What Role Are Buddhists to Play?

Buddhism and Politics in Vietnam

PAUL VAN CAIN

GENERAL GAP of North Vietnam has said that the Americans cannot win in Vietnam because they do not understand how to organize a political administration of the country. It follows that the Communists are unlikely either to negotiate or disengage unless they see real political progress being achieved in the South. Why should they when recurring political conflicts suggest that one day the situation may fall into their hands?

The essence of the Honolulu Conference was an
attempt to encourage Saigon authorities to address
themselves to aspects of this problem. Because of a
lack of political consensus the South Vietnamese
have failed to move ahead with programs of eco-
nomic, social, educational and administrative re-
torms despite repeated American pressures.

At the heart of the political dispute is the role
Buddhists are to play in politics. The Buddhists
advocate a radically different program from any so
far put into effect by Saigon. Their central conten-
tion is that killing and fratricidal warfare should
be minimized. Instead they advocate implementa-
tion of revolutionary policies, the elimination of cor-
ruption, the purge of Diemst elements, and service
to the people. They believe such measures will
draw the people to the support of the Saigon Gov-
ernment. Most Buddhist leaders recognize that the
strategy they advocate requires a continued Viet-
nese and American military effort until positive
programs take effect, but some fear the American
presence may inhibit the political changes their pro-
gram nukes.

The Buddhists, in effect, are suggesting that the
solution lies in dynamic change designed to make
the national government more attractive, rather
than in the sterile search for governmental stability
and an enlarged "war effort." Underlying the Bud-
dhist approach is a practical appreciation of politi-
cal power in Vietnam, which rests in the cities and
towns. A political framework assuring genuinely
effective, just and national administration would
perhaps spread its impact to the surrounding coun-
tries. But as long as even the urban areas are
poorly administered and those under the control of
Saigon are neglected, the Buddhists see little pros-

pect that the collaboration of the rural people can
be obtained. Further, by immediate service to the
rural people the Buddhists would hope to accom-
plish more than do the present efforts to impose
military security as a precondition of progress. They
believe the peasantry would quickly reject the Viet-
cong if offered an attractive alternative.

Recent events in Danang and Hue certainly chal-
lenge the assumption that a military victory to be
followed by a free choice of institutions is a realistic
goal. Politics has demonstrated repeatedly its capac-
ity to bring the Vietnamese war effort to a standstill.
Moreover, it should now be clear that a victory in
strictly military terms is not easily obtainable.

Practical difficulties arise from four factors. first,
the Vietnamese people increasingly realize that the
pattern of their future government is likely to be
determined by how the struggle against the Commu-
nists is pursued; second, inflation from the extensive
American military buildup is causing new and per-
haps uncontrollable unrest as indicated by recent
labor and urban incidents; third, the fratricidal
aspects—especially the higher noncombatant cas-
ualties—have intensified disaffection with the Gov-
ernment and a consequent search for alternatives;
fourth, greater reliance on American forces may
and arousing fears regarding long range American
prove counter-productive by alienating nationalists
objectives.

In these circumstances the Buddhist strategy may
appear increasingly attractive, but its adoption will
depend upon the extent to which the Buddhists can
overcome the honest doubts and fears of other Viet-
nese. Despite Buddhist claims, opposition to
their movement is considerable and strong.

Needed: A Coalition of Social Forces

To understand the political scene it is important
to recognize that a small number of critical social
forces, rather than numerous political parties, play
the dominant role. In order of relative strength
these social forces are: the military, the Buddhists,
the Catholics, the trade unions, the Ho Hao and
the Cao Dai. Under some circumstances one might
add the high school and university students. Each of
these social forces has enough power to threaten
seriously any government, but none, including the

PAUL VAN CAIN is a former leader in the Student Christian Movement who recently lived and worked in Vietnam. He has had many contacts with influential Buddhists.

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military seems to have enough strength to govern effectively on a national basis without the active or passive cooperation of all the others. The conflicting interests, fears and internal tensions of the above groups constitute the stuff of politics.

Each social force has its own severe internal divisions stemming from competition for leadership, religious or secular differences, regional conflicts, differing degrees of militancy, and individual corrosion and opportunism. Each force without exception undoubtedly has been subject to some Communist infiltration. It is worthy of note, however, that the main leadership of each has remained basically noncommunist if not actively anti-Communist. This fact is one of the strongest indications that the Vietnamese people oppose the effort of the Vietnamese Communists to impose their particular program on the country.

The problem of statecraft is to weld an effective coalition of these social forces and to maintain it despite understandable maneuvers by each force to enlarge its sphere of power and influence. The institutional avenues to permit such a coalition to be formed and to undergo orderly change as circumstances require have yet to be established.

Since the fall of the Diem regime the extent to which the Buddhist movement would be admitted to a share of power has been the main source of political contention. The Catholic minority of 10 percent is appallingly regarding its future. Its dispirited influence in the army general staff and in the administrative services has handicapped Buddhist gains. Some Catholics believe a military alliance with a Western power is essential to the future of their group. Military men are inclined to mislead the Buddhist emphasis on political and economic aspects of the struggle against the Communists and some officers feel personally threatened by Buddhist demands for reforms and purges. The people of the Delta, whether Buddhist or Catholic, have shown resentment and distrust of the Buddhist movement led largely by refugees from the North and militants from Central Vietnam. Finally, Buddhist indirection and intellectual articulation of goals often due to internal divisions have contributed to a lack of comprehension of their concerns.

Yet as one looks toward the prospect of elections in September few will deny, particularly on the basis of the successful local elections of May 1965, that the Buddhists are likely to attain between 30 and 50 percent of the seats in the Constitutional Assembly if the ballot box is conducted with reasonable fairness. Theirs is one of the strongest organized

political forces in Vietnam, and there is ample reason to hope that its orderly admission to a share in power may bring increased viability to the Government at Saigon.

## A Growing Activism

To understand Buddhism in Vietnam it is important to realize that the monk leaders who have suddenly dominated world headlines are hardly unknown quantities or newcomers to the scene. While their heroic role in the struggle against Diem endowed them with a new charisma, in point of fact monks had been quietly working for a renaissance of Buddhism since the Nineteen Thirties. They organized a strong Buddhist families movement that by 1953 was the most important youth movement in the country, found even in fairly remote villages. Three academies for training monks were created at Hue, Nhatrang and Cholon.

Before the conflict with Diem three regional associations for North, South and Central Vietnam with parallel Sangha (clerical) and lay sections were conducting vigorous programs of a religious, welfare and educational nature. A number of parochial schools had been organized, and a Buddhist Studies Association, under the leadership of Mai Tho Truyen, was making considerable progress toward involving Western trained intellectuals and technicians in a new relationship to Buddhism. In addition, there was a strong Theravada Buddhist movement composed of approximately 600,000 ethnic Cambodians residing mainly in the Delta region and enjoying Vietnamese citizenship.

Several of the leading monks, including Thich Lam Chau and Thich Tri Quang, had written extensively on religious and social subjects, and a number of younger monks had been sent for training to Japan, India, Ceylon and the United States in order to provide future leadership for the further strengthening and revival of Vietnamese Buddhism.

But well-educated lay leadership was in short supply. Not many followers had direct personal contact or experience with the West. Buddhism also generally lacked the esteem of the nation's intellectuals, who had often been trained in the French and Catholic traditions. Few of the established leaders in the government, the army or public life were Buddhists despite the fact that a 1962 survey by the statistics department of the government concluded that 70 percent of Saigon's population was Buddhist.

In short, until 1964 Buddhism enjoyed the role of a traditional religion with limited contacts with

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modernizing elements in the society. It remained relatively untouched by foreign influences but in close contact with the common man in the village and the marketplace. There was strong regional leadership from a coterie of revivalist monks but neither the genuine national unity nor the hierarchical institutions necessary to achieve the renaissance for which a few monks had been working.

The revival dates from the struggle against Diem. The conflict, which started over specifically religious issues, provided the impetus for monks to exercise their leadership for the first time. The fact that their protest grew into a virtual social revolution, however, resulted from the disenchantment of virtually all the other social forces with the excesses and shortcomings of the Diem family regime. They rallied to the Buddhist cause. It is no discredit to the heroic role of the monks to observe that in the end it was a cop by senior officers of Diem's general staff that brought down the Government. The generals acted primarily to head off the social revolution and to save the situation before it got completely out of hand.

From their initial success the Buddhist leaders seem to have derived a measure of overconfidence in their power, which may have clouded their judgment regarding their potential strength. In subsequent conflicts they have perhaps been led at times to overplay their hand and to make excessive demands. For example, the situation today between the Buddhists and Ky is not at all the same as the confrontation with Diem, primarily because the other social forces do not fully share the militant Buddhists' disenchantment with Ky's leadership. In fact, within the Buddhist movement itself there is a significant indication of differing assessments of the extent to which the Ky Government should be opposed, particularly when the promised elections may resolve the conflict in favor of Buddhism.

## An Organization for Action

In January 1964 the Unified Buddhist Church was formed to serve as a national hierarchy for Buddhism in Vietnam. Virtually all important Buddhist groups adhered to it except perhaps 50 percent of the pagodas in the Delta, the Chinese pagodas primarily in Cholon, and the small group of less than 10,000 ethnic Vietnamese who have converted to Theravada Buddhism. At this high point of unity the movement could certainly claim to represent well over five million practicing Buddhists. But even at the historic unification congress the basic internal divisions were clear.

The leadership of the critically important Insti-
tute for Secular Affairs (Vien Hoa Dao) was given to The Ven. Thich Tam Chau, who is regarded as a moderate. Tam Chau is a refugee from the North with a record of struggle against communism. His main opposition came from The Ven. Thich Tri Quang, whose base of power was in Central Vietnam where Buddhists have traditionally been better organized, more militant and long suffering. Tri Quang was forced to settle for the Secretary Generalship of the Institute of Clerical Affairs, which was designed to deal with doctrinal issues.

Another competitor was Mai Tho Truven, a distinguished lay leader whose following consisted of the more conservative, less organized Southern Buddhists of the Delta and Saigon. He believed that the monks should stick to religion and leave secular matters to laymen. His point of view was resoundingly rejected, in part because there were few laymen with public records of leadership and service that could command the respect of the masses. Other offices within the Unified Buddhist Church were distributed with due regard to the strength of the minority Theravada Buddhists, the sects and the geographic regions.

The Buddhists of the Delta seemed to have remained somewhat dissatisfied with their relative lack of influence within the hierarchy. They had no strong candidates for office. They were also alarmed by a move to take a census of all religious properties, which they regarded as a first step toward bringing local pagodas under the central control of the hierarchy and consequently under the direction of more politically and militantly oriented Northern and Central monks. This tension with the Southerners has persisted through all subsequent political crises. It appears to be a generic problem in virtually all Vietnamese public organizations and governments, going back to long-established conflicts between Cochin Chinese, Annamites and Tonkinese.

The program of action adopted by the initial Congress of the Unified Buddhist Church was surprisingly moderate and roughly parallel to the existing social action of the country's Catholics. The Congress called for the organization of a Chaplains Corps to provide services to Buddhist soldiers and their families. It advocated the creation of a university, and it authorized the formation of a parish structure—based on elections by local Buddhist groups—that was to carry out the social service, educational and welfare activities encouraged by the church at the regional, provincial and hamlet levels. Such programs have been successfully organized and have enhanced Buddhist power and prestige.

The Mien (parish) structure gives the Buddhists

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in organization for social action throughout the country. Vietcong efforts to disrupt the work of the Military leadership by assassinating some monks led to passage of a resolution by the Institute for Secular Affairs severely condemning the Communists. The Chaplains Corps has established a chain of influence within the military that some professional military men, particularly Catholics, fear may be used for political purposes, although the Corps' leadership is in the hands of moderate monks and evidence of such use is lacking. The university has served as a rallying point for intellectual leadership and the development of a stronger lay following among youth and student activists who have provided so much of the strength of the movement. Funds for realization of these programs were readily contributed by the faithful, and within a year more than a score of parochial schools had been created.

The actively dissenting political role of the Buddhist movement was resumed following General Khanh's attempt to restore dictatorial power under the Vung Tau Charter in mid-1964. Opposition was continued against the subsequent Huong Government which attempted to exclude the Buddhists, and for that matter all other social forces, from a share in governmental power. In addition the Huong Government made an active effort to split the Buddhist movement by exploiting the tensions within it. When Dr. Phau Hy Quat restored Buddhist participation in his cabinet briefly, Catholic and Southern elements brought down his government on the grounds that it was "too Buddhist." Dr. Quat invited the military junta to take over.

## Ky and the Buddhists

It is important to understand that the Ky Government was not initially unacceptable to the Buddhists. General Ky had maintained cordial relations and active political liaison with their leaders during earlier crises. Within the junta there were sympathetic others, such as General Thi, whose presence indicated to the Buddhists that they could safely postpone their demands while gaining time to reorganize their increasingly weary following, which had been virtually exhausted by the struggle against Huong. The Buddhists also were conscious that the Vietcong had made gains during the repeated political crises, and they feared further deterioration of the military situation. Then doubts were also disputed by the appointment of a protégé of General Thi as Chief of the National Police, thus reassuring them that the police would no longer act prejudicially toward them. In short the Buddhists believed

a constructive balance of social forces could be maintained despite the fact that General Nguyen Van Thieu, the Chief of State, was regarded as hostile and pro-Catholic.

The removal of General Thi not only upset the balance but also provoked open opposition from Thich Tri Quang because he was not personally consulted regarding the move. Some of Tri Quang's deputies apparently were notified, but the way the matter was handled must have seemed a threat to Tri Quang's power. He reacted accordingly.

Tri Quang and Thi, while not allies, had learned over two years to accommodate each other within Central Vietnam. Ky's move was a direct affront to their modus vivendi. They were temporarily driven together until the election promise was made, opening a new avenue for Tri Quang to pursue his objectives. However, the subsequent surprise move by Ky to take over Danang and Hue by force undoubtedly indicated that Ky wished strong central government control in order to work against a victory by the militant Buddhists at the polls. In consequence Tri Quang again moved into active opposition even to the organization of elections.

These rapid developments placed the Saigon Buddhist leadership in a quandary. Thich Thien Minh, the Commissioner for Youth Work, who has often moderated differences between Tri Quang and Tam Chau, swung to the side of Tri Quang while Tam Chau and the moderates seemed to believe that nothing should be done to threaten the prospect of elections. The latter understand that a new regime would not necessarily be committed to elections.

Perhaps the Saigon Buddhists see more clearly than Tri Quang that other social forces are not inclined to join the protest since Ky can claim he is protecting central government authority and attempting to organize elections. Tri Quang is thus left making a purely political rather than a moral protest. In this context the determined tactics that succeeded against Diem lose some of their compelling force.

While some people may rejoice in the evident disunity of the Buddhist movement as a result of recent developments, it is probable that such disunity poses an even greater threat to democratic progress and peace in Vietnam. Within Buddhist unity is likely to be found moderation, and compromise and an honest effort to work in harness with other social forces to develop a government that can command genuine popular support. Disunity by contrast promises increasingly desperate acts by determined minorities of which there are already an overabundance on the Vietnam scene.

July 11, 1966

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