# LETTERS

## THE KISSINGER PAPERS

*To the Editors:*

I regret that I cannot take the authorial credit that Henry Kissinger so graciously extends to me [“Talking with Mao: An Exchange,” *NYR*, March 18] when he describes “Mr. Burr’s canard that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress had been placed there to prevent access to them under the Freedom of Information Act.” My remarks on this point in my book, *The Kissinger Transcripts*, merely follow in a long line of commentators, not the least of whom was Justice John Paul Stevens, who observed in the *Kissinger v. Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press* case: “Finally, the fact that the documents had been removed by the head of the agency shortly before the expiration of his term of office raised an inference that the removal had been motivated by a desire to avoid FOIA disclosure.”

The fact remains that Dr. Kissinger’s papers at the Library of Congress, which are closed to the public without his permission until five years after his death, contain the only complete set of the highest-level records of the foreign policies of this country in the Nixon and Ford years. My book is testament to the fact that copies of these documents can also be found in various scattered locations in the government, including the Nixon papers, the Ford papers, the State Department’s files, and the papers of Kissinger aides like Winston Lord. In my book, I describe this reality as a “deliberate inconvenience” to scholars. And because of the national security secrecy restrictions on almost all of these documents, Dr. Kissinger had every reason to believe he would have exclusive access to these records for decades after leaving office.

Theodore Draper made a similar point when he reviewed the first volume of Dr. Kissinger's memoirs in the spring 1980 issue of *Dissent*. Mr. Draper observed that Dr. Kissinger's use of classified documents was “nothing less than scandalous” because his book “contains literally scores of direct references to and textual quotations from documents obviously of the highest classification... I wondered how Kissinger could make use of classified documents on such a large scale and of such recent vintage. If they had been declassified for him, could I or any other scholar have access to them? Could one check up on how he used these documentary sources?” Draper found that the answer was no. “In effect, only quotations were declassified, documents were not. By means of this dodge, no one else can gain access to these documents to de-

NY Review of Books

May 20, 1999

termine how faithfully Kissinger made use of them.”

Even more problematic is Dr. Kissinger's claim that the only unique originals in the Library of Congress collection are the transcripts of “telephone conversations ruled by the US Supreme Court as private.” But the Supreme Court only ruled that the Reporters' Committee did not have standing to sue; it did not rule on whether or not the telcons were private. The only courts that did—in decisions vacated by the Supreme Court—in fact decided that the telcons were the “property of the United States,” which were “wrongfully removed and should be returned to the State Department.” Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision on Reporters' Committee suggested that if the telcons were government records, Kissinger's treatment of them probably violated the Federal Records Act “since he did not seek the approval of the Archivist prior to transferring custody to himself and then to the Library of Congress.” As the Court pointed out, “The Archivist did request return of the telephone notes from Kissinger on the basis of his belief that the documents may have been wrongfully removed under the Act. Despite Kissinger's refusal to comply with the Archivist's request, no suit has been instituted against Kissinger to retrieve the records under 44 USC 3106.”

Finally, Dr. Kissinger claims that he has made the telcons and other classified documents available to official State Department historians. But they cannot take notes from, or make copies of, the telcons. Copies of those documents will be made available for use in State Department historical compilations only when Dr. Kissinger gives his permission.

I would encourage Dr. Kissinger to return the telcons voluntarily; failing that, the Archivist of the US should bring suit. Needless to say, my publishers are eager for a sequel.

William Burr

Senior Analyst
The National Security Archive
George Washington University
Washington, D.C.

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The New York Review

NY Review of Books 3/18/99

# Talking with Mao: An Exchange

To the Editors:

No China scholar has influenced my own thinking more than Jonathan Spence. My comments on his review of *The Kissinger Transcripts* edited by William Burr [NYR, March 4] should therefore be read as minor differences in emphasis.

Professor Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress had been placed there to prevent access to them under the Freedom of Information Act. The truth—known to Mr. Burr's publishers well in advance of publication—is quite different. Every document in the Library of Congress is the copy of an original in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National Archives. (The only exceptions are telephone conversations ruled by the US Supreme Court as private. However, in October 1998, I gave access to these conversations to the State Department historians so that they might extract portions relevant to foreign policy decisions for inclusion in their publications.) Every last document cited in *The Kissinger Transcripts* has been available in governmental archives under the Freedom of Information Act on the basis of regulations established by the US Government. I have no voice in these decisions. Mr. Burr required no "special ingenuity" to obtain them.

Professor Spence, who over the years has greatly enlightened me on the context of China's history, should be equally meticulous in drawing conclusions from dependent clauses and isolated phrases in individual diplomatic conversations. For example, the diplomacy of December 1971 involved a complex minuet triggered by the India-Pakistan war. In our view, the very existence of Pakistan, which had just facilitated our opening to China, was now being threatened by a de facto Soviet-Indian alliance. At the same time, in the guise of talking tough, China was angling for reassurance from the United States. With neither Washington nor Beijing prepared to use force, each was calibrating its measures to give the maximum diplomatic help to Pakistan and to avoid being charged by the newfound partner with abandoning a mutual friend. The discussions about intelligence should be read in that context.

On the more important issue of who benefited more from the Sino-American relationship, it is no doubt true that Mao applied traditional Chinese methods to the dialogue; what other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true that I recognized these nuances less easily at the time than I would today. But that lacuna in my knowledge made no practical differ-

ence to the results of the overall policy.

What brought the two sides together were not phrases used at individual meetings but genuine common concerns. China, threatened by forty-two Soviet divisions along its borders, was eager to break out of its self-imposed diplomatic isolation. To that end, it needed, following age-old Chinese diplomatic patterns, to use a distant barbarian to balance the threat from the barbarian nearby—a point we fully grasped at the time.

The United States' goals were to prevent a Soviet attack on China, to isolate the Soviet Union, to achieve the freedom of maneuver to end the Vietnam War and over-

come its legacy, and to avoid military conflict over Taiwan.

This is what the conversations were about. Twenty-five years after the event, it is not possible to judge whether too much or too little was said in one conversation. Professor Spence takes Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary—drawn from a standard catechism—more literally than he would Chinese texts. In the end, both China and the United States achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than Professor Spence might wish. This is the essence of successful diplomacy and why the initial pattern has lasted through every administration of both American political parties ever since.

Henry A. Kissinger

New York City

Jonathan Spence *replies*:

I thank Henry Kissinger for his detailed response to my review. The question of who had access to what is a significant one, and Mr. Kissinger's pointed rebuttal of William Burr on this point led me to reexamine the preface to *The Kissinger Transcripts*. The language used there by William Burr, I can

see now, is more carefully qualified than I realized on my first reading. In the preface (p. x) Burr writes: "In January 1977, when [Kissinger] left the State Department, he transferred to the Library of Congress copies of his White House and State Department files as part of a larger collection of his papers." Burr continues (preface p. xi) that in the Library "documents deemed Mr. Kissinger's personal papers" were "protected...from FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] requests of historians, journalists and the general public." Among the key words here are "copies" and "deemed." Presumably, even if some of these transcript copies were "deemed" personal, they were still only copies, and the originals remained in the White House or the State Department, where they would—if not still classified—be subject to requests for access through the normal channels.

Regardless of what may be inflated claims for the difficulty of gaining access to these transcripts, I am glad that we have them now in published form. General readers without the inclination or the expertise to invoke the FOIA will gain a much fuller sense of the specific issues and topics covered in the talks, and of the way the tone and direction of the talks meshes with long-held Chinese patterns of thinking about diplomacy.

It is this level of detail, for example, that lets us place Mao's ruminations inside a more discursive Chinese historical tradition, and observe the balance he creates between shrewd reflections on policy and remarks designed to jolt the interlocutor. Thus I cannot exactly agree with Mr. Kissinger that Mao had no choice to think any other way but within such a tradition: Mao's long years in the Chinese Communist Party, not to mention his complex relations with Stalin and Khrushchev, surely gave him many other models of behavior. Similarly, it is just because we have the fuller transcripts that we can move beyond the "dependent clauses" and "isolated phrases" to put some of the most interesting or even startling sentences by the participants into a tighter line of argument.

I would, of course, agree with Mr. Kissinger that the overall structure of a diplomatic initiative is far greater than the parts we can observe in this particular narrative. As I noted in my review, Henry Kissinger is not only a master of detail, but possesses a wide-ranging knowledge of international politics, that enabled him—along with President Nixon—to propose major new directions for United States policy. China was only a part of that process, just as these transcripts are only a part of the China story. But they are a most intriguing part.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 11, 1999

To the Editor of The New York Review of Books:

No China scholar has influenced my own thinking more than
Jonathan Spence. I value our personal relationship. My
comments on his review of *The Kissinger Transcripts* edited by
William Burr should therefore be read as minor differences in
emphasis.

Professor Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard
that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress had
been placed there to prevent access to them under the Freedom
of Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers
well in advance of publication--is quite different. Every
document in the Library of Congress is the copy of an original
in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National
Archives. (The only exceptions are telephone conversations
ruled by the US Supreme Court as private. However, in October
1998, I gave access to these conversations to the State
Department historians so that they might extract portions
relevant to foreign policy decisions for inclusion in their
publications.) Every last document cited in *The Kissinger*

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

2

*Transcripts* has been available in governmental archives under the Freedom of Information Act on the basis of regulations established by the US Government. I have no voice in these decisions. Mr. Burr required no "special ingenuity" to obtain them.

8

3

that I recognized these nuances less easily at the time than I
would today. But that lacuna in my knowledge made no
practical difference to the results of the overall policy.

What brought the two sides together were not phrases used
at individual meetings but genuine common concerns. China,
threatened by 42 Soviet divisions along its borders, was eager
to break out of its self-imposed diplomatic isolation. To
that end, it needed, following age-old Chinese diplomatic
patterns, to use a distant barbarian to balance the threat
from the barbarian nearby--a point we fully grasped at the
time.

The United States' goals were to prevent a Soviet attack
on China, to isolate the Soviet Union, to achieve the freedom
of maneuver to end the Vietnam War and overcome its legacy,
and to avoid military conflict over Taiwan.

This is what the conversations were about. Twenty-five
years after the event, it is not possible to judge whether too
much or too little was said in one conversation. Professor
Spence takes Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary--
drawn from a standard catechism--more literally than he would
Chinese texts. In the end, both China and the United States
achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than
Professor Spence might wish. This is the essence of
successful diplomacy and why the initial pattern has lasted

8

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 11, 1999

Transcripts has been available in governmental archives under
the Freedom of Information Act on the basis of regulations
established by the US Government. I have no voice in these
decisions. Mr. Burr required no "special ingenuity" to obtain
them.

Professor Spence, who over the years has greatly
enlightened me on the context of China's history, should be
equally meticulous in drawing conclusions from dependent
clauses and isolated phrases in individual diplomatic
conversations. For example, the diplomacy of December 1971
involved a complex minuet triggered by the India-Pakistan war.
In our view, the very existence of Pakistan, which had just
facilitated our opening to China, was now being threatened by
a de facto Soviet-Indian alliance. At the same time, in the
guise of talking tough, China was angling for reassurance from
the United States. With neither Washington nor Beijing
prepared to use force, each was calibrating its measures to
give the maximum diplomatic help to Pakistan and to avoid
being charged by the newfound partner with abandoning a mutual
friend. The discussions about intelligence should be read in
that context. In fact, no significant intelligence
information was made available at that point.

other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true
that I recognized these nuances less easily at the time than I
would today. But that lacuna in my knowledge made no
practical difference to the ~~positive~~ results of the overall
policy.

This is what the conversations were about. Twenty-four
years after the event, it is not possible to judge whether
much or too little was said in one conversation. Professor
Spence takes Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary--
drawn from a standard catechism--more literally than he was
Chinese texts. In the end, both China and the United States
achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than
Professor Spence might wish. This is the essence of

I slightly reworded this
It had read
"too much
was said or
too little in
one conversation".
OK?

3

other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true
that I recognized these nuances less easily at the time than I
would today. But that lacuna in my knowledge made no
practical difference to the *positive* results of the overall
policy.

This is what the conversations were about. Twenty-four
years after the event, it is not possible to judge whether
much or too little was said in one conversation. Professor
Spence takes Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary-
drawn from a standard catechism--more literally than he w-
rote in Chinese texts. In the end, both China and the United States
achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than
Professor Spence might wish. This is the essence of

3

other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true
that I recognized these nuances less easily at the time than I
would today. But that lacuna in my knowledge made no
practical difference to the positive results of the overall
policy.

February 11, 1999

2

3

FEB-10-1999 20:56

KAI DC

212 753 7248

2/10/99-#4

I respect no China scholar more than Jonathan Spence who has influenced my own thinking more than any other. I value our personal relationship. My comments on his review of _The Kissinger Transcripts_ edited by William Burr should therefore be read as minor differences in emphasis.

Professor Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress had been placed there to prevent access to them under the Freedom of Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers *well* in advance of publication--is as follows. Every document in the Library of Congress is the copy of an original in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National Archives. (The only exceptions are telephone conversations ruled by the US Supreme Court as private. However, *these* are being *in* October 1998.)

02-10-99 20:40 TO:

FROM:212 753 7248

P02

FEB-10-1999 20:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.04

Washington nor Beijing prepared to use force, each was calibrating its measures to give the maximum diplomatic help to Pakistan and to avoid being charged by the other with abandoning a [mutual] friend. The discussions about intelligence should be read in that context. In fact, no significant intelligence information was made available at that point.

On the more important issue of who benefited more from the Sino-American relationship, it is no doubt true that Mao applied traditional Chinese methods to the dialogue; what other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true that I recognized these nuances less easily at the time than I would today. But that lacuna in my knowledge made no practical difference to the positive results of the overall policy.

02-10-99 20:40 TO:

FROM:212 753 7248

P04

FEB-10-1999 20:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.05

What brought the two sides together were not phrases used
at *this* meeting but genuine common concerns. China,
threatened by 42 Soviet divisions along its borders, was eager
to break out of its self-imposed diplomatic isolation. To
that end, it needed, following age-old Chinese diplomatic
patterns, to use a distant barbarian to balance the threat
from the barbarian nearby--a point we fully grasped at the
time.

The United States' goals were to prevent a Soviet attack
on China, to isolate the Soviet Union, to achieve the freedom
of maneuver to end the Vietnam War and ~~overcome its legacy~~,
and to avoid military conflict over Taiwan.

Twenty-five years after the war

This is what the conversations were about. Professor
Spence takes Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary--
drawn from a standard catechism--more literally than he would
Chinese texts. In the end, both China and the United States

02-10-99 20:40 TO:

FROM:212 753 7248

P05

FEB-10-1999 20:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.06

02-10-99 20:41 TO:

TOTAL P.06

FROM:212 753 7248 P06

FEB-10-1999 20:53

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.01

2/10/99-#4

I respect no China scholar more than Jonathan Spence who
has influenced my own thinking more than any other. I value
our personal relationship. My comments on his review of <u>The
Kissinger Transcripts</u> edited by William Burr should therefore
be read as minor differences in emphasis.

Professor Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard
that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress had
been placed there to prevent access to them under the Freedom
of Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers
in advance of publication--is as follows. Every document in
the Library of Congress is the copy of an original in the
State Department, the Ford Library, or the National Archives.
(The only exceptions are telephone conversations ruled by the
US Supreme Court as private. However, these are being

FEB-10-1999 20:53

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.02

2

processed for publication by the State Department historians
[per] an agreement of October 1998.) Every document cited in
<u>The Kissinger Transcripts</u> has been available under the Freedom
of Information Act on the basis of regulations established by
the US Government. I have no say in these decisions. Mr.
Burr required no "special ingenuity" to obtain them.

Professor Spence, who over the years has greatly
enlightened me on the context of China's history, should be
equally meticulous in drawing conclusions from dependent
clauses and isolated phrases in individual diplomatic
conversations. For example, the diplomacy of December 1971
involved a complex minuet revolving around our concern that
Pakistan, which had just facilitated our opening to China, not
be reduced to impotence by a de facto Soviet-Indian alliance.
At the same time, China was angling for reassurance from the
United States in the guise of talking tough. With neither

FEB-10-1999 20:54

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.03

FEB-10-1999 20:54

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.04

4

What brought the two sides together were not phrases used at this meeting but genuine common concerns. China, threatened by 42 Soviet divisions along its borders, was eager to break out of its self-imposed diplomatic isolation. To that end, it needed, following age-old Chinese diplomatic patterns, to use a distant barbarian to balance the threat from the barbarian nearby--a point we fully grasped at the time.

The United States' goals were to prevent a Soviet attack on China, to isolate the Soviet Union, to achieve the freedom of maneuver to end the Vietnam War and to overcome its legacy, and to avoid military conflict over Taiwan.

FEB-10-1999 20:54

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.05

5
achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than
Professor Spence might wish. This is the essence of
successful diplomacy and why the initial pattern has lasted
through every administration of both American political
parties ever since.

TOTAL P.05

FEB-10-1999 15:18

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.01

2/10/99-#3

There is no China scholar I respect more than Jonathan
Spence. He has influenced my own thinking more than any
other. I value our personal relationship. My comments on his
review of *The Kissinger Transcripts* edited by William Burr
should therefore be read as minor differences in emphasis.

Mr. Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard that
the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress were placed
in compliance with the Freedom of
Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers in
advance of publication--is as follows. Every document in the
Library of Congress is a copy, the original of which is either
in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National
Archives. (The only exceptions are telephone conversations
regulated by the Supreme Court to be private. These have

FEB-10-1999 15:18

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.01

2/10/99-#3

There is no China scholar I respect more than Jonathan Spence. He has influenced my own thinking more than any other; I value our personal relationship. My comments on his review of *The Kissinger Transcripts* edited by William Burr should therefore be read as minor differences in emphasis.

Mr. Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress were placed there to prevent their accessibility under the Freedom of Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers in advance of publication--is as follows. Every document in the Library of Congress is a copy, the original of which is either in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National Archives. (The only exceptions are telephone conversations [ruled] by the Supreme Court to be private. These have,

FEB-10-1999 15:18

KHI DC

212 753 7248

2

however, been made available to the State Department historian
by an agreement of October 1998.) Every document cited in The
Kissinger Transcripts has been available under the Freedom of
Information Act on the basis of regulations established by the
US Government. I have no say in these decisions. Mr. Burr
required no "special ingenuity" to obtain them.

Mr. Spence, who has greatly enlightened me on China's
historical context, should not draw profound conclusions from
dependent clauses and isolated phrases of a single diplomacy
conversation. For example, the diplomacy of December 1971
involved a complex minuet in which our concern was that
Pakistan, having just facilitated our opening to China, not be
humiliated by a Soviet-Indian de facto alliance. At the same
time, China was angling for reassurance from the United States
while talking tough. Neither Washington nor Beijing was
prepared to use force, but each was calibrating its measures

FEB-10-1999 15:18

KHI DC

212 153 1248 P.03

to avoid being charged with the consequence of that decision
while seeking to protect the territorial integrity of West
Pakistan. The discussions about intelligence matters should
be read in that context. No significant intelligence
information was, in fact, exchanged at that point.

On the more important issue of who benefited more from
the US-China relationship, it is no doubt true that Mao
applied traditional Chinese methods; what other methods would
one expect him to apply? It is also true that I recognized
these nuances less well at the time than I would today. But
the lacunae in my knowledge made no practical difference.

What brought the two sides together were not phrases at a
meeting but genuine common concerns. China was threatened by
42 Soviet divisions along its borders. It was eager to break
out of its self-imposed diplomatic isolation. And it needed,
following age-old Chinese diplomatic patterns, to use a

FEB-10-1999 15:19

KHI DC

212 753 7248 P.04

distant barbarian to balance the threat from the barbarian
nearby.

The United States wanted to prevent a Soviet attack on
China, to isolate the Soviet Union, to achieve freedom of
maneuver to end the Vietnam War, to overcome its legacy, and
to avoid military conflict over Taiwan.

This is what the conversations were about. Mr. Spence
should not take Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary
too literally. For both sides achieved the results they
sought, if less elegantly than Mr. Spence might wish. And
this is why the initial pattern has lasted through every
administration of both our political parties ever since.

TOTAL P.04

FEB-10-1999 13:47

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.04

2/10/99-#2

FEB-10-1999 13:47

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.05

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KAI DC

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to avoid being charged with the consequence of that decision, while seeking to can protect the constitutional integrity of West Berlin.

On the more important issue of who benefited more from the relationship, it is no doubt true that Mao applied traditional Chinese methods; what other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true that I recognized these methods less well at the time than I would today. But the lacunae in my knowledge made no practical difference.

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This is what the conversations were about. Mr. Spence
should not take Mr. Burr's tendentious and petty commentary
too literally. For both sides achieved the results they
sought, if less elegantly than Mr. Spence might wish. And
this is why the initial pattern has lasted through every
administration of both our political parties since.

TOTAL P.07

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KAI DC

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2/10/99-#2

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KH1 DC

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to avoid being charged with the consequence of that decision.

On the more important issue of who benefited more from the relationship, it is no doubt true that Mao applied traditional Chinese methods; what other methods would one expect him to apply? It is also true that I recognized these less well at the time than I would today. But the lacunae in my knowledge made no practical difference.

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KAI DC

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4

nearby.

TNTAI P 07

FEB-10-1999 12:38

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.01

2/10/99

There is no China scholar I respect more than Jonathan Spence. He has influenced my own thinking more than any other; I value our personal relationship. My comments on his review of _The Kissinger Transcripts_ edited by William Burr should therefore be read as minor differences in emphasis.

Mr. Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress were placed there to prevent [their accessibility under] the Freedom of Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers-- is as follows. Every document filed in _The Kissinger Transcripts_ is a copy, the original of which is [either] in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National Archives. They are available under the Freedom of Information Act on the basis of regulations established by the US

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4
sides achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than
Mr. Spence might wish. And this is why the initial pattern
has lasted through every administration since (of both our
political parties.)

TOTAL P.04

FEB-10-1999 12:38

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.01

2/10/99

Mr. Spence had no reason to doubt Mr. Burr's canard that the papers I deposited in the Library of Congress were placed there to prevent [their accessibility under] the Freedom of Information Act. The truth--known to Mr. Burr's publishers--is as follows. Every document [cited] in *The Kissinger Transcripts* is a copy, the original of which is [either] in the State Department, the Ford Library, or the National Archives. They are available under the Freedom of Information Act on the basis of regulations established by the US

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Government. I have no [say] in these decisions. Mr. Burr
required no "special ingenuity" to obtain them.

Mr. Spence, who has [greatly enlightened] me [on] China's
historical context, should not draw profound conclusions from
dependent clauses and isolated phrases of a single
conversation. The diplomacy of December 1971 involved a
complex minuet in which [our concern was that] Pakistan,
having just facilitated our opening to China, not be
humiliated by a Soviet-Indian de facto alliance [at the same
time] China was angling for reassurance [from the United
States] while talking tough. Neither Washington nor Beijing
was prepared to use force, but [each] was calibrating its
measures to achieve the best results short of this. No
significant intelligence information was, in fact, exchanged.

On the more important issue of who benefited more from
the relationship, it is no doubt true that Mao applied

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3

traditional Chinese methods which I recognized as such less
well at the time than I would today. I would not have been
surprised to discover this, but the lacunae made no practical
difference.

China was threatened by 42 Soviet divisions along its
borders. It was eager to break out of its self-imposed
diplomatic isolation. And it needed, following age-old
Chinese diplomatic patterns, to use a distant barbarian to
balance the threat [from the barbarian nearby].

The United States wanted to prevent a Soviet attack on
China, to isolate the Soviet Union and achieve freedom of
maneuver to end the Vietnam War, and then to overcome its
legacy.

This is what the conversations were about. Mr. Spence,
with his great sense of context, should not take Mr. Burr's
tendentious and petty commentary too literally. For both

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4
sides achieved the results they sought, if less elegantly than
Mr. Spence might wish. And this is why the initial pattern
has lasted through every administration since of both our
political parties.

TOTAL P.04