8/9/82

Johannesburg Speech

I am pleased to be the keynote speaker at such a
distinguished gathering.

I will try to set the scene: to describe the
international situation as it appears from an American
perspective. The East-West confrontation is of particular
concern; problems of the Third World are a second focus.
Third, I will say a few words about how Africa, and particularly
southern Africa, fits into this global context.

The American Perspective

Americans do not have much national experience with
foreign affairs. Our Founding Fathers were quite sophisticated
in manipulating the European balance of power to secure
American independence. Since then, however, a century and
a half of isolation encouraged the illusion in America that
we did not really need a foreign policy -- or rather, that
foreign involvement was purely a matter of choice for us:

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We could intervene, or not, as we preferred. It took
two world wars in this century to shatter this illusion,
but certain preconceptions linger in the American psyche.

Americans in our period of isolation tended to look
down on the sordid power politics of Europe. Our avoidance
of such involvement appeared to us as a virtue, as a sign
of moral superiority. Since 1945, now that we are permanently
active in world affairs, we still, as is evident, tend to
view the world in moral terms and hold ourselves -- and our
friends -- to an unusually high standard of moral conduct as
we see it.

For a time after 1945, this did not pose tremendous
difficulty. The United States represented the amazing figure
of half of the world's Gross National Product. We were so
overwhelmingly powerful that our allies tended to follow our
prescriptions; since we offered them military protection and
enormous economic aid, it was a relatively harmonious partner-

-3-

ship. It may have given us a distorted picture of what
foreign policy was all about. The Marshall Plan seemed
just a projection of our domestic experience -- an overseas
application of the New Deal, in which economic progress brought
with it political stability almost automatically. And
the West's security problem which prompted the Truman Doctrine
and the foundation of NATO, seemed easily analogous to the
problem of Hitler -- that of unambiguous aggression by
organized units across recognized frontiers.

a
It was/creative and brilliantly successful period of
American foreign policy, but, as I say, our world leadership
then was grounded in a rather unusual set of conditions.

Not until the 1960's and 70's, really, did the United
States have to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations
in history have had to conduct it: as one country among
many, unable either to dominate the world or escape from it;
forced to seek by persuasion, accommodation, negotiations what

-4-

it could no longer achieve by unilateral fiat; obliged to
learn the traditional techniques of maneuver instead of the
frontal assault; forced to be sensitive to marginal shifts
in the balance of power and aware of the interconnections
between events; no longer able merely to overwhelm problems
with resources. Today, political, economic, and military
power are much more widely diffused -- partly as a result of
the success of some of our policies such as European and Japanese
recovery. Today the United States represents about 21 percent
of world GNP -- significant but not dominant.

In this sense, the frustration of Vietnam only accelerated
a painful process of adjustment that was inevitable.

Still, American thinking about foreign policy has not
always kept up with changing circumstances. The East-West
confrontation is a perfect example.

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The East-West Confrontation

There seem to be two schools of thought in America
about such problems as East-West relations.

One tends to view foreign policy as a branch of
psychiatry: The basic requirement of our diplomacy, in this
view, is to demonstrate our goodwill. Adversaries are
hostile because they mistakenly fear us or resent us;
because we have failed to reassure them that our objectives
can certainly be harmonized with theirs. Conflicts are an
aberration from an otherwise natural state of harmony.

The opposing school of thought sees foreign policy
as a branch of theology. Communism is consummate evil;
there is no compromise with the devil. Therefore in any nego-
tiation with the Soviet Union we are sure to lose our shirt;
negotiation only confuses the American public and is itself
a form of moral disarmament. What is needed is to sound
the trumpet, rally the people, confront our enemies -- and

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the walls of Jericho presumably will crumble.

Both these strains in American thinking, of course, share some features in common. Neither is comfortable with the idea of America's permanent involvement in foreign affairs, our permanent responsibility to engage in the long-term, philosophical competition with the Soviet Union while taking account of the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Americans are not yet quite accommodated to the notion of a long-term struggle without a final resolution; of a world in which our ideals can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly or gradually. Americans are in some sense in a state of permanent rebellion against the contemporary reality of world affairs.

The Soviet Union is clearly in an expansionist phase of its development. Even as the moral claims of its ideology prove more and more to be a hollow pretense, the Soviet system is growing in military power and geopolitical

-7-

reach. In the past, the emergence of an ambitious new
major power seeking a role on the world scene almost always
led to war. Most expansionist powers produced a coalition
against them, and a new equilibrium could be achieved only
after a test of strength. In the nuclear age, this
is an impossibility. The maintenance of peace -- and
of the way of life of the free world -- will depend on
maintenance of a balance of power.

This requires, in my view, two things. First of all,
it is the duty of the West to maintain the military balance
and resist Soviet expansionism. A revolutionary power like
the Soviet Union _must_ learn -- through the West's vigilant
resistance -- that encroachments on the global equilibrium
cannot be tolerated. It cannot be beyond the West's
capability -- superior as we are in economic strength --
to accomplish this.

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Secondly, history also shows that an equilibrium of power is often not sufficient. Many wars have occurred even in conditions of a balance of power, either by general misclculation or by one country's calculation that it could gain an advantage by superior strategy or skill. Thus in the long run our objective must be to hold out to the Soviet Union the prospect of more normal relations if its expansionist aims are either dropped or frustrated.

This was always my perception of the problem when I was in office. Recent events I believe have borne it out -- often, unfortunately, by negative example.

The Vietnam trauma in the United States, coupled with Watergate and its weakening of executive authority, produced a condition in the mid-70's in which the United States was unable or unwilling to act vigilantly against Soviet encroachments. Indochina collapsed in the Spring of 1975.

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As you know, later in that same year the United States was
unable to render even tiny amounts of military assistance
to two anti-Communist liberation groups in Angola fighting
against Soviet equipment and Cuban combat troops airlifted
by the Soviet air force in an unprecedented demonstration of
Soviet interventionism. It was indeed a precedent. For
the Soviet Union quickly reached the conclusion that, if we
were not willing to stop it, there was no reason not to
exploit other opportunities in the region -- from Ethiopia
to South Yemen. There were no inhibitions, therefore, to
using Soviet combat forces for direct intervention to maintain
Communist control over Afghanistan. Nor did the West pose
the prospect of sufficient penalties to inhibit the brutal
suppression of freedom in Poland.

In sum, the last seven years have seen an unparalleled
Soviet geopolitical offensive. It has, at least, brought

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about a considerable cooling of East-West relations. But
this in itself is no substitute for local resistance, on
the ground, to geopolitical encroachments. The West has not
lived up to its duty.

But recent history also bears out the second principle,
namely that maintaining the balance of power is not always
enough. In the democratic nations of the West -- all of
them -- it is clear that the public will not sustain a policy
of confrontation without some prospect of easing it. They
will not support defense programs or a vigorous foreign policy
if they imagine that their governments are the cause of
tensions or if serious efforts are not being made to ease
tensions and push back the specter of nuclear war.

It is for this reason that arms control has been on
the agenda of US-Soviet relations for most of the last fifteen
years. Arms control is not a substitute for a secure military
balance, but it can be a way of maintaining it at lower levels

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of forces or of reducing the risks of the outbreak of
nuclear conflict by miscalculation or panic. President Reagan
has made forthcoming proposals for strategic arms reductions.
His proposals have wisely focused not only on reducing the
numbers of nuclear weapons, but on those types and character-
istics of strategic weapons that most pose the danger of
surprise attack or first strike.

The past year has seen strong expressions of public concern
in Western countries over the danger of nuclear war. The
success of a strategic arms reduction negotiation would only
highlight another problem, which is taking on increasing
importance: In an age of nuclear stalemate, challenges become
more likely on the conventional level. If the West seeks to
reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons -- which I have always
believed it must -- there is no substitute for building up
conventional forces and forces for local and regional defense.

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The Third World

Most of the conflicts that occur today occur, of course,
in what is sometimes called the Third World -- the developing
countries, most of which are newly independent in the postwar
period following the dissolution of the European colonial
empires. This is another subject on which there has been
a certain naive American expectation born of inexperience.
What is interesting is that the misconceptions are now
widely shared in Europe, which cannot claim inexperience but
which is perhaps moved by feelings of guilt over its "imperialist"
past.

One fashionable idea is that the North-South split in
the world is more of a threat to world peace than the
East-West conflict. There are several problems with this
notion. One is that while it is absolutely clear that the
Soviet Union is not the source or stimulus of every local

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difficulty, Soviet and radical influence can exacerbate
every local problem, turn it into an international problem,
and indeed exploit it in ways that do serious damage to
the security and well-being of the West.

Secondly, it is not true that wars are caused, or are
likely to be caused, by poor nations burning with resentment
against the wealthy nations. It has been understood
by historians ever since Tocqueville that it is not the
poorest who revolt, but those who on the contrary see improve-
ment taking place and whose expectations outrun present reality.

Another problem is that, while most conflicts in the
developing world arise from genuine social, political, or
economic grievances, the time frames for solving the grievances
and for dealing with the immediate security problem of outside
intervention are not identical; we may have to face up to
a guerrilla war without waiting for reform, which is inevitably
a long-term process at best. Indeed, force-feeding political

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reform on a government like South Vietnam or El Salvador
or Iran under the Shah may do nothing but undermine the
cohesion of the regime and guarantee its replacement by its
tyrannical and decidely unreform-minded enemies.

The fact is that the West has no coherent theory of economic
and political development, no thorough understanding of
the process of political evolution that is taking place in
such turbulent conditions in the Third World. Conventional
Western wisdom, as I said, has taken it for granted that
economic advance would automatically ensure political stability,
as it did in Western Europe and Japan after 1945. But in
those societies, political institutions had a long history.
Closing the gap between economic capability and the temporary
condition of postwar devastation enabled the underlying political
cohesiveness to reassert itself. In developing societies,
by contrast, rapid modernization undermines traditional
social structures and patterns and therefore produces
political instability.

-15-

The cliché about the Iranian revolution is that we failed
to press the Shah early enough for political reform. There
is some truth in this. Nevertheless it is important to note
how much the events in Iran defied all Western [liberal]
notions of how progressive change comes about. The assault
on the Shah's rule did not come from those whom Western
pundits would have identified as the forces of "progress"--
secular modernizing socialists or reformers. These existed,
but ironically the stimulus of upheaval turned out to be
the very process of modernization and economic and social
reform led at a rapid pace by the Shah, who, like his father,
was perceived for years as a secular reformer in the mold
of Ataturk. The revolt came from groups threatened by
social change, such as the conservative landowning clerics
who resisted land reform and objected to mass education and
women's rights; they found fertile ground for agitation

-16-

in the peasants who migrated from the villages to the
industrial cities and felt rootless, isolated, and rest-
less, cut off from traditional family ties. They all found
moral sustenance in a religious fervor directed against the
secular modernism of the West--and, to some degree also
against the Marxism of the East. Whatever the Shah's un-
doubted errors, no one in the West dreamt that his over-
throw would be led by those who objected to what he was doing
right, more than to what he was doing wrong.

Thus there is a profound weakness in Western thought and
philosophy on this vitally important question. As this
audience well knows, many Third World countries face the
problem not of economic development but of political legiti-
macy. In Africa, borders cut across tribal lines following
the administrative convenience of the former colonial rulers;
the new nations face the daunting task of *creating* a sense
of national cohesion. In European history the nation

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existed before the state; in Africa, the state existed in
many cases before the nation.

One of the great ironies of contemporary history is that
Marxism, which founds it appeal on a theory of materialism
and economic determinism, has utterly failed as an economic
system. Its success in the Third World comes from the fact
that it provides a rationale for centralized power once tradi-
tional structures collapse. And yet the Western democracies,
whose civilization proclaims the importance of moral and
spiritual values, has responded to the Third World only
with proffers of economic aid and technical assistance.

The nostalgia even persists that radical regimes, anti-
Western by ideology, can be won over by economic aid and
professions of goodwill. This reflects, in part, the
assumption that economic progress is the key to stability.
In addition, the liberal assumption that harmony is the

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cannot absorb the reality that some countries
natural state of mankind/and leaders are genuinely hostile to
the values we stand for and cannot be charmed out of their
deeply held convictions by friendly gestures. There are
many moderate governments in the Third World, who seek and
deserve our help.

It is clear that a world of peace and prosperity requires
that the more than 100 new and developing nations be made
part of the international system. No international order
can survive unless they feel a stake in it. In an increasingly
interdependent world economy, this is in the general interest.
The true challenge to the West is not to our economic capa-
city, but to our political understanding.

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## Southern African Dilemmas

In much of what I have said, you will recognize the relevance to Africa: the challenge of Soviet and radical exploitation of tensions; the developing world's quest for political legitimacy.

Southern Africa, of course, presents its own unique dilemmas of moral and political evolution.

I have to say at the outset that I will not presume to offer easy solutions, for the simple reason that I have none to suggest. Nevertheless, I would like to discuss for a few moments my very personal perception of the problem.

When I was the American Secretary of State, I dealt with your leaders in the early stages of the negotiations over Rhodesia and South-West Africa. President John Vorster, and Pik Botha who was then serving with great skill as Ambassador in Washington, were my partners in these endeavors. And I must say that your government behaved honorably in its undertakings with us, keeping its promises and dealing with us openly, helpfully and with a great sense of responsibility.

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I must also say that I appreciate the enormous
strategic and geopolitical importance of South Africa and
the role it plays in the West's security. I understand
the pride of those who built this country into a modern and
technologically advanced and prosperous society. And I
understand the complexity of the internal problems that
you face.

Nevertheless, all this being said, the fact remains
that those of us abroad who appreciate all these things will
never be able to find common ground with you on the moral
and political plane as long as the present system of racial
exclusion continues.

As I said, I have no solution. I realize that one-man-
one-vote overnight -- an immediate institution of parliamentary
democracy with equal rights for all races -- is a utopian
dream. Yet the status quo will never be accepted by the
outside world, even by those who would like to be your
friends. The many steps that have been taken to ease petty

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[Y]

apartheid, the measures to broaden the political rights of Coloureds and the economic conditions of blacks -- and the signs that your government is trying to think creatively and promote change (and paying a political price for it) -- these are noted, and appreciated. But there is a long way to go.

The homelands policy might be the germ of a solution -- except that the new states are not economically viable and comprise a disproportionately small share of the land and its wealth.

The most hopeful signs are the efforts being made to improve the economic and educational status of blacks.

Clearly this only increases the contribution that blacks can make to South Africa. Indeed, your economic system, to work smoothly and to advance, now depends on increasing levels of skills among the black population. This is therefore both humane and in your self-interest. But the lessons of Tocqueville do not stop at the borders of this Republic.

As the black population rises in its skills and capabilities,

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it will more and more develop its own articulate leadership
and be conscious of its condition -- and its potential.

Thus the more genuine the progress being made, the more it
may contain the seeds of turmoil down the road.

Perhaps a peaceful accommodation can and will be found.
Perhaps we are heading for a monumental tragedy.

I say these words with sadness and no little sympathy.
I say them with trepidation and with considerable humility,
since I do not know what I would advise you to do if you were
so reckless as to ask me.

I know only that the history of the remainder of this
century will be full of dramatic events, and much of the
history of that period will be made on this continent.

Thank you.

8/24/82

DRAFT III

South Africa Speech

I am honored by the opportunity to address this
distinguished group in a country whose future evolution
is of great, perhaps decisive importance for the prospects
of a continent. And it is as well a daunting assignment.

For South Africa is geographically as far from America
as it is possible to be on this globe. Its problems reflect
a different evolution and its domestic structure a contrasting
set of values. At the same time South Africa has many
institutions that tie it to the Western world and its strategic
importance is undisputed. These factors produce an
inevitable ambivalence in America's attitude to your country--
a tug of war between geopolitical and philosophical
considerations. It is, as I shall point out later, in the
interest of freedom everywhere that this gap be narrowed
and ultimately eliminated.

2

But I have not come here to speak primarily about
the policies of your country. My assignment is to discuss
the approach to international relations of my own. I will
try to describe the international situation as it appears
from an American perspective. From the vantage point of
the United States, Africa and Southern Africa fit into a
larger picture of global concerns. I will try to trace
some of those broad concerns: the East-West confrontation;
relations between America and Western Europe; and problems
of the Third World generally. Then I will venture a few
words about the role that Africa and Southern Africa play
in this larger context.

## The American Perspective

The American perspective on world events has itself
undergone dramatic changes in the last generation.

Americans do not have a long experience with foreign
affairs. Our Founding Fathers were quite sophisticated

3

in manipulating the European balance of power to secure
independence. Since then, however, a century and a half
of isolation encouraged the illusion in America that we
did not really need a foreign policy--or rather, that foreign
involvement was purely a matter of choice for us: We could
involve ourselves, or not, as we preferred. It took two
world wars in this century to shatter this illusion, but
certain preconceptions lingered in the American psyche
for some decades afterward.

Americans in the isolationist period tended to look
down on what they considered the sordid power politics
of Europe. Our avoidance of such involvement appeared
to us as a virtue, as a sign of moral superiority. Since
1945, now that we are permanently active in world affairs,
we have had to face the facts of power. But we also tend
to hold ourselves--and our friends--to a high standard
of moral conduct as we see it. We fall short of it from

4

time to time but only at heavy cost; it causes us to
sacrifice the consensus needed to sustain a strong foreign
policy.

For a time after 1945, it seemed relatively easy to
equate power and morality--the secret American dream. The
Soviet Union appeared as an aggressor in the Nazi mold.
The United States represented the amazing figure of half
of the world's Gross National Product. We were so over-
whelmingly powerful that our allies tended to follow our
prescriptions; since we offered them military protection
and enormous economic aid, it was a relatively harmonious
partnership. Even the principal developing countries saw
in us the source of their economic development. All this
gave us a distorted picture of what foreign policy was
all about; it caused us to identify a fortunate and temporary
concatenation with a permanent state of affairs. The Marshall
Plan was in effect a projection of our domestic experience--

5

an overseas application of the New Deal, in which economic
progress brought with it political stability almost
automatically. And the West's security problem which prompted
the Truman Doctrine and the foundation of NATO, seemed
analogous to the problem of Hitler--that of unambiguous
aggression by organized units across recognized frontiers.

It was a creative and brilliantly successful period
of American foreign policy, yet never to be repeated. For
our world leadership then was grounded in an inherently
ephemeral set of conditions.

Not until the late 1960's and 70's did the United
States have to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations
in history have had to conduct it: as one country among
many, unable either to dominate the world or escape from
it; forced to seek by persuasion, accommodation, negotiation
what it could no longer achieve by unilateral fiat; obliged
to learn the traditional techniques of maneuver instead

6

of the frontal assault; required to be sensitive to marginal
shifts in the balance of power and aware of the inter-
connections between events; no longer able merely to overwhelm
problems with resources. Today, political, economic, and
military power are much more widely diffused--partly as
a result of the success of some of our policies such as
European and Japanese recovery. Today the United States
represents about 21 percent of world GNP--powerful but
no longer predominant.

We are therefore faced towards the rest of the world
with the requirements of the very balance of power which
we have deplored through the centuries. Our position is
now analogous on a global scale to that of Britain towards
Europe for the better part of three centuries. Britain
resisted the domination of Europe by a single power regardless
of its professions; Britain felt that its resources could
not match those of the Continent. A Europe united against

7

it would sooner or later be able to impose its will.

America's position towards the rest of the world is no different. If all the rest of the world fell under hostile control--directly or indirectly--we would be outmatched.

Maintaining the balance of power is not a favor we do others but an imperative of our survival.

This confronts us with three major difficulties. America is--as I have pointed out--reluctant to face the role of power, preferring to prevail by the purity of its maxims.

Americans also are uneasy with--indeed they resent--relative answers, which are the essence of a policy of equilibrium.

Throughout our history every problem we have recognized as such proved soluble--that is to say, we found a final answer--if only to overwhelm it with resources. A world in which the balance of power plays a crucial role is by definition somewhat relativistic--and hence elicits in Americans a sense of rebellion. Thus both ends of our

8

political spectrum tend to attack the foreign policy of
the United States which has dominated US foreign policy
for most of the postwar period on the ground that it offered
no final answers.

One extreme tends to view foreign policy as a branch
of psychiatry: The basic requirement of diplomacy, in
this view, is to generate goodwill. Adversaries are hostile
because they fear or resent us, because we have failed
to reassure them that our objectives can be harmonized
with theirs. Conflicts are an aberration from an otherwise
natural state of harmony. This school of thought emphasizes
unilateral measures of conciliation; seeks negotiations
regardless of Soviet acts of intransigence and sometimes
especially then. Communists in their view share some similar
objectives--Third World nations will rally to our standard
if we only identify with them.

9

The opposing school of thought sees foreign policy
as a branch of theology. Communism is consummate evil;
there is no compromise with the devil. The new nations
are either adversaries or cowards. Therefore negotiation
with the Soviet Union only confuses the American public
and is itself a form of moral disarmament. And the new
nations should be treated with indifference until they
rally to our side. What is needed is to sound the trumpet,
confront our enemies, ignore the uncommitted--and the walls
of Jericho presumably will crumble.

Both these strains in American thinking, of course,
share some features in common. Neither is comfortable
with long-term struggle without a final resolution; of
a world in which ideals can be realized, at any point in
time, only imperfectly and always gradually. Americans
are in some sense in a state of permanent rebellion against
the aspect of contingency in world affairs.

10

These tensions produce a third obstacle to a consistent American foreign policy: the tendency to decide foreign policy issues by analogy to domestic disputes. This causes problems to be segmented into a series of individual decisions resolved by compromises between adversarial positions which in turn are stated in absolute terms to nudge the final outcome as close to each side's preference as the pressure of advocacy permits. In domestic legislation, where each issue is essentially discrete and completed with the passage of the law, this has proved quite effective--especially as in the American political tradition, the loser accepts his setback with grace (but also with the expectation to renew the battle at an early propitious moment). But foreign policy is a seamless web. Compromise between philosophical positions may yield the least common denominator, not the best conceived outcome in terms of national strategy.

11

The continuous renewal of the domestic debate leads to
the lack of continuity about which some of our allies
especially have complained. Each new Administration prides
itself on rejecting the methods and assumptions of its
predecessor. Leaving aside the merit of the position, it
makes for some uncertainty on the part of other nations
and produces a tendency by those that depend on us to hedge
their bets. It sometimes contributes to the confusion
of adversaries.

The difficulties are compounded by the complexity
of assessing the balance of power in the modern period.
Historically military, economic and political power were
congruent. In our time this is no longer necessarily
the case. Some countries are strong militarily but stagnant
politically, for example the Soviet Union. Some countries
such as several oil producing states are powerful economically
but weak militarily. Some third world nations have at

12

times had a political influence out of proportion to their
military and economic strength; India in the Fifties and
early Sixties is a good example. And the time scale for
dealing with the various balances is not identical. Repairing
the military balance is occurring more rapidly than the
economic or political one. But success in one category
of power does not guarantee success in others; the problem
of synchronization of policy is thus a continuing challenge.

Vietnam was the catharsis that made these facts evident;
but reality would have imposed them in any event. The
trauma of having to come to grips with a world of contingent
solutions and relative power has marked the foreign policy
debate of America in the Seventies. And we have emerged
from it the stronger. The avoidance of the balance of
power has given way to a recognition of its essentiality.

The period of self-doubt has come to an end. While tactical
oscillations continue the main trend of the current foreign

13

policy has wide support. But our friends must never
forget the dual strain of American policy and the ultimate
impact of our domestic convictions. Whatever the importance
of geopolitics and equilibrium, however much it may become
an important factor in American foreign policy considerations,
the moral aspect of our national tradition will never disappear
completely. At some point our foreign policy will return
to the well spring of American motivations for justice,
human dignity and the quest for peace. The act of statesmanship
for America consists of combining these two strands.

US-Soviet Relations

With this as a background let me turn to the East-West conflict. The Soviet Union had presented us with a multifaceted challenge: a superpower militarily, stagnant politically, in a crisis economically. The Soviet Union is clearly a superpower militarily. Even as the moral claims of its ideology prove more and more hollow, the

[Y]

14

Soviet system is growing in military strength and geopolitical reach. In the past, expansionist powers produced a coalition against them, and a new equilibrium could be achieved only after a test of strength. In the nuclear age, war threatens global cataclysm. The maintenance of peace is therefore both a moral as well as a political imperative.

This requires two seemingly contradictory courses. First of all, it is the duty of the West to maintain the military balance and resist Soviet expansionism. The Soviet Union **must** learn--through the West's vigilant resistance-- that encroachments on the global equilibrium cannot be tolerated. It cannot be beyond the West's capability-- superior as we are in economic strength--to accomplish this.

However, the same problem I mentioned earlier with respect to the various categories of power exists within

15

the area of military power as well. Overall strength no
longer guarantees power in specific circumstances. Strategic
power is no assurance of the capacity to intervene locally.

In the Fifties the industrial democracies relied on the
strategic nuclear arsenal substituting technology for numbers
and sacrifice. They refused to face the fact that strategic
nuclear weapons could continue to counter-balance local
Soviet advantages only if the US strategic arsenal was
clearly superior to that of the Soviet Union--superiority
being defined as the ability to destroy the opposing nuclear
capability at acceptable cost. That condition began to
disappear in the Sixties. Technology tended toward equality,
and to levels beyond which additional increments of
destructiveness lose all relationship to the objectives
likely to be in dispute. Under current conditions superiority
to be meaningful would require an edge so large that no
opponent would tolerate it and calculations so esoteric

16

that few leaders will understand them or stake survival
on them. Arms control theory and practice, with their
formal emphasis on equality, only accelerated and legitimized
this trend.

Logically, once the Soviet Union acquired the capacity
to threaten the United States with direct nuclear retaliation,
the American pledge to launch an all-out nuclear war on
behalf of Europe was bound increasingly to lose its credibility
and public acceptance, if not its sense--and so would the
Alliance's defense strategy. For the strategy now rested
on the threat to initiate mutual suicide. But governments
continued the existing strategy, seeking to compensate
by emphatic reiterations of all-out nuclear defense for
the implausibility of their professions.

The legacy we are left with is a precarious combination
of a NATO reliance on nuclear defense, trends toward nuclear
stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism, and continued deficiencies

17

in conventional forces. If we are reluctant to resort
to nuclear weapons, and if we continue to evade the necessity
for conventional forces, the Western Alliance is left with
no defense policy at all, and we are risking the collapse
of the military balance in Europe that has made possible
thirty-five years of European security, prosperity, and
democracy. We will in effect have disarmed ourselves uni-
laterally while sitting on the most destructive stockpile
of weapons that the world has seen.

In these circumstances the West faces a profound moral
as well as practical challenge. The risks of nuclear war
produce a feeling of revulsion verging on abdication. If
peace becomes the sole objective of foreign policy the
world is open to the domination of the most ruthless.
The deepest challenge to the industrial democracies is
to build support for the proposition that peace must be
based on justice as well as restraint; that leaving the

18

world to the totalitarians can produce horrors even greater
than the risks of resistance--witness IndoChina.

Thus the West has two tasks: it must maintain the
balance of power in all its complexities. But maintaining
the balance of power is not enough. In the democratic
nations of the West--all of them--it is clear that the
public will not sustain a policy of confrontation without
some prospect of easing it. They will not support defense
programs or a vigorous foreign policy if they imagine that
their governments are the cause of tensions or if serious
efforts are not being made to reduce tensions and push
back the specter of nuclear war.

It is for this reason that arms control and efforts
to reduce tensions have been on the agenda of US-Soviet
relations for most of the last fifteen years. Arms control
is not a substitute for a secure military balance, but
it can be a way of maintaining it at lower levels of forces

19

or of reducing the risks of the outbreak of nuclear conflict
by miscalculation or panic. President Reagan has made
forthcoming proposals for strategic arms reductions. His
proposals have wisely focused not only on reducing the
numbers of nuclear weapons, but on those types and character-
istics of strategic weapons that most pose the danger of
surprise attack or first strike. And he has stressed as
well the need for restraint in superpower relations.

Thus a long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet
Union must combine power and diplomacy; both resistance
to challenges and a willingness to resolve political problems
through negotiation; both defense of Western values and
a recognition that we are doomed to coexist on this planet
in an era of thermonuclear weapons.

This becomes all the more important because the inherent
instabilities of the Soviet system will make negotiations
inevitable sooner or later. Both sides in the East-West

20

confrontation are betting on history. One of the ironies
of the postwar period is the extraordinary structural weakness
that is now seen to lie beneath the impressive surface
of Soviet power. The Soviet economic system is glaringly weak;
its ideological appeal has faded; its political base and empire
are increasingly precarious. In the 65-year history of the
Soviet state, it has never managed a legitimate, regular
succession of leadership. The system has failed to deal
seriously with the aspirations of the intellectual and
managerial elite that industrialization inevitably spawns;
instead the Soviet intelligentsia is a cynical, careerist
"new class" corrupted by privilege, its creativity stifled by
heavy-handed political rigidity. And the system has yet to
cope with the looming reality of its growing non-Russian
population, soon a majority, with the severe social and
political tensions this will entail.

The Soviet economy is a vast cumbersome machine burdened
with administrative rigidity, pervasive inefficiency, and a
level of performance that tends toward stagnation. It seems

21

to require a black market, that is, a secret free market,
to function at all. But this only magnifies the classic
weakness of Communist economies: chronic shortages and
chronic surpluses existing side by side. The dilemma of
Communism is that it seems impossible to run a modern economy
by a system of total planning; yet it may not be possible to
maintain a Communist state *without* a system of total planning.

In every Communist state -- it is almost an historic
joke -- the ultimate systemic crisis, latent if not evident,
is over the role of the Communist party. What is the function
of a Communist Party once it is entrenched in power? It is
not needed to run the government, or the economy, or the
military. It is the guardian of a political legitimacy that
has long since lost its moral standing as well as its
revolutionary spirit. The Party functionaries specialize in
dealing with internal crises which their centralized system
has created and external crises into which their rigidity

22

tempts them. In Poland, the Communist Party was nearly swept away because of its irrelevance and impotence. Its moral bankruptcy was devastatingly revealed by the Polish working class which overwhelmingly repudiated it. It is another historic joke that the only spontaneous revolutions in industrialized countries have been against Communist governments.

And we are only at the beginning of that process of transformation. If Moscow is prevented by a firm Western policy from deflecting its internal tensions into international crises, it is likely to find only disillusionment in the boast that history is on its side.

Then the time for serious negotiations on a broad front will have arrived. The industrial democracies must convey now that they are ready for such a dialogue, that they are not seeking the collapse of the Soviet system but its self-restraint. But they must also husband their

23

resources for that occasion and not piddle them away for
short-term benefits. This is at the core of some American-
European disputes.

Relations between America and Europe have undergone
many periods of stress in the past generation. To a significant
degree it is the result of one of the great successes of
American policy: our support for the economic recovery
of Europe and Japan, and for European integration. To
perhaps some extent, American expectations were exuberant and/somewhat
naive. It was thought by the fathers of European unity
that a restored Europe would share our burdens and continue
to follow our lead. It was not considered that a stronger
Europe would inevitably assert its own identity and role.
Hence the occasionally petulant reaction. In fact a stronger
unified Europe is in America's interest even if its perceptions
at times differ from ours. A Europe asserting its own
identity should theoretically come to parallel conclusions

24

as we on most issues of defense or international relations.

But such has not been the case. It would be idle to deny

that fundamental differences have arisen over an exorbitant

number of issues. Some difference of perspective is, of

course, inevitable in any coalition of sovereign states.

But today the Western Alliance is at odds over central

issues of East-West diplomacy, international economic policy,

the Middle East, Central America, and relations with the

Third World. Indeed, it is hard to find an important issue

on which the allies are united. Sooner or later such divisions

*must* affect the field of European security as well. For

too long the allies have evaded uncomfortable questions

that divided us; our evasions are now coming home to roost

in a public disenchantment with the main directions of

Alliance policy.

In too many NATO countries, protests and mass demonstra-
tions tend toward a unilateral psychological, and even
physical, disarmament. The impression is created that

25

it is America's attempt to restore its military balance
which threatens the peace and which must be resisted.
Little attention is paid to a whole series of aggressive or
intransigent Soviet actions, from the dispatch of Cuban
troops to Africa through the occupation of Afghanistan
to the repression of freedom in Poland, which not only
threatened the global equilibrium but are the proximate
cause of the breakdown of strategic arms control negotiations
in the 1970s.

Even less attention is paid to some basic facts of
postwar history: that but for Soviet pressures in the
immediate postwar period American troops would have been
withdrawn from Europe in the Forties, as indeed they were
from Korea; that but for the Korean war the US military
budget would have shrunk to derisory levels; that it was
the threat to the freedom of Berlin in the late Fifties
which accelerated the American military build-up; that

26

the Soviet strategic arsenal has grown and been modernized relentlessly since the Cuban missile crisis twenty years ago; that for a variety of reasons the United States stopped its numerical build-up in the late Sixties and slowed its modernization for the better part of the Seventies; and that _all_ wars in the postwar period have occurred where there were _no_ American forces and _no_ nuclear weapons, while Europe under American nuclear protection has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its history.

For all these reasons, the clamor for peace in much of the West is in most respects addressed to the wrong governments. Unmatched as it is by comparable agitation in the East, it poses the danger that a psychological imbalance, indeed a form of unilateral disarmament, will compound the regional military imbalances which have already produced such a sense of insecurity in almost all countries around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

27

But the basic difference does not derive from public
demonstrations. It resides in the attitudes of
governments. Three major differences have arisen: over
military strategy and its corollary of arms control; over
the nature of East-West relations and over East-West trade.

The change in the nature of the military balance has
affected European-American relations in a particularly
acute manner. So long as America possessed strategic
nuclear superiority the prevalent strategy coincided with
the determination to banish war from European territory.
But the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile produces
the need of local defense. Many in Europe recoil before
that prospect. In their defense effort they stop well
short of creating a meaningful alternative to general nuclear
war and thereby evade the key contemporary defense issue.
In the longer term this makes the current American deployment
in Europe untenable. Too strong for a trip wire, too weak

28

for local defense, the current NATO military establishment persists in a never-never land which encourages public escapism and internecine Allied strife.

Some allies seek in arms control an escape from this dilemma. But arms control can stabilize or reduce only those armaments which exist; it cannot substitute for an adequate defense policy. If used to escape complex choices it can have a dually negative impact: freezing an untenable strategy while creating the illusion of political progress. There is an urgent necessity of developing a coherent strategy for the Alliance to give meaning to defense and direction to East-West negotiations on the limitations of arms.

The debate over deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe illustrates the problem. Too often it has been portrayed as an American attempt to shift the risks of nuclear war to Europe or to use Europe as a forward base for strictly American purposes. This

29

is absurd. To the extent that intermediate-range weapons
are needed for American nuclear strategy, they can be deployed
in various modes at sea. The real argument for placing
intermediate-range nuclear weapons on the soil of the European
continent has always been two-fold: to reduce the possibility
of selective Soviet nuclear blackmail against Europe alone,
and to link the nuclear defense of Europe indissolubly
to the strategic deterrent of the United States. The Soviet
Union could not risk attacking Europe with conventional
weapons without destroying our intermediate-range missiles
also, lest they devastate Soviet command centers in a retaliatory
blow. And it could not seek to destroy the missiles in
Europe while leaving our strategic arsenal in America
unimpaired for a possible strike against Soviet ICBMs.

Far from giving us the possibility of separating the nuclear
defense of Europe from that of the United States, intermediate-
range missiles in Europe indissolubly link the two. They

30

increase the risk to America, not to Europe; logically
the public demonstrations against them should be on the
American side of the Atlantic.

I believe that our allies should now decide that aspect
of the requirements of their defense without further American
hectoring. By the same token, our proposals in the INF
talks should be made on their merits, independent of
considerations of shoring up the domestic support for our
deployment in various European countries. Such a course
would restore balance to the transatlantic dialogue and,
frankly, a sense of proportion to the domestic deliberations
of our allies.

The second problem concerns East-West relations in
general. The myth has developed in many quarters in Europe
that the US administration is needlessly confrontational.
Underlying it is a shift in emphasis between Europe and
the United States amounting to a reversal of historical

31

roles. In the closing years of the Second World War, there
were significant differences of philosophy between America
and Britain. Many Americans thought Churchill needlessly
obsessed with the postwar balance of power, too rigidly
anti-Soviet, too colonialist in his attitude to what is
now called the third world, and too little dedicated to
building the fundamentally new, pacific international order
toward which American idealism has always tended. Churchill
undoubtedly saw the Americans as naive, moralistic, eager
to evade the realities of defense and security and their
own share of responsibility for maintaining the global
balance of power. While the United States has never abandoned
its earlier moralism or fully developed a concept of
equilibrium as Europeans had long understood and maintained,
it has been forced by postwar realities to deal however
reluctantly with the problems of equilibrium. Today many
in Europe seem paradoxically to have moved to the positions

32

vacated by America and to have adopted some of the illusions
to which Americans clung in years of isolation from global
responsibility.

Whether American tactical judgments are always correct
need not be debated in this forum. But I believe that
America's insistence on a detente which has a geopolitical
basis is correct and that the attempt to deal with East-
West relations by analogy to personal relations is doomed.
The threat to world peace has not been American rhetoric--
even in its most exuberant version--but a series of Soviet
aggressive actions extending over several decades and especially
during the past seven years ranging from the dispatch of
proxy Cuban forces to Angola and Ethiopia, to sponsoring
Communist coups in South Yemen and Afghanistan to the invasion
of Afghanistan, the intelligence and logistic support to
various terrorist and subversive groups, and the military
pressures on Poland. The American objective is not--as

33

is often alleged--the collapse of the Soviet system but
an end to Soviet assaults on the global balance through
a substantial reduction of armed forces and a code of
restrained conduct.

As I have pointed out, I expect that the Soviet system
will have to come to grips with its internal and external
stresses. At that point a major and responsible negotiation
can and must take place. And the Soviet leaders should
know that the West stands ready to negotiate seriously
within a framework that respects the legitimate security
interests of a Soviet Union conducting the policies of
a national state and not of a revolutionary power seeking
to overthrow or subvert the existing order. But such nego-
tiations can succeed only if the West does not give up
its assets unilaterally ahead of time.

This is at the heart of the dispute over East-West
trade, of which the recent European uproar over President

34

Reagan's pipeline decision is symptomatic. The fundamental problem can be defined as follows: Theoretically trade reflects the mutual benefit of both parties. But East-West trade is distorted by two factors: By any objective analysis, the Soviet Union and its satellites are infinitely more dependent on East-West trade than their trading partners, the industrial democracies. The Soviet Union cannot feed itself without the non-Communist world's grain; it desperately needs Western technology. The typical Western product for sale in the East contains new ideas; what the Soviet Union has to offer in return is raw materials--products which contain no conceptual input. The inequality in benefits would long since have reduced trade to a trickle had not Western governments stepped in with direct or hidden credits, which now amount to nearly $90 billion for the Communist world. In addition, many export prices are subsidized by governments directly or indirectly. The

35

Communist countries thus are not only gaining a relative
advantage in trade but they are being financed by the nations
against whom they are simultaneously conducting a geo-
political offensive. Lenin's dictum that capitalists would
compete to sell the rope with which they are to be hanged
is coming true with a vengeance--for Lenin never guessed
that Western governments would provide the money to buy
the rope and subsidize the price to facilitate the purchase.

This problem is compounded by the fact that the Soviet
Union deals with the industrial democracies through a single
unit--a purchasing commission subject to strict political
direction. The industrial democracies are divided into
competing units.

For these reasons the issues raised by President Reagan
with respect to the pipeline go to the heart of the matter.
If the industrial democracies subsidize credits and provide
large foreign exchange earnings to the Soviet Union during

36

a period of a Soviet military build-up, Soviet proxy forces
in Africa, Soviet pressure in Poland and Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan, what possible incentive can the Soviet
leadership have for the fundamental negotiations I outlined
earlier?

I am not opposed to trade justified by commercial
considerations--though I have always believed that even
here the United States has been too profligate in the use
of our agricultural resources. But what goes beyond this
in the way of direct or indirect subsidies should be made
the subject of political negotiations.

This presupposes a common strategy by the industrial
democracies. So far as one can tell no serious study was
made about alternative sources of energy, for example, the
large deposits of Norwegian natural gas. If the industrial
democracies feel the necessity of subsidizing their exports
by easy pricing and credit policies, the creative area for

37

such efforts is in the market oriented, moderate developing
countries, not in the Soviet Union or its satellites.

Unfortunately, the industrial democracies have no
common forum for addressing the range of political, economic,
and military issues that are the subject of dispute. The
NATO alliance has no institutional machinery for addressing
economic or Third World issues, or long-term political
strategy. The European Community, while increasingly
successful at political coordination, has no mechanism
for formulating a coherent European view on matters of
defense. The economic summits of Western and Japanese
leaders, begun in the mid-70s when President Ford was in
office, are an attempt to surmount this procedural impasse,
but they can do little more than call key leaders' attention
to key problems in an informal, unsystematic way. Procedures
do not solve substantive problems. Nevertheless, the West
must find some forum to address its common future in

38

a concrete way.

## The Developing Countries

I have spent so much time on issues not subject to frequent debate in South Africa because they define the context of American views on Africa and on your own country.

And even the American perspective on Africa is part of an over-all perception of the developing world.

Lc

and an open heart to demonstrate my country's desire to work with you on these great tasks. My journey is intended to give fresh impetus to our cooperation and to usher in a new era in American policy.

The United States was one of the prime movers of the process of decolonization. The American people welcomed the new nations into the world community and for two decades have given aid and encouragement to economic and social progress in Africa. And America's responsibilities as a global power give us a strong interest today in the independence, peace, and well-being of this vast continent comprising a fifth of the world's land surface. For without peace, racial justice, and growing prosperity in Africa, we cannot speak of a just international order.

There is nothing to be gained in a debate about whether in the past America has neglected Africa or been insufficiently committed to African goals. The United States has many responsibilities in the world. Given the burden it has carried in the postwar period, it could not do everything simultaneously. African nations, too, have their own priorities and concerns, which have not always accorded with our own. No good can come of mutual recrimination. Our differing perspectives converge in a common purpose to build a secure and just future for Africa. In active collaboration there is much we can do; in contention or apart we will miss great opportunities. President Ford and the American Government and people are prepared to work with you with energy and good will if met in the same spirit.

So it is time to put aside slogans and to seek practical solutions. It is time to find our common ground and act boldly for common ends.

Africa is a continent of hope, a modern frontier. The United States from the beginning has been a country of the frontier, built by men and women of hope. The American people know from their history the meaning of the struggle for independence, for racial equality, for economic progress, for human dignity.

I am not here to give American prescriptions for Africa's problems. Your program must be African. The basic decisions and goals must be African. But we are prepared to help.

Nor am I here to set African against African, either among your governments or among factions of liberation movements. African problems cannot be solved, and your destiny cannot be fulfilled, except by a united Africa.

America supports African unity. We urge all other countries to do the same.

Here in Africa the range of mankind's challenges and potential can be seen in all its complexity and enormous promise.

The massive power and grandeur of nature is before us in all its aspects—as the harsh master and as a bountiful servant of mankind.

Here we can feel the rich and living cultures which have changed and invigorated art, music, and thought around the world.

And here on this continent we are tested, all of us, to see whether our future will be determined for us or by us, whether humanity will be the victim or the architect of its destiny.

## The Issues of Southern Africa

Of all the challenges before us, of all the purposes we have in common, racial justice is one of the most basic. This is a dominant issue of our age, within nations and among nations.

We know from our own experience that the goal of racial justice is both compelling and achievable. Our support for this principle in southern Africa is not simply a matter of foreign policy but an imperative of our own moral heritage.

The people of Zambia do not need to be reminded of the importance of realizing this goal. By geography and economic necessity, Zambia is affected directly and grievously by strife in southern Africa. Political stability in this region means more to Zambia than to many others. Yet Zambia has chosen to stand by her principles by closing her

May 31, 1976

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border with Rhodesia and enduring the economic consequences. This is a testimony to the determination of the people of this country and to the statesmanship of its great leader, President Kaunda.

And it was in this city seven years ago that leaders of east and central African states proclaimed their Manifesto on Southern Africa.

One is struck by the similarity of philosophy in the American Declaration of Independence and in the Lusaka Manifesto. Two hundred years ago Thomas Jefferson wrote:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

And seven years ago the leaders of east and central Africa declared here in Lusaka that:

> By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own Government.

There can be no doubt that the United States remains committed to the principles of its own Declaration of Independence. It follows that we also adhere to the convictions of the Lusaka Manifesto.

Therefore, here in Lusaka, I reaffirm the unequivocal commitment of the United States to human rights, as expressed in the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa—in the name of moral principle, international law, and world peace.

On this occasion I would like to set forth more fully American policy on some of the immediate issues we face—in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa—and then to sketch our vision of southern Africa's hopeful future.

## The U.S. Position on Rhodesia

The U.S. position on Rhodesia is clear and unmistakable. As President Ford has said, "The United States is totally dedicated to seeing to it that the majority becomes the ruling power in Rhodesia." We do not recognize the Rhodesian minority regime. The United States voted for, and is committed to, the U.N. Security Council resolutions of 1966 and 1968 that imposed mandatory economic sanctions against the illegal Rhodesian regime. Earlier this year we cosponsored a Security Council resolution, which was passed unanimously, expanding mandatory sanctions. And in March of this year we joined others to commend Mozambique for its decision to enforce these sanctions even at great economic cost to itself.

It is the responsibility of all who seek a negotiated solution to make clear to the Rhodesian minority that the world community is united in its insistence on rapid change. It is the responsibility of those in Rhodesia who believe in peace to take the steps necessary to avert a great tragedy.

U.S. policy for a just and durable Rhodesian solution will therefore rest on 10 elements:

- First, the United States declares its support in the strongest terms for the proposals made by British Prime Minister Cecil Laghan, then Foreign Secretary, on March 22 of this year: that independence must be preceded by majority rule, which in turn must be achieved no later than two years following the expeditious conclusion of negotiations. We consider these proposals a basis for a settlement fair to all the people of Rhodesia. We urge that they be accepted.

- Second, the Salisbury regime must understand that it cannot expect U.S. support either in diplomacy or in material help at any stage in its conflict with African states or African liberation movements. On the contrary, it will face our unrelenting opposition until a negotiated settlement is achieved.

- Third, the United States will take steps to fulfill completely its obligation under international law to mandatory economic

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Department of State Bulletin

LC

sanctions against Rhodesia. We will urge the Congress this year to repeal the Byrd amendment, which authorizes Rhodesian chrome imports to the United States; an act inconsistent with U.N. sanctions. In parallel with this effort, we will approach other industrial nations to insure the strictest and broadest international compliance with sanctions.

—Fourth, to insure that there are no misperceptions on the part of the leaders of the minority in Rhodesia, the United States, on the conclusion of my consultations in black Africa, will communicate clearly and directly to the Salisbury regime our view of the urgency of a rapid negotiated settlement leading to majority rule.

—Fifth, the U.S. Government will carry out its responsibility to inform American citizens that we have no official representation in Rhodesia nor any means of providing them with assistance or protection. American travelers will be advised against entering Rhodesia; Americans resident there will be urged to leave.

—Sixth, as in the case of Zambia a few years ago, steps should be taken—in accordance with the recent U.N. Security Council resolution—to assist Mozambique, whose closing of its borders with Rhodesia to enforce sanctions has imposed upon it a great additional economic hardship. In accordance with this U.N. resolution, the United States is willing to provide $12.5 million of assistance.

—Seventh, the United States, together with other members of the United Nations, is ready to help alleviate economic hardship for any countries neighboring Rhodesia which decide to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers.

—Eighth, humanitarian provision must be made for the thousands of refugees who have fled in distress from Rhodesia into neighboring countries. The United States will consider sympathetically requests for assistance for these refugees by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or other appropriate international organizations.

—Ninth, the world community should give

its support to the people of Rhodesia as they make the peaceful transition to majority rule and independence and should aid a newly independent Zimbabwe. To this end, we are ready to join with other interested nations in a program of economic, technical, and educational assistance to enable an independent Zimbabwe to achieve the progress and the place in the community of nations to which its resources and the talents of all its people entitle it.

—Finally, we state our conviction that whites as well as blacks should have a secure future and civil rights in a Zimbabwe that has achieved racial justice. A constitutional structure should protect minority rights together with establishing majority rule. We are prepared to devote some of our assistance programs to this objective.

In carrying out this program we shall consult closely with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.

We believe these are important measures. We are openminded with respect to additional actions that can help speed a resolution. The United States will consult closely with African leaders, especially the four Presidents, and with other friends on the Rhodesian problem. For the central fact that I have come here to stress is this: The United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid, just, and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia.

## Namibia

Rhodesia is the most urgent but by no means the only critical problem in southern Africa. The status of Namibia has been a source of contention between the world community and South Africa for over three decades.

The Territory of South West Africa turned into a source of serious international discord following World War II. When the United Nations refused to accede to South Africa's proposal for annexation of the territory, South Africa declined to enter into a trusteeship agreement and since then has refused to recognize the United Nations as the legal

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sovereign. In 1966 the General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate over the territory. In 1971 the International Court of Justice concluded that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal and that it should withdraw.

The United States voted for the 1966 General Assembly resolution. We were the only major power to argue before the International Court that South African occupation was illegal. And in January 1976 the United States voted in favor of the U.N. resolution condemning the occupation of Namibia and calling for South Africa to take specific steps toward Namibia's self-determination and independence.

We are encouraged by the South African Government's evident decision to move Namibia toward independence. We are convinced that a solution can be found which will embody equal rights for the entire population and at the same time protect the interests of all who live and work there. But we are concerned that South Africa has failed to announce a definite timetable for the achievement of self-determination, that all the people and all political groupings of Namibia have not been allowed to take part in determining the form of government they shall one day have, and that South Africa continues to deny the United Nations its proper role in establishing a free and independent Namibia.

Therefore the U.S. position is as follows:

- We reiterate our call upon the South African Government to permit all the people and groups of Namibia to express their views freely, under U.N. supervision, on the political future and constitutional structure of their country.

- We urge the South African Government to announce a definite timetable, acceptable to the world community, for the achievement of self-determination.

- The United States is prepared to work with the international community, and especially with African leaders, to determine what further steps would improve prospects for a rapid and acceptable transition to Namibian independence. We are convinced

that the need for progress is urgent.

- Once concrete movement toward self-determination is underway, the United States will ease its restrictions on trade and investment in Namibia. We stand ready to provide economic and technical assistance to help Namibia take its rightful place among the independent nations of the world.

## South Africa

Apartheid in South Africa remains an issue of great concern to those committed to racial justice and human dignity.

No country, no people, can claim perfection in the realm of human rights. We in America are aware of our own imperfections. But because we are a free society, our problems and our shortcomings are fully aired and made known to the world. And we have reason to take pride in our progress in the quest for justice for all in our country.

The world community's concern with South Africa is not merely that racial discrimination exists there. What is unique is the extent to which racial discrimination has been institutionalized, enshrined in law, and made all-pervasive.

No one, including the leaders of black Africa, challenges the right of white South Africans to live in their country. They are not colonialists; historically, they are an African people. But white South Africans must recognize as well that the world will continue to insist that the institutionalized separation of the races must end. The United States appeals to South Africa to heed the warning signals of the past two years. There is still time to bring about a reconciliation of South Africa's peoples for the benefit of all. But there is a limit to that time—a limit of far shorter duration than was generally perceived even a few years ago.

A peaceful end to institutionalized inequality is in the interest of all South Africans. The United States will continue to encourage and work for peaceful change. Our policy toward South Africa is based upon the premise that within a reasonable time we shall see a clear evolution toward equality of op-

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portunity and basic human rights for all South Africans. The United States will exercise all its efforts in that direction. We urge the Government of South Africa to make that premise a reality.

In the immediate future, the Republic of South Africa can show its dedication to Africa—and its potential contribution to Africa—by using its influence in Salisbury to promote a rapid negotiated settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia. This, we are sure, would be viewed positively by the community of nations as well as by the rest of Africa.

## A Vision of the Future

Southern Africa has all the prerequisites for an exciting future. Richly endowed with minerals, agricultural and hydroelectric potential, a favorable climate, and most important, great human resources, it needs only to overcome the human failure of racial strife to achieve bright prospects for all its peoples. Let us all strive to speed the day when this vision becomes a reality.

The United States stands ready to work with the nations of southern Africa to help them achieve the economic progress which will give meaning to their political independence and dignity to their struggle for equality.

As you know, Deputy Secretary Robinson, an expert in economic development, is accompanying me on this visit. This is the first time that an American Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary together have come on such a mission, reflecting the importance we attach to the economic development of southern Africa. Mr. Robinson and I are discussing development needs with African officials in the various capitals, and we shall continue these consultations at the UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] meeting in Nairobi next week. After my return to Washington, based on what we have learned, we will urgently study a new aid program for this continent.

Africa and its friends face a dual challenge: immediate and long-term growth. In the short term, economic emergencies can arise from natural disasters or sharp swings

in global economic conditions over which developing nations have little control. These economic shocks must be dealt with if the nations of the region are to maintain their hard-won progress toward development. For example, the sharp drop in world copper prices has had a devastating impact on the economies of Zambia and Zaïre. The United States will deal with this problem in its bilateral assistance programs for these countries and in our programs for multilateral action—to be proposed at UNCTAD next week—for resource development, buffer stocks, and earnings stabilization.

But our basic concern must go beyond responding to emergencies. We need to develop urgently programs to lay the foundations for sustained growth to enable the developing nations of southern Africa to deal effectively with global economic shocks and trends.

Let me mention four that are especially relevant to southern Africa: trained local manpower, rural development, advanced technology, and modern transportation.

- For Namibia and Zimbabwe, training programs should be intensified now so that needed manpower will be ready when majority rule is attained. Existing programs to train Namibian and Zimbabwean refugees as administrators and technicians should be expanded as rapidly as possible. We have requested additional funds from Congress for this purpose. We urge other donors and international organizations to do more.

- Development for all of southern Africa involves a process of transforming rural life. We are prepared to assist in agricultural development, in health programs, in manpower training, in improving rural transportation, through both bilateral and multilateral programs.

- A revolution in development planning could be achieved by the use of satellites to collect vital information on crops, weather, water resources, land use, and mineral exploration. The United States has already shared with developing nations information from our earliest earth resources survey satellites. We are now prepared to undertake much larger programs to apply this tech-

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nology to Africa, including training programs and the development of training facilities and satellite-receiving stations in Africa itself.

—Perhaps the most critical long-term economic need of southern Africa is a modern system of regional transportation. The magnitude of the effort extends beyond the capacity of any one nation or group of nations. For this reason the United States proposes that the World Bank undertake as a priority matter the organization of a multi-lateral consultative group of donors to develop a modern regional transportation system for southern Africa. For our part we promise our full cooperation in working out a long-term program and in financing appropriate portions of it.

And finally, I can announce today that we expect to triple our support for development programs in southern and central Africa over the next three years.

In addition, the United States has offered leadership in many international forums to promote development through multilateral cooperation. The industrial nations, the newly wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries themselves must collaborate for the goal of development. Africa is a principal beneficiary of the many U.S. initiatives in multilateral institutions and programs— to enhance economic security through supporting export earnings in the face of sharp economic swings, to promote growth through better access to capital markets and technology transfers, to accelerate agricultural production, to improve the conditions of trade and investment in key commodities, and to address the special needs of the poorest nations.

Many of the proposals we have made are already being implemented. Next week in Nairobi, I will put forward new proposals to further advance progress in relations between developed and developing nations.

Today I have outlined the principles of American policy on the compelling challenges of southern Africa.

Our proposals are not a program made in America to be passively accepted by Afri-

cans. They are an expression of common aspirations and an agenda of cooperation. Underlying the proposals is our fundamental conviction that Africa's destiny must remain in African hands.

No one who wishes this continent well can want to see Africans divided either between nations or between liberation movements. Africans cannot want outsiders seeking to impose solutions or choosing among countries or movements. The United States, for its part, does not seek any pro-American African bloc confronting a bloc supporting any other power. Nor do we wish to support one faction of a liberation movement against another. But neither should any other country pursue hegemonial aspirations or bloc policies. An attempt by one will inevitably be countered by the other. The United States therefore supports African unity and integrity categorically as basic principles of our policy.

There is no better guarantee against outside pressure from any quarter than the determination of African nations in defense of their own independence and unity. You did not build African institutions to see outside forces fragment them into competing blocs. The United States supports Africa's genuine nonalignment and unity. We are ready for collaboration on the basis of mutual respect. We do so guided by our convictions and our values. Your cause is too compatible with our principles for you to need to pursue it by tactics of confrontation with the United States; our self-respect is too strong to let ourselves be pressured either directly or by outside powers.

What Africa needs now from the United States is not exuberant promises or emotional expressions of good will. What it needs is a concrete program, which I have sought to offer today. So let us get down to business. Let us direct our eyes toward our great goals —national independence, economic development, racial justice, goals that can be achieved by common action.

Africa in this decade is a testing ground of the world's conscience and vision. That

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Department of State Bulletin