Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum of conversation with Chancellor Erhard - January 28, 1966

The conversation came about in the following manner: While visiting Bonn on January 24th and 25th, I saw--among others--Ministers Krone, Mende, Gradl and Westrick and the Secretary of State in the Defense Ministry, Gumbel. I left Bonn on January 25th. On January 26th, while attending a conference in Ebenhausen near Munich I received a phone call that the Chancellor wanted to see me Friday morning at 11:30 a.m. I said that I was eager to attend the closing session of our conference in the afternoon and that I would, therefore, prefer an earlier appointment. The appointment was thereupon changed to 9:30 a.m. It lasted 1 1/2 hours. It was attended by Westrick.

Erhard opened the conversation by saying that Westrick had told him about our conversation three days earlier and that he was eager to have my views. He was beset by a number of perplexities particularly with respect to European and NATO policy. He wanted to put these before me. Before doing so, he wanted to ask my opinion about another matter: He had just seen that the United States had submitted a new 7-point disarmament plan at Geneva. The German government had not been aware of it. This put him into a very difficult position because it proved the point of his critics that the United States was never consulting adequately on matters of crucial import to the FRG. I said that it seemed to me inconceivable that a United States plan was presented of which the FRG was unaware. Was he certain? Erhard sent for the information which turned out to be a news story about Foster's opening speech at Geneva. I explained that this was not a proposal but a

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

statement of objectives. I could not imagine that his government had not been
told about it. Erhard thereupon suggested to Westrick that he check with the
Foreign Office whether they knew about Foster's speech.

He returned to his "perplexities" listing four: European integration,
NATO nuclear policy, non-proliferation and Vietnam and American troops in
Germany. These will be discussed in turn:

**European Integration.** Erhard said that he was profoundly disturbed by the crisis in the Common Market. On the one hand, no other country had as big a stake in upholding the sanctity of treaties as the Federal Republic. For this reason, he was inclined to stand firm on the Treaty of Rome. On the other hand, he was more and more disturbed by the evident deterioration of Franco-German relations. Germany did not want to see the break-up of the Common Market, even less bad relations with France. Westrick thereupon began to explain all the economic concession the FRG had already made. Erhard interrupted to say that the details did not matter.

I then asked Erhard what he expected to come out of the Luxemburg
meetings which were starting that morning. Did he see any compromise?
Erhard turned to Westrick who said that Germany could not give up the principle
of majority voting. However, he was in favor of concurrent declarations by
the Six that they would not apply the principle if vital interests were involved.
As for Hallstein, Westrick said that, of course, France's actions were un-
reasonable, but one could not wreck the Common Market on a question of
personalities. He, therefore, felt that upon consolidation of the various

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European agencies Hallstein should be proposed by the FRG as a member of the Commission but that the chairmanship should be rotated.

Erhard said that these proposals seemed fair to him. However, he still had the problem of obtaining a sensible French attitude on the Kennedy Round. What did I think was the best tactic for dealing with De Gaulle? I said that no one had yet solved this problem. However, it seemed to me that the General preferred philosophical to economic discussions.

Erhard, sighing, said that he was aware that De Gaulle despised economics and economists. On the other hand, everybody expected him to settle in two hours on February 7th what his Foreign Minister had failed to achieve in six months previously. He frankly was baffled by how to deal with France. If he made prior bilateral agreements with France, the other European countries were offended. But if he dealt first within the framework of the Five, France became intransigent.

**NATO Nuclear Policy.** Erhard then said that his most perplexing problem was nuclear policy. On no subject did he receive so much conflicting advice --even, he was frank to say, from the American side. For example, early in November he was urged by many Americans to state German nuclear demands very clearly. He had been urged to stress the ownership aspect because (a) consultation without ownership would soon prove empty, (b) Germany could not expect to receive in a negotiation what she had not asked for and (c) Britain was eager to leave the nuclear field via co-ownership with Germany.

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As a result, he had, during November, stated a number of demands, including even a revival of the MLF. In the weeks prior to his trip to Washington he had noticed that American interest in the ownership question had cooled with every passing day. In Washington, he had observed the following line-up: Ball was strongly in favor of German co-ownership; Rusk more moderately so; McNamara seemed at best indifferent and the President's attitude could be summed up as follows: "Ludwig, I will do anything for you but don't complicate my life by asking for nuclear weapons."

All of this faced him with the following problem: There was no doubt that Germany did not have an influence commensurate with its contribution within NATO. Only one of NATO's senior commanders was German; only one German officer was attached to SAC. Westrick interjected that he was there in his NATO capacity and that he would be rotated next year. Erhard said that the question was whether Germany could increase its influence without owning some nuclear weapons. I said that under no scheme with which I was familiar would Germany be owning nuclear weapons since we would retain custody and that we were talking about shares in commonly-owned delivery systems. Erhard replied that the last thing he wanted was for Germany to own nuclear weapons; on the contrary, he wished to preclude such pressures within Germany. On the other hand, could he stand before history as the man who had rejected a nuclear option for Germany when it was in effect offered to him. I asked just what nuclear option did he think was being offered to him? He replied that the various ownership schemes (he

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never used the phrase "hardware") protected Germany in case Israel, India or other small countries acquired nuclear weapons. I asked in what way this was so. Erhard was extraordinarily vague and Westrick to whom he turned could offer little additional information.

Erhard then asked me what I thought he should do next. I said that it seemed to me important to define what the FRG really wanted. Did it want co-ownership for its own sake or did it want it as a step towards something else, for example increased consultation. Erhard said he definitely wanted the latter. However, he had been told that consultation had to have a precise subject matter and that it was unlikely to work unless Germany owned some shares. It had to be on the board of directors of a joint stock company. I said that a precise subject matter in the nuclear field was already provided by the existing NATO nuclear stockpile. Moreover, his initial comments on the Foster speech indicated an interest in subjects transcending nuclear strategy. Erhard said that he would be delighted to obtain adequate consultation and he did not want to be in the position to plead for nuclear weapons. It was the last thing he wanted. But what should he do when so many experts (including Americans) were telling him that co-ownership was necessary and that Britain was eager to leave the nuclear field via German participation in a NATO force.

Westrick interjected that he thought defining an adequate consultative machinery should be top priority while the ownership issue, without being

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dropped, should be deferred until the effort to define a more active consultative
role for the FRG had been pressed. Erhard agreed but not in a manner that
indicated that a strong personality might not change his mind again.

**Non-proliferation.** The conversation then turned to the non-proliferation treaty. Here Erhard grew more animated. He said that the FRG was deeply concerned that a non-proliferation treaty would jeopardize vital German interests. In 1954, the Federal Republic had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons in return for an Allied pledge to foster unification. Now it was being asked for another renunciation--in effect towards the East. This could be acceptable only if an additional commitment to unification were undertaken this time by the USSR. He had presented this point of view to Ambassador Harriman in Munich and had been brutally rebuffed. Still it was the dominant view in Germany.

Some of his advisors were urging co-ownership of nuclear weapons
as a means of preventing the non-proliferation treaty. What did I think?
Could Germany refuse to sign?

I replied that the kind of ownership being proposed was consistent with
the American draft of the non-proliferation treaty. It would, therefore, surely
not prevent that treaty. Secondly, it seemed to me that for Germany to adopt
as a national policy an attempt to prevent a non-proliferation treaty was to
play into Soviet hands. It would enable the Soviets to picture Germany as a
perpetual troublemaker and thus contribute to its isolation. Finally, I did

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not believe that the FRG would be able to withstand pressures for signing a treaty if it should be negotiated. Erhard, sighing, said he agreed with all of this. What should he do? I said that it seemed to me essential to intensify the German-American dialogue at earlier stages and at lower levels. Erhard said that this was his preferred solution and he was strongly supported by Westrick. However, Erhard added, the consultation negotiations never seem to become concrete.

**American troops in Germany and Vietnam.** Erhard asked about Vietnam and I gave him a brief description of the situation. He said that he thought bombing of the North should be resumed lest America appear weak and indecisive. He expressed concern that the American involvement in Asia would reduce its interest in Europe. He asked whether we really wanted German combat troops in Vietnam. I said that I was unaware of any such request. Erhard said that Secretary McNamara had urged on Ambassador Knappstein that FRG send at least engineer battalions to Vietnam. He thought that sending uniformed personnel was out of the question. He was prepared, however, to make a real sacrifice in extending economic aid and encouraging German civilian construction firms to interest themselves in Vietnam.

Westrick interjected that he had been told that American pressures--including Embassy pressures--for a greater German contribution in Vietnam may be designed to establish an alibi for the withdrawal of some American units. He had heard the figure of 75 thousand. I said this seemed to me

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extremely unlikely. However, this constant sense of insecurity underlined
the need for better consultative machinery.

Erhard, in parting, urged me to visit him soon again.