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1 of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the reinstatement of a Kuwaiti

2 government, and the release of hostages, but also the

3 reduction of Iraq's military capabilities so as to promote

4 stability and security in the region?

5 Am I correct that you believe this fourth goal is as

6 important to the U.S. as are the other goals?

7 Dr. Kissinger: Correct. I do not believe, however, that

8 it is necessary to destroy the Iraqi military capability

9 totally, because we should remember our experience in the

10 Iran-Iraq war, and we should not tempt the neighbors of Iraq

11 into rash ventures.

12 But I believe the reduction of Iraq's offensive military

13 capability is necessary in the light of all that has happened.

14 Senator Warner: And that's offensive military

15 capability --

16 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

17 Senator Warner: -- which we understand to mean not

18 completely, elimination of everything they have.

19 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

20 Senator Warner: Now, if we cannot attain any one of

21 these goals without resorting to the use of military force,

22 should we forsake that goal as a nation rather than use

23 military force to attain it?

24 Dr. Kissinger: Well, that is probably the way the issue

25 will finally resolve itself. I mean, it will come down to a

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1 Mr. Chairman, I have had a chance to briefly thumb

2 through the prepared statement that Dr. Kissinger gave. He

3 recited some of it. Has this document been accepted as part

4 of the record?

5 Chairman Nunn: It will be without objection, and it will

6 be placed in front of his testimony.

7 Senator Exon: Thank you very much. I did want to get

8 that in before I referenced a question that I had with regard

9 to statements made in his prepared statement by Dr. Kissinger

10 on page 5.

11 Before I get into that, I suspect Dr. Kissinger, as I

12 listened to the answer to the questions raised by Senator Nunn

13 and Senator Warner, you know, about where we are going to go

14 and how we are going to resolve this situation, I suspect that

15 the best of all worlds would be if we could in some way get

16 Saddam Hussein to remove all of his forces from all of Kuwait

17 and then begin to move out our troops and others that are in

18 there. Would not the best of all worlds be a United Nations

19 force that would move in and take the place of the forces that

20 are there now?

21 Dr. Kissinger: After Saddam Hussein has withdrawn from

22 Kuwait, yes, I think that that would be a desirable outcome.

23 Senator Exon: That is what I, as one Senator, I have

24 been hoping that we could resolve.

25 Dr. Kissinger: Also, as I have stated repeatedly in public, I

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1 really do not believe we can keep substantial American forces

2 in Saudi Arabia for an indefinite period of time. Therefore,

3 I do not believe a permanent American military establishment
4 in Saudi Arabia can be or should be part of the security

5 arrangements of the area.

6 Senator Exon: Could you put a scope around that phrase

7 that we hear so often, "indefinite period of time"? In your

8 view, is that 3 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months,

9 24 months? What is the period of time that you think we can

10 sustain those forces?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Again, I am speaking as an outside

12 observer I do not have access to conversations that

13 undoubtedly are taking place. I am nervous about the period

14 that begins with Ramadan, that month of fasting. My

15 nervousness increases with the beginning of the pilgrimages in

16 June, when hundreds of thousands of outside visitors come to

to clarify:

lines 17-18 are revised as follows:

"Saudi Arabia, and the Government may fall under attack by radicals in the region as needing infidels to protect the holiest places of Islam."

the holiest places of Islam,

time limits that I have in my
region.

tion to judge the tolerance of
is the third problem, which is

22 the American

23 I am very nervous about having a very large American ground

24 establishment in a region in which Iraqi forces are in front

25 of it, Iranian forces are at the flank of it, and are political

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I do not believe, that, a permanent American military establishment

arrangements of the area.

sustain those forces?

observer for I do not have access to conversations that

that begins with Ramadan, that month's of fasting. My

June, when hundreds of thousands of outside visitors appear in

Saudi Arabia, and when the Government may be under attack from

radicals in the area as protecting the holiest places of Islam,

with the approval of the Infidels. So these are the time limits that I have in my

mind from the conditions in the region.

You gentlemen are in a position to judge the tolerance of

the American public, and there is the third problem, which is

I am very nervous about, having a very large American ground

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except perhaps for air and naval power, turned over to others.

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instability is all around them because we could easily become
the subject of totally unpredictable events and be drawn into
things that were not part of our original mission. So for all
of these reasons, I would like to finish this and then turn it
over, except perhaps for air and naval power, to other units.

Senator Exon: Let me pursue that point a little further,
if I might, by quoting from your statement on page 5: "The
United States is approaching the point in the Middle East
crisis where a choice must be made between a course relying on
sanctions or, as a last resort, a military course.

"The two approaches have been presented as if they were
successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will
prove mutually exclusive, because by the time it is evident
that sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military
option will probably no longer exist."

To try to zero in on this a little bit, I suspect, then,
you are telling us in one form or another that you think that
time frame is between now and when Ramadan begins. Is that
correct?

Dr. Kissinger: More or less, yes. I can be persuaded on
this, but that is the time frame that I have on my mind.

Senator Exon: That fits in very well, then, with the
January 15 proposal that the administration is attempting to
get authorized by the United Nations, does it not?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I agree with what the

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1 administration is attempting to do in this regard.

2 Senator Exon: Are you then saying that you do not

3 believe that the sanctions can work beyond February 1?

4 Dr. Kissinger: I, Senator, am heavily influenced by the

5 American experience in the Korean and Vietnam negotiations. I

6 do not exclude, in fact, it is highly probable, that around the

7 deadline of the U.N. resolution or shortly thereafter, Iraq

8 will offer some sort of negotiation.

9 I believe also that its strategy will be to drag us
10 into a protracted process in which it can never be shown that
11 success is impossible, but in which at the same time success

12 can be
13 is never quite be
14 Such
15 negotiations under those circumstances shows that our
16 around the idea
17 that we will be

18 consensus will develop that the use of force under those
19 is
20 with greater force
21 circumstances becomes less and less credible, and any attempt
to bear
22 that we will get into a vicious circle.

23 to bring military pressure will be more and more resistant, so
24 that we will get into a vicious circle.
25 Senator Exon:

26 In other words, I do not believe a clear-cut point will
27 ever be reached in which we can tell sanctions are working or
28 not working, and it will, certainly be Saddam Hussein's
29 strategy if he is at all skillful, to put us into that
30 position.

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22 position.

23 Senator Exon: Just let me finish my first round with
24 this question. I am somewhat confused, then, because if we
25 must make a decision by January 15 to February 15, then it

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1 would mean that we would likely be forced to take military
2 action in that time frame and not give the sanctions time to
3 work.

4 If your appraisal is an accurate one, which I am not
5 saying it is not, then certainly on August 2, when the
6 President made the announcement that he was moving in with
7 defensive forces and give the sanctions a time to choke off
8 Saddam Hussein, certainly the administration could not have
9 been very realistic to think that the sanctions could have
10 worked between August 2 and the time frame of January 15 to
11 February or March 1 that we are talking about now.

12 Dr. Kissinger: I have been a strong supporter of the
13 objectives of the administration and of its diplomacy and
14 its general strategy. I have always believed, however, that
15 there has been a reluctance to face the reality that I am
16 seeking to describe here, namely that at some point sanctions
17 and military operations will become alternatives to one another,
18 and not successive phases of policy.

19 Senator Exon: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. That is what
20 all of us are trying to figure out here, also.

21 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Exon. Senator
23 Thurmond.

24 Senator Thurmond: And we thank you for taking your time
25 to share your views on the Persian Gulf crisis and our

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1 Nation's response.

2 I've had the opportunity to read several of your articles
3 on our involvement in this crisis and I want to commend you on
4 them. In your usual style you have been incisive and
5 presented a realistic evaluation of the issue facing our
6 Nation and the administration.

7 As I indicated yesterday I support the President's
8 actions and hope that we can reach a diplomatic resolution of
9 this difficult situation. However, as you pointed out, in an
10 August 19 article of the Washington Post, and I quote, "The
11 ability to cause a worldwide economic crisis is not the sort
12 of power to be left in the hands of a ruler who has attacked
13 two of his six neighbors, is engaged in moral conflict with
14 two others, and has used poison gas against his own distant
15 population."

16 So one way or another we must force Saddam Hussein from
17 Kuwait. If sanctions do not have the desired effect, then
18 another option should be considered. We cannot back away from
19 that reality.

20 Dr. Kissinger, it appears that the administration will
21 get an agreement through the Security Council which will
22 authorize offensive action if Saddam Hussein does not pull out
23 of Kuwait by a specified date. How will this resolution be
24 seen by the Arab nations and will the resolution be sufficient
25 to ensure the participation of the Arabs in any offensive

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1. Shouldering ought to be carried by Europeans
2. a target region
3. who receive share of the oil from the area.

4. postwar, global role and the military force is capable of
5. exercising it. So over a 10-year period I would think
6. the balance of responsibilities must shift. But in the interim
7. middle-term future, however, the United States remains the
8. key stabilizing factor in the area. The one country that can
9. promote people negotiations and whose credibility is therefore
10. of great consequence, and therefore, the outcome of this crisis
11. for the next 5 years is of the greatest consequence for peace
12. in the Middle East and, therefore, in the long term for peace
13. for us.

14. Senator Thurmond: Dr. Kissinger, although we're all
15. concerned over the political impact, the outcome this crisis
16. will have on the United States, I expect it will also have an
17. impact on the United Nations. If Saddam Hussein can stand up
18. to the embargo and the Security Council resolutions, what
19. message will this send the world with regard to the United
20. Nations' influence in the post-Cold War world?

21. Dr. Kissinger: Of course, its most immediate impact
22. would be in the Middle East itself, but I believe, as that
23. moderate governments that joined the U.N. action would be
24. under tremendous strain and, because, be either overthrown or shaped in
25. a more radical direction. And but any other nation with a

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1 powerful neighbor that relies on United Nations support would

2 clearly be discouraged, and so therefore, to the extent that the

3 United Nations is a stabilizing influence, it would be

4 weakened.

5 Senator Thurmond: Dr. Kissinger, it appears to me that

6 several countries, among them Japan, have greater economic

7 stake in this crisis than the United States, yet their

8 contribution is minimal. Should the administration demand a

9 greater financial if not military contribution from these

10 countries?

11 Dr. Kissinger: I think one lesson of this crisis is that

12 the time to demand is before you make your own commitment,

13 because after that you are bargaining position is not as great

14 as it might be. In an ideal world, and in fact in justice

15 ~~other countries~~ nations should be making a greater contribution ~~that~~

16 than they are making. Regrettably many of them ~~they~~ are figure we

17 ~~are so deeply committed, now that whether~~ they make a

18 contribution or not, we have no choice but to proceed. And

19 they are probably right.

20 Senator Thurmond: Dr. Kissinger --

21 Dr. Kissinger: I am not saying they are morally right; rather

22 I'm saying they are practically right in practical terms.

23 Senator Thurmond: Dr. Kissinger, how concerned should

24 the United States be with regard to an Iraqi nuclear weapons

25 capability?

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Dr. Kissinger: I have seen these conflicting statements

as to the *imminence* of a nuclear weapons capability. I would

think
I believe that the acquisition by Iraq of nuclear weapons in

addition to the chemical weapons and their demonstrated
*SAJDAM'S*

ruthlessness in using force would give them in increasingly

at the *that is*
dominant position in the area, probably hostile to us.

If they had not taken Kuwait, if they had not taken

10,000 hostages, if there were not a record of using poison

gas against their own people, I would not have *6 months ago*

we had deterrents. I would not have said *the* Iraqi nuclear

capability justifies American military deployment in the area.

But now that we are there, to leave without having dealt with

this problem *and* with the certainty that we cannot *return or at least*

should not, return very *soon*, that seems to me another

issue
question.

Senator Thurmond: Dr. Kissinger --

Dr. Kissinger: But now that we *are* where we are, now

that there have been *10,000 hostages* from nations all over the

world, I *would* feel that this opportunity should be *used* to

restore the balance of offensive capabilities in the area.

Senator Thurmond: Dr. Kissinger, the last question I

have for you the fact that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait shows

that he's not concerned about the diplomatic consequences of

his actions. If my evaluation is correct, why should we place

much credibility on a diplomatic solution to this crisis?

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Dr. Kissinger: I do not think we can. I would not

trust a solution that depends on Saddam Hussein's word, so one

most would have to judge any so-called diplomatic solution by the

enforcement guarantees that accompany it. It cannot be based

on the unsupported word of the Iraqi leader.

Senator Thurmond: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

Senator Nunn: Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator

Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy: Thank you very much, I do want to join
in welcoming Dr. Kissinger to the Committee. Dr. Kissinger,
if I understand your positions: one, you believe that
sanctions will not work and if they begin to cut in then the
various countries in the area will make their own deal; and
two, even if they do work, they are not going to deal with the
chemical and nuclear capability of Iraq; and third, even if
there are efforts of negotiations, given your own kind of
experience, if he is a clever politician and I think all of us
grant that he is at least clever and wilely and cunning, that
they will basically undermine our will to involve ourselves in
conflict.

Dr. Kissinger: I would be delighted to be proved wrong in
any of those assumptions.

Senator Kennedy: All right, but that assumption, I do
not think you can get away from the basic premise, that are
advocating that the United States go to war, and go to war

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1 soon, and go to war in such a way that we are going to have

2 massive kinds of air intervention.

3 If these are the points of reference, and whatever is

4 done has to be done before Ramadan which is in the middle of

5 March in next year, and if you take Dr. Schlesinger's

6 estimates that any kind of war might last up to 3 to 4 months,

7 I do not see how you can reach any kind of conclusion to the

8 kind of testimony you are giving here today.

9 Dr. Kissinger: I am prepared, I think we should give

10 sanctions --

11 Senator Kennedy: You said yourself, even you give them

12 the chance --

13 Dr. Kissinger: -- up to the absolute limit, But if you

14 ask for my evaluation of what is likely to be the case, I do

15 not believe we can maintain 400,000 troops there much beyond

16 the spring of next year, and that therefore our overall
general

17 position will be influenced. Yes, we will be driven to that

18 decision.

19 Now it may be true, and I agree with the fundamental statement

20 that has been made, that an initially smaller deployment might

21 have given us more staying power, but that is not where we are

22 now, and I am assessing the situation in terms of where we are

23 now.

24 Secondly, I have never advocated a massive air attack,

25 and I really have great difficulty understanding the position

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1 of so many of our military leaders who have been asking for

2 discriminating capabilities. What I think If there is

3 military action, it should consist of the selective

4 destruction of specific military targets relevant to the

5 military capability of Iraq. That would speed up the process

6 of sanctions, and it could restore the offensive balance in

7 the area, and I do not have in mind an all-out, massive,

8 population attack.

9 Senator Kennedy: All right, we will accept that, but we

10 have to recognize that whether it was in World War II against

11 Germany, we had superiority for 3 years and it ended up in a

12 ground war. It was true we had air superiority over Japan and

13 it was a ground war; air superiority in Korea, ground war; air

14 superiority for 15 years in Vietnam and a ground war.

15 So in every past recent history, whether we have had air

16 superiority, it has ended up in a ground war, you believe that

17 that might be avoided.

18 Let me just come to this point, you talk about not

19 massive, we have surgical strikes in North Vietnam, as you are

20 familiar with, 52,000 civilians killed in surgical strikes in

21 North Vietnam.

22 Now what is your assessment of the political impact that

23 that will have on our public opinion, when we find out that

24 the casualties that are going to be experienced over there are

25 going to be overwhelming Arab if we go into the kind of

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1 surgical strikes, even as we had in the Vietnam period which

2 turned out to be unsuccessful?

3 Dr. Kissinger: First of all, with respect to your first

4 point, Senator Kennedy, if it is true that any kind of

5 pressure ~~will~~ must~~ be eventually lead to a ground war, then that ~~is~~ would

6 also ~~true of sanctions because, to me at least, it does~~ not make

7 much sense to say that an air attack cannot succeed because it

8 must be followed by ground attacks, but ~~sanctions can succeed~~ that ~~could~~

9 without a subsequent ground attack because the end result is

10 supposed to be the same.

11 Now with the surgical strike, unfortunately it is a term

12 coined ~~which~~ having used -- I used, and it was one I regret using, but I maintain the

13 basic point, it was presented, not as an alternative to

14 sanctions, but as an alternative to large ground operations.

15 I would think that in Iraq the problem is different than

16 it was in the ~~other~~ places. What we need is something that ~~would~~

17 speeds up the process of sanctions, if we conclude that sanctions

18 are not going to work.

19 Senator Kennedy: And you believe that is conflict and

20 war?

21 Dr. Kissinger: Yes, probably. I would not have put this

22 many troops in to begin with, but they are there now and I

23 think our national interest is now at stake. involved.

24 Senator Kennedy: Earlier, we had Admiral Crowe who

25 talked about, when he was asked about the casualties that

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M

1. might be experienced, he referenced the experience of Israel
2. in their past wars in the deserts. You were obviously in
3. office in the last Middle East conflict in the 1973 war in
4. which Israel suffered over 11,000 casualties in 20 days with
5. approximately the same 300,000 that we are facing with Saddam
6. Hussein.

7. That was both an air and obviously involved ground
8. forces. The best estimate in terms of the casualties and who
9. is going to bear them, 90 percent, Dr. Schlesinger said, not
10. disputed by others, depending upon the ground strategy.

11. Now if you give 11,000 casualties in 20 days,
12. overwhelming of them Americans, Dr. Schlesinger talked about 3
13. months, you are getting up now into 30,000 to 35,000,
14. overwhelming American, and then you balance that against what
15. we had this morning from Admiral Crowe who says, I am
16. persuaded that U.S. initiating hostilities could well
17. exacerbate many of the tensions I have cited and further
18. polarize the Arab world.

19. Then he continued, I sense more nervousness among our
20. allies about our impetuousness rather than our patience. Now
21. do you not think it is wise that we move along the line of
22. trying to give at least these sanctions a reasonable period of
23. time with the ultimate option of reaching alternative means if
24. that comes into becoming a necessity?

25. Dr. Kissinger: The deadlines that I gave, Senator, were

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arbitrary,

arbitrary, drawn from the air, there must be people there, there are be, on the one hand, much better position than I to determine

certainly, people in a much better position than I to determine

for how long we can sustain our deployment in the desert

without war, and for how long we can retain the military options

while sanctions are in place.

And I certainly favor the maximum period of time. When

that point is reached, whenever that is, the President will

certainly have to weigh what you just put forward, and he will

have to weigh it against the consequences of a collapse of all

moderate regimes and another war, 2 to 3 years down the road in

which we will have lost many of the supporters and in which we

may then get involved under worse circumstances, with heavier

casualties, that is really the equation he will have to draw.

Senator Kennedy: Thank you, Doctor, my time is up.

Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Senator

Cohen?

Senator Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger,

we had testimony from two former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

and a number of the members were surprised, I might say even

astonished at the scope and strength of the convictions that

were expressed by both of those gentlemen.

I have read a book written by former National Security

Advisor who said that high military officers must always

strike a balance between their convictions and their knowledge

that to be effective they must survive to fight another day.

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1 Their innate awe of the commander-in-chief tempts them to find

2 a military reason for what they consider barely tolerable, and

3 contrary to some of the public methodology, they rather

4 challenge the commander-in-chief, they seek excuses to

5 support, not to oppose him.

6 That has been apparently your experience when you were

7 serving in that capacity.

8 Dr. Kissinger: It is a well written passage.

9 Senator Cohen: I am sorry, it is a relevant passage?

10 Dr. Kissinger: I compliment the author.

11 Senator Cohen: I thought you would recognize your own

12 words in that, and the reason I raise this is because some of

13 this panel would question exactly if that is the testimony

14 coming from our two former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that

15 sanctions should be pursued for at least another year,

16 possibly 18 months, questions have risen, if not vocally, at

17 least privately, what kind of military advice is the President

18 getting?

19 Is it your experience that if the President makes it

20 clear that he would like to seek a military option, that his

21 military advisors, including the joint chiefs and the Chairman

22 and inclined to support that even if they have doubts?

23 Dr. Kissinger: That is certainly one (pressure) on them (the)

24 but I think, at least since Vietnam, (yet) another pressure on the

25 military is to be sure to be in a position that if anything

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it
1 goes wrong, they can never be accused of not having asked for

enough, and of shifting the responsibility on the political
2

3 leadership for any conceivable failure, and it is my
4

impression, based on ignorance, this is simply an outsider
5

impression, is that when the President said he wanted to
6

defend Saudi Arabia, that he was told, if you want to do it,
7

he should, do not do it in a half-baked way, and that they asked for
8

every conceivable contingency that might occur, and in the
9

process built us into a situation which may present itself as
10

a defensive one, but in which the dividing line between
11

offensive and defensive operation is eroded from the very
12

beginning.

13 And I do not fully agree with the Chairman's distinction,

even though it is based on what has been publicly said,
14

because I think once we put that many forces in, there was no
15

exit except to prevail. And I believe that the origin of it
16

was that the military did not want again to be accused of
17

having followed too slavishly a political instruction.
18

19 Senator Cohen: Secretary Kissinger --

20 Dr. Kissinger: But you can get better testimony than

mine on this, and it is of course difficult to testify here
21

without a single, when no administration spokesman has been here who can speak
22

authoritatively.
23

24 Senator Cohen: If the United Nations were to grant the
25

use of force to the United States, and the President were to

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1 come before the Congress to seek the same authority, and

2 Congress should come to the conclusion based upon testimony

3 presented to this Committee and the Foreign Relations

4 Committee, that sanctions should be pursued for another 18

5 months and declines to authorize a specific use of force at
6 this time, what would be the consequences in your mind?

7 Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, I do not think the

8 President should go before the Congress to ask for this grant

9 unless he is sure that he can get authority, because I believe
10 that the refusal by the Congress of a public request by the
11 President for this authority would lead to an American debacle

12 in the Gulf.

13 No one would believe that at the end of 18 months the
14 same procedure might not be repeated; and long before those 18
15 months are over, there would be, we would be in a position of
16 having to negotiate the exit of our forces with a new

17 Administration government.

18 Senator Cohen: Can I reverse that then? Should the
19 President make a determination as to whether he has the
20 support of Congress first before going to the United Nations
21 or do you have a reverse debacle take place that the U.N.
22 authorizes the use of U.S. troops fighting in the desert but
23 Congress says no?

24 Should the President find out first whether he has the
25 support here before going to the U.N.?

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Dr. Kissinger: I believe that the President should make
quite sure that he has Congressional support before he goes
very far down the road towards military conflict. Whether he
should do that by going to a joint session or by informal
consultation, there is better experts than I to speak to
that.

Senator Cohen: Admiral Crowe indicated that Saddam
Hussein is seeking a face saving way out of the mess that he
has created in Kuwait, and he indicated for example he had
considerable experience in dealing with Arab nations. He
spent some time in Bahrain, and believes that the Arab world
feels that Saddam Hussein is trying to find a "face saving way
out."

You have written that saving Iraq's face is exactly the
opposite of what is needed, that it would enable Hussein to
claim some gain from his aggression, while the goal of Gulf
strategy has to be to demonstrate its failure.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends. You see, it is easy to
through these slogans around, if a face-saving formula (If a
face-saving formula is one that permits Saddam Hussein that
to gain something from he gains something out of his actions, and if he can make a
plausible case for that, then he will also claim that he
down the U.S. faced not just us, but the whole United Nations structure,
down. other possible actions would progress
Are there things that could be done that have another

line 21: "to claim success from his actions, and if he can make a"

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1 adjective attached to it than face-saving? I would have to

2 hear what they are, and I would be glad to give my opinion on

3 each of them individually.

4 Senator Cohen: I believe you have also written in the

5 past that any agreement which provides, allows both sides to

6 claim victory is a success.

7 Dr. Kissinger: In the abstract is it true, but when a

8 nation has annexed a neighbor, expelled half of its citizens,

9 looted the country, taken 10,000 international hostages

10 without any penalty and without an adequate outcry, I must say

11 and then comes out of it being able to claim a victory, I cannot

12 would not apply that rule to it.

13 Senator Cohen: Thank you.

14 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Cohen. At this point

15 we have said we will take a 5 minute break and we will come

16 back here promptly at 2:05 and Senator Bingaman will be

17 recognized.

18 [Recess]

19 Chairman Bingaman: The Committee will come to order and

20 we will recognize Senator Bingaman.

21 Senator Bingaman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr.

22 Kissinger, let me follow up on some earlier questions that

23 were asked. I understand, let me first clarify my

24 understanding of your testimony.

25 You indicated that in your view we cannot maintain a

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1 Senator Bingaman: Let me bring you back to the question
2 that I was, and I understand the point you made that it would
3 be an embarrassment or difficult to explain a reversal of the
4 decision to go to a higher troop level --

5 Dr. Kissinger: More than an embarrassment, it would
6 ~~undermine, probably~~ our strategic and political position ~~now.~~ of this time.

7 Senator Bingaman: But if in fact a decision of that type
8 were taken and we kept our troop strength at the lower level,
9 would that in fact give us more opportunity to let sanctions
10 work and more opportunity to pursue other options and take the
11 pressure off of us to pursue this military solution?

12 Dr. Kissinger: In the end, one of the reasons for the
13 deployment is the threat of a credible military option, as
14 Secretary Schlesinger pointed out yesterday, ~~So one again~~ wegh
15 would have to balance the perhaps greater sustainability
16 ~~with~~ against the reduced threat against Saddam Hussein.

17 I think in an article on August 19th which was quoted
18 here, I said that the Rubicon was crossed when we put in
19 250,000 troops, that was my view then and that is my view now.
20 I do not see ~~that huge a difference between~~ 250,000
21 ~~the~~ sustainability and 400,000.

22 Senator Bingaman: So you think even at the level that
23 the President had committed to, the level of troop strength
24 the President committed the country to before November 8th, we
25 were in a position where we would be forced to pursue a

40

military option sometime this next spring, if not sooner?

Dr. Kissinger: Probably.

Senator Bingaman: You also said that now that we are
there, we should pursue action to, and I think these are the
words you used, restore the balance of offensive capabilities
in the area.

Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

Senator Bingaman: Now I understand that with regard to
the military threat that Saddam Hussein may pose in the
future. I guess my question is, would that also apply to the
nonmilitary, the conventional military capability which he has
amassed and which he maintains in a million man army. Are you
suggesting that part of what we have to accomplish in order to
succeed in this enterprise is a drastic reduction in the level
of his military forces?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am talking primarily about nuclear,
chemical and biological capability and perhaps the offensive
missile forces.

Senator Bingaman: So if we were to deal with the
nuclear, the chemical, the biological and the missile
capability, you think that would be adequate?

Dr. Kissinger: That would meet the objectives as I have
outlined them in my mind.

Senator Bingaman: Okay. This morning, Admiral Crowe
made the statement that he believes Saddam Hussein's action in

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1 invading Kuwait had legitimized a long-term military presence

2 by the U.S. in the Middle East. I believe that was the

3 statement he made.

4 Your statements seem to contradict that or take a

5 different view as I understand it. You take the view that the

6 U.S. cannot maintain a large permanent capability, at least in

7 Saudi Arabia.

8 What is your, maybe you can elaborate on what you think

9 the long-term presence is --

10 Dr. Kissinger: I support the Carter Doctrine, as it was

11 reiterated by President Reagan and also by President Bush;

12 according to which the domination by a hostile outside power

13 of the Gulf affects vital American interests. So I would

14 support a naval presence and perhaps even a small air

15 presence.

16 I believe that a substantial ground presence in the

17 region makes us hostage to unpredictable political

18 consequences and may wind up having us almost physically as well.

19 hostages. I think it will create more psychological and

20 political problems that it solves, and I do not favor a

21 security system that depends on American ground forces who are

22 maintaining it.

23 Senator Bingaman: Thank you very much, my time has

24 expired.

25 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Bingaman. Senator

line 18: "developments and may wind up with us as physical"

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1 McCain?

2 Senator McCain: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,

3 Dr. Kissinger, for being with us this afternoon.

4 It is always an enlightening experience.

5 First of all, as far as the issue of what Congress should

6 do, I am of the view, Dr. Kissinger, that if Congress does not

7 support the President, for example, in the fashion of the

8 United Nations resolution, which, I understand, is about to be

9 passed, then I think the American people should know that

10 right away. I don't think there is reason for delay and

11 confusion to the point where perhaps action is contemplated

12 and then we find out that it would not be supported by the

13 Congress and the American people.

14 I think it would be very relevant if Congress came back

15 into session and voted on this issue some time in the near

16 future, so that we can be sure. And if the Congress chooses,

17 as some of my friends on the other side of the aisle, to say

18 that military action is not called for, then so be it. But I

19 think the worst of all worlds is for the President to

20 contemplate a course of action for which he cannot gain

21 Congressional support.

22 One of the things I regret more than anything else is,

23 whenever we hear there is a chance of conflict or the

24 possibility of a conflict, we always revisit the Vietnam War

25 as some sort of role model. In fact, the model of the Vietnam

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1. War is exactly what not to do in the conduct of war, including
2. actions on the part of Congress.

3. But to say that there was, "52,000 casualties in the
4. surgical strikes of North Vietnam" is just darn foolishness.
5. The fact is, as you know, Dr. Kissinger, that, in 1972, for
6. the first time, there was significant bombing, which was not
7. constrained by either Congressional or Presidential mandate,
8. which virtually brought that nation to its knees, with a
9. minimum of casualties, despite the hue and cry over one bomb
10. that hit one hospital, which seemed to be the biggest attack
11. in the history of warfare, which still angers me. The
12. Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese themselves have stated that
13. there were minimum casualties in the Christmas 1972 bombing
14. raids. And the fact is to purvey the idea is that somehow air
15. power failed in Vietnam because air power was not capable
16. certainly is an insult to the experience and intelligence of
17. those of us who served there.

18. Senator Kennedy: Would you just yield for one second?

19. Senator McCain: I would not yield.

20. Senator Kennedy: Since I was the one to use the figures,
21. as a point of personal privilege, I would like to say that
22. that was provided to me by a former Chairman of the National
23. Security Council. I just wanted to have that on the record.

24. Chairman Nunn: That will not come out of your time,
25. Senator McCain.

44

1 Senator McCain: Was that Mr. McFarlane?

2 Mr. Kissinger, isn't it true that the reason why the

3 North Vietnamese came back to the bargaining table in

4 Christmas 1972 was because they were virtually brought to

5 their knees by the bombing of North Vietnam?

6 Dr. Kissinger: They certainly agreed after the bombing
7 to things that they had not agreed to before and were very eager
8 to settle. I believe they were brought back to the bargaining
table. Yes,

10 Senator McCain: Do you believe that 52,000 casualties
11 over a seven or eight year period is some kind of exorbitant
12 number of casualties?

13 Dr. Kissinger: I have no independent knowledge of that
14 figure one way or the other, although it sounds credible to
me.

16 However, you gentlemen, even more than I, must have been
17 briefed for years about the smart bombs we are now developing,
18 the capacity for selective bombing. Certainly every time that
19 people wanted to get my support for the military budget, they
20 made a point of it, and I would explain to me how, with conventional,
21 bombing we could stop the Soviets in Europe.

22 So why should not work in an area where there is
23 relatively little air defense and relatively few targets that
24 need to fulfill the criteria that I had set up? I just do not
accept the proposition. Either a lot of money has been spent

45

1 for nothing, or we must have the capability that has been the
subject of our discussion.

2 which, however, claimed in briefings that you gentlemen must have had more of

3 than I.

4 Senator McCain: Clearly, Dr. Kissinger, I agree with
5 you. We have the capability to carry out not "surgical"
6 strikes, but strikes which would be concentrated on military,
7 air defense, command and control and communications, which I
8 think would go a long, long way in carrying out the mission
9 which we seek.

10 Both witnesses, Dr. Kissinger, in the last day have said
11 that Saddam Hussein has "showed willingness," showed
12 willingness to negotiate.

13 Do you have any indication of that?

14 Dr. Kissinger: All I know is what people like the Soviet
15 Envoy, Primakov, have been saying. If I understood his
16 position correctly, it is that Saddam Hussein would at some
17 point say that he is willing in principle to withdraw from
18 Kuwait; that then the United States, that a side deal is at
19 that point made in which the Arab nations take the
20 responsibility for turning over to him the two islands and
21 maybe the Ramallah oil field; that then the United States
22 withdraws and then the Arab nations turn over those islands to
23 him, rather than doing it.

24 To me, that would mean that Saddam has achieved a significant
25 progress at the end of a period that brought 400,000 Americans

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lines 1-3 as follows

"into the area, in which thousands of
hostages from all over the world were
taken, people with no conceivable relation-
ship to their governments, and certainly with
no conceivable relationship to"

was taken from all
a relationship to their
conceivable relationship to
play with it.

5 I think that would have disastrous consequences to the
6 stability of the area.

7 Those are the only examples of willingness to negotiate

8 that I know about, unless there are ~~secret things~~ other things that have

9 not been revealed. But I don't know whether the other

10 witnesses would know them better than I do.

11 Senator McCain: Dr. Kissinger, in light of your concerns
12 about the size of the U.S. military buildup, do you think
13 that, conceivably, part of our reaction could be to the
14 sizeable increase in troops strength and tanks that the Iraqis
15 have moved into Kuwait? My understanding is that they have
16 gone up to about 225,000 people, with about 3,500 tanks in the
17 area.

18 Dr. Kissinger: I know this is not exactly your question, but with every passing month Iraq is changing the demographics and the reality of Kuwait. They have already stripped the country of all movable equipment. They have thrown out about half of the ~~technically~~ what were Kuwaiti citizens, and ~~they~~ have moved in hundreds of thousands of their own people.

24 I understand why the President moved in these troops. But my
25 argument has been from the beginning that one cannot combine

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[Y]

into the area, in which 10,000 hostages were taken from all
were taken people with
over the world that had no conceivable relationship to their
governments and some of them no conceivable relationship to
what was going on, and that he got away with it.

I think that would have disastrous consequences to the
stability of the area.

Those are the only examples of willingness to negotiate
that I know about, unless there are secret things that have
not been revealed. But I don't know whether the other
witnesses would know them better than I do.

Senator McCain: Dr. Kissinger, in light of your concerns
about the size of the U.S. military buildup, do you think
that, conceivably, part of our reaction could be to the
sizeable increase in troops strength and tanks that the Iraqis
have moved into Kuwait? My understanding is that they have
gone up to about 225,000 people, with about 3,500 tanks in the
area.

Dr. Kissinger: I know this is not exactly your question,
but with every passing month Iraq is changing the demographics
and the reality of Kuwait. They have already stripped the
country of all movable equipment. They have thrown out about
half of the technically Kuwaiti citizens, and they have moved
in hundreds of thousands of their own people.

I understand why the President moved in these troops. But my
argument has been, from the beginning, that one cannot combine

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1 the benefits of every course of action. If one goes down a

2 certain road, at some point one has to face the consequences

3 ~~that this~~ road implies.

4 The more forces we have there, the greater our threat

5 ~~against Saddam,~~ but the shorter our staying power. That is a

6 fact of life.

7 I don't say this as a criticism. I can see the arguments

8 ~~that brought~~ the President to that point.

9 Senator McCain: Thank you.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator McCain.

12 I believe that Senator Dixon is next.

13 Senator Dixon: Dr. Kissinger, I want to thank you for
14 your very valuable contributions to the deliberations of this
15 Committee. Very early in your remarks, not your prepared
text, but your earlier, extemporaneous remarks -- and I am
17 going to paraphrase this; if I am not entirely accurate, I
18 know you will correct me -- you said something like this:
19 that, while you felt the embargo and the sanctions were taking
20 some effect, you did not see a case in which Saddam Hussein
21 would eventually send the President a note and say okay, I
give up, I'm getting out; that you thought ultimately that
23 would have to be resolved through negotiations.

24 Now I think that is a fair characterization of what you
25 said.

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Dr. Kissinger: Correct. It is a fair statement.

Senator Dixon: I agree with you entirely.

Now, here is what bothers this Senator, and I talked
about it yesterday in the course of my discussions with Dr.

Schlesinger.

The administration takes the position that they will not
talk as long as Saddam Hussein is in Kuwait. He has a face
saving problem, I take it, about that position by the
President.

It occurs to me that the United States of America, the
one great super power in the world today, in my view, is there
in great force. We're dominant in the air without question.
I'm sure you'll agree. We're dominant in the sea without
question. I'm sure you will agree. We are going to be there
in tremendous numbers with all of this technological
advantage, the optical advantage for night warfare and other
things. We are powerful and we are there with power.

I ask you, sir, as one of the great negotiators of our
time, why we cannot somehow find a way to begin talks to
resolve this situation short of war, given those facts?

Dr. Kissinger: You certainly know how to get to me,
Senator.

[General laughter]

Senator Dixon: I'm trying, Dr. Kissinger, I'm trying.

Dr. Kissinger: You know, if one studies almost every

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1 conflict in which the United States was involved, there is a
has been close.

2 period in which the impression is created that talk is its own
during, as seems to become

3 objective, and as the taking on a
the same sort of life is

4 detective story in which there are some clues out there that
help own, like some to see the are and

5 you have to find. though,

6 In my experience with negotiations, you usually know

7 whether the other side is willing to settle. You may then

8 have a miserably tough negotiation in coming to an agreement.

9 In this case, I don't see that any framework for a
negotiation exists. If a framework could be created which has

10 with a plausible outcome, even if we have not yet agreed on what it

11 is, I could understand a negotiation. But to send somebody to

12 Baghdad or Geneva to initiate a discussion with Iraq would,

13 in my view, start a panic in all the other Arab countries that

14 are associated with us and we would learn very little.

15 They can send us messages through so many channels that

16 would enable the President to judge whether or not

17 utility in pursuing it.

18 Senator Dixon: And could not talented men like you, with

19 your vast experience, and others similarly situated be in a

20 position to discover that in a variety of ways? I suggest to

21 you, sir, that the problem we have here is that so many

22 witnesses talk about the two alternatives, you know, patience

23 and the embargo and sanctions with our strength, and then the

24 suggestion from you and others, which I think is either

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1 expressed or implied often, that, in the end, that probably

2 won't quite do it, or war.

3 I suggest to you that there is this other alternative and

4 that talented people, who are good negotiators, could find

5 that opportunity somehow if we sought it.

6 Dr. Kissinger: I think for ~~anybody~~ like ~~myself~~ or

7 ~~anybody else~~, to appoint himself a free-lance negotiator,

8 unasked by the administration --

9 Senator Dixon: Oh, I don't ask you to do that.

10 Dr. Kissinger: -- ~~could only confuse the issue. I am~~

11 very uneasy about some of these ~~leading figures from Britain~~,

12 Japan, and Germany who have gone to Baghdad to negotiate on

13 their own. I think that ~~actually~~ *ca. only* ~~strengthens~~ the

14 determination of Saddam, and it gives him a way to use the

15 hostages which I find revolting.

16 But you haven't suggested that one talk about hostages.

17 You have suggested one talk about peace.

18 Senator Dixon: I have suggested that one explore in the

19 world community in a variety of ways that would best be known

20 to people of the expertise of our witness here how we develop

21 the opportunity for talks, given the fact that we are there in

22 strength.

23 You see, it does not impress me that it is a sign of

24 weakness for us to try to resolve this conflict by

25 negotiations in view of the fact that the whole world knows

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1 that we are the power in the region.

2 I see nothing about that that bothers this Senator. You
3 know, when you are in a position of strength, I see nothing
4 the matter through common sense to find a method of discussing
5 through the artful powers of communication a way to resolve
6 this problem, short of war.

7 Dr. Kissinger: Short of war and compatible with the
8 fundamental objectives on which I think everybody here has
9 agreed.

10 Senator Dixon: Of course. Yes, positively.

11 Dr. Kissinger: If it can be done, that would be
12 ~~preferable~~, surely be preferable, to war.

13 It is not evident to me from what I have read and heard
14 that such a framework now exists, right now.

15 Senator Dixon: Are you of the opinion the administration
16 is seeking that framework in some way?

17 Dr. Kissinger: I am of the view that the President, that
18 nothing would please the President more than an honorable way
19 out of this crisis, but that he would define "honorable" as
20 ~~that which is~~ being compatible with the U.N. objectives.

21 Senator Dixon: Thank you.

22 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Dixon.

23 I don't want to interrupt anyone, but we have
24 approximately 30 minutes and we have at least 6 or 7 more
25 Senators with 6 minutes each. So the arithmetic doesn't work

52

1 unless everyone sticks exactly to the time and we get perhaps

2 5 minutes of grace from Secretary Kissinger.

3 Mr. Gorton.

4 Senator Gorton: Mr. Kissinger, you very kindly
5 abbreviated your written statement in order that more of us be
6 able to have questions.

7 I have read it. I don't know that it has been totally
8 outlined by any speaker here. I think it included five or six
9 points which I would like to paraphrase and see whether or not
10 I am getting the message that you want to leave with us.

11 First: dependence on both sanctions and military action
12 after an extended period of time are not only not consistent
13 but are mutually inconsistent as a course of action to follow.

14 Second: sanctions, standing alone, are unlikely to gain
15 our objectives if we include in those objectives the end of
16 both the desire and the capacity on the part of Iraq to
17 dominate the Middle East region.

18 Dr. Kissinger: That point is not correct. That was Mr. Schlesinger's point. That isn't mine.

20 Senator Gorton: Do you think that sanctions might regain
21 the goal of removing their ability to dominate the Middle
22 East?

23 Dr. Kissinger: I would like to believe what so many here
24 believe, that the sanctions will work. However, I am not
25 Realistically think that the furthest sanctions will get us is

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1 to the opening of negotiations, but that we will not even gain

2 the full withdrawal from Kuwait through the negotiations

3 without the threat, at least, of military pressure.

4 Senator Gorton: That is the way I understood what you

5 said, that the most we can get from sanctions is negotiations

6 and a partial withdrawal.

7 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

8 Senator Gorton: Next: the military option is not going

9 to last as a practical matter indefinitely, or perhaps even

10 past next spring because of internal conditions in the Middle

11 East itself.

12 Dr. Kissinger: Correct, and maybe internal conditions

13 here.

14 Senator Gorton: Yes.

15 Next: any diplomatic solution almost by definition will

16 leave Iraq as the dominant power in the Middle East and will

17 undermine moderate regimes in that area.

18 Dr. Kissinger: Unless the diplomatic solution includes a

19 concept of arms control that reduces Iraq's offensive

20 capability.

21 Senator Gorton: Next: an attempt to parallel the Middle

22 East to Western Europe and to Korea is erroneous; we cannot

23 keep large numbers of troops there for an extended period of

24 time; cultural and religious differences between Saudi Arabia

25 and the Middle East and even Korea simply make that a totally

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1 invalid comparison.

2 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

3 Senator Gorton: Next: if we must pursue military goals,
4 those goals should be limited, that is to say, they should not
5 attempt to destroy Iraq as a society, and the means by which
6 we attempt to gain those limited military goals must in
7 themselves be limited and relatively low cost, i.e., not major
8 tank and infantry attacks across a fortified border.

9 Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely correct.

10 Senator Gorton: Thank you.

11 Now, for a question. Do you believe that the course of
12 action being followed by the United States in the United
13 Nations and similar authority from Congress and a deadline
14 date would increase or decrease the chances of our being
15 successful without the use of force; that is to say that
16 Saddam Hussein is unlikely to back down in the way in which we
17 wish him to back down unless he sees no alternative to that
18 other than that or a military defeat?

19 Dr. Kissinger: I believe that the course of action we will
20 followed so far is the one most likely to cause him to back
21 down, provided we understand its implications and it is a
22 foreshortened time span.

23 Senator Gorton: I think that is about 6 minutes, Mr.

24 Chairman. I have the answer that I wanted, so I thank you.

25 Chairman Nunn: Thank you very much, Senator Gorton.

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1 Senator Gore.

2 Senator Gore: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Secretary Kissinger, it is a great pleasure to have you
4 here today. I have enjoyed listening to your statement.

5 You have made the point that, if we continue the policy
6 of sanctions on the assumption that the military option can
7 then be employed at a later time, we may find the military
8 option will disappear after a certain number of months.

9 That is the most powerful point that I hear you making.

10 There are many others that you make as well.

11 Dr. Kissinger: That is my view.

12 I really would like to make one general observation,
13 which is this.

14 We are discussing a very anguishing problem, to which
15 really nobody knows the answer. We are all operating on the
16 basis of assessments we cannot prove exactly correct. It is
17 the President's problem, it is the problem of this Committee,
18 and it is my problem.

19 So, no matter how dogmatic I may sound, it should be
20 taken in the context that we are talking here for everybody,
21 of 51-49 types of decisions.

22 Senator Gore: I respect that. The President is in the
23 same position. Everybody in our country is trying to see
24 through to a successful conclusion to this matter.

25 One of the reasons it has been so dangerous from the

56

1 beginning is that it has been extremely difficult to look into
2 the future and see a successful resolution of it.

3 But I want to explore with you your reasoning on this
4 central point, what I take to be a central point of your
5 statement here.

6 I will refer to the prepared text that you gave us, and
7 it is consistent with what you have said orally here.

8 You support your assertion that a military option will
9 fade the longer we pursue the sanctions policy with several
10 assertions. The sanctions have to bite, and you question
11 whether they will. They have to be maintained throughout any
12 negotiations. The military option must remain intact.
13 psychologically, technically, diplomatically, during the
14 entire course of the negotiations, and there must be no other
15 upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied
16 cohesion.

17 Now, when I boil those assertions down to their essence,
18 what I think you are really saying -- and correct me if I am
19 wrong -- is that you believe the military option will
20 disappear because during the time we are waiting for the
21 sanctions to work, something will happen. Circumstances will
22 change and the coalition will fall apart. Resentment within
23 Saudi Arabia will build, there will be a new aggressive tone
24 to the Intifada that will poison the relations between the
25 Arab world and the United States.

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1 Dr. Kissinger: Any number of things.

2 Senator Gore: Any number of things.

3 Dr. Kissinger: Plus the fact that many countries will

4 become less and less willing to support the sanctions

5 themselves and begin trading again with Iraq; plus the fact

6 that Kuwait will then be so de facto incorporated that the

7 demand for its liberation will no longer make any sense.

8 These are all factors that contribute to my judgment.

9 Senator Gore: All right. But, basically, what you are
10 saying is that you think that the risk of continuing the
11 policy of sanctions is too high.

12 Dr. Kissinger: Especially after the statements that have

13 been made and the deployments that have been undertaken.

14 Senator Gore: What do you mean "especially after the
15 statements that have been made?"

16 Dr. Kissinger: Because there is no way now that we can

17 sustain this effort. We will have to start withdrawing troops

18 if we are going to go into a long siege, in my view.

19 Senator Gore: All right. But that, it seems to me, is a
20 different argument.

21 Dr. Kissinger: It's a subsidiary argument.

22 Senator Gore: Yes. I agree with those who have said
23 that this is not Vietnam and it's not World War I. It's not
24 any previous war. It is a conflict unique in our history.

25 There are some parallels with past conflicts. One of the

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1 lessons of Vietnam, for example, that I think does apply is

2 that the Congress should be involved and we should respect the

3 fact that domestic consensus is itself a strategic asset.

4 Another lesson is that we shouldn't launch an offensive

5 move only because our forces are there.

6 Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

7 Senator Gore: It seems to me that to argue that because

8 we have deployed, we then have to use the forces in a

9 particular way is an unwise argument. You use that as a

10 subsidiary argument and I am uncomfortable with that.

11 Dr. Kissinger: No, no. I am assuming the forces are

12 there because there was a strategy underlying putting them

13 there. To abandon that strategy now is different from never

14 having adopted that strategy in the first place.

15 Chairman Nunn: Senator Gore, if I am going to go around

16 on this, I am going to have to interrupt because otherwise

17 somebody will get left out altogether. I hate to interrupt.

18 I know you have a line of questioning going. Perhaps we'll

19 have time to get back to it.

20 Senator Gore: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Chairman Nunn: Senator Coats.

22 Senator Coats: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 Dr. Kissinger, I just have one question in the interest

24 of time. It may require somewhat of a lengthy answer and it

25 is a little bit of a lengthy question.

59

We talked earlier here about and have discussed for two
days now the consequences of U.S. engagement in an armed
conflict in terms of relations within the Arab world, post-
conflict relations, the perception of the United States and so
forth, and U.S. casualties and the direct impact there.

But I wonder if you would elaborate on your answer to
Senator Kennedy in terms of consequences to the United States
and to the world if we do not engage in armed conflict, if we
do end up in some type of protracted negotiations in which
Iraq is perceived to be somewhat of a winner, and if their
military remains intact.

What are we looking at 3 years, 5 years, 10 years out in
terms of consequences to the world, the United States, and
potential casualties?

Dr. Kissinger: I want, Incidentally, to say to Senator
Gore that I am not arguing that we should use forces because
they are there. I am saying, really, we are addressing the
question which you put, Senator Coats, which is what are the
consequences of our withdrawing these forces without having
achieved the objectives that were enunciated by the United
Nations plus the arms control objectives which I believe are
necessary.

I believe that the consequences will be First of all,
I don't believe that there can be a very orderly withdrawal
under these circumstances because at some point radical

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governments will emerge in some of the Arab countries now

allied to us, or even in some of the governments that are now

in power, which will try to burnish their credentials by

accelerating our withdrawal once it is clear that we cannot

achieve our objectives.

I believe that then radical governments will emerge in

many of the countries now associated with us, or radical

policies.

This will lead, first of all, to a much larger share of

the oil revenues of the region going to Iraq, accelerating its

capacity for a military buildup and the threat to its

neighbors.

This will, sooner or later -- and I think sooner, in

fact, I think very soon -- lead to a high possibility of

conflict between the remaining moderate Arab nations and the

radical nations, and the near certainty of an Arab-Israeli

conflict in which there is a high possibility that this time

nuclear weapons might be involved. If we remember that in

every previous one the United States got itself into a

confrontation with various other nations, I think we could

find ourselves in an extremely uncomfortable position in a

very brief period of time, in my view.

Senator Coats: And you would define that brief period of

time as what?

Dr. Kissinger: You know, it is hard to predict. I would

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1 think less than five years. I would think two to three years.

2 Senator Coats: And would it be possible for the United

3 States not then to intervene in such a situation? I assume

4 we're talking about massive destruction of the world oil

5 supply or prices.

6 Dr. Kissinger: We faced an oil embargo in the last

7 conflict in the region, in which some Arab nations were still

8 fairly sympathetic to us. Under the scenario that I have

9 outlined, we could find a massive disruption of oil supplies

10 and some very difficult choices with respect to friendly

11 governments.

12 Senator Coats: Israel being one.

13 Dr. Kissinger: Israel being one.

14 Senator Coats: And Saudi Arabia being another.

15 Dr. Kissinger: Saudi Arabia and maybe Egypt.

16 Senator Coats: How do you compare that potential

17 consequence and casualties that might result with the

18 consequences and casualties of a limited attack, such as you

19 described now, to deal with this situation?

20 Dr. Kissinger: If I were not convinced that this is a

21 high probability, I would never say anything that would

22 support the possibility of military action.

23 Senator Coats: And you are convinced that it is a high

24 probability?

25 Dr. Kissinger: That is my conviction.

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62

1 Senator Coats: Thank you.

2 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Coats.

3 Senator Shelby.

4 Senator Shelby: Thank you.

5 Dr. Kissinger, we all respect your opinions and, although
6 you might not be getting all the intelligence briefings every
7 day, your knowledge of the world is very important to us here
8 on the Committee.

9 Dr. Kissinger, what real options, just in a nutshell and
10 just in a minute, does the President of the United States have
11 here, if we accept your basic testimony that, as I understand
12 it, long-term options and long-term military commitments over
13 there are basically a contradiction in terms?

14 Dr. Kissinger: Well, as I have indicated, I probably
15 back in August would have recommended a different strategy
16 than the one that was adopted, although I respect the
17 President's courage in adopting it and I strongly support his
18 objectives.

19 Now that we are down this road, which I think is a
20 reasonable road, I think the ideal would be if a united
21 country helped him create the impression that he is prepared
22 to go, to do what he has said repeatedly he would do. I
23 think that is most likely to generate a negotiation. Then we
24 can have a debate whether the terms of the negotiation are
25 adequate for us to step back from where we are.

63

We are in danger of sliding <u>our</u>self into a position

where we get neither the benefit of a blockade policy nor the

benefit of the buildup <u>that</u> we have undertaken and <u>that</u> was,

after all, undertaken without public opposition <u>by anybody</u>,

including <u>me</u>.

Senator Shelby: How important is it -- we know it is

important, but on a scale of one to ten, how important is

public opinion of the American people, the backing of the

President on the Gulf and his policy?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, I think it is extremely important.

Obviously everybody has a responsibility <u>towards</u> that.

Senator Shelby: Do you believe that the President of the

United States, President Bush, has properly -- "properly" is

not the word -- has adequately communicated to the American

people why we are there, what his options are, in a

satisfactory way?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, he is caught in the usual dilemma

of a chief executive, that if he spells it out too precisely,

he may give away what he is planning to do.

I think at some point well before the deadline of January

15 he will have to explain not just why resisting aggression

is important but why resisting this aggression at this place

is important to the national interests of the United States.

I am convinced that he will do this, and I think that he

has handled the crisis with courage and skill.

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1 Senator Shelby: Thank you.

2 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Shelby.

4 I believe Senator Wirth is next. He will be back I am
told.

6 Senator Glenn.

7 Senator Glenn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 I was interested in your article in the "Washington
Post," that you were critical with the administration for just
9 going along with the three purposes of Iraq out of Kuwait,
10 restoring the legitimate government, release of hostages, but
11 not in going ahead and establishing or explaining the vital
12 American interests and what our American national interest is
13 in that area.
14

15 I think that is a rather critical area because so far it
16 seems to me we have had mainly sort of sound bite
17 justification for why we are there. We have had the "I've had
18 it with Saddam Hussein," we have had the mistreatment of
19 hostages, the embassy rights, Hitler-like, the overstating of
20 our nuclear danger, the naked aggression. The naked
21 aggression has justified -- that's a good one and I agree with
22 that one. But surely no one could think we'd have 400,000
23 troops over there in the desert right now if there weren't
24 other reasons there, too.

25 There are lots of borders that get crossed and lots of

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1. aggression in the world and we don't throw in 400,000 troops
2. to take care of it.

3. I think, in following up on Senator Shelby's comments,
4. the American people have to really understand why we are there
5. and our vital long-term interests if we are not just to repeat
6. Vietnam over again, where we were forced out of an action by
7. the public getting disenchanted with the whole thing. The
8. potential control of 70 percent of the world's oil was
9. obviously an Iraqi objective. Implications for a long-term
10. U.S. collective security, our relations with the Arab nations
11. and hopes for a Mideast peace, the fact that Iraq already has
12. chemical weapons and is trying to go for nuclear, the
13. interests of Israel -- these are all things that I think the
14. President should be explaining to the American people.
15. Otherwise, we are just going to get ourselves into a situation
16. where we wind up with the public not supporting whatever the
17. action is, either the embargo or the war that we might get
18. into.

19. I don't understand yet, though, why you think we cannot
20. maintain 400,000 people there. You made in your statement the
21. differentiation between that and the 350,000 or so that we had
22. in Europe for 45 years, the fact that they were domestically
23. stabilizing in Europe but are domestically destabilizing in
24. the Persian Gulf area.

25. Is there any evidence that the Saudis are beginning to

67

1 ~~we~~ were asked to leave.

2 Senator Glenn: I am also a little bit vague here as to
3 why you think the embargo will not work. It is the most
4 perfect embargo situation that has ever existed in modern
5 times, as far as I know. It is a land-locked nation. The
6 whole world is united for the first time against it. The U.N.
7 is united. We have the embargo on. It appears that already
8 it is beginning to bite some.

9 Why do you think it will not be effective over the long
10 haul?

11 Dr. Kissinger: I will make two points.

12 That Point one is I have noticed ~~that~~ a number of commentators
13 have pointed out that the nuclear issue arose in Iraq just at
14 the time that public opinion polls showed some concern with ~~there was~~ a

15

the American people.

lines 18-19 as follows:

"hearings evolved, suddenly a lot of people
from whom we have not heard in months began
to claim that the sanctions were working in
a definite time frame."

I noticed that, as these
~~began to~~ that
~~people are claiming~~ the
~~we~~ have not heard ~~for~~ in
~~months.~~ though
~~on the subject except~~ I am
~~at~~ 15
~~I am saying that all the~~

22 sanctions ~~will do~~ the best ~~sanctions will do~~ is to initiate a
23 negotiation. ~~And~~ at that point, we will face a whole ~~set of~~ new
24 hurdles. Will we maintain the sanctions during negotiations? ~~during~~
25 Will we maintain our terms ~~in a protracted negotiation?~~ Will

67

1 ~~we~~ were asked to leave.

12 ~~Point one is I~~ that I have noticed ~~that~~ a number of commentators
13 ~~have pointed~~ out that the nuclear issue arose in Iraq just at
14 ~~there was~~ the time that public opinion polls showed some concern with
15 it.

16 Senator Glenn: 54 percent of the American people.

17 Dr. Kissinger: I have also noticed that, as these
18 ~~evolved~~ hearings developed, suddenly a lot of people began to ~~that~~ are claiming the
19 ~~were in a definite time frame~~ in which we have not heard of the sanctions are working from whom we have not heard for months.

20 I have no independent opinion on the subject except I am
21 not saying the sanctions will not work. I am saying that all the
22 sanctions will do, the best sanctions will do is to initiate a
23 negotiation. And that point, we will face a whole set of
24 hurdles. Will we maintain the sanctions during negotiations?
25 Will we maintain our terms in a protracted negotiation? Will

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Y

1 we maintain our military option?

2 These are the obstacles.

3 I think sanctions ~~will~~ would get us eventually to a negotiation. But they will not get us, in my view, to our objectives.

6 Senator Glenn: But you also felt that if the sanctions took a lengthy period of time, we would not be able to sustain our forces over there --

9 Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

10 Senator Glenn: -- for that period of time.

11 Dr. Kissinger: You know, it depends on how you define "a lengthy period of time."

13 I would be astonished if we could maintain our forces there ~~will~~, say, 18 months from now.

15 Senator Glenn: Do you mean just because of American public opinion or physical inability?

17 Dr. Kissinger: Because of the circumstances then ~~again~~ because of circumstances that I described, and maybe American domestic opinion.

20 But I am no expert on American domestic opinion. You gentlemen are in a better position to judge that.

22 Senator Glenn: Well, I wouldn't necessarily agree with you on that.

24 Thank you. My time is up.

25 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

69

1 Chairman Nunn: Thank you, Senator Glenn.

2 Senator Levin.

3 Senator Levin: You have my welcome, Dr. Kissinger.

4 I would like to pursue a line of questioning that many of
5 us have talked to you about relative to the sanctions working
6 and pick up where Senator Glenn left off.

7 You said that sanctions, even if they work, would not get
8 us to all of our objectives properly. That's number one.

9 Number two, you don't believe that it's likely that we'll
10 be able to maintain our forces there long enough so that
11 sanctions will even get us to that point.

12 Is that so far pretty much what you think?

13 Dr. Kissinger: No. I think we can maintain our forces
14 long enough to get us to a negotiation. I expect a
15 negotiation early next year.

16 Senator Levin: Now, if it proved, as events unfolded and
17 it appeared that we could maintain our forces there for a year
18 or two, and that your prediction was wrong in that regard and
19 internal events in Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Arab
20 world and here and in Europe and so forth indicated that we
21 could maintain our forces there for a year or two, would you
22 recommend that course of action?

23 Dr. Kissinger: I would prefer for sanctions to work as
24 long as we commit ourselves to achieve all the objectives that
25 I outlined and we don't start jettisoning them as time goes

Y

70

find
achieved
on. But if we make the assumption that all of this can be
done, then I would prefer sanctions to war.

3 Senator Levin: I'm not talking about maintaining an
4 assumption. If, as events unfold, it appears that we can
5 maintain our forces there for a year or two --

6 Dr. Kissinger: And If we can maintain the coalition and
7 ~~if we can~~ maintain the willingness to maintain sanctions, and
8 if we can look ourselves in the eye and say we are going to
9 maintain all these conditions, then ~~surely~~ *I would prefer it.*

10 Senator Levin: -- you would prefer that course?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Certainly.

12 Senator Levin: So we could reach a judgment in January,
13 February, or March, for instance, that maybe events will prove
14 that course to be possible. We should not commit ourselves
15 now, then, to a course which would not make that outcome
16 possible.

17 Is that correct?

18 Dr. Kissinger: We need not commit ourselves ~~today or now~~ right now

20 Senator Levin: Or to a deadline?

21 Dr. Kissinger: No. But I ~~should~~ would think the
22 Administration, in its ~~internal~~ own thinking, needs to have some
criteria.

24 Senator Levin: Maybe criteria. But should we commit
25 ourselves to a deadline, externally?

71

Dr. Kissinger: Not an artificial deadline. If we can

maintain all of your conditions, Senator, and really mean it

and just use it to waste time, then we need no deadline.

Senator Levin: In response to Senator Cohen's question,

you indicated that you believe that the President should find

out if he has Congressional support before he goes very much

further down this road.

Dr. Kissinger: Right.

Senator Levin: How should he do that?

Should he seek a Congressional authorization of some

kind? If not, how would he seek that support?

Dr. Kissinger: I haven't really thought this through,

but I think he needs an issue that can be expressed in some

operational terms.

I don't think he can go to Congress and ask for

general support for his policy because that would be like a

parliamentary vote of confidence.

But if, for example, the U.N. passes this resolution, and

it ought to be within the wit of man to formulate a

proposition that the Congress makes the same kind of

authorization, or at least expresses its support for that

resolution, or something of that nature, I think that might become

one way of doing it.

Senator Levin: Somehow or other he should seek --

Dr. Kissinger: But it should be a concrete, operational

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1 decision. It should not be a vague, philosophical statement

2 of whether they support or do not support the President,

3 because that will not prove much.

4 Senator Levin: But with that one limit, that it ought to

5 be a specific action that is supported, he should seek

6 Congressional support?

7 Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

8 Having had to wind up a war we inherited, that we did not

9 even start, without Congressional support, I can tell you that it

10 is a nightmare and it should never be attempted again.

11 Senator Levin: And when you say "Congressional support,"

12 you mean authorization?

13 Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Well, I don't know what the legal

14 terminology is. But it should be, something the public can understand as a

15 clear statement of our Congressional view and that will not

16 permit the Congress afterward to say that they didn't

17 understand what was being done.

18 Senator Levin: You indicated that you would have placed

19 fewer of our troops there.

20 Can you tell us why you would have placed fewer troops

21 there?

22 Dr. Kissinger: My instinct would have been to put just

23 enough troops there to deter an attack on Saudi Arabia and

24 then let the sanctions operate. But I must also tell you, my

25 instinct would also have been somewhere along that road to

line 1 as follows: "taking out the offensive military capability by air power because"

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1. take out the offensive military capability of Iraq because

2. that would have created a new negotiating reality and we would

3. then not be in a circumstance where we have to accomplish

4. everything at once.

5. So I might well have been willing to take some military

6. action earlier, but I would not have relied so much on

7. ground operation.

8. Senator Levin: Thank you.

9. Dr. Kissinger: But all of this is off the top of my
10. head. This is not something that I have had a chance to study

11. fully.

12. Chairman Nunn: Thank you.

13. This completes our first round of questioning. We have
14. miraculously done it, Dr. Kissinger, within the timeframe that

15. we had committed to you.

16. First, I want to thank you for being here. You are
17. always very helpful. You provoke our thinking. You make us
18. think in a lot of different directions, and you stimulate our
19. overall questions and give us a lot of good answers.

20. The one thing that I have difficulty with on your logic
21. is this. You paint a very gloomy picture of the Middle East
22. as to what will happen if we withdraw our forces without
23. accomplishing our objectives. That is an assumption that I
24. don't think anyone is proceeding on the basis of. I don't
25. think anyone is counseling the withdrawal of forces without

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1 achieving our objectives.

2 The one thing that I think all of us agree on here is
3 that we have committed and that we ought to see it through.

4 Where we have differing opinions is the question of tactics,
5 whether we do try the embargo longer or shorter.

6 There is not any disagreement, though, that I know of on
7 this Committee and very little that I have heard of in the
8 Congress as to whether we ought to start withdrawing without
9 achieving our objectives.

10 There are many of us, though, who share your apprehension
11 about the size of the force that we are putting over there
12 now. I think that the force is much too large to be able to
13 be sustained politically and perhaps even logistically. I
14 have felt that for some time and, as a matter of fact, said
15 that in August. I've said it publicly a number of times.

16 So there have been people speaking out on the subject of
17 the size of the force.

18 The other thing I would pose for your thought is if you
19 have 230,000 forces there now and you end up in January,
20 February or March with about the same number by adopting a
21 rotation policy rather than an augmentation policy, then you
22 have not withdrawn forces. You have not diminished the level
23 of forces you have now.

24 The final point I would make -- and I think you and I
25 would be in agreement on this -- is we don't have to get to

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line 9-10: "They should not say one thing or another."

1 400,000-some forces to have the kind of offensive capability

2 that you believe is applicable and necessary.

3 Dr. Kissinger: But then, can you use your influence to

4 keep our generals off television announcing that we no longer

5 have an offensive capability?

6 Chairman Nunn: Well, we might bring General Duggin back

7 for that purpose.

8 [General, laughter] They should not say,

9 Dr. Kissinger: I don't expect him to say one thing or

10 another.

11 Chairman Nunn: But there are a lot of people who feel -

12 - and I think you and I would agree on this -- that we have

13 had an offensive capability, a very substantial offensive

14 capability, air capability, since early October. So the

15 question of having to go to 430,000 troops to be able to say

16 we have an offensive threat is one that no one has supplied an

17 answer to me on.

18 I also would say, and I know you probably would concur in

19 this, that the Joint Chiefs usually don't come in and say

20 we're giving you the mission, Mr. President, and here is how

21 many forces we need to carry out that mission. It works the

22 other way. The President gives them the mission and then they

23 say how many forces. When they went to the 400,000-something,

24 that's when they were given a new military mission, which was,

25 indeed, to be prepared to liberate Kuwait offensively. That

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1 The Chairman has indicated that there was no disagreement
2 by this panel or this Committee and the witness that we should
3 not withdraw our forces before our goals are achieved.

4 As I listened to the testimony, Dr. Kissinger said that
5 any reversal of the decision to send 400,000 would be
6 perceived as a reversal of policy and undermine the
7 credibility of the administration; that you might not have
8 made that determination; but, once having been made, a
9 reversal of that, meaning keeping the same level of forces we
10 currently have and rotating them on a regular basis, would be
11 perceived by others as being a reversal and defeat.

12 Chairman Nunn: Senator Cohen, on that point, I think you
13 have made a good point. But if he had that, I thought he
14 walked away from it --

15 Senator Cohen: I'm trying to bring him back to that.

16 Chairman Nunn: -- because if you have 230,000 forces
17 there now and you end up with 230,000 forces there and then
18 say to the world you have withdrawn forces, that does not
19 figure into my arithmetic.

20 Senator Cohen: Mr. Chairman, if I could just complete
21 this --

22 Chairman Nunn: Sure.

23 Senator Cohen: -- I think that is what Dr. Kissinger
24 indicated before, that the President, having made the decision
25 to add another 200,000, to reverse that position now and

[Y]

78

1 maintain the current level would be seen as being a

2 retrenchment and retreat on the part of the administration.

3 That's point number one.

4 Point number two -- and this, again, is unclear on the

5 basis of what Dr. Kissinger just said -- my understanding is

6 that you indicated assuming that you could keep 230,000 or

7 250,000 American forces there for an 18 month period of time,

8 over that period of time there are likely to be destabilizing

9 activities taking place. So, even if we were committed to

10 keeping 250,000, in your judgment, based upon your prior

11 statement, that probably is unlikely, no matter what the

12 consensus here in Congress is, that the political reality is

13 such that Saudi Arabia and others would probably be

14 jeopardized by their very presence, even though we are

15 committed.

16 Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. Chairman, if the President

17 had not added the forces in November, I would not have written

18 an article urging him to do so. On the other hand, if he now

19 reversed it, it would have the consequences which Senator Cohen

20 described. So the level of forces we could reach over a

21 period of months, ~~that~~ would be the only issue, I agree

22 strongly with the summary of Senator Cohen.

23 Senator Cohen: I'm just summarizing what you have said.

24 Dr. Kissinger: You have summarized me correctly.

25 From the point of view of American domestic politics,

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1 that might be a stable situation and one to which I would not
2 object. I would be nervous about a very large American ground
3 establishment in the Middle East for an extended period of
4 time and I would need a lot of persuasion that the surrounding
5 circumstances make that safe.

6 Chairman Nunn: I agree with you on that point. I have
7 felt for a long time that we have built too many forces over
8 there. But we have changed strategy, too, in terms of
9 military mission.

10 In any event, Dr. Kissinger, you have been a great help
11 to us today and we are getting you out of here approximately
12 on time. We hope that we will have enough credibility with
13 you on the time clock to get you to come back.

14 Dr. Kissinger: You always do, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

15 Chairman Nunn: Thank you.

16 [Whereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the Committee adjourned, to
17 reconvene upon the call of the Chair.]

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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Draft 3

# SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

## Introductory Note

The following is an adaptation of articles published in *The Washington Post* on August 19th, September 30th and November 11th. It is intended to focus discussion.

## Objectives

American objectives have included fulfillment of stated UN goals of restoration of the status quo ante in Kuwait as well as the unconditional release of all hostages. It should also provide for a reduction of Iraq's offensive capability which now overshadows its neighbors. Were Saddam suddenly to accept the UN terms, he would in fact preserve the essence of his power, although it would represent a huge loss of prestige for him.

Iraq would still retain its chemical and nuclear capabilities. Its large standing army would still preserve the

[Y]

2

capacity to overwhelm the area. Many nations in the Middle East
might adjust to the perception that the mobilization of forces
from all over the world cannot be repeated every few years.

Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important
if US forces are to be substantially withdrawn from the Gulf as I
believe they should be. At the same time, it would be
undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed
for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their
past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to
the temptations of a military vacuum.

## Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the
crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: it could passively
endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it
could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which
are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is--

3

were prepared to do in concert; or it could take the lead in
opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support
for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal
burden.

The Administration concluded that anything other than a
leadership role for the United States would have ended with
making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and led to the
collapse of the moderate governments in the region including
Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role,
President Bush made another crucial decision. The American
military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and
a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi
oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President
Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They
concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope
of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming

4

force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if
necessary.

In short, early in America's involvement there was some
argument as to whether American vital interests justified a
massive deployment in the Gulf. That debate has since been
overtaken by the scale of our deployment and the number of
countries that have followed America's leadership in the Gulf.

The perception of American failure would shake international
stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be
gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not
survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of
radicalism and fundamentalism.

## Sanctions or Military Action?

The United States is approaching the point in the Middle
East crisis where a choice must be made.

Y

5

According to official pronouncements, the UN goals are to be achieved by sanctions leading to negotiations if possible but, as a last recourse, by military means.

The two approaches have been presented as if they were successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove mutually exclusive because by the time it is evident that sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will probably no longer exist.

To achieve the proclaimed objectives by sanctions, at least five hurdles must be overcome:

* The sanctions must bite.

* They must be maintained throughout any negotiations.

* Once the UN terms are achieved, arms control objectives must be addressed.

* The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically and diplomatically during the entire course of the negotiations.

6

* There must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesion.

To state these hurdles is to set forth the practical obstacles to clearing them.

For one thing, upheavals in the Middle East are a way of life. In one recent week, the second highest ranking official in Egypt was assassinated, Syria battled Christian forces in Beirut, and 21 Palestinians died in Jerusalem.

If the sanctions do bite within a time frame relevant to political processes, Iraq is more likely to offer to negotiate than to yield.

In that case, pressures to ease the sanctions will be difficult to resist. Which democracy will want to be responsible for starvation in Iraq and Kuwait once negotiations are under way?

The fundamental dilemma is that the UN terms leave no real room for negotiation--except perhaps the staging of the Iraqi withdrawal.

Y

7

Thus all so-called diplomatic solutions effectively dilute
the UN objectives while maintaining Iraq's war-making potential
and thus confirming Iraq as the supreme military power of the
Middle East.

For example, even if Saddam accepts the principle of
withdrawal from Kuwait, he has already hinted--and Soviet
presidential aide Yevgeny M. Primakov has confirmed--that he
would define Kuwait as excluding a strip of land containing a
major oil field as well as two islands controlling access to the
Shatt el-Arab.

Saddam's Arab neighbors will surely note that none of the
proposals in the public discussion would reduce Iraq's military
pre-eminence of restore Kuwait completely.

If they conclude that they will be condemned to live with a
dominant Iraq, they will begin their own negotiations. Recent
remarks by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan suggest that the
haggling has already begun.

[Y]

8

But will the psychological basis for a military option still
exist after months of such inconclusive maneuvering? And without
a realistic military threat, how can the US/UN objectives be
achieved?

And having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of
the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make
concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms
control negotiation.

## A Regional Security System?

Many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations recognize
that sanctions will not be able to achieve a balance of power in
the Gulf. They propose to protect a settlement by a new regional
security system based on a significant American military presence
in Saudi Arabia.

I consider this a dangerous mirage. If, after the adamant
pronouncements from Washington and the deployment of a large

Y

9

expeditionary force, the stated US objectives could not be
reached, no Gulf state would easily entrust its fate to a long-
term American presence.

The often-heard argument that America proved its staying
power in Korea and Europe misses the point. The issue in Arabia
is not American staying power but the host country's domestic
stability.

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to
Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to
domestic stability; in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

A substantial American ground establishment would soon
become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. Once
Iraq has faced down US and UN terms, such a force would sooner or
later become hostage to revolutionary Iraq, fundamentalist Iran
and events substantially out of our control.

Nor can the restoration of the military balance in the Gulf
be left to subsequent arms control negotiations. For having

10

In short, the route of sanctions and the military option can
be pursued up to a certain point simultaneously. At some point,
however, trying to pursue both courses will turn into an evasion
incompatible with reaching what should be our objectives. At
that point the US must choose a strategy appropriate to its
objectives or else choose objectives achievable by whatever
policy we are willing to implement.

## What Military Strategy?

If war proved unavoidable it is to be hoped that military
strategy remains related to realistic political objectives.

Outsiders should not play field marshal. But America has no
national interest in weakening Iraq to a point where it becomes a
tempting target for covetous neighbors.

11

If war does prove unavoidable, our objective should be not to destroy Iraq, but rather to raise the cost of occupying Kuwait to unacceptable levels while reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors.

The destruction of the Iraqi military/industrial complex, especially its chemical and nuclear facilities as well as its air and missile forces would improve the military balance in the Gulf and would speed up the effect of sanctions.

Such a strategy would rely on air and naval power and use ground forces primarily to overawe a response. As the government of Iraq, which is after all a military dictatorship, sees its principal source of power erode, a negotiation more compatible with stated US objectives could result.

Even if one of the compromises sketched above came eventually to be adopted--a contingency I would regret--the setback would be eased by the reduction in the Iraqi military

12

threat. I am extremely skeptical about a full-scale ground
assault.

## Conclusion

In the process of overcoming the current crisis, the United
States must not emerge as the permanent defender of every status
quo. But the path to peace and progress resides in success in
the Gulf.

Afterwards the United States, together with its Arab
partners, can demonstrate the benefits of cooperative action in
promoting the well-being of the Arab peoples.

Too, it should then seek energetically to make progress
toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now
that looming disaster might have brought all sides second
thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable
participants in peace negotiations.

13

It is to be hoped that a united America can find a way that avoids both a military strategy of total destructiveness and a diplomatic strategy committed to amassing UN resolutions--the progressive disregard of which will at some point demonstrate the UN's impotence rather than an international consensus.

But whatever our destination, we must arrive at it by design rather than as captives of circumstances.

DEC. 31 '90 22:17 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y. OFFICE, DC

P.001

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Draft 3

## SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

### Introductory Note

The following is an adaptation of articles published in The Washington Post on August 19th, September 30th and November 11th. It is intended to focus discussion on the

### Objectives

NOV. 27, 1980 11:06 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, N.Y. DEC. 31 '80 22:18 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y. DC

P.002

## Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the
crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: it could passively
endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it
could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which
are more dependent on Middle East oil than the United States is--

NOV. 27, 1990 14:01 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, DC
DEC. 31 '90 22:19 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.003

The Administration concluded that anything other than a
leadership role for the United States would have ended with
making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and ~~would lead~~ to the
collapse of the moderate governments in the region including
Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role,
President Bush made another crucial decision. The American
military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and
a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi
oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President
Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They
concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope
of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming

NOV 27 '80 2:00 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y. NOSH. INC.
DEC.31 '80 22:20

P.004

4

The United States is approaching the point in the Middle
East crisis where a choice must be made between an early
relief of sanctions or, as at least so far, an even milder course.

NOV. 27 1979 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES WASH. DC
DEC.31 '80 22:20 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.005

* The sanctions must bite.

DECEMBER 14, 1980 22:21 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y. WASHINGTON, DC

P.006

NOV 27 '80 2:22 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, N.Y.
DEC. 31 '80 22:22 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, N.Y.

P.007

7

For example, even if Saddam accepts the principle of
withdrawal from Kuwait, he has already hinted--and Soviet
presidential aide Yevgeny M. Primakov has confirmed--that he
would define Kuwait as excluding a strip of land containing a
major oil field as well as two islands controlling access to the
Shatt el-Arab. And President Mitterrand has stated
that only agreement in principle is needed to bring
about a negotiation to withdraw

Saddam's Arab neighbors will surely note that none of the
proposals in the public discussion would reduce Iraq's military
pre-eminence or restore Kuwait completely.

NOV. 26, 1980 KISSINGER HOSPITALITY, WASHINGTON, DC
DEC.31 '80 22:23 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.008

8

DEC.31 '80 22:24 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.009

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to
Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to
domestic stability, in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

NOV 30 '80 11:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. D.C.
DEC. 31 '80 22:25 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P.010

10

## What Military Strategy?

P.011

11

The destruction of the Iraqi military complex, especially its chemical and nuclear facilities as well as its air and missile forces would improve the military balance in the Gulf and would speed up the effect of sanctions.

NOV 27 '80 22:26 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y. MORG. DC

P.012

12

## Conclusion

Too, we should then seek energetically to make progress
toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now
that looming disaster might have brought all sides second
thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable
participants in peace negotiations. But such a move
CAN NOT be limited to the resolution of the current
crisis for we do so would mean suddenness into
a hero in the Arab world.

LINKED

NOV 27 '80 2:15 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y. SH. DC

P.013

13

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Draft 3

## Introductory Note

The following is an adaptation of articles published in The Washington Post on August 19th, September 30th and November 11th. It is intended to focus discussion.

## Objectives

P.03

## Early Choices

NOV. 27 '90 14:07 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.04

3

NOV. 27 '90 14:08 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.05

4

NOV. 27 '90 14:09 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.06

5

* The sanctions must bite.

NOV. 27 '90 14:10 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.07

6

P.08

7

NOV. 27 '90 14:11 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.09

8

NOV. 27 '90 14:12 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.10

NOV. 27 '90 14:13 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 11

10

What Military Strategy?

NOV. 27 '90 14:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.12

11