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1 you about the half or more, or more than half who did not get

2 returned, was it that those people had been killed, or was it

3 that those people had been held as prisoners afterwards?

4 Answer: He presumed they had been killed.

5 Question: When you learned this information, did you

6 give it to anyone else in the United States Government?

7 Answer: Yes. I reported it to the DIA.

8 Question: Did you ever have a discussion with

9 Dr. Kissinger about this information that you had about French

10 POW's?

11 Answer: Yes.

12 Question: So there's no question in your mind.

13 Answer: His reaction, as I remember it, was well, they
14 probably won't kill ours because they want more from us than
15 they do from the French. The French, all they wanted was the
16 French to leave. From us, they wanted help to reconstruct.

17 So he was somewhat more optimistic in the case of ours.

18 And then, from your deposition, question: Were you
19 familiar with the so-called French experience that the French
20 had suffered after Dien Bien Phu in the Fifties, after the
21 defeat of Dien Bien Phu?

22 Answer: In a general way.

23 Question: Are you familiar with the problems that the
24 French had had in making the Vietnamese account for the

25 soldiers that they lost?

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1 consummated agreement, but merely a shift in Hanoi's modus

2 operandi. We will probably have little chance of maintaining

3 the agreement without evident hair trigger U.S. readiness,

4 which may be in fact challenged at any time, to enforce the
5 provisions."

6 That was my basic view then, and it's my basic view now.

7 It did not matter whether we could have added one or another

8 clause to the agreement. The provisions with respect to the

9 missing in action were perfectly plain. They just didn't

10 carry them out.

11 Senator Grassley: Let me apologize if need be. I'm not

12 here to say I could do a better job. I could not have done a

13 better job. I'm only here to get whatever information we can

14 of the process at that time, of the thought process at that

15 time.

16 Is it plausible in your mind that the Vietnamese held

17 back prisoners, either in Vietnam or Laos, expecting to

18 receive reparations? I mean, if reparations were their

19 primary concern, and if we didn't give it to them, and then

20 you consider the lesson of the French experience, isn't it

21 logical that the North Vietnamese would have held back some of

22 our men until they got their reparations?

23 Dr. Kissinger: Senator, until 1976 they never made that

24 claim, and they need a lot of hinting from Americans before

25 they even said that.

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1 Answer: I was translating.

2 Dr. Kissinger: Senator Smith brought out already this
3 morning a statement from Ambassador Habib, which I confirmed.

4 There's no doubt that the Vietnamese welcomed or desired some
5 reparations. Again, I must say -- the Chairman calls Mr.

6 Codinha the star of the show. I noticed he smiled when you
7 read the word "bridled," because it showed him that I was not
8 discriminating against him, and I can bridle also at
9 foreigners.

10 And I think you have the records, and I believe you will
11 find from the record which we're talking about events that
12 happened 20 years ago. I think you will find that the issue
13 of reparations -- first of all, that I consistently rejected
14 and violently rejected the word "reparations," and Walters says
15 it.

16 Secondly, I think you will find that if you look at the
17 record, that the issue of economic aid arose only late in the
18 negotiations after the principles of other issues had already
19 been settled. But I won't swear to that; you have the
20 records, so it's very easy to determine. And from that, it is
21 easy to determine the relative priority that was given.

22 My recollection is not the one of General Walters, who
23 was, after all, doing it from memory and 20 years ago.

24 Chairman Kerry: The ubiquitous Mr. Codinha tells me that
25 it was 1971 it was first discussed.

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1 some attention to hear an answer to that challenge and hear an
2 answer to that question. It is, after all, part of what we
3 are focused on with this inquiry.

4 I wanted to go through briefly what occurred to me to be
5 potential answers, what I think has been offered, and ask you
6 to comment and ultimately ask whether or not there were things
7 you might have done, things the President might have done,
8 that could have helped.

9 First of all, it strikes me that we could have spoken
10 out. When I say we, I mean both the Congress and the
11 executive. You pointed out, I thought rather forcefully,
12 that, indeed, the President did speak out specifically
13 indicating that he had not complied with the requirements for
14 full accounting.

15 You have indicated a number of areas where you spoke out,
16 including a statement, quote: We are extremely dissatisfied
17 with the results of that part of the agreement, referring to
18 the accountability. It strikes me any fair observer would
19 find that you did speak out.

20 Secondly, it seems to me that you could demand a full
21 accounting at the negotiating table. As I understand your
22 testimony, you have indicated that you did that on numerous
23 occasions.

24 Thirdly, one option that seems to be present itself is to
25 threaten to bomb North Vietnam, or take other military

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1 Congress we resume the bombing.

2 Well the issue was clear then. A majority of the Senate
3 voted not to give the president leverage to force the
4 Vietnamese to account. Would that have worked? I do not
5 know. I suspect there is not a member on this committee that
6 would know.

7 But that covers the first four ideas that I have heard
8 mentioned. The fifth is simply to pay ransom. I do not know
9 if you favored that. I suspect, or at least I understand that
10 you did not. But the facts are that Vietnam did not offer to
11 exchange prisoners for a ransom, or at least as far as we
12 know, and Congress acted to deny the reparations payment or
13 the payments that were talked about in the negotiations; that
14 door was closed.

15 Those are five things that could have been done; I have
16 not heard others mentioned. But it seems to me if someone is
17 going to be critical, they ought to be able to suggest what
18 you should have done or what you did not do that you could
19 have done. And that is really my question to you. Looking
20 back on it with hindsight now, is there something more you
21 would have liked to have seen done in that period?

22 Dr. Kissinger: Senator, you have stated my view on the
23 matter very well. It would have probably taken me twice as
24 long to make these points. But I agree with the options you
25 presented. I believe that that was a fair statement of them.

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