Telcon
Ambassador Kenneth Keating

March 14, 1973; 10:49 a.m.

KK: Henry.

HAK: Yes, Ken.

KK: The answer in principle is yes. I've been thinking it over and I really do look upon it as a great challenge which is reinforced by what I read in the paper this morning.

HAK: What did you read in the paper this morning?

KK: About the new supply of brains.

HAK: Oh, yeah.

KK: Now, do you have a minute to talk with me, or do you want to...

HAK: Can I call you back?

KK: Yes. I want to discuss two or three things that might take 5 minutes.

HAK: Let me call you during the course of the day.

KK: All right, they've got my number, I believe, but it's 972-7000.
[New York]

HAK: Do you want to hear one of the prizes of your old clients, Ken?

KK: Yeah (laughing).

HAK: Had you known they'd been screaming about poisoned wheat?

KK: About what?

HAK: That we'd been sending them poisoned wheat?

d

KK: Yes, I heard that?

HAK: So I told Moynihan, well, well maybe we should stop sending them the wheat.

KK: That's right.

HAK: So he raised that and it turns out that they said they'd paid for the wheat themselves. It's their own contract, their own money, and since it's their wheat they can say about it whatever they want.

RECLASSIFIED

Agency E017258
Date Mar 14 1973
By: D.

-2-

KK: Ha, ha, ha, oh, God! If that doesn't take the cake. My God!

HAK: (laughing) So what do you think of that?

KK: I want to tell you, that's about the best yet. XXXXX God!

HAK: I think that's one of the better ones I've heard since I came here.
(laughing) They bought it, so they canvilify it.

KK: Oh, man.

HAK: Ok, Ken, aren't you sorry we pulled you out of there?

KK: (Laughs).

HAK: Or you left?

KK: No, I'm...

HAK: Well, I'm delighted by this news and I'm going to call you before
the end of the day.

KK: Yeah, please do, because I do before the day is out talk to you again.

HAK: Good.

KK: And I have -- let me say, I have a 4 o'clock meeting of trustees out
of the office.

HAK: I'll call you before that.

KK: Thank you very much.

HAK: Goodbye.

CLASSIFIED

Ad. only EO17258

By: A HAROLD M. GLISER

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Justice Arthur Goldberg

11:28 a.m. 3/14/73

AG: I'll take a moment on the telephone. I've been approached by several people to head up a committee in support of the aid to Vietnam.

HK: Right.

AG: Now I have thought about it and first I want to talk to you. I think it ought to be a bi-partisan party.

HK: I agree.

AG: I have an idea of a person who might, along with me, take the initiative.

HK: Who is that?

AG: That would be Cabot--Lodge

HK: That's not a bad idea.

AG: See he is a hawk, I am a peacenik--

HK: Yeh, good idea.

AG: He's a Republican, I'm a Democrat--you see we cover all bases, but in matters like this you are already aware that I do not believe we act without the informal--this is informal and off the record.

HK: Right.

AG: You know, approval of the President.

HK: Well, Arthur, I appreciate your meticulousness. Let me check with the President. I am 99% certain that he will approve it--not only approve it but welcome it.

AG: And then we need some private consultations about you know who else--

HK: Right--

AG: I can tell you some of the people who have come to me and a discussion of timing, etc., on a strictly private basis--

HK: Averill Harriman has told me that he is willing to do something like this.

RECLASSIFIED

Act. fly. EO17258
By: J. M. Harriman

AG: Good, it will be wonderful.

HK: McBundy mentioned it but after his testimony last week I think the President wouldn't want him.

AG: No, no we have to coordinate with the President on the line and I rather like the idea--this is the investment in peace and I am very much worried as you must be about the Hill when I see McGovern going back to South Dakota and now preaching South Dakota politics---which is

HK: Oh, that is unbelievable.

AG: This must be handled, since I know the Hill as you know --properly and must be handled with people who have accessibility to both sides of the Hill if it is to be effective. So would you check it out and then let me know and then perhaps someone ought to be designated in your shop to coordinate the approach, the attitude, etc.

HK: I appreciate it very much Arthur--I think you are the ideal man to do it

AG: But I will not want to do it alone.

HK: Of course not. I think it has to be bi-partisan. I don't think you should do it alone.

AG: No, I won't and not only that, I would want associated with it, someone as I said like Cabot who has taken another view.

HK: No, no it should have hawks and doves
Let me check and also let me find out what the best time would be.

AG: Timing and you know approach and so on.

HK: Good.

AG: You'll call me--

HK: Yeh.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. by E017258
By: A. M. D. / S / L / O / T

TELCONE
Gov. Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

12:51 p.m., March 14, 1973

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: Great. How are you?

K: Okay.

R: Listen, we had an interesting discussion with Nancy. She probably told you.

K: She just told me you had an interesting discussion.

R: Well, we talked about the outline, the philosophy -- how do we approach it, you know, the psychology. Don't know whether you'll approve of our approach.

K: Well, I haven't seen it.

R: Well, neither have I. It was just in conversation, which was to take a positive approach.

K: Well, I'm in favor of that but you really, Nelson, should be careful about all-out support for European unity.

R: I'm going to use whatever language you say.

K: Because McCloy was in yesterday and, you know, he's the father of it and he said he was scared to death by how that's developing now in an anti-American direction.

R: Well, I understand and there's two philosophies on this thing. One would be the Jew -- you know, if we have a strong plea, a central purpose, we know what we're doing, we can maneuver among them. If we don't have a strong plea, a central purpose, then they can take us to the cleaners.

K: Well, we can't maneuver among them if they're unified.

R: No, no, no; that's what I say. Well, yeah, I understand. I understand. This wasn't the thing that I was discussing because I talked to you about it. My question was related to how do we approach this?

K: Oh, no, you must approach it positively.

R: Positively. You know, the great tremendous heritage of these . . .

K: Absolutely. Essential, essential.

CLASSIFIED

Allotted E01258
By A. M. D. Liffey

12:51 p.m., March 14, 1973

2

R: And we've got to lift our sights and look at the realities.

K: Nelson, are you coming down tomorrow or what had you planned?

R: I'm supposed to have something tomorrow night up here. I don't know
how I can come down there. You're not coming up for the meeting with
the Chinese.

K: Because they're going to be in Panama for that Security Conference.

R: Oh, I don't believe it. So you're not going out of there. Well, I'll have to find out then whether I can bring Happy down and Dolly. See this was a basic thing.

K: Yeah, well, that's one possibility. I could conceivably come up if you sent your plane.

R: Well, of course, I would.

K: I just don't want to take a government plane.

R: Don't worry. We'll do one or the other. Why don't we leave it that way. Let me talk to Happy, we'll do one or the other.

K: Good.

R: In either case, we'll use the plane.

K: Marvelous.

R: Henry, you're the greatest.

K: It would be a little easier for me because I'm going away the next day if you came down.

R: Let me see if I can work it out with her. It would give me an excuse to not go up to Syracuse, which I've got a little problem with. I'm going to call Happy and see if she will do that.

K: Marvelous.

R: Okay?

K: See you tomorrow in either case.

R: Great! Thanks a lot. Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Autumn 2023
By: M. D. S.

TELCONE
Ambassador Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

3:20 p.m. 3/14/73

HK: Well our darlings have sent us three endless messages all of which
firmly reject everything we say--they have carefully investigated
all civilian --- and they have investigated every allegation and
have found they're all civilian goods--they are also slamming us about
that every single civilian has been released including one of the 5,000
I promised them on February 11.
Do you want to come over here and draft a few replies?

AS: Ah, let's see--I've got Tan Van Dong coming to see me tonight---

HK: Yeh, anytime this afternoon

AS: Yeh, I'll get over maybe towards 5 o'clock--I guess I can get there
about quarter of.

HK: okay.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority EO1725f
By DA HARDAley

TelCon

Amb. Kenneth Keating/Mr. Kissinger

3:25 pm, March 14

K: Hello.

KK: First, after ________ the indians, the thought occurred to me that they may, if they haven't paid for this, they may be just trying to find an excuse not to pay. You know, the lawyer that represented them had to sue them for $5,000 for his fee. He couldn't get his money out of them.

HK: Well, it's a good thing they are so moral, otherwise I wouldn't know how to survive them.

KK: Well, my first question is I hope that something can be said as quickly as possible to the State Department, and my reason is--

HK: Hold on one second. (Pause)

HK: Hello.

KK: In my book, personnel and staff are terrifically important, and I know about the competition in the Department and I want to decide on that just as early as possible.

HK: Right.

KK: Can you give me any idea when you think something could be said to them.

HK: Well, I simply know it already in principle, I'll get Haldeman to call over there.

KK: All right. If you will I'd appreciate it so that I can then take it up with somebody, would it be Sisco--

HK: That's right.

KK: I guess so. Now, secondly, you have any idea of time when the announcement might be made.

HK: Well, I guess within the next two or three weeks. Two weeks.

KK: I want to say something, I've been very close mouthed, but I want to tell you one incident--I got back in here the morning after we talked and Jack Wells, my partner, came in and he said I want to tell you something that you probably don't know, he said you are being seriously considered as Ambassador to Israel.

CLASSIFIED

2

HK: Well I don't know how it got around, Ron just called me too.

KK: I just can't imagine. Be--

HK: Because I hadn't talked to anybody.

KK: He said I really cannot tell you about it, but that sort of thing does get around. I just don't understand it. And I--it's disturbing to me. I want to say something to half a dozen people, my daughter, my sister and my secretary, and my Post Office associates and all of my fiancées.

K: I was gonna say Kay Graham must know.

KK: (Laughter)

HK: Why the hell do you think we're tring to get you out of the country?

KK: She hasn't agreed to marry me yet so, just the one's that have agreed to marry me is all. Judge Tyler who has appointed me a Trustee of U Express and before any of those read it in the paper, I'd like to be able to say something to them. So if I can have a little advance, I'd--

HK: Let me talk to Haldeman and let you know.

KK: All right. Now, I have made five speaking engagements, four of which I can get out of one way or the other; one I'm--on May 9 before the association of the Bar, here in New York--

HK: Why don't you keep it.

KK: In other words May 1st is slightly flexible.

HK: Oh, yeah, to make it May 15th, that will be fine.

KK: All right. I appreciate that. You're going away tomorrow or so. According to the papers.

HK: That's right.

KK: Going to be on vacation and then you're according to the paper to see Castro, so give him my kind regards.

HK: But, he'll have Wigs--blond wigs.

KK: I see, well, I didn't know. I hope you have a wonderful rest, you deserve it, and if you would have somebody down there call me about when I can say something to somebody, I would appreciate. It's so difficult

DECLASSIFIED

Acting by E01758
By: D. R. Mains/ley

TelCon
Dep. Secy Simon/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 pm, March 14, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hi.

K: How are you?

S: Fine, thank you. I talked to George on the secure phone.

K: Oh, good.

S: And gave him your messages verbatim which I had written down when we chatted. It was a lousy connection, and--

K: What did he think.

S: He repeated it to me. He was in, it seemed, agreement but as I say it was a lousy connection, but he got my transmittal and that was the most important.

K: Right.

S: Number two, I'm sending a courier off to Paris right now, he was on his way over, would you like to send anything over to George. Do you have any materials at all that you think would be of interest to him.

K: No, I don't really have much to add to what I've already told you.

S: Okedoke, well I just wanted to make sure that you didn't have a document there that maybe George would like to read over the next week and half.

K: I don't think so. Is he going to take a vacation after this?

S: He is going to be in Paris on Friday, London, then Saturday through Tuesday he leaves on Tuesday for Santa Cruz for a day and a half, and then he'll be back here in Washington Thursday evening at 5:00pm, and I've been urging O. B. to take George away and neither of us have been able to get him to go, and that's a mistake because I've never seen a man that was more tired as he was before he took this trip.

K: I don't see any reason why he has to come back Thursday night. Why doesn't he come back over the weekend.

S: Exactly, exactly. We have a very old mutual friend, Dr. Kissinger, named Don Marion.

CLASSIFIED

Antonly ED1758
By DAVID HARRIS 03/15/73

DECLASSIFIED
Act. No. E017258
By: A. R. D. S. L. S.

K: Oh, yeah.

S: Don and I are old friends from East Hampton.

K: Yeah, he's very bright.

S: Oh, boy, I almost had him down here. Did he tell you that story.

K: We had him in OMB.

S: That's correct. He would have been just super in that job.

K: But I think he wants more disability. (?)

S: Well, he would have taken the Deputy Director, but Fred Malek decided that he wanted it,

notch

K: Deputy Director, yes, but then they offered him one a/k/a further down--

S: Yes, but they advised him at the same time not to take it, and to wait for a couple of years and when the Administration does its next shift that he would be on top of the pile, so I hope he comes then. He'd make a great contribution to the country.

K: Yeah. He's always wanted me to join his firm for which I'm spectacularly unsuited.

S: I don't know that I agree with that. As a matter of fact, I disagree with it, having come from that industry. You read the specs incorrectly. You'd be spectacular in that business. Investment banking, that's what that business is. People with minds like yours.

K: That's a new vista in my life that hadn't occurred to me.

S: It's a marvelous business. That's where Pete's going, you know. And I've been spending many hours with him.

K: Oh really. Where is Pete going?

S: Well, I haven't talked to him, he's home now, and--

K: Oh, is he back?

S: Yes, he got back. He was in the office today. I've been talking to him as well as my former partner, Billy Sullivan, and Johnny Goodfriend, and he's been talking to Lehman and Soloman. Billy called me the other day and told me he was offered the offer he had given to Pete, and I would be surprised if Pete didn't take it.

2

3

So he will be, one way or the other, in the investment banking
business, I would expect, within the next month.

K: No business is big enough to contain both Peterson and me.

S: I doubt that.

K: I'm kidding. Pete is a good friend.

S: I know he is. Well most importantly, you get a good rest.

K: But that's not my problem now. You know, my basic view is
that at this stage we should not bring about any further European
integration until we--i'd even pay a certain price if necessary
intervening, if it's done for National currency.

S: Exactly.

K: My view of a common float, if it works, is going to lead to a common
monetary system.

S: I must admit that I don't have terribly much concern there because
I don't see this float working for terribly long.

K: Oh, really.

S: Yeah. But that's not disruptive. I think that several float, if you will,
just as England and Italy by themselves right now is the answer for
the immediate future.

K: Right, right, right. Okay.

S: Well, sir--

K: And thank you for keeping me so meticulously informed.

S: Oh, you are welcome.

K: Bye.

S: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Advisory Board

Byron H. Patsley

TelCon
Scotty Reston/Mr. Kissinger

3:36 pm, March 14, 1973

K: Hello

R: Henry!

K: Scotty, how are you.

R: I'm fine. Henry I don't want to keepnbothering you about this money business, but I got a cable from him saying that he's been ill and he can't get out at the end of this month, and asked me if I would explain that to you and suggest that he thinks he could make it the first week in May. Does that look like a reasonable time,

K: The first week of May looks pretty good now.

R: Yep. All right, I'll just send him a message--

K: And you know, I assume we can adjust the day.

R: Oh, sure. He's going to be in Washington for two weeks, roughly from the 7th.

K: Oh, well then it's guaranteed. You can tell him also that I've talked to the President and that unless something very unforeseen happens he'd like to see him briefly.

R: All right, will do. Thank you Henry. When are you going off.

K: Friday.

R: For God sake, get a good rest. You deserve it.

K: Thank you for everything. Bye.

R: Bye. All the best.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E017258
By: HAROLD GLOSSER

TelCon
Hank Trewhitt/Mr. Kissinger

6:02 pm, March 14, 1973

K: I thought it was good.

T: I think it came out pretty well. On the whole I'm pleased with it. Got a splendid personal note from him today which says--in fact what it really comes down to is "all the good things are good and all the bad are bad, but on the whole he thought it was a pretty fair job".

K: Oh, I thought it was good. I thought it was very fair.

T: I haven't been working in Southeast Asia--

K: Only part of it I think is crap is that Peterson's missile or whatever it was had anything to do with me.

T: Well, that was a stupid line. And I must confess it just got by both Hubbard and me. It obviously was silly and should have come out, and we just did not flag it. We missed on that. The reason I was so anxious to get you is that we have a query here which says they are scheduling the Vietnam <u>violation</u> this week, pegged to POW release and focusing on the crumbling ceasefire.

K: Listen, Newsweek has been consistently wrong, <u>think</u> they are always historical, the ceasefire isn't crumbling but we are having adjustment problems.

T: Isn't it a fact the level of violence has some fits and starts but nevertheless it's down.

K: That is right.

T: This was what I am most concerned about.

K: Our strategy is to make clear that violations aren't free, but from there to conclude, you know we could pretend that all of this is good clean fun.

T: There's a piece this morning which says we may get tough, some stage a little bit later than this, and I understand ______ is doing one tomorrow. Now I have never bought the notion that Richard Nixon was seeking a fig leaf out of vietnam, and I don't think so now. I realize the restraints on you so far as prisoners are concerned and so forth, but while you said stay with the notion

RECLASSIFIED

Authority ED1758
By: HARRIS GLOSSER

2

that we are perfectly serious about a stable peace in South Vietnam

K: That's right and the President has announced a thousand times what he wanted. It's not his fault that no one believes him, and takes him at his word. He has not been going around saying that he believes --that he received an honorable peace to get it blown up now.

T: I need to speculate along those lines and I suppose one should not try to speculate far enough to determine what kind of actions will be taken later on, but simply stay hard with the notion that he is perfectly serious about the kind of restriction he has laid out for a Southeast Asian settlement and that he will adhere to that, right.

K: That is right.

T: Whether or not the prisoners are out--I don't really know how to phrase that but I don't want to cause trouble in that respect, but the notion that we are going to fold our tent and walk away--

K: That is wrong. Any idea that the ceasefire is crumbling is also wrong. Just remind your colleagues of the cover the spectre of defeat.

T: I new you had an extremist. That go well, doesn't go down well up there. How long are you going to be gone.

K: Ten days.

T: Good luck with it because it's a good opportunity and I hope you come back refreshed.

K: Thank you Hank.

T: and ready to stay in.

K: You are very nice.

T: Okay, I'm going to hang up.

K: Well really, look, I don't give a damn what you write because events are going to determine this and not what the Newsweek stories says.

T: I very much being correct, you know.

K: I know and you are when you can control it, and I would--what you said to me, that framework. Of course there's a constant testing of the limits of the agreement. That's why we react. But basically it is not a crumbling ceasefire.

RECLASSIFIED

Act. II ED 12/25/84
By: D.R. HARRIS-GIBSON

TelCon
Amb. Hill/Mr. Kissinger

6:30 pm, March 14, 1973

K: Hello.

H: This is Bob Hill.

K: How are you.

H: Pretty good, sir.

K: Bob tells me he's talked to you.

H: Yes he did.

K: And all I can tell you is, you know, on that post, it's not the most
pleasant place in the world as you know.

H: Yes I know, I served there as a kid.

given

K: But on the other hand, there is the complex situation with India.

H: Right.

Given

K: But the fact that we have done some things there, vis a vis the Chinese
or together with the Chinese that are very difficult. We have to have
a man there that is the President's man totally and with whom we
can backchannel and who will take his orders from the White House.

H: Right.

K: Because anything we do through the bureaucracy given they are
Indian eyes bias might as well put into the newspapers.

H: I understand, that's right.

K: And also we want to give the signal that one of the President's men
are there.

H: Right.

K: So, for all these reasons we really thought there wasn't anybody else
whom we trust enough to send there.

H: Well, thank you very much Doctor. Now I understand from

CLASSIFIED

Allotted E017258
BY DAVID HARRISLEY

2

Mr. Haldeman that you are going tomorrow on a holiday.

K: Right.

H: Yes, I would like to talk to my wife about it.

K: Sure

H: And how should I come back at you while you are going to be away on a holiday.

K: Well, when do you think you'd come back.

H: I would say, she's going to meet me in New York tomorrow at Noon, and I'm going down to Dallas, Texas, to make a speech, and--

K: Look; my office will know how to get me.

H: Well that's fine-- you'll be in the U.S. then.

K: I'm going to Mexico, but we have very good communications.

H: All right, very good Sir, then I'll call your office, I would say

K: Talk to General Scowcroft who's my Deputy.

H: All right, sir.

K: And I really hope you'll do it because, once you take it I'll tell you some of the things that went on during the India/Pakistan war.

H: Yes.

K: And some of the things we are planning to do in connection with Iran and we just can't do it with a Foreign Service Officer.

H: I understand, sir.

K: And--well you know the area so you know it's hard--there's some beautiful scenery close by, but still that's not the reason to take it.

H: Gallons of work to be done too.

K: In terms of a challenging job, it's one of the top ones.

H: I'll have a talk with the lady and be back there through the General hopefully this weekend.

RECLASSIFIED

Auto. by HAROLD GIBSON
By A.

TelCon
Stewart Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 pm, March 14, 1973

K: Hello.

A: Hello Henry.

K: I want you to know the only Alsop my office recognizes is Joe. I said
return Mr. Alsop's call and I got Joe.

A: I'm sure he was delighted to hear you calling and probably babbled
away enthusiastically.

K: I couldn't stop him.

A: Well, no one can as you well know. I'm thinking of doing another
God damned cover about that God damned country we're all so
tired about.

K: Vietnam.

A: Yeah.

K: Just don't join the fashionable yelling, will you.

A: Well, what do you mean the fashionable yelling.

K: Newsweek says they are doing a piece on the collapsing ceasefire.

A: Uh huh. Joe did a piece on the same line, I think Rollie Evans has
one coming out tomorrow. It does seem to me that the evidence
suggests that the ceasefire--that's what's happening to the ceasefire
is about what Xuan would have predicted.

K: But there are many interpretations of what's happening. One may be
that they are pouring in one batch of equipment to make up for what
we poured in on our side in November and December.

A: That's reinforcement.

K: That's right. Other possibility is that they are just testing the limit
of our reaction, and the quote is that they are having an all out push.
The evidence really isn't conclusive now.

A: Um huh. The evidence is sufficient to say that they are cheating on
the ceasefire as one would have expected.

RECLASSIFIED

Article E017258
By A. MARGulisley

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. HAR.Davis

By: D. B. HARRIS

K: Yeah. But so is the other side. I mean, the reason we are reacting so strongly is just to make sure they don't misunderstand what's going to happen if there's an all out attack.

A: What's going to happen, is the B-52s.

K: I'm not going to say what's going to happen but when the President talks of an honorable peace, he is not going to let it go down the drain.

A: I wonder if he can prevent it going down the drain.

K: Well, we'll see.

A: Well, put it this way Henry, this is the lines along which I've been thinking and see if I'm wrong. If I remember correctly many people, including close advisers of the President, believed and have said that the--at least for the immediate future, at least for the next year and perhaps more, given the kind of clobbering they got after their invasion of South Vietnam and given the December bombing and the bombing that went on previously, x could not be capable of launching an all out offensive before a long period of time.

K: About a year to a year and a half.

A: Year to year and a half. This being so, and it also being so that it must have been at least a very real possibility in all your minds that they would behave as they always have behaved, as they behaved after the '62 Laos agreement, and have behaved consistently; in fact they would break the ceasefire any time they thought they could get away with it.

K: That's right.

A: Add the third fact that the President has said again and again that all he wished to do, all he intended to do would be to give the South Vietnamese "a chance" to defend themselves.

K: Right.

A: Is it therefore necessary, if and when the NVN clearly have cheated on the ceasefire and the ceasefire is largely are only breaking down is it essential that we be intervening. I ask this because in my opinion a decision by the President to send the bombers over again would be-- he's a tough man, but this would be the toughest stand he's taking. You'd have this country blow up, your reaction of the Europeans this time would be even more irrational than it was last time, and finally I think that you would find that your hands would be tied by the Senate. On top of that it might not work.

K: Well, it depends entirely what we are talking about.

A: I'm talking about a sort of repetition of the December bombing.

K: Well, when it happened--at what time in this sequence all of it happens.

A: After it becomes clear that the NVN have no intention whatsoever of honoring the ceasefire or their promise to withdraw from Laos or Cambodia. I never really believed them.

K: Well, I'm not saying they are going to send the B-52s easily.

A: What else is there.

K: Well, Stewart, I'm not impressed by the Public service arguments by------(end of tape)

DECLASSIFIED

Official E017258
By A. HARRIS 01/15/84

Stewart Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., March 14, 1973

4

K: . . . we do not consider particularly useful now. It's a great exer-Jesus of what the President cannot do.

A: Um-humm. Well --

K: Or should not do. When you don't know what he's planning to do --

A: I haven't a clue what he's planning to do except that when one simply uses one's intelligence, which I presume Hanoi --

K: Yeah, he isn't going to use B-52s easily.

A: What's that?

K: We're not going to use B-52s easily.

A: I would hope not.

K: No, we're not.

A: The thing that I keep coming back to, Henry, -- We've discussed this again and again-but sooner or later we're going to have to say -- Look, it's up to the South Vietnamese to defend themselves.

K: Sooner or later we will say that.

A: Do you think this is too soon?

K: Yes.

A: Because they lack the capability?

K: No. You know, it's one thing for an Agreement to erode over a period of years. It's another thing for it to be broken --

S: To be smashed the day after it happens.

K: That's right.

A: Presumably, objective one is to get those prisoners out. And presumably this will happen within the next two weeks.

K: Well, we're getting another batch this week.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E01725f
By: D.R. HARRIS/Clifford

Stewart Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

5

A: Yeah. The 60-day deadline ends in a couple of weeks now, doesn't it?

K: That's right.

A: So that presumably again, no decision will be taken before then.

K: It depends entirely what decision you're talking about, Stewart. This town will never cease to amaze me. There's a fashionable trend -- Joe writes something; Rolly writes something; then you go --

A: You want me to write something?

K: Huh?

A: Scotty writes something.

K: And the goddamn thing -- you'd think we're in a -- Both sides are testing each other. Now the only --

A: I don't think it's a matter simply of fashion. When you have the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House all agreeing that the North Vietnamese have taken measures which clearly are countervening the Paris Agreement --

K: Yeah, and the purpose --

A: It's a piece of news you have to consider.

K: And the purpose is partly due -- to drive them off it. Two weeks ago everyone was calling us and telling us it was falling apart because of the POW delay and we got that under control.

A: Thank God. You were very confident about that, I remember.

K: That's right. And I'm reasonably confident about this one.

A: Uh-huh.

K: I really am. They are not yet ready to have that showdown and it's in our interest to delay it. It's also true the Economic Commission is starting to meet tomorrow. There are a lot of -- And our exchanges with them are still on a civilized note.

A: Um-humm. Well, I hope your confidence is again justified, as it has been in the past.

CLASSIFIED

Act: 012258
By: PARIS-BELGIUM

Stewart Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

6

K: I'm not saying they're not going to kick it over eventually. Of course they are.

A: It's a matter of timing?

K: That's right.

A: I would think that eventually -- I can't see any reason why it's not inconceivable that the South Vietnamese would be able to defend themselves.

K: Or not.

A: If they're not able to defend themselves, then what the hell are we doing anyway?

K: That's exactly right.

A: Because we surely can't use the B-52s --

K: Yeah, but it's one thing to say we've made an honorable peace before all the countries in Asia and 4 weeks later you run out of there -- I mean, you get a total ...... of an Agreement within 3 weeks of an International Conference, if this is the way it's going to go, which I don't believe it will.

A: Um-humm. You have no doubt about the infiltration? Or the tanks or ?

K: No, I have no doubt about the infiltration but I think there could be many explanations for that.

A: Um-humm. Do you have any serious beliefs that they'll withdraw from Cambodia and Laos, Henry?

K: I think there is a 50-50 chance that they will withdraw from Laos.

A: Do you?

K: Yes.

A: .................... and I have always, as you know, been very dubious about it. I can't see what would force them to do it.

K: I think there is a slightly better than 50-50 chance. It may be 50-50 chance.

A: You've been right in the past --

K: As long as Lon Nol --

DECLASSIFIED

Act. No. 5017258-1
By: D.M. HARVEY 06/15/84

DECLASSIFIED

Advisory E017258

By A. D. HARRIS

Stewart Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

7

A: Let me ask you one question. You said in your -- I think it was your November press conference -- that it was your belief -- you didn't say that this was a conviction -- I can't quote it exactly -- that both sides were interested in peace rather than an armistice.

K: That's right.

SA: Do you still believe that?

K: I think there is a trend in Hanoi that wants this.

A: Um-humm.

K: But I think also that these maneuvers find it very hard to find an operational definition for that. You know, whenever they have a concrete decision to make, they do the only thing they know how to do.

A: It's a kind of a _______ reaction to make war rather than peace.

K: That's right. One thing is a theory and the other is a fact, and therefore it is important for us to be rather stern with them.

A: Um-humm. Well, I must say, I publicly confessed I was wrong about the Christmas bombings but I think that if we did that again, I -- my soul shivers.

K: Stu, it will not be anything like that. Nothing has happened yet that could even remotely bring that on.

A: Um-humm. Well, we shall hope for the best. When are you taking off?

K: Friday night.

A: Have a good time.

K: That isn't even in the cards right now.

A: When the mind is open for another dimension of pressure and it's very hard to see what it is since we haven't -- they got the economic aid operating and you haven't by any means got it through the Senate, as we all very well know, what else is there? Force? What form can the force take?

K: Look, we don't have to go to that sort of bombing. At this stage of the game, I believe we're in a testing operation.

A: It's a test of manhood, as you say.

TELCONE

Gen. Haig/Kissinger

9:33 a.m. - 3/15/73

K: Hello.

H: Hi, Henry.

K: Al, do you suppose you could get those idiots you've got over there, Weyand and Woodard, are taking a sort of cavilier attitude about this Agreement and they're giving us all that bullshit that if the two-party commission never comes into being so much the better.

H: Yeh.

K: Now I don't know why these fools cannot get it through their heads that they are working for the U.S. We know the goddamned agreement will probably not work, but we've got to be in a position where if it doesn't work, it will be the result of the other side.

H: Yeh. Exactly. Well, I'll uh - we'd better get a little something off to Weyand then.

K: Oh, excuse me for a minute. (Pause) Hello.

H: Yes, Henry. Do you want me to. . .

K: Could you get it across to these guys that we have to have meticulous observance if we're ever going to do a tough thing.

H: Yes, absolutely.

K: And they cannot egg on the South Vietnamese to do these silly little moves when we are playing a major league game.

H: Right.

K: We've got to have a record so that we can clobber them for big stakes.

H: Well, that's right.

K: Not harass them for stupid little ones.

H: Right. Right.

CLASSIFIED

By: AARON D. OLITSKY

2

K: Do you think you can get to Woodard and Weyand?

H: Yes, easily. Sure, I'll just send them a service message which they'll get right away. Nobody else will see it.

K: Now what is your view on the Laos bombing?

H: Well, I think we're getting very close to where we're going to have to do something dramatic, Henry, with this thing.

K: Now the question is do we do it still while there are prisoners there or right after?

H: I'd be inclined to do it before. I feel your logic is not the softest logic. If you do it before you've really conveyed the impression that god damn it you mean business.

K: Yeh.

H: Although it'll get more criticism, I don't think a helluva lot more.

K: Well, that's my instinct. They might hold the prisoners but then we'll just have to bomb them in the north.

H: That's right. If they're going to do that, they're not going to do it based on Laos bombing. Your being tough and promptly tough is invariably what is needed.

K: Yeh.

H: Now I don't know what you've been conveying through the other channel but I assume that you brought that about to the point where it's counter-productive anymore.

K: I don't think the others can intervene in day-to-day tactics.

H: Yeh, no I mean even with our customer - the Hanoi people. You're still using that other Paris channel?

K: Oh yeh.

H: But you've used that to the point where it's counter-productive.

K: Well, I mean we've warned them and warned them and we can give them a few more days.

CLASSIFIED

Act:017258
By: A. D. P. M. A. S. L. O. F. S. I. S. O. L.

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:50 a.m., March 15, 1973

K: ... that you haven't met yet.

D: Well, I'm really almost eager to see her.

K: I'm sorry I didn't get your approval before I hired her.

D: But I do rely on your taste, I'm sure about it. Because up till now, in most cases I do approve.

K: Okay.

D: Henry, I just received from Gromyko in connection with your yesterday's call at night.

K: Yeah.

D: And he's just sent a telegram there to our representation. First of all, he telling them in rather strong language saying that this particular document was given in a strictly confidential measure to some western countries. He doesn't give your call but make it this way and should be discussed only through confidential channels but not in any case in Helsinki.

K: Right.

D: And you he said to Ambassador and other representatives should very strictly adhere to this rule.

K: Right.

D: So this is already -- I received a copy of this telegram.

K: Well, I'm talking to Rush and I will have a suggestion. We'll tell you how we'll handle it tonight.

D: So it is still as I see from this, it is very clear that we prefer -- not prefer but really it is still only you, as I mentioned, and with France and through you, you said and Great Britain.

K: That's right.

D: That's all really. So what I mentioned to you about confidential character of this document, it still stands as it was a month ago.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FO12058
By: N.W. Tanzer
Date: 03/15/73

TELCORN

Dick Watson/Mr. Kissinger

9:53 a.m., March 15, 1973

W: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you, Dick?

W: I'm fine. How are you?

K: Okay.

W: Good. Did you have a good holiday?

K: I haven't gone yet, I'm going tomorrow.

W: For God's sakes, I thought you'd already gone.

K: No.

W: Henry, I called you because I'm a little bit embarrassed because Nancy and I are going to that place you're going to several times and I find that they're going to make us their guests.

K: Well, why not?

W: And I haven't checked in with the Department but I thought I ought to tell you.

K: I think that's fine.

W: It is. Well, I tried to do it myself -- our daughter had a terrific trip. We're going to leave Paris for Shanghai on the 5th of April.

K: Well, Dick, I think you could probably afford it if you paid for it.

W: I think I should be able to work it out.

K: So I don't think that anyone will suspect you of any ulterior motive there.

W: (laughter) Well, I just thought you ought to be informed about it, that's all.

K: Well, that's very nice of you. Are you coming ever to Washington?

W: Well, I hadn't planned on it.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01725f
By: D. HARRIS

Dick Watson/Mr. Kissinger

9:53 a.m., March 15, 1973

2

K: But come down certainly after you return.

W: I'd love to do that.

K: Well, you and Nancy come down and we'll have lunch or dinner.

W: Because I'd love to tell you about the thing and see how it goes.

K: Well, that's what I'd love to do.

W: And I'm just going there as John Private Citizen but they're going to make me a guest of the foreign group.

K: Well, that's terrific !

W: So maybe I'll get a chance to meet a couple of the guys.

K: Oh, you'll certainly meet some of the top people.

W: All right. You haven't got any advice for me?

K: No, just be yourself.

W: All right, Henry, that's great. How are you doing?

K: I'm doing fine.

W: Well, you're still our hero.

K: Well, I saw some of the nice comments you made about me.

W: Well, that was fun up there in Colby.

K: Well, Dick, I'll see you as soon as you come back.

W: All right. I'll be in touch with you. Thanks for calling, Henry.

K: Love to Nancy.

W: Thank you, sir, bye.

wgh.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. only E01725& By A.D. HARRIS/CLISBY

TELCORN

Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

11:04 a.m., March 15, 1973

K: Ken, two things. One, on the instructions to Johnson, the thing we objected to was his saying that reductions are our preferred approach.

R: Oh, I see.

K: He's authorized to discuss reductions but not as our preferred approach.

R: Right, right.

K: One possible approach.

R: Right. Well, that would be all right.

K: Can you take care of that?

R: I'll take care of that. Because all I want to do is to be sure that we explore the idea with them.

K: Yes.

R: But not as our preferred approach. Right, I agree.

K: Right. Second, on the India-Pakistan thing, some of your guys are saying that we will not authorize transfer of US. arms from third countries. Will you tell them to cool that?

R: Right.

K: But do it in a way so that they don't leak it.

R: Right.

K: Because that is not our policy between you and me.

R: Right.

K: And, in fact, the President is pretty heavily there.

R: Right.

K: But just tell them to -- tell Sisco to shut up.

R: I will.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E017258
By: D. HARRIS-GILLET

Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

11:04 a.m., March 15, 1973

2

K: If that's doable.

R: (laughter)

K: If he doesn't want to be Ambassador to Bangladesh.

R: I will tell him to shut up and whether it's doable for him to shut up is something else again. But, no, I will do that, Henry.

K: Good.

R: Now, on this Human Rights thing, Hoffman was going to raise this issue when the question of emigration, which is on the agenda, came up and I told him not to say anything at all.

K: Okay. Good.

R: Henry, on the CSCE.

K: Yeah.

R: I now have this. Just what --

K: The status of it is they have given it to the President, to Brandt and to Pompidou.

R: Right.

K: They propose this as a final declaration. We have never given them an answer so if you can suggest an answer to me, which I should return to Dobrynin, it would be very helpful.

R: Right. Good. Well, I'll get this in the works at once.

K: Now, but keep it in your shop.

R: I'll keep it in my shop. I can bring Stoessel in on it.

K: If he keeps his mouth shut.

R: I think I can trust him.

K: Yes, you can.

R: I can. Okay, Henry, I'll see you this afternoon.

K: Good, Ken.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01725F
By DAVID HARRIS/Dreamtime

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:05 a.m., March 15, 1973

D: Hello, Henry, how are you? Are you prepared for the press conference?

K: Of course.

D: I know. You could give answer any time.

K: It's the President who's giving it.

D: Not you?

K: No.

D: Oh-h-h. Because trouble with you is you're really always prepared for a press conference.

K: On the Human Rights thing, we cancelled the instructions.

D: They cancelled?

K: Yes.

D: I think this is very good idea and I will send a telegram to Gromyko right away.

K: Good.

D: Well, I think it's very good idea. So, 5:30.

K: 5:30?

D: Yeah. Thank you very much, Henry.

K: Good. Thank you.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

TELCOM

Governor Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

11:50 a.m., March 15, 1973

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: How are you today?

K: I beg your pardon.

R: How are you doing?

K: I'm doing pretty well.

R: You are. Listen, Henry, I can't bring Dolly [Shift ?] down because she can't get away till 7:30. What I might suggest is that Nancy and I come down with the speech on the plane. I'll work with her coming down, then if you can come back with us for dinner, this would be wonderful. If you can't do it, we would work there and I'd come back.

K: Well, aren't you nice. I have an appointment with Dobrynin at 5:30, which I really cannot break.

R: Right.

K: Because he will think there is something more to it.

R: Of course.

K: So I really wouldn't be free much before 6:30.

R: Oh, that's no problem.

K: And then we can see.

R: Why don't we come down. We had a good meeting, as I told you, in Albany on the speech.

K: Right.

R: She's supposed to have got a new draft.

K: Right.

R: Working with Huey and Joe on this sort of a buildup of, you know, this tremendous history in the past and the great relationship of the Atlantic nations and so forth, preserving freedom, and, you know, all that big stuff and now with these changed conditions, this is the big challenge -- Can we think big and work together?

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258
Byron HART Dec 05/64

11:50 a.m., March 15, 1973

2

K: Right. If I miss Dolly Shift, I'll give you any evening you want when I come back.

R: Well, why don't we leave it this way -- that I call back to Happy when we see if you're through. If you get through on time, we come back and have a late dinner. If not, then we go to work down there and I go back.

K: Okay. So where should we meet? I mean, I'll be glad to meet in my office but if you'd like to meet some other place, that's okay.

R: No, no, no; I'll come to your office.

K: Good. k About 6:30?

R: Yeah. Now then, if you're then free -- we'll get there 6:30 -- if you're then free and things are in hand --

K: Oh, I see. We could then work on the plane.

R: We could ride up on the plane together -- the car and the plane -- and that would give us an hour and a half.

K: Okay. Well, let's plan on that.

R: You're just terrific!

K: And if I can't get away, you'll understand.

R: If you can't, then I'll understand.

K: You're really very generous.

R: Well, listen, listen, this is great. This is great.

K: Good. I'll see you then.

R: We'll be in your office.

K: Terrific!

R: Okay. Thanks.

K: Bye.

R: Bye, bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Audio: E017258
By: HANNAH GIBSON

TELOON

Dr. Jim Schlesinger/Mr. Kissinger

1:20 p.m., March 15, 1973

K: Jim, Tom told you this thing about Iran yesterday.

S: Yes, sir.

K: And are you acting on it?

S: We are acting on it. We have sent out warnings, one. Two, as you may know, we have a security man, which despite State protestations, we have sent along with the individual.

K: Absolutely.

S: Thirdly, we are counting on the Shah to recognize that he has a vulnerability there and we are straightening that out, making sure that the protective arrangements into Tehran are adequate.

K: No, we have not told the Shah any of this.

S: Um-humm. Well, we will not talk to him about that. We will just ascertain that the protective arrangements --

K: No, you can tell him about the information. You can't give him the source.

S: right. Good.

K: Or do you want us to send us a message to the Shah?

S: No, we shall do it.

K: But if it comes from us, then it's obvious that it came from a very high source.

S: We shall tend to that one immediately.

K: Okay. So it's in your hands. We won't tell the Department.

S: Well, not if you don't want it in the press.

K: We certainly don't want it in the press.

S: Yes.

K: Okay, Jim, it's your baby.

S: Okay, Henry. Thank you.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

By: HAROLD

TELCORN

Senator Javits / Mr. Kissinger

2:09 p.m., March 15, 1973

J: Henry.

K: Jack, how are you?

J: How are you?

K: Okay.

J: Listen, we have a date tomorrow but I've got a chance to take my wife
down to St. Martin's.

K: If you have a chance to take your wife to St. Martin's, you must do it.

J: We're not going to sit tomorrow.

K: Oh, by all means do it.

J: You let me do that?

K: Jack, I'll let you do it if you don't vote for the Jackson Amendment.

J: (laughter)

K: How about that?

J: That's not a bad trade. Listen, Flanigan's got me over a terrible spot. I gather he says no, but a lot of people up here think that I've got some compromise in the works with him.

K: Well, that's what he's been telling us.

J: I know. Well, I talked to him this morning and that isn't so in the sense
that -- I gave them the basic idea that --

K: Well, I thought it was unwise to put you on the spot.

J: Exactly. It's not only unwise, it's counterproductive.

K: That's right.

J: Very counterproductive.

K: You know, if that compromise gets developed, one would hope you would
vote for it but you couldn't sponsor it.

CLASSIFIED AD

Ad. only. E07258
Byron HARRIS

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

2:09 p.m., March 15, 1973

J: Right. You see, what I suggested -- I didn't have this in mind. I had in mind generalized preferences, etc. but what I had proposed to them was the idea of having all MFN matters subject to Congressional --

K: That's right. No, that he understood.

J: The thing he didn't explain to these people, which he should, and I think I got it clear with him today is that the White House expects that the veto will be used but the purpose of it is simply to enable the President to perform his commitment, even if it issues.

K: Yeah.

J: And then the Russians have the option to use that as a serious enough matter to call it off, which I gather the White House doesn't think they would do.

K: Well, I do want to talk to you about the Jackson Amendment because I believe it is -- Frankly, I believe it's damaging to our foreign policy and it cannot be helpful to the Jewish people.

J: Well, this is a serious matter.

K: But that we shouldn't discuss on the telephone.

J: Yeah. Well, look, you going to Acapulco?

K: Yeah.

J: When?

K: Tomorrow night.

J: And how long will you be away?

K: I'll be gone only 10 days. I'll be back on the 26 or 27th.

J: Well, that suits me because I have to go to Europe for my Committee of 9 on Wednesday so my office will apply for a breakfast date with you the week you come back.

K: Just don't use the word "apply". Of course, we'll have breakfast.

J: (laughter) Okay, Henry. Listen, one other thing I wanted to tell you. You know, I asked you about the mayoralty thing. Subsequently, Rockefeller had a talk with the President.

RECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01251-
By: HANDEGLISY

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

2:09 p.m., March 15, 1973

3

K: Yeah.

J: And conveyed to me, and I'm sure it's correct because Ehrlichman confirmed it, that as far as he was concerned, he preferred my staying in the Senate.

K: Well, you can perform a distinguished service either place.

J: Well, that's what I gathered and that made a big difference to me, not that it decided me but it made a big difference because, as I told you, one could only do a something in New York City.

K: Absolutely.

J: You know, if the White House is really back of you.

K: No question.

J: Well, I just put that in your mind. You undoubtedly will be able to take a reading on it yourself.

K: I'll talk to Nelson.

J: Yeah. Well, Nelson transmitted that --

K: Well, then let me talk to my colleagues here and find out what their thinking is.

J: Well, that apparently was the way it came out.

K: Let me talk to Haldeman -- I'll talk to the President, that's the easiest.

J: Great. And, Henry, unless you have something for me --

K: No, I really -- Look, I think we should have an exchange but it's of an general nature. It can easily wait.

J: Good. I'll see you then the week after next.

K: Good.

J: Have a great time in Acapulco. I know you've got a beautiful house.

K: It's marvelous. It's near your friend Warren Avis.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017456
By: D. R. D. L. G. I. S.

TELCONE
Richard Sykes (British Emb.)/Mr. Kissinger

2:48 p.m., March 15, 1973

S: Good afternoon, Dr. Kissinger, Richard Sykes.

K: Yes. On this matter we were discussing with Brimelow.

S: Yes.

K: We have redrafted the document and we're going to give it to the other side. And we thought there was no need to clear it with you because we have weakened your draft.

S: (laughs) I see.

K: And since I didn't think that you wanted to err on the side of strengthening it.

S: No indeed.

K: For example, we've taken out that obligation for joint studies on anything that will affect the future of peace. That just seemed to us too risky.

S: Well, I'm sure that the people in London will be extremely interested to hear this. Have you any particular date for handing it over?

K: This week. And I'm sending it over to you now.

S: Well, that's most kind.

K: So that you will see -- the only change we've made is that -- Well, we've eliminated your article -- Well, you'll see what we've done when you get it. We've eliminated your Article 6 altogether.

S: I see.

K: And for the rest we've kept most all of yours. Eliminating Article 6 -- No, we've kept your Article 5, we've kept your Article 4, we've kept your Article 1, kept your Article 2. And instead of your Article 6, what we've done is to say the two sides will form a group to study how the conditions can be implemented.

S: I see.

K: Or how the conditions of renunciation of force can be achieved.

S: Yes. I see.

CLASSIFIED

Article E012758
By: J. Kissinger

Richard Sykes (British Embassy)/Mr. Kissinger

2:48 p.m., March 15, 1973

2

K: And that doesn't mean anything.

S: No, quite. Well, I, as you know, Tom Brimelow made it quite clear
as far as we were concerned.

K: I thought I had your authority to weaken it.

S: (laughter) I'm sure ....

K: If I understood the drift of your conversation.

S: Indeed, yes.

K: Okay.

S: Good. Well, that was very kind of you, Dr. Kissinger.

K: I'll send it right over.

S: You're sending it across, are you?

K: Right. Oh, we've also vaguely weakened your Preamble.
But you will see all of this.

S: Yes, indeed. Well, I shall look forward to that with great interest.

K: Good.

S: Thank you very much for calling.

K: Right. Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258
By DA HARRIS/Dalley

TelCon

Richard Valeriani/Mr. Kissinger

3:02 pm, March 15, 1973

V: Thank you for calling back so quick. Say, I wonder if the President's statement today indicates that you've made a judgment that the stuff coming down the infiltration routes was sent down after the ceasefire rather than having been on the pipeline before.

K: We think that some of it was sent down after the ceasefire.

V: The stuff after, is it at a level as worrisome as the level of last year's, do you know that..

K: That's still, you know, you'd have to say the stuff that was sent afterwards, was that at the same level, or whether the stuff afterwards together was what was already in the pipeline.

V: Is the principle focus of concern on the big equipment like tanks and--

K: Well, the major point is if they stop now, one can still keep the situation -- it's somewhat fudged. But if they keep it up you'd have to say that there is a massive violation of the agreement.

V: We talk about the other interested party, do we have any evidence yet that the other interested party have forstrained their supply in the North Vietnamese.

K: That would be hard to judge.

V: We just don't know about that. That area.

K: That's right.

V: Okay, well thank you very much.

K: Right.

V: Henry, have a good vacation.

K: Thank you, Dick.

V: Bye.

K: Bye.

TelCon

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

4:28 pm, March 15, 1973

K: Hello.

T: K, how are you doing.

K: Okay.

T: I had a couple of questions on the basis of the President's press conference. One was that he seemed to lead the impression that as long as there were replacements---

K: No, no, that I've just been straightening out. The replacement of personnel is totally illegal under the agreement. What he was trying to say, and got too compressed, was that the replacement of men, while illegal, didn't immediately threaten to upset the strategic balance, while the replacement of materiel greatly augments the situation. But we are not going to acquiesce in the introduction of personnel.

T: But the introduction of some materiel does, like the tanks.

K: Well you know, that is an augmentation of what was said there.

T: Well, I didn't understand what you meant Henry, because you said that--

K: But be that as it may, the position is that the infiltration of both men and materiel is--the infiltration of men on any case is illegal, the infiltration of materiel is illegal if it exceeds replacement.

T: Right.

K: And our point is that the materiel far exceeds replacement and therefore is an augmentation of their force.

T: I see. What do you think they have in mind.

K: Well, they make just be pushing against the edges of the agreement to see how far they can go, or they may be planning another offensive.

T: What do you think, the first.

K: Yeah, I think the first, until now.

T: Are those numbers right, 8000 people and hundreds of tanks and so forth.

CLASSIFIED

2

K: Yeah.

T: What do we --

K: Well it depends when you start counting them.

T: I thought it was 8,000 since the ceasefire.

K: Yeah, but -- about that.

T: 2 or 300 tanks --

K: Right.

T: What can we do not, resume bombing.

K: No, let's not get too excited, you know.

T: Yeah. He was sort of implicit in what he said, I think explicit was this was a threat. That we can retaliate in some way. I was just wondering what the options are on our side right now, or even take two weeks from now after the prisoners are back.

K: Well, let's--I just don't want to speculate on that.

T: Not even for my guidance.

K: No.

T: All right. Okay, that's all I have. Oh, while I have you and the President was talking about travel plans, I have my own travel plans if I'm in danger of not being able to take a vacation between mid-June and the first of August.

K: Could we meet soon in the first of August.

T: Yeah. There is a six weeks stand in there and we are going to drive across the country.

K: I think you are pretty safe.

T: Is there an announcement coming on the Brezhnev visit, soon.

K: I wouldn't think so. It depends on what you mean by soon, I think sometime in the next four to six weeks, yes.

T: Oh, no, no, I had heard that Dobrynin came back and there was a possibility of an announcement as early as this week on his coming here.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By DAVID HARRISLEY

TelCon

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

5:36 pm, March 15, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you.

S: Oh great. Thanks for your coming to lunch yesterday. You're in pretty good form. I see you--

K: Pretty good form!

S: (Laughter)

K: What's that, a B minus.

S: You're always up in the air. I thought they didn't work you over hard enough, that's all.

K: Well, why didn't you do it.

S: Well, I was dazzled. No, I tried a little bit, you noticed that. But, they are not just exposed to such radiance often enough.

K: That's of course true, I can't deny that. The real problem is you know, that there aren't that many contingent issues around right now.

S: Right.

K: To really excite their passions.

S: Well, I kinda hoped that we could have had our own sort of shop talk about the negotiations at some point, but I'll have to wait to do that with you, on your next vacation instead of this one. What I called about, I was hoping maybe you could take a minute and talk to me a little bit about what you expect the Liaison Office to do once it gets going there. Do you see any kind of specific priorities--we are going to do the story next week, and nobody really is in a position to talk about it except you.

K: Well we expect it to handle most of the contacts between our two sides, and we wanted to send somebody who really knew our thinking and in whom we had confidence, and could talk to the senior Chinese.

S: Uh huh.

RECLASSIFIED

K: And with some authority.

S: You said your thinking, what do you mean.

K: The thinking of the White House.

S: I see. Now, where do you expect this to be set up, in a diplomatic
enclave out there, or--

K: We have no idea.

S: I see. Well you are talking about--

K: Maybe in the forbidden city.

S: I thought only you get in there--you and the President. What about --
are there any specific things, say

K: Well, you know, the normal business will excellerate, all of these
things are bound to accelerate, and I think the diplomatic contact
which up to now has had to be handled through rather circuitous
channels and very much on a personal basis.

S: Yeah, but I would assume you're still going to handle the political
channel yourself, aren't you with Chou En-Lai.

K: Yeah, but I mean there are a lot of things in the interim that we
you know, I may go there once a year.

S: Uh huh. Well now, the 30 people we are talking about normal--

K: Well there about 10 professionals, nine or 10 professionals, and
then the rest are secretaries, guards--

S: I see. Are you going to have an economic man--

K: That's right. And as in all countries, we'll have an expert on
each political party.

S: (Laughter) I love it when you start speaking French. What about,
for example, things like journalists and--

K: We are pretty sure that that is going to open up a lot.

S: I see. Listen, I'm still trying to get Donovan in there. He said
I can't go again until he goes.

K: Well, tell him to talk to me.

2

DECLASSIFIED

3

S: Well--

K: All it will take is one cover a month. And a friendly story.

S: Yeah, well you've already had that, just about.

K: Were you surprised by Bruce.

S: Well, you know, frankly, I heard he was kinda over the hill.
Physically, and you know--people say he shows his age, to put it gracefully.

K: He's the best man we have.

S: Okay. Who's going to lead this advance group.

K: That hasn't been determined yet.

S: I see. When do you think we'll know from the Chinese when they are going to send their people.

K: When or whom?

S: Well, whom. I heard this fellow, the Treasurer of China, what's his name--

K: Yeah, I've seen that speculated. Look, I got Shultz calling me from Paris.

S: All right. Can I call you back.

K: Well, haven't you got everything you need.

S: Well, what about Shang Wan Chen?

K: We haven't had the official notification.

S: Could I speculate on that, do you think?

K: Well, I'd take it easy.

S: Okay.

K: Okay, I'll talk to you later.

S: All right, thanks.

DECLASSIFIED

Act 1 E017258
by HAROLD GILLIAM

["TelCon\nSecretary Shultz/Mr. Kissinger", "5:42 pm, March 15, 1973", "K: Hello.", "S: Hi, Henry.", "K: Hello, George, how are you.", "S: All right, thank you. We have had a pretty satisfactory session with both Bonn and here, and we have developed a US draft communique, whether it will be the final communique is certainly a long way to be seen, but we showed it in both places and the reaction has been reasonably good.", "K: Right.", "S: Now, we have sent--we have just dispatched a copy to you.", "K: All right.", "S: And, presumably it will be there in a few hours, and I think it's something like that is what comes out will be very much along the lines of the message I received from you.", "K: Right. Well, that's--", "S: I would say that the situation is better than was assumed.", "K: Right. Of course, you know. I don't want to make any comments--(end of tape)", "(Begin new tape) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TelCon

William Downey/Mr. Kissinger

6:50 pm, March 15, 1973

(and John Downey)

K: Hello.

D: Mr. Kissinger, this is Bill Downey.

K: How are you.

D: I'm pretty good considering that my mother isn't so good.
But I couldn't be happier about my brother being home.

K: Well, he makes a marvelous impression on television.

D: Well, he's just in time. Mother has taken a considerable turn for the worse, and we couldn't be more--

K: But she recognized him.

D: Yes, it couldn't have been happier. And he's here and would
like to say thank you personally if he may.

K: Aren't you nice.

JD: Hello, Doctor.

K: Hello, Mr. Downey, how nice to hear from you.

JD: Well, Doctor, it's really great to hear you, and I just wanted to tell you my thanks --

K: Well not at all, we owe you thanks, you've given up a big part of your life, and-- and I feel I know you quite well now.

JD: Well, that's grand. And I certainly appreciate all you did and I find myself feeling great.

K: Well, I'm delighted. Are you going to come to Washington at any point.

JD: Well, I'll be down there sooner or later, sir, but I don't know quite when.

K: Well, when you come will you look in on me.

JD: Oh, I would really love to, sure.

K: Will you do that. Just call the White House and we'll certainly set something up.

CLASSIFIED

JD: Absolutely. I understand you're going on vacation right now.

K: I'm going to Mexico tomorrow and I'll be gone about ten days.

JD: Well, have a good time, then.

K: Thank you and I hope everything works out well for you, and anything we can do, you let us know.

JD: I shall. Okay, good.

K: Very thoughtful of you to call.

JD: Well, I just wanted you to know, you know, it's really great.

K: You're very nice.

JD: Bye.

K: Bye.

RECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258

By DAVID HARVEY ALBSON

TELCORN

Secy Bill Simon (Treasury)/Mr. Kissinger

7:55 p.m., March 15, 1973

S: Good evening, Dr. Kissinger, Bill Simon.

K: Have you seen that?

S: Yes, sir, I just got it and I just went over it.

K: What do you think?

S: Well, I have to question George on the wording. It looks fine. The 6 loaders, of course, doing it jointly -- whether that works in a two and a quarter gain or not remains to be seen. The significant part of it, if it's read the way I read it, those countries represented at the meeting with parities or central rates have suspended any obligation to intervene to maintain market exchange rates within established margins. And then you have at the top of the second page when it said, "At it's initiative we will intervene when necessary and desirable in its own market acting in a flexible manner in the light of market conditions." Well, that gives us all the latitude not to have the inter- vention and to keep the uncertainty in the market which will hinder the speculators. If I read it correctly, that is correct. We don't give them --

K: Will that drive the Europeans together, this arrangement?

S: Well, basically -- You've only got half of them together and while they sit there and they say by golly, six of them are now floating jointly. The UK, Italy, and several others, Canada, etcetera, are all floating by themselves and enjoying it very much. Now if over a long period of time this float worked properly, then perhaps they would be together.

K: Um-humm.

S: But I don't know how they can work that out, I truly don't.

K: Well, I think we've worked out -- we've put ourselves in a good strategic position. We couldn't bust the Common float without getting into a hell of a political fight.

S: No, sir.

K: But we should create conditions in which the Common float is as hard to work as possible.

S: Well, let me tell you how that can be done.

K: By not intervening.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority E01725f
By HAROLD ECHSLEY