2

traumatic. It goes to the heart of the national security structure of the
United States across a spectrum far exceeding the events of 9/11. It
will basically alter the methods for dealing with the issue of terrorism
but, equally important, will modify the way judgments about the
nature of the political and economic forces that will shape the world
over the next decades are reached.

Most major policy decisions involve judgments about
consequences and about facts. Intelligence supplies the indispensable
raw material from which these judgments are distilled. Any reform
must start with examining whether its objectives can best be achieved
by improving and modifying existing institutions or whether a
substantial restructuring is needed.

The 9/11 proposals amount to a radical restructuring. To
undertake such a step in the midst of a war is a major decision

3

requiring the most careful consideration. Changes of the scope now
being discussed will bring with them a long period - perhaps years - of
turmoil throughout the intelligence community. Care must be taken
lest a too hasty reorganization create vulnerabilities greater than those
trying to be solved. Thoughtfulness is more important than speed.
This is especially the case when decisions are accelerated during an
election campaign.

A pause for reflection appears all the more desirable when one
examines the issues awaiting resolution:

(a) <u>The Role of the Proposed National Director of Intelligence</u>

The decision to create another layer between the President and
the existing institutions raises the following problems:

-- If the director is to be the principal intelligence adviser to the
President, a new bureaucracy would have to be created to redirect the

4

flow of intelligence throughout the government and sift the intelligence
input from the various components of the intelligence community.

Where would the personnel for such a structure come from? Does it
mean dismantling existing institutions, and which ones? Could the
national intelligence director function without having the analytic
branch of the CIA placed under his or her direction? If the CIA were
reorganized in this manner, would it then shrink into an organization
for conducting clandestine activities? If the essential relationship
between analysts and operators is weakened, does the operational
branch become rudderless and the analytical branch too academic?

-- Is the new director to be in control of domestic intelligence?

If so, is this compatible with the checks and balances most other
advanced democracies have found preferable? Creating an intelligence
czar with domestic surveillance authority that is not under the

Attorney General, and measures that separate domestic intelligence
from law enforcement, go against all the lessons that democratic
governments have learned the hard way.

-- How will competing views on intelligence be brought to the
President's attention? Indeed, how will competing views emerge in so
centralized a structure?

-- Does a national intelligence director with such powers weaken
the NSC process and the roles of the national security adviser and
secretary of state?

-- How is the tactical and operational military intelligence linked
to the new structure being envisaged? The proposal to have the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence act at the same time as Deputy
Director of Intelligence could weaken the authority of both principals.

6

-- Could some of the objectives sought by reorganization be achieved by strengthening the existing institutions, especially the position of the DCI?

(b) Separating Intelligence from Policy

This problem has two seemingly contradictory aspects. On the one hand, the analytical function needs to be distanced from the preferences of policymakers so that analytical conclusions, to the maximum extent possible, are based on the evidence and not on the policy preferences of particular policymakers. At the same time, care must be taken lest analysts push their own preferences under the guise of "objective" facts.

Collection, on the other hand, should reflect policy priorities, and covert action should be under the close control and scrutiny of policymakers. Excessive centralization may defeat both objectives.

7

The intelligence chief should not have a policy role or a formal position
as a member of policy bodies. But the control of clandestine
operations requires a control that transcends the intelligence
community and assures that policy and legal considerations are fully
taken into account.

(c) Improving the Quality of Analysis

This is the central challenge to reform. As the Senate

Intelligence Report has pointed out, group think is a major danger.

However, intellectual conformity and failure of analytical imagination

are not the only sources of intelligence breakdowns. A major

contributing factor is the inadequacy of the information base. This

reflects shortcomings in trained personnel, the vagaries over decades

of alternating emphasis and assaults on human intelligence, and also

excessive compartmentalization. Since intelligence thrives on

8

information, some types of it are rigorously guarded by their
possessors. As a result, intelligence analysts are frequently forced to
make analytical judgments with key pieces of available information
missing. Strengthening collection by improving human intelligence is
one way of addressing this problem, but it can never solve the
conundrum in a fully satisfactory way. What one should expect is that
collection inadequacies are addressed properly, that analytical
judgments are professional, and that available information is properly
coordinated.

Encouraging different perspectives and alternative hypotheses is
desirable. Yet not all hypotheses are equally sound, and some are
rubbish. Policymakers should not cherry-pick among competing
hypotheses and select only those that fit their policy proclivities.
There must be a systematic ability to make professional judgments as

9

to which hypotheses should be discarded as inconsistent with the bulk
of the evidence. Excessive centralization may distort the competition
necessary for such a process.

Finally, the critical shortage of human expertise must be
addressed. We not only need more National Security Education
Program funding, but we need more Americans studying abroad,
becoming fluent in foreign languages and gaining improved
understanding of foreign cultures through such an experience.

(d) <u>Information-Sharing</u>

Different components of the government have different missions
and priorities that cause them to assign different levels of importance
to protecting intelligence information. Law enforcement elements
want to use intelligence to prosecute cases even if this will
compromise the source. The intelligence collectors fundamentally

10

mistrust the reliability of law enforcement elements in protecting the
information, making them reluctant to share it. This is an inherent
problem that can be minimized (but not eliminated) through good
management. Good management requires that, when there are
contradictions between using intelligence and protecting it, the
decisions are made by an established procedure. Sharing should be
optimized, not mandated in detail. To attempt to prescribe all the
circumstances in bureaucratic or legalistic language would involve so
much detail and so many exceptions as to defeat its own purpose.

## Conclusion

The magnitude of the tasks outlined here suggests that Congress
leave itself an opportunity to return to the issue early next year to
permit a comprehensive approach.

11

I confess that my bias is toward coordination rather than centralization. But this is not the issue of the moment. My recommendation to this Committee is therefore to adopt a procedure that permits a careful examination of the issues involved, drawing on the experience of men and women who have held key positions in the field of national security, many of whom are uneasy about the pace in which restructuring of the country's intelligence is being pursued.

Perhaps the task could be assigned to the distinguished commission dealing with the issue of weapons of mass destruction, which is scheduled to report in March 2005.

1241 WORDS

9/19/04-#2

Statement Before Senate Appropriations Committee

Tuesday, September 21, 2004

Henry A. Kissinger

Thank you for inviting me to appear before this Committee. Few issues before the country match the importance of the reform of the intelligence community that you are considering. The proposals that give the impetus for this effort were put forward by the 9/11 Commission in a thoughtful, unanimous report. [This] Commission, whose Chair and Vice Chair are friends of long-standing, deserve our nation's gratitude for the meticulous manner by which it has assembled the facts of that tragedy and the thoughtful recommendations it has made. The majority of these proposals have either been implemented or are in the process of being implemented.

Sep. 19 2004 07:02AM P02

FROM: Hotel TORREMAR Business Center PHONE NO.: +21 34 66

But the drastic restructuring of the intelligence community that is being proposed transcends the lessons of a single episode, however traumatic. It goes to the heart of the national security structure of the United States across a spectrum far exceeding the events of 9/11. It will basically alter the methods for dealing with the issue of terrorism but, equally important, will modify judgments about the nature of the political and economic forces that will shape the world over the next decades are shaped.

[4]

Sep. 19 2004 07:02AM P03

FROM : Hotel TORREMAR Business Center PHONE NO. : +21 34 66

Sep. 19 2004 07:59AM P01

The 9/11 proposals amount to a radical restructuring. To undertake such a step in the midst of a war is a major decision requiring the most careful consideration. Changes of the scope now being discussed will bring with them a long period - perhaps years - of adjustment throughout the executive branch. Care must be taken lest a too hasty reorganization create vulnerabilities greater than those trying to be solved. Thoughtfulness is more important than speed. This is especially the case when decisions are accelerated during an election campaign.

(a) The Role of the Proposed National Director of Intelligence

The decision to create another layer between the President and the existing institutions, the following problems arise:

At the same time, there is an even greater need for systems that preserve human rights and secure the rule of law. Creating an intelligence czar with domestic surveillance authority that is not under the Attorney General, and measures that separate intelligence from law enforcement, go against all the lessons that democratic governments have learned the hard way about the need to balance security with the rights of individuals

Moreover, there is a critical need for a working partnership between intelligence analysts and operators at the federal level that allows the rule of law to function, as well as the FBI and all of the elements of homeland defense to operate as teams in both prevention and response. Moreover, this functionality must extend down to the state and local level -- including the National Guard if not mobilized by the President.

In most cases, a counterterrorism center can only function in dealing with policy or coordinating action when a clear and present danger mandates national action. Most day-to-day activity must occur at the agency level and in the field. No matter how good the national system and center are, there will be many cases - and probably most - where everything depends on the quality of the federal team in the field and intelligence support for or within that team.

Once again, overcentralization of intelligence under an NDI can easily by counterproductive and destructive, and splitting out intelligence from the FBI can delay or prevent effective action. The focus should be on securing the US outside the beltway; that is the whole rationale for having any activity within the beltway.

TOTAL P. 14

-- If the director is to be the principal intelligence adviser to the President, a new bureaucracy would have to be created to redirect the flow of intelligence throughout the government and sift the intelligence input from the various components of the intelligence community.

Where would the personnel for such a structure come from? Does it mean dismantling existing institutions, and which ones? Could the national intelligence director function without having the analytic branch of the CIA placed under his or her direction? If the CIA were reorganized in this manner, would it then become an organization for conducting clandestine activities? Does this risk weakening the essential relationship between analysts and operators exist, does the operational brand become muddied?

[M]

4

Sep. 19 2004 07:04AM P07

-- How will so powerful a director affect the NSC process, and will he be allowed to meet with other powers?

How will competing views be brought to the President's attention?

-- How is the tactical and operational military intelligence linked to the new structure being envisaged? The proposal to have the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence act at the same time as Deputy Director of Intelligence, could weaken the authority of the principals.

(b) <u>Separating Intelligence from Policy</u>

Sep. 19 2004 07:05AM P09

PHONE NO. : +21 34 66

FROM : Hotel! TORRENMAR Business Center

This is the central challenge to reform. ~~Group think is a major~~

Calitating empires and assemblies for decades of human intelligence, and also excessive

Kuris compartmentalization. Since Intelligence lives on information, some
types of it are rigorously guarded by their possessors. As a result,
intelligence analysts are frequently forced to make analytical

available judgments with key pieces of information missing. Strengthening
collection by improving human Intelligence is one way of addressing
this problem, but it can never solve the conundrum in a fully
satisfactory way. What one should expect is that collection

Sep. 19 2004 07:05AM P10

PHONE NO. : +21 34 66

Inadequacies are addressed properly, that analytical judgments are professional, and that available information is properly coordinated.

Encouraging different perspectives and alternative hypotheses is desirable, yet policymakers should not cherry-pick among competing hypotheses and select only those that fit their policy proclivities. Not all hypotheses are equally sound, and some are rubbish. There must be a systematic ability to make professional judgments as to which hypotheses should be discarded as inconsistent with the bulk of the evidence. Excessive centralization may distort such a process.

Different components of the government have different missions
and priorities that cause them to assign different levels of importance
to protecting intelligence information. Law enforcement elements
want to use intelligence to prosecute cases even if this will
compromise the source. The intelligence collectors fundamentally
mistrust the reliability of law enforcement elements in protecting the
Information, making them reluctant to share it. This is an inherent
problem that can be minimized (but not eliminated) through good
management. Good management means that, when there are
contradictions between using intelligence and protecting it, the
decisions are made by an established procedure. Sharing should be
in detail.
optimized, not mandated. To attempt to prescribe all the

H

Sep. 19 2004 07:06AM P11

Henry A. Kissinger

Thank you for inviting me to appear before this Committee. Few issues before the country match the importance of the reform of the intelligence community which you are considering. The proposals which give the impetus for this effort were put forward by the 9/11 Commission in a thoughtful, unanimous report. The 9/11 Commission, whose Chair and Vice Chair are friends of long standing, deserve the gratitude of the nation for the meticulous manner in which it has assembled the facts of that tragedy and the thoughtful recommendations it has made. The majority of these have either been implemented or are in the process of being implemented.

But the drastic restructuring of the intelligence community which is being proposed goes beyond the lessons of a single episode however

Sep. 19 2004 02:16AM P01

traumatic. It goes to the heart of the national security policy of the

United States across a spectrum far transcending the events of 9/11

and going beyond even the issue of terrorism to judgments about the

nature of the political and economic forces that will shape the next

decades.

Most major policy decisions involve judgments about consequences and about facts. Intelligence supplies the indispensable raw material from which these judgments are distilled. Any reform must start with examining whether its objectives can best be achieved by improving and modifying institutions or whether a substantial

restructuring

dismantling is needed.

amount to a

The 9/11 proposals go far in the direction of radical restructuring. To undertake such a step in the midst of a war is a major decision requiring the most careful consideration. Changes of the scope now being discussed will bring with them a long period -

[4]

Sep. 19 2004 02:19AM P01

PHONE NO. : +21 34 66

perhaps years - of adjustments throughout the Executive branch.
Care must be taken lest a too hasty reorganization create greater
vulnerabilities than it is trying to solve. Thoughtfulness is more
important than speed. This is especially the case when decisions are
accelerated during an election campaign. That is not a criticism to
which the reform should run the risk of being subjected in the
aftermath of legislation. My basic recommendation to this Committee
is therefore to adopt a procedure that permits a careful examination of
the issues involved, drawing on the experience of the distinguished
men and women who have held key positions in the field of national
security, with a short deadline, say six months. Or else the task could
be assigned to the distinguished commission dealing with the issue of
weapons of mass destruction, which is scheduled to report in March
2005.

If that just creates another layer between the President and the
existing institutions, the following problems arise:

-- If the director is to be the principal Intelligence adviser to the
President, a new bureaucracy would have to be created to redirect the
flow of Intelligence throughout the government and sift the intelligence
input from the various components of the intelligence community.

Where would the personnel for such a structure come from? Does it
mean dismantling existing institutions, and which ones? Could the
national intelligence director function without having the analytic
branch of the CIA placed under his or her direction? If the CIA were
governed in this manner, what would become of the remnant?
would it then become an
organization for indirect intelligence activities? Does this risk too weakness
in the relationship between analysts + operators?
and what about mental

11

Sep. 19 2004 02:20AM P02

5

-- How will so powerful a director affect the NSC process, and
how will competing views be brought to the President's attention?

[x]

Sep. 19 2004 02:21AM P03

7

the possessors of the information. As a result, intelligence analysts are all too frequently forced to make analytical judgments with key pieces of information missing. Strengthening collection is one way of addressing this problem, but it can never solve the conundrum in a fully satisfactory way. What one should expect is that collection inadequacies are addressed properly, and that analytical judgments are professionally sound and not distorted by poor coordination of the available information is properly coordinated.

Encouraging different perspectives and alternative hypotheses is desirable, but this also poses risks. Policymakers should not cherry-pick among competing hypotheses and select only those that fit their policy proclivities. Not all hypotheses are equally sound, and some are a systematic ability to make rubbish. There must be professional judgments as to which hypotheses should be discarded as inconsistent with the bulk of the evidence. Enhancing centralization may distort such a process.

(J)

Sep. 19 2004 02:21AM P04

Sep 19 04 08:07a

8

Finally, the critical shortage of human expertise must be
addressed. We not only need more National Security Education
Program funding, but we need more Americans studying abroad,
becoming fluent in foreign languages and gaining improved
understanding of foreign cultures through experience abroad.

(d) The Problem of Information Sharing

The problem is that different components of the government
have different missions and priorities which cause them to assign
different levels of importance to protecting intelligence information.
Law enforcement elements want to use intelligence to prosecute cases,
even if this will compromise the source. The intelligence collectors,
therefore, fundamentally mistrust the reliability of law enforcement
elements in protecting the information. This makes them reluctant to
share. This is an inherent problem which can be minimized (but not
eliminated) through good management. Good management means

Sharing should be optimized, not mandated.

## Conclusion

The magnitude of the tasks outlined here suggests that Congress
leave itself the scope of the issue to early next year to permit a
comprehensive approach.

Moving up
To attempt to prescille all
the circumstances in
bureaucratic detail would
entail some detail +
some exceptions as it defeat
its own purpose,

H

Sep. 19 2004 02:22AM P05

SEP-17-2004 17:40

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.02/07

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky

CONRAD BURNS, Montana

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ranking

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

TOM HARKIN, Iowa

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

HARRY REID, Nevada

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin

PATTY MURRAY, Washington

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

THE COMMITTEE MEETS ON CALL OF THE CHAIRMAN

Full committee appointments—January 15, 2003.

SEP-20-2004 13:04

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P.01/01

MESSAGE

page 2 of 2

Subject: Full Committee Hearing

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
NOTICE OF FULL COMMITTEE MEETING

The Full Committee on Appropriations will meet at 10:00 am in open session on Tuesday, September 21, 2004 in Room SD-192, and again on Wednesday, September 22, 2004 in Room SH-216.

The program includes: Review of the 9-11 Commission's Intelligence Recommendations

Witnesses:

Tuesday, September 21, 2004
SD-192

Panel I:

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State

Panel II:

Former Senior Military Commanders:

Admiral Dennis C. Blair, USN (Retired), former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

General Joe Raalston (Retired), former Commander,

U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. (Retired), former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

Wednesday, September 22, 2004
SH-216

Executive Branch Officials:

Judge Richard Posner, Judge of the Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit

Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. Dale Watson, former Assistant Director for Counter-Terrorism Division, FBI

*Please Note *

Due to limited space, we request that seats behind the dais be limited to permanent staff.

TOTAL P.01

SEP-22-2004 14:08

KAI DC

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[c]

Chairman Stevens, Ranking Member Senator Byrd, distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to again come before this distinguished committee to discuss one of the most important subjects of our day—how we organize the intelligence functions of the United States Government to meet the future challenges confronting our country. At the outset let me emphasize how grateful I am that you are making a dedicated study of this matter. America's security depends on a sophisticated and robust intelligence community. But Americans are nervous about their own government at times. We must have a government that can protect us, and we all want to insure we are protected from abuses by our government. That depends on the oversight of the people's branch of government, the United States Congress. I am very grateful you are assuming these responsibilities at this critical time.

Mr. Chairman, we are now very far along the road in this debate. Unfortunately, from my perspective, the shape of this debate has been driven more by political imperative than deep analysis of the challenges we face in this area. We do need intelligence reform, I believe. But I believe the debate to date, and the proposals before the Congress, are too narrowly constructed around one perceived failure of the intelligence community, and that is the failure to coordinate the activities of the components of the intelligence community.

Frankly, I believe that the so-called intelligence failure of 9-11 is overstated. I believe that 9-11 was just as much a failure of the policy community—the near uniform absence of consciousness of the specific threats we experienced on 9-11 by the policy world. Far more serious were the failings of the intelligence community that forecast massive stocks of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. No place on earth was more scrutinized than Iraq during a period of a decade, yet we missed this story almost completely. Again, the policy community is not without blame. But this has to be considered a massive intelligence failure, too.

The recommendations of the 9-11 commission are almost entirely oriented around the issue of coordination. That was not the problem with the missing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Narrow “group think” plagued us in that instance, and I firmly believe that problem will be worsened by the recommendations of the 9-11 Commission.

## Do no harm

Mr. Chairman, we are being propelled by the election to rush to pass legislation before you adjourn the 109th Congress. Elections are great times to hold debates, but terrible times for making binding decisions. The medical community has enshrined the principle of “do no harm” in the practice of medicine. I think that is good counsel to the Congress at this critical moment. In this regard, I think there are several key issues that I would bring to your attention.

## The politicization of intelligence

The intelligence community is always seeking to serve the needs of the policy leaders. There is a fine line between “serving the needs” and “pleasing” the policy bosses. It is critical that the intelligence community not cross over that line. The 9-11 Commission completely breaks through that line. Putting the intelligence czar in the White House at the right hand of the president is a terrible idea.

SEP-22-2004 14:08

KAI DC

212 753 7248

By definition, the closer your office is to the Oval Office, the more political your activities. That is not a bad thing. That is a good thing. Politics is a constructive force in American government. But intelligence should not be part of the political life of the White House, and locating the DNI in the White House would invite the direct politicization of intelligence.

## Eroding the responsibilities of constitutional officers

Making the intelligence czar the single focal point for intelligence inputs to the president and the cabinet is a terrible idea. Undercutting the cabinet secretaries who are constitutional officers of the government charged to manage the instruments of foreign and security policy for the country is a bad idea.

Through the 1970s, it was the practice of the National Security Council to have the Director of Central Intelligence attend the start of the meeting, brief the cabinet secretaries and other members of the Council on the facts, answer questions, and then depart the meeting so that the Council could deliberate the policy alternatives for the government. I believe that was the superior model. Current practice has the DCI participating throughout the deliberations. The 9-11 Commission would make the new DNI a super-agent in those meetings. This is a trend in the wrong direction.

Accountability for the policies and activities of the U.S. government flow from the president down through the constitutional officers of the government—the cabinet secretaries. They must be both free to decide and completely accountable for their decisions. I fear these recommendations would undercut their standing and their accountability.

## Confused command relationships

The 9-11 Commission called for giving the DNI control over the budgets and personnel within the departments of other cabinet secretaries. I believe this is a bad idea. I served as Comptroller for the Defense Department and then as Deputy Secretary. I can tell you from personal experience that ambiguous command relationships invariably lead to serious substantive problems. The formulation of divided command authority envisioned by the Commission is an invitation to turmoil at best and most likely serious operational problems.

## So what should the Congress do?

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, I have delineated the reservations I have about the 9-11 Commission recommendations. I know that there are competing bills now under consideration in the Congress. Some of those bills closely match the recommendations of the commission and some depart significantly from those recommendations. As I said, I am most worried that the Congress will feel propelled by the impending election to decide something. We did that when we created the Department of Homeland Security, and candidly that is a mess. The risks of making a serious mistake here are greater, I believe.

SEP-22-2004 14:08

KAI DC

212 753 7248

Yesterday, my think tank—the Center for Strategic and International Studies—released a short declaration of principles developed by a bipartisan and very distinguished group of former government leaders who have had exceptional and direct experience in foreign and security affairs for the United States. Those principles, which I should add, reflect the collective opinion of the distinguished signatories rather than those of the Center, put forward a uniform message of caution. The declaration also contains useful suggestions to guide a more deliberative reform process. I would ask permission of the Chairman to have this declaration of principles included at this point in the record.

## Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, we do need to reform our intelligence community. But we need that reform to be based on a dispassionate assessment of all the failings of the intelligence and policy communities, not just the coordination problem perceived to have been the cause of 9-11. Centralizing intelligence management to solve coordination problems will exacerbate the greater failings of the intelligence world, I believe. I strongly caution the Committee to take the time to fully assess all the problems we need to fix and ground a reform on a thorough, bipartisan foundation of representative government and government accountability.

Thank you for the privilege of testifying before you today. I am pleased to answer any questions you might have.

3

TOTAL P.04

With HAK's notes for delivery

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to appear before this Committee. Few issues facing the country match the importance of the reform of the intelligence community that you are considering. The proposals that give the impetus for this effort were put forward by the 9/11 Commission in a thoughtful, unanimous report. This Commission deserves the nation's gratitude for the meticulous manner by which it has assembled the facts of that tragedy and the thoughtful recommendations it has made. The majority of these proposals have either been implemented or are in the process of being implemented.

2

The 9/11 proposals amount to a radical restructuring. To
undertake such a step in the midst of a war is a major decision
requiring the most careful consideration. Changes of the scope now
being discussed will bring with them a long period – perhaps years – of

3

[Y]

4

6

[Y]

Excessive centralization leads to

Ems + prevents

distinction

excessive compartmentalization. Since intelligence thrives on gaining

8

access to secret information that is rigorously guarded by its
possessors, and collection is not always successful in overcoming these
obstacles, intelligence analysts are frequently forced to make
analytical judgments with key pieces of information unavailable.

Encouraging different perspectives and alternative hypotheses is
desirable. Yet not all hypotheses are equally sound, and some are
rubbish. There is therefore need for a mechanism to both generate
options and to establish criteria for choosing between them lest
policymakers cherry-pick among competing hypotheses and select only

9

those that fit their policy proclivities. There must be a systematic
ability to make professional judgments as to which hypotheses should
be discarded as inconsistent with the bulk of the evidence.

10

## Conclusion

11

M

I confess that my bias is toward coordination rather than centralization. The proposals for reform draw on the experience in building the current DOD organization. The DNI becomes the DOD, and the existing institutions for intelligence turn into the military services. But there is an important difference in the missions. Defense must build toward unified action; intelligence should serve coherence in analysis that aids the decision-making ability of senior policymakers.

But for present purposes, this is not the key point. I am not here to offer answers to the issues I raised. My recommendation to this Committee is therefore to adopt a procedure that permits a careful examination of the issues involved, drawing on the experience of men and women who have held key positions in the field of national security, many of whom are uneasy about the pace in which

12

Reading version

Mr. Chairman:

2

M

3

4

The 9/11 proposals amount to a radical
restructuring. To undertake such a step in the
midst of a war is a major decision requiring the
most careful consideration. Changes of the
scope now being discussed will bring with them
a long period - perhaps years - of turmoil
throughout the intelligence community. Care
must be taken lest a too hasty reorganization

5

[Y]

(a) <u>The Role of the Proposed National</u>
<u>Director of Intelligence</u>

6

-- If the director is to be the principal
intelligence adviser to the President, a new
bureaucracy would have to be created to
redirect the flow of intelligence throughout the
government and sift the intelligence input from
the various components of the intelligence
community. Where would the personnel for
such a structure come from? Does it mean

7

8

9

M

10

11

[y]

12

Collection, on the other hand, should reflect
policy priorities, and covert action should be
under the close control and scrutiny of
policymakers. Excessive centralization may
defeat both objectives. The intelligence chief
should not have a policy role or a formal
position as a member of policy bodies. But the
control of clandestine operations requires a
control that transcends the intelligence
community and assures that policy and legal
considerations are fully taken into account.

14

intelligence, and also excessive compartmentalization. Since intelligence thrives on gaining access to secret information that is rigorously guarded by its possessors, and collection is not always successful in overcoming these obstacles, intelligence analysts are frequently forced to make analytical judgments with key pieces of information unavailable. Strengthening collection by improving human intelligence is one way of addressing this problem, but it can

15

16

establish criteria for choosing between them
lest policymakers cherry-pick among
competing hypotheses and select only those
that fit their policy proclivities. There must be
a systematic ability to make professional
judgments as to which hypotheses should be
discarded as inconsistent with the bulk of the
evidence.

17

18

19

## Conclusion

20

M

21

But for present purposes, this is not the
key point. I am not here to offer answers to
the issues I raised. My recommendation to this
Committee is therefore to adopt a procedure
that permits a careful examination of the issues
involved, drawing on the experience of men
and women who have held key positions in the
field of national security, many of whom are
uneasy about the pace in which restructuring of
the country's intelligence is being pursued.
Perhaps the task could be assigned to the

22