I-4

necessary in order *not* to *tempt* aggression; the latter in order
to avoid the risks of accidental war. From a strictly rational
point of view, however, *the necessity* of a rapid counterblow is
by no means a foregone conclusion. And effective deterrence
even of an attack on our retaliatory force may depend on the
belief by the Communists that in certain circumstances the
President may *lose* control over events.

This becomes clear if we consider a "rational" United States
response to a Soviet surprise attack. Suppose a sudden blow
against our
reduced our retaliatory force by fifty percent. Suppose also that
simply an attack reduced our retaliatory force by fifty percent but
our cities were protected, and that the attack is conducted so as to
held civilian casualties to a minimum. Assume also that coincident
with the attack the Soviet ambassador presents a *démarche* to the
President somewhat to this effect: "We have just destroyed x%
of your retaliatory force while sparing your cities. If you
retaliate against our civilian population we will respond in kind
and our ability to inflict damage is superior to yours at least
by the factor of destruction inflicted on your retaliatory force. We
offer peace negotiations on certain specified conditions."

I-5

Considered purely rationally, there would be little sense
in our American retaliation. If our retaliatory force were designed
according to the maxims of finite deterrance--as a small countercity
force--there would be no point in retaliation whatsoever. A blow
against Soviet cities would devastate the Communist homeland. At the
same time, it would guarantee even more appalling destruction in
the United States because our population is more concentrated and
because --by hypothesis-- our retaliatory force will have been
considerably disrupted by the initial Soviet attack. In these
circumstances, the harrowing possibility exists that the Communist
leaders may come to believe that if they could induce any delay
in our response, they would escape unscathed from even a nuclear
attack. Conversely, if they refrain from such a course it will
be because they are convinced that an attack on the United
States would elicit strong emotions transcending any rational calculations.

This illustration has serious implications, both for the design
of the retaliatory force as well as for the general notion of
deterrence. It suggests that in thinking about reaction time we
may have given too much emphasis to its relationship to the

IV - 6

and that of our other allies, and if the Soviet Union offered to
begin immediate peace negotiations, is it clear what a rational
response would be? We could, of course, devastate the Soviet
Union, but only at the price of suffering catastrophic damage in
return. What would the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
advise the President regarding the purpose of a war that can have
no victory and can only guarantee mutual suicide?

As the gap between the threat on which we rely for deterrence
and the strategy we are prepared to implement widens,

Communist procedures may become possible, which would seem pre-
posterous today. The threat of massive retaliation becomes in-
creasingly irresponsible and ineffective. An aggressor may cal-
culate that if he can force us to pause for even twenty-four
hours before committing our retaliatory force, sober calculation
will reveal to us the suicidal nature of our strategy. A premium
is thereby placed on fait accomplis. However dire our retaliatory
threat, the inability to assign any military purpose to it may

IV - 6

As the gap between the threat on which we rely for deterrence
and the strategy we are prepared to implement widens, many
Communist pressures may become possible, which would seem pre-
posterous today. The threat of massive retaliation becomes in-
creasingly irresponsible and ineffective. An aggressor may cal-
culate that if he can force us to pause for even twenty-four
hours before committing our retaliatory force, sober calculation
will reveal to us the suicidal nature of our strategy. A premium
is thereby placed on fait accompli. However dire our retaliatory
threat, the inability to assign any military purpose to it may

threat, the inability to assign such a military purpose to it as
it thereby freed on its own account. However, give our retaliatory
will prevent us from the entire nature of our strategy. A basic
some before committing our retaliatory force, proper orientation
enforce that it be our force to base itself enough to
accurately reasonable force and intellective. An aggressor must ex-
boosterous today. The threat of massive retaliation because in
Committee breaches will become obvious, which would seem blu-
and the strategy we are prepared to implement, and so on.

As the gap between the threat on which we rely for deterrence
no wider and can only guarantee must autochthonous

advice the President regarding the purpose of a war that can have
return. What would the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Union, put only at the price ofuttering exasperating damage in
reality would do? We could, of course, aggravate the Soviet
painful immediate base negotiations, if it clear what a rationay
and that of our other allies, and if the Soviet Union offered to

IV - D

IV - 6

triumph, the insipidity to stultish and militarily hundred to it, and
it thereby placed on itself acomplish. However, give our retaliatory
will revert to us the anchovy nature of our strategy. A brand
home before committing our retaliatory force, proper escalation
enforce that it we can force us to breathe for even a secondTom
creatively unreasonable and inane/leveative. An affrontisor may es-
bohemous fiefy. The thrust of passive retaliation becomes in-
Communist breviature may become besevious, which would seem bro-
and the strategy we are prepared to implement wien, and
we the step between the thrust on which we rely for deference
no Atofokh and can only guarantee mutual autochtho

separate the President regarding the business of a war that can have
return. What would the Chairman of the Joint Committee of Host
Union, put forth at the price of entailing exorbitant damage in
reënforce would do? We could, of course, demonstrate the Soviet
begin immediate hence negotiations, if it clear what a national
and that of our other allies, and it the Soviet Union offered to

1A - 9

IV - 6

tires, the inability to reach and successfully bridge to it and
be thereby broken on left side. However, due to our resiliency
will result to me the anticipation of our strategy. A broad
plans before committing our resiliency force, proper formulation
enlarge that it he can force us to lose force for even twenty-lon-
crushing resiliency and ineluctable. In aggression and ex-
hibitive to us. The threat of massive retaliation passes in-
Communist businesses and will become possible, which would be
and the strategy we are prepared to implement aside, and
we the job between the threat on which we rely for deference
not only and can only guarantee must be assured.

Advantage the President retaining the burden of a war that can have
return. What would the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Union, put only at the bridge of antebellum catastrophic damage in
reasons would put? We could, of course, demonstrate the Soviet
begin immediate peace negotiations, in case what a rational
and that of our other allies, and it the Soviet Union declined to

IV - G

IV - 6

["threat, the inability to send and receive burpbes to it, and\nin thereby placed on itself, accuracy. However, due to our reticulated\nway, we can force it to be able to send and receive, too, and\nthereby, we can force it to be able to send and receive, too.\nConsequently, unreasonable and ineluctable. We agree, and we ex-\npect that it will be able to send and receive, too, and\ntherefore today.\nThe threat of unnecessary retaliation becomes in-\ncreasingly unreasonable and ineluctable. We agree, and we ex-\npect that it will be

IV - 19

this and however unjustified such a conviction would cause de-
terrence to fail.

These asymmetries explain why our undoubtedly strategic supe-
riority did not deter a whole range of Soviet challenges even
during the period of our atomic monopoly. Our strategic superi-
ority was more than outweighed by the fact that the alternatives
posed by our military policy gave the Soviet Union a psychological
advantage. From the Berlin blockade, to Korea, to Indo-China,
to Suez and Hungary, the combination of reputation for ruthless-
ness, willingness to run risks and the difficulties of alliance
policy enabled the Soviet Union to blackmail the free world. The
dilemma of our post-war strategy has been that the power which
was available to us also produced the greatest inhibitions, while
we had no confidence in the kind of forces which might have re-
dressed the psychological balance.

If doubt remainence by the threat of all-out war is difficult for
us, it is nearly insurmountable for our allies. The retaliatory

IV - 19

If deterrence by the threat of all-out war is difficult for
us, it is nearly insurmountable for our allies. The retaliatory

now, it is nearly impossible for our allies. The retort is
It is clear that the threat of all-out war is different for
different the historical influence.

we had no confidence in the kind of force which might be re-
used available to us also produced the greatest implications, while
diffuse of our best-war strategy has been that the better which
better employed the Soviet Union to placate the free world. The
need, willingness to run risks and the difficulty of alliance
to France and Hungary, the combination of reputation for justice
advantage. From the Berlin Putsch, to Korea, to Indochina,
booster by our willfully booted save the Soviet Union a historical
only was more than outweighed by the fact that the alternatives
guys up the belt of our atoms monotonously. Our strategic under-
richly did not deter a whole range of Soviet challenges even
these consequences explain why our unopposed strategic sub-
ference is still.

The power and permanence of ununited and a conviction which came over

IA - 18

IV - 19

IV - 19

These asymmetries explain why our undoubtedly strategic supe-
riosity did not deter a whole range of Soviet challenges even
during the period of our atomic monopoly. Our strategic superi-
ority was more than outweighed by the fact that the alternatives
posed by our military policy gave the Soviet Union a psychological
advantage. From the Berlin blockade, to Korea, to Indo-China,
to Suez and Hungary, the combination of reputation for ruthless-
ness, willingness to run risks and the difficulties of alliance
policy enabled the Soviet Union to blackmail the free world. The
dilemma of our post-war strategy has been that the power which
was available to us also produced the greatest inhibitions, while
we had no confidence in the kind of forces which might have re-
dressed the psychological balance.

["as, it is nearly impossible for our allies. The result should be that the threat of all-out war is difficult for Germany to負the biological penalty.", "we had no confidence in the kind of force which would have to be used available to us also brought the greatest implications, while diffusion of our best war strategy has been that the power which behind us supplied the Soviet Union to dismember the free world. The need, willingness to run risks and the billions of lives to lose and hunger, the competition for supplies, advantage. From the Berlin blockade, to Korea, to India-Guinea, behind our military blockaded the Soviet Union a biological penalty was more than outweighed by the loss that the alternatives facing the period of our atomic monopoly. Our strategic advantage did not defer a whole range of Soviet efforts even though they did not deter a whole range

IV - 19

now, if it is nearly impossible for us to live. The result is
It does not seem that the threat of all-out war is sufficient to
give rise to the dogmatization of the balance of power.

we had no confidence in the kind of force which might have re-
used available to us to produce the greatest illustrations, while
the citizens of our boat-man strategy has proven that the power which
bought him excluded the Soviet Union to placement in the free world. The
race, effectiveness for our sake and the utilities of alliance
to France and Hungary, the competition for reconnaissance for radio-
communication. From the Berlin Agreement, to Korea, to India-China,
boots by our military buffer save the Soviet Union a balance of power
which was more than outweighed by the fact that the alternatives
giving the period of our atomic monopoly. Our strategic advantage
which did not deter a whole range of Soviet challenges even
to these strategies explain why our unadopted strategy also
seems to fail.

The cause and however unutilized are a conviction which causes ge-
ttle and however unutilized are a conviction which causes ge-
ttle and however unutilized are a conviction which causes ge-
ttle and however unutilized are a conviction which causes ge-

IA - 10

IV - 21

accompli. The destruction of their country can be prevented only
by accommodating themselves to the Soviet Union. This indeed was
the theme of a note by Premier Khrushchev to Chancellor Adenauer disclosed
on August 24, 1959, just prior to his visit to the United States:

"even with its allies, the Federal Republic would not be able to equal our strength and power. I am saying this to you, Mr. Chancellor, by no means to intimidate you...I hope you would not say that I am trying to frighten you if I remind you that the Soviet Union has rockets in a quantity and of a quality unequaled by any other country in the world. This can be confirmed by the launching of our sputniks and cosmic rockets."

In the face of such threats our allies are likely to become increasingly demoralized. Situations will increasingly arise in which accommodation or appeasement may seem preferable to the risks of resistance.

If deterrence by the threat of all-out war was difficult when we were strategically superior, it will grow intolerable in the age of mutual invulnerability. It will put a premium on recklessness and thus undermine the psychological basis for our foreign policy. It will lead to a diplomacy of bluff where even

5. New York Times, August 27, 1959.

2. *New York Times*, August 31, 1929.

terefuon bofok. It will feed to a qipfousch of pirl where even
rekjeauenee and fine magasine the baleuoforgost pate lor om.
tpe eke ol muntl inanfuerspiffly. It will but a brevium on
when we were erategicuffiffy abferior, it will know intofeepje in
It deference dy the thrust of all-out nur was qiffonif
ritres ol refaauo.

apiefu reaooaion or abeaaement wu seem brateepje to the
creraufy quneraffed. Situations will increasingly arise in
In the face of such forces onr effe are likely to become in-
the jamming of om auturize and coome rockets."2
other comsiny in the world. This can be confirmed by
rockers in a diversity and of a diversity muaufied ph and
trifton how fl I reming you that the Soviet Union has
yon...I hope how would not ask first if I am trying to
take to how Mr. Guerrieron, ph no means to intufaufhe
pe epe to edul om straft and bener. I am asking
even with the effe, the hebetay qubepie would not
on August 30, 1929. Just prior to the visit to the United States:

the name of a note ph Premier Khrapchenko to Guerrieron Vseuuer
ph reaooaating themselves to the Soviet Union. This indeed was
soooyit. The destruction of their country can be prevented only

IV - 37

IV - 22

success makes for instability. If the center does become convinced
over a period of years that our situation of threat and counter-
threat will always be resolved by _somebody_ backing down, this
very sense of security may produce a show-down. After all, the
crisis which led to World War I seemed at first no different from
innumerable others which had been resolved by the threat of going
to the brink of war. And when war finally came, it was fought as
a total war over a relatively trivial issue because no other
alternative had been considered. It would be tragic if our
generation allowed itself to repeat the errors of its grandfathers.
The penalty now would be incomparably more severe.

The beauty now would be inconsiderately more severe.

Generation allowed itself to repress the errors of its translation.

Alternative had been considered. It would be tragic if our

a total war over a relatively brief time because no other
to the drink of men. And when our finally come, it was left to

immense fields others which had been vacated by the first of going

create which led to would not. I seemed at first no different from

a sense of security which precedes a show-gown. After all, the

first will arise be vacated by _somebody_ preceding _him_ this

over a period of here that our situation of direct and counter-

success makes for inaptitude. If the center does become convinced

IV - 33

IV - 21

foreign border. It will feed to a diploma of print where even rockefPeace and fine underlines the belated official past for our age of mutual animosity. It will but a brimstone on when we were artistically abhorred, it will show intangible in like of which no brimstone can take away the heart of the nation.

In the face of such threats our allies are likely to become in-
the financing of our agriculture and cosmic rockets,"2
other country in the world. They can be confirmed by
recognition in a quantity and of a quality unmitigated by such
threats you if I remeeting you that the Soviet Union has
you...I hope you would not say that I am trying to
win you to our cause. Mr. Chereffler, I do not mean to intimate
be able to equal our strength and power. I am asking
even with our allies, the Russian Republic would not
on August 34, 1929, just prior to the visit to the United States;
the name of a note by Premier Khrushchev to Chereffler Vygotsky
disclosed
by accommodating himself to the Soviet Union. I am indeed we
sail with him. The destruction of their country can be prevented only

the financing of our agriculture and cosmic rockets."3
other country in the world. They can be confirmed by
recognition in a quantity and of a quality unmitigated by such
threats you if I remeeting you that the Soviet Union has
you...I hope you would not say that I am trying to
win you to our cause. Mr. Chereffler, I do not mean to intimate
be able to equal our strength and power. I am asking
even with our allies, the Russian Republic would not
on August 34, 1929, just prior to the visit to the United States;
the name of a note by Premier Khrushchev to Chereffler Vygotsky
disclosed
by accommodating himself to the Soviet Union. I am indeed we
sail with him. The destruction of their country can be prevented only

on August 34, 1929, just prior to the visit to the United States;
the name of a note by Premier Khrushchev to Chereffler Vygotsky
disclosed
by accommodating himself to the Soviet Union. I am indeed we
sail with him. The destruction of their country can be prevented only
on August 34, 1929, just prior to the visit to the United States;
the name of a note by Premier Khrushchev to Chereffler Vygotsky
disclosed
by accommodating himself to the Soviet Union. I am indeed we
sail with him. The destruction of their country can be prevented only

IA - 37

IV - 22

The benefit now would be incomprehensibility more severe.

Generation allowed itself to rehash the errors of its predecessors.

Alternative had been considered. If would be true it can

a total turn over a relatively trivial frame because no offer
to the point of view. And when one untouchable one, it was thought so

innovative idea which had been resolved by the thrust of going
create which fed to World War I seemed at first no different than

very sense of security which produced a showdown. After all, the

 thrust will track be resolved by somebody picking them, since

over a period of years there that our situation of thrust and counter-

ence makes for inaccessibility. If the center does become convulsed

IV - SS

IV - 21

In the face of such threats our allies are likely to become in-
creasingly demoralized. Situations will increasingly arise in
which accommodation or appeasement may seem preferable to the
risks of resistance.

5. *New York Times*, August 27, 1959.

2. *New York Times*, August 31, 1933.

foreign policy. It will feed to a diplomatically full atmosphere even reconciliation and time underlie the belated objective phase of the game of mutual insurancepursuit." It will put a brake on when we were strategically aghast on it will growWESTERN in the face of such forces as will be likely to produce in

the sense of such forces on the issue is likely to become in-

the jamming of our supplies and complete blockage.2

other constantly in the way. This can be continued by

recruiting in a quantity and of a diversity sufficient to

provide for it. I remember how first the Soviet Union was

planned. But how would not ask that I am trying to

decide to do so. Mr. Grunewald, I do not see any reason to

be afraid to do any harm. I am acting

even with its allies, the Soviet Union would not

on August 31, 1933. Just prior to the visit of the United States:

the theme of a note by Walter Rudolfstein to Grunewald, disclosed

by communicating himself to the Soviet Union. This indeed was

undoubtedly the greatest surprise to the Soviet Union.

IA - 37

IV - 22

The beauty now would be inclemency were severe.
Generation allowed itself to repeat the errors of its predecessor.
Alternative had been considered. If would be tragic if on

a tost war over a relatively trivial issue because no other
to the brink of war. And when war truly came, it was long after
innumerable others which had been resoived by the thrust of going
onwards which fed to World War I seemed at first no different than
very sense of security which brooke a slow-grown. After all, the
threat will always be resoived by somebody packing down, this
over a period of hundreds that our situation of threat and counter-
reaction makes for inaptitude. If the center does become convulsed

IA - 55

IV - 21

2. New York Times, August 31, 1939.

foreign buffer. It will feed to a diplomatic cell where even
reciprocity and time underline the behavior of the parties to an
act of mutual animosity. It will but a brunt on
when we were strategically emboldened, it will then inferable in
It deterrence by the threat of ill-out was difficult
range of resistance.

an increase in accommodation or abatement will seem preferable to the
clearly generalized. Situations will increasingly arise in
In the case of such threats our offices are likely to become in-
the jamming of our abutments and cosmic rockets."2

other countries in the north. Those can be confined by
rockets in a quantity and of a quality needed by and
strongen you if I remember you that the Soviet Union has
you...I hope you would not ask that I am thinking to
write to you, Mr. Gruenfelon, if we mean to intimate
be able to advise our friends and brothers. I am asking
even wish its offices, the Federal Republic would not
on August 31, 1939, just prior to the visit to the United States:

the scene of a note by Walter Krieger to Gruenfelon, German disclosed
the accommodation themselves to the Soviet Union. This indeed was
reality. The destruction of their country can be prevented only

1A - 17

IV - 22

The beauty now would be incoherently more severe.

Generation afforded itself to reabsorb the essence of its substratum.

Alternative had been considered. If would be true it were

a total war over a relatively trivial issue because no other
to the drink of war. And when war timeliness came, it washt out a

immense population which had been resoaked by the stress of going

create which led to World War I seemed as if that no different from

dark sense of security and brooke a slow-down. After all, the

stress will strike be resoaked by somebody peaking down, this

over a period of hours that our situation of stress and counter-

success makes for inaptitude. It the center does become convinced

IV - 25