22 West 55th Street
New York, N.Y. 10019

Judson 2-7030

Mr. Peter Rodman,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

1 December 1972

Dear Peter,

Enclosed are details of the Swiss Foundation about
which I talked to you this afternoon. I really want to
find out whether it is worth the Governor's while to
meet with him in February.

Looking forward to hearing from you. Thanks a
lot.

YALE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

January 17, 1972

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Henry:

Sorry we missed again last week. As I said, I find the pattern of events in Vietnam disturbing, for reasons explained on the attached pages from my forthcoming book. From this vantage point, at least, I should have expected the Chinese to have turned Hanoi off, and visibly, long before January 17. Of course they want to deploy our weight against a Soviet attack as cheaply as possible. China was always thus, and not China alone. But surely they are far too practical to think they could get what they must have from us without putting Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Korea clearly on the counter before the President takes the risks of a summit. See pp. 482-483 of "Khrushchev Remembers." If the President comes back with no more than impressions of Chou En-lai's charm, great as it undoubtedly is, there will be troubled spirits around here, among serious men, and trouble deeper than politics.

EVR/dhw

Enclosure

cc George W. Ball

The Future of American Foreign Policy

15

a fever is to prevent the convulsions which are its cause -- to continue steadily to insist on the achievement of a reasonably stable system of peace in world politics, based on a dispersal of power, and the enforcement of understood rules as to the limits of rivalry.

Many who accept this premise as a valid definition of the purpose of American foreign policy often add that times have changed since the late forties, when Truman and Acheson laid down the broad lines of the foreign policy the United States has followed ever since. The Communist movements of the world are no longer so tightly controlled as was the case then, they point out, implying, at least, that they are less of a threat to the balance of power than they were in Truman's time. Of course the divisions among Communist parties and nations offer Western diplomacy certain opportunities. But it by no means guarantees their success. The pressure of Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban ambition is still felt in many parts of the world. In each case, it attempts to harness local revolutionary impulses, and more diffuse feelings of violent protest, to its cause. That pressure, backed by arrays of conventional and nuclear force, and the full panoply of political, psychological and guerrilla warfare, has increased in intensity since the Sino-Soviet split. It is hardly obvious why the pressures arising from the rivalry of several revolutionary parties, movements and nations should be easier for the West to manage and contain than was the case when the world Communist movement was firmly under Soviet control. Both in economics and in labor relations, competition, even among the few, is hardly less turbulent and dynamic than monopoly or duopoly.

The interplay of these factors and rivalries has become the central

The primary structure of the problem of power for the next ten years or so is what is often called the Sino-Soviet-American triangle. It would

17

The Soviet Union is allied with the nations of Eastern Europe, save for Albania and Jugoslavia; with Cuba; and with Syria, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern states. It has developed and will continue to develop close relations with India. It will surely seek to establish at least a cooperative, and conceivably an allied regime in China, as opportunity may occur, or be created.

It is fashionable in Western Europe and the United States to believe that the Cold War is over, that detente prevails, and that the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of collaboration with the West, both in the field of nuclear arms, and on other subjects. I have been unable to find any evidence to support such a view. True, the NATO governments no longer engage in vituperation with or about the Soviet Union. But Soviet propaganda, at home and abroad, is still written in vitriol. We have simply stopped listening.

Limited agreements with the Soviet Union, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, have been achieved, and others may still be achieved, for it is decidedly in the Soviet interest to induce the United States to limit its military and research expenditure, to control its own armaments budget, and to prevent Europe, Japan, and some other countries from becoming nuclear powers. Michel Debre, when he was minister of Finance, once remarked that what the world needed most was a trade union of finance ministers to suppress the scientists. Like every other country, the Russians show signs from time to time of complaining about the high and rising cost of military technology.

Thus the possibility of nuclear agreement is kept alive, while the Soviet Union pursues a policy of imperial expansion based on ambitious programs of military expansion, particularly striking in the fields of sea-power, space technology, and nuclear energy. The build-up of Soviet

sea and air power, and of nuclear capability, has no parallel in world politics since the Kaiser's bid to challenge Britain on the seas during the years before World War I. Nuclear warfare has been avoided in the period since 1945, because the persistent pressure for the expansion of Soviet control has paused before an occasional American threat of reprisal with overwhelming force. But Soviet energy presses outwards, patient and ingenious, flowing around obstacles, taking advantage of every opening. It can be stopped only by the calm deployment of unacceptable risks.

The underlying balance of forces is changing, as the West flags. The nature of Soviet pressure is changing as well. Soviet policies of expansion are far more sophisticated and difficult to contain today than was the case in 1949, when they were no more than the glacial outward movement of a land mass -- first in Iran and Turkey, then in Greece and Berlin, then in Korea. A direct invasion of Europe is not now a serious possibility, at least while there are strong NATO conventional forces in being. But Europe has been outflanked in the Mediterranean, and perhaps in the northern seas as well, by a process of penetration which poses major problems for the defense of allied interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, in Iceland, in Norway, and in Europe as a whole. The true Soviet goal in Western Europe, one should suppose, is not occupation, Polish style, but West European neutrality and disarmament, and American withdrawal both from the continent and from the Mediterranean.

In the perspective of American policy, the conflicts in the Middle East should be viewed in these terms. The Middle Eastern crisis is not an Arab-Isareli conflict, or a conflict among different tendencies in Arab politics. It is a NATO crisis, an attempt to drive the United States out of Europe, to dismantle NATO, and thus to bring the resources and energies of Western Europe under effective Soviet control. Arab hostility

19

to the existence of Israel is exploited as a catalyst for the process of
Soviet expansion in North Africa and the Near East. Unless peace on
American terms is achieved in the Middle East, and achieved soon, no
conceivable combination of events, short of major war involving the United
States, could forestall Soviet predominance in the area, which President
Nixon has declared it to be a vital national interest of the United States
to prevent.

In the Far East, Soviet policy has been, and remains, caught up in
a dilemma whose contradictions were evident in the conflicts over Korea,
Indonesia, and Vietnam, and are now brought into even more vivid and
portentous focus by its quarrel with China. The dilemma is implicit in
the basic problem of the balance of world power. If Soviet control expands
too quickly or too far, as was the case in Korea, it may stir a response
from the United States, Japan, or Europe, or from all three together.
But if the Soviet Union moves to abate the risk, it will be charged with
revisionism and collusion with the West, and may lose to China, and to
Communist parties oriented to China, its leadership in the world-wide movement
of revolutionary impulse, which in many parts of the world is a powerful
and attractive tool of imperial expansion.

The United States and the Soviet Union have parallel national interests
in limiting Chinese expansion. A consciousness of those interests dominated
Soviet and American policy towards India after the Chinese demonstration
on the Indian frontier in 1962. That policy of parallelism ended, for
fundamental reasons, when the Soviet Union supported the Indian attack on
Pakistan in 1971, following the Bengali revolt in East Pakistan nine months
earlier, and its suppression by the Pakistani government. From the point
of view of national interests, the Soviet Union should likewise have
collaborated with the United States with regard to Indochina, insisting

on the inviolability of the arrangements for French Indochina which emerged
from Geneva in 1954, and were confirmed by the Soviet agreement with the
United States over Laos in 1962. But the attractions of American misery
in the Vietnam morass were irresistible to Soviet policy makers. Perhaps
they concluded that the United States had been irreparably weakened and
paralyzed by its internal debate over foreign policy, so that its interests
could be ignored. They may also have been concerned that China would have
moved into North Vietnam if Soviet influence were weakened or withdrawn,
as had proved to be the case in North Korea fifteen years before. In the
event, the Soviets supported North Vietnam's effort to change the Geneva
arrangements by force, and refused to liquidate the adventure, as they did
finally in Korea, when North Vietnam failed.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has increased both its nuclear
capability and its conventional military presence on all fronts -- in Siberia
and Outer Mongolia, in Central Europe, in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic
and the Indian Oceans. It apparently believes that it has restrained China
by its nuclear threats, or at least imposed certain limits on Chinese
policy for the period of the next few years, before Chinese nuclear weapons
could constitute a major threat to the Soviet Union. To take advantage
of this short period of time, the Soviet Union has been pressing a bold
and risky strategy in the Mediterranean and in Europe, in order to achieve
the disintegration of NATO, and the withdrawal of United States forces
from Europe and the Middle East, before it faces the probability of a
showdown with China. In Europe and the Middle East, Soviet policy has
recently had a new urgency, which can be explained only by its policy of
pressing for the neutralization of Europe, and the end of NATO, while China
is still relatively weak; the United States weary and uncertain, after the
ordeal of Vietnam; and Europe still not genuinely united as a political

21

and military force.

This Soviet policy, as the British say, has proved to be "too clever
by half." Its consequences are potentially disastrous for the Soviets.
Their tactical success in Vietnam has led to strategic failure in a larger
theater. By building up their conventional and nuclear forces in Siberia
to a level of clear and present threat, and their expanding presence in
Southeast Asia, they forced China to turn to the United States as the only
power on earth that could deter a Soviet attack on China itself. For
China and the United States have parallel interests in limiting Soviet
expansion, exactly like the interests the United States and the Soviet
Union share in limiting Chinese expansion. The heavy Soviet hand in Siberia,
and the increasing Soviet threat to China from India, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia, have compelled China to change its foreign policy, for
the time being at least, in order to obtain American backing, and thus
persuade the Soviet Union that its nuclear and non-nuclear threats against
China involve unacceptable risks.

In 1971, China moved dramatically to obtain American support against the Soviet Union. Naturally, it will seek to pay as little as possible for American efforts to prevent Soviet aggression against China. But it is inconceivable that help so vital to Chinese security should not involve at least a Vietnam settlement compatible with American policy; a Formosan settlement which respects long standing American commitments, and Japanese and American security interests; and an understanding about Korea based on the principles and interests which led the West to resist the conquest of South Korea in 1950. The Chinese government has explained its approach to the United States in terms of an article by Mao Tse-Tung, published in 1940. Just as it was proper then to seek American help against Japan, the article contends, so it is proper now to unite "with forces that can be

united with while isolating and hitting at the most obdurate enemies."²
Thus, the Chinese argue, it is entirely compatible with revolutionary principles to obtain help from an imperialist power not now committing aggression against China in order to confront the imperialism that presents the greatest danger to the country.

This major event illustrates the classical mechanism of the balance of power at work. The potentialities of conflict between two powers, or two power groups, must take into account the possibility of reaction by a third. The Soviet Union must be concerned about Chinese reactions if it becomes dangerously involved in Europe or the Middle East, and of American, Japanese, and NATO reactions, as well as the risk of explosions and rebellions in its Central European empire, if it should undertake to destroy the Chinese nuclear establishment, or should become embroiled with China in other ways. China cannot expect to obtain American, European and Japanese backing to head off the rising threat from the Soviet Union unless it accepts and respects the interests of those nations.

The most appropriate posture for the United States in this crisis is that stated by Acheson in his famous and controversial speech after the withdrawal of American forces from Korea in 1949, where he said that no person can guarantee areas where there is no American military presence against attack, but "should such an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations" -- a formula whose potential was demonstrated in Korea.

The tensions of this triangular relation, which, during the next decade, should also involve Europe and Japan as effective allies of the

²New York Times, August 22, 1971, Section I, p. 5, col. 1.

United States, offer great hope for a degree of peace which could meet the security needs of the United States. The dynamics of response and counter response require both China and the Soviet Union to confront the fact that now, as always, there are limits to the possibility of imperial expansion. Under the circumstances of modern life, the path of wisdom and prudence is that of stalemate, stability, detente, and peaceful coexistence under the rules of the United Nations Charter. We must assume that these will remain the major goals of American foreign policy in the decade ahead -- goals the United States will continue to seek through patient and sustained diplomatic effort, necessarily backed by force. Policy cannot assume that these desirable goals have already been achieved.

IV

The goals of American foreign policy in the Third World are the true center of the debate about the future of that policy. Most critics of recent foreign policy concede the national interests of the United States in protecting the independence of Western Europe and of Japan, great centers of power whose transfer to Soviet or to Chinese control would affect the possibility of national safety. And most understand as well the interest of the United States in a rapprochement with China and with the Soviet Union, or, if rapprochement is not possible, in a state of stabilized tension in the magnetic field of their interrelationships.

But the conviction that the troubles of the Third World do not concern the security of the United States is the simple and imperative theme that runs through much of the literature.

Some put the thesis in terms of power politics. These men say that only that we keep Western Europe and Japan out of hostile hands. A few go further. They believe that considerations of security require us to prevent the hostile control only

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78712

Department of Economics

October 23, 1972

Dear Henry:

I follow your travels and the rumors with sympathy and hope, as well as ignorance.

I leave two thoughts with you, both of which I hope President Nixon underlines should you come to some form of agreement.

First, the outcome will depend on the willingness of the United States, the South Vietnamese, and all the other non-Communist parties concerned to insist on scrupulous enforcement of our side of the bargain. The worst part of postwar history, from Yalta to the Laos Accords of 1962, is the tendency of Americans -- and others in non-Communist states -- to regard the achievement of an agreement as the end of the line. We must learn in an era of negotiation to be as attentive to the maintenance of agreements as to their achievement. This goes for SALT. It goes for a Southeast Asian agreement. The cost of failing to follow through (as the Geneva Accords of 1962 underlines) is tragedy and war -- not peace.

Second, the South Vietnamese have been bearing the brunt of the battle over the past year. They stopped the massive Communist offensive which began on March 30, 1972, with their bodies. They have been losing something like 600 dead per week, while American casualties fell virtually to zero. The equivalent for the United States would be 7000 dead per week. They have earned the right to independence, to our respect, and to our continued economic and political support.

A third proposition, of which I am less sure ☐ from President Nixon's point of view. I believe he should say that the continued independence, increased unity, and prosperity of Southeast Asia is

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

May 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Rumanian Release of Alex Ionescu

This case started under the last administration and is dragging on. Your friends are asking you to intervene again (Tab B), but this would probably be a mistake.

Ionescu worked for British Intelligence during the war and then for Standard Oil. As a result of his connections, our Ambassador and the British asked the Rumanian Government to allow him to emigrate to Australia; he now has his passport and visa, but there is some unexplained delay.

Your answer, attached at Tab A, says to wait a while lest we arouse undue suspicions in Bucharest. There is no special reason for the US Government to be involved and State thinks he will get out if we do not rock the boat.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

COPY

159 East Ninety-Fourth Street

April 21

Dear Jim,

It may be that the Ionescu affair has
hit a snag. The enclosed letter tells you
about it.

Since the letter you sent me from H.
McPherson indicates Henry Kissinger would
continue the efforts started by W. Rostow, and
since you suggested that I turn again to you
in case trouble develops, I am doing so.

Shall I let you deal with it or shall
I, as you suggested too, ask Augie (or myself,
since I know Kissinger also) to write to him?

With many thanks for your continuing
help and attention, and my best to you and
Libby, I am cordially yours,

Claude

B. D. LOW

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10028

April 17, 1969

Mrs. August Heckscher
55 East 76th Street
New York, New York - 10021

Dear Mrs. Heckscher:

I just thought you would be interested
to hear that Mr. Mantsch received a letter
from Alec Ionescu from Bucharest. The
letter was dated April 6th.

Mr. Ionescu mentioned that he had com-
pleted all the documents required,
submitted his application for a passport
and paid the fee late in December. At
that time the authorities assured him
that his passport would be issued within
four weeks. As of April 6th, he had re-
ceived no further information. Of course,
we do not know whether this is due to
slow administrative procedures, or whether
some problem has developed.

If you consider it appropriate, you may
want to pass the above information on to
Mr. James Rowe.

BDL:MD

November 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harry McPherson

Alexander Ionescu

You will recall I mentioned to you the name
of Alexander Ionescu and the question whether the
President would have our Government ask the Romanian
Government to allow him to leave the country and join
him family in Australia.

Both the British and Australian Ambassadors have
intervened without success. It is possible the American
Ambassador will have the same fate--but that is no reason
for not trying! This comes to me from Claude Heckscher--
Augie's wife (and of course there is no lawyer-client
relationship here).

If the attached piece of paper is correct, we Ameri-
cans certainly owe Ionescu something. Standard Oil of
New Jersey for obvious reasons, is also in favor of
helping him.

I would think the CIA could check out the factual
statements in the attached pieces of paper.

Whatever you do, dear Harry, let the decision be
made in the White House, not by the Country Desk. Hell,
I can ask the Country Desk myself!

James Rowe

B. D. LOW

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020

October 3, 1968

Dear Mrs. Heckscher:

This refers to our recent conversations about Mr. Alexander Ionescu's unfortunate situation and his desire to join his family in Australia. You informed me that Mr. J. T. Mantsch had written to you that in his opinion the only way that Mr. Ionescu could ever obtain an exit visa might be through the personal intervention of President Johnson with the Romanian authorities. You mentioned that you could arrange for Mr. Ionescu's case to be brought to the personal attention of the President, and that you would need more details about Mr. Ionescu's background and World War II activities to do so. I have prepared the attached biographical history of Mr. Alexander Ionescu for your use. Several copies are enclosed for your convenience. Should you need further information or details, please let me know.

I am uncertain as to whether you plan to write to President Johnson or arrange that Mr. Ionescu's case be personally discussed with the President. In either case, I am sure that you would want to send to President Johnson, or leave with him if Mr. Ionescu's case is discussed with him, a letter outlining the basis for your request for his help and supported by the "Biographical History of Alexander Ionescu". I believe that your letter would be most effective if prepared in your own words and with your own ideas and thoughts. At any rate, I have listed below several items which appear to me to be most important and I would suggest that you consider including your comments about these points in your letter.

1. Certainly, the request for the President's intervention is for humanitarian reasons to help a very deserving man who risked his life during World War II for the Allied Intelligence, was sentenced in the

Mrs. August Heckscher -2-

October 3, 1968

post-war period to a long prison term by the
Romanian Military Tribunal on a trumped up
charge of espionage for the Americans, and
has suffered greatly at the hands of the
Romanian Communist Regime. However, I believe
it would help the case if you can outline for
President Johnson the reasons for your personal
interest in Mr. Ionescu's case.

2. Mr. Ionescu has endeavored to obtain a passport from the Romanian authorities during the past four years and even though he has enlisted the assistance of the British and Australian Ambassadors his request has so far been refused.

3. The biographical sketch of Mr. Ionescu enclosed gives further details of his services to the allied cause as well as his unjust imprisonment by the Romanian authorities and his untold sufferings. It is the irony of fate that the Romanian Supreme Court has recently abrogated his sentence and declared him innocent of the charges brought against him, after he had served fourteen years of the sentence, but so far this has not helped him.

4. You may want to reemphasize that President Johnson's intervention is the last remaining hope of a very deserving man re-joining his family in Australia, as so far efforts of British and Australian authorities have not been successful. The Australian Government has expressed its willingness to grant Mr. Ionescu an entrance visa for Australia upon his presentation of a valid Romanian passport.

If I can provide any further information, please let me
know. Furthermore, if you are able to present Mr.
Ionescu's case to President Johnson, and he indicates
some actions may be taken either directly by him or
through the State Department, would you please let me
know so that I can be prepared to assist Mr. Ionescu if
he is able to get out of Romania.

BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY
OF
ALEXANDER IONESCU

Address: Alexander Ionescu,

Mrs. Margaret Ionescu,

Casuta Postala 2812
Bucharest 20, Romania

87 Westbury Street
E. St. Hilda, Melbourne
Victoria, Australia

Mr. Alexander Ionescu was born in Bucharest, Romania, September 4, 1904. He was educated at the University of Pittsburgh and after receiving his engineering degree returned to Romania and was employed by the Romana-Americana Oil Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey)) in 1937.

At the start of World War II, Mr. Ionescu was Executive Assistant to Mr. V. C. Georgescu who was then Managing Director of Romana-Americana. Mr. Georgescu was arrested in August 1941 as one of the leaders of the pro-Allied Romanian movement headed by Dr. Maniu, and for maintaining clandestine contacts (radio transmitter-receiver, courier, etc.) with the British Government representatives (S.O.E.) in the Middle East. Subsequently, through the intervention of family and friends Mr. Georgescu was able to receive almost daily visits from his family and his former assistant, Alexander Ionescu. This contact was vital because by Mr. Georgescu's arrest Dr. Maniu's group had lost a direct contact with the British allies.

Mr. Ionescu in support of Mr. Georgescu's pro-Allied activities was able to re-establish contacts with Dr. Maniu's pro-Allied underground group. Mr. Ionescu played a most important role in preparing for the Istanbul meeting in which representatives of the Romanian underground re-established contacts and regular communications with the British Government representatives (S.O.E.) in the Middle East. Mr. Ionescu and his wife became the only official receivers in Bucharest of coded radio messages from London over the BBC. They decoded messages received and subsequently coded messages to be transmitted. In 1943 when the S.O.E. clandestine British party arrived in Bucharest (after parachuting into Yugoslavia) Mr. Ionescu became the caretaker of the British operator and his equipment. Mr. Ionescu organized in every detail the radio man's mission and manner of operation in Bucharest. All the messages received and transmitted were

-2-

coded and decoded by Mr. Ionescu and his wife. Furthermore, Mr. Ionescu and the underground group were able to obtain control of certain special materials and arrange for their export to Scandinavia in order to finance these clandestine activities. This was an extremely delicate and hazardous undertaking as at this time the Germans were watching each and every shipment that was exported from Romania.

The Istanbul meeting in which contacts were re-established between the British (S.O.E.) and the Romanian underground was the most significant development in the history of the Romanian Coup d'Etat on August 23, 1944 directed to overthrow the German forces from Romania. The carefully prepared plans to re-establish contact with British friends in Istanbul would have been almost impossible without the physical assistance and discreet maneuvering by Alexander Ionescu.

After the "coup" and when the Romana-Americana Oil Company was temporarily placed under the administration of the Romanian Government, Mr. Ionescu was appointed by the government as "sole administrator" of the company in recognition of his war record, and as a trustworthy friend of the allies (USA in particular). In 1945 Mr. Ionescu was appointed a Director of the Romana-Americana Oil Company and subsequently was appointed a Managing Director (one of three). He had the unenviable task of supervising the Public Relations and Employee Relations, Labor Negotiations with Communist Trade Unions, Purchasing and Supplies for the company and its employees during the postwar political turmoil and inflation while the Communists were moving to take over the country. Under these extremely difficult conditions, Alexander Ionescu carried out his duties well and very conscientiously, sometimes at the risk of personal danger.

In October 1947 he was suddenly arrested. His family knew nothing of his whereabouts until February 1948 when just as suddenly reappeared at home, looking thin, pale, grey-haired and suffering from vitamin deficiency and mental exhaustion. Under his doctor's care he quickly recovered. During his arrest he went without food for days at a time, was being constantly interrogated and placed in solitary confinement.

After the nationalization of the Romana-Americana Oil Company on June 10, 1948, Mr. Ionescu was forced by the Communist authorities to sell the party newspaper "Scanteia" (Spark) on the street corner in order to humiliate him. Unfortunately, Mr. Ionescu's release proved only temporary as he was re-arrested in October 1948. On May 6, 1954, he was tried and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment by a military tribunal on trumped-up charges of spying for the Americans and all his property was confiscated. From 1948 until 1957 he was in various prisons. On April 1, 1957, he was taken in a deplorable state from the prison in Aiud, one of the most dreaded prisons in the country where he underwent indescribable torment and suffering,

-3-

[LC]

to a political concentration camp. During all this time, his family was slowly starving, as his wife was not allowed to work.

On July 1, 1964, Mr. Ionescu was set free by a general amnesty, but was still under police surveillance. He was compelled to stay at the camp, however, as he had no other place to go. Later on, Mr. Ionescu's wife who in June 1964 was granted an exit visa by the Romanian authorities arranged with a friend in Bucharest to take him in and he has been living there ever since.

In the meantime, his wife and son were permitted to travel to Austria enroute to Israel. After arrival in Austria, due to a change in plans, they obtained a visa for Australia and left for that country early in 1965, with the hope that Mr. Ionescu would soon be able to join them. However, so far he has not been able to do so as the Romanian authorities have refused repeatedly to grant him a passport in spite of the intervention of both the British and Australian ambassadors.

On May 28, 1968, the Romanian Supreme Court abrogated Mr. Ionescu's sentence as he was found innocent of the charges leveled against him by subsequent investigation. As of now, this has done him no good.

September 24, 1968

College of Physicians & Surgeons of Columbia University

DEPARTMENT OF NEUROLOGY

630 West 168th Street
New York, N. Y. 10032

December 28, 1972

Prof. Henry Kissinger
c/o White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Prof. Kissinger:

If any of us had the slightest shred of confidence in the foreign policy of the present administration, it was because of your presence as Advisor. Even if you were sincere in your pre-election proclamation of "peace at hand" how can you be quiet now in the face of the massacre by bombing. What are you advising now?

Or are you the German, the good German, who remains silent at the horror of holocaust to save his own skin? The academic community mourns.

In despair

RGR:es