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12/26/62

# THE SKYBOLT CONTROVERSY

On December __, just before the NATO meeting, it became known that the United States was planning to abandon the Skybolt missile, which had been planned to prolong the effectiveness of the B-52 Bomber fleet and which had been promised to the RAF. The Skybolt is a missile launched from a plane with an effective range of about 1,000 miles. It would enable planes to launch their missiles from outside the enemy air defense system and still hit their targets.

In justifying the cancellation, the President stated that the technology of such a missile was really beyond us. (Get correct quote.) Five days later, the United States Air Force successfully launched a Skybolt.

The issues raised by this abrupt cancellation are

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profound and complicated. It is not possible for the layman
to enter the technical argument. However, the issue is much
deeper than a technical problem--indeed, to treat it only as
such is bound to lead to wrong or misleading conclusions.

Of course we must strive for a maximum economy in the operation
of the Defense Department. However, the real costs of decisions
are not to be determined solely in terms of dollars. The
flexibility of our military establishment, the political
usefulness of our weapons systems, the confidence our allies
have in us are all intangibles requiring earnest consideration.

I do not believe that adequate attention has been paid to these
factors. I therefore feel compelled to express my concern with
respect to the following points:

## A. The Nature of our Military Establishment

It seems to me dangerous to give up on a weapons system

 have in us are all intangible requiring earnest consideration.

 naughtiness of our weapons systems, the confidence our allies

 such is pound to lead to wrong or misleading conclusions.

The

prolonged and complicated. It is not possible for the layman

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after only six operational tests, one of which was a success.

A certain amount of failure is to be expected in testing any new weapon; this is the price of innovation. No one has suggested cancelling Minuteman, even though it has had some malfunctions recently. The conclusion is inescapable that technical difficulties are a pretext but not the basic reason for the cancellation of Skybolt.

The cancellation of Skybolt means that our manned
bomber force will be obsolete by the late 1960's, or at least
five years earlier than would have been the case had it been
developed. Coupled with the cancellation in 1961 of the B-70,
this means that in less than a decade airplanes will no longer
have a strategic mission. Has adequate consideration been
given to the impact of this on our strategic flexibility?

It has been said that missiles can perform the
functions of airplanes. From a purely technical point of view

It has been said that missiles can perform the
given to the impact of this on our strategic flexibility?
have a strategic mission. Has adequate consideration been
this means that in less than a decade airplanes will no longer
developed. Coupled with the cancellation in 1961 of the B-70,
five years earlier than would have been the case had it been
pomper force will be obsolete by the late 1960's, or at least

The cancellation of Skapolt means that our manned
tion of Skapolt.

cultures are a pretext but not the basic reason for the cancella-
recently. The conclusion is inescapable that technical diffi-
cancelling Minuteman, even though it has had some malfunctions
new weapon; this is the price of innovation. No one has suggested
A certain amount of failure is to be expected in testing any
after only six operational tests, one of which was a success.

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this may be true. However, our retaliatory force performs many
other functions, among them to prevent war by a demonstration
of readiness. During the Cuban crisis, for example, the dispersal
of our strategic air force to civilian airports and the
increased alertness of SAC undoubtedly contributed greatly
toward demonstrating our determination. How does one demonstrate
increased readiness with hardened Minutemen in underground
silos?

B. The Organization of our Government

Another serious concern relates to the impact of
the cancellation on our close and traditional ally, Great
Britain. Was sufficient attention given by the State Department
to the political implications of this decision? Why was it
dealt with in London by Secretary McNamara and not Secretary
Rusk? Does this decision indicate an absence of coordination

Risk? Does this decision indicate an absence of coordination dealt with in London by Secretary McMurray and not Secretary to the political implications of this decision? Why was it Britain. Was sufficient attention given by the State Department the cancellation of our close and traditional ally, Great

## B. The Organization of our Government

ates?

increased readiness with hardened Minutemen in underground toward demonstrating our determination. How does one demonstrate increased alertness of SAC undoubtedly contributed greatly of our strategic air force to civilian airports and the of readiness. During the Cican crisis, for example, the dispiral other functions, among them to prevent war by a demonstration this may be true. However, our retaliatory force performs many

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in our Executive Branch and an inadequate attention to the
political element?

C. Relations with Great Britain and France

The cancellation of Skybolt and, even more, the manner
in which it was done, has had a serious impact on relations with
Great Britain. The backbone of the British military effort has
been the Bomber Command and the maintenance of a strategic
retaliatory force. In June, 1960, Great Britain cancelled its
own missile development and was promised Skybolt. This would
have extended the life of the British bombers into the 1970's.

The abrupt cancellation of the Skybolt has at one
blow wiped out the utility of the British forces. It has
forced a recasting of the British military establishment. It
will cast doubt on the entire British nuclear effort. Without
warning or consultation, we have embarrassed a friendly government.

warning or consultation, we have embarrassed a friendly Government.

plow wiped out the utility of the British forces. It has

The abrupt cancellation of the Skypolt has at one
have extended the life of the British pompera into the 1970's.
own missile development and was promised Skypolt. This would
retaliatory force. In June, 1960, Great Britain cancelled its
been the Bomper Command and the maintenance of a strategic
Great Britain. The backbone of the British military effort has
in which it was done, has had a serious impact on relations with

The cancellation of Skypolt and, even more, the manner

political element?

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It cannot be in our interest to demonstrate to Britain that it
is impotent; the reverse should be our policy. It cannot be
helpful to our reputation for reliability to wipe out without
warning a major program of an ally to the support of which we
were formally committed.

The cancellation of Skybolt brought home to Great
Britain and other allies that we might use our position to
impose weapons systems on them which, to say the least, had
not been their first choice. Far from tightening allied bonds,
such a policy is likely to strengthen Third Force tendencies in
Europe. Our policy did not demonstrate Allied community; it
is more likely to be considered a high handed exercise of
hegemony. It might lead either to breaking the spirit of our
allies or enhancing their efforts to conduct separate policies.

To be sure, we have now offered Polaris submarines to
Great Britain and France. These are to be part of a NATO force,

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though they can be used independently in case of overriding
emergency. The meaning of this clause is not obvious. If the
NATO force is integrated, the submarines cannot be used inde-
pendently. If they are available for independent use, then the
decision of December 21st is hard to reconcile with the President's
statement of December 17th rejecting United States support of
independent nuclear forces. The confusion of voices on the nuclear
question is likely to reduce the political impact of our offer.

The cancellation of Skybolt is bound to reduce the degree to which
our European allies will make themselves dependent on the
delivery of another missile which is not to be available before
1967.

For all these reasons, I believe that the cancellation
of Skybolt was a serious mistake and I strongly deplore the
manner in which it was cancelled. I agree with Senator
Symington that resources for it could have come from other

Salemton that resources for it could have come from other
manner in which it was cancelled. I agree with Senator
of Skypolt was a serious mistake and I strongly deplore the

1967.

delivery of another missile which is not to be available before
our European allies will make themselves dependent on the

The cancellation of Skypolt is bound to reduce the degree to which
question is likely to reduce the political impact of our offer.

independent nuclear forces. The continuation of voices on the nuclear
statement of December 17th rejecting United States support of

decision of December 21st is hard to reconcile with the President's
bendently. If they are available for independent use, then the
NATO force is integrated, the submarines cannot be used inde-

emergency. The meaning of this clause is not obvious. If the
though they can be used independently in case of overriding

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projects, such as stretching out the propagandistic man on the
moon project, which will cost $40 billion before it is
finished.

The Skybolt controversy also calls attention to the
urgent need to settle the strategic disputes within NATO
which have rent the Alliance ever since the advent of the
Kennedy Administration.

Kennedy Administration.

which have rent the Alliance ever since the advent of the
urgent need to settle the strategic disputes within NATO

The Skypolt controversy also calls attention to the
finished.

moon project, which will cost $40 billion before it is
projects, such as stretching out the propaganda man on the

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