# Notes about United States Strategy

by Henry A. Kissinger

## Aspects of the Level of U. S. Military Strength

A. We require a level of military strength adequate to deter Soviet aggression and to defeat it should it occur.

B. The willingness of our allies to undertake necessary sacrifices depends in part on the example we set, in part on our ability to make clear to them the military significance of their contribution.

C. The willingness of the uncommitted to resist depends in part on their estimate as to who will emerge the winner in case of war.

D. In short, the impact of the U. S. military posture on the calculations of other powers depends a) on the objective U.S. strength; b) on the assessment by the other powers of how U.S. strength will be used.

## Aspects of Deterrence

The U. S. requires two kinds of deterrence: a) against general war; b) against "creeping aggression," or limited war.

Both deterrents depend on at least the following factors:

1. The relation of offensive striking power to defensive capability.

2. The relation of the time factor to the technological race, i.e., various U. S. - Soviet capabilities have to be examined at different time phases.

3. The feasibility of developing a cost-threshold for alternative strategies. A cost-threshold is the level below which expenditures yield no return or are even counter-productive. It can be compared to the water level of a dam. Below a critical point, all expenditures are wasted; at the critical point, a small additional quantity would cause the dam to function.

## Deterrence to General War

Deterrence to a general war can be achieved in three ways of decreasing effectiveness:

1. If one power can get its nuclear weapons on the target while the other is unable to do so.

2. If both sides possess the capability to cripple each other.

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3. If neither side is capable of inflicting a mortal blow on the other, i. e., if one side possesses the defensive capability to contain the other side's offense.

The last two conditions have been loosely called "nuclear stalemate."

## Nature of Nuclear Stalemate

A. The practical situation never exhibits a pure stalemate between offensive and defensive capabilities, but a stalemate brought about through the proper offense-defense mix, the apportionment of resources between offense and defense.

B. Therefore, the crucial problem of strategic planning is to estimate the offense-defense mix of the other side at various time phases and to develop offense-defense mixes to contain or surpass it.

C. Another critical problem of strategic planning is to develop procurement lead times which will at least equal those of the other side.

D. The offense-defense mix should be chosen with an eye not only on its impact on the Soviet bloc, but on its impact on our allies and the uncommitted. This is because a military posture which deters an attack on the U.S. does not necessarily deter an attack on third powers. Moreover, our allies may never run the risk of any kind of war as long as they believe that the outbreak of a war is tantamount to national destruction. Thus the air-defense of NATO might be essential for political and psychological reasons, even if from a purely military point of view it might appear a diversion of resources.

E. The nuclear stalemate is not stable, but can be ended by a technological breakthrough.

F. A nuclear stalemate, although it reduces the effectiveness of the SAC deterrent, might in the long run prove advantageous to the U.S. It might provide the shield behind which U.S. industrial superiority can be mobilized to achieve superiority on the battlefield in the style of World War II.

## Deterrence to Brush-Fire War

A. Under conditions of nuclear stalemate, the threat of a general war will not necessarily deter a limited war.

B. Many threatened areas do not now possess the capability to protect themselves. The U.S. capability to afford protection, therefore, becomes the crucial factor in assuring the defense of threatened areas and the stability of their regimes.

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C. Since most threatened governments are concerned above all to avoid the ravages of a Soviet occupation, their willingness to resist depends not only on their assessment as to who will emerge as the eventual winner in a war, but on their assessment of the degree to which the U.S. can assure the integrity of their territory.

D. Any further military expansion into the Free World area threatens the vital interests of the U.S.

E. We should, therefore, be prepared to resist local aggressions, with our allies if possible, unilaterally if necessary. It would be para-doxical if the power strong enough to resist aggression _alone_ were prevented from doing so by a doctrine of collective security.

F. To resist locally we need a mobile striking force based on a substantial air-carrier capacity. It will be important to devise tactics and weapons systems which maximize U.S. technological superiority.