funder concepts of national policy.

Shareholders for functional and political interests, and but them over another
representing the implications of bioproduct from the various departments; other
for the general interest, who can improve the working of present authorities in
the National Security Council complex of committees a group of shareholders

There may be need to establish bioproduct for including within the structure
government for the formulation or statement of an overall view.

Interests, and under existing attemping patterns, since there is room within
power clearly in place, still must be consulted the shareholders for better
operations, common aspects of shareholder interests, and the President, with formal
shareholders within government to form conditions and coordinate, printing
interest (or the President himself). There there is a continuing tendency for
the objection not only of opposing interests, but of abutting shareholders for the national
call on the authority of the shareholders for the functions it has in charge, against
civil government in functionally organized and for the most basic departments, or
the administration of political power within the Executive Branch, becomes an
organizational barrier to power in government itself. There is a good deal of the fact
that, from the political point of view, not only of our society, but of the state,
created by our system of representation and our federal system of government,
the problems of the presidency in maturing the cube in our government

than often devoted to procedure, and pure special benefits on the leadership
of Executive branch tends to reduce flexibility, due up many officials in meetings

July 11, 1923

(Sixth Draft)

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July 11, 1957

The problem of ensuring that the formal powers of the Presidency are broad enough and that its organization is comprehensive and flexible enough today, presents a dilemma. The White House is today the major focus of those powers and functions on which the nation depends most completely. It already disposes of enormous power, authority and influence. And it is widely accepted that there may be, from time to time, serious need for increase in these formal powers and for recasting of organization of the White House and the Executive Office to cope with crises of fresh intensity or novel form. But it seems to us that the difficulties that would be raised by the effort to gain more formal powers, or to change the organizational pattern, might be too great, and the effort to get them might create situations worse than those obtaining at present. Demands for greater formal power in time of peace are bound to create difficulties and frictions with the Congress. And demands for changes in organization may lead to fresh restrictions or inflexibility rooted in legal prescriptions or legislative understandings. A request for added powers might be interpreted as a drive to consolidate Executive supremacy, and Congress might respond by cutting into the current fields of Executive discretion.

Can anything be done today to improve the exercise of the existing formal powers of the Presidency? Whoever tries to answer that question should recognize that there is no simple or permanent organizational solution to the internal arrangements for policy decision and the control of execution at this level. And there is clear danger in over-organization frozen into statute. The question whether the structure around the Presidency is the most rational

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or the most convenient turns in part on the work habits and requirements of
whoever is President. This is another reason for keeping the formal structure
and its legislative underpinning as flexible as possible.

## Federal Organization

Problems of organization and control appearing in the office of the
Presidency ramify into the larger subject of organization of the Executive branch.
The general problem of how to bring our functional-hierarchical form of
organization into line with the government-wide implications that most issues
present, is important on the domestic side. And in the field of foreign affairs,
there is literally no problem of any magnitude that does not concern more
than one Federal department. Thus there is a twofold pressure: to see to it
that the basic organization of government matches as nearly as may be the
large contours of our most prominent government functions; and then to see to
it that there are adequate procedures for the consideration and disposition of
problems that cut across those contours. As technology changes, as the nation
develops both domestically and in its world relations, the problems of govern-
ment change. So there is a constant need to scrutinize the organization of
government to make sure that it is appropriate both to the basic problems and
to the talents and skills of those leaders -- and most especially the President
himself -- who must operate the system.

To be able to keep government organization at its maximum effectiveness,
there is need for continuing governmental power to reorganize itself.

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Historically that power has been used both by the President and by the Congress with Congress reserving both in theory and practice the right to prescribe details as well as broad principles. Today, reorganization authority is granted to the President in fairly sweeping terms, but only for limited periods (two years) and subject to Congressional veto. The problem is to find some sort of basis for continuing reorganization authority for the President that gives him the organizational flexibility he needs, while allowing Congress the chance to pass on reorganization proposals that affect basic matters of public interest; and, most important, that does not impose undue statutory rigidities upon organization and procedure. The temporary value of a particular reorganization may be nullified if it is purchased at the price of statutory rigidity.

We conclude that two steps are in order.

First, we recommend the granting to the President on a permanent basis of the reorganization authority he has received from Congress in the past on a two-year basis. For the President to take full advantage of this power in the public interest, the existing machinery for consideration of questions of government reorganization--now located in the Executive Office of the President--should be strengthened.

Second, to offer the necessary perspective and corrective of a more detached and broader-gauged point of view than may be available from any continuing intra-governmental agency, we recommend further that arrangements should be made to have at periodic intervals--say every ten years, or sooner

should be made to have at periodic interviews--say every ten years, or sooner
continuing intra-governmental agency, we recommend further that arrangements
detained and proposed be made of view than may be available from any

Second, to offer the necessary peremptive and corrective of a more
President--should be strengthened.

Government reorganization--now located in the Executive Office of the
public interest, the existing machinery for consideration of questions of
a two-year basis. For the President to take full advantage of this power in the
of the reorganization authority he has received from Congress in the past on

that, we recommend the drawing to the President on a permanent basis
We conclude that two steps are in order.

statutory right.

particular reorganization may be justified if it is purchased at the price of
liabilities upon organization and procedure. The temporary value of a
public interest and, most important, that does not impose undue statutory
due to base on reorganization proposals that affect basic matters of
gives him the organizational flexibility he needs, while affording Congress
out of basis for continuing reorganization authority for the President that
(two years) and subject to Congressional veto. The problem is to find some
granted to the President in fairly sweetened form, but only for limited periods
deliberate as well as most principles. Today, reorganization authority is
with Congress reserving both in theory and practice the right to prescribe
Historically that power has been need both by the President and by the Congress

July 11, 1927

(Sixth Draft)

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July 11, 1957

if need be-- a thoroughgoing study of the whole problem of Federal government organization, with full reports to the government and to the people.

## The Budget Process

Problems of budgetary procedure and organization go beyond problems of organization of the Executive Office of the President and of the Executive Branch, into the effects of the budget process on policy formulation and execution. This process combines at least three emphases of vital significance. First is the budget in its overall fiscal aspect: how does the amount, timing and direction of Federal spending affect the economy as a whole, and its major segments? Second is the presentation of Federal activities as a whole in their dimensions of costs against revenues, with a sub-dimension of the costs and yields of particular programs. Third is the area of management, efficiency, and the coordination of staff work.

Improvement is needed in all three aspects.

Better coordination of the budget as a document embodying fiscal policy calls for closer interrelations between the Budget Bureau, the Treasury, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Federal Reserve Board and other executive agencies concerned with major components of fiscal policy. Needless to say, the budget process in itself is neutral on the basic issue of how much the country can afford for all government services; nor can it do more than provide a systematic procedure for deciding how to balance the substantive requirements of particular programs against the larger issues of fiscal policy

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in their impact on the national income, employment and the health of the economy.

The problem is how to use the machinery of the budget most effectively to reveal the implications of overall fiscal decisions and to square them with the needs of the various functions and activities of government.

Some start has been made in the direction of program budgeting, owing to the initiatives of the first Hoover Commission. But we are still well short of the ideal, in which the budget should be presented in meaningful program terms--so that the Congress and the public can have a clear conception of the nature and the cost of the great programs of government--in particular of the military strength to be supported and other services to be rendered by the government.

As to the management functions of the Bureau of the Budget, these have always run in loose linkage with the fiscal functions. They have been relatively thinly manned, so that slender resources have had to be rather sharply concentrated in only a few sectors of government administration. Much the same could be said of the resources of the Bureau available to the huge task of co-ordinating high-level government staff work as it is reflected in the budget process. This underlines the wisdom of a recommendation to parallel stronger staffing for management services with better co-ordination of staff work.

The budget in its present form is far too detailed and time-consuming.

It stands as a temptation to Congress to try to use it as an instrument of management and control within the Departments, and for the promotion of

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efficiency and economy. Congress, in its efforts to achieve these ends now gives close scrutiny to plans for spending money and administering appropriations, emphasizing justification in advance and in detail, rather than a post-audit of performance against general legislative prescriptions. The current process not only takes great energy and time, but leads to administrative rigidity whether imposed by legislative rider or by the warnings of appropriations committees. A broader presentation by the Executive might discourage attempts to legislate in advance and in detail, and might help readjust the balance between substantive and appropriations committees within Congress.

## Personnel

Our Federal personnel system seems to us weak in its higher ranges, largely unable to produce executive discipline and a sense of devotion to the purposes of government as a whole rather than to individual departments or bureaus. Procedures for the identification and flexible use of the best administrative talent in the higher civil service are as yet rudimentary. We do not have today a career system for civil servants comparable to that of the military or of the foreign service; and we may be paying a considerable price in reduced attractiveness of the Federal service to the most competent administrators--at a time when top administrative talent is in great demand. In our civil service generally, we relate status and pay to a job, not to a man, thus increasing the risks borne by the individual servant of the top grades in transferring under the current system from department to department, as the govern

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ment's needs suggest.

Within the limits of current procedures for recruitment and classification, it is still possible to make some gains in training, especially of the top staff. This process probably cannot be pushed much farther, however, unless the government makes it possible for higher grade officials to develop administrative alter egos, and to devote substantial amounts of time to in-service training and executive development--so notable a feature of the more progressive personnel policies of our business organizations.

With better trained and more widely experienced top staff, it becomes possible to rely more heavily on staff officers to balance the inherent parochialism of interdepartmental committees.

But in the absence of optimum scope in our civil service system for recruitment, training, and utilization of its highest-grade officials, is it really possible to co-ordinate any institution such as the Federal government by procedural devices alone? Or does the best co-ordination not depend on the availability of men in top ranks with varied as well as long administrative experience and broad training? Can interdepartmental committees reach agreement on fundamental policies when there is no system of personnel discipline and no opportunity of promotion across departmental lines? Is it possible for any political executive to control a department when he cannot have a career executive at the apex of a hierarchy under him?

The implications of these questions seem to us to be so compelling that we recommend steps toward the elaboration and installation of an improved

we recommend steps toward the elaboration and implementation of an improved

The indications of these duties seem to be so compelling that
the aim of the above of a hierarchy under him?

Political executive to control a department when he cannot have a career executive
of promotion or some administrative title? Is it possible for any
administrative policies when there is no system of personnel discipline and no
and proper training? Can interdepartmental committees reach agreement on

quality of men in top ranks with varied as well as broad administrative experience
of central duties alone? Or does the bear co-ordination not depend on the staff
possible to co-ordinate any institution such as the Federal Government by pro-
recruitment, training, and utilization of its highest-grade officials, if it really
but in the absence of optimum scope in our civil service system for

tem of interdepartmental committees.

possible to rely more heavily on staff officers to balance the inherent槽

With better training and more widely experienced top staff, if becomes
possible of our business organisations.

executive development--as notable a feature of the more progressive personnel
after ads, and to devote substantial amounts of time to in-service training and
government make it possible to attract grade officials to develop administrative
the process properly cannot be achieved much further, however, unless the
We are still possible to make some gains in training, especially of the top staff.

there is a need for adjustment.

July 11, 1963

(Sixth Draft)

VI.-Revises

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system for the government-wide use of top career administrative talent,
along the lines of the recommendations of the second Hoover Commission for
a "senior civil service."

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July 11, 1957

Top Staff Work

The vital need for improving top staff work in our government comes
from its concern with the great issues that frame our leadership. This im-
provement depends not only on personnel, but rests on organizational grounds
as well. Yet the organizational problems of getting better staff work and
better evaluation of policies cannot be entirely met by even the most elaborate
system of interdepartmental committees and clearances or by proliferation of
the staff of the Executive Office of the President and of the White House.

The choice of persons to make decisions, the degree to which the President
is able to retain firm control of his basic policies while developing the
necessary staff work to specify and to understand the consequences of the
alternatives on which they must be founded, is a matter of political genius,
and not one for settlement by maxims drawn from texts on public adminis-
tration. In considerable measure it must be the product of a man's past
experience, the depth of his understanding of the nature of the system in
which he is the responsible leader at the national level, and his ability to
evoke sources of support on a national level through the most skillful use
not only of his party but of many other channels of appeal as well.

It is at this range of the democratic process that the true testing of
the leadership which is diffused throughout the system is brought to bear.
If the President is capable of making the national purpose understood in
terms that are familiar to the people and yet applicable to new dimensions of

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challenge, he must find widespread support throughout all the great association and basic communities of the society -- the church, the professional association the labor union, the community organizations and club life, the schools, and the educational system.

And somehow that support and concern must be made manifest at the top level of the staffs in the Executive Office. The men who support the work of the Cabinet and the major interdepartmental committees need to bring a wider view than that nurtured by responsibility to a single department or to a single functional interest. While the President is the unique representative of all the people, the spokesman for the general interest, it is impossible for him to bring that representative quality home in detail to all the work of the interdepartmental committees that mould the fundamentals of our national policy.

## The Congress

There may need to be changes in the relationships of the Executive as a whole toward Congress. Today these relationships are largely characterized by a disposition to treat Congress as an agency to be cajoled, persuaded, or gotten around, if not as a maleficent force in the body politic that for captious or parochial reasons interpolates particularist conceptions of interest in the way of generalized and imaginative programs proposed by the Executive. These tendencies to treat Congress as an unequal or worse in the governmental structure are reinforced by the organization and performance of Congress itself. These tend on the whole to force Congress to deal with legislative proposals in piecemeal fashion. Congress divides up its work

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among committees that rule very largely over the consideration of its business, subject to sporadic discipline from the Rules Committee or to the variable influence of the policy committees of the parties. The strategy of Executive presentation and persuasion is perforce directed to the particular composition and preferences of the members of the several committees, as it is only the most challenging or controversial problem that can provoke debate on the floor leading to an overturn of committee action. Such attempts to override committee action usually involve a powerful appeal to the electorate as a whole buttressed by the most skilfull analysis of the particular pressures that will bring a majority of Congressmen into line, and appeals to the interests so revealed.

Whatever the justification of these modes of Executive treatment of Congressmen, it seems clear that these procedures themselves tend to perpetuate the kind of Congressional responses that seem to justify further Executive deviousness. If Congressmen respond to Executive efforts to discuss policy proposals before they are publicly released, by leaking the proposals and taking prompt counteraction against any threat to particularist interests, the Executive can hardly be expected to take Congress into confidence in advance. But it is equally improper to expect Congressmen to accept with good grace Executive leaks of policy proposals to newsmen in advance of information to the appropriate Congressional leaders or committees.

Whatever changes may be made in the style and spirit of communication between the Executive and key Congressmen, it nevertheless remains

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utopian to expect Congress as now composed and organized to conceive an
inclusive legislative program. Even in its heyday of hegemony in the
Federal structure, it could never be said that Congress had this capability.
Congressional government, in Wilson's phrase, meant that certain Congressmen
notably the chairmen of the key committees, were able through the power of
the purse and the power over legislative authorization to rule large fiefs within
the Executive structure. But Congress as such never tried to plan and put
through an inclusive legislative program. This was not of the temper of
those times.

This is not to say that Congress or Congressmen are impotent in
important roles of leadership; for the inability to create a complete and self-
coherent legislative program does not prevent individual Congressmen or
groups of them, who have particular programs or interests in mind, from
prodding the Executive Branch, demanding from it proposals for legislation,
examining the Executive in detail on its views of the costs and consequences
of such proposals, in effect, forcing the Executive to act its role of leadership.
The role of Congress in foreign aid is a case in point: both in the conception
of the large framework of postwar economic policy, and in the adjustment of
that policy to the emerging security and economic possibilities and requirements
of the postwar situation, Senator Vandenberg, Congressmen Herter and
Vorys and others played an important part.

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July 11, 1957

Congressional Reform

Certain proposals for Congressional reform have been made, however, that fall a good deal short of complete reorganization and that would do much to improve Executive-Congressional relationships insofar as they affect the legislative role in policy formation.

The relationship between the substantive committees and the appropriations committees is a case in point. The present distribution of power over the substance of legislation and the extent and timing of governmental programs force the Executive to present its programs twice. The Executive must not only convince the substantive committee of the propriety and appropriate scale of a given program, but it must convince the appropriations committees as well, and to a large degree from the beginning. The range of criteria applied by the appropriations committees usually goes well beyond the questions of availability of money or capacity of the Executive to spend or obligate money within given time periods. These committees characteristically second-guess the substantive committees and in most cases appropriate less money than is authorized by substantive legislation. And these reductions are usually made in response to *ad hoc* and not to overall budgetary or fiscal considerations. There emerges a tremendous pressure on Executive agencies, in conceiving and proposing the funding of programs, to set their sights well above the figure they feel may be legitimate, since each program must successively run the gauntlets not only of the Bureau of the Budget

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but also of the substantive and the appropriations committees. And because
the appropriations committees concern themselves with fine detail, both
Congress and the country easily lose sight of the larger issues of program
and of fiscal policy.

These and other Congressional procedures for considering important
legislative proposals turn on particular aspects of the legislative process
that are not easily altered. Some are rooted in the Constitution, others are
rooted in political practices or in rules of Congress sanctioned by our
representative system and by long practice. These include the rules of
seniority on committees, the terms of representatives, and the requirement
that representatives shall reside in the districts from which they are elected.
Despite demands by powerful interest groups (notably those interested
in labor legislation and in civil rights) that the seniority rule and the Senate
rule governing cloture should be altered, Congress has shown little disposition
to find an appropriate substitute for seniority and has not proved receptive
to proposals to bind committee chairmen to uphold party policy as enunciated
in the party platform. The Senate seems wedded to a particular interpretation
of the cloture rule that gives representatives of particular regions of the
country an effective veto on legislation. This is of course anathema to the
upholders of majoritarian democracy, and a source of continuing irritation
to those who support the kinds of legislation denied. The case for cloture
rests on a view of our polity that values the power of minorities to protect

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July 11, 1957

themselves from the decisions of majorities where those decisions might
trespass upon the conception of agreed political values that form the informal
but real constitutional unity of the country. Therefore the problem of dealing
with the little groups of willful men is not easy.

There are, however, procedural remedies for the blockage of
legislation by unfriendly committees. But these come into play only where
the case is in extremis, and the coalition of supporting interest is powerful
enough to force legislation out of committee.

Top executive leadership could live better with the seniority system
for choosing committee chairmen if the chairmen of key committees were
pledged to uphold the same lines of political policy followed by the executives.
Invocation of loyalty to the party platform is often urged as a touchstone;
but this has great shortcomings in the light of two facts: first, the necessarily
general language of platforms; and second, the forms of political responsibility
in our Federal system that hold a Senator or Congressman responsible in the
first instance to his district, and only secondarily to whatever concept he
may hold of the national interest -- or the value he may place upon support
of and by the President. Here as in the field of international alliances,
guarantees of performance rest more on perceptions of interest than upon
pacts. Such joint conceptions of responsibility may be operative in the party
system, and find expression in party platforms; but these always need to be
reh interpreted in the light of particular proposals and conditions.

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July 11, 1957

In the end, the burden rests on national Executive leadership to
demonstrate that its proposals do serve both the national interest and the
particular interests represented in Congress.

But there is no reason why the Executive should always have to
shoulder the extra burden of winning support for its proposals in committees
where the accidents of the seniority rule and of elections in the several
States bring to power chairmen who are unalterably opposed to programs that
are desired by the majority of the party in charge of a branch of the legislature,
or who are simply not adequate to their jobs. Therefore we conclude that the
seniority rule be abolished, despite its occasional usefulness in upholding
particular elements of the concurrent constitutional consensus. It should
be replaced by a system of selection of committee chairmen by the party
caucuses in each House of Congress, in which weight is given to the
elements of competence and willingness to put through the political
programs espoused by those caucuses. Selection of committee chairman
thus clearly remains a matter for determination of the parties in Congress;
but such a system would offer better opportunities to the President as Party
leader to bring his weight to bear.

Problems of defragmenting the budget process can also be solved
only if the Executive takes very powerful initiatives, requiring great courage,
to present its budget clearly in its overall fiscal aspect and to keep to the
large issues of program and policy. In our tripartite system of government,

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the Executive has no way of forcing the legislative to confine its questions about fiscal policy or budget to large issues; the powers of investigation by Congress are virtually unlimited, and it is up to Congress to decide whether to spend its energies on details or in the large. But a determined executive could do much to hold discussion to the larger issues; particularly if the form of budget presentation by the executive lends itself to such debate and discussion. The Congress cannot comfortably find itself in the position of denying needed funds and grants of power for national defense and foreign affairs, simply because the executive has insisted on an intel-ligible if broad presentation of its needs. Congress might even find a more respected and congenial role in the debate of serious matters rather than trivia.

## Local Representation and Party Discipline.

At bottom, however, the interrelations of Executive and Congress must rest on the distribution of political power in our decentralized form of government. Not through the party system as we have it can the executive leadership exercise stringent discipline, for the choice of Congressmen is as much a local matter as a matter of national issues. The national political leadership, if powerful, may proffer or withhold valued help; but an executive intervention to defeat a locally solid candidate is almost always bound to fail. Again, the exercise of judicious and persuasive leadership, based on insight into the position of the local representative and its relation to national

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interest, is the nub of the issue.

Party discipline in our country is far more a phenomenon of state and local politics than it is of national politics. Our parties are characteristically coalitions, living by compromise, exhibiting the centripetal tendencies of loose groups seeking for combinations that will be successful at the polls. As such they must show the same hospitality for diversity that characterizes our whole political system; they must refrain from pushing unanimity of principle very hard, and must concentrate on finding the agreements on the consequences of particular proposals and programs that will command enough assent to get approval and action.

We seek discipline through our parties at the price of these valued elements in our politics; and the continuing problem of national leadership is to judge how much diversity is compatible with the national agreement needed for survival and achievement in the world of today and tomorrow.

## Relations of Government with Society

So far we have spoken of the problems of national leadership as if they bore in the main on our role in the society of nations. But these problems must be faced in the context of domestic problems, involving relations between the Federal government and the states and localities. Here there are newly emerging challenges, and our society must ask how we can meet the economic, social and political problems of our vast new urban complexes with political

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machinery shaped during the 19th century. National leadership cannot overlook them, even though some of them may be relatively restricted in geographical area. Our metropolitan areas involve large concentrations of people, industry and administrative resources. Many of them cross State lines. Many of their ramifications into fields of highway transportation, social welfare, education, governmental services and protection, involve the interests and services of the Federal government. In their local manifestations they are the more difficult to cope with not only because the sources of leadership within the central urban city seem to be drying up, but because the fiscal resources needed to cope with them are being increasingly absorbed by State and Federal governments.

Granted that these challenges affect our domestic performance in the first instance, the way we meet them is nevertheless important to our world performance. The problems of interrelations of Federal, state and local governments now are being worked out in a complicated maze of intergovernmental relations that have been recently examined by the Kestnbaum Commission; and the outcomes can bear on our world position. State and local governments are part of our system for the training and seasoning of leaders available for national and world roles. The problems of distribution of powers in our Federal system are important insofar as the kinds of tasks, responsibilities and resources found at the state and local level are such as to challenge high-caliber leadership in their own right, and to maintain health and balance in

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our governmental system as a whole. And finally, most of our problems of
national security reach into the states and localities. Civil defense is but
an example. And the effectiveness of our nation in dealing with all aspects
of these problems depends in good part on effective performance by state
and local leaders -- not only in government but in community life.

The party system, in large part because of its centripetal and loose federative character, offers not only the opportunity to draw together leadership and policy on money matters of common concern, but also a source of leadership and of executive talent that cannot be ignored by the Executive, let alone by Congress in which party plays so vital a role.

Yet there is a broad feeling that parties can do much more than they
have, not only in these ways, but as a major solution to the problem of
bridging the gaps inherent in our Federal system, and as a major institutions
through which citizens everwhere can participate in government. Most
prescriptions for improvement in our party system call for centralization,
improvement in central organization and discipline, and for the setting up
of "shadow governments" that might simplify the problem of transfers of
power when an administration suffers defeat at the polls. Most of such
proposals involve inherent difficulties and damage to our decentralized
political structure. Fortunately it is not necessary to erect new formal
and centralized structures -- such as would provide for a clear "govern-
mental opposition" -- for the party system to undergo considerable improvement.

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As a flexible instrument, inherently responsive to vigorous expressions of political sentiment, the party system can do much more in the clarification of vital issues. And in turn, improved public understanding and support for the current realities of the party system can strengthen it materially.

The attitudes of the business community toward the parties have seriously handicapped the party system as a source of ideas and of leadership. Business has devalued politics and the party process, has discouraged participation of its best people within that process, and has demanded of parties and government direct rewards for contributions, not being satisfied with "a right to be heard and a fair shake".

Yet there are notable exceptions to this generalization. Some business firms have encouraged their employees to participate in the party of their choice and have made executives available for relatively short periods of time for posts of political and administrative leadership. Educational institutions, foundations, and parts of the business community have participated in such movements as the Citizenship Clearing House. There have been efforts toward promoting party finance on a bipartisan basis that have had noteworthysuccess in several communities -- noteworthy, that is, because such a bipartisan move has been undertaken with any success at all. Both sorts of efforts have helped to make party organization and procedure more comprehensible, reducing by acquaintance some of the distortions inherent in ignorance or in the anti-political biases so deeply rooted in much of our

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political teaching.

Possibly more serious than its relation to the world of political parties, is the attitude of much of the business community and of other private institutions toward participation of their personnel in the political and career ranks of government administrators. Boards of trustees, directors, and at times large stockholders of important business have all too frequently made it difficult or impossible for their personnel to take periodic leaves of absence for government service, or to concern themselves prominently with the affairs of a particular administration. The usual reason for this is the fear that any prominent participation in political activity -- whether in party work or within the Federal administration -- may offend one or another of the important persons or groups to which a business or a private institution (such as a foundation) must turn for support.

We think, however, that not only the individuals of this nation but its great private organizations should be willing to give more than token support to the national government, and should be willing to take some risk to ensure that the nation's government remains effective in serving the national interest.

If our government is to be by the people, it must be able to look to all parts of our community for its leadership and for its administrative talent. And if our government is to be responsive to the interests of all the people, those interests must be widely and properly reflected in both policy determination and administration.

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There is a continuing need for unity on the major issues confronting our society; but such unity cannot be gained through discipline while preserving the fundamentals of our democratic order. Nor is it likely that this discipline can be imposed or gained by any artificial means.

In a society resting on communications, persuasion, and the search for common elements of interest in programs to achieve great national goals, discipline as such plays only a minor role.

## Recommendations

Throughout the foregoing discussion has run the thread of our concern with ways in which leadership in our country can work more effectively in its interdependent relations with political institutions and problems of communications that we must bring to maximum efficiency. We have noticed ways in which that organization, in its pluralism, with its multiplicity of interests and its dispersion of effective points of power and initiative presents both strengths and weaknesses as we face the trials of the forthcoming decade and a half. We have been chiefly concerned with ways and means for national leadership to be wholly adequate to these challenges.

As specific moves toward that objective, we recommend the following:

1. Permanent reorganization authority for the President.

2. Improved machinery in both the Executive and the Legislative Branches for review of organization and management in the Federal government.

3. At intervals of some years, major study of government organization

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by an appropriate commission outside of the regular governmental structure.

4. Development of more effective career and non-career personnel, to include

a. Strengthening of the top staff personnel to balance present excessive reliance on interdepartmental committees; and

b. A "senior civil service".

5. A revised form and procedure for the Federal budget

a. Recast so far as possible in program terms;

b. Showing fiscal and tax policy as well as spending, based on coordination of the budget with the Economic Report;

c. Providing for closer coordination of staff work with the Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Budget Director.

6. The item veto.

7. Within Congress,

a. A better relationship between the substantive appropriations committees, with effort to overcome fragmentation of the appropriations process; and

b. Abolition of the seniority rule and the election of committee chairmen in caucus, pledged to stand on party policies.

8. Repeal of the 22nd Constitutional amendment prohibiting a third term for the President.

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# AREA III. COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDING

## INTRODUCTION

Since democracy involves shared power, decisions, and responsibilities, but survival and health in the modern world require timely and interjected common decision, then surely the communications linking together all elements of society in a politically functioning whole, are vital. If organization in our society provides for a good deal of decentralization and wide opportunities for initiative within a framework of overall purpose, then surely the communications linking the whole are equally vital to common and coordinated and effective performance, focussing resources on the most important tasks. If a decent respect for the opinions of mankind calls now as it did in 1776 for our society to make itself clear to the world abroad, then surely systematic methods for revealing ourselves, our ideals, our government and our manner of life are needed today.

Thus leadership, while reaching for new dimensions of both understanding and organization of effective national purpose, must also strive for new dimensions in the fields of communications as well. This calls for a better understanding and an improved operational use of all the techniques of communication, from the simplest principle of confidence in demonstrated character to the sophisticated and morally responsible use of mass media.

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New dimensions of responsibility for communication rest on our
national leadership. But that responsibility must be discharged within the
limits imposed by a confidence that it is ultimately the truth that makes men
free. This governs the communication that a leader can use in evoking the
goals of our society in terms that reflect at once its moral heritage and its
aspirations. The leader, moreover, must both symbolize and dramatize. His
reflection of his times is not one merely of mirroring the needs of a society.
He transforms and clarifies. He brings to a focus. He gives direction. He
moves towards the ends chosen by programs of action. In all these ways
he symbolizes in some measure, as an epic example, the character of his
society.

Yet, since he must reflect its freedom of thought and association and
nourish the elements that give a free society strength, a constitutional leader
must keep fertile the seedbed of initiative and growth for those ideas and
beliefs that germinate from the individual's freedom to disagree. Lincoln,
during the most difficult times of the nation, had to use stern measures to
deal with treason within his own lines and to repress rebellion against the
Union and threats from without. Yet few men were ever more considerate of
the view of others or careful for their protection -- up to the point where the
survival of the constitutional system itself became the supreme law.

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Communications, Support and Responsibility

In a broad sense, the term "communication" means this perpetual
education on a two-way basis of the nation by its leaders and of the leaders
by the nation. It is embodied in every aspect of the political process itself
through the selection of leaders; their relation to party programs and machinery;
the working of liaison and cooperation, or its opposite, between the Executive
and the legislator; the use of the press and the other media of mass communi-
cations, and so on. But it is more than education by information; it must also
be the effective two-way exercise of influence in many forms. Washington
remarked that "Influence is not government." But it is a prime ingredient of
the politics that shapes government and makes or breaks its leaders.

Today it must be clear that leaders at every level in a democracy who
do not understand the uses of the new media of communication will not be
effective in reaching and educating and winning the support of the potential
supporting leadership, or in sensing the critical evaluation by their supporters
and followers, which they must have to carry out their continued and burdensome
work of national leadership. The especially onerous tasks of common defense
that now confront us must be shorn of the illusions bred by wishes for "workable
and safe" disarmament; this is only a prime example of a major communications
problem for our national leaders.

At the same time, it is equally clear that no technical proficiency, no
manipulation of the sources of information, no smoothness or skill in presentatio

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carries anything like the basic conviction that firmness and reasonableness, combined in the expression of the leader's public appearances and in his consistent handling of crises and difficulties, imply. His communications, in short, depend upon his total impact as a character upon the public of which, today, television appearances and films add a very direct and important new dimension. The days of a nationally-shared Town Hall are not quite here, even though the gentlemen of the Fourth Estate in their press conferences are far more insistent and sometimes less restrained in their questions than are neighbors in a Town Meeting. The responsibility of the press and the limits of its inquisitorial powers are things that are brought in question by the very nature of the democratic process.

## Communications Tasks

The key communications tasks of a society are to awaken interest and create a broad sense of involvement in the most important issues facing that society; to identify major operational issues, anticipating crises insofar as possible; and to carry out a threefold process of creating consensus, elaborating doctrine, and fostering the flow of communications between leaders and led. Needless to say these are not serial steps; these functions constantly interact among themselves. Since society does not work automatically, the initiative in doing these tasks falls on leadership, within and without government.

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Since the main concern of this report is with our national security, a prime task for communications is to create a broader and more urgent sense throughout America of the extent to which all are involved in national and international issues. Leaders must select and delineate the most important issues, and focus the manifold energies of our society upon them. And they need to create by symbol, precept, and joint action, a lively sense of operational involvement in efforts to cope with these problems. This task is the more difficult in the international arena, for despite the extent to which we are involved in the commerce of the world, we still retain a feeling that we need not be involved deeply in world affairs, and if we are, that we can participate in them largely on our own terms.

A second task is to cut through the enormous multiplicity of communications that compete for our attention, to get wide hearing for those issues of national policy that require consensus and action. Sustained attention requires, in turn, a sense among citizens that their participation is both timely and meaningful. Without this sense, awareness quickly fades; or if it persists, opinion turns into uneasy or embittered brooding or euphoric faith in leaders, Fate, or God.

Our national leaders need to measure, and if necessary to build consensus. Much measurement today comes only after a policy is announced or a program launched, and our leaders discover whether they are right or wrong

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only by sensing reactions, and thus they face a fresh set of problems. Such
measurement services as we have tend to reflect superficial opinion on single
issues, yet people think of issues as related to one another and react to them
as such. Leaders need a better picture of how public opinion does this and
how deep and stable are its responses to those groups of ideas.

Leadership can usually count on favorable response to the broad
principles of our society, but this is rarely enough. Acceptance of a broad
principle does not guarantee approval for specific proposals. Faced with such
concrete expression of principle, leaders must learn better how people interpret
programs in terms of their impact on particular, concrete interests. People
usually ask, what will a government program do to me? Accepting the principle,
citizens are still free to disagree about the operational consequences of specific
programs, and it is a main task in building consensus to take account of those
disagreements. Therefore the result may be changes in the programs, or
changes in the way they are interpreted by those who must support them or
who are otherwise affected by them. But leadership should not make such
changes, or attempt reinterpretations of proposed programs, without solid
evidence of citizen response. Letters to Congressmen or to Executive Depart-
ments or to the White House are notoriously unreliable indexes both of the
general state of public opinion, and of the answers to these needs. The
government needs a better service for measurement of opinion in depth on

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important clusters of issues. But the results of such a service should not serve as more than a guide; for it is neither of the proper nature nor intention of leadership in our society to abdicate the striving for consensus in support of needed programs.

When opinion is diffuse, firm and timely executive leadership backed by adequate information may be the best way to consolidate opinion. This is especially true in times of crisis when the nation is looking for leadership, and does not want to have problems shunted off, say to the United Nations or to some other forum. A strong lead is especially needed when the government knows that it cannot offer the citizens alternative choices without risking vital positions.

Communications of leaders in a society paying genuine respect to the opinions of its citizens, need to be well rooted in reason and in doctrine. This does not mean that our government has to have an ideological basis; it does mean that the reasoning behind any of our great programs must be cogent and clear. Citizens are entitled to know not only what the government is doing, but also the reasons for the nature and shape of its programs; they need to share a sense of expectations about the future, and the kinds of consequences that may follow from government action -- not to mention the kinds of risks the government is taking and the reasons for them. This, in short, is what they should be able to gain from doctrine.

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If doctrine is lacking, communications remain unfocussed and their effects are uncertain. Without doctrine, leadership is constantly forced into improvisations about what to say on important issues. For example, some sharing of common ideas about the nature, the strengths and limitations, and the prospects for limited war are needed if leaders or citizens generally are to appraise the wisdom of our government's defense policies, or are to understand what our government has to say about them. Program budgets for the defense services, for example, are meaningless figures unless they can be related to some coherent thought about the need for the kinds of arms we have or are getting; for the kinds of research and development we are carrying on; or for any of the related matters that go to make up a key government defense program.

Doctrine in this sense is not "received doctrine"; nor is it static; but statements by leaders of their beliefs about what they are doing. The creation, criticism, and sharing of such organized ideas are a necessary part of the process whereby the leaders and thinkers and citizens generally use reason to shape programs to achieve their common ends.

For communications to play their full role in our democracy, leadership must invite and stimulate a vigorous two-way flow, contributing to a sense of identity between leaders and led, and measuring the community's consensus on goals and doctrine. Initiative in proposals for action rests, as it must,

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with leaders, but both identity and consensus will suffer unless leaders
outline proposals to citizens in ways that offer genuine opportunity for criticism
and response before the decision is fixed.

This vigorous two-way flow can be cut down if leaders fail to recognize
their communications responsibilities, or discharge them ineptly; and it will
be diminished if citizens do not understand the degree of their involvement,
or do not think the expression of their opinion can be timely or important.
The role of leaders in national security matters is hampered by legitimate
requirements of secrecy for much fact and intention in this area. Somehow
leaders must strive for a sufficient and trustworthy flow of information in this
field so that citizens believe that they can grasp its issues intelligently, while
maintaining a prudent reserve of discretion. Here, as in the field of censorship,
we need more dependable facts on the effects of disclosure on national programs.
For if citizens lose faith in their ability to judge national security matters
from the facts made available, support for our policies depends on faith in
leaders; and a change in leadership may touch off surprising changes in policy
preferences among the people. Such changes can surprise leaders, too, as
witness Wilson's discomfiture in the change in temper of the American people
on basic issues of international involvement.

The nation remains committed to the ideal of the freest possible cir-
culation of ideas and of people, both at home and abroad. Problems of freedom

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of speech and expression have sharpened into crisis at many points in our history, and are in constant need of vigilant defense. Despite its clear justifications, such freedom is under continuing threat. It is not merely a case of freedom for private organs of opinion to collect and publish facts of importance to national policy; or to express their views on them. It is also a case of preserving a system in which all sorts of ideas can find public expression, and compete in a varied marketplace of ideas.

National security is only one of the interests restricting full communications. Commercial, educational, moral and religious interests are involved, and each in its own way puts its pressures on the nation's press.

None of these forces will disappear, nor will the interests they represent. How are they to be understood and squared with the ideals of full freedom of communication and the achievement of other values? How is the trap to be avoided of celebrating the ideal of freedom of speech to the point where the necessary restrictions are misjudged, undervalued, and the integrity of the whole process of communications unnecessarily compromised?

## Channels of Communications--Access and Use

No one with eyes to see or ears to hear can be oblivious to the sheer volume of communications in our society; and no one with an eye to trends in the structure and equipment of our communications can fail to see that our communications networks--press, radio, television, motion pictures--will

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grow in their ability to cover the nation and to reach out into the world abroad.
We are at the threshold of enormous development, especially in television.
Television today offers top governmental leadership an unexampled opportunity
to present itself to the people and to pull together the full resources of the
community on behalf of public causes. And the electronic media are reinforced
by the vigorous outpouring of newspapers, magazines, and books.

The question then is not of the overall adequacy or the total growth
patterns of our communications; we need to be concerned over the ways in
which this network functions, and its implications for our ability to conduct
democratic politics.

## Mass Media

We note the misgivings frequently expressed over the concentration
of control of ownership and programing in the electronic media, and the cautions
expressed over the ownership patterns in the press. We feel, however, that
the performance of mass media to date has justified neither the worst fears
nor the highest hopes. More than threat, they represent a continuing opportunity
for leadership in all walks of life to carry out their leadership functions, and
that includes education of the people in its broadest and best sense.

This function of information and education calls for development in
two directions. One proceeds along the lines offered by the educational
television movement today. This movement is still in its infancy, but it is a

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reality in many cities in the nation, and is making its impact both through public channels and in the schoolrooms. The horizons of educational television are only now becoming clear, as the educators of the country are discovering how to put this instrument to work not to replace the teacher, but to infuse the educational process with examples of the best in teaching. Educational television can also bring more widely to the nation, special resources of demonstration that may not be available to all, and thus help level up the educational opportunities available to every child. Moreover, educational television by concentrating its whole effort on the educational uses of the medium, can help to expand freedom of choice for viewers throughout the country. For all these reasons, we think the Federal Communications Commission should be slow in considering commercial assignment of any of those channels previously reserved for educational television.

But the educational television movement is only one line of progress. The other, and potentially the most significant line because the one most easily and quickly evident to all the people, is the better use of commercial television (whether free or pay) for fundamentally educational purposes. We recognize that commercial television is chiefly devoted to advertising and to entertainment; but entertainment does not exclude education and may enhance it. Moreover, the public service obligations of the stations, and the sense of public duty felt by the networks, have produced much of lasting educational value.

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The most obvious gain might seem to come from decisions by those controlling the use of time on television and radio to devote more programs to educational purposes. But the current division of programing is made in response to powerful forces, and there is little expectation that these forces-- including public service obligation as well as advertising revenue--will significantly change.

Therefore a more likely and feasible source of gain might come from decisions by those in control of programing to use the kinds of programing they have found to be commercially profitable and practically feasible, for the better presentation of the role of leaders in our society. Television has shown considerable affinity for drama, and it seems altogether practicable for those who write and produce drama, ranging from soap opera to the most ambitious forms, to provide, on balance, a picture of leadership that is accustomed to take risks, to mould resources, to marshal consent, and to strive for excellence. This sort of gain need not be confined to the role of leadership. It can be sought and achieved in all those areas in which the nation's goals are involved. Through television, the nation can perceive itself potentially at least in its manifold richness. There is an obligation on those who control that medium to see that this perception is adequate to the challenge of our present and future.

The performance of leadership itself is of course critical. Leaders are by that very fact news, and can command coverage. National leaders are the

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obvious examples, but leaders elsewhere, by concerning themselves with
appropriate subjects of vital import, can raise the whole tone of public
discussion, and help bring to focus vital issues for public attention.

Seen from the standpoint of the national government, even from that of
the Presidency concerned with problems of high policy, the problem of access
involves a dilemma. By virtue of his office, the President is able to command
nation-wide coverage to discuss matters of national interest, and to present
his views on the broad outlines of public issues. But also, by virtue of his
position, he is unable to pursue matters in sufficient detail to drive them home;
and those key assistants who could devote the time to it, are not able to
command the requisite attention in our mass media by virtue of their position.
Such development must compete with the whole host of topics that fill our
press; and it is not always that editorial decisions allow adequate access for
it.

Moreover, the educational function of press conferences by the President
and other key officials have been less than fully explored. Despite frequency
and open questioning, the talk usually deals with current matters. There is
little attempt either by the officials or by the press to anticipate future crises,
and to seek prevention rather than cure. This is in part a shortcoming of the
press itself, for the questions asked do not probe beyond immediate matters.

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Adequate communications for a democracy depend here as in other areas on the way the Fourth Estate perceives its role and responsibilities, and on the efforts it makes to discharge them.

## Specialized Channels

Possibly even more important than the mass media for the discussion of national security matters are those specialized channels that involve communications among those persons in government and out of it who care enough about their nation and its responsibilities in the world to inform themselves and to take an active part in shaping the directions of national life. These channels involve government, the educational system, and specialized research institutions. In government, the Executive Branch plays a major role, especially on matters of national security; but in these and other areas, the role of Congress, and on special matters, of the Judiciary, are of great moment.

The aspect of security affects discussions by the executive, and thus the total flow of specialized communications. As originator of much of the information and of policy decision on national security questions, the Executive must decide how much of its information and intentions should be made public, when. But the power and relevance of the response of specialized publics depend on the kinds of information that are at its disposal, and the extent to which the Executive can take them into its confidence without distorting their

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discussion or muzzling the expression of their findings. The Executive as well as the general public has a vital interest in seeing that the reports of specialized groups are as well founded and as freely expressed as possible.

A democratic society is entitled to the generation and dissemination of a fully adequate conception of policy. National government leaders must play a prime role in explaining the concepts of policy and action within which they operate, and in furnishing the main elements of information bearing on these policies. But because of their role, they cannot always be fully candid. Any diplomat who gives an account of his strategy and information in advance risks defeat in negotiation. Both in diplomacy and war, there must be a certain amount of ambiguity and uncertainty.

Therefore, for a full exploration of the alternatives of policy and their consquences, the country must turn to its educational and to its specialized research institutions. The educational system must create the foundation of historical sense and ability to master and marshal relevant facts, and to make clear the full range of policy alternatives among which government leaders can choose. Independent research organizations can be more concentrated and specialized, exposing in full detail the complex areas of fact and analysis bearing on fundamentals of national policy.

For this interrelation to work best, government can properly indicate alternatives of policy that seem most appropriate for examination, but should

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not try to restrict discussion to them, let alone suggest which ones should
be chosen and defended. Educational and private research organizations should
equally respect the legitimate requirements placed by government on the use
of classified information; and even more important, keep in mind the practical
restrictions on freedom of action that may keep government from accepting
a theoretically desirable path.

Participation by private research agencies in this task of clarifying
and analyzing broad alternatives of action gives government a special benefit:
a check on the alternatives perceived by government, and an opportunity for
public discussion of avenues of action that might be closed in the absence of
independent discussion leading to broader-gauged public opinion. The work
of private research institutions gives basis for independent judgment of the
effectiveness of government actions--and this may mean greater consensus
supporting a final result. Informed discussion by those outside government
can provide a chance for the detailed and lengthy examination of fundamental
questions, free of the pressures of office. Such intensive concern offers a
corrective to the development of isolated, esoteric, inbred governmental circles
overconcentrating on problems of policy. The educational system and special-
ized research institutions can help assure that government officials will have
a full range of alternatives to consider and a detailed check on the estimates
of the consequences and acceptability of each.

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## Objectives

The objectives of communicators are as various as their interests and purposes, and in our free society result in a bewildering variety of communications made in the effort to win attention and support for these interests. A continuing task is to focus adequate attention on the most important ones-- most important from the standpoint of our survival and health in the world of the future. Three general areas seem to be of overriding importance: the generation and projection of a deep understanding of the nature of our political, economic and social system; the creation and dissemination of a reliable system of expectations about the future of world politics, and the place of the United States in it; and the projection of a realistic appraisal of the Communist threat both as it appears today and as it is likely to do so in the future.

These tasks are worthy of the best efforts that the educational system, specialized research institutions, and the mass media can make.

We have discussed in the introduction and the first section of this Report our concept of the nature of our political economy, stressing our character as a constitutional republic, resting on respect for the dignity of the individuals and the rights of minorities, and our deep-rooted determination to pursue our political and economic ends by means that comport with our fundamental moral consensus. We need to stress our practice of achieving political effectiveness and constitutional harmony by our search for practical

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agreement on the shape and consequences of political programs, without insisting on conformity to any ideological norm. Thus we preserve both tolerance and faith.

Because we cherish and seek difference, while we insist that those who espouse difference make clear their authorship, our communications to ourselves and abroad must not try to ignore or obscure serious differences, but must explain them. In a very deep sense, the way we deal with differences is the difference between our political philosophy and practice, and those of others. It should lie at the heart of our practice of communications. Only by giving a realistic picture of the relative power of different voices in our society, and their shifts in power through time, can we project abroad a true picture of ourselves, and enable foreign observers to relate our realities to their interests.

We need to create and communicate a more adequate and better-explored system of expectations about the world system of the future than we now share broadly. We need a view of the probable trends in the distribution of power and influence so conceived that current problems can be realistically related to them and courses of action can be chosen with some dependable idea of how their consequences will lead toward fulfilment of our aspirations. The position, power, and prospects of the United Nations; the prospects for a multipolar world; the impact and future of foreign aid; these and many similar topics are ripe for fresh analysis and appraisal--with the results available for world communication.

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One of the most difficult parts of this task is the creation of a dependable and realistic notion of the meaning of crisis for ourselves and for others. In the past, we have sought international peace and tranquillity, regarding international crisis as something to be avoided, outwaited, or overmastered, after which we would return to a tensionless *status quo*. (It is beside the point that hindsight too often understates the amount of tension that existed in the nostalgically regarded past.) We are now beginning to realize that we must live with world tension for a protracted period. We can interpret this either with pessimism or with optimism. Our earlier assumptions favor the pessimist approach, but such an approach leads surely to frustration, a sense of weakness because we are unable to abolish crisis and failure.

We can, however, take an optimistic view, and create a doctrine of the constructive use of crisis. Thus we can generate expectations among our own people and among our companions abroad that our policy can take advantage of the opportunities for change implicit in crisis, to advance our cause in the world. This is critical to the general requirement that leadership should instill confidence in followers that the job can be done; that many situations of crisis can not only be shouldered off with little damage, but can be turned to positive advantage. If this can be done, the country can demand and get more sacrifice of energy and treasure for public ends. We can abolish the frustrations inevitable among those who expect early surcease from struggle. We can foster hope and breed courage among all who meet crisis with a belief.

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that our side can gain.

It is only a step from this idea to a conception that views foreign
relations not as a series of static situations, but as a dynamic continuum, in
which the future is constantly being reshaped by the action of the present.
And the very process of reshaping contains the possibility of increased rewards
and freedom.

Within this continuum, we need a just estimate of the proper role of
national power, regional power groupings, and the United Nations. We have
dealt elsewhere with the enduring problems of justifying the use of national
power in terms of interests and morals, and relating it to the successful
achievement of shared goals in the world. And we have hinted at some of the
insufficiencies as well as the strengths of the United Nations. It is worth
mentioning the value of greater stress upon regional groupings, within which
smaller states can find a proper and comfortable place, and which can partici-
pate as regions in the total balancing of power on which future stability and
security seem to depend.

Given the estimate, it will be a continuing communications task to
disseminate and refine it.

And we can recall here the discussion above about the need for doctrine
and communications concerning a revised concept of aggression and of limited
war, appropriate both to the technological capabilities and to the moral demands
of the coming years.

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The extreme case of atomic aggression has not been illuminated by
experience, and hopefully may never be. But there is prime necessity to
clarify the ways in which an aggressor might launch an all-out attack, and
how the response by the free world probably involving the use of nuclear
power would be justified.

The case of all-out aggression is probably less difficult, from an in-
formational and morale point of view, than the case of limited war.

Total attack will call forth total response. But justification of limited
war--its initiation, its forms of restriction, its continuation, and its termina-
tion--is almost beyond our experience, with the exception of the Korean im-
passe. A precondition, is the creation of a working consensus of what limited
war is. The concept of unlimited application of all available force leading to
"victory" will not serve us here as in the past. The objective is no longer
the destruction of the enemy's capacity to fight, but the weakening of his will
to fight. Diplomacy and propaganda will be wedded to military operations
with special intimacy, for the power brought to bear on the enemy's will to
fight includes temptation as well as suffering, offers as well as the suasion
of arms. Terms must be opened to the enemy at various points in the struggle
that seem more attractive to him than its continuation, yet are compatible with
the limited war aims at our side. Limited war may be waged in alternative
bursts of military operations and diplomacy, with periodic time out for the par-
ticipants to ponder the balance of advantages between continuation or cessation
of the military passage.

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Now it is clear that American opinion is wholly unaccustomed to this
conception of war. War, being wholly evil, has been justified only as a
response to greater evil: an unavoidable reply to clear and unambiguous enemy
aggression involving a threat to our vitals. So seen and justified, war must
then be fought unrelentingly and unremittingly, bending every resource to win
total victory. So runs the existing set of expectations.

If, then, it is the purpose of the administration to be able to wage
limited war if it has to, it behooves that administration to create the informa-
tional freedom of action that makes this course feasible; that anticipates the
kinds of information problems sure to arise under conditions of limited war;
and that conserves the morale and heightens the understanding with which such
a course can be pursued in the national interest. We need to be ready to
clarify the way we use power in a restricted struggle, to explain and sustain
the expenditure of money and manpower for the objectives appropriate to
limited war, and to make clear that skillful pursuit of limited war does not
mean any lack of determination to wage it to a successful outcome.

Our determination to seek peace with justice does not exclude the use
of force, if necessary to repress violence and defend our moral values. Such
use of force has moral and ethical sanction. We should be clear on this point
to ourselves and to the world.

Such a point of view helps to justify the fact that it is necessary to
maintain for long periods of time a military posture able to threaten retailatory

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power, as the necessary means to prevention of enemy resort to equivalent
measures; and at the same time to maintain the capability of dealing with
lesser struggles. Such a posture is the price the free world must pay to pre-
serve its opportunity to pursue the goals that freedom permits. Hankerings
for a world without arms and without competition over morally vital principles
can only weaken the shield that guards a free and rich life against totalitarian
threat.

Recent developments both in the Soviet Union and in Communist China,
and our policy respnnses to them, are testimony to the fact of change in these
countries. Communist policy and propaganda sense the value of the soft line,
and are playing it skillfully. So far out posture has been sustained by such
characteristic outbursts of barbaric violence as that in Hungary. But this may
not always be so, and it is a continuing problem for policy and information in
the free world to keep sharply inview the unchanging nature of the Communist
threat, while fostering those developments in the Communist world that initially
prevent their effective exercise of power against us, and that ultimately will
lead to fundamental redirection along lines that are compatible with the survival
of our freedom. We know enough of the nature of our adversary to know that
he is implacable and patient. Our struggle will be a long one. Therefore we
must demonstrate to the American people that there is no prompt, radical and
enduring solution to the problem of relations with Communism; there is only
the road of eternal vigilance and eternal devotion to the practice of freedom.

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- 91 -

## Overseas Information Problems

In most senses, the problems of our communications to the world abroad and our receipt of communications from them are larger extensions of the two-way flow of domestic communications, particularly when these problems concern the fundamentals of our society and the functioning of leadership and of institutions within it. There is for example a common interest in the projection abroad of our understanding of the nature of the American political economy. But there are also the special problems of the creation and sharing with peoples abroad of a sense of community of goals on which a free community can be constructed, and there are special problems of instrumentation of our overseas communications through governmental agencies and private institutions.

## A Community of Goals

Given a pluralistic society at home, Americans should be the first to recognize the problems and to cope with the requirements of living in an even more pluralistic world environment; one in which we hope to lead, but in which we cannot order; one where powers of initiative and decision and of judgment are widely dispersed.

The creation of a sense of community is partly a function of diplomacy and partly a function of communications, but the perception and achievement of community depends on basic policy and action, and thus transcends the operations of private negotiation and reporting, or public explanation.

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But the task will recur frequently during the next decade and a half of
harmonizing the many inevitable discrepancies between the goals and timing
and methods of foreign policy among ourselves and our partners in the world
system; regulating them in a moral and fundamental sense, whenever possible,
and respecting differences relating to intermediate goals and methods so long
as our moves and those of our counterparts are compatible with the long-run
interests of freedom to seek fundamental values in the world.

Instrumentation for Overseas Communication

Problems of instrumentation for overseas communications allow, as
domestic communications do not under our system, the existence of a special-
ized government agency to fill the gaps that seem inevitable if projection of
ourselves abroad is left to the existing systems of public and private com-
munications. This is the basic justification for the U.S.I.A., and the founda-
tion of its roles and missions. As now broadly specified in law and by
Presidential order, these provide an adequate framework for action to meet
expected requirements. They permit a considerable flow of communication
and other representational activity in the interest of demonstrating the nature
of the American system, the community of goals of members of the free world
(and the terms thus implied on which others might join), and the reality of the
Communist system. Deficiencies seem to be those of performance, of compre-
hension of the full import of these directives, and of lack of a sense of basic
challenge that would take the performance of USIA personnel above the routine

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and the technical.

There has been too much emphasis on the automatic and the journalistic.
Reporting "the news" too often stands for an insightful and comprehensive in-
terpretation of the spirit and the nature of America - and even this reporting
function is hampered by the attitudes of Congressmen and of spokesmen for
our press anxious to prevent any possible competition between our government
services of news and information with private sources, however spotty and
inadequate more private services may be. But reporting the news is not
enough. Our governmental communications abroad as well as at home should
anticipate the news, preparing our audiences to understand our actions by
explaining what kind of a people we are, and the goal we seek.

Remedies, if there be any, are not immediately apparent. Therefore
we suggest consideration of the establishment of a high-level commission of
inquiry to look deeply into the nature of the USIA function; to go beyond the
immediate efficiency of the conduct of technical news, reporting, exhibits,
and similar functions; and to probe deeply into the ways in which the country
could use public funds so as to take full advantage of the public and private
networks of communications at home and abroad, and to rise fully to the
psychological and moral challenges of discovering and describing the elements
of moral community.

USIA and Policy

The basic problem of adjustment of interest and aspiration among nations

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remains, and becomes the more critical if a good part of our information output
consists in stressing those elements about our own society that we think most
useful as guidance and example to the development of certain states abroad.

What is needed is a common framework of principle and purpose,
transcending those of either party to the communication. The policy-determin-
ing processes of our information agency must consider this common framework;
but to create and sustain it calls for wider consideration by many agencies of
our government (and our society) concerned with the impact and success of
our foreign relations. Here obviously is a case where the interaction of all
sorts of leaders is needed. Projection of a common framework requires that
leaders act within it, whether they have domestic world considerations chiefly
in view. Despite this challenge to the effectiveness of our information policy,
the policy functions of USIA seem progressively less important and vigorous
within the agency than the conduct of operations. And there is the further
question whether the evaluation function both in USIA and in State is sufficiently
flexible and adequate to measure the subtleties of interpreting trends and
potentialities of opinion abroad under a wide range of conditions.

Both policy and evaluation functions should be strengthened.

Although USIA as a specialist in dissemination of information has no
very powerful claim to a seat at high policy conference tables, there are im-
portant reasons for keeping the agency's leaders close to the points of funda-
mental decisions. First, of course, is the necessity of taking public opinion

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abroad into account in the formulation of policy. Second, and possibly more
important, is the effect on the quality and performance of USIA leadership. If
the functions of USIA leaders are to be restricted at best to the efficient dis-
charge of technical specialties, it cannot be expected that USIA leadership
can consistently transcend the challenges and requirements of technical
matters. However, no specialist in information without line responsibilities
for major policy or operating functions and without recognized political power
can speak with great weight about the future of policy or of performance. He
is at best a spokesman or a specialist in audiences and media. And if, in
addition, his concept of the requirements of survival in his job and continued
good relations with Congress require him to celebrate a strategy of truth with
platitudes or with half-truths, he can hardly expect to win the respect and
attention of critical persons, at home or abroad, to whom he should be able to
turn for the dissemination of those points of doctrine and mutual interest that
are vital to the accomplishment of our informational tasks abroad.

But for our top information officials to rise above the level of mere
technical excellence, it may be necessary to offer the challenge of opportunity
to participate in the fundamental shaping of doctrine concerning the nature and
use of our power and position in the world abroad, and the adjustment of par-
ticular information tactics and campaigns to the requirements of such a
framework.

Furthermore, it seems almost mandatory to bring top USIA leadership

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into such a _de facto_ relationship to top leaders, since there is little case for
the existence of an information policy as a thing in itself, divorced from other
elements of action and policy. It is what the nation does that speaks with
greatest authority abroad; and the information function at best can see that the
proper interpretation is laid on those actions. This can best be done by those
with full awareness of the people, intentions and timing of major action.
Beyond this, however, is a range of subtle additional gains that a skillful
information program can maximize; a range in which the expectations of others
about the performance of the United States are skillfully shaped. Such work
should be done only in closest collaboration with our top policy officials.

The problem of overseas communications is far from exhausted by
considering USIA's technical condition. The behavior of our civilian and
military governmental personnel abroad makes a great impact, much depends
on the extent to which they are able to enter skillfully and sympathetically
into the lives of the people in the countries to which they are accredited.
Many USIA people abroad have done as much or more in this way as they have
in their official duties; the extent to which they have participated in life in
Iran has been almost a model. The 91 Ambassadors and the ICA technical
specialists have contributed in their way too. More can be done.

Nor is the question exhausted by noticing this aspect of our govern-
mental behavior, and the usually unfavorable contrast to the behavior abroad
of Communist functionaries. The behavior and impact of the life of our business

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men in foreign communities has, if anything, even more impact and heartening progress has been made in many countries in getting out of compounds and into the life of the countryside or city.

And the impact of our educational and philanthropic institutions, already immense, can be even greater in future. By concentrating on this form of international expansion, which represents our national genius as its best, we may be able to transmit information about ourselves abroad in ways that will have most favorable effect, and be least susceptible to the countercharges of propaganda or pecuniary interest.

## Some Recommendations for Action and for Further Consideration

The Panel is in general agreement that no public provision for a "Ministry of Information", such as is set up in wartime, is either necessary or useful under current conditions. But it is equally concerned to see that the government should utilize the available and accepted means of educating the country on basic national policies and on the many areas that have been covered by other Subpanels in their own reports so as to make effective the leadership which our system does possess. To this end it considered that the existence of serious and sustained efforts at understanding and explaining the basic problems of the nation by groups of citizens brought together through the many associations devoted to this end, like the Council on Foreign Relations and others, make a great contribution both to the effectiveness of leadership in the country and to the education and response to the public that is the essence

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of the problem of national communication. It is the hope of this Subpanel that
this experiment in serious study, backed with competent staff papers and sus-
tained discussion meetings, may have added a useful contribution to the problem
of communications in the American Republic.

There was a general feeling, also, that the need for continuous and
high level study of the nation's basic problems by a group of Americans most
representative of wisdom, integrity, and public devotion ought to be recognized.
Serious thought should be given to the creating of a body composed of such
persons who could study national problems in their full implications, and make
their advice available to the political and other leaders of the nation.

There should be consideration for the establishment of a high level com-
mission of inquiry into the whole subject of government information policies
and practices, with special reference to the underlying conceptions of our
foreign information activities.

At home, we should not lose sight of the tremendous possibilities im-
plicit in educational television, and suggest that the Federal Communications
Commission should continue its policy of reserving a substantial portion of
television channels so as to permit full development of those possibilities.
Nor should we lose sight of the equally vital possibilities implicit in the utiliza-
tion of our whole scheme of communications resources under commercial guid-
ance, for the education of our people in the nature and challenge of leadership,
in the duties and responsibilities we bear toward our society, and in the kinds

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of goals that are appropriate to the achievement in this world of the dignity of
free men in ways that are shareable by all.