Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of our Security Assistance Program for the fiscal year 1976.

I would like in particular to discuss with you the fundamental place of security assistance in our effort to help construct an international structure in which peoples can pursue prosperity, justice and positive aspirations under conditions of enhanced stability and wider prospects for peace.

## The Changing Context of Security Assistance

We live in a turbulent age, a fact which has placed security and world order at the center of international relations. From the time of Woodrow Wilson, America's strength and influence have been used to help structure a stable global order. For Americans have increasingly understood that democratic institutions and the political, economic and moral principles we hold dear cannot be secured in a world plagued by perennial conflict and disruption.

In the Cold War era we saw our task as relatively straightforward. To create a world environment conducive to freedom we felt, in the broadest sense, a keen interest in the course of events all over the globe. To contain our adversaries we sold or gave defense equipment and services to those who would associate with us in opposition to Communism. While specifics of our security assistance programs were sometimes debated, there was general consensus between the executive and legislative that the concept of security assistance was integral to our most important foreign policy objectives.

With the end of the last decade it became evident that this rigid bipolar structure had passed into history. The era of American predominance has given way to strategic parity at a time when nuclear weapons grow more devastating, nuclear capability proliferates, and festering regional conflicts imperil global stability. Long-held assumptions about the nature of international relations are challenged. New centers of power and influence have sprung up around the globe, bringing calls for major alterations in global structures. A vast range of economic problems has imposed new imperatives for restored growth and greater efficiency.

In sum, we have entered an uncertain and unpredictable era, a time of heightened peril to the success and even the survival of the community of nations. But in this time of change we have seen new opportunities for progress as well. Over the past several years we have taken historic steps to make the most of these opportunities. Our foreign policy design is sound and well underway. Its goals are those which any Administration -- Democrat or Republican -- can support. We seek

-- to maintain our national strength and national purpose;

-- to continually revitalize our bond to allies who share our tradition, values, and interests;

-2-

-- to reduce the perils of nuclear war;

-- to build a rational relationship to potential adversaries;

-- to help resolve regional conflicts that imperil global peace;

-- to solve the crucial economic issues before us, in the context of a new era of global economic cooperation among all nations, industrial and developing, producers and consumers, east and west, north and south.

Security assistance is one of the foundation stones of this design.

All foreign policy still begins with security.

-- Our alliances and the military assistance programs which support them have been the bedrock of our security and of world peace throughout the post-World War II years. To maintain our nation's safety there simply is no substitute for a strong national defense bolstered by mutually supporting defense ties with other nations which share a commitment to peace and a determination to protect the independence of their nationhood. Especially in this age, when nuclear weapons can bring global holocaust, we have no more fundamental task than to maintain the strategic balance, for otherwise we risk our survival.

-- But a balance of terror is an unacceptably perilous solution. Any realistic hope for a durable peace will depend upon the continued effort to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable, reciprocal, and long-term basis. Based on our strength and the unity of our alliances we have achieved many positive developments in international relations over the past several years. These unquestionably have been grounded on the recognition by would-be aggressors that those they would confront were part of a security system which left them no rational alternative to cooperation.

-- In a world of proliferating nuclear capability, many festering regional conflicts pose a great risk of global conflagration. We have no choice but to help contain these disputes and remove their root causes. While it is still possible in some areas of the world to seek to preserve peace through agreements to deny the external supply of military materiel, the possibilities of success through this approach are diminishing. Instead, regional stability is increasingly bound up with the maintenance of stable balances of power through carefully considered transfers of defense equipment.

-- Every nation great or small, whether part of the central strategic balance or not, is fundamentally concerned with its ability to defend the integrity of its territory and maintain internal order. No government can be indifferent to its security, however it defines it; and security requirements will compete with economic and social development for a share of whatever resources are available. Thus, this is a world in which the level and quant

-3-

of international military transactions will be substantial. An increasing number of countries have arms production industries and are becoming international suppliers. And an increasing number of countries without defense production industries now can afford to pay cash for arms from anywhere in the world. It is of substantial political importance to the United States that we be able to respond to the felt needs of nations with which we seek constructive relations across the broad range of contemporary issues. The United States cannot expect to retain influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard. Defense supply links to these countries can significantly strengthen efforts to achieve cooperation on other issues -- whether political, economic or cultural.

Thus a careful security assistance policy is a crucial instrument of our national policy in much the same sense as are our political support and economic assistance for others. And there are gains to our domestic position as well. Security assistance programs contribute needed jobs to several sectors of our labor force. They help us maintain a more favorable balance of payments. And they permit our defense industries to achieve significant economies through scale of production -- economies that are passed along through lower prices to our armed forces.

## The Criteria of Security Assistance

There are many factors which must be considered in any foreign transfer of American defense services and equipment, whether by cash, credit or bar. Each arms transfer case must be assessed on its own merits but there are a number of basic questions which must be answered in all cases:

- **What is the nature and extent of the threat to the security of the recipient nation?** Do we agree on the nature of the threat? Involved here is the role that country plays in its region and in the world; its capacity to maintain its stability, and its will to defend its own interests.

- **What is the United States' interest in helping to preserve that security?** What interests does the recipient have in common with us and where do our interests diverge? What potential influence for restraint or positive conduct is involved?

- **What other nations are involved in military transfers to the recipient -- now or potentially?** What options has the recipient? Will a refusal lead it to turn to another source of supply, perhaps altering a presently desirable international relationship?

- **And what are the consequences for us if we fail to respond?** What are the disadvantages of refusing to sell to a government with which we enjoy good relations? Will regional or even global military balances be affected? What will be the impact on our own readiness?

-4-

The Review Process

In order to ensure that these factors be considered thoroughly and com-
prehensively, the Department of State established, four years ago, a
formal resource planning review that passes on all transfers within the
framework of the Foreign Assistance and the Foreign Military Sales Acts.
The review is conducted by the Security Assistance Program Review
Committee, under the personal chairmanship of the Under Secretary of
State for Security Assistance. Committee membership encompasses all
the federal agencies involved: State, Defense, ACDA, Treasury, OMB,
NSC, and AID.

The Security Assistance Program Review Committee provides the central
forum for the necessary interagency dialogue pertinent to the continuous
supervision and general direction of Security Assistance Policy. In
those cases where complex political, military and economic issues give
rise to conflicting interagency interests, the National Security Council
System is employed to reconcile those interests. Major policy decisions
bearing on defense transfers are made by the President himself.

Commercial sales of defense-related articles and services, transacted
outside of the government authority provided by the Foreign Assistance
and Foreign Military Sales Acts, are assuming a growing share of our total
defense transfers. These sales are controlled by the Department of State
under the authority provided to the President by the Mutual Security Act
of 1954. As in all MAP and FMS cases, decisions taken in regard to
commercial sales incorporate the views of all the pertinent federal agen-
ties.

Of particular importance in decisions on defense-related transfers is
the potential effect which they may have on our national defense prepared-
ness. Here, the views of the Department of Defense are given the highest
attention and their judgments form an indispensable part of the decision-
making process. Transactions which might result in lessening the readi-
ness of US armed forces receive the most careful attention at the highest
levels and final decisions are made by the President.

The procedures we have established to govern military transfers assure
that all relevant information, analysis, and considerations are avail-
able to those who make the decisions. We cannot expect to confront
straightforward choices nor to achieve our objectives in every case.
Our task is to make the best possible systematic judgment in light of
the totality of US interests, just as with our other international
political judgments.

- 5 -

## *Morality Assistance to the Middle East*

I would like to take up with you now the question of most immediate and urgent interest -- America's security assistance to the Middle East. This includes, as you know, both military and economic elements.

The Middle East portion of our security assistance request is large, fully seventy percent of the program. But it is matched in magnitude by the United States national interests that it is designed to protect and further.

Our Middle East security assistance program directly affects matters of vital national importance. It is a central part of our efforts to help achieve progress towards peace. We have a historical and moral commitment to Israel. We have important concerns in the Arab world. Perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies. And upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery and increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. For all these reasons, our aid request is a prudent investment in peace.

Economic and military support for Israel's security has been American policy during five administrations. Last May 76 U.S. Senators wrote to President Ford urging that the U.S. "be responsive to Israel's urgent economic and military needs." The Administration's proposal is responsive to this call.

A keystone of our policy in the Middle East has always rested on the ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense. That ability is currently undergoing its most strenuous test and, despite what we here in the U.S. would consider to be extremely stringent domestic austerity measures, it is clear that Israel must have both substantial economic and substantial military assistance. Our program for Israel is aimed at permitting both defensive strength and economic health. Our new friendship for Egypt does not in any way undermine our traditional friendship with Israel. Indeed, our policy of furthering all constructive forces in the Middle East is the surest path through which we can help the parties attain a durable settlement which meets the principal concerns and interests of all in the area -- including the survival of Israel as a state.

While our friendship for Israel is embodied in our economic and military assistance, we must also find the means to demonstrate and nurture our growing friendship for Israel's neighbor, Egypt. And the case for Egypt is equally strong. Egypt has courageously embarked on the road to peace and moved from confrontation to negotiation as a means to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. At the same time Egypt's leaders must take on the massive tasks of rebuilding the Suez area, rehabilitating the economy, and carrying forward the development of their country. The United States can and should assist Egypt in overcoming these major economic problems, and encourage Egypt's efforts toward closer relations with the West.

- 6 -

Our security assistance also helps Jordan to remain an area of stability and moderation in a strategic area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan pursues a moderate course and remains a staunch friend of the U.S. while confronting serious problems of economic underdevelopment. Jordan has opened a new chapter in its attack on its economic problems and is turning new imagination and energies to its development. We must help Jordan to develop and to maintain its course of moderation in a particularly sensitive area where stability and progress are essential in preserving a framework for moving toward peace.

Syria desires to accelerate economic development and improve the living standards of its people. We must consolidate our cooperation with Syria in this area as part of our overall relationship which is central to the negotiating process.

Our Special Requirements Fund continues to be needed to allow us to seize new opportunities in the peace process in the Middle East and to cover the costs of our recently approved Sinai Support Mission.

In sum, the stakes in the Middle East are big, no less than war and peace; our national interests in the area have become vitally important. The responsibilities we have assumed are substantial, but they are warranted.

Our assistance is not, as some have suggested, the price of the recently concluded Sinai agreement. It there had been no agreement, the needs of the countries concerned, and the imperatives of our interests and of our relations with them, would still have required an ongoing program of comparable magnitude -- in conditions of continuing stalemate rather than as is now the case, in the context of hopeful forward movement. The additional burden of U.S. assistance is modest -- and infinitely less than the demonstrated costs of another war.

In the last two years we have worked closely with the nations of this area in the search for peace. One of the consequences of working together in one sphere of vital interest is that those with whom we work come to trust us and look to us for help in other spheres of vital concern -- strengthening their own countries and improving the conditions of life for their own peoples.

In preparing our Middle East program, we have been mindful of the economic problems facing us here at home and the budgetary restraints they require. We have therefore tried to strike a balance between what we could do to assist constructively in the area and what we should ask the Congress and the American people to provide. Our program reflects this balance. We hope it will receive the support that it requires and deserves.

- 7 -

## Security Assistance to Other Regions

After the Middle East, the balance of our security assistance requests is allocated to other regional areas in the following portions:

<table><tr><td>- Europe</td><td>11%</td><td>$534.0 million</td></tr><tr><td>- East Asia</td><td>10%</td><td>$448.4 million</td></tr><tr><td>- Latin America</td><td>4%</td><td>$196.0 million</td></tr><tr><td>- Africa</td><td>1.5%</td><td>$68.5 million</td></tr><tr><td>- Near East<br>(exclusive of<br>the Middle East)</td><td>1%</td><td>$55.0 million</td></tr></table>

### Europe

Our European proposals are focused primarily on Turkey and Greece. The strength of these two countries and their association with us in NATO is critical to the stability of the Mediterranean region and the solidity of our position within it. The Congress is well aware of the extraordinary complications which the Cyprus dispute has created for our relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the impact on the overall NATO structure. By resuming well-conceived grant and credit assistance programs for these two key nations, the United States can meet legitimate military procurement needs that will strengthen our allies and at the same time encourage resumption of normal bilateral relationships. This in turn should enable us to play a more effective role in helping find a mutually satisfactory solution to the Cyprus conflict.

### East Asia

Our security assistance program proposals for East Asia assume particular significance this year and have been framed with a view to demonstrating our intention of sustaining a constructive American role in the area.

The Asian scene is currently marked by uncertainties, reflecting the unsettling effects of Indochina developments last spring. It is clear that throughout the region states eager to preserve their independence are anxious to see the United States remain politically engaged in Asia. They recognize -- as we must -- that no equilibrium can long be maintained there without our active participation. And many countries of consequence to us will measure our will and capacity to perpetuate a constructive involvement in the Asian balance by our efforts to help others develop a more self-reliant defense position. Already perceptible progress in the direction of self-reliance is evident in the fact that our request for Foreign Military Sales credits for East Asian countries exceeds -- in fact, is twice as large -- as our request for grant aid funds.

In Korea we are requesting $76 million in grant aid and $126 million in credits, repayable in full at current market interest rates. The South Koreans have made substantial progress in their own military

- 8 -

modernization effort. In the face of heightened tension on the pen-
insula, they have imposed on themselves a heavy defense tax to finance
improved defenses. We have put forward proposals in the United Nations
to break the diplomatic impasse on Korea. We intend to provide the
necessary muscle with which to support these initiatives.

We consider it important to pay special attention to allied and friendly nations in Southeast Asia, whose concern for their security is understandable in the light of recent developments. The Philippines has internal security problems. Thailand wants to preserve the security of its border regions and counter an increased potential for subversion in three parts of the country. Likewise, Indonesia seeks to strengthen its ability to patrol and protect its far-flung archipelago. Our grant programs in these countries are matched by credit proposals that attest to the increasing abilities of these countries to meet much of their defense burden.

Latin America

Four months ago in the spirit of mutual confidence and respect that has
increasingly characterized hemispheric relations, we joined with our
neighbors in successfully modernizing the Rio Treaty,
the world's oldest mutual security instrument. In keeping with this
continuing cooperation, and in an effort to take into account the growing
self-sufficiency and economic development priorities of the Latin American
countries, we have focused our programs primarily on the fostering of
professional skills and relationships rather than on the support of military
inventories or maneuvers. Training is accordingly the common denominator,
while our grant materiel programs are being phased out. Excepting only
the $2 million program for Bolivia, grant materiel assistance is limited
to less than $500,000 for each of only eight countries. In addition, in
proportion to the military budgets of the Latin American nations which
remain low by international standards, our proposed FMS credits are also
modest. On the whole, our programs reflect our interest in remaining
responsive to Latin America's reasonable military needs within a frame-
work of cooperation and growing economic self-sufficiency.

Africa

There are two significant programs proposed for Africa. Stability in the Horn of Africa has wider geopolitical meaning. To help maintain that stability we propose $12.6 million in grant aid and $10 million in credits for Ethiopia, a strategically located nation.

Zaire would receive $19 million in credits to help modernize its forces
and meet its legitimate defense needs in view of increased threats to its
security -- particularly that posed by the instability in Angola. Our aid
would help meet a defensive force need recommended by a U.S. military
study team after careful observation and consultation with the Zaire
military.

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks to the central aspects of our
security assistance program -- its place in our overall foreign policy

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## Statement

### SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

*The following is a statement by Secretary Kissinger before the House International Relations Committee, November 6, 1975.*

I welcome this opportunity to testify on behalf of our security assistance program for the fiscal year 1976.

I would like in particular to discuss with you the fundamental place of security assistance in our effort to help construct an international structure in which peoples can pursue prosperity, justice, and positive aspirations under conditions of enhanced stability and wider prospects for peace.

### Changing Context of Security Assistance

We live in a turbulent age, a fact which has placed security and world order at the center of international relations. From the time of Woodrow Wilson, America's strength and influence have been used to help structure a stable global order. For Americans have increasingly understood that democratic institutions and the political, economic, and moral principles we hold dear cannot be secured in a world plagued by perennial conflict and disruption.

In the cold war era we saw our task as relatively straightforward. To create a world environment conducive to freedom we felt, in the broadest sense, a keen interest in the course of events all over the globe. To contain our adversaries we sold or gave defense equipment and services to those who would associate with us in opposition to communism. While the specifics of our security assist-

November 6, 1975
Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

ance programs were sometimes debated, there was general consensus between the executive and legislative [branches] that the concept of security assistance was integral to our most important foreign policy objectives.

In sum, we have entered an uncertain and unpredictable era, a time of heightened peril to the success and even the survival of the community of nations. But in this time of change we have seen new opportunities for progress as well. Over the past several years we have taken historic steps to make the most of these opportunities. Our foreign policy design is sound and well underway. Its goals are those which any Administration—Democrat or Republican—can support. We seek:

* To maintain our national strength and national purpose;

* To continually revitalize our bond to allies who share our tradition, values, and interests;

PR 556

2

* To reduce the perils of nuclear war;

* To build a rational relationship to potential adversaries;

* To help resolve regional conflicts that imperil global peace; and

* To solve the crucial economic issues before us, in the context of a new era of global economic cooperation among all nations—industrial and developing, producers and consumers, east and west, north and south.

All foreign policy still begins with security. Our alliances and the military assistance programs which support them have been the bedrock of our security and of world peace throughout the post-World War II years. To maintain our nation's safety there simply is no substitute for a strong national defense bolstered by mutually supporting defense ties with other nations which share a commitment to peace and a determination to protect the independence of their nationhood. Especially in this age, when nuclear weapons can bring global holo-caust, we have no more fundamental task than to maintain the strategic balance, for otherwise we risk our survival.

But a balance of terror is an unacceptably perilous solution. Any realistic hope for a durable peace will depend upon the continued effort to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable, reciprocal, and long-term basis. Based on our strength and the unity of our alliances we have achieved many positive developments in international relations over the past several years. These, unquestionably, have been grounded on the recognition by would-be aggressors that those they would confront were part of a security system which left them no rational alternative to cooperation.

Every nation great or small, whether part of the central strategic balance or not, is fundamentally concerned with its ability to defend the integrity of its territory and maintain internal order. No government can be indifferent to its security, however it defines it; and security requirements will compete with economic and social development for a share of whatever resources are available. Thus this is a world in which the level and quantity of international military transactions will be substantial. An increasing number of countries have arms production industries and are becoming international suppliers. And an increasing number of countries without defense production industries now can afford to pay cash for arms from anywhere in the world. It is of substantial political importance to the United States that we be able to respond to the felt needs of nations with which we seek constructive relations across the broad range of contemporary issues. The United States cannot expect to retain influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard. Defense supply links to these countries can significantly strengthen efforts to achieve cooperation on other issues—whether political, economic, or cultural.

Thus a careful security assistance policy is a crucial instrument of our national policy in much the same sense as are our political support and economic assistance for others. And there are gains to our domestic position as well. Security assistance programs contribute needed jobs to several sectors of our labor force. They help us maintain a more favorable balance of payments. And they permit our defense industries to achieve significant economies through scale of production—economies that are passed along through lower prices to our armed forces.

There are many factors which must be considered in any foreign transfer of American defense services and equipment, whether by cash, credit, or grant. Each arms transfer case must be assessed on its own merits, but there are a number of basic questions which must be answered in all cases:

3

* What is the nature and extent of the threat to the security of the recipient nation? Do we agree on the nature of the threat? Involved here is the role that country plays in its region and in the world; its capacity to maintain its stability, and its will to defend its own interests.

* What is the U.S. interest in helping to preserve that security? What interests does the recipient have in common with us and where do our interests diverge? What potential influence for restraint or positive conduct is involved?

* What other nations are involved in military transfers to the recipient—now or potentially? What options has the recipient? Will a refusal lead it to turn to another source of supply, perhaps altering a presently desirable international relationship?

* And what are the consequences for us if we fail to respond? What are the disadvantages of refusing to sell to a government with which we enjoy good relations? Will regional or even global military balances be affected? What will be the impact on our own readiness?

## The Review Process

In order to insure that these factors be considered thoroughly and comprehensively, the Department of State established, 4 years ago, a formal resource planning review that passes on all transfers within the framework of the Foreign Assistance and the Foreign Military Sales [FMS] Acts. The review is conducted by the Security Assistance Program Review Committee, under the personal chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. Committee membership encompasses all the federal agencies involved: State, Defense, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, National Security Council, and Agency for International Development.

The Security Assistance Program Review Committee provides the central forum for the necessary interagency dialogue pertinent to the continuous supervision and general direction of security assistance policy. In those cases where complex political, military, and economic issues give rise to conflicting interagency interests, the National Security Council system is employed to reconcile those interests. Major policy decisions

Commercial sales of defense-related articles and services, transacted outside of the government authority provided by the Foreign Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Acts, are assuming a growing share of our total defense transfers. These sales are controlled by the Department of State under the authority provided to the President by the Mutual Security Act of 1954. As in all MAP [military assistance program] and FMS cases, decisions taken in regard to commercial sales incorporate the views of all the pertinent federal agencies.

Of particular importance in decisions on defense-related transfers is the potential effect which they may have on our national defense preparedness. Here, the views of the Department of Defense are given the highest attention and their judgments form an indispensable part of the decisionmaking process. Transactions which might result in lessening the readiness of U.S. Armed Forces receive the most careful attention at the highest levels and final decisions are made by the President.

The procedures we have established to govern military transfers assure that all relevant information, analysis, and considerations are available to those who make the decisions. We cannot expect to confront straightforward choices nor to achieve our objectives in every case. Our task is to make the best possible systematic judgment in light of the totality of U.S. interests, just as with our other international political judgments.

## Security Assistance to the Middle East

I would like to take up with you now the question of most immediate and urgent interest—America's security assistance to the Middle East. This includes, as you know, both military and economic elements.

The Middle East portion of our security assistance request is large, fully 70 percent of the program. But it is matched in magnitude by the U.S. national interests that it is designed to protect and further.

Our Middle East security assistance program directly affects matters of vital national impor-

4

tance. It is a central part of our efforts to help achieve progress toward peace. We have a historical and moral commitment to Israel. We have important concerns in the Arab world. Perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies. And upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery and increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. For all these reasons, our aid request is a prudent investment in peace.

Economic and military support for Israel's security has been American policy during five administrations. Last May 76 U.S. Senators wrote to President Ford urging that the United States "be responsive to Israel's urgent economic and military needs." The Administration's proposal is responsive to this call.

The keystone of our policy in the Middle East has always rested on the ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense. That ability is currently undergoing its most strenuous test and, despite what we here in the United States would consider to be extremely stringent domestic austerity measures, it is clear that Israel must have both substantial economic and substantial military assistance. Our program for Israel is aimed at permitting both defensive strength and economic health. Our new friendship for Egypt does not in any way undermine our traditional friendship with Israel. Indeed, our policy of furthering all constructive forces in the Middle East is the surest path through which we can help the parties attain a durable settlement which meets the principal concerns and interests of all in the area—including the survival of Israel as a state.

problems and encourage Egypt's efforts toward closer relations with the West.

Our security assistance also helps Jordan to remain an area of stability and moderation in a strategic area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan pursues a moderate course and remains a staunch friend of the United States while confronting serious problems of economic underdevelopment. Jordan has opened a new chapter in its attack on its economic problems and is turning new imagination and energies to its development. We must help Jordan to develop and to maintain its course of moderation in a particularly sensitive area where stability and progress are essential in preserving a framework for moving toward peace.

Our special requirements fund continues to be needed to allow us to seize new opportunities in the peace process in the Middle East and to cover the costs of our recently approved Sinai support mission.

Our assistance is not, as some have suggested, the price of the recently concluded Sinai agreement. If there had been no agreement, the needs of the countries concerned, and the imperatives of our interests and of our relations with them, would still have required an ongoing program of comparable magnitude—in conditions of continuing stalemate rather than, as is now the case, in the context of hopeful forward movement. The additional burden of U.S. assistance is modest—and infinitely less than the demonstrated costs of another war.

In the last 2 years we have worked closely with the nations of this area in the search for peace. One of the consequences of working together in one sphere of vital interest is that those with whom we work come to trust us and look to us for help in other spheres of vital concern—strengthening their own countries and improving the conditions of life for their own peoples.

5

<table><thead><tr><th>Region</th><th>Percent</th><th>Amount ($ million)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Europe</td><td>11</td><td>534.0</td></tr><tr><td>East Asia</td><td>10</td><td>448.4</td></tr><tr><td>Latin America</td><td>4</td><td>196.0</td></tr><tr><td>Africa</td><td>1.5</td><td>68.5</td></tr><tr><td>Near East<br>(exclusive of the Middle East)</td><td>1</td><td>55.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

**Europe.** Our European proposals are focused primarily on Turkey and Greece. The strength of these two countries and their association with us in NATO is critical to the stability of the Mediterranean region and the solidity of our position within it. The Congress is well aware of the extraordinary complications which the Cyprus dispute has created for our relations in the eastern Mediterranean and the impact on the overall NATO structure. By resuming well-conceived grant and credit assistance programs for these two key nations, the United States can meet legitimate military procurement needs that will strengthen our allies and at the same time encourage resumption of normal bilateral relationships. This in turn should enable us to play a more effective role in helping find a mutually satisfactory solution to the Cyprus conflict.

**East Asia.** Our security assistance program proposals for East Asia assume particular significance

The Asian scene is currently marked by uncertainties, reflecting the unsettling effects of Indochina developments last spring. It is clear that throughout the region states eager to preserve their independence are anxious to see the United States remain politically engaged in Asia. They recognize, as we must, that no equilibrium can long be maintained there without our active participation. And many countries of consequence to us will measure our will and capacity to perpetuate a constructive involvement in the Asian balance by our efforts to help others develop a more self-reliant defense position. Already perceptible progress in the direction of self-reliance is evident in the fact that our request for foreign military sales credits for East Asian countries exceeds—in fact, is twice as large as—our request for grant aid funds.

In Korea we are requesting $76 million in grant aid and $126 million in credits, repayable in full at current market interest rates. The South Koreans have made substantial progress in their own military modernization effort. In the face of heightened tension on the peninsula, they have imposed on themselves a heavy defense tax to finance improved defenses. We have put forward proposals in the United Nations to break the diplomatic impasse on Korea. We intend to provide the necessary muscle with which to support these initiatives.

**Latin America.** Four months ago, in the spirit of mutual confidence and respect that has increasingly characterized hemispheric relations, we

6

joined with our neighbors in successfully modern-
izing the Rio Treaty, the world's oldest mutual
security instrument. In keeping with this con-
tinuing cooperation, and in an effort to take into
account the growing self-sufficiency and economic
development priorities of the Latin American
countries, we have focused our programs primarily
on the fostering of professional skills and relation-
ships rather than on the support of military
inventories or maneuvers. Training is accordingly
the common denominator, while our grant materiel
programs are being phased out. Excepting only the
$2 million program for Bolivia, grant materiel
assistance is limited to less than $500,000 for each
of only eight countries. In addition, in proportion
to the military budgets of the Latin American
nations which remain low by international stand-
ards, our proposed FMS credits are also modest.

On the whole, our programs reflect our
interest in remaining responsive to Latin America's
reasonable military needs within a framework of
cooperation and growing economic self-sufficiency.

Africa. There are two significant programs proposed for Africa. Stability in the Horn of Africa has wider geopolitical meaning. To help maintain that stability we propose $12.6 million in grant aid and $10 million in credits for Ethiopia, a strategically located nation.

Zaire would receive $19 million in credits to
help modernize its forces and meet its legitimate
defense needs in view of increased threats to its
security, particularly that posed by the instability
in Angola. Our aid would help meet a defensive
force need recommended by a U.S. military study
team after careful observation and consultation
with the Zaire military.

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks
to the central aspects of our security assistance
program: its place in our overall foreign policy
design; the basic criteria under which it is em-
ployed; and the process through which our deci-
sions on it are reached. I have focused on the area
of greatest present urgency, the Middle East, and
have reviewed our proposals for other regions.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 10, 1975

No. 560

#73

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ROOM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE-
NOVEMBER 10, 1975

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a two-part question.

Do you accept President Sadat's position that
there can be no final peace settlement on the Middle East
without a solution of the Palestinian problem, and if so,
given the U.S. and Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO,
what steps are you taking to handle the problem of the
Palestinian refugees and their representation at Geneva?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We agree with the proposition

For further information contact:

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that any final peace settlement must include the interests
of the Palestinians and a solution to the Palestinian
problem. Our position with respect to the PLO has been that
we cannot make a decision on how to deal with them until
they have accepted the State of Israel and until they have
accepted the relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions, particularly 242 and 338.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President said yesterday that growing tensions in the Cabinet led to the dismissal of Secretary Schlesinger and the other shake-ups. Can you explain what led to those tensions and what was your responsibility for the shake-up?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President has pointed
out repeatedly that he made the decision for the shake-up
and that the decision was his. There were differences
between Secretary-Schlesinger and myself, as you would
expect between two individuals of strong minds. I consider
Secretary Schlesinger a man of outstanding ability and one
of the best analysts of defense matters with whom I have
dealt and whom I have known for over a decade. The
differences are partly due to the difference in perspective
between the Department of Defense and the Department of

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State, and they will always exist. Some concern certain
technical matters, usually having to do with the SALT
negotiations. None were as sweeping as I have seen described
in the press. And, no question, there were some personality
disputes which neither of us handled with the elegance and
wisdom that perhaps was necessary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, where does the shake-up
and the Soviet rejection of the latest American SALT
proposal leave the negotiations now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as far as the shake-up
is concerned, and its impact on foreign policy, SALT and
otherwise, the foreign policy of the United States is not
conducted on the basis of personality. It is related to the
permanent interests and values of the United States. And
while it is absolutely inevitable that senior advisors
of the President will disagree from time to time, we have
the machinery by which decisions can be made, and those
decisions should not be seen in terms of the prevalence
of a particular individual or be conducted in terms of
personalities. Therefore, our SALT position will reflect
the best judgment of the President and of his advisors
of what is in the long-term national interest of the United

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States. We believe that a SALT agreement, if it is
balanced and reciprocal, is in the interests of both the
United States and the Soviet Union and in the interests of
world peace. And we will continue to pursue a SALT
agreement.

QUESTION: Is it now up to the United States to come up with a new proposal to present to the Soviets?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We don't believe that the mere fact that the Soviet Union has rejected an American proposal requires us to come forward with another one.

We still are expecting some sort of reasoned response to our last proposal, and we cannot make a new decision until we see some modification in the Soviet position.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in terms of the foreign policy you are talking about -- the President's trip to China appears to be in some trouble; at least it is not going smoothly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I read that in the press.

It is not the case, but I don't want to contradict such a distinguished group.

QUESTION: Well, it appears at least arrangements are not going smoothly. Your trip to China did not apparently go all that well. The summit with Mr. Brezhnev

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appears deferred until next year at least. And in an
election year there is some doubt about getting an arms
control agreement at all with the Russians. Where does that
leave the whole structure of foreign policy today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I cannot accept
your premises. I don't accept the premise that my trip to
China did not go well within the framework of what was
possible, and compared to other trips that other leaders
of other countries have taken to China.

Secondly, the trip by the President to China
is on schedule and the appropriate announcements will be made
in due time.

With respect to arms control agreements with the
Soviet Union, I do not believe that they should be
accelerated because of elections, nor should they be delayed
because of elections. We will make those agreements that
we consider in the national interest of the United States
and without regard to the electoral process.

So I believe that the basic structure of American
foreign policy is sound, that the essential elements are
in place, and will be continued to be pursued in the months
ahead.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will you discuss with us in some detail the nature and volume of the involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Angola, which unexpectedly got its independence a day early? You mentioned this at a hearing the other day, and I would like to know if it is in manpower, dollars, etc -- what you can tell us about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't have the figures here, and I cannot go much beyond what I stated the other day, which is that the Soviet Union earlier this year introduced a substantial amount of military equipment into Angola -- substantial in relation to the balance of forces that then existed; that Cuba has also participated in the form of advisors and of military equipment. We consider both of these steps by extra-continental powers a serious matter and really, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, not compatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions.

QUESTION: Sir, we are also an extra-territorial power. What are we doing there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our interest in Angola, which is related to the fact that the access to the sea of the surrounding countries goes through Angola, was basically generated by the intervention of other countries.

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The United States has no other interest except the territorial integrity and independence of Angola. We strongly support the call of the Organization of African Unity for a cease-fire and for negotiation among the three factions that are involved there to form a coalition government, and we have no United States interest to pursue in Angola.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have expressed your admiration this morning for Secretary Schlesinger and you have also said that foreign policy is not made on the basis of personalities. Since you think so highly of Secretary Schlesinger, why in fact was he then let go if it was not due to personalities?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have pointed out that I have very high regard for Secretary Schlesinger. I have also pointed out that there were differences. He was not let go by me, so this is a question that you must address elsewhere.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you ever ask or tell anyone that the President would have to choose between you and Mr. Schlesinger, including the President?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President has said that you will be giving up your post as Special Advisor on National Security Affairs. How will this affect the way you do your job?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My job, as I understand it, is to help the President make decisions on foreign policy. This must be organized in a way with which the President is comfortable and within which the President can operate. It means that I will do my job, obviously, primarily from the Department of State. But I have never believed-- and I have said so when I held the two jobs and I continue to hold this view--that foreign policy making depends so crucially on a particular bureaucratic structure. I am confident that I have sufficient access to the President so that my views are heard, and that is all that a Cabinet member has a right to ask for.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are informed reports that you were upset by the timing of these changes in the government and that this might upset your own foreign policy timetable. (a) Were you consulted on this change; and (b) is it true, as these reports say, that you gave some consideration to resigning because of

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the timing ?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was informed about the change. I do not believe that the changes will influence the conduct of our foreign policy for the reasons that I have given here. And I cannot comment every two weeks about stories about my resignation.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you still confident that a SALT agreement can be reached before the political pressure of the conventions?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have every reason to believe, on the basis of extensive conversations with the President, that we will proceed in negotiations towards SALT regardless of the political circumstances next year, influenced only by whether it is possible to work out a compromise with the Soviet Union that the President considers in the national interest.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what are your priorities for the European summit later this week in Paris?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am making a speech tomorrow in which I will deal with the European summit at greater length. But basically there are two aspects to the European summit. One is to deal with the problem of the economic well-being of the industrial democracies. The second is a more fundamental problem. That is to bring about a degree of cooperation among the industrial democracies that gives their people a sense that they are masters of their destiny and not subject to blind economic or other forces. And, therefore, the President considers this economic summit of very considerable importance. We do not expect that any major announcements will necessarily flow from the summit. The summit is designed to start a process by which the

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industrial democracies, which have been talking to each other on a bilateral basis over the last year in terms of their economic, political, and defense future, can now talk about their economic prospects, but also about some of their political prospects as a group. And it reflects what we had originally proposed in 1973, a greater degree of coordination among these countries, above all to enable them to set some goals and some directions that give them a sense of mastering the very complicated problems that they now face.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have known Don Rumsfeld for some period of time now, worked with him. What do you think his particular strengths are, relative to dealing with you and with defense matters? What specific qualifications does he have, in addition to being an aviation specialist?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You want me -- we haven't had a brawl in this town for all of three days. (Laughter)

I have known Mr. Rumsfeld for many years. I think he is a man who is very well attuned to the political process, very intelligent, very concerned with issues of national security; and I think he will do a good job as Secretary of Defense, and I intend to cooperate closely with him.

QUESTION: Do you feel that there will be a better cooperation than there has been with Schlesinger? Do you have any special reason for the feeling?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't believe that -- well, I certainly hope that some of the difficulties that may have existed, that some of those difficulties, can be eased and that everybody has learned, including myself, from recent events. But I repeat I stand on what I said previously about Secretary Schlesinger.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does that mean you will have to share the President's time on defense matters with Rumsfeld and with Mr. Bush if he is confirmed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Two years after we all leave town, no one will care who spent what amount of time in the President's office. The only amount of time that one needs in the President's office is the amount of time that is necessary to conduct the nation's business. That amount of time I am certain will be available. If the President wants others present when that is being discussed, that is his privilege and no derogation of anybody's position.

I have read all these stories. No one has yet told me about them. But it is quite possible that it will happen. If so, it is a triviality.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, your responses on SALT suggest that there is a large chasm between our position and the Soviets', so large, in fact, that we can't make another proposal

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until they modify their rejection. Could you elaborate for us
exactly what went wrong? And wouldn't you agree that detente
and SALT is in some crisis now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I have said previously that
I believe that ninety percent of the SALT agreement is substantially--
or of the SALT negotiation -- is substantially agreed to. The
remaining ten percent is, of course, of considerable significance.
Now, it doesn't mean that the chasm is very wide or is unbridgeable.
What it does mean is that when we make a serious proposal without
getting a substantive response, we cannot establish the principle
that all the other side has to do is to reject an American proposal
in order to elicit another proposal.

I believe that the differences between us and the Soviet
Union on SALT are bridgeable. I believe that an agreement on
strategic arms limitations is in the national interest and is in
the world interest, especially if you compare it with the
alternatives that the nation will face and that the world will
face if an arms race continues unchecked. So I am confident that,
with a serious effort on both sides, these differences can be
bridged.

As far as detente is concerned, I can only emphasize
again what I have said repeatedly in public statements. Detente
is not a favor we grant to the Soviet Union. Detente reflects an

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assessment of the basic national positions, in which strategic
arsenals exist on both sides capable of destroying humanity,
in which the United States must be able to demonstrate to its
own people that if a confrontation occurs we will have done
everything on our side to preserve the peace, in which if we
look ahead at the problem historically, we do not want to be in
a position where millions of people get killed in a war and
afterwards no one will be able to explain exactly what produced
it except mock rhetoric.

If the Soviet Union threatens our national interests
or the national interests of any of our allies, the United States
will resist. The United States will not hold still for any
hegemonial aspirations, but the United States will also make an
effort to transcend the conflicts and the controversies of the
Cold War in order to build a better future for the people of this
country and for the people of the world. That policy will continue.

As it stands now, on the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks there is the stagnation that I have described. It is a
stagnation which we are prepared to break. We are prepared to
look for an honorable compromise; but it is up to the Soviet Union
to be prepared also to make a compromise.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, had you ever considered
resigning from your office as Secretary of State because of the

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differences that occurred that have been alluded to by both
the President and yourself this morning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Never.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I may follow back that
point, the President yesterday seemed to be hinting that he might
be prepared to accept some sort of a compromise involving the
Russian Backfire bomber. Would you discuss that, please?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The issue of the Backfire is a rather complicated technical issue which raises a number of questions. There is no dispute that the Backfire on one-way missions, flying subsonically, can reach the United States from the Soviet Union. It is also a fact that the United States possesses many planes, that are not being counted, that on one-way missions can reach the Soviet Union. And, therefore, the problem concerns what categories -- it falls into the issue of what categories of weapons should be counted, especially when we get into what one really has to call hybrid systems that are designed for one mission but are also capable of carrying out another mission.

That is an important subject that has existed in the
negotiations in which we are trying to find a solution and are
prepared to listen to reasonable proposals.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that it would require a meeting either between yourself and Mr. Gromyko or Brezhnev and Ford to overcome the impasse itself. Is that under consideration; and would you conceive of a summit without a SALT agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We do not conceive right now of a summit without a SALT agreement; certainly not a visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States without a SALT agreement.

QUESTION: Would that mean that Mr. Ford would meet him somewhere else?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no such plan. But a meeting between Gromyko and me when either side has something important to say we are, of course, prepared to do.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that Great Britain will now play a role in Mideast negotiations. If that is true, will you work with them, or do you have any plans to relinquish your role in pressing for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Those of you who have been on shuttles with me will know that anyone who wants to take over will have my enthusiastic cooperation.

If Great Britain were to play a more active role in negotiations, we would strongly support its efforts. We

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don't claim any exclusive right to conduct these negotiations,
and we would support any promising effort, no matter who conducts
it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I just ask a question?
You've said that, and the Soviets seem to agree, there should
not be a summit without a SALT agreement in sight. On the other
hand, President Ford is apparently going to China without any
real substantive matters to be decided. Can you discuss why the
President is going to China, and why not have a less dramatic
summit agreement between Brezhnev and Ford just to discuss world
issues?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have -- by mutual
agreement incidentally -- both sides have linked a visit by
Brezhnev to the United States to an imminent SALT agreement,
partly because one did not want to have it associated with the
failure of a specific negotiation.

If a meeting between the General Secretary and the
President would appear desirable, we are not going to make an
issue of principle out of this at some point. It has not been
discussed, and there is no such plan -- no such plan exists at
the moment--but I don't want to exclude it for all time.

With respect to our relationships with the People's
Republic of China, those relationships have really concerned

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basically the orientation of both countries towards international affairs. We do not have that much bilateral business with the People's Republic of China that we must link visits or high-level meetings with the People's Republic of China to specific progress on specific issues. It is important for us, however, to exchange views on fundamental issues of international events in order to see where our national interest coincides and where a certain parallelism in our policies exists. This makes it necessary to have occasional meetings at a very high level with Chinese leaders. This is why once a year I have gone to the People's Republic of China and why the President is visiting--for the first time in four years that an American President has been in Peking.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it possible under any circumstances to have diplomatic relations simultaneously with the governments of Taipei and Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there are some moves now for the early reunification of the two Viet-Nam states. What are your views on the subject, and would that be one of the points discussed in Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have only seen press reports, and we were not consulted before these discussions took place. It is my impression that if this unification should take place,

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it will make *de jure* what already exists *de facto*. I don't think it will change the real situation in Viet-Nam. I think it is a matter for the existing Vietnamese governments to decide. It will not affect our attitude particularly, and it is not a matter that we plan to raise in Peking, but, if somebody asked our opinion, we might be prepared to give it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you expect to last out President Ford's term?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't answer my telephones on Sunday.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions on the Middle East. First of all, what is your estimate of what Syria will do when the mandate for the United Nations emergency force expires at the end of this month?

And secondly, what is being done to get the Sinai task force, or monitor volunteer force, in place?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our Ambassador to Damascus is in Washington right now for consultation, and we will send him back with our full considerations, not only about the renewal of UNDOF but about the diplomatic evolution in the Middle East. We have not been told what the Syrian intentions are. And that

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is not unusual. They have in the past never told us until shortly before the decision was due. We hope that Syria will agree to renew UNDOF because we believe, first, that Syria must participate in the diplomatic process leading towards a final settlement, and we are prepared to be helpful in this process.

And, secondly, we do not believe that an exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East will serve anybody's purposes-- and will produce a situation that is extremely dangerous for all concerned. So we hope that when Syria weighs its alternatives and when it looks at the considerations we will put before it that it will decide to renew UNDOF.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a question about the task force--

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, excuse me, the second question about the task force. We have completed an interagency study which is now before the President for his final decision on the organization of the observers in the Sinai. We expect that the President will make his decision within the next week or two, and we are certain that this force will be in place when it must be, on February 22, when the Israeli withdrawal from the passes will be completed.

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Q Mr. Secretary, Congressman Pike a week ago commented on the much-criticized covert activities of the CIA. He said it was not a rogue elephant operating on its own, but that all of its activities had been approved by the Special Assistant to the President of the United States. That happened to be you during the last seven years. What do you comment relative to his accusation that you have, in fact, approved all of these criticized activities?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I don't consider it an accusation. I believe that the covert operations of the CIA with which I am familiar were decided upon by serious people in the national interest, in a world in which there is a gray area between overt diplomatic activity and military activity. And except for the fact that it is difficult to do internationally, I am prepared to justify every covert operation that the United States has engaged in, with which I am familiar, was in the national interest.

Secondly, the Special Assistant of the President acts for the President. I have testified that the covert operations were approved by the President. I chaired, when I was in my capacity as Special Assistant, the Forty Committee, and in that capacity I transmitted the recommendations of the Forty Committee to the President.

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I, myself, had no authority by myself to authorize covert operations. So it is quite true, as long as I have been in Washington, the Central Intelligence Agency, to the best of my knowledge, was under Presidential control. I see no reason to apologize for that.

Q Congressman Pike made the statement further that in some instances the CIA did not want to engage in some of these activities, and that orders, at least channelled through you, resulted in them carrying out activities that have since been criticized quite broadly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They have since been criticized by Congressman Pike. That doesn't necessarily mean broadly.

The fact is that the Forty Committee exists in order to permit the views of the various agencies to reach the President. It is therefore very rarely possible that the President will disapprove recommendations from various agencies, and go ahead with a covert operation, even if the agencies concerned -- even if one or two of the agencies opposed it.

In the particular instance to which you refer, the basis for the opposition was not a substantive opposition,

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it was the belief of the CIA that the operation could
not be kept secret. And President Nixon decided that he
was prepared to run that risk. It was not a substantive
opposition, it was an opposition only based on the belief
that it could not be kept secret, and it is entirely
within the Presidential prerogative to make these decisions --
even if -- and I know of only one such case in the seven years
that I have been in Washington. I know of no other case.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of
press reports that you do not favor counting the Backfire
bomber as a strategic weapon because it needs to be re-
fuelled in order to make a six thousand-mile run. Do you
favor placing limits above the 2,400 that were placed at
Vladivostok on strategic delivery systems on both the U.S.
cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have read a number of
reports about the alleged positions of both myself and
Secretary Schlesinger, and I have seen, I would say, almost
none that is accurate.

The last position that has been put before the
Soviet Union, which included a provision regarding Backfires,
was jointly worked out by Secretary Schlesinger and myself.

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It represented our joint position, and that is the only
governmental position that exists, to which of course I
subscribed, and I have every reason to believe that
Secretary Schlesinger subscribed.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you giving up in addi-
tion, as you acknowledged, your chairmanship of the Forty
Committee, your other chairmanship of the other NSC
subcommittees to General Scowcroft? And will you have
some continuing role, though, as Secretary of State in the
operations? I am thinking of such things as the WSAG.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have discussed this with
the President, after I have seen all these news stories.
I believe that the chairmanship of all of these committees
has been assigned by the President to the Assistant for
National Security Affairs, but has been assigned by the
President years ago when these committees were set up.

I believe also that I will maintain some special
relationship with the Verification Panel and the Special
Action Group that deals with crises. But we will work
out the precise nature of that within the next week.

I repeat, committees do not determine policy, and
chairmanships of committees do not determine necessarily

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influence. Whatever arrangements are agreeable to the
President, I will accept.

Q Mr. Secretary, whenever you are asked about --
or anyone else in authority -- is asked about the PLO,
there is usually a very short answer, which is, until they
change their position on Israel -- and then it trails off.
I wonder if you go could beyond that?--

SECRETARY KISSINGER: After they have changed
their position on Israel, we will consider what to do.

Q No, the question I am putting badly is,
are we edging toward dealing with the PLO? Will it take
any more than a simple statement by the PLO that there
is a state called Israel, and then we are willing to
negotiate with them to bring them into the Geneva Confer-
ence? And, if I may ask a second part, are we setting
up now, is the public being set up for, an Administration
request for arms for Egypt at some foreseeable date?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Two closely related ques-
tions. [Laughter.]

Q Well, Middle East and Israel is security.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the first
question, I don't know what more we can say until the PLO

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has declared its intentions, because a great deal would
depend on the manner in which they declare their intentions,
and what they say with respect to their acceptance of
Security Council Resolution 242 and their acceptance of
the State of Israel as a fact.

With respect to arms for Egypt, we have stated
that we have had general discussions. We have also stated
that we have not before us a specific list, or a specific
request from Egypt for individual items.

When that is reached, then we will make a decision.
That decision would have to be discussed in great detail
with the Congress, and, of course, Congress would have a
veto over it under the Nelson Amendment.

So, the public is being told exactly what the
situation is as of this moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your view, what political
role, if any, should a Secretary of State play in a Presi-
dential election?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Secretary of State
should play no political role in a Presidential election.
I intend to stay out of the election completely. I con-
sider the foreign policy of the United States, as I have

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said earlier, to reflect the permanent interests of the
United States. It is not a partisan matter. I am asking
for support for it on a non-partisan basis, and I will
conduct myself in a non-partisan way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United Nations General Assembly this afternoon may take up a resolution under which Zionism is considered to be a form of racism. If that resolution is passed, what would your assessment of its significance be?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President, myself --
and I have the impression our Ambassador to the United
Nations--have expressed our views on this subject. We
think that this is an example of the bloc-voting, of the
one-way morality, that has weakened the public support in
the United States for the United Nations. We consider
it an inappropriate resolution. We are opposing it. And
it cannot help the attitude of the American public towards
the United Nations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you clear up the
reports of a distortion in -- that there is a difference
between the State Department and the Pentagon on Soviet
strength and of Soviet compliance with the arms control
agreement? You have alluded a couple of times to

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differences.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no disagreement between the State Department and the Defense Department about estimates with respect to Soviet strength. All of those are developed on an interagency basis, and a common position exists with all of them.

With respect to compliance issues, the only minor difference that existed months ago was the manner in which they should be brought to the Soviet attention. That has been resolved for nearly a year. There has been a united position in which the compliance issues have been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union in the Standing Consultative Committee. Many of the issues have been resolved. Some of the issues still remain to be resolved, but they do not exist between the State and the Defense Departments; they exist between the United States Government and the Soviet Union.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you see any changes in the U.S. relations with post Franco Spain, and will you push harder for Spain's admission into NATO?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, it depends

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on the evolution of post Franco Spain, and I want to
point out we are not in the period of post Franco Spain.
So it depends on the evolution of Spanish policy. But
the United States has believed that it would be in the
interest of the West for Spain, as soon as possible, to
be more closely linked to Western Europe and to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. And we hope that the evolution
in Spain will be such as to make that-easier.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The briefing terminated at 12:12 p.m.]

The Secretary
of State

Speech

November 11, 1975

Pittsburgh, Pa.

THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES
AND THE FUTURE

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Pittsburgh*
*World Affairs Council.*

I want to talk to you tonight about the cen-
tral concern of American foreign policy: our rela-
tionship with the industrial democracies of the
world.

For three decades we and our allies in the
Atlantic community and Japan have been the en-
gine of the global economy and the cornerstone of
global peace. But fundamental change is now be-
fore us; the world we have known is in the process
of transformation.

We must understand this change and help
shape it. Thirty years ago the democracies banded
together in the Marshall plan and peacetime al-
liance to overcome the chaos of the aftermath of
the Second World War. Today a decade of upheaval
impels us to make the cooperation of the industrial
democracies as dynamic and creative a force in
shaping a new world environment as it was a
generation ago. The challenge is, above all, to our
imagination and our vision.

Americans have learned, several times in this
century, that their own security and global peace,
their own prosperity and the global economy, are
inextricably linked. In an age of intercontinental
missiles and thermonuclear weapons, of global
communications and a world trading system,
events in other continents touch our lives directly
and immediately. The 1973 Middle East war, oil
embargo, and price rises—which cost the United
States over 500,000 jobs and over $10 billion in

national output-brought home to us that a break-
down of peace far away can have profound politi-
cal and economic consequences here at home. If
this self-interest determines America's involvement,
our traditional moral concerns for the survival of
freedom, the relief of suffering, and the security of
our friends produce the conviction to carry out our
responsibilities. We will not now fail the tradition
which has made us a beacon of hope to millions
around the world.

At the close of World War II, this country
broke with its isolationist tradition and undertook
a role of leadership in world affairs. In those 30
years America has achieved an extraordinary
record. We have made our mistakes, but we assured
the economic recovery of Western Europe and
Japan; our alliances safeguarded the common se-
curity and maintained the balance of power; we
built an economic system that has fostered un-
precedented growth and prosperity around the
world; we created international organizations to
help keep the peace and to promote economic de-
velopment; we have pioneered in arms control; we
have mediated conflicts; we have fed the hungry,
educated young men and women from other lands,
and been a refuge and symbol for all those who
resisted tyranny and oppression.

America, since its birth, has symbolized,
above all, the power of free men to choose their
future, to be masters and not victims of their fate.
When we took the lead, others took heart; when
we exerted ourselves for the common good, others
were encouraged to redouble their own efforts.

PR 562

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by the developing countries. We urged

-- cooperative measures to ensure basic economic
security by stabilizing export earnings;

-- accelerating growth through better access to capital,
technology, and foreign investment;

-- improving the world trading system;

-- creating better conditions for trade and investment in
key commodities, especially to improve the production of
food; and

-- devoting special attention to the poorest nations,
hardest hit by current economic conditions.

Next month we will participate in the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation in Paris, an innovative

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effort grouping 27 countries -- advanced, oil producers,
and less developed -- in an effort to deepen our
economic discussions.

The Conference will launch four commissions.

-- The key subject will be *energy*, the question of oil
prices, security of supply, and increasing the supply of energy.

-- A second area is *raw materials*. While many producer
nations seek to emulate the oil producers cartel, the problem is
stable, renumerative prices and expanding markets. To this
end, we will emphasize for some commodities buffer stocks, for
others increased productivity. It is clear to us that the wide
diversity of raw materials markets makes a case by case examina-
tion the only feasible approach. We are also interested in long-
term supplies, and we are convinced that private capital will
play a critical role in their development. It is for this reason

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that we support a substantial increase in the capital of the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, not to supplant private capital,
but to give the IFC a greater capacity to mobilize it by reducing
the political risks inherent in investments in raw materials
projects in developing countries.

-- A third problem is **economic development**: Most urgently, the plight of the poor countries most seriously affected by oil development prices. Questions of international/assistance, food and food production, trade opportunities and industrial growth will be addressed.

-- Finally, **financial affairs**: the financial consequences of energy prices, investment of petrodollars, and the financial aspects of commodity arrangements.

We go to this Conference primarily to discuss oil prices,
and their impact on the world economy. We want to talk to

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the rich oil producers about their new role in the world economy
and the responsibilities their financial strength entails as
regards the poor countries without oil resources. The United
States has come a long way in seeking an understanding both
with oil-producing and the non-oil producing developing
countries. The industrial consuming countries simply will not
stand for having their economic recovery periodically jeopardized
by arbitrary decisions of the oil producers.

We look forward to gaining the cooperation of the oil
producers on the energy situation, not only for our own
interests, but also for the developing countries which have
seen their hopes dashed by increased oil prices.

Nations face a choice: confrontation or cooperation. We
have chosen the latter course. We expect others to approach
our discussions in the same spirit. We are convinced that
the issues which have divided us can unite us in a common
purpose.

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Some issues cannot be negotiated away. We do not believe, for example, that it is feasible, much less desirable, for the developing countries as a whole, to link the price of their raw material exports to the price of the industrial goods they import. In the same vein, our economy is basically private and market oriented, and we are not prepared to transform our system in order to accommodate non-market solutions which other countries may easily accept. Nor can we accept artificial arrangements made at the permanent disadvantage of the American consumer.

We are also discussing an international code of conduct for transnational enterprises, but our agreement does not imply acceptance of any presumption that these companies are negative elements on the world economic scene. The controversy over their role and their conduct is in itself an

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obstacle to their fulfilling their functions as engines of world
economic growth and development. Any agreement concerning
them must be voluntary and balanced, providing for equitable,
non-discriminatory treatment of transnationals, and calling for
respect by transnationals and governments of contractual
obligations freely undertaken by them. I can assure you that,
as discussions go forward on a code of conduct for trans-
national enterprises, we will stick to these principles.

We will also press for harmonization of international tax
laws and practices, cooperation among governments in dealing
with restrictive business practices, and improved procedures
for the resolution of investment disputes.

The business community has an enormous stake in the
international economic order. We are now engaged in a series
of laborious international negotiations designed to construct a

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better environment for international trade, for investment and
for economic expansion under conditions of stability.

The ultimate stakes are enormous. Nothing less than the
unity and confidence of our people that democratic institutions
and processes can solve the problems of the modern era.

With hindsight, there is little difficulty in identifying those
moments in history when mankind broke from old ways and
moved in a new direction. For those enmeshed in the turmoil
of change, the future is harder to perceive. Our generation
now has the chance to shape a new cooperative international
system. I am confident that we will find the unity and vision
to do the job. The result can bring a fair and prosperous
world economy of benefit to all nations; and a new spirit of
hope and widening opportunity to all peoples.