[x]

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The Nassau Agreement is a document of extraordinary ambiguity; it reflects the attempt to reconcile the American quest for the integration of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance with the British desire to maintain a measure of independence. The United States agreed to supply Polaris missiles to Great Britain. Britain was to construct the submarines and provide the warheads. Great Britain and the United States agreed to create a NATO nuclear force, initially to be composed of allocations from United States strategic forces, from the United Kingdom Bomber Command and from tactical nuclear forces in Europe. The British Polaris submarines, armed with American missiles and British warheads, were to be subscribed to this NATO "multilateral" force (a term which within a few months was to change its meaning). Great Britain agreed to use these forces "for the purpose of the international defense of the Western Alliance" except "where the supreme national interest was at stake." The same qualification appeared in a provision according to the effect that both governments agreed that Western defense "is indivisible and ... in all ordinary circumstances of crisis or danger emphasis added it is this very unity which is the best protection of the West." Finally Great Britain and the United States

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agreed that NATO in addition to having a nuclear "shield" should have a non-nuclear
"sword," thus reversing the traditional NATO strategic concept.

This agreement was transmitted to President de Gaulle after it was
published. In an accompanying memorandum, the United States offered to sell
Polaris missiles to France on the same terms as to Great Britain.

The Nassau Agreement attempted a *tour de force*. It tried to reconcile
integration with independence, the American belief in the need for an
indivisible nuclear strategy with a British desire for autonomy.

The price was high, however, and in practice its various clauses
tended to cancel each other out. For example, what was the significance
of subscribing the British retaliatory force to NATO while at the same time
reserving the right of independent action when the supreme national interest
was at stake? As President Kennedy pointed out shortly after, the supreme
national interest is automatically involved when nuclear weapons are involved.
Similarly, what was the meaning of the phrase that a unified strategy was
the best protection in "ordinary" circumstances? To what contingencies did

1
Text, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, 1229 (January , 1963), p.

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the escape clause refer? Finally what was the meaning of the reversal of
the traditional notions of "shield" and "sword" in NATO strategy? Did it
imply that the United States and Great Britain were proposing to resist
a conventional attack in Europe primarily with conventional means?

Thus even an individual less prone to exploit Allied discord than
President de Gaulle was likely to view the Nassau Agreement with suspicion.
Indeed, reaction to the Nassau Agreement all over Europe ranged from cool
to hostile. In Germany, the grouping of NATO's nuclear forces in a special
nuclear command revived fears of a possible nuclear disengagement. The
British opposition took it as proof of the validity of their previous
contention that British nuclear independence was a sham. It did not
satisfy those in the United States who had been pressing for an integrated
strategy. And it was, of course, rejected out of hand by President de Gaulle.

The debate about military integration demonstrated how abstract and
doctrinaire the strategic dispute had become. Many influential Americans
objected most strongly to the escape clauses regarding the disposition of
nuclear forces. They implied that without these clauses the "assignment"
of the British Polaris force to NATO would have been irrevocable. In fact,

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"assignment" in NATO has never been irrevocable; it has always had a largely symbolic quality as all forces in NATO are normally under national command. NATO eadquarters are planning outfits that control the forces "assigned" to them only during specified maneuvers or in war. Each ally retains the right to go to war according to its own constitutional processes.

The right of withdrawal is inherent, and "assignment" does not significantly restrict the independent disposition of NATO forces. This has been proved abundantly by the United States withdrawal of forces from Germany for action in Lebanon, by French withdrawal of its fleet from NATO, by the use of NATO-assigned forces by both Greece and Turkey during the Cyprus crisis and by the withdrawal of British forces from Germany for use in Malaysia.

The escape clauses gave Britain no additional rights; they were significant above all in terms of British electoral politics.

If integration did not go far enough for some Americans, it was much too sweeping for President de Gaulle. The debate having taken on its scholastic tone, President de Gaulle was likely to object to the term "assignment" whatever its actual significance. He said that the proposed

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assignment of nuclear forces to NATO involved:

> ...a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself ... such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.¹

And he asked how in practice integration could be reconciled with independent disposition, putting his finger on the key evasion of the Nassau Agreement. At the same time, he agreed that cooperation between the national nuclear forces within NATO was both possible and desirable.

It is symptomatic that, while arguing, sometimes vituperatively, the relative merits of integration and coordination, neither side has defined what concrete meaning these phrases would have in practical terms or said specifically what common action might be possible under a different label.

The timing of the Nassau Agreement and the way it was negotiated created still greater problems than its content. Its impact on Britain's application to enter the Common Market was disastrous. Given de Gaulle's wartime experiences and his view of France's role in the world, it was against all probability that he would accept a proposal negotiated by

¹ Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *Major Addresses*, p. 219.

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the "Anglo-Saxons" without consultation with him and transmitted to Paris
only after it had been released to the press. It should have come as no
surprise that de Gaulle acidly commented at a press conference: "Of course,
I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because it has been
published and because their content is known."

Moreover, the actual terms of the agreement must have appeared to
de Gaulle to perpetuate the discriminatory treatment which he had opposed
throughout his public career. Since France possessed neither submarines nor
warheads for the Polaris missiles, the Nassau Agreement could bring benefits
to France only after many years. And Britain's experience with the
Skybolt program reduced the already small incentive of France to make
itself dependent on the promise of future delivery of United States missiles--
all the less so as France was not offered the privileged information about
the construction of nuclear warheads for these missiles which had been
available to Britain since 1954.

1, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *ibid.*, p. 218.

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But the most profound impact of the Nassau Agreement was on Britain's application for membership in the Common Market. There have been endless debates whether the Nassau Agreement precipitated de Gaulle's decision to veto British membership, whether it was a pretext or--as is most likely--whether it was simply a contributory cause. Without deciding this issue, it is clear that the Nassau Agreement exacerbated an already difficult situation and posed the issue of British membership in Europe under the most adverse conditions imaginable.

Whatever their other differences, de Gaulle and the European integrationists were agreed that Europe, to be properly organized, must have its own defense program. Britain's application for membership in the Common Market inevitably raises the issue whether it was consistent with the aspirations of a united Europe for one of its members to have an exclusive relationship with the United States on so vital a subject as nuclear strategy or whether it should share its nuclear competence with its new partners.

The Nassau Agreement brought this issue to a head while Britain was still negotiating its entry into Europe. Britain had received an abrupt

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rebuff on the Skybolt issue. Yet it never seems seriously to have considered
using this opportunity for closer cooperation with its European partners
in the military field. Instead, it concluded an agreement with the United
States without even consulting France, the other European nuclear power,
and it developed a nuclear plan for NATO without the participation of its
prospective partners in the Common Market. It agreed to reverse the
traditional significance of "sword" and "shield" in NATO doctrine without
consulting any other NATO ally. Perhaps de Gaulle had decided on a veto
in any event. But if he still hesitated, the Nassau Agreement was likely
to tip the scales.

In retrospect, the failure of Britain to consult with France and its
other European allies before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems
an historic missed opportunity. It will never be known what the reaction
would have been if Britain had made such an overture before the Bahamas
meeting. Even had it failed, it would have placed the subsequent debate in
a far better context.

As it was, de Gaulle, in his press conference of January 14, 1963,
abruptly and brutally vetoed British membership in the Common Market and rejected
the Nassau offer. The shape of Atlantic relations will never be the same

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as it was before that date. De Gaulle's action exploded the premises on which much of previous thinking had been based. The belief in an automatic progression from economic to political integration suddenly stood in need of re-examination. The concept of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a united Europe, including Great Britain, was seriously challenged. It was now clear that conflicting approaches to Atlantic relationships were confronting each other.

The debate was confused by the way the lines were drawn, which made it dangerous to take either criticism or support of United States positions at face value. The French claim to speak for Europe was belied by the fact that on economic issues Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with Great Britain and in the field of strategy the Federal Republic leaned towards the United States. Many in Europe were disquieted by de Gaulle's tactics even when they basically agreed with his policies--as in the case of the recognition of Communist China and the neutralization of South East Asia.

At the same time, opposition to de Gaulle does not guarantee support of United States policies. British policy often differs from that of

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de Gaulle only in the greater suppleness of British methods. Much internal French criticism is due to the frustration that the Opposition's policy is carried out by the incumbent. The major difference on defense matters seems to be a question of timing: when the French nuclear force is to be turned into a European one. All over Europe left-wing groups violently oppose de Gaulle's imperious style, seeing in him a direct descendent of the dictators of the Thirties. But this does not mean that they object to Third Force policies as such or that their alternative is close ties with the United States. The Federal Republic maneuvers uneasily between relying on the military protection of the United States and the diplomatic cover of France.

The press conference of January 14, 1963, ushered in a period of frantic diplomatic activity in which the United States strove hard to vindicate its previous conception and France aloofly pursued its own course. The result may well be contrary to the intentions of each of the rivals. What started out as a dispute about the internal structure of Europe and its role runs the risk of fragmenting Europe or of shifting the balance within Europe in unexpected directions. Both the United States