to proceed, provided we make some concessions in the wording of the convention. This met with the President's approval and I telephoned Lansing who promised to send both despatches tonight.

I had some doubts about giving these instructions of the President to Lansing, but I have been so busy and my time is so limited that I took the risk. Polk tells me that the Secretary is in great good humor with me at present. This will not last long, however, unless I use care. I have not be able to see him today, which is in itself a mistake, but there has been no real necessity for it.

I asked Lansing what he thought of the President's note about the submarine controversy. He liked it excepting the last page. He objected to the same things I do. He hoped the tone might be strengthened. At that time he thought the President would be in New York Saturday and Sunday, but in discussing this with the President later, he put it squarely whether I considered it advisable for him to come to New York on a semi-pleasure jaunt while such a momentous decision was pending. Much as I wished him to come, I could not advise him to do so, for it seemed patent he ought to remain unknown in Washington for the present. It was therefore practically decided that way.

(149)

The President had a dinner engagement and I dined with Senator Newlands who asked me to name the other guests. Secretary Houston, Senator Stone of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Flood of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs were the ones I wished to meet. My purpose in seeing them was to disabuse their minds as to my activities as exploited in the newspapers. I did this without actually bringing up the subject, but by letting the conversation drift into certain channels where I could turn it in the direction I wished. My idea was that it might save me some trouble in the future if Stone and Flood knew more of my endeavors in Europe, and were informed that those accredited to me were false, and could spread the truth in Congress.

We had a delightful evening. The talk was general but was confined largely to foreign affairs.

I returned to the White House by 10.30 in order to meet the President. On our way back, Houston told me of the Cabinet meeting and of how Burleson drooled along for nearly an hour advising the President to bring our troops out of Mexico. The President finally said, "Burleson I hardly know what to say to you in answer". Lane spoke up and said, "Mr. President, I would suggest that you say to him just what the Postmaster General said to you at the last Cabinet meeting upon the same subject". This brought general laughter, for Burleson then objected just as strongly to withdrawing our troops as he does now to keeping them there.

The President in speaking to me about the Cabinet meeting said he had been bored for two hours with a lot of childish talk. I replied that he evidently did not have a very high regard for his official family, and did not enjoy assembling with them. It reminded me of a tale of Lord Salisbury who so seldom attended Cabinet meetings when he was Prime Minister.

(150)

ter that he had difficulty in recalling the names of the different members.
At one meeting, Salisbury leaned over to the man sitting next to him and
asked, "Who is that fellow at the other end of the table with the disagreeable face?" His colleague replied, "that is your Chancellor of the Exchequer".

Before dinner, the President, Mrs. Wilson and I went to the Executive
Office and remained for nearly two hours, the President signing accumulated
mail, commissions, acts of Congress, etc. etc. Mrs. Wilson and I helped
him in the mechanical part of it as far as we could. This work had accu-
mulated during the last four days while he has been ill. He tells me he
signs his name on an average of about 1000 times a month. Some way should
be devised by which the President could be spared this unimportant detail.

The President came to my room while I changed from my evening clothes
and made ready for the train. He thanked me for coming over, and for the
help I had been to him. He said we had cleaned up much accumulated matter.

He asked again about the New York Postmastership and whether the inde-
pendent democrats were more reconciled to Johnson. I replied that their ob-
jections were irreconcilable.

We discussed whether it would be advisable to send some such message
to the French Government as we had sent to the British, since it was evident
Grey preferred our going to them direct rather than through him. We decid-
ed to do nothing in that direction because it would have to be done through
Ambassador Jusserand since I neglected while in Paris to arrange any direct
means of communication.

The President wondered whether the South American countries would
be willing to sign a peace pact with us, guaranteeing our political and ter-
ritorial integrity in the event we broke with Germany. We both thought this
might halt proceedings, and yet it is possible it might accelerate them for

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the reason that if our existence is menaced, theirs will be likewise.

Dr. Grayson came to the train with me. I told him I was disturbed by
the many complimentary articles appearing about me in the press, and I was
afraid they might get on the nerves of the President. Grayson said he did
not believe anything could shake the President's affection and confidence in
me. He said Mrs. Wilson told Miss Bones the other day that Grayson and I
were the only two friends the President had who were serving him without a
selfish motive.

New York,

April 12, 1916.

Captain Gaunt came to report on his activities. He told some interest-
ing incidents. Chief Flynn followed. I gave Flynn an intimation that a
break was near with Germany and advised him to start looking for competent,
trustworthy men to add to his force in the event of trouble. He promised to
be discreet. He, too, told many happenings of passing interest.

We took dinner with Mrs. Marshall of No. 6 East 77th Street. The other
guests were Robert van Cortlandt, Mary Alexander, Mrs. Jenkins and Mr. Day.
We went to the theater to see Galsworthy's, "Justice".

April 13, 1916.

B. M. Baruch telephoned that he had arranged with McCombs to withdraw
from the Chairmanship of the National Democratic Committee. My letters of
today to the President are parts of the diary.

Mark Sullivan took lunch with me. He lunched with Roosevelt yesterday
and gave me news of him. He wished to write about me for Collier's but I
begged him not to do so, and to leave what he said last week as evidence of his
good opinion of me.

Dudley Malone came to report and to give his views upon pending matters.

(152)

A letter came from Ambassador Fletcher which, with my answer, is a part of the
diary.

There were no callers of importance excepting the Attorney General, who
came at six o'clock and remained until half past seven o'clock. Mr. and Mrs.
Sidney Brooks came to dinner.

April 14, 1916.

Police Commission Woods and Commissioner Scull called to ask my good offices with the War Department to obtain the loan of 5000 Springfield rifles. They are getting up a rifle squad, and wish to be prepared for eventualities in the event of a break with Germany. I told Woods of the many threatening letters I have been receiving, and he kindly offered to place a personal guard at my disposal day and night. I declined this, stating that I felt I could take care of myself with a pistol permit which I have had several years. The main danger is from a crank or crazy person, and they would probably parley with me before doing anything violent. If there is danger from a deliberate plan to murder me, the protection Woods offers would be of no service.

I promised Woods to let him know in advance of a break with Germany so
he might have sufficient notice for preparation.

My only other important visitor was Richard Washburn Child, who has
just returned from Russia on an expedition for Collier's. We discussed Rus-
sia and the European situation at much length. He told of many things of in-
terest, particularly in regard to the prohibition movement in Russia. I urged
Child to write more short stories and discontinue some of his other work which
does not seem to me to promise so much.

Harry Marsh and Mrs. O'Connor came to dinner and we went to see Amalie
Rives' play, "The Fear Market".

(153)

April 15, 1916.

A great many telephone calls but a very light mail. Bernstorff's letter, which is a part of the diary, is the only one of importance.

Governor Glynn telephoned from Albany to say he was not well and had to postpone his trip to New York until next week. I wish to talk with him about being made Temporary Chairman of the Saint Louis Convention.

Commissioner Woods telephoned to say that in his conference with General Wood, the General told him there were not more than 3000 Federal troops available without denuding such places as Boston, which would be out of the question. This makes the situation more serious than I had thought.

R. W. Woolley is over from Washington to tell about the democratic gathering there the other night at the Jefferson Day Banquet. He is setting his pegs to be National Chairman and in lieu of a better man, I shall aid him in getting it. He is almost the only man who is doing any political work of value.

I received a cypher message from the President about the New York Post-mastership. It is characteristic of him. He does not wish to consult anyone and in this he is heading for trouble. However, his suggestion is good and is certainly a relief from what he first proposed to do. My reply is attached will be and so also is my letter which I shall write tomorrow.

April 16, 1916.

Sidney Brooks came as usual to read me his Sunday cable and to get information for future ones.

We went to Piping Rock for lunch and were gone practically all day.

April 17, 1916.

The day has been interesting. General Wood telephoned to discuss the Mi-

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litia Bill now pending in Congress which he considers bad. I asked him to put his views in writing and I would give them to the President, which I did later through Dr. Grayson who is leaving for Washington tonight.

I took lunch with Sidney Brooks at the Plaza Hotel. The other guests were Charles Miller, Editor of the Times, and Melville Stone of the Associated Press. Stone has been anxious for me to see de la Barra and I promised to do so, but after reading the Herald today giving an expose of the Diaz-de la Barra revolution plot, I concluded it was best not to do so. Whether the statement in the Herald is correct, I do not know, The only reason I promised to see de la Barra was that he now lives in France, is considered a man of honor and is sailing for France day after tomorrow.

Perhaps the most complimentary editorial that has yet been written of me appears in this week's Collier's, entitled "A Man", which I append hereto.

Dr. Grayson called. He is much perturbed over the political outlook and believes the President has lost the Saturday Evening Post among other influential journals. He lays most of the President's misfortunes to Tumulty.

We dined with Gordon and Janet it being Janet's birthday.

April 18, 1916.

Last night Commissioner Scull came before leaving for Washington. I gave him a letter to Secretary Baker suggesting that he let the Police Force of New York City have the rifles they desire. Scull thinks that all the interned German ships are mined and ready to be blown up at a moment's notice. The Police Department will take measures to see if it cannot be prevented in the event of a break.

I received a letter from the Secretary of State this morning enclosing an article which Thos. Nelson Page has written for his approval and mine in defence of the President's foreign policy. I have not read it, but I have a

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feeling that it is not in the best of taste for an Ambassador to write in de-
fence of a President he is serving under, and on the even of a presidential
campaign.

The most interesting sentence in Lansing's letter is this:

"I am awaiting with natural impatience for the President to determine finally our policy in regard to submarine warfare. I sincerely hope that it will be in accordance with the views which we (Lansing and I) mutually hold."

It is evident from this that the President has said nothing to him as
to his real intentions. I did not have time to see Lansing when I was last
in Washington, consequently he is in the dark as to the President's plans. I
cannot understand why the President does not take him more into his confidence.
I thought, of course, he knew just what was planned.

I called at the studio of Muller-Ury to see the finished portrait of
Mrs. Wilson which he is painting for me to give the President. The coloring
is good, but the likeness lacks the illusive charm that Mrs. Wilson possesses.

B. M. Baruch was with me this afternoon to discuss the McCombs matter.
He believes he has gotten McCombs to a point where he is willing to write the
President declining to serve again as National Democratic Chairman. I promised
Baruch if he would get the letter I would undertake to get from the President
a letter equally courteous and complimentary, or would return McCombs' to him.
I suggested that McCombs should resign now, and I would undertake to get the
President not to accept the resignation until after the St Louis Convention,
which would make it very much more complimentary to McCombs.

Baruch expressed the sincerest sympathy for McCombs because he realizes
he is physically and mentally in no position to aid the President or to main-
tain himself in a directing capacity. He therefore wishes everything done, as
indeed I do, to save his feelings.

["(156)", "I have been in constant touch with the United Press and others regard-\ning the German situation which is tense, since the President will call Con-\ngress in joint session tomorrow at one o'clock to tell them of his intentions.", "I received a letter from Walter Page yesterday asking for more money. I\ntelephoned Cleveland Dodge this morning and he agreed to send another $10,000.\nI feel this is an imposition upon Dodge. He and Charles R. Crane are asked\nto give in so many directions that it distresses me to be even remotely a party\nto the depletion of their purses. When Mr. Dodge was at the White House with\nus, he told me the picture Vonnoh painted of the first Mrs. Wilson and her\nthree daughters cost $12,000, which he, Crane and perhaps two others paid and\ngave to the President. It was an outrageous price, and Vonnoh could not have\nobtained in the general market one fifth of that amount.", "April 19, 1916.", "This has been a busy and eventful day. The President's address to Con-\ngress, and his Note to Germany mark an important phase in our negotiations with\nGermany. I see signs of some soberness in those who have been clamoring so\nassiduously for drastic action. They are beginning to realize that we are on\nthe brink of war and what war means. XxhxxXxhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXhxxXh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McCombs, and of a plan he had for merging his Independent Committee into the National Committee and opening up headquarters at once. They want Gordon to be assistant treasurer, which is an honor for so young a man.

Gaunt came again after Morganthau left to deliver a message he had received in cypher from the British Ambassador asking my advice as to whether the Anglo-French Note just received, should be delivered to the State Department or with-held. I advised with-holding for the present, in order that it might not become entangled with our controversy with Germany.

My old school friend, Clarence H. Esty, followed close upon Gaunt's heels. Then came Felix Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School.

The letter Sir Edward Grey wrote me and brought over by Lord Eustace Percy was delivered today. Grey states exactly what I told the President as to what the feeling will be among the Allies if the United States Government does not take a strong stand about the sinking of the Sussex. We are in the unfortunate position of having either to break with Germany, or lose the friendship and respect of the Allies. If we choose the latter course we lay ourselves open to the charge of compounding an international felony, and would not gain the friendship of Germany.

April 20, 1916.

Judge and Mrs. Clarence J. Shearn, Gordon and Janet and Mr. and Mrs. David Miller took dinner with us.

Gaunt called again during the dinner hour to bring me a copy of the British note which I advised them to with-hold for the moment. The State Department will not get this note until later, when we consider the time more propitious. Gaunt also gave me a cable from Sir Horace Plunkett, signed by Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, saying:

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"Mr. Balfour fears you may think that the British Government is indifferent to American intervention. The desire to prevent any suggestion of attempting to influence opinion in the United States opposed to the Government may have caused this erroneous impression. The Cabinet unanimously believe your intervention would be immensely helpful and probably decisive. Should this come to pass the President may rely on a cordial welcome as an ally and on full appreciation of the high motives which determined his action".

(Signed) Nicholson.

April 21, 1916.

I have a letter from the President suggesting I write an article about him and his administration for a forthcoming number of Harper's Magazine. The letter speaks for itself. I am not inclined to write it. I am too intimate an associate of the President at the moment to write of him in a public way. I doubt whether it would have a good effect. Not only that, I have refrained from any public expressions in regard to him and his administration, and I do not like to begin now. However, I shall consider the matter and let him know later.

A telegram came yesterday from the German Ambassador asking if he might see me today. I replied through the State Department that I would see him this morning at ten o'clock.

Von Bernstorff came promptly. He was palpably nervous and showed signs of the crisis he feels is impending. He asked whether I thought it would be satisfactory if his Government agreed to suspend their submarine warfare temporarily in order to negotiate and see whether an agreement could be reached with us, and which would enable them to continue upon a basis satisfactory to neutrals.

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I wrote down what he said verbatim, and told him I would submit it to the
President.

I called the President over the telephone later in the day, and found he
was on his way to Philadelphia. I reached him finally at the Jefferson Hos-
pital where he was visiting his daughter, Mrs. Sayre. After trying three dif-
ferent wires, we found it impossible to talk with any degree of satisfaction.
However, he got an inkling of what I was saying and said he would send me a
code message tonight from Washington. In the meantime, I wrote him the sub-
stance of my conversation with the German Ambassador, so he may get it in the
morning. That letter is a part of the diary.

Bernstorff thought his Government would be willing to concede a great
deal, provided they thought the cessation of submarine warfare might ultimately
lead to peace parleys brought about through the good offices of the United
States Government. I encouraged this idea.

I convinced him, I think, it was best for his Government to yield, and
that it was best for our Government to make the demand we did. If we had not
made it, the Allies would have lost confidence in us and we would have no in-
fluence with them in any effort we might make toward peace. They would con-
sider us as inocuous as the South American Republics, and any demand we might
make would be listened to with scant courtesy. Bernstorff saw this and un-
derstood and he will try to impress it upon his Government.

The lack of intelligence displayed by diplomatists among the belli-
gerents is past understanding. The stupid things each of the governments do
ax from time to time makes one skeptical of the final outcome of a peace set-
tlement. The British Government is not lacking in stupidity. The sending of
their answer to our notes at this time is an incredible performance.

A small illustration of their methods may be seen in having Lord Eustace

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Percy bring an important letter from Sir Edward Grey, which Percy later sends to me in New York by a man of German extraction, instead of delivering it himself. When I mentioned this to Captain Gaunt he was dumbfounded.

Going back to Bernstorff, I suggested that he remain in New York for the present so we might discuss matters directly rather than to have to reach him in Washington. He was willing to be advised by my judgment, and will remain as long as I think necessary.

My namesake, Edward Andrews, is down from Yale and came to lunch. Mother Jones, the labor leader, called to ask my good offices in behalf of some prisoners whom she thought ought to be released on parole. She thought there had been some discrimination against them in their trials. She is a shrewd old woman, and I believe exercises a good influence over her flock. I was surprised to find she had few prejudices. She speaks kindly even of John D. Rockefeller Jr., and understands that their differences are more because of their environments than anything else.

I received a telegram from the President asking me to offer the New Mastership of York Postoffices to Senator Wagner. I immediately got in touch with Wagner through Gordon, and had him come to see me. He declined to accept the office, because his ambition lay in another direction. My letter to the President explains more fully.

Baruch had me over the telephone several times, as did Morganthau. Baruch discussed the McCombs matter, and Morganthau his successor to Turkey. R. W. Woolley called to tell of his recent activities. Judge Seabury followed to explain his attitude regarding his proposed candidacy for the Governorship. Judge Carson of the Philippines Supreme Court wished to ascertain whether it would be worth while for the Philippines delegation to offer the name of Governor General Burton Harrison for the nomination of Vice President. I show-

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ed him how useless it would be to make such an effort, and he acquiesced in my
view of it.

Frank Polk telephoned from Washington to say that the President had in-
structed Secretary Lansing to send me certain memoranda in regard to the German
controversy with a view of my negotiating direct with the German Ambassador and
the German Government. It is evident that the President wishes me to handle
this matter rather than Lansing, which is complimentary but rather disconcert-
ing, as I fear for Lansing's sensibilities.

Polk was interested in my account of my interview with von Bernstorff. He
asked me to keep him here until Tuesday if I could, and promised to send kmax
datax by special messenger the data the President desired me to have. They do
not want von Bernstorff in Washington for the present, because of complications
which may arise growing out of the seizure of the von Igel papers. The State
Department is evidently worried and fearful lest the German Government may
themselves break off relations with us because of this incident. We are skat-
ing upon very thin ice in that affair.

Polk said the German Ambassador in his talk with him the other day, had
been very complimentary in his remarks about me, saying kmax I had treated him
with such uniform courtesy and kindness that he would never forget it.

John Howard Whitehouse, M. P. called, but I could not see him. I gave him
an appointment for 9.30 tomorrow morning.

We went to the opening of the Rialto Theater as guests of the manage-
ment. Our loge was decorated with American flags, and I was supposed to be
there as the President's representative.

April 22, 1916.

The day opened early again this morning with telephone calls before I
was out of bed. Captain Gaunt and one or two others called before breakfast.
A code message came from the President as follows:

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As soon as the first rush was over, I telephoned von Bernstorff to come which he did at once. I read him the first part of the President's message and I urged him again to impress upon his Government the necessity for meeting our demands. I explained the impossibility of our doing anything other than what we have done, and stated it was best for all concerned. He asked if he might send a despatch through the State Department, and how he could word the message without letting Lansing know that he and I were negotiating direct. I gave him the true status of affairs, in order he might know the President wished me to carry on negotiations with him here. I thought he should remain until Tuesday morning, and I promised to make another appointment with him for Monday so we might exchange information received in the meanwhile.

In talking with Edward S. Martin this morning about the recent editorial concerning me which appeared in Collier's, he thought it strange the public had so few facts regarding me. This is one of the factors that has led me to keep a diary through this administration. There is no record of the work I have done in the past in Texas and elsewhere, and those who knew are dead or soon will be. For instance, it is only known that I was potential in the elections of some Governors and other officials in Texas, but no facts are known, or ever will be, of the part I took in the legislation of my State; the party platforms I wrote, and the general direction I gave public affairs during my semi-public career. If this diary had not been kept, no one would ever know the part of took in the making of the Federal Reserve Act, for what I did

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is even now a mere memory in the minds of those who were impressed with it at the time. Long before the election of 1912 it seemed to me clear that a banking act should have the most important place upon our legislative program, provided our party won, and to do it, and do it well, would be the greatest triumph we could have. I followed it assiduously, keeping it out of both the campaign for the nomination and that of the election, knowing if it once got in, promises would be exacted and demands made which would make the building of a proper measure impossible. As soon as the election was over, I went to Washington to confer with Carter Glass, the Chairman-elect of the House Banking Committee, and from that moment I followed the measure to its successful conclusion.

Letters came today from Ambassadors Gerard and Thos. Nelson Page, etc. Captain Gaunt called at dinner time. He had a letter from the British Ambassador asking him to get my opinion as to whether the Anglo-French Note should be delivered Monday, and whether certain passages which he pointed out should be emphasized and given to the press. I gave an affirmative answer to each question. While the sending of the note at this time was a stupid performance yet since it is here and since it is known that it has come, it might as well go in.

Gaunt and I discussed the British Cabinet at some length. He takes the same view I do, that Great Britain lacks a strong, forceful man to direct her affairs. She has several in the Cabinet who have the ability and without the force,

Morganthau called over the telephone to tell me that Abram Elkus would accept the post of Ambassador to Turkey. Morganthau send me his photograph with the following inscriptions:

I spent the evening going over papers and documents needing my attention.

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April 23, 1916.

I have a special delivery letter from the President enclosing his answer to McCombs' letter of resignation. He responded handsomely. This, I hope, eliminates McCombs as a source of trouble.

Loulie, Gordon and I went to the dock to meet Mr. and Mrs. Thos. Nelson Page when they arrived on the S. S. St. Louis. General and Mrs. Wood were also there to meet them. The Ambassador later came to our apartment to get information as to current affairs, and to express his willingness to serve in any capacity we thought advisable while he was in America. He had no foreign news of importance.

I had a few minutes conversation with General Wood about the Mexican situation, and about the question of preparedness in this section in the event of a break with Germany.

James Speyer came to offer his services in avoiding a break with Germany. He thought if the German-American bankers wired the German bankers and business men, some good might result. I thought it would be useless to undertake such propaganda at this time. The business men of Germany know the effect of a break with the United States quite as well as their brethren here.

April 24, 1916.

The German Ambassador telephoned this morning asking whether there was anything new. He had heard nothing himself, therefore we agreed not to meet until tomorrow.

the State Department came
Last night a special messenger came from Washington to deliver a memo-
randum and some despatches from the State Department. The memorandum con-
cerned our interpretation of international law as to the use of submarines.
Lansing wished me to present this to the German Ambassador. I have conclud-

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ed it would not be wise to do so. It would simply muddle the situation.

I have had long conversations with Polk over the long-distance telephone concerning it and he agrees with my conclusions. My letter to the President also bears upon this and other subjects.

Captain Gaunt called and we discussed the memorandum I received from the State Department. I wished to get the benefit of his knowledge as a naval expert.

We took Margaret Wilson and Dr. Devoe to Augustus Thomas' play, "Rio Grande".

Frederick Dixon, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, came from Boston to take lunch with me.

April 25, 1916.

Albert Bigelow Paine came to lunch. We had an old time heart to heart talk. I like him much.

Count von Bernstorff telephoned asking for an appointment shortly after lunch. My letter to the President pretty well covers our conversation. I called the State Department by telephone and gave Polk the substance of my talk with Bernstorff. The German Ambassador thought if his Government acceded to our request pending negotiations, we would be up against a crisis again within a short while, that is, in a month or six weeks, for they would not hold off longer. My reply was if we could keep the break from coming that long, we might meet the emergency again when it arose. It is evident that the German Government want peace more than anything else, and Bernstorff is holding that out as a bait, or, as he expressed it, "the sugar coated pill". He is sugar-coating the submarine pill with peace hopes.

Henry M. Pindell of Peoria called to offer his services in the campaign in any way I thought they might be useful.

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Garet Garrett, of the New York Times, came to tell something of his experience in Germany and to urge greater efforts in behalf of peace. I tried to explain the difficulties.

Norman Angell came to discuss peace and its aftermath. He is concerned in bringing about international relations which will prevent war and has some good ideas. I asked him to submit them in writing so I could read at my leisure what he had to say.

April 26, 1916.

I have a code message from the President saying:

"Think it would be best if opportunity offers to communicate to Bernstorff substance of State Department memorandum".

Since the Ambassador went to Washington last night I cannot see him. I do not agree with the President as to the advisability of showing him the State Department memorandum regarding submarine warfare. It will confuse the issue and make for trouble.

Edward S. Martin and Sidney Brooks both came this morning. Brooks was wondering whether I could give him material for a cable. He also wished to discuss the Irish question.

Otto Carmicheal telephoned to know if the Administration had anyone in mind for Senator. I told him, as far as I knew, they had not and I had never heard the President mention the matter. He intimated that his friends were interested and were wondering whether someone could not be selected to please them. I made it clear to him that I was taking no part in State politics and I shall continue to be firm in this attitude.

Roger Sullivan, Col. R. M. Johnson, of Texas, Henry Morganthau, Dudley Malone, R. W. Woolley and Gordon came to lunch. Woolley came first in order to have some private talk. He sees signs of the protectionists and big busi-

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ness trying to influence the control of the democratic election machinery. I
have seen indications of this myself. I told him of Carmicheal's interest
in the Senatorship and we discussed how best to handle the situation. I am
certain the President will feel as I do. Lynch has already proposed to Mor-
ganthau that campaign funds be collected from Federal office holders. I shall
ask the President to veto such a movement.

Roger Sullivan did most of the talking during lunch and afterward. The
lunch was given for the purpose of letting him relieve himself of pending
grievances. He knew that in reaching me he would reach the President direct.
Sullivan is an old time politician and is too old to learn new ways. However,
he has many fine characteristics and is better than some of his critics. I
was a silent listener to the conversation and was anxious for them to go since
I had so much of real importance to do.

The World has a long article from Washington concerning my activities
in the appointment of Postmaster of New York, claiming I have angered Tammany.

Roy Howard, of the United Press, telephoned to say that a cable had just
come from Carl Ackerman in Berlin to the effect that Ambassador Gerard had
said that he and I were working closely together to avert a break between Ger-
many and the United States. I asked Howard to kill the despatch, which he did.

Howard had scarcely finished when Don Seitz and Frank Cobb of the World
telephoned they had a message from von Weigand, their Berlin correspondent,
asking what the situation was, and claiming the German Government wished to
avoid a break but did not know what was demanded of them. I indicated to
Cobb the answer to send and told him something of the negotiations now going
on between the German Ambassador and me.

Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher came to report on the South American
Pact. Things are going better there, but the Brazilian Ambassador is ill
and there is a halt for a few days.

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George Foster Peabody followed, and then Lincoln Steffins of whom I made
short shift as I was completely worn out, and had a dinner to attend.

Dr. and Mrs. William M. Polk gave a dinner of sixteen covers to us at their residence 310 Fifth Avenue. The other guests were, Senator and Mrs. Wetmore, Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, Mr. and Mrs. Bradley Johnson, Mr; and Mrs. Murray Young and others.

Frank Polk was in frequent communication with me during the day over the long-distance telephone from Washington.

April 27, 1916.

The following came from Gerard this morning:

"My conclusions after long conference with the Chancellor is that he is inclined to send note agreeing that Germans will not attack without previous warning etc. Unarmed passenger liners according to arrangement merchant vessels. Note also to express regret for Sussex; offer indemnity and punish commander.

Wish I had details as to whether this or that would be satisfactory to the President. Perhaps word 'unarmed' could be left out and no reference be made to armed passenger and merchant ship question by either side. If Germany now adds merchant ships as demanded in note is that not enough initiate. Our note does not specifically refer to armed liners".

Berlin, April 24, 1916.

Gerard is evidently not kept informed of the situation which I consider unfair to him and a mistake. More can be done by personal contact in a crisis of this sort than by any number of cables. If Bernstorff and I were in Berlin, I have no doubt a break could be averted.

Polk telephoned early this morning to ask if I had received a special delivery letter from the German Ambassador. I had not then, but it arrived later. The letter is attached and also my note to the President written on a copy of Bernstorff's which I sent for his information.

Captain Gaunt took breakfast with me. He brought many messages to me from the British Ambassador. They were mainly concerning the Japanese

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question, and how best for us to avert trouble pending passage of the Immigra-
tion Bill. I told Gaunt of my conversation with Sir Edward Grey as to the
Pan-American Peace Pact and Great Britain's participation, and asked him to
convey this to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and urge him to give a helping hand where
he could.

I received a letter from Count von Bernstorff today which is a part of
the diary. I sent a copy to the President by special delivery letter, and
telegraphed Bernstorff that I would inform him later regarding his inquiry.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Adrian Iselin and went to the Russian Ballet.
The other guests were Mr. Baldwin and Justice Hart of the Juvenile Court. I
left the opera at half past nine as it was necessary for me to get home and do
some work and to be ready to go to Washington on the midnight in the event the
President called.

April 28, 1916.

There has been great agitation today about Brandeis. His friends like
Normal Hapgood, Miss Lilian Wald, Mrs. Kelly etc. etc! have been urging me
to exert every influence in his behalf. It looks from indications at Wash-
ington that he may fail of confirmation.

invited us to go to
Mr. and Mrs. Sumner Gerard gave us a dinner tonight and w*kkhauxwankxk*
the play. The other guests were Mr. and Mrs. Amos Pinchot and Mr. Mont-
gomery Hare. After dinner I had to return home to my work.

April 29, 1916.

A telegram comes from the President stating they have sent the infor-
mation direct to Ambassador Gerard to present to the German Government rather
than to have Bernstorff do it. I think myself this is the better course.

Clifford Carver and I motored up to North Wilton, Connecticut, to take

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lunch with Edward S. Martin at their new-born country place. We were away
most of the day.

Count von Bernstorff telephoned from Washington during my absence and
again after I returned to find whether I desired him to come over. I told
him the information had been sent Gerard direct consequently it was not nec-
essary for him to come.

April 30, 1916.

Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Brooks and Mr. and Mrs. Elmer Roberts lunched with us. Roberts is just from Paris and has lived there so long that he is thoroughly embued with the French outlook. In speaking of French feeling for the United States, he said "There is a feeling of sadness that the United States has not risen to the high ideals which the French people thought actuated the American people etc. etc" It is the old story. As a matter of fact, the French people as a whole do not believe we have any ideals further than that represented by a dollar mark. What the Allies want is to dip their hands into our treasure chest. While the war has become a war of democracy against autocracy, not one of the democracies entered it to fight for democracy, but merely because of the necessity of self preservation. If we go in it will be because we believe in democracy and do not desire our institutions and the character of our civilization changed.

May 1, 1916.

A quiet day. Some telephone calls, some correspondence, some callers
but nothing of importance.

C. R. Macauley, the cartoonist, came with his force of moving picture
photographers, arranged the lights in the sitting room and took many films of
me to be used in preparing a political idea Macauley has eulogistic of the
President. These films will be used during the campaign. I dislike the

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publicity and the method, but it seems inevitable and I feel I should do my
share toward helping the cause.

May 2, 1916.

R. W. Woolley came to talk over campaign matters. Paul F. Mueller, of the Abenpost, Chicago, was another caller. He travelled all the way from Chicago to see me for the scant thirty minutes I was able to give him, in order to tell how unneutral German-Americans considered the President. I was interested in Mueller's story. His father left Germany in '48 to escape arrest and death; went to England; arose to distinction there, becoming a member of the National Academy. Still Mueller sees little good in England, or the British Government, and is so pro-German that he cannot well be called an American, although he has lived here all his life. I did not argue any of the questions he brought up, because I saw it was worse than useless to waste time doing so.

William H. Coolidge of Boston came for a friendly visit.

Mr. and Mrs. Frank Andrews of Texas came to dinner and we went to see Dietrichstein in "The Great Lover". I am taking the midnight train for Washington.

The White House,
Washington.

May 3, 1916.

I arrived at the White House by half-past seven and breakfasted alone at eight o'clock. The President came to my room soon after, and we began our talks which continued on and off during the entire day until 10.15 at night. We both had the feeling that this would perhaps be my last trip to Washington until cool weather, and we talked of matters of interest at the mo-

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ment, and of prospective happenings.

The first subject that held our attention was the Pan-American Peace
Pact. Fletcher had sent me a copy of what the Brazilian and Chileans Gov-
ernments would agree to. We went over this and made such changes in the
verbiage as we thought necessary, the President writing them in with his own
hand, the copy of which I retained. Later, Fletcher added the word "present"
to the first paragraph.

It took some time to thresh this out sufficiently because of its many
bearings. For instance, Chile desired to leave the question in doubt as to
whether we should guarantee the territory in dispute between herself and Peru
which is now in her "possession". The President said he would prefer the
Pact to fail rather than do such an injustice to one of the smaller nations;
since the whole pact was based upon mutual good will and justice he did not
wish to start it with a palpable injustice. I like to bring out these char-
acteristics of the President, for it shows him at his best.

I found him set in his determination to make Germany recede from her
position regarding submarines. He spoke with much feeling concerning Germany's
responsibility for this world-wide calamity, and thought those guilty should
have personal punishment.

I believe I have more influence over the President than I realize. For
instance, the last time I was here he was so disinclined to be firm with Ger-
many that I feared he might destroy his influence. I therefore did all I
could to make him stand firm. I evidently overdid it for I now find him un-
yielding and belligerent, and not caring as much as he ought to avert war.

After our conference I sent for Fletcher, had him take a copy of the
changes made by the President in the peace pact covenant, and asked him to
see both the Brazilian and Chileans Ambassadors at once and report later in

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the day. I advised what he should say when making the suggestion that they accept the text as we now have it. I thought there was much in the manner in which it was presented to them.

He returned in about an hour to report that the Brazilian Ambassador was in New York and would not return for several days. This makes another unavoidable delay. I requested him to send a copy to the Ambassador and to get an answer as soon as he could. I first suggested that he go to New York and see Da Gama. He was willing to do this if I thought best, but he did not feel it was dignified for one ambassador to chase another around the country. I laughingly apologised and told him I was so eager to close matters that ambassadorial dignity failed to enter my thought.

Frank Polk called and spent nearly two hours. We discussed the Mexican and European questions, and took up matters relating to the coming campaign. I have gotten the President so thoroughly imbued with the idea that Polk is the right man for Chairman that I cannot shake him loose. This is another evidence of having overdone it. Polk and I have come to the conclusion that he should remain in the State Department during these critical times, if it is possible to secure another man for National Chairman. Lansing is not over-well and must have a vacation, and it would not be advisable to have a new man entirely unfamiliar with what has happened, become acting Secretary of State during Lansing's absence.

Polk mentioned several men whom he thought might do. I told him the President would not take any of them because he knew them. Polk asked why the President was willing to take him, but added, "I have only seen the President two or three times to talk with him". I smilingly replied, "If you had seen more of him he would probably not want you any more than the others. He is taking you on the faith I have in you-- a faith he would probably lose

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if he knew you better." Polk took this as good-naturedly as it was meant.
As a matter of fact, there is much truth in what I said.

The President and I lunched alone and I took up with him several of the
names of men Polk and I thought might do for National Chairman. None of them
suited him. I told him it would inconvenience Lansing too much to lose Polk.
He thought the contrary. Lansing's convenience was not as important as it
was to have a proper man for National Chairman. He declared he did not desire
to be President any longer, and it would be a delightful relief if he could
consciously retire. He said he felt it his duty toward his country and
his party to continue. He believes a second term may be anti-climax.

The reason I wanted Polk as National Chairman, and the arguments I gave
the President for wishing him, are that he has good judgment and is absolutely
clean in purpose and thought. He would never "go to sleep at the switch", and
the President need never have a moment's worry concerning the manner in which
the campaign was being conducted. There could be no scandal or anything approaching one with Polk at the helm.

I discussed with the President the plan which Fred Lynch and others
have to assess office holders for campaign purposes. I told him I thoroughly
disapproved, and had expressed myself as being sure he would also. He was
emphatic in his disapproval and was sorry such a move was contemplated, and
authorized me to stop it.

I advised him to let the New York postmastership alone. I advised
this in the beginning, in the interim and again now. I am inclined to think
he will regard it. I never tell the President "I told you so", but he looks
at me sometimes in a way that makes me know he is thinking this himself.

We desired to find a particular word and its different shadings as
to meaning. The President went into another room, procured a Century Dic-

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tionary, and came back with it balanced on his head very much as the Negroes in
the South balance pails of water. Mrs. Wilson and I laughed to see him walk
along in the grotesque way necessary to keep the book balanced. I said to her,
"you see we have reason to be proud of him in more ways than one". The Pres-
ident took this in good humor, but removed the book from his head.

Mrs. Wilson's portrait painted by Muller-Ury which I gave them as a
wedding present, has been hung above the mantel in the rose sitting-room. The
President stood with one arm around me and one around Mrs. Wilson and thanked
me for having thought to give it to him.

He apologized for leaving me in order to play golf and expressed a
willingness to remain if I thought necessary. I insisted that he go for I
had much to do in the meanwhile.

I found Secretary Houston out of town. The President desired me to see
him and ask the loan of Solicitor Caffey during the time Polk was absent
from the State Department in the event he became National Chairman.

Polk came over for another conference. I told him none of the men
mentioned were acceptable to the President and it looked as if he would have
to serve. In the circumstance, I thought he had better speak to Lansing.
He did this later in the afternoon and said Lansing was terribly upset over
it.

I persuaded the President to ask Lansing for a conference, not that a con-
ference is needful, but I thought it would be well to have him feel he was be-
ing consulted. The President named eight o'clock, but as Lansing was giving
a dinner I changed the hour to 6.30, trusting it would be agreeable to the
President who was not at the moment available.

Today Polk told me of additional conversations caught by our Secret
Service. Some of them related to me. The German Ambassador guardedly re-

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ferred to me as being the one to be reckoned with in the settlement of the
submarine dispute. They now call me by various names, but always something
relating to a house. It is palace one time, column another etc.

A despatch came from Gerard today not relating to the submarine con-
troversy, but stating he thought Germany would be willing to accept the Pres-
ident as mediator, and that "Colonel House would be very welcome here now".

The German Ambassador sent a letter to the White House asking if I
could see him within the next day or two. I had Phillips telephone that I
would see him in New York tomorrow morning. I did this for two reasons. The
first was that I wished to leave tonight, the second, I thought it better to
see Bernstorff immediately rather than defer it a few days.

I asked Phillips to come to the White House to discuss matters relating
to his particular sphere. I desired to know what had been done about some
readjustments in the Diplomatic and Consular Services.

The President came in from golf and took me for a short motor ride before
Lansing arrived. I have been urging the President from time to time today not
to allow the war to continue beyond the Autumn. I am certain he can end it
whether the belligerents desire it or not. He can so word a demand for a con-
ference that the people of each nation will compel their governments to consent.

He asked me to give my views in detail, and I outlined what was in my mind
as to how and when it should be done. I thought during May, June and July,
certainly by August, the Allies would have had sufficient time to demonstrate
their ability or inability to make a dent in the German lines. After two
months' constant effort the Germans have shown their inability to break through
at Verdun, and it is not likely that a greater or more successful effort can be
made anywhere on the western front by either side.

Our conference with Lansing was more or less a formal affair. We
told him of the changes in the Pan-American Pact which Fletcher had already

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shown him, and in which Lansing had made an additional suggestion in the third
clause regarding the shipment of munitions of war to revolutionists who had
been recognized as belligerents. The clause if left as it was, Lansing thought,
would prevent any of the republics from shipping arms to revolutionists, even
when their cause was thought to be just. For instance, Madero would not have
had any assistance of this kind from the outside in his effort to overthrow
the Diaz tyranny.

We discussed the German and Mexican situations, but there was nothing
said or done that I have not already outlined elsewhere.

There were no outside guests at dinner. After dinner we sat for awhile
in the second floor sitting room, and then we adjourned to the study for a two
hour and a half conference.

The President was so insistent that I write an article about him for
Harper's Magazine that I concluded to do so, provided I have the time and can
work out something worth while. I told him I could either do it quickly or
not at all. I advised getting a journal of wider circulation, such as Col-
lier's, or the Saturday Evening Post. He approved of this, provided it could
be done with propriety, but Duneke of Harper's had made the suggestion and he
did not think it fair to publish the article in some other journal. I reliev-
ed his mind in this by telling him the suggestion was not new, that I had been
asked many times by many different magazines and periodicals to write of him
He left the matter in my hands.

We definitely decided on Governor Glynn for Temporary Chairman of the
Saint Louis Convention, and the President and I will aid him in preparing the
keynote speech. I agreed to take charge of it and after the speech is fin-
ished, I am to send it to the President for criticism.

We discussed the question of appointing a commission to mobilize in-

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dustrial resources in the event of war, and I spoke of my conference with Dr. Crampton and Dr. Hollis Godfrey. He asked me to express his appreciation to them for the work they have so unselfishly carried on for more than ten months and at much personal sacrifice.

I asked him to make a list of the men I thought should form the Executive Committee to run the campaign. He objected to some; agreed to others, and we got it into shape. I explained if Polk ran the campaign we would have a private wire from headquarters to wherever I spent the summer, and when Polk did not care to take the responsibility, I would do so.

I thought the republicans were holding their convention a week before ours because they intended to put something in their platform concerning the war, its settlement and its aftermath in order to forestall the democrats. I felt so certain of this that I advised him to make a speech prior to the Republican Convention outlining our policy in such a manner that they could not appropriate it. The President was keen about this and will do so. In outlining this policy we agreed that I should either write or cable Sir Edward Grey and get his approval of the policy, and when the President announced it as his own, the approval of Great Britain would follow.

We talked of the time when Grey should announce that Great Britain was in accord with our Pan-American Peace Pact, of which Great Britain would like to become a party as far as her American possessions are concerned. We discussed this a little while Lansing was present in the afternoon, and we later took it up more in detail. The President thought if the North and South American States guaranteed each others territorial integrity under republican forms of government, England could not sign such a pact because the British Government was not a republic. We wondered how we could overcome this obstacle. I shall take it up with Grey and try to think a way out.

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I began to get my traps together at 10.15 so as to go by the Department of Justice where I had an engagement with the Attorney General. Gregory and Grayson went with me to the station around midnight.

Gregory was concerned over some anticipated trouble with McAdoo about the employment of Samuel Untermyer in the Riggs Bank criminal prosecution case. Gregory will refuse to employ Untermyer even though it should cause a break in his relations with McAdoo. I suggested a plan by which he could throw the burden upon the President, believing if this were done, hard feeling between the two Secretaries might be averted. I know the President's feeling is the same as Gregory's, and it would be better to have him tell McAdoo than to have Gregory do so.

The President read me a draft of the platform he has written for the St. Louis Convention. He has done it well, but it is too verbose according to my taste and ideas, and he, himself, wondered if he had not erred in that direction. He had left out one or two things which I thought should be embodied and he made a memorandum to insert them.

New York,
May 4, 1916.

The usual happenings after a day's absence in Washington or elsewhere.
Accumulated mail, etc. etc.

Count von Bernstorff came at half past ten o'clock. Neither of us had anything to communicate, he not having heard from his Government, nor we from Ambassador Gerard. He was optimistic without having any reason for it. I, on the other hand, was rather pessimistic. We agreed if his Government should have adopted the suggestion he made at the beginning, and in which I concurred and obtained the approval of the President, that is, they stop their submarine warfare entirely pending negotiations. Anything short of this will mean, I

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thin, a break, for the Germans will stupidly try to make arguments which will
lead nowhere.

I wish ka again to pay a tribute to Bernstorff. He has courage and he
has kept his temper under the most trying circumstances. He has represented
his Government well, better indeed than they have been able to represent them-
selves at Berlin, and if his advice has been listened to from the beginning,
our relations with Germany would never have come to such a pass.

Hugh Wallace has just returned from Europe. He tells me that Page
has made up his mind to resign in the event the President sends me to London
again on a similar mission to those I have been on before. Page is the only
one of our Ambassadors who is under real obligations to me. I was the first
to suggest his name to the President for appointment, and I have constantly
upheld him when and where I conscientiously could. One would think, if he
could not accept the situation, he would quietly get out upon some pretext or
other than the real one.

I have not determined what I shall do, but I think I shall take it up
with the President and let him decide what is best in the circumstances. It
will not do for the President to ask me to go over again without knowing the
facts, therefore it is essential for him to know the xxxxx true condi-
tions in order to decide whether my going is of sufficient value to justify
the trouble which may ansue. However, I shall not worry for the news comes
to me second-hand, and something may have been lost in transit which would
soften the tale of Page's attitude.

Frank Polk telephoned from Washington to say he would be here at
nine o'clock tonight and would get in touch with me. At that time he had
nothing of importance from Berlin to communicate. He rang me up again upon
reaching New York and said the State Department had received a message from
Gerard giving a summary of the German Note which is to be sent tomorrow. It

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will not be satisfactory if Gerard's interpretation is correct, and a break
seems inevitable.

May 5, 1916.

The German Note is coming in over the wires and the United Press is
sending it up to me in installments. Gerard told us it would be sent this
way first and communicated by him through cypher in the regular way. It is
being sent by wireless. I shall make further comments during the day.

I suggested to Dudley Malone to come this afternoon to discuss Senator O'Gorman's announcement that he would not run again for the United States Senate. I shall suggest to Dudley that he make the race, provided we can get united support back of him.

I have had so many telephone calls and requests for interviews this
morning that everything has been in confusion. They all wish to know about
the German Note, and what I think our Government should do in the circumstances.

The German Ambassador telephoned me first, and I asked him to come at
half past four o'clock. The United Press sent me the German Note as it came
in, and telephoned parts of it in order that I should get it quickly. I
asked them to do as much for Bernstorff.

I had some further talk with Wallace about Walter Page. It seems I
misunderstood Wallace concerning Page's intentions. He may not resign if I
go over, but he wishes to know in advance of my coming so he may protest to the
President if he thinks it advisable. This is better. I should much prefer
having him thresh it out with the President in advance.

Polk came and spent a good part of the morning. He was astonished at
the Page story, and is in for bringing him home at once, ostensibly for the
purpose of discussing our trade relations with Great Britain, but really for
the purpose of straightening him out if that is possible.

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Wallace says the entire London Embassy is a nest of disloyalty to the
President.

I took lunch with Wallace at the Metropolitan Club. Joseph Davies called at half past two o'clock about the Federal Trades Commission, the coming campaign etc.

Bernstorff was visibly pleased over the note, although he regretted
its nasty tone, and was sorry they had not adopted his suggestion which would
have placed them in a much better position. I suggested that he tell his
Government that if any infractions of their promises should occur, I believed
a break would come immediately.

My letter to the President of tomorrow will tell further of my inter-
view with Bernstorff. I shall not have time to write about it today.

Dudley Malone came for an hour to discuss his senatorial prospects and
various other matters, and at nine o'clock Frank Polk came again. We went
over the international situation and then took up campaign matters. Before
he left at 10.30 I received a code message from the President asking my opin-
ion of the note, and my advice as to what should be done. I immediately
wrote him my views, and this letter is a part of the diary. I sent it to
him by Polk, who is leaving on the midnight train. I go to bed at twelve
o'clock, tired but not altogether a dissatisfied man.

May 6, 1916.

I wrote the President more fully this morning and sent the letter by
special delivery so as to reach him tonight. This, too, is a part of the
diary and explains my views somewhat more clearly.

Polk telephoned to say that Lansing disagreed with my opinion. His
first reading of the note was that it would not do; his second reading was

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that it would, and his third brought him back to his first opinion and he
believes we should send Bernstorff home. The President will therefore have
Lansing advising him in one direction and I in the other.

Captain Gaunt called and I frankly told him what I advised the President,
that
He said he was sorry but he was compelled to agree with me. He had hoped the
Germans would not follow Bernstorff's advice. If they had, both he and the
British Ambassador believed it would have placed the Allies at great disadvan-
tage. I told Gaunt that he reminded me of Bernstorff, in as much as he had
courage and good temper and viewed matters like a sportsman. I wish Gaunt
was British Ambassador and that Bernstorff was Minister for Foreign Affairs
in Berlin. It is my intention to suggest to the British Government that they
handsomely recognize Gaunt's services during the war.

Mr. Gibson called to unfold a plan which he has for Polish relief. He
believes it might be accomplished through the good offices of the Russian Gov-
ernment very much as the French are cared for in the territory Germany holds
in Northeastern France. The idea is not a bad one and I gave some advice as
to the best method of procedure.

Police Commissioner Woods called to tell of preparations he has made
and is making to protect New York in the event of break with Germany. He
is frankly alarmed. There are more German reservists here than I thought.
At the outbreak of the war, they collected here hoping in some way to reach
Germany. Failing in that, they are stranded here, and, under certain condi-
tions, which Woods and I discussed, they might seriously menace the safety of
the city.

In reading articles concerning the war and estimates of the Germans, I
am pleased to find von Falkenhayn placed so high. My reason for this is when
I met him in the Spring of 1914 at Potsdam, when I lunched with the Kaiser,

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I thought of him, wrote of him, and said that he was the ablest one of those I met in Germany. I have had no reason to change this opinion.

May 7, 1916.

I largely spent the day thinking over the European situation and the po-
sition the President should now take regarding peace proposals and guarantees
of peace when the war has closed.

In the afternoon I formulated these thoughts in a letter to Sir Edward
Grey which I sent the President for his approval or criticism.

May 8, 1916.

Edward S. Martin called. Also Mr. D. N. Heineman who was disturbed about
his passport which the Government for some reason has held up. I have a
letter from Brand Whitlock commending Heineman to me cordially, therefore I
sent him to Gordon and told him to confer with the authorities and to see that
Heineman got his passport.

Cleveland H. Dodge telephoned suggesting that the President should act
with celerity upon Morganthau's successor. He thinks Elkus would answer ad-
mirably. I suggested to Dodge that he send me a letter giving his views so
I might forward it to the President.

I had another talk with Polk from Washington. The President has decided
to send another note to Berlin in reply to theirs. Lansing, I think, is in-
sisting upon this. The President wrote a note and Lansing wrote one, with
the result that the President took all of Lansing's excepting the last para-
graph which he wrote himself and which has most of the "punch" in it. The
composite note is admirable in every way, and my only objection is that it is
sent in that form. In my opinion, it would have been better if Lansing had
made the statement unofficially and given it to the public in that way. It

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would have answered the same purpose and Germany could not have replied.
As it is, we still run the danger of a break, and the further danger of con-
tinued argument, all of which seems to me unnecessary. If we can get away
with it, it will be a success. If it reopens the matter and causes a break,
it will be a failure.

Commissioner Woods called to tell of the general situation regarding
the Police and preparations in the event of trouble.

Judge McAdoo called to discuss matters in general. He told me some cur-
ious gossip of the President and, incidentally, of me.

May 9, 1916.

I have a letter from the President this morning approving the one I
wrote Sir Edward Grey. He indicates a keen interest in what I am doing in
this direction. The President desires me to emphasize the fact that opin-
ion will grow against the Allies under certain conditions. After reading my
letter to Sir Edward, I came to the conclusion it would be best not to send it
as it is, but to re-write it in the form of a cable. It occurred to me, too,
that the 27th of May, when the League to Enforce Peace meets in Washington,
would be the right time to make this proposal, and I am so suggesting to the
President. I have arranged with the Secretary of the League to have ex-Pres-
ident Taft, who is President of the League, send another invitation to the
President. My letter to the President of today is in regard to this.

This afternoon Mr. Ryarson, President of the Board of Trustees of
the Chicago University, called with Charles R. Crane. S. R. Bertron fol-
lowed. He is leaving for Europe Saturday, and asked my opinion as to whether
it was safe. I am continually asked this, and as constantly reply that their
opinion is as good as mine.

I telephoned Captain Gaunt. There are some questions I wished to

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ask, and some information I desired him to gather for me.

May 10, 1916.

The President's letter of today is a part of the diary. He cor-
dially approves cabling the message to Sir Edward Grey. In the meanwhile, I
have entirely revamped the message, and shall send it without submitting it to him
again. It is an improvement on the form sent him and embodies the same thought.
A copy is attached.

R. W. Woolley came to talk over campaign matters. Dudley Malone came
at three o'clock to discuss his recent visit to the President in company with
State Chairman Harris.

Ray Stannard Baker came at 5.30 to discuss the article he is writing about
the President. I gave him such data as I could think of off-hand, and sug-
gested the manner in which the article should be written.

I find it would be almost impossible for me to write of the President
for the reason that scarcely a day goes by that I do not coach someone either
for a speech, an editorial or for an article about him. If I wrote I could
give out nothing original because I have given all my thoughts away.

I wrote the President today concerning Walter Page and it is attached.
I did not go into details because I hesitate to worry him at all, but it seemed
necessary he should know what was brewing.

May 11, 1916.

This was foreign mail day and letters went to Ambassadors Gerard, Sharp,
Francis and Penfield and Sir Horace Plunkett and A. H. Frazier.

May 12, 1916.

Dr. Crampton and Hollis Godfrey called this morning to make a further
report upon the mobilization of our industrial resources.

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I motored into the country with Henry Morganthau and took lunch at his daugh-
ter's cottage near White Plains. We took this occasion to discuss the coming
campaign, and I gave him, for the first time, what I had in mind. He was much
surprised and remarked that I seemed to have thought it out pretty thoroughly,
and I think he wondered why I had not taken him into my confidence before. He
was pleased with the entire plan and hoped the President would accept it as a
whole.

Morganthau tells me one minute he wants nothing, only desiring to serve,
in the next minute he speaks of his ambition to become a member of the Cabinet
in order to show the country how efficiently he could run a department.

David Lawrence called at five o'clock. He is to write some politi-
cal articles and wished to discuss them with me. He is planning to go to New
Haven on Sunday to interview Mr. Taft. We are hoping Mr. Taft can be made to
come out for Justice Hughes. This, we believe, will infuriate T. R.

It is a delight to watch the political game, to see amateurs step in, get
their wings singed, and fall out. Even as clever a youngster as Dudley Malone
gets caught at times when he flirts with Tammany.

May 13, 1916.

A long cable comes from Sir Edward Grey today which is a part of the
diary. I am disappointed that he does not rise to the occasion. For two
years he has been telling me that the solution of the international well being
depended upon the United States being willing to take her part in world affairs.
Now that we indicate a willingness to do so, he halts, stammers and questions.
I am distinctly disappointed. We are running up against the lack of co-
hesion in the British Government. Every member speaks for himself and seems
to have no knowledge of what his colleagues have in mind. I can see, too, a
distinct feeling of cocksureness in the Allies since Verdun. This will grow

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in the event they have any success themselves, and I can foresee trouble with them. An international situation can change as quickly as relationships between individuals, that is overnight. A situation may arise, if the Allies defeat Germany, where they may attempt to be dictatorial in Europe and elsewhere. I can see quite clearly where they might change their views on militarism and nationalism. It depends entirely upon what nation uses it whether it is considered a good or bad thing.

May 14, 1916.

The German Ambassador came from Washington this morning to see me. His letters of the past few days indicate his reasons for this. He wishes to settle the Lusitania and Von Igel cases. He is willing to send Von Igel home if we so desire, provided the papers are returned. He claims they are about old matters, most of them happening two years ago. He thinks if the slate can be wiped clean it will make for better relations between Germany and the United States. I agree that there should be a period of quiet, where nothing shall be sent back and forth across the sea from either country, and no recriminations or demands made.

I particularly cautioned Bernstorff about having his Government insist that something be done in the blockade. I told him to let it alone, and the matter would take care of itself, that it was a situation we could not force, and at best, could do but little. He understood this and agreed. He asked how much truth there was in the rumor that the Pope was urging the President to use his good offices to make peace. I did not know the details, but thought such things were absolutely of no value; that when peace came it would have to come by the insistence of the President, that he was the only one in the world who could bring it about.

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Bernstorff said his Government had cabled him that they thought there should be a denial made of the report that they were anxious for the President to mediate. Public opinion in Germany was too strong against the United States to readily acquiesce in such a move now. Later it might be brought about. They also told the Ambassador they would very much like for me to come over again to discuss this and other questions with them. He said they emphasized this. I suggested to Bernstorff that he remain in New York until Tuesday. Polk, I told him, would be over this afternoon or tomorrow, and I thought he had better be near at hand to discuss matters further in the event it was necessary. He placed himself at my disposition, saying the most important thing he had to do now was to discuss these matters with me.

Secretary Daniels called to give me data from the Navy Department to be used in Governor Glynn's speech. Baruch came before Daniels left and I introduced them. Baruch thought it would be a good idea to call on Daniels later at his hotel in order to become better acquainted, and to talk preparedness. He telephoned later saying "I believe Daniels is a good, honest, simple-minded jackass who is trying to do well, but who is not able to circumvent the people surrounding him who are using him for their personal ends."

Dr. McKelway came to suggest some social welfare planks for the Democratic Platform. He did not have them in good shape and I asked him to revamp them and send them to me later.

My three letters to the President are attached.

May 15, 1916.

This has been an exceedingly busy day. Fred Lynch of Minnesota came first to discuss campaign matters. We had a good laugh over McCombs' interview in which he claims I was not for Wilson before his nomination; never

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contributed to the campaign fund, and was scarcely known to Wilson until
he was elected President. McCombs has been so wild in his misstatements
that it saves me the trouble of publicly contradicting him.

Stanley Quinn came to get additional data for the Glynn speech. I asked the Mayor to delegate Quinn to Governor Glynn during the time he is preparing his speech/ Frank Polk came before Quinn left and we discussed together the character of the address.

Polk remained with me until three o'clock. We went over foreign affairs and pending matters very fully. I have about come to the conclusion that Vance McCormick of Pennsylvania is worth looking over for National Chairman. I shall arrange to have him over this week so as to see what he is like.
(Polk)

Polk thinks it would be cruel to Lansing to have him leave the State Department at this time and I agreed with him. Lansing is not well, and his serious disability at this time would, in my opinion, be a blow to the administration.

I showed Polk my letters and suggestions to the President, my cable to Sir Edward Grey, and the suggestion I made to the President concerning the speech to be made on May 27th. He approved it all. He thought it a pity we did not have someone as Ambassador in London who could help in the general plan we have in mind. He knows, as I do, how hard it is to bring about accomplishment when we are all working together and striving for the same end.
he had dug up

When Quinn was here he told us of some reference he had made
by Alexander Hamilton concerning foreign affairs and the selfishness of nations
and I added my own opinion upon this subject. The pirates of finance are not
more ruthless as a rule, in their dealings with one another than are governments.
The governments, however, clothe their actions in subtle and diplomatic terms
and use high-sounding, patriotic and altruistic sentiments.

Billy Phillips dropped in on his way from Boston to Washington to

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ask if there was anything he could do. He, too, is upset over our representative at London and thinks we should get the best available man for the post.

to

The German Ambassador telephoned this morning asking if it was necessary for him to come up for another conference. I told him to ring me up again at 3.30 after I had finished talking with Polk and I would let him know. He did so and I asked him to come immediately.

He is anxious that the Lusitania and von Igel cases be wiped off the
slate. Polk considers it best for us to keep these matters hanging fire
until we see what Germany does about her submarine policy. I told Bernstorff
I would try to keep everything quiet on this side if he would keep it quiet on
the other. I cautioned him guardedly against talking or permitting his govern
ment to talk of peace. That, I thought, was the worst way to obtain it.

I cannot understand the German mind. They have convinced the entire
world that they are eager for peace, and the Allies have acquired new confi-
dence and a disinclination to do anything in the direction of peace because of
this attitude. If the Germans will keep quiet for awhile we may be able to
initiate a peace movement.

Dr. Grayson called to talk about his coming marriage which is to take
place at Grace Chapel on the 24th.

We had for dinner Mr. and Mrs. Iselin, Mrs. Marshall and Mr. Sands. We went to see Sir Herbert Tree in the Merchant of Venice. The scenic part was good, the acting poor other than Tree himself.

May 16, 1916.

I have the following telegram from the President this morning.

"Your letters of fourteenth received. Am posting reply today."

(Signed) Woodrow Wilson.

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May 16, 1916.

Mr. Duneka of Harper's Magazine lunched with me to talk over his and the
President's desire that I should write an article about the President. I made
no definite promise, but told him I would consider it when I had more peisuse.

Ira Morris, our Minister to Sweden, called. He told some interesting
facts concerning the Scandinavian countries. He said the invitation cabled to
the State Department inviting me to Sweden came directly from the King. The
King called Morris to the palace and asked if he would make the request of the
President in order that I might talk over with the Swedish and nearby neutral
governments the question of blockade.

Ex-Congressman Connolly followed Morris and then came Harry Marsh.
The President's letter, acopy of which is attached, came by special delivery
tonight. I had no time to answer it formally, but scratched off a rough
draft of a cable to Sir Edward Grey which I shall send the President for his
approval.

May 17, 1916.

My letters to the President enclosing a copy of the proposed cable to
Sir Edward Grey are attached.

The President and I are getting into deep waters, and I am not sure we
are coming out as we desire. If he will play our hand with all the strength
within our power, I believe we can make them do as we desire. But if he does
not, we will lose some prestige and perhaps the good will of the Allies.

Frank Polk telephoned from Washington to tell of his interview with the
German Ambassador who called upon him at my suggestion. Bernstorff expressed
keen appreciation for all I had done and was doing to help the two countries
out of their difficulties.

The President has said nothing to Lansing of his proposed speech on

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May 27th, nor indeed has he mentioned to him the discussions I am having with Sir Edward Grey, which are as important as any I have had. I do not understand why the President acts as he does. It makes it so awkward for me. I feel if I am to keep on good terms with Lansing we must cooperate with him, and play with all the cards on the table. I have no such feeling about Lansing as I had about Bryan. Bryan thought so differently from the President and me concerning things that to tell him hindered accomplishment. But with Lansing, it is an aid to accomplishment rather than otherwise, though the President does not seem to see it that way.

Polk is urging me to come to Washington, but I have no desire to do so since I find it quite possible at present to work through correspondence. He says Chandler Anderson has just seen Lansing, and told him we were making a mistake in keeping Page in London; that he has no influence; that he knows no one other than Grey, and that we could accomplish nothing through him. Anderson, of course, is prejudiced, and what he says is not true. We have never had an Ambassador at London better liked than Page. The only objection to him is that he does not see eye to eye with the President, and his heart is not in the work of carrying out our policy. He is clean, able and honest, and he may be right in his views, but they are not the President's views--hence the trouble.

Arthur Page came today to ask me to let Doubleday, Page & Co. have what data or correspondence I might have in order that they may publish it later. Morganthau, Herrick, and his father are already on their list. He is also trying to get Brand Whitlock, Gerard and me to come in. I made no promises and told him it was impossible for me to do so at this time; that if I had anything to publish today, I would give it to his firm, but that conditions might change entirely when I was ready, should I ever be ready to publish what I have. He was disappointed but appreciated my position.

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I agreed to help him with the others. I was struck by the fact that he showed no evidence of anything excepting good feeling toward me. I expected him to ask my plans for the summer, but there was no mention of it except by me. Sometimes I wonder if we are not misjudging his father, because most of what we hear that is disagreeable comes as gossip.

May 18, 1916.

Several letters came from the President today. One about Page pleases me much. He takes the stand I anticipated. When Lansing asked him to bring Page home for consultation he gave no answer and both Lansing and Polk thought he was not sympathetic with the idea.

The State Department was delighted when it was learned there might be possible friction between Page and me because they thought it would bring matters to a head. After Lansing saw the President, though, they lost confidence. As a matter of fact, the President indicated nothing, and I have no doubt wishes to discuss the matter with me before giving his decision.

The President's other letters are among the most important he has ever written me and are particularly noted. The last one in regard to the cable I suggested to be sent Sir Edward Grey, is especially pleasing. He does not make a single change.

The President is leaving this momentous decision to me-- a decision, indeed, that marks the turning point in our international relations and in our old-time non-interference policy. I feel sure if he will follow our present plans all the way through, history will give him one of the highest places among the statesmen of the world. It does not matter whether he mediates or not, but what does matter is for him to strike the high note, the right note, and hold to it regardless of consequences to himself. He can and will become

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the dominant factor in the situation because he, of all the statesmen now liv-
ing, is the only one in a position of power necessary to accomplish the task.

My secretary, Miss Denton, coded the message to Sir Edward Grey to-
night and it will go forward tomorrow.

My most important visitor today was Secretary Baker. We went over cam-
paign matters, Mexican affairs and things in general. I touched lightly upon
the possibility of his becoming our candidate for Vice President. He is a
better man for this office than Marshall, and I am strong in the belief that
we should put up a man high enough to fill the place of President. It is too
great a risk to allow the life of one man imperil such policies as we have
planned to carry out. Baker expressed a willingness to come and go between
wherever I am this summer and Washington, and to take such messages as are
necessary. He shows no trace of ego.

Norman Angell was another interesting visitor. We discussed the Eu-
ropean situation, peace and its aftermath. When he offered to help I asked
him to give out an interview upon reaching England to the effect that the
American people were demanding that the President take some action toward
peace, and if he did not act, such momentum would come from the movement that
he would be forced into it. I told Angell that the belligerents went up
and down with success or failure. When the Allies were losing they clung to
us and had high and noble sentiments regarding a settlement, but as soon as
they had any success, I felt a decided hardening of sentiment against peace,
and they were more intent upon the spoils of war than upon a permanent and
just settlement.

May 19, 1916.

I have spent almost the entire day looking over Vance McCormick to see
whether he would do for Chairman of the National Committee. I believe he

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Will. He took both lunch and dinner with me and I put him through his
paces. My letter to the President indicates what I think of him.
My letters to the President and his to me are parts of the record.

George McCarty came to tell of conditions in the City of Mexico.
Mr. Jacob Shiff came to introduce Mr. Robinson whom he considers desirable
timber for the Rural Credits Board when that measure becomes a law. Robin-
son is a Jew who is interested in public affairs, and has had some exper-
ience in rural credits.

Jo Davison, the sculptor, came with an introduction from Ralph Pu-
litzer. He very much wishes to do a bust of the President. I thought it
too late as the President was so occupied now, but I promised to try and ar-
range it for the Autumn.

May 20, 1916.

After finishing the correspondence, we motored to Tuxedo for lunch
and the night. During the evening I wrote a memorandum for the President
making suggestions for his speech to be delivered before the League to En-
force Peace. The President asked me to do this. I wrote the memorandum
in the form of a speech just as I would deliver it if called upon to do it
myself. However, it was hastily and crudely done and I should have elab-
orated and improved it if I had had more time.

May 21, 1916.

We motored in this afternoon in time for me to keep an engagement
with Frank Polk. I showed Polk the correspondence between the President
to
and myself, and also cables sent and received from Sir Edward Grey. I
desired him to be abreast of the situation for neither Lansing nor Polk
get any information from the President.

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My letter to the President of today explains itself.

May 22, 1916.

Paul M. Warburg, of the Federal Reserve Board, called. He told of
his adventures in South America during his recent visit there and also of the
workings of the Federal Reserve Board.

The German Ambassador called. I again impressed upon him the folly
of Germany talking peace. I advised them to do nothing, say nothing, and to
be absolutely quiet for a period. I asked why they made such an outcry con-
cerning food shortage. I supposed it was for the purpose of exciting the sym-
pathy of neutrals. It failed however to have this effect. It served only to
make the Allies believe Germany was in a sinking condition, and hardened them
to all suggestions looking to peace. I thought it entirely legitimate for
the Allies to starve Germany into peace if they could do so, and whatever ac-
tion we took would be for the purpose of enforcing our legal rights.

Bernstorff asked if a peace conference should be called, whether it
would be called here or in Europe. I told him Europe, probably at the Hague
He thought this preferable to having it here.
and if not there, at Geneva. His Government had asked him to find out what
answer the President had sent in reply to the Pope's plea for continued peace-
ful relations between Germany and the United States. I had not inquired, but
thought he might assume it was along the lines of the answer Germany had made
the Pope.

Hamilton Holt of the Independent was a caller. Curiously enough, Holt
wanted to know what I thought of the President's reversing the usual order
of peace proposals by asking what guarantees could be made for permanent peace
after the war was over. This, of course, is what the President has in mind
to say in his Saturday night speech. Holt wondered whether it would be worth
while to bring the suggestion to the attention of the President. I had to tell

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him that the President and I had often discussed this feature of the situation that he understood it perfectly, and favored it.

I told Holt rather guardedly of my endeavors in Europe before and during the war, and let him see that the President was more conversant with all phases of the situation than anyone else. He said he could now understand why it was everyone who discussed European affairs with the President was so impressed with his knowledge of them.

Holt remained for more than an hour discussing the various subjects of interest in which the League to Enforce Peace is concerned. He claims to have originated the idea and, with Theodore Marburg, put it into effect. We discussed the Independent, of which he is owner and editor, and its policy during the coming campaign. I believe I succeeded in making him a better friend of the President than he was before.

Polk telephoned to report a conversation he had just had with the French Ambassador. Polk asked whether he should transmit the interview to the President. I advised him to do so immediately.

Captain Gaunt, Miss Eliaabeth Robins, the authoress, and Mrs. Devereaux came to kumak dinner. I only invited one man as I wished to talk alone with Gaunt. He said Australia had always looked upon the United States as her ideal, but she now bitterly resents our not entering the war. He had a letter from a friend stating that in future Australia would purchase from Germany rather than the United States. He told of the deep under current of feeling the French hold against us for the same reason. He believes all the Allies are resolved that we shall have no part in the peace conference.

At this point I began to talk and tell him how little we cared what they thought or did, if we were conscious we were right. The part we had taken, and the part we intended to take was entirely unselfish. We were the

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only nation that desired nothing, and I did not believe the democracies engaged in this fight would be stupid enough to refuse help from the greatest democracy of them all.

Gaunt gave me a cable which had just come for me from Sir Edward Grey. It reads:

"No letter has arrived recently but situation as presented in your telegram of May 19th will be considered with the Prime Minister at once and I hope to send a reply in a few days."

I sent the substance of this to the President by wire, half in code and half straight, so as to obscure the meaning.

May 23, 1916.

The important incident of the day is a letter from the President enclosing one from Frank Polk (which I advised him to write) concerning his conversation with the French Ambassador. Both letters are attached.

The President asks for a copy of his letter "upon which you based your cable to Sir Edward Grey." This shows two things: First, that he does not keep copies of his most important letters, (for surely he never wrote a more important one) and again that he has forgotten that my cable was not based upon his letter but rather upon Sir Edward Grey's to me. However, he uses the expression because I referred to it in that way in a recent letter to him.

Mrs. Florence Kelly and Mrs. Abby Scott Baker called concerning the Constitutional Amendment for Women's Suffrage now before Congress.

Lloyd Griscom called to tell of his stay in London after we left. He dined with Lord Kitchener's Secretary, Colonel Fitzgerald, who told him K thought the war would continue for three years and that at the finish, the position of the armies would probably not be different from what they are today.

We took dinner with Ms. and Mrs. Dudley Field Malone. The other guests were Margaret Wilson and a Mr. Hume. We afterward went to hear John

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McCormick sing for the benefit of Irish sufferers. I had to return to see
Captain Gaunt at half past ten o'clock as he had a message from the British
Ambassador. Gaunt has just returned from Washington and gave me a copy of
a despatch which the British Ambassador had received from Sir Edward Grey. This
is attached.

Gaunt was much disturbed, and so it seems is Grey. They wish us to
send a duplicate note to France regarding mail seizures. They appear to have
just waked up to the fact that it is not a good thing for Great Britain to take
all the burden of responsibility. I have tried to impress this upon them for
nearly two years, and it seems to have now sunk in. I shall take the matter
up with the President tomorrow.

May 24, 1916.

Since the President is to come over for the Grayson-Gordon wedding, the
usual accompaniments have followed and I have scarcely had time to breathe.

I went with Dudley Malone to meet the President at one o'clock. The
first thing he told me was that the Senate Committee by a strict partyvote
had reported Brandeis' nomination favorably.

We drove to Miss Gordon's where we left Mrs. Wilson, and the President
and I came to our apartment. He first suggested a drive, to which I assented.
Afterward I thought it would not be possible for us to work in that way so we
remained for an hour and a half working assiduously. It was one of the most
important sittings we have had for a long while.

I showed him Sir Edward Grey's note to the British Ambassador, and was
surprised to hear him say that our note had already gone to the British Gov-
ernment. I asked him to send at once a duplicate to France, which he agreed
to do. He thought it would be wise for me to cable Grey that this was being
done. I handed him a pad and asked him to write what he thought should be

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sent. His memorandum is attached.

Miss Denton coded it at once. I have the advantage of the President in having a secretary to whom I can intrust every delicate and secret matter. The President seems entirely satisfied to accept my judgment of her discretion, and he knows that no one excepting himself, myself and Miss Denton have knowledge of these confidential negotiations.

We discussed the European situation and the futility of trying to please the different belligerents. I told him of my conversation with Gaunt. I also read extracts from letters I had received from Paris, and a letter which had come from Sir Horace Plunkett. It is evident that unless the United States is willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of treasure we are not to be on good terms with the Allies.

One of the difficulties, I explained to the President, was that neither Great Britain or the United States was represented in the right way at Washington or London. We agreed it would be wise in the circumstances to greatly modify the speech he is to make next Saturday before the League to Enforce Peace.

He is to treat the subject as we have outlined it with the exception that he is not to do more than hint at peace. He asked for a pad and made a memorandum.

We divided the subject into four parts, and indicated just how far he should go.

I shall not give this in detail for his speech itself will indicate our conclusions.

I asked if he thought it wise for him to see the French Ambassador and have a talk with him to inform him just what advantage France would have under the plan we have in mind. He thought it would be better for me to see him.

I cannot go to Washington, but will ask Jusserand to come over, although I understand he has not left Washington for a year or more.

I explained France's real feeling, that is, she had best stick to this

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war until Germany is crushed, for she could never again hope to have Great Britain, Russia, Italy and Belgium fighting by her side.

I spoke about the New York political situation and outlined it as I saw it. He agreed that Dudley Malone would be a satisfactory man for Senator and authorized me to arrange it if it could be done without involving him. He authorized me to offer Governor Glynn a place on the Shipping Board when it is created. I told him Glynn could fill any position and could be put in the Cabinet with safety. He thought the country would not approve of his putting a Catholic in the Cabinet. I disagreed with him and contended that the country would not object in the slightest. What they do object to is having the President's Secretary a Catholic. Many Protestants do not believe that communications reach the President. While this is probably not true, nevertheless, the feeling cannot be overcome. Much to my surprise, the President asked me to suggest some for Secretary in Tumulty's place. I asked him when he would make the change, and he again surprised me by saying, "immediately, if I can find the right man. I will offer Tumulty something else".

I took this occasion of telling him if Tumulty is a mistake, McAdoo and I are responsible for it. I remember quite well the type of man the President desired for that important and responsible place, and I persuaded him to take Tumulty. I knew Tumulty but slightly, and took him at McAdoo's estimate. I remember, too, that he thought it would not be a place in which to have a Catholic. Again, I overcame his objections. The truth is my experience had been limited to gubernatorial secretaries and I did not realize the difference.

Knowing that Governor Hamlin's term on the Federal Reserve Board expires during the summer we discussed his reappointment. We also talked of McAdoo's probable resignation. He suggested Houston for his place and I warmly endorsed it.

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I suggested to the President that he show Lansing his speech before he makes it Saturday night. He promised to do this because he said the speech was of such importance that he dared not deliver it extemporaneously. He is to write it between now and Saturday for he has the matter of it well in hand.

I urged him to accelerate the Navy program and to mention it in his speech Saturday. We decided upon what he should say. It will not please the British, but it will please Americans and I shall be content with that. The balance of the speech will not please the Germans and the Allies should take comfort there.

We talked of Mexico and of the hopelessness of that situation. I thought it was an economic problem and we should reach it in that way through governmental aid. He thought I was right, but declared Congress would never take such a step. I believed it would if he would get back of it properly, which I doubt being able to get him to do. Poor man, I hate to crowd more work upon his shoulders, and yet it is important for him to settle the Mexico question with something more of vigor than he has yet shown.

We talked of the Vice Presidentcy and whether we should side-track Marshall and give the nomination to Baker. He felt that Baker was too good a man to be sacrificed. I disagreed with him. I did not think any man was too good to be considered for Vice President of the United States. I thought if the right man took it, a man who had his confidence as Baker has, a new office could be created out of it. As he might become Vice President in fact as well as in name, and be a co-worker and co-helper of the President. He was interested in this argument but was unconvinced that Baker should, as he termed it, be sacrificed. He was afraid he could not educate the people in four years up to the possibilities of the office. He reminded me that no Vice President had ever succeeded a President by election.

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The President showed some signs of fatigue and it was time for him to call
for Mrs. Wilson to take her to the wedding. We went to the door together. There
was a large crowd assembled to see him come out and I was gratified to hear the
cheers that greeted him.

Loulie and I went to the wedding and afterward to the reception at Miss Gordon's apartment at No. 12 West 10th Street. It was a notable wedding and a notable gathering.

I had a few minutes conversation with Mrs. Wilson and with the President.
Afterward, McAdoo and I motored for an hour in order to have some talk. The
President evidently does not tell McAdoo much of what is in his mind. I was
surprised to find that he knew so little excepting of matters current in his
own department.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Chas. R. Crane. The other guests were
Margaret Wilson and Secretary and Mrs. McAdoo. After dinner we went to see
the play, "Boomerang".

May 25, 1916.

John Mott, of the Y.M.C.A. called with Charles R. Crane for a conference prior to Mott's leaving for Europe. He wish advice which I gave him as best I could.

We went to dinner with the Mezes. The other guests were Mr. and Mrs. Jacob Shiff, Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Untermyer and Dr. and Mrs. Cahnman. We afterward went to the Masque at the Stadium. I returned at half past ten as I had an engagement to meet Captain Gaunt. He has been in Washington and brought messages from the Ambassador and the following cable from Sir Edward Grey:

"Your two last telegrams and letter are being carefully considered by
my colleagues and I hope to send a reply very soon".

Gaunt said the British Ambassador was much exercised at the harshness of

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our note on mail seizures sent to the British and French Governments. He thought the same object might be accomplished by a softer tone. I am not sure he is right. It looks as if a club was necessary before they take any notice. Gaunt gave some information about German intrigue in British Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico. The Germans are again active in those countries.

May 26, 1916.

The securing of a competent architect for

The rebuilding of the University of Texas has taken a large part of my morning. David Harrell, Chairman of the Building Committee, is here and I have been in touch with Cass Gilbert and Charles G. Loring, architects, concerning the matter.

My letter to the President explains itself. I had a long conversation with Frank Polk over the telephone from Washington. He is to have the French Ambassador come over sometime soon for a conference with me as the President desires.

Polk said the German Ambassador is getting up regular propaganda concerning the President's speech before the League to Enforce Peace. I am afraid I have misled Bernstorff for when I talked with him it was our plan to make the speech something more of a plea for peace than is now contemplated. As rearranged, it will be almost wholly a speech to preserve peace in the future rather than to make peace now. Polk said Bernstorff was so eager about the matter, that he is hardly fair in his methods, and is using every available means to accomplish his purpose.

Polk believes there is a determined effort to create the impression abroad that there is dissention in Government circles, particularly between the President and Lansing. He is making vigorous denial today.

Jerome Green, of the Rockefeller Foundation, called me over the telephone

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to ask my help in furthering Polish relief work. The Foundation made avail-
able today a million dollars for this purpose. I promised help with the di-
plomatic end.

Ambassador Fletcher called at five o'clock to tell of the progress he
is making with the South American Peace Pact. Negotiations have halted while
Brazil is endeavoring to persuade Chile to come in upon the terms we wish.

Adolph Miller, of the Federal Reserve Board, followed Fletcher. His
trouble, like Warburg's, is the prospect of having Hamlin for Governor for
another term. He does not agree with Warburg that it would be well to rotate
the governorship, because he does not believe there is a man on the Board
qualified for leadership. He believes a big man should be taken from the
outside, and one able to make himself felt not only in the Board itself, but
in the country at large. He considers Hamlin a weak, placid, compromising
gentleman. Both he and Warburg intimate that if Hamlin is reappointed there
will be several resignations from the Board.

Edward Harris, of the New York State Executive Committee, called at
8.15. I wished to inform him that we had considered his message sent through
Malone to the effect that the State and City organizations would conform to the
President's wishes as far as possible in the selection of candidates for Sen-
ator and Governor of New York. I said the President did not wish to inter-
fere, and would not indicate any preference regarding Governor. As for Sena-
tor, the President had a warm affection for Dudley Malone and I was sure would
be glad to have him nominated for the Senate. After Harris left I went to
the Biltmore to see Hugh Wallace who is ill.

May 27, 1916.

Don Seitz of the World called and talked for an hour or more. I get some
information from him and I suppose he gets some from me.

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Dr. Crampton came to report further progress on the work he and Dr. Godfrey are doing in the plan to mobilize our industries.

Frank Polk telephoned from Washington to say that Bernstorff was using the President's speech to be made on Saturday to promote German peace propaganda, and was quoting me rather wildly. The cables from Berlin indicate that I am expected there soon. I have a cable from Stockholm asking me to visit Sweden when I return to Europe.

The Associated Press called from Washington to ask when I expected to leave. The United Press made the same inquiry. It is evident a rumor of my coming is general throughout Europe.

May 28, 1916.

Vance McCormick came over from Harrisburg to thresh out the National Chairmanship. He believes it inadvisable to choose him for the place, because the liquor interests would probably be against him on account of the attitude he took for local option in his race for Governor of Pennsylvania last year. There are also some private reasons for thinking he should not accept. We left the matter in abeyance for further discussion.

This leaves us at sea again. I have had George McAneny in the back of my mind for sometime. I shall try him out tomorrow through Malone and see what he thinks of himself as an available chairman.

Henry Morganthau came in the afternoon to tell of his trip in the West; of his recent conference with the President and other leaders in Washington, and to talk over the coming campaign. Malone same before he left and also Sidney. I concluded to have them all witness my willow which I made today.

My letters to Sir Edward Grey and the President are parts of the diary.

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I am delighted with the President's speech. He has followed the suggestions I made closer than I thought he would. If we had not decided to cut out the plea for peace he must probably have used more of the draft I sent him. I hope the country and the world will rise to his call. There was one unfortunate phrase in his speech, i.e. when he says, "with its causes and objects we are not concerned". The Allies will overlook all the good in it and accentuate this.

May 29, 1916.

I am happy to read the general approval of the President's May 27th speech. A. G. Gardiner is particularly enthusiastic in his comments in the London Daily News. The New York Times also writes an admirable leader. The Members of Congress who were at the League to Enforce Peace banquet all seem to thoroughly approve.

It is a great speech and, as I wrote the President, will be a landmark in history. It marks a beginning of the new and the decline of the old order of statesmanship. It is in line with the President's Inaugural Address and his Mobile speech.

I have been busy the entire day trying to find a suitable National Chairman for the coming campaign. Secretary Lane was with me for awhile and I asked him to make suggestions. Also Frank Cobb of the World. I am combing the country for the right man. My letter to the President covers this ground.

My callers included, Secretary Lane, Frank Trumbull and Dr. Lovinggood, the colored educator from Texas.

Polk telephoned to tell me he was worried about Lansing's health. He grows worse rather than better. He is now in a condition where the doctors will not permit him to have public business discussed in his presence.

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May 30, 1916.

A letters comes from the President this morning. I also have one from
the French Ambassador confirming his engagement with me here for tomorrow.

Governor Glynn sends me his speech to review. My letter to Glynn gives
my estimate of it. So also does my letter to the President. He has done the
work admirably and I am delighted.

I am still trying to find a man for Chairman. Billings, Collector of
the Port of Boston, is the latest possibility. I had Dudley Malone telephone
him to come over and see me tonight. He will arrive at nine o'clock. He has
many of the necessary qualifications.

Henry Morganthau brought Abram Elkus to call at half past five in
order that we might become better acquainted before he leaves for his post at
Constantinople.

My letter to Lansing is a part of the record.

A six hundred work despatch came from Sir Edward Grey tonight and is at-
tached. It does not get us anywhere. The trouble seems to be with the
French. I see indications that the English, or at least some of them, would
like to have the war end, but France, for reasons I have given before, does
not share in this desire. I am forwarding the cable to the President without
particular comment, though my better to him is attached.

May 31, 1916.

Today, like yesterday, has been overwhelming. Edmund Billings came
last night and I talked with him concerning the National Chairmanship. I am
sending him axar to Washington for the President to look him over, but
there are some objections to him for the place.

My most important visitor was the French Ambassador who took lunch

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with me, and whose conversation I will epitomize in a letter to the President
tomorrow.

The German Ambassador telephoned just before the French Ambassador
came, but I made his appointment some hours later to avoid any chance of
having them meet.

Bernstorff, as usual, was calm, fair-minded and uncomplaining. He merely wished to say goodbye, to get my address and to make arrangements to see me in the event it became necessary.

I looked over Elton Parks as a possible Secretary to the President.
Frank Polk telephoned from Washington twice to discuss the growing crisis of
Mexico. He asked whether I thought some of the German diplomats should be
sent home. He said they now have sufficient proof to give Bernstorff his pass-
port. I advised doing nothing for the present further than to get everything
in shape to use at a moment considered desirable. I advised giving Bernstorff
a hint of what we had so he might know his tenure was uncertain.

I advised using a firm hand and firm tone with Mexico. We have played with that situation as long as circumstances will permit. It is best for Mexico and for all concerned that an end should be made of their troubles as speedily as possible.

Hugh Wallace, Dudley Malone, Edmund Billings and many others came in
succession.

June 1, 1916.

I counted upon leaving at nine o'clock this morning for Manchester, but
two special delivery letters from Secretary Lansing and Governor Glynn detained
me. Governor Glynn enclosed the first part of his revised keynote speech.
Telephone calls, long distance and local, cables to be prepared to Sir Edward
Grey and Sir Horace Plunkett, letters to write the President and others kept

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me until late. I shall not write further in the diary until I reach Sunapee,
New Hampshire, on Tuesday June sixth.

Sunapee is nine miles from a railroad and four miles from a postoffice.
I purposely selected this isolated spot in order to be free from interruptions.
At our usual abiding place on the North Shore of Massachusetts I should have
been disturbed every hour. At Sunapee I can rest and read and think. It is
so remote from the beaten path that someone has said, "it is one of those
places you start for but never reach".

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Ponemah,
Lake Sunapee, N. H.

June 6, 1916.

I left New York June first, motored as far as Brookfield, Massachusetts, where I spent the night and reached Manchester, Mass. at lunchtime June second. Several long-distance telephone calls were awaiting me, all of them about the chairmanship of the National Committee.

I wrote the President a short note and sent a telegram in connection therewith.

I did no work on Saturday, Sunday and Monday and received no mail since it had all gone to Sunapee. I motored to Sunapee today, arriving in time for dinner. There was much accumulated mail but nothing of pressing importance.

June 10, 1916.

My correspondence practically covers everything since I have been here. Letters from the President, my letters to him, those from Gerard, Page, Brand Whitlock, etc. etc. speak for themselves. I wrote Sir Edward Grey and sent a copy to the President, all of which are a part of the diary.

Joseph Davies telephoned Thursday concerning troubles brewing in the Trades Commission. I advised what I thought best to do. Such troubles, I think, would not arise if the President paid a little more attention to the various departments. No one can see him to explain matters or get his advice, therefore they come to me and I have to do it at long-range which is difficult and unsatisfactory. The President lacks executive ability and does not get the best results from his Cabinet or those around him. I should have an hour a week for each Cabinet official and heads of important

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commission in which they might give me a summary of work done during the week, and what was proposed for the week following. This would be far more effective than Cabinet meetings, which are in themselves of little value, where matters of general policy need be discussed by them as a whole.

In foreign affairs, where they are urgent as now, I should have Lansing come to the White House every day between the hours of six and seven to give an epitome of the day's despatches and news, instead of having a mass of cables dumped upon me and having to dig out those that are important. I should make each individual connected with the Government feel he was an essential part of it and that my success must necessarily be his success, for indeed, it is.

If the President is not a success, all of those who are helping him become of no importance whatever. Our places depend entirely upon how large a part he plays in history. However, if the President did what I have suggested, there would be no place for me, for it is to supplement his deficiency in these directions which make my endeavors valuable to him.

June 17, 1916.

I have not kept the diary day by day since my letters and telegrams are the record. There have been many telephone calls from McAdoo, Malone, McCormick, Polk etc. etc. but they practically all related to current political happenings and have no lasting importance.

The President shows signs of panic since the meeting of the Republican Convention at Chicago. He urges me to take the Chairmanship and run the campaign. I feel that it would not be wise for me to do so as I am not strong enough to undertake it. I communicated this to the President largely by telephone, and through Malone, who transmitted it to him. I am trying to persuade him to take Vance McCormick for National Chairman. Even with his re-

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- cord on local option he seems the best man available. It would be foolish to place me at the head of our political organization for it would prevent me from going to Europe to do the necessary work there. It would not be well to have me openly manage his political fortunes and also take part in the direction of foreign affairs. I have felt for a long while that the President would not want me to go to Europe while this campaign is on, and I have no desire to do so if it can be avoided.

George W. Andreson, U. S. District Attorney of Massachusetts, spent the day with me Wednesday. He came for advice as to our party nominations for Senator and Governor in his State. He also wished to urge the appointment of Gregory for the place on the Supreme Court made vacant by Justice Hughes' resignation. My opinion is that the President should appoint a Northern man. I have a feeling the republicans may try to bring the sectional issue into the campaign. The South is clearly in the saddle, both in Congress and in the administration, and it has gotten upon the nerves of many in the North. I can see evidences of it in my friend Edward S. Martin.

Gregory telephoned from Boston that he would be here this afternoon. Hamilton Holt telephoned from New York Thursday and asked my opinion as to whether the President would be willing to receive a large committee of prominent citizens who would like him to take some action looking to peace. Jacob Shiff, and many other men of that stamp, are at the head of the moment. I advised Holt to form the committee, but to do nothing for the moment. All my advices from Europe indicate that any move in the United States toward peace would be resented and would have a tendency to postpone peace. Holt accepted my judgment and thanked me for my advice.

Letters have come from Lord Bryce, Sir Horace Plunkett and others and are parts of the diary.

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June 19, 1916.

The Attorney General came Saturday and left this morning. Before he arrived I had a telephone message from District Attorney Anderson, who was in Justice Brandeis' office in Boston and was speaking for the Justice as well as for himself. They urged that I use my influence to have Gregory appointed a Justice of the Supreme Court. They had been talking to Gregory and had come to the conclusion that his decision in the matter rested almost wholly with me, that is, the President would appoint him if I damex advised him to do so, and Gregory would accept if I thought it best for him to do so.

They thought it necessary for someone with Gregory's viewpoint to have the place, because Brandeis is the only one on the Court with progressive ideas, and they knew of no one excepting Gregory having a similar outlook whom the President would appoint. They considered it more important to have him a Justice than Attorney General, although I called their attention to the fact that the President would probably have saaxaxak Federal Judges to appoint, and Gregory could select the type needed to offset those already in office.

Gregory and I discussed the matter from every angle. While he thought he would take it if the President should offer it, he shared my opinion that it would be best to select a man from the North if one entirely suitable could be found. We discussed all sorts of combinations, but found it hard to come to a satisfactory conclusion. My letter of today to the President will give some idea of what we thought.

My letter to the President of yesterday and Fletcher's to me are parts of the record. They both refer to the South American Pact.

June 21, 1916.

Yesterday and today are chiefly interesting because of letters, tele-

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grams and telephone calls. Letters to the President and others are parts of the record.

Vance McCormick will be here tomorrow. The President evidently sent him. He may also send Dr. William H. Welsh of Johns-Hopkins and Dr. George E. Hale whom he has commissioned to do certain work in the mobilization of our scientific resources. I dislike asking anyone to come such a long way, for it takes the better part of two days for the round trip.

I have outlined an organization for McCormick and will give it to him tomorrow. This also is a part of the diary.

Gordon telephoned that Judge Shearn wished to know what I thought of his making the race for Governor of New York.

June 22, 1916.

Vance McCormick has been with me most of the day. We went over each phase of the coming campaign and its organization. The President sent many messages through him, and he is to take back word from me to the President whom he is to see Saturday.

I advised against the speech of acceptance being made until after Hughes has made his. The republicans, against all precedent, called their convention first, therefore it is up to them to have their speech of acceptance made first. This will give us some advantage.

I advised that the notification and response should be made at Shadow Lawn rather than at the White House. This is also the President's view, unless foreign affairs are so critical as to prevent him from leaving Washington.

McCormick seems capable and I believe we made no mistake in selecting him for Chairman of the National Democratic Committee.

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June 23, 1916.

Prof. George E. Hale came for the day. Dr. Welsh found it impossible to come and delegated Professor Hale to speak for him as well as for himself. The purpose of his visit was to impress upon me the necessity for having a scientist on the commission to be created for the mobilization of our resources.

an

I found Hale an intelligent, patriotic fellow. I learned much from him that was both interesting and instructive.

I received a letter from Lord Bryce and sent a copy of it to the President. My three letters to the President explain themselves, and

Letters have also come from Ambassadors Penfield, Gerard and A. H. Frazier. I wish the President would pay more attention to foreign affairs. He seems to be interested mainly in domestic matters which bears out his own assertion that he has "a one track mind". I do not believe he reads Gerard's or Penfield's letters which come to me through him, and are sent in that way for his information as well as mine. If he would keep himself informed, he would not destroy his influence abroad as he does from time to time by things he says in his speeches.

Lord Bryce also calls attention to the fact that one phrase in his addresses is taken up and the main purpose of them overlooked.

Penfield indicates that the Austrians are suspicious of the President because of his declaration that every nation should have the right to say under what government it shall live.

I believe the French and English are prolonging the war unnecessarily. It is stupid to refuse our proffered intervention on the terms I proposed in Paris and London. I made it clear to both Governments that in the event of intervention we would not countenance a peace that did not bring with it a plan which would make for permanent peace, as far as human foresight could do so. If

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Germany refused to acquiesce in such a settlement, I promised we would take the part of the Allies and try to force it. It would mean the end of militarism, but it would also mean an end of navalism, and that perhaps is where the shoe pinches. Great Britain desires to destroy militarism and at the same time perpetuate navalism, when the war has shown that of the two, navalism might be the one made more oppressive of the two branches of military service. Under a liberal government, navalism or militarism would not be a menace, but under a reactionary government such as Great Britain might have, it could be made a serious menace to the happiness and freedom of mankind.

The President's proposal for permanent peace has had no response whatever from official Great Britain or France. The only murmur we have had has been of criticism. In France because of some expression of no real consequence, and in Great Britain because of the proposal for a measurable freedom of the seas. It is not the people who speak but their masters, and someday I pray the voice of the people may have direct expression in international affairs as they are beginning to have in national matters.

June 25, 1916.

Noel Buxton, M. P. and his cousin the Reverend Bruce have been here two days. I have had long talks with them, particularly, with Buxton. My letters to the President indicate the nature of our conversations. Buxton and Bruce came to Sunapee to see me when they found it was not possible to see the President.

June 26, 1916.

Another letter from Lord Bryce and one from A. G. Gardiner came. These and my letter to the President are attached.

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June 28, 1916.

Letters from Walter Page, Gerard and Lanier Winslow. I am sending the
President excerps from them.

Frank Polk and I had a fifteen minute talk over the telephone. He is
disturbed about McAdoo's activities in New York political matters. I was dis-
tressed to hear no good news of the Mexican situation, and also that Lansing
was in such condition that he would have to leave for a vacation no matter
how grave the crisis might be.

I talked with Polk about pending matters. I also had a long talk
with Vance McCormick regarding the formation of the Campaign Committee. It
stands about as we made it here, the President accepting our suggestions.

June 29, 1916.

When Noel Buxton was here I told him how Impossible it was to
satisfy the Allies. It is always something more. I thought if we went in-
to the war, the Allies after welcoming us warmly and praising us beyond our
deserts, would later, when they found we were not furnishing as many men, or
any men for that matter, for we have none, would begin to chide us just as
the French did the English, and say we were not spilling our blood; that we
were shirkers, etc. etc. Nothing, Xxkhaugkxxaukdxpxaaxaxxhaua which it
would be possible to do within a year after we entered the war, could please
them.

It was tiresome, I told Buxton, to hear the English declare they were
fighting for Belgium, and that they entered the war for that purpose. I ask-
ed if in his opinion Great Britain would have entered the war against France
if she had violated Belgium or, indeed, whether Great Britain would not have
gone into the war on the side of the Allies even if France had violated Bel-
gium. In my opinion, the purpose of Great Britain's entrance into the war

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was quite different from that. The stress of the situation compelled her to side with France and Russia and against the Central Powers. Primarily it was because Germany insisted upon having a dominant army and a dominant navy; something Great Britain could not tolerate in safety to herself.

Buxton admitted that I had given the real reason for Great Britain's having entered the war. He qualified it, however, by saying that Englishmen generally believed Great Britain had entered the war because of the violation of Belgium, and it was only those who really knew she could not do otherwise, who felt differently.

I have a cable from Sir Edward Grey saying my letter of June 1st had been received and he was preparing an answer. I hope to get it between now and the Autumn, so slowly do the English move.

July 9th, 1916.

I have not been keeping the diary for there has been so little of importance outside of correspondence which speaks for itself. The telephone calls I have had from McCormick, Morganthau, Malone and others relate almost wholly to the campaign which is of fleeting interest.

The President's letter of July 2nd is one of the most interesting he has written me for sometime. That and my reply are attached to the diary. In lieu of my diary I am dictating reminiscences of my childhood days, my school-life and my political activities in Texas covering a long period.

August 9, 1916.

It has been a month since I have recorded anything in the diary. My correspondence shows practically everything of value. There have been a number of visitors like R. W. Woolley, of the Publicity Committee, Daniel C. Roper, Organization Committee, Norman Hapgood, who is doing special writing,

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Hugh Wallace, etc. etc. All of our conversations have related to the campaign. My letters indicate the suggestions I have made and what I have advised in the premises.

Sam Blythe has written another article about me in the Saturday Evening Post which I suppose he regards as complimentary, but which I think of much as I did of the last one he wrote. He gives me credit for being the most powerful democrat in the party with the exception of the President, and intimates that I even direct him. The manner in which he characterizes my methods are as far from the facts as any fiction could be. Because I keep my own counsel, he has an idea that I do everything surreptitiously. As a matter of fact, my methods have always been open and bold.

The absurd thing about his article is that he credits me with so much power in the party, and so much influence over the President, which I could not possible possess by the methods he describes. The President would have nothing to do with a man such as Blythe pictures, and I would be of no value to him. If I have been of service it has been by suggesting policies and by culling the best material we had in the party to carry them out. I have never met Blythe and he has no more idea of me than he has of the man in the moon.

August 15, 1916.

Nothing new since I last dictated for the diary excepting that shown in my correspondence, and the visit of Vance McCormick on Saturday. We went over campaign matters and decided many important features of it.

As to the suffrage amendment we decided it would be best to read the riot act to the suffragists and tell them they were making a mistake in coming out for the Republican Party because they would so antagonize the democrats that they would ruin their chances of getting a two thirds vote for an amendment through Congress. The suffragist, like all other reformers, are thor-

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Though unpractical. They had their affairs as good condition as possible at this time, for both platforms are committed to suffrage and the President and Mr. Hughes are in favor of state enactment.

The President is doing some things well and some things badly in the campaign. He allows his personal feelings, particularly in regard to men, to enter too largely. He declined to see reporters or make any statement regarding campaign issues, asserting it would be dangerous because the reporters would write things he did not say. Of course, the obvious thing for him to do, and what I intended to have him do, was to give out written statements and refuse to add to them. If he gave out statements in the presence of a number of newspaper men, no one could misquote him. McCormick says they are offended with the President because he refuses to comment on the campaign or its issues.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey of the Drexel Institute came up on Saturday and we had an interesting talk on the mobilization of our scientific and industrial resources.

Norman Hapgood lunched with us Saturday and I outlined articles which he is to write concerning the campaign.

The most interesting letter received is one from David Lloyd George, a copy of which is a part of the diary.

War Office, Whitehall,
London.

July 31, 31, '16.

Dear Colonel House:

Thank you so much for sending me the interesting cartoon.

On the whole the American Press has always dealt kindly by me.

I wish it had been possible to carry out the programme we sketched out at those momentous little dinners; but I fear it is premature.

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The Allies are winning at last, but they have not yet won; and although
Germany must now be getting anxious, her rulers are not quite convinced as
yet that the game is up.

With kindest regards,

Colonel E. M. House.

August 27, 1916.

During this past week a number of interesting people have been here,
among them the Dutch Minister, Secretary McAdoo, Governor Glynn etc. I out-
lined something of the Dutch Minister's conversation in my letter to the
President.

McAdoo surprised me by saying he did not know the contents of the
President's speech of acceptance although it had been written. He spoke
with some feeling of the fact that the President did not take him wholly into
his confidence. He said the President had no confidence in the judgment of
any of his Cabinet. I could see he thought the new Mrs. Wilson was antago-
nistic to him and to several other friends of the President's.

McAdoo's ambition to be President has not abated although he disclaims
any designs on that office. I was curious to know how the Federal Re-
serve Board troubles had been adjusted. The President wished to appoint
Delano as Governor of the Board, which of course was the proper thing to do
since he was Vice-Governor, but McAdoo objected to the point of threatening
to resign. The President gave way and appointed Harding. Both desired
Hamlin but as I predicted, they came to see that Hamlin's appointment would
mean a crisis which they did not dare bring about at this critical time.

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It would be an interesting experiment to have McAdoo President. He is able, and has great courage. He lacks discretion, although he has more of this quality than Theodore Roosevelt. I am not sure he would not make a great President because in addition to his other qualities he has imagination.

Daniel Roper came to go over the organization of the campaign and to consult as to the next move. I find he is getting matters in good shape and we are beginning to know just how the land lies. He has gone sufficiently into matters now to find that my estimate of the states we should carry, and probably can carry, is correct, and the one Burleson made and argued about the last time he was here, is eliminated. The only mistake I made was in stressing Connecticut too much and not enough on Colorado. Indications now are that we will carry Colorado and lose Connecticut.

I find that Roper is the only member of the Campaign Committee who is persona grata with the New York organization. They will have none of McCormick and the others because "they do not speak the same language". Roper does. He has had several interviews with Murphy and believes he will play fair with us. I am not so sure of this myself.

Roper, Glynn and others are urging me to return to New York, believing I am the only one of those near the President who can harmonize differences which arise. I can see trouble for myself when I return to New York. While I have planned every feature of the campaign, I have tried to lay the burden of detail on other shoulders, but it seems inevitable that I shall have to assume some of that too. My interest is wholly in world politics and international situation, and I find it difficult to bring myself to think in terms of domestic affairs.

Governor Glynn told of the recent Satatoga Conference. McCombs was an eleventh hour choice for the nomination of Senator, Morganthau by his officious-

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ness complicating the situation and it went by default. I am not certain that Murphy did not nominate McCombs designedly in order to slap both the President and McAdoo.

My letters and correspondence will tell whatever story there is to tell other than what I have written here.

September 3, 1916.

Gregory has been here with me for a day or two. He was worried over certain malicious gossip of the President. He had been told the republicans planned to put this out on the eve of the election, and too late for it to be answered. The plan was for Hughes and the Republican National Committee to disclaim any knowledge of it, but to have it done by those lower down. My own opinion is that they will finally not do this.

I wish to say again that as far as I know the President's private life has been, and is, all it should be, every rumor or gossip to the contrary notwithstanding.

Gregory told about the appointment of Justice Clark to the Supreme Court and how the President urged it upon him, Gregory. He declined because he not thought it better for the President to appoint him, and because he felt that his hearing was not sufficiently acute to make him an effective Justice. Gregory said that although decisions of the Supreme Court are delayed for an interminable time, they will actually determined every Saturday after the oral arguments have been made. This is the reason for the delay. The reason for the delay is because the opinion to be written require much work, and have to be verified. Sometimes in working out the decree new points of law are found, and occasionally the first decision is reversed, though this does not occur often.

This is something I have long criticised in our courts. Sometimes decisions are handed down years after the arguments have been made, and it is

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humanly impossible to carry points of a case accurately in one's mind for such a length of time. It gives one a better opinion of the Supreme Court and its decisions. Gregory told me this in order to convince me how necessary it was for the members to hear distinctly.

In sending me an advance copy of the President's speech of acceptance, Mrs. Wilson wrote that it was then seven A. M. and she and the President had already breakfasted and were hard at work in the study.

Letters from Frazier, Gerard, Winslow and others from abroad are parts of the diary. So also are my letters to Lord Bryce, Lord Loreburn, A. G. Gardiner, St Loe Strachey, Robert Donald, Sir Horace Plunkett, Sidney Brooks, Georgie Prothero etc.

Count von Bernstorff telephoned last night asking if he might come to see me today. I invited him and the Countess, who has just arrived from Germany, to lunch.

We had an interesting two hours together. He says his Government thinks it necessary for Ambassador Gerard to have an extended vacation, that he is so nervous it is difficult to deal with him. My letter of today to the President goes more into detail as to this.

In talking to Bernstorff about the recent appointment of Field Marshal von Hindenburg as Chief of Staff in place of von Falkenhayn, I considered it a move directly in favor of the Chancellor. When I was in Germany, the Chancellor in talking of peace measures said that von Hindenburg was willing to throw the weight of his influence on the side of peace terms which would not be popular in Germany, but which would probably be acceptable to the Allies. Bernstorff had no intention of this, and the information caused him to give me some inside confidence. The Chancellor told Countess von Bernstorff as she was leaving Germany to tell the Ambassador that he did not know how long Germany could hold Germany from

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unbridled submarine warfare, and to be prepared to leave the United States at a moment's notice. While the Countess was enroute, and after von Hindenburg had been appointed Chief of Staff, the Chancellor cabled Bernstorff to disregard the message he had sent by the Countess. Until I told him of the relations between the Chancellor and von Hindenburg he did not understand the reason for the cablegram.

Bernstorff said from the beginning he had tried to impress upon his Government the seriousness of their submarine warfare policy. They only partially realized it after the Lusitania and Arabic were sunk, and they censured Bernstorff for going beyond his instructions in the Arabic settlement. It was not until the Sex was sunk that they fully realized how near they were to war with us. This brought forth our ultimatum, and kmax in their reply they were compelled to go far beyond what Bernstorff had agreed to in the Arabic case.

Bernstorff touched upon the election and asked how matters stood with us. He said someone had called the German Embassy over the telephone and wanted to know how much they were willing to give to the republican campaign fund. He refused to answer the impertinent inquiry, and instructed his secretary to say that the German Government was not taking any part in the election. He thought the question was asked in order to get him in disrepute and cause him to be sent home. However, he showed a keen desire to know how matters were going. I thought if the election was held tomorrow, the President would win. He concurred in this opinion from general observation. I took occasion to point out how necessary it was for the President to be re-elected. If he was not, it would be impossible for him to intervene in Europe between the time of his defeat and the inauguration of a new President. Matters would necessarily have to wait until the new administration came in, and the diplomatic corps had been changed. The new men would have to be given time to acquaint themselves with the belligerent

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situation in order to properly advise in regard to it. This, I thought, could
not be done before next Autumn, a year from now.

This view came as a surprise for he had not realized what a change of
government in the United States means, and delay may be fatal to Germany. Of
course, I had an object in presenting this viewpoint to him. He agreed that
in the event the President won, he would be the most powerful individual in the
world, and his demand upon the belligerents to cease fighting would be a com-
pelling one.

He asked whether I still had in mind the calling of a peace conference
without indicating the character of peace. I replied that my attitude was un-
changed as to this. I spoke of the power the President had over Congress and I
thought if he was re-elected, he could speak with the voice of America back of him.

I voiced the hope that Bernstorff would be a peace delegate from his country.
He was gratified, but thought von Buelow should be the first delegate no matter
who was second. He considers von Buelow the ablest diplomat in Germany.

I asked why Germany got into war with both Great Britain and Russia at the
same time. War with either was bad enough, but to have them both against her
showed a lack of judgment which seemed to me apalling. Bernstorff said that in
his opinion war would not have happened if a man of the first class had been in
charge of the destinies of either of the great powers in Europe-- such a man, for
instance, as Bismarck. When I suggested that Germany should have brought Great
Britain to her side as soon as it became evident that France and Russia had be-
come allies, he agreed with enthusiasm. Great Britain, I thought, would have
been glad to have had Germany's militarism grow to an even greater perfection
than it has.

Bernstorff thought that Prince Lichnowski was such a pacifist that he
misled Sir Edward Grey and the British Government into the belief that there

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would be no war. If a strong man had been there, he thought matters might have
shaped themselves differently.

In explanation of the German foreign policy and of the difficulties which
she has finally found herself, he said it was thought wise to balance Great
Britain and Russia against one another. The German Foreign Office had not be-
lieved since Bismarck's time that Great Britain and Russia could ever be brought
into an active alliance, and it was to Germany's advantage to keep them apart, and
not link up with either the one or the other.

As to the war, he believes von Hindenburg may even yet stem the tide in
Southeastern Europe, and when winter closes in, there may be a deadlock. He
thought it was clearly to the interests of the United States that there should be
a deadlock between the belligerents. I doubted whether this country could live
on amicable terms with either the Central Powers or the Entente should one or the
other become entirely triumphant. He shared this opinion.

I told him I had tentacles reaching into each of the belligerent coun-
tries, and that opinion immediately hardened against the United States in Germany
when they were more or less successful, and the same thing happened in the Entente
countries when they were successful. I said I was in Sunapee quietly resting
but I was in close touch with affairs. He smiled and answered, "it is not nec-
essary to tell me that, and the reason I have not communicated with you oftener
during the summer, or have not seen you before, is proof that relations between
our two countries is satisfactory."

Bernstorff is the only one of the Ambassadors among the belligerents
who has retained his equilibrium and has been able to smile upon the present and
philosophize as to the future.

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New York.

September 16, 1916.

I came in from Manchester this morning. The last days at Sunapee were without incident further than the usual telephone calls from Democratic Headquarters, telegrams and correspondence. On the 11th I motored down to Manchester to be with Mona and Randolph for a few days. I saw no one of note there.

I find my desk here piled high with accumulated mail, foreign and domestic. I am getting this out of my way before attempting to get in touch with anyone. I changed my telephone number so no one can reach me until I am ready.

I am endeavoring to keep the diary free from non-essentials and not have to more monotonous than necessary. My life is no less busy than it has been, and the demands upon my time are greater if anything rather than less, but to fill in with such details makes a tiresome story and I shall try to weed out the unimportant.

September 18, 1916.

I have not gotten in touch with the President as yet because of the death of his sister, Mrs. Howe. He goes to South Carolina today for the funeral service and will probably not return until the middle of the week.

Vance McCormick, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Daniel Roper of the Organization Bureau, Hugh Wallace of the Foreign Bureau, were those with whom I conferred.

My foreign letters include one from Viscount Grey, Viscount Bryce, Noel Buxton, A. H. Frazier, Jas. W. Gerard, Lanier Winslow etc.

R. W. Woolley, of the Publicity Bureau, came to discuss his departmental affairs.

Lincoln Steffens called to talk about Mexico. He still believes in Caravanza.

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Ambassador Fletcher also called to say that Argentine was now ready to come into the Pan-American Pact. He wished my advice as to whether to go ahead with them or to wait further upon Brazil and Chile. I advised going ahead. The Chileans know that in order to maintain their place as one of the three great South American powers they will have to acquire more territory, and they are looking toward Peru and Bolivia. They feel that unless they can do it now, or soon, they may be barred, for the reason that Argentine is growing stronger while they are more or less at a standstill because of lack of fertile territory. If they postpone the acquisition of territory ten years longer they will probably be barred forever. It is the old story-- bigness, rather than greatness in other ways, is their ambition.

Fletcher presented me with a copy of the "Statesman's Year-Book" with a very pleasant inscription.

He is hoping when he goes to Mexico as Ambassador, a commission will be formed to take care of the claims against the Mexican Government so that he will not be embarrassed and made *persona non grata* by such work with the Foreign Office. He asked whether in the discussions now going on in New London, the "American claims" should be specified, or whether the word "foreign claims" should be used. I advised the latter because I thought we were morally bound to look after the claims of Europeans as well as our own.

September 19, 1916.

Harry Hawes of St. Louis called and Henry Morganthau came to lunch. I went over the finances of the campaign with Morganthau, looking to see where it might be augmented.

I have a telegram from Walter Page urging me to see him here on Sunday. I am told he is pretty well disgruntled. He has been unable to have a private talk with the President, although he has been in America now for more

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than a month. I think the President is wrong in not seeing Page for he
should get his point of view, contrary to his own though it may be.

September 20, 1916.

This has been an interesting day. Frederick Dixon, of the Christian
Science Monitor, called at the instance of the British Ambassador to acquaint
me with the feeling in Great Britain and France regarding the retaliatory mea-
sures passed by the last Congress. Dixon believes the tension is greater
than we realize. He had long talks, when he was in England, with both Grey
and Cecil and while Grey was moderate as usual, Cecil said if we attempted to
put such measures into effect, it would probably mean breaking off diplomatic
relations and the withdrawing of all trade. That, I look upon in the nature
of a bluff.

Captain Gaunt wished to see me about the same matter but he was much
milder in his talk. They both sent cables to Grey telling of their con-
versations with me and of my promise to try and iron matters out.

Shadow Lawn,
Long Branch, N. J.

September 23, 1916.

Every waking hour of the past two days have been occupied with campaign
matters.

I motored down to Shadow Lawn reaching here in time for lunch. I
found Walter Page also lunching with the President. The conversation was
general and unimportant during the meal and Page left for Washington shortly
afterward.

The President came upstairs to my room and we went over the speech
he made this afternoon concerning the eight hour law. He was inclined to
treat the subject lightly, but I emphasized the importance of it. He seems

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to think the American public can easily go into the philosophy of government and understand the moral questions involved. If he would look into the faces of the ordinary person he meets, it seems to me he would know that such questions are over their heads. I told him that while the logic of the situation was with us, the vote would certainly not be unless the drift which had set in against us because of the eight hour law, was stopped.

The President does not realize that Tumulty has not made him friends with the Catholics and has driven away a large Protestant vote. He does not realize the prejudice against Secretary Daniels, neither does he realize that Comptroller Williams, while right in most of the actions he has taken, has done them in a way to irritate the entire banking fraternity and their satellites. I have tried to get the President to see that it was the small things we had to look out for as well as the larger ones, but he has such confidence in the intelligence and discrimination of the people that he never feels it necessary to unduly exert himself to make his position clear.

He made a good speech, but it did not satisfy Jacob Shiff and some of the other business men who heard it. I mingled in the audience after the speech and tried to get the reflex opinion.

The Attorney General was with us at dinner. He came as the guest of Dr. and Mrs. Grayson, but they were not prepared to put him up for the night so the President invited him to stay at Shadow Lawn. The evening was largely spent discussing pending political questions, the eight hour law being one.

September 24, 1916.

Gregory left early to play golf and returned to New York in the afternoon. The President came to my sitting room in the morning and we spent several hours going over foreign affairs, principally our differences with

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Great Britain. Page had left a mass of memoranda which the President read aloud. I also gave him my last letters from Sir Edward Grey, Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton and others. It was my opinion that the real difference with Great Britain now was that the United States had undertaken to build a great navy; that our commerce was expanding beyond all belief, and we were rapidly taking the position Germany occupied before the war. No one in England would probably admit that the things I mentioned were causing the growing irritation against us, but it was a fact nevertheless. The President replied: "Let us build a navy bigger than her's and do what we please": I reminded him that Germany had undertaken to do that and Great Britain had checked her before she could accomplish her purpose, and in the Spring of 1914 I had predicted that she would. I thought it unlikely the British would be willing to permit us to build a navy equal to theirs if they could prevent it. I thought their alliance with France, Russia, Italy and Japan made them a formidable antagonist, provided the Allies won. We came to no conclusion for lunch was served and the conversation was discontinued.

There was no one for lunch other than myself and after lunch we motored for something like sixty miles. There was no conversation of note during the ride.

There were no guests for dinner, and after we had finished the President read Matthew Arnold's "The Future". He also read Browning's poem about the Arab physician who visited Palestine during the time of Christ. I do not recall the title of it. I asked if he thought Christ's teachings had made much progress in the nearly two thousand years since his death. He said it was not that it had made much progress, but rather that it had acted as a moral balance to us. He thought we knew what was wrong even though we did wrong, and our conscience held us in check. I thought that unselfishness

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and humility should be taught our youth for they seemed to me to be the es-
sentials of the Christian religion. He concurred in this, and asked if I
had read an essay of his touching upon this subject. I had not and he told
something of its contents.

At half past nine o'clock we began to discuss the political situation.
I outlined it as accurately as I could and gave him my point of view. It was
not encouraging and made him feel the necessity of arousing himself to action.
I thought the campaign was being managed in a mechanical way as well as it
could be with the amount of money we had in sight, and the limited amount of
time one necessarily had in organizing a great political fight. He was sur-
prised to find the precision with which we were organizing, and how accurately
we knew conditions in the doubtful states.

I spoke to the President about bringing Ambassador Gerard home for
a time in pursuance of the German Ambassador's suggestion. The President had
written Secretary Lansing that he did not consider it wise to bring Gerard
home, but in a few minutes I talked him out of this attitude and he consented
to have the State Department cable him to come. The letters I shall write
tomorrow to Lansing and Polk will explain further.

New York,
September 25, 1916.

We arose early this morning. The President and Mrs. Wilson
went to Baltimore where the President is to make a speech and I motored to
New York.

Walter Page called this afternoon and we had a two hour conference. I
cannot see that his frame of mind has altered. He is as pro-British as ever,
and cannot see the American point of view. He hit Lansing wherever he could,
but expressed profound regard for the President, a feeling I am afraid he ex-

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aggerates. He complained that Lansing discusses matters with the British Ambassador without informing him. At the same time he told me with some satisfaction that Lansing said the British Ambassador was totally unfit for his duties, and should be replaced by someone with a more equable temperament and one who had a better understanding of the situation. Page does not know that Lansing's opinion of the British Ambassador is perhaps a shade higher than his opinion of Page himself.

He said the British resent our trying to bring about peace; they thought my visits to Europe were for that purpose and that I was sent abroad as the special emissary of the President in order to find some crévice in the armor where we might make an entering wedge toward peace. I did not think this was an ignoble effort as it seemed to Page. He declares none of us understand the situation or the high purposes of the British in this war. I replied that we resented some of the cant and hypocrisy indulged in by the British, for instance, as to Belgium. Page admitted that the British would have been found fighting with France even if France had violated Belgium in order to reach German territory more effectively.

I asked Page if he thought the irritation apparent in Great Britain had increased because of naval program, and whether we were not getting in the same position, from the British viewpoint, as Germany. I spoke of the traditional friendship between Germany and Great Britain which existed until Germany began to cut into British trade and to plan a navy large enough to become formidable, and I wondered whether they did not see us as a similar menace both as to their trade and supremacy of the seas.

Page thought not, and yet he said Great Britain would never allow us to have a navy equal or superior to theirs. If we built, they would build more, although they would do it in a friendly spirit.

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Page thought good relations might have been brought about with Great Britain had we acted differently. This irritated me, and I told of the number of ways in which the United States had shown friendship and partiality for the Allies only to find our relations worse now than at the beginning of the war. I ventured the opinion if we sent Bernstorff home, and entered the war, we would be applauded for a few weeks and then they would demand money. If the money was forthcoming they would be satisfied for a period, but later would demand an unlimited number of men. If we did it all, they would finally accuse us of trying to force them to give better peace terms to Germany than was warranted.

Page desires the President to say that he does not intend to use the reprisal act. I did not believe he would use it unless compelled to do so.

September 30, 1916.

I went to the boat to see Page off this morning. There was no one else there as far as I could see excepting members of the family. I am glad I went as Mrs. Page and the others seemed to appreciate it. Page urged me to use my influence with the President and the State Department to keep them from using retaliatory measures. In the event they use the measure, he asked me to have a despatch sent him at least a week in advance, in order that he might take some action.

I am not altogether certain why he requested this.

He asked me if I had not written him more frequently, and I replied it was because he had not written me.

Wilbur Marsh, Treasurer of the National Committee, went down to the dock with me, in order to have a talk about campaign matters going and coming. I seldom have a chance to ride or walk alone these busy days.

Vance McCormick came to lunch and later Morganthau and Tom Chadbourne

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joined us, and we discussed different phases of the campaign. We are dis-
trustful of Tammany and it is a question whether to read the riot act now
or wait a little longer to see whether they intend to "throw us". I hate to
deal with them, and never do except through third parties.

I edited Dr. Axson's article on the President, cutting out what the
newspaper boys term "sob stuff". It was too intimate and I was afraid the
President would not like it.

I have a letter from the President asking about Indiana. McAdoo is
advising him to do something about which he is in doubt, and he wished infor-
mation so as to know how to act.

October 1, 1916.

Billy Phillips came this morning to go over some foreign appointments.
Van Dyke has resigned from the post at the Hague, Thad Thomson plans to resign
from Bogota, and the post at Siam is vacant. My letter to the President in-
dicates our views.

Phillips expressed much concern over our strained relations with Great
Britain which are growing worse rather than better. He attributes it to the
two Ambassadors, Page and Spring-Rice. Of the two, Spring-Rice is more to
blame, because Page is <u>persona grata</u> in London and creates no irritation
since he wholly agrees with the British point of view. Spring-Rice, on the
other hand, irritates and is himself irritable. Phillips thinks Spring-Rice
constantly sends word to London leading them to believe we are anxious to have
a row with them.

Miss Denton suggests we send unofficial word to Viscount Grey that
Spring-Rice needs a vacation because of his nervous condition, just as Berlin
has sent us word about Gerard. I shall take this up with Polk tonight for
the suggestions seems a good one. It is more a question of how we can apply
it. I could convey the information to Grey, but I should very much prefer

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not doing so, and for the same reason I thought it wise not to intimate to
Grey last winter that Spring-Rice's recall would be gratifying to the Govern-
ment at Washington. Both the President and Secretary of State authorized
me to do this, but Lord Bryce, to whom I talked freely about the matter, ad-
vised against my doing so believing it would lessen my influence in England.

Fletcher called to report on the Pan-American Peace Pact. He did not go further with Ambassador Naon, who is willing to sign for Argentine, because Lansing had promised Dr. Muller, Brazilian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that he would not move actively in the matter until the 15th of November which would give Muller time to return to Brazil and ascertain the will of his Government. Muller has been in the United States for the past six months—weeks at a health resort.

Fletcher thinks in view of the trade agreement the Allies recently promulgated at Paris, we should have some understanding with the South American Republics regarding trade, particularly with the A. B. C. powers. His idea is that we could at least determine to keep our trade relations as now, despite any foreign influence. The suggestion seemed to me good, and I asked him to go ahead with it and see what could be done.

October 2, 1916.

Frank Polk remained with me last night until twelve o'clock. We went over every phase of the European situation particularly our relations with Great Britain. Polk gave some information concerning George Harvey and his connection with William C. Whitney and Thos. F. Ryan. It seems that Polk had a client who occupied some such position with Ryan and Whitney as Harvey, and he knew the character of work Harvey did for them. It lowered the already low estimate I have of Harvey.

Ambassador Spring-Rice and Captain Gaunt took lunch with me. Sir Cecil was at his best and no man can be more charming than he. We spent a

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delightful two hours together and ironed out several matters of an irritating nature. I telephoned Polk at Washington and asked him about one matter in controversy and received an explanation which was entirely satisfactory to the Ambassador. When Polk began to explain, what he said was so lucid that I turned the receiver toward Sir Cecil so that he might hear just what Polk was saying.

The Ambassador again referred to the time when I had a paragraph struck out of a note to Great Britain which he said would have caused his Government to break diplomatic relations with us. He seldom sees me that he does not bring this up, and insists upon the great service I did both countries. I cannot agree with him, for it seems to me he exaggerates the discourtesy and importance of the paragraph in question.

In looking at Mrs. Asquith's photograph upon our mantle, he recalled the time in 1914 before the war when he and I lunched with the Asquiths. He said he had never felt greater humiliation and had determined never again to accept an invitation from them. He said, "of course you noticed it". I would not admit anything, and he said "of course you would not". As a matter of fact, I cannot recall what happened to offend him. I remember that he sat on one side of Mrs. Asquith and I on the other, and that there was rather a large gathering and after lunch Mr. Asquith talked exclusively to me. This may be what he referred to, or Mrs. Asquith may have said something indiscreet which seemed to him offensive. I have come to like Mrs. Asquith and do not mind the freedom with which she talks even when it is directed, as it oftentimes is, against those I admire.

The Ambassador and I arranged to keep in closer touch, and he asked if he might let me know in advance when he saw breakers ahead so I might take a hand in averting trouble. We parted in great good humor as we always do when

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he is in an amiable mood.

During the past twenty-four hours I have had many interesting and dis-
tinguished callers, and it is curious that I should regard "Packey McCabe"
who followed the British Ambassador, the most interesting of the all. I ex-
pected the usual type of Irish American politician and in this I was not dis-
appointed. However, he is so clever, so frank that it was delightful to hear
him review the political figures now on the boards. He gave a clear-cut
character sketch of Murphy which will be of value in any future dealings I
may indirectly have with the Tammany organization. I asked McCabe's advice
as to the best method of procedure at this time, and he gave it in a way that
left no doubt in my mind that he was advising wisely.

Mr. Peabody of Chicago, and Hurley, Chairman of the Federal Trades Com-
mission, followed McCabe. They desired to discuss the raising of campaign
funds, and wished me to favor certain plans for collections which Peabody had
in mind. I listened but did not indicate my views. It is a necessary feature
of political campaigns which I detest and always "side-step": I have never in
my life asked a man for a dollar for political purposes, and I do not intend to
begin at this late day.

Henry Ford took dinner with us. I had him alone for it was my purpose
to get him enthused over the President and his work both at home and abroad.
As I said after a former interview with Ford, I found him crude, ignorant and
with very little general information. He cannot discuss foreign affairs be-
cause he knows so little about them. He knows even less about politics and
the only safe ground was practical mechanics and farming. I think he is an
idealist and has many fine qualities. Just how he has succeeded in amassing
so large a fortune is something of a mystery to me. He is wiry and nervous
and has so little composure that one sympathizes with him. I found no note

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of egotism in him, and I believe if I saw more of him I might derive some pleasure from his company.

I asked if it was true that the Ford Company originated the Ford jokes. I had been told the company gave prizes for the best, and that it was indirectly through them that the Ford Joke Book had been published. He denied this and said he had no idea how the stories started, but perhaps they originated among his workmen. He said he never originated one himself, and I am ready to accept this as true, for he seems totally without humor.

Edward S. Martin came in before Ford left and was delighted to have some talk with him. At nine o'clock Gordon came to take Ford away for I had an intuition that I would have entirely finished by then.

October 3, 1916.

Mrs. J. Borden Harriman called to tell of her woes at Newport this summer caused by her championship of the President. She says there were not a half dozen Wilson supporters there. She made a wager with Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt that Jas. W. Gerard would not be made Secretary of State in the event the President was re-elected. Mrs. Vanderbilt said she knew of an understanding between the Kaiser and the President by which this Government is to favor Germany and Gerard as Secretary of State is to carry out the agreement. To such levels does the campaign descend.

I was pleased to hear that Lloyd Griscom had defended the President in general and me in particular. It confirms my opinion of him, and is in sharp contrast to Chandler Anderson to whom this administration has extended many courtesies.

Every day now is a strain from morning until late bedtime. A constant stream of callers and the telephone ringing almost continuously.

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in
The German Ambassador came at twelve o'clock. He had nothing particular
on his mind. He smiled and said, "I see Mr. Gerard is coming home." I
replied that there had never been any question about his coming since his
(Bernstorff's)
visit to me at Sunapee, but the President thought, until I convinced him to
the contrary, he should not come until after the election.

Bernstorff asked if we thought there was any possibility of peace dis-
cussions before the election. I explained again why this was impossible. He
said he was instructed by his Government not to make any request in regard to
it, but to merely find out the *status quo* and to assume the attitude that Ger-
many would consider such a move favorably. Bernstorff candidly tells me
the instructions he receives and how far he is to go, and then explains their
real thoughts and purposes of his Government. Long acquaintanceship has
made him feel confident that anything he reposes in me is safe.

He has an engagement with the President at Shadow Lawn on Monday in
order to give the German answer to the Polish Relief question. He goes in
person, because, as he smilingly admitted, "the British Ambassador thought
best to present their side in that way".

He was happy over the partial defeat of the Roumanians yesterday.
He thought this would satisfy sentiment in Germany for the moment regarding
submarine warfare, which he hoped would not be resumed and which any victory
for German arms made less likely.

I told him I had no intention of going abroad soon. He expressed regret
saying he always felt my visits tended to further good relations. He spoke
of the personnel of the State Department, saying Lansing was cold but that Polk
and Phillips were charming.

We touched upon the very delicate question of the election. He asked
how things were going with us. I told him well and that it would not surprise

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me if the President was overwhelmingly re-elected. He laughed and said it was utterly impossible to influence in any way the rabid German-vote; that they were more pro-German than the Germans themselves. He said to argue with them was futile; they had conceived the idea that the President had branded them as disloyal, and they would take their revenge by voting for Hughes. Bernstorff said many traps were laid for him to express himself about the election, but he never mentioned the subject to any human being excepting to me. I replied that nearly all the Germans were republicans anyway, and their vote against the President gave us no concern.

He said the Postmaster General thought he was succeeding in making some converts among the German voters and then he laughed.

The Postmaster General came to lunch and we went over pending matters. October
He tells me McAdoo is very much disturbed because he is being kept out of New
York and he resents not being allowed to speak here. I am sorry, but the
fault is wholly his. I have warned him for two years or more that he was
pursuing the wrong course in New York, and as he has sown so must he reap.

Mrs. Charles Dana Gibson, Chairman of the Eastern Women's League, called, and so did George Eustis and Dudley Malone.

October 4, 1916.

Vance McCormick was my most important visitor. We discussed different phases of the campaign. Malone followed and gave an outline of speeches he is to make.

October 5, 1916.

Carter Glass, Charles Burlingham and Edward S. Martin took lunch with me.

McAdoo telephoned from Washington to complain of his treatment about speaking. I tried to placate him. He is coming over Monday to register

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and I shall arrange to see him.

Secretary Baker called and we discussed army matters and the campaign. He has been badly misplaced as a campaign speaker and I am arranging a better itinerary for him. I am impressed by Baker's earnest desire that the army be kept out of politics. There have been one or two matters placed before him which I am glad he has turned down, for the reason they smacked of politics. I thoroughly agree with his attitude and congratulated him upon his firmness in this direction.

October 7, 1916.

The New York Evening Post sent a representative to talk to me about peace moves. I declined to be quoted directly, but they wrote a long article which so directly pointed to me that they might as well have used my name.

R. W. Woolley rang up while we were at dinner and said it was important for him to see me at once. He sat with us through dinner and told his tale of woe. It seems the Texas Finance Committee have issued a circular requesting funds from Federal office holders, and in such an offensive way that immediate notice must be taken of it. Woolley could not get in touch with McCormick and he wished my authority for issuing a statement in the name of both the President and McCormick repudiating such methods of raising campaign funds. The Texas Committee is composed wholly of former Bailey partisans, and whether they did it to embarrass us or whether they believe such means of raising funds is justified, we do not know. Anyway, the statement we made covers it and shows our attitude.

Later McCormick telephoned having heard that a statement had been given out to which his name was signed. He was somewhat disturbed that he was not consulted before his name or that of the President was signed. I expressed my willingness to assume all responsibility for the statement, as far as the President was concerned.

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October 8, 1916.

We motored to Farmingdale to lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Sumner Gerard and to talk over matters having to do with his brother's return. I suggested that he write out what his brother should say upon landing and send it to me tomorrow for my approval. I feel so entirely responsible for Gerard's coming at this time that I do not want him to say anything which will cause trouble.

It was necessary for me to return to New York at half past four in order to meet Paul Warburg. He seemed glad to be able to talk with me for once about something other than the Federal Reserve Board troubles. He believes we should move for peace before the election. I made it clear that this was impossible because it would be construed as an electioneering move. I talked along the lines I did to Bernstorff, showing if the President was not re-elected no peace move could be made by Hughes before Autumn of next year. This brought forth a wish for the President's re-election and a firm belief that he would be successful. He thought I should go to Europe before the election, no matter what criticism it brought forth. I explained how impossible it was for me to leave the campaign at this critical time. My interest, I said, was wholly in international affairs, but they depended upon the President's re-election, therefore I was giving my time almost entirely to the campaign.

I called attention to the kind of men who would probably advise Hughes regarding an international settlement, and thought that Root, Lodge and Roosevelt would necessarily be to the fore. He deplored this as warmly as I thought he would, and hoped such matters would continue to be in my hands. He spoke of the confidence the belligerents had in me, especially the English and Germans.

I met McAdoo at eight o'clock and we went to the Strand Theater to see the film of the President and his Cabinet to which we had been specially invited. Some of our Campaign Committee were there and my entire time was tak-

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en up with conferences, both in and out of the theater, so I saw little of what
was passing on the stage.

Huston Thompson had come from Washington at my suggestion to help at Head-
quarters, and I was giving him advice as to what he should do. Norman Hapgood
desired to submit a speech he intends making tomorrow and which contains matter
relating to Catholics and to three Congressmen who are financing the Catholic
movement against the President. I suggested that he get the names of the Con-
gressmen and use them in his speech. This, I told him, would give the necessary
punch to carry wide publicity.

I had very little conversation with McAdoo which pleased me for I did
not wish to go into his troubles.

October 9, 1916.

Harris, Chairman of the State Executive Committee, came at half-past ten o'clock to give me a summary of conditions and to report generally. Roper and I afterward went over his latest poll which shows a sharp curve upward in our favor.

Captain Gaunt came at four o'clock. I have never seen him quite so perturbed. The sinking of six vessels by U-53, just off our coast, was a little too much for even his staunch nerves. I counseled calmness until we could see where we stood. I am always afraid someone will precipitate trouble when a moment's quiet will carry one over a crisis.

Sheppard, of the United Press, followed Gaunt. He has just returned from
Germany and knows conditions there fairly well. I outlined the situation as I
saw it to aid his association in the distribution of news.

Dudley Malone came at five to report on his trip to Shadow Lawn.

Roper came again at six to give final figures which I later sent the President.