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[1]

just as Gorbachev was beginning to show interest in a rapprochment with China about a year and a half ago, I had a conversation with a leading official in Beijing. I observed that China was probably doing less with Moscow than some Americans feared-but more than Beijing was letting on. My interlocutor replied: "In any event, we will stop well short of the world's record which is held by Shultz and Shevardnade." In other words, China did not propose to be the last combatant on Cold War barricades that had been abandoned by the original warriors.+

[11]

That remark sums up why the United States should not be unduly alarmed by Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. Had a Soviet leader undertaken such a journey a decade ago, it would have seemed like a diplomatic earthquake-possibly even the beginning of a new Sino-Soviet alliance. We were still in the midst of the delicate process of restoring relations that began with my secret journey to Beijing in 1971. That process involved years of intensive political dialogue with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, then with Deng Xiaoping. Finally, in 1979 the Carter administration established formal diplomatic relations, one of its senior officials referred to it as playing the China card.

([14])

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(14)

official referred to it as playing the China card. The
author
in
retrospect
assumed formal diplomatic relations, one of its
U. S.
Embassy, then with Deng Xiaoping. In 1989 the Carter admin-
istrative dialogue with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou
intensive

Journey to Beijing in 1981. That process involved years of
d certificate process of relating relations that began with my secret
the

using of a new Soviet-Baltic alliance. We were still in the middle of

seemed like a diplomatic earthquake—broadly even the begin-

lever undertaken such a journey a decade ago, it would have

unduly stoked by Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. Had a Soviet

What remark amuse us why the United States should not be

original warriors.

fear on Cold War barbages that had been abandoned by the
dose...
In other words, China did not propose to be the first compact-
short of the world's record which is held by USSR and Soviet-
well

facing on. My interlocutor replied: 'In any event, we will do
than some Americans tested—but more than Beijing was
operated that China was properly doing fees with Moscow
had a conversation with a leading official in Beijing, I
reapproach with China about a year and a half ago, I
just as Gorbachev was beginning to show interest in a

IN0431 Vaya

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Today we know that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with its domestic affairs-and Beijing, too wary of Soviet intentions-for such a reversal to be realistic. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing should provoke not a sense of crisis but a realization that the pieces on the diplomatic chessboard have been essentially rearranged:+

The political world is no longer bipolar. The United States [7] and the Soviet Union remain military superpowers, but other centers of power have emerged in Asia and in Europe.+

In this new world the United States and China continue to have a mutual interest in keeping the Soviet Union or any other country from dominating the Eurasian land mass. But our policy must now become more flexible and more sensitive to shifts in the political and economic balance in Asia.+

The American interest requires careful orchestration of an emerging three-cornered di-

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plomacy that will involve Chi-
na, Japan and the USSR.-

These changes may create
new opportunities-but also

[5]

new risks-((okay? I wasn't clear what you meant by perspectives... mark?)) in old trouble spots
such as Korea and southeast
Asia, especially Indochina.-

MChina: In the '70s, the seem-
ingly ineradicable hostility be-
tween Moscow and Beijing cre-
ated a classic diplomatic
opportunity for the United

[6]

States. All Washington had to do was position itself so that it was

closer to each of the two communist giants than they were to one
another (with a tilt toward China, since it was the weaker, more
vulnerable and less expansionist of the two.) That period of almost

mechanical simplicity is coming to a close. Beijing no longer fears
an imminent Soviet attack. It calculates that the Soviet Union is

too preoccupied with domestic difficulties and with the aftermath
of Afghanistan war to risk unpredictable adventures. Moscow is
overcoming its nightmare-which-was never realistic-of a Sino-
U.S. alliance aimed at the Soviet Union.-

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[18]

12. 05. 1989 01:45 AM P06

B

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U.S. influence aimed at the Soviet Union. -
overcoming its nightmare-which was never realized-or a sin-
or Afghanistan war to risk unpredictable adventures. Moscow is
too brazened with domestic difficulties and with the aftermath
an imminent Soviet attack. It calculates that the Soviet Union is
mechanical simplicity to coming to a close. Beijing no longer fears
vulnerable and less expansionist of the two.) That period of almost
another (with a tilt toward China, since it was the weasel, who
closer to each of the two communists giant than they were to one
States. All Washington had to do was position itself so that it was
opportunity for the United
arid a classic diplomatic

arid a classic diplomatic
ruse. Moscow and Beijing cre-
ated intransigible hostility be-
lieve in the '90s, the seem-
ingly: In the '70s, the assem-

Vale, especially Indochina.+

**[d]**

Vale, especially Indochina.+

anox as Kores and southeast
mark)(in old trouble above

mark)(in old trouble above
new take-((...))

new opportunities-but also
new opportunities-but also

These clouds may create

---
OK

(2)

us, Taiwan and the U238.+

broadly that will involve Chi-
bromach that will involve Chi-

TM0451 Vels

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In journeying to Beijing, Gorbachev is seeking to apply in Asia the strategy that has worked so well in Europe. He is trying to break up American coalitions by removing the impression of Soviet bellicosity. At the same time, he is doing little-indeed, he

can do little-to alter an underlying strategic relationship based on the long Soviet border with China and Moscow's large armed forces. No doubt the visit to China will be followed soon by overtures to Japan.

None of this need be of fundamental concern so long as the United States analyzes the new relationships properly. For in Asia, Gorbachev's special brand of bonhomie and flair for dramatic gestures will have far less impact than in Europe. The Asian nations are less haunted by the two world wars and face less domestic pressure to respond to Gorbachev's bent for the spectacular. Arms control is not an opiate for them. In Asia, Gorbachev cannot ask for concessions to his personality; he must offer real concessions aimed at establishing a realistic equilibrium.

[9]

The reality in Asia is that none of the major nations will run the risk of separating itself from the United States in order to gain the goodwill of Moscow. Nor will any of them challenge the Soviet Union simply to curry favor with the United States. These

conditions limit the options((okay? mark)) for

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[9]

10.05.89 01:23 AM P07

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conditions limit the options(above) for
with the United States. These
Union simply to carry out
goodwill of Moscow. Not will any of them challenge the Soviet
to act of separating itself from the United States in order to gain
the

The status in Vais is that none of the major nations will turn

concessions aimed at satisfying a realistic equilibrium.

cannot ask for concessions to be personality he was offered real
lar. Arms control is not an obligation for them. In Vais, Gorbachev
domestic pressure to reboard to Gorbachev's pent for the abscission
ations are less haunted by the two world wars and face less
in features will have less impact than in Europe. The Vajan
Vais, Gorbachev, a special brand of bonhomie and list for drama-
United States analyse the new relationships properly. For in
None of this need be of fundamental concern so long as the
[2]

forces to Japan.

No doubt the visit to China will be followed soon by over-
on the long Soviet border with China and Moscow, a large armed
can do little-to affect an underlying strategic relationship based
on the Soviet-Baltic relation.

Soviet diplomacy. At the same time, he is doing little—indeed, he
break up American coalitions by removing the impression of
the strategy that has worked so well in Europe. He is trying to
[In journeying to Beijing, Gorbachev is asking to apply in Vais
DEBT. IN
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Vais
IN0431]

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IN0421 Asia
both U.S. and Soviet foreign
policy in Asia.+

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□No doubt Beijing's immediate fear of Soviet invasion has receded. China therefore sees less need for a rigid anti-Soviet stance than it did a decade ago. Gorbachev has also met most of Beijing's conditions for an improvement in relations: withdrawal from Afghanistan; a thinning out of Soviet troops in Mongolia; withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.+

[10]

□But while China's short-term fears may have eased, its strategic concerns remain. Beijing cannot forget the history of Russian expansion across Siberia and into the Maritime provinces throughout the 19th Century. It knows that advance was well on the way to engulfing Manchuria and Korea when it was stopped by imperial Japan, which seized those prizes for it-

[12]

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E

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self. China will not risk being left alone in Asia with the Soviet Union and Japan. It will seek to use the United States as a counterweight-as long as it sees that Washington has the commitment and ability to maintain a balance of power in Asia.

[16]

For these reasons, Gorbachev's freedom of maneuver in Beijing will be circumscribed. China will try to settle issues that threaten its security-especially Vietnam's presence in Cambodia. At the same time, Beijing will do its utmost to avoid weakening ties with America. Indeed, if America keeps its composure, the outcome of Gorbachev's journey could well be that Beijing will seek to improve its short-term ties with the USSR and its long-term relations

with the United States( I want to briefly suggest how maynard d and i should be making a political dialogue.

[11]

The most interesting conversations between Gorbachev and Deng may deal less with foreign policy than with their respective experiences with modernization. For Beijing and Moscow have begun the process from opposite directions. Both seem to agree that it is not possible to undertake simultaneously the political and economic reform of a communist system. China has stressed economic reform and has made significant progress towards what the West calls a

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market economy((out the rest of the paragraph for space. mm+))),

[12]

China's economic revival has benefitted from several factors: a homogenous culture; the experience of Chinese who have lived overseas; the lessons of Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan; the entrepreneurial zeal of so much of the population. In fact, Beijing's most immediate economic problem is an overheated economy and the dilemma of price reform. This is a huge problem in a society where prices have been fixed and subsidized for decades. The first attempt to bring about realistic prices last year led to major inflation and popular discontent. It has since been suspended.

[19]

Where China is experiencing the political consequences of economic success, Moscow's economic reform is stillborn. Living conditions in the Soviet Union are probably worse than they were at the beginning of the Gorbachev period. Since only 51 percent of the population is Russian, economic decentralization increases the

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threat of nationalist uprisings. ~~Therefore~~(need therefore?)
maynard), Gorbachev has obvious-
~~economie change is the dangerous until~~
ly decided that~~he must first centralize~~ political decision-making
in his own hands—a process likely to take the better part of this
year. Only then will it become clear whether the political policy
of
glasnost was a tactic or a long-term policy—and how Gorbachev
proposes to carry out the economic policy of perestroika.+

[14]

The difference in priorities has had an ironic effect on Western

perceptions. Gorbachev has received extraordinary credit for po-
litical changes which have done little to improve the standard of
living <u>of</u> most of the Soviet population. China, on the other hand,
is
faulted for not responding to growing pressures for political
change-pressures that have increased precisely because econom-
ic progress has been so rapid. Were Gorbachev and Deng to have a
discussion about modernization, it would be fascinating to know
whether they could agree on the appropriate mix of political and
economic reform-or on whether such a mix is achievable in a
communist society.+

[13]

For all those reasons, the geopolitical basis of Sino-U.S.
relations
remains firm. China continues to be a key component of the
balance of power in Asia and, for the foreseeable future, the
weakest

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B

["(((MORE)))", "weekend\nbalance of power in Asia and, for the Chinese future, the\nremains film. China continues to be a key component of the\nrelations", "The anti-fascist resistance of the democratic parties of Asia and", "(13)", "communist society.\n\neconomic reform or on whether such a mix is achievable in a\nwhether they could agree on the appropriate mix of political and\ndiscussion about modernisation, it would be fascinating to know\nin detail. Broadsides have been so rapid. Were Gorbachev and Deng to have a\nchange-presenters that have increased precisely because econom-\nisation for not responding to growing presentations for political\nis", "living at least of the Soviet population. China, on the other hand,\nlogical changes which have done little to improve the standard of\nbeauty. Gorbachev has received extraordinary credit for po-", "The difference in priorities has had an important effect on Western", "[f4]", "broadsides to carry out the economic policy of Castro's.\n\n\"\"\"\"\"\" was a tactic or a long-term policy-and how Gorbachev\nof", "year. Only then will it become clear whether the political policy\nin his own hands a process likely to take the better part of this\nyear decided that the next great centralise political decision-making\n\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"

IN0421 Asia

DEPT. IN

of Asia's major powers. Hence, it continues to deserve major American support, including help in its efforts to modernize. But American policy can no longer be one-dimensional. Its long-term position in Asia ultimately depends on its ability to identify fundamental long-term strategic and political interests in the interplay between China, the USSR and Japan.

[13] The idea of maintaining a balance of power in distant parts of the world has traditionally been anathema to American intellectual and political figures alike. Americans have tried to preserve the peace by asserting the moral superiority of U.S. policy, and have rejected the relativism that is seemingly required to maintain a constantly shifting equilibrium. Yet no other role is possible in Asia. Its ancient societies would find America's claim to moral superiority unacceptable. And they have seen too much change over the millenia to rely on *fixed patterns for stability*.

[10] In many ways, maintaining the equilibrium is easier in Asia than in Europe. None of the major Asian nations looks to the United States as a first line of defense. All are prepared to undertake significant defense efforts; even Japan is augmenting its defenses, if in

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ing its defenses, if in
totals even Japan is judgment-
desire adequate defense of-
defenses. All are prepared to un-
United States as a first line of
Jap Asian nations looks to the
chain in Europe. None of the war-

With many ways, maintaining the equilibrium is easier in Asia

[10]

over the wifens to rely on fixed defences for stability. +

autonomy unacceptable. And they have seen too much chance

Asia. Its ancient societies would find America's claim to moral
certainty shifting equilibrium. Yet no other role it possible in

to reflected the relativism that is nearly required to maintain a

balance by asserting the moral superiority of U.S. policy, and have

and political influence like. Americans have tried to break free from

world has traditionally been anathema to American intellectual
to the

The idea of maintaining a presence of power in distant parts of

between China, the East and Japan.

[13]

factors.

Position in Asia ultimately depends on its ability to identify

American export, including help in its efforts to modernise. But

of Asia a major power. Hence, it continues to preserve major

IN0451 Vais

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PAGE-10

-15-

economic field taken in part unilaterally in Washington as part of American domestic policy.

Peace in Asia depends to a considerable extent on a balance of power between the USSR, China, Japan and the United States with the United States as a result of history and geography in the role of the balance of the equilibrium. Of these components of the balance of power, the most dynamic at this moment is Japan. It is a remarkable country whose institutions, appearing familiar and analogous to Western counterparts, are at the same time impervious to outside influence or accessible only by processes carefully controlled by a disciplined and self-perpetuating leadership group. Japan is a country whose periodic elections in fact perform the role of opinion polls for a ruling party which is governed by four or five faction whose leaders are appointed and which vote almost as a feudal voting bloc;

-16-

whose prime ministers are predictable a decade ahead (leavened only by the occasional scandal). Its culture produces negotiators whose opening statement is generally their only significant utterance; afterwards they can register what their interlocutor says but cannot modify their positions in any significant way until they have consulted the consensus-es they represent. Thus negotiations with Japan are both protracted and intermittent; their pace is determined by a consensus which is itself out of direct reach of the mon-Japanese negotiator. The result is a social performance both disciplined and cohesive. That Japanese consensus has shown itself in the past extraordinarily responsive to nuances in its perception of the balance of power. It enabled Japan to move from feudalism to centralized authoritarianism in response to the forcible opening of the country and from centralized authoritarianism to a species of democracy under the impact of

-17-

defeat. In each case the transition was accomplished with
remarkable discipline and caused not by some ideological
conversion but by Japanese reaction to external forces.

As Tokyo emerges as the financial center of the world,
the financier and therefore to some extent the determinant
of other countries' economic expansions, as its technology
dominates world markets and its military establishment
emerges as the world's third largest, Japan's international
role cannot remain what it was for most of the postwar
period. Its very sensitivity to balance of power will cause
Japan to emerge in an increasingly assertive role causing
major disquiet in China, most countries of South East Asia
and in the end the Soviet Union.

American exhortations that Japan play a more active
international role are therefore largely beside the point. A
more active international role for Japan is inherent in its

-18-

(N)

situation and its culture even though it will evolve gradu-
ally and indirectly, almost anonymously. The challenge is
how to relate that role to the aspirations of other nations
in Asia.

That means that the United States is in a complex
position vis-a-vis Japan in Asia. We are Japan's ally with
respect to threats to its serenity, though with the growth
of Japanese military power that role will diminish. But most
other Asian nations see in the United States a counterweight
to Japan whatever our formal policy. But that role depends
on American measures outside the realm of formal foreign
policy. It depends on whether American industry can remain-
or become - competitive again; whether American economic
ingenuity is focussed on the creation of productive capacity
rather than on financial manipulation; whether America, in
short, can control its twin deficits. This requires a tax

-19-

policy that rewards investment rather than consumption. It
also means abandoning the alibi that unfair Japanese prac-
tices are the principal cause of America's relative economic
decline. Japan's economic policies are indeed extremely
disciplined and occasionally discriminatory. But the root
cause of Japan's growing economic power is competitiveness.

Thus the key to America's future in Asia is in many
ways our domestic performance. At the same time in the
international arena, we have to learn to think in categories
Americans have generally rejected. In the minds of most
Asian nations this future is not determined by the catego-
ries of American idealism but by assessments of relative
power.

In North East Asia it is possible that the Gorbachev
visit to Beijing will temporarily ease the competition
between Moscow and Beijing for influence in North Korea. But

-20-

Beijing will cast a wary eye on a Soviet or Japanese role in
Pyongyang. Japan, despite its alliance with the United
States, will seek to enhance its role in North Korea if only
because the division of Korea is no more anathema to it than
to any of the other adjoining countries. Indeed, of the
major surrounding countries, the United States is probably
the only one that does not have a historic reluctance to see
the emergence of a strong unified Korea. The others do not
find the status quo intolerable - to put it mildly - provid-
ed it maintains their relative influence on the peninsula
and does not lead to unwanted conflicts. These factors have
enabled both Koreas to enhance their international roles and
have produced a relaxation of tensions in the peninsula. But
they require careful management lest the competition of
outside powers produces an explosion.

-21-

The same balance of power considerations apply to South
East Asia. Vietnam is a specially neuralgic point. In
America it is so neuralgic, so bound up with a period of
national travail that an objective approach is difficult to
come by. Too many groups act out roles of a drama whose plot
the younger generation in America barely knows and whose
passions are largely irrelevant to their experiences. For
American foreign policy it is important to remember that
China will always react extremely neuralgically to the
emergence of a major power on its borders and especially to
the growth of foreign influence in that nation. At the same
time the Soviet Union sees in Vietnam a means to pressure
China and in its bases in Indo China a device to project
power over hitherto inaccessible regions. Some countries of
Indochina ? seek in Vietnam a means to contain growing
Chinese expansionism. Thus the United States must tread

-22-

warily among these contending forces reenacting neither the
hostility of battles painfully concluded nor the expiation
of self-inflicted transgressions. My own sense is that in
Vietnam America should not move faster than China in improv-
ing its relations and that we would lose nothing by staying
half a step behind it.

Indo China seems destined to inflict a nightmare in
each decade on America. The current nightmare is Cambodia.
For a a decade America has opposed the Vietnamese occupation
of that country. But it has concentrated on legal, political
and moral efforts; the trauma of military involvement has
been too great to permit in Administrations of both parties
a military role - even of supplying arms - to the forces
fighting for independence. The result is that as Vietnamese
troops withdraw the only well-armed forces in the field are
Communist: the army created by the Vietnamese and the

-23-

(Y)

murderous Khmer Rouge. The military forces of more or less democratic orientation have been given humanitarian aid by the United States - an absurd evasion for which the price now will have to be paid.

Belatedly there are stirrings to give military aid to the forces of the democratic resistance. But the proposed assistance is so hesitant and so irrelevant - if one is to believe that it is to consist exclusively of rifles - that it is likely to lead to another American embarrassment. It is an irony that at this point the forces trained by the Vietnamese may be the more benign. In any event it is too late now for an American military role.

The lesson to be derived however is that Asia challenges us to a serious assessment of our way of thinking about foreign policy. The endless technical or tactical debates, the frequent changes of positions, the reluctance to think

-24-

in terms of power or to define what power is relevant will
cause America to become a nag on the sidelines incapable of
contributing to shaping events in an area of growing strate-
gic and economic importance. But by the same token an
America conscious of its international role, its scope and
its limits, can contribute to a better future because of all
the principal participants it is in the best position to
take a general view.

INTERNATIONAL

Seeking a New Balance in Asia

Gorbachev's trip challenges Washington to rethink its policy in the region

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

Just as Gorbachev was beginning to show interest in a rapprochement with China about a year and a half ago, I had a conversation with a leading official in Beijing. I observed that China was probably doing less with Moscow than some Americans feared—but more than Beijing was letting on. My interlocutor replied: "In any event, we will stop well short of the world's record, which is held by Shultz and Shevardnadze." In other words, China did not propose to be the last combatant on Cold War barricades that had been abandoned by the original warriors.

That remark sums up why the United States should not be unduly alarmed by Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. Had a Soviet leader undertaken such a journey a decade ago, it would have seemed like a diplomatic earthquake—possibly even the beginning of a new Sino-Soviet alliance. We were still in the midst of the delicate process of restoring relations that began with my secret journey to Beijing in 1971. That process involved years of intensive political dialogue with Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, then with Deng Xiaoping. When in 1979 the Carter administration established formal diplomatic relations, one of its senior officials referred to it as playing the China card.

Today we know that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with its domestic affairs—and Beijing too wary of Soviet intentions—for such a reversal of relationships to be realistic. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing should provoke not a sense of crisis but a realization that the pieces on the diplomatic chessboard have been essentially rearranged:

* The political world is no longer bipolar. The United States and the Soviet Union remain military superpowers, but other centers of power have emerged in Asia and in Europe.

* In this new world the United States and China continue to have a mutual interest in keeping the Soviet Union or any other country from dominating the Eurasian landmass. But our policy must now become more flexible and more sensitive to shifts in the political and economic balance in Asia.

* The American interest requires careful orchestration of an emerging three-cornered diplomacy that will involve China, Japan and the U.S.S.R.

* These changes may create new opportunities—but also new risks—in old trouble spots such as Korea and Southeast Asia, especially Indochina.

**China:** In the '70s, the seemingly ineradicable hostility between Moscow and Beijing cre-

ated a classic diplomatic opportunity for the United States. All Washington had to do was position itself so that it was closer to each of the two communist giants than they were to one another (with a tilt toward China, since it was the weaker, more vulnerable and less expansionist of the two). That period of almost mechanical simplicity has ended. Beijing no longer fears an imminent Soviet attack. It calculates that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with domestic difficulties and with the aftermath of the Afghanistan war to risk unpredictable adventures. Moscow is overcoming its nightmare—which was never realistic—of a Sino-U.S. alliance aimed at the Soviet Union.

In journeying to Beijing, Gorbachev is seeking to apply in Asia the strategy that has worked so well in Europe. He is trying to break up American coalitions by removing the impression of Soviet bellicosity. Yet he is doing little—indeed, he can do little—to alter an underlying strategic relationship based on the long Soviet border with China and Moscow's large armed forces. No doubt the visit to China will be followed soon by overtures to Japan.

None of this need be of fundamental concern so long as the United States analyzes the new relationships properly. For in Asia, Gorbachev's flair for dramatic gestures will have far less impact than in Europe. The Asian nations are less haunted by the two world wars and face less domestic pressure to respond to Gorbachev's bent for the spectacular. Arms control is not an opiate for them. In Asia, Gorbachev cannot ask for concessions to his personality; he must offer concrete concessions aimed at establishing a realistic equilibrium.

The reality in Asia is that none of the major nations will run the risk of separating itself from the United States in order to gain the good will of Moscow. Nor will any of them challenge the Soviet

Union simply to curry favor with the United States. These conditions limit the options for both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in Asia.

No doubt Beijing's immediate fear of Soviet invasion has receded. China therefore sees less need for a rigid anti-Soviet stance than it did a decade ago. Gorbachev has also met most of Beijing's conditions for an improvement in relations: withdrawal from Afghanistan, a thinning out of Soviet troops in Mongolia, withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

But while China's short-term fears may have eased, its strategic concerns remain. Beijing cannot forget the history of Russian expansion across Siberia and into the maritime provinces throughout the 19th century. It knows that advance was well on the way to engulfing Manchuria and Korea when it was stopped by imperial Japan, which seized those

PICTORIAL PARADE

'A delicate process': Meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai during the secret trip to China in 1971

NEWSWEEK : MAY 22, 1989 51

INTERNATIONAL

Japan but to contribute to conditions that will make such a role compatible with the aspirations of other nations.

The U.S. relationship with Japan has become extremely complex. As Japan's ally, we are committed to responding to threats to its security (though that role will diminish with the growth of Japanese military power). Yet most other Asian nations see the United States as a counterweight to Japan in the economic field. Whether we can continue to serve that role will depend on our ability to take measures outside the realm of formal foreign policy: to make American industry competitive; to focus our economic ingenuity on the creation of productive capacity rather than financial manipulation; to control our trade and budget deficits.

The first step should be to accept that unfair Japanese practices are not the sole—or perhaps even primary—reason for America's relative economic decline. Japan's economy is extremely disciplined, and its trade policies occasionally discriminatory. But

the root of Japan's growing economic power is its superior competitiveness. By the same token, the key to America's future in Asia is to improve our domestic performance.

The Soviet Union will play a relatively subordinate role in Japan's future. I expect a Soviet overture to Tokyo, probably even a compromise on the four northern islands that the Soviets annexed at the end of the war. But the historic distrust between the two sides is too deep, and their mutual interests too few, for a fundamental change in relations. No conceivable shift in Soviet policy will keep Tokyo from marching to its own drummer.

**The rest of Asia:** The new international relationships will also be reflected on the Korean Peninsula. For a while, the Gorbachev visit may ease the

petition between China and Moscow for influence in North Korea. But Beijing will cast a wary eye on any increased Soviet or Japanese role in Pyongyang. Of the major players in the region, the United States is probably the only one with no historic reasons for opposing the emergence of a strong, unified Korea. The others would just as soon preserve the status quo, provided it maintains their relative influence on the peninsula and does not lead to unwanted conflicts. For that reason, South Korea has increased contacts with the communist world, and Pyongyang has reached out to Japan and a few other capitalist countries. Relations between them are likely to remain in uneasy equilibrium and may even ease marginally. But that process will require careful management, lest jockeying outside powers and the volatile Korean temperament combine to produce an explosion.

Over the next decade this should produce a less intrusive role for American forces on the peninsula. The U.N. command could perhaps be abolished and moved out of Seoul, and there may even be some token U.S. troop reductions—largely in response to growing South Korean nationalism. And the United States should stand ready to improve relations with Pyongyang symmetrically with any moves by Beijing and Moscow to establish ties with Seoul.

Sino-Soviet rapprochement may well enhance America's role in Southeast Asia. Countries like Indonesia—and to a lesser extent Malaysia—have always been wary of China. That apprehension is likely to be enhanced if they judge that China has less to fear from the Soviet Union. The United States should improve its relations

with these countries, but take care to avoid the appearance of participating in an anti-Chinese cabal.

This process is bound to raise again the question that so tragically divided America in the '60s and '70s: what to do about Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina? Some countries in Southeast Asia would like to build up Vietnam as an obstacle to alleged Chinese designs on the rest of the region. Meanwhile, Soviet military bases in Vietnam serve as a reminder to Beijing that Moscow has options other than reconciliation—and a warning to Washington that it is still determined to project Soviet power onto distant oceans.

For the United States, there is no region in the world that is more difficult to view objectively. Too many groups are still driven by the passions of the war, even though they are largely irrelevant to the current problems of Southeast Asia. At a minimum, it is important for American policymakers to remember that China will always react neuralgically to the emergence of a major power

on its borders. The United States must tread warily in its relations with Vietnam, siding neither with those who would like to refight the battles of the past nor with those that seek expiation for sometimes imaginary transgressions. My own sense is that America should not move faster than China in improving relations with Hanoi—and that we would lose nothing by staying a step behind Beijing.

Cambodia remains America's biggest nightmare in Indonesia. Each decade, with the best of intentions, we seem to contribute to deepening the dilemmas. For a decade, Washington has correctly opposed the Vietnamese occupation. But it has concentrated on legal, political and moral support for opposition forces. Both Democratic and Republican adminis-

trations have refrained from supplying arms to the democratic forces fighting for independence. The result is that as Vietnamese troops withdraw, the only well-armed forces in the field are communist: the army created by the Vietnamese and the murderous Khmer Rouge. The more democratically oriented military forces have received only humanitarian aid from the United States—an absurd evasion for which the price will now surely be paid.

Support is belatedly starting to grow for supplying military aid to the democratic resistance. But the proposed assistance is so timid—it would consist only of rifles—that the result would probably be another American embarrassment. In any event, it is too late now for a U.S. military role. Of course the United States should support a broad-based government and maximum U.N. supervision. But we should have no illusions; our actions have consigned us to the periphery of decision making.

It has become commonplace to argue that the center of gravity in world affairs is shifting to the Pacific. It is certainly true that the Pacific Basin will gain in importance. But America's role in this process will be crucially affected by intangibles: by our ability to define our national interest consistently; by our willingness to keep domestic political changes from dramatically altering our international role; by our ability to sustain an economy that can support our global responsibilities. In that sense, Gorbachev's visit to Beijing should be viewed not as a distant drama that has turned America into a passive spectator. Rather it should be seen as a challenge to rethink our own role in shaping Asia's future.

ANDY HERNANDEZ FOR NEWSWEEK

'America's biggest nightmare in Indochina':
Vietnamese troops withdrawing from Cambodia

56 NEWSWEEK : MAY 22, 1989

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