DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01287
By: CHNARA Date 05/15/72

*

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:12 a.m. - 5/15/72

D: I have several questions. I don't know whether to . . . . . or
the importance, but what about you? You mentioned about a . . .

K: Well I will have an answer for you this afternoon first of all on
that note you gave me yesterday.

D: I see. Let's make it around 5:00, all right?

K: All right, 5 o'clock.

D: So if I . . . . . I will give it to you.

K: Do you have anything for me?

D: I have several small things, but I will tell some of them. First
about this - I receive from Moscow that they agree with you . . .
on this incident on the sea should be signed now only clarified or
. . . . in Washington. And, the official signing will be in Moscow.
They agree with this proposal.

K: Right, assuming they can come to an agreement.

D: Oh, of course, this is the point.

K: Right. I'll talk to you about that this evening.

D: At 5 o'clock.

K: Right.

D: All right. In this case it will be in Moscow. Who will sign from
your side?

K: Well we can have Rogers, or we can have. . .

D: This is an . . . incident or you think it's on the level of the Foreign Minister's?

K: Oh, no, probably not. We'll think it over.

D: You'll think it over. Then the second one - we agreed with all the
proposals. . . . . . . discussions which have taken place in Moscow
about this environment.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012567
By CNARA Date 03/01/67

K: Oh good.

D: So I just received that it's approved, but again Moscow asks you on behalf of the President on what level it should be signed? We don't know. We approved your draft but they are prepared to sign but on what level they don't know yet. So if you could find out.

K: All right. I'll try to get that.

D: On what level.

K: Have you any opinion?

D: Really I don't have any opinion. In our case it will be easy because we can find anyone in Moscow.

K: Our problem is that we only have three people there - the Ambassador, The President or the Secretary of State.

D: Maybe on the level of Ambassador.

K: I think so.

D: OK, once more we will go through . . . . on that.

K: I will have for you this afternoon an answer to that message you sent over yesterday and if I don't have anything on the Middle East by 5 o'clock I'll have it first thing in the morning.

D: And on this ratification business you promised to say something about it.

K: That's right. We'll do it either today or tomorrow. I will give you the text

D: Yes, and then the last one on this draft agreement on scientific and technical corporations. Today I receive practically an agreement to what you propose. You are not involved directly but . .

K: That's right. I know what you mean.

D: . . . . to David. So my counselor will go to the. . . . and explain that we accept it. That's for your own information, Henry. If it's necessary we are prepared to sign it at the summit meeting. The whole draft, really, not only the statement but the draft proposed by you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2587
By Lb NARAS Date 05/01/87

K: Good.

D: So you just tell the . . . break

K: It's hard for us to break up a negotiation in which you agree with our draft, isn't it?

D: All right.

K: I will think of a way of showing that you're really intransigent. You see, you're making it tough.

D: I try to prevent it. I knew your strategy that's why I try to prevent it. To put you in a position the . . . . . . will feel it's really impossible to agree with everything you said. So now I am telling them - Look here I am prepared . . . . . . . So five o'clock.

K: Good.

D: The usual place.

K: Good.

D: Bye-bye.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Seci. 3.6

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:12 a.m. - 5/15/72

By: K.H.V. NASA Date: 5/13/74

D: I have several questions. I don't know whether to ... or the importance, but what about you? You mentioned about a...

K: All right, 5 o'clock.

D: So if I ... I will give it to you.

D: I have several small things, but I will tell some of them. First about this - I receive from Moscow that they agree with you ... on this incident on the sea should be signed now only clarified or ... in Washington. And the official signing will be in Moscow. They agree with this proposal.

D: At 5 o'clock.

K: Right.

D: All right. In this case it will be in Moscow Who will sign from your side?

K: Well we can have Rogers, or we can have...

D: This is an ... incident or you think it's on the level of the Foreign Minister's?

D: You'll think it over. Then the second one we agreed with all the proposals ... discussions which have taken place in Moscow about this environment.

The President's Office in Washington, D.C.

The State of the Union

March 5, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: KHLW NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Oh good.

D: On what level.

K: Have you any opinion?

K: I think so.

D: OK, once more we will go through . . . on that.

K: That's right. We'll do it either today or tomorrow. I will give you the text.

D: . . . to David. So my counselor will go to the. . . and explain that we accept it. That's for your own information, Henry. If it's necessary we are prepared to sign it at the summit meeting. The whole draft, really, not only the statement, but the draft proposed by you.

H. P. Lovecraft, the open man,
the dark, silent, residential
Metropolis of the Dead?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 1293, Sept. 3.5

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:03 p.m. - 5/15/72

By: K.M. W.

NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: Bob, Brezhnev wants a black Eldorado Cadillac.

H: (Laughter) He does; huh?

K: ________ turned him down.

H: He doesn't want a sports car, eh?

K: No, he wants a black Eldorado Cadillac. He doesn't want a Ford product either. I offered a Lincoln ________ him.

H: Why don't you call him back and tell him the President wants to give him a hydrafoil that goes at least 300 knots.

K: (Laughter)

H: Is he really identifying the model he wants?

K: Yes, black Eldorado Cadillac. He wants the outside to be black.

H: He won't take a black Lincoln Continental.

K: No, that's in fact what I suggested. I said how about a Lincoln Continental.

H: That'll act as the epitome of capitalism. That's what he wants. Isn't that something?

K: Isn't that something.

H: OK.

K: Ok, good.

H: If General Motors is willing to give us a black Cadillac, I am certain they'll be able to be persuaded.

K: Can they make a special model?

H: What do you mean?

TELECON
Secretary Connally

3/15/72 12:08 p.m.

Re: latest time the open line
is open, and if 'closed' call President
President's Office

OCLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KVLW, NASA, Date: 5/13/74

C: Henrique?

K: Mr. Secretary.

C: How are you?

K: I am fine.

C: Well we're doing all right. I was just checking in; I want to know if we're doing all right.

K: Oh we're doing great. I wish . . . Can you either drop in or let me drop over . . . you're going to be over to see the President, aren't you some time this afternoon?

C: Yeah, I'll drop by there when I get through.

K: How about that. When will it be, about 3 30.

C: About 3:30, yeah.

K: Good why don't you do that.

C: Or I can come a little before 2:30/

K: I think I'll be out for lunch.

C: All right, all right, that's fine.

K: If that's all right with you.

C: Yes, sure, oh yes. I got no reason for wanting to know except . . .

K: No. No, no, no, no, no. I was going to call you; I just got out of a meeting. I was going to call you.

C: But nothing untoward happened over the weekend?

K: No, things are moving the right way.

C: All right, that's good. Okay.

K: And your prediction turned out to be right.

C: All right; I'll see you about . . . I'll try to call you after I get through with him, about 3:30.

K: Right. You won't hear me admitting that I did prediction turned out to be

TELECON

Secretary Connally

5/15/72 12:08 p.m. p. 2

Re: phone call to the press office
of the State Department
(Declassified by State)

OECIASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: K.L. V. NAFU Date: 5/15/04

wrong, you know.

C: No, no, I understand. Well I know a fellow ought not to make such an admission.

K: That's right.

C: Hell, you can just say & circumstances changed or that the prediction I made obviously was based on changed circumstances from what we're presently confronted with. And don't elaborate on what those are at either time.

K: Well that's exactly the line I'm taking.

C: I'd say this. I saw Joe Alsop's column this morning reflected a hell of a lot of missionary work that you had obviously done. And it was a god-damned good one.

K: I haven't read it yet.

C: Well it's a damned good one.

K: Well, no sense reading your own writing, & is there.

C: No, that's right. It came out well. I just wanted you to know that.

K: Good, I've got to read it.

C: All right.

K: Bye.

C: Goodbye.

The telephone is the most important tool in the modern world.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger
12:15 p.m. - 5/15/72

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

S: Boy, you've had your hands full, haven't you?

K: I surely have.

S: Well, God bless you, keep your fingers crossed. I don't think things look too bad.

K: No, I think we may pull it off.

S: I hope so, Henry. And I think you're with it. The only reason why I called is that there is a picture of you in the Sunday *Baltimore Sun* with the most beautiful girl I've ever seen you with.

K: Who is that?

S: My wife.

K: Oh, terrific! Terrific!!

S: (Laughter) I know it's terrific. really. Henry, I know you've had a lot of . . .

K: I thought we had kept our meetings secret though.

S: (Laughter) I'll tell you one thing she was surprised when I called it to her attention so that you and she - whatever it is, you've done well. Henry, I know that you've had other things to worry about but if you should during the course of the week want to talk about that memorandum on the Middle East which is obviously a very delicate matter.

K: Who the hell has got it at this moment?

S: Well, you have. You've had it for about ten days.

K: I've been asking your agent over here - Saunders, to give it to me.

S: Oh, really. Well it's a memo - I sent you the bootleg copy directly.

TELCORN

Joe Alsop/Kissinger

2:45 p.m. - 5/15/72-

Re: Joe Alsop's call open 5-15-72

Re: Kissinger's call open 5-15-72

OECIASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: J. M. V. NASA Date: 5/13/73

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Henry, about that personal matter of the visa. I thought a long time about it and decided your advice was right. But I then talked to John __________'s doctor and he - I am the only one who can give Stu a transfusion and I just can't go. My thought was I'd like to do it on a somewhat higher level than Mr. G______ Young. I assume but I don't like to use your name about authority, you see what I mean.

K: What - to tell them you're not coming?

A: And explain the thing. They'll understand a family matter but the problem is Stu - if he gets an infection I'm the only person who can give him a transfusion and I was rather unhappy although Stu was a lot better then about my going to Vietnam until I assured him I could be back in two days time with your help. But nothing in God's creation will get me back in two days time from the Republic of China, you see what I mean? And I really can't take the risk.

K: I understand that completely and that's of course correct. He can, you know. . . but how would you use my name?

A: Well, I think I ought to write somebody a letter.

K: Why don't you give it to me and I'll get it to them.

A: Why don't I just write you and say that since. . .

K: No, I would write it to them.

A: Well then who do I address it to? XWMM . W'ang Wa (?) - the Ambassador from ________.

K: Yes, and we'll get it to them.

A: Good. Good.

The President's Office is open 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. except on Federal holidays.

Receives Mail at 12:00 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: K.M.V. NASA Date 5/13/74

TELCOM

Geo. Shultz/Kissinger

2:48 p.m. - 5/15/72

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry. I have been working on the questions of the so-called supplemental for Defense. Have you been focusing on that?

K: I haven't focused on it, no.

S: There is a possible proposal for a supplemental to the '72 budget of about $650 million.

K: Yes, I know.

S: And the '73 budget of almost $8 billion. The total coming to about $2.6. As I understand it technically they could probably get through Fiscal '72 although they have exercised a lot of their transfer authority and so on nevertheless they probably could make it. If we have an assumption of a September 30 continuance of the present level of activity then they certainly would have to get a much greater re-programming authority or a higher total of men for the Fiscal '73 budget although that might very well be something that could be done when the budget is set up next January. In other words I think that while one can argue I think there are good grounds for arguing for going ahead now or for going ahead after the President returns from Russia. It isn't absolutely necessary to do that. But I don't know how you are conceiving of this and I wanted . . .

K: I would say not to go ahead now and prefer to wait until the President comes back from Moscow at the earliest.

S: That would be my very, very strong preference. One thing we are -- probably they are probably going to veto a black lung bill - a bill providing for compensation for people who get black lung disease in the coal mines this week and I think the juxtaposition would be very bad. But anyway, go ahead.

K: I told Laird this morning that I didn't want to have it surfaced this week which was what he wanted

S: OK.

Re: [insert telephone number]

To: [insert name]

From: [insert name]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

Rogers/Kissinger

4:58 p.m. - 5/15/72

By: KVLW NASA Date: 5/13/74

(Came in late)

K: I have been talking to Haldeman. I think that can be worked out but who sent the message I don't know.

R: It's ridiculous to send a message about me and not let me know about it.

K: It didn't come through me.

R: Well, it must have been through Chapin or somebody.

K: But what channel would they use?

R: I don't know.

K: Just wait a day or two before that gets sorted out. I wasn't aware of any of these decisions.

R: I think if we're going to hold it's going to leak. I just think we got to get the President to reverse it because...

K: OK, that's fine.

R: I talked to Haldeman and I think you get after him.

K: I talked to Haldeman also and I said to him that I think it makes a lot of sense to bring you back.

R: Yes, and it doesn't make any difference to the President - just the symbolism. Under the circumstances, I think it makes sense and furthermore they told Chapin, according to John Thomas, told him Friday that I had been notified. Hell, I didn't know anything about it until today and I called up right away...

K: The first time I heard about it was when Haldeman called me and said he talked to you and I know Haig notified Ted Eliot but he got that list from Chapin. We had nothing to do with it. And you know I can just see how it happened. I think it's ridiculous to notify an Ambassador without telling you.

R: Of course.

K: Let's see if we can get it done by the end of the day.

TelCon:6:17:5/15/72

Mr. Kissinger/
Secretary Laird

Re: your leave, will you be open to see me
again, for an hour or two this afternoon?
Thanks, you too

OCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

6/17/72
By: K.H. V
NAPUA, Data: 5/12/04

L: How are you Henry?

K: Mel, I just want you to know strictly for your own information not to be repeated, I think we are going to have an incident at sea along the lines you wanted. That is no fixed distances and a commitment to study it for a year.

L: That is fine.

K: I just put it to Dobrynin but for Christ sakes don't tell it to State yet.

L: No, I don't see no point. Bill just called me on that a few minutes ago.

K: Just don't yield.

L: And I just stayed right there.

K: OK good. We are going to get it settled tomorrow.

L: He thought I was being a little hard and I just stayed right there Henry.

K: Well we are going to have it done tomorrow.

L: OK good. Thanks Henry.

K: Goodbye.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6", "Help wanted in the civilian control of\nthe air force of commercial\nMilitia Units!", "By: K.H.L. NAFU Date: 5/13/64", "TelCon: 7:45 p. m. 5/15/72\nMr. Kissinger/\nAdmiral Moorer", "K: I understand we have some har har har har har har har

OCLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: J. M. W. NAVA Date: 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/
Ambassador Mosbacher:

M: Well Doctor, how are you.

K: I am fine Mr. Ambassador.

M: ________ writing mashnotes to my wife.

K: I am wild about your wife.

M: As the President says to me about her, he can't afford her either.

K: Listen if you can't afford her I am outside.

M: Well, that may be but it has nothing to do with being able to afford.

K: I can see how they made you chief of protocol you have a winning personality

M: Thank you, you know that. My Lord - you know why they made me chief of protocol, how can we unmake me.

K: On November 4 or the day after the election

M: You and I leave together.

K: We will either leave together or do other things together.

M: Alright, that is fair enough. When I called you - I two or three things which I know how busy you are Henry, so I don't take much time. But I appreciate very much your suggestion about that book on Iran which is going to work out fine and Humming(?) was just great and he is going to make it available to us.

K: Terrific.

M: The other two questions I did want to raise with you because I think - I hate to bother you with the crap but - I got the word today we should go buy a cadillac car for Brezhnev. And I just really want to be sure that you and the President have focused on it before we do it.

K: Well, you know it is <u>right</u> nuts.

M: I think it is.

K: But they have asked for the God damn thing.

M: Oh, have they.

The president of the school is a
graduate of the University of
California, Berkeley.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: K.L.V. NASA&D, 5/12/04

I mean the problem now is whether it is a good idea. You know they asked me what does the student want.

What did you tell them.

You know I said some sort of art. I stated nothing that would be of any consequence. So I said what does Brezhnev want and he said -- which was a mistake -- and said the only really thing he likes is cars. So you know, I thought he would let it go. Next thing I know they call me up, said what he would really like is a cadillac coup. The next thing I know he's says it should be black. And now I just saw him ten minutes ago and he is again.

Oh really.

Yes. And he wants a hunting rifle for Kosygin and a hunting rifle for Podgorny.

I hadn't heard that yet.

Well, I just got it five minutes ago.

Hunting rifles. You know this is waste of everything we have been trying to do - the rifles I support is not what you would want to pick but if they ask for it.

Listen. It was the dumbest question I ever asked. But who would have thought - you know I thought he would say anything that you consider appropriate which is in fact what he said. Can you imagine anyone asking for a black cadillac, Oldsmobile coup.

Henry, I hope you trade better substantive matters.

On substantive matters I never ask a question on which I don't the answer.

You are really still a professor at heart.

But tell me Bus, can't you get General Motors to donate it.

Well we will try. There are a couple of questions that came up. The obvious one is about just giving a car. Now if we are stuck in doing it, the next question is the political problem. But if he has asked for it we will just have to explain somehow, don't thinking in terms of

The French gave him a car. That's it a little easier.

Re: [insert telephone number here]

To: [insert name here]

From: [insert name here]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Date 5/13/04

M: Well what I was thinking about was - you know if we give him a
cadillac what Henry Ford is going to say.

sell

K: I tried to sell a Lincoln to him and he wouldn't do it. He wants a
cadillac. I started with a Mustang, they said no sports car.

M: Right.

K: Then I said well how about a Lincoln. No. You know, they obviously
had thought about it. We might get a custom made model.

M: Well, I'll get in touch with them and do what we can.

K: Tell them that is what he asked me.

M: Is it necessary in your opinion that we take it with us - or can we send
it later if we have to.

K: We can send it later.

M: I hope we can get one. Did he tell you what color he wanted the upholstery?

K: No. Conservative anyway.

M: Right. Not white or purple.

K: No.

M: The other thing - and this is not really your baliwick but I understand
on Mrs. Nixon's side she is going to a watch factory and somebody
has suggested that we should take some American Mickey Mouse watch
and give it to the people who make watches.

K: That is insane.

M: Isn't it. Well I think so. I don't know who makes these decisions these
days, but

K: Well, listen. Whoever makes these decisions to cut me up last week.

M: Well, all I can say to you Herr Doctor is welcome to the Club. You want
me to get hunting rifles, hun.

K: The only thing I can tell you Mr. Ambassador - some of us fight back.
But some of us are in a better position to fight back.

M: Well that is true. As I recall one day you told me not to because somebody

H. E. T. U. S. Air Force
lieutenant colonel
Retired, Senior Officer
U.S. Army

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLU

NASA Date: 5/12/04

else had the ear(?) six hours a day.

No, no you were right not to fight back but I have the ear(?) 4 hours a day.
I laid into my pal today.

Well I hope it is about time that two people do start(?) - well in any case
I think this watch thing is crazy. Does that come into any part of your
baliwick?

I will raise hell about it.

Alright. We will order a couple of rifles and a car.

I just hope he won't insist on playing ping pong because all Communists
are so good at playing ping pong.

Henry with your sense of humor we need it.

OK, good bye.

Sec. Peterson/Kissinger

Sunday - 5/15/72

Re: the open line
and the open end
of the day
Subject: Mutual
Informational

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: KML V

NASA Date: 5/13/64

K: Pete.

P: Yes, Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

P: Say, I'm meeting with our friends first thing in the morning and I'm getting some rather different signals from your side of the house and Peter's on what it is you would really come out of this at the summit.

K: I saw what you had in that memo - I thought was a good outcome. But let me give you my experience with them. Do not give them a signed memo because that becomes an official document. Just give them an unsigned memo on no stationery and say this is an oral note - your own thinking out loud.

P: Right.

K: That gives us the maximum running room.

P: That's exactly what we've done. We just put it on plain paper, not even watermarked so it couldn't be identified later.

K: I think the various points you had in there I would start your talks in July, not before.

P: You wouldn't. All right, now could you have a fantasy and tell me what you would consider to be a perfect outcome in terms of timing because I can push them pretty hard tomorrow or I can.

K: I think we should agree at the summit on principle that we will extend credits, but you'd give some priority consideration to some of these projects; to the agricultural deal that will set up the economic commission and that the lend lease will get settled as part of that. But I'd like the execution of all of these agreements to be handled through the Economic Commission.

P: All right so you do not want then to end up with actual granting of credits on Kama River which they are working hard on until, shall we say July. See they're saying they're going to have to go elsewhere unless we can give them an answer. They've been waiting too long.

It is not known where the open fire of the ship or the origin of theatoryal Publications came from?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12000, Sect. 3.5

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/04

K: Peter, I have had great experience with them. I held up the Gleason ball bearing thing for two years. We constantly told them to go elsewhere.

P: Right. No I agree with you. But I want.

K: My experience is that they wouldn't be here if they could go elsewhere. You can tell it to them on the basis that it is practically certain that they will get it in July and that they should do their planning on that assumption. Because you know practically certain means if they start running the blockage(?) then of course the conditions are changed.

P: Alright. But if you had your way then you would not want to do anything substantive at the Summit in terms of money actually passing hands.

K: That is right. I would not have money passing hands but I would tell them - you can tell Patolichev or I will tell Patolichev if you want me to, or I will tell Dobrynin that you know this is the first project that will be approved and we expect to approve it early in July.

P: Alright. OK.

K: Why don't I mention it to Dobrynin so that he gets a little. You know I have been blackmailing him with the Germany - with a piece of paper on Germany for four weeks. He understands this game.

P: Alright. So the Summit then is essentially an announcement of the pending commission and statement of intent on both Ex-Im and KSMX (MFN(?))

K: Well if we could get the agricultural deal consumated that would be great. You do understand the word consumated, I am sure.

P: Yes, I understand. I am not sure whether we are close to the rate than to the spectrum of seduction, Henry.

K: Listen you bastard, how did you turn Connally against me.

P: How did I do that.

K: Every paper is now full of stories that the first time Kissinger has had a rival, is Connally and Connally is taking over from me as Mr. inside. Newsweek is full of it. I thought I had him happily - knocking you off. I thought I was safe from him until the second term.

P: ______ and spit me out Henry. It is not nearly as tasty the second time. It is not a worthy menu for him. You should be flattered Henry.

H. W. SHERMAN
President of the Senate
of the United States

President of the Council

By: K.H. W.

NASC. Date: 5/13/84

K: No, but I thought he wouldn't come after me until January.

P: Well, are you going to be at the Bradens' tomorrow night?

K: Yes.

P: Well I spent 3 hours with M. Macgory(?) and will step outside for 5 minutes now.

K: Are you going to be there?

P: Yes, after the Patolichev meeting.

K: Why, is she down on me?

P: Oh no, no. But she is gravely concerned about the Connally implications. She has been doing a great deal of talking around town, apparently.

K: Oh yes, unbelievable.

P: Best we save that for tomorrow.

K: Good. Than you are coming after the Blair(?) dinner. Well if you can proceed that way that would be the best.

P: OK. And the way I will play it then Henry is I will give him this general scenario and say now on this basis let's see how fast we can move on lend lease. You and I agree. I think we should not pander out any money until they have at least started paying Ex-Im.

K: And tell them you are authorized by the President to say and I will confirm it to Dobrynin that the ______ of the project will be the first thing authorized and we expect to do that in July. And they can make their planning on that basis. That keeps them quiet until July which is what we want.

P: And then we will tell them on this basis that the lend lease matter will be settled in June.

K: Right.

P: Right. OK, Henry. Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012857
By: CNARA Date: 05/16/72

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:40 a.m.

- 5/16/72

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: I would like to check with you one question. You remember we - yesterday you gave me a list of preliminary places (?) of signing and announcements. Two things were missing really and first about who will sign from your side - I guess the President but I would like to check really . . . about the ______ which will be discussed in Moscow.

K: We had left it open. Do you think they should be signed or just promulgated?

D: No, we think it's better to be signed.

K: The President, OK. And in case . . .

D: The President, OK. And in case . . .

K: Unless you and I get to sign something.

D: Well, could we . . . . . . of our own and then . . .

K: We will have a big signing ceremony.

D: Exactly. And the second. . . . . . for some kind of signing - you remember what the ______ told you about neutral things. So you do it I guess on the same level.

K: I would think so but I don't know whether we can get that completed next week.

D: No, no, I understand but in that case.

K: In that case but as I told you we could still, if we do it later, arrange a ceremony by satellite.

D: Oh yes, yes, let's try it. It's a nice idea. You have quite an imagination. I always admire you.

K: But you know I think it would be a nice continuation.

D: No, no, I wasn't joking. I am just telling you seriously. That's a good idea. Well, we can talk about it - maybe later on.

The President's Office in the Senate
of the United States of America
Reproduced with permission

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3, 6

6/16/72
By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/13/72

Doornum/Kissinger

9:40 a.m. - 6/16/72

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: I would like to check with you one question. You remember we - yesterday you gave me a list of preliminary places (?) of signing and announcements. Two things were missing really and first about who will sign from your side. I guess the President but I would like to check really . . . about the ______ which will be discussed in Moscow.

D: Exactly. And the second. . . . . for some kind of signing - you remember what the ______ told you about neutral things. So you do it I guess on the same level.

D: No, no, I wasn't joking. I am just telling you seriously. That's a good idea. Well, we can talk about it maybe later on.

The President's Office is open to the public, but the use of cell phones is prohibited.

President's Desk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

TELECON
Secretary Peterson
3/16/72 11:50 a.m.

By: KVLW, NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: Peter, all I can tell you is whatever the boys are cooking up it will be worse for the nation.

P: Yes, that's why I said for the moment. I could only imagine that this is just a six months off until...

K: I mean I didn't know about it until it incidentally.

P: You didn't.

K: No.

P: Well, I don't think...

K: I mean I knew about it... I learned about it this morning.

P: Yeah. I don't think our country is out of danger because...

K: No, no, it's in worse... I mean this... I don't know what they're cooking up.

P: But this could be a brief respite you know until the next big assignment.

K: Yeah.

P: But at least for the next six months hopefully... what do you think that part-time deal could be?

K: He's taking a trip to Latin America. ... sending him on a trip to Latin America and also thinking of sending him to Africa. It all points in the same direction.

P: Uh-huh, uh-huh. Okay. Well I am just delighted for you for the next six months. I at least had the good sense to say last night that maybe my concerns are premature but... when two or three people tell me the same thing...

K: No, no, no, no. Listen, it makes the ultimate destination more self-evident.

P: Uh-huh, right. And that could be the price for support in the interim.

K: Yep. See the trouble was in the Cabinet meeting no leverage.

P: Yeah, and then in this way he can continue to have the leverage.

K: Exactly. You know, imagine Democrats like Nixon. But there's got to be a deal.

Secretary Peterson

5/16/72 11:50 a.m. p. 2

Re: [redacted] Phone: 5-6100
the Sen. of Comm.室
President's Office

OCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

P: Right. Frightening possibility. Well at least for six months one can relax. Maybe.

K: Maybe.

P: Yeah. A word on the Soviets today. I presented to them the grain deal that you and I mentioned last night. They seemed rather intrigued. I also gave them the possibility of the moratorium, stressing it as my idea and not something I had yet cleared, but I'm trying to link the two Henry because this is a major concession on our part, this moratorium idea even though we planned it all along.

K: Which moratorium?

P: Well the idea that they . . .

K: Pay one year?

P: Pay one year and then we give them . . . if we haven't got MFN by the end of '73 then it's a moratorium. But I presented that as a dramatic last-minute idea. I didn't want to . . . Unlike our State friends, I hate to say out a scenario the first day you know. They present they say any deal that involved grain because after all this is a separate issue. But I think if we can pull this one off you could announce a grain deal at the summit and that in turn is why you're willing to make nice noises about MFN and Ex-Im Eligibility. And then we will still pull the string xxxx on the actual credit as you and I have discussed in July.

K: Right.

P: Okay?

K: Good.

P: So they're going to let me xxx know at 8:00 and then I'll tell them I'm going to then check it with my senior associates, so xxx nobody's committed to this.

K: Well that means you're checking it with yourself.

P: Yeah.

K: You have no senior associates.

P: Henry, I consider you my senior associate.

K: See you soon.

TELCONE

Haldeman/Kissinger

1:02 p.m. - 5/16/72

Haldeman-Kissinger
11:00 a.m. (PDT)
May 16, 1972

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L. V. NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: Hello.

H: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Bob.

H: The President said unless we want to make an issue out of it he thinks we ought to go ahead and let Rogers go to Poland and I assume that's what you think too, isn't it?

K: Yes, but I'd like to have Haig be the one who informs him.

H: OK. Now Rogers is trying to call me now. I'll say you are out?

K: Yes, I'll get Haig to call him.

H: Can you get Haig to call him now?

K: Yes.

H: Just tell him that - whatever you want to say.

K: OK. But he can't bring his whole goddamn delegation back with him. That's just. . .

H: Well, can we say that right now - or ______ a follow-up too?

K: OK. I don't give a damn.

H: . . . . . we've lost another 30 points. The President is stomping around.

K: But I think he'll be moping for the next two weeks.

H: . . . . . there's nothing but trouble and I think it's better to play this price than that one. Not only can he not bring an entourage but I've already told him that he'll have to set up his own schedule there. Because the President's is ceremonial and Rogers won't be involved in it.

K: Yes. OK. I think we ought to do that and I'll get Al to call him in the next ten minutes.

H: OK.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012587
By CNARA Date 6-01-87

TELECON
D

5/16/72 2:45 p.m.

D: ... big surprise you have.

K: No, no, nothing affecting our relations. You've heard about the resignation of Connally.

D: Oh yes I did, but I didn't know what you are aiming at with the resignation.

K: Well,

D: ... more on the politics side, what is in front but not what was behind.

K: Well we'll discuss it when I see you. Let's meet tomorrow morning at 11:00.

D: Tomorrow.

K: Yes, I need a little more time to discuss this with the President.

D: Instead of today.

K: Yes.

D: It's all right with me.

K: And I'll give you some thing then which will be more in the thinking out loud category but as a basis for discussion.

D: I understand. It will be some papers.

K: Yeah.

D: Yeah. Tomorrow at 11:00.

K: Yes.

D: Okay.

K: Is that convenient for you?

D: Quite all right. Or can we get it 11:30?

K: Or make it 11:30; that way I'll be safe.

D: Okay.

K: And also the President would like to have breakfast with both of us Thursday morning.

D: Oh it will be just fine, really fine. Tomorrow we will go around 11:00.

The New York Times the open lines
to the Navy and the military
U.S. Navy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: K.M.V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

Taft Schreiber

5/16/72 3:21 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Yes Taft.

S: I talked to Mitchell and he's going to call you about those other two which he thinks are terribly important, the one in New York, but ~~to~~ to him the most important thing we must close up is the 17th of June for California. Then I think I've got it read in so really you're going to do the talking. He's only going to thank them for coming. Do you follow?

K: Right.

S: And I've just got to close it up and what they're worried about is that you might go off to Russia and not go because the invitations, the kind of people we have and what we do is of the utmost importance. So I know they know that you'll be back; I know they believe that you won't take a vacation and I know they believe that I as your agent am the only one who can get it locked up cause they know that everybody at the White House wants you to take it ease and not kill yourself.

XXX But there's still Sunday, the following day and if you want to make the arrangements on Sunday we'll make the arrangements.

K: It would be a little safer.

S: The 17th?

K: The 18th.

S: Well, whatever you say. You know, I want to tell you one thing else: the 18th is Father's Day.

K: So?

S: So... in other words you don't have that problem. Well if you do say it's the 18th for sure and that's the way to lock it up, we'll lock it up on the 18th.

K: I'll let you know before the end of the week.

S: And look, I've got to tell what's his name that you are... that you will absolutely close it up by then. If we do it on Sunday we'll start a little early; we'll start around 6:00. Do you follow?

K: Right. If you do it Saturday you do it when?

Re: [illegible text] the open file
of the case of [illegible text]
Matters Disclosed

OBLIQUE
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

It's Schneider

16/72 3:21 p.m.

S: Well Saturday we do it around 7:00, 7:30. But wait a minute. You know the other problem maybe a lot of these people won't come in if they find we've got their children to worry about, you know.

K: Oh I see.

S: That's one of the big problems.

K: So you prefer Saturday.

S: We prefer... I prefer it too because we can get the real turnout. We're going to go up as high as we can with 200-300 and I think finally what we're going to do is probably do it at my home, and fix up the garden with flowers and everything and an orchestra and a buffet and you know a very relaxed and... and after dinner -- we'll have an early buffet -- it will be serious because we won't have any

K: Okay, and you want me to talk to them after dinner.

S: After dinner. It's a briefing of what the President's ford on policy is.

K: Okay/

S: We'll do it before dinner but I think it will be much more fun and much more relaxed if we do it after.

K: That's fine with me.

S: All right.

K: See I'm easy to get along with.

S: Oh you're wonderful. Well when... shall I close it now or do you want me to still give you a day or two protection?

K: Give me a day or two protection.

S: All right, well I'll have to call you back unless you want to call me.

K: Well one way or the other we'll talk on Friday.

S: Friday then, all right. I will tell Mitchell what it's 99 percent set

K: Right.

S: All right.

K: Fine.

H. J. Schreiber
Hijl. Schreiber
S. Schreiber
P. Schreiber

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 32938, Sec. 3.6

By: KJLW NASA Date: 5/13/84

J. Schreiber

16/72 3:21 p.m. p. 3

S: He'll be calling you anyway and you know about the other things you'll
have a chance to say something to him about the fact you're working this out.

K: Right.

S: Okay?

K: Right, right. Okay. Just make sure you have John Wayne there. My
son wants me to get his autograph.

S: John Wayne? What do you mean I'll have him there. I'll have Keno
me come to Washington to see your son. I don't do anything in half measures.
are you going down to the thing for Spira on the . . . cause all your buddies
will be there, Sinatra, Clint Eastwood . . .

K: Who?

S: They're all going down to Baltimore.

K: Yeah, I can't. It's the day before we leave.

S: Oh it's the day before you leave. Well that's a good place to get
loaded before you leave and you'd get sobered up by the time you get to Russia.

K: Listen I'm going to be so loaded in Russia . . .

S: Look, I trust you in Russia. Between you and the President, I'll tell
you one of the fellows told me we're god-damned lucky, you'd own the world.
you're lucky I mean we have you on our side.

K: You're nice to say that.

S: Okay, my friend, I'll talk to you Friday if you don't call me before.

K: Okay.

bert evans

6/72 3:40 p.m.

K: Hello.

E: Henry.

K: Bobbi, how are you?

E: Fair.

K: I have heard about you and I've been thinking about you and I thought
I just call to find out how . . .

E: Well, I don't know yet Henry. I don't know. I'd like to speak to you
about it at length . . .

K: Are you coming East?

E: Yeah, I'm coming east tomorrow night

K: Eh, isn't that nice.

E: But it's a problem Henry.

K: Do you want to come down?

E: It would be a very bad time.

K: Yeah of course, god dammit I'm going to Russia probably on Saturday.

E: Oh you're leaving Saturday?

K: Yeah.

E:

K: Wait a minute; let me make sure everybody is off the line.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KH, NASA Date: 5/12/84

SANITIZED

SANITIZED

Re: [insert telephone number]

of the State of California

Narcotics Unit

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KM V NARA Date: 5/12/04

Joe Kraft/Kissinger

9:28 a.m. - 5/17/72

Kr: Henry, how are you.

K: Joe, how are you?

Kr: You are a very faithful fellow, y' know. Thank you for calling back as often as you do.

K: Well, not at all.

Kr: There were two things. One, is there any chance of seeing you before Moscow. I find myself utterly baffled by them.

K: I'll try.

Kr: Okay.

K: I nearly said -- but I was afraid you would take it seriously -- nearly made a cynical remark -- not about you. I nearly said it's a pleasure to do business with men without principles.

Kr: [laughter] Very good. I'm sort of planning to hook up in Austria but if you thought it would be better to go in there on the chance of seeing you, I would do that. I'm hoping to stop by in Paris and see Tho and then go on to Vienna and Salzburg.

K: But you are not coming to Moscow.

Kr: I am coming to Moscow.

K: Well, I'll try to see you before the end of the week.

Kr: Okay, if that's a possibility. My present plan is to leave Friday and catch them Saturday in Paris. If you could do it...

K: Tomorrow, I will be in Camp David. Let me see whether I can do something late this afternoon. Are you in most of the day?

K: I'll be in all day.

K: Okay, I'll call you.

9:28 a.m. - 5/17/72

Re: [Subject to change] if the President's name is to appear in the press release.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/04

Kr: Secondly, the Connally story, Did you know about it in advance?

K: Very briefly. I mean, you know, not enough to help me personally. But this really might that he's going to ... that he wanted a maximum political **Connally** leverage this year;

Kr: Yeah, that's what it tells me.

K: And that he wasn't to get it... You know, as a Cabinet Member he has no choice to support the President. He can't sell his support then.

Kr: You think he could go either way politically. No, he's pretty much bound to support...

K: No, but he can sell the degree of his support now. I don't think there's any conceivable way for him to support the Democrats.

Kr: But the degree of support is up. Don't you think, Henry -- those stories that came out just before which he was source of as you well know -- to me underline the sense that his ambition is to become the head of a new American establishment.

K: Oh, yes. What stories? About how tough he was

Kr: Not only about how tough he was but about he was the guy who played the critical role and he held the President's hand.

K: Yeah.

Kr: I mean, I think the circulation... you've had and Pete Peterson has had and Walker has had ... that he wanted to be Secretary of State seems to be very reasonable.

K: I don't know exactly what he's after, but three of these stories didn't come by accident, and were a very simplified version of a very complex situation. That's another story. No, I think he thinks there is a new establishment being built and he's going to be the guy who leads it. I think that's a perceptive comment.

Kr: Are you in trouble?

K: Personally?

Kr: Yeah.

The play is about a man who has a dream he can't fulfill.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.V. NAFU Date: 5/13/04

J. DEACON

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

9:28 a.m. - 5/17/72

K: I don't have that sense but why should I be?

Kr: Well, just some things that Laird has been saying suggest to me that he is really shooting you very hard and feels that the last trip to Paris was a mistake and that he is pushing you downhill on a slippery slope.

K: You mean Laird is pushing me down?

Kr: Henry, you know I'm oversensitive to these things but the comments he's been making about how he was wrong to have said that we should have made them get back before we offered to negotiate again. How do you interpret that?

K: That he was wrong?

Kr: He has been acknowledging that he was wrong in saying that we should have made the North Vietnamese withdraw before offering to negotiate again.

K: I don't know how to interpret -- how would you interpret that?

Kr: I interpret that as a slap at the guys who were prepared to negotiate before they withdrew.

K: Oh, I see. But the trouble with his position though is that he is always on both the Dove and the Hawk positions simultaneously.

Kr: No, I agree. It's very hard to follow and it's probably a foolish occupation to try. But I've had this sense recently and, in fact, very recently that both he and Connally had decided there wasn't room to be -- that they were enemies to the right of you in this area.

K: Oh, yeah, well, that I don't doubt. That and on SALT.

Kr: Um-humm.

K: There will even be people --

Kr: Does he want SALT?

K: ... by Rogers. So that I think is true.

Ms. Sue, I'm residential
Nursing Home Staff

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

9:28 a.m., 5/17/72

6/17/72 NASA Date 5/13/74

Kr: Did Laird want SALT?

K: No -- well, he will acquiesce in it.

Kr: (laughter)

K: But you know that's not new in my position.

Kr: No, I guess it isn't although I've sensed that they were coming out more openly with it and sort of posing wrong and letting people understand that there was daylight and there were differences much more than in the past.

K: Well, I just have to last until November.

Kr: I'm sorry. It's really kind of silly consideration but I did want to get a ______. Do you think that he had been offered the Vice Presidency?

K: No, I really don't know. You know, I'd like to pretend that I was in on all these decisions but I wasn't.

Kr: Yeah. Am I wrong to be baffled by the Russians or do you find it all very explicable?

K: No, I am not surprised by their mild reaction. I am surprised by their now going all out on the summit that way.

Kr: Yeah.

K: I did not expect them to take a very violent reaction given what I knew about their -- at least what I knew from my contacts with them. But I thought they would take some formal action.

Kr: Some formal action, yeah. Well, I can see how this is not the most important ballgame in the world to them. And if they figure to do anything, they'll do it later and pretend that it doesn't exist for a while. I gather that you and Brezhnev talked about football.

K: Yeah -- but, you know, little.

Kr: A little. I s he a --

K: He's a nutty soccer fan.

H. E. T. U. S. Air Force
President of the United States of America

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Seci. 3.6

One President

5/17/72 9:52 a.m.

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/04

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry, how are you?

K: I'm fine.

P: Been plowing through these books. My God you gave me enough work for two months here.

K: Well I thought I'd . . . we'd make them a little full.

P: Yeah. No, no, it's an excellent job.

K: To give you the flavor of it because contrary to the Chinese, as you discerned yourself when you read the conversations, this fellow isn't really very conceptual guy so he will be learning a lot of positions.

P: That's right.

K: And he won't necessarily know where he's going in the way Chou En-lai lid.

P: Right, right. I understand.

K: So where the Chou En-lai meetings were very philosophical here I thought you needed to know . . . you don't have to touch on it, just if he raises an issue so that you have a feel for some of the details.

P: Sure, sure. Incidentally, one small thing I wanted to mention. Be sure you WAREX warn Gromyko and obviously Brezhnev that they've got to be very careful not to talk about the special channel where Rogers is involved.

K: Right.

P: See what I mean? Because then we'd have to explain what the hell it is to him.

K: I think they understand it but I'll make absolutely sure.

KP: You can see why.

K: Oh yeah.

P: So when you talk to Dobrynin, you just say now look . . . talks about the communication that Brezhnev and I have but let's not be . . . let's just be, you know, it's just one of those things. Somebody might drop a hint with regard

It is possible that the open line to
the base will be cut off as a result of
a nuclear war.

5/17/72 9:52 a.m. p. 2

By: KMLW NASA Date: 5/17/72

to 'we'll do this in the special channel' and then Rogers will want to know what the hell it is and we just can't get this thing involved in that. Well, you getting all prepared for yourself.

K: Oh yes, I saw the Chinese yesterday and gave them a rundown of what was . . .

P: Oh did you. Good.

K: And on your behalf went through the thing. We did And we will send them a letter later this week just before we go; I didn't want them to have it so they could show it around just before you're in Moscow.

P: Right, right. Well that's good; that's good. They're probably appreciative . . .

K: Oh very much.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: They were mumbling around about Vietnam, just repeating their formal governmental statement.

P: Yeah. But you really mumbled back I presume.

K: Oh yeah. I just said . . . they didn't say . . . even mention mining as such. They were just talking about American military activities.

P: Yeah. Well anyway, one thing we can be sure of Henry -- there's no decision that's been made in the post-War period that's been more difficult or more necessary.

K: And more courageous.

P: Yeah. But we had to do it.

K: Because now it all looks, you know, as if we can have the best of all worlds, but the fact is we did this . . . you did this . . . assuming that the summit would be cancelled. For all you knew it would ruin any chance of re-election and you were doing it for the sake of the Presidency.

P: Well anyway . . .

K: Against total domestic opposition.

Re: [insert title here]
[insert title here]
[insert title here]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

One President

5/17/72 9:52 a.m. p. 3

P: You know I think perhaps the major by-product of this is . . . well there are two or three. One the morale of our own country, I mean the fact that you know by two to one people approve it -- you know, they're a little proud again.

K: That's right.

P: And second, the morale of the South Vietnamese. I think their morale is stepping up some, don't you think so?

K: Absolutely.

P: Based on what we've heard; I mean . . .

K: Absolutely.

P: It seems to feel that they're fighting better.

K: They're fighting much better; they're fighting much more aggressively. They're now clearing the road to An Loc and we expect that to be open in another 24 hours.

P: I guess Kontum is now the next point of attack.

K: __________ and that you have to expect that we will lose, but we must also keep our sense of perspective. We've always, even before we knew that the attack would take this form, did we think that Kontum would be lost.

P: That's right.

K: And it's now getting very late in the dry season for them to go very far from Kontum.

P: After they get it where the hell are they going to go?

K: Well, they'll go to Pleiku, but that's another two weeks, three weeks, and by that time they'll be closed in. And it's not yet a hundred percent sure that they'll get it. I mean this could be like Long Tien.

P: Particularly with the air that Abrams . . . going to run 12000 sorties tonight.

K: That's right. I expect them to get it, Mr. President, but I think that these people are getting hurt.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12458, Sec. 3.5

5/17/72 9:52 a.m. p. 4

P: Well, whatever we do we want to be sure we continue to crack them in the North. They get the balance of that bridge and whatever else is necessary.

K: Well, we're going to do that. These god-damned Air Force hasn't hit in the Hanoi area now for three days.

P: Weather?

K: Yeah, so it's now getting. . . It wouldn't be good to put everything in there just because . . .

P: Oh, I don't mean to put everything; everything should go on the battlefield/ first, but the point is they gotta get their 200 sorties in there as soon as it clears.

K: Oh yeah.

P: And . . .

K: But all over the north, I mean all over the area. If they put them all into Hanoi itself it's going to be a too much noise.

P: Yeah well I understand; I understand. But they gotta get in there . . .

K: They've got to hit that bridge . . .

P: Let them know that we're still around.

K: Also we authorized a bridge 12 miles from China for just one strike just enough to get it dropped.

P: You don't think that's too close?

K: Well it's pretty close but I think at this stage it's more important to get these rail lines knocked out.

P: Right, right.

K: I mean we can't do it day after day but I think we can do it once before they get anti-aircraft in there.

P: Well, the way our friend Mansfield is acting he'll go up the wall again, but God damn him, he just does nothing but cut us up.

K: That's right.

P: Unbelievable.

The President

The State of the Union

January 5, 1972

President's Salute

The President

5/17/72 9:52 a.m. p. 5

By: K.L.V. NARA, Date: 5/17/72

K: He's been incredible.

P: Yeah. Unbelievable. He's delayed this amendment, all that sort of thing; it's really something.

K: But we've got all the negotiations in good shape now Mr. President; I mean they're all concluded except the maritime agreement. This is unbelievable on SALT, incredible.

P: Yeah?

K: After screaming about 62 boats, he wasn't satisfied with accepting the Brezhnev formula; he's now come up with one of his own, that would enable the Russians to get up to 70 boats.

P: Jesus Christ.

K: For mere self-will, just to have proved another gimmick.

P: Well, just pin it down.

K: Well, we've pulled it back. He'd already offered it to the Russians; now of course the Russians like his offer better than theirs. Why not! Well, I'm going to get it pulled back, but it's an absurd absurdity. But I think we'll have that done by Sunday.

P: And so you're still planning the little trip from Salzburg.

K: Well, I haven't had an answer yet. I think the chances are 50-50 that it won't come off. But then we can say we offered it.

P: Oh sure, sure. Well the point is we say we offered that and that we ... doing anything else with the Russians before we go. We're not going to agree to any damned plenary session though.

K: No, I think Mr. President, I've just rewritten one of the pages on Vietnam. The strategy with Brezhnev has to be the only way we will get them involved is not by protesting our good faith but by telling them one way or the other we are not going to end it.

P: Yeah.

K: By giving them the sense . . .

The President

The State of the Union

January 5, 1968

Presidential Message

By: J. M. W. NASA Date: 5/12/68

The President

7/17/72 9:52 a.m. p. u

P: Oh hell, I'm not going to protest goodness you know. That's the
wrong way to do it.

K: The only interest the Russians have in the feeling that they will be
confronted with one miserable choice after another for nothing.

P: Right.

K: If they get that sense then they'll settle.

P: Right, right. If you keep talking about withdrawal and we're ready
to negotiate and withdraw . . .

K: That we can throw in too, but the major thing . . . the first thing to
establish and this is where you were so wise when I was there in making me
take that hard line, is to make clear that we are utterly determined, and by
this time they believe things you say, threaten you make. Then you can
give them flexible possibilities. Another thing that's come up is that apparently
State is again talking to the Russians and the Germans about signing the Berlin
agreement while we are in Moscow. And I just think that's a mistake.

P: Just . . . sit . . . and we'll put out a . .

K: I'll take care of it.

P: Just say that from me, I do not want any agreements . . . I don't want
anything done except by ourselves, I don't want anybody else there.

K: Yeah, well the present plan is for Rogers and Gromyko to come back
to Berlin, but it would . . . I don't see why we should do that. We can do it
later. Of course the treaties may not pass in time. There's another chance
now to pull another little wrinkle which we've discovered which is that the
German upper house we thought it had automatically to vote on it on Friday but
we found that if there's one German state that wishes a delay in the debate
they can delay it. So now we're looking around whether we can find a state
that can have a say for a delay without our getting caught at it. Because that's
the best insurance you have for good Soviet behavior.

P: You will come with Dobrynin tonight after the dinner with Stewart Alsop?

K: Yeah, it's Stewart Alsop's birthday party. Joe is giving it for him.
And I'll come up around midnight.

P: With Dobrynin.

K: With Dobrynin.

Re: [insert title here]
High, Sir, at your service.
Appreciate your help.

By: K.M. W. NASA Date: 5/13/84

P: Fine. We'll have a... we'll be in Dogwood, the two of you.

K: Good. I think that's very nice.

P: And you're coming up late; we'll have breakfast say at 8:30 in the morning.

K: Good, Mr. President. 8:30. We'll come over to Aspen.

P: Fine, fine. We'll just keep the things going and the... I don't think there's any reason... I know there are all these problems to try to prove that the Commitment isn't relevant to the situation today and all that sort of thing. I just don't think it all matters any more.

K: I don't think so. I'll be glad to m with any group of people that you think...

P: Oh, but I think that the point we make is that we don't need... with anybody. Just let it through.

K: I think after the summit, Mr. President, if you want to, there's about a two or three week period in which Iuld with good effect get the word around how you orchestrated all of this. And I think that might...

P: But I don't think before the summit, cause that might jeopardize us

K: After the summit; after the summit

P: What do you think?

K: I think after the summit

P: Because all these, these. I would like the damned writers to climb the wall anyway, aren't they.

K: Oh they're going out of their minds.

P: Are they?

K: Oh yeah.

P: Yeah. They don't know how to judge tis. They say the President was very rash and he saved the summit, Jesus Christ, that's a great line isn't it.

K: Well, but even that... that is the sort of thing I can knock down, but it's better to do it after the summit.

The President's Office of the Vice President

The State of the Union

President's Note

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3, 6

By: K.M.L.

NASA Date: 5/13/64

P: Right, give the Russians all the credit in the world at this point. Afterwards we don't have to worry about them.

K: Right, right.

P: Right. Okay.

K: I've been working with the speech writers this morning to make sure they get the right tone into your speeches.

P: Who you . . .

K: Safire, Andrews, and Price.

K: All three of them work hard. It will come out; it will come out.

K: Oh sure.

P: I just. . . the one I hacked up. . . of course, particularly is that approved television thing. As I said, not a word over 1800 to 2000 words. 000 absolute maximum; preferable 1800 so that you don't go more than 30 minutes.

K: I couldn't agree more.

P: And that's what it's going to be

K: Right.

P: And everything else short, as short as possible. They can just not give me great long, I mean the toast should be 150 words, things like that. And that way it will force them to think more precisely and they don't say too much and yet they say enough.

K: Exactly.

P: Right. Okay, fine. Brevity is the thing. But I don't want any supplemental notes or anything of that sort because most of these things I'm going to read anyway because of the translation problems. I'm going to read the toasts and so forth and so on cause Brezhnev will read his, won't he?

K: Almost certainly, I would say certainly.

P: Well, if that's the case -- you can discuss that with Dobrynin, say if Brezhnev and the Russians are going to read their toasts the President will read it so they don't think we're one-upping them. But then tell our people the main thing is Henry they gotta keep them short. Like for example, a toast or statement,

LIEUT. COLN
the President

17/72 11:12 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Hello Mr. President.

P: Henry I. . . I just had a chance -- just got here -- to read the first draft by Price. Let me make three or four suggestions. One, I don't think we ought to go into Vietnam on this speech.

K: Absolutely.

P: Second, I think that it's important not to go on and on about liberty and freedom and all that sort of . . .

K: I said exactly . . .

P: No use to throw that to them.

K: I just saw it this minute and I said exactly the same thing to them.

P: The other thing is I think we should talk about our . . . something about our alliance in World War II, the great suffering of the Russian people in war. I think something about that should be thrown in.

K: Right.

P: I think some of the other things the words are fine. But the point being that they don't know America, we wish that they did and I just want to tell them that I speak for the American people. I know our people, I know what they want in the world. We like our system and, you know, something about but on the other hand we're not trying to impose it on anybody else. But we . . . and we want peace in the world. That means that great powers have a particular responsibility to use their influence to preserve peace and not to break it and that . . . so we would like to have that kind of relationship with . . . that I respect the Russian people as a great people and . . . sort of along those lines.

K: I don't think it is proper for you to start lecturing them about freedom of speech.

P: Oh no, no, no, no, no, no . .

K: And all that USI A stuff.

P: No, this is not for that purpose and it should be . . . The other thing is that this always a weakness of the speech: it refers to the Russians not only love but have to have some anecdotal material. They just got to have some佐料a story or two, you see?

Request for a copy made at the request of a friend of the President.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

6/14/72 NASA Date 5/13/04

The President of the United States of America

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.6

President

7/72 11:12 a.m. p. 2

By: K.M.V

NASA Date 5/13/64

K: Yeah, I'm not sure on Russian television Mr. President.

P: Well no, what I mean is, if it related to something that I've seen
file I'm there. In other words, if you've read my speech when I was at...
en I spoke in 1959, the most effective parts of it was when I referred to
a Russian children as . . . you know, when they threw flowers in the car.

K: Oh, that sort of thing. I thought you meant stories.

P: No, no, no, I meant examples . . .

K: Oh yes, absolutely.

P: So that it related them rather than just cool tough logic, you see.

K: Right.

P: Our people just don't know how to . . .

K: No, that is a definite sentimental streak.

P: There needs to be that, that as I . . . as I saw . . . in Samarkan in
a Soviet citizen who was . . . you know with one leg gone; he had lost it
World War II and he said we want to be friends with America. Something
that; that's what Winston Win (?) wants; that's the kind of thing that he ought
to in but . . . Well, I don't want to spend too much time on it, but if you
get them . . . It's not his fault because he was flying blind and he says so,
if you could sort of give him the feeling of what we're doing, not too much
instance, not too much . . . I don't think we ought to go into the rigamarole
but we have an agreement on arms control, an agreement on trade, an
agreement . . .

K: They'll read that in the newspapers anyway.

P: That's right. It's more in terms of saying, look, I'm an American,
first one on an official visit to this great country. I wouldn't slobber over
me too much; I'd be very proud of what we stand for, but on the other hand
would say that we respect you, xan we want you to respect us and we can
sure? you on peace but peace is not something that we have simply by
ing for it, that we have to act responsibly through the world, you
in our relations with small nations and others and respect all other
les in the world. We say something to China at the same time.

K: And we can say this can be the beginning of a new era; we have started
something like that.

ELECON

the President

17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 3

The President's Office
The Senate
The House
Merchandise Mart

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 32938, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLV NAVAQ Date: 5/13/04

P: Yeah, the first steps, but I would say that it means that the great nations, you know what I mean, ... Well, that's sort of the ... of the thing but you could get Ray back on that track that will be fine.

K: Right, I'll do that immediately.

P: And you may have told him most of it already but those are my reactions and I just didn't want him to get bogged down in some of the things that we know we don't want to ... we can't use.

K: XXXXX The German vote has come out very well.

P: Oh.

K: They fell short of an absolute majority by one, but they have a relative majority so now it has to go to the upper house. They were going to vote on it Friday, but two German states have ... it has to lie before that house for six days unless they unanimously vote to accept the consideration immediately.

P: And they didn't?

K: They refused ... they couldn't get a unanimous vote so now they will vote next on the 24th, next Wednesday, and then it won't get signed until the following Friday. So that will cover most of your visit there. That removes even the one percent chance that they might kick over the traces.

P: Yeah, they ... they'd be playing a damn dangerous game.

K: That's right.

P: That's right. Well they're not anyway ... they can't now anyway Henry; it's too late.

K: No, exactly.

P: Well, they can but they're ... then they're proving that they're utterly stupid, and if they're utterly stupid we should be smart.

K: But it also means that we have a pretty clear run for the better part of that week while we are there. I mean we would have it anyway, but this gives us a little insurance.

P: Incidentally, with regard to these talks, it would be helpful when you're talking to Dobrynin if we worked it out that we did it sort of in line and subject by subject. What I meant is that I don't have to prepare each one. See, then I can brush up on a certain subject rather than read all three ... You got four books up here on issues now.

ELECON

the President

1/17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 4

Re: [group photo] who is the only one who can make it

OECIASSIFIED

E.O. 12058, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NAFU Date: 5/13/04

K: Absolutely, Mr. President.

P: And you know, I can't read four books before each meeting.

K: No, we will have a subject or two and maybe we can get that even worked out before we get there.

P: That's right. And what I was going to say is that what you might do then, you and Sonnenfeldt, and he's obviously done a lot of this work -- you tell him, it's just a brilliant job; it's an excellent job -- but the point is that whoever worked on it . . .

K: Right, Sonnenfeldt and Lord.

P: . . . and Lord, I would think that if we did that then before each meeting you could have one of them go through the talking points there and even boil it down more, say these are the things when they'll bring up things you should emphasize.

K: Absolutely.

P: So that . . . because the mental . . . I can retain most of this and I can fly blind pretty well but it would help very much to have it done that way.

K: No, that's exactly what we'll do. The purpose of these is to give you the general feel, then before each meeting we'll give you two pages . . .

P: Good. Have you told Dobrynin to call on Rogers?

K: Yes, and that's set for tomorrow afternoon.

P: Oh. Oh, he's going to come back and then call on him.

K: Right.

P: And you've told him so. Good.

K: Well, that's perfectly normal. Then, when he's made all his calls in one day.

P: Right, right, right, right.

K: And I suggested today, but for some reason they prefer to do it tomorrow.

P: Um-hm. Going to see us first.

K: If may have been State wanting to do it.

ELECON

the President/

1/17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 5

Re: [話] 17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 5

P: Well, whatever it was, fine. At least he's going to do it.

OECIASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: J.M.W. NAFU Date: 5/13/74

K: Right. Oh yes, that's all done.

P: Now with regard to that . . . when you're talking to Dobrynin you
do work out like, you've got to let Gromyko and Rogers haggle around about
the Mid East and European Security and all these other things.

K: Oh, that's all done.

P: Now, the statement of principles of course is, as you issued it will
be one that they'll try to nit-pick like hell and I don't know quite how we're
going to be able to handle it. I know Rogers will be smart enough to know that
Brezhnev and I didn't sit down and concoct the whole thing. How do we explain
that to him or . . . ?

K: Well, we can say that you asked Dobrynin and me to work it out.

P: Or we can say that they submitted some things and I said well we'll,
let me submit some things and you're working on it.

K: I think as a face-saver he'll accept this. I mean he knows it won't
be true, but he won't want . . . next the alternative put out.

P: Yeah, that he had nothing to do with it. Right, right.

K: We'll have one horrible day, there's no question about it.

P: Well, it can't be for me cause I'm not going to take it again.

K: No, I'll take it. But the point is if we don't have one we'll have five.
We have never . . . we played for example the SALT thing absolutely straight
and we gave it to him the second I came back to America. And that didn't ease
the attacks on it.

P: No. It sure didn't. Well, we won't borrow trouble if I . . . if you could
find something to call him about today or tomorrow I hope you will do so.

K: I've called him every day and I'll call him . . .

P: What I meant is to say that we're working on it; I'm reading the book.

K: I don't think he's in too belligerent a mood.

ELECON
the President

11/17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 6

It appears there is a typographical error in the original.
Please read the text.
Repeate please?

By: K.M.L.

NASA Date: 5/13/84

P: No, I don't think so either. I'm just trying to set him up for what he's going to do there. Now he's going to apparently going to go to NATO and then come back to Poland.

K: Mr. President, it's childish, really nuts . . .

P: I don't know what the hell he wants to come to Poland for . . .

K: Oh because there are going to be . . . he thinks there are going to be crowds in the streets.

P: Oh what the hell. But the point is even if there weren't, does he want to go to Iran?

K: No.

P: Well, that's my point. Why to Christ does he go to Poland and not to Iran? You see I think that's an affront to the Iranians.

K: Well, and it's a childish move because there isn't anything to talk about. But he's made such an issue of it; he's called me three times; he called Haldeman three times . . .

P: All right; all right, do it.

K: It doesn't make any sense; there's no good reason except that he'll be moping around for two weeks if he doesn't. Then that way he can come back with you; I think that has something to do with it.

P: No problem. We're arranging the schedules you know in such a way that when I go to Leningrad and what's the other city, Kiev now or . . . ?

K: Kiev I think he won't be with you.

P: Do I go to Kiev?

K: Yes.

P: Yes. Well, anyway when we go to these cities, these other places you know, I'm being really brutal. Haldeman is arranging that all the party, all the party goes in Leningrad and Moscow and others, when we do go out, goes separately from me. They go see some things; I go see other things.

K: I think that's right.

P: Rather than having them all tag along with me because I have seen most of the things in these places where we're going to be.

ELECON
the President

11/7/72 11:12 a.m. p. 7

The President's Office
Receptionist's Note

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12998, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/04

K: I think that's much better.

P: They want to call it... that's too bad if people don't like it. That's just it.

K: Mr. President, I think it's a lot better.

P: One thing we've certainly got to do is... in briefing this... I think we have to recognize we have totally different, I mean relationships with Brezhnev and Gromyko and myself and Rogers. Brezhnev does rely on Gromyko and the main reason is Gromyko does not try and upstage; he does what he's told.

K: Right.

P: And does a hell of a lot and so I hope Dobrynin understands the difference in the relationships.

K: Totally, Mr. President, totally. And Gromyko understands that he's got to keep Rogers occupied.

P: Uh-huh. Right. And have them agree on some things that they can.

K: And he's a pro, I mean Gromyko is really good.

P: Oh yeah, yeah. Oh God, I wish he were working for us.

K: He is outstanding. Actually he is the sort of Secretary of State you would want.

P: He's exactly that because he's... carries out things meticulously; he works his tail off; he has some ideas of his own; he never tries to upstage... and as a result of course Gromyko has become a very great figure in the world.

K: That's right.

P: That's the way to do it, you know, rather than trying to do it in your own right. Well, that's another problem. I just have a feeling of this, that it was just a mistake. If I ever do any more foreign travelling I don't think any Cabinet people should go along, none, none at all.

K: I think in your second term, Mr. President, you should set these things up the way you are comfortable with them. You've been babying and carrying your associates now for four years and in your second term you ought to do it the way it's best for you.

H. W. SHERMAN, as a member of the
House of Representatives,
United States of America.

ELECON
the President

/17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 8

By: KHC W. NAVA, Date: 5/12/04

P: Yeah. We have to...

K: You shouldn't have to worry about someone's morale

P: ... the people who are going along; who's not going along. Nobody's going to go with me.

K: To fly people like back from Bonn to Washington to Warsaw for a 22-hour day is really nuts, but if he wants it, fine.

P: Well, it's ... we have to pay that price.

K: Yeah, but I just mean the second term you ought to...

P: Oh well, don't worry, don't worry.

K: ... do these things the way you are comfortable

P: I shouldn't be even worrying about these things and I'm not going to now that I've mentioned it to you. It's all done now and Haldeman understands and that's the way it is going to be. And you're going to set up two plenary sessions I understand.

K: That's right.

P: And, have you told Bill that?

K: M Uh, yes.

P: He knows that.

K: Right.

P: I'm not sure that you ought to set up the separate meeting. Haldeman told me something about and I don't think you ought to set up the private meeting between him and Brezhnev.

K: Well, I think...

P: I just don't think we ought to do that.

K: You do that and you're going to get publicity that makes it sound as if it were all done there.

P: That's right. And, so I hope you haven't mentioned that.

ELECON
the President

1/17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 9

Rogers, W. E. (the open line)
the President's Office
Publicity Staff?

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/74

K: No, no.

P: Has ________ suggested it?

K: No, I suppose they'll do it if we ask for it.

P: No, no, no. Well, but there's no reason for it, damn it.
Brezhnev talks to me, right.

K: That's right.

P: And basically I think this thing should be that Gromyko and
Rogers meet and sometimes Gromyko, Rogers, Brezhnev and I will meet.
But I'll be damned if I think we ought to have a situation where I ask
Brezhnev to meet with Rogers.

K: Well, I don't see any . . .

P: Let's not do it. Because you have the plenaries, I see there's no
reason to now. How does Kosygin fit into this whole thing?

K: Well, when there is a plenary, Kosygin will be there.

P: Oh I understand that.

K: And my guess is that Kosygin may be there once or twice when . . .

P: Yeah, now is Kosygin going to . . . is he going to see Rogers separately?

K: Well actually, Mr. President, I think they have the same problem we
have without ability to resolve it.

P: Yeah.

K: I think they want to keep it open until you get there.

P: Yeah. What I think we ought to do. I think we ought to tell
Dobrynin that the best thing to do is opposite number-opposite number, period.
In other words, Rogers and Gromyko should meet, either together or in the
plenary and as far as the others are concerned it should be exactly the same
way. I'll meet with Brezhnev . . . do they plan me to meet with Kosygin alone
at all?

K: No. I think you will either meet with Brezhnev alone or with Brezhnev
Kosygin and Podgorny together.

P: Podgorny. And sometimes Gromyko.

["ELECON", "The President", "5/17/72 11:12 a.m. p. 10", "Re: [illegible] one the 1st of [illegible] [illegible] [il

Husqville 3100 the open end
the Sides of a mutual
Pleasantest Place

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3-6

TELCONE

Ziegler/Kissinger

11:23 - 5/17/72

Z: I'm planning on posting this press list now at 3:00 and giving a general overview of the schedule, but I wanted to make sure that you were aware and that you might want to have one of your people tell Dobrynin or you may want to tell Dobrynin.

K: What?

Z: That we're going to do this.

K: When are you going to do it?

Z: At 3 o'clock.

K: OK, I'll tell him.

Z: Now they've already released stuff on the Moscow - have you seen that?

K: Yes.

Z: On the wire?

K: On what?

Z: On the schedule, on the press list and so forth.

K: That isn't true so don't worry about it.

Z: What do you mean that's not true.

K: I mean about the number of meetings.

Z: They'll have another schedule out today that's more authoritative.

K: That I haven't seen.

Z: They've been fixing it this morning apparently. It's with the day he's going to Leningrad and the whole thing so really it's pretty authoritative.

K: Oh good.

Z: I just want you to know that I'm going to give a general overview. I'm not going to talk about the church on Sunday or anything else that may occur.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KMH
NASA Date: 5/12/04

K: I wouldn't.

Z: But I want to go - will you be around so I can just double-check with you on it.

K: Yes, I'll be around.

Z: And I also want to get some general words from you because in their stories they said there is no fixed agenda and I want to get a tone because they asked me for a tone. You know, what we intend to accomplish and so forth.

K: I would just set up on substance.

Z: I don't want to get into substance, but you know is there a fixed agenda and that type of thing. I want to say no, both sides are free to bring up whatever they want to or you know, that type of language.

K: Right.

Z: Now I'm also going to push for you for a 9:30 briefing in Salzberg.

K: On Sunday.

Z: On Sunday.

K: OK.

Z: 9:30 in the morning. To let the guys go in with a sense of confidence, that's all.

K: I think it'd be a good idea.

Z: Don't you agree?

K: Yes.

Z: Then I'm going to raise that with the President today. Don't you mention it to him until I do.

K: I won't mention it at all.

Z: NO, I mean. . .

K: He won't approve it, I'll tell you that right away.

Z: Yes he will.

K: OK.

Z: I'll see you later.

TELECON

Peter Flanigan

5/17/72 11:16 a.m.

Re: latest news of the union strike
and the strike's effect on
the union's future?

OECIASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

6/21/72 11:16 A.M. NASA Date 5/12/04

F: I understand that there may be something coming to a head on this
shipping deal.

K: Good.

F: We here are still trying to make sure that if we were to sign we wouldn't embarrass the President badly in August by having the unions refuse to load. We're not in a position to have even a feeling of assurance there. I'm having some meetings tonight at 6:30; I will know better by the end of the week, but I can't give you an assurance that the unions would support a signing as of this time.

K: Well but do your best.

F: I will do my best; I just don't want any commitments that I can't deliver on imposed on me without having the people who make them know the facts.

K: Okay, I don't know what the . . . I hardly understand the issues.

F: The issues are we haven't got the unions in camp yet.

K: I understand.

F: And we're trying to get them in camp within a week.

K: Good, thank you.

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Re: Question 1 from the open list
in the State of New York
Public Records Search?

TELECON

Bob McCloskey

5/17/72 11:58 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Henry.

K: Yes Bob.

M: I apologize for interrupting.

K: Not at all

M: ... statement that we'd like to use in the name of the Secretary on the action in Bonn today. "The United States Government views with satisfaction the action taken by the Bundestag today on the Federal Republic's treaties with the Soviet Union and with Poland. In light of this action we would hope for an early signature of the final quadripartite protocol which will bring the Berlin agreement into effect in accord with the President Nixon described as a milestone ..."

K: Well, the only thing that the President ... it so happened I talked to him about this early signature business in a different context.

M: I see.

K: He doesn't does not want to build a fire that any of that be done in the next two or three weeks. If you said "In the light of this we should not proceed to an ready signature ...

M: Uh, hm. "The way is open for early signature"?

K: Well he doesn't want to use ... I know he won't want to use the word "early."

M: Yeah, I see.

K: For the signature.

M: All right. "In light of this action, the way is open for signature."

K: Yes.

M: Okay. Otherwise all right?

K: Yeah.

M: Thanks Henry.

Re: a question about the report in a
article in the _Austrian_ press
Publicity Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sept. 3.5

TELECON
Amb. Gruber (Austria)

5/17/72 12:07 p.m.

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/17/04

K: Hello.

G: Gruber speaking.

K: Hello Mr. Ambassador. How nice to hear from you. I'm calling you about some of the reports we are getting about large demonstrations in Salzburg and also the fact that these crowds are going to be let in on the airport when the President arrives. And I just want to say, you know, I know there are limitations on what you can do. But it would really have very unfortunate consequences here...

G: I don't think this is in any way the case, but I will call them up in Vienna right away

K: And you know, the President has very warm feelings towards Austria and it would be a pity to destroy them with this sort of thing.

G: No, no, I will talk to them right away and we'll see that we get the true picture. The trouble is the news reports very often exaggerate it or are not quite...

K: Well, I know what... You know, I know it's not the feeling of the Austrian government or the vast majority of the people.

G: Straxx Salzburg should be the ideal to settle then I would say; there should be no problem whatsoever.

K: Well that's what I would have thought. But I just thought I should call you.

G: That was very fine. Thank you very much and I will get in touch with them immediately.

K: Very good.

G: Thank you very much.

K: Nice to talk to you.

G: Thank you very much.