[Y]

19

Q. I can't help but wonder whether we are incapable of defining our national interest until someone else presents a sufficiently large threat?

A. That has been historically true but will no longer be adequate in the contemporary world. The art will be to act early enough before a threat has become overwhelming and without having it turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Q. How do you think the Clinton Administration is doing on an operational level?

A. It doesn't have the right mix people of people, or, rather, it has integrated them independently of their individual qualities. I think highly of (Secretary of State Warren) Christopher, but the mix between the key people is not right. When you have a president who really does not seem attuned to foreign policy, there should be a process that leads to a philosophical resolution and by which he can force

X

[Y]

20

himself to think about where he is trying to go rather than to
reduce it all to tactical issues.

If what I read is correct - that Talbott could influence the
President on Russian policy against the opposition of
Christopher and Lake - it is indeed a dangerous procedure for
one man with no real governmental experience and very
passionate views to be instituting the key policies. One could
say that this had happened during the Nixon-Kissinger period,
but there we had a president who had thought a great deal
about foreign policy and who was very conceptually oriented,
which led to a certain balance. From that point of view, I
cannot say the process is working very well. In the current
Administration, there is more emphasis on selling whatever it
is that is being done at a particular moment than on analyzing
its intrinsic worth.

X

[Y]

21

Q. Christopher made a couple of runs at filling the vacuum at the top by trying to get some time on Clinton's schedule for precisely the kind of discussion you are talking about - non-tactical, non-crisis discussion of where we are heading, what we are here for, but Clinton keeps knocking it off the schedule.

A. That's a big mistake. I'm not saying that this is necessarily the model to follow, but I used to spend hours with (President) Nixon. Not on tactics, which really didn't interest Nixon, but on where we were trying to go. Ford was less conceptual but we still spent a minimum of half an hour every day whenever we were both in town, on the theory that it could not be that the President and the Secretary of State had nothing to talk about. Usually it was longer than a half hour. And when we didn't have current problems, we picked an issue, the Near East or whatever, and talked about it. I think that

X

[Y]

22

it's definitely a big mistake not to have that kind of
dialogue.

If you look at football teams, what is the difference
between a great and an ordinary team? It's in the nuance of
execution. It's not that one has a super-duper play which the
other does not. Everyone knows more or less the same things.
The way you get outstanding policy is to think about your
basic concept so that when something important comes along you
don't have to discuss the goal and can focus on tactics. But
if everything has to be started from scratch and then you have
to get ready for a presidential trip, it is human nature that
we prepare for the photo opportunity.

X

JAN-29-1994 11:40

FROM

TO

12124213934 P.01

HENRY KISSINGER TAPE -- Edited 1/28 -- Take One

Q. Everyone has drawn a parallel between this period and the
immediate post-World War II period; we are present at the
creation of something but we don't know what it is yet. Can
you bring any coherence to what to most of us is still a very
incoherent picture? What are the defining facts of this new
era and what should be the defining principles of an American
foreign policy?

It is easier to define the problem than to give an answer. And I do not want to say that I have a precise blueprint in my mind and that the difficulties we are facing are because nobody is following my blueprint. I would say that some difficulties we will be facing are due to the fact that nobody is asking the questions. It took us about four to five years after World War II to come up with a design.

The defining characteristic of the period is that in essence, Americans have been Wilsonian in this century, with the possible exception of Richard Nixon. And that therefore American foreign policy has been justified in ideological terms. Once the ideological conflict was defined after the war, it was given a geostrategic concept, --- containment. But the impetus behind containment and behind the American effort in the postwar period was not that there are general principles of foreign policy but that there was a specific

01/28/JAN 28 '94 21:09 212-759-0042

LAI SYNDICALE

P.1

[Y]

HENRY KIRSTINGER TAPE -- Edited 1/28 -- Take One

Q. Everyone has drawn a parallel between this period and the immediate post-World War II period; we are present at the creation of something but we don't know what it is yet. Can you bring any coherence to what to most of us is still-a very incoherent picture? What are the defining facts of this new era and what should be the defining principles of an American foreign policy?

A. It is easier to define the problem than to give an answer. And I do not want to say that I have a precise blueprint in my mind and that the difficulties we are facing are because nobody is following my blueprint. I would say that some of the difficulties we will be facing are due to the fact that nobody is asking the questions. It took us about four to five years after World War II to come up with a design.

The defining characteristic of the period is that, in essence, Americans have been Wilsonian in this century, with the possible exception of Richard Nixon. And that, therefore, American foreign policy has been justified in ideological terms. Once the ideological conflict was defined after the war, it was given a geostrategic concept, -- containment. But the impetus behind containment and behind the American effort in the postwar period was not that there were general principles of foreign policy but that there was a specific

JAN-29-1994 11:42 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.05

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

the equation.

On the other side, ~~my type of analysis~~ focuses on the question of what reality will impose on us. Now the query is, can you marry the two approaches? And that has not yet been done. Lake's speech had very elevated attitudes towards the Wilsonian tradition. And he was trying to oppose his concept ~~of the containment concept.~~ But he gave it me a lot of credit for ~~operational meaning~~. On the other hand, when George Kennan put forward containment as a policy toward the Soviet Union, he had a clear definition: To resist communism wherever it might be. And that was an operational definition that was something you could do.

Now enlargement of democracy operates on a number of assumptions which I think are extremely dubious. One is that democracies don't make wars. There have never been enough democracies to test it. But in Yugoslavia most of these governments are more or less popularly elected. I think in the ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and I suspect that the wars in the Middle East are extremely popular. And one of the reasons the various leaders do it is because they think it gets the public support, not it undermines public support. Secondly, I'm not sure that market economics automatically leads to democracy and so I think the premise may be wrong. I want to make it clear, I think democracy is the best form of government. But I don't see that automatic evolution.

But, Assuming these propositions are true, do we have any

JAN-29-1994 11:47 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.14

[Y]

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

at the top by trying to get some time on Clinton's schedule for precisely the kind of discussion that you're talking about -- non-tactical, non-crisis discussion of where we are heading, what are we here for, and Clinton keeps knocking it off the schedule.

HK: That's a big mistake. I mean I'm not saying this is necessarily the model, but I used to spend hours with (President) Nixon. Not on tactics, which really didn't interest Nixon, but on where we were trying to go -- endlessly. I had, with Ford, who was less conceptual than Nixon still, we had a minimum of half an hour every day that we were both in town, on the theory that it could not be that the President and Secretary of State had nothing to talk about. Usually it was more. And when we didn't have current problems, we picked an issue, let's say the Near East or whatever and said what are we thinking about? I think it's a, definitely it's a big mistake.

If you look at football teams, what is the difference between a great and ordinary team? It's nuances and execution. It's not that one has a super-duper play that the other one doesn't have. Everyone knows more or less the same thing. The way you get outstanding policy is to think about your basic concept so that when something important comes along you don't have to discuss it anymore and then you can really think about tactics. But if everything has to be started from scratch, and then, you have to prepare for a presidential

JAN-29-1994 11:47 FROM

TO

12124213934 P.15

[Y]

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

trip, it is human nature that we prepare for the photo
opportunity for the television screen. And then you get into
these vague statements, I mean, when you take the Middle East,
I've been arguing for years. What is it about the word 'peace'
that we are so concerned about? Why can't we reduce the
Arab-Israeli issue to concrete things both sides have to do.
And, so that we don't get paid off with a word that isn't
operational. What would that lead us to? I don't know. But, to
prepare for Assad (President Hafez Assad of Syria) just
before you have to see him puts you at a big disadvantage.
end interview

JAN-31-1994 09:23

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.01

Kissinger LA TIMES Interview - Edited - 1/31/93 - Take One

Q. Everyone has drawn a parallel between this period and the
immediate post-World War II period; we are present at the
creation of something but we don't know what it is yet. Can
you bring any coherence to what is to most of us still a very
incoherent picture? What are the defining facts of this new
era, and what should be the defining principles of an American
foreign policy?

A. The defining characteristic of the post-World War II
period has been that, in essence, American presidents since
Woodrow Wilson have all been Wilsonian, with the possible
exception of Richard Nixon. Thus, American foreign policy has
been justified in ideological rather than in strategic terms.
After World War II, once the ideological conflict was
recognized, it was invested with the geostrategic concept of

JAN-31-1994 09:23

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.02

2
containment. But the impetus behind containment, and behind
the whole American effort in the postwar period, was not
general principles of foreign policy but the existence of a
specific threat which had to be countered and which was
perceived, above all, in moral terms.

Today, we are in a world in which there is no clear-cut
ideological threat. And there is no clear-cut concept of
geopolitics or geostrategy in American thinking. Even if there
were, we would have a difficult time applying it to
contemporary circumstances. This, I think, is the problem
which American foreign policy is facing at the moment.

It is compounded by the fact that, when an old system
disintegrates and a new world order emerges, all kinds of
tensions accompany it. But these are symptoms, not causes, nor
can Americans solve them from their traditional perspective of
seeking final answers. We are therefore at present in

JAN-31-1994 09:24 FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.03

[Lc]

3

transition from a period of ideological conflict to one of
open-ended process with no clear-cut terminal point and about
which we haven't really come to any conclusion.

Q. If you were to try to imagine a final outcome, what would it look like? And how would American power be used?

A. There are two main types of problems in the world today. First, the traditional problems of equilibrium among nations, and, secondly, genuinely global problems - nuclear proliferation, the population explosion, technological development - which have nothing to do with the equilibrium.

How, then, is America to apply the concept of equilibrium in
the post-modern world? In order to apply the concept of the
balance of power, you have to know what your vital interests
are. What is it you will defend no matter how it is
challenged? America has never faced that issue before. It did
not have the Monroe Doctrine, which was gradually expanded

JAN-31-1994 09:24

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.04

[lc]

4

until it had attained a hegemonic character. But that was mostly in relation to conjectural, not actual, threats. America has never had a concrete definition of the vital interest in the way Britain did when it maintained that the Low Countries must never be occupied by a major Continental power, or in the way France did when it was still dominant and adhered to the rule that Central Europe must not be controlled by a single power.

It is probably a vital American interest to see to it that Eurasia not be controlled by a single power center. In essence, we have fought two wars over this issue. And we have a certain interest in the equilibrium, especially in Asia. With respect to Europe, I think we have learned to live with a United Europe, though probably because we don't think it can be more powerful than we are.

JAN-31-1994 09:25 FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.05

5

We would, for instance, have to resist if the whole area
from Europe through Russia and China were being dominated by a
single country. Even if all of the countries of Asia formed a
single group, it would pose a serious long-term problem for
America. Therefore, in Asia - in the interplay of Japan,
Russia, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia - we are in the
position of having to play a role very similar to that of
Britain in the 19th century vis-a-vis Europe. The trouble is
that we have no theory or experience for such a role. The
diplomacy sketched here will require us to be closer to each
of the participants than they are to each other. This is one
reason we should be reluctant to break with China. I think the
Administration is recognizing this, or at least is moving in
that direction.

Q. Even though China has the potential to exercise hegemony
in Asia?

TO

7590042 P.06

[Lc]

6

A. Right now it does not. But 25 years from now, it could well be that we will have to move to limit the influence of China. But that is not the case today, though it could be even in 15-20 years, and we should then act accordingly.

Q. Let's go back for a minute to the fundamental principle you are trying to lay out here. You know better than anyone else that Americans tend to be uncomfortable with geostrategic equations.

A. Absolutely. It is one of our problems.

Q. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's National Security Adviser, last year gave a speech he had worked on for a long time that was intended to set forth some kind of set of principles, and I'd like to know your reaction to it. He came up with a word, "enlargement," which tried to give American foreign policy an ideological basis.

JAN-31-1994 09:25

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.07

A. American foreign policy has historically been based on the notion that America has a unique role in the world. And every president has adhered to this theme. In the context of that symbiotic relationship which presidents have with their publics, they all realized that their publics needed some such affirmation. That is one side of the equation, which Lake correctly emphasized.

On the other hand, it is necessary to analyze what reality is imposing on us independent of our values. The query is, can the two approaches be combined? That has not yet been done.

Lake's speech contained very elevated attitudes based on the Wilsonian tradition. And he was trying to oppose his concept of the enlargement of democracy to the concept of containment.

Yet he gave it no operational definition. When George Kennan had put forward containment as a policy toward the Soviet Union, his had been a clear definition: to resist communism

JAN-31-1994 09:26 FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.08

wherever it might press. Now that was an operational definition, being something that one could actually do.

Enlargement of democracy operates from a number of assumptions which are not self-evident. One is that democracies don't make wars. But there have never been enough democracies to test this. In the former Yugoslavia, most of the governments are more or less popularly elected; the ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union and the wars in the Middle East are in fact extremely popular there. And one of the reasons the various leaders are involved in these conflicts is that they think it gets them public support.

Secondly, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that market economics automatically translates into democracy. I consider democracy the best form of government, but I don't see evolution toward it as being automatic. Do we really know enough about conditions in every country to prescribe how

JAN-31-1994 09:26

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.09

[Lc]

9

to go through the stages which took hundreds of years in the few operational democracies that do exist? And, when we become that intrusive, might we not be contributing to nationalist reactions? To what extent is American pressure helping reform in Russia or impeding reform in Russia?

Clinton said in Europe that we ought to conduct policy on the basis of the best possible outcome. We should certainly try for that. But a statesman must make allowances for the worst contingency as well. The Clinton Administration was right in trying to help reformist Russia. It went overboard by identifying support for Yeltsin with ignoring normal foreign policy considerations, including symptoms of reemerging Soviet imperialism. The art of policy is to strike a balance between influencing Russian attitudes and Russian calculations, between incentives for restraint and penalties for intransigence.

JAN-31-1994 09:27

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.10

10

Similarly, in the economic field, it is possible that there
will be one global economic system. But it is also possible
that the world will break up into regional groupings. It is
all very well to say that we want non-discriminatory treatment
from the European community, but it is the essence of an
economic community that it be discriminatory. We can try to
make it less discriminatory, as we should. We have to be
prepared for either contingency.

I am a strong supporter of a Western Hemisphere economic
unit for these reasons. If the international system becomes
genuinely global, a Western Hemisphere arrangement facilitates
the growth of the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, if
the system becomes regional, it gives each nation of the
Western Hemisphere a way to compete without encapsulating
itself in 19th century nationalism. Indeed, it gives the
Americas an opportunity to use the Western Hemisphere

JAN-31-1994 09:27

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.11

11
community to attach non-Western Hemisphere nations to the
principles which operate within the Western Hemisphere.

Q. Strobe Talbott (Clinton's nominee for Deputy Secretary of State) said that, not only should our policies aim for the best case, but that, if we declare that we are preparing for the worst case and visibly prepare for the worst case, we are in danger of bringing the worst case about.

A. I disagree. I would argue that it helps Russian reformers if they are warned against the dangers of a return to historic Russian expansionism by pointing to clear-cut Western policies. A country like Poland - partitioned four times in 200 years by Russia and for just five years free of Russian occupation - has every historical reason to be terrified of its neighbor. Nor would I accept the proposition that Russia has a just cause to feel threatened if Poland, the victim, takes security precautions that cannot possibly threaten

JAN-31-1994 09:28

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042

[Lc]

12

Russia. America should pursue a two-track policy. It should provide additional security for Eastern Europe while at the same time enabling Russia to participate in other structures in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields. If Talbott's hope is realized and the best were to happen, after 20 years NATO would become vestigial. What I object to is merging the two and trying to use NATO as an instrument for bringing about the so-called best outcome, which leaves us with no safety net.

## Take Two of Same Tape

Q. I take it that you believe that America is going to be the dominant power in the world as far as we can foresee?

A. By the weight of its powers and its ideals, America will be the most influential country in the next decade. After that, China could become a very powerful country.

JAN-31-1994 09:28

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.13

13

Q. Do you think that the American people are ready to continue this role for another 10 years? And do you think that Clinton has an understanding of our influence? Do you think he's ready to lead the people?

A. The American people have always responded to strong national leadership. In 1937, three Neutrality Acts were passed by the Congress with overwhelming majorities. Yet, three years later, Roosevelt had managed to convince the American people that Germany must not be permitted to win the war.

As yet, Clinton does not appear to have a clear view of international affairs. He is shaped by his youth and by the experiences of his youth, feeling instinctively that an assertion of American influence around the world is not healthy for either America or for the world.

TO

7590042 P.14

14

Clinton is an example of the contemporary style of leadership, which is quite distinct from historical precedents. The modern leader is shaped far more by television and the visual image than he is by the written word, that is by images rather than by concepts. Thus he is more emotional in his response to stimuli and less willing to stick to something over an extended period of time. That affects foreign policy above all, where some notion of what kind of a new world order is essential, one that might take five years to emerge and which must be sustained in the face of being sniped at every day. Our current political process closes its books almost every evening with "Nightline." And if you are in a high office, you are necessarily concerned about your public image. From this point of view, I don't think that Clinton has yet shown strong long-term leadership. On the other hand, he is a man of extraordinary intelligence. And on an issue

JAN-31-1994 09:29

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.15

[Lc]

15

like NAFTA, he came a long way and fought for it with great
courage and skill.

Q. Roosevelt in 1940 and Truman in 1949 were both aided by
large threats which made it easier to express what the
national interest was. We're circling around the question that
we can't escape: if you were the national security adviser and
you were to devise for the president a statement of the
national interest at its core, how would you, where would you,
start?

A. The President made a mistake by including Russia and
Europe in the same trip. They represent two entirely separate
problems. You have a thousand newsmen with you the minute you
hit Brussels, and then you have to worry about what they will
write from Moscow. Then too, Clinton had to deal with the fact
that, in Europe, the generations are changing. The political
structure of Italy has collapsed. In Spain, there is a great

JAN-31-1994 09:29

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.16

[Lc]

16

deal of difficulty. In Germany, there will be a generational
change in leadership within the next five years and perhaps
sooner. Thus, all the European leaders were preoccupied with
their own domestic affairs. They could not afford an argument
with the United States. And they didn't have any clear ideas
about what they wanted. Clinton arrived with a set of answers
with which many of the leaders he encountered did not agree
but which they were also not prepared to resist.

I believe that Clinton would have been better advised if he
had said: "Look, fellows, we're in a new world. We have the
following problems which we haven't solved and toward which we
should develop a common approach: out-of-area conflicts, the
Balkan problem, Russia, Eastern Europe, Islamic
fundamentalism. I'm coming back here on June 6 for the D-Day
celebration. Why don't we use that occasion not to celebrate
our ancient hatreds but our new, common, purposes? In the

JAN-31-1994 09:30

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.17

[ic]

17

meantime, let's create a group of our best people to make recommendations to us." Then, Clinton could have repeated the same message in Prague. And he could have gone to Moscow separately after a Russian Cabinet was formed.

If he had done that, the thoughtful individuals would have had something to rally around. His Partnership for Peace idea is basically a sugarcoated gimmick to sidestep granting the countries of Eastern Europe their request to join NATO. Either Russia or the East European countries will, sooner or later, see it as a subterfuge.

Q. If you were the National Security Advisor now, what would you suggest to the President that our national interests actually are? And how would you try to get a president to focus?

A. First of all, we need to educate the American people that we still have major international interests. America has

JAN-31-1994 09:30 FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.18

[Lc]

18

historically oscillated between global approaches and isolationism: to keep Eurasia from being dominated by a single power; to build new ties across the North Atlantic; to create a Western Hemisphere community; to learn to conduct a balance of power policy.

Q. What, as you look out ten years, are the potential threats that worry you the most?

A. Islamic fundamentalism and mass migrations - for which we have no concept at all. Given the stark distributions of wealth and resources in the world, we could experience migrations similar to those which had occurred at the end of the Roman Empire. And military conflicts of the Bosnian type could spread over a much broader area and with much larger units, leading to a sort of regional anarchy.

JAN-31-1994 09:31

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042

[Lc]

19

A. It doesn't have the right mix people of people, or, rather, it has not integrated their individual qualities. I think highly of (Secretary of State Warren) Christopher, but the mix between the key people is not right. When you have a president who really does not seem attuned to foreign policy, there should be a process that leads to a philosophical resolution and by which he can force himself to think about

JAN-31-1994 09:31

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042

P.20

[L.C.]

20

where he is trying to go rather than to reduce it all to
tactical issues. From that point of view, I cannot say the
process is working very well. In the current Administration,
there is more emphasis on selling whatever it is that is being
done at a particular moment than on analyzing its intrinsic
worth.

A. I think that Christopher's recommendation was wise.

JAN-31-1994 09:31

FROM GOLDHAMMER

TO

7590042 P.21

[L.C.]

21

minimum of half an hour every day whenever we were both in town, on the theory that it could not be that the President and the Secretary of State had nothing to talk about. Usually it was longer than a half hour. And when we didn't have current problems, we picked an issue, the Near East or whatever, and talked about it. I think that it's definitely a big mistake not to have that kind of dialogue.

If you look at football teams, what is the difference between a great and an ordinary team? It's in the nuance of execution. It's not that one has a super-duper play which the other does not. Everyone knows more or less the same things. The way you get outstanding policy is to think about your basic concept so that when something important comes along you don't have to discuss the goal and can focus on tactics. But if everything has to be analyzed from scratch as a deadline

01/28/94 16:51

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☑001

It is easier to define the problem **than** to give an answer. And I do not want to say that I have a **precise** blueprint in my mind and that the difficulties we are facing are because nobody is following my blueprint. I would say that some difficulties we will be facing are due to the fact that nobody's asking the questions. It took us about four to five years after World War II to come up with a design.

The defining characteristic of the period is that in essence, Americans have been **Wilsonian** in this century, with the possible exception of Richard Nixon. And that therefore American foreign policy has been justified in ideological terms. Once the ideological conflict was defined **after** the war, it was given a geostrategic concept, --- containment. But the impetus behind containment and behind the American effort in the postwar period was not that there are general principles of foreign policy but that there was a specific

01/28/94 16:51

213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

002

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

threat that had to be countered. Now we are in a world in
which there is no clear-cut ideological threat. There is no
concept of geopolitics or geostrategy in American thinking.
Even if there were, we would have a hell or a time applying it
to contemporary circumstances. This, I think, is the problem
that American foreign policy faces at the moment.

Now, it is compounded by the fact by the fact that when all
old system disintegrates and a New World Order emerges, all
kinds of tensions accompany it, that are symptoms and not
causes, and which Americans want to solve from the point of
view that there's a conclusive answer. And so I would say we
are in transition from a period where it was possible for one
to define an ideological conflict. We are now in an open-ended
process that we haven't really come to a conclusion about.

HK: You see, I would say there're two types of problems now
in the world. One, classical problems of equilibrium among
nations. Two, genuinely global problems which have nothing to do
with the equilibrium -- nuclear proliferation, population,
development.

Now, how would America apply the concept of power in the
modern world? In order to apply the concept of power you have
to know what our vital interest is. What is it you will
defend, no matter how it is challenged? America has never
faced that problem before. It had the Monroe Doctrine, which
in a way did that. And which was then gradually expanded to be

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

given a really offensive character. But that was as much
ideological as geopolitical. But we have never had a
definition of the vital interest the way Britain used to have,
that the Low Countries could not be occupied by a major
country. Or the way France did, when it was still dominant,
that central Europe could not be governed by a single power. I
would say we probably have a vital interest to see to it that
Eurasia, or Europe and Asia, or maybe even one of them, even
Asia, could not be in the control of a single power center.
And we have a certain interest in equilibrium, especially in
Asia. In Europe I think we have learned to live with a United
Europe. But probably because we don't think it would be more
powerful than we are.

I would say almost clearly that if that whole area from
Europe through Russia to China were dominated by a single
country we would have to resist that. If one took all of the
countries of Asia and formed a single group, that would be a
serious long-term problem for us. And therefore in Asia,
Japan, Russia, China, Korea, we are in the position where we
have to play a role very similar to that of Britain in the
19th century, vis-a-vis of Europe, except we have no theory
for it. We are in the best position to achieve that objective
if we are closer to each of the participants than they are to
each other. And this is one reason I've been always so
reluctant to break with China. I think the administration is
now recognizing that or now moving in the same direction, if

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

for different reasons.

Q. Even though China has the potential to exercise hegemony in Asia? Right now it does not. But 25 years from now it could well be that we have to move to limit the influence of China. I would be totally open to that strategy. It is not the case today. It could easily be in 15-20 years.

Q. Let's me go back for a minute to the fundamental principle you're trying to lay out here. You know better than anyone else Americans tend to be uncomfortable with geostrategic equations.

HK: Absolutely. It's one of our problems.

Q. Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser, last year gave a speech he had worked on for a long time that was intended to set forth some kind of set of principles, and I'd like to know your reaction to it. He came up with a word, enlargement, which tried to give American foreign policy an ideological basis.

HK: If you look at the way Americans have conducted foreign policy, you cannot separate it from the American exceptionalism, from the notion that America has a unique role. And no matter who the President is, he has, they have always insisted on that theme. They have all insisted on it whether they individually meant it or not, and I think the capacity for hypocrisy is exaggerated because they're too busy to be hypocritical. I think they meant it and in that symbiotic relationship that presidents have with the American public, they knew the public needed it. So that's one side of

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

the equation.

On the other side, my type of analysis focuses on the question of what reality will impose on us. Now the query is, can you marry the two approaches? And that has not yet been done. Lakes's speech had very elevated attitudes towards the Wilsonian tradition. And he was trying to oppose his concept to the containment concept. And I give him a lot of credit for it. On the other hand, when George Kennan put forward containment as a policy toward the Soviet Union, he had a clear definition: To resist communism wherever it might rest. And that was an operational definition that was something you could do.

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

idea how they're implemented? Do we really know enough about conditions in every country to prescribe how to go through the stages that took hundreds of years in the few operational democracies that exist? And secondly, when we become this intrusive, may we not create a nationalist, to what extent is American pressure helping reform in Russia and impeding reform in Russia?

You ought to conduct policy so that you're open for the worst and not just for the best contingencies. I noticed that Clinton said in Europe that we ought to conduct policy on the basis of the best possible outcome. Well, I think you have to provide also for the worst. If you look around the world, is it really likely that there will be one totally coherent economic system? Or, is it more likely, or is it at least possible that the world will break up into regional groupings? Well, I think the second is as likely as the first. And in fact if you look at the actual policies of the groups of nations, take the European community, it's all very well to say we want non-discriminatory treatment. But it's the essence of an economic community that is discriminatory that's, you can lower the degree of discrimination. You can make it less decisive, less relevant, and we should.

I'm a strong supporter of a western hemisphere economic unit. For two contradictory reasons. Reason One, if the system is global, then the fact that there's a western hemisphere arrangement facilitates the growth of the western hemisphere. It's not essential but it helps. But if the system is not

KISS/REV/A 01-28-94

global it gives each nation of the western hemisphere a way
for competing without encapsuling itself in the manner of 19th
century nationalism. And indeed it gives you an opportunity to
use your community offensively by attaching non-western
hemisphere nations, to the principles that operate within the
western hemisphere. Which of these outcomes is the more
probable? I would tend to believe the regional outcome is the
more probable.

Q. Strobe Talbott (Clinton's nominee for deputy secretary of state) said that Not only should our policies aim for the best case, but that if we declare that we are preparing for the worst case and to visibly prepare for the worst case we are in danger of bringing about the worst case.

HK: I would not agree that that saying that a country like
Poland, partitioned four times in 200 years by Russia, just
freeing itself from Russian occupation 5 years ago, is
unreasonable if it is terrified of its neighbor. Nor would I
accept the proposition that its neighbor has a right to feel
threatened, if it takes security precautions. I believe this
is a classic case where we could provide some additional
security while at the same time enabling Russia to
participate in other structures in the political, economic,
social, cultural fields -- and where I could visualize that
after 20 years NATO would have become so irrelevant that
people wouldn't worry about it. What I object to is merging
the two, and trying to use NATO as an instrument of bringing
about that so-called best outcome. This is my objection to

01/28/94 16:54

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☑008

KTSS/REV./A 01-29 94

Talbott. If Talbott said we will do what we can but we can't put you (Poland) fully into NATO, but we will show the Russians that we will take Poland's independence very seriously And if we then went to the Russians and said we want you to participate in the European security conference structure, I would strongly support that.

¡End of Side One on McManus tape!

More TK

01/28/94 16:44

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☑001

HENRY KISSINGER TAPE -- Edited 1/28 -- Take Two

Q: I take it that you believe that America is going to be the dominant power in the world as far as we can foresee.

HK: No, that I don't know. I think America by its weight and its idealistic attitude will be the most influential country in the next 10 years. I think China could become a very powerful country.

Q: Do you think that the American people are ready to continue this role for another 10 years? And do you think Clinton has an understanding of our influence? Do you think he's ready to lead the people?

HK: I don't pretend to be an expert on the psychology of the American people. I note however that the American people have always responded to strong national leadership. If one thinks what Franklin Roosevelt did in 1937 --- three neutrality acts were passed by Congress, with overwhelming majorities, and yet three years later Roosevelt has managed to convince the American people to all practical purposes that Germany must not be permitted to win the war. It took him another year to make it effective. And that was almost the act of a single leader.

Now, does Clinton have that fire in his belly? I do not believe that Clinton has a clear view of international

01/28/94 16:44

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☎002

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

PAGE 2

affairs. And I think he's shaped by his youth, the experiences of his youth, in which he instinctively seems to feel that an assertion of American influence around the world is not healthy, either for the world or for us. With which I disagree.

Secondly, I believe that the modern style of leadership, of which he's an example but it would be true of almost, of most conceivable leaders, is totally different from the historical one. The modern leaders are first of all shaped more by television than by books. That means they're shaped by images rather than by concepts. And that means they are more emotional in response to stimuli and less willing to stick to something over an extended period of time. That affects what we're discussing here. You have to have some notion of what kind of a world you're moving towards over a five-year period, in the face of being sniped at every day. And we close our books almost every evening with Nightline. And if you are in high office you are necessarily concerned about the image you make. So from this point of view I don't think Clinton is ready to do it. On the other hand I think he's a man of extraordinary intelligence. And on issues like NAFTA he came a long way and fought it with great courage and great skill.

Q.: In 1940 Roosevelt, in 1949 Truman, were both aided by large threats that made it easier to express what the national interest is. We're circling around on the question that we can't escape: If you were the national security advisor and you were to devise for the President a statement of the

01/28/94 16:45

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☎003

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

national interest at its core, how would you, where would you start?

HK: Well, you know, I think the President made a mistake on this European trip. First of all he made a mistake to include Russia and Europe on the same trip. It was two totally separate problems. And yet when you have a thousand newsmen with you, from the minute you hit Brussels you're worried about what they will write from Moscow.

Second, he faced the following situation: In Europe they're in the process of changing generations. The political structure in Italy has collapsed. In Spain they're in great difficulty. In Germany there will be a change of generation within the next five years and maybe sooner. So all of the European leaders were totally preoccupied with their domestic affairs. They could not afford to fight with the United States. And they didn't have any clear ideas of what they wanted. He arrived with a set of answers. He said here is the answer to these European problems.

I believe he would have done more for Europe and America if he had said Look, fellows, we're in a new world. We have the following problems; we haven't solved them; we may not even know how to solve them: out of area conflicts, Balkan problem, Russia, Eastern Europe. I'm coming back here on June 6 for the invasion celebration. Why don't we use that occasion to get together, in the meantime let's create a group of our best people, to make recommendations to us. Then he could have had the same message in Eastern Europe.

01/28/94 16:45

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☑004

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

PAGE 4

If he had done that then the thoughtful people would have had something to rally around and to occupy themselves.

Q: if you were the National Security advisor now, what would you suggest to the President our national interests actually are? And how would you try to get a president to focus?

HK: I think we have first of all to educate the American people than we still have major international interests. America has historically oscillated between global approaches and isolationism. I think we have to show, tell the Americans, that we have to convey to the American people, that we have to be part of some larger structures now. I know what is not the American national interest, which is self-indulgence or the idea that democracy will magically solve our problems. I think we're too intrusive in Russia, too intrusive and too permissive at the same time.

What, as you look out ten years, what are the potential threats that worry you most?

HK: Islamic fundamentalism. Migration -- for which we have no concept at all. We could have migration similar to what happened at the end of the Roman empire. And military conflict of the Bosnian type over much larger, with much larger units leading to a sort of regional anarchy.

Q. I can't help but wonder whether if we are incapable of defining our national interest until someone else presents a

01/28/94 16:46

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☎005

[c]

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

PAGE 5

sufficiently large threat?

HK: Yeah, but that may be late in the game. That, you know
the art is to catch it early enough without turning it into a
self-fulfilling prophesy.

Q. How do you think the Clinton administration is doing on an
operational level?

HK: They don't have the right mix of people. It's
independent now of their individual qualities. I think more
highly of (Secretary of State Warren) Christopher for example
than the common opinion. But it's not right, the right mix
when you have a president who really seems to me not attuned
to foreign policy. In other words, has not thought about it.
there ought to be some process by which he is forcing himself
to think about where he's trying to go, rather than reduce it
to tactical issues.

If what I read is correct, that Talbot could convince him
(on Russian policy) against the opposition of Christopher and
Lake, that's a dangerous procedure if one man who has no real
governmental experience but very passionate views can
institute the key policies. You can say this happened in the
Nixon-Kissinger period but there was a president who had
thought a huge amount about foreign policy. So there was a
certain, there was a certain balance. So from that point of
view I don't think the process is working very well. They're
more eager to sell whatever it is they're doing at a
particular moment than to analyze.

Q. Christopher made a couple of runs at fixing the vacuum

01/28/94 16:46

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

006

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

If you look at football teams, what is the difference
between a great and ordinary team? It's nuances and execution.
It's not that one has a super-duper play that the other one
doesn't have. Everyone knows more or less the same thing. The
way you get outstanding policy is to think about your basic
concept so that when something important comes along you don't
have to discuss that anymore and then you can really think
about tactics. But if everything has to be started from
scratch, and then, you have to prepare for a presidential

01/28/94 16:46

☎213 237 3769

LAT SYNDICATE

☑007

KISS/REV/B 01-28-94

PAGE 7