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can solve by themselves -- that no nation can solve for any other, and
that require a cooperative effort. This, I would say, is our big
problem. And to the extent that there are vestiges of the previous
state of affairs, we are trying to overcome them.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how have the recent accusations of CIA meddling in policies of foreign countries affected our foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There is no other country in the world in which an intelligence agency would be exposed to the public scrutiny that has been the case here in the last six months. In some parts of the world these accusations of meddling have been able to be used as propaganda against our foreign policy. I think it is safe to say that in most parts of the world leaders do not consider the substance of the charge as unusual as some Americans do or are not as shocked by these accusations as we like to think, or some of us like to think. I think these reports have been on the whole not helpful to our foreign policy. They have above all not been helpful to the conduct of intelligence operations abroad. But they have not been a major impediment to the conduct of foreign policy.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, does the recent rash of press criticism against you bother you?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Totally unjustified.

**QUESTION:** Do you feel they are unfair?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Do I think they are unfair?

**QUESTION:** The recent criticism of you in the press.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, of course, unless there was some hope for a terminal date to my efforts, the morale of my associates would disintegrate completely.

Are those some of my associates applauding?

I think there was a period where, for understandable reasons, when everything seemed to be disintegrating domestically, praise for me was excessive. This was then balanced by another period in which perhaps criticism was excessive. I tend to think any criticism of me is excessive.

I don't think it was unfair.

I have to say this about criticism. One way I keep the press here in control is that my father keeps a scrapbook of anything that is written about me. And he has, I think, thirty-four volumes. Every author is given two chances. After he has written two unfavorable articles, he becomes a non-person and is eliminated from the scrapbook. There are few journalists willing to take that risk.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what would you consider positive steps that Castro would have to take before the U.S. started to change our policy towards Cuba?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have indicated that we would respond to the positive moves that Castro might take. And he has recently moderated the tone of Cuban propaganda and even taken some limited steps. I don't want to give a precise list of our requirements, because I think we should discuss those first through private channels.

But we are prepared to reciprocate Cuban moves, and we do not consider that an animosity towards Cuba is an essential aspect of our foreign policy.

* * * * * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 18, 1975

No. 338

As Prepared for Delivery

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT 9:00 P.M. EDT WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 1975. EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION UNTIL 6:00 P.M. EDT WEDNESDAY, JUNE 18, 1975. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE
THE JAPAN SOCIETY
NEW YORK CITY
JUNE 18, 1975

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN A CHANGING WORLD

America's ties with Japan are strong, close, and full of promise. Tonight I want to describe the importance of this relationship — for America, for Asia and for the world.

This occasion comes as a welcome opportunity. The tragic end of our involvement in Indochina has stimulated questions, among Asians as well as Americans, about the future of United States foreign policy. But paradoxically, these events have also driven home the recognition, among Asians as well as Americans, of how essential a strong and purposeful United States is to global peace and progress.

As we and Japan seek to shape the future together we face a world profoundly different from that in which our relationship was forged.

The bipolar world of the 1950s and 1960s has disappeared. The re-emergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the so-called Third World, have created a new international environment — a world of multiple centers of power, of ideological differences both old and new, clouded by nuclear peril and marked by the new imperatives of interdependence. American policy has sought to shape out of this a new international structure based on equilibrium rather than

For further information contact:

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domination; negotiation rather than confrontation; and a consciousness
of global interdependence as the basis of the ultimate fulfillment of
national objectives.

As the members of this Society have long recognized, the relationship
between the United States and Japan is crucial to this design. It is
central to the continued stability, progress and prosperity of the
international community and it is fundamental to American policy in Asia.

- Our Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation reflects an
enduring sense of common interest in the peace of Asia.
Through many changes in conditions and alignments, our ties
have proven their continuing and indispensable validity
for our two countries and for global stability.

- As maritime trading nations with complementary economies, the United States and Japan account for 52 percent of the production and 26 percent of the trade of the entire non-Communist, industrialized world. We possess the world's most dynamic economies. As economic superpowers, our respective policies profoundly affect each other and the world at large.

- Our nations share an enduring commitment to the political values of free societies, and an abiding concern for the well-being of our fellow men.

Japan's evolution over the last thirty years into a major factor on the
world scene inevitably has brought changes in the style of our relations
even as the community of our mutual interests has grown. Adjustments
in United States economic policies and a new policy toward China in 1971
led to painful but transitory misunderstandings to which — let us be
frank — our own tactics contributed. We have learned from experience;
these strains are behind us; our policies are moving in harmony in these
areas; our consultations on all major issues are now close, frequent and
frank.

US-Japanese bilateral relations, I am pleased to say, have never been
better in thirty years.

It is a fitting symbol, therefore, that in his first trip abroad as Chief
of State, President Ford visited Japan last November. We look forward
to the visit of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, whose presence will
lend further dignity and strength to the ties between us. And before
the Emperor's arrival, Prime Minister Miki will come to Washington for
consultations on the foreign policy and economic issues facing our two
countries.

I cannot refer to this series of consultations without paying tribute to
Eisaku Sato, a great leader of Japan, a great champion of Japanese-American

PR #338

friendship, and one of the world's great statesmen. I sought his counsel on each of my five visits to Japan, even after he had left office. I was privileged to know him as a colleague and a personal friend. I shall miss him greatly.

## The Foundations of Our Partnership

Japan and the United States have known each other for a century and a quarter. Our relationship has passed through an incredible range: from curiosity to competition, conflict, occupation, reconciliation, to alliance and mutual dependence. This long, complicated and varied experience has taught us that our close association is more essential than ever, and that the dramatic differences in national styles and situations are a strength to be husbanded rather than a weakness to be overcome.

We Americans are a disparate people — heterogeneous in our origins, constantly striving to redefine what we have in common. Japan, on the other hand, is a country of unusual cohesiveness and homogeneity. For Americans, contracts and laws are prime guarantors of social peace. The Japanese depend less on legal and formal rules to preserve social harmony than on the quality of human relationships and on unstated patterns of consensus and obligation.

Our language is designed for categorization. It invites logical distinctions and value judgments. The Japanese have lived together for so long and shared so many experiences that they frequently communicate through intuition and indirection, occasionally without need of words. The Japanese prize form and mood, as well as content. We honor content above all, and frequently exhibit impatience with emphasis on style.

The United States is blessed with vast land and ample resources; abundance is taken for granted. Japan is a great industrial power; but its prosperity is more recent and, because of the dependence of its industry on imported food, energy, raw materials, and external markets, more vulnerable.

In foreign policy, the United States has assumed global security responsibilities. Japan has devoted its energies to the growth of its economy and commerce, while — alone among the world's great powers — foreswearing large military forces or assertive diplomacy.

Communication between cultures is always difficult. But the United States and Japan have achieved an increasing sensitivity, sometimes fascination, with our national differences. Our two nations supremely demonstrate the possibility of close and enduring association between two different cultures and two distant continents. It is an extraordinary achievement, and we too often take it for granted.

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We formed a political alliance and security relationship in a period of Japanese dependence. War had shattered her economy and political system. Japan accepted American leadership in that difficult period and only gradually began to reassert an autonomous diplomacy and active political involvement in the world around her.

Japan's emergence as a major economic power and international force has substantially transformed our relations in recent years.

The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last major vestige of the war from our bilateral agenda. We have made significant progress in removing the trade imbalance which was so often an irritant in our relations. In response to Japanese concerns, the United States has reaffirmed its specific commitments as supplier and purchaser of important goods and materials.

Our relationship which was forged by the necessities of security has flourished as well on the other contemporary challenges — improving relations with the Communist countries, advancing the prosperity of the industrial democracies and building a new era of cooperation among all nations.

Our most immediate shared interest, naturally, is in Asia.

## The United States and Asia

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia — particularly in Northeast Asia. China comprises the heartland of the continent. The Soviet Far East spreads across the top of Asia. The Japanese islands span 2,000 miles of ocean off the mainland. America's Pacific presence encompasses the entire region. Western Europe has important economic links with Asia and feels indirectly the effects of any disturbance of the equilibrium in the area.

Asia's share of the world's population and resources is immense. In the last two decades, the Asian-Pacific economy has experienced more rapid growth than any other region. It is here that the United States has its largest and fastest-growing overseas commerce. We have as vital an interest in access to Asia's raw materials as Asia has to our markets and technology.

The ties between Asia and America have a deeper philosophical and human dimension. The influence of America and the West stimulated the transformation of much of Asia during the past 100 years. From the days of the New England transcendentalists to the modern period, Asian culture and ideas have significantly touched American intellectual life, thereby reflecting the universality of human aspirations.

The role of Asia then is potentially decisive for the solution of the contemporary agenda of peace and progress and the quality of life.

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This is why, in spite of recent events, the United States will not turn away from Asia, or focus our attention on Europe to the detriment of Asia. Our relationships with Europe and Japan are equally vital; each is essential to global peace and security. In the modern world the problems and opportunities of each area overlap and are inseparable from those of the other. Our fidelity to our commitments will be as strong in one part of the globe as in the other.

Nor can we confine our Asian policy to Japan without destroying the underpinnings of the US-Japanese relationship. The interests that bind Japan to Asia are no less vital than those binding it to America and the other nations of the West. The value of our political and security relationship depends on its contribution to a broad balance of security in Asia. This is decisive for Japan as well as for us.

The basic principles of America's foreign policy find their reflection and necessity in Asia:

— First, peace depends on a stable global equilibrium: While an effective foreign policy must reach beyond the problem of security, without security there can be no effective foreign policy. A world where some nations survive only at the mercy of others is a world of dependence, insecurity and despotism. This is why the United States will continue to oppose the efforts of any country or group of countries to impose their will on Asia by a preponderance of power or blackmail.

We have learned important lessons from the tragedy of Indochina — most importantly that outside effort can only supplement, but not create, local efforts and local will to resist. But in applying these lessons we must take care not to undermine stability in Asia and ultimately world peace.

We will permit no question to arise about the firmness of our treaty commitments. Allies who seek our support will find us constant. At the same time, if any partner seeks to modify these commitments, we will be prepared to accommodate that desire.

In fulfilling our commitments we will look to our allies to assume the primary responsibility for maintaining their own defense, especially in manpower. And there is no question that popular will and social justice are, in the last analysis, the essential underpinning of resistance to subversion and external challenge. But our support and assistance will be available where it has been promised.

Specifically, we are resolved to maintain the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, for this is of crucial importance to Japan and to all of Asia. We will assist South Korea to strengthen her economy and defense. But we shall also seek all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confrontation.

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We place the highest value on our relationship with our ANZUS partners Australia and New Zealand, and on our historic relationship with the Philippines. We will maintain our treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific. And we welcome the growing influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations — Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand — as a force for self-reliance, stability and progress in the region.

— A second basic principle of our foreign policy is that peace depends ultimately on reconciliation among nations. All of us — friends, neutrals or adversaries — exist on a small planet threatened with extinction. The ultimate aim of our alliances has always been to ease, not intensify, divisions and tensions. We will continue our effort to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique.

Similarly, we will continue our effort to regularize and improve our relations with the Soviet Union, and to make further progress in the control of arms, especially strategic arms.

We have no illusions. We recognize that our values and social systems are not compatible with those of the Communist powers and may never be. But in the thermonuclear age, when the existence of mankind is at stake, there is no decent alternative to the easing of tensions. Should these efforts fail, at least our peoples will know that we had no choice but to resist pressure or blackmail. There can be no conciliation without strength and security, but we would be reckless if we forget that strength without a spirit of conciliation can invite holocaust.

New regimes have come to power in Asia in the last few months. They have flouted international agreements and flagrantly violated accepted international standards, and that we cannot ignore. But we are prepared to look to the future. Our attitude toward them will be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward us.

— Finally, peace depends upon a structure of economic cooperation which reflects the aspirations of all peoples. The problems of the world economy — ensuring adequate supplies of food, energy and raw materials to consumers and markets and stable income to producers — require global economic arrangements that accommodate the interests of developed and developing, consumers and producers. We have consistently taken the view that a necessary first step is close cooperation among the industrialized countries. On the basis of unity and mutual support, we welcome a dialogue with the developing countries in a spirit of sympathy, realism and cooperation.

These are the principles which guide America's actions in the world and in Asia.

Japan's role and the US-Japanese relationship can be decisive.

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The United States and Japan

The Challenge of Peace and Security. Japan's contribution to a peaceful world is unique. Despite its industrial prowess Japan elected to forego the military attributes of great power status, limiting itself to modest conventional self-defense forces, and relying for its security on the support of the United States, and the good will of others.

In this framework, Japan has thrived. Its security has been assured; its democratic institutions have flourished. Its economy has achieved unparalleled growth, partly because through much of this period Japan enjoyed assured access to imported raw materials and food at reasonable prices. Japan has been able to develop constructive economic and political relations with its neighbors, thereby contributing to regional stability and growth.

The events of recent years have transformed this relatively simple uni-
verse. The interaction among the major powers has become much more
complex than in the Fifties or early Sixties. The oil crisis of 1973
confronted Japan with its economic vulnerability. Today suppliers of
raw materials are presenting a variety of new demands that are not easily
accommodated in the context of existing world trade and monetary
structures.

These changing circumstances have required both Japan and the United
States to rethink old premises and devise new, creative approaches. By
their nature, these problems require collaborative, not separate responses.
Japan and the United States must relate national security to international
reconciliation and national growth to international cooperation.

The Challenge of Reconciliation. Both our countries seek to move
the world beyond equilibrium toward reconciliation. The United States
has attempted to normalize and improve its relations with the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China. Japan has made the same
effort. For some time the Japanese Government has pursued what it has
described as "peace diplomacy" — a diplomacy designed to ease Asian
confrontations.

Japan normalized its relations with the Soviet Union in 1956; recently
it has been intensifying its economic relations with that country. Japan
has been a trading partner of the People's Republic of China for decades.
In 1972 Japan granted full recognition to Peking and since then has been
broadening her bilateral relations. We have welcomed these developments.

As each of us engages in this more complex interplay among the major
powers, we have faced a common problem: How to preserve a sense of
priority among our international relationships? This Government has
stated on many occasions — and I will state again — that we make a
clear distinction between our allies and our adversaries. "Equidistant
diplomacy" is a myth. For us, Japan is not an occasional interlocutor
but a permanent friend — a partner in building a world of progress.

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Of course, we do not expect to pursue identical policies — toward China, toward the Soviet Union, or toward all Asian issues. But we should seek to maintain compatible approaches. In our bilateral relations we should recognize a higher standard of mutual concern than normally obtains between states, accepting a greater obligation to consult, to inform, and to harmonize domestic and external policies that impinge on the interests of the other.

We believe that both our countries share this approach. To implement it, we have jointly developed channels for more intensive consultation and used them with growing frequency and frankness. The United States intends to propose a semi-annual review of policies at the foreign ministers level, alternately in Washington and Tokyo, to assess the present and to chart the future.

**The Challenge of Economic Cooperation.** The prosperity which Japan and America have achieved in the course of the past three decades is one of the great successes of the post-war world. The economic power we possess as a result imposes on us special responsibility for the health of the global economy and for its ability to satisfy the thrust of human aspirations. Today that responsibility is under severe challenge. A major recession, an energy crisis, global food shortages, unprecedented inflation, and a trend toward politicizing economic issues have subjected the world economy to serious stress.

We have three major objectives:

We must spur the stable growth of our own economies. We must strengthen cooperation among the industrialized countries. We must respond to the aspirations of the developing world.

All our objectives — domestic well-being, security, unity, relations with the Communist world and the developing nations — require economic strength and growth. Few can be realized by stagnating economies. The stability of our institutions and the self-assurance of our societies will benefit from the earliest possible recovery of sustained and non-inflationary economic growth.

In the global economy, no nation can hope to achieve sustained growth by its own efforts alone. In a world of interdependence, the experience of thirty years has shown that the industrialized nations prosper or suffer together. Coordination of effort is essential for any economic objective — whether it be growth, energy, food, or raw materials — and also to maintain the conditions of well-being that underpin our political and security cohesion.

It is encouraging that over the last year the United States and its major partners are beginning to harmonize their national policies to combat recession and promote expansion. This was a central topic of the

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President's discussions in Tokyo last November. These consultations
should be continued systematically and deal particularly with a common
analysis of the requirements of global economic growth.

We have no reason to apologize for the economic system we have built
since the war. It has spread progress far beyond the industrialized
world; in fact, it has contributed to the political evolution and
diffusion of economic power that have now brought that system under
challenge. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that no set of
economic relationships can flourish unless its benefits are widely
shared; it must be perceived as just.

It is in the self-interest of the advanced industrialized countries that
global economic arrangements embrace the aspirations of the majority of
mankind. Reality makes us a global community; if world order breaks
down over economic conflicts, we face the specter of chronic global
civil war.

The Japanese Government, acutely sensitive to this problem, has made an
imaginative proposal to the OECD: that the industrialized democracies
undertake a joint long-range examination of how the progress of the
advanced societies can be pursued to foster the progress of the develop-
ing countries. We welcome this initiative and have supported it; it is
a subject of profound importance. We will work closely with the Japanese
Government as the study proceeds.

Let me now turn briefly to a number of crucial economic issues, first in
terms of Japanese-US relations and then in terms of their impact on
the global order.

Our two nations have a special concern and responsibility in trade. We
have succeeded in resolving most of the bilateral problems in our trading
relationship; we must now turn our attention to what we can jointly do
to improve the global trading system which has nourished the world's
prosperity for a generation. The current round of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations is called appropriately the Tokyo Round, for Japan's
extraordinary dependence on commerce gives it a unique stake in the
outcome. Our purpose in those talks must be to reach agreement on a
reliable access to supplies as well as markets; the renunciation of the
use of restrictive trade measures to cover deficits brought about by
recent economic difficulties. We must pay special attention, as well,
to the needs of the developing countries for improved trade opportunities.
With respect to all of these issues we will proceed on the basis of close
consultation with Japan.

Energy is a key element in the structure of global interdependence. Each
industrialized country has a choice: to permit increasing vulnerability
to arbitrary price rises and political pressures or to impose conserva-
tion and spur the development of alternative supplies. But individual
efforts are almost certain to be ineffective. To reduce dependence, the

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major consumers must pool their efforts. This is why Japan and the United States have joined other industrialized countries in common programs to transform the energy market through the International Energy Agency. Together we are working to protect against new embargoes, to maintain financial solidarity, to conserve energy and to develop new sources. Japan's dependence on energy imports means that it cannot end its energy vulnerability by conservation alone. It has a major stake, therefore, in research and development of new sources.

For the next ten years nuclear energy will be increasingly important. The United States has pioneered the development of uranium enrichment processes for nuclear energy; Japan has been our largest market. As Japan's use of and dependence on nuclear energy expands, so too does our obligation to be a reliable supplier of fuel. The United States therefore pledges to continue to provide nuclear fuel, appropriately safeguarded, under long-term contracts. We will shortly add enrichment capacity to ensure adequate supplies to meet domestic and foreign needs.

Over the long term, more exotic energy sources must be emphasized. Our two countries are in a unique position to focus capital, skill and the most advanced technology in their development. We are ready to begin a large-scale energy research and development effort with Japan. Japanese capital is welcome to participate and will receive in turn a proportional share of our expanded production of conventional and synthetic fuels.

But energy, of course, is not simply a technical issue. It goes to the heart of our political relationship with the developing world. Japan has been insistent that we must proceed by cooperation rather than confrontation — a view which we share. We and Japan together with the other members of the IEA are prepared to resume the dialogue with the energy producers, and search for cooperative solutions of mutual benefit.

Japan and the United States both recognize the desire of raw material producers for a dialogue that goes beyond the issue of energy. Together with our other partners in the IEA we have expressed our readiness to discuss these concerns. We and Japan and other importing nations have an interest in reliable supplies. The producers need long-term stability of incomes for their development programs. It is in the joint interest of producers and consumers to discuss how drastic price fluctuations can be alleviated in order to encourage timely investment in the development of new supplies and to give reality to the development plans of producers. Both Japan and the US have a political stake in promoting a healthy commodities trade which serves the interests of both producers and consumers.

No issue on the economic agenda is more vital than *food*. It is a dramatic example of the links between bilateral and global issues and between relations with our allies and relations with the developing world.

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Japan is our largest market for agricultural exports, and we are Japan's principal external provider of food. The world's dependence on the United States for foodstuffs imposes upon us an obligation to be a reliable supplier. The United States therefore pledges that in times of tight markets it will take account of the needs of our long-time customers, such as Japan. We will seek to prevent a repetition of the unfortunate experience of 1973 when we were forced suddenly to restrict the export of soybeans to Japan and other countries.

In a broader context, the United States and Japan bear a special responsibility because they are among the world's largest producers and consumers of agricultural goods. We both are in a position to apply technical innovation and skill to the expansion of food production in developing countries. And as a hedge against the feast-and-famine cycle of global harvests, we should both help in creating an international system of nationally held grain reserves by the end of this year.

These areas do not by any means exhaust our joint agenda. We attach great importance to our scientific and technical exchanges. This fall we expect to conclude a comprehensive joint review of all our exchanges. We will then be able to plan our efforts more efficiently and identify new areas for cooperation.

As two of the most advanced industrial nations, we have a special awareness of what progress has done to the environment. The bilateral accord we are about to conclude for environmental protection is therefore of great potential importance not only for us but for others in the process of industrialization.

The talents and joint efforts of our two gifted peoples will surely be a unique contribution to the wider world community. To strengthen this bond, the United States intends to augment our cultural relations with Japan — an endeavor in which the work of this society, and through it, the US-Japan Cultural Conference, has been crucial. The Administration will seek to integrate and obtain approval this year of proposals now before the Congress to establish a Japan-United States friendship fund which would make substantial new funds available for cross-cultural programs between our two countries.

## Conclusion

The great Japanese writer Saikaku, who lived in another era when the old order was breaking down and the shape of things to come was not yet clear, said that to experience "this modern age, this mixture of good and ill and yet to steer an honest course to the splendors of success — this is a feat reserved for paragons."

Our times demand as much of us. We may not be paragons, but our assets are great. No two nations are so different yet so close; none have a more direct and wide experience of the best and the worst which the modern age offers; and none have constructed a more intensive and

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effective relationship of consultation and cooperation. Our mutual
interest has brought us together, but our mutual understanding has
enabled our friendship to thrive to a degree which would have been unh-
imaginable two decades ago.

Americans and Japanese can take pride in what we have achieved, and use
it as a point of departure for greater efforts still. We are seeking
the crucial balance between diversity and common purpose that is the
best hope for building a creative, just and productive international
community. With the good will and good sense, the high hopes and hard
work which have so far marked our journey we will continue to strengthen
our relations — for ourselves and for mankind.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

Speech

June 18, 1975

New York City

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Japan Society.

America's ties with Japan are strong, close, and full of promise. Tonight I want to describe the importance of this relationship—for America, for Asia, and for the world.

This occasion comes as a welcome opportunity. The tragic end of our involvement in Indonesia has stimulated questions—among Asians as well as Americans—about the future of U.S. foreign policy. But paradoxically these events have also driven home the recognition—among Asians as well as Americans—of how essential a strong and purposeful United States is to global peace and progress.

The bipolar world of the 1950's and 1960's has disappeared. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the so-called Third World, have created a new international environment—a world of multiple centers of power, of ideological differences both old and new, clouded by nuclear peril and marked by the new imperatives of interdependence. American policy has sought to shape out of this a new international structure based on equilibrium rather than domination, negotiation rather than confrontation, and a consciousness of global interdependence as the basis of the ultimate fulfillment of national objectives.

As the members of this society have long recognized, the relationship between the United

States and Japan is crucial to this design. It is central to the continued stability, progress, and prosperity of the international community, and it is fundamental to American policy in Asia.

* Our Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security reflects an enduring sense of common interest in the peace of Asia. Through many changes in conditions and alignments, our ties have proven their continuing and indispensable validity for our two countries and for global stability.

* As maritime trading nations with complementary economies, the United States and Japan account for 52 percent of the production and 26 percent of the trade of the entire non-Communist, industrialized world. We possess the world's most dynamic economies. As economic superpowers our respective policies profoundly affect each other and the world at large.

* Our nations share an enduring commitment to the political values of free societies and an abiding concern for the well-being of our fellow men.

Japan's evolution over the last 30 years into a major factor on the world scene inevitably has brought changes in the style of our relations even as the community of our mutual interests has grown. Adjustments in U.S. economic policies and a new policy toward China in 1971 led to painful but transitory misunderstandings to which—let us be frank—our own tactics contributed. We have learned from experience; these strains are behind us; our policies are moving in harmony in these areas; our consultations on all major issues are now close, frequent, and frank.

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2

U.S.-Japanese bilateral relations, I am pleased to say, have never been better in 30 years. It is a fitting symbol, therefore, that in his first trip abroad as Chief of State, President Ford visited Japan last November. We look forward to the visit of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor, whose presence will lend further dignity and strength to the ties between us. And before the Emperor's arrival, Prime Minister Miki will come to Washington for consultations on the foreign policy and economic issues facing our two countries.

I cannot refer to this series of consultations without paying tribute to Eisaku Sato [the late Prime Minister] - a great leader of Japan, a great champion of Japanese-American friendship, and one of the world's great statesmen. I sought his counsel on each of my five visits to Japan, even after he had left office. I was privileged to know him as a colleague and a personal friend. I shall miss him greatly.

## THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR PARTNERSHIP

Japan and the United States have known each other for a century and a quarter. Our relationship has passed through an incredible range—from curiosity to competition, conflict, occupation, reconciliation, to alliance and mutual dependence. This long, complicated, and varied experience has taught us that our close association is more essential than ever and that the dramatic differences in national styles and situations are a strength to be husbanded rather than a weakness to be overcome.

We Americans are a disparate people—heterogeneous in our origins, constantly striving to redefine what we have in common. Japan, on the other hand, is a country of unusual cohesiveness and homogeneity. For Americans, contracts and laws are prime guarantors of social peace. The Japanese depend less on legal and formal rules to preserve social harmony than on the quality of human relationships and on unstated patterns of consensus and obligation.

Our language is designed for categorization. It invites logical distinctions and value judgments. The Japanese have lived together for so long and shared so many experiences that they frequently communicate through intuition and indirection, occasionally without need of words. The Japanese prize form and mood as well as content. We honor

content above all and frequently exhibit impatience with emphasis on style.

In foreign policy the United States has assumed global security responsibilities. Japan has devoted its energies to the growth of its economy and commerce, while—alone among the world's great powers—forswearing large military forces or assertive diplomacy.

Communication between cultures is always difficult. But the United States and Japan have achieved an increasing sensitivity—sometimes fascination—with our national differences. Our two nations supremely demonstrate the possibility of close and enduring association between two different cultures and two distant continents. It is an extraordinary achievement, and we too often take it for granted.

The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last major vestige of the war from our bilateral agenda. We have made significant progress in removing the trade imbalance which was so often an irritant in our relations. In response to Japanese concerns the United States has reaffirmed its specific commitments as supplier and purchaser of important goods and materials.

Our relationship, which was forged by the necessities of security, has flourished as well on the other contemporary challenges—improving relations with the Communist countries, advancing the prosperity of the industrial democracies, and building a new era of cooperation among all nations.

3

THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia—particularly in Northeast Asia. China comprises the heartland of the continent. The Soviet Far East spreads across the top of Asia. The Japanese islands span 2,000 miles of ocean off the mainland. America's Pacific presence encompasses the entire region. Western Europe has important economic links with Asia and feels indirectly the effects of any disturbance of the equilibrium in the area.

Asia's share of the world's population and resources is immense. In the last two decades the Asian-Pacific economy has experienced more rapid growth than any other region. It is here that the United States has its largest and fastest-growing overseas commerce. We have as vital an interest in access to Asia's raw materials as Asia has to our markets and technology.

The ties between Asia and America have a deeper philosophical and human dimension. The influence of America and the West stimulated the transformation of much of Asia during the past 100 years. From the days of the New England transcendentalists to the modern period, Asian culture and ideas have significantly touched American, intellectual life, thereby reflecting the universality of human aspirations.

The role of Asia then is potentially decisive for the solution of the contemporary agenda of peace and progress and the quality of life. This is why, in spite of recent events, the United States will not turn away from Asia, or focus our attention on Europe to the detriment of Asia. Our relationships with Europe and Japan are equally vital; each is essential to global peace and security. In the modern world the problems and opportunities of each area overlap and are inseparable from those of the other. Our fidelity to our commitments will be as strong in one part of the globe as in the other.

Nor can we confine our Asian policy to Japan without destroying the underpinnings of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The interests that bind Japan to Asia are no less vital than those binding it to America and the other nations of the West. The value of our political and security relationships depends on its contribution to a broad balance of security in Asia. This is decisive for Japan as well as for us.

The basic principles of America's foreign policy find their reflection and necessity in Asia.

**First, peace depends on a stable global equilibrium.** While an effective foreign policy must reach beyond the problem of security, without security there can be no effective foreign policy. A world where some nations survive only at the mercy of others is a world of dependence, insecurity, and despotism. This is why the United States will continue to oppose the efforts of any country or group of countries to impose their will on Asia by a preponderance of power or blackmail.

We have learned important lessons from the tragedy of Indochina—most importantly that outside effort can only supplement, but not create, local efforts and local will to resist. But in applying these lessons we must take care not to undermine stability in Asia and ultimately world peace.

We will permit no question to arise about the firmness of our treaty commitments. Allies who seek our support will find us constant. At the same time, if any partner seeks to modify these commitments we will be prepared to accommodate that desire.

Specifically we are resolved to maintain the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, for this is of crucial importance to Japan and to all of Asia. We will assist South Korea to strengthen her economy and defense. But we shall also seek all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confrontation.

We place the highest value on our relationship with our ANZUS partners—Australia and New Zealand—and on our historic relationship with the Philippines. We will maintain our treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific. And we welcome the growing influence of the Association of South-East Asian Nations—Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand—as a force for self-reliance, stability, and progress in the region.

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among nations. All of us-friends, neutrals, or adversaries-exist on a small planet threatened with extinction. The ultimate aim of our alliances has always been to ease, not intensify, divisions and tensions. We will continue our effort to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China in the spirit of the Shanghai communique.

Similarly, we will continue our effort to regularize and improve our relations with the Soviet Union and to make further progress in the control of arms, especially strategic arms.

Finally, peace depends upon a structure of economic cooperation which reflects the aspirations of all peoples. The problems of the world economy-insuring adequate supplies of food, energy, and raw materials to consumers and markets and stable income to producers-require global economic arrangements that accommodate the interests of developed and developing consumers and producers. We have consistently taken the view that a necessary first step is close cooperation among the industrialized countries. On the basis of unity and mutual support, we welcome a dialogue with the developing countries in a spirit of sympathy, realism, and cooperation.

These are the principles which guide America's actions in the world and in Asia. Japan's role and the U.S.-Japanese relationship can be decisive.

# THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

## The Challenge of Peace and Security

Japan's contribution to a peaceful world is unique. Despite its industrial prowess Japan elected to forgo the military attributes of great-power status, limiting itself to modest conventional self-defense forces and relying for its security on the support of the United States and the good will of others.

In this framework Japan has thrived. Its security has been assured; its democratic institutions have flourished; its economy has achieved unparalleled growth, partly because through much of this period Japan enjoyed assured access to imported raw materials and food at reasonable prices. Japan has been able to develop constructive economic and political relations with its neighbors, thereby contributing to regional stability and growth.

The events of recent years have transformed this relatively simple universe. The interaction among the major powers has become much more complex than in the 1950's or early 1960's. The oil crisis of 1973 confronted Japan with its economic vulnerability. Today suppliers of raw materials are presenting a variety of new demands that are not easily accommodated in the context of existing world trade and monetary structures.

These changing circumstances have required both Japan and the United States to rethink old premises and devise new, creative approaches. By their nature these problems require collaborative, not separate, responses. Japan and the United States must relate national security to international reconciliation and national growth to international cooperation.

## The Challenge of Reconciliation

Both our countries seek to move the world beyond equilibrium toward reconciliation. The United States has attempted to normalize and improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Japan has made the same effort. For some time the Japanese Government has pursued what it has described as "peace diplomacy"-a diplomacy designed to ease Asian confrontations.

5

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As each of us engages in this more complex interplay among the major powers, we have faced a common problem: How to preserve a sense of priority among our international relationships. This Government has stated on many occasions—and I will state again—that we make a clear distinction between our allies and our adversaries. "Equidistant diplomacy" is a myth. For us Japan is not an occasional interlocutor but a permanent friend—a partner in building a world of progress.

Of course, we do not expect to pursue identical policies—toward China, toward the Soviet Union, or toward all Asian issues. But we should seek to maintain compatible approaches. In our bilateral relations we should recognize a higher standard of mutual concern than normally obtains between states, accepting a greater obligation to consult, to inform, and to harmonize domestic and external policies that impinge on the interests of the other.

We believe that both our countries share this approach. To implement it we have jointly developed channels for more intensive consultation and used them with growing frequency and frankness. The United States intends to propose a semi-annual review of policies at the Foreign Ministers' level, alternately in Washington and Tokyo, to assess the present and to chart the future.

## The Challenge of Economic Cooperation

The prosperity which Japan and America have achieved in the course of the past three decades is one of the great successes of the postwar world. The economic power we possess as a result imposes on us special responsibility for the health of the global economy and for its ability to satisfy the thrust of human aspirations. Today that responsibility is under severe challenge. A major recession, an energy crisis, global food shortages, unprecedented inflation, and a trend toward politicizing economic issues have subjected the world economy to serious stress. We have three major objectives:

* We must spur the stable growth of our own economies;

* We must strengthen cooperation among the industrialized countries;

* We must respond to the aspirations of the developing world.

All our objectives—domestic well-being, security, unity, relations with the Communist world and the developing nations—require economic strength and growth. Few can be realized by stagnating economies. The stability of our institutions and the self-assurance of our societies will benefit from the earliest possible recovery of sustained and noninflationary economic growth.

In the global economy no nation can hope to achieve sustained growth by its own efforts alone. In a world of interdependence the experience of 30 years has shown that the industrialized nations prosper or suffer together. Coordination of effort is essential for any economic objective—whether it be growth, energy, food, or raw materials—and also to maintain the conditions of well-being that underpin our political and security cohesion.

It is encouraging that over the last year the United States and its major partners are beginning to harmonize their national policies to combat recession and promote expansion. This was a central topic of the President's discussions in Tokyo last November. These consultations should be continued systematically and deal particularly with a common analysis of the requirements of global economic growth.

We have no reason to apologize for the economic system we have built since the war. It has spread progress far beyond the industrialized world; in fact it has contributed to the political evolution and diffusion of economic power that have now brought that system under challenge. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that no set of economic relationships can flourish unless its benefits are widely shared; it must be perceived as just.

6

to the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]—that the industrialized democracies undertake a joint long-range examination of how the progress of the advanced societies can be pursued to foster the progress of the developing countries. We welcome this initiative and have supported it; it is a subject of profound importance. We will work closely with the Japanese Government as the study proceeds.

Let me now turn briefly to a number of crucial economic issues, first in terms of Japanese-U.S. relations and then in terms of their impact on the global order.

**Trade.** Our two nations have a special concern and responsibility in trade. We have succeeded in resolving most of the bilateral problems in our trading relationship; we must now turn our attention to what we can jointly do to improve the global trading system which has nourished the world's prosperity for a generation.

The current round of multilateral trade negotiations is called appropriately the Tokyo Round, for Japan's extraordinary dependence on commerce gives it a unique stake in the outcome. Our purpose in those talks must be to reach agreement on a reduction of tariffs, the removal of nontariff barriers, assuring more reliable access to supplies as well as markets, the renunciation of the use of restrictive trade measures to cover deficits brought about by recent economic difficulties. We must pay special attention, as well, to the needs of the developing countries for improved trade opportunities. With respect to all of these issues we will proceed on the basis of close consultation with Japan.

**Energy.** This is a key element in the structure of global interdependence. Each industrialized country has a choice—to permit increasing vulnerability to arbitrary price rises and political pressures or to impose conservation and spur the development of alternative supplies. But individual efforts are almost certain to be ineffective. To reduce dependence the major consumers must pool their efforts. This is why Japan and the United States have joined other industrialized countries in common programs to transform the energy market through the International Energy Agency [IEA]. Together we are working to protect against new embargoes, to maintain financial solidarity, to conserve energy, and to develop new sources. Japan's dependence on energy imports means that it can-

For the next 10 years nuclear energy will be increasingly important. The United States has pioneered the development of uranium enrichment processes for nuclear energy; Japan has been our largest market. As Japan's use of and dependence on nuclear energy expands, so too does our obligation to be a reliable supplier of fuel. The United States, therefore, pledges to continue to provide nuclear fuel, appropriately safeguarded, under long-term contracts. We will shortly add enrichment capacity to insure adequate supplies to meet domestic and foreign needs.

Over the long term more exotic energy sources must be emphasized. Our two countries are in a unique position to focus capital, skill, and the most advanced technology in their development. We are ready to begin a large-scale energy research and development effort with Japan. Japanese capital is welcome to participate and will receive, in turn, a proportional share of our expanded production of conventional and synthetic fuels.

But energy, of course, is not simply a technical issue. It goes to the heart of our political relationship with the developing world. Japan has been insistent that we must proceed by cooperation rather than confrontation—a view which we share. We and Japan, together with the other members of the IEA, are prepared to resume the dialogue with the energy producers and search for cooperative solutions of mutual benefit.

Japan and the United States both recognize the desire of raw-material producers for a dialogue that goes beyond the issue of energy. Together with our other partners in the IEA we have expressed our readiness to discuss these concerns. We and Japan and other importing nations have an interest in reliable supplies. The producers need long-term stability of incomes for their development programs. It is in the joint interest of producers and consumers to discuss how drastic price fluctuations can be alleviated in order to encourage timely investment in the development of new supplies and to give reality to the development plans of producers. Both Japan and the United States have a political stake in promoting a healthy commodities trade which serves the interests of both producers and consumers.

**Food.** No issue on the economic agenda is

7

more vital than food. It is a dramatic example of
the links between bilateral and global issues and
between relations with our allies and relations with
the developing world. Japan is our largest market
for agricultural exports, and we are Japan's prin-
cipal external provider of food. The world's
dependence on the United States for foodstuffs
imposes upon us an obligation to be a reliable
supplier. The United States, therefore, pledges that
in times of tight markets it will take account of the
needs of our long-time customers, such as Japan.
We will seek to prevent a repetition of the unfortu-
nate experience of 1973 when we were forced
suddenly to restrict the export of soybeans to
Japan and other countries.

In a broader context the United States and
Japan bear a special responsibility because they are
among the world's largest producers and consumers
of agricultural goods. We both are in a position to
apply technical innovation and skill to the expan-
sion of food production in developing countries.
And as a hedge against the feast-and-famine cycle
of global harvests, we should both help in creating
an international system of nationally-held grain
reserves by the end of this year.

**Science and Technology.** These areas do not by any means exhaust our joint agenda. We attach great importance to our scientific and technical exchanges. This fall we expect to conclude a comprehensive joint review of all our exchanges. We will then be able to plan our efforts more efficiently and identify new areas of cooperation.

**Environment.** As two of the most advanced industrial nations, we have a special awareness of what progress has done to the environment. The bilateral accord we are about to conclude for environmental protection is, therefore, of great potential importance not only for us but for others in the process of industrialization.

**Cultural Relations.** The talents and joint efforts of our two gifted peoples will surely be a

unique contribution to the wider world commu-
nity. To strengthen this bond the United States
intends to augment our cultural relations with
Japan—an endeavor in which the work of this
Society, and through it, the U.S.-Japan Cultural
Conference, has been crucial. The Administration
will seek to integrate and obtain approval this year
of proposals now before the Congress to establish a
Japan-United States friendship fund which would
make substantial new funds available for cross-
cultural programs between our two countries.

CONCLUSION

The great Japanese writer Saikaku, who lived
in another era when the old order was breaking
down and the shape of things to come was not yet
clear, said that to experience "this modern age, this
mixture of good and ill and yet to steer an honest
course to the splendors of success—this is a feat
reserved for paragons."

Our times demand as much of us. We may not
be paragons, but our assets are great. No two
nations are so different yet so close; none have a
more direct and wide experience of the best and
the worst which the modern age offers, and none
have constructed a more intensive and effective re-
lationship of consultation and cooperation. Our
mutual interest has brought us together, but our
mutual understanding has enabled our friendship
to thrive to a degree which would have been un-
imaginable two decades ago.

Americans and Japanese can take pride in
what we have achieved and use it as a point of
departure for greater efforts still. We are seeking
the crucial balance between diversity and common
purpose that is the best hope for building a crea-
tive, just, and productive international community.
With the good will and good sense, the high hopes
and hard work which have so far marked our jour-
ney, we will continue to strengthen our relations—
for ourselves and for mankind.

INTERVIEW OF SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER
BY WALTER CRONKITE (CBS) TV
EVENING NEWS, JUNE 19, 1975

MR. CRONKITE: A current question, Mr. Secretary, on the day's news regarding the Middle East. There is a story out of Israel that the majority party is sticking by a map, or at least its plans, which make clear that it has no intention of giving up the Golan Heights or the Gaza Strip -- an old position, but it has been restated today. Have they stated that that is a non-negotiable position?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course we are dealing with the Government of Israel and not with a party. The Government of Israel, when Prime Minister Rabin was here, indicated flexibility with respect to negotiations. We did not attempt to draw any final lines. But we did have the impression that they were ready to negotiate in a flexible manner.

MR. CRONKITE: President Ford told the Minneapolis Tribune that the drift is still towards war in the Middle East, a statement made after the meetings with Rabin, and, of course, with Sadat in Europe. Do you agree?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think you are trying to get me into trouble, Walter. I think that the President was trying to emphasize that as long as there is no progress either towards an interim settlement, or an overall settlement, that there will be a drift towards war, and that this drift must be arrested. We believe that there are possibilities of negotiations, but until they have been achieved, the drift towards war will continue.

MR. CRONKITE: What are the prospects now for reversal of that drift?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we have a chance to reverse that drift.

MR. CRONKITE: Could you give us a timetable?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't give a timetable, but I think we are trying to do it within the next months.

MR. CRONKITE: The Secretary of State, in addressing the Japan Society in New York last night, seemed to further define U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the sticky area of military support for non-democratic regimes. He said the lesson of Viet-Nam was that outside military support was not enough -- that there was not a popular will to resist.

- 2 -

Nonetheless, he added, the United States, in the interest of
peace and security, will meet treaty obligations to support
governments that do not reflect the "popular will" and
social justice. I asked him if that meant that American
foreign policy put expediency above principle.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is a very extreme statement. There are situations in which the collapse of a country could have drastic consequences for world peace. For example, in World War II, the United States and Great Britain supported the Soviet Union even though we had fundamental disagreements with their internal system. On the other hand, wherever the United States can do so, and to the maximum extent possible, we must support democratic institutions, humane governments, and before there are pressures we should use and intend to use our influence in that direction.

MR. CRONKITE: You mentioned specifically Korea last night, and obviously this is what you had in mind in much of this discussion. Are you saying that we will keep our treaty commitment even if we know from the Vietnamese experience that popular will is lacking, and we therefore are likely to lose the ball game in the end anyway?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think that the judgment is correct that we will lose the ball game in the end in Korea, or that a willingness to defend against attack from North Korea is lacking. There are some disputes regarding the internal situation in South Korea, and the United States basically supports a liberal evolution towards democratic forms. But the will to resist certainly exists in Korea, and it does not have to be created, as was the case in Viet-Nam.

MR. CRONKITE: On another point from last night's speech, sir, you said that our attitude towards the new regimes in Indochina -- and I assume you mean South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and I suppose Laos along with that -- will "be influenced by their conduct towards their neighbors and their attitude towards us." I wonder what specific signs you are going to be looking for that would signal the possibility of detente with those communist nations of Southeast Asia.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, as far as Laos is concerned, we still have diplomatic relations with it. With respect to Viet-Nam and Cambodia, we would look for particularly the implementation of the Paris Agreement, especially with respect to the missing in action, and we would expect that they maintain peaceful relations without pressure or subversion with their neighbors. Under those conditions, we would be willing to consider our relationships to them.

MR. CRONKITE: How long a time do they have to prove them-

selves -- that they will not have aggressive intentions
towards their neighbors? That could be a long time in
proof, wouldn't it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, but I think one can determine
over the next months or year what the basic pattern of their
behavior is going to be. And I think we'd be open minded
looking for signals.

MR. CRONKITE: A story that has just crossed our desk from
Zaire -- that the U.S. Ambassador has been declared persona
non grata, at least has been asked to leave the country,
presumably over the allegation that Americans were involved
in a plot against President Mobutu's life. Have you any
reaction to that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, these allegations are totally
unfounded and we regret that this decision has been taken.
We do consider Zaire one of the key countries of Africa
with which we would like to maintain cordial relations.
And the action was based on totally wrong information that
fell into the hands of the Government of Zaire, probably
as a result of forgery.

MR. CRONKITE: As a result of what, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It must have been forgery, because
we had absolutely no connection with any plot, nor did we
know there was a plot.

MR. CRONKITE: Thank you very much, sir.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND
SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, JUNE 20, 1975

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, we have just started our discussion. The Foreign Minister and I will be meeting with the President in an hour; we'll meet again for dinner and for breakfast tomorrow. We have just started a very constructive review of the Middle East negotiations and the prospects for peace in the Middle East and we'll continue this review in the other talks that we are going to have. He doesn't know what I have said, but he agrees with me. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Khaddam: I held a discussion with Dr. Kissinger and reviewed the situation in the Middle East. We will continue our talks when I meet with President Ford at 4 o'clock. Thank you.

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE, FOLLOWING HIS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, JUNE 21, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Foreign Minister and I concluded a very detailed review of the Middle East situation and the prospects in the area. We reiterated, as the President has stated repeatedly, the United States would remain engaged in the peace making effort and that it would oppose any stagnation or stalemate. We had a constructive exchange and we will stay in close contact.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you hopeful about further agreement between Syria and Israel?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We -- I don't want to express any prediction, but as I have said, we believe that progress should be made towards an overall peace.

QUESTION: Is progress being made, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am always hopeful.

S/PRS 6/21/75

The Cohesion of the Industrial Democracies:
The Precondition of Global Progress

The Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) met at ministerial level at Paris June 21-22. Following is a statement made before the Council by Secretary Kissinger on June 21, together with the texts of a Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises with its annex (Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises) and Decisions on Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines, on National Treatment, and on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives, adopted by the Council on June 21.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 311 dated June 21

The purposeful cooperation of our nations
has been at the heart of the world's prog-
ress for three decades. Today, we are chal-
lenged to deepen and advance that common
effort. The cooperation of the industrial de-
mocracies is decisive for world peace, pros-
perity, and the cause of justice and human
dignity.

No group of nations is better equipped to
master these challenges. Ours are the soci-
ties that launched the two great events that
gave birth to the modern age—the political
revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries
that shaped today's community of nation-
states and the Industrial Revolution that
produced the contemporary world economy.
We share a heritage of pioneering effort in
all the modern forms of commercial, social,
and governmental organization. And we have
been able to perceive and respond to new

challenges, especially in giving effect to our
recognition of the imperatives of inter-
dependence.

Our democratic systems have disproved the
doctrine that only repression and authoritar-
ianism could advance human well-being. On
the contrary, the industrial democracies as-
sembled here have demonstrated conclusively
that it is in freedom that men achieve the eco-
nomic advances of which ages have dreamed.
There is some irony in the fact that after
years of disparaging our economic system,
both the Socialist countries and the develop-
ing countries have turned to us to help them
advance more rapidly. Today it is the indus-
trial democracies which primarily have the
resources, the managerial genius, the ad-
vanced technology, and the dedication which
are needed for sustained economic develop-
ment under any political system.

The advanced industrial nations have con-
ducted themselves of late with vigor, deter-
mination, and a sense of shared purpose.
Most of the OECD countries are now enter-
ing a period of economic expansion. We have
worked together in the process of recovery,
averting protectionist tendencies in trade
and the selfish pursuit of oil and raw mate-
rials at each other's expense. Largely due to
this, we are recovering quickly and with
excellent prospects for continued progress.

We have acted together because we rec-
ognize that the world economy has become
global. National interests cannot prosper or
endure in isolation. And the nations assem-
bled here are the engines of the world econ-
omy. Our performance is the pivot around
which international trade and finance re-
volve. Our technology and investment are the

July 19, 1976

73

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catalysts of development and economic progress in developing nations.

Today the world economy faces new and demanding challenges. Our past cooperation must be given fresh impetus in our twofold task: to improve our performance in areas where we have already begun to work together and to create mechanisms of cooperation to deal with new issues and opportunities.

This organization is well suited to this task. Its history and durability are a demonstration of the unity and cooperation of the industrial democracies. It has provided a unique forum and necessary focus for dealing with the critical link between national aspirations and global opportunity. This is no accident; it reflects our fundamental moral and political fraternity. Our traditions of freedom give moral meaning and political purpose to our technical achievements.

This is why I wish to stress the importance of furthering our unity and progress through the OECD. The objective is not to forge a bloc for our own advantage or for purposes of confrontation. It is to shape a new international environment based on the consciousness that in an age of interdependence national interests can best be served by advancing the aspirations of all mankind through cooperative efforts.

Let me discuss three areas of challenge and opportunity:

- Strengthening the cohesion and prosperity of the industrialized democracies;

- The new issues we face in economic relations with the Communist world; and

- The ongoing international effort to promote economic development and a constructive long-term relationship between the industrial and developing worlds.

## Relationship of the Industrial Democracies

Our first and fundamental concern must be economic cooperation and progress among the industrialized democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Asia. Tomorrow, finance and economic ministers will discuss these economic questions in detail.

Today I want to sketch in broad terms four essential areas of our cooperation which have the greatest significance for world order and the future of the international system:

- Noninflationary economic growth;

- Strengthening our open international trade and monetary system;

- The encouragement of transnational investment; and

- Greater cooperation in energy.

I shall discuss each of these in turn.

First, as our nations move to recovery and expansion, we must insure steady, noninflationary economic growth. Only in this manner can we resolve conflicting claims on resources, reinforce the political vitality of our institutions, enhance our freedom of action in world affairs, and enlarge the economic horizons of all societies.

We must overcome cycles of boom and stagnation, which in the past have impaired productivity, constricted investment, and choked off our full economic potential. We can achieve sustained growth by containing inflation. The investment needed to create jobs for our growing labor forces will dry up in an environment of rapidly and constantly rising prices. Inflation erodes the progress made in raising the standard of living of our peoples; it strains the social fabric of our democratic societies.

The responsibility for noninflationary growth rests with national governments. But close consultation and collaboration are essential to insure that national policies are complementary and reinforcing; to contribute to exchange rate stability among us; to give special attention to members that are in difficulty; and to collaborate on policies of trade, energy, and relations with the developing countries. The summit meeting at Rambouillet last November made a major contribution to general recovery and promotion of these goals. The summit next week in Puerto Rico will assess the progress we have made and use it as a point of departure for future advances.

This meeting provides an opportunity for the nations assembled here to reaffirm our

74

Department of State Bulletin

joint commitment to an open economic system, to national responsibility, and to international cooperation. With sound and certified policies among us and with efforts to coordinate our strategies for expansion, the potential for the world's sustained economic growth can be realized.

At last year's OECD ministerial meeting, at U.S. recommendation, a Group of Distinguished Economists was set up, chaired by Professor [Paul W.] McCracken. It was assigned the task of examining the medium- and long-term and structural problems of sustained economic growth. It is exploring the problems of inflation, investment, structural imbalances, and adequate supplies of raw materials. We look forward to its conclusions and recommendations.

Strengthening our trade and monetary system also requires enhanced collaboration. In recent years, high unemployment and economic uncertainty have revived protectionist pressures in many countries; inflation and drastic differences in the performance of member nations have produced major payments imbalances, exchange rate pressures, and financial strains.

The Rambouillet summit and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] meeting in Jamaica last January were milestones in adapting the international monetary system to a new era. We have agreed to new IMF rules to avoid the shocks and disequilibrium which plagued the Bretton Woods system and to insure a smoother functioning of our trade and investment.

Today and tomorrow the OECD nations are continuing close and detailed consultations. We will examine both current problems and the long-term future, both the existing institutions and institutional reform. A recent example of our capacity for innovation was the agreement on the OECD Financial Support Fund, designed to help us deal cooperatively with serious economic dislocations aggravated by the oil price rises. The United States is seeking swift ratification of this agreement so that the Fund may come into being soon.

In *trade*, two years ago the OECD nations

jointly undertook an extraordinary political commitment to preserve an open economic system despite a period of general economic difficulty. On May 30, 1974, we pledged to avoid new restrictions on trade. We rejected policies which would tend to shift one nation's difficulties onto others. That declaration strengthened our successful efforts to resist protectionist pressures and thus benefit countries with particularly acute balance-of-payments problems. The declaration was renewed last year. We should now renew it for an additional year.

Our economic recovery provides significant opportunities for further progress:

- First, the political commitment represented by our trade pledge should be the basis for wider cooperation among us. The United States proposes that this organization recommend further areas for common action, not only on current trade problems and negotiations but on the long-term operation of our open trading system.

- Second, all nations assembled here should make a political commitment to accelerate the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. We are at the point where we must move forward at a more rapid pace if the negotiations are to reach a successful conclusion in 1977. To this end, the United States strongly recommends that we reach agreement this fall in Geneva on a tariff-cutting formula.

- Third, it is our shared obligation to improve the conditions of trade for developing countries. The postwar trading system was built on a consensus among industrial countries in which the developing countries did not participate and which they now challenge in several important respects. We need to reexamine the trading system, prepared to change or strengthen it where necessary. In the multilateral trade negotiations we will be negotiating new provisions in such areas as nontariff barriers, supply access, the settlement of disputes, and trade restrictions that are justified for balance-of-payments purposes. This organization and its members can play a crucial role in building a new global consensus on these issues.

July 19, 1976

75

*Transnational investment* is the third area calling for close collaboration among the industrial nations.

Investment is the lifeblood of our economies and vital to worldwide development. It has been a principal source of the economic growth and security and prosperity which the nations represented here enjoy. It has been the single largest source of development capital for Third World nations and a powerful force marshaling management and technology for their benefit. It has developed resources; it has increased income; it has provided jobs. Since the midsixties, foreign direct investment has been growing faster than international trade and global GNP.

The increasing importance of transnational investment to the global economy has been accompanied by no little concern over the activities of private investors, particularly the multinational corporations. Questions have been raised as to how the international firms can serve the national interests of their hosts as well as their own. A few notorious cases of illicit payments have stirred apprehension and cast a cloud over the overwhelming majority of international firms whose behavior has been beyond reproach.

Governments, too, have impeded the flow of capital through inconsistent policies or discriminatory treatment of international firms. And most industrial countries have been under pressure at home to take increasingly nationalistic positions toward international investment.

If this trend is not halted, we shall face a gradual deterioration in the international investment climate, with serious consequences for economic development and the global economy.

It is highly significant, therefore, that this organization undertook two related tasks: to negotiate voluntary guidelines for multinational firms and to clarify governmental responsibilities to preserve and promote a liberal investment climate. We are able to announce today the acceptance by OECD member governments of a declaration on investment. This declaration extends the co-

operation which has characterized our trade and monetary relations into the area of investment. It includes:

- Recommended guidelines for the activities of multinational corporations;

- An agreed statement of the basic responsibilities of our governments with respect to transnational investment;

- Provision for strengthened cooperation on the questions of incentives and disincentives to foreign direct investment; and

- Provision for increased consultations between our governments on all these matters.

The United States strongly endorses this declaration and urges its widest possible adoption and observance.

A framework for investment is now emerging. We must encourage its development. Therefore, in addition to our full support for the OECD declaration, the United States urges the following policies for our nations:

- First, we should support the work of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations and the related U.N. Information and Research Center within its Secretariat, which will develop a comprehensive information system on issues relating to transnational corporations. This will contribute to a fuller understanding of investment issues among all nations.

- Second, we should review the proposal of the International Resources Bank which the United States put forward at UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] at Nairobi last month. While the Bank will focus on energy and raw materials, its principal features—as a multilateral guarantor against noncommercial risk and as a facilitator of production sharing and technology transfer—have important implications for development generally.

- Third, we should take strong collective measures to eliminate corrupt payments. Bribery and extortion are a burden on international trade and investment. We reiterate our proposal that negotiation of a binding international agreement on corrupt practices

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Department of State Bulletin

begin at next month's session of the U.N.
Economic and Social Council.

—Fourth, we should cooperate to restrain
anticompetitive practices of firms which
undermine the benefits of our open economic
system. The United States proposes a dual
effort: to reduce international procedural
obstacles to the enforcement of laws against
international restrictive business practices
and to pursue bilateral and multilateral
agreements for international antitrust co-
operation similar to that about to be con-
cluded between the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany.

—Fifth, we should strengthen the work
of specialized OECD committees which deal
with investment problems such as harmoniz-
ing statistical systems, cataloguing restric-
tive business practices, improving the ex-
change of tax information, dealing with tax
haven problems, as well as their work now
underway on the general topics of technol-
ogy transfer and short-term capital move-
ments.

The fourth crucial sphere of cooperation among the industrial nations is *energy*. The cooperation of energy-consuming nations has become an imperative, for the last few years have demonstrated the economic and political costs of loss of control over this critical component of industrial growth.

For the next several years, our nations'
heavy dependence on imported oil will con-
tribute to our political and economic vulnera-
bility. The outlook for reducing our depend-
ence in the next decade is not encouraging.
Forecasts based on existing energy pro-
grams in the industrial countries indicate
that our imports of OPEC [Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil will in-
crease from 27 million barrels a day in 1975
to as much as 37 million barrels per day by
1985. At the same time, it has become clear
that oil reserves, while still large, are finite.
Thus we must reduce our immediate depend-
ence on imported oil side by side with be-
ginning a long-term transition to alternative
energy systems through the most rapid pos-
sible development of new and alternative
sources of energy.

The industrial countries have begun to re-
spond to the energy challenge. The difficult
process of reorienting energy priorities and
establishing new energy policies has been
started. When the energy crisis became ap-
parent, we moved rapidly to set up the new
International Energy Agency (IEA), within
the framework of the OECD. Through its
impetus, a comprehensive structure of tech-
nical cooperation and policy coordination
among industrial countries has grown up. At
the same time, a dialogue with the OPEC
countries has been started in the Conference
on International Economic Cooperation
(CIEC). And the importance of helping the
poorer developing countries—especially those
with limited energy resources—to survive
the energy crisis has been recognized.

Despite these accomplishments, our ef-
forts have fallen far short of our needs.
They will neither adequately reduce our im-
mediate energy vulnerability nor achieve a
satisfactory global balance of energy supply
and demand over the longer term. The United
States therefore proposes that OECD mem-
bers take the following cooperative steps:

—First, that we establish on an urgent
basis joint energy production projects to
pool technical know-how and financing in
areas such as coal extraction and utilization,
uranium enrichment, and synthetic fuels.
Such actions would accord with the commit-
ments we undertook in the IEA Long-Term
Program. They will contribute to the early
availability of commercially attractive addi-
tional energy sources.

—Second, that we establish collective and
individual goals for substantially reduced de-
pendence on imported oil by 1985. This will
require agreed targets for additional energy
production, particularly in the coal and nu-
clear energy sectors; these represent our
best hope for substantially reducing our
energy dependence in the next decade.

—Third, that we agree to intensify our
national efforts to reduce the growth in
demand for energy.

The United States urges that the Govern-
ing Board of the IEA launch these efforts on
a priority basis. Member governments

July 19, 1976

77

should endorse these goals for reduced de-
pendence and also make the essential polit-
ical commitments to specific and concrete
actions to achieve them. We should aim for
a ministerial meeting in six to nine months
to accomplish these objectives. The minis-
terial meeting should also look beyond the
next decade to the post-oil era and seek ways
to build on cooperative research and develop-
ment efforts in such areas as solar power and
nuclear fusion. OECD countries not members
of the IEA should be given an opportunity
to participate fully in this process.

This agenda—of action for growth, trade and monetary affairs, investment, and energy—suggests an expanding role and responsibility for the OECD. Working together, the nations of the OECD face an unprecedented opportunity to advance their common welfare and prosperity. And from this foundation of cooperation we can more effectively deal with the issues which involve us with nations outside the OECD region.

Let me now turn to these relations with
the rest of the world.

East-West Economic Relations

Our relations with the nations of the East turn primarily upon political and security issues. In the past, trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have not been among our central concerns. But a new dimension of economic interaction between East and West has begun to take shape. It is time to act cooperatively so that this new economic factor becomes an increasingly positive element in the world economy.

The Soviet Union has the second largest
economy in the world. Together with all
COMECON [Council of Mutual Economic As-
sistance] countries, it accounts for about 20
percent of world output. But despite the size
of its economy, the Soviet Union is not a
major factor in the world economic system.
Its trade is relatively small; it has made
little contribution to economic development.

In recent years, however, the Soviet

Union and the countries of Eastern Europe have moved toward greater economic contact with the West. The basic reason is plain. These countries have come to realize that they cannot provide for growing consumer demand or meet the technological imperatives of the more sophisticated economy they seek solely from their own economic resources. Further, many of the countries of Eastern Europe wish to diversify trading patterns that were established in the aftermath of World War II.

As a result, in the last four years, trade
between the COMECON countries and the
OECD countries has increased nearly four-
fold. Most East European countries now de-
pend on and prefer Western machinery, tech-
nology, and material imports for the dynamic
element of their economic growth. And in
matters of finance, the sudden increase in
the external debt of the Soviet Union and the
countries of Eastern Europe has been strik-
ing. Their net debt to private Western banks
doubled in 1975 to $15 billion, and their total
hard currency debt has reached nearly twice
that amount.

The most familiar example of the impact
of Communist countries on the international
economy has been Soviet shortfalls in the
production of grain, which has become the
single most volatile element in the world food
picture. In addition the Socialist countries
can become an important element in the
global energy balance. And in an era where
adequate supplies of many other industrial
raw materials can no longer be taken for
granted, the extensive mineral reserves of
the East can expand resource availability
worldwide. It is therefore clear that in our
multilateral efforts to build a strengthened
international economic system, we will have
to take account of the potential needs and
contributions of the centrally planned
economies.

For us, the industrial democracies in the
OECD, the growing economic interaction be-
tween East and West and the Eastern in-
fluence on the global economy are realities
that if arranged wisely can be positive de-
velopments, stabilizing relationships and

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Department of State Bulletin

broadening contacts. At the same time, man-
aging relations between free economies and
state trading systems has inevitable compli-
cations. Dealing with a centrally planned
economy under strict political direction can
never be treated simply as a commercial
enterprise alone.

Certain principles stand out:

—All our nations have been engaged in this process.

—State trading countries must not be permitted to use their centrally directed systems for unfair advantage, nor should they be permitted to play off the industrial democracies against each other through selective political pressure.

—Growing East-West trade also presents
hopeful prospects, both economic and politi-
cal, if approached with understanding, skill,
and foresight.

—In short, it is up to the industrial democracies to consult closely and to manage this process cooperatively.

Therefore the United States proposes that the OECD nations adopt a systematic work program for developing objectives and approaches for our economic relations with the Communist countries. To this end, some progress has already been made; for example, in aligning national export credit policies among the industrial countries. If we are to face this issue in an intelligent and harmonious fashion, many additional areas should be examined. Specifically, our nations should seek answers to the following questions:

—How can we insure effective reciprocity in trade between market and nonmarket countries?

—How do we deal with the problem of dumping and other unfair trade practices by countries in which prices need not bear a relation to costs or market forces?

—What are the implications of the
growing external debt of the Communist
countries?

—How can the industrial democracies deal with possible efforts to misuse economic rela-

tions for political purposes inimical to their
interests?

—What should be the relationship be-
tween the nations of the East and the multi-
lateral bodies dealing with economic affairs?

—How do we take account of the diversity of interests and needs that has already appeared among Eastern countries?

—And finally, is it possible to bring the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European
countries into the process of responsibly
assisting development in the Third World?

The United States will elaborate its views on these issues at the next meeting of the Executive Committee in Special Session. The results of our examinations of these questions could be embodied in a report to the next ministerial meeting of this organization.

Growing East-West trade presents problems together with great opportunities. It is up to the countries assembled here to understand the process and its complexities and to manage it cooperatively. In that case, it can contribute to the vitality of our economies and to the stability of the international order.

The Relationship Between North and South

One of the most urgent and compelling challenges that summon our cooperation is the relationship between the industrial and the developing nations. The new era of international cooperation we seek must include economic relations that offer mutual prosperity and widening opportunity for all the peoples of the world.

Every nation has a stake in global stability and world peace. But the ultimate good must be to look beyond the maintenance of peace to a world which offers its children a hope of a better future.

The United States has made its commitment. We have demonstrated our determination at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly, at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris, at Kingston in January, and at the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi last month.

July 19, 1976

79

Our efforts begin from the conviction that an effective international system must be founded upon a consensus among all nations and peoples. The world community which is our ultimate aspiration can only be realized if all nations and peoples can pursue their goals with a sense of participation and an awareness that their concerns are heeded. If we are to live in a stable world, the preponderant number of nations must be persuaded that their legitimate concerns are taken seriously.

The poor nations cry out for development. Their objectives are clear: economic progress, a role in international decisions that affect them, and an equitable share of global economic benefits. The objectives of the industrialized nations are equally clear: widening prosperity for all peoples produced by an open world system of trade and investment with expanding markets for North and South. We want to see stable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials as the fundamental basis for a prosperous world economy.

Thus, the objectives of the industrial democracies and those of the developing nations should be complementary. The process of building a world community must therefore be shared by nations of both North and South and must address the issue of economic development in the context of growing global prosperity.

But this is not inevitable. Effective cooperation presupposes that both sides face certain realities without illusion.

The most critical of these realities is that development is a long-term process. Sustained economic development cannot possibly result from any one conference or any one set of proposals. It will depend primarily upon the internal effort, the domestic policy, and the national will of the developing countries themselves. In most cases the effort will extend over decades. Often this will require painful short-term sacrifices for longer term gains. Development cannot be created by rhetoric or by parliamentary victories in international forums.

Development further requires the sustained and collective effort of the industrial countries. The role of the industrial democracies is critical, for we possess the largest markets and most of the world's capital and technology. Thus real development presupposes a serious, unemotional, constructive North-South dialogue.

In such a dialogue it is futile for one party to seek to impose solutions to the problems of development on another. An atmosphere of extortion or pressure, unworkable proposals, or excessive reliance on parliamentary maneuvers will ultimately undermine public support in the only countries capable of contributing effectively to development.

We of the industrial democracies have a special responsibility. What we do—or fail to do—is critical to the future of the countries of the Third World. If we substitute competition among ourselves for a dispassionate analysis of the issues, the development process will falter. Our resources will be inefficiently scattered or misallocated; projects will too often prove fruitless for lack of careful analysis or want of wider support. We do no one a favor when we substitute rhetorical concessions for intelligent and realistic proposals that link the interests and concerns of both sides in a prospering global economy. Those who curry short-term favor may mortgage the long-term future.

It is imperative that the North-South dialogue advance in a way which benefits both sides. In the long run, progress, stability, and peace depend upon it.

The United States has done its utmost to be forthcoming in the dialogue. We have strained our domestic processes to develop pragmatic proposals to meet real problems in our relations with the developing world. As our economies improve and as we, together with the developing world, identify new areas for cooperation, we can look forward to widening global cooperation which can serve the interests of all.

The spirit of cooperation necessary between North and South requires first a commitment to cooperation among the industrial nations. This is not a call for confrontation

80

Department of State Bulletin

[L]

with the Third World. It is an indispensable step we must take if we are not to fragment our efforts and fail in our objectives.

The United States believes that this or-
ganization should focus on three areas where
our cooperation is most necessary and would
be most effective:

- We must improve our ability to concert our development efforts in international forums, for it is in these meetings that ideas are launched, compromises are made, and political directions are set.

- We must enhance our collaboration in our bilateral and multilateral aid programs; for our resources are limited, and closer alignment of programs is essential for their effectiveness.

- We must develop a longer term strategy for development which integrates the diverse strands of North-South policy, including foreign aid, technology transfer, financial policy, and trade. For development is a comprehensive and never-ending process with implications for every area of the international economic system.

Let me discuss each area in turn.

First, we must improve the coordination of our positions at major international conferences. Recent unfavorable experiences at UNCTAD in Nairobi and at other international forums should make clear the importance of this step. We in this organization have supporting mechanisms for coordination of positions on energy, commodities, finance, and development, but their effectiveness has been frequently less than adequate. For the remainder of this year we will be relying on these bodies to continue to support our work in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation. It is therefore imperative that we review now our recent experience with the objective of strengthening the coordinating role of each OECD support mechanism as well as the relationship among them.

The United States recommends that the Secretary General undertake an immediate examination of the issues and present recommendations to the Executive Committee in

Special Session on ways in which we may
more closely align our positions.

We suggest as well that this organization take a more active role in developing views on key North-South issues than it has in the past. We believe this could most fruitfully be done by identifying in advance of international meetings specific issues of major concern to industrialized countries and arranging for consultations to develop mutually supporting positions. It makes no sense to work out our differences under the pressure of deadlines and of other participants at international conferences.

The next several months will be a test of our ability to work together in a variety of international settings. The agenda of conferences is full. We will be considering on a case-by-case basis measures to improve the functioning of individual commodity markets, including the reduction of excessive price fluctuations and methods of buffer stock financing. We will also be translating the analysis of the first six months of the year into concrete results in CIEC. In this forum, the United States looks forward to visible and concrete achievements in energy, raw materials, investment, trade, and measures to address the problems of the poorest countries. We will want:

- To explore possibilities for further consultations on energy, including ways to assist developing nations that have no energy resources;

- To facilitate progress on commodity discussions, including ways to improve the functioning of individual commodity markets; and

- To begin work on the International Resources Bank proposal, which we see as relating to the work of all the CIEC commissions, particularly those dealing with energy and raw materials.

Second, we must increase the effectiveness of our bilateral and multilateral aid efforts in addressing specific problems in the developing world. The OECD Development Assistance Committee has done important work to improve and coordinate development assist-

July 19, 1976

81

(L)

ance policies. There are, as well, over 20 con-
sultative groups working with regard to
specific developing nations. We should review
our coordination in all these areas. We may
consider streamlining some of those mecha-
nisms and eliminating duplication.

We must seek to enhance the coordination
of assistance policies and programs which
have a regional or even continental focus.
The *Club des Amis du Sahel* is a recent suc-
cessful effort to concert our resources to
combat the problems of that African sub-
region. We should explore whether there are
other regions, in Africa or elsewhere, where
similar approaches are needed. The recent
initiative by the President of France for
focusing joint attention on specific problems
on the African Continent is an example of
the kind of effort we must make together in
the future.

Third, we must devote a major portion of
our efforts to longer range planning for
global development. The problem of growth
will not go away. No one policy will be de-
cisive; no one conference will devise perma-
nent solutions. We must begin to focus
honestly and carefully on the development
challenge through the distant future.

A high priority in this effort must be to
consider together the various development is-
sues we have been addressing separately.
Development policies can be either mutually
reinforcing or they can undermine one an-
other. We must find a way to look at devel-
opment as a comprehensive and integrated
whole, harmonizing our long-range planning
efforts in trade, aid, investment, and tech-
nology. These individual policies need to be
placed into a larger coherent plan so that the
industrial nations' development efforts can
more efficiently respond to the most pressing
issues in the developing world.

To achieve a more effective integrated de-
velopment strategy, the United States pro-
poses that OECD countries decide now to
review the entire range of North-South is-
sues which we will be addressing over the
remainder of this decade and beyond. Over
the next year we should develop a consistent
and comprehensive set of objectives and
strategies.

At the same time, we should now move to
strengthen the institutional arrangements
within this organization for handling North-
South issues. There should be a central focal
point in the OECD for consideration of all
such activities. This will give a greater po-
litical impetus to our efforts. And it should
also stimulate greater consideration for the
needs and interests of developing nations in
the ongoing work of specialized OECD com-
mittees.

The kind of coordination which I have sug-
gested will require attention at the highest
levels of our governments. It will, of course,
also require compromises on policies and pri-
orities which each of us has developed in the
past. But it is our best, perhaps our sole,
chance to accelerate the pace of constructive
progress in our relations with the Third
World while not undermining our relations
with each other.

The Imperative of Cooperative Action

The nations assembled in this room pro-
ceed from two main premises: the interde-
pendence among the OECD nations and our
common desire to help shape a new era of
global economic cooperation among all na-
tions.

The central task before the industrialized
democracies of the OECD is to give new
focus and purpose to our own cooperative
economic action. Economics is only part of
that enterprise. The choices before us and
the decisions we take will, above all, reflect
our perception of ourselves as peoples and as
nations. The tasks are long term, and they
demand that we extend our line of sight
beyond immediate technical issues or politi-
cal controversies to more distant horizons.

Ours is a time when the centers of global
power and influence are many and diverse.
And ours, therefore, is a choice between co-
operation or chaos. Today more than ever,
the industrial democracies require leadership
determined not to adapt to reality, but to
shape it. Circumstances have provided us
with a clear understanding of our interde-
pendence, and our efforts to translate this
reality into common progress are well begun.

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Department of State Bulletin

We have every reason for confidence in our capacities.

Our cooperative endeavor, which has accomplished so much in the past, can be even more dynamic as we turn to the new and long-term challenges of interdependence. What we elect to do together is bound to have vast meaning to a world that seeks progress and justice and needs from all of us in this room a fresh demonstration of what strong and free nations working together can accomplish.

## TEXTS OF DECLARATION, WITH ANNEX, AND DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL¹

### Text of Declaration

#### DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

#### THE GOVERNMENTS OF OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES²

##### CONSIDERING

that international investment has assumed increased importance in the world economy and has considerably contributed to the development of their countries;

that multinational enterprises play an important role in this investment process;

that co-operation by Member countries can improve the foreign investment climate, encourage the positive contribution which multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress, and minimise and resolve difficulties which may arise from their various operations;

that, while continuing endeavours within the OECD may lead to further international arrangements and agreements in this field, it seems appropriate at this stage to intensify their co-operation and consultation on issues relating to international investment and multinational enterprises through inter-related instruments each of which deals with a different aspect of the matter and together constitute a framework within which the OECD will consider these issues:

##### DECLARE:

###### I. Guidelines for MNE's

that they jointly recommend to multinational

enterprises operating in their territories the observance of the Guidelines as set forth in the Annex hereto having regard to the considerations and understandings which introduce the Guidelines and are an integral part of them.

### II. National Treatment

1. that Member countries should, consistent with their needs to maintain public order, to protect their essential security interests and to fulfil commitments relating to international peace and security, accord to enterprises operating in their territories and owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of another Member country (hereinafter referred to as "Foreign-Controlled Enterprises") treatment under their laws, regulations and administrative practices, consistent with international law and no less favourable than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises (hereinafter referred to as "National Treatment").

2. that Member countries will consider applying "National Treatment" in respect of countries other than Member countries.

3. that Member countries will endeavour to ensure that their territorial subdivisions apply "National Treatment".

4. that this Declaration does not deal with the right of Member countries to regulate the entry of foreign investment or the conditions of establishment of foreign enterprises.

### III. International Investment Incentives and Disincentives

1. that they recognise the need to strengthen their co-operation in the field of international direct investment.

2. that they thus recognise the need to give due weight to the interests of Member countries affected by specific laws, regulations and administrative practices in this field (hereinafter called "measures") providing official incentives and disincentives to international direct investment.

3. that Member countries will endeavour to make such measures as transparent as possible, so that their importance and purpose can be ascertained and that information on them can be readily available.

### IV. Consultation Procedures

that they are prepared to consult one another on the above matters in conformity with the Decisions of the Council relating to Inter-Governmental Consultation Procedures on the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, on National Treatment and on International Investment Incentives and Disincentives.

#### V. Review

that they will review the above matters within three years with a view to improving the effectiveness of international economic co-operation

¹ Adopted on June 21 by the OECD Council meeting at ministerial level (texts from OECD press release PRESS/A(76)20).

² The Turkish Government was not in a position to participate in this Declaration. [Footnote in original.]

July 19, 1976

83

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 23, 1975

No. 342

As Prepared for Delivery

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 P.M. EDT MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1975. EMBARGOED FOR WIRE
TRANSMISSION UNTIL 6:00 P.M. EDT MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1975. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUB-
LISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SOUTHERN COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AND THE ATLANTA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

June 23, 1975

CONSTANCY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

We meet at a time when America, as so often before in its history, is
turning a time of testing into a period of renewal.

Less than three months ago under the impact of our disappointments in
Indochina some were questioning the very nature of our involvement in
world affairs. The Executive and the Congress seemed to be heading for
a stalemate on foreign policy.

But paradoxically our setbacks have brought home to us -- as well as the
rest of the world -- how essential America is to the peace and prosperity
of mankind. And at home the dialogue between our two coequal branches
of government is taking place in a more constructive atmosphere.

We have every reason to face our future with confidence. The United
States still stands as the greatest democracy the world has ever known.
Our institutions have withstood extraordinary turmoil and dissension
and have emerged vital and strong. Whatever our disappointments we have
reason for pride in our achievements. If there is peace in the world
today, our sacrifice has been decisive; if there is to be progress, our
contribution will be essential.

We have learned irrevocably the central fact of the modern world; our
security, our well-being, our very existence are intimately bound up
with the kind of international environment we shall succeed in building.

PR #342

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If the weakness of free peoples tempts aggression, the lives of Americans will be in danger. If the disunity of free peoples invites economic chaos, the well-being of Americans will be in jeopardy. As the energy crisis surely has taught us, we live in an interdependent world -- a world in which words such as "isolation" and "withdrawal" grow ever more anachronistic.

Thus we are not about to reverse the course of the last 30 years, retreat from our commitments, and leave our friends and allies to fend for themselves in the vacuum our actions would inevitably create. We shall not invite chaos. On the contrary, before us is a new opportunity to achieve peace and progress greater than even our recent past.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has undertaken a role of world leadership which has had the support of both parties and all Administrations. That policy has preserved peace and freedom; it has sustained global stability and the global economy. Indeed it is our very accomplishments that have created the new conditions -- and problems -- which we must now face.

- America's assistance to the post-war recovery of Western Europe and Japan, and our defensive shield, promoted the resurgence of those allies as strong and independent pillars of the free world.

- The international economic system -- the trading and monetary relationships created by American leadership at Bretton Woods in 1944 -- has fostered economic progress not only in the industrial democracies but in every quarter of the globe.

- The inexorable process of decolonization which we encouraged, and our pioneering efforts in technical and economic assistance for development, have helped scores of new nations launch their own national progress.

Foreign policy is a process. It knows no plateaus. What does not become a point of departure for a new advance soon turns first into stagnation and then into retreat. Thus the achievements of the past generation have created the agenda for the next decades:

- The growing strength and self confidence of our allies requires the adaptation of our alliances from American tutelage to equal partnership.

- The growing destructiveness of nuclear weapons requires an alternative to policies of confrontation and an easing of international tensions.

- The interdependence of the world economy must lead to increased cooperation among the industrialized nations and a greater recognition of the concerns of the developing countries.

PR #342

-3-

This agenda is vast. But there are not many periods of history when man can see clearly the outline of his own future and shape it to his ends. We have it in our power to lay the foundation of a new international structure -- in which nations no longer fear domination, in which negotiation replaces confrontation, and in which the fulfillment of basic human needs becomes a central concern on the agenda of international diplomacy.

A world of over 140 nations is a world of unimagined diversity and complexity. But it is also a world of enormous potential. A world of pluralism, of spreading ideas, of independent states free to choose their destiny, is a world of hope and an opportunity for fresh creation.

And the United States will always be mindful of its responsibilities. We have learned our limits, but we have not forgotten our possibilities. We are the world's largest democratic nation; we are the greatest single concentration of economic and military power; we are the nation with the most experience at organizing international cooperation; we are the major influence in global communication. If we do not lead, no other nation that stands for what we believe in can take our place.

## The Elements of America's Strength

What then is required of us? What are the elements of our strength?

First of all, we must maintain the bedrock of our security. While foreign policy must reach beyond military concerns, there can be no substitute for maintaining our own defenses and the objective conditions of our security. An equilibrium of power is essential to any stable international order. A world in which the survival of nations is at the mercy of others is a world of insecurity, instability, and oppression.

America's military strength has always been used to defend, never to oppress. At home, we have already adapted our defense budget to accord with our national priorities. In terms of its portion of the Federal budget and of the Gross National Product, our defense spending is at the lowest level in 25 years. Yet the trend of military programs of our potential adversaries is in the direction of expansion. Therefore there is an irreducible minimum below which we cannot go without allowing important interests of the United States and its allies to be endangered. We will seek prudent measures of arms control to enhance our security. But this Administration is determined never to allow the military defenses of the United States to be dismantled.

We strive to create the conditions for accommodation and reconciliation of differences with adversaries. But conciliation must not flow from weakness; flexibility is a virtue only in those who are thought to have an alternative.

Secondly, we have also learned that all our objectives -- our security, our well-being, the cohesion of our alliances, and the health of the international environment -- depend to a remarkable degree on the health

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of the American economy. This is, rightly, an immediate concern of every American; it is also the engine of economic growth worldwide, and therefore an international responsibility.

The recession and inflation of the last two years have had ominous international consequences -- which now we are on the way to remedying. Recession and inflation eat away at the well-being and hopes of groups on the margin of prosperity. They breed disunity at home, drain the energies of nations away from international concerns, and complicate the harmony of international relations. At home, they undermine social peace, confidence in government, and the vitality of democratic processes. Abroad, economic strains tempt the governments of the industrial nations into protectionism or measures of rivalry and threaten an era of bloc economic warfare between rich nations and poor.

Yet no government acting alone has a possibility of correcting the fundamental economic conditions that beset it. In the modern world, our economies are tied together; we prosper or decline together. The restoration of growth offers our best hope of accommodating the aspirations of all who compete for betterment of their own future. It frees resources for meeting all national needs. It restores faith in democratic institutions and democratic leaders.

The position of the American economy is central. As the President said in his State of the Union address in January: "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do." We shall do what is required.

Finally, our national strength depends on our unity as a people. There is no limit to what free men can accomplish acting together.

In the last quarter of this century, we are no longer preponderant. We can no longer overwhelm our problems with our resources; the diversity and complexity of the world no longer offer moral simplicity. We are, therefore, called upon, as never before, to show purpose, coherence, flexibility and imagination in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

We must be one nation, one government. Our institutions must moderate special interests in the definition of a national interest. We must have the self-discipline to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive process. We must attack our problems and not each other. We can no longer afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

The consensus which sustained an enlightened involvement in foreign affairs for more than a generation is one of our most precious national resources. We are on the way to restoring our unity and therefore our capacity to act as a confident nation. We shall spare no effort to continue this process so that we will face our third century and its challenges as a united people.

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Today's Agenda

Let me now turn to our agenda and describe the design of our policy.

Alliances: Our allies and friends remain our first international priority.

What unites us and our allies are not simply the treaties signed a gener-
ation ago but the inescapable necessities of the present world. In
recent weeks we have reaffirmed our commitment to our alliances. We
have made clear that the United States will stand by its obligations
in Asia as well as in Europe. But what gives life to our alliances is
not verbal reaffirmation but the reality of common action in response
to common problems. We must find common purpose in challenges beyond
the necessities of military defense.

This is why last week I outlined, on behalf of the President, the agenda
for our close relationship with Japan and Asia. This is why on his
trip to Europe the President outlined the issues facing all the nations
of the Western Alliance. The tasks which the President set before the
NATO Summit could serve as the agenda for all our alliances:

-- we must maintain a strong, modern and credible defense; an
alliance that does not have the vigor and dedication to
defend itself fails in its primary purpose;

-- we must improve the quality and integrity of our political
relations; participation and responsibility must be un-
qualified if they are to be credible;

-- we must improve our political consultation to develop common policies to deal with common problems;

-- we must work together in setting a productive and realistic agenda for the easing of tensions;

-- we must look to the health of our democratic institutions;

-- we must understand that the industrialized societies hold the key to the world's new problems of population, food, energy development, raw materials.

Urgent, cooperative action is needed on all these issues. Alliances
must be adjusted to changing security requirements or they will disin-
tegrate. They must reflect common political objectives and a common
strategy for attaining them, or their defensive capability will lack a
sense of purpose. Therefore, we attach great importance to improved
political consultations. And we must never forget that strong domestic
institutions ultimately provide the best protection against subversion
as well as the sinews for defense against aggression.

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Progress has been made but much work remains. On the central problem of economic growth, allied leaders have begun to coordinate national economic policies to an unprecedented degree.

On the vital subject of energy, the industrial nations created the International Energy Agency, to pool the efforts of the major consumers. We have agreed on safeguards against new oil emergencies; we have established a $25 billion solidarity fund to ensure against monetary dislocations due to the massive payments imbalances caused by energy costs; we have launched new programs of conservation of existing supplies and the development of alternative sources. We are building the foundation for a constructive dialogue with the energy producers looking toward a fair and equitable long-term economic relationship.

This remains a priority concern. We are determined to end our vulnerability to external decisions or external pressures. As the economies of the industrialized nations begin again to expand, the necessity for energy conservation and development of new energy sources becomes more urgent. Without determined efforts now, the expansion of demand will give free rein to the producers' ability to maintain or raise the price of oil or to use the supply of energy for political purposes.

The national interest demands a comprehensive and effective energy program. The President will work with the Congress to obtain it; but if that effort fails he will exercise the authority he has to reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources.

In our political relations, we and our allies both have an obligation to a common interest. We do not assist others in their defense as an act of charity but in our mutual interest. For us to terminate military assistance or even sales to an ally is basically self-defeating. We weaken the political ties, endanger our collective defense, and also fail to achieve whatever purpose the aid restriction was meant to serve. For this reason, the President has strongly opposed the Congressional cut-off of military aid to Turkey and is now working hard with the Congress to bring about its immediate restoration.

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By the same token, no country should imagine that it is doing us a
favor be remaining in an alliance with us. Any ally whose perception
of its national interest changes will find us prepared to adapt or
end our treaty relationship. No ally can pressure us by a threat of
termination; we will not accept that its security is more important
to us than it is to itself.

We assume that our friends regard their ties to us as serving their
own national purposes, not as privileges to be granted and withdrawn
as means of pressure. Where this is not the mutual perception, then
clearly it is time for change. Where it is the common view, the U.S.
will remain a steady friend. We regard our alliances as the corner-
stone of our foreign policy and the essential pillars of the structure
of international stability.

**Easing of Tensions:** However fundamental our alliances, we recognize that a peace that rests solely on a balance of forces and off-setting blocs is fragile and sterile. We are committed, therefore, to continue the effort to improve relations with the Communist powers. In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to a serious effort to ease tensions on a reliable and reciprocal basis.

Therefore, in the past few years we have taken a number of practical
steps to regularize our relations with the Soviet Union. The objective
has been, in our own interest, to reduce the danger of war and to
encourage new patterns of relations and international conduct.

This process proceeds on several levels. We have negotiated balanced
and effective agreements to limit strategic weapons on both sides and
in other areas of arms control.

In our bilateral relations, we have reached a number of agreements for
economic and technical cooperation, agreements that provide benefits to
both sides and give both sides a stake in the continuation of a
positive relationship.

In resolving political conflicts in vital areas where we are both
engaged directly, such as Europe, we have reached an agreement in 1971
to make Berlin more secure. We are now engaged in comprehensive
negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions and on the
broader questions of security and cooperation in Europe.

In other areas of the world such as the Middle East, South and South-
east Asia, the course of U.S.-Soviet relations has been uneven. There
have been cases where tensions have, in our view, been exacerbated
needlessly. Thus, while we have made significant progress in our
relations with the Soviet Union over the past six years, we have done
so without illusion. The USSR remains our ideological and political
rival. Should it seek to use detente as a device for selective
exploitation of strategic opportunities the entire fabric of our
evolving relationship will be brought into question.

At the same time, it is vital to maintain our perspective. We must never
lost sight of the fact that war between nuclear superpowers risks the

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extinction of mankind. We are ideological opponents; technology
drives our competition; political conflict around the world pulls us
into rivalry. If humanity is not to live constantly at the edge of
an abyss and eventually to be consumed by its technology, we must
take care to nurture mutual restraint which has been so painfully
built up, guarding against the tendency to use our improving relation-
ship with the USSR as the whipping boy for our frustrations. Detente
can never be a substitute for our own efforts; where our own efforts
flag we should not blame the resultant setbacks on our adversaries.
International events in a turbulent world, and domestic conditions in
many countries are sufficient explanation for many problems. We
should not exaggerate Soviet influence by blaming all difficulties on
them. The experience of Indochina should have taught us that it is
easier to start confrontations than to sustain them. Tough rhetoric
is not the same as sustained strong action. We will defend our
vital interests and those of our allies uncompromisingly. But we
can do so effectively over an extended period of time only if our
people know that we have first pursued untiringly all conceivable
alternatives to confrontation.

The principal item on the U.S.-Soviet agenda today is SALT -- the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. We are actively engaged in working out a new agreement based on the principles already agreed by the President and General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok last November. If we can resolve the issues that still remain between us -- and I believe we can -- we will for the first time in history have placed a ceiling on the nuclear arms race.

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is now a
durable feature of the world scene. It serves our respective interests
and the broader interests of peace and stability in Asia and around
the world. No stable international order is conceivable without the
participation of this one-quarter of the human race. As you know,
President Ford plans to visit China, thereby confirming the durability
of our relationship and further advancing the ties between our two
countries on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.

The Middle East: Our present agenda necessarily includes those areas
of crisis which pose a danger of wider conflagration. To help moderate
conflicts where our good offices are desired is an American tradition
that goes back at least to the beginning of this century. History
has shown that the breakdown of peace around the globe can touch
our lives directly, and there are some disputes for which we have a
special responsibility such as the Middle East crisis.

That troubled area still poses grave dangers of war and of world-wide
economic dislocation. The mistrust of decades is not easy to overcome.
The international implications of chronic crisis in the area and the moral and
strategic commitments of outside powers compound the basic intractability.
They also require continued movement towards a lasting settlement. An
active American role is imperative:

-- because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival

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and well-being of Israel;

-- because of our important interests in the Arab world -- an area of more than 150 million people sitting astride the world's largest oil reserves;

-- because the eruption of crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our allies in Europe, and Japan;

-- because continuing instability risks a new international crisis over oil and a new setback to the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being not only of the industrial world, but of most nations of the globe; and

-- because a crisis in the Middle East poses an inevitable risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation and has done so with increasing danger in every crisis since the beginning.

We can never lose sight of the fact that U.S. foreign policy must do its utmost to protect all its interests in the Middle East. Given our inescapable involvement -- economic, political and military -- there is no alternative to the full and active engagement of the United States in the diplomacy of peace in the Middle East.

Since October 1973, we have made major efforts to help the warring parties to resolve their differences. Unprecedented progress has been made. Disengagement agreements have been negotiated between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria which have been carried out by all sides. While deep suspicions remain, these agreements may have demonstrated to the parties that there is an alternative to war. We welcome the opening of the Suez Canal; we believe the Syrian decision to extend the United Nations mandate for six months was helpful; and the recent decision of the Israeli Government to thin out and withdraw some of its forces and equipment in the Sinai is a constructive move.

But we must not be lulled into inaction by the relative quiet of recent weeks; the fundamental issues remain unresolved. It would be imprudent to view recent steps -- valuable as they are -- as an indication that further progress is no longer urgent: Events have been calmed in the last few months in considerable part by the expectation -- and our pledge -- that the American effort would resume. We are now at a point where there must be a turn either toward peace or toward new crises.

We consider diplomatic stagnation an invitation to confrontation. We will not be deflected from our course by temporary disappointments or strong passions. The President has stated repeatedly that the United States will not accept stalemate or stagnation. We urge all parties to take seriously these words which were carefully chosen.

In recent weeks President Ford has held important consultations with King Hussein, President Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin and Deputy Prime Minister Khaddam of Syria. We expect to come to an early judgment on how best to proceed.

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The United States will pursue whichever course seems most promising. We are open-minded whether interim agreements or an early convening of the Geneva Conference offer the best method. Each course has its recognized advantages, pitfalls and risks. We are not committed to a particular approach, we are committed to progress.

Our ultimate goal is clear -- to find solutions that will take into account the territorial integrity and right to live in security and peace of all states and peoples in the area. To reach that goal will require concessions by all parties. We are determined to persevere in pursuit of what we consider the fundamental national interest of the United States -- the security and economic well-being of our country, of our allies and above all of the peoples in the area that demand it.

**Developing Nations:** In recent years, the problems of the new nations of the developing world have grown more urgent.

The strength of the dollar, the expansion of trade, the free flow in investment, the supply and price of energy, food, and other vital raw materials all depend on the vitality of the international economic system. But no economic system can be stable if scores of nations consider themselves outside and hostile to it. The present global economic system is large enough to encompass the well-being of consumers and producers, rich and poor. But if it does not, we face a generation of economic warfare. The United States is prepared to work, with understanding and imagination, for these changes. But there must be a process of mutual accommodation that safeguards the interests of all nations. We will not submit to blackmail, bloc pressures or ideological rhetoric. We will defend our interests. But we will listen to reasoned debate and consider carefully productive suggestions for reform.

The United States has already taken the lead with new proposals on a range of issues vital to the developing world:

- To fight the scourge of hunger, this Government, recognizing that America's food aid cannot provide a long-term solution to the global food problem, called for the World Food Conference which met last November in Rome. At that Conference we engaged other nations in a multilateral commitment to raise food production, to improve agricultural financing and distribution, and to the establishment of an international system of nationally-held grain reserves.

- One hundred and forty nations are now engaged in an unprecedented negotiation on a comprehensive new law of the sea. At stake are the reach of territorial sovereignty, the safety of the shipping lanes, and access to vast resources. Success in these negotiations would represent an unprecedented achievement in international cooperation affecting three quarters of the surface of our planet and enormous mineral and other wealth. The United States will make a major effort to bring it to a successful conclusion at the final session next March.

- On the broader question of raw materials, the developing countries seek a stable and fair income from commodities which are central to their development programs. We in turn seek reliability of supply for our industries. The U.S. has therefore proposed new inter-

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national rules and procedures on access to supplies and markets; discussions on new arrangements for commodity trade on a case-by-case basis; and new ways of financing commodity development in producing countries.

All these issues will be raised at a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly this September. Working closely with Congress, we are now preparing concrete detailed and we hope creative proposals for that session. We intend, while fully protecting our nation's interests, to deal with controversial issues with realism, imagination, and understanding. We hope that others will meet us in the same spirit.

## Challenge at Home

We have before us a vast agenda. The peace and prosperity of future generations depend on decisions we make now. The choice is relatively straightforward: either we use our strength and opportunities for good, or others will surely use their own strength for ends incompatible with our values. The problems we face are of such magnitude, their answers so complex -- and the opportunities so far-reaching -- that the last quarter of the 20th Century will either be remembered as another period of American leadership and creativity, or as a time of growing chaos and despair. Therefore it is time to put an end to the self-doubt and cynicism which have marked, and marred, American life for so much of the past decade. It is time to remind ourselves that America has accomplished great things in the past and that there are still greater things to be accomplished.

In our pluralistic society, national action depends on the support of citizens everywhere -- not only in government but in the professions, in business and labor, in the universities, in the cities and on the farms all over America. These people, in their millions, have supported an enlightened international involvement for more than a generation, for they knew in their hearts that the greatest nation on earth could no longer remain isolated from the world around it. Again today, at another time of decision, it will be the American people who will decide, as they should, the direction their country will take.

There can be no doubt about the outcome. The American people will decide to keep their country the pillar of stability and the vision of hope that it has been for two centuries. They will support our leadership in the search for a new, lasting, just and peaceful international order.

Throughout our history America has proved capable of renewal and greatness. The colonists who came to the shores of a wilderness; the founding fathers, who created the world's only revolution that never declined into tyranny; the pioneers whose eyes never left the horizon; the men of enterprise who made American productivity and efficiency the world's standard; the soldiers and statesmen of our century who built a world power both great and constructive; and the creative minds of a democratic society who have given the breath and inspiration of freedom of men and women everywhere -- these are the foundations

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on which we build and the tradition we seek to emulate.

"Equal and exact justice to all men" -- this was how Thomas Jefferson defined the goal of our national destiny, at home and abroad. And he added, "Should we ever wander in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty and safety."

We are at one of those moments. We will not miss our road.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

[LC]

Speech

June 27, 1975

Washington, D.C.

## THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger at the swearing-in ceremony of the 119th Foreign Service Officer class.

I have come here today to congratulate you on your choice of career and the Department of State for its wisdom in selecting you. It will be, I know, the beginning of a long and fruitful association.

Six years of experience in Washington have convinced me that you are joining the most able, the most dedicated group of professionals with whom it has been my privilege to be associated. You are joining an institution with a great tradition—and tradition, even today, is not something lightly to be put aside. This Department and the people in it have, you will find, a unique sense of pride in their purpose and a deep sense of dedication to the national interest.

But with all these qualities one of the tests of any profession or institution is its ability to overcome the tendency to fight new problems with outmoded concepts and an obsolete structure.

Some of the functions of diplomacy have not changed over the centuries. The representation of our country's interests abroad remains at the heart of your profession. But in today's interdependent world the scope of diplomacy has broadened dramatically and continues to do so every year. In the contemporary world, as never before, events and policies in one country have unprecedented effect on the lives of millions elsewhere around the globe.

It is not enough in today's world for the Foreign Service to report on foreign developments and their relationship to our national interests. That, important as it is, is a passive function. Today what is needed is a Foreign Service that understands our goals as a Nation, is capable of formulating a strategy for reaching those goals, and possesses the tactical skill necessary to implement that strategy.

At home, as well, the context of diplomacy has changed. No longer is it the esoteric art of an elite separated from the people and the political process it serves. Today the Congress has a decisive role to play in the formulation and execution of our foreign policy; today the American people must be convinced of the wisdom of the course we espouse. In a speech I gave [August 2, 1973, before the International Platform Association, Washington, D.C.] shortly before becoming Secretary of State, I said that no foreign policy could survive in a democracy if it were born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none. I believe that today even more deeply than I did 2 years ago.

In short while the objectives of diplomacy may not have changed, its scope most certainly has. And so have the responsibilities of the Department of State. In a time of massive and continuous change, this Department must, as a matter of course, constantly reexamine the assumptions it has made, the strategies it has espoused, and the objectives it seeks to serve.

What is the purpose of the Department? In its broadest sense it is to preserve the peace, the secu-

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rity, and the well-being of the United States and-
since America cannot live in isolation—to contrib-
ute to just international arrangements for all
mankind. It is to bring to the formulation and
execution of our foreign policy a vision of the
future and a sense of direction.

This concept of the Department's role defines
the focus of our work. The crucial test of the
Department's relevance will lie in our sense of
history and historical perspective. And it will lie in
our ability to integrate and to synthesize the na-
tional interests of the United States, the global
concerns that affect it, the tactical issues of the
moment, and the isolated events of the day into a
conceptual whole which gives meaning to events
and purpose to our decisions. If the Department of
State serves the President with these qualities, it
will stand at the center of the foreign policy pro-
cess—not because an organization chart says it
should but because its courage, its intellectual
strength, and its strategic grasp have put it there.

What you are entering today is not the For-
eign Service of the State Department but the
Foreign Service of the United States. Foreign
Service Officers should not think that their natural
base is overseas, with Washington tours the painful
interruption in an otherwise interesting career.
They should look forward to Washington assign-
ments and cultivate the skills necessary for such
work. In the field, where our principal purpose is
the execution of foreign policy, compromise and
negotiation are the natural tools of diplomacy. But
in Washington, where it is the formulation of for-
eign policy that should most concern us, our
purpose must often be an unrelenting drive to
clarify purposes and discover alternatives, so that
the policymaker will know the depth and dimen-
sion of the issues he has before him for decision.

After nearly 2 years in this Department I am
convinced that the dedication and native ability of
the Foreign Service mark it as a unique and great
institution. Individually we are professionally as
good as the best the country has to offer. But the
product of our collective effort is sometimes less
than the sum of our individual abilities.

I, like every Secretary of State before me,
hope that when I take my leave this Department
will be a more effective instrument than when I
came. I want the Foreign Service and the Depart-
ment to have a better appreciation of their own
value and worth; I want them to be less concerned

with status and more concerned with substance. I
believe we have already made great strides.

* The principle of putting the ablest where their talents can best be used is well established, as demonstrated by the number of Ambassadors and Assistant Secretaries appointed solely on the basis of merit and without regard to age or rank. We have shown that even an FSO-4 can have an Ambassador's baton in his knapsack.

* We have reformed the assignment process that allowed, or forced, an officer to return to the same geographic area repeatedly. As a result Foreign Service Officers are gaining a broader perspective and a deeper sense of the range and complexity of the challenges we face as a Nation.

* We have moved to compensate for the rigidities of specialization by encouraging officers to take assignments outside their area of functional expertise. While I recognize that the establishment of the cone system was in response to the need for greater emphasis on specialization, we must not permit compartmentalization to deter us from providing the breadth of experience necessary for positions of high responsibility.

* Our analytical and conceptual capabilities have been greatly enhanced by giving the Policy Planning Staff a central position in the organization and by staffing it with the best available talent. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, too, has been brought into a dynamic and intimate relationship with policymaking and policymakers.

These steps were primarily designed to
improve the Department's product by focusing
greater attention on a precise definition of our mis-
sion and by encouraging a more analytical, more
strategic approach to the issues of foreign policy.
This is the essential first phase of institutionaliza-
tion. Now it is time to turn our attention to the
development of a Departmental structure that is
more responsive both to the needs of its members
and the demands of an increasingly interdependent
world.

Resource Allocation

Our first and most critical task is to find a
more effective means than we now possess to link
resources and policy objectives. Over the years—
and especially over the past decade—our policy
priorities have undergone substantial change. Yet

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3

our resources—people and money—have, because of
institutional inflexibility, remained focused on the
familiar problems of the past.

The Department lacks an effective system for
addressing or deciding priorities among areas or
specialties. What is needed, therefore, is a new
approach—a mechanism for coordinating resources
and goals and for reprogramming existing resources
from less important functions to areas that deserve
priority attention.

I have, therefore, recently established a Prior-
ities Policy Group whose principal task will be to
provide the mechanism for linking decisions on
resource allocation to the broader considerations
of foreign policy.

The Group will have the following functions:

* It will play the central role in formulating the Department's annual budget.

* It will review the present allocation of all positions on a regular basis.

* It will examine all significant requests for additional resources, both in Washington and overseas.

* It will employ whatever instruments it deems necessary—including expanded use of the Foreign Service Inspection Corps—to identify and correct the inefficient use of our resources.

The Group will be headed by the Deputy
Under Secretary for Management and will include
as members the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff, the Director General, the Inspector General,
the Counselor, the Assistant Secretary for Admin-
istration, and the Director of Management
Operations.

I have directed the Deputy Under Secretary for Management to use this new mechanism to bring our budget process under central management control. This will mean change in some of our current budgetary practices and a reduction in the degree of autonomy the Bureaus now enjoy in the management of their funds. But it will also mean that the Department, as a whole, will have an important new capacity to bring its resources into relationship with its problems.

Personnel

Our greatest resource in this Department is
people. How well we serve the national interest will
depend on the kinds of people we recruit, how well

we train them, how demanding we are of superior
performance, and how well we reward those who
perform with excellence. And so, in consultation
with the American Foreign Service Association as
appropriate, I am directing new departures to
improve the recruitment, evaluation, assignment,
and career development of our professional service.

Recruitment

Our country has every right to expect a corps
of foreign affairs professionals which is expert in
politics, economics, science, the oceans, military
strategy, and other disciplines. These people must
be capable of drawing together the widely diver-
gent interests of our society and Government,
synthesizing this array of forces, tapping available
expertise in and outside of Government, and ad-
vising our political leadership on how best to
pursue our national objectives.

In the area of recruitment our major problem
rests in the need for a clearer definition of our
requirements and the need for systematic standards
for appointment. I have, therefore, instructed the
Director General:

* First, to adjust examination standards for FSOs to relate our selection more closely to our needs without, at the same time, forcing the officer to choose a specialty even before he has begun his career. I personally am doubtful that either the Department or the individual concerned is well served by a system that requires the selection of a functional cone at the time of examination.

* Second, to define and develop exacting stan-
dards and procedures for recruiting professionals
outside the Foreign Service Officer Corps. With the
right training and experience Foreign Service Of-
ficers will be able to perform many of the tasks
requiring both expertise and specialization. But
there will be a continuing need for highly expert,
specialized professional talent which cannot neces-
sarily be found in a closed career system. The
Department must be free to hire the best talent our
society can offer and to guarantee those it hires
fair treatment and adequate reward. The career
system, on the other hand, has a right to expect
that the Department will not abuse its right to hire
and promote outside the career service as a device
for circumventing the system.

* Third, to institute a program aimed at re-
cruiting top quality women and representatives of

4

minority groups. Our record as an equal opportuni-
ty employer must be improved; I intend to see that
it is.

Evaluation

Virtually everyone agrees that our system of
performance evaluation is badly in need of im-
provement. Regular efficiency reports will contin-
ue to be essential in identifying those officers
deserving of promotion. But there has been a
growing tendency for rating officers to avoid the
hard and critical judgments that an effective merit
system requires. We need to place more emphasis
on effective methods for evaluating officers at criti-
cal points in their careers.

We have, for some time now, experimented
with the concept of a junior "threshold"-a system
that would permit the Department stringently to
examine a junior officer's performance, abilities,
and potential for growth before any final decision
to promote him to the intermediate ranks. It is
now time to move from the experimental stage to
implementation of this threshold concept as an
integral part of the career process. I have instructed
the Director General to take the steps necessary to
accomplish this. I have also asked her to develop
for my early consideration plans for the institution
of a senior threshold which would apply to officers
about to enter the executive levels of the Foreign
Service.

Assignments

Central to the quality of our service is the
assignment process. The system today is too decen-
tralized—too much characterized by bargaining
between Bureaus. It is neither rational nor service-
wide in its approach. In order to correct this
weakness I have instructed the Director General to
establish a more open, centrally directed assign-
ment process. While the new procedures will take
into account the legitimate interests of the individ-
ual, the Bureaus, and the posts abroad, they can
only be fair and orderly if they drastically limit the
right of an Assistant Secretary or Ambassador to
veto assignments and if it is clear that every
member of the Service must accept an assignment
once made.

Professional Development

As in all other professional fields today the
range and complexity of foreign affairs issues are

heavily affected by the expanding horizons of
knowledge and technology. If the professional
service is to provide relevant leadership in a wide
range of technical subjects, it must be intellectually
equipped, as a part of the career process, to take
these complexities into account in framing foreign
policy. But our present training programs—except
in the field of languages, where we have an out-
standing program—vary widely in quality and
relevance.

As a first step toward correcting this situa-
tion, I have ordered the establishment of a Board
of Professional Development. It will have the fol-
lowing functions:

* Formulate a comprehensive training program;

• Oversee its implementation;

* Assure that changes in that policy are made
as the needs of the Department change; and

* Correct current failings in the system.

It will also have oversight responsibility for
details to other agencies and Branches of Govern-
ment and assignments to universities.

The members of this Board will be the
Deputy Under Secretary for Management, the
Director General of the Foreign Service, the Direc-
tor of the Foreign Service Institute, and other
senior officers of the Department on a rotating
basis. The Board should, from its inception, seek
advice from universities, business, and other appro-
priate institutions with experience in advanced
training techniques.

The Department must also give greater atten-
tion to other forms of professional development. I
have, for example, instructed that an expanded
Junior Officer Rotational Training Program be
established. This program will give more entering
officers on-the-job experience during their first
assignment in all of the principal areas of Foreign
Service work-administration and consular, eco-
nomic and political affairs. I would hope that we
can have this program established in time for at
least some of you to take part in it.

We also need to redress our neglect of training
in such areas as administration and for those most
critically important people—our secretaries. I have
directed that these areas be given priority
attention.

Finally, details to other agencies, assignments
to State and local governments and to the Congress

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5

will be substantially expanded. In this regard I welcome the recent efforts in Congress to make it possible for the Department to detail a greater number of its officers to the Congress and to State and local governments throughout the country. Such assignments would offer enviable experience and should, in some cases, provide excellent managerial training. And most important—now that foreign and domestic policies are virtually inseparable—these assignments will make us more sensitive to the values, interests, and priorities of the country we represent.

In order to relate all these forms of professional development to the key steps in an officer's career, I have asked the Director General to make a year of training or a special detail outside the Department a part of the threshold process. Such assignments should be looked upon as at least as important to an officer's career as an assignment to a Bureau or a post abroad.

## Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, I recognize that some of the institutional changes I have announced today may not, at least at first, meet with universal popularity. Reforms seldom do. But I am convinced that they will, over time, be seen as a creative strengthening of the Department and the Foreign Service and that they will mean a more challenging and exciting career for all of you. Yet, in the last analysis, it will be the mutual sense of responsibility and obligation that you feel for the Department of State and that the Department feels toward you that will be important. As you go on in your careers it will be the Department's responsibility, as well as your own, to encourage the fresh

approach, the new initiative; it will be the Department's obligation to permit you to argue what you believe deeply, however unorthodox, and to question old assumptions.

But the reverse side of that coin is that you have an obligation to support decisions once made. "Loyalty" has become an archaic term, but ultimately it means professional self-discipline and as such is the pride and strength of any professional service and a prerequisite to its self-respect.

If, over the many years ahead, you and the Department can maintain a mutual sense of esteem and devotion because each has met its obligation to the other, and both have fulfilled their duty to the Nation, you will have achieved such a standard of excellence that the question of which agency is the President's principal tool in the conduct of American foreign policy will not need to be asked. You and your colleagues will already have given the answer.

But having a central place in the policy process is only a means to an end. Your ultimate objective must be to serve your country with all your heart and mind, no matter how onerous the task, no matter how difficult your position. Your job, as junior officers no less than when you reach the senior levels, will often require undramatic, persevering, laborious effort. But if you do your best I believe you will always find it exhilarating.

I know that I speak for the Director General and all your other colleagues here in the Department and abroad when I extend to you best wishes for a long and productive career. You stand at the threshold of an exciting time, in a world poised between great danger and unprecedented promise. Whether we succumb to the dangers or realize the promise will, in large measure, depend on you.

355

As Recorded for Broadcast

ARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 6 PM EDT SATURDAY, JULY 5, 1975. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY
LISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WITH
TED KOPPEL
ABC SATURDAY NEWS

JULY 5, 1975

MR. KOPPEL: And in Washington, earlier today, an interview with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Mr. Secretary, the Israelis are obviously nervous. Tomorrow they have a cabinet meeting, and these rumors of the past week while you have been away have got them terribly upset, privately and semi-publicly. To what extent is the United States still committed to Israel? To what extent is there a drifting apart?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States is committed to the survival and security of Israel, and nothing in the current discussions changes that situation. We also believe, however, that the security of Israel is best assured through a process of peace in the Middle East. In fact, we believe that if there is no progress towards

For further information, contact.

PR #355

2

peace in the Middle East, that another war sooner or
later will be inevitable with disastrous consequences for
all of the peoples in the Middle East as well as for
Western Europe, Japan, and serious consequences for the United
States in terms of a possible confrontation with the Soviet
Union.

For all these reasons, we feel that there should
be progress towards peace in the Middle East. In fact, we
feel there must be progress.

MR. KOPPEL: So in that sense, it is not really
unfair to suggest that the United States is pushing very
hard for a peace settlement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has
publicly stated that it urges progress towards peace in the
Middle East. But the United States also remains committed
to the survival and security of Israel.

MR. KOPPEL: Now, the question is, is the United
States pushing President Sadat and the Egyptians with equal
vigor? Are you looking for concessions from the Egyptians
as much as you are from the Israelis?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is fair to say that
all of the concessions, or many of the concessions that

PR #355

3

President Sadat has offered have been the result of American urging. So the United States is attempting to find a formula in which both sides, making concessions, take a step towards peace.

Israel does have a problem in the sense that it is giving up territory, while it is getting in return some assurances. But this fact has been known for a year. The United States has asked nothing of Israel in recent weeks that it did not make clear that it felt was necessary for the last ten months.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, now, as the Israeli cabinet goes into session tomorrow, if you were addressing yourself to the Israeli people directly, what would you tell them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that whatever decision they make is going to have problems; that it is not going to be a question of one road being easy and the other road being difficult. All roads are difficult. We understand their dilemmas. We understand their fears. But we also feel that they must take a chance on making progress towards peace, because any other approach is going to lead to a war sooner or later which is going to have serious consequences, above all for the people of Israel.

PR #355

4

But the United States will stand behind them in conditions
in which we can reasonably say to our people that progress is
being made.

MR. KOPPEL: Now, Mr. Secretary, over the past
few months both you and the President have always
finesSED the question of which route to take. And yet it
seems behind the scenes that the United States is pushing for
another interim agreement. Everything that is happening
over the past few weeks seems to indicate another interim
agreement. Is that inaccurate?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has always
believed that an interim agreement is a step that can
most easily be taken. If that does not prove possible,
then the United States will have to pursue an overall
agreement. It is certain, however, that on the road towards
an overall agreement, we will very soon find exactly the
same dilemmas, and this time on all fronts and on all issues
that have produced the difficulties now.

MR. KOPPEL: Next Saturday you and Prime Minister
Rabin will be in Bonn at the same time. Isn't it inevitable
that the two of you will meet and talk?

PR #355

5

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. As I understand it, Prime Minister Rabin's tentative plan is to leave Bonn on Friday. We have left open the possibility that we might meet depending on the cabinet decision tomorrow and whether there are any further clarifications that may be needed. At this moment, there is no fixed plan to meet, but there is a geographic proximity that makes it possible for us to meet if it should be necessary.

MR. KOPPEL: On another subject -- since you have been gone, Prime Minister Gandhi of India has revoked essentially all the democratic processes in India, in what we have always rather broadly referred to as the world's largest democracy. We have received word that you came down rather hard on all your people here and said, "Button up. I don't want to hear anything." Is it possible for you now to say anything, and is it possible for the United States not to say anything when something like this is going on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The fixed policy of the Department of State is not to comment on the internal developments in other countries. The American preference for democratic forms is clear. But we do not think that it

PR #355

6

would help the situation at this moment for us to make
daily comments on the situation in India. Our preference
for democratic procedures is clear.

MR. KOPPEL: How does this affect U.S. foreign
policy in that part of the world? Does this make it more
difficult? Do you see Mrs. Gandhi now moving even closer into
the Soviet orbit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have noticed that
Mrs. Gandhi last week made some friendlier references to
the United States than has been the case previously. The
United States considers India an important country. We
have said this during periods of difficulties with Indian
foreign policy, and we have to say this now. We were not
asked about these domestic events that are taking place in
India, and we do not think it is appropriate for us to make
official comments on these.

MR. KOPPEL: Also while you were gone, a great
deal has happened while you have been away -- the Murphy
Commission issued its findings, and one of the points
they made was that in the future they do not believe that
any man should simultaneously hold the positions of
Secretary of State and head of the National Security Council.

PR #355

7

If it is possible for you to take an objective view of that,
how would you feel in the future? Do you think anyone should
ever again hold these dual positions?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the President ought to have the flexibility. It depends entirely on his chemistry with the people concerned and on the qualities of the people concerned. And therefore, I don't think there should be any legislative action that constricts the President's freedom of choice.

I think the Murphy Commission has a point that
under normal circumstances it would be more usual to keep
the two jobs split. But I think that the President, if he
finds somebody with whom he can work in this manner, and
depending on the circumstances, should have the flexibility
to make that decision.

MR. KOPPEL: Well, if you will permit my phrasing
it this way, what is the abnormality of the current situation?
Are you the abnormality?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The situation is that
I was Assistant to the President when I was appointed
Secretary of State, so I had in fact been carrying out --

PR #355

8

I had been in fact active in both jobs. Secondly, that
the President obviously has believed that I can perform
both jobs simultaneously, and I have no question that this
can happen again. When Acheson was Secretary of State,
and when Dulles was Secretary of State, they in fact carried
out both jobs, though they didn't have the title.

The position of the Assistant to the President
at that time was a purely technical administrative function.

And therefore, when you have a strong Secretary
of State, who has a close relationship with the President,
in fact, the tendency is that he will carry out both of these
jobs. It is not such an unusual event.

MR. KOPPEL: You don't, then, regard this as a
personal slap at you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. In fact, they
specifically exempted me.

MR. KOPPEL: On that note, thank you very much,
indeed.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 9, 1975

No. 360

REMARKS
OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON DEPARTURE FROM ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE

JULY 9, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am leaving for consultations with our European allies and also to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister to review Soviet-American relations, and particularly to discuss the situation in the Middle East. And of course we attach great importance to the meeting with Prime Minister Rabin, all of which is part of our effort to encourage the process of peace in the Middle East.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there's been some talk of additional U. S. assurances, commitments, guarantees for Israel. Are there any additional assurances?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Any progress towards peace in the Middle East has two elements -- the negotiations between the parties in the Middle East and what the United States can contribute in the way of any assurances, or acting as a transmitter of assurances of the two sides to each other. And whatever it is humanly possible to do, the United States will do to promote progress.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there are reports that an agreement is already wrapped up between Israel and Egypt.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Totally wrong.

**QUESTION:** But is it approaching the point?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. We are not anywhere near that point. But all sides, Israel and Egypt, are working seriously. And of course the United States has repeatedly expressed its interest in promoting peace on a basis just to all.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there's been a report that the President and some leaders in the House have worked out a tentative compromise on resuming aid to Turkey.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, they discussed this morning possible ways by which aid to Turkey can be resumed. Hearings will be held in the Foreign Affairs Committee or the International Relations Committee tomorrow, and we are hopeful that something can be done.

Thank you.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

July 10, 1975

No. 363

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER JEAN SAUVAGNARGUES
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING
ELYSEE PALACE, PARIS

JULY 10, 1975

**QUESTION:** Who took the initiative for this meeting?

**FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES:** We are in constant contact with the Secretary of State and it had at first been agreed that I would meet with him in Washington. But the Secretary of State's schedule and the meetings he is to have in Bonn led him to modify his plans and to come to Paris. I thank him for this while nevertheless hoping to see him again, probably in Washington on the occasion of the UN meeting. The Secretary of State is going to tell you personally that we had a long private conversation this morning and that we decided to go together and report it to the President of the Republic.

**QUESTION:** On what subjects, Mr. Foreign Minister?

**FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES:** We spoke of the resumption of the dialogue; we spoke of Cyprus; we spoke of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and we discussed in a general way...the Secretary of State referred to the Middle East problem...this was a very thorough exchange of views and, I believe, a very constructive one.

**QUESTION:** ...The European Cooperation Conference?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First, let me say that I agree completely with what my colleague has said. We've had very constructive talks and we reviewed most of the outstanding issues in the spirit of friendship and cooperation which characterizes our relationship. We discussed the resumption of the dialogue between consumers and producers and I believe we have made very good progress towards establishing a framework for the resumption of this dialogue. And we had fruitful exchanges on a range of other subjects.

With respect to the European Security Conference, I believe that both our countries are of the view that it should be brought to a conclusion as rapidly as possible and that both our delegations are working in that sense at Geneva.

**QUESTION:** What did you tell the President about the prospects for another settlement in the Middle East, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We had a full discussion of the situation in the Middle East and I told him we cannot really judge until I have had a chance to talk with the Israeli Prime Minister and until the views of the Israeli Government will then have been formally communicated to the Egyptian Government for their reaction.

-2-

PR #363

**QUESTION:** About President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for a monetary conference next autumn?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have not had a formal suggestion to that effect, but we take the views of the French Government on the monetary situation seriously and we recognize that this is one of the big outstanding issues about which we will remain in very close contact.

**QUESTION:** Have you agreed on a tentative date for the resumption of the oil dialogue?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We haven't agreed on a date, but I think we are making progress towards establishing a framework which should enable us to propose dates within a reasonable future.

**QUESTION:** About the renewal of the dialogue before the Special Session of the UN?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are working in that direction.

*****

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

July 11, 1975

No. 368

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AFTER MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER A. A. GROMYKO
AT THE SOVIET MISSION
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

JULY 10, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we had very extensive talks, very constructive and conducted in a cordial atmosphere. We concentrated on the European Security Conference and mostly on SALT. With respect to the European Security Conference, the United States supports the consensus that has developed that the last stage of the conference should take place on July 30 as proposed by Canada, and we are prepared to bring this to as rapid a conclusion as possible in order to permit the Finnish hosts to make their preparations. With respect to SALT we had extensive discussions which will be continued tomorrow and progress was made.

Thank you.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you heard anything from Malta? Since the meeting is still on, they are still waiting down there.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I understand that the only country that has not yet joined the consensus is Malta, and that they are waiting to hear from them either tonight or tomorrow morning.

**QUESTION:** Did Mr. Gromyko give you anything resembling a new proposal on verification that would help reach agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I cannot go into the details of a discussion that is still going on, but as I pointed out progress has been made.

**QUESTION:** The Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Middle East will be discussed tomorrow. We have not yet discussed the Middle East. Tomorrow we will continue our discussions on SALT and then we will turn to the Middle East. We will meet here at 10:30. We have been meeting off and on with the Ambassadors to the European Security Conference.

Thank you.

* * * *

[lc]

SPEECHES, REMARKS, ETCETERA CONTAINED HEREIN

<table><tr><td>Milwaukee, Wisconsin</td><td>The Global Challenge and Intern'l Cooperation</td><td>July 14, 1975</td></tr><tr><td>USUN</td><td>Global Consensus & Economic Dev.</td><td>Sept 1, 1975</td></tr><tr><td>Cincinnati, Ohio</td><td>Global Peace, the ME, & the US</td><td>Sept 16, 1975</td></tr><tr><td>USUN</td><td>Furthering Peace in the ME</td><td>Sept 29, 1975</td></tr><tr><td>New York</td><td>The Western Hemisphere: Our Common Future</td><td>Sept 30, 1975</td></tr><tr><td>Detroit, Michigan</td><td>Building an Enduring Foreign Policy</td><td>Nov 24, 1975</td></tr><tr><td>San Francisco, Cal</td><td>The Permanent Challenge of Peace: US Policy Toward the Soviet Union</td><td>Feb 3, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Laramie, Wyoming</td><td>America's Destiny: The Global Context</td><td>Feb 4, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Latin America</td><td>Major Statements on LA</td><td>Feb 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Boston, Massachusetts</td><td>America's Permanent Interests</td><td>Mar 11, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Dallas, Texas</td><td>Foreign Policy and Nat'l Security</td><td>Mar 22, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Phoenix, Arizona</td><td>A Strong Foreign Policy for a Confident America</td><td>April 16, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Lusaka, Zambia</td><td>Southern Africa & the US: An Agenda for Cooperation</td><td>April 27, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Nairobi, Kenya</td><td>UNCTAD IV: Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development</td><td>May 6, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>London, England</td><td>Fundamentals of US Foreign Policy</td><td>May 26, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Santiago, Chile</td><td>6th GA of OAS & UN Commission for LA</td><td>June 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Paris, France</td><td>Cohesion of Industrial Democracies: Precondition for Global Progress</td><td>June 21, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>London, England</td><td>The Industrial Democracies: The Imperative of Cooperation</td><td>June 25, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Chicago, Illinois</td><td>The Future of America's Foreign Policy</td><td>July 6, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Seattle, Washington</td><td>America and Asia</td><td>July 22, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Boston, Massachusetts</td><td>America & Africa or The US and Africa: Strengthened Ties for an Era of Challenge</td><td>Aug 2, 1976</td></tr><tr><td>Philadelphia, Pennsylvania</td><td>The Challenges of Africa</td><td>Aug 31, 1976</td></tr></table>

The Secretary
of State

Speech

THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Institute of World Affairs of the University of Wisconsin.*

Ten days ago our nation entered its 200th year. We begin our Bicentennial with justifiable pride in our past, a recognition of the challenges of the present, and great hope for the future.

The world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of great enterprise and creativity or an age of chaos and despair. We have, on the one hand, developed weapons that could destroy us and our civilization; we have, on the other, created a world economy that could—for the first time in history—eradicate poverty, hunger, and human suffering.

This complex of unprecedented opportunity and unparalleled danger is at the heart of the great challenge that has faced the United States with increasing urgency since the close of World War II. And it is our generation that must make the choices which will determine success or failure. It is a burden that we can shoulder with fortitude or ignore with peril—but it is a burden we cannot shed.

Our nation has come to symbolize man's capacity to master his destiny. It is a proud legacy that has given hope and inspiration to the millions who have looked to us over the past 2 centuries as a beacon of liberty and justice.

Today's generation of Americans must be as true to its duty as earlier generations were to theirs. When weapons span continents in minutes, our security is bound up with world peace. When our factories, farms, and financial strength are deeply affected by decisions taken in foreign lands,

July 14, 1975

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

our prosperity is linked to world prosperity. The peace of the world and our own security, the world's progress and our own prosperity, are indivisible.

The Structure of Peace

We have a proud foundation on which to build. We have maintained stability in the world, ensured the security and independence of scores of nations, and expended blood and treasure in the defense of freedom. Our economic support helped our major allies regain their strength; we contributed to a global trading and monetary system which has sustained and spread prosperity throughout the world. With our encouragement the new nations took their place in the international community and set out on the path of economic development. At our initiative many longstanding disputes were settled by peaceful means. Conflicts were contained and global war was avoided.

We have provided more economic assistance than any other nation in history. We have contributed more food, educated more people from other lands, and welcomed more immigrants and refugees. We have done so because we are a generous people—for which we need not apologize—and because we have understood that our self-interest is bound up with the fate of all mankind.

These successes have brought great change. The rigidities of the Cold War period have fragmented. Power and wealth, ideology and purpose, have become diffused and have transformed the international scene. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist

PR 370

(Le)

2

powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the developing nations have produced a new global environment—a world of many centers of power, of persistent ideological differences clouded by nuclear peril and struggling for economic security and advance. The central focus of U.S. foreign policy is to help shape from this environment a new international structure, based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of cooperation that reflect the reality of global interdependence.

Our task begins at home. To be strong and effective abroad, we must be strong and purposeful at home. To preserve peace our military strength must be beyond challenge. To promote global prosperity our domestic economy must prosper. To carry forward our international efforts we must be a united people, sure in our purposes and determined to build on the great achievements of our national heritage.

Our first responsibility abroad is to the great industrial democracies with whom we share our history, our prosperity, and our political ideals. Our alliances across the Atlantic and with Japan are the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Today they are more than responses to military threat—they are instrumentalities of social and economic cooperation as well.

The ultimate objective of our alliances has always been to ease, not to freeze, the divisions of the world. In the past few years the United States has taken a number of steps to resolve concrete problems with the Soviet Union and lay the basis for more positive endeavors. We have also forged a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. There can be no lasting international stability unless the major powers learn habits of restraint and feel a stake in international peace; all our hopes for a better world require that they use their power for the benefit of mankind.

The scores of new nations that have become independent since the Second World War are now major actors on the world scene. In their quest for their own progress, they present a challenge to the rest of the world—to demonstrate that the international structure can give them a role, a fair share, dignity, and responsibility.

All of us—allies and adversaries, new nations and old, rich and poor—are part of a world community. Our interdependence on this planet is

becoming the central fact of our diplomacy. Energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas—these are problems whose benefits and burdens transcend national boundaries. They carry the seeds of political conflict over the coming generation; they challenge the capacities of the international community with new requirements for vision and statesmanship.

Much of our current agenda is therefore global in nature and must be dealt with on a global basis. Within a few weeks there will be two major meetings of the most prominent international organization—the United Nations. A Special Session of the General Assembly will be devoted to economic issues and the 30th regular session of the General Assembly will address the broad range of international problems. Therefore, I would like to use this occasion to place before you and our fellow members of the United Nations a candid assessment of how the U.S. Government views the contemporary United Nations—its capacities and its limitations, its promise and the trends which threaten future progress.

## The Record of the United Nations

Thirty years after the founding of the United Nations, its achievements have been substantial and its promise is great. Most of the world is at peace. Beyond the absence of armed conflict there has been a transition from a preoccupation with security to a new concern for the economic and social progress of all mankind. Yet, at the very time when interdependence impels international cooperation and when the membership of the United Nations is most universal, the international organization is being tested by a new clash of ideologies and interests, and by insistent tactics of confrontation. Such tendencies diminish the prospect for further achievement and threaten the very institution itself.

Let me place these tendencies in historical perspective.

The end of the Second World War brought on a period of idealism and hope. Victory in war against tyrannical regimes—by nations united for that purpose—seemed as much a triumph for liberty as for peace. The end of the colonial era was shortly to begin and was clearly in prospect. The awesome power of nuclear weapons ironically gave hope that the imperatives of collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes would at last im-

3

press themselves on mankind. The League of Nations had failed, but the cost of another failure now seemed so overwhelming that it was possible to hope that the nations of the world would be obliged to make the United Nations succeed.

No nation embraced this hope more genuinely than the United States. No country more seriously looked for the United Nations to replace force and domination with cooperation. No government more earnestly sought to create a world organization with a capacity to act. It is worth recalling that a year after the San Francisco conference, when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, we offered to turn this entire technology over to the United Nations.

Even then American spokesmen were careful to insist that there were realistic limits to the scope of the new organization. Of these limits the most important, even if perhaps the easiest to overlook, is that the United Nations is not a world government; it is an organization of sovereign states. It is not an entity apart from its membership. It reflects the world context in which it operates: its diversity, its imperfections, its many centers of power and initiative, its competing values, its worldly compound of nobility and tragedy.

The founders' hope for peace rested not on a naive belief in the perfectibility of man but on the hope that the major powers, given a dominant role in the Security Council, would be able to concert together to keep the peace. This hope, of course, proved stillborn when the United Nations became an arena for the confrontations of the Cold War.

A generation later its record in maintaining the peace shows both success and failure. There have been local wars, yet there has been no general war. More than once small conflicts, which had led in the past to great ones, have been contained through the efforts of the United Nations.

Time and again—in the eastern Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Kashmir—the peacekeeping role of the United Nations has proved indispensable for settlement, guarantees, and prevention of major power intervention. While a far cry from the concept of collective security originally envisioned, these operations have proven valuable and increasingly indispensable. They represent the most advanced manifestations of international cooperation for security yet achieved.

The United Nations has understood the principle that peace is not the same as the status quo,

but must embrace procedures for peaceful change. Whether by special commissions or mediators or through the expanded role of the Secretary General within his broad responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter, the United Nations has offered a flexible instrument of pacific settlement on a score of occasions since its founding.

The United Nations has provided a forum for debate and negotiation on regional or global problems, and for multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament. The talks provide a safety valve and a sounding board; in the corridors quiet progress is often being made.

We found early on that there were limits to U.N. action on behalf of peace and security. Its writ can run no further than the agreement of its members. And on the sweeping issues of war and peace it is the great powers, by virtue of their size, military strength, economic power, and political influence, who bear the principal responsibility for world stability and security. Of late, as the great powers are learning the practices of coexistence, there is hope that the United Nations can find renewed possibilities for effective action in accordance with the vision of its founders.

The United Nations, originally concerned primarily with issues of peace and security, has been the focus of increasing attention to economic and social issues. The U.N. Charter contains a commitment "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Today, roughly nine-tenths of expenditures within the U.N. system relate to economic and social cooperation. We welcome this evolution and have contributed generously to it.

Indeed it is in these fields that the work of the United Nations has been most successful, and yet the most unheralded. Its specialized agencies have been effectively involved with countless areas of human and international concern: speeding decolonization; spreading education, science, and technology; organizing global cooperation to combat hunger and disease, to protect the environment, and to limit population growth; regulating international transport and communication and peaceful nuclear power; advancing human rights and expanding international law among nations and in outer space and on the seas; preserving the priceless cultural heritage of mankind. It is striking, and of great importance for the future, that the United Nations has been able to respond creatively

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to so many of the challenges of the modern age.

Thus the United Nations is of considerable importance for the world's future. It has accommodated our traditional security and political concerns to the new conditions of international diplomacy; it has extended its reach—even before most nations did—toward the new agenda that now confronts the world community. The United Nations is both a symbol of our interdependence, and our most universal instrument for common progress.

In this connection, I want to pay tribute to the outstanding leadership given to the United Nations by its Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. He is tireless and totally dedicated to peace, fairness, and the future of the United Nations. The rapidity and efficiency with which he organized and dispatched peacekeeping forces to the Middle East in late 1973 was but one example of the many services he has rendered the organization and the international community.

## The United States and the United Nations

Yet, with all these achievements, the future of the United Nations is clouded. Much that has transpired at the United Nations in recent years gives us pause. At the very moment when great power confrontations are waning, troubling trends have appeared in the General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies. Ideological confrontation, bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate the Charter to achieve unilateral ends threaten to turn the United Nations into a weapon of political warfare rather than a healer of political conflict and a promoter of human welfare.

The United Nations naturally mirrors the evolution of its composition. In its first phase it reflected the ideological struggle between the West and East; during that period the United Nations generally followed the American lead. Time and again in those days there were some 50 votes in support of our position and only a handful of Communist-bloc members against.

Ten years later, when membership had grown to more than 80, our dominance in the General Assembly no longer was assured. Neither East nor West was able to prevail. In the Security Council the American position was still sustained, while the Soviet Union was required to cast veto after veto in order to protect what it considered to be its vital interests.

But with the quantum leap to the present membership of 138, the past tendencies of bloc politics have become more pronounced and more serious. The new nations, for understandable reasons, turned to the General Assembly in which they predominated in a quest for power that simply does not reside there. The Assembly cannot take compulsory legal decisions. Yet numerical majorities have insisted on their will and objectives even when in population and financial contributions they were a small proportion of the membership. In the process, a forum for accommodation has been transformed into a setting for confrontation. The moral influence which the General Assembly should exercise has been jeopardized and could be destroyed if governments—particularly those who are its main financial supporters—should lose confidence in the organization because of the imposition of a mechanical and increasingly arbitrary will.

It is an irony that at the moment the United States has accepted non-alignment, and the value of diversity, those nations which originally chose this stance to preserve their sovereign independence from powerful military alliances are forming a rigid grouping of their own. The most solid bloc in the world today is, paradoxically, the alignment of the non-aligned. This divides the world into categories of North and South, developing and developed, imperial and colonial, at the very moment in history when such categories have become irrelevant and misleading.

Never before has the world been more in need of cooperative solutions. Never before have the industrialized nations been more ready to deal with the problems of development in a constructive spirit. Yet lopsided, loaded voting, biased results, and arbitrary tactics threaten to destroy these possibilities. The utility of the General Assembly both as a safety valve and as an instrument of international cooperation is being undermined. Tragically, the principal victims will be the countries who seek to extort what substantially could be theirs if they proceeded cooperatively.

An equally deplorable development is the trend in the specialized agencies to focus on political issues and thereby deflect the significant work of these agencies. UNESCO, designed for cultural matters, and the International Labor Organization have been heavily politicized. An egregious recent case came in the World Food Council in Rome

(LC)

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where the very nations who desperately need, and would most benefit from, food assistance threatened to abort its work by disruptive tactics unworthy of an international organization. This council grew out of the American initiatives at the World Food Conference last year.

It reflects our deepest humanitarian concerns; it represents a serious effort on our part to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse by those whom we are trying to help, attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries of our efforts, threaten to undermine the very fabric of cooperation in a field of crucial long-range importance to mankind.

We realize that those of us who wish to surmount the current crisis must show some understanding of its origins. The major powers have hardly always set a consistent example of altruistic or benevolent behavior. The nations which would seek to coerce the industrialized countries have themselves been coerced in the past. History haunts us all. But it is precisely to transcend that history that the United Nations was founded. And it is precisely to arrest such trends that the United States is calling attention to them today.

The process is surely self-defeating. According to the rules of the General Assembly, the coerced are under no compulsion to submit. To the contrary, they are given all too many incentives simply to depart the scene, to have done with the tense. Such incentives are ominously enhanced when the General Assembly and specialized agencies expel member nations which for one reason or another do not meet with their approval.

Our concern has nothing to do with our attitude toward the practices or policies of the particular governments against which action is being taken. Our position is constitutional. If the United Nations begins to depart from its Charter, where suspension and expulsion are clearly specified prerogatives of the Security Council, we fear for the integrity and the survival of the General Assembly itself, and no less for that of the specialized agencies. Those who seek to manipulate U.N. membership by procedural abuse may well inherit an empty shell.

We are determined to oppose tendencies which in our view will undermine irreparably the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is the smaller members of the organization who would lose the most. They are more in need of the United

Nations than the larger powers, such as the United States, which can prosper within or outside the institution.

Ways must be found for power and responsibility in the Assembly and in the specialized agencies to be more accurately reflective of the realities of the world. The United States has been by far the largest financial supporter of the United Nations; but the support of the American people, which has been the lifeblood of the organization, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the numerical majority respects the views of the minority. The American people are understandably tired of the inflammatory rhetoric against us, the all-or-nothing stance accompanied by demands for our sacrifice which too frequently dominate the meeting halls of the United Nations.

The United States, despite these trends, intends to do everything in its power to support and strengthen the United Nations in its positive endeavors. With all its limitations and imperfections the world body remains an urgent necessity. We are eager to cooperate, but we are also determined to insist on orderly procedures and adherence to the Charter. The United Nations was never intended as an organization of like-minded states, but rather an arena to accommodate and respect different policies and different interests. The world needs cooperative, not arbitrary, action; joint efforts, not imposed solutions. In this spirit the United States will do what it can to make the United Nations a vital hope for a better future.

## The Agenda Before Us

This, then, is the promise and the problem of the United Nations. We must insure that the promise prevails because the agenda we face makes the institution more necessary than ever before. The United Nations, first, faces continuing and increasing responsibilities in its mission, in the famous words of the U.N. Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

**Areas of Dispute.** One of the central issues of our time is the Middle East conflict, and the U.N. Security Council continues to play a vital role in the quest for a solution. Resolution 338 of 1973 launched a negotiating process which has borne fruit and proved durable. Secretary General Waldheim convened and addressed the first session of the Geneva conference. Resolution 242 of 1967 stated general principles for a comprehensive

6

peace. The stationing of U.N. forces was an indis-
pensable element of the recent disengagement
agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel
and Syria in 1974.

Despite these and other real achievements, the
global perils of local conflict continue to loom
large. The world has dealt with them as if it were
possible to contain conflict perpetually. But such
tolerance tempts conflagration. That is how the
first two world wars began. We must not have a
third; with modern weapons there would not be a
fourth. It is not enough to contain the crises that
occur; we must eradicate their causes. President
Ford is therefore determined to help bring about a
negotiated solution in the Middle East, in Cyprus,
and in other areas of dispute. And peacekeeping
and peacemaking must be a top priority on the
U.N. agenda.

Nuclear Technology. Another problem of
peace which the world community must urgently
address is the spread of nuclear weapons. Their
awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost
3 decades; their sophistication and expense have
long helped limit the number of nations which
could possess them. But now political inhibitions
are crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe-whether by
plan or mistake, accident, theft, or blackmail-is no
longer implausible.

It is imperative to contain—and reverse—the
nuclear arms race among the major powers. We are
now engaged in translating the principles agreed to
in Vladivostok [November 1974] between
President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev
into a new accord between the United States and
the Soviet Union that will for the first time place a
long-term ceiling on the strategic weapons of both
sides.

As we strive to slow the spiral of nuclear arms
we must work as well to halt their spread. This
requires both political and technical measures. In
these areas the work of the United Nations has
been important and could be crucial.

The [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1970 was an important beginning. The recent con-
ference held under U.N. auspices to review the
treaty, and the adherence of additional countries
to its provisions, have been valuable further steps.

The priority now is to strengthen the safe-
guards on the export of nuclear materials for
peaceful uses. The oil crisis adds fresh urgency to
this task because it has made the development of

nuclear energy essential for an increasing number
of nations. This means wider availability of mate-
rials, such as plutonium, and of equipment which
might be used to develop nuclear explosives.

Future generations have a right to expect of
us that commercial competition among the indus-
trial exporting countries will not be so reckless and
irresponsible that it accelerates the spread of nu-
clear weapons and thereby increases the risks of a
nuclear holocaust.

Therefore the United States has begun confi-
dential discussions with other nuclear exporting
countries to develop stronger and generally ac-
cepted safeguards. In this task, the role and work
of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency
is vital. As peaceful nuclear programs grow in size
and complexity it is crucial that supplier- and user-
nations agree on firm and clear export standards
and strengthened IAEA safeguards. An effective
world safeguards system will minimize nuclear
risks while fostering the development of peaceful
nuclear energy. The control of nuclear weapons is
one of the most critical tests of this generation.
The United Nations can crucially help decide
whether we will meet this test.

The Problem of Interdependence

In the last few years the world economy has
undergone a series of shocks and strains.

* Nations have suffered both severe inflation and deep recession on a worldwide scale.

* The price of the world's most essential com-
modity, petroleum, has been precipitously and ar-
bitrarily increased, burdening the economies of all
consuming nations and imposing the most serious
hardships on the poorest countries.

* The world's food reserves have dwindled
alarmingly in only a few short years. Unless mas-
sive efforts are mounted, the gap between popula-
tion growth and food production could reach disas-
trous proportions.

* The pursuit of economic growth is compli-
cated by the fact of interdependence; it can no
longer be pursued by national efforts but requires
coordinated, global actions.

Seventh Special Session. This September's
Special Session of the General Assembly will focus
on the new global economic concerns. It will be an
early and important test: will the rich nations and

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poor nations identify common goals and solve problems together, or will they exacerbate their differences? Can we turn our energies from rhetorical battles to practical cooperation? Will nations strive for empty parliamentary victories or concrete progress?

The United States has made its choice. We believe strongly in a cooperative approach. We believe that the time has come to put the technological and economic genius of mankind into the service of progress for all. We will approach the Special Session with determination to make progress; we intend to make concrete and constructive proposals for action across a broad spectrum of international economic activities such as trade and commodities, world food production, and international financial measures.

The session will also consider structural changes to improve the U.N. capabilities in the field of economic development. A group of experts appointed by Secretary General Waldheim has just completed a study of this subject. We will offer specific comments on these recommendations during the Assembly debate.

In this spirit let me speak directly to the new nations who have pressed their claims with increasing fervor. We have heard and have begun to understand your concerns. We want to be responsive. We are prepared to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your economic problems. Clearly this requires a posture of cooperation. If nations deal with each other with respect and understanding, the two sessions this fall could mark the beginning of a new era in which the realities of an interdependent world economy generate a global effort to bring about peaceful and substantial change.

At the same time we are obliged to speak plainly to the question of what works and what does not. We believe that economic development is in the first instance an internal process. Either societies create the conditions for saving and investment, for innovation and ingenuity, for enterprise and industry which ultimately lead to self-sustaining economic growth, or they do not. There is no magical shortcut and no rhetorical substitute. And to claim otherwise suggests a need for permanent dependence on others.

In this quest for development, experience must count for something and ideology is an unreliable guide. At a minimum we know which economies have worked and which have failed; we have

a record of what societies have progressed economically and which have stagnated. We know from our own experience that investment from abroad can be an important spur to development. We know also that it is now in short supply. In the future, as in the past, there will be competition to attract capital; therefore those who do not wish investment from abroad can be confident that they will not receive it. By the same token those countries which are eager to industrialize must also be ready to create the conditions that will attract large-scale investment.

The voting records of the blocs in the General Assembly simply do not reflect economic reality. The family of less developed countries includes both producers and consumers of energy, importers and exporters of raw materials, and nations which can feed their populations as well as those which face the specter of famine. These divergent interests must be accommodated and reflected in practical measures; they cannot be resolved from the unreality of bloc positions.

At the same time the industrial world must adapt its own attitudes to the new reality of scores of new nations. At bottom the challenge is political, not economic—whether the interests and weight of the less developed nations can be accommodated in the international order. Their political objectives often represent legitimate claims. Yet at the same time the new nations must not expect us to make *only* political decisions, with no thought for economic consequences. If they want truly to serve their peoples there must be practical concern for effective results.

If the industrial world wants to overcome the attitude of confrontation between nations, it must offer equitable solutions for the problems of the less fortunate parts of the world. Just as we are rightly concerned about the economic impact of exorbitant oil prices, so we should show understanding for the concerns of producers of other raw materials whose incomes fluctuate radically. As for the operation of our companies abroad, we consider it in our interest as well as in the common interest to promote an environment of mutual benefit, in which our international businesses can continue to be both profitable and beneficial to the countries in which they operate. We will address this issue more fully at the Special Session.

Above all, the industrialized countries must recognize that many developing countries have had

8

frustratingly slow rates of growth. Rather than a
comfortable margin of progress, they face an abun-
dance of obstacles and a surplus of despair. The
future of international politics over the next gener-
ation—the kind of world our children will in-
herit—will be determined by what actions govern-
ments take now on this spectrum of economic
issues.

Conclusion

Dag Hammerskjold once predicted that the
day would come when people would see the
United Nations for what it really is: not the ab-
stract painting of some artist, but a drawing done
by the peoples of the world. And so it is—not the
perfect institution of the dreamers who saw it as
the only true road to world harmony; and not the
evil instrument of world domination that the isola-
tionists once made it out to be.

Rather it is, like so many human institutions
before it, an imperfect instrument—but one of
great hope nonetheless. The United States remains
dedicated to the principles upon which the United
Nations was founded. We continue to believe it can
be a mighty and effective vehicle for preserving the
peace and bridging the gap between the world's
rich and poor. We will do all we can to make it so.

The past decade—and particularly the past

several years—have been a difficult time for Ameri-
ca. We have known the agony of internal dissension
and political turmoil, and the bitter costs of a
lengthy war. But our nation has come through all
this, and its most difficult constitutional crisis
since the Civil War, with our institutions intact and
our people resilient. And we have seen that the
world still looks to us for leadership in preserving
the peace and promoting economic advance for all
mankind.

But the past decade has also surely shown
that, strong and prosperous as we are, we cannot
remake the world alone. Others must do their part
and bear their responsibility for building the better
world we all seek for the generations that will
come after us.

In this endeavor, the United Nations plays a
central role. It is there that each nation, large or
small, rich or poor, can—if it will—make its contri-
bution to the betterment of all. It is there that
nations must realize that restraint is the only prin-
ciple that can save the world from chaos, and that
our destinies are truly intertwined on this small
planet. It is there that we will see whether men and
nations have the wisdom and courage to make a
reality of the ideals of the Charter and, in the end,
to turn the parliament of man into a true expres-
sion of the conscience of humanity.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

The Secretary
of State

Speech

July 15, 1975

Bureau of Public Affairs

Minneapolis, Minnesota

Office of Media Services

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FOREIGN POLICY

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the
Upper Midwest Council.

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have long looked forward to coming to Minnesota because it is the home of a man I admire enormously, the one man who likes to talk almost as much as I do—Senator Humphrey. At the hearings on my nomination as Secretary of State, Senator Humphrey instructed me with much wisdom on the difficult job ahead. His advice was right on the mark, and has been ever since. He is a good friend, and a great statesman. Minnesotans can be proud that he represents them in the United States Senate, for he is an example of the spirit of our country—its decency, its humanity, and its strength.

America has now entered upon its 200th year as a free nation. In those 2 centuries our country has grown from a small agricultural nation with very few responsibilities beyond its borders to a world power with global responsibilities. Yet, while the range of interests has changed massively, our commitment to the values that gave birth to our nation has remained unaltered.

These are the aspects of our national experience I would like to address today: the pursuit of America's values as a humane and just example to others; and the furthering of America's interests in a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter. How do we reconcile and advance both aspects of our national purpose? What, in our time, is the significance of the age-old quandary of the relationship between principle and power?

Through the greater part of our history we

have been able to avoid the issue. A fortunate margin of safety and an unexplored continent produced the impression that principle and power automatically coalesced, that no choice was necessary or that only one choice was possible.

But now for nearly a decade our nation has been weighed down by uncertainty and discord. We have found ourselves doubtful of our virtue and uncertain of our direction largely because we have suddenly realized that like other nations before us we must now reconcile our principles with our necessities. Amid frustration, many Americans questioned the validity of our involvement in the international arena; in the wake of our disappointments, some abroad now doubt our resolve.

We are, I believe, emerging from this period with a renewed sense of confidence. Recent events have brought home to us—and to the rest of the world—that a purposeful, strong, and involved America is essential to peace and progress. These same events have also reminded us of the contribution this country made in the 30 years since World War II—and what is at stake in the next 30 years.

The United States can look back on an extraordinary generation of achievement. We have maintained a stable balance of power in the world; we have preserved peace and fostered the growth of the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped shape the international trade and monetary system which has nourished global prosperity. We promoted decolonization and pioneered in development assistance for the new nations. We have taken major initiatives to forge more reliable and positive relationships with the major Communist powers.

PR 572

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In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, in an international system not of empire but of scores of independent states, the global contribution of one nation—the United States—has been without precedent in human history. Only a nation of strong conviction and great idealism could have accomplished these efforts. We shall not turn our backs on this legacy.

## The Modern Agenda

Today we face a new agenda. Our accomplishments over the past generation have changed the world and defined our tasks for the coming decades:

* Our allies, the major industrial democracies, have recovered their vigor and influence. We are transforming our alliances into more equal partnerships. We shall act in harmony with friends whose security and prosperity is indispensable to our own and whose cooperation is essential for progress and justice.

* The incredible destructiveness of modern weapons has transformed international politics. We must maintain our military strength. But we have an obligation, in our own interest as well as the world's, to work with other nations to control both the growth and the spread of nuclear weapons.

* In our relations with the Communist powers we must never lose sight of the fact that in the thermonuclear age general war would be disastrous to mankind. We have an obligation to seek a more productive and stable relationship despite the basic antagonism of our values.

* Thirty years of economic and political evolution have brought about a new diffusion of power and initiative. At the same time, interdependence imposes upon all nations the reality that they must prosper together or suffer together. The destinies of the world's nations have become inevitably interwined. Thus, the capacity of any one nation to shape events is more limited, and consequently our own choices are more difficult and complex.

## The Legacy of Our Past

To deal with this agenda we require strength of purpose and conviction. A nation unsure of its values cannot shape its future. A people confused

about its direction will miss the opportunity to build a better and more peaceful world. This is why perhaps our deepest challenge is our willingness to face the increasing ambiguity of the problem of ends and means.

We start with strong assets. Throughout our history we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves—a beacon to the oppressed from other lands—from the first settlers to the recent refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a powerful force.

But the emphasis on principle has also produced a characteristic American ambivalence. Relations with a world of nations falling short of our ideal have always presented us with dilemmas. As a people, we have oscillated between insistence on our uniqueness and the quest for broad acceptance of our values; between trying to influence international developments and seeking to isolate ourselves from them; between expecting too much of our power and being ashamed of it; between optimistic exuberance and frustration with the constraints practicality imposes.

Through most of our history we have sought to shield our country and hemisphere from outside intrusion, to shun involvement in balance-of-power politics. Soldiers and diplomats—the practitioners of power—have always been looked upon with suspicion. We considered generosity in relief efforts, the encouragement of free international trade, and the protection of our economic interests abroad as the only wholesome forms of international involvement.

Our founding fathers were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and knew how to profit from it. For the succeeding century and a half, our security was assured by favorable circumstances over which we had little influence. Shielded by two oceans, and enriched by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special situation as universally valid to nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own.

Indeed, the concern of other nations for security reinforced our sense of uniqueness. We were a

3

haven for millions, a place where the injustices, inequities, privations, and abridgements of human dignity which the immigrants had suffered were absent, or amenable to rapid redress. As our strength and size expanded, we remained uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power and involvement in day-to-day diplomacy. At the turn of the century, for example, there were soul-searching debates over the Spanish-American War and our first acquisition of noncontiguous territories. While many saw our policies as dictated by our interests, others considered them our entrance into a morally questionable world.

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems—all these were invoked to banish the reality of power. And when our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1917, Woodrow Wilson translated our geopolitical interest in preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe into a universal moral objective. We fought to “make the world safe for democracy.”

The inevitable disillusionment with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationist sentiment. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward, as we sought to deal with the problems of our own society—even as that same depression simultaneously generated real dangers abroad.

We were stirred from isolation only by external attack and we sustained our effort because of the obvious totalitarian evil. We opposed all-out war, and total victory further strengthened our sense of moral rectitude—and ill prepared us for the aftermath. Of all the nations involved, we alone emerged essentially unscathed from the ravages of conflict—our military power, economic strength, and political confidence intact. And in the postwar bipolar world of cold war confrontation we believed we faced a reincarnation of the just defeated foe—an apparently monolithic and hostile ideological empire whose ambitions and values were antithetical to our own.

Our success and the preeminent position it brought convinced us that we could shape the globe according to American design. Our preponderant power gave us a broad margin for error so we believed that we could overwhelm problems through the sheer weight of resources. No other nation possessed so much insurance against so

many contingencies; we could afford to be imprudent in the definition of our interests. Indeed, we often imagined that we had nothing so selfish as interests—only obligations and responsibilities. In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our cause.

## America's Role

We no longer live in so simple a world. We remain the strongest nation and the largest single factor in international affairs. Our leadership is perhaps even more essential than before. But our strategic superiority has given way to nuclear balance. Our political and economic predominance has diminished as others have grown in strength and our dependence on the world economy has increased. Our margin of safety has shrunk.

Today we find that—like most other nations in history—we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Today we must conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of our interests. We must be thoughtful in defining our interests. We must prepare against the worst contingency and not plan only for the best. We must pursue limited objectives and many objectives simultaneously. In this effort, the last decade has taught us:

* That our power will not always bring preferred solutions; but we are still strong enough to influence events, often decisively.

* That we cannot remedy all the world's ills; but we can help build an international structure that will foster the initiative and cooperation of others.

* That we can no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance; but as the richest and most powerful nation, we still have a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a sponsor of world order.

* That we cannot banish power politics from international affairs, but we can promote new and wider communities of interest among nations; we can mute the use and threat of force; we can help establish incentives for restraint and penalties for its absence; we can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation; and we can help construct a more equitable pattern of relations between developed and developing nations.

4

This new complexity has produced in some a
rebellion against contemporary foreign policy. We
are told that our foreign policy is excessively prag-
matic, that it sacrifices virtue in the mechanical
pursuit of stability. Once attacked as cold-war
oriented, we are now criticized by some as insensi-
tive to moral values. Once regarded as naive in the
use of power, we are now alleged to rely too much
on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most
generous of nations, we now stand accused by
some of resisting a more equitable international
economic system.

It is time to face the reality of our situation. Our choice is not between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either, nor are they incompatible. This nation must be true to its own beliefs or it will lose its bearings in the world. But at the same time it must survive in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills.

We need moral strength to select among often
agonizing choices and a sense of purpose to navi-
gate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But
we need as well a mature sense of means, lest we
substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of
survival.

Clearly we are in need of perspective. Let me
state some basic principles:

Foreign policy must start with security. A
nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibil-
ity; it cannot be compromised or put to risk. There
can be no security for us or for others unless the
strength of the free countries is in balance with
that of potential adversaries; and no stability in
power relationships is conceivable without
America's active participation in world affairs.

The choices in foreign policy are often difficult and the margins are frequently narrow; imperfect solutions are sometimes unavoidable. In the Second World War, for example, we joined forces with countries whose values we did not share in order to accomplish the morally worthy objective of defeating Nazism. Today we cooperate with many nations for the purpose of regional stability and global security, even though we disapprove of some of their internal practices. These choices are made consciously, and based on our best assessment of what is necessary.

At the same time, security is a means not an
end. The purpose of security is to safeguard the
values of our free society. And our survival is not

always at stake in international issues. Many of
decisions are not imposed on us by events. Where
we have latitude we must seize the moral oppor-
tunity for humanitarian purposes.

Our assistance to developing nations, for
example, serves both foreign policy and humani-
tarian ends. It strengthens political ties to other
nations. It contributes to expanded trade; close to
90 percent of our foreign assistance is eventually
spent in this country. And our assistance reflects
our values as a people, because we cannot close our
eyes to the suffering of others. Because of history
and moral tradition, we cannot live with ourselves
as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation.

In the whole field of foreign aid, and particu-
larly in food aid, America's record is unsurpassed.
We and the world owe much to leaders with vision
and compassion like Senator Humphrey who
drafted the Food for Peace legislation some 20
years ago.

Finally, our values link the American people
and their government. In a democracy the conduct
of foreign policy is possible only with public sup-
port. Therefore your government owes you an arti-
culation of the purposes which its policies
designed to serve; to make clear our premises,
contribute to enlightened debate, and to explain
how our policies serve the American people's ob-
jectives. And those principles—freedom, the dignity
of the individual, the sanctity of law—are at the
heart of our policy; they are also the foundation of
our most basic and natural partnerships with the
great industrial democracies which are essential to
our safety and well-being.

Morality and Policy

The relation of morality to policy is thus not
an abstract philosophical issue. It applies to many
topics of the current debate. It applies to relations
with the Communist powers, where we must
manage a conflict of moral purposes and interests
in the shadow of nuclear peril; and it applies in our
political ties with nations whose domestic practices
are inconsistent with our own.

Our relationship with the Communist powers
has raised difficult questions for Americans since
the Bolshevik Revolution. It was understood very
early that the Communist system and ideology
were in conflict with our own principles. Sixty-
years passed before President Franklin Roosevelt
extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet

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Government. He did so in the belief, as he put it, that "through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened."

Today again courageous voices remind us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to defend freedom. About this there is no disagreement.

There is, however, a clear conflict between two moral imperatives which is at the heart of the problem. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship between the two superpowers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance-when both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized life-there is no alternative to coexistence. In such conditions the necessity of peace is itself a moral imperative. As President Kennedy pointed out: "In the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

It is said, correctly, that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the furthering of Soviet objectives. In a world of nuclear weapons capable of destroying mankind, in a century which has seen resort to brutal force on an unprecedented scale and intensity, in an age of ideology which turns the domestic policies of nations into issues of international contention, the problem of peace takes on a profound moral and practical difficulty. But the issue, surely, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they also serve our own. Constructive actions in Soviet policy are desirable *whatever* the Soviet motives.

This Government has stated clearly and constantly the principles which we believe must guide U.S.-Soviet relations and international conduct and which are consistent with both our values and our interests:

* We will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve our security. We will as a matter of principle and national interest oppose attempts by any country to achieve global or regional predominance.

We will judge the state of U.S.-Soviet relations not by atmospherics but by whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

* All negotiations will be a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable observance of agreements.

* We will insist, as we always have, that progress in U.S.-Soviet economic relations must reflect progress toward stable political relationships.

* We will never abandon our ideals or our friends. We will not negotiate over the heads of, or against the interests of, other nations.

* We will respond firmly to attempts to achieve unilateral advantage, or to apply the relaxation of tensions selectively.

Beyond the necessities of coexistence there is the hope of a more positive relationship. The American people will never be satisfied with simply reducing tension and easing the danger of nuclear holocaust. Over the longer term, we hope that firmness in the face of pressure and the creation of incentives for cooperative action may bring about a more durable pattern of stability and responsible conduct.

Today's joint manned mission in space-an area in which 15 years ago we saw ourselves in almost mortal rivalry-is symbolic of the distance we have traveled. Practical progress has been made on a wide range of problems. Berlin has been removed as a source of conflict between East and West; crises have been dampened; the frequency of U.S.-Soviet consultation on bilateral and multilateral problems is unprecedented; the scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the state of affairs 10, even 5, years ago. The agreements already achieved to limit strategic armament programs-the central weapons of our respective military arsenals-are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Your Senator [Walter F.] Mondale is a strong and constructive advocate of such strategic arms control efforts.

Our immediate focus is on the international actions of the Soviet Union not because it is our only moral concern, but because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationships, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation.

Therefore, critics of detente must answer:

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What is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does detente encourage repression—or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Can we ask our people to support confrontation unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored?

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States will maintain its strength, defend its interests, and support its friends with determination and without illusion. We will speak up for our beliefs with vigor and without self-deception. We consider detente a means to regulate a competitive relationship—not a substitute for our own efforts in building the strength of the free world. We will continue on the course on which we are embarked because it offers hope to our children of a more secure and a more just world.

These considerations raise a more general question: To what extent are we able to affect the internal policies of other governments and to what extent is it desirable?

There are some 150 nations in the world, and barely a score of them are democracies in any real sense. The rest are nations whose ideology or political practices are inconsistent with our own. Yet we have political relations and often alliances with some of these countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

Congressman [Donald M.] Fraser has raised this issue with great integrity and concern, and I have profited from many discussions with him. We do not and will not condone repressive practices. This is not only dictated by our values but is also a reflection of the reality that regimes which lack legitimacy or moral authority are inherently vulnerable. There will therefore be limits to the degree to which such regimes can be congenial partners. We have used, and we will use, our influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demand it.

But truth compels also a recognition of our limits. The question is whether we promote human rights more effectively by counsel and friendly relations where this serves our interest, or by confrontational propaganda and discriminatory legislation.

And we must also assess the domestic formance of foreign governments in relation to their history and to the threats they face. We must have some understanding for the dilemmas of countries adjoining powerful, hostile, and irreconcilable totalitarian regimes.

Our alliances and political relationships serve mutual ends; they contribute to regional and world security, and thus support the broader welfare. They are not favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of mutual interests. They should be withdrawn only when our interests change and not as a punishment for some act with which we do not agree. In many countries, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in many countries—especially in Asia—it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline, and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices.

The attempt to deal with those practices restrictive American legislation raises a serious problem, not because of the moral view it expresses—which we share—but because of the mistaken impression it creates that our security ties are acts of charity. And beyond that, such acts—because they are too public, too inflexible, and too much a stimulus to nationalistic resentment—are almost inevitably doomed to fail.

There are no simple answers. Painful experience should have taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. Therefore let me state the principles that will guide our action:

* Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

* The United States will speak up for human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments.

* We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem policies that bring positive results.

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We will not lose sight of either the requirements of global security or what we stand for as a nation.

## The Domestic Dimension

For Americans, then, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how. The issue is whether we have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; whether we will look behind easy slogans and recognize that our great goals can only be reached by patience, and in imperfect stages.

The question is also whether we will use our moral convictions to escape reality or as a source of courage and self-confidence. We hear too often assertions that were a feature of our isolationist period: That a balance of power is a cynical game; that secret conspiratorial intentions lurk behind open, public policies; that weapons are themselves the sources of conflict; that intelligence activities are wicked; that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement.

These are the counsels of despair. I refuse to accept the premise that our moral values and policy objectives are irreconcilable. The ends we seek in our foreign policy must have validity in the framework of our beliefs or we have no meaningful foreign policy. The maintenance of peace is a moral as well as a practical objective: Measures to limit armaments serve a moral as well as practical end; the cohesion of our alliances with the great industrial democracies makes our way of life and our principles more secure; cooperation to improve the world economic system enhances the well-being of peoples; policies to reconcile the rich nations and the poor, and to enhance the progress of both, serve a humane as well as a political end.

We live in a secular age which prides itself on

its realism. Modern society is impersonal and bureaucratic. The young, who in every generation crave a sense of purpose, are too often offered cynicism and escapism instead of a faith that truly inspires. All modern democracies are beset by problems beyond the margin of governments' ability to control. Debunking of authority further drains democratic government of the ability to address the problems that beset it. A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The opportunities that we face as a nation to help shape a more just international order depend more than ever on a steady, resolute, and self-assured America.

This requires confidence—the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives.

Thus, for this nation to contribute truly to peace in the world it must make peace with itself. It is time to put aside the cynicism and distrust that have marked, and marred, our political life for the better part of the past decade. It is time to remind ourselves that while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all have the same ultimate objective—the peace, prosperity, and tranquillity of our country and of the world.

And most of all, it is time we recognized that as the greatest democracy the world has ever known, we are a living reminder that there is an alternative to tyranny and oppression. The revolution that we began 200 years ago goes on, for most of the world still lives without the freedom that has for so long been ours. To them we remain a beacon of hope and an example to be emulated.

So let us come together for the tasks that our time demands. We have before us an opportunity to bring peace to a world that awaits our leadership.

Statement by
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

July 24, 1975

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE)

-- The substantive phase of negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has at last concluded after over 22 months of difficult bargaining and the way is now open for convening a summit-level final meeting of CSCE at Helsinki on July 30.

US Objectives

-- Since the November 1972 beginning of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks for this Conference, the United States has had two principal objectives: to help ensure that eventual CSCE results would be balanced and acceptable to all 35 participant states; and to coordinate our positions on CSCE with our Allies in a manner safeguarding the unity of the Atlantic Alliance.

-- We have achieved these objectives.

-- At CSCE the overall emphasis of the Western and neutral countries has been on improving, not freezing, the status quo in Europe.

-- It should be recalled that our NATO Allies, who had taken the lead in responding to Eastern calls for a European security conference, decided, ultimately with our

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support, in 1969 that such a Conference might serve a useful
purpose if concrete progress could first be achieved on
Berlin, the most sensitive aspect of East-West confrontation in
Europe.

-- In June 1972, a new Berlin accord was put into
effect along with the FRG-GDR basic treaty, and the Allies
considered that their conditions had been met for agreeing
to the start of CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks at
Helsinki the following November.

-- Also, the Warsaw Pact countries agreed to meet the
West at Vienna to commence exploratory talks on mutual and
balanced force reductions shortly thereafter, in January 1973.
Conference Results

-- As for the CSCE results, conference participants
consider the CSCE documents to be statements of political
resolve or declarations of intent, not agreements legally
binding upon governments. The Conference has not produced
a treaty.

-- It is clear, however, that CSCE results will be
seen as having important political commitments behind them,
since they will be signed by high-level representatives
of 35 nations.

-- The CSCE Agenda has covered four major items
known as "baskets."

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-- Under Agenda Item 1, or basket 1, there is a declaration of ten principles of interstate relations, which resembles the "Friendly Relations" Declaration of the United Nations. The principles declaration includes, at Western insistence, a specific reference to the possibility of effecting border changes by peaceful means. The military security aspects of the Conference was limited to agreement on two modest "confidence-building measures:" prior notification of major military maneuvers and exchange of observers at those maneuvers.

-- In basket 2, the Geneva talks produced a series of declarations calling for increased East-West economic and scientific cooperation.

-- The third Agenda Item -- the famous "basket 3" of the Conference -- was included on the CSCE agenda only as a result of energetic efforts by the NATO Allies and the neutral states. Here the West has sought to strengthen East-West human contacts, exchange of information, and cooperation on cultural and educational questions.

-- In basket 4, post-CSCE follow-up arrangements have been negotiated. In 1977, a meeting of experts will be convened at Belgrade to prepare for a subsequent meeting of senior officials later the same year, also in Belgrade, to review results of CSCE and plan for possible further follow-up activities.

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Alliance Solidarity

-- Across the backdrop of the CSCE negotiations, let us review briefly the efforts of the United States to ensure effective coordination of Allied positions at the Conference and, more generally, to maintain the solidarity of the Alliance.

-- You will recall that I asked in April 1973 that our Allies join with us in writing a new "Atlantic Charter" reaffirming the solidarity of the Alliance during a period of intensified efforts to improve relations with the East. Despite difficulties stemming from different approaches to the 1973 October war in the Middle East, our Allies joined us in signing a new Declaration of Atlantic Relations at a NATO summit meeting in June 1974. And, more recently, in late May, the Allies again joined us at a NATO summit meeting in Brussels which once more underscored our common transatlantic commitments.

-- Thus, in light of the generally satisfactory and balanced results of the Geneva negotiations and the exemplary success of our efforts to maintain Alliance solidarity during the CSCE negotiations, we and our Allies are preparing to attend the Helsinki stage III meeting opening on July 30 at the summit.

* * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 25, 1975

No. 387

#64

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

The White House
July 25, 1975

MR. NESSEN: This is all on the record, for
immediate release and quotation. Maybe the best way
to go at this would be to have 20 minutes or so of
questions on the trip, which begins tomorrow, and 15
minutes or so, if there are other matters that interest
you.

The Secretary has a crowded schedule today,
and we would like to try to hold this to somewhere between
30 and 35 minutes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Barry, I understand you
have the first question.

Q I was going to ask a Middle East question.
There is a statement here that the White House has put
out on the trip. In it, the President says the Helsinki
declaration will further the aspirations of the people of
Eastern Europe, and he restates our commitment to the
peaceful changes.

In a specific way, can you tell us how somehow
this will further the aspirations of the people now
locked into the Soviet sphere?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, one has to analyze what the phrase "locked into the Soviet sphere" means.

Q Lithuania, Latvia and part of the Soviet Union.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In those countries, the existing situation in Europe reflects, among other things, a balance of forces and a state of affairs that has continued for a generation. It was not created by a document and it will not, as such, be changed by a document.

Therefore, the question that has had to be answered in the entire post-war period and has been answered in different ways at different times is, what is more helpful for a humane evolution, a policy of confrontation or a policy of easing tensions, whether peoples can realize their aspirations better under conditions in which there is political and a threat of military conflict, or under conditions in which the two sides are attempting to settle their disputes and ease tensions.

The judgment that has been made -- and it is important to remember that it is not only that of the United States, but of all West European countries -- is that a policy in which an attempt is made to settle political conflicts will help the humane values that they espouse.

This was the basis for Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik in 1969, in which he faced within his country the question of whether the objectives that he sought were best achieved by a policy of political confrontation or by a policy of easing tensions.

He gave the answer, he made the decisions as far as the Federal Republic and the German question was concerned, which in turn was at the heart of the European problem.

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The agreement by the United States to attend
the European Security Conference was in fact made
conditional on progress on the German question, and
particularly on the solution of the Berlin issue.

So, therefore, it is, I believe, that the
easing of tensions in the world and easing of tensions
in Europe will help ease the lives of people and may
contribute to an evolution in which the problems that
produced the Cold War can be dealt with more effectively.

No document is going to change the existing
balance of power on the Continent, and therefore
there are limits to what any agreement can achieve, but
this is the sense in which the President used that
paragraph.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee as
being the consequences of yesterday's House vote on the
Turkish arms embargo? Do you see any progress in --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to answer
that in the second part of the press conference.

Q Question please.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was the
consequences of the House vote on the Turkish aid embargo,
and I would prefer to answer this -- if we could keep
the first 20 minutes on the trip and the implications of
the trip, and the second 20 minutes on general foreign
policy questions --

Q Mr. Secretary, the President will be
meeting with Secretary Brezhnev twice. Can you describe
what will be discussed in those talks and how far apart
and how difficult to narrow is the gap on the SALT
negotiations?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, every time the President and the General Secretary meet, there is a general review of the world situation. But, I would think that the three subjects that will receive most attention will be primarily SALT, then the further evolution of European negotiations, such as MBFR and finally undoubtedly there will be a discussion about the Middle East.

With respect to the SALT negotiations, Foreign Minister Gromyko gave us some replies to the American position on SALT while we met in Geneva. On several important categories, these represented distinct progress.

In other categories, there is still a gap. The issues on which a gap remains are substantially fewer in number than was the case a few weeks ago. So, what the President and the General Secretary will attempt to do is to see whether the issues on which progress has been made, how to turn them over to Geneva, and on the issues on which progress still remains to be made, whether they can narrow the differences.

It is our view that a SALT agreement is possible and that the issues on which the compromises have to be made are now quite clearly defined, and therefore it depends on political decisions in both countries.

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Q Mr. Kissinger, since the United States is going to go into the CSCE summit with absolutely no economic policy whatsoever except massive austerity and triage, which is backed up by the kind of international terrorisms that you are now personally implicated in, in the Colt arms deal and Black September and various other things, New Solidarity would like to know what you are going to tell us will be the American response to the Soviet alternative to all of this, which is increasing trade arrangements with the Third World and Western Europe based on a transfer of rubles which would undercut the existing dollar debt structure --

Q Question?

Q What was the question, Dr. Kissinger?
(Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was almost as complicated as my answers tend to be and probably a little more comprehensible. But if I understand the question it was, has the United States an economic policy -- I am leaving out the various personal allusions --

Q No, what would your response be to the Soviet policy which has now been made clear?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we have to make clear that at the European Security Conference the Soviet Union is not likely to put forward an integrated economic policy to which we have to respond, because the European Security Conference really is primarily concerned with ratifying the agreements that have been reached in stage two and to permit each of the leaders to make a policy statement.

However, at the side there will be many bilateral discussions. The United States -- leaving aside the various comments about Soviet economic policy -- the United States requires a foreign economic policy for an extremely rapidly changing world and one which it is quite possible the Soviet Union may attempt to enter over the next five to ten years, but I do not believe that that issue will come up at Helsinki.

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Q Mr. Secretary, why do you think the
Russians seem so interested in having such a conference?
What do they get out of it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to stress
that our policy has to be made in terms of our purposes.
We should not gear our policy to preventing something
that the Soviets may have a motive for doing. We have
to assess whether it also serves our own purposes.

Now the European Security Conference has been
a part of Soviet policy since 1953 and 1954. At that time,
it had a totally different purpose. At that time, it
was designed to keep the Federal Republic from entering
NATO.

It has been resurrected at periodic intervals by
the Soviet Union. It was rejected for a long time by all
the European nations as well as the United States.

In the 1960s an increasing number of West
European nations moved towards acceptance of the idea of
a European Security Conference. And then, in the late
1960s, with the beginning of the change in German policy,
it gained a momentum in which the United States decided
that it was wiser to participate in that process rather
than to attempt to block it.

However, the conditions have changed importantly
since this process was initiated and I would say that
for the Soviet Union it was started at one time to
prevent the Federal Republic from entering NATO.

In the 1960s it may have been conceived as a
kind of a substitute peace treaty, but then as the 1960s
developed many of the issues which originally could have
been discussed at the European Security Conference were
settled in a series of bilateral agreements which the
Soviet Union made with every West European country and
the United States, so now the focus of the European
Security Conference has drifted more to a general statement
of principles rather than the character it had then.

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Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has continued
to attach great importance to it, perhaps in part
because, like other governments, when something has been
such a cardinal aim, once it is achieved, even if some
of the original assumptions have somewhat altered,
it still retains its importance as an achievement as a
long held goal.

But as far as the United States is concerned,
we see the significance of the Security Conference as a
useful step in a general pattern of the improvement of
relations between the East and West. We do not consider
it an additional ratification of any existing arrangement.
We consider these principles of conduct that repeat what
has already been stated in many bilateral arrangements
and adds to it certain principles of peaceful change and
improved human contact, which we consider useful progress
but which we will confine to the words "useful progress."

Q Mr. Secretary, the United States initially
came to the position of participating in the conference
in the belief that also some parallel progress should be
made in MBFR. Can you tell us now what progress is being
made in MBFR?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, that is not a correct
description of what the United States' position has been.
The United States linked the opening of the European
Security Conference to the opening of the MBFR discussion.
During the course of it, it was never the position of
the United States, and certainly never the position of
our West European allies, that progress in both of these
negotiations should be linked, and indeed on the one or
two occasions that we explored the possibility of this
link with our West European allies, they rejected the
concept that the forced reduction negotiations should
be conducted in step with the European Security Conference.

So the fact that they are not linked together
is primarily due to discussions within the West and it has
never been a condition that the United States made.

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The question is, where do we stand on the force reduction negotiations? The United States attaches importance to the force reduction negotiations. Without question, the President will raise this in his discussion with the General Secretary.

These negotiations are now in recess. They have followed the procedures and the general atmosphere that occurs in the general course of these negotiations, which is that they go through a long discussion of technical phases in which the positions of the two sides are not frequently compatible.

They are now at a point where some decisions have to be made on both sides. Some decisions have to be made on both sides modifying the positions that exist.

The positions that have been taken up to now, while they have been irreconcilable, have nevertheless enabled both sides to study the technical implications of a number of reduction proposals that have been put forward. We are now at a phase where this requires a decision -- which has happened also in the SALT negotiations -- to move things into a stage of more detailed negotiations.

Q Mr. Secretary, one criticism of this conference is that its purposes are so modest that it does not seem to warrant engaging the presence of the President of the United States and 34 other heads of government, to sign these papers. How do you respond to that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The position that the United States took throughout the conference was that we would attend the conference at the highest level if this was the judgment of the other participants and if sufficient progress were made to justify it.

That sufficient progress was defined during the conference as progress in the so-called Basket 3 on human rights and progress on the military provisions of the advance notification of maneuvers, and finally on the clause with respect to peaceful change in Basket 1 on the statement of principles. These objectives were substantially attained.

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Nevertheless, the United States did not agree to the summit level until all the major West European countries had previously agreed to it, and it was our view that nuances that might separate one in one's assessment of this, did not warrant breaking allied unity on the subject.

Secondly, the conference will give a very useful opportunity, of course, for the meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev and also with other leaders for the President to exchange views and to make progress on outstanding issues.

So on the whole we consider the content of the conference useful and the visit will also make a significant contribution in a number of areas.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the meeting with Brezhnev, you had talked about SALT a little bit but can you be more specific? Has there been progress on the verification issue, and has the Soviet Union accepted American proposals on the counting of MIRV's or have they come up with a viable substitute?

And two, are you seeking Soviet forbearance for an interim agreement or for American presence, as technicians in the Middle East? What do you want to talk about on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to SALT, I have no question that within the next weeks it will seep out of various elements in the Government, uncharacteristically, but in summer our standards relax a little.

But I have promised Foreign Minister Gromyko that until the negotiations were somewhat further advanced, not to go into a detailed description of the proposal.

I can only repeat what I have said before, that in some areas some significant progress has been made. In other areas, considerable differences remain. And, of course, the United States has attached importance to the verification issue, but I don't want to go into where the differences remain and where the progress has been made.

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With respect to the Middle East, to say the United States asked for Soviet forbearance is to imply a state of affairs that may not correspond to facts. We naturally, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, periodically review the Middle East situation with the Soviet Union. We have also always held the view that no final settlement could be made in the Middle East that excluded Soviet participation.

So what we have to discuss with the Soviet Union is where down the road and in what manner the approaches to a final settlement will be made.

With respect to negotiations now in progress, it is not correct to say we are seeking Soviet forbearance so, of course, the restraint of all of the parties as well as outside countries in that process, is of utility.

MR. NESSEN: Let's open it up now for more general questions, for 15 minutes.

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Q I would like to ask this question to bridge the two subjects. Mr. Secretary, the Administration is encountering extraordinary criticism here of the President's trip to Helsinki. Simultaneously, the Administration suffered a major setback in Congress yesterday on the Turkish vote and also in committee on the Jordanian Hawk missiles.

Can it be the Administration is seriously misjudging the Congress and the public in terms of what their views are of what the traffic will bear on foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One of the benefits of detente is that you can criticize detente, and if we did not have it, we would be criticized for missing opportunities for peace.

Is it true? Is the Administration misjudging what the temper of the country is? We believe that in the basic direction of East-West relations, the Administration is in no way misjudging the temper of the country.

In any event, the Administration has an obligation to put before the country and to put before the Congress its best judgment of what is required for peace or progress towards peace in certain areas, even if it should get defeated on the issues.

First, on the East-West relations, we do not believe we are misjudging the temper of the country, and we ought to keep in perspective the nature of the criticism, the depth of the criticism and we ought to be aware of the fact that what makes the criticism possible at all is that we are not living under conditions of crisis.

So, there is a temptation to have all the benefits of peace, as well as all the benefits of looking tough.

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With respect to the Turkish aid vote, I believe
this is a result of a special Congressional situation
that existed before last year and of considerable
pressures that were mounted.

We offered a compromise between the total
cutoff and the total restoration, which we favored. We
believe that it is a very unfortunate decision. We had
no choice except to request a change in a Congressional
decision, which is unfortunate for Greece, unfortunate
for Turkey, unfortunate for the possibilities of a
settlement in Cyprus and unfortunate for the security of
the Eastern Mediterranean.

I think it is a tragic evolution, and I
hope that when this subject continues to be discussed,
it will not be seen in terms of a conflict between the
Executive and the Legislative and not trying to prove who
was right to begin with, but trying to see it in terms
of the fundamental interests of the United States and
the basic requirements of peace.

It is in that spirit that we will try to live
with the decision, and we will try to do the best we can.
We will have to come back to the Congress with our best
judgment later on.

Q Mr. Secretary, Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen
says a CIA spokesman told him the Soviets are pumping
about $10 million a month into Portugal to finance a
Communist takeover of that country.

Senator Bentsen says the State Department tells
him there are unconfirmed reports of $2 million a month.
Can you tell us what you know about how the Soviets are
intervening in the internal affairs of Portugal? Is this
intervention not a violation of the European security
agreement, and if it is a violation, why are we signing
the agreement?

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