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CHAPTER IV

SOME CONCLUSIONS ON POLICY

Table of Contents
(Titles in Brief)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. The Scope of Possible Conclusions</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>2. Certain General Conclusions</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>(a) Emphasis on positive objectives of United States</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>(b) "Legitimacy"</td><td>97</td></tr><tr><td>(c) Continuous Communication; especially with associated groups.</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>(d) Bold promulgation new ways handling problems</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>(e) "Timing"</td><td>104</td></tr><tr><td>3. Defense and Military Preparation (H.A.K.)</td><td>106-120</td></tr><tr><td>4. Approaches to Certain Immediate Problems</td><td>121</td></tr><tr><td>5. Possible Changes in Method: "Collective Approach"</td><td>129</td></tr><tr><td>(a) Consolidation of "positions"</td><td>129</td></tr><tr><td>(b) Inter-American Group</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>(c) NATO</td><td>134</td></tr><tr><td>(d) Handling Economic Problems</td><td>137</td></tr><tr><td>(e) New Instruments of Economic Policy</td><td>141</td></tr><tr><td>(f) Economic Systems and Political Policy</td><td>143</td></tr><tr><td>(g) Exploration of Economic Groups still in infancy</td><td>145</td></tr><tr><td>6. The World-Wide Group</td><td>147</td></tr></tbody></table>

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CHAPTER IV
SOME CONCLUSIONS ON POLICY

The foregoing examination, coupled with the special studies and reports, convince us that certain conclusions on policy can be reached. These relate to directions of policy and possible instruments capable of use rather than to immediate problems. Immediate solutions of immediate international problems plainly must be reached in light of information some of which no private group can have, and in light of circumstances which can change from one day to the next. Consequently there is here no intention to invade the field of day-to-day decision-making in respect of problems many of which are delicate, dramatic, and dangerous.

It is, however, fair to observe that the day-to-day decisions reached through the past decade indicate one defect in national policy: they have too little pattern or design and therefore tend to be chiefly defensive. Need for immediate solutions of problems, military, political and economic, proved more determinative than need to seek and follow a steady directional line towards a projected result.

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Though we feel this criticism is justified, it is wholly unpolitical.
Failure to achieve a pattern has always been a problem in foreign affairs
(it was so even in the case of British policy immediately following the
Napoleonic Wars). In the case of the United States, it is clear that the
American public for some years after World War II did not fully appreciate
her new position. Policy and decision-making (as in the case of the United
States prior to World War II) is one thing in the case of a nation only second-
arily involved in world affairs and which therefore must adapt to the
position and policies of a number of other, greater, Powers. It is quite
different when the nation is itself a world leader, in such position that the
policies of other Powers must depend on her. The difference lies in the fact
that policies of a world leader can not fluctuate with varying political currents
to the same degree as was possible and perhaps necessary prior to American
attainment of world-leadership.

Participation in World War I, and in the League of Nations after it, were
matters of American choice from 1914 to 1921. Politicians could (as they did)
debate and decide the matter; there was no overriding imperative of national
safety. Even prior to World War II the American situation was not wholly clear.
It did not become so until two years after World War II was in full swing.
Since 1945, on the other hand, and certainly since 1947, the primary position
of the United States has eliminated certain alternatives. It now enforces a

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greater continuity of policy. The United States thus can not now decide that she will not participate in world adjustments outside the American hemisphere. To do so would lay her open to gravest danger. American capacity to decide whether she will or will not become involved in any given situation is limited; in most cases her vital interests prevent her from standing aside. American internal political life only slowly has become aware of this fact.

Yet though American decision-making must now follow the broad lines of a continued pattern which are no longer open to alteration, it is also true that great and new possibilities are opening. Entirely new instruments of policy are appearing, both in the political and economic fields. These are only partly controlled by the new and rapidly developing techniques of weapons and defense.

The policy of a world leader can not (without great danger) be primarily opportunistic or primarily Machiavellian. Both these qualities are imposed on a small State; they are probably open to a large but not a determinative Power; they are of minimal use in the armory of one of the two chief polarizing forces in the world. Comparative predictability of American policy is one of the essentials in present day diplomacy, - as the Middle East controversy is teaching us. This is true not merely in territorial and military matters; it is even more true in economic matters. When half the world must build its economy in considerable part on the operations of the United States, these operations can not fluctuate save gradually, and with advance notice.

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Moral continuity and consistency is paramount. The moral position of the United States should be predictable in practically all situations; the use of its powers and resources should be predictable within the areas where, and to the extent that, its power and resources can be prudently used.

Finally, a word is appropriate about the use of that kind of thinking we call "realist." Realism, accurately analyzed, consists in knowledge of capabilities, and in excluding any course of action making commitments beyond capabilities. "Realist" thinking essentially is limitation on decision-making and policy commitment. Beyond that point it is not a guide for action. It might, for example, have been realistically possible for the United States to initiate a preventive atomic war with and to destroy the Soviet Union in 1948 -- a policy which the United States, rightly, placed beyond possibility, chiefly on moral grounds, (though other considerations could have been urged as well). Realism primarily dictates that the capabilities of the United States, political, economic and military, shall be maintained at the maximum prudent level, thereby affording to the United States greater capability for acting or withholding action she would otherwise have taken.

## 2. Certain General Conclusions

(a) Emphasis should at all times be on the positive objectives of the United States.

Drama of contest between a free world led by the United States and a Communist world led by the Soviet Union has tended somewhat to confuse

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policy-making and political discussion. Communist aggression, military, para-military and by subversion, clashes with American aims and ends; it is an obstacle to be overcome. But containment or defeat of Soviet aggression is not an end in itself. There is danger that the entire policy and action of the United States may be twisted or perverted if its entire direction and energy is merely response to Communist-Russian or Communist-Chinese threat.

This does not imply lack of resolution or diminution of effort in meeting Communist threats, and in coping with their tactics of force, disruption or propaganda. It does imply that eventual triumph of American objectives over such threats will be achieved rather by steady, unrelenting pursuit of positive American aims than by mere defense or counter-attack.

Present Communist opposition to the United States, accurately apprehended, is merely one of many obstacles and difficulties to be overcome.
Pursuit of a positive program is and must continue to be the essential American purpose. The panel is therefore clear that consistent, continuous advocacy and support of clearly stated American ideals and purposes, quite irrespective of Communist attacks, will induce growing willingness on the part of the other nations to work with the United States; and that this should induce a continuing, greater factor of common action. As this occurs, capability of

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the United States (including its military capacity) in concert with others to
make progress towards her objectives will steadily increase.

This would mean, for example, that economic relief or assistance
should not be given _merely_ as antidote to possible Communist action, though
the fact that it may counter Communist moves may be an incidental advantage.
Economic programs should be undertaken because the circumstances and case
of the country and people involved and their necessities justify an economic
program on its own merits.

It would mean likewise that campaigns of propaganda should not be
directed primarily against Communist propaganda, but should be, designed
to assist in communicating and pushing toward the American objective. Obvious-
ly lies have to be answered, and attacks have to be rebutted; but this is
incidental to the chief end of communicating the purposes and hopes of the
United States and of explaining the methods and measures proposed and in
progress.

Defense, obviously, is conditioned principally by the degree of
potential threat. Being able to meet force with greater force is a plain necessity
in the present situation. This will continue as long as the Communist countries
are "adventurist" and threaten military or para-military invasions, and, as
they are presumably doing, atomic warfare. In this field, the United States
is frankly responding to a Soviet threat. It must continue to do so until
conditions are created which reduce or eliminate that threat. Yet even here,

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the objective must be to bring about a situation in which, ultimately, American force is essentially part of the peace-keeping or policing equipment of a community of nations.

(b) "Legitimacy" of government in action.

"Legitimacy" is a conception which has received little attention in the past half-century, though it proved useful in reconstituting world order after the Napoleonic wars. Now, since the objective is to create a free world acting as a community of world order under law, some conception of "legitimacy" is essential. Tacitly it exists at present. A "government" is "legitimate" where it represents and acts with the real assent of the people it governs -- though the problem of "assent" is complicated and not susceptible of simple statement. The reasons are obvious. Unless a government has this consensual representative quality, the people can not be bound. Changes in government or perhaps even changes in personalities mean that previous understandings or agreements will not be honored save as this can be compelled by external force or pressure.

"Legitimacy of action" by a government which is representative and legitimate requires that the action be taken consonant with general conceptions of world law, or where no such law exists, consonant with a public consensus. For example, the action of the Soviet Union in moving its troops into Hungary in 1956 was plainly "illegitimate" -- probably by the same standards the British-French-Israeli expedition against Egypt was illegitimate, though that

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question never was determined. Prima facie, the United Nations and the regional organizations like the Organization of American States are the institutions charged with the task of passing on the "legitimacy" of any international action. The Assembly of the United Nations too often has discarded its obligations in this regard, as many of its members take positions solely on opportunistic consideration of national interest. The survival of such institutions clearly will depend on their vitality and responsibility in doing so and their eventual capacity to make their decisions effective.

In this respect American policy can and should be somewhat in advance of crystallized doctrine. It is said, for example, that a government must be "recognized" in any area where it is able to maintain order and to honor the international commitments and agreements of the country; such a government is entitled to recognition. Recognition, of course, need not imply legitimacy and probably should not do so. The United States can quite consistently recognize the Kadar government in Hungary without thereby accepting it as "legitimate" -- which, at least morally, America does not. But in any action or decision the criterion of "legitimacy" should be one of the criteria applied, though this is by no means the only criterion and not necessarily a determinative one.

The broad objective, obviously, is of a world made up of nations with "legitimate" governments, all of which act "legitimately" -- in other words, a world of just order under law.

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(c) There must be far more continuous and understanding communication with all other countries and especially with nations forming membership in the groups in which the United States presently operates.

We are clear that necessity for communication, consultation and finding common ground with the United States in the various groupings is vastly more necessary under modern conditions than ever before. The endless, patient process of seeing to it that our associates and even our enemies know what we are trying to do and why and how we are trying to do it, and that in any given situation we in turn seek counsel from and understanding of our associates in formulating our immediate objectives and our longer-range aims, is essential. More attention to, and perhaps better organization of, this seems required.

We are keenly conscious of the fact that distinct improvements have been made in the past few years. Clearly they have not yet gone as far as circumstances require. This is not matter of a greater personnel in embassies and missions; many of which could usefully be reduced in size. Rather, it involves an increased number of top-level trained men and greater communication between them and top-levels in Washington, so that authoritative and full communication and understanding may be had without putting the impossible burden on a few top officials in Washington to maintain the whole structure of authoritative communication and discussion with ninety-odd independent nations.

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"Communication" falls into two distinct categories.

**Government-to-government communication** is essential at all times.

It is crucial where the United States acts as part of a group (NATO, OAS, and so forth). This is the normal work of the State Department, diplomatic missions and the many special missions which exist in specialized fields. Ideally an American Ambassador should be able to carry on any communication, discussion or negotiation which the Secretary of State could do if present.

This ideal is rarely reached and scarcely regarded. Certainly a great deal of strain could be lifted from the top echelon of the United States government if Ambassadors were chosen and trained to speak with greater authority and with lively assurance that what they said would be backed by action.

This implies a much closer relationship between Ambassadors and the ultimate decision-making authorities in the United States government than has commonly been the case in recent American practice. It also implies an increased degree of frank statement of the American point of view and intended action, and greater exchange of views, in dealing with our associates in the groups through which we act. One result should be that action is more often taken by the relevant group of which the United States is a member (the Atlantic bloc, the Organization of American States, or the like), and less often by "the United States" acting on the premise that others will follow.

A second category is **extra-governmental communication** -- contact with non-governmental elements to the fullest extent possible in the countries where

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the United States is represented.

This may be conducted both by the accredited diplomatic representative, and by non-diplomatic or extra-governmental agencies. Clearly the time has gone by when it was improper for an Ambassador to communicate with anyone save officials of the government to which he was accredited. To some extent this has been remedied; but complaints are often made that American Embassies limit their contacts (especially at higher levels of diplomatic life) to government officials and other Embassies. Practically, a modern Embassy is accredited both to a government and to a people.

Extra-governmental agencies will probably carry on the bulk of communication between the American people and peoples of other countries. These run all the way from recognized governmental information agencies to private organizations of one sort or another: universities, foundations, scientific societies, individual contacts, intellectual and in business. Relatively little use is made of these extra-governmental agencies presently existing, although in some cases (this is especially true where a government is "illegitimate") such contacts may be of the highest value. So far as we know, there is no catalogue in the United States of the institutional contacts (universities, foundations, scientific societies and so forth) between groups in America and groups in other countries. There exists no real inventory of the really enormous resources which the United States has in this regard. Almost unlimited opportunity exists for greater communication by American institutions and American individuals

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traveling or operating abroad, and through contact with men from other countries
visiting the United States. Particularly where government-to-government
communication is difficult, or relations are strained, extra-governmental,
people-to-people contact can be crucial.

The United States has pioneered the path in people-to-people contacts
from the days when John Hay used the Chinese Boxer indemnity to establish
scholarships for Chinese students in America. But, as Professor Hans Morgenthau
has pointed out, mere contact may lead to hatred as well as to friendship.
Communication implies carrying contact to a point where it reaches initial respect
and a degree of mutual understanding.

It is sufficient to say here that the field of communication needs much
more, and more expert, attention than it has yet had.

(d) Opportunity presents itself from time to time for bold promulgation of new ways of handling problems. These opportunities should be grasped.

Each crisis presents opportunity as well as danger; greater use could
perhaps be made of such opportunities. One result of international crisis is to
focus attention as well as anxiety on the situation in hand; possibly also on
the larger problems of world-arrangements. In such a situation clear-cut state-
ments of policy receive great attention. A sound plan moving towards the
American objective of a world of peace under law permitting maximum self-
development does more than state national intent. It offers opportunity to outline
basic principles applicable to and advantageous for many peoples, and such

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statements can liberate psychological and intellectual forces all over the world. For example, the crisis in the Middle East at bottom turned on two cardinal considerations. The Suez Canal is an international waterway and its fate can not be determined purely on grounds of technical international recognition of "sovereignty." Also, access to oil supplies on which much of the world depends is essential; denial of access on purely nationalist grounds is not "resistance to imperialism," but a variety of imperialism in reverse. It would have been possible under these circumstances to consider proposing for world discussion recognition of the need of certain internationally guaranteed waterways, and also of an internationally administered guarantee that oil supplies should not be cut off.

The current issues set up by communications from the Soviet Union to the NATO Chiefs of State, again, might well have offered a launching base from which the United States might launch a broad statement of the basis on which international tension will be relieved and fear lifted and the conditions in which advances might be made towards ending an armament race, and towards wider cooperation looking toward economic prosperity.

Clearly the entire world is seeking, not only spot solutions to current problems, but also *structures* of solution, offering hope for the developing future. Crises permit movement in this direction.

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(e) "Timing"

Great objectives, such as those of the United States, involve all manner of problems. Obviously it is impossible to deal with all or even with great parts of them at any given time. No nation has ever sufficient capability of realizing them; certainly the United States does not. Some principle of "timing" is essential if the United States is not to be continually involved in so many directions at once that its capabilities are dispersed to the point of ineffectiveness. The United States by the nature of its being has -- and should have -- a moral position on most of the problems within its cognizance. But the problems which she can solve at all are limited by realistic appraisal of her capabilities. Under that limitation those she can help to solve at any given moment are still fewer. Within the scope of her capabilities, priorities based on circumstances must be set up.

Clear distinction can and should be made between (1) situations which the United States believes can and must be rapidly solved and (2) situations which the United States believes can be resolved but which need not or can not be resolved at present, and (3) between problems which the United States believes should be solved but in respect of which she can only await time and circumstances giving opportunity for solution.

Unquestionably in the minds of the decision-makers within the United States government, these distinctions are presently drawn. But they are not commonly explained to the American public; indeed the necessity of making such

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distinctions has never been squarely discussed. It probably would be unwise
indeed to make a list of any specific situations. But makers of policy do know
their approximate lines of action and the commitment of capabilities which
these may involve. Where they foresee the necessity of greater capability, it
then becomes the business of the policy-maker to increase American capability
to the necessary degree.

In a disparate world three possibilities are commonly present in respect
of any given situation. The United States may accept it, recognize its results
and assume that the state of affairs will be permanent and "legitimate."

Or she may decline to accept the state of affairs and consider it
illegitimate or undesirable but still decide that, present capabilities considered,
nothing can be done about it for the time being. The question then remains
on a list of unsolved problems, awaiting the time and circumstances when a
better result can be reached. Third, it can appraise the problem as one which
can or must be resolved, and commit its existing capabilities to reach the
solution. This happens in problems of extreme urgency threatening the peace
of the world and the safety of the United States; and also in lesser situations
in which American capabilities, in the circumstances, can reach an acceptable
result.

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While we do not presume to enter the field of immediate decision-making, we believe three problems are urgent and fundamental. On these it is justifiable to express conclusions as to the line of approach.

(a) The tension between the Soviet Union and the Free World and the Problem of an armament race.

Overshadowing the entire world is the mounting pace of competition in armament coupled with the growing intensity of Soviet propaganda and of Soviet government communication. The combination is intended to produce the false impression that the West is ardently preparing for war; that any defense against the projects of the Soviet Union constitutes a threat to peace. No less disturbing is the unremitting effort of internal Soviet propaganda to convince the Russian people that the Free World and the United States in particular desires and intends to attack them. The Soviet Union is here using the familiar build-up of a government preparing for an aggressive war, which it intends to present to the world as necessary "defense."

This Panel has few illusions. It is fully acquainted with the falsifications of fact contained in Russian propaganda, and with the diplomatic purposes concealed by passionate pleas for "peace" -- meaning non-resistance to acts of aggression. Yet behind all this is a solid fact: the Russian people want no war and no adventure leading to war. Nor do

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the people of the United States, nor, for that matter, do most of the peoples
of the world. There is a correspondence of national interest in this fact.

There are also certain areas in which solutions in fact may be
possible despite the present incompatability of Soviet plans and Western
objectives. It is our view that the current crisis (December, 1957) and the
inevitable similar crises which will occur should be approached with a
desire to discover where and what solutions can be had, rather than by
dismissal of the Soviet position without searching for opportunities. Besides
the common interest in avoiding atomic war, there is also the common
interest in lightening the economic burden of armament -- a burden pro-
portionately greater for the Soviet Union than for the United States.

Obviously the specific proposals commonly made by the Soviet
Union offer little if any hope; thus far they have commonly amounted to
suggestions that the West give up positions where it is strong, leaving
the Soviet Union to attack undefended areas by subversion or para-military
action.

This would be absurd. But obviously in some details there are
areas on which agreement could be had, and there are points in which the
West could without great risk make concessions against adequate *quid
pro quo* concessions by the Soviet Union.

In certain respects -- for example, widened contact between the
Soviet people and our own -- agreement probably could be reached. It is

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apparent to us that within the Soviet Union the view of the United States
and of the Free World is almost wholly unreal. Probably to some extent
the Western view of the Soviet Union is similarly unreal. It would seem
that closer approach to realities by both peoples could not fail to be useful,
whatever the outcome.

(b) The problem of controlled armament.

As stated elsewhere, so long as there is danger that the Communist
world may resort to force the United States and the groups in which it works
must be prepared with equal or greater force. Yet it is clear that force is no
ultimate answer; armament is essentially a sterile occupation. Certainly
the United States (and probably also the Soviet Union) does not regard a
militarized society as the flower of its civilization as did the militarists
controlling the German government in 1914 and in 1939. Further, wars
which result, not in "victory" or "defeat," but in mutual destruction, are
not and can not under modern circumstances be conceived as in the
"national interest" of anyone save by fanatics and maniacal irresponsibles.
Justification for modern armament rests solely on the premise that it may
prevent another Power from making war in the belief that it will suffer no
serious consequences.

In the long run since "victory" has become meaningless, a
situation should arise in which modern armament falls into the sole custody
and its use becomes the sole prerogative of some central, effective