# THE VIETNAM WAR AS A RICHARDSON PROCESS*

N.Z. Alcock and Keith Lowe

Canadian Peace Research Institute, Oakville, Canada

(Journal of Peace Research, No. 2, 1969 in press)

## 1. Introduction

By means of a pair of differential equations, Lewis Richardson sought to describe an arms race between two belligerent nations "if instinct and tradition were allowed to act uncontrolled". "What would people do," Richardson asked, "if they did not stop to think?" (Richardson, 1960, p.12).

The equations were applied to the arms races preceding World Wars I and II.¹ Total arms expenditures of France, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary (expressed in £ sterling) were calculated for the period 1909 to 1913 and plotted in a form which should result in a straight line: the difference in total annual expenditures between each successive pair of years versus the mean total annual expenditures for each successive pair of years over the time interval studied.² Similarly, the arms expenditures (expressed as man-hours of work) for France, Britain, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Russia were plotted for the years 1919 to 1938.

The arms race preceding World War I could be described by a straight line. The arms race preceding World War II, however, was a dog-leg with the knee at 1933, as shown in Figure 1 for the years 1931 to 1938 (cross bars illustrate errors of ± 10% in the differences.).³

### Figure 1 about here

Was the dog-leg caused by the Nazis coming to power? Richardson preferred to consider other possible causes--the great trade depression of 1930 or a "fading of (World War I) war-weariness--though, qualitatively at least, he did not exclude the possible effect of Hitler "because leaders lead people where they are willing to be led." (Richardson, 1960, p.231).

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The arms race equations describe preparations for war; they do not describe war itself, which in most cases follows a deliberate declaration. With the advent of the military strategy of deterrence, following the total destruction potential of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, a new type of warfare has grown into prominence. The *limited* and *undeclared* war is assumed to differ from previous conflicts to the extent that the belligerents do not employ their full military potential against the adversary. Moreover, these wars generally build up gradually from small skirmishes through step-by-step escalation rather than an initial massive onslaught as in many wars of the past.

The hypothesis of this research is that an escalating limited war follows an action-and-reaction process which is less calculated and more irrational than an "old-fashioned" declared war. Specifically, the Vietnam war is hypothesized to be described by the Richardson arms race equations.

## 2. Method

Annual casualty figures for all major belligerents (U.S., South Vietnam, N.L.F. and North Vietnam) were recorded for the period 1962 to 1968. Following Richardson, the difference in total annual casualties between successive pairs of years versus the mean of total annual casualties for successive pairs of years was plotted for the period 1962 to 1968. Casualty figures for the years 1962 to 1964 inclusive were from Keesing's Contemporary Archives (1966, p.21227) and for the years 1965 to 1968 inclusive from the Unclassified Statistics on Vietnam issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.).

Qualitative events were collected over the period considered, in anticipation of significant departures from the expected straight line relationship and a need for explanations.

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## 3. Results

In addition to an analysis of the total casualties for all belligerents, an analysis was made for U.S. casualties treated separately.

Differences and means for successive pairs of years are given in Table 1 and shown in Figure 2 for the U.S., and in Table 2 and Figure 3 for total combat casualties (U.S., South Vietnam, N.L.F., and North Vietnam). Cross bars illustrate errors of ± 10% in the differences.

A correlation of 0.97 was found between combat casualties--killed in action--for the United States, and for the N.L.F. and North Vietnam over the years 1965 to 1968 as determined by a month by month rank ordering.

Tables 1 and 2
and
Figures 2 and 3 about here

Figures 2 and 3 show sharp breaks in slope not unlike that found by Richardson for the arms race of 1930 to 1939 (see Figure 1). Otherwise the escalation can be described by straight lines, again like the arms races preceding World Wars I and II.

Killed in action statistics for combatants must reflect necessarily decisions reached weeks or months before, for large number of fighting troops in modern war cannot be summoned instantly into action. They must be trained, equipped, and transported; in the case of Vietnam they must be transported either across the Pacific (the U.S.) or down the Ho Chi Minh train (North Vietnam). On the assumption that the time period involved is likely somewhere between zero to four months for South Vietnam, the N.L.F. and North Vietnam, and likely four to eight months for the United States, significant events were sought from April 1964 to May 1965 to account for the break points at December 1964 and September 1965 in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. The following "significant" events were taken from a much larger compilation of 345 events from April 1964 to May 1965.

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1964

<table><tbody><tr><td>April 12-16</td><td>N.L.F. offensive of three battalions against Kien Lang in Mekong Delta was largest N.L.F. force committed to such a pitched battle. (Keesing's, 1964, p.20464)</td></tr><tr><td>June 30</td><td>South Vietnam naval craft landed a force of commandos on the coast of Quang Binh province. (Keesing's, 1964, p.20464)</td></tr><tr><td>July 10</td><td>Beginning of South Vietnamese commando sabotage of key industrial and harbour targets in North Vietnam. (I.F. Stone, Sept. 12, 1966, p.3)</td></tr><tr><td>July 30</td><td>North Vietnamese coastal islands of Hon Me and Hon Nga shelled by South Vietnames warships. (Keesing, 1964, p.20464)</td></tr><tr><td>August 2</td><td>U.S. ship in North Vietnames territorial waters exchanged shots with North Vietnamese torpedo boats. (Schurmann, p.40)</td></tr><tr><td>August 4</td><td>Alleged attack on U.S. ships Maddox and Turner Joy by North Vietnamese torpedo boats basis of retaliatory air attacks on three major North Vietnamese coastal bases. (Lacoutre, pp.257-8)</td></tr><tr><td>August 7</td><td>U.S. joint Senate and House of Representatives resolution, following Gulf of Tonkin incident and President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnamese coastal bases, gave approval to president "as Commander-in-Chief to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression." (Trager, pp.180-81)</td></tr><tr><td>September 15</td><td>N.L.F. ordered a general military offensive resulting in highest South Vietnamese losses of the war. (Keesing, 1964, p.20464)</td></tr><tr><td>November 1</td><td>N.L.F. attacked Bien Hoa airbase destroying 20 U.S. planes. (Lacouture, p.262)</td></tr><tr><td>November 3</td><td>President Johnson elected.</td></tr><tr><td>December 28</td><td>Battle of Binh Gia greatest victory of war to date for the N.L.F. (Keesing, 1965, p.20655)</td></tr></tbody></table>

1965

<table><tbody><tr><td>January 5</td><td>Hanoi accused South Vietnam and U.S. of bombing attacks on North Vietnamese villages. (Schurmann, p.52)</td></tr><tr><td>January 23</td><td>"...the United States State Department accused North Vietnam of wanting to provoke a clash with the United States." (Schurmann, p.52)</td></tr><tr><td>January</td><td>Washington press reports in January "suggested that President Johnson and Mr. Dean Rusk were resisting pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were believed to hold the view that Viet Cong victory within the next 12 months could be averted only by destruction bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatch of a U.S. expeditionary force." (Keesing, 1965, p.20759)</td></tr><tr><td>January 20</td><td>President Johnson inaugurated.</td></tr></tbody></table>

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February 6 Premier Kosygin arrived in Hanoi from Peking.
(Keesing, 1965, p.20761)

February 7 Small band of N.L.F. attacked U.S. base at Pleiku.
(Schurmann, p.54)

February 7 Premier Kosygin warned U.S. against attacking Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam and promised "all necessary assistance"
if they did attack. (Keesing, 1965, p.20761)

February 8 Twelve hours after N.L.F. attack at Pleiku, and following an
emergency meeting between President Johnson and the U.S. Nat-
ional Security Council, U.S. planes began bombing of North
Vietnam. (Keesing 1965, p.20760)

February 10 Communique on Premier Kosygin's departure from Hanoi to Peking
said U.S.S.R. would aid in strengthening North Vietnamese
defences. (Keesing, 1965, p.20761)

February 24 For first time it was admitted that Americans were piloting
aircraft in action against N.L.F. (Keesing, 1965, p.20655)

February In late February the U.S. began its systematic heavy bombing
in South Vietnam. (Schurmann, p.58)

March 2 Largest U.S. raid on North Vietnam to that point. Its organi-
zers did not attempt to justify it on the grounds of "enemy
aggression". (Lacouture, p.268)

U.S. raid on North Vietnam was the first explicitly non-retalja-
tory raid against North Vietnam. (Schurmann, p.63)

These raids were the first which did not follow an N.L.F.
attack on U.S. forces in South Vietnam. (Keesing, 1965, p.20765)

March 8 3,500 U.S. marines arrived in Danang, the first Americans to
be referred to as "combat troops" rather than "advisors".
(Keesing, 1965, p.20656)

March 22 Napalm and phosphorous bombs and gas used. (Lacouture, p.268)

April 3 U.S. began to bomb bridges and roads in North Vietnam, the
first purely non-military targets. (Keesing, 1965, p.20769)

April 15 230 U.S. and South Vietnames planes dropped 1,000 tons of bombs
on forest in Tay Ninh province, presumed to be an N.L.F. head-
quarters; it was the largest air raid to date. (Keesing, 1966,
p.21225)

May 5 Three battalions of parachute troops totalling 3,500 men were
the first U.S. army units sent. (Keesing,1965, p.20772)

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## 4. Discussion

The specific hypothesis has been confirmed, that the Vietnam war can be described by the Richardson arms race equations.

The general hypothesis has not been confirmed, that an escalating limited war is more irrational and less calculated than an "old-fashioned" war. Perhaps all wars follow a Richardson process though this hypothesis needs to be tested.⁴

An inspection of significant events preceding the breaks in Figures 2 and 3, of December 1964 and September 1965, suggests that August 1964 and February 1965 may have been the crucial months. In August there was the Tonkin Bay incident and subsequent resolution. In February there was the Pleiku base incident followed by the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, the Kosygin communique, and the U.S. systematic bombing of South Vietnam.

Can these actions alone account for the observed change in slope of the curves in Figures 2 and 3? In August 1964 and February 1965 did the defence (or sensitivity)⁵ coefficients and/or the fatigue (or forgiveness)⁵ coefficients change in value, or is some other explanation required? From the methods of analysis there is no way of knowing, though the *non-retaliatory* raids of March 2nd suggest the kind of change required. Moreover, since one of the key variables is the attitude of the leaders, and since the men in Washington were given a strong new mandate from the American people in November 1964, this may be the explanation of the change in slope early in 1965. In November 1968 a new mandate was given to another group in the White House; will this new mandate cause new coefficients in the Richardson equations and another change in slope? If not, one can confidently predict that 21,000 U.S. servicemen will be killed in action in 1969.⁶

Confirmation that the Vietnam war is a Richardson process comes from another analysis based on another method. Jeffrey S. Milstein and William C.

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Mitchell (1968) of Stanford University performed simultaneous and cross-lagged regression analyses on the following data over the 1965-67 period: publicly stated preferences and perceptions of national policy-makers, domestic public opinion, N.L.F. and North Vietnam defectors, black market value of the South Vietnam piastre, force commitments, bombing and casualty rates. The policy-makers' perceptions were then compared with empirically derived models of the war in which each variable in turn was treated as the dependent variable of the system.

Among a wide variety of conclusions, Milstein and Mitchell noted that "escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam produced subsequent North Vietnamese counter-escalation, as predicted by the Richardson hypothesis."

## 5. Practical Implications

A Richardson process takes place when both belligerents react; therefore the arming of the N.L.F. and North Vietnam by the U.S.S.R. (though this is not proved by the data) is as crucial to the escalation as the arming of South Vietnam by the United States. The evidence suggests that the Vietnamese are caught in a power struggle between two or three super-nations. However there is an asymmetry: American troops and not Soviet or Chinese troops are on Vietnamese soil. This suggests but does not prove that peace negotiations and a de-escalation of the fighting are more likely to occur after there is a significant withdrawal of American combat troops. On the basis of our analysis, such a step is the most plausible strategy.

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NOTES

* Casualty figures for the 1965-68 period of the Vietnam war were kindly supplied by Drs. Milstein and Mitchell, and for the Canadian forces in World War I and II by the War Service Records Division of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Ottawa.

The University of Saskatchewan freely offered library facilities for one of us (KL). This research was financed in part by Rosemary Maxfield and Virginia Young of the Canadian Peace Research Institute who have given unstintingly of their time, and in part by a Canada Council grant.

1. The Richardson equations are:

$$ \frac{dx}{dt} = g + ky - ax $$

$$ \frac{dy}{dt} = h + \ell x - by $$

where x and y are the armament expenditures of two groups of belligerents
k and l are the defense coefficients of the two sides
a and b are the fatigue coefficients of the two sides
g and h are the grievance (or ambition) or goodwill terms of the two sides,
depending on whether they are positive or negative.

2. Assuming k = l and a = b, then addition of the Richardson equations gives:

$$ \frac{d(x + y)}{dt} = (g + h) + (k - a)(x + y) $$

$$ \text{letting } \frac{d(x + y)}{dt} = Y \quad x + y = X $$

then $Y = (g + h) + (k - a) X$ which is a straight line having a slope of $(k - a)$ and intersecting the Y axis at $(g + h)$.

3. The positive slopes of the lines show that an arms race was in progress. And while the reduced slope after 1933 might suggest the arms race was slowing down, in fact it was still steadily escalating. The reduced slope simply means that the two sides were **reacting** less to one another after 1933 than before. The level of grievance or ambition, however, had increased: in fact before 1933 there was goodwill, since the Y intercept was negative; after 1933 the goodwill changed to grievance or ambition, since the Y intercept had become positive.

Were arms expenditures to be plotted versus time, the slope of the curve would increase steadily with time. Richardson's method, though visually confusing,

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Vietnam - Alcock

has the advantage of allowing the constant term ($g + h$) and the expression ($k - a$) to be uniquely determined (see Note 2).

4 Casualty figures for World Wars I and II for one nation--Canada--were plotted and found not to follow a Richardson process, but since no correlations were determined between Canadian and total war casualties no valid conclusions could be drawn. The Richardson arms race equations are based on total arms expenditures; similarly the casualty equations should be based on total casualties.

5 To use terms coined by Robert Abelson (1963).

6 The solution of the Richardson equations when

$k = \ell$ and $a = b$ is

$$x + y = Ce^{(k-a)t} - \frac{g+h}{k-a}$$

where $C$ is an arbitrary constant.

From Figures 2 and 3 it follows that casualties after 1965 are

$$\text{U.S. casualties for year } t = 21,660 e^{0.18 (t - 1966)} - 16,600$$

$$\text{Total casualties for year } t = 70,000 e^{0.42 (t - 1966)}$$

## REFERENCES

(1) Abelson, Robert, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1963.

(2) *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*.

(3) Lacouture, Jean, *Vietnam Between Two Truces* (Random House, 1966, 295 pp)

(4) Milstein, Jeffrey S., and Mitchell, William C. *Dynamics of the Vietnam Conflict: A Qualitative Analysis and Predictive Computer Simulation* (Stanford University, paper prepared for delivery at the Peace Research Society, Cambridge, Mass., June 1968.)

(5) Richardson, L.F. *Arms and Insecurity*, (Pittsburg: Boxwood Press, 1960)

(6) Schurmann, Franz, Scott, Peter Dale and Zelnik, Reginald, *The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam*, (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett, 1966)

(7) Stone, I.F. *I.F. Stones Weekly* (Washington)

(8) Trager, Frank N., *Why Viet Nam?* (Praeger, 1966, 238 pp.)

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## SUMMARY

The general hypothesis of this empirical research is that an escalating
limited war follows an action-and-reaction process which is less calculated and
more irrational than an "old-fashioned" declared war. The specific hypothesis
is that the Vietnam war can be described by the Richardson arms race equations,
with total casualties replacing total arms expenditures. Irregularities in the
resulting curves were tested against qualitative events over the time period
studied.

The general hypothesis was not confirmed; the specific hypothesis was
confirmed--the Vietnam escalation appears to be very similar to the arms race
preceding World War II with a single sharp change in slope interrupting an
otherwise consistent straight line plot.

Two events may account for the apparent discontinuity: the Tonkin Bay
incident of August 1964 and the Pleiku base incident of February 1965 followed
immediately by the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

It is noted that the events cited correspond to a change of office in
the American presidency, and it is speculated therefore that another change of
office in January 1969 may lead to a further discontinuity. On the basis of
the calculations it is suggested that peace negotiations and a de-escalation of
the fighting are more likely to occur after there is a significant withdrawal of
American combat troops from Vietnam.

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Figure 1. Arms race preceding World War II (after Richardson)

Figure 2. U.S. combat casualties in Vietnam War

Figure 3. Total combat casualties (U.S., South Vietnam, N.L.F. and North Vietnam) in Vietnam War

Table 1. U.S. combat casualties in Vietnam War

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>1963</th><th>1964</th><th>1965</th><th>1966</th><th>1967</th><th>1968</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>killed in action</td><td>50</td><td>146</td><td>1,368</td><td>5,004</td><td>9,378</td><td>14,521</td></tr><tr><td>difference</td><td>96</td><td>1,222</td><td>3,636</td><td>4,374</td><td>5,143</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>mean</td><td>98</td><td>757</td><td>3,186</td><td>7,191</td><td>11,950</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Table 2. Total combat casualties (U.S., South Vietnam, N.L.F. and North Vietnam) in Vietnam War

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>1962</th><th>1963</th><th>1964</th><th>1965</th><th>1966</th><th>1967</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>killed in action</td><td>30,010</td><td>30,680</td><td>30,250</td><td>48,000</td><td>69,860</td><td>108,360</td></tr><tr><td>difference</td><td>670</td><td>-430</td><td>17,750</td><td>21,860</td><td>38,500</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>mean</td><td>30,340</td><td>30,460</td><td>39,120</td><td>58,930</td><td>89,110</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

1817

Harper & Row, Publishers

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49 East 33d Street, New York, N.Y. 10016

December 22nd 1969

Dear Henry,

Over the week end I read two good appreciations of yourself, one in the *Times* and one in *Atlantic* by Norah Beloff.

It seems to me time for a profile book on HK and I would appreciate your letting me know whether you would approve this, indicating the author you would prefer.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Cass Canfield...cju

Dictated by Mr. Canfield and signed in his absence.

Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated Cable: Harpsam Phone: 212-889-7500

February 25, 1971

Dear Mr. Klein,

I was delighted to hear that we may
publish U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. I
look forward to the book's appearance under our
imprint and expect that we will have it within
about 3 1/2 weeks, which is pretty fast going.

Now, I would like to get your permission
to use "U.S. Foreign Policy" as a subtitle and
for the title: BUILDING FOR PEACE. Actually, the
latter phrase is the subtitle in the manuscript
we received. In our opinion, the title BUILDING
FOR PEACE is more effective than the other.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Herbert Klein
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Cass Canfield...sk

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STATE OF NEW YORK
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JAMES M. CANNON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE GOVERNOR

22 WEST 55TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019

August 6, 1970

Dear Henry:

On behalf of the fourteen Republican
Congressional challengers who participated in the
discussions yesterday, I want to say once more
how much we appreciate the excellent briefings.

Every member of your staff who took part was
impressive; and your own summary and responses were
outstanding.

From what the candidates told me later, I am
confident that they came away not only with
valuable political ammunition, but also with a
better understanding of the world, U.S. relationships,
and what this Administration has accomplished in a
relatively short time.

One candidate said to me later: "Why don't we
read about all this in the papers?". I had no answer.

Thank you again. This was of real benefit to
these Congressional aspirants.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

August 17, 1970

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Some of the newspaper headlines about what Governor Rockefeller said at the Governor's Conference in response to questions about possible campaign visits to New York by President Nixon and Vice-President Agnew did not reflect the text of what the Governor said. Nor did most newspapers mention that the Governor again stated his support of the President on Vietnam.

I thought you might like to have this transcript of pertinent excerpts from the Governor's press conference at Lake of the Ozarks.

With warm regards.

JMC:jm

Enc.

EXCERPTS FROM NEWS CONFERENCE OF NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
FOLLOWING A CONFERENCE OF THE GOVERNORS AT LAKE OF THE OZARKS
MISSOURI, AUGUST 9, 1970, 11:30 A.M.

QUESTION: Governor, if you invite President Nixon to come into New York for your campaign, would you consider it an asset for you?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: As you know, I campaigned on three occasions in the State of New York and have always taken the position that for governor, you are going on local issues and should not become involved in national issues any more than was necessary. And therefore I prefer -- and always have -- to campaign for myself and not get the national personalities involved.

QUESTION: So your answer is no?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, with that background, yes.

***

QUESTION: Governor, what is your attitude towards the Rockefeller-Buckley committee that seems to be springing up in New York, that seems to reflect a great deal of dissatisfaction with Mr. Goodell's policy, particularly upstate?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, as you know, the voters in our state are very independent and they split all over the lot, which is a tradition.

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We have a ticket. I am standing with the ticket, which
is with Mr. Goodell on this ticket.

As far as votes are concerned, I don't think anybody is
going to be elected by his own party votes alone. Therefore I would
like to have votes from anyone who is willing to give me support
in the campaign.

As far as the ticket is concerned, I stand for the
Republican ticket.

***

QUESTION: Governor, to go back to the business of having
out-of-state people in the campaign for you --

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Right.

QUESTION: You did have President Eisenhower in 1962. Does the fact that you are not inviting Mr. Nixon mean also that you are not considering him an asset in New York?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: I don't think that's a fair statement at all. I think that -- if I am correct -- on the Eisenhower participation, that was not an initiative on my part because, as you know, now, my opponent then wanted to make the national administration and their policies the issue. Now these are important policies affecting the people of New York, as they are of any state. But the truth of the matter is that the abilities and powers of the Governor, while they may

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reach beyond the state's borders -- what he can only do, on
an official basis -- his power relates only to those powers
that are the responsibilities of the governor.

Therefore I would like to keep to the maximum degree
possible the focus on that area of responsibility.

QUESTION: Does that include Vice-President Agnew too?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: There is a gentleman behind you who has
been trying to pose a question - back there.

* * *

QUESTION: Governor, does what you said about President Nixon
apply to Vice-President Agnew too?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, anyone who is part of the
national administration comes in relation to national problems.
Obviously they are going to come in the state, and we always
welcome anybody from Washington or any national figure in the
state. But when you talk about the campaign, I think, as far
as the campaign is concerned, for governor I would like to run
my own campaign.

As far as other positions are concerned -- Senators or
Assemblymen, Congressmen, local Senators, local officials --
each one has to conduct his own campaign as he sees fit.

* * *

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QUESTION: Governor, you spoke this morning to the question of drug abuse. Do you favor some sort of singular over-all federal program for the control of drug abuse?

QUESTION: Did you get much help from the federal government, Governor?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, the federal government -- I have been down and we have been working on this for years. I went down to see the past three presidents on this subject. President Kennedy and President Johnson were sympathetic, but the problem hadn't reached the point where they became involved, and so nothing really happened.

President Nixon has been very aware and concerned about the problem. They have moved the Narcotics Bureau from Treasury over to Justice. They have stepped up the number of people. First they reorganized it because there was considerable corruption -- I think very large corruption in the bureau. They have reorganized it and they have increased it on a large scale. They have now moved into the foreign countries, trying to work with the foreign countries on the control of production, and processing and importation.

As far as the support of our own efforts are concerned, this year we are spending $140 million - the State is -- on operating funds, and we will get about 13 million from the federal government.

***

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QUESTION: Governor, are you supporting President Nixon's Vietnam policies?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, I am supporting the position that President Nixon has taken that he wants to end this war and achieve a peace and get our boys back to this country as rapidly as possible.

QUESTION: What is the difference between your position and Arthur Goldberg's?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, I couldn't tell you what Arthur Goldberg's position is because it's a little hard to follow. (laughter) He was the international spokesman, the world-wide spokesman for President Johnson during the years they took the American involvement from 59,000 men up to 534,000 men. He was also the New York campaign manager for Mr. Humphrey, and after he left the United Nations and during the campaign period. And during all of that period there was no major break with the Johnson policies.

Now exactly what his policy today is, I couldn't tell you.

QUESTION: Are you saying you are more of a dove than he is?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: I don't call this either being a dove or a hawk. I would just like to say that our country has been rendered a rather large disservice by trying to categorize

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everybody by either a dove or a hawk. If you take statistics
on any subject, you know the majority of the people are in
the center and the curve goes down on the ends. The doves
and the hawks are on either end and there is only relatively
a small percentage of the people in those two areas. The
American people want peace. They want to see the American
boys come home and they want to see this done on the basis
of sound judgment and as rapidly as can be accomplished with
a minimum loss of American lives.

QUESTION: Governor, if either the President or the Vice-
President would come into your state and put his arm around
your shoulder and endorse you, would it embarrass you?

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER: Well, I tell you, I've been in public
life a long time and I understand politics. And I understand
that the national leaders are going to handle their political
efforts on a basis that will maximize what they feel is
essential from their point of view, and in the case of New York,
maximize what they feel is the best interests of your humble
servant to get re-elected.

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