For publication in
Munich Foreign Affairs
assoc. 50th Anniversary
Magazine
(submitted 5/7/88)

[Y]

The nations of the Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America or Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius. Without Europe, America's path would be lonely; without America, Europe's role would approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent it.

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role, Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of Europe that is historically valid--that is, which includes the nations of Central Europe.

An American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against German hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of its foreign policy.

- Henry A. Kissinger

⊗

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before this committee on a
matter of such importance to America's future. If this
century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is
inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution
expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in
Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from
the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the
consequences of its success.

The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the
Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental
link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into
a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium,
much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a
role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to
Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America or
Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America
would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to
a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect
its national genius. Without Europe, America's path would be
lonely; without America, Europe's role would approach
irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this
century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power
threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent
it.

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hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of its foreign policy.

Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays them.

I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would store up endless future troubles.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of the common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt America's leadership role and to try to influence the security position of the buffer zone. Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion between Germany and

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Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a
political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

Considerations such as these have transformed the great
Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early
NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely
appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic
evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the
most optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely
compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in
Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does
not share this view.

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two
conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia
against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe
between Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely
to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as
its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may
drift out of their association with Europe. The end result
would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has
tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from
defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is
opting for progressive irrelevance.

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply
worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia
to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils.
Alliances define a common threat; collective security deals
with a legal contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be
defended; collective security is open-ended and is redefined
from case-to-case.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective
security, not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties'
"shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided
Europe, whole and free" and refers to the parties' "allegiance
to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior." But
Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms
to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist.
Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting
of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border
with Ukraine. Of what, then, do the shared commitments cited
in the Founding Act consist?

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The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead (and only once) the euphemism "commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty" (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the nature of these commitments.

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes--not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states--decisions are made by consensus.

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall

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relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the US Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State for clarification on a number of these issues when she appeared before the committee two weeks ago.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution

should declare that the United States expects Russia--after
the qualitative changes that we have made--to desist from all
pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the
meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of
Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to
join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the
institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion
comes into being years before expansion occurs.

If the administration does not want to be remembered as
having in effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this
century, it should welcome efforts to clarify the many
ambiguities in the Founding Act. In this way, a truly
bipartisan approach to American-European security relations
can be restored.