TELCON

November 19, 1973/10:10 a.m.

Bill Timmons/HAK

K: Bill can you explain to me. What the hell this is about Sonnenfeldt. It's beyond my comprehension.
you

T: When did you plan to submit his thing.

K: In about two or three weeks.

T: The Congress would either like to confirm him and have us swear him in or not swear him for the Treasury post or withdraw him because Mansfield said it's not fair to single one out and therefore he's holding about 24 I think nominations up.

K: Who put him up to that. That does not sound like Mansfield.

T: No it is. We've talked to him. Brent has talked to him. Everybody has talked to him and that's what he wants to do. So our options is either to withdraw him now or go ahead and let him be confirmed. Frankly I see nothing wrong with having him confirmed by the Senate and not sworn in.

K: When is that going to happen.

T: As soon as we can get approval to go ahead that way. He doesn't want to do that of course. He says that's unfair to have him confirmed when they know full well he's not going to be sworn in. What's your preference on it? You'd prefer to have him just sit where he is. Right?

K: Until I nominate him but I've got three guys that I need in the Department that aren't being confirmed. Is it clear though that if he is confirmed and not sownr.
T:

K: It makes absolutely no difference to me. I just want to get my 3 guys through and it isn't any reflection on Hal not to confirm him now since the whole Senate gets a chance at confirming him anyway. The Committee has confirmed him. If the Senate has any doubts about him they can refuse him when he comes up through the State.

T: I think we can probably swing him this week probably get him confirmed because I believe that's the only way we'll clear out the other nominees we've got is to have Hal confirmed and Felch just won't swear him in for two weeks until you send him up as another nomination.

K: OK.

T: I think we can work that. There was another problem connected with this
in that one of the Senators had a hold on him but we can work that out
I think.

K: Do you want to move on that today. So I can get my guys confirmed.
If it's necessary I'll call Mansfield I'm sure he'll do it.

T: I think he'll confirm him. I don't believe there is any problem on that
but he's not going to let him just sit up there by himself and go ahead
and move the other nominations.

if

K: Well, / you can say that I intend to appoint him to something in State
I see no reason why he cannot pull him out.

T: He's been reluctant to do that Henry. For two weeks we've been arguing
with him and you may want to call him and see if he'll do that.

K: Why don't you first give me a report.

T: OK.

K: Now secondly your various notes about the committees I have to meet.
Let me say this. Everybody knows that the President is very grandiose
about signing me up. Everyone of these meetings takes a morning.
I've got to run a department, do the NSC job and conduct all the
negotiations and keep running around the world. It's just humanly
impossible to do all these things. Now this week I'm meeting with
the Senate Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations, I think the
Senate Armed Services Committee next week I'll meet with the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and I'll be willing to meet with the Armed
Services Committee but I can't be just thrown around. The curse of
this Administration is that they drive everything into the g.d. ground.

T: I know. But rest assured that wasn't my idea. He hits me on that every
damn time I see him.

K: But you know he is only thinking two days ahead. Just between you and me
I fail to understand what he is doing with all these sessions with
congressmen except building a trap for himself.

T: Well he's trying to restore the confidence in his office and while some
of the press has been bad with some of the guys who go out and leak stuff
but generally they have been very good this last week.

K: Have you. Were you there.

T: All of them. 9 of them he had and they're very positive we don't get much
news story out of those just the guys that go out and leak bad things but

really and truly they have been....

K: That's his problem. I can just worry about my problem. My problem is that don't sign me up for these things. I'm here now for 3 weeks before I go on the road again.

T: Of course I have not gone to the hill and told the members. I've sent notes to you every time he asks me about it.

K: I'm not blaming you for it. He zaps me every time.

T: If you and are doing the Foreign Relations and Armed Services this week and are open to do the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services later, like next week or within 10 days, I think that will cover his....

K: If the Committee asks me.....

T: Of course. OK.

K: Bye.

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TELCOM
Peter Lisagor/HAK

November 19, 1973/10:36 a.m.

K: Hello

L: Hello

K: Peter, how are you.

L: Fine, how are you Henry.

K: You're the one cynic I didn't have on my trip.

L: The one cynic. Were they all that cynical?

K: No. We had a good time.

L: It sounded like it. I wish I had been along. The party hierarchs - that is the Gridiron Club hierarchs - thinks that I have some special influence with you and I tried to disabuse them of it but I told them I would do this.

K: It is true.

L: I would call you and again reaffirm their invitation to you for their winter dinner which is December 8. They are very anxious to have you there. You know, it's a black tie. It's a small dinner and they are having some White House types. You've done it once before.

K: Is that just to attend or to speak?

L: I suspect they want you to speak but you know you would be the ranking member of the Administration who would be there so...

K: Peter, my problem is that the NATO meeting begins on the 9th.

L: I wasn't aware of that.

K: It begins on the 10th but I could conceivably go to the dinner and leave right afterwards.

L: Yes. They are very anxious to have you and of course I would be pleased as everybody would, if you could make it. It is quite informal and a good fun evening.

K: I've been there.

L: You were there once before, I remember. I'm still quoting some of your remarks about Bismarck and so on but I just wanted to reinforce their invitation. I think you have somewhere a formal invitation.

K: Let me tell you something. A friend of mine from the Rockefeller office wrote me a letter congratulating me for being appointed Secretary of State two months ago. He received a reply last week thanking him for his helpful suggestions on the Middle East crisis.

L: Yeah, I know.

K: Signed by the Asst. Secretary for Public Affairs. So where that damn thing is in the State Department I have no way of knowing.

L: But just put it down and if you can, everybody would love to have you and appreciate your being there.

K: December 8. It can't be the 7th.

L: No, it's set in concrete because it's a Saturday night and I guess for that reason they've made the arrangements for the hall and it's a small intimate thing.

K: I remember it very well and had a lot of fun. Look, I'll do my best to make it.

L: Alright. I'll tell them that and if the President, whoever it is, I'm not sure, wants to do something more about getting something to you so you'll have it for.

K: I think I haven't got a formal invitation but that doesn't prove a thing.

L: I'll tell them to do that. Are you bearing up alright? You didn't realize it but they had a good couple of shots of you at the football game yesterday.

K: No, I didn't realize that.

L: Yes, you were eating peanuts. You've got to watch it you know.

K: I really have to be....

L: Where that camera is on you. Well it was a great trip from all accounts.

K: We had a lot of fun and I think we did some good. OK. Peter thanks. Bye.

TELECON

Marshall Wright/ Secretary Kissinger

November 19, 1973

3:05

K: Is that Armed Services thing all set? It has become inconvenient.

W: For Wednesday at 10:00. I am sorry.. has it become inconvenient now.

K: Yes.

W: They have already sent notices out and it would be inconvenient to..

K: The only reason is I wanted to give a press conference on Wednesday.

W: What about Wednesday afternoon?

K: Well, you know people want to get away and

W: I think attendance would be bad for our people in the afternoon.

K: Well, then I'll have to do it in the afternoon.

W: They would go up the wall if they were postponed for a press conference.

K: OK

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/16/73</td></tr><tr><td>TO C.A.R.A. Date 6/16/73</td></tr><tr><td>BY OK</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Mr. Stoessel/Secretary Kissinger

November 19, 1973

5:10

K: ...that the Europeans have now proposed a bilateral declaration to the Japanese.

S: I saw that and also to the Canadians. The Danes went in to see them.

K: Did they give us any indication ahead of time?

S: Not specifically, no.

K: But they never formally informed us.

S: No. It has been.. the idea floating around but they never formally informed

K: I think that should be mentioned as an example of totally inaccurate consultation.

S: We'll do that.

K: What do you think of it.

S: It is conceivable.. the Japanese don't like it.

K: I don't know whether these goddamn declarations are worth it. Do you?

S: I am beginning to doubt it, but we have come so far to stop it would be bad. I think the Declaration on NATO is pretty good, though it... which gives us too much of a we and they.. and what comes out of the EC will not be that bad. To stop it all with everything else might be too much.

K: We could just shelve it for a year.

S: So much depends on timing of the President's trip and how it might tie in with the declaration of NATO.. you could have a ministerial for that and the President goes later.. which may tie in with CSCE..

K: Well, let me think about it.

S: We'll be getting up some recommendations to you.

K: Why don't you think about what could be done?

*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Rabin
11/20/73; 8:30 a.m.

(Missed the first part)

R: All right, I will try to be in touch with you.

K: Do you want to have breakfast on Saturday?

R: I would love to.

K: Good! Why don't we do that?

R: Fine. At what time?

K: Oh, I don't know whether any of our places are open at about 8:30. Let's say about 8:30 at the State Department unless I tell you to the contrary.

R: All right. I'll check with your office Friday morning.

K: Good. Where will you stay in case there is any -- in case all the offices are closed. Mine are usually not closed.

R: I don't know -- either the Embassy or one of the hotels. It is better that I will try to find out with you.

K: Call me through the White House switchboard. They will know how to find me.

R: Fine.

K: Good.

R: Well, I would love to see you.

K: Look forward to seeing you. A lot has happened since we saw each other.

R: And all the best.

K: Good. Look forward to seeing you.

R: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Senator Scoop Jackson
11/20/73; 9:21 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Henry.

K: Scoop.

J: You sound pretty good. You must have had quite a trip!

K: Yes, it really was something. Scoop, people here tell me that you are mad at me because I won't see you. I can't believe that.

J: Why that's nonsense. I had a call yesterday from the press who said had a met with Henry Kissinger and I said no.

K: Flanigan tells me you are willing to withdraw the Jackson Amendment if I only asked you to do it.

J: How many barrels of oil can you get me?

K: No, you would do that just because I asked you -- wouldn't you?

J: (Laughter) Sure.

K: I want you to do that on a day on which there wasn't much other news so that we could get a headline.

J: (Laughter) Listen, someone called yesterday and asked. . .

K: We could go to a Synagogue together and announce it there.

J: Absolutely. And I'll be the Rabbi -- you be the Cantor.

K: You are much better qualified to be a Rabbi than I, that's for sure.

J: I am going to have my Bar Mitzvah later. Henry, listen. . .

K: Give you a Bar Mitzvah without being able to read Hebrew.

J: I'll do it in Yiddish. Henry, listen, someone called. I was on the Floor -- we had seventeen roll calls getting this emergency bill through. Someone called the office and asked if I had met with you and I said no I have not. And are you planning? and I said no, I don't have any immediate plans. Some press guy called and that must be the origin of it.

- 2 -

K: No, no. This I didn't know about. But Peter Flanigan, to be honest, feels that I am killing the trade bill because I am insulting you by not being willing to accept the compromise you are dying to offer on the Jackson Amendment.

J: Peter is naive. It's totally nonsense.

K: That was my impression.

J: You and I can have some honest differences but there is nothing personal in any of it.

K: Oh, well...

J: We will have you over at the house soon.

K: Well, I am a great admirer of yours.

J: You know there is nothing in that. We have our minor disagreements but...

K: You are not ready to offer a compromise on the Jackson Amendment, are you?

J: No. No. Listen, I am up to my eyeballs trying to get a few of these energy problems squared away.

K: Well, I would like to talk with you -- I mean I will be glad to include the Amendment but I think...

J: I would like to hear about your trip.

K: Well, that's what I think. We ought to have a review of the whole international situation.

J: Well, I would like to sit down and kick it around with you.

K: When -- what are your plans.

J: Well, I am going to get away Thanskgiving Day. My wife and I are just going down to Williamsburg for a couple of days just to rest up and do a little catch up on the reading. You know I haven't had a chance. It's been hell here.

By 01 NARA Date 6/26/64
DECLASSIFIED

- 3 -

K: Well, if you do any reading you will be ahead of me to begin with.

J: I haven't looked at a book for so long.

K: The only way people get me to read books is to stamp Top Secret on every page.

J: (Laughter) What are your plans? Are you going to ...

K: I'll stay here now. How about getting together next week sometime. Or over the weekend.

J: All right. Listen, I get back on Sunday. Could I do this, Henry: let me check my situation out and I will have my girl check with yours. Let's do it that way.

K: Good. And then I'd like to talk with you about the international aspects of the oil problem.

J: Well, I want to go over the whole picture with you and what our options are and a few things and I want to hear about especially your trip to China.

K: Well, that's another thing I want to talk with you about. The Chinese, after you have seen your colleagues visit there, have put a clamp on all Congressional visits. But they do want you! Seriously.

J: Really?

K: They are very anxious for you to come.

J: They know I am not the other guy, you know.

K: No, no, I am serious. The only two Senators they want to have come until late next summer is Mansfield to whom they have a long-standing commitment. But the one they are really eager to see is you. And ...

J: And who?

K: And no one else. Just you.

11/20/73; 9:21 a.m.

J: All right. Let me just see where we are and I will get back later in the day.

K: They really think you are the only Democrat that really understands international politics.

J: I really want to go over and . . .

K: Well, you ought to . . .

J: To talk and not just sightsee!

K: Look, I can arrange anything you want.

J: I know you can.!

K: I don't have to arrange it. But you will find that they are the only people that you can talk to in the world today who have an overall grasp of the situation.

J: Right. Listen, I will get back, Henry, and we will work out a mutual satisfactory time.

K: Good.

J: Okey-doke. Bye.

By 01 NARA Date 4/28/69
DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Hal Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger

November 20, 1973

4:10 p.m.

K: First, on the Japanese, are you familiar with the latest ....

S: No.

K: After refusing the Japanese in a tri-lateral effort, now they have sent a note to the Japanese inviting them to a bi-lateral declara-
tion. Any effort that includes the U.S. would be so vague as to be meaningless, they say, while they themselves could have a very
interesting bilateral __________. I'm very interested in what
they mean about our participation would make it meaningless.

S: They have been saying that for some time.

K: My point is ....

S: I understand what you're saying.

K: It's not a friendly note. To do that without consultation with us ....

S: They want to do it as the nine. ____

K: They are deliberately undercutting us in an effort to set up with the Russians in the Middle East and trying to get themselves involved.

S: That can be pretty quickly turned off by the Israelis can't it.

K: Yah.

S: My point is that there are benefits we would be losing.

K: If George Shultz were more disciplined he could say I can't
say anything because you guys are so bloody minded.

S: Essentially not in our interests. There's a meeting in January.
This is what we are preparing for. Flexible systems are what we
have been working for essentially and what we want, and therefore
something general is in our interests, we may have to sacrifice.

K: What do you think, I mean in the light of all the additional information?

S: We have got to measure the benefits ...what we get out of it
without Europeans. My feeling we should ____ or at least postpone

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      <td>Authority: EO 12958</td>
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2.

it indefinitely,....

K: Well, not indefinitely.

S: Well, in physical terms it would be difficult to reconstitute this particular group before January. ______ queasy about the effect on balance of payments. It's difficult to characterize and it gets to be very ramified. We might find it necessary to go back to the Europeans to get discipline in the monetary system. We may find we have lost valuable time. I'm reluctant to drop this one. Although, Shultz can use the occasion to say some tough things to them.

K: He won't.

S: I don't know. It's pretty clear to him what your feelings are. Its a matter of programming them right.

K: Let's think about it.

S: Uh, did you make the arrangement with Mansfield on my nomination?

K: Not yet.

S: ______ says its all settled on the nominations. They will go forward on Dec. 10. That's a bad deal. It will give them a target to vote on it. They will go forward on everything except mine and mine will go on Dec. 10.

K: We'll pull it back before then.

By 01 NARA Date 4/3/1969

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

November 20, 1973

5:11 pm

K:..... NATO again?

D: On the contrary. I am trying to support you in the UN

K: That's good. Two things, Anatoyl. I cannot have lunch tomorrow because I am giving a press conference.

D: I noticed. You could be influenced by your talk with me. What about Friday?

K: Friday I can't make lunch, but we can meet during the day.

D: Alright.

K: What about Thursday?

D: Well,

K: That's Thanksgiving.

D: Are you working?

K: I probably will be working.

D: Are you free on Thursday?

K: Let me call you tomorrow, probably yes.

D: If you like, we can meet on Friday at 4 or 5.

K: Alright then, otherwise we will meet Friday during the day. The other thing is we got reports from the Europeans .. that the Syrians want the British and French to participate in the Conference.

D: This could be.

K: Under these auspices it will turn into a nightmare.

D: I understand. I know when we discussed just after you left Middle East with the Egyptians and Syrians, they said alright except the French

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012058
By: L.W. Parry Date: 04/30/73

will say the Syrians were not that precise... but prepared to say that
we are toying with the idea of maybe four. I have no additional
information.

K: The Egyptians are willing to go along and the Jordanians.
The Israelis would not accept.

D: We didn't encourage..

K: I think it is essential that you use your influence with the Syrians.

D: May be could be more precise in joint action.

K: I am prepared to have a joint letter. I would like you to find out
from the Syrians if they would accept a joint letter from you and me.
The most effective would be if you and we wrote a letter to the
Secretary-General.

D: Saying that we are..

K: That it is our understanding that all sides are prepared to accept.
We have not asked the Israelis formally and we have not heard from
the Egyptians.

D: I put this way. Let's say in the middle of next week, on Tuesday
or Wednesday

K: Let's say Wednesday.

D: OK, next Wednesday, we are prepared to send a joint letter to Waldheim
and that it is our understanding they are prepared to accept.

K: Exactly.

D: And the Syrians..

K: Would you check about..

D: This is the point. I will check with Moscow if it is acceptable.
Could you send me a little draft?

K: I will send.

D: If you could send a draft over by one of your messengers.

K: Tomorrow morning.

DECLASSIFIED
10/27/77
W.W.

10/27/77
8:00

D: Tomorrow morning. OK, tomorrow you send your letter.

K: Exactly.

D: How is the cease-fire going?

K: By Middle East standards, reasonably well.

D: What about troops?

K: I think you and we could probably agree.. those two could never.

D: I hope now the Egyptians will give you..

K: These stories are not true. The Egyptians say they will do something in 24 hours and we never hear from them again.

D: OK, you send your letter in draft tomorrow.

K: OK

END

DECLASSIFIED

D: We didn't encourage..

D: Saying that we are..

K: Let's say Wednesday.

K: Exactly.

D: And the Syrians..

K: Would you check about..

K: I will send.

K: Tomorrow morning.

By O1 NARA Date 4/30/69

DECLASSIFIED

K: Exactly.

D: What about troops?

K: OK

END

DECLASSIFIED

By OT NARA Date 4/28/64

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary-General Waldheim
11/21/73; 9:05 a.m.

(Missed the first part)

W: I hope you are not too tired.

K: No.

W: I know what such a trip does -- means. Dr. Kissinger, I have tried to keep you informed through my last letter but of course there are a number of developments which I think are important. As far as Syria is concerned, the things are not going too well. The Guyia mission -- he is back now -- did not really produce a breakthrough. They insist he had a long talk with President Asad. They insist on the return to the 5th of October lines and a return of the 15,000 civilians. They would then exchange the prisoners. Send back those Israeli prisoners. But there is one of hope. That is that they are negative on some sort of meetings. Perhaps even military meetings following the example on the Egyptian front. I don't know what that will produce. Unfortunately the Ambassador here is not -- I don't have the impression that he is really authorized to have negotiations on this subject. But both sides -- Mrs. Meir and President Assad insisted heavily on continuing to talk, especially Assad. Mrs. Meir -- they appreciate the fact that I send Guyia there and that we are trying to be helpful and repeatedly insisted to continue to talk. So I do not exclude that something will finally come out. So I thought I should let you know this.

K: Well, I appreciate this. I understand that you and I are going to get together in the next few days.

W: Well, I suggested that. I would be very happy to see you and to discuss more in detail the situation but I haven't got any information from your office when you would suggest that I come for insistence to Washington -- if it is easier for you or whether it is when you are here in New York. I leave it to you. You are very busy now and I can imagine it is not too easy for you to come.

K: No, I approved yesterday.

W: Oh, I didn't know.

K: And I am sure we will be working it out within the next day.

W: Oh, very good. So I will get then the information from your Mission here.

K: Absolutely.

11/21/73; 9:05 a.m.

-2-

W: Well, I hope you get the regular information I send to your mission here. I get quite interesting reports on the meetings on the road, Cairo-Suez 101. Our ________ people are sending me regular reports. Detailed reports and I hope the mission is sending all this to you because I instructed my people to give all the information he gets to your Ambassador. Unfortunately Scali, the poor man, is now very sick.

K: No, I do receive this and I appreciate it very much.

W: Well, it is of interest.

K: I know. And I appreciate all your cooperation.

W: We are keeping close contact with your mission -- Ambassador Bennett now -- and I hope . . . But I have one last problem, Mr. Secretary, and it is this. Malak is bothering me day and night.

K: We will absolutely not agree to this.

W: Yeah, yeah. I just wanted to know . . . it

K: You know/is an absurdity on that basis. They are right back to their original 72.

W: Exactly. I think this seems to be their idea. To get the 72.

K: We will not agree to it.

W: Because he gives the impression that you would be inclined to, etc. so because yesterday he tried to reach me again and I . . .

K: It is absolutely not. I would like myself to be kept out of it personally. But you can assume that our delegation speaks totally for me.

W: Good. So, we speak -- stick to the sixth. (36th?)

K: Absolutely.

W: I shall then give him this answer.

K: Good. I shall see you soon.

W: Thank you very much. Good-bye, Mr. Secretary.

TELECON

Ambassador Dinitz/ Secretary Kissinger

November 22, 1973

2:35

D: This is based on a good source that has proved itself in the past.

K: What is the information?

D: I have passed this to Scowcroft and it says there is a concentration of armour as well as cannons and complete readiness of infantry along the front...the military posture of the Syrian...with information that the Soviets are encouraging the Egyptians by telling them that they have a good chance to succeed.

K: What is your judgment?

D: They might try to force a military decisive move..

K: But, what is your judgment.

D: I don't have this... we are trying to avoid it.

K: I can't believe you would be surprised twice.

D: We are not.

K: No, no. I mean you won't let them..

D: I am saying this to you on my own. We are not trying to preempt. We will try to preserve the structure for negotiations.

K: I will get in touch with the Soviets.

D: I think that would be ... maybe with the Egyptians. The Syrians are also on the alert position. The Prime Minister asked me to bring this to your attention.

K: I will reach both of them.

D: I do have some information about kilometer 101 bit I will tell it to Scowcroft.

K: Nothing important.

D: We have gone ... to say the UN can stay on our side...

K: I wish you would stop making proposals.

By 01 NARA Date 4/28/68

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCOM
Guido Goldman - Secretary Kissinger

November 21, 1973

4:00 p.m.

K: I got your message about these Jewish leaders you thought I should see.

G: Klutznik is a central figure who would coordinate it, Gus Levy, Lazarus.

K: My question is if I talk to them will they turn up at the Israeli Embassy an hour later.

G: Absolutely not. Now, in addition I think there should be a couple of others from the academic community, like Ed Levy.

K: Who's Ed Levy?

G: Chancellor of the University of Chicago. Henry Rosovsky.

K: How about Dave Landers.

G: Sure, although don't want to get too many from Harvard. Anyway, they feel very much the same, there has to be an element

K: Who's going to get them together?

G: Klutznik.

K: Well, I would love to see them if they asked for an appointment, but I would much prefer they ask than I ask for them.

G: Oh, no. you must not ask them.

K: You can be sure I will see them. I would like to do it next week. What I would like to do is see Klutznik alone for about 15 minutes, and then....

G: I will ask Klutznik to call you. Do you need any background on him.

K: Well, I have some, but....

G: Just briefly, he's been active in many Jewish organizations, he knows a great many people, he's a very wealthy self-made industrialist, he's a person a moderate, more moderate than my father.

2.

Can control him more than my father.

K: Well, I don't want to control him, I just want to tell him what the problem is.

G: He and I have talked about a much larger group which would be supportive of American policy and it may create a tremendous....

K: Are you coming with your father?

G: No, I can't get to Washington until later.

K: Why don't we shift the appointment so you can both come.

G: I will call. Also, If I could have 5 minutes alone with you I would like to explain the relationship with the Governor.

K: Don't worry about that.

G: I really can't do it.

K: I don't think you should.

G: Good Henry. See you next week.

TELCORN
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin

11/22/73 10:32 a.m.

D: ...... to make a movie, about our diplomacy--it will be a documentary
more or less but in a very positive way.

K: Right.

D: And they asked me to check if it is possible to make a picture of
maybe, you and me.

K: Certainly.

D: So the question really is, for instance, if -- and this is the man who
worked for --he is a permanent here and at the same time worked
for the Ministry of __________. Could you make--he asked me on a very
short thing--if for instance I would come to you, then he would go out
with me, he would just make a few short; is it possible?

K: Certainly. The only problem is--you know it doesn't bother me. I
am only wearing sports clothes today--

D: I think it doesn't matter really.

K: And I just don't want you audiences to think that I treat you too casually.

D: (laughs) I think it will be all right.

K: Otherwise we will do it some other time.

D: But could you arrange it?

K: Certainly. Do you want to do it now?

D: I could wait for an answer for another time. Just want to --

K: No, I will definitely do it.

D: Okay, there is no need for me to press it now, but within let's say, next
week we'll do it--will that be all right with you?

K: That will be fine.

D: Just to make it--he would like to make it for about 1 or 2 minutes really
--because they would like to have it

K: Good and we will do it next time we meet or today?

D: What you prefer--if you think it is better for the next time,

K: I'm just wondering what, you know, your audiences in Moscow will think

D: I really don't know, frankly, they probably expect Foreign Minister to be a little bit more formally dressed

K: Then let's do it next time--
We'll certainly meet next week, so let's do it then?

D: Okay, yes, we'll do it this way

K: Okay.
I'll see you at 11:00

D: Yes, thank you very much. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012658
By: MM
Page: 01 Oct 04

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/ Secretary Kissinger

November 22, 1973

3:09

D: By some mysterious way I find you call.

K: We have had some intelligence information that substantial
Egyptian military concentrations around Israeli bridgeheads on the
West Bank and it would be a disaster if military operations start
again.

D: West, yes. This is rumor.

K: I can not judge that.

D: You want me to pass this on to Msocow?

K: I think it is important that resumption of hostilities be prevented.
We have told the Israelis we will not condone any attack by them.

D: Are they moving.. or in a deadlock.

K: I think essentially in a deadlock. I don't think they can make a
settlement in these talks.

D: Did you explain to Egyptians one hundred times..

K: Yes, 100 times. On Monday, Wednesday and Friday - yes.
But on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, - I am not so sure.

D: What is your estimate?

K: My estimate is that they can be made to understand that they are
bluffing. They can recognize..

D: Up to now, the Egyptians have mentioned to us..

K: I am not sure.. we just know about the concessions. We don't know
what they intend to do about it.

D: No, not specifically.

K: Nothing serious... if they do we will... them you can be sure. We
will not go along with any Israeli moves.

D: OK, Henry.. goodbye.

K: OK

*

TELECON

November 22, 1973

3:54 pm

D: Henry, I have just received telegram to check with you. I will tell you now. First, in Moscow noted that the President and you confirmed that you continue to adhere to understanding reached on the Middle East while you were in Moscow. From our side the Soviet Government has intentions to continue to do within the framework of that understanding.. Brezhnev asked you to tell the President.

K: I shall tell him this afternoon.

D: Secondly, as far as some rumors that the Soviet Union has tried to put French against Soviet or United States. this is completely such nonsense. no need to be regarded. this kind of rumor.
Gromyko has asked me to confirm that he is planning to take part in conference on Middle East and participate at the beginning.

K: How long?

D: Participate at the beginning stage. He didn't specify.

K: For your information, I am planning two days at the most.

D: You won't want a little bit more.

K: As much as I can give..

D: He is not planning to stay very long.

K: That was just for your information.

D: I will gladly check opinions with you on all the questions that rise in connection with conference.

K: Maybe he and I should have dinner the night before the opening.

D: Not a bad idea.

K: It would be a good symbolic gesture.

D: A good idea.

K: Why don't we suggest that.

D: I will check with Gromyko. Fourthly, as far as place of conference

TELCORN
Deputy Secretary Rush - Secretary Kissinger

November 23, 1973

12:28 p.m.

R: On the Chile destroyer thing -- there's no question thj at
we ought to give them the destroyers. The Problem is we now
have a very good foreign aid security assistance bill. Marshall
Wright feels and I feel that ____ bill passes send the other down to the
Senate.

K: When?

R: Two or three weeks. The key thing in Chile is that the
services are having to spend money to keep the destroyers
going.

K: The fact that we are going to then send them isn't going to be
I don't want our people to start building a back fire.

R: If we do it before it passes the Senate ____. Used on a
fray as a means of....

K: Must we settle it right now. I've got somebody here....

R: No, no, but I understood you wanted to do it today.

have

K: I just want to put a hold on it removed. We can discuss that
today.

R: OK. Right.

*

*

TELCONE

Kay Graham - Secretary Kissinger

November 23, 1973

12:55 p.m.

K: How are you?

G: I'm fine. How are you?

K: I'm fine. Where are you?

G: I'm right here in my little office toiling away. Where are you?

K: Right here in my own office toiling away.

G: What can I help you with.

K: The trouble with you is that you are so suspicious. All I wanted is to ask you to come for lunch on Monday.

G: Oh, the answer is yes. I don't know where I am or what I'm doing, but....let me get to my desk.

Henry, that's glorious.

K: Would you like to come alone or would you like to bring Phil or Meg, or....

G: I'd like to bring Phil.

K: It would be more scandalous if you would come alone, but....

G: More fun if Phil and Meg come.

K: Now, don't -- you realize that my...I will be looking for a job if my leader finds out.

G: You mean not to tell reporters. Where do I come, C Street?

K: Come to C Street, and come up to the 7th floor. The dining room is on the 8th floor, but....

G: What time Henry. Meg and Phil, and you wouldn't want any Murry kind of types I gather.

K: I went through 10 days with Murray....

*

Secretary Kissinger - Kay Graham

November 23, 1973

12:55 p.m.

2.

G: You don't want Ben.

K: Oh, would you like to bring Ben. Fine.

G: All right. One more thing. What about Meg's sort of co-
equal, Howard.

K: Howard who?

G: Howard Sonnet (sp?). You don't have to, I don't want to push it, but...

K: Sure, by all means, bring him too.

G: I don't want to push people on you, but.

K: No, the real reason I suggested Meg and Phil is once you invited me to your house and they were there.

G: That was because at the time you were not having anything to do with news people.

K: Well, they're not going to write about this?

G: Oh, no.

K: I have no particular ulterior motive, I mean no particular briefing I want to give.

G: I can come with just Meg and Phil alone if you think it would be nicer.

K: The only thing I don't want is a news story to come out of it. Ben and I have met. I like Ben.

G: Why don't you assume there will be 5 of us and I will let your secretary know if I am going to leave out the news people.

K: I am very fond of Ben.

G: Now, on a new question. Is there anything I can do to pleasure your weekend. Like, tonight Joe wanted me to have Lillian Hallman and -- he wanted me to give a dinner for Lillian and I guess Rabin or whatever Israeli Joe has handy.

November 23, 1973

12:55 p.m.

I thought you might want to make some brownie points before
you let them down.

K: That's not hard to do. If they only get 99% of what they asked for they feel betrayed.

G: And then I'm going to the farm.

K: I appreciate it, but I can't do it this weekend.

G: Fine, we'll try some other time. Are you getting any rest.

K: More than I had on the trip.

G: Did you ever catch up after the trip.

K: I did get a few days....last Sunday......

G: Did you get to put your head on the pillow.

K: I spend most of the day sleeping last Sunday.

G: You know there has to be a moment when you catch up, Henry.
You are very nice and I appreciate it. We will see you at one.

DECLASSIFIED

By 01 Authority
NARA Date 6/29/73

November 23, 1973

7:32PM

(Missed the first half)

K: Because that happy group is now in Algiers.

D: We have not yet discussed this text with anyone - anyone outside. First we have to agree with you and between us and then we have to proceed with Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel, in this order. If you say this is all right for the text, we consider it approved mutually by you and we are open to your suggestion. I don't know, but maybe, for instance, in those capitals where we have Ambassadors together. They could do it together. Or it could come within an hour.

K: You could do Syria alone and we could do Israel alone.

D: He simply asked me to ask your suggestion. I think we could get the corrected text to you right away - within a half hour.

K: That sounds good to me. Send it to Scowcroft - and he can send it over to me with the machine.

D: Then you will give me final answer tomorrow.

K: Either tonight or in the morning.

D: I will have to leave soon. I will be here around 11:00 o'clock. I will be in touch with you tomorrow.

K: You're going out again.

D: (laughter)

K: But I'm sure the text will be fine.

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

November 23, 1973

(Missed the first part)

(Timing on the announcement on Stessel's appointment)

S: .....the announcement from here.

K: .....but then later that day before I make the announcement.

S: .... That's what has registered to me.

.....

S: I think we can arrange that one.

K: Will you let me know as soon as possible?

S: Yes

S: I think he thinks he will be named.

K: .....OK, thank you.

TELECON

November 24, 1973

8:34

K: All we would say is the Soviet Union. and US have now been informed. Otherwise we agree except for a footnote.

D: What footnote?

K: That at the same conference the Soviet Union will announce the destruction of its SS-9s. My proposal is to put all the new ones on the submarines, and that would sink all your submarines. You remember the proposal we made last year.

D: I remember the proposal you made last year.

K: Wait a minute, one other change -- on page 2. where that new phrase you added.. and later by special appointment.. Just with Ambassadorial rank. " Take out "the." That's a minor thing. A good letter.

D: As we discussed yesterday.. the same.

K: But otherwise, that's acceptable.

D: When shall we start the meeting?

K: I understand that the Foreign Minister isn't back in Egypt.

D: Well, that's alright.

K: Frankly, we have nobody to deal with in the Foreign Ministry except the Foreign Minister.

D: Alright, when do you think?

K: As soon as he is back.

D: You mean in Egypt?

K: That's what I mean, in Egypt. In other countries we don't care.

D: In Jordan and Egypt we will act together and in Syria and in Israel we are separate. I think it should be done in Egypt.

K: Yes. Why don't we say Wednesday. I think the whole happy crew will be back on Wednesday -- or Tuesday.

By OJ NARA Date 4/2/64

DECLASSIFIED

*

- 2 -

D: Let's say Tuesday.

K: Alright, Tuesday. Except in Egypt.

D: Why?

K: Well, we don't know whom to go to except the Foreign Minister.

D: I'm sure the Acting Minister.

K: Whenever we ask for an appointment they tell us to wait.

D: I could check this because in this case the only thing.. if you go to others and not Egypt, they will be last told and not a good idea.

K: You are right. Let me check in Egypt to find out whether we can present a letter.

D: Still, let's make it Tuesday. and whatever will be because, after all, our people could check. We could do it ourselves, too.

K: But you can't do it for us.

D: What difference would that make? Couldn't we make it this way. Send instructions to our Ambassador in Cairo and to your Ambassador. and let them decide the arrangement and how to do it.

K: Good idea. Let's do it Tuesday.

D: Tuesday, let's then act together. and we will send instructions to them... with understanding that it should be Syria, and you will do the same for Israel. Nothing else for time being.

K: Good idea. Nothing else. Thank you very much.

D: Good bye.

END

TELECON
Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger

November 24, 1973

11:18

First part of conversation dealt with Verification Panel on SALT

S: Talk about this on the part.. and we need a replacement sub and a long range missile modification program.. forces.. We don't need configuration of Trident which is off-design.. You should keep in mind that that is an area of potential bargaining.. You could get a hell of a lot.

K: I agree with that but that we should put it in general negotiations.

S: Quite right. ..if you press details in that form they would take positions we can't give up.

K: We have to settle... this at one of our breakfast meetings and then you can instruct your people on Verification Panel that is to follow. Two other things, First I saw Cromer today and he said he gave you a written account of that Security Council business.

S: He read a few paragraphs.

K: He may be formally correct but he is substantively incorrect.

S: He was not convincing.. that was clear.

K: OK, just as long as you understand. Secondly, we have now agreed ... to present Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel on next Tuesday and Wednesday ask them to agree to a conference for the 17th and 18th.

S: Do you think we can get some motion from the Saudis...

K: I have had a message from Saqqaf. He says we need something concrete.... at the least I think we have a chance. Thirdly, I have had a very good talk with Rabeen. I think I am ... him about.

S: He is sensible

K: in the direction we want to move.

S: You can't get him back as Ambassador instead of what..

By 01 NARA Date 6/26/73

DECLASSIFIED

*

- 2 -

K: I told him they needed... I am fairly optimistic that in January we will make some progress of a substantive nature. The Egyptians forces cannot ... other side This if for your information.

S: Very good. Have you thought more of the ... to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait&

K: Let's get the peace talks set up first.

S: What about Hall. Do I take it that the Canadian possibility is set.

K: Does he want an ambassadorship?

S: He has to go... The Committee has raised questions about some ownership of stock and asked him to sell. He can't sell. ... he must leave by the end of the year.

K: I will tell you if I could find a way to get rid of my people over here in such a way..

S: Heh, heh, ... he is interested in the Argentine slot.

K: That's what I am thinking of.

S: We have to know by the end of the year... I take it that Sonnenflekt would not be available.

K: Right.

S: You were equivocal about Porter.

K: I haven't decided whether to keep him.

S: What about the Washington Post today.

K: That must have come from Sisco.

S: Yeah.

K: I was considering him but I hadn't told him, now..

S: He took a ... on that job.

K: I will have that settled by next week.

TELECON
Gerald Warren/Secretary Kissinger

November 24, 1973

3:35 pm

K: On that story. My worry is if I call him...well, first I never said anything.

W: Let me tell you what I said. We have no evidence that Secretary Kissinger's phone has ever been tapped. They have a denial also from your press office...but your associate stands by it.

K: Who is that?

W: Beats me.. but if you told him you never made such a statement.

K: I could have said.. now you know the plumbers weren't working for me. .or some other context. Saffire once called me up and said we now know your phone was tapped... My worry is if I call him up ... he can say.. I have the Secretary call be and said...

W: But the point is they said you know your phone is tapped and we have no information it was tapped. That's where the strong language should come in... you are quoted as saying that you were virtually certain your phone was tapped in early 1969.

K: I have no way of knowing...

W: We have said there is no evidence your phone has ever been tapped. The damaging one is whether they attributed to you that you know...

K: There are various phones and it is that point, there could have been a number of associates who were certain ... today, no one is sure and I don't think it was... I just hate for the Secretary of State to call that son of a bitch.

W: I hate to see this get out with no challenge.

K: I have had my press office deny it. What should I do?

W: I think you should call the son of a bitch, excuse me. And tell him you never said that.

K: I am not 100 per cent sure I never said it to someone, but it would have to have been a goddamn close associate.. that's my problem.

W: I suggest that you say there is no evidence

TELECON

Mr. Casey/Secretary Kissinger

November 24, 1973

4:00 pm

K: How are you?

C: Before you went off on your trip you said something about
breakfast...how about tomorrow.

K: Jesus.

C: Do you have something better to do?

K: Well, where?

C: Come around to my place and I'll give you breakfast. At 2501
Mass Avenue around the corner from the Japanese Embassy.

K: How about if I call you tomorrow.

C: Sure call me in the morning and see how you feel. I'll be at
232-2558.

K: OK. Well, I can get your number from the White House.

C: Yeah.

END

TELCORN
Amb. Bunker - Secretary Kissinger

November 26, 1973

10:50 a.m.

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine, Henry. I'm about to start off. I'll let you know by the end
of the week. I would like to do it if I am in shape to do it. I'll talk
it over with Carol. I had one other thought. I noted in the press release
about new positions that Bill Jordan was mentioned for Central America.

K: What press release?

B: Not press release, the account in the Washington Post. Bill Jordan
was mentioned possibly going to Central American. I thought, you know
he knows Torillos. He might be good there.

K: All right.

B: That was the one thought I had interms of negotiations, he is pretty
familiar with the situation there. That was one thought I just wanted
to leave with you.

K: All right. Good. Let me think about that.

B: I just wanted wanted to mention it in passing. It's not vitally important
but it might help with the negotiations in some way. I'll be in touch with you
by the end of the week.

TELCORN

Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

Sunday, November 25, 1973, 12:50 p.m.

K: Two things: I am not sure that those two paragraphs you cut out of the speech -- they are a little overstated on the foreign policy on page 2.

S: We can put them back in. It seems so narrowly focussed I did not seem to think we should bring foreign policy back in the thing.

K: Yes.

S: It is not a broad speech. It is very narrow. But if you would like them back in it is no problem.

K: If you said something while the resumption would reduce shortages we cannot plan the future on the caprices of far away governments -- something like this. That is why I announced...

S: Right.

K: He called me and he wants to send a special emissary to Saudi Arabia to get them to turn the oil on.

S: Oh?

K: He does that and he is in deep trouble with me. We cannot have this now.

S: Oh, no. That would be the worst thing possible thing to do.

K: Besides, aid will be refused. It will put us in the position of the supplicant.

S: Exactly the wrong thing to do. Where do you think he got that idea?

K: Probably from some of his oil friends. No sense worrying about it. He will calm down, don't you think?!

S: I would hope so. Goodness. That would be a disaster.

K: Sisco came in and said he is resigning because I will not give him that job and he has been offered a college presidency.

By OJ NARA Date 6/8/84
DECLASSIFIED

2.
Scowcroft - Nov. 25

S: Is that right?

K: I suppose I could change his mind but what do you think?

S: In all honesty I would not. One thing I don't like on top of the others is blackmail.

K: I don't just don't consider him steady enough.

S: I don't either. I don't think he is the one for you.

K: I will let him go. I hate to let him go because he is an asset to the government.

S: I don't think he is the one for you in that no. 3 job.

K: That is the way I think. I think I am better off keeping it for a bit.

S: I think so for a time.

K: What worries me is if I go on trips and Sisco is here alone I would hate to think what he would do.

S: He would be out of hand and Rush cannot control him that is for sure.

K: O.K. Fine. Thank you.

S: You want that statement back in the speech.

K: The way I phrased it.

S: O.K. Fine.

END

*

TELCORN

November 26, 1973/9:27 a.m.

Rowland Evans/HAK

K: Hello. Rollie how are you?

E: I'm alright.

K: You are now going from insolence to ultimatum.

E: Yes. I've been very high on you in the last two weeks, I've been praising you all over the place, saying what a great job you did with ______ but I'm beginning to have second thoughts and I want to talk to you. I went down to see my friend Stu Alsop the other day and he told me that he had to go to the hospital today for tests and then I find out out you cancelled lunch because you can't join us.

K: I didn't know we had a lunch.

E: I was told about it Friday. But you know it may be days and days before you can get ~~XX~~ us both together and I want to really see you Henry. Seriously. Do you see 20 minutes today sometime.

K: Well let me. Can you come over about 10:00 for about 10 minutes.

E: I can come over at 10 for 10 minutes. You have the 10 minutes now.

K: Listen Rollie. I've got about 15 hours with two sets of maniacs.

E: I got a full report of you last week here in Washington.

K: What am I doing last week.

E: I know what you're doing. I know how you've got plenty of time all this crap about overwork and its just nonsense.

K: I didn't say overworked but don'tworry about your clients in Saudi Arabia. We doing the thing.

E: That story was totally wrong wasn't it.

K: I didn't read it what is it.

E: They had Joe taking Porter's job. Didn't you see it in the paper.

K: Oh, Joe Sisco. There is no basis for that.

E: I know that whole story. I think it's a damn good out but not with ______.

By 01 NARA Date 63-04-04

Authority

ECO 12958

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON

Congressman Buchanan/HAK

November 26, 1973/9:54 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Mr. Secretary. John Buchanan. How are you sir?

K: OK. How are you.

B: Fine. First of all I want to tell you that you had some very fine work done in New York last week by, various folk in our mission, on this funding question for UNIF. I was just delighted with the wway we came out.

K: Good. I'm delighted.

B: Startlemyer (? ( and his group and the political people, I think did rather excellent jobs because it looked so adverse at first in terms of resolutions that would have interjected political questions and assign the quilt to Israel and cut down the Arab share and all that you know, so I know good work is done around the world but I wanted you to know how well I think your team up there performed.

K: I appreciate that very much.

B: Secondly, Armasted Seldon I understand, has been recommended to you by Senator John Sparkman, and perhaps others, for an Ambassadorial post.

K: That is correct.

B: He was of course a member of Congress from my state.

K: I know him very well.

B: I think he would make an excellent man, as you know, he has served the President and the Administration before in the Defense Department. He is a democrat which perhaps would not hurt under the present circumstances. He also is very much a Nixon man and I think he has very fine qualifications for such a post. I understand he has a specific interest in New Zealand and if that should be available Mary Jane Seldon, as you probably know, is a very bright and attractive and charming lady. I think they would both be quite an asset to the country.

K: I'm glad to have your recommendation and it's at a timely point.

By 01 NARA Date 6/8/84

DECLASSIFIED

*

B: Would you like me to follow through in writing.

K: I don't think it's necessary.

B: Very good. Well, I would highly.

K: But if you want to do it you're welcome to do it but it's not necessary.

B: Alright so now is there anything else that I might do that would be of help.

K: No, I already heard from Senator Sparkman and the recommendation of two people that I respect as much as you will weigh very heavily.

B: You are very kind doctor. I've long felt if we could just get you into the Middle East, we'd begin to see an end to our troubles and I think that is correct. I know it's just a beginning but it's a rather thrilling prospect I must say to be making some real headway at last.

K: I hope we can keep up the momentum.

B: Me too. Thank you sir.

*

TELCORN

November 26, 1973/10:34 a.m.

Carl Maw/HAK

K: Hello. How are you Carl?

M: I'm just fine thank you Henry.

K: Carl, I know this isn't strictly your problem any more but on this
business of turning over my Nobel Prize, which I've decided to do,
I just don't see that I can accept money for making peace when so
many people were killed.

M: Henry, I'm also worried about the political aspects of turning it over to any Vietnam group. It'll become a political thing if you give some of it to the North, people will criticize...

K: No, I wouldn't give it to the North. What I thought I would do is to give it to, there is an institution for Vietnam orphans.

M: Well, the points which I haven't been able to explore as yet to day is how about turning it over to the Carnegie Foundation for Administration, of a Kissinger fund for world peace somehow in a program.

K: Another thing I thought of is to set up a scholarship fund for the sons of servicemen killed in Vietnam or missing in action, or for the children.

M: There again something like that but keeping it here in this country rather than getting over there involved. After all we are going to rehabilitate the North and if we draw a line between the North and the South its very awkward but if you limit it to american people...

K: Well, I have to do something though this week and I have to find some organization to give it to.

ne

M: Is there anything wrong with the Carnegie fund that could administer it as a trust for either scholarships or for the same purpose you received it for improving the peace of the world. Could I make it...that idea of having it in the hands of an American foundation.

K: That appeals to me. I would most like to give it to something that benefits the children of servicemen who were killed or missing in action there. That's not a political thing. No one can object to that.

K: No, they certainly could not to that and that I can find a place for you to give it in two or three telephone calls.

By 01 NARA Date 4/9/04
DECLASSIFIED

*

K: Could you do that.

M: Yes. I think I might be... Yes. Let me make 2 or 3 phone calls and come back to you Henry.

K: And conceivably we could do it as a prize for contribution to peace but those things usually turn into such horrors.

M: It would have to be pretty specific.

K: And then the question arises, why didn't I keep it for the Nobel Foundation.

M: I think that is easily explained. It's a prize and you want it to go to the peaceful efforts or to help those who we lost in the struggles.

K: The children of those, that's easy.

M: Yeah. It can be a regular administered scholarship fund based on the merits.

K: Exactly. And of course, after a while, you know, it could go out of, you know they should be able to use up the capitol because those children will grow up over 20 years.

M: Yes, and that would give them an allowance so they can use capital and income for this purpose until this thing eased up.

K: Yeah.

M: I think __________ education has 2 or 3 such funds but I'd like to get it away from the political and into something that is totally private.

K: If you could make a suggestion to me so that we could... I have to write a letter by the end of this week.

M: Ok.

K: Many thanks Carl. I'll have the pleasure of swearing you in tomorrow.

M: Tomorrow at 4:15 I understand.

K: Terrific.

M: Look forward to it.

K: Good by.

By 01 NARA Date 48104
DECLASSIFIED
Authority 5012958

TELECON

November 26, 1973

10:50

K: Anatoyl, I have just received a message from our Ambassador in Cairo.

D: What message?

K: I am trying to tell you. Apparently, Virgridov is instructed to deliver the letter to Sadat or someone Sadat designates.

D: Yes.

K: But Sadat is not there and our man thinks and Virgridov agrees that they should delay submitting the letter till after Sadat returns.

D: They know what was said in our instructions to go Sadat or someone who is there...then we have to change all other embassies.

K: Both of our Ambassadors seem to agree that none is in Cairo to deliver the letter to.

D: In Jordan they have to change...so in Egypt..2 days later. Do you think it is right?

K: I would wait everywhere till Thursday or Friday.

D: I will tell..

K: It makes no difference to me.

D: If they agree, both of them in Cairo let them do what is most fitting. Only question is Egypt later than the others, but if we can't reach anyone then alright with me...have the Ambassadors postpone, yes.

K: That is my impression.

D: Maybe we do this way. Let them do it with our Ambassadors. OK

K: How about the other plan.

D: They will go through.

K: Tomorrow.

D: ...we send instructions. on 2 places..do everything together with you Ambassador and in Syria alone.

*

- 2 -

K: Apparently Virgridov said he has to deliver it to Sadat.

D: Sadat or some other official. ..... Let's wait until they get back.. I am not sure time enough to intercept instructions to other places, for example in Syria and Amman..

K: Is it possible for you to ask Moscow and let me know by this afternoon.

D: I don't know if I can get message back in time. It is 7:00 at night in Moscow...

K: Since it is at night in the Arab countries we can discuss..

D: ...maybe while they are there they can infrom Arabs..

K: I am worried about what the Egyptians will do if the Egyptians have found out from the Syrians and Jordanians that we have approached the others and we haven't gotten to them in Cairo... there will be all hell to pay.

D: I will raise this with Moscow

K: Why don't you ask Gromyko.. we will do whatever you want. The second thing, Virgridov is saying unless we have disengagement before the conference, the conference cannot take place.

D: Who did he say this to?

K: To our Ambassador. Why don't you calm him down. They won't have disengagement before the 18th.

D: OK. I will send message right away and try to get answer.

END

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON
FM Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger

November 26, 1973

12:03

R: ..you're wonderful trip around the world.

K: And congratulations to you on the spectacular way you handled
the Bogota Conference.

R: As I told you Henry, no aggressiveness. I used...in my
speech, saying we are getting to speak with Dr. Kissinger not
against Dr. Kissinger.

K: You were a major influence and would not have happened without
you.

R: ...Vasquez appointment and the 8 point..

K: He is coming up on Friday and I am inviting him to lunch.

R: I would like to get together with you, when can we meet in
Mexico?

K: In February.

R: ...for security reasons and I want to propose Cozumal..

K: I have never been there. I would love to

R: A beautiful place and for us Latin American Foreign Ministers,
to get together one or two days before your arrival to talk over
any programs beforehand. I would like to send them over and then we
can discuss these proposals and on the 3rd day get together with you...
in the latter part of February.

K: The second part of February.

R: That is fine. I want it to be smooth and I will need time to adapt
things physically and intellectually. I will make no type of official
announcement.

K: Let's plan on it..

R: In principle, we are in agreement. It should be in second part
of February.

- 2 -

K: I have two other things. We are going to make the ambassadorial appointment.. the man you suggested.

R: Fine.. the man I suggested.

K: It won't be announced so don't you announce it. What do you think of the DCM, Des. Would he be good as Ambassador to Peru.

R: He is a good man.

SANITIZED

K: I thought maybe over New Year's I would go to Acapulco from about the 29th to the 6th or 7th of January.

R: Fine. Let me put it down. December 29th to

K: Say the 7th of January.

R: I will contact them.

K: Marvelous. I have that in mind.. we have taken care of the airlines..

R: The main thing is he is a good man, but he doesn't.. anything.

K: You can be sure we will settle it in the 6 months.

R: Even Texas. I might ask you to give it back to us.

K: I knew you were going to start on that.

R: And then New Mexico. A state a year.

K: I'll give you Southern California right now.

R: We can have a meeting.

K: I'll call you at the end of this week and let you know what the ... program will be.

R: Thank you very much

END

TELCONE
Secretary Schelsinger - Secretary Kissinger

November 26, 1973

2:50 p.m.

K: How are you Jim?

S: Fine, Henry. How are you?

K: Fine.

S: I've moved the lunch to Thursday, which is what you wanted.

K: That's fine. Your getting to be almost obsequious. Just remember
I am two ranks above you in the cabinet. In the hierarchy you are no.
3, you have to try extra hard.

S: Henry, I am happy to see you any day but Tuesday. That luncheon
has been set up for some time.

K: That's fine. I was just kidding, Jim. I have talked to Otto Passman
on the Israeli thing. He needs a letter from you or me saying that this
is an emergency before he marks up the bill.

S: That a good idea.

K: I would rather have you do it in order to have my name free....

S: Well, it would be more natural for you to do it.

K: I know it would be more natural for me, but it would be better for you to
do it. Can you do it by 4:00 p.m?

S: 4:00?

K: Coordinate with Ken Rush. I have told you we're sending a letter to
Cairo, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Amman and ______.

S: Right. Did you bear down on Cromer in your conversation with him.

K: He told me he would explain it to you. He said you were an son of a
bitch and he was all right.

S: Then you didn't talk about reciprocity and intelligence and all that.

K: Not intelligence, but did talk about reciprocity. And ah...I really
told the French Ambassador that if he didn't restrain his people I
would be goddamned ______ if he made one of his slighting remarks
a bout the U.S.

By 01 NARA Date 6/8/69

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TELECON

Caryle Maw/Secretary Kissinger

November 26, 1973

5:44 pm

M: There are two organizations in that city that handle funds in various amounts. One is in Boston and one is in New York. In New York is the New York Community Trust. It is the best of the two and they would be happy to handle for you ... the purposes you have in mind. I would suggest you follow this out and you establish a fund in your name or in any name you wish for scholarships of children of Armed Services... in Viet-Nam. The decisions would be taken by a committee that would handle it at first and then they would hand it over... a group at Princeton... it is a recognized institution ... would direct the prize money on your behalf and others who would like to contribute. I suggest we call it the Henry Kissinger Fund or the Henry Kissinger Scholarship Fund. I am coming down tonight..

K: Good. I should set it up and then write the letter.

M: We set it up with one dollar and the it is done..

K: Let's talk about it after your swearing-in.. it is much better than giving to the Viet-Nam thing.

M: I talked to a man up there, a Mr. Herbert West, he said he has met you. And they were very cooperative and willing to do anything they can...

K: You're very nice. We'll talk about it tomorrow. Can you get it done by the end of the week?

M: Fine.

END

*

TELCORN

November 27, 1973/10:25 a.m.

Congressman Passman/HAK

K: Hello.

P: Mr. Secretary

K: Mr. Chairman.

P: I want to talk to you in the strictest of confidence. You requested 2 billion 2 for Israel, that's the budget request. We marked up our Bill yesterday. What I did. And the vote was 9 to 3. That was 1 billion 700 million in emergency funds and I earmarked 300 million in military sales from the January request which brought this up to 2 billion. Then I proposed and it was accepted, 1 billion dollars, not more than 1 billion, could be in grants leaving you then the right to go down to zero. This was a very crucial thing because two members, they knew right away what could happen. I said, well now listen, we've got to give the Secretary of State and Administration some flexibility in this thing. Because, here is what I want to do. And you are the only man I am going to mention this to. Not another soul until, until about an hour before I report this to the full Committee. Here is why I want to do it in two pieces. Our military or defense bills passed the full Committee yes, we cut it 3 billion dollars and this hits the headlines of the front pages of the papers then we followed with of course these supplemental appropriations which was cut very substantially. Now if I had have moved this thing out at 2.2 you understand, we could have been in serious trouble. Now, here's what I want to do. I want, the chances are 99 to 1. I need a little leeway. I think that my skids are greased, I think I'm safe but when I get into the full Committee and report this Bill I'm going to say I am in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense's letter, I have it now, "Top Secret," on top of my desk. That I am going to offer the motion in the full Committee to move it up to 2.2 you see.

K: Right.

P: If we had bought this off at 2.2 there had been so much opposition building up it could have been in trouble. Because there is a KOKO hell of a lot of money in this Bill for Israel and trying to word it and Morgan's Bill only passed by 5 votes. So I'm asking you, you're entitled to this information. My plans are to give you 2.2.

K: Well, you're a good friend.

P: Now, if you could, and I need this letter confidentially, it ought to be marked "Secret." Make a strong case for it, you understand, as you can and let me have a letter on it.

By 01 NARA Date 6/20/58

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*

K: Good. I'm at a meeting and won't be able to do it until this afternoon.

P: That's alright but make it very strong. That it is crucial, it is urgent
that no less than 2.2. Just make it as strong as you want to and I'm
going to give you 2.2.

K: Terrific.

P: And remember this, that Richard Nixon has the key to this storehouse
anytime he wants to come in. That's I feel for the man, nothing he can
do for me. Told him to make a good President and that's what he is
doing. It's our obligation to back you up because you're doing a great
job for this country. The chances are 99 to 1 that I'm going to ask
the motion in this Committee and bring this Bill onto the floor at 2.2.

K: Terrific.

P: And you're the only man I'm going to tell.

K: Mr. Chairman, many thanks and we won't forget it.

P: OK. Goodbye.

By 01 NARA Date 6/8/04
DECLASSIFIED
E012958

TEUUN

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Klessinger

November 27, 1973

4:55 p.m.

D: How are you, after having brifed all the people in Congress?

K: Annoly, I'm going to get a bipartisan foreign policy if it kills me.

D: My impression is you have already got one, after your press conference, your meetings with Fulbright, etc.

K: I think we're getting them under control.

D: I think so. How are things going? I have telegram in connection with yesterday's conversation. I have full text of conversation between your Ambassador and our Ambassador.

K: Ch, good. I understand that they submitted the letter to Fawzi today.

D: Good idea.

K: Fawzi made a few objections.

D: I have not yet the telegram.

K: The Egyptians don't want us to be co-chairmen, just participants. But let's wait until you get instructions and then we'll settle it, OK?

D: OK.

K: They want the auspices to be under the Secretary General.

D: They want the Secretary General, I never heard this kind of ideas. We discussed auspices, not participants.

K: I think we should insist on the auspices, but not on the co-chairmen.

D: The auspices, never objected to this one to my knowledge.

K: I think our European friends may be in on this one.

D: I'll say I discussed with you along these lines, auspices in Moscow, then the co-chairmen doesn't really matter.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012054
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2.

Leibnitz/Mossinger

November 27

4:55 p.m.

K: I don't care about the co-chairmen, really. I don't know if
Waldheim is bright enough to be chairman of anything.

D: I don't know if he is really going to be chairman, otherwise
we're in trouble.

K: We would like to nominate Stoezel as Ambassador. We haven't
asked for a formal agreement. Could you get approval?

D: Am I to check in an official way, or....?

K: Officially, yes. We are asking for an agreement for him.

D: Agreement for him. Fine. I will do it right away.

K: If it's not a problem.

D: No, no, no problem. When I get a reply we will follow regular
procedures as usual.

K: Secondly, Analytly, you remember we have an understanding about
release of prisoners.

D: What prisoners?

K: Israelis that the Arabs hold.

D: In Moscow when you were there.

K: The Syrians haven't even given a list and I'm afraid this is going
to cause complications if they haven't at least given a list of prisoners

D: I understand the problem.

K: If you could do something we would appreciate it.

D: I will check with Moscow and then let you know. I have no information on that at present. I will contact you on what is really going on. I'll try. I understand it would be helpful to do something along those lines.

K: Thank you.

I: I want to talk with you a little about our Ambassadors. I have
full trust in our Ambassador....my impression is simple ...that they are simply

3.

Leibniz/Wiesinger

November 27

4:55 p.m.

sent on to me what he said without correcting it or anything, according
to this he said, it was his impression the Egyptian side is not satisfied
at all by fulfillment of Israelis of agreement, by point 2, he said his
impression was that the Egyptian side is not satisfied.

K: Well, that's all right.

D: He mentioned in the telegram the Egyptians complained to him several times to the Ambassador, and his own impression was they are complaining. This would create obstacles...

K: One other thing, actually. The Israelis keep telling us that there
is extremely high readiness of Egyptian forces.

D: This could be. They make public.

K: No, no. We are telling the Israelis if there is any attack by Israel we will have to oppose them. We hope you will use your influence with the Egyptians to calm them down. We have told our Ambassador to tell the Egyptians.

K: No chance to discuss it yet.

D: No, because EMMELZ Fahmi isn't back.

K: They mentioned to us too in the sense they are afraid of some tries by the Israelis and telling them should be prepared, publically said this. Not just to us, from time to time tell us about things, but nothing in addition to my knowledge to what was said publicly. I will notify you as soon as they know ... In there any change in the elections. Are the Israelis going to change the elections?

K: If the Israelis change the elections it will not affect our determination to proceed. If the election is not until the 31st we should not put substantive matters before them, but if they delay by three months then we will go into substance right away.

D: If we must wait so to speak 3 months, it will take a lot of...

K: We will not take that much time. Only delay which is acceptable in the short.

D: This is understandable. We do understand that in Moscow.

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

November 27, 1973

4:55 p.m.

D: How are you, after having brised all the people in Congress?

K: Anatoly, I'm going to get a bipartisan foreign policy if it kills me.

D: I think so. How are things going? I have telegram in connection with yesterday's complaint. I have full text of conversation between your Ambassador and our Ambassador.

K: Oh, good. I understand that they submitted the letter to Fawzi today.

D: Good idea.

K: The Egyptians dont want us to be co-chairmen, just participate. But let's wait until you get instructions and then we'll settle it, OK?

D: OK.

D: I'll say I discussed with you along those lines, auspices in Moscow, then the co-chairmen doesn't really matter.

2.
Dobrynin/Kissinger

November 27

4:55 p.m.

K: We would like to nominate Stoessel as Ambassador. We haven't asked for a formal agreement. Could you get approval?

K: If it's not a problem.

K: Secondly, Anatoly, you remember we have an understanding about release of prisoners.

D: What prisoners?

D: I understand the problem.

D: I will check with Moscow and then let you know. I have no information on that subject from Moscow. I will check with them on what is real situation. I'll say I understand it would be helpful to do something along those lines.

K: Thank you.

D: I want to talk with you a little bit about our Ambassadors. I have full text of our Ambassador... My impression is simple ... that they simply sent on to me what he said.

By 01 NARA Date 6/8/84

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3.
Dobrynin/Kissinger

November 27

4:55 p.m.

K: Well, that's all right.

D: He mentioned in the telegram the Egyptians complained to him several times to the Ambassador, and his own impression was they are complaining. This would create obstacles....

K: One other thing, Anatoly. The Israelis keep telling us that there
is extremely high readiness of Egyptian forces.

K: No, no. We are telling the Israelis if there is any attack by Israel we will have to oppose them. We hope you will use your influence with The Egyptians to calm them down. We have told our Ambassador to tell the Egyptians.

D: No, because EZZAZ Fahmi isn't back.

K: They mentioned to us too in the sense they are afraid of some tricks
by the Israelis and telling they should be prepared, publically said this.
not just to us, from time to time tell us about things, but nothing in
addition to my knowledge to what was said publicaly. I will notify Mosow
so they know ....Is there any change in the elections. Are the Israelis
going to change the elections?

K: If the Israelis change the elections it will not affect our determination to proceed. If the election is not until the 31 then we should not push substantive matters before then, but if they delay by three months then we will go into substance right away.

D: If we must wait so to speak 3 months, it will take a lot of....

K: We will not take that much time. Only delay which is acceptable is the 31st.

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Authority EO 12958