FINAL
Sent out to
Heritage 3/22/95

Remarks by Henry Kissinger
B.C. Lee Lecture
Four Seasons Hotel

February 1, 1995

This is a complex period for American foreign policy. We have achieved a tremendous victory in the Cold War. If one compares what American leaders said in the late 40s and early 50s with what has come about, there is a truly extraordinary correlation. In fact, it is rare to find - I can think of no example - where a nation brought about as closely what it had set out to do or in so short a period of time.

But such a success brings one face to face with a dilemma that was described by George Bernard Shaw when he said: "There are two tragedies in life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire, and the second is to fulfill your heart's desire." That is the challenge for our period and it comes at a moment when many of the traditional premises of what foreign policy ought to be ought to be re-examined.

The American international experience has been unique. We are the only major country that was populated almost entirely by immigrants; the only major country whose history has a definite beginning which can be dated; the only major country that has never had a powerful neighbor; and, therefore, the only major country that could believe its involvement in foreign affairs was entirely up to it, that it could choose its involvements and withdraw from them at will. Also, the immigrant experience gave rise to the conviction that, by making the world conform to its own domestic experiences, it could guarantee universal peace and the end of international conflicts. The ideas of collective security, self-determination, and world government were largely introduced by America into international affairs. Unchallenged within the United States, they have dominated the thinking of our century.

Now the United States finds itself in a unique position in terms of its past. All its previous foreign involvements were triggered by the perception of some specific threat. Each major effort of the United States was viewed by its leaders as bringing about some sort of terminal point after which the world would live in an atmosphere of reconciliation. Thus all of the great initiatives of the post-World War II period were given terminal dates. Today, we dwell in a world without a clear-cut strategic adversary. We

live also in a world without a specific ideological enemy, or many
ideological adversaries, whichever way one wants to put it. We
have not yet developed, and we may not be able to develop, a
concept of some kind of terminal point toward which we are working.
And yet, at this precise moment, we are the strongest military
power, the only super power, the most vital economic power, and a
nation on whose actions as much depends as it did in the immediate
post-World War II period.

Yet in the immediate post-World War II period, we were re-
enacting to some extent the two seminal national experiences of
this half-century: overcoming the Great Depression of the 1930s,
and overcoming our enemies in World War II. In the period into
which we are now heading, we do not have such clear cut agendas or
precedents of approach. So, there must be a debate in America.
It will not be easy to formulate a bi-partisan approach under
present conditions because the premises are not self-evident.
There is a big difference between whether one believes that all
problems must be dealt with primarily multilaterally, or whether
there has to be a clear definition of a national interest. It
makes a difference whether one believes that alliances are still
valid or whether one believes that alliances are a vestige of a
forgotten or transcended period and can therefore be largely
ignored. I am struck by the fact that in very few of the public
statements of our politicians does one find what used to be almost
ritualistic statements about the Atlantic Alliance and other
alliances. Precisely because they were ritualistic, they provided
a fundamental anchor in the days when I was in government as they
did before and after. It would have been impossible to clear a
presidential speech about foreign policy if it did not mention the
Atlantic Alliance or our relationship with Korea or other allies -
even if it made for a very general sentence; today, general
speeches which make no NATO reference are the rule. I point this
out only to illustrate that a philosophical issue must be there.

The traditional American premise that there was some general
principle which could be applied equally in every part of the world
- for example containment - or the spread of democracy as the
principal goal of foreign policy, is very difficult to apply in the
present period. In a way, it is probably what led us into the
tragedy of Vietnam which is to say that, even during the Cold War
period, it did not apply fully. In the present period, the United
States has to begin with some concept of its national interest in
various regions of the world, and that national interest must of
course encompass our moral and social values but it must also
relate these to other concerns.

I want to make these general statements before I turn to my
discussion of Asia because Asia is the region of the world in which
American thinking is in many respects in greatest need of
clarification. (I must say that I have read the various Heritage
papers on the subject with considerable agreement.)

2

In Europe we are dealing with nations exhausted by their experiences in war and unlikely ever to consider each other as enemies; they have become strategic allies working toward some sense of community. But even if they do not fulfill that goal, conflict among them is extremely improbable. In Europe, the real question is where the borders of Europe begin, what should happen to the nations of Central Europe, and what is to be the new relationship with Russia and with the successor states of the Soviet Union.

But in Asia, we are dealing with nations that in no sense consider themselves part of a single community. In Asia, we are dealing with societies each of which is in a process of fundamental transformation determined to an extraordinary extent by national and cultural characteristics. It may be possible to speak of an Asia-Pacific Community in the economic sense but, politically, the relationships of Japan, China, Korea, and Asian Russia to each other as well as the relationship of all these nations toward Southeast Asia is not defined primarily by a sense of living in a community. Many of them have closer relationships with the United States than they have with each other. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has affected all of us in very special ways.

Let me begin with Japan. Some Americans have the tendency to believe that all of history works automatically toward our preferred institutions and that conversion to these is the ultimate goal of foreign policy. Therefore, we had the conviction that, after its defeat in World War II, Japan would evolve into a society very similar to ours. In Japan, we thought we saw a permanent feature of the post-war international scene. But that could not be the case. Under the shock of defeat, Japan gave its priority to economics. After the trauma of World War II, it was natural for a country defeated for the first time in its history to attempt to emulate some of the methods of the victor. It was also the quickest way toward recovery. Moreover, with only one clear-cut enemy, the Soviet Union, strategic objectives of the United States and Japan were bound to run parallel.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new generation in Japan, it seems inevitable that Japanese foreign policy will take a more national turn. It is inherent in the politics of the region and accelerated by the single-focus approach of American foreign policy that has produced one trade crisis after another. To maintain the alliance, which is desirable, requires restoring political dialogue. Yet when it comes to Japanese culture, producing dialogues of any kind is not exactly an easy assignment. The Japanese communicate by creating a mood. We communicate by asking direct questions. When a Japanese Prime Minister says "yes," it only means that he has understood what has been said, not that he is going to do it. Conceptual discussions of strategic and political issues therefore do not come easily with

the Japanese.

And yet the Japanese-American relationship will not prosper unless it is broadened beyond trade issues. Some common conception of the political evolution of at least Northeast Asia and probably all of Asia is needed. That dialogue remains yet to be conducted, and really needs to be conducted - not only on the governmental level, perhaps not even primarily on the governmental level, but in the many institutions that were so important in establishing some sort of common approach with the West European nations during the period of the Cold War.

Our relations with China, too, suffer from cultural shock. In China most provinces have a population larger than the largest European country. And if you ask a Chinese to date something, he will mention a dynasty whereas a Westerner would give you a date. But most dynasties have lasted longer than the entire history of the United States, which inevitably produces a difference in time perspective.

What China has wanted from the beginning of our dialogue in 1971 was to have a strategic relationship in the widest sense. They seek an understanding of our perception of the evolution that was going to take place in Asia and preferably in the world, and then to see whether we could come to an agreement - not in the way allies do, but in some fashion leading to a framework to enable us to comprehend their actions.

Having the longest uninterrupted history of any nation of the world, the Chinese have been obliged to deal with many idiosyncrasies, so I think the Chinese can understand, even if they don't agree, that we should have certain moral preferences which need to be taken into account, and that indeed we have every right and indeed need to make those clear. But the key issue in our relationship is how we can bring our various priorities into a relationship to each other that enables us to act on behalf of our mutual interests and in as coordinated a way as circumstances allow. I believe that in Asia stability requires a major effort of understanding between the United States and China and therefore, I have opposed efforts to sanction China even on issues where I have agreed with the objectives of those who recommend the sanctions. It is extraordinarily important the United States and China find a way toward a serious political dialogue which, at this moment, is not taking place adequately.

Having discussed these two major countries, let me say something about Korea. Korea was the first Asian country in which I spent any amount of time. I was there during the Korean War and I traveled from Pusan to Seoul in a rickety troop train. I have seen Seoul when it was devastated, and all the cities that had been occupied by the enemy troops. It took courage and dedication to rebuild this country at a time when it was conventional wisdom that

4

[Y]

Korea was doomed forever to being an under-developed, somewhat backward Asian society. I have tremendous admiration for what Korea has been through. As a veteran of the Vietnam negotiations, I am also very conscious of what happens in a divided country when one party participates in negotiations, not necessarily to achieve an agreement but to delegitimize the other party, especially when the other party is our ally.

The rule with which we could start in Korea is to do nothing to permit it to become isolated or separated from us. Therefore in all negotiations involving the future of the Korean Peninsula, we should not talk with the North Koreans without the participation of South Korea; and if the North Koreans are not willing to do this, then I don't think we should talk to them. (There may be issues that are bilateral between us and North Korea which could be dealt with separately.) We should also keep in mind that our interests with respect to Korea are not always the same as those of Korea's neighbors.

I am not happy about the way that the Korean Nuclear Agreement came about. I don't think it is good policy to have an American negotiation in Korea that excludes Seoul, and I am uneasy about our having acquiesced to the nuclear status quo in the peninsula. On the other hand, we have an agreement and the best that can be done now is to be very cautious about making sure that the obligations of that agreement are rigorously carried.

I don't want to go through every country of Asia with the same kind of analysis, but my basic point is that Asia is undergoing a tremendous economic revolution. I find the changes in China, which I visit every year, awe-inspiring. I remember what China looked like in 1970 and even in 1979 when compared with what it is now. I can see happening in China in the next century what happened to Japan in this century as a premier economic power, whatever the political situation.

Throughout Southeast Asia, we face an extraordinary opportunity. The United States is present everywhere, yet to take one issue and make it the test of an extraordinarily complex relationship would be a mistake. Still, in no Asian country would America's withdrawal be welcome. In Southeast Asia, as they pointed out to me, the strategic divisions run along the line of which nations are more concerned about Vietnam and which are more concerned about China. Those more concerned about China are friendly with Vietnam. Those more concerned about Vietnam are friendlier with China.

In conclusion, what does all this mean for the United States? If you ask the nations I have mentioned to list their principal security threat, not one of them would name the United States. Not one. Each of them would refer to some other country of the region. The United States is an Asian power for a unique reason. It is the only major power that not only can afford to but has an obligation

5

to have friendly relations with all of the nations of Asia. It is
the only power that can conduct simultaneous dialogue with China,
Japan, and both Koreas and maintain a position in Southeast Asia.

So, in this sense, what goes on in Asia affects our perception
of international affairs in general. One often hears that this
sort of analysis is now outdated and that we should emphasize the
environment, population issues, and drug abuse. Those of you who
know Asia should ask yourselves this: if this were the only thing
we could talk about, how would we handle what I have described in
geopolitical terms? Yes, these are issues with some consequence
and, in the decades ahead, they will undoubtedly become of still
greater consequence. But, what is immediately required is to
contribute to a structure of relationships in vital and crucial
regions of Asia.

Since World War I, all the great decisions in foreign policy have
in one way or another come from the United States. It is a truism
to say that this must be so when all the world is looking to us.
Yet it must be the case for a few more decades. That is our
burden, our obligation, and our opportunity.

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Four Seasons Hotel

February 1, 1995

Yet in the immediate post-World War II period, we were re-enacting to some extent the two seminal national experiences of this half-century: overcoming the Great Depression of the 1930s, and overcoming our enemies in World War II. In the period into which we are now heading, we do not have such clear cut agendas or precedents of approach. So, there must be a debate in America. It will not be easy to formulate a bi-partisan approach under present conditions because the premises are not self-evident. There is a big difference between whether one believes that all problems must be dealt with primarily multilaterally, or whether there has to be a clear definition of a national interest. It makes a difference whether one believes that alliances are still valid or whether one believes that alliances are a vestige of a forgotten or transcended period and can therefore be largely ignored. I am struck by the fact that in very few of the public statements of our politicians does one find what used to be almost ritualistic statements about the Atlantic Alliance and other alliances. Precisely because they were ritualistic, they provided a fundamental anchor in the days when I was in government as they did before and after. It would have been impossible to clear a presidential speech about foreign policy if it did not mention the Atlantic Alliance or our relationship with Korea or other allies - even if it made for a very general sentence; today, general speeches which make no NATO reference are the rule. I point this out only to illustrate that a philosophical issue must be there.

2

3

the Japanese.

4

5

February 1, 1995

[Y]

The American international experience has been unique. We are the
only major country that was populated almost entirely by
immigrants; the only major country whose history has a definite
beginning which can be dated; the only major country that has never
had a powerful neighbor; and, therefore, the only major country
that could believe its involvement in foreign affairs was entirely
up to it, that it could choose its involvements and withdraw from
them at will. Also, the immigrant experience gave rise to the
conviction that, by making the world conform to its own domestic
experiences, it could guarantee universal peace and the end of
international conflicts. The ideas of collective security, self-
determination, and world government were largely introduced by
America into international affairs. Unchallenged within the United
States, they have dominated the thinking of our century.

2

[Y]

3

[Y]

4

[Y]

5

[Y]

6

[Y]

7

[Y]

8

[Y]

9

C]

to comprehend their actions.

10

[Y]

about Korea. Korea was the first Asian country in which I spent
any amount of time. I was there during the Korean War and I
traveled from Pusan to Seoul in a rickety troop train. I have seen
Seoul when it was devastated, and all the cities that had been
occupied by the enemy troops. It took courage and dedication to
rebuild this country at a time when it was conventional wisdom that
Korea was doomed forever to being an under-developed, somewhat
backward Asian society. I have tremendous admiration for what Korea
has been through. As a veteran of the Vietnam negotiations, I am
also very conscious of what happens in a divided country when one
party participates in negotiations, not necessarily to achieve an
agreement but to delegitimize the other party, especially when the
other party is our ally.

11

[Y]

I am not happy about the way that the Korean Nuclear Agreement came about. I don't think it is good policy to have an American negotiation in Korea that excludes Seoul, and I am uneasy about our having acquiesced to the nuclear status quo in the peninusla. On the other hand, we have an agreement and the best that can be done now is to be very cautious about making sure that the obligations of that agreement are rigorously carried.

12

[Y]

In conclusion, what does all this mean for the United States?
If you ask the nations I have mentioned to list their principal
security threat, not one of them would name the United States. Not
one. Each of them would refer to some other country of the region.
The United States is an Asian power for a unique reason. It is the
only major power that not only can afford to but has an obligation
to have friendly relations with all of the nations of Asia. It is

13

[Y]

14

Heritage Foundation

February 1, 1995

faxed to Gina ✓

[Y]

With Gina's edits

Dick, Ed, thank you. I must say, Dick, you gave a most generous description of our association at the National Security Council and I appreciate it very much. If anyone had told me ten years ago that I would be invited to be the first speaker in an endowed lecture series by The Heritage Foundation and that I would be introduced by Dick Allen, I would have thought it a highly improbable suggestion.

My relations with The Heritage Foundation in those days could be described by the experience of the man who went to a Communist Party meeting to see what it was like. It was soon raided by the police and as they were pulling everyone out, he said, "But I am anti-communist." The police hit him over the head again and said, "We don't care what kind of a communist you are."

1

[Y]

But such a success brings one face to face with a dilemma that
was described by George Bernard Shaw when he said: "There are two
tragedies in life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire,
and the second is to fulfill your heart's desire." The first is
the equivalent of the theories that shaped the Cold War period and
gave America a sense of direction at a time when the major issue
was confrontation with the Soviet Union on a global basis.

3

[Y]

that could believe its involvement in foreign affairs was entirely
up to it, that it could choose its involvements and withdraw from
them at will. Also, being a nation of immigrants, it consciously
turned its back on their European countries of origin and gave rise
to the conviction that, by making the world conform to its own
domestic experiences, it could guarantee universal peace and the
end of international conflicts. The ideas of collective security,
self-determination, and world government were largely introduced
by America into international affairs. Unchallenged within the
United States, they have dominated the thinking of our century.

4

Yet in the immediate post-World War II period, we were re-
enacting to some extent the two seminal national experiences of
this century: overcoming the Great Depression of the 1930s, and
overcoming our enemies in World War II. In the period into which
we are now heading, we do not have such clear cut agendas or
precedents of approach. And so, remember this, there must be a
debate in America. It will not be easy to formulate a bi-partisan
approach under present conditions because the premises are not
self-evident. There is a big difference between whether one
believes that all problems must be dealt with primarily

5

multilaterally, or whether there has to be a clear definition of
a national interest. It makes a difference whether one believes
that alliances are still valid or whether one believes that
alliances are a vestige of a forgotten or transcended period and
can therefore be largely ignored. I am struck by the fact that in
very few of the public statements of our politicians does one find
what used to be ritualistic statements about the Atlantic Alliance
and other alliances. Precisely because they were ritualistic, they
provided a fundamental anchor in the days when I was in government
as they did before and after. It would have been impossible to
clear a presidential speech about foreign policy if it did not
mention the Atlantic Alliance or our relationship with Korea or
other allies - even if it made for a *totally meaningless* sentence,
*day general* speaks that make no NA to reference any side.
I point this out only to illustrate that a philosophical issue must
be there.

The traditional American premise that there was some general
principle which could be applied equally in every part of the world
- for example containment - or even the spread of democracy as the

6

[Y]

I want to make these general statements before I turn to my
discussion of Asia because Asia is the region of the world in which
American thinking is in many respects in great need of
clarification. (I must say that I have read the various Heritage
papers on the subject with considerable agreement.)

In Europe we are dealing with nations exhausted by their
experiences in war and unlikely ever to consider each other as
brothers.

*City, State become strategic allies working toward some sense of community. But even if they do not fulfill that goal, conflict among them is extremely improbable. In Europe, the real question is where the borders of*

7

[Y]

Europe begin, what should happen to the nations of Central Europe, and what is to be the new relationship with Russia and with the successor states of the Soviet Union. Very few of these have a largely hostile political possibility except perhaps some, foreseeable, evolution in Russia in a more nationalistic direction.

But in Asia, we are dealing with nations that in no sense consider themselves part of a single community. In Asia, we are dealing with societies each of which is in a process of fundamental transformation determined to an extraordinary extent by national and cultural characteristics. It may be possible to speak of an Asia-Pacific Community in the economic sense but the relationships of Japan, China, Korea, and Asian Russia to each other as well as the relationship of all these nations toward Southeast Asia is not defined primarily by a sense of living in a community. Many of them have closer relationships with the United States than they have with each other. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has affected all of us in very special ways.

Let me begin with Japan. Americans have the tendency to believe,

8

or some Americans have the tendency to believe, that all of history
works automatically toward our preferred institutions and that
conversion to these is the ultimate goal of foreign policy.
Therefore, we had the conviction that, after its defeat in World
War II, Japan would evolve into a society very similar to ours. In
Japan, we thought we saw a permanent feature of the post-war
international scene. But that could not be the case. Under the
shock of defeat, Japan gave its priority to economics, though it

shock of defeat, Japan gave its priority to economics, though it
After the war, Japan would have given its priority to economics, though it
After the war, Japan gave its priority to economics, though it
could not remain forever a primarily economic institution. After

Moreover, with only one clear-cut enemy, the strategic objectives
of the United States and Japan were bound to run parallel.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new
generation in Japan, it seems to me inevitable that Japanese
foreign policy will take a more national turn. It is only natural.
And it is inevitable. It is inherent in the politics of the region

9

[Y]

Others say the same is true in our relations with China. There too, there is a huge cultural shock. I am always shocked when I go to China that I rarely visit any province which does not have a population larger than the largest European country. And if you ask a Chinese when something happened, whereas a Westerner would give you a date, the Chinese gives you a dynasty, and each dynasty has lasted longer than the entire history of the United States. Which, inevitably, produces a difference in perspectives.

What China has wanted from the beginning of our dialogue with it in 1971 was to have a strategic relationship in the widest sense. They wanted from us an understanding of our perception of the evolution that was going to take place in Asia and preferably in the world, and then to see whether we could come to an agreement - not in the way allies do, but in some fashion leading to a conceptual understanding or, better yet, a framework to enable us to comprehend their actions.

11

[Y]

Having the longest uninterrupted history of any nation of the world, the Chinese have been obliged to deal with many idiosyncrasies, so I think the Chinese can understand, even if they don't agree, that we should have certain moral preferences which need to be taken into account, and that we have every right and indeed need to make those clear. But the key issue in our relationship is how we can bring our various priorities into a relationship that enables us to act on behalf of our mutual interests and in as coordinated a way as circumstances allow. I believe that in Asia stability requires a major effort of understanding between the United States and China and therefore, I have opposed efforts to sanction China even on issues where I have agreed with the objectives of those who recommend the sanctions. It is extraordinarily important the United States and China find a way toward a serious political dialogue which, to my mind, is not adequately taking place.

12

[N]

any amount of time. I was there during the Korean War and I traveled from Pusan to Seoul in a rickety troop train. I have seen Seoul when it was devastated, and all the cities that had been occupied by the enemy troops. It must say it took courage and dedication to rebuild this country at a time when it was conventional wisdom that Korea was doomed forever to being an under-developed, somewhat backward Asian society. I have tremendous admiration for what Korea has been through. As a veteran of the Vietnam negotiations, I am also very conscious of what happens in a divided country when one party participates in negotiations, not necessarily to achieve an agreement but to delegitimize the other party, especially when the other party is our ally.

I harken back to a rule I learned from President Pompidou. I once asked him why he did not like a particular French political figure and he said that one way to build friendship is amongst loyal friends; the second way is to try and placate enemies. The latter always loses.

13

I would say that the rule with which we could start in Korea is to stick with our friends and to do nothing to permit them to become isolated or separated from us. Therefore in all negotiations involving the future of the Korean Peninsula, we should not talk with the North Koreans without the participation of South Korea; and if the North Koreans are not willing to do this, then I don't think we should talk to them. (There may be issues that are bilateral between us and North Korea which could be dealt with separately.) We should also keep in mind that our interests with respect to Korea are not always the same as those of Korea's neighbors.

I am often asked why don't the Japanese and Chinese understand the dangers of a North Korean nuclear capability. I believe that they understand it very well. But frankly I also believe that the leaders of both Japan and China would not die unfulfilled if Korea remained divided in their lifetime. Hence they have to balance the nuclear threat against their fear of the impact of the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the local political situation

on the Korean Peninsula. I don't say this as a criticism; I say
it as a fact of life. We have to understand that there cannot be
some universal approach. I am certainly not happy about the way
that the Korean Nuclear Agreement came about. I don't think it is
good policy to have an American negotiator negotiating between our
government and an adversary is, and I am uneasy about having
acquiesced to the nuclear status quo. On the other hand, we have
an agreement and the best that can be done now is to be very
cautious about making sure that the obligations of that agreement
are maintained.

15

Throughout Southeast Asia, we face an extraordinary opportunity. The United States is present ~~throughout~~ every year in, yet to take one issue and make it the test of an extraordinarily complex relationship would be a mistake. Still, in no Asian country would America's withdrawal be welcome. In Southeast Asia, as they pointed out to me, the strategic divisions run along the line of which nations are more concerned about Vietnam and which are more concerned about China. Those more concerned about China are friendly with Vietnam. Those more concerned about Vietnam are friendlier with China.

In conclusion, what does all this mean for the United States? What it means ~~is that~~, if you ask the nations I have mentioned to list their principal security threat, not one of them would list the United States. Not one. Each of them would mention some other country of the region. The United States is an Asian power for a unique reason. It is the only major power that not only can afford to but has an obligation to have friendly relations with all of the nations of Asia. It is the only power that can conduct simultaneous dialogue with China, Japan, and both Koreas and

16

maintain a position in Southeast Asia. It isn't necessary for us to abandon our principles in Asia. We are, after all, dealing with adults. But it is necessary for us not to create the impression that we can impose our every conviction on others or ask that they subordinate everything to us.

17

[c]

Dick, Ed, thank you. I must say, Dick, you gave a most generous description of our association at the National Security Council and I appreciate it very much. I must say if anyone had told me ten years ago that I would be invited to be the first speaker in an endowed lecture series by The Heritage Foundation and I would be introduced by Dick Allen, I would have thought it was a highly improbable suggestion.

My relations with The Heritage Foundation in those days could be described by the experience of the man who went to a Communist Party meeting to see what it was like. It was then raided by the police. As they were pulling everyone out, he said, "But I am anti-communist." the police hit him over the head again and said, "We don't care what kind of a communist you are."

In the intervening period, The Heritage Foundation and I have communicated with each other, and we have cooperated. I believe that The Heritage Foundation is making a huge contribution at this moment and that it has made a huge contribution for the period of its existence at a time when American long-range thinking on national security policy is at a crossroads, and when most political leaders are not interested in foreign policy. One chapter in my book [Diplomacy] that no one has reviewed is the one in which I say that the Reagan Administration brought about the victory of the Cold War. That specific chapter has not been recognized by any of the reviewers but it is true that much of the conceptual thinking for Reagan was developed here. And so I accepted this invitation with great pleasure and I want to thank Ed and Dick for receiving me so warmly.

This is a complex period for American foreign policy. We have achieved a tremendous victory in the Cold War. If one compares what American leaders would say in the late 40s and early 50s with what has come about, one finds an extraordinary correlation. In fact, it is rare to find, I can think of no example, where a nation brought about so closely what it set out to do in such a short period of time.

But such a success faces one with a dilemma that has been described by George Bernard Shaw when he said "There are two tragedies in life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire and the second is to fulfill your heart's desire." The first is the equivalent for the theories that shaped the Cold War period and this gave America a sense of

direction when the major issue was the confrontation on a global basis with the Soviet
Union.

That is the challenge for our period and it comes about at a moment when many
of these traditional premises of what foreign policy ought to be ought to be re-examined.

The American international experience has been unique. We are the only major
country that is populated almost entirely by immigrants; the only major country whose
history has a definite beginning that can be dated; the only major country that has never
had a powerful neighbor; and, therefore, the only major country that could believe that its
involvement in foreign affairs was entirely up to it, that it could choose its involvement
and withdraw from this involvement. And also being a nation of immigrants that has
turned its back on its European countries of origin, it also has the conviction that by
making the world conform to our own domestic experiences, we could guarantee
universal peace and the end of international conflict.

The ideas of collective security, self-determination, and world government were
largely introduced by America into international affairs. When ______ were
unchallenged when they were produced in the United States and they have dominated the
thinking of our century. Now the United States finds itself in a unique position in terms
of its past. All previous involvements of the United States were triggered by the
perception of a specific threat. Each major effort of the United States was viewed by its
leaders that it would bring about some sort of terminal point after which the world would
live in an atmosphere of reconciliation. all of the great initiatives of the post World War
II period were given terminal dates. Now we live in a world without a clear cut strategic
adversary. We live also in a world without a specific ideological enemy, or many
ideological adversaries, whichever way one wants to put it. We have not yet developed
and we may not be able to develop a concept of some kind of terminal point toward
which we are working. And yet, at this precise moment, we are the strongest military
power, in fact the only super power, the most vital economic power and a nation on
whose actions as much depends as it did in the immediate post World War II period.

But in the immediately post World War II period, we were acting out, to some
extent, experiences of overcoming the depression of the 1930s and overcoming our
enemies in World War II. In the period into which we are now heading, we do not have
such clear cut ______. And so, remember this. There must be a debate in America.

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It isn't so easy to formulate a bi-partisan approach under present conditions because the premises are not so self-evident. There is a big difference whether one believes that all problems must be dealt with primarily multilaterally, or whether one believes there has to be a clear definition of a national interest. It makes a difference whether one believes that alliances are still valuable or whether one believes that alliances are a vestige of a forgotten period or of a transcended period and can be largely ignored. I am struck by the fact that in very few of the public statements of our politicians, one finds what used to be ritualistic statements about the Atlantic Alliance and other alliances. Precisely because they were ritualistic, they have provided a fundamental anchor in the days I was in government and before and after. It would have been impossible to clear a presidential speech about foreign policy if it did not mention the Atlantic Alliance, or our relationship with Korea or other allies, even if it were a totally meaningless sentence. I point this out only so that there is a philosophical issue that must be there.

The American ______ according to which there was some general principle that could be applied equally in every part of the world, like for example containment, or even elective spreading of democracy as the principal goal of our foreign policy, is very difficult to apply in the present period. In a way, it is probably what led us into the tragedy of Vietnam so not even during the Cold War period did it apply fully. In the present period, the United States, in my view, has to begin with some concept of what its national interest is in various regions of the world and that national interest of course must encompass its moral and social values but which also must relate those to its other concerns.

I want to make these general statements before I turn to my discussion regarding Asia because Asia is the region of the world in which American thinking is in many respects in great need of clarification. I must say that I have read the various Heritage papers on the subject with considerable agreement.

In Europe we are dealing with nations exhausted by their experiences in the war, unlikely ever to consider each other as strategic allies working toward some sense of a community which even if they do not fulfill it, makes conflict between them extremely improbable. In Europe, the real question is where the borders of Europe begin, what should happen to the nations of Central Europe, what is to be the new relationship with Russia and with the successor states of the Soviet Union. But very few of those have a

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largely hostile political possibility except possibly some foreseeable evolution in Russia
in a more nationalistic direction.

But in Asia, we are dealing with nations that in no sense consider themselves part
of a single community. In Asia, we are dealing with societies that are each of them in a
process of fundamental transformation determined to an extraordinary extent by their
national and cultural characteristics. It may be possible to speak of an Asia-Pacific
community in the economic sense but the relationship to Japan, China, Korea, Asian
Russia to each other and then the relationship of all these nations towards southeast Asia
is not defined primarily by a sense of living in a community. Many of them have closer
relationships with the United States than they have with each other. Moreover, the end of
the Cold War affects all of us in a very special way.

Let me begin with Japan. Americans have the tendency to believe, or some
Americans have the tendency to believe, that all of history works automatically toward
our preferred institution and that conversion is the ultimate goal of foreign policy and,
therefore, there had to be a conviction that Japan after its defeat in World War II became
a society very similar to ours and that in Japan we saw in the post War period a
permanent feature of the international scene. That cannot be the case. Japan under the
shock of defeat gave its priority to economics. But it would never remain forever a
primarily economic institution. After World War II, it was natural for a country defeated
for the first time in its history to attempt to emulate some of the methods of the victor. It
was also the quickest way for recovery. Moreover, there was only one clear cut enemy
and, therefore, the strategic objectives of the United States and Japan were bound to be
______. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and with the emergence of a new
generation in Japan, it seems to me inevitable that Japanese foreign policy will take a
more national turn. It is natural. It is inevitable. It is inherent in the politics of the
region. It is accelerated by the single focus approach of American foreign policy that
produces one trade crisis after another. To maintain the alliances, which I believe to be
good, requires the need to restore a political dialogue. Yet dialogues of any kind, as
products of the Japanese culture, _________ are not a particularly easy assignment
to produce. The Japanese communicate by creating a mood. We communicate by asking
direct questions. When a Japanese Prime Minister says "yes, " it only means he has
understood what we have said, it doesn't mean he is going to do it. Conceptual
discussions of strategic and political issues do not come easily with Japanese. And yet, I
believe that the Japanese-American relationship must be moved from endless discussions

about trade issues. It is important if they have some common conception of the political evolution of at least northeast Asia and probably all of Asia. That dialogue remains to be conducted and it really needs to be conducted, not only on the governmental level, perhaps not even primarily on the governmental level, but in the many institutions that were so important in establishing some sort of a common approach with the west European nations during the period of the Cold War.

Others say the same is true in our relations with China. There, there is also a huge cultural shock. I am always shocked when I am in China that I rarely visit a province that does not have a population larger than the largest European country and when you ask a Chinese when something happens, when a westerner would give you a date, a Chinese gives you a dynasty. And each dynasty has lasted longer than the entire history of the United States. So that inevitably produces a different perspective.

What China has always wanted from the beginning of our dialogue in 1971 was a strategic relationship in the widest sense. They wanted from us an understanding of our perception of the evolution that was going to take place in Asia and preferably in the world and to see not whether we could come to an agreement like allies, but whether we could come to some conceptual understanding, maybe not even an understanding, but to create a framework that enabled us to comprehend their own action.

Having the longest uninterrupted history of any nation of the world, the Chinese have dealt with many idiosyncrasies so I think the Chinese can understand, even if they don't agree, that we have certain moral preferences that need to be taken into account and that we have every right and indeed the need to make those clear. But the issue in our relationship is how we can bring our various priorities into a relationship that enables us in the mutual interest to act in as coordinated a way as our circumstances allow. I believe that in Asia, Asian stability requires a major effort of understanding between the United States and China and therefore, I have opposed efforts to sanction China even on issues where I have agreed with the objectives of those who recommend the sanctions. And I believe that in the present area, it is extraordinarily important the United States and Chins find a way toward a serious political dialogue which in my mind is not adequately taking place.

Having discussed the two major countries, let me say something about Korea. Korea was the first Asian country in which I have sent any amount of time. I was there

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during the Korean War and I traveled from Pusan to Seoul on a rickety troop train. I saw
Seoul when it was devastated and all the cities that had been occupied by the enemy
troops. I must say it took courage and dedication to rebuild this country at a time when it
was conventional wisdom that Korea was doomed forever to be an under developed,
somewhat backward Asian society, so I have tremendous admiration for what Korea has
been through. As a veteran of the Vietnam negotiations, I am also very conscious of
what happens in a divided country when one party participated in negotiations, not
necessarily to achieve an agreement but to delegitimize the other party, especially when
the other part is our ally.

I harken back to a rule I learned from President Pompidou. I asked him why he
did not like one particular French political figure and he said one builds friendship on his
loyal friends; the second way one tries to placate his enemies. The second kind always
loses.

I would say the rule with which we could start in Korea is to stick with our friends
and to do nothing to permit them to be isolated or separated from us. Therefore in all
negotiations involving the future of the Korean Peninsula, we should not talk with the
North Koreans without the participation of South Korea and if the North Koreas are not
willing to do this, then I don't think we should talk to them. [There may be issues that
are bilateral between us and North Korea which could be dealt with separately.]

We must also keep in mind that our interests with respect to Korea are not always
the same as those of Korea's neighbors.

I am often asked why don't the Japanese and Chinese understand the dangers of a
North Korea nuclear capability. I believe that they understand that very well. But
frankly I also believe that the leaders of both Japan and China would not die unfulfilled if
Korea remained divided in their lifetime and so they have to balance the nuclear threat
and their fear of the impact of the global proliferation of nuclear weapons and the local
political situation on the Korean peninsula. I don't say this as a criticism; I say it as a fact
of life. We have to understand and shouldn't expect that there can be some universal
approach. Under the Korean Nuclear Agreement, I am not happy about the way it came
about. I don't think it is good policy to have an American negotiator negotiating between
our government and an adversary and am uneasy about having acquiesced to the nuclear

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status quo. On the other hand, we have an agreement and the best that can be done now is to be very cautious to make sure that the obligations of that agreement are maintained.

I don't want to go through every country of Asia with the same kind of analysis, but my basic point is Asia is undergoing a tremendous economic revolution. I find the changes in China which I visit every year awe inspiring. I remember what China looked like in 1970 and even in 1979 to compare it with what is now. I can see happening in China in the next century what happened to Japan in this century as a premier economic power, whatever the political situation. Throughout Southeast Asia we face an extraordinary opportunity. The United States everywhere is present, and yet to take one issue and make it the test of an extraordinarily complex relationship would be a mistake. Yet, in none of the Asian countries would a withdrawal of America be welcome. In Southeast Asia, as they pointed out to me, the strategic divisions run along the line of which nations are more concerned about Vietnam and which are more concerned about China. Those more concerned about China are friendly with Vietnam. Those more concerned about Vietnam are friendlier with China.

In conclusion, what does this mean for the United States? What it means is that if you ask the nations I have mentioned to list their principal security threat, not one of them would say the United States. Not one. Each of them would mention some other country of the region. The United States is an Asian power for a unique reason. It is the only major power that not only can afford but has an obligation to have friendly relations with all of the nations of Asia. It is the only power that can conduct simultaneous dialogue with China, Japan, and both Koreas and maintain a position in Southeast Asia. It isn't necessary for us to abandon our principles in Asia. We are dealing with adults. But it is necessary for us not to create the impression that we can impose every conviction and subordinate everything else to us.

So, in this sense, what goes on in Asia affects our perception of international affairs in general. One often hears that this sort of analysis is now outdated and that we should emphasize the environment, population issues, and drug abuse. Those of you who know Asia should ask yourselves if this were the only thing we could talk about, how would we handle what I have described in geopolitical terms? Yes, these are issues with some consequence and in the decades ahead, they will undoubtedly become of still

Since World War I, all the great decisions in foreign policy have one way or
another come from the United States. It is a truism to say that this must be the case when
all the world looks to us. But it must be the case for a few more decades. That is our
burden, our obligation and our opportunity.