OFFICIAL, 10/15/70 jlp

Type of Request & Date

PAUL

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Denny Paul, 1970-71 International Teenage Citizen

Request: Mr. Raleigh Stengel, President of the Association for World Affairs, Columbus Ohio, is in town with Denny Paul (age 17) who has just been elected International Teenage Citizen. They will be here through Sunday and Denny Paul would like to talk with Mr. Kissinger to give him an understanding of how the NSC works.

Stengel can be reached where he is staying: Watergate Hotel, 965-2300, ex. 7519 or Executive House Hotel, AD2-7000, ex. 505

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information: Keith Kustner vice

Resolution:

Columbia University in the City of New York |

New York, N. Y. 10027

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Fayerweather Hall

30 April 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Henry,

This morning I sent the following wire to President Nixon: "American intervention in Cambodia is quicksand. Please keep us out." Let me press the same views on you personally, presuming on several meetings at Harvard and in New York which you may remember.

This decision follows the logic of the earlier decisions to engage massive military strength in Vietnam. It has been argued, no doubt, that if we do not intervene, the Viet Cong will take over Cambodia.

That disagreeable alternative is less fearsome than the certainty that the same logic will carry us inexorably into full-scale occupation of Laos and eventually Thailand too, if we win, and an even vaster guerrilla if we do not. All this to protect a position in South Vietnam which we have already announced we do not intend to keep.

If you are in fact powerless to stop this folly, your friends would love to see you regain your independent voice.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

June 29, 1971

Dear Gregory and Veronique:

Just a short note to tell you how pleased I
was to learn that you would be in town today
and that you would be able to come to the
party. I am delighted to have a chance to
see you again.

Mr. and Mrs. Gregory Peck
c/o The Madison Hotel
15th and M Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

jlp:6/29/71

12-5-69

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION & AMERICAN POLICY

It seems paradoxical and unfortunate that President de Gaulle should be removed from office at the very moment when he had ceased to be a nuisance in Franco-American relations.

From the standpoint of the American national interest, however, his removal is an historical event of great importance, not a political tragedy.

In fact, that event creates opportunities which must be carefully exploited.

1.- If de Gaulle had been suddenly or violently removed from the scene by death or in a chain of events similar to last year's rebellion, the transition to the post-de Gaulle era could have been difficult, if not outright dangerous. It now seems that the change will be orderly and peaceful.

From the standpoint of continuity and stability, a Pompidou regime is to be preferred. As elected President, Poher could not long operate with the Gaullist majority in the National Assembly, which would be dissolved very shortly after he assumes office. That venture could plunge France into grave constitutional difficulties and the two basic abnormalities of the French Constitution could not be concealed any longer: how could a President elected by popular vote play the function of an arbiter, standing aloof from party politics and parliamentary intrigues ? how would the President settle with the Premier

the problems raised by the dualism which now exists under
the Constitution in the executive branch of the French
government ? The legislative election, which would follow
the dissolution of the National Assembly by Poher, could
split the Gaullists irremediably into Centrists and
irredentists (i.e. individuals clinging to the Gaullist
mystique.) The Centrists would break away from Gaullism
altogether to form a government with non-Gaullist centrists
and the irredentists go into the opposition and eventually
disappear as effective political force ?

Could there be a political regroupement under the
leadership of Poher ? If elected, Poher will preside over
the liquidation of Gaullism, and his personality is almost
irrelevant. The new system will be republican, pluralistic
and moderate. It is unlikely that any single centrist
party with an absolute parliamentary majority would soon
emerge. There will be coalition governments, the parliamentary
groups will again become influential, some key personalities
will come and go, and come back --thus giving to national
policy continuity in a system itself very unstable. If the
Constitution is not amended, the President of the Republic
could, indeed, fill his role of arbiter, by exercising a
conservative influence, free from the pressure of parties
and appealing directly to the public at large. But the
spirit and ideology of the new French politics will be
fundamentally different from Gaullism.

Even if he is no more than a political bubble, Poher
could last long enough to defeat Pompidou. If Pompidou wins,
Poher's challenge will have made him stronger politically and
that strengthening is in the American national interest. If

Poher wins, the Nixon Administration is well equipped to
handle the constitutional transformation of France and
its evolution towards political pluralism: US policy will,
first, go with the tide: the Poher regime will be less
arrogant, more cooperative, more inclined towards Europe,
etc. so that it should become easier for the US policy-
makers to sell their concepts to the new French leaders;
on the other hand, the United States would not place Poher
on its lap but, on the contrary, take its distance, act as
if the United States wanted to discourage a total break
with Gaullism, and apply the brake-not so much in order to
promote stability in France than for the purpose of achieving
a posture of superiority and independence vis-à-vis the
Poher régime.
morel

2.- De Gaulle's fall is not a blow to *Nixon's European* *diplomacy* ; whose main achievement so far had been a rapprochement with de Gaulle.

(i) What has been ended by de Gaulle's departure are mainly the *negative factors* which could have turned the current Franco-American rapprochement into a venture that leads nowhere, even though it was gloriously begun.

Sooner or later, Nixon's NATO policy, American interests in Asia and elsewhere, etc. would have hit against de Gaulle's *idées fixes*.

In some areas of American foreign policy --such as
Vietnam and the Mideast-- the desire to achieve a working
relationship with the former French President could have
forced the Nixon Administration to give an unfavorable
twist to US policy. The main thing was, however, that de
Gaulle's personal vanity and his bluff could have led US

-4-

policy in Europe into a dead-end; that his personalism
could have had a sterilizing influence on the development
of a new approach to Europe's problems --a danger that
was the greater because of de Gaulle's profound intuitions
and the congeniality of some of his better ideas.

In the United States themselves, Nixon does not have
any longer to negotiate a path between the pro-Gaullists
and the NATOists or between the anti-de Gaulle Atlanticists
and the pro-de Gaulle neo-isolationists. The real confrontation
with de Gaulle has been avoided through a stroke of luck which
is sad enough to allow Nixon in good conscience to regret
the fallen hero of French politics and to look forward to
cooperation with his successor.

(ii) Assuming that France's political vitality will not be absorbed by constitutional difficulties, it seems that de Gaulle's removal will not destroy the favorable momentum generated by Nixon's trip to Europe.

The inauguration of a new Administration in Paris will
signal a second and more profitable round in the search for
agreement and cooperation between France and the United
States. A successful relationship with the United States would
have a great value for the new French President. Furthermore,
French policy would fall into step with American policy in
several ways :

—Like the United States, France needs a period of calm
reappraisal, of political orthodoxy, of de-mythologizing,
of realism, of moderate conservativism; and the change in
style will be encouraged by a shift from foreign policy to
economics, from great designs to concrete achievements, etc.

—France will combine restraint and conservatism with
profound change. Already to get elected, Pompidou will

have to introduce change into his political make-up; even if
he were personally inclined to imitate de Gaulle, he could not
conduct a glamorous foreign policy, nor do business through
shock treatment.

In France like in the United States, this is the beginning
of a new period in national history. The substance of the
new politics will be deeply affected by history --not the history
of the past, as in de Gaulle's days, but the pressure generated
by the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. It would,
therefore, be quite superfluous and wrong to comment that
"French policy will not change much for a while," etc. Even if
nothing should apparently change, the true change from
Gaullism will be profound and substantial.

The secret realization by French public opinion of impending
change serves as an outlet to the malaise from which France
has suffered in the past few years --even though there is no
excitement about what lies in the immediate future.

----Pompidou is undoubtedly better qualified than Poher to
handle a situation where movement will have to be combined with
imobility-- and here lies the true subtlety and danger of
France's new politics.

Progress will be achieved neither through reassertion of
Gaullist dogmas nor by apostasy. Pompidou would be not only
less ideological than de Gaulle, but also less Machiavellian,
more realistic, more sincere, and therefore more idealistic.
Being more terre-à-terre and less nationalistic, more
pragmatic, more interested, Pompidou's policy will remain
centered on France. The nationalism of Pompidou might
differ from that of de Gaulle like Colbert's nationalism
differed from that of Richelieu. Furthermore, nationalism