MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND DATE: 2:45 p.m., September 23, 1971

PLACE: Los Angeles Times Building
Chandler Pavillon

PARTICIPANTS:

Otis Chandler

Tony Day

Frank Haven (Managing Editor)

Bob Gibson (Foreign Editor)

Ed Guffman (Regional Editor)

Lou Fleming (Chief Editorial Writer)

Ernest Conine (Editorial Writer)

Marvin Seid (Editorial Writer)

Mr. Otis Chandler introduced Dr. Kissinger and there followed light banter about Dr. Kissinger's prior meeting at Perino's Restaurant, and the upcoming trip to Anchorage, Alaska. Dr. Kissinger observed that the conversation there might be rather strange, since the Japanese Emperor speaks with authority largely about stunted trees, and since the President wasn't elected because of any flair for making small talk.

**Question:** Will Sato be at the meeting?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No; it isn't really that big a deal. Fukuda will be there, but not Sato.

**Question:** If this show is purely ceremonial, why are you going?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The meeting is symbolic, not substantive; but Rogers and I will talk to Fukuda.

**Question:** Where will the meeting take place?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) At the Commanding General's quarters on Elmendorf Air Force Base. Have you ever seen the books that the advance-men do on the President's travels? You should see it: three steps here, three steps there ...... (laughter)

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**Question:** (Mr. Chandler) Let me start with an easy one.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Have you done any bad editorials on me recently? (Laughter)

**Question:** (Mr. Chandler) Oh, no!

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Then I'll take it.

**Question:** (Mr. Chandler) Bob Elliott's position on Vietnam certainly has changed.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) What is it?

**Question:** (Mr. Chandler) He thinks it is time to get out now.

**Question:** (Mr. Chandler) How about the Supreme Court? Will Rogers get the nomination? I have heard speculation that is what he has been after all along.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No, I don't think that is what he has wanted. This is only my instinct, but I don't think Rogers will go to the Court.

**Question:** And how about China and the current situation?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I know little more than you do. My contacts may be a bit more continuous, but the facts are known to us all. First there was a stand-down in civil aviation, and then they stood down military flights. The October 1st parade was cancelled; and we also have reports -- which I must classify as unreliable -- that there has been an increase of rioting in China recently. So those are the facts. I will say personally that I don't believe Mao is dead or terminally ill. The reason is fairly simple: If he were dead, all of the steps that they would take at such a time would have been taken in a shorter period of time. They wouldn't have stopped civil aviation flights for two days, let them run for three days, stood them down for two more days, then stood down military flights, etc. Also, they have been vehemently protesting that Mao is alive and well. If he were seriously ill or dead, I do not think that they would protest so vehemently. It would merely set them up for a loss of face later on when the true facts come out. You know, they can't hide something like the death of Mao forever. Of course, your judgments are as good

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as mine. I see two possibilities: The first is growing military tensions involving Soviet Union and China. We have some evidence of military activity on both sides. Of course, both sides are paranoid. That type of paranoia makes possible escalation by both sides under circumstances when one side thinks the other is moving. I must say I don't think this possibility is very likely. The second and more likely possibility is that there is some political clash going on in China today. It might be one of three confrontations. The Cultural Revolutionists might be purging Chou. Or Chou might be trying to purge the Cultural Revolutionists in order to nail down support in the country for his foreign policy development. The third possibility is that Mao is attempting a comeback of the type that was involved in the Cultural Revolution. I lean to the view that the difficulties are political difficulties in which Chou is purging the Cultural Revolutionists.

[At this point Dr. Kissinger confirmed the off-the-record status of the remarks he was making.]

**Question:** Is Lin Piao alive?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) That's a curious problem. People have not been hearing much recently from or about Lin Piao. We don't know anything more than that.

**Question:** What about speculation of Chinese travel to Yugoslavia, Romania, etc.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) There has been some talk about travel for a trade delegation, but certainly there will be no immediate travel for Chou to Yugoslavia or Romania.

**Question:** When you were in China, was Chou clearly in charge from the Chinese perspective during your discussions?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) In my meetings, he was clearly in charge. There were no consultations. The only evidence we saw of another power source were his comments at the end of each day that he had to report to Mao. The following day he would come in with instructions. But, of course, they could have been his own instructions to himself. In matters such as communique drafting, dates, etc., Chou was in complete control.

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**Question:** Could the difficulties in China today be a reflection of opposition in China to the proposed Presidential trip?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) This is a possibility. We have to keep in mind that we are dealing with the country which has had 25 years of continued revolution. They have assailed everyone, including the United States, as ideological enemies during this period.

**Question:** Are you saying that the consensus that Chou had gathered for this new foreign initiative may be coming apart?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) This would be purest of speculation. Chou clearly has the support of the Armed Forces and the bureaucracy. There is no evidence of any change in that support. The Air Force, of course, is the most radical element in the Chinese Establishment. The stand down in military flights could reflect an effort to neutralize the Air Force. We do know that there was a massive public relations problem in China after our trip.

**Question:** What is China's motive in this diplomatic initiative?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Necessity has drawn both sides together in this diplomacy. That is the reason that I feel we're quite likely to be successful with our proposed trip. The decision to take the initiative on the part of China was not a trivial decision. It was pursued with skill and persistence over a year. The real basis for the Chinese change in this regard I take to be their view of world forces, and their conclusion that a policy of isolation is simply too dangerous today. They see that they need contacts in the world, if not friends.

**Question:** What is the likelihood of success for the President's mission in China?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I have an idea of what might constitute success which might not satisfy you gentlemen. It is something when put in the form of a communique which would not appear to be dramatic evidence of progress. On certain concrete issues, our differences with the Chinese are not going to disappear. But issues like Formosa, the United Nations issue--the issues that the press hits--are not, I think, the important issues in the China initiative. There we can't anticipate any dramatic change. The Communists want Formosa out of the United Nations.

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They want at all costs to avoid a situation in which juridical support for the national status of Taiwan is created. You know, Chou is clearly to the right of Scotty Reston on the United Nations issue! The Formosa problem in China is an historical problem that cannot be settled at any "summit" meeting at this time. My hopes for the summit lie perhaps more in the areas of ideas and philosophy. I hope that we can consummate a harmony of trust where our interests do not conflict with those of the Chinese; further, I hope we can moderate the conflicts which do exist between the two of us. In addition, I hope for some pragmatic diplomatic developments of a more objective nature. We seek a communique that evidences progress, but the important evolution to look at will be that of the coming two to five years.

**Question:** Will the President tell us before he goes what he wants out of this trip to China. Chou has been doing that. Will President Nixon do it too?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Once the agenda is set and we are all ready to go, I think the President will have something to say about what he seeks in Peking.

**Question:** Did Chou talk Japan to you as much as he did to Scotty Reston?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Chou, you know, has not revealed the substance of our talks, and I am compelled to do likewise. Let me say, however, that nothing that has happened after our trip has surprised me on the China scene, including Chou's comments to Reston.

**Question:** (Chandler) In Vietnam, two items: the flooding and the recent heavy bombings--in combination do they constitute a major set-back for the North?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The flooding in Vietnam has been the worst since 1945, and we have estimates that 20% of the rice crop in the North has been destroyed. However, the dikes seem to have held, and there has been no absolute collapse of the regime in the North. The floods should result in a slowing down of the North's re-supply efforts, perhaps in the amount of two to six weeks. Time, of course, is the big element for us in Vietnam. The Cambodian and Laotian operations showed the North's supply system to be precarious--not precarious in the sense

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that we have the capacity totally to destroy it--but precarious in
the sense that we were able to slow down their supply system
more than we had thought. We can see that the Cambodian opera-
tion set them back at least a year and a-half. We hoped for a
maximum of nine months. As well the Laotian operation set them
back in the first and second quarters more than we had thought.
Turning to the bombing, I can't really claim much connection
between the flooding and the bombing.

**Question:** (Otis Chandler) How much time have we bought with these operations?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Oh, in terms of time actually bought, not that much with the bombing--perhaps a week or two. We did, however, hit sizable supplies of fuel and have created problems in re-supply for them.

**Question:** Is the Vietnamese election related to the recent bombing raids?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You must understand that if we are to stay in South Vietnam at all, the North must be aware that we will retaliate if they attempt major buildups. Whenever they are involved in an obvious buildup, we must continue to warn them, and to demonstrate to them what the penalty could be in a continued war.

**Question:** But will they get the message? All along, in the previous Administration, the theory that escalation would demonstrate to the North the folly of its ways, failed.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Their escalations never reached the climax that we are reaching in this Administration. In the Johnson Administration, the step-ups in military activity were small increments--increments small enough that the other side had the time and capacity similarly to escalate. Now the war is ending. There is no question about that. The North faces one of two choices: either the United States will end this war unilaterally, or the war can be ended in some international forum.

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**Question:** How serious is all of the talk about a coup? Today we saw some traffic indicating that the United States has threatened that it will withdraw all military aid if there is a <u>coup d'etat.</u>

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) It is fair to say that with the 1965 experience behind us we cannot be expected to tolerate a divisive coup and then to put the pieces back together again.

**Question:** Is this a threat to cut off aid, to pull out faster?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Faster than what? You gentlemen don't know the schedule that the Administration is following, after all. Let me say, I am convinced that several years from now, people will be asking what all the excitement over Vietnam was about--the degree of current disagreements will not be understandable. Today I would like to see someone write down on a slip of paper the date that the Nixon Administration wants to get out of Vietnam and the date that McGovern, for instance, would plan to leave Vietnam. Even McGovern is not now demanding an immediate pullout. What would the difference be? Four--six--eight months, at the most? Anyway, today is not like 1968, when some people wanted to win the war militarily and others, to cut and run. Our Administration, and there is evidence to support it on the record, goes for the big play. How can people assume, given the evidence of our past and present diplomatic efforts, that we are simply plodding along in the Vietnam situation, not working on it constructively? Now, on the question of whether we would accelerate the withdrawal of our forces if there is a coup......

**Question:** But the real question is the impression we are conveying, not what we would actually do, isn't it?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Look, situations could vary. If all the generals in Vietnam agree that Thieu has to stand sown, if you have unanimity, that would be one situation. If, as in 1962, you have the individual Corps Commanders scrapping it out among themselves, a coup would appear in an entirely different light. In the first case, I suppose, our presence in Vietnam might not be precluded. We have long made it clear that our interest in the Vietnamese government is not a personal interest in Thieu himself. In the second case, the situation would be different.

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**Question:** I see Secretary Connally is getting into the foreign policy field.

**Answer:** Oh really, I hadn't thought so. (Laughter)

**Question:** How do you coordinate this sort of thing? Is international economics a part of your shop?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I got rid of international economics when I came into the White House. At that time, economic issues were all technical. I find that when I don't have at least the competence of the people I am working with, I can't successfully play the devil's advocate in order to get their best production. I was the one that pressed for an Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy---Pete Peterson's job. Now the issues have changed and the international economic scene, of course, is having a profound impact on political life. It is clear now, for instance, that a foreign exchange issue requires foreign policy knowledge to be handled correctly. A foreign exchange problem requires a knowledge, for instance, of domestic politics in foreign countries. Now the National Security Council is being pulled back into foreign economic policy. I am not going to sit by and see all the gains that we have made be lost. I am involved now. I participate in the meetings, though I don't chair them as I do in the National Security Council operations. It used to be that I merely had an assistant sit in. Now, especially on issues like "Where do we go from here?", I get involved personally. I think you will find in the near future that our economic policies will be good ones!

**Question:** Can you give us anything on the Middle East? The Russians have been more active in Egypt, yet other regimes have become more anti-communist. What is the situation there?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The Egyptian situation is both eerie and encouraging for the Russians. On the eerie side, they see a situation like the Indonesian one, where Russian arms were used to put down the Communists themselves, or the Sudan one, where the outcome was determined by Egyptian use of Russian air power to get troops to Sudan, where the foremost Communist leader of North Africa was ousted. On the other hand, you have huge Egyptian dependence on Russia for its

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