IIGP Chairman Yasuhiro Nakasone

IIGP Executive Director Yukitsugu Nakagawa

FOREWORD

We are pleased to make available proceedings of the first symposium sponsored by the
International Institute for Global Peace.

The symposium, titled "The Changing East-West Relationship: How to Cope with the Soviet Union under General-Secretary Gorbachev," was presented at the Palace Hotel in Tokyo, Japan on March 17, 1989.

Our symposium speakers are two of the most eminent authorities on the East-West relationship today, Professor Robert O'Neill, of Oxford University and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State. Professor O'Neill analyzed the evolving East-West relations from the European standpoint, and Dr. Kissinger, from the perspective of the United States. A question and answer session followed, with chairman Yasuhiro Nakasone joining the two speakers.

The East-West relationship has been of critical importance to global stability for a number of years. Now that the relationship is undergoing significant changes under new leadership on both sides, careful examination of the changes and future courses of action is of even greater importance. We hope that this publication can contribute to this end.

Yukitsugu Nakagawa
Executive Director
International Institute for Global Peace

Edited by: Tsugumoto Aikawa
Sue Winski

© International Institute for Global Peace, 1989

International Institute for Global Peace
Sogo Kojimachi Daisan Building, 1-6 Kojimachi
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Telephone (03) 222-0711 Facsimile (03) 222-0710

THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP:
HOW TO COPE WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNDER GENERAL-SECRETARY GORBACHEV

Symposium Proceedings

Mr. Nakasone: I would like to thank you all for taking time out of your busy schedules to be with us here today for our first symposium on "The East-West Relationship: How to Cope with the Soviet Union under General-Secretary Gorbachev."

The International Institute for Global Peace was established in June of last year. Thanks to the support we have received from various sources our staff today numbers about thirty -- including twelve senior researchers, three researchers and support staff. The research work of the institute has begun. In our research, we are already seeing some promising results. We are establishing an extensive overseas network. The institute is still a baby and we are doing our best to help it grow into a thriving adult. I should like to count on your kind and continued support in these efforts.

Looking at the current international situation, I see four major problem areas. One area covers problems of covers economic imbalance -- trade friction, North-South problems, etc. A second large area is Third World debt. The total size of the debt is enormous, and it is imperative that all the countries of the world work together to devise measures for resolving these

difficulties.

A third area is East-West relations and the easing of tensions therein. Looking at the series of policies that have been announced by General-Secretary Gorbachev, we now seem to be facing a world situation that departs from patterns of the past. How are we to address these changes? In Japan, we have the additional problem of the northern islands. We must, therefore, watch the shifts in political currents around the world with great care and attentiveness, and plan our responses accordingly. CFE [Conventional Arms Forces in Europe], CSCE [Confidence and Security Building Measures], disarmament talks, arms control talks, and other major issues lie ahead of us in Europe. Security is a global issue; it cannot be divided. Thus, we in Japan must remain ever alert, watching the North-South as well as the East-West dimension, and address the East-West relationships from that perspective.

Lastly, there is the environmental issue -- a truly global matter. Increasingly, recently we hear of such phenomena as the greenhouse effect and deforestation. These global issues, concerning the whole of mankind, are taking center stage.

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I expect these matters to be taken up at the upcoming economic summit in Paris. These are issues that are relevant and of great concern not only to the summit players but to all people world-wide. To deal successfully with these issues will require cooperation on a global scale.

Reflecting the importance of East-West relations, we have brought here today from the United States and Europe two of the foremost authorities on the subject. I should like to thank Professor O'Neill and Dr. Kissinger for coming such a long way to be with us this afternoon.

Professor O'Neill was born in Australia. After finishing his university in Australia, he continued his studies at Oxford University, where he is currently a professor. He formerly headed the well-known International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. I had the pleasure of giving a lecture at IISS when I was prime minister, and Professor O'Neill was the head of that institute at that time. Our friendship has continued from that time. Professor O'Neill has also been very hospitable to many Japanese who have visited IISS. He is a specialist in history of war. Recently he has written on disarmament issues, in particular, U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the northeast Asia-Pacific area. He has tremendous in-depth knowledge of this subject. I have great respect for him and I am greatly interested in what he has to say. I think what he has to say is very

important for us all.

Dr. Kissinger needs no introduction. Our friendship dates back to July of 1953 when I attended the International Summer Seminar at Harvard University where Dr. Kissinger was my teacher. Even now, whenever I see him, I still address him as "My dear professor." It was about a year ago that I met Dr. Kissinger and reminded him about the duty of a professor to help his students and he agreed.

Dr. Kissinger's views are of great importance in the world today, and his thoughts have an important influence on the new American administration as well. We are very fortunate that Dr. Kissinger was able to be with us today. I am sure you already know about his background, including the fact that he is a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Without further ado, I would like to proceed with the program, and I look forward to a very active and lively discussion as well. I am not going to deliver a speech today, but as you leave the symposium you will receive a package containing a copy of my prepared text which will take the place of my speech. I look forward to a brisk discussion -- we have set aside ample time for that purpose, and would most appreciate your kind participation. Thank you very much.

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Mr. Saeki: The first speaker is Professor O'Neill, who will speak for about one half-hour.

## Professor O'Neill:
A COMPLEX CHALLENGE

The seriousness of the subject that I have been asked to address today was emphasized by a headline in The Times on the day when I began to write these remarks. "US DEEPLY TROUBLED BY NATO ALLIES' VIEW OF GORBACHEV" was the message. A difficult period for trans-Atlantic relations, and also for intra-European relations, is clearly upon us. It has been foreseen for some considerable time but we were saved from it last year largely by the distracting effect of the US presidential elections. Now that they are behind us the Alliance faces one of its periodic proving tests.

It would be an exaggeration to lay the blame entirely at the door of Mikhail Gorbachev. Even if Leonid Brezhnev himself were still presiding over an extended age of stagnation, it would be the season for tensions to rise between the United States and its European allies. There is an intrinsic tension in this relationship which is perfectly understandable: that which always exists between a protecting and a protected partner. At times this divisive force is strengthened by others such as recriminations over how the joint burden is to be shared, what combination of military and political pressures should be brought to bear on the Warsaw Pact, whether these pressures should be increased

or decreased and how the individual policies of NATO states towards the Soviet Union should be shaped. When administrations change in Washington and a vigorous new team of officials comes to the helm, it is a time for reckoning with the allies and having differences out with them. It is also a time when the allies make clear their own views on whatever shortcomings, they saw in the previous administration in the hope that the newcomers will prove more amenable. Policy reviews take place and accustomed but imperfect old arrangements are vulnerable to new criticisms. If relations with the Soviet Union are not in bad condition, exerting a cohesive force of their own, the tendency for differences to be clearly and strongly put is all the greater. This does not mean of itself that the Alliance is in mortal danger. Rather it is a time for focusing very closely on the problem of how to overcome the differences and put relations on a sound course for the life of the new administration.

The Alliance has been through difficult days on other occasions and it has survived through having a remarkably durable sense of common purpose, aided by the magnanimity, the generosity in spirit and the courage that have been shown by many of its leaders in the past. One thinks back to the great early days of Acheson, Bevin, Schuman and Spaak, to Adenauer for his role in creating strength and stability out of the chaos and demoralization of war ruins, enabling the Federal Republic to play a vital role at the geographic centre of the line

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of confrontation which has divided Europe for
so long. We recall the way in which the
Alliance responded to the opportunities of the
early 1970s, guided by the philosophy of the
Harmel report and led by a notable generation
during the Nixon and Ford Administrations.
More recently we have seen how it passed the
difficult tests of the twin-track decision of 1979,
the gas pipeline dispute of 1982, the
deployment of INF and the years of standing
firm in the face of unacceptable Soviet arms
control proposals, until they saw the wisdom of
changing them. There were many points at
which the Alliance could have foundered or
divided but overall it has shown itself equal to
the challenges of an overtly hostile or
threatening Soviet Union.

The challenge the Alliance faces today is of a
more complex kind. First and foremost,
alongside all the more familiar problems
mentioned above, is the divisive effect of a
much more adroit Soviet leadership. As
Secretary of State James Baker has recently
seen at first hand, Gorbachev is having a
powerful impact on Western European, and
particularly West German, perceptions of how
they should pursue their security interests in
future.

A second new factor which needs special
consideration is the growth of European
economic and political cohesion which has
motivated the advance towards the single
market of 1992. These trends will not stop at

that point. A more closely integrated Western
Europe will almost certainly become more
influential, and can wield that influence wisely or
unwisely. Europe will have greater potential in
economic, political and security terms. It will
generate more powerful waves in the
international community and will have to pay
more attention to the ways in which it uses its
influence. Special care will be necessary so
that a stronger Europe does not result in a
weaker Alliance. Despite the security linkages
which exist in Europe, particularly the WEU,
there is nothing in prospect which can replace
the Alliance as an effective guarantor of
European security.

A third factor, not so new but of increasing
importance, is the global nature of Western
interests, economic, political and military, which
strengthens the need to work together with
other friends in framing policies for dealing with
the new Soviet challenge. It makes increasingly
little sense to analyse the major problems of
East-West relations exclusively in a narrow
NATO-Warsaw Pact framework. Gorbachev has
shown with great agility the global nature of his
own outlook and we know from his Vladivostok
and Krasnoyarsk speeches of 1986 and 1988
that he attaches special importance to
improving Soviet relations with Japan and
China. Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze
has demonstrated a formidable ability to
implement the new Soviet foreign policy
programme on a world-wide basis. In addition
the growing interdependence between the

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major developed economies emphasizes further
the need for a common approach to East-West
relations to be worked out between the United
States, Western Europe and Japan. The very
strength of their different particular international
interests makes this goal more difficult to
achieve, but the more prominent political role
which Japan has played on the international
scene in recent years is welcome evidence of
the importance this country's leaders give to
the development of the necessary joint
approach.

ISSUES FOR ACTION

What then is to be done? Let me outline some
thoughts on the six main issues for action that
suggest themselves. The coincidence of the
trends and problems that I have been
describing suggests that the West and Japan
must undertake a major reappraisal of their
policies for dealing with the Soviet Union. This
does not necessarily mean a total dismantling
of existing guidelines. The basic philosophy of
the Harmel Report, namely the pursuit of ways
in which to decrease tensions with the Soviets
while keeping the West's guard strong, still has
much merit. However the ways in which we
apply that philosophy will need careful attention
and we may also find that it needs extension
and supplementation through a more global
approach than seemed justified in 1967.

REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES
AND CAPABILITIES

The starting point for such a reappraisal must
surely be the nature of the Soviet Union and
the problems and challenges it will present in
the coming decade or two. Analysis must take
into account not only the changes wrought by
Gorbachev and the potential of his continued
success but also the possibility that reform will
fail and the Soviet Union will revert to
something like its old form, not exactly as it was
under Brezhnev, but more abrasive than at
present. This does not mean that the West
should change nothing for fear that the old
bear may re-emerge: indeed failure on the part
of the West to make adjustments may increase
the probability that Soviets will become more
difficult to live with. It does suggest however
that the West should keep intact its capabilities
to raise its guard quickly in response to a more
rigid Soviet position.

The great thing that Gorbachev has done for
the Soviet Union is to have abandoned openly
the old pretence that it was on the way to
becoming a true super-power. The mismatch
between means and ends is now a matter for
everyday discussion and wide consensus in the
Soviet Union, embracing both moderates and
conservatives. If the Soviet Union is not to be
marginalised in all dimensions including the
military, it needs to improve its technological
capabilities. Hence it needs *perestroika*. But
the extent to which *perestroika* will run and the

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purposes it will serve are far from clear. What we can see is that Gorbachev is choosing another route which can lead either to a stronger capacity to hegemonize or to a more normal membership of international society, with substantial de-emphasis of military and ideological confrontation. If one takes some of Gorbachev's formal statements at face value, particularly those in his book *perestroika*, his goal would seem to be essentially to fulfil the prescriptions of Lenin more effectively. But things are rarely what they seem on the surface of Soviet politics and he may be simply cloaking himself in orthodoxy in order to achieve something of which Lenin would never have approved. We need to keep an open mind on either possibility.

Even more to the point, we need to remember most particularly that *perestroika* may fail. The task of re-educating and re-motivating people who have been conditioned by the Soviet system for over seventy years is extraordinarily challenging. It is all the more difficult when the available incentives will be more philosophical than material for a long time to come. Reports on what *perestroika* has brought to Soviet workers in the past three years are cheerless: if anything things seem to have become worse, not better in terms of consumption goods and standards of living. To carry the process through to some kind of demonstrable success is going to call for remarkable persistence by the leadership and patience on the part of their followers.

And as controls on political expression have been relaxed, so the nationalities question has emerged with remarkable force and not a little agility on the part of those who are promoting the cause of greater freedom from central direction. Are we likely to see the growth of what amounts to individual foreign policies under the control of the governments of the republics? Will that prospect not arouse feelings of vulnerability within the central leadership, if not in Gorbachev himself, which will lead to a reimposition of the old strict controls on nationalist behaviour?

Gorbachev's encouragement of reform in Eastern Europe poses similar threats to his grand design. A loosening of the bonds of control and dependence will permit a degree of self expression by the allies of the Soviet Union which may be difficult to reconcile with its perceived requirements of security. And the levels of success in reform achieved throughout the Warsaw Pact states are bound to differ considerably. Failed reform in Czechoslovakia will not necessarily mean failed reform in Hungary. While failed reform in the Soviet Union will carry major consequences for reform in Eastern Europe, the converse almost certainly will not apply. What seems most likely is that Hungary will do much better because of its more flexible system and East Germany will also do well out of its privileged access to the European market through West Germany. The other states of Eastern Europe will flounder in difficulties of various kinds ranging from the

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inept rule of the Ceacescu family in Rumania to the special kind of mess that the Poles have created. There will be a growing divergence in their fortunes which will encourage divergence in their political attitudes towards each other, the Soviet Union and the West. Like NATO, the Warsaw Pact will have to face some formidable internal problems and challenges in the coming years. These challenges can combine with the others mentioned above to derail *perestroika* before many years are out.

For all these reasons we need to approach Gorbachev's Soviet Union with a considerable degree of skepticism. We cannot assume that all the things that we would like to see happening there will in fact come to pass. We do not know that Gorbachev will retain the spectacular freedom to manoeuvre that he has enjoyed to date. The great flexibility that he has shown in arms control strategy seems unlikely to last much longer. Equally we cannot make sound policies on the certain basis that Gorbachev or *perestroika* or both will fail.

What the West has to do, and I include Japan very much in that term, is to equip itself with an array of practicable policy options ranging from measures to encourage the process of reform in the Soviet Union through to ways of handling a disappointed and more hostile state which proved unable to reform itself. In this process we should not rule out of our thinking the possibility that a reformed Soviet Union could

pass security problems to the West just as much as an unreformed one. This is unlikely because successful reform will tend to encourage interdependence and cooperation, but it is not of itself impossible. Hence we need particularly to safeguard our own essential means of defence and be cautious about the technology we transfer to the Soviet Union either knowingly or unknowingly.

In this context of a changing Soviet Union, what can the West do to help itself? First it must ensure that it has agreement within its own ranks on what its political goals should be.

## THE POLITICAL GOALS OF THE WEST

It is extremely important that the continuing need for a cohesive and strong alliance is recognized by all on whose support it has to rely. I refer in this not so much to government attitudes, although I wonder sometimes in the cases of a partner like Greece, as to public opinion. Glasnost and the "Charm Offensive" have had a clearly discernible effect on the political debates in most countries of the Alliance, including the United States. Hope leads people often to be less mindful of the prospects of failure for *perestroika* than they should be. Governments will need to make special efforts to sustain public support for the Alliance and its goals, and if they are not to undercut their own efforts, they must take care not to cause each other sudden embarrassment. President Reagan's failure to

7

consult his allies before announcing the SDI programme or appearing at Reykjavik to be willing to negotiate all of the United States's nuclear weapons away are cases in point. The failure of the Kohl Government to control chemical exports to Libya is another.

Going hand in hand with full consultation is the need for fair sharing of the burden. There can be no two ways about it: the European allies and Japan are going to have to take up a larger share if the Alliance is not to depreciate politically as well as militarily. The situation calls for steady rather than dramatic responses by way of increasing defence expenditures. The United States is not about to drop its bundle and run away, but the less response it perceives on the allied front to the call for a more equitable sharing, the stronger will be the pressures for unilateral action in the Congress, and the worse will be the problem when allies have to deal with it.

One of the motivating factors behind *perestroika* has been the force of the example of the West, not only in the economic and technological dimensions but also in that of the freedom guaranteed by law which is the basis of Western societies. While the Soviets are not about to create such a society, the way in which we maintain and develop our own system sets standards which can have an effect within the USSR, particularly at the present time. Where we see those standards flagrantly violated in the Soviet Union we should voice

our protests very directly to them. The fact that Western psychiatrists have recently been invited to inspect some Soviet mental hospitals does not mean that psychiatric abuse in the USSR has been abolished. It does suggest that the Soviets wish to regain international acceptance in the psychiatric field and are willing to accept some norms in the process. These considerations apply in other areas of human rights and we should speak plainly about them. At the same time we must be sure that our own house is properly in order. The way in which we observe the basic principles of free, open, democratic societies is particularly relevant at this juncture.

## MAKING EFFECTIVE USE OF NEW OPENINGS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

While the military side of the East-West relationship has changed relatively slightly as yet, opportunities for political and other forms of contact with the Soviets have increased dramatically. The impact of Glasnost is more evident than that of *perestroika* at present, and there are significant opportunities for engaging them in discussion, on both official and non-official levels. It is important that such discussion should be a real exchange of ideas, not just a matter of going through the motions. I sometimes wonder at the apparent orthodoxy of unorthodoxy among some of the Russians with whom I have spoken in the past two years. Are they telling us what they really think or only what they think we want to hear? Only time will

8

tell, but let us probe their thinking as rigorously
as we can and engage them directly, without
special restraint just because they are more
responsive to Westerners at present. This is a
period of special opportunity to get through to
the minds of intelligent people in the USSR and
give them a deeper insight into what it is like to
belong to an open society.

They may come to see that there is more merit
in our system than they had previously been
allowed to see. In this I am not forecasting any
convergence of our two systems, and even if
that were to be the case I do not believe that it
would eliminate the security problem in the
West's relations with the Soviet Union. But we
need to take full advantage of the opportunity
offered by greater openness of contact with the
Soviets to re-direct the thrust of East-West
competition from the military field into those of
politics and economics.

The West has to be careful in this situation that
it does not engage the Soviets in self-
contradictory ways. While a certain amount of
pluralism does no harm, and can in fact be
beneficial, it will be important to let the Soviets
see that there is unity on fundamentals, on
what the West stands for and what it will not
stand. The West must learn to speak
consistently, although of course not identically,
on its objectives and standards. We are under
inspection in a more serious way than before
Gorbachev. We should also pay more heed to
the need for intra-Western consultation and

sharing of information on contacts with the
Soviets.

WESTERN MILITARY POLICIES

Soviet military policies are now beginning to
observe a stricter discipline of cost-
effectiveness. It is impossible to tell exactly
what the military impact of the recently
announced unilateral cuts in personnel and the
defence budget will be, but clearly it will be a
smaller and more modern force, probably
evolving in the same direction as NATO, with
greater reliance on technology and less on
man-power. This does not mean that NATO
can relax. The level of Soviet conventional
superiority has been such that they still will
have a very considerable edge if the reductions
are fully implemented. Whether they will be
fully carried through will be extremely difficult for
the West to tell for quite some time.

At least Gorbachev has created the
expectations that his forces will be going down
in size rather than up, and that their rate of
procurement of new equipment will also decline.
This is surely preferable to his saying that
defence expenditure must rise and that the
forces must be enlarged. But it is no ground
for the West to decrease its own level of
defence capability other than through
negotiated reductions applying to both sides.
The planned modernization programmes of
NATO members and Japan must continue if the
West is to retain credibility in the coming

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decade. The proposed removal of Soviet armoured formations and assault river crossing equipment from Eastern Europe, will, if implemented, reduce the danger of short-warning-time attack. It is to be hoped that this will prove to be the first step down a long path to enable substantial bilateral conventional reductions to be achieved in Europe, but there is no way of being certain at this point that it will. NATO has all too little by way of conventional forces with which to trade for Soviet reductions, except in a highly asymmetric way. A firm commitment to existing Western modernization programmes is a useful incentive for the Soviets to be serious in their pursuit of agreed reductions. However it is one thing to advocate this policy: it is much more difficult for Western Governments at this time to convince public opinion that it is sensible.

On the principal element of controversy in NATO's modernization programme, that of the follow-on to the Lance short range missile system, great delicacy will be called for both in Bonn and Washington. Public opposition to deployment of new systems in the Federal Republic is strong with 68% against and only 14% for, according to a 1988 poll. Yet without such modernization NATO's theatre nuclear capabilities would decline to bombs, artillery shells and stand-off missiles, should those missiles be deployed. This would be a poor match for the 1432 Soviet short-range missile launchers now deployed and would weaken deterrence in a theatre sense while leaving the

Soviets with substantial conventional superiority.

If Chancellor Kohl were seen to accept deployment of new systems simply in response to heavy pressure from Washington, he could be seriously weakened at next year's elections. Of course standing firm and resisting such pressures could do him some good domestically, but the costs in terms of Congressional attitudes would be high. It is to be hoped that the framework of NATO's soon-to-be completed Comprehensive Concept, better known as by its German name as the *gesamtkonsept*, for modernization and arms control will put the West German Government in a stronger position. If Kohl's acceptance of a commitment to deploy were to be linked to early negotiations on reduction of short range nuclear systems, Foreign Minister Genscher might go along and public opposition might be mollified, but such an arrangement would be opposed by both the United States and the Unite Kingdom as likely to lead to a third nuclear zero. The precise terms of the *gesamtkonsept* therefore will be extremely important not only for the modernization of NATO's short range systems but also for the future cohesion of the Alliance.¹

In terms of regional intervention, recent events such as the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the greater willingness of the Vietnamese to withdraw forces from Cambodia suggest that the Soviet authorities are prepared to write off costly and unsuccessful ventures. Gorbachev

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clearly does not wish to squander his rubles on
vain causes in troubled regions. This is not to
say that the Soviets are abandoning the
competition for influence in the Third World, but
they have down-graded the military as a means
of securing influence and are focusing more on
political and economic approaches. They may
not always follow this line, and the United
States, and those of its European allies that
have forces suitable for use outside the NATO
area, should maintain their capabilities. But the
nature of security problems in the Third World
seems less likely to be of a militarily
interventionist nature in the coming years than
in the past decade or two. It is too much to
hope that wars will soon become a thing of the
past in developing countries too, but at least
they may be confined to clashes between local
interests and forces. The role preferred by
outside powers, where they are involved at all,
will be that of logistic, economic and technical
support -- still costly forms of intervention but at
least once where the West has greater
strengths. But the West needs to think hard
about how it can continue to help strengthen
regional security in the new context and to
devote resources to this end. In this regard in
particular there is a major role for Japan to play
through the provision of increased economic
assistance, including freer technology transfer
to close friends such as the ASEAN countries
and more balanced trade flows. But for such
action to be possible, more of a constituency
for such assistance has to be built up in Japan
itself.

WESTERN ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

While NATO's nuclear modernization problems
are complex, they pale into insignificance
alongside those of strategic and conventional
arms control policies. At the strategic level the
START negotiations have already made
considerable progress but their results to date
have been criticized both by Dr. Henry
Kissinger and General Brent Scowcroft as
destabilizing. They see the current US ICBM
force becoming more vulnerable under the
proposed reductions because the ratio of Soviet
warheads to American silos could increase from
the current three to one to over four to one.
Their concerns emphasize the deficiencies of
the current US strategic force structure and the
need for deciding what its future shape should
be before entering into firm commitments
through new arms control treaties. If the US
were to build a single- or double- warhead
missile such as Midgetman and down-load
some of its Minuteman III missiles, the Soviets
would have to strike at many more targets to
take out the force. They could still do it under
the currently agreed START reductions, but it
could be made much more difficult than at
present by combining mobile missiles with a
static force distributed over many more silos.
Until the Bush Administration knows what the
Congress will permit, however, it is extremely
difficult to design an effective arms control
strategy. The current review being undertaken
by the Administration will be very important for
Western security as a whole and needs to be

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carried through rigorously.

The review will also have to consider where the United States ought to stand on contested issues such as the verification arrangements for mobile missiles, missile loadings, dual-capable systems, missile testing and missile manufacture; the future of the ABM treaty and the SDI programme; counting rules for air-launched cruise missiles; and Soviet pressures for inclusion of sea-launched cruise missiles within the START negotiations. This is not the work of five minutes and allies will have to show patience while the review is underway. At the same time the Administration ought not to forget that Gorbachev will be making political capital out of prolonged delay in resuming the negotiations, hence allied governments must be kept closely in contact while the review is running.

In the conventional field the going will also be difficult, probably more so than in the nuclear, because of the asymmetry between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and the need for highly intrusive verification arrangements. Gorbachev's unilateral cuts announced last December may pave the way for further moves that the Soviet military must find unpalatable. But equally he may call a halt to such actions and allow what he has already proposed to work on Western public opinion in order to achieve some reciprocity without the need for formal negotiations. In the negotiations NATO is right to concentrate on the major offensive systems

where the Soviets have substantial superiority, that is tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. What is less clear is the deal NATO will have to give the Soviets in order to achieve these cuts. It is difficult to believe that it will not become politically important to allied governments that there should be a compromise, rather than allowing the negotiations to stall for years, and nuclear capable aircraft seem to be the most likely candidates for adding to the mix in due course. Significant NATO troop reductions will be very difficult to achieve without diminishing stability. NATO has so few divisions to cover its front that removal of even two or three would tend to open up gaps that the Pact could still exploit.

While the multilateral forum of the coming conventional arms negotiations will give the allies a strong voice in the proceedings, there will remain a need for extensive consultation with the United States on both conventional and nuclear arms control issues. While Japan is not a participant in the talks, their outcome clearly will bear on its security and it must also play a role through full consultation.

## TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICIES

In conjunction with these more military oriented policies, Western states will have to consider how they will regulate other forms of contact with the Soviet Union, particularly in the fields of trade and technology transfer. If not the Soviets will be able to sidestep the effects of

12

arms control measures, exploiting Western inventions for our own discomfort. But regulation of this field cannot be made totally non-permissive without harming Western interests, and in the light of different behaviour shown by the Soviet Union, the West will need to consider how far and in what ways it might modify existing trade and technology transfer policies. But before we can be reasonably sure that the Soviets will not simply waste much of what they acquire from us we might do something towards helping to improve their management techniques. Once some real progress is seen in this area then it may be prudent to grant other assistance in the form of finance and technology.

## IN CONCLUSION

In trying to reach agreement on these six policy areas, the United State, its NATO allies and Japan face a very difficult task, both in deciding between themselves how to handle Mr. Gorbachev and then in building the necessary public support for these measures within their

own societies. To carry this task through successfully will take as much devotion and magnanimity as at any time in the Alliance's history. There will be serious dangers of divisions between the United States and its allies, and perhaps even more so between the allies themselves. But, given the formidable nature of the Gorbachev challenge, we have a very strong incentive to work closely together in the best spirit of partnership.

We must dare to have new hopes and the vision to achieve them, while not forgetting the many hard lessons that we have learned in reaching our present position of strength and security. The coming years will be rich in challenge to those who analyse the East-West relationship and Western security policies. It is particularly encouraging therefore to see the International Institute for Global Peace established to provide more of an Asian-Pacific contribution to the dialogue which takes place between leading American and European bodies in this field. Those of us who work in this field in Europe wish it great success.

1. For fuller discussion of the nuclear modernization issue see Hans Binnendijk, NATO's Nuclear Modernization Dilemma. Survival, March-April 1989, pp 137-155.

[Editor's Note: The transcript of Professor O'Neill's remarks is taken directly from prepared text provided to IIGP.]

13

Mr. Saeki: Thank you so much for giving us a very enlightening talk on such a complicated and broad subject in such a limited time. Next we will hear from Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, Prime Minister Nakasone, Professor O'Neill. It is indeed a privilege to accept the invitation of Prime Minister Nakasone to address his new institute. Mr. Nakasone and I have known each other for thirty-five years, and we have been friends for a long time, during which I think he has made significant contributions to relations between the United States and Japan. And I have learned a great deal from him, having enormous confidence in his role in international affairs. Therefore, it is a special privilege for me to be here today and to be speaking at the opening session of his new institute.

I am supposed to discuss the subject of East-West relations, primarily from the American perspective. Let me say that I essentially agree with the preceding speaker, who has already given us a very good description of many of the practical issues facing our relations with the Soviet Union. I would like, therefore, to address now the more conceptual, or rather philosophical, issues and to illustrate these with some concrete examples.

The most difficult problem for the United States in dealing with East-West relations, or for that matter with any foreign policy issue, is that the

United States really has relatively little experience with the conduct of foreign policy in the same way other nations have had to conduct their foreign policies. Whenever I visit Asia I am struck by the difference in perspective between nations that have had an uninterrupted history of some 2000 years as opposed to our nation which has had a history of only 200 years. When I visit China and hear my Chinese hosts speak of their dynasties, it is always brought home to me that most each of them lasted longer than the entire history of the United States. And, of course, this country (Japan) has behind it thousands of years of uninterrupted history. A Japanese friend asked me this morning about Japanese defense and I said, "Look, you've been defending yourselves for 2000 years without the advice of the United States, during 1800 of which we didn't even exist. So why don't you make up your own mind about the requirements of your defense, and keep it a Japanese problem. It's not an American problem."

Not only is America's history shorter than that of most other nations, but America's experience with foreign policy is even shorter than our history. Until 1945 the United States had no daily involvement in world events. After 1945 the United States had an atomic monopoly, and a huge economic superiority; so that for the United States during much of the post-war period, foreign policy was a case of identifying a threat and then overwhelming it with resources. It is only in the last twenty years,

14

(LC)

since the Vietnam War, that the United States
has had to face what every other nation that I
know of has always faced throughout its
history; namely, that however powerful it may
be, its resources are limited in relation to all the
things it could be doing at any moment of time
and to all the challenges which might arise.

Therefore, America is facing for the first time in
its national history --- except for the first twenty
years --- the problem of establishing priorities,
and establishing these priorities on the basis of
assumptions which cannot be proven true at
the time you make them. So much depends on
assessments which only the future can prove or
disprove. So you should understand that what
you hear from me is an assessment and not a
demonstration. And that the nature of the
American debate is that there does not yet exist
a consensus on an assessment. If one studies
British, or French, or for that matter Chinese
foreign policy over the centuries, the concept
that a reassessment is necessary every time a
new government comes into office would be
unimaginable. The basic premises of a foreign
policy would be presumed, since national
interest does not change every four or eight
years. What might be reassessed are the
tactics for achieving it.

There does not yet exist a standard notion of
the American national interest. Enormous
attention is paid to personal, or otherwise
essentially subjective factors; I have said on
more than one occasion that many Americans

treat foreign policy as if it were a branch of
psychoanalysis or theology. As if one can
reduce foreign policy to personal relationships,
or a struggle between good and evil. This is
why in wartime America historically strives for
unconditional surrender, believing in the
ultimate conversion of the opponent, as if a
nation can rise above its history or its culture
through a spontaneous act of will.

This seems to me the fundamental problem
which Gorbachev poses for America, and in a
way, for Europe. Much less so for Asia. The
fundamental challenge of Gorbachev is that he
is such a novel type of Soviet leader. He has
gone to university. He is more familiar with
technology. He did not go through the purges
or the Second World War. He is personally so
much more attractive than the previous Soviet
leaders. And he has announced many policies
that are, at least on a tactical level, and maybe
on a substantive level (though it is too early to
tell), quite new. Now this has had considerable
appeal in America for the reasons I just gave,
and in Europe for another reason. The
Europeans have had a long tradition of national
foreign policy -- except for Germany, whose
came late. But many Europeans have
complicated domestic situations and therefore
prefer to push into the next administration the
problems they might be dealing now. (Mrs.
Thatcher always excepted, since she expects to
be there for a long time). For one can always
escape one's dilemmas as a political leader by
making favorable assumptions about the future,

15

which is really another way of leaving the
problem to future generations.

In my view, this is less of a problem in Asia. I
do not have the impression that either
Japanese or Chinese leaders much care how
Mr. Gorbachev smiles, that he wears western
suits or conducts himself in a personally
charming manner. In both Japan and China,
my impression is that the leaders have a fairly
precise view of what they want and that they
relate progress to some concrete conditions:
Japan has stated the objective of its four
northern islands; and China has put forward
three conditions for various international
problems.

To return to my basic assignment, the American
problem is simply this: granting that Gorbachev
is a new personality, the question is to what
extent is his policy personal, and to what extent
does it reflect certain objective necessities that
any Soviet leader would have to carry out, if
with less panache, than he? I believe that
those who argue it is all due to one man are
selling the Western countries short, and I
include Japan, for these purposes, among the
Western countries. If everything is really due to
the personality of a single Soviet leader, we are
all in deep trouble because his term in office is
bound to be more or less short. At any rate, it
will end. Secondly, every Soviet leader has
been disavowed by his successor.

We are better off analyzing the objective forces

that have produced the current situation, rather
than to be preoccupied by the personality of
one man. In any event, I consider it an
extraordinary principle of diplomacy to be asked
to make concessions to the personality of a
leader that one would not have made to a less
obliging personality. I have never heard that in
diplomacy one should pay for individual
conduct. The coin of foreign policy is foreign
policy, and anyone who wants concessions
must show what he will change by the example
of his own conduct. This is the only reliable
basis for foreign policy.

I have met Mr. Gorbachev, once in the
presence of Mr. Nakasone. I certainly find him
interesting, intelligent, even amusing. On the
other hand, I do not believe he was selected for
the entertainment of visiting Western leaders.
His duty is to advance the interests of his
country, and our duty is to advance the
interests of our countries and to discover
common interests. That is the basic
philosophy.

Now I also believe that there are certain
objective necessities that have produced this
change in Soviet conduct. One is the
economic situation in the Soviet Union, for the
Soviet economy is in systemic crisis and cannot
solve its problems within the existing structure.
This is different from a recession in the Western
model. It is a fact of the system of central
planning that the central leadership
paradoxically loses all control over the future.

16

It does not know what is really going on. There
is no market. There is no sense of cost, since
all prices are fixed, many of them at 1928
levels! There are no entrepreneurs. Managers
are politicians who negotiate a quota with a
planning mechanism and with the ministries, all
of whom have a vested interest in setting the
quota as low as possible because if they set
too ambitious a quota, all will go down
together. There is no incentive for innovation,
except in the military field where there is foreign
competition. Prime Minister Nakasone will
perhaps remember Mr. Gorbachev telling us
that there were hundreds of thousands --- or
millions, I don't remember exactly --- of pairs of
shoes in warehouses that nobody would buy.

So they have a huge structural problem. Unlike
China, which has an entrepreneurial tradition, in
which the central planning mechanism was
never as firmly established, and which has had
to recourse to overseas Chinese --- to Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan -- from whom it
could learn, there have been no such factors in
the Soviet Union. Gorbachev therefore has a
more serious problem than China, so one does
not have to ascribe to him Western pacifist
philosophies to think that he might be looking
forward to a period of peace.

Secondly, he faces an objective, international
(and logistical) problem. Every major country
contiguous to, or of close proximity to the
Soviet Union, is growing faster than the Soviet
Union, and by this I mean Japan, China, India,

Western Europe, and the United States. A
prudent leader could conclude that aggressive
policies have served to unite all these countries,
and that a continuation of aggressive policies
will only further tighten these bonds. A period
of relaxation of tensions is in the Soviet national
interest because it would stall a continuation of
this tacit coalition. So, in my view, we ought to
take Gorbachev seriously and not treat him as
if he were one of our Western professors
besotted by pacifist philosophy. We ought to
take him seriously as a statesman of a
significant country who has drawn some logical
conclusions.

And this becomes even more important when
one looks to other factors -- the history of the
Communist party leadership and the history of
Russia. Choirboys do not become leaders in
the Soviet Union. The penalty for failure in the
leadership struggle is brutal. If you want job
security in the Soviet Union you manage a
factory, where you cannot fail. And the history
of the Soviet Union, including a Russia under
czars and commissars, has been one of
uninterrupted expansion. From the Duchy of
Moscovy to the center of Europe and to the
shores of the Pacific, every significant country
bordering the Soviet Union or the Russian
Empire has been involved in a war with that
country. There are many explanations. For
one thing, the Soviet Union and the Russian
Empire have often been invaded. It is not so
strange that the Russian concept of security
should have boiled down to an attempt to

17

neutralize the surrounding states. Certainly it
has not been content with equilibrium. Now the
United States, on the other hand, has never
had to deal with equilibrium, being so powerful.
And yet, if I had to define the big foreign policy
problem of our period, I would say it is: Can
we negotiate a position of equilibrium with the
Soviet Union -- a balance of power in which
everybody's security is, in fact, augmented?
And this is what must be put into concrete
terms, which brings us to many of the issues
Professor O'Neill has already mentioned. I
would now like to address just a few of them.

First, what is Soviet strategy? I don't think they
know exactly what their strategy is at the
moment. But if one leafs through Soviet
theoretical journals, it seems to be the idea to
remove the fear of the Soviet Union, thereby
weakening America's relationship with her allies
in both Europe and Asia. From that point of
view, it is not so much a strategy of
coexistence as it is a strategy of political
change. On the other hand, the United States
has no vested interest in fearing the Soviet
Union; rather, we have an interest in realistic
assessment, and if the real causes of fear can
be removed, this is obviously in everyone's best
interests.

Professor O'Neill referred to the fact that I and
others have been critical of some of the Soviet
efforts to remove the fear. I have been critical
on two grounds. One, that too much emphasis
has been placed on the personal relationship of

leaders. I do not believe that foreign policy
should be based on personalities. Secondly, I
do not believe it is in the interest of the
Western countries to have nuclear weapons as
the only, or in any case principal, subject of
negotiations. Even if every agreement were
more or less balanced, because the West
depends more on nuclear weapons than the
East, the progressive de-legitimization of nuclear
weapons weakens the defensive position of the
West more than it does of the East, leaving
aside the additional problems that Professor
O'Neill mentioned, which would get us into too
esoteric a discussion for my purposes.

Now again I would distinguish what happens in
Europe from what happens in Asia. Both in
Europe and Asia there is a real imbalance of
conventional military force. However, for the
Soviet Union to destroy a country the size of
China or to launch an attack on an island
power like Japan would require an effort of
such massive proportions, that I believe a
balance in Asia is in fact closer at hand than it
has ever been in Europe. Europe is now
paying the price for decades of conceptual
neglect and having left too much to the United
States. If everything is left to the American
nuclear deterrent at a time of declining reliance
on nuclear weapons, a gap will open up and at
the present time the process of reductions of
conventional forces is raising two other issues.

First, there really does not exist a conceptual
basis for conventional disarmament. Everybody

18

talks about equal forces and defense
deployment, yet where in history does one find
any evidence that this has worked? Almost all
wars in Europe have been fought between
roughly equal forces. Most victories that I know
anything about in European wars (I haven't
studied Asian wars) have been achieved by
roughly equal forces. In fact, German forces in
the two world wars were, numerically, and in
terms of equipment, inferior to those of their
opponents on every front, but they succeeded
by concentration, generalship, and many
intangible elements. So, simply counting the
number of forces is no guarantee of deterrence.
Indeed, since the aggressor can concentrate
while the defender has to spread himself out,
there is an inherent advantage to the attack.

Secondly, even separating forces requires
analysis, whether it contributes to warning time,
or whether it really inhibits an attack. Besides,
adding to warning time is useful only if: (a) the
warning is taken seriously, which is rare; and
(b) if you can do something about it -- that is,
if you have units you can move forward. I don't
want to get too technical, but simply want to
point out that if we are serious about
conventional arms control in Europe, we need
a military doctrine about the defense of Europe
that everybody is practicing. And it will have to
be a very peculiar type of military doctrine,
since everybody is committed to reduction. If
reductions will in fact be negotiated, we need to
know not only what level is required today, but
whether every foreseeable level of reduction

can in fact maintain proper defense.

My experience of government, which I do not
believe has changed, is that whenever there is
a reduction people do not analyze what is left;
rather, they analyze the reduction itself. Then
they say: this reduction does not make any
appreciable difference. The reduction may not
make any difference but there must be some
point at which what is left does makes a
difference. I am saying that all this requires
some solid analytical work. And that is on the
purely military level. We have a political level
too, which is *perestroika*. It has already
produced major uncertainties within the Soviet
system and major demoralization of the
communist parties in Eastern Europe. After all,
when you hear from the Soviet leader that every
Soviet leader since Lenin has been either a
criminal or a fool, it does not exactly inspire
confidence in the historical validity of a system.

Now the result of this has been two-fold, and
neither has been very comforting for the Soviet
Union. In countries like Poland or Hungary, the
Communist Party has lost a great deal of
legitimacy. But even in a country like Eastern
Germany, which does not accept reform, the
result is that the East Germans argue that since
they never followed the Soviet model to begin
with, they should not have to follow its reforms
either. In other words, national communism.
Now to the extent that the Soviets succeed in
creating a neutralist sentiment in West Germany
and a nationalist sentiment in East Germany,
and to the extent that Eastern Europe is in

19

turmoil anyway, there will occur a political crisis
in Europe east of the Rhine. It is therefore
unavoidable that a political dialogue has to be
combined with arms control.

Now in America, whenever somebody does not
want to face an issue he pulls out an old
slogan, so I have been accused of wanting a
new Yalta. It stands to reason that what I am
proposing is to de-Yaltarize Europe by undoing
some of the consequences of Yalta, not to have
another Yalta. But it must be done in a way
that does not lead to an explosion, and that is
a challenge to which I am not giving an answer
in this lecture. But it requires dealing with yet
another Soviet proposal. Now the Soviets have
put forward the concept of a Europe from the
Urals to the Atlantic, which has been widely
welcomed in Europe as being innovative. I see
it as a symptom of Western escapism. How is
it possible to conceive of a Europe from the
Urals to the Atlantic? What happens to the
Soviet Union from the Urals to Vladivostock?
What would be its status? What it means, in
effect, is that Europe becomes an appendage
of the Soviet Union. Now some Europeans are
saying that Americans can have a room in this
"European home". How generous of them! Yet
it is inconceivable that the United States should
accept a lesser status in Europe than the Soviet
Union -- or a scenario in which the Soviet Union
is an organic part of Europe and the United
States is a visiting guest. What that implies is
the eventual dissociation of the United States
from Europe. I am not saying that the United

States needs any more superior status in
Europe than the Soviet Union. But this is an
important political issue. For whether the
European frontier begins at the Soviet-Polish
front or at the present West European border is
not just a theoretical problem. These are major
questions of policy affecting the very structure
of East-West relations.

To return to Asia, I think there is relatively
easier to conduct negotiations over here. That
is because Japan, it seems to me, has a clearly
articulated concept of its national interest.
Many people in the economic field would argue
that this concept of the national interest is
perhaps too clearly defined. I would never
accuse the Japanese of excessive sentimentality
in the conduct of their relations with foreigners -
- and I say that as a compliment, not as a
criticism. I think that China, too, has not
survived for 3000 years of uninterrupted history
by being short-sighted. And while everybody
seems to be fascinated by the Gorbachev visit
to Beijing, the reality is that the Chinese know
very well who expanded where in Asia in the
last century. They know the United States was
the least expansionist of all the counties they
have to deal with. We are also the farthest
away. I do not believe that the Chinese will
gamble their future on the goodwill of any
Soviet leader. Certainly the objective conditions
for a relaxation of tensions in Asia require less
complex decisions than in Europe.

20

Now let me get back my starting point. I think
Gorbachev has asked important questions.
When I stress that he has motives other than
personal goodwill, I mean it as a hopeful, not a
critical, comment. It is better for us that we do
not make of Gorbachev some sort of
supernatural being. It is not only better for us
psychologically, it is better for us in the day-to-
day conduct of foreign policy because it either
represents Soviet interests or it is built on
quicksand. Our obligation in the West is to
take what he says seriously, but to give it
meaningful content reflective of realistic
objectives protecting the legitimate security
interests of both sides. The Russian state and
the Soviet state are entitled to legitimate
security interests. They are not entitled to
impose their rule on every foreign country they
can reach ideologically or geographically.
Some of Gorbachev's proposals may have a
purely tactical objective and it is our duty to
turn them into a strategic and historic reality

that can be explored. I am not being
pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe that the
conditions that produced this peace offensive
are real. We do not have to accept the
definition of how to deal with it from the side in
the greatest trouble. We, the nations of the
West, should work together on a serious
concept and negotiate it in the years ahead,
and then I believe the conditions will exist, if not
for a permanent, for a long period of tranquility.
Thank you very much.

Mr. Saeki: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. It sounds to me that Dr. Kissinger's basic thinking is much the same as that of Professor O'Neill. Yet listening very carefully, it does seem that Dr. Kissinger is a bit more uncompromising in his approach to the Soviet Union. Could it be that there are slight differences in approach between them? You will have a chance to judge for yourselves in the question and answer session that follows.

21

Question and Answer Session

Dr. Inoki: It seems to me that the United States, with its technological superiority, has decisively won the Cold War. The Soviet Union lost the race due to the shortcomings of the command economy which were pointed out by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek in the 1920s. The Soviet Union cannot catch up with the West without abandoning the command economy. Therefore it seems to me the West had better do nothing, and just wait and see for five years or so. The West should not act quickly to take advantage of Soviet inferiority to settle the Middle Eastern problem. My question is -- am I too optimistic, or do you agree with my point?

Dr. Kissinger: I think you are essentially correct when you say that the West has won the Cold War. I think that Soviet ideology has lost its conviction, even in the Soviet Union and certainly more so, outside. And I think the balance of forces between the Soviet Union and the outside world will shift more and more against the Soviet Union if the outside world conducts itself with any degree of rationality. On the other hand, I do not believe it is possible to do nothing, because of public opinion, and because of the way governments now function. And also because the disintegration of an empire also creates huge

foreign policy problems. So I think the problem is how to manage this process in such a way that it does not lead to an explosion, rather, that it leads to a constructive outcome. But I agree with you that the West does not really need to get nervous, nor does it need to be so anxious.

Dr. O'Neill: Dr. Kissinger made the essential points. I think I would just add that our problem with the Soviet Union is not just the problem of the Cold War. The Cold War can go away, but we still can have a security problem that affects the West because of events inside the Soviet Union. And until we can really see that there is a major change firmly in place there, and there is a much more interdependent relationship between the Soviet Union and the West (it's going to be a long time), we still have to treat the Soviets as a potential security problem. I think the situation in Eastern Europe is something we can spend a little time on. It is commonly said that Eastern Europe is in an explosive situation. I'm not sure that is the case. There are some difficult trends there. But we ought to think more about how the situation in Eastern Europe can be relieved and what the role of Western Europe is in strengthening relations with Eastern European countries, particularly now

22

(LC)

that they have a little freedom of manoeuver vis-
- a-vis the Soviet Union. It's illusory to think that
Hungary can step outside the Warsaw Pact.
But I think we can do a lot to strengthen the
processes of reform in Eastern Europe, and
that's very much in the interests of the West.

Mr. Saeki: The following question is
addressed to Mr. Nakasone. What were your
impressions of General-Secretary Gorbachev?
What is your assessment of Gorbachev's
policy? What should be Japan's response to
his policy?

Mr. Nakasone: These are very tough
questions. I have met with General-Secretary
Gorbachev three times, and I believe he is a
very courageous patriot. As Dr. O'Neill
mentioned, Gorbachev understands better than
anyone else the failings of the Soviet Union,
and he has embarked on bold reforms to try
and overcome them. We do not know
whether he will succeed or fail, but the way he
has done things so far says a lot about what
kind of person he is.

When looking at how heads of state happen to
steer their countries in certain directions, you
look at the past and the present -- and then
you must try and project what may happen in
the future. Looking at his track record so far,
to some extent he has been able to do what
his predecessors were not able to do, and I
think he deserves credit for that. Personally, I

truly hope *perestroika* will succeed. Better
*perestroika* than some other policy, which might
be worse. What is his present situation?
Gorbachev confronts formidable circumstances -
not exactly total deadlock, but certainly
stagnation. What about the future? I do not
think we can make any predictions at this time.

For example, Gorbachev's agricultural reform
proposal to extend the time period that farmers
can lease land was shoved aside at the central
committee meeting. Obviously Gorbachev is
facing grave difficulties. Even as competent
young leaders emerge, they will surely be
influenced by the inherent nature of the Russian
peoples and the accumulation of seventy years
of communist history and its negative legacy.

Therefore we cannot assume that he will
succeed, or that he will fail. All we can do is
observe the Soviet moves carefully, and then
decide our moves accordingly.

My impression of Gorbachev, from the first time
I met him, has been one of a man who is
intelligent, shrewd and flexible. In his thinking
he is philosophical, but in his actions, he is
extremely shrewd. As a politician, he acts on
the basis of what we Japanese call *water
philosophy*. When a boulder lies in the path of
a river, the water will try to flow around it. If
the rock completely blocks the river, water will
accumulate and form a pond. Then when the
water becomes deep enough, it can flow over
the rock. Sometimes Gorbachev seizes the
opportunity to move forward. But when he
recognizes resistance he knows how to wait

23

and he knows how to compromise. He is still
young. He has possibly another ten years in
office. Therefore he can patiently continue to
promote *perestroika* slowly, step by step.

Our effectiveness in pursuing our goals with
respect to the Soviet Union depends heavily
upon maintaining the solidarity of the Western
alliance. This solidarity must take the highest
priority. The second important point is that we
act with firmness and consistency. The most
dangerous thing we can do is to waver in our
resolve. Therefore consistency is crucial. We
must always conduct a kind of litmus test, and
make our moves depending on the results.
And to the extent that these test results serve
as a prediction, we should take the initiative
when appropriate.

The Western allies must be flexible, and should
look at the observable facts. Gorbachev is
doing his very best and we must not ignore his
accomplishments to date. This is our window
of opportunity and we must take advantage of
this opportunity and keep the window open.
We do not want to spoil the budding potential
of improved relations with the Soviet Union.

The Northern Territories issue is a major
problem. Negotiations between the experts are
about to start. I have been telling the Soviets
that negotiation is a process in which each side
gives the other side what it wants. For Japan
it is more complicated, like a simultaneous
equation with many interdependent values to

solve. When you are solving for the values of
X,Y, and Z -- you cannot determine the value of
X unless you know what Y and Z are. Once
you know Y and Z, then the value of X
becomes clear. This is the kind of negotiating
we have to do with the Soviets.

Soviet interests today are looking out in three
different directions: to the north, over the pole,
in the INF treaty with the United States; to the
west, in the ongoing bargaining between NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries, in which the most
urgent task is the negotiations on short-range
nuclear weapons; and to the south, including its
withdrawal from Afghanistan, improved relations
with India, a more flexible approach to the
Vietnam problem, and restoration of friendly
relations with China.

The new Soviet policy does not touch upon
Northeast Asia, that is, the area from the
Korean peninsula to the Bering Straits.
Perhaps this is because of the strong presence
of the American Navy, or possibly, it is because
they recognize the very strong alliance between
Japan and the United States. This region may
be the next area for negotiation between the
Soviet Union and the Western powers.

The Soviet Union's military reductions are in
areas where they have large excesses and can
afford to cut down, or in areas where they have
superiority and they encounter no risk to
reduce their strength. The Soviets must be
very cautious since the region from the Korean

24

(c)

Peninsula to the Bering Straits is a very
sensitive one, especially because it involves
naval and air forces.

Let me talk about arms reduction. This is
certainly an issue for the Soviets, but in my
opinion, it is not an issue for Japan because
Japan is limited to a defense budget of 1% of
GNP. It is said the Soviets are looking toward
Japan with the expectation of their cooperation
in developing Siberia. I do not think this is
necessarily true. I believe the Soviets have
changed their narrow viewpoint of the past
which looked at Siberia as a storehouse of
natural resources, and they are now taking a
much more global viewpoint -- one which
covers issues such as technology, foodstuffs,
transportation and finance.

The current Soviet approach is political and
diplomatic, rather than military. I liken the
Soviet position to that of the *newaza* lying
posture in the Japanese sport of judo. In judo,
if your opponent goes for the lying posture,
then you should counter in the same style. It
is very dangerous to keep standing -- your legs
could get snapped off! So Japan also, must
patiently maintain a lying posture.

It is critical that we leave this window of
opportunity open, and that Japan stand in
strong and firm solidarity with the West as we
proceed in responding to the Soviets. Thank
you.

Mr. Saeki: I would like to introduce a few
questions for Dr. Kissinger.

1. You mention the need to be coolly objective to see what Gorbachev does. Does that mean that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is easier for the West to have a dialogue with than the Soviet Union under Brezhnev? The stability of a Gorbachev administration is going to be affected by how we respond to the Soviet Union and therefore shouldn't we act on tactical matters, and by doing so, help improve Gorbachev's situation?

2. The issue of untied loans from Western banks to the Soviet Union is one that's been hotly debated in the U.S. Congress -- whether or not untied loans to the Soviet Union should be a target of regulation because of security issues. President Bush seems to be more cautious about this than the previous president, Mr. Reagan. What is your view?

3. Dr. Kissinger, if you were Prime Minister of Japan, where would your emphasis be during the next ten years in the political, economic and foreign relations spheres with regard to the easing of tension between superpowers as the economy becomes more globalized?

4. If you were the General-Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, when would you return the Northern Islands, and under what political and military conditions?

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Dr. Kissinger: The first question is about Gorbachev being easier to deal with than Brezhnev; that we have an interest in sustaining him; and, that the manner in which we conduct negotiations should be an element in sustaining him. Of course, I dealt with Brezhnev. And I must tell you I don't recognize the Brezhnev that is now coming into public view as the Brezhnev I dealt with. One has to distinguish the pre-1976 Brezhnev and the one after, because his series of strokes left him incapacitated and you could no longer regard him as a major policy figure.

In the 1970-1976 period, when I was seeing him in action, I thought he was interested in detente. Now he was interested in detente, in a Soviet way. I wouldn't have wanted to be weaker than Brezhnev, but he genuinely sought a relaxation of tensions. Now his attitude was somewhat different from Gorbachev's. Gorbachev seems to believe in a very daring diplomacy while Brezhnev was more interested in maintaining what he had, and having the status quo accepted rather than trying to undermine our side and paying some price on his side. The second big difference has to do with everybody saying Brezhnev became very adventurous in the Third World. He did become very adventurous in the Third World after the U.S. impeached its president, after Congress cut its military budget and drove us out of Vietnam, and, in general, produced paralysis of our foreign policy. I don't know

whether Brezhnev's adventurism would have existed without those conditions. When you have a weak hand in foreign policy and are driven into offensive postures, you get into trouble. That was the situation in the mid-70s. In the late 70s, again, we had a weak presidency, and I do not think Brezhnev was so much in control. I am not trying to defend him, but we have to take a realistic view. I do think Brezhnev wanted a period of relaxation and for the same reasons that Gorbachev wants one now.

Now to the more important question. Should we help Gorbachev by the way we respond to him? That depends on what you mean by that question. I would put it this way: Should we make concessions to Gorbachev that we would not have made to Brezhnev? To that I say no. We should make concessions to a Soviet leader on the basis of his foreign policy, not his domestic behavior. What successes does he need in foreign policy? If he needs a genuine agreement that genuinely improves the security of both sides, and genuinely lowers tensions, then we should do it. We should not refuse to do it because he is in difficulty. But if he wants unilateral concessions, we should not make them to pay him back for being more obliging in his personal conduct, or to help him pay for his domestic reforms. The domestic reform of the Soviet Union is primarily a Soviet problem, not ours. I am not so convinced by this theory that if they reform they will become more peaceful, on the other hand I cannot be sure it

26

is entirely untrue. I just do not know enough
about it. Nobody knows enough about it. If
they become stronger with an unchanged
foreign policy, then it is not true. If you argue
that when countries have more interdependence
they grow more peaceful, maybe it is true. But
we ought to remember that before World War
I there was, in effect, free trade in Europe -- no
visas, free communication -- and they still
managed to get a pretty good war started. So
I think we should separate the unquenchable
desire for reforming other people from the
conduct of foreign policy. If Gorbachev wants
concessions from us, he should offer
concessions in return. And then, of course, we
should make agreements. But he cannot ask
us to pay him for reforming an economy they
have made a mess of without us. We cannot
give up fundamental security interests because
Gorbachev wants to institute *perestroika*.

Now for the second question -- untied loans to
the Soviet Union -- which is really a subdivision
of the previous question. There is a school of
thought that is saying we ought to have an
interest in building up the Soviet Union,
because a vital Soviet Union will be more
peace-loving than a poor Soviet Union. This is
surely a new theory of international relations --
that a strong adversary is better for you than a
weak adversary. Two groups of people hold
these views: the intellectuals, who have abstract
theories unrelated to historical experience; and
businessmen, who daily prove Marx's view that
businessmen very well understand their political

interests as absolutely untrue.

My view is that loans to the Soviet Union
should be made on the basis of the status of
our political relationship. If our political relations
improve, then loans ought to be easier to get.
If political relations do not improve, I do not see
any point in it. But I have come to another
view after observing the Soviet Union, an
additional view. I used to think, and I still think,
that this desire to give untied loans is an
example of the Western obduration. For under
the present system I do not think any amount
of loans can change the Soviet system. What
they need is a systemic change; they will not
be able to use the loans with the present
managerial and ministerial setup. And any
businessman who puts in money hoping to get
anything back will be, in my view, severely
disappointed. This being the case, the only
justification for loans can be political. And
therefore they should only be given in return for
a change in Soviet conduct.

And what would I do as a Japanese prime
minister? I think most people would agree that
I would not be the typical Japanese prime
minister and even in my advanced stages of
megalomania, I do not believe that I would be
completely eligible to be considered for that
position. Anyway, I think your politics are too
rough for me to survive over here.

When will the Soviets give back the four
northern islands? If foreign policy were entirely
logical, I think they would give them back. It

27

would be a fairly easy gesture. On the other hand, once the Soviets start giving back territory they have acquired, they will have a real problem because there are a lot of claimants on territory that the Soviets have acquired in the last fifty years, not to speak of territory that the Russians acquired in the last 150 years. So I think this will be an inhibiting feature. I personally believe that the fact the Soviets have agreed to discuss the subject means that they must be willing to do something about it. I do not think they would have agreed to discuss it unless they were willing to change the status of the islands in some way, to give back one or two, or to make some other type of adjustment. Thus I interpret their willingness to negotiate as a sign that some definite progress can be made in a measurable time.

**Mr. Saeki:** Thank you very much. And now, some questions for Professor O'Neill.

1. In the Far East, Gorbachev is proposing a peace offensive focused on reduction and rolling back of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific. This will only unilaterally serve the purpose of the Soviet Union and will not have any positive effects for Japan's security. Yet to leave the initiative for arms control to Gorbachev may have negative impact on public opinion. Thus, faced with actual political conditions, what sort of realistic arms control and disarmament policy should the West pursue to promote political

stability?

2. Do you see the need to revise the Harmel Report of 1967? If so, then what sort of conditions should be satisfied?

3. What is the likely impact of changes in the East-West relations on the Asia Pacific area?

4. It seems possible that Gorbachev will remain in power for at least the next ten years. What conditions do you imagine would cause him to be removed before that time?

**Professor O'Neill:** I don't think we should get into an arms control dialogue in Northeast Asia until we have a much clearer idea as to how the negotiations are going to work out regarding the area from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the strategic arms negotiations. I think the Soviets themselves are going to be very cautious about their dispositions in Northeast Asia also. We're talking mainly about naval and air forces, forces they have put a great deal of effort into building, forces they attach a great deal of importance to. Therefore, I don't think they are going to be ready to make spectacular gestures there also until they see what the situation is going to be like on their western front.

However, once we get into the area of arms control in Northeast Asia, it becomes very complex indeed. We have to decide whether

28

we're talking about a bilateral superpower arms control negotiation, or a fully multilateral set of negotiations. Personally I see much more prospect in the former category because we have NATO dealing comprehensively with integrated alliance frameworks. In Northeast Asia we have a very different structure of power. It's going to be difficult to control from anyone's point of view other than the Soviet Union. So I think we'll have to go slowly on that one. I would imagine the framework of arms control in Northeast Asia is a very important item on the agenda of this institute over the next couple of years.

Regarding NATO philosophy, I don't believe that the Harmel Report needs taking apart and doing again. I think its philosophy is sound, as I said in my talk. Rather, the NATO allies have got to decide much more on their political objectives of the next decade. Dr. Kissinger has referred to the problems that are going to come up, particularly vis-a-vis Germany - the two halves of Germany, the gradual change of the political situation in Eastern Europe. These are things we've got to take into account. We've also got to match the growth of European political cohesion through the European Community with the maintenance of a sound trans-Atlantic relationship. And that is going to take quite a degree of thinking about, discussing and consultation. So I would lay emphasis for NATO reform more on getting its political act together. Once that's done I think we'll have a rather clear idea of how to proceed

in a military sense. I think it's wrong to go in the reverse direction, and I'm a little bit afraid that the gesamtkonsept suffers from that weakness. I think it is trying to put together a lot of military complexities without there being sufficient unanimity on basic political purpose.

What is the impact of changes in East-West relations on the Asian-Pacific area? Obviously the major regional conflicts look as if they are going to move some way towards solution -- the Korean problem and the Kampuchea problem. It will make an immense difference not only to regional relations, but also to superpower postures in the area and there could be quite long-ranging benefits, particularly if Vietnam can be drawn into more normal relations with Southeast Asian countries. As the East-West relationship improves, one particular focal point is going to be Japan. If the military dimension becomes less important in determining the way in which international relations are conducted in East Asia, then the economic and political are going to become more important. Here is where Japan, I think, can step out more strongly than it has done in the past. I would see a special role for Japan in helping to bring Vietnam successfully through a phase of reform if that is the direction that the Vietnamese finally decide to move. There are some encouraging indications, but we want to see a little more evidence.

The fourth question on Gorbachev reminds me of the sort of exam question that I set for first

29

TO SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS:

In July of last year, I visited the Soviet Union.
Again in January I, along with former French
President, Giscard D'Estaing, and former U.S.
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, held a long
meeting with General-Secretary Gorbachev.
Drawing from these experiences, I would like to
give you my impression of the new Gorbachev
regime.

First, General-Secretary Gorbachev has devised
a policy designed to adjust relations with the
West. He has done so more aggressively than
we in the West anticipated. In his candid
speech last December to the United Nations, he
incorporated the policy blueprint agreed upon
by the entire collective leadership of the Soviet
Union. Naturally, we could detect elements of
propaganda and touches of expansionism in his
speech, as well as indications of the traditional
perseverance of the Russian people. I had the
feeling that the ghost of Stalin and idealism of
Tolstoy were both there, sitting beside each
other.

Second, there is a pressing need for
*perestroika* in the Soviet Union. This need
could have prompted the United Nations
speech. *Perestroika* is now at an impasse, and
the leadership is searching for a way out.
General-Secretary Gorbachev is using his

diplomatic achievements as a tailwind to push
*perestroika* forward. And indeed, he can claim
a number of significant achievements.
President Reagan's statement that "the Soviet
Union is an evil empire" has been erased. One
after another, leaders of Western Europe are
visiting Moscow with seemingly more relaxed
views about the Soviet Union. Relations with
China, a long-standing issue, have improved,
and Gorbachev and Deng Xiao Ping will meet
soon in Beijing. These results have probably
become a main source of support for
*perestroika*.

Nonetheless, resistance by the *nomenclatura* and the bureaucracy to *perestroika* is deeply rooted. Furthermore, throughout its history Russia has sacrificed popular activism, and there is not yet enough initiative or momentum to rollback authority. The Russian people have been led by Marxism-Leninism for 70 years. Many old workers have become passive. They do not like competition or hard work. A deep, dangerous abyss threatens *perestroika*. In the Soviet economy, price reform is an absolute necessity if firms are to operate on their own. If external trade is to become normalized, the ruble will have to become convertible. There appears to be a desire to undertake these changes, but there is little prospect that such

31

(L)

changes will occur soon.

Generally, the socialist economic system is being profoundly criticized by history. Last November, in a conversation with a Japanese government official, a high-ranking Vietnamese official half-jokingly said: "We thought that the economy belonged to the government, not to the people. But, we now realize that we were wrong. It took the Soviets 70 years to recognize this mistake. The Chinese took 40 years, and it has taken the Vietnamese only 10 years." This confession frankly reveals the current bankruptcy of the socialist economic model.

Third, new developments in the Soviet Union's security policy seem to go in three directions. One travels over the North Pole, another leads to the West, and the third, to the south of the Eurasian continent. The northern path led to the signature of the treaty with the United States to abolish INF. The western path meant following up the Helsinki Accords with the negotiations on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe, and the negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures with NATO. Finally, the southern path led to withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, strengthening of relations with India, improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, and promotion of a resolution of the Cambodian problem. What has yet to be addressed is the region of Northeast Asia, from Japan to the Bering Straits. Even in this region, a smiling invitation for discussions has

arrived. Looking at Soviet positions in these regions, we can see that the Soviets have conducted arms control negotiations and announced unilateral troop reductions in regions where they maintain military superiority or where they have an excessive military presence. The Soviet Union may plan to make Northeast Asia the subject of future negotiations, because they believe the American navy, bolstered by Japanese forces, has a clear superiority in the region.

In my meetings with General-Secretary Gorbachev, I came upon two particularly interesting points: First, when Giscard D'Estaing posed a question about whether it will be possible for the countries of Eastern Europe to enter the European Community while they are members of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev responded that it would be a violation of the Warsaw Pact. At present, he would like to see organic cooperation occur between international economic organizations, specifically, between the EC and COMECON, rather than strengthening of bilateral relations.

I then asked Mr. Gorbachev, "In its relations with the Soviet Union, China has put forth five principles of peace. In other words, China sought complete equality, with no interference, in its relations with the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet relations improved when the Soviet Union agreed to these five principles of peace. Are these five principles of peace applicable to Soviet relations with Eastern Europe?" The

32

General-Secretary responded by saying that, "The five principles of peace are already included in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. We are allies, and therefore our relations are at a higher level. Both sides also enjoy concrete economic benefits. Goods are exchanged without hard currency. East Europe welcomes this friendly link. I would like to make it very clear that the Soviet Union now needs stability even more than ever." He then said that my question seemed to have a "hidden agenda." From this remark, I knew the General-Secretary was aware that I was really asking whether or not the Soviet Union would abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine.

I consider General-Secretary Gorbachev to be a rare and exceptional Soviet leader. He gave his full attention to our statements. There is a Western rationalism in his judgments and actions, and his remarks were unequivocal and straightforward.

Detente between East and West was fashionable at the beginning of the 1970s. There are critical differences between the situation today and that of the 1970s. First, detente in the 1970s was limited to the US-Soviet relationship. The thrust of both powers was to place a limit on increases in strategic nuclear weapons. That failed. It is now recognized that the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s continued its build-up of both nuclear and conventional forces. Second, at the time, the Soviets did not think that detente

contradicted the policy of expanding Soviet influence in the Third World. Their expansion became evident in the latter half of the 1970s. Third, the Soviets made no attempt at domestic reform in the Soviet Union during the earlier period of detente. The detente of the 1970s, thus, was weak. To no one's surprise, it collapsed in less than a decade.

In contrast to the 1970s, however, the reduction of tensions now occurring between East and West is not limited only to the United States and the Soviet Union. There are more actors - Western Europe, Japan and China. Furthermore, the content of the dialogue is not limited to arms control and disarmament. It now includes the resolution of regional conflicts. Even in the area of arms control and disarmament, the scope of our negotiations has broadened. All weapons systems are being discussed. In comparison to the 1970s, today's detente is much more fundamental and far reaching. It should not be allowed to fail.

However, we should not allow ourselves to indulge in naive thinking with respect to either the reform of the Soviet system or to our coexistence with the Soviet Union. The difficulties facing General-Secretary Gorbachev are immense. Even if a fair amount of progress is made towards Soviet reform, it is likely that systemic differences and military and diplomatic rivalry between East and West will continue.

In determining how to respond to the "new

33

[Lc]

thinking" in Soviet diplomacy, let me suggest several preconditions: First, the Western countries should be united in their policy towards the Soviet Union and should move in step. Experience has taught us that the loss of Western unity makes it impossible for us to have any meaningful negotiations with the Soviets. Clearly, Western policy towards the Soviet Union should include our joint position on security-related technology issues. I believe that we should utilize the upcoming July economic summit in France as an important opportunity to coordinate our views of, and our policies toward, the Soviet Union.

Second, we need clear principles for long-term stability in East-West relations. We should negotiate a comprehensive package that includes political, economic, security, and human rights guarantees. We should ask for the free exchange of people and information. We should include the resolution and prevention of regional conflicts in our discussions. We should not be enticed by instant and short-term compromises.

Next, I would like to discuss the basic stance the West should take in negotiating with the Soviet Union. With respect to the viability of the new Soviet policy, there appear to be two views. The one appreciates Gorbachev's leadership and accomplishments up until now. The other questions the role of any personal leadership in the Soviet Union, where the system and characteristics of Soviet Russia

have traditionally overwhelmed its leaders, however impressive the leader may appear.

These views are not mutually exclusive, and, in fact, General-Secretary Gorbachev's new policy can be seen from both of these perspectives. On one hand, Gorbachev's thoughts and accomplishments deserve considerable praise. On the other hand, the new policy also faces strong resistance from the Soviet system and the Soviet people, many of whom retain much of the traditional Slavic character.

The West should respond to the Soviet changes flexibly, and as realistically and positively as circumstances permit. The important points to watch for presently are the content and direction of General-Secretary Gorbachev's new policy, as well as the speed of his progress. I believe *perestroika* is now passing the point of no return.

My impression of Gorbachev, since our first meeting, has been one of a man who is intelligent, shrewd and flexible. In his thinking he is very philosophical, but in his actions, he is extremely shrewd. As a politician, he acts on the basis of what we Japanese call "water philosophy." When a boulder lies in the path of a river, the water will try to find a way to flow around it. If the rock completely blocks the river, water will accumulate and form a pond. Then when the water becomes deep enough, it can flow over the rock. Sometimes Gorbachev seizes the opportunity to move forward. But

34

when he recognizes resistance he knows how to wait and he knows how to compromise. He is still young. He has possibly another ten years in office. Therefore he can be patient, continuing to promote *perestroika* slowly, step by step.

However, it is dangerous for us to overestimate the progress of Gorbachev's new policy and the effectiveness of his leadership. We should not prematurely let down our psychological guard toward the Soviets.

The West should adopt the water philosophy. In the sport of judo, when one side employs the *newaza* lying posture, the other side risks almost certain defeat if it remains standing. *Newaza* must be met by *newaza*. That's a basic principle of judo. We must adopt a flexible stance. We must be prepared to respond rapidly to any changes we meet, like the judo player who crouches down low to respond flexibly to his opponent's strategy. We should respond in kind to General-Secretary Gorbachev's emphasis on political and diplomatic tactics if he is reluctant to address military issues.

There are two fundamental issues that need to be addressed by the Western alliance. One is the necessity to develop an effective means of sharing decision-making as well as sharing costs. If military tensions are reduced and flurries of discussions surface in our free world, which is just what General-Secretary Gorbachev

intended, the critical problem then will then be that of public acceptance, the second issue. In order to gain public acceptance on any policy, shared decision-making among Western countries is imperative. The time has come for the West to examine and resolve these two issues. Up to now, the West appears to be passive and somewhat bewildered in the face of the series of initiatives Mr. Gorbachev has put forward.

As I already mentioned, non-government efforts from the West are welcomed because they improve the Western image among non-aligned countries and the Third World. The West must keep the "window of opportunity" open to the Soviet Union. When I look at the future of East-West relations, I can envisage four scenarios:

> The first would be to put unrelenting pressure on the Soviets while they are experiencing their current difficulties. A second strategy would be to be conservative and deal with the Soviets as we have in the past. Third, we could engage in an active strategy of negotiating with the Soviets in areas where an improvement in our relations may be possible. Or, fourth, we could be visionary, seeking to establish principles for transforming East-West relations, and promoting global reconciliation in all aspects - political, economic and security.

Of these approaches, option three is the most suitable for the time being. In order to do this, various issues between East and West must be

35

resolved. It will be necessary to achieve overall progress in the CSCE process in Europe, to reduce the potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and to resolve the Cambodian problem and other problems the Soviets have with Japan and China. In the future, Japan should give special consideration to development of stability on the Korean Peninsula, resolution of the Northern Territories problem, and reduction in excessive military forces in Northeast Asia.

But we in the West should be prepared to move toward the fourth, visionary strategy in the event that we are successful in achieving a resolution on the concrete issues. Some aspects of General-Secretary Gorbachev's policy to achieve stability in East-West relations are certainly long-term goals, whose accomplishment would enable him to concentrate on bringing *perestroika* to fruition. Once more stable conditions are realized, he could then concentrate on making *perestroika* successful. This scenario can only happen after attaining option three. I do not know if *perestroika* will be successful. But even if it fails, the Soviet Union tomorrow will be different from the Soviet Union today. It cannot turn back.

General-Secretary Gorbachev himself pointed this out in his discussions with us. We should pay close attention and foster whatever forces exist, if any, that will lead to world peace and human prosperity. In my meeting with the

General-Secretary in July last year, I told him: *International tensions today are a result of the showdown between the drive for hegemony by Stalin just after the war, coupled with the Soviet tradition of expansionism, and the Western response to this - the policy of containment. As a result of the war, the Iron Curtain was brought down, and a series of confrontations ensued - the Berlin Crisis, the Korean Conflict and Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, Stalin's quest for hegemony and Soviet expansionism must first be relinquished. Then the West will be able to abandon its policy of containment. Realizing this goal throughout the world is the responsibility of politicians of this century.*

My comments to Gorbachev were based on two considerations. I wanted to make the point that we in the West are not asking the Soviets to make endless concessions. I thought it was necessary to make clear to the Soviet leadership and to the Soviet people that there are points of agreement that we must reach through compromise on both sides. Second, I wanted to make clear to people around the world that we in the West hold high the flag of idealism. Our ideal is human prosperity through coexistence. The gradual but eventual lifting of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, through wisdom and consideration on both sides, should be of common interest to all people. I doubt that anyone in either the East or the West wishes another tragedy such as has occurred in Eastern Europe. If I am correct in this belief, then the West should raise the

36

flag of our idealism in its response to Mr.
Gorbachev.

Finally, we are in the midst of a period where
the international political, economic and security
structure created after World War II is changing.
The most important issues for the West are to
foster an overall economic system that is
sound, and to create a momentum that will spur
the spiral development of the entire world
economy. In addition, the West must

restructure and strengthen its alliance in Europe
and Asia in response to today's changes.

It is time for Japan, Europe and the United
States to examine how we can confront these
challenges and strengthen our process of
consultations at both official and non-official
levels. I strongly believe that we, the trilateral
countries, should decide without delay on a
framework and a timetable for our joint efforts.

[The above is a translation of materials prepared by IIGP Chairman Nakasone and presented to symposium participants.]

37

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, Prime Minister Nakasone, Professor O'Neill. It is indeed a privilege to accept the invitation of Prime Minister Nakasone to address his new institute. Mr. Nakasone and I have known each other for thirty-five years, and we have been friends for a long time, during which I think he has made significant contributions to relations between the United States and Japan. And I have learned a great deal from him, having enormous confidence in his role in international affairs. Therefore, it is a special privilege to be here today and to be speaking at the opening session of his new institute.

Not only is America's history shorter than that of most other
nations, but America's experience with foreign policy is even
shorter than our history. Until 1945 the United States had no
daily involvement in world events. After 1945 the United States
had an atomic monopoly, and a huge economic superiority; so that
for the United States during much of the post-war period, foreign
policy was a case of identifying a threat and then overwhelming
it with resources. It is only in the last twenty years, since

3

Therefore, America is facing for the first time in its national
history -- except for the first twenty years -- the problem of
establishing priorities, and establishing these priorities on the
basis of assumptions which cannot be proven true at the time you
make them. So much depends on assessments which only the future
can prove or disprove. So you should understand that what you
hear from me is an assessment and not a demonstration. And that
the nature of the American debate is that there does not yet
exist a consensus on an assessment. If one studies British, or
French, or for that matter Chinese foreign policy over the
centuries, the concept that a reassessment is necessary every
time a new government comes into office would be unimaginable.
The basic premises of a foreign policy would be presumed, since
national interest does not change every four or eight years.
What might be reassessed are the tactics for achieving it.

4

This seems to me the fundamental problem which Gorbachev poses
for America, and in a way, for Europe. Much less so for Asia.
The fundamental challenge of Gorbachev is that he is such a novel
type of Soviet leader. He has gone to university. He is more
familiar with technology. He did not go through the purges or
the Second World War. He is personally so much more attractive
than the previous Soviet leaders. And he has announced many
policies that are, at least on a tactical level, and maybe on a
substantive level (though it is too early to tell), quite new.
Now this has had considerable appeal in America for the reasons I
just gave, and in Europe for another reason. The Europeans have
had a long tradition of national foreign policy -- except for
Germany, whose came late. But many Europeans have complicated
domestic situations and therefore prefer to push into the next
administration the problems they might be dealing with now (Mrs.
Thatcher always excepted, since she expects to be there for a
long time). For one can always escape one's dilemmas as a
political leader by making favorable assumptions about the

5

future, which is really another way of leaving the problem to
future generations.

To return to my basic assignment, the American problem is simply
this: granting that Gorbachev is a new personality, the question
is to what extent is his policy personal, and to what extent does
it reflect specific objective necessities that any Soviet leader
would have to carry out, if with less panache, than he? I
believe that those who argue it is all due to one man are selling
the Western countries short, and I include Japan, for these
purposes, among the Western countries. If everything is really
due to the personality of a single Soviet leader, we are all in
deep trouble because his term in office is bound to be more or
less short. At any rate, it will end. Secondly, every Soviet
leader has been disavowed by his successor.

6

Now I also believe that there are certain objective necessities that have produced this change in Soviet conduct. One is the economic situation in the Soviet Union, for the Soviet economy is in systemic crisis and cannot solve its problems within the existing structure. This is different from a recession in the Western model. It is a fact of the system of central planning that the central leadership paradoxically loses control over the

7

future. It does not know what is really going on. There is no
market. There is no sense of cost, since all prices are fixed,
many of them at 1928 levels! There are no entrepreneurs.

Managers are politicians who negotiate a quota with a planning
mechanism and with the ministries, all of whom have a vested
interest in setting the quota as low as possible because if they
set too ambitious a quota, all will go down together. There is
no incentive for innovation, except in the military field where
there is foreign competition. Prime Minister Nakasone will
perhaps remember Mr. Gorbachev telling us that there were
hundreds of thousands -- or millions, I don't remember exactly --
of pairs of shoes in warehouses that nobody would buy.

So they have a huge structural problem. Unlike China, which has
an entrepreneurial tradition, in which the central planning
mechanism was never as firmly established, and which has had to
recourse to overseas Chinese -- to Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Taiwan -- from whom it could learn, there have been no such
factors in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev therefore has a more
serious problem than China, so one does not have to ascribe to
him Western pacifist philosophies to think that he might be
looking forward to a period of peace.

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Union, and by this I mean Japan, China, India, Western Europe, and the United States. A prudent leader could conclude that aggressive policies have served to unite all these countries, and that a continuation of aggressive policies will only further tighten the bonds. A period of relaxation of tensions is in the Soviet national interest because it would stall a continuation of this tacit coalition. So, in my view, we ought to take Gorbachev seriously and not treat him as if he were one of our Western professors besotted by pacifist philosophy. We ought to take him seriously as a statesman of a significant country who has drawn some logical conclusions.

And this becomes even more important when one looks to other factors -- the history of the Communist party leadership and the history of Russia. Choirboys do not become leaders in the Soviet Union. The penalty for failure in the leadership struggle is brutal. If you want job security in the Soviet Union you manage a factory, where you cannot fail. And the history of the Soviet Union, including a Russia under czars and commisars, has been one of uninterrupted expansion. From the Duchy of Muscovy to the center of Europe, and to the shores of the Pacific, every significant country bordering the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire has been involved in a war with that country. There are many explanations. For one thing, the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire have often been invaded. It is not so strange that the Russian concept of security should have boiled down to

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an attempt to neutralize the surrounding states. Certainly it
has not been content with equilibrium. Now the United States, on
the other hand, has never had to deal with equilibrium, being so
powerful. And yet, if I had to define the big foreign policy
problem of our period, I would say it is: Can we negotiate a
position of equilibrium with the Soviet Union -- a balance of
power in which everybody's security is, in fact, augmented? And
this is what must somehow be put into concrete terms, which
brings us to many of the issues Professor O'Neill has already
mentioned. I would now like to address just a few of them.

First, what is Soviet strategy? I don't think they know exactly
what their strategy is at the moment. But if one leafs through
Soviet theoretical journals, it seems to be the idea to remove
the fear of the Soviet Union, thereby weakening America's
relationship with her allies in both Europe and Asia. From that
point of view, it is not so much a strategy of coexistence as it
is a strategy of political change. On the other hand, the
United States has no vested interest in fearing the Soviet Union;
rather we have an interest in realistic assessment, and if the
real causes of fear can be removed, this is obviously in
everyone's best interests.

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Now again I would distinguish what happens in Europe from what
happens in Asia. Both in Europe and Asia there is a real
imbalance of conventional military force. However, for the
Soviet Union to destroy a country the size of China or to launch
an attack on an island power like Japan would require an effort
of such massive proportions, that I believe a balance in Asia is
in fact closer at hand than it has ever been in Europe. Europe
is now paying the price for decades of conceptual neglect and
having left too much to the United States. If everything is left
to the American nuclear deterrent at a time of declining reliance
on nuclear weapons, a gap will open up, and at the present time
the process of reductions of conventional forces is raising two
other issues.

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Frist, there really does not exist a conceptual basis for conventional disarmament. Everybody talks about equal forces and defense deployment, yet where in history does one find any evidence that this has worked? Almost all wars in Europe have been fought between roughly equal forces. Most victories that I know anything about in European wars (I haven't studied Asian wars) have been achieved by roughly equal forces. In fact, German forces in the two world wars were, numerically, and in terms of equipment, inferior to those of their opponents on every front, but they succeeded by concentration, generalship, and many intangible elements. So, simply counting the number of forces is no guarantee of deterrence. Indeed, since the aggressor can concentrate while the defender has to spread himself out, there is an inherent advantage to the attack.

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negotiated, we need to know not only what level is required
today, but whether every forseeable level of reduction can in
fact maintain proper defense.

My experience of government, which I do not believe has changed,
is that whenever there is a reduction people do not analyze what
is left; rather, they analyze the reduction itself. Then they
say: this reduction does not make any appreciable difference.
The reduction may not make any difference but there must be some
point at which what is left does make a difference. I am saying
that all this requires some solid analytical work. And that is
on the purely military level. We have a political level too,
which is perestroika. It has already produced major
uncertainties within the Soviet system and major demoralization
of the communist parties in Eastern Europe. After all, when you
hear from the Soviet leader that every Soviet leader since Lenin
has been either a criminal or a fool, it does not exactly inspire
confidence in the historical validity of a system.

Now the result of this has been two-fold, and neither has been
very comforting for the Soviet Union. In countries like Poland
or Hungary, the Communist Party has lost a good deal of
legitimacy. But even in a country like Eastern Germany, which
does not accept reform, the result is that the East Germans argue
that since they never followed the Soviet model to begin with,
they should not have to follow its reforms either. In other

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words, national communism. Now to the extent that the Soviets succeed in creating a neutralist sentiment in West Germany and a nationalistic sentiment in East Germany, and to the extent that Eastern Europe is in turmoil anyway, there will occur a political crisis in Europe east of the Rhine. It is therefore unavoidable that a political dialogue has to be combined with arms control.

Now in America, whenever somebody does not want to face an issue he pulls out an old slogan, so I have been accused of wanting a new Yalta. It stands to reason that what I am proposing is to de-Yaltarize Europe by undoing some of the consequences of Yalta, not to have another Yalta. But it must be done in a way that does not lead to an explosion, and that is a challenge to which I am not giving any answer in this lecture. But it requires dealing with yet another Soviet proposal. Now the Soviets have put forward the concept of a Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic, which has been widely welcomed in Europe as being innovative. I see it as a symptom of Western escapism. How is it possible to conceive of a Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic? What happens to the Soviet Union from the Urals to Vladivostock? What would be its status? What it means, in effect, is that Europe becomes an appendage of the Soviet Union. Now some Europeans are saying that Americans can have a room in this "European home". How generous of them! Yet it is inconceivable that the United States should accept a lesser status in Europe than the Soviet Union -- or a scenario in which

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the Soviet Union is an organic part of Europe and the United
States a visiting guest. What that implies is the eventual
dissociation of the United States from Europe. I'm not saying
that the United States needs any more superior status in Europe
than the Soviet Union. But this is an important political issue.
For whether the European frontier begins at the Soviet-Polish
front or at the present West European border is not just a
theoretical problem. These are major questions of policy
affecting the very structure of East-West relations.

To return to Asia, I think it is relatively easier to conduct
negotiations over here. That is because Japan, it seems to me,
has a clearly articulated concept of its national interest. Many
people in the economic field would argue that this concept of the
national interest is perhaps too clearly defined. I would never
accuse the Japanese of excessive sentimentality in the conduct of
their relations with foreigners -- and I say that as a
compliment, not as a criticism. I think that China, too, has not
survived for 3000 years of uninterrupted history by being short-
sighted. And while everybody seems to be fascinated by the
Gorbachev visit to Beijing, the reality is that the Chinese know
very well who expanded where in Asia in the last century.
They know the United States was the least expansionist of all the
countries they have to deal with. We are also the farthest away.
I do not believe that the Chinese will gamble their future on the
goodwill of any Soviet leader. Certainly the objective

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Now let me get back to my starting point. I think Gorbachev has asked important questions. When I stress that he has motives other than personal goodwill, I mean it as a hopeful, not a critical, comment. It is better for us that we do not make of Gorbachev some sort of supernatural being. It is not only better for us psychologically, it is better for us in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy because it either represents Soviet interests or it is built on quicksand. Our obligation in the West is to take what he says seriously, but to give it meaningful content reflective of realistic objectives protecting the legitimate security interests of both sides. The Russian state and the Soviet state are entitled to legitimate security interests. They are not entitled to impose their rule on every foreign country they can reach ideologically or geographically. Some of Gorbachev's proposals may have a purely tactical objective and it is our duty to turn them into a strategic and historical reality that can be explored. I am not being pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe that the conditions that produced this peace offensive are real. We do not have to accept the definition of how to deal with it from the side in the greatest trouble. We, the nations of the West, should work together on a serious concept and negotiate it in the years ahead, and then I believe the conditions will exist, if not for a

International Institute for Global Peace
Question and Answer Segment

**Dr. Inoki:** It seems to me that the United States, with its technological superiority, has decisively won the Cold War. The Soviet Union lost the race due to the shortcomings of the command economy which were pointed out by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek in the 1920s. The Soviet Union cannot catch up with the West without abandoning the command economy. Therefore it seems to me the West had better do nothing, and just wait and see for five years or so. The West should not act quickly to take advantage of Soviet inferiority to settle the Middle Eastern problem. My question is -- am I too optimistic, or do you agree with my point?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I think you are essentially correct when you say that the West has won the Cold War. I think that Soviet ideology has lost its conviction, even in the Soviet Union and certainly more so, outside. And I think the balance of forces between the Soviet Union and the outside world will shift more and more against the Soviet Union if the outside world conducts itself with any degree of rationality. On the other hand, I do not believe it is possible to do nothing, because of public opinion, and because of the way governments now function. And also because the disintegration of an empire also creates huge foreign policy problems. So I think the problem is how to manage this process in such a way that it

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<u>Mr. Saeki</u>: I would like to introduce a few questions for Dr. Kissinger.

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In the 1970-1976 period, when I was seeing him in action, I thought he was interested in detente. Now he was interested in detente, in a Soviet way. I wouldn't say I wanted to be weaker than Brezhnev, but he genuinely sought a relaxation of tensions. Now his attitude was somewhat different from Gorbachev's.

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Congress cut its military budget and drove us out of Vietnam, and, in general, produced paralysis of our foreign policy. I do not know whether Brezhnev's adventurism would have existed without these conditions. When you have a weak hand in foreign policy and are driven into offensive postures, you get in trouble. That was the situation in the mid-70's. In the late 70's, again, we had a weak presidency, and I do not think Brezhnev was so much in control. I am not trying to defend him, but we have to take a realistic view. I do think Brezhnev wanted a period of relaxation and for the same reasons Gorbachev wants one now.

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convinced by this theory that if they reform they will become
more peaceful, on the other hand I cannot be sure it is entirely
untrue. I just do not know enough about it. Nobody knows enough
about it. If they become stronger with an unchanged foreign
policy, then it is not true. If you argue that when countries
have more interdependence they grow more peaceful, maybe it is
true. But we ought to remember that before World War I there
was, in effect, free trade in Europe -- no visas, free
communication -- and they still managed to get a pretty good war
started. So I think we should separate the unquenchable desire
for reforming other people from the conduct of foreign policy.
If Gorbachev wants concessions from us, he should offer
concessions in return. And then, of course, we should make
agreements. But he cannot ask us to pay him for reforming an
economy they have made a mess of without us. We cannot give up
fundamental security interests because Gorbachev wants to
institute perestroika.

Now for the second question -- untied loans to the Soviet Union--
which is really a subdivision of the previous question. There is
a school of thought that is saying we ought to have an interest
in building up the Soviet Union because a vital Soviet Union will
be more peace-loving than a poor Soviet Union. This is surely a
new theory of international relations -- that a strong adversary
is better for you than a weak adversary. Two groups of people
hold these views: the intellectuals, who have abstract theories

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unrelated to historical experience; and the businessmen, who daily prove Marx's view that businessmen very well understand their political interests as absolutely untrue.

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me to survive over here.

When will the Soviets give back the four northern islands? If foreign policy were entirely logical, I think they would give them back. It would be a fairly easy gesture. On the other hand, once the Soviets start giving back territory they have acquired, they will have a real problem because there are a lot of claimants on territory that the Soviets have acquired in the last fifty years, not to speak of territory that the Russians acquired in the last 150 years. So I think this will be an inhibiting feature. I personally believe that the fact the Soviets have agreed to discuss the subject means they must be willing to do something about it. I do not think they would have agreed to discuss it unless they were willing to change the status of the islands in some way, to give back one or two, or to make some other type of adjustment. Thus I interpret their willingness to negotiate as a sign that some definite progress can be made in a measurable time.

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Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, Prime Minister Nakasone, Professor O'Neill. It's a great privilege to follow the invitation of Mr. Nakasone to address his new institute. Prime Minister Nakasone and I have known each other for thirty-five years, and we have been friends for a long period of time. During that period I think he has made major contributions to relations between the United States and Japan. I have learned a great deal from him, I have always had great confidence in the role he has played in international affairs. Therefore it is a particular privilege for me to be here today and speak at this opening session of his new institute.

I'm supposed to discuss the subject of East-West relations, primarily from the American perspective. I would like to say that I have agreed with everything that was said by the preceding speaker, who has already given a very good description of most of the practical problems that are facing us in relations with the Soviet Union. I would like to address myself more to conceptual, or rather philosophical problems, and to illustrate them with a few concrete examples.

The most difficult problem for the United States in dealing with East-West relations, or for that matter with any other foreign policy issue, is that the United States really has relatively little experience with the conduct of foreign policy. In some ways other nations have had to conduct foreign policy. Every time I visit Asia, of course, I am struck by the difference in perspective between nations that have an uninterrupted history of 2000 years and the nation that has a history of only 200 years. When I visit China, and my Chinese hosts speak of their dynasties, it is always brought home to me that almost every individual dynasty lasted longer than the entire history of the United States. And of

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course, this country (Japan) has behind it thousands of years of uninterrupted
history. A Japanese friend asked me this morning about Japanese defense and I
said, "Look, you've been defending yourself for 2000 years without the advice of
the United States, during 1800 of which we didn't even exist. So why don't you make up
your own mind about the requirements of your defense, and keep it a Japanese
problem. It's not an American problem."

Because Not only is America's history shorter than that of most other nations, but American experience with foreign policy is even shorter than American history. Until 1945 the United States was not involved as a daily actor in world events. After 1945 the United States had an atomic monopoly, and a huge economic superiority; so that for the United States during the post-war period, foreign policy was a problem of identifying a threat, and then overwhelming it with resources. It is only in the last twenty years, since the Vietnam War, that the United States has had to face what every other nation that I know of has always faced throughout its history: Namely, that however powerful it may be, its resources are limited in relation to all the things it could do, at any moment of time and to all the challenges which might arise.

And therefore, America has faced, for the first time in its national history, except for the first twenty years, the problem of establishing priorities, and establishing these priorities on the basis of assumptions which cannot be proved at this time. So much true when you make them. It depends on assessments which only the future can prove correct. So you should understand that what you hear from me is an assessment and not a demonstration. And that the nature of the American debate is that there does not yet exist a consensus on an assessment. If one studies

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British, or French, or for that matter Chinese, foreign policy over the centuries, the concept that every-time a new government comes into office a reassessment is necessary would be unimaginable. The basic premises of a foreign policy would be considered settled because the national interest does not change every four or eight years. What might be assessed is different tactics for achieving it.

There does not yet exist a crystallized concept of the national interest. Enormous attention is paid to personal, and essentially psychological, factors; on one hand, Subjective factors; on the other hand, Objective factors. I have said on more than one occasion that many Americans treat foreign policy as if it were a subdivision of psychiatry, or as if it were a subdivision of branch (-analysis). If one could reduce foreign policy to personal relationships, or as if one could reduce it to a struggle between good and evil. (And those two merge in wartime. This is why during wars, America has historically striven for unconditional surrender, but also has tended to believe in the conversion of its opponents, as if nations could separate themselves from their history and their culture by an act of individual will.)

This seems to me the fundamental problem posed by Gorbachev for America, and in a way, for Europe. Much less so for Asia. The fundamental challenge of Gorbachev is that no doubt he is a new type of Soviet leader. He has gone to university. He is more familiar with technology. He didn't go through the purges and the second World War. He is personally so much more attractive than many previous Soviet leaders. And he has announced many policies that are, at least on a tactical level, and maybe on a substantive level, though it is too early to tell. quite new. At the same time, and this has had considerable appeal in America for the

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reasons I gave, and in Europe for another reason the Europeans have a long
tradition of national foreign policy except for Germany, which came late. But
many Europeans have a complicated domestic situation and therefore prefer to push
into the next administration the problems they might deal with in the current
administration. (Mrs. Thatcher always excepted, since she expects to be there
for a long time). And one can always escape one's dilemmas as a political leader
by making favorable assumptions about the future, which is another way of leaving
the problem for a future generation.

In my view, this is less of a problem in Asia. I do not have the impression that
either Japan or China do the leaders much care whether Mr. Gorbachev smiles
more easily, wears western suits and conducts himself in a personally charming
agreable manner. In both Japan and China, my impression is that the leaders
have a fairly precise view of what they want and intend to relate progress to some
concrete conditions. Japan has stated the objective of its four northern
islands. China has put forward three conditions for various international
problems.

The American problem is to return to my basic assignment, this: Granting that
Gorbachev is a new personality, the question arises as to what extent is
his policy personal, and to what extent does it reflect certain objective
necessities that any Soviet leader would have to carry out, if with less panache,
than Gorbachev? I believe that those who argue that it is all due to one man
are selling the Western countries short, and I include Japan, for these purposes,
among the Western countries. If everything is really due to the personality of
only one Soviet leader, we are all in deep trouble because his term in office is
bound to be more or less short. At any rate, it ends. Secondly, every Soviet

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We are better off analyzing the objective forces that, ~~produced this~~, have, ~~the current situation~~, the current situation, rather than to be fascinated by the personality of one man. In any event, I consider it an extraordinary principle of diplomacy to be asked to make concessions to the personality of a leader that one wouldn't make to a less obliging personality. I've never heard that in diplomacy, one ~~pays~~, ~~shares~~, or ~~dilemmas~~, for individual conduct. Or, if leader can say he's entitled to help in his domestic difficulties, The coin of foreign policy is foreign policy. And anyone who wants concessions must show what he will change ~~in his own conduct.~~, ~~by the example of this~~, ~~the only reliable basis for~~, foreign policy.

Now I also believe, of course, that there are certain objective necessities that have to produce this change in Soviet conduct. One is the economic situation in the Soviet Union, ~~for the Soviet economic system is in systemic crisis.~~ The Soviet economic system cannot solve its problems within its existing structure. ~~This is different from a recession in the Western model. It is a fact that~~ in the system of central planning, ~~the central leadership paradoxically loses all control over~~, the future. It does not know what is really going on. There is no market.