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Letter from a Japanese Historian

wrought upon the German political consciousness, as it observed with chagrin the trend of the historic currents in some other countries, which were tending in an exactly opposite direction to those at home. France, England, and Russia had been tending, though in vastly different ways from one another, toward unity and centralization, and even expanding outward. If Providence had condemned the Germans to an undeserved fate -- Schicksal, a favorite word of theirs, could they not hack their way out of it? If they had been decreed to be an inferior nation, how might they prove to others, even more to themselves, that they were really superior to all? Can it be said to be altogether strange that, in the course of unending calamities, their political mind - I am not speaking of any other aspect of the German character - should have been deeply scarred and woefully warped, bent inward and made spiteful and defiant toward others? Foreign nations are bounden enemies, forever denying to Germany her legitimate right and honor, and ready at any instant to unite their forces in a move to "encircle" and strangle her; the Germans can depend upon nothing but themselves and their own prowess; they would intensify mutual loyalty among themselves; but, as against the others, every deceit and aggression is a mark of their devotion to their own community, and is the only self-demonstration of their innate mission and capacity to dominate, which they have come to attribute supremely to themselves. The characteristic international conduct of the Germans in modern times since Frederick the Great has been an inevitable application of this very mind to the successive events, as also a cause of its further confirmation. That any other people thrown in the same historical situation would have roacted in a like manner and been imbued with the same psychoses, seems to me, for one, most doubtful. However that may be, it is difficult for a student not to feel a measure of compassion for a nation that has been a victim to so unbroken a series of tragic experiences.

Sympathetic or not, however, the world must for long years to come be constantly prepared to deal wisely and safely whatever should emanate from this well of explosive poison that has been dug deep in the heart of Europe. Will there be sufficient wisdom and determination for this task? Must we resign ourselves to an expectation of seeing recurrences of appeasements and consequent wars?

Pardon my repeating that the Teutonic spirit that has been preserved by the Germans is in character primitive. It is not a fault into which one happens to have fallen on the way, not even a habit which has been bred under some untoward circumstances and which would not long survive them, but an immemorial heritage kept alive and nurtured through the ages, and deeply embodied in the national temper through repeated practices on large scales. What, I ask, can be more primitive and untamed than the German attitude that mine is all forever mine, and all thine will be mine; that I must prove to myself my power to destroy thy personality and thy life; than the Germans' blindness to the moral forces animating their neighbors' lives, coupled with their implicit faith in the supposed omnipotence of sheer brute force; than their refusal, on the one hand, either to recognize the existence of others' rights and honor or to tolerate the restraints of any civilization, and, on the other, their slavish obedience to their loader's behest to sacrifice themselves and others to the glory of their own universal domination; and than their ardor, in the exclusive interest of this elemental aim, to develop an invincingly strong arm, and to devote to that end every material and intellectual resource they can command in themselves and in the conquered? Aside from the sacrifice of parts to the whole and the harnessing of resources to a single purpose, the enumerated characteristics are simply the ways of a child of utmost waywardness who fancies himself to be the center of the world and would break everything standing in his way. The sole aim conceived and the sole means employed are of extreme simplicity. They are rooted in a blind urge to bloat oneself and in a bitter hatred of every one else. Of themselves an indefinite inflation, and for others a total nihilism, the German "need" (Not) can admit no

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possibilities of elevation, or of any manner of justification that might seem intelli-
gible to another person. Whatever may be said of any other aspect of the Germans'
Kultur, such traits as I have sketched are without exaggeration what has been clearly
demonstrated of their political spirit reduced to its simplest terms.

Another point that has been proven beyond a doubt is that the racial theory
of the Germans, from its very nature, can provide no room for allies of equal foot-
ing to themselves. For the nation that has conquered Norway, Denmark, and Holland,
more Germanic than itself, the Latins and the Slavs can only be the less its peers.
Italy was for hundreds of years after Charlemagne and Otto lorded over by the Toutons.
As for the Slavs, they are traditionally deemed incompatible with the Germans and are
marked out for a final subjugation. In the present war with Russia, this thought is
thinly disguised under the mask of an anti-communism so freely taken off and put on.
If alliances are created with these alien nations, they can be naught else than
temporary tools employed in the Germans' own work of conquest. That it is intended,
during even the period of actual alliance, gradually to bind their limbs and finally
to enslave them altogether, can hardly be doubted, if one recalls the freely ex-
pressed German contempt and hatred of them. Witness how in the past few weeks the
Balkan allies - Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Jugoslavia - have already been re-
duced to a position of servitors, and how their resentment has been steadily rising.
Italy, as a strong Power and as an elder brother in the totalitarian movement, would
still seem to be enjoying an equal treatment, but the reality is far from the ap-
pearance; hence the mounting discontentment of Mussolini and his people. One or two
illustrations should suffice. The reasons for the presence of German troops in the
peninsula are not only that it is a convenient jumping-off ground for African
ventures, but much rather that any uprising may be suppressed, and that Italy should
little by little forfeit her freedom of action. There probably is no Italian who is
so obtuse as not to realize this fact. The Italian soldiers and marines, reluctant-
ly, are doing obsequious service at their peril for Germany in parts of the Balkans
and in Russia, regions where Italy has little political interest of her own. Even
more shameful is the fact that between three and five hundred thousand peninsular
laborers are employed in Germany, providing their own food. These facts attest that
the treatment accorded the southern ally is, in nature, little different from that of
the conquered nations of Greece and of northern and western Europe. That poor
Mussolini is still supporting Hitler is not that he is unaware of his precarious
state, but that any resistance would cost him his position, and that his nation, dis-
gruntled as it is, lacks the tradition and the will to assert its own rights. As its
poverty and humiliation grow, how it will eventually comport itself, is an interest-
ing problem.

(The enclosed article was obviously written too early to note the predicament of Italy which has since become painfully evident.)

Japan, being far away, has as yet escaped servitude in any gross form. But
it can hardly be doubted that, remote as it is, the Pacific Ocean is ear-marked as
within the sphere of German exploitation in a later stage, just as much as is South
America, and quite likely as a region much more important for German "power-politics"
than the latter. One can hardly think that Germany repents her former acquisition
of a nearly quarter-million square miles of islands in the South Seas, her Manila Bay
venture, her seizure of Kiao-Chow, and the grandiose scheme of a trans-Asiatic nove-
ment that she built upon the possession of that strategic Chinese port. Those were
all lost in the first world war, and Japan has fallen heir to some of them; but from
the German standpoint, Japan may well be regarded as a temporary custodian. As to
when the Germans may again be ready to stretch their arms to the Pacific, that may
well be the question which they themselves cannot answer for the moment. But, inas-
much as the attempt must at any event wait for some time, Germany would no doubt

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welcome a temporary success of her present ally in that sphere, as a convenient stake for her future harvest. From the German viewpoint, an immediate expansion of Japan in that valuable field would be a great service rendered by her despite her own intention. The fact that Japan is regarded by men of knowledge as having been scrupulous in the observance of agreements, except the nine-Power treaty, must be a source for the Germans of no little cynical pleasure. If, on the contrary, the Japanese army, on its part, perhaps regards the alliance as a liaison of convenience pending the accomplishment of its private plans of aggrandisement, with which it would confront the world, an eventual German success or failure in Europe notwithstanding, - if so, it may be taken for granted that Germany, from her own practices, perfectly understands the secret motive of her Eastern servant and knows how to turn it to the master's account at the right moment.

Nor can Japan well hope to counter German cunning with her own of a cleverer sort. For while she appears to stand for a time beyond the scope of an immediate German endeavor, and so to command a sufficient leisure in which she may proceed to consolidate her position according to her desire, she may do well to remember that, in one important respect, she is at a decided disadvantage in comparison with her fellow allies in Europe. This is over and above the German intelligence mentioned above. I mean that Japan is the chief object of German hatred among the non-Aryan, "yellow" Mongolian race stigmatized by Hitler as sub-human and bestial, even as fated for extermination. Extermination, as I have said, may be arrant nonsense. Economically, however, a slow process of stifling may not be so far beyond the range of possibility. Germany, intending, as she has already avowed, to close Europe and starve out England and America, no doubt means, after shutting Europe, the Americas, the South Seas, and a large part of the Asiatic continent, to freeze Japan commercially. That such is the picture already formed in the German imagination is a cogent inference from German assertions repeated for many years. One would even venture to think that, during that process, the Germans would probably not consider it beneath their sense of honor to exploit China's hatred of Japan at the latter's expense.

The enclosed article and my letter are for the object of demonstrating that such conclusion is inescapable, and of calling to it the attention of Japanese statesmen.

My own belief is that such Oriental policy of Germany, even if executed in small part, is destined to fail; and, moreover, that it is highly probable that, before the time can arrive for Germany to make an attempt of this character, her work of conquest in Europe itself will collapse. The reason that I, despite this belief, presume to warn Japan at this time is as follows.

Whatever the conviction of the Japanese army, I have never doubted from the outset that Germany will sooner or later fail in Europe; it is today believed by vast majorities of people in America and Europe, including those of the conquered nations. It would not make the least difference in this respect if the Russian government should fall, and German victory should advance to the Mediterranean and Near East, for every step in the progress sows another crop of the final disaster for the victor. But whether this will come late or soon must depend upon the gradual unfolding of the problems that are still unsolved. If late, then there may well lie the danger of Japan being involved in a great struggle literally fatal to her, and Germany's nefarious hand being stretched to the Orient. That is the heart of my fear. Therefore, it behooves Japan as quickly as possible to grasp the true spirit of Germany, and without losing a moment to build an appropriate policy.

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I pray that there be not a particle of meanness in the national policy so established. But a policy that aims only negatively not to be dishonorable, but lacks positive elements, would leave the main difficulty unsolved and allow it to remain as the cause of untold calamities in the future. Tiny differences in today's policy might widen into a great divergence of destiny in years to come. That is, if merely negative, the basic policy would be but a conservation of the principles held hitherto as "immutable"; and only vain, casual compromises, as heretofore, would be made between these principles and the newly gained knowledge.

Compromise, indeed, is the inherited political habit of the Japanese people. Compromise has, it is true, served them well most of the time in the past. It is no doubt, like the same virtue of the English, a valuable heritage of the nation that should be preserved with solicitude. A provident guide at ordinary times, however, compromise is a curse at a national crisis. A crisis would often seem to be a test given by Heaven to train its favorite child: by conquering sloth and leaping over the hurdle, he would win a new lease of life; by erecting a screen of inertia and self-justification, and following the line of least resistance, he would allow the crisis to mount to its height of menace. Is it not a crisis of first order that confronts Japan at this moment? Is it a time for her to compel her political parties to efface themselves and for the latter to give up their important mission in the national organism, so that she might become a "one-minded" automaton; or for her to counsel foreign powers to be "sincere" and to cease to "misunderstand" her, so that they would mend their policies in conformity with the cherished habits she has indulged herself these late years? One would recall the obstinate fisherman who with a solemn face spread his net in the open air in order to catch birds fish-wise, and saw all feathered creatures fly above and around the net! Fortunately, history proves that Japan is gifted with an unusual measure of the power of self-reflection at extraordinary times. Then she knew how to discard her wonted compromise, and, by way of self-conquest, to extricate herself from an impasse. Again and again, as in 645 and in 1868, she displayed admirable candor and perspicacity: she spurned all makeshifts, and, clearly perceiving the evils of her accustomed ways, made a complete volte face, and boldly and successfully took a leap into the unknown. She is in the same need of a thorough reconstruction of policy, for the peril that faces her is not a whit smaller, is perhaps of greater dimensions in some respects. She cannot have lost that power of reflection and of action that has served alone and so well to preserve her life through repeated crises. Bare ten years of the inuring of the people to an obtuse policy, driven as they have been to be of "one mind" in its support, can hardly have sufficed to stifle their historic capacity for same self-reflection. If unfortunately that were the case, then would one not have to face the dreadful thought that any searching reflection by the nation must await its prostration under a tragedy the like of which it has never dreamed during the entire course of its long history? Who can dare say that it might not then be too late for any attempt at resurgence?

Thrown overboard should be the so-called "immutable" policies of the past ten years. They are what has led Japan astray in the maze of the "sacred" war in China, and of the devious methods of inflicting "co-prosperity" upon nations who detest it. These immutable, sacred policies are, in the eyes of every foreign friend of Japan, unnatural and hypocritical, irrational and short-sighted, mean, and most arrogant. What is far worse, they are violently contrary to the spirit of her history, and to the ever-broadening movement of the whole world. It should, at least, be evident to Japan, that, if she were in the place of the victims of these policies, she would not for an instant submit to such shameful impositions. No less ignoble and dangerous are they for her own immediate future. For thereby she had made herself disloyal to the ancestral heritage of the nation and to her revered

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sovereign; has tied her destiny with that of the desperate robbers who are plunging
to their deaths; and has earned a despised isolation among the hitherto admiring
nations. Now she can look forward to nothing but the ermitage of everyone, including
and above all the neighbor possessing enormous possibilities for future strength;
possibly a gruelling war with one or more Powers far stronger than herself in material
resources and in moral convictions; and, precisely at that juncture, the treachery,
at best the desertion, of her infamous partners. For me, it is the cause of profound
regrets to reflect how bright would have been Japan's future, if she had, on the
contrary, cooperated with other Powers in aiding China in her valiant struggle for
emancipation and enlightenment; and thrown in her lot with that of those who are
fighting for the preservation of the broad path of human civilization against the
worst enemy it has ever encountered. Regrets are futile, but there is still time for
Japan to retrieve herself. Now is high time to make the supreme effort. The sooner
the better. Nay, as I have ventured to suggest, soon it might be too late. But
retrieve she cannot, save by a drastic reversal of her policies of the past decade.

If the "immutable" policies were tenaciously adhered to, no matter what
petty concessions and adjustments be made, and no matter what partial arrangements
be patched up with America and England, no nation on earth, not even the present
allies, could help continuing to suspect Japan's intentions; and the root of the
disease that has made her an outcast of the world and is bound to lead her to worse
calamities would persist. If she would truly be noble, and would radically cure her
cancer, the only path open is positively and resolutely to reflect upon her true
self, as she did in 645 and 1867, -- again to open her mind's eye, and to resume the
same "open, catholic, and sincere" (kō-mei sei-dai) attitude that once inspired the
ex-Shogun, the enlightened barons and many of their vassals.

Surely the conditions are different from those of 1868, and the shape of the
policy must be accordingly different, even as that of that year was from the one of
645. But the spirit must ever be the same. The larger aspects of the application of
this spirit to the present needs should include, among others, the following:- with-
draw the armies from the continent, and restore the conquered territories at ap-
propriate times and in a suitable manner; denounce and repudiate the alliance with
Germany and Italy, and openly and clearly declare to them and to the world the
reasons why this apparent breach of faith was necessary for the greater faith to
which she had been a misguided traitor; radically alter the organic law, so as to
separate clearly and definitively the administration of the political and the mili-
tary affairs; liberate the people and their education from the absurd shackles
recently inflicted upon them, and restore the open exchange of ideas and commodities
with other nations; and, if possible, render the utmost aid within her capacity to
those who are contending with the common enemy of humanity.

Since such a complete reversal of policy affects all aspects of national
life, large and small, it is obvious that the concrete measures to be taken must
observe the difference in magnitude, importance, and difficulty, between affairs to
be dealt with. But, apart from the precedence of measures, the turnabout should not
be partial but complete. Any partial policy would be certain to leave openings for
reaction and so to invite defeat. Moreover, a partial repontance is bound to be much
more difficult to make than a clean breast. Aside from the opportunities the former
would create for the return of evil forces, it would only mean a weak will behind it,
which could not help entailing one's own petty regrets on the morrow about this
matter or that, and possible reversion to another path of unreason. On the other
hand, nothing could be more gratifying to a nation with a high capacity for frank
reflection than a bold, whole-hearted transcendence over its past sin, and nothing
truly easier. Therefore, even if the procedure be gradual, the principles and the

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direction of the entire policy should, as in 1868 or in 645, be completely established
in advance, and openly announced to the nation and the world. The declaration should
leave nothing fundamental in obscurity; for an important omission, whether intention-
al or by chance, would cause among the populace uncertainties and anxious guesses,
and probably also provide protexts for a revolt of reactionaries and self-seekers.
Then, a sincere and deep trust should be reposed in the hearts of the people, and the
measures be step by step carried out with their willing cooperation. It should be
needless to fear harmful effects of this sudden change of policies and loyalties upon
the moral consciousness of the nation; for nothing is more convincing than a true
repentance, and every person would be inspired by the sincere initiative so cou-
rageously taken by the leaders. There is not the slightest doubt that the beautiful
soul of the nation would loyally respond; and that the sympathy and friendship of
foreign nations, near and far, would also be won, and their erstwhile suspicion and
fear would vanish, as by a miracle. In fact, the whole action, in spite of the con-
temporary form it would assume as a matter of course, would be exactly identical, in
spirit, with the pronouncement of the Five-Article Oath and the promulgation of the
Constitution, and, indeed, with the Reforms of Taikwa and Taihō, and the founding of
the empire by Jimmu.

The so-called "super-extraordinary time" and "encirclement" have for the
greater part been of Japan's own creation. The world crisis is indeed the common
calamity of mankind, but Japan's special crisis, grave as it is, is almost wholly her
handiwork. She alone can break the fetters with which she has tied her limbs, and
bring herself back to the common movement of the world. To do so is within her power,
and is her duty to herself. The true difficulty, so far as Japan alone is concerned,
lies, not so much in the character of the times, as in being caught in the little
considerations of "face", and in failing to muster the courage to free herself from
the servitude of self-made, unnatural, and hollow slogans of the day. But once en-
lightened, nothing would be simpler and more natural than to return to the native
sanity. And nothing could be more inspiring than to emerge from darkness to the sun.

Militaristic, anti-historical obtuseness has created something of a second
Baku-fu, a medieval obscurantism. If the military lacked the moral courage of Keiki
and Kaishu, to efface themselves from the political scene, then it would be necessary
for others to invoke an imperial sanction for the initiative. A sanction, I entertain
no doubt, would be most graciously granted. And it would be necessary in any event.
If, on the contrary, the present-day statesmen shirked the duty that is upon them,
and again failed to make anything more than trite compromises, how would they face
the charge of having betrayed the illustrious history of the nation and the hopes of
its future?