# I. Introduction

Almost from the beginning of the new Administration, NATO has been rent by a debate to which current United States defense policies have given rise. This has concerned the relative significance of nuclear and conventional forces; of the control over what has come to be called The Deterrent, i.e. the offensive nuclear striking power; the relationship between the United States and its European allies, particularly those on the Continent. The debate has been needlessly confused by a tactical mistake committed early in the Kennedy Administration: the insistence that no new defense policy was being promulgated in Washington; that we were simply requesting our European allies to live up to their (previous?) commitments. This had the result of casting much of the subsequent discussion in terms of the

prevented the NATO goals from being fulfilled inconsistencies which had caused the NATO goals not to be fulfilled in the first place. In terms of a retaliatory strategy, the U.S. proposals to build up conventional forces was bound to appear either unnecessary or disingenuous. The reluctance to avow departures from accepted doctrine, forced us on the defensive and provided arguments--if any were

nuclear?
needed--for the build-up of retaliatory forces under national control in
France.

But whatever the wisdom of our tactics the trend of U.S. Defense
policy has reflected the realities of the emerging weapons technology.
The uncertainties which do exist are not the result of American decisions
and they could not be avoided by glossing over the facts of life. In a
rapidly changing technology, periodic reexaminations of our defense policy
are essential. Our allies should be concerned not if we change our policy
emphasis, but if we cling rigidly to doctrines of a past in the process
of being transcended. Indeed, our chief error has been not to face fully
the implications of the period into which we are about to head. Too much
of our effort is still beset by ambiguities inevitable when obsolete slogans
are used to describe new conditions.

In assessing these conditions, it may be helpful to begin by analyzing
the changes in the current strategic situation independent of the fact that
NATO is an alliance of sovereign states. This fact adds complications--parti-
cularly with respect to the control of nuclear weapons. It does not, however,

which has come about in the last...years.
affect the fundamental change in the strategic situation: the altered significance of the notion of strategic superiority.

## II. The Problem of Strategic Relationships.

Agret deal of recent discussion has concerned the readiness of the United States to employ its nuclear arsenal in the defense of Europe.

Many critics, particularly on the Continent, have seen in our new emphasis on conventional weapons a symptom of our reluctance to resort to nuclear retaliation. We have been accused of wishing to make the security of Europe dependent on the fluctuating fortunes of conventional battle. We have replied that quite the contrary is the case. The build-up of conventional forces, it

(by our critics or by us?)

has been said, does not imply a degradation of the deterrent, whose total strength is being developed apace.

1. far

The non-nuclear build-up, far from reducing the credibility of our nuclear power, enhances it according to

2.

Secretary MacMamara. Because of the insistence that the basic policy had remained unchanged various phrases have come to describe the purpose of the conventional forces in Europe: Their purpose has been said to be to provide

a "pause, so that the Soviets appreciate the wider risks involved." Another

1. See speech by Secretary of the Army Stahr to the NATO Parliamentarian's Conference, November 13, 1961.

2. Speech, February 17, 1962.

purpose has been said to be to create a "threshhold" for the use of nuclear weapons.

about

All these arguments--except perhaps of the threshhold--have suffered from certain inconsistencies. It is not self-evident how the build-up of conventional forces demonstrates a resolve to use nuclear weapons. It can

would not necessarily be aware

at least be argued that the Soviets are not necessarily going to be aware

who would be taking? pause in what?
of the wider risks/during a pause/at the end of which our conventional forces
would be
are presumably completely defeated. Or if we are threatening them with our
defeat rather than with our resistance, the question arises why few, rather
than more forces, might not make the defeat more certain and the nuclear threat
therefore less ambiguous. The trouble is that the new strategic relationship
cannot be encompassed in traditional slogans. The issue is not whether the
United States will invoke nuclear retaliation on behalf of Europe--this way
of posing the problem posits a duality of interest which is misleading and not
the core of the issue. The real issue is whether NATO can face up to a situation
where traditional notions of superiority and victory which have dominated the
strategy of the past decade are on the verge of being losing most, if not
all, of their significance.

that is, until 19--

For the first decade and a half of the nuclear age, the West (U.S.) enjoyed nuclear preponderance. This meant that the United States could win a general war whether it struck first or second. Or put another way, we were able to deter an attack or pressure on areas recognized as vital by the threat of initiating general war. The Soviet Union could not exploit the local superiority brought about by its larger ground forces lest it trigger SAC. And it could not attack the United States simultaneously with our allies because, while this would have increased our losses, it would nevertheless meant eventual defeat of the... have sealed the fate of the Communist empire. In these circumstances, Soviet military pressure against our European allies was discouraged--though even our nuclear superiority did not prevent a whole series of other shakingsuşan Challenges elsewhere.

Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin, in November, 1958, was a signal that the impending change in the strategic situation. A challenge to the vitals of the Western position was made in the obvious belief that it would not lead to a nuclear strike. And the Western response since then has demonstrated that there were at least some elements of the status quo in Europe which did

not seem worth a nuclear war.

What were the changes in that situation? Our strategic preponderance
had been based on the following factors: a lead in the development of nu-
clear weapons, a substantial superiority both in the numbers and deploy-
ment of our Strategic Air Command; our system of overseas bases; the
nature of strategic war in the bomber age. For most of the nuclear age,
our stockpile of the new weapons and their technology was far superior to
that of the Soviet Union. The technical superiority of our weapons caused
the Soviet delivery system to be inevitably more cumbersome and therefore
less flexible than ours. For a long time, it would have been technically
difficult for the Soviet Union to attack both Europe and the United States
massively at the same time. Throughout the bomber age (give dates), our large
and efficient bomber force, together with our overseas bases system,
would have enabled us to cripple the Soviet retaliatory force if we struck first--
say in response to an attack on Europe. Though a number of writers--foremost
among them Albert Wohlstetter--brilliantly demonstrated the disparity between
our first and our second-strike capability, between our overwhelming offensive
power and the relative vulnerability of our bases--this did not detract

from the deterrent effect of our strategic forces against an attack on
Europe. (It raised the risk of a pre-emptive strike against us.)

All this is in the process of being changed by the onset of the
missile age. The studies about surprise attack and vulnerability have
underlined the need to protect our retaliatory forces. One of the major
efforts of the new Administration has been in this direction. By 1963,
our retaliatory force will possess a "mix" against which a successful surprise
attack will be difficult to visualize. The combination of bombers on
fifteen minute alert, hardened Minutemen, Polaris submarines and perhaps
other forms of sea-borne mobility should make a successful surprise attack
next to impossible. Providing we exercise reasonable vigilance and keep
up in the technological race, only rapid and spectacular advances in anti-
air and anti-missile defense (on the part of an opponent) could upset this
invulnerability enough to make a surprise attack technically possible. And
it is the belief of most students of the subject that these defenses are
not likely to be overpowering against the expected advances in the offense.

If invulnerability is possible for us, it is only prudent
prudent to assume that the Soviet Union will also achieve it sooner or later.

Of course, invulnerability is a忌word, especially in the military. No retaliatory force can be completely protected. However, it should be possible always to safeguard a sufficient percentage of the retaliatory force to guarantee a devastating counterblow. In the airplane age, surprise attack was a conceivable strategy because the number of airfields was always smaller than the number of airplanes. A single attacking weapon could therefore destroy a substantial number of the opposing retaliatory force. In the missile age, however, the weapons can be so dispersed that a single hit can destroy at best only one opposing weapon. Their characteristics can be so varied that the effort required to launch an attack with confidence can be reduced to a very small probability.

The hurdles to replying on a counterforce strategic strike to counter Soviet local superiority are threefold: (a) for the reasons already mentioned, a successful first-strike will become technically increasingly complex. The confidence even in purely military terms in the efficacy of such a strategy is therefore constantly bound to decline. Even if the percentage of the Soviet force that can be destroyed remains constant--a highly optimistic

assumption--the absolute number of retaliatory weapons will increase and so will the cost of a counterforce strategy. (b) Whatever the technical feasibility of a counterforce strategy to repel local attack, it will prove increasingly difficult to convince the political leadership of its efficacy. What responsible statesman can rely on an estimate of, say, an 80% probability that a first strike will destroy 90% of the opposing retaliatory force--all the more so when the remaining 10% is a large number and the warheads, if directed against civilian targets, would inflict catastrophic losses. (C) Even if a counterforce strategy is technically feasible and even if the political leadership has some confidence in it, it may not serve to prevent pressure or aggression against our allies. For if the Soviets do not believe our threat, they may be encouraged to press or to blackmail. Maintaining the credibility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of local areas will require a diplomacy inconsistent with the domestic structure of a democracy, much less a coalition of them. It would be credible--if at all--only if we were prepared to behave somewhat recklessly, by deliberately staking our prestige so that the question of cost could not arise. In fact, public opinion imposes on our leaders the requirement

of appearing "calm," "rational," "ready to compromise," all qualities in-
consistent with a counterforce strategy.

Of course, having some counterforce capability is useful in certain
circumstances, for example in the improbable contingency of a deliberate
# exerts
Soviet surprise attack. And it exercises a certain restraint even on local
aggression. But it is essential to recognize that what used to be known
as The Deterrent will deter an ever smaller range of dangers as the missile
age develops. The decline in credibility is not the result of our decisions;
rather our decisions have been an attempt to adjust to the consequences of
this change. This means that many of the cherished notions of the past
decadé and a half will be fundamentally changed. It will be difficult for
# absolute
many to accept the fact that retaining an # absolute and continuing margin of
superiority is no guarantee of strategic dominance. In most # absolute
# foreseeable
circumstances, retaliatory forces will have to be designed so that they can
# attempt
ride out an attack. This reduces the incentive to surprise attack as well
as pre-emption, the # of the recent past. It may make possible
a slow war of attrition.

sheds a new light, places a new emphasis?
Above all, it places a completely new aspect on the problem of local

-11-

defense. If a counterforce first strike is likely to produce only mutual
devastation an aggressor may be tempted to seize the territory of an
ally as a hostage--He may not credit our threat of retaliation. And
even if he proves to be wrong, the result would(only)be mutual devastation,
not the protection of the threatened ally. It has been said that an attempt
to defend our allies locally makes their future dependent on the outcome
of a local battle. This can be contested. But any ot her course

places them at the mercy of a Soviet coup de main. For retaliation will not protect them it may indeed submerge their fate in the much greater upheavals that would inevitably attend a general war. The attempt by NATO to adjust to this situation has dominated allied discussions for the past year.

### III. Local Defense and Conventional Forces

Had NATO carried out the implications of its own strategy, the balance of forces on the Continent would today be enormously if unfavorable. In terms of the prevailing strategy, nothing was required except a force large enough to determine that a general Soviet advance was in fact taking place. At that point, the retaliatory forces would intervene. The outcome would be decided by the success of the air battle. If SAC was effective, the Soviet advance would presumably halt. There was some reference to "broken-back warfare" which would follow a nuclear exchange and where conventional or other local forces would struggle for supremacy. Nevertheless, it was plain that the primary reliance for both deterrence and the conduct of a war was to be placed on the nuclear retaliation.

Throughout the existence of NATO, the forces maintained on the Continent were always larger than was justified by prevailing NATO theory.

A fairly substantial military establishment came into being on the Continent even though our military doctrine could assign no particular purpose to it.

The reason was political and psychological, not strategic. Our European allies have always been uneasy about an alliance where the major responsibility for defense fell on a power three thousand miles away and with a recent tradition of isolation. No moral commitment could entirely remove the concern of many of our allies that we might not implement our guarantee.

If NATO was only a form of Monroe doctrine, the European powers would have in effect resigned any major voice in the decision of peace or war or in the strategy for common defense.

This led to two efforts: on the one hand, there was an attempt by Great Britain and more recently, France, to build up nuclear forces of their own at least in part in order to be able to demand a voice in the common strategy. Concurrently, our allies sought to remove our freedom of decision in case of aggression by committing us to maintain large ground

forces on the Continent. On the other hand, we could not be induced to
send these forces unless mmx our allies were prepared to make an effort
of their own. As a result, there grew up a substantial military establish-
ment on the Continent, conceived at first by us as a form of trip wire and
by our European allies as the price of admission to American mmx nuclear
protection.

NATO strategic doctrine has always followed rather than guided the
creation of these forces. Force goals which later became almost sacrosanct
were originally developed on the basis of what the traffic would bear.
The thirty divisions which the Administration has set as an objective were
originally agreed on in 1957 when, in terms of the then prevalent theory
they made little strategic sense. After these goals were developed, a theory
to utilize them grew up.--the nation of the shield and the sword. The
shield comprising the forces was supposed to hold long enough until the
nuclear offensive had destroyed the Soviet *d* capability to conduct military
operations. Another function of the shield was to deal with minor Soviet
incursions which might not have seemed to warrant general nuclear war. However,
it was always evident that the hodge-podge of conventional forces on the

Continent would not be able to offer serious resistance to a major Soviet
attack. They were therefore supplemented by tactical nuclear weapons of
various kinds. Some were assigned to front line divisions; others
were short-range interdiction weapons; still others could be called tacti-
cal only in the technical sense that they were not under the command of
SAC. In every other respect, they performed functions & indistinguishable
from those of our retaliatory force. There was a continuum of nuclear power--
but the purposes of this continuum were far less clear and the question
of how to control operations once the order to release nuclear weapons
had been given was never successfully addressed. With nuclear weapons
deployed so far forward, any local reversal might lead to their use.
Once employed anywhere along the front it was not easy to see how their
general use could be prevented or their employment controlled.

This was the situation when the new Administration took over. None
of the goals for the shield forces had been met and a rationale for them
was sadly lacking. If any large scale attack was bound to turn into all-
out nuclear exchange, the exact size of the shield forces was of peripheral
importance. Too large as a trip wire, too small for effective local

defense, with a hodge-podge conventional and nuclear deployment, the NATO
establishment on the Continent represented a series of uneasy compromises
whose basic confusion was obscured by the conviction that the basic
defense of NATO depended on a force outside of NATO control: the
Strategic Air Command.

Ever since coming into office, the Administration has sought to place
greater emphasis on the shield forces. It has persistently called on our
European allies to fulfill their commitment to reach thirty divisions.
We have insisted on the need for greater flexibility. Yet we have been
a
engaged in/circuitous debate in which every demand for an increase in
shield forces is answered by a renewed request for an American guarantee.

Part of the difficulty has been our insistence that we were not pro-
posing a new policy but an implementation of the old one. The strengthening
of the shield forces was designed to strengthen the credibility of the Deterrent.
It was to increase the risk of nuclear war to the aggressor, not to reduce
it.

But this proposition for all the insistence with which it has been ad-
vanced, is open to serious question. One reason why the 30 division force

goal was never met was that in terms of a retaliatory strategy it simply did not make too much sense. If there were a full scale Soviet attack, 30 divisions could no more stop it than the existing twenty. If the only purpose of the shield forces was to bring about a pause while the retaliatory forces exchanged nuclear blows, it was not obvious what difference an additional ten divisions would make. And the deployment of nuclear weapons almost insured that a war in Europe could not remain conventional very long.

This has set up a vicious circle. The more we called attention to the need for shield forces, the more our European allies have demanded the nuclear guarantees to give them meaning. The more we have protested our readiness to reemploy nuclear weapons after all, the more we have put in doubt the specific conventional goals we have proposed. Or else they have been fulfilled, not because of any great belief in their efficacy, but rather for the traditional reason of obtaining a U.S. nuclear guarantee.

The question of the shield forces has proven to be inseparable from that of the control of nuclear weapons. Such issues as NATO as a fourth nuclear power have come to the fore as an inevitable concomitant of the proposal

to strengthen conventional strength.

To be sure, a host of theories were developed to explain the relationship of the shield to the sword, and of the nuclear to the conventional forces. The purpose of the shield was said to be to enforce a pause to compel the aggressor to face the wider risks--presumably of nuclear war. The conventional forces were supposed to provide a threshold below which we would not be compelled to use nuclear weapons. The threshold in turn has been variously described. Its most common formulation is that by a Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric: "The current doctrine is that if at NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by non-nuclear attacks from the Boc countries, that NATO would respond, would make use of nuclear arms."

However, the basic difficulty remained. For example, the maximization concept of pause was based on the notion that it be able to resist a certain number of days, say, thirty, by conventional means. The Soviets will be forced to confront the larger risks involved, presumably nuclear war. But this is not very convincing. If a full-scale Soviet attack occurred, the Soviets had presumably discounted the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation. Is it absolutely clear that their threat would be more

-19-

credible during conventional operations, each day of which would shift
the local balance against us? At the end of the period of thirty days
why should our bargaining position be better than at the beginning? What
if at that point the Soviets offer to negotiate in possession of their
prize? If nuclear war was too risky at the beginning of such a conflict,
why should it not be even more risky when the local issue has in effect al-
ready been decided against us and under conditions of mutual invulnerability
when the devasation caused by the nuclear exchange might cause the local
situation to appear irrelevant. If, on the other hand, it is argued that
the Soviets would never run the risk of such an exchange, we are back to
our original problem. If it is our defeat, and not our resistance, which
deters the Soviets, what have we gained by increasing the conventional
forces from 22 to 30 divisions? Would it then not be better to leave no
?

doubt that any incursion short of a minor incursion would inevitably lead
to nuclear war? In other words, as long as the "sword" remains the chief
weapon in our arsenal, the increase in conventional forces in Europe now
projected may turn out to be too little or too much; too little for a
real local defense, and too much for nuclear deterrence.

Of course, thirty divisions are a more powerful force than twenty. They will improve our capability to resist minor incursions. And they will enable NATO to offer a somewhat more prolonged resistance to full-scale attack. However, it is important to inquire just what is meant by a minor incursion. A Soviet coup de main with, say, five divisions, can be resisted by 20 NATO divisions if not quite as flexibly. A larger Soviet attack would be tantamount to full-scale war on the Central front. Because its risks would be not much lower than that of a major assault, it can be expected that such an attack would be made in whatever force is required to overwhelm the Central & front.

Thus, the major purpose of the conventional build-up will be to raise the "threshold" at which nuclear weapons will have to be used to repel the attack. When our conventional forces were "about to be overwhelmed" we would resort to our nuclear weapons. This raises two questions: (1) What determines whether our conventional forces are about to be overwhelmed? (2) How do we then use our nuclear weapons?

With respect to the first question, the current deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe gives cause for serious concern. It is at least conceivable that even in an otherwise successful defense a single division might be overrun.

With nuclear weapons deployed so far forward and so widely dispersed, the
possibility exists that a local tactical situation would force the employ-
ment of nuclear weapons or else impose on us the decision of whether we
are prepared to have these weapons and the stockpiles overrun. This situa-
tion may contribute to deterrence; it is not necessarily consistent with
a decision to conduct sustained conventional operations.

Assuming, however, that it is possible to make a clear determination
that NATO's conventional forces are being overwhelmed, the problem arises
how nuclear forces are to be used? If we assume a certain ΝΣΣΣΕΚΧ symmetry
in the possession of tactical nuclear weapons, it is far from clear that the
employment of these weapons would favor the defense at that particular
point. With the conventional defense overwhelmed, there would presumably
be few shield forces left to stem the tide, even if the attacking units
were decimated by nuclear power. After a breakthrough has been achieved,
the local employment of nuclear weapons may well favor the offense, whose
units can at that point be dispersed. And they can work against the de-
fense which has to move its units into predictable areas. It is of course

conceivable that the employment of very large yield weapons could bring
all operations to a standstill. The end result of this process would be,
however, that the Soviets would remain in possession of whatever prize
they had achieved while defeating the NATO conventional forces. In short,
if tactical nuclear weapons are to be used at all, it is likely that the
optimum, perhaps the sole, appropriate moment in early in military operations.
We thus return to our original problem. If NATO wished to reverse this situation,
it would have to employ a retaliatory strategy. This in turn depends on the
efficacy of a counterforce first-strike and the confidence we could have
in it. If we possess such a capability, however, it is unlikely that the
Soviets would launch a large-scale attack. In that case, it may not make
too much difference whether NATO has twenty-two divisions or thirty. If
we do not have an overwhelming counterforce capability, thirty divisions
may be insufficient.

There has been talk of other thresholds than the nuclear one. For
example, it has been said that thirty divisions could hold the fifty
plus Soviet and satellite divisions stationed in Eastern Europe. This

-23-

This figure is arrived at by postulating that in conventional war the offense requires a superiority of about 3:1. There are three difficulties with this line of argument. First, the notion of the strength of the defense vis-a-vis the offense--somewhat reminiscent of certain French theories prior to World War II--cannot, even if argiably valid, be applied too mechanically.

The attacker does not require a three to one superiority, all along the front. He can win by massing troops at the decisive point and breaking through. Historically, victories in conventional war have generally come about when in a battle between evenly matched forces, one side achieved a breakthrough by massing its strength against an opponent whom the mere fact of the defensive imposed a certain dispersal. German victories in both World Wars were achieved with forces numerically inferior to their opponents. And Germany's eventual defeat could probably not have been achieved by the allies if Germany had been able to defend its prizes with nuclear weapons. Thus it is far from a foregone conclusion that the ratio is quite so unfavorable to the offense as is often maintained. Even if thirty divisions could hold the Communist forces now in Eastern Europe,

the problem of reinforcements would still remain. The Communist would have the option of either strating military operations, thus fixing our deployment and then reinforcing rapidly. Or they could reinforce before launching their blow. Either course would impose on us the requirement of initiating nuclear war; the latter course indeed would create strong temptations for NATO to initiate operations *before* the Soviets struck. Though the use of nuclear weapons at an early phase of operations may well stop the aggression in its track, the conventional build-up would then be very similar to the traditional NATO role: the shield forces would remain dependent on the "word" if a defense of Europe is to be conducted. The Soviets would retain the option of confronting us with the problem of initiating the use of nuclear weapons, albeit at a higher threshold. This is, of course, aşistential a desirable goal in itself. However, it should cause us to understand why our proposal for a conventional build-up has at the same time raised such demands for shared control of nuclear weapons.

A major difficulty about the role of the conventional weapons in NATO has been the reluctance to face the question of their purpose. There has been more of a tendency to analyze what the traffic will bear rather

than what the objective should be over, say, a five year period, or rather
these two processes have become identified one with the other. Thirty
divisions has become a magic figure no matter how it was arrived at
originally. There has been enormous reluctance to avow the goal of con-
ventional defense of Europe by conventional weapons, means regardless of
the scale of aggression, lest it reinforce European doubts about our
readiness to employ nuclear weapons.

However, the question of the use of nuclear weapons, their significance
for deterrence or defense cannot be settled either by exhortations or by
protestations of good faith. It depends on the relationship of strategic
forces, the doctrine underlying the use of tactical nuclear weapons, factors
which would be decisive regardless of the question of possession and
control of atomic warheads. NATO owes it to itself to be clear about
its purposes and about the price that must be paid for various choices.
The worst course is a series of half measures intended by one part of the
allied to bring about a serious conventional option and by the other as
a means to commit us to a nuclear defense. Such a course runs the danger

of falling between two stools.

It is often said that a commitment to a conventional defense of Europe would invite Communist aggression by making war again "acceptable."

Another frequent argument is that such a course is designed to turn the United States into a sanctuary while Europe suffers the ravages of conflict. Of course, it is not self-evident what it benefits Europe if in case deterrence fails the United States is devastated together with its allies. On any foreseeable projection, a general nuclear war will cause even more destruction in Europe than in the United States. And it surely cannot make for allied cohesion for countries in the direct line of attack to seek to divert the impact of the conflict from themselves to an ally three thousand miles away.

As for the argument that a commitment to a conventional defense encourages aggression, quite the opposite is likely to be true. If Europe would be defended by conventional means, no motive for aggression would seem to remain. Even if the shield forces were capable of offering protected resistance, the incentives for pressure would sharply diminish.

For if the conventional forces could hold long enough for the superior mobilization potential of the Western countries to make itself felt--say a year--the issue is likely to turn against the Soviet Union. White it is

true that now the Soviet Union possesses greater military mobilizable reserves, in the long run the West possesses both a greater industrial potential and greater reserves of manpower. If the gap between the readily mobilizable forces is closed--as it can be--the danger of aggression would inevitably diminish. It would be an odd doctrine to assert that by closing off an avenue for aggression we invite attack.

Moreover, a sustained conventional defense cannot be separated from the nuclear threat. Any conventional war would constantly involve the danger that nuclear weapons may be invoked if operations are not brought to a halt. In this situation, too, there would seem to be an optimum opportunity for the tactical employment of nuclear weapons. In short, the most desirable situation would be one where the readily mobilizable NATO forces could hold any conceivable Communist attack sufficiently long to enable the mobilization potential of the West to make itself felt or for the threat of nuclear operations to become unbearable for the aggressor.

This, to be sure, would require forces considerably beyond those now being discussed, particularly in ready reserves. It will be resisted with the argument that such a policy is beyond the economic capacity of the West. But surely it cannot be beyond the economic reserves of NATO to match a

country with only about one-third of its Gross National Product, and less than one-half of its population. If it should be maintained that it is beyond the political and psychological capacity of the NATO countries, then the question of the credibility of the nuclear threat should perhaps be asked from a new aspect: If the NATO nations are unwilling to make the relatively minor sacrifices to assure their defense in peacetime, why should an aggressor believe in their readiness to face the destruction of their material substance in case of aggression, especially if it takes an ambiguous form?

If this goal cannot be reached, if it cannot even be avowed, the best the Alliance can achieve is a series of thresholds with the ambiguities and uncertainties described earlier. This may turn out to be the best current Western statemanship can achieve, but at least it should not delude itself that it also represents the optimum course.

Whatever the level of the conventional build-up, it is important to take some immediate steps to make it effective. Foremost is the problem of standardization. The present NATO deployment contains a melange of weapons,

with several different types of tanks, of artillery and of small arms.

In case of conflict the already complicated puppy problem might produce chaos. It is think likely that each national force represents a separate capability in terms of both "pause" and "threshhold." A serious conventional build-up will have to remedy this weakness.

A second problem is to prevent that a conventional battle of any duration lead to the attrition of the nuclear forces. This is a particular difficulty for the Air Forces. Because of the high destructiveness of individual nuclear weapons, an individual aircraft has to perform only a limited number of missions for economical operations.

By the same token, in a conventional conflict the necessary number of sorties increases sharply. The attrition rate of planes designed for nuclear war were used for conventional operations as would be disastrously high and might deprive NATO of a substantial part of its capability for tactical nuclear operations. A serious conventional build-up will have to augment sharply our tactical air forces and develop planes which are less complicated and costly than those designed primarily for nuclear conflict.

This problem is directly related to the most fundamental obstacle

to sustained conventional operations at whatever level: the current deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe and the concept underlying their use.

The current deployment of nuclear weapons dates in part from the decision of the previous Administration setting a limit of 200 miles in "tactical" missiles assigned to the Army. As a result, tactical nuclear weapons in much of Army planning came to be identified with weapons of relatively short range. Thus, nuclear weapons in Europe are now deployed so far forward that any tactical reverse will create enormous pressures for their use. At the same time, they are so scattered that discriminating control after the decision to release them has once been given will be extremely difficult.

Then again, the term tactical in current usage includes any weapon not assigned to the Strategic Air Command. While some of the weapons in Europe are designed for battlefield use, others have essentially retaliatory functions and ranges that will make their effect indistinguishable from that of the Strategic Air Command. Thus, there is involved in current NATO deployment a built-in pressure towards escalation both towards nuclear

war and once that, annihilation of any nuclear threshold is
crossed, towards its most destructive ...

Whatever the level of the conventional build-up, a reassessment of
the deployment and concept underlying the use of nuclear weapons is
essential.

This is all the more important because whatever the conventional
build-up, the spectre of nuclear war cannot be banished entirely. Even
under optimum conditions the Soviets would be able to introduce nuclear weapons
against our conventional defense. At lower levels of a conventional
build-up we would face the problem of nuclear warfare at whatever
"threshold" NATO has chosen. And no build-up is likely to be effective,
if our European allies would see in it only a symptom of our reluctance to face
nuclear war and it they fear that they will be abandoned if the "threshold" is crossed.

### III. Nuclear Weapons and NATO.

**A. Tactical Nuclear Weapons.** The present nuclear deployment of NATO represents an anomaly. Nuclear weapons and delivery systems in considerable numbers have been deployed in Europe. NATO doctrine implies their use at some stage of any conflict. Yet it is far from clear what their function is to be (in a conflict or in general?) Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric has said, "I, for one, have never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of a nuclear bang." And more recently, Secretary MacNamara has insisted that our strategic forces are alone sufficient to perform any nuclear mission: "There is no question but that today our strategic retaliatory forces of bombers, missiles and Polaris are fully capable of destroying Soviet targets,evening absorbing an initial nuclear surprise attack. Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack we calculate that our forces would destroy virtually all Soviet targets without any help from deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces which, of course, have the capability of attacking these targets with nuclear weapons."

1. Press Conference, June 6, 1961.

2.

III-2

In these terms, the nuclear establishment is both dangerous and useless.

Deputy
It is dangerous because it may bring on the limited nuclear war/Secretary
Gilpatric has declared impossible. And it is useless because it will
merely duplicate attacks on targets already covered by our strategic
forces. These tacit assumptions have led to the curious situation that
NATO has been discussing joint control arrangements for a small retaliatory
force yet to be created and which is bound to be of highly questionable
strategic significance, while the incomparably larger and more potent forces
on the Continent are being kept under present command arrangements.

The validity of the assumptions of our highest defense officials
depend, of course, on the assumptions one makes about the efficacy of a
counterforce strategy based on an overwhelming nuclear blow. If it is
possible to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force with an overwhelming
blow or if any nuclear war must inevitably seek to destroy all Soviet
launching sites, then a limited nuclear war is impossible. But in that
situation, a substantial conventional build-up is as unnecessary as the
nuclear establishment on the Continent is superfluous. If, on the other
hand, the confidence in a counterforce strategy must inevitably diminish,

III-3

then the only kind of nuclear war that makes any sense involves the con-
trolled use of nuclear weapons. The reasoning behind the conventional
build-up on the Continent should impel us to reconsider the problem of limited
nuclear war.

Among those who do take the prospect of limited nuclear war seriously,
some argue that nuclear war, if it occurs, will create a situation also
confused and fraught with peril that the local situation will be relatively
unimportant. The issue will *a* be decided either because the attrition of
the strategic forces threatens complete defeat or else because the *a* damage
inflicted by nuclear reprisals becomes unbearable. They would therefore
recommend a "demonstrative" use of nuclear weapons, whenever a conventional
defense is no longer feasible.

The effect of the demonstrative use of nuclear weapons depends, however,
on what is being demonstrated. If there is a limited attack on the
opposing retaliatory force, the outcome will depend on its vulnerability.
If the opposing retaliatory force is vulnerable, the response may be a counter-
blow of some magnitude directed against cities. If it is relatively
invulnerable, or if the NATO nuclear blow is relatively light, the result

III-4

may be a tit-for-tat, letting the bargaining situation depend on the local outcome. A limited counterforce strike requires an extraordinary skill in harmonizing political and military measures. In almost any foreseeable situation, an all-out counterforce blow may be less risky than a limited one.

At the same time, a strategic war of reprisal may again cause the outcome to depend on the local situation. If after the shield forces are on the point of being defeated there is an attack on say a Soviet city to which the opponent replies in kind, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable the Soviets to consolidate their gains. After Soviet forces for example, have reached the Rhine, the destruction of Kiev may furnish a motive for holding on to their prize. And a similar destruction in the West might submerge all other considerations in the desire to end the spiral towards ever greater devastation.

For these reasons, if nuclear weapons are to be used in a limited way, their tactical employment to stabilize the situation locally seems to be the most effective. In the best of circumstances, the confusion attendant on any use of nuclear weapons will be considerable and it will be compounded by the lack of experience of every country with them.

III-5

The choices for limited the conflict would therefore be greatest if nu-
clear weapons were to be used so as to stabilize a local conflict and to
prevent a significant territorial advance by the attacker. Of all
conceivable limitations, this is the easiest to understand and to concert.
If a standstill in military operations can be forced, the major objective
of the defense will be achieved. And if the capability for this is clear,
the incentive for attack or blackmail (by an opponent) will also be at
a minimum.

Such a tactical mission has heretofore been frustrated by a variety
of groups: by pacifists eager to polarize our options between the most
extreme alternatives; by disciples of traditional air theory convinced that
any limited employment of nuclear weapons is certain to produce an in-
conclusive outcome; by advocates of more limited disarmament schemes eager
to retain an eventual option for such schemes as a nuclear-free zone in
Europe. The nuclear establishment in Europe reflects the ambivalence of
the military and the NATO debate about nuclear control with its significant
omission of the nuclear establishment on the Continent reflects the uncer-
tainties of the civilian groups.

while?

III-6

Yet among the alternatives of which the President spoke, between surrender and general nuclear war, a capacity for tactical nuclear operations would seem to be essential. This is the most useful role for most of the nuclear weapons based on the Continent. The present weapons fall into two general categories: those developed by the Army are of relatively short-range and roughly designed for tactical emissions. Most of the Air Force delivery systems are primarily geared to interdiction missions --sometimes of great depth. A new approach to the nuclear establishment on the Continent would therefore separate in so far as is possible the tactical XEX from the interdiction and retaliatory missions. It would define the tactical mission as inhibiting the movement of military units in the combat zone. The targets should be defined as strictly as possible to exclude population centers and the yield of the weapons should be the minimum consistent with military effectiveness, strickly defined. The depth of the combat zone should be deliniated; It should be kept in mind that op rations of this kind will not require massive resupply and the kind of interdiction campaign appropriate for conventional war is therefore not so necessary. By the same token, the range of modern weapons makes

III-7

the traditional goal of complete air superiority meaningful only in a
general nuclear war and technically next to impossible to attain even then.

This type of warfare--as any employment of nuclear weapons--requires discriminating control and careful advance planning. Neither objective is likely to be attained as long as nuclear weapons are such an integral part of every major military unit. Both in order to make the conventional build-up meaningful and to permit a flexible use of nuclear weapons, the atomic arsenal on the Continent should be grouped in a separate command.

If a NATO nuclear command is thought necessary, the control of tactical operations would appear to be the most sensible focus for it.

It is easy to jibe at such "Marquis of Queensbury" rules. According to the mythology of those who either advocate some form of massive retaliation or some form of surrender any war, particularly any nuclear war, is bound to become all-out, because the losing side will always invest greater resources to restore the situation. But if this is true, it should work to the advantage of the defensive, because it would mean that an aggressor could never achieve a decisive advantage. The statement, *is however, only partially true. If the loca 1 situation disintegrates*,

1. See below, page

2. See for example, Pierre-Marie Gallois, Chhiers de la Republique, p.

it can happen that no amount of additional violence can restore it.

Any employment of nuclear weapons tactically, therefore, depends for
its effectiveness on the strength of the shield forces.

Thus, a conventional build-up should not be considered a preparation
for a conflict on the model of World War II. Any war is going to be fought
in the shadow of nuclear weapons and against the background of the nuclear
threat. The deployment and the tactics of conventional forces will have to
take into consideration
consider the possibility of the introduction of nuclear weapons by the
opponent. There must always be reserves in sufficient depth so that a
breakthrough cannot be quickly achieved by the sudden use of nuclear
weapons. And the tactics of nuclear war must consider that the introduction
of nuclear weapons by the defense cannot be delayed until the shield forces
in this sense
are already overwhelmed. Any war henceforth will be atomic, whether or
not nuclear weapons are (actually) used.

But whatever the judgment about the nature of nuclear war, that and
whatever the threshold at which it must be invoked, NATO will come up against
the problem of the retaliatory or strategic use of nuclear weapons. If the
the notion of a tactical use of nuclear war is rejected, the issue will

III-9

be forced as soon as the "threshhold" to nuclear war is crossed. Even
if the tactical use of nuclear weapons remains integrated into NATO
planning, the limits of such a conflict can be established only by the
retaliatory forces. It is no accident that the issue of the control
of nuclear weapons has come to the fore at the precise moment that
alternatives to a holocaust have been sought. For these alternatives
are meaningless unless backed up by the retaliatory XNK threat.

IV. The Control of Nuclear Weapons: the Strategic Threat.

For nearly two years, the issue of the control of the nuclear
weapons of the Alliance has been the subject of consultation, sometimes muted,
sometimes strident. It has taken various forms: France has pursued an
effort to build up its won retaliatory force following a path long since
trodden by Great Britain; the Federal Republic, in the latest formulation
of its Defense Minister, has asked for information about the nuclear

These represent the
weapons stockpiles in its territories (representing the preponderance of
the nuclear establihsment on the Continent), a guarantee that these will
not be withdrawn without the consent of NATO and a degree of unspecified
joint control over weapons fixed from or on German territory. Other NATO

III-10

allies have spoken of a form of joint control designed less to contribute
to an affirmative decision to employ nuclear weapons than to a veto over
their use. The United States has advanced various schemes for a NATO
nuclear force, ranging from placing five Polaris submarines under NATO
5
command to the creation of a multi-national, multi-laterally controlled
missile force.

Of the variety of these schemes reflects the basic uncertainty of
NATO about the significance and role of nuclear weapons. The French
effort is designed to reduce European reliance on the United States
retaliatory force. The German proposal is relevant primarily to the
issue of tactical WHAM nuclear war, for the nuclear weapons in German
territory are neither designed nor intended for a retaliatory strategy.
The suggestions of some of our other allies oscillate between attempts to
forestall German national nuclear rearmament, to commit the U.S. to a
nuclear defense of Europe, and to prevent us from using nuclear weapons
without their consent. And our own thinking has suffered from the lack
of certainty about the kind of nuclear war we were talking about and even
are

5. Speech by President Kennedy in Ottawa, ...date.

III-11

more by the attempt to combine two incompatible courses of action: we would
like to head off the multiplication of national nuclear establishments; but
we would also like to retain the determining voice in the nuclear policy
of the Alliance.

?

For the various schemes with respect to shared nuclear control have
at least one feature in common. They reflect the realization, at various
degrees of explicitness, that the changed strategic relationship which has
given rise to the concern with a conventional build-up also requires a
reexamination of the nuclear strategy of NATO. The preponderance of the US
in strategic planning and the monopoly on nuclear deployments may have
been acceptable to our allies while our strategic superiority was the
key element of NATO strategy--indeed then they insisted on it as an added
element for their portection. It will not prove tenable in the decade
ahead,,all the less so in the light of Europe's growing strength and
self-confidence. It is against all reason to expect our European friends
to integrate their conventional forces in a joint command to place increased
reliance on a conventional build-up, while all those efforts remain at
the mercy of a Soviet nuclear threat in the fact of which one partner

III-12

reserves for itself a monopoly on the means of respond and freedom of
action in employing them.

From this point of view, even the French national nuclear effort
is not as senseless as it appears. It is often said that national
nuclear forces are ineffective because they cannot withstand a determined
surprise attack and if used independently they will only guarantee the com-
plete destruction of the country concerned. Far from making United States
assistance dispensable, national nuclear forces will increase dependence
on the United States, both in terms of technology and the conduct of
strategy. At the same time, it is argued somewhat contradictorily that
nuclear forces in Europe under national control will produce a weakening
of NATO. Each country possessing nuclear forces will face with respect
our attitude toward it.
to its neighbors, the same inhibitions it ascribes to us with respect
to itself. It will, so the argument goes, reserve retaliation for only

(omit-only most dire emergencies covers it)
the most dire emergencies threatening its own survival (most overwhelmingly.)

Above all, the spread of nuclear weapons to yet another NATO country must
lead to the eventual unchecked diffusion of nuclear weapons to everybody.

The Nth country has a problem, according to this line of reasoning, would

III-13

be finally out of control.

Many of these arguments have great force. They cannot be dealt with in detail. For purposes of this article, which deals with common NATO policy, it is sufficient to point out that some of the analyses about the military ineffectiveness of national retaliatory forces *misses* their central feature. Following the traditional literature of surprise attack, pre-emptive attack, etc. and making no allowance for some of the invulnerability? improvements in vulnerability which mobility will bring, it is easy enough to demonstrate that in a second strike, national nuclear forces will be paltry and in a first strike suicidal. However, the key question is whether these forces are ever intended to be used separately. Could the Soviet Union ever conduct a surprise attack against the retaliatory forces of Great Britain or France without running an unacceptable risk of a counterblow from the United States or from the other European ally, temporarily spared. Alternatively, take the case where the strategic forces of our European allies attack the USSR without our consent or perhaps against our wishes. Considering the matter in the abstract, it is of course possible to say petulantly that we would then leave our ally to his fate. However, in

III-14

would be the real world, such a course is extremely unliekly. For our task is not to "punish" recalcitrant allies, all the less so as the punishment for us if France or Great Britain were destroyed would be scarcely less severe for us then for the ally involved. Moreover, such a dissociation is technically extremely difficult. We may could probably dissociate ourselves from ourally only by measures likely to lead to the dissociation of NATO. Inpractice, independent national nuclear forces--whatever their military effectiveness, will have the consequence of forcing a coordination of policies which De Gaulle first proposed in his scheme for a Directorate and which in fact already exists between the United States and Great Britain.

To be sure, it is an expensive method to achieve coordination, of strategy--and President De Gaulle has undoubtedly other goals in mind as well. The question then becomes whether it is possible to achieve this coordination of policies without an expensive duplication of effort. Or put another way, is it possible give our allies a greater sense of participation in the nuclear policy of NATO without at the same time multiplying nuclear forces?

Several schemes have been advanced, most of them variations on the

III-15

concept of a NATO nuclear force. For example President Kennedy has formally offered to "commit to the NATO ....? five; and subsequently stil more--Polaris atomic submarines... subject to any agreed NATO

X 6

guidelines on their control and use." In the same speech, he expressed

a willingness to consider "a NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly

7

multi-lateral in ownership and control. . ." Since then discussion

within the alliance has further elaborated the scheme for a multi-lateral

forces.

The crucial issue, then, is just what purpose such schemes are
of?
supposed to serve. It is symptomatic for the emphasis on a retaliatory
strategy that the offer to work out joint guide-lines for the use of
nuclear weapons was focussed on five Polaris submarines, while the very
substantial nuclear establishment on the Continent went unmentioned.
More important, it is not clear what is supposed to be accomplished by
working out guidelines for the employment of gm five Polaris submarines.
For one thing, a discussion of guidelines may raise more issues than it
solves. Almost inevitably it can produce agreement only the most clear-cut
6. Speech by President Kennedy at Ottawa, May 17, 1961.
7. Loc. Cit. check whether text in NYT May 18)

III-16

cases. A guideline not only includes; it also excludes. It is open
to question whether it is desirable to throw open to debate such a set
of issues, all the more so as the governments involved will undoubtedly
reserve for themselves the final decision as to whether the situation to
which the guide lines refers has in fact arisen.

Of course, it is highly desirable that our allies have more in-
formation about the targeting and planned employment of our nuclear
forces. It is arguable, however, whether this process is furthered by
beginning the discussion with seeking to devise a strategy for a limited
number of Polaris submarines, either U.S. or multilaterally-owned. Such
a NATO nuclear force represents in many respects an anomaly. Whatever
its size, it will be much smaller than that of the United States. A
counterforce strategy for it will be out of the question. Its prupose
must therefore be retaliatory. However, this NATO retaliatory mission can
be effective only as part of an overall plan. From the point of view of
effective guidelines, the only ones that make sense relate not to a NATO
force, but to the total nuclear strength of the alliance.

III-17

A NATO strategic force presents, however, more serious problems than the difficulty of developing guidelines for it. Its establishment that there exist three kinds of strategic forces within the alliance; a very large one under exclusive U.S. control two smaller national forces and finally, a small NATO force in which all the countries possessing national forces also participate. It may be asked to precisely what problem such a NATO force is supposed to address itself. Presumably, if our strategic forces already cover every Soviet target without requiring any help from deployed overseas forces it will be superfluous militarily--all the more so as these submarines would what? otherwise be at our own disposal. And to create simply to provide a me chnaisn for joint planning is not only wasteful but may create more problems than it solves. For joint planning to be meaningful it must, as we have seen, extend to the entire nuclear strike plan of the alliance.

Moreover, if we create a NATO nuclear force that is militarily senseless, we will not be at the end but at the beginning of a process. The principle of a joint force having once been established, it will be

III-18

next to impossible to head off pressures to turn it into a militarily
useful instrument. This may be desirable--indeed if such a force is
created it would be--but we should at least embark on such a course
with our eyes open.

If a NATO force as now conceived is militarily unnecessary, is it
a political answer to the European concerns about our nuclear predominance?
Specifically, can it deal with the European concern that circumstances
may arise in which European countries consider their vital interests
threatened while we are reluctant to employ our nuclear arsenal? These
questions raise squarely the issue of the veto in a NATO nuclear force.

If we retain a veto in a NATO nuclear force--if in other words nu-
clear weapons cannot be released without our consent--then two strategic
forces will exist in NATO: a small, militarily insigetifiable one, which
requires our consent together with that of whatever control mehanism
is devised and another large force--the U.S. strategic forces--which would
remain under our exclusive control. With respect to the smaller force,
our European allies could prevent its use but they could not compel it.
With respect to the larger U.S. force--from the military point of view
the crucial one--our allies could neither prevent nor mete compel its

III-19

XX
use.

In a case of disagreement with our European allies one of two things would happen. If we wish to use nuclear weapons and the Europeans do not, we could still employ SAC. If they desire to use nuclear weapons and we do not, both the nuclear force and SAC would be inactive. In other words, a NATO nuclear force with an American veto would multiply safety catches but not triggering devices. It can easily be demonstrated a shift of nuclear weapons from one American headquarters to another.

Moreover, any aggressor trying to make sense out of such an arrangement could some to the conclusion that the NATO force represents the limit of the United States commitment to NATO. In that case, a NATO force would weaken rather than strengthen deterrence. Whatever its immediate advantage, a NATO nuclear force with a veto would in the long run create more problems than it would solve.

If, on the other hand, we agree to give up our veto--that is, if we agree to participate in the employment of the NATO nuclear force even should we disagree--a major and perhaps insoluble constitutional issue will be raised in the United States. Can a group of foreign powers commit

III-20

us to be nuclear war without our consent? While the present situation
is not too XIXXIXX different, a great deal may depend on the maintenance
what is it? nuance?
of this nuance. While the attempt to eliminate it may create a debate
casting in doubt the extent of our nuclear commitment to NATO. (not a sent.)

If we give up
For if we give up our veto, just what is it that we are committing
ourselves to? Does it mean that the five Polaris submarines assigned to
NATO can fire on Soviet targets while the rest of our strategic forces
remain at our disposal? Or do we commit ourselves to use our entire
retaliatory power? In the latter case, a separate NATO force would again
be unnecessary. Giving up the veto would then oblige us to use all our
nuclear forces at the request of whatever majority has the power of
decision in the control body. If we are prepared to go this far, it would
be much simpler to create such a control mechanism, agree to accept its
decisions, give it a voice in our targeting and not go through the
exercise of creating a separate force.

At the same time, a NATO force without our veto is a European Atomic
Force. If we are prepared to give up our veto, it would be better to support
a European Atomic Force which would avoid the constitutional dilemma. It

III-21

would also be psychologically healthier from the point of view of coordinated planning and would avoid the impression that a NATO force represents the limit of the U.S. commitment.

Before dealing with this problem, it may be well to point out that the preceding discussion about the veto indicates that the European concern about nuclear control is not as baseless as is often alleged. If it were not possible to conceive of a difference in approach between ourselves and our European allies, the question of the veto would not have any particular urgency. We could then simply agree to use our nuclear arsenal whenever a certain number of our allies requested it according to plans mutually agreed upon. As long as we are unwilling to do this, we should have understanding, even if when we do not agree, for the efforts of some of our allies to achieve a great voice in determining their fate.

## V. A Possible Solution.

What, then, is the way out of this impasse? How are we to desire of some of our European allies for a greater voice in nuclear matters with the realization that the defense of the North Atlantic area is indivisible (from what?) How to combine the effort to build up

III-22

conventional forces with the coordination in nuclear matters, without
which the effort to strengthen the shield forces will remain half-
hearted? (This sentence too complex)

The first step is to analyze the number of shield forces the
alliance is willing to create and the theory according to which they
are to be deployed. NATO owes it to itself not to continue to
plan km by subterfuge and to realize that the relation between conventional
and nuclear forces depends crucially on the size of the former and
the role assigned them. Nothing would be more dangerous than to act as
if a sustained conventional defense were attended while in fact nuclear
war remains the chief sanction. At the same time, our European allies
owe it to themselves to approach the planning of the shield, not with the
arriere pensee of
XOXCKHHCWMCWXCXOXHCKEXOXCMAMONCHCXEMSK
of
American escape hatches but with the attitude of developing the means
for the most effective common defense.

Concurrently, and whatever the ultimate decision about the size of
the shield forces, the nuclear weapons now assigned to NATO should be
given a clearly tactical mission and designed less for retaliatory km

III-23

missions but to control a battle situation. To this end, a NATO tactical nuclear Command should be created under SACEUR, charged with planning andense conducting tactical nuclear operations. Whatever the merit of previously agreed upon guidelines, they would seem much more relevant to the conduct of tactical operations than to the operation of a minuscule strategic force. In the case of a NATO tactical force, at least all of the necessary forces are, or should be, under NATO command. The guidelines would therefore be more than a gesture. If a joint control body is created for NATO nuclear forces, it should address itself preeminently to the problem of the NATO tactical forces. In order to take into account the European wish for a greater role in nuclear planning, the commander of this force would be European, presumably French.

From the point of view of strategic necessity, nothing else may be needed except greater European participation in the planning and perhaps targeting of our retaliatory forces. Were NATO in face one political unit, the spectrum of deterrence would be complete. However, if one looks at the future of a revitalized Europe moving ever closer towards

III-24

political unity, it seems unrealistic to expect that these nations will
be forever content to place the ultimate decision with respect to nuclear
weapons into the hands of a single ally, however powerful and sincere.

(This point has been made several times before ) Sooner or later, they
will insist on either sharing control over our weapons as equals or
obtaining a voice by means of building their own deterrent.

They may consider that an emphasis on the shield forces, including
even tactical nuclear weapons, will tempt the Soviets into a retaliatory
strategy directed against European cities, and that we may take this
challenge less seriously than would our European partners. It is easy
to ridicule these fears. But would the U.S. attitude be much different
is our survival came to depend so intimately on the decision of an ally
however closely related? (This also is repetitive) It is no accident
our
that its criticism of French "obstructionism" has not induced Great
Britain to give up its own national nuclear forces.

While there is no need for us to encourage any further diffusion
of nuclear weapons, it may be wise to consider our Attitude if European
pressures for participation in the nuclear field mount. If Europe

III-25

insists on contributing to the retaliatory mission, we should encourage
the development of a European Atomic Force into which the French and
British forces would be merged. We will not be able indefinitely to
continue nuclear assistance to Great Britain while refusing it to our other
allies. Making continued assistance dependent on a European arrange-
ment would not increase the list of nuclear powers while ending the irritations
or
ax caused by our discriminating policy.

To be sure, a European Atomic Force would not be a substitute for
our own. It could remove to some extent European fears that in a showdown
we may not take certain threats sufficiently seriously (as seriously as
they would) It can provide a sanction to the expansion of any conflict,
conventional or nuclear. Should it prove necessary to use nuclear weapons
in a battle-zone, a European Atomic Force would reduce Soviet temptations
to devastate Europe while sparing the United States. And it would
remove European fears that this is our motive in strengthening the
shield forces. (What is our motive?)

The relation of a European Atomic Force to NATO could be the same
as that of SAC. The relation of such a force to our strategic forces would

III-26

be analogous to the relationship of the British Bomber Command to SAC. In most circumstances--indeed in all foreseeable ones, these forces would be part of a common strategy. European Atomic Force would to enable our allies be one device for our allies to participate in the planning of our strategic forces.

To be sure, it is not for us to press such a course. It may be that our allies will settle for a program of information and for the subtle distinction made by Alastair Buchan between control and control. In the more likely eventuality that the pressures will increase, we should be clear at what point the wiser course for us is to guide an inevitable development than to impede it.

However, the ultimate problem in NATO is not military. It is all very well to protest the indivisible interests of the North Atlantic Community of nations in the abstract. But a whole series of disputes, from the Congo to Berlin, indicate that this has not been the case. Every bilaterally negotiation we have had with the Soviets from or which our European allies have been excluded/in which they have played 8. Alastair Buchan, Foreign Affairs, January 1962. title KHX

III-27

the role of observers emphasizes that different approaches are at
least possible. NATO cannot be welded into a unit militarily until
it becomes one politically.

9. Some of the structural changes recommended by Alastair Buchan
may help. But the fundamental problem goes deeper. What is required
is nothing less than a fundamental reassessment of attitudes on both
sides of the Atlantic. When NATO was formed the United States was pre-
ponderant politically and strategically. The only security for our
European allies was the American guarantee. They were therefore
too
willing to accept most of our proposals without the many quibbles,
whatever their real views, for the very act of submission increased our
since then
commitment. We have, therefore, fallen into the NATO habit of dealing
with our European allies--except Great Britain--almost psycho-therapeutically:
we have tended to confuse periodic reassurance with partnership and the
mixture of the expression of concern with meeting the cause of it.
Our Continental allies in turn have shown their disquiet more frequently
with
discension?
in the hesitancy which they carry our agreed measures than in frank discussion
L 9. Buchan. loc. cit.

III-28

However, an alliance cannot prosper if one side is self-righteous,
timid?
the other plaintive. In the decade ahead we must face the fact that
the mere enunciation of a policy by us no longer guarantees acceptance.
Henceforth, the Europeans are bound to examine not only the fact of
our commitment but also its nature. At the same time, our allies
must accept the responsibility that goes with their new equality.
They cannot adopt a posture of plaintive criticism or of passive
aloofness without depriving the Alliance of vitality. These adjustments will no doubt prove difficult. But they contain the seeds of the
dynamism of free peoples (!)

The issue of the level of conventional forces in NATO cannot be solved by invoking traditional slogans or by treating as sacrosanct force goals developed years ago in completely different circumstances. What NATO requires, above all, is an explicit consideration of the end of its various forces are supposed to serve. The worst course is a series of compromises between the U.S. effort to develop a serious conventional option and the European tendency to seek to commit us to a nuclear strategy. Such a course runs the danger of falling between two stools.

What, then, are the goals that should be set for a conventional build-up? Two options present themselves, both almost certainly requiring larger forces than now being planned, and surely a different command structure in NATO in order to be effective. If the NATO shield forces are strong enough to hold a Soviet conventional attack until the superior industrial potential of the West can make itself felt, no incentive for a conventional attack would seem to exist. White it is true that the USSR possessed greater mobilizable reserves, the West

2

is superior in industrial capacity and even in manpower. If the gap
in ready forces is closed, the danger of aggression would inevitably
diminish. Such a course would offer the best means of depriving the
Soviets of the possibility of seizing a prize and bargaining on the
basis of the status quo. To achieve this goal--which is the optimum
situation--NATO would have to increase the thirty division goal

be more specific?
somewhat and the ready reserves very considerably.

If NATO is not willing to make this effort, another goal would
be to stop Soviet forces deployed at any time in Eastern Europe. If
the goal is to prevent a sudden coup by the Communist forces in
Eastern Europe, NATO would have to be prepared to increase its
forces in the face of any gradual build-up of Soviet power or lose the
benefit of its build-up.

Even then, a basic dilemma would remain. Assuming that thirty
divisions are able to hold the Communist forces now in Eastern Europe,
the Communists would have the option of starting military operations,
thus fixing our deployment and then reinforcing rapidly. Or they could

what?

reinforce before launching their blow. Either course would impose
on us the requirement of initiating nuclear war. The latter course,
indeed, would create strong temptations for NATO to use its tactical
weapons on Soviet concentrations *before* the Soviets struck. This may
be the best, if not the only, time to use them effectively. Though
the use of nuclear weapons at an early phase of operations may well

clarify
stop the aggression in its tracks, NATO must be clear what the
real purpose of the build-up is. It should be to create optimum
conditions for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It would be
highly dangerous to act as if we had one capability when we really
had another. The conventional build-up in fact would then be very
similar to the traditional NATO role: the shield forces would remain
dependent on nuclear weapons if a defense of Europe is to be conducted.
were

The Soviets would retain the option of confronting us with the
problem of initiating the use of nuclear weapons, albeit at a higher
threshold. This is, of course, a desirable goal in itself. However,
it should cause us to understand why our proposal for a conventional
build-up has at the same time raised such demands for shared control
of nuclear weapons.

Both of these options will meet with the objection that such a strategy seeks to make the United States a sanctuary while turning Europe into a battlefield. A build-up and such as envisaged here would never be supported by public opinion. Greater emphasis on conventional forces, so the argument goes, would make war again "an instrument of policy". The United States nuclear guarantee having been weakened, deterrence would fail.

These criticisms SEIZE reflect the degree to which our allies are still influenced by the doctrines of a counterforce strategy. They have not yet assimilated the fact that as a retaliatory f strategy turns into a pure strategy of devastation, its credibility is bound to decline. They have for so long identified deterrence with the most extreme threat that they are overlooking that any responsible made strategy must harmonize the threats with the willingness to implement them. Though a greater emphasis on a local defense of Europe will in fact reduce the damage to the United States, it will also reduce off many avenues for Soviet pressures. Above all, it will also reduce the damage to Europe (in case of an attack) Our losses in a general

war would be dwarfed by those of Europe. To be sure, our allies
believe that as long as we maintain the threat of general war, they
will not have to face the risk of any war. But how responsible is it
to stake the future of freedom on a gamble that a threat one is not
prepared to implement will never be challenged.

As for the argument that the sacrifices implied by such a build-
up are too great and that, therefore, we have no choice except to
retain a retaliatory strategy, it raises an interesting question
about credibility: If the NATO nations are unwilling to make the
relatively small sacrifices involved in building up their conventional
strength, why should an aggressor believe in their readiness to face
the destruction of their material substance in a general war?

Far from weakening deterrence, the kind of build-up described
here, though not necessarily that envisaged in the 30 division goal,
would strengthen it by producing a stalemate in the conventional
field similar to that impending in the nuclear area. Moreover, it
is dangerous to look at the problem of conventional and nuclear defense

as if they were entirely separable. No war in the nuclear age can
be entirely conventional. Deployment and planning will have to take
into account the possibility of the sudden introduction of tactical
nuclear weapons. Any extended conventional war involves the risk
of general war. The degree to which it does so depends on the
vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. That of the
Soviets forces will not be negligible for some time--in other words,
for a while yet we will possess some counterforce capability.

But it would be foolhardy not to consider this a wasting asset.
Even under conditions of mutual invulnerability a conventional
conflict increases the risks of general war--if only by magnifying
the dangers of accident or miscalculation. Under most foreseeable
conditions, a conventional war of World War II length is the least
likely contingency. In these terms, the goal of the NATO conventional
build-up would be to eliminate Soviet temptations to seek to demonstrate
Western impotence by forcing the Soviets to confront risks they
can no longer control. (Sentence too long) The only significant

threshhold is the one where the risk of general war becomes unacceptable
to the Soviets.

While our allies must face the changed strategic balance, we
have an obligation not to present the case for a conventional build-
up in excessively optimistic terms. Too often, we give the impression
that a sustained conventional defense is within easy reach by postulating
that in conventional war the offense requires a superiority of about
3:1. The notion of the up superiority of the defense vis-a-vis the
offense--strangely reminiscent of certain French theories prior to
World War II--cannot, even if valid, be applied too mechanically. The
attacker does not require a three to one superiority/ all along the front.
He can win by massing troops suddenly at the decisive point and
overwhelming it, all the more so as all the shield forces can never
of this point
be committed to the defense at once because of the dispersal indicated
by the threat of tactical atomic weapons. Historically, victories
in conventional war have generally been won between evenly matched
forces, because one side achieved a breakthrough by massing its
being on the
strength against an opponent in whom the mere fact of the defensive

imposed a certain dispersal. German victories in both World Wars
were achieved with forces numerically inferior to their opponents.
And Germany's eventual defeat could probably not have been achieved (very awkward
by the allies if Germany had been able to defend its prises with nuclear
weapons.

Then, too, a serious commitment to conventional defense will
require the solution of three other problems: standardization,
special forces for conventional war and nuclear deployment. At
present, NATO is equipped with several different types of tanks,
of artillery and of small arms. Each national forces has its own
weapons. In case of conflict the logistics may prove insuperable.
It is likely that each national force represents a separate capa-
bility in terms of both "pause" and "threshhold."

Then, too, there is the danger that with present weapons, a con-
ventional battle of any duration leads to the attrition of the nuclear
forces. This is a particular difficulty for the Air Forces. Because
of the high destructiveness of individual nuclear weapons, an indivi-
dual aircraft has to perform only a limited number of missions for
economical operations. By the same token, in a conventional conflict

9

the number of sorties increases sharply. The atttition rate if planes

designed for nuclear war were used for conventional operations would

develop plans which are less complicated and costly than those

to sustained † conventional operations at whatever level: the current

deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe and the concept on which this

is based. These (what are these?) are now deployed so far forward

that any local reverse will create enormous pressures for their use.

At the same time, they are so dispersed that while the President

undoubtedly controls the decision to employ them, discriminating

control after the decision to release them has once been made will

be extremely difficult. Then again, the term "tactical" in current

use, others have essentially retaliatory functions that will make
their effect indistinguishable from that of the Strategic Air
Command. Thus, there is involved in current NATO deployment
a build-in pressure towards escalation both towards nuclear
war and once that threshold is crossed, towards its most destructive
form. Whatever the level of the conventional build-up, a reassessment
of the deployment and concept underlying the use of nuclear weapons
is essential.

But the UK's two deepest problems raised by the kind of conventional
build-up described here are not technical. The first concerns the
impact of a new NATO strategy on the defens of other areas. For
whatever the impact of a conventional build-up, the credibility of
the deterrent at the Central Front, it must have a very negative impact
in other areas, even in NATO. It simply does not make sense to seek
to emphasize conventional defense in the most vital area while continuing
to place practically exclusive reliance on the nuclear deterrent
in almost everywhere else. In the case of Greece and Turkey, the
decreased effectiveness of the nuclear threat may still be compensated

11

for by the increased strength of the Central Front since this may
threaten the Soviet flanks in case of an attack on them--though even
this is not entirely clear. (Sentence too long) But the defense
of CENTO or SEATO will require a similar recasting of the
strategic concept for these areas. If it is thought impractical to
build-up the indigenous conventional forces we will have to increase
our mobile strategic reserve considerably beyond targets now being
planned. Otherwise, the same factors that have produced the need
of a conventional build-up in Europe will lead to an increasing
jeopardy in all other areas.

An even more serious problem is that of the control of nuclear
weapons. It was inevitable that the greater emphasis on conventional
defense would also open a debate about the control and use of nuclear
weapons. On the tactical level, this is because any conventional
build-up can be made irrelevant by a nuclear attack on the shield
forces. To prevent this or to withstand it should it happen, a
similar threat must exist on the side of NATO. Our allies are therefore
bound to take an increasing interest in the nuclear backing of their
NATO's part.

12

line forces. Beyond this, as the concept of nuclear retaliation
changes its meaning and as Europe gains in power and vitality, the
**UNIVERSAL** exclusive dependence on one ally becomes psychologically
awkward
increasingly difficult to support. Conventional strategy is thus
not an alternative to a nuclear concept, but its complement. One (what) Problem?
cannot be solved without the other.