DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Frank Lindsay

6:53 p.m., January 26, 1971

L: Yeah. Do you want to hear Gore? Think the schedule is drinks about 5:30 and supper, an early supper about 7:00. If you don't want to hear Gore ...

K: I would just as soon hear Gore.

L: They gave him an hour to an hour and a half. I would rather have you at the end anyhow, then you could continue on with the kids. There will be a number of business people, academic ...

K: They are all hostile to the Administration, I didn't see anyone on the list who would support the Administration. I don't object to that but I don't like to appear in the debate format and this is practically a debate.

L: How about doing -- you know how the hell it is to get the kids to understand, can we make it a joint venture?

K: I do have to run now but let me talk to you tomorrow.

L: All right, I do hope you will make it.

wgh

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Frank Lindsay

6:53 p.m., January 26, 1971

K: I have to run off but we have had some problems about Friday.

L: I hope not a serious one.

K: A serious one, after that Crimson story -- I don't care about meeting with any student group again.

L: I didn't see it.

K: They ran an article and made it look as if I am a liar after I spent 3 1/2 hours with them which is more than the Secretary of Defense gets from me. What I really object to is Gore is going to be there and I am acting as a straight man to Gore. I didn't want to appear with John Price, that means Gore too.

L: The Gore thing, I didn't know they had done.

K: I like Gore and I have nothing against him but I know what's going to happen and 20 minutes for Question and Answer is really not worth it.

L: 20 minutes, don't know how that came out of it.

K: It will be Gore making a speech.

L: How about putting Gore first.

K: That would be easier for me.

L: Didn't even know they had asked Gore.

K: Let me think about it overnight.

L: Would hate really to see you not come now. I know it is awfully rough on you.

K: I will not come if Gore speaks last. If I am straight man to open first and have everybody shoot at me, that I can't do. I will call you about that in the morning. What time would I have to be there if I do it last, about 7:00 ?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Under Secy. Irwin

7:00 p.m., January 26, 1971

I: It is okay from the Secretary's point of view. Much of the dry season if this is not acceptable .......

K: How about the other sentence?

I: Put in reference paragraph 9 to numbered cable, because he did refer to it. If operations should proceed we strongly hope if he protests and asks for a withdrawal, he will not limit his protests to one. If operation should proceed, otherwise it looks like decision made.

K: The decision is pretty well made.

I: Yeah but is almost, better to say if operation proceeds.

K: The President will kick but I will take that on. Say "operations proceed" rather than 'operations should proceed'.

I: Right. I will get it out right away.

K: Good.

wgh

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

7:00 p.m., January 26, 1971

K: On this matter which we discussed earlier, that communication --
the President wants you to keep it entirely to yourself.

L: Okay.

K: He is attracted by that idea of yours.

L: We will go ahead and plan an operation so that we have planning done
along that line.

K: An air operation.

L: No, an enlargement up to ...

K: That's not the point, that particular communication is not to be shown
to anyone. I would like to explain his thinking to you tomorrow. I
don't want to discuss it over the phone. It is essential that you
cooperate in making the thing -- helping us go through with Phase 1.
Along the line of your thinking, no distribution of that particular
communication is to be made to anyone.

L: Okay, I'd better get the word to Dave too. Don't want him to talk
to anyone.

K: Need his cooperation. Are you going to be at that meeting tomorrow.

L: Yes.

K: I will talk to you tomorrow right after the meeting at Noon.

L: I have postponed my departure now so I won't be departing until 1:00. (1:30 ?)

K: It is scheduled for 12 o'clock. You and I can go off after the meeting
and I will explain his thinking.

L: I don't think I should cancel out on this San Francisco thing again, I
have already cancelled and people will begin to think ...

K: You should go.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

D. Chapin/Kissinger
afternoon 1/26/71

C: I hate to bother you with this but the President is thinking of using Lawrence Rockefeller's home at Dorado Beach.

K: Yes.

C: Is it right on a public golf course.

K: It's on a golf course but set back. It's not on the ocean and there's no private beach.

C: A quarter mile from the beach.

K: Why not Caneel Bay?

C: We have to kick someone else out (mentioned a diplomat) and it will look bad if he changes his mind.

K: It has a house overlooking the golf course and they are some distance away. They are within site -- 200 yards away. You have previous privacy but no ocean. The pool is on the road and there's not much traffic on the road. I don't know if there's shrubbery on the road. It's a little smaller than the San Clemente pool.

C: Is there a beach he could helicopter to?

K: I don't know. I think the helicopter pad is a 10 minute drive. There's an airport that Dorado Beach has. It's a lovely place but since he likes to have the ocean.

C: We are thinking about a place to helicopter to.

K: It's a long stretch. There are probably stretches not crowded but how to get there. It's not exactly a place to get away from the inhabitants. While in the house and it's environs it's private but not when he starts moving. I would recommend Caneel Bay. The house has its own beach. It's completely secluded. Dorado Beach is an island for golfers. There's not much sense in going unless you golf. The house is about a quarter mile from the beach -- 10 mins. walk. There's a beautiful view. It isn't immediately self-evident to me where the beach is that he could go where there isn't people but I didn't look for one. The public beach isn't jammed but since he doesn't like to be with anybody.

C: No sir.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

D. Chapin/Kissinger

afternoon 1/26/71

-2-

K: The pool is very pleasant. Does he want to go even if the weather is good in Fla.?

C: No but the weather is really bad unless it changes.

K: It's better then Fla. if the weather is bad. Who are you dealing with in the Rockefeller organization.

C: They have talked to Lawrence Rockefeller's guy. We want to be sure we are not making a mistake. Hughes is doing it.

K: Call Louise Boyer in Rockefeller's office. She handles this for the Governor. Is She's the secretary of the family organization. She will understand.

C: Let me see where we stand. Louise Boyer in the Governor's office.

K: CI 7 - 3700. Her husband is in charge of the hotel operation. She has great sense in these matters and I would tell her your dilemmas.

C: She may know of another place.

K: I would trust here completely. I don't trust Don Hughes' judgement even though I like him intangibly. Agree?

C: I don't comment on those things.

K: Then you will outlast me.

C: I work at a different level than you will ever have to.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Gov. N. Rockefeller/Kissinger
11:17 a.m. 1/27/71

-2-

R: (cont) more impressed that he was representing the President then that he was on private property. Either **he** or Lawrence will call.

K: Either one.

R: I will call Lawrence because **he** don't know the details.

K: It's a question of intangibility.

R: We are thrilled he will be there.

K: For future relations.

R: We are all delighted.

K: Looking forward to seeing you next week.

R: I am counting on it. I will be in touch. It's no problem.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

Telecon

Gerard Smith

1/27/71 4:15 p.m.

S: I am told Laird wrote a letter.

K: That's right, reiterating his position.

S: I thought it was on the hard site question of changing it.

K: Frankly I haven't studied it. My impression was that it was on insisting we go forward on the four-site proposal. You have a copy of it?

S: No, but Paul told me the substance of it . . . . .

K: That will not happen without a detailed discussion.

S: My suggestion is that since the Secretary has already made up his mind and the whole thing is a festering community and if it's up in the air, you are not going to get ______ to whether change mobiles. I suggest you organize a decisional process.

K: Okay, I agree with you. It's purely a question of my time right now. But the President will not have an opportunity to act on this without a decisional process. My experience with Laird is that nine tenths of these letters are written for the Chiefs of Staff and never go any further. But you are correct. We know what the issue is and should put it in a decisional process.

S: Okay.

K: As long as I have got you on the phone, I have no one to suggest for the dinner on the 4th. You were kind enough to offer.

S: Okay, we'll see if we can get you some beautiful spy.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger (secure phone)

4:20 p.m.

1/27/71

K: I just wanted to follow up growing out of the meeting today. I think he was
wondering if the Dept. would draft a cable to Godley. The President doesn't
want to send a personal letter to the king but anything short of that would
be willing to do. And I think we should tell Godley phase one is starting and
he should present that as a preliminary precautionary move. It may kick (?)
into VN and it won't? ? ? ??. One advantage is if we keep the threat
there it is crazy to put it in the pipeline so we have to keep it plausible.

R: We will draft it and let you take a look at it.

K: I thought it went well.

R: Yes, I did too.

K: On Congress, we have to be honest. No games of word picking.

R: The thing I was struck by and I hope he was that everyone agrees that
Vietnamization will work without this. If that's the case, then all we can
say is it speeds up the process or makes it less expensive put it's a hell of a
gamble because it could defeat Thieu and set back Vietnamization.

K: Without it we would be in great danger in 72. If we can reduce the SVN
army from ______ to ______, it isn't worth the chance.

R: Or to 80,000 by election day isn't worth it.

K: I have locked Moorer into a position that he recognizes he must get a
good order on phase 2 and cannot go without the President's authority.
We will have a meeting on Tues. and we can still put it off for a bit. Your
questions is ? ? ? ? If the other sie knows what's the rush. So we shouldn't
move until we have considered everything.

By.

NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:24 p.m., January 27, 1971

P: It occurred to me one way we might consider it to be -- just a
second -- and it would be to go for the big play but to do it in
terms of -- remember we discussed previously the idea of laying
it out in Paris and at the same time announce the big play and withdraw
by a certain time, you understand what I mean. It gives a hell of
a kick to it and says we have fiddled around long enough. We are
going . . . to support the South Vietnamese and announce a withdrawal
somewhat along the lines of what you mentioned. What do you think?

K: It depends on the time frame we are talking about. If we announce
it by the middle of next year . .

P: The total withdrawal.

K: Except for advisors.

P: Except for the residual 50,000 until all prisoners are released.

K: Let me think about it, Mr. President.

P: This would be all in one package. We are doing this -- but clear it
with Thieu so he understands -- announce the whole program of
withdrawal right now but in order to do this we have to destroy the
enemy capability. Of course, it still has the disadvantage of our
Russian friends.

K: At least it gives them something to think about, there are limits.
There are reports that another group of ships on its way to Cuba.
If they keep playing these games with us . . . . . . . . . . and it makes it
a little worse for them to . . . . . . . . .

P: Think it is probably -- it is another way to play the game.

K: I checked the intelligence, the fact that they don't have their men
there doesn't mean anything. They don't have the supplies to arm
the men . . . . . . 14,000 tons -- the men will follow after they position
the supplies.

P: That's the way they work it. In any event it may be we can't hack it
because of the buildup but put that carrot out there. There is the carrot
but here is the stick.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Frank Lindsay

9:50 p.m., January 27, 1971

L: Are you still at work?

K: Yes

L: That's terrible

K: I just wanted to tell you I am sorry but I can't do it. In the light of
the forum and under these circumstances, too many problems
especially with the student group.

L: I know it is tough.

K: I see more students than anyone else. Even when they give me their
word of honor and it's leaked to the newspapers but I can't do it with
Gore and newsmen there.

L: Let me ask -- if we could do it in a way that Gore wouldn't be there,
could you do it?

K: It would be too complicated and I didn't think I would ever be part
of a confrontation. Actually I like Gore and have no problem with him
personally.

L: Why not -- they have know that you were coming.

K: You can always say I got too busy.

L: I will try to cover. If Gore is a problem, let me try to work it out.

K: Gore is the principal problem but there are two problems and one is
the Crimson article that appeared on a meeting where I spent nearly
3 hours talking to a group of Harvard students which is more than I
give the Cabinet officers. It was a vicious, stupid article which I
didn't .......

L: You talked to the Globe people 2-3 weeks ago and it was not violated.

K: The newsmen don't bother me so much. What bothers me is the
combination of students and Gore who are hostile.

L: Did you recognize any on the list of the group that was hostile.

K: That was however before the Crimson article.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Frank Lindsay

9:50 p.m., January 27, 1971

L: Yeah, but the kids are not related to the Crimson people.

K: They were carefully selected by Stanley Hoffman as being ......

L: You can't talk to carefully selected students, pros.

K: Pros would be a waste of my time. It's not worth my time to talk to a group of hostile students and I repeat that I have given more time to students than anyone else.

L: I can't quarrel with that.

K: I don't see any way how you could drop Gore.

L: Don't know, it might not be possible.

K: Above all, I wanted to tell you I wanted to do it and I would have liked to do it especially for you.

L: It obviously isn't for me.

K: I mean coming from you.

L: You may be quite right but it was their idea, they wanted you.

K: But did they want me simply to show the depths of depravity ......

L: They took the initiative coming out to see me, saying look we are concerned about the world, we are not bomb throwers, we want to hear from the Administration.

K: Why did they invite Gore?

L: Maybe they wanted the balance on both sides.

K: They had two more days.

L: No, after this is entirely within the group. If you don't come, I'll ask Cy Vance who is coming to talk.

K: He is another critic.

L: Yes but he is well-balanced and he did support Johnson. As you say,

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Frank Lindsay

9:50 p.m., January 27, 1971

L: you don't want to talk to the people who will already __________, it would be a waste of your time but I would hate at this late date to drop you off.

K: You can say I got busy.

L: Yes I can do that and would do that but they worked awfully hard to take the initiative, they really wanted to talk to the establishment.

K: Sometime when you are down here, you can see my schedule and you will see that I see more students than anyone.

L: What you are saying is that you don't want to talk to students and Gore at the same time.

K: ....... morality plan when the Administration is set up as a victim. He (Gore) is there to show that the establishment can kill a decent man and that's how it looks to me.

L: May have been true. Some of these with some hostile group and SDS kids but there won't be any of those in this group.

K: The main reason I called was to tell you how sorry I am.

L: If I can sort out the Gore thing, would you reconsider?

K: Don't disinvite him without calling me first.

L: I don't think we could disinvite him but maybe we could work it out on rescheduling. Would you then reconsider?

K: I would make an effort to reconsider anyway.

L: Margo is here, would you like to speak to here for a minute.

K: Yes.

[Mr. Kissinger then talked to Margo Lindsay. She said she had left several messages for him. He told her he had only received one but that she had already gone by the time he had gotten it. Mr. Kissinger told Mrs. Lindsay he would love to see her and if possible to please let him know ahead of time when she was going to be here and to come to see him. Mrs. Lindsay said that she would let him know the next time they come down.]

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Frank Lindsey/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 a.m., January 28, 1971

L: I'm sorry to be taking so much of your time.

K: I'm sorry to be such a prima donna.

L: I understand your position. It seems to me you feel you have done everything you can to meet the kids half-way. I just wanted to tell you one thing -- our own Student Committee commented to my fellow who has been working with them that they were horrified by the Crimson piece. They said whoever had written it had misinterpreted it; it was a hatchet job which was totally unjustified. Our Student Committee is on your side.

K: How about the Gore problem?

L: I have thought about it further. To try to get him put to the next day is hard.

K: I agree.

L: All the more so that it doesn't put you in a bad position.

K: I like him -- that isn't the problem. I just don't want him to answer me.

L: How about this possibility? Let Gore go first. Gore will be gone the next morning.

K: The next morning is out for me.

L: No, you speak in the evening after Gore -- then you are in a position for rebuttal and not Gore.

K: I wouldn't take it.

L: I think we can assure that Gore won't start attacking. You would be on second. I can't give you a written guarantee that someone won't misbehave. But I am damned impressed with the student group I have been working with. They volunteered the business that they thought the Harvard Crimson really acted in an outrageous manner. They took advantage of you and did you in.

NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

5:24 p.m., January 28, 1971

K: I just was wondering how you think you are going to proceed after your conversation with Rabin.

S: I think the first thing is to get a report out which we will do. And, then secondly, first of all we will have Wally Barber follow up. My judgment is they will squeal but take it. They were negative as we expected. Rabin put a bit of a show on. Before I make any judgment, let me follow up and let Wally take a crack at it.

K: Give us a hint before you do something.

S: I made you a promise, didn't I?

K: You are going on Wednesday with the Four-Power Meeting?

S: At the moment, the thinking is to temporize for the next meeting. It is complicated and a very delicate operation we are pursuing. From the other side, it's also becoming a factor as to whether the ceasefire gets extended.

K: That's why I was wondering whether you are going ahead.

S: We don't want to give any more away than we have to. Right now, we are in a pressure and counter-pressure situation with the Egyptians. These are genuinely nervous people -- they don't know where they are going. We say, 'have confidence in us. The only way we can move in a sensible way is quietly on a step-by-step on the assumption you are willing to engage in the process of negotiation. If you are not willing, we aren't going to do anything for you.' We are pounding. It's beginning to have a little effect. What we have been doing successfully over the past 8 weeks is closing all options other than the negotiating option. We succeeded in killing the bilateral talks. We have done the next-to-best thing with the Four-Power talks -- we have temporized. We are not going ahead in the Four-Power talks as the Egyptians want. The Israeli theory is it will get into a discussion of guarantees and the other three will use it as a backdoor attempt for a blueprint. Which is true. It's hard to believe -- we have succeeded in running the Four Power talks for two years and prevented any damage -- that's a good record.

K: It's not at all a bad record. Keep me advised.

S: By all means.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Helms/Kissinger

9:15 a. m.

1/29/71

H: I wanted to check one thing with you. Yesterday we two of my most senior
officers were invited for a briefing in Moorer's office to bring them into the
picture. In order to be helpful on it we should be going on it. It would be useful
in the Pentagon and here to have it coordinated in that area of the world.

K: If we are serious, we have to do it.

H: That was my impression but I thought I should check with you.

K: I haven't had a chance to canvas you --having seen these things come and
go, is it desirable?

H: On the question of militarily, no (contest) but with the statesmen we have to get
a better feel of it out there. We should have a military victory and a political
disaster. But it's important if we can bring if off because there's not doubt on
the importance of the area. We could set this fellow back.

K: There isn't? Are you as optimistic about 72 as some of our colleagues?
Without it.

H: I think that it's down the track that is our problem. We are pulling our
troops out and propping the SVN up but the time of greatest danger is 72. The
whole statistical base points in that direction. One other thing, I was not
aware from the briefing we got on Phase 1 that there was involved a question
of taking over Cay Son and getting that air strip taken up. There will be a rise
in American casualites during that. Does everyone know that? A lot of
NVA troops up there. The lower level types focused on that yesterday and
wanted up to be sure to be aware of it.

K: I wasn't aware of that. Thank you for calling it to my attention.

H: It might be worth a call.

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1/29/71 9:30 a.m.

K: I wanted to tell you that from reading the papers I think you did superbly. Even the worst... The Washington Post, what they report you as saying was perfect.

R: It's a classic case of lack of credibility of newspapers. Both have the same lead story with exactly the opposite slant.

K: Both have what you said the same way, but the conclusions are different. But a reader with any sense would have to conclude that the steam is out of it.

R: On the Chup thing; is it possible to have the South Vietnamese do most of the flying? On the other we had it geared up for out transport planes to be used. We changed it and they did fine.

K: That's their instructions: to use American only after South Vietnamese is exhausted.

R: It didn't sound to me as if they will meet much opposition. It looks like they will just back away like they did in the incursions in Cambodia.

K: Let me go back to Laird and Moorer on that.

R: If there could be just one flare-up instead of two.

K: You saw the scenario?

R: It relieves me if Souvanna is on board.

K: No, I mean the scenario for the Chup operation we worked out yesterday. But that assumes major American aircarft involvement.

R: They had the same kind of thing in Kompong Cham; after we changed it they did fine. No problem.

K: Let me go back to them, and on the other, we should sleep on it over the weekend.

R: We can't do anything about it till Tuesday anyway.

K: Right, just let it go till Tuesday.

R: Okay, fine.

K: But I thought it came out very very well.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Packard/Kissinger (secure phone)

10:02 a.m. 1/29/71

P: A couple of things I want to touch base with you on. It would be well to have Ron Zeigler briefed on Pahse 1 and Dix Chup. Ron apparently knows something is going on and I recommend Dan brief him.

K: Sure.

P: This situation in Equador. We are very much concerned about that. I don't think we can acquiesce on that.

K: State f _______ that up. They shouldn't have thrown down the gauntlet unless they were prepared to pick it up.

P: We can get this support in the UN and they will vote against us in the OAS. So if we go to the OAS first we will be a bunch of fools.

K: Let me take it up with the President.

P: If there's anything I can do -- We are already pushing on this issue. It could be disastrous. Third is a housekeeping detail. We are trying to get trucks for Cambodia for help with the rice harvest. We have some military trucks but they are hard and expensive to maintain. The Australians have some commercial trucks. We need waver of ______.

K: We will wave it.

P: It will save money.

K: It will cost twice as much for military trucks. I am certain the President will wave it.

P: Our latest with Souvana looks encouraging.

K: What do you think.

P: I am in favor of going ahead. If we are careful in how we present this to Congress, we can minimize the impact.

K: That's how I come out especially since we have the Laotian imput. They will pass us off if we can't come out okay. If we are restrained and have casualites next year then we will be blamed.

P: If the SVN are getting to optimistic but I don't think they are. I don't think we will get clobbered. I am for it.

K: You have been a tower of strength through this.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

10:02 a.m. 1/29/71

P: We work together the best we can.

K: I have enjoyed it on a human and substantive leve.

P: I think you should know that Mel is not as strong for this as he was. I will talk with him Sun. night when he gets back. We will keep him posted on the details.

K: It wouldn't be the first time the President has done it on his own.

P:: We should stand by him.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Irwin/Kissinger

10:33 a.m. 1/29/71

K: I am not calling on the annual report. We haven't had any comments back from you and I didn't expect any but so we stop it from being a brouhaha (?) and I figure I will talk with Bill Cargo and he will do things in the Dept. It worked well last year. If my people start negotiation with your Assit. Secys we will lose the thrust in things.

I: I will coordinate with Bill and if any problem, I will come back to you.

K: If Bill wants to come over or however he wants to work on it. We are sending you chapters every day now.

I: Occupies you with everything else.

K: If I am impatient at meetings you will understand the report plus special operations and normal flow, etc.

I: We should cut down the papers. On the first of two things we discussed yesterday do you have a complete picture of what our ______ is going to be?

K: I have talked with Bill this morning and I am going back to Defense to see if they can ______ it again and reduce our participation.

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Gerard Smith

1/29/71 11:26 a.m.

S: One loose end from the discussion in the NSC the other day. The impression was left that although Soviet ICBM deployment is flattening out there had been a substantial increase in testing. My record shows 236 last year, 231 in 1969 and 231 in 1968. This doesn't support such a conclusion. In 1970 they tested more of their new ICBMs, but that was understandable because they were now. They also had ________ testing and testing of new mods(?). But I thought you might not want to leave the impression with the President that though their deployment is levelling out they are expanding the testing, which is not the case.

K: I will get that to him over the weekend.

S: Okay.

K: Thank you Gerry.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
11:30 a.m. 1/29/71
(Sisco in Secy. Rogers' office)

S: I am reviewing this section on the M.E. and I feel two things will have to be done to it. One, it's very lengthy and goes into a considerable amount of detail and I am concerned about passages that will have impact on the area.

K: Why don't you re-draft it. We want every suggestion of re-drafting and omission. We are open to suggestion. We don't want anything out that you and the Secy. disapprove of. Will you tell this to the Secy.?

S: Yes.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Irwin/Kissinger

12:22 p.m.

1/29/71

K: One minor thing. I would like to shift the oil issue back to the Under Secretaries Committee even though the President wants a report on it. You are up on it more than I.

I: Whatever you say. It's agreeab. e to me.

K: Good.

I: I talked with Cargo and Pedersen.

K: I will not deal with Pedersen.

I: I told them all contacts would be through Cargo. In the conversation Cargo said that Sisco had quite a week few ideas on the M.E. section and a different thrust of it. Without knowing much about it perhaps the principle differences would be throwing it in the cast of Soviet then Arab/Israeli. I said that for Joe to make any comments he wanted but go through Cargo. If it really seems to be depending on how substantive it is, it maybe at some point that we should talk with you or you will want to talk with us or Joe.

K: We will talk.

I: The initial thrust will be through Bill.

K: We will talk and we don't want it totally emasculated but in M.E. where it's in
a delicate phase --

I: All right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
4:30 p.m. 1/29/71

K: I just wanted to call. I haven't seen your press conference but everyone here says you were outstanding.

R: I think the President will be pleased. They are obviously on to the Laos matter but that's because of the embargo. I didn't forclose anything.

K: That's exactly right. I understand the President's strategy. If he doesn't he wants to throw the fear of God into them and say as little as possible. Packard wants to brief the Senators on three troop movements. we don't do that. If we do go and brief them they think we have set them up.

R: I agree. Let's call if off. On the other I am not concerned.

K: It's a slight advantage.

R: No one can say we mislead anyone. I was in such command of it that they didn't have their hearts into it. They don't put up a fight.

K: It's like lion taming.

R: I asked questions about rhetorical 3-4 times. It doesn't cost very much and we don't lose planes and men. I said to Muskie yesterday -- here are what we are doing and President should not be mauled about what we are using or where it touches down or doesn't. We want to protect Americans lives. He said I said what should we do? He ducked it. He said it raises the risk of greater involvement. I said not if we continue to bring out troops.

K: And we control it and the idea of sliding into war is nonsense.

R: Reactions were good.

K: People here who heard it thought it was outstanding.

R: On that other thing, let's not tell Congress for the moment. It's internal troop movements.

K: Build up in S. Laos and these are usual measures.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Sisco/Kissinger

5:30 p.m. 1/29/71

K: My problem is that I have to take off for Boston. I have an 8:00 engagement there.

S: The Secy. has asked me to convey the following. He would like you to clear on the President's behalf as we cannot talk to the President. In 24 hours this will be public.

K: Can't we put it on the LDX? Isn't that faster?

S: Sure if that's what you want.

K: Do you have the car waiting?

S: Yes.

K: Well, come on over.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
5:35 p.m. 1/29/71

K: On that letter, I haven't seen either the Morroccan letter or the reply. My disposition is to support as you and Joe think it desirable. I want to raise this question. What is the hurry of getting it out tonight?

R: They will make it public tomorrow and make it difficult for Jarring and U Thant to make a statement Mon. --

K: I see. Then U Thant will say one party claims no progress.

R: They were going to do this tomorrow but the Egyptians asked them to wait and see because they didn't know why, they agreed. Then they sent this to the ambassadors of the big 4. We are afraid they will be weak need.

K: You think they would __ with a letter from us.

R: I think there's a good possibility if the king doesn't make this public. Then we have a good chance of getting U Thant and Jarring to move. If the king takes the lead of turning this over to the big 4, we are afraid U Thant and Jarring will get a bad cold feet.

K: Do you think it's a good thing to consult the British about?

R: Yes. I will have Joe do it. No use in consulting the French. I will talk to Joe about it.

NARA, Dale

5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1/29/71 6:10 p.m.

R: I got a call from Fulbright -- he is being beseiged with reporters and he asked what's up. I said the embargo has been placed by General Abrams and he is going to do the briefing so there are no misunderstandings.

K: And we didn't know . . .

R: And we didn't know and that it is essentially a tropp movement in South Vietnam. He said is this preliminary to an invasion of Laos? I said if you are talking about ground troops going in the answer is no. But I said other than that when a decision is made I'll get in touch with you. He was sort of gloomy. I said I can't give out any information before the decisions are made. This is basically an in-country troop movement. But I wondered if I should have Dave Abshire tell Aiken and Cooper that Fulbright called me and this is what he said.

K: We can say there is no decision to invade Laos.

R: Plus the fact that in any event there won't be American ground combat troops. In saying this we aren't saying anything we haven't said publicly. I said that at the press conference.

K: I think it might be just as well.

1/29/71 6:16 p.m.

K: The only suggestion I have about the last conversation is couldn't we avoid saying no decision has been made. That almost invites a pressure campaign. Say it is an internal country troop movement and Abrams will explain it all tomorrow.

R: But then what they do is ask you. "Does this mean possible invasion of Laos?"

K: But if we could avoid the impression that this is what we are meeting on. Then they are going to scream like crazy all next week.

R: But because of the movement. The question arose at the press conference because of the embargo. And then these people get the word about the embargo back here. The don't violate the restrictions on talking about the embargo just ask questions in the area. Then they go to Fulbright and get him steamed up.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1/29/71 6:16 p.m. page 2

In a case where secrecy is important it's a different matter.

K: But I want to avoid getting an uprad started before the decision
is made. They can claim they backed us off of it.

R: But that's because of the troop movement. You can't do this
without raising all kinds of questions. What has had the effect on them
is the movement and the embargo. I said to Fulbright if there is any-
thing I can tell you I will. That's about all you can say. If you say
No Comment that's worse than. . .

K: Say I have told you everything that is now going on.

R: But those answers don't make any difference. The troop movement
and the embargo and the briefing that's going to cause the flap. And that
briefing is going to be difficult as hell because they will say what does this mean.

K: I wonder if we shouldn't have had a briefing. I wonder if we should
have just moved the troops. Well, that's water over the dam.

R: Yes.

K: Let's just see what happens.

By

D

NARA, Dale

5/26

TELCORN
Moorere/Kissinger
morning 1/29/71

K: Just in light of our conversations if you can keep your neurotic x field commander relaxed we have a good chance to get it into the next phase. Tell him no more temper tantrums.

M: I have taken care of that.

K: I am having just to keep you informed, we are going to expand the meeting Tues. afternoon or Wed. morning -- probably Wed. morning -- we are going to add Connolly's, Mitchell and Agenw for the meeting. I am briefing them Monday afternoon. If you are not there no one can say we loaded it. I will have Haig give them military facts and read Rogers brief of the other day. So tell Abrams to work with enthusiasm and vigor because it will probably go. What date?

M: I was going to play it according to the progress that they made but I would say 5 or 6.

K: It may slip a day. At least make it so nothing irrevocable is done until after the meeting.

M: I will take care of that.

K: Dick Helms says the road clearing will get us a lot of casualties.

M: I don't think so. At least Abrams doesn't think so.

K: x says: The phase one part of it.

M: Right. Not too much in that so far. We will give them x full support. I don't think it will be bad. They are confident that they can do it. They will have support from both sides.

K: You are talking Phase 1 now.

M: They will have screening forces on both sides.

K: I will not tell you how to conduct military operations. We want to keep U.S. casualties --

M: Of course. We all do.

K: OK.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

mid-afternoon 1/29/71

S: There has just come in over the wire a new power play by the Egyptians as a further attempt to divert the negotiating process. They have put the Moroccasn to a letter to the President, Pompidou, Russians and ______. It's only a 3 paragraph letter and the thrust is no progress and must do this all through the ______. The same divisory tactics. I want to discuss with you how this should be handled. Thant was going to put out a report today. He should delayed putting it out until Monday at the behest of the Egyptians. Now I understand. They have already indicated their intention to publicize this so we must answer this letter right away so if then they publish this tomorrow then we can publish the reply or xxx leak the reply.

K: Do you have a draft?

S: Do you have a draft?

D: I will have it for the Secy. and you in an hour. It's one of the situations where I will show the Secy. the reply. It's something you can clear for the President.

K: He is in Caneel Bay and not reachable. I am leaving for Boston in an hour. Get it to me as quickly as possible.

S: We have to move fast and I would like to demonstrate we can move fast. I need an hour.

K: Do it a little faster. I will treat it as WNVN say -- with good will and serious attitude.