cy. This requires patient diplomacy exercised with precision." His forthcoming Continental tour thus looked like a first key step in a cautious, long-term approach to an eventual U.S.-Soviet summit designed to resolve both political and military differences.

**Worldly:** The President, it seemed clear, was basing his hopes for talks with the Russians on a coherent, ordered approach to outstanding global problems. He was particularly at pains to explain that his trip was more a matter of re-establishing ties to European allies rather than any real shift in foreign-policy emphasis. "I think you could describe me best as not being a half-worlder, with my eyes looking only to Europe, or only to Asia," he said, "but one who sees the whole world."

There was only one point, early in the conference, when for a quietly dramatic instant, Mr. Nixon seemed to lose his aplomb. That came when a reporter pointedly called the President's attention to the fact that newly appointed U.N. Ambassador Charles W. Yost has been under attack from some right-wingers because of a "close association" with Al-ger Hiss in the 1940s. "In the light of your more than passing familiarity with the Hiss case," the reporter asked, "would you care to comment on these attacks ... and whether they should be given credence?"

For a fleeting second, the President's features went taut. Then they relaxed, and the man who was the personal nemesis of Hiss and of a number of Hiss's State Department contemporaries in the late '40s and early '50s responded gracefully but forcefully:

"As far as Mr. Yost's background is concerned, I am completely aware of it ... But what I am looking to now is his capability to handle the problems of the future, and not events that occurred over twenty years ago. There is no question about his loyalty ... He is one of our prime experts on the Mideast."

**'Authority'**: And with his own eye clearly on the future conduct of U.S. foreign policy, Mr. Nixon next confronted the sometimes controversial question of whether the State Department or the National Security Council is pre-eminent in the policy field. On this point, the President minced no words at all.

"The answer," he said, "is neither place ... The President has the authority to make the decisions, and I intend to exercise that authority."

And that was that, except as Washington came to learn during the week, that meticulous and unflamboyant Dick Nixon has also quietly taken over personal control of the foreign policy of the White House kitchen. Dinner guests at the Executive Mansion reported that Mr. Nixon has abandoned Lyndon Johnson's policy of serving only American wines, and has been offering his guests imported French champagne—Pol Roger '61, to name one vintage brand chosen recently to grace the President's table.

Newweek—Wally McNamie

White House aides Burns and Kissinger: They man the new machinery

## COMMITTEES, COME TO ORDER

During the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, "government by committee" was a phrase nearly as naughty as "back to normalcy" or "Drew Pearson says ..." Kennedy aides swept across bureaucratic yard lines with the improvisational abandon of broken-field runners. Johnson Cabinet members dealt directly with their boss if they were in favor and found it difficult to deal at all if they were not. But under the regime of Richard Nixon, the interagency committee has been hauled from the back of the administrative tool shed, sharpened up, freshly oiled and pressed into service as a prime instrument of executive policymaking.

In his first week in office, President Nixon refurbished one Cabinet-level committee (the National Security Council), created two new ones from scratch (the Council for Urban Affairs and the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, itself designed to supplement the work of another informal committee, the economic "quadriad" of the Treasury Department, the Budget Bureau, the Council of Economic Advisers and the Federal Reserve Board), and presided over the birth of nine interagency subcommittees spawned by the CUA. Each of the committees has hit the ground in full stride: the NSC and CUA meet once a week and the CCEP about twice a month.

**Snickers:** This elaborate machinery of interlocking directorates, cross-agency camshafts and double-meshed Cabinet officers has drawn some wry Parkinsonian snickers. Critics envision mountains of useless memorandums spewing forth in a whir of spinning gears. Old-timers recall the endless haggling over NSC position papers during the committee-heavy Eisenhower years, which one Washington

wit dubbed "the century of the comma man." The superimposition of the CCEP upon the quadriad's economic high command has already been widely passed off as a duplication of effort designed primarily to slake the bureaucratic thirst of Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, who joined the Cabinet on the understanding that his department would join the top economic councils of the government.

Mr. Nixon is well aware of these criticisms—and of the perils of committee government. He is fashioning his new machinery, it seems clear, to try to avoid what he considers the mistakes of past Presidents, not the least of them committed by his old boss Dwight Eisenhower. And, from this point of view, his new committee structure has a number of positive objectives:

* It will, he hopes, help strip away the parochial blinders that have sometimes caused agency heads to see only their own department's narrow interests. Committee discussions will bring each participant into Washington's parochial "big picture." The President, says one aide working the CUA, "clearly likes the idea that besides being able to iron out decisions in these meetings, his department heads have a chance to sit back and look at their own programs in the total context of urban affairs."

* Mr. Nixon also hopes to eliminate some of the intra-Cabinet backbiting and special pleading common in free-wheeling Administrations. With decisions being made in open committee rather than in private Oval Office deals, a White House staffer points out, "if they've got something to say they have to stand up and say it right out in front of everybody." The members of the Cabinet, adds another, "have a gentleman's agreement

28

NATIONAL AF

that there will be no negotiating behind
one another's backs, no negotiating in
the halls."

Unlike Ike, Richard Nixon regards his committee system as a way of involving himself in, rather than screening himself off from, policy disputes. As presiding officer, he goes out of his way to draw dissenting views into the discussion: "You don't agree with that, do you," is one of his favorite gambits. The committee format, however time-consuming, satisfies Mr. Nixon's appetite for a variety of policy alternatives rather than a predigested recommendation to which he must answer a simple yes or no. "There is overlap, clearly," concedes one Nixon staffer. "I think that's very good. Why should the President have just one set of advice?"

The committee approach also may
draw more policymaking directly into
the White House orbit, bypassing some
of the bureaucratic bottlenecks in the
traditional channels. This appears to be
what the President had in mind when he
redraw the entire organization chart of
Washington's foreign-policy establish-
ment last week, gathering most of the
strands into the White House-based
NSC. From now on, sub-Cabinet inter-
agency committees devoted to foreign-
policy problems will report directly to
the NSC. Though they will continue to
be chaired by an Assistant Secretary of
State, they will no longer have to route
their findings through the upper echelons
of the State Department.

Some observers sensed that something
more fundamental was afoot: that Mr.
Nixon might be temporarily unplugging
the State Department machinery in or-
der to begin repairs, a project that he
spoke of several times during the cam-
paign. They noted that NSC chief of
staff Henry Kissinger has already lured
away some of State's top hands to his
own corral: Sovietologist Helmut Son-
nenfeldt, Latin American expert Viron
Vaky, generalist Lawrence Eagleburger,
and Far East specialist Richard Sneider.
These recruits join a young and star-
studded crew, including Morton Hal-
perin, an arms-control expert from the
Defense Department, and Yale econom-
ics Prof. Richard Cooper.

Squads: Kissinger plans to break down
his team into three main squads: one
to follow day-to-day operations, one to
ride herd on long-range planning and
execution of NSC decisions, and one to
keep tabs on all expenditures by all
U.S. agencies in particular areas of
the world, so that, as a White House aide
says, "a proposal can be viewed not
only on its own merits, but against the
total picture."

The White House insists that Kissinger's job "is not to be the chief formulator of policy, but to make sure that the proper range of choices is available to the President." Secretary of State William Rogers, as both a close friend of

Richard Nixon and his ranking Cabinet
officer, will be his "principal foreign pol-
icy adviser." It seems probable, how-
ever, that the NSC will act as something
more than a clearinghouse for foreign
policy advice. "Every Administration,"
says one top veteran policymaker, "in-
evitably ends up with one group—either
in State, the Pentagon, or the White
House—with a predominant influence on
the course of U.S. foreign policy. Once it
was State's Policy Planning Board. To-
day, it would seem to be the White
House. It is there that one finds that
imaginative mass of individuals who are
most likely to be the greatest influence
on the President."

Beyond that, Kissinger's stable of tal-
ent, together with his own assertive
personality, adds an ingredient probably
essential to making one part of Mr.
Nixon's elaborate committee structure
work. Somewhere, in addition to the
President, there must be a driving force
to extract decision out of discussion, to
force the wheels of bureaucracy to roll
forward rather than spin in place. In
foreign policy, there seems little doubt
that Kissinger's the one.

**Old English:** In domestic affairs, the
equivalent role seems likely to be played
by Arthur Burns, the new Counselor to
the President. Quiet but outspoken, en-
ergetic but civil ("He's a real swinger,")
says one colleague, "but you have to
spell that in Old English type"), this
64-year-old economist has a mandate to
superintend the President's entire dom-
estic program. Already he has been
responsible for 80 Presidential direc-
tives to the various agencies. A veteran
bureaucrat (he was chairman of Ike's
Council of Economic Advisers), he is
firmly unbureaucratic in spirit, impatient
with needless secrecy or structuring.
When he heard about a plan last week to
set up an interim committee to consider
creation of a standing committee on tran-
sition to a peace-time economy, "I blew
my top," he reports. "It obviously belongs
in the Council of Economic Advisers."

Virtually no one wise in the ways of
Washington believes that Mr. Nixon's
magnificent committee machine will
work perfectly. Jurisdictions will still
overlap, rivalries will still erupt, backs
will still be bitten. Some skeptics expect
the whole many-branched organizational
tree will simply wither and die as com-
mittee meetings become less frequent
and Cabinet members delegate their
seats to lesser officials. But President
Nixon, an organization man from way
back, is clearly intent upon giving it a
try. "We may be overorganized," admits
Counselor Burns, "but if we are, that's
easy to correct: we can just meet less
frequently. There is logic to the present
organization." And the core of the logic
is that the new President, who must
finally make the tough decisions, wants
to approach them along an orderly path
as Mr. Chairman Nixon.

DEFENSE:

A Halt for Sentinel

"John," Sen. George McGovern South Dakota remarked, "some should get together in the next few days to discuss ways and means of stopping ABM." "Let's see if we can't get a guy on the floor next week," Sen. Sherman Cooper of Kentucky said. Then both men, stark naked as custom, resumed their paddling Senate's sacrosanctly private swimming pool. In that unlikely setting, the far-reaching military-preparedness bate the 91st Congress seems likely to confront was opened early last week.

What McGovern wanted to stop
Sentinel, the controversial, $6
anti-ballistic-missile defense system
was approved by Lyndon Johnson
1967. As then Defense Secretary
S. McNamara originally described

Herblock © 1969—Washington

'Tut tut—a mere sliver of ice'

the "lightly deployed" system was
tended as a shield against the prin-
ICBM's that Communist China would
possess by the early 1970s—not ag-
ainst the Soviet Union's vast and sophisti-
delivery systems. But in his Senate
firmation hearings, and at a later
conference, Defense Secretary M.
Laird emphatically endorsed Sentin-
al a necessary implement of negotiat-
ing forthcoming arms talks with the Rus-
Most of Sentinel's supporters were
sured that the project would be car-
ried through as planned regardless of
storm of public protest that was built
up against it.

'Monster': But when the storm be-
last week, it was more violent than no
had suspected. The first clouds
formed late last year, when the
Army announced the first of Sentin-
al proposed locations. Local outcry—mo-
it over fear of accidental detonat-
ing proved both loud and immediate. W

February 17, 1969

**Time:** 7:45 A. M., Weekdays
**Place:** Roosevelt Room, West Wing, White House

# Nixon's Inner Circle Meets

By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr.

WASHINGTON.

THE session is supposed to begin at 7:45, but Herb Klein always arrives five minutes late. A man with a friendly nature, rumpled appearance and drooping eyes who regards the world through a perpetual squint, Klein mumbles his good mornings, then turns to the left to grope for the coffee urn, which is to the right. The others around the polished fruitwood table watch nervously as Klein struggles to get his bearings. He has only a few moments to find the urn, fill his cup and get out of the way of the door; it will fly open at 7:55 to admit a small German steamboat named Henry Kissinger, who has a widespread reputation for efficiency and who indeed, quite punctually, has arrived 10 minutes late for nearly every meeting since Jan. 21.

ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr. is the White House correspondent of The Times.

Haldeman

Erlichman, the counsel, hears a point from Chapin

A gathering of intellectuals: Moynihan, Kissinger, Burns

Harlow, and such is his familiarity with the subterranean passages of the capital that nobody was surprised when Nixon named him to the White House staff before anyone else.

Harlow is a shade over five feet tall. Appearing at the Women's National Press Club dinner earlier this year, he slipped behind the lectern, hesitated until the applause died down, and said: "Don't wait for the rest of me. I'm standing up." He then called 6-foot-6-inch Rogers Morton of Maryland to the podium and remarked: "Rogers and I have stood eyeball to kneecap" ever since 1938, when "I first turned to the public treasury for a living." In the meantime, he went on, he had worked for both Congress and the White House and "learned that Pennsylvania Avenue is paved with sandpaper and there are rats-excuse me, I mean rasps-at both ends."

The little man was the giant in the humor contest that night—the other speakers, most of them Nixon aides, were comparatively flat—but this would not have surprised his boss, whose admiration for Harlow is practically unlimited. At the beginning of the year Nixon got together with Cabinet secretary John Whitaker to draw up lists of people who could attend various internal meetings.

"The President said there was one man who could attend any meeting he wanted to," Whitaker recalls, "and that man was Harlow."

Nixon wants Harlow around in part because Harlow, as the chief sales-

man of the President's proposals to Congress, must know something of the origin of the proposals. But Nixon also wants him around because he has no other man on his staff-with the exception of Moynihan and possibly Dent—who is wise in the ways of both the bureaucracy and Congress.

Few men have seen Congress from as many angles. Changing his political affiliation from Democratic to Republican in the nineteen-forties, he served as chief of Congressional relations under Gen. George C. Marshall at the War Department, staff director of the House Armed Services Committee and, in 1953, as a speechwriter and legislative aide under Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons on Eisenhower's Congressional-relations staff.

Harlow is soft-spoken, gentle, courtly and conservative, and he has great reverence for the constitutional process and Congressional prerogatives. There are those who accuse him of failing to do enough arm-twisting on Capitol Hill (some of them the same people who accused Presidents Kennedy and Johnson of doing too much), but Harlow prefers a softer sell and instructs his small staff to use it.

In the final days of the hectic surtax battle in the House, for example, Harlow and Nixon calculated that they could win if they could persuade four or five undecided Republican Congressmen to vote for the surtax extension. Some White House aides urged direct pressure through Presi-

dential telephone calls; Harlow suggested a breakfast at the White House. The breakfast was held, Nixon spoke quietly of his needs and the necessary votes were produced.

No man is infallible, of course, and near the end of the 1968 campaign Harlow drafted and urged Nixon to deliver a very hawkish speech accusing the Democrats of creating a "security gap." The speech, which neither Harlow nor Nixon regrets in retrospect, was seen by some outside observers as one of a series of talks that helped Hubert Humphrey in the waning days of the campaign.

Such lapses are infrequent, though, and a crisis situation these days often finds other staff members in Harlow's office or Harlow in the President's office, and he is forever being asked to untangle messy situations created by his colleagues. Back in November, for instance, the Nixon high command told Murray Chotiner, an old and controversial associate of the President's, that he would be the "real power" in any new alignment at the Republican National Committee. The high command then offered the committee chairmanship to Rogers Morton without telling him of their pledge to Chotiner. When it transpired that Morton had no use for Chotiner, it was left to Harlow to try to soothe both men and to find another job—as general counsel to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations—for Chotiner.

Harlow is a delightful conversationalist, when you can get him for

lunch (never these days) or on the telephone (practically never). Rich in the lore of backwoods politics, he is fond of quoting Southern Congressmen to illustrate the proper tactics in legislative battle. One of his favorites concerns the willow and the oak.

"A Southern Senator," he recalls, "used to remind all of us who had gotten our backs up on some issue of the willow and the oak. The mighty oak, he would say, stands straight and tall and powerful and proud, but then the big wind comes and topples the oak with a mighty crash. But the lovely willow? Well, the big wind comes, and the willow, she just whips around and around, and gives a little here and there, but in the end she perseveres and the wind goes away."

Well, then, asked a visitor in his office not long ago, does that mean you're about to do a little compromising on the ABM issue?

Harlow thought for a moment, his forehead crinkling and his deep-set eyes twinkling. "My boy," he said, "we are feeling just a little bit oakish on this one."

## Kissinger: The Professor

HENRY KISSINGER first met Richard Nixon more than a year ago at a cocktail party at Clare Boothe

(Continued on Page 45)

New York Times photographs by GEORGE TAMES

AUGUST 3, 1969

# A Bad Case Of the Troubles Called Londonderry

By DAVID HOLDEN

Behold the Crimson Banners float
O'er yonder turret hoary,

They tell of days of mighty note
And Derry's deathless glory,

When her brave sons undaunted
stood,

Embattled to defend her,

Indignant stemmed oppression's
flood

And sang out "No Surrender!"

LONDONDERRY.

IT is 279 years since the Protestant citizens of the little town of Londonderry in Ulster triumphantly withstood a nine-month siege by the Catholic armies of King James II and thereby not only created the legend celebrated in the song above, but also cemented the foundations of the present Protestant state known as

DAVID HOLDEN is chief foreign correspondent of The Sunday Times, London.

Northern Ireland. Today, as many Northern Irish Protestants believe, those foundations are once more under "Papist" attack, under the guise of a nonsectarian civil rights movement, and Londonderry is again the fulcrum of the contest.

Throughout the last 12 months Londonderry has been the most divided and explosive place in Northern Ireland. It was here that the province's current cycle of demonstration, suppression, riot and reform began when a civil-rights demonstration on behalf of Ulster's Roman Catholics clashed with the predominantly Protestant police force on Oct. 5, 1968. It is in Londonderry that most of the biggest and worst of the succeeding demonstrations and riots have occurred, from the massive and comparatively peaceful civil-rights march of Nov. 16 when 12,000 people invaded the town against the express orders of the Northern Ireland Gov-

ernment, to the fierce street fighting of this April 20 and—worst of all, so far—the burning and looting of July 12-14 (on the 279th anniversary of King William III's Protestant victory over the Catholic Irish at the Battle of the Boyne), when the town suffered more than half a million dollars' worth of damage, the police had to admit they could no longer control the Catholic mobs, and British troops were called in for stand-by duties.

MORE than once the troubles of Londonderry have threatened to degenerate into outright communal war. All that was required, probably, to tip the balance was an authentic martyr on either side; and twice the Catholics have almost been provided with one. There was Samuel Devenney of William Street, in the Roman Catholic slums of Bogside in Londonderry, who collapsed of a heart attack on April 20 when police kicked down the door of his little house and beat up him and his family in pursuit of some Catholic youths who allegedly had been stoning them and looting shops.

For the whole of the next day Catholics and police faced each other in mutual fear and anger, the police with their pistols as well as truncheons and water cannon ready, while the citizens of Bogside, five or six thousand strong, gathered in a new Catholic public housing development called Greggan on the edge of the city, armed with clubs, chains and shotguns, ready for revenge.

"It was touch-and-go," was the comment later of John Hume, the young Roman Catholic leader of Londonderry's civil-rights movement, whose Catholic followers elected him to the Northern Ireland Parliament last February. "We spent the whole day trying to calm our lot down and get the police out of Bogside in peace. But if Devenney had died, nobody could have controlled those people. It would have been civil war."

Mercifully Devenney was spared, to die in his bed late last month, at which time his widow made a moving appeal to both sides to commemorate

his death with peace. But by then another cause célèbre had appeared, in the shape of one Francis McCloskey, a Catholic and a former member of the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.), who collapsed with head injuries and died earlier in July, supposedly after a police charge, while watching the burning of a Protestant hall in the village of Dungiven, near Londonderry. Angry Catholic cries for an investigation into his death immediately exacerbated the divisions that probably had caused it.

OBJECTIVELY, these troubles seem increasingly irrational, for Northern Ireland has moved further and faster toward reform in the last 12 months than in the previous 50

**THE BATTLE THAT NEVER ENDED**—William III, king of "the Prods," is here depicted defeating the Catholics at the Boyne River in July, 1690. Proof that the battle is not yet over has been bloodily evident in this summer 279 years later.

Nixon's inner circle

(Continued from Page 9)

Luce's New York apartment. He talked to Nixon "for about three minutes" and did not see him again until November, when they began the first of four discussions about Nixon's offer of the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

So far, neither man has regretted Kissinger's acceptance of the job. Kissinger has placed at Nixon's disposal the insights of a rare and versatile scholar in foreign affairs, a man who had survived a difficult whiz-kid phase (he wrote the seminal "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" at 34) and who had gone on to become an eminent authority on Europe, an unofficial adviser to Presidents and a full professor at Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

For his part, Nixon has given the 46-year-old Kissinger a major role in decision-making and prominence beyond his fondest expectations. Kissinger's responsibilities are great; while others may cast up alternatives for the President's choosing, he organizes and dominates the process. All judgments on foreign affairs pass through him on the way to the President.

Kissinger says he has been pleasantly surprised at the White House, not only by his boss but by the Haldemans and Zieglers, men who have spent much of their adult lives working for Nixon in administrative capacities, and therefore present no threat to their scholarly colleague in the policy-making field.

"I do not sense the current and tensions here that I did in the Kennedy years or in the academic life," he says, suggesting that Nixon's odd mixture of intellectuals and junior-chamber-of-commerce types may have had a soothing effect on both.

And the young men out of California very much like this man from Germany via Cambridge, calling him "Henry" and treating him with a mixture of deference and impertinence, which he seems to enjoy. Ziegler, who was going to senior proms at about the time Kissinger was composing "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," is forever confronting him in the White House corridors and saying with mock seriousness, "Heny,

ry, I just want you to know you're making a swell contribution to national security."

**Burns:**

*The Devil's Advocate*

MANY Government officials approach press interviews with passive caution, rarely engaging in two-way dialogue for fear that in the heat of conversation they might slip and reveal some innermost secret. Arthur Burns, the President's Counselor, is a bit different. He loves to talk—circumspectly, of course — and to try out his ideas on whomever happens to be sitting before him. He is, moreover, unafraid of an occasional outrageous statement ("The amount of money being spent on the poor simply astounds me," he declared one day). Accordingly, a conversation with Burns is usually an adventure.

He is discursive, sometimes playful, full of long silences between short puffs on his enormous curved pipe, spinning out ideas that he may sooner or later reject or bring into the deliberations of the White House. And often his listeners leave without the slightest idea where he stands —in a practical political sense —on the question they've been discussing at length.

"He infuriates you," says one colleague. "He is often brilliant and usually supercilious, and he will devil's-advocate you to death. But he is always probing, which is a rare and useful quality around here."

Burns has been asking hard questions for a long time. Now 65, he's had a distinguished career as an economist, gaining recognition as a leading authority on business cycles and serving as chairman of President Eisenhower's Council of Economic Advisers.

He was regarded as a liberal in those days, but is seen as a conservative now—not so much because he has changed as because the needs of the economy have and because other influential members of Nixon's group (Moynihan, for instance, and Robert Finch, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare) would — move ahead faster than he.

Oddly, given Nixon's own conservative bent, Burns has lost more battles than he's won; the Model Cities project (Continued on Page 50)

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*(Continued from Page 54)*

low's office or Ehrlichman's, and sometimes in both.

Ehrlichman's title is Counsel to the President, but his mandate is broad.® In simplest terms, he is supposed to perform the same function in domestic policy-making that Kissinger performs in for-

Among other myriad duties, Ehrlichman helped put together the President's crime proposals, set up the advance arrangements for the President's European trip, keeps a sharp eye on the President's personal finances and reviews Presidential appointments for potential conflicts of interest. In the early days, he also found time to call newsmen to complain about technical misstatements of fact and was generally accessible to reporters. He is no longer accessible. This may be because he is extraordinarily busy; it may also be because he knows a lot more than he used to.

eign affairs, which is to make sure that the President hears the best testimony on all sides of an issue before making a decision.

Nixon handed Ehrlichman this assignment shortly after his European trip in early March, and when the assignment became public knowledge it was widely interpreted to mean that Burns and Moynihan had been downgraded. In retrospect, however, the move appears to be less an affront to either man than an attempt to correct some of the limitations built into the system when the President gave Burns and Moynihan policy-making roles. He found that by giving everyone a policy job he had constructed an advocacy system without a judge to control it and insure fairness.

Ehrlichman not only serves as referee in White House de-

bates but also negotiates disputes between the agencies. He sat in the middle of the fight over the extension of the surtax and the battles between Attorney General John Mitchell and Secretary Finch over school guidelines and the tone and content of the President's response to student disorders.

Ehrlichman inherited the mantle of Joseph A. Califano, who did the same sort of work for Lyndon Johnson and who, in the process, won the respect of many and the hatred of a few. Umpiring interagency disputes is a thankless task. Indeed, the Nixon Administration was determined not to have a Califano, fearing that the negotiator would inevitably come to dominate his clients. But now they have him, and already the complaints are coming in from senior officials who find themselves negotiating with

Ehrlichman instead of Nixon and who, in the words of one, "would prefer to bypass the referee and go directly to the scorekeeper."

He appears to have the equipment for the job. Like Califano, he is exceptionally versatile, transparently self-assured and very tough. As "tour-director" of Nixon's 50,000-mile campaign, he developed a reputation for iron efficiency (the tour was rarely behind schedule) and a capacity to be abrupt but inoffensive to politicians clamoring for the candidate's time.

Like others on the White House staff, he owes much of his present prominence to Haldeman, his classmate at U.C.L.A. After college, Ehrlichman took a law degree at Stanford and developed a thriving practice in Seattle, where he specialized in land development, participated in

community affairs and raised a family of five children. From time to time, however, Haldeman would ask him to do advance work in various Nixon campaigns, and as Haldeman developed respect for Ehrlichman's work, so, too, did Nixon.

Growing bald and a bit portly in his 44th year, Ehrlichman combines an arch sense of humor with a severe conception of duty. He can be a charming, relaxed and quick-witted dinner companion, yet he demands from his staff the same discretion, energy and loyalty that the President demands of him. Those who play ball are rewarded; those who don't find themselves in decline.

The extent of his influence on Nixon's final judgments in the domestic field is not altogether clear, but temperamentally and philosophically

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THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE

his instincts lie on the conservative side. He thinks that the student revolt is misguided, and when Kissinger says—as he has—that the revolution displays elements of fascism, he nods swift agreement.

He also appears to share the view—dominant at the White House—that the future of the Republican party lies not on the Eastern seaboard but in the heartland. When a newsman asked him why the President had made a certain move that had aroused criticism in Washington, Ehrlichman replied crisply: "Don't worry. It'll play in Peoria."

At the same time, however, he was a force for moderation in the savage internal debate over the Administration's approach to campus disorders—he argued against immediate Federal intervention — and from time to time he has slipped out of town unan-

nounced to visit college campuses and learn more about the grievances of faculty members and students. More often than not, he has also taken the side of modestly liberal Secretary Finch on such matters as the hunger program and the appointment of Finch's first choice, Dr. John Knowles, as Assistant Secretary of Health.

Although Nixon places high trust in Ehrlichman's judgment, he is not infallible. White House insiders say that it was Ehrlichman who recommended Willie Mae Rogers for the job of consumer adviser, despite the presence of what some observers felt was a conflict of interest between the consumer-affairs post and Miss Rogers's job at Good Housekeeping magazine.

"John's a bit naive politically," says an admirer, "but he hasn't made many mistakes

since the Rogers affair. And I don't think he'll make many more. He's not the sort of fellow who suffers mistakes lightly, including his own."

## Haldeman:

### The Gatekeeper

THOUGH Nixon is forever saying that he detests "yes men" and that he wants and needs critical advice, the suspicion has persisted that it takes a man of courage to contradict him, and that the man who takes this risk must know him well to get away with it. Politics has made him cautious, and he develops trust in another only after long association and careful observation in the heat of the campaign. Burns can say no to Nixon and does so; so, too,

can Harry Robbins Haldeman, the 42-year-old Californian who serves as the President's chief administrative aide.

"I told him not to run for the governorship of California," Haldeman recalls, "and I was still asking him not to run all the way down the corridor in Los Angeles to the room where he made his announcement. I lost that one—and, having lost, agreed to manage his campaign."

The campaign was not a howling success—after it, Nixon was widely said to be finished as a practicing politician—but he has never held the defeat against Haldeman, whose original advice turned out to be correct. Nixon trusts him; Haldeman has always been there, it seems, when Nixon needed him, beginning with routine advance work in the fifties and culminating last year when Haldeman dropped

family and business to come East and serve as the liaison between the candidate and his campaign apparatus.

Haldeman performs essentially the same role in the White House—he is the human link between the President and the machinery. On the European tour, he sat close to Nixon on the plane, taking the President's instructions on a yellow pad, relaying them back to Washington. In Key Biscayne, he remains on what amounts to a 24-hour alert in a small villa across the road from Nixon's bayside bungalow.

If a member of the Students for a Democratic Society were asked to select the archetypal Nixon man, he would doubtless alight on Haldeman: lean, industrious, tanned, crew-cut, serious, loyal, mildly suspicious, with blue eyes and

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<table><thead><tr><th>Family Members To Be Insured</th><th>Date of Birth</th><th>Weekly Hospital Income<br>(check box for coverage desired)</th><th>Quarterly Premium</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Mo.</th><th>Day</th><th>Year</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">Name of Male Applicant<br>(Print Name Below)</td><td></td><td></td><td>$100 per week ☐ 8.80</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>$200 per week ☐ 17.60</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Name of Female Applicant<br>(Print Name Below)</td><td></td><td></td><td>$100 per week ☐ 10.25</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>$200 per week ☐ 20.50</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Name of Child<br>(Print Name Below)</td><td></td><td></td><td>$100 per week ☐ 5.85</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>$200 per week ☐ 11.70</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Name of Child<br>(Print Name Below)</td><td></td><td></td><td>$100 per week ☐ 5.85</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>$200 per week ☐ 11.70</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="2">Name of Child<br>(Print Name Below)</td><td></td><td></td><td>$100 per week ☐ 5.85</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>$200 per week ☐ 11.70</td></tr></tbody></table>

Total Quarterly Premium: $__________

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City

State

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Applicant's Occupation and Duties

FORM A-GR-HI-1A

To the best of your knowledge and belief:

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Date

Signature

(Applicant)

T-8-9

AUGUST 3, 1969

59

at someone. "Where is the
on?" He looks up, sees the
already here in the outer of-
clamps his teeth on the secret
that might have escaped,
s back into his office and clos-
the door, and men with a
hed look between their eyes
m in and out.

It 10 minutes later the visitor
side and Kissinger is sitting
in an overstuffed chair, his
on the coffee table, and he is
ing in a slow, rumbling, Ger-
accented voice. He looks re-
almost sleepy. As his visitor
Kissinger's hand reaches sur-
tiously toward the magazines
table. On the phone he reads
the other person talks, his
handling both at once, and
aside the reading only when
ponds. He is a courteous man
he would not do this in a vis-
s presence, but his hand for-
and ruffles the magazines
ingly.

the day his visitor was an old
Uzi Uzi Narkiss of Israel. Once
kiss had been a student at the
national Seminar at Harvard
Kissinger ran every summer;

more recently, he had been com-
manding general of the troops that
took Jerusalem. Having left the
army, his visit was entirely unof-
ficial—and yet, each man was near
the heart of his own government
and the quiet, easy conversation
had a certain meaning.

"Henry," Narkiss said, "the thing that we have learned is that there are many problems that have no solution, that people must live with. The Middle East is such a problem."

"Yes," Kissinger said, "but
that does not mean that what is
without a solution will remain
unchanged."

There is a kind of shorthand in
such conversations. "Of course,"
Narkiss said, "but Israel will stay
a long time in the territories it has
taken. It will stay as long as it
likes."

"No. For a while, yes; for a year
or two—"

"Fifteen years."

"Oh, I doubt it. I think the world
climate will not permit it." Kissing-
er paused. The sun was pouring in
his windows. There were prints on
the wall, and the furniture, though

the U.S. and Israel do not find
themselves on one side against the
world and that a general world war
does not result. The question be-
fore Israel is whether it can trade
some of its physical superiority for
some political legitimacy.

"Normally a good agreement
leaves both sides happy. In the
Middle East, it is when both sides
are equally unhappy. Ideally a
good settlement leaves no reason
to attack. In the Middle East, it
would be when both sides were un-
able to attack . . ."

There is a feeling among his as-
sociates that Kissinger has found
his métier in the action arena, as if
the man of ideas all along had a la-
tent thrust toward the pulse beat
of power. At Harvard he was seen
as a tense, driven man with a prick-
ly personality that made him as
many enemies as friends. He was
proud, impatient, intolerant of
fools and suspicious of those who
seemed potential competitors.
"Sooner or later," said a man to
whom it had happened, "that thin
link of trust Henry had with any-
one would break and then he
would be a devastating adversary."

Washington townhouse and won
extraordinary honors. But now
black car waits outside to take
where he pleases and in the cor-
dors of the White House he is
with deferential smiles. Even whi-
things are happening very fast
is in easy control. He is conti-
and it is plain that he enj-
himself.

His wit, emerging in droll
marks delivered without warn
from a solemn expression, is
creasingly evident. "I want you
meet my new assistant," he so
one day. "Already he is taking
the drawn look of his predeces-
We are introducing him to the
alities of the office." Arriving
Andrews Air Force Base one de
for a trip, he found the Air Fos
had assigned him not his usu-
but a propeller-driven craft.
this was Russia. I would think
was slipping," he said. Sudden
his eyes rolled and his voice we
hollow. "Next they will take aw
my position. . ." If his wit
somewhat ponderously Teuto-
(he came from Germany in 193
a Jewish refugee), it also punctu-
his reputation for arrogance
cause he readily turns it on hi
self. When he met with his Harv-
seminar for the last time, after his
appointment had been announced
photographers appeared. "Th
will be good for my megalomania
he said, and the picture shows th
room rocking with laughter.

President Nixon's choice of K-
singer for the most sensitive po
in the White House was quite lo-
ical. Kissinger had impeccable en-
dentials as an intellectual goin
back to 1957 and the publication
of his first book, *Nuclear Weapons
and Foreign Policy*. It opened
whole new range of thinking on the
effect of the nuclear age on diplo-
macy. Among the book's mo-
novel ideas was the first under-
standing that a great nation is de-
nied unlimited use of its power an
do so is vulnerable in ways it had ne

CONTINUED

Kissinger (standing) meets with Nixon and aides John Ehrlichman (right) and Bob Haldeman

["Kissinger has so much reading to do and so many phone calls to take and make that he often combines the two—reading while listening to a caller.", "In 1957, the U.S. still had not yet learned that lesson years later when it assumed that, once applied, American power naturally would always be the day in Vietnam. Kissinger had been Nelson Rockefeller's best adviser on foreign policy since 1957, which made him one of the few academics associated with the Republicans. In 1968, in fact, it probably was more active in public affairs than any academic in Vietnam who had not been part of the Kennedy or Johnson administrations. Nor had he taken a serious public position on Vietnam, which was important because to chosen a man already committed would have tended to commit the new Administration as", "probably the most human and the most sensitive to the President's picking. He was simply that the two felt comfortable with each other to private both are quiet, resolute and aloof, and somewhat less and less and less and less and less and less

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undercut State?

CONTINUED

ear. Kissinger's predecessor, Walt Rostow, was charged with that, though those who knew Lyndon Johnson well never supposed that Rostow was doing more than the President wanted done.

There is nothing in Kissinger's job that designates him the second man in foreign policy. None of his predecessors, including Rostow and McGeorge Bundy, were relied upon so heavily. Traditionally, the Secretary of State is the President's chief adviser and operator in foreign affairs, and in this case the Secretary also is the President's friend of 20 years, William Rogers.

There is a running conflict between Kissinger and Rogers that is the talk of Washington, though they keep it on a professional level and appear to remain personally friendly. The conflict is built into the job, for it is the Assistant's duty to be sure the President has all the insights and information he needs, while it is the Secretary's to suggest courses of action. That means that sooner or later the Assistant will be second-guessing the Secretary and the Secretary will resent it. Pride runs hand in hand with power, for a man's effectiveness tends to depend on the estimate other people make of his power. If he appears powerless he probably soon will be, and so he fights the appearance.

But there is more than mere second-guessing and the Secretary's consequent irritation. The conflict between Kissinger and Rogers began as soon as the Nixon administration was formed, long before the inauguration, and it appeared to turn on a technicality. Nixon had decided to handle foreign policy through the mechanism of the National Security Council rather than between himself and the Secretary of State, as had been the tendency in the two previous administrations. The primary members of the NSC would be the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and Kissinger.

The flow of foreign political starts at an intergovernmental meeting chaired by the Department at which the various departments put forth their and needs. Papers go from committee to an NSC review meeting, chaired by Kissinger, then to the NSC. The technique over which the battle was being fought was whether the first committee the one chaired by the Staff was a paper issue in the sense that the Secretary obviously would not want his voice in every situation, it also was real in that by the Secretary even in theory delineate and therefore limit power. And power, of course, what such competitions are.

The issue came to a head big meeting while the new Administration was still in New York. Rogers was not well prepared, argued weakly that the Secretary of State traditionally was not a suitable for foreign policy and should have a controlling role. But Kissinger sliced to the heart of the matter: if the NSC was the central decision point, should State have rights of进口 denied other departments also sat on the original committee. He won—and State has been kled ever since.

Kissinger insists that he is trying to undercut the Secretary and of course he is not. But point is that the President uses Kissinger and his expertise, and Secretary has nothing to do with that. The gossip mills of Washington, which are much more ested in power than in sex, are telling that Rogers' friendship with Nixon will outlast Kissinger's pertise—but then, the same would have given odds against quiet, complex little profiles having the cold nerve and the strict for combat that are f

CONTINUED

‘Henry understands that West Germany is not a great power’

CONTINUED

The fundamental difference between many fellows analysts of foreign policy and Kissinger is that he is the world's affairs as an international web, each part affecting the sum. He sees no point in talking out Berlin without considering Middle East or Vietnam or Vietnam. This may grow from academic background, which is philosophy and history. "Henry," he says, "has an innate sense of duty, like an inner musicality. It stands that events are inorganic continuum, that today from yesterday and tomorrow today and that man will change this radically or sudden with a clever plan." It may be that Henry puts it, simply because all, like it or not, events are related. To think other-than-realistic.

"When you are in the White House," Kissinger once said, "all easy decisions have already been made. The ones that go to the top are complicated and the options equally divided and balanced. That is why they come to the top. When the scope for action is wide, knowledge is often at a minimum, and when knowledge comes to the scope for action very often it is narrowed to a single course. In fact it was not easy to know what he intended. By 1940 nearly everyone knew, but at what cost in gold and pain."

Another time, told that his office was calling him, he sighed and "In my job, one never has to say that the news will be good." He added, "The greatest problem on time. One does not realize in this job, one reacts on basis of thinking already

the fundamental difference between many fellows analysts of foreign policy and Kissinger is that he is the world's affairs as an international web, each part affecting the sum. He sees no point in talking out Berlin without considering Middle East or Vietnam or Vietnam. This may grow from academic background, which is philosophy and history. "Henry," he says, "has an innate sense of duty, like an inner musicality. It stands that events are inorganic continuum, that today from yesterday and tomorrow today and that man will change this radically or sudden with a clever plan." It may be that Henry puts it, simply because all, like it or not, events are related. To think other-than-realistic."

insists on dealing with things only as a whole. It implies a plain risk —arms talks may already have been critically delayed and it is even possible that matters that could lead to nuclear bombardment should not be tied up with the vagaries of Middle East crises —but it also could yield immense dividends. One of Kissinger's early books examines the two men who, after Napoleon's fall, put together a European peace that was so well constructed, so aware of every nation's fears and desires, that it lasted a century. It collapsed into World War I, brought about in part because people had grown so confident of peace that they no longer felt the pressure to maintain it, but it had been a nice century.

Viewing conceptually, then, involves grasping the whole rather than just the immediacy. It means searching out the inner reality. "It is a matter of looking at what really is," a friend said. "Henry will understand, for instance, that West Germany is not a great power. Others will look at its extraordinary industrialization, its gross national product, its export ratio, and will say this is an important state. Henry will say that in the last half century it has lost two wars, that its regime has been broken five times in a man's lifetime, that it is a weak country."

Kissinger sat at the dinner table late one night, ruminating over the affairs of the world. The conversation was wide-ranging and often changing and it caught the sense of his thinking. "The turbulence in Asia," he was saying, "is a matter of imbalance rather than ideology alone—it is the result of the size of China, 700 million people. It is not a matter of what government they

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of where we want to
come out in Vietnam

CONTINUED

nuclear proliferation. Spending on
peaceful uses of atomic energy,
which are readily transferrable to
military uses, has increased tenfold
in many countries, nuclear experts
have risen in governments, the
question has lost its horror. On the
other hand, the damage is done: for
the U.S. now to fail to ratify the
treaty would be to compound the
damage. He anticipates more nu-
clear states in the future. Including
Germany? someone asked. Kis-
singer looked directly at him.
"Germany cannot have a nuclear
capability," he said flatly, "be-
cause if it did the Russians would
go to war."

On European unity: "Certainly
the U.S. thinks Europe should uni-
fy and that it will eventually, but
U.S. efforts to urge and even man-
age this in the past have not
worked. It seems a truism that
questions primarily in the interests
of others should be worked out pri-
marily by them."

On the Cuban missile crisis:
"The President had no choice and
he also was holding all the cards.
He had strategic superiority—our

ICBMs grossly outweighed the
at that time. He had tactical su-
priority in the area and he had mo-
rality. Anyway, he could not
have survived politically had he let
Russian missiles in place."

On dealing with the Soviet
Union: "There are people in this
country for whom talking to the
Russians takes on aspects of po-
chotherapy. I do the Russians the
honor of taking them seriously.
I think that 50 years of trouble be
tween two countries suggests som-
fundamental reasons for that trou-
ble. Do not misunderstand me.
am not against talking to the Rus-
sians, but I don't think that for
fundamental differences will be
aside just by having good personal
relations with them. I think our ap-
proach is better founded on a co-
assessment of the situation. People
who believe that talks would solv
tings per se should reflect on the
fact that every summit visit ha
been followed by worse relations.

On Vietnam, for obvious rea-
sons, Kissinger does not talk rea-

That night, the North
began a red-
hand, he li-
quoring in the
world's fires
and the wea-
ky on this mo-
ment: "We
and, we see
you hear no
kill ratio
view out
of come out
on. It is ne-
ave along
move too
longer is
longer is
Sometimes
down on the
cases in his
careers in Kiss-

Due at a White House dinner
in minutes, Kissinger hurried-
ly shaves. But two of his as-
sistants still have important
matters to discuss with him, so
he pauses to make a point.

theirs
supremoral
not
he left

Soviets in this
theory of
psychology
are thus
able to be
seen as
a part of
the personal
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apparatus
a cool
and cool
People's
institute
in
the
press
on
read.

that night at the dinner table,
he put a red-wine glass slowly in
a red-hand, he listened, nodding, un-
standing but not necessarily
ing the view that error had
committed and that error de-
veloped a radical change. Then, talk-
ing that slow yet somehow
coming voice which must be com-
ing to the President when the
decals seem out of control
the weight of decision ap-
proaches. Kissinger said all he will
in this most anguished of sub-
"We are moving. Under-
we seek no military victory.
hear no talk of body counts
in all ratios from us. We have a
view of where we want this
come out and a workable solu-
tion is necessary for Hanoi to
get along too, and for the U.S.
we too fast is to slow Hanoi's
in the process. Hanoi doesn't think
we are on our side—but today it
is on our side, either."

Sometimes, when dark comes
on the city and the pressure
in his office, a wistfulness ap-
pears in Kissinger. Then the dream

is very strong, of the bright day
when the nation's anguish is eased.
Kissinger long has been involved
in the quest for peace. In 1967 he
met two men with direct links to
Ho Chi Minh and, acting for the
U.S. government, began develop-
ing a position from which to ne-
gotiate. Kissinger's work led di-
rectly to the position later made
public as the San Antonio Formula
and, in the words of a ranking
member of the Johnson adminis-
tration, "thus laid the foundation
for the talks being held in Paris."

Kissinger was with the President
on his recent tour when he told
Asian leaders that his position has
altered, grown more realistic, more
keyed to the whole of the Pacific
and the world. It is all preparatory;
it all has meaning. The Assistant re-
lates only to the President, the Assis-
tant's public face is obscure. But he
sits in his office as the night noises
of the city soften and the tension
goes out of his face and his voice
is slow and rumbling, and then
it is clear that above all he dreams
of peace that works, that lasts,
that binds the world together. ◀

Lunar brings
the moon's
golden glow
down to earth in
this luxurious new
leather color. And
lunar designers have
created of Lunar Gold a
collection of footwear
fashions that are smartly at
home in this or any other world.
Lunar Gold styles (all featuring
"wear-tested" comfort) are now on
display at your lunar dealer's.

## LETTERS

### KISSINGER ON WAR

*To the Editors:*

In the issue of September 25, 1969, Mr. Clayton Fritchey states that "Nixon had little to go on in studying Kissinger's writings for a clue to his real feelings about Vietnam. In having kept most of his thoughts on the war to himself all these years, Kissinger is almost alone among the nation's prominent students of foreign policy." This statement is not supported by the record. In the August 9, 1966 issue of *Look*, Kissinger published an article strongly supporting the war. The first section entitled "The Impossibility of Withdrawal" ends with this summation: "In short, we are no longer fighting in Vietnam only for

the Vietnamese. We are also fighting for oursleves and for international stability." On February 6, 1966, the German Broadcasting and TV System taped a program in which I opposed the war while Kissinger supported it. He did the same in public lectures. Furthermore, considering the Johnson administration's abhorrence of dissent, Kissinger would not have been sent on official missions to Vietnam had he not supported the policies of that administration. Finally, the Rockefeller-Kissinger peace plan of July 13, 1968 is based upon the assumptions of the Johnson administration. Thus Nixon could have had no doubt as to where Kissinger stood on Vietnam.

Hans J. Morgenthau

Chicago

Clayton Fritchey replies:

I agree with Professor Morgenthau that Nixon must have satisfied himself about Kissinger's views before appointing him, for the President interviewed the Professor at some length in New York prior to hiring him. There was little on the public record, however, to guide the President. Mr. Morgenthau refers to a Kissinger article in *Look* three years ago, and a German radio broadcast that was not heard in the US. Compare that with Professor Morgenthau's record. Almost every literate American knows where the latter stands because he has probably made over one hundred public assaults on the Vietnam war in the form of articles, lectures, speeches, debates, etc. Like thousands, perhaps millions, of others, I have been impressed and influenced by his forthright and compelling views.

However influential Kissinger has been behind the scenes, I doubt if he had any public impact on the Vietnam issue before going to the White House. I also agree with Mr. Morgenthau that "Kissinger would not have been sent on official missions to Vietnam had he not supported the policies of the Johnson Administration." In fact, I wrote that "when Nixon invited him [Kissinger] to join his staff, he must have sensed in Kissinger the qualities that also appealed to other Presidents he has advised -the coldness and belief in *Realpolitik* that are reassuring to the White House."

### CREDIT

*To the Editors:*

Friends here have drawn my attention to the fact that the name of the translator is not given in the heading of my review of Nathalie Sarraute's *Between Life and Death*

J. K. Fairbank's assessment of "indefinite" [NYR, June 5], his reference to "the Chinese President, General Secretary, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who has been in power for "transitory success," which Fairbank has described as "out of date and with that of other Westerners who are trying to replace him." He has also stated that "the Chinese government has been designated as one of the three major powers in the world that are recognized by the United States." This position is not supported by the records of the Chinese government, and it is not the position of the United States government. Moreover, the Western press has been carrying reports of the government's misleading statements about the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and the government's false statements about the death of President Kennedy. Furthermore, the Western press has been carrying reports of the government's misleading statements about the death of President Ford. The government's false statements about the death of President Johnson, and the government's false statements about the death of President Carter, have been carried over from the previous administration. Furthermore, the Western press has been carrying reports of the government's misleading statements about the death of President Kennedy, and the government's false statements about the death of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Finally, the government's false statements about the death of President Ford have been carried over from the previous administration.

Furthermore, the Western press has been carrying reports of the government's misleading statements about the death of President Kennedy, and the government's false statements about the death of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Furthermore, the Western press has been carrying reports of the government's misleading statements about the death of President Ford, and the government's false statements about the death of President Carter. It is also claimed that "the Chinese government has been designated as one of the three major powers in the world that are recognized by the United States government." This is not true. The Chinese government has not recognized the United States government since it was formed. Furthermore, the Chinese government has not been a party to any convention or agreement that would require it to recognize the United States government. Moreover, the Chinese government has not been a party to any convention or agreement that would make it responsible for the acts or omissions of the United States government. Therefore, the government's false statements about the death of President Kennedy, and the government's false statements about the death of President Lyndon B. Johnson, have been carried over from the previous administration.

Lionel

Rochester, N. Y.

John K. Fairbank replies:

I would agree with Mr. Standard Norman Bethune that he has achieved recognition in China providing *sotto voce* that, through the dissident Chairman Mao Tse-tung, he is the唯一 person in China who appears likely that, unlike most of his predecessors, will be able to remain in power after the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Here is the Jonathan conclusion about Bethune:

> He went to China to expiate the sin of his generation, to purge himself of his apathy and callousness and purify which he believed had been污

one else's, and I have no children, no grandchildren, no great-grandchildren—that is, no witnesses to my old age, and therefore I don't risk falling into senile garrulousness or starting to oppress my progeny with my caprices.” This is, I suppose, what one calls “strength.”

But perhaps most interesting in her story is the atmosphere it conveys of émigré life—a difficult life, full of

nostalgia, dissatisfaction, distrust, estrangement; of impotent rage against the abandoned native land and covert hostility toward foreign ones—a state of mind in which the spirit struggles against its own pettiness, and misery seeks defense in an armor of stoic attitudes, or of scorn, indifference, playfulness, cynicism, or religiosity; when the need to be recognized, or just accepted, leads some to despair and some to self-aggrandizement, when

pathos and bitterness are dominant, and a sense of tragedy is impossible in a merely pitiful and hideous world.

These moods, as much as the tragic, have evolved their own values and their own art, and Vladimir Nabokov is their best representative. No wonder that to Nina Berberova he is “the answer to all the doubts of the exiled, the persecuted, the insulted and the injured, the ‘unnoticed’ and the ‘lost,’” the savior of her own generation “of deprived,

broken, silenced, stripped, homeless, destitute, disenfranchised...poets.” Their “tragedy” was that they had no “style,” no new way of saying things suitable to their unique experience, and Nabokov brought them “a renewal of style.” A matter of style, then, constitutes the tragedy of the émigré writers—hardly the tragedy of Akhmatova and Pasternak, Mandelshtam and Solzhenitsyn. ☐

## An Impeachable Source Who Can Be Identified

### American Foreign Policy

by Henry A. Kissinger.
Norton, 144 pp., $3.95

### Clayton Fritchey

No member of the Administration seems to outrank Dr. Henry Kissinger in the esteem of Richard Nixon. The President wholeheartedly shares the common view that the choice of the former Harvard professor as the chief White House Adviser on National Security Affairs is his most inspired appointment. Contrary to general supposition though, the President's gratitude is probably not so much for Kissinger's ideas on policy formulations, as for his unexpected virtuosity in expounding Nixon's own involved formulations to the press and thus, by indirection, to the public.

How could anybody familiar with Kissinger's style have guessed that almost overnight he would become Washington's most celebrated exegete? An elaborately anonymous one, to be sure, but all the more effective because of that. There is little in *American Foreign Policy* or other Kissinger books to suggest this potential, but then his new success is not based on the clarity and precision of his private briefings, but, consciously or not, on almost the reverse. His natural style is marvellously, if momentarily, suited to the ambiguities of Nixon's Vietnam policies. The result must have surprised the President as much as it has the rest of Washington. And it has altered the arrangement that was contemplated when Kissinger was first appointed last December.

The original offer was for the scholar to play a self-effacing role as a behind-the-scenes adviser, with the new Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, a lawyer and talented advocate, acting as the front man on foreign policy. This entirely suited Kissinger, it is said, because he neither desired nor intended to deal with the press, but that is not the way it worked out. Rogers was handicapped by inexperience and the heavy burden of getting the State Department reorganized. Kissinger, on the other hand, was on top of the situation from the beginning.

He brought to the White House not only his own professionalism, but a large hand-picked staff of assistants who are specialists in almost every field of foreign policy. The Kissinger operation was already functioning before the inauguration. It was inevitable that the President would rely on it during those first months in office when State was still being reorganized.

There were pressing publicity problems from the beginning, notably Vietnam, which called for expert ex-

position, and the responsibility automatically fell on Kissinger. He was there in the White House; he saw the President constantly; he knew better than anybody else what Nixon was thinking; he had an authoritative but not too explicit way of stating things that Nixon admired; he was respected by the top politicians and members of the press who need and expect regular off-the-record background briefings on the real aims of the Administration. So, almost accidentally, Kissinger began to assume

this delicate, highly sensitive responsibility. In foreign policy today, it is not what the President says that counts so much as what Kissinger (at the direction of his Patron, of course) says he meant.

Under the rules of the game, Kissinger cannot be personally quoted, nor can anything be attributed to him. The synonym for him and his operation is “White House sources” or some variation of that. This anonymity has unique advantages. Since Kissinger can't be quoted, his normal style is an advantage instead of a handicap, for

his studied opacities and obliquities, his discursive rather than precise musings, his guarded adumbrations of things to come, put the burden of public interpretation on the press. Many of the leading diplomatic correspondents, as well as influential columnists and other opinion-makers, seem to enjoy this experience. They find it stimulating to try to penetrate the somewhat Delphic hints of the agreeable professor.

Kissinger's role and his extraordinary

value to the President can be illustrated by his private exposition of President Nixon's famous Vietnam television speech on the night of May 14. To the ordinary citizen listening without benefit of briefing by “White House sources,” most of it seemed like the mixture as before. In spite of this, Nixon got good mileage out of the speech after Kissinger gave the press a privately conducted tour of it. The ensuing interpretation prompted two prominent Senatorial doves, Frank Church and Albert Gore, to applaud “the President's initiative,” whereas on

the opposing side there were no complaints from hawks like Senators Goldwater and Dirksen. There was a similar dual reaction (also helpful to Nixon) among some of the leading and most sophisticated Washington correspondents, all of whom have regular access to the White House.

In the Washington Post, Chalmers Roberts, who has a good ear for nuances, was as impressed with what Nixon did not say as with what he did say. He concluded that the President had retreated from his resistance to coalition government, and was no longer necessarily wedded to President Thieu. When “all these components, some fully clear, some still shadowy, are added together,” he said, “they represent an immense change from past American policy... one is struck by how far the Nixon Administration has moved.” Conversely, Richard Wilson, a knowledgeable columnist with good Administration connections, said, “Those who have taken their time in measuring Nixon's television speech, along with the explanations of it at the White House and the public reaction to it, tend toward the conclusion that its main emphasis was on not quitting in Vietnam.”

Later, James Reston of the New York Times got “the clear impression that Mr. Nixon's first priority is to get out of the war, with the agreement of the South Vietnamese if possible, without it if necessary...” Joseph Alsop, on the other hand, thought the President was merely conning the doves. He said, “Nixon's strategy is, of course, a bit like the strategy of the Russian lady in the old story, who threw the wolves a child from time to time in order to keep the wolf pack from catching up with her troika.” Alsop and his brother Stewart, a columnist for Newsweek, probably see as much of Kissinger, informally as well as formally, as any other journalists in Washington, if not more. Yet Stewart's reading of the Nixon-Kissinger Vietnam scenario indicates he is skeptical about Nixon's pledge never to accept a “disguised defeat” in Vietnam. “For strongly to denounce a disguised defeat,” he wrote, “is one way to disguise a defeat.”

After yet another White House briefing, it was reported that the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam is “irreversible,” but this didn’t inflame the hawks because, as NEA columnist Bruce Biossat wrote, “Nixon intends to retain strong options to be considered in the event Hanoi, at any stage of the withdrawal process, tries to take military advantage of this on a major scale... They include a resumption

September 25, 1969

25

This, of course, was a policy initiated
by Johnson before he left office, and
so far the withdrawals have been small
ones of no military significance.

If we examine the statements of both Kissinger and Nixon on withdrawal, we find a record so contradictory that it is meaningless, unless it is understood as an ambitious exercise in public relations. Kissinger warned against unilateral withdrawal, which, he wrote, could lead "to an even more dangerous international situation." Yet not long ago a group of Republican senators, after a private briefing by the President himself, reported that Nixon intended to bring back all US troops before the 1970 elections. That would be unilateral withdrawal on a scale far exceeding even that proposed by Clark Clifford, the former Secretary of Defense, who suggested the pullback of

or even question the Johnson-Nixon
thesis that US intervention is justified
because it is not a civil war, but a
simple case of external Communist
aggression. The impression that Kissin-
ger is indifferent to the moral aspects
of the war is reinforced by statements
such as: "What is involved now is
confidence in American promises."
And again: "However we got into
Vietnam, whatever the judgment of
our actions, ending the war honorably
is essential for the peace of the
world." Obviously, "honorably" means
on terms acceptable to the US. It
should now not be too difficult to see
why the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four
hard-line Presidents found Kissinger an
acceptable adviser.

Kissinger's present writ runs far
beyond Vietnam, for he is the working
manager of the National Security
Council, and thus in a position to

influence every aspect of foreign and
military policy. Yet, for more or less
fortuitous reasons, his influence has
not been decisive on a number of the
big decisions of the new Administra-
tion. The sharpest issue of all, the
ABM program, was suddenly, almost
spontaneously, pre-empted by the Sec-
retary of Defense. There is no reason
to think that Kissinger fundamentally
disagreed with Laird's campaign for
ABM, but if it had been left to him
the exposition of the policy would
have been less clumsy. At another crit-
ical moment, when North Korea shot
down the EC-121 intelligence plane, it
was William P. Rogers, the Secretary of
State, rather than Kissinger, who
quickly, and decisively, exerted his
influence to forestall Presidential retal-
iation. Again, it appears that this was
in line with Kissinger's own thinking,
but the initiative was Rogers's.

The impulsive public actions of the
Secretary of State and Defense will
always present problems for anyone in
Kissinger's position. Before the Ad-
ministration had time to settle down,
for instance, Laird openly threw cold
water on the disarmament talks with
Russia. He was criticized in the Senate
for saying the US would not be ready
to sit down with the Soviets before
summer or fall, but he turned out to
be right. Kissinger's approach would

merely combat troops. Stewart Alsop,
after an interview with Kissinger, re-
ported in *Newsweek* (June 16 issue)
that the President had told Kissinger,
in preparing optional plans, to elim-
inate unrealistic proposals. "In a Viet-
nam paper, for example," Kissinger
told Alsop, "such an essentially silly
option as loading the troops on ships
and sailing away would not be includ-
ed." On June 19, however, at a
televised press conference, the Pres-
ident said that he hoped to withdraw
US troops faster than Clark Clifford
had suggested. Then, on August 22,
Nixon announced bluntly that he was
holding up further withdrawals. More
recently, the anonymous sources have
been mentioning the withdrawal of
100,000 troops by Christmas.

Kissinger's book itself has several
curious contradictions. At one point,
for instance, he remarks that "a mixed
commission to develop and supervise a
political process to reintegrate the
country—including free elections—could
be useful." But then, as previously
noted, he tells the reader that it is
unimaginable that the opposing forces
"could work together." His analysis of
the war itself also seems inconsistent.
He acknowledges in a short preface to
the essay on Vietnam, that the conflict
is a "civil war which has torn a society
for 20 years," but he does not criticize

September 25, 1969

"Impressive and important"

— GEORGE F. KENNAN

THE MARXIAN
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA

By Robert C. Tucker

Author of *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx*,
Professor of Politics and Director of
Russian Studies at Princeton University

"I N his parting word about Marx at Highgate Cemetery," Professor Tucker observes, "Engels characterized his friend as 'before all else a revolutionist.' This was a true summation of Marx both as a man of action and as a thinker. For as a theorist Marx was before all else a theorist of revolution. The revolutionary idea was the keystone of his theoretical structure. Marxism, as he fashioned it with the assistance of Engels, was in its essence a theory and a program of revolution."

Professor Tucker here follows "The Marxian Revolutionary Idea" in thought and application, through infancy to maturity, in success and failure, and as it has been transformed by modern socialism.

"I think it an impressive and important work — one that avoids the polemical overtones that have weighed on so much of critical literature about Marx, and passes through to new and significant appreciations. I am sure that its importance, as a contribution to the critical literature on this subject, will grow steadily with the years, and will have a very significant effect, in the long run, on historical interpretation." — GEORGE F. KENNAN

CONTENTS

One

The Marxian Revolutionary Idea

The Genesis of Marxism

Marxism as Social Theory

The Springs of Revolution

The Revolution of Communism

Two

Marx and Distributive Justice

The Polemic Against the

Idea of Justice

Is Capitalism Unjust?

Justice and the

Post-Revolutionary Future

The Underlying Issue

Three

The Political Theory of
Classical Marxism

The State as Allienated

Social Power

The State as Organized Coercion

Historical Forms of the State

The Proletarian State

The Economy as Polity

The Anarchism of Marx

Four

Marxism and Modernization

The Process of Modernization

Modernization and Communism

Strengths and Weaknesses

of the Theory

Nonbourgeois Modernization

The Problem of Appeals

Five

Marxism and
Communist Revolution

The Postulate of Universality

The Revolution of
Underdevelopment

The Role of War

The Russian Pattern

The Path of Armed Struggle

The Imposed Revolution

The Future of Communist
Revolution

Six

The Deradicalization of
Marxist Movements

Interpretations of Post-Stalin

Ideological Change

Radicalism: A General View

Deradicalization of Social
Democratic Parties

Radicalism and Deradicalization
under Lenin and Stalin

Soviets, Deradicalization
Since Stalin

China and Deradicalization

Seven

Marx and the End of History

With Preface, Bibliographic
Note and Index

At all bookstores, $5.95

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC.

55 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

27

September Report on

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The very least. We have now selected from it to make a book, and — until you read it — you will have to take our word that the book makes even more absorbing reading than the magazine pieces did. Read as a whole instead of over a period of thirty months, the book, edited by Robert Manning and Michael Janeway and entitled WHO WE ARE: An Atlantic Chronicle of the United States and Vietnam, tells us mostly about ourselves.

"We thought," Robert Manning writes, "there was a need to show how the war was affecting the tone and fiber of life in America. The *Atlantic* did it with pens, reports, essments, debate, stories, letters, and commentary by authors ranging from Leo Tolstoy (the most venerable) to Frances Fitzgerald, Michael Janeway, and Orville Schell (the youngest). Others, to name a few, are D. W. Brogan, Oscar Handlin, Bill Moyers, Wilfrid Sheed, James C. Thomson, Jr., Dan Wakefield, Tom Wicker, and Judge Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. Many of the pieces have won prizes; we immodestly think the book deserves one.

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probably have been less blunt, but the
issue was seized by Laird before he
could get into the act.

It would be a mistake to conclude
from this that Kissinger's influence
is less than it is reputed to be. The
large press corps that followed Nixon
around the world saw at first hand
how close Kissinger is to the Chief
Executive, and how eager he is to have
his side continuously at his side.
McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow,
who preceded Kissinger in his present
position, were key figures in the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
but they were not given to the kind of
official recognition Kissinger is enjoy-
ing. Toward the end of his recent
world tour, for example, the President
delegated Kissinger to give the Pres-
ident of France and the NATO Per-
manent Council a private briefing on
the results of Nixon's journey. The
loftiness of this assignment was
matched only by Kissinger's summa-
tion of the Nixon odyssey. "I believe,"
he said, "in this tour we achieved what
we set out to do, and from this
standpoint we can call it a suc-
cess...."

What had they set out to do? The Administration's hopes for the limitation of arms, of peace in the Middle East, even of a settlement in Vietnam, have been based in whole or part on the cooperation and good will of Russia. Did the celebrated visit to Rumania, which so exhilarated Nixon, advance this objective or set it back? Secretary Rogers said that the President's Rumanian visit was "most successful," but added that the US "has no way of knowing whether it affected Soviet thinking." This is puzzling, for almost immediately after the Rumanian trip was announced, the Soviet leaders canceled a scheduled trip to Bucharest to sign a twenty-year pact. Just after Nixon returned, the Russians pointedly sent a second-string delegation to the 10th Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party. Finally, on August 20, they even more pointedly announced that Rumania's celebration of its World War II liberation from the Germans would not be attended, as expected, by any of the ruling troika of Kosygin, Brezhnev, or Podgorny.

Meanwhile, on the Russian end, the
dismarment wire has now gone dead,
and the Soviets seem to have lost
interest in working for either a Middle
East or Vietnam settlement. After
Nixon left Bucharest, President Cau-
escu pledged his country's allegiance
to the Warsaw Pact, and hailed the
Soviet Union as the savior of mankind.
He also criticized American "imperial-
ist" and called for the withdrawal of
US troops from Vietnam.

After Nixon left New Delhi, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi revealed that
she "felt that the Vietnamese should
be left without any outside interfer-
ence." In the wake of Nixon's visit to
Thailand, that country has begun to
talk about bringing home the 12,000
troops it put in Vietnam to please the
US. "Possibly the only good the Nixon
mission has done for the American
public," said the Manchester Guardian,
"is to arouse it to the real peril of a
second Vietnam in Thailand."

Wherever the President and Kissinger
went, the talk inevitably came back to
Vietnam. The essence of the Nixon
message: Vietnam will go down in
history as "one of America's finest

hours," but one such war is enough
and there won't be any more. This has
puzzled the rest of the world as much
as it has the American public. One
reason Nixon seems to admire Kissin-
ger so much is that his learned adviser
rivals the master himself as a cryptog-
rapher. Kissinger, for instance, has
written that "the guerrilla wins if he
does not lose; the conventional army
loses if it does not win." By this
definition the US has already lost the
war in Vietnam. But he then goes on
to say: "The US cannot accept a
military defeat or a change in the
political structure of South Vietnam
brought about by external military
force...."

Traveling in Europe just after the
end of the Nixon tour, I found every
official I talked to had the same
question: Does Nixon have a plan to
end the war in Vietnam? If so, what
is it? To them, the situation seems much
the same as it was under Lyndon John
son. That is, there are still more than
500,000 American troops in Vietnam,
the peace talks in Paris are still
staleminated, in Saigon an undiluted
military government remains in power,
the casualties continue to mount, there
is talk (but little progress) of bringing
the boys home, and the same old
propaganda goes on about democratiz-
ing the Saigon regime, and turning the
fighting back to the South Vietnamese
army at some mythical time when it is
prepared to cope with the enemy.

Just after Nixon left Saigon, a
London *Times* dispatch said: "It seems
inconceivable that the Americans have
no peace plan; it seems inconceivable
that President Nixon, with the mega-
ton mind of Dr. Kissinger at his elbow,
would induole in foolish optimism or
whistling in the dark; it seems equally
inconceivable that, out of simple bon-
homie, President Nixon would go out
of his way to visit President Thieu,
praise his magnanacia, and then, al-
beit off the cuff, describe him as one
of the four or five best politicians in
the world. No American President has
such an impulsive cuff. It cannot be
anything the Thieu government has
already done; it must be something it
is going to do." The *Times* then haz-
arded a guess that Thieu was about
to spring the major Cabinet reshuffle
that has long been promised as the
first step in broadening the govern-
ment, but that possibility was scotched
when Thieu named a close military
buddy, General Tran Thien Khiem, as
the new Premier.

The Nixon strategy, if it can be
called that, is more explicable if it is
looked upon as an ambition, rather
than a plan. The ambition is to relieve
the Administration of the political
liability of the war, but without any
forthright admission of error, or any
renunciation of existing commitments
in Vietnam and Asia as a whole. And,
above all, the Administration wants to
protect itself against charges of a
"disguised defeat" and "sell out," or
of being soft on communism, espe-
cially from those who did so much to
put Nixon in power. If the recent
maneuvering of Nixon, in both word
and deed, seems tricky, it is because
this kind of operation requires con-
stant improvisation, involved extenua-
tions, fast footwork, and faster public
relations.

From the Administration's point of
view, the ideal solution would be for
Saigon and the National Liberation
Front to agree on a peace settlement,

which, regardless of the terms, could
not be blamed on Nixon. After all, the
US has long been committed to accept-
ing even a communist government, so
long as it is not "imposed". In Paris,
the US negotiators still talk hopefully
of progress, but in Washington very
few officials, including Nixon and
Kissinger, are counting on it any
longer. For Hanoi and the NLF, any-
thing less than a transitional coalition
government would be tantamount to
surrender; for President Thieu and his
fellow generals, a coalition government
would doubtless be political suicide.

Does the US have the power and/or
the will to force a settlement on the
opposing sides? We have already aban-
doned a military victory, and have
stopped bombing North Vietnam; the
enemy's casualties are down, and he
can hope for further relief through the
pressure of US public opinion to bring
the troops home. Why should he
budge?

As for Saigon, the generals are well
aware that they must make some
surface concessions in order to help
Nixon appease US public opinion.
They can afford, for example, to go
through the motions of agreeing to a
mixed electoral commission to conduct
new elections, for they would still be
in effective control of the government,
and anyway there is no chance of the
enemy agreeing to such a mechanism
as long as Thieu is in power. Thieu is
also willing to humor Nixon by reshu-
fling his Cabinet, but he is not about
to free the imprisoned Truong Dinh
Dzu, the non-Communist peace candi-
date who ran so well in the last
election, and bring him into the gov-
ernment. Since his Midway meeting
with Nixon, Thieu has been making it
increasingly plain that he has gone
about as far as he will go, which
means that serious peace talks are not
in the cards.

Once US military escalation and
immediate peace negotiations are ruled
out as practical possibilities, Nixon's
options are swiftly narrowed. They
come down to the following: (1) force
(or try to force) Thieu to come to
terms with the enemy whether he
wants to or not; (2) failing that,
withdraw support of Thieu, and allow
a new government to come to power
that would be willing to negotiate
seriously a settlement with the NLF
and the withdrawal of US troops; (3)
unilaterally withdraw all US troops and
turn the war back to South Vietnam,
leaving it up to the Saigon government
to negotiate a peace or continue
fighting on its own; (4) continue the
present policy of stalemate war and
stalemate peace talks, hoping the enemy
will eventually collapse or capitulate.

Since the first three options would
trigger "sell-out" charges against Nix-
on, they can be dismissed. He is not
the sort of leader who will risk being
vulnerable to charges of "softness"; and
he has shown neither the inclination
nor the courage to present a serious
policy of withdrawal to the public.
Thus the Administration has chosen
the fourth option, essentially the old
LBJ formula, but with a new façade to
make it more popular. It is apparent
that Nixon thinks Johnson's chief
failure was not in the policy, but in his
inability to package it successfully for
public consumption.

It must be conceded that Nixon and
Kissinger have been more adroit in that
respect. They have kept up a hot-and-

28

The New York Review

"An exceptionally
fascinating study"*

Terror and
Resistance

*A Study of Political Violence*

By E. V. WALTER

"An exceptionally fascinating study, original in concept and provocative (as well as depressing) in its conclusions. The author thinks that the use of terror by a government or by a ruler should not be considered — as it has been in Western political theory from the Greeks on down — proof of social failure or mental illness. He believes that terror is the price some societies accept to hold themselves together. Mr. Walter has chosen his examples from various African societies — some tribal, some organized as kingdoms, and a few unitary despotisms, like the nineteenth-century Zulu state. Using Africa strengthens the force of his argument, for against comparatively unfamiliar backgrounds we find behavior that is startlingly familiar: the Zulu subjects of Shaka resemble the Russian subjects of Stalin — terrified, obedient, and puzzlingly proud of their murderous overlord." — *The New Yorker*

$8.50 at all bookstores

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

move, but to seem to be moving." He was writing about the Middle East, but he found a parallel in Nixon's Vietnam policy, which he characterized as one of "embellishment—the creation of an illusion of accomplishment."

Kissinger has at times successfully parried efforts by the press to probe into Administration policy by noting that high officials cannot always be responsive, and that on occasion some things must be taken on faith. "It's difficult to convince the opposition in this country that you're doing something," Kissinger told Gerald Astor. "Critics, perfectly legitimately, raise questions. But we're in the difficult position of not being able to answer. This job makes you doubt the amount that any outsider can know of what's happening." Kissinger seems to be blissfully unaware of it, but he is

already suffering from an illusion endemic to the White House, especially among newcomers, including new Presidents. This is the illusion that "inside" information somehow confers omniscience on those privy to it. Acting on super-secret CIA advice, John F. Kennedy made one of the worst mistakes of his career, the Bay of Pigs invasion. Lyndon Johnson, encouraged by the secret information of the Joint Chiefs, thought North Vietnam would be a pushover. In their dealings with "outsiders," it is only human for high officials to think, if not to say, "if you only knew what I know."

How much the better it would be if, once in a while, they knew what the public sometimes instinctively knows—without benefit of inside information. That, for instance, the government's Vietnam policy is a disaster. ☐

"Ssh"

Cascando and
Other Short Dramatic Pieces
by Samuel Beckett.
Grove, 79 pp., $3.95; $1.75 (paper)

Robert M. Adams

When it was first announced for publication, Samuel Beckett's new collection, *Cascando and Other Short Dramatic Pieces*, bore the title *Cascando and Other Residua*. But as this may have suggested to the publisher such morbid phrases as "scraping the bottom of Beckett," the title has now been changed. Still, the fact is that the present volume consists in good part of things written more than five years ago, and entirely of things already published in England—some of them published before that on the continent. The title piece, along with "Play" and "Words and Music," was published in 1964 by Faber & Faber; the other three pieces were published in 1967, two by Faber & Faber, one by Calder & Boyars. The seventy-nine pages of the present chrestomathy do indeed represent a convenient gathering of Samuel Beckett's recent activities; but they are neither very recent nor, in the crude, quantitative sense, very copious.

Actually, Beckett seems to be getting more and more gnomic as he goes on. Of the three most recent pieces, one (subtitled, appropriately, "Dramaticale") covers just two-and-a-half pages, during which 125 words are spoken; another ("Film") includes just a single spoken word—and that word is "ssh." We have already had mimelets with no words at all. Mr. Beckett may in due course achieve the ultimate asceticism of a play with no words, no characters, no stage directions, no title—to the immense relief of the fellow who purchases ink for Grove Press. With Rauschenberg's "Erased DeKooning" on the wall, and Cage's "Four Minutes and Thirty Nine Seconds" of stereophonic silence on the hi-fi, the esthete of the future will be almost too burdened to appreciate Beckett's ultimate reticence.

The situation isn't without its comic aspects, as who would know better than Mr. Beckett? But this shouldn't obscure the elegance of his angular, pedantic little drolleries. As his mind distills more and deeper insight into fewer words, sparser gestures, defter paradigms, Mr. Beckett comes ever

closer to the ultimate word, a supremely aromatic monosyllable, a compression of all the thought and feeling and insight which he is absolutely destined to pronounce.

Cascando consists of a half-dozen curiously strong peppermints for a mini-stage, TV, radio, and film. Most of them deal with variants of a single theme, that of despairing, 'only old age; and in most of them the characters (or at least the speakers) are manipulated like marionettes to give an impression of mechanicallessness. Words often seem to be wrung from them like drops of water from a badly closed tap. Sometimes, unexpectedly, they pour forth a sudden spate of empty formulas, like Lucky's famous thinking-exhibition in *Godot*, but then they are abruptly throttled into silence. Somewhere in the remote past there is usually a faint, half-forgotten recollection of something vaguely akin to happiness; words evoke it, though only weakly and for a moment, before it disappears in the fumbling of senile decay. Movement, intonations, lighting, and stage-details are all rigidly prescribed, so that the least ripple of expression, a slightly colored word, stands out as a bold gesture.

Cascando itself (the title piece) contains in its entire scenario just one such non-neutral word, "Woburn"; but whether it's the name of the chief character, the country seat of the Duke of Bedford, a town near Boston, Mass., an English series of collected short stories, or a yoking of two dire monosyllables (*woe* plus *burn*) isn't indicated in any way. The short play "Come and Go" contains one non-neutral statement—when Vi, Ru, and Flo link hands at the end of the play, Flo says, "I can feel the rings." The last sentence of directions concerning the costuming of the characters says simply, "no rings apparent." Which is, of course, precisely right, and puts the action of the playlet just where Beckett wants it, in the lost, unreachable recollections of his three gray neutralities; but it's also characteristic of his extraordinary dramatic economy.

An admirably gay variant on these somewhat somber arrangements in gray and brown is provided by the script of a film (entitled, succinctly, "Film"), about which it's doubtless presumptuous to write without having seen the

30

September 25, 1969