- 4 -

American strategy not only failed to answer the problem of the guerrillas -- which in turn were the military force of which the Vietnamese civilians were most aware -- it supplied no frame-work for negotiations. It could succeed, if at all, only through the complete defeat of North Vietnam which in turn was prevented by the restrictions imposed by the overall international situation. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins, if he does not lose. The conventional army loses, if it does not win.

The problem for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, in short, was simpler than that of the United States. The United States had to conduct its operations to lay the basis for an eventual withdrawal. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong needed in being merely to keep/forces sufficiently strong to dominate the population after the United States' forces tired of the war.

- 5 -

Thus we fought a military war. Our opponents fought a political war. We sought victory; our opponent aimed for our psychological exhaustion. The North Vietnamese used their main forces the way a bullfighter uses his cape -- to keep us hanging in areas of marginal political importance. Since they made no attempt to hold territory, our strategy of attrition was bound to be stillborn: the majority of military operations was initiated by Hanoi enabling them to regulate their casualties within these limits at least.

Finally, our military operations have little relation-
ship to our declared political objectives. President Johnson
had announced repeatedly that we would be ready to negotiate
at any moment, anywhere, unconditionally. This in effect left
the timing of negotiations to the other side. But our military
deployment could be effective, if at all, only in case of total
victory; it was not well designed to support a negotiation
short of surrender by the opponent. For purposes of negotiations
we would have been better off with 100 percent control of sixty

- 6 -

percent of the country (to set up an unambiguous bargaining
counter), than with sixty percent control of 100 percent of
the country.

Our strategy not only failed to support our diplomacy,
it also produced an incongruity between our conception of
security and that of the Vietnamese villages. American
maps tended to show three kinds of control: government,
contested and Viet Cong. There have been many complicated
criteria but in essence, the first category included all
villages which contained some governmental authority; the
second, areas slated to be entered by governmental cadres.
This representation, based on the notion that control was
exclusive, did not do justice to the realities of Vietnam.
The fact has been that the government controlled eighty
percent of the country in the daytime, in the sense that
government troops could move anywhere they went in
sufficient force. The VietCong dominated a large percentage --
hard to estimate -- at night. For the villages, the dominant

[y]

- 7 -

reality was not the presence of government during the day
but its absence at night. Governmental cadres invariably
withdrew from the villages into the district or provincial
towns at dark. But if armed teams of administrators con-
sidered the villages unsafe at night, the villagers could
hardly be expected to resist the guerrillas. The typical
pattern in Vietnam has always been dual-control with the
villages leaning toward whichever side seemed to be physically
preponderant. The security map for the Vietnamese population
did not coincide with that for the Americans in Vietnam.

The non-military side of the pacification effort had
little impact on this state of affairs. It was based on
the propositions that governmental stability depended on
popular support and that popular support could be won by
raising the level of economic activity in the countryside.
These assumptions were dubious on several grounds. In
Vietnam, governments tend to be popular because they are
strong, not the other way around. The tradition of the
"mandate of heaven" relates legitimacy to governmental

- 8 -

1. Secondly, the root causes of governmental instability in Vietnam are not economic. They have to do with the transition from a mandarin to a modern society; from developing a sense of legitimacy which is institutional rather than personal. Economic programs produced stability in Europe because existing institutions were threatened above all by the gap between expectations and reality. In Vietnam -- as in most developing countries -- the overwhelming issue is not to butress but to develop governmental legitimacy. The political power of the Viet Cong derives in part from terror; in part from the ability to develop a sense of political legitimacy. One ironic aspect of the war in Vietnam is that while we profess an idealistic philosophy, our failures have been due to an excessive reliance on material factors; the Communists, by contrast, holding to a materialistic interpretation of the world, owe their success to their ability

1. For a splendid discussion of this problem, see Francis Fitzgerald, "The Struggle and the War: The Maze of Vietnamese Politics" in *Atlantic Monthly*, August 1967

[y]

- 9 -

to supply an answer to the question of political
legitimacy.

The TET offensive brought to a head the accumulated
weaknesses of the American position. As with every aspect
of the war, almost any assertion made about it is likely
to be true. It is true that from a strictly military point
of view, the offensive was an American victory. Viet Cong
casualties were very great; in many provinces the Viet
Cong infrastructure of guerrillas and shadow administrators
surfaced and could be severely hurt by American forces.

At the same time, the issue of the war has never been
purely, or perhaps even primarily, military. On the
psychological level, two sets of expectations have been in
conflict. The United States and Saigon have promised that
they would be able to protect those who had thrown in their
lot. The Viet Cong had never claimed that they were able
to provide permanent protection; they had threatened

- 10 -

permanent retribution to those who had collaborated with
Saigon or the United States. From this aspect, the TET
offensive represented a victory for the Viet Cong premises.

Some twenty provincial capitals were occupied by the Viet
Cong. Though none were held for more than a few days
(except Hue), the Viet Cong were there long enough to
penalize those they had labelled collaborators. Moreover,
while the word "secure area" never meant the same to
Vietnamese civilians as to Americans, it applied best to
the provincial capitals. This was precisely where the TET
offensive took its most severe toll. The Viet Cong had
made a point which does not have to be repeated to be
politically effective: there are no secure areas for
Vietnamese civilians. This has compounded the already
great tendency of the Vietnamese population to await
developments and not to commit itself irrevocably to the
Saigon government.

- 11 -

The TET offensive had other results: the withdrawal of government troops from the countryside to the protection of cities and the consequent increase in Viet Cong activity in the countryside even in the daytime. The most important consequence was political: the TET offensive marked the watershed of the American effort; it meant that existing programs had run out of time. No matter how effective our actions henceforth, the prevalent strategy could no longer achieve its objectives in a period acceptable to the American political process.

The refusal to send the large additional forces requested by General Westmoreland -- reported to be on the order of 200 thousand -- forced a change in United States' strategy and a gradual withdrawal to the populated areas.

This set the stage for President Johnson's speech of March 31, which ushered in the current negotiations.

- 12 -

## II. THE ENVIRONMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

Of course, the popular picture that negotiations began in May is only partially correct. The United States and Hanoi have rarely been out of touch ever since the American commitment began to escalate. Not all these contacts have been face to face. Some have been by means of public pronouncements. Between 1965 and 1968, the various parties have publicly stated their positions in a variety of forums: Hanoi has announced Four Points, the NLF has put forth Five Points, Saigon has Seven Points and the United States -- perhaps due to its larger bureaucracy -- has promulgated Fourteen.

These points indicate that there is a fairly wide area of agreement on some general principles. These include that the Geneva accords could form the basis of a settlement, that the United States' forces will ultimately be withdrawn, that the reunification of Vietnam should come about by peaceful means only, that Vietnam after a settlement not contain foreign bases. The United States has indicated that

- 13 -

three of Hanoi's Four Points -- are acceptable.

There is disagreement about the status of Hanoi's forces in the South; indeed Hanoi has yet to admit that it has forces in the South -- though it has prepared a "fall-back position" to the effect that North Vietnamese forces in the South cannot be considered "external." The role of the NLF is equally in dispute. Saigon rejects a separate political role for the NLF; the NLF considers Saigon a puppet regime. There is disagreement about what those propositions which sound alike really mean or how they are to be enforced.

In addition, to those negotiations by public pro-
nouncements, there have been many secret contacts which
have been described in many books and articles. 1 It has
been alleged that these contacts have failed because of a
lack of imagination or a failure of coordination within our
government. (There have also been charges of deliberate
sabotage). A fair assessment of these criticisms will not

1. The fullest account is to be found in Kraslow and Loory, *The Secret Search For Peace in Vietnam*, Random House, 1968.

- 14 -

be possible for many years. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to stress that those critics who imply that the
greatest obstacle to progress has been lack of ingenuity
almost surely misunderstand the problem. The issues in
Vietnam are too complex for rapid resolution. Good will
may not always have been present; but even were it to
motivate all sides, dramatic results might be delayed.
For all parties face enormous difficulties.

Both Hanoi and the United States confront the problem that ultimately the issue of the war turns on a psychological problem: the state of mind of the population of South Vietnam. The Vietnamese people have lived under foreign rule through the greater part of its history. It has maintained a remarkable cultural and social cohesion by being finely attuned to the realities of power. The national symbol is not by accident the bamboo shoot which bends but rarely breaks in the wind and which rights itself after a holocaust. Survival in these conditions

- 15 -

has meant to calculate -- almost instinctively -- the
real balance of forces. For the people of South Vietnam --
as almost surely for Hanoi and the NLF -- negotiations are
not a different stage but a continuation of the existing
process in a different dimension. If negotiations leave
the impression that they are primarily a camouflaged
surrender, there will be nothing left to negotiate.
Support for the side which seems to be losing will collapse.
Thus, all the parties in the war are aware -- Hanoi
explicitly, we in a more complicated, bureaucratic way --
that the way things are done is almost as important as what
is done. The choreography of how one enters negotiations,
what is settled first and in what manner is almost as
important as the substance; in fact, it is inseparable from
the substance.

Thus a series of stalemates result at least in part
from objective difficulties within South Vietnam and not
necessarily from American unimaginativeness or North
Vietnamese obstinacy. On its merits, the debate about the

- 16 -

site of the conference -- extending over a period of six
weeks -- was trivial. Judged intellectually, the six
weeks were "wasted." But they did score a useful
function: they enabled the United States to let Saigon
get used to the idea that there would be negotiations.
It would not be surprising if Hanoi had a similar problem
with the NLF.

The situation confronted by Washington and Hanoi
internationally, is scarcely less complex. Much of the
bitter debate in the United States about the war in Vietnam
has been conducted in terms of the categories of 1961 or
1962. The failure to analyze adequately the geopolitical
importance of Vietnam thus has indeed contributed to the
current dilemma. But when over five hundred thousand
Americans are engaged after three years of war, Vietnam
has become important by the mere fact of American involvement.

- 17 -

Other nations can gear their actions to ours only on the basis of our performance. "Credibility" or "prestige" are not empty phrases; they are a nation's principle coin in relating itself to others. It is true that the Vietnamese war is highly unpopular in many countries; though the intensity of the criticism seems to increase with distance from the scene. It does not follow that we can remove the charge of bad judgment by a demonstration of incompetence. Even critics are unlikely to be reassured by a complete collapse of the American effort in Vietnam. Those whose safety or positive goals depend on American promises could only be dismayed. Since world order depends on a significant American contribution, simply liquidating the war is not a responsible American option.

Hanoi's position is equally complicated. Its concerns are not global; they are, if anything, xenophobically Vietnamese. But for Hanoi, survival depends on a correct

- 18 -

calculation of international factors -- especially within
the Communist world. In order to retain its autonomy
Hanoi must maneuver skillfully between Peking, Moscow and
the NLF. Hanoi's margin of survival is so narrow that
precise calculation has become a way of life; caution is
almost an obsession. Hanoi has no desire to become
completely dependent on one of the Communist giants for
to do so would limit its independence. For this reason,
too, Hanoi is not prepared to risk its ties with Peking
simply to find out what the American negotiating program
might be; in Hanoi's eyes, such a course would tend to
undermine its bargaining position. Cultural traits and
Communist ideology compound this wariness. In short,
Hanoi's freedom of maneuver is severely limited.

The same is true of the Soviet Union without whose
large- aid Hanoi could not continue. As a semi-
participant in the war, Moscow must be torn by contradictory
emotions. A complete victory for Hanoi would tend to benefit

- 19 -

Peking in the struggle for influence in the world;
communist parties: it would tend to support the Chinese
argument that revolutionary intransigence toward the United
States in relatively riskless or at least manageable. But
a defeat of Hanoi would weaken a potential barrier to
Chinese influence in South East Asia; above all, it would
demonstrate Soviet inability to protect fellow Communist
countries against the United States. Torn by conflicting
considerations, beset by bureaucratic inertia, Moscow has
done enough to sustain the war effort but little to settle
it. Events in Czechoslovakia have reduced Moscow's capacity
for constructive action even further. Any attempt by Moscow
to settle the war -- and of Washington to accept this effort --
would lay both superpowers open to the charge that they are
sacrificing their allies to maintain a sphere of influence --
a charge which is already widespread in Europe. Thus Moscow

- 20 -

is unlikely to be able to play a very positive role in the
next phase of the negotiations; indeed from the American
point of view, it is not desirable that it do so -- lest
our palli reaction to events in Czechoslovakia be ascribed
by our allies as a sacrifice of European interests to
extricate the United States from South East Asia.

This state of affairs would be enough to produce
prolonged negotiations advancing, if at all, by means of
a series of statements. But the negotiating process is not
eased by differences in cultural and bureaucratic style which
turn mutual comprehension into a truly formidable under-
taking. It would be difficult to imagine two societies more
destined not to understand each other than the Vietnamese
and the American. History and culture combine to produce
almost morbid suspiciousness on the part of all Vietnamese.
The Vietnamese style of communication is indirect and, by
American standards, devious. The fear of being made to look
foolish sometimes seems to transcend all other considerations.

- 21 -

Thus it is possible that even an American acceptance of Hanoi's maximum program would produce months of haggling while Hanoi looks for our "angle." Survival for the Vietnamese has involved a subtle ability to manipulate forces physically stronger than themselves. Careful, subtle planning is a principal characteristic of Hanoi. These tendencies are compounded by Communist ideology which defines the United States as structurally hostile and by Hanoi's experience in previous negotiations in 1954 and 1962 which it may well feel deprived it of part of its achievements on the battlefield.

All this produces the particular negotiating style of Hanoi: the careful planning, the subtle indirect communication deliberately opaque toward both foe and friend which may be equally important from Hanoi's point of view -- all methods facilitating reconnaissance withdrawal to assess the opponent's reaction, to be followed by another diplomatic sortie. In fact, the methods of Hanoi's

- 22 -

diplomacy are not very different from the Viet Cong
military strategy.

It would be difficult to imagine an approach less
compatible with the American approach to negotiations.

The United States approach to negotiations is pragmatic,
bureaucratic and legalistic. Indeed, pragmatism and
bureaucracy tend to reinforce each other. Pronouncements
that the United States is ready to negotiate do not
guarantee that a negotiating position exists or that the
United States' government has articulated its objectives.

The opposite is more nearly true. Until a negotiation
actually ceases to be scheduled, two groups in the
bureaucracy tend to oppose the elaboration of a negotiating
position: those who oppose negotiations and those who
favor them. The opponents generally equate negotiations
with surrender; if they agree to discuss settlement terms
at all it is to define the enemy's capitulation. Aware of
this tendency and of the reluctance of the highest levels
to engage in a bureaucratic battle in the abstract, those

- 23 -

favor negotiations go along with the delay in developing
a negotiating position. Moreover, they tend to have great
confidence in the importance of negotiating skill and they
want to reserve freedom of action for circumstances that
may arise in the conference room. Pragmatism and bureaucracy
thus combine to deprive American diplomacy of criteria to
determine progress especially during preliminary soundings
that precede formal negotiations.

The legal bias of our policymakers compounds these
problems. We are in quest of commitments which can be
reduced to legal obligations, an effort which suppresses
intangibles of psychology or measures of interpretation.

These tendencies of American diplomacy have produced
a massive breakdown of communication with Hanoi -- especially
in the preliminary phases of contact. Hanoi bent all its
ingenuity to avoid clear-cut, formal commitments -- less
because they did not want to be committed than for the
cultural and historical reasons described earlier. We
insisted on legal formulae. Hanoi communicated with us

- 24 -

through subtle changes of tense. Washington was unequipped
for this mode of communication. In a press conference in
February, 1968, President Johnson said: "As near as I am able
to detect, Hanoi has not changed its course of conduct since
the very first response it made. Sometimes they will change
'will' to 'would' or shall' to 'should', or something of the
kind. But the answer is all the same." It may have meant
nothing legally. It remains to be asked whether a different
analysis might have focused on the context to give a clue to
the purposes of government whose record of careful planning
would suggest that a change of tense was unlikely to be
inadvertent.

To Washington, Hanoi appeared to be devious, deceitful
and tricky. To Hanoi, Washington must have seemed, if not
obtuse, then cannily purposeful. In any event, the real
problem produced by the difference in negotiating style
involves an inquiry into the nature of "commitment" or the
meaning of "trickery" in modern diplomacy.

1. New York Times, February 17, 1968

- 25 -

III. COMMITMENT AND RISK IN VIETNAMESE DIPLOMACY

No issue illustrates the difference in conceptions
as to what constitutes a commitment than the problem of the
bombing halt. It shows, too, the difficulty of encompassing
intangibles of psychology and nuance in the practice of
Vietnamese diplomacy.

The United States' position on the bombing halt has
been expressed in the San Antonio formula of President
Johnson. This states: "The United States is prepared to
stop unconditionally the bombing of North Vietnam provided
this leads promptly to productive negotiations. It is
assumed that Hanoi will not take advantage of such a halt."
Not unpredictably, Hanoi lost no time in pointing out that
it could not guarantee "productive" negotiations since
this depended on the attitude of both sides. 1 The phrase
"not take advantage" presented analogous difficulties. On
the face of it, it seemed so vague -- especially to people
so morbidly suspicious as the North Vietnamese -- that it

1. Interview with B. lett (?) BURCHETT

- 26 -

might have been taken as a loophole to resume bombing as well as an offer to stop it. Washington has responded by explaining "no advantage" to mean a number of concrete steps which could be taken singly or together: respect for the Demilitarized Zone, no large-scale attack on cities, no increase in the level of military activity in the South -- and some idea as to what would follow in the negotiations. 2

Hanoi has refused any reciprocity. Does this mean that Hanoi has been determined to "take advantage" or to "trick us?" The answer depends in part on what one understands by commitments in diplomacy. Hanoi's refusal to commit itself to reciprocity may have been due -- at least in part -- to the objectively difficult situation in which it finds itself. It considers the pressures of world opinion against the United States as one of its most effective weapons. To agree to reciprocity would give up this claim; it suggests that United States' bombing would be justified in at least some circumstances. If Hanoi could be accused of violating the understanding the United States

2. See Secretary Rusk on Issues & Answers, Oct.6, 1968.

- 27 -

could then bomb "legally."

But would Hanoi in fact take advantage? This depends on the context of events. The reluctance to commit itself to reciprocity does not necessarily mean that reciprocity would not be extended. The question is whether Hanoi would be restrained by a formal, legally binding commitment or by some other factors. If Hanoi violates a bombing pause, no court to which Hanoi could be taken exists. The primary sanction is what the United States could do to Hanoi unilaterally in retaliation, not what Hanoi has formally promised. From this point of view, it is more important that Hanoi understands what the United States would consider "take advantage" than what Hanoi formally promises.

Clarity in our communication is more useful than a legally binding document.

But how do we know that Hanoi will not trick us?

The answer depends on what is understood by trickery. The record of Hanoi leaves little doubt that it would be prepared to trick the United States if it served its purpose.

- 28 -

There is little doubt that Hanoi would continue its
efforts to subvert Saigon politically -- but this effort
is not encompassed in the American definition of "take
advantage" and cannot be. As to taking advantage against
United States' military forces, the inhibition paradoxically
is likely to be the same that operates against undertaking
a formal commitment: the reluctance to provide the justifi-
cation for a resumption of bombing. Unless Hanoi can gain
an overwhelming military advantage, tricking us would seem
to serve no rational purpose. Any major, but not decisive
United States' defeat -- and a decisive victory seems beyond
Hanoi's strength whatever the level of trickery -- would
simply remove all American restraints. Thus the issue of
a bombing half depends essentially on three elements:
(only two listed)

(1) how much either side wants it; (2) what sanctions
are available in case of violation. Clarity about objectives
and consequences is more important than formal commitments.

- 29 -

For the United States, this means that once the decision to halt bombing has been taken, it is more important to make sure that Hanoi understands the meaning we attach to the no advantage clause than to elicit a formal pledge. If we have communicated properly, the United States can, in fact, stop bombing unilaterally even unconditionally -- though in the relations of sovereign states, these phases cannot limit future actions if the context of events changes. A corollary is that Hanoi must understand that the United States would, in fact, resume bombing were Hanoi to take advantage. The issue of the bombing halt thus essentially turned more on establishing a reliable mode of communication than on formal pledges.

- 30 -

IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

After the bombing halt has been arranged, negotiations will turn at last to substantive issues. This confronts the United States with a major conceptual problem: whether to proceed step by step through an agenda of items made familiar by frequent debate or whether to attempt some other procedure.

It is unfortunate that so much attention has been paid to the bombing halt because it has given rise to the illusion that it would lead relatively rapidly to a settlement of substantive issues. In fact, if the negotiations proceed step by step through a formal agenda, there is a real prospect that a bombing halt will only be an admission ticket to another deadlock. The underlying problems described earlier will remain. The mutual lack of trust makes a step-by-step approach especially complicated. In the absence of clarity as to final goals, both sides have an extraordinary incentive to submit all proposals to the most searching scrutiny and to erect hedges for failure or bad faith. This is well illustrated by two

- 31 -

proposals which are frequently advanced for the next stage of
negotiations: the ceasefire and coalition government.

It has become axiomatic that a bombing halt would
lead -- almost automatically -- to a ceasefire. However, it
is likely to turn out that negotiating a ceasefire is tantamount to establishing the preconditions of a settlement. If
there existed a front line with unchallenged control behind it,
the solution would be traditional and relatively simple. Were
the conflict purely military, negotiating permissible actions
under conditions of ceasefire would be straightforward. But
there are no front lines in Vietnam; control is not territorial,
it depends on the time of day. If a cease fire permits the
government to move at will within South Vietnam day or night
without challenge, it would define a Saigon victory. If
Saigon is prevented from entering certain areas, it would mean
in effect the partition of the country.

This would involve the following additional problems:
(1) it would lead to an intense scramble to establish predominant control before the ceasefire goes into effect; (2) it would

- 32 -

make next to impossible the verification of any withdrawal
of North Vietnamese forces since the local authorities in
areas of preponderant Communist control would doubtless
certify that no external forces were present and impede any
effort at international inspection; (3) it would raise the
problem of the applicability of a ceasefire to guerrilla
activity in the non-Communist part of the country; in other
words, how to deal with the asymmetry between the actions of
regular and of guerrilla forces. Regular forces operate on
a scale which is reducible to precise definition of what is
permitted and what is proscribed; guerrilla forces can be
effective through isolated acts of terror difficult to dis-
tinguish from normal criminal activity.

There are many other problems in the typical cases of
dual control: who collects taxes and how, who enforces the
ceasefire and by what means. In other words, a tacit de facto
ceasefire may prove more attainable than a negotiated one. By
the same token, formal negotiations for a ceasefire would, in
effect, predetermine the ultimate settlement.

- 33 -

This is even more true of the notion of a coalition
government so often advanced as the "solution" to the problems
of Vietnam. It is advocated by some as a face-saving prelude
to eventual Communist takeover; but many believe that a coalition
government may be a step toward a compromise settlement. The
latter group does not do justice to Vietnamese conditions. The
notion that a government can bring about a political evolution
rather than reflect it, is drawn from the Western experience
where governments tend to be obeyed because they are legitimate.
In most new countries, the legitimacy of a government depends
on its ability to govern. Office confers no additional sanctity.
The image of a line of command extending from Saigon into the
countryside is hardly true of the non-Communist government in
Saigon. It would be absurd in the case of a coalition govern-
ment. Such a government would posses no authority other than
that of each minister over the forces he controls either through
personal or party loyalty.

In short, to solve the problems of Vietnam by means of a
coalition government makes as much sense as to attempt to overcome

- 34 -

the problems of Mississippi through a coalition between the
SDS and Ku Klux Klan. It is beyond imagination that parties
that have been murdering and betraying each other for twenty-
five years could work together as a team giving joint
instructions to the entire country. To take just one example
of the difficulties: Communist ministers would be foolhardy in
the extreme if they entered Saigon without bringing with them
sufficient military force to protect them. But the introduction
of Communist military forces would change the entire political
complexion of Vietnam; it would deprive the government of the
one secure base which it now has.

Theoretically, of course, it is possible to conceive
of a coalition government in which each party can protect its
own interests but is unable to impose its will on its opponent.
But such a solution is extraordinarily improbable. The much
more likely outcome will be the continuation within the govern-
ment of the struggle that has taken place outside of it. And
since a coalition government is inconceivable with the present

- 35 -

Saigon government, any attempt to impose it is likely to be
successful only by eliminating the army and thus to remove
the chief counterweight to Viet Cong takeover. Finally, the
negotiations about coalition are likely to be so complex and
prolonged that they would totally change the political land-
scape. We would, in effect, be settling the war over an
issue least amenable to outside influence with respect to
which we have least grasp of conditions and the long-term
implications of which are most problematical.

This is not to say that the United States should resist
a coalition government if it came about through negotiations
between the Vietnamese -- in that case, in fact, the United
States would be in no position to resist. It does suggest that
any negotiation about it by the United States is likely to lead
either to an impasse or to the collapse of Saigon.

If the step-by-step approach is likely to lead to pro-
longed delays, what alternatives are open? It is possible that
where distrust is so deep, a global settlement may be simpler
than a series of partial ones. The most important role of

- 36 -

negotiations may be to agree first on an ultimate goal and
to work back from this to the details to implement it.

This requires an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses
of both sides. Hanoi's strength is that it is at home; while
the United States is fighting far away. As long as Hanoi can
preserve some political assets, it retains the prospect of an
ultimately favorable political outcome. Not surprisingly,
Hanoi has shown a superior grasp of the local situation and a
greater capacity to design military operations for political
ends. Hanoi's weaknesses are that to fight the greatest
industrial nation for years even with massive outside help is
bound to drain the country. A point will inevitably be reached
where the next escalation could be resisted only by degree of
foreign assistance tantamount to a sacrifice of autonomy.

This Hanoi has carefully resisted; it has accepted foreign
equipment, but it has rigidly insisted on operating even very
advanced equipment with its own men. Finally, Hanoi must con-
sider that even a victorious war might leave the country so
exhausted as to make illusory the purpose of decades of struggles.

- 37 -

negotiate. American assets are the reverse of this. No matter how irrelevant some of our political conceptions or how insensitive our strategy, we are so powerful that Hanoi is simply unable to defeat us. Hanoi cannot by its own efforts -- or even with foreseeable allies -- force the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. It must, in short, negotiate us out of Vietnam. Our weakness is that we have not demonstrated any ability to create any viable political structure that could survive our withdrawal against military opposition from Hanoi. This state of affairs defines the limits of the American commitment in South Vietnam which can be expressed in two propositions: (1) the United States cannot accept a military defeat, or a change in the political structure of South Vietnam brought about largely by external military force; (2) the United States cannot commit itself to keeping a particular government in power in Saigon by force once external forces are removed.

- 38 -

This suggests the outline of a possible settlement in return for a staged withdrawal of external forces; North Vietnamese and American, the internal structure of South Vietnam would be left to indigenous processes. The details of such a phased, mutual withdrawal are not decisive for our present purposes and in any case would have to be left to detailed negotiations. The following principles should be kept in mind, however: (1) the withdrawal should be over a sufficiently long period so that a genuine indigenous political process has a chance to become established; mutual withdrawal cannot be treated as a camouflage for a Communist takeover; (2) the contending sides in South Vietnam should commit themselves not to pursue their objectives by force while the withdrawal of external forces is going on; (3) the definition of what constitutes a political process should be left to the South Vietnamese in so far as possible.

1. Governor Rockefeller proposed a plan based on four stages beginning with a withdrawal of external forces into regroupment areas through a token presence of American forces, the introduction of international peacekeeping forces and finally the of a final settlement by the two Vietnams.

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If this analysis is correct, the course for American negotiators is clear: they should insofar as possible avoid negotiating about the internal structure of South Vietnam and concentrate on the subject of the mutual withdrawal of external forces. Negotiations about the internal structure of South Vietnam will lead us into a morass of complexities where we would suffer two major disadvantages: (1) we would be the party in the negotiation least attuned to the subtleties of Vietnamese politics; (2) hence, our presence may wind up being directed against Saigon as the seeming obstacle to an accommodation. The end result may be the complete demoralization of Saigon, a prolonged stalemate or a resumption of the war.

But in the face of these prospects, why should Hanoi accept such an approach? The answer is that partly because it has no choice; it cannot bring about a withdrawal of American forces by its own efforts -- particularly if the United States adopts a less impatient strategy of victory, geared to the protection of the population and minimum casualties. It may

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also believe that being better organized and more determined,
the NLF can win a political contest. (Of course, the prerequisite
of a settlement is that both sides think they have a chance to
win but neither side is assured of it.) Above all, Hanoi may
not wish to give the United States a permanent voice in internal
South Vietnamese affairs. It may be reinforced in this attitude
by the belief that a prolonged negotiation about coalition
government may end no more satisfactorily from Hanoi's point of
view than the Geneva negotiations over Vietnam in 1954 and Laos
in 1962.

As for the United States, it cannot forever protect a
government with an army of 700 thousand men, a large airforce
and the most modern equipment against its domestic enemies. If
it brings about a removal of external forces and pressure, and
if it gains a reasonable time for consolidation, it will have
done the maximum possible for an ally, -- short of permanent
occupation.

If these become the objectives of a negotiation, they
should shape the negotiating procedure. Indeed, the

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[y]

negotiating procedure may well determine the nature of the
outcome and the speed with which it is achieved.

As part of the bombing halt, it was agreed that Saigon
and the NLF join the conference on a basis which permitted both
to pretend that its opponent did not have a separate existence
but was part of the American respectively North Vietnamese
delegation.

This face-saving formula provided a device for the
formal conferences. It is unlikely to be very effective in
reaching a comprehensive settlement. Saigon and the NLF may
be able to work out a tacit accommodation locally (where it
already exists in many parts of Vietnam) or even on the national
level; they are unlikely to do so at a public forum in front of
other parties or so long as they can expect that other parties
will fight for total victory. The best solution would be a
three-tiered approach. The four-party conference could provide
a legitimizing forum for two other conferences: between Hanoi
and the United States and between Saigon and the NLF. Hanoi and
Washington would discuss mutual troop withdrawal and related

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subjects such as guarantees for the neutrality of Laos and
Cambodia. Saigon and the NLF would discuss the internal
structure of South Vietnam. Ultimately, a fourth negotiating
tier would be added: an international conference to work out
guarantees and safeguards for the agreements arrived at in the
other forums, including international peacekeeping machinery.

To be sure, Saigon, for understandable reasons, has
consistently refused to deal with the NLF as an equal,
international entity. But if Saigon understands its own
interests, it will see that the procedure outlined here involves
the minimum recognition that can be extended. In the four-power
forum, Hanoi can force de facto recognition by withdrawing its own
negotiators, the myth that the NLF is really part of the Hanoi
delegation would make it difficult to select the individuals that
are acceptable. In the three-tiered approach outlined here,
Saigon would retain the maximum control over the issues that
affect its own fate; direct negotiations between the United States
and the NLF would be obviated. A sovereign government is free to
talk to any group that represents an important power base

[y]

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domestically without conferring sovereignty on it; it happens domestically all the time in union negotiations.

To be sure, a negotiating procedure and a definition of objectives cannot guarantee a settlement. If the other side insists on total victory, the war must continue. Any other posture would destroy the chances of a settlement. In that case, we should seek to realize unilaterally as many of the objectives of the negotiations as possible. We should adopt a strategy which by reducing casualties is plausible for the long run and which by concentrating on the protection of the population offers some prospect of undermining Communist political assets.

We should strengthen the Vietnamese army to permit a gradual withdrawal of some American forces. And Saigon should broaden its base so that it is stronger for the political contest with the Communists which sooner or later it must undertake.

No war in a century has aroused the passions of the conflict in Vietnam. By turning Vietnam into a symbol of deeper resentments, many groups have defeated the objective they profess to seek. However, we got into Vietnam, whatever the

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judgement of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential
for the peace of the world. It can be in nobody's interest to
unloosen forces that shake all prospects of international
order. The people of Vietnam have suffered enough not to have
to prolong their agony by being made the test case for
frustrations far away and little connected with local issues.

A new Administration must be given the benefit of the doubt and
a chance to move toward an objective which is finally in
everybody's interest: a peace of reconciliation which grants
the people of Vietnam what they have struggled so bravely to
achieve: an opportunity to work out their own destiny in their
own way.

Draft I - 10/31

As these lines are being written, the negotiations in Paris have ended their sixth month. Their course has been marked by the typical Vietnam syndrome; optimism alternating with bewilderment and frustration. Sudden bursts of activity have punctuated stretches of stagnation. As with every other aspect of the war in Vietnam, the problem has been of understanding the situation both on the ground and at the conference table. In its absence, criteria for progress have been hard to come by.

# I. THE SITUATION WITHIN VIETNAM

It is truism that negotiations are not autonomous; they can reflect an objective situation, not create it. But the American tragedy in Vietnam has been above all conceptual. Our preconceptions of war, of diplomacy, of political stability have fitted Vietnamese realities with the greatest difficulty, if at all. Any discussion of the prospects for negotiations must inevitably start with an analysis of the situation within Vietnam.

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Perhaps the best way to begin is with General Westmorland's visit to Washington in November, 1967. On that occasion, General Westmorland told a Joint Session of Congress that the war was being militarily won. He gave figures marking our progress and indicated that a limited withdrawal of United States' combat forces might be undertaken starting late in 1968. On January 17, 1968, President Johnson in his State of the Union address emphasized that the pacification program -- the extension of the control of Saigon into the countryside -- was progressing satisfactorily. Sixty-seven percent of the population of Vietnam was under government control and the figure was expected to rise. A week later, the Tet offensive overthrew the assumptions of American strategy. What had gone wrong, of the expectations of those who emphasized military means as well as those who stressed political and economic programs?

Perhaps the key problem has been the tendency to apply traditional maxims of both strategy and "nation building" to a situation which they did not fit. The American military

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strategy has followed the classic doctrine that victory depended
on a combination of control of territory and attrition of the
opponent. Therefore the majority of the American forces were
deployed along the frontiers to prevent enemy infiltration and
in the Central Highlands where most of the North Vietnamese
main force units -- those units organized along traditional
military lines -- were concentrated. The theory was that
defeat of the main forces would cause the guerrillas to
wither on the vine.

However, a guerrilla war differs from traditional war
because its key prize is not control of territory but control
of the population. At issue is, above all, the expectations
and the sense of security of the population. This problem has
been particularly acute in Vietnam because of the great con-
centration of the population in the coastal plains and the
Mekong Delta. Hence, it is difficult to fight guerrillas and
hold territory simultaneously. Eighty percent of United States'
forces were to be concentrated in an area containing less than
four percent of the population.

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The problem for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, in short, was simpler than that of the United States. The United States had to conduct its operations to lay the basis for an eventual withdrawal. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong needed in being merely to keep forces sufficiently strong to dominate the population after the United States' forces tired of the war.

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Finally, our military operations have little relationship to our declared political objectives. President Johnson had announced repeatedly that we would be ready to negotiate at any moment, anywhere, unconditionally. This in effect left the timing of negotiations to the other side. But our military deployment could be effective, if at all, only in case of total victory; it was not well designed to support a negotiation short of surrender by the opponent. For purposes of negotiations we would have been better off with 100 percent control of sixty

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[y]

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1. Interview with Burchett

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2

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could then bomb "legally."

But would Hanoi in fact take advantage? This depends on the context of events. The reluctance to commit itself to reciprocity does not necessarily mean that reciprocity would not be extended. The question is whether Hanoi would be restrained by a formal, legally binding commitment or by some other factors. If Hanoi violates a bombing pause, no court to which Hanoi could be taken exists. The primary sanction is what the United States could do to Hanoi unilaterally in retaliation, not what Hanoi has formally promised. From this point of view, it is more important that Hanoi understands what the United States would consider "take advantage". than what Hanoi formally promises.

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[y]

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IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

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It has become axiomatic that a bombing halt would
lead -- almost automatically -- to a ceasefire. However, it
is likely to turn out that negotiating a ceasefire is tanta-
mount to establishing the preconditions of a settlement. If
there existed a front line with unchallenged control behind it,
the solution would be traditional and relatively simple. Were
the conflict purely military, negotiating permissible actions
under conditions of ceasefire would be straightforward. But
there are no front lines in Vietnam; control is not territorial,
it depends on the time of day. If a cease fire permits the
government to move at will within South Vietnam day or night
without challenge, it would define a Saigon victory. If
Saigon is prevented from entering certain areas, it would mean
in effect the partition of the country.

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[y]

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This suggests the outline of a possible settlement in
return for a staged withdrawal of external forces; North
Vietnamese and American, the internal structure of South
Vietnam would be left to indigenous processes. The details
of such a phased, mutual withdrawal are not decisive for our
present purposes and in any case would have to be left to
detailed negotiations. 1 The following principles should be
kept in mind, however: (1) the withdrawal should be over a
sufficiently long period so that a genuine indigenous political
process has a chance to become established; mutual withdrawal
cannot be treated as a camouflage for a Communist takeover;
(2) the contending sides in South Vietnam should commit
themselves not to pursue their objectives by force while the with-
drawal of external forces is going on; (3) the definition of what
constitutes a political process should be left to the South
Vietnamese in so far as possible.

negotiation

[y]

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