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The second problem this Administration faced on coming into office was a dramatic change in the strategic balance with the Soviet Union. In 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis the supporters of President Kennedy were prone to glorify the President for bringing us to the edge of Armageddon. At that time, however, the Soviet Union had some 70 missiles, all in open sites and each requiring some ten hours to fuel. In other words, its entire strategic missile force was totally vulnerable to a U. S. preemptive strike.

At that time, our margin over the Soviets in strategic missile capacity was approximately 10 to 1. Now the Soviets have some 1400 missiles. When we came into office the balance (which had been 10 to 1 in our favor in 1962) had already tilted in the direction of the Russians. It is possible to debate all sides of the missile issues with vigor. The fact of the matter is that we had to conduct our foreign affairs policy with the knowledge that it was impossible for the United States to launch a preemptive strike. In fact, we have had to live with the serious concern that we might be so struck.

A third crucial aspect of this Administration's tenure in office has been the evidence of growing economic power in other centers of the world; namely, in Europe and Japan. We have already lived to see the success of our post-war policy economically. Of course, we have reaped some political benefits by seeing the Europeans and Japanese are back on their feet economically. But now we are beginning to face their competition in international markets.

A fourth change in the international situation that we have confronted has been the split in the previously united Communist bloc. The post-war view of the Communist world as monolithic has simply been proved incorrect by the split between the Russians and the Chinese.

A final major element that we confronted when we came into office, of course, was the Vietnam war. When we took over in 1969 there were 540,000 American troops in Vietnam and we were suffering casualties in excess of 300 per week. In addition there was no program to reduce American participation in Vietnam.

Curiously enough, within several months after we took office the very people who had got us into the Vietnam war were rioting in the streets to force us to withdraw.

Let me say that I believe the Vietnam war is not a big issue at this time. We will be getting out of Vietnam, whether unilaterally or by negotiation. Let me say something, though, about our attitude toward the war. The President faced a situation in 1969 in which within six months of his taking office there were riots in the streets protesting that he had not ended a war he had

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inherited from prior Administrations. Presidential advisors at that time, and I remember this clearly, advised the President at one point not to say anything about how we got involved in the Vietnam war but rather to look ahead exclusively and to indicate that we would do the best job we could. But, the President refused this. He indicated a firm belief that the country owed a responsibility, not only to those people in the streets who might go to Vietnam (and most of them, of course, would not go to Vietnam), but also to those who had served in Vietnam and to the mothers of those killed and wounded there. We have reached toward our goals in Vietnam and at the same time reduced casualties from 250 a week in the first months of the Nixon Administration (and over 300 in the months before that) to nearly nothing. (There were two reported deaths this week and only one last week.)

In conjunction with these remarks about the Vietnam policy, let me say this Administration, in my view, has the responsibility to maintain the authority of leadership in the United States. As a historian, I can say History aptly demonstrates that people do not forgive their leaders for disaster even if that disaster was brought on by the desires of the people themselves. In 1938, Chamberlain was cheered as a hero in England, but 20 months later he was the most despised man imaginable. We are in the process of winding up our involvement in Vietnam. We are going to end that situation there in a way that first minimizes a threat of world conflict and second provides a reasonable chance to the South Vietnamese for self-government.

This cancer of Vietnam, though, has been a difficult illness with which to live during the first three-and-a-half years of this Administration.

Before I turn to China let me make some remarks about our defense program. I can begin by saying, and I am sure you will agree, that anyone who has seen the evolution of our national defense policy must be gravely concerned. (In the recent India-Pakistan confrontation we have seen another example of the Soviet taste for aggressive behavior which always seems to break loose at one point or another.) On defense matters we have faced nearly a united opposition -- including nearly all the newspapers in the country, large segments of the scientific establishment, and, of course, a hostile Congress. That opposition seems to oppose anything in the defense area that we support.

When we came into office I can also tell you that we found the cupboard bare. Our attempts at building up a defense arsenal again in most cases won't be operational before at least 1973 or 1974.

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When we came into office we put in the ballistic missile defense
against the united opposition of the intellectuals and newspapers.
They took the position that no SALT agreement with the Russians was
possible as long as we continued to build our ABM. Anybody with any
knowledge of the SALT discussions knows that it was the existence of
our ABM program itself which made the prospect of success in Helsinki
possible. The knowledge that we were progressing with an ABM system
was precisely what made the Russians interested in bargaining with us
on SALT. It is that very system which they want to stop.

In addition to the ABM system, this Administration has been responsible
for the development of the MIRV program. Similarly, we have maintained
the B-1 program and the ULMS program. In addition, we have pushed
forward with the F-15, F-14, and international fighters.

What I am saying to you is that we have moved in the defense area with
a double goal: first, to get the most possible in defense terms from a
hostile Congress, and second, to build a basis in the national defense
area from which we could easily expand if the SALT talks fails.

Now let me make some remarks about the Soviet Union and China. First,
the Russians. Early in our Administration the Russians came forward
with proposals for closer relationships -- including a proposed summit
meeting. We found in the early stages, though, that what the Russians
were really putting forth was mere atmospherics.

Our experience with the Russians has been a constant one of oscillations
veering between direct conflict and apparent understanding. On the one
hand, we had the Cuban missile crisis. On the other hand, we saw
Khrushchev as an "average man" eating corn in Iowa, or wherever that
farm was.

During periods of understanding, American foreign policy has tended to
view our relationship with the Russians as a subfield of psychology;
whenever the Russians wanted relaxation of tensions with the United States,
they pushed this psychiatric idea of improving personal relationships.

In our Administration, though, we have tried to avoid the extremes of
these policies. The President saw that 30 years of conflict with the
Russians could not have been without a reason. It was not due to any
problem of difficult interpersonal relationships among the leaders. We
became convinced that it was not impossible to deal with the Russians,
but that we had to deal with them concretely -- on an issue-by-issue
basis -- and not exclusively in an atmosphere of personal diplomacy.

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We also viewed the issues that we were involved in with the Russians as linked together. This so-called linkage policy was bitterly attacked by the press. As an example, (you obviously have particular interests in business) expansion in trade with the Russians is dependent in part on their cooperation with us in the political process.

When I came into office I not uncommonly got threatening letters for the President from businessmen enclosing copies of proposed statements for their Board of Directors. They were seeking licenses for trade to Russia. When I got those letters the first thing I did was put them to the bottom of the pile of license letters. (Laughter) We held firm on the trade issue until last year, when the Russians and we made significant progress in areas like SALT, Berlin, and other fields. At that point, it became reasonable to ease trade restrictions with the Russians. More licenses were issued last year than ever before.

As we deal with the Russians we do not intend to encourage bellicosity, but similarly we want to avoid psychotherapy. I think it is fair to say that the American relations with the Soviets have been better under this Administration than ever before. This I believe is due in no small part to the development of our initiatives with the Chinese.

I know that for conservatives the Chinese appear to pose a peculiarly devilish threat. In addition, they feel a sincere emotional commitment to Taiwan. (And there is reason for that emotional commitment; they well deserve it.) But, at the time we came into office it was clear that we faced two opponents in Asia. One possessed 1500 intercontinental ballistic missiles; the other none. The Russians were building up their forces on the Chinese border.

It was clear to us that we did not want the Russians to speak for all the Communists in the world. We faced a situation not unlike that in which the Germans attacked Russia, and Churchill commented that if Hitler invaded hell he would make a pact with the Devil. We want to prevent the Eurasian land mass and its resources from its falling exclusively under the control of the Russians. The recent conflicts in South Asia between India and Pakistan once again revealed Soviet ambitions in this area.

You can rest assured that we are not going to Peking in order to sell out our interests. We are not going their in order to hand Taiwan to the Chinese. I didn't spend 60 hours in Peking with Chou En-lai to hand over all of the gains we have made in our foreign policy in the post-war era.

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Ideologically, of course, the Chinese are even tougher Communists than the Soviets, but physically the Chinese are not as threatening as the Russians. They had their own reasons for desiring resumption of some relations with the United States; and we had ours. They know that we're not coming there to sell out Taiwan -- to hand over our interests.

If it had not been for our initiative with Peking, I firmly believe that we would not have seen some of the progress that we have with the Russians. For instance, our Berlin Agreement, the Accidental War Agreement, the agreement for the President's visit, and certain easings on trade restrictions have all occurred after our opening to China.

Of course we can't play one Communist power directly off against another. What we have to do is deal independently with each of them. We must deal realistically on concrete terms with both Russia and China.

When we took office this country was at a turning point in history. It was at a point where the post-war philosophy of foreign affairs had disintegrated. The theories and attitudes that resulted in the Marshall Plan (American dominance of the free world, a polar division between the Free and Communist worlds, and a willingness on the part of the United States to undertake unlimited sacrifices to achieve its international goals.) had come to an end.

President Nixon had to reach out for a new foreign policy which would continue to give hope to free people that the U.S. would be a force in foreign affairs, but that at the same time would adjust our involvement to the realities of a changing international situation.

I might say that one problem the President has had in foreign affairs has been that some of his best supporters have tended to attack him on minor aberrations from what they desire, instead of spending their time attacking the somewhat more major aberrations of his political opponents.

When the history of this period is written, though, the hope of this Administration is not that it will be viewed as the Administration that ended the war in Vietnam (though the war in Vietnam will be so ended), but rather as the Administration that opened a new period of foreign

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affairs, a new period of American responsibility in the international
order. With this as a background let me now take time for some
questions from the floor.

**Question:** (Asa Call) I enjoyed your remarks very much. My question is: can you sell it to the people of the United States in 1972?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I suppose I should begin by admitting I have never been involved in a winning campaign. (Laughter) I don't really have the kind of expertise necessary to judge what can and what cannot be sold to the American people. But personally, I think we can sell it.

**Question:** (Woman Guest) I just want to say, Dr. Kissinger, that I thought President Nixon in his interview with Dan Rather at 9:30 the other night was absolutely marvelous, They went after him in every possible way and he really put it to them.

**Question:** (Tex Thornton ?) Dr. Kissinger, I enjoyed your remarks thoroughly. Let me say that the crucial question in this matter as I view it is survival. If I may I would like now to read you a couple of paragraphs from a recent issue of . . .

[At this point the person posing the question read from a magazine, apparently an aviation magazine. The matter quoted noted: There has been a drastic change in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the change in this military balance has gone unnoticed by the American public. The change in that balance, because of its vital role in protecting European security, is well-known to the Europeans. This change, though well-known to the President through his advisors at the Pentagon, is not known by the American public. The questioner then continued.]

I have two questions. Not long ago I and two others had a talk with
Defense Minister (sic) Mel Laird. We asked Laird if the United States
could survive a military confrontation with the Russians now, or any
time within the next five years. Laird's simple answer was "no". My
question is: what could we do to change this situation? Secondly, why
does the President go to the people with the facts, in order to get the
legislation necessary to change this balance?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I must begin by saying that we have never been told by the Secretary of Defense that there is any question about our capacity vis-a-vis the Russians. If Mel Laird told the President what you have said, the President would go immediately to the Congress to get the funds necessary to alter our defense posture.

You should know that in this Administration there has been no weapon system proposed by the Pentagon which has been turned down at the White House level. Every year our Defense budget has exceeded that proposed by the Pentagon. This is an unusual situation.

I cannot understand the answer that you attribute to Mel Laird. It is totally contradicted by what I know about our defense posture. It's true that the quantity of the Soviet arsenal has gone up drastically in recent years. But it is also true that we have weapons more sophisticated in some senses than those of the Russians.

Of course, the overall situation has changed. Ten years ago a confrontation between the United States and Russia would have resembled the confrontation in 1967 between the Egyptians and the Israelis. At that point the Russians knew well that if they pushed too hard the likely result was the loss of their forces by a preemptive strike on our part. This imbalance has disappeared. Then our ratio of missiles was about 10 to 1 over the Russians. Now the Russians have 1500 missiles. Even if we had maintained that 10 to 1 ratio the technology of the missile situation would mean that we would still have lost the capacity to make a preemptive strike. You can guarantee with some certainty an ability to knock out 70 missiles; but no matter how many missiles we had we couldn't guarantee that we could get all 1500 of the hard-site Russian missiles.

Let me say, of course, that we're very concerned about these developments. One of the most serious aspects of it is that there has been no missile development since the Eisenhower Administration. In this Administration we have pushed on ULMS, on MIRV, on the B-1 program, and on stand-off missiles. So much for your first question about the imbalance and what we can do.

Secondly, though, you asked why the President had not gone to the people on this. I am not a political analyst. But I can say to you that the President did go to the people on this in 1970 in the Congressional elections, and he did not get a majority in Congress. From 1970 to

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1972 battling against the Democratic Congress, he has continually faced a Senate that opposed every idea of rational defense development.

During that time, of course, we were faced with the difficult problem of the Vietnam war. Saddled with the Vietnam problem in Congress, the President's choice was really between trying to get the highest budget he could from a reluctant Congress, or starting another tremendous fight with the legislative branch. The President opted for the former: namely, to seek from a reluctant Congress the maximum defense budget possible (without precipitating a major fight). I think he was correct, especially because there was a possibility that if he decided to fight it out he might not have gotten anything at all. In short, we have pushed publicly as hard as we have thought possible on the defense issues. I must say I do not think our military situation is as bad as you indicate. We simply wouldn't tolerate that level of imbalance.

**Question:** In a recent *Los Angeles Times*, Jim Bishop's article enumerated the superiority of the Russians in each specific field of weapons. Let me quote from Air Force General Ryan. He indicated that in 1962 Russia had 38 ballistic missiles and we had 400. Five years later the Russians had one-fourth fewer missiles than we did. Today he indicates that they have 40% more missiles than we do, and also that they may have double the megatonage that we do.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) One can argue the missile issues on one side or the other. They have more missiles. We have more missile heads. We can strike more pockets than they can. But there are reasonable counter-arguments. Let me say, though, that we are concerned about the missile situation *vis-a-vis* the Russians, and we are building a base from which . . .

**Question:** Well, I think the Administration should talk about it if everybody else is wrong.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I'm not saying that everyone else is wrong. I don't want to argue numbers of missiles here. What I do want to argue is the direction of this Administration in the defense area.

**Question:** Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us who made the initial overture in the China matter? Was it the Chinese or us?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We took the original initiative on establishing a channel to the Chinese, (that is to say, on a means of communication). I think it's fair to say that they were more responsible for the substantive initiatives which led to my visit in July to Peking.

I'm amused now to hear people say that this China initiative is a political move on the part of the President. That's a little hard for me to understand. Can you imagine us going to Chou En-lai and saying that we would like to come to China because it would help the President be reelected in 1972? That's ridiculous. We had no idea what to expect when we opened the China initiative. We did it for our reasons, and they did it for theirs.

**Question:** Dr. Kissinger, on two occasions you have mentioned that the Chinese had their reasons for cooperating in this initiative to Peking. Can you tell us what those reasons are?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The Chinese are even more dedicated Communists than the Russians. We entered into this relationship with no illusions whatever.

Let me relate a story to you. When I came into office I assumed that China was the more aggressive of the Communist nations -- that Russia was relatively more peaceful. I don't mean peaceful in the absolute sense, but more peaceful, at least, than the Chinese.

Then there were a series of incidents between the Chinese and the Russians along their border. One time when we were in San Clemente there was another incident. I went to a map and noticed that the incident took place some 200 miles from the nearest Chinese railhead, but only two miles from the nearest Russian railhead. For the Chinese to have gotten their forces to the place of the incident they would have had to cross the Sinkiang Desert. At that time it was worth noting that the Russians were continuing to build up their forces on the Chinese border. Those forces (which reached a level twice that of the forces facing Western Europe) were right on the Chinese border. As would be typical for a weaker country in such a situation, the Chinese forces were back from the border. All this information was much more consistent with the theory that the Russians were the more aggressive of the two Communist nations.

From the Chinese perspective they are confronted on the north by the Russians who have nearly a million troops on the border. On the south they face an India armed with Russian weapons and claiming large territories now administered by the Chinese. To the east they have the

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Japanese. The Japanese today are weak militarily, but they have an
enormous economic capacity. The Chinese are well aware that an
economic capacity can become a military capacity through a simple
political decision. Now, this is my assessment -- not anything Chou
En-lai spoke to me about. Let me now make a few comments about the
India/Pakistan situation.

Among other things we are now reading that the President drove India
into Russian arms, that the ineptitude of our policy has forced India to
become a Soviet client. Well, let me begin by saying that in recent
years the Indians have received $850 million worth of arms from Russia.
During that same period they received $1,700,000,000 worth of aid from
the United States. We stopped our aid to India in part so that we might
begin to focus on the question whether what we are really doing is financing
Indian arms purchases from Russia -- whether we are really giving to a
society aid which enables it to reallocate resources to military equipment.

The Pakistanis have long had alliances with China and with the United States. Our basic alliance with Pakistan was reaffirmed in the Kennedy years in a special way vis-a-vis India. If pushed, we will actually show the documents. Up to now we have not. I find it somewhat unusual for the Indians to be self-righteous as they strip from Pakistan the eastern portion (which accounts for 60% of the Pak population and 50% of its foreign exchange) on the ground that elected government had been abrogated. The Indians themselves abrogated an elected government in West Bengal and Calcutta. It's not a very consistent argument to sue against East Bengal.

More important, though, if you allow this sort of thing to happen, what
will the impact be in other parts of the world? For instance, how about
the Middle East? How can we encourage the Israelis to rely on inter-
national guarantees if, when the United Nations votes 104 to 10 in the
General Assembly and 11 to 2 in the Security Council against India, nothing
can be done to stop the loss of East Pakistan? Also, if we had not taken
action against the Indians in this matter the Chinese would clearly have
viewed this as a conspiracy of the Russians, the Indians and the Americans
to encircle China.

There was no question but that we had to oppose the clear aggression on
the part of the Indians. What we sought to do was to stop the damage in
the subcontinent before it reached the irreparable stage. If we hadn't
stopped it before the Indians moved against West Pakistan similar aggression
would have been likely in the Middle East. It also would have been possible
in other areas of the world -- such as Iran. Our policy did not drive India

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into a pro-Soviet position. India had taken that course itself. Our major concern was West Pakistan. We had certain intelligence information that the Indians were planning to attack in the West.

**Question:** But isn't this all rather hollow? India achieved all of her objectives in this matter and at the same time turned East Pakistan into a type of Czechoslovakia.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Without military action on the part of the Chinese there was no hope of saving East Pakistan. Once the war started, the East was essentially lost. It was separated from the West by over 1200 miles, among other things.

Let me also say that the Indian position was not exactly brilliant. Mrs. Gandhi has no interest in having the communists take over the Indian government. She needs the support of her Congress party. Now she is using the Russians, but she has a difficult choice in East Pakistan. India must choose whether to dominate East Pakistan (making it a sort of Czechoslovakia under the Germans) or to let it go its way. Letting it go, however, will give great leeway to the radicals in East Bengal, and one result of that would be a flourishing of radicalism in East Bengal; this could easily backlash against the Indians by turning into a separatist movement for the Bengalis in India.

I'm not saying that the subcontinent war was a great victory for us. We faced a disaster, but I think we turned it into a defeat. If West Pakistan had fallen it could logically have led to war in the Middle East, and to serious problems with the Chinese. The war between India and Pakistan was a setback for us, but I think we averted a tragedy.

**Question:** But to the people on the street in the United States the situation appears differently. They saw the problems in East Pakistan, the refugees flowing out of East Pakistan due to the actions of the army. They saw India coming to the rescue of the people seeking their freedom in West Pakistan. It is very difficult to justify our support for the West Pakistanis at the same time that we are taking the action we do in Vietnam. How can we get the full story across to the people on the street in America?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Personally, I think that the next six to nine months will not see any dramatic increase in freedom in East Pakistan.

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Just recently for instance they barred all foreign correspondents (so our information from there has been drastically limited). The Administration never said that West Pakistan was right in the actions that were responsible for the flight of refugees from the East. What it did say, though, was that Indian military action against the Pakistanis was wrong.

The public debate about the India-Pakistan war raises what I think is a more fundamental question. This Administration faces a situation in which it seems that all the vested interests of this society line consistently against any authority; not just Presidential authority, buy any authority whatever. Even the Establishment itself now looks upon the government as being led by crooks and knaves with taudry motives. It's hard anymore even to get serious debate started about substantive issues because of the serious attack against all notions of authority in this country.

**Question:** (Blanche Seaver ?) How do you justify the "no-win" policy of the Administration in Vietnam which has cost the lives of thousands of Americans?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) First let me say that domestically any chance for policy other than the one we have followed was destroyed in the prior administration.

Second, I do not agree that we have been pursuing a "no-win" policy. Our essential objective in Vietnam has been to prevent a forcible takeover by the Communists, and to guarantee a chance for the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves. That objective, which seemed nearly impossible when we came into office, is now in sight. At the same time that objective is in sight, we have also achieved a drastic reduction of American forces in Vietnam.

So in reality I think that our goals are being achieved in Vietnam, and that the theory of "no-win" philosophy is the result of a vicious propaganda campaign that has been waged from both sides against our policies in Vietnam.

**Question:** I think the real problem we face in this country is the problem of survival. How can we survive as a nation in a world which is populated with what I would call "unified countries"? In this country we cannot get a majority of the people to agree on anything. 50% of the people will oppose any policy. Blanche's question about an aggressive "win" policy in Vietnam is something I think that could have been achieved four years earlier, but not in this Administration. The problem in this country I see is disunity. We can't get 50% of the people in favor of any one thing.

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The Russians and Chinese are unified countries. My impression from traveling in Russia is that the often heard statement that the Russians would gladly overthrow their government is wrong. I believe the Russians are satisfied with their government, probably more satisfied than we are. I have the same feeling about the Chinese. Do you agree?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I can't really judge about the Chinese. My visit to China really only involved meetings with the top officials there.

Let me speak as a historian for a moment, not as a member of the Administration. We have done the best we could in a difficult situation. A question that I think is vital (and non-partisan) is the question: what will happen to this nation if there is not a resurrection of the notion of unified national interest. On substantial national issues, one expects debate -- yes, but not civil war. We are in bad shape as a nation.

Among others, the intellectual community is bitter, in large part, I believe, due to its failures in the Kennedy Administration. They came into the Kennedy Administration with naive confidence, and now realize that most of our current national problems are the results of their mistakes.

We've reached a point now in the United States where people avoid involvement on national issues unless they have a narrow parochial interest. At that point they become a narrowly focused pressure group. What we don't have is a broad national group of the type required to maintain public unity and cohesiveness.

In Britain, even the lowest tabloid, whether on the right or on the left, would never publish the type of material that's been published by Jack Anderson. To do so in that society would result in a person's being treated as social outcasts. In our next term our biggest challenge will be to recapture this sense of national cohesiveness. If we cannot do it, this country will become ungovernable. (Applause)

**Question:** There is a substantial body of thought that says that the United States has never gained a thing from any summit meeting. As we go into the China summit my question is, which is more important: the appearance of the summit, or the substance which will result from it?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I have written on the question of the utility of summit meetings, and in general I agree with your comments. But our problem in the past has been because we treated summit meetings

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as chances to better personal relations between the leaders of the nations involved. I've never understood how men could come to Washington (men who had been tough in their businesses) and subscribe to this psycho-therapeutic view of international relations. In 1955 in Geneva, for instance (and I've looked at the press coverage of the '55 Geneva talks), the full emphasis was on the fact that Eisenhower and Khrushchev established a good personal relationship. This personal-relationship basis of international affairs is one well played by the Russians.

When you deal with the Russians they always give you the impression that they understand you better than you do yourself. No matter what you say they always think that they can explain what is really involved for you. In any case this personal-relationship basis of diplomacy has regularly led at the summit level to substantive failures.

As we approach the Soviet summit we have already made detailed preparations. We expect no surprises in Moscow (unless of course something should come up that's not on the agenda that we have discussed).

In Peking the situation will be different. There the key things will be intangible. This reflects the fact that we do not directly impinge on each other in the way that we and the Soviets do. What will be more important from the Chinese summit will be what does not happen, as opposed to what does happen. This, of course, is the beginning of an evolution with the Chinese; a change of one degree at this point can result in a large deviation after five or ten years.

We're not going to Peking with a hearts-and-flowers attitude, with an expectation to leave there as blood brothers with the Chinese. Neither the Chinese nor we have an interest into getting into bed with the other. They are terribly opposed to us ideologically, and we are in no way going to go to Peking and trade off old friends for a lessening of hostilities with an adversary.

In Moscow there are specific areas where concrete results are possible. These areas include SALT, The Middle East, and so forth. I don't know how many of you here know the President; but I can tell you (and I don't think I am insulting the President) that it's fair to say his strong point is not making small talk. He is not going to Moscow and Peking so he can shoot the breeze with Brezhnev and Chou En-lai. (Laughter) I can't promise you success at the summits, but I can promise you that we will be able to tell whether we have succeeded or whether we have failed.

[At this point Dr. Kissinger's remarks ended and he left the room.]

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CONFIDENTIAL

| NAME | BRIEF DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| George Hearst | Newspaper Publisher |
| Jack Wrather | Wrather Corporation, Contributor and Supporter |
| Fritz Burns | Real Estate, Supporter and Contributor |
| Fred Hartley | Contributor and Supporter, President of Union Oil |
| Bill Doheny | Oil, Contributor and Supporter |
| Charles Cook | Automobiles, Contributor and Supporter |
| Harry Volk | Chairman of Union Bank |
| Robert McClure | Publisher of Santa Monica Outlook |
| William Simpson, Jr. | Contributor and Supporter, Construction |
| Justin Dart | President of Dart Industries, Contributor and Supporter |
| Roy Crocker | Chairman of Lincoln Savings, Contributor and Supporter |
| Kenneth T. Norris | Norris Industries, Contributor and Supporter |
| Charles Thornton | Litton Industries |
| Robert Bauer | Oil, Global Marine |
| Ross Barratt | President of Foster and Kleisar |
| Henry Salvatori (HOST) | |
| Herb Kalmbach | Lawyer |

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| NAME | BRIEF DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Asa Call | Pacific Mutual Life |
| Phillip Walsh | Contributor and Supporter |
| Carl Hartneck | President of Security Pacific National Bank, Contributor and Supporter |
| Arnold O. Beckman | Chairman of Beckman Institute and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of California Tech |

John Wayne

Actor

| Clement Hirsch | Contributor and Supporter |
|---|---|
| Sam Bowlby | Bank of California, Oil, Contributor and Supporter |
| Jac Hume | San Francisco, Contributor and Supporter |
| Ed Gauer | Roos and Atkins, Contributor and Supporter |
| Leland Kaiser | Kaiser Industries, Contributor and Supporter |
| Charles Thomas | Former Secretary of the Navy |
| John Rinucane | Contributor and Supporter, Oil |
| Edwin Johnson | Contributor and Supporter, Financial Federation, Inc. |
| Frank White | President of Knotts Berry Farm |
| Tex Talbert | Insurance, Contributor and Supporter |

page two of three

CONFIDENTIAL

ARIZONA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Astronomical and Space Sciences

ARMED SERVICES

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

TACTICAL AIR POWER SUBCOMMITTEE

NATIONAL STOCKPILE AND NAVAL PETROLEUM
RESERVES SUBCOMMITTEE

December 17, 1971

Mr. Gilbert E. Wheeler
1900 West 19th Street
Yuma, Arizona

Dear Mr. Wheeler:

Thank you very much for sending me your complaints about the policies of the Nixon Administration. They came as no surprise as many of them are matters with which I have taken issue with the President both personally and in public, and they coincide generally with the complaints I have received from other conservatives.

Your letter had one thing in common with the others in that it did not mention even one thing for which the Nixon Administration should receive the gratitude of conservatives everywhere.

In fairness, I want to point to a number of things which seem to have been overlooked by the President's conservative critics. They are as follows:

1. Mr. Nixon is the President who gave us a conservative Supreme Court over the strongest possible objections of liberals in both political parties. I have yet to receive more than one or two letters applauding the President for his appointment of men like Rehnquist and Powell and Burger and Blackmun.

2. Mr. Nixon is the President who has turned over many government departments and regulatory agencies to conservative control. He has placed a conservative at the head of the Federal Communications Commission. He has appointed conservative activists to the National Labor Relations Board. He has given this country an outstanding and outspoken and fearless conservative Vice President. He has named dozens of conservatives to federal judgeships and to policy-making positions throughout every bureau and department of the government. Among the cabinet members who fit this description are Attorney General John Mitchell, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans, and Interior Secretary Rogers Morton.

3. Mr. Nixon is the President who gave his conservatively-oriented Justice Department the go-ahead to cooperate on the jailing of 10,000 May Day radicals bent on disrupting the government.

Mr. Gilbert E. Wheeler

December 17, 1971

Page Two

4. Mr. Nixon is the President who had the courage to tell George Meany and his leftwing labor stooges to "get lost" in front of their own convention.

5. Mr. Nixon is the President who vetoed the bill to put the federal government into the business of child care in the face of strenuous objections from Republican Senators Jacob Javits, Clifford Case, Edward Brooke as well as every bleeding heart Democratic liberal in Washington.

6. Mr. Nixon is the President who is already mobilizing international pressures against the communist government of Chile to make sure that communist inroads into South America are halted as quickly as possible.

7. Mr. Nixon is the President who got our NATO allies to kick in $1 billion more to the defense of Europe than they had before.

8. Mr. Nixon is the President who was not afraid to take forthright action against the unfair competition of foreign goods which were robbing American workers of jobs and pay.

9. Mr. Nixon is the man who refused to be pressured into cancelling the Amchitka Nuclear Test.

10. Mr. Nixon is the man who has refused to replace FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as demanded by the liberals.

11. Mr. Nixon is the man who fought enormous odds in the U.S. Senate to get every last penny of money it was possible to squeeze out for new weapon systems and the defense of this country.

As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I know intimately how desperately the President fought to maintain our defense posture in the wake of long-range weakening policies which the McNamara regime left us. I was in the thick of a fight for an ABM which the President won by one vote and during which time the liberals in the country mounted a tremendous opposition drive, and conservative support was something vague and unimportant as measured by the mail I received.

Many conservatives have written to me complaining about Federal wage and price controls. I yield to no man my record of opposing federal controls of any kind. This has been my position for many

Mr. Gilbert E. Wheeler

December 17, 1971

Page Three

years. But I want to say one thing, in view of the inflation
that was ruining this country as a result of Democratic
extravaganza, I know of nothing any President could have done
to protect the American consumers short of imposing temporary
government restrictions.

It disturbs me that people who write and criticize President
Nixon's actions can't recognize why it is that our President
has earned the hatred and the feverish opposition of all the
radicals and leftwingers and liberals in this country.

Some conservatives have accused me of taking a negative attitude
in pointing out that the alternative to Nixon is the likely
election of a dedicated liberal. I have been told I should be
looking around for a better man than Mr. Nixon. If such a man
exists, I haven't found him and he certainly hasn't been
recommended to me by any of the people who write and call to
complain about the man in the White House.

In conclusion, I can only say that we are never going to have
a President who will give conservatives 100% of what they think
they should have. And I do think that those who insist that
the President has not maintained this Nation's defenses have
some accounting to do. Where were they when we were fighting
the battles for the ABM, the C-5A, the MIRV, the B-1, and other
defense items recommended by the President? Some of today's
complainers weren't even interested enough to write to their
Senators and demand that the security of 207 million Americans
be placed above liberal concerns.