PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 34

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

11:34 A.M. EDT

OCTOBER 3, 1973

WEDNESDAY

In the Briefing Room
At the White House
Washington, D.C.

THE PRESIDENT: Won't you be seated, ladies and gentlemen. I guess I should say all those who can find seats.

Dr. Kissinger, as you know, from an announcement that I understand went out about 30 minutes ago from Peking, will visit Peking on October 26th to 29th. This is part of the continuing dialogue between the People's Republic of China and the United States which began with my visit to China last year.

The subjects that will be discussed include those that have been discussed on previous occasions, trade, for example, where, it is interesting to note, that the amount of bilateral trade between the two countries, which was approximately $6 million in 1971, will be an estimated $800 million in 1973. Scientific and cultural exchanges will be a major subject of discussion and, of course, other matters of mutual concern to the two nations.

In addition, Dr. Kissinger has been invited by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Oaira, to stop in Japan on his visit to the Far East. He will do so. The timing of that visit, however, has not yet been agreed upon and will be announced as soon as we hear from the Japanese.

Incidentally, I learned that 12 to 15 members of the press will be invited, if they desire to go, to go on the trip with the Secretary of State, and if you would put in your applications at the State Department, in this instance, I think that they will be honored in the order in which they are received.

Now, I will be glad to take question on other subjects, since I understand Mr. Warren has been rather busy with the briefings lately.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, would you tell us why you sent Bryce Harlow out to Arizona last month just after the Vice President and Mr. Goldwater conferred?

THE PRESIDENT: I didn't send him to Arizona, as far as I know. I think he went to Oklahoma.

QUESTION: He was reported to have gone to Phoenix.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he might have. He might have. I think that what had happened was that Senator Goldwater had indicated an interest in the status of the situation with regard to the Vice President's case and Mr. Harlow, being somewhat familiar with that matter, was the best man to provide that information for him.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think that the Vice President should resign if he is indicted?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Vice President has addressed that question and his answer is an altogether proper one. The Vice President is in a different position, for example, than a member of the President's Cabinet or a member of his staff. I have indicated that if a member of the President's Cabinet or his staff is indicted, he would have to resign pending the outcome of the trial.

However, the Vice President, like the President, is elected by all the people. He holds that office in his own right and the decision as to whether he should resign is for him to make. He has indicated that he will not resign if indicated and therefore, that decision on his part should be respected.

QUESTION: Mr. President, have you ever asked for him to consider resigning?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I have not. I have noted the lively discussion about resignation here in the press room and I understand that. But let me say that in all the conversations I have had with the Vice President, I have never asked him to resign. I have always told him and he understands this position, that this matter is one for him to decide.

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I would say further that as far as our discussions are concerned, they are privileged and I will not go further than to say that we both agreed that we could make public the fact that the charges that have been made against him and which he has denied publicly, he has denied to me privately on three occasions.

QUESTION: Mr. President, at your last press conference you said that some of the government work done at San Clemente had diminished the value of the property for use as a home. I would like to ask about two items that are in the GSA reports on it.

First, do you think that the $13,500 electrical heating system that was installed diminished its value. And Second, do you think when the GSA hired a local landscape architect to redesign the flower beds on the west side of the residence four times a year, that they were spending the taxpayer's money wisely?

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I can plow that ground again, I guess. If any of you have lived in California, you will know that gas heat costs less than electric heat. I preferred it first, gas heat. For security reasons, apparently, they decided it presented a fire hazard which could not be tolerated. And so that decision was made.

With regard to the other matters that have been brought up, I think full statements have been made over and over again on this, and I really think anything I would say in answer to your question, in view of the way you have already presented it as a statement, would not convince you or anybody else.

QUESTION: Mr. President, may I ask you two questions in one, because both relate to --

THE PRESIDENT: You are like Mr. Mollenhoff. You can ask three if you like.

QUESTION: I will just ask a double-header, all right? Both are related to unfilled jobs. That is why I am putting them together.

We have not had an Ambassador in the Soviet Union now for going on to nine months, and the Chairman of your Commission on Civil Rights, that job has been unfilled about eight or nine months. What are your plans on that?

THE PRESIDENT: The Ambassador to the Soviet Union is a very important post and, as a matter of fact, I discussed that with Dr. Kissinger just yesterday. I think we will have an announcement on it within the next two or three weeks.

With regard to the other position, that is one also that we consider to be very important and it is at present being considered within the Domestic Council. I am sure a recommendation will be made to me soon and we will try to fill it.

The main thing about these appointments, as I am sure you all know, is to get the right person, man or woman, for the job rather than to do it in too much of a hurry.

QUESTION: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Beckman.

QUESTION: Mr. President, can you tell us whether you will actively oppose Senator Percy's efforts to win the 1976 Republican nomination, and if you will not, can you tell us what has changed since February when you suggested that you might?

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have noted, particularly in the Chicago papers, not only the Tribune, but the Sun Times and the News -- and is there another one there, too?

QUESTION: Today?

THE PRESIDENT: Today, that there has been much speculation about my meeting with Senator Percy. It was a very candid discussion. I did say at one point, due to a misunderstanding, that I thought that Senator Percy should not be a candidate in 1976 and as I told him when we met, that statement was made because I had understood that he had opposed Elliot Richardson for Attorney General right after I had announced that I was sending his name to the Senate, which I thought was a highly irresponsible thing to do, in view of the fact that both Elliot Richardson and Senator Percy are in what we call the more liberal wing of the Republican Party.

Senator Percy, however, later explained that his resolution in that respect that would have affected Elliot Richardson had been misinterpreted, that he had actually introduced it prior to the time that I made my announcement.

Now, so much for the statement that was made in February. Second, to put it all in perspective, whether it is Senator Percy on the one side, or one of several Governors or former Governors who might be a candidate, the Mayor of Indianapolis, or a number of Senators, and one or two House Members, all of them have a right to seek the Presidency if they so desire.

As far as I am concerned, I will make no decision with regard to supporting or opposing any one of these candidates until they have been tried in the field of battle. I think that we learned in the year 1972 that when an individual moves from the Senate -- and I am referring now to the primaries -- to the big leagues, or when he moves from the Governorship to the big leagues, and we learned this in other years, that sometimes he can't hit the big league pitching. And I would like to see how these various potential candidates handle themselves in the primaries before making any decision with regard to who should be the candidate.

I am not saying now incidentally, categorically that I will endorse a candidate before the Convention. I reserve the right to make that decision at a later time. But certainly, I would say finally, that Senator Percy has been a vigorous campaigner for the Senate, an articulate spokesman, not always on the side of the Administration, but I respect differences of opinion, and he has every right to seek the Presidency. He will not be opposed at this time and should he prove to be the strongest candidate, he will not be opposed, certainly if he receives the nomination. I will support whoever receives that nomination.

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QUESTION: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Jarriel.

Go ahead. I am sorry.

QUESTION: Mr. Risher.

THE PRESIDENT: Gene Risher. You look like Jarriel though. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: You don't get paid as much as he does though. (Laughter)

QUESTION: I know. (Laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: UPI please notice -- a raise in salary.

QUESTION: Could you tell us, Mr. President, if you have done any contingency planning about a possible Vice President in the event that Vice President Agnew leaves office for any reason?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Risher, certainly not. It would be highly inappropriate to have any contingency planning with regard to what should happen if the Vice President leaves office.

As far as the Vice President is concerned, I have said in my statement of the 25th of September that he has denied the charges that have been made against him, that he is entitled to the presumption of innocence, which is the right of every American citizen and I urge all of my fellow Americans to give him that presumption of innocence, as I certainly do, and particularly that presumption of innocence, I think, should be underlined in view of his years of distinguished service as Vice President; having in mind, too, the fact that the charges that have been made against him do not relate in any way to his activities as Vice President of the United States.

I would say further in that respect that I would hope that in this rather white hot atmosphere, which I understand has developed since the Vice President's case came to public attention, that he will not be tried and convicted in the press and on television by leaks and innuendos and the rest. There is nothing really that is more harmful to the rights of an individual than to be tried and convicted in the press before he has an opportunity to present his case and I would urge all of you ladies and gentlemen, because I know you want to be responsible in this respect, to make your statements on the basis of all the evidence, not on the basis --

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QUESTION: Mr. President --

THE PRESIDENT: Let me finish.

-- make your statement on the basis of all the evidence and not simply on the basis of an unilateral charge that is made, not under oath --

QUESTION: Mr. President --

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mollenhoff, yes, you.

QUESTION: -- on that particular point, you have been briefed in some detail on the evidence in the Agnew problem. You are also a lawyer with some expertise. You could tell us --

THE PRESIDENT: Some would question that.

QUESTION: -- whether there is any substance to Mr. Agnew's charges that this is a frivolous investigation, that it is a frame-up, and that it is in fact a smear.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Mollenhoff, when you say that I have been briefed on the charges, I should respond to that by saying that I have not heard the witnesses. I have only been briefed on what it is believed the witnesses might testify to.

As far as the charges are concerned, they are serious and not frivolous. The Vice President's complaint, as you know, is that the leaks that have come out on this particular matter have convicted him in advance and it is that particular point that concerns him and it concerns me as well.

As a matter of fact, in the strongest terms I have spoken to the Attorney General about this matter. He shares my view. He has taken personal charge of the investigation with regard to leaks, and, incidentally, he has assured me, Mr. Mollenhoff, that the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Petersen, who, as you recall, I praised rather highly in my 22nd of August press conference in San Clemente, was in no way -- neither he nor members of his office in the Justice Department -- involved in the leaks involving the Vice President.

QUESTION: Mr. President, if I may follow up, please.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may follow up.

QUESTION: Thank you.

In view of that remark, do you then still support Mr. Petersen's handling of the investigation?

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THE PRESIDENT: If I did not support Mr. Petersen's handling of the investigation, he would have been removed at this time. But it would be a disservice to an individual who has served both Administrations with distinction for many, many years, to remove him from handling the investigation unless there was clear evidence that he had been guilty of an indiscretion and I have taken this matter up quite directly with the Attorney General.

The Attorney General assures me that his investigation -- his, the Attorney General's investigation -- indicates that Mr. Petersen has handled this investigation without prejudice in advance and without, of course, engaging in what, in my view, is the totally inexcusable and inappropriate conduct of leaking information on a Grand Jury investigation.

QUESTION: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Theis.

QUESTION: In view of your sidewalk remark the other night about travel plans, can you pinpoint for us any better your timing of your trip to Europe?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Theis, it is difficult to pinpoint the timing of a trip to Europe, but in order that all of you can make your plans a little better, the trip to Europe will be made within the next few months and the timing will be based on these factors: First, the progress which is made on the discussions now going on with regard to a declaration of principles with regard to the Alliance, and with regard to economic matters as well.

The latter, as you know, I discussed with Mr. Ortolani when he was here. That progress is going on, incidentally, well ahead of schedule according to Dr. Kissinger. As soon as those preliminary negotiations are completed and as soon as it is clear on both sides of the Atlantic that this will be a trip not for protocol purposes, but one that will have real substance in it, then we will work out a date.

Now the second factor, however, which enters into this is the Congressional schedule. I cannot take a trip to Europe or any place else at a time when there are matters before the Congress of very great significance. That is why I cannot pinpoint this in terms of saying that just as soon as the Europeans are ready we will go.

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If the Europeans are ready at a time that we have
a heavy calendar in Congress, I shall have to postpone the
trip until after that.

But I would say I am thinking in terms of the next
three or four months, but it might be sooner than that;
probably not much later.

Now, with regard to Japan, I agreed with Mr.
Tanaka, when he was here, that I would visit Japan before
the end of 1974. We will, of course, make those plans
again consistent with our developments on the bilateral
side and at a time when we think that there is a matter of
substance to be discussed or matters of substance to be
discussed and at a time which is consistent with my responsi-
bilities on the domestic front.

QUESTION: Could I ask, Mr. President --

THE PRESIDENT: This lady is --

THE PRESIDENT: You don't mind a lady going ahead of
you, do you?

QUESTION: No, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

Do you have any comment to make on the Austrian
decision to close the Russian emigrant facilities?

THE PRESIDENT: Excuse me.

QUESTION: The Austrian decision to close the
Russian emigrant facilities.

THE PRESIDENT: I heard your question, but I
wanted the radio to hear it, too.

QUESTION: Oh, thank you.

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have. The Austrians are in a very difficult position here. As you know, I stopped in Austria on my way to Moscow and for the first time -- no, the second time, met the Prime Minister, Mr. Kreisky, and anybody who knows his background knows that he is certainly not anti-Semitic, but Austria is in the eye of a hurricane and Austria, therefore being a relatively small country and relatively weak, militarily, et cetera, is making a very, what I am sure for Mr. Kreisky, painful decision in this respect.

I recall, for example, that at the time of the Hungarian revolution, Austria opened its arms very generously to thousands of refugees and I know that is the Austrian tradition and custom. I would hope -- and I would express this -- I would hope that the Prime Minister would reconsider his decision -- even though I know he has even lately reiterated it -- reconsider it for this fundamental reason that goes far beyond his country and even ours, and that is that we simply cannot have governments, small or large, give in to international blackmail by terrorist groups. That is what is involved.

Not to mention, of course, the fact that we all have a concern for the emigres. They must have a place to come. So, on humanitarian grounds and on geopolitical grounds of the highest order, I believe that decision should be reconsidered, but naturally, I am not going to put my friend, Mr. Kreisky, in the position of trying to dictate to him what it should be.

Now, you go ahead.

QUESTION: Sir, there is at least the possibility that if you don't give up the Watergate case, some of the cases or potential cases against your former aides might be aborted. I wonder if you are concerned about this, and further, whether you might see some room for compromise in the Appellate Court suggestion?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, since the Appellate Court is still considering the matter, it would be inappropriate for me to talk about what should be done with regard to compromise. As you know, discussions, extended discussions, took place between Mr. Buzhardt and the Special Prosecutor in this respect, and they agreed to disagree.

As far as the tapes are concerned, I have stated my position, and I restate it again today. The position is that the confidentiality of Presidential discussions must be maintained and whether it is a Presidential paper, a memorandum of conversation prepared by a member of his staff after meeting with the President, or whether it is a tape of a conversation, it is the responsibility of the President with regard to the separation of powers principle, to defend the integrity of those conversations so that Presidents in the future will be able to conduct free-wheeling, extended conversations with no holds barred with foreign advisors and, of course, with those who come to see him from the United States.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, do you agree with the proposition put forth by your CEA nominee, Mr. Fellner, that the country will have to abandon its goal of four percent unemployment and move to five percent, or perhaps higher, to fight inflation?

THE PRESIDENT: I noticed Mr. Fellner's rather, shall we say, outspoken comments, and also his comments with regard to Phase IV where he said he thought we should apparently -- at least the press indicated that he thought we should junk Phase IV pretty soon, or sooner than we certainly intend to do so.

Before answering that question, let me say that I have found that economists are the most independent breed of human species, except for members of the press. (Laughter) And the reason for that is that the American economy is highly unpredictable. It is a free economy.

I have found that my economic advisers are not always right, but they are always sure in everything they recommend. (Laughter)

Now as far as Mr. Fellner is concerned, whether the goal should be four percent or five percent is not really the point. The main thing is to get unemployment down as low as we can.

At the present time this economy is going at full bore ahead -- that is on the plus side -- despite the unacceptable rate of inflation, and unemployment is, we trust, going to either stay where it is or come down.

But I am not going to say that we are going to abandon Phase IV or go to V or go to VI. Our goal is to see that every American who wants to work and who is qualified to work can get a job. That is one that we must never give up on, and the percentages are not the main factor.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, just a point of clarification.

THE PRESIDENT: Sure.

QUESTION: In your discussion of the declaration of principles, there was an intention to include Japan as well as the European communities. Is that still the case or has that been changed?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me explain what we feel now with regard to including Japan.

I have told all of our foreign visitors, Chancellor Brandt, and, of course, Prime Minister Heath, President Pompidou, that it is vitally important that Japan -- which is now the second major economic power in the world, and, of course, in the Pacific, a potential very great force for peace and stability -- that Japan not be out of the club.

Now, they all agree. The difficulty is in writing a declaration with regard to the Atlantic Alliance which fits Japan, the difficulty is, is writing one with regard to the European Economic Community which fits Japan.

So what we are presently thinking of is three declarations, one for the Atlantic Alliance, one for the economic community and then a more general declaration to which the Japanese might be willing to adhere.

Now, I have gone beyond what we have worked out, but that is what we can expect.

Let me say finally, that in that respect, I know that these declarations may not seem too important when we consider the domestic problems that presently obsess us, but it is essential at a time that we are having negotiations with the Soviets and with the People's Republic of China, it is essential that we breathe new life and new purpose and new spirit into the American Atlantic Alliance and into the free world community, which includes Japan, and unless we do so, unless, for example, the Atlantic Alliance speaks to our times rather than to the times 25 years ago, it is going to fragment. Our European friends realize this and I am glad to note that even the economic experts like Ortoli recognize it, too.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

END

(AT 12:00 NOON)

Briefing by Ambassador McCloskey - Sat., Oct 6, 1973, NYC.

I thought you should know the Secretary of State will be returning to Washington early this afternoon. This is the result of the events in the Middle East now that we have a situation in which fighting has broken out. He had planned to be here throughout the weekend.

If I can, I will review for you a little bit of our activities here from very early today. I might better begin by going back a little further than that to say that in the recent period -- and I would have to perhaps over some weeks -- we have had reports that speculated upon a certain military buildup. These were never definitive and they originated from a variety of sources. In our own checking of these reports over this period, all indications were that they were defensive in nature and not subjects that would preage any imminent military action. That was the situation generally until last night when we received a report that gave us the first indication that perhaps there was a little more the possibility of something more than simply defensive.

Then at around six a.m. this morning New York time we received the first confirmed information that clearly indicated imminent military action. The Secretary was immediately in touch with the President in Roy Biscayne. He has been in telephone conversation with the President four or five times since then until now, and the President has instructe the Secretary in the diplomatic action which I will outline for you in a moment.

Our major interest and effort of course in those early hours was to do what could be done to prevent any outbreak of fighting. Regrettably, that did not turn out to be the case, and I must say, going back over the conversations that the Secretary has had here in New York with the Prime Ministers in the last several days, we

never had any indication from any of the Ministers that there was a military action intended by any of the governments. Indeed, the entire emphasis, as I am sure those of you who have followed our activities here, the entire emphasis in the Middle East was one of peaceful intention, one that emphasized the desire certainly shared by us that we hoped that diplomacy would become a little more active in that area and that negotiations for a peaceful settlement might be undertaken. Coming back to this morning, the Secretary, not necessarily in the following order, has been in contact with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel, the Secretary General of the UN, the President of the Security Council, who this month is the Permanent Representative of Australia, Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and messages were sent by the Secretary to King Faisal and King Hussein in their respective capitals. All of the diplomatic steps that the Secretary has undertaken were at the direction of the President and in turn the Secretary has kept the President informed of the substance of the Conversations. All of this has been by telephone. The Secretary has had no direct person-to-person meetings with people whose names - I have no far mentioned.

Anticipating a question on the Security Council and the likelihood of a meeting, as of the time I came down here, there was no decision by anyone that we are aware of requesting a meeting of the Security Council. Obviously, that in the present circumstances cannot be ruled out, and, in summary, our present estimate is a rather obvious one that there is serious fighting under way in the Middle East.

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Perhaps some of the reports may even be ahead of our own information, but that seems eminently clear. Now I will be glad to answer a few brief questions because we are hoping to return to Washington very soon.

Q- (Tape didn't pick up)

A- The Secretary made an effort to reach the Syrian Foreign Minister, and as of the time I came down here he had not succeeded.

Q- Are there any indications any New Yorkers may be trapped in the middle of this?

A- One would have to say that this is a possibility, given the number of Americans from everywhere who this time of year are in the area. Whether in fact they would be where the actual fighting is occurring I think would be terribly hard to say.

Q- (Tape didn't pick up)

A- I wouldn't want to draw any conclusions one way or the other. I tried to outline the chronology of events as we ourselves have reviewed them without making any judgment.

Q- Is the State Department's view that the Arabs initiated the attack?

A- I said that the principal effort throughout the morning was to ascertain the facts, to try to construct the most sensible diplomatic means to bring about a cessation of the fighting, and in light of that effort, which has not been completed, I don't want to draw any judgments.

Q- (Couldn't hear any questions)

A- I just couldn't get into that kind of detail right now. I think that is going to have to wait our return to Washington.

Q- Could you tell us anything about the seriousness of the situation, about how many people are involved?

A- Certainly not with any confidence. There is fighting along both Egyptian and Syrian borders. Our present information indicates

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that it involves both air and land weapons at least. We saw a report earlier in the morning that we do not have any confirmation of that the Israelis have taken action in the Gulf of Suez, but I would have to emphasize here, as we of now we do not have the best communications arrangements that we would like to have in a situation like this, and this is more reason for going back to Washington.

Q. (Question couldn't be heard on tape).

A. No, I don't know the answer to that. I would speculate in that direction.

Q. What will the Secretary be doing when he gets back to Washington?

A. Well, there was to have been -- or whether they have gotten together yet in Washington -- A. WSAG meeting and for those of you in New York not familiar with this acronym -- it is an acronym for Washington Special Action Group. It is an inter-departmental group of senior officials who meet in the White House in times of emergencies where U.S. interests are affected. So one thing could be to ascertain how far that group has gotten with its meeting.

Q. (Couldn't hear question)

A. Our appeal, yes, indeed, in each of these communications it has been to urge restraint, to avoid the undermining -- the violation -- of the permanence of the ceasefire that has been in effect since 1970; to avoid any escalation and any continuation of the fighting. That has been the substance of our contact.

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Q. Do you have any information or indication how these hostilities
were initiated?

A. No, we have not sufficient information to make a judgment
in that regard as of now.

Q. When did the President get his call.

A. Around 6:00 A.M.

Q. Was there any positive response from the Foreign Ministers
saying we will do what we can, or what was the reply?

A. I'd rather leave their replies and their comments to
themselves. They are here available in New York, and leave it to you to
get in touch with them.

Q. Would you say this is in any way another 1967 war?

A. I wouldn't, with any confidence, attempt that broad answer.
It is quite obviously serious in its degree and we will undertake every
effort to see that it is brought to a stop.

Q. When you mentioned build-up of arms did you include Soviet
arms to Syria?

A. I don't want to say yes or no that that, because that is
a highlight on one aspect of a serious of reports that are much broader
in detail than that one point.

Q. Have you been informed of any action in the air.

A. We have had reports that there is action on the ground and
in the air along the Egyptian and Syrian borders with Israel.

Q. Have you any reports of a buildup of Israeli ______?

A. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Q. Does the Secretary have any personal meetings scheduled

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION NEWS BRIEFING

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1973, 5:44 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY: Well, you've seen the announcement from Key Biscayne that the President has directed the Secretary to take the situation in the Middle East, because of the fighting that has continued, to the United Nations and to request a meeting of the Security Council.

Q Are you ON THE RECORD, Bob?

A Yes.

The Secretary has within the last hour on and a half spoken with Ambassador Scali; and Ambassador Scali will be requesting a meeting, probably for tomorrow. He will, in the meanwhile -- and by that I would expect, in part, tonight but also tomorrow morning -- be in consultation with various members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council for this month -- who is the Permanent Representative of Australia -- with a view to proceeding in the most constructive way, as the matter becomes fixed on the agenda of the Security Council.

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I want to emphasize that we have not ourselves formulated a specific draft resolution. We approach the Security Council consideration with a view toward finding the most appropriate means to bring the hostilities in the area to an end.

Our interest, also, is in helping to find the means to restore conditions in the area -- conditions that would be conducive to a settlement of the long-standing disputes and differences in the Middle East.

Now, throughout the day, the Secretary in Washington was in consultation at various times with the President; with Foreign Ministers Eban, and Zayyat; with Ambassadors Cromer of Great Britain, Dobrynin of the Soviet Union; the Secretary-General of the UN; Ambassador Scali; and then members of Congress, including Senators Fulbright and Aiken. And he was attempting to reach Chairman Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee just before I came down.

Now, that's generally the setting in which the day here in the State Department unfolded.

The WSAG meeting that I mentioned to you last night is now to occur at about six o'clock. I would not

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expect to have a briefing following that.

Q Bob --

A Now, I'll try to answer your questions
the best I can.

Q -- moving to the Security Council, today
Foreign Minister Eban said he wanted a return to the
cease-fire lines that existed prior to the recent outbreak
of hostilities. Does the United States support this
Israeli position?

A Well, I took the initiative, in stating
our general objectives, in my opening remarks, in an
effort to have you understand, as clearly as my words
will permit, what our objectives are. They are general
in nature; we do not have a specific resolution that
we are tabling at this time.

Obviously, we will take into consideration,
in the pre-debate period and during the consultation,
the views of the other governments and let that more
educated view, if you like, govern our actions
during the debate in the Security Council.

Q Can I just follow that up?

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Q Bob, just from what you say on that
point, you seem to be suggesting that 242 ought to
be updated.

A No. In fact, I didn't have 242 in mind
at all when I said that.

Q Bob --

A I really do emphasize the general nature
of our approach, with the two objectives I've mentioned:
Find the means to bring the hostilities to an end. At
the same time, seek to find a means that will return some
serenity to the area -- a type of serenity that will make
possible negotiations between and among the parties
toward a settlement.

Q Does the United States think a cease-
fire would do that -- meet those two ends -- an
immediate cease-fire?

A Well, I have said one of the principal
objectives that we have is how to bring the hostilities
to an end. If you use the word formally -- if you
use the word "cease-fire" formally -- obviously you must
consider the means by which that is achieved, and it is whether

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done in a way, or it will be done in a way, that is
acceptable to those engaged in the conflict.

Q Bob, do you have --

A So this is why I didn't use that
particular word.

Yes, sir.

Q If I understand you on the specific
draft resolution for the Security Council, you are
ruling out that we would go into the meeting with
any such proposal; is that correct?

A I do not expect that we will, at the outset
of the meeting, present a draft resolution. But I think
you have to permit me to have my words a little less than
inscribed in stone here, because we are going into a
consultative period that will occupy us this evening and
part of tomorrow morning; and I wanted to put the emphasis
on what our general objectives will be rather than specific
tactics, once the session starts.

Q Bob, I assume from what you're saying that
we have not yet achieved the consensus that you talked
about last night among, at least, the permanent members
of the Security Council; is that correct?

A-6

A Well, there is no consensus that we could point to that would write the script as to how the Security Council session will unfold. That would be correct.

Q Well, in light of that then, has anything changed or why have we decided to go to the Security Council today when obviously there was no great urgency about going to the Security Council yesterday?

A Well, there are two principal reasons for it. One is the background -- which is, in part, contained in the statement made in Key Biscayne, which expresses the President's attitude. And the second thing grows out of the continued consultations we've had here today.

Now, where views of other governments may have been modified -- and I don't want to say they have in all cases -- I wouldn't want to attempt to express their views.

Q Would you say that we're a little closer to a consensus today than we were 24 hours ago?

A On the desirability of having a Security Council meeting?

A-7

Q No. Of a result of a Security Council meeting.

A No; I couldn't go that far. I would say "Yes" on the desirability of having a Security Council meeting.

Q But, specifically --

Q Does that mean all five permanent members want a meeting?

A No. I didn't say that either.

Q What was the question?

A The question was: As a result of the consultations we have had, is it fair to say that there is more of a consensus toward having a Security Council meeting and/or what the result of a Security Council meeting would be.

I said I wouldn't attempt to answer the second question. On the first question, without identifying governments, I said: "Yes; it is my view that there is more of a consensus toward having a Security Council meeting."

I'm not saying there is a unanimity of view.

A-8

Q Bob, does Secretary Kissinger expect to play any personal role before the Security Council in New York, or will all this be done by Ambassador Scali?

A On present form, I would expect the U. S. interest to be handled by Ambassador Scali.

Q Bob, Specifically, do Egypt and Israel agree with your decision to request --

A Look, you'll have to appreciate that I am not going to stand here and attempt to be spokesman for all of the other governments involved. There are outlets to them, and they should speak for themselves.

Q Bob, what about the Secretary's travel plans? Does any of this affect his plans to go to Europe or to China?

A No. Our schedule is still to go to Europe toward the end of this week and to make the China trip later in the month.

Q Have you made any --

Q What about the speech tomorrow night?

A The speech for tomorrow night is still

A-9

on schedule.

Q Have you made any progress, Bob, in
determination of who was responsible for the outbreak
of hostilities?

A Well, we'd have to say that on the basis
of evidence that was presented to us by UN observers
the crossing of the lines came from the Syrian
and Egyptian side. But I feel I should hasten to add
that we're less interested in passing judgments than
we are in finding resolutions to the conflict.

Q Bob, on the Security Council business,
do you understand anything now, what the sequence was
today? Earlier today, there was an announcement from
London that the United Kingdom and West Germany have
requested such a meeting. Then it appeared that there
was, in fact, no formal request.

Were we involved in that sequence at all?
Did we know what was going on?

A No. We were taken a bit by surprise
by that announcement and inquired immediately of
Ambassador Cromer here, who said it was not correct;
and at the same time we were inquiring here, our Mission

[ic]

A-10

was inquiring in New York of the UK Mission here.

Now, that's all I know. That report proved
to be incorrect.

What the antecedents for the report are or
were, I don't have information.

Q Bob, there has been, apparently, in the
last 24 hours, some element of urgency in this, as
expressed in the President's statement. Is this
because of developments on the ground in the Middle
East?

A Well, certainly, the fighting is
now 36 hours from its beginning and is continuing, although
nightfall has come in the area as of a few hours ago.
But I was just looking at the last military SITREP
we made up as of 4 p.m. and fighting has not ceased either
by the force of nightfall or for any other reason.

It may have scaled down, but there's no
indication that it won't be resumed again at first
light tomorrow.

Q Do you have an assessment of the losses
in man and equipment?

B-1

Q Bob, do you have any comment on the Soviet comment today that called for return to the 1967 lines, but stopped short of saying who was responsible for starting the fighting?

A No comment.

Q Bob, just a clarification. In one of the two objectives you gave to outline the general nature of the U.S. position, it was to make negotiations possible between the two parties?

A I said between the parties to the issues there, and, obviously, we are speaking about Egypt and Israel, in the first instance -- well, I suppose we are talking principally about Egypt and Israel, because they are the ones we have had the most contact with over negotiations. Syria is a party to the fighting, but we have had no contact with Syria with respect to negotiations. We have, however, with Jordan, but Jordan is not a party to the present fighting.

Q Bob, do you have anything on evacuation of American citizens?

A We have not ordered evacuation in any place. We have had reports from all of our embassies in

B-2

the area, including, if I may, add a personal note of my
own, and they have reviewed what we call these E&E plans,
and as I read the returns this morning, they all are pre-
pared to be operative, but we have not invoked any of
them. But, as I pointed out last night, that might be
done on instruction from Washington, if that was Washing-
ton's judgment, or it lies in the discretion of the
Ambassador, also.

A rough figure on Americans -- the Middle East
and North Africa -- would run to approximately 90,000.
That would include officials, dependents, but, of course,
an enormous number of non-official Americans and tourists.
For example, in Israel, where we have approximately 200
officials and dependents, there may be as many as 50,000
other Americans that would include tourists. In Egypt,
we have approximately 70 officials and dependents, and
there are approximately 1,200 non-official Americans, which
probably includes some tourists. Lebanon, there are
approximately 400 officials and dependents, but almost 5,000
non-official Americans, including tourists. And we have
figures on the other countries which we can make available
in the office.

B-3

Q Bob, in your using this phrase "prepared to be operative", does that represent any kind of an alert stage or anything? In other words, there is no --.

A We really haven't done anything. I suppose I could say that, in general, personal prudence would dictate that if you were planning to travel into the area now, you might want to think twice or consider it carefully as to how necessary it is, but we have not issued any instruction against travel of Americans nor for evacuation.

Q Bob, what do you know about the ship?

A The only thing we know, Endre, is that the ship was apparently taken into a Syrian port this morning, without any reference to the United States. There are approximately 200 Americans aboard. We have asked Italy, who represents our interests there, to inquire. To the best of my knowledge, we haven't had any response, nor do we have any confirmation of a report this afternoon that the vessel had left.

Q Bob, on the basis of our consultations with other Council members, how long do we visualize the Council meeting to go on? And, second question, is it remotely possible that we might expect a new interpretation of 242?

B-4

A I'm not going to answer the second question.
I simply haven't -- 242 simply hasn't been discussed in
any of the meetings that we have had here. And, on the
first question, Darius, you know better than I that it's
difficult to predict how long a Security Council debate
will go on on any given item. I just don't know.

Q Isn't it rather remarkable that 242 hasn't
been discussed in our meetings? Hasn't that been considered
the basis for a settlement in that area for six years by
this government?

A Yes, and so far as we are concerned, we
still find it the benchmark or a vehicle around which nego-
tiations might be pursued..

Q Bob, do you have any reason to believe
that there will be a sharp escalation or escalation of
fighting tomorrow?

A John, I simply wouldn't attempt to answer
that, one way or another.

Q In your military situation report, can
you give us some idea of how far Syrian and Egyptian forces
have penetrated into Israeli-occupied territory?

A No, I could, but I won't.

B5

Q I mean, is it significant?

A I'm just not going to get into
a military briefing in this situation. I'm sorry,
I'm just not going to do it.

A It is being covered by media from all over
the world, and I'm just not going to try to do it from
here.

Q Bob, apart from considerations of going
to the Security Council, are we thinking of a peace-keeping
force by the United Nations?

A Joe, I have given our considerations twice,
our considerations and our objectives. I simply can't
improve on them now, and I don't know how I can attempt
to write the outcome.

Q Was the hot-line used today?

A I should think not.

Q Bob, a moment ago, you said that the
crossing of the lines came from Syrian and Egyptian sides.
Do you have any information that that was provoked in any
way?

A No.

B-6

Q Bob, what was the nature of the telephone calls to Fulbright and Aiken?

A Informing the two Senators that the President had made the decision this afternoon to go to the United Nations. The Secretary had spoken to both Senators yesterday to brief them on where matters stood diplomatically, and so it was principally to inform them of the decision.

Q Bob, can you tell us anything about the agenda of the WASAG group today?

A I could, but I won't.

Q Do you have any idea when the Security Council will meet? Have you a suggested time for it?

Q We are not suggesting a time. I would not -- I certainly would not expect it tonight, and I think it would be doubtful if it got into session tomorrow morning. But the rest of the day can't be ruled out.

Q Bob, there have been --

Baghdad announced that the Iraqi Air Force has joined the Syrians. I think Tunisia is sending help to Egypt. The Sudan is standing on alert. What is your assessment of this thing gaining momentum of its

B-7

own, of really blowing up into a global conflict?

A I just can't offer that kind of an assessment that you are asking for, that attempts to forecast. I said here last night that one of the fundamental reasons that the United States is deeply concerned about what has been happening over the last 36 hours is that it does have ramifications that go beyond the locale of the present fighting, which often of and by itself is indeed serious enough.

So, if you ask me is it possible to take on a momentum that escalates beyond where it is now, I'm just not going to become a hero and attempt to answer that. I just -- I'm not going to do it.

Q Bob, can you tell us whether the movement of the Task Force of the Sixth Fleet out of Athens was a result of this decision taken here and what the intention is?

A FOR BACKGROUND, the decision is clearly related (to the situation in the area).

B-8

Q Bob, a couple of questions. Where is the Secretary of State working, here or at the White House?

A Well, he was here all day, and he, maybe. has gone over for the White House meeting by now. He was still upstairs when I came down.

Q A second question, do you have any comment or reaction to the Iraqi nationalization of two American petroleum companies?

A Jim, I'm sorry, I just don't have enough information on it to make any sensible comment. May I take that?

Q On the status of the Six Fleet, exactly what is the situation there? Have they -- the Pentagon -- ?

A The Pentagon has said that there has been a movement of some vessels of the Six Fleet and they are not going to say which ones or where they have gone. We've been up and down this sea lane before, Jim, and I am not going to attempt to say anything about where they are, what ships they are, what the purpose of it is. I have acknowledged over here one answer that it seemed to me was fair enough, but I'm not going to go beyond that on movements of the fleet.

B-9

Q I understand that, but if I understand your answer there, you said that there was a relationship between what the ships are doing and what is happening. And his question was, whether the orders came from here, as I understand it.

A Then I'm sorry, I didn't realize that. No, those orders are militarily directed; but as a result of decisions reached within the government here.

Q One more question on the WASAG, Bob.

Q Any comparable movements by Soviet vessels in the Mediterranean?

A I don't have any information on that, one way or another.

Q Bob, is it safe to assume that one purpose of the WASAG meeting will be to refine the American approach in the Security Council?

A No comment.

Q Is the Sixth Fleet on an alert status?

A No comment.

Q Bob, can we expect any more tonight from you?

A No.

Q Thank you, Bob.

[The briefing terminated at 6:10]

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 199805

THE PREVIOUS CEASE-FIRE LINES?

A. THE ANSWER TO THAT IS NO. WE HAVE URGED, AS I HAVE EMphasIZED HERE ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, IN A GENERAL WAY RESTRAINT, EXPRESSED OUR HOPE IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, I SUPPOSE MOST VISIBLY IN CALLING FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT MEANS BE FOUND TO ARING THE HOSTILITIES TO AN END. BUT WE HAVE NOT WANTED TO PREJUDICE OUR OWN CASE, IF I CAN PUT IT THAT WAY, BY LEVYING DEMANDS OR SPECIFIC REQUESTS DURING THE COURSE OF THE BATTLE ON ANYONE IN PARTICULAR.

Q. BOB, IN THE PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, AND ALSO THE PARTIES, DO WE HAVE A FEELING FOR THE PARAMETERS OF THE RESOLUTION THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ADOPTED IN THE COUNCIL?

A. WELL, I WOULDN'T DENY THAT WE HAVE SOME ATTITUDE, FEELINGS, THOUGHTS, TOWARDS THE PARAMETERS, BUT WE HAVE NOT SETTLED ON A RESOLUTION. WE HAVE NOT INTRODUCED ONE.

AND LET ME SAY ON BACKGROUND I DON'T EXPECT THAT WE WILL INTRODUCE ONE IN OUR FIRST STATEMENT. WE PREFER TO BE GUIDED BY THE ATTITUDES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN REACHING A COURSE OF ACTION IN THE UN THAT MAKES THE MOST SENSE IN THE EFFORT TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END.

Q. BOB, IS THE GOVERNMENT PREPARED TO HAVE 242 RE-OPENED, FOR SOME MODIFICATION?

A. NO -- IT REMAINS OUR VIEW THAT 242 OUGHT TO BE PRESERVED IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM, AND WE WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE ANY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IMPAIR THE SPIRIT AND THE CONTENT OF 242 AS IT STANDS.

Q. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THERE ARE SOVIET ADVISORS WITH THE SYRIAN TROOPS.

Q. OK EGYPTIAN -- AND/OR EGYPTIANS.

A. THERE IS NOTHING IN THAT REGARD THAT I CAN SAY WITH ANY ASSURANCE.

Q. CAN YOU CONFIRM THE REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET ADVISORS PULLED OUT OF SYRIA 36 HOURS BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT?

A. WE DID HAVE SOME REPORTS THAT SOVIET PERSONNEL, INCLUDING DEPENDENTS, I BELIEVE, HAD BEEN LEAVING EGYPT

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-1652

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 STATE 199805

IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY BEFORE, YES.

Q. HOW ABOUT SYRIA?

A. I'M SORRY. I THOUGHT THE QUESTION WAS ABOUT--

Q. IT WAS SYRIA.

A. THEN I THINK I WOULD HAVE TO SAY NO. I HAVEN'T SEEN ANYTHING IN THAT REGARD.

Q. BUT YOU HAVE SEEN IT ON EGYPT?

A. WE HAD SEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF THAT, YES.

Q. THIRTY-SIX HOURS?

A. WELL, I DIDN'T TIE MYSELF LITERALLY TO THAT TIME.

Q. BOB, DOES THE U.S. HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIFT UNION ATTEMPTED TO DISSUADE THE ARABS FROM THE MOVE THAT THEY MADE ON SATURDAY?

A. I WOULD HAVE TO SAY FOR BACKGROUND I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY EVIDENCE OF THAT.

Q. BOB, WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE LEVEL OF U.S. CONCERN ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA IN GETTING INVOLVED, PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AND ALGERIA, AND THE POSSIBLE ENTRY OR THE ACTIVITY IN JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA?

A. WELL, ONE WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THE ADDITIONAL INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES IN THE AREA WOULD INFECT THE SITUATION WITH MORE FEVER THAN NOW IS PRESENT OBVIOUSLY THAT WOULD RAISE THE DEGREE OF OUR CONCERN.

Q. THERE HAVE BEEN ONE OR TWO ANALYSES ON TELEVISION AND RADIO PARTICULARLY THAT HAVE SAID THE U.S. WAS NOT INTRODUCING ANY CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION OR CALLING FOR AN

IMMEDIATE STOP TO THE FIGHTING BECAUSE IT WANTED TO ALLOW ISRAEL TIME TO REGAIN SOME OF THE LOSSES, THE ALLOW ISRAEL TIME TO REGAIN SOME OF THE LOSSES, THE LOST TERRITORY. COULD YOU RESPOND SPECIFICALLY TO THAT?

A. WELL, I THINK THAT IS UNFAIR AND UNWORTHY OF THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THE U.S. HAS APPROACHED THE ENTIRE SITUATION, AND IN LIGHT OF OUR CALLING FOR A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I HAVE SAID HERE EARLIER WE ARE NOT TRYING TO FIND WAYS TO PREJUDICE THE POSITION OF ANYONE BUT TO DO IT AS FAIRLY AS WE KNOW HOW, BUT IN A WAY THAT IT IS NOT GOING TO LEAD TO AN ENDLESS DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

UNCLASSIFIED

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 199805

Q. BOB, CAN THE U.S. TAKE ANY CREDIT FOR JORDAN'S NON-INVOLVEMENT TO DATE? YOU WERE ASKED BEFORE ABOUT THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, AND YOU RESPONDED AS TO THOSE THAT ARE INVOLVED: SOME ARE HOLDING BACK, MOST SIGNIFICANTLY JORDAN. IS THAT A RESULT OF ANY DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY ON OUR PART, DO YOU THINK?

A. I WOULD PREFER TO SAY NO COMMENT TO THAT.

Q. BOB, DO YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE ANY INTENTION TO GET INVOLVED?

A. ON BACKGROUND, AND IF YOUR QUESTION MEANS MILITAR-ILY, I DON'T SEE THAT AS OF THIS TIME.

Q. BOB, THE OPEC COUNTRIES ARE MEETING TOMORROW IN VIENNA. HAVE WE HAD ANY COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE OIL-RICH ARAB COUNTRIES THAT THEY INTEND TO MOVE ON THREATS THEY HAVE MADE IN THE PAST TO NOT INCREASE OIL PRODUCTION OR TO HOLD BACK OIL DELIVERIES?

A. FOR BACKGROUND, I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY MOBILIZING OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS THAT KIND OF A DECISION. IT IS A CONTINGENCY, HOWEVER, THAT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED HERE IN WASHINGTON, OBVIOUSLY. WE HOPE THAT NOTHING LIKE THAT OCCURS.

Q. BOB, HAS THERE BEEN ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT REQUEST FOR DISCUSSION BY THE ISRAELIS, OR DISCUSSION OF AMERICAN MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL?

A. NO COMMENT -- I'M SORRY.

Q. BOB, WAS KING HUSSEIN RESPONDED TO THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE THAT WAS SENT ON SATURDAY MORNING?

A. YES, HE HAS

Q. CAN YOU TELL US THE GENERAL TONE OF THE MESSAGE?

A. I'M SORRY -- I WON'T. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 8, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT
AND
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

THE OVAL OFFICE

THE PRESIDENT: We have nothing to add to the official pronouncements that have been made, or announcements, I should say, with regard to the Mideast situation.

Last night I had a rather long talk with Dr. Kissinger shortly before midnight, getting the late reports. This morning I was here around 7:30 or so, and studied all of the reports, both with regard to the military situation and the reaction to our diplomatic initiative.

Dr. Kissinger and I have been meeting for a good part of the morning here on particularly that diplomatic initiative, and having in mind the importance of getting strong support for the position that the United States will take.

It is very easy to think of this particular kind of a crisis simply in terms of a grandstand play, where the United States will go in and unilaterally make a move which then fails.

I can assure you that Dr. Kissinger and his colleagues have been very busy and we are developing support for a position which we hope and believe will be effective in stopping the fighting.

Doctor, would you like to add a word to that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I think you have summed up the situation, Mr. President. We have been in close contact, at the President's instruction, with all the permanent members of the Security Council, with the parties to the conflict and we have been doing this since Saturday afternoon in order to bring an end to the fighting and we will now see what develops at the Security Council session this afternoon. Our intention is to move forward with the broadest possible support that can be effected.

END