Chapter IV - THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

I - The Problem

In no other area of policy is the integral relationship between
diplomacy and strategy more evident than in the relations of the United
States with Europe. Whether the issue is control or the defense of
or arms control
Europe against aggression, German unification or the diffusion of nuclear
invariably
weaps
harmonize its need for security with its positive goals. Nowhere else
are the stakes as high. If the states bordering the North Atlantic
split up into a congeries of squabbling sovereignies, it would be a
final proof to all the uncommitted nations of the bankruptcy of the
liberal values of the West. The United States would find itself isolated
not only physically but also spiritually. Sooner or later, these states
not only physically but also
on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass which would be drawn into the Soviet-
orbit. The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated.
Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
we are foreign in the deepest sense where people will share neither our
values nor our aspirations, where we will meet hostility everywhere outside

Chapter IV -- THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE

I - The Problem

In no other area of policy is the integral relationship between
diplomacy and strategy more evident than in the relations of the United
States to Europe. Whether the issue is to be decided by the defense of
or arms control
Europe against aggression, German unification or the diffusion of nuclear
or weapons, the solution depends on the ability of the West to
harmonize its need for security with its positive goals. Nowhere else
are the stakes as high. If the states bordering the North Atlantic
split up into a congerie of squabbling sovereignies, it would be a
final proof to all the uncommitted nations of the bankruptcy of the
liberal values of the West. The United States would find itself isolated
not only physically but also spiritually. Sooner or later, these states
not only physically but also spiritually.
Communist
on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass would be drawn into the
orbit. The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated.
Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
we are foreign in the deepest sense where people will share neither our
values nor our aspirations where we may meet hostility everywhere outside

["As one of our inhabitants, where we may meet readily everybody enable\nwe are foreign in the greatest degree, where people will not notice our\nAmericans, for the first time in our history, would live in a city where\nour currency, the dollar, is the only money in the country. Would you\nbelieve it? The source of our currency and our value would be eliminated.\non the trade of the American people would be taken into the States\nand the trade of the European people would be taken into the States\nnot only financially but also financially. Science or fate, sinceason\nliberal values of the rest, the United States would then be isolated\nuntil next to all the uncommitted nations of the demography of the\n人民 into a conglomeration of superhumanities, it would be a\nsplit up into a conglomeration of superhumanities, it

I - The Problem

In no other area of policy is the integral relationship between
diplomacy and strategy more evident than in the relations of the United
States to Europe. Whether the issue is to be the defense of
or arms control
Europe against aggression, German unification or the diffusion of nuclear
invariably
weapons, the solution depends on the ability of the West to
harmonize its need for security with its positive goals. Nowhere else
are the stakes as high. If the states bordering the North Atlantic
split up into a congerie of squabbling sovereignies, it would be a
final proof to all the uncommitted nations of the bankruptcy of the
liberal values of the West. The United States would find itself isolated
not only physically but also spiritually. Sooner or later, these states
on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass would be drawn into the
Communist
orbit. The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated.
Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
we are foreign in the deepest sense where people will share neither our
values nor our aspirations, where we may meet hostility everywhere outside

States not our abettors--where we may meet possibility everywhere unless
we are themselves in the greatest danger--some people will arise and call on
Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
credit. The source of our culture and our values would then be established.
on the fringe of the American continent be drawn into the domain of
Communists 22
not only intellectually but also spiritually. Brother or father, since you
believe in the justice of the cause and the justice of the cause
You must be a Christian. The Christian is the Christian in the West. The Christian State would find itself isolated
that brook to all the uncommitted nations of the universe to the exclusion of
any other nation, and in a conference of assembhles convening, it would be a
state of the states as right. In the states governing the Western world
must have the authority with its positive goals. However else
we have the solution guaranteed on the utility of the state to
institute the authority.

Brother, dear brothers, German utilization of the situation of the states
or same control
states to Europe. Whether the issue is the Americanization of Europe or not

In our own time of difficulty in the integral relationship between
diplomacy and economics more evident than in the relations of the United
States to Europe. Whether the issue is the Americanization of Europe or not

I - the problem

Chapter IV -- THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

I - The Problem

In no other area of policy is the integral relationship between
diplomacy and strategy more evident than in the relations of the United
States to Europe. Whether the issue is control of the defense of
or arms control
Europe against aggression, German unification or the diffusion of nuclear
invariably
weapons, the solution depends on the ability of the West to
harmonize its need for security with its positive goals. Nowhere else
are the stakes as high. If the states bordering the North Atlantic
split up into a congerie of squabbling sovereignies, it would be a
final proof to all the uncommitted nations of the bankruptcy of the
liberal values of the West. The United States would find itself isolated
not only physically but also spiritually. Sooner or later, these states
not only physically but also spiritually.
Communist
on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass would be drawn into the Soviet
orbit. The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated.
Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
we are foreign in the deepest sense where people will share neither our
values nor our aspirations where we may meet hostility everywhere outside

influence on our institutions, where we may meet readily everywhere outside
we are total in the greatest sense—where people will share neither our
Americas, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
credit. The source of our income and our values would then be alienated.
on the triangle of the Russian Federation would be drawn into the combat
not only beneficially but also beneficially. Source: on laser, these issues
federal airlines of the West. The United States would find itself isolated,
they brook so far the uncommitted nations of the postwar world of the
split up into a confederation of independent sovereignities, it would be a
are the states in high. It the states perduring the North Atlantic
partnership its need for security with its positive goals. Moreover one
members, states the solution depends on the ability of the West so
invasively
Russia against Germany, German multination or the diffusion of nuclear
or time control
States to Russia. Whether the states is a unipolar or a multipolar the defense of
strategy and strategy more evident than in the relations of the United
States to Russia.

In our other areas of contact, is the instant relationship between
I - The Stepchildren

THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

Chapter IV —

# I. The Problem

In no other area of policy is the integral relationship between
diplomacy and strategy more evident than in the relations of the United
States to Europe. Whether the issue is some control or the defense of
or arms control
Europe against aggression, German unification or the diffusion of nuclear
or weapons, invariably
the solution depends on the ability of the West to
harmonise its need for security with its positive goals. Nowhere else
are the stakes as high. If the states bordering the North Atlantic
split up into a congerie of squabbling sovereignies, it would be a
final proof to all the uncommitted nations of the bankruptcy of the
liberal values of the West. The United States would find itself isolated
not only physically but also spiritually. Sooner or later, these states

on the fringe of the Eurasian landmass would be drawn into the Communist
orbit. The source of our culture and our values would then be alienated.
Americans, for the first time in our history, would live in a world where
we are foreign in the deepest sense, where people will share neither our
values nor our aspirations, where we may meet hostility everywhere outside

["triumph over our aspirations, where we may meet success and achieve our\n Goals in theभारत में जैसी बौध देखी जाता है कि उनका भी अनुशंसा\n नहीं है कि उनका भी अनुशंसा नहीं है जो कौशल नहीं है कि\n उनका भी अनुशंसा है कि उनका भी अनुशंसा है कि\n उन

I - 4

in an atmosphere of confusion that threatened to deprive any
under conditions not conducive to clean thought and likely to deprive
resulting actions of their full impact.
any action of its full impact. The constant repetition of the claims

of
the formal unity followed by haggling over details, emphasized the inability
of the alliance to agree on its program or its future. NATO strategy,
the significance of nuclear weapons, arms control, German unification,
European security all evoked discordant opinions barely obscured by
general declarations of amity. Though Soviet intransigence at least
produced a closing of ranks, we could make no worse mistake than
to pretend that the underlying difficulties have been solved. Unless
the North Atlantic group of nations develops a clearer purpose it will
be doomed to oscillate between euphoria and panic.

I - 4

under conditions not conducive to clear thought and likely to deprive
any action of its full impact. The constant repetition of the claims
to formal unity followed by haggling over details emphasized the inability
of the alliance to agree on its program or its future. NATO strategy,
the significance of nuclear weapons, arms control, German unification,
European security all evoked discordant opinions barely obscured by
general declarations of amity. Though Soviet intransigence at least
produced a closing of ranks, we could make no worse mistake than
to pretend that the underlying difficulties have been soft. Unless
the North Atlantic group of nations develops a clearer purpose it will
be doomed to oscillate between euphoria and panic.

be deemed to encroach between embankments and banks.

the North Atlantic Group of nations devotes a certain amount it will

be deemed that the underlying difficulties have been solved. Unless

produced a feeling of ranks, we could make no worse mistake than

General declarations of Smith. Through Soviet intransigence at least

Bulgarian security has revoked certain opinions partially opened by

the significance of nuclear weapons, same control, German manipulation,

of the alliance to agree on its program or its future. NATO advanced,

to form a society followed bypegging over details subordinated to the inactivity

and action of its full impact. The constant repetition of the claims

under conditions not constructive to clear thought and likely to deprive

I - 4

EP

I - 4

I - 4

be deemed to encourage between embodihe and bannic.

the North Atlantic group of native races, a former bannose it will
be present that the underlying difficulties have been solved. Unless
produced a feeling of rancor, we could make no worse mistakes than
regard deviations of such. Through Soviet intransigence at least
Europe has security will evoked discordant opinions which are
the significance of nuclear weapons, some control, German multination-
el of the effluence to agree on its program or its future. NATO advanced,
to former unity followed by fighting over details appended to the impugish
and action of its will indeed. The constant repetition of the claim
under conditions not constructive to clear thought and likely to deprive

I - 4

I - 4

be deemed to encourage between embattled and belligerent
the North Atlantic Group of nations develop a clearer understanding it will
to benefit that the underlying difficulties have been settled. Unless
produced a closing of ranks, we could make no more mistake than
General declarations of Smith. Through Soviet intranetness at least
Europeans seem to all avowed coherent opinion preying upon
the significance of nuclear weapons, same control, German multiplication,
of the alliance to agree on its program or its future. NATO strategy,
to format Smith followed by pointing over details emphasized the insufficiency
and action of its full impact. The constant repetition of the claims
under conditions not constructive to clear thought and likely to deprive

I - 4

III - 3

spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that on some awful day Western Europe should be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington. And who can even say that the two rivals after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?

"In truth, France, in equipping herself with a nuclear weapon, will render a service to world equilibrium."

These views, though much criticized, differ from similar arguments in Great Britain only in their bluntness.

What this conference (Labour Party Conference) ought not to do--and I beg them not to do it now--is to decide upon the dismantling of the whole fabric of British international relationships without putting anything in its place. . . . If they carried the resolution, with all its implications, and did not run away with it, they would send a British Foreign Secretary, whoever he was, naked into the conference chamber.

Both the British and French deterrents have been justified with the argument that possession of nuclear weapons would enable our allies to exert a greater influence over our actions. Since these weapons were obviously not intended as a threat against us, the influence they confer must be the power to initiate a nuclear war in defense of vital British or French interests--if necessary without United States participation. Our allies have sought to

5. Aneurin Bevan, speech at Brighton, October 3, 1957, quoted in *London Times*, October 4, 1957.

III - 4

create an independent deterrent, at least in part, to remove any
doubt in the mind of a potential aggressor about the likelihood of
retaliation when their security is at stake--regardless of what the United
States might decide to do. The implication is inescapable that →

III - 17

years ago to the problem of protecting the retaliatory force. They have
more
not adequately taken into account the difference between a first and

a second-strike capability. Independent retaliatory forces in Europe stand in
danger of producing an illusory feeling of security which in some respects
magnifies the danger. The allies
It is clear that no single European state is capable of creating
None of our

from its own resources a retaliatory force capable of defeating the USSR,
even by striking first. For all practical purposes, then, the retaliatory
force of the Soviet Union is invulnerable in relation to the retaliatory
force of any single European nation. Thus it is extremely unlikely that
any European country would initiate nuclear war against the Soviet Union,
even in the face of considerable provocation. For such an attack could
not achieve victory, while it would guarantee the devastation of the
country concerned. Europe is more densely populated than the USSR. The
distance to targets in Western Europe from Soviet missile bases is
relatively short. Compared to an attack on the United States, a retaliatory
blow by the Soviet Union would therefore be more accurate and, because
each missile would be able to carry a heavier payload, more destructive.
Indeed, the Soviet Union might have a positive interest in raving
to ravening the

III - B14

clearly raised the risk of Soviet pressure on Europe. The disagreements
among the allies over the future of Berlin and Germany, which have extended
over a year in the face of Soviet pressure, hardly inspire conviction
about the periodic declarations of formal unity. The diplomacy initiated
by
Mr. Macmillan's sortie to Moscow and by Khrushchev's visit to the United
States which has been seen each ally dealing separately, does little to create
faith in the cohesion of the West. Though these conferences have been
were
formally described as "conversations", this distinction is hardly
significant. Heads of state by definition cannot simply converse. Their
pronouncements are more binding than those of subordinates--this indeed
is the chief attraction to many of the personal diplomacy of recent
years. Whatever the protestations to the contrary, separate ddealings
raised
have been
the possibility of separate arrangements. This must be their chief
attraction in Khrushchev's eyes.

From the military point of view, the danger is always present in
any alliance that there exist as many foci for pressure as there are sovereign
states. We do not have to station nuclear weapons in Alaska under state

III - 13/15

control in order to make credible our determination to resist an attack on it even if only a single weapon were exploded there. It is "self-evident" that in the case of an attack on any part of the United States the question of whether the particular objective is "worth" the risk of nuclear retaliation will not be asked, even though its value may actually be less than that of an objective in Europe. Similarly, there is no danger that the Soviet Union will be able to blackmail Alaska into surrender because of doubt about the willingness of the United States to resist or about the efficacy of retaliation should it take place.

No FP

This is not the case in Europe. Whether we like it or not, our allies' quest for independent retaliatory forces is based on a doubt about our reliability. And such a state of mind tends to be self-confirming. It raises the possibility that the Soviet Union will be able to blackmail our allies one by one--at least such is a constant possibility which The Soviet would not attempt would be a vis-a-vis a state of our Union. The logical solution would be a specialization of functions, by which we concentrate on nuclear forces and our allies

This on conventional arms is inhibited by two other factors: the predominance

III - 334

The fact remains, that standing aloof and refusing to share even control
over the strategic forces may be the best means to be brought about more
and more national nuclear establishments, while if we agree to share
control over our weapons with our European allies, we may perhaps gain
some influence over the manner of the diffusion and shape the direction
of future nuclear policy. If we are not prepared to proceed with the
integration of NATO to the point where our allies achieve a measure of
positive control over the means of retaliation, the pressures for nuclear
diffusion will grow irresistible.

We face, in fact, two contradictory dangers: (a) that nuclear
weapons technology will spread to all nations, or else come into the possession
of more nations.12 (b) that we will be maneuvered into the position
of being the sole power in the free world possessing nuclear weapons.
The first danger involves the risk that every irresponsible leader will
be in a position to unleash a nuclear holocaust. It will be discussed
separately.13 The second peril--almost as great--is that by being the
only country in the free world possessing nuclear weapons we will gradually

12. Ibid.

13. See below p. ____.

III - 35

be pushed out of Europe. This would inevitably involve its neutralization.

For while it may be true that a nuclear defense involves grave risks, a conventional defense of a territory exposed to nuclear blackmail and being stripped of nuclear weapons is impossible. We cannot ask our European allies to make greater efforts in the field of conventional weapons without enabling NATO to prevent the Soviet Union from making this effort irrelevant by nuclear blackmail.

If we are unwilling to create a NATO nuclear establishment and if national possession by our European allies is politically dangerous and militarily useless, what alternative presents itself? In default of the NATO solution described above, the most hopeful approach would seem to be a European Atomic Force into which the British and soon-to-be French retaliatory forces would be merged. The European powers including Great Britain possess sufficient resources if they pool their resources to create a substantial nuclear establishment, and to protect it particularly if it is mobile or based on ships. The adequacy of the deterrent would To be sure, not reside in the fact that Europe could win an all-out war even by striking with the USSR.

IV - 11

of reunification should be approached primarily from class
positions. Can we agree when the capitalist world proposes to
achieve the reunification of Germany at the expense of the German
Democratic Republic <u>and thus narrow down the front of socialism</u>
(italics supplied). We have not and we do not live to yield to
capitalism...The question can also be put thus: Why not reunite
Germany by abolishing the capitalist system in West Germany and
establishing there the power of the working class. <u>But it would</u>
<u>be unrealistic today</u> (italics supplied)...I repeat we are for
German unity and the German people will be reunited. Therefore,
do not hurry, the wind does not blow in your faces...If you want
your children and grandchildren to remember you with gratitude,
you should fight for the conclusion of a German peace treaty which
would be an important step towards the unification of Germany."

The Soviet proposal that a peace treaty be concluded with
both Germanies thus marks the beginning and not the end of a

Foreign Broadcasts Quoted from Foreign Radio Broadcasts:
Daily Report, No. 62, 1959, BB2 ff.

IV - 13

a republic of the working class. It is a republic of workers and
peasants, the homeland of <u>all</u> German workers. "(italics supplied).

A similar point was made by a leader of the East German Communist
party in March 1959: "Socialism will triumph in the German Demo-
cratic Republic in the next few years. When we will place this
question before the entire German people and in what manner depends
on necessary real, objective conditions. <u>Under present circum-
stances</u> the main task in West Germany and West Berlin is to bring
about a change in the balance of forces in favor of peace and
democracy, <u>without as yet posing the demand for a transformation
of the social order</u>. Everything depends on taking a stand not
as a party of opposition but as the leading and the largest
party in all of Germany, a party which has a program for the
solution of the cardinal concerns of the <u>entire</u> German nation."(italics supplied).

19. Ibid.

20. Berliner Zeitung, March 5, 1959.

II - 3

that it might reduce the United States' and British willingness
to resort to all-out war in the defense of Europe.

This strategy has
new reached an impasse.

The issue then turns on the strategic significance of all-out
war for the defense of Europe in the missile age. Is Europe more
secure because our nuclear arsenal is more powerful than ever or
less secure because we are vulnerable as never before? Does the
increase in the range of missiles and airplanes make a substantial
military establishment on the Continent more or less important?
Should the NATO forces be designed to defeat Soviet aggression in
Europe or does their function remain to hold only until the effects
of the nuclear retaliatory blow have made themselves felt?

The threat of all-out war can ensure the security of Europe
only if we are able to meet two conditions: Our retaliatory force
must be sufficiently strong to win a war - in the sense of re-
ducing a counterblow to acceptable proportions - if we struck
first, and so invulnerable that it can inflict damage considered
intolerable by the Soviet Union if we struck second. In these
are attached.

II - 4

circumstances, the Soviet Union would not dare to attack Europe
for fear of triggering a pre-emptive strike which would destroy
its means of retaliation. It could not escape this dilemma by
launching a simultaneous attack on Europe and the United States
for our retaliation would -- by hypothesis -- still produce un-
acceptable losses. Then, the local forces in Europe would in
fact perform the role of a trip-wire. Their purpose would be to
deal with minor incursions. In case of major aggression, however,
the Soviet Union could not dare to attack only Europe, because
even if there were some doubt about our willingness to retaliate,
the penalty for a Soviet miscalculation would be complete defeat.
Hence we would deter. This in effect was the situation during the war,
the Soviet pressure on Berlin signaled the advent of an altered
strategic relationship.

It must be stressed that deterrence of an attack on Europe
by the threat of all-out war is possible only if we have the ability
to win by striking first -- in short if the Soviet retaliatory

II - 5

force is vulnerable. If our only option is to initiate a strategy
of devastation, if in response to pressure on Europe our only re-
course is to destroy Soviet cities, aggression may be encouraged.
For when an attack would ensure a similar degree of damage in the
United States the Soviet leaders may come to believe that our
threat of massive retaliation is bluff.

However, in the period of the missile gap, between, that is,
1961 and at least 1964, it will be technically impossible for us
to win an all-out war, even if we struck first. During that
time we will do well to protect our retaliatory force against
surprise attack. It will be reckless to rely on it to deter an
attack on Europe. A strategic striking force which is numerically
inferior in missiles and relies to a considerable extent on air-
planes, cannot hope to win an all-out war, even by striking first.
With the possibility of a pre-emptive strike ended beyond any
doubt, the threat of massive retaliation will lose much of its
significance even for the defense of Europe. After the missile

II-8

gap ends, it is theoretically conceivable that we could again
achieve strategic superiority either through breakthroughs on the
part of the offense or of the defense. But it is extremely unlikely
if only because of the increase in the total number of missiles and
their growing mobility. In any case we cannot gear our policy to
such an expectation. The only responsible course is to base
strategy on the assumption of the mutual invulnerability of the
retaliatory forces -- and to admit that to attain even this goal
requires efforts we have heretofore refused to make.

Under conditions of mutual invulnerability it will become
increasingly futile to rely on the strategy of the past decade.
The defense of Europe can then no longer rest on the threat of
all-out war alone. The threat of it may produce a pre-emptive
attack and the actuality of it would only insure our destruction
without protecting our allies. Western Europe could not be saved
by all-out war. We could achieve no more than mutual devastation.

If NATO can defend only by all-out war it will face a hopeless

II - 9

a contribution to our defense. They questioned not the strategy which had been developed but the wisdom of contributing to it.

Nothing could have revealed better the hopelessness of continuing to rely on all-out war for the defense of Europe. Confronted by Sputnik with the implications of NATO strategy, many people in Europe seemed above all concerned with banishing war from their territory. In the process, they neglected to ask themselves this crucial query: If so many Europeans recoiled before the consequences of the only strategy available, even in the defense of Europe, how could the United States be expected for an indefinite period of time to assume even more cataclysmic risks on its behalf of foreign countries however closely allied.

The security problem of Europe may thus be summed up as follows: (1) The Soviet Union can threaten all of Europe from its own territories. Consequently, alliances are not essential for policy. (2) No European country is capable of withstanding Soviet pressure alone. Security for them is therefore inseparable from

II-10

unity. (3) The threat of all-out war is losing its credibility and its strategic meaning. (4) The defense of Europe cannot be conducted solely from North America, because the aggressor can pose threats which will not seem to warrant total retaliation and because, however firm allied unity may be, a nation cannot be counted on to commit suicide in defense of a foreign territory.

A strengthening of the forces for the local defense of Europe is therefore essential for the very reasons usually invoked against it. No weapons have added new dimensions to the problem of deterring an attack on Europe.

From the point of view of strategy European bases are not essential for the event of all-out war. They are an added advantage to a power when it comes to establishing a military establishment in a country the government of that country considers it is above all necessary to defend against the threat of steadily diminishing importance, but not a necessity. It is argued by many that since European bases are no longer required for all-out war "the need for a substantial military establishment

II - II

on the Continent has disappeared." 3 Quite the reverse is true.

It is truly inconsistent to argue that the United States must be prepared to run greater risks than ever for an area whose strategic significance is constantly declining.

The psychological problem is more serious still. Every country
including our own, must become increasingly resistant to risk.
its existence for anything except the most direct challenge to its
survival. We have been loath to make these propositions explicit
lest we alarm our allies and because we have been unwilling to ac-
cept the fact of our vulnerability. Our allies have not been
prepared to believe in the changed situation, in order to avoid
the necessity of making a greater effort and for fear that a
realization of the inconsistencies of present NATO strategy might
lead to the withdrawal of the United States from Europe.

Such evasions must be demoralizing in the long run. Europe
need only recall its own hesitation over the offer of United States

3. Speech by the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Signor Quaroni, at the University of Frankfurt, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Apr. 1, 1959.

II - 12

missile bases to understand the difficulty soon to be imposed on
NATO by its present strategy. If Europe proved reluctant to
perticipate in an all-out war for the defense of the United States --
the only meaningful rationale for the doubts about establishing
missile bases -- so may the United States be reluctant to risk
total destruction for the defense of Europe -- particularly if
the Soviet leaders show their customary skill in confusing the
issues and if the challenge is apparently local. NATO should have
every incentive to develop a strategy which does not force the
United States to have to choose between all-out war and inaction
in the defense of Europe.

It may be objected that the Soviet Union would not be so
foolhardy as to bring pressure on the most sensitive area. The
more weakly defended region on its southern periphery would seem
to be much more tempting. An attack on say Iran, would have a
high probability of military success and the obstacles to American
retaliation would be even greater than in the case of Europe.

15
II - 16

war in Europe need not be determined in the abstract. The stronger
the local forces of NATO, the less likely it will be that the Soviet
Union will be tempted to probe, harass and adventure. The more
effective the military establishment on the Continent, the larger
must be the Soviet attack designed to overcome it. The more the
required effort approaches the scale of all-out war, the clearer
will be the challenge to our security and the more plausible our
threat of all-out war becomes. In short, as the horrors of all-
out war cripple the will to resort to it, the minimum objective
of the forces in Europe must be to raise the scale of the Soviet
effort required to defeat them to a level that can leave no doubt
about its ultimate objective. The most favorable situation would
exist if the military establishment in Europe could not be over-
come locally. Then the risk of initiating all-out war would be
shifted to the Soviet Union. Opportunites for blackmail or pres-
sure would be drastically reduced, if not eliminated.
As the military pressure on theSSK. forces in Europe should be lessening, there is no reason why the risk of all-out war should not be an insurmountable one for the SSK.

Some opponents of a greater military effort on the Continent

II - 18

still far exceed those of the Soviet Union to continue to claim
that they cannot afford what is needed for their defense or to
cite "hordes" of Soviet manpower as justification for what is
basically a lack of will.

In terms of a strategy of all-out war, the American forces
on the Continent are much too large. The function often ascribed
to them -- to serve as a symbol of our commitment to defend
Europe -- could be carried out as well by much smaller, indeed
by token contingents. Present NATO deployment, in fact, probably
combines the worst features of massive retaliation and of a policy
of local defense. Too strong for a trip-wire, too weak to avert
a major Soviet advance, it represents an uneasy compromise which
tempts Soviet blackmail and must lead to irresolution in the face
of pressure. The reliance on all-out war paralyzes the will in
times of crisis and furnishes a rationale for a reduction of local
defense forces in periods of calm.

~~In this atmosphere of present strategy~~

~~the conventional strategy on all local defense forces may become inevitable, because of the inability~~

present forces of NATO are too low. The planned minimum goals have never been achieved and in the light of changing technology they are almost certainly inadequate. More importantly, the defense of Europe must always involve American participation from the outset. The certainty of this adds to deterrence. A commitment of U.S. forces raises the risks to an aggressor whatever form our threat takes. A limited war over Europe involving the United States may represent an intolerably high risk of all-out war — if only because the Soviet leaders could not be confident that either they or we would know how to keep such a war limited. And if deterrence failed, only American participation could keep a conflict localized or insure a favorable outcome. If Europe attempts independent action, it may only tempt a demonstration of Soviet ruthlessness. An effort by either Europe or the United States to leave the defense of Europe entirely in European hands would prove disastrous to all partners.

Of course, it is always possible that the United States will

III

NATO and Nuclear Weapons

To recognize the need for a stronger military establishment

in Europe is to raise questions about its nature, about the relation

of nuclear weapons to NATO strategy and, above all, about the diffusion

of nuclear weapons to our European allies. The declining credibility

of the threat of massive retaliation--which has produced the need for

an increase in the military establishment in Europe, has also raised

in acute form the problem of control over what has heretofore been called

"The Deterrent." The growing Soviet capability to menace the United

States has thrown into sharp relief doubts which first appeared during

the Buez crisis and have been magnified since: whether the United States

can be relied upon to respond by all-out war to every challenge which

our allies may consider vital and if we do, whether we will use our

power in a manner they deem necessary to protect their interests.

President De Gaulle has explicitly justified France's request for
nuclear weapons of her own by the danger that the United States might
make a separate arrangement with the U.S.S.R. Or else

Liz: The quotation presumably coming from McCarthy Committee hearings is not to be found anywhere among said hearings, nor is there any hearing topic corresponding to the one given. Suggest you contact Feld or Ransom or somebody that may know more about it.

The Khrushchev Leipzig speech business can read: speech at Leipzig, March 5, 1959, text quoted in Pravda, March 6, 1959.

The Bevan Hansard citation in the "negotiations" chapter is:

Hansard, Vol. 582, p. 1418, February 20, 1958.

The Bevan "naked" quotation is as follows:

"What this conference (Labour Party Conference) ought not to do-- and I beg them not to do it now-- is to decide upon the dismantling of the whole fabric of British international relationships without putting anything in its place. . . . If they carried the resolution, with all its implications, and did not run away with it, they would send a British Foreign Secretary, whoever he was, naked into the conference chamber."

Aneurin Bevan, speech at Brighton, October 3, 1957, quoted in London Times, October 4, 1957.

The De Gaulle press conference (Nov. 10, 1959) remarks follow (quoted in the New York Times, November 11, 1959):

"No doubt the sort of equilibrium that exists between the atomic powers of the two camps is for the moment a factor of world peace. But who can say what will happen tomorrow? Who can say that, for example, some sudden advances in development, especially for space rockets, will not provide one of the camps with so great an advantage that its peaceful inclinations will not be able to resist it?

"Who can say that if in the future, the political background having changed completely-- that is something that has already happened on earth-- the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world?

"Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that on some awful day Western Europe should be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington. And who can ever say that the two rivals, after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?

De Gaulle, press conference of November 10, 1959 (Reuters),
quoted in the *New York Times*, November 11, 1959:

> "No doubt the sort of equilibrium that exists between the atomic powers of the two camps is for the moment a factor of world peace. But who can say what will happen tomorrow? Who can say that, for example, some sudden advances in development, especially for space rockets, will not provide one of the camps with so great an advantage that its peaceful inclinations will not be able to resist it?

> "Who can say that if in the future, the political background having changed completely-- that is something that has already happened on earth-- the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world?

> "Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that on some awful day Western Europe should be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington. And who can even say that the two rivals after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?

> "In truth, France, in equipping herself with a nuclear weapon, will render a service to world equilibrium."

NATO and Nuclear Weapons

theuez crisis and have been magnified since: whether the United States

President De Gaulle has explicitly justified France's quest for
nuclear weapons of her own by the danger that the United States might
make a separate arrangement with the U.S.S.R. or else

["H20 and H3000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

III - 2

mutual deterrence among the major nuclear powers might have the result
that they might tacitly agree not to devastate each other and to confine
their violence to other parts of the world. ⁴ Nuclear weapons under
French control would be a means to keep France from being a victim of
nuclear war.

These views, though much criticized, differ from similar arguments
in Great Britain only in their bluntness. The British deterrent has
been justified with the argument that possession of nuclear weapons would
enable Great Britain to exert a greater influence over our actions.
Since these weapons were obviously not intended to be used against us,
the influence they confer must be the power to initiate a nuclear war
in defense of vital British or French interests—if necessary without
United States participation. Our allies have sought to create an
independent deterrent, at least in part, to remove any doubt in the mind
of a potential aggressor about the likelihood of retaliation when their
security is at stake—regardless of what the United States might decide
to do in the first instance. The implication is inescapable that the

4. *Christian Science Monitor*, November 12, 1959

["4. C. C. M. H. H. H. H. H. H. H. H. H. H.

NATO and Nuclear Weapons

the Suez crisis and have been magnified since: whether the United States

President De Gaulle has explicitly justified France's quest for
nuclear weapons of her own by the danger that the United States might
make a separate arrangement with the U.S.S.R. Or else

["HATO and Holley House", "To recognize the need for a stronger military capability in Europe is to take questions about its nature, about the relation of major weapons to NATO strategy and, above all, about the direction of major weapons to our European allies. The declining credibility of major weapons to our European allies has produced the need for a change in our strategy of military acquisition. While Europe has also raised the question of the military capability of the United States in Europe, the problem of control over what the United States can do to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to ensure the United States has sufficient arms to prevent acquisition of arms is one of the major issues which must be addressed. The question of military capability of the United States in Europe has since been raised in Europe which that capability during the Second World War was not sufficient to prevent acquisition of arms. The question of military capability to

III - 2

4. *Christian Science Monitor*. November 12, 1959

["A. G. C. S. A. E. N. O. S. A. R. E. U. S. A.", "to do in the first instance. The implication is inescapable that it is\nundertaken to act as a sort of organ of government, and that the United\nStates government is a sort of organ of government which holds\nthe benefit of the consent of the governed, and which is not subject\nto a horizontal influence, apart from the influence of the state or\nfederal government, apart from the influence of the United States\nlegislature, and apart from the influence of the United States\nlegislature, at least in its strictest sense, to remove any doubt in the mind\nthat the United States government is not subject to the control of\nthe United States legislature, and that the United States legislature is not\nsubject to the control of the United States legislature, and that the United\nStates legislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the United States legislature is not subject to the\ncontrol of the United States legislature, and that the United States\nlegislature is not subject to the control of the United States\nlegislature, and that the

III - 48

first European country which attempted independent retaliation against it.

Reduced to rubble, it could become a warning to all others which may

be considered opposing Soviet designs by means of an independent retaliatory force.

Will an independent retaliatory force at least be able to prevent nuclear attack against the country possessing it? It is argued by some that an independent national retaliatory force does not have to be able to win. In order to deter it need only be able to inflict damage out of proportion to any gain an aggressor might achieve. But to the extent that the Soviet Union credits the possibility of independent retaliation, it may launch a pre-emptive strike. And it is extremely doubtful whether any European country can develop a retaliatory force capable of surviving a determined Soviet surprise attack. None of them have sufficient area to disperse their force or adequate resources to harden it--and hardening will be relatively ineffective or extremely costly against the accuracy possible in a Soviet missile attack on Europe. Indeed, until retaliatory forces become mobile and preferably seaborn they may constitute an

III - 8

depends on the prospect of United States intervention. Their function
would not be too different from that of the trip-wire forces described
earlier.

This is not apparent, however, in the early stages of nuclear
development. The first reaction to the possession of nuclear weapons
and the means to deliver them has generally proved to be an access of
confidence. The realization of vulnerability comes only later with the
study of strategic implications of the new found strength; it may then
produce a feeling of impotence. Great Britain for example, does not
seem to have derived particular firmness and resolution from its
~~almost exclusive~~ reliance on nuclear weapons.

Whether the reaction is overconfidence or a sense of futility,
the peace will be equaled by individual strength; the centralization
of an independent retaliatory force is likely to give rise to a certain
unanimity in the Western alliance.

The very creating of an independent retaliatory force
springs from a lack of confidence in either American understanding
of the common interest or American willingness to run risks on behalf
of our allies. Then again, unless a country's retaliatory force is

III - 11

directly threatened, a powerful incentive to defer a show-down exists.

The conviction will grow that as long as a country's means of retaliation are unimpaired, it is unnecessary to risk the national existence on behalf of a foreign country. Each European country will face in relation to all the others the inhibitions against resorting to all-out war which they have ascribed to the United States and which induced them to develop an independent retaliatory force in the first place. They will reserve nuclear retaliation to direct and overwhelming attacks on their national existence. In relation to all other issues, their relative weakness and greater proximity to the USSR will probably produce hesitations exceeding our own. The result of a multiplication of national retaliatory forces must be the weakening of NATO. Such a course will diffuse the risks while detracting from over-all strength.

At the same time, it is essential that we understand the dilemma that has led to the effort by Great Britain and France to develop independent national retaliatory forces of their own. Present NATO doctrine confronts our allies with a very real and serious problem: the alliance relies for

III - 19

waters.

The problem of the strategic significance of intermediate range missiles in Europe is reinforced by an even more serious allied concern:

whether retaliation will in fact take place in situations where they
believe their vital interest to be at stake and we differ. The
double-veto system under which the intermediate-range missiles are
based in Europe gives our allies only a negative control. According
to it, missiles cannot be launched except with the approval of the
United States and the host country. This our allies can prevent us
from retaliating, they cannot compel us to do so. Nor is the double
veto system symmetrical. While we can veto retaliation from Europe,
our allies cannot veto retaliation from the United States.

This system has serious drawbacks. For one thing it is difficult
to visualize how it would operate in a defensive <u>way</u>. The warning time
available to European based missiles is not likely to exceed ten minutes.

9B. Similar and more detailed arguments have been made by Albert Wohlstetter in The Delicate Balance of Terror, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1959, p. 222.

III - 20

It is not easy to see how A is a practical matter the concurrence of the governments concerned—or even if their military in this interval can be obtained in this interval. And the authority to resort to nuclear weapons cannot be delegated too far down the line.

The double-veto system—far from being sensitive to the conception of their interests of individual allies—guarantees that the response will be of the lowest common denominator obtainable within the Alliance. Intermediate range missiles in Europe under the present system of control therefore barely reduce the scope of Soviet blackmail. In any concrete case, NATO would still be entirely dependent on our willingness to run the risks of nuclear war and this willingness is, or at least should be, unaffected by the stationing of the present family of intermediate range missiles in Europe. This may be desirable from our point of view. It is, however, not surprising that some of our allies are restless with a state of affairs which gives them so little influence over their destiny.

The double veto system also affects the utility of intermediate range missiles for deterrence of limited aggression. Intermediate range

III - 22

a strategy of tit for tat against the Soviet homeland would be suicidal.

Our European allies would soon begin to doubt the value of an alliance which used them essentially as a lightning rod.

This is not to say that missiles stationed in Europe are without
any utility. But they should be designed primarily for tactical defense
and not for retaliation. The retaliatory mission can be carried out from
ship-based missiles or from those based in the United States. For the
tactical mission, accuracy and above all mobility are a prime requisite.
Accuracy is necessary to permit a discriminating application of power,
and mobility is needed to reduce the vulnerability to surprise attack.

NATO should therefore strive to create a missile system which can be
moved by motor, a major part of which is constantly shifting position.
Submarines, and surface ships, provide another form of mobile launching
site. Surface ships can be very simple. Even coastal steamers or
barges could supply considerable protection. Missiles of ranges up to
800 or 1,000-miles would prove highly useful though they could not be
decisive in an all-out war--and perhaps because of it. The very fact

[Y]

III - 29

for what is in effect a tendency to make all other allies dispensable.

Moreover, the inhibitions on carrying out our responsibilities outside
of Europe are more apparent than real. There are three contingencies
in which we may wish to use our retaliatory forces: (a) for all-out
war (b) for limited war in the NATO area (c) for limited war outside
the NATO area. In the case of all-out war, our NATO allies would be

bound to support us. If our allies should both, ~~the~~ Treaty obligations
and, no doubt, by the formal agreement specifying the circumstances for
nuclear retaliation described above. If our allies should seek to evade
their responsibilities, we would thereby be freed of all obligations
and the part of our retaliatory force assigned to NATO would revert to.

If NATO is involved, however - as by treaty and by interest - almost all forces any one of them should be part of an overall plan of U.S. control. Placing a part of SAC under NATO control would thus

present no handicap in the eventuality of all-out war.

In use of limited war in the NATO area, the arrangement of a parting will make limitations somewhat easier by giving NATO an additional means of retaliation and by making a distinction, however tenuous and formal, between our over-all strategic force and those assigned to NATO. (Though these distinctions may not

V - 5

substitute for security effort, but its reverse side is

The Arms control in Europe depends on understanding the what should be the characteristics of an arms agreement essential characteristics for European security: A scheme of arms for Europe

control must take care not to wreck NATO, for without NATO each
European country would face the preponderant Soviet might alone.

It must not eliminate the possibility of local defense, lest our
allies become demoralized by the threat of Soviet conventional
and tactical nuclear strength. But while protecting our European
allies against nuclear blackmail or conventional aggression, it
must also give assurances to the Soviet Union against attack from
NATO territory. For real stability/progress must be made towards
the unification of Germany, because this would remove the chief
cause of political tension in Europe and the one most likely to
produce an explosion. The question then becomes whether in the
event of German unification it is possible to conceive of two
military establishments on the Continent capable of defensive
action but deprived through appropriate control measures of

21. See below p.

V - 15

an interest in maintaining the East German puppet government because of their own tenuous hold on their populations. And they have strong nationalistic grounds as well. For them a divided Germany will seem for a long time the best protection against renewed German pressure and the most certain protection of their territorial gains since World War II. In short, disengagement which does not address itself to the problem of German unification invites the very dangers it seeks to avoid.

The same is even more true of a "thinning-out" of forces which is often proposed. It affords no possibility whatever of a loosening of Soviet political control in the satellites or in Eastern Germany. For purposes of political control two divisions are as effective as twenty: they symbolize Soviet power and they establish the possibility, if not the right, to intervene. There are only two divisions in Poland, none in Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. This suggests that even without the presence of the Soviet troops a more liberal evolution is not certain. But as for us, we are free to choose.

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ground operations, most schemes for troop reduction would merely weaken the capability for local defense of the West without providing an additional reassurance to the Soviet Union. They would improve the _offensive_, but not the _defensive_, position of the USSR.

Even a troop freeze has the result of keeping NATO from adapting itself to changed strategic relationships. Unless coupled with a major reduction of Soviet forces or a build-up of conventional strength in the part of the Continent outside the controlled zone and probably through a combination of both, it will perpetuate an inequality which will represent a growing invitation to Soviet adventures as Soviet long-range missiles multiply.

Moreover, many of these objectives can be achieved by the Soviet Union simply by _negotiating_ about disengagement. The argument is frequently made that we should at least offer disengagement "to test Soviet good faith" or as a propaganda move to make it clear how such a test would not be made. However, if we are to receive a test of Soviet good faith, we must make proposals it is not prepared to see accepted. It cannot

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ability to retaliate. In these circumstances the Soviet Union might be encouraged to threaten Central Europe and to attempt to split the Western alliance by emerging to the countries controlling nuclear weapons that the issue was not "worth" a nuclear war. Nevertheless, once a denuclearized zone was established, it would be difficult to deal with Soviet pressures to expand it to

include eventually the entire Continent.

As long as the West bases its defense so heavily on nuclear weapons, we are hardly in a position to convince our allies that their security would not be jeopardized if they must rely on foreign weapons, stationed on foreign territory, and under foreign control. After all, the British deterrent has been explicitly justified as necessary for contingencies where the United States might be reluctant to engage itself. In the Defense Debate of

1960, the leader of the Labor Party, Hugh Gaitskell, said:

"If we get into a situation in which we had a little difference with the United States and the Russians were threatening us over something about which we felt

that they would gain no additional security from arms control schemes.

Thus, effective negotiations may be prevented, not by the strength of NATO but by its weakness and irresolution.

We must realize that arms control schemes cannot by themselves ameliorate the tensions which are caused by the Soviet suppression of freedom in Eastern Europe and particularly in East Germany. As long as Germany remains divided, the danger of an explosion exists whatever the wishes of the chief protagonists. Measures to control armaments in Central Europe, to be effective, should therefore accompany a political settlement. The natural dividing line for arms control schemes is the Oder, not the Elbe. If the Soviet Union is really concerned with stability and not with consolidating a springboard for a new advance, it should have a similar interest in creating conditions which will remove the chief political irritant and the one most difficult to control by pure arms limitation schemes.