CHURCHILL

Fulton Speech

III

331 "and American zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and western democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts, this is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace.

332

"I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. ... Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be relieved by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement and the longer this is delayed the more difficult it will be and the greater our danger will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins,

CHURCHILL

Fulton Speech

IV

332

> offering temptations to a trial strength. If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the UN charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all."

> "If the population of the English-speaking commonwealth be added to that of the U. S., with all that such cooperation implies in the air, on the sea and in science and industry, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure."

CHURCHILL

Broadcast from Londoh to the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundatiob N, Y.
Oct 14, 1947

"We have traveled a long way in opinion since I spake at Fulton, under
the auspices of the President, eighteen months ago, and many things
which were startling or disputable then have now become the foundation
of dominant Anglo-American thought.

"I've been much puzzled to know why it it that the Soviet
governments have taken this viálently aggressive line. From an external
point of view it seems so foolish and we wonder what is the real motive
behind it. I cannot, myself, believe that it is the prelude to war.
...If their minds were set on war I cannot believe that they would not lull
the easygoing democracies into a false sense of security."

"Great wars come when both sides believe they are more or less
equal, and when each thinks he has a good chance of victory. No such conditions
of equality would be established if the Soviet Gov't and their Communist
devotees were to make a separate organization of their own. Indeed, the two
great systems might even begin to be polite with one another and speak again

[Y]

CHURCHILL

Speech in House of Commons, Jan 23, 1948 p296-301

300

Will there be war? "...The situation has deteriorated (since his Fulton speech), especially in the last six months. ...I will only venture now to say that this seems to me to be very real danger in going on drifting too long. I believe that the best chance of preventing a war is to bring matters to a head and come to a settlement with the Sov. Gov't before it is too late. This would imply that the Western democracies, who should, of course, seek unity among themselves at the earliest moment, would take the initiative in asking the Soviet for a settlement.

"It is idle to reason or argue with the Communists. It is, however, possible to deal with them on a fair, realistic basis, and, in my experience, they will keep their bargains as long as it is in their interest to do so, which might, in this grave matter, be a long time, once things were settled. When this Parliament first assembled, I said that the possession of the A bomb would give three or four years' breathing space. Perhaps it may be more than that. But more than two of those years have already gone. I cannot think that any serious discussion which it may be necessary to have with

CHURCHILL

H. of C. Speech Jan 23, 48

II

"the Sov. Gov't would be more likely to reach a favorable conclusion if we wait till they have got it too."

"We may be absolutely sure that the present situation cannot last. . . who can ever believe that there will be a permanent peace in Europe, or in the world, while the frontiers of Asia rest upon the Elbe? But now this line runs farther south along the Adriatic shore, and there is actual fighting now going on in Greece to decide whether it shall not curl round Athens, and so to the Dardanelles and Turkey. Surely, there can be no doubt in our minds that this is highly dangerous, and cannot endure. It is not only here in Europe that there are these iron curtains, and points of actual collision. In China and in Korea there are all kinds of dangers which we here in England find it baffling to measure. There is also much to be considered in the Middle East. There are very grave dangers--that is all going to say today--in letting everything run on and pile up until something happens, and it passes, all of a sudden, out of your control."

"With all consideration of the facts, I believe it right to say today that the best chance of avoiding war is, in accord with the other W. democracies, to bring matters to a head with the Sov. Gov't, and, by formal diplomatic processes, with all their privacy and gravity, to arrive at a lasting settlement."

CHURCHILL

H. of C. Jan 23, 1948

III

301

"There is certainly enough for the interests of all if such a settlement could be reached. Even this method, I must say, however, would not guarantee that war would not come. But I believe it would give the best chance of preventing it, and that, it it came, we should have the best chance of coming out of it alive."

V.S. July 15, 1955

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Dulles, "U.N. Charter Calls for Collective Effort," Address at U.N. 10th Anniversary Meeting, June 24, 1955

p. 1351

"Collective effort is needed to preserve freedom. Without collective strength despotism would have free rein; the rights of nations would be trampled under foot, and human beings would be made slaves.

"The founders of the U.N. endowed the charter with the flexibility needed to keep alive this concept of collective effort that these unpredictable times demand. A secure peace still eludes us. But that spirit of collective effort implicit in the charter, if practiced in good faith and with creative will, can guide us toward the ultimate goal of man--peace with freedom.

"Every one of these collective security arrangements embodies the basic principle of the UN Charter, a principle which in turn derives from the teachings of all the great religions that people have the right and the duty to help each other. Every one of these arrangements also gives added security even to the nonparticipants. There is less armament, because multiplication of armament is avoided when the force that protects one is equally at the service of many. Also the military power and facilities of a coalition tend to become distributed and not within the control of any single nation.

In international affairs, as in domestic affairs, the sharing of power is the best safeguard against abuse.

(cont'd)

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

II

Dulles, June 24, 1955

"Power which is shared among a group of independent sovereign nations cannot be used effectively unless the participating countries are in accord. Such accord would be totally unattainable except for collective self-defense.

Because collective security responds to the needs and highest aspirations of mankind, it has been invoked by many nations.

The U.S., which in 1914 and again in 1939, sought safety in neutrality, has now learned by that hard experience that security lies in collective action.

We believe that the power which we possess ought to be made available for the protection of others, just as we desire the help of others for our own defense.

So, the U.S. is today a party to mutual security treaties which bind us collectively with the defense of no less than 44 countries. We are proud to have these multiple ties of trust and confidence."

V.S. Aug. 15, 1951

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Acheson, "Looking Ahead," Address delivered at 250th Anniversary of the founding of Detroit, July 24, 1951

px642

p. 643

"Neither war nor weakness is the way to meet the Soviet challenge. We will counter force with force, if necessary, but war does not solve problems--it multiplies them. Weakness, on the other hand, would lead to defeat, with or without war. Between these two extremes lies a middle course, which seeks to block Soviet expansion without war by building an effective system of collective security, and by making it strong."

V.S. Oct. 15, 1950

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Acheson, "Soviet Barriers to Peace," Address before U.N. G.A., Sept. 20, 1950

p. 12 "There is only one real way the world can maintain peace and security in the face of this [Russian actions] conduct. That is by strengthening its system of collective security. Our best hope of peace lies in our ability to make absolutely plain to potential aggressors that aggression does not succeed. The security of those nations who want peace and the security of the U.N. itself, demands the strength to prevent further acts of aggression... The action of the U.N. to put down the aggression which began on June 25 against the Republic of Korea was exactly the effective collective measure which was required. It marked a turning point in history, for it showed the way to an enforceable rule of law among nations.

p. 13 "We need [collective security] against further aggression in order to pass through this time of tension without catastrophe, and in order to reach a period when genuine negotiation may take its place as the normal means of settling disputes.... The Soviet leaders are realists, in some respects at least. As we succeed in building the necessary economic and defensive military strength, it will become clear to them, we hope, that the non-Soviet world will neither collapse nor be dismembered piecemeal. Some modification in their aggressive policies may follow, if they then recognize that the best interests of the Soviet Union require a cooperative relationship with the outside world. (cont'd)

[Y]

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

II

Acheson, Sept. 20, 1950

p. 13

"Time may have its effect. It is but thirty-three years since the overthrow of the Czarist regime in Russia. This is a short time in history. Like many other social and political movements before it, the Soviet revolution may change. In so doing, it may rid itself of the policies which now prevent the Soviet Union from living as a good neighbor with the rest of the world.

"We have no assurance that this will take place. But as the U.N. strengthens its collective security system, the possibilities of this change in Soviet policy will increase. If this does not occur, the increase in our defensive strength shall be the means of ensuring our survival and protecting the essential values of our societies.

"But our hope that is that a strong collective security system will make genuine negotiation possible, and that this will in turn lead to a cooperative peace.

"It is the firm belief of the people of the U.S. that the U.N. will play an increasingly important role in the world during the period ahead, as we try to move safely through the present tensions...The steps we take to strengthen our collective security are not only essential to the survival of the U.N. but will contribute positively towards its development."

V.S. Nov. 1, 1950

[y]

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Dulles, "The Door to Peace." Address before U.N. General Assembly Political and Security Committee, Oct. 9, 1950

p. 29

[Speaking about Korea] "But also there is reason for grave concern. Korean events have dramatized organizational weaknesses which, in the future, could prevent the will and the capacity of the member states finding timely collective expressions."

p. 40

"In the present state of international affairs, there is the same need for assured collective resistance to aggression that Marshall Stalin called for in March 1939. He then pointed out that the "nonaggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A....have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors and have taken up a position of nonintervention..! Actually speaking' he said, 'the policy of nonintervention means conniving at aggression, giving free reign to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war.'

"That warning went unheeded and that analysis proved correct. Six months later the series of little wards did, in fact, culminate in World War II. We do not want that to happen again, and there is no reason why it should happen again. The peoples of the world are clearly in a mood to develop 'collective resistance to the aggressors.' ...

(cont'd)

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

II

Dulles, Oct. 9, 1950

p. 40 "Some may suggest that it is dangerous to respond, lest the building of bulwarks against aggression may annoy potential aggressors into aggressing more quickly. To such, I say that inaction is no solution. It would confront each of our peoples and nations with three choices. Either (1) to accept, fatalistically, continuing exposure to piecemeal aggression which would presage general war; (2) to organize elsewhere and otherwise than within the framework of the present U.N., (3) to revert to a condition of 'each for himself and the devil take the hindmost.'

"The U.S., at least, will not choose any one of these three courses so long as* the other members of the U.N. want actually to use the now unused possibilities of this time to make that reside in the present U.N. Charter."

...The proposals before you do not rest upon any finding of guilt, but rather on two general propositions, accepted since San Francisco; first, there is always a danger of aggression and of general war, second, a good preventive is the creation of effective collective resistance to aggression."

*My italics.*

V.S. June 15, 1950

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Acheson, "The North Atlantic Community" before Informal Jt. Sess. of Congr.

May 31, 1950

p. 516 - 517

"The principle of balanced collective forces [is] the only principle which can reconcile the resources available with the demands upon them. It is the only way in which forces can be developed to meet successfully any initial attack and to carry through to a successful conclusion any war that is forced upon us."

"It [the principle of balanced collective forces] demonstrates that each country will rely on every other member of the community and that the community will look to each country to contribute what it is best able to contribute to the common defense in accordance with a common plan. It demonstrates that each country recognizes that [EACH OTHER'S] COMMON security is no better than the security of the community as a whole. It will give tangible proof to an aggressor that he must face the combined resources of the community, that there will not be opportunities to pick off one member at a time."

V.S. August 15, 1949

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

"The Price of Peace" by Acheson before House Foreign Affairs Committee, July 28,49

p. 643 "On the basis of that conviction that no nation can achieve security by itself which was shared by many others, the U.S. undertook the leadership of the movement to organize the postwar world for collective security... What we envisaged, and what we put into effect, was a broad constructive effort in which the nations of the world could cooperate to achieve peace, freedom and an increasing measure of material well-being for all peoples.

The concrete expression of that ideal is the U.N...

The U.S. has continued its leadership in the movement for collective security, which we are still convinced is the only principle on which a just and enduring peace can be achieved."

p. 644 "It must be our objective to achieve the necessary measure of security for us at the minimum drain on our own economy. The achievement of that objective requires that we be associated with free nations who are strong."

pl 645 "The fundamental pledge of the Treaty (NATO) that an attack on one signatory will mean an attack on all, closes the door to piecemeal aggression....An invasion of Western Europe would mean a total war in which the aggressor would be pitting its strength against the combined strength of the Atlantic Pact nations.

Since our own future is so closely entwined with the interests of other free nations, we find that when we help them, we also help ourselves."

[Y]

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

"The Atlantic Pact," Acheson speech of March 18, 1949. V.S. p.356-57, Apr. 1, 49.

"It is a simple fact, proved by experience, that an outside attack on one member of this community is an attack upon all members.

We have also learned that if the free nations do not stand together they will fall one by one. The strategy of the aggressor is to keep his intended victims divided, or, better still, set them to quarrelling among themselves.

Then they can be picked off one by one without arousing unified resistance.

We and the free nations of Europe are determined that history shall not repeat itself in that melancholy particular."

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Acheson: *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom*

Feb 1949-April 1950, Dept of State

Acheson: "Practical Effects of Proposed Military Assistance" Statement before Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, Aug. 8, 1949. pp. 92-93

"...this is a recognition of the demonstrable truth that the security of the U.S. and the security of Western Europe are one and the same thing."

in

"The dictators of recent times have become involved in war when, / their belief, their intended victims would fall easy prey without substantial risk to the aggressor. The strengthening of the defenses of Western Europe is designed to prevent a repetition of the tragic consequences of such dangerous self-deception. Thus, history and common sense dictate the wisdom that the preservation of peace and of our own security is immeasurably advanced by the strengthening of Western Europe to resist aggression."

CHURCHILL

V.S. Llandudno Speech, October 9, 1948

pp. 44 - 46

44 "I will not encourage you with false hopes of a friendly settlement with Sov. Russia. It may be that some formula will be found or some artificial compromise effected which will be hailed as a solution and deliverance."

45 "It is my belief--and I say it with deep sorrow--that at the present time the only sure foundation of peace and of the prevention of actual war rests upon strength."

If it were not for the stocks of A bombs now in the trusteeship of the U. S. there would be no means of stopping the subjugation of Western Europe by Communist machinations backed by Russian armies and enforced by political police."

Of one thing, I am quite sure, that if the U. S. Were to consent, in reliance upon any paper agreement, to destroy the stocks of A bombs which they have accumulated they would be guilty of murdering human freedom and committing suicide themselves.

8 ..."If the Sov. gov't wish to see Atomic energy internationalized

CHURCHILL

Llandudno speech

XXX II

"and its military use outlawed it is not only by verbal or written agreements that they must reassure the world, but by actions, which speak louder than words."

Actions recommended:

- Free the satellite countries

- Have the Russians go back to the Curzon line

- Liberate the German and Jap. ¨ prisoners

- Lift Berlin blockade

- Stop interfering in Malaya and Indonesia

- Liberate communist held portion of Korea

- Stop fomenting civil war in China

- Open up Russia to outsiders

"We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement, we ought not to go jogging along impudent waiting for something to turn up."

The Western nations will far more likely to reach a lasting settlement without bloodshed if they formulate their just demands, while they have the support of a power and before the Russian communists have got it, too."

I am, therefore, of the opinion that our party must bound to support any firm measures which the gov's is found capable of taking."

46

CHURCHILL

Speech at Edinburgh

Feb. 14, 1950

Appeal for a new "top-level" attempt to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union for control of the A bomb and the end of the cold war. Only U. S. deterrent power has kept peace so far.

"It is not easy to see how things could be worsened by a parley at the summit, if such a thing were possible."