Chapter III -- *Limited War - A Re-Appraisal*

I - *The Nature of Limited War*

As the consequences of all-out war grow more horrible, reliance on it also becomes more absurd. The gap between the threat made for purposes of deterrence and the strategy which we are prepared to implement will widen. Every increase in destructiveness is purchased at the price of reduced credibility of the retaliatory threat. In this vicious circle, deterrence may fail. And if it does the reliance on massive retaliation will *guarantee the most dire outcome*. It will lead either to surrender or to the most catastrophic form of war.

Nothing is more urgent than to harmonize our deterrent policy with a strategy we are prepared to implement. The wider the gap, the greater the scope for Soviet blackmail. The more we rely on nuclear retaliation against the Soviet homeland, the more exposed the other countries of the free world will be to Communist pressures threatening *fait accompli*. In the missile age, the side which can add another increment of power without resorting to all-out war—or which can threaten to do so/will gain a perhaps decisive advantage over an opponent

I-2

who does not have this ability. Flexibility in both diplomacy and
strategy requires that a maximum number of stages be created between
surrender and Armageddon.

The argument is frequently heard that the purpose of the
West's military establishment is to deter war, not to wage it. Sir
John Slessor writes, for example: "I do not believe that the great
deterrent *will* fail of its purpose--i.e. I don't believe there *will*
be another total all-out war." And the same writer says elsewhere:
"...the job of the German Army, like the rest of NATO, will be to
*prevent* war, not to wage it." Any inquiry into a tolerable strategy,
it is alleged, is therefore beside the point. It will weaken deterrence
by reducing the risk in the aggressor's mind. To the degree that the
consequences of war appear tolerable to us, they may grow acceptable
to the aggressor as well. Aggression will thereby be encouraged. And
once war starts, on whatever scale, it may become all-out.

However, this argument begs the principal question: that de-
*terrence cannot be separated from strategy. Deterrence results from*

1. Sir John Slessor, "Total or Limited War," in *The Great Deterrent*, London, 1957, pp. 266-267.

2. "Strategy for the West," *Ibid.*, p. 229.

I-2a

a product of which the elements are the extent of the retaliation
to aggression and its likelihood. These two factors are related
to each other in an inverse ratio. If either is very low, deterrence
fails. If the side seeking to deter emphasizes the destructiveness
of its response at the expense of the likelihood of retaliation,
aggression may be encouraged. .... ....

I-3

If we place too much stress on a strategy of minimum cost, the penalties against/may be too low for effective deterrence. Deterrence is at a maximum when the product of these two factors is greatest. The challenge before our military policy is to strike the best balance between deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail.

These considerations bear importantly on the problem of limited war. Limited war has been much debated over the past few years. Many refined theories have been developed. But the basic concept is simple. It maintains that the threat of massive retaliation has lost both credibility and utility since a retaliatory strategy would have to be carried out with the knowledge that a counterblow would inflict perhaps catastrophic damage. Henceforth we must seek to deter Communist aggression by developing military forces capable of checking Communist aggression at whatever scale of violence it may be initiated. Deterrence would be complete if the aggressor could not defeat the military forces of the free world whatever form aggression takes. If adequate limited

I - 6

which this strategy
Theorists of limited war do not deny that the risk/it poses to the aggressor
is less than that of massive retaliation. But they argue that this
is more than made up for by the increase in the certainty of the response.
Moreover, the notion that deterrence requires the threat of total

devastation is a vestige of our period of invulnerability, and/rockless
in the age of nuclear plenty. Aggression would seem to be senseless
if the aggressor knew in advance that he could not achieve any benefit
gain regardless of the nature or the scale of his attack.
whatever military measures are understood. Limited war forces, properly
designed, should ensure this. If the Communist countries were certain
that they could not win a limited war, their opportunities for blackmail
would be sharply reduced. A strategy of limited war would seek to
achieve deterrence not so much through the threat of devastation but
through depriving the aggressor of the possibility of gaining his objective.

Many object that limited war is chimerical because neither side
would be willing to accept defeat as long as it still had available
uncommitted resources. Hence there is a danger of "escalation": the
adding of increments of power until limited war may insensibly merge

acting of instruments of power until limited by instrumentality made
unlimited resources. House debate is a matter of 

Many object that limited war is exceptional because neither side

through controlling the aggressor or the beneficiary or behind the objective,
modifying deterrence not so much through the threat or manifestation of
would be strategy to benefit war would seek to
that they could not win a limited war. Such opportunities for placemaking
decals, should ensure that. If the Communist countries were certain
in themselves that they would have the resources toشن limited
war forces properly
in regardless of the nature or the scale of the attack.

it the aggressor knew in advance that he could not achieve such目的
in the age of most recent wars. Aggression would seem to be unnecessary
generation is a vice of our period of inflationaryism. It is true
therefore

Hence, the notion that deterrence requires the threat or total

it more than made after the increase in the certainly of the response.
it less than that of massive retaliation. But such terms that title

Theories of limited war do not demand that the risk of loss to the aggressor which this strategy

I - 8

I-5

into all-out war. By seeking to avoid the ultimate risk, so the argument goes, a strategy of limited war makes it inevitable.

It is true that the possibility of all-out war is inherent in a limited war among major powers. Since limited war by definition does not involve all the resources of the opponents it is easy to "prove" how a war could expand. No one can know whether either side would accept defeat. But we must be clear about what is involved in pressing the argument about escalation too far. A country prepared to risk mutual destruction rather than forego the possibility of gaining its objective can be deterred only by surrender. While it is true that war can be kept limited only if the two sides wish to keep it limited, it is equally true that an aggressor convinced that its intended victim is unwilling to run any risk may be positively encouraged to resort to the most dire manaces.

The purpose of a strategy of limited war, then, is, first, to strengthen deterrence, and second, if deterrence should fail, to provide an opportunity for settlement before the automatism of the retaliatory forces take over. The worst

I-5a

A country not willing to risk limited war because it fears that
resistance to aggression on any scale may lead to all-out war

can hardly make credible the threat of massive retaliation.

In a showdown, its only alternative will be surrender.

The purpose of a strategy of limited war, then,
is first to strengthen deterrence, and second, if deterrence
should fail, to provide an opportunity for settlement before
the automatism of the retaliatory force take over. The worst

..... ....... ......

I-7

works both ways. An aggressor may not credit our threat of massive retaliation because it would force us to initiate a course of action which will inevitably involve enormous deviation. He may calculate, however, that once engaged in war on any scale neither he nor we would know how to limit it, whatever the intentions of the two sides. The stronger the limited war forces of the free world, the larger will have to be designed more the Communist effort/to overcome them. The/govern the scale of conflict required for victory approaches that of all-out war, the greater will be the inhibitions against initiating hostilities. In this sense a capability of limited war is necessary in order to enhance the deterrent power of the retaliatory force.

The risk that war could become general places constraints both on its extent and its duration. If either side wanted an all-out war, it would be foolish to alert the retaliatory force of the opponent by engaging in local conflict. The more fact that a limited war is taking place is a signal/to avoid a showdown. Experience has shown that both sides generally lean over backwards to convey their limited aims and methods to the other.

I - 2

prevail approaches that of all-out war, the greater will be the inhibitions against initiating hostilities. The risk that war could become general, places constraints both on its extent and its duration.

If either side wanted an all-out war it would be foolish to alert the retaliatory force of its opponent by engaging in local conflict. The more fact that a limited war is taking place is a signal of the desire to avoid a show-down. Experience has shown that both sides generally lean over backwards to convey their limited aims and methods to the other.

Those who decide specific limitations as illogical miss the central point: an illogical limitation is often particularly effective in conveying one's self-restraint to the other side. During the Korean war we did not attack the bases in Manchuria from which air attacks against our forces were being mounted. The Communists in turn did not bomb the only two ports through which we could obtain supplies. Similar restrictions were observed in the conflict over Quonoy. Despite the fact that Communist China has always claimed that its territorial waters extend twelve miles, our ships were permitted to approach within three

such twelve miles, our ships were positioned so as to enhance within time
that the Committee Office may be located that its territorial waters
restricted were observed in the conflict over Canada. Due to the
pump the only two ports through which we could obtain supplies. Thereafter
against our forces were put names. The Committee in turn did not
not we did not affect the place in Newfoundland from which air attacks
against one aircraft resistant to the other side. During the four days
point, an indirect limitation in some perturbative objective in
These who desire specific limitations to indirect limit the control
other.

Each one of these makes to convey, direct, indirect and specific methods to the
so vast a shore-borne. Experience has shown that both these generally
were that a limited war to taking place is a signal of the close
resistible force of its opponent by engaging in local conflict. The
It either side might be off our own, but it would be too late to affect the
power General, places concentrate force on the extent and the duration,
indirectness against initiating position. The aim that we seeking
prevent subordination that of all-out war, the strategy will be the

I - 10

miles of Quemoy without being fired on. We then loaded supplies on small Nationalist landing vessels. These were shelled as soon as they crossed the three mile limit which had been tacitly agreed upon. We in turn did not use planes against Chinese shore batteries. Neither of these limitations came about through explicit agreement. Neither would have been thought very sensible had it been proposed as a model at military staff colleges.

Though limitations must be to some extent arbitrary, not every limitation is equally useful. Self-restraint, illogical or otherwise, will be effective only if each side understands the intentions of the other and cooperates.

It is essential that both sides understand the intention to avoid a showdown lest what is intended is limited resistance is construed as the prelude to all-out war, and dealt with accordingly. However intense the desire to limit a conflict, it could expand because of a failure of communication.³ For these

3. For a brilliant discussion see Schelling, Thomas, "Bargaining, Communication and Limited War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. No. 1, March 1957

of Conflict Resolution.

A.J. No. 1, March 1923
"Bargaining," Communication and Limited War," Journal
3. For a brilliant discussion see "Bargaining," Home, 2
expenditure of a failure of communication." 3 For these
occasionally

However, intensity the desire to limit a conflict, it could
relate to be construed as the bringing to all-out war.

to avoid a showdown, what is intended is limited
not every limitation is equally necessary. Self-restraint.

If it is essential that both sides understand the intention

understand the intentions of the other and cooperate.

indefinite or otherwise, will be effective only if each side
not every limitation is equally necessary. Self-restraint.

Neither would have been thought very sensible had it been
these limitations come out through explicit agreement.

use issues against Chinese shore batteries. Neither of
had been transmitted so directly agreed upon. We in turn did not
enjoyed so soon as they crossed the three wire limit which
ambushed on small Nationalist funding vessels. These were
wives of Chenoy without being fired on. We then lodged

I - 10

I - 11

reasons, the limitations which inspire greatest confidence
are those which might most "naturally" occur to both parties--
assuming they wish to establish limitations--and without
this desire no limitation of any kind is feasible.

For example, any limited war must have some sanctuary
areas--if only because a global war cannot be considered
limited. There is no particular reason for establishing the
boundaries of these sanctuaries in any particular place. In
practice, however, the danger of misunderstanding is least
if the sanctuary follows national boundaries. This is not
because other demarcation lines are unfeasible, technically
agree
a line
on one chosen entirely at random. The more "unfamiliar"
the limitations, the more difficult it will be to make them
stick. This consideration will be of importance in discussing
the relative emphasis to be given to conventional or nuclear
weapons in limited war.

whereby in limited war.

the relative egotism to be given to conventional or unclean
stick. This consideration will be of importance in discussing
the limitations the more difficult it will be to make them
on one chosen entirely at random. The more "unsanitary"

It is rather that it will prove more difficult to some
because other demarcation lines are uncleanly consequently
it the sanctuary follows national boundaries. This is not
practice, however, the danger of misunderstanding is great
boundaries of these sanctuaries in such particular place. In
limited. There is no particular reason for splitting the
area--it only because a global war cannot be considered
for example, such limited war must have some sanctity
this centre no limitation of any kind is feasible.
seeming they wish to split limitations--and without
there which might most "naturally" occur to both parties--
reasons, the limitations which inspire greatest confidence

I - 18

I - II

Nevertheless, it would be irresponsible to minimize the
risk of what has come to be called "escalation." It will
be great in proportion as limited war is considered entirely
as a strategic problem and not as an opportunity for a pause
not to permit negotiations. Any limited war should be considered
a cheaper method of imposing unconditional surrender but
as an opportunity for another attempt to prevent a final
showdown. We must enter it prepared to negotiate and to
settle for something less than our traditional notion of
complete victory. To be sure, the most likely outcome of
a conflict fought in this manner is a stalemate. But the
high likelihood of a stalemate would seem to deprive aggression
of its object. Hence deterrence would be achieved.

It is often argued that if both sides could agree on
anything as complicated as limited war, they could probably
agree on keeping the peace in the first place. But this is
essentially a debating point. The problem of limited war
obviously will not arise if there is agreement on outstanding

Optionally will not arise if there is agreement on outstanding
essentially a debating point. The problem of limited war
agree on keeping the peace in the first place. But this is
snapping as complicated as limited war, they could properly
It is often argued that it both sides could agree on
of its object. Hence determination would be achieved.

High likelihood of a settlement would seem to deprive addression
a conflict fought in this manner is a settlement. But the
complete victory. To be sure, the most likely outcome of
settle for something less than our traditional notion of
showdown. We must enter it prepared to negotiate and to
see an opportunity for another attempt to prevent a total
as's cheaper method of imposing unconditional surrender put

to permit negotiations. If limited war should be considered
not

as a strategic problem and so an opportunity for a base
be great in proportion as limited war is considered entirely
risk of what may come to be settled "accident". It will

Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to minimize the

I - II

I-13

establishment is necessary to make plausible the threat of
massive retaliation, we must not leave the impression that we
would be prepared to rely entirely on limited war forces. According
to this school of thought, the sooner the point is reached at
which we could escape a setback only by resorting to all-out
war, the stronger our deterrent position will be. A substantial
limited war establishment might raise doubts about our ultimate
resolve and thereby bring on aggression.

But as the missile age develops, an inadequate limited war
establishment may combine the worst features of every strategic
choice. If we place only a little step between surrender and all-
out war, the Soviet opportunity to blackmail allies and neutrals would
substantially remain. The dread alternative of surrender or suicide
will even be compounded by the risk of a series of "small" defeats,
none of which
....
....
....

none of which

....

....

....

will even be compounded by the risk of a series of "small" defeats, suboptimally resulting in the gross alternative of surrender or suicide out war. The Soviet opportunity to place small allies and neutrals would choice. If we place only a little step between surrender and all-out efitapliment may complete the worst features of every strategic

resolve and therapy bring on aggressors.

limited war efitapliments might raise doubts about our ultimate
war, the stronger our deterrent position will be. A substantial
which we could escape a setback only by reacting to all-out
to this school of thought, the secon the point is reached at
would be bereaved to rely entirely on limited war forces. According
masive retaliation, we must not leave the impression that we
efitapliment is necessary to make plausible the threat of

I-13

I-h4

seems "worth" an all-out war. The consequences may be positive
Communist incentive to defeat small American limited-war forces--
if only to demonstrate our impotence. In the period of mutual
invulnerability, the United States cannot impose on itself the
burden of having to respond to every challenge with the threat
of self-destruction. And it only fudges the issue to look at the
limited-war establishment primarily as a trigger for the retali-
tory force. The free world will not be really safe until it can
shift on to the aggressor the risk of initiating all-out war.

There are two categories of criticism of the concept of
limited war then. Some question it because they believe limi-
tation will be _too_ effective and this, they assert, violates
traditional notions of warfare. Others object because they do
not believe limitation can be effective enough.

The fact of our vulnerability has not been easy to accept
by those who but ten years ago conceived the retaliatory strategy
as the most "modern" utilization of our industrial potential and
who now find themselves in the conservative position. Many of

(Continued on 14-a)

(Continued on next)

who now find themselves in the conservative position. Many of
as the most "modern" utilization of our industrial potential and
by those who put ten years ago conceived the ratiocentric attraction
The fact of our vulnerability has not been easy to seege
not believe limitation can be effective enough.

traditional notions of warfare. Others opt for those do
tation will be too effective and this, they assert, violates
limited war then. Some question it because they believe limit-
There are two categories of criticism of the concept of
applied on to the aggressor the risk of initiating all-out war.
force. The free world will not be really safe until it can
limited-war appreciation primarily as a trigger for the resis-
tance of self-destruction. And if only underlies the issue to look at the
pursuit of having to respond to every challenge with the greatest
inclusiveness, the United States cannot impose on itself the
it only to demonstrate our imbedence. In the period of much
Communist incentive to defeat small American limited-war forces—
seems "worth" an all-out war. The consequences may be negative

and the two categories of criticism of the concept of

limiting war then. Some question it because they believe limit-

Others opt for those do

I-44

I-14-a

them construe any attempt to develop an alternative to a strategy of devastation in the age of nuclear plenty as foregoing a unilateral advantage. General Power has argued: ...

a multilateral advantage. General power has argued: ... they lack of devastation in the age of nuclear plenty as foregoing them constitute any attempt to develop an alternative to a arms-

I-17-S

I - 15

...I think if we get into a war which is not a little tiny policy action, I do not want to see us use conventional bombs, because I have a deep moral sense as it applies to Americans. I get a little indignant with people who become very lofty in their thinking and do not want to kill a few of the enemy but would gladly risk additional American lives. My crews are more important to me than the enemy. If I can send only one airplane over and do the job of a thousand, that is what I want to do."

The problem of nuclear war as against conventional warfare will be discussed later in this chapter. For present purposes, it is enough to point out that even by General Power's yardstick the problem is not nearly so simple. The choice is not between airplane crews and enemy targets. An attack on the aggressor's civilian population may cost more American lives than any other strategy because of the certainty of retaliation. Deterrence is the act of posing the maximum credible risk. In the age of nuclear plenty and growing missile forces this is more likely to be provided by a strategy of limited war than by a retaliatory threat always in danger of becoming an empty pose.

4. General Power in "Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations," House of Representatives, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, Part 2, p. 388, Feb. 13, 1959.

to the concept of limited war.

Limitation. It is easy to understand the objection of the traditionalists. Others agree if because they select the very definiteness of

I - 16

on for the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism of some of the other groups is puzzling. They pretend that those who urge a greater reliance on limited war wish to bring it about. They give the impression that the choice before us is peace or limited war and they then proceed to demonstrate the easy proposition that peace is preferable.

However, our alternatives are quite different. No responsible person advocates initiating limited war. The problem of limited war will arise only in case of Communist aggression or blackmail. In these circumstances, if we reject the concept of limited war, our only options will be surrender or all-out war. And it does not make sense to ridicule the notion of limited war because it might lead to general war and then to rely on a military policy which gives us no other choice but all-out war. The conclusion is almost inescapable that in case of Soviet aggression--the only contingency worth discussing in this context--many of those decrying the