APR 19 1968

Pacification 'Back on Track'

By Peter Braestrup

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, April 18 — The hardhit pacification drive in South Vietnam's countryside is "generally back on the track and moving again," Ambassador Robert Komer said today.

In a televised news conference, Ambassador Komer, Gen. William C. Westmoreland's civilian deputy for pacification, declared that the Communist attacks on the cities in February had done less damage than he thought at first. Problems, mostly — "psychological," remained, however, he said.

"I grant that we may not be as far along at the end of 1968, if the war continues until then, as e had planned to be," Komer said. As always, pacification, he said "is just not going to be susceptible to dramatic movement like the siege or the relief of Khesanh. But we're back on the offensive."

## Year-Old System

From his year-old Hamlet Evaluation System, utilizing computerized monthly data from U.S. advisors in the 44 provinces and 242 districts, Komer presented figures depicting the immediate Communist gains from the February offensive and the slow allied recovery.

The number of hamlets judged to be relatively secure at the end of January stood at 5331. This figure dropped in the first month after the enemy attacks to 4472. By the end of March it had risen to 4559. A similar pattern of change was noted for the categories of contested hemlets and those under Vietcong control.

Before the heavy fighting,

67.2 per cent of South Vietnam's 17.2 million persons were considered to be relatively secure from the Vietcong. The percentage dropped to 59.8 at the end of February and then rose to 61 per cent at the end of March.

As Komer noted, the term hamlet applies not only to rural subdivisions but also to some, but not all urban areas where hamlet means a city subdivision.

A U.S. analysis put the true rural population—defined as people living outside cities, towns and villages of over 20,000 population—at about 10.5 million.

## Less Than Half

Less than half of the rural population lives in relatively secure areas, in contrast to the 61 per cent for nation as a whole. During the enemy offensive, 9.4 per cent of the rural population, or close to one million persons, dropped into the contested or VC controllers category.

As Komer put it, security was "degraded" for about 1.3 million people in both cities and countryside by the lunar new year onslaught. But the heaviest blow to local security in terms of population came in the countryside, though the Tet offensive itself struck hardest in the cities.

Komer pointed to a welcome if belated shift back to the countryside by South Vietnamese security forces. Regular army battalions, for instance, fell to 31 in the first month after the offensive began from their January figure of 51. At the end of March they were up to 46. Police forces are even higher now than they were before the attacks began.

The Regional Forces (RF)

and Popular Forces (PF) militia, totalling about 300,000 men, are due this year for at least a 40,000-man boost in strength, Komer said. Of total RF manpower, 73.8 per cent is now deployed outside district and provincial capitals while 63.7 per cent of the locally recruited Popular Forces are securing hamlets. The regular Army (ARVN) has yet to deploy all 51 battalions assigned before Tet to protect Revolutionary Development RD teams in countryside. At one point during the offensive, Komer said, two-thirds of these regular units were pulled in to protect the cities. TR for add two

Vietcong terrorism directed against the RD teams, Komer noted, has been fairly constant, "indicating that the Vietcong is not targeting on them"—148 incidents in January, 199 in February and 167 in March. Of 629 RD teams,

519 are sleeping overnight in their assigned hamlets. Some 449 teams have begun work in hamlets designated for pacification this year, the other teams, are he said, "reworking" hamlets pacified earlier, but hurt by the Tet offensive.

The most imprtant problems, Komer said, are "psychological." The worst-hit and slowest to recover area has been the Delta, home to half Souht Vietnam's population. Despite the fact that most key coads and canals have been reopened to daylight traffic, Delta rice shipments are still running 50 per cnet below the last year's figure, and civilian traffic in general has not returned to normal.

Moreover, Komer said, some ARVN commander remain "overly-defensive" minded." The RF and PF still tend to hole up in their mudforts instead of patrolling actively by night around the hamlets.

The U.S. Mission statistical analysis of the effect of the Tet offensive on population control:

## HAMLETS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>End Jan.</th><th>End Feb.</th><th>End March</th><th>Change (Jan. to March)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Relatively secure</td><td>5331</td><td>4472</td><td>4559</td><td>-772</td></tr><tr><td>Contested</td><td>3593</td><td>4247</td><td>4084</td><td>491</td></tr><tr><td>VC Controlled</td><td>3838</td><td>4043</td><td>4093</td><td>255</td></tr></tbody></table>

## POPULATION

(total 17.2 million)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>End Jan.</th><th>End Feb.</th><th>End March</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Relatively secure</td><td>67.2%</td><td>59.8%</td><td>61%</td></tr><tr><td>Contested</td><td>16.3%</td><td>22%</td><td>20.7%</td></tr><tr><td>VC Controlled</td><td>16.4%</td><td>18.2%</td><td>18.2%</td></tr></tbody></table>

## SECURITY FORCES IN RURAL AREAS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>End Jan.</th><th>End Feb.</th><th>End March</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ARVN Battalions</td><td>51</td><td>31</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>RF Companies</td><td>909</td><td>809</td><td>883</td></tr><tr><td>PF Platoons</td><td>4365</td><td>4068</td><td>4347</td></tr><tr><td>RD Teams</td><td>574</td><td>321</td><td>545</td></tr><tr><td>Police</td><td>39150</td><td>35561</td><td>41850</td></tr></tbody></table>

# U.S. Blames N. Korea for DMZ Clash, Is Warned Off 'Unilateral Invective'

From News Dispatches

PANMUNJOM, Korea, April 18—The United States and North Korea exchanged accu- sations of armistice violations today, a few hours after an- other incident in the demili- tarized zone.

Rear Adm. John V. Smith said at the armistice commis- sion meeting that a clash Sun- day, taking the lives of two American and two South Ko- rean soldiers, "clearly illus- trates how little you North

Korean Communists respect the armistice agreement." He said North Korean infiltrators ambushed the U.N. Command truck, bound for the site here, from concealed positions on both sides of the road.

"Your killers circled the truck attempting to finish off any survivors . . . then stole two pistols from the dead and dying men," said Smith.

Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Kook denied any North Korean role in the incident, said the U.N.

Command was "scheming to turn the DMZ into a hotbed for hostile actions," and warned Smith against "hurling unilateral invectives."

The South Korean army said that three of its soldiers were wounded yesterday when an 11-man patrol was am- bushed in the DMZ. A North Korean broadcast said "armed bandits" attacked a Commu- nist guard post and were re- pelled after suffering casual- ties.

II. STRATEGIC FORCES

U.S. VS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

|                       | 1 Oct. 1966 |             |
| :-------------------- | :--------- | :--------- |
|                       | U.S. a/    | USSR a/    |
| ICBMs b/              | 934        | 340        |
| SLBMs (U.E. Launchers) c/ | 512        | 130        |
| Total Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles d/ | 1446       | 470        |
| Intercontinental Bombers e/ | 680        | 155        |

We have been hedging against this possibility for some time, and
last year we took a number of actions of which the following are the
most important:

1. Accelerated development of the POSEIDON missile.

2. Approved production and deployment of MINUTEMAN III.

3. Developed penetration aids for MINUTEMAN.

Now, in the FY 1968 program we propose to take a number of additional
actions to enhance the future capabilities of our Assured Destruction
forces, of which the following are the more important:

(1) Produce and deploy the POSEIDON missile.

(2) Produce and deploy improved missile penetration aids.

(3) Increase the proportion of MINUTEMAN III in the planned force and provide it with an improved third stage.

(4) Initiate the development of new reentry vehicles, specifically designed for use against targets heavily defended with ABMs.

p. 49:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>POSTURE A<br>Invest. Cost<br>($ Billion)</th><th>POSTURE B<br>Invest. Cost<br>($ Billion)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Radars</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MAR</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TACMAR</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>PAR</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MSR</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Invest. Cost</td><td>$ 6.5</td><td>$12.6</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Missiles</strong></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SPARTAN</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SPRINT</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Invest. Cost</td><td>$ 2.4</td><td>$ 4.8</td></tr><tr><td>DoD Invest. Cost</td><td>$ 8.9</td><td>$17.4</td></tr><tr><td>AEC Invest. Cost</td><td>$ 1.0</td><td>2.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D)</td><td>$ 9.9</td><td>$19.4</td></tr><tr><td>Annual Operating Cost</td><td>$ 0.38</td><td>$ 0.72</td></tr><tr><td>No. of Cities w/Term. Def:</td><td>X</td><td>2X</td></tr></tbody></table>

The Multi-function Array Radar (MAR) is a very powerful phased-array radar which can perform all the defense functions involved in engaging a large, sophisticated attack: central control and battle management, long-range search, acquisition of the target, discrimination of warheads from decoys or "spoofing" devices, precision tracking of the target, and control of the defense interceptor missiles.

The TACMAR Radar is a scaled down, slightly less complex and less powerful version of the MAR, which can perform all the basic defense functions in a smaller, less sophisticated attack.

The Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) is a phased-array radar required for the very long-range search and acquisition functions involved in area defense. To achieve the full potential of the extended-range SPARTAN, the target must be picked up at much greater distances in order to compute its trajectory before the SPARTAN is fired.

p. 49 cont:

The Missile Site Radar (MSR) is a much smaller, phased-array radar needed to control the SPRINT and SPARTAN interceptor missiles during an engagement. It can also perform the functions of the TACMAR but on a considerably reduced scale. Actually, a number of different sizes are being studied. This "modular" approach will permit us to tailor the capacity of the radar to the particular needs of each defended area.

The SPARTAN is a three-stage missile with a nuclear warhead capable of intercepting incoming objects at relatively long range above the atmosphere.

The SPRINT is a shorter range, high-acceleration interceptor missile designed to make intercepts at lower altitudes.

The technical principles involved in the radars are now fairly well established. One R&D MAR-type radar has been constructed at the White Sands Missile Range. A contract has been let for the power plant of a second MAR-type radar, which is to be constructed on Kwajalein Atoll. The Missile Site Radar is well along in development and the construction of one of these radars on Kwajalein Atoll has also begun.

pp. 51-52:

The fatalities which these Soviet forces could inflict upon the U.S. (with and without a U.S. ABM defense) and the fatalities which the U.S. forces could inflict on the Soviet Union (with a Soviet ABM defense) are shown on the table on the following page:

<table><caption>Number of Fatalities<sup>a</sup> in an All-Out Strategic Exchange (in millions)<sup>b</sup><br>(ASSUMES NO SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">U.S. Programs</th><th colspan="2">Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates</th><th colspan="2">U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate <sup>c</sup></th></tr><tr><th>U.S. Fat.</th><th>Sov. Fat.</th><th>U.S. Fat.</th><th>Sov. Fat.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Approved</td><td>120</td><td>120+</td><td>100</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Posture A</td><td>40</td><td>120+</td><td>30</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Posture B</td><td>30</td><td>120+</td><td>20</td><td>70</td></tr></tbody></table>

If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate" case to the levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment in one of these possible ways:

<table><thead><tr><th>Level of U.S. Fatalities<br>Which Soviets Believe<br>Will Provide Deterrence <sup>a</sup><br>(Millions)</th><th>Cost to the Soviets of<br>Offsetting U.S. Cost<br>to Deploy an ABM</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>40</td><td>$1 Soviet cost to $4 U.S. cost</td></tr><tr><td>60</td><td>$1 Soviet cost to $2 U.S. cost</td></tr><tr><td>90</td><td>$1 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost</td></tr></tbody></table>

p. 53 cont:

If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM deployment, the results would be as shown below:

<table><caption>Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic Exchange (in millions)<br>(ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)</caption><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">U.S. Programs</th><th colspan="2">Soviets Strike First,<br>U.S. Retaliates</th><th colspan="2">U.S. Strikes First,<br>Soviets Retaliate</th></tr><tr><th>U.S. Fat.</th><th>Sov. Fat.</th><th>U.S. Fat.</th><th>Sov. Fat.</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Approved (no response)</td><td>120</td><td>120+</td><td>100</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Posture A</td><td>120</td><td>120+</td><td>90</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Posture B</td><td>120</td><td>120+</td><td>90</td><td>70</td></tr></tbody></table>

In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.

a/ U.S. fatalities if U.S. strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in the table below:

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">U.S. Fatalities<br>(in millions)</th><th colspan="2">Chinese Strike First<br>(Operational Inventory)</th></tr><tr><th>X Missiles</th><th>3X Missiles</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Without ABM</td><td>5</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>With ABM</td><td>0+</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>