LAW SCHOOL
MEMORANDUM

FROM Leach
To Kissinger

You might be interestedx to know that
our latest possible satellite course is
proposed for the University of the
Ryukyus (3000 students) on Okinawa,
conducted by the U.S. Civil Administration,
Ryukyu Islands.

It has been suggested that I go out
and help the course get started, and
damn if I don't think I will.

I have the correspondence.

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# PREFACE

This paper is intended to raise questions rather than furnish answers. Like many others, I, too, hope that some organizational structure can be designed which will allow the NATO alliance to evolve into a more powerful and permanent cooperative mechanism. At the same time, as a veteran "organizational man," I have weathered too many remodelings to be impressed with those schemes which concentrate on what *should* be done to the exclusion of considerations for what *can* be done.

Reorganizations I have known which fell short of anticipations did so for reasons which could easily have been foreseen had a tough feasibility test been applied. NATO is a vital, living instrumentality of great importance to the West. I have here attempted only to flag some critical issues which should be (but which have not been) debated by the proponents of various modification programs. I hope it will provide food for thought to those who may have occasion to ponder the future of our most important regional institution.

Unfortunately, by its very nature the paper adds up to a negative viewpoint. I can only defend this by stating that the theses are tentative -- a few, I hope, are erroneous. But if they are erroneous, they should be disproved. For this reason, particularly, I welcome argument and criticism.

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# SUMMARY

Pundits tell us NATO is in trouble. They cite ample evidence to support this conclusion. They also supply us with a wide selection of organizational remedies designed to alleviate or cure the ailments. Each proposal seems plausible, but, in the aggregate, their very profusion leads one to suspect that some have been inspired by a generous injection of aspiration in addition to the generally astute and perceptive theoretical analyses.

The present NATO organization, ungainly and based largely on expediency, has nevertheless sponsored a creditable and important military contribution over the past decade. We must therefore critically examine not only the goals but also the probable performance of a structural remodeling before abandoning the mediocre but tested for the ideal but untried. This study is designed to serve as sort of a devil's advocate against reorganization in order to identify and discuss some of the fundamental issues often overlooked in admiring the attractions of a new arrangement.

Proposals for reconditioning the alliance generally involve around one or more of the following measures (each considered in a separate section of this study):

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(1) Creation of a more effective instrumentality for "concerting" allied action in the political and economic realm of activity.

(2) Consolidation of the military, political and economic planning apparatus.

(3) Basic reformation of the military structure.

(4) Minor adjustments to the military structure.

Concerted alliance action, particularly in the field of political affairs, appeals to most of us as a highly desirable goal. Yet any commitment to follow a common course has obvious drawbacks. Quite conceivably a few powerful global powers could be prevented from taking forceful and risky but necessary action by a more timorous majority. Even worse, an obligation (either legal, moral or organizational) to act only in unison could leave the alliance subject to paralysis at critical junctures by a foot-dragging minority.

A consolidated planning and directive staff for military, political and economic functions gives a neat appearance but may also contain serious deficiencies. Integrated policy is indispensable in the ultimate; but the basis of military planning differs so profoundly from political and economic considerations that more harm than good could possibly come from forced amalgamation. The eternal problems of the planner

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-- assumptions, preferences, and priorities -- could become so muddled and obscure in a combined operation that planning could become unmanageable. While the present degree of military harmony might, with consolidation, assist accord in other fields, it is more likely that political and economic dissidence would dilute the military cohesiveness. We must be careful that projected improvements in other fields do not interfere with the prime purpose of the alliance: common defense.

In the present arrangement the Military Committee (MC) is unwieldy and handicapped by the familiar problems of unanimity. The Standing Group (SGN), while more compact, suffers from similar frustrations of securing unanimous consent. They are also hampered by congenital factionalization, induced by the status of each member as a spokesman for a national position.

SACEUR, on the other hand, is free to choose the best overall course for the alliance, even if it should appear invidious to some member nations. SACEUR also benefits from an autonomous position which allows him to make unequivocal recommendations in spite of disagreement within his staff.

Most reorganizational plans aim at inserting some creative planning and directive agency just below the final authority of the North Atlantic Council (which would still operate under

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rules of unanimity to avoid infringing on national sovereignty). Suggestions can be divided into three classifications, depending on whether they propose to resolve differences by: (1) vote, (2) voluntary adjustment, or (3) arbitration.

The first category visualizes some variant of the principle of majority rule. These proposals promise to alleviate the enervating effect of unanimity at three successive levels. But a voting system, in itself, would not provide the atmosphere of mutual interdependence necessary to sponsor the most progressive corporate plan.

The second category of reorganizational proposal contemplates a potent international staff as the top element in the military hierarchy. A committee-type staff, composed of officers with submerged national affiliations, would stimulate planning in the common interest. But, unless an explicit means of resolving the inevitable disagreements is woven into the pattern, this elaborate agency might represent little or no improvement over the present.

The third category would eliminate indecisiveness by superimposing on the international staff a single dominant authority -- usually referred to as a NATO Secretary of Defense. This individual, civilian or military, could maneuver with much freedom within his prescribed domain, making decisions and

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furnishing recommendations with autonomy just as SACEUR does today at a much lower level. However, in spite of the fact that this single authority would be subject to immediate and constant supervision by the North Atlantic Council, it is unlikely that the member nations would be willing to entrust such comprehensive powers, particularly in wartime, to the stewardship of one man.

In the wake of these pessimistic analyses, the ungraceful existing structure begins to look better. We seek some means of framing dynamic plans and policy. We have it now in SACEUR/SHAPE. Nations will undoubtedly insist on some type of military council, on which each is represented, to oversee the international military apparatus. This consideration dictates some body on the order of the Military Committee, which in turn will need some type of executive agency. Some minor modifications in membership or location of the Standing Group might energize that body, but if we wish the most homogeneous initial planning input, it might be unwise merely to increase the activity of the Standing Group unless we could also remedy its subjective inclinations and unanimity restrictions.

In short, the admitted imperfections in the present system do not, in themselves, justify revision, for every replacement seems to have -- from the little we know about it -- some

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disqualifying blemish. Advocates of reorganization propositions
should take pains to demonstrate how their candidate would
achieve its goal without falling prey to the same weaknesses
of indecision and self-interest which hamper the higher
direction machinery of the present system.

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CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>PREFACE</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>SUMMARY</td><td>111</td></tr><tr><td>I BACKGROUND</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>II WHAT FUNCTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE?</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>III SEPARATE OR INTEGRATED MILITARY-POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PLANNING?</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>IV SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE PRESENT NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>V ALTERNATE PROPOSALS CONSIDERED</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>VI THE VALUE OF MINOR STRUCTURAL ALTERATION</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>VII RECAPITULATION</td><td>69</td></tr></table>

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# I. BACKGROUND

During my four years of planning at SHAPE, I built up a genuine affection -- one might even say a left-handed respect -- for the ramshackle NATO structure which has coaxed and guided the military efforts of the Western powers in Europe over the past twelve years. I say "left-handed" respect, for I do not wish to imply that affection has blinded me to the imperfections of the system. Quite the contrary! Like anyone who has served in the labyrinth of interlocking staffs and overlapping committees, I must honestly admit to occasions of bitter frustration. But a working acquaintanceship has at least given me a better appreciation of why the system is organized as it is -- and perhaps a better understanding of why certain plausible changes in organization would or would not improve the situation.

Since leaving NATO service several years ago, I have followed with lively interest many public and private suggestions for change. Most of these suggestions have been tabled by scholars far more knowledgeable than I in the theory of international relations or organizational practice. However, I am emboldened to speak out in this instance first because of the evident disagreement among the experts and, second, in the belief that a few observations from practical experience may

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enrich the debate. After all, NATO is a pragmatic venture -- an exercise in the real world. The objective is to establish the best working relationship so that nations (or their representatives) will blend together most efficiently toward the common goal. There is no more worthy evidence on such matters than the performance record. Personal experience may narrow one's viewpoint, but a realization of how the system has actually operated in the past is a most essential ingredient to the normative process.

Several attitudes can be identified among those who would change the pattern of NATO. Some critics maintain that it must be revitalized to preserve its very existence; others recommend reorganization as a means of improving efficiency. The most prevalent group of critics feel that NATO must expand its scope in order to cope with the new challenge of politico-military-economic warfare in the nuclear age.

Invariably the commentator draws attention to the drastic change in conditions since the inception of NATO. If amended conditions automatically call for an evolution in organization, then NATO is indeed overdue for revision. However, this relationship should not be taken for granted, since many governmental structures have altered little through decades of service and change.

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Why do the evolutionists see a need for transformation in
the alliance structure? They list a number of environmental
and attitudinal developments which are said to shake the very
foundations of the communal institutions. Prominently
mentioned among these divisive influences is the waning
European confidence in an American willingness to place the
United States in nuclear jeopardy to thwart minor Soviet
aggression in Europe. There are also frequent allusions to
dissension over nuclear/conventional strategy and the need for
separate national nuclear striking forces. Still other critics
express concern over the divergencies in attitude among allies
toward the emergent nations of Africa and Asia -- or the varied
dispositions between Europeans and Americans over the global
spread of communism into regions like Cuba.

We have not here the space to run a performance check on
whether or not the proposed structural changes would alleviate
any or all of these ailments. A skeptic, of course, would argue
that many of the ills appear too deep-rooted to be dissipated
by organizational legerdemain. Still, the reorganizers have a
point, too, when they maintain that disunity among the Western
powers severely handicaps the Free World in its struggle
against the monolithic Soviet bloc. In their argument, necessity
becomes the mother of invention: we face defeat if we do not

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improve our efforts; one obvious weakness is a lack of harmony
among the allies; therefore, we must mend our co-ordinating
machinery. Each reorganizational proposal has as its objective
the alleviation of one or more of the conditions mentioned
above.

But generally neglected are the possibilities of harmful
side effects of reorganizing NATO. Suppose that a more
elaborate political-military instrumentality for the formula-
tion of nuclear strategy and control of nuclear weapons would
assuage European concern about being left in the lurch. What
would this improved atmosphere cost in terms of increased
obligations on the part of the participants, particularly the
United States?

We must look at the debit side of the ledger as well.
Certainly there are powerful arguments in favor of a more
close-knit union, but there are disadvantages, too. This
study will examine two aspects of this problem: first, are the
arguments in favor of remaking NATO into a more homogeneous
political community so outstanding that they override the
potential disadvantages; and, second, if the conclusion is not
weighted positively in favor of a more intricate political
association, what other reorganizational measures might be
useful to improve the performance of the alliance?

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The advisability of a closer political integration entails considerations of a complex and esoteric nature -- so much so that it becomes necessary to refer liberally to the opinions of more qualified authorities. The second portion of the study, dealing with matters of internal NATO organization, will be based more directly on personal experience and deduction.

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## II. WHAT FUNCTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE?

A large body of observers on both sides of the Atlantic, viewing with distaste the divergencies besetting the alliance and noting that they are more political than military, have offered solutions for converting the present military alliance into a more close-knit political union. Now experience indicates that separate states can merge permanently into a viable political community only if they succeed in creating a central decision-making organ to combat the separatist influences which will inevitably arise from diverse interests. Unfortunately, a political community of nations means supra-national authority, and supranational authority can only be gained at the expense of diminution in national sovereignty.

There seems to be little dispute about the ultimate desirability of some more formal Atlantic confederation -- as a long-range goal -- and nothing said here should be construed as antithetic to this reasonable end-objective. At the same time, only an optimistic fringe would rate political confederation as a feasible accomplishment within the next generation. For today's remedy, then, we should concentrate on measures which would be useful over the next 20 to 30 years but do not militate against the ultimate objective of confederation.

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Some revisionists suggest a modicum of confederation forthwith but tiptoe lightly over the unavoidable conflict between national and supranational authority which would result from even the minimum communal institutions.* However, the great bulk of reformation proposals -- the type we will analyze here -- contemplate a less perturbing innovation. They would employ some innocuous organizational device to entice multinational agreement without actually superimposing a central authority. The evolutionist plans to accentuate cohesiveness without infringing on national sovereignty by creating more intricate co-ordinating instrumentalities and by enhancing the stature of both the agencies and the officials involved in the collaborative machinery.**

While the revisionist does not guarantee that his method will cure the ills of the alliance, neither does he devote much attention to the possibility that any harm could come

*See, for example, Morton Halperin, "The Future of NATO," *The New Republic*, May 22, 1961.

**As indicative of prevalent attitudes regarding integration in NATO, I have assumed the following articles by eminent scholar-strategists to be generally representative:

Alistair Buchan, "The Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 2, January 1962

Henry Kissinger, "An American View," *Survival*, Vol. 3, No. 2, March-April 1961

Robert E. Osgood, *Nuclear Control in NATO*, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1962

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from trying it. Such confidence may be misplaced. If voluntary collaboration measures do not work, and there is reason to believe they may not succeed, then a more formalized co-ordination agency could merely entangle the separate members in an international procedural network, which would inhibit individual or selective groups of allies from taking necessary action.

One need not look far for evidence that the foreign policies of NATO partners are frightfully disconcerted. We need witness only Suez, Cyprus and Algeria or a number of other less dramatic cases. Conflicting courses have caused rifts not fully healed and still other potential sore-spots might fester at any time. Undeniably, a need exists to draw the foreign policies of the member states into a closer harmony.

But does a need for improved collaboration automatically prescribe institutional reform? In discussions of complex subjects, it helps to understand terms precisely. We should agree beforehand, for example, on the difference between an "alliance" and a "confederation" or "community." An alliance is a formal agreement to adopt prearranged measures in event certain specified circumstances arise.* It does not necessitate

*For a more comprehensive discussion of this point see Edgar Furniss, "France, NATO, and European Security," *International Organization*, Vol. X, No. 4, November 1956, p. 551.

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an international machinery, although one can be instituted as
long as it remains subservient to the control of *each* ally. A
confederation or community, on the other hand, does not exist
without a more binding commitment, including some surrender of
individual sovereignty to a supranational corporate agency.

NATO has been an alliance in the restricted sense defined
above. We are here considering only amendments to the common
structure which would not change its basic status as an
alliance. Within this framework, we are debating whether the
establishment of a centralized political planning and co-
ordination agency, *without plenipotentiary authority*, would be
the optimum method for securing improved collaboration among
allies. In particular, we wonder whether there are not un-
explored disadvantages in the possible hindrances to forceful
individual actions that would come from waiting for corporate
concurrence which may not be forthcoming.

Alliances are formed through the commitment of two or
more partner-states to consolidate their efforts toward common
ends. Often the goals and the commitments are couched in
general terms and apply equally to all partners -- at other
times, the commitments are specifically enumerated and may
fall unequally among the participants. Universally, there are
obligations for each partner -- as well as benefits. An

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ever-present disadvantage is the necessity to restrict one's
independent action in consideration of the effect on one's
partners. In the words of Henry Wriston:

> All significant international intercourse
> involves some surrender of freedom of
> action, and it is inevitably greater in
> case of an alliance....*

Now Wriston is not arguing that all alliances are bad
because they limit a nation's freedom of action. Rather, he
suggests that each alliance should be analyzed for both
purpose and composition to be sure that the advantages of the
partnership equal or outweigh the restrictions imposed by the
pact.

The observation is not novel. Americans learn by primer
the parting admonition from our first president to avoid
"entangling" alliances. We might also ponder advice of an
earlier vintage. In the 5th century B.C., that indelible
Chinese sage, Sun Tzu, recorded this rubric in his guidelines
for the would-be strategist:

> We cannot enter into alliance with
> neighbouring princes unless we are
> acquainted with their designs.**

*Henry Wriston, "Thoughts for Tomorrow," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1962, Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 378.

**Sun Tzu Wu, *The Art of War* (translated by Lionel Giles), The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pa., 1949, p. 89.

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This simple statement from antiquity capsules the two questions we should still ask about any combined endeavor: "With whom to ally?" and "For what purpose?" Only the second question has direct application to our examination of NATO, for -- ideal or not -- the composition has already been decided and presumably is not under reconsideration. We are, however, vitally interested in the second element which the revisionists have brought forcefully to our attention. Should we try to remake the NATO alliance into a political and economic association with across-the-board cohesiveness similar to that which now obtains in the military field?

To reiterate, we have little quarrel with the *goal* of securing a better harmony of foreign and economic policy. Skepticism derives rather from an uncertainty about the best *method* to achieve this goal. Pitfalls, as well as windfalls, can result from haphazard associations. Just as we should be selective in choosing partners to be sure that our aims are in consonance, so should we cogitate before mechanically trying to convert a going alliance of one type into another species.

Alliances are fragile institutions. They will not stand much tampering. Professor Hans Morgenthau -- long a student of the breed -- has emphasized the inverse relationship between the strength and duration of alliances and the totality of the commitment. Says Morgenthau:

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On the other hand, there exists a correlation between the permanency of an alliance and the limited character of the interests it serves; for only a specific, limited interest is likely to last long enough to provide the foundation for a durable alliance.*

Turning again to Wriston's excellent piece, we can detect a reaffirmation of this thesis. On the issue of expanding the role of an association, he warns explicitly

> ...against the feeling that the way to strengthen an existing alliance is to load it with new and different functions.**

I will not attempt to reinforce these two succinct observations. Alliances can be extremely valuable. They can prosper and grow stronger when the objectives of the members harmonize for the specific purposes of the alliance (assuming that other outside objectives of the members do not bring them into serious conflict). But where an attempt is made to span functions in which basic accord among the allies does not exist, the entire undertaking may be jeopardized. The point is so vital that I risk repetition to quote again from the trenchant phraseology of Morgenthau:

*Hans Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, edited by Arnold Wolfers, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1959, p. 191.

**Henry M. Wriston, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

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A typical alliance attempts to transform a small fraction of the total interests of the contracting parties into common policies and measures. Some of these interests are irrelevant to the purposes of the alliance, others support them, others diverge from them, and still others are incompatible with them. Thus a typical alliance is imbedded in a dynamic field of diverse interests and purposes. Whether and how long it will be operative depends upon the strength of the interests underlying it as over against the strength of the other interests of the nation concerned.*

Having scanned the impressive array of advice against a mechanical expansion of the alliances to fields where the requisite degree of mutual intent may not exist, it behooves us to judge whether sufficient centripetal attraction does exist among NATO allies in the realm of political and economic collaboration.

Politically, NATO is composed of fifteen independent and dissimilar nations. Their modes of government range from liberal socialism to benevolent oligarchy; their attitudes towards communism extend from complacency to total and belligerent antipathy. Basic policy differences also derive from their external interests due to variations in size and

*Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 191.

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location. Several members are world powers with global interests (that do not always coincide). Others are small European states with predominantly local outlooks. The smaller nations are primarily interested in preserving peace and new-found prosperity. If peace is impossible, at least they would like to avoid complicity in the world-wide great power confrontation. Here is one veteran internationalist speaking for his own nation -- a small one:

> There must be a hierarchy in international obligations. The nations of a continent cannot reasonably be asked to consider with the same realism and sincerity of judgment affairs which directly concern them and events which are taking place thousands of kilometers away in regions where they have neither interests nor influence.*

If the continental nations have scant interest in what goes on in the rest of the world, they will certainly be inclined toward the most placid form of global policy. Yet global and NATO strategic matters are virtually inseparable. We cannot avoid the impression that foreign policy matters -- even those pertaining strictly to Europe -- will be

*The views are those of Paul-Henri Spaak, quoted by Kenneth W. Thompson, in "Theories and Problems of Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, edited by Roy C. Macridis, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Edgewood Cliffs, N.J., 1958, p. 353.

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approached by the global and continental powers from different frames of reference.

This question is particularly relevant to American foreign policy, and we should not be ashamed to review the matter in a coolly analytical fashion. Whether we have sought the role or not, the United States has been propelled into the leadership of the Free World coalition. In a very literal sense, what is good for the United States is good for the alliance; the fate of the smaller nations of Europe depends not only on the continued strength of the United States but also the policy which we follow toward a forceful guarantee of their security.

The worst that could befall Western Europe would be for the United States to abdicate its role as the natural leader and withdraw to isolationism -- or take refuge in a policy of acting only when all our allies concur with the proposed course of action. The rule of unanimity under which NATO now operates should not be compared to majority rule -- it could better be described as a domination of the minority, for a member cannot only refuse to co-operate but can also veto concerted action by the remainder. Our policy-makers must walk the tightrope between being overly solicitous of allied opinion or seeming to disregard allied advice. A recent comment summarizes this situation as follows:

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> Any alliance restraints the freedom of movement of every partner, including the senior one.... Yet an alliance of autonomous nations, however, unequal in power, introduces even more stringent constraints on the senior partner....*

The foreign policy objectives of the fifteen nations do not coincide. The member states are not equal in power or consequence. The United States faces a responsibility which we dare not shirk, for our own sake or that of our allies. We must exert our leadership, even though it will frequently bring criticism and rancor.

Advocates of integrated political planning and concerted action argue that a tighter organization will allow the coalition to react quickly and in unison to communist probes. More than likely the acrimonious and devisive wrangles over policy would have quite the opposite effect: they would decelerate the pace of Western response. In this regard, Edgar Furniss asserts that Secretary Dulles felt keenly the need to impress on our allies the fact that agreement to consult did not extend to a willingness to foreclose independent action. He cites the following excerpt as a concrete warning of this limitation:

*Stanley Hoffman, "Restraints and Choices in American Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, Fall 1962, p. 676.

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The NATO members believe in the principle of consultation between allies and at our council meetings we are increasingly practicing that consultation. But every NATO country has, of course, certain vital national interests that may sometimes require independent judgment.... ...the process of consultation should never enmesh us in a procedural web so that we fall victim to the ability of despotisms to act suddenly and with all their might.

Quite patently, then, both scholars and diplomats are concerned about hobbling freedom of action through excessive obligations to harness our actions to those of our allies. Agreement to a policy of increased collaboration -- either a moral commitment or participation in a more comprehensive co-ordinating agency -- should be evaluated carefully in light of this potential inhibition. Whether the co-ordinating mechanism itself consists of a simple, compelling 'directoire' or an elaborate but loose-knit political-military super staff would make a difference -- but dangers are inherent in each. This is not to say that a better instrumentality for harmonizing foreign policy cannot be designed -- but an essential characteristic would seem to be some means of avoiding corporate immobility due to minority objection. The onus must be on

*John Foster Dulles, Department of State Bulletin, April 20, 1956, as quoted by Edgar Furniss, op. cit., p. 553.

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the proponents of the systems to prove that a progressive
common course could probably be evolved. It does not suffice
to assume that organizational proposals for "concerting"
action are inherently synonymous with "good."

Collaboration in the field of economics might be less
fraught with dangerous consequences. However, the barriers
to economic harmony may be more formidable. In many nations
of the alliance, industry is institutionally linked to the
government. In all other nations, commercial pressures exert
a powerful influence. Where every item of standardization or
common procurement means millions of dollars of expenditure
from national budgets or the common fund -- and substantial
profit to the manufacturer -- we should not be surprised at
the vicious nature of the commercial infighting. Even the
amazing success of the Common Market, should it continue
apace, would not suppress the normal competitive instinct
among manufacturers and the protective instinct of national
officials who are properly considerate of local industry.
Again, we can refer to a most apt description from the tongue
of Mr. Spaak:

> I can say from experience that, today,
> it is in the economic field that are
> to be found all the egoism and the
> nationalist illusions.*

*Paul Henri Spaak, quoted in Report of the Western
European State of the European Security, 1959-1961, Document
No. 215, 10 November 1961, p. 99.

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Progress will undoubtedly be made toward more effective collaboration in the commercial field. Several projects are now being conducted by international consortiums with surprising success. But these ventures have, in the main, been concerned with developing unique equipment where competing prototypes were not already in existence and where production could be spread among the several nations buying the product. Economic experts inform us that NATO does not appear to be the ideal combination of states from which to forge a viable economic community.* The mechanism for increasing collaboration exists today if nations wish to make use of it. We must carefully assess whether agencies to generate more comprehensive collaboration would do more harm than good in a process which must be gradual and voluntary.

Returning now to the general discussion of whether or not to seek a more cohesive political or economic NATO union, we must not neglect one other point of view. At the opposite end of the spectrum from the "consolidator" stands the advocate of an even more flexible relationship. (We have argued

*Lincoln Gordon, "Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy -- The NATO Experience," *International Organization*, Vol. X, No. 4, November 1956.

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an intermediate position -- that while closer collaboration
is desirable, it cannot be forced in a non-confederated
association beyond the disposition of the members to act in
unison.) Our survey of philosophies would not be complete
without an observation from those who feel that NATO already
curtails individual activities to an unwholesome degree.
Paul L. Peeters, in a provocative article, claims that:

> What we have sought in NATO previously
> has been unity, more unity, and still
> more unity.

* * *

> But NATO can get along with a good
> deal of disunity. Or, to put it in
> perhaps a better way, the key to a
> strong NATO, growing stronger all the
> time, may well be a kind of interallied
> *disengagement*. There is no need for us
> to huddle together like sheep. We must
> be allies. We must cooperate fully....
> But, at the same time there would be a
> superb new quality of strength for the
> West in an alliance whose members
> followed their own courses of action in
> a number of areas.*

Peeters believes that the proper relationship among an
alliance of sovereign nations is a minimum of integration for
indivisible tasks (like air defense) and a maximum freedom to

*Paul L. Peeters, "NATO Must Be Born Again," *Air Force*,
December 1961, p. 73.

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employ bilateral or _ad hoc_ arrangements for all other
functions. Finally, he adds the capstone that the Soviets
realize the dangers of a close-knit partnership better than
we do. He concludes that our enemies now hope for the demise
of NATO through an overly-ambitious effort on our part to
bind ourselves closer together. The Soviets are convinced
that "by aiming too high NATO will miss the mark."*

Is it really necessary that NATO act as the architect of
common political and economic policy? Alliances have tra-
ditionally sprung from a desire to improve the _combatant_
effectiveness of the individual partners. The intent may
have been a predatory attack on a neighbor -- or merely self-
preservation -- but the basic purpose of alliances in modern
history has been military.**

NATO constitutes no exception to the rule. The only time
that the phrase "unite their efforts" was used by the treaty
framers appeared in reference to "collective defense." Con-
certed political policy is not explicitly mentioned and
economic collaboration is treated only as a generality.***

*Ibid., p. 75.

**Zugene S. Haugee, _Alliances in International Relations_
Since 1920, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Nebraska,
1954, p. 2.

***Lord Ismay, _NATO, the First Five Years_, Bosch-Utrecht,
Netherlands, 1955, p. 17; Preamble and Articles of the North
Atlantic Treaty.

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Not only was the alliance born of a need for common defense,
but the success in the area of military co-operation has far
outstripped the results in other functions, as even the
critics freely acknowledge. Military collaboration has more
than held its own; it has, in the words of several evaluators,
been the "cement" which has held the alliance together through
stormy political disturbances.

Furthermore, the alliance appears to have accomplished
its original mission of preventing further communist conquest
of Europe by armed force. The point to be made is that, in
considering the reorganization of NATO, we are not faced with
a free choice. We have here a valuable military instrument
that has proven its worth. We lose much if, by tinkering
with the co-ordination machinery, we undermine its effective-
ness for carrying out its prime purpose.

In short, there are potential disadvantages as well as
merits to extending the functions of an alliance, particularly
in fields where a great community of interest may not
materialize. We have seen that national political and economic
objectives of the member states in NATO frequently do clash.
In spite of this, the alliance has been a qualified military
success and represents a valuable asset to the West in the global
confrontation. It does not suffice to conclude that, because

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better harmonization of political and economic policy is
desirable (or even mandatory), the institutions of the alliance
should be amended to enforce a Procrustean bed-fellowship.

The case is yet to be proven that, short of confederation, a
more formal political and economic organizational pattern is
the best way to achieve the optimum concord among the members.

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### III. SEPARATE OR INTEGRATED MILITARY-POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PLANNING?

Whether or not we should decide to consign more responsibility for interweaving allied foreign policy to central NATO institutions, there still remains a need for a better relationship between the military, political and economic elements of the system. It requires little research to uncover worthy military projects which have been blocked by political aspirations or circumvented by commercial pressure groups. Any system which would minimize these conflicts should represent an improvement.

Most proposals for NATO reorganization emanate from the articulate group of observers who have brought the intellectual disciplines of the social sciences to bear on the problems of military strategy. They have induced a wider understanding that military strategy encompasses far more than the art of winning battles -- and that military considerations alone are only an important segment of that vast mélange that goes to make up grand strategy. Since their central thesis acclaims the inseparable relationship between military and nonmilitary factors, these same writers are disposed to carry a preference for integration into the field of alliance organization.* Hence,

*The proposals of military analysts, which seldom reach public print, seem to aim more at improvement in the military hierarchy.

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we find, with few exceptions, that the antidote prescribed by these diagnosticians for an ailing NATO is the physical amalgamation of military, political and economic planning agencies. The tendency to assume that such consolidation would be beneficial has become so prevalent that one hesitates to question its validity.

Of course, if the NATO allies were to agree on some form of centralized collaboration for foreign and economic policies, then a more comprehensive co-ordinating body would be required. Some reorganizers have recommended a consolidated planning staff on this very assumption: that more authority will be delegated by the nations to the central instrumentalities of NATO. Others have argued from the opposite direction: that the more creation of a combined body will make for a more cohesive set of policies. We have postulated in the previous section that the prudent course is to assume that NATO allies will continue to operate on a purely voluntary consultive basis in the realms of political and economic endeavor -- that no NATO-wide supranational authority can be developed in the short run. It is under these circumstances that we should judge whether a combined military, political and economic agency would perform better than the present separate planning compartments.

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Several reasons have been advanced in favor of amalgamated planning: it would aid in resolving matters which span two or more of the functions; diplomats and financiers would come to understand the soldiers' needs better; some of the successful collaboration of the military might carry over to other fields. All of these constitute plausible reasons for combining the now-separated functions. Yet they also exude an unwarranted confidence in the healing qualities of organization per se.

The problem of control of nuclear weapons is often cited as a matter which could be easier solved, had we only a group which could deal with issues which overlap both the political and military fields. Yet the creation of a joint politico-military body would only scratch the surface of the hard-core dilemmas that make up this complex issue. Even within our own relatively homogeneous officialdom there is no true acceptance of a common strategic doctrine with regard to nuclear weapons. Where several different European views conflict with a United States reluctance to relinquish control of these vital instruments of war, a permanent multinational civil-military control group might contribute a focal point for argumentation -- but it would merely paper over some seemingly irreconcilable policy divergencies. Certainly a decision on usage must be basically a political decision. If a workable formula could

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be devised for avoiding the ambiguities of "fifteen fingers
on the trigger," and military advice were needed, it would
seem that an _ad hoc_ political-military group could as easily
be established within the present framework.

In extolling the virtues of a more intimate planning
association, proponents of a consolidated agency are apt to
underrate the amount of co-ordination which now goes on
between officials in the three fields. Under the present
system each nation furnishes continuous political and economic
guidance to its military representatives. Even the officers
assigned to international staffs are kept abreast of their
country's position on issues at hand. (At SHAPE it is
generally understood that dissemination of such advice is one
of the primary roles of the extra-mural National Military
Representative from each country.) Military matters with
political or economic overtones are monitored by home authori-
ties from their inception, and one can trace a consistency in
national attitude up the military chain and into the discussions
where political and economic considerations are ostensibly
first introduced. There is nothing nefarious about this
arrangement. It is practical government in operation. The
system would surely founder if we had to expect reversals of
national positions as new considerations were introduced at

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different levels. As things stand now, if a nation is politically or economically opposed to, say, further integration of air defense, we would expect that military officers of that nationality would reflect a negative attitude toward the subject at all levels. If these officers took any other position they would simply mislead their colleagues. So, while political and economic considerations do not predominate in early military planning, they are still very much in evidence, even under the present "compartmented" system.

Military and nonmilitary planning respond to vastly different stimuli and constraints. The tactical military problem is generally straightforward: what is the optimum means of defense against the common enemy? Given the numerous unknowns and divergent preferences and backgrounds, strategic and tactical problems often spawn real controversy. But there is generally a common framework of fact and objective which seldom materializes in the political and economic fields. Politically and economically, an ally in the grand scheme is also an opponent for the interior maneuvering -- and he is an opponent today, not at some unknown point in the future. This internal competition can best be demonstrated by a simple example in the financial field. Since the NATO common fund is made up of contributions from the members, each is competing

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against the others to keep his own contributions at a minimum -- and to maximize those programs which would bring the most revenue back to his country.

The diplomat is also more circumscribed in the matters he can act on. The military are able to make certain suppositions and explore areas where the statesman would not wish to trudge. NATO military commanders would be derelict if they did not prepare for every reasonable contingency -- for conventional or nuclear war, for partial or complete NATO participation, for forced retreat in vulnerable regions. They must contemplate some eventualities which would be unpalatable to the statesman.

To take a specific example, General Norstad recently stated that even in 1951, a NATO main line of defense as far back as the west bank of the Rhine was "politically unacceptable." Yet, he goes on to reveal, not until 1956 did the military planners set for themselves the future objective of defending West Germany at the Iron Curtain. Imagine the discomfort of the West German political representative who would have participated in the combined planning group which directed the deliberate abandonment of the region east of the Rhine. Of

*General Laurie Norstad, transcript of television broadcast, Columbia Broadcasting System, New York City, November 11, 1962, p. 5.

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course, with an integrated staff, political considerations
might have prevailed and the plans could have been amended to
direct an infeasible military campaign (in which case it
would have been the military members who would have been
uncomfortable).

History furnishes many more examples of the incongruous
political-military relationship. Prior to both World Wars,
allied military commanders were handicapped in their approach
to potential allied counterparts by political constraints.
Political authorities worried that combined military plans or
preparations would be indicative of commitments they wished
to avoid -- or would convey too belligerent an impression to
the enemy.

Finally, soldiers, diplomats and financiers deal in
different terms. To the general there is one best solution
to a given strategic problem. Deviations from this plan
increase the risk of failure in a mission for which the mili-
tary commander must shoulder full responsibility. Hence, he
is understandably reluctant to depart from his preferred plan.
The diplomat and the economist think in more flexible terms.
To them, the ideal is seldom attainable; they are more willing
to bargain. *Quid pro quo* and trade-offs -- terms which the
soldier finds distasteful -- comprise useful tools in their
trade.

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A great deal of thought has been devoted to the issue of whether political factors should be ground into the military planning operation from the beginning. There is much to be said on both sides, for almost everyone agrees that political considerations must predominate in the end. Regarding our specific problems, where the plans of the combined staff would be subject to review in the politically-oriented North Atlantic Council, a remark of Sir Richard Gale seems particularly appropriate. He comments as follows:

> I think also that it [the type of estimate] depends very much on whether the final decision lies with the commander himself or with some superior authority; if it lies with a superior authority, and if this is a political authority, there is the very real danger that if a nicely balanced military and political appreciation is submitted, the political arguments will again be stressed by the minister responsible and may therefore receive additional and undue weight. So the best course surely is to make a sound military appreciation.*

In the nebulous and uncertain planning function, a firm point of departure must be established before too many perturbations have been introduced. Just as good reasons support

*Sir Richard Gale, "The Impact of Political Factors on Military Judgement," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCIX, No. 593, February 1954, p. 39.

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the segregation of planning into like functions for national
organizations (Defense, State, Treasury, etc.) so do cogent
reasons argue for a separation in the international structure.
Just as we sometimes grumble at the seeming lack of co-ordina-
tion among our own independent national departments, so can we
see occasions when it looks like a combined section would be
more efficient in the alliance structure. But an organization
to amalgamate military, political and economic planning would
automatically gear itself to the pace of the least tractable
subject. Military planning and preparatory measures, which
have demonstrated an ability to forge ahead, would suffer.

One could logically argue that political collaboration
is so important that we can afford to sacrifice some military
harmony in order to secure better political accord. The
position is tenable but the potential gains and risks should
first be calculated. Until such an assessment has been made,
it seems judicious to attempt first to strengthen the separate
military, political, and economic compartmental machinery
before designing a contrivance to consolidate the three.

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IV. SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE PRESENT
NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE

The NATO military establishment alone provides ample
fodder for organizational analysis and speculation. It has
furnished a static target from many a broadside from the
dissatisfied -- military and civilian alike. However, we
would be well advised to remember that there was a reason for
every seemingly illogical protrusion in the haphazard
hierarchy. At one time, the baroque structure was the most
regular that the architects were willing to accept -- and it
may still be.

The task of the military structure could be subdivided
in many ways. At a minimum we must differentiate between the
peace and war missions.

NATO's prearranged apparatus to carry out its wartime
functions has attracted relatively little attention. True,
many have wondered whether the mild commitments of the treaty
-- specifying only that, in case of an attack on one member,
the other allies would take what action they deem necessary,
"including the use of armed force" -- would guarantee a united
response to enemy provocation. But this query is directed
more at the political <u>casus foederis</u> than at the military
machinery for directing the struggle. One or two choleric

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personalities have assailed the political accommodations which kink and distend the command lines. But general satisfaction exists over the substantial amount of authority which would pass to international commanders in time of war.*

A conglomerate army of several nationalities may not equate in combat effectiveness to a homogeneous national force of comparable size. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the NATO military hierarchy consists essentially of an international co-ordinating network superimposed on top of the normal national command structure.** For this reason, the probabilities of friction or insubordination arising on the battlefield are somewhat reduced, for co-ordinating instructions will be transmitted between headquarters more remote from the confusion of the front lines. Higher troop commanders, faced with critical operational decisions, may still choose the line of action more compatible with national interests in lieu of

*The relatively unequivocal authority preallocated to international commanders for wartime conditions contrasts sharply, for example, with the World War I instructions of Lord Kitchener to his field commander, Sir John French, that "your command is an entirely independent one and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied general." Cited by Barbara W. Tuchman in *The Guns of August*, The Macmillan Company, New York, N.Y., 1962, p. 195.

**Notable exceptions, of course, do exist in the functional fields of co-ordinated air defense and atomic weapon delivery.

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following wholeheartedly the directives of the international commander. But such hypothetical developments could hardly be precluded even by ironclad prior agreement on realignment of command channels. They are best overcome by time, confidence, and the gradual reduction of the ability of national forces to operate independently -- conditions which the present system seems to be sponsoring.

Even military perfectionists recognize the necessity to cater to national sensitivities when it comes to expropriating a nation's most precious resource by assigning command of its defense forces to a wartime commander of another nationality. Present command channels, while occasionally devious and inflated, still offer a reasonable compromise between the desire for straightforward international military direction and the necessity to preserve a measure of national influence in operations affecting the fate of each participating country. Finally, we should recognize that present arrangements raise the wartime power of the international commander to a level never before contemplated in the pre-hostility commitments of a modern coalition.

The peacetime apparatus does not compare in clarity and simplicity to the unambiguous provisions which would prevail in war. The ambiguous peacetime condition might be less

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aggravating were the mission simply to prepare for war. But in the dynamic confrontation which goes under the name of the Cold War, deterring the enemy from aggressive acts is probably as important as getting ready to fight.

Under current procedures, NATO plans, policies and directives are generated in a complex series of military staffs and committees. Although military matters proceed up a completely separate channel from political and economic affairs, there is an unorganized but frequent lateral exchange of views, both on a national and international basis. The military system merges formally with the political and economic channels only at the pinnacle: the North Atlantic Council (or its agents, the Permanent Representatives).*

The upper NATO military hierarchy consists, in order of rank, of the Military Committee, the Standing Group, and the Supreme Commanders. In the opinion of most observers, the Military Committee and the Standing Group have failed to exert the leadership expected of them, while it is generally conceded that the Supreme Commanders have performed remarkably well. In fact, critics frequently complain that the Supreme

*Occasionally, military affairs are decided by a plenipotentiary meeting of the Defense Ministers.

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Commanders (particularly SACEUR) have usurped the responsi-
bilities and duties intended for the superior bodies. If this
development is unwholesome -- and most people seem to believe
that composite planning should be performed at a level higher
than SACEUR and SACLANT, we should first diagnose what makes
the system operate as it does before attempting to prescribe
corrective action. Why have the most important planning tasks
devolved upon or been expropriated by the subordinate head-
quarters -- a development quite the antithesis of normal
patterns of military relationships?

The Military Committee suffers from several debilitating
weaknesses. The most formidable limitation is imposed by
requirements of unanimity. In addition, the Military Committee
meets only twice a year for a few days each session. Moreover,
each member is the chief military figure of his country and
heavily burdened with problems of his own. All in all, it is
no wonder that the Military Committee has exerted little
creative influence on NATO planning. In an attempt to overcome
its deficiencies, it has recently established a subordinate
Military Committee in Permanent Session; but a membership of
15 representatives requiring unanimous agreement will always
operate at a halting pace.

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The Standing Group was originally intended to compensate for the unwieldiness of the Military Committee by serving as a compact executive agent. In concept, it was to direct the military activities of the alliance during most of the year when the Military Committee was not in session. Unfortunately, the Standing Group suffers from its own multiple ailments. First, since it is composed only of the representatives of the original three great powers of the alliance (France, Great Britain, and the United States), it has had to engage in a running jurisdictional battle with the Military Committee (which represents all members -- not just the elite). The Military Committee is becoming increasingly stingy with the powers it delegates to the Standing Group. With some justification, the representatives of the other NATO nations resent the present composition of the Standing Group. Britain and France no longer rank in the first three contributors of forces assigned to the Supreme Commanders (they do, of course, still maintain large air and naval contingents under national command, but this constitutes a weak argument for a preferential position in the corporate structure).

Second, the Standing Group operates as a triumvirate composed of the principal representatives from the nations mentioned above. Chairmanship is rotated quarterly.

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Consequently, no one individual speaks with complete assurance; the Chairman is truly only a temporary "first among equals." Even when there is unusual accord on a matter, differences of expression or emphasis are apt to plague the trinity. This feature places the Standing Group members as individuals in a less authoritative position than the Supreme Commanders. The Standing Group members have always been officers of considerable experience, ability, and prestige in their own nations, but none has acquired the stature of, say, General Norstad as SACEUR. In the constant jockeying for position which goes on in any type of organization, the Standing Group has been handicapped by the classic difficulties of a triumvirate.

But, in my opinion, the Standing Group has not excelled as a spawning ground for plans and policy because of a characteristic which is seldom mentioned: call it built-in factionalism! Here is one brief explanation of how the body operates:

> Each Standing Group member has a chief of staff and a small number of staff officers drawn from each of the three Services. The three chiefs of staff form a steering committee and the staff officers form international planning teams, each consisting of three officers, one for each Standing Group country. When a subject is under study in the

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Standing Group, the first step is for each member of the planning team to seek guidance from his own national Ministry of Defence as to the line to be taken.*

We can deduce from the above description, as the same author notes elsewhere in his article, that Standing Group actions "reflect the national views of its three members...." Each representative is an unabashed advocate of the course favored by his country, and, by inversion, opposed to a course which does not coincide with his national policy. The Standing Group does, of course, seek to develop a proposition which is best for the entire membership. But one must conclude from the method of operation that projects will be viewed somewhat subjectively. Furthermore, the system does not induce a compulsion for progress. Valuable projects unappetizing to one or more members may lie dormant because the other nations have not sufficient interest to face the unpleasant task of hammering out agreement.

The procedure fails to stimulate a vigorous enthusiasm for the welfare of the community. Most plans for a composite enterprise require some subordination of individual interest. Under the present system there is little incentive to

*Lieut.-Colonel C. T. Honeybourne, "The Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization," The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XCIX, No. 596, November 1954, p. 552.

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compromise, even if the individual should be willing. At SHAPE, officers are assigned to the international staff, and directed to make their decisions based on what is best for the combined endeavor. At Standing Group, officers are members of national delegations, and their attitudes are conditioned by the national ministries.* Staff member's orientation remains primarily national, and each judges his own effectiveness by how well he can sway the common course of action toward his preferred country position.

Now this negative screening function is vital; in a voluntary co-operative venture it must be performed somewhere. Short of confederation, each nation must have its opportunity to veto a measure it considers inimical to its interest. But the present system encourages self-consideration by repeating the veto process three times over -- at the Standing Group, the Military Committee, and again at the Defense Ministers or North Atlantic Council level. We would not therefore expect to find the inspired community leadership emanating from any of these groups.

*It must be granted that a small international secretariat serves both the Military Committee and the Standing Group. However, the duties of these international servants are "secretarial" in the literal sense. Their task is to transcribe -- not to make -- policy.

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Compared to the heterogeneous character of the committees of instructed national representatives, the definitive nature of SACEUR's position stands out in sharp relief.* His decisions and plans can be couched in unambiguous terms, even when there is disagreement within his staff. His perspective can be elevated to the progressive goal of the most that should be done by the alliance rather than the least that his country would like to do. The reliability and discretion of his proposals is emphasized by the measure of support they usually receive. The normal pattern of dispute in the upper chambers will see the majority group supporting SACEUR's position against a small, sometimes partisan, minority. Frequently the majority opinion will prevail with minor modification. Of course, this pattern is to be expected for a SACEUR would not long remain useful if he habitually submitted proposals lacking in common appeal.

SACEUR's autonomous position enhances his effectiveness in another way. Not only can his recommendations be unambiguous; he can arrive at these recommendations rapidly. In fast-moving

*From this point I will refer to SACEUR rather than the Supreme Commanders. SACEUR and SACLANT are the only two Supreme Commanders with significant assignments. SACLANT, with no forces assigned in peacetime and only a token international staff, does not really compete with SACEUR as a germinating cell for combined planning and direction.

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Cold War situations, or when called on to furnish immediate advice to meetings of the Council (or other high-level groups such as disarmament negotiators), SACEUR can reach a decision in the time that it takes him to survey the problem and make up his mind. Formulation of a similar position by the Standing Group or Military Committee could consume days of debate in arriving at a common position which might then have to be cleared with home offices.

Now it is true that the proposals of SACEUR represent only recommendations -- not approved policy. We would not have it otherwise, else the concentration of authority in one individual might represent an unacceptable risk. Perhaps, in view of the provisional nature of SACEUR's authority, it is unfair to compare the ease with which he can formulate recommendations to the laborious process by which the superior bodies both construct and approve. However, SACEUR's suggestions have been accepted with such consistency that they customarily represent far more than a mere component input. In fact, as the critics have noted, a basic proposal from SACEUR, modified and approved by the Standing Group and the Military Committee, has come to constitute the most common method of formulating plans and policy for the alliance.

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The purpose of this section has been to determine why SACEUR has so far excelled in the planning function and has come to represent the power core of the NATO military machinery. The fact that his duties are to "propose" rather than "dispose" seems to have little to do with performance. It appears more likely that he and his staff have become the planning and policy incubator because, in comparison with the more factious Standing Group and Military Committee, SACEUR is: (1) free to select courses uninfluenced by national constraints, and (2) relatively autonomous and able to make rapid and clear-cut decisions.*

*Some observers ascribe the relatively passive role of the Standing Group to a third reason: the fact that it is located in Washington rather than Paris. Erik Bergaust, in a somewhat disjointed editorial, cites this as the "main criticism" of the organization. I personally discount the importance of this factor, though it undoubtedly contributes to some loss of efficiency in dealings with the Permanent Representatives. Erik Bergaust, "Cooperation or Disintegration," *NATO Journal*, September 1961, p. 9.

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V. ALTERNATE PROPOSALS CONSIDERED

Having examined the relationship between the three top
strata of the military hierarchy -- the Military Committee,
Standing Group and SACEUR/SHAPE -- we are now prepared to
consider some of the constructive proposals for modifying the
system. While we should not expect revisions to be aimed
exclusively at remedying what appear to be deficiencies in
the present scheme, they should take account of the fact that
certain types of arrangement have not performed efficiently in
the past.* At a minimum, we should insist that proposed
reorganizations not risk accentuating current weaknesses.

No useful purpose would be served by a roundup of the
complete galaxy of schemes for revising NATO. Plans logically
divide themselves into three constellations -- all seemingly
variations of a central theme. The grand design has its
origins in the fact that most evolutionists recognize the
necessity (in the absence of some type of confederation) of

*The need to judge future courses of action by standards of past experience has been asserted elsewhere. For example, Annette B. Fox, in reviewing Osgood's erudite treatise, has this to say: "...like other works of the genre, the methods employed for analysis and the subsequent prescriptions depend heavily upon logic and upon the assumption that states will react similarly to the same external stimuli; they do not rest upon detailed observation of past behavior." Annette Baker Fox, Review of R. E. Osgood's "NATO, The Entangling Alliance," *Political Science Quarterly*, September 1962, Vol. LXXVII, No.3.

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acquiescing in the rule of unanimity at the summit. In the
quest for a means of adding some congealing property to this
fluid arrangement, the proponents have generally selected as a
**modus operandi** some form of provisional decision-making just
under the North Atlantic Council. By eliminating the ponderous
and veto-prone Military Committee and replacing it with a more
cohesive decision unit, the reorganizers would create a pro-
cedure for coalescing alliance policy. They would still, of
course, protect national sovereignty by providing that all
decisions could be overridden by a veto in the North Atlantic
Council. Three major species of reorganization can be
distinguished, differentiated by whether they contemplate a
decision by: (1) **vote**; (2) **voluntary adjustment of differences**;
or (3) **arbitration**. Since most proposals are similar in
appearance, we sometimes have to delve into cryptic descriptions
to pin down just how the author intends the system to produce
the ultimate decision. As a result of such probes, we often
find that proposals fall into a different category than we
would have surmised at first glance.

We need not belabor the matter of principles. A system
which depends on the principle of the *vote* would use some
variation of majority rule. One such proposition has been
advanced by a leading adviser on strategic affairs, Professor

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Henry Kissinger. In his version, a "steering committee" composed of representatives from seven allied nations would make decisions and/or recommendations in specified political-military fields for the alliance as a whole. Five votes would constitute a majority, and would be sufficient to authorize action (unless the decision was appealed to the top council).*

The second category encompasses those schemes which involve a resolution of conflicting views through a *voluntary adjustment of differences*. This classification comprises, in my definition, any planning or co-ordination agency without a formally-imposed system of adjudication.** The present Standing Group arrangement (and most proposals for invigorating it) falls into this category, since positive action depends on the mutual accord of the member nations.

*Kissinger is obviously unhappy about the rule of unanimity at the top as well. In his book, *The Necessity for Choice*, he states: "Each ally, whether or not a member of the steering committee, could appeal its decisions to the NATO Council, where a two-thirds vote would carry." (Underlining added.) A few months later, writing in *Survival*, he omits the underlined phrase from an otherwise identical description of his system. Apparently, Kissinger developed second thoughts about so vital an impingement on national sovereignty. Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, Harper & Bros., New York, N.Y., 1960, p. 167. Henry A. Kissinger, "An American View," *Survival*, March-April 1961, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 74.

**Two outstanding suggestions of this type have been drafted by Alistair Buchan, *op. cit.*, and Robert E. Osgood, *op. cit*.

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We must not be confused by complicated organizational structures. Almost all reorganizational suggestions contemplate an "enhanced status" for international officials which would presumably result in a more effective performance.

(Often the proposals include prestigious new positions, such as a Deputy Secretary-General for military affairs.) However, unless these officials or bodies are specifically armed with some mechanism for reaching decisions, we must assume that the system will operate, as it does today, on the basis of negotiated compromise. I would emphasize that no opprobrium is intended by these terms. "Compromise" and "voluntary adjustment of differences" are ancient and legitimate methods of doing business in a collective enterprise. Sometimes, they are the only way of securing agreement. However, it is best that we understand clearly the key function of reaching a verdict. An elaborate superstructure may give the appearance of providing a decision-making mechanism when, in fact, it actually diffuses and complicates the process.

The third category -- **arbitration** -- is distinguished by the incorporation of some type of international authority (other than a voting committee, which would fall into category one) empowered to supervise planning and to make preliminary decisions. To be most effective, the arbitration authority

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should be an individual. Advocates of this type of arrangement conceive of the presiding official as a powerful NATO Minister of Defense (or Deputy Secretary-General). No one, to my knowledge, has spelled out the responsibilities of the office in detail, although many have alluded to the need for just such a central co-ordinating authority.* Lacking a precise description of this third category, I would picture it as the type of arrangement exemplified (at a lower level) by the SACEUR/SHAPE relationship. In other words, NATO military planning would be the province of a single person, civilian or military, responsible directly to the North Atlantic Council. He would be served by an extensive international staff. This viceroy would have complete jurisdiction in his prescribed planning and directive domain. He would be furnished deputies of other nationalities, but would have the prerogative of overriding their advice. He could accept or reject the recommendations of his staff (although the occasion would presumably arise infrequently) or to reach down to any staff level to advise or instruct in a manner which might preordain the solution.

*The reader who is familiar with the literature of NATO re-
organization will have remarked by now that both Buchan and
Osgood, whose proposals have been classified under the second
category, also contemplate a Deputy Secretary-General to head up
their planning staff. So they have, but in this case the
operative word is "powerful." See page 56 for further discussion
of this point.

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Having made these basic distinctions, let us now analyze these three types of reorganization suggestions to see what each has to offer as an improvement over the present system.

Professor Kissinger's scheme would eliminate the worst flaw in today's structure -- the requirement for unanimity at three successive levels. It would provide, at no sacrifice to national sovereignty, a method for reaching a provisional decision without watering a proposition down to meaninglessness.

Most community projects with enough attractiveness to be formalized in NATO channels hold a high degree of common interest. Those that fail to reach fruition are usually frustrated by the opposition of a small dissident element.

Kissinger's format would force the minority objectors to take the issue to the court of last appeal: the NATO Council.

Since nations would often be reluctant to appeal to this august body, we can expect that more measures would be passed by default. Kissinger's system would also reduce the current tendency to bow to the will of an obstinate minority. At present, the majority is sometimes forced to defer to the few on vital issues in order to arrive at some agreement. In a system where a consensus could formulate and transmit meaningful policies, the majority would be less subject to pressure to accept an expedient compromise or see the entire proposal rejected.

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Unfortunately, Kissinger has outlined his plan only in skeleton form. Hence, we do not know what other innovations he had in mind to supplement his key measure for avoiding deadlocks. From what he has explained, the system would not seem to remedy the second cardinal weakness noted in the present Military Committee and Standing Group: the tendency to think in individual rather than collective terms.

Let us return momentarily to this aspect, for it seems to constitute the principal difference between the concepts of Kissinger and Buchan. In the horse-trading between Kissinger's committee members, we would expect to see much practical compromise and the emergence of a program acceptable to a majority of members. But does that mean that the ensuing plan will be the best that could be devised for the community? Not necessarily, for it need not be conceived with that objective in view! It could develop as the plan least objectionable to the most members of the committee -- which might be quite different from the best plan for the alliance as a whole. How then do we institutionalize thinking in terms of the community interest? Certainly an ideal system would call for plans to be generated by a group with a broad concept of the common weal. This would seem to call for a comprehensive international group -- not a committee of national representatives.

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An indirect (but relevant) indictment of the NATO system is contained in a testimonial to the advantages of the Common Market by the British financial expert, Lord Franks.* In a stimulating article, he explains the duties and relationship of the three senior bodies of the European Economic Community (EEC): the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament.

The Council of the EEC resembles the North Atlantic Council; i.e., it is composed of national representatives voting their country position who must approve every matter of major policy for the Community. In effect, then, each country has a voice in the approval or disapproval of each major issue.

(The fact that their votes are weighted and that an increasing number of decisions will be determined by a plurality system does not affect the fundamental prerogative of the Council.)

But it is the Commission of the EEC -- a group of international officials acting independently of national affiliation -- which arouses enthusiasm. Speaking of them, Lord Franks has this to say:

> The Commission has the sole power of initiative to make proposals; it also executes policy when it has been approved. Its major purpose is to represent the whole against its parts.

*Lord Franks, "Cooperation Is Not Enough," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 1, October 1962.

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* * *

The novelty of this political procedure is evident. When the Commission, exercising its power of initiative, makes a proposal, it is thinking for the Community as a whole -- as a unit. The Community, therefore, through its institutions gives itself the opportunity of working out a common solution to a common problem, something that cannot be attained by the normal processes of international bargaining between states which so often produces only a least common denominator of agreed action.*

Admittedly, the above description refers to an economic coalition. However, the principles of combined planning could easily apply to any type of common undertaking. Who speaks for NATO in the military hierarchy? Whose job is it to represent the whole against its parts? Only at the fourth level down do we find a group with an intrinsic international outlook. SHAPE is the highest echelon at which staff members are, by terms of reference, enjoined specifically to place the common interest ahead of national considerations.

Alistair Buchan and Robert Osgood have both submitted, in considerable detail, plans to erase this potential lack of objectivity in the upper echelons of the present military

*Ibid.*, p. 32.

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structure. Both propose the creation of a high-level international staff as the real fountainhead of the planning process. Of course, it would be discourteous to imply that this is the sum total of their observations. Both commentators have provided far-ranging, sophisticated analyses. Nonetheless, most of their other suggestions would be vitiated if their planning mechanism -- the core of their proposal -- should fail to function as they anticipate. Let us take a closer look at their creations.

Buchan would establish as an adjunct to the North Atlantic Council a "strong secretariat in which civil and military planners work under central authority." We have, of course, ruled out of consideration the amalgamation of military, political and economic policy-making. But it is fair to say that the format for the combined function should perform as well or better for the purely military task. The military element of Buchan's supercharged staff would be headed by a civilian Deputy Secretary-General. Under him would be established a military Chief of Staff, three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and the head officials of the working divisions. All nations would be represented in the secretariat. Key posts would be judiciously allocated to the major powers; officials of the smaller nations would participate in planning teams,

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head it with a civilian Deputy Secretary-General, and place it
at the level just under the ultimate decision-making Council
(both would absorb the present Military Committee into the
NAC as military advisers to the ambassadors).

The suggestions of these two astute observers are drafted
with great skill and understanding. They contemplate an adroit
interlacing of key positions among the nationalities of the
alliance so as to mitigate friction in the staff. Yet, they
impute a decision-making quality to their machinery that would
not seem warranted merely on the basis of the changes they
suggest. Paradoxically, both Buchan and Osgood fail to lay
stress on the one factor which Kissinger seems to feel is
overriding: some means of assuring unambiguous decisions.

Now many disputes can be ironed out by close association
and friendly discussion. Ingenious organization will eliminate
others. But anyone who has served on international staffs
knows that disagreement is the rule rather than the exception.
Assignment to an international position induces a significant
psychological change in the individual; released from rigid
loyalty to service doctrine and national aspirations -- given
a new goal -- the normal official will readily reorient his
viewpoint to the larger allegiance of the common endeavor.
However, a mere change of assignment does not eradicate the

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attitudes of a lifetime. We can still predict with accuracy
that a Turk will take a different view of a matter than will
a Greek or a Dane. Then, too, the service concepts are
frequently more difficult to reconcile than the national
divergencies. Therefore, if some power of arbitration is not
built into the system, it risks being hobbled by dissension.

Certainly, as Kissinger and others have noted, a central
problem of any alliance hinges on its ability to make decisions.
With what new element have Buchan and Osgood infused their
structures in order to avoid the discords which have so far
hamstrung the Military Committee and the Standing Group?

Buchan has exchanged a committee of instructed delegates
for a staff-committee complex -- obviously an improvement.
But he is imprecise about how decisions would be reached in
this planning forum. He appears to sponsor free-ranging
debate rather than definitive recommendations. His Deputy
Secretary-General would have considerable prestige but little
authority since he would be "responsible, not for making policy,
but for drawing together the threads of official planning and
debate...."*

*Alistair Buchan, op. cit., p. 177 (underlining added).

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Buchan recognizes the need for weighted influence in his
staff. Specifically, he suggests that

> the Secretariat could effectively serve
> the Council only if the *division of
> functions* was related to the *contribu-
> tion* which different countries make to
> the collective military and economic
> resources of the alliance.*

An allotment of senior posts in rough proportion to national
contributions would seem to be the fairest way to man the
staff.** Presumably this policy determines assignments today.
If national contributions are not given primary credit under
present procedures, then the policy (but not necessarily the
organization) should be changed.

But a more judicious dispersion of key positions will not
abolish dispute! On the contrary, interspersing nationalities
at critical points throughout the NATO hierarchy generates
rather than eliminates disagreement. While this internal
disagreement is probably healthy in the main, it also means,
as those familiar with the idiosyncracies of international
staffs know only too well, that an abnormal amount of important
decisions (and many trivial ones, too) can only be made in the
front office.

**Mr. Buchan has explained in a personal letter to the
author that "allotment of senior posts" is a more appropriate

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International staffs, while similar in format, do not operate as replicas of national staffs. In the delicate atmosphere of international military co-operation style is almost equal to substance. The chief must be more personally associated with the decisions of his staff and he alone must be available to answer the questions of his many important masters. He can delegate far less to his subordinates than do commanders of homogeneous national staffs. Hence, an international staff becomes peculiarly the creature of its chief. The staff which Buchan has described, with the headman explicitly debarred from making decisions, might work as a national institution but seems inapt for the NATO problem.

Osgood asserts that the Deputy Secretary-General visualized under his system would "help concert plans and transmit results..." but, as far as we can tell, he invests the position with no specific authority to carry out the function.

We remain uncertain as to whether his civilian Deputy Secretary-General could overrule the rejuvenated Standing Group, whether he would be co-equal, or whether he would have only one vote out of five or six. It also remains unclear

description of his intent than "division of functions."
Letter from the Honorable Alistair Buchan to Brig. General
E. Vandevanter, Jr., dated May 3, 1962.

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whether the Standing Group would continue to operate by the
rule of unanimity or convert to some system of majority rule.
If Osgood's Deputy Secretary-General does not have overriding
power, and if the Standing Group must still reach a solution
acceptable to each member, we may not have "revitalized" at
all; in fact, the addition of a Deputy Secretary-General and
two national representatives may have, by doubling the number
of delegates to be satisfied, caused us to retrogress even
further toward organized immobility.

The third category of possible solutions -- arbitration --
centers around a NATO Minister of Defense or Chief of Staff
to head up a competent international staff and empowered to
make definitive plans and recommendations. This arrangement
would plug certain deficiencies in the other proposals. It
would encourage planning in the corporate interest by freeing
individuals from national allegiance, yet would provide a
positive means of resolving impasses. Intimate staff super-
vision by one individual would guarantee continuity of planning
as it progressed through the staff.

It would be pedantic to expound here on the virtues of a
homogeneous general staff and director for the alliance. The
advantages are obvious -- and so are the dangers! Arguments
have raged for years in American circles over the merits and

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deficiencies of centralized direction of United States military forces -- and they are no nearer settlement at this time. If an international Defense Minister (or Chief of Staff of the military services) were analogous to his national counterpart, we could drop all consideration of the scheme as a futile exercise. The concentration of power in the hands of one individual would surely exceed what the nations would be willing to relinquish. But the positions are so dissimilar that more investigation is required before writing off the possibility.

We have already alluded to the tendency to attribute characteristics to international institutions in the same measure as for national bodies. While this helps to place governing instrumentalities in general perspective, it can also create some misleading impressions. Let us examine the functions of an international military pro-consul; take first the peacetime role.

**Peacetime direction of forces** by a single allied Minister of Defense would infringe no more than the present system on the authority of national officials. The prerogatives granted the combined network for control of national forces in peacetime are so restricted that the international commanders are little more than advisers. On this score, we could almost

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disregard the national bogeyman: fear of a "man on horseback."
The engrained military loyalty which might conceivably support
a national military coup simply does not exist in multination
forces.

**Peacetime planning** introduces a slightly greater element of risk of undue influence by a Minister of Defense. Of course, all significant plans or policies would still have to be approved by the North Atlantic Council, so there would be little danger of major usurpation of power. The predictable concern of nations would stem rather from the possibility of excessive concentration of influence. For example, the opinion of this overlord would carry great influence in the selection of military equipment, for the specifications he could establish would in most cases prejudice the country of manufacture. His recommendations on such items as an integrated air defense system for Europe would in a sense present the Council with an "either-or" proposition, since there would be little opportunity for objecting nations to produce an alternative plan if they did not like the official candidate.

Most advocates of a single top NATO authority for the
military hierarchy visualize him as a counterpart of a U.S.
Secretary of Defense; that is to say, he would be charged
also with integration of political and economic considerations.

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These reorganizers see the need for a supreme authority for co-ordination in matters of pay, procurement, standardization of equipment, civil defense, conscription and the myriad of vital functions other than pure strategy. These are precisely the areas where national sensitivities are most acute. The time does not seem ripe for a broad-gauge NATO Secretary of Defense -- although a Chief of Staff for purely tactical and strategic matters, if his functions were narrowly defined, might be less objectionable.

However, while nations might accept a single Chief of Staff for peacetime, they would probably take exception to his wartime authority. In a fast-moving situation, the single commander's decisions would be partially implemented before national authorities could have a chance to consider fully his proposed course of action. Of course, it should be noted here that field command of the assigned forces of all nations would, under present arrangements, be exercised in war by only two major NATO Supreme Commanders. But this fact does not relieve -- in fact, it may reinforce -- the desire of nations to supervise the activities of important NATO commanders. It seems unlikely that many sovereign nations would be willing, in effect, to turn over strategic direction of the war to a single commander of another nation without

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retaining some measure of control over his activities. Even if this control were to be largely symbolic, the independent nations will undoubtedly insist on some military body, on which each is represented by a delegate responding to national direction, to supervise and direct the combined war effort.

In summary, each of the three types of reorganization proposal leaves something to be desired. The voting formula neglects the corporate interest, the voluntary compromise system leaves us prey to indecision, and the arbitration scheme creates an unacceptable concentration of power, particularly in wartime.

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# VI. THE VALUE OF MINOR STRUCTURAL ALTERATION

This somewhat selective analysis of major organizational proposals has led to a *cul de sac*. Not only do the remodeling suggestions each seem to have some disqualifying weakness, but the over-all survey uncovers no novel solution preferable to those we would discard. Fortunately, even negative deductions are of some value. For one thing, we may have gained a better concept of the theoretical ideal, an understanding of what the modifications proposals have been designed to accomplish, and an appreciation of the impediments which bar the way to perfection.

Perhaps through a synthesis of these proposals we could come somewhat nearer the goal. A combination of Kissinger's majority rule with a type of top-level international staff (headed by a chief with some real power) sounds attractive. However, that combination (or any of the several individual proposals) would require a substantial change in the international structure and would profoundly affect national abilities to influence the course of military events. Organizational changes of this nature take place only after agonizing deliberation, if at all. Attractive as may be the anticipated results of major renovations, we must discount them somewhat in relation to minor alterations more amenable to the membership.

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From such a viewpoint, the present unsightly structure
begins to take on new appeal. We seek a cohesive power center
capable of generating altruistic plans and policy; we have it
(at least for the major portion of NATO) in the person of
SACEUR and the institution of SHAPE. To provide against the
tangible danger that this powerful individual might exert his
influence or authority inequitably, he has been placed under
the supervision of two superior military bodies, in which each
national representative has the power to disapprove any major
action or recommendation. For reasons which we have previously
discussed, some telescoping of this attenuated structure might
be desirable, but at least one military supervisory agency
would seem to be indispensable between the primary planning
source and the final approving authority.

Here again we can discern some justification for the
present arrangement. First, it seems likely that each nation
will insist on being represented on the supervisory board.
This automatically dictates a body resembling the Military
Committee, replete with similar problems of unwieldiness. Some
means of expediting and sharpening up its decisions must be
found. Perhaps a system of weighed votes and majority decisions
could be imposed, but this seems hardly likely since the
*raison d'être* of the group is to provide an opportunity for

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each member to interpose a military objection. It is more
probable that an executive committee would be established for
much the same reasons that the Standing Group was originally
conceived.

If we opt to keep the Standing Group (and presumably it
will be with us for some time to come), what of the many pro-
posals for improving its efficiency? For example, we hear
repeated recommendations for altering its membership or moving
its location. In light of the foregoing discussion, neither
of these proposals seems as desirable as they once may have
appeared. In the first place, West Germany is an obvious
candidate for membership because of its contributions to the
wherewithal of the alliance. But it is hardly conceivable
that the Federal Republic will merely replace one of the current
members, so in practical terms we are talking about enlarging
the group. Plans and policies would then have to pass muster
with four rather than three delegates -- a task which mathe-
maticians tell us is statistically almost twice as difficult.

Moving the agency to Paris would have one beneficial
result. It would symbolize a greater European voice in NATO
affairs, and for this reason alone may be a worthwhile measure.
It would also encourage the Standing Group to take a more
active role in the direction of activities, but this may not

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be an uncompensated blessing. Unless, at the same time, an
improvement could be made in the procedural conditions, it
might be unwise merely to increase its metabolism. If it
is to remain stymied by unanimity requirements and subjective
procedures, we might, quite seriously, prefer to leave the
Standing Group as a passive supervisor.

If, as many believe, the Standing Group has today "drifted
outside the main current,"* the practical result has been to
elevate SACEUR's cohesive planning center -- the agency which
seems best able to plan dynamically for the alliance -- to a
more potent role. Assuming there must be multilateral super-
vision of this one decisive planning and policy cell, should
we not prefer for this supervision to be exercised with
maximum laissez-faire? A movement of the Standing Group to
Paris, which would cause it to delve increasingly into active
direction of alliance affairs, might not produce the salutary
effect many have predicted.

*Staff Study for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
*Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership I*, 87th Congress,
Second Session, Document #132, September 14, 1962, p. 43.

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## VII. RECAPITULATION

Defense of the status quo inspires little enthusiasm. Over the long term, we all know, progress is stimulated by men of vision who set their sights on lofty goals and forge ahead undeterred by doubts of the hesitant. Men of good will want evolution and growth; this essay will probably be criticized for subordinating the grand concept of political collaboration to the technicalities of organizational design.

Yet the matter of decision-making capacity is more than a detail. It forms the crucial issue at stake in any combined venture, be it a business undertaking, a federation of states, or an international coalition. A confederation, of course, would surmount this problem by creating central agencies endowed with authority to make decisions for the community as a whole; but a confederation seems too remote to be a practical alternative for the present.

Several quasi-confederation schemes have been suggested and discussed here. Their value should be judged, not on the *need* for better harmony -- which is manifest and common to all schemes -- but on the *forecast ability* of each to operate successfully over the long run. Protagonists have not attempted to examine the operational aspects of their schemes, confining their analyses mostly to outlining objectives and describing