[L.C.]

IRA G. EAKER
1612 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON D. C. 20006

STERLING 3-8280

October 31, 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Nixon Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Mitchell
20 Broad Street
New York, New York 10005

Dear Frank:

In addition to the answers to your questions which I have submitted, here are a few suggestions.

1. When Mr. Nixon declared that there was a security gap, Mr. Humphrey called this irresponsible. I have been surprised that no one has pointed out that Committees of the House and Senate, a majority of whose members are Democrats and all of whose Chairmen are Democrats, have unanimously warned about the depreciation of our military strength viz a viz Russia.

I am enclosing copies of the Hardy and Stennis reports which amply confirm this view. Why not tell the people that the alarming, unilateral reduction of our strategic forces is confirmed by the Democratic leaders in Congress?

Mr. Clifford should not be permitted to get away with his contention that the U.S. has more military power than the USSR, for it is not true. Mr. Clifford in his nuclear delivery capability evaluation did not credit Russia's several thousand medium ranged missiles which could destroy our European allies and prevent return of U.S. troops to Europe. Neither did he include Russia's medium ranged missiles on ships other than submarines. Actually Russia has more nuclear capability in megatons than the U.S. because her warheads are much more powerful than ours. The greatest disparity in the Clifford estimates was the failure to include Russia's medium ranged bombers, 400-500 in number, which could reach any U.S. target on a one-way flight. Mr. Clifford also failed to mention that the USSR has 150 divisions to our 26.

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Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln

October 31, 1968

Page Two

2. I do not believe the Republicans have fully appreciated the smoldering, deep-seated resentment of U.S. citizens about the supine response to the Pueblo seizure.

3. The suggestion of Mr. Clifford that the Defense Department become a new welfare agency is ridiculous. Note my column on this subject, copy enclosed. This is a booby-trap cleverly laid for the next administration.

The induction of 150,000 draftees who do not meet minimum physical and mental standards and the huge sums spent in their training is a misuse of defense funds. What is worse it reduces the quality and dignity of military manpower. The last place to put a mental or physical defective is in uniform where his inadequacy can jeopardize his comrades and their mission.

There are other appropriate welfare agencies to conduct such training. There is ample qualified manpower for our armed services. Putting the armed services into the welfare business reduces their capacity for performing their mission as outlined in the National Defense Act.

4. Research and Development.-

During the past 8 years there has been a failure to appreciate the vital importance of research and development to national security and welfare. Here is a real gap, viz a viz Russia, and one which will have disastrous results if not soon corrected.

5. The main thread running through the whole fabric of our foreign policy has been timidity and fear. What is needed in this area is courage and firmness. This does not mean that we should be overbearing, cruel, unjust or provocative. It does mean that we should be strong, quickly responsive to condemn Red expansion by force and unhesitating in meeting any challenge firmly.

6. The recent security scandals in Germany indicate clearly that our own vital secrets may have been compromised. The Pueblo seizure adds to these worries. An early and exhaustive study of our whole intelligence apparatus, system, organization and manpower is urgently needed.

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln

October 31, 1968

Page Three

7. Appointments to key positions.-

Mr. McNamara's example highlights the decisive nature of cabinet and senior administrative appointments. The first priority of a new Commander-in-Chief should be to eliminate the Whiz Kids, self-styled intellectuals, from positions of responsibility and control in all government departments, particularly Defense and State.

All organizational changes in DOD toward centralization of authority should be reviewed carefully and most of them eliminated.

The new President will not be able to accomplish his worthy promises and objectives if he leaves intact the Washington bureaucracy built up during the past eight years.

DOD, THE NEW WELFARE AGENCY

by
Ira C. Eaker

Recently Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford proposed that the Department of Defense take on additional duties in the field of domestic welfare programs. Specifically, he said the Pentagon would experiment in low cost housing, automation in hospitals, teaching methods and training aids. He also proposed that weapons contractors be favored who contributed most to welfare and anti-poverty programs.

Many members of Congress have suggested that one reason why defense appropriations have risen sharply during the past eight years (the 1969 defense bill now before the Congress is the largest in our history) is because DOD takes on the tasks of other departments of government since it can get the money.

Mr. Clifford's suggestion that DOD become active as a new welfare agency supports this charge. One will search in vain in the National Defense Act of 1947 and its amendments, which established DOD and defined its mission, for any directive or authorization that it assume welfare tasks.

This is not to oppose welfare, that would be like being against home and motherhood. It is to say that the Congress has established several departments of government to supervise the Federal welfare programs. The 1969 budget allocates $59 billion to health, education, welfare, relief and the anti-poverty programs.

If our defenses were adequate there might be less concern when DOD proposes to take on the additional welfare burden. But

our strategic military strength vis a vis the Russians has declined steadily in recent years and now approaches parity. If present trends and rates continue the Reds will surpass the U.S. in military strength by 1970. This no doubt accounts for the new Red truculence and recent bold ventures like the rape of Czechoslovakia, the threat to Berlin and West Germany and the naval push into the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

There is a legitimate welfare area which should consume the interest of the Pentagon. That concerns the status of the three million men and women in uniform. They have long been underpaid compared with similar skills in civil life. They receive inadequate compensation for long periods of family separation, frequent changes of station and the hazards of their war time duties.

Thousands of military men could qualify for poverty programs since their income is less than the standards set for federal relief. It will be small comfort for the junior officers and enlisted men who have lived in trailers, garages and hovels for years, and who are forced to drive thirty to forty miles to work because of inadequate housing, now to learn that hard to get funds for military quarters are to be used in an experiment on low cost housing. Such a project is appropriate for and in fact is now in progress at H.U.D. (The Department of Housing and Urban Development).

The Pentagon has not appeared to recognize and sympathize with the plight of the military. In fact, Mr. Clifford's predecessor opposed a raise in military pay proposed by Congress. As a result of the failure of the Pentagon to represent the interest and guard the welfare of our men in uniform, re-enlistment rates are the lowest ever and resignations and early retirement of young officers are the highest in years.

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The proposal that contracts for weapons be let on any other
basis than the best weapon (determined by the military who will
use them) at the fairest price (determined by competitive bidding)
could open Pandora's Box. It could return weapons procurement
to earlier times when favorite states, favored cities and those
who contributed most to party coffers got the contracts.

The best weapon at the cheapest price should be the firm
criteria in defense procurement.

If it is wise and necessary for the Pentagon to join HEW,
HUD, OEO and the other welfare agencies, why did its proponents
wait until the end of the Johnson Administration to propose it?

October 20, 1968

POST ELECTION DEFENSE PLANNING

by
Ira C. Eaker

One of the prime controversies in the late Presidential
campaign concerned the state of our national security. Many of
the arguments advanced had obvious political overtones.

Now that the election is over, one of the early tasks of the
next Commander-in-Chief should be a non-partisan appraisal of our
defense posture measured against a realistic evaluation of today's
international climate.

In this examination a review of defense policy is more impor-
tant than counting hydrogen bombs, missile warheads or armored
divisions. Sound defense strategy is primary and must be prelimi-
nary to weapons procurement because strategy controls weapons types
and numbers.

For example, it has been Department of Defense doctrine since
1961 that U.S. strategic superiority over Russia was unsettling and
provocative. The prospects for peace will be better served, accord-
ing to this view, when parity in armaments between the two leading
world powers is achieved. Adherence to this formula undoubtedly
has accounted for the steady decline in U.S. strategic forces and
for the failure to provide modern interceptors and bombers. It
also accounts for the fact that recent defense leaders have not
appeared to be concerned about growing Russian naval strength and
the threat of its projection into the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean.

Is arms parity sound or is U.S. arms superiority safer? This
is perhaps the primary defense decision to be made by the new
administration.

The belief or hope that Communism is no longer a monolith, in view of Russian and Red Chinese quarrels, and therefore no longer a danger to Western World security also has adversely affected U.S. defense posture in recent years. This, with its companion piece, that the leaders in the Kremlin are reasonable men who will negotiate fairly, should now be completely exposed for the nonsense that it is by the recent wanton rape of Czechoslovakia.

After defense policy, defense organization is next in importance for scrutiny and review by the new administration.

During the last eight years there has been a dramatic change in national security organization largely accomplished administratively without the sanction of the Congress.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, designated in the National Defense Act as the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President, have been largely superceded by civilian security advisers in the White House, initially McGeorge Bundy and more recently Walt Rostow.

Another principal defense advisory group provided by law, the National Security Council, has fallen into disuse. In recent years it has seldom met, having been superceded by the Wednesday White House Luncheon Club.

In the Pentagon a group of young civilian intellectuals has been brought in and established as the principal advisers to the Secretary of Defense, largely replacing the counsel of military leaders.

This group has been especially prominent in weapons selection despite its inexperience in weapons or warfare. Its influence has

(lc)

resulted in the substitution of options for weapons and it has
also resulted in some multi-billion dollar weapons blunders such
as the TFX fiasco.

All these suggestions for change and improvement in the formu-
lation of defense policy and organization have been made by Armed
Services Committees, and Investigating Subcommittees, House and
Senate, a majority of whose members and all of whose Chairmen have
been Democrats, hence they cannot be dismissed as partisan,
Republican judgments.

When new national defense policies have been agreed upon they
should be widely disseminated. During the past eight years national
security policy could be divined only by reading the speeches of
the President and members of his cabinet. There was not always
general agreement here and abroad as to what our security commit-
ments were.

There will be much less likelihood of uncertainty among our
Allies and miscalculations by our enemies if U.S. defense policy is
spelled out explicitly and published to the world.

November 10, 1968

[LC]

GENERAL BRUCE C. CLARKE, Ret.

4026 NORTH TAZEWELL STREET
ARLINGTON VIRGINIA 22202

TEL: 703 536-9638

15 October 1968

Dear Frank:

I inclose some material on the present DOD setup which I feel will be of interest to the next Secretary of Defense.

Inclosure 1 is an organization chart of the DOD. You will note there are 42 Assistant Deputy Secretaries of Defense, including Deputy Directors of Research and Engineering.

Inclosure 2 is a summary of the personnel of OSD and JCS. You will note also that the Secretary of Defense's office is 3100 strong; the JCS is 2000 strong.

Inclosure 3 is a statement of a recently retired senior Army officer who served in the Department of the Army for the past six years.

Inclosure 4 is a statement of a senior official who has seen the Army and DOD function for almost thirty years. You will find it of interest.

I cite two specifics that illustrate how unsatisfactory the present setup works:

a. There has been "puffing" in size of forces. When I was CINCUSAREUR I had five divisions plus corps and army and special troops. McNamara lumped the corps and army troops together and claimed a Sixth Division. No military man felt this was an honest claim. We may be deceiving ourselves on our readiness posture and our ability to cope with new crises.

b. Notwithstanding all these tight DOD controls a highly vulnerable EUCOM Command Center has been built at Stuttgart costing many millions of dollars. It is "soft" and would not stand a Russian offensive as they are only a few hours away.

Below are my general impressions of the present Pentagon setup:

a. It is at least one-third overstaffed.

b. It is a bureaucracy which feeds on itself.

c. It has placed an unbearable reporting load on the field commanders. They must respond even while conducting operations.

COMMENTS OF A SENIOR OFFICER IN DA WHO HAS JUST RETIRED AFTER SIX YEARS IN THE PENTAGON:

I have only a generality to offer with respect to the people question for DOD, but some hard proposals with regard to things that need to be done in OSD. With regard to people, we have been pretty heavily endowed with people with legal training. By the very nature of that training, each argument becomes an adversary proceeding, and that tends to become a hard taking of sides. Obviously, we need some people with legal training. However, we also need some with other kinds of background, including a substantial number who believe that there is something to be learned from what has gone before. The Systems Analysts have too great a degree of control and are not required to provide the same justification for the positions that they adopt as do the agencies submitting proposals. Cost data is suspect in many instances, but the effectiveness data against which costs are theoretically measured is almost totally lacking. I think they perform a useful purpose, but only in a subordinate role and not in a dominant one as at present.

With respect to change, the first step that needs to be taken is to get programs and budgets in step. For my last five years in the Pentagon, we struggled for at least nine months of the year carefully shaping a program and budget. Each year, in the final two months and often in the final weeks, all the carefully tooled programs were tossed out and a budget was thrown together by gross aggregations and factoring. There is no real integrity to the budget process and formulation. For a long time, the fiction existed that there was no real ceiling on annual appropriations. I cannot document my own view that there was such a ceiling, with perhaps a one-to-two percent swing or range factor. I do believe that to be the case.

Contrary to the legislative history of the successive amendments to the National Defense Act, OSD is in the operating business and is not limited to policy making. I am not sure that operations can be returned to the Departments and to the major commands, but it would restore some balance in programs and it would return OSD to the role that the Congress intended, as I interpret the exchanges that took place during Congressional consideration of changes in the law. However, the trend toward centralization and operations in OSD should be halted, if not reversed.

Inclosure 3

The intelligence function is in particularly bad shape. Our
whole government is designed (or was) on a system of checks
and balances. With the Defense Intelligence Agency, there is
little influence from the services or the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on their activities. I had an estimating capability in
the Army staff, but at the expense of other activities. I used
that capability to keep DIA honest, as I looked at things.
They (DIA) tend to get bound by procedures and to forget their
basic purpose. Since the Agency is a Defense activity, there
is also an inclination to try to influence intelligence judg-
ments, especially by the young intellectuals who have had
little or no practical experience. Some of this could be
resisted, but not all, and I am concerned about the longer
term future. Nothing could be more catastrophic for our
security than painting the intelligence picture as we would
like it to be rather than like it is. In this area, I'm
troubled.

In summary, I have no specific names to suggest. I do believe
that we need a balance between industrialists, lawyers,
engineers, scientists, and social workers. We have some
first class people in OSD, but we have some others with whom
I'd rather not associate. For jobs that can be done better:

Align program and budget and keep them aligned.

Limit OSD to policy and return operations to the De-
partments. Service Secretaries have tended to be-
come assistants to Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Restore some checks and balances in the intelligence
function.

R&D needs a look too, because the tendency is to run the program
in R&D channels outside the normal pattern of activity. You
wake up and find that the R&D community has taken you a long
way down the road to a weapon or weapon system about which the
operator and logistician know far too little. Hopefully, we
have a system in the Army to overcome this condition, but it
will be some time before we know.

1. The basic concept of DOD being the policy maker, coordinator and wholesale manager; and the Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force being the implementors and middle managers, has been lost. We have now two separate echelons both directing and managing in great detail the field commands.

2. A DOD bureaucracy has been established and entrenched in the last eight years that exceeds anything in government history. For example, there are 42 Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense in OSD; eight times more than needed.

3. Three new offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense have been established to satisfy prestige demands of individuals; i.e., ASD(Admin), ASD(Systems Analysis), ASD(Public Affairs). They can be eliminated readily.

4. There are so many officials in DOD, that satisfying their wants keeps the Military Departments and even the overseas commands heavily occupied. Large special staffs have been provided exclusively to give the Army counterparts to cope with DOD.

5. The JCS has degenerated into an action agency handling vast minutiae and heavily engaged in feeding the civilian experts in DOD. DOD civilian officials, particularly ASD(Systems Analysis), are deeply involved in tactical operations and decisions.

Inclosure 4

6. There has been a substantial breakdown of staff rapport and teamwork between the Secretarial elements with the military staffs. The result is adding an echelon in each headquarters, with loss of time and dissipation of high quality personnel.

7. The process of centralization in command and control and resource management has reached a point that response time, readiness and administrative efficiency have been impaired substantially. Staffing project approvals for important Vietnam requirements can take a year or more.

8. Many of the major reorganizations of DOD and Army have not worked out. The atmosphere of face saving and "don't rock the boat" precludes objective reappraisal by DA and DOD at this time. The R&D and logistics posture has deteriorated and exceptional arrangements like "stove pipe logistics" for critical programs are getting more common.

9. Congressional and public attitudes toward the Department of Defense have never been worse. The military services are now confronted with troop attitudes and morale problems that need resolution. Teamwork and harmony between the President, the Congress, Secretary of Defense and the military hierarchy is essential for our defense posture.

GEORGE W. ANDERSON

Suite 500
1629 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

November 15, 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln
20 Broad Street
New York City, New York 10005

Dear Frank:

Thank you for your gracious note of November 9. I did
not contribute nearly as much as I would have wished, but I did
put forth a strenuous prayerful effort especially so when the
returns looked to be dangerously close.

We are all most grateful for the fact that Dick won even
if the margin was narrow. Certainly the result was a resounding
defeat for the administration of the past four years.

My recommendations in very oversimplified form are:

a. Get good men into the Defense Department. A house
cleaning is definitely in order. However, I am very "high" on
Chuck Baird the under secretary of the Navy. I am not sure but
I think he is a Republican.

b. Reestablish the effectiveness of the National Sec-
urity Council, its staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. The President (and to assist the Vice President)
should have top flight military, naval and air force aides of
the Colonel/Captain level as did Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.

d. The Chairman of the JCS should have a fixed weekly
date with the President along as was the practice between President
Eisenhower and Radford/Twining.

e. Procurement practices and procedures of the Defense
Department should be clearly and publically defined and greatly
simplified to save time, money and people.

f. IDA, RAND and so-called study groups should be sharply
reduced. Functions should be reassumed by the Weapons System Evalua-
tion Group whose civilians can, if necessary, be hired by IDA as
originally conceived. The parade into and out of the Pentagon and

State Department of so called political scientists with Top Secret
security clearances from certain universities should be stopped. We
must tighten up on security clearances.

g. Do not expect miracles! The Defense budget will be hard to reduce because you won't really know how bad the situation actually is until you can get the unadulterated truth from the working levels. The bow wave of deficiencies is a big one.

With warm regards and best wishes

1307 Tracy Place
Falls Church, Va. 22046

December 14, 1968

Honorable Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
22 Roland Drive
Short Hills, N. J. 07078

Dear Frank:

The idea of naming this preliminary group a "task force" may not be good strategy. Rather, it might be called an "advisory group", or, a "transition team". A "task force" will doubtless be required after January 20, and the immediate objective to be sought now would not be the same.

The purpose of an "advisory group" now should be to assist in the identification of the major issues when the new team takes over on Jan. 20. After the announcement in the spring by President Johnson of his intention not to run, the machinery in the Pentagon noticeably slowed down, except for the continuing support of Viet Nam. The surtax three billion plus cut-back also took its toll. To restart the machinery in the right direction will require a review by competent persons working with those officials, military and civilian, who are available there now.

Mr. Laird, in addition to picking key assistants, must identify the top-priority programs and determine the degree of support, and rank them to coincide with the policies of the New Administration which will evolve over the next six to twelve month period. For instance, the Viet Nam War has drained off the majority of our strategic forces, those not committed are generally poorly equiped or are ill-trained. Some re-balancing is immediately required to re-store diplomatic considerations, particularly in the near and middle East.

con

An "advisory group" should also provide information/cerning areas to be studied by "task forces" after the change-over. Dr. Kissinger would undoubtedly find this select group very helpful to him.

The following names of men, many of whom will be known to you, can be helpful. Some of them are not National figures, but they do "know their way around the Pentagon".

## MILITARY

Burke, Admiral Arleigh, former CNO. Washington, D.C.
Sides, John H., Admiral, former head of ASEG, and CINCPACFLT. Now with Lockheed.
Kruulak, Lt. Gen'l. Victor H. USNC - Former MFPAC Now with Copley, San Diego.
Felt, Admiral Harry, former CINCPAC - Now with Ryan Aero. San Diego

## Civilian

Pratt, Mr. Albert, former ASTREGNAV PERS. Now a partner with Paine Webber Jackson etc.
Olson, Loren K., former AEC Corp. Now an attorney - Wash. D.C. Procurement specialist.
McCullough, Mr. Hugh, former SP Project Off. Budget specialist - now with Grumman, Beth Page.
Iundell, Mr. Ernest, former budget specialist - now with General Dynamics - Wash.
Pelieu, Mr. Kenneth, former ASTREGNAV Procurement - Wash.
Vakelin, Mr. James V., former ASTREGNAV Res. and Dev., Wash.
Paget, Mr. Richard, partner Cresap., McCormick & Paget. New York

JOHN H. DILLON

1307 TRACY PLACE
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

November 26, 1968

The Honorable Franklin Lincoln
Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander and Mitchell
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Frank:

In line with our conversation yesterday, I submit the
following thoughts which may be helpful to you in providing
an orderly transition in the Department of Defense.

Of first importance, of course, would be the early
announcement of the new Secretary of Defense. With such
an announcement, there could follow orderly steps and
procedures which would greatly facilitate his assumption of
responsibilities and would further provide the preliminary
mechanism for his deputy and key assistants.

As you know, this period of transition can be effectively
used for developing position papers which could be implemented
when the President-elect takes his Oath of Office. Many of the
appointive officials and key assistants in the Department of
Defense are eager to provide current briefings, and their
views and experience are invaluable to a new administration.
While this is not to say that the period of transition is a period
of individual official action, indeed it is not, but the learning
time of the new team can be greatly reduced by capitalizing on
the assets that can be provided by the outgoing members.

I suggest as a means for providing the necessary leadership during the next eight weeks, that a small, highly selective group be provided you and that they be divided into four principal areas of concern, two each in the military departments and two in OSD. In addition to the two members in OSD, several more

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designations should be made to cover public affairs, research
development, and the new budget. This would give you approxi-
mately twelve people as principal assistants to help provide the
continuity in these designated areas. More particularly they
would provide the essential listening posts for the departmental
personnel to contact and also serve as a channel to supply needed
information for the new Secretary of Defense. It would be
desirable if the men assigned to each of the departments had
some prior knowledge of the Department of Defense and hopefully
one should have a military background. This latter suggestion
is made so that military personnel may be assured the new
administration will at least listen to their voice.

The group should not necessarily concern themselves with
the operation of the Department of Defense. The detailed briefings
could come later, even after 20 January, and such alterations,
realignments and programs for reductions of personnel and the
elimination of non-essential functions could follow after proper
studies have been conducted. Of first priority, and one which
would appear to me would be the first concern of the President-
elect, would be how he can continue to support a growing economy
and, at the same time, supply an active war front. Related to
this, of course, is the continuing need for "up stream research"
and the orderly replacement and improvements of major military
weapons systems in order to stay abreast of the national objectives
and commitments to our allies. Concentration of the aforementioned
group then should be concerned with preliminary investigation of the
major defense systems in being, and those that are planned in the
near future with related budget implications.

Of lesser importance, but desirable to consider, would be
the "pattern" for briefing new appointees. Some standard format
should be developed to present to them individually or collectively
the manner in which the Department of Defense is administered.
Some of the broad categories which should be covered in this
briefing would be the role of the National Security Council -- the
method by which "the threat" is determined, and the manner in
which programs are to be pursued to meet that threat. The
organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Command
Structure should be fully described. Additionally, the individual

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departments should be given ample opportunity to describe
their roles and missions and should be encouraged to discuss
freely problem areas as they see them from the military
point of view.

The detailed briefings are probably already prepared, and
I mention them here only in terms of secondary importance.
While I realize that the foregoing does not present a specific
or detailed plan for you to follow, I believe there are several
actions which you could take that would greatly facilitate
fulfilling your responsibilities.

I stand ready to be helpful in any manner that you deem
appropriate. Kindest personal regards.

JHD:phm

NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION

GENERAL OFFICES · 2300 EAST IMPERIAL HIGHWAY · EL SEGUNDO, CALIFORNIA 90245

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU
ASSISTANT TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
(213) 647-5713

REPLY TO
WASHINGTON OFFICE
1629 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 296-6900

November 25, 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Nixon Mudge
20 Broad Street
New York, New York 10005

Dear Frank:

The ability of the President to control, develop and guide a more dynamic foreign policy will require the energizing of the National Security Council as the focal point for such policy.

The system prevalent at this time is static, and self-serving. The replacement of present members of the Executive by others, dedicated but unfamiliar with the problems, will only invite the continuance of the present lethargic system to be dominated, for some time at least, by the recommendations of the lower echelons who will remain unchanged. The record of what happened in 1961 should be sufficient to prove my point.

The effectiveness of Congressional hearings always depends on the input to the committee members and/or counsel of information and/or questions that challenge the prepared presentation or defense of the witnesses. Obviously, only an independent source can provide such input. The same observation applies to the White House.

If you accept this observation, it becomes apparent that only the alerting of the President to opportunities, observations or approaches to policies as broad as the spectrum of possibilities can save him from mainly accepting the conclusions presented without the more careful scrutiny and challenge a hard-headed executive knows to be necessary.

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.

Page Two

The examples of hidden or poorly-evaluated intelligence, analysis, plans and advice to the White House are surely recognized by our President-elect from past experience. Some independent staff views beyond those of established departmental positions remain essential.

Such staff views could communicate and stimulate fresh approaches to and by the NSC and departments in the policy area. Through earliest warning, they could alert the President to the need for policy review, or foundation of decisions of the gravest nature.

Only a highly knowledgeable member on his staff can stimulate such action. This is an area where ideas and experience are more important than high I.Q., friendship or politics.

I repeat again, you cannot bring a new man into government to do this particular job. Only someone who has "lived with it" for years, who still possesses an open and creative mind, and who is intimately aware of policies which, and people who need special scrutiny, can perform this function.

I know such a key civilian, long in government, and stand ready to endorse him unqualifiedly if this matter interests the President-elect. He is a quiet, modest man who seeks nothing but to serve his country well. He holds a very responsible position today. He could be attached to the staff of a presidential assistant for National Security Affairs. He could help develop a significant input of judgment and opinions from esteemed public leaders outside of government. This could include all segments of our society freed from restraints and with opinions not filtered out by established department agencies.

IRA C. EAKER
1612 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON D. C. 20006

STERLING 3-3280

November 13, 1968

Dear Frank:

Your letter of November 9th is deeply appreciated. May I say that all of us who met with you at lunch are now hopeful you will become Secretary of Defense.

My congratulations to the Chief and all of you for the great victory on November 5th.

Those with whom I have been associated have expressed agreement and satisfaction in your idea of a talent bank. In that spirit, may I suggest two names of distinguished scientists for possible consideration as scientific advisers to the President, or for DDR&E in the Pentagon. They are Dr. Robert F. Bacher and Dr. Albert D. Wheelon. A brief biographical sketch of each is inclosed.

I do not know these men personally, but those in whom I have the greatest confidence assure me that they are completely sound in every respect and meet fully the qualifications Mr. Nixon has indicated for his advisers and assistants in his herculean tasks.

Inclosed is my column of this week expressing concern about our intelligence apparatus and the disastrous results which can flow from loss of our vital defense secrets.

I stand ready to answer your call any time if I can be of service in any way.

Inclosures

BACHER, Robert Fox (bäch-ér) physicist; b. Loudonville, O. Aug 31, 1905; s. Harry and Byrl (Fox) B.; BS University of Michigan, 1926; Ph. D., 1930, Doctor of Science (Honorary), 1948; m. Jean Dow, May 30, 1930; children - Martha, Andrew Dow. Natl. Research fellow, Calif. Inst. Tech., 1930-31, Mass. Inst. Tech., 1931-32; Alfred Lloyd fellow, U. of Mich., 1932-33; instr. physics, Columbia, 1934-35; instr to prof. physics Cornell, 1935-49; Radiation Lab. Mass. Inst. Tech., 1940-45; head exptl. physics div., Los Alamos Lab Atomic Bomb Project, 1943-44, bomb physics div., 1944-45; mem. AEC. 1946-49; mem. President's Sci. Adv. Com., 1957-60, Naval Research Adv. Com. 1957-62; prof. physics Cal. Inst. Tech. 1945---, dir. Norman Bridge Lab physics, chmm. div. physics, mathematics, astronomy, 1949-62, provost coll., 1962---; dir. Detroit Edison Co., Bell & Howell Co., Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., Trustee Asso. Univs., Atoms for Peace Awards, Carnegie Corp. of NY, Inst. Def. Analysis, Rand Corp., 1950-60. Recipient Medal for Merit 1946. Mem. Am. Acad. Arts and Scis., Am. Phys. Soc. (pres. 1964), Nat. Acad. Sci., Am. Ass. U. Profs., Am. Philos. Soc., A. A. A. S., Sigma Xi, Kappa Sigma. Home; 345 S. Michigan Avenue, Pasadena, Cal.

MARQUIS Who's Who in America

November 12, 1968

9 October 1967

Brief Resume for Albert D. Wheelon

Personal

Born: 18 January 1929 Moline, Illinois
Married, two children, 7 and 11

Education and Employment

* BSc in Engineering Science, Stanford University 1949.

* PhD in Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1952.

* Teaching Fellow in Physics MIT 1949 - 51.

* Research Assistant in Research Lab for Electronics MIT 1951-1952.

* Member Technical Staff and Laboratory Director, Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation, later Space Technology Labs 1953 - 1962.

* Assistant Director for Science Intelligence, CIA 1962 - 1963.

* Deputy Director CIA, Science and Technology 1963 - 1966.

* Vice President-Engineering, Hughes Aircraft Co., 1966 to present.

Other Activities

* Lecturer in Electromagnetic Theory UCLA 1957 to 1961.

* Consultant and Member of Visiting Committee to National Bureau of Standards, Central Radio Propagation Lab, 1957 to 1962.

* Consultant to USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1959 to 1966.

* Member U.S. Delegation to Surprise Attack Conference in Geneva 1958.

* Consultant to President's Scientific Advisory Council 1960 to present.

* Defense Science Board, 1966 to present.

* President's Commission on Health Manpower 1966 to 1967.

Publications

Thirty-three technical papers in scholarly journals broken down as follows:

<table><tr><td>Radio Propagation</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Space Technology and Missile System Engineering</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Turbulence Phenomenon</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Miscellaneous</td><td>2</td></tr></table>

COPY NO.

REPORT TO SENATOR KENNEDY

FROM

COMMITTEE ON THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

## Introductory Statement

Since its appointment on September 14, 1960, the Committee, within the limits imposed by the time available, has attempted to bring up to date various earlier studies of the administration and management of the Defense Department and related defense agencies and organizations.

In the course of its consideration of possible changes in the Defense Establishment, the Committee, in accordance with your instructions*, has made use of the extensive materials on that subject which have been developed during recent years through the work of Congressional Committees and of private study groups.

Some of the proposals advocated by such Committees and groups fall short of, while others would go beyond, the measures recommended by this Committee.

While thus taking advantage of the great body of source material available to it in the area of defense management and administration, the Committee has not met formally with others. Nevertheless, individual members of the Committee have had the benefit, in arriving at their present conclusions, of the general thinking on many of the matters dealt with in this Report of a

*As contained in your release of September 14, 1960, attached hereto as Exhibit B.

number of former officials in the Defense Department.

* * * * *

In any appraisal of the U.S. military posture one salient factor stands out above the rest. That is the three-fold significance of reaction time at this stage in history:

**First** is the unprecedented strategic value of time -- the ability to react instantly against aggression in this nuclear-space age.

In Word Wars I and II our country had at least eighteen months to build and mobilize its defenses.

If there should ever be a World War III, we would be fortunate to have eighteen minutes to react.

**Second** is the crucial time element in the United States v. Soviet arms race -- the need for early selection among alternative weapon systems and for shorter lead times between conception and use.

**Third** is the effect of time on defense cost. Regardless of how much the people of this country spend, they cannot buy time. Yet we tend to forget the costly effect of building weapons which have become obsolescent as a result of delay.

2

Only by giving full recognition to these all-important time
factors can the Defense Establishment of the United States be strengthened
in a meaningful way.

## Background of Committee Recommendations

The existing structure of the Department of Defense is still
patterned primarily on a design conceived in the light of lessons learned in
World War II, which are now largely obsolete.

The piecemeal amendments to the basic legislation effected
in 1949 and 1958 and the "reorganization" of 1953 did not alter the essential
character of the U.S. military organization, deployed on the basis of whether
a military man travels on land, sea or air. Hence it can be truly said that
since 1947 there has been no fundamental change in the scheme of organiza-
tion of our armed forces.

Yet, during this period of nearly a decade and a half, the whole
state of the art in military science has been revolutionized, as epitomized in
the transitions to the jet, nuclear and space ages.

No longer is the prime mission of the military forces of the
United States to prevail in a World War II-type of open warfare; now it is to
insure the defense and survival of the nation in the current era of cold war
and protracted conflict, with always the possibility of nuclear attack.

3

Changes of comparable magnitude have taken place in the
international political conditions which constantly accentuate the military
risks to which the United States is now subject.

Although two partial reorganizations of the Defense Depart-
ment since 1952 failed to bring the organizational structure of the Depart-
ment into line with the requirements of today's military conditions, the
necessity for modernizing the defense organization has been widely recog-
nized; and both the Administration and the Congress have been repeatedly
urged to take further measures.

In 1958 the Rockefeller Brothers Report recommended major
changes in the military establishment to remedy those central weaknesses
in its structure which have contributed to the lag in U.S. weapons systems
development versus that of the Soviets.

In 1959 Senator Cooper proposed a bill designed to make
improvements in the administration and control of the Defense Department;
and in 1960 Senator Symington introduced amendments to the National Security
Act which would have effected further reorganization of the Defense Depart-
ment.

It was in the light of such bipartisan moves that the Democratic
Platform for 1960 called for "a complete examination of the organization of
our armed forces", as a first order of business of the next Administration,
and that Senator Kennedy asked this Committee to produce for him "a

concrete program with specific proposals in the clearly defined field of its
responsibility".

Throughout all proposals, past and present, to make more
effective the Defense Department organization has run one central theme --
the clarification and strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense
over the entire U.S. military establishment.

There are some who believed, even prior to the 1958 amend-
ments to the National Security Act, that existing legislation provided ample
basis for the Secretary's authority. Others took a contrary view. It is the
conclusion of this Committee that the doctrine of civilian control will be
compromised as long as any doubts exist on this vital point.

Besides resolving any such remaining doubts, there are three
major objectives to be sought in modernizing the present Defense Department
structure:

First, there must be a shortening of the time factor

in bringing new weapons systems from conception to utilization

without duplication and wasted effort. Under the existing multi-

layered structure it is only possible to reduce administrative --

i.e., decision-making -- lead time by crash procedures set up

for key programs such as the Special Projects Office of the Navy

now in charge of the Polaris program and the Ballistic Missile

Division established by the Air Force to expedite the ICBM

5

program. This _ad hoc_ streamlining of weapons systems management inevitably slows up progress in other areas.

Furthermore, for today's advanced weapons, such as missiles, and tomorrow's possible new ones, such as space vehicles, there is no longer any validity in separating the development and production cycle into two parts. This has been the practice with World War II-type and other conventional weapons which, when developed, can be manufactured by production line techniques.

With the present need for concurrency in many stages of weapons systems management, and with the relatively limited number of any given advanced weapon that will be produced, rigid distinctions between Research & Development and Procurement & Production organizations are no longer needed, and their performance should be more closely coordinated in the interest of economy in time, money and motion.

Second, the predominance of Service influence in the formulation of defense planning and the performance of military missions must be corrected. At present, defense planning represents at best a series of compromised positions among the military services. Action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff takes place, if at all, only after prolonged debate,

6

coordination and negotiation between the staffs of the three
Service Chiefs in preparing them to represent the points of
view of their Services in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

No different results can be expected as long as the
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retain their two-hatted
character, with their positions preconditioned by the Service
environment to which they must return after each session of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nor can the Joint Staff become fully
effective in developing the basis for clear military judgments
unless the present degree of influence exercised by separate
Service thinking is sharply reduced.

In short, there is a clear need for defense interest
rather than particular service interest.

Third, there must be more effective utilization of
human effort and material resources in the Defense Establish-
ment. This can only be achieved through a flexible organiza-
tion conforming to the present day nature of military missions
instead of traditional service concepts. Such a change in
organization would tend to minimize the duplication and delay
growing out of the present multiple layers of control and the
overlapping among military programs and operations caused
by steadily increasing inter-service rivalry in effort to fulfill
common missions.

7

No longer can this nation afford the luxury of letting each service strive to develop in itself the capability of fighting any future war by itself. The national resources available for our country's defense effort are in limited supply, and we cannot afford such waste of either manpower or funds.

## Recommendations for Defense Department Reorganization

In order to accomplish the objectives mentioned above, the Committee recommends the elimination of the present departmental structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force, but would preserve the military Services as separate organic units within a single Defense Department. Such a step would do away with the present departmental Service Secretaries and their Under and Assistant Secretaries, fifteen in all.

Certain of the defense reorganization proposals that contemplate this change, such as the bills introduced during recent sessions of Congress by Senator Cooper (S. 2728) and Senator Symington (S. 2957), have made provision for replacing the present Service Secretaries with three new Under Secretaries of Defense for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Committee (including its Chairman) now believes, however, that, by perpetuating separate Service secretariats, it will be more difficult to subordinate service interest to national interest. The Committee therefore considers that it would be wise to discontinue what is now a dual system of civilian control as a result

8

of interposing between the Secretary of Defense and the Services themselves
a set of Secretaries identified with each service.

Vesting directly in the Secretary of Defense the administration
of the Services would be consistent with the functional scheme of military
operations already now reflected in the unified commands, would concentrate
civilian control in the Department of Defense *at one level* instead of two, would
reduce the delays incident to obtaining separate service department coordination
and would facilitate effective civilian direction of defense policy as distinct from
military operations.

Since the 1958 amendments of the National Security Act, the chain
of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and, through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commanders of the unified and specified commands.
The only change in this operational chain of command contemplated by the recommendations of the Committee would be to substitute the Chairman of the Joint
Staff for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, orders to Commanders of unified and
specified commands would be issued by the Secretary of Defense (or by the Chairman of the Joint Staff by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense).
These Commanders, in turn, would continue to have full operational control over
the forces assigned to them.

Under the new structure proposed by the Committee the military
services would retain their existing responsibilities for administrative and

logistic support of the military Commands. The chain of command for such
purposes, as distinguished from operational direction of the military Com-
mands, would run from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the
Chiefs of the Services rather than to the military departments through their
Secretaries as at present. The effect of this one change in the chain of
command for non-operational functions would be to shorten the chain --
again, reduce delay -- and to place the Chiefs of the separate Services
(who would no longer serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff) in direct line of
command with the Secretary of Defense from whom their orders would issue.

The end result should be to accomplish what the Committee
believes to be a major objective in any change of the Defense structure,
namely, to make the Secretary of Defense the civilian official in the Depart-
ment of Defense with unquestioned authority and control over all elements of
the Department of Defense at all levels.

Specific Recommendations

A. Strengthening Civilian Authority.

1. The military Services would be retained, but the present departmental structure of the Army, Navy and Air Force would be eliminated. This in turn would do away with the present positions of Service Secretaries,

10

Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. The Services would remain separate organic units, albeit within a single department (as is the case today with the Marines), and subject to the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense.

2. There would be created two new Under Secretaries of Defense, one for Weapons Systems and one for Administration. Together with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, they would comprise the planned statutory appointees in the Department*. In addition, the Secretary of Defense may designate such civilian assistants as he deems necessary.

The seven existing offices of Assistant Secretary of Defense (in addition to the fifteen Service Secretarial offices) would be abolished. Their functions would be absorbed by Directorates set up under the two new Under Secretaries. This Directorate organization would be subject to change by the Secretary of Defense and should not be frozen into a pattern fixed by legislation.

*Mr. Leva, while agreeing that there should be a drastic reduction in the number of Secretaries, Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, believes that the Secretary of Defense needs the assistance of several additional Under Secretaries of Defense.

3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Administration would be responsible for activities such as Financial Management (Comptroller), Personnel, Legal, Transportation and Communications, Legislative, Congressional Liaison, Public Information, and Health and Medical.

As rapidly as possible all military personnel would be subject to similar recruitment practices, rules for training and length of service, pay for comparable responsibilities, and flexibility of assignment and transfer within and among the services and the service schools and academies.

There would be unified direction and responsibility for all service schools and other military educational institutions.

4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Weapons Systems would be responsible to the Secretary for the complete cycle of weapons development, procurement and production; and also for construction and installations, including bases, housing and depots.

These activities would be managed through three Directorates, namely:

a. The Directorate of Research and Engineering, which would take over the functions now carried on by the present Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and in addition would be responsible for the following

12

activities now located in the office of the Secretary
of Defense:

(1) The Science Advisory Board (formerly the Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee).

(2) The Research and Development Policy Council.

(3) The Defense Science Board.

(4) The OSD Ballistic Missile Committee.

The functions heretofore exercised by the Advanced Research Projects Agency would be absorbed in the new Research and Engineering Directorate.

b. The Directorate of Procurement and Production, which would be responsible for all procurement and production functions.

c. The Directorate of Facilities, which would be responsible for all activities regarding facilities and installations, including responsibility for the planning and construction of facilities for research and testing of weapons, industrial-type facilities for weapons production and maintenance, facilities for weapons operation and use -- such as missile and space vehicle launching

13

installations -- and non-combatant facilities such
as on- and off-base housing.

5. There would be created a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Arms Control who would serve as the Defense liaison in that area with the State Department; and also with other agencies as designated.

B. Command of Military Operations.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be reconstituted so the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (to be redesignated Chairman of the Joint Staff) would be the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman would preside over a group of senior officers from all Services to be known as the Military Advisory Council. Each of such senior officers would be appointed by the President and would no longer have any functions or responsibilities in the Service from which he came and to which he would not return.

In addition, the Chairman would direct the Joint Staff enlarged commensurate with the added responsibilities of the Chairman.

7. Each of the Services would have a Chief who would not serve on the Joint Staff or the Military Advisory Council; and who would report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

8. There would be established the following unified Commands, the Commanders of which would report directly to the Chairman of the Joint Staff:

14

a. A Strategic Command, responsible for all
strategic missions.

b. A Tactical Command, responsible for all
limited and conventional defense missions.

c. A Defense Command, responsible for all
continental defense missions.

Each of the above unified commands will include all
personnel, equipment, and weapons systems required for the performance
of its respective missions.

To the extent that any regional or area specified Commands
would be required in addition to the above-listed unified Commands, their Com-
manders would also report directly to the Chairman of the Joint Staff. Such
Commands would be composed of units assigned from the unified Commands.

9. There would be established a unified Command in charge of the National Guard and Reserve elements of all of the Services. In addition to its other functions, this Command would be responsible for Civil Defense, and would report directly to the Chairman of the Joint Staff.

C. Budgetary Procedures.

10. The Secretary of Defense would be required to present to the appropriate Committees of the Congress a detailed explanation of the military requirements for all missions and Defense Department operations prior

15

Released by Senator Kennedy,
St. Louis, Sept. 14, 1960

EXHIBIT B

PRESS RELEASE

After consultation today with Senator Stuart Symington, Senator John F. Kennedy issued the following statement about the former's survey for Senator Kennedy of the organization and management of the nation's defense structure.

Senator Kennedy said that he had approved the appointment by Senator Symington of the following individuals to this Committee on the Defense Establishment:

**Clark M. Clifford:** Lawyer; Washington University (St. Louis); partner in Clifford and Miller; Special Counsel to President of the United States (1946-50); assisted in drafting National Security Act of 1947; U. S. Navy (1944-46); Naval Aide to President of the United States, 1946; Navy Commendation Ribbon.

**Thomas K. Finletter:** Lawyer and author; University of Pennsylvania; partner in Coudert Bros.; Special Assistant to Secretary of State (1941-44); Chairman, President's Air Policy Commission (1947-48); Secretary of the Air Force (1950-53); U. S. Army (1917-19).

**Roswell L. Gilpatric:** Lawyer; Yale University; partner in Cravath, Swaine, and Moore; Under Secretary of the Air Force (1951-53); member of Rockefeller Special Studies Project (1956-57); member of Advisory Panel to Joint Congressional Subcommittee on Military Application of Atomic Energy.

B-1

**Fowler Hamilton:** Lawyer; University of Missouri and Oxford University; partner in Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton; Special Assistant to Attorney General of the United States (1938-42); Chief of Enemy Branch of Foreign Economic Administration (1942-43); Chief Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice (1945); General Counsel Senate Subcommittee on Airpower (1956); former member of Joint Intelligence staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Marx Leva:** Lawyer; University of Alabama and Harvard University; partner in Fowler, Leva, Hawes and Symington; attorney in OPA (1941) and WPB (1942); served with U.S. Navy (1942-45), received combat citation; Special Assistant to Secretary of Navy (1947) and Special Assistant and General Counsel to Secretary of Defense (1947-49); Chairman, Civilian-Military Review Panel for Special Committee of U.S. Senate (1957).

Dr. Edward C. Welsh will serve as Executive Director of the Committee: Economist; Lafayette College, Tufts University, and Ohio State University; university faculties (1930-42); Deputy Administrator of OPA 1946-47; Chief, Antitrust and Cartels Division in Japan (1947-50); Legislative Assistant in U.S. Senate (1953 to present).

Senator Kennedy said that he and Senator Symington had reviewed the scope, procedure and objectives of the work to be done by the Committee.

"The work of the Committee will be focused upon the administration and management of the Defense Department and related defense agencies and organizations.

B-2

"It will deal with such matters as the relationships between civilian and military, decision making in the Defense Establishment, the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lag time in the introduction of new weapons.

"The Committee will not make another sweeping investigation or study of defense, military policies and resources such as has been so ably and thoroughly done in recent years by various House and Senate Committees, and by such private groups as the Gaither and Rockefeller Committee, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the Carnegie Corporation, the great universities, and others."

"Rather it will utilize their splendid work as its primary source for facts, analyses and informed opinion on the narrower field of defense management and administration with which it is called upon to deal."

"The principal problems are well known; and the information needed for their analysis is readily at hand."

"The crucial questions are those of judgment as to what changes should be made in the organization and administration of our defense agencies to eliminate or at least to diminish the present crippling effect of these problems upon our defense power."

"In this critical area of judgment the Committee will seek the views of each branch of the armed services and of defense industries and it will also seek the opinions and counsel of qualified and experienced civilians"

B-3

irrespective of their political affiliation or particular service backgrounds.

"We must improve the administration of our defense agencies and we must do so without delay. To that end, the Committee will make recommendations to me as to the measures, whether legislative or executive, that should be taken to achieve two primary and related objectives: (1) To obtain a defense adequate to protect the nation and to enable it to discharge its international responsibilities; and (2) To obtain such a defense within the framework of a free and solvent economic system.

"In short, I expect this Committee to produce for me a concrete program with specific proposals in the clearly defined field of its responsibility.

"At my request Senator Symington has undertaken to have his recommendations in my hands before December 31, 1960, so that the new administration could take such steps, including the recommendation of appropriate legislation to the Congress, as may be necessary to remedy present basic weaknesses in the administration and management of our national defense establishment."

B-4