- 10 -

DR. KISSINGER: Because we are not eager to score debating points. Obviously, the North Vietnamese negotiators have to get wherever we are going to meet from where they are. We have told them that any day they are ready to meet, we will be there. We have suggested Paris, but we have also told them that we would meet in other locations that might be more convenient for them.

Q Would you go to Hanoi, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we should complete the agreement elsewhere.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have, in effect, encouraged the American people that you are on the brink of peace. By coincidence -- this happens to come by coincidence, you say at any rate -- this comes at a time when the American people are about to vote for President. What assurance can you give the American people that this will not somehow fall down; that is, that it will not come off after the election?

DR. KISSINGER: We can only give the assurance of our record. We have conducted these negotiations for four years and we have brought them to this point with considerable difficulty and with considerable anguish. We cannot control if people believe or if people choose to assert that this is simply some trick.

We have negotiated seriously and in good faith. We stand by what we have agreed to, and we give the assurance that we will stick by what we have negotiated and what we have achieved so laboriously.

As for the point that this is by a so-called coin-
cidence, I can only repeat that the deadline was established
by Hanoi and not by us, and that we were prepared to keep this
whole agreement secret until it was consummated, and we would
not have revealed it if it had not been consummated before
the election.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what are the main differences
between Saigon and Washington now, and what will happen if
the agreement is not reached?

DR. KISSINGER: We are confident that agreement will
be reached. No useful purpose would be served by going into
the details of consultations that are still in process, but
we are confident that we will reach agreement within the time
frame that I have described to you.

Q Is the U.S. prepared to sign a separate agree-
ment with North Vietnam if President Thieu refuses to sign the
agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: I see no point in addressing a hypothetical question which, as I have said, we are confident will not arise, and as I have indicated, the particular objectives which we seek for ourselves in the remainder of the negotiations are all views which we strongly hold as the United States Government.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you haven't said whether Presi-
dent Thieu accepts a cease-fire.

MORE

- 11 -

DR. KISSINGER: I think I have expressed my con-
viction that President Thieu will accept a cease-fire.

Q Dr. Kissinger, President Thieu said in his speech that the Communists were demanding a coalition government and you did not mention one. Could this National Council be turned into a coalition?

DR. KISSINGER: This settlement is a compromise settlement in which neither side achieves everything, and in which both parties have the necessity of posturing themselves for their constituency.

We do not consider this a coalition government and we believe that President Thieu was speaking about previous versions of a Communist plan and not about this version of the Communist plan. I think we all recognize the fact that political leaders speak to many audiences at the same time.

Q Are you going to make the text available that you had?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MORE

- 12 -

Q Do you believe the North Vietnamese will leave on the negotiating table the proposals they have accepted thus far, if you don't make the October 31 deadline?

DR. KISSINGER: I cannot believe that when this major progress has been made, that an arbitrary deadline should be the obstacle to peace, and we believe that the negotiations will continue.

Q On the same point, with respect to the 8th of November deadline, what is to assure them that our side will not harden our negotiating stance once the pressure of the election is off?

DR. KISSINGER: Our negotiation has not been framed by the election. We have not revealed any of our positions throughout the election, and had not Hanoi revealed the text or the substance of the agreement, we would have had no intention of disclosing it until or unless an agreement had been reached.

We have given a commitment that a text that will be agreed to at the next session will be the final text and that no new changes will be proposed. We will maintain this commitment. We are not engaged in Vietnam for the purpose of conducting a war.

I would like to suggest to you ladies and gentlemen that while it is possible to disagree with provisions of an agreement, the implication that this is all a gigantic maneuver which we will revoke as soon as this period is over is unworthy of what we have gone through.

[L]

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you say whether President Thieu himself would insist on signing an agreement or whether somebody else might, for his government?

DR. KISSINGER: The level at which the agreement will be signed has not been finally determined, but it is almost certainly not at the Presidential level.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the resupplying and re-equipment of the Communist forces apply only to those in South Vietnam and if so, are the North Vietnamese at liberty to take as much from the Soviet Union as they can get?

DR. KISSINGER: The formal provisions apply only to South Vietnam, but there is no question, and there can be no question, that the general conditions in Indochina will govern the actions of many of the countries, but I don't want to go into greater detail.

Q Does your formal explanation there cover U.S. support, the status of continuing U.S. support?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no limitation of any kind on economic aid. Military aid is governed by the replacement provisions that I have described. There is no limitation of any kind on economic advisors, and the military presence is governed by the withdrawal provisions.

Q Is bombing covered within the concept of a withdrawal of U.S. forces?

MORE

[L]

- 13 -

DR. KISSINGER: It covers an end to all military activities over the territory of North Vietnam from whatever direction.

Q What effect does it have on Thailand and the Seventh Fleet?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no limitations on American forces in Thailand nor on the Fleet.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you think that the mining of the harbor and the bombing of North Vietnam contributed to the acceleration by the North Vietnamese of negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on North Vietnamese motivation.

Q Would you tell us, please, what concessions did the United States make to get this agreement, in your judgment?

DR. KISSINGER: The United States made the concessions that are described in the agreement. There are no secret side agreements of any kind.

[L.C.]

Q Did you discuss with Le Duc Tho at any time the deadline of October 31st to sign the agreement, and if he raised this question, what did you reply?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe that it is quite possible that an honest misunderstanding arose. We always said that we would make a major effort to meet the deadline and we developed various hypothetical ways by which this deadline could be met. We also said, and that is equally in the record, that all of this depended on a satisfactory completion of various parts of the agreement. But they may have misunderstood, honestly, the conditional or hypothetical nature of some of the schedules.

But the most significant aspect cannot be whether one signs on one date or another. The significant aspect is that when one is so close to an agreement, whether one perfects it and then signs it regardless of the deadline. There is no magic about any one date.

MORE

Q Why did Hanoi want that deadline?

DR. KISSINGER: You will have to ask Hanoi.

Q Is it still possible to achieve that deadline of
October 31? What countries would participate in the ceasefire
and in the conference?

DR. KISSINGER: We are committed to achieving an agreement in another session of several days duration, and it is up to the other side to determine when they want to meet.

As to the second question, until all countries are
approached, I don't think it would be proper for me --

Q Is the United States one of them?

DR. KISSINGER: The United States is a party. It cannot be part of the supervisory mechanism, but the United States is a party to the four-power Joint Military Commission. That is one of the bodies that supervises those provisions that apply to the four parties. It is not part of the international body, but it is part of the international conference.

Q How broad would the conference be, sir?

DR. KISSINGER: Again, it would be inappropriate to
list the countries until they have been approached.

Q Would you amplify somewhat on the Cambodian-Laos
agreements. Both sides must withdraw forces and cease major supplying, is that what you implied before?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have given the general outline
of the agreement, but it is envisaged that foreign forces are
withdrawn from these countries.

Q When was Hanoi advised one more meeting would be
necessary?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe on Sunday morning our time
here, and we also informed them that we would stop military
activities north of the 20th Parallel.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 12:35 PM EDT)

As recounted in _White House Years_, p. 1236 ff:

6. Among the many public statements pledging US enforcement of the Paris Agreement were the following:

*President Nixon's Address to the Nation, January 23, 1973:*

[T]he terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

*Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, January 24, 1973:*

QUESTION: If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Vietnam?

KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise.

*Deputy Assistant Secretary William Sullivan on NBC-TV's Meet the Press, January 28, 1973:*

QUESTION: There's also reports from Saigon today, Mr. Ambassador, that the United States has given official but private assurances to Saigon that we would intervene militarily again if Hanoi commits serious violations. Just what is our commitment? What would we do if a cease-fire breaks down?

Chapter Notes

1237

SULLIVAN: I am not going to speculate on that, Mr. Rosenfeld. I think you have seen Dr. Kissinger's statement concerning the method in which the agreement has stipulated the requirements for carrying out this accord. There are no inhibitions upon us, but we are not going to discuss any hypothetical questions at this time about what the future prospects may bring.

*Dr. Kissinger's Interview on CBS News with Marvin Kalb, February 1, 1973:*

KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I was trying to get at is what happens — and I suppose this question must be asked. In the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire is going to hold. In the world that we live in it may not. President Thieu said in an interview tonight on CBS that he would never call upon American air power to go back. And Ambassador Sullivan said only last Sunday that there are no inhibitions — I believe were his words — on the use of this air power. Is that correct?

KISSINGER: That is legally correct.

KALB: Politically and diplomatically?

KISSINGER: We have the right to do this. The question is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It depends on the extent of the challenge, on the nature of the threat, on the circumstances in which it arises; and it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official at this stage, when the peace is in the process of being established, to give a checklist about what the United States will or will not do in every circumstance that is likely to arise.

For the future that we can foresee, the North Vietnamese are not in a position to launch an overwhelming attack on the South, even if they violate the agreement. What happens after a year or two has to be seen in the circumstances which then exist.

Most of the violations that one can now foresee should be handled by the South Vietnamese.

KALB: So that for the next year or two, if I understand you right, there would be no need for a reinvolvement of American military power?

KISSINGER: Marvin, we did not end this war in order to look for an excuse to reenter it, but it would be irresponsible for us at this moment to give a precise checklist to potential aggressors as to what they can or cannot safely do.

*President Nixon's News Conference, March 15, 1973:*

I will only suggest this: that we have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and of what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire, the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern has also been expressed to other interested parties. And I would only suggest that based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern when they are made with regard to a violation. That is all I will say about it.

*Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Porter, speech in Grand Rapids, March 21, 1973:*

President Nixon has made clear our concern at North Vietnamese infiltration of large amounts of equipment into South Vietnam. If it continued, this infiltration could lead to serious consequences. The North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard our expressions of concern.

*President Nixon's Address to the Nation, March 29, 1973:*

There are still some problem areas. The provisions of the agreement requiring an accounting for all missing in action in Indochina, the provisions with regard to Laos and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam have not been complied with. We have and will continue to comply with the agreement. We shall insist that North Vietnam comply with the agreement. And the leaders of North Vietnam should have no doubt as to the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement.

*Defense Secretary Richardson on NBC-TV's Meet the Press, April 1, 1973:*

NESSEN: Mr. Secretary, can you say that the United States will never under any circumstances send military forces back to Indochina?

RICHARDSON: No, I cannot give any categorical assurance, Mr. Nessen. Obviously the future holds possible developments that are unforeseeable now. But certainly we very much hope that this will not be necessary.

NESSEN: And if I ask you the same question about, can you say whether the United States will never bomb again in North or South Vietnam, your answer would be the same?

1238

Chapter Notes

RICHARDSON: Yes, but of course our hope and expectation is that the cease-fire agree-
ments will be observed.

NESSEN: President Nixon has warned several times North Vietnam that it should have
no doubt about the consequences if it violates the cease-fire. What does he mean, what
are the consequences?

RICHARDSON: This is obviously something that cannot be spelled out in advance, Mr.
Nessen. . . .

They have, I think, had some reason, looking back over the past, to know that the
President has been willing to do what has been necessary in order to bring about a ne-
gotiated solution and to bring an end to the war.

*Defense Secretary Richardson to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 1973:*

QUESTION: There are reports out of South Vietnam today that President Thieu of South Vietnam says that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have an agreement that if there is an offensive, that if the North Vietnamese do come in, that the United States will come back with its airplanes and with its air support? Do we have such a commitment?

RICHARDSON: This is a question simply of very possible contingencies. I wouldn't want to try to amplify on anything he said or to subtract from it. . . .

We, of course, continue to adhere to the proposition that the cease-fire agreements not only have been signed but are in the interest of all the parties and our objective is to assure so far as is possible that they are carried out. . . .

Our job is to reinforce the considerations that will, we trust, lead them to carry out the
agreement. . . .

If he [the President] had the constitutional power to carry on the war while winding it down, we think it's a natural extension of this to say that he has the constitutional power to take whatever incidental steps that are now required in order to assure that the cease-fire agreements are carried out.

*US-GVN Communiqué (San Clemente), April 3, 1973:*

Both Presidents, while acknowledging that progress was being made toward military and political settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed with great concern in-filtrations of men and weapons in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam into South Vietnam in violation of the Agreement on Ending the War, and considered that actions which would threaten the basis of the agreement would call for appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed their conviction that all the provisions of the Agreement, in-cluding in particular those concerning military forces and military supplies, must be faithfully implemented if the cease-fire is to be preserved and the prospects for a peaceful settlement are to be assured. President Nixon stated in this connection that the United States views violations of any provision of the Agreement with great and continuing con-cern. . . .

*Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson, interviewed by newsmen prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, April 3, 1973:*

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, under what conditions might we have to begin bombing in support of the South Vietnamese?

RICHARDSON: It would be one of those questions that it's impossible to answer in gen-
eral terms. We can only see what develops, and hopefully, what will develop is the full
and complete implementation of the cease-fire agreements.

QUESTION: But is it possible that we will have to bomb either North Vietnam or in support of the South Vietnamese army again?

RICHARDSON: It's certainly something we cannot rule out at this time.

*Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, May 2, 1973:*

QUESTION: You say if North Vietnam does not obey the call for an honorable cease-
fire, it would risk revived confrontation with us. Could you spell out a little bit more
clearly what you mean there [in the Foreign Policy Report]?

KISSINGER: . . . Now, on the confrontation, we have made clear that we mean to have the agreement observed. We are now engaged in an effort to discuss with the North Vietnamese what is required to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement. We have every intention and every incentive to make certain that our side of the agreement is maintained, and to use our influence wherever we can to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement.

Chapter Notes

1239

But the United States cannot sign a solemn agreement and within weeks have major provisions violated without our making an attempt to indicate it. Now, the particular measures: Some of them are, of course, obvious and we would prefer, as we state in the report and as we have stated publicly many times, to move our relationship with the North Vietnamese toward normalization, and to start a process which would accelerate, such as other processes normally have.

So the general thrust of this paragraph is that the tension existing between us certainly cannot ease as rapidly as we want if the agreement is not observed.

*President's Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973:*

We hope that the contending factions will now prefer to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and political competition rather than through the brutal and costly methods of the past. This choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant concerning violations of the Agreement. . . .

Hanoi has two basic choices. The first is to exploit the Vietnam Agreement and press its objectives in Indochina. In this case it would continue to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam, keep its forces in Laos and Cambodia, and through pressures or outright attack renew its aggression against our friends. Such a course would endanger the hard won gains for peace in Indochina. It would risk revived confrontation with us. . . . The second course is for North Vietnam to pursue its objectives peacefully, allowing the historical trends of the region to assert themselves. . . .

The Republic of Vietnam will find us a steady friend. We will continue to deal with its government as the legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people, while supporting efforts by the South Vietnamese parties to achieve reconciliation and shape their political future. We will provide replacement military assistance within the terms of the Agreement. We expect our friends to observe the Agreement just as we will not tolerate violations by the North Vietnamese or its allies. . . .

We have told Hanoi, privately and publicly, that we will not tolerate violations of the Agreement.

*Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, June 13, 1973:*

**QUESTION:** Do you feel now that with the signing of the document you have more or less ended your work in the Indochina area or that you will still have a lot of difficulties, especially concerning Cambodia?

**KISSINGER:** The remaining issues in Indochina will still require significant diplomatic efforts, and we expect to continue them. Of course, we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement, and we will maintain our interest in it.

*President Nixon's Message to the House of Representatives, June 27, 1973, opposing the Indochina bombing halt:*

A total halt would virtually remove Communist incentive to negotiate and would thus seriously undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a cease-fire in Cambodia. It would effectively reverse the momentum toward lasting peace in Indochina set in motion last January and renewed in the four-party communiqué signed in Paris on June 13. . . .

A Communist victory in Cambodia, in turn, would threaten the fragile balance of negotiated agreements, political alignments and military capabilities upon which the overall peace in Southeast Asia depends and on which my assessment of the acceptability of the Vietnam agreements was based.

Finally, and with even more serious global implications, the legislatively imposed acceptance of the United States to Communist violations of the Paris agreements and the conquest of Cambodia by Communist forces would call into question our national commitment not only to the Vietnam settlement but to many other settlements or agreements we have reached or seek to reach with other nations. A serious blow to America's international credibility would have been struck — a blow that would be felt far beyond Indochina.

*Secretary Kissinger's Letter to Senator Kennedy, March 25, 1974:*

As a signator of the Paris Agreement, the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Vietnam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability. . . .

We have . . . committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally.

TAB 12

Excerpts from President Johnson's April 1965 speech -- attached.

President Nixon's Address to the UN General Assembly,
September 18, 1969 -- attached.

U. S. Peace Proposal of January 25, 1972 -- Tab 6.

Excerpts from President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to
Congress, on U.S. Foreign Policy, February 9, 1972 --
attached.

Dr. Kissinger's News Conference of October 26, 1972 -- Tab 9.

Dr. Kissinger's News Conference of January 24, 1973 -- attached.

President Nixon's News Conference, January 31, 1973 -- attached.

Paris Peace Accord -- Tab 3.

Excerpts from President Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins
University, April 7, 1965, as noted in his memoir, *The
Vantage Point* (pp 133-34):

*

At 9 P.M. on the night of April 7 I stepped to the podium of an auditorium on the Johns Hopkins campus and into the glare of television lights, for the speech was being broadcast live. I listed the essential elements of a just peace: an independent South Vietnam that was "securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country."

"There may be many ways to this kind of peace: in discussion or negotiation with the governments concerned; in large groups or in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones," I said. "We have stated this position over and over again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe alike. And we remain ready, with this purpose, for unconditional discussions."

I then looked forward, beyond war and the coming of peace, to what
could happen in that troubled and underdeveloped region of the world.

"These countries of Southeast Asia are homes for millions of impoverished people," I said. "Each day these people rise at dawn and struggle through until the night to wrest existence from the soil. They are often wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and death comes at the early age of forty." I said there should be "a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world." The first step, I said, was for the countries of Southeast Asia to "associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development."

"We would hope that North Vietnam would take its place in the common effort just as soon as peaceful cooperation is possible," I said. I urged that the Secretary General of the United Nations use the prestige of his office to launch a plan for cooperation in economic development.

"For our part," I said, "I will ask the Congress to join in a billion dollar American investment in this effort as soon as it is under way. And I would hope that all other industrialized countries, including the Soviet Union, will join in this effort to replace despair with hope, and terror with progress."

*

Excerpts from President Nixon's Address to the United
Nations General Assembly, September 18, 1969:

*

And in the name of peace, I urge all
of you here—representing 126 nations—
to use your best diplomatic efforts to per-
suade Hanoi to move seriously into the
negotiations which could end this war.
The steps we have taken have been re-
sponsible to views expressed in this room.
And we hope that views from this organi-
zation may also be influential in Hanoi. If
these efforts are successful, this war can
end.

The people of Vietnam, North and
South alike, have demonstrated heroism
enough to last a century. And I speak
from personal observation. I have been
to North Vietnam, to Hanoi, in 1953, and
all over South Vietnam. I have seen the
people of the North and the people of the
South. The people of Vietnam, North
and South, have endured an unspeakable
weight of suffering for a generation. And
they deserve a better future.

When the war ends, the United States
will stand ready to help the people of
Vietnam—all of them—in their tasks of
renewal and reconstruction. And when
peace comes at last to Vietnam, it can
truly come with healing in its wings.

*

Excerpts from President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to
Congress, on U. S. Foreign Policy, February 9, 1972:

*

Our Peace Plan Is New, Comprehensive, and Flexible. Since the last private meeting in September we have essentially met all of Hanoi's proposals on military issues except the requirement that we withdraw equipment and cease our aid to South Vietnam. We and the South Vietnamese have offered every reasonable means of ensuring that the political process will be fair to all parties, and that the incumbent government will have no undue advantage. Past statements of principle have now been made specific. We have designed our formulations to meet the stated requirements of the other side; and we have made clear in our communications that we remain prepared to listen to additional suggestions from them. The following are new elements of our proposal.

- The U.S. and the other countries allied with the Republic of Vietnam offer a fixed date of six months for total withdrawal either as part of an overall agreement or an agreement on military issues alone.

- These withdrawals would take place *before* the withdrawal of other outside forces and *before* the new presidential election.

- President Thieu's secret offer to step down one month before the new presidential election is unprecedented; his willingness to make that offer public is an important political fact in itself.

- We are ready to accept limitations on military and economic aid to South Vietnam if North Vietnam will accept limitations on the nearly one billion dollars of aid it receives annually from its allies.

- We are prepared to undertake a massive 7½ billion dollar five-year reconstruction program in conjunction with an overall agreement, in which North Vietnam could share up to two and a half billion dollars.

*

Excerpts from Dr. Kissinger's press conference of
January 24, 1973:

As I have said in my briefings on October 26th and on December 16th, and as the President affirmed on many occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the United States is seeking a peace that heals. We have had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will last.

And, therefore, it is our firm intention in our relationship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to move from hostility to normalization and from normalization to conciliation and cooperation and we believe that under conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina to a realization of the human aspirations of all the people of Indochina and we will, in that spirit, perform our traditional role of helping people realize these aspirations in peace.

It will be our challenge in the future to move the controversies that could not be stilled by any one document from the level of military conflict to the level of positive human aspirations and to absorb the enormous talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks of construction, rather than in tasks of destruction.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the amount to which the United States is committed in rebuilding construction you referred to in North Vietnam, the reparation or whatever it is to be -- is there any dollar amount suggested?

DR. KISSINGER: We will discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all of Indochina, including North Vietnam only after the signature of the agreements, and after the implementation is well advanced, and the definition of any particular sum will have to await the discussions which will take place after the agreements are in force.

[LC]

Excerpts from President Nixon's press conference of
January 31, 1973:

From his opening statement:

DR. KISSINGER'S TRIP TO HANOI

As far as Dr. Kissinger's trip is concerned, this is a matter that we feel is very important in terms of developing the postwar relationship with North Vietnam. When we look at this very intricate agreement, which Dr. Kissinger so brilliantly briefed for the members of the press, and if you have read it, you will see why I use the word "intricate," we can see that, insofar as its terms are concerned, if the agreement is kept, there is no question about the fact that we will have peace in not only Vietnam but in Indochina for a very long period of time. But the question is whether both parties—in fact, all parties involved—have a will to peace, if they have incentives to peace, if they have desire to peace.

Now, on this particular point, it is necessary, of course, for us to talk to the South Vietnamese, as we are. It is also vitally important that we have a direct communication with the North Vietnamese. And Dr. Kissinger will be going to Hanoi to meet with the top leaders of the Government of the DRV. There he will discuss the postwar relationship. He will, of course, discuss the current status of compliance with the peace agreements which we have made, and he will also discuss, in terms of postwar relationships, the matter of the reconstruction program for all of Indochina.

As the leaders probably reported after my meeting with them the day after I announced the cease-fire agreement, I raised with the leaders the point that the United States would consider for both North Vietnam and South Vietnam and the other countries in the area a reconstruction program.

I, of course, recognized in raising this with the leaders that there would have to be Congressional consultation and Congressional support. In terms of this particular matter at this time, Dr. Kissinger will be having an initial conversation with the North Vietnamese with regard to this whole reconstruction program.

I should also say that I have noted that many Congressmen and Senators and many of the American people are not keen on helping any of the countries in that area, just as they are not keen on foreign aid generally. But as far as I am concerned, whether it is with the North or the South or the other countries in the area, I look upon this as a potential investment in peace. To the extent that the North Vietnamese, for example, participate with us and with other interested countries in reconstruction of North Vietnam, they will have a tendency to turn inward to the works of peace rather than turning outward to the works of war.

POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION IN
INDOCHINA

[4.] Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, Hearst Newspapers and Hearst Headline Service].

Q. Do you have any floor or ceiling dollar figure in mind for the rehabilitation of North Vietnam or the rest of Indonesia?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Theis, that is a matter that the Members of the Congress raised with me, as you might imagine, and they raised it not only with regard to North Vietnam but with regard to South Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos in this period as we move into the cease-fire and, we hope, peacetime reconstruction.

I cannot give you that figure now, because it is a matter that has to be negotiated, and it must be all part of one pattern. The figure, of course, will come out. The figures will come out, but they must first be discussed with the bipartisan leadership because, with all of this talk about the powers of the Presidency, let me say I am keenly aware of the fact that even though I might believe that a program of reconstruction for North Vietnam, as well as South Vietnam, is an investment in peace, the Congress has to believe it. The Congress has to support it. And this is going to be one of the more difficult assignments I have had as President, but I think we can make it if the Congress sees what the stakes are.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 47

JANUARY 1969

No. 2

THE VIET NAM NEGOTIATIONS

By Henry A. Kissinger

THE peace negotiations in Paris have been marked by the classic Vietnamese syndrome: optimism alternating with bewilderment; euphoria giving way to frustration. The halt to the bombing produced another wave of high hope. Yet it was followed almost immediately by the dispute with Saigon over its participation in the talks. The merits of this issue aside, we must realize that a civil war which has torn a society for twenty years and which has involved the great powers is unlikely to be settled in a single dramatic stroke. Even if there were mutual trust—a commodity not in excessive supply—the complexity of the issues and the difficulty of grasping their interrelationship would make for complicated negotiations. Throughout the war, criteria by which to measure progress have been hard to come by; this problem has continued during the negotiations. The dilemma is that almost any statement about Viet Nam is likely to be true; unfortunately, truth does not guarantee relevance.

The sequence of events that led to negotiations probably started with General Westmoreland's visit to Washington in November 1967. On that occasion, General Westmoreland told a Joint Session of Congress that the war was being won militarily. He outlined "indicators" of progress and stated that a limited withdrawal of American combat forces might be undertaken beginning late in 1968. On January 17, 1968, President Johnson, in his State of the Union address, emphasized that the pacification program—the extension of the control of Saigon into the countryside—was progressing satisfactorily. Sixty-seven percent of the population of South Viet Nam lived in relatively secure areas; the figure was expected to rise. A week later, the Tet offensive overthrew the assumptions of American strategy.

What had gone wrong? The basic problem has been conceptual:

L.

[LCJ]

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the tendency to apply traditional maxims of both strategy and "nation-building" to a situation which they did not fit.

American military strategy followed the classic doctrine that victory depended on a combination of control of territory and attrition of the opponent. Therefore, the majority of the American forces was deployed along the frontiers of South Viet Nam to prevent enemy infiltration and in the Central Highlands where most of the North Vietnamese main-force units—those units organized along traditional military lines—were concentrated. The theory was that defeat of the main forces would cause the guerrillas to wither on the vine. Victory would depend on inflicting casualties substantially greater than those we suffered until Hanoi's losses became "unacceptable."

This strategy suffered from two disabilities: (a) the nature of guerrilla warfare; (b) the asymmetry in the definition of what constituted unacceptable losses. A guerrilla war differs from traditional military operation because its key prize is not control of territory but control of the population. This depends, in part, on psychological criteria, especially a sense of security. No positive program can succeed unless the population feels safe from terror or reprisal. Guerrillas rarely seek to hold real estate; their tactic is to use terror and intimidation to discourage coöoperation with constituted authority.

The distribution of the population in Viet Nam makes this problem particularly acute. Over 90 percent of the population live in the coastal plain and the Mekong Delta; the Central Highlands and the frontiers, on the other hand, are essentially unpopulated. Eighty percent of American forces came to be concentrated in areas containing less than 4 percent of the population; the locale of military operations was geographically removed from that of the guerrilla conflict. As North Vietnamese theoretical writings never tired of pointing out, the United States could not hold territory and protect the population simultaneously. By opting for military victory through attrition, the American strategy produced what came to be the characteristic feature of the Vietnamese war: military successes that could not be translated into permanent political advantage. (Even the goal of stopping infiltration was very hard to implement in the trackless, nearly impenetrable jungles along the Cambodian and Laotian frontiers.)

As a result, the American conception of security came to have

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little in common with the experience of the Vietnamese villagers. American maps classified areas by three categories of control, neatly shown in various colors: Government, contested and Viet Cong. The formal criteria were complicated, and depended to an unusual extent on reports by officers whose short terms of duty (barely 12 months) made it next to impossible for them to grasp the intangibles and nuances which constitute the real elements of control in the Vietnamese countryside. In essence, the first category included all villages which contained some governmental authority; "contested" referred to areas slated to be entered by governmental cadres. The American notion of security was a reflection of Western administrative theory; control was assumed to be in the hands of one of the contestants more or less exclusively.

But the actual situation in Viet Nam was quite different; a realistic security map would have shown few areas of exclusive jurisdiction; the pervasive experience of the Vietnamese villager was the ubiquitousness of both sides. Saigon controlled much of the country in the daytime, in the sense that government troops could move anywhere if they went in sufficient force; the Viet Cong dominated a large part of the same population at night. For the villagers, the presence of Government during the day had to be weighed against its absence after dark, when Saigon's cadres almost invariably withdrew into the district or provincial capitals. If armed teams of administrators considered the villages unsafe at night, the villagers could hardly be expected to resist the guerrillas. Thus, the typical pattern in Viet Nam has been dual control, with the villagers complying with whatever force was dominant during a particular part of the day.

The political impact of this dual control was far from symmetrical, however. To be effective, the Government had to demonstrate a very great capacity to provide protection; probably well over 90 percent. The guerrillas' aim was largely negative: to prevent the consolidation of governmental authority. They did not need to destroy all governmental programs; indeed in some areas, they made no effort to interfere with them. They did have to demonstrate a capability to punish individuals who threw in their lot with Saigon. An occasional assassination or raid served to shake confidence for months afterwards.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had another advantage which they used skillfully. American "victories" were empty

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unless they laid the basis for an eventual withdrawal. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, fighting in their own country, needed merely to keep in being forces sufficiently strong to dominate the population after the United States tired of the war. We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their main forces the way a bullfighter uses his cape —to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.

The strategy of attrition failed to reduce the guerrillas and was in difficulty even with respect to the North Vietnamese main forces. Since Hanoi made no attempt to hold any territory, and since the terrain of the Central Highlands cloaked North Vietnamese movements, it proved difficult to make the opposing forces fight except at places which they chose. Indeed, a considerable majority of engagements came to be initiated by the other side; this enabled Hanoi to regulate its casualties (and ours) at least within certain limits. The so-called "kill-ratios" of United States to North Vietnamese casualties became highly unreliable indicators. Even when the figures were accurate they were irrelevant, because the level of what was "unacceptable" to Americans fighting thousands of miles from home turned out to be much lower than that of Hanoi fighting on Vietnamese soil.

All this caused our military operations to have little relationship to our declared political objectives. Progress in establishing a political base was excruciatingly slow; our diplomacy and our strategy were conducted in isolation from each other. President Johnson had announced repeatedly that we would be ready to negotiate, unconditionally, at any moment, anywhere. This, in effect, left the timing of negotiations to the other side. But short of a complete collapse of the opponent, our military deployment was not well designed to support negotiations. For purposes of negotiating, we would have been better off with 100 percent control over 60 percent of the country than with 60 percent control of 100 percent of the country.

The effort to strengthen Saigon's political control faced other problems. To be effective, the so-called pacification program had to meet two conditions: (a) it had to provide security for the population; (b) it had to establish a political and institutional

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link between the villages and Saigon. Neither condition was ever met: impatience to show "progress" in the strategy of attrition caused us to give low priority to protection of the population; in any event, there was no concept as to how to bring about a political framework relating Saigon to the countryside. As a result, economic programs had to carry an excessive load. In Viet Nam—as in most developing countries—the overwhelming problem is not to *buttress* but to *develop* a political framework. Economic progress that undermines the existing patterns of obligation—which are generally personal or feudal—serves to accentuate the need for political institutions. One ironic aspect of the war in Viet Nam is that, while we profess an idealistic philosophy, our failures have been due to an excessive reliance on material factors. The communists, by contrast, holding to a materialistic interpretation, owe many of their successes to their ability to supply an answer to the question of the nature and foundation of political authority.

The Tet offensive brought to a head the compounded weaknesses—or, as the North Vietnamese say, the internal contradictions—of the American position. To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, Tet was an American victory. Viet Cong casualties were very high; in many provinces, the Viet Cong infrastructure of guerrillas and shadow administrators surfaced and could be severely mauled by American forces. But in a guerrilla war, purely military considerations are not decisive: psychological and political factors loom at least as large.

On that level the Tet offensive was a political defeat in the countryside for Saigon and the United States. Two claims had been pressed on the villages. The United States and Saigon had promised that they would be able to protect an ever larger number of villages. The Viet Cong had never made such a claim; they merely asserted that they were the real power and presence in the villages and they threatened retribution upon those who collaborated with Saigon or the United States.

As happened so often in the past, the Viet Cong made their claim stick. Some twenty provincial capitals were occupied. Though the Viet Cong held none (except Hué) for more than a few days, they were there long enough to execute hundreds of Vietnamese on the basis of previously prepared lists. The words "secure area" never had the same significance for Vietnamese civilians as for Americans, but, if the term had any meaning, it

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applied to the provincial and district capitals. This was precisely where the Tet offensive took its most severe toll. The Viet Cong had made a point which far transcended military considerations in importance: there are no secure areas for Vietnamese civilians. This has compounded the already great tendency of the Vietnamese population to await developments and not to commit itself irrevocably to the Saigon Government. The withdrawal of government troops from the countryside to protect the cities and the consequent increase in Viet Cong activity in the villages even in the daytime have served to strengthen this trend. One result of the Tet offensive was to delay—perhaps indefinitely—the consolidation of governmental authority, which in turn is the only meaningful definition of “victory” in guerrilla warfare.

For all these reasons, the Tet offensive marked the watershed of the American effort. Henceforth, no matter how effective our actions, the prevalent strategy could no longer achieve its objectives within a period or with force levels politically acceptable to the American people. This realization caused Washington, for the first time, to put a ceiling on the number of troops for Viet Nam. Denied the very large additional forces requested, the military command in Viet Nam felt obliged to begin a gradual change from its peripheral strategy to one concentrating on the protection of the populated areas. This made inevitable an eventual commitment to a political solution and marked the beginning of the quest for a negotiated settlement. Thus the stage was set for President Johnson's speech of March 31, which ushered in the current negotiations.

## II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

Of course, the popular picture that negotiations began in May is only partially correct. The United States and Hanoi have rarely been out of touch since the American commitment in Viet Nam started to escalate. Not all these contacts have been face to face. Some have been by means of public pronouncements. Between 1965 and 1968, the various parties publicly stated their positions in a variety of forums: Hanoi announced Four Points, the NLF put forth Five Points, Saigon advanced Seven Points and the United States—perhaps due to its larger bureaucracy—promulgated Fourteen.

These public pronouncements produced a fairly wide area of apparent agreement on some general principles: that the Geneva

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Accords could form the basis of a settlement, that American forces would be withdrawn ultimately, that the reunification of Viet Nam should come about through direct negotiation between the Vietnamese, that (after a settlement) Viet Nam would not contain foreign bases. The United States has indicated that three of Hanoi's Four Points are acceptable.¹

There is disagreement about the status of Hanoi's forces in the South; indeed, Hanoi has yet to admit that it has forces in the South—though it has prepared a “fall-back position” to the effect that North Vietnamese forces in the South cannot be considered “external.” The role of the NLF is equally in dispute. Saigon rejects a separate political role for the NLF; the NLF considers Saigon a puppet régime. There is no agreement about the meaning of those propositions which sound alike or on how they are to be enforced.

In addition to negotiations by public pronouncements, there have been secret contacts which have been described in many books and articles.² It has been alleged that these contacts have failed because of a lack of imagination or a failure of coordination within our Government. (There have also been charges of deliberate sabotage.) A fair assessment of these criticisms will not be possible for many years. But it is clear that many critics vastly oversimplify the problem. Good will may not always have been present; but even were it to motivate all sides, rapid, dramatic results would be unlikely. For all parties face enormous difficulties. Indeed, the tendency of each side to overestimate the freedom of manœuvre of the other has almost certainly increased distrust. It has caused Hanoi to appear perversely obstinate to Washington and Washington to seem devious to Hanoi.

Both the Hanoi Government and the United States are limited in their freedom of action by the state of mind of the population of South Viet Nam which will ultimately determine the outcome of the conflict. The Vietnamese people have lived under foreign rule for approximately half of their history. They have maintained a remarkable cultural and social cohesion by being finely attuned to the realities of power. To survive, the Vietnamese have had

¹ These are: withdrawal of U.S. forces, the provision of the Geneva agreements calling for neutrality for North and South Viet Nam, and reunification on the basis of popular wishes. The United States has rejected the third point which implies that the internal arrangements for South Viet Nam should be settled on the basis of the NLF program—though the United States has agreed to consider the NLF program among others.

² See, for example, Kraslow and Loory, "The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam." New York: Random House, 1968.

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to learn to calculate—almost instinctively—the real balance of forces. If negotiations give the impression of being a camouflaged surrender, there will be nothing left to negotiate. Support for the side which seems to be losing will collapse. Thus, all the parties are aware—Hanoi explicitly, for it does not view war and negotiation as separate processes; we in a more complicated bureaucratic manner—that *the way* negotiations are carried out is almost as important as *what* is negotiated. The choreography of how one enters negotiations, what is settled first and in what manner is inseparable from the substance of the issues.

Wariness is thus imposed on the negotiators; a series of deadlocks is difficult to avoid. There are no "easy" issues, for each issue is symbolic and therefore in a way prejudges the final settlement. On its merits, the debate about the site of the conference—extending over a period of four weeks in April and May—was trivial. Judged intellectually, the four weeks were "wasted." But they did serve a useful function: they enabled the United States to let Saigon get used to the idea that there *would* be negotiations and to maintain that it retained control over events. It would not be surprising if Hanoi had a similar problem with the NLF.

The same problem was illustrated by the way the decision to stop the bombing was presented. Within twenty-four hours after announcement of the halt, both Hanoi and Saigon made statements of extraordinary bellicosity, which, taken literally, would have doomed the substantive talks about to begin. But their real purpose was to reassure each side's supporters in the South. Saigon especially has had a difficult problem. It has been pictured by many as perversely stubborn because of its haggling over the status of the NLF. However, to Saigon, the status of the NLF cannot be a procedural matter. For South Viet Nam it has been very nearly the central issue of the war. Washington must bear at least part of the responsibility for underestimating the depth and seriousness of this concern.

The situation confronted by Washington and Hanoi internationally is scarcely less complex. Much of the bitter debate in the United States about the war has been conducted in terms of 1961 and 1962. Unquestionably, the failure at that time to analyze adequately the geopolitical importance of Viet Nam contributed to the current dilemma. But the commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Viet Nam. For what is in-

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volved now is confidence in American promises. However fash-
ionable it is to ridicule the terms "credibility" or "prestige," they
are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to
ours only if they can count on our steadiness. The collapse of the
American effort in Viet Nam would not mollify many critics;
most of them would simply add the charge of unreliability to the
accusation of bad judgment. Those whose safety or national
goals depend on American commitments could only be dismayed.
In many parts of the world—the Middle East, Europe, Latin
America, even Japan—stability depends on confidence in Ameri-
can promises. Unilateral withdrawal, or a settlement which un-
intentionally amounts to the same thing, could therefore lead to
the erosion of restraints and to an even more dangerous inter-
national situation. No American policymaker can simply dismiss
these dangers.

Hanoi's position is at least as complicated. Its concerns are not
global; they are xenophobically Vietnamese (which includes, of
course, hegemonial ambitions in Laos and Cambodia). But Hau-
noi is extraordinarily dependent on the international environment.
It could not continue the war without foreign material assistance.
It counts almost as heavily on the pressures of world public opinion.
Any event that detracts from global preoccupations with the
war in Viet Nam thus diminishes Hanoi's bargaining position.
From this point of view, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
was a major setback for Hanoi.

Hanoi's margin of survival is so narrow that precise calculation
has become a way of life; caution is almost an obsession. Its bar-
gaining position depends on a fine assessment of international
factors—especially of the jungle of intra-communist relations. In
order to retain its autonomy, Hanoi must manœuvre skillfully
between Peking, Moscow and the NLF. Hanoi has no desire to
become completely dependent on one of the communist giants.
But, since they disagree violently, they reinforce Hanoi's already
strong tendency toward obscurantist formulations. In short, Ha-
noi's freedom of manœuvre is severely limited.

The same is true of the Soviet Union, whose large-scale aid to
Hanoi makes it a semi-participant in the war. Moscow must be
torn by contradictory inclinations. A complete victory for Hanoi
would tend to benefit Peking in the struggle for influence among
the communist parties of the world; it would support the Chinese
argument that intransigence toward the United States is, if not

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without risk, at least relatively manageable. But a defeat of Hanoi would demonstrate Soviet inability to protect "fraternal" communist countries against the United States. It would also weaken a potential barrier to Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and enable Peking to turn its full fury on Moscow. For a long time, Moscow has seemed paralyzed by conflicting considerations and bureaucratic inertia.

Events in Czechoslovakia have reduced Moscow's usefulness even further. We would compound the heavy costs of our pallid reaction to events in Czechoslovakia if our allies could blame it on a quid pro quo for Soviet assistance in extricating us from Southeast Asia. Washington therefore requires great delicacy in dealing with Moscow on the Viet Nam issue. It cannot be in the American interest to add fuel to the already widespread charge that the superpowers are sacrificing their allies to maintain spheres of influence.

This state of affairs would be enough to explain prolonged negotiations progressing through a series of apparent stalemates. In addition, a vast gulf in cultural and bureaucratic style between Hanoi and Washington complicates matters further. It would be difficult to imagine two societies less meant to understand each other than the Vietnamese and the American. History and culture combine to produce almost morbid suspiciousness on the part of the Vietnamese. Because survival has depended on a subtle skill in manipulating physically stronger foreigners, the Vietnamese style of communication is indirect and, by American standards, devious—qualities which avoid a total commitment and an overt test of strength. The fear of being made to look foolish seems to transcend most other considerations. Even if the United States accepted Hanoi's maximum program, the result might well be months of haggling while Hanoi looked for our "angle" and made sure that no other concessions were likely to be forthcoming.

These tendencies are magnified by communist ideology, which defines the United States as inherently hostile, and by Hanoi's experience in previous negotiations with the United States. It may well feel that the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962 (over Laos) deprived it of part of its achievements on the battlefield.

All this produces the particular negotiating style of Hanoi: the careful planning, the subtle, indirect methods, the preference for

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opaque communications which keep open as many options as
possible toward both foe and friend (the latter may seem equally
important to Hanoi). North Viet Nam's diplomacy operates in
cycles of reconnaissance and withdrawal to give an opportunity
to assess the opponent's reaction. This is then followed by an-
other diplomatic sortie to consolidate the achievements of the
previous phase or to try another route. In this sense, many con-
tacts with Hanoi which seemed "abortive" to us, probably served
(from Hanoi's point of view) the function of defining the terrain.
The methods of Hanoi's diplomacy are not very different from
Viet Cong military strategy and sometimes appear just as im-
penetrable to us.

If this analysis is correct, few North Vietnamese moves are ac-
cidental; even the most obtuse communication is likely to serve
a purpose. On the other hand, it is not a style which easily lends
itself to the sort of analysis at which we excel: the pragmatic,
legal dissection of individual cases. Where Hanoi makes a fetish
of planning, Washington is allergic to it. We prefer to deal with
cases as they arise, "on their merits." Pronouncements that the
United States is ready to negotiate do not guarantee that a nego-
tiating position exists or that the U.S. Government has articu-
lated its objectives.

Until a conference comes to be scheduled, two groups in the
American bureaucracy usually combine to thwart the elabora-
tion of a negotiating position: those who oppose negotiations and
those who favor them. The opponents generally equate negotia-
tions with surrender; if they agree to discuss settlement terms at
all, it is to define the conditions of the enemy's capitulation.
Aware of this tendency and of the reluctance of the top echelon to
expend capital on settling disputes which involve no immediate
practical consequences, the advocates of negotiations coöperate
in avoiding the issue. Moreover, delay serves their own purposes
in that it enables them to reserve freedom of action for the con-
ference room.

Pragmatism and bureaucracy thus combine to produce a diplo-
matic style marked by rigidity in advance of formal negotiations
and excessive reliance on tactical considerations once negotia-
tions start. In the preliminary phases, we generally lack a nego-
tiating program; during the conference, bargaining considerations
tend to shape internal discussions. In the process, we deprive
ourselves of criteria by which to judge progress. The over-

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concern with tactics suppresses a feeling for nuance and for
intangibles.

The incompatibility of the American and North Vietnamese
styles of diplomacy produced, for a long time, a massive break-
down of communication—especially in the preliminary phases of
negotiation. While Hanoi was feeling its way toward negotia-
tions, it bent all its ingenuity to avoid clear-cut, formal commit-
ments. Ambiguity permitted Hanoi to probe without giving away
much in return; Hanoi has no peers in slicing the salami very
thin. It wanted the context of events rather than a formal docu-
ment to define its obligations, lest its relations with Peking or
the NLF be compromised.

Washington was unequipped for this mode of communication.
To a government which equates commitments with legally en-
forceable obligations, Hanoi's subtle changes of tense were lit-
erally incomprehensible. In a press conference in February 1968,
President Johnson said, "As near as I am able to detect, Hanoi
has not changed its course of conduct since the very first response
it made. Sometimes they will change 'will' to 'would' or 'shall'
to 'should,' or something of the kind. But the answer is all the
same." A different kind of analysis might have inquired why
Hanoi would open up a channel for a meaningless communi-
cation, especially in the light of a record of careful planning
which made it extremely unlikely that a change of tense would
be inadvertent.

Whatever the might-have-beens, Hanoi appeared to Washing-
ton as devious, deceitful and tricky. To Hanoi, Washington must
have seemed, if not obtuse, then cannily purposeful. In any event,
the deadlock produced by the difference in negotiating style con-
cerned specific clauses less than the philosophical issue of the na-
ture of an international "commitment" or the meaning of "trick-
ery." This problem lay at the heart of the impasse over the
bombing halt.

### III. LESSONS OF THE BOMBING HALT

The bombing halt occupied the first six months of the Paris
talks. The formal positions were relatively straightforward. The
American view was contained in the so-called San Antonio for-
mula which was put forth by President Johnson in September
1967: "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval
bombardment of North Viet Nam when this will lead promptly

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to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while dis-
cussions proceed, North Viet Nam would not take advantage of
the bombing cessation or limitation." In its main outlines, the
American position remained unchanged throughout the negotia-
tions.

Hanoi's reaction was equally simple and stark. It scored the
obvious debating point that it could guarantee useful but not
"productive" talks since that depended also on the United States.'
But in the main, Hanoi adamantly insisted that the bombing halt
had to be "unconditional." It rejected all American proposals
for reciprocity as put forward, for example, by Secretary Rusk:
respect for the DMZ, no attack on South Vietnamese cities, re-
duction in the level of military operations.

Though this deadlock had many causes, surely a central problem was the difficulty each side had in articulating its real concern. Washington feared "trickery;" it believed that once stopped, the bombing would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to start again even in the face of considerable provocation. Too, it needed some assurance as to how the negotiations would proceed *after* a bombing halt. Washington was aware that a bombing halt which did not lead rapidly to substantive talks could not be sustained domestically.

The legalistic phrasing of these concerns obscured their real
merit. If bombing were resumed under conditions of great public
indignation, it would be much harder to exercise restraint in the
choice of targets and much more difficult to stop again in order
to test Hanoi's intentions. The frequently heard advice to
"take risks for peace" is valid only if one is aware that the
consequences of an imprudent risk are likely to be escalation
rather than peace.

Hanoi, in turn, had a special reason for insisting on an unconditional end of the bombing. A government as subtle as Hanoi must have known that there are no "unconditional" acts in the relation of sovereign states, if only because sovereignty implies the right to reassess changing conditions unilaterally. But Hanoi has always placed great reliance on the pressures of world opinion; the "illegality" of U.S. bombing was therefore a potent political weapon. Reciprocity would jeopardize this claim; it would suggest that bombing might be justified in some circumstances. Hanoi did not want a formula under which the United States

ª Article by Wülfred Burchett, *The New York Times*, October 21, 1967.

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could resume bombing "legally" by charging violations of an
understanding. Finally, Hanoi was eager to give the impression
to its supporters in the South that it had induced us to stop "un-
conditionally" as a symbol of imminent victory. For the same
reason, it was important to us that both sides in South Viet Nam
believe there had been reciprocity.

As a result, six months were devoted to defining a quid pro quo
which could be represented as unconditional. The issue of the
bombing halt thus raised the question of the nature of an inter-
national commitment. What is the sanction for violation of an
understanding? The United States, for a long time, conducted
itself as if its principal safeguard was a formal, binding commit-
ment by Hanoi to certain restraints. In fact, since no court exists
to which the United States could take Hanoi, the American sanc-
tion was what the United States could do unilaterally should
Hanoi "take advantage" of the bombing pause. Hanoi's fear of
the consequences is a more certain protection against trickery
than a formal commitment. Communicating what we meant by
taking advantage turned out to be more important than eliciting
a formal North Vietnamese response.

The final settlement of the problem seems to have been arrived
at by this procedure. In his address announcing the bombing
halt, President Johnson stressed that Hanoi is clear about our
definition of "take advantage." Hanoi has not formally acknowl-
edged these terms; it has, in fact, insisted that the bombing halt
was unconditional. But Hanoi can have little doubt that the
bombing halt would not survive if it disregarded the points pub-
lically stated by Secretary Rusk and President Johnson.

If the negotiations about the bombing halt demonstrate that
tacit bargaining may play a crucial role in an ultimate settlement,
they also show the extraordinary danger of neglecting the politi-
cal framework. Washington had insisted throughout the negotia-
tions that Saigon participate in the substantive talks which were
to follow a bombing halt. President Johnson, in his speech an-
nouncing the bombing halt, implied that Saigon's participation
satisfied the requirement of the San Antonio formula for "pro-
ductive talks." How we came to insist on a condition which was
basically neither in our interest nor Saigon's cannot be deter-
mined until the records are available—if then. It should have
been clear that the participation of Saigon was bound to raise
the issues of the status of the NLF and the internal structure of

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Viet Nam—issues which, as will be seen below, it is in everybody's interest to defer to as late a stage of the negotiations as possible.

Having made Saigon's participation a test case, we advanced the "your side, our side" formula. Under it, Saigon and the NLF are to participate in the conference. Each side can claim that it is composed of two delegations; its opponent is free to insist that it really deals with only one delegation. Thus the United States does not "recognize" the NLF and insists that Hanoi is its negotiating partner; Hanoi can take a similar view and maintain its refusal to deal formally with Saigon. It is difficult to disentangle from public sources whether Saigon ever agreed to this formula and whether it understood that our formula amounted to giving the NLF equal status.⁴

On the face of it, Saigon's reluctance to accept equal status with the NLF is comprehensible for it tends to affect all other issues, from ceasefire to internal structure. The merits of the dispute aside, the public rift between Saigon and Washington compromised what had been achieved. To split Washington and Saigon had been a constant objective of Hanoi; if the Paris talks turn into an instrument to accomplish this, Hanoi will be tempted to use them for political warfare rather than for serious discussions.

Clearly, there is a point beyond which Saigon cannot be given a veto over negotiations. But equally, it is not preposterous for Saigon to insist on a major voice in decisions affecting its own country. And it cannot strengthen our position in Paris to begin the substantive discussions with a public row over the status of a government whose constitutionality we have insistently pressed on the world for the past two years. The impasse has demonstrated that to deal with issues on an ad hoc basis is too risky;

⁴ Clashes with our allies in which both sides claim to have been deceived occur so frequently as to suggest structural causes (see Skybolt, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, now the bombing halt). What seems to be happening is the same bureaucratic deadlock internationally which was noted above within our Government. When an issue is fairly abstract—before there is a prospect for an agreement—our diplomats tend to present our view in a bland, relaxed fashion to the ally whose interests are involved but who is not present at the negotiations. The ally responds equally vaguely for three reasons: (a) he may be misled into believing that no decision is imminent and therefore sees no purpose in making an issue; (b) he is afraid that if he forces the issue the decision will go against him; (c) he hopes the problem will go away because agreement will prove impossible. When agreement seems imminent, American diplomats suddenly go into high gear to gain the acquiescence of the ally. He in turn feels tricked by the very intensity and suddenness of the pressure while we are outraged to learn of objections heretofore not made explicit. This almost guarantees that the ensuing controversy will take place under the most difficult conditions.

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before we go much further in negotiations, we need an agreed
concept of ultimate goals and how to achieve them.

IV. CEASEFIRE AND COALITION GOVERNMENT

Substantive negotiations confront the United States with a
major conceptual problem: whether to proceed step by step, dis-
cussing each item "on its merits," or whether to begin by attempt-
ing to get agreement about some ultimate goals.

The difference is not trivial. If the negotiations proceed step
by step through a formal agenda, the danger is great that the
bombing halt will turn out to be an admission ticket to another
deadlock. The issues are so interrelated that a partial settlement
foreshadows the ultimate outcome and therefore contains all of
its complexities. Mutual distrust and the absence of clarity as to
final goals combine to produce an extraordinary incentive to sub-
mit all proposals to the most searching scrutiny and to erect
hedges for failure or bad faith.

This is well illustrated by two schemes which public debate
has identified as suitable topics for the next stage of negotiations:
ceasefire and coalition government.

It has become axiomatic that a bombing halt would lead—
almost automatically—to a ceasefire. However, negotiating a
ceasefire may well be tantamount to establishing the precon-
ditions of a political settlement. If there existed a front line
with unchallenged control behind it, as in Korea, the solution
would be traditional and relatively simple: the two sides could
stop shooting at each other and the ceasefire line could follow the
front line. But there are no front lines in Viet Nam; control is not
territorial, it depends on who has forces in a given area and on
the time of day. If a ceasefire permits the Government to move
without challenge, day or night, it will amount to a Saigon vic-
tory. If Saigon is prevented from entering certain areas, it means
in effect partition which, as in Laos, tends toward permanency.
Unlike Laos, however, the pattern would be a crazy quilt, with
enclaves of conflicting loyalties all over the country.

This would involve the following additional problems: (1) It
would lead to an intense scramble to establish predominant con-
trol before the ceasefire went into effect. (2) It would make next
to impossible the verification of any withdrawal of North Viet-
namese forces that might be negotiated; the local authorities in
areas of preponderant communist control would doubtless certify

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227

that no external forces were present and impede any effort at
international inspection. (3) It would raise the problem of the
applicability of a ceasefire to guerrilla activity in the non-commu-
nist part of the country; in other words, how to deal with the
asymmetry between the actions of regular and of guerrilla forces.
Regular forces operate on a scale which makes possible a rela-
tively precise definition of what is permitted and what is pro-
scribed; guerrilla forces, by contrast, can be effective through
isolated acts of terror difficult to distinguish from normal criminal
activity.

There would be many other problems: who collects taxes and
how, who enforces the ceasefire and by what means. In other
words, a tacit de facto ceasefire may prove more attainable than a
negotiated one. By the same token, a formal ceasefire is likely to
predetermine the ultimate settlement and tend toward partition.
Ceasefire is thus not so much a step toward a final settlement as
a form of it.

This is even more true of another staple of the Viet Nam de-
bate: the notion of a coalition government. Of course, there are
two meanings of the term: as a means of legitimizing partition,
indeed as a disguise for continuing the civil war; or as a "true"
coalition government attempting to govern the whole country. In
the first case, a coalition government would be a façade with
non-communist and communist ministries in effect governing
their own parts of the country. This is what happened in Laos,
where each party in the "coalition government" wound up with
its own armed forces and its own territorial administration. The
central government did not exercise any truly national functions.
Each side carried on its own business—including civil war. But
in Laos, each side controlled contiguous territory, not a series of
enclaves as in South Viet Nam. Too, of all the ways to bring
about partition, negotiations about a coalition government are
the most dangerous because the mere participation of the United
States in talking about it could change the political landscape of
South Viet Nam.

Coalition government is perhaps the most emotionally charged
issue in Viet Nam, where it tends to be identified with the second
meaning: a joint Saigon-NLF administration of the entire coun-
try. There can be no American objection, of course, to direct nego-
tiations between Saigon and the NLF. The issue is whether the
United States should be party to an attempt to *impose* a coali-

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tion government. We must be clear that our involvement in such an effort may well destroy the existing political structure of South Viet Nam and thus lead to a communist takeover.

Some urge negotiations on a coalition government for precisely this reason: as a face-saving formula for arranging the communist political victory which they consider inevitable. But those who believe that the political evolution of South Viet Nam should not be foreclosed by an American decision must realize that the subject of a coalition government is the most thankless and tricky area for negotiation by outsiders.

The notion that a coalition government represents a "compro-
mise" which will permit a new political evolution hardly does jus-
tice to Vietnamese conditions. Even the non-communist groups
have demonstrated the difficulty Vietnamese have in compromis-
ing differences. It is beyond imagination that parties that have
been murdering and betraying each other for 25 years could work
together as a team giving joint instructions to the entire country.
The image of a line of command extending from Saigon into the
countryside is hardly true of the non-communist government in
Saigon. It would be absurd in the case of a coalition government.
Such a government would possess no authority other than that of
each minister over the forces he controlled either through per-
sonal or party loyalty.

To take just one example of the difficulties: Communist min-
isters would be foolhardy in the extreme if they entered Saigon
without bringing along sufficient military force for their pro-
tection. But the introduction of communist military forces into
the chief bastion of governmental strength would change the
balance of political forces in South Viet Nam. The danger of a
coalition government is that it would decouple the non-com-
munist elements from effective control over their armed forces
and police, leaving them unable to defend themselves adequately.

In short, negotiations seeking to impose a coalition from the outside are likely to change markedly and irreversibly the political process in South Viet Nam—as Vietnamese who believe that a coalition government cannot work quickly choose sides. We would, in effect, be settling the war on an issue least amenable to outside influence, with respect to which we have the least grasp of conditions and the long-term implications of which are most problematical.

This is not to say that the United States should resist an out-

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229

come freely negotiated among the Vietnamese. It does suggest that any negotiation on this point by the United States is likely to lead either to an impasse or to the collapse of Saigon.

## V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Paradoxical as it may seem, the best way to make progress where distrust is so deep and the issues so interrelated may be to seek agreement on ultimate goals first and to work back to the details to implement them.

This requires an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. Hanoi's strength is that it is fighting among its own people in familiar territory, while the United States is fighting far away. As long as Hanoi can preserve some political assets in the South, it retains the prospect of an ultimately favorable political outcome. Not surprisingly, Hanoi has shown a superior grasp of the local situation and a greater capacity to design military operations for political ends. Hanoi relies on world opinion and American domestic pressures; it believes that the unpopularity of the war in Viet Nam will ultimately force an American withdrawal.

Hanoi's weaknesses are that superior planning can substitute for material resources only up to a point. Beyond it, differences of scale are bound to become significant and a continuation of the war will require a degree of foreign assistance which may threaten North Viet Nam's autonomy. This Hanoi has jealously safeguarded until now. A prolonged, even if ultimately victorious war might leave Viet Nam so exhausted as to jeopardize the purpose of decades of struggle.

Moreover, a country as sensitive to international currents as North Viet Nam cannot be reassured by recent developments. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia removed Viet Nam as the principal concern of world opinion, at least for a while. Some countries heretofore critical of the United States remembered their own peril and their need for American protection; this served to reduce the intensity of public pressures on America. Hanoi's support of Moscow demonstrated the degree of Hanoi's dependence on the U.S.S.R.; it also may have been intended to forestall Soviet pressures on Hanoi to be more flexible by putting Moscow in Hanoi's debt. Whatever the reason, the vision of a Titoist Viet Nam suddenly seemed less plausible—all the more so as Moscow's justification for the invasion of

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Czechoslovakia can provide a theoretical basis for an eventual Chinese move against North Viet Nam. Finally, the Soviet doctrine according to which Moscow has a right to intervene to protect socialist domestic structures made a Sino-Soviet war at least conceivable. For Moscow's accusations against Peking have been, if anything, even sharper than those against Prague. But in case of a Sino-Soviet conflict, Hanoi would be left high and dry. International crises threatening to overshadow Viet Nam in successive years—the Middle East in 1967; Central Europe in 1968—thus may have convinced Hanoi that time is not necessarily on its side.

American assets and liabilities are the reverse of these. No matter how irrelevant some of our political conceptions or how insensitive our strategy, we are so powerful that Hanoi is simply unable to defeat us militarily. By its own efforts, Hanoi cannot force the withdrawal of American forces from South Viet Nam. Indeed, a substantial improvement in the American military position seems to have taken place. As a result, we have achieved our minimum objective: Hanoi is unable to gain a military victory. Since it cannot force our withdrawal, it must negotiate about it. Unfortunately, our military strength has no political corollary; we have been unable so far to create a political structure that could survive military opposition from Hanoi after we withdraw.

The structure of the negotiation is thus quite different from Korea. There are no front lines with secure areas behind them. In Viet Nam, negotiations do not ratify a military status quo but create a new political reality. There are no unambiguous tests of relative political and military strength. The political situation for both sides is precarious—within Viet Nam for the United States, internationally for Hanoi. Thus it is probable that neither side can risk a negotiation so prolonged as that of Panmunjom a decade and a half ago. In such a situation, a favorable outcome depends on a clear definition of objectives. The limits of the American commitment can be expressed in two propositions: first, the United States cannot accept a military defeat, or a change in the political structure of South Viet Nam brought about by external military force; second, once North Vietnamese forces and pressures are removed, the United States has no obligation to maintain a government in Saigon by force.

American objectives should therefore be (1) to bring about

THE VIET NAM NEGOTIATIONS 231

a staged withdrawal of external forces, North Vietnamese and American, (2) thereby to create a maximum incentive for the contending forces in South Viet Nam to work out a political agreement. The structure and content of such an agreement must be left to the South Vietnamese. It could take place formally on the national level. Or, it could occur locally on the provincial level where even now tacit accommodations are not unusual in many areas such as the Mekong Delta.

The details of a phased, mutual withdrawal are not decisive for our present purposes and, in any case, would have to be left to negotiations. It is possible, however, to list some principles: the withdrawal should be over a sufficiently long period so that a genuine indigenous political process has a chance to become established; the contending sides in South Viet Nam should commit themselves not to pursue their objectives by force while the withdrawal of external forces is going on; in so far as possible, the definition of what constitutes a suitable political process or structure should be left to the South Vietnamese, with the schedule for mutual withdrawal creating the time frame for an agreement.

The United States, then, should concentrate on the subject of the mutual withdrawal of external forces and avoid negotiating about the internal structure of South Viet Nam for as long as possible. The primary responsibility for negotiating the internal structure of South Viet Nam should be left for direct negotiations among the South Vietnamese. If we involve ourselves deeply in the issue of South Viet Nam's internal arrangements, we shall find ourselves in a morass of complexities subject to two major disadvantages. First, we will be the party in the negotiation least attuned to the subtleties of Vietnamese politics. Second, we are likely to wind up applying the greater part of our pressure against Saigon as the seeming obstacle to an accommodation. The result may be the complete demoralization of Saigon, profound domestic tensions within the United States and a prolonged stalemate or a resumption of the war.

Whatever the approach, the negotiating procedure becomes vital; indeed, it may well determine the outcome and the speed with which it is achieved.

Tying the bombing halt to Saigon's participation in the substantive discussions was probably unwise—all the more so as Hanoi seems to have been prepared to continue bilateral talks.

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The participation of Saigon and the NLF raised issues about status that would have been better deferred; it made a discussion of the internal structure of South Viet Nam hard to avoid. Nevertheless, the principles sketched above, while now more difficult to implement, can still guide the negotiations. The tension between Washington and Saigon can even prove salutary if it forces both sides to learn that if they are to negotiate effectively they must confront the fundamental issues explicitly.

As these lines are being written, the formula for resolving the issue of Saigon's participation in the conference is not yet clear. But the general approach should be the same whatever the eventual compromise.

The best procedure would be to establish three forums. If the South Vietnamese finally appear in Paris—as is probable—the four-sided conference should be looked upon primarily as a plenary session to legitimize the work of two negotiating committees which need not be formally established and could even meet secretly: (a) between Hanoi and the United States, and (b) between Saigon and the NLF. Hanoi and Washington would discuss mutual troop withdrawal and related subjects such as guarantees for the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. (The formula could be the implementation of the Geneva Accords which have been accepted in principle by both sides.) Saigon and the NLF would discuss the internal structure of South Viet Nam. The third forum would be an international conference to work out guarantees and safeguards for the agreements arrived at in the other committees, including international peacekeeping machinery.

If Saigon continues to refuse the "our side, your side" formula, the same procedure could be followed. The subcommittees would become principal forums and the four-sided plenary session could be eliminated. The international "guaranteeing conference" would not be affected.

To be sure, Saigon, for understandable reasons, has consistently refused to deal with the NLF as an international entity. But if Saigon understands its own interests, it will come to realize that the procedure outlined here involves a minimum and necessary concession. The three-tiered approach gives Saigon the greatest possible control over the issues that affect its own fate; direct negotiations between the United States and the NLF would be obviated. A sovereign government is free to talk to any group

that by nature is not of State origin, to be considered as a part of the transaction. The parties to the discussion are the States, and the parties to the agreement are the NLF and Saigon. The agreement is binding on the States, and the obligation of the NLF to Saigon is binding on Saigon. The obligation of Saigon to the NLF is binding on the NLF, and the obligation of the NLF to Saigon is binding on Saigon. The agreement is binding on both sides, and the obligation of each side is binding on the other side.

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233

that represents an important domestic power base without there-
by conferring sovereignty on it; it happens all the time in union
negotiations or even in police work.

But why should Hanoi accept such an approach? The answer
is that partly it has no choice; it cannot bring about a withdrawal
of American forces by its own efforts, particularly if the United
States adopts a less impatient strategy—one better geared to
the protection of the population and sustainable with substan-
tially reduced casualties. Hanoi may also believe that the NLF,
being better organized and more determined, can win a political
contest. (Of course, the prerequisite of a settlement is that both
sides think they have a chance to win or at least to avoid losing.)
Above all, Hanoi may not wish to give the United States a
permanent voice in internal South Vietnamese affairs, as it will
if the two-sided approach is followed. It may be reinforced in this
attitude by the belief that a prolonged negotiation about coali-
tion government may end no more satisfactorily from Hanoi's
point of view than did the Geneva negotiations over Viet Nam
in 1954 and Laos in 1962. As for the United States, if it brings
about a removal of external forces and pressures, and if it gains
a reasonable time for political consolidation, it will have done
the maximum possible for an ally—short of permanent occupa-
tion.

To be sure, Hanoi cannot be asked to leave the NLF to the
mercy of Saigon. While a coalition government is undesirable, a
mixed commission to develop and supervise a political process
to reintegrate the country—including free elections—could be
useful. And there must be an international presence to enforce
good faith. Similarly, we cannot be expected to rely on Hanoi's
word that the removal of its forces and pressures from South
Viet Nam is permanent. An international force would be required
to supervise access routes. It should be reinforced by an electronic
barrier to check movements.

A negotiating procedure and a definition of objectives cannot
guarantee a settlement, of course. If Hanoi proves intransigent
and the war goes on, we should seek to achieve as many of our
objectives as possible unilaterally. We should adopt a strategy
which reduces casualties and concentrates on protecting the popu-
lation. We should continue to strengthen the Vietnamese army
to permit a gradual withdrawal of some American forces, and we
should encourage Saigon to broaden its base so that it is stronger

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for the political contest with the communists which sooner or
later it must undertake.

No war in a century has aroused the passions of the conflict in
Viet Nam. By turning Viet Nam into a symbol of deeper re-
sentments, many groups have defeated the objective they pro-
fess to seek. However we got into Viet Nam, whatever the judg-
ment of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential for
the peace of the world. Any other solution may unloose forces
that would complicate prospects of international order. A new
Administration must be given the benefit of the doubt and a
chance to move toward a peace which grants the people of Viet
Nam what they have so long struggled to achieve: an opportunity
to work out their own destiny in their own way.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>DRV "Two-Point Elaboration"<br>February 3, 1972</th><th>-2-<br>DRV Position<br>August 1, 1972</th><th>DRV Position<br>September 15, 1972</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>STATUS OF<br>GVN</td><td>Thieu must resign immediately<br>and entire GVN security<br>apparatus must be disbanded.</td><td>Thieu continues in power until<br>signing of final agreement, when GVN<br>is replaced by coalition government.</td><td>Thieu continues in power until<br>signing of final agreement, when GVN<br>is replaced by coalition government.</td></tr><tr><td>FORMATION<br>OF NEW<br>GOVERNMENT</td><td>PRG will negotiate with this new<br>Saigon administration to form<br>three-segment Government of<br>National Concord (as before).</td><td>In meantime, DRV and U.S. will agree<br>to form Government of National<br>Concord composed of three equal<br>segments representing:<br>--PRG<br>--GVN, without Thieu<br>--neutralist political and religious<br>tendencies (chosen by mutual PRG/<br>GVN agreement)</td><td>In meantime, DRV and U.S. will<br>agree to form Provisional<br>Government of National Concord<br>composed of three equal segments<br>(with guarantees that no one side<br>will dominate), representing:<br>--PRG<br>--GVN, without Thieu<br>--other political and religious<br>tendencies (chosen by mutual<br>PRG/GVN agreement)</td></tr><tr><td>FUNCTIONS<br>OF NEW<br>GOVERNMENT</td><td>Government of National Concord<br>will organize general elections,<br>elect a constituent assembly,<br>and work out a new constitution,<br>to set up definitive government<br>in South Vietnam.</td><td>Government of National Concord<br>will have full powers in both<br>internal and external affairs,<br>and organize general elections.</td><td>Both PRG and GVN temporarily remain<br>in existence to administer areas<br>controlled by them, until definitive<br>government is formed. Government<br>of National Concord is called the<br>"central government of all South<br>Vietnam." Committees of National<br>Concord will be formed at all<br>local levels to implement its<br>decisions. Government of National<br>Concord will "stimulate and<br>supervise implementation of signed<br>agreements," organize general<br>elections in 6 months, and organize<br>consultations between the PRG and<br>GVN to settle any differences. All<br>laws contrary to Government of<br>National Concord will automatically<br>be abrogated.</td></tr><tr><td>RELATION<br>TO CEASE-<br>FIRE</td><td>Ceasefire not specifically<br>mentioned.</td><td>Ceasefire immediately after<br>signing of overall agreement.</td><td>Ceasefire immediately after<br>signing of overall agreement.</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>DRV Position<br>September 26, 1972</th><th>DRV Proposal<br>October 8, 1972</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. STATUS OF GVN</td><td>Thieu continues in power until signing of final agreement, when coalition government is formed.</td><td>Thieu and GVN remain in place after agreement.</td></tr><tr><td>2. FORMATION OF NEW GOVERNMENT</td><td>In meantime, DRV and U.S. will agree to form Provisional Government of National Concord composed of three equal segments (with guarantees that no one side will dominate), representing:<br>--PRG<br>--GVN, without Thieu<br>--other political and religious tendencies (chosen by mutual PRG/GVN agreement)</td><td>DRV and U.S. agree to form an Administration of National Concord, at all levels, composed of three equal segments:<br>--PRG<br>--GVN<br>--other political and religious tendencies (by mutual PRG/GVN agreement)</td></tr><tr><td>3. FUNCTIONS OF NEW GOVERNMENT</td><td>Government of National Concord will have 12 members, rotating chair among the three segments; it will take all decisions by unanimity. Both PRG and GVN will temporarily remain in existence to administer areas controlled by them, and maintain their existing foreign relations (consistent with a foreign policy of peace and neutrality). Government is no longer called the "central government" but "a body independent of all the South Vietnamese parties." Committees of National Concord will be formed at all local levels to implement its decisions. Government of National Concord will direct and supervise implementation of the signed agreements, organize general elections for a constituent assembly, and draft a constitution for the assembly's approval. It will review policies and laws of PRG and GVN and stimulate them to amend or abrogate those in conflict with the signed agreements.<br>Upon signature of overall agreement, Thieu resigns, PRG and GVN remain in existence, and Government of National Concord assumes power.</td><td>The Administration of National Concord will direct and supervise the PRG and GVN in implementing the signed agreements, maintaining the ceasefire, preserving peace, achieving national concord, and ensuring democratic liberties; it will organize general and local elections. It will take all decisions by unanimity. The PRG and GVN agree to settle all disputes through negotiation.</td></tr><tr><td>• RELATION TO CEASE-FIRE</td><td>Standstill ceasefire immediately after signing of overall agreement.</td><td>Standstill ceasefire immediately after signing of overall agreement.</td></tr></tbody></table>