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stability and effective government, then its GNP will have
surpassed the Japanese economy within about three decades,
and later on it will reach the same order of magnitude and weight
as the economies of the United States or of the European Union.
There will then be three great currencies in the world: The US-
Dollar, the European Euro and the Chinese Yuan. Of course the
Chinese will in the meantime have to overcome enormous
problems and they will encounter setbacks as well.

The West would, in my view, be well advised not to bother the
Chinese nation with attempts of ideological or spiritual tutelage.
There is no need to hurt their pride! They are indeed a proud
nation. But I do not sense any symptoms of aggressiveness –
also not in the case of Taiwan. As long as no provocations from
the outside do occur, I guess under this condition the Chinese
can and will patiently wait until the attraction of a prosperous
mainland becomes irresistible. I have delivered that same
prognosis in front of a large auditorium in Taipei – and nobody
has booed me out. Recently the tensions across the Taiwan Strait
have mellowed. If prudence on all sides (including the U.S.)
prevails also in future, then the dangers, then any danger of
military conflict will be kept under control. The same may – by the
way – apply to the Cashmere conflict.

I will not speak about all the points I have prepared concerning
Russia, it takes too much time. Some remarks about the future:
However long Russia's present domestic and economic
weaknesses may last, Russia will remain to be a world power,
namely due to her vast territory, due to her great number of
smaller neighbours, due to her riches in oil and gas and other
minerals, also due to her enormous military power. By the way: In
Russia it seems likely to me that we are going to see a moderate

15

economic growth over the longer hauls. Of course the oil price
will still be a major factor. The speed of institutional and
domestic reform is the other major factor. To create resilient
institutions will take time; it does of course depend on domestic
political stability. I would guess that sufficient stability can be
expected – which means: for a lengthy period of many years a
rather authoritarian type of government is to be expected – like in
China.

Also alike in the Chinese case Russia will in the foreseeable
future probably become aggressive if not provoked. But the
future of Ukraine and Belorus appears as unclear. After all both
these former Soviet republics have formerly and over centuries
been integral parts of tsarist Russia. And their structures and
economies are much weaker than those of Russia. On the other
hand there do not exist any clear language barriers. For more
than one reason one would not be too much astonished in case
of remerging in the course of this century.

One little footnote here from a German point of view: We
Germans feel rather relieved about the fact that despite two
enormously bloody wars in the 20th century there does not seem
hatred to be left over between Russians and Germans. Instead we
do sense a will for fair partnership on both sides – which again
makes for a positive aspect also of Russia's future.

Having enumerated the US, China and Russia as the three
powers of global importance I am of course aware of the great
future weight of India, which by the middle of this century will
have 1500 million citizens. Indonesia then will be 300 million
people, the next numerous states will be Brazil and Nigeria. The
future development of these states seems a bit less predictable.

16

Nevertheless I do not expect for the foreseeable future that the policies of any of them will originate worldwide conflicts or dangers. The existence of nuclear weapons on almost all sides does make a great war between great states very unlikely.

On the other hand one cannot rule out another type of great conflict. Whether we do believe in Samuel Huntington's analysis or not – nobody can rule out the possibility of an almost global conflict between Islam and the West. It might not happen in the form of a great war. It seems thinkable that in an atmosphere of lasting general animosity on both sides armed conflicts, wars, particularly terrorist activities and guerilla activities may be triggered time and again.

Out of the nearly 200 states on our globe almost 60 are populated by Muslims. Most of these states are poor. Some of them are utterly poor and at the same time rather difficult to govern. Very few of them do enjoy boundaries which have a historical legitimacy that goes further back than World War I or World War II. Even fewer of these states do enjoy a functioning democracy; most of them can at present and already since their beginning only be ruled in an authoritarian or dictatorial way.

The western public opinion and also the western political elites do have only a very limited knowledge of Islam and its history. We tend to forget that for instance the concepts of universal rights of the individual and of democracy are western achievements of just the last two centuries. Thomas Jefferson did still have slaves – like Perikles did in ancient Athens, two millenniums earlier on. The Thora and the New Testament and also the Quran have given all of us only commandments, but not rights. It needed the era of enlightenment 250 years ago to

17

conceive of equal rights for any human being to conceive of the
rule of law and of democracy. These concepts did stepwise
evolve in England, in America, Holland, France etc. – quite a bit
later in my own country! – but not so in Arab regions, not so in
the Middle East or in Iran or in Indonesia, not so in India, not in
China. Enlightenment has not as yet reached most Muslim
people. And particularly has it not reached the Islamic masses,
altogether about one fifth of the global population. It is rather
unlikely that one could condense the process of enlightenment,
which in the West has needed centuries, into just a short period
and bring it about in the Islamic world by military power.

I often wonder about our western legitimation to try and
proselytize the Muslim masses into democrats. They will easily
accept television, automobiles, Coca Cola and all the western
technologies, which we export to them. But to convert them into
democrats will take generations – and it does take
understanding, and economic aid and also tolerance.

I believe it would already be an enormous success if we could
bring all their states and governments to acknowledge and obey
the rule of international law and to obey the Charter of the United
Nations! But alas, in the meantime we sell weapons and military
technologies to them! I would hope that arms limitation is to
remain on the international agenda. Poverty, population
explosion and migrations will probably also in future make for
armed conflicts – and not to forget petrol and natural gas. For all
these reasons not only the Middle East will remain a region of
unrest and conflicts, but as well great parts of Africa, possibly as
well Central Asia – I do avoid to mention some states specifically.

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These remarks about some regions which breed conflicts of
global importance do necessarily lead me to the role of America.

IV. The Superpower U.S.A.

Some Americans believe September 11th has changed the world. But this is not quite correct. Instead it obviously has deeply changed the perspectives under which most Americans do perceive the world outside.

Despite all their power for the first time in their national history
had the Americans to suffer from a violent attack on their own
soil. This experience has led the American leadership to use all
their enormous military power to fight the so-called "war on
terrorism". As a result tendencies for hegemonial behaviour vis-
à-vis some other nations appear to have become prevailing.

An imperialist element within the foreign policies of the U.S. has
always coexisted with isolationism and also with internationalist
idealism - nowadays called multilateralism. Sometimes one of
these elements has prevailed, sometimes another one. The
history of imperialist tendencies goes back to the middle of the
19th century, back to Commander Perry in the bay of Tokyo, back
to the wars against Mexico and Spain, and back to Teddy
Roosevelt, who was called an imperialist by his contemporaries,
which was not a negative word at that time. In modern times we
have heard catchwords like "rogue states" or "axis of evil"; we
also saw Reagan and Clinton bombing Grenada or Belgrade or
Sudan without a decision by the Security Council.

19

Of course America is by far not the only state that has violated the Charter of the U.N. American leaders are as well by far not the only ones who forcefully try to spread their own ideologies beyond their borders. The sense of mission has been an element of American strategies since a long time - think for instance of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt or George Marshall and Harry Truman.

Right now a European might characterize America's strategy by two principles:

1) Freedom of action, not to be impeded by „entangling alliances“;

2) The will to wage preventive wars

Many Europeans interpret these guidelines as democratic imperialism. It seems thinkable that these guidelines will persist for longer time than the period of President Bush jun. in office. Most people, particularly in Europe, would prefer America to act as a leader in international multilateralism. They will try to influence America in that direction.

My own guess is that for quite a while the world will have to live with a considerable degree of American unilateralism. But such situation will not necessarily entice other nations and their governments to voluntarily instrumentalize themselves.

In my view it would at present be helpful if today America would analyze the reasons for the rather quick, but unforeseen disappearance of sympathy and solidarity, which had after 9/11 overwhelmingly characterized public opinion all over Europe.

20

Including France, including Germany! Why has it disappeared?
Why has that change happened?

The several possible answers to these questions do easily lead to
the basic question, which many leaders outside America ask
themselves, namely: Will the U.S. stick to the Charter of the
United Nations? Or is it thinkable that unilateralism will for
decades prevail over American geostrategy?

It may be difficult to get a clearcut answer. But then, there are
quite a few further questions to be answered – or further choices
to be made. I will only mention two of them. First: What is
America's policy vis-à-vis more than a billion Muslims in Asia,
Africa and Europe? Is it really realistic to believe in your
capability to guide them to create democracies in their 50 odd
states? And the last question: Is the U.S. prepared to accept a
growing role of China? What is America's policy vis-à-vis the
world power China and its presently 1300 million nation.

Right now the U.S. appears free to make its own choices. Later
on, the historians may come to understand whether the early
years of the 21st century have been a watershed. My private
guess is this: Not quite soon but somewhat later the Americans
will once again become conscious of the fact that this century
will certainly present mankind with dangers and challenges,
which no state and no nation, even not the most powerful USA, is
capable to stand up against just on its own. Whether in the fields
of the global population explosion or of global warming, whether
mankind is confronted with global environmental decay or global
epidemics, globalized crime or globally operating terrorist groups
of different kinds or whether we will be confronted with global
monetary disorder, in none of these fields will America or any

21

other great nation be able to unilaterally impose the answers and
provide the means – nor even to unilaterally provide shelter for
herself. And of course the same goes for any less powerful
nation. And the same goes for the European Union!

After all it is the non-perfect U.N. and its non-perfect charter on
which the rule of law in international affairs is based. This non-
perfect world has no other globally binding constitution. The
European nations will therefore try to uphold the U.N.

V. About the E.U.

As well, in order to preserve their self-determination vis-à-vis
global dangers and disorder during this century, the Europeans
will try to stick together and try to complete the European Union
and develop the Union into a competent entity.

We have started that undertaking half a century ago, just six West
European nations (The Dutch, the French, the Germans, the
Italians, the Belgians and Luxembourg), under the guidance of
French statesmen and with benevolent assistance from America.
Despite the recent internal rift due to the member states' differing
positions in face of the Iraq War the so far attained status of the
EU of 15 nations – and in a short while of 25 states – ought to be
considered as an enormous success. One only needs to look
back into a millennium of devastating intra-European wars. One
only needs to remember the fact that almost all the European
nations – and all their national languages! – do have a national
history of around 1000 years behind themselves. Some nations
and their languages even much longer than 1000 years!

22

It is this long, long time and its heritage that makes it so difficult for many to sacrifice some of their national sovereignty or autonomy. To establish a functioning common foreign policy may still take anything between another 25 and 50 years, particularly as the future role of Great Britain is a yet undecided. A common defense policy may take even longer.

Half a century since we started in 1950 is gone. If maybe we need just another 50 years to reach a fully operative entity, in face of the long history of all the European nations, it would not be too bad. But alas!, there is one big *if* in the way. Because we will achieve this goal only *if* our present and our future leaders and if the public opinion in two dozens of nations maintain the conviction that a well functioning union is a necessity in order to maintain the basic patriotic interests of any individual nation.

One cannot totally rule out the possibility of the oncoming enormous enlargement by the accession of ten states at one and the same time leading to a watering down of the competence of the Union. One cannot totally exclude the possibility of the development of a much closer cooperation of a smaller inner core. And then there remains the possibility that some nations – under the impact of disillusioning disappointments over the E.U. – will try to attach themselves in some way or other to the U.S. rather than to the E.U. In that case they might find some open ears and arms in America. In all such eventualities the permanence of the common market and of the common currency Euro appears as highly likely.

Some Americans seem to be irritated by future competition from the E.U., they therefore sometimes try to hamper the progress of common European projects; the quarrel about a European

23

satellite-based geo-positioning system is just the latest example.
On the other hand the Europeans will try to influence America's
foreign policies, they will try to dampen the hegemonic
tendencies and to strengthen the multilateral tendencies instead.
The French and the British elites will be the most active ones in
this regard - although they will pursue quite different lines.

I have publicly urged my own government - in the light of the
rather unpleasant exchange of niceties over Iraq -, I have urged
them to maintain an attitude of composed dignity. It would have
sufficed to remind our American friends and partners of the 2
plus 4-Treaty on the unification of Germany that my country is
obliged to "never ever use its military weapons" except in case of
accordance with the Charter of the U.N. This treaty was
negotiated upon James Baker's initiative, just a dozen years ago,
it is ratified by the United States of America, by the Russians, the
Germans, the French, the British.

A lot of fuzz across the Atlantic ought to have been avoided.
Good neighbourly relations and cooperation between America
and Europe nowadays need to be taken care of! Whether
Americans or Europeans, both of us stand upon the shoulders of
Montesquieu and Rousseau and Voltaire. Both of us follow the
footsteps of the "federalist papers". And the basic principles of
democracy and human rights have been created in America, in
England, in Holland, in France etc. under mutual fructification.
Without Charles Darwin or Albert Einstein modern science would
- on both sides of the Atlantic - hardly be conceivable! The
people on either side have inherited one and the same enormous
wealth of cultural and civilizational achievements and insights. It
appears desirable to once again remind public opinion of these
common roots!

24

Nevertheless, it is as well an undeniable fact that the U.S. today – and also tomorrow – is the only state that has the power to militarily operate unilaterally all over the globe. Unilaterally - that means to act alone, without much care about the opinion and advice of others. It is for America to decide, whether you wish to listen to, whether you accept advice, or whether you don't. If you decide against it, then the Europeans will have to take that as a fact of life that they cannot change. But Americans should take into account that they hardly can expect an unlimited willingness of all the Europeans to after a unilateral preventive American war send European troops and finances to clear up and rebuild the demolished houses, bridges and cities – like we did in Bosnia, Kosovo – and to participate in the burden of administrating the quasi-protectorates, which seem to follow rather regularly.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I apologize for this too long discourse. Let me sum up by three concluding sentences: Growing interdependence in an ever more densely populated world does mean growing potential for conflict, but it does also mean a growing necessity for compromise. In future the conscientious will for compromise and for tolerance becomes more decisive than has been in the past. Nobody is entitled to exclusively pursue his own rights, claims or interests – anybody does as well have duties and responsibilities vis-à-vis others.

Thank you very much!

DATE

SEP 2 5 2003

CORR. FILE

Schmidt, Helmut

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

Jessee Theresa

Don Amanda Suzanne

SUBJ. FILE

CROSS REF.

COMMENTS:

9/29 Asking CBN.

9/30 CBN has been in touch w/
Schmidt's office to make
arrangements.

DC OFFICE:
Christie / Jody / Tiffany

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

CBN

TO BE FILED ✓

HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 15, 2003

Dear Helmut:

I thought you might like to have an inscribed copy of
my new book, CRISIS: The Anatomy of Two Major
Foreign Policy Crises.

Enclosure

His Excellency
Helmut Schmidt
DIE ZEIT
Postfach 10680
22587 Hamburg
GERMANY

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
FACSIMILE (212) 759-0042

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Helmut:

I greatly appreciate your sending me a
copy of your speech in New York in Sep-
tember. As with all your public state-
ments that you are kind enough to send
me, it was cogent, insightful and
realistic. It should come as no surprise
that we are in substantial agreement.

I am looking forward to seeing you at the
earliest opportunity.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency
Helmut Schmidt
"Die Zeit"
Postfach 106820
22587 Hamburg
Germany