[L.C.]

THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY
AND GERMANY
1933-1939

It is widely believed in the United States that the policy of appeasement, as pursued by the British Government towards Germany in the years preceding the outbreak of war in September 1939, was foisted on a reluctant and misinformed public by a small clique within the Conservative Party -- a clique sometimes called the Cliveden Set -- which, for reasons of its own (generally presumed to be discreditable) was anxious to strengthen a Hitler-dominated Germany, even at the risk of endangering British safety. That this belief, though widely held, is nonsense I have no hesitation in affirming. The policy of appeasement, mistaken though events have proved it to be, was a popular policy, supported by all classes and all political parties. It was, of course, essentially the policy of preserving peace, even at the cost of paying tribute to obvious aggressors. That this policy did not work, that it never has worked, is one of the most obvious lessons of history. The desire to preserve peace, even a merely fictitious peace, is, however, a desire that should be readily enough understood by the people of the United States.

It is the purpose of this article to throw light upon the attitude adopted by the British Labour Party -- the principal opposition party -- towards Germany during the years between Hitler's acquisition of power in January 1933 and the outbreak of war in September 1939. This attitude cannot be considered entirely apart from the Party's attitude towards the armed forces of Great Britain, the problems of defence, collective security, and international relations in general,

defence, collective security, and international relations in general, attitude towards the armed forces of Great Britain, the problem of this attitude cannot be considered entirely apart from the party's of power in January 1938 and the outbreak of war in September 1939.

Party -- towards Germany during the years between Hoffer's accession and adopted by the British Parliament -- the principal opposition

It is the purpose of this article to show right upon the attitude of the British states.

a desire that should be really enough understood by the people of the state to brake the peace, even a merely theoretical peace, is, however, never done. worked, is one of the most obvious reasons of history. The tribute to opinions aggressors. That this policy did not work, that it essentially the policy of breaking peace, even at the cost of paying supported by all classes and all political parties. It was, of course, ment, metaparon though events have proved it to do, was a popular policy, is nonence I have no relaxation in attaining. The policy of abating or enhancing British safety. That this policy, though widely held, was anxious to strengthen a Hoffer-dominated Germany, even at the risk of an exodus of its own (generally presumed to be legitimate) Conservative Party -- a thing sometimes called the Civiagen set -- on a reform and misinformed public by a small elite within the the years preceding the outbreak of war in September 1939, was followed by an abatement, as Burden by the British Government towards Germany in

THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT
1938-1939
AND GERMANY

2

nor, of course, apart from the actual developments in Europe and else-
where. Throughout what might be called strictly official sources
have been used: speeches by members of the Party in Parliament, pam-
phlets and periodicals formally published by the Party, reports of
the annual Conferences of the Party.

It should be borne in mind that within that Party (as within
all parties of more than one member) there were conflicting views.
It
This should also be remembered that, during all the years from 1933
through 1939, it was always an opposition party and was never in
office. Now the first duty of an opposition party is, no doubt, to
oppose. Hence members are likely, from time to time, to utter more
or less irresponsible statements, which presumably even they them-
selves do not take too seriously. One need only study the utter-
ances of our Democrats during the twenties or our Republicans in the
thirties to realize the truth of this.

The purpose of this article is to throw light on the belief,
mentioned above, the belief that appeasement was the work of a small
Tory clique. That theory obviously presumes that the opposition
groups -- especially the Labour Party -- were anxious to resist German
aggression and that they, presumably, advocated a policy that would
have made such resistance possible. Was that so? That is the ques-
tion which this article will try to answer.

Before one can proceed to a discussion of this question, it
is necessary to consider some of the Labour Party's theories about
the general conduct of international affairs. It recognized that,
at least in the near future, there might occur acts of unprovoked

at least in the near future, there might occur acts of unauthorised
the General command of international states. It recognised that,
is necessary to consider some of the Republican party's theories about
Before one can proceed to a discussion of this question, it
tion which this article will try to answer.

have made some resistance possible. Was that so? That is the ques-
aggression and that need, brazenly, advocated a policy that would
Gromba -- especially the Republican party -- were anxious to resist German
Tortoise. That theory operationally premises that the opposition
mentioned above, the pellet that abatement was the work of a small
The purpose of this article is to show light on the pellet.

traces to realise the truth of this.

sence of our Democrats during the twenties or our Reunions in the
salons do not take too seriously. One need only study the letter-
or less liberal statements, made brazenly even then from-
above. Hence members are further, from time to time, to utter more
office. How the first and of an opposition party is, no doubt, to
through 1939, it was made an opposition party and was never in
the same also be remembered that, during all the years from 1933
all parties of more than one member) there were conflicting views.

If anyone deems in mind that within that party (see within
the annual Conferences of the party.

brute and barbarous toposes published by the party, reports of
have been made: shepherds by members of the party in Parliament, bem-
where. In front of what might be called strictly official sources
work, of course, is bent from the actual developments in Europe and else-

3

4

[LC]

C.R. Attlee⁴ said:

> We believe in a system of pooled security under the League of Nations... You had to face the possibility of war if you were prepared to carry out your commitments to the League of Nations ... You cannot build up a system of pooled security unless you are prepared to take risks. I am asked, "If you say that, why, then, did you oppose the Estimates?" I stated our attitude very clearly in the Debate on the Air Estimates. I said that we on these benches [the Labour Party] did not believe in national armaments.⁶

4. Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party from 1935; a member of the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party; a member, without Cabinet rank, of both Labour governments.

5. The sum voted annually for the maintenance of the armed forces of the nation.

6. 287, 14 March 1934, col. 465-466.

In an official pamphlet it was stated that:

> The collective organisation of security means that there must be forces available to carry out the decisions of the League. British Labour believes that the best way to ensure this is by the ultimate creation of an international force and the reduction of all national armed forces to the lowest possible level. Meanwhile, it is prepared for this country to make its proper contribution to the collective forces which are necessary for the preservation and defence of peace.

> The forces to be brought against an established aggressor must have such strength, organisation and direction as to make them an effective deterrent.

> This means, instead of the piling up of competitive armaments, really effective co-operation in the maintenance and use of the forces at the disposal of the League and the lightening of the burden of armaments which are pressing on the world.

> The strength of these forces will depend on the existence of the will to peace among the Members of the League, and the abandonment of their pursuit of national and imperialist policies.⁷

7. The Labour Party, Labour and the Defence of Peace, London, May 1936; italics added; note that this was published after the Italian attack on Ethiopia, after Japan and Germany had left the League, after the remilitarization of the Rhineland.

5

[LC]

In criticizing the National Government's foreign policy

8. The expression "National Government is used throughout to refer to the coalition, almost entirely dominated by the Conservative Party, that controlled Great Britain from 1931 to 1939 under the leadership of MacDonald, Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain.

and in calling attention to what he considered were the evil results of this policy, Attlee said:

> You [the National Government] are, therefore, driven to trying to carry law and order in the world on the shoulders of practically two countries--[Great Britain and France].⁹

9. 310, 26 March 1936, col. 1533.

The Labour Party policy, then, was clear enough: security through the collective action of many nations, with individual, national armaments reduced to a low point. Since national political leaders must deal with real situations and cannot pursue a purely theoretical policy, it is legitimate enough to ask: how, practically, was this policy to be carried out?

Its fundamental weakness was unconsciously revealed by some equally unconscious irony by Henderson as he continued the speech quoted above. After answering the question of what about armaments to support a League policy by saying that forty-six nations had given the assurance of mutual aid, he added:

> After all, a nation can do more than give an assurance. 10

10. 313, 23 June 1936, col. 1707.

That, perhaps, is only too true; unfortunately more than assurances are needed to stop powerfully armed and determined aggressors.

enemies are needed to stoke powerfully aimed and determinedagoa.
That's precisely, is curl too true; motorized more than as-

10° 318' 32 June 1958, cef.1401.

After all, a nation can go wrong more than give an assurance. To
assurance of mutual aid, he adds:

embolt a League belf in a leading that forth-six nations put on the
shut up a stake. After answering the question of what spot axioms to
edify a monologue from which Henderson as he continued due sheen
to some fundamental weakness was monotonously revealed by some
belf to be carried out?

belf, it is legitimate enough so as: now, biologically, was the
mutual deal with real situations and cannot brane a brief preposition
of emoluments required to a few hours. Since national belfical ferre
through the collective action of many nations, with individual, national

The London belf, upon, was of course enough: security

3° 310' 26 July 1958, cef. 1953.

tically two committees... [Great Britain and France].

It to carry law and order in the mix if on the shopgore of bia-
--→ You [the National Government] are, therefore, given to txh-
ot the belf, after all said:

and in calling attention to what he considered were the only results

of Macdonald, Belgia and Neuville Crumperlain.

that controlled Great Britain from 1931 to 1938 under the fagot-
the coalition, almost entirely dominated by the Conservative Party.
8. The exclusion "National Government" has no tarmac to refer to

in critiquing the National Government's foreign belf

p

[c]

[Lc]

6

Throughout the twenties and thirties almost all the representatives of the nations of Europe repeatedly stated that their countries would participate in military sanctions only to the extent permitted by their special geographical and military situations. To any intelligent listener these pronouncements clearly indicated that in military matters the small nations would do nothing if large and neighboring nations were involved in war. Furthermore, entirely aside from any question of willingness to act in such circumstances, the small nations simply could not act. The Seven Weeks War of 1866 had conclusively enough proved that a well-equipped, compact, mobile army could defeat an almost unlimited number of small, scattered forces, even though the total numbers of the scattered forces were greater than the number of the united, striking force. If that were true in 1866, it was far more true in the nineteen thirties, at a time when small countries could not afford the expensive, motorized equipment that was enormously increasing the speed and power with which a military force could strike. The small nations would and could, then, contribute nothing real to any armed resistance that might be offered to an aggressor.

What great powers were prepared to do so in the thirties? The United States was not a member of the League and was obviously not prepared to offer armed help to victims of aggression. Germany and Japan left the League in 1933 and were, clearly enough, potential aggressors, not shields against aggression. Italy became an obvious aggressor in 1935 and shortly thereafter left the League. Russia did not join the League until 1934 and, in spite of the bland and wordy assurances of Litvinoff, no action of that nation gives any justification for supposing that its armed forces would have been made available

tion for embarking that its armed forces would have been available
assemements of Vitrauott, no action of that nation gives any justifications
not join the League until 1934 and, in spite of the plan and words
aggression in 1938 and especially thereafter felt the League. Nations got
aggression, not offenses against aggression. It is hard to imagine an opinions
and then felt the League in 1938 and were, clearly enough, potential
not prepared to offer armed help to victims of aggression. Germany
The United States was not a member of the League and was obviously
What great powers were precluded to do so in the charkies?

to an aggressor.

tribute nothing real to any armed resistance that might be offered
force could arise. The small nations would and could, then, could-
be enormously increasing the speed and power with which a military
country could not afford the expensive, motorized equipment that
was far more true in the nineteen charkies, at a time when small
parties of the mults, striking force. It that were true in 1938, it
does the total numbers of the scattered forces were greater than the num-
ber almost multiplied number of small, scattered forces, even though
enough proved that a well-organized, combat, mobile army could detect
simply could not act. The seven weeks War of 1938 put concomitantly
direction of willingness to act in and of circumstances, the small nations
nations were involved in war. Furthermore, entirely naive from any
matters the small nations would go noticing it far greater and weighing
back from their special geographical and military situations. To any inter-
world battlefields in military operations only to the extent permitted
further of the millions of troops repeatedly stated that their countries
are the representatives of the nations.

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