DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

Telecon

Secretary Packard

3/8/69

9:30

P said that he would support it if HAK wanted to call the President. If we do nothing, it looks as if we are afraid of escalation. P said we ought to be quiet and then give them a little bang.

HAK said when you have a weak poker hand, you shouldn't be too cautious. We shouldn't be afraid that they will walk out in Paris. We shouldn't set here and do nothing. the CIA report might not be as pin-pointed as it could be. The impact on the Soviets would be the same.

HAK said he thought maybe some of our colleagues would start a vendetta. P wasn't worried about that. He thought the President should tell Rogers what he plans to do and that he had considered the alternatives.

HAK wanted to know if we should do it in the same week as the ABM. P thought that the ABM could be postponed for a week.

HAK wanted to know if Colorado Springs had been put in. P thought that this was incidental and unimportant at this point. C.S is very well protected but there might be some problem of putting in communications.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958:

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON

Mr. Haldeman (in Key Biscayne)

Mr. Kissinger

3/8/69 10:10 a.m. Saturday

Haldeman mentioned possibility they'll come back tomorrow.

HAK told Haldeman he cancelled yesterday evening "that thing we discussed in Belgium," and that Packard went thru the roof, calling again this morning saying he wanted to call the President, but HAK said no, that was his job, and that if the Pres. wants to talk about it further to Packard he will do so. Packard feels very strongly that we are making Laird the fall-guy; that we are looking terribly weak,; that it is not such a big thing to do; that after the next attack on us it will be too little. He is very very strong about it. Haldeman asked if HAK wanted to talk to the Pres. about it, and HAK said the Pres has heard all the arguments, but when the Acting Secy feels as strongly as he does about the matter, the Pres should know about it.

Haldeman asked, what action are we aiming towards? HAK said it can't be done tomorrow; it would have to be Monday. We could slip the matter of ABM a few days.

HAK: He feels the way to handle the other end of town is to say this is the decision, and he expects full support. I don't think you negotiate with a Cabinet officer after you have given him a chance to make his case.

Haldeman: You still have that risk problem.

HAK: That risk problem will not be diminished. I didn't urge the President not to cancel it. As of now, it is cancelled by my orders based on full discussion with the Pres.

HAK: Lodge is meeting today with Hanoi--let's see what he gets out of that. In the meantime, why don't you tell the President what Packard thinks. Tell him I am not yet prepared to make a recommendation, but I will call you after I know what Paris reports, and I will then see whether he wants to talk to me. Just tell him Packard feels very strongly (which he can easily verify by calling Packard) and I didn't want him to be bothered as long as there is no clear operational decision, and I didn't want him to be in a position where he had to overrule Packard.

Haldeman: Does the President know how sides are drawn? In other words, the only opposition is Rogers -- the rest of you are in agreement to go ahead?

HAK: I can see some merit in Rogers' argument. A basic strategic argument is involved. It's a question of stance. I can see Roger's argument, but my view is that what will determine the President's position in public opinion will be whether the war is wound up 15 months from now. If it isn't, having received a favorable editorial now will do him no good; if it is, having been clobbered by the NYTimes this week won't harm him. My feeling is we ought

MSS .DIV LIB CONG.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON

The President (in Key Biscayne)

Mr. Kissinger

3/8/69 10:45 a.m.

Pres: I talked to Haldeman. My general feeling is, as you know, strongly along the lines of Packard's. The problem is not one of Rogers' veto, which has nothing to do with it. But you know the little State boys will start squealing and then having Rogers not going along on a major decision. It occurred to me that it could be useful if you would get Rogers and Packard together. Packard is a strong man and I'd like to see Packard work Rogers over a little on this. I am glad that he is willing to step up to a tough one. I am certainly willing to do it --and in fact I'm leaning toward it -- and we may have to tell them. What is the latest on shelling?

HAK: Nothing has happened.

P: But Packard's point is if we allow them to shell and not respond, he feels it's a bad posture to sort of sit there...then it may be too eager a response if we do it.

HAK: I am gradually coming to the point of view that our original idea with respect to it--which was really to think of doing it as quite independent from... we started thinking of this well before the offensive. It's really the right thing.

P: Your whole point is you want to influence the Soviets...

HAK: My feeling is we lean over backward not to hit the North. If we hit the North only to influence the Soviets....I feel that this one is one we really shouldn't do so much as retaliatory....but as retaliation to the whole offensive, not to a specific act. After we have done this I would keep taking things for a long time and then do something very drastic.

P: If they continue to go along we'll crack the North and crack it good. We may have to

HAK: Haiphong is the only target worth doing it to.

P: The ships have moved?

HAK: The ships have moved and reconnaissance started today. We have another problem: if private talks start within the next two weeks and all shelling is really a prelude to them, then if you do it you are going to be accused of screwing up the talks.

P: Basically, the Rogers/State Dept line is that these -- first, they don't think it is an important target; they're buying the view of CIA.
CIA is all over the lot on this; that doesn't really bother me too much.
We're getting an area and that indicates it is spilling over a bit.
What is your view?

MSS . D.IV. LIB. CONG.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

-2-

HAK: We ought to see what comes back from Lodge today.

P: I hope we do not go through that thing again. I must talk to Rogers and tell him I feel it is a great mistake to ever beg for a meeting. We don't do that. I don't like Lodge going hat in hand and going back. If they break the appointment, they break the appointment.

HAK: My own inclination would have been ... I think you made the right decision, faced with the problems we had, which is to defer. But on balance, I think it might be useful just before we go into the private talks, to do it, and then be very forbearing for a while.

P: Now on the ABM decision, there is no reason to be concerned about that; we'll make that when we are ready -- perhaps at the end of the week. I would be willing to defer the ABM for a week. After all, it's a strong move, too. In other words, I wouldn't mind doing two strong things basically at once. It poses no problem with me.

HAK: My overall judgment is: if the war is settled in a year, it doesn't make any difference if you get attacked now. So the really key question is, how can one bring it to a conclusion more quickly?

P: State, I guess, is traditionally opposed--they don't think it would have any effect to hit them.

HAK: State believes it's a negotiation game. I think that may work but it's also a very time-consuming strategy and time is not on our side. The one thing going for us now is that the Chinese/Soviet feud must be worrying the North Vietnamese.

P: That dispute seems to be quite lively.

HAK: The Soviets have published pictures of mutilated Soviet soldiers and a mob in Moscow smashed windoes in the Chinese Embassy.

P: And that doesn't happen by accident.

HAK: So Hanoi must feel the heat, too; they are completely dependent on international environment in which Communist support is assured, to the extent that attention of the world is deflected. Now my recommendation would be that I talk to Bill after he has talked to Dobrynin and to see what exactly he said, and to wait for what Lodge gets.

P: Let's stop being knocked off balance by what Dobrynin says -- Bill has to take a very hard line with Dobrynin. Don't let this personal thing go too far. You and I know that where these fellows are concerned, this personal stuff has no meaning at all.

MSS. DIV. LIB. CONG.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F012958
By MV NARA Date 08/06/98

-3-

HAK: I think the Walsh line is not going to be working. Habib is coming in to see me. Would it help if I brought him up to see you for a few minutes?

P: I want him to stick his chin up and level.

HAK: I'm going to communicate with him; I think he's one of the few tough fellows over there.

P: He seems to be.

HAK: I saw him in action in Saigon under tough circumstances; he has a lot of guts.

P: We don't have to convince them of our sincerity. I just know sincerity has nothing to do with this. Face-saving is fine, but sincerity is not what this is about. They know we want out of this thing; the question is, do they?

Do you think, if Packard feels that strongly, that he will stand up to Bill? I was thinking if you and Packard and Bill could talk. As this thing goes along, I don't think we can fail to react to it. Can Laird back-channel to us as to what he really thinks? Let's get what he really thinks.

HAK: Packard and I are planning to come on Monday.

P: I may come back Sunday night. Basically, Rogers has to go along on this. I think Packard ought to work him over a little.

HAK: If you order it, you have a right to expect loyalty in execution.

P: I think the question is degree of enthusiasm. We even got loyalty from Smith.

HAK: Packard and I both think that if we do it, and if silence about it doesn't help, we have to step up and say what we did.

P: I don't want to be in a position --we remain silent and let heat build up -- it may say no, yes, no, yes, or maybe. And then say Yes, I ordered the attack on/border for those reasons and we'll do it.

HAK: The primary responsibility is to the security of our forces.

P: The attacks originated from that area; it was a thinly populated area; we had to hit them from both sides, so we did. I wouldn't fudge it at all.

HAK: Packard agrees. Everyone agrees that the target is important.

P: Helms says he is not so sure they are all there; that it's only a captain. That doesn't bother me too much there. So we'll hit something.

You talk to Bill, who can talk to Packard, and Packard and Bill can get together; and tell Packard to be strong and firm.

MSS-DIV LIB CONG.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 080608

-4-

HAK: I'm going to get Laird to back-channel us his full assessment.

P: This is not the time to hit the North; I think we've got to threaten it by physically having a movement. But if we hit the North we have to hit something worthwhile.

HAK: Then as a seeming retaliation hit something way off in another direction -- it's not clear that that doesn't look weak. But we can wait a few days; it can't be done over the weekend.

P: Do you think we can wait? I understand Packard would like to do it Monday. I would like to do it tomorrow, for that matter. I think the pressure for hitting the North -- this is the alternative. I don't want to hit the North, but I'm going to do something. Where Bill's argument falls: why do you have to do something? It's not our fault that the fighting is going on. They mounted this offensive; they have been mounting it for months.

HAK: I'm having an analysis made of the number of engagements initiated by the other side, in order to see just what there is in that argument. But they've been mounting the infiltration for months.

P: State argument is because we've been killing them. State Dept people never see these things with any realism.

HAK: They do have a tendency to see the other side. Up to now they have had to pay heavy casualties in order to keep us off the back of the infrastructure. And for the first time we can start pounding away at the infrastructure. And in view of some of the other things we are planning. We are losing the leverage.

P: Continue for a couple of months -but then Defense has got to change its character for a support action on the police side and they've got to give the South Vietnamese the stuff they need.

P: We are going to lean so hard..

HAK: The police they must do immediately.

P: But in terms of providing more support for the South Vietnamese forces they've got to start doing that now. On July 1st we start playing it the other way.

HAK: If you do it from a dormant situation the other action will look like the inevitable result and you will be driven to it.

MSS DIY LIB CONG.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

-5-

HAK: I will get Packard and Rogers together; maybe I'll get Packard to take the initiative.

P: See how the two come out. I don't mind making a decision, but if we can bring Rogers along, it would be infinitely better. If we can't, we will.

HAK: I thought it was the right thing to act as you did. But I thought you had to know Packard's strong views.

P: On ABM we aren't tied down to doing it any particular time. Also, I might decide that I'm getting some more evidence and thinking it over. The disadvantage is that people who are against it will squeal that much louder. My own view is that the case we make here is awfully strong. You have immensely important arguments. It is a guarantee against the Chinese attack; a guarantee against an accidental shot. Beyond that it creates an area of--it tends to balance the power.

HAK: I can see the argument that reducing casualties from 80 to 40 million isn't attractive.

P: With regard to the Soviets, too, in terms of Soviet intention. The credibility of the power that we have and they have in international diplomacy that credibility is substantially lessened in my view unless we go forward. It is substantially increased xxx if we do. Let's face it. It's just xxx that much more. Anything that adds to the equation on one side changes the game.

HAK: I wouldn't recommend that for the public. What is absolutely true can be said to the public; if the Soviet has defensive intentions this deployment doesn't affect their capability at all. If the Soviet has offensive intentions then it affects their capability. So it is buying insurance against a reckless Soviet weapons policy.

P: To use Jackson's term, it's the protection of the deterrent.

HAK: This is the minimum condition. This gives us a few options we don't talk about.

P: It does strengthen our bargaining position. It's like the NATO - Warsaw Pact forces. Even if I felt we could get along with one division, and then get them to give up something too.

HAK: To say if they lob one in the US and have to kill 80 million people is very amateurish and naive.

P: The main thing is that Packard carry the ball with Bill. The thing with Bill is that I really believe there must be a response because of the bargaining table situation, and on that score we can't give the impression that we're just sitting here. The main thing is Packard must hold up the spectre of pressures for hitting the North.

HAK said he would report to the President later.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012958
By: MW NARA Date: 08/06/98

P: See how the two come out. I don't mind making a decision, but if we can bring Rogers along, it would be infinitely better. It was done.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/68

Telecon

Secretary Packard

3/8/69 11:20 a.m.

Packard was going over the ABM situation again to make sure we
were doing the right thing. He was a little worried about the
congressional problem but thought we were going in the right
direction.

HAK said the President might return Sunday night since the weather
was so bad.

HAK said he would like to get together tomorrow with Rogers, Packard
and himself at the President's request and try to get Rogers on our
side. All the reports should be in from Paris by morning so that they
can go over all the material at one time.

HAK said the President was willing to put off the ABM.

(In a second conversation HAK added the following)

HAK wanted Packard to get from Laird, through back channels the South
Vietnamese mental attitude toward attacks and what Laird and Bunker
thought jointly about the other target. HAK reiterated the back channel
again.

A meeting was set up for 4:30 in HAK's office with Sec. Packard and then
they will go on to Sec. Rogers office at 5:00.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon

Secretary Rogers

3/8/69

11:45

HAK said he had talked to the President and the President wanted
Packard, Rogers and HAK to meet together to discuss the matter
they talked about Thursday. HAK thought Packard should present
his case to Rogers. Rogers agreed.

HAK asked about his meeting with Dobrynin. Rogers said it went
fine and that he (Rogers) and D were off on a very good personal
basis. He said D was relaxed. Rogers gave him the information
and it was agreed to start discussions here maybe next week. D
thought meetings should be held in Moscow but Rogers felt it should
be started here and it could possibly change at a later date.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 08/06/89

Telecon

Max Fisher

3/8/69 12:15

Fisher is speaking at a couple of groups Sunday and Monday and wanted to get a couple things clear.

HAK said on the Middle East thing that we had a very complicated situation. We are trying to set up so that an international forum we won't be in a 3-1 position with the U.S. alone defending the Israelis. This forces us not to be in an advocates position. It has become obvious because of our French visit that the have shifted their position and Israel knows that. (HAK mentioned that this was extremely privileged information for Fisher only). HAK mentioned that Eban was coming to Washington next week and would be completely informed of our position. HAK specified two things (a) no imposition and (b) physical, tangible guarantees.

Fisher mentioned a story that had leaked from some congressional briefing. these were evidently from Jewish constituencies. Their reports were vague but HAK said Fisher was given the whole story.

Fisher said there were to be some meetings in which Javits and Simington would be speaking. Fisher said he didn't think people from State should be talking on things that might be a tenuous at this time. HAK agreed.

They discussed having dinner next week some time. Fisher is going to call to set up appointment. HAK agreed to this either next week or the next.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958:
By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

March 8, 1969 -- 6:25 - 7:10 p. m.

The President and H. A. Kissinger

K -- after today's meeting among myself, Packard and Rogers, Packard very disturbed about Rogers' action of today -- it was handled like a corporation case.

Pres -- When Laird returns, Laird, Rogers, Packard, Kissinger and I must meet to see what the strategy will be. We cannot have this thing running in every direction!

K -- The first cables of instruction were unbelievable. We got them changed, yet Lodge is apparently operating close to original instructions. It is hard to tell what goes on on the phone. Suggest you instruct Habib.

Pres -- I definitely want to sit with Habib and find out what is going on. Let's hope the strategy is right.

K -- Question of judgment. I don't believe we are not making progress because the other side doubts our sincerity.

Pres -- I made that clear over there.

K -- And, secondly, I don't think their feelings are hurt by us.

Pres -- Who is putting out that "feelings are hurt"?

K -- Harriman and Vance feel passionately that they are and have all along. Rogers reported this passionately today. It is the Thompson view toward Russia. I feel it gets us back into the Kennedy position vis-a-vis Russia. It was only after the missile crisis that the Soviets started talking peace to Kennedy.

Pres -- We ought to get the ABM out fairly soon next week under the circumstances.

K -- We should prepare very carefully with the Senate. I do not believe you should go on TV.

Pres -- I should make a written statement with no large press conference.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

K -- That would be my recommendation and Bill agrees. Believe Packard should give a news conference. All of us should work on the Senators.

Pres -- And on the press with backgrounders.

K -- Your problem is not with the public. Most of the questions would be so technical. I am sending a book to you tonight containing possible questions and answers on the ABM.

Pres -- I will look it over and see what I need to do. We might have to go on later to answer some of the foolish things. But I think we should move on it and make a good strong statement.

K -- There should be a written statement issued to the press with possibly a morning press conference on it -- not a national, evening press conference.

Pres -- I don't intend to use prime time. The only purpose for a press conference is to answer questions. I could stay out of the technical stuff and make a statement and let it go at that.

K -- It won't fly without your strong support. A written statement may not be strong enough. It may have to be a regular press conference -- opened by this subject, and then open the floor to any other questions, half of which would be on this.

Pres -- Back to the private talks --

K -- I don't think you could issue an order from Key Biscayne without an enormous bureaucratic blow-up. Laird gets back Wednesday. If they attack Saigon again, respond. If they don't, we will be in private talks by the end of the week. We are now committed to it. If you hit Cambodia after the private talks start, it can break them, and you will be accused of insincerity.

Pres -- Once we are in private talks, we are virtually dead as far as strong action is concerned. If done, it has to be before.

K -- Hit them and then ask for private talks.

Pres -- Packard sees this as the best way to proceed diplomatically?

K -- Yes, but doesn't feel that confident about it. Rogers feels it would be bad for negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

3

Pres -- When Habib gets here, I want to talk. They are not going to give away the game there. We could lose the whole South Vietnam position.

K. -- Saigon will collapse on us.

Pres -- Did Lodge and Walsh recommend opening the talks to political as well as military matters? Why did Bill volunteer? Did Dobrynan ask or did he volunteer?

K -- It doesn't say in this cable what Dobrynon said to Bill. I don't know whether he volunteered or answered a question.

Pres -- Seems to me that it is a simple thing -- tying political to military was such a major shift in position.

K -- That is what Dobrynon says. Bill said he didn't know why Dobrynon said it was a shift.

Pres -- It was in the briefing paper!

K -- We weren't saying we didn't want to discuss political questions. I think, myself, we have now wound up, in this first testing period, in a weak posture in a tough sequence of events. My concern is they will now feel free to press us along in these private talks.

Pres -- We can't be boxed in where we are at the mercy of the fact that we can't hit the north and we can't have private talks. We will have no bargaining position.

K -- For the first 4 weeks, they have been pressing publicly for political and military talks. Now they have achieved this, they can go into the private talks and string them out.

Pres -- You can cut that down by making clear to the Soviets, and I will say so in the press conference, there will be no compromise on this coalition government.

K -- I don't believe it will be easy for you to attack Cambodia while the private talks are going on and not much being done in South Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08106148

4

Pres -- My point is if, while the private talks are going on and they are kicking us, we are going to do something.

K -- The Communist objective will be to push you to the left. They will be much less cautious when this is achieved.

Pres -- Get Habib in and we will see what's going on and have him throw in some other arguments.

K -- Can't do much now unless they have another rocket attack laid on before the cables to Hanoi and Moscow.

Pres -- I want to see those cables next time myself -- any cables of instruction on these talks. I have strong feelings and I will personally dictate them on any instructions. Who prepared the first instructions?

K -- My information was they came from Bill. (In response to query from the President) Bill Bundy is the Assistant Secretary in that area of responsibility.

Pres -- Is he taking the Harriman line now?

K -- He was tough formerly, but he was shell-shocked by the last Administration.

Pres -- And he is tired.

K -- I will show you the original instructions when you return. What Lodge did was bad primarily in tone but still it got us much of the way to private talks. The Dobrynon conversation we will have to live with.

Pres -- I agree. I can't believe he agreed to go politically.

K -- On the Middle East, he went ahead and told them bi-lateral. My concern is this is our one chance to be precise and concrete.

K -- The more reasonable we sound, the worst off we are. We should have the option open that we might go back to the Dulles position. Once the private talks start on Friday, we can't go with the Cambodian thing.

Pres -- The major thing is tying together the political and military.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 081064

5

K -- If we keep pushing to speed up negotiations, we might crack them. We have a massive problem if we want to play this way. They should be given authority to do it. If not, we need a high command to monitor negotiations or they will fly apart.

Pres: From now on, I want to see the instructions. That was the understanding. I have to see them! I know more than Bill or Walsh will every learn.

On the ABM, again:

Pres -- There are two ways to put out the ABM:

(1) Written Statement

(2) Then make a statement in the press conference on Thursday.

K -- We could release the 7-page statement and have you speak from a shorter one.

The President agreed -- thought Thursday was definitely the time to do it. Speak orally for 2-3 minutes, "this is what I have decided," and ask for questions.

K -- Some people think we may lose this one in Congress.

Pres -- I don't think so; I think it will carry. Assuming we lose in Congress, I think it is more important that I am for it; that this fact gets across to the Soviets.

Pres -- (Back on the Dobrynon matter) We shouldn't build this Dobrynon thing up -- I didn't give him an inch in my conversation. Bill has to learn this is the way to treat them.

K -- We still have a chance -- 6 months to get them moving in a qualitative direction.

Pres -- There is not going to be any de-escalation. State has nothing to do with that. We are just going to keep giving word to Wheeler to knock hell out of them.

K -- It was also bad agreeing to private talk with NLF in the same room.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08100608

6

Pres -- Did he check that with Lodge? Will that wash with Ky?

K -- I think Saigon will be horrified when they hear of this.

Pres -- We will back off. Lodge hasn't said this yet.

K -- It's being sent to Lodge; that's how I got it. I think we can
get Lodge under control through Habib.

Pres -- Do that Monday. I will start looking at the instructions
myself and dictate my own reactions. That will bring them around
fast. I should get some memo out on the private talks. Lodge has
to know this -- say to Bill, one thing is very important. Lodge
and the President talked to Ky -- we have to be sure we have told
Ky to have private talks with the NLF. We have to be sure Ky
agrees. This is very important. Tell Bill to send a cable.

K -- They will interpret that as authority to beat away at Ky to
agree.

Pres -- You can't order him to do it. The best thing is to wait
until you can tell Hanoi what you think.

K -- Lodge doesn't technically have authority for private talks.
Why don't we leave it that you reserve the right to give authority.

Pres -- It will be interesting to see what happens on the other side.

K -- If they hit us, we must refuse to have private talks for
another week.

Pres -- We cannot stand back and not hit them. Let us suppose
between now and next Wednesday, they shell us again and we have not yet
hit Kaswan (?).

K -- There is also the 7th NVN division 10 miles away from Kaswan (?)
if they shell us again.

Pres -- We cannot tolerate one more of these without hitting back.
We have already warned them. Presumably they have stopped.
If they hit us again, we will hit them with no warning. That is
the way we are going to do it. I can't tolerate argument from
Rogers on this. You only warn once. However, if they don't
hit us, we are screwed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958:
By MW NARA Date 081009

7

K -- We could wait at least through next week for private talks to see how they behave.

Pres -- In the future, we will keep in more close control. I think Bill did not realize the tremendous significance of tying political with military matters. We have to start talking about Viet Nam outside of the NSC -- just among the President, Kissinger, Rogers and Laird -- to bring up such things as this political matter to educate people. If Bill had been to Vietnam, he would not have done this.

by: kora Simkus

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger 11:50 a.m.

Rogers said he was LDXing over a statement to HAK; it's a little stronger. HAK said he would put it before the President immediately. Rogers said this is getting sites and signing contracts with long-term lead-time items, etc. It does suggest a delay in the deployment. It may well be that we could state it some other way, but Rogers doesn't know just where we are in our planning. HAK said it's about where Rogers knows it is. It isn't frozen and concrete, and the President must look at it very carefully. There was discussion about pros and cons on the Hill; HAK saw nose-count Bryce has, and it raises problems.

Rogers said HAK should tell the President he doesn't have strong views on it. HAK said his understanding is Rogers will support whatever the President does, but in the meantime wanted him to consider the statement Rogers was sending over.

There was brief mention of Richard Goodwin's trip to Peru--and the consensus was that Goodwin was not a very high type.*

HAK told Rogers that Habib had been in to see him for about 15 minutes--the President noted he was here, so he saw Habib for about 10 minutes--just to get his impressions -- Habib told him what was in the long cable which the President hadn't seen.

Rogers said he got a cable from Cabot in which he asked to proceed to work out private talks (the cable is in the Cherokee series, so HAK didn't have a copy).

HAK said he thinks what the President is now thinking is to give authority -- there hasn't been any shelling this week -- early next week. Rogers said if we gave them the go-ahead they couldn't do it until next week. Rogers said, "Do I have permission to seek talks March 14 or a suitable time thereafter?" HAK said I would suggest we do it as of 17th or 18th. HAK said why don't you let me raise it with the President? HAK told Pres when we got cable over here in reply to cable that came in yesterday morning, he wanted to look it over, and there's no obstacle in principle. Rogers said Bill Bundy stated he would send it over this morning. Bundy showed it to Rogers, who has no problem with it. The President did say he wanted to see it. Rogers hopes they can get it out tonight.

*read, mean, awful*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 081004

TELCORN

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
3-10-69 6:25 PM

R said he has been talking with Alex, Elliot and Gerry and they have
some thoughts re ABM as to whether we should not indicate that
proposal is good one but stall a bit on commitments. R said said
we could proceed with acquiring sites, long lead items but not jump
into it right away. R asked if there was any chance to discuss
further or has decision been made? K said it has been made but
if R has some further thoughts, he should be heard. R asked whether
it is still scheduled for Thursday. K said yes. R asked if it would
come up at NSC meeting - K said no. K said he thinks he should set
up something for R tomorrow. K asked whether this would just
stretch out deployment and R said yes. R read paper he had.
K said he did not think President would object to stretching out
the thing if the deployment commitment is made this year. R said
they will work out something on paper and have it for K tomorrow
and perhaps he can talk with the President later in the afternoon.
R said he is concerned that if President loses battle now, he will
lose the whole system.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Deputy Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger
3/11/69 9:00 a.m.

yesterday

HAK said he had talked to the President at present he does not want to go the R&D route. HAK told the Pres about the stretch-out -- saving $700 million -- what's the difference between that and the R&D decision? Packard said the stretch-out is the same as the original decision. The R&D is complete change. The stretch-out is simply we didn't ask for quite as much construction money in the FY 70 budget. The original $700 budget figure was 1.8. We were going to bring that down by $530 million, which would be a little under 1.3.

In answer to HAK's question if 700 was on top of 530, Packard said it's 700 total, instead of 530. All it does is to delay work on the first installation from early fall of '69 to early spring of '70. It's a delay of 4 months.

HAK asked if that was something one could mention, and Packard said that causes no particular problem.

HAK referred to Rogers' call (he doesn't have memo yet) about State's suggestion, to continue R&D procurement of long lead-time items and acquisition of sites.

Packard said he thinks if we want to delay, it ought to be done on the basis that we continue the R&D; that we stop the production; in other others, go the route he suggested. If Pres wants to delay it that much, we ought to go back and reevaluate. The memo he gave HAK gives essential aspects of the matter. They ought to be doublechecked if Pres does want to go that way.

HAK's concern about this is he thinks it will kill the program. If 4 weeks ago we had announced our present program... I think by next year there's a sort of religious opposition to ABM which isn't going to be moved no matter what we do.

Packard thinks HAK's concern has some merit. If we delay, we might never be in a position to go ahead--depending on what the circumstances are at the time. Packard thinks if we present the case and rationale for it even at this time, we have quite a good chance of getting acceptance--he thinks all this confusion has been bad, but if we present a rational plan, he believes we'll get a lot of people to come around.

HAK asked if Packard back if we have to choose between some of these VNam things and ABM, which would he choose? Packard didn't think the two have very much relationship to each other. There's another consideration that if the President wants to put a little more pressure on budget reduction for '70 budget, we have some other things we could do which would be to delay the construction of some of our naval vessels--we've an aircraft carrier and some other ships. But HAK said no, he didn't think that was the problem.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

-2-

Although HAK asked for a paper explaining what the 700 million stretch-out
means, Packard explained that it's a 3-months' delay in the beginning of
construction--that's all it amounts to; the construction to start early in
spring of '70 instead of the fall of '69; otherwise no change. Packard
said he outlined that as a possibility at the NSC meeting. We'd say we
are not going to start any actual installations until the spring of 1970.
It would give an opportunity to talk with the SALT people. We ought to
have the SALT talks under way by then.

Packard said something about the only benefit on that about long-lead-term
items and purchasing sites about using a little more leverage in going ahead--
but it doesn't really give you enough, in his view, to give assurance the
program would be approved a year from now. If we delayed now, would it
ever be approved? HAK said they could kill the appropriation next year.
Packard said they could do that, and if you spend several billion dollars on
a program, it would be a little more difficult to cancel it.

##

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Authority F012958:
By MW NARA Date 08106198

TELCON
Phil Habib
Mr. Kissinger
3-11-69 12:10 PM

K said he had just talked to the Secy (Rogers) and he told K that
Lodge came in on Cherokee line today. H said he has just talked
to Lodge and told him not to send any more messages - just to
sit and wait.

K said Rogers is now hitting us over the head to go ahead with it. H said the timing is still what he and K had discussed - as soon as H gets out of town, L reverts. H said he told Lodge not to send any more messages and to sit still until he gets instructions. Lodge understands. K said this will affect his instructions. H said the instructions should remain the same. H said, secondly, there is no reason for doing anything this week - it can wait until next week. K asked what we do now when he says he has been instructed by his Chief Negotiator? H said K could get on the phone to the Chief Negotiator. K said as a result of all this, there will be a reluctant yielding. Habib said he would try to talk with the Secretary; said K knows how to smooth things over over here. K said he can smooth things over if H will get Rogers off his back. H said he would call for an appointment right away. H said he has told Bundy so he knows that withdrawal is the issue.

jm

Habib called back later to say he had meeting with Secretary scheduled for 3:30

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 081068

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
3-11069 12:45 PM

R said Harlan Cleveland is here and asked him about the President's participation in the NATO meeting. R said they have recommended that President make speech on Thursday at 2:30 - R thinks he has to make a speech. K agreed and said that is as good a time as any. R asked about Defense Ministers' attendance - has President decided on that? K said his impression is that he has but he better check. K said he is practically certain that President did not raise with de Gaulle the matter of the French Defense Minister. K said his own instinct, which is not very passionate on this, is to have them. K says he does not think it will hurt if French absent themselves.

R said there will be some distinguished guests invited who are not Government officials (like Spaak) - they will be attending whole meeting. There will be about 25 of them and a lot of them do not have any money. R said someone has suggested that the President have one of his planes pick them up in Brussels and take them back. K said he would check into it. R said he would like to know before the end of the day because Harlan is going back. K said he would call R back this afternoon.

K called D Chapin to ask to speak to President on the phone - call will be returned.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By MW NARA Date 081069

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger
Robert Haldeman
3-11-69 12:50 PM

H said he had two requests for Ambassadors to see the President which he understands HAK recommends - Amb Neumann and Ambassador Ohelert. K said H had told him that Neumann supported the President in 1962 and that he was owed something - K is completely neutral. K said on Ohelert - it is a little awkward. He has some very strong views on some aspects of arms business. H asked K whether they could not be expressed to someone else. K said yes, he does not have to see the President. K said President was wrong on Ohelert. K said he will see him and if he then thinks he should talk to the President, he will bring him up.

H said there is request from Harriman to see President on something having to do with Human Rights. H does not see why he needs to see him since President is giving dinner for career ambassadors - four or five of them who are retiring and Harriman will be included. Dinner will be on April 15 and will salute ambassadors with long service who are retiring. K agreed. K said he would leave Neumann up to H.

H and K discussed ABM. K said he thinks we can swing it if the President is willing to fight for three weeks day and night - will not be able to get it just by dropping it. H asked whether someone would tell President this loud and clear. K said he will tell him and Bryce has told him.

K said before April is out we will be in a fight with the State Department on Vietnam. K said he would talk to President about both these problems.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
3-11-69 1:30 PM

K said Rogers had called him about the NATO meeting and wondered if we had decided to invite the Defense Ministers. President said we discussed it and he thought it went pretty far. K said Rogers leans toward it but the only problem is that the French will not send theirs. President said yes. K said his view is that this would not be too bad considering some of press stories re France - we invited their Minister of Defense in any event. President said he was not concerned about press stories about France - they have to make something up to be critical of. President said he thought they went pretty far on the Defense Ministers and he also thinks it is a pretty good ploy to make to the Russians that we are still talking about defense and that NATO is not an alliance detente but an alliance of defense as well. K said we will invite French Defense Minister and see what response is.

K said some 25 senior political leaders instrumental in founding of NATO have been invited. K said it might be good idea to send plane to pick up if appropriate and then return them to Brussels. President said he thought that was o.k. - we probably have plenty of planes. President said he thinks we should go ahead on Defense Ministers - can't back off it now. President said he thought K should call Amb Lucet and tell him story. K said he would invite him to lunch.

K said he is seeing some scientists on ABM - no need for President to see unless he wants to. President said DuBridge gave him his pitch this morning. K asked whether President wanted to talk with him about ABM again today. President looked at his schedule and suggested 5:00 - K said that is when scientists are coming; he could come up right after that. President said he had Congressional reception this evening. It was finally agreed that K would change his appt with the scientists to 5:30 and see the President at 5:00. K said there is a State Department proposal that he thinks President should have a chance to see. President asked if Laird would be back for NSC tomorrow. K said no he gets back tomorrow night. President said something about going ahead and putting in a call.

President asked about Ayub thing and whether K had put into mill. K said yes, Sisco is writing me a note - Sisco is not enthusiastic. President said it is personal matter and he wants to see him before he steps down.

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Authority F012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

-2-

President asked if Habib is in the camp - K said yes; he is in camp as a matter of conviction. Harriman may be pushing out the line or Walsh might be doing it. K thinks Habib will be very loyal. President said he sees all of our problems and knows how we have to play it? K said yes. K mentioned newspaper report that Hanoi has said they are not interested in secret talks. President said no one can say that we caused that. K said we have through some of the things that happened over the week end. President said: we gave too much? K said yes. President agreed. President said we will play it out.

President mentioned his talk with Dubridge on ABM. Said one point that was raised was with regard to defense against Chinese. President asked whether he understands it is a defense against the Chinese even though it is deployment for purposes of defending minutemen. K said yes. President said this is not Dubridge's view and asked what Defense says. K said Defense says it is a defense against a primitive attack by Chinese but not a sophisticated one. President mentioned Scott and other potential supporters in Senate talking about prototype - Dick Russell talked about this. President said what he needs to know is what could be done short of deployment which would still give us something. K said that is what he wants to discuss with him. President said he would like Packard's views - K said he had talk with him this morning and also with good friend of his from scientific community in Cambridge; when he sees President this afternoon he will give him their thinking.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/98

TELCOM

John Walsh
Mr. Kissinger
3-11-69 4:55 PM

W said he had just talked with Cy and he would like to see HAK if possible either before or after his appt with the President tomorrow. K said he thought President was postponing this appointment to next Monday, but W better check. If meeting tomorrow with Vance is put off, K agreed to see him at 3:45.

W said he was sending over memo on Anderson story in the paper today - said he thought it was desirable to give K something in writing.

K said there is colossal restiveness over here about Dobrynin memcon. W said original has been changed. K asked whether it would be possible to see original. W said he would try to get a copy and send it over.

W said he sex was sending over proposal from Secretary about sending letters to Allon and Hussein. Sec sex signed it, but W thinks it should be looked at carefully.

K asked W to tell the Secretary that it is o.k. to invite the NATO Defense Ministers and o.k. on the plane - President has approved.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958:
By MW NARA Date 08/06/88

TELCOM
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
3-11-69 5:00 PM

R and K discussed ABM - K said not ready yet to announce because
President wants to mull over all the proposals. K said he thought
President should not decide until he sees R's paper - K has explained
that R is ready to back President's original position, however.

K said he had talked with Walsh on something else, but asked him to
tell Secretary that Defense Ministers invitation is o.k. and plane
is o.k.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08101968

TELCON
Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger

3-11-69 5:10 PM

First part of call not monitored.

P said they are somewhere between the two positions that he gave K the other day - hard line for the R&D only, cancel construction authorization and procurement authorization. K asked whether they were not doing four now. P said yes but only four - nothing else, no Spartans. P said Spartans could be put on. K said no - he could not recommend that. P said another possible move they had talked about over there would be to deploy par (?) radars and some of missile site radars only. P said there are some alternative things that can be done. K said without getting everyone stirred up could he explore this.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

By MW NARA Date 08/06/08

Telecon

Gerard Smith

7:10 3/11/69

HAK said that the NSC meeting (Smith's portion) was being put off until Saturday if that was o.k. Smith said he was planning on leaving Saturday night but that shouldn't hurt his departure.

Smith said he would like to have a picture and formal announcement and have the President sign the letter of instructions before he leaves.

HAK assured him that this would be handled before his (Smith's) meeting or opening session on March 17.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08106198

TELCONE

McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Kissinger

3-12-69 9:00 AM

McG said Fisk and Romnes - telephone types - are against ABM deployment.
They think thing to do is to MAX research and develop forever but never
to deploy. K said on the basis of their conversations, he takes it that
McG's view is the same. McG said yes. K said he appreciated this information
and he is going to try to get in touch with Fisk. McG said Pentagon
will feel if they get smoked out they have been betrayed. McG's friend
Irwin Miller (his name should be kept out of this) told him that Fisk
and Bell System would rather not be in on this but they are kept in by
Pentagon. K said he knows Jim and would like to hear his views and
this would be a perfectly natural thing on his part to call him.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON
Gov Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
3-12-69 10:45 AM

K said he hopes R is not against the ABM. R said he is for it. K said he hopes we can have R's support if we do it. R said he thinks ABM is essential - if it is not done now you will be closed out on everything. The longer it is delayed the more opposition there will be. R said President should make it clear that it is essential to the national security and will be helpful in解决 negotiations with Soviet Union on disarmament; also that he has enough information to know what this will do. R said this is very important moment for the President in exerting in a clear way his leadership and he has to be authoritative on it. He has no alternative in protecting the national interest - flat and strong. He should say he has taken the time because did not want to leave anything unexplored, etc. K said R knows what his view is.

R asked whether K had received a copy of Ed Teller's recent letter. K said no and R said he would send a copy down.

K said he thought ABM decision would be made today and he will let R know what it is. R said he would like to be able to support President and the best thing for him to do is to put the facts in the statement so it makes it possible for any of them to say on the basis of the facts there is no alternative.

R and K discussed R's trip. R said Jimmy Roosevelt had come to see him and he would like very much to go. Both agreed this was interesting possibility and after K has thought it over he may mention to President. R said David is out - he made his own decision. They discussed scheduling of R's trip - K thinks he should wind up first trip in some country that has high possibility of some success. K said Venezuela perhaps - would like to check out with CIA to be sure it is not one where there are apt to be riots.

R said he will be in Washington on Saturday and they may be able to get together. R discussed Sol Linowitz and possibility of his running for Governor of Senator. R said if he is kept on at QAK OAS, he would not come back into politics in NY. K said he would speak to President about this.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON

Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger
3-12-69 11:05 AM

H said he has list from State of Ambassadorial assignments and wondered if K wanted to go over them - before, with or after the President.
There are some that K might not like. Toon for Czechoslovakia, for instance. K said that is not bad. H suggested that when K has a free minute he call and they will go over the list quickly on the phone.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 08106108

TELCOM

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
3/12/69 2 30 p

Gerard Smith referred to the prestigious general advisory committee to ACDA (McCloy is Chairman) and brought up question of accepting all the resignations, instead of trying to pick and choose. He thought the President had talked to McCloy during the campaign about reconstituting the committee. When he asked if he should accept all the resignations and just get 15 new people, HAK said he has no problem with that. Smith mentioned that some of our scientist friends are on the committee (such as Kisty) and HAK said "accept those resignations with everybody else." HAK said his instinct is this is the right way to proceed.

GSmith said they meet twice a year--according to statute--and if we get present committee to start in April, it would be that much harder to make a clean slate after they have met.

HAK said he would mention the above to the Pres.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958:
By MW NARA Date 081068

TELCOM

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
3/12/69 5:40 p. m.

On the Bunker visit, Rogers said they are going to send a telegram and get him back, and they agreed it would be the end of the next week.
(Bunker wanted to come back anyway)

HAK talked to Pres. about the NATO business, and Pres. is not so much for consultation in practice as in theory. Pres. doesn't want to have it taken up tomorrow -- he wants it Friday morning. Pres. was afraid of leaks. Rogers said he didn't have any problem with that. He said he is not going to be able to notify anyone else, of course.

HAK said the Canadians ought to be told. Defense was going to do that. HAK was going to take that up with Packard. The English will get it through NATO, but HAK said "I ought to do it through the back channel."

Rogers said de Gaulle was notified (as HAK Said, 'what we are doing is not so radical a departure from what we discussed with him!') What about Germans? HAK told Rogers that if he will call the German Ambassador, he thinks the Germans will hold it tight--if he did it tomorrow afternoon. Rogers said he would do it Friday morning.

Rogers asked, "What about the cable?"

HAK said, "This will come over to you within the hour."

###

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958
By MW NARA Date 080608

TELCOM

Jerome Weisner

Mr. Kissinger

3-13-69 9:00 AM

W said he wanted to talk about ABM for a few minutes - one of worst
possible decisions that the President could make would be to take a
posture that looked politically acute like basing it on minutemen,
which clearly needs defending (spending mone on something that is
not needed, etc.) W said total Soviet force at this stage could
not destroy the minutemen - in order to have a high probability of
destroying, you would have to have at least a two to one attack.
W said at this juncture minutemen are safe. W said
if picture changes, there is time to react. W said it is really
not a good system for protecting minutemen - it is too expensive
and it is not even sensible to do it. K said this has been put before
President but he will reinforce using W's name.

W and K agreed to meet on Monday, March 17 at 6:00 PM

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012958:
By MW NARA Date 08106168

TELCORN

Martin Hillenbrand
Mr. Kissinger

3-13-69 9:30 AM

K said he had called yesterday but then spoke to Secretary - it was
about consultations on ABM, which have now changed to notifications.
H asked when it would happen and K said tomorrow probably.
K said President did not want it sent over until he had approved
statement and he will not do that until this afternoon. H said he would
tell Cleveland he will get it as soon as President as signed off.

H brought up invitations for NATO Ministerial events - particularly
the ceremonial thing involving the President at 2:30. H asked if K
could nail down the President on this - K said he would get an answer
by the end of the day. H brought up question also of whether Pres
would give lunch or dinner. K said Pres does not want to sit in on that
meeting with State, Defense, etc. - will just see him once, and give
a dinner.

H said they have message from Emb in Madrid re Allen's trip. Somehow
or other travel plans have become known to the Spanish who think
purpose of trip is to negotiate on bases. H talked to Allen about
delaying his trip for a week or so - Allen said he wanted to think about
it. I missed part of call but K said he would accept
H's recommendation on this and that he will take the rap for it with
Allen.

jm