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than agreements—

all the more so as the arguments are not finally strategic ones.

The insistent opposition to national nuclear forces within the Alliance inevitably sharpened inter-allied disputes. It involved not only technical issues but--whether we wanted to or not--an intervention in the domestic politics of allied governments. To ask a government to admit that a policy it has pursued for over a decade at heavy expense is bankrupt is to force it to swallow a bitter pill. When this is done by a foreign government, tensions are inevitable. We should only ask ourselves how we would react if an allied government insisted publicly and repeatedly that a major US weapons program is "provocative," "dangerous" and "prone to obsolescence."

Thus our strategic doctrine inevitably became involved in the domestic disputes of allies. This not only magnified the problem but it also led to a curious reversal of electoral positions. In Great Britain, in Germany and to a lesser extent even in Italy, those who had been most responsible for close NATO ties found themselves under attack by groups some of which had in the past not been noted

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either for their commitment to the Alliance or their commitment
to defense programs. Of course we should be happy when there is
a genuine change of heart. But it would be dangerous to take every
agreement with reservations
assertion at face value.

Finally, it is important that we understand just what
is implied by the proposal that there be no European nuclear
programs. We may have analytical truth on our side in our strategic
assessment. But Europeans, living on a Continent covered with ruins
testifying to the fallibility of human foresight may be closer
to historical truth. They feel in their bones that history is
more complicated than system analysis. They have too much
experience with the mNVANCES of interpretation that are possible
with all formal commitments. They do not believe that they must
be able to describe the exact circumstances in which they might
have to rely on their nuclear forces in order to wish to reserve
some degree of control over their destiny.

For wah what we are asking of them is to leave the m nuclear
field not only for now but forever. This is a great deal to demand
of a sovereign state--however closely allied. No one could have

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foreseen at the beginning of any decade in this century what
the world would look like at its end.
In trying to end the
nuclear program of our allies we must take care not to wreck their
will to resist.

Perhaps the best statement of the concerns of those who are
not willing to give up their identity in nuclear matters is from
a
two men who have actively promoted the multilateral force.

Arguing against the Nassau agreement, Robert Bowie spoke before
the WEU Assembly as follows on December 3, 1963: "Britain has
retained its national command structure and the right to withdraw
them at its option. This means that they certainly could not be
counted upon by any of the others to be available in case of need."

In fact the British force is much more closely geared
into NATO than the Strategic Air Command.

Since the issue of nuclear control has become so much a
question of prestige and since feelings have run so deep, it is
not surprising that the arguments often take the form of

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### III Purpose of Strategy: Doctrine

There are in fact two debates going on in AN NATO: (a) about the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy (b) about the control of nuclear weapons.

I will deal with only the second of these issues because whatever the view of the relative role of nuclear and conventional weapons, the control question would confront NATO.

The question of control has two aspects: (a) participation in the right to trigger weapons (b) Participation in the right to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

Any solution has to take into account the following facts:

1. NATO is an alliance of sovereign states threatened by a unitary state.

2. The Soviet Union can threaten individual allies--some of which are not nuclear countries. The retaliatory threat has to be made against the Soviet Union which possesses the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world.

3. Any strategic doctrine must be able to be carried out over an extended period. Solutions that cannot be maintained over

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an indefinite period or measures which create more difficulties

later are counterproductive.

4. A doctrine to be viable must take account not only of

strategic but also of political and psychological factors. It is easy to ridicule the scenario of French maneuvers in the fall of 1963. However, it corresponded to the French experience of 1940 and the previous two decades of frustration. Similarly, the latent German insecurity can be explained by the history of the last forty years. The memories of our allies should be as real factors for our policy makers as the analysis of weapons systems.

5. Any doctrine should be formulated with an awareness of

the psychological frame-work. Agreement with a given strategic doctrine can involve one of two arriere-pensees: "If pressed, this is what I will do." Or it can involve the notion: "If this is all I can do, I will do nothing."

In other words, we should ask ourselves: Do allies understand doctrine? Do they believe in it? Why do they accept it.?

A too complex theory may promote not cohesion but a sense of impotence. Agreement with current US doctrine may mean a sincere