NEWSWEEK: JUNE 18, 1990

L[C]

INTERNATIONAL

A Plan for Europe

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

At his meeting with so-called intellectuals in Washington, Gorbachev took me aside to say that a road map for the future was his most important concern. He was right. The upheavals of the past year make the creation of a new structure for European security essential. It must take into account the imminent unification of Germany as well as the de facto collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It has to define America's new relationship with Europe while granting the Soviet Union a serious role in Europe.

Above all, such a design must transcend the euphoria based on personal relationships that surrounded the summit. With all respect for the subtlety of President Bush's conduct, it is important to recall that we have been there before. In 1955, the first postwar summit between Eisenhower and Khru-shchev was lauded by The New York Times as follows: "Other men might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to draw others into the circle of his good will and to modify the attitudes if not the policies of the little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe." One year later ensued the concur-rent crises of Suez and Hunga-ry, and two years after that the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin.

The world has changed dramatically since 1955. The United States has achieved most of the objectives it set for itself

then; the Soviet Union is in deep crisis. For opposite reasons, both need a design for a journey from where they are to where they have never been. At the same time, this is likely to be the last summit at which it was possible to discuss the future of Europe without European participation. As Europe becomes politically unified and security concerns less dominant, the special advantage of the superpowers—their nuclear supremacy—will become less and less relevant to the political issues.

This may explain why the discussion on Germany at the summit was so inconclusive. The Soviets, shackled by the categories of the past, advanced a plethora of

ideas that have been staples of Soviet foreign policy since the days of Stalin: that Germany join both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; that Germany become neutral; that it remain under the political umbrella of NATO but leave the military organization; that the Soviet Union join NATO; that an all-European security system replace existing alliances. The staleness of these proposals suggests that the Soviets find it hard to abandon their old dream of separating the United States from Western Europe; their number implies that the Soviets are groping for a way out.

The American response has been based

on the assumption that in the end the Soviet Union will prefer to preserve NATO because Moscow looks to Washington to act as a restraint on a unified Germany. This is why, together with its allies, the United States has proposed a number of concessions to make the idea of German NATO membership more palatable. Among them: changing the emphasis of NATO to make it a more political institution; imposing a variety of arms limitations on Germany; asking a reunified Germany to provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union; having Germany pay for Soviet troops to remain in present-day East Germany for a specified period, and reducing the num-

ber of nuclear forces on German soil.

The loud Soviet expressions of fear, however well founded in the psyche of the Soviet people, are surely not without some design. It is difficult to believe that Soviet leaders in possession of well over 10,000 nuclear warheads and the largest tank force in the world genuinely fear another German attack. And if they do, they would be better off with German forces as a part of NATO, which would surely veto any such preposterous enterprise.

The Bush administration has rightly resisted the effort to organize Europe around the fear of Germany. A policy of isolation

would throw Germany back on its own resources. It would repeat its historic tragedy of wandering between two worlds and disquieting both.

Those in the West who fall in with the Soviet definition of the German problem prevent Soviet consideration of realistic alternatives. While in the end the Soviet Union may well settle for a continuation of NATO in its present form, this is clearly not the Soviets' first choice. However remarkable Gorbachev's personality, he is a product of Russian history. And Russian foreign policy, at least since Peter the Great, has been a tale of expansion not only in Europe but to the gates of India and into northern China. Whenever a limit was reached, the Russian empire—under tsar or commissar—relentlessly sought to undermine whatever it had defined as the competing power center: Sweden; the Austro-Hungarian Empire; China; Britain in the Middle East; or

the United States after World War II.

Since the days of Stalin, the various Soviet proposals regarding Germany have had one common characteristic: they have sought to sever the organic security link between Europe and the United States and undercut the American military presence. And as soon as the U.S. military presence is removed, the Soviet Union's huge nuclear arsenal and vast remaining tank armies would become strategically dominant. Then a partially recovered Soviet Union could attempt a deal that would keep Germany in check with Soviet nuclear strength while turning Germany into the chief engine of Soviet economic recovery.

Neither side must feel beaten: Bush and Kohl at the White House

Moscow looks to
Washington to restrain
a unified Germany

In this manner, the Soviet Union would have used its weakness to achieve the hegemony over Europe that eluded it when it seemed strong. And America would have acceded to the domination of Eurasia against which it fought two world wars.

**Multiple concessions:** Accepting the Soviet premise that Germany is the major threat to European security is likely to tempt the Soviets into seeking more ambitious goals than stability. And it would encourage a "compromise" whereby Germany would remain in NATO but NATO would be emasculated through multiple concessions to the Soviet Union. The reluctance to classify the Soviet Union as a potential military threat accentuates that danger. After the summit, the absurd Soviet proposal to join NATO was rejected far too gently with the extraordinary argument that the Soviet Union is not yet a democracy.

In their heart of hearts, Gorbachev and his advisors surely realize that they cannot stop German NATO membership and that their threat to keep troops in East Germany unilaterally is empty. Unification will occur because the so-called German Democratic Republic will dissolve itself into the five states ("Länder") out of which it was formed. Each of them would then seek admission to the Federal Republic under Article 23 of that country's constitution. All existing laws and treaties would apply automatically, including German membership in NATO. A neutral status could come about only through the deliberate destruction of the Atlantic alliance.

Nor does the Soviet Union have a realistic option to keep its troops in East Germany, as Gorbachev has hinted. For one thing, the Warsaw Pact provides that the GDR's obligations to it lapse after Germany is unified. At that point, Soviet forces in East Germany would no longer have any local counterpart to facilitate maneuvers, troop movements and other routine measures. Besides, reverting to the status of conqueror would mortgage Moscow's long-term relationship with a unified Germany.

The most realistic security system therefore would have the following components:

(a) the creation of a neutral belt composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—on the Austrian model;

(b) the creation on both sides of this zone—that is, in the Soviet Union and in Germany—of an area with strict limitations on types of weapons and numbers of men;

(c) special restrictions on the territory of

present-day East Germany to ensure that NATO forces are not stationed there. (If Poland preferred to remain in the Warsaw Pact, symmetry could be maintained by prohibiting the stationing of Warsaw Pact forces on its soil.)

In such a scheme, neither side could launch an attack without extensive arms-control violations and military operations across several hundred miles of neutral territory, which would require months of preparation and give ample warning.

Such an approach would be both realistic and comprehensive. It would break the pattern of searching among the various Soviet schemes for the ones that do the least damage—an essentially negative enterprise. Though the Soviet Union is too traumatized by recent events to deviate from the familiar, it may in the end be relieved by an approach that changes the question. However put, a new approach of this kind re-

quires a radical redesign of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe.

When these negotiations began, the political dividing line ran through the center of Germany, and Soviet ground forces were assumed to be vastly superior. Since then, the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have collapsed; most of the new governments have asked the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces. For an interim period, symmetrical reduction of forces will provide a way for the Soviets to withdraw forces without losing face and without creating American obligations that go beyond what the budgetary process is likely to allow. But with every increment of withdrawal, the

principle of symmetrical forces will become more firmly established. Arms control runs the risk of permitting more Soviet forces than the East European countries want. Alternatively, it could generate pressures on the United States to withdraw all its forces from Central Europe, thus jeopardizing NATO. This is why the present approach should be abandoned after the completion of the first stage of negotiations in favor of a scheme more in line with existing European political realities.

The design of a new security system for Europe and a new approach to arms control requires the closest consultation and coordination between Western Europe and the United States. In the foreseeable future, Soviet conventional forces will be needed at home. But its nuclear forces remain intact and are preponderant vis-à-vis Europe. Deterring nuclear blackmail requires a new strategy as well as a political relation-

ship based on the premise that European and American destinations are inextricably linked.

European unity is rapidly advancing in the political field and will sooner or later encompass defense. Therefore, the existing institutions for transatlantic dialogue will grow increasingly fragile. At present, military issues are discussed within NATO; political issues will find their focal point in the European Community as Europe moves toward unity. The United States has sought to make German membership in NATO more palatable to the Soviets by hinting at a new political role for NATO. But aside from the difficulty of defining such a role, the proposal runs up against the old European suspicion that the United States is somehow manipulating NATO to undermine Europe's emerging political identity. For in NATO, the United States deals with the European countries individually; the European Community is

not represented as an institution.

By the same token, the United States is for all practical purposes excluded from the political deliberations of the European Community. The standard procedure is for the Council of Ministers to convey its conclusions to the United States through a Chairman who rotates every six months. But that foreign minister is in effect an instructed messenger; he has no negotiating flexibility. The best he can do is to transmit the American views to colleagues understandably reluctant to hazard their hard-won consensus. Thus, security issues are 'relegated to a forum inimical to European identity while politi-

PATRICK PIEL—GAMMA-LIAISON

The Soviets have no option of staying in Germany: *Troops pull out*

## The Russian empire always undermined the competing power

NEWSWEEK: JUNE 18, 1990 33

INTERNATIONAL

cal issues are handled in a forum that excludes the United States from meaningful participation.

A solution must be found to permit the European Community to participate in NATO discussions, and for the United States to be heard within the European Community before deliberations harden into formal decisions. Perhaps a new comprehensive treaty between the United States and the European Community will be in order when European unity has sufficiently progressed.

The Soviets are entitled to a meaningful voice in European affairs. But their proposal for a European security system embracing North America, Europe and the Soviet Union to replace existing alliances

is better designed to undermine the Atlantic alliance than to establish a forum for cooperation. If everybody agreed on everything, no structure would be necessary. And if they differ, the "system" could dissolve into competing national states. It would in fact come rather close to the map of Europe prior to World War I. Europe would disintegrate in the name of a "common European house."

There are, however, common objectives that unite rather than divide: the environment, worldwide economic growth, cultural exchange, human rights, and confidence-building measures on arms. All these are suitable for the kind of embracing institution Moscow has put forward.

These designs gain even greater rele-

vance against the backdrop of the drama playing itself out inside the Soviet Union. In so fluid a situation, it is reckless to gear policy to one man; the only safe course is to put forward objectives and purposes to which any emerging Soviet leader could relate. The Western democracies will lose their bearings if they focus on personalities and equate amiability with harmony.

Though I am of the view that America has prevailed in the Cold War, I also believe that a new international order can emerge only if neither side claims victory and neither side feels defeated. And the best way to bring this about is to stop the debate about the issues of yesterday and redefine the questions that make up the agenda for the future.

## Gorbachev: The Price of Survival

I have never encountered a Soviet delegation so tentative as the one that accompanied Gorbachev to Washington. Some of its members seemed nonplussed by the collapse of the Communist Party. Others appeared torn between the familiar contours of central planning and the potential attractions of market economics. The head of the central planning agency lost command of his English when asked how his office was going to coordinate with the market sector, then did not seek to hide his irritation about this state of affairs. On the situation in Europe, they offered a series of complaints, fears and speculations. But these had a plaintive quality, as if they hoped America would rescue them from the consequences of their actions.

Through this maelstrom glided the eloquent, apparently confident figure of Gorbachev—more verbose than usual, but otherwise dominant. Yet my respect for this extraordinary tour de force could not obscure the conviction that Gorbachev's role as a *deus ex machina* is ending. Not that I expect him to be overthrown. I have no way of judging such a prospect; I would surely regret it. But the upheaval he has wrought will force Gorbachev to rely increasingly

on unfamiliar constituencies.

Gorbachev has already assured his place in history. He diagnosed the maladies of his society and set about courageously to remedy them. History may record that he produced consequences far more dramatic than he ever intended. I have yet to meet a Soviet personality in a position to know who believes that Gorbachev's purpose in 1989 was to start dismantling the Soviet empire. What he appears to have sought was to foster growing access to Western resources and technology by putting in place in Eastern Europe reformist Communists capable of liberalizing, not overthrowing, existing institutions. But when matters got out of hand, Gorbachev displayed extraordinary fortitude. He confined the Soviet Army to its barracks even while Communism was being dismantled all over Eastern Europe. Gorbachev would not be the first revolutionary to set in motion events that sweep beyond his design. But since history judges results more than intentions, it will be kind to Gorbachev.

Still, the disparity between intentions and results makes Gorbachev's power base uncertain. Either at the next summit or soon thereafter, Gorbachev will likely be answerable to a different con-

stellation of forces. He rose to office as the standard-bearer of the Communist Party. When it became an obstacle to reform, he set about to dismantle it with a complicated system of elections designed to vent resentments but incapable of creating an alternative national structure. On paper this must have looked like a masterful, even Machiavellian, maneuver to fragment the opposition and enhance personal rule. But the artfully designed elections have caused something akin to democracy to emerge in the 15 constituent republics, including the Russian republic, which comprises three quarters of the territory and over half of the population.

**Desirable outcome:** In the face of these centrifugal trends, *perestroika* can proceed and national unity be maintained only by a deal between the center and the elected heads of the various republics. They have spoken of a confederal structure in which defense would be national but each republic could evolve internal policy and some foreign policies. From the point of view of international stability, that would be a desirable outcome—a Russia strong enough to defend itself but too decentralized to attack. But it would confront Gorbachev with the risk of being perceived as a

symbol of the central apparatus he sought to overcome.

If he fails, he may emerge too strong to be replaced but too weak to impose his will. Probably he can regain legitimacy in only one of two ways: by repression, which would risk his relations with the outside world, or by cutting some sort of deal with the elected leaders in the republics—thus transforming the Soviet state. Whatever course he chooses, Gorbachev will represent a different Russia in the future—if he survives the forces he has unleashed.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

ELIZABETH KARNAZES—REUTERS

Gliding: *At Stanford*

NEWSWEEK: JUNE 18, 1990 37

["HAKÇOP\nVER # 00", "DEPT. MWHITA\n\nBU: HJ: Y 00102 LINES(INCL.HEAD)\nPG: ISSUE: ; 90A\nHAKCOP3 -MWHITA-PVT\nMWHITA ;06/07,15:34", "I have never encountered a Soviet delegation more tentative than the one that accompanied Gorbachev to the Washington summit. Some of its members seemed nonplussed by the collapse of the Communist Party. Others appeared torn between the familiar contours of central planning and the potential attractions of market economics. The head of the Gosplan—the central planning agency—lost command of his up until then quite adequate English when asked how his office was going to coordinate with the market sector, and then did not seek to hide his irritation about a state of affairs that made such a question possible. On the changed situation in Europe, they offered a series of complaints, fears and speculations. But these had a tentative, even plaintive, quality, as if they hoped America would rescue them from the consequences of their own actions.", "Through this maelstrom glided the elo-", "[21]", (((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP", "DEPT.", "quent, apparently confident figure of Gorbachev-more verbose than previously, but otherwise pondering an extraordinary tour de force. Yet respect for this performance could not obscure my conviction that Gorbachev's role as a deus ex machina is coming to an end. Not that I expect him to be overthrown. I have no way of judging such a prospect; I would surely regret it. But the scale of the upheaval he has wrought will force him to rely on constituencies other than those which brought him thus far.", "[14]\n\nNo doubt Gorbachev has already assured his place in history. He diagnosed the maladies of his society and set about with great courage to remedy them. History may record that he produced consequences far more dramatic than he ever intended. I have yet to meet a Soviet personality in a position to know who believes that Gorbachev's purpose in 1989 was to start dismantling the Soviet satellite empire. What he appears to have sought was to foster growing access to Western economy and technology by putting in place reformist Communists capable of liberalizing, not overthrowing, exist-", (((MORE))))"]

HAKCOP

DEPT.

ing institutions. But when matters got out
of hand, Gorbachev displayed extraordi-
nary fortitude. He confined the Red Army
to its barracks even while Communism was
being dismantled all over Eastern Europe.
Since history judges results more than in-
tentions, it will surely be kind to
Gorbachev.

[22]

But the disparity between intentions and
results makes Gorbachev an unreliable
guide to the future. Either at the next sum-
mit or soon thereafter, Gorbachev will
likely represent a different constellation of
forces. He rose to office as the standard
bearer of the Communist party. After two
years he saw it as an obstacle to reform.
With great daring, he set about to disman-
tle the apparatus with a complicated sys-
tem of elections designed to vent resent-
ments but incapable of creating a national
alternative party structure. On paper this
must have looked like a masterful, even
Machiavellian, maneuver to fragment the
opposition and enhance personal rule. But
the elections so artfully designed to thwart
the appearance of national movements or
parties have caused something akin to de-

(((MORE)))

["HAKCOP", "DEPT.", "mocracy to emerge in the fifteen constitu-\nent republics. This has not only brought to\nthe fore the centrifugal tendencies of the\nempire (only half of whose population is\nRussian) but threatens the very cohesion of\nthe historic state known to both tsars and\ncommisars. +", "[26]", "☐ If present trends continue, perestroika\ncan proceed and national unity can be\nmaintained only by a deal between the cen-\nter and the elected heads of the various\nrepublics, who in turn are hostile to Gorba-\nchev's centralizing instincts. Thus Gorba-\nchev the reformer is in danger of becoming\na symbol of the central apparatus he\nHe may emerge as being too strong to be replaced but this would mean a change of regime to a new one.\nsought to overcome. Probably he can re-\ngain legitimacy in only one of two ways: by\nrepression which risks his relations with\nthe outside world, or some sort of deal with\nthe populist forces that produced Yeltsin\nand other elected leaders in the republics\nand thus transform the nature of the Rus-\nsian state. Whatever course he chooses,\nGorbachev will represent a different Rus-\nsia in the future—assuming he succeeds in\nmanaging the forces he has unleashed. +", "[19]", {"bbox": [761, 1384, 893, 1408], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "superpowers-their nuclear supremacy-\nbecomes less and less relevant to the politi-\ncal issues. In the near future, ~~these key~~ European\nissues will require a larger forum.+", "[14]", "This may explain why the discussion on\nGermany at the summit appeared so hack-\nneyed. The Soviets, shackled by the catego-\nries of the past, advanced a plethora of\nideas that have been staples of Soviet for-\neign policy since the days of Stalin: that\nGermany join both NATO and the Warsaw\nPact; that Germany become neutral; that it\nremain in ~~the political~~ but leave the mili-\ntary organization of NATO; that the Soviet\nUnion join NATO; that an all-European\nsecurity system-including the US, Cana-\nda, and the Soviet Union-replace existing\nalliances. The ~~number and~~ staleness of\nthese proposals suggests that the Soviets\nfind it hard to disenthrall themselves from\ntheir old dream of separating the United\nStates from Western Europe, ~~which sug-", "gests that the Soviets were groping for a", "way out. +", "and a means to encircle it +", "a continued voice in European affairs.", "[20]", "The American response has been based\non the assumption that in the end the Sovi-", (((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "et Union ~~would~~ will prefer to preserve NATO as\nAmerica's sole institutional link to Europe,\nbecause Moscow looks to Washington to act\nas a restraint on a unified Germany. This is\nwhy, together with its allies, the United\nStates ~~has~~ offer~~ed~~ a number of concessions\nproposed!\nto make the idea of German NATO mem-\nbership more palatable, ~~such as~~ making\nthe emphasis of NATO ~~to~~ a more political\ninstitution; imposing a variety of arms lim-\nitations on Germany; some kind of econom-\nic assistance to the Soviet Union from a\n~~reunified Germany.~~ German payment for\nSoviet troops in present-day East Germany\nto remain in the present-day period; and,\nnumber of nuclear forces on German soil.", "But the Western democracies must not\nencourage any effort to organize Europe on\nthe basis of the fear of Germany. However\nunderstandable the fears of German resur-\ngence, a policy of isolating Germany would\nthrow that country back on its own re-\nsources. Germany would repeat its historic\ntragedy of wandering between two worlds\nand disquieting both.", "Now the magnitude of the ~S~ ex~p~ression of", "[18]", "[9]", {"bbox": [763, 1383, 896, 1408], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "Soviet fear is surely not without some de-\nsign. It is difficult to believe that the Soviet\nleaders in possession of well over ten thou-\nsand nuclear warheads and the largest\ntank force in the world genuinely fear an-\nother German attack. And if they do, they\nwould be better off with German forces as a\npart of NATO which would surely veto any\nsuch preposterous enterprise.", "[10]", "Yet too many in the West fall into this\ntrap. In various meetings with members of\nthe Soviet delegation, I was stunned by the\nenthusiastic acquiescence of their non-offi-\ncial interlocutors—some of them senior es-\ntablishment figures—in the Soviet defini-\ntion of the German problem. They did not\nseem to understand that to the extent they\nare taken seriously, they also prevent a\nSoviet consideration of realistic\nalternatives.", "[11]", "It may be true that in the end the Soviet\nmay well have to\nUnion will settle for a stability based on\nthe continuation of NATO in its present form—\ncontinued US presence in Central Europe,", "But it is dangerous to assume that this is the\nSoviet first choice. However remarkable\nthe personality of Gorbachev, he is a prod-", (((MORE)))))"]

["Y", "HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "uct of Russian history as much as he is of\nthe Communist experience. And Russian\nforeign policy, at least since Peter the\nGreat, has been a tale of expansion from an\narea surrounding Moscow to the gates of\nIndia, the northern part of China and deep\ninto Central Europe. Whenever a limit was\nreached, the Russian empire-under tsar\nand commissar-relentlessly sought to un-\ndermine whatever it defined as the compet-\ning power center: Sweden, the Austro-Hun-\ngarian Empire, China, Britain in the\nMiddle East, and after World War II the\nUnited States.", "[20]", "Since the days of Stalin, the various Sovi-\net proposals regarding Germany have had\none common characteristic: they have\nsought to sever the organic security link\nbetween Europe and the United States and\nthus destroy the principal common trans-\natlantic task. This would be achieved by the\ndevice of either Germany joining both alli-\nances or the Soviet Union joining NATO, or by\nthe overarching security system, each\nmaking an American presence absurd. For\nas soon as the American military presence\nis removed, the Soviet Union's huge nucle-", {"bbox": [764, 1407, 895, 1431], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

HAKCOP POLICY

DEPT.

ar arsenal and vast remaining tank armies
would be strategically dominant. Then a
partially recovered Soviet Union could at-
tempt a deal where Germany is kept in
check with Soviet nuclear strength while
turning it into
Germany becomes the chief engine of Sovi-
et economic recovery. In this manner, the
Soviet Union would have used its weakness
to achieve with German help the hege-
mony over Europe which eluded it when it
seemed strong. And America would have
acceded to the domination of Eurasia
against which it fought two world wars.

[26]

This is why great cards must be taken not
to grant the Soviet premise that Germany
is the major threat to European security.
For this may attempt the Soviets into seeking
more ambitious goals than stability. And it
encourages a "compromise" whereby Ger-
many remains in NATO but NATO is
emasculated through multiple reassur-
ances to the Soviet Union. The reluctance
to classify the Soviet Union as a potential
military threat accentuates that danger.
The absurd Soviet proposal to join NATO
was gently rejected, not because NATO is
a extraordinary
designed to deal with a potential future

# (( (MORE) )))

HAKCOP POLICY

DEPT.

Soviet threat, but because the Soviet Union
is not yet a democracy, as if this were the principal obstacle to the primacy of NATO to participate in the business of the world

For Gorbachev and his advisors surely realize that in their heart of hearts, they cannot in the end stop German membership in NATO and that their threat to keep their troops in East Germany unilaterally is empty. Unification will occur because the so-called German Democratic Republic will dissolve itself into the six states ('Laender') out of which it was formed. Each of them would then seek admission to the Federal Republic under Article 23 of that country's constitution. All existing laws and treaties would apply automatically, including German membership in NATO. A neutral status would come about only if Bonn were expelled from NATO or chose to leave it-both equivalent to the deliberate destruction of the Atlantic Alliance.

Nor does the Soviet Union have a realistic option of simply keeping its troops in Eastern Germany, as Gorbachev has hinted. For one thing, the Warsaw Pact provides that GDR obligations to it lapse after

[19]

(((MORE))))

HAKCOP POLICY

DEPT.

Germany is unified. Moreover, at that
point the Soviet forces in East Germany no
longer will have any local counterpart to
facilitate their daily activities. Maneuvers,
troop movements and other routine meas-
ures would become extremely difficult to
implement. Reverting to the status of con-
queror would mortgage the Soviet Union's
long-term relationship with a unified
Germany.

The most realistic security system would
therefore have the following components:

(a) the creation of a neutral belt com-
posed of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hun-
gary on the Austrian model;

(b) the creation of a new and west of this
zone—that is, in the Soviet Union and in
Germany of an arms control zone with
strict limitations on types of weapons
and numbers of men;

(c) the territory of present-day East Ger-
many would have special restrictions once
NATO forces could be stationed there. In
such a scheme neither side could launch an
attack without extensive violation of the

[15]

[2]

[3]

[5]

# (((MORE))))

["[v]", "HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "arms control regimen followed by a mili-\ntary operation across several hundred\nmiles of neutral territory. Such an enter-\nprise would require months of preparation,\nthus giving ~~substantial~~ *ample* warning. +", "[10]\n\nSoviet Union is the victim of two traumatized by recent events. The pattern of searching among the various Soviet schemes for those that do the least damage—an essentially sterile enterprise. However, *forward impetus* from *the two Presidents*. For it requires a radical redesign of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe, *and an overruling of entrenched lineancians*.", "[11]\n\nWhen the current negotiations on conventional arms control began, the political dividing line ran through the center of Germany and Soviet ground forces were assumed to be vastly superior. Thus, equal force levels would have been a major contribution toward stability. Since then, the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have collapsed; most of the successor governments have asked the Soviet Union to", (((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "withdraw its forces. For an interim period symmetrical reduction of forces will provide a way for the Soviets to withdraw forces without losing face and without creating American that go for the United States obligations beyond what the budgetary process is likely to allow in any event. But with every increment of withdrawal, the principle of symmetrical forces will become more firmly established. Arms control runs the risk of becoming a means to legitimize more forces in Eastern Europe than the host countries want. Alternatively, it could generate pressures on the United States to withdraw all its forces from Central Europe, thus jeopardizing NATO. This is why the present appearance should be abandoned after the completion of its first stage of negotiations in favor of a settlement which, in addition with existing European political stability, [26]", "The design of a new security system for Europe and a new approach to arms control requires, of course, the closest consultation and coordination between Western Europe and the United States. This is made necessary in any event by the new strategic realities. For forty years, Europe trembled before Soviet conventional preponderance.", "In the foreseeable future, Soviet conventional forces will be needed at home. But Soviet nuclear forces remain intact and are", (((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "preponderant vis-a-vis Europe. Deterring\nnuclear blackmail requires specific mili-\ntary steps beyond the scope of this article.\nBut these will be empty unless the political\nrelationship supports the proposition that\nEuropean and American destinies are inti-\nmately linked.", "The US-European dialogue has too long\nneglected this challenge. In fact, as Europe-\nan unity advances, with American support,\nthe existing institutions for transatlantic\ndialogue will grow increasingly fragile. At\npresent, military issues are discussed with-\nin NATO; political issues find their focal\npoint in the European Community and will\ndo so progressively as Europe moves to-\nward unity. The United States has sought\nto make German membership in NATO\nmore palatable to the Soviets by downplay-\ning the military element and hinting at a\nnew political role for NATO. But aside from\nthe difficulty of defining such a role, the\nproposal runs up against the European sus-\npicion that the US is somehow manipulat-\ning NATO to undermine Europe's new-\nfound political identity. For in NATO, the\nUS deals with the European countries indi-", "[18]", {"bbox": [764, 1407, 896, 1431], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "vidually; the European Community is not\nrepresented as an institution. +", "At the same time, the United States is for\nall practical purposes excluded from the\npolitical deliberations of the European\nCommunity. The standard procedure is for\nthe Council of Ministers to convey its con-\nclusions to the United States through a\nChairman who rotates every six months.\nBut that foreign minister is in effect an\ninstructed messenger; he has no negotiat-\ning flexibility. The best he can do is to\ninform his colleagues of the American\nviews. But since their decision usually\nemerges from months of painful delibera-\ntions, they are understandably reluctant to\nchange their views. Thus, security issues\nare relegated to a forum inimical to Euro-\npean identity while political issues are han-\ndled in a forum that excludes the United\nStates from meaningful participation. +", "A solution must be found to permit the\nEuropean Community while it is articulat-\ning political institutions to participate in\nNATO discussions, and for the United\nStates to be heard within the European", "[22]", "[19]", {"bbox": [766, 1380, 897, 1405], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "Community before deliberations harden into formal decisions. Perhaps a new comprehensive treaty between the Untied States and the European Community will be in order when European unity has sufficiently advanced.→", "The Soviets are entitled to have their serious voice in European affairs. [11]\n\n→ Fears taken seriously. Their own proposal for a European security system embracing North America, Europe and the Soviet Union to replace existing alliances is far too sweeping. If everybody agreed on everything, no structure would be necessary. And if they differ, the 'system' could dissolve, will fly off into competing national states. It would then in fact come rather close to the map of Europe prior to World War I. Europe would be disintegrating in the name of Europe.→", "There are, however, common objectives that unite rather than divide: the environment, economic growth (world-wide), cultural exchange, human rights, and confidence-building measures on arms. All these are suitable for the kind of embracing institution Moscow has put forward.→", "These designs gain even greater rele- [7]", (((MORE))))"]

["HAKCOP POLICY", "DEPT.", "vance against the backdrop of the element\nal drama playing itself out inside the Sovi-\net Union. In so fluid a situation, it is\nreckless to gear policy to one man; the only\nsafe course is to put forward objectives and\npurposes to which any emerging Soviet\nleader can relate. (The West has, properly,\nbehaved with great circumspection toward\nthe conflict between the various republics\nwhich dominates Soviet life. We have an\ninterest in preventing repression there be-\ncause it would surely elicit a public outcry\nin the democracies, which would arrest fur-\nther Soviet progress toward normalization\nBut we cannot encourage chaos because it\nwould raise fears of nuclear proliferation\nand international conflict in volatile areas\non the fringe of existing tenderboxes such as\nthe Middle East.)", "[20]", "Some leaders in the various Soviet re-\npublics, including Yeltsin, have spoken of a\nconfederal structure in which national de-\nfense would be carried out in common but\neach republic would have some scope in\nforeign policy and the freedom to evolve\ninternal policies as well. From the point of\nview of international stability, it would be", (((MORE)))))", "[Y]"]

IN0925 policy

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IN0925 -MWHITA-PVT

MWHITA ;06/08,10:37

At his meeting with so-called intellectu-
als during his visit to Washington, Gorba-
chev took me aside to say that a road map
for the future was his most important con-
cern. He was right. The upheavals of the
past year make the creation of a new struc-
ture for European security essential. ~~It~~
must take into account the imminent unifi-
cation of Germany as well as the de facto
collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It has to de-
fine America's new relationship with Eu-
rope.~~And~~it must grant~~ the Soviet Union a
serious role in Europe.~~

Above all, such a design must transcend
the euphoria based on personal relation-
ships *surrounding* the summit. With all
respect for the subtlety of President Bush's
conduct, it is important to recall that we
have been there before. In 1954, the first
post-war summit between Eisenhower and
Khruschev was lauded by the New York
Times as follows: ~~Mr. Eisenhower~~ had

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["IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "done even better than defeat an enemy in\nbattle as had been his assignment a decade\nago. He had done something to prevent\nbattles from happening .⊥.⊥. Other men\nmight have played strength against\nstrength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to\ndraw others into the circle of his good will\nand to modify the attitudes if not the poli-\ncies of the little band of visitors from the\nother side of the Elbe.\" Two years later\nensued the concurrent crises of Suez and\nHunary and two years after that there was\nthe Soviet ultimatum over Berlin.+", "The world has changed dramatically\nsince 1954. The United States has achieved\nmost of the objectives it set itself then; the\nSoviet Union is in deep crisis. For opposite\nreasons, both need a design for a journey\nfrom where they are to where they have never\nbeen. And it cannot be imposed by the su-\nperpowers. Indeed this is likely to have\nbeen the last summit at which it was possi-\nble to discuss the future of Europe without\nEuropean participation. As Europe be-\ncomes politically unified and the issues\nmove away from security, the special ad-\nvantage of the superpowers-their nuclear", "[22]", (((MORE)))))"]

["IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "supremacy will become less and less relevant to the political issues. In the future, European issues will require a larger forum.", "[18]", "This may explain why the discussion on Germany at the summit was inclusive. The Soviets, shackled by the categories of the past, advanced a plethora of ideas that have been staples of Soviet foreign policy since the days of Stalin: that Germany join both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; that Germany become neutral; that it remain under the political umbrella of NATO but leave the military organization; that the Soviet Union join NATO; that an all-European security system—including the US, Canada, and the Soviet Union—replace existing alliances. The staleness of these proposals suggests that the Soviets find it hard to disenthrall themselves from their old dream of separating the United States from Western Europe; their number implies that the Soviets were groping for a way out, and a means to ensure a continued voice in European affairs.", "The American response has been based", "[21]", (((MORE))))"]

["[Y]", "IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "PAGE-4", "on the assumption that in the end the Soviet Union will prefer to preserve NATO as America's sole institutional link to Europe, because Moscow looks to Washington to act as a restraint on a unified Germany. This is why, together with its allies, the United States has proposed a number of concessions to make the idea of German NATO membership more palatable. Among them: changing the emphasis of NATO to make it a more political institution; imposing a variety of arms limitations on Germany; asking a reunified Germany to provide some kind of economic assistance to the Soviet Union; having Germany pay for Soviet troops to remain in present-day East Germany for a specified period; and reducing the number of nuclear forces on German soil.", "[20]", "Now the loud Soviet expressions of fear, however well-founded in the psyche of the Soviet people, are surely not without some design. It is difficult to believe that Soviet leaders in possession of well over ten thousand nuclear warheads and the largest tank force in the world genuinely fear another German attack. And if they do, they", (((MORE)))))"]

["[Y]", "DEPT.", "IN0925 policy", "PAGE-6", "Russian foreign policy, at least since Peter\nthe Great, has been a tale of expansion\nfrom an area surrounding Moscow to the\ngates of India, the northern part of China\nand deep into Central Europe. Whenever a\nlimit was reached, the Russian empire-\nunder tsar and commissar Relentlessly\nsought to undermine whatever it defined as\nthe competing power center: Sweden; the\nAustro-Hungarian Empire; China; Britain\nin the Middle East; and the United States\nafter World War II.", "[19]", "Since the days of Stalin, the various Sovi-\net proposals regarding Germany have had\none common characteristic: they have\nsought to sever the organic security link\nbetween Europe and the United States and\nThis would be achieved either by Germany\nor by some other means.\n\nAssuming both alliances, or by the Soviet\nUnion joining NATO, or by the overarch-\ning European security system, each makes\nitself felt.\n\nAn American presence in Europe is\nsoon as the American military presence is\nremoved, the Soviet Union's huge nuclear\narsenal and vast remaining tank armies\nwould be Strategic dominant. Then a\npartially recovered Soviet Union could at-", {"bbox": [758, 1394, 892, 1419], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["[Y]", "IN0925 policy DEPT.\ntempt a deal that would keep Germany in\ncheck with Soviet nuclear strength while\nturning Germany into the chief engine of\nSoviet economic recovery. In this manner,\nthe Soviet Union would have used its weak-\nness to achieve-with German help-the\nhegemony over Europe that eluded it when\nit seemed strong. And America would have\nacceded to the domination of Eurasia\nagainst which it fought two world wars.+", "[25]", "□Accepting the Soviet premise that Germany is the major threat to European security is likely to tempt the Soviets into seeking more ambitious goals than stability.\n\nAnd it would encourage a \"compromise\" whereby Germany (remains in NATO but NATO is emasculated through multiple reassurances to the Soviet Union. The reluctance to classify the Soviet Union as a potential military threat accentuates that danger.\n\nThe absurd Soviet proposal to join NATO was gently rejected by the summit with the extraodinary argument that the Soviet Union is not yet a democracy, as if this were the principal obstacle to participation by a country whose threat gave rise to NATO.+", "[17]", {"bbox": [759, 1422, 893, 1446], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))"]

["[Y]", "IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "In their heart of hearts, Gorbachev and his advisors surely realize that they cannot\nin the end stop German NATO membership in\nNato, and that their threat to keep their\ntroops in East Germany unilaterally is\nempty. Unification will occur because the\nso-called German Democratic Republic\nwill dissolve itself into the six states\n('Laender') out of which it was formed.\nEach of them would then seek admission to\nthe Federal Republic under Article 23 of\nthat country's constitution. All existing\nlaws and treaties would apply automatically,\nincluding German membership in\nNATO. A neutral status would come about\nonly if Bonn were expelled from NATO or\nchose to leave it both equivalent to the\ndeliberate destruction of the Atlantic\nAlliance.", "Nor does the Soviet Union have a realistic option of simply keeping its troops in Eastern Germany, as Gorbachev has hinted, he might do. For one thing, the Warsaw Pact provides that the GDR's obligations to it lapse after Germany is unified. At that point, moreover, the Soviet forces in East Germany no longer would have any local", "[19]", {"bbox": [770, 1398, 903, 1422], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))"]

["[Y]", "DEPT.", "PAGE-9", "IN0925 policy", "counterpart to facilitate their daily activi-\nties. Maneuvers, troop movements and oth-\ner routine measures, would become ex-\ntremely difficult to implement. And it is\nreverting to the status of conqueror would\nmortgage the Soviet Union's long-term re-\nlationship with a unified Germany.", "[15]", "The most realistic security system, would\ntherefore have the following components:", "[2]", "1. (a) the creation of a neutral belt com-\nposed of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hun-\ngary-on the Austrian model;", "[3]", "1. (b) the creation to the east and west of\nthis zone—that is, in the Soviet Union and\nin Germany—of an arms control zone with\nstrict limitations on types of weapons and\nnumbers of men;", "[5]", "1. (c) special restrictions on the territory of\npresent-day East Germany ~~to insure that~~\nare not NATO", "forces could be stationed there. In such a\nscheme, neither side could launch an at-\ntack without extensive violation of the\narms control regimen, ~~followed by a mili-\ntary operation~~ across several hundred\nmiles of neutral territory, ~~such an enter-~~", {"bbox": [760, 1376, 894, 1401], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))"]

IN0925 policy ~~wholly~~ price would require months of preparation, ~~and~~ e thus-giving ample warning.+

DEPT.

PAGE-10

[10]

□Such a ~~comprehensive~~ approach would be a realistic Western vision of a new European arrangement. It would break the pattern of searching among the various Soviet schemes for those that do the least damage—an essentially negative enterprise. The Soviet Union is too traumatized by recent events to deviate from the familiar, but it may in the end be relieved by an approach that changes the question. However put forward, a new design of this kind must receive the imprimatur of both Presidents Bush and President Gorbachev. For it requires a radical redesign of negotiations on conventional force reductions in Europe and an overruling of entrenched bureaucracies.+

□When the current negotiations on conventional arms control began, the political dividing line ran through the center of Germany and Soviet ground forces were assumed to be vastly superior. Thus, equal force levels would have made a major contribution toward stability. Since then, the

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["[Y]", "IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have collapsed; most of the new governments have asked the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces. For an interim period, symmetrical reduction of forces will provide a way for the Soviets to withdraw forces without losing face and without creating American obligations that go beyond what the budgetary process is likely to allow. But with every increment of withdrawal, the principle of symmetrical forces will become more firmly established. Arms control runs the risk of becoming a means to legitimize more forces in Eastern Europe than the host countries want. Alternatively, it could generate pressures on the United States to withdraw all its forces from Central Europe, thus jeopardizing NATO. This is why the present approach should be abandoned after the completion of the first stage of negotiations in favor of a scheme more in accord with existing European political realities.+", "The design of a new security system for Europe and a new approach to arms control requires the closest consultation and coordination between Western Europe and the", "[30]", (((MORE))))"]

IN0925 policy

DEPT.

United States. For forty years, Europe trembled before Soviet conventional preponderance. In the foreseeable future, Soviet conventional forces will be needed at home. But Soviet nuclear forces remain intact and are preponderant vis-a-vis Europe. Deterring nuclear blackmail requires specific military steps beyond the scope of this article. But these will be empty unless the political relationship between Europe and the United States supports the proposition that European and American destinies are ~~internationally~~ linked.

The US-European dialogue has too long neglected this challenge. In fact, as European unity advances, the existing institutions for transatlantic dialogue will grow increasingly fragile. At present, military issues are discussed within NATO; political issues (single, their focal point in the European Community and ~~will do so even more~~) as Europe moves toward unity. The United States has sought to make German membership in NATO more palatable to the Soviets by downplaying the military element and hinting at a new political role for NATO. But aside from the difficulty of de-

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["[Y]", "IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "PAGE-13", "fining such a role, the proposal runs up\nagainst the old European suspicion that the\nUS is somehow manipulating NATO to un-\ndermine Europe's new-found political\nidentity. For in NATO, the US deals with\nthe European countries individually; the\nEuropean Community is not represented\nas an institution.+", "[22]", "By the same token, the United States is\nfor all practical purposes excluded from the\npolitical deliberations of the European\nCommunity. The standard procedure is for\nthe Council of Ministers to convey its con-\nclusions to the United States through a\nChairman who rotates every six months.\nBut that foreign minister is in effect an\ninstructed messenger; he has no negotiat-\ning flexibility. The best he can do is to\ncommit himself to the American\ndeliberations, etc.\n views. But since their decisions usually\nerge from months of painful delibera-\ntions, they are understandably reluctant to\nchange their position. Thus, security issues\nare relegated to a forum inimical to Euro-\npean identity while political issues are han-\ndled in a forum that excludes the United\nStates from meaningful participation.+", "[19]", {"bbox": [772, 1419, 904, 1443], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))"]

["IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "A solution must be found to permit the European Community to participate in NATO discussions, and for the United States to be heard within the European Community before deliberations harden into formal decisions. Perhaps a new comprehensive treaty between the United States and the European Community will be in order when European unity has sufficiently advanced.", "meaningful", "[10]", "The Soviets are entitled to a serious voice in European affairs. Their own proposal for a European security system embracing North America, Europe and the Soviet Union to replace existing alliances is further defined and unamounts to an alliance which is not to be sweeping. If everybody agreed on everything, no structure would be necessary.", "better defined\n& unamounts to an alliance which is not to be\nestablished a form\nfor comprehensive.", "And if they differ, the ``system'' could dissolve into competing national states. It could in fact come rather close to the map of Europe prior to World War I. Europe would be disintegrating in the name of Europe.", "There are, however, common objectives that unite rather than divide: the environment, world-wide economic growth, cultural exchange, human rights, and confi-", "[12]", {"bbox": [759, 1371, 891, 1396], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))", "[y]"]