Vice President
Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

regretions when we meet for lunch on Friday.
I would be very eager to get home
therefore find few cooperative solutions.

a catalogue of our problems, and you will
these chapters are enclosed to be
happened when you try to simplify things.

written at the moment, which is always what
on the telephone. They are a little over-
of our time report which I mentioned to you
Enclosed are the first two chapters

Dear V. V.:

Havard
Widener 80
Mr. V. M. Schlesinger, Jr.

December 3, 1943

March 28, 1958

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener 95
Harvard University

Dear Arthur:

It was very nice of you to send me the clipping
and I am sorry that I have not had a chance to reply sooner.

I agree with your criticism of Acheson, but I am
afraid that I cannot say any more for Kennan. His instincts
may be the right ones - and I believe they are - but his pro-
posals strike me as so hysterical and so self-righteous that
they might make the present situation even worse. I do not
agree with the argument that a policy is good simply because
it is new. Our justified frustration with the present course
must not lead us into agreeing with any policy simply because
it is different. At the same time, I quite agree with you that
the basic short-coming of our policy is our failure to make it
meaningful in human terms.

All the best.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE SPACE AGE. By James M. Gavin. New York: Harpers.
304 pages. $5.

This remarkable volume contains at least three separate books.
One is the autobiography of a brilliant man who enlisted in the Army
out of the coal fields of Pennsylvania at the age of 17 and rose to
the rank of Lieutenant-General. Another is a cutting critique of the
defense policies and programs of the Eisenhower administration by a
man who believes that our national security depends on maintaining
our capacity to fight limited war. A third is an only slightly con-
cealed brief in favor of the Army against the Navy and especially
against the Air Force. The three books weave bewilderingly in and
out of each other with inordinate reaffirmation and repetition. Yet
the result is an arresting work.

Let us first consider General Gavin's case on defense. He is
profoundly opposed to those who would rest American security on the
policy of strategic nuclear retaliation. Such a policy equips us, he
points out, only for all-out wars; it leaves us disarmed against the
more likely tactics of Communist aggression, such as economic and
political pressure, subversion and local war. While General Gavin
agrees that we must maintain our strategic nuclear deterrents, he
contends that we should have devoted a far larger part of our resources
over the last few years to the development of our limited war capabi-
lities -- to airborne divisions, to airlift, to tactical air power and
to tactical nuclear weapons.

to tactical nuclear weapons.

It is true -- to airborne divisions, to aircraft, to tactical air power and over the last few years to the development of our limited war capacity -- contains that we should have devoted a far larger part of our resources to research that we must maintain our strategic nuclear deterrence, be political breather, and diversion and local war. While General Gavin more likely tactics of Communist aggression, and as economic and points out, only for all-out war! It leaves us disarmed against the policy of strategic nuclear retaliation. Such a policy consists, of course, obviously opposed to those who would rest American security on the result that we first consider General Gavin's case on defense. He is the result is an arresting work.

out of each other with inordinate restimulation and repetition. Yet against the Air Force. The three pocks weave pshawlingly in and ceased quiet in favor of the Army against the Navy and especially our capacity to fight limited war. A third is an only slightly confused defense policy and programme of the Airpower administration by the rank of Lieutenant-General. Another is a cutting criticism of the out of the coal fields of Pennsylvania at the age of 15 and rose to One is the autobiography of a brilliant man who emigrated in the Army. This remarkable volume contains at least three separate pockets.

304 pages. $2.

MAY AND BEACH IN THE SPACER AGE. By James M. Gavin. New York: Harcourt.

[Lc]

2

General Gavin makes this case with broad and sweeping strokes. In so doing, he neglects to provide the detailed analysis which his argument requires. The champions of the limited-war thesis must really be more concrete about where and how they anticipate that such a war might be fought. General Gavin does not mention Henry Kissinger's proposal for limitation through communication of our intentions to the enemy. Short of that, where is such war to come? In Europe? Not likely under present conditions. In the Middle East? Not so very likely either, judging by the second thoughts over Lebanon. In the Far East? Again not likely. Where then? Such a catechism is, of course, no argument against expanding our limited war capability; we need to do this if only to increase the flexibility of our diplomacy. But it may be an argument against making limited wars the immediate center of our defense strategy -- especially when that proposal is advanced by those who can evidently see no other way of keeping the Army in business.

Nor does General Gavin consider in close detail how limited wars are to be kept limited. For example, he himself advocated the use of nuclear weapons in Korea -- an act that might well have enlarged the war. Some military planners have tried to show that the use of nuclear weapons might be militarily and politically compatible with local war; but it is a complicated argument; and General Gavin simply slides over the point. Nor does he deal with the question of the cost of airlift which, though the nation could certainly stand it economically, is likely to be achieved under the current political

economically, it is likely to be achieved under the current political
coast of a shift which, though the nation could certainly stand it
sides over the point. Nor does he deal with the question of the
local war; but it is a complicated argument: and General Gavin seems
clear reasons might be differently and politically compatible with
war. Some military planners have tried to show that the use of un-
unclear weapons in Korea -- an act that might well have enlarged the
ure to be kept limited. For example, he himself advocated the use of
Nor does General Gavin consider in close detail how limited was
in principle.

advanced by those who can evidently see no other way of keeping the Army
center of our defense strategy -- especially when that proposal is ad-
justed to do this it only to increase the flexibility of our diplomacy.
Since no argument against expanding our limited war capability we
will not be likely. Where then? Such a category is, of
likely either, judging by the second thoughts over reason. In the
Not likely under present conditions. In the Middle East. Not so very
the enemy. Short of that, where is such war to come? In Europe;
proposed for limitation through communication of our intentions to
might be thought. General Gavin does not mention Henry Kissinger's
be more concrete about where and how they anticipate that such a war
argument requires. The champions of the limited-war theories must really
in so doing, he neglects to provide the detailed analysis which his
General Gavin makes this case with broad and sweeping strokes.

3

[r]

3

[LC]

leadership only at the expense of other urgent needs (such as programs necessary to combat Communist economic and political pressure).

His remarks on the organization of the Defense Establishment seem similarly sketchy and unsatisfying. On the one hand, he proposes reorganization in terms of functional needs (total war, limited war, home defense); on the other, he wants to retain the traditional services. And he suffers under the Pentagon delusion that tinkering with the "decision-making process" will somehow suddenly produce better policies. Surely his experience with Charles E. Wilson should have convinced him that stupid men can defeat any decision-making procedures, no matter how perfectly designed.

To say all this is to question the haste and disorder of General Gavin's arguments rather than the validity of his conclusions. And one records these objections with regret, because the image of the man which emerges from the book is immensely appealing. General Gavin is not only brave and dedicated; he is also bursting with ideas, respectful of disagreement and passionately persuaded of the value of uninhibited discussion. He frankly calls himself a liberal on questions of defense policy. He writes of Mr. Wilson that he dealt with his Chiefs of Staff as though they were recalcitrant union bosses; "the thought often struck me that Walter Reuther, under the circumstances, would have been a more effective Chief of Staff than a professional soldier." He is an unashamed military intellectual, who has no hesitation in aligning himself with Dr. Oppenheimer on strategic

no relaxation in affecting himself with Dr. Oppenheimer on strategic
strategic officer." He is an unmaugured military intellectual, who has
attention, would have been a more effective Chief of Staff than a pro-
"the thought often struck me that Walter Rether, under the circum-
stances of defense policy. He writes of Mr. Wilson that he dealt with
unindigested discussion. He truly calls himself a liberal on race-
specific of disagreement and passionately persuaded of the value of
is not only brave and dedicated; he is also purging with ideas, re-
man which emerges from the stock is immensely appealing. General Gavin
And one records these objections with regret, because the image of the
eral Gavin's arguments rather than the validity of his conclusions.
To say all this is to question the base and disorder of Gen-
culture, no matter how perfectly designed.

have convinced him that a stupid man can defeat any decision-making pro-
deteringo policy. Smully his experience with Charles E. Wilson should
with the "decision-making process" will somehow suddenly produce
vices. And he utters under the Pentagon definition that tinkering
home defense; on the other, he wants to retain the traditional set-
organization in terms of functional needs (total war, limited war,
seem similarly sketchy and unstatisthing. On the one hand, he proposes
His remarks on the organization of the Defense Establishment
necessary to combat Communist economic and political pressure).

Leaderahip only at the expense of other urgent needs (such as programmes

3

[L]

4

issues and who quotes Adlai Stevenson, Henry Commager and Max Lerner
as easily as he does Clausewitz. "New ideas and intelligent criticism,"
he emphasizes, are indispensable; "without these two ingredients in
our thinking, we will not survive."

Now that General Gavin is out of government, we must all hope
that he will continue to serve the republic by employing his gifts for
analysis and exposition -- and that, having got this book out of his
system, he will make his next one more sustained in development
and more rigorous in argument.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

[Memo to M.M. -- if this review is too long, cut out paragraph 5.]

[Memo to M.M. -- it this review is too long, cut out paragraph 2.]

ARTHUR SCHMIDT, JR.

State, he will make his next one more sustained in development
anfluence and exposition -- and that, having got this book out of his
that he will continue to serve the Republic by employing his skills to

Now that General Gavin is out of Government, we must all do the
our thinking, we will not survive."

be emphaSES, are indispensible: "without these two ingredients in
as easily as he does Clausewitz." "New ideas and intelligent criticism,
issue and who quotes Adelio Stevenson, Henry Commer and Max Planck

[c]

WIDENER T
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

UNIVERSITY 4-9710

November 5, 1958

Dear Henry:

Is Nelson going to make you his Secretary of State in succession to Carmine?

I should be delighted to come to the dinner for Jim Fisk on November 25th and will hope to come to the meeting at the Center on the same day.

Could we have lunch one of these days, say, Wednesday, November 12th or Monday, November 17th?

Mr. Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue

March 16, 1959

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener T
Harvard

Dear Arthur:

I have read pamphlet number 4 of the Democratic Advisory Council with great interest and general agreement. I think it could stand editorial tightening. Some of the similarities seem to me ill-chosen (for example the one on page 3) and certain passages are thereby given a tone of lightness. Substantively I think the discussion of what is required for the defense of Europe is excellent. The remaining sections seem to me less carefully thought through. I question the wisdom of having an official document of the Democratic Party take quite so pessimistic an approach to the possibility of defending the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Even if it is correct I am not sure it should be stated.

Also it seems to me that the discussion of limited nuclear warfare is a little bit too compressed. Surely there are good arguments for being ready to conduct limited nuclear war other than that the economizing of manpower. While my own thought is tending in the direction of a greater conventional capability, I do believe that the problem of limited nuclear war needs a somewhat more serious treatment.

A few minor points. On page 1 I object to the phrase that it is in our interest "to preserve in Western Europe regimes willing to associate themselves with us." This is true, but I think it should be based less on trying to help regimes than of working in the *common* interest with people whose values we share. I would stress the aspect of cooperative effort rather than that of American national interest.

The point on page 23, while I agree completely, about not building airplanes so that airmen have something to fly, is apt to excite the Air Force unnecessarily and could perhaps be stated more subtly.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

UNIVERSITY 4-9710

March 23, 1959

Dear Henry:

Just a line to thank you for sending me a copy of your Reporter essay. I read it with great interest and admiration. I particularly liked your emphasis on the "inward insecurity" of top officials. This is a valuable and illuminating point. I wish you had been able in your conclusion to develop a little more your hints about the kind of leadership and administration structure which encourage imagination and innovation.

April 15, 1959

Dear Arthur:

I wish I could speak on June 7th
for the ADA. Unhappily I will be in Europe
at the time attending a NATO Parliamentarians'
Conference.

Ann and I would love to have dinner
with my fellow Young-Man-Of-The-Year.

Kind regards.

ADDRESSES

Professor Bernard Bailyn
Widener 447
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Richard Chase
Columbia University
New York 27, N.Y.

Professor Perry Miller
Widener 764
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dr. Dwight L. Dumond
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor
Michigan

Professor Ernest Nagel
Columbia University
New York 27, N.Y.

Professor Alfred Kazin
110 Riverside Drive
New York City, N.Y.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Mr. William Lee Miller
Yale Divinity School
New Haven, Connecticut

Mr. James B. Consent
568 Fifth Avenue
New York City, N.Y.

Professor Louis Hertz (to Sept. 1)
114 Rue Michel-Ange
Paris 16, France

Department of Government (after Sept. 1)
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Mr. Max Lerner
NEW YORK POST
75 West Street
New York City

Professor I. Bernard Cohen
Widener 189
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Donald Fleming
Widener 217
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Richard Hofstadter (to Sept. 1)
Gaius College
Cambridge, England

Columbia University (after Sept. 1)
New York 27, N.Y.

Mr. Philip Rahv
131 Marlborough Street
Boston, Massachusetts

Professor J. K. Galbreith
Litteauer 207
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Edward Shils
Center for Behavioral Studies
Stanford University
Stanford, California (to Sept. 1)

Obiange University (after Sept)
Chicago 57, Illinois

Mr. Daniel Bell
Center for Behavioral Studies
Stanford University
Stanford, California (to Sept.)

Columbia University (after Sept)
New York 27, N.Y.

Opiago, 21. Illinois

New York 21, N.Y. College University (after Gebt.)

Stanford, California (to Gebt.)

Stanford, California (to Gebt.) Stanford University

Center for Research and Education Professor Edward Stiles

Mr. James B. Cossart

****

New Haven, Connecticut
Irene Dainieth School
Mr. William Lee Miller

****

Compridge, Massachusetts
G Dainieth Vacant
Mr. Henry Krieger

****

New York City, N.Y.
110 River街 Drive
Professor Vittor Kain

****

New York 21, N.Y.
College University
Professor Ernst Nagel

****

Richland
Van Veen
University of Michigan
Dr. Delegt F. Dumond

****

Compridge, Massachusetts

Hersard University

Mayer 164
Professor. Reta K. Miller

****

New York 21, N.Y.
College University
Professor Richard Chace

****

Compridge, Massachusetts
Hersard University
Mayer 441
Professor Bernard Berlau

Compridge, Massachusetts

Hersard University
Pitts 501
Professor T. K. Gebhardt

****

Boston, Massachusetts
121 Mariporah Street
Mr. Philip Repa

****

Compridge, Elsang
Cirne College

Professor Richard Holsteger (to Gebt. 1)

****

Compridge, Massachusetts
Hersard University
Mayer 511
Professor Donerd Lientig

****

Compridge, Massachusetts
Hersard University
Mayer 168
Professor I. Bernhard Cohen

****

New York City
12 West 40th
NEW YORK 1021
Mr. Max Fenzler

****

Compridge, Massachusetts
Hersard University
Department of Government (after Gebt. 1)

Purdue 10, Indiana
11100 Ute Michael-Ville
Professor Louis Hartz (to Gebt. 1)

ADDRESS

Lfd

May 6, 1959

Dear Arthur:

Thank you for your note of
April 29th. On thinking the matter over,
I really do not think that I should take
on the essay for the volume, interesting
though it would be. My own work as you
know is more in the post World War II
period and I have so many writing commit-
ments that I better not undertake another
one. If you should find that your project
is delayed, I might reconsider.

With all good wishes.

[LC]

★ **Assertions and judgments seemingly from him or his family** present Governor Rockefeller as the successful candidate of GOP for President in 1960: a man of "supreme self-confidence", "quick-silver decisions", "snap decisions", intolerance of Washington co-workers, who believes "capital should provide everyone with a better life as a matter of right."

★ **John D Rockefeller Is Misrepresented**

1. The "curious oxbow around the name of Rockefeller" has not been described by "the stream of time," but by slanting journalism.

2. He did not shun the Stock Exchange because he "despised the turmoil"; he was producing wealth not brokering and buying his or others' stocks.

3. He did not win battles by "wile and sheer determination"; he used sheer efficiency.

4. Vanquished contestants did not lay it to his "intellectual will", but to his ability and power skilfully and lawlessly used.

5. He was not an "instinctive competitor," but a conscious eradicator of competition vs him.

6. He was not "frankly out to alter American economy," except for what he wanted.

7. He was not "a genius at engineering economic revolutions from within" and so insisted.

8. He did not remain "aloof from corruption ... wholesale bribery of authorities" unless being a "fence" is aloofness.

9. His "alliance with party" was not less dubious then than it is "by today's lights."

10. His family name was not despised 50 years ago; feared, condemned, never despised.

11. His family name is not an asset today if tied to anti-social action; if its tax escaping were told, it would be despised as it never was when dreaded the world over.

(L.C.)

12. He did not find edification in Baptist pews alone, but in his wife, home life, seeing and planting trees, travel, world supremacy in "making" and giving millions in small and gigantic gifts.

13. His son did not "acquire, a liberal bent" from Mc Kenzie King, but surcease from scandal shown by the Wilson Natl Industrial Commission 1915.

14. His son will not admit being a "furtive side-door visitor" to President Taft.

## Others Are Misrepresented for the Governor

1. The similarities with "Franklin Roosevelt" are synthetic not historical, mostly claiming credit for the governor at FDR expense.

2. Vice President Nixon was not "presiding over" GOP tragic disaster while Nelson was taking NY by 577,000 votes."

## Boomerang-able Blurbing of Gov Rockefeller

1. He did not inherit the "Taft clique" that was not just a clique.

2. Harriman was not snowed under by Rockefeller exposure of bossism at the Dem convention, but by the dog-in-the-manger defection of Mrs Roosevelt, ex-Senator Lehman, the owner of NY Post and Liberal Party "leaders"; and by the less than half-hearted moves of Harriman, the "boss" and Democrat campaigners to show the sham, inflated charges of bossism.

5. The Dem bossism was a pigmy compared with the giant bossism that allowed no competition with self-picked Rockefeller for the GOP post.

6. Of his lone-eagle fight he says "I never worked so hard for anything as for that nomination." He picked and pushed himself, won GOP's state chairman, defied party principles and, for reasons not yet really

June 16, 1959

Dear Jacques:

Henry Kissinger tells me that he is inviting you to come and talk to the International Seminar this summer. I am glad to second his invitation in strong terms. I have spoken to the Seminar on a number of occasions, and can say that every time I find it the most stimulating and thoughtful group of foreign visitors that I have encountered. I think they would entertain you and I know that you would greatly benefit them. So I hope you will come -- and I especially hope you will come in August when I will be back in Cambridge.

I have been meaning to write you about *The House of Intellect*. It is not only an astute analysis but it is a delight to read. I wish the grace of style could become contagious in the profession -- but I fear not. *The House of Intellect* is at the top of my list for reading at Wellfleet.

Yours ever,

Mr. Jacques Barzun
Columbia University
New York 27, N.Y.

July 6, 1959

Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener T
Harvard University

Dear Arthur:

I saw all the people to whom you
were good enough to give me notes. Bevan
I saw for a long stretch; I had dinner with
Crossman and some of his friends; and I had
sessions with both Gaitskell and Ormsby-Gore.
All of this was fascinating, and I am deeply
grateful.

It would be nice if we could see
something of each other this summer.

Henry W. Kissinger

Sincerely yours,

grapefruit.

VII of this was fascinating, and I am deeply
seated with both Guttkeell and Ormery-Gore.
Crossman and some of his friends; and I had
I saw for a long stretch; I had dinner with
were good enough to give me notes. Bean
I saw all the people to whom you

Dear Arthur:

Harvard University
Wigener T
Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

July 9, 1958

July 30, 1959

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener T
Harvard University

Dear Arthur:

Just a note to say I am pleased
that you will have dinner with Mrs.
Roosevelt and several of the Seminar
members on Tuesday evening, August 4th.
Sherry will be served at the Center for
International Affairs, 6 Divinity Avenue,
at 7:00 and dinner will be at 7:30.

I look forward to seeing you
on Tuesday evening and on August 6th at
1:15 at the Faculty Club.

DEMOCRATIC ADVISORY COUNCIL
1028 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 1108
Washington 6, D. C.

District 7-1717

FOR RELEASE TO AM NEWSPAPERS

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1960

An enforceable ban on nuclear tests is possible, 17 scientists asserted today.

Council's
The scientists, members of the Democratic Advisory/Committee on Science and Technology, made this assertion in a policy paper "Nuclear Tests and National Security" released today (full text attached).

Citing data on explosion seismology -- a specialized field distinct from earthquake science -- the scientists maintained that nuclear tests can be adequately monitored down to a level of three kilotons, even if these explosions are muffled by detonating them in underground excavations. They asserted that reduction of the "Geneva grid" -- the network of seismic stations -- so that the spacing between stations is 250 miles (400 kilometers) would provide for adequate monitoring of illicit tests. This new system also would permit assignment of suspicious events to an area of roughly three square miles, thus greatly facilitating on-site inspection, they said.

The scientists gave reasons pro and con for continuing nuclear tests, specifying their value to the U. S. and to the U.S.S.R. They concluded that the greatest U. S. need for more tests is the development of higher yield warheads for the next generation of ballistic missiles. The Russian need is estimated to be two-fold; the development of anti-aircraft and anti-missile warheads and the perfection of warheads for submarine-based missiles.

Arguing that "there must be a balance struck between short-term rewards and long-term risks", the Committee backed a policy of arms control. "A super arms race takes humanity on a course beset with calamitous pitfalls, unsightly detours and genocidal cul-de-sacs", the scientists warned. They stressed the mutual advantages of nuclear test controls and concluded: "If the nations of the world meet with success in their negotiations on nuclear testing, then the first step may have been taken on the road toward a new system of world security."

The full text of the policy statement is --

(MORE)

District 7-1717

FOR RELEASE A.M. NEWSPAPERS

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1960

NUCLEAR TESTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

(A Policy Statement of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology
of the Democratic Advisory Council)

Introduction

The present and projected national security is based upon a policy of
nuclear deterrence. According to this policy an aggressor will be deterred
from launching an attack by the threat of counter-attack. It is basic to this
policy that the retaliatory capability survive the impact of the aggressor's first
nuclear strike. A vulnerable retaliatory force would upset the equilibrium of
this so-called nuclear stalemate and might even invite attack. Even a highly
invulnerable striking force would not guarantee continuation of the stalemate.
The balance of force is not static nor is it simple. The equation of this
quasi-equilibrium is complex and includes factors which are incalculable. For
example, nuclear war may break out as a result of accidents; i.e., mental
aberrations, misintelligence or as a result of action by a third power or of
uncontrolled growth of a limited war.

Security in the long run requires that there be a universal reduction
and control of the methods of widescale destruction. This involves a paradox
since one must go in two directions: (a establishing a sufficiently in-
vulnerable deterrent to create a semi-stable stalemate and (b) achieving the
controlled reduction of arms. The testing of nuclear weapons influences both
of these objectives. To reach a sound policy on nuclear testing, the benefits
of testing must be compared to the advantages of a test ban as a step toward
arms control.

Military Value of Nuclear Tests

Nuclear weapon design is such that it includes nuclear and non-nuclear
components. The latter may be tested without resort to nuclear detonations.
For example, one can test the electronic controls and the weapon ordnance and
mechanical details of the bomb without including nuclear materials in the device.
Many phases of a new weapon design may also be worked out by experimental
testing of the non-nuclear components of the weapon.

The world's first nuclear explosion, the Trinity shot at Alamogordo, New Mexico, was preceded by a very intensive testing of the non-nuclear components with chemical explosives. The theory of the uncontrolled chain reaction was studied carefully even though only relatively crude computers were available for use. The proof test at Alamogordo was successful and substantially exceeded the average estimates of yield made by the scientists at the Los Alamos Laboratory. The bomb exploded over Hiroshima was of a different design but it was fired without a nuclear proof-test. Its yield compared with that of the Alamogordo bomb and was only slightly less than the power of the third bomb dropped on Nagasaki. All three bombs were in the range of 13 to 23 kilotons within an error of perhaps 3 kilotons. This constitutes a remarkable performance considering the fact that there was no prior test art.

Since 1945 the United States has greatly augmented its store of knowledge about the science and technology of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear test program includes the explosion of 145 successful shots and several "duds". The total yield of all U. S. tests through 1958 amounts to roughly 100 megatons; i.e., 100 million tons of TNT. This is sixty times the total weight of all high explosive bombs dropped on Germany throughout World War II.

The United States has also built up two major nuclear weapons research and development laboratories. It has devoted over $2 billion to weapons development and testing. Furthermore, huge electronic computers have been acquired to facilitate the theoretical evaluation of new weapon designs. The comparison of theoretical calculations with the nuclear test data permits scientists to have greater confidence in predicting the performance of new weapon types. Accordingly, a test ban does not mean stagnation in weapon design. In fact, an enforceable test ban could give some advantage to the United States because of its greater experience in the nuclear weapons field.

Nuclear weapons are sometimes tested to determine their physical effects under different environments. In general the effects of nuclear weapons at sea level are well known and no further testing is necessary. This applies both to surface bursts and to low altitude detonations. There is only limited experience with nuclear weapon explosions at extremely high altitudes and much remains to be learned about weapon phenomena, especially ionospheric effects and kill capabilities as related to ICBMs. Underground nuclear tests are required to determine the efficiency of seismic detection. Additional research is necessary to determine the extent to which underground cavities can be used to muffle or hide nuclear explosions. There is no experimental data obtained with nuclear

explosives to substantiate the theory of nuclear muffling.

In the main, future tests would be aimed at testing new principles of weapon design and proving out weapon prototypes. Nuclear tests are quicker, easier and more convincing than calculations or studies of simulated explosions. Some radical innovations in weapon design might not prove calculable. A test ban can therefore be expected to reduce the rate of development in those weapons for which there is the least prior experience.

## U. S. Need for Weapon Development

Further experiments could produce minor improvements in weapons of medium power; i.e., in the range of 10 to 100 kilotons. There is an ample supply of nuclear material for such weapons so that improvements in nuclear efficiency are not vital. Nuclear tests would be more significant if they were needed to perfect special warheads for anti-aircraft and anti-missile applications. Anti-aircraft missiles have already been fitted with nuclear warheads so that the adaptation of existing weapon designs seems possible without further testing of their nuclear components for anti-missile warheads.

The range of weapons below 10 kilotons is generally considered to be the province of tactical or battlefield weapons. Such weapons extend down to fractional kilotonnages. The lowest yield tactical weapons can be packaged in containers weighing less than 100 pounds. The investment in nuclear material for these weapons is approximately the same as that required for medium-power weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons, it is claimed, are essential for the deterrence or the conduct of limited wars. In this line of argument it should not be forgotten that one of the greatest dangers of a limited war is the strong possibility that it will develop into a major war. Various authorities have attempted to rationalize the limitation of a nuclear war by postulating self-imposed restraints on the caliber and targeting of nuclear weapons. So far as weapon power is concerned it would appear that whereas small or medium power bombs might be employed initially there would be an inevitable tendency for higher power weapons to be employed. This tendency would be aggravated by a number of factors including precipitous action by a local commander, a rapidly degenerating military situation, inadequate intelligence, and counter-action against missile launchers or aircraft bases. In many areas such as Western Europe medium-power or inaccurately aimed low-power bombs could cause a spill-over of nuclear destruction to civilian areas. This could lead to reprisal attacks upon conjugate targets by the enemy and to an expansion of the area of conflict.

Some analysts who advocate reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons have not adjusted their thinking from the days when the U. S. enjoyed an atomic monopoly. Today we must consider that both sides engaging in war may have available all calibers of nuclear weapons. In the event that U. S. forces used nuclear weapons against Soviet satellite forces, it is most likely that Russia would supply our adversaries with equivalent or even superior weapons, Nuclear weapons used in equal measure by both sides would generally be to our disadvantage; in most geographical locations we would be required to supply the active ground forces through a long and highly vulnerable logistic system. For example, if the Korean war had been fought with nuclear weapons the U. S. supply problem would have been an impossible one.

By far the most important need for nuclear testing is the military requirement for developing higher yield warheads for the next generation of ballistic missiles such as the *Minuteman*. The latter is a solid-fueled, three-stage ICBM which has a much smaller warhead than the *Atlas* or *Titan*. Both the *Atlas* and the *Titan* are designed to be operated from fixed, continental bases. The demonstrated high accuracy of long-range, ballistic missiles severely compromises the integrity of *Atlas* and *Titan* bases. Hardening these bases by placing the missiles underground in blast-resistant configurations reduces but does not remove the vulnerability of the ICBM bases.

There is an urgent and surpassingly important national requirement for a deterrent in the form of retaliatory missile systems of high survivability. It would be highly desirable to base this deterrent force so that it would be highly mobile and not draw nuclear fire to the mass of the U. S. population. A number of weapons systems qualify for such a deterrent. These include the submarine based Polaris missile system, IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missiles) systems based off the U. S. continent either in mobile land form or on surface vessels.

Some of these smaller missiles can deliver a warhead which is only a small fraction of the megatonnage deliverable by B-52 bomber but this weapon is still very impressive. The military gain to be expected from increasing the yield of these ballistic missile warheads depends upon the type of targeting and the accuracy of the missile. For example, if we consider "soft" targets such as cities and industrial complexes the number of retaliatory weapons required would not decrease in proportion to all increase in the warhead yield. This follows because the power of a fractional megaton weapon is sufficient to destroy all the largest of such "soft" targets. Thus for such targets the military need for greatly increasing

the warhead yield is not urgent. If retaliation features reliance upon radioactive fall-out as a weapon, then the areas contaminable to a lethal level would be expected to increase roughly in proportion to the increase in yield of the nuclear explosives.

A more urgent need for more powerful warheads for these smaller missiles is involved if the U. S. depends upon them for a counterforce blow as, for example, a strike at enemy strategic bases. The number of missiles required to insure destruction of a target is large unless the warhead yield is increased or the accuracy of delivery is improved. Further testing of nuclear warheads could cause some reduction in the number of missiles needed. However, greater military gains can be obtained by improving the accuracy, reliability and reaction time of the missiles. At the same time development of the missile to carry weightier warheads would allow for increased warhead yield without further nuclear testing.

In summary, the principal U. S. military need is to achieve a relatively invulnerable deterrent weapons system as well as to acquire adequate numbers of weapons. The present predicament of extreme U. S. vulnerability is not due to a lack of nuclear testing but to the vulnerability of the nuclear delivery /and to inadequate numbers of weapons. systems/ This deficiency cannot be overcome by nuclear testing; priority must be assigned to the building up of such missile systems.

## Russian Need for Nuclear Tests

Russian performance with long-range rockets provides convincing evidence that Russian ICBMs have truly intercontinental range, high accuracy and heavy warheads. The power of the heavy warheads projectible by the Soviets must to be assumed to be at least equal/and, probably greater than, the Atlas-Titan megatonnages. The heavier weight of the Soviet warheads compensates for their assumed inferior nuclear efficiency. These highly accurate ICBMs jeopardize the Atlas-Titan complexes now being built west of the Mississippi; but to some extent the Soviet planners must have some concern about their own strategic base vulnerability. Even though they know that the U. S. is committed to a policy of never striking the first blow, they must consider a counterforce strike designed to forestall continuing Soviet missile launchings. For this reason, Soviet planners must protect their missile launch capabilities. They have several electives -- hardening their bases, relying upon mobility, concealment or sheer numbers of weapons.

The further development of small or tactical nuclear weapons would appear to be of less value to Russia in light of its large ground forces. No doubt the Soviet military leaders are compelled to stockpile tactical nuclear weapons in order to be able to match weapons with the U. S. but it is doubtful if they attach as much importance to these weapons as do many U. S. experts.

The two most obvious Russian needs for further testing are: on the defensive side -- the development of more efficient weapons for anti-aircraft and anti-missile applications; and on the offensive side -- the development of higher yield warheads for submarine based missiles.

## Arms Control and Testing

The development and maintenance of a less vulnerable deterrent must be the keystone of any rational military defense policy. Gains to be expected from further nuclear tests must be measured against this national requirement. We have seen that the most urgent needs in this area are not met by nuclear development but rather by missile development. Even if the most urgent need were nuclear, the decision to resume testing must look beyond the immediacy of short-term benefits of weapon development and encompass a view of long-term national goals. In other words, there must be a balance struck between short-term rewards and long-term risks.

At best an arms race promises nothing more than/temporary respite. This is important to be sure, since a position of inferiority or enemy-estimated weakness might splinter the keystone of deterrence. But a superarms race takes humanity on a course beset with calamitous pitfalls, unsightly detours and genocidal *cul-de-sacs*. Arms development and production now compels nations to seek security via a different course. Real security requires control of armaments.

The view that political settlements must precede arms reductions has often been advanced. While this view may have had some validity in the past, it no longer seems to be applicable. At present and in the future, all-out war will be so devastating to victor and vanquished alike that no political gain justifies the waging of such a war. Accordingly, the only rational incentive to launch an all-out attack is fear of an imminent attack upon one's homeland and a consequent compulsion to ward off this anticipated attack by striking a preemptive blow. Even though an attack were not in the offing, a nation might seize upon a temporary advantage in the arms race (i.e., a point

of imbalance brought about by technology or arms production).

Arms controls offer a path of freedom from an arms race. As nations more fully perceive the perilous security of "peace through mutual terror", they will increasingly seek a means of reducing and controlling modern arms. Arms controls thus offer the possibility of reducing the magnitude of a war and at the same time reducing the likelihood of war.

## Benefit of Arms Controls to Russia

Most of the advantages of arms controls apply equally to both sides. Neither side wants to see a war start as the result of a systems error, say, spurious signals on a radar screen. Neither nation wishes to see a war triggered by an act of irresponsibility on the part of a few individuals. Neither can view with complacency the prospect of a war instigated by the action of a third country. Russia could not tolerate spread of nuclear weapons to its own satellites. And it must be disturbed by the continuing drain which armaments make upon its growing civilian economy.

Russia is within range of an arc of U. S. air bases and a small number of intermediate range ballistic missiles bases. These bases are highly vulnerable but, even so, the Russians are anxious that they be removed.

## Inspection: Key to Arms Control

In the days when arms consisted largely of battleships and mass armies, there was little need for inspection to verify arms reduction agreements. Aircraft in numbers sufficient to transport strategically significant quantities of conventional explosives are equally difficult to conceal. The development of the hydrogen bomb and the ICBM completely changed the dimension of the inspection problem. Both the necessity for, and the difficulty of, weapon inspection became critical.

A nuclear attack of 3000 megatons, it is generally agreed, would be sufficient to devastate a country as large as the United States. A smaller attack could destroy our strategic bases. In a few years such an attack will be deliverable by ICBMs numbered in the hundreds or by a smaller number of submarines equipped with Polaris-type missiles. These numbers come within the realm of what it is possible to conceal from ordinary intelligence. However, such a force can be detected by developing thorough inspection techniques and implementing large-scale inspection programs.

Inspection for nuclear weapons or weapon material already produced is much more difficult than inspection for the weapons carriers. Even large quantities of nuclear explosives can most certainly be hidden and escape detection within the vastness of a country such as Russia. On the other hand, nuclear explosives are only one component of an integrated weapons system and are useless unless deliverable. The delivery systems lend themselves more readily to inspection. Complete inspection will require extensive development, but it should not delay agreements on more limited inspection. We should be careful not to derive an unwarranted sense of security from a limited agreement.

## Nuclear Test Controls

A first step in instituting arms controls is an agreement to cease nuclear testing subject to detection by a reliable inspection system. Such a system would consist of monitoring posts located throughout the world and equipped with instruments designed to respond to test signals.

A logical extension of inspection for nuclear tests would be the establishment of inspection posts for monitoring missile testing. One would not anticipate a total ban on missile tests since certain high-thrust missiles are required for space exploration. Such missiles would be policed by the inspection system and would serve to calibrate and determine the effectiveness of the monitoring. A natural extension of this missile system would be the development of safeguards against surprise attack and accidental war.

Eventually, inspection for arms production and products might be developed.

Russian handling of the arms control issue reflects a traditional esteem for secrecy and great caution in permitting foreigners to penetrate freely into the sensitive areas of Soviet economy and geography. In the military domain the Soviet Union has a priceless advantage in the concealment of its missile bases. Any uncertainty in the exact location of missile bases adds a high degree of invulnerability to them. This is of immense value to the Soviets and must give them confidence that the United States will not strike the first blow. The Soviets may also be fearful of exposing their population to the free flow of ideas that might accompany the installation of many inspection posts within the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. The Soviets are apt to view an inspection system as tantamount to an instrument of political penetration and intelligence procurement. Accordingly, they may be expected to negotiate at length and to seek U. S. concessions in exchange for any compromise of its security through secrecy.

## Previous Negotiations

Early post-war proposals made by the United States were rejected by the Soviet Union. It became obvious that the Soviets did not wish to negotiate from a position of nuclear inferiority. Almost a decade elapsed before the Soviet leaders relaxed their rigid attitude on inspection. No doubt Soviet success in the thermonuclear field and in rocket development had much to do with their subsequent proposals on arms controls. Whatever the reason, on May 10, 1955, the Soviets made a dramatic proposal on arms controls including ground inspection at various critical points such as harbors and bases. President Eisenhower reacted to the sudden shift of Soviet policy with his "open skies" aerial inspection proposal.

In the summer of 1958 a "Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests" was held at Geneva. The experts found themselves in general agreement on the technology of nuclear test detection. They proposed an international grid of monitoring posts, spaced about 1000 kilometers apart, to provide reasonable assurance that illicit tests would be detected.

In 1959-60 the U. S. requested a reexamination of the conclusions reached at Geneva in 1958. The U. S. took the position that the inspection network specified in 1958 was inadequate.

## The Present Situation

At present the U. S. has proposed the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all the environments that can now be effectively controlled. This means that all atmospheric tests, all space tests out to a distance that is monitorable, all ocean tests and all underground tests are banned above the threshold of detection. The United States takes the position that the threshold for underground tests corresponds to a seismic magnitude value of 4.75 and that all tests below this value (corresponding to explosions of more than 19 kilotons by U. S. calculations) will be permitted. The Soviet response to the U. S. proposal is a reiteration of its plea for a ban on all tests regardless of size and a declaration of its willingness to allow limited inspection of sites where seismic data point to "suspicious events".

U. S. negotiations seem to be dominated by fear that the Soviets will cheat on a test ban. On the other hand, Russian negotiations are overlaid with a fear of free inspection. Russia appears to have no worries about U. S. cheating, presumably because of the efficiency of its intelligence services and the obvious openness of the U. S. society. Accordingly, they register no concern about the adequacy of a control system and maintain that the 1958 Geneva system is still adequate.

What Control Agreement Would be Acceptable?

If the U. S. is to forego the immediate military advantages of further
nuclear testing, it should seek compensation in the form of a corresponding
gain in its long-term security. This raises the question: what kind of a
test control agreement would insure such a gain?

One aspect of the agreement is simple; it would necessarily include
inspection of Russian territory. This inspection system could provide a
beginning for controlled, meaning inspected, arms reduction. Accordingly,
the system should include the maximum number of technical features which would
facilitate its extension toward other uses. A limited aerial inspection --
such as would be useful for on-site survey -- would be a valuable adjunct to
a seismic network. Radar equipment would be useful for the detection of high
altitude explosions. Both of these systems would be of/greatest value for
extending the system to the monitoring of missile tests and the prevention of
surprise attack.

Another aspect of the agreement is that the controls should provide
reasonable safeguards against violations. It would be unwise to underwrite
a control system in which one could place little confidence. Such an agreement
would be the breeding ground for suspicion and recurrent anxiety. It is for
this reason that any agreement should provide for improvement of the inspection
system. On the other hand, it is not necessary for the U. S. to insist upon
a 100 per cent foolproof system designed to be certain of detecting any
nuclear explosion, however small. It is important that any significant test
series would be likely to be detected. In other words, it is necessary that
there be no certain method of defeating the system.

There is a penalty attached to a test ban violator in the form of world
opinion which would turn against any nation found guilty of breaking the nuclear
agreement. The latter will be no ordinary agreement. It will symbolize a
veritable turning point in history -- an attempt to make a small but firm step
on the road to disarmament. A nation which violates such an agreement auto-
matically sets into motion an arms race from which there may never be an end.
The notion that a nation could gain some supreme momentary advantage in the
arms race by a quick series of tests is fanciful. It takes years to convert
test data on weapon innovations into the stockpiled weapons of war.

## The 1958 Geneva System

The inspection system agreed to at Geneva in 1958 provides adequate assurance for the detection of nuclear tests in the ocean, in the atmosphere and in near earth-space. However, the spacing of the seismic grid is too great to give reasonable certainty of detecting underground explosions and locating them with accuracy. The Hardtack (1958) series of underground nuclear explosions did not reveal this inadequacy; they merely confirmed it. Moreover, the theoretical possibility of muffling explosions underground emphasizes the need for closer spacing of the grid.

These deficiencies in the 1958 proposals must be recognized and corrected. The present U. S. approach is to outlaw those tests which are clearly detectible. While this position has the merit of forcing Russian acceptance of improvements in the seismic system, it suffers from two major faults. First, it does not lead to a world-wide ban of all tests. Thus, it does not prevent the spread of tested weapons to other powers. Second, by stipulating a threshold of detection as 4.75 on the seismic magnitude scale without specification of the maximum allowable yield for weapons tested, the U. S. presents what is probably an unacceptable proposal to the Soviets. The U. S. could through the use of muffling techniques test weapons in the range of 100 kilotons without violating the threshold on the seismic scale.

## The Muffling Argument

The possibility of decoupling or muffling nuclear explosions was recognized in 1958. Preliminary calculations of a theoretical nature were first published early in 1959. This classified document was made available to the Soviet delegation at Geneva later that year. According to this theory, the seismic signal generated by an underground nuclear explosion may be reduced by detonating the device inside a deep cavity. If the underground chamber is large enough, the shock wave will produce only an elastic deformation of the chamber wall so that much less energy will be imparted to a seismic wave. It is estimated that under proper conditions muffling may reduce the seismic signal 300-fold. In effect, then, a 90 kiloton explosion could by the process of muffling produce a seismic signal characteristic of a 0.3 kiloton non-muffled explosion.

Experiments have been conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission to test the validity of muffling theory as applied to conventional explosions up to a

-12-

limit of 1 ton of TNT. Assuming that the theory is verified for conventional
explosions and that a 1,000 to 100,000 scale-up of the data is valid, then the
possibility of muffling will make seismic detection more difficult but by no
means impossible.

With an adequate number of seismic stations, the problem is not to
observe the seismic signal but to distinguish it from signals representing
natural events. In most circumstances an explosion of 1 ton of TNT (0.001
kiloton or 1/3 kiloton with maximum decoupling) usually yields an ample seismic
signal out to a distance of 400 kilometers. An explosion of 10 tons is
detectable with high reliability within this distance.

It is interesting to note that one can define three types of seismology:
earthquake seismology in which natural events are recorded at very great
distances, explosion seismology in which manmade explosions are recorded out
to a distance of several hundred miles, and oil-well or geophysical seismology
where small charges of explosives are studied within a few miles of the
detonation. In the United States emphasis has been placed on earthquake and
oil-well seismology with very little research being devoted to explosion
seismology. The Soviets have done intensive work in explosion seismology.
There is a gap in U. S. experience and knowledge in this very important field
of research.

Experiments are needed to determine whether muffled explosions do not
generate peculiar signals which will render them more readily recognizable.
For one thing, it is expected that repeated explosions in the same earth cavity
would generate identical seismic records; i.e., a seismic signature. This
point is important if a test violator wished to use a cavity for a series of
nuclear tests.

While muffled explosions may minimize seismic signals and make seismic
detection more difficult, one has to consider the practical aspects of muffling.
Cavities large enough to decouple large explosions would involve very large-
scale excavation and earth removal. It is estimated that the cavity required
to muffle a 70 kiloton explosion would necessitate a 2 to 4 year excavation
program costing $25 to $50 million. Approximately 20 million tons of material
would have to be excavated -- an amount greater than the annual anthracite
production in the U. S. Preparations for a muffled nuclear test would probably
be verifiable long before the test took place. After the shot, the evidence

-13-

would remain to be investigated over a long period of time. For example, if the suspicious event turned out to be a muffled test involving a large earth cavity, the survey team could look for a variety of clues. Seismic and gravity surveys could reveal the existence of a subterranean cavity. Any trace of escaping radioactive gas would be a telltale sign of a nuclear explosion.

In summary, the construction of huge cavities in the earth to hide nuclear explosions does not seem to be a practical method of evading test detection. The possibility of firing small nuclear weapons in natural earth cavities does make it necessary to consider even small seismic signals as suspicious events.

## Improvements in the Geneva System

The principal change required in the Geneva system is a reduction of the grid spacing to 400 kilometers or less. This could be achieved either by adding more manned stations to the grid or by filling in the gaps with unmanned or robot monitors. This closer spacing of monitors would permit: (a) detection of the seismic signal of a 3 kiloton test even though this explosion was thoroughly decoupled, (b) more precise location of seismic signal origins, and (c) the possibility of discriminating against most earthquakes by unambiguous observation of the direction of first motion.

Precision in location of the suspicious event is of great importance since it would limit sharply the total area to be studied by the on-site inspection team. This fact alone should make the on-site inspection less objectionable to the Russians. Furthermore, the smallness of the area to be searched would expedite the survey and give confidence to conclusions reached by the on-site inspectors.

The on-site inspection problem has not been given sufficient attention to date. It would be highly desirable to have some independent group, such as the National Peace Agency proposed by the Democratic Advisory Council undertake a thorough study of the means available for detecting the after-effects of nuclear explosions in a small area subject to on-site inspection. If the area subject to on-site inspection is reduced to 3 square miles by the closer detection grid then air-portable instruments could be developed for making investigations of radioactive, geophysical, thermal, and gravity anomalies in the suspect areas in order to verify the existence of a test ban violation. Highly sensitive devices can be developed for sensing the presence of infinitesimally

-14-

small traces of bomb-produced radio-elements. Any intelligence such as that provided by a defector a long time after the illicit test could be verified by on-site inspection since the radioactive residue of the explosion is quite indelible.

Given the closer grid spacing for the inspection system the number of on-site inspections required per year need not be large, perhaps 30 per year, particularly if a somewhat larger number of aerial inspections are permitted. The latter could rule out many events in inaccessible regions.

Improvements in the seismic detection system suggested in December 1959 were agreeable to the Russians and it seems quite possible that additional improvements, such as those outlined above, would also be acceptable. These improvements would go far to prove to a potential violator that there would be no safety in cheating.

## Conclusions:

The negotiations for a ban on nuclear testing have assumed greater importance than the testing warrants *per se*. This is because the test ban has been looked upon as a critical proof-test of arms control. The nations of the world are waiting to see if a turning point in world affairs has been reached where international agreements can lead to mutual trust and to substantial reductions in arms.

If the nations of the world cannot agree to ban nuclear tests under a system of international inspection and control, then the future appears quite easy to predict. Most surely, both sides will resume limited nuclear testing, probably on an underground basis. Self-imposed limits on the power of weapons tested will be disregarded as the nuclear competition increases in tempo. Above surface testing of megaton-class weapons is likely to follow and radioactive contamination of the atmosphere will be resumed. The arms race would intensify and within a relatively short time other nations would test nuclear weapons of their own design and the number of nuclear powers would multiply. The problems of turning back the clock and reattempting an arms control agreement will then be vastly more difficult. The prospects for humanity disentangling itself from this nuclear mess seem bleak, indeed. It is, in fact, the contemplation of the ultimate consequences of an uncontrolled arms race that motivates many people to attach great importance to a cessation of nuclear tests on a controlled basis.

-15-

## Members of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology

Dr. Ernest C. Pollard (Chairman)
Chairman, Biophysics Department
Yale University

Dr. David R. Goddard
Director, Division of Biology
University of Pennsylvania

Dr. Samuel K. Allison
Professor of Physics
The Enrico Fermi Institute
for Nuclear Studies
University of Chicago

Dr. Frank Goddard
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology

Dr. Harrison Brown
Professor of Geochemistry
California Institute of Technology

Dr. David L. Hill
Consulting Physicist
New York City

Dr. James F. Crow
Professor of Medical Genetics
University of Wisconsin

Dr. Polykarp Kusch
Professor of Physics
Columbia Radiation Laboratory
Columbia University

Dr. Louis B. Flexner
Chairman, Department of Anatomy
School of Medicine
University of Pennsylvania

Dr. F. T. McClure
Chairman, Research Center
Applied Physics Laboratory
The Johns Hopkins University
Silver Spring, Maryland

Mr. Trevor Gardner
Chairman and President
Hycon Manufacturing Company

Dr. Richard B. Roberts (Vice Chairman)
Dept. of Terrestrial Magnetism
Carnegie Institution
Washington, D. C.

Dr. H. Bentley Glass
Professor of Biology
The Johns Hopkins University

Dr. John S. Toll
Chairman, Department of Physics
University of Maryland

Dr. Leslie C. Dunn
Professor of Zoology
Columbia University

Dr. Harold C. Urey
Institute of Technology & Engineering
University of California
LaJolla, California

*Dr. Gilbert F. White
Chairman, Dept. of Geography
University of Chicago

*NOTE: Dr. Gilbert F. White does not subscribe to this policy statement. Dr. White writes: "I feel that the paper is a competent technical analysis but that it over-values the soundness of nuclear deterrence as national policy directed toward the maintenance of peace. I would prefer that greater emphasis be placed on the urgency of establishing a National Peace Agency, as proposed by the Committee, and carrying out the functions planned for that Agency."

# # # # # #

March 24, 1960

Dear Arthur,

This is just a note to thank you for hunting up the DAC statement on disarmament. It was very helpful.

I also want to thank you for
lunch yesterday; it was a very pleasant
occasion.

Henry V. Klaasinger

FROM: ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

To: Henry Kissinger

This is self-explanatory.

I hope very much you can help.

General Schlesinger yields to
 Marshal Kissinger!

ASjr.

THE ADVISORY COUNCIL
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE

1028 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.
TELEPHONE DISTRICT 7-1717

CHARLES TYROLER, II
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

May 31, 1960

Dear Arthur:

Would you be so good as to ask
Kissinger to take a look at the at-
tached draft, on a confidential
basis, and give us the benefit of
his reactions thereto?

If General Schlesinger has the
time, we would appreciate his comments,
too.

Dr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Professor of History
Harvard University
Widener T
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

CQ 028

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

UNIVERSITY 4-9710

October 10, 1960

Dear Henry:

If I am in town on the 28th, I should be delighted to come to the Mendes-France dinner; but, because of the uncertainties of the campaign, I will not be sure until a few days before. I hope it won't be too inconvenient if I therefore defer my answer to you until the beginning of the week of the 24th.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue