DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELECON
Don Oberdorfer
8/6/71 6:00 p.m.

O: About your conversation with Ken -- I was gone when you talked --
I was working on the Pentagon papers story . . .

K: I will not go into that.

O: Can I check one thing?

K: That discussion was off the record.

O: But we have a new story from another source in the light of which
and in view of what you said I thought I ought to ~~try it out~~ on you. It
is not based on what you said.

K: Okay.

O: The story is that the publication of the Pentagon papers very nearly
blew up negotiations to get Kissinger into China. If Americans can't keep
their secrets . . .

K: That would not be correct . . . I mean that is an overstatement.

O: Did they give you any indication . . . I mean it was not something
in our minds, but in theirs.

K: No, it was something in our minds.

O: That casts a different light on it. Okay, thank you.

By JCS NARA, Dated 8/27

TELECON
Admiral Moorer
8/6/71 6:30 p.m.

K: Tom, for your information, but for God's sake don't tell anyone --
I am going to turn off that zero-ABM next week. I am taking the position
that it will ruin any chance for agreement if we now table another proposal
and let them choose and go through all that agony.

M: I agree, right. That's been our position all along.

K: I just wanted you to know that I might even sometimes do something
the JCS can like.

M: That's good news Henry.

K: But don't tell anybody yet because I will still have to get the approval
of the President and he may overrule it.

M: Okay Henry, thanks.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON

Chalmers Roberts/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., August 6, 1971

R: Are you a mind reader or did you get the letter I sent you?

K: No, I didn't get the letter you sent me. I just wanted you to know that I was thinking of you and that I talked to the President about you. He said that you were still very much on his mind, his promise is still good but that he doesn't want to make any news on foreign policy right now.

R: I wrote you a note this morning about two things. One was that and I said I realize this is a very touchy moment.

K: This is a bad time to speak on foreign policy. He promised me he would give you an interview and that you are at the top of his list which amazes me. He must have forgotten the paper it was going to be published in!

R: It will be published other places too. ..... but I must castigate my brother for letting you get away with the belly-belly bit.

K: It was interesting.

R: I spent a while in Peking and I would desperately love to go back with you. Are arrangements being made?

K: Off-the-record can I tell you that Chou En-lai and I have an arrangement. I can take those that write well about me. I can pick them. I am not trying to influence you but --

R: And you are telling that to everybody in town.

K: Not everybody.

R: I would love to go back but there are probably a lot of people lined up in front of me.

K: We don't have fixed arrangements yet. We will do it later.

R: It's an awful problem.

K: There are thousands that want to go.

By NARA, Date

5/27

TELCORN

7:30 p.m., August 6, 1971 -- page 2

R: A plane load. It's a fascinating town.

K: I, of course, under the auspices of which I saw it was charmed
but of course I never got out on the street by myself.

R: That's difficult anyway. The other thing I mentioned in the note --
I just read the book by Neville Maxwell on the Indian/Chinese war.
Have you read it?

K: No, I haven't.

R: It is an absolutely superb job on the Chinese psychology.

K: Not to mention the Indian psychology.

R: It is fascinating, you really ought to read it and you might want
to recommend it to the President.

K: I must get it. I will get it.

R: You really pulled the coup and it was a great thing. I hope it
all works out.

K: I think it will be all right.

R: One thing struck me about it -- it hasn't been written about yet
and I have refrained from it until fall. It encompasses the
Vietnam thing -- in the larger context of Asia -- where from the
President's standpoint politically --

K: Also internationally.

R: Longer hold of any subsequent Administration that the whole thing
appears to me most of all -- the goddamn thing of it is the
division at home.

K: Peripheral of Southeast Asia. Hope you are enjoying the summer
and I will see you in the fall.

R: Keep that in mind. Are you going to be around?

K: I am leaving the 17th or 18th for San Clémente.

By: Ccc

NARA, Dato

TELCONE

Rowlandt Evans/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 8/9/71

E: You have escalated your notereity since I left.

K: But There's no sense in corrupting you. I thought you were going to write pro-Greek.

E: I have never seen such a spate of publicity since your China trip. in Europe.
Could you see me today or tomorrow?

K: Perhaps late in the day. I will call early in the afternoon and give you a
time.

E: My partner is going to the Far East. Laos, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Tokyo and we are trying to get a visa to China. I wanted to see if you have an idea. Second, I want to talk about Romania visit which produced interesting things on China. I had an interesting session with ______ who went with Ceaşescu on his visit. Fascinating on Soviet/China relations. If not today, if tomorrow breakfast is possible. Have Dianne call me. I hear Joe struck out. Did you read my stuff from Israel?

K: No.

E: They are hard-nosed.

K: There may be ways of doing it but this isn't one of it.

E: Joe went over by Rogers because State was furious over your success
in Peking and trying to get bakc.

K: It's not true.

E: Of course not. I went to Sharmel Sheikh. They are colonizing the whole
place. It's beautiful. They don't have good leadership and factual problems
in govt. and they will hang in there because no alternatives.

K: I will call you early in the afternoon.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
British DCM Millard/Kissinger
11:05 a.m. 8/9/71

M: Sorry to bother you. Wonder if you are in a position for a reply to
letter.

K: That is going to Secy. today. I recommend you call him Wed. or Thurs.

M: When I have done so, but not before, I will go before would it be in
order to ____ Adm. Zumwalt? It occured to me that he may wonder why it
wasn't mentioned to him when he was in London last month. The reason
is we wanted to get ____ from you.

K: I will handle Zumwalt. He has an uncanny sense of where his bread is
baked, buttered on.

M: If you would. Thank you.

By

NARA, Date

TEL. CON

Mosbacher/Kissinger

11:28 a. m.

8/9/71

M: I wanted to say thank you and second, I wanted to tell you that the list went out. Marshall Green sent it. Someone in my office did not sign off but it was signed by my name. You are an alternate. Marshall told me that when rumor was going around about Tokyo he said he would like India.

As
K: SOB! it turns out, I have to go with the President tomorrow night. But it's interesting.

M: King Olaf of Norway will be in NY 9/10-12 on a sailing thing. A mutual friend has tried to reach me about his coming to Washington.

K: I doubt the President wants to see a lot of extra foreigners.

M: When he was here in '67 Johnson gave a big dinner and we would suffer by comparison.

K: I will check with the President but I doubt he wants it.

M: If you could let me know before things start moving.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date

TELECON
Deputy Secretary Packard
8/9/71 2:32 p.m.

P: Do you have a few minutes after the Verification Panel to talk about the presentation of the '73 budget on Thursday?

K: Yes, if the meeting doesn't go beyond 5:00.

P: You ought to be able to get it settled before that.

K: I hope so.

P: I understand Wayne Smith was doing some work over there and I've been doing some here over the weekend and I think we ought to get together.

K: Good. Dave, on this meeting this afternoon, the President's tentative thinking is that he is getting tired of these constant esoteric questions from Helsinki. We're turning this into a philosophical discussion of arms limitation. We're just going into one problem after another. He just wants to ______ on negotiating within the May 20 framework.

P: I think we are concerned about getting the offensive force date limitation moved if we go to zero-ABM.

K: I'm not sure he wants to do that. Everything has been based on ______ NCS ... then we are starting back from scratch with two proposals.

P: I don't object to NCA. The question is whether they are so deep into zero-ABM now we can't get out of it.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Dobrynin/Kissinger
4:58 p.m. 8/9/71

K: One thing -- we have went an instruction to Beam who is still assailed by the idea that Brezhnev will be insulted if he doesn't say something to the Foreign Minister. It's a banal instruction. We don't want to persue conversation in that channel so we don't want a long exchange.

D: Did you send a copy of the letter?

K: No. A very -- reply to conversation with Groymko in which Breshnev asked about American policy We are saying to tell Gromyko for Breshnev that we are not applying zig-zag policy.

D: No reference to letter.

K: NO and no referesne from Gromyko (we hope).

D: I understand.

K: That should end Brezhnev part on your side. If it could be done we would appreciate it.

D: I don't know what Gromyko will respond but --

K: Not very detailed instructions.

D: An answer in a general way.

K: Second, on the port security issue -- Soviet ships in American ports. Some issues are bureaucratically very complicated. The thing we can do easiest is reduce waiting time to 14 days at all American ports. Right now it's 30 days at most and 7 at a few. Uniformly at 14 at every port. The other things we can't negotiate.

D: Maybe this a good idea to begin with other things.

K: If you are interested tell me about the 14 days and we will order it unilaterally and we will expect you to reciprocate.

D: Then what next?

K: Then a formal discussion with you on other issues with instructions from WH to be as forthcoming as they can.

D: On future (?) things subject to negotiation. You will send people there or we will send people here. It will take time. In general you are prepared

By NARA, Date

Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:58 p.m. 8/9/71

-2-

D(cont): to organize the State Dept. or whomever.

K: I don't know who to do it but we can find a way.

D: In principle it's all right. In Sept. or Oct. start certain types of discussion. People from our ministry could come here? Generally speaking.

K: Yes.

D: Or your people --

K: Let your people come here because it's a bureaucratic can of worms. So many agencies. Let's say late Sept. or early Oct.

D: I will check with them.