MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 23, 1971

The India-Pakistan Conflict

This tape is to describe the basic strategy that this Admin-
istration has attempted to follow with respect to the India-Pakistan
conflict.

When the Pakistanis moved in the East, the primary desire
of the United States was to localize the conflict and avoid United
States involvement. Later on in the spring, the Pakistan Govern-
ment acted as the intermediary between us and the Chinese. This
inevitably affected our actions in two ways--first, because of our
need of Pakistan as a transmission belt and secondly, because of
our concern not to offend the Chinese during the period that contacts
were being developed. But in any event it was our judgment that
no point would be served by encouraging Indian military action against
Pakistan, since this would only lead to Indian attempts to spread
their influence further along in South Asia and establish a pattern
of recourse to military force.

Throughout, the State Department--dominated by the pro-India-
at-any-price mentality--was attempting to put a squeeze on Pakistan.
We received almost bi-weekly proposals to cut off the military pipeline
to Pakistan. Every White House order was interpreted in the most

DECLASSIFIED

Per NSE Filing

By LTC. L.C. Date

4/25/1971
4/25/1971

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rigid possible manner and the general tilt of our policy began to be
more and more in the direction of India. For example, when the
Indian Foreign Minister came to Washington, the State Department
to all practical purposes promised him a cut-off of military aid to
Pakistan, a refusal to grant new economic credits, and pressure
for a political settlement which in turn was defined in terms almost
identical to India's.

Throughout we had a difficult line to hold. We were in favor
of a political settlement in the White House. On the other hand, if
Pakistan became weakened too much, there was the danger that
India would be tempted to settle more fundamental scores and that
the issue of East Pakistan would be submerged in an attempt by
India to undo the settlement of 1947.

As the summer progressed, this Indian strategy became more
and more apparent. We offered the Indians the following procedure:
(1) help to alleviate the pressure of the refugees (and in fact we
contributed more than half of the relief funds); (2) food relief into
East Pakistan to prevent a further outflow of refugees; and (3) urging
of a political evolution which would have the practical consequence
of bringing about autonomy. And autonomy would almost surely lead
to independence if they gave us a reasonable period of time, say six
months to at most a year. The Indians consistently refused this,

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primarily because they wanted to settle the problem of East Pakistan
in so traumatic fashion that West Pakistan would be affected as
well. They therefore constantly escalated their demands: They
discouraged direct contacts between Bangla Desh and Yahya which
we had arranged. They insisted on the immediate release of Mujib,
who was after all being accused of treason. They refused any
military accommodation along the border. When Prime Minister
Gandhi saw the President, she said that India had been formed by
patriots while Pakistan had been formed by British stooges. She
complained that Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier should never
have been part of Pakistan--giving a taste of what the long-term
objective of India was. I called in the Indian Ambassador on innum-
erable occasions to warn him against military adventures. The last
time, prior to his departure for home on November 18, I told him
that if India could wait until Yahya had turned over a governmental
authority to a civilian ruler on December 27, it would be much easier
for us to bring the sort of pressure that might be necessary to
guarantee autonomy. Ambassador Jha was totally unresponsive
and pointed out that once this new government was in place it would
be even harder to move. It was obvious that they wanted to force
a settlement while Yahya was in office, in other words with the most
rigid Pakistani, in order to have the maximum traumatic affect on
the Pakistani structure.

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This was the situation when the Indians attacked in the Jessore area and near Chittagong. The State Department immediately took the position that the facts were not known and that it was therefore impossible to act decisively. They opposed sending cables and they wanted to move the issue into the Security Council. In the Security Council, of course, there would have been a resolution focusing on a political settlement, and putting the issue of military pressure into a secondary line.

Our principal concern again was not to maneuver in such a way that the People's Republic of China in its first encounter with us would feel betrayed. Our attempt was to generate the maximum pressure on India to make it stop just short of war and failing that, not to get into a position where we would be caught between India and Pakistan and the Soviet Union and Communist China; and finally, to make clear to India that it would pay a price for attacking an American ally and disregarding American recommendations. Nevertheless, the State Department, just short of insubordination, has kept every move from being effectively implemented by cutting off the military pipeline to Pakistan. They have insisted that cutting off the military pipeline to India would provoke an intolerable reaction, while insisting that cutting economic aid to Pakistan would have a positive effect and that cutting off economic aid to India could only be counterproductive. I have therefore attempted through this office,