PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 13 MARCH 1971 (15)

# U. S. Losing Arms Race?

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON.—Is the U. S. really falling behind in the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union?

The idea has been implied strongly in recent days by Pentagon reports that the Russians may be building a new and powerful missile system to present the U. S. with a serious new challenge.

But hard facts in testimony presented formally to Congress this week paint a somewhat different picture.

The testimony shows that the U. S. is still far ahead of the Soviets in key strategic categories — and in fact is currently deploying nuclear warheads at a rate three times as fast as the Soviets.

The Pentagon budget shows that the U. S. is plunging ahead with deployment of major new strategic systems on both land and sea — as well as continuing its anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program, which is a nuclear weapons defense system.

Headlines have been dominated by reports of what the Pentagon fears the Soviets might or could do — not by what they actually are known to have done.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) — a one-time secretary of the Air Force who is no novice in the field — says that the Pentagon is engaged in its annual spring campaign for a higher defense budget.

"Many new occurrences inevitably come with spring," he told the Senate with a way smile the other day, including "warnings of grave new dangers to this country because of new developments in Soviet weaponry."

Here's the way the strategic picture now shapes up in key categories according to testimony by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Adm. Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This, in essence, is what the fine print says:

(1) —Deliverable nuclear warheads.

This is perhaps the most important category of all — and the U. S. has a huge lead which nobody thinks could be overcome in the next decade.

The U. S. had 4000 deliverable nuclear warheads at the end of 1970, compared to 1800 for the Soviets.

The Soviets are building — but the U. S. is building faster. The Soviets are expected to have 2000 by mid-1971 — the U. S. 4600.

U. S. growth is a result of the highly complex, little understood MIRV program in which multiple warheads are being installed on U. S. missiles, both land and sea based.

U. S. technology makes it possible to aim each of the warheads separately. The Russians still don't know how to do this and nobody is sure when they might learn.

(MIRV stands for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle.)

The U. S. has never said how many bombs it plans to build — but informed estimates have run from 10,000 to 15,000.

The Soviets continue to have an overall lead in "megatonnage" — meaning in explosive nuclear power. This is because of the immense power of their

huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missile, by far the most powerful in the world.

President Nixon told the New York Times in an interview this week that "the Soviets now have three times the missile strength of ourselves." The White House explained later that the President was referring to megatonnage. Precise figures are classified.

The U. S. chose voluntarily not to try to build such a big missile years ago because scientists felt the power would be wasted. The U. S. could still do it if it wished.

(2) —Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (IOBMs).

The Soviets have a numerical lead, but have halted or leveled off deployment recently in all major categories — including the SS-9 missile.

The Soviets now have 1440 land-based ICBMs while the U. S. has 1054 — a figure the U. S. has maintained, and considered adequate, for several years.

But figures on the numbers of missiles can be misleading. An important question is how many nuclear bombs each of the missiles can carry and how accurate they are.

In this field the U. S. is ahead. It is proceeding to deploy nuclear warheads on land-based missiles far more rapidly than the Soviets.

The new U. S. defense budget calls for a 42 percent increase in funds for the U. S. Minuteman III Missile program — the backbone of the U. S. land-based missile force.

The budget requests more than a half a billion dollars to build new Minuteman missiles with multiple nuclear warheads.

Defense Secretary Laird has said publicly that he has information that the Soviet Union is "going forward with the construction of a large missile system."

But he didn't pretend to know exactly what the Soviets are doing, beyond construction work on new missile silos, and he interpreted the Soviet program as indicating that they intend to maintain "parity" in strategic weapons, meaning equality.

(3) —Submarine - launched missiles (SLBMs).

The U. S. is far ahead in submarine-launched missiles with its virtually invulnerable fleet of 41 Polaris submarines and an on-going program to convert 31 of them to the much more powerful Poseidon.

The U. S. has 656 launchable missiles, compared to 350 for the Soviets.

The Soviets, however, are struggling to catch up. They are building submarines faster than anything else, and will deploy 50 new under-water missiles by the middle of this year.

Nevertheless, U. S. submarine technology is way ahead of that of the Soviets. Their submarines aren't nearly as effective. They still do not have a solid fuel missile and are operating with highly dangerous liquid fuel.

Laird said if the Soviets continue building at the current rate they would have a fleet comparable to the U. S. Polaris-Poseidon fleet by 1974.

But he and Adm. Moorer declined to point out that the U. S. Poseidon-building program will multiply the strength of the U. S. submarine fleet vastly in

this same period it involves added hundreds — in fact thousands — of nuclear warheads that can be separately aimed.

The Soviets haven't learned how to do this yet, and thus the U. S. has a huge margin in one of the most important parts of the strategic equation.

(4) —Strategic bombers.

The U. S. has a huge lead numbers as well. It has 517 bombers and adding to the force, while the Soviets have 195 and are cutting down.

The U. S. is also putting $371 million into developing a new bomber.

(5) —Anti-ballistic missiles (ABM).

The Soviets have deployed four ABM complexes around Moscow, but the Defense Department's official statements fail to note that they are considered outmoded and ineffective.

The U. S. is continuing to expand its Safeguard ABM system. It is building two sites and plans to build two more. The first elements would become operational in 1974. The effectiveness of the U. S. ABM is a matter of scientific dispute.

Over-all, Laird and Moorer put great emphasis on their fears of eventual Soviet capabilities.

Adm. Moorer said, for example, that he believed it is "fair to say that the over-all strategic balance, during the last five or six years, has drastically shifted in favor of the Soviet Union."

"Our comfortable lead now all but vanished," he said, "and within the next five or six years we could actually find ourselves in a position to over-all strategic inferiority, certainly as numbers of offensive delivery vehicles and megatons, and air defense systems, are concerned."

Sen. Symington, however, expressed skepticism.

"One cannot fall to remember several comparable spring announcements of previous years," he said, "... in the early 1950s those thousands of new long range bombers the Soviets were going to build, but never built. In the late 1950s those hundreds upon hundreds of long range missiles the Soviets were going to build, but never built ...

"As a result ... the American taxpayer is currently bearing the burden of tens of billions of dollars of additional weaponry we now know is not needed for his and our security."

WASHINGTON POST 8 March 1971 P1

# Jackson Says Reds Deploy New ICBM

By Morton Mintz

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said yesterday that the Soviet Union, in an "ominous" development, is in the process of deploying "an advanced generation" of huge, new intercontinental ballistic missiles.

He said the new weapons are as "big or bigger" than the mammoth SS-9s and probably superior to them, "not necessarily in yield, but in quality."

The Defense Department, questioned about Jackson's statement, said it was "correct that we have detected some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union."

A Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, added, "We are not exactly sure what it is or what Soviet intentions are."

Jackson speculated on those intentions on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP).

He was, he said, reasonably sure that the Russians will use "this huge buildup" not for a first strike against the United States but as a power base for taking "greater and greater international risks in the 1970s.

"This is the meaning of their buildup of strategic arms and of conventional surface forces, the buildup of their navy," Jackson continued.

The senator did not identify the source of his information about the new missiles. Neither did he give any direct response to a question about the numbers that may be deployed.

He said that a related "ominous" development involved the SS-9s, which "have leveled off at 305—around that figure."

Jackson said he was convinced that the reason for the leveling-off is the need to adapt the SS-9 for MIRVs, or Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles.

He said that it will come "as a shock to most Americans" that the Russians are deploying a new generation of offensive systems while indicating a contrary position by holding back on SS-9 deployment.

Last month, The Washing-

ton Post quoted well-informed U.S. officials as saying that, since last spring, the Russians had stopped work on a total of 18 new SS-9 silos. In a downward revision of earlier estimates, they said that the Soviet Union has 288 SS-9s, 276 of them now judged ready to fire.

A single SS-9 can carry three five-megaton nuclear warheads. The Pentagon has depicted it as the biggest threat to the survival of the U.S. Minuteman, the "second-strike" ICBMs. Pentagon officials have said that 420 SS-9s, each equipped with three warheads, could wipe out the entire force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles in a surprise attack.

President Nixon, in his press conference last week, said he was against any agreement with the Russians in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) that would be confined to defensive weapons alone.

Jackson said yesterday that the President on this..."I he wholeheartedly supports think our position is sound,

which calls for a limitation on offensive and defensive systems." The "further buildup in new offensive systems" by the Russians makes the need to limit such systems critical, he said.

Turning to other subjects, Jackson said the administration was guilty of "a terrible mishandling" of the news blackout on the invasion of Laos.

If there had to be such a blackout for security reasons, he said, it "made no sense at all" to impose it on the pre-invasion phase, only to lift it on the eve of the invasion itself.

# AF Seeking Billions For Bomber Defense

## Another in a series of periodic articles on major defense issues.

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Air Force this week will try to persuade a rather dubious Congress that now is the time to begin spending a lot more money on defense against enemy bombers—even though the Russians haven't built any new heavy bombers in 10 years.

The only new Soviet attack plane that seems headed for production is a medium bomber judged too shortrange to reach the United States on anything but one-way missions, according to intelligence estimates.

The immediate forum for this presentation is the Senate Armed Services Preparedness Committee. Sen. John C. Stennis (D. Miss.) heads a special air defense subcommittee which is expected to hear Air Force generals testify in secret session this week.

While his subcommittee's findings will be highly influential on the lawmakers, the question of how much is enough for air defense—at a time when both super powers have thousands of nuclear-tipped ICBMs—goes to the heart of a larger question before Congress: How much of the defense dollar can safely go into domestic programs

Just as the supersonic transport has become a rallying point for environmentalists trying to stop the march of technology, the bomber defense issue this year will be a focal point for lawmakers trying to contain Pentagon spending.

Sen. Mark O. Hatfield (R.-Ore.) has said as much. This year he heads the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, a bi-partisan group of 115 lawmakers who have taken on the Pentagon with some success in recent years.

"In this decade," Hatfield said, "when the Soviets are upgrading their missiles and not their aged bombers, a commitment to a new air defense system easily costing $6 billion seems totally unwarranted."

Yet the Air Force — with the backing of many senators and representatives — argues that bomber defense cannot be allowed to die as long as Russia keeps its relatively small force of 150 long-range bombers intact and continues

to show any interest at all in building new ones, even medium-range types.

## Air Force View

Money, politics, jobs, intelligence findings, war plans and guesses—all this and more are wrapped into the argument as the lawmakers try to decide if the $5 billion or more the Air Force wants to spend on modernizing air defense over the next six years is a justifiable investment.

A good starting point for understanding what is involved in this complex but significant debate is at Ft. Fisher, a back-up Intercept Control (BUIC) command post in the scrub-brush flatland along the Atlantic beaches outside Wilmington, N.C.

This Air Force BUIC base is one of a string of sites that ring the perimeter of the United States. Ft. Fischer is part of the $25 billion the United States has invested in building and operating bomber defenses since the 1950s. It is also one of those that has survived massive cut-backs of recent years.

The big white balloon—the radar built to warn of approaching Russian bombers—stands out against the back-drop of pines in the distance. Inside a low, brick building are the computers, telephones and teletypes which would send up American fighters to intercept Russian bombers hopefully before they could reach the mainland.

Reflecting on the bomber defense cutbacks, the BUIC base commander, Air Force Col. Robert L. Embrey says "We can only go so far. We need something to build on. If we go ahead and shut everything up and the Russians do come in with a new bomber we're in a hell of a position."

"I just can't see," he says, "how a trillion dollar economy can't afford to know what's going on above its borders."

## Pentagon's View, Too

The same view prevails some 340 miles away from Ft. Fischer in the offices of Air Force generals in the Pentagon.

Yet, more Ft. Fischers are not the answer. Nor are the Army's 1950-style Nike-Hercules antiaircraft missiles, 80 batteries of which rimmed the country at one time. The

Army, which has been closing these batteries down for the past three years as too costly and ineffective, last week announced another big reduction which will leave only about 40 sites still operational.

What is needed for the 1970s, the Air Force says, is a new kind of air defense—one which essentially takes Ft. Fischer's radars off the ground and puts them inside airplanes. Such airborne radar planes—called Airborne Warning and Control systems, or AWACS—could look down from above to detect enemy bombers which try to fly under the warning beams of today's land-based radars.

The Air Force is recommendations putting 42 AWACS airplanes on guard—a $2.7 billion venture.

Other parts of the new bomber defense the Air Force wants to build include at least two new land-based radars which can see over the horizon because their beams bounce back and forth between the surface of the Earth and a reflective layer in the atmosphere. It will cost $322 million to build and operate those radars for 10 years.

Also, the Air Force wants to replace its aging F-106 interceptor aircraft with something new—probably versions of the Air Force F-15 or Navy F-14 fighters under development. About $2 billion is envisioned for the new interceptors.

This total of $5 billion could go higher if the Army decides to replace its dwindling Nike-Hercules batteries with a new missile now on the drawing board.

U.S. intelligence chiefs last week briefed the Stennis subcommittee on what they thought the Russians had in mind for their bombers.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has acknowledged that even the Russian medium bomber force is thinning out, with some 700 of these twin-engine planes still in service. That is about two-thirds of what the Soviets had in 1963.

While the intelligence community believes these planes are targeted for Red China and NATO, the Air Force has raised the possibility that the new medium-range plane, with swing wings, could be used to attack the United States, possibly landing in Cuba rather than trying to make the long trip back across the North Pole. It has been observed recently refueling in flight.

But if the Soviet Union were really intending to build an anti-U.S. bomber force, there is general agreement that it would be building either bigger bombers or new aerial tankers to go with the

new swing-wing planes.

There is no evidence of such an effort at this time, according to informed sources. Therefore, the old cry of "the Russians are coming" will not by itself be enough to carry the air defense argument on Capitol Hill, observers there believe.

This year's debate, the first in a long time over air defense, will hinge on more sophisticated—and harder to grasp—arguments.

Interviews with backers and opponents show these as the conflicting points.

## Pro:

* The Soviet Union is still exhibiting interest in bombers as it builds its technological base for its own triad of weaponry — aircraft, missiles and submarines. Air Force leaders, in making this point, state that the Pentagon's Whiz Kids — civilian systems analysts who worked for former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara — have been proved wrong in predicting Russia would retire its intercontinental bombers altogether.

* Bomber defense, just like missiles at the ready in underground silos, must be regarded as part of the American arsenal to deter war. Money spent on air defense thus cannot be considered wasted. The whole idea was to discourage an attack in the first place.

* Even if the Soviet Union does abandon bombers altogether, the United States must keep up an air defense against the day other nations—including Red China and Marxist regimes in South America — might have planes which could sneak over our borders.

One top air defense strategist, in making that point, said: "We've got to be able to protect our airspace; to know what's flying toward and over our borders, and to knock it down if necessary.

"The type and size of those defenses," he continued, "are indeed legitimate questions. But we just can't drop them. What we ought to be saying is this: we need air defense for the next 50 years; now let's figure out the best way to go about it."

Congress has the choices of eliminating air defense as obsolete in the missile age; embarking on a slow and modest improvement program, or moving quickly into full-scale construction.

## Con:

* Bomber defense is the Air

WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 8,

EDITORIALS

LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL

16 MARCH 1971 (19)

ABM argument
springs old
leaks again

THE PENTAGON is polishing up the latest chapter in its long-running ABM soap opera, and from all indications this year's version is going to be depressingly like last year's. Not that this means much. Each year the script seems cornered than that of the previous year, but each year it manages to get the money out of Congress, which, as far as the missile men are concerned, is what counts.

Two years ago, when the anti-ballistic mis-
sile was being urged by the President and
Defense Secretary Laird, it was billed as a
necessary defense against developing Chinese
attack missiles. Secretary Laird admitted that
it would provide only a "thin" defense which
would have little effect against such Russian
nuclear missiles as the SS-9, but insisted that
it would be able to knock down any missiles
launched by China within the next decade.
Why China would launch an attack on a
country with enough missiles to blast every
foot of its territory five times over was not
explained.

By this time last year the argument had
switched. The SS-9, Mr. Laird declared, was
being produced as a first-strike weapon, aimed
at our cities. Furthermore, the Russians were
ringing their cities with ABMs to defend them
against our missiles, so we had to ring our
cities with ABMs to defend them against the
SS-9. If the Russians could hit us without the
danger of being hit, they might be tempted
to launch a first strike.

*It's that season again*

Last August the pitch shifted again. This time the ABM was needed not as a deterrent to Chinese madness or Russian sneak attack, but as a dove of peace. We needed the ABM, said Mr. Laird, as a "bargaining chip" at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). For

example, he said, if we had a chain of ABMs,
we could offer to give up our ABMs if the
Russians would give up theirs. (He never did
explain where this would leave the mad
Chinese with their missiles.)

But now money-voting time again ap-
proaches, and suddenly the capital is aquiver
with reports of—what else?—the SS-9. The
Pentagon has been leaking the usual scare
reports, and Senator Henry Jackson, the
Pentagon's Democratic doom-crier, has
warned television listeners of a "new gen-
eration" of SS-9s being deployed by the Rus-
sians, obviously designed to zap the U.S. and
calling for more, bigger and better ABM em-
placements.

Senator Stuart Symington protested that
the Jackson warning was (1) an unethical re-
lease of confidential information given the
Senate Armed Services Committee by CIA
director Richard Helms, and (2) an exaggera-
tion of what Helms had actually said. A Penta-
gon clarification has since tended to support
Senator Symington's view. The Russians do
seem to be building some new missile silos.
Secretary Laird now says, but it is not clear
what type of missile they are built to house.
And, Mr. Laird admits, there is no evidence
that the Russians have resumed the missile-
building pace which they slowed last fall.

Nevertheless, both Mr. Laird and his as-
sorted uniformed and congressional spokes-
men insist on more ABMs, this time as a mis-
sile for all reasons—to counter the Chinese
missiles, to discourage attack by the Rus-
sians, and to use as a bargaining point in the
SALT talks, reopening yesterday. And this is
where the argument starts springing leaks.
For Mr. Laird has admitted that the Chinese
have neither cause nor capacity for attacking
us. He has admitted that the ABM could not
really fend off the Soviet MIRV-headed SS-9s
if the Russians lost their minds and launched
an attack that could only lead to the destruc-
tion of their own land and probably of the
world.

And, finally, the Pentagon has not yet ex-
plained how the ABM is to be used as a bar-
gaining chip. The Russians offered at the last
SALT session to limit or eliminate defensive
nuclear weapons if the U.S. would; and we
wouldn't unless offensive weapons were cov-
ered, too.

Well, Mr. Nixon's search for a "grand set-
tlement" is an inspiring concept. But if the
Soviets are willing for the moment to dis-
card only defensive weapons, why not ac-
cept the opportunity for a beginning? Or must
we forever go on building our stacks of chips,
as both we and the Soviets have done since
Hiroshima, until the weight and cost of the
burden bankrupts us?

Russian Might and America's

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 14 MARCH 1971 (19)

# Whose Arms Have More Power?

By PAUL GRIMES

Of The Bulletin Staff

Both cautious optimism and stern warnings have emerged from Washington in recent days on the comparative military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Both President Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird reported to Congress that the Russians have slowed the pace of their missile deployment.

Both, however, cautioned that the significance is not clear and that the U. S. Safeguard anti-b ballistic missile (ABM) program should be continued.

CONSIDERABLE CONCERN was aroused last week by the disclosure by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash) that the Russians are deploying "an advanced generation" of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). The Pentagon

quickly confirmed that "we have detected some new ICBM construction" but that "we are not exactly sure what it is or what Soviet intentions are."

Three days later, however, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the Russians would gain nuclear superiority over the United States "within the next five or six years"—a situation, he said, to be "avoided at all costs."

In this setting, the Administration appeared hawkish in making its defense requests for the next fiscal year, which begins July 1. This posture was heightened by the lack of progress in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, and by reports that Communist China may have begun flight-testing an ICBM.

Laird proposed that work start on a Safeguard system at Whitman Air Force Base in Missouri, the third of four ABM sites approved by Congress last year. Work already is underway at Minuteman bases in North Dakota and Montana.

But the Administration is requesting authority to switch the fourth ABM site from Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming to Washington, D. C. The switch would be made, however, only if no agreement is reached with the Russians at SALT that would limit ABMs to Washington and Moscow.

LAIRD ALSO proposed development of a new bomber and a missile-carrying submarine. He announced a five-year defense strategy of "realistic deterrence" to prevent wars.

But to Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, many of the Administration's warnings appeared designated simply to get more money out of Congress and might not necessarily be valid.

"Here we go again," Symington said.

This Bulletin Spotlight examines some of the available data on U. S. and Soviet military strength and what it means.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 3/14/71 (19)

# Ours and Theirs

The following chart shows, according to the best available information, how the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union compare:

<table><thead><tr><th>Item</th><th>United States</th><th>Soviet Union</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Services</td><td>2,860,589</td><td>3,305,000</td></tr><tr><td>Divisions</td><td>17</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>Defense budget</td><td>$71.8 billion</td><td>$51.7 billion</td></tr><tr><td>Tactical aircraft</td><td>4,600</td><td>4,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air-defense fighters</td><td>650</td><td>3,300</td></tr><tr><td>ICBM launchers</td><td>1,034</td><td>1,440</td></tr><tr><td>Polaris-type missile launchers</td><td>656</td><td>350</td></tr><tr><td>Polaris-type submarines</td><td>41</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Long-range bombers</td><td>552</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td>Hydrogen bombs</td><td>4,000</td><td>1,800</td></tr></tbody></table>

The details follow. Their source is "Toward a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement," by Herbert Scoville Jr., for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Land-based ICBMs—The U. S. has 1,000 Minuteman and 34 larger Titan missiles deployed in silos hardened to survive pressures of several hundred pounds per square inch. The Minuteman can carry a thermonuclear warhead in the megaton class and the Titan one in the multimegaton class.

Of the operational Soviet ICBMs, more than 900 are small

# The Change in U.S. Forces

The following chart shows how U. S. conventional armed forces have changed in the last decade (figures are for June 30, except in 1971):

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1960</th><th>1965</th><th>1968</th><th>1969</th><th>Latest 1971</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Men in service</td><td>2,476,435</td><td>2,655,389</td><td>3,547,902</td><td>3,460,162</td><td>2,860,589</td></tr><tr><td>Men in Vietnam</td><td>650</td><td>65,000</td><td>535,000</td><td>539,000</td><td>322,200</td></tr><tr><td>Army divisions</td><td>14</td><td>16</td><td>19</td><td>193%</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Marine divisions</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Navy ships</td><td>813</td><td>880</td><td>932</td><td>934</td><td>720</td></tr><tr><td>Budget for conventional forces<br>(in billions of dollars)</td><td>18</td><td>17.6</td><td>30.5</td><td>30.6</td><td>27.8</td></tr></tbody></table>

SS-11s, 276 are SS-9s and the remainder are older missiles and SS-13s. Most are deployed in single silos that are hardened and dispersed.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles — Each of the 41 U. S. Polaris submarines is equipped with 16 ballistic missiles of ranges greater than 1,500 miles. More than half the subs are kept continuously on station in a position to launch a retaliatory attack. Some of the existing missiles, such as the Polaris A-3s, contain three warheads (not MIRVs), each with a yield in the hundreds of kilotons. Others hold single warheads with a yield of about one megaton.

The Soviet submarine missile program has lagged behind that of the United States.

8-F

THE NEW REPUBLIC - 20 MARCH 1971 (17)

Senator Jackson's Latest Alarm

Wolf at the Pentagon Door

by Ronald L. Tammen

Responsibility for national defense rests, of course, as much with Congress as with the military establishment. Congress, however, has not only neglected its responsibilities but has misused its power to review military programs. Not many years ago, certain weapons systems came out of Congress with more funds than DoD had optimistically requested. One is even tempted to say, more than they knew what to do with, but that would contradict a rule of bureaucracies. Perhaps lulled by congressional laxity, the public comfortably accepted the direction and size of the military establishment. In part, this acceptance can be attributed to a decline in keen investigative reporting. In part, it was a by-product of our confidence in American technology.

The Department of Defense is the largest single-unit bureaucracy in the world and, as with any bureaucracy, it responds to criticism in kind, engages in extreme forms of self-protection, expands whenever possible, generates work without authorization, and erects a protective wall around itself. With changes in Administration coming rather frequently, there is little on-going control over the bureaucracy; it bends but never breaks. Built-in bureaucratic inertia so regulates routine business that inefficiency becomes routine. Only in time of crisis can the organization shake loose. This tendency to respond effectively only in emergencies has led to an uneven weapon acquisition process. The Pentagon has done what comes natural; it tried to fill in the lows—the times when foreign threats did not seem alarming—in order to sustain a high level of weapon acquisition.

To borrow the basic concept of the free enterprise system, the Pentagon needs stimulation to work effectively. It needs competition with end-goals. But external competition, i.e. the international threat, is precisely what has been absent for most of the past decade. In a very real sense, the Pentagon has been too effective, and as a consequence has been forced to develop new methods for wringing the money it wants out of the Executive and the Congress.

Throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the United States enjoyed unparalleled strategic superiority. Granted, Sputnik and the "missile gap" threw scares into the public and the military alike, yet in strict statistical measures, there was no real strategic threat to this country. This presented Defense planners with a distressing dilemma. How do you request more funds to augment an already overpowering military force? Several techniques were found. First, exaggerate the threat. This was not necessarily a deliberate decision. In certain cases, prolonged exposure to the military environment produced a particular mentality which generated perceptions of potential threats in larger-than-life forms. Mirror imaging and face value acceptance of some Soviet statements also contributed to this exaggeration. In addition, it is the normal inclination of defense planners to guard against all possible threats, even when unsubstantiated, and this encouraged a conservative analytical approach as represented by the "greater-than-expected" technique of assessing enemy capabilities.

On the other hand, occasionally this exaggeration was deliberate. A little inter-Service rivalry can go a long way toward producing a specific threat evaluation to fit a desired level of funding. For years, the Air Force held out against the Army, Navy, CIA and NSA over the question of the number of Soviet long-range

bombers. They used the technique of taking a footnote to the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on USSR strategic capabilities and intentions. In public and private discussions, the Air Force would cite their larger Service footnotes, instead of the consensus of the other intelligence agencies. This in turn provided the basis for Air Force requests for advanced air defense systems like SAGE, Nike-Hercules and now AWACS, as well as for new strategic bombers.

With the end of the 1960s, and the realization that the Soviet Union was approaching parity with the US in terms of strategic missile launchers, the competitive spirit was rekindled at the international level. However, a new problem faced the Pentagon—credibility. It hasn't solved it. After repeated cries of "wolf," traditional calls to arms are failing to evoke immediate congressional panic. For years, just prior to the military authorization and appropriations votes, lead stories appeared in newspapers warning of impending and aggressive Soviet military moves. The SS-9 scare emerged in time for the ABM authorization debate of 1970. The rumor of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba coincided with the 1970 appropriations bill, and now Senator Henry Jackson (D, Wash.) has aired his version of new "ominous developments." According to this Presidential aspirant, the Soviets have started deploying a large follow-on to the SS-9 ICBM, a fact that should "shock" us. As in previous leaks of this kind, his story is built upon sketchy information. Neither the Pentagon nor the Administration has echoed Jackson's alarm. The Soviets apparently have begun construction of some type of new or modified silos, but this alone does not support the assertion that the USSR is initiating a "huge build-up." The tone and timing of Jackson's statement are strikingly similar to John F. Kennedy's illusory missile-gap of 1960. These Soviet missile activities are subject to many different interpretations. It will be some time before intelligence analysts reach any firm conclusions. Focusing on the worst possible interpretation, exaggerating and even distorting facts, serves only to foster hysteria. The seriousness of the problem demands the highest responsibility. In the long run, this selective release of classified material to reinforce budgetary requests or to enhance political reputations will undermine public confidence in the Pentagon and in Congress.

What, then, are the lessons that Congress and DoD can learn from recent experience? First, if meaningful agreements are reached at SALT, we must beware that internal competition is not again substituted for the foreign threat and defense spending retained at inflated levels. Second, DoD must start playing it straight with Congress by explaining just how foreign threats are computed. And third, the Office of the Secretary of Defense must not be afraid to make hard allocative decisions, even though they may adversely affect one of the three Services. We can no longer afford to feed the Army, Navy and Air Force at $20 billion each a year. Someone has to, in Pentagonese, bite the bullet. And when that happens, it is quite possible that the Air Force will be the branch that feels the pain. Gradually, liberals and conservatives alike are reaching toward some sort of tacit understanding that the nation's deterrent is most effective when moved to sea. If Congress and the Executive continue to move in this direction, then the previous internecine Service battles will seem diminutive by comparison. It is not hard to forecast a real showdown between the Navy and Air Force over the spoils of strategic systems.

RONALD L. TAMMEN is a consultant on military spending to a group of 25 United States senators and representatives.

WASHINGTON POST, MARCH 22, 1971

# Air War on Hill: 3 Planes for 1 Job?

One of a series of periodic articles on major defense issues.

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon is pressing ahead with development of three different kinds of warplanes to carry out what some influential lawmakers view as essentially the same mission.

The mission is close air support—knocking out enemy troops, tanks and guns locked in combat with U.S. ground forces at close range.

At stake is the future of three aircraft:

* The Army's Cheyenne helicopter gunship—packed with electronic gadgetry, anti-tank missiles and machine guns.

* The Air Force's AX—a simple, rugged fixed-wing plane that carries tons of ordnance.

* The Marine Corps' British-built Harrier—a swivel engine jet that can take off and land almost like a helicopter.

To buy all three planes—about 1,000 aircraft all told—would cost the taxpayer's $4 billion to $5 billion over the next few years.

But if the skeptics in Congress are successful in canceling one or two as unnecessary duplication, as much as $2 billion could be saved.

The Pentagon argues that all three are needed.

The possibility that congressional flak will down at least one of them has sharpened combat between the three services who want to fly them—especially between the Army and Air Force. It has also led to a fight between advocates of fixed wing attack planes and backers of helicopter gunships.

What troubles many legislators is a feeling that Congress is being asked to back too many costly, overlapping projects simply because the Pentagon may be taking the easy way out.

Critics charge that the Defense Department itself has failed to come to grips thus far with the very complicated question of how best to do close air support, leaving the decision to the individual services and thereby insuring a proliferation of different aircraft.

This is compounded, they claim, by the Pentagon's unwillingness or inability to

solve the bitter dispute between the Army and Air Force on basic responsibility—who is responsible for providing air cover to the infantryman and tanker?

Many lawmakers are caught between the fear of military waste and fear of jeopardizing troop safety. They complain that they and their staffs can be easily overwhelmed by the complex inter-service tactical disputes and swamped by tons of statistics on helicopter/fixed-wing loss ratios in Vietnam which can be manipulated to make any point either service wants.

"We're going to hold the Pentagon's feet to the fire to get the best possible solution to these alternatives," says Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

"What we want," he said in an interview, "is to compel the Defense Department to do the hard analytical job."

Mahon's committee, in October, raised serious doubts about supporting three planes "designed to perform essentially the same function." Similar doubts were raised in the full Senate Armed Services Committee and in that group's research subcommittee.

Mahon has asked Laird to supply both an analysis and a recommendation "on the aircraft best suited to meet the close air support need" in time for the fiscal 1972 budget hearings now under way. Late last month a working group, headed by Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, was formed by the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mahon has been promised his report by about June 1.

But Senate Armed Services Committee chairman John C. Stennis (D-Miss.) says Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's defense report to Congress early this month makes it pretty clear that the Pentagon has already made up its mind that it wants all three planes. Nevertheless, says Stennis, "a Congressional decision has got to be made, too, before any production is ordered, and I'm a great believer in getting all the facts and costs first. We may need all these planes, and we may not."

To get the facts, Stennis last week ordered a special investigating subcommittee, headed by Sen. Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.), to look into the entire situation,

with closed hearings likely to begin late in April.

Last July, Stennis's full committee backed the AX, knocked out money for Cheyenne, and suggested to the Secretary of Defense that after 20 years it might be a good idea to review the roles and missions assigned to the Air Force and the Army.

Congressional staffers say the issue is also clouded by a feeling on the part of some legislators that keeping Cheyenne going is somehow linked to a Pentagon master plan to help keep afloat financially beleaguered Lockheed Aircraft Corp., the craft's manufacturer.

Army and Defense officials vigorously deny that implication, claiming that even if Lockheed did go under they would expect to continue the project there under new management.

The Vietnam war also is now shaping the debate, creating a new set of problems for Cheyenne. That — and these other developments—assure bumpy flying for the helicopter before it is approved for production:

* In the U.S.-backed Laos incursion, helicopter losses—including Huey and Cobra gunships—have been heavy and well publicized. The Army makes a strong case for keeping these losses in perspective to the thousands of missions flown, the objectives and the alternative of a “tree by tree” push through Laos. Nevertheless, the big toll has fortified the arguments of those who say even more modern choppers could not survive in the face of massive Warsaw Pact anti-aircraft fire in Europe where Cheyenne is meant to operate.

* A Cheyenne fire power demonstration early last month at Yuma, Ariz., before a high-powered Congressional audience was less than a success, as Pentagon officials concede. Only one of two TOW anti-tank missiles fired hit the target and the craft's 30mm machine gun was thrown off target by a bug in the electronic control hook-up.

* This year's "defense budget now before Congress shows no more money requested for Cheyenne research and development. Yet the Pentagon's actual plan—even though it is not written down in the Fiscal 1972 budget—is to commit almost $100 million to cure the troubles that caused the Army to cancel the helicop-

ter's production in 1969.

Pentagon officials explain that they will ask Congress for authority to "reprogram" about $63 million in previously approved production funds for Cheyenne—money left stranded after the initial cancellation. Another $17 million lies in the Cheyenne research account from last year.

But the blank space in the budget has already stirred the chief antagonist of the Pentagon and Lockheed, Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.)

In a March 16 letter to Stennis, Proxmire urged that the reprogramming route be turned down and the regular budget process used instead. He told Stennis the whole Senate should have a chance to vote on the money actually needed this year.

Promire has also asked to expand his views before the Cannon subcommittee.

The Army wants to buy at least 375 Cheyenne helicopters, which run between $3.5 million to $3.5 million each. Cheyenne production, under the current plan, would start in the fiscal year beginning in July, 1972, about two years ahead of AX.

Is Cheyenne worth all that money? The Army says yes; Chairman Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.) of the Senate Armed Services Research Subcommittee is among the influential lawmakers who doubt it. Here are the main arguments for and against.

**Pro:**

* Cheyenne—the first helicopter ever designed from the start for maximum firepower—promises to be an unsurpassed tank killer, popping up from behind trees and hills to make quick strikes. The 16 anti-tank missiles and Gatling-type machine guns on each Cheyenne—with the whole fire system aimed by the most accurate devices ever put in a helicopter—will be deadly, the Army says. Other electronics equipment will enable it to fight in bad weather and at night.

* Unlike fixed-wing support planes which at best pass over friendly troops in a whoosh and try to hit the enemy around them, the Cheyenne could hover in the sky and fire away in all directions with sustained accuracy. The fact that the Cheyenne's rotor blades are solidly fixed to the center post of the ship, instead of hinged, eliminates the vibra-

tion which ruins the aim of today's helicopters.

* "Cheyenne's strongest point," said Brig. Gen. William J. Maddock Jr., Army chief of aviation and holder of 127 air medals, "is the timidity of this gunship with the infantryman and tankers." To win a land battle, he said the Army should have what it needs under its direct control—meaning (but not stated) that the service does not want to depend on the Air Force to come to its aid.

### European Role

Gen. Maddock contends that Cheyenne "in its initial role" in a European war would "operate over friendly lines, firing over the shoulder of allied troops and then moving through a penetration point with the airmobile force."

Also, Cheyenne backers assert that Cheyenne's ability to fly in Europe's bad weather while fixed-wing planes would have to stay on the ground might be crucial. Said one air support specialist, "In World War II, bad weather meant no flying, and the enemy's tanks would go on the move. With Cheyenne, they couldn't do that."

### Con:

* Neither Cheyenne nor any other helicopter could survive against the withering anti-aircraft fire the Warsaw Pact countries would use with their tank columns in a conventional war. The North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire demonstrated that in Laos.

* Hovering for the necessary 10-15 seconds to sight in and guide its missile at a moving tank — providing it could find it in the first place — would make Cheyenne a sitting duck on a European battlefield.

* Cheyenne is so fancy that it may have to be kept at the rear where elaborate maintenance is available. In that case, the Army might as well call in faster Air Force planes from the rear. At the front it might also be in easy range of Soviet artillery.

Sen. McIntyre argues that the Army cannot have it all ways. If Cheyenne is such a deadly tank killer, then he argues the Army should be willing to buy fewer tanks, which are also counted as tank killers.

If it is not certain that the Cheyenne could live over a European battlefield or if it has to stay behind friendly lines, then the better idea is to modify the cheaper Cobra helicopters now flying in Vietnam for the role.

Proxmare makes the same point. "When the basic role of attack helicopters in Europe is so questionable in the first place," he says, "I'd rather lose $1 million helicopters than birds costing well over $4 million each."

The Army and Marines already have about 500 Cobras and production is continuing.

The Pentagon's counter to this is that loading down the Cobra with even a few anti-tank missiles and enough armor to give it a fighting chance in Europe would cut way down on its fuel and ammunition. Cheyenne will carry three times as much ammo as Cobra does now.

Whatever merit these arguments have, both backers and skeptics agree that "survivability and cost" are the key issues hanging over a go-or no-go decision for Cheyenne.

The Air Force case for its AX hinges on the argument that Cheyenne cannot surpass the ability of a fixed-wing plane loaded down with a variety of ordnance.

Air Force generals say they have no quarrel with using gunships to escort troop-carrying choppers or to suppress enemy fire at a landing zone. But for going after tanks, the heavily armored AX with its special tank-busting 30mm gun is viewed as a much safer bet.

That gun, weapons experts say, can rip through 3½ inches of steel, about twice the thickness of top and turret armor used on any tank.

Perhaps because of the Army's development of helicopter gunships for Vietnam, or because "no chief of staff wanted to be known as the one who lost close support to the Army," the Air Force gave a top priority to AX about two years ago.

It is the first Air Force plane ever designed from the drawing board up for close support, and by all accounts it is expected to be a good one.

The AX, the Air Force says, will be able to fly low and slow enough to deliver 14,000 lbs. of bombs, rockets and machine gun ammunition far more accurately than the high speed jets that now swoop over the battlefield.

AX is meant to stay in the air for more than four hours at a time, loitering near the combat zone for quick call-in by field units. Pentagon officials say its design and heavy covering of armor plate will make it five times less likely to be shot down by heavy ground fire than

any plane now being used for close support.

The Air Force wants some 500 of these planes at about $1.6 million apiece. The price would go up if the Pentagon crams more night-fighting electronics into them, a move which the Air Force says it is resisting.

Air Force research chief Lt. Gen. Otto J. Glasser, has told Congress he is "totally convinced that an AX will do 80-90 per cent of all the missions of the Cheyenne and at one-third the cost."

The Army disagrees, contending that both AX and gunships are needed.

As for Harrier, some experts have reservations about its short range and bomb load. But they admit that the Marines are already so far along in buying these planes from England, having already ordered 30 of a planned total of 114, that it would be tough to stop now. Further, there is substantial support in Congress for trying out these radically different swivel-engine jets.

However, some military officers also speculate that even the threat of halting Harrier may work in favor of U.S. efforts to get the British government to help more in balling out Rolls Royce in their troubles with Lockheed.

Sen. McIntyre sees the

choices among the three aircraft as another challenge to the committees to do their homework. Without all the facts, he says, if the military says "we need this" the answer from Congress will be yes.

"Even when you study it, it's still a tough question. Which way do I go? Even if you say no, it haunts you. And you don't dare go on intuition alone."

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT - 22 MARCH 1971 (16)

# MEANING OF LATEST SHIFT IN U.S. DEFENSE

## TODAY'S UNEASY BALANCE OF ARMED MIGHT

Military forces, as of mid-1971, made public by Defense Secretary Laird—

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

<table><thead><tr><th>U.S.</th><th></th><th>RUSSIA</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1,054</td><td>Land-based intercontinental missiles</td><td>1,500</td></tr><tr><td>656</td><td>Submarine-based missiles</td><td>400</td></tr><tr><td>569</td><td>Long-range bombers</td><td>175-195</td></tr><tr><td>4,600</td><td>Nuclear warheads and bombs</td><td>2,000</td></tr><tr><td>0</td><td>Anti-ballistic-missile launchers</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>92</td><td>Nuclear-powered submarines</td><td>87</td></tr></tbody></table>

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

<table><thead><tr><th>U.S.</th><th></th><th>RUSSIA</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>2,700,000</td><td>Manpower under arms</td><td>2,200,000</td></tr><tr><td>599</td><td>Fighter-interceptors</td><td>3,000-3,300</td></tr><tr><td>4,020</td><td>Tactical aircraft</td><td>5,000</td></tr><tr><td>325</td><td>Major surface ships</td><td>215</td></tr><tr><td>50</td><td>Non-nuclear submarines</td><td>264</td></tr><tr><td>1,136</td><td>Antiaircraft-missile launchers (some nuclear)</td><td>10,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

A lid on spending for new weapons... cut-backs in armed forces... more reliance on allies for their own defense... These plans lie at the heart of the strategy for the coming decade, unveiled on March 9 by Defense chief Laird. Officials concede this approach contains some risks in the face of a continuing build-up of military might by Russia and Red China.

For the third time in two decades, Americans are being told there is to be a major shift in fundamental defense strategy for the nation.

The new concept is designed to last through the 1970s, placing less reliance on any heavy, fresh build-up of American arms, with the intention of demanding more help from allies.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, unveiling the Pentagon master plan in a 191-page message to Congress on March 9, labeled the policy "realistic deterrence."

In practical terms, Mr. Laird's blueprint stresses:

* U.S. nuclear missiles continuing to be the primary deterrence against global war-but with no new arsenal of offensive nuclear forces planned. Instead, improvements in quality are emphasized.

* A hold-down on money for new weapons of all kinds, based on a defense-spending ceiling of less than 7 per cent of the nation's gross national product.

* Manpower cuts to the lowest level since 1961, calling for an all-volunteer armed force of 2.5 million men-down 1 million from the Vietnam peak.

* Reduction of conventional combat forces below the pre-Vietnam level.

* A modest addition to the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system.

* Strengthening allied forces with more billions in military aid so they can take over a larger part of the responsibility for regional defense.

Mr. Laird himself is the chief architect of realistic deterrence, which he describes as steering "a prudent middle course between two policy extremes-world policeman or new isolationism."

The Laird plan succeeds the "flexible response" policy of the Kennedy-Johnson period, which in turn succeeded President Eisenhower's strategy of "massive retaliation."

The Defense chief explained the difference between earlier strategies and realistic deterrence in these words:

> "Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. Past policy was responsive and reactive. Our new policy is positive and active. The old policy focused on containment and accommodation. The new strategy emphasizes measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of strength."

Mr. Laird conceded some "risk" is attached to the Nixon Administration's determination to hold down defense spending, which is pegged at 76 billion dollars for the year ending June, 1972. Speaking mainly of Russia's military program, Mr. Laird told Congress: "The threats we face around the world continue to increase, not diminish."

On March 10, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went further, reporting that the U.S. holds but a slim lead in strategic strength and must maintain it "at all costs" if the U.S. is to avoid becoming a second-rate power within five or six years. He added:

> "I believe it is fair to say that the over-all strategic balance, during the last five or six years, has shifted drastically in favor of the Soviet Union."

In the massive document outlining defense needs over the

next several years, these highlights emerged:

**The Russian threat.** The Soviet Union by midyear will possess 1,500-intercontinental ballistic missiles able to reach the U. S. This country has 1,054 land-based ICBM's. If this rate of increase remains steady, the Russians could have 1,900 ICBM's by the mid-1970s.

"This force, alone, would be more than enough to destroy all U. S. cities of any substantial size," Mr. Laird reported. He also pointed out that practically all of the U. S. population lies within range of the growing Soviet submarine-missile force.

The Russians are also actively developing a new anti-ballistic-missile system, in addition to four complexes that protect Moscow.

Though reporting an apparent slowdown in the deployment of Russian ICBM's to Congress on March 9, Mr. Laird one day later disclosed in a TV interview there was now firm evidence the Russians are rushing construction of an upgraded missile system. Mr. Laird informed Congress of the implications of these trends were not clear.

The Defense Secretary revealed that Russia's force of missile-launching submarines had grown to 17 in operation, and 15 more are being assembled or fitted out. Two years ago the Soviets had four of these subs in operation.

The Soviets probably have no multiple warheads yet that can be flown independently to targets, but the Russians have been testing multiple warheads since 1968. Mr. Laird also told of Russian activity in developing a new "swing wing" bomber which other officials say is 'capable of reaching the U. S. with refueling. This is in addition to the present force of nearly 200 long-range bombers.'

**Red China's progress.** Made public was the report that a "reduced-range test" of an ICBM may have been attained by the Communist Chinese last year and that progress toward achieving an ICBM capable of reaching the continental U. S. is continuing on the mainland.

Pentagon officials later confirmed that a test flight of several thousand miles took place entirely within China in 1970. Mr. Laird said Red China could be expected to deploy its initial force of operational ICBM's between 1973 and 1975.

Also, within the last year China may have deployed its first medium-range, nuclear-tipped missiles, which would be a danger to Russian and Asian population centers but not to the U. S.

The Defense Secretary, describing China as the principal military threat in Asia, expressed doubt, nevertheless, that Peking has the capability of waging war on more than one front at a time. He stressed that it was unlikely that Red China's supply problems, and its border dispute with the Russians, would permit Peking to engage in widespread warfare unless there was no effort to interdict its lines of communications and smash its military capability.

**Middle East situation.** Mr. Laird cautioned once again that the immediate peril in the Middle East—a war between Arab states and Israel—could involve the Soviet Union and the U. S. if it got out of hand.

In numbers, the combined military forces of the Arab countries involved—Egypt, Syria, and possibly Jordan—and Iraq—remain far greater than the Israeli forces. The Defense chief reported: "As before the June, 1967, war, however, the qualitative superiority of the Israeli armed forces offsets the numerical difference."

**Vietnam and Southeast Asia.** About half of the entire North Vietnamese Army is now deployed in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Mr. Laird disclosed. He placed the over-all enemy strength inside South Vietnam itself at 240,000 North Vietnamese soldiers, Viet Cong and guerrillas.

Communist strength in Cambodia was estimated at more than 55,000. In Laos, the number was given as 145,000 North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao.

Congress was told that the South Vietnamese armed forces were "progressing on or ahead of schedule."

**Future U. S. defenses.** While military salaries and spending for research have gone up this year, there has been no appreciable change in strategic-force spending. "We continue to believe," Mr. Laird said, "that hard decisions may have to be made in this area in the coming months, and I will not hesitate to recommend additional effort should the threat or developments ... warrant."

The Pentagon chief asked Congress for 1.6 billion dollars to convert more than half the 1,000-missile Minuteman force to multiple warheads and to mount multiple-warhead Poseidon missiles in submarines.

An additional 1.3 billion dollars was sought to continue building three sites of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile defense, and start construction on a fourth, as described elsewhere on this page.

Looking ahead to possible new weapons if arms-control talks with the Russians fail, Mr. Laird told Congress the budget contains 110 millions for preliminary work on a new long-range, submarine-launched missile system (ULMS) and 370 millions for work on an advanced bomber called the B-1.

Mr. Laird also urged a stepped-up program of research and development totaling nearly 8 billion dollars. Purpose to keep the U. S. from being taken up short by a dramatic Soviet breakthrough in weapons.

**Aid to allies.** "Soviet and Communist Chinese aid to North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Warsaw Pact countries clearly increases the military threat which we and our allies must face," Mr. Laird reported.

Best estimates, he said, are that military aid among Communist countries approximated 15 billion dollars in the 1955-1970 period, with more than 85 per cent provided by the Soviet Union. The largest portion, he said, went to North Vietnam. Non-Communist countries received another 8 billion in military aid in the same period.

The Defense Secretary emphasized the success of U.S. strategy in the 1970s will depend heavily on continued aid by America to its allies.

"The better equipped our friends and allies are to provide for their own security, the more firm will be our own security," Mr. Laird said. "This is because the probability of war and of U. S. involvement in war will be lowered."

Mr. Laird indicated no change in present strength of U. S. forces in Europe but noted: "Military manpower is more costly for the U. S. than for any of our allies, and the differential probably will grow as we move toward an all-volunteer force."

Defense officials added that the U. S. will continue to maintain its 300,000-man force in Europe, but that NATO Allies have been served notice they must prepare themselves against any but nuclear war.

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 25— Hubert H. Humphrey, in his first major speech since returning to the Senate, urged the Nixon Administration today to seek an agreement limiting antiballistic missile systems as the first step toward a comprehensive strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

The Minnesota Democrat criticized the Administration for assuming an "all-or-nothing position" in the strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union by insisting that any agreement must include both offensive and defensive weapons.

Along with his speech criticizing the Administration approach to the arms talks, Senator Humphrey introduced a sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling upon the President to propose a ban or limit on ABM defensive systems "as the first step toward achieving a more comprehensive agreement on both defensive and offensive weapons."

Under Mr. Humphrey's proposal, the mutual freeze on ABM systems would be of limited duration and linked to subsequent success in negotiating a limitation on offensive weapons.

While the ABM limitation was being negotiated, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union enter into a mutual moratorium on the deployment of new offensive and defensive weapons and on the testing of multiple missile warheads known as MIRV's (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles).

This moratorium would be dependent upon both sides demonstrating "comparable self-restraint," with the United States suspending deployment of the Safeguard ABM system and MIRV warheads for the Minuteman intercontinental missiles, and the Soviet Union suspending deployment of its land-based intercontinental missiles and testing of MIRV warheads.

Contending that mutual restraint in weapon deployment has become an essential ingredient for success of the arms limitation talks, Senator Humphrey said:

"President Nixon must be willing to take some risks for peace in the way his predecessors, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, did to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty."

He noted that both previous presidents had laid the groundwork for the treaty by eventually stopping nuclear testing in anticipation of a compensurate response on testing of the Soviet Union.

## SST and War Stands

To Senator Humphrey, the long speech marked his debut as an active Senator, and to many of his colleagues, further

confirmation that the 1968 Democratic Presidential candidate was once again a possible contender for the Presidential nomination.

After two months of unusual reticence in the Senate wings, Senator Humphrey has stepped forward onto the front stage in a manner that has convinced many of his close colleagues that he is interested in running for the Presidency again and is trying to reshape his political image.

He broke yesterday with organized labor — and sided with the younger faction of the party in the Senate — in voting against the supersonic transport. He also presided over a meeting of the Democratic National Committee's policy council that adopted a resolution urging Congressional action to force a complete troop withdrawal from Vietnam by the end of 1971.

And then with his first major Senate speech today, he sought to re-establish his role as a spokesman on disarmament dates to his earlier days in the Senate when he was chairman of the disarmament subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

With his disarmament speech, Senator Humphrey, at least momentarily, may have upstaged a potential Presidential rival, Senator Edmund S. Muski of Maine, who has yet to take advantage of his new platform as chairman of the disarmament subcommittee.

The Muskie subcommittee will have closed-door briefings next week on the arms limitation talks and the Soviet strategic threat. Beyond that, the Maine Democrat is tentatively considering open hearings in May on the Administration's proposal to expand the Safeguard ABM system.

NEW YORK TIMES

26 MARCH 71p13

## HUMPHREY URGES LIMITS ON ABM'S

### Criticizes 'All or Nothing' Attitude in Arms Talks

Seated in his Senate office behind a desk that he apologetically noted was scarred from previous Senatorial service, Mr. Humphrey said he had withheld his Senate speaking debut until now because "I did not want to do much specifying and publicizing until I was ready."

But he said he intended to speak out hereafter on both foreign and domestic issues. While emphasizing that he is

not ready to join some of his fellow liberal Democrats in urging cuts in the defense budget, he admits that he is changing his views on foreign policy, such as on Vietnam. He sees the nation going through a period of devising "a whole new foreign policy," just as it was doing in 1949 when he first came to the Senate and the groundwork was laid for the Cold War policy of containment of Communism.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 MARCH 71 p9

A MISSILE FREEZE
URGED BY JACKSON

Senator Calls for One-Year
Halt by U.S. and Soviet

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 28—
Senator Henry M. Jackson pro-
posed today a one-year agree-
ment with the Soviet Union
freezing the deployment of
most land-based missiles. He
said this would "arrest the de-
cline in the security" of the
United States nuclear deterrent.

The Washington Democrat, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee who has been mentioned as a potential Presidential candidate, called for an immediate agreement that would halt the deployment of United States Minuteman III missiles with multiple warheads, as well as the deployment and construction of new Soviet intercontinental missiles and launchers and installation of antiballistic systems defending population centers.

Appearing on "Issues and Answers," a radio and television program of the American Broadcasting Company, Senator Jackson announced that he would outline his proposal in a speech to the Senate tomorrow.

He said such an agreement
was necessary because the So-
viet had started building "a
massive system that involves
the deployment of an ICBM
(inter-continental ballistic mis-
sile] force that exceeds 25
megatons."

Earlier Disclosure

It was Senator Jackson who disclosed three weeks ago that the United States had detected the new Soviet construction effort. This was later confirmed by the Defense Department.

Today, he said, "The Rus-
sians have an ability this year
—and this is what is ominous—
to deploy between 60 and 70 of
such huge SS-9 type missiles."

"If they should deploy 70 of such missiles," he said, "they would have a capability this year alone of adding more megatonnage, or destructive power than we have in our entire current land-based Minutemen ICBM system."

On Feb. 25, President Nixon
said in his State of the World
Message that the growth of
Soviet strategic forces "leads
inescapably to profound ques-
tions concerning the threats we
will face in the future, and the
adequacy of our current strate-
gic forces to meet the require-
ments of our security."

Mr. Nixon stressed that dur-
ing 1970 the Soviet Union had
further increased its lead over
the United States in the deploy-
ment of intercontinental mis-
siles. At the end of last year
he said, the Soviet Union had
1,440 ICM's and the United
States 1,054.

Senator Jackson's appeal for
a freeze came amid growing
concern over the new Soviet
strategic arms programs and
the apparent stalemate at the
talks in Vienna on bombing
strategic arms.

Humphrey Asks Moratorium

In a major Senate speech last
Thursday, Senator Hubert H.
Humphrey, Minnesota Demo-
crat, another potential Presiden-
tial candidate, introduced a
resolution calling for a mutual
moratorium on deployments of
offensive and defensive weap-
ons and MIRV testing while the
U. S. and the Soviet Union
negotiated a ban on antiballistic
systems.

Senator Humphrey criticized
the Administration for insliting
on a comprehensive agreement
with Moscow on both offensive
and defensive weapons, and
suggested that an antiballistic
accord come first.

The Senate disarmament sub-
committee, headed by Senator
Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, the
leading Democratic Presidential
contender, is scheduled to start
closed door briefings this week
on the status of the Arms-
Limitation Talks and the Soviet
threat.

During his television appear-
ance, Senator Jackson said that
in the talks with the Russians,
resumed in Vienna on March
15, "the real problem that we
face is that, the Russians ap-
car to be going ahead on an
unabated basis with a very
large offensive land-based sys-
tem."

He said the new Soviet ac-
tivities "would put into serious
question the credibility of our
second-strike force" and that
"if the Russians continue to de-
ploy these huge offensive sys-
tems we will have to take an-
other look at our whole deter-
rent posture" and "at the need
for more offensive systems."

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT - 5 APRIL 1971

"U.S. SUPERIORITY HAS ENDED"

A hard-hitting report on the state of U. S. defenses, drawn up by leading private citizens, is starting to attract notice in Washington. The warning: This country had better wake up, lest it become a second-rate power.

Following is full text of the official summary of a 35-page statement submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense on "The Shifting Balance of Military Power":

The converging trends. The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union. These trends include:

1. The growing Soviet superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles,

2. The Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U. S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof,

3. The possibility that present U. S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union,

4. The convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a pre-emptive first-strike capability,

5. The rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability, and

6. The mounting hostility of segments of the public toward the military, the defense establishment and "the military-industrial complex" without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the U. S.

A second-rate power. If these observable trends continue, the U. S. will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people. Neither the facts concerning these trends nor the ultimate danger is generally understood by the public, which for the most part remains uninformed and hence apathetic.

A Soviet world order. Since World War II, a degree of world order has been maintained by the dominance of U. S. strategic military strength. This American-preserved world order is now disintegrating as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it.

There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union envisions a new era which it will dominate, employing superior military power and the threat of its use to achieve long-cherished political, economic and even military objectives.

The end of U. S. superiority. In a dramatic shift in the balance of power, largely unnoticed by the public, the quarter century of clear U. S. strategic superiority has ended.

The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's—the principal weapons system of the nuclear age. The U. S. retains, for the time being, a substantial edge in the smaller, short-range SLBM's launched from Polaris submarines. Yet the Soviet Union has a major submarine-construction program which by 1973-74 could nullify this advantage. The U. S. subsonic B-52 bomber force still outnumbers the Soviet strategic bombers by a 3-to-1 margin, but both nations recognize the relatively obsolete character of this weapons system.

There are, of course, other elements in the equation of strategic military power. In some of these—such as MIRV [multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicle] and Poseidon—the U. S. is ahead of the Soviet Union. In others, such as strategic defense against missiles—ABM's—and against bomber attack, the Soviets are significantly ahead.

But however one may view the balancing, no informed person now denies that the period of clear U. S. superiority has ended. The Soviet SS-9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U. S. force of ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

A Soviet first-strike capability. Our planners in the '60s assumed that if both superpowers had an adequate retaliatory capability, neither would prepare for or risk a first strike.

The evidence is now reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union, rejecting this assumption, is deploying strategic-weapons systems designed for a first-strike capability.

This evidence includes:

* The continued Soviet production and deployment of ICBM's after having attained a clear numerical and megatonnage advantage,

* The emphasis on SS-9s designed as counterforce weapons capable of destroying U. S. hardened missile silos,

* The development of MRV [multiple re-entry vehicle]—with warheads also designed as counterforce weapons—and of MIRV by 1971-72.

* The development of a fractional-orbital missile which significantly minimizes warning time,

* The construction of a Y-class atomic-powered-submarine SLBM-launching fleet capable, with no effective warning, of destroying our national command centers and much of our B-52 bomber force, and

* The continued Soviet emphasis on strategic-defense systems against both missiles and bombers—an emphasis without parallel in this country.

The characteristics of these offensive and defensive-weapons systems which the Soviets continue to expand are consistent only with a pre-emptive-strike capability. Such a weapons mix and volume are not required for effective retaliation.

A challenging Soviet Navy. The Soviet Navy, modern and rapidly expanding, is now challenging U. S. naval superiority in every category except aircraft carriers. This Soviet naval build-up is a major element in the shifting balance of military power.

Retreat from the threat of the '70s. The situation which our country faces is without precedent. As we enter the '70s, the strategy of American superiority has given way to the concept of deterrence by maintaining an assured retaliatory capability. But there is no longer any certainty that our nuclear deterrent will remain credible to a Soviet Union which apparently seeks a pre-emptive-strike capability and which is moving rapidly into the role of the world's dominant military power. Red China, bitterly hostile to the U. S., also is acquiring a significant ICBM capability.

It is not too much to say that in the '70s neither the vital interests of the U. S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure. Yet many of our most influential citizens respond to this unprecedented national peril not by a renewed determination to assure an adequate national defense but rather by demands for further curtailment of defense measures which can only increase the peril.

Cutback in defense spending. Although the President has submitted for fiscal year 1971 a "bare bones" defense budget reflecting the largest single cutback since the Korean War, public and political pressures are mounting for even more-dramatic reductions.

As U. S. defense spending goes down, the trend of spending by the Soviet Union continues steadily upward. Its total military funding about equals that of the U. S., although its gross national product is barely half that of this country. The mix of Soviet spending is especially meaningful. Without the drain of a Vietnam war or public pressures to curtail defense funding, Soviet expenditures in dollar equivalents on strategic offensive and defensive weapons significantly exceed those of the U. S.

Threat to technological superiority. U. S. qualitative superiority in weapons due to its advanced technology has afforded a decisive advantage over the past years. This advantage is now being eroded away as the U. S. falls behind the Soviet Union in the support of research and development and in the training of scientists and engineers.

There is an ever-present risk of disastrous technological surprise in major weaponry where an open society is in competition with a closed Communist society. We are neglecting, by inadequate support and planning, to minimize this risk.

Negotiations-trap or opportunity? Since the end of World War II, repeated attempts have been made by the U. S. to negotiate limitations on the arms race. Negotiations for sound, enforceable limitations should be continued, and hopes are

now high for the success of the current strategic-arms-lin. tion talks. But the total experience of negotiating with Com. munist nations suggests the utmost caution and the need for the most-critical analysis of the possible consequences of any proposed terms. Not only is the security of this country at stake but it is possible that a limitations agreement as to strategic weapons could have the effect of neutralizing the U. S. as a strategic power, leaving the Soviet Union and Red China relatively free to employ their superior tactical capabilities wherever this seems advantageous.

Hostility toward the military. At this critical time when the balance of military power is shifting, it is uniquely unfortunate that public hostility toward national defense and the military is at an unprecedented level.

This attitude reflects a broad spectrum of opinion-from honest pacifists and dissenters over Southeast Asia to New Leftist revolutionaries. But the base is sufficiently broad and the voices supporting various aspects of it sufficiently powerful to have a profoundly adverse effect upon almost every aspect of national defense.

In a democracy, national defense suffers when there is inadequate public understanding and support. It may be fatally undermined when a significant segment of public opinion is not merely negative but irresponsibly hostile.

A viable national strategy. Unless the American people wish to accept irrevocably the status of a second-rate power-with all of the probable consequences-the only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability. This can be accomplished by reversing the trends identified above and by eschewing agreements which freeze the U. S. into a second-rate status.

The margin of our over-all strategic strength must be sufficient to convince the most reckless aggressor that even after a surprise first strike the capability to retaliate will in fact survive and be adequate to impose unacceptable destruction on the aggressor nation. This course of action is not incom- patible with continued negotiations for arms limitations. Indeed, it will significantly enhance the chances of negotiations being genuinely fruitful without constituting a trap.

The consequences of second-rate status. Basic Communist dogma contemplates the employment, over such time spans as may be necessary, of the entire arsenal of pressures against the U. S. as the strongest democratic power. Despite discord among Communist states there has been no amelioration of this doctrinal goal.

Throughout the past quarter century when the Soviet Union was relatively weak strategically, it precipitated or supported crisis upon crisis-directly or through puppets and satellites-designed to extend its influence and to create disarray within the U. S. and the free world.

It is irrational to think, with the balance of military power shifting in its favor, that the policies of the Soviet Union will be less hostile, disruptive and imperialistic. The consequences of being second rate, even if national survival is not threatened, could be seriously detrimental to the most vital diplomatic and economic interests of this country.

Weakness-the gravest threat to peace. The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary.

Among the great nations only the strong survive. Weakness of the U. S.-of its military capability and its will-could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world.

WASHINGTON

12 APRIL 1971 P-1

## Arms Critics Hopeful on Budget Battle

One of a series of articles
on major defense issues.

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Today is mobilization day for a motley political army that intends to fight the well-organized ranks of the Pentagon soon on the issue of military spending.

Sounding the call in a fifth-floor committee room in the New Senate Office Building will be Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), a politician fresh from what looked like another hopeless battle, the downing of the supersonic transport.

Proxmire, like it or not—and he talks more like “or not”—this year is the Senate’s leader of the anti-Pentagon forces. No more one-man search-and-destroy missions for him. Events have pushed this Senate loner into a leadership role.

"Who else was there?" asked an arms control lobbyist working on the mobilization.

It was Proxmire, the lobbyist explained, who took on military programs like the C-5A before it was deemed politically safe and then racked up a stunning 71 per cent of the state vote in winning reelection to the Senate in 1970.

It was Proxmire who came close last year to getting the Senate to impose a money ceiling on the Pentagon's annual budget.

And it was Proxmire, after shouting down the well for so long about the folly of spending millions on the supersonic transport, who suddenly found himself this year riding a crest of public rebellion over the plane. He won that one after so many years of defeats on other budget-cutting amendments.

Also, this year he is co-chairman of the military subcommittee of the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

The group is a loose, bipartisan alliance trying to work its will on the Defense Department by challenging specific weapons and policies. The other chairman is Rep. Ogden R. Reid (R-N.Y.).

Not that all this gives Proxmire instant popularity in the Senate or even admittance to the inner circle. It doesn't. But it is why Proxmire will be the senator addressing the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy today—a group the Pentagon must worry about.

The coalition, founded by 20 national organizations that lobby Congress from

the outside while Proxmire and his allies work on fellow lawmakers from the inside, is—to quote the brochure—"a coordinating body for national religious, peace, liberal, labor and scientific organizations which seek to reverse the militarization of America's policies and resources."

Former Democratic Sen. Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania is chairman of the coalition's executive committee. That committee also includes representatives of SANE, the National Education Association and the United Auto Workers. This year for the first time coalition spokesmen got an opportunity to testify before the House Armed Services Committee, and they are seeking the same kind of audience with the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Proxmire, in his speech to the coalition today, will declare that it is high time for the Pentagon to stop pretending the Russians are 10 feet tall and to adjust the military budget to their real size. The senator also will describe part of the Pentagon's chamber of horrors, including the main battle tank, in arguing that forced reforms would make the military stronger, not weaker.

### Far From New

This line is far from new—especially from Proxmire. But the anti-Pentagon forces believe more people will listen to them this year and then act—as they did on the SST. These are the reasons arms control lobbyists give for their optimism about cutting military spending in 1971:

* Credibility gap. The Vietnam War has worn down the credibility of everybody in the Defense Department—civillan secretaries and military generals alike. Their claims for "must" weapons and manpower levels are thus apt to run into heavy congressional resistance, especially in the Senate.

* New Faces. Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) is the new chairman of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, succeeding the late Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.). Ellender will be harder on military spending than Russell—and more skeptical about the Pentagon picture of the Communist threat.

Also, the House Armed Services Committee has a slightly more critical membership with the departure of the late Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.) and the addition of new young Congressmen.

* Economy. The only way to obtain money for domestic programs without aggravating inflation further is to take it out of the Pentagon budget. However, even this year's optimists do concede that the troubled economy makes military base closings—with the accompanying loss of jobs—unpopular politically.

* New Senate coalition. The SST vote showed the viability of a political coalition of the liberals and conservative budget cutters. Voting against the plane on March 24 were such liberals as Sens. Frank Church (D-Idaho), Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.), Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.) and Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) along with such conservatives as Sens. Harry F. Byrd Jr. (D-Va.), Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), Clifford P. Hansen (R-Wyo.), Len B. Jordan (R-Idaho) and Jack Miller (R-Iowa).

Arms control lobbyists believe such a Senate coalition could be organized to control Pentagon spending, once waste is dramatically proved. Already there is an effort under way by disarrament lobbyists to enlist environment leaders who fought the SST in the anti-Pentagon movement. It is admitted that this will be a gradual process. But the SST is described as a heartening victory for changed priorities—with the prospect of adding thrust to the arms control effort before long.

* Early start. The mobilization against military spending is off to a much earlier start this year than in past years and promises to be better organized. The Members of Congress for Peace Through Law hope to increase the impact of this year's posture statement by releasing it a chapter at a time, with each chapter analyzing a specific Pentagon program. It is hoped that Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) will spearhead with Proxmire the Senate drive to cut the defense budget.

### No Easy Victory

While those reasons are cited as the basis for optimism, the arms control lobbyists do not pretend an easy victory is in sight. This year as in past years, Pentagon programs the Senate recommends killing most likely will be revived in the House.

"But the battle will be joined across a wider front," said one leader of the coalition of national organizations. He argued that the antiballistic missile debate of 1969, while fought long and

hard, exhausted the Senate without coming to grips with the broader question of how to put the Pentagon on a shorter leash. While weapons programs can be stopped in the Senate, he said, "too many foreign commitments" are the magic words in the House.

While the ADM and other specific weapons projects will be attacked in the Senate again this year, Proxmire said he hopes to keep amendments on them to a minimum. His idea is to attack the Pentagon's most questionable programs, one after the other, without voting on individual amendments to reduce or cancel them.

The debate would amount to building the case for one really big amendment—imposing a dollar ceiling on the Defense Department. This would avoid forcing the uncertain politicians in Congress to out-expert the generals and admirals in overriding them on such things as tanks and aircraft carriers. The Pentagon would restructure itself within the imposed dollar ceiling.

The amount Proxmire has in mind for the ceiling is between $66 billion and $70 billion, or from $10 billion to $6 billion less than the $76 billion the Pentagon intends to spend in Fiscal 1972.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has predicted that there will be no close votes on Pentagon programs this year. But Proxmire sees it differently.

"The main thing that is different this year," Proxmire said in an interview, "is that the President is increasing the defense budget compared to the decreases" of Fiscal 1970 and 1971. "We're getting down to marginal expenditures in Vietnam as we get out. Therefore, there ought to be a cut."

Also, he said the Nixon administration's proclaimed intent of having only enough forces to fight one big war and one little one—the 1½ war policy compared to the Johnson administration's 2½ war policy—should mean that less money is needed now for the military, not more.

WASHINGTON POST - 19 APRIL 1971

## 1½ War Capability in Doubt

# Defense Costs Peril Strategy

The Nixon administration, which reduced the Kennedy-Johnson goal of military capability for 2½ simultaneous wars to 1½, is now confronted with the possibility that soaring costs may price the country out of even this less ambitious goal.

Thus, in only the second year of the decade, the major American military strategy for the 1970s is in doubt.

"If present trends continue," says one high-ranking official, "the conclusion is inescapable: the 1½ war strategy will be right out the window."

The trends include:

* Increasing Manpower costs—pay and benefits for American servicemen. Government studies show that manpower costs will consume 65 per cent of the $90 billion projected for the defense budget by 1975. These costs are rising even as the administration is pushing for an all-volunteer army.

* Weapons cost that continue to defy original estimates by large margins. What many planners fear is that these costs are becoming so high that the military—increasingly challenged by lawmakers and taxpayers—simply may not be able to buy enough ships, planes and tanks during peacetime to be able, if necessary, to fight and win a large-scale conventional war.

The price of a single tank is ten times what it was in World War II. The latest Air Force and Navy fighter planes will cost 100 times more than their Korean War ancestors. Navy shipbuilding costs, according to an administration budget specialist, "have gone completely out of sight."

### Defense Planners

Furthermore, a number of top defense planners feel the services have reached a point of diminishing returns in building costly, sophisticated weapons.

Attention must be turned, they stress, to simpler, cheaper weapons that can be bought in large enough quantities to keep the United States from simply being outgunned. "We've got

to stop using $15 million airplanes to try and knock out $3,000 trucks," as one planer puts it.

But officials are not at all certain that service habits can be changed, nor that the Laird-Packard regime at the Pentagon is willing to force them to change.

Officially, the Nixon-Laird strategy of realistic deterrence" calls for enough nuclear arms to deter an all-out nuclear war with the Russians, plus enough conventional forces to fight a major non-nuclear war in either Europe or Asia while contending with a smaller outbreak somewhere else at the same time.

Thus the "1½ war" tag.

But interviews with a number of the most experienced civilian defense planners and budget experts in government reveal widespread doubt that even these scaled-down goals can be fully met.

For one thing, a number of those interviewed expressed a fear that the seapower-oriented Nixon administration may be cutting back the number and readiness of Army combat divisions to a dangerously low level to help achieve the politically popular goal of an all-volunteer Army and to help pay for ever more expensive hardware, mostly for the Navy and some for the Air Force.

"The Army," says one administration insider, "is taking it in the neck," both within the administration and in votes by the Joint Chiefs of Staff where Navy strength predominates.

The administration already plans to cut the Army down to 13½ divisions by 1972, three fewer than the Army had before the Vietnam build-up in 1964.

### First Sacrifice

And, planners worry that if the fiscal crunch gets worse, Army readiness will be the first sacrifice, without anybody really being aware of it except the Army. "They may still have 13½ divisions on paper," says one source, "but they won't be fully manned and equipped."

Yet, many defense analysts view the Army as the most important element of American military power for the most likely battles that lie ahead.

Defense planners are also deeply troubled by the lack

of an answer to this question: "Who," one official asked, "is looking after the real national interest in defense?"

The individual services, officials say, still cling to the glossiest, most costly versions of traditional weapons at the expense of new ideas and less glamorous but important projects. Without stronger civilian control, they say, the services cannot be expected to overcome today's fierce competition for money within and between each branch in such a way that the country winds up with a properly balanced arsenal.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird is given high marks as a driving force within the administration to end the war. But when it comes to challenging service priorities, the defense chief is viewed mostly as a referee rather than as a tough overseer of military shopping lists.

"The secretary has got to play a stronger role than he has," says one official, "but

he'll probably settle for getting out of Vietnam for his four years. He's the Clark Clifford of the Nixon administration."

"If the Secretary of Defense does his job correctly," another official adds, "he can't be well liked by the military. But until I see him take on a major project that the service wants, 'participatory management' (Laird's term for giving the services a bigger say in defense decision-making) merely means cutting up the pie."

Some planners complain that scarce resources are being added and taken away "on a 33½ per cent each basis." If the defense budget goes up again next year, as is likely, "every dab of the extra resources in the Air Force will go for the B-1 bomber and into carriers in the Navy," says one experienced planner. "But maybe more should go into Minute-man or ULMS (the successor to the Polaris submarines), or small, fast patrol boats. Nobody else is making the trade-offs."

If present trends continue, says one planner half

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

April 19, 1971

The Washington Post

Chart shows rise in weapons costs since World War II.

BALTIMORE SUN 18 April 1971 P3 (19)

# 2 Pentagon Critics Hope SST Coalition Will Cut Military's Budget

BY ANTERO PIETILA

Two supporters of reductions in military spending said yesterday they hope the same congressional coalition that defeated the supersonic transport will be maintained to divert funds away from the Pentagon.

During a seminar here, Stanford Gottlieb, executive director of SANE, a peace group, and Representative Paul S. Sarbanes (D. Ill) said the only way to cut arm spending is to continue this "unlikely coalition" of liberals and fiscal conservatives.

"That's exactly what we have to do as was shown in our victory over SST," Mr. Gottlieb told an approving audience of about 200 in the seminar "From War to Peace" held at City College.

He added that, although Senate leaders such as George McGovern (D., S.D.), a presidential hopeful and anti-war liberal, and Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (independent Democrat, Va.), a fiscal conservative, disagree on how any funds diverted from military use should be spent, both agree that cuts in the arms budgets are necessary.

Mr. Sarbanes warned in his speech, however, that the approaching 1972 presidential campaign might alter whatever conditions there are for such co-operation between liberals and conservatives on Capitol Hill.

He said that if the nation's present unemployment situation is not improved by campaign time, President Nixon might decide to increase military spending to produce more jobs.

"It's the easiest thing in the world to boost military expenditures," the freshman congressman from Baltimore city said, adding that "we may well see the 1972 counterpart of the 1960 missile gap."

Mr. Sarbanes said he saw indications of that kind of strategy in the recently published reports by Pentagon spokesmen that the strategic capacity of the Soviet Union was surpassing that of the United States.

He said, therefore, that a return to full employment was

"terribly important" so that joblessness could not be used as an excuse for military spending.

Yesterday's day-long seminar in Baltimore was the first area conference of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy.

The group, whose members include such liberals as Senators McGovern, Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) and William S. Proxmire. (D., Wis.), is planning a nationwide congress later this year.

Youthful activists who have crowded earlier peace meetings were almost totally absent from yesterday's seminar, which consisted of a series of discussions on the economics of war and peace by 10 experts. They included John Stark, staff director of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress.

The Baltimore conference was arranged by the coalition and co-sponsored by 28 other organizations.

They included the Afro-American Labor Council, Activists, Inc., Americans for Democratic Action, the American Friends Service Committee, Baltimore

Ethical Society, Baltimore Teachers Union, the Board of Christian Social Concern of the United Methodist Church, Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace, Community Action Agency, the Delta Sigma Theta sorority.

Also, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Interdenominational Mineral Alliance, League of Women Voters (Baltimore city and county), Maryland Conference on Social Welfare, Maryland Student-Citizen Coalition, Maryland Veterans for Peace, Baltimore Urban Coalition, the United Auto Workers, (Region 3).

Other sponsors were the Maryland chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the First District New Democratic Club, the Second and Fifth district New Democratic coalitions, the Northwest Baltimore Corporation, SANE, the Social Action Committee of the First Unitarian Church and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.

NEW YORK TIMES

20 APRIL Pg 15 ✓

## SENATE REOPENS DEBATE OVER ABM

### A Defense Aide Argues for $1.3-Billion Additional

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 19—

The antiballistic missile debate began again in the Senate today with many of the same arguments but little of the enthusiasm or organized opposition of past years.

Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in support of the Administration's request for $1.3-billion additional to expand the Safeguard ABM system.

The Administration proposal this year is to continue construction of Safeguard sites around Minuteman intercontinental missile bases in North Dakota and Montana, start construction of a Safeguard complex at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, and take preliminary steps toward a fourth Safeguard site either around Washington or at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming.

### Bargaining Need Cited

As in the past, Dr. Foster argued that the Safeguard system was needed as a bargaining incentive in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union and as a counter to the growing Soviet strategic threat. He said that, after a pause last year, the Soviet Union had apparently resumed its build-up in offensive missiles.

He predicted that without the Safeguard defense the survival of the retaliatory force of Minuteman Missiles could be threatened later in the nineteen-seventies.

Dr. Foster also reported that Safeguard development was proceeding on schedule, but with some increase in cost, largely because of inflation. The cost of a sour-site system has risen to $71.1-billion—not including the $1.1-billion for

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY - 19 APRIL 1971 (21)

# $3-Billion Cut Expected in Defense Requests

By Donald C. Winston

Washington-Major attack on the Defense Dept. $78.7-billion Fiscal 1972 budget request opened in Congress last week, setting the stage for cuts expected to exceed $3 billion—and possibly reaching double that figure—by the time the legislative process is complete late this year.

As in previous sessions, the conclusive debate will take place in the Senate in midsummer. But new factors at work in both House and Senate this session have greatly complicated the task of Defense Dept. officials in selling their programs to Congress. As a result, the fate of several major weapon systems at this time is highly uncertain.

The new factors include:

* Decline of the Southeast Asia war as a prime political issue, essentially ending the distinction between "hawks" and "doves" in matters concerning the military in general. Strong opposition to a particular major weapon system no longer carries an automatic "dove" label. This truth will become more evident as established "hawks" increasingly question the economics and strategic importance of some of these systems.

* Defeat of the supersonic transport last month (AW&ST Mar. 29, p. 14) by a coalition of liberals and conservatives. The political strength demonstrated in that vote will show enough cohesiveness to influence future votes on major military procurement, with liberals opposing the programs because they are defense-oriented and conservatives in opposition because they are expensive.

* Continuation of a high level of unemployment against a background of inflation. This combination is encouraging anti-defense spending forces to advocate a "shift of priorities" to civilian spending, which they claim will create more jobs while contributing less to inflation.

Evidence of the depth to which the move to chop Defense Dept. spending has moved is seen in the action of Sen. John C. Stennis (D.-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who last week ordered the General Accounting Office to investigate the Navy/Grumman F-14 fighter contract.

The Stennis move followed by a month an order by Rep. George H. Mahon (D.-Tex.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, for a staff report on relative capabilities of the F-14 and the Air Force/McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighters (AW&ST Mar. 8, p. 188).

The GAO investigation into F-14 was triggered by what Sen. Stennis called "concern over recent reports of cost increases" in the program. He said he is aware of "some contractual implications on cost for varying quantities and abnormal economic variation."

Earlier, Sen. Stennis had served warning on Defense Dept. officials that his committee will examine each proposed weapon system in great detail before approving funds for Fiscal 1972 (AW&ST Mar. 15, p. 15). The committee will concentrate its efforts on aircraft and missiles.

Last session, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees convinced Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird of the political necessity of reducing the scope of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system in order to get it passed by Congress. The same "friends of the Pentagon" in Congress this session are expected to conduct a similar survey of the mood of their colleagues and may recommend even sharper cutbacks, in Safeguard as well as other programs, for the same reasons.

Example of the strategy expected to emerge in coming months on the part of anti-Defense Dept. forces was given by Sen. William Proxmire (D.-Wis.), who last week attacked the Fiscal 1972 program on the premise that because it is too costly it will weaken the U.S. economically and, ultimately, militarily.

The Proxmire attack was timed for maximum impact, when Congress was out of session and full attention could be gained because there were few other legislators at work. The choice of timing also made reply difficult, with several key committee leaders out of town.

Sen. Proxmire, fresh from his victory as leader of the anti-supersonic transport forces, is a long-time opponent of major Defense Dept. weapon programs. In the past, his attacks have dwelled almost exclusively on waste in defense spending, but this session he has shifted emphasis to military reform.

Sen. Proxmire declared, "through more prudent policies and through military reform, we can provide a more than adequate defense for the U.S. for far less money. In fact, if we continue to squander our treasure for obsolete or unworkable weapons as we have done in the past, we will weaken ourselves militarily and economically."

He said that $4 billion could be cut from what he described as an $18-billion annual expenditure for strategic weapons and still provide by Fiscal 1975 approximately 19 times the nuclear force "needed to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union or to destroy 30% of her population and 76% of her industry."

Sen. Proxmire accused the Defense Dept. of spending more money each year than Congress has authorized. The figures he presented, however, included military construction expenditures but not military construction authorizations.

He explained that the unequal comparisons were given to demonstrate that "the Pentagon has suffered only the most minute or marginal cut" in recent years.

U.S. defense planners were also cajoled for failure to exercise "some self-restraint" in light of what Sen. Proxmire declared was a "decision by the Russians not to deploy the SS-9" intercontinental ballistic missile. According to U.S. officials, approximately 240 SS-9 Scarp missiles have been deployed in the Soviet Union, and numerous tests have been performed with them (AW&ST Mar. 8, p. 27).

Sen. Proxmire's declaration that the Defense Dept. regularly spends more

than Congress authorizes, and that the Soviets have not deployed the SS-9, immediately stood out as a warning that the upcoming debate will not be fought squarely on the facts.

Of current major weapon systems, only the Lockheed Poseidon underwater-launched ballistic missile received full endorsement from Sen. Proxmire, who similarly approved further research on the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS), the Poseidon follow-on. Weapons strongly opposed by Sen. Proxmire include:

* North American B-1 bomber. "The B-1 cannot be justified by its mission," he declared. "Present aircraft with standoff weapons can adequately perform the same mission."

* Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Sen. Proxmire said that neither the Russians nor the Chinese possess a credible bomber threat, and that the system cannot be justified on the basis of general tactical usefulness. "This system has every appearance of being a major boondoggle," he said.

* Attack aircraft carriers. He said that carriers "are sitting ducks for modern missiles" and that the Navy's existing carrier fleet is inefficiently utilized.

* Main Battle Tank 70. "We need a new tank. But we don't need this one," Sen. Proxmire declared.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 25 APRIL 1971

# Why Pentagon Faces
A New War Over
Soaring Arms Costs

By JAMES McCARTNEY
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON.

IN 1963 the Navy started work on a new torpedo, the Mark 48. It estimated the cost for the project at $720 million.

Today the price tag has skyrocketed to $3.9 billion—a rise of 600 percent.

Torpedoes would now cost a million dollars each. They used to cost $38,000.

But the Navy still doesn't have a Mark 48 torpedo. Eight years and a half a billion dollars of expenditures since the program began, the new torpedo still doesn't work.

To cap it all off, a group of congressional critics of defense spending, including 30 U. S. senators, is asking whether the new torpedo is needed at all in today's warfare.

They're suggesting that the Mark 48 may already be obsolete.

The story of the Mark 48 is simply "Exhibit A" in the coming battle here

over President Nixon's $76 billion defense budget.

"It's been the worst managed program of them all," says one congressional defense expert.

The same kinds of questions are being raised about many another multibillion dollar weapons system.

—Why are costs rising so dramatically?

MCCARTNEY

—Are many expensive programs really needed?

Costs of major weapons programs for which Nixon is requesting money have increased by more than $10 billion over original estimates.

The price for one fighter plane went up by $1.3 billion in three years. The cost for a fleet of destroyers tripled. The price for another plane doubled.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has acknowledged the problem.

"When we assumed office in 1969," he says, "we had to face up to a number of problems and breakdowns in the weapons acquisition process that had developed over the years.

"Nearly every new weapons system was turning out to be substantially more costly than estimated when the system first authorized. Furthermore, a many of the new weapons did not as well as predicted, reliability too often was poor, and maintenance costs were excessive."

Laird has made a number of management changes in the Pentagon to try to solve problems and has more in mind.

The amount of money involved is as
tronomical.

At least 13 major weapons systems under consideration would involve total expenditures of $3 billion or more each —and many of them substantially more.

Fighter planes come in fleets priced at more than $8 billion, destroyers at $4 billion, nuclear frigates at $5 billion. Nothing is cheap.

Technical and management problems abound in virtually every category. Dulations of years are common, cost rises the norm.

The budget supports six different anti-submarine warfare programs — all designed essentially to do the same thing. The total cost of the six: $23.3 billion.

It contains support money for three different kinds of close support aircraft—all designed to do the same thing. The cost of the three: $4 to $5 billion.

Other targets for defense critics:

—The budget proposes more than a billion dollars for carrier-based fighter planes designed for anti-submarine warfare of which a congressional study said: "Evidence available indicates that we have no need for the aircraft."

Costs of this program—the so-called S-3A—have grown from an initial estimate of $1.7 billion to almost $3 billion.

The cost per plane in the initial order now figures at $28 million each. The U. S. has been paying $3 to $5 million for F-4 Phantom jets, the backbone of today's fighter fleet.

Some critics believe a better, more effective plane could be built for half, or even a third of the price.

## Threefold Increase

—The budget asks another half a billion dollars for Navy destroyers which critics charge may be of only "marginal" value.

The ships were originally estimated to cost $34 million each, just four years ago. The price tag today has risen to $111 million apiece.

The total program, according to the General Accounting Office, will cost, at least $4.1 billion.

—It asks $1.5 billion for two separate fighter plane programs which top defense experts in congress fear duplicate one another. They question seriously whether both are needed.

A secret study made by the House Appropriations Committee also questions whether either one will be able to handle modern Russian planes.

One program—the Navy's F-14 carrier-based fighter—has a total price tag of $8.2 billion, according to current official estimates, but a well-informed expert says "God only knows what it will cost."

The other planes—the Air Force's F-15 land-based fighter—would cost the tax-

payers $8.1 billion.

Cost estimates for both have increased—the Navy's by a minimum of $400 million in just two years, the Air Force's by a cool billion.

—The budget asks $87 million for a new "main battle tank" the Army has been seeking to develop for eight years, with little success.

Research and development costs have grown by 525 percent above original estimates.

The Defense Department is worried about the tank's cost. It says it is now trying to come up with a cheap, or "au-stere" version, to hold down expenses. Estimated price per tank of the "au-stere" version: $600,000.

## 115-Member Group

Some experts say the Defense Department is dreaming. They estimate the tank is going to cost $1 million a copy.

They ask whether the tank is needed at all in an age of strategic, intercontinental war.

Congressional critics say that a million dollar tank could be knocked out by a $5000 anti-tank weapon.

Questions about these programs, and others, are coming from a new congressional group called Members of Congress for Peace Through Law.

The group includes 115 members of Congress in both parties. Thirty are senators.

Top men are Sens. Mark Hatfield (R., Ore.) and William Proxmire (D., Wis.).

Their intention is to challenge major items in the defense budget in a series of special studies which they plan to make public in the weeks and months to come.

Nothing will be sacred.

The outspoken Sen. Proxmire sounded an opening gun in the campaign just recently with a speech on the Senate floor.

"Until we cut spending for unneeded or duplicate weapons, for excessive gold-plating, for redundant bases, and for ex-travagant logistic and supply purposes," he said, "the military safety of this nation will decline...."

"If we persist in buying weapons which are so sophisticated they do not work, if we continue to follow practices through which the price of weapons routinely exceed their projected costs by 50 to 100 percent, if we persevere in a system whereby weapons and supplies are regularly delivered late, if we continue to cut our combat forces while adding to the logistic tail . . . the security of this country will suffer."

## 'Mess on Hands'

Defense Department officials, while not accepting Proxmire's arguments, do not deny there are serious problems.

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard says: "We've got a mess on our hands."

Defense Secretary Laird says: "We have a tremendous cost growth problem."

The Pentagon's effort to sell six separate multi-billion dollar weapons programs designed to fight Russian submarines is the most expensive—and perhaps the most questionable—package in this year's $76 billion defense budget, ac-

cording to budgetary critics on Capitol
Hill.

There can be little question about the
growing Soviet submarine threat.

Laird says submarines are "the fast-
est growing element" of Soviet strategic
power.

The question, however, is whether all
of the U. S. anti-sub programs are need-
ed.

"The anti-submarine warfare program is out of control," says Sen. Proxmire. "The military," he says, "is merely building everything it can think of as an anti-sub weapon.

"Someone has to bang some heads to-
gether and bring order out of chaos in
this field."

Yet there is a bonafide fear of Soviet
submarine strength.

The critics want the Pentagon and the
Navy to decide on a basic anti-submarine
strategy and to stick with it. They fear
the Navy is currently buying anything
that sounds like it might work—and the
cost be hanged.

Among the other big question marks
in defense policy are the future of the
manned bomber and the future of the
aircraft carrier.

Both involve literally incalculable
sums of money not just billions, but
tens of billions.

Both were basic weapons in World War
II. The Pentagon is battling to keep both
in the U. S. arsenal.

To opponents they are mastodons,
creatures of an earlier era—the possible
equivalent for the U. S. military of the
French Maginot Line.

To proponents they are vital to the de-
fense of the nation. The carrier makes
it possible to wage mobile war at sea,
far from U. S. shores—the bomber can
be controlled by man, preventing a
“computerized” war.

This year, Sen. George McGovern (D.,
S. D.), an avowed candidate for the
White House, plans a showdown battle
in the Senate over an Air Force drive
for the largest sums ever sought for the
bomber, the B-1.

He'll seek to junk the program, alto-
gether on grounds that it is not neces-
sary at all—and if it were, the proposed
model is too fancy, “gold-plated” and of
poor design.

"The B-1." McGovern says, "has the potential for being the costliest single weapons system ever developed by this country."

The Pentagon is asking $370 million
for continued research on the bomber—
a five-fold increase over last year's ap-
propriation.

Cost rises have already been a prob-
lem.

The General Accounting Office reports
that the total cost of the program is now
estimated at $10.5 billion—an increase
of $1.5 billion from original estimates,
and the plane is still in the research
stage.

Sen. Thomas McIntyre (D., N. H.), a
leading Senate expert on the plane who
has favored continued research, has es-
timated the total cost "might well be
$20 billion."

He has said the cost per plane could
run to $50 million a copy. Some Senate
critics of the program have said it could
go to $60 million a copy. No U. S. plane
has ever cost nearly as much.

Critics charge the bomber would be
extremely vulnerable.

The future of the aircraft carrier in-
volves a completely different kind of
question.

First of all, on the surface of it, there
shouldn't be a battle over carriers this
year. The Pentagon has not asked for
money to build a new carrier in this
year's budget.

It has asked only for $164 million to
pay for unexpected cost increases for
two nuclear carriers now under con-
struction.

Other Programs

But the future of the aircraft carrier
lurks in the background of a whole

range of Navy programs involving many
billions of dollars—planes, escort ships,
torpedoes, missiles.

And Defense Secretary Laird has said
that a new nuclear carrier will be need-
ed. Funds will probably be asked next
year or the year after.

The fact is, as Adm. Thomas H. Moor-
er, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
has put it, "the U. S. Navy general pur-
pose forces are built around attack car-
riers . . ."

If you have carriers you must have
planes to fly from them. submarines to
protect them, destroyers and frigates to
escort them, missiles to defend them, as
well as many other support weapons.

The Navy's budget this year is heavily
laden with multibillion-dollar programs
which tie in with a carrier-dominated
Navy.

The Navy now has 16 attack carriers
and three antisubmarine warfare car-
riers. The Soviets have no carriers.

No other country has built carriers in
more than a decade.

Critics of the carrier in Congress say
the carrier is outmoded — and far too
costly for what you get out of it.

They say that it costs $1.4 billion to-
day to build a single carrier task force.

With 16 task forces, the price indeed
comes high—in fact, it's 40 percent of
the Navy's total budget.

A congressional study on carriers con-
cluded: "Since the cost for constructing
new nuclear carriers is prohibitively
high, no new nuclear carrier should be
constructed.

"Moreover, the number of carriers on
active duty should be reduced to 10 or
12 as soon as practical."

On the whole, the study said, carrier
task forces are "both wasteful and in-
effective."

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS May 1971 (6)

Letter from Washington

RONALD L. TAMMEN

# NEW STRATEGY, NEW THREATS
## The Fiscal 1972 Military Budget

Arguments justifying the 1972 Military Budget break down into five major categories: the increased Soviet threat; high unemployment in the aerospace community; our overseas commitments; the SALT talks; and the so-called triple deterrent — land-based missiles, bombers and submarines. Ronald Tammen looks closely at the Budget with the expert's eye: He spent several years with the Central Intelligence Agency in a weapons-related field and is now consultant on military affairs to a bipartisan group of 105 Senators and Congressmen, affiliated under the name of Members of Congress for Peace through Law. He is advisor to the Military Spending Committee, headed by Senator William Proxmire.

The President has submitted an $80.2 billion military budget to Congress and his Secretary of Defense has attempted to justify this figure in the annual Defense Report. This combination of offensive firepower traditionally has overcome Congressional opposition to military spending. During the last few years, however, these documents have lost their immutable qualities. Both are now subject to intensive scrutiny and their flaws are illuminated in and out of Congress.

This year, the key to increased budget appropriations is the enunciation of a "new" deterrence strategy coupled with the specter of increased military threats. As for the

latter, the release of apparently alarming intelligence information to justify new budget requests is a long-standing technique at DOD. The same officials who complain bitterly about security leaks in November feel it appropriate to reveal highly classified data in March to insure Congressional appreciation of military needs. The Services recognize that the intelligence-budgetary relationship is the most important linkage in national security planning and they are adept at exploiting it.

The United States will be responding to the Soviet and Chinese threat with an across-the-board increase in military systems. The 12 programs listed in the table alone will cost,

by conservative estimates, over $60 billion to complete. This is not the "rock bottom," transitional budget the Secretary of Defense defended in 1970. Nor does it mesh with his testimony this year that the United States does not have to begin building a series of new weapons. Once again, it appears we will hedge against all conceivable threats, regardless of how remote, on the premise that our security depends upon assuming the "worst possible" case. Former Secretary Robert McNamara, who publicly committed DOD to this philosophy, recognized that it also can lead to a misreading of intentions and with that, unnecessary provocation (December 1967 Bulletin).

Last year, the Administration argued that without Safeguard we would be forced to augment our offensive forces. This year, with Safeguard, the Defense Report clearly states that the B-1 strategic bomber and the Underseas Long-range Missile System (ULMS) are the "most significant of our ongoing long-range developments." It never has been an either-or choice between offensive and defensive systems. From

the beginning it has been both. Congress only acts as a minor irritant to the timing of these programs. Questions of the critical force-mix are considered too sensitive for close examination. For example, a remarkable coalition is forming behind the ULMS concept. Liberals and conservatives both find the long-range, deep-diving submarine force appealing. Yet, there has been extraordinarily little public analysis of this system, even though it could cost more than the ABM and determine our deterrent strategy for the 1980s.

The Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Report is based upon a strategy called "realistic deterrence." In a defensively worded introduction, Defense Secretary Laird claimed that it was a new strategy rather than "a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging." It has three components: sufficient strength, partnership and negotiation. The key variable is "sufficiency" as defined by the President in the State of the World Address:

> Sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced.

The Secretary of Defense isolated four criteria of sufficiency before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: assured destruction, crisis stability, damage equivalence and defense against small or accidental launches. While these seemingly are more quantifiable, they include no mechanism for establishing arms levels. Indeed, damage equivalence is an open-ended invitation to continue the arms race.

Secretary Laird was perfectly correct in his anticipated criticism of "realistic deterrence." Sufficiency, partnership and negotiation comprise no new theoretical breakthrough. They appear to be exactly what he warns us against — new labeling for old material. Perhaps the truth-in-packaging laws should be extended to cover national security policy.

The Department of Defense obviously is concerned about the technological challenge of the Soviets. The Soviet research, development, test and engineering (RDT&E) budget is stated to be growing in the 10 to 13 per cent range each year while that of the United States holds

constant. These figures may be accurate and a cause for concern, but they are also puzzling. First, do they consider the technological base? Second, how are they computed? When intelligence analysts cannot agree on major observable Soviet programs, how can we confidently estimate Soviet R&D which occurs inside bureaucracies and laboratories?

One encouraging characteristic of the Defense Report is its free discussion of force levels and the one-and-a-half war philosophy, defined as the capacity to fight one major war and a holding war elsewhere. The Administration legitimately argues that forces-in-being never did match the old two-and-a-half war level — a major war on two fronts and a holding action elsewhere — and that we are now adjusting to a more rational policy. This introduces a note of realism, but it also confirms the suspicion that policies are always the servants of force levels, never the master.

The President's proposed budget produced ripples of approval in the aerospace community: It has been interpreted as a quiet go-ahead signal for almost every new system. Thus, there is a distinct feeling that the industry has bottomed-out. Even if Congress trims the budget, outlays probably will continue to increase as a result of previously appropriated funds. The aerospace companies have shown no interest in production for nonmilitary purposes; they would prefer to remain patient and specialized. Only successful SALT negotiations could disrupt this confidence in future weapon acquisition.

The Congressional reaction to the new budget has been surprisingly subdued considering that candidates for the 1972 Presidential election are already campaigning. Undoubtedly, controversies will surface as the House and Senate Armed Service Committees hold hearings and the military critics take aim on specific programs. House Armed Services Chairman F. Edward Hebert has made his position quite clear: We should approve everything the Pentagon requests.

The general feeling in Washington, as reflected in the press, is that military spending will fare better this year than last. That is,

Congress will not continue to pare away the budget. Analysts point to the defeat of all individual weapon amendments during the Ninety-first Congress as an indicator that this technique is not viable. They also suggest that the ABM vote of 1970 took the flame out of the budget-cutter's fire, leaving only some smoldering coals of discontent. There is room for optimism, however. Standing Committees, particularly the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, have taken over where individual Congressmen left off, and there is every indication that they are prepared to deal responsibly with the new budget.

Most likely there will be an attempt to put a ceiling on DOD expenditures similar to the Proxmire-Mathias amendment of last summer. This type of amendment has appeal to conservatives as being fiscally responsible in times of massive federal budget growth. Senators and Congressmen from defense-oriented states also are more likely to support a general ceiling than specific cutbacks which reverberate back home. In addition, it does not directly criticize the work of the Standing Committees. And, of course, there is considerable popular sentiment in both parties that a certain amount of military spending is wasted.

Regardless of Congressional action, some factors remain constant. Henry Kissinger once documented just how much the military budget process was determined by cyclical internal politics:

> Budgetary pressures compound the inherent conservatism of the military and end in subordinating doctrine to the battle for appropriations. . . . In order to create a favorable climate for their budgetary requests, the services tend to emphasize the most ominous aspects of the United States security problem. . . . A vicious circle is thereby set up: the more terrible we paint Soviet capabilities, the more we confirm our predilection for an all-out strategy.

Today, the strategic relationship has changed considerably, but the internal politics look all to familiar. One need only reread the systems in the table and recall how similar are the three Service budgets to agree with Mr. Kissinger about the dynamics of defense appropriations.

BALTIMORE SUN 5 May 1971 P5

# Budget's Foes In Congress Assail Bomber

By GENE OISHI

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, May 4—Congressional critics of defense spending began their annual assault on the military budget today with an attack on the Air Force's supersonic B-1 bomber, which they said is already obsolete though not yet fully developed.

A report on the bomber was released today by Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.) and Representative John F. Seiberling (D., Ohio) in behalf of Members of Congress For Peace Through Law, a 115-member bipartisan organization.

"To Enhance . . . Glamour"

Mr. McGovern said the new bomber would cost more than $47 billion—four times the Air Force's estimate—and that its only purpose is "to enhance the excitement for strategic bomber pilots and the glamour of the Air Force recruiting programs."

The Air Force estimates the cost of the project at $11.1 billion and says the new bomber is needed to replace the aging B-52 fleet, which will go out of service around 1980.

Congress appropriated $100 million for developing the plane in fiscal 1970 and an equal amount for the current fiscal year. For fiscal 1972 the Defense Department has asked for $370 million.

The McGovern-Seiberling report recommended that only $20 million be appropriated this year to finish up outstanding contracts and to redesign the aircraft.

## Not Supersonic

While not conceding that a new manned bomber was needed, Mr. McGovern and Mr. Seiberling said that, if one were developed, it need not be supersonic.

Mr. Seiberling called the B-1 "a weapon system in search of a mission," because, he asserted, even with its supersonic capability it could not penetrate the air defenses of a technologically advanced nation such as the Soviet Union.

A more useful strategic supplement to the U.S. missile force, they said, would be an aircraft armed with air-to-ground missiles crusing outside the range of an enemy's air defense system.

Such an aircraft, because it need not be supersonic, they said, could be developed a much lower cost.

## Air Force Insistence

The insistence of the Air Force that the B-1 be supersonic, they said, has added 10 per cent to its cost.

The McGovern-Seiberling report estimated the cost of the B-1 bomber itself at $20.2 billion. But it said that the new bomber inevitably would require a new

tanker to replace the KC-135 now used for in-flight refueling of the subsonic B-52. This would add another $20 billion to the project cost, the report said.

The Air Force has said that B-1 would be compatible with the KC-135 and only minor modifications would be required.

## General Quoted

But the McGovern-Seiberling report quoted Gen. Bruce K.

Holloway, commander of the Strategic Air Command, as writing in the Armed Forces Journal last June, "We need a new tanker no matter what kind of bombers we have."

Senator William E. Proxmire (D., Wis., chairman of the military spending committee of Members of Congress For Peace

> 'Through Law, said no decision has been made as to whether the group would engage in a floor fight specifically to block the B-1.'

A case will be made against several weapons systems, which the group feels are unnecessary or undesirable, leading to a fiscal effort to make an across-the-board cut in the proposed $76 billion defense budget. Mr. Proxmire said.

## Failed Last Year

A similar strategy failed last year, although the pressures generated by the group might have contributed to a more intense scrutiny of the defense budget by the armed services committees.

The panels made several cuts, including a curtailment of the

Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system and the elimination of a third nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Senator Proxmire's committee has scheduled a series of weekly press conferences through the next two months, each devoted to a different weapon or facet of the defense budget.

Next in line are the F-14 and F-15 fighters, the ABM, multi-warheaded missiles, troops in Europe, anti-submarine warfare, military manpower, tactical nuclear weapons, Pentagon public relations, underground nuclear testing, foreign weapon sales, conversion of defense industry to civilian purposes, general purpose force, and the strategic arms limitation talks.

WASHINGTON POST 12 MAY 1971 PAGE 8

# Pentagon Critics Seek $7 Billion Budget Cut

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Pentagon critics in Congress will try to cut the defense spending budget by "about $7 billion" this year, Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) said yesterday.

He is chairman of the defense panel of the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law—a bipartisan group conducting a systematic campaign to trim military spending.

Imposing a ceiling on Pentagon spending in Fiscal 1972 represents a change in tactics. Critics in past years concentrated on knocking specific weapons programs out of the Pentagon budget.

While declaring that there may again be some amendments of that kind this year, Proxmire told a news conference that the prime target of the group he leads is a Congressionally dictated budgetary ceiling.

He stopped short of predicting victory for the ceiling amendment. But he noted that a similar amendment came within 11 votes of passing the Senate last year. The outlook for such an amendment is generally considered dimmer in the more hawkish House.

If such a ceiling were imposed, the Pentagon could not absorb congressional cuts by turning to leftover funds and other accounts—a procedure Proxmire said he wants to stop.

What he considers to be the Pentagon's Fiscal 1972 spending figure, his aides said, is the $74,975,000,000 shown on page 86 of President Nixon's budget book. That total covers almost everything except military assistance to foreign nations.

Thus, the intent is to get spending for the fiscal year beginning this July 1 down to about $68 billion. Proxmire said that the ceiling would be proposed as an amendment to a Senate bill—perhaps the draft extension measure now being debated.

## Cancellation Sought

The forum for Proxmire's remarks was a press conference

calling for cancellation of the Navy's F-14 fighter on the grounds that the plane and its expensive Phoenix missile system could neither adequately protect the fleet nor combat Soviet aircraft in dog fights.

The Grumman Aerospace Corp. of Bethpage, L.I., is the manufacturer of the F-14. Its first test plane crashed. The F-14 is running at a cost of about $1 million more than the original estimate of $11.5 million for each aircraft, according to Pentagon sources.

Sen. Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) and Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.)—the latter from Grumman's home state—presented the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law report. The report made these assertions:

* The cost and delivery date of the F14A are uncertain and Congress therefore should refuse to appropriate the $806 million requested in the Pentagon's Fiscal 1972 budget for 48 planes.

* The six Phoenix missiles that each F-14 would carry for knocking down enemy aircraft would cost from $200,000 to $800,000 each. Yet the missiles would have to be dumped in situation in which the F-14 would need to maneuver in an aerial duel with another fighter. Laying out that much money for missiles to fight Soviet bombers that have not materialized amounts to a weapon which "offers minimal dependable security payoffs at extremely high cost... The sooner we abandon it (Phoenix) the better."

* The F-14 without the Phoenix air-to-air missile looms as a second-best air superiority fighter. Therefore, an advanced version of the F-4 Phantom promises to "be superior to the F-14B and C" models. Money from the F-14 cancellation should go instead into the F-4. The Air Force F-15 fighter project should be continued.

* A fighter beyond the F-15, which could handle the Soviet MiG-23 should be developed. The emphasis in this new plane should be on the single mission of air combat. Costs should be kept below that of the F-14 and F-15.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

1 May 1971 P3

# Proxmire Hits Jackson's Use Of Silo Data

WASHINGTON (UPI). — Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) accused the Pentagon on Friday of giving top secret information on new Russian missile facilities to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) to try to gain support for higher weapons spending.

Proxmire said the Defense Department told Jackson about the existence of 40 new missile silos in the Soviet Union to drum up support for a fatter military budget.

He said Jackson — President Nixon's first choice to be Defense Secretary — took the data and drew a "highly exaggerated and even semi-hysterical "conclusion that U. S. security was threatened.

## 'HOLES IN GROUND'

In a speech to the Massachusetts Teachers Association, speech in Boston a week ago in which the Westerner said the nuclear strategic balance "may be tilting toward Moscow."

Proxmire, a frequent critic of military spending, said the only evidence the Pentagon has is that "the Soviets have about 40 new holes in the ground."

No missiles have been deployed, he said, and even if they had been, "we have over 10 times the nuclear power (needed) to destroy the Soviet Union" if it launched an attack.

## 'COLD WAR LANGUAGE'

Proxmire charged the warnings by Jackson and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird had become an annual spring event coinciding with hearings in Congress on the military budget.

This year, Proxmire declared, the campaign is for the Safeguard antiballistic missile and an increase in the military budget.

Proxmire charged his fellow Senate Democrat and Laird used "the cold war language of the 1950s in the 'overkill era' of the 1970s. We have over 10 times the nuclear power (needed) to destroy the

Soviet Union. They have five times the nuclear power to destroy us.

"We can both blow each other and the world to smithereens."

## DISPUTES CONCLUSIONS

Even if missiles are placed in Russia's new silos, Proxmire said, the Jackson-Laird conclusions about them are exaggerated.

The Soviet Union's total megatonage is only one factor in the strategic balance, and "the number of re-entry vehicles, their reliability, their accuracy, and their technical sophistication are all equal or more important elements."

If anyone has nuclear superiority, it is the United States. Proxmire asserted.

NEW YORK TIMES 19 MAY 1971

The Mansfield Amendment:

No

By JOHN J. McCLOY

The sudden reappearance of the
Mansfield Resolution in its present
form constitutes one of the vagaries
of American politics which from time
to time confound our allies and shock
those responsible for the conduct of
foreign policy in this country.

It is difficult to think of any single
piece of legislation which embodies so
many potentially disastrous conse-
quences at this particular stage of
history as this amendment to the draft
act. Government officials, past and
present, who were engaged in the
formulation of our defense and foreign
policy after the close of World War
II when NATO was organized, the
Marshall Plan put into operation and
the Atlantic partnership formed, are
just about unanimous in their belief
that the passage of this amendment
at this time could seriously and ad-
versely affect the existing balance of
power, profoundly impair our relations
with our allies and diminish the secu-
rity of the country.

Let us examine the situation that
the United States is facing. We have
been witnessing a substantial increase
in the nuclear potential of the Soviet
Union which is, in certain of its forms,
riously disturbing. It is an increase
at coincides in time with a marked
expansion of Soviet naval strength, as
well as Soviet naval presence in the
wider seas, most noticeably in the
Mediterranean, which constitutes the
southern flank of NATO and Western
Europe. The amendment comes at a
time when, as a result of the Czech-
oslovak invasion, there are more
Soviet divisions deployed farther west
than at any time since the close of
World War II. It comes at a time when
doubts as to the credibility of the
American deterrent have been growing
in Europe not only because of the in-
creased Soviet nuclear and military
power but also by reason of the
apparent malaise of spirit and will
which the Vietnam war, the demon-
strations, the violence and the lack of
community and individual responsibil-
ity in this country seem to have in-
duced. It comes at a time when the
actual balance-of-payments costs of
maintaining our NATO troops are, I
believe, at their lowest stage in history.

One frequently hears the argument
that the threat of a Soviet land attack
which induced the original stationing
of our troops in Europe no longer
exists. This ignores both reality and
story. The fact is the troops were
used there for very much the same
reasons that their presence is now so
vital a factor in the balance of power.
If anything, the political need which
was the primary cause for placing the
troops in Europe is perhaps greater
now than it was then.

Those troops represented and still
represent the real earnest of our

Yes

By DAVID P. CALLEO

WASHINGTON—Senator Mansfield's
proposal has been treated as an aber-
ration by a normally balanced and
solid politician. But with hindsight,
it is Mr. Mansfield who is likely to ap-
pear the statesman and his opponents
irresponsible. For there is an excellent
case to be made for a substantial
reduction in American forces in Eu-
rope.

The United States is seriously over-
extended throughout the world. The
signs of domestic strain are rather
obvious, the pressures for a reduction

NATO commitment. They did restore
Western confidence; they did discour-
age probing adventures; they did
create a sense of security behind which
the forces of economic rehabilitation
could go to work and they did keep
the peace. Today the presence of those
troops actually constitutes deterrents
to hostile adventures against the Free
World.

The Mansfield move comes at a time
when we are in the midst of negotia-
tions to remove the dangerous lever-
ages the Soviets are so tempted to
apply from time to time on Berlin. If
the Soviets see this significant reduc-
tion in American forces, one can con-
fidently predict that their attitudes on
Berlin will stiffen.

There is another argument which
needs to be disposed of and it runs
somewhat along these lines:

Who can say we need 300-, 400- or
500-thousand men stationed in Eur-
rope? Would not 100,000 or 200,000,
or maybe even 50,000, serve the same
purpose? All we really need is a sym-
bol of our presence to create the
deterrent.

To those who say that the presence
of our troops in NATO simply extends
the aspects of the cold war, precisely
because it does confirm and solidify
the alliance, I would reply that per-
haps at another period in history the
Alliance in its present convincing
nature would be unnecessary and un-
productive, but it is vital now. While
it functions in full vigor, it contributes
to the damping down of the cold war.
For the present and the measurable
future, it is the best guarantee that I
can conceive of for the maintenance
of the peace and the integrity of our
free civilization.

A united Europe in solid partnership
with the United States is essential and
every effort to solidify that partnership
should be exerted and every effort to
dilute it should be resisted. The psy-
chological effect of the passage of the
Mansfield amendment, even if it only
passed the Senate, could be profound,
and this is a risk to which the security
of the nation and the continuity of
our foreign policy should not be sub-
jected.

John J. McCloy was U.S. High Com-
missioner for Germany 1949-52.

of military spending compelling. To
avoid a disastrous collapse of our
whole world position, our foreign pol-
icy must develop a sense of priority
and measure. We must stop trying to
do things for others that they can
much better do for themselves. We
should, therefore, devolve our swollen
responsibilities for security wherever
other countries are rich and stable
enough to assume them. There is no
serious reason why the major nations
of Western Europe cannot take over
from us the primary responsibility for
their own defense, especially conven-
tional defense. It would not be the end
of the alliance, but its rejuvenation.
Britain, France and Germany have
nearly 1,400,000 men under arms. If
they believe these forces inadequate,
they have ample resources to raise
more.

Under the circumstances, to argue
that we should wait for "balanced and
mutual force reductions" is to miss
the point entirely. What is needed is
an unbalanced and unilateral reduc-
tion of America's excessive share in
Western Europe's ground defense.
Above all, there is needed a funda-
mental reform of NATO's structure to
place the primary responsibility for
organizing European defense upon the
European states themselves.

It is quite understandable that many
European politicians prefer us to con-
tinue the heavy outlay for their de-
fense. But even if they were willing
to pay much more of the real cost,
why should we? Why should American
youth be turned into condottieri for a
prosperous Western Europe?

Ironically, the heaviest cost falls
upon Europe's future. It is in Europe's
best interest, and our own, that the
European states build among them-
selves a solid military coalition before
negotiations for a definitive European
settlement. By doggedly insisting that
the Europeans should rely primarily
on us, instead of each other, we are
subsidizing European disunity and ad-
venturism. Indeed, our dollar deficit,
caused in considerable degree by
NATO's costs over the years, now
threatens the whole structure of that
economic community which is Europe's
best hope for the future.

This week will doubtless see a fine
and heartening display of old faces
and old slogans. Old comrades will
refight the battles of yesteryear.
Threats will be contained, cowardly
isolationists squelched, and our world
responsibilities manfully shouldered.
But when all the flags are put away,
it should be painfully obvious that
nostalgia for great accomplishments in
the past is a poor substitute for a for-
eign policy. Senator Mansfield, at
least, has acted with imagination,
courage and common sense. It is a pity
these qualities have become so rare
elsewhere in the American Govern-
ment.

David P. Calleo is professor of Euro-
pean Studies at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International
Studies.

WASHINGTON POST

20 May 1971 P1

# 61-36 Vote Key Victory For Nixon

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's challenge to the Nixon administration on U.S. troop levels in Europe was defeated by a 25-vote margin in the Senate yesterday.

On a roll call vote of 61 to 36, the Senate beat back the Montana Democrat's proposal to require the President to slash the 300,000-man U.S. contingent in Europe to 150,000 by Dec. 31.

The outcome was an important administration victory. Its spokesmen had argued that making such a cut by legislative fiat, instead of through negotiation with America's allies, would undermine confidence in U.S. intentions to defend Europe. They also contended that a unilateral U.S. cut would remove any Soviet incentive to negotiate a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe.

On the final vote, all but five Republicans rallied behind the administration. Many Democrats split with Mansfield because of the mandatory nature of the cutback.

Although the Mansfield amendment lost, the number of votes it received constituted what many called a "strong signal" to the administration of sentiment in favor of forcing the European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defense.

Mansfield argued that with the cold war waning, with the Soviet Union needing to strengthen its rear against China and desirous of reducing its own costly military burdens, it is time for the financially hard-pressed United

States to shift a much larger share of the NATO burden to Europe.

Mansfield said after the vote that he had been trying for years to help bring about a reduction in U.S. NATO forces, but until he forced the issue in the Senate there had been "no hint of an understanding

from downtown on overseas."

Now, as a result of his offering an amendment for a mandatory troop cut, "this matter has come to the attention of the administration, it has come to the attention of our NATO allies, it has come to the attention of the people... sometimes it takes a sledgehammer to make an impression."

Most Senate observers believe that the decisive factor in the defeat of the Mansfield proposal was last week's call by Soviet Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev for negotiations for a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. This undercut Mansfield by allowing the administration to argue that passage of the mandatory troop slash would leave the administration little to bargain with at the negotiating table.

When Mansfield first introduced his proposal in a form which, if passed, would have had the force of law, it appeared to have a chance of passage. There was widespread feeling in the Senate that Europe should contribute more toward its own defense, especially when the dollar was under attack in European currency markets. But the Brezhnev proposal, made three days later and heavily emphasized by the administration in its lobbying against the Mansfield proposal, apparently sealed the issue.

Although Mansfield lost yesterday, he has said he will offer his amendment again if troop reduction talks produce no changes. Mansfield has told reporters that by forcing the issue to the Senate floor, he has already achieved one major goal: To make clear both to the administration and to the allies that there is serious pressure in the United States for a cut.

Before turning back Mansfield's proposal, which was offered as an amendment to the pending two-year draft-extension bill, the Senate rejected a series of softer, administration-opposed compromise amendments.

* By a roll call of 63 to 26, the Senate defeated a modified version of the Mansfield amendment, proposed by Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) which Mansfield said would be acceptable to him. Instead of a cut to 150,000 by Dec. 31 of this year, the Nelson com-

promise called for a cut to 250,000 by June 30, 1972, to 200,000 a year later, and 150,000 by June 30, 1974. It further provided that should the Warsaw Pact nations and NATO start negotiations for a mutual arms reduction before Dec. 31, 1971, the first of the scheduled reductions would be held in abeyance, leaving two years to negotiate before any cuts had to be made.

Some senators voted against this proposal because they wanted a clear test vote on the original Mansfield language. Others called it an absurdity. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) said, "We would be putting it into the hands of the Soviets to force us to withdraw 50,000 troops a year by their simply refusing to start negotiations. . . . I don't think we could give them a better advantage."

* By an 81-to-13 vote, the Senate defeated an amendment sponsored by Sens. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), William Saxbe (R-Ohio) and Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.) cutting U.S. forces in Europe back to 150,000 by the end of 1972 unless the allies agreed to pay $325 million more a year of U.S. costs for NATO.

* By a 73-to-24 roll call, the Senate defeated a proposal by Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) requesting the President to start negotiations with the Warsaw Pact for mutual arms reductions and with the allies for a reduction of the U.S. share of the NATO burden.

* By an 81 to 15 vote, the Senate turned down a compromise proposal by Frank Church (D-Idaho) to limit the mandatory reduction to 500,000 men instead of three times mandatory reduction to 50,000 U.S. troops in Europe. Mansfield backers who felt 50,000 reduction was too small united with administration supporters to kill the Church compromise.

As a matter of fact, the U. S. is
widening the missile gap

By HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr.

As the first salvo in the campaign to obtain larger appropriations this year for strategic weapons systems, Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) announced March 7 that the Soviets were deploying a new generation of offensive missiles which could be as large or larger than their SS-9's. He submitted that this could be the missile for MIRV's (multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicles) which the Russians were developing as a first strike weapon against the U.S. Minuteman. This initial announcement was quickly followed by a statement from Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Soviets had begun a new ICBM silo construction program. However, the admiral considerably softened Senator Jackson's warning by adding "... we do not know what these silos are intended for."

The admiral's statement and other releases have made it clear that the Soviets have not developed or tested a new missile for those launchers. Indeed, Senator Jackson later admitted that there is no direct evidence that the Soviets have flight-tested a new missile, and that it would probably be 18 months before such missiles' were emplaced. Nevertheless, reference to new Soviet construction was made frequently in the course of the recent hearings before the Armed Services Committee, and on April 21 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told the American Newspaper Publishers Association that "this new ICBM construction effort, coupled with additional momentum in the strategic defensive area ... must be of major concern."

Finally on April 27 'the secretary announced that the Sov.ets had recommended ABM deployment with advanced hardware, after" a lull of more than three years.

Parallel to this scare campaign about large Soviet missiles, there have been renewed attempts to raise fears about another missile gap. Ger. (Bruce K.) Holway, commander of Strategic Air Command, has been reported as deploring the growing Soviet strategic superiority. The Defense Department on March 11 released a report written six months earlier by a rump group of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, whose charter was to study DOD organization, not policy.

This document grossly exaggerated Soviet capabilities, downgraded U.S. deterrent strength, called for increased military expenditures to prevent the U.S. from becoming a second-class power, and summoned us to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability.

In view of the competing needs for funds and resources to cope with our internal problems, it is important to analyze calmly the validity of all these claims and avoid being panicked into unnecessary spending on new and more dangerous weapons. The renewed deployment of additional Soviet ICBM launchers, particularly for new large missiles is, of course, a step in the wrong direc-

tion. At the same time, however, the Russian SS-11 small-missile program appears to have leveled off and the rate of new silo construction for even the large ICBM's (SS-9's or bigger) has actually decreased in recent years.

## 50 New Launchers

Previous to 1969, the Soviets were said to have been building 50 to 60 SS-9 silos per year. But as of August, 1969, no new construction was observed until May, 1970, when about 20 new starts were reported. This past winter, the Defense Department announced that construction on some of these new silos may have been suspended and that the program had leveled off below 300.

The new large-silo construction is currently reported to be limited to several tens of launchers. Thus, it would appear that at the most, during the past 21 months, the Soviets have initiated construction on about 50 new large launchers, a considerable reduction from previous years and far below the level predicted by Secretary Laird in 1969 in his original justification for the Safeguard ABM program.

At this rate of construction it would not be until 1975/76 that the U.S.S.R. would have the 420 operational missiles which Secretary Laird postulated would be required, with three MIRV's on each, to threaten our Minuteman force. While the program could accelerate faster than the rate of the last two years, it would be almost impossible for the 420 to be achieved before 1974, the date originally predicted....

The U.S. strategic weapons program has been pursued during the past few years at an augmented pace and, if anything, a "missile gap" is rapidly developing in our favor. Secretary Laird himself points out in this year's posture statement that between December 30, 1970, and mid-1971, our offensive strategic nuclear weapons will increase from 4,000 to 4,600, while the Soviets' during the same period will only increase from 1,800 to 2,000, an addition of 600 for the U.S. as compared to 200 for the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, this rapid U.S. acceleration is only the beginning of a vast program; during the next five years U.S. missile warheads will increase to more than 7,000 as we place MIRV's on our Minuteman III ICBM's and Poseidon submarine missiles.

## Big Megatonnage Outdated

This buildup cannot be discounted by saying that the number of warheads is not as important as megatonnage. Each of these MIRV warheads has an explosive force at least several times that of the explosions which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the early Sixties, virtually all U.S. authorities reached the conclusion that our security would be enhanced by substituting multiple small bombs for a very high yield single weapon in our B-52 loads, 64 hardened Minuteman missiles in lieu of the largerTitans, and by MIRV's with lower yields in place of single bigger warheads. Senator Jackson, in hearings of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, confirmed that he had endorsed this concept. Megatonnage has long been outdated as a critical measure of relative strength.

How can one say that a missile gap in favor of the Soviet Union is developing when the U.S. is adding to its warheads at the rate of 1,200 per year, while the present rise in Soviet warhead strength is no more than 400 per year? While the Russian program certainly has strong momentum, so does ours. In time, of course, the Soviet MIRV program could approach and even surpass our present one, but the Russians are, at a minimum, several years behind us in this area.

## New Increases Unjustified

It is this long-range and as yet unrealized Soviet potential that poses the true risk to our security and demonstrates the recklessness and tragedy of our failure to negotiate seriously a limitation on MIRV's at the SALT talks. President Nixon's refusal to negotiate an "ABM only" limitation as a first stage of an arms limitation agreement may now have reaped its harvest with the resumption of Russian ABM deployment, making agreement in this area and perhaps others more difficult than before. Arms limitation is still much the best but most neglected way of protecting U.S. security and avoiding the panicky over-response which seems always to be the trademark of an unrestricted arms race, and of the annual military budget debate.

In sum, U.S. strategic programs have long been under way to cope with threats far beyond those envisioned by any of these recent alarms about new Soviet weapons, and none of these alarms justifies new increases in U.S. strategic force levels.

NEW YORK TIMES

3 JUNE 71 Pg15

RISE IN F-14 COST
PUT AT $2-BILLION

By RICHARD WITKIN

The Defense Department yes-
terday put the cost increase
for the Navy's F-14 fighter-
plane program at about $2-bil-
lion.

If tentative plans to produce
more than 700 of the swing-
wing fighters are adhered to,
that will mean a $2.8-million
increase per plane, from $11.5-
million to $14.3-million.

Jerry W. Friedheim, a Pentagon public affairs officer, said the increase was a "major problem." Asked Tuesday if the whole F-14 program might be scrapped, as some Congressional critics have suggested, Mr. Friedheim said:

"I think that it is not an
active consideration at the mo-
ment."

The Grumman Aerospace
Corporation, the Bethpage, L.I.,
company that builds the plane,
declined to comment on the
Defense Department statements

Previous Pentagon and Grum-
man estimates of the expected
cost overrun have been about
$1-million a plane. And some
officials close to the project
indicated they though the
$2.8-million figure to be far out
of line.

Mr. Friedheim's acknowledg-
ment that costs might increase
$2-billion for the entire pro-
gram came just a day after
the disclosure that top Penta-
gon officials were considering
major changes in the contract
for F-14 production.

Chafee Reviews Ordered

Specifically, it was revealed
that David Packard, Deputy De-
fense Secretary, had directed
John H. Chafee, Secretary of
the Navy, to review the finan-
cial and technical problems en-
countered by Grumman. Mr.
Chafee was urged to recom-
ment within the next few
weeks what steps should be
taken.

The F-14 is a twin-tail twin-
jet craft designed as a succes-
sor both to the esteemed F-4
Phantom fighter and the can-
ceded F-111B fleet-defense plan

the first F-14 off the Grum-
man line crashed in December
on its second flight because of
failure in the hydraulic systems
that operate the plane's control
surfaces.

A sister plane got the flight
program back in the air May
24 and has successfully logged
over 12 hours on seven flights.

It became public knowledge
in March that the F-14 was
running into problems that have
bedeviled so many weapon sys-
tems—where the actual cost
exceeded the original estimate.
Grumman had privately warned
the Navy about these problems
in September, 1969, less than a
year after signing the first con-
tracts for the plane.

In a letter to the Navy dated
March 31, Grumman said it was
"commercially impracticable" to
produce planes under current
contract terms after the first
38 covered in previous Con-
gressional appropriations.

The company blamed "abnor-
mal inflation" and the decline
of its over-all business, which
meant that F-14 production
would have to bear a higher
proportion of total company
overhead than had been antici-
pated when the F114 contracts
were signed.

On May 11, a bipartisan
Congressional group seeking to
cut defense spending recom-
mended that F-14 production
be canceled because of low
effectiveness per unit cost, or
be suspended pending proof
that the plane was significantly
better than existing Navy
fighters. The group, calling it-
self the Members of Congress
for Peace Through Law, said
that it might be wise to replace
the F-14 at half the cost with
an improved version of the F-4
Phantom.

The Navy has drawn up a
detailed rebuttal vehemently op-
posing the idea. It argues that
both the current 1,400 mile-an-
hour version of the F-14 and
especially the later 1,650-mile-
an-hour version will be huge
improvements over the F-4, and
well worth the cost.

The Navy says the later ver-
sion will have 40 per cent bet-
ter acceleration, 100 per cent
better rate of climb, 40 per cent
tighter turns, twice the combat
radius, twice the radar range,
and the ability to fire missiles
from much greater distances.

The F-14 had been intended
for delivery to Navy carriers
beginning in 1973. But the delay
in the test program resulting
from the December crash is ex-
pected to push this delivery
date into 1974.

WASHINGTON POST 8 JUNE 1971 Pg 6

F-14 Defect Charges
Are Sifted in House

By Jim Adams

Associated Press

Charges that a hydraulic
line defect blamed for an F-14
jetfighter crash had been dis
covered before the ill-fated
flight are being investigated
by the House Armed Services
Committee.

Allegations—as yet un-
proved—that spurred the con-
gressional inquiry are in a let-
ter in a 2,300-page transcript
of the committee's closed
hearings on military weapons
and defense.

Former Navy employees
charged in the letter that the
F-14 Tomcat was released for
test flight over civilian engi-
neers' objections after the hy-
draulic defect was found—and
that safety tests including one
for the hydraulic system had
been waived to speed up the
F-14 program.

But the Navy captain who
released the plane for the test
flight denied the charges and
said the letter was filled with
"inaccuracies and half-truths."

"The failure of that line was
not brought to my attention
until after the crash." Capt.
Andrew Yates said in a tele-
phone interview.

Yates is the Navy represent-
ative at the Grumman Aero-
space Corp. plant at Bethpage,
N.Y., where the F-14 is being
manufactured.

Both pilots escaped when
the plane crashed last Dec. 30
on Long Island but the acci-
dent set back six months the
development program for the
F-14, successor to the scrapped
Navy F-111. The Navy says the

crash occurred after hydraulic
lines ruptured, knocking out
the plane's controls.

The letter charged that a
key line had failed during an
enging test and was repaired
as detective tubing. But
engineers found before
flight that the line, in fact,
had ruptured under fatigue
failure" from vibrations.

"Notwithstanding that fact,
the Navy representative re-
leased the aircraft for its sec-
ond flight, again over the
objections of its civilian engi-
neers," the letter said. "It was
on the flight that the aircraft
crashed due to failure of the
same tube that had previously
failed in the engine run-up."

Chairman F. Edward Hebert
(D-La.), who is heading the
committee investigation, em-
phasized that the charges are
unproved.

WALL STREET JOURNAL 10 JUNE 1971

# Lockheed Rescue Seems Headed for Trouble
In Congress; Packard's Backing Lukewarm

By FRED L. ZIMMERMAN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Nixon administration's proposal to guarantee loans to Lockheed Aircraft Corp. faces a close vote in the Senate Banking Committee, presaging serious trouble for the plan in Congress.

Interviews with committee members and staff aides suggest that at present on the 15-man committee there probably are five solid votes for the plan, five solid votes against it, and five undecided.

Yesterday, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard gave only lukewarm support to the proposal to guarantee up to $250 million of loans to Lockheed. Overall, his testimony probably did the proposal more harm than good, as it probably will provide the plan's opponents with material for use in the Senate floor debate.

Following Mr. Packard's testimony, an aide to one committee member who opposes the plan said he is "much more optimistic" than before that the proposal will be killed outright in the committee.

Before the panel began its hearings Monday, it had been generally assumed that the loan-guarantee bill would be cleared for Senate floor action by a lopsided margin. Since then, however, it has become evident that the plan has fewer friends on the committee than had been thought.

## Some Republicans May Defect

Some of the committee's seven Republican members may reject the party line and vote against the proposal. The most likely Republican dissenters, according to committee sources, are Sens. Robert Taft of Ohio, William Roth of Delaware, Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, and Robert Packwood of Oregon.

Sen. Roth said following yesterday's hearing that "to be perfectly honest, I'm a long way from making up my mind" about how to vote on the bill. Sens. Roth, Taft, and Packwood have expressed misgivings about the plan in their questioning of witnesses.

Sen. Roth, while declining to say what effect the Deputy Defense Secretary's testimony might have on the committee, agreed with the assessment of others that Mr. Packard's support had been unenthusiastic.

An aide to Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.), the plan's leading opponent, was blunter. "Packard's testimony could sink the whole thing," he said.

The aide said Mr. Packard's testimony contained two statements particularly damaging to the loan-guarantee proposal. One was the disclosure that the Defense Department estimates Lockheed will need to sell "substantially over 300 aircraft" to break even on its TriStar

airbus. Lockheed has told the committee that the break-even point will be reached with sales of between 195 and 205 aircraft. Lockheed currently has firm orders for 103 aircraft.

The British government, which has conditioned its continued support of the TriStar's RB211 engines on U.S. government guarantees for Lockheed loans, is scheduled to meet today to consider the implications of the situation in Congress.

## "Corporate Ballouts"

Under questioning by Sen. Proxmire, Mr. Packard also said that if he thought the loan-guarantee bill would be used as a precedent for "corporate ballouts" in the future, he would oppose it.

"If we look at this as a specific, single case," said the Pentagon official, "then there's some justification for it. But it is very important that we don't establish it as a long-term precedent."

Sen. Proxmire replied that "once you do something like this in Congress, no matter what you say or feel in your heart, it becomes a precedent."

At the start of yesterday's hearing, the Deputy Secretary told the committee in a prepared statement that without the loan guarantee he doesn't believe Lockheed can avoid bankruptcy. "Substantial unemployment would be the immediate result," he said, adding that the defense industry and the airlines would suffer financial losses. "The loan guarantee has very little risk for the government, in my view, and should be supported."

Mr. Packard emphasized, however, that he regarded the issue as an economic rather than defense matter. "Our defense programs would be less troublesome if the company survives," he said, "but it isn't an absolute disaster if it goes the other way."

Sen. Proxmire asked Mr. Packard if, in view of Lockheed's financial troubles, he had ever felt any "pressure from the White House or the Treasury" to award the company additional defense contracts.

Mr. Packard, who is the Pentagon's chief procurement officer, paused and then replied: "Not that I recall."

Sen. Proxmire asked if Mr. Packard was unable to state unequivocally that there hadn't been any such pressure. Mr. Packard replied: "I don't recall any case in which they have had any pressure on any specific Lockheed one."

Then Sen. Proxmire asked if anyone at the White House or Treasury had ever "contacted" Mr. Packard, asking "about the possibility" of favoring Lockheed.

Mr. Packard responded: "I think my friends at the White House have learned by now it doesn't do any good to ask me to do something in terms of awarding contracts. I will say that categorically and I will tell them."

Columnists Disputed

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 12 JUNE 1971 (17)

# Defense Budget CAN Be Safely Cut

By JOSEPH S. CLARK

Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote a column that appeared in Thursday's Inquirer in which they were critical of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy for its lobbying efforts in cutting U. S. Defense spending. Following is a reply by former Sen. Joseph S. Clark, chairman of the coalition:

In their recent column "The Anti-Defense Lobby." Rowland Evans and Robert Novak take the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy, of which I am chairman, to task for advocating a substantial cut in annual defense spending. They suggest that we are advocating such cuts in the defense budget "without regard to national security dangers."

Nothing could be farther from the truth. Aping Pentagon propaganda, their column raises false fears about our national security much as little children are frightened by the dark at the top of the stairs.

The coalition is neither pacifist nor an "anti-defense lobby." The more than 60 religious, farm, environmental, educational and labor organizations which are associated with coalition activities know very well that adequate national security must be maintained until such time as comprehensive arms control and disarmament agreements can be negotiated with the Russians but we believe that we should meet real and not imagined threats to our country.

Moreover, we are convinced that the continued neglect of our domestic needs is already posing a greater threat to our national unity and security than anything looming from either Russia or China.

The Pentagon's "worst case philosophy" is utterly unrealistic. While we should not underestimate either Soviet or Chinese intentions, neither should we exaggerate their capabilities. There is nothing to indicate a greater threat to the United States from abroad than existed last year or the year before. Quite

the contrary, there are clear evidences of an international thaw.

Since the President has failed to do the job, the Congress should reorder spending priorities to meet human needs. It cannot do so without attacking military spending on a realistic basis. The coalition is convinced that, at a minimum, $12 billion can be cut from the military budget advocated by Secretary Laird and the President without affecting our national security in the slightest.

Nor are we alone in this regard. The National Urban Coalition recently issued a carefully prepared blueprint for changing national priorities entitled "counter-budget." It advocates a cut of $16 billion in the 1972 fiscal year budget and total cuts of some $50 billion over the next five years.

Among those who presumably would come within Messrs. Evans' and Novak's description of "the anti-defense lobby" and who signed the counterbudget report are former Ambassador Sol Linowitz, chairman; Mrs. Bruce Benson, president of the League of Women Voters; His Eminence John Cardinal Dearden, archbishop of Detroit; John W. Gardner, chairman of Common Cause; Dorothy I. Haight, president, National Council of Negro Women, Inc.; Andrew Heiskell, chairman of Time, Inc.; John V. Lindsay, mayor of New York; James M. Roche, chairman of General Motors Corporation; David Rockefeller, chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank, and Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers of America.

Clearly the judgment of these men and women must be assessed against that of Messrs. Evans and Novak and the military-industrial complex which they so gleefully support. One is reminded of a similar column they published on January 6, entitled "Defense Spending Uncuttable." We wonder who told them that. It just isn't so.

Nor is it true, as the columnists suggest, that specific facts respecting the Defense budget "are beyond the interest of the coalition." We have pinpointed exactly where specific reductions could be made but we are prepared to permit

the President as Commander-in-Chief and the Defense establishment to select where, within the over-all cut, specific savings should be made. Far from being a blunderbuss budget cut, we have advocated in testimony before both the House and the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees the following specific savings:

Eliminate the ABM, cease the deployment of MIRV, eliminate the B-1 bomber, eliminate the F-14 fleet defense aircraft, reform Pentagon procurement and development policies to eliminate the cost overruns which seem to be the rule and not the exception, get rid of at least one of the three offensive nuclear deterrents (land-based missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-based missiles), stop piling up overkill on top of overkill and get rid of obsolete expenditures such as those for air defense against strategic bombers.

"Superimposed on this, we advocate a cut of over-all military strength from the present level of around 2.6 million to a figure, at the end of the year, of no more than 2 million."

It is hard to take seriously the contention of the columnists that the conversion from arms spending for waste to wealth-creating spending to meet critical national priorities will cause in the end significant unemployment.

Messrs. Evans' and Novak's concept that Defense spending makes for prosperity reminds one of the lemmings who rush to their own destruction in the sea. There is no health in spending for waste when we have the ability to spend for wealth.

Unless the Pentagon and the President are intent on involving us in more Vietnam, this would save us a minimum of $6 billion without in any way affecting our ability to defend legitimate foreign policy objectives of the United States.

The coalition is mobilizing citizen efforts to cut the military budget, to move forward with arms control and disarmament and reorder our national priorities. Of course we are lobbying for these ends. We are proud, not ashamed of that fact. And as we move into the halls of Congress we are met every day by an able, sophisticated, knowledgeable lobby by civilians and officers in uniform stemming from the Pentagon but paid at taxpayers' expense who seem toestermerize such otherwise and knowledgeable reporters as my friends Rowly Evans and Bob Novak.

BALTIMORE SUN 16 June 1971 P1

Hebert Panel Moves To Cut Off F14 Funds

By ADAM CLYMER

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 15—The House Armed Services Committee moved today to eliminate the trouble-ridden F14 fighter plane from the Navy's arsenal.

Representative F. Edward Hebert (D., La.), the committee's chairman, told the House that he would move tomorrow to delete the $806 million provided for the new fighter from the $21.8 billion military procurement bill.

Statement By Grumman.

Later, the Grumman Aircraft Corporation said that it would consider "very appropriate" a congressional cut-off of further production funds for the F14 Fording the solution of cost problems.

The company did not say why it would take this view. Some congressmen said the action would lead to a renegotiation of contracts to cut Grumman's losses.

Mr. Hebert, saying the committee supported him unani- mously in setting both technical difficulties and cost increase

problems" as reasons for re-
versing the stand the House took
last month when it voted to in-
clude the amount requested by
the administration for the new
carrier-based fighter, which is
intended to replace the F4 Pnan-
tom.

Rise In Cost

The chairman said that since
the Defense Department itself
was restudying the F14 pro-
gram, after a crash last Decem-
ber of the first model of the new
plane. A second plane has been
flown successfully by Grum-
man, but the firm has advised
the Navy that the total cost per
plane may now go as much as $1
million above the current $11.5
million figure.

He said he had asked the De-
fense Department for the study
before the House votes on the
bill, but was told that it would
not be ready. If it comes later,
and persuades the Senate, he
will be ready to reconsider the
issue when the bill goes to con-
ference, he said.

Mr. Hebert's disclosure, hint-
ed at last week, was the only
major development in today's
debate, which was punctuated

by quorum calls as Republicans
sought to put off a vote on an
amendment to set a Vietnam
withdrawal date, which is sched-
uled for tomorrow.

Their strategy was to see that
the amendment, which calls for
withdrawal from Vietnam by
December 31, did not come to a
vote until after a similar meas-
ure is voted on—and presuma-
bly defeated—in the Senate.

Representative Gerald R. Ford (R., Mich.), the minority leader, told a meeting of House Republicans today that President Nixon would regard a vote for the amendment as a vote of "no confidence" in him. He indicated that the White House also opposed two milder Republican substitutes, conceived by their sponsors as pro-administration moves but apparently rejected by the administration anyway.

One of the sponsors of the De-
cember 31 deadline, Representa-
tive Lucien N. Nedzi (D.,
Mich.), predicted that the move
would get the support of 150 of
the 434 House members. He pre-
dicted that it would let unex-
pected support from conserva-
tive Southern Democrats.

3

NEW YORK TIMES

17 JUNE 71 Pg6

HOUSE VOTES HALT
IN FUNDING OF F-14

Awaits Study by Pentagon
of Plane's Excess Cost

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 16—The House voted today to halt funding of the Navy's F-14 swing-wing jet fighter, pending completion of a Pentagon study of the plane's excess cost.

The $801.1-million earmarked earlier for the F-14 was stricken from a $21-billion military procurement bill upon the recommendation of Representative F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

The House action was termed "very appropriate" by spokesmen for the Grumman Aircraft Corporation, manufacturer of the F-14.

Noting that the excess cost
problem was being studied by
Defense Department officials;
spokesmen for Grumman said,
"We have confidence in the
wisdom of their reviews."

The House endorsed the Hé-
bert recommendation to halt
the F-14 funding by voice vote
after only token debate.

'In a Dilemma'

Representative Robert L. Leggett, Democrat of California, said he was "a little in a dilemma" as to why Grumman would applaud the cutoff of funds. He said he hoped it did not mean that Congress and the Pentagon were prepared to absorb the excess cost by allowing Grumman to renegotiate a new contract.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 21 JUNE 1971 (25)

# THE REAL PROBLEM-HOW TO CUT DEFENSE BILLIONS

## Inflation vs. Military Security

Pentagon's budget is in for rough going this year—if critics have their way. Question is: How much “give” is left in the nation's defenses?

A showdown of far-reaching importance is building up in Washington over U. S. defense spending.

At stake is a whole series of broad, basic issues:

What kind of defense will the United States have when the Vietnam war ends? Is it safe to shift billions of dollars from military to domestic programs? Can the U. S. withdraw many of its forces that now stand guard in Europe and Asia? Is an all-volunteer force in the cards?

All of these decisions must be faced by a Congress that includes many members determined to make major cuts in the Nixon Administration's proposed defense budget of 76 billion dollars for the fiscal year starting July 1.

With hearings by four committees expected to wind up in mid-June, the debate will switch to the floors of the House and Senate—on the way to crucial votes in both bodies.

There is no question about the determination of many in Congress to cut the Pentagon's budget, described by the Administration as "bare bones." Powerful voices have varied that trims of 10 billion dollars or more will be sought. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, the first a nominee candidate for the Democratic 72 presidential nomination, reflected that sentiment when he declared that military outlays "could probably be cut in half, including the money that we would save by ending the war in Vietnam."

Anti-Nixon forces say the incentive to slash future arms spending has rarely been greater. Peace groups want to force an end to an unpopular shooting war. Others are seeking a "peace dividend," by which more billions might be shifted to popular domestic programs—antipollution, antipoverty, anticrime, welfare, housing, transportation and the like. At the same time, some Congressmen say they sense a widespread emotional urge to prune military spending, as a result of growing animosity feeling and even of neoisolationism in parts of the country. The big challenge, as these Congressmen see it now, is where to make deepest cuts without gutting the nation's basic defenses.

At first glance the Administration's budget made big reductions look easy to its critics. The Pentagon proposes to increase military spending in the coming year, at a time when manpower under arms is to be cut back, the Vietnam war wound down further and the number of air, sea and land combat units diminished.

A closer look at Defense Secretary Melvin B. Laird's plan for the fiscal year starting July 1 shows his.

Dollar spending, in direct military and civilian force.

billions this year to 76 billions next.

However, the military's share of spending, compared to the over-all U. S. budget, would decline considerably—to its lowest level since 1950. According to the Pentagon, Defense would take 32.1 per cent of the federal budget, compared with 33.9 per cent in fiscal 1971 and 38.4 per cent in 1970. As a proportion of U. S. gross national product, defense would cost 6.8 per cent, down from 7.4 per cent in 1971. Manpower reductions, under the Laird budget, would bring the number of men in uniform from 2.7 million now to 2.5 million a year from now.

In 1968, it was more than 3.5 million.

Combat units would be pared further back in the process, with fewer Army divisions, tactical air wings and naval warships than in the pre-Vietnam U. S. forces. The cut in divisions is from 192½ at the war's peak to 13½ a year from now. Total warships would be reduced from 934 in 1968 to 658 in mid-1972.

With U. S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam continuing at the present rate, the direct cost of the Vietnam war would go down by another 4 billions under the proposed budget.

This is part of the so-called "peace dividend."

Vietnam "savings," however, are more than offset by the cost of new military and civilian pay rises and the effects of inflation—which will exceed the war savings by an estimated 1.5 billion dollars.

On top of that, the basic cost of the new weapons that Mr. Laird deems necessary is rising steadily, and this budget is likely to be followed by one that reaches 80 billion dollars in 1973, in the Defense Secretary's view.

**The key roadblock.** As critics dissect the current budget proposals in defense hearings now going on, their search for fruitful areas to cut runs repeatedly into this roadblock:

Military payrolls, the biggest single item in the budget, are rising at the same time that military manpower is being reduced.

Personnel costs, for example, included a basic payroll of 13.1 billion dollars in 1968, when there were 3.5 million men in uniform.

In 1972, with manpower to be cut to 2.5 million men, the military payroll would not be down, but up-to 16 billions.

During this period, total pay and related costs of maintaining manpower are scheduled to rise by 21 per cent. They increase as a proportion of the total defense budget from 42 to 52 per cent. The reason: Five pay raises have been granted during this four-year period, effective at intervals from July 1, 1968, to Jan. 1, 1972, for both military men and civilian defense employees.

These pay increases, since mid-1968, amount to about 50 per cent in military basic pay, and about 36 per cent in civilian salaries.

Payroll costs are certain to rise even more if Congress goes along with plans for shifting to a 36 per cent defense force. The

WASHINGTON STAR 24 JUNE 1971 (25) PAGE 2

# Effort to Cut Defense Budget
By 9% Is Planned in Senate

The next Senate challenge to
President Nixon's military poli-
cies was signaled today as the
fight over a draft-extension bill
wound down.

Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., the perennial critic of defense spending, held a news conference with Republican Sen. Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland to announce an attempt to cut the defense budget by 9 percent for fiscal year 1972.

Proxmire and Mathias will in-
trude their amendment early
next week when the Senate con-
siders a continuing resolution to
provide money for the Defense
Department after June 30, when
the fiscal year 1971 spending au-
thorization expires.

Celing of $68 Billion

Since the defense budget will
be considered in different seg-
ments over the next few months
in the Senate, the Pentagon
would be authorized to continue
spending at fiscal 1971 levels
while the new budget is pending.

But if Proxmire and Mathias
are successful, that temporary
authorization will place a ceiling
of $68 billion on Pentagon spend-
ing for fiscal 1972.

The administration has esti-
mated a 1972 defense budget of
$75 billion, not including $1.7
billion added by Congress for a
military pay raise.

"Moderate Cut"

"Our figure of $68 billion is a
modest and moderate cut which
can be absorbed on a timely
basis without, in any way, harm-
ing our military security," Prox-
mire said.

Last year a similar amend-
ment lost by 11 votes. But Prox-
mire said the mobilized lobbying
efforts to various labor, reli-
gious and peace groups give him
hope the ceiling can gain ap-
proval this year.

Mathias said that the United
States spent twice as much as
the Soviet Union on defense in
the 1960s, yet now Pentagon ex-
perts report that this country is
falling behind Soviet military
capabilities.

Mathias said money should not
be wasted on obsolete hardware
and such open-ended commit-
ments as the Vietnam war.

BALTIMORE SUN

25 JUNE 71 p8

Axes Sharpened
In Senate For
Defense Budget

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 24 — Two
critics of defense spending. Sen-
ators Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.
(R., Md.) and William E. Prox-
mire (D., Wis.) set the stage to-
day for a vote next week on
their proposal to cut the defense
budget by $8.7 billion.

Their proposal would set a
ceiling of $68 billion on defense
expenditures for fiscal 1972, be-
ginning July 1, compared to the
administration budget figure of
$76.7 billion.

Senator Proxmire said the
Pentagon ought to be able to
absorb the cut easily because
the winding down of the Viet-
nam war and reductions in mili-
tary manpower have produced
savings of $20 billion to $22 bil-
lion.

The Proxmire-Mathias pro-
posal will be offered as an
amendment to a resolution to
authorize the Defense Depart-
ment to continue spending at
current levels while Congress
completes work on the fiscal
1972 budget. The resolution is
scheduled to reach the Senate
floor early next week.

Last year, a similar Proxmire-
Mathias amendment to the mili-
tary authorization bill was de-
posed by a 42-to-31 vote.

WASHINGTON POST 24 JUNE 1971 PAGE 1

# Pentagon Urges F-14 Funding

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard set the stage yesterday for a showdown between the Navy, Congress and Grumman Aerospace Corp. over the fate of the Navy's F-14 fighter plane project, which has been afflicted with huge cost overruns.

After an intensive and often heated Pentagon review of the plane and its problems, Packard has asked Congress to go along with the project under the original contract with Grumman as "the best of the available alternatives."

Packard said he was "not completely satisfied with this approach," but argued that the Navy had "been unable to negotiate" with Grumman an acceptable alternative to the existing contract under which Grumman is committed to produce several hundred of the swing-wing fighter-bombers at an already agreed-upon price.

In a letter to Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Packard asked Congress to go along with the Navy's request for $806 million in this year's budget to continue buying the planes under the original contract.

In effect, Packard was telling Congress that the Pentagon was going to try to hold Grumman to its original agreement as the least costly way to cope with the plane's mounting financial troubles and the best way "to protect the government's interest."

Grumman, however declared in a letter to the Navy last March 31 that continued production of the plane under the existing contract "is commercially impractical."

The Asthpage, N.Y., contractor has claimed it will face "an economically unsound posture" if it must continue producing the F-14 under the original terms because other business has turned out; to be far less than anticipated in 1969, when the original contract was signed.

Grumman officials had no comment yesterday when asked about the Packard letter.

Last week, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. F. Edward Gilbert (D.-N.Y.), also threatened

to strike the entire $806 million from this year's budget—which includes payment for 48 more planes—unless the Navy explains how it intends to solve the plane's cost problems.

The Navy originally wanted to buy 722 F-14s to help protect its aircraft carriers and escort attack planes to their targets. The original cost estimate was $11.5 million per plane. Now, however, the cost per plane has shot up to almost $15 million, according to Defense officials. The total cost for 700-plus planes and their equipment is also up from about $8.3 billion, to almost $11 billion.

Because of the rising costs, the currently planned purchase of the planes has been dropped to 313 aircraft, with only about 38 planes already paid for.

Should the Navy buy only 313, the total project cost would probably drop, but the cost per plane would probably rise even higher, say project source.

Packard also figured in another controversial military aircraft issue: Federal Congress yesterday.

The Pentagon's top man

sent another report to Congress that urged the legislators to back Pentagon plans to develop three separate aircraft for close air support of ground troops.

Packard sent a six-page report to Capitol Hill which he said was the initial phase of a study he had personally led after being asked for such a review by Congress.

Because of the review, Packard asked Congress to approve continued purchases of the British-built Harrier jet for the Marines, and continued development of the Cheyenne helicopter gunship for the Army and a new AX attack plane for the Air Force.

Collectively, the three projects should eventually involve production of more than 1,000 planes at a cost of more than $4 billion.

The Pentagon review, however, claims that all three planes "offer sufficiently different capabilities for our future forces to justify continuing all three programs at the present time."

In the past, several powerful committee chairmen in Congress have expressed the view that perhaps one or two of the plants could fulfill the role for all the services.

WASHINGTON POST 27 JUNE 1971 (28) PAGE 2

Defense Cut Seen Costing Jobs

By Edward K. Delong

United Press International

Defense Secretary Melvin R.

Laird said yesterday a proposed $7-billion cut in military spending over the next 12 months would force him to slash defense personnel levels almost in half, eliminating up to 1.5 million military and civilian jobs.

Laird's comments in an interview marked the opening round in the Nixon administration's fight to block a proposal to limit the fiscal 1972 defense budget to $68 billion. Sens. William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) and Charles McC. Mathias (R-Md.) said they would attempt to impose the limit early next week in Congress.

In the wide ranging interview, Laird also:

* Expressed hope for an agreement with the Soviet Union on both strategic arms limitations and mutual balanced ground troop reductions in Europe, followed by mutual naval force reductions and possibly by limitations of foreign military aid, "during the next few years."

* Clearly indicated that although he will step down as Defense Secretary at the end of President Nixon's first term, he would be willing to accept another cabinet post if Nixon is re-elected in 1972.

* Said a senate amendment to the draft extension bill, calling for U.S. troops to be out of Vietnam within nine months if all American prisoners of war are released, differs by only "a few months" from President Nixon's withdrawal timetable.

But he said the senate proposal "closes down the negotiation track in Paris." He said at present he still has hopes the Paris peace talks will provide the quickest possible end to the war.

* Reported a decline during the past six months in Vietnam and North Vietnamese terror attacks in South Vietnam. He said the South Vietnamese "are doing a reasonable job at this time" in keeping the countryside secure and he assessed Vietnamization progress as good.

Laird said although the Proxmire-Mathias amendment would decrease the administration's $75-billion defense budget by only $7 billion—to $68 billion—its real effect would be a $9-billion reduction because congress already had added a mandatory military pay raise almost $2 billion greater than the budget allowed for.

If Congress approves the measure, Laird said, "we would have to cancel, in the contract area, around 40 per cent of our existing contracts and we would not be able to place any new contracts."

"We would have to fire and let go about a million employees—more like 1.5 million."

Laird said this would present a reduction of almost 50 per cent in the manpower level of 2.5 million military personnel and 1.1 million civilian employees now planned for the end of fiscal 1972. He said it would save the Pentagon an estimated $3.5 billion.

Turning to world military matters, Laird said "our planning for Vietnam is well in hand and I have turned my attention to planning beyond Vietnam."

"Our hope (for the future) lies in entering into agreement with the Soviet Union during the next few years in the area of strategic arms limitations and in the area of mutual balance force reductions," he said.

"I believe the first area of reduction in strategic forces will be offensive weapons and planned defensive weapons. In mutual balanced force reductions, the greatest probability in the next year or so appears to lie in ground forces, and then perhaps in naval forces forward-based aircraft and missiles."

These are all areas in which Soviet leaders have indicated a willingness to negotiate. But Laird carried the possibilities a step further.

"As you go down the line," he said, "I think there is a possibility for agreement in levels of military assistance."

Although Laird did not spell it out, this indicated his hope that the world's two superpowers might in years to come be able to halt the spiraling race to build up the armed forces of their allies, such as Israel and Egypt or North and South Vietnam.

But Laird said for the present the United States must maintain its military might as part of base from which it can negotiate. He increasingly cited specifically the aging U.S. Navy as opposed to the increasingly modern Russian navy.

"I have no question in my mind that we are in a superior position at this time (on the high seas), but we are dangerously close to slipping away from that position," he said.

"The concern that I have is that we must go forward—until we get these agreements (on arms and troops limitations) — with our modernization program."

SAN DIEGO UNION 25 JULY 1971 (3 AUGUST)

# Weapons Price Overrides
Cost Taxpayers $11 Billion

By FRANK MACOMBER

Military-Aerospace Writer

Copley News Service

Weapons price- overrides and down-
right white elephants which don't per-
form as advertised have cost U.S. tax-
payers more than $11 billion over the
last 17 years.

For this money the nation's defenses
received either a curtailed number of
weapons to offset cost overrides or no
weapons at all when the system failed
to fulfill its intended mission.

The $11 billion-plus figure, computed
by the General Accounting Office, con-
gressional watchdog on government
spending, is higher if you add dollars
spent on some weapons projects
launched and then abandoned after sec-
ond-thought Pentagon decisions.

The Navy's new troubles with its
Grumman-built F-14 swing-wing super-
sonic carrier-based fighter — moth-
balled at least temporarily by Congress
until cost- overrides can be explained —
brings to mind the painfully long pa-
rade of cast-off weapons and the price
tags attached to them.

Some of these by comparison ease
the Navy's anguish over the F-14, side-
tracked now because the cost of 710
planes suddenly has jumped $2 billion
above the originally estimated price of
$8.3 billion.

The white elephant syndrome can be
laid at no door markd "Democrat" or
"Republican." The Pentagon's func-
tions changes little whether its boss in

the White House is of one political par-
ty or another. This is borne out by a
Defense Department list of major proj-
ects cut back or abandoned since
1954.

Some but not all of the Pentagon's
biggest dollar hangups came during the
regime of Defense Secretary Robert S.
McNamara. He canceled the Skybolt
long-range air-to-ground missile proj-
ect after $440 million had been spent on
the system.

McNamara abandoned the use of
railway cars to give the Minuteman in-
tercontinental ballistic missile a mobile
and evasive system, after $400 million
had been spent in planning and prelimi-
nary work.

At least $1.468 billion was spent to
build two RS-70 supersonic bombers be-
fore one crashed in a mid-air collision
and the project was crossed off by
McNamara.

The Pentagon list itemizes 66 weap-
ons projects on which more than $9 bil-
lion was spent before they were aban-
doned either as unnecessary, unwork-
able or useless. It is incomplete, how-
ever, and did not include all the Dyna-
Soar funds. On the list are 19 aircraft
programs and 28 missile development
systems.

Not on the list is the $600 million the
Navy reluctantly spent on the F-111B
carrier fighter before it was deemed
too heavy and was replaced by the now
controversial F-14.

Missile systems, often named after
mythical gods, birds and even Greek
philosophers, have suffered high cas-

uality rates in the past.

For example, among 10 Air Force
missile projects canceled were: Na-
vaho, which cost $670 million; Snark,
$677.4 million; Rascal, $484 million, and
the land-based Talos, $118 million, in
addition to the mobile Minuteman.

A dozen scrubbed Navy missile pro-
jects, ranging in cost from $12.5 to $225
million, included Sparrows I and II:
Regulus II: Petrel, Corvus, Eagle, Me-
teor, Rigel, Dove, Triton, Oriole and
Typhon.

The Army, which has to battle con-
stantly with the Air Force and Navy to
get missiles it can call its own, lost six
projects after nearly $400 million was
spent to develop them.

The Pentagon list also carried Army
tanks, trucks and an atomic mortar
project and several electronic warfare
systems canceled for one reason or an-
other.

Not on the Pentagon list was the Air
Force's Advent satellite project on
which about $300 million was spent be-
fore it was transferred to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
and a public corporation.

Dr. John S. Foster Jr., for many
years now the Pentagon's chief adviser
on weapons development and a re-
nowned physicist, has tried to explain
the white elephant parade in testimony
before impatient congressional com-
mittees.

One of the heaviest pressures for new
weapons, he says, is the constant fear
of the Soviet Union and international
communism.

Then there are industry's salesmen
and lobbyists, often retired military
officers, and scientists who bring their
ideas to the Pentagon.

And, ironically, even some of the suc-
cessful weapons which survive the long
ordeal of testing are tagged with an
"obsolescent" label before they can be
fixed in place. Then the endless devel-
opment process starts over again.

15 July 1970 Pl (16)

CHICAGO DAILY

27 lawmakers seek defense budget cut

by William McGaffin
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — A bipartisan group of 27 senators and representatives Wednesday challenged Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird's contention that the $71.8 billion the administration has earmarked for defense is a "rock-bottom budget."

They declared that about $5 billion in weapons spending could be cut out "without any corresponding weakening of national security." Another $5 billion could be saved, they said, if military manpower was cut at home and some troops were brought back from Europe and Korea.

In a prelude to the Senate's military spending debate, expected to begin next week, they released a voluminous study put together by their combined staffs. This set out how the critics would pare all three of the major military services.

AMONG THE major targets of their attack are the Army's Safeguard antiballistic-missile system, the Air Force's new manned bomber and the Navy's new nuclear carrier.

They noted that the Senate Armed Services Committee already has cut the ABM program by eliminating that part designed to protect the United States against a Communist Chinese attack.

But they asserted that the ABM was "not technically suited" even to perform the role the committee delegated to it, protection of the Minuteman missile bases in the United States. They suggested that $404 million could be saved if the system was limited to the two sites approved by Congress last year.

If money for the Safeguard program, including research and development, were placed in escrow — not to be spent until it is possible to see what success is achieved at the U. S. -Soviet arms limitation talks in Vienna — a little more than $1 billion could be saved, it was estimated.

THE CRITICS' objection to the B-1, the proposed manned bomber, stems from their feeling that the United States already has so much "destructive deterrent power" in its land-and-sea-based missiles that the bomber may not be

needed.

They recommended that the $100 million requested for research and development on the bomber be denied until there is a clearer idea of the bomber's future role. Noting that the B-1 program would cost an estimated $9.4 billion, they said that a less costly one could probably be developed.

THE AIRCRAFT carrier the Navy wants to build — it would be the fourth nuclear-powered carrier in the fleet — drew their veto on the ground that carriers are becoming too costly, considering their vulnerability to Soviet cruise missile boats and attack submarines.

They recommended that construction on the carrier be halted and that $152 million requested for procurement be deleted. If it is built, it will cost $640 million, they estimated.

They also urged that the number of carriers on active duty be reduced from 15 to 10 or 12 "as soon as practical."

THEY PROPOSED that land-based planes take over the carriers' antisubmarine mission. If this were done, the Navy could phase out its remaining four antisubmarine warfare carriers, they suggested. It could, in addition, dispense with the $207.8 million for research and development, and $101.7 million for procurement of a new antisubmarine plane scheduled to be carried by the carriers, they said.

They said that the aircraft carriers on which the new plane, the S-3A, would be based "are highly vulnerable

to hostile submarine action which could put them and their S-3A's seriously out of commission."

MONEY-SAVING suggestions were made on other big items in the defense budget, including the controversial C-5A cargo plane being built by Lockheed, the F-14 and F-15 and F-111A planes, the main battle tank, the mobile Minuteman, the advanced intercontinental ballistic missile, the program of "superhardening" for Minuteman missiles, the Mark 48 Anti-submarine torpedo, the nuclear missile frigate and the attack submarine.

ON MANPOWER, their principal recommendations were that 20,000 of the 55,000 GIs in Korea and 100,000 of the 315,000 in Europe should be brought home, while the overall strength of U.S. armed forces should be cut to about 2.3 million. At present, it is about 3.1 million, down 400,000 from its peak.

Among the legislators making the recommendations were Senators Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) and Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) and Representatives Abner J. Mikva (D-Ill.) and Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.).

2

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 19 July 1970 P6(20)

# Senate Liberals Will Try Again to Spike Safeguard

By SAUL FRIEDMAN

Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, July 18. —

For the third consecutive year. Senate liberals next week are scheduled to launch an attempt to stop deployment of the Safeguard anti-Ballistic Missile System.

Ironically the anti-ABM forces have been weakened by partial success.

Consequently, in order to keep their supporters in line, the opponents are considering an unusual proposal to put nearly $1 billion of ABM money in escrow to await the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Russians.

## ENDED IN TIE

Last year, after a six-week battle, ABM foes came within a single vote of shooting down the project. The vote was 50-50.

This year it seemed they might succeed.

The Administration asked for a "phase two" expansion to protect more Minute Man missile bases, and also to begin construction on sites to protect population centers against a possible attack from Red China.

Two senators who staunchly supported ABM are out of action because of illness. Several who last year voted for the ABM indicated they might supply the votes to defeat it now because they were opposed to a big expansion of a system before it has proved itself.

## ALSO UNIMPRESSED

Some senators have noted that just six months ago the Pentagon minimized the threat from Red China.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, concerned that ABM would be beaten if the Defense Department insisted on too much, also was unimpressed with the Red Chinese threat. Therefore, the committee cut back on the Pentagon request for phase two of the ABM.

The cut wasn't much, but it succeeded in eroding the strength of the ABM opponents, led by Sens. John Sherman Cooper R., Ky.) and Philip A. Hart (D., Mich.).

The Pentagon had asked for $1.359 billion, of which about $1 billion was to be spent on the phase one sites approved last year in North Dakota and Montana.

The rest of the money was to be spent on new phase two sites in Wyoming and Missouri, and to begin construction of future ABM installations at four "area defense" locations around the country.

The Pentagon has estimated deployment of the entire ABM system will cost $6 billion. But opponents say the total will be closer to $20 million.

The Armed Services Committee cut from the Pentagon request by only $10 million, but it was money designated for the anti-Chinese "area defense" sites.

Opponents of ABM claim the cut is not enough because the expansion to Wyoming and Missouri gets the Pentagon's foot in the door for construcing an "area defense."

Such a "thick" ABM system could begin a new arms race spiral, they say. Besides, they argue, ABM won't work anyhow.

Cooper and Hart want to introduce once again their amendment, which lost by a tie last year, to cut off all funds for deployment but allow $365 million for continued research and development.

Hart acknowledges that such an amendment now has less chance this year than last because of the Armed Services Committee action, and because the Senate is in no mood for a drawn out debate which would go over old ground.

So Cooper and Hart and other anti-ABM senators are considering less severe measures to curtail the ABM program.

3

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS
20 July 1970 P1 (21)

Major
U.S. arms
costs soar

By William McGaffin
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) disclosed Monday that the cost of 38 major weapon systems has gone up by $3.6 billion to $23.8 billion in nine months.

"The major cost increase occurred on four programs," Proxmire said. "Safeguard antiballistic missile went up by $1.7 billion, the P-3-C aircraft $291.1 million, Minuteman II $464.4 million, and Minuteman 111 $1.1 billion.

"In only one of these four systems, Minuteman III, was the cost overrun attributable to any extent to an increase in the number of units purchased. Even in the case of that program, a major portion of the added costs was caused by reasons unrelated to the change of the number of units."

PROXMIRE'S figures came from a report, covering the period between June 30, 1969, and March 31, 1970, which he requested the comptroller general to make for his subcommittee of economy in government.

"What these disturbing figures indicate to me is that the Defense Department has not yet learned how to control the costs of major weapons programs," Proxmire asserted. "In my judgment, the cost overruns in these programs are largely the result of waste and mismanagement. They represent public funds that are being used foolishly and that probably ought not to be spent by the Defense Department at all."

The senator made his disclosure on the eve of a debate over military spending expected to get under way in the Senate Tuesday. He is one of a

group of Pentagon critics who will attempt to cut the $19.2 billion military procurement authorization bill reported out by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

THE OVERRUN figures for the 38 systems are calculated from the planning estimates for these programs, Proxmire explained. The first report on these systems made in June, 1969, at his request by the comptroller general showed overruns totaling $20.2 billion.

He further disclosed that it was only by cutting back on the number of weapons units it was buying that the Pentagon avoided an additional $2.7 billion jump in overruns on top of the $3.6 billion.

4

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 22 JULY 1970 P-12

Pentagon Hits Cost
Overrun Charges

BY FRED FARRAR

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, July 21—The Defense Department denied today that a $3.6 billion increase in cost overruns on 38 major weapon systems in nine months was the result of waste and mismanagement, as charged yesterday by Sen. William Proxmire [D., Wis.].

Instead, the Pentagon said, 86.8 per cent of the increase was the result of adding a third antiballistic missile site, improved reporting of costs, schedule changes, increased capability of the weapons systems and engineering or support modifications.

It said that 13.2 per cent of the increase was the result of inflation and the refinement of cost estimates.

Proxmire Cites Report

Proxmire, citing a General Accounting Office report, said the cost overruns on the 38 weapons systems had increased from $20.2 billion in the nine-month period ending June 30, 1969, to $23.8 billion for the period ending last March 31. He asserted that "in my judgment these cost overruns are largely the result of waste and mismanagement."

Proxmire said the major overruns occurred in four programs—the ABM system, the Minuteman 3 offensive missiles, the older Minuteman 2 and the P-3C antisubmarine control aircraft.

Doesn't Dispute Figures

The Defense Department did not dispute the figures—saying they were given to Congress and the General Accounting

Office as part of the department's latest quarterly report on cost overruns. Instead, the Pentagon gave the following breakdown for the increases:

On the ABM, the Pentagon said that a decision to add a third site and to change the number and types of missiles to be acquired accounted for $1.3 billion of the $1.75 billion increase. The rest, it said, resulted from schedule changes, support requirement changes, inflation and better cost estimating.

Of the $1.1 billion increase for the Minuteman 3, the department said $913 million resulted from increased research and production costs "because of decisions to significantly increase" the missile's capability.

It added that schedule changes contributed another $95 million to the overrun and that strikes accounted for an additional $70 million.

The department denied a charge by Proxmire that part of the increase was the result of a decision to buy additional missiles.

It said that of the $464 million increase for Minuteman 2, $356 million is accounted for by the inclusion of related construction costs in the latest report—costs which were not included in the earlier report.

On the P-3C, the department said that $274 million of the $291 million increase was the result of stretching out the production schedule. The program, it said, also suffered a five per cent inflation rate.

BALTIMORE SUN

22 JULY 1970 P-5

## Pentagon Seeks $44 Million To Study New Submarine

Washington, July 21 to.—The Pentagon is seeking $44-million in this year's budget for what is called "the blue water option," considered by its sponsors as the future keystone of the nation's defense.

The option is ULMS, a mammoth version of today's Polaris submarines and known officially as the Undersea Long Range Missile System. The new submarine still is in the conceptual stage and no specific data on its size have been released.

ULMS currently has at least the tentative support of the secretary of defense, Melvin R. Laird, for top priority when and if nuclear strategy goes beyond the current mix of land-based ICBM Minutemen, the B-52 bomber and the Polaris.

ULMS remains in the research-and-development stage, partly because Polaris still is a viable weapon system. And partly because a low profile is thought best by the administration while the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviets are on in Vienna.

With clearance, ULMS would blossom swiftly into a $10 billion to $20-billion program. These giant, improved ICBM-firing subs are thought to be little

more than a "plumbing" job on which little fresh scientific ground would need to be broken.

Inter-service rivalry would be part of the ULMS future since the Navy system enjoys Mr. Laird's favor over the Air Force B-1 bomber. A shift away from the entire land-based ICBM concept also may be involved.

ULMS capitalizes on Polaris, its Navy and congressional advocates say, in such a way as to make it practically invulnerable.

These big boats' missiles would have multi-warheads and be able to hit from 6,000 to 7,000 miles. Present Polaris subs being fitted with the multi-head Poseidon, are restricted to operation belt 800 miles off the Eurasian continent.

With ULMS' greater range the Soviet anti-submarine program would be thwarted, ULMS backers say. In addition, the ULMS subs could sortie and be serviced from United States ports, eliminating the chain of costly, vulnerable, overseas bases now needed for Polaris.

The key in the strategic argument is vulnerability.

Critics of the Pentagon in Congress, looking to save a dollar, say the present land-based Minutemen are vulnerable, as are the B-52s. Official admission of the need for the Safeguard ABM. judged wasteful and ineffective by the critics, is proof of vulnerability, they say.

The announced U.S. posture is retaliation to a first strike by the enemy. To do this there must be something left to strike with, hence the attention to ULMS.

ULMS' congressional advocates see it as the most creditable deterrent, good, safe and relatively cheap. They say it would wind down the arms race, take the war to sea and away from America.

"Because the sea-based force is virtually invulnerable and can be made increasingly so and because this force has an overwhelming overkill . . . we could clearly afford to rely eventually on a sea-based deterrent," says a research study by an ad hoc group of congressmen.

5

Major
U.S. arms
costs soar

6

BY FRED FARRAR

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

Proxmire Cites Report

Doesn't Dispute Figures

WASHINGTON POST 22 JULY 1970 P-1

Pentagon Mans Special Post
To Tell Senators About ABM

The Defense Department is manning a special command post in the lower reaches of the Pentagon — nicknamed Tranquility Base — to help senators during the coming debate on the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

The Pentagon insists the special office is only a center for distributing the facts to both sides, not a lobbying operation to get Safeguard passed again this year.

But a letter from the White House, declaring that the same office last year "in large measure insured success" in the Senate's voting on Safeguard, challenges that insistence of impartiality.

Kenneth E. BeLieu, President Nixon's special assistant who lobbies for White House legislation in the Senate wrote in last year's letter that "without the professional advice and support of the U.S. Army Safeguard task force, my task would have been most difficult."

BeLieu's letter went to Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor on Dec. 19, 1969 — after the Senate had approved the Safeguard ABM by one vote. Resor is also the Pentagon official who proposed to former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford on Sept. 30, 1963, that a massive public relations campaign be launched to sell the ABM.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, when asked about this year's special ABM office in the Pentagon, said: "I hope they're doing their job of supplying information." He said Safeguard information goes out in response to requests and does not constitute lobbying.

Laird indicated that he did not realize that C. Robert

Wieser, assistant director for defensive systems in the Pentagon's research office, ran a separate office in Room 1C-738 for Safeguard information. "Has he got an office separate from 'his regular office?'" Laird asked.

Room 1C-738 is 40 paces from the guarded door to an office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Its front room contains several ordinary desks manned by civilians and Army officers. A blackboard stands out from the apple green walls.

"The purpose" of this special office, Wieser said in an interview yesterday in his regular third-floor office at the Pentagon, "is to get accurate and timely information out for the people who have a need for it."

Col. Clark C. Martin from the Army's Safeguard Systems Office in Rosslyn heads the special office staff of seven, Wieser said. They are assisted by additional Safeguard specialists during busy periods.

Wieser and his deputy, Robert S. Sargent, said they answer questions referred to them by the Pentagon's legislative liaison office as well as letters sent over from the White House. The information goes to Safeguard friends and foes alike, they said.

Sens. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.), opponents of Safeguard, asked 90 questions about the system, which were answered by the Pentagon's special office, Wieser said.

Asked if the Pentagon office supplied information to friendly senators without being asked, Wieser said, "I would be surprised if it was volunteered. I know for sure it doesn't work that way this year."

A military source no longer connected with Safeguard gave quite a different picture of the operation. He said Secretary Resor takes an intense personal interest in the office —and was especially interested last year when the Senate vote was very much in question.

Resor donated his plush conference room near the Pentagon Mall entrance to Safeguard Forward—last year's name for the same operation—and reportedly saw to it personally that the special office answered attacks on Safeguard. Brig. Gen. George Mayo Jr., deputy director of the Army's Safeguard Systems Office, headed last year's effort.

Special groups to head off assaults on Pentagon projects are nothing new. Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara organized "red" and "blue" teams to refine arguments for the TFX airplane.

Sargent, who was associated with Safeguard Forward last year, and Wieser said yesterday they knew of no congratulatory letters on the work of the special Safeguard Information office. They said none of the special Safeguard office staff was serving at the White House now. BeLieu's congratulatory letter to Resor revealed that at least one colonel was detailed to the White House's special Safeguard team last year. Wrote BeLieu:

"I particularly appreciate the help provided by the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army, Mr. Charles Poor, and his Executive, Colonel L. G. Hergert; Mr. Roger Currier; General Starbird's special Safeguard Task Force; and Colonel R. J. Bennett of General Starbird's staff who served on temporary duty here at the White House with the Safeguard Support Group."

8

By GENE OISHI

[Washington Bureau of The Sun]

Washington, July 26—Senate liberals will begin what is expected to be another prolonged assault on defense spending this week, but if last year's experience is any guide the military budget will emerge virtually unscathed.

One significant exception might be the Safeguard anti-bal listic missile system. Liberal forces appear generally optimis- tic about being able to block the administration's effort to ex- pand the ABM system, which squeaked through last year by a one-vote margin.

At the very least, foes of Safeguard hope to limit deployment of the system to the two sites approved last year—Grand Forks, N.D., and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.—and to cut out funds for expanding the system to Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., and Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.

### Authority Needed

The administration, mean- while, is arguing that the au- thority to expand the missile de- fense system is needed to use as a bargaining counter in its talks with the Soviet Union on arms limitation, currently underway in Geneva.

At issue is the $19.2 billion military authorization bill, now on the floor of the Senate. The bill authorizes only part of the total $72 billion military budget for the year. The rest is covered by previous authorizations.

But the bill can be used as a vehicle for cutting back on military spending across the board, and a group of senators, headed by William Proxmire (D., Wis.) and Mark O. Hatfield (R., Ore.), are considering a sweeping amendment which would knock as much as $10 billion from the total military budget.

### Open to Doubt

Now successful the effort will be open to doubt. Last year, the same group of senators, after an eight-week fight, managed to cut the military budget by only $72 million. And that amount and more was restored in a House senate Conference Committee, dominated by strong supporters of the military.

Many of the items that sur- vived the assault of the group will come under attack again this year. In addition to the Safeguard system, they include a new manned strategic bomber (the B-1), certain tactical air- craft and the C-5A military transport plan.

Last year, the high point in the assault on the defense bud- get came when critics of the military came within one vote

of blocking the Safeguard sys- tem. After that, however, their forces were routed, losing one roll-call after another in their attempt to stop or curtail ma- jor weapons systems.

### Different Tactic

The group has chosen a dif- ferent tactic this year. Senator Hatfield acknowledged recently, "Frankly, we got a little tired of losing" last year.

Although the group is still feeling its way, the plan is not to press for roll-call on specific weapons but instead to conduct floor "discussions," all leading to a vote on a single amend- ment, calling for a ceiling on all defense spending.

There has as yet been no de- cision on where to place the ceiling, but Senator Proxmire appeared to indicate the maxi- mum figure by which the group would trim the military spend- ing. In a floor speech, that marked the opening shot, he asserted last week that the over- all $72 billion defense budget could be cut by $10 billion.

### Some Exceptions

While critics of the military plan to steer the debate toward one, dramatic, win-or-lose vote, there will be some exceptions.

The Safeguard system will be treated as a separate item, but so far there has been no deci- sion on how to proceed on the issue. The alternatives are:

1. Limit funds to research and development, testing and evalua- tion, which would amount to $365 million.

2. Authorize the full $1.3 bil- lion, but on the condition that the deployment funds be set aside and not used, pending the outcome of the arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union.

3. Authorize funds for research and development, testing and evaluation and deployment at only the two sites approved last year.

The principal sponsors of the anti-Safeguard amendments will be the same as last year: Sena- tors Philip A. Hart (D., Mich.) and John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.).

Senator Edward W. Brooke (R., Mass.) plans to introduce two amendments related to multi-warheaded missiles, com- monly called MIRVs (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles).

The first would require the defense department to begin de- veloping means to convert ex- isting multi-warhead missiles— the Minuteman III ICBM and the submarine-launched Poseldon— to single-warhead missile in preparation for a possible agree- ment with the Russians to limit

or halt the deployment of such missiles.

### "First Strike" Weapon

The second would prohibit the United States from developing multi-warhead missiles accurate enough to destroy underground or "hardened" missile sites in the Soviet Union.

Such a system would be re- garded as a "first-strike" weap- on, since, in theory at least, it would give the United States the capability of launching a surprise attack, which would knock out the Soviet Union's ability to retaliate.

It is feared that if either na- tion developed a "first-strike" capability, it would force the other to take counter-measures —increasing its missile sites or developing new weapons—and send the arms race into a never- ending upward spiral.

### Deploying New Weapon

The Safeguard system, in fact, is justified on the grounds that the Russians are deploying their new SS-9, a multi-warhead mis- sile, with at least the potential of being a first-strike weapon.

Also in the line-up is the Mc- Govern-Hatfield "end-the-war" amendment, which its support- ers will attempt to attach to the military authorization bill. This amendment is expected to be the last to be called up in the de- bate which could last until La- bor Day, or possibly beyond that date.

The McGovern-Hatfield amendment would cut off all funds for the war in Indochina after the end of this year, ex- cept for what is needed for "the safe and systematic withdraw- al" of all U.S. forces from the area and for defraying other expenses related to American dsengagement from Southeast Asia. It would also require that U.S. withdrawal be completed by June 30, 1971.

9

SUN, BALTIMORE, MONDAY MORNING, JULY 27,

P.5

Senate Bloc Will Try Again
To Trim Defense Spending

WASHINGTON STAR 27 July 1970 P6

# Senate Beginning Weeks of Debate On Military Budget

The first full week of extended Senate debate on military spending begins today amid controversy over whether new American initiatives in arms control talks may have been timed to influence the Senate's decision on antiballistic missiles.

In contrast to the speed with which military spending proposals have slipped through Congress in most recent years, this year's debate—like the one last year—is expected to last at least a month.

> "It should have a significant impact on the shape of the nation's military establishment during the decade of the 1970's. And it will be heavily influenced by a strong mood of economy in which even the normally hawkish Senate Armed Services Committee voted to cut the administration's "barebones" budget by $1.3 billion."

But it will also be influenced by a rapid expansion of Soviet missile and conventional forces, the Middle East crisis and the uncertainties of the strategic arms limitation talks.

## Just Talk

Senate observers think the first week of the debate will be "just talk," with no meaningful vote before the middle of the next week.

A flurry of nsws report over the weekend concerning the new American proposals for the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks in Vienna brought comments from some anti-ABM senators that the administration may have been seeking an advantage in the Senate debate on military spending. Many observers have said that ABM, which narrowly won last year in the Senate, may be in even more trouble this year.

Both Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., and Sen. George D. Aiken, R-Vt., said yesterday the administration may have let out word of the U.S. proposals to persuade the Senate that ABM is a key bargaining chip in the arms talks.

Outright called the whole thing "propaganda," and said it was intended to place the blame on the Senate if the arms talks fail. Aiken said he will judge ABM on its merits, not on its possible role as a bargaining chip.

ABM limitations are reported to be a key point in the U.S.

proposal to limit the two nations' nuclear and missile forces.

In opening the debate, Sen. John Stennis, D-Miss., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said he expects to take up the smaller individual items of the procurement and research bill first, then turn to the Safeguard missile defense system. Toward the end will come the "end-the-war" amendment proposed by Sens. Mark Hatfield, R-Ore., and George S. McGovern, D-S.D., which would cut off funds for the war in Southeast Asia after Dec. 31, 1970, except for money needed to finance American withdrawal.

## $20.6 Billion Sought

The debate will center around the administration's request for $20.6 billion for procurement and research—a little less than a third of the total defense budget request of $71.8 billion.

The House cut only $34 million from the administration request, although it did take away some money the administration wanted for some things and voted funds for other things that had not been requested—primarily for ship construction.

The Senate Armed Services Committee cut the request by $1.3 billion.

In a 150-page report issued recently the military spending committee of the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law said the budget should be cut even deeper—by a total of $4.4 billion to $5.4 billion. Hatfield is chairman of the committee.

## Foes Offer Study

The report, which is being reproduced in the Congressional Record, is the most detailed analysis critics of military spending have ever had available to them. Much of the work on the report was done by staff members of interested senators and representatives. Their work was coordinated by Ronald Lee Tammen, a 26-year-old former Central Intelligence Agency employee now working for MCPL.

Work of MCPL is financed by contributions (not tax-deductible) from a number of wealthy persons, according to Sandford A. Persons, a staff consultant to the group. He said $65,000 was raised at a dinner in

the Capitol in September at which 33 persons dined with about 40 members of Congress. Since then, additional pledges have been obtained at similar dinners in Baltimore and New York, he said.

The group suggested savings through cuts in Safeguard, multiple warheads, the B-1 bomber, F-14, F-15, F-111A and Harrier airplanes, a number of Navy programs and reductions in American troop strength overseas.

## Delays Asked

Some of the proposed reductions would result from delays of programs, however, and might not produce real savings in the long run.

The major action recommended by Stennis' Armed Services Committee would restrict the Safeguard system to the defense of the Minuteman missiles, and would bar use of funds for an area or anti-Chinese defense at this time.

While the amount of ABM money cut —only $10 million—is not significant in terms of the whole program, the committee's action could be important not only in terms of the configuration of the system but also in terms of its effect on the chances of passage of the Safeguard plan this year.

## Compromise Seen

In last year's debate, the funds for Safeguard were passed by only one vote in the Senate. The sentiment against it may be even stronger this year. But a more limited program than that proposed by the administration — such as the one backed by the Stennis panel — could be more palatable to several members of the Senate, and swing their votes over to the favorable side.

To some extent, the action of the committee in cutting as deeply as it did intot he administration request is probably preparation for an eventual bargaining session with the House.

The chairman of the conference between the two houses this year will be Rep. L. Fendel Rivers, D-S.C., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Rivers personally got $435 million for five naval vessels added to the administration proposal.

If the Senate does not approve a Safeguard program satisfactorily to the administration, Rivers is expected to use the leverage provided by his control over these extra Navy funds to change the Senate's attitude.

But some of Rivers' bargaining power may be eaten away if he has to "buy back" many items which are cut by the Senate that Rivers and his House

colleagues would like to see restored.

Thus, the decisions reached by the Senate alone in its month or more of debate thus may not be an accurate reflection of the final shape of the Safeguard system or of the military spending budget.

10

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH 30 JULY 1970 (5AUG)

# Nixon Pays Little Heed To Group Seeking To Cut Defense Budget

11

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.

A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

SAN CLEMENTE,
Calif., July 30

THE WHITE HOUSE is sounding the alarm on Congressional spending here this week but has not embraced a bipartisan group that is trying to reduce President Richard M. Nixon's military budget.

Members of Congress for Peace through Law released the 1970 edition of their military spending report in mid-July, pointing to specific ways in which 5 to 10 billion dollars could be cut from Mr. Nixon's defense requests for fiscal 1971—the period that began this month.

The cochairsmen of the group's Military Spending Committee, Senators Mark O. Hatfield (Rep.), Oregon, and William Proxmire (Dem.), Wisconsin, held a press conference in Washington on the report but it got little attention.

That was partly because the Senate

Armed Services Committee, of which the chairman is Senator John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi, came out at the same time with its recommendations on the 19.2-billion-dollar weapons procurement bill, now being debated in the Senate.

THE STENNIS PANEL cut more than 1.3 billions from the sum approved by the House, which had gone along as usual with all but a pittance of what the Administration wanted. This was a 6.7 per cent cut. Proxmire said it was significant, but not enough.

Although the Hatfield-Proxmire study did not receive extensive news coverage, it apparently drew blood at the Pentagon, where defense officials suggested that it contained classified information not supposed to be divulged to the public.

The national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Ray Gallagher of Redfield, S. D., charged that some members of Congress were "playing loose and fancy free" with secret information about weapons.

"Handing the Communists facts and figures about our military secrets on a

silver platter is an inexcusable act against our national interest," Gallagher said. He rejected the excuse that the information had been printed previously in newspapers and magazines.

HATFIELD REPLIED that he and his colleagues respected the rules on keeping mum about defense-related information, even though it appeared at times that the intent was to deny information to defense critics at home rather than to foreign countries.

"The report contains only information that can be found in newspapers, trade journals, congressional hearings and other publications and sources in the public domain," Hatfield said.

"If the Department of Defense is seriously charging that there is classified material in this report, and if it would designate privately or publicly exactly what material it is referring to — which it has not done to date — we will be glad to

provide public documentation."

DEFENSE budget-cutters in the congressional group, described as an independent, bipartisan association of 28 Senators and 70 House members took note of the fact that Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird had described the 1971 arms request as rock bottom.

Laird, who has said further paring would damage national security, took occasion here Monday to put in a plug for the full 1.4 billion dollars sought by Mr. Nixon for the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. This is a favorite target of proponents of reduced military outlays.

Although Laird championed the ABM at the Western White House, reporters were told repeatedly by George P. Shultz, director of the Office of Management and Budget, that Congress must curb its spending to help fight inflation. The White House expressed concern about a $500,000,000 addition to an education bill.

The chairman of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, which was organized four years ago, is Representative F. Bradford Morse (Rep.), Lowell, Mass.

ACTIVE in the Peace through Law group is Representative William S. Moorhead (Dem.), Pennsylvania, whose office developed a 14-page "overview" of strategic forces that is contained in the new report on military spending.

"This year's report goes beyond previous efforts in a significant way," Moorehead said. "In the past we have critically reviewed individual weapons systems, but without sufficient discussion of their role in our over-all objectives. This year we have added that necessary analysis."

Moorhead's analysis said the yearly cost of the strategic forces could be cut from the present 18 billion dollars to 14 billions. This would save 4 billions and produce, it was said, a "restrained, yet awesomely powerful, posture." The overview said the nation had 10 times as many deliverable warheads as needed to deter an attack.

The strategic section recommended deep cuts in the ABM program, cancellation of the plan to deploy multiple, independently targeted (MIRV) warheads on Minuteman missiles, postponement of the new manned strategic bomber, B-1, and so on.

"TOO OFTEN in the Congress we become overly fascinated with military hardware and we forget to deal with the real questions of what we are trying to accomplish ...," Moorhead said.

In addition to the section on strategic forces, there are critical analyses of tactical air and ground forces, naval forces and manpower. One chapter points to "severe economic distortions" caused by excessive defense spending.

The military spending report was put out by a bipartisan committee composed of 11 Senators, including Thomas F. Eagleton (Dem.), Missouri, and 16 members of the House. The committee had 20 Democrats and seven Republicans.

What they produced was a standard manual for members of Congress who want to give the defense budget searching, critical, cost-conscious scrutiny.

AVIATION WEEK 27 July 1970 (29)

# Defense Bill Keyed to ABM Fight

## Failure of Safeguard foes to cut program could spur blanket amendments to slice DOD authorization by flat figure up to 10%

By Donald C. Winston

Washington-Senate floor move to reduce Fiscal 1971 authorization for the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, if successful next month, will pave the way for introduction of additional amendments aimed at carving as much as $4 billion from this session's $18.9-billion defense procurement bill.

If the Safeguard amendments fail, a Senate defense economy bloc plans to switch tactics from emphasis on individual weapon systems to intense discussion of U.S. military commitments and strategic theory. This will be capped by blanket amendments to reduce the planned authorization by a flat amount, probably 10%.

Strategy on both sides of the crucial Fiscal 1971 struggle over defense began to emerge last week, with the opening of Senate debate. The authorization bill, whose Senate version includes $1.349 billion for Safeguard, passed the House earlier after perfunctory debate (AW&ST Apr. 20, p. 23).

House version of the bill approved the full Nixon Administration plan for Phase 2 of Safeguard, while the Senate Armed Services Committee reduced the requested figure by $10 million and restricted deployment to sites used for protection of Air Force Minuteman strategic missiles (AW&ST July 20, p. 16).

Opening of debate coincided with distribution to senators of a nearly-250-page report containing 27 separate studies on military weapon and manpower programs compiled by the Military Spending Committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. The bipartisan organization, founded last session and headed by Sens. William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) and Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.) currently has a membership of 11 senators and 16 representatives and maintains staff offices near the Capitol.

Basic assumption of the group was included in its "overview" of strategic forces which said, "... decision-making in the Defense Dept. is keyed to making the worst assumptions about enemy intent and capability—patterning our future forces on what the enemy might do, not what he is actually doing ... Their [Defense Dept. planners'] basic assumption—that the Soviets are seriously determined to excel all U.S. strategic deployments—seems unrealistic, however, since the Soviet economy, only half the size of ours, is already under severe strain."

Sen. John C. Stennis (D.-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and floor manager of the authorization bill, warned that "massive assaults on the defense budget just for the purpose of diverting dollars for other purposes can very well leave us in a very shaky position with respect to our ability to meet our many and heavy commitments around the world and face the growing Soviet threat."

He said the current spending level is needed to support treaties and other agreements by the U.S. to protect more than 40 other nations. "I would welcome an entire examination of our treaty commitments around the world" Sen. Stennis declared, "In the meantime, however. I think we are going to have to face the hard facts."

The Stennis committee earlier shaved

the House authorization bill by more than $1.3 billion. Many of the reductions, including that of Safeguard, were intended to obviate Senate debate (AW&ST July 13, p. 13).

This tactic is not expected to be successful.

Of the currently-planned major weapon systems, only the Navy undersea long-range missile system (ULMS) and the Air Force AX attack aircraft received strong endorsement by the Peace Through Law group. Applying a cost-effectiveness yardstick, the group's report declared that ULMS "nearly cubes the anti-submarine warfare problem for the Soviet Union."

Defense Dept. has requested $44 million for research and development on the program for Fiscal 1971. and plans to ask for major funding next year (AW&ST July 20, p. 14). The concept was lauded by the peace group because of its potential as a replacement for all land-based missiles and for the anti-ballistic missile system. It would also permit eventual withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. forces now stationed overseas, the group declared.

Administration request for $27.9 million for the AX was approved on grounds of its low cost and simple design.

At least five separate amendments to reduce Safeguard spending are expected from members of the peace committee, and the number is expected to escalate sharply during the debate. Range of alternatives suggested by the peace group include:

* Keep Safeguard at the research and development level, with no funding for deployment. This would result in a reduction of almost $1.1 billion from the Fiscal 1971 request, with an expenditure of $365 million.

* Restrict deployment to the two sites approved last year, stopping all Phase 2 deployment. This would provide a cut of $404 million.

* End the Safeguard program and divert the $365-million research funding request to an advanced anti-ballistic missile system.

* Create an "escrow" type of authorization in which release of funds would be dependent on results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

Adoption of Safeguard now would "hamper the development of an effective defense in the future by creating a heavy vested interest in an inflexible technology incapable of responding to new offensive developments," the peace group's report declared.

12

13

If amendments to halt or constrict Safeguard are successful, the group's strategy calls for introduction of further amendments aimed at other specific weapon systems. Failure of the Safeguard amendments, which will be introduced early in the debate, will greatly retard efforts to strike other systems.

The fact that this is an election year is the reason for the strategy. "Not many members want to be put in the position of voting for many losing amendments at a time like this," a staff member explained. "On the other hand, a vote for a blanket cut in the defense budget could be justified more easily, many members believe."

Specific weapon systems slated for floor attack, as selected and explained by the peace committee, include:

*   **Multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV),** recommended for a total freeze for a Fiscal 1971 funding reduction of $686 million. Weapon system is opposed because of "fixed-base vulnerability and the potential destabilizing effects." Although the group emphasized that its action is aimed at the Air Force program to put multiple warheads on Minuteman 3, the weapon concept in general was condemned because it is "one consequence of unrestrained technology." Funding for the related advanced ballistic re-entry systems program (ABRES) was also opposed. "We recommend that no funding be approved for improving the accuracy of the Minuteman 3 MIRV," the report said.

*   **North American B-1 advanced strategic bomber,** restricted to $80 million carried over from Fiscal 1970 for research and development only. Additional funding of $50 million, recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee, was opposed. Potential for cost growth, particularly in avionics, could raise the unit price of the B-1 to $60 million or more, the group declared. This would have the effect of weakening U.S. defense by diverting dollars from "projects of more discernible merit," the report declared.

*   **Lockheed C-5A heavy logistic transport,** to be suspended until Congress is satisfied it will meet original performance specifications and that Lockheed is not using the program to attract government funding for civilian aircraft production. Amendments will be offered to delete the $200-million contingency fund voted by the Armed Services Committee regardless of what group strategy is adopted.

*   **Advanced strategic missiles,** to be suspended "until it is determined whether or not land-based missiles will continue to play a role in our deterrent future."

*   **McDonnell Douglas F-15 tactical fighter,** to be cut to $185 million for research and development instead of the $370 million requested by the Nixon Administration and voted by the Armed Services Committee. F-15 costs should be reviewed, the group believes, because the $12-million unit price will mean only 320 aircraft would be available for a $5-billion expenditure. For the same amount of money, 910 McDonnell Douglas F-4s could be produced. Development of a lighter and cheaper F-15, without long-range missile capability, was recommended by the group. Such an aircraft would have a unit cost of approximately $5 million. The present design, the group said, "has undergone little scrutiny with regard to trading off extra nice-to-have capabilities for cost savings."

*   **Grumman F-14 Navy fighter,** to be restricted to $274 million for research and development only, with no action taken on a $658-million production funding request. An alternate amendment would permit the Navy to procure 15 F-14s during Fiscal 1971, in keeping with a minimum procurement agreement already signed with Grumman. A third amendment would halt the entire program pending development of a cheaper aircraft and review of the entire fleet defense mission.

*   **LTV Aerospace A-7E** to be deferred pending National Security Council review of attack carrier force levels, but Air Force A-7D to be procured at rates sufficient to maintain the production base.

*   **Hawker Siddeley AV-6B Harrier vertical takeoff and landing fighter,** to be deleted pending results of flight tests funded in Fiscal 1970. Marine Corps has requested $118.3 million for purchase of 18 additional aircraft for testing. Total of 12 was procured earlier on Fiscal 1970 funds. Amendment to require the aircraft to be assembled in Great Britain, at an alleged $24-million saving, also will be offered.

*   **Lockheed S-3A anti-submarine warfare aircraft,** to be canceled in connection with phasing out existing anti-submarine warfare carriers. Fiscal 1971 saving of $309.5 million would be involved. Rationale for the recommendation is that land-based aircraft, primarily the Lockheed P-3C, could fulfill almost the entire mission of the S-3A at a fraction of the cost of the latter.

*   **Aircraft carriers in the fleet** to be reduced from the present 15 to 10 or 11 and no funding should be available for the CVAN-70, for which $152 million has been requested.

Meanwhile, Sen. Stennis, introducing

the authorization bill, said that when factors of inflation and national economic growth are cranked into the Fiscal 1971 defense procurement budget, it can be shown that U.S. military purchases are down substantially from Fiscal 1964 levels.

He told the Senate that under such an analysis this year's planned procurements would be equivalent to a $15.4-billion outlay in Fiscal 1964. Actual Fiscal 1964 outlay was $18.9 billion, including items now included in defense procurement but carried under other budgets at that time.

"This is a reduction of almost 19% from Fiscal 1964, the last pre-war year," he said.

At the same time, the Soviets "are not neglecting their forces," Sen. Stennis declared. "The Soviet advances in strategic systems, new aircraft and the second greatest navy in the world are mute testimony to their continued emphasis on military superiority. Program by program, system by system, we have seen rapid progress by the Soviet Union and their momentum shows no sign of slackening," Sen. Stennis said.

AVIATION WEEK 3 AUGUST 1970 (6)

DOD Fund Debate Centers
On Foreign Policy Matters

By Donald C. Winston

Washington—Early stage of Senate debate over the Fiscal 1971 defense procure-
ment authorization bill has centered on basic assumptions underlying U.S. for-
eign policy rather than on the merits of specific weapon programs.

Critics of the $18.9-billion measure turned the debate toward foreign policy questions to provide background for their contention that as much as $4 billion could be cut from this year's authorization without degrading U.S. military strength (AW&ST July 27, p. 14).

Supporters of the bill last week were hoping to reach a vote in early August over the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system. Senate rejection of amendments to eliminate Safeguard or to reduce it sharply would indicate that the rest of the authorization would be likely to pass the Senate in approximately the form approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee in June (AW&ST June 22, p. 25).

Strategy employed by Sen. John C. Stennis (D.-Miss.). chairman of the com-
mittee and floor manager of the bill, calls for section-by-section presentation to the Senate by subcommittee chair-
men, with the presentations spaced sev-
eral days apart.

In an attempt to discourage floor op-
position to specific portions of the bill,
Sen. Stennis and his subcommittee
chairmen invited all members with tech-
nical questions to submit them to com-
mittee members or staff for detailed
explanation.

Despite this plea, the expected flood
of amendments to the bill began with
introduction of two sponsored by Sen.
Edward W. Brooke (R.-Mass.), himself
a committee member.

The first Brooke amendment would direct the Defense Dept. to initiate development of single re-entry vehicle systems for Boeing Minuteman 3 and Lockheed Poseidon missiles, both of which were designed primarily for multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).

Sen. Brooke said such a move would aid the current strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) by providing a de facto reduction in U.S. strategic forces. Development of the single-warhead systems would make it easier for the U.S. to abide by any weapons reduction formulas developed at SALT, he said.

The other Brooke amendment would prohibit development, testing or procurement of a hard-target MIRV system by limiting U.S. systems to yields and accuracies no greater than one-third the level considered necessary to enable a single warhead to neutralize a hardened missile silo.

This would demonstrate to the Sovi-
ets that the U.S. has no intention of
achieving a first strike capability. and
would increase the credibility of this
country's second-strike retaliatory force,
he declared.

Tendency toward broadening the de-
bate beyond specific questions of mili-
tary hardware was exemplified by Sen.
Stuart Symington (D.-Mo.), who told
the Senate it should not consider the
defense authorization bill without keep-
ing in mind that a substantial portion
of the expense stems from secret com-
mitments made by the Johnson and
Nixon administrations.

He said that Congress should take a
more active interest in monitoring U.S.
commitments abroad so it would not
find itself in the position of being ob-
ligated to "tailor the defense budget to
commitments about which it knows
nothing."

Sen. Symington cited secret commit-

ments to Laos, in which neither Presi-
dents Johnson nor Nixon acknowledged
that U.S. forces were active in and
over that country.

"To honor some of these executive agreements—and even treaties—in the manner considered appropriate in recent years would bankrupt the nation and in the end, therefore, do irreparable harm to our own national security," he said. Sen. Symington was referring to approximately 40 international commitments assumed by the U.S. since the end of World War 2, which, Sen. Stennis had declared earlier, were a prime reason for the current level of U.S. military spending.

Earlier, Sen. William Proxmire (D.-Wis.) led off opposition to the authorization by telling the Senate that "our strategic forces are more than sufficient" at this time. He said the current nuclear force of the U.S. is actually 10 times bigger than it would have to be to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. He used the level of unacceptability devised by former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara as equaling 30% of the estimated 1972 Soviet population and 75% of that country's industrial capacity.

The U.S. arsenal has reached the point of diminishing returns, Sen. Proxmire declared, contending that doubling the number of delivered warheads on Soviet territory from 400—the amount estimated as necessary to inflict unacceptable damage—to 800 would only increase population fatalities by 9% and industrial damage by 1%.

Sen. Proxmire repeated earlier asser-
tions that the Soviet Union cannot afford
to keep up with the U.S. in the arms
race, and is therefore in a far weaker
position militarily than Defense Dept.
officials will admit publicly. He said re-
cent hearings held by his Joint Econ-
omic Committee revealed the Russians
were putting a disproportionate amount
of their resources into programs for agri-
culture.

This means the Soviets cannot spend
large amounts of money on the military
for any extended period without reduc-
ing their economic strength, he declared.
"The Russians are not 10 ft. tall. If we
are 6 ft. tall, then, economically, the
Russians are 3 ft. tall and the Chinese
...are only 6 in. tall," he declared.

Sen. Proxmire said the U.S. could cut
$10 billion from the proposed $71.1-
billion Fiscal 1971 overall Defense bud-
get "and still meet every assumption on
which the secretary of defense says it
is based. A military budget in the $60-
billion range should certainly be ade-
quate for the U.S. to play its proper role
in the world."

Meanwhile, Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre
(D.-N.H.), chairman of an ad hoc sub-
committee on research and develop-
ment for the parent Armed Service-
Committee, detailed committee action
in approving a $7-billion research, de-
velopment, test and engineering budget
for the Defense Dept.

The amount recommended for Senate
approval was $385 million less than

14

the Nixon Administration request and
$249.1 million lower than the amount
approved earlier by the House (A&W&ST
Apr. 20, p. 23).

The cut amounted to 6.3% of the
$7.4 billion requested and was about
half the size of the cut recommended
by the subcommittee in last year's au-
thorization.

Sen. McIntyre said the cut was
smaller this year because the Defense
Dept. had already trimmed its research
budget sharply from last year's re-
quested $8.2 billion. The $800-million
Pentagon cut, he noted, was made
largely "in precisely those areas" which
his subcommittee had not examined
closely in more than 70 hr. of hearings.

Reason for this, Sen. McIntyre noted,
is that his subcommittee concentrated
on major programs. He described the
nature of Defense Dept. cutbacks as
"a natural phenomenon" in bureau-
cratic complexes where there is a desire
to protect the largest and most pres-
tigious programs.

In times of retrenchment, he noted,
"cuts are focused . . . in the manpower
area and in those basic research and
exploratory development areas which
have little institutional support behind
them."

The remaining large programs, he
said, are the ones which have tradi-
tionally received the most publicity for
cost overruns and technical failures.

"It is here that we have seen the
development of systems so complex and
sophisticated that they have never been
able to function adequately even in
the performance of their primary task,"
he said. "And it is here. it seems at
times, that we have seen the develop-
ment of systems, even without duplica-
tion, which add more to the prestige
of their service sponsors than to the
defense of our country."

Subcommittee reasoning was illus-
trated in these research reductions
which it recommended:

*Elimination of $15.7 million re-
quested by Air Force and Army for
Project Mallard, described by Sen.
McIntyre as "an ambitious international
communications program with long-
term implications in the billions of
dollars." He said such a development
is considered inappropriate in view of
the fact that a military-wide tactical
communications system has never been
developed for U.S. use and when the
Defense Dept. inventory "is replete
with communications equipment having
a lack of commonality."

* Reduction of $27 million out of the
$77 million requested by Air Force for
its Minuteman rebasing program. The
money would come out of the proposed
hard-rock silo program, which Sen.
McIntyre declared, would not only be
terribly expensive, but . . . would be-
come increasingly vulnerable to im-
provements in the accuracy of attacking
missiles."

* Reduction of $20 million in the
$158-million Army request for an ad-
vanced ballistic missile defense pro-
gram. This money would otherwise be
spent for advanced hardsite defense de-
velopment, a concept rejected by the
committee.

* Postponement of all engineering de-
velopment work on the Army's SAM-D
surface-to-air missile program until
Fiscal 1972, involving a reduction of
$15 million in the $89.3 million re-
quested. Army was requested to review
the system's capabilities in connection
with its planned coordination with the
Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-15
air-sup Superiority fighter, giving special
attention to the missile's horizontal and
vertical ranges. Object is elimination of
all non-essential capabilities from the
SAM-D missile, which would result in
lower overall program cost.

15

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

1 August 1970 P3

# ABM Foes Seek to Cut 2 Sites, Save $350 Million

BY PHILIP WARDEN
[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, July 31.—
Critics of the proposed anti-
ballistic missile defense system
decided today that a little pro-
tection might be good.

Senators John Sherman
Cooper [R., Ky.] and Philip
Hart [D., Mich.] disclosed at a
press conference that they now
prefer to have a nucleus of a
safeguard ABM system under
way if arms limitation talks
with Russia fail.

Cooper and Hart unveiled
what was purportedly a con-
sensus amendment of the ABM
critics they will introduce Mon-
day to the pending $19.2 billion
military procurement authori-
zation bill. The critics compose
up to one-half or more of the
Senate. Many have wanted to
ban the ABM entirely.

## Would Authorize 2 Sites

The Cooper-Hart amendment
would authorize continued in-
stallation of Safeguard sites at
Malstrom Air Force Base,
Mont., and at Grand Forks Air
Force Base, N. D. It would
deny proposed expenditures of
approximately $350 million for
advanced procurement for an
additional Safeguard site at
Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo.,
and advanced preparation for
another site at Warren Air
Force Base, Wyo.

"I think that this position,
reflecting adjustments of some
very strongly held beliefs, is
just about the bare bones
accommodation," Hart said.

Cooper told the newsmen that
since the Senate last year "gave
the go ahead" for erection of
Safeguard sites at Malstrom
and Grand Forks "that ground
should not be replowed." At the
same time, he said, further
development of Safeguard
"should not venture out into the
further reaches of Missouri and
Wyoming."

## Saving of $350 Million

Cooper said that the bill
would authorize the spending of
about a billion dollars on the
Safeguard sites, and that the
Cooper-Hart amendment would
save approximately $350 mil-
lion.

"I think the question may be
less 'How many dollars are
involved?' than obtaining re-
straint of the 'hell-for-leather'

let's get a full ABM screen
around this country'," Cooper
said.

"If you waste a billion dollars
and still achieve success at the
SALT [Strategic Arms Limita-
tion talks], it would still be
worth it," he said.

Hart said that even if the
SALT talks fail, going ahead
with the Safeguard system "to
me makes no sense." But he
said he had agreed to the
compromise amendment being
offered by the ABM critics.

"If the SALT talks fail, we
have taken a step to protect the
security of this country,"
Cooper said of the decision of
the critics to permit work at
Malstrom and Grand Forks to
continue.

## Expects Vote in Week

Sen. Mike Mansfield [D.,
Mont.], the majority leader,
told newsmen that he hoped
that a vote on Cooper-Hart
could be obtained before the
end of next week. Both Cooper
and Hart agreed that one week
of debate should be sufficient.

"Given the education that the
Senate has had on the ABM, all
of us have been exposed to, we
would anticipate nothing like

the time consumed last year
would be necessary," Hart
said.

"We believe we should reach
a vote in a week," Cooper said.

Sen. Hugh Scott [R., Pa.], the
minority leader, who opposes
the Cooper-Hart Amendment,
said that if the Senate would
move along and pass the
defense procurement bill, the
House could act on the defense
appropriations bill before its
mid-August recess. He said
such actions could eliminate
the necessity of a post-election
session of the Congress.

## Issue Now Familiar

Sen. John C. Stennis [D.,
Miss.], Armed Services Com-
mittee chairman, urged the
Senate to expedite its action on
the weapons procurement au-
thorization measure. He said it
was his opinion that "every
senator" was thoroughly familiar
with the ABM issue.

Sen. William Proxmire [D.,
Wis.] spoke at length on the
sensor surveillance system,
which has been called the
"automatic battlefield" since it
helps locate enemy troops and
equipment under jungle or
night conditions. He wanted to
know why, if it is supposed to
be so effective, the United
States has "had so little
success with it in Viet Nam?

16

17

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 4 AUGUST 1970 (5)

# Valuable, revealing look at Pentagon

By Carl T. Rowan

WASHINGTON — The public is truly indebted to the members of that blue-ribbon panel that has come up with a vast program for completely overhauling the Defense Department.

A lot of people were expecting a whitewash of the military because the panel seemed to be overloaded with conservatives, hawks and businessmen with some pretty lucrative ties to the military-industrial complex.

But with integrity and candor, these panelists apparently concluded that the only way to halt the erosion of public confidence in, and support for, the Pentagon was to tell the truth about what is wrong and lay out a plan to correct it.

Rowan

THIS PANEL confirms that the military bureaucracy is in such a mess that, as chairman Gilbert W. Fitzhugh put it, "We are amazed that it works at all."

The panel makes it clear that there have been massive expenditures for weapons that failed, or were produced too late, or cost almost incredible amounts more than was estimated.

So the report emphasizes the need to end a situation where one tiny band of

military men decides they need a new weapon, decides how to make it, tests it, says let's spend $2 billion more on it because it didn't test out at first, and, $10 billion later, says that it was a brilliant idea even though the public's money is spent, the weapon is virtually useless and the nation's security is weakened (because of economic troubles and public distrust of the military) rather than enhanced.

WITH BOTH guts and wisdom, this panel stated emphatically that it was recommending certain organizational changes "to increase the civilian control which the Constitution and the whole history of this country believe is essential to the sound workings of the military."

Although the report is terribly vague as to what the future holds, it is clear that the panel intend to clip a feather or two off the wings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And the panelists were most outspoken about the diffuse intelligence operations within the Pentagon. I have always believed that Lyndon B. Johnson had some deep gut doubts about the "intelligence" the joint chiefs brought him to support the charge that two U.S. destroyers had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964.

The blue-ribbon panel wants to collect all the defense intelligence operations and put them under the control of one man. If that is done, at least we'll know

whom to hold responsible for tomorrow's doubtful data that prompts a Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

The panel points out that the Defense Department is trying to force its contractors to renounce racial discrimination in hiring when the department itself sets the worst kind of example.

So the panel wants to see more minority group officers in the services and a real drive to give equal opportunity to minorities in the department that is the nation's biggest employer.

DON'T EXPECT all the panel's recommendations to be implemented. The bureaucracy and the military already have their forces out, fighting for as much of the status quo as they can preserve.

But this panel's report cannot be ignored in its entirety. Congress, the military and those segments of industry that rely on military spending for their continued existence all know that the public is fed up with talk of cost overruns and military waste. They know that the public wants some money devoted to problems of environment of the cities and to other domestic ills.

They all know that the easy way to get this money is to put defense expenditures in line.

Credit the Fitzhugh panel with showing the way for some long-overdue Pentagon reforms.

WASHINGTON STAR 5 August 1970 P3

# Senate Critics of Safeguard
See Immediate Obsolescence

Star Staff Writer

Senate foes of the Safeguard antiballistic missile program say newly released House testimony proves that it will be obsolete before the system is fully operable.

Pentagon officials are quoted as telling a House subcommittee in late April that they already have started work on a more accurate replacement for Safeguard.

## Inadequacy Charged

Those comments bolstered Senate critics yesterday as they began their keyed to the theme that Safeguard system would be inadequate to defend the U.S. land-based missile force from new Soviet attack missiles.

On the other hand, say the opponents, the Pentagon told the House panel that the missiles of Project Hardsite, on which $6 million already has been spent, would be able to do the job— even if the Soviets improve their missiles further, such as equipping them with multiple warheads.

The renewed questions on the workability of Safeguard, whose radar and computer components are called extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack, came as Senators John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., and Philip A. Hart, D-Mich., prepared to push their amendment limiting ABM expansion to two sites authorized last year.

## Would Bar Two Sites

The amendment would strip $350 million from a total $1.5 billion ABM program, and bar the beginning of work at two additional Safeguard sites proposed by the Nixon administration.

The Senate Armed Services Committee earlier stripped the pending $19.2 billion military procurement bill of a Safeguard authorization aimed at starting an area ABM defense against a limited missile attack by Communist China.

Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield urged the Senate yesterday to adopt the Cooper-Hart amendment, contending approval would give President Nixon at least 90 percent of the bargaining advantage he aspired for the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

## 'Lever' Foreseen

Administration spokesmen have said they hope Safeguard can be used as a lever at the arms talks to force a mutual

Soviet-American ban on ABM development.

Sen. Jacob Javits, R-N.Y., said yesterday the Cooper-Hart plan would give the administration an ABM system to bargain away—if it so desired—without committing the nation to full deployment of a project he said would involve huge spending for questionable results.

In the testimony April 27 before the House Defense appropriations subcommittee, Pentagon officials said Project Hardsite would use smaller and less expensive computers and radars than Safeguard but would involve a total cost equal to or greater than the $6 to $10 billion now earmarked for Safeguard.

## Value Is Questioned

Some senators have asked why they should be asked to approve a system that will, granting the expected improvements in Russian rocketry, be obsolete before it is finished.

But during the House hearings, R. L. Johnson, assistant secretary of the Army for research, said if that view were followed "you would never build anything, because by the time

you were ready to build it, you would say, 'I can do better.'"

During the debate yesterday, the Senate approved 77 to 0, an amendment requiring that the Pentagon make the first announcement of its contracts—with no advance tipoff to members of Congress or anyone else.

The contract amendment, proposed by Sen. John J. Williams, R-Del., drew not a word of dissent—although Sen. Hugh Scott, R-Pa., had said Monday he hoped it would be overwhelmingly defeated. Scott voted for the amendment.

Williams said Congress should end the system of advance contract award notification because it gives the impression that senators and House members influence the contracts.

The House is not expected to go along with the amendments.

13

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

5 August 1970 P8

ABM IS NEEDED
IF TALKS FAIL,
SAYS COOPER

WASHINGTON, Aug. 4—Sen. John Sherman Cooper [R., Ky.], coleader of Senate critics of the Safeguard Antiballistic Missile system, said the system is essential today if arm limits talks with Russia fail.

Cooper told the Senate during this introduction of the anti-ABM amendment offered by him and Sen. Philip Hart [D., Mich.], with 26 co-sponsors:

"We believe that the development of an advanced ABM system, in the event that the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] should fail, is essential to the security of our country."

World Allow Work

The Cooper-Hart amendment proposes to allow the administration to continue work on ABM sites at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., and Grand Forks Air Force Base, N. D. It would forbid, however, advanced procurement for another ABM site at Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., and advance preparations for a site at Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.

Cooper proposed the limitation as an amendment to the pending $19.2 billion Weapons Procurement Bill. He said the Cooper-Hart amendment would reduce ABM spending to $1,027,200,000 and would save the government $322,200,000.

The carryover of $224 million from last year's initial ABM appropriation "plus this year's authorization. provide ample funds for work on the evolving prototype system at Malmstrom and Grand Forks to keep existing production lines intact, and by maintaining forward momentum would provide whatever bargaining strength for the SALT talks the administration states is require," Cooper said.

More Is Wasteful"

Sen. Clifford Case [R., N. J.] said "to do more would be wasteful of money, energy and resources."

Sen. Mike Mansfield [D., Mont.], the majority leader, said "I intend to stick to this

particular amendment and no other. It ought to be reiterated again and again that Safeguard is far from perfect."

Mansfield said as a result of a computer error, he had received a letter asking him to make a contribution to the campaign fund of the Republican candidate for the Senate in Utah. He said this error was made by "just a simple computer." He said he could just imagine the problems being found in the intricate computers used to direct American ABMS at enemy attacking missiles.

Amendment O. K'd

Meanwhile, the Senate took its first positive action on the Military Procurement Bill after extensive debate. It voted 77 to 0 in favor of an amendment offered by Sen. John L. Williams [R., Del.] to prevent members of Congress from using military contracts for political gain.

Williams said that it has been the practice of the Defense Department to give members of Congress advance notice of military contracts going to companies in their states or districts, leading voters to believe they used political influence to obtain the contracts.

Williams said such jealousy had developed between senators and members of the House that he recently found three Defense Department officials, their watches synchronized, ready to rap on the doors of two senators and a House member at the Capitol at the identical second so that each could announce simultaneous advance notice of a contract award.

10

WASHINGTON STAR

5 August 1970 P7

Pentagon Aide
Raps Defense
Spending Foes

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

Critics of defense spending, by "ignoring the facts and addressing the past rather than the present," are doing the country a disservice, according to Robert C. Moot, assistant Defense secretary.

In the sharpest reply from within the Pentagon to those who have urged deep cuts in defense spending, the defense comptroller said:

"The defense budget simply is not, and cannot be, the central element in our resource allocation problems for the years ahead. It should be scrutinized carefully and it should be placed in priority review with other needs. But defense spending cutbacks cannot be assumed to be the source of all resource needs.

"Our national security is too important for such erroneous reasoning to be accepted."

Moot, a career government official who also served as defense comptroller in the final months of the Johnson administration, made his comments in a speech to the graduates of the Army Comptrollership School at Syracuse University Friday. The text was made available at the Pentagon yesterday.

Although he did not name the critics he had in mind, Moot mentioned those who think "bbillions (10 to 15) can be diverted from the swollen defense budget." Leaders of the current effort in the Senate to cut defense spending are Senators William Proxmire, D-Wis., and Mark Hatfield, R-Ore.

AVIATION WEEK - 10 AUGUST 1970 (11)

# Cost, Time Doubts Led to B-1 Fund Slash

By Donald C. Winston

Washington-Doubts over the ultimate cost of the North American B-1 manned strategic bomber were the prime reason for a $50-million Fiscal 1971 cut in the program recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Skepticism over Air Force estimates was centered in an ad hoc subcommittee on research and development headed by Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-N.H.). Although subcommittee recommendation for a halving of the Air Force's original $100-million request was upheld by the full Armed Services Committee and reported to the Senate floor for debate, two of Sen. McIntyre's recommendations concerning the program were not adopted by the full committee.

One would have called for a formal Air Force study of B-1 specifications and their relationship to cost, with a full report to be submitted to Congress prior to consideration of the Fiscal 1972 budget next session.

The other involved an estimate of tanker costs over the life of the program. Sen. McIntyre claims the Air Force is sharply divided over whether the life of current Boeing KC-135A tankers could be extended so that they could serve the B-1.

Current Air Force planning calls for procurement of five test aircraft. These would probably be modified for operational duty if full scale production were ordered, but a decision has not yet been made.

## Funding Rationale

In presenting the rationale for the B-1 decision on the Senate floor last week, Sen. McIntyre said the main reasons for the $50-million reduction were:

* Projected service life of the Boeing B-52G/H, with modifications, has been extended into the 1980s. This would make the mid-1978 initial operational capability target date for the B-1 immaterial. Senate sources concede the funding cutback will contribute to slippage in the B-1 program, but they insist the prime reason for slippage is in engineering development delays by the Air Force.

* Problems of coordinating various components of the B-1 will consume far more time than the Air Force has admitted, making the $50-million reduction meaningless from the point of view of program slippage. Avionics development has not yet been integrated with the rest of the aircraft. Similarly, time will be required to integrate avionics subsystems, engine subsystems and other components into the main design. Buildup of contractor engineering personnel, as a consequence, is likely to be far slower than the Air Force has planned.

* Development program as currently envisioned would require $569 million in Fiscal 1972 and another $560 million in Fiscal 1973. Because the Nixon Administration has promised large defense cuts in both years, the B-1 may find itself in the position of absorbing too much of the remaining funds. It would consume approximately 8% of the total defense research, development, test and engineering budget in Fiscal 1972 and would be the largest single item of its type. Slowdown in Fiscal 1971 would delay and reduce the peak, taking pressure off the Fiscal 1972 defense budget.

Air Force originally requested $196

million for the B-1 in Fiscal 1971, but this amount was reduced by the Budget Bureau prior to submission to Congress. Approval of the $100-million request, already voted by the House (AW&ST Apr. 20, p. 23), would result in a first flight by about June, 1974, Air Force officials told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Long-term cost considerations dominated subcommittee examination of the aircraft, according to Sen. McIntyre. During hearings, he questioned Air Force officials on a rise in the procurement cost estimate from $8.96 billion on Dec. 31, 1969, to $9.37 billion last spring.

Gen. Otto J. Glasser, Air Force deputy chief of staff for research and development, replied that the change is not considered relevant since costs are not "nailed down" until after the contract definition phase is reached. He said the changes could be attributed to schedule adjustments and inflation.

In his report to the Senate, Sen. McIntyre declared that changes in B-1 specifications since the beginning of calendar 1969 should have resulted in a reduction of the estimated unit cost. These changes included a 25% decrease in the number of Boeing AGM-69A short range attack missiles (SRAM) and subsonic cruise armed decoys (SCAD) carried by the bomber.

A 20% decrease, from supersonic to high subsonic range, in the aircraft's low-altitude speed also was cited as contributing to what should have been a cost decrease, he declared.

In addition, a decrease in size of the avionics package was made, which should have resulted in savings of at least $5 million per aircraft, Sen. McIntyre said.

"Not only does the absence of these savings cast doubt on the validity of last year's estimate, it also lends credence to those who claim that the present $29.2-million projected unit cost for the B-1 is still unrealistically low," he added.

Further doubts within the subcommittee were based on comparison of the B-1 with the General Dynamics FB-111 bomber, whose takeoff weight is one-third that of the B-1 and whose avionics are less complex. On that basis, the B-1 should cost at least triple the $13-million unit price of the FB-111, or one-third more than the current estimate.

## Avionics Reduction

Reduction in the avionics package. Sen. McIntyre noted, was made because of a lower evaluation of the enemy

change in threat estimates could lead to avionics system growth which could bring about a unit cost increase as great as $6 million, since no reduction has been made in avionics system cost in connection with the original cutback.

A final consideration in the cost question was belief on the part of some subcommittee members that insufficient attention to inflation had been paid in the long-range estimates.

The tanker question also played a major role in the decision to halve Fiscal 1971 funding. Air Force originally had requested $500,000 for study of the tanker question in general, but then canceled its request on ground the KC-135 service life will extend into the late 1980s and possibly into the 1990s.

Pre-takeoff survivability of the KC-135 in the late-1970s period may require extensive modification, particularly if it is to be operated in conjunction with the B-1. "Just what modifications will be required and what their costs will be is not fully known at the present time," Sen. McIntyre said.

Some Air Force officials, he added, have been suggesting the Lockheed C-5A for the B-1 refueling mission. This could bring about an ultimate tanker cost of $7 billion, according to the subcommittee, and could result in making the B-1 program economically infeasible.

Despite doubts, Sen. McIntyre and the subcommittee supported the concept of an advanced strategic bomber as part of an offensive force consisting also of land-based and sea-based missiles. Preence of a force of advanced manne Bombers would provide strike capability if communications with sea-based missile launchers were impaired or if the bulk of land-based missile silos were incapacitated in a heavy attack, the subcommittee said.

20

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 10 AUGUST 1970 (11)

21

Sen. Cooper
vs. Pentagon

By William McGaffin

Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—It was a tough break for the Pentagon generals when John Sherman Cooper, a moderate Republican from the mountains of Kentucky, came to the U.S. Senate.

The 68-year-old Cooper is anything but a hero type. He is hard of hearing and when he gives a speech in the Senate he mumbles so low that he can hardly be heard by his fellow senators, let alone in the galleries.

He is not a military expert. Yet he alone is responsible for starting the drive in the Senate against the Safeguard antiballistic missile system.

The challenge he generated came within one vote of victory on this controversial weapons project. Nor did it end there. It can be credited, as he properly noted in an interview, with "Opening the defense budget to a critical scrutiny for the first time in history" — a scrutiny that resulted in a several-billion-dollar cut in the figure requested by the administration.

The momentum of that challenge, moreover, has carried over with such force that a second round is being fought this year over both the ABM and the rest of the defense budget.

AT FIRST GLANCE, it might seem odd that Cooper should be the one among the 100 senators to get the ball rolling. In retrospect, however, it is not so illogical. The fact that he was not a military expert, or a member of the Armed Services Committee, was to his advantage. He was not beholden to the Pentagon and had not been subjected over the years to its persuasive techniques.

When he joined the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967, it put him into a position where his trained lawyer's mind (he was graduated from Harvard Law School in 1925) and his experience in weighing evidence as a county and circuit judge could be brought to bear on the flaws in the Pentagon argument for the ABM.

Recalling his days as a youth in Somerset, Ky., Cooper says, "I was brought up on a farm. I knew how to milk a cow but I had no mechanical bent. I did not know how to make an ABM."

He was impressed, however, to discover that Pentagon research director John Foster did not seem to be too certain, either, how to build one of the contraptions. This came out when Foster was testifying in 1967 before a foreign relations subcommittee, headed by Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), to which Cooper had been assigned.

The doubts about Foster's seemingly shaky testimony in support of the Sentinel ABM system, which it was called in 1967 when it was

first proposed by President Johnson, were further compounded for Cooper when he listened to Defense Sec. Robert McNamara speak out for it.

"McNamara seemed to be all over the lot in the speech he gave in San Francisco in September of 1967," said Cooper. "He sounded reluctant and only half-hearted when he wound up with a recommendation that we go ahead with ABM to guard against an attack from Communist China."

IT WAS IN THE fall of 1967 that Cooper began to make up his mind on the ABM issue. It was not until April of 1968, however, that he made his first move against it. He decided to take the plunge after reading a memo and suggested amendment brought to him on the Senate floor by his youthful special assistant, William Miller.

Miller had studied at Williams College in Williamstown, Mass., and Oxford, taught Elizabethan literature at Harvard and served in the State Department before working for Cooper. He had seen at first hand some of the defects of the U.S. military system at his first foreign service post in Iran.

. On this particular day, he knew he had impressed the boss with his memo and suggested amendment because Cooper had pleared his throat after reading it This was Cooper's unconscious way of showing his appreciation of something.

The plan was to seek a delay in Senate authorization of the ABM program, included in a military procurement authorization bill the Senate was debating, until the defense secretary could certify that it had been fully proved by research and could establish its probable cost.

ALTHOUGH IT WAS a hasty move without any advance effort to line up votes for it, Cooper's amendment was only defeated 31 to 28. And Cooper discovered, to his pleasant surprise, "that nobody in the Senate knew very much about the ABM."

Encouraged by this near success, Cooper won the support of a prestigious Democrat, Sen. Philip A. Hart (Mich.) and the two set out to "educate" themselves and their fellow senators.

They gained an expert knowledge of the ABM's defects from scientists outside the government and from ABM opponents within the Pentagon and they also learned from the Central Intelligence Agency that the Russians had halted construction on their ABM setup after building only 67 emplacements around Moscow.

One of the turning points in the battle came on Oct. 14, 1968, when the Senate, acting on a Cooper suggestion, met in secret session to discuss the ABM. With a majority of the Senate present, because of the novelty of a secret session, Cooper and his opponents succeeded in putting the Senate Armed Services Committee on the defensive.

The committee members, who had never been questioned before, did not have the answers to searching questions that Cooper had compiled with the help of David R. Inglis, a nuclear physicist on the staff of the Argonne

National Laboratory, near Chicago.

ALTHOUGH THE SENATE eventually approved deployment of the Sentinel ABM system before it quit in 1968, the fight did not end there. Instead, it took on new momentum when Chicago and other cities began to protest the Army's plans to locate ABM sites in their back yards.

Reacting to this uproar, President Nixon called a halt to the program and, after a "reassessment," he asked Congress to approve a switch. Instead of Sentinel, it would be called Safeguard. Instead of protecting cities, it would protect Minuteman missile sites.

The President announced his decision on March 14, 1969. Cooper, Hart and their fellow opponents were defeated on Aug. 6 of that year.

But the margin was so narrow that the Senate is again about to take on the administration in a decisive vote. And now, as then, Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird, in the view of anti-ABM forces, is trying to scare the Senate into submission with dire warnings about Soviet deployment of its huge SS-9 missile.

Last year, in Cooper's judgment, Laird presented the Senate with an "unbalanced picture" by stressing the threat of the SS-9, without acknowledging such balancing American weapons as the multiple-warhead Poseidon missile.

THIS YEAR, LAIRD IS making much of the fact that the Soviets have continued to deploy the SS-9 at an alarming rate.

"Are you worried about this continued deployment?" Cooper was asked.

"Yes, I am," he acknowledged. "If the Russians don't stop, we will have to do something about it. But Safeguard is not the answer."

Then he pointed out that "one scientific expert after another had testified this year at hearings on the ABM conducted by Gore of Tennessee to the effect that Safeguard simply is not designed to do the job assigned it."

Cooper said that if we are going to have to react to continued SS-9 deployment, in the event that the SALT sessions do not produce a U.S.-Soviet arms limitation agreement, then we will have to either start with a brand-new ABM system — or consider building more offensive missiles, "which would be a cheaper and faster way of reacting."

Cooper felt that Gore's hearing this year were even better than last year. "After listening to them, I felt that I could not avoid taking a stand again against Safeguard."

It was "not easy" to do this, he said, when the administration you are opposing is headed by a President of your party. And it was even more difficult that, in this same year, he became a co-leader of a Senate move to restrict the President's military activities in Cambodia, after the Nixon operation there.

The fact that Cooper pushed ahead on ABM right after leading the charge on Cambodia is an example of how deeply he feels about these issues. This has not, however, disturbed his personal relationships with the President, he says.

WASHINGTON STAR 11 August 1970 P9

# Senate Critics of ABM
## Rap 'Bargaining' Stand

By DANA BULLEN
Star Staff Writer

Critics of President Nixon's Safeguard antiballistic missile plan in the Senate have stepped up their attack on the "bargaining chip" argument for the ABM.

But — as a series of critical votes nears — supporters of the Safeguard system assert the United States should not "disarm" in the face of Soviet missile strength.

Although the administration says approval of new Safeguard funds will promote agreement at the Vienna arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, Sen. Harold E. Hughes, D-Iowa, charged yesterday that approving a bigger ABM actually would jeopardize these negotiations.

"Such a contradictory policy destroys our credibility at the bargaining table," Hughes said.

"How can we justify expanding our arsenal in order to reduce it? That kind of military logic is strategically similar to the tactic of destroying a village in Vietnam in order to save it," he said.

Hughes is sponsoring the most reaching of three proposals on the ABM, on which voting will start in the Senate tomorrow. His amendment, would block all funds for work on the Safeguard system except a $365 million item for further research and related activity.

Sens. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., and Sen. Philip A. Hart, D-Mich., sponsors of a second proposal would delete $322 billion from the military procurement authorization bill for expanding the ABM for two new sites, but their proposal would allow authorization of $1.02 billion for continued work on sites already approved for two locations in Montana and North Dakota.

A third proposal by Sen. Edward W. Brooke, R-Mass., would bar deployment of missiles at new sites but allow use of all the fund in the present bill for the two installations already in the work.

Hughes said he hopes to get "close to 40 votes" for his proposal.

After its probable defeat, the senators are expected to split most evenly on the Cooper-Hart amendment. Senators on both sides predict victory. The Brooke amendment is basically a fallback proposal if the Cooper-Hart amendment fails.

In a floor statement supporting the administration's plan, Senate GOP Leader Hugh Scutt said he doubled arms limitation

talks would succeed if the Soviet Union believes Congress is unwilling to provide "needed, dangerous weaponry."

Asserting it would be "far easier," especially in an election year, for him to back proposals to disarm, Scott said the United States should not repeat the mistake it made after World War I when it sank battleships under a disarmament plan while the Japanese and Germans only tore up blue prints of their weapons.

Sen. Robert Dole, R-Kan., said expansion of the Safeguard system represents "the minimum response to an urgent need."

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

10 AUGUST 1970 (11)

# New ammo against the ABM

As the Senate prepares to make up its mind about the Safeguard antiballistic-missile system, a new revelation has further strengthened the position of the system's critics.

Secret testimony before a congressional committee revealed that the Army has started work on a new and better ABM system. Its cost would be about the same as the $6 billion to $10 billion contemplated for the Safeguard program. It is intended to replace the Safeguard system with one that would be far more widely dispersed and therefore far less vulnerable.

The Army argues that since this new system is still in the "concept formulation" stage the completion of the Safeguard program should be carried forward full-tilt to provide the maximum protection at the earliest moment. Otherwise, it says, the nation might never finish even one plan.

We see it from a different viewpoint. If the nation is to continue going all-

out for an ever-more-sophisticated — and endless — series of weapons, we will wind up bankrupt with the "ultimate" system still to be built.

Since there can never be a "perfect" defense, some compromise is always necessary. We believe the amendment proposed by Senators John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Philip Hart (D-Mich.) represents the best resolution. This would limit the Safeguard system to the two sites approved last year, and halt the proposed expansion to two additional sites in Missouri and Wyoming.

The result of such a moderate policy could have positive impact on the arms limitation talks now in progress between Russia and the United States; it would provide defenses adequate to any immediate threat envisioned by the military, and it would save a whopping chunk of money at a moment when the federal budget is being squeezed badly out of whack.

23

WASHINGTON POST 11 AUGUST 1970 P-2

Scott Gives Senate
Warning on Arms Talks

21

Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) warned the Senate yesterday that nuclear arms limitation talks between the United States and Russia are unlikely to produce agreement "if the Russian government is convinced that the Congress of the United States is unwilling to defend the United States with adequate ... deterrent weapons."

But Sens. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo.) and Harold Hughes (D-Iowa) rejected the contention that the Safeguard antiballistic missile system must be enlarged merely to get the Russians to agree to arms limits. They launched a slashing attack on Safeguard as the Senate, amid predictions of victory from both sides, prepared for Wednesday's crucial vote on the ABM issue.

Scott told associates yesterday that the chief anti-Safeguard amendment—a proposal by Sens. Philip A. Hart (D-Mich.) and John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) to permit continued deployment at two existing sites, while barring expansion to two added sites—will be defeated by a 50-to-48 vote when the showdown comes.

Scott also said he believes a "live pair" for the ill Sen. Karl E. Mundt (R.-S.D.) has been secured from among anti-Safeguard Republican senators. This means that a senator who otherwise would have cast his vote against Safeguard would withhold it on the crucial Cooper-Hart test as a courtesy to Mundt, who would have voted for the Safeguard deployment. With the vote as close as it is, the nullification of one anti-Safeguard vote through the "pair" device could decide the issue. Last year, a move to kill Safeguard lost on a 50-50 tie.

Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) also said he believed the Cooper-Hart amendment would lose, but Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) said he felt a shift of strength to the anti-Safeguard

forces, and Majority Whip Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) predicted in Boston that the Cooper-Hart amendment would win.

## Vote Surveys

Preliminary vote surveys indicate 48 senators are likely to vote for the Cooper-Hart amendment and 48 against it, with Mundt absent and three senators undecided—John O. Pastore (D-R.I.), Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) and Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.M.). Anderson is believed to favor the Cooper-Hart amendment, and many observers believe Pastore will vote for it, too, but there is little certainty in either case. Mrs. Smith traditionally does not reveal her position in advance.

In attacking expansion of the Safeguard system yesterday, Gore argued that the technical ability of Safeguard to defend against Soviet attack was highly questionable. He said the United States would do much better, if no arms limitations can be agreed

upon, to put its reliance on enhanced offensive capability "with an unquestioned will to use it in case of a nuclear attack upon the United States."

Both Gore and Eagleton criticized the argument that more deployment of Safeguard was needed as a "bar-gaining chip" for arms control talks with the Russians. They cited doubts about the system's effectiveness, and the fact that Safeguard, as approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee, protects only missiles, not cities, and thus could not threaten Russia with a first-strike capability.

In a letter to Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said a new, advanced ABM (Hard-site) which Safeguard opponents said should be designed in place of Safeguard could not be ready until later than Safeguard and would not replace Safeguard but complement it. Therefore, said Laird, Safeguard should not be put aside now in favor of Hardsite.

BALTIMORE SUN 14 AUGUST 1970 Pg 7

2 Key Senators Will Back
3d Attempt To Limit ABM

Washington, Aug. 13—Two senators who voted against two moves to curb the Safeguard anti-missile systems aid today that they will help to lead a third drive to accomplish the same thing.

The announcement of the support of Senator Thomas J. McIntyre (D., N.H.) and Marlow Cook (R., Ky.) for restraints on the geographical expansion of Safeguard gave the system's foes one more chance to achieve their goal.

The less-restrictive amendment, drafted by Senator Edward Brooke (R., Mass.) would require that the entire $1.3 billion earmarked in the pending $19.2-billion military procurement bill be spent only for improving the two ABM sites approved last year.

"This amendment leaves intact every dollar recommended by the Armed Services Committee for work on ABM," Senator McIntyre said. "It provides the full momentum of an ongoing ABM program, and of growing capability to expand the system's deployment should the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (with Russian fail)."

The Senate rejected yesterday, 62 to 33, an amendment to stop all Safeguard deployment and limit spending to research only.

By a far closer 52 to 47 vote, it turned down a move by Senators Philp A. Hart (D., Mich) and John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.) to strip $322 million from the bill and prohibit expansion to two new sites.

By all counts, if the senators who voted for the Cooper-Hart amendment remain firm, the vote on the Brooke amendment would be closer.

The addition of Senators Cook and McIntyre would bring the tally to 50 to 49.

In other action today, the Senate voted 59 to 26, to reject a proposal by Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.) that the Pentagon be allowed to spend no money on new weapons until it complies with a law requiring it to file reports on their impact on the environment.

Senator Proxmire said that the Defense Department has had seven months to comply with the law and has filed only one report, a pace he said provides a bad example to industrial polluters.

Senator Edmund Muskie (D., Maine) opposed Senator Proxmire's proposal on grounds that the Pentagon has not the staff to produce in-depth reports required by the law.

Chairman John Stennis (D., Miss), of the Armed Service Committee, was more emphatic.

"Thousands and thousands of transactions by the Defense Department would be affected," he said. "All past, present and future money would be locked in.

It's unthinkable we could tie up the department this way."

The Senate did adopt, with little discussion, an amendment by Senator Harrison A. Williams (D., N.J.) increasing the strength of the U.S. Coast Guard selected reserve from 10,000 to 15,000 men.

25

NEW YORK TIMES 14 AUGUST 1970 P-2

Senators Tell of ABM Telegram From Arms Envoy

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 13—

The Administration prevailed upon the chief American arms control negotiator to intervene in the Senate antiballistic-missile debate despite his disclaimer of any knowledge of the amendments being voted upon by the Senate.

This was disclosed today by Senators who were permitted to see the top secret telegram signed by Gerard C. Smith, head of the United States delegation to the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

The Smith telegram was regarded as instrumental in helping the Administration to defeat yesterday an amendment co-sponsored by Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Philip A. Hart of Michigan, that would have blocked Administration plans to expand the Safeguard antiballistic-missile system.

The manner in which the Administration used the telegram and injected Mr. Smith's name into the debate was causing angry grumblings today from such Senators as Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, and Senator Cooper.

The Smith telegram, according to Senate sources, was ordered by the White House late last week in anticipation of the vote on the Cooper-Hart amendment.

Originally, according to these sources, Administration supporters in the Senate suggested to the White House that Ambassador Smith return to Washington to brief Senators on the diplomatic desirability of defeating the Cooper-Hart amendment. Ambassador Smith reportedly objected to this procedure on the ground that it would put him in the position of lobbying against legislation.

As an alternative, therefore, it was decided between the White House and its supporters in the Senate that Ambassador Smith should send a telegram that could be shown to selected Senators who seemed to be wavering or uncommitted on the issue.

As reconstructed by Senators who have seen the message, the one-paragraph telegram starts off by disclaiming any knowledge of various ABM amendments pending before the Senate. But the telegram then goes on to express concern about the possible impact of the debate upon the talks

and to urge that the United States not assume a "static" position on deployment.

### Interpretations Vary

The telegram was obviously open to varying interpretations, but the point White House officials and Senator Henry M. Jackson were seeking to make, as they showed the message to a small group of Senators, was that Safeguard expansion was regarded by the American delegation as a vital bargaining chip in seeking a strategic arms limitation agreement from the Soviet Union.

That was the interpretation reached by Senator Thomas J. McIntyre, Democrat of New Hampshire, who on Monday called Ambassador Smith in Vienna through the White House switchboard to obtain his views on the Cooper-Hart amendment.

In the conversation, Ambassador Smith reportedly emphasized that he was not acquainted with the specific amendments before the Senate. But he went on to lay down "criteria" for considering the amendments in terms of their impact upon the arms negotiations. A "static position" on ABM deployment is not sufficient, the Ambassador reportedly told the Senator, and the United States needs to maintain a "momentum" in the ABM program to enhance its bargaining position.

Senator McIntyre interpreted this to mean that Ambassador Smith was opposed to the Cooper-Hart amendment and he proceeded to switch his position to vote against it.

The telegram was influential in switching the votes of Senators Marlow W. Cook, Republican of Kansas and Clinton P. Anderson, Democrat of New Mexico.

23

WASHINGTON STAR 16 AUGUST 1970 (17) PAGE 6

27

# Packard Accepts Carrier Cut, But Opposes Missile Curb

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard is convinced the Navy does not need another nuclear-powered aircraft carrier now and that it will have to get along with 12, rather than the present 16, attack carriers.

Packard also said in an interview that he considers a pending Senate effort to amend the administration's Safeguard missile defense proposal as "manifestly absurd and wasteful."

His comment came in response to a question concerning a proposal by Sen. Edward Brooke, R-Mass., that is expected to be voted on this week. It would permit the full $1.4 billion earmarked for expansion of Safeguard but would restrict the money to strengthening the system in the two Minuteman fields where construction has already started.

## Talks Recess till Nov. 2

Packard is convinced that the strategic arms limitation talks, which recessed Friday and are scheduled to resume Nov. 2 in Helsinki, Finland, will go on for many more months before a firm agreement is reached.

In the meantime, he said, the U.S. should keep its missile defense program going, but also make it as flexible as possible.

"The problem," he said, "is to keep going with some kind of momentum so we can move in whatever direction we think is wise if there is a SALT agreement — on if the SALT discussions fail."

In commenting on the Navy's hope for a third new nuclear carrier in addition to the two under construction, Packard said he had personally come to the conclusion that the Navy needs other things more than it needs another carrier.

The Navy's first priority is its anti-submarine warfare program, Packard said, and cutting off the third carrier, now estimated to cost $610 million, would permit construction of other surface ships and submarines to combat the Soviet submarine force in case of war.

The Navy announced two weeks ago that it would begin within the next six months to retire one of its 15 active duty attack carriers. With one anti-submarine warfare carrier now serving as an attack carrier, this will leave a fleet of 15 on active duty.

But Packard said budget pressure on the Pentagon is so tight that he does not see now how it would be possible to retain more than 12 attack carriers on active duty.

## Study Is Underway

Although a National Security Council study of the carrier force is still under way and although Packard described his position on the carrier as a personal opinion, Capitol Hill apparently already understands that the Pentagon will not press hard for funds for the third new carrier.

The House approved the administration request for $152 million in the 1971 procurement and research budget for advance purchases of parts for the third of the Nimitz class carriers. But the Senate Armed Services. But mittee cut the funds from the bill pending an NSC decision.

The Navy has fought vigorously for both the additional nuclear carrier and an active force of at least 15 attack carriers. The added carrier was the subject of six days of special hearings by the Senate and House armed services committees in April.

There were indications during Navy testimony then, however, that the Navy might be willing to get along with fewer than 15 carriers if it were forced to decide what it would rather do without...

Packard said the nation's military strength would drop to "unacceptable levels... a very unsatisfactory situation" if the Pentagon is forced to cut its 1972 budget much below the level of the 1971 request.

Congress is now considering a 1971 spending budget of $71.8 billion.

Pay raises, inflation and funds to help support an all-volunteer force would bring that same level, in 1972 dollars, to between $75 and $80 billion, Packard said.

"We are going to have to fight pretty hard to keep it from getting to unacceptable levels," he said.

So far, the Pentagon has not received final guidance from the White House on how much money it should count on in 1972.

YORK TIMES - 17 AUGUST 1970 P-1

23

U.S. MAKES OFFER
TO GIVE UP ABM'S
IF SOVIET DOES SO

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 — The United States has offered to give up its antiballistic missile defense system entirely if the Soviet Union would agree to limit the number of its huge SS-9 offensive missiles and abandon its own missile defenses, a Nixon Administration source reports.

The official said that, at the conclusion of four months of negotiations with the Soviet Union in Vienna, last week, the United States was extremely optimistic about the progress made and fairly hopeful about reaching an agreement on limiting missile systems.

His comments were made at a background briefing organized by the White House for news editors at New Orleans last Friday and made available for publication tonight. New Orleans newspapers have reported that the editors met with President Nixon and were briefed by Henry A. Kissinger, his special assistant for national security affairs, and other Administration officials.

### Compromise Sought

At the briefing, the editors were told by one official that the United States would try to encourage Israel and the Arab states to reach some territorial compromise in their forthcoming negotiations through Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, the United Nations representative.

An Administration official said that no political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute could be achieved if the Arabs continued to insist that Israel must withdraw completely to her borders that existed before the six-day war of June, 1967, or if Israel insisted on "substantial acquisition" of territory.

This official explained that Israel, Egypt and Jordan had accepted the recent American proposal for a standstill ceasefire and resumption of negotiations on a political settlement with the understanding that one of the principal items for negotiation would be Israel's final borders.

### Arabs Firm on Withdrawal

Nonetheless, Egyptian and Jordanian officials have already said that they would stand firm on demands that Israel should withdraw to her 1967 lines and that what remained to be negotiated was the timetable and mechanics of the Israeli withdrawal.

The news editors were also told that the Administration saw no chance for a settlement if the Arab states maintained their demand for the return of 1.3 million Palestinian refugees to their lands, without giving Israel assurance that she was not expected to take them all back at the risk of altering the fundamental Jewish character of the state of Israel.

In the coming weeks and months, an Administration source said, the United States will have the task of encouraging both sides to move away from their stated positions on territories and refugees, to strike a compromise.

In discussing the negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms, now in recess until the next round begins in Helsinki on Nov. 2, Administration officials defended the White House contention that the continuation of construction of the Safeguard missile defense system provides the United States with the best leverage for achieving an ultimate agreement.

One Administration official said that, during the negotiations thus far, the one American development in the missile field that the Russians seemed most interested in stopping was the antiballistic missile, or A.B.M., program.

This official said that it would be very easy for Moscow to stop this program by agreeing to limits on deploying of Soviet SS-9 missiles, which worry Washington. In a package proposal submitted to the Soviet negotiators on July 24, the United States suggested numerical limitations on nuclear delivery systems of all types, with a special quota on huge missiles such as the SS-9.

The Russians now have about 300 SS-9's in operation or in some stage of deployment.

The Nixon Administration, fearful of the potential threat to American missiles from these weapons if their numbers are increased, wants to limit the Russians to no more than their present inventory of SS-9's.

### Arsenals Compared

The Soviet Union currently is known to have about 1,650 offensive missile launchers and bombers — about 1,250 land-based intercontinental missiles such as the SS-9's and the smaller SS-11's and SS-13's, 200 submarine-based missiles and 200 strategic bombers and refueling planes.

The United States arsenal includes 2,260 missile launchers — 1,054 intercontinental missiles, 656 submarine-based missiles and about 550 B-52 strategic bombers.

An Administration official repeated earlier White House assertions that the American antiballistic missile program provided the one real inducement for the Russians to agree to such a limit on SS-9's.

After an intensive debate, the Administration won a major legislative victory last Wednesday when the Senate, by a vote of 52 to 47, rejected an amendment that would have blocked expansion of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system to include two new bases.

This week the Senate will vote on an amendment offered by Senator Edward W. Brooke, Republican of Massachusetts, that also would prevent geographical expansion of the Safeguard system but would allow the full $1.3-billion authorization to permit expansion of the two original antiballistic missile sites.

### U.S. Would Scrap A.B.M.'s

American negotiators, an Administration source said, have indicated Washington's willingness to reduce the American antiballistic missile system to very small proportions; indeed, to abandon it, if the Russians were willing to abandon their 64-site antiballistic system now installed around Moscow and to limit their inventory of SS-9's.

The basic American proposal

had already been reported, but last week's briefing with newsmen was the first time it had been stated for publication by such high officials.

The proposal was submitted to Soviet negotiators in Vienna on July 24 and there has been no conclusive response from the Russians on whether they considered this an acceptable offer. But for three weeks, until the arms talks adjourned last Friday, Soviet negotiators intensively questioned the Americans about all facets of the proposal.

Their active interest has been interpreted by some American officials as an indication that the Russians consider the American offer a reasonable possibility, although American officials expect months of hard bargaining — and possibly a Soviet counter offer — when the talks resume in Helsinki.

If the Russians were to refuse to limit their SS-9's, the official said, then the United States would have to assume that Moscow was trying to develop a force for striking at American land-based Minuteman missiles and would therefore have to proceed with the Safeguard system to protect the Minutemen.

On the Middle East, another official said that the United States should reach a judgment by tomorrow on Israeli complaints that the United Arab Republic had violated the American-sponsored ceasefire by moving new missiles into forward positions nearer the Suez Canal.

What was at one time an almost routine bit of legislation—passage of the military’s annual spending bill —has now been turned into a lengthy and frequently bitter battle over a score of military programs and policies.

Senate debate this year on the $19.2 billion authorization measure has centered, as it did last year, on the Safeguard ABM system.

But the long and complicated argument over ABM, which the Nixon Administration has won thus far, has obscured what is in fact the most widespread assault on all kinds of military activities ever made on Capitol Hill.

This year's bill has been tagged with more amendments, 32, than any previous measure of its kind.

Some of the most crucial proposals would restrict the President's freedom of military action in Southeast Asia, force the Pentagon into an all-volunteer Army and new buying habits, and restrict Air Force plans for a new bomber and more C-5A transports.

Here are the major amendments still to be acted upon and the areas they would affect:

War in Indochina—Principal fight is expected to resolve around a joint amendment by Sens. Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.) and George McGovern (D-S.D.) that would force the President to withdraw all U.S. military personnel from Vietnam by June 30, 1971, and that would also cut off funds for anything but withdrawal costs and non-military programs for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia after Dec. 31 of this year.

At the moment, this amendment calls for a formal declaration of war in each of those areas if combat is to be pursued beyond year end, but some modification in this provision is reportedly under consideration. The measure is sure to generate extensive debate.

Related amendments include one by two Wisconsin Democrats. William Proxmire and Gaylord A. Nelson, joined by Iowa Democrat Harold E. Hughes, that would forbid sending new draftees, except those who volunteer, to the war zone after the procurement bill's

enactment, and another by J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that would prevent funds provided to Vietnamese or other free world forces from finding their way into Laos and Cambodia.

**Draft**—An amendment first proposed by Sen. Hatfield and co-sponsored by an unusual coalition of hawks and doyees that numbers, among 15 senators, Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) and Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), would force the Pentagon to accept the recommendations of the Gates Commission and move toward an all-volunteer armed force by July, 1971, when the present draft law expires.

The measure has strong backing and could pass. If it does, it would cost an additional $3.2 billion in higher pay and incentives during the first year of transition, according to the Gates Commission estimate. Others have estimated it would cost at least $4 billion more to maintain the force of 2.9 million men projected for mid-1971.

**Procurement**—Sen. Proxmire, in an amendment expected to come to a vote today, will try to force the Pentagon to adopt the so-called "fly-before-you-buy" policies recommended by the President's panel on reorganization. The Senator wants new regulations and reporting procedures to insure this. However, the bill has a loophole that would allow by-passing those provisions in an emergency.

**C-5A**—An earlier Proxmire amendment on the controversial Air Force Lockheed transport has been withdrawn in favor of a new one sponsored by Proxmire and Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.), expected to be put forth early next week. This would withhold $200 million in contingency funds pending for the C-5 until either a military board of contract appeals says the government (the Air Force claims it doesn't) owes that money to Lockheed or a trustee in any future Lockheed bankruptcy says it is necessary for the government to get its airplanes.

**B-1**—Sen. McGovern has introduced a measure that would strip any money for

the Air Force's proposed new bomber in the new budget. The Senate Armed Services Committee has already cut the Air Force's $100 million request in half, McGovern's move, if successful, would leave the service only with $65 million approved last year but not yet spent.

**Manpower**—A move to give Congress the power to pass each year on the authorized strength of the individual armed services is seen by Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.), sponsor of an amendment to that effect, as a restoration of congressional authority given up in the Korean War. Now, Congress only appropriates funds for force levels up to 5 million men. As Bayh sees it, the present Congress only has authority to "support" armies, but not to "raise" them in the sense of controlling their size.

**Rotation**—Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) has proposed changes in the service non-combat rotation policies. Percy says reducing the number of times men make so-called permanent change of station moves could save $140 million a year.

**Chemical Warfare**—Two amendments by Sens. Charles E. Goodell (R-N.Y.) and Sen. Nelson are aimed collectively at stopping military use of antiplant chemical weapons, or herbicides, preventing their transfer to other countries, destroying existing stockpiles and preventing funding for new ones.

**MIRV**—Two amendments proposed by Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R-Mass.) would pre-

vent the Defense Department from developing new multiple warhead systems that are even better than the ones going into Minute-man III and Poseidon, and would also make the Pentagon develop a new attack system for both missiles that would use only a single warhead.

What the Senator's proposals mean, in effect, is that in his view the current U.S. MIRVs are not big enough and accurate enough to threaten Russian missiles in their silos, but that if they became more accurate, in particular, it would give the Soviets cause to expand their ICBM force or add to their defenses.

The single warhead development is aimed at having something to put on U.S. missiles if arms talks ever lead to a MIRV ban.

Ironically, the U.S. had a new single warhead program, the Mk 17, going but it was cancelled in 1967 by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara because its single big warhead might look like too much of a threat to Soviet silos.

WASHINGTON POST 17 AUGUST 1970 Pg3

# Military Activities
Under Widespread
Assault on Hill

23

WASHINGTON STAR 28 August 1970 P3

31

# Sharp Defense Budget Cuts
# Pushed by Mathias, Proxmire

Sens. Charles McC. Mathias Jr., R-Md., and William Proxmire, D-Wis., today called for Senate approval of an over-all $5.2 billion cut in Pentagon spending for the coming year.

The proposal, on which senators were to vote after three hours of debate, would reduce military spending from a planned $71.2 billion to $66 billion, with the President and the secretary of defense determining where specific reductions should be allocated.

Asserting that misplaced priorities and fiscal pressures present a "menace" to the economy, Mathias said the nation "simply cannot afford the expenditure of a single dollar beyond our minimal needs."

"We must act swiftly and decisively to restore fiscal order," he said in a speech prepared for delivery before today's vote.

## Stennis Opposes Move

Proxmire maintained there was "no question" the Defense Department "can live with $66 billion," but Sen. John C. Stennis, D-Miss., claimed the cut proposed by Mathias and Proxmire would go to far.

"This will give our men second-rate weapons while the other men have the best. This will push us perilously close to the state of unpreparedness," said Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

While Mathias and Proxmire did not specify where the military spending cuts should be made, they said "a thoroughly documented case" has been made for cuts of $10 to $14 billion.

Possible places for reductions, they said, include weapons procurement, where cost overruns amount to $23 billion, closing unnecessary overseas bases and manpower reductions.

Their proposal would be an amendment to the, $19.2 billion military procurement authorization bill.

Senators turned to that amendment after a number of other actions on the authorization bill.

By a voice vote, the Senate yesterday approved a proposal by Sen. Edward W. Brooke, R-Mass., to authorize the secretary of defense to initiate re-

search on improved single re-entry vehicles for U.S. missiles now planned to carry multiple, independently targetable warheads.

The research would provide up-to-date plans for U.S. missiles should arms limitation talks now under way with the Soviet Union lead to agreement with a prohibition of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, known as MIRV's.

Brooke withdrew a second proposal, one that would limit the capability of MIRV warheads so as to make clear to the Russians that the United States is not seeking to develop a first-strike missile capability.

The United States has denied any such plans, but Brooke feared a large vote against his proposal might convey the opposite, mistaken message to the Soviet Union.

In other actions, the Senate:

1. Defeated, 48 to 33, a proposal by Sens. Gaylord E. Nelson, D-Wisc., and Charles E. Goodell, R-N.Y., to prohibit use of chemicals to destroy crops in Vietnam.

2. Approved, 82 to 1, writing into law the Defense Department's decision against future disposition of any chemical or biological weapons before they have been detoxified.

The amendment, sponsored by Sen. Charles H. Percy, R-Ill., included language added on the floor to permit immediate disposal in emergency situations—such as a fire on a ship—to safeguard human lives:

3. Passed, by voice vote, a proposal by Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., to require State Department clearance before conventional munitions are dumped in international waters. "I don't want us to dump high explosives on top of nerve gas," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 AUG. 1970 p1

SENATE REJECTS
$5-BILLION SLASH
IN DEFENSE FUNDS

By ROBERT M. SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 28—The Senate defeated today, 42 to 31, a proposal that would have cut more than $5-billion from what the Nixon Administration wants to spend for the military this fiscal year.

One of the authors of the proposal, Senator William Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, described the vote in advance as "the test vote of 1970 on economy in government." After the vote, the pronounced himself pleased with the relatively narrow margin of defeat.

"This is terrific progress," Mr. Proxmire said. He promised to "try again on the appropriations bill" later this year.

### Hatfield-McGovern Next

Opposition to the amendment centered mainly on the charge that it represented what Senator John C. Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, called a "meat-ax" approach and was impractical.

The defeat of the amendment sponsored by Senators Proxmire and Charles McC. Mathias, Republican of Maryland, cleared the Senate calendar for debate next Monday and a vote next Tuesday on the last major amendment being offered to the military procurement authorization bill. This is the Hatfield-McGovern "amendment to end the war."

The amendment, sponsored by Senators Mark O. Hatfield, Republican of Oregon, and George S. McGovern, Democrat of South Dakota, would require the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam by the end of next year, although it gives the President some latitude in meeting that deadline.

### Power Held Sufficient

Senator Proxmire's amendment would have cut the Administration's proposed total of $71.2-billion for military spending by fixing a ceiling of $66-billion. It would have mandated no specific cuts, leaving that to

the White House, and the Pentagon.

"We would still spend $26-billion more than the Russians would spend," Mr. Proxmire argued. "We have excessive redundant bases. We have a European commitment 25 years after World War II. We are still following a two-plus war strategy, although the Administration has said it favors a one-plus war strategy. The Pentagon is spending some $40-million in public relations."

The Senator went on to say that if the entire $5-billion cut were concentrated in the area of nuclear arms, "we would have 15 times as much power as we need to knock out the Soviet Union instead of 20."

Senator Proxmire also called his proposal "the national priorities amendment," and there was a good deal of floor discussion to the effect that too much was being spent for the military.

Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, said, for example, "We now have to re-adjust national priorities in this country, if we are not to sacrifice domestic tranquility for foreign war. We simply must devote more resources to cities, schools, health, the ecology."

Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, called the proposed cut "the only last resort" and "a signal that we don't intend to press the arms race on and on and on."

Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader, said that when Senators tried to challenge money for specific weapons, "the Senate is de-luged by Defense Department reports, secret documents and what not that accomplish the purpose of obfuscation."

"This is the Senate's opportunity," he went on, "to contribute to balancing the books so loudly heralded when education bills are passed." This was an obvious reference to Republican charges that a "spendthrift" Democratic Congress was running up a budget deficit and contributing to inflation. Congress overrode the President's veto recently on a bill providing education funds.

### Stennis Fears Confusion

Summing up the opposition's argument, Senator Stennis called the amendment an "antifactual thing" that "would cause downright confusion" and throw "into the junk heap some heretofore reliable guidelines in our committee work."

Mr. Stennis argued that the military budget ought to come down. "The Defense Department knows where my corns are," he said, "and they know this [excess] personnel matter hurts by corns all the time." But he said "things have to be done in an orderly way."

It would be impossible, he continued, for the Pentagon to make a rational $5-billion cut in the half year or so that would be left after the legislative process ends and it learns that appropriations it will have for the fiscal year that began July 1.

The Armed Services Committee, which Mr. Stennis heads and of which Mr. McIntyre is a member, resented the $19.2-billion procurement bill on which the Senate is acting.

Defending the work of his committee, Mr. Stennis argued that the military bill "has been picked to pieces and put back together by men who knew what they were doing." He continued:

"We put [a] square compass on these figures from every conceivable angle and we get the same result: with the inflation, we have cut out the increase for the war, despite the fact that the war is still going on."

"Just give us time" to reduce the budget, Senator Stennis said at one point. "We are well on our way."

Senator McIntyre said that the amendment ignored "the simple fact of life that contracts are made several months in advance" and therefore the Pentagon cannot backtrack so rapidly. He also said that the $5-billion cut would mean elimination of 1.3 million Defense Department jobs.

In the end, observers indicated that the amendment had been defeated for a number of reasons that included the partisan issue of support for the Administration's request; concern for unimpaired national security; respect for the Armed Services Committee and Mr. Stennis; the broad scope of the

amendment and its immediate impact; a depressed civilian economy; perhaps some personal antipathy for Senator Proxmire, whose many attempts at economy in government would affect the states of several Senators, and probably just plain ennui after five weeks of debate on the same bill.

32

NEW YORK TIMES 4 SEPTEMBER 1970 P-4

# Pentagon Budget-Cutting

## Senate's Critics of Military Spending
Make Inroads While Losing Round 2

WASHINGTON, Sept. 3—For six weeks, Senate critics of military spending tried to hack away at the Pentagon budget. They got nowhere: their challenge to the Safeguard anti-missile system, their proposal to restrict payments on the C-5A cargo jet and their move to cut $5-billion from defense outlays all lost. And yet, according to those on both sides of the debate, the liberal cause — a smaller and more closely controlled military budget — won.

News

Analysis

Many on Capitol Hill think the critics of defense spending should be pleased because the Nixon Administration asked for $71.8-billion for the Pentagon —$5.2-billion below what it spent last year — and the Senate Armed Services Committee carved $1.3-billion more out of that.

Some of those who watched the Senate debate point out that several cuts were made privately, in the working sessions of the Armed Services Committee this summer. There, long before the floor confrontations that brought sorrow to the liberals, the committee denied the Navy funds for a nuclear carrier; scrapped the Cheyenne helicopter project; cut the funds for the B-1 supersonic bomber in half, and reduced the research and development budget by $400,000.

A question remains: Would the Administration and the Armed Services Committee have made the reductions if the initial and abortive efforts of the money-cutters in the Senate last year had not warned them they would be back this year?

### Two Points of View

The foes of military spending contend that nothing would have happened without their pressure. Those closer to the Administration say that the executive was tired of waste in the Pentagon and eager to proclaim frugality as a Republican virtue.

Committee sources praise Senator John C. Stennis, the chairman. They say the Mississippi Democrat has three qualities that made him take a close look at the Pentagon's requests:

The feeling of a senior Senator that Congress ought to have a strong, independent role; fiscal conservatism, and openmindedness.

They might have added that Mr. Stennis seems to share the craving of most Senate patriarchs for the respect of their colleagues and was irritated at being cast by liberals in the role of a Pentagon lackey.

All this leaves the liberals in the position of having won less than they wanted and of having done even that by proxy. In their defense, many of them say: "Remember, this was only the second year anybody has challenged the Pentagon," and plead that they are "taking on in a frontal confrontation the most powerful and organized economic groups in the country."

What will happen to military spending now that the critics have lost once again?

The Administration has already indicated that it will try to keep next year's Pentagon spending at about the current level. Little is likely to happen to trim it in the more conservative House.

What happens in the Senate will probably turn on two things — the mood of the country toward military spending and the ability of liberal Senators to attract the votes of their more conservative colleagues.

### Electronics a Factor

Some conservatives on Capitol Hill are saying that the opposition to the defense budget stemmed from opposition to the war in Indochina and that as the war winds down, so will the talk about military outlays.

The Congressional elections may provide some index of the country's mood.

Many in Congress feel that Senator Albert Gore, Democrat of Tennessee, has taken a few steps to the right in anticipation of the elections and that Senator John O. Pastore, Democrat of Rhode Island, is leaning to the left. They are watching those contests, among others, to see if there is political profit in opposing the Pentagon.

Some of the liberals argue that the possibility of their picking up conservative votes to cut military spending is not as improbable as it might seem.

The liberals will try to persuade fiscal conservatives like Senator John J. Williams, Republican of Delaware, that economy is more important than weapons systems in a time when absolute security cannot be bought.

The Administration, and its supporters in the Senate, will probably argue again that the military budget is at "rock-bottom," point to Soviet advances in hardware and research and declare that further cuts will peril America.

34

NEW YORK TIMES 6 SEPT 70

35

# Economy:
What Is
Effect of
Defense
Cutbacks?

WASHINGTON — The Gov-
ernment supplied further evi-
dence last week of a very
substantial decline in the
role of defense in the na-
tional economy, but the Ad-
ministration came under fire
for blaming this otherwise
desirable development for the
rise in unemployment.

If one looks solely at bud-
get spending figures, the de-
cline in defense outlays does
not seem very great. But
these figures mask the big
impact of higher military pay
and also higher prices for
many of the items the De-
fense Department buys, from
food to bullets.

In real terms — which is
the measure of the impact on
industrial output and jobs—
the magnitude of the decline
becomes more meaningful.
This involves adjusting for
inflation. These are some of
the highlights:

In 1970 dollars, defense
spending has declined from
its peak annual rate of $91.5-illion in the second quarter
of 1968 to $76.8-billion in
the second quarter of this
year, with most of the de-
cline occurring since mid-
1969. It is continuing.

Military prime contract
awards in the second quarter
had dropped all the way
back to the level of mid-
1965, when the Vietnam
buildup began.

As measured in the Fed-
eral Reserve Board's indus-
trial production index, out-
put of defense products is
now 20 per cent below a
year ago.

Military manpower has
dropped almost 500,000 since
the peak of mid-1968 and ci-
lian personnel in the De-
fense Department are down
from 1963.

The main reason for all of
this is the gradual withdraw-
ing from Vietnam, though it
has reflects some reduction
"normal" defense procure-
ment installations in an
 effort to save money.

The Nixon Administration
has been making two points
it has been going

New Priorities

The first—in the words
last week of Harold C.
Passer, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Economic
Affairs — is that there has
been "a major reordering of
priorities which govern the
use of the nation's productive
resources." On every occa-
sion, spokesmen point out
that more is now being spent
on "human resources" than
on defense, and that this
year's budget allocates the
smallest share to defense
since 1950.

There is no serious quar-
rel with this view except that
the change was probably in-
evitable given the winding
down of the Vietnam war
and the enormous built-in
growth of such human re-
sources programs as social
security and Medicare, which
required no decisions.

The second point is much
more controversial. The Ad-
ministration is suggesting,
usually without quite saying
so, that a major explanation
for the rise in unemployment
is the presumably desirable
decline in defense spending.
The Labor Department re-
ported last week that unem-
ployment in August rose
slightly to 5.1 per cent of the
labor force, though it has re-
mained essentially stable
since May after climbing
sharply between December
and May.

Paul W. McCracken, the
chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers, said of
the defense decreases recent-
ly that "the total direct dis-
placement effect on employ-
ment has already been up-
wards of one million people."
President Nixon has stressed
this point on several recent
occasions, talking about "the
adjustment from a wartime
to a peacetime economy" and
adding that "it is not hard to
see where much of the cur-
rent increase in total unem-
ployment has come from."

The basic answer to this
is that, apart from an inevi-
table impact on individual
companies and communities,
the Government's economic
policy could have kept total
job growth at a level suffi-
cient to absorb the whole of
the defense decline if it had
wanted to. But of course the
aim of policy was just the
opposite—to slow the econ-
omy in an effort to check in-
flation.

Not 'Separate'

Put another way, the de-
clining defense outlays were
a major element of a pur-
posely restrictive Govern-
ment fiscal policy, reinforced
by a restrictive monetary
policy. Declining defense,
therefore, is not a "separate"
cause of the economic slow-
downs, though Administra-
tion officials have tried to
make it appear so.

By the same token, the
sharply rising domestic
spending is proving, already,
a major offset to declining de-
fense. The total budget is
growing and is turning dis-
tinctly more expansionary.
Jobs are created when re-
tired persons spend their so-
cial security checks, commu-
nities build hospitals and lo-
cal governments hire teach-
ers with Federal aid, just as
much as from the placement
of a defense order.

What has happened is that
the composition of the coun-
try's total output has
changed, with defense drop-
ping from a peak of 9.2 per
cent of the gross national
product to 7.9 per cent by
the second quarter of this
year, at the same time that
total output has purposely
been kept from growing.

It is the size of the total
output that determines em-
ployment and unemployment,
not the composition. The size
is immensely influenced by
over-all Government budget
and monetary policy. The re-
cent policy of restraint can
be defended in its own right
and need not be excused by
the changing nature of de-
fense.

—EDWIN L. DALE, Jr.

WASHINGTON POST 8 SEPTEMBER 1970

Sen. William Proxmire

Military Costs Too High

33

(Joseph R. Slevin is on vac-
cation. His quest columnist
today is Senator William
Proxmire (D-Wis.), vice
chairman of the Congression-
al Joint Economic Commit-
tee).

This country must remain
strong and free. We must
have a sufficient strategic
nuclear force to deter our
enemies. We must provide
the general purpose forces
to protect our basic inter-
ests. Virtually all Americans
agree on that.

But we should not do
more. for military spending
is highly unproductive.
While funds for housing,
schools, health, or consumer
goods satisfy some definite
human need, military spend-
ing is wasteful. It satisfies
no need. Because of this, we
must not spend one dollar
more than is needed for our
basic security.

But we still spend far too
much to support the mili-
tary. We should cut it and
use the savings for two gen-
eral purposes.

First, to meet those huge
unmet domestic needs upon
which the ultimate security,
safety, and strength of our
country depend — educa-
tion, job training, anti-pollu-
tion and health, to name
only a few.

Second, we should return
some of the cuts to the
hard-pressed taxpayer. His
burden for local property
and sales taxes, and state in-
come taxes has become al-
most impossible to bear.

There is vast military
waste and duplication which
weakens rather than
strengthens us. Here are
some places we could cut:

* The overruns on 38 major weapons systems — the difference between what the military said they would cost when they asked for them and what they are now estimated to cost — amount to $23 billion. This is a rise of $3 billion in the last nine months.

* The cost of the C-5A air-
plane has gone up from $27
million to $85 million each.
But Boeing's huge 747 com-
mercial transport costs only
$23 million each.

* We have 400 major and almost 3,000 minor bases scattered in 30 countries throughout the world. Many of these are redundant for any military need.

According to the President, we have shifted from a two-plus war strategy to a one-plus war strategy. No longer are we to have enough military strength to fight a land war in Asia and a land war in Europe, plus a minor incident somewhere else all at once. According to past Bureau of the Budget studies, that should save $14 billion. But not one cent has been cut from the defense budget because of this new policy.

* The new B-1 bomber
will cost at least $10 to $12
billion, and probably twice
that much. Yet it will not be
completed until the end of

the 1970s. Almost a decade
ago, the Secretary of De-
fense refused to build it on
grounds that manned bomb-
ers in an age of sophisti-
cated missiles are out of
date. But now we're going
ahead.

By cutting waste and un-
needed military spending,
we can strengthen both the
military and civilian sectors
of our country.

© 1970, Newsday, Inc.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

8 SEPTEMBER 1970 PAGE 10

# Air Force Pressing for $1 Billion Program To Protect Minuteman by Hardening Sites

By RICHARD J. LEVINE

WASHINGTON—The Air Force is seeking Defense Department approval for a billion-dollar program to increase the survivability of its land-based Minuteman missiles by hardening or reinforcing the missiles' sites.

A proposal that the U.S. proceed quickly with a hardening program was made recently by Air Force officials in a briefing for Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard. The program is one of several options for protecting the Minuteman from enemy attack that has been under consideration by the Air Force.

Details of how the hardening would be accomplished are secret, but informed sources say it wouldn't, as has been suggested in some public discussion, necessarily involving the underground missile silos with cement. Rather, they suggest, the missiles and electronic equipment could be made to withstand greater pressure from an attack by installing new mountings for the equipment and "hanging" the missile in the silo in a different fashion.

## Speed and Cost Stressed

The Air Force favors the hardening approach because it feels it would considerably enhance the survivability of the 1,034 Minuteman intercontinental missiles relatively quickly and cheaply. The hardening, which would be done in conjunction with Minuteman modernization already underway, could be completed in perhaps two or three years for about $1 billion, according to military sources.

Protection for the Minuteman is extremely important to the Air Force, which is increasingly sensitive to suggestions that its two strategic arms, the manned bomber and the land-based missile, may be headed for obsolescence. Indeed, even if the Minuteman missiles are hardened and other protective steps are eventually taken, the Minuteman may face a limited future.

"We aren't sure that the problems of adequate land-based missile survivability can be solved permanently," John Foster, the Pentagon's Director of Research and Engineering, told Congress in April. "In the unfortunate event that they cannot, a backup is to place greater emphasis and dependence on our sea-based missile forces," in the form of a new long-range submarine now being studied.

Whether the Air Force gets the go-ahead to harden the Minuteman sites is likely to depend on the Administration's current reading of the Soviet missile threat and the likelihood, as well as the possible shape, of any agreement reached in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Russians. Presumably, the Administration would postpone a decision on the hardening program if it felt that to proceed at this time might complicate the delicate SALT talks.

However, a decision to harden the sites would appear to be consistent with the Administration's continuing emphasis on and concern about the Soviet missile threat. Both Defense Secretary Laird and Mr. Foster have stressed that the continued growth of Red missiles could eventually threaten to overwhelm the Minuteman, thereby neutralizing its effectiveness as a nuclear deterrent.

Since taking office, Mr. Laird has gone to considerable length to focus public attention on Russia's efforts to enlarge its intercontinental missile force and improve its accuracy and power. On Aug. 26, for example, Mr. Laird disclosed that the Soviet had conducted two additional tests of Minuteman-sized SS11 missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles.

Any program to harden the Minuteman sites would be in addition to—not a substitute for—the limited Safeguard antiballistic missile system now going forward. "It must be recognized that the threat (to the Minuteman) could actually turn out to be considerably larger than the Safeguard defense is designed to handle," Mr. Laird said early this year.

## Other Shields Studied

The other means of protecting the Minuteman that the Air Force has studied are these:

- Placing the missiles in new silos dug in hard rock. However, this study program was terminated because it was too expensive (about $6 million a missile) and because it might have jeopardized the SALT talks. Air Force sources say if Minuteman missiles were ever emplaced in such hard rock silos it would require a "fantastic improvement in the accuracy and yield" of Soviet weapons to knock them out.

- Making the Minuteman mobile by placing it on a wheeled or air-cushion vehicle. In one form of the mobile Minuteman concept the missile could be moved to one of several "deceptive shelters," upon warning of attack, thus forcing the enemy to guess which shelter contained the missile and which was empty, in a form of the old pitchman's shell game. In addition to the expense, a major problem with the mobile concept is that it would have required considerable enlargement of missile bases. Air Force men believe this would have created a problem with citizens unhappy about the prospect of living near nuclear-tipped missiles.

- A special close-in antimissile defense for the Minuteman designed to intercept those enemy missiles that got through the Safeguard system. A close-in defense, sources say, could be added after the sites were hardened if an estimated enemy threat so required.

In its current budget, the Administration requested $77 million to study Minuteman protection concepts. The House approved the full amount, but the Senate slashed $27 million, which the Air Force still hopes to get restored.

37

WASHINGTON STAR - 25 SEPTEMBER 1970 P-6

# $19.9 Billion Approved For Pentagon Buying

A limited, four-site antiballistic missile system and a two-year, open-ended provision for military aid to Israel have been approved by Senate-House conferees.

Agreement on these and other military spending items late yesterday cleared the way for final action by both houses on a $19.9 billion military procurement authorization bill.

The dollar total represents restoration of roughly half the cuts made in the Pentagon's initial request for $29.6 billion. The House had approved a $20.5 billion figure, while the Senate had cut this $19.2 billion.

In other major decisions, the conferees:

* Kept in the bill $435 million

for new ships which the House had approved even though the Department of Defense had not requested the items. A further $152 million for a new nuclear carrier was not approved.

* Restored a House-approved $30 million item for development of an advanced "freedom fighter" aircraft for use by foreign nations requiring modern but unsophisticated jet war planes. The Senate had deleted the item.

* Retained a Senate-approved ban on use of mercenary forces in support of Laos or Cambodia. A further limitation on special combat pay for Thai and other foreign troops in Vietnam was retained in watered-down fashion which will affect only future agreements to provide such forces.

* Increased from $2.5 billion to $2.8 billion a ceiling on funds to support Vietnamese and other forces in Southeast Asia. The ceiling was moved up to cover possible increased U.S. aid as American forces leave Vietnam.

In approving a limited, four-site Safeguard ABM system, conferees scrapped an administration-sought 12-site plan which had been approved by the House.

The bill now provides for expansion of the two-site system to include two new ABM locations at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and Warren AFB in Wyoming.

Although the four-site Safeguard system approved by the conferees allows less work than the House authorized, it was the product of a major Nixon victory in the Senate over critics who tried and failed to further limit the ABM system.

## Other Actions

In other actions, the conferees restored some funds cut by the Senate for other missiles and put back $17.6 million for the Cheyenne helicopter project cut by the Senate. They also softened a controversial Senate-approved restriction on government-backed "independent research and development. The change permits work that has a "potential" military use.

The section on aid to Israel allows the President to transfer aircraft and supporting equipment "as may be necessary" to counter any increased military assistance provided other countries in the Middle East.

While details are not fully known, administration spokesmen have been quoted as telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that substantial, continuing aid is going to Israel.

Over-all, Stennis said the final form of the bill does not represent "any substantial modification that in any way impairs" military preparedness.

A House-passed proposal to require splitting of a $2.1 billion contract awarded to Litton Systems Inc. for 30 new destroyers, was rejected by the conferees. The Senate earlier had upheld the present contract.

33

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS 27 SEPT 1970 (28)

Anti-ABM forces win one

The anti-ABM forces in Congress won a victory Thursday, but at a price. In the Senate-House conference committee considering military expenditures, they succeeded in limiting new Safeguard ABM sites to two, rather than the six requested.

But before the compromise had been reached, the sound of rolling logs was loud in the marble corridors. Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), who has succeeded in making his district an armed camp, got approval for the construction of $435 million worth of ships that he wanted but the Defense Department had not requested. And Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) got $2.8 billion for the construction of 30 destroyers at a Mississippi shipyard.

High as that price is — and however dubious may be the pork-barrel projects with which it was paid — the reduction in the number of ABM sites to be built represents a healthy reassessment of the nation's military expenditures and a heartening if tentative step toward slowing down the arms race. The antiballistic-missile program is not an offensive under-

taking; it is intended only to protect our long-range nuclear missile bases. Even so, its limitation might serve the cause of peace.

The present ABM system, in process and planned, should also be challenged on the score of obsolescence, if no other. The Army is working on a new and better system that would cost about the same as originally contemplated for the Safeguard program. Congress should proceed cautiously in authorizing new expenditures.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR 28 SEPT 70

Paring at the Pentagon

39

The other day a Gallup Poll found that a majority of Americans, except in the South, favored a reduction in military spending. While this was about as expectable as a vote in favor of retaining Christmas, the Nixon administration is giving some heed to the national desire for economy at the Pentagon. And to the national need for military economy, to keep the budget from totally swamping.

The budget deficit for fiscal 1971 was originally expected to be about $1 billion. It is more likely to be $10 billion. And for fiscal '72, beginning next July, the deficit could run to a colossal $15 to $20 billion. The first reaction of a lot of Americans is likely to be: "What about all that Pentagon spending?"

The Nixon administration avers that it has pared the military budget plenty already. But there's still some more to be trimmed off. Specifically the Defense Department plans to cut three more divisions from the Army over the next nine months. The Army currently maintains 162/3 divisions, down from 192/3 at the peak of the Vietnam war — and up from the 14 divisions which existed before President Kennedy began a preparedness program to show Soviet Premier Khrushchev that the United States was no paper tiger.

Still further cuts are in contemplation — assuming that the Vietnam war is wound down satisfactorily — to reduce the standing Army to 112/3 divisions. Add in the Navy with its Polaris-Poseidon submarines and carriers, and the Air Force, and this still makes a plentifully impressive aggregation.

Meanwhile Congress is holding the Pentagon away from heavier spending on the ABM missile system. Two new ABM Safeguard sites have been approved by Congress, in addition to those existing in North Dakota and Montana. But the Nixon plan to begin expanding the ABM system (in the Northwest, New England, and elsewhere) into a "thin" defense against a possible Chinese nuclear attack, has been rejected by Congress.

So the Army is taking on a leaner aspect — probably two less divisions in South Vietnam and one less in Korea. And the ABM system is being held to its original purpose — to protect the Minuteman ICBM launching sites against a "first strike" onslaught — and not as a general area defense.

This economy has much to commend it. The United States still retains a big capacity for "flexible" response; its eggs are not all in the nuclear basket. But the Pentagon's consumption of national wealth and treasure is being safely reduced, which is what the budget needs and the public wants.

ALL STREET JOURNAL 30 SEPTEMBER 1970 PAGE 4

Defense-Procurement Bill Passed by House

341-11; Soviet's Middle East Presence Noted

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON--The House overwhelmingly passed a compromise $19.9 billion defense-procurement bill authorizing spending for a wide array of military hardware.

Approval of the bill, shaped by Senate-House conferees late last week, came on a 341-to-11 roll-call vote. The bill, which the Senate is expected to pass this week, authorized two new ABM sites to protect U.S. missiles. But it denied an Administration request for four sites to defend against a possible Chinese attack.

As passed by the House, the bill contains a provision authorizing arms credits for Israel to restore and maintain the military balance in the Middle East." In language that House Speaker McCormack termed highly unusual, the bill states that "the Congress views with the concern the deepening involvement of Soviet Union in the Middle East and the clear and present danger to world peace resulting from such involvement."

The bill authorizes $435 million above the amount requested by the Pentagon for Navy shipbuilding and $75 million for development of an advanced strategic bomber.

In conference, the House prevailed in reserving $17.6 million for the Army Cheyenne Helicopter, a program the Senate attempted to kill, and $30 million for building an international fighter, a plane that will be designed specifically for export to our Asian allies.

In their report on the conference, the House conferees were critical of the Pentagon for allegedly "foot dragging" on the international fighter. Pointing out that a contractor still hasn't been selected, the conferees said that the aircraft was in their view "a matter of the greatest urgency," because it would facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces safely from Southeast Asia.

The $19.9 billion authorized by the bill is $700 million below the Administration's request.

NEW YORK TIMES 4 OCTOBER 1970 (5) P-1

Defense Rise of $1-Billion,
First in 3 Years, Is Due

Increase Is Approved by White House
to Cover Inflation and Higher Pay—
Pentagon Counted on $5-Billion

By WILLIAM BEECHER

Special to The:

WASHINGTON, Oct. 3—The White House has told the Pentagon to plan on seeking an increase in defense spending next year. The increase would be considerably smaller than the Pentagon had been counting on, but it would represent the first upturn in military spending in three budget years.

The new Presidential guidance, issued within the last few weeks, calls for a spending level of $74.5-billion. This would be almost $1-billion more than officials expect to spend on the military this year.

But it is more than $4-billion below earlier Administration guidance figures given to the defense officials who are working on the budget that will go to Congress in January.

Because of inflation and a variety of pay increases, the higher budget would finance a considerably diminished defense establishment, officials say, with continuing sharp cuts in the number of active-duty troops, planes and ships.

Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, in an interview, said top defense officials were "troubled" by the new directive. "We're going to be very severely pushed" to come within the new ceiling, he said.

While the Administration has asked for $71.8-billion in defense spending for the current fiscal year, officials point out that actual expenditures, including pay increases already voted by Congress, should raise the total to about $73.6-billion.

This compares with expenditure totals of $78.6-billion two years ago and $77.8-billion last year.

Until the recent White House decision, the Pentagon had been working up a proposal of $79-billion for the fiscal year

starting next July 1.

About $3-billion of this was to have provided for cost-of-living pay increases and additional increases for servicemen in the lower ranks to make military careers more attractive and thus reduce dependence on the draft.

Well-placed Administration officials said that final budgetary decisions would not be made until next month, but that the general outlines of the new budget were already apparent. They said it was likely to be based on the following assumptions:

That all but about 40,000 to 50,000 of the 390,000 G.I.'s now in Vietnam will be withdrawn and many of them released from service during the new fiscal year, opening the way for cuts in the active duty forces of anywhere from 400,000 to 600,000 men. The higher number could be reached by eliminating many of the 400,000 training and supply jobs in the United States directly associated with the Vietnam effort.

That the Navy, currently scheduled to go down to 14 attack aircraft carriers in the current fiscal year—the first time it has fallen below 15 carriers in more than 10 years—may lose two more, and possibly some anti-submarine carriers as well.

That the Air Force and Navy each will lose several squadrons of vintage jet fighters, the activated planes to be turned over to the Air National Guard and Air Reserves.

That further troop cuts and base closing will take place in Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, and possibly, though no decision has yet been made, in West Germany as well.

Defense planners say that inflation alone will add about $1.5-billion to the cost of goods and services during the next budgetary year. Sophisticated new weapons—such as yet aircraft, helicopters and tanks—cost considerably more than they did a few years back. And the Administration hopes to add anywhere from $2-billion to $5-billion in pay raises.

Balance on Forces Sought

With such factors pushing up spending estimates, the savings expected from the pullout in Vietnam are not sufficient to maintain even current force levels, officials say.

Defense officials are trying to come up with a balance of forces—in all likelihood appreciably lower than the 2.6 million men under arms at the start of the Vietnam buildup—that would put some sort of lid on defense spending while enabling the United States to meet its worldwide commitments.

One major result of this effort is the so-called Nixon Doctrine, which aims at reducing American forces in the Far East to a very modest level—still undefined—while putting more of the burdens for defense on American allies in Asia.

The Pentagon has already announced that the Army will be cut back to 13 2/3 divisions by next June 30, the lowest number of divisions in the Army in a decade. An attempt will be made to improve the equipment and readiness of reserve forces to enable them to move into the breach in the event of a sudden emergency.

Mr. Packard said no decision had been made on whether the Army would be cut still further in the next budget.

Personal Problems Seen

Army cutbacks would help in terms of defense savings, he said, but it would be very difficult so long as the United States continued to earmark eight divisions for use in Western Europe in an emergency.

Another problem of cutting down the Army "too fast and too far," he said, is that a lot of good captains and majors who have had two tours of duty in Vietnam would face the prospect of waiting 10 to 15 years for their next promotion. In that situation, he said, much of the future leadership of the Army might decide to leave the service.

And yet, he said, the Administration is determined, as it cuts all the services, to ensure that advanced weapons are purchased and that active research and development continue on still better weapons.

He specifically cited the need for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers for the Navy, F-15 fighters for the Air Force, and a new tank, the Cheyenne helicopter and a new battlefield air defense missile for the Army.

The Pentagon is deferring cutbacks in some of the older weapons in the strategic nuclear forces for fear of weakening the American bargaining position in the strategic arms limitation talks.

Some planners have pointed out that substantial savings could be achieved by phasing out the 54 old Titan-2 inter-

continental ballistic missiles and a significant number of the early model B-52 bombers.

But since the United States is trying to negotiate a ceiling on the number of missiles and bombers maintained by the Soviet Union and the United States, officials feel they would be throwing away "bargaining chips" needlessly if they unilaterally decreased American strategic systems.

40

NEW YORK TIMES

7 OCTOBER 1970 P-1

HOUSE UNIT VOTES
A $2-BILLION CUT
IN DEFENSE FUNDS

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6—The House Appropriations Committee cut the Administration's "rock bottom" defense budget by $2-billion today, approving $66.6-billion in new funds for the Pentagon.

The reduction amounts to 3
per cent. The committee said
in a report that the reduced
budget should be "sufficient to
maintain adequate military
strength" in the current fiscal
year.

At the same time the com-
mittee cautioned that unless
there was a halt in the atomic
arms race, defense spending
might have to be increased in
another year to offset what it
called the growing strategic
strength of the Soviet Union.

The measure, the largest mon-
ey bill this session, will be voted
upon Thursday by the full
House. The House is expected
to go along with the Appro-
PRIATIONSE Comittee, which is
headed by George H. Mahon,
Democrat of Texas. But in the
Senate further attempts will be
made to cut the defense budget.

A Trend Continues

The committee reductions
continue the downward trend
in defense funding over the last
three years as both the Ad-
ministration and Congress,
caught in budgetary pressures,
have sought to economize in.
the military sector. The appro-
priations approved by the com-
mittee today, for the year that
began July 1, are about $8-bil-
lion below the level voted for
1968-69.

With this year's proposed
$68.7-billion budget, however,
Defense Secretary Melvin R.
Laird repeatedly made the point
to Congress that the defense
budget had been reduced to a
"rock bottom" level and that
further cuts could not be made
by Congress without impairing
the strength of the military
establishment.

But the Appropriations Com-

mittee declared in its report,
"The reductions recommended
can be accommodated without
denying programs essential to
the basic military strength of
the country."

The report was critical of
many aspects of military man-
agement and procurement. The
committee said one of the major
objectives of its reductions was
"to tighten up the operations
of the Department of Defense
and make the department more
efficient for the critical times
ahead."

"The country has every right
to expect that the appropria-
tions of more than $66-billion
will provide formidable mili-
tary forces throughout fiscal
year 1971," the committee said.

"What this country needs,"
it continued, "is more defense
for the dollar, not necessarily
more dollars for defense."

The committee nevertheless
accepted the Administration's
premise that the proposed mili-
tary budget was at an "interim"
or "transitional" level and that
spending on strategic weapons
would probably have to be in-
creased unless there was a
slackening in the Soviet stra-
tegic build-up or an agreement
to curb the atomic arms race.

"Unless there is substantial
progress in the current strate-
gic arms limitation talks or
some other arms limitation
agreements, we may be re-
quired to begin another large
step forward to buttress our
military strength," the commit-
tee said.

In line with this view, the
White House recently advised
defense officials to plan on
seeking an increase of about
$51-billion for military spending
in the fiscal year 1972.

Procurement Cut Made

The committee reduced the
$16.2-billion requested for pro-
curement by $1.1-billion. In line
with the Pentagon's new policy

of "fly before you buy," the
committee contended that some
of the planes and missiles for
which production money was
requested had not been suffi-
ciently developed and tested.

The panel approved $554-mil-
lion for continued procurement
of the C-5A transport from the
Lockheed Corporation. Includ-
ed in this amount is a $200-
million "contingency fund" to
assist Lockheed in the financial
difficulties that it has encoun-
tered in production of the
plane.

The $20.6-billion requested
for personnel was reduced by
$343.5-million. The reduction
was accompanied by criticism
of "overstaffing" in military
headquarters and complaints
over the manner in which the
Army was spending money to
train colonels and generals to
fly helicopters.

"Flying helicopters would
not appear to be the most ef-
ficient use of executive time
and talent," the committee ob-
served in calling for an end to
the Army program.

Shipbuilding Funds

The committee provided
$417-million more than re-
quested by the Administration
for shipbuilding. The addition-
al funds include $166-million
for a nuclear attack submarine
—in addition to the two pro-

posed by the Administration.

But the committee expressed
doubt that the answer to mod-
erization of the Navy "lies
in numbers of ships alone." It
suggested improvement in the
Navy's management of its ship-
building and conversion pro-
grams.

Included in the appropria-
tions bill is $1,079,900,000 to
expand the Safeguard antibal-
listic-missile system with a third
site at Whiteman Air Force
Base in Missouri and prelim-
inary work on a fourth site at
Warren Air Force Base in Wy-
oming. This expansion was in
line with the compromise
reached on the recently passed
military procurement bill, and
the ABM fight is not expected
to be renewed.

The committee deleted $3.2-
million requested by the Air
Force to conduct a "demon-
stration launch" of a Minute-
man intercontinental missile
from an operational silo at
Malmstrom Air Force Base in
Montana into the Pacific.

Aside from the adverse pub-
lic reaction over a missile's
flying over the northwestern
portion of the United States,
the committee suggested that
the cost did not justify the
purpose of "proving to the
general public that our Minute-
man missiles do constitute a
reliable and effective deter-
rent."

41

Laird cites Soviet threat

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

15 OCTOBER 1970 P-1

# Pentagon fights budget cuts

By George W. Ashworth

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird is girding the Pentagon for battle.

This time the targets are congressional foes of defense spending at the rate the Secretary desires.

Mr. Laird has declared his intention to fight over recent defense reductions voted by the House.

The Defense Secretary told reporters, "I hope to have the support of a majority of the United States Senate and the conferees of the House and the Senate when this bill gets back into conference after the election recess. ... An all-out effort will be made by the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Department of Defense to see that these funds are restored in our 1971 Appropriation act."

All the services are lobbying friendly or neutral congressmen, as well as those who might be switched.

Mr. Laird has become the general and chief of the new budget offensive, but he can be expected to call upon the senior civilians and military men in the department for help—help they are quite willing to give.

## Tough decisions ahead?

Mr. Laird has increased his public appearances, and he repeatedly hammers at the themes that the fiscal 1971 budget is a "rock-bottom, bare-bones" budget, that the Russian threat is continuing to grow, that the United States may have to sharply increase expenditures if the SALT (strategic-arms limitation) negotiations fail, and that more money is needed if the United States is ever to achieve a volunteer force.

The Defense Secretary said recently in Duluth, Minn., that "any major cuts in our proposed funding, particularly in view of the momentum of the Soviet weapons and research and development buildup, could take us below the threshold of tolerable risk."

The next day he told the San Antonio, Texas, Chamber of Commerce, "Any major reductions in these requests will endanger our national security and our pursuit of peace."

Still later he went on national television and gloomily warned, "Unless we have success in SALT and these other negotiating areas, we are going to have to face up to some hard, tough decisions here which could require a tremendous increase as far as defense expenditures are concerned."

The cause of the secretarial furor has been the inclination on Capitol Hill to keep slicing away at defense budgets. Recently, the House voted 274 to 31 to cut defense expenditures for fiscal 1971 by $2 billion.

Actually, the cut was more than that, for the reduced appropriation included about $500 million Rep. L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina wanted added for more ships and submarines the Pentagon had not requested.

Many senators and congressmen remained convinced that there is still a sizable cushion in defense-budget requests. Some believe that the Pentagon will still be able to find the money it needs for crucial projects despite cutting, and they believe constant budgetary pressures may force the Pentagon into some cost cutting that only it can achieve.

While few doubt that money continues to be spent unnecessarily by the defense establishment, there is a real question whether the establishment can cut only in unnecessary areas. What is more likely, some officials argue, is that the unnecessary spending will be reduced but not eliminated and that some necessary projects might go by the board as well.

## Results sought

Essentially, Mr. Laird is hoping to achieve two major results with the Pentagon's new offensive:

* He would like to get most, if not all, of the $2 billion cut in obligatory authority restored, although he is undoubtedly willing to make compromises.

* At the same time, Mr. Laird hopes to drive the point home to the public and on the Hill that defense budgets have now about reached the lowest level possible. If this argument is accepted, the way should be easier for the Pentagon to get more funds later to move toward a volunteer army and to meet threats.

In a press conference, the Secretary reiterated that he hopes to get to a "zero-draft" situation by the end of fiscal 1973, and he has ordered everybody to work toward that goal. This puts the Pentagon in a position to argue that this sought-after goal will be impossible to achieve unless more money is forthcoming.

"Turning to immediate problems at hand, Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor told the Association of the United States Army, "To meet the twin pressures of rising costs and a reduced defense budget, the Army has been compelled to embark on the most drastic reduction since the demobilization following World War II...."

"It has been announced that Army military manpower will be reduced significantly over two years—from over 1,500,000 in June, 1969, to slightly over 1,200,000 in June, 1971. However, we may have to make even further reductions due to budget pressures."

Continued pressure for heavy budget cutting may have surprised the Defense Secretary. The budget he gave to Congress early this year was indeed a substantially reduced one, although it had in it enough items that could safely, in Mr. Laird's view, be cut without causing security problems. Now he appears genuinely worried.

Under present plans, the Army is losing essentially all the manpower it had fighting in Vietnam. The Navy appears heading toward a 500-ship level, which will make it roughly comparable in size to the pre-World War II Navy.

The Air Force is experiencing similar cuts. And the Marines are fast falling back to their pre-Vietnam strength.

Essentially, the Pentagon will argue that what it is doing to cut back is enough. And it will try to convince Congress and the public that more—not less—must be spent if present goals are to be met.

46

47

EN YORK TIMES 15 OCT 70 P47THURSDAY MORNING, 15 OCTOBER 1970

# Defense Costs—Huge but Vital

By CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

For some years the budget for na-
tional defense has been the favorite
target for most people urging reduc-
tions in Federal expenditures or seek-
ing funds to be diverted to different
projects. Simply because of sheer size
defense has necessarily attracted the
attention of both groups.

In spite of this attention, expendi-
tures for defense remained the largest
single item in the budget through the
1960s. They rose steadily from $45.9
billion in fiscal 1960 to $81 billion in
1969.

Not until this administration came
in was the pattern changed. As a
result of the President's policies the
first genuine cuts have been made.
The Administration's proposed 1971
defense budget of $71.8 billion repre-
sents a cut of $6 billion from 1970.
The House has recently proposed addi-
tional cuts of $2 billion. These would
bring defense down to less than
37 per cent of the total budget, the
lowest since the Korean war.

Why has it proven so difficult to cut
the defense budget? Is there any pos-
sibility that similar reductions can be
made?

As one who has been given some
responsibility for keeping the defense
budget at the lowest possible level
consistent with achievement of our
national objectives, I offer the follow-
ing considerations:

First, the objectives of defense
spending are substantial. These objec-
tives are nothing less than our survival
as a free nation in a world that cannot
be considered completely friendly.

Our formal alliances to some forty-
five nations around the globe simply
cannot be carried out without a very
large investment in armed forces.
Maintenance of strategic nuclear forces
to counter the threat posed by the
Soviet Union is not inexpensive.

Secondly, the defense budget is the
result of complex factors. It implies
the government's best answer to ques-
tions concerning the most sophisti-

cated technology, delicate diplomacy.
and complicated strategy, based on
incomplete knowledge and limited con-
trol of future events. The uncertainties
substantially increase pressure to err
on the side of caution and spend too
much rather than too little.

Another difficulty is close intercon-
nections between programs. The main-
tenance of large ground forces in the
United States prepared to meet certain
contingencies may be agreed on, but
what is the point of having these
forces available unless we have effi-
cient airlift and sealift capabilities?
The interconnections between pro-
grams involving strategic nuclear
weapons are very complex. But again,
the cost of error is high, both in risks
and in gaining back lost ground
through crash programs if necessary.

Simply to maintain the same force
in readiness costs more each year. Pay
raises have driven up the costs, Equip-
ment grows old and has to be replaced.
Pay and price increases will drive up
the cost of a static defense structure
by as much as 5 per cent from 1971
to 1972; keeping the dollars constant
would mean a cut in the forces of
5 per cent. Technological improvements
cost more in absolute terms, and we
cannot usually offset these higher costs
completely with lower quantities.

Finally, the immense size of the
defense budget means that even sub-
stantial cuts are likely to go unnoticed.
Thus, a cut of $6 billion between the
1970 and 1971 defense budget, suffi-
cient to eliminate the budgets of most
other programs entirely, has not di-
minished the cries of those who object
in simplistic terms to the size of the
defense budget; nor has the recent
house cut of an additional $2 billion
satisfied these critics. The budget still
amounts to more than $66 billion, they
single-mindedly point out.

There are some particular difficulties
involved in reducing the defense budget
for the next year.

The increasing costs of personnel
and equipment modernizations will
continue to be with us. The President's
commitment to an all-volunteer armed

force will require more money, even
though total manpower may be re-
duced.

Although the President has indicated
a shift in the level of preparedness
of our general purpose forces from a
2½ to a 1½ war strategy, the transi-
tion must be accomplished prudently.

Another important consideration is
the SALT talks. These talks hold
promise for constructive agreements
which would limit or reduce the costs
of the strategic nuclear forces. Pre-
mature or unilateral action on our part
to reduce these forces prior to agree-
ments, however, would be imprudent.
We cannot forget that the balance of
forces helped create the climate for
these talks in the first place.

Finally, and this is the most un-
pleasant consideration, it is still a fact
that the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.
and China are maintained at extremely
high levels and their strategic nuclear
forces are increasing. That these coun-
tries are not only ready but willing to
use the forces at their disposal has
been shown in the clashes between
them, but more significantly for the
United States, in India, in Czechoslo-
vokia, in Burma, and indirectly in the
Middle East.

While Russia already possesses more
land-based ICBMs than this country
(1,300 compared with 1,054, according
to the Institute for Strategic Studies),
a superiority for which our more
numerous Polaris and Poseidon mis-
siles adequately compensate now, the
Soviets continue to build them and
continue to expand their naval forces.
In this state of affairs, it would be
less than prudent to make radical re-
ductions in our levels of capability
beyond those already made.

Of course, reductions of troop levels
in Vietnam should result in significant
savings. But these savings will help
to hold defense spending relatively
level, not decrease it.

But only if we keep in mind all the
other extremely difficult issues can we
have an enlightened discussion of the
nation's priorities and how best to
allocate Federal resources to achieve
them.

WASHINGTON POST 22 OCTOBER 70 Pg 1

Pentagon Triples Budget for Project

Navy Gets Go-Ahead
on Missile Subs

By Michael Geller

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Defense Department, uneasy about the Soviet nuclear weapons build-up and uncertain over prospects for halting the arms race, has given the Navy a go-ahead to triple the money it has budgeted for design of a mammoth new class of missile-firing submarines and a new long-range missile to go aboard them.

Sources close to the program say the project's $44 million budget for this year will be increased to about $130 million in the new military spending request which goes to Capitol Hill next January.

The new submarine-missile combination is meant as a potential successor to all or part of the current 41-boat fleet of Polaris and Poseidon-equipped U.S. submarines.

Because of the much longer range of their missiles, however, the new subs will be able to cruise several thousand miles off hostile shores and still be within reach of their targets, rather than inside 800 miles as is now common with Polaris subs.

This, in turn, vastly expands the area Soviet sub hunters must search if they are to find and destroy these missile carriers during wartime.

The stepped up financial backing next year will allow the Navy and its main industrial contractor on the project — the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics — to complete final design of the submarine and to start developing and testing critical components.

Most importantly, it will put the Pentagon in a position next year to order full-scale development and production of the system if it appears that little headway is being made at the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) which resume in Helsinki Nov. 2.

In recent months, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has repeatedly referred to "tough" and "expensive" decisions that must be faced within the next 1½ months unless there is progress at SALT.

On those same occasions, he has consistently singled out the Navy's proposed Underwater Long-range Missile System (ULMS) as typical of the decisions that lie ahead.

Explaining the need for a decision soon, Laird has pointed out that because of the time it takes to produce such a complex new weapon it would be 1978 at the earliest before the United States has its first new sub of this class even if a go-ahead were given right now.

By the late 1970s, defense planners fear that Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) may be accurate enough and numerous enough to overwhelm a U.S. antiballistic missile (ABM) system and wipe out most of the land-based Minuteman force.

The growing fleet of Soviet missile-firing submarines, they believe, might also outflank the U.S. early warning system and destroy much of the bomber force in a surprise strike before it gets off the ground.

That would still leave the Polaris/Poseidon force of 656 missiles aboard 41 submarines, which at the moment are judged to be all but invulnerable to Soviet attack.

However, defense planners also stress that "anti-submarine warfare techniques are improving and there is a reasonable chance that late in this decade we may not feel so confident."

To Outrace Soviets

ULMS is being designed to overcome the prospect that Russian technology and a growing armada of anti-submarine warfare ships, planes and submarines might eventually catch up with the Polaris/Poseidon force.

Though several key design decisions are still to be made, sources close to the project say ULMS is taking shape along these lines:

* The vessel itself will be huge, an estimated 1½ times as big as the largest existing Polaris subs.

Its size will create some problems, however, including the need for new port facilities and probably new submarine tenders.

* Each ULMS will probably carry a load of 24 missiles in comparison to the 16 on Polaris subs.

There is some chance that the Navy may stick to 16 missiles per boat, but Pentagon sources say the larger number is favored now as a way to reduce cost by cutting the number of submarines needed. On the other hand, some officials are concerned that this will also allow the Soviets to put more ships against each sub.

* With 24 missiles per sub, Defense officials estimate a fleet of 15 vessels can be built for less than $10 billion spread over the next eight to ten years, including the missile costs. Other Navy sources believe the cost will be closer to $11 or $12 billion.

A fleet of about 25 subs with 16 missiles each would cost about $15 billion.

* The missiles—under study by Lockheed—will be longer and wider than Poseidon, with a range of between 4,500 and 6,500 nautical miles in comparison to the 2,800-mile reach of Poseidon.

* The Navy is expected to make use of the existing MIRV warhead of Poseidon on the new missile. Officials point out that the role of ULMS is not to deliver more megatonnage on target but to keep the existing deterrent safe.

Quiet Submarine

* The most intensive effort by far will be aimed at making ULMS an extremely quiet submarine, using the very latest techniques to keep noise of machinery, nuclear power plant and propellers from the sonar screens of Soviet sub hunters.

ULMS will rely for its survival on its ability to prevent detection. It will not be armed with torpedoes, nor is it likely to be able to outrun attack submarines.

As an additional evasion measure, however, it will probably be able to dive deeper than the 1,000-foot-plus level of today's U.S. missile subs. It is also being equipped with sophisticated electronic and acoustic spoofing equipment intended to throw any Soviet ship nearby off its trail.

ULMS, officials also point out, will be the first U.S. missile-firing sub designed from the start for that role. As such, they expect that it will be easier to solve the noise problem and that the sub will be better suited for staying on station for longer periods of time and will require much less in-port maintenance.

43

At any one time, almost half the current Polaris/Poseidon force is normally being repaired, overhauled or en route to and from station.

Because ULMS can stay on station longer than Polaris, officials estimate that the U.S. could maintain the same amount of striking power at sea as it now has but with 30 to 40 per cent fewer missiles.

This feature could be important with respect to any forthcoming SALT agreement.

Some defense and Navy officials feel that ULMS will move ahead even with an agreement since at some point it will be necessary to replace the older vessels in the Polaris/Poseidon fleet upon which an agreement may be based. Adding ULMS would reduce, rather than add to, the number of missiles actually deployed, they say, and its warhead is no more powerful, at least as now planned, than the one on Poseidon and less powerful than Minuteman.

## Strategic Advantages

Strategically, ULMS also has some significant advantages, in the view of Defense officials.

The longer reach of its missiles, officials explain, will allow shifting boats with Soviet targets from the relative confinement of the Norwegian Sea to broad areas in the Atlantic much closer to the United States.

This eliminates the need for overseas ports, increases Soviet search problems and also brings U.S. submarines within reach of protective air cover from land-based planes and closer to normal operating areas of Atlantic fleet destroyers.

Operating closer to home also would help ease a communications problem with submerged submarines which has occasionally played havoc with U.S. military planners.

Communications with Polaris subs is done via shore stations, relay aircraft and ships, but there have been instances when technical breakdowns or atmospheric conditions have delayed contact.

These occasional technical breakdowns have taken place with Minuteman as well, and they underscore one reason why many top Defense officials are reluctant to depend only on a single retaliatory system even though it is becoming increasingly hard and expensive to guarantee the survival of land-based systems.

## Missile Accuracy

There are other reasons, too.

A missile launched from an 8,000-ton submarine that is drifting off station at one foot per second, about the speed of a baby crawling, will land a mile off course when it reaches its destination.

Because of this, Polaris and Poseidon are targeted for Soviet cities rather than for pinpoint military installations such as missile silos or command centers.

If the United States were left with just this sea-based force after a Soviet attack, the only option left to the President would be to strike at Russian cities rather than at any remaining war-making capabilities.

President Nixon has said he doesn't like the limitation and has used this rationale to support Safeguard ABM protection for Minuteman.

The Navy, however, is now working to improve missile accuracy.

Included in the ULMS missile studies is a new navigation system for the submarine and a new guidance system for the missile which would use star sightings in flight to correct launch errors.

If the Navy is successful in bringing pinpoint accuracy to the new ULMS missile, it may add even more fuel to the fight now going on between the two services over which service will prevail over the

major weapon systems of the 1980s.

43

BALTIMORE SUN

23 OCT 70 Pgl

DEFENSE CUT
IS PREDICTED

BY CHARLES W. CORDDRY

Washington Bureau Of The Sun

Washington, Oct. 22—The Nixon administration currently expects to cut defense spending again next year, despite heavy pressures tending to drive it up over this year's projected $71.8 billion.

Authorities who disclosed this
today said the forecast of a
modest reduction in the budget
going to Congress in January—
or at least holding the line—is
based chiefly on a rapid winding
down of American participation
in the Vietnam war.

Another major factor, it was
noted, is the probability that de-
cisions on whether to put new
strategic nuclear weapons into
production will be delayed
again, in the hope that some
sort of agreement will emerge
from the arms limitation talks
resuming next month in Helsin-
ki.

The main strategic weapons
involved here are the Navy's
proposed new submarine and ul-
tra long-range missile to be car-
ried in it, and the Air Force's
long-proposed supersonic B-1
bomber to replace dwindling
numbers of B-52's.

Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of
Defense, has warned continually
that weapons of this sort may
have to be produced unless
there are reasonably early sign
of a limitation agreement. The
reason is that they take years to
develop and produce and, bar-
ring an agreement, must be
available in time to avert
achievement of strategic nucle-
ar superiority by the Soviet Un-
ion.

There apparently has been no
let-up in Soviet strategic weap-

ons development during the
talks and there is now widely
considered to be a condition of
nuclear parity between the two
countries.

Nevertheless, authorities indi-
cated that both the new submar-
ine and missile combination,
and the B-1 bomber, are likely
to be kept in the research and
development stage in the budget
going to Congress in January to
cover the fiscal year starting
July 1, 1971.

Both will get money increases,
but will not become huge pro-
jects, as such weapons go. For
example, the submarine is get-
ting $44 million this year and
may receive upwards of $100
million next. But commitment to
buy a fleet would eventually en-
tail multibillion-dollar outlays.

By pursuing this course, the
administration keeps its option
to proceed with production later.

Decisions Two Months Off

Authorities noted that presi-
dential decisions on these key
issues, and others such as con-
tinuation of the anti-ballistic
missile system, are about two
months away. Also, Mr. Laird
and the deputy defense secre-
tary, David Packard, will be
spending the time until then
going over all the issues in de-
tail.

But in regard to the prospect
of a budget cut, now being
worked on, it was pointed out
that President Nixon is. fully
aware of the general course
being taken and has directed no
alterations.

The anti-ballistic missile, like
the submarine and bomber, po-
ses a current financing problem
because it is unknown whether
an arms deal will be made. But,
unlike the other two, it is al-
ready in production and a key
negotiating card. It is unlikely
that less than $1.3 billion will be
proposed for next year's install-
ment.

Aircraft Carrier

Another major expenditure
item that is as yet unresolved,
apparently, is the Navy's fourth
nuclear-powered aircraft car-
rier. Congress disallowed start-
ing funds this year, for a ship
ultimately to cost $640 million.
But the Navy will press the case
again, either next year or the
year after.

Faced with cuts in carrier
forces, Admiral Elmo R. Zum-
walt, Jr., chief of naval opera-
tions, continues to press the
need for 15 aircraft carriers. His
position, authorities said, is as
stated in July: "Th Navy in my
judgment needs its 15 (large at-
tack carriers). I intend to so
state to any audience."

Next month, with the decom-
missioning of the Shangri-La,
the carrier fleet will be down at

least temporarily to 14 and
could go lower under budget
stringencies.

The Vietnam war cost, whose
decline is the major hope for a
budget cut, is expected to be
down to an annual rate of $11
billion by next summer. That is
considerably under half the cost
when the Nixon administration
began troop withdrawals.

50

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 27 October 1970 P10

# Defense Cuts Blamed on Radicalism

By JOHN F. CLANCY
Of The Inquirer Staff

Reduced Federal appropriations for defense research and development have "grave implications for the future military strength of the entire free world" and for the future economic growth of the United States. Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard said Monday.

Packard, in the keynote address to the opening of the 25th international conference of the Instrument Society of America at the Civic Center, blamed radical elements on the campus; the scientific community and the general population for congressional appropriation cuts.

The United States at present is "from two to four years ahead of the Soviet Union in every important area of weapons technology," he said. "Our weapons are better now because we developed a substantial lead in technology during the World War II. And we have maintained high levels of research and development to stay ahead ever since."

But if this country ever loses that lead, he said, we would face a threat of Soviet superiority "in every important area of military weapons, in strategic nuclear forces, in naval forces and in conventional ground forces. No responsible Administration official nor any member of Congress can afford, in my opinion, to take that gamble with the future security of our nation and the future safety of our people."

Packard emphasized he was not trying to "make a case for higher military budgets." But with reduced military forces, he said, "we cannot afford to have at the same time inferior weapons."

## RESEARCH CUTBACK

"Unfortunately, the House has cut back this year our request for research and development funds, and unless we can reverse this trend there will be only one possible result — the Soviet Union will come to have a larger and better military defense research and development (R&D) effort, and in due course, will have superior weapons in every category," he said.

Packard agreed that R&D efforts need not be supported solely by the Defense Depart-

ment, but with other Federal funds, but he said "we get a double benefit from Defense - supported research and development."

"A high level of R&D is the only way we can be assured of superior weapons in the future," he said, "and on the average, a defense dollar supporting R&D will contribute to this country's economic and social progress just as effectively as a non-defense dollar supporting R&D."

## UNIVERSITY REFUSALS

He said he was "not particularly troubled that a few university facilities have chosen not to support Defense-funded research ... there are many other universities where defense support is welcome, and there are many scientists and engineers to do the work."

He told a press conference later that he hoped it would be only a "temporary phenomena" and predicted that it would be "unfortunate for the universities not for the Defense Department."

51

PHILA. INQUIRER

28 OCT 1970 Pg4

# New Plan Laid To Pentagon on Arms Spending

By JAMES McCARTNEY

Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON. Oct 27. — A former top member of President Nixon's National Security Council staff believes there is a "real possibility" that the Pentagon is preparing for a new round of massive spending on strategic arms. He says it isn't necessary.

The former White House official is Morton H. Halperin, who quit as a senior member of Dr. Henry Kissinger's NSC staff to work for the highly respected Brookings Institution here.

## WORKED AT PENTAGON

Halperin was a defense planner for Kissinger in the early months of the Nixon Administration. Before that he was a disarmament expert at the Pentagon.

He told a news conference here that the United States is far ahead of the Soviet Union in every major area of strategic arms technology nad it would take the Soviets years to catch up.

He appeared with Herbert Scoville Jr., former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to challenge what they described as a growing propaganda campaign to sell the idea that the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union in strategic weapons.

## AHEAD, NOT BEHIND

In a joint statement they declared: "The United States is ahead, not behind, the Soviet Union by any important measure of strategic force effectiveness."

"American strategic forces have never been stronger and they are rapidly increasing in capability at the present time."

Both strike under auspices of the Federation of American Scientists.

Both said they were concerned about a campaign being mounted on the eve of the national elections by the American Security Council. ASC aimed at drumming up support for huge new defense expenditures.

## CONDUCT CAMPAIGN

The ASC is a conservatively oriented private organization which has been conducting a mail and newspaper advertising drive designed to show that the United States is falling behind the Soviets in nuclear strength.

The scientists said that the campaign is trying to "scare or stampede" the U. S. public.

Scoville said that while it is true that the Soviets have built up "tremendous momentum" in a program to build new missiles, the United States also has been expanding its strategic forces, and also has a program with "tremendous momentum" going.

He said that the total number of deliverable nuclear warheads in the U. S. arsenal is being increased from a present strength of about 2000 to about 7000 by the mid-1970s.

## HINTS ON INCREASE

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has hinted at the possibility of new increases in spending for strategic weapons.

Laird said on Oct. 11 that a "tremendous increase" in military expenditures would be seriously considered by the United States unless the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviets prove successful.

He has not expanded on the statement since.

It has been reported, however, that the Navy has been given a go-ahead already to triple money budgeted for design of a mammoth new class of missile-firing submarines to replace the Polaris.

Both Halperin and Scoville said they were concerned that the White House and Defense Department have made no effort to respond with factual information to false statements in the ASC campaign.

52

BOSTON GLOBE 26 NOVEMBER 1970 (2 DECEMBER 1970)

# The Pentagon's budget: pressure to cut, pressure to increase continues to grow

By Victor K. McElheny
Globe Staff

Just before the elections, a group of prominent "hawk" military men and scientists took a full-page ad in the New York Times to denounce disarmament-minded liberals for striping the nation's defenses.

The "peace through strength" call for votes against liberals in Congress, made by the so-called National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council, was almost the only discussion of military issues in a campaign where even Vietnam was virtually taboo.

The advertisement's discussion of a "megaton gap" between the Soviet Union and the US was immediately labeled as misleading "scare tactics" by the disarmament-oriented Federation of American Scientists.

The FAS said that numbers of bombs and warheads were what counted, not total explosive power.

Whatever the merits, the ad and its point of view had little effect in an election where economic recession, an issue favorable to liberals, ended up having more impact than law and order questions, the chief topic chosen by President Nixon and the conservative candidates he campaigned for.

To many observers the ad appeared to fall wide of the mark in a time of dis-

proval of the military, expensive failure in Vietnam, cost overruns on most new weapons, and continual agony over the draft.

Nonetheless, the advertisement was a reminder of the many political-military issues which will be argued in the next two years.

At the heart of the debate is money. There is pressure to spend more of it, or less of it, on defense.

The pressure to spend more comes from thousands of aerospace scientists and engineers — many of them residents of San Jose, Calif. — left jobless by cutbacks in strategic weapons development and purchase.

It comes from companies like California's North American Rockwell, which does not know if the planned B-1 low-flying strategic bomber will be purchased in quantity. B-1 funds were cut in Congress this year.

Pressure comes from an Air Force which sees the credibility of its 1000 missile force of Minutemen shrinking as the Soviets increase missiles, warheads and accuracy.

The Air Force "wants to harden" its Minutemen, which are getting multiple warheads, and to buy some 200 of those B-1s at a cost of $10 to $20 billion.

Although the Army is getting an antiballistic missile (ABM), it is losing disvisions. Although the Navy may get a longer-range, quieter missile sub, it is in danger of losing aircraft carriers.

Pressure comes too from a politician like Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), just reelected with 80 percent of his defense-linked states' vote.

But there are equally strong pressures on the Nixon Administration, which lost prestige in the 1970 voting, to keep cutting defense budgets as they have been cut in the past two years.

Laird lately has been saying that the budget for the next fiscal year will have to rise instead of fall again. The level this year is some $7 billion below the peak of two years ago.

In a speech at the Economic Club of New York last week, Laird said the Pentagon budget "must at least remain stable in terms of real purchasing power," that is, to account for inflation it must go up at least $1 billion over the current $73.6 billion.

But only early October, on the advice of its appropriations committee, not a notably anti-military body, the House cut $2 billion out of the $66 billion Nixon Administration request for new contracting authority in the current budget year.

The vote of 274 to 31 was a strong sign of widespread feeling in the country that defense spending should continue downward.

That feeling was underscored by the re-election of Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), chief investigator of cost overruns on such projects as the huge C5A transport plane.

One reason for feeling that the megaton gap advertisement misread public sentiment was the trouble President Nixon himself ran into late in his 1968 campaign where he declared the US must have nuclear "superiority" over the Soviet Union.

For the Democrats, this declaration immediately mobilized large numbers of disgruntled, hitherto inactive voters who had supported Sen. Robert Kennedy and Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy.

Immediately after his augmentation, following a paper thin victory, Mr. Nixon substituted the term sufficiency for superiority.

The impact of the Nixon statement led the contentious Democratic party theorist and speechwriter Richard Goodwin to argue in The New Yorker magazine that disarmament might turn out to be a helpful issue for Democrats

as they rebuilt from the ashes of Chicago.

Goodwin harked backed to President John Kennedy's surprise in 1963 when western audiences cheered every mention of the treaty banning tests of nuclear devices in the air, oceans and space. The treaty had difficulty passing the Senate.

The American public may be much more afraid of nuclear war than suspected, Goodwin wrote, and might reward politicians who made real progress toward caging nuclear demons.

Whether or not this is true, the Nixon Administration didn't stress during the recent campaign the negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit strategic arms.

These so-called SALT negotiations began in Helsinki, Finland, last November, resumed in Vienna last April, recessed in August and resumed in Helsinki Nov. 2.

An American proposal for "freezing" present numbers of bombers and land-based and submarine rockets is now being discussed.

Despite this, the Nixon Administration's only statement during the campaign about defense appeared to express pessimism about SALT.

On Oct. 11 Laird said that unless progress was made on SALT he would have to give the green light to the longer-range submarine missile program, which could cost $10 billion or more.

It was as if Laird were using the new subs as another "bargaining chip" at SALT, beyond the ABM.

53

By JAMES McCARTNEY

Of Our Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON.

PRESIDENT Nixon's slashing attack on the nation's semi-sacred defense budget is coming deep into the economy. Literally thousands of men have been thrown out of work as a direct result, contributing heavily to unemployment.

Hundreds of communities across the land — from tiny places like Valley Forge, Pa., to good-sized cities like Seattle, Wash. — have been hit hard. Southern California's aerospace industry is reeling from the shock.

Even though the defense budget is about to rise once again, the effects of cuts over the last two years continue to hit home.

Mr. Nixon's program, which has been masterminded by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, is sweeping in its scope.

Yet because it evolved bit-by-bit over a two-year period its full dimensions have not been widely understood.

Here is the way it adds up now, in terms of people affected, at the end of the two-year period.

—MORE THAN 1,200,000 defense contract workers have been slashed. Many have been scientists and engineers.

MILITARY MANPOWER the number of men in uniform—has been cut by 639,000.

—CIVILIAN EMPLOYS OF the military mechanism are down about 142,000.

This, however, is only one way to look at the cutbacks. There are other kinds of measuring rods.

The number of ships in the Navy, for example, has been cut by 150—from a high in the early days of the Nixon Administration of 858.

The number of divisions in the Army has been cut. It was up to 19 and two-thirds divisions. Now the new figure has been set at 13 and one-third divisions.

That is the lowest strength for Army divisions in a decade.

The Air Force has also been hit.

The number of planes in the Air Force is down by about 10 percent. That's a slash of about 5000 aircraft.

## Biggest Factor

All this has struck raw

desires across the land.

Administration officials widely acknowledge that the defense cuts are the greatest single contributing factor to the current unemployment problem.

That problem is now considerable.

In round numbers, as of the end of September there were about 4,700,000 unemployed.

The figure represents a growth of 1,900,000 million during the Nixon Administration. The number of unemployed when the Administration took office was about 2,800,000.

As computed by Defense Department Comptroller Robert C. Moot, defense cuts have fed about 1,200,000 men into the labor force during this period.

“We have let that many men go, you could say,” says Moot.

“You can’t say that every man we’ve released has become unemployed. It’s not that simple.

“It’s not a one-for-one thing.

“But we are the most significant contributors to the unemployment problem.”

## Where It's At

Moot notes that a careful study of unemployment shows quite clearly that the major pockets of unemployment have occurred where defense cuts have been made.

By far the hardest hit region has been the West Coast—all the way from the southern California aerospace complex to the state of Washington. This one area has absorbed almost a third of the impact in unemployment from defense cutbacks—about 32 percent of the total.

The so-called “North Central” region of the country — including Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri and Kansas — ranks second, with 17 percent.

Percentages in other regions are: South Central (including Louisiana and Texas) 16.7 percent; New England (including Massachusetts and Connecticut) 12 percent; South Atlantic (including Georgia and Florida) 9 percent; Middle Atlantic (including Pennsylvania) 9 percent; Mountain, 4.

In some particular industries the impact has simply knocked business for a loop.

## Chain Reaction

Defense cutbacks, for example, have slashed demand for aircraft and aircraft parts by 44 percent.

The electronics industry has also been affected heavily. The slash in demand for electronic equipment amounts to 23 percent.

In some towns and cities across the land this has meant something like localized depression.

Probably the worst hit city in the country has been Seattle, which has depended on Boeing Aircraft for its economic survival.

Seattle, like many a southern California town, is a waste-land.

But many a smaller place has suffered quietly.

Valley Forge, Pa., a suburb of Philadelphia, was one of the first to be hit in the early days of the Nixon Administration. The Administration canceled the so-called “Manned Orbital Laboratory” program—sometimes called the “MOL” program.

A major contractor was General Electric, with a plant in the Valley Forge area.

Raymond Bell Posey, executive vice-president of the Valley Forge Chamber of Commerce, estimates that retail sales in the area have dropped about five or six percent since the contract was cancelled.

He says about 4500 men lost jobs, many of them white collar professionals.

“But this is such a diversified area,” he says, “that the impact has not been severe.”

He points out that many of the employes of the General Electric plant commuted from Philadelphia, or Pottstown, or even from New Jersey—often traveling as far as 20 miles to get to work.

Thus the Philadelphia area has absorbed the loss, and many who lost work have found other jobs, he believes.

This kind of pattern is repeated elsewhere. The “one industry” town is no longer common in the U. S., and thus most cities can absorb defense contract losses without disaster.

## Congress Resists

In terms of dollars, the Nixon Administration actually sought to slash the defense budget by about $6 billion—but has not succeeded in getting all requested cuts through Congress.

Administration officials — particularly Defense Secretary Laird—have been plain-spoken in stating that they did not think the economy ought to depend on artificial stimulus from defense spending.

The President has made his attitudes clear on this subject privately.

In other words, the Administration does not wish to support a kind of “military-industrial complex” to keep employment high, according to officials.

This could be a courageous political point of view on the part of the Administration for which it has gotten little public credit.

The defense cutback program, however, has clearly ended.

Last year's final Administration proposal was for $71.8 billion. A rise of at least several billion is now in prospect — probably to about $74 or $75 billion.

It could go much higher if Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union fail.

55

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 1 December 1970

# Defense Cuts Sent Economy Reeling

56

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 2 DECEMBER 1970

# The jaws of the dilemma

By Joseph C. Harsch

Washington

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has served notice that the defense budget has been cut back as far as can safely be cut and that instead of going down it will probably have to go up.

But at the same time President Nixon is hoping to extract from the Congress a new welfare program which will increase the cost of welfare. And his White House planners are at work on a new national health program expected to add from five to eight billion a year to the budget. And every department of government concerned with the quality of life in the United States is lining up with more new programs adding more money to the federal budget.

## Put up more money

But, no one in high places in Washington has come forward to suggest that, if the U.S. is to remain a world military power and also bring itself up to date in terms of social welfare and public amenities, the taxpayers must put up more money for it.

At present levels of taxation the U.S. can remain a great military power, but lag behind in modern social and public services. Or it can catch up with the more advanced countries in public and social services, but lag behind in military power. But it can't do both.

The most prominent single feature of the state of the nations of the world these days is that those with the greatest military power — the U.S. and Soviet Russia

— are lagging behind in social and public amenities. Those most advanced in social and public services have largely or entirely opted out of military power. Germany and Japan head the list. Britain is not far behind. The Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and the Netherlands are also cases in point.

All of these countries are well ahead of both the U.S. and Russia in eliminating poverty, in eliminating slums, in providing high-quality medical services, in such amenities as public transportation, in low-cost housing, even in the arts.

## Torrent of inflation

All of them have paid for their relative advance in social services and public amenities either by raising taxes or doing without military power or both. The British carry roughly the same tax load as do the Americans — just a trifle higher—but are far ahead in such areas as public housing and national health. They have paid for it by giving up the "burden of empire," the armed forces which go with empire.

No country in the world today has yet managed to be in the forefront both of military power and of social progress.

It is a favorite boast of American politicians that the U.S. is rich enough to be able to afford both military power and the best things in the way of life at home.

It may well be true that the country is rich enough

to afford to lead in both fields, but only if it would tax itself well beyond present levels of taxation. Try to have both without raising taxes is to invite such a torrent of inflation as would make the present rate seem like nothing more than a gentle spring rain.

Mr. Nixon clearly intends to go into the 1972 election campaign on a record of major advances along the welfare and public amenities front. But he also shows every intention of keeping the U.S. at least on a level of parity with the Russians. He would like to include in his reform package the end of military conscription. But this would raise the military budget even further. If men are to volunteer for soldiering, they must needs be paid more than the going wages in the U.S.

## Plain speaking

These are the jaws of Mr. Nixon's dilemma.

He wishes, and intends, to give the U.S. one of the most ambitious reform and domestic improvement programs of all time.

He wishes, and intends, to keep the U.S. in the forefront of military power.

But he has yet to show any sign that he knows that he must raise the tax levels to accomplish all this without disastrous inflation.

He has yet to say that the United States wants the best, and can afford the best, and must someday learn to be willing to pay for the best.

That is precisely the kind of plain speaking that the American people expect to get from Republican presidents. So far, they haven't had it.

WASHINGTON POST
4 December 1971 P23(6)

# Hearing Opens on Hill
## Into Cost of Weapons

The Senate Armed Services Committee, concerned that U.S. weapons may be getting too expensive to buy in sufficient quantities and too complicated to hold up well in combat, opened a series of hearings yesterday to find out "what sort of reforms will give us a better product."

The committee was assured by the Pentagon's top scientist, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., that the dual problems of cost and complexity were also receiving "the most urgent attention" of the military.

"We are scrubbing the gold-plating with a wire brush," Foster said, referring to the tendency to load up new weapons with every conceivable kind of high-priced, "gold-plated" extra.

But the committee also heard a top civilian expert warn that unless the Pentagon stops letting the developers of new weapons also play the key role in evaluating their actual performance, it will remain hard to control costs and assure that the right weapons are built.

The warning came from Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, who headed a year-long, presidentially appointed Blue Ribbon Panel that sharply criticized many of the Pentagon's policies for developing, buying and testing new weapons in a report issued in July, 1970.

Fitzhugh, conceding that he hadn't been able to follow the Pentagon's habits as closely since the panel's work was concluded, said he did see some encouraging signs that the current Defense Department hierarchy was indeed making improvements.

But he reiterated a key panel recommendation, thus far mainly avoided by the Pentagon, that an independent group be set up within the department to oversee the operational testing and evaluation of new weapons.

Fitzhugh stressed that the military service that was slated to use the new equipment would continue to carry out the actual testing. But "the operators can get carried away," and an independent group of "about 20-25 top-level experts needs to be set up in

the Defense Department to do the monitoring, to make sure the right tests are run, to see the results and to make sure they get what they want."

"Otherwise," Fitzhugh maintains, "there is too much possibility of an in-house conflict of interest."

A service or civilian group that pushed development of a new weapon might be reluctant to admit that it didn't turn out right.

Fitzhugh also suggested that Congress make the Pentagon specify in its budget each year the amount to be spent on operational tests and evaluation.

Foster contends that the Pentagon has responded, at least in part, to the panel's suggestion in this field, but that the relationship between developer and user is too hard to separate and too important to tamper with drastically. He fears that the establishment of a powerful group of overseers could create unproductive antagonisms within the huge research, development, test and engineering establishment he runs.

Foster told the committee, chaired by Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), that the Pentagon has moved to make operational testing better and more timely, conducting at least some of it before big production decisions are made.

Foster has also appointed a small group within his office to keep a closer watch on testing. It is headed by retired Army Gen. Alfred D. Starbird, who formerly headed the Safeguard ABM program.

57

WALL STREET JOURNAL - 4 DECEMBER 1970 P-2

# Senate Panel Chops Pentagon Funds More But Restores Weapons' Cash Cut by House

WASHINGTON--The Senate Appropriations Committee cut still deeper into the grand total of funds for the Pentagon, but it restored money for some key weapons systems the House had reduced.

The Senate committee approved a total appropriation of $66.4 billion for the Defense Department in the fiscal year ending next June, down $2.3 billion from the Administration's budget request. The panel thus, in its overall money scoresheet, rejected Defense Secretary Laird's appeal for restoration of much of a $1.9 billion cut voted in October by the House.

The Senators, however, restored some or all of the cuts made by the House in several individual weapons for the Air Force and Army. They made room for the restorations mainly by scuttling the extra $417.5 million of Navy shipbuilding money that the House had approved at the insistence of Rep. Rivers (D., S.C.), though Mr. Laird hadn't asked for it.

The committee's deep-looking cuts in the appropriations total are intended to forestall efforts by the entire Senate to chop further when the bill reaches the floor next week.

Thrown in as an added attraction to Pentagon critics was a new statutory ban on "the introduction of American ground combat troops" into Cambodia. Existing law makes Thailand and Laos off-limits to U.S. troop formations and, if the House concurs, the committee's new language would add Cambodia to the list.

## Little Chance of Passage

After lengthy debate last summer, the Senate had approved a separate bill forbidding the use of U.S. troops in Cambodia, but this has been stalled by House objections and is unlikely to become law. The new stay-out-of-Cambodia rider on the appropriations bill may have a better chance.

The Senate committee's biggest saving—$17.5 million in Navy shipbuilding money—would, of course, be canceled when the bill reaches the House-Senate conference stage. This would come in the waning days of the current lame-duck session when Pentagon economists in the Senate would be unable to mount a lengthy fight.

The big battle over antiballistic missiles was settled earlier this year with enactment of a separate bill authorizing ABM deployment in two more states, besides the two approved last year. The appropriations bill routinely provides $1.1 billion of actual ABM money, almost all the Pentagon requested.

The Senate committee bill also goes along with both the Air Force and the House in providing funds for another controversial piece of software, the C5A jet cargo plane made by Allied Lockheed Aircraft Corp. The Senators approved the full $544.4 million request, including a $200 million "contingency" amount that's sure to be attacked in Senate floor debate.

## Ping-Pong Match Goes On

Senators continued their Ping-Pong match with the House over the so-called International Fighter, cutting out all of the $30 million that had been requested by the Air Force and approved by the House. The Air Force last month awarded an initial contract to Northrop Corp. to start building the fighter, which the U.S. would export to South Vietnam and other Asian allies as a defense against the Soviet MiG-21. Contract officials at the time made it clear the award is "contingent upon Congressional approval of the necessary funds."

A Senate deletion of the $30 million in another authorizing bill this year was restored in conference with the House, and the same pattern could be followed again.

Working from its cushion of shipbuilding cuts, the Senate committee was able to vote against increases in the amounts approved for

ample was the committee's restoration of $49.5 million in funds for production of Boeing Co.'s short-range air-launched missile for B52 bombers and F-111 fighter-bombers, bringing the money back to the Air Force's original $99.5 million request. The Senators also canceled a House cutback in funds to modify the B52 and the F-111 to carry the missile.

## Reversing House's Cuts

The House had cut $38.2 million from the $81.4 million authorized for the Army's improved Hawk surface-to-air missile, a Raytheon Co. project, but the Senate panel voted to put back the money. Likewise, the Navy wanted $112.5 million for procurement of Grumman Corp.'s A6E Intruder attack plane; the House cut $40 million; and the Senators put it back.

The Senate committee approved $92.3 million for the Navy's E2C, a Grumman plane designed to warn a task force of approaching enemy planes. The House had deleted the whole sum.

The Senate committee also took issue with a House decision on buying a vertical takeoff-and-landing jet from the British, and instead ordered it to be made by McDonnell-Douglas Corp. in this country. The House had approved $72 million for the Marines' purchase of 18 of these planes from Hawker-Siddeley Group Ltd. in Britain. The Senators provided $96.2 million for acquisition of planes made by the American concern under a licensing agreement.

They concurred, however, in the House decision to delete $79 million for production of Lockheed's S3A carrier-based antisubmarine plane, and limited funds instead to $58 million for further research and development work.

53

complished mainly by installing new equip-
ment mountings in the underground silo and
"hanging" the missile in the silo in a different
fashion. This method, they say, would substan-
tially increase the blast pressure the missile
could withstand. If the enemy threat continued
to escalate, Air Force men say, a close-in de-
fense system could be added, complementing
the hardening program.

The Air Force is increasingly sensitive to
suggestions that both its strategic arms—the
manned bomber and the Minuteman missile—
may be headed for obsolescence as the num-
ber, power and accuracy of the Soviet missile
force increase. Thus, the service is especially
anxious to see Minuteman-protection efforts go
forward rapidly.

Still, some defense experts believe that no
protection program will be able to solve per-
manently the problem of Minuteman survivva-
bility. As a result, the Navy's underwater
long-range missile system—a new submarine
that would be able to hurl missiles far greater
distances than the current Polaris subs—is at-
tracting increasing attention in the Pentagon.
Development funds for the new sub system will
be significantly increased in next year's de-
fense budget.

60

WASHINGTON NEWS (15

14 December 1970 P21

Defense
budget
to rise

By ROBERT DIETSCH
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

President Nixon has agreed to a significant change in the budget-making process which will be responsible at least in part for an increase in next year's defense budget.

At this critical stage in budget-making within the Administration, the president has decided that the chief policy-maker for Defense Department funds will be the new Defense Program Review Board rather than his Office of Management and Budget.

Partly as a result of this new arrangement, and partly because of rising costs and what the Administration views as increased military capabilities of the Soviet Union, next year's defense budget will show an increase for the first time in three years.

This increase will come at a time when the Administration says it is sticking with its plans to continue troop withdrawals from Southeast Asia.

$74.5 BILLION

The defense budget for fiscal 1972—the year which begins next July 1—will be about $74.5 billion, about $1 billion higher than the current fiscal year. The Administration originally asked a fiscal 1971 defense budget of $71.8 billion, but that total has since swelled, mostly because of pay increases voted by Congress.

In fiscal 1969, defense spending totaled 78.6 billion; in fiscal 1970 the total was $77.8 billion.

Under an executive branch reorganization which took effect in mid-1970, the Bureau of the Budget was incorporated into the OMB, headed by George P. Shultz, who moved over from his post as Labor Secretary. Among other important functions, OMB was in charge of the budget process, and in that function Mr. Shultz has proved to be more powerful and influential than any of the old budget directors.

The fiscal 1972 budget must go to Congress the 92d Con-

gress within 15 days after it convenes while no final decision has been made on the initial meeting date, it's expected to be between Jan. 15 and 20.

NIXON POLICY

Even before OMB was created, it was Nixon policy to put the Budget Bureau in primary command of the military budget; this was a reversal of policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when the Pentagon (headed then by former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara) called the shots on its own money requests.

In fact, shortly after taking office, Mr. Nixon created in the Budget Bureau a special assistant director for national security to ride herd on the Pentagon money managers. The post was filled by James R. Schlesinger, a Rand Corp. economist. In putting together the fiscal 1971 budget, Mr. Schlesinger rather than the Pentagon had the most influential voice.

One result was a lower defense budget figure.

61

BALTIMORE SUN

17 DEC 70 Pgl

Laird Fears A Security

Risk As House Passes

$2 Billion Reduction

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, Dec. 16-The congressional slash of $2 billion in defense appropriations requests is going to force new cuts in military and civilian manpower, base closings throughout the country and layup of additional ships, the Pentagon said today.

The House passed the compromise $66.6 billion appropriation, the largest money bill of the year, by a 327-to-30 vote this afternoon after hearing a complaint by Representative Durward G. Hall (R., Mo.) that, "we are becoming a second-rate naval power before the people know what is going on."

## Security Risk Claimed

The cuts agreed on by a House-Senate conference committee "will increase the risks to our national security," Melvin R. Laird. Defense Secretary, said in a statement.

Noting that the fiscal year is almost half over, Mr. Laird said one effect of the compromise bill will be to cut defense spending by about $800 million between January and June.

The full $2 billion cut does not translate into an equivalent spending reduction for this fiscal year because much of it is in funds for weapons and related procurement that would have been spent over several years.

## Manpower Cutback

Secretary Laird spoke only generally of the areas where he will now "go forward promptly" with more defense reductions.

Other sources said a cut of $298 million in personnel funds now will insure that military manpower is reduced about 200,000 below the 2,908,000 level specified in the budget for June 30, 1971. Pentagon planners, having seen the handwriting on the wall as the money bill went through Congress, were expecting such a cut.

If the forces are down to 2 million by June 30, the total reduction since the Nixon administration entered office will have been 700,000. Officials plan eventually to cut about 1 million from the 3 million-man level of January, 1969.

## Civilian Jobs

Worldwide civilian employment of the Defense Department, 1,262,000 when the administration came in, has been scheduled to drop to 1,103,000 by June 30, and now presumably will go lower.

Civilian layoffs and base closings or reductions will result from a cut of $152 million in requested funds for operation and maintenance of the forces, Pentagon officials said.

The number of additional ships to be laid up was not indicated, but it apparently will be small. The Pentagon has told Congress that lay-ups already announced publicly will reduce the fleet to 658 ships. There were 894 ships in commission when the administration took office.

The cut requested procurement funds totaled $1.3 billion and covered a wide range of items sought by all the services. Remaining reductions were for research and development.

Despite the cuts, Mr. Laird said "many of our high priority requirements" were met.

63

64

AVIATION WEEK 21 December 1970 (23)

## Conferees Set $66.6-Billion DOD Fund

Washington-Senate-House conferees have agreed on a final Fiscal 1971 defense appropriation totaling $66.595 billion, cutting some of the aerospace restorations voted earlier by the Senate (AW&ST Dec. 7, p. 24) and giving the Defense Dept. $2.15 billion less than it requested for the year.

The final figure is $6.1 billion lower than the Fiscal 1970 defense appropriation. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird last week expressed disappointment in the congressional action, and there were indications that the Fiscal 1971 defense supplemental request would be in excess of the $1.6 billion predicted by Senate sources.

Conferees agreed to compromise differences between House and Senate versions of the bill by adding $178.9 million to the Senate version, which had passed by an 89-0 vote (AW&ST Dec. 14, p. 15) and trimming $210.6 million from the House version.

Major action taken by the conferees was to allow $188.5 million in non-budgeted shipbuilding funds, out of more than $400 million voted earlier this session by the House. The Senate had deleted all the non-budgeted shipbuilding items in order to put additional funding into aircraft, missile, and research and development procurement, but this action was partially reversed by the conferees.

In its final form the bill gave the Nixon Administration less than full funding on the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, restricting the scope of deployment to protection of offensive missile sites and eliminating protection of populated areas (AW&ST June 22, p. 25). Congressional action is expected to result in elimination of future Defense Dept. plans to use Safeguard to protect the Washington, D.C., area.

Major aerospace programs affected by final conference action included:

* Grumman A-6E Navy attack aircraft, funded at $112.5 million for 12 aircraft and $11.4 million for A-6E initial spares. House had cut the totals to $72.5 million and $5.7 million, but

the Senate restored them and they were retained in conference.

* Hawker Siddeley AV-8A Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing fighter, funded at $64 million as proposed by the House instead of the $96.2 million voted by the Senate. The funding will permit procurement of 18 aircraft as planned by the Navy, but with the lower funding figure, conferees wrote a stipulation that procurement be made from the United Kingdom rather than from McDonnell Douglas, the licensee in the United States.

* Grumman E-2C early warning aircraft, $43 million, compared with no funding voted by the House and $92.3 million approved by the Senate. Conferees declared their action was consistent with Defense Dept. desire to award a contract for production of 11 aircraft in Fiscal 1972. Reduction from the original request "should in no way be construed as an effort to delay this important program," conferees said.

* International Fighter Aircraft, $18 million instead of the $30 million voted by the House. Senate had deleted funds on grounds the Defense Dept. has $28 million in unexpended prior-year funding available for the program. Conferees withheld giving full production approval in voting the compromise figure for the Northrop aircraft.

* Boeing AGM-69A SRAM short-

range attack missile, $99.5 million, a move which concurred with Senate action to restore funding cut earlier by the House.

* Boeing B-52 and Convair FB-111 bomber modification to accommodate SRAM, funded at $99 million. This backs the Senate position, compared with $71.3-million voted by the House.

* Philco-Ford MIM-72A Chaparral surface-to-air missile, $51.9 million as proposed by the Senate, cut from a $76.4-million sum voted by the House.

* Raytheon XMIM-23B Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile, $58.2 million, a compromise figure between the $43.2 million proposed by the House and $81.4 million by the Senate.

* LTV XMIGM-52A Lance battlefield support missile, $34.9 million. House had refused funding for the program, but conferees agreed to the Senate position. The funding is for initial production of the missile.

* Subsonic cruise armed decoy, no funding. Senate had attempted to restore $10 million.

* Minuteman strategic missile rebasing program, $61 million instead of $27 million proposed by the House. This is less than the original amount requested by the Air Force, and allows for deletion of the mobile Minuteman and Hard-Point defense concepts.

Conferees added a clause to the original Senate bill weakening the effect of a funding restriction on U.S. operations in Southeast Asia. The clause stated that nothing contained in the restrictive section "shall be construed to prohibit support of free world or local forces in actions designed to promote the safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia or to aid in the release of Americans held as prisoners of war."

WASHINGTON POST 19 DEC 70 (21) Pg 1

Senate Probe Calls
F-111 Major Error

By Bernard D. Nossiter

Washington Post Staff Writer

A Senate inquiry yesterday wrote off the Pentagon's F-111 fighter-bomber program as a "failure" and a "fiscal blunder of the greatest magnitude."

Its outcome, moreover, has had "an adverse impact on our defense posture," the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee declared.

The 93-page report climaxed an on-and-off eight-year inquiry into the ill-fated plane directed by Chairman John McClellan (D-Ark.). His examination placed the major portion of the blame on Robert S. McNamara, Defense Secretary in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

A key McNamara decision, selection of General Dynamics to build the plane, was described as "capricious, lacking in depth, and without factual substantiation."

McNamara and his top civilian aides were charged with "a series of management blunders . . . poor decisions . . . which compounded error upon error."

Roswell Gilpatric, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, was accused of "a flagrant conflict of interest" because he had served as outside counsel to General Dynamics before moving to the Pentagon. The conduct of Fred Korth, former secretary of the Navy, was described as "at best an impropriety." He came to the Pentagon from a bank in Fort Worth, the town where the F-111 is built.

McNamara, now president of the World Bank, declined comment. In New York, Gilpatric said he "respectfully disagreed with the committee's conclusions" and noted that a 1963 letter by an assistant attorney general "concludes that my work did not contravene the conflict of interest statutes."

Korth could not be reached for comment and the Pentagon and Air Force did not reply to requests for their observations.

General Dynamics, the plane's maker, said "It is significant" that the report contained no "suggestion of wrong-doing" by the company. The firm said it has produced "an outstanding weapons system."

Although the report has little to say about General Dynamics' role, it asserts that the company's management decided in 1963 to "deny" the "major problems" it faced with the plane's aerodynamics and to "conceal" from the Pentagon its difficulties with a growing weight. The study notes that General Dynamics has estimated it will make a profit of $312.7 million when the still incompleted program is finished.

According to the subcommittee, the Air Force and Navy originally intended to buy 1,726 TFX planes, the early name for the F-111. General Dynamics promised to deliver them for $5.8 billion or about $3.4 million each. The plane was supposed to be an advanced craft, with pivoting wings for speed above and below that of sound, to serve both services.

Navy Version

Congress killed off the Navy version in 1968. Today, the Air Force expects to get only 538 planes, according to the company. The subcommittee calculates the total amount that has been and will be sunk in the program at $9.2 billion. This works out to about $17 million a copy or five times the original estimate.

Of all the planes now due, the report asserts, only 82 or fewer than one in five, will meet the standards "of the truly modern and high performance tactical bomber originally sought by the Air Force."

Earlier this year, the Air Force grounded all 230 of the planes it then had in stock after a fatal crash. By the start of this month, however, 152 craft had been cleared to fly.

The McClellan subcommittee counted five "major management errors" since McNamara first called for a TFX in 1961. They are:

1. The decision to design a single plane for two services with different requirements, the Navy and Air Force.

2. The choice of General Dynamics to build the plane over Boeing, despite the recommendation of Boeing by four evaluation boards of military professionals. The Boeing design was found by the generals and admirals to be superior and less costly.

3. The refusal in 1964 to redesign the Navy F-111 in the face of warnings that it was headed for trouble.

4. McNamara's effort in 1966 to rescue the program by "personal management" from his office.

5. The 1967 decision to continue production of an early version of the F-111 although "many technical design problems" remained unsolved.

The report suggests but fails to assert directly that the Pentagon signed a loose contract with General Dynamics. The study repeats approvingly testimony that the Pentagon never held the company to any clear performance standards.

No effort is made to place a dollar figure on the total wastage of funds. But the committee concludes that there has been a "directly accountable waste of more than $500 million," the sum represented by "unacceptable" planes that were abandoned before production began.

Finally, the inquiry charges the McNamara team with making "extraordinary efforts to conceal the results or their errors" and "deliberate attempts to deceive the Congress, the press and the American people."

One subcommittee member, Sen. Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), declined to sign the report and filed an "individual view" defending Gilpatric. Javits said the New York lawyer played only a "minor role" in the choice of General Dynamics. However, "hindsight indicates that Mr. Gilpatric would have been better advised to have avoided even the appearance of impropriety."

According to the subcommittee, Gilpatric advised McNamara to give the award to General Dynamics. The inquiry concluded that he had been a "top level policy counselor" to the company in the 2½ years before coming to the Pentagon, that he had spent one third of his time in that period on General Dynamics' business, and attended 18 of 31 board meetings.

"He deliberately attempted to mislead the subcommittee regarding his relationship with the General Dynamics Corp." the report declared.

65

WASHINGTON POST 25 DECEMBER 1970

A Battle Shaping Up Over United States
Troop Cuts in NATO

67

By Chalmers M. Roberts

President Nixon now has made a formal
pledge that "given a similar approach by our
allies, the United States will maintain and
improve its own forces in Europe and will
not reduce them unless there is reciprocal
action by our adversaries."

The NATO allies, to whom the pledge was
made at the just ended Brussels ministerial
meeting, have promised to raise their contri-
butions to the joint defense by around a bil-
lion dollars over five years.

The President has made the pledge but he
will have to persuade Congress to sustain it.
Sen. Mike Mansfield who has been trying to
force this and the previous administration to
trim the U.S. forces in NATO by a "substan-
tial" amount by proposing a sense of the
Senate resolution co-sponsored by a major-
ity of the 100 members, now threatens to at-
tack next year's Pentagon budget directly to
force a reduction. And although it is evident
that the European allies have promised
something additional, the offer is far from
what a good many of Mansfield's co-sponsors
want. The net is that a battle between the ex-
ecutive and the legislative branches is shap-
ing up for next year.

THE REASONS for this are legion: the
balance of payments loss involved in sus-
taining U.S. troops in Europe, the desire to
transfer resources to domestic needs, the
feeling that the Europeans should do much
more. But there is something else, too; a
form of neo-isolationism which combines
those reasons with a disbelief that there
really is much danger of a Soviet attack in
Europe and that those who say there is are
bogged in the thinking of Cold War.

How many members of Congress feel this
way is impossible to tell. But that the chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.),
does is beyond doubt. In this respect the
transcript of hearings last May, June and
July, not made public until Nov. 23, on
American commitments in Europe is illum-
nating.

Allowance may be made, of course, in
reading the following excerpts for Ful-
bright's use of the leading question tech-
nique to draw out opinions of witnesses.
Nonetheless, the senator's own view of the
East-West relationship in Europe comes
through clearly and it is important to under-
stand it.

THE following May 25 exchange between
Fulbright and Gen. David A. Burchinal, dep-
uty commander in chief, U.S. forces in Eu-
rope, helps illuminate Fulbright's thinking:

Burchinal: As a military man looking at
the security problems in Europe, I think
that the size of the U.S. commitment to
our security in Europe is about what is re-
quired today to maintain the stability that
we have had for the past 21 years. I look
at our allies, and I think that rather than
we doing less it is essential that they do
more to maintain this in the years ahead
after 1970

Fulbright: Then you feel that a greater
effort and more troops and planes should
be maintained.

Burchinal: Not necessarily more troops,
senator, but certainly more improvement
qualitatively in their equipment, more
rapid rate of modernization of their forces
—this kind of qualitative improvement. I
think the numbers probably would hold

Fulbright: Is this because you assume
the Russians are becoming a greater
threat?

Burchinal: The capability of the Soviet
forces and the Warsaw Pact forces cer-
tainly has increased both qualitatively and
in some respects quantitatively over the
last 5 years and it is today a significant
threat in terms of capability for military
operations.

Fulbright: On what do you base your
judgment that the Russians are deter-
mined to overrun Western Europe?

Burchinal: I don't recall making that
judgment, sir.

Fulbright: Well, then, I just assumed
you made that. What is the purpose of
your—.

Burchinal: I say they have the capabil-
ity of conducting very significant military
operations with the forces they and the
Warsaw Pact maintain across the Iron
Curtain.

Fulbright: What do you think is their
objective other than just increasing their
influence, their trade. Is that any differ-
ent from in your view our efforts to in-
crease our influence and trade in any
country?

Burchinal: I think theirs is less benign
than ours. I am disturbed when I see
them, at least figuratively moving astride
the principal pipelines, oil pipelines from
the Middle East and North Africa, and we
have the statement by the new Libyan re-
gime that were it in their interests to do
so they would shut off the supply of oil to
Western Europe.

And later:

Fulbright: So you have a situation
where they have to keep troops in their al-
lies to keep order, and we have troops in
our allies to meet their threat. It seems a
little incongruous, doesn't it.

Still later:

Fulbright: Of course if they are primar-
ily concerned with maintaining their con-
trol of their own satellites our withdrawal
really wouldn't affect them, would it?

THERE followed a discussion of the num-
ber of tanks available to NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, a discussion in which Gen.
James H. Polk, commander in chief of the
U.S. Army in Europe, was involved.

Fulbright: What difference does it make
if they have four times or 20 times as
many tanks as we have. If we have nuclear
weapons it really nullifies the tanks, gen-
eral...

Polk: No; I don't believe it does.

Fulbright: If you have nuclear weapons

I don't think the hypothetical is so far off the mark, but we will assume it without your having to testify about it that we have some, we will say, 6,000, and they have 6,000; if there is a serious movement of Russian forces into Western Europe, and they would use them, what difference does it make if we have tanks?

Polk: Well, I don't think either side really wants to use them. I don't think our side want to use them.

Fulbright: Use the nuclear?

Polk: Use the nuclear weapons.

Fulbright: But if they attacked, we would; wouldn't we? You don't have any doubt if they started rolling across Germany or from out of Czechoslovakia that we would respond, if they came in with a million men and we only 500,000, or whatever are the numbers.

Polk: General (Andrew J.) Goodpaster (Commander in chief, U.S. European Command, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) has a great number of options, Mr. Chairman, and I think when we say use nuclear weapons, this is a very loose sort of term which everybody thinks means we are going to shoot all 7,000 the first day.

Fulbright: No, no, not the first day; just whatever are necessary.

Polk: (Deleted).

Fulbright: I didn't mean to ask about how to use them. The general proposition if there is a serious attack, do you have any doubt in your own mind that the nuclear weapons would be used?

Polk: If we are given sufficient warning time and if we get some of these very effective antitank TOW weapons (a large missile) that are on the boards. We are starting to get out TOW weapons in (deleted). Our infantry battalions will be equipped with the TOW.

Fulbright: Mr. Chairman, I didn't mean to ask any questions about the TOW. These are very general questions.

Burchinal: This is very important thought; this does not represent a bankrupt conventional capability. It is a respectable, conventional capability and that capability can be improved.

Fulbright: That isn't what I asked. But it doesn't make any sense to me if a country like Russia, with tensions that exist, made a determined effort like that it seems inconceivable that we wouldn't use nuclear weapons or vice versa....

But now, nuclear weapons are a new type of warfare. We are the only country that has used them. We certainly ought to know their capacity for destruction. I would assume the Russians know it by now. And I don't think the Russians are about to want to get into a war with us. I think they also know very clearly if they move into Western Europe we would use them. In fact, if they are seriously disturbed about what we are doing they would probably use them on us first, but, in either case, I don't see that the value of your attack is going to be very great over there—the fact that they have more tanks than we just because they have had this defensive psychology that they have been attacked more often than we have. Their whole psychology is oriented in that way.

But, I raise it because there seems to be some great significance attached to the fact that they have more tanks, and, I assume, you will be asking for more tanks, but I can't see that they are very pertinent or relevant to what the probabilities are with a war with Russia.

ALL THIS was said months before the NATO ministers approved at Brussels a document called AD 70 as basic allied defense policy for the decade. The theme of this document is that continued military strength, at something akin to parity with the Warsaw Pact, is the only route possible to negotiations with the Communist nations. And that the kind of defense involved continues to be the flexible response instituted in the U.S. by President Kennedy.

Flexible response means having enough conventional arms, including tanks, and manpower, including U.S. troops, to give the American President a choice other than between surrender and nuclear war should there ever be a Communist attack in force. Whether such a force would produce the "pause" its sponsors hope to permit negotiations, rather than lead automatically to nuclear war, no one can foretell. So far, at least, this doctrine at least has been part of a successful deterrent to any overt Communist military move.

But such issues, Fulbright indicated, do not interest him. His point, evident in the Q and A above, is that the idea of an attack is nonsense today and even if it occured nuclear war is the only response. This is not exactly the same as John Foster, Dulles' "instant massive (nuclear) retaliation" doctrine or the "more bang for the buck" of a generation ago but it is getting close.

Next year, when the NATO troop level comes before Congress we shall see how many members share this new version of neo-isolationism.

63

BALTIMORE SUN

30 DEC 70 Pg1

# DEFENSE BILL PASSES WITH DOVE WORDING

By ADAM CLYMER

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, Dec. 29 — Congress tonight passed a compromise $66.6 billion defense appropriations bill after renegotiating it to satisfy Senate doves.

The final version dropped language permitting the use of American troops in Cambodia if the President thought their deployment necessary to aid in withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

The Senate passed the bill, 70 to 2, with only two lame-ducks, Senator Albert Gore (D., Tenn.) and Senator Charles E. Godel (R., N.Y.), voting no. The vote sent the measure to the White House, since the House had approved it earlier, 234 to 18.

## Remaining Hurdle

But the two houses failed to agree on the other remaining foreign policy hurdle before adjournment—a $2.5 billion regular foreign aid appropriation including $200 million for credit foreign arms sales.

This provision, insisted on by the House, was being opposed by the same Senate doves who won a major victory on the defense appropriation by compelling House-Senate conferees to rewrite the bill.

The doves had fought against an earlier conference report and tonight Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho) argued that the final version, together with language in another bill passed last week, represented the "largest step yet taken in the restoration of the Senate's role" in foreign policy.

The first version of the conference report had provided broad exceptions to a Senate amendment barring the use of American ground troops in Cambodia. The Senate rejected that version late last night.

Today, the conferees met again and dropped the whole provision.

This satisfied the doves be cause last week's passage of the supplemental foreign aid author ization (now awaiting presidential signature) would flatly bar the use of American ground forces and advisers in Cambodia. The doves thus felt they no longer needed a Cambodia ban in the defense money bill.

In exchange, they agreed to a weakening of language barring American financial support for troops from other countries, such as South Vietnam or Thailand.

The final conference amendment said U.S. support of such forces would be allowed if that support was designed to aid the withdrawal of American forces from Southeast Asia or U.S. prisoner of war rescue missions.

Senator John Sherman Cooper (R., Ky.), expressed fear during the Senate debate that the "language is somewhat loose" and "leaves a loophole." But Senator John Stennis (D., Miss.), the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, insisted that the language was intended only to allow support of efforts "to keep the sanctuaries clear" and not to expand the war.

## Nothing Of Value

Representative George H. Mahon (D., Texas), the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told the House that since no one now advocates the use of American ground forces in Cambodia, the House conferees—who had insisted on the loophole in the first place—were surrendering nothing of value.

He cited President Nixon's December 12 press conference in which Mr. Nixon, asked if he could imagine circumstances requiring a new dispatch of American troops into Cambodia, replied: "None whatever."

Mr. Mahon also reassured House members that nothing in the bill prohibited attempts to rescue American prisoners being held in North Vietnam.

The disagreement over the foreign aid amendment persisted, however. The credit sales money was added by the House, although no authorization bill ever was agreed to by both houses. That impasse was caused by the Senate's insistence on retaining its original Cooper-Church amendment barring American troops from Cambodia. Because this amendment was effectively written into law in last week's supplemental aid authorization, some of the steam may have gone out of the Senate fight, and the Senate doves may give in on that issue.

69

72

FEATURES-COLUMNISTS

THE NEW REPUBLIC - 15 AUGUST 1970 (11)

# SALT Chips And Safeguard

by Ralph E. Lapp

The US Senate is now debating Phase II of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program. Phase I of this ABM effort squeaked through the Senate last year by the narrowest of margins and, anticipating another close vote, the Senate Armed Services Committee has pared back the program hoping that a more modestly priced system will win support.

In reporting out the authorization bill, Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, claimed that the new version of Safeguard would cost only $0.5 billion as opposed to $10.7 billion for the full system. In making this cutback the Committee has once more shifted its stance on ABM, this time abandoning the 12-site area defense system (including projection against Red Chinese missiles) in favor of a base deployment of radars and missiles. These will be aimed at defending part of the Minuteman ICBM force against the threat of a first strike by the Soviet Union. Senator Stennis maintains that the missile defense of Minuteman is absolutely essential to the survival of the United States - a thesis held with equal fervor by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird who has based his case for Safeguard on the first-strike potential of the mighty SS-9 Soviet missiles, as projected to the mid-1970s. But Sen. Stennis and Safeguard backers make no secret of the fact that their strongest argument is that the ABM system is a cardinal bargaining chip in the SALT talks, which seek to limit strategic arms. Defeat Safeguard, Sen. Stennis argued on the Senate floor, and "We would have a situation where Congress would deny to our President the very item - the major item. I believe - of the bargaining arrangement."

In response to the bargaining chip argument, Senator J. W. Fulbright highlighted the illogic of the concept: "They say that this money is to be only for hard-point defense for missile sites for Minuteman; and the very same day in a different context, you have Dr. Kissinger, the principal adviser to and spokesman for the President, saying, 'We are considering restricting ABM defense of Washington if the Russians only want the defense of Moscow.'" Ironically, the Washington ABM site is one abandoned in Phase II of the latest Safeguard plan. So it's difficult to see how a failure to fund Phase II this year has any chip-value at all. For that matter there is no ascribable value to either Phase I or Phase II since each now seeks only to defend Minuteman silos - and not to protect cities against atomic attack. The bargaining power of Phase II has to be related to the SS-9 and to further deployments of this offensive missile, but nothing coming out of the SALT talks at Vienna suggests such a deal.

Assuming, however, that the SALT agreement pointed to matching a Washington, D.C. ABM defense against the 64-Galosh missile system (ABM-1) de-

ployed around Moscow, would this mean stopping work on the US sites planned to protect Minuteman? That's hardly a bargain that President Nixon could go for, especially since he has placed so much emphasis on the Soviet strategic threat to these Minuteman bases.

Encouraged by the one-vote margin of loss in last year's Safeguard vote, opponents of the ABM program had been eager to press for denial of further funds to Phase I ($1.0 billion) and new funds of $0.4 billion for Phase II. The former funds one site to defend Minuteman missiles at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, and a second site at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. Last year, in urging approval of funds for Phase I, Secretary Laird pleaded: "Let us deploy Phase I. Let us complete it. Let us finish it. Let us see how it works and after that decide whether to go ahead." This year the Pentagon, having gotten the camel's head under the tent, is trying to ram through at least a hump. Nothing has been completed in Montana or North Dakota; nothing works - but now the Defense Department summons forth Phase II to cram more short-range Sprint missile interceptors into the Montana-North Dakota sites, and seeks to establish a brand new Safeguard site to protect the Whiteman AFB in Missouri. This 3-site ABM system will cost $5.9 billion, plus $0.9 billion for nuclear warheads for a total of $6.8 billion. There's even provision in Phase II authorization for preliminary work on another ABM site for the Warren AFB in Wyoming - the other hump of the camel!

On July 31, Senators Sherman Cooper (R, Ky.) and Philip A. Hart (D, Mich.) revealed their ABM opposition strategy, when they introduced an amendment to prohibit any new ABM sites from being constructed - beyond the two authorized in Phase I. Their amendment allows addition of more Sprints to the Montana-North Dakota sites, and is aimed at countering the don't-steal-the-President's-chips argument. That has become the mainstay of the Safeguard case, as illustrated by Senator Stennis' admonition on July 30th when he summed up a pro-ABM speech: "...I warn again, as strongly as I can, that a vote in the Senate against the ABM means sudden death at this sitting, at least, of the SALT talks in Vienna."

The history of the ABM project is tortuous, but never has a weapons system's justification shifted so abruptly to a basis of arms limitation.

It's tempting for a critic of Safeguard to analyze the new crop of inconsistencies, sudden swerves and policy twists in the program, but such an exercise merely underlines the irrationality of the whole program. Rather than attempt to follow the switchbacks and U-turns of Safeguard evolution, it is prudent to direct an analysis to the cost effectiveness of Safeguard, assuming the 3-site system is built and that it works.

The key question to ask about the Safeguard system is: "How much does an ABM chip cost us - and how much will it cost the Soviets to match us?" Or, as Dr. John Foster, Jr., director of the Pentagon's research and development programs, put it: "- how much does it cost to add an extra defensive missile and how much

Ralph E. Lapp is author of The Weapons Culture. His article, "Power-Hungry America," appeared in The New Republic, July 11.

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SALT CHIPS AND SAFEGUARD

CONTINUED

to add an offensive missile?

Dr. Foster gave his answer - $5 to $5 million for a US interceptor and $10 million for a Soviet attacking warhead. His chip cost is two or three to one in our favor. But he is also chief salesman for the Safeguard and as such he may be swept up in his own promotional zeal. Therefore, we shall examine the Safeguard system and make an independent assay of the chip cost.

First, let's look at our costs. To do this, we need to
examine the US ABM system in some detail.

Phase I of Safeguard consists of the following hardware items for the Malmstrom and Grand Forks bases:
- One PAR (Perimeter Acquisition Radar) for long-range detection and tracking of hostile warheads.

- One MSR (Missile Site Radar) for directing missiles to intercept the detected incoming warheads.

- One battery of long-range Spartan interceptors designed primarily for area defense of the United States.

- Three batteries of short-range Sprint interceptors to back up the Spartans and to provide an active defense of the system radars.

The radars are the eyes of the Safeguard and they are also its Achilles' heel. Without electronic vision the giant missile system is blind and helpless to defend the Minuteman missile silos. Unlike the latter, which are underground silos built of reinforced concrete, the radars are ten times more vulnerable to a nuclear blast. Defense Secretary Laird explained: "That is why most of our Sprint missiles will be deployed to provide protection for those MSRs."

In fact, Phase II of Safeguard adds four more Sprint batteries to the Montana and North Dakota sites to beef up the system. And in its initial version, Phase II sought to add ABM bases to protect the Whiteman (Missouri) and Warren (Wyoming) Minuteman fields. However, the Administration sensed the temper of the Senate and modified this deployment to include only the Whiteman site, reserving Warren for a future budget.

As it now stands, the Safeguard system will consist of 3 sites designed to protect 500 Minuteman missiles at a total cost of $6.8 billion. This figures out to be about $13 million to protect each Minuteman, but the figure is too low because there are fewer than 500 Sprints and Spartans in the system available to defend the silos. The Sprints are limited to defense of only one Minuteman squadron (50 silos) at a time.

If the Soviets target their attack on the weakest link in the Safeguard chain, they would aim to destroy the radars. Therefore, the number of interceptor missiles capable of fending off such an attack is the critical to use in calculating the cost of an ABM defense chip. The Pentagon refuses to disclose the number of Sprints and Spartans being produced in Phase I and II, presumably to keep the Soviets in the dark. Disclosure of the number would strengthen the hand of Safeguard opponents who maintain that the system is too thin to provide a thick defense of a critical component like MSR. In any event, the Soviets will know the number soon enough when the Sprint-Spartan cells are constructed and made visible to orbital photographic inspection.

It will be assumed that the total number of killer missiles available for MSR defense is 100 per base or 300 for all three ABM installations.

Assuming that each killer interceptor knocks out one
interfering warhead, we divide $6.8 billion - the system
cost by 300 to obtain a chip cost of $22 million for

the defense. This figure is many times that given Dr. Foster and is to be explained by the fact that made only marginal allowance for radar costs that neglected the total systems cost. There is no military experience in the anti-missile field, although the use of surface launched missiles in attacking aircraft shows that it takes as many of 50 defensive missiles to knock out one aircraft. The one-for-one ratio that Dr. Foster assumes is a most optimistic forecast. Should it require two Sprints to kill off one warhead, then the chip cost escalates to $45 million apiece.

Dr. Foster has minimized the US chip cost; how valid is his $10 million estimate for the matching Soviet chip? Estimating Soviet costs is a perilous accounting practice, but we shall proceed by using the very same figures that Dr. Foster cites for Soviet weapons. These are $30 million for the monstrous SS-9 missile, which carries three 5-megaton warheads, and $10 million for the SS-11 missile which mounts a 1-megaton warhead.

Megaton-class warheads are essential for silo-busting - for digging Minuteman out of the ground - but they are overkill weapons when targeted on vulnerable radars. A warhead of one-tenth megaton delivered two-thirds of a mile off-target would destroy an MSR. Therefore the Soviets have a variety of offense options in staging an attack on Minuteman if they wish to knock out the ABM system. They could allocate a small number of SS-9s to a radar-busting attack, equipping these missiles with many o.1-megaton warheads. These need not all be MIRVed, i.e., independently targeted reentry vehicles; they could be partly clustered warheads like those carried in our A-3 Polaris-submarine-launched ballistic missile. The US Poseidon missile, successor to Polaris, can mount a maximum of 14 warheads (MIRVs) per missile, so it is not unreasonable to assume that the much more massive SS-9 missile could carry twice as many warheads.

The Poseidonizing of the SS-9 was actually anticipated in the *Report on Military Spending* (to be discussed in a forthcoming article in *The New Republic*) released last month by Members of Congress for Peace through Law. This report put the cost of an SS-9 fitted with 20 warheads as $35 million. Thus each attacking warhead would cost about $2 million if allowance is made for launch failures.

A second Soviet option would be the employment of SS-11 missiles to carry, say, a cluster of five warheads. The Soviets have already deployed more than 830 of the SS-11s and allocation of a small fraction of these to radar-busting would make little impact on their inventory. They could also use the newer SS-13, a solid-fueled ICBM first deployed in 1968, to carry a multiple warhead. Such options would yield unit costs of about $2 million per attacking warhead.

Such offensive options are by no means far-fetched; they are within easy reach of Soviet technology and must be considered as realistic threats to Safeguard. The Soviets could also employ decoys in an attack on MSR, but we shall restrict the analysis to live warheads as stipulated by Dr. Foster.

The above reckoning gives the Soviets a unit cost of $2 million per warhead vis-à-vis $22 million for a US killer missile. That's an eleven-to-one cost advantage for the Soviet. My estimate and Dr. Foster's are widely divergent, differing by a factor of 22.

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and Budget, reportedly concerned about the accuracy of the cost estimate, favored further study of the plane—which has been studied since 1962—with an eye toward a less expensive version.

One suggested alternative was to use a very large but relatively slow-moving jumbo aircraft that could fire missiles and decoys already under development for the B-1, at inland targets, from beyond Soviet defenses. This would remove the need for a high-speed, high-performance plane like the B-1, which is also designed to slip through the defenses and carry additional bombs directly over inland targets.

The B-1, has undergone lengthy reviews by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and other top-level civilian officials and in its proposed form is said to have solid support. This view is said to have prevailed in the most recent confrontation.

The new budget will also include increases for U.S. conventional weaponry and military assistance programs, but officials say that in terms of actual purchasing power the higher spending figures in general will at best hold the line at about this year's level.

The $75.5 billion figure for next year includes some additional military pay raises, officials say. But they leave the door open to still others that may be proposed separately as the Pentagon attempts to make service life more attractive in the hopes of reaching an all-volunteer force and eliminating the draft by mid-1973.

Secretary Laird has said that 53.54 per cent of the entire defense budget next year would go to manpower costs.