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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

news conference, 37 members of Congress filed into the Cabinet Room to present the President with petitions signed by precisely 363,053 backers of his Vietnam policy. After leafing through the boxes of petitions, Mr. Nixon let it be known that he planned to keep up the momentum with another public accounting on the war. The White House announced later that the speech—a short sequel to Mr. Nixon's Nov. 3 address—would be made this week. In it, he was expected to set the size of the next troop withdrawal. A cut of 50,000 men would bring the total for 1969 to the previously hinted-at goal of 100,000.

**Problems:** Later in the week Mr. Nixon launched a round of consultations with prominent figures outside his Administration. Among those who turned up at the White House were former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former New York Gov. Thomas E. Dewey and retired Gen. Lucius D. Clay. But the principal visitor of the week was Lyndon B. Johnson. During a breakfast meeting in the White House family dining room, the President and the ex-President discussed the situation in Vietnam, along with some of the other delicate matters confronting the United States. Two hours after he arrived, Johnson emerged from the White House, climbed into a waiting limousine and sped off without pausing to comment on his talks with Mr. Nixon. Later LBJ told an intimate wryly: "I think I have some understanding of the President's problems."

Perhaps the surest evidence of Mr. Nixon's firm grip on the home front came at the weekend when the Vietnam Moratorium Committee launched the third round in what it once hoped would be a growing war on the war. Compared to the October and November moratoriums, the mid-December activities were decidedly low-key affairs. On both coasts of the country, where hundreds of thousands had mustered last month to protest against Mr. Nixon's conduct of the war, the December moratorium seemed half-hearted and uncoordinated.

**Sputtering:** For the moment, the peace movement seemed to be sputtering down. In Washington, leaders of the Moratorium Committee, plagued by a shortage of money and a decline in enthusiasm, abandoned the original concept of an escalating protest each month. "What could we do for eight days in May?" said Marge Sklencar, one of the prime movers behind the one-day October and two-day November demonstrations. Now, the moratorium people toyed with the idea of disbanding, or at least focusing on more modest goals such as the 1970 Congressional elections. Even here, however, there was further evidence that Mr. Nixon was winning the battle for public opinion. For a good many congressmen and senators up for re-election were openly wondering whether, given the current climate, hordes of youngsters working in their behalf might not hurt more than help.

Newsweek—Wally McNamee

Kissinger in the Situation Room: Endless hours of constant mental motion

# Mr. Nixon's Professor

## Kissinger and the New Shape of U.S. Foreign Policy

Eactly eleven months have passed since Henry Alfred Kissinger of Cambridge, Mass., went down to Washington, D.C., to hang his ersatz-parchment commission shingle, attesting to Richard Nixon's "special trust and confidence in your integrity, prudence and ability," on the wall of his shop at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Physically, he has made few changes in the White House's west basement, the traditional lair of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. The tiny, walnut-paneled Situation Room still looks more like a Holiday Inn conference chamber than the grotesque fantasy of Stanley Kubrick's "Dr. Strange- love." Intelligence cables, which are supposed to keep Mr. Nixon in touch with reality, worldwide, continue to whir off the duplicating machines night and day. The battery of secretaries still looks properly harried, overworked and blandly expectant of imminent crisis, as befits an office where crisis is measured by the color of the telephone reporting it. There is only one really personal, and unintentionally ironic, Kissinger touch: in the far corner of his modest 16- by 21-foot inner sanctum, where the décor remains an undisturbing neuter, stands a battered old spin globe of the world, with a penciled note stuck inside its wooden frame, warning: "Do not touch-fragile."

Professor Kissinger, lately of Harvard, is not much given to material signs of status. Yet by any realistic standards of power and influence, he now ranks very high indeed. As the first year of the Nix-

on Administration draws to a close, Kissinger has firmly established himself as a predominant force in the shaping and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, a man on whom the President relies more than on any other in the White House and, consequently, one of the half-dozen most important personalities in Washington—and thus in the world.

In the blurry Milky Way of Nixonian Washington, Kissinger's star is one of the few to burn brightly and distinctly. Foreign diplomats treat him as a virtual Secretary of State ex officio; their wives vie for the pleasure and prestige of his company at ambassadorial dinner parties, where his attendance is duly noted in official cables home the next day. Kissinger sits in and speaks up at most Presidential encounters with world leaders. He spends more time with Mr. Nixon alone than any of his peers—an average of 90 minutes a day in and out of the Oval Office, uncounted minutes on the intercom phone, long informal chats at the Camp David retreat and on the beaches of Key Biscayne and San Clemente. He is admired, respected, resented, envied, even feared by the cumbersome national-security apparatus he is determined to change—that Byzantine labyrinth of the Pentagon, State Department, Disarmament, Information and other agencies whose chief reason for being, it often seems to the White House, is to preserve the status quo without endangering their own parochial interests.

Down to his bitten fingernails, horn-

December 22, 1969

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

rimmed glasses and self-deprecating wit, Kissinger, 46, is unmistakably and un-abashedly an Eastern intellectual in a government that has shown no great love for the genus. Improbably enough, how-ever, his very cast of mind has given him real cachet and helped make him a ce-legriity in Washington—a remarkable achievement in itself for a deeply seri-ous, slow-talking, graying, middle-aged professor who has never quite lost the traces of a Teutonic accent and manner he carried across the Atlantic when, as a Jewish refugee of 15, he fled Nazi Ger-many in 1938.

**Romance:** All of this makes Kissinger fine newspaper copy and a favorite sub-ject, and frequent target, of cocktail and office chitechat. As one of Washington's most eligible bachelors (his fifteen-year marriage ended in divorce in 1964), Kissinger is pursued by gossip columnists

fifteen-hour days in the White House—butterted by a talented staff of about three dozen experts and administrative aides handpicked from Washington offi-cialdom and academic think tanks, many of whom match his weekly time-card rec-ord. (Several Kissinger staffers have been unable to keep up to the boss' pace and have left. Policy differences played no role in any of these departures, though personality differences did.)

On the job, Kissinger is in constant
mental motion: monitoring and channel-
ing intelligence cables for the President's
"eyes only," reading and criticizing enor-
mous reams of reports and papers; chair-
ing interdepartmental policy discussions
with Under and Assistant Secretaries for
whom he is often the sole link to the
Oval Office; receiving an endless stream
of official, diplomatic and journalistic visi-
tors; and responding to every Presiden-

Eisenhower's paper factory and relied
more on strong-minded national-security
assistants, McGeorge Bundy and Walt
Rostow, both imported from Cambridge
campuses. And now Kissinger, with the
blessing of a President with a passion for
neatness and order, is well along toward
effecting still another transformation of
the National Security Council organiza-
tion—this time into a systematic clearing-
house of policy ideas for Mr. Nixon, dom-
inated by Kissinger's own vigorous and
continual direction.

In the last hectic years of Johnson's
reign, when Vietnam overwhelmed all
other considerations, the guiding princi-
ple of the NSC seemed to be little more
than ad hoc improvisation at Tuesday
lunches in the White House. Mr. Nixon
and Kissinger agreed well before Jan.
20 that this would no longer do. Their
new system, they believe, insures that
no policy idea reaches the President
without having first undergone Kissin-
ger's rigorous evaluation (unless, of
course, it is personally conveyed to Mr.
Nixon by the few Cabinet members and
friends who enjoy such access). Kissin-
ger's role is crucial at every stage of the
making or changing of policy: he initi-
ates studies on everything from U.S.
strategic weapons needs in the '70s
through the prospects for European uni-
ty to the definition of what constitutes a
"fact" in Vietnam; he elicits suggestions
from the bureaucracy and coordinates
interagency action; he formulates the
presentation of options with painstaking
exactitude; and, not least important, he
presents the final series of proposals to
the President.

**New Approach:** "The essence of my job," Kissinger explains, "is to use a mechanism to change substance. My goal is a different and, I hope, better approach to policymaking within four years." He insists that he is open to all new ideas and that he goes out of his way to solicit and make them available to the President. To the suggestion that his own ideas must somewhere be inserted in the elaborate policy machine he has constructed for the President, Kissinger reacts with unusual passion. "There is no 'Kissinger policy' on any substantive questions," he insists, his hand stabbing the air for emphasis. "My task is to convey the full range of policy options to the President. If there were a 'Kissinger policy,' the whole new mechanism we have set up in the National Security Council-not to speak of relations between the governmental agencies-would be in a shambles."

Such disclaimers seem disingenuous to
many Washington officials, particularly to
those middle-echelon bureaucrats who
are convinced Kissinger has pre-empted
their policy-shaping prerogatives, turned
the White House basement into a "shad-
ow State Department" and thereby in
fact created an interagency "shambles."
But in public, at least, the once-outspoken
professor of government, who established
his international reputation on the basis

Newsweek—Wally McNamee

The President and his counselor: Common views and shared convictions

who record his quips and asides, follow
him to supermarkets and chronicle his
housekeeping trivia as well as his love
life. Barbara Howar, Washington's mod
Perle Mesta, is one of his dates (she calls
him "Super Kraut") and he sometimes
turns up at parties with magazine writer
Gloria Steinem. The odds-on favorite in
the Kissinger matrimonial sweepstakes is
a tall, blond New York socialite named
Nancy McGinnis, who once worked for
him as a researcher in the Rockefeller
Foundation. "Romance with a man tailed
by a bodyguard is about as sexy as tak-
ing a ride in a Brink's armored car," says
Barbara Howar with a sly smile. "He'll
never marry while he's holding this job."

Given Kissinger's formidable workload,
there is probably considerably less to his
self-proclaimed image as a "secret swing-
er" than meets the eye. Six days almost
every week and often on Sunday as
well, he puts in grueling twelve- to

tial request for information and advice,
which can range from mundane statistics
on Micronesian demography to the life-
and-death matter of a downed U.S. spy
plane. Most of his meals, tasteless at
best, come from the nearby White House
mess. And on the few occasions he does
get to dine out in restaurants, Kissinger
invariably carries an electronic "call-boy"
that can summon him to instant com-
munication with the President.

Kissinger does more than merely cope,
however. Every President since Harry
Truman, who established the National
Security Council as the supreme arbiter
of Executive policy in 1947, has molded
its apparatus in his own image. Dwight
Eisenhower turned it into a staff-work
machine mostly employed in churning
out supposedly definitive—and often ir-
relevant—papers on every conceivable
policy question. John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon Johnson dismantled much of

22

Newsweek

of bold and unequivocal pronunciamentos on postwar U.S. policy, has studiedly re-
frained from the slightest hint of a "Kissinger policy" in any way different from that of the government he serves. "I will not play the game of my predecessor," Kissinger has confided to friends on occasion. "I will not bad-mouth the President by taking credit for what goes right in our policies and blaming him for what goes wrong."

Yet so much of Kissinger's general approach to foreign affairs and specific views of world problems is on the record (box) that trying to distinguish between what is and what is not "Henry's contribution" to Administration policy has become an irresistible Capital pastime. So far, though, it has proved to be a frustrating game. For aside from the two principals themselves, no one really knows what really goes on when Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger closet themselves to discuss policy.

**Accord:** What is clear, on the basis of the important Administration decisions taken this year, is that the two men hold common views on what should be the basic U.S. approach to foreign affairs in the '70s. Mr. Nixon's trip to Western Europe barely six weeks after he took office re-established that area as primary to the U.S. interest and, at the same time, served notice that the new Administration hoped the Europeans would in the future depend less on Washington than on themselves in solving Continental problems—two themes repeatedly stressed in Kissinger's writings during the past decade. Similarly, the President's early decision to construct a modified anti-ballistic-missile system and to undertake talks with the Russians on strategic-arms limitation (just recently begun in Helsinki) only after the most careful preparation, reflect a shared conviction. Kissinger and his boss both believe that negotiations with Moscow can only succeed if conducted with extreme caution and from a position of real strength.

Generally, too, the President and the professor agree that the U.S. must begin to disengage itself from many of the "bastions of the free world," especially in Asia. Commitments made during the cold war era—which is now, they both believe, slowly coming to an end—no longer seem valid or relevant or in the U.S. interest. If Mr. Nixon himself first spoke of moving from "a period of confrontation" to "an era of negotiation," it is a fairly safe bet that the notion of a new "low profile" for the U.S. originated in Kissinger's shop. And both slogans, repeated so often in recent months, are really expressions of the same fundamental idea: reduce the U.S. presence in the world of the '70s.

Slow disengagement and a lowered U.S. profile was therefore the message carried by the President on his Asian trip last summer. And, significantly, the new Asian policy was first announced publicly at Guam in a statement that contained unmistakable echoes of articles

A KISSINGER PRIMER
ON WAR AND PEACE

Whether in print or in conversation, Henry Kissinger is one of the most provocative diplomatic theorists of the postwar era. A sampling of Kissinger's mind at work:

Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear least able to achieve tranquillity. Whenever peace—conceived as the avoidance of war—has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. Whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised, even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.

—"A World Restored," 1957

It is a mistake to assume that diplomacy can always settle international disputes if there is "good faith" and "willingness to come to an agreement." For in a revolutionary international order, each power will seem to its opponent to lack precisely these qualities. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to speak the same language.

—Ibid

The test of a statesman ... is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends ... The acid test of a policy, however, is its ability to obtain domestic support.

—Ibid

Events in Czechoslovakia demonstrate the limits of Eastern European autonomy that the Soviet Union is now prepared to tolerate. But the Soviet Union may not be willing indefinitely to use the Red Army primarily against allies as it has done three times in a decade and a half. In any case, no Western policy can guarantee a more favorable evolution in Central Europe; all it can do is to take advantage of an opportunity if it arises.

—*Brookings Institution paper, 1968*

Almost any statement about Vietnam is likely to be true; unfortunately, truth does not guarantee relevance.

—*Foreign Affairs article, 1969*

The modern bureaucratic state, for all its panoply of strength, often finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittleness and the worldwide revolution of youth—especially in advanced countries and among the relatively affluent—suggest a

spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a political environment that increasingly emphasizes bureaucratic challenges and is dedicated to no deeper purpose than material comfort.

We fought a military war [in Vietnam]; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win.

The commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Vietnam. For what is involved now is confidence in American promises ... However we got into Vietnam ... ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world. Any other solution may unloose forces that would complicate prospects of international order.

—*Ibid*

I find quite chilling the similarities between the revolutionary romanticism of some of our more radical students today and the young German intellectuals of the 1930s—and I don't mean the Nazi thugs but those idealistic students who were looking for commitment for its own sake. My primary feeling about our students is sadness over the conditions that produced them. They are looking for heroes—not for brothers, but for fathers.

—*Conversation, 1969*

If it were not for Vietnam, this job would be quite enjoyable.

—*Conversation, 1969*

Drawing by David Levine © 1969 The New York Review

December 22, 1969

published by both Mr. Nixon and Professor Kissinger within the previous two years. The Administration's decision last month to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972 reflects not only its recognition of legitimate nationalist sentiment but its desire to encourage Tokyo to play a political role commensurate with its power as a renascent economic colossus in the East—and so, again, help Washington reduce its own presence.

Above all else in importance, of course, there is every indication of a solid—if not total—convergence of views on Vietnam between the President and his chief foreign-policy adviser. Both believe that a conventional military victory is no longer possible but that a defeat, either open or disguised, would ultimately have a disastrous political impact at home and drastically alter the international balance of power. Accordingly, their decision was to opt for a "two-track" strategy—first delineated in a Kissinger article published in Foreign Affairs magazine just after his appointment—which provided for an attempted negotiated settlement at the Paris peace talks while simultaneously beginning a gradual, unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from the battlefield.

**Poker Hand:** Until now half of that strategy has failed to work, as the President admitted in his news conference last week by bluntly rating current chances of a negotiated settlement as "not good." And despite Mr. Nixon's contention that "Vietnamization"—the Administration's hopeful justification for unilateral U.S. withdrawal—"continues to work," it is still a very open question whether total reliance on supposed progress by Saigon's armed forces is a sure road to the successful "conclusion" of the war he promised. "The 'two-track strategy' has flopped," says a former Washington policy analyst and close friend of Kissinger's. "We're operating on only one track now. It might work, if the President is able to manipulate public opinion at home and if there is no collapse of will in Saigon. But it might not—and then things could get dramatic."

For Henry Kissinger, the Presidential adviser most identified in the public mind with the Administration's policy, failure in Vietnam could spell personal disaster and ignominy. Throughout 1969, Kissinger has been the President's most articulate backstage advocate on Vietnam, briefing journalists both collectively and individually, meeting with dovish politicians, Quakers, student leaders and other dissenters. He has also involved himself intimately in behind-the-scenes contacts with the North Vietnamese in an all-out effort to get his two-track strategy on the rails. "Henry is fascinated by playing one more round of poker in the Vietnam game," notes a dovish professor who acted as an informal and ultimately unsuccessful intermediary between Kissinger and Hanoi representatives in Paris last summer. "I got the impression, though, that he was not pri-

marily interested in ending the game as such—but rather in playing it."

Poker-playing at such stakes, as Kissinger is well aware, is a dangerous intellectual sport. A constant, almost obsessive theme in conversations with friends is his fear of "ending up like Walt," of being rejected and exiled by his academic peers as Rostow was at the end of the Johnson Administration. "Would you be happy at a small university in Arizona?" he is fond of joking to his female acquaintances. But the prospect of becoming a primary Vietnam scapegoat is no laughing matter for Kissinger, who has already had a bitter taste of what may lie in store for him. At commencement exercises last spring at Brown University, two-thirds of the student body pointedly turned around when he was awarded an honorary degree—a

Harry Naitchenyan—Washington Post

With Miss McGinnis: Secret Swinger?

particularly galling experience for a teacher who prided himself on his rapport with students (and only partially alleviated by a cable that arrived the next day from several former colleagues at Harvard, promising, "We will not turn our backs on Henry Kissinger").

As Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger—like Rostow and Bundy before him—is in an especially vulnerable position on Vietnam. Other key Presidential advisers, notably Secretary of State William Rogers, Attorney General John Mitchell and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, are cushioned against shock by bureaucratic underpinnings and can take shelter in long-standing personal friendships with Mr. Nixon. But Kissinger enjoys no real power base or refuge in case of defeat. His present lofty position within the Administration rests entirely on the force and sharpness

of his mind, his tenacity and seriousness of purpose—it is only those qualities that can retain the President's trust and confidence.

Kissinger's special intellectual virtues have always been more analytic than creative. His mind excels at structuring, organizing and articulating ideas rather than generating them. Balance, judiciousness, thoroughness and order are what he strives for. He is tolerant of honest intellectual mistakes and readily admits to having made several himself in the past (including his early belief in the viability of limited nuclear war), but he does not suffer fools, fanatics or false reasoning gladly. Still, he is sympathetic to earnestness and sincerity of any variety—even among revolutionaries or student radicals. He is less dogmatic than dogged in temperament and, while open to fresh ideas, will seldom abandon old ones without a struggle.

Kissinger enjoys speculation as long as it is grounded in specifics but cannot abide a failure to think a position through to its logical conclusion. At a recent interdepartmental meeting on European affairs in the White House, he listened quietly until a veteran State Department official predicted "there would be very bad consequences" if a proposed course of action were followed. "What will the consequences be?" Kissinger asked. "I don't know," answered the diplomat. "Well," responded Kissinger, "if you don't know what the consequences will be, how do you know they will be bad?" That ended the discussion.

**Teuton:** Such virtues—and their attendant vices of arrogance and limited imagination—are strikingly consistent with Kissinger's origins and are partly explained by his early uprooting. A rather indifferent student in the Bavarian town of Fürth, where his father, Louis Kissinger, was a respected schoolmaster until 1933, Henry became a star pupil when his family finally decided to make the long journey to Manhattan's budding colony of German refugees in Washington Heights (his parents still live there today). After a straight-A record at George Washington High School and a prolonged stretch in the Army, spent mostly in counterintelligence work in Germany, Kissinger entered Harvard. There, his precociousness was quickly recognized. William Y. Elliott, the distinguished professor of government, wrote in a letter recommending the undergraduate Henry Kissinger to Phi Beta Kappa that "[he] is more like a mature colleague than a student ... On the other hand, his mind lacks grace and is Teutonic in its systematic thoroughness."

Elliott, who became Kissinger's mentor throughout his student days at Harvard, was himself a consultant to five U.S. Presidents and probably helped persuade Henry to set his sights higher than professional distinction. That, at any rate, was the course Kissinger pursued when, after being appointed to the Harvard government faculty in the mid-'50s, he became

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Newsweek

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

intimately associated with two prestigious organizations located in that peculiarly American midway between the academy and the government: the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. And from these two convenient jumping-off points, it was just a short hop for the Harvard professor to enter government service as an expert on foreign affairs.

**Clash With State:** His first experience as a full-fledged government adviser—in the Kennedy Administration—was not a happy one. In part, a difference of opinion was responsible. Kissinger's ideas on European affairs—his specialty—ran directly contrary to the predominant ideological slant of the “theologians” in the State Department who urged Kennedy to press a multilateral nuclear force on America's European allies. But there was more to Kissinger's failure to achieve real influence on the New Frontier than a clash of ideas. “It was less Henry's

and members of Hubert Humphrey's foreign-policy task force.

Soon after the election, Mr. Nixon met with Kissinger twice and, impressed both by the professor's talk and by his contribution to the Brookings Institution's "Agenda for the Nation," offered him the job Kissinger had hoped to have under Rockefeller. Kissinger accepted, explains a friend, because "his misgivings about Nixon were overcome by the prospect of exerting that much influence."

To the surprise of both men, perhaps, the appointment has proved to be mutually satisfactory. Probably the major reason for the apparent compatibility between the President and Kissinger is that they complement each other intellectually. "Henry performs a function for Nixon that he himself could not do," suggests one close observer. "He takes the President's ideas, structures them, works out the details, and returns them wrapped in a neat package. Henry is the perfect

tial," he wrote in his Brookings essay last year. "Without it stability will prove elusive."

Stability is all-important for Kissinger, whose fundamentally conservative approach to world affairs leaves room for political and social transformations and institutional reform but ranks all such changes as secondary to maintaining a proper balance of forces. "Henry takes a great deal for granted in the existing order," notes one of his oldest acquaintances, "first and foremost that it is worth preserving at all." Another old friend, who worked alongside him for many years at Harvard, defines Kissinger's conservatism more precisely: "Henry's views on social change remind me of Goethe's old dictum that if he had to make a choice between disorder and injustice, he would choose injustice. The same is true of Henry—not because he favors injustice, but because he feels in his bones that there can be no justice without order."

**Old Truths:** Kissinger's conservatism, in reality, amounts to an updated version of nineteenth-century liberal Toryism. And it is thus no secret where Mr. Nixon got the notion—bandied about with great delight by his aides a few months ago—that he is something of a twentieth-century Disraeli. The only trouble is that neither the Chief Executive nor his court philosopher seem open to the suggestion that even the most eloquent, reasonable recasting of the old verities may prove inadequate in an era that has been creating a whole new set of truths.

"Henry's mind works within a restricted area," remarks a friend, "which is both an asset and a limitation." The same might be said of Mr. Nixon, who now speaks with great confidence of the eventual success of his most important foreign policy, backed, he is sure, by the great silent mass of Americans. That is the President's asset and one he has exploited skillfully in recent weeks. But his—and Kissinger's—limitation could lie in their inability to give enough weight to other perceptions: that majorities are not constant, and that an important generational change may yet transform the framework in which U.S. foreign policy is conducted.

Ultimately, the fate of both men depends on how successful their policy is in extricating the U.S. from a war for which neither is in the least responsible. By their estimate, the principal U.S. concern should be to protect its own national power and thus preserve a solid measure of the international power balance in the '70s. But such criteria, however responsible, may not be enough. "Doesn't that man realize that a good part of this country regards the war in Vietnam as *immoral*?" exclaimed an exasperated visitor to Kissinger's office not long ago. The answer is, he does. But neither Henry Kissinger nor Richard Nixon believes that is the decisive question—and only the future will tell whether they will stand or fall on their judgment.

Henry, at 8, in Fürth and his parents today in New York

Newsweek—Bernard Gotfryd

views than his style that hurt him," recalls a sympathetic colleague who served with him at the time. "He simply wasn't light-footed enough for the Kennedy circle."

Kissinger was more successful later in performing short-term study missions in Vietnam for Lyndon Johnson and was even able to establish a direct contact, through a French friend, between the President and Ho Chi Minh in 1967. But his real hopes for full-time public service seemed to rest on the political fortunes of Nelson Rockefeller, with whom he had remained in close contact since the '50s. During the 1968 campaign, Kissinger served as Rockefeller's chief foreign-policy adviser, and he was bitterly disappointed at Rocky's failure to win the nomination. He received an immediate offer to help write nominee Nixon's speeches but turned it down because, a former associate recalls, "Henry doubted that he could write anything that Nixon would be willing to use." But he did remain in informal contact with both the Nixon camp

man for the job—he has a strong, precise, well-structured mind."

Kissinger also has strong convictions about the proper conduct of foreign affairs that seem remarkably in tune with Mr. Nixon's own instincts and predilections. Basically, he views world problems through the classic prism of power relations. "International order," the highest value in Kissinger's political pantheon and a recurrent phrase in all his writings, can only be achieved through the most delicate balance of major-power relations. This equilibrium among the great powers, he believes, is always dynamic and changing, never permanent: "The foundation of a stable order is the relative security—and therefore the relative insecurity—of its members." And with the onset of the '70s and the slow melting away of the cold-war balance of terror, Kissinger feels, it is imperative that the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the two great superpowers, readjust their relations in conformity with new realities. "A new concept of international order is essen-

December 22, 1969

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UPI

Shoot-out in Los Angeles: Sudden sympathy and pressure for investigation

Too Late for the Panthers?

Is there some sort of government conspiracy afoot to exterminate the Black Panthers? The black revolutionaries themselves are convinced of it—and have long used such charges as part of their propaganda against capitalist white society and its “pig” police. Last week, in the wake of yet another bloody shoot-out between the cops and the Panthers, the talk of conspiracy—or, at the least, systematic harassment—began to find a larger and more sympathetic audience than ever before.

The latest skirmish in the guerrilla war between the gun-toting Panthers and the police took place in Los Angeles. The cops' mission, authorities said, was to search Panther headquarters on the edge of the Watts ghetto for a suspected cache of illegal weapons. To bring off the job, the police department assembled a 300-man task force and moved in on the building just before dawn. The result

was a four-hour gun battle in which both sides exchanged hundreds of shots. At one point, the police tried to get at the Panthers by dynamiting the roof of their headquarters. The cops also used helicopters—to scout the neighborhood for Panther reinforcements—and even wheeled up an armored personnel carrier, borrowed from the National Guard.

Outnumbered and outgunned, the Panthers finally hoisted a white flag. And when the police finally got into the building, they found what they said they had come for: an arsenal of weapons including two submachine guns, a dozen carbines and rifles, eight pistols, a score of homemade bombs and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Six Panthers (and three policemen) were wounded during the fight and thirteen militants arrested.

The Los Angeles episode came just four days after a deadly confrontation between the police and the Panthers in Chicago in which two top Illinois leaders of the party were killed (NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15). The two incidents prompted an unprecedented outcry—and not just from the Panthers and their allies on the far left. Liberals of impeccable credentials, including Whitney Young Jr. of the Urban League, attorney Joseph L. Rauh Jr. of Americans for Democratic Action, and Adlai Stevenson III, the Illinois State Treasurer and U.S. Senate candidate, called for investigations of the police action against the Panthers, whose hierarchy around the country has been all but decimated over the past year.

**Inquiry:** The pressure brought a prompt response from the government. In Washington, the Justice Department denied that it had ever had a "policy of concerted activity with local police in order to harass any members of the Black Panther Party." And Justice did agree to a preliminary Federal investigation of the Chicago incident. The U.S. investigation won't be the only one. At the weekend, a dozen organizations, including the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and

the American Jewish Congress, were planning to set up a committee of inquiry to look into the question of alleged police harassment of the Panthers.

There is no doubt that the police around the nation have made the Panthers a prime target in the past two years—but whether there is any sort of systematic approach to it all is highly questionable. "I doubt seriously that there is anything organized on a national scale," says one former high-ranking Federal lawman. "But there could be inspiration."

The Justice Department makes no secret of the fact that it maintains a special intelligence unit to keep tabs on the Panthers; and the FBI follows standard procedures for exchanging information with local law enforcement agencies. "If we hear that the Minutemen or the DAR or the Black Panthers are caching submachine guns," said one FBI source last week, "it's absolutely incumbent upon us to pass that on to local police." Last summer, FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover described the Panthers as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country" among all black extremist groups.

Not that local authorities need much prompting from anyone where the Panthers are concerned. The Panthers' whole stance is based on unrelenting hostility to all established authority, especially "the pigs." Recently, the Panthers have tried to downplay their gun-barrel politics and introduced a free breakfast program for children, but in ghettos around the country cops grumble about sniping and other hit-and-run assaults that they blame on the party. What's more, police raids on Panther hide-outs generally do turn up frightening arsenals—and the Panthers' insistence that they arm only for self-defense is less than persuasive to many officials.

While Panthers and police practice self-defense, the party's ranks are dwindling. Federal officials estimate that

Panther weapons seized in L.A.

UPI

L.A. Panthers being led to Newsweek

26

12

2

AMERICAN
Press Clipping Service, Inc.

Tel. WOrth 2-3797

From JAN 19 1969

SUN-TIMES

CHICAGO, ILL.

M548,000 S-732,000

A Clean Sweep

HENRY KISSINGER, the Nixon assist-
ant for national security affairs, is sweep-
ing all the old faces out of the White
House. He is bringing a Harvard profes-
sor named Morton Halperin over from
Defense to serve as his deputy. He is
anxious to refute the notion that Richard
V. Allen, the trenchant young anti-Com-
munist from Stanford, will be the num-
ber two man on the National Security
Council. His aim is to create NSC ma-
chinery that will be different from any-
thing attempted before. Experts with
whom Kissinger has conferred have been
impressed with the humility with which
he is approaching his ticklish assignment.

PRESS (e)
MIDDLETOWN, CONN.

CIRC. 19,250

JAN 27 1969

New
England
Newsclip

# Secretary Rogers Already Has a Problem of Morale

WASHINGTON (UPI)— Secretary of State William P. Rogers already has a morale problem in his department.

Many State Department career officers are concerned with what they see as the growing possibility that the secretary's traditional function as chief adviser and executive officer for the President in the field of foreign policy is being usurped by Harvard Professor Henry A. Kissinger.

The reason for this concern—whether it is justified or not—is obvious.

Kissinger, selected by President Nixon as his special assistant for national security affairs, already has put together a staff of more than 20 bright young experts on international affairs and laid two or three policy recommendations on Nixon's desk.

Rogers, meanwhile, is still struggling with the problem of filling key posts which are vacant or about to be vacant and pulling together the administration of the department, which is traditionally regarded as a "can of worms" so far as organizing it is concerned.

The fact that Kissinger, in putting together what is regarded in Foggy Bottom as "a little State Department" within he

White House, has tapped some of the State Department's own outstanding specialists for his operation makes the pill even more bitter.

Nixon eventually will determine the relative importance of Rogers and Kissinger in the policy planning sphere. But State Department officers are afraid that the brilliant Harvard professor, who has pushed his way to the front so rapidly, may get such a head start that Rogers will never catch up. This in turn would dilute the influence which the career specialists in the department are able to exert.

Pope Names
10 to Posts
In Hungary

VATICAN CITY (UPI)

Pope Paul VI has filled church posts in Hungary in a sweeping move to restore official church life in that heavily Catholic country since the Communists seized power in 1947.

The appointments ended a five-year deadlock between the Vatican and Budapest regime and affect the government of eight of Hungary's 11 dioceses.

However, a Vatican announcement made clear the two sides were still at odds over the status of Cardinal Josef Mindszenty, 76, who has been in self-imposed seclusion in the American Embassy in Budapest since Soviet

The Des Moines Register

DES MOINES, IOWA
D. 242,371 SUN. 512,401

JAN 4 1969

Kissinger on Vietnam

After Prof. Henry Kissinger of Harvard was picked as President-elect Richard Nixon's White House assistant on national security matters, he tried to get Foreign Affairs magazine to drop the article he had written last fall on "The Vietnam Negotiations," or at least permit him to revise it. No luck: the article was already in print and the magazine about to be distributed by that time.

Presumably the portions he would have edited out were the things which infuriated the Saigon government leaders of South Vietnam.

Kissinger assumed a "four-sided" conference would probably emerge in Paris and suggested it be broken down into two negotiating committees. (1) The United States and North Vietnam alone would discuss mutual troop withdrawal and guarantees for the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia, with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements as guides; (2) The Saigon government and the National Liberation Front alone would discuss the internal structure of South Vietnam.

He also suggested a broader third conference to work out international peacekeeping machinery to guarantee the agreements arrived at.

Kissinger thought the U.S. and North Vietnam could make progress first—but should take their time about actual withdrawal. He thought if Saigon continued to object to the four-sided conference that could be skipped altogether. He was against forcing Saigon to meet with the Front, to say nothing of forming a coalition government with it. But he felt

Saigon would come to want to deal with the Front (but not as an "entity") in order to get a settlement while American troops were still there.

Kissinger thinks that each side has little freedom of maneuver. The United States is caught by its own public opinion and South Vietnam's. North Vietnam is limited by its own smallness in fighting the United States and in balancing off Russia and China, its giant and mutually hostile allies.

Kissinger doubts there could be an early cease-fire or an early settlement within South Vietnam, because zones of control overlap so much, with no firm lines anywhere. He sees a genuine coalition government as impossible—for one thing because N.L.F. members would have to bring an army into Saigon with them for their own personal safety and this would change the whole balance of forces there.

Kissinger thinks some sort of mixed commission might be possible — but that the United States should in its own interest stay as far out of these matters as possible. Though the United States has asserted an interest in preventing forcible overthrow of the Saigon government by external aggression, direct or through fomenting guerrilla war, Kissinger believes the U.S. should avoid getting mixed up in the tangle of Vietnamese politics, which Americans do not understand and cannot effectively influence.

The new President will not be given any simplistic, quick solutions on Vietnam by Henry Kissinger.

THE OHIO NEWS
BUREAU COMPANY

Cleveland, Ohio 44115
First Clipping Bureau In Ohio

The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, O. 44114
P.M.-circ. 387,977

JAN-30-69

CS

Nixon Is Planning Trip Abroad
---

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — President Nixon, continuing to concentrate on U.S. foreign policy, will go abroad soon, probably to confer initially with NATO countries. He also has made it clear that Secretary of State William P. Rogers will be his chief foreign affairs adviser.

Nixon's communications director, Herbert G. Klein, told a group of newsmen yesterday: "I would expect, depending on world events, that he would go abroad in the next few months."

Klein said he thought Nixon would want to meet with heads of countries involved in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) before considering any trip to Russia.

Several weeks before his inauguration, Nixon told newsmen at his transition headquarters in New York that "you can expect that during the first six months, we will be traveling quite a bit. I want to get to know the leaders of other nations and I want them to get to know me."

Nixon personally squelched reports that the secretary of state's traditional

PRAISES ROGERS — President Nixon told State Department employees that William P. Rogers, secretary of state, remains his primary adviser on world affairs. (UPI Telephoto)

role as his chief foreign policy adviser might be usurped by Harvard Prof. Henry A. Kissinger, the White House special assistant for national security affairs.

"I consider the secretary of state to be my chief foreign policy adviser," Nixon told between 700 and 800 officers of the State Department during a visit to the department's headquarters in Washington's Foggy Bottom area.

13

WESTERN
PRESS CLIPPING
EXCHANGE
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

MILWAUKEE (WIS.) JRL E. 362,013 S. 546,595
SUNDAY, JANUARY 19, 1969

Part 1

Sunday, January 19, 1969

THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL

# Kissinger to Rely Heavily on Career Men

© New York Times News Service

Washington, D. C. - Henry A. Kissinger, President-Elect Richard Nixon's chief White House adviser on foreign affairs, has drawn heavily on career diplomats and Johnson administration specialists for his new national security council staff.

The reaction of foreign policy specialists in congress and government agencies is that Kissinger has quietly assembled a "high powered" staff of expert technicians who, despite their youth, are well acquainted with the behind the scenes operations of government.

## Major Role Likely

Although the national security council staff is the epitome

of the proverbial "faceless bureaucrat," its members often have considerable impact on day to day conduct of foreign policy because of their proximity to the president and higher echelons of operating agencies.

Henry A. Kissinger

Nixon has made it clear, furthermore, that he intends to give the national security council apparatus a more prominent role in foreign policy formulation than did either Presidents Kennedy or Johnson. Its staff is expected to have a considerable role in shifting and refining the alternatives put before the new president.

Among the more prominent Johnson administration officials tapped by Kissinger, a former Harvard university professor, is Morton C. Halperin, head of policy planning in the defense department in recent years.

## Wrote About Arms

Halperin, also a former Harvard professor, is the author of

several books on arms control and policy toward Communist China, fields he will pursue in the new national security council setup.

Last March, Halperin was reportedly one of the Pentagon officials who privately advocated a cutback in American bombing of North Vietnam. In May, he gave a policy speech speaking out against further American armed intervention in Asia after Vietnam.

At least five career diplomats, most of whom served in sensitive posts in the Johnson administration, have been drafted by Kissinger for the new national security council staff. They are:

**Viron P. Vaky, 43**, the acting assistant secretary of state for

Latin American affairs in the final weeks of Johnson's administration and a veteran of nearly 20 years in the foreign service.

**Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 42**, director of the state department's research office on the Soviet Union and eastern Europe.

**Daniel I. Davidson, 32**, a New York Lawyer who served most recently as personal assistant to Ambassador Averell Harriman, the chief American negotiator on Vietnam for the Johnson administration.

**Richard L. Sneider, 46**, a career diplomat who has served most recently as the state department's country director for Japan.

**Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 38**, whose latest post in the Johnson administration was special assistant to Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach.

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL

Sunday, January 19, 1967

## Places Murder Trial

lice and local law enforcement officers with helping the FBI apply increasing pressure on the klan and curb terrorist acts.

In the Dahmer case, three White Knights convicted of murder have been given life sentences, and another, convicted of arson, has been given a maximum 10 year sentence. Bowers was tried on an arson charge in the case, but a mistrial was declared after the jury reported that it was hopelessly deadlocked, 11 to 1, in favor of the guilty verdict.

### Face More Charges

During the trials there was testimony that Bowers ordered the "elimination" of Dahmer.

Five other klansmen still face state trials in the case and

they, Bowers and five others also face trial on federal charges of violating Dahmer's civil rights.

Dahmer, a leader of the NAACP, was killed when two carloads of night riders attacked his house with guns and a fire bomb.

The first convictions of White Knights occurred Oct. 20, 1967, when an all-white federal jury at Meridian found Bowers and six other klansmen guilty of civil rights violations in the 1964 lynching of three rights workers in Neshoba county. Bowers remained free on an appeal bond after the trial. The guilty verdict, which resulted in a maximum 10 year sentence, is still under appeal.

## Proxmire Seeks Air Force Vow

Washington, D. C. - AP -

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) demanded Saturday that the air force provide assurance that it would not fire a civilian employe who told congress that costs of the C-5 cargo plane had run $2 billion over estimates.

In a telegram to Air Force Secretary Harold Brown, Proxmire accused the air force of "a determined effort to punish a courageous public servant." He referred to A. E. Fitzgerald.

"It will be a sad day indeed . . . if a public servant who tells the truth, gives the facts and acts in the public interest immediately finds that his job is in jeopardy," Proxmire said.

## Humphrey

Washington,

President Johnson named Vice-President Humphrey as chairman of the board of the Wood International Centers, the White nounced Saturday.

Johnson also appointed en civilians to the Charles Horsky of New York, John Roache of Massachusetts, James MacGregor Burns of Massachusetts, Harry McPherson of Texas, Allan Nevins of California and Kevin Roche of Connecticut.

Johnson also appointed two members of the National Council of the Arts: Ruth Carter Johnson of Texas and Robert Berks of New York.

In another appointment,

member national advisory council on vocational education with Hugh Calkins of Ohio as chairman, the White House announced.

The council, created Oct. 16, will meet at least four times a year to advise the education commissioner on the administration and effectiveness of new vocational education programs.

Johnson's appointments run for varying terms.

FOND DU LAC (WIS.) REPORTER E. 19,561

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1969

A rocket on rails, the Turbotrain begin moving along it.

## Bit Of Hindsight

Suddenly, four years after we start-
ed getting massively involved in Viet-
nam, and after the expenditure of
more than 30,000 American lives and
who really knows how many billions
of dollars, we are discovering that the
South Vietnamese are the bad guys
after all.

Specifically, it is dapper, mus-
tachioed little Vice President Ky, chief
monkey wrench-tosser at the Paris
peace talks, who is the villain.

Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota has blasted Ky as "a tin-horn dictator" who is living high on American dollars and American blood.

Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, annoyed at the refusal of the South Vietnamese delegation to sit down at a bargaining table with the Viet Cong in a position of equality with themselves, has suggested that the United States deal unilaterally with North Vietnam on the question of troop withdrawals. This is echoed in a recently published article by Harvard historian Henry Kissinger, President-elect Nixon's appointee as chief foreign policy adviser.

Ky has dismissed the idea as so much "junk" and suggests that American critics "shut their mouths."

Obviously, there is little love lost between Americans and General Ky, who once reportedly expressed admiration for Adolph Hitler. But it should be just as obvious that Ky merely happens to be the handiest target available right now on which Americans can vent their mounting frustrations over this endless war.

We should certainly not be so foolish as to believe that, were Ky to disappear, everything would be just fine in Vietnam and in Paris.

South Vietnam is not and never has been a democracy, or even a real nation. It is a backward, bleeding, much-colonized land that has been trying to forge a national identity and unity ever since it was created by international compromise in 1954, attempting to overcome its historical deficiencies while at the same time fighting for its life against a relentless enemy.

The time to be aware of corruption and malfeasance or misfeasance in South Vietnam was when we began giving aid, not now. The time to press

for economic and political and military reforms was at the beginning of our involvement, not now.

Instead, we maintained the fiction that South Vietnam was a full-fledged sovereign nation and ally whose internal affairs we could not meddle in. It is a bit late now to blame the present rulers of South Vietnam for a situation that existed all along and which every nonadministration observer who went to Vietnam in the past 10 years abundantly documented and warned about.

It is a bit late now, after all that we have sacrificed to give the South Vietnamese what sense of independence they have, to resent their behaving independently.

The South Vietnamese see the Communist camel, in the form of the Viet Cong, poking its nose into the tent in Paris. They are quite certain that the whole animal will inevitably follow.

We ignore this far-from-unwarranted fear at our possible peril when we concentrate our dissatisfactions on a little man called Ky.

common council's discussion meeting at Goodrich High School Little Theatre tonight will open with public hearings on five issues.

In addition to the proposed new service charge, hearings are slated on the following matters:

An ordinance to rezone property at the northeast corner of North Peters Avenue and West Johnson Street from planned shopping district to central service district; an ordinance to rezone from single family detached residence to single family attached and multiple family residence district property located on East Second and East Fourth streets and bordered by South National Avenue and de Neveau

## Election Set At Cathedral

Men and boys of the Cathedral Church of St. Paul will receive Holy Communion at the 7:30 p.m. Mass Sunday which is the Feast of the Holy Family. A breakfast meeting and election of officers will

Creek; an ordinance the official map provide for the Portland Street f Street to East and construction on West Sibley Street to a point

Other Ordinances. Other ordinances council's agenda action is slated afternoon — are One to limit portion of East and one to esta

zone on West First Street near the First National Casualty Co., building.

the city's central area.

Other resolutions would (Con. on Page 18, Col. 8)

8,000 books (2.5 billion copies!) published America, ONE is required reading for anyone in history as we are living it today.

WORLD IN 1968, fifth in the series of volumes by The Associated Press, world's largest news service, for this and other member newspapers.

My ordinary annual, it recreates in "you are" and great news photographs, both color and black, the actual feeling of the year's memorable events in this year, of all years, events have indeed been! Just to mention a few—

President Johnson counts himself out.

Russia invades Czechoslovakia.

By Kennedy is assassinated.

Art transplants make medical history.

States soar and market bounces.

Bet-beset delegates nominate Hubert Humphrey.

It shake DeGaulle regime.

Martin Luther King is slain

67

2

Tel. W.Orth 2-3797

From JAN 19 1969
ADVANCE
STATEN ISLAND,N.Y.
E-62,000S-54,500

New administration
shunts right-winger

By ROWLAND EVANS
and ROBERT NOVAK

WASHINGTON — To the predictable outrage of the anti-communist far right, their lone representative on the White House staff — Dr. Richard V. Allen — is being quietly submerged in favor of solid, professional foreign policy specialists.

Allen, 32, a right-wing pamphleteer and tough political infighter, climbed aboard the Nixon bandwagon early in the campaign and was named as deputy to the highly respected Dr. Henry Kissinger of Harvard in one of the President-elect's first announced appointments.

However, a decision has been made at high levels of the new administration to isolate him from substantive duties. Moreover, Kissinger has quietly assembled a professional staff — almost entirely from present Johnson administration officials — that will not mollify Allen's colleagues on the right.

Included among the aides being selected for the Kissinger staff, besides the previously announced Daniel Davidson (presently assistant to Ambassador Averell Harriman), are Mortimer Halperin (an arms control expert) from the Pentagon and Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Soviet intelligence), Lawrence Eagleburger (Undersecretary Nicholas Katzenbach's office), Richard Sneider (Japanese Desk), and Viron Vaky (Latin American affairs) from the State Department. From outside the government, Prof. Robert E. Osgood of Johns Hopkins is a top prospect to join the staff.

Allen's downgrading is another sign that President-elect Nixon intends no radical departures in foreign policy. It is also evidence that pushy infighters, conservative or liberal, don't fare well in the Nixon administration.

During the campaign, when former Gov. William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania was making a European mission for Nixon, Allen tried to elbow himself in. Displaying to Nixon some personal correspondence with German conservative Franz-Josef

Strauss, Allen suggested that he accompany Scranton to Germany. The suggestion was rejected, both by Nixon and Scranton.

More recently, Allen dismayed other Nixon aides during a staff meeting by proudly presenting newspaper clippings claiming he had tipped off Nixon to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

A footnote: When asked by friends why in the world he appointed Allen, Nixon has replied that Allen's point of view should be represented in any administration, particularly a Republican administration. It seems now, however, that the point of view may not get much attention.

Instead of screaming, Southern political agents of President-elect Nixon have fully backed the Republican national committee's unannounced decision to lift its 1969 budget for political work among minorities to a non-election-year record.

The plan, originating with minorities-division leader Clarence Towne, is to spend $175,000 at the national committee to proselytize Negroes and Mexican-Americans for the Republican Party.

Strongly backed by National Chairman Ray C. Bliss, there was nevertheless some opposition among party pros to this high spending among voters who spurned the Nixon Agnew ticket.

Harry Dent, the Republican South's chief resident-political agent in the Nixon White House, heard about the complaints and immediately came down hard for Bliss and Townes. More surprising, so did Mississippi State Chairman Clarke Reed.

In 1968, the national committee allotted $150,000 for election-year work with minorities, but spent a good deal more. The last non-election-year budget in 1967 was $90,000 — but $124,000 was spent. With Nixon determined to build a majority party, spending well above the 1969 budget is probable — particularly if the Republicans do better in 1969 municipal elections in New York City, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Atlanta, and Detroit.

The fare for the trip to downtown Manhattan is 75 cents, and apparently there are hundreds who are glad to pay the extra price for a fast and comfortable trip.

‘Of course, this service augments the ferry service, but it doesn’t do much to alleviate the problems there, because the passenger load has been increasing to a far greater extent than the new bus lines can siphon off.

The buses apparently are a good idea. But the big idea is to get more ferryboats fast, and to convert the newest ones so they can carry more passengers.

## A new goal for Tottenville

Tottenville High School is venturing into a brave old world.

It's trying to raise funds to field a football team.

We cheer on the organizers of this effort.

Although Port Richmond High School surmounted the biggest obstacle, it's still a tough one — raising $10,000. Tottenville's problem is that it's a smaller school and has fewer businesses and industries within its distinct lines.

We urge community support. A football team benefits not only the players but gives the school a rallying point. The students and faculty members deserve credit for their enterprise. Now they should be given the cash to go with it.

Vol. 83. No. 15,746. Sunday, January 19, 1969

## Staten Island Sunday Advance

Published every Sunday (the Staten Island Advance is published every weekday afternoon) by Advance Publications, Inc., S. I., Newhouse, President and Treasurer; Donald E. Newhouse, Secretary; Address: 950 Fingerboard Road, Staten Island, N.Y. 10305. Mail subscription rates for United States and Canada $24 per year.

The address of the company is The Advance Building, 950 Fingerboard Road, Staten Island, N.Y. 10305. Telephone Yukon 7-1234. Established 1886 as the Richmond County Advance. Entered as second class matter at Staten Island, N. Y. July 21, 1921, under Act of March 3, 1879.

The Associated Press is entitled exclusively to the use for publication of all the local news printed in this newspaper as well as all AP news dispatches.

DREW PEARSON

JACK ANDERSON

come up between his toes and the dust did when he was a barefoot boy in Texas.

Sometimes he couldn't sleep. He would sit reading in the big double four-poster Lincoln bed reading government reports on cables from abroad. Lady Bird who adjusted her reading hab

## It's your opinion
### Indians deserve immediate help

In the news today, there are stories of hunger and of people fighting for survival. Millions of dollars are spent on programs for these people. I think that we should help these people, but only after the people in the United States have been helped. The people that need the most help are the American Indians.

For years, ever since the white man came to this land, the Indians have been one of the most oppressed and mistreated peoples in our nation. Many of the reservations are in swamp-lands and deserts. The ones that are shown in pamphlets are the reservations that are selected by the government. All the rest are run-down and unsanitary. I hope that our new president can fix this situation.

I thank God that I am young and still have my whole life ahead in which to help these people. I hope that American people will soon open their eyes and do something about this situation.

JOSEPH SORRENTINO

483 Broadway,
West Brighton

Member of the Associated Press
Member of the American Newspaper Publishers Association
Member of Audit Bureau of Circulation

Now you've heard everything.

The Countdown 350.

Polaroid®

DECEMBER 1969 VOLUME 224 NO. 6

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Making It in America</td>
      <td>63</td>
      <td>John P. Sisk</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>How Nobel Prizewinners Get That Way</td>
      <td>69</td>
      <td>Mitchell Wilson</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>At Mercy Manor. <i>A Poem</i></td>
      <td>75</td>
      <td>James Dickey</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Prof. Bismarck Goes to Washington</td>
      <td>77</td>
      <td>Nora Beloff</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Afterword. <i>A Poem</i></td>
      <td>89</td>
      <td>Fanny Howe</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Thumbing Around: Letter From a Sixteen-year-old</td>
      <td>90</td>
      <td>Bluejay Abigail Stone</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Wyndham Lewis</td>
      <td>93</td>
      <td>Marshall McLuhan</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>A Short Account of the Japanese. <i>A Poem</i></td>
      <td>98</td>
      <td>Stephen Sandy</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>Mr. Sammler's Planet. Part II, unabridged</td>
    <td>99</td>
    <td>Saul Bellow</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td colspan="3">Drawings by Mario Micossi</td>
  </tr>
</table>

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Reports: Washington</td>
      <td>4</td>
      <td>Elizabeth B. Drew</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Israel</td>
      <td>18</td>
      <td>Eliav Simon</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SDS at Chicago</td>
      <td>30</td>
      <td>James K. Glassman</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>The Mail</td>
      <td>42</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Life and Letters</td>
      <td>143</td>
      <td>Anthony Sampson</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>148</td>
      <td>Martha Bacon</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>152</td>
      <td>Evan S. Connell, Jr.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>156</td>
      <td>Edward Weeks</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>160</td>
      <td>Robert Evett</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>164</td>
      <td>Phoebe Adams</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

## Coming in the Atlantic:

Winter issues will feature
T. S. ELIOT AND EZRA POUND:
COLLABORATORS IN LETTERS
by Donald Gallup, a major
achievement in original
scholarship. For the first time,
the friendship of two of the
key figures in twentieth-century
literature is examined and docu-
mented in fascinating detail.

THE LOWERING HEMISPHERE
by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
The noted historian contemplates
"one of the more conspicuous
hypocrisies of the American way
in foreign policy"—our attitude
toward Latin America—and
suggests what must be done
about it.

THE DIVINE RITE OF MUSHROOMS
by Robert Graves

PIECES OF THE FRAME
by John McPhee

THE POOR ARE EVERMORE
WITH US
by Michael Harrington

249. CAPTIVE CITY
Chicago in Chains
by OVID DEMON
(Retail price $6.95)

322. IN THIS HOUSE
OF BREDE
by RUMER GODDEN
(Retail price $6.95)

317. MY LIFE WITH
MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. by CORETTA
SCOTT KING
Photographs
(Retail price $6.95)

111. ERNEST
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# Prof. Bismarck Goes to Washington:

## Kissinger on the Job
by Nora Beloff

The man who confers with President Nixon more often and more intensively than any other in Washington is a Harvard Professor who is said to admire Metternich but in fact finds in the thinking of Otto von Bismarck the guidelines to America's role in the world today. Installed in the White House in two crucial posts—as the President's resident foreign affairs adviser and as manager of the National Security Council—he is one of the most powerful men in Washington. On the basis of personal acquaintance, private interviews, and many years of experience in writing about international affairs, a distinguished British journalist here profiles the person and thought of Dr. Henry Kissinger.

When Dr. Henry Kissinger was appointed President Nixon's chief aide on world affairs, he liked to amuse his friends by impersonating Peter Sellers impersonating Dr. Strangelove, who might have been an impersonation of Dr. Kissinger himself.

Like Strangelove, Kissinger made his fame as an expert on nuclear war; like him he is a Central European; and like him, his voice is heard in the inner sanctum of government. Unlike Strangelove, Kissinger is a political scientist, and physicists Edward Teller and Wernher von Braun have better claims to being the inspiration for the hero of the famous film. Further, whereas Strangelove was, to say the least, screwed up, Kissinger is cool, humorous, and most of the time, detached.

The impersonation, like most of what Kissinger does, was brilliantly executed and showed two things: first, that he had guessed rightly what a lot of Washington was (and still is) saying of him; second, that having reached the pinnacle of his ambitions, he can now afford self-mockery. An old acquaintance who remembers "the ponderous, uptight, spotty Teutonic professor" of ten years ago says that in those days he never laughed at himself and rarely laughed at all. But over the years, success has changed him: he has lost weight (still plump but no longer fat), improved his appearance, relaxed his manner, and developed a slightly macabre sense of humor about his own role: "Please forgive me, I have to make one more telephone call, to the Secretary of State. We have to tell him when we start a nuclear war . . ."

What is fascinating, and, some would say, alarming, about this soft-spoken academic is that a theoretician of the use of power to achieve national objectives is now in a position to translate theory into practice. In the White House, he sometimes jokes, "You can only make one mistake." Namely, of course, Kissinger is no more than a rather large cog in the vast bureaucratic machine, without any executive authority whatever. He enjoys assuring credulous journalists (Life, Look) that he would never dream of anything as improper as using his special role as compiler of presidential dossiers to get across his private views. Yet as a man of ideas and proud of his conceptual grasp of world affairs, Kissinger is known to have a withering contempt for bureaucrats, with their "quest for calculability" and "yearning for routine," and it is fair to say that he would not be satisfied to be a shuffler of papers for the President. The models he would prefer are those "to whom it is given not only to maintain the perfection of order but to have the strength to contemplate chaos, there to find material for fresh creation." The attributes he admires are those "which enable the spirit to transcend an impasse in the crisis of history and to contemplate the abyss, not with the detachment of a scientist, but as a challenge to be overcome—or to perish in the process."

His critics like to remember that his main historical work (from which both these quotations are

77

drawn) was about Prince Metternich, and some suspect that his much vaunted "conceptual framework" of world affairs is no more than a hankering for the good old days of the nineteenth-century Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe. Those who have had the stamina to read the book through to the end will know, however, that he dismisses Metternich as an obsolete leftover from the Enlightenment, who wrongly believed in the natural harmony of international affairs and expected the world to work like clockwork and that, consequently, "he failed to achieve final greatness."

Kissinger's real hero, the man he judged by far the greatest genius of his age, perhaps of any age, was Otto von Bismarck, who, while recognizing that "equilibrium was needed for stability," saw the balance of power "in constant flux" and proposed to base his own concert of nations "on precise calculations of power." Bismarck, we learn in a glowingly appreciative study Kissinger wrote last year (and reprints of which he obligingly circulated to some of his friends at the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam), denied that any state has the right to sacrifice its opportunities to its principles. Bismarck, he relates, was "unencumbered by moral scruples" and "knew how to restrain the contending forces, both domestic and foreign, by manipulating their antagonisms."

It is obviously to Kissinger's advantage that the press should see him in a relatively servile role—as it is to the advantage of the senior members of the Nixon Cabinet, both for prestige purposes and to maintain authority over their own departments, to show that they are the focal points of power. The counterfeit bureaucrat, doing nothing but staff work, is also a comforting illusion for Congress, which is allowed to put Cabinet members on the carpet but has no right to question White House personnel. But to at least one of his oldest and most intimate friends at Harvard, there has never been a shadow of doubt that Kissinger went to the White House in the hope of playing a Bismarck to Kaiser Nixon. He would certainly be a disappointed man if he failed to leave his own imprint on the nation's history.

The nature of Kissinger's job is twofold: on the one hand he is the inseparable adviser, confidant, consoler, apologist, and spokesman for the President. The two men are constantly in each other's company; Kissinger is at his side for all important meetings and on all foreign journeys. He rents (partly at his own cost) the nearest villa to the Western White House at San Clemente, and at moments of major decision (how to retaliate when the North Koreans shot down an American spy plane, when and whether to announce the next withdrawals from Vietnam), the two men are often closeted alone together for hours on end.

Any President needs one man around who knows the world better than he does and who is utterly

trustworthy and personally congenial: in this sense Kissinger is to Nixon what McGeorge Bundy was to Kennedy or Walt Rostow to Lyndon Johnson. But there is another side, as executive secretary of the National Security Council, where Kissinger has greatly enlarged the role played by his predecessors.

Even before coming into office Kissinger had thought and written a lot about the need to streamline the processes of decision-making in Washington, so that the major issues would come up to the Chief Executive before actions were agreed upon and so that decisions, once taken, would be effectively and immediately implemented. Here he sensed an immediate sympathy with the President, whose previous experience had convinced him of the need for firmer central control.

Kissinger's main complaint against the old regime was that the planning of foreign and defense policy took place in a vacuum—or became, as he put it, "an esoteric exercise," while the actual decisions, vitally affecting long-term national interests, were taken on an *ad hoc* basis, in the light of some immediate crisis. He detected "a constantly widening gap between the technical competence of the research staff and of the planners and what hard-pressed political leaders were capable of absorbing." He noted that "in many fields—strategy being a prime example—decision-makers may find it difficult to give as many hours to a problem as the expert has had years to study it." He deplored the Executive's habit of taking cognizance of a problem only when it emerged as an administrative issue, and when it could no longer be fitted into the wider foreign policy concept: he saw that "various elements of the bureaucracy make a series of non-aggression pacts with each other and thus reduce the decision-maker to a benevolent constitutional monarch." And Kissinger is not the man to waste time as the servant of a constitutional monarch.

It was this explicit need to integrate the day-to-day decisions into the wider planning and conceptualizing of foreign policy that led Kissinger to get Nixon to broaden the tasks of the National Security Council, so that the whole operation came under the White House apparatus, which meant, in practice, under Kissinger's own management.

An effort to systematize decisions and get the departments and agencies to work together instead of against each other started under President Johnson, who ordered the installation of interdepartmental groups to examine issues and areas of special interest, but under his plan they were instructed to report back to the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. Under the new arrangements, the interdepartmental groups survive and are strengthened, but instead of reporting to the Secretary of State, or in the case of military matters, to

78

the Secretary of Defense, as they did before, they
now report their agreements or disagreements di-
rectly to Dr. Kissinger, at the White House.

If the problem under study is a long-term one—
and some of the groups are now handling reap-
praisal of national policy not only over the next
three to five but even over the next ten years—
Kissinger will then ask his own staff to see whether
there has been any interesting research or new
proposal from outside the official hierarchy, in
academic institutions or the serious press. And it is
only when the subject forces itself into the news
or has been thoroughly explored that he will
identify the range of choices and present them to
the President.

He can then advise the President whether the
issue needs to be taken before the National Se-
curity Council (which consists of the President, the
Vice President, Secretaries of State, Treasury, and
Defense, and the Director of Emergency Planning,
and, sitting in, Kissinger, the director of the CIA,
and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) or
whether he should handle it personally. Either
way Kissinger will be there, directing the flow.

Kissinger denies that he is cutting Secretary of
State William P. Rogers out of the act: he notes
that the chairmen of all the interdepartmental
groups are the Assistant Secretaries from the rele-
vant sectors of the State Department and says he
assumes they represent their chief, the Secretary of
State. But the fact remains that when the work is
done, the results bypass the departmental hierarchy
and go straight to the White House. Not that the
executive secretary of the NSC would claim that
all his decisions are right; only that there is no
other way except by the centralization around him-
self to prevent the President's wishes from becoming
the casualties of what he sometimes knowingly re-
fers to as "interdepartmental guerrilla war."

Nobody with experience of Washington would
suppose that these transformations have been with-
out tears. Kissinger is doing his best not to overplay
his hand. For example, although his closeness to
the President would make it easy for him to in-
fluence the choice of personnel for the prestigious
overseas posts, he has deliberately refrained from
interfering, even when he knows that an appoint-
ment made for some domestic political reason
would seem internationally silly. He has privately
acknowledged that he cannot "fight on all fronts at
once."

The interdepartmental tension began even be-
fore President Nixon's inauguration, when Dr.
Kissinger, named to succeed Walt Rostow as execu-
tive secretary of the National Security Council,
moved in with deliberate haste and thoroughness
to recruit the best available people to his staff. His
extensive knowledge of the Who's Who of the
Washington hierarchy, and of its academic periph-
ery, enabled him to grab some of the ablest young

experts from the State Department, the Pentagon,
and the universities. Most of them turned out to be
Democrats, excited by the prospect of being so
near the center of power. Many were soon to be dis-
illusioned by President Nixon's White House, but in
the meantime, the NSC shop, with a staff of twenty-
five senior executives, was already in business, ready
and able to handle any world problems involving
the President, while Mr. Rogers and Mr. Laird were
still fumbling about, looking for adequate nomi-
nees to fill the top jobs in their own vast and unfa-
miliar establishments. They have not yet caught up.

Working himself relentlessly, Kissinger
drove his team into a seven-day week,
with the days often lasting well into the
nights. He comforted himself with the thought
that most of his assistants were ten or fifteen years
younger than himself, and none was being asked
to work harder than he did.

The first casualty was his chief staff man,
Lawrence Eagleburger, formerly of the State
Department, who suffered a nervous breakdown and
was relieved to be shifted to a less harassing post
at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Dr. Kissinger
has told him he can come back when he feels up
to it.

There are some indications, however, that it is
not only overwork which has already led to the res-
ignation of no less than eleven members of the NSC
staff. One factor is Dr. Kissinger's own habit of
making exacting demands, and his tendency to bully
and berate those underneath him. Another factor
has been that in trying not to antagonize the other
departments he has ordered his subordinates not to
have contacts with outsiders, particularly to avoid
the press. High-level reporters, who are used to be-
ing ushered into every government office, indignant-
ly resent the ban, finding themselves often cut off
from experts and valued contacts they knew and
freely mixed with before these went into the
White House. The reporters had enough power to
force the White House to relax the rules, but most
of the men on Kissinger's staff still dare not be
seen fraternizing with journalists.

This means that anyone who wants to make a
real contact with the NSC staff—in other words,
anyone who is seeking information about current
presidential thinking on foreign and defense policy
—needs to see Kissinger himself.

Miss Beloff is chief political correspondent for
London's *Observer*. An Oxford graduate, she worked
in political intelligence for the British Foreign
Office during World War II, started in journalism as
a reporter for Reuters. Her book *The General Says*
*No* describes Britain's failure to get into the
European Common Market.

79

As a non-American reporter, I consider it a privilege to see the President's chief adviser, and I certainly do not complain that before one of my meetings there were no less than seven consecutive cancellations; nor that at one of these, on a particularly eventful day, I was kept waiting in the White House lobby for three and a quarter hours, with constant assurances from his staff that he would soon be free, before being told that he was still with the President and I might as well go home. But well-known American columnists have cracked jokes about using the time they are kept waiting for Kissinger as a good opportunity for rereading *War and Peace*. And there are some Cabinet ministers, including the redoubtable John Mitchell, Attorney General, who have been heard complaining that Kissinger never returns their calls.

Paradoxically, the experts Kissinger recruited on his own staff are among those who find it hard to be fitted into his appointments schedule. The fact that they were left to their own devices while their boss went off to San Clemente last summer with the President seems to have exacerbated their feelings of futility—and there were several more resignations when he got back.

Another explanation for the low morale among Kissinger's bright young men is that they rarely see the President himself. Under former Presidents, specialists recruited to work inside the NSC were available when the President needed expert advice: nothing, of course, is more stimulating or encouraging inside the Washington bureaucracy than occasional access to the man who makes the decisions. The Harvard economist Francis Bator, for example, expert on international trade and currency, first under McGeorge Bundy, then under Walt Rostow, used to see President Johnson very frequently indeed. Under the present system, Kissinger absorbs the information from his staff and does all the briefing of the President himself, even on subjects on which he is not an expert. This satisfies Mr. Nixon, who likes to limit the number of people he needs to see; and it satisfies Dr. Kissinger, who enjoys the monopoly.

The resentment and jealousies which the extraordinary accumulation of functions in his office has provoked around Washington are beginning to show in implicitly hostile stories about him appearing in the press. Some of them, clearly, are leaked. He has himself noticed that almost every other week something appears in the newspapers suggesting, in his view quite unfairly, that he is demoting the State Department. He is convinced that these stories come not from the top but from the lesser bureaucrats down the line.

One morning at the San Clemente White House last August, he picked up his Los Angeles *Times* and saw, to his horror, an article by Flora Lewis entitled: "Kissinger Questionnaire Raises Eyebrows

—and Hair." It proceeded to list, accurately, a series of areas and issues on which, as secretary of the National Security Council, he had commissioned special inquiries from the RAND Corporation. The story revealed that the NSC was taking over this type of contract from the Defense Department, from which RAND has always received most of its funds. All this could only have come from an inside source: certainly not from RAND. But what made it so damaging was that, while the overall subjects were correctly listed, the formulation of the precise questions was distorted to make the whole thing sound infinitely more sinister than it really was. The study on the Middle East, for example, was presented as if it had been commissioned to answer the question "circumstances in which American nuclear weapons might be used in the Middle East"; the study on Brazil to analyze "circumstances in which the Government of Brazil might be overthrown, if it decided to expropriate American assets." Kissinger and his staff tried hard but unavailingly to trace the origin of the distorted report, but so far, it seems, without success.

To the inevitable question of how Kissinger reached his present eminence, the stock Washington—or anyhow, Georgetown—reply is that he was the only serious intellectual the Republicans had. It is certainly true that intellectuals are bigger frogs in the Republican than in the Democratic puddle, especially since President Kennedy amassed so many. It is also true that Kissinger is intelligent, erudite, extremely well read, and highly articulate. But it would be wrong to conclude that he got where he is only by the dazzling quality of his mind. Indeed, most of those who have worked with him and also with McGeorge Bundy would agree that on sheer brainpower, Bundy wins. Within his own high-level academic background of Harvard, Kissinger was an obvious *summa cum laude*, but in seminars when he came to debate with dialectical duelists like Tom Schelling, many felt that Kissinger was left trailing far behind.

What has been special about Kissinger has been a certain perseverance and determination not only to acquire knowledge on world affairs but also to put that knowledge to practical use, and this meant, inevitably, getting as near as possible to the Oval Room in the White House.

To push all the way to the adjoining office meant developing a relatively thick skin and a tolerance of rebuffs and setbacks, and for this Kissinger had the hardest training of all, having spent his boyhood in Nazi Germany. Many emerged from that experience permanently bowed down; others, like Kissinger, seem to have acquired a certain protective insensitivity and hardness, which strengthened them in later life.

His father, a high school teacher and a deeply

80

religious Jew, was deprived of his job. He waited hopefully for Germany to come back to its senses, as many other intellectuals did, and gave up and arrived penniless in New York only in 1938, when his son was fourteen. In Manhattan, of course, his erudition was irrelevant, and he had to fall back on drearily unskilled clerical work, while his wife, Paula, an excellent cook, went to serve Jewish families on special occasions. Even now, she occasionally helps out old clients, though she prefers them to call her by her first name only, so that their guests will not know they are being served by the mother of one of the President's chief advisers.

Kissinger's own feelings about his native country have always been ambivalent: he seems more deeply concerned about Germany than about other foreign countries (friends say he was shattered by the news of the first young life lost trying to cross the Berlin wall), yet he is convinced that there is a streak of basic insanity in the German character which might return. He immensely admired, some say worshiped, "der Alte," old Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who helped nurse West Germany to recovery, but he has always remained implacably opposed to any idea of giving Germany nuclear weapons or encouraging it to reassert dominance over Europe.

Unlike many Americans, Kissinger actively dislikes reminiscing about his "rags to riches" life story, and he may prefer to suppress any sense of identification with the German or Jewish minorities which might bring into question his authority as an objective international adviser. Inevitably, he had some difficulty adjusting to the boisterous in-discipline of a Manhattan boys' school, even though academically he was so far ahead of his age group; and it seems that the real transformation from the oppressed and teased foreigner, Heinz, to the suc-cessfully and proudly integrated American, Henry, came during his Army service in World War II. His thoroughness, energy, and discipline seem to have commended themselves to the Army, which moved him quickly into intelligence work, and he ended his military career as a captain in the Mili-tary Intelligence Reserve. That is perhaps why, whereas many Western intellectuals emerge from hated military service as passionate antimilitarists, Kissinger remained fascinated by the military es-tablishment and directed a great deal of his post-war intellectual energy into military matters.

Following his Army service he earned his A.B. summa cum laude in 1950, and in 1954 a Harvard doctorate. But the upward curve was not continu-ous. His first major setback was academic: his con-temporaries remember that, after his doctorate, he assumed he would automatically be promoted to the Harvard faculty; but although his name was seri-ously considered and well supported, the decision went against him. Details of the argument are of

course academic secrets, but according to one of the members of the faculty at that time, he was not only judged personally a difficult colleague (he had the reputation of being much nicer to his superiors than to his subordinates), but still more important, the professors suspected that he was less interested in the university or in teaching and research than in making a career in public service.

The major work which earned him his national reputation was *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, and from its publication on he was in and out of the Pentagon as consultant and part-time adviser. The book challenged the Dulles concept of massive retaliation, not on the standard argument that the use of any nuclear weapons is unthinkable, but because, once the Russians had the bomb, the threat was meaningless. Consequently, Kissinger argued, more thought should be given to the use of tactical nuclear weapons which could be related to political realities. Though he has subsequently had second thoughts and no longer advocates limited nuclear war, there is at least one senior (and conservative) staff member of the Brookings Institution who feels that anyone who could even have contemplated initiating the use of nuclear weapons should have disqualified himself from advising an American President.

It was during his work in Washington that he came to know Nelson D. Rockefeller, who hired him to direct the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, and it was then that he wrote his next major work, *The Necessity for Choice*, caution-ing against overconfidence in the East-West détente.

Harvard News Office Photo

81