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event be the worst imaginable. Any mixing of such demands made in the manner of an ultimatum with the all-German question would lead the West along a path ending either in a restriction of Berlin's freedom or in a more or less disguised capitulation in the all-German question, for it is inconceivable that even a basic outline of an acceptable solution could be found for the German problem in six months.

Nevertheless it seemed to me that the Russians' strategy was to force us either to recognise the East German Government or by refusing to deal with them to impose, as it were, a blockade upon ourselves.

In a reply to a message from Dulles, giving an account of a talk with Anastas Mikoyan, in which he seemed to be slightly drawing back, I said:

> All the same I do not think that it has been the Russian intention to impose a blockade at the end of the six months. Their intention has been to make us choose between imposing a blockade on ourselves or dealing with the East Germans, whether as their successors or their agents. But they now seem to be a little alarmed that their note should appear to the Western world as having directly threatened a blockade.

I still felt that while making every possible plan for the emergency which might follow the Russians making a separate treaty with East Germany, we should stand upon the reality and not upon the form. I pointed out to Dulles that the Russians had already threatened that they would support the D.D.R. if we attacked them. The corollary was surely that the Russians must see to it that the D.D.R. carried out all their obligations including those that the Russians might purport to have transferred.

While this friendly interchange was going on between Washington and London, ably assisted by our Ambassador, Harold Caccia, who seemed to have won the complete confidence of the Secretary of State, our Ambassador in Bonn arrived in London.

Kit Steel... came for a talk... Chancellor Adenauer is in a bad way and ageing rapidly. The rest of them (Brentano, etc.) are unable or unwilling to think out anything new in these circum-

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stances. At one moment Adenauer is violently pro-French and pro-de Gaulle, at another, highly critical. He is still, it appears, fond of me!

About Berlin, etc., he stands (officially) for absolute rigidity and a solid front against Soviet Russia. Behind the scenes, he wrings his hands and says that Russia and the West are like two express trains rushing to a head-on collision.¹

Meanwhile, on 10 January the Soviet Government made a new move. In a note addressed to the three Western powers they proposed a peace conference to include a discussion on the Berlin question. No mention of a time limit was given in this note. This appeared to confirm the hints given by Mikoyan while in the United States. From this it would seem that the Soviet Government was, after all, keeping the door open for negotiations. Nevertheless the note insisted once more that

> no one can hinder the Soviet Government from relinquishing the functions which it performs in respect of Berlin and its communications with Western Germany and from regulating the questions which arise in this connexion by means of an agreement with the German Democratic Republic.²

With this communication the Soviet Government included the draft of a peace treaty. This in effect provided for the partition of Germany into the two existing states. It would consequently allow all the Allied powers to sign a treaty with those states without waiting for an all-German Government to be formed. The Allied powers would do their best to promote agreement between the two German states, which for their part were to renounce the use of force as a means of achieving unity. Pending reunification, the two German states were to abandon their membership of the Warsaw and the NATO alliances; military forces would be allowed so far as was necessary to keep order and the local defence. All this had a certain specious attraction. Yet since foreign troops were to be withdrawn from both Germanies, then in the absence of any real disarmament or security system, the U.S.S.R. would have an enormous military advantage. They could pour in their troops at a few hours'

¹ 16 January 1959.

² *Annual Register, 1959*, p. 136.

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notice; whereas if Western Germany were once demilitarised and neutralised the strength of NATO would be, in fact, weakened almost to the point of inanition.

The Russian note was skilfully devised and would clearly need a careful and if possible a positive reply. To agree the terms of such a reply would necessarily be a matter of some weeks. Indeed it was not until 16 February that the answer could be sent. It was, for once, simple and constructive. While stating that the Soviet proposals were unacceptable, the Allied note called for a Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four powers with German advisers in attendance to deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications.

Meanwhile I began to ponder over some method of dealing with the situation which might so easily drift from month to month with interchanges of diplomatic notes and *démarches* until a final disaster.

I have decided to send telegrams to Washington expressing my anxiety and my desire to make some progress. I would like, above all, to go to Washington for talks with Dulles and the President. This method has worked very well during the last two years. But with French jealousy and German suspicion, it may be too dangerous. It seems therefore that I had better make a more complicated plan.

For a long time there has been a sort of outstanding invitation to go to Moscow. Of course, the invitation might not be renewed. But it is worth trying. In that case, I would go to Moscow (with Foreign Secretary)-then to Bonn and Paris, and finally to Washington.¹

On 20 January after full discussion at the Foreign Office the necessary telegram to Dulles was drafted and approved.

Caccia will see Dulles tomorrow, and we should have our reply by Thursday morning. Some think the Americans will be incensed and go off the deep end; others think they will acquiesce.²

The House of Commons had now returned, and Parliamentary questions about Berlin and Russia were pouring in. Gaitskell and Bevan were naturally both pressing me hard, being apparently

¹ 18 January 1959.

² 20 January 1959.

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converts to the idea of 'disengagement' and German neutrality. In view of the approaching end of the Parliament and the possibility of a Labour Government taking office, I did my best to discourage them, for I feared that any weakness could only serve to encourage Russian intransigence.

Meanwhile the reply arrived from Washington. The President and Dulles naturally pointed out that there were certain risks in my going to Moscow before any agreed Western position had been reached, but their attitude was not unsympathetic and afforded me great encouragement.

The American reply has come and in most friendly terms. They say, in effect, that they have complete confidence in me and I must do whatever I think best.¹

On the same day I had a meeting with the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a number of other leading Ministers, in which I told them about my plan. The Foreign Secretary had, of course, been fully in my confidence all through. After this conference, and with the approval of my colleagues, I telegraphed urgently to Sir Patrick Reilly asking for his views as to whether, if I were to take up the invitation extended at the time of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1956, my proposal would be welcomed. A rebuff would be disconcerting. The Ambassador in reply felt bound to point out the dangers. The Russians would be sure to look at the visit against the background of what they considered to be the state of public opinion in Britain in a pre-election period and try to get all they could out of it. He doubted whether they could hope for any success in driving a wedge between Washington and London since my close relations and friendship with the President were well known. They would more probably try to use the opportunity to isolate Adenauer and the West German Government and to represent them as the chief obstacle to a settlement of the German problem. He felt, therefore, that not only the Americans but also the French and especially the Germans should publicly approve the visit and also that the visits to Bonn, Paris and Washington should be announced simultaneously with that to Moscow. He added that

¹ 22 January 1959.

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it was no use trying to fish for an invitation; the request must be put
forward simply and straightforwardly. In a further message Reilly
expressed the hope that the visit would not be hurried. It should be
of the same character as that which the Russian statesmen had made
in Britain. Although it should be essentially a working visit, it
should also provide the opportunity for me and my party to see some
other Russian cities and something of the Russian countryside and
people.

On receipt of this advice, and after much thought and discussion
with the Foreign Secretary and other leading colleagues, I decided
to take the risk. Instructions were sent to the Ambassador accord-
ingly. Reilly saw Andrei Gromyko on 24 January and put forward
my proposal of a visit of a week or ten days, starting if possible about
20 February. For some days there was no reply. On the 29 January
the Ambassador sent me a message to say that the proposal had
probably surprised the Soviet Government and might have upset
their own plans. He thought an actual rebuff unlikely, but they were
probably considering whether the visit would be to their advantage
or not. Would I wish him to press for an answer? To which I
immediately answered, 'No, let things take their course, we must
not seem to be too anxious.'

However, by 31 January I was becoming rather concerned:

Dulles comes Tuesday and leaves Wednesday lunch time. We
must prepare for this, which will be a very important discussion.
We can bluff the Russians—if we can—but we must not bluff
ourselves.

The French Prime Minister [Michel Debré] is to come early
in March. I agreed a telegram to Reilly (in Moscow) asking his
advice on what now to do with the Russians, who (no doubt
occupied with their great Congress and all their visitors) have
not answered my proposal. We must not run after them; but we
must not let them insult us by too long a delay.¹

On 2 February the reply came.

I heard after luncheon that the Russian Minister had called at
Foreign Office and given the Russian reply. All my anxieties are

¹ 31 January 1959.

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585

removed. They have accepted the date, the length of visit, and
the terms of the announcement. This will be 3.30 p.m. on
Thursday. This is an immense relief, for we rather 'stuck our
necks out' in making the proposal, and a rebuff (which would have
leaked) would have been damaging as well as embarrassing.¹

Now that the matter was settled I began to have some qualms.
What would the Amercians really feel? What would the French say
or do? How would Adenauer react? Would the visit prove a success
and help at least to break the ice and gradually lead to more relaxed
relations between East and West? Would it above all contribute to
a solution of the urgent problem caused by Khrushchev's ulti-
matum? Or would it prove disastrous? It was certainly a perilous
undertaking. I must avoid negotiation on the immediate subject of
Berlin, for I had no authority to speak for my allies, nor had they
any agreed plan. The visit would certainly be a great adventure; it
might also be great fun. But before I could set out there was much
still to be done.

I immediately sent messages to Adenauer, to Debré, now Prime
Minister of France, as well as to the Prime Ministers of the Com-
monwealth. In my message of 2 February to Adenauer, who I knew
would view my decision with dismay and even alarm, I referred to
the long-standing invitation to Sir Anthony Eden, which I had not
up to now thought it opportune to revive. It now seemed to me that
something useful might come from a personal contact in Moscow.
It would certainly help if we could know something of their real
intentions, about which we were still in the dark.

The primary purpose of my visit to Moscow will therefore be
to try to discover something of what is in the minds of the
Soviet leaders. I shall make it clear that I am not coming to
negotiate. It would not enter into my mind to try to negotiate
on my own, nor indeed would I be in a position to do so because
it will still be some time before the Western allies will be able to
decide on the line which they are to take with the Russians at any
conference. If I can bring anything useful back with me in the
shape of some insight into their motives this might in fact be of
some help to all of us in settling our line.

¹ 2 February 1959.

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I also felt that my visit might serve a useful purpose with Western opinion. A firm policy required full and understanding support

If our public opinion is to be kept resolute, as of course it can be, and if it is to accept the measures of military preparedness which it may before long be necessary for us to take and impossible for us to conceal, then we must demonstrate our readiness to talk to the Russians and the reasonableness of our approach to them. People in the United Kingdom are very ready to make sacrifices and run risks if they are really convinced that this is necessary. But they do not like to be put into these positions unless they are certain that their leaders have made every effort to reach understanding and agreement.

I added that, since my visit would be of an exploratory character, I hoped I would be able to discuss its results with him as soon as possible after my return from Moscow. I also proposed to visit Paris and Washington.

Since the Foreign Secretary was in Paris he was able to have a personal talk with Couve de Murville and pass my message direct to Debré, who sent a friendly if non-committal reply. My reason for sending a message to Debré asking him to inform de Gaulle was that my new plans involved postponing Debré's visit to London. On 3 February our Ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, reported that the French took the matter very calmly and Couve de Murville's only comment was that if my visit succeeded in persuading the Russians to withdraw their ultimatum it would be a very good thing. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers sent messages of approval and encouragement.

The news from Bonn was not so satisfactory. The Chancellor was at first inclined to regard my visit as purely an election manœuvre. When the Ambassador indignantly denied this, he observed that this was the only useful point in it that he could see. However, at the end of the interview, which the Ambassador described as far from happy, it was clear that Adenauer's attitude would be much affected by what line the French took, but above all by the American reaction. In his reply to my message, however, Adenauer only stressed one point, the importance of giving no official recognition

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to East Germany. This question was, of course, the one upon which he held throughout his life the strongest and most unshakable views.

On 4 February Dulles arrived in London. He came to Downing Street at 9 p.m., and I was shocked at his appearance. I had not seen him for some months, and it was clear to me now that he was a very sick man. Indeed ten days later it was announced in Washington that an operation for hernia had revealed that he was suffering from a recurrence of cancer. Although he showed remarkable courage and was determined not to abandon his high position, it was a tragic thing to see this once massive figure struck down by so terrible a disease.

> He is not able to dine out. He has to eat some strange foods and rest to digest them. But Janet came to a dinner at No. 10 which Dorothy gave (wives only), and Foreign Secretary and I had a sandwich together, awaiting his arrival at No. 10.¹

I had a few words alone with Dulles before the conference began. Dulles was accompanied by Livie Merchant (Under-Secretary) and the American Ambassador, Jock Whitney. With me were Hoyer Millar, Rumbold and Bishop. After discussing some other points we soon came to Berlin.

> Here Foster had 'thoughts aloud'. The impression he gave was that he had completely abandoned the Pentagon plan and the idea of a large convoy of tanks, with perhaps a division or more of troops and artillery, to force and hold the road and rail approach. He put forward a much more modest and much less spectacular form of 'probe', to be followed by political pressure-in U.N. and by other means.¹

Although the Secretary of State had told me this in our short preliminary talk I was very anxious

> that he should restate this view to me, in the hearing of his American colleagues. For he *must* speak on the same lines in Bonn. This does *not* mean that we should abandon our position in Berlin or desist from a 'tough' point of view. But it means that while we must present a firm and united front to the Russians,

¹ 4 February 1959.

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we must not deceive ourselves. Above all, we must not slip into the 1914 position—mobilisation sliding into war. I thought this exposition of the case very ably done. Foster Dulles knows that it is the opposite of what Murphy and the Pentagon have been saying for weeks, almost accusing us of being weak and defeatist—perhaps traitors—because we did not swallow the military plan without thought. I suspect that it is the President who has overruled the soldiers. Indeed, when we were alone, Dulles as good as told me this.¹

The Berlin problem naturally led on to the wider question of Germany and European security.

I threw out various ideas—really to try out the Americans. We might propose ‘thinning out’—without national discrimination. We might even prepare something much more ambitious—Russian troops to leave Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia—at a price...

To my surprise Foster Dulles was not unduly shocked. He seemed to be ready to discuss new ideas. This may be partly the result of having lost control of Congress and therefore having to accommodate the views of the Administration and the Senate.¹

On the next day Dulles and the Americans came again at noon. We soon reached agreement on the timing of our plans, though we had not yet any precise draft of what we proposed to say when the Conference of Foreign Ministers took place. Much to my surprise, the main business being over, Dulles then began to talk in more general terms. One interesting thing he said

in a sort of parenthetical way, but nevertheless quite firmly—‘a Summit Conference, to which the President would come, ought not to be *excluded* in May next’. Foster Dulles thinks the Conference with the Russians must last four to five weeks. I think his idea is that, if some progress could be made, *one* week of this could be a meeting of *Heads*. He also seemed to like my idea of a more or less continuous or permanent Conference-adjourning for long periods and reassembling for new work, with Ministers attending from time to time, and officials (Ambassadors, etc.) working on committees and reporting to

¹⁴ February 1959.

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Ministers. Such a Conference, or Congress, would in itself ‘relieve tensions’.¹

When Dulles left I felt very sad. In spite of all the troubles and difficulties we had had with this strange man, I had grown to have an affection and respect for him. I was to see him again before his death, but already I felt that he was a doomed man.

On the same afternoon I made a statement after Questions in the House of Commons. After referring to the Soviet invitation extended to Eden in 1956 I continued:

> Recent international developments have made me feel that a visit at the present time would be of value. On my instructions, therefore, Her Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow suggested to the Soviet Government some days ago that I should go to the Soviet Union on 21 February for a visit of a week or ten days accompanied by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary. I am glad to tell the House that on 2 February—that is, last Monday, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in London informed us that his Government welcomed this proposal. Our friends and Allies have been informed.

We are, of course, in close consultation with our Allies about how best to handle the serious issues which at present face us in Europe. On all these we act together. My right hon. and learned Friend and I will not be going to Moscow to conduct a negotiation on behalf of the West. Nevertheless, we hope that our conversations with the Soviet leaders will give them a better knowledge of our point of view and make it easier for us to understand what is in their minds. Thus, we and our Allies may be better able to judge what our policies and actions should be. Personal contacts do not in themselves solve international problems, but there are times when they may make a contribution to their solution.

There are, of course, other important aspects of this visit. There are many matters such as trade, information and cultural relations which we should hope to discuss. I shall also look forward to seeing something of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people. But my principal purpose will be to try to dispel misconceptions and to establish some basis for better understanding.

¹ 5 February 1959.