[LC]

RICHARD NIXON

January 11, 1985

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

JAN 16 1989

Since a rather severe case of shingles made my 72nd birthday a major media event, I wanted you to know that the bottle of Perrier-Jouey helped to make the day a very special one for Pat and for me.

As you can imagine, we have had a lot of inquiries with regard to the state of my health and scores of recommendations as to miracle cures. My doctor tells me that none of them will work but reassures me that while shingles is extremely painful, it is never fatal. Consequently, I expect to be around for a few more birthday celebrations in the future!

Pat joins me in sending our very best wishes for a happy, prosperous and peaceful New Year.

Dr. and Mrs. Henry Kissinger

RICHARD NIXON

February 22, 1985

Dear Henry:

Since April 30th will mark the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, we shall probably be inundated in the weeks ahead with scores of books, columns, and television documentaries criticizing and lamenting the American role in Vietnam.

The enclosed book presents a different point of view. There can be an honest difference of opinion over whether we should have become involved in Vietnam and how the war was conducted. But after witnessing the reign of terror that has been imposed upon the people of Vietnam and Cambodia by the Communist regimes we opposed, fair-minded observers can reach only one conclusion: Whatever our mistakes, the United States tried and failed in a just cause in Vietnam.

As I put it in the last paragraph of this book, "'No more Vietnams' can mean that we should not *try* again. It *should* mean we must not *fail* again."

Sincerely,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

MAR 7 1985

4/5/85

HAK:

Last month Richard Nixon sent you
a copy of _No More Vietnams_ and
you sent a short note of reply.
That exchange is at back.

The former President has now sent
you another note - this time en-
closing a letter of praise from
Lee Kwan Yew.

How about something like the
attached as a further reply?

Approve ______

as edited ______

Rosemary

(CV: Date when signed)

May 6, 1985

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: Two More Letters from President Nixon

Last week President Nixon sent you a note expressing outrage at the way you had been treated by CBS (Stahl) in a recent TV program about Vietnam (which RN had not seen but heard about). (April 26 letter)

Just this morning you received a further letter, this one sending you 'off-the-record' 'observations' on a number of issues (Bitburg, US-Soviet ties and attacking the press generally for coverage of Reagan). The views are robust and, like his interview in Time magazine (also attached) put forth in very informal manner. (May 3rd letter)

Both of these letters are at Tab B.

At Tab C are your last two letters to Nixon.

At Tab A is a suggested reply.

Approve Tab A (sign) ____

Approve as edited ____

"Off Stride" trumpets the headline of the New York Times "Week In Review" on Sunday, April 28th. The Times reporter observes, "Less than six months after his landslide, Ronald Reagan seems, quite suddenly, politically vulnerable. His decision to proceed with the visit to a Germany military cemetery, the rebuke that the House of Representatives handed out in rejecting aid to the rebels in Nicaragua, the uncertainty that dominated the end of the week's Senate debate on the President's compromise budget proposal, the resistance in Congress to a possible tax overhaul," are cited as examples of the President's decline in popularity and influence.

The Washington Post, the weekly newsmagazines and the network TV anchors parrot the same line. Dr. Austin Ranney, a former President of the American Political Science Association, chimes in by declaring, "Mr. Reagan has finally become a lame duck." And the usual anonymous White House officials speaking on "condition their names not be used," acknowledged that the decision to visit the German cemetery was a "political disaster." Gallup reports that the President's approval rating has dropped 12 points since the Inauguration.

Before everyone pushes the panic button, it is time to put some of these recent developments in perspective. First, consider the source as far as most of the criticism writing Reagan off is concerned. The New York Times and Washington Post both endorsed Mondale. The columnists who take the same line, like Tom Wicker, Anthony Lewis and James Reston, were all for Mondale. The same is true of television anchormen like Dan Rather. They did not want Reagan to win in 1984 and they predictably gloat over any "failures" he experiences as proof that they were right.

We have witnessed the same syndrome in the media's revolting "celebration" of America's defeat in Vietnam ten year ago. The TV networks competed with each other in showing how happy the Vietnamese people are now that the U.S. has left the scene and in outrageously blaming U.S. troops who were trying to prevent a communist takeover for the communist

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massacre of two million Cambodians. Communist Vietnam leaders have been paraded before the cameras in the best-possible light, and those who opposed them have been viciously attacked. Why this obscene gloating over a defeat for American forces? Because after Tet in 1968 the great majority of the media heavyweights turned anti-war and predicted the U.S. would lose. Now they never miss a chance to prove to their audience that they were right and their government was wrong.

A bit of political history will help to put Reagan's present troubles in perspective. Early in 1983, the title of the New York Times lead editorial was, "The Stench of Failure." In strident and apocalyptic terms, the Times ponderously proclaimed that he had failed on all fronts: the economy was in the doldrums; no progress was being made on arms control or other issues with the Russians; various Reagan officials had come under attack or investigation because of questionable personal and financial activities. Eighteen months later, Reagan was re-elected in one of the greatest landslides in history.

The purpose of recounting history is not to prove that the Administration is not going through a difficult time. The second terms of Presidents in this century, particularly after landslide victories, have without exception run into difficulties. But what we must always keep in mind is that things are never as bad or as good as they seem in the short term and that what matters is whether the long-term policies of the President and his Administration are fundamentally sound.

The German cemetery visit, without question, is harmful to the President in the short term. The heat he is taking, particularly from Republicans in the House and Senate, must seem at times almost unbearable to him. Someone asked me a few days ago whether I would have made the same decision with regard to visiting the cemetery. My answer was, "No, and neither would President Reagan if he had known then what he found out later about who was buried there." But having accepted Kohl's invitation to go, it would have been a major mistake for him to have changed his mind and

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refused to go because of domestic political pressure. The image of being a weak leader would have encouraged opponents at home and abroad to apply pressure on him in the future whenever he made a decision they didn't like.

Despite the unfortunate publicity, we must remember that the President's visit to Bitburg commemorates two profoundly important, watershed events: the end of one of the most tragic episodes in human history, Hitler's Holocaust; and the birth of a new German nation opposed to all Hitler stood for. The supreme irony is that the new Germany is one of the indispensable building blocks of the strategy which can prevent another holocaust in the future. We must never forget that without the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO would be a hollow shell which would collapse under Soviet pressure. Only the loyal participation of German troops makes it possible to prevent the Soviet Union, the most anti-semitic nation in the world, from overrunning Western Europe.

Anthony Lewis's snide suggestion that Reagan's decision showed "insensitivity" to the horrors of the Holocaust is both viciously unfair and untrue. No President in the postwar era has been a stronger supporter of Israel. Truman, for example, was pro-Israel for political reasons. Reagan is pro-Israel because he has deep personal affection and respect for the Jewish people and heartfelt concern over the tragedy they have had to endure. I am convinced that the speech he will make in Bitburg will enable him to set the record straight and repair most of the damage which has been done up to this point. It is unfortunate that so many who claim to be friends of Israel -- and I think I have earned that distinction -- have gone overboard in castigating a President who has been and will remain one of their strongest supporters.

His media critics are gleefully congratulating each other over the House vote rejecting his request for $14 million in non-military aid for the Contras in Nicaragua. I predict that their cheers will turn to tears by Election Day 1986. I would not like to be a Democratic candidate who had voted

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against aid to the anti-communist Contras running
against an opponent who would remind the voters
that the Nicaraguan communist government had
praised his vote and that the communist President
Ortega ended up the next day exchanging kisses on
the cheek with his Soviet sponsors in Moscow.

The opponents of aid to the Contras now must
take the responsibility for what happens in
Nicaragua. My prediction is that within a few
months, the President will be able to go to the
Congress again and get a request for military aid
approved by both the House and the Senate. It is
ironic that those who oppose aid to the Contras
have as their slogan, "No more Vietnams." What
they fail to recognize is that the way to avoid
another Vietnam in Nicaragua is to provide aid now
to anti-communist Nicaraguans who are willing to
risk their lives to fight against the communist
government rather than to have to send in Americans
later to neutralize a Soviet base which, just like
Cuba, will be built if the Contra effort
collapses.

The program offered by the President's
opposition is ludicrous. They say: Use diplomacy,
not military power, to persuade the Nicaraguan
communists to change their position. Diplomacy
without military power to back it up is impotent.
In the 40 years since the UN has been in existence,
can anyone name one example where a UN resolution
prevented Soviet aggression or repression? In his
Notre Dame speech in 1977, Jimmy Carter said, "We
do not want to be the world's policemen, but we do
want to be the world's peacemakers." The media
were ecstatic and praised his eloquence and wisdom.
But when you have a murderer running amok in your
neighborhood, you have to call on armed policemen
to arrest him. That is why they call them peace
officers.

I am enclosing an article from *Time Magazine* of April 22nd which accurately reflects my views on Soviet/American relations. I hope that in view of some of the hard-line statements being made by Gorbachev and the Soviet Union's reversing their position and now insisting they have a right to

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shoot first and ask questions later as they did in
the case of Major Nicholson, the Administration may
cool the idea of a "get-acquainted" session with
Gorbachev when he comes to the UN in October and
take a posture of being willing but not anxious to
have a properly-prepared meeting next year which
would provide time for preparing an agenda with
real substance. I can hear the self-proclaimed
Soviet experts in the media and the political
opposition sharpening their knives now to cut the
President to pieces if he holds a summit which
produces headlines and handshakes but no real
progress on reducing tensions between the two
superpowers. A quickie, get-acquainted summit will
be immensely popular and will raise the President's
approval rating spectactularly in the short term,
but in the long term it will do far more harm than
good by raising hopes and then dashing them.

These foreign policy issues are, of course,
the most newsworthy. But all of them pale into
insignificance compared with the importance of the
economic issue. The President can get military aid
for the Contras and have a highly successful
substantive meeting with the Soviets and still fail
in his second term if the economy goes to hell.
That is why the battle on the budget is one that
the President is very properly mustering all of his
forces to win. If he can get a substantial
percentage of his budget cuts approved and a tax
simplification bill passed by the end of 1986, the
groundwork will have been laid for a strong economy
in 1987 and 1988. If he loses the battle on the
budget, however, and a recession occurs, it will be
a very sad second term. Again, I turn to history
to prove this point. In 1958, Eisenhower had an
enormously successful foreign policy initiative in
Lebanon where, by sending in 15,000 Marines, he
quieted down a potentially dangerous situation,
bluffed the Russians out, and did so without losing
a single American life. Yet, the deep recession
later that year drove his popularity for the first
and only time below 50%. The President's advisors
should bear this historical evidence in mind as
they try to determine where to commit their major
forces for the legislative battles of the second
term.

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There is one fallout from the Bitburg controversy which could do permanent damage if not dealt with quickly. The backbiting and leaks to President Reagan's critics in the media from inside the White House staff cannot be tolerated. Blaming Don Regan for the foulup is ridiculous. The President accepted Kohl's invitation to go to Bitburg long before Regan took over as chief of staff. If Kohl would not withdraw the invitation, Reagan had no choice but to go through with the visit or risk doing irreperable damage to the NATO alliance and lending credence to the view that he is only interested in being popular and will succumb to political pressure. By the same token, by going through the fire of criticism the President has immeasurably strengthened his image as a strong leader who will do what he thinks is right regardless of political pressure. This will help him in the balance of the second term as he deals with the Soviets, other foreign governments, and his political opposition at home.

What we must never forget about Don Regan and Pat Buchanan is that, whatever their alleged faults, they are first, last, and always Reagan loyalists. That is one reason the anti-Reagan media heavyweights are attacking them so unmercifully. I am reminded of what President Eisenhower told me shortly after the Inauguration in 1953. I asked what was the most important single quality a staff member should have. He thought a long time before answering, and then he said, "Selflessness." Not high IQ or willingness to work hard or any of the other attributes one might think of, but "selflessness." That is what Regan and Buchanan have in spades. Neither is in business for himself. Both are dedicated to only one goal: the success of Ronald Reagan in his second term. Unfortunately, that cannot be said for some of their critics on the White House staff who have been leaking their complaints to Reagan's critics in the press. The going is going to get even rougher in the days ahead, and it is time for all hands to shape up or get out.

tion, the impact in Europe was muted. The center-left French daily *Le Monde* headlined its story A SETBACK FOR GORBACHEV: EUROPEANS REJECT THE MISILE MORATORIUM. As usual, Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was quick to line up with Reagan. Said she: "The place for negotiations was across the table in Geneva, not in the pages of newspapers." A few peace groups took heart from Gorbachev's message, but even some of them seemed disappointed. Said Pierre Galand, head of a Belgian organi-

zation opposed to nuclear weapons: "The moratorium is fairly weak. We had the right to expect something more." That something more might be what Dobrynin hinted at in Atlanta: Soviet reductions in Euromissiles in exchange for U.S. concessions on Star Wars.

Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek also expected more than he received. During a meeting with Gromyko in Moscow, he reiterated the Dutch position that the Netherlands planned to go ahead with Euromissile deployment only

if the number of Soviet SS-20s pointed at Europe this November exceeded the number in place last June, NATO figures show an increase of roughly ten missiles already. Van den Broek said that Gromyko did not dispute that estimate and that the Soviet Foreign Minister seemed unwilling to make any concessions or any effort to understand the Dutch point of view.

It now remains for the Administration to make up its mind whether it wants a full-dress "summit" or a less formal

## "We in the U.S. Are Suckers for Style"

Richard Nixon's first love has always been foreign policy. He has written four books on the subject (No More Vietnams was published this month) and maintains a network of high-level contacts. The appointment of a new Soviet leader was much on his mind last week when he met with TIME Washington Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott and Senior Editor Stephen Smith. Looking tanned and fit after a vacation in the Bahamas, the former President said he had recovered from a prolonged bout of shingles. In his first on-the-record interview since November 1984, Nixon discussed the pitfalls of summitry and assessed the challenges facing the U.S. in the Third World. Excerpts:

We in the U.S. are suckers for style as far as Soviet leaders are concerned. I remember how we had an NSC briefing on Nikita Khrushchev back when he came to power in the '50s. We were told that he was going to be a temporary man because he drank too much, wore ill-fitting clothes, spoke bad Russian and had boorish manners.

John Foster Dulles was there. Foster used to chew his cud, and he had a tic over his eye. I can see him now as he sat back and said, "But anyone who claws his way to the top in that Soviet jungle will prove formidable." As it turned out, Khrushchev was by far the most intelligent, imaginative and creative Soviet leader I've ever met.

I remember that before I went to see Khrushchev in 1959, Harold Macmillan told me that the Soviet leaders want to be accepted as members of the club. That's a cheap price to pay. They should be treated with respect. But they are not affected in the least by how nicely you treat them.

Then when Andropov came along, I practically lost my breakfast when I read some of that sappy stuff about him in the morning papers—how he liked Western pop music and so on. Now we're hearing about how Mikhail Gorbachev has good eye contact and a firm handshake and a good sense of humor and how his wife wears stylish shoes. Just because Gorbachev uses charm does not mean he is going to be swayed by it. And as for this façade about a modern, Western-style technocrat—it's just that, a façade.

It is a testament to Gorbachev's brilliance as a politician that he could preside over four years of failure in agriculture and still come out smelling like a rose. He has the confidence of the Soviet bureaucracy because they believe he is a true believer. He isn't going to change the system. He is going to try to make it work better.

Does that mean we can't do business with him? Of course not. But it will be like doing business with the American robber

barons of the 19th century. Gorbachev is not going to be a fastball pitcher. He'll throw curves, knuckleballs and sizzlers if he can get away with them. Of course, Ronald Reagan has played a pitcher too, in that movie *The Winning Team*, and he's also a very shrewd political leader. So you've got two pretty good pitchers going against each other. The question is Which side can hit?

Gorbachev has got major problems at home with the economy. Therefore where we in the West are strong, he needs our help. He's got to be concerned about Eastern Europe and the outer perimeters of the Soviet empire. Every one of the Soviet Union's "colonies" is a drag and has to be subsidized.

It's not that Gorbachev is worried about the Soviet Union collapsing, the way some of our superhawks think. Rather, to paraphrase Jack Kennedy, he has got to be worried about getting it moving again. He needs a summit a lot more than Ronald Reagan does. He needs better relations with the U.S. more than we need them with him.

I have been relieved about what seems to be a change of view within the Administration on the wisdom of a full-blown quickie summit. I have always thought that a get-acquainted, atmospheric summit, with all the trappings, would be much more in the Soviets' interests than in ours. It would be a public relations blockbuster, and the Europeans would say, "Thank God the Americans and the Russians are getting together." But if nothing came of it, there would be a lot of disillusionment, and it would be directed against us.

That is one reason why I favor annual summits. That way you can keep the pressure on. Annual summits will inhibit the Soviet Union. Nations tend to behave better when they have big meetings coming up between their leaders.

A summit must not labor and bring forth a mouse. Mickey Mouse things, like fishing rights and a new consul in Kiev and commercial agreements, are fine. We had them at the first Moscow summit in 1972. They're the froth. But you've also got to have some good stout beer.

President Reagan has an opportunity to control the timing and the substance. So the questions are when, where, how and what. As for when, the key thing is not to be in a hurry. Reagan's position should be that he is willing but not anxious.

On the question of where, the best place to have a summit is over there. I know from experience that when an American President goes abroad, he has a more favorable press than when he stays here. Reagan was very effective in China, and he will be very effective in the Soviet Union, not just with people

EDWARD GILLES

14

TIME, APRIL 22, 1985

"meeting" or both in the next year or so. At a summit the U.S. would insist on four basic areas of discussion: arms control, regional conflicts, human rights and bilateral matters like cultural exchanges and trade. The presummit bargaining on such an agenda would probably take months. By contrast, a get-acquainted meeting could be prepared for much faster. Such a meeting, however, is riskier, for it might be impossible to script the outcome.

Gorbachev faces the same questions. He may decide that getting acquainted is

not good enough and hold out for a summit. Most analysts argue, however, that a meeting of any sort is more in Gorbachev's interest than in Reagan's. It would help him to consolidate his own hold on power at home and increase his influence in Europe. It would also give him a chance to affect American policy, since summitry tends to muzzle the U.S. on other areas of mutual contention. The pressure to reach agreements is felt more acutely in the U.S. than in the Soviet Union, where public opinion is not a

concern in policymaking. Moreover, Gorbachev seems to have the kind of personal assurance that could be effective in face-to-face confrontation with Reagan.

Reagan, of course, is not exactly lacking in personal assurance. He faces a different problem. Having opened the summitry game, he and his aides are now visibly struggling to figure out how they want to play.

—By Richard Stengel.
Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow and
Johanna McGeary/Washington, with other
bureaus

back here, but in Europe too. All that European concern about how the world is going to blow up because of the cowboy in the White House—that has gone down the tubes.

How to plan a summit? There has got to be intense talk at the highest level. Whatever we want to say about Henry Kissinger in our time, we were quite good at privately preparing for meetings, not making publicity all the time.

Now on the question of what the principal business of a summit should be: arms control [the first SALT accords] was the centerpiece of the '72 summit, but I do not believe it is possible to have a significant arms-control agreement by the end of this year. We might get a cosmetic agreement and set a process in motion. Even that cannot be done in Geneva. Able as Max Kampelman is, you cannot get an agreement at a table with 18 people on each side. I do not see anyone to do it but Bud McFarlane, although always with George Shultz very much on it.

Rather than arms control, the centerpiece of the summit could be a resolution of some of the political issues dividing us in such areas as Central America, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. They are more important than arms control anyway, since it is political conflicts that could lead to the use of arms.

Gorbachev is not able to back away from any of the Soviet Union's forward positions, but his interests do require reducing the level of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S., particularly in sensitive areas such as Central America. He knows that we cannot have a situation where the Soviet Union is supporting activities that are neuralgic for us.

A statement of principles comparable to the one we signed at the 1972 summit would be useful. The problem was not in the way we applied those principles. The problem was in the way the relationship was managed after we left office.

When it comes to supporting our friends and allies who are under attack around the world, or rebels who are opposing our enemies, there is a mistake we too often make. Americans want to see things in terms of black and white, good and evil. This sometimes leads us to reach judgments that miss the mark.

For example, people with the very best of intentions—people who are all-out anti-Communists—sometimes contend that the U.S. should always support those who fight for freedom and against repression anywhere in the world. Well, let's look at China. If there were freedom fighters there, would we support them? No, of course we wouldn't, and we shouldn't.

Now China is as repressive a state as the Soviet Union. The difference between them is that in a geopolitical sense, the Chinese not only pose no threat to us, but good relations with them are indispensable to our foreign policy goals.

We have to keep looking at things globally, with an eye to our struggle with the Soviets for influence, particularly in the

Third World. Take Angola. The civil war there is part of a broader conflict. American support for the rebels there is the Brezhnev Doctrine in reverse. In the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviets were in effect saying, "What is ours is forever; you cannot roll us back." That went primarily for Eastern Europe but also for any other country where Soviet proxies or surrogates are in power. In Angola, we should support those who are attempting to turn back Soviet power.

When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there was a lot of talk about how they were concerned over Muslims on their border. That, of course, is bull. What they could not tolerate in Afghanistan was counterrevolution. It concerns them because of Eastern Europe and the outer reaches of the Soviet empire. If I were a Soviet leader, I would be concerned too.

The most clear-cut case where we are justified in supporting rebels is Nicaragua. The Sandinista government represses its own people. That gives us a moral right to support the *contras*, but is it enough? No. However, there is a second factor, which is that the Nicaraguan government is expansionist and aggressive; it is attempting to export its revolution. Moreover, Nicaragua is close to us. Also, it is a potential Soviet military base in the Americas. Put all these factors together, and you have a strong case for support of the *contras*.

There has been a tendency on the part of the American media to downplay both the Sandinistas' repression and the threat to their neighbors. Part of this has to do with the whole Viet Nam syndrome, the press worrying about how "we're going to end up on the wrong side of history" or "we're going to get a little bit pregnant here." There has also been a little too much equanimity, a tendency to say, "So

what? What difference does it make?" Well, what difference does it make who is in charge of little Cuba? It makes a hell of a lot of difference.

People talk about the need for diplomacy. I am all for the Contadora process and that kind of thing; but diplomacy without power is simply impotent. At the same time, we should not give the impression that our approach is almost completely military. We have not given enough emphasis to our economic power. Now, I know from my own experience that foreign aid is the most unpopular damn thing in the world. It is a loser politically. We have to make it a winner.

The Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Kissinger Commission report are getting virtually no attention at all. That is because the recommendations they make—for economic aid and trade—are not as glamorous or as interesting as military and covert assistance. But economics and ideology are our strongest suits. If we competed with the Soviet Union in those areas, it would be no contest.

> "Just because Gorbachev uses charm does not mean he is going to be swayed by it. And as for this façade about a modern, Western-style technocrat—it's just that, a façade."

> "Mickey Mouse things, like fishing rights and a new consulate in Kiev and commercial agreements, are fine ... They're the froth. But you've also got to have some good stout beer."

TIME, APRIL 22, 1985

15

EXCERPTS FROM REVIEWS OF NO MORE VIETNAMS BY RICHARD NIXON

(as of May 12, 1985, a New York Times bestseller)

Brian Crozier, British biographer and journalist: "...By far the most penetrating analysis of what went wrong and why....More and more, the ex-President...is emerging as possibly the most important writer in the world on international affairs...[A] powerful book..."

John Chamberlain, author and columnist: "In a rational world Richard Nixon, as author of *No More Vietnams*, would be asked to head our National Security Council. He is that good when he is offering his own distilled wisdom about the willingness to use power either directly or indirectly or as a tacit threat in the conduct of foreign policy....Of course, Nixon will get no bid to go to Washington...But he can write his books and he can be sure that Ronald Reagan will read them on the quiet."

Dalvan M. Coger, historian (review in Memphis Commercial Appeal): "His chapter on 'Third World war' is worth the price of the book."

William A. Henry III, Time magazine: "In an inspirational final summons to 'a peaceful revolution for progress in the Third World,' Nixon brings back to mind the far-seeing foreign policy analyst whom Watergate, and Vietnam, destroyed."

Todd Culbertson, Richmond News Leader: "Nixon's previous efforts -- e.g., Leaders and Real Peace -- have won praise from the author's former foes. *No More Vietnams*, however, is being called a return to the 'old Nixon.' In other words, it is good stuff."

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., columnist, author, and editor: "In time... historians will see through the bizarrencies of the [Vietnam] era and chronicle the war accurately. Then it will be recorded that much that Nixon has written in this book is unassailable and that the questionable points he makes are at least plausible..."

Lynn L. Sims, military historian (review in Richmond Times Dispatch): "This is a good book. It will make you feel better about our part in the Vietnam War ...Don't read this book looking for Nixon to whitewash his role in Vietnam. Read it to see, perhaps for the first time, pro-American arguments on the morality of the war."

Col. Harry Summers, author of *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* and instructor, Army War College: "*No More Vietnams* is a valuable addition to the literature on the Vietnam War...Particularly useful is his discussion of how the initial will and resolve of the American people that supported our early involvement were frittered away."

Clay F. Richards, UPI: "Vintage Nixon rhetoric...Among many, including those in the highest ranks of the Reagan Administration, his foreign and military policy is regarded as the model. Nixon in his book thus provides some key clues to the thinking behind the direction the nation may be headed toward in the battle for the Third World."

Frank Hurley, Mobile Press Register: "In *No More Vietnams*, Richard Nixon displays the rough, pragmatic, insightful approach to worldly affairs that was his special competence."

Alice Hornbaker, Cincinnati Enquirer: "Nixon delves precisely -- and with some strong, insightful commentary -- into his and four other Presidential administrations which were involved in Vietnam."

Joseph Shattan, the American Spectator: "What Mr. Nixon has done...is to

analyze the political and military errors which various administrations, as well
as Congress, committed in Vietnam, in the hopes of averting similar failures in
the future. That [this] book is vitally needed goes without saying. That Mr.
Nixon is uniquely qualified to write it also goes without saying."

Roy R. Perry, Nashville Banner: "A sustained and penetrating analysis of America's longest war...Richard Nixon's most carefully considered and thought-provoking book....It...should be read by all serious students of foreign policy. It advances clearly and cogently the hard realities of our times."

Jeffrey Hart, syndicated columnist: "[No More Vietnams] will come to have classic status in the literature of the Vietnam War....Mr. Nixon's perspective here is presidential, his grasp of history firm, and his judgements persuasive."

Chilton Williamson, Jr., National Review: "...A very good book, in my opinion Richard Nixon's best, saving only the remarkable *Memoirs*....It is going to have to be digested -- one way or another -- by anybody wishing to consider responsibly the flood of print released by the observance of this tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon."

Raymond Coffey, Chicago Tribune: "Much of what Nixon has to say...about Vietnam and U.S. policy there over the long years of the war is right, and a lot of people would agree with him....Much of what Nixon prescribes in his last chapter as the way to avoid future Vietnams -- basically a 'get-tough' policy -- also will make sense to a lot of people."

Lauren Soth, Des Moines Register: "[The book has a] broad and intelligent view of the world...Nixon expresses practical ideas on how to confront Communist political aggression."

James Chace, New York Times Book Review: "With a Wilsonian zeal to participate in great causes -- causes 'as big as the whole world itself' -- Richard Nixon in this strongly argued, often imtemperate polemic urges Americans to contest aggression wherever it rears its head."

Charles Horner, Washington Times: "Mr. Nixon...is arguably the most brilliant and insightful politician of our era....His public reputation, slowly ascending, will be attacked once again because of this book, but his real standing will grow."

Publisher's Weekly: "Quintessential Nixon...[He] offers admirable idealistic closing arguments for beating the Soviets in the ongoing war for the Third World by actually *helping* the impoverished masses, thus forestalling Marxist uprisings."

Booklist: [Nixon] compels attention....He avoids partisan attacks despite criticisms of Kennedy's actions and Johnson's policies, and despite his anger over the destruction by a Democratic Congress of his policies after the Paris peace agreements of 1973."

Marshall Swanson, Detroit Free Press: "Dick Nixon is back, and he's doing some kicking around. That's Dick Nixon. Richard Nixon has been with us all this time, of course as the statesmanlike former President...We haven't seen all that much of him...and what we have seen has been remarkably free of hard edges. No More Vietnams changes that. It signals his abandonment of cerebral detachment and his return to gut-level involvement....Living well is not the best revenge. The best revenge is to re-enter the arena and win a rematch. This book brings Nixon back into the arena....It is a hard-hitting, incisive account, and millions of Americans would agree with it...It challenges his opponents of old to get that rematch going."

· [y]

HAK:

Texas A&M hopes you will write a letter to President Nixon to endorse their lecture series and reassure him that you were treated well when you were there.

They have received firm commitments for April 1 from Presidents Ford and Carter, but Nixon has turned them down after initially indicating interest.

Texas A&M feels that if Pres. Nixon is wavering, a good word from you might swing the balance in their favor.

Draft something bland ✓
***

Ignore
***

MSC Wiley Lecture Series

Memorial Student Center ★ Texas A&M University ★ College Station, Texas 77844-9081 ★ (409) 845-1515

June 28, 1985

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

JUL 01 1985

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The Endowed Lecture Series Program of April, 1984 entitled "Perspectives on U. S. Foreign Policy" featuring General Alexander Haig, Marvin Kalb, and yourself was a premier event at Texas A & M University. The success of that program contributed to the securing of a substantial endowment from the Wiley Brothers General Contractors, Inc. of Dallas which, in turn, prompted a name change to the Wiley Lecture Series.

Most recently, the 1985 Wiley Lecture Series featured Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. James Schlesinger, and Ambassador Arkady Shevchenko in a discussion entitled "U.S. - Soviet Relations: the Quest for International Security."

In an effort to build upon these precedents, the 1986 Wiley Lecture Series will present a program entitled "The Presidency" featuring President Jimmy Carter, President Gerald Ford, and President Richard Nixon. While we have received confirmation from President Carter and President Ford to speak on Tuesday, April 1, 1986, our initial response from President Nixon's office was negative.

We feel that the decision of President Nixon's staff was based on inadequate information. Since his presence is extremely important to the success of the Lecture Series, we would sincerely appreciate your assistance in obtaining President Nixon's participation. A letter and/or phone call to President Nixon from you on behalf of the Wiley Lecture Series would be of great help. It is important to us that our guest be assured that he will be warmly received, comfortably accomodated, and treated with the utmost respect and dignity. We feel that since you have worked with the Lecture Series in the past, you will be able to provide President Nixon with some insight into the quality of our program and staff.

We will be in contact with your office on July 2, 1985 to answer any questions you may have. Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

1986 MSC WILEY LECTURE SERIES
PROGRAM PROPOSAL

**TITLE:** "The Presidency"

**SPEAKERS:** President Jimmy Carter, President Gerald Ford, and
President Richard Nixon

**MODERATOR:** TBA

**DATE:** Spring 1986

**PLACE:** James Earl Rudder Auditorium, Texas A&M University

PROGRAMMING

This discussion of the position of the presidency will focus on the opinions and insights of those who have held our nation's highest office. These speakers will be asked to give their views on such topics as the role of the President of the United States as a world leader, the limits and power of the Presidency, and the influence of public opinion on the President.

SPEAKERS

The 1986 MSC Wiley Lecture Series program will feature the former Presidents Jimmy Carter, Gerald R. Ford, and Richard M. Nixon. It is generally agreed that no one is more qualified to discuss the Presidency than those who have held the office. These men have each been a part of history, held the reins of power, and faced the difficult and far-reaching decisions that are a part of the burdens of responsibility associated with the office of President of the United States. By providing such a forum, the Wiley Lecture Series hopes to expose the University community to the knowledge and experiences of those who have been, as some have said, "the most powerful man in the world."

PROGRAM FORMAT

The format of the program will be similar to the MSC Wiley Lecture Series presentations of the past. Each speaker will be asked to give his preliminary remarks on the topic. This will be followed by a discussion period between the speakers and the moderator. An audience-interaction period will be provided, in which questions (submitted by members of the audience and screened by a student-faculty panel) are put to each speaker. Finally, each speaker will be given the opportunity to present his closing thoughts on the subject, thus concluding the program.

MSC WILEY LECTURE SERIES
PROGRAM PROPOSAL
PAGE 2

RELATED PROGRAM EVENTS

In order to maximize the educational benefits from the program for the students of Texas A&M, the speakers for the MSC Wiley Lecture Series participate in informal discussion seminars with student groups. Ideally one such seminar would be held for each speaker prior to the program and another on the day following the program. The seminars will provide students with an opportunity to interact with the speakers and give both the speaker and students an opportunity to discuss relevant topics not covered in the program discussion.

ACCOMMODATIONS

Speakers' accommodations will be provided in the Board of Regent's wing of the Memorial Student Center. Speakers' aides and security personnel will be housed in the guest rooms of the Memorial Student Center adjacent to the Board of Regent's wing.

SEP. 15 '87 10:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.002

SEP 14 19871

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON

September 11, 1987

Hon. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

The attached materials are for your file and
are self-explanatory. Your name came up in this
connection because when I told Leslie Gelb at the
Times that the "This is a great wall" quotation
was in error, he said his staff had confirmed it
in *The White House Years*.

As one of your admirers, I was deeply
disappointed when I checked and found that he was
right, and surprised to learn from the preceeding
page that you had not been present when RN visited
the Great Wall. Having served him as a researcher
on some of his books, had I been one of yours I
would have gone directly to *The Public Papers of
the Presidents*, which contains a transcript of his
extemporaneous remarks and which came out long
before your first volume.

Gelb attempted to argue yesterday that this
was a minor matter -- far less important, he said,
than some "substantive" misrepresentation. But
what could be more damaging than the notion that
during one of his greatest moments President Nixon
uttered a thoughtless banality? In fact he spoke
with all the eloquence one would hope for in such
majestic times and surroundings, and one would
hope that his friends, at least, would have
credited him for it.

With respect,

SEP. 15 '87 10:17 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.004

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON

September 10, 1987

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036

To the Editor:

In its lead editorial on September 10th, the Times said that in 1972 President Nixon's Chinese hosts took him to the Great Wall and that he "was said to have remarked, 'This is a great wall'

Sincerely,

John H. Taylor
Assistant to President Nixon

SEP. 15 '87 10:18 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.005

1066

1972: *From War to Peace*

peared like the great Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang-ti with whom he often
compared himself while dreading the oblivion which was his fate. And
his words to Nixon, like so much of what he said and attempted, had the
ring of prophecy: "I have only been able to change a few places in the
vicinity of Peking."

Walks, Talks, and Tousts

AFTER our encounter with history we turned to the practical issue of
how to distill from it a direction for policy. While I had outlined
the American approach to world affairs in considerable detail to Chou
En-lai on two previous visits, only the President could confer final au-
thority and conviction. Much would depend on the Chinese leaders' as-
sessment of Nixon's ability to execute, parallel with them, a global pol-
icy designed to maintain the balance of power which was the real
purpose of their opening to us.

And there was need, too, for a formal expression of the new rela-
tionship between two countries that had had no communication for over
two decades, no diplomatic ties, and no framework for dealing with
each other. So the final communiqué was crucial. What was required
was a document equally symbolic for Communist cadres and capitalist
observers, capable of squelching criticism from the ideological left in
China and the conservative right in America. It had to encompass Tai-
wan but remove it as a bone of contention. It had to suggest our real
mutual security concerns without spelling them out in provocative fash-
ion. What was required was easier to state than to achieve. We had
made major progress during my October trip. Three paragraphs re-
mained to be settled, one dealing with India-Pakistan, a second with
trade and exchanges, and the third with Taiwan. They took four late-
night sessions to complete.

Meanwhile, the Peking summit unfolded on other levels as well, all
intricately interwoven by our subtle hosts and our not so subtle advance
men. The Chinese wanted to use the majesty of their civilization and the
elegance of their manners to leave an impression that nothing was more
natural than an increasingly intimate relationship between the world's
most avowedly revolutionary Marxist state and the embodiment of capi-
talism. Our advance men had simpler objectives. They sought exposure
in prime television time. The purposes intersected to produce a spectac-
ular show, a string of Presidential visits to the architectural and artistic
monuments of China's past: the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, the
Ming Tombs, the Summer Palace, and the Temple of Heaven, where
the emperors had carried their self-absorption and presumption to the
point of locating the precise geometric center of the universe within a
series of concentric circles in what is now downtown Peking.

I participated in none of the sight-seeing. I had seen the landmarks on

paragraphs re-
a second with
took four late-

els as well, all
subtle advance
lization and the
thing was more
en the world's
diment of capi-
tught exposure
duce a spectac-
ural and artistic
idden City, the
Heaven, where
sumption to the
diverse within a
king.
the landmarks on

In other words, the Chinese had hit on a characteristically simple idea: Instead of the guests' complying with the host's schedule, the host would gear himself to the wishes of the visitor. Chinese protocol thus inspires a strange sense of repose; it conveys both respect and a flattery all the more effective for appearing totally matter-of-fact.

With this preparation, the various sight-seeing trips went off as magnificent spectacles. Hordes of famous television commentators and senior journalists converged on each set piece, eager to record the profound thoughts of the leading actors. "This is a great wall," said Nixon to the assembled press at the Great Wall, placing his seal of approval on one of mankind's most impressive creations. The fact that the excursions were geared to television only reinforced that here, if ever, the medium was the message. In the mind of the American public, television established the reality of the People's Republic and the grandeur of China as no series of diplomatic notes possibly could have. The advance men had, after all, made their own contribution to history in a way that I had not comprehended or appreciated beforehand.

The symbolic events were continued each evening — in banquets, an
exhibition of gymnastics and table tennis in the Sports Palace, and a

SEP. 15 '87 10:21 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.006

[66] Feb. 21

greetings to the American people on the other
side of the great ocean.

President Nixon's visit to our country at
the invitation of the Chinese Government pro-
vides the leaders of the two countries with an
opportunity of meeting in person to seek the
normalization of relations between the two
countries and also to exchange views on ques-
tions of concern to the two sides. This is a
positive move in conformity with the desire
of the Chinese and American peoples and an
event unprecedented in the history of the rela-
tions between China and the United States.

The American people are a great people.
The Chinese people are a great people. The
peoples of our two countries have always been
friendly to each other. But owing to reasons
known to all, contacts between the two peoples
were suspended for over 20 years. Now,
through the common efforts of China and the
United States, the gate to friendly contacts
has finally been opened. At the present time it
has become a strong desire of the Chinese and
American peoples to promote the normaliza-
tion of relations between the two countries and
work for the relaxation of tension. The people,
and the people alone, are the motive force in
the making of world history. We are confident
that the day will surely come when this com-
mon desire of our two peoples will be realized.

The social systems of China and the United
States are fundamentally different, and there
exist great differences between the Chinese
Government and the United States Govern-

ment. However, these differences should not
hinder China and the United States from
establishing normal state relations on the basis
of the Five Principles of mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual
nonaggression, noninterference in each other's
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit,
and peaceful coexistence; still less should they
lead to war. As early as 1955 the Chinese Gov-
ernment publicly stated that the Chinese people
do not want to have a war with the United
States and that the Chinese Government is will-
ing to sit down and enter into negotiations with
the United States Government.

This is a policy which we have pursued con-
sistently. We have taken note of the fact that in
his speech before setting out for China President
Nixon on his part said that "what we must do is
to find a way to see that we can have differences
without being enemies in war." We hope that,
through a frank exchange of views between our
two sides to gain a clearer notion of our differ-
ences and make efforts to find common ground,
a new start can be made in the relations between
our two countries.

In conclusion, I propose a toast

- to the health of President Nixon and Mrs.
Nixon,

- to the health of our other American guests,

- to the health of all our friends and com-
rudes present, and

- to the friendship between the Chinese and
American peoples.

67 Exchange With Reporters at the Great Wall of China.

February 24, 1972

THE PRESIDENT. I can only say to the
media, who, like myself, have never seen
the Great Wall before, that it exceeds all
expectations. When one stands there and
sees the Wall going to the peak of this
mountain and realizes that it runs for
hundreds of miles, as a matter of fact
thousands of miles, over the mountains
and through the valleys of this country,
that it was built over 2,000 years ago, I

think that you would have to conclude
that this is a great wall and that it had to
be built by a great people.

Many lives, of course, were lost in build-
ing it because there was no machinery or
equipment at the time. It had to all be
done by hand. But under the circum-
stances, it is certainly a symbol of what
China in the past has been and of what
China in the future can become. A people

370

SEP. 15 '87 10:23 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

Richard Nixon, 1972

Feb. 24 [67]

who could build a wall like this certainly
have a great past to be proud of and a
people who have this kind of a past must
also have a great future.

My hope is that in the future, perhaps
as a result of the beginning that we have
made on this journey, that many, many
Americans, particularly the young Ameri-
cans who like to travel so much, will have
an opportunity to come here as I have
come here today with Mrs. Nixon and the
others in our party, that they will be able
to see this Wall, that they will think back
as I think back to the history of this great
people, and that they will have an oppor-
tunity, as we have had an opportunity, to
know the Chinese people, and know them
better.

What is most important is that we have
an open world. As we look at this Wall, we
do not want walls of any kind between
peoples. I think one of the results of our
trip, we hope, may be that the walls that
are erected, whether they are physical
walls like this or whether they are other
walls, ideology or philosophy, will not
divide peoples in the world; that peoples,
regardless of their differences and back-
grounds and their philosophies, will have
an opportunity to communicate with each
other, to know each other, and to share
with each other those particular endeavors
that will mean peaceful progress in the
years ahead.

So, all in all, I would say, finally, we
have come a long way to be here today,
16,000 miles. Many things that have oc-
curred on this trip have made me realize
that it was worth coming, but I would
say, as I look at the Wall, it is worth
coming 16,000 miles just to stand here and
see the Wall.

Do you agree, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY ROGERS. I certainly do, Mr.

President. It really is a tremendous privi-
lege we have all had to be here today.

THE PRESIDENT. And I really didn't
need the coat.

TRANSLATOR. No, this is great weather.

THE PRESIDENT. It's marvelous. And
nobody is ever going to see the hat that I
brought. I didn't need it. And my ears are
not nearly as cold as they get when I walk
sometimes on the streets of New York—
in those side streets that go, you know,
through the middle of Manhattan and
down through those tall buildings—and
the wind blows. It's much colder than this.

TRANSLATOR. The Vice Premier says
that Mr. President has given a very good
speech. [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. I was supposed to just
say a word. The Vice Premier has climbed
to the top. But we both decided that this
was a job really for Foreign Ministers and
not for the Vice Premier and myself.

But I would simply conclude, because I
know we have to go on, that while we will
not climb to the top today, we are already
meeting at the summit in Peking.

Let me ask the members of the press, do
you think it was worth coming?

REPORTERS. Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT. You know, you are
lucky, and my wife is lucky: You get out
to see the great points of interest. She
gives me a report every night. Of course,
I would not trade. My talks are very in-
teresting, too.

Q. Are you finding, Mr. President, the
afterhours events as entertaining as we
are, such as the athletic events?

THE PRESIDENT. Fantastic. I thought
not only the ballet was great, Tom [Jarriel,
ABC News], but I also thought that the
athletic event last night was just superb.
As you know, I have a rather casual inter-
est in athletics, and it has been so re-

371

5 pages attached

September 16 - Wednesday

FOR CHRIS VICK re: "Great Wall"

Chris,

I got a copy of the editorial which John Taylor had not included in his correspondence. It is immediately attached, as Tab A.

I am not repeating all of the materials you sent me as you have them.

The two relevant pages in *White House Years* are 1066 (where HAK said he did not participate in sight-seeing) and page 1067, where HAK quotes only the phrase "This is a great wall" from Nixon's much longer statement.

I went back to PWR's research and here are the results - attached at back:

--As you will see, PWR in his research text selected out the quotes on 'a great wall' and that 'it had to be built by a great people.'
See Tab B.

--PWR also tabbed at the back of his book the *full* text of Nixon's statement at the Great Wall. Either he or HAK *underlined* the phrase "This is a great wall." See Tab C.

It is the latter which made its way into the China trip chapter, and which appears on page 1067 of WHY.

The more curious part of the Taylor letter to HK is the remark that Gelb alluded to 'substantive' misrepresentation. To what is he referring?

Rosemary

1150

The New York Times

Founded in 1851

ADOLPH S. OCHS, Publisher 1896-1943

ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER, Publisher 1935-1961

ORVIL E. DRYFOOS, Publisher 1961-1963

ARTHUR OCHS SULZBERGER, Publisher

MAX FRANKEL, Executive Editor

ARTHUR GELB, Managing Editor

JAMES L. GREENFIELD, Assistant Managing Editor

WARREN HOGE, Assistant Managing Editor

JOHN M. LEE, Assistant Managing Editor

ALLAN M. SIEGAL, Assistant Managing Editor

JACK ROSENTHAL, Editorial Page Editor

LESLIE H. GELB, Deputy Editorial Page Editor

A. M. ROSENTHAL, Associate Editor

ARTHUR OCHS SULZBERGER JR., Assistant Publisher

LANCE R. PRIMIS, Exec. V.P., General Manager

RUSSELL T. LEWIS, Sr. V.P., Circulation

ERICH G. LINKER JR., Sr. V.P., Advertising

J. A. RIGGS JR., Sr. V.P., Operations

HOWARD BISHOW, V.P., Employee Relations

JOHN M. O'BRIEN, V.P., Controller

ELISE J. ROSS, V.P., Systems

Breaching the Wall at Krasnoyarsk

When Richard Nixon made his historic visit to China in 1972, his hosts took him to inspect the Great Wall. The President was said to have remarked, "This is a great wall." The U.S. representatives who returned this week from the large Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk also made a historic visit, to a controversial Soviet installation that the Administration says violates the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Their visit also confirms the obvious: the radar is still where it shouldn't be, and will violate a solemn treaty if it becomes operational.

Still, the mere fact of the visit signals that the Soviet leadership wishes to do something about the anomaly. In the Administration's long litany of alleged violations of arms treaties by the Soviet Union, the Krasnoyarsk radar stands out as by far the most serious. Its shadow looms over the impending Soviet-American medium- and short-range missile agreement, which the Senate will want to be sure is cheat-proof.

The Krasnoyarsk device is a large phased array radar, whose beam is steered electronically instead of with a rotating dish. Such radars can be used for tracking objects in space, for giving early warning of attack and for directing interceptors against incoming ballistic missiles. To preclude the anti-missile role, the ABM Treaty specifies that all early warning radars may be situated only on a country's periphery, facing outward. Krasnoyarsk is some 500 miles from the nearest Soviet border.

When the radar was noticed by satellite four years ago, the Russians claimed its purpose was space-tracking. But a space-track radar in northern latitudes would most efficiently point south to see the space shuttle and the many satellites in equatorial orbit. Krasnoyarsk faces northeast. Besides, if it can space-track it can also do early warning, and is therefore illegally sited.

The Russians implicitly acknowledged a problem two years ago by offering to cease construction at Krasnoyarsk if the U.S. canceled extensive modernization of two permitted early warning radars in England and Greenland. The Greenland radar is now completed but Moscow makes clear that the offer is still valid.

That's hardly a fair trade, since the radar upgrades in Greenland and England are probably permitted by the treaty, while Krasnoyarsk certainly is not. But some arrangement should be negotiable, if the Administration is prepared to seek a solution instead of reiterating accusations.

In permitting the Congressmen to visit and photograph the site, the Russians risked possible intelligence gains by Washington for the sake of enhancing chances of resolving this and maybe other violations. They have opened a chink in a usually impenetrable wall. It probably reveals little that could not be seen from a Keyhole satellite. But it could presage a new understanding by Moscow of what's needed to verify future arms pacts.

Politicians and Privacy

Gary Hart keeps missing the point. Under Ted Koppel's sharp questioning on ABC Tuesday night, he insisted anew that the point was privacy. No, he said, he had not been absolutely and totally faithful to his wife. But having said so, he exhorted the national press corps: "Never ask another candidate that question," because it's no one else's business, and questions like that drive good candidates out of politics.

The important point in this case, however, is neither privacy nor promiscuity but recklessness.

Mr. Hart has paid, painfully, since disclosures about his philandering ended his Democratic can-

causes heartburn, as in the case of Geraldine Ferraro and her husband in 1984.

The second answer concerns other aspects of candidates' lives. Voters need to know about candidates' character and judgment, yet generally candidates deserve a presumption of privacy. Just because they are running for office creates no warrant to snoop through their trash cans. But there's a difference between a presumption of privacy and a guarantee.

If there's good reason for doubt about personal behavior, reporters may feel justified, even duty bound, at least to check it out. That's what happened in Mr. Hart's case. It was his behavior in the 1984

Letters [Y]

China Ca

To the Editor:

"China's Myopic Puptuals" by Merle Go, Aug. 21) offered some into the political situation. However, Professor overconcerned with such signals and failed to see the roots of the latest purge, previous purges of inti-

Professor Goldman's latest purge "contradicts signals coming from me, the purge resulted in the basic assumption of Communist Party and ship, including Deng's party only allows itself "heavenly mandate," Deng nor his conservative likes such ideas as free and democracy. The totals who strive for modernization will troubles with a party wants only moderniza-

Professor Goldman the past, under the leadership of a purge of it ally coincided with the more conservative le-

Remember

To the Editor:

I agree with Bill H. the Federation to serve the Greenwich Village Waterfront and Port (Op-Ed, Aug. 15) the site of Robert Fulton 1807 Hudson River ship boat journey should be preserved. The program by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to construct a ground subway system emergency towers, area, or a highway, be a mistake.

Why destroy this Robert Fulton, the national developing the first stration of a steamboat era of steam navigation, deserves a program let's also remember inventor who almost than Fulton, built a carried freight and down the Delaware.

John Fitch, who is an eccentric genius, ents for his steamboat governments of and France, but he contracting money to sments and his unprofitable company. A final d

Rustin as an
Of Nonviolence

II-87

B

The Fourth Day's Talks (Thursday, February 24)

Thursday, February 24, was the fourth day of meetings in Peking. As usual, Nixon took the morning off. He and Mrs. Nixon, along with Secretary Rogers, Acting Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei, were escorted by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on a visit to the Great Wall of China and then to the tombs of the emperors of the Ming Dynasty. At the Great Wall, Nixon could not resist speaking for the occasion. It exceeded all expectations, he said. It was "a great wall," he said, and "it had to be built by a great people."
He announced he was against walls; he was for an open world: "As we look at this Wall, we do not want walls of any kind between peoples." A few hours later at the Ming Tombs, Nixon chatted again with reporters and told them he was impressed with the Tombs too: "The only think I think is comparable to it in the world is the Valley of the Kings in Egypt. That is a very different time, of course, and a different country."

The full text of these and other Presidential utterances is
at Tab B.

HK and Ch'iao Kuan-hua skipped the tours and resumed work that morning on the communique. Nixon describes in his memoirs (pp. 570-571) the communique-drafting process:

After each evening's social event Kissinger would meet with the Vice Foreign Minister and go over each new draft of the official communiqué word by word. Sometimes Chou would join them; sometimes Kissinger would walk across the small bridge connecting the two guesthouses and report to me on the progress they were making or the problems they had run up against. As a result of these nocturnal negotiations, few of us got very much sleep, and Kissinger got hardly any.

Taiwan was the touchstone for both sides. We felt that we should not and could not abandon the Taiwanese; we were committed to Taiwan's right to exist as an independent nation. The Chinese were equally determined to use the communiqué to assert their unequivocal claim to the island. This was the kind of disagreement that our formula for drafting the communiqué was supposed to take into account: we could state our position and they could state theirs. In this case, domestic political considerations led Kissinger and me to try to convince the Chinese of the necessity of exercising moderation.

We knew that if the Chinese made a strongly belligerent claim to Taiwan in the communiqué, I would come under murderous cross fire from any or all the various pro-Taiwan, anti-Nixon, and anti-P.R.C. lobbies and interest groups at home. If these groups found common ground on the eve of the presidential elections, the entire China initiative might be turned into a partisan issue. Then, if I lost the election, whether because of this particular factor or not, my successor might not be able to continue developing the relationship between Washington and Peking. In the official plenary sessions with Chou, therefore, I spoke very frankly

Richard Nixon, 1972

Feb. 24 [67]

Do you agree, Mr. Secretary?

REPORTERS. Yes, sir.

371