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cold war Russia. Alleviating suffering and encouraging economic reform are important tools of American foreign policy, but not substitutes for a serious effort to maintain the global balance of power vis-à-vis a country with a long history of expansionism.

The vast Russian empire acquired over the course of two centuries is in a state of disintegration, generating two causes of tension: attempts by neighbors to take advantage of the weakness of the imperial center, and efforts by the declining empire to restore its authority at the periphery. Iran and Turkey are seeking to increase their roles in the largely Muslim republics of Central Asia. But the dominant geopolitical thrust has been Russia's attempt to restore its pre-eminence in all the territories formerly controlled from Moscow in the name of peacekeeping. The U.S., focusing on the goodwill of a "reformist" government and reluctant to embrace a geopolitical agenda, has acquiesced. It has done little to enable the successor republics, except the Baltic states, to achieve international acceptance. The presence or activities of Russian troops on their territory are rarely challenged.

This is in part because America has been dealing with the anti-communist and the anti-imperialist revolutions as if they were a single phenomenon. In fact, they work in opposite directions. The anticommunist revolution has enjoyed substantial support throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. The anti-imperialist revolution, directed against domination by Russia, is widely popular in the new non-Russian republics and extremely unpopular in the Russian Federation. Russian leadership groups have historically perceived their state in terms of a "civilizing" mission, the overwhelming majority of Russia's leading figures—whatever their political persuasion—refuse to accept the collapse of the Soviet empire or the legitimacy of its successor states, especially of Ukraine, the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy. Even Alexander Solzhenitsyn, when writing about ridding Russia of unwilling foreign subjects, urged the retention by Moscow of a core group of Ukraine, Belarus and almost half of Kazakhstan—nearly 90% of the former empire.

A realistic policy would recognize that the reformist Russian government of Boris Yeltsin has maintained Russian armies on the territory of most of the former Soviet republics—all members of the U.N.—often against the express wish of the host government. These military forces have participated in the civil wars of several of the republics. And Russian diplomacy is beginning to assert a veto over the foreign policy of its former satellites in Eastern Europe. Long-term prospects for peace will be influenced by Russian reform, but short-term prospects will depend on whether Russian armies can be induced to stay at home.

Russia is bound to have a special security interest in what it calls the "near abroad," the republics of the former Soviet Union. But the peace of the world requires that this interest be satisfied without military pressure or intervention. The key issue is whether to treat Russia's relationship to the new republics as an international problem subject to accepted rules of foreign policy, or as an outgrowth of Russia's unilateral decision making that America will seek to influence by appeals to Russia's goodwill.

For the post-cold war period, American policy toward Russia has staked everything on a kind of social engineering geared to individual leaders. In the Bush Administration it was Mikhail Gorbachev, and under Clinton it has been Boris Yeltsin; because of their perceived personal commitment to democracy, Gorbachev and Yeltsin have been treated as the guarantors of a peaceful Russian foreign policy. America's leaders have been reluctant to invoke the traditional diplomatic brakes on Russian policy for fear of provoking Yeltsin's nationalist opponents.

It does Russia no favor to be treated as immune from normal considerations of foreign policy, for this will have the practical result of forcing it to pay a heavier price later on if it is lured into courses of action from which there is no retreat. The veterans of Russia's internal struggles are quite capable of comprehending a policy based on mutual respect of each other's national interests;

they are likely to understand such a calculus better than appeals to an abstract and distant utopianism. Generous economic assistance and technical advice is necessary to ease the pains of transition, and Russia should be made welcome in institutions that foster economic, cultural and political cooperation. But Russian reform will be impeded, not helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of historic Russian imperial pretensions.

American policy toward Russia should be geared to permanent interests, not to the fluctuations of Russian domestic politics. If American policy makes Russian domestic politics its top priority, it will become the victim of forces out of its control and lose all criteria for judgment. The new Russian leadership is entitled to understanding for the anguishing process of trying to overcome two generations of communist misrule. It is not entitled to be handed the sphere of influence that Czars and commissars have coveted all around Russia's vast borders for 300 years. If Russia is to become a serious partner in building a new world order, it must be ready for the disciplines of stability as well as for its benefits.

## MANAGING EUROPE

—THE ARCHITECTS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE been incitedious had they been told that victory in the cold war would raise doubts about the future of their creation. They took it for granted that the prize for victory in the cold war was a lasting partnership. But the alliance has been marking time since the collapse of communism. Downgrading the U.S. relationship with Europe has become all too fashionable. Yet without its Atlantic ties, America would find itself in a world of nations with which—except in the Western Hemisphere—it has few moral bonds or common traditions. In these circumstances, America would be obliged to conduct a pure Realpolitik, which is essentially incompatible with the American tradition.

Disagreements with Europe have the grating character of family squabbles. Yet on nearly every key issue, there has been far more cooperation from Europe than from any other area. Europe may not be able to rally itself to a new Atlantic policy, but America owes it to itself not to abandon the policies of three generations in the hour of victory. The task before the Alliance is to adapt the two basic institutions that shape the Atlantic relationship, NATO and the European Union, to the realities of the post-cold war world.

In the years ahead, the traditional Atlantic relationships will change. Europe will not feel the previous need for American protection and will pursue its economic self-interest much more aggressively; America will not be willing to sacrifice as much for European security and will be tempted by isolationism in various guises. In due course, Germany will insist on the political influence to which its military and economic power entitle it and will not be so emotionally dependent on American military and French political support. Europe, even with Germany, cannot manage either the resurgence or disintegration of Russia.

It is in no country's interest that Germany and Russia should fixate on each other as either principal partner or principal adversary. If they become too close, they raise fears of condominium; if they quarrel, they involve Europe in escalating crises. Without America, Great Britain and France cannot sustain the political balance in Western Europe; Germany would be tempted by nationalism; Russia would lack a global interlocutor. And without Europe, America could turn, psychologically as well as geopolitically, into an island.

The future of Eastern Europe and of the successor states of the Soviet Union are not the same problem. Eastern Europe was occupied by the Red Army. It has identified itself, culturally and politically, with Western European traditions. This is especially true of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Without ties to Western Europe and Atlantic institutions, these will become a no-man's-land between Germany and Russia. To be economically and politically viable, they need the European Union, and for security they look to the Atlantic Alliance. Since most members of

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the European Union are members of NATO, and since it is incon-\ ceivable that they would ignore attacks on one of their members
after European integration has reached a certain point, member-
ship in the European Union will lead to at least de facto extension
of the NATO guarantee.

The American objection to NATO membership for these coun-
tries is one of principle. Going back to Wilson's historical objection
to alliances—because they were based on the expectation of con-
frontation—President Clinton offered his alternative vision at last
January's NATO summit. He argued that NATO could not afford to
"draw a new line between East and West that could create a self-
fulfilling prophecy of future confrontation."

Instead Clinton put forward a scheme he called the Partner-
ship for Peace. It invites all the successor states of the Soviet Union
and all of Moscow's former East European satellites to join what

amounts to a vague system of collective security. It is not a way sta-
tion into NATO, as is often misleadingly asserted, but an alternative
to it.

The Partnership for Peace runs the risk of creating two sets of
borders in Europe—those that are protected by security guaran-
tees, and others where such guarantees have been refused—a state
of affairs bound to prove tempting to potential aggressors and de-
moralizing to potential victims. Care must be taken lest strategic
and conceptual no-man's-land is created in Eastern and Central
Europe.

It will prove impossible to solve the twin problems of establish-
ing security for Eastern Europe and integrating Russia into the in-
ternational community as part of the same program. If the Part-
nership for Peace is made an aspect of NATO, it may well
undermine the Atlantic Alliance by diverting it into activities unre-
lated to any realistic security mission, magnify the sense of insecu-
rity of Eastern Europe and yet, being sufficiently ambiguous, fail
to placate Russia. The Partnership runs the risk of being treated as
irrelevant, if not dangerous, by the potential victims of aggression.

At the same time, relating Russia to the Atlantic nations is im-
portant. There is a place for an institution that deals with missions
that all its members interpret in substantially the same manner.
Such common tasks exist in the field of economic development,
education and culture. The Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe (CSCE) could be given expanded functions for these
purposes.

In such a design, the Atlantic Alliance would establish a com-
mon political framework and provide overall security; the Europe-
an Union would accelerate membership for former Eastern Euro-
pean satellites; and the CSCE would relate the republics of the
former Soviet Union—especially Russia—to the Atlantic structure.
A security umbrella would be extended over the new democracies
in Eastern Europe. If Russia remained within its borders, the fo-
cus on security would shift over time to the Partnership. The com-
mon political and economic projects would increasingly dominate
the East-West relationship.

HANDLING ASIA

THERE HAS BEEN A SURGE OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN ASIA AS symbolized by the proposal for a Pacific community made by Clinton at a meeting with the Asian heads of government in 1993, but the nations of Asia view themselves as distinct and competitive. Their relations bear most of the attributes of the European balance-of-power system of the 19th century: any significant increase in strength by one of them is almost certain to evoke an offsetting maneuver by the others. There is no pretense of collective security or of cooperation based on shared domestic values, even on the part of the few existing democracies. The emphasis is all on equilibrium and national interest. Military expenditures are already rising in all the major Asian countries.

Clinton's proposal for a more institutionalized Pacific commu-
nity was received with polite aloofness. Asian nations do not want
an institutional framework that might give potential Asian super-
powers or even the U.S. a major voice in their affairs. They favor
keeping America sufficiently involved to help ward off threats to
their independence. But they are too suspicious of powerful
neighbors, and to some extent of the U.S., to favor formal
institutions.

Nevertheless, the wild card is the attitude of the U.S., which
alone has the capacity to function in much the same way that Great
Britain once did in maintaining the European balance of power.
The stability of the Asia-Pacific region, the underpinning of its
vaunted prosperity, is the consequence of an equilibrium that will
need increasingly careful and deliberate tending.

In the next century, China's political and military shadow will
fall over Asia and will affect the calculations of the other powers,
however restrained actual Chinese policy may prove to be. The
other Asian nations are likely to seek counterweights to an increas-
ingly powerful China as they already do to Japan. Though they will
disavow it, the nations of Southeast Asia are including the hereto-
fore feared Vietnam in their ASEAN grouping largely in order to
balance China and Japan. And that too is why ASEAN is asking the
U.S. to remain engaged in the region.

During the cold war, Japan basked in the protection of the U.S.
A determined economic competitor, it paid for freedom of maneu-
ver in the economic field by subordinating its foreign and security
policies to Washington's. As long as the Soviet Union could be per-
ceived as the principal security threat by both countries, it made
sense to treat American and Japanese national interests as
identical.

That pattern is not likely to continue. Confrontation with the
U.S. over economic issues is becoming the rule rather than the ex-
ception. With Korea and China gaining in military strength, and
with the least impaired portion of Soviet military power located in
Siberia, Japanese long-range planners will not indefinitely take
the absolute identity of U.S. and Japanese interests for granted. Ja-
pan's perspective differs from America's because of geographic
proximity to the Asian mainland and historic experience. The Jap-
anese defense budget has been creeping upward until it has be-
come the third largest in the world. Faced with an aging popula-
tion and a stagnating economy, Japan might decide to press its
technological and strategic superiority before China emerges as a
superpower and Russia recovers its strength. Afterward, it might
have recourse to that great equalizer, nuclear technology.

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Close Japanese-American relations will be a vital contribution to Japanese moderation and a significant reassurance to the other nations of Asia. Japanese military strength linked to America worries China and the other nations of Asia less than purely national Japanese military capabilities. And Japan will decide that it needs less military strength to long as an American safety net exists. A substantial American military presence in Japan and Korea will be needed to give America's commitment to a permanent role in Asia credibility.

— Good American relations with China are the prerequisite for good long-term relations with Japan, as well as for good Sino-Japanese relations. It is a triangle that each of the parties can abandon only at great risk. It is also an ambiguity with which the U.S. is not totally comfortable, since it runs counter to the American tendency to label nations neatly as either friend or foe. But with economic growth rates around 10% annually, a strong sense of national cohesion and an ever more muscular military, China will show the greatest increase in stature among the major powers.

China welcomes U.S. involvement in Asia as a counterweight to its feared neighbors, Japan, Russia and, to a lesser degree, India. Yet an American policy that seeks simultaneous friendship with

sions, provided they can be presented as emerging from its own free choice as part of a broader relationship. But American insistence on publicly prescribing conditions is perceived in China as a humiliating attempt to convert its society to American values and as a sign of a lack of American seriousness. Such an insistence suggests that America has no national interest in the Asian equilibrium as such. But if America cannot be counted on for that purpose, China will have no interest in making concessions to Washington. The key to Sino-American relations—even on human rights—is a tacit cooperation on global, and especially Asian, strategy.

## STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

WHEN, IN 1821, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS WARNED AMERICANS AGAINST the penchant to slay distant "monsters," he could not have imagined the magnitude and sheer number of monsters that would exist in the post-cold war world. Not every evil can be combatted by America, even less by America alone. But some monsters need to be, if not slain, at least resisted. What is most needed is criteria for selectivity.

America's leaders have generally stressed motivation over structure. They have placed emphasis on affecting the attitudes more than the calculations of their counterparts. As a result, American society is peculiarly ambivalent about the lessons of history. American films often depict how some dramatic event transforms a villain into a paragon of virtue, a reflection of the pervasive national belief that the past has no final claim and that new departures are always possible. In the real world, such transformations rarely happen.

The American habit of rejecting history extols the image of a universal man living by universal maxims, regardless of the past, of geography or of other immutable circumstances. Since the American tradition emphasizes universal truths rather than national characteristics, American policymakers have generally preferred multilateral approaches to national ones: the agendas of disarmament, nonproliferation and human rights rather than essentially national, geopolitical or strategic issues.

A country with this idealistic tradition cannot base its policy on the balance of power as the sole criterion for a new world order. But it must learn that equilibrium is a fundamental precondition for the pursuit of its historic goals. And these higher goals cannot be achieved by rhetoric or posturing. Foreign policy is conducted by a political system that emphasizes the immediate and provides few incentives for the long range. Leaders are obliged to deal with constituencies that tend to receive their information through visual images. All this puts a premium on emotion and on the mood of the moment, just when priorities need rethinking and capabilities require analysis.

At a time when America is able neither to dominate the world nor to withdraw from it, when it finds itself both all-powerful and totally vulnerable, it must not abandon the ideals that have accounted for its greatness. But neither must it jeopardize that greatness by fostering illusions about the extent of its reach. World leadership is inherent in America's power and values, but it does not include the privilege of pretending that America is doing other nations a kindness by associating with them, or that it has a limitless capacity to impose its will by withholding its favors.

The fulfillment of America's ideals will have to be sought in the patient accumulation of partial successes. The certitudes of physical threat and hostile ideology characteristic of the cold war are gone. The convictions needed to master the emerging world order are more abstract: a vision of the future that cannot be demonstrated when it is put forward and judgments about the relationship between hope and possibility that are, in their essence, conjectural. The Wilsonian goals of America's past—peace, stability, progress and freedom for mankind—will have to be sought in a journey that has no end. "Traveler," says a Spanish proverb, "there are no roads. Roads are made by walking." ■

Beijing and with countries that Beijing perceives as potential threats—which is the correct U.S. stance—requires a careful and regular dialogue between the U.S. and China.

For four years after the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, this dialogue has been inhibited by the American refusal to engage in high-level contacts—a measure never employed against the Soviet Union, even at the height of the cold war. Human rights moved to the center of the Sino-American relationship.

The Clinton Administration wisely restored high-level contacts; the future of Sino-American relations depends on the substance of these exchanges. Clearly, the U.S. cannot abandon its traditional concern with human rights and democratic values; the problem is the degree to which all aspects of Sino-American relations are made conditional on them. China finds condescending the implication that Sino-American relations are based not on reciprocal interests but on American favors that can be shut off at Washington's discretion. Such an attitude makes America appear both unreliable and intrusive, and unreliability is the greater failing in Chinese eyes.

China might be prepared to make some human-rights concessions, provided they can be presented as emerging from its own free choice as part of a broader relationship. But American insistence on publicly prescribing conditions is perceived in China as a humiliating attempt to convert its society to American values and as a sign of a lack of American seriousness. Such an insistence suggests that America has no national interest in the Asian equilibrium as such. But if America cannot be counted on for that purpose, China will have no interest in making concessions to Washington. The key to Sino-American relations—even on human rights—is a tacit cooperation on global, and especially Asian, strategy.

TIME, MARCH 14, 1994

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16 fect, Washington has worked to implement
17 the ideals of Woodrow Wilson: BRIEF
18 SUMMATION tk. Now, says Kissinger, it is
time for America to DO WHAT
20
21 hed tk
22
23 International systems live precariously.
24 Every ``world order'' expresses an aspira-
tion to permanence; the very term has a
25
26 ring of eternity about it. Yet the elements
27 which comprise a ``world order'' are in con-
stant flux; indeed, with each century, the
28
29 duration of international systems has been
shrinking. The order that grew out of the
30
31 Peace of Westphalia in 1648
32 years; the international system created by
33 the 1815 Congress of Vienna maintained it-
self for a hundred years; the international
34
35 order characterized by the Cold War ended
after 40 years. Never before have the com-
ponents of world order, their capacity to in-
teract, and their goals all changed quite so
39 rapidly, so deeply, or so globally.
40
41 have spoken of the new world order as if it
were just around the corner. In fact, it is
43 still in gestation, and its final form will not
be visible until well into the next century.

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103 such nations, a radical, unpredictable, usu-

104 **ally** violent realignment of frontiers would

105 be inevitable.

106 Finally, there are the continental-type

107 states, which will probably represent the

108 basic units of the new world order. The In-

109 dian nation that emerged from British co-

110 lonial rule unites a multiplicity of tongues,

111 religions, and nationalities. Similarly, Chi-

112 na is a conglomerate of different languages

113 held together by common writing, com-

114 mon culture, and common history. It is

115 what Europe might have become had it not

116 been for the religious wars of the seven-

117 teenth century, and what it might yet turn

118 out to be if the European Union fulfills the

119 hopes of its supporters.

120 Similarly, the two superpowers of the

121 Cold War period have never been nation-

122 states in the European sense. America suc-

123 ceeded in forming a distinct culture from a

124 polyglot national composition; the Soviet

125 Union was an empire containing many na-

126 tionalities. Its successor states <---> especially

127 the Russian Federation <--> are torn between

128 disintegration and reimperialization.

129

129 «

0129

linespace, please

130 All this has radically changed the sub-

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131 stance, the method, and, above all, the
132 reach of international relations. No previ-
133 ous international order has contained ma-
134 jor centers of power distributed around the
135 entire globe. Nor have statesmen ever been
136 obliged to conduct diplomacy in an envi-
137 ronment where events can be experienced
138 instantaneously and simultaneously by
139 leaders and their publics.

140 As the number of states multiplies and
141 their capacity to interact increases, on what
142 principles can a new world order be orga-
143 nized? Given the complexity of the new in-
144 ternational system, can Wilsonian con-
145 cepts like ``enlarging democracy'' serve as
146 the principal guides to American foreign
147 policy and as replacement for the Cold War
148 strategy of containment?

149 The end of the Cold War has created
150 what some observers have called a ``unipo-
151 lar'' or ``one-superpower'' world. But the
152 U.S. is actually in no better position to dic-
153 tate the global agenda than it was at the be-
154 ginning of the Cold War. America is more
155 preponderant than it was ten years ago, yet,
156 ironically, power has also become more
157 diffuse. America's ability to employ it to
158 shape the rest of the world has actually
decreased.

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160. Victory in the Cold War has made it far
161. more difficult to implement the Wilsonian
162. dream of universal collective security. In
163. the absence of a potentially dominating
164. power, the principal nations do not view
165. threats to the peace in the same way, nor
166. are they willing to run the same risks in
167. overcoming those threats they do recog-
168. nize. The world community is willing
169. enough to cooperate in ``peacekeepin-
170. g''<---> an existing agreement not challenged
171. by any of the parties <--> but it has been skit-
172. tish about peacemaking <--> suppressing ac-
173. tual challenges to world order. Not even
174. the U.S. has as yet developed a clear con-
175. cept of what it will resist unilaterally in the
176. post-Cold War world.
177. As an approach to foreign policy, Wil-
178. sonianism presumes that America is pos-
179. sessed of an exceptional nature expressed
180. in unrivaled virtue and unrivaled power.
181. The U.S. was so confident of its strength
182. and the virtue of its aims that it could envi-
183. sion fighting for its values on a worldwide
184. basis.
185. As the 21st century approaches, vast
186. global forces are at work that will render
187. the U.S. less exceptional. American mili-
188. tary power will remain unrivaled for the

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189 foreseeable future. Yet America's desire to
190 project that power into the myriad small-
191 scale conflicts which the world is likely to
192 witness in the coming decades <---> Bosnia,
193 Somalia, and Haiti <---> is a key conceptual < are examples
194 challenge. The U.S. will likely have the
195 world's most powerful economy well into
196 the next century, yet wealth will become
197 more widely spread, as will the technology
198 for generating wealth. The U.S. will face
199 economic competition of a kind it never ex-
200 experienced during the Cold War.
201 America will be the greatest and most
202 powerful nation, but a nation with peers;
203 the primus inter pares but nonetheless a
204 nation like others. America should not view
205 this as a humbling of America or as a symp-
206 tom of national decline. For most of its his-
207 tory, the U.S. was in fact a nation among
208 others, not a preponderate superpower.
209 The rise of other power centers <--> in West-
210 ern Europe, Japan, and China <--> should not
211 alarm Americans. After all, sharing the
212 world's resources and the development of
213 other societies and economies has been a
214 peculiarly American objective ever since
215 the Marshall Plan.
216 Yet if Wilson's dictates <---> collective se-
217 curity, the conversion of one's competitors

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218 to the American way, an international sys-

219 tem that adjudicates disputes in a legal

220 fashion, and unqualified support for ethnic

221 self-determination <--> are becoming less

222 practicable, on what principles ought

223 America to base its foreign policy?

A → insert here the section from p. 6 as marked.

224 . The concept of raison d'etat <--> that the

225 interests of the state justify the means used

226 to pursue them <--> has always been repug-

227 nant to Americans. That is not to say that

228 Americans have never practiced raison d'e-

229 tat <--> there are many instances of it, from

230 the time of the Founding Fathers' shrewd

231 dealings with the European powers in the

232 early decades of the republic to the single-

233 minded pursuit of Western expansion,

234 which was placed under the rubric of

235 ``manifest destiny.'' But Americans have

236 never been comfortable acknowledging

237 openly their own selfish interests. Whether

238 fighting world wars or local conflicts, U.S.

239 leaders always claimed to be struggling in

240 the name of principle, not interest.

241 In the next century, American leaders

242 will have to articulate for their public a con-

243 cept of the national interest and explain

244 how that interest is served in Europe and

245 Asia by the maintenance of the balance of

246 power. America will need partners to pre-

This whole
section is to
be Moved
To p. 13,
line 346.

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247 serve equilibrium in several regions, and
248 these partners can not always be chosen on
249 the basis of moral considerations alone.
250 A clear definition of the national interest needs to be an equally essential guide to American policy. The growth of democracy
251 will continue as America's dominant aspiration, but it is necessary to recognize the
252 obstacles it faces at the moment of its seeming philosophical triumph. Curbing the
253 power of the central government has been
254 a principal concern of Western political
255 theorists; in most other societies, political
256 theory has sought to buttress the authority
257 of the state. Nowhere else has there been
258 such an insistence on expanding personal
259 freedom. Western democracy evolved in
260 culturally homogeneous societies with a
261 long common history; even America, with
262 its polyglot population, developed a strong
263 cultural identity. The society and, in a
264 sense, the nation preceded the state without
265 having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of
266 an underlying consensus; today's minority
267 is potentially tomorrow's majority.
268 In most other parts of the world, the
269 state has preceded the nation; it was and
270 often remains the principal element in

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<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>276</td>
      <td>forming it. Political parties, where they exist, reflect fixed, usually communal, identities; minorities and majorities tend to be</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>277</td>
      <td>permanent. In such societies, the political</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>278</td>
      <td>process is about domination, not alternative in office, which takes place, if at all, by</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>279</td>
      <td>coups rather than by constitutional procedures. The concept of a loyal opposition</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>280</td>
      <td>tion &lt;--&gt; the essence of modern democracy &lt;--&gt; rarely prevails. Much more frequently,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>281</td>
      <td>opposition is viewed as a threat to national</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>282</td>
      <td>cohesion, equated with treason, and ruthlessly suppressed.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>283</td>
      <td>Western-style democracy presupposes</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>284</td>
      <td>a consensus on values that sets limits to</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>285</td>
      <td>partisanship. America would not be true to</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>286</td>
      <td>itself if it did not insist on the universal applicability of the idea of liberty. That America should give preference to democratic</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>287</td>
      <td>governments over repressive ones and be</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>288</td>
      <td>prepared to pay some price for its moral</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>289</td>
      <td>convictions is beyond dispute. That there is</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>290</td>
      <td>an area of discretion which should be exercised in favor of governments and institutions promoting democratic values and human rights is also clear. The difficulty arises</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>291</td>
      <td>in determining the precise price to be paid</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>292</td>
      <td>and its relationship to other essential</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>293</td>
      <td>American priorities, including national se-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>294</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>295</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>296</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>297</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>298</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>299</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>300</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>301</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>302</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>303</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>304</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
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<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>305</td>
      <td>curity and the overall geopolitical balance.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>306</td>
      <td>If American exhortations are to go beyond patriotic rhetoric, they must reflect a realistic understanding of America's reach.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>309</td>
      <td><b>The U.S.</b> must be careful not to multiply moral commitments while the financial and military resources for the conduct of a global foreign policy are being curtailed.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>313</td>
      <td>Sweeping pronouncements not matched by either the ability or the willingness to back them up diminish America's influence on all other matters.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>317</td>
      <td>The precise balance between the moral and the strategic elements of American foreign policy cannot be prescribed in the abstract. But the beginning of wisdom consists of recognizing that a balance needs to be struck. A gap is threatening to open up in America's policy between its pretentions and its willingness to support them; the nearly inevitable disillusionment too easily turns into an excuse for withdrawing from world affairs altogether.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>328</td>
      <td>Foreign policy must begin with some definition of what constitutes a vital interest &lt;--&gt; a change in the international environment so likely to undermine the national security that it must be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensi-</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

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334 bly legitimate it appears. Since Woodrow
335 Wilson's entry into World War I, America
336 has avoided defining a national interest
337 with the argument that it was not opposed
338 to change as such, but to the use of force to
339 bring it about. The controversy surround-
ing almost all American military actions in
340 the post-Cold War period shows that a wid-
er consensus on where America should
341 draw the line does not yet exist. To bring it
342 about is a major challenge to national
343 leadership.
344

345

346

347 How to Deal with Russia

0347

or subhed tk

348 Geopolitically, America is an island off
349 the shores of Eurasia, whose resources and
350 population far exceed those of the U.S. The
351 domination by a single power of either Eu-
352 rope or Asia remains a good definition of
353 strategic danger for America, Cold War or
354 no Cold War. Such a grouping would have
355 the capacity to outstrip America economi-
cally and, in the end, militarily. That dan-
356 ger would have to be resisted even were
357 the dominant power apparently benevo-
lent, for if the intentions ever changed,
358 America would find itself with a grossly di-
359 diminished capacity for effective resistance
360 and a growing inability to shape events.
361
362

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363 Just as Soviet hostility shaped America's attitudes toward the global order from the perspective of containment, so do Russia's reform efforts dominate America's thinking now. U.S. policy has been based on the premise that peace can be ensured by a Russia tempered by democracy and concentrating its energies on developing a market economy. In this light, America's principal task is conceived to be to strengthen Russian reform, with measures drawn from the experience of the Marshall Plan rather than from the traditional patterns of foreign policy.
377 In the aftermath of the communist collapse, it has been assumed that Russia's hostile intentions have disappeared. Students of geopolitics and history are uneasy about the single-mindedness of this approach. They fear that, in overestimating America's ability to shape Russia's internal evolution, America may involve itself needlessly in internal Russian controversies, generate a nationalist backlash, and neglect the usual tasks of foreign policy.
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 While they would support a policy designed to modify Russia's traditional truculence through economic aid and global cooperation, they would argue that even if a

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392 moral transformation did occur, it would
393 take time, and in that interlude America
394 should hedge its bets.
395 Nor should America expect economic
396 aid to achieve results in Russia comparable
397 to those of the Marshall Plan. The Western
398 Europe of the immediate postwar period
399 had a functioning market system, well-es-
400 tablished bureaucracies, and, in most
401 countries, a democratic tradition. Compa-
402 rable conditions do not exist in post-Cold
403 War Russia. Alleviating suffering and en-
404 couraging economic reform are important
405 tools of American foreign policy; they are
406 not, however, substitutes for a serious ef-
407 fort to maintain the global balance of pow-
408 er vis-a-vis a country with a long history of
409 expansionism.

410 The vast Russian empire acquired over
411 the course of two centuries is in a state of
disintegration, *generating* two causes of
412 tension: attempts by neighbors to take ad-
vantage of the weakness of the imperial
center, and efforts by the declining empire
413 to restore its authority at the periphery.
414 Both processes are going on simultaneously
415 in the successor states of the former Soviet
416 Union. Iran and Turkey are seeking to
417 increase their roles in the largely Muslim

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421 republics of Central Asia. But the dominant geopolitical thrust has been Russia's attempt to restore its pre-eminence in all the territories formerly controlled from Moscow. In the name of peacekeeping, Russia seeks to re-establish some form of Russian tutelage, and the U.S., focusing on the goodwill of a "reformist" government and reluctant to embrace a geopolitical agenda, has thus far acquiesced. It has done little to enable the successor republics<--->other than the Baltic states<--->to achieve international acceptance. Visits there by senior American officials are few and far between; aid is minimal. The activities of Russian troops on their territory, or even their presence, is rarely challenged.
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434 can officials are few and far between; aid is minimal. The activities of Russian troops on their territory, or even their presence, is rarely challenged.
435
436
437
438 This is in part because America has been dealing with the anticommunist and the anti-imperialist revolutions as if they were a single phenomenon. In fact, they work in opposite directions. The anticommunist revolution has enjoyed substantial support throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. The anti-imperialist revolution, directed against domination by Russia, is widely popular in the new non-Russian republics and extremely unpopular in the Russian Federation. Russian

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450 leadership groups have historically perceived their state in terms of a "civilizing" mission; the overwhelming majority of 451
452 Russia's leading figures <--> whatever their political persuasion <--> refuse to accept the collapse of the Soviet Empire or the legitimacy of the successor states, especially of 453
454
455
456
457 Ukraine, the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy.
458 Even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, when writing about ridding Russia of the incubus of 459
460 unwilling foreign subjects, urged the retention by Moscow of a core group of 461
462 Ukraine, Belarus, and almost half of Kazakhstan <--> nearly 90% of the former 463
464 empire.
465 A realistic policy would recognize that 466 even the reformist Russian government of 467 Boris Yeltsin has maintained Russian arms on the territory of most of the former 468
469 Soviet republics <--> all members of the United Nations <--> often against the express wish 470
471 of the host government. These military forces have participated in the civil wars of 472
473 several of the republics, Long-term prospects for peace will be influenced by Russian reform, but short-term prospects will 474
475
476 depend on whether Russian armies can be induced to stay at home. 477
478
Russia is bound to have a special security

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479 ty interest in what it calls the ``near

480 abroad," the republics of the former Soviet

481 Union. But the peace of the world requires

482 that this interest be satisfied without mili-

483 tary pressure or unilateral military inter-

484 vention. The key issue is whether to treat

485 Russia's relationship to the new republics

486 as an international problem subject to ac-

487 cepted rules of foreign policy, or as an out-

488 growth of Russia's unilateral decision-

489 making which America will seek to

490 influence by appeals to the Russian leader-

491 ship's goodwill.

492 For the post-Cold War period, Ameri-

493 can policy toward postcommunist Russia

494 has staked everything on a kind of social

495 engineering geared to individual leaders.

496 In the Bush Administration, it was Mikhail

497 Gorbachev and, under Clinton, it has been

498 Boris Yeltsin, who, because of their per-

499 ceived personal commitment to democra-

500 cy, have been treated as the personal guar-

501 antors of a peaceful Russian foreign policy.

502 America's leaders have been reluctant to

503 invoke the traditional diplomatic brakes on

504 Russian policy for fear of provoking Yelt-

505 sin's presumed nationalist opponents.

506 It does Russia no favor to be treated as

507 immune from normal considerations of

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508 foreign policy, for this will have the practical result of forcing it to pay a heavier price
509 later on if it is lured into courses of action
510 from which there is no retreat. The veterans of Russia's internal struggles are not blushing novices whose internal balances will be unhinged by realistic dialogue.
511
512
513
514
515 They are quite capable of comprehending a policy based on mutual respect of each other's international interests. In fact, they are likely to understand such a calculus better than appeals to an abstract and distant utopianism.
516
517
518
519
520
521 Integrating Russia into the international system has two components which must be kept in balance: influencing Russian attitudes and affecting Russian calculations.
522
523
524
525 Generous economic assistance and technical advice is necessary to ease the pains of transition, and Russia should be made welcome in institutions which foster economic, cultural, and political cooperation. But Russian reform will be impeded, not helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of historic Russian imperial pretensions. The independence of the new republics, recognized after all by the U.N., must not be tacitly downgraded by acquiescence in Russian military moves on their

↑ equilibria

↑ others'

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537 soil.

538 American policy toward Russia should

539 be geared to permanent interests, not to

540 the fluctuations of Russian domestic poli-

541 tics. If American foreign policy makes Rus-

542 sian domestic politics its top priority, it will

543 become the victim of forces essentially out

544 of its control and lose all criteria for judg-

545 ment.

546 The new Russian leadership is entitled

547 to understanding for the anguishing pro-

548 cess of trying to overcome two generations

549 of communist misrule. It is not entitled to

550 be handed the sphere of influence that

551 tsars and commissars have coveted all

552 around Russia's vast borders for 300 years.

553 If Russia is to become a serious partner in

554 building a new world order, it must be

555 ready for the disciplines of stability as well

556 as for its benefits.

557

558 Managing Europe.

0558

or subhed tk

559 The architects of the Atlantic Alliance

560 would have been incredulous had they

561 been told that victory in the Cold War

562 would raise doubts about the future of their

563 creation. They took it for granted that the

564 prize for victory in the Cold War was a last-

565 ing partnership. **But the Alliance** has been

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566 marking time since the collapse of commu-
nism. Downgrading the U.S. relationship
567 with Europe has become all too fashion-
able. Yet without its Atlantic ties, America
568 would find itself in a world of nations with
569 which it has few moral bonds or common
traditions. In these circumstances, Ameri-
570 ~ except in the Western
571 ca would be obliged to conduct a pure Re-
572 alpolitik, which is essentially incompatible
573 with the American tradition.
574
575

576 Part of the reason for the decline is that
577 NATO has come to be taken for granted as
578 part of a landscape that needs no further
tending. The generation of American lead-
ers that has reached prominence in the last
579
decade and a half has been drawn mostly
580 from the South and West, where there are
581 fewer emotional and personal ties to Eu-
582 rope than among the old Northeastern es-
tablishment. Moreover, American liberals
583 have frequently felt let down by democrat-
584 ic allies who practice a policy of national in-
585 terest rather than of collective security and
586 reliance on international law; they cite
587 Bosnia and the Middle East as examples. At
588 the same time, the isolationist wing of
589 American conservatism has been tempted
to turn its back on what it disdains as Eu-
590
591
592
593
594

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595 selfishness.

596 Disagreements with Europe have the

597 grating character of family squabbles. Yet,

598 on nearly every key issue, there has been

599 far more cooperation from Europe than

600 from any other area. In fairness, it must be

601 recalled that, in Bosnia, French and British

602 troops were on the ground, and American

603 troops were not, although the public rhetor

604 ric has created the opposite impression. In

605 the post-Cold War world, Europe may not

606 be able to rally itself to a new Atlantic poli

607 cy, but America owes it to itself not to aban

608 don the policies of three generations in the

609 hour of victory. The task before the Alli

610 ance is to adapt the two basic institutions

611 which shape the Atlantic relationship,

612 NATO and the European Union, to the re

613 alities of the post-Cold War world.

614 The premises on which these institu

615 tions were founded have been shaken by

616 the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

617 unification of Germany. The Soviet army

618 no longer exists, and the Russian army

619 stands hundreds of miles to the east. At the

620 same time, Russian tendencies to re-estab

621 lish the former empire have reawakened

622 historic fears of Russian expansionism, es

623 pecially in the former satellite states of

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624 Eastern Europe. The emergence of a uni-
fied Germany compounds these fears.
625
626 Aware that the two Continental giants have
627 historically either carved up their neigh-
bors or fought battles on their territory, the
cost
628
629 countries located between them dread the
emerging security vacuum; hence their in-
tense desire for American protection by
630
631
632 joining NATO.
633
634 In the years ahead, all the traditional
Atlantic relationships will change. Europe
635 will not feel the previous need for Ameri-
can protection and will pursue its econom-
636
637 ic self-interest much more aggressively;
638 America will not be willing to sacrifice as,
639 much for European security and will be
tempted by isolationism in various guises;
640
641 in due course, Germany will insist on the
political influence to which its military and
642
643 economic power entitle it and will not be so
644 emotionally dependent on American mili-
tary and French political support.
645
646 The great achievement of the postwar
generation of American and European
cost
647
648 leaders was their recognition that, unless
649 America was organically involved in Eu-
rope, it would be obliged to involve itself
650
651 later under circumstances far less favor-
able to both sides of the Atlantic. That is
652

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653 even more true today. Germany has be-
654 come so strong that existing European in-
655 stitutions cannot by themselves strike a
656 balance between Germany and its Europe-
657 an partners. Nor can Europe, even with
658 Germany, manage either the resurgence or
659 the disintegration of Russia.

660 It is in no country's interest that Ger-
661 many and Russia should fixate on each oth-
662 er as either principal partner or principal
663 adversary. If they become too close, they
664 raise fears of condominium; if they quarrel,
665 they involve Europe in escalating crises.
666 America and Europe have a joint interest
667 in avoiding unbridled national German
668 and Russian policies competing over the
669 center of the Continent. Without America,
670 Great Britain and France cannot sustain
671 the political balance in Western Europe;
672 Germany would be tempted by national-
673 ism; Russia would lack a global interlocu-
674 tor. And without Europe, America could
675 turn, psychologically as well as geopoliti-
676 cally, into an island.

677 The future of Eastern Europe and of
678 the successor states of the Soviet Union are
679 not the same problem. Eastern Europe was
680 occupied by the Red Army. It has identi-
681 fied itself, culturally and politically, with

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682 West European traditions. This is especially true of the Visegrad countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Without ties to Western Europe and Atlantic institutions, these will become a no-man's-land between Germany and Russia. To become economically and politically viable, they need the European Union; and, for security, they look to the Atlantic Alliance. In truth, membership in one institution implies membership in the other. Since most members of the European Union are members of NATO, and since it is inconceivable that they would ignore attacks on one of their members after European integration has reached a certain point, membership in the European Union will lead to at least de facto extension of the NATO guarantee.

The American objection to NATO's membership for the Visegrad countries is one of principle. Going back to Wilson's historical objection to alliances -- because they were based on the expectation of confrontation -- President Clinton offered his alternative vision at last January's NATO summit. Explaining why the United States did not favor the admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

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711 kia into NATO, he argued that NATO could
712 not afford to ``draw a new line between
713 East and West that could create a self-ful-
714 filling prophecy of future confrontation."
715 Instead, Clinton put forward a scheme
716 which he called the Partnership for Peace.
717 It invites all the successor states of the So-
718 viet Union and all of Moscow's former East
719 European satellites to join what amounts to
720 a vague system of collective security. It is
721 not a way station into NATO, as is often
722 misleadingly asserted, but an alternative to
723 it.
724 The Partnership for Peace runs the risk
725 of creating two sets of borders in Europe:
726 those that are protected by security guar-
727 antees, and others where such guarantees
728 have been refused <---> a state of affairs bound
729 to prove tempting to potential aggressors
730 and demoralizing to potential victims. Care
731 must be taken lest, in the name of avoiding
732 confrontation, a strategic and conceptual
733 no-man's-land is created in Eastern and
734 Central Europe.
735 It will prove impossible to solve the
736 twin problems of security for Eastern Eu-
737 rope and of integrating Russia into the in-
738 ternational community as part of the same
739 program. If the Partnership for Peace is

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740 made an aspect of NATO, it may well undermine the Atlantic Alliance by diverting it into activities unrelated to any realistic security mission, magnify the sense of insecurity of Eastern Europe, and yet, being sufficiently ambiguous, fail to placate Russia. The Partnership runs the risk of being treated as irrelevant, if not dangerous, by the potential victims of aggression while being treated in Asia as an ethnic club directed primarily against China and Japan.

751 At the same time, relating Russia to the Atlantic nations is important. There is a place for an institution that deals with missions that all of its members interpret in substantially the same manner. Such common tasks exist in the field of economic development, education, and culture. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) could be given expanded functions for these purposes, and renamed the Partnership for Peace.

762 In such a design, the Atlantic Alliance would establish a common political framework and provide overall security; the European Union would accelerate membership for former Eastern European satellites; and the CSCE would relate the republics of the former Soviet Union <---> e-

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769 specially Russia <--> to the Atlantic structure.

770 A security umbrella would be extended

771 over the new democracies in Eastern Europe.

772 If Russia remained within its borders,

773 the focus on security would shift over

774 time to the Partnership. The common political

775 and economic projects would increase

776 dominatethe East-West

777 relationship.

778

Handling

779 Relating to Asia

0779

or subhed tk

780 There has been a surge of American interest

781 in Asia as symbolized by the proposal

782 for a Pacific Community made by Clinton

783 at a meeting with the Asian heads of government

784 in 1993. But the term "communit

785 ty" applies to Asia in only the most limited

786 sense, for relationships in the Pacific are

787 fundamentally different from those in the

788 Atlantic area. Whereas the nations of Europe

789 are grouped in common institutions,

790 the nations of Asia view themselves as distinct

791 and competitive. Their relations bear

792 most of the attributes of the European balance

793 of-power system of the nineteenth

794 century. Any significant increase in

795 strength by one of them is almost certain to

796 evoke an offsetting maneuver by the

797 others.

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798 The wild card is the attitude of the U.S.,
799 which has the capacity to function in much
800 the same way that Great Britain **once** did in
801 maintaining the European balance of pow-
802 er. The stability of the Asia-Pacific region,
803 the underpinning of its vaunted prosperity,
804 is not a law of nature but the consequence
805 of an equilibrium which will need increas-
806 ingly careful and deliberate tending.
807 **In Asia,** there is no pretense of collec-
808 tive security or **of** cooperation based on
809 shared domestic values, even on the part of
810 the few existing democracies. The empha-
811 sis is all on equilibrium and national inter-
812 est. Military expenditures are already ris-
813 ing in all the major Asian countries.
814 **In the next century,** China's political
815 and military shadow will fall over Asia and
816 will affect the calculations of the other
817 powers, however restrained actual Chi-
818 nese policy may prove to be. The other
819 Asian nations are likely to seek counter-
820 weights to an increasingly powerful China
821 as they already do to Japan. Though they
822 will disavow it, the nations of Southeast
823 Asia are including the heretofore feared
824 Vietnam in their grouping (ASEAN) largely
825 in order to balance China and Japan. And
826 that too is why ASEAN is asking the U.S. to

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827 remain engaged in their region.
828 During the Cold War, Japan basked in
the protection of the U.S. A determined
829 economic competitor, it paid for freedom
830 of maneuver in the economic field by sub-
831 ordinating its foreign and security policies
832 to Washington's. As long as the Soviet
833 Union could be perceived as the principal
834 security threat by both countries, it made
835 sense to treat American and Japanese na-
836 tional interests as identical.
837
838 That pattern is not likely to continue. A confrontation with the US over
839 With Korea and China gaining in military
840 strength, and with the least impaired por-
841 tion of Soviet military power located in Si-
842 beria, Japanese long-range planners will
843 not indefinitely take the absolute identity
844 of American and Japanese interests for
845 granted. When every incoming American
846 administration begins its term by pro-
847 claiming a reassessment of existing policies
848 and when confrontation over economic is-
849 sues becomes the rule rather than the ex-
850ception, it is difficult to argue that Ameri-
851 can and Japanese foreign policy interests
can never diverge. In any event, Japan's
852 perspective differs from America's because
853 of geographic proximity to the Asian main-
854 land and historic experience. Therefore,
855

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856 the Japanese defense budget has been
857 creeping upward until it has become the
858 third largest in the world.
859 Clinton's proposal for a more institu-
tionalized Pacific Community on the Euro-
860 pean model was received with polite aloof-
861 ness, largely because the nations of Asia do
862 not view themselves as a community. They
863 do not want an institutional framework
864 that might give potential Asian superpow-
ers or even the U.S. a major voice in their
865 affairs. They favor keeping America suffi-
866 +to
867 ciently involved so that, in an emergency, it
can help ward off threats to their indepen-
868 dence. But they are too suspicious of pow-
erful neighbors and to some extent of the
870 U.S. to favor formal, Pacific-wide
871 institutions.
872
873
874 The American role is the key to helping
875 Japan and China co-exist despite their sus-
876 picions of each other. In the immediate fu-
ture, Japan, faced with an aging population
877 and a stagnating economy, might decide to
878 press its technological and strategic superi-
879 ority before China emerges as a superpow-
er and Russia recovers its strength. After-
880
881
882 ward, it might have recourse to that great
equalizer, nuclear technology.
883
884 Close Japanese-American relations will

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885 be a vital contribution to Japanese moderation and a significant reassurance to the other nations of Asia. Japanese military strength linked to America worries China and the other nations of Asia less than purely national Japanese military capabilities. And Japan will decide that it needs less military strength so long as an American safety net exists. A substantial American military presence in Japan and Korea will be needed. In its absence, America's commitment to a permanent role in Asia would lack credibility, and Japan and China would be increasingly tempted to pursue national courses of action which, in the end, could well be directed against each other and all the buffer states in between. Good American relations with China are the prerequisite for good long-term relations with Japan, as well as for good Japanese relations. It is a triangle which each of the parties can abandon only at great risk. It is also an ambiguity with which the U.S. is not totally comfortable, since it runs counter to the American tendency to label nations neatly as either friend or foe. But with economic growth rates approaching 10% annually, a strong sense of national cohesion, and an ever

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914 more muscular military, **China** will show

915 the greatest relative increase in stature

916 among the major powers.

917 China welcomes **U.S.** involvement in

918 Asia as a counterweight to its feared neighbors,

919 Japan and Russia, and <--> to a lesser degree <--> India. Yet an American policy that

920 seeks simultaneously friendship with Beijing and with countries that **Beijing** perceives as potential threats <--> which is the

921

922 correct U.S. stance <--> requires a careful and

923

924

925 regular dialogue between **the U.S. and**

926 **China**.

927 For four years after the events of Tian-

928 anmen Square in 1989, this dialogue was

929 inhibited by the American refusal to en-

930 gage in high-level contacts <--> a measure

931 never employed against the Soviet Union

932 even at the height of the Cold War. Human

933 rights moved to the center of the Sino-

934 American relationship.

935 The Clinton Administration wisely re-

936 stored high-level contacts; the future of

937 Sino-American relations depends on the

938 substance of these exchanges. Clearly, the

939 U.S. cannot abandon its traditional concern with human rights and democratic

940 values; the problem is the degree to which

941 all aspects of Sino-American relations are

942

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943 made conditional on them. China finds
944 condescending the implication that Sino-
945 American relations are based not on recip-
946 rocal interests but on American favors **that**
947 can be shut off at Washington's discretion.
948 Such an attitude makes America appear
949 both unreliable and intrusive, and unreli-
950 ability is the greater failing in Chinese eyes.
951 China might be prepared to make some
952 human-rights concessions, provided they
953 can be presented as emerging from its own
954 free choice. But American insistence on
955 publicly prescribing conditions is per-
956 ceived in China as a **humiliating** attempt to
957 convert its society to American values and
958 as a lack of American seriousness. It sug-
959 gests that America has no national interest
960 in the Asian equilibrium as such. But if
961 America cannot be counted on for that pur-
962 pose, China will have no interest in making
963 concessions to it. The key to Sino-Ameri-
964 can relations <---> paradoxically, even on hu-
965 man rights <---> is a tacit cooperation on glob-
966 al, and especially Asian, strategy.
967
968 subhd tk
969 When, in 1821, John Quincy Adams
970 warned Americans against the penchant to
971 slay ``distant monsters,'' he could not have

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972 imagined the sheer number and magni-
973 tude of monsters that would exist in the
974 postCold War world. Not every evil can be
975 combated by America, even less by Ameri-
976 ca alone. But some monsters need to be, if
977 not slain, at least resisted. What is most
978 needed are criteria for selectivity.
979 America's leaders have generally
980 stressed motivation over structure. They
981 have placed more emphasis on affecting
982 the attitudes than the calculations of their
983 counterparts. As a result, American society
984 is peculiarly ambivalent about the lessons
985 of history. American films often depict how
986 some dramatic event transforms a villain
987 into a paragon of virtue (sometimes cloy-
988 ingly so) <---> a reflection of the pervasive na-
989 tional belief that the past has no final claim
990 and that new departures are always possi-
991 ble. In the real world, such transformations
992 are rarely observed in individuals, even
993 less so among nations which are compos-
994 ites of many individual choices.
995 The American habit of rejecting history
996 extols the image of a universal man living
997 by universal maxims, regardless of the past,
998 of geography, or of other immutable cir-
999 cumstance. Since the American tradition
1000 emphasizes universal truths rather than

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1001 national characteristics, American policy-
1002 makers have generally preferred multilat-
1003 eral approaches to national ones: the agen-
1004 das of disarmament, nonproliferation, and
1005 human rights rather than essentially na-
1006 tional, geopolitical, or strategic issues.
1007 A country with *this* idealistic tradition
1008 cannot base its policy on the balance of
1009 power as the sole criterion for a new world
1010 order. But it must learn that equilibrium is
1011 a fundamental precondition for the pursuit
1012 of its historic goals. And these higher goals
1013 cannot be achieved by rhetoric or postur-
1014 ing. Foreign policy *is* conducted by a politi-
1015 cal system that emphasizes the immediate
1016 and provides few incentives for the long
1017 range. Leaders are obliged to deal with
1018 constituencies that tend to receive their in-
1019 formation *through* visual images. All this
1020 puts a premium on emotion and on the
1021 mood of the moment in a time that de-
1022 mands rethinking of priorities and an anal-
1023 ysis of capabilities.
1024 At a time when America is able neither
1025 to dominate the world nor to withdraw
1026 from it, when it finds itself both all-power-
1027 ful and totally vulnerable, it must not aban-
1028 don the ideals which have accounted for its
1029 greatness. But neither must it jeopardize

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1030 that greatness by fostering illusions about
1031 the extent of its reach. World leadership is
1032 inherent in America's power and values,
1033 but it does not include the privilege of pre-
1034 tending that America is doing other nations
1035 a kindness by associating with them, or that
1036 it has a limitless capacity to impose its will
1037 by withholding its favors.
1038 The fulfillment of America's ideals will
1039 have to be sought in the patient accumula-
1040 tion of partial successes. The certitudes of
1041 physical threat and hostile ideology charac-
1042 teristic of the Cold War are gone. The con-
1043 victions needed to master the emerging
1044 world order are more abstract: a vision of a
1045 future that cannot be demonstrated when
1046 it is put forward and judgments about the
1047 relationship between hope and possibility
1048 that are, in their essence, conjectural. The
1049 Wilsonian goals of America's past <---> peace,
1050 stability, progress, and freedom for man-
1051 kind <--> will have to be sought in a journey
1052 that has no end. ``Traveler,'' says a Spanish
1053 proverb, ``there are no roads. Roads are
1054 made by walking.''

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19 time for America to DO WHAT «

20

21 hed tk

22

25 tion to permanence; the very term has a

28 stant flux; indeed, with each century, the

30 shrinking. The order that grew out of the

31 Peace of Westphalia in 17tk lasted 150

34 self for a hundred years; the international

36 after 40 years. Never before have the com-

37 ponents of world order, their capacity to in-

38 teract, and their goals all changed quite so

40 Both *Bill* Clinton and *George* Bush

41 *have* spoken of the new world order as if it

42 were just around the corner. In fact, it is

44 be visible until well into the next century.

0019 brief summation of

0019 kissinger's principle

0019 argument about what

0019 should replace

0019 wilsonianism.

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45 In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. is the
46 only remaining superpower with the ca-
47 pacity to intervene in every part of the
globe. Yet power has become more diffuse
48 and the issues to which military force is rel-
49 evant have diminished. The absence of an
50 overriding ideological or strategic threat
51 frees nations to pursue foreign policies
52 based increasingly on their immediate na-
53 tional interest. In an international system
54 characterized by perhaps five or six major
55 powers and a multiplicity of smaller states,
56 order will have to emerge much as it did in
57 past centuries: from a reconciliation and
58 balancing of competing national interests.
59

60 In the nineteenth century, the appear-
61 ance of even one new nation <---> such as the
62 united Germany <---> produced decades of
turmoil. Since the end of World War II,
63 nearly a hundred new nations have come
64 into being, many of them quite different
65 from the historic European nation-state.
66 The collapse of communism in the Soviet
67 Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia have
68 spawned another twenty nations, many of
69 which have concentrated on re-enacting
70 century-old bloodlusts.
71

72 Part of the turmoil results from the fact
73 that at least three types of states calling

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<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>74</td>
      <td>themselves ``nations'' are interacting while</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>75</td>
      <td>sharing few of the nation-states' historic attributes.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>76</td>
      <td>On the one side are the ethnic</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>77</td>
      <td>splinters from disintegrating empires, such</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>78</td>
      <td>as the successor states of Yugoslavia or of</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>79</td>
      <td>the Soviet Union. Obsessed by historic</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>80</td>
      <td>grievances and age-old quests for identity,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>81</td>
      <td>they strive primarily to prevail in ancient</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>82</td>
      <td>ethnic rivalries. The goal of international</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>83</td>
      <td>order is beyond their fields of interest and</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>84</td>
      <td>frequently beyond their imaginations.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>85</td>
      <td>Some of the postcolonial nations represented yet another distinct phenomenon. For</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>86</td>
      <td>many of them, the *ir* current borders represented the administrative convenience of the</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>87</td>
      <td>imperial powers. French Africa, possessing</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>88</td>
      <td>a large coastline, was segmented into seven administrative units, each of which</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>89</td>
      <td>has since become a state. Belgian Africa</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>90</td>
      <td>then called the Congo, now Zaire &lt;--&gt; had</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>91</td>
      <td>only a very narrow outlet to the sea, and</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>92</td>
      <td>hence was governed as a single unit even</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>93</td>
      <td>though it constitutes an area as large as</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>94</td>
      <td>Western Europe. In such circumstances,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>95</td>
      <td>the state too often came to mean the army,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>96</td>
      <td>which was usually the only ``national'' institution.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>97</td>
      <td>When that claim collapsed, civil war</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>98</td>
      <td>frequently *followed*. If Wilsonian principles of self-determination were applied to</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>99</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>100</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>101</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>102</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

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103 such nations, a radical, unpredictable, usu-
104 **ally violent** realignment of frontiers would
105 be inevitable.

120 Similarly, the two superpowers of the
121 Cold War period have never been nation-
122 states in the European sense. America suc-
123 ceeded in forming a distinct culture from a
124 polyglot national composition; the Soviet
125 Union was an empire containing many na-
126 tionalities. Its successor states <---> especially
127 the Russian Federation <---> are torn between
128 disintegration and reimperialization.

129

129 «

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140 As the number of states multiplies and
141 their capacity to interact increases, on what
142 ~~principles can a new world order be organized?~~ No
143 Given the complexity of the new in-
144 ternational system, can Wilsonian con-
145 cepts like ``enlarging democracy'' serve as
146 the principal guides to American foreign
147 policy and as replacement for the Cold War
148 strategy of containment?

149 The end of the Cold War has created
150 what some observers have called a ``unipolar'' or ``one-superpower'' world. But the
151 U.S. is actually in no better position to dictate the global agenda than it was at the beginning of the Cold War. America is more
152 preponderant than it was ten years ago, yet,
153 ironically, power has also become more
154 diffuse; America's ability to employ military forces
155 shape the rest of the world has actually decreased.

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160 Victory in the Cold War has made it far

161 more difficult to implement the Wilsonian

162 dream of universal collective security. In

163 the absence of a potentially dominating

164 power, the principal nations do not view

165 threats to the peace in the same way, nor

166 are they willing to run the same risks in

167 overcoming those threats they do recog-

168 nize. The world community is willing

169 enough to cooperate in ``peacekeepin-

170 g''<--->an existing agreement not challenged

171 by any of the parties <--->but it has been skit-

172 tish about peacemaking <---> suppressing ac-

173 tual challenges to world order. Not even

174 the U.S. has as yet developed a clear con-

175 cept of what it will resist unilaterally in the

176 post-Cold War world.

177 As an approach to foreign policy, Wil-

178 sonianism presumes that America is pos-

179 sessed of an exceptional nature expressed

180 in unrivaled virtue and unrivaled power.

181 The U.S. was so confident of its strength

182 and the virtue of its aims that it could envi-

183 sion fighting for its values on a worldwide

184 basis.

185 As the 21st century approaches, vast

186 global forces are at work that will render

187 the U.S. less exceptional. American mili-

188 tary power will remain unrivaled for the

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196 the next century. Yet wealth will become

204 nation like others. Americas should not view

209 The rise of other power centers <---> in West-

210 ern Europe, Japan, and China <---> should not

215 the Marshall Plan.

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221 self-determination <---> are becoming less

224 The concept of raison d'etat <---> that the

226 to pursue them <---> has always been repug-

229 tat <---> there are many instances of it, from

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250 A clear definition of the national interest needs to be an equally essential guide to American policy. The growth of democracy will continue as America's dominant aspiration, but it is necessary to recognize the obstacles it faces at the moment of its seeming philosophical triumph. Curbing the power of the central government has been a principal concern of Western political theorists; in most other societies, political theory has sought to buttress the authority of the state. Nowhere else has there been such an insistence on expanding personal freedom. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

251 est needs to be an equally essential guide to American policy. The growth of democracy will continue as America's dominant aspiration, but it is necessary to recognize the obstacles it faces at the moment of its seeming

252 American policy. The growth of democracy will continue as America's dominant aspiration, but it is necessary to recognize the

253 will continue as America's dominant aspiration, but it is necessary to recognize the

254 ration, but it is necessary to recognize the obstacles it faces at the moment of its seem-

255 obstacles it faces at the moment of its seeming philosophical triumph. Curbing the power of the central government has been a principal concern of Western political theorists; in most other societies, political

256 ing philosophical triumph. Curbing the power of the central government has been a principal concern of Western political theorists; in most other societies, political

257 power of the central government has been a principal concern of Western political theorists; in most other societies, political

258 theorists; in most other societies, political theory has sought to buttress the authority

259 theorists; in most other societies, political theory has sought to buttress the authority of the state. Nowhere else has there been such an insistence on expanding personal freedom. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

260 theory has sought to buttress the authority of the state. Nowhere else has there been such an insistence on expanding personal freedom. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

261 of the state. Nowhere else has there been such an insistence on expanding personal freedom. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

262 such an insistence on expanding personal freedom. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

263 freedom. Western democracy evolved in culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

264 culturally homogeneous societies with a long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

265 long common history; even America, with its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

266 its polyglot population, developed a strong cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

267 cultural identity. The society and, in a sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

268 sense, the nation preceded the state without having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

269 out having to be created by it. In such a setting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

270 ting, political parties represent variants of an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

271 an underlying consensus; today's minority is potentially tomorrow's majority.

272 is potentially tomorrow's majority.

273 In most other parts of the world, the state has preceded the nation; it was and

274 state has preceded the nation; it was and often remains the principal element in

275 often remains the principal element in

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276 forming it. Political parties, where they exist, reflect fixed, usually communal, identities; minorities and majorities tend to be permanent. In such societies, the political process is about domination, not alternation in office, which takes place, if at all, by coups rather than by constitutional procedures. The concept of a loyal opposition <---> the essence of modern democracy <---> rarely prevails. Much more frequently, opposition is viewed as a threat to national cohesion, equated with treason, and ruthlessly suppressed.

289 Western-style democracy presupposes a consensus on values that sets limits to partisanship. America would not be true to itself if it did not insist on the universal applicability of the idea of liberty. That America should give preference to democratic governments over repressive ones and be prepared to pay some price for its moral convictions is beyond dispute. That there is an area of discretion which should be exercised in favor of governments and institutions promoting democratic values and human rights is also clear. The difficulty arises in determining the precise price to be paid and its relationship to other essential American priorities, including national se-

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305 curity and the overall geopolitical balance.

306 If American exhortations are to go be-

307 yond patriotic rhetoric, they must reflect a

308 realistic understanding of America's reach.

309 The U.S. must be careful not to multiply

310 moral commitments while the financial

311 and military resources for the conduct of a

312 global foreign policy are being curtailed.

313 Sweeping pronouncements not matched

314 by either the ability or the willingness to

315 back them up diminish America's influ-

316 ence on all other matters.

317 The precise balance between the moral

318 and the strategic elements of American for-

319 eign policy cannot be prescribed in the ab-

320 stract. But the beginning of wisdom con-

321 sists of recognizing that a balance needs to

322 be struck. A gap is threatening to open up

323 in America's policy between its pretentions

324 and its willingness to support them; the

325 nearly inevitable disillusionment too easily

326 turns into an excuse for withdrawing from

327 world affairs altogether.

328 Foreign policy must begin with some

329 definition of what constitutes a vital inter-

330 est<--->a change in the international environ-

331 ment so likely to undermine the national

332 security that it must be resisted no matter

333 what form the threat takes or how ostensi-

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346

347 How to Deal with Russia«

0347

or subhed tk

348 Geopolitically, America is an island off
349 the shores of Eurasia, whose resources and
350 population far exceed those of the U.S. The
351 domination by a single power of either Eu-
352 rope or Asia remains a good definition of
353 strategic danger for America, Cold War or
354 no Cold War. Such a grouping would have
355 the capacity to outstrip America economi-
cally and, in the end, militarily. That dan-
ger would have to be resisted even were
357 the dominant power apparently benevo-
lent, for if the intentions ever changed,
358 America would find itself with a grossly di-
360 minished capacity for effective resistance
361 and a growing inability to shape events.
362

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363 Just as Soviet hostility shaped Ameri-
364 ca's attitudes toward the global order from
365 the perspective of containment, so do Rus-
366 sia's reform efforts dominate America's
367 thinking now. U.S. policy has been based
368 on the premise that peace can be ensured
369 by a Russia tempered by democracy and
370 concentrating its energies on developing a
371 market economy. In this light, America's
372 principal task is conceived to be to
373 strengthen Russian reform, with measures
374 drawn from the experience of the Marshall
375 Plan rather than from the traditional pat-
376 terns of foreign policy.

377 In the aftermath of the communist col-
378 lapse, it has been assumed that Russia's
379 hostile intentions have disappeared. Stu-
380 dents of geopolitics and history are uneasy
381 about the single-mindedness of this ap-
382 proach. They fear that, in overestimating
383 America's ability to shape Russia's internal
384 evolution, America may involve itself
385 needlessly in internal Russian controver-
386 sies, generate a nationalist backlash, and
387 neglect the usual tasks of foreign policy.
388 While they would support a policy de-
389 signed to modify Russia's traditional trucu-
390 lence through economic aid and global co-
391 operation, they would argue that even if a

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394 should hedge its bets.

399 had a functioning market system, well-established

401 countries, a democratic tradition. Comparable

402 conditions do not exist in post-Cold

403 War Russia. Alleviating suffering and encouraging

404 economic reform are important

406 not, however, substitutes for a serious effort

407 to maintain the global balance of power

408 vis-a-vis a country with a long history of

409 expansionism.

412 disintegration, *generating* two causes of

413 tension: attempts by neighbors to take advantage

414 of the weakness of the imperial

415 center, and efforts by the declining empire

416 to restore its authority at the periphery.

417 Both processes are going on simultaneously

418 in the successor states of the former Soviet

419 Union. Iran and Turkey are seeking to

420 increase their roles in the *largely Muslim*

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421 republics of Central Asia. But the dominant
422 geopolitical thrust has been Russia's at-
423 tempt to restore its pre-eminence in all the
territories formerly controlled from Mos-
424 cow. In the name of peacekeeping, Russia
425 seeks to re-establish some form of Russian
tutelage, and the U.S., focusing on the
426 goodwill of a ``reformist'' government and
reluctant to embrace a geopolitical agenda,
429 has thus far acquiesced. It has done little to
430 enable the successor republics <---> other than
431 the Baltic states <---> to achieve international
acceptance. Visits there by senior Ameri-
432 can officials are few and far between; aid is
433 minimal. The activities of Russian troops
434 on their territory, or even their presence, is
435 rarely challenged.
436

437
438 This is in part because America has
439 been dealing with the anticommunist and
440 the anti-imperialist revolutions as if they
441 were a single phenomenon. In fact, they
442 work in opposite directions. The anticom-
munist revolution has enjoyed substantial
443 support throughout the territory of the for-
444 mer Soviet Union. The anti-imperialist
445 revolution, directed against domination by
446 Russia, is widely popular in the new non-
447 Russian republics and extremely unpopu-
448 lar in the Russian Federation. Russian
449

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450 leadership groups have historically per-

451 ceived their state in terms of a ``civilizing''

452 mission; the overwhelming majority of

453 Russia's leading figures <---> whatever their

454 political persuasion <---> refuse to accept the

455 collapse of the Soviet Empire or the legiti-

456 macy of the successor states, especially of

458 Even Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, when writ-

459 ing about ridding Russia of the incubus of

460 unwilling foreign subjects, urged the re-

461 tention by Moscow of a core group of

462 Ukraine, Belarus, and almost half of Ka-

463 zakhstan <---> nearly 90% of the former

464 empire.

467 Boris Yeltsin has maintained Russian ar-

468 mies on the territory of most of the former

469 Soviet republics <---> all members of the Unit-

470 ed Nations <---> often against the express wish

472 forces have participated in the civil wars of

473 several of the republics, Long-term pros-

474 pects for peace will be influenced by Rus-

475 sian reform, but short-term prospects will

477 induced to stay at home.

478 Russia is bound to have a special securi-

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491 ship's goodwill.

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511
512
513
514
515 They are quite capable of comprehending a policy based on mutual respect of each other's national interests. In fact, they are likely to understand such a calculus better than appeals to an abstract and distant utopianism.

521 Integrating Russia into the international system has two components which must be kept in balance: influencing Russian attitudes and affecting Russian calculations.
522
523
524 Generous economic assistance and technical advice is necessary to ease the pains of transition, and Russia should be made welcome in institutions which foster economic, cultural, and political cooperation. But
525
526
527
528
529 Russian reform will be impeded, not helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of historic Russian imperial pretensions. The independence of the new republics, recognized after all by the U.N., must not be tacitly downgraded by acquiescence in Russian military moves on their

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537 soil.

538 American policy toward Russia should
539 be geared to permanent interests, not to
540 the fluctuations of Russian domestic poli-
tics. If American foreign policy makes Rus-
541
542 sian domestic politics its top priority, it will
543 become the victim of forces essentially out
544 of its control and lose all criteria for judg-
545 ment.

557

558 Managing Europe«

0558

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566 marking time since the collapse of commu-
567 nism. Downgrading the **U.S.** relationship
568 with Europe has become all too fashion-
569 able. **Yet** without its Atlantic ties, America
570 would find itself in a world of nations with
571 which it has few moral bonds or common
572 traditions. In these circumstances, Ameri-
573 ca would be obliged to conduct a pure Re-
574 alpolitik, which is essentially incompatible
575 with the American tradition.

576 Part of the reason for the decline is that
577 NATO has come to be taken for granted as
578 part of a landscape that needs no further
tending. The generation of American lead-
579 ers **that** has reached prominence in the last
580 decade and a half has been drawn mostly
581 from the South and West, where there are
582 fewer emotional and personal ties to Eu-
583 rope than among the old Northeastern es-
584 tablishment. Moreover, American liberals
585 have frequently felt let down by democrat-
586 ic allies **who** practice a policy of national in-
587 terest rather than of collective security and
588 reliance on international law; they cite
589 Bosnia and the Middle East as examples. At
590 the same time, the isolationist wing of
591 American conservatism has been tempted
592 to turn its back on what it disdains as Eu-
593 rope's Machiavellian relativism and
594

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CYI

595 selfishness.

603 troops were not, although the public rhetoric has created the opposite impression. In

604 the post-Cold War world, Europe may not

605 be able to rally itself to a new Atlantic policy, but America owes it to itself not to abandon the policies of three generations in the

606

607

608 hour of victory. The task before the Alliance is to adapt the two basic institutions

609

610

612 NATO and the European Union, to the realities of the post-Cold War world.

613

614 The premises on which these institutions were founded have been shaken by

615 the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

616

620 same time, Russian tendencies to re-establish the former empire have reawakened

621

622 historic fears of Russian expansionism, especially in the former satellite states of

623

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625 fied Germany compounds these fears.

628 bors or fought battles on their territory, the

630 emerging security vacuum; hence their in-

631 tense desire for American protection by

632 **joining** NATO.

633 In the years ahead, all the traditional

634 Atlantic relationships will change. Europe

636 can protection and will pursue its econom-

640 tempted by isolationism in various guises;

642 political influence to which its military and

645 tary and French political support.

647 generation of American and European

650 rope, it would be obliged to involve itself

652 able to both sides of the Atlantic. That is

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701 The American objection to NATO
702 membership for the Visegrad countries is one of principle. Going back to Wilson's historical objection to alliances <---> because they were based on the expectation of confrontation <--> President Clinton offered his alternative vision at last January's NATO summit. Explaining why the United States did not favor the admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

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LYI

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711 kia into NATO, he argued that **NATO** could

714 filling prophecy of future confrontation.''

715 **Instead,** Clinton put forward a scheme

717 It invites **all** the successor states of the So-

718 viet Union and **all** of Moscow's former East

720 a vague system of collective security. **It** is

723 it.

734 Central Europe.

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769 specially Russia<--->to the Atlantic structure.

773 the focus on security would shift over time to the Partnership.

774 The common political and economic projects would increase

775 and dominate the East-West relationship.

776

778

779 Relating to Asia«

0779

or subhed tk

780 There has been a surge of American interest in Asia as symbolized by the proposal

781 for a Pacific Community made by Clinton

782 at a meeting with the Asian heads of government in 1993. But the term ``community'' applies to Asia in only the most limited sense, for relationships in the Pacific are

783

784

785

786

788 Atlantic area. Whereas the nations of Europe are grouped in common institutions,

789 the nations of Asia view themselves as distinct and competitive. Their relations bear

790

791 most of the attributes of the European balance-of-power system of the nineteenth century. Any significant increase in

792

793

794

795 strength by one of them is almost certain to evoke an offsetting maneuver by the

796

797 others.

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807 In Asia, there is no pretense of collec-
808 tive security or of cooperation based on
809 shared domestic values, even on the part of
810 the few existing democracies. The empha-
811 sis is all on equilibrium and national inter-
812 est. Military expenditures are already ris-
813 ing in all the major Asian countries.

814 In the next century, China's political
815 and military shadow will fall over Asia and
816 will affect the calculations of the other
817 powers, however restrained actual Chi-
818 nese policy may prove to be. The other
819 Asian nations are likely to seek counter-
820 weights to an increasingly powerful China
821 as they already do to Japan. Though they
822 will disavow it, the nations of Southeast
823 Asia are including the heretofore feared
824 Vietnam in their grouping (ASEAN) largely
825 in order to balance China and Japan. And
826 that too is why ASEAN is asking the U.S. to

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829 the protection of the U.S. A determined

830 economic competitor, it paid for freedom

831 of maneuver in the economic field by sub-

832 ordinating its foreign and security policies

833 to Washington's. As long as the Soviet

834 Union could be perceived as the principal

835 security threat by both countries, it made

836 sense to treat American and Japanese na-

837 tional interests as identical.

850 ception, it is difficult to argue that Ameri-

852 can never diverge. In any event, Japan's

853 perspective differs from America's because

854 of geographic proximity to the Asian main-

855 land and historic experience. Therefore,

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860 tionalized Pacific Community on the Euro-

861 pean model was received with polite aloof-

862 ness, largely because the nations of Asia do

863 not view themselves as a community. They

864 do not want an institutional framework

865 that might give potential Asian superpow-

866 ers or even the U.S. a major voice in their

867 affairs. They favor keeping America suffi-

868 ciently involved so that, in an emergency, it

869 can help ward off threats to their indepen-

870 dence. But they are too suspicious of pow-

871 erful neighbors and to some extent of the

872 U.S. to favor formal, Pacific-wide

873 institutions.

877 ture, Japan, faced with an aging population

878 and a stagnating economy, might decide to

879 press its technological and strategic superi-

880 ority before China emerges as a superpow-

881 er and Russia recovers its strength. After-

883 equalizer, nuclear technology.

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886 tion and a significant reassurance to the

887 other nations of Asia. Japanese military

888 strength linked to America worries China

889 and the other nations of Asia less than

890 purely national Japanese military capabilities.

891 ties. And Japan will decide that it needs less

892 military strength so long as an American

893 safety net exists. A substantial American

894 military presence in Japan and Korea will

895 be needed. In its absence, America's commitment to a permanent role in Asia would

896 lack credibility, and Japan and China

897 would be increasingly tempted to pursue

898 national courses of action which, in the

899 end, could well be directed against each

900 other and all the buffer states in between.

901

902 Good American relations with China

903 are the prerequisite for good long-term relations with Japan, as well as for good Sinoc

904 Japanese relations. It is a triangle which

905 each of the parties can abandon only at

906 great risk. It is also an ambiguity with

907 which the U.S. is not totally comfortable,

908 since it runs counter to the American tendency to label nations neatly as either

909 friend or foe. But with economic growth

910 rates approaching 10% annually, a strong

911 sense of national cohesion, and an ever

912

913

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33

916 among the major powers.

918 Asia as a counterweight to its feared neigh-

919 bors, Japan and Russia, and <---> to a lesser de-

920 gree <---> India. Yet an American policy that

921 seeks simultaneously friendship with Bei-

922 **jing and** with countries that **Beijing** per-

923 ceives as potential threats <---> which is the

924 correct U.S. stance <---> requires a careful and

926 **China**.

930 gage in high-level contacts <---> a measure

934 American relationship.

939 U.S. cannot abandon its traditional con-

940 cern with human rights and democratic

941 values; the problem is the degree to which

942 all aspects of Sino-American relations are

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CYI

943 made conditional on them. China finds
944 condescending the implication that Sino-
945 American relations are based not on recip-
946 rocal interests but on American favors **that**
947 can be shut off at Washington's discretion.
948 Such an attitude makes America appear
949 both unreliable and intrusive, and unreli-
950 ability is the greater failing in Chinese eyes.
951 China might be prepared to make some
952 human-rights concessions, provided they
953 can be presented as emerging from its own
954 free choice, But American insistence on
955 publicly prescribing conditions is per-
956 ceived in China as a **humiliating** attempt to
957 convert its society to American values and
958 as a lack of American seriousness. It sug-
959 gests that America has no national interest
960 in the Asian equilibrium as such. But if
961 America cannot be counted on for that pur-
962 pose, China will have no interest in making
963 concessions to it. The key to Sino-Ameri-
964 can relations <---> paradoxically, even on hu-
965 man rights <---> is a tacit cooperation on glob-
966 al, and especially Asian, strategy.
967
968 subhed tk
969 When, in 1821, John Quincy Adams
970 warned Americans against the penchant to
971 slay ``distant monsters,'' he could not have

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972 imagined the sheer number and magni-
973 tude of monsters that would exist in the
974 postCold War world. Not every evil can be
975 combated by America, even less by Ameri-
976 ca alone. But some monsters need to be, if
977 not slain, at least resisted. What is most
978 needed are criteria for selectivity.
979 America's leaders have generally
980 stressed motivation over structure. They
981 have placed more emphasis on affecting
982 the attitudes than the calculations of their
983 counterparts. As a result, American society
984 is peculiarly ambivalent about the lessons
985 of history. American films often depict how
986 some dramatic event transforms a villain
987 into a paragon of virtue (sometimes cloy-
988 ingly so) <-- > a reflection of the pervasive na-
989 tional belief that the past has no final claim
990 and that new departures are always possi-
991 ble. In the real world, such transformations
992 are rarely observed in individuals, even
993 less so among nations which are compos-
994 ites of many individual choices.
995 The American habit of rejecting history
996 extols the image of a universal man living
997 by universal maxims, regardless of the past,
998 of geography, or of other immutable cir-
999 cumstance. Since the American tradition
1000 emphasizes universal truths rather than

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1007 A country with *this* idealistic tradition
cannot base its policy on the balance of
1008 power as the sole criterion for a new world
1009 order. But it must learn that equilibrium is
1010 a fundamental precondition for the pursuit
1011 of its historic goals. And these higher goals
1012 cannot be achieved by rhetoric or postur-
1013 ing. Foreign policy *is* conducted by a politi-
1014 cal system that emphasizes the immediate
1015 and provides few incentives for the long
1016 range. Leaders are obliged to deal with
1017 constituencies that tend to receive their in-
1018 formation *through* visual images. All this
1019 puts a premium on emotion and on the
1020 mood of the moment *in* a time that de-
1021 demands rethinking of priorities and an anal-
1022 ysis of capabilities.

1024 At a time when America is able neither
to dominate the world nor to withdraw
1025 from it, when it finds itself both all-power-
1026 ful and totally vulnerable, it must not aban-
1027 don the ideals which have accounted for its
greatness. But neither must it jeopardize
1029

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1051 kind <---> will have to be sought in a journey

1054 made by walking.''

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<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>16</td>
      <td>fect, Washington has worked to implement</td>
      <td>0019</td>
      <td>brief summation of</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>17</td>
      <td>the ideals of Woodrow Wilson: BRIEF</td>
      <td>0019</td>
      <td>kissinger's principle</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>18</td>
      <td>SUMMATION tk. Now, says Kissinger, it is</td>
      <td>0019</td>
      <td>argument about what</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>19</td>
      <td>time for America to DO WHAT «</td>
      <td>0019</td>
      <td>should replace</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>20</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>21</td>
      <td>hed tk</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>22</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>23</td>
      <td>International systems live precariously.</td>
      <td>0019</td>
      <td>wilsonianism.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>24</td>
      <td>Every "world order" expresses an aspira-</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>25</td>
      <td>tion to permanence; the very term has a</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>26</td>
      <td>ring of eternity about it. Yet the elements</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>27</td>
      <td>which comprise a "world order" are in con-</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>28</td>
      <td>stant flux; indeed, with each century, the</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>29</td>
      <td>duration of international systems has been</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>30</td>
      <td>shrinking. The order that grew out of the</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>31</td>
      <td>Peace of Westphalia in 17tk lasted 150</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>32</td>
      <td>years; the international system created by</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>33</td>
      <td>the 1815 Congress of Vienna maintained it-</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>34</td>
      <td>self for a hundred years; the international</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>35</td>
      <td>order characterized by the Cold War ended</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>36</td>
      <td>after 40 years. Never before have the com-</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>37</td>
      <td>ponents of world order, their capacity to in-</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>38</td>
      <td>teract, and their goals all changed quite so</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>39</td>
      <td>rapidly, so deeply, or so globally.</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>40</td>
      <td>Both <i>Bill</i> Clinton and <i>George</i> Bush</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>41</td>
      <td><i>have</i> spoken of the new world order as if it</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>42</td>
      <td>were just around the corner. In fact, it is</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>43</td>
      <td>still in gestation, and its final form will not</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>44</td>
      <td>be visible until well into the next century.</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

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45 In the post-Cold War world, the U.S. is the only remaining superpower with the capacity to intervene in every part of the globe. Yet power has become more diffuse and the issues to which military force is relevant have diminished. The absence of an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national interest. In an international system characterized by perhaps five or six major powers and a multiplicity of smaller states, order will have to emerge much as it did in past centuries: from a reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests.
60 In the nineteenth century, the appearance of even one new nation <---> such as the united Germany <---> produced decades of turmoil. Since the end of World War II, nearly a hundred new nations have come into being, many of them quite different from the historic European nation-state.
67 The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia have spawned another twenty nations, many of which have concentrated on re-enacting century-old bloodlusts.
72 Part of the turmoil results from the fact that at least three types of states calling

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<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>74</td>
      <td>themselves ``nations'' are interacting while</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>75</td>
      <td>sharing few of the nation-states' historic at-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>76</td>
      <td>tributes. On the one side are the ethnic</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>77</td>
      <td>splinters from disintegrating empires, such</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>78</td>
      <td>as the successor states of Yugoslavia or of</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>79</td>
      <td>the Soviet Union. Obsessed by historic</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>80</td>
      <td>grievances and age-old quests for identity,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>81</td>
      <td>they strive primarily to prevail in ancient</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>82</td>
      <td>ethnic rivalries. The goal of international</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>83</td>
      <td>order is beyond their fields of interest and</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>84</td>
      <td>frequently beyond their imaginations.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>85</td>
      <td>Some of the postcolonial nations repre-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>86</td>
      <td>sent yet another distinct phenomenon. For</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>87</td>
      <td>many of them, their current borders repre-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>88</td>
      <td>sent the administrative convenience of the</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>89</td>
      <td>imperial powers. French Africa, possessing</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>90</td>
      <td>a large coastline, was segmented into sev-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>91</td>
      <td>enteen administrative units, each of which</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>92</td>
      <td>has since become a state. Belgian Afri-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>93</td>
      <td>ca &lt;--&gt; then called the Congo, now Zaire &lt;--&gt; had</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>94</td>
      <td>only a very narrow outlet to the sea, and</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>95</td>
      <td>hence was governed as a single unit even</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>96</td>
      <td>though it constitutes an area as large as</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>97</td>
      <td>Western Europe. In such circumstances,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>98</td>
      <td>the state too often came to mean the army,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>99</td>
      <td>which was usually the only ``national'' insti-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>100</td>
      <td>tution. When that claim collapsed, civil war</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>101</td>
      <td>frequently followed. If Wilsonian princi-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>102</td>
      <td>ples of self-determination were applied to</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

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129

129 ' 0129 linespace, please

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149 The end of the Cold War has created
150 what some observers have called a ``unipo-
151 lar'' or ``one-superpower'' world. But the
152 U.S. is actually in no better position to dic-
153 tate the global agenda than it was at the be-
154 ginning of the Cold War. America is more
155 preponderant than it was ten years ago, yet,
156 ironically, power has also become more
157 diffuse; America's ability to employ it to
158 shape the rest of the world has actually
159 decreased.

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167 overcoming those threats they do recognize. The world community is willing

168 enough to cooperate in ``peacekeeping''

169 g''<---> an existing agreement not challenged

170 by any of the parties <--> but it has been skittish about peacemaking <--> suppressing actual challenges to world order. Not even

171 the U.S. has as yet developed a clear concept of what it will resist unilaterally in the post-Cold War world.

172

173

174

175

176

177 As an approach to foreign policy, Wilsonianism presumes that America is possessed of an exceptional nature expressed

178

179 in unrivaled virtue and unrivaled power.

180

182 and the virtue of its aims that it could envision fighting for its values on a worldwide

183

184 basis.

187 the U.S. less exceptional. American military power will remain unrivaled for the

188

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189 foreseeable future. Yet America's desire to
190 project that power into the myriad small-
191 scale conflicts which the world is likely to
192 witness in the coming decades <---> Bosnia,
193 Somalia, and Haiti <---> is a key conceptual
194 challenge. The U.S. will likely have the
195 world's most powerful economy well into
196 the next century. Yet wealth will become
197 more widely spread, as will the technology
198 for generating wealth. The U.S. will face
199 economic competition of a kind it never ex-
200 experienced during the Cold War.
201 America will be the greatest and most
202 powerful nation, but a nation with peers;
203 the primus inter pares but nonetheless a
204 nation like others. America should not view
205 this as a humbling of America or as a symp-
206 tom of national decline. For most of its his-
207 tory, the U.S. was in fact a nation among
208 others, not a preponderate superpower.
209 The rise of other power centers <---> in West-
210 ern Europe, Japan, and China <---> should not
211 alarm Americans. After all, sharing the
212 world's resources and the development of
213 other societies and economies has been a
214 peculiarly American objective ever since
215 the Marshall Plan.
216 Yet if Wilson's dictates <---> collective se-
217 curity, the conversion of one's competitors

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<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>218</td>
      <td>to the American way, an international sys-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>219</td>
      <td>tem that adjudicates disputes in a legal</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>220</td>
      <td>fashion, and unqualified support for ethnic</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>221</td>
      <td>self-determination &lt;--&gt; are becoming less</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>222</td>
      <td>practicable, on what principles ought</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>223</td>
      <td>America to base its foreign policy?</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>224</td>
      <td><b>The</b> concept of <i>raison d'etat</i> &lt;--&gt; that the</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>225</td>
      <td>interests of the state justify the means used</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>226</td>
      <td>to pursue them &lt;--&gt; has always been repug-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>227</td>
      <td>nant to Americans. That is not to say that</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>228</td>
      <td>Americans have never practiced <i>raison d'e-</i></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>229</td>
      <td>tat&lt;--&gt; there are many instances of it, from</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>230</td>
      <td>the time of the Founding Fathers' shrewd</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>231</td>
      <td>dealings with the European powers in the</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>232</td>
      <td>early decades of the republic to the single-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>233</td>
      <td>minded pursuit of Western expansion,</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>234</td>
      <td>which was placed under the rubric of</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>235</td>
      <td>``manifest destiny.'' But Americans have</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>236</td>
      <td>never been comfortable acknowledging</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>237</td>
      <td>openly their own selfish interests. Whether</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>238</td>
      <td>fighting world wars or local conflicts, <b>U.S.</b></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>239</td>
      <td>leaders always claimed to be struggling in</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>240</td>
      <td>the name of principle, not interest.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>241</td>
      <td>In the next century, American leaders</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>242</td>
      <td>will have to articulate for their public a con-</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>243</td>
      <td>cept of the national interest and explain</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>244</td>
      <td>how that interest is served in Europe and</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>245</td>
      <td>Asia by the maintenance of the balance of</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>246</td>
      <td>power. America will need partners to pre-</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

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273 In most other parts of the world, the state has preceded the nation; it was and often remains the principal element in

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327 world affairs altogether.

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347 How to Deal with Russia«

0347

or subhed tk

348 Geopolitically, America is an island off
349 the shores of Eurasia, whose resources and
350 population far exceed those of the U.S. The
351 domination by a single power of either Eu-
352 rope or Asia remains a good definition of
353 strategic danger for America, Cold War or
354 no Cold War. Such a grouping would have
355 the capacity to outstrip America economi-
cally and, in the end, militarily. That dan-
ger would have to be resisted even were
356
357 the dominant power apparently benevo-
lent, for if the intentions ever changed,
358 America would find itself with a grossly di-
359
360 minished capacity for effective resistance
361
362 and a growing inability to shape events.

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394 should hedge its bets.

409 expansionism.

413 tension: attempts by neighbors to take ad-

414 vantage of the weakness of the imperial

417 Both processes are going on simultaneou-

418 ly in the successor states of the former Sovi-

419 et Union. Iran and Turkey are seeking to

420 increase their roles in the *largely* Muslim

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421 republics of Central Asia. But the dominant
422 geopolitical thrust has been Russia's at-
423 tempt to restore its pre-eminence in all the
424 territories formerly controlled from Mos-
425 cow. In the name of peacekeeping, Russia
426 seeks to re-establish some form of Russian
427 tutelage, and the U.S., focusing on the
428 goodwill of a ``reformist'' government and
429 reluctant to embrace a geopolitical agenda,
430 has thus far acquiesced. It has done little to
431 enable the successor republics <---> other than
432 the Baltic states <---> to achieve international
433 acceptance. Visits there by senior Ameri-
434 can officials are few and far between; aid is
435 minimal. The activities of Russian troops
436 on their territory, or even their presence, is
437 rarely challenged.
438 This is in part because America has
439 been dealing with the anticommunist and
440 the anti-imperialist revolutions as if they
441 were a single phenomenon. In fact, they
442 work in opposite directions. The anticom-
443 munist revolution has enjoyed substantial
444 support throughout the territory of the for-
445 mer Soviet Union. The anti-imperialist
446 revolution, directed against domination by
447 Russia, is widely popular in the new non-
448 Russian republics and extremely unpopu-
449 lar in the Russian Federation. Russian

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450 leadership groups have historically perceived their state in terms of a ``civilizing'' mission; the overwhelming majority of 451
452 Russia's leading figures <--> whatever their political persuasion <--> refuse to accept the collapse of the Soviet Empire or the legitimacy of the successor states, especially of 453
454
455
456
457 Ukraine, the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy.
458 [Even] Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, when writing about ridding Russia of the incubus of 459
460 unwilling foreign subjects, urged the retention by Moscow of a core group of 461
462 Ukraine, Belarus, and almost half of Kazakhstan <--> nearly 90% of the former 463
464
465
466 even the reformist Russian government of Boris Yeltsin has maintained Russian armies on the territory of most of the former 467
468
469 Soviet republics <--> all members of the United Nations <--> often against the express wish 470
471 of the host government. These military forces have participated in the civil wars of 472
473
474 several of the republics. Long-term prospects for peace will be influenced by Russian reform, but short-term prospects will 475
476 depend on whether Russian armies can be induced to stay at home. 477
478
Russia is bound to have a special securi-

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491 ship's goodwill.

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508 foreign policy, for this will have the practical result of forcing it to pay a heavier price
509 later on if it is lured into courses of action
510 from which there is no retreat. The veterans of Russia's internal struggles are not
511 blushing novices whose internal balances
512 will be unhinged by realistic dialogue.
513 They are quite capable of comprehending a
514 policy based on mutual respect of each other's
515 international interests. In fact, they are likely to understand such a calculus better than
516 appeals to an abstract and distant
517 utopianism.
518 Integrating Russia into the international system has two components which must
519 be kept in balance: influencing Russian attitudes and affecting Russian calculations.
520 Generous economic assistance and technical advice is necessary to ease the pains of
521 transition, and Russia should be made welcome in institutions which foster economic, cultural, and political cooperation. But
522 Russian reform will be impeded, not
523 helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of historic Russian imperial pre-
524 tensions. The independence of the new republics, recognized after all by the U.N.,
525 must not be tacitly downgraded by acquiescence in Russian military moves on their
526

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537 soil.
538 American policy toward Russia should
539 be geared to permanent interests, not to
540 the fluctuations of Russian domestic poli-
tics. If American foreign policy makes Rus-
541
542 sian domestic politics its top priority, it will
543 become the victim of forces essentially out
544 of its control and lose all criteria for judg-
545 ment.
546 The new Russian leadership is entitled
547 to understanding for the anguishing pro-
548 cess of trying to overcome two generations
549 of communist misrule. It is not entitled to
550 be handed the sphere of influence that
551 tsars and commissars have coveted all
552 around Russia's vast borders for 300 years.
553 If Russia is to become a serious partner in
554 building a new world order, it must be
555 ready for the disciplines of stability as well
556 as for its benefits.
557
558 Managing Europe«
559 The architects of the Atlantic Alliance
560 would have been incredulous had they
561 been told that victory in the Cold War
562 would raise doubts about the future of their
563 creation. They took it for granted that the
564 prize for victory in the Cold War was a last-
565 ing partnership. *But the Alliance* has been

0558 or subhed tk

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566 marking time since the collapse of commu-
nism. Downgrading the U.S. relationship
567 with Europe has become all too fashion-
568
569 able. Yet without its Atlantic ties, America
570 would find itself in a world of nations with
571 which it has few moral bonds or common
572 traditions. In these circumstances, Ameri-
573 ca would be obliged to conduct a pure Re-
574 alpolitik, which is essentially incompatible
575 with the American tradition.

576 Part of the reason for the decline is that
577 NATO has come to be taken for granted as
578 part of a landscape that needs no further
tending. The generation of American lead-
579 ers that has reached prominence in the last
580 decade and a half has been drawn mostly
581 from the South and West, where there are
582 fewer emotional and personal ties to Eu-
583 rope than among the old Northeastern es-
584 tablishment. Moreover, American liberals
585 have frequently felt let down by democrat-
586 ic allies who practice a policy of national in-
587 terest rather than of collective security and
588 reliance on international law; they cite
589 Bosnia and the Middle East as examples. At
590 the same time, the isolationist wing of
591 American conservatism has been tempted
592 to turn its back on what it disdains as Eu-
593 rope's Machiavellian relativism and
594

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595 selfishness.

602 troops were on the ground and American

606

607

609

610

613

615

621 historic fears of Russian expansionism, especially in the former satellite states of

622

623

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624 Eastern Europe. The emergence of a uni-
fied Germany compounds these fears.
625
626 Aware that the two Continental giants have
627 historically either carved up their neigh-
bors or fought battles on their territory, the
628
629 countries located between them dread the
630 emerging security vacuum; hence their in-
tense desire for American protection by
631
632 joining NATO.

633 In the years ahead, all the traditional
634 Atlantic relationships will change. Europe
635 will not feel the previous need for Ameri-
636 can protection and will pursue its econom-
637 ic self-interest much more aggressively;
638 America will not be willing to sacrifice as,
639 much for European security and will be
640 tempted by isolationism in various guises;
641 in due course, Germany will insist on the
642 political influence to which its military and
643 economic power entitle it and will not be so
644 emotionally dependent on American mili-
tary and French political support.

646 The great achievement of the postwar
generation of American and European
647
leaders was their recognition that, unless
648
649 America was organically involved in Eu-
650 rope, it would be obliged to involve itself
651 later under circumstances far less favor-
652 able to both sides of the Atlantic. That is

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682 West European traditions. This is especially true of the Visegrad countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Without ties to Western Europe and Atlantic institutions, these will become a no-man's-land between Germany and Russia. To become economically and politically viable, they need the European Union; and, for security, they look to the Atlantic Alliance. In truth, membership in one institution implies membership in the other.
693 Since most members of the European Union are members of NATO, and since it is inconceivable that they would ignore attacks on one of their members after European integration has reached a certain point, membership in the European Union will lead to at least de facto extension of the NATO guarantee.
701 The American objection to NATO membership for the Visegrad countries is one of principle. Going back to Wilson's historical objection to alliances <---> because they were based on the expectation of confrontation <---> President Clinton offered his alternative vision at last January's NATO summit. Explaining why the United States did not favor the admission of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia,

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723 it.

734 Central Europe.

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775 and economic projects would in-

776 creasingly dominate the East-West

777 relationship.

778

779 Relating to Asia

0779

or subhed tk

784 in 1993. But the term ``community'' applies to Asia in only the most limited sense,

785 for relationships in the Pacific are

786 fundamentally different from those in the

787 Atlantic area. Whereas the nations of Europe are grouped in common institutions,

788 the nations of Asia view themselves as distinct and competitive. Their relations bear

789 most of the attributes of the European balance-of-power system of the nineteenth century.

790 Any significant increase in strength by one of them is almost certain to evoke an offsetting maneuver by the

791

792

793

797 others.

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