Speech by Dr Henry Kissinger

at Foreign Affairs College, Beijing Nov. 9, 1985

Mr Vice-President, Mr. President, Friends: It is a great honour for me to be invited to speak at this institute. I know it must be difficult for you to follow my English. And if you have difficulty, remember that it is almost certainly my fault because I speak English with a German accent. For me, visiting China is always a sentimental experience. When relations between our two countries were reestablished, there were of course important practical reasons on both sides. Permanent relations between great nations can really only be based on a correct perception of the national interest. But in addition, on my many visits to China, there have formed so many ties of personal friendship, there have been now so many associations of warm memories that I am violating some of my own principles in the conduct of foreign policy, when I say that the ties are now not only national interest as far as I am concerned, but very sentimental ones as well. I have been asked to talk to you about U.S.—Soviet relations. And since I was invited to speak to you only about a week ago, I did not have the opportunity to write out the speech, so I will talk to you from notes, not particularly address as you are a Chinese audience, but I will tell you what I would say to any audience on this subject.

The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is extremely complex, partly because of the extraordinary different historical experience of the two countries. Until the end of World War II, the United States really never had to conduct a foreign policy. It was protected by two great oceans. The problem of powerful neighbours did not exist for us. And the United States therefore could develop a view of foreign policy, partly isolationist, partly moralistic. most Americans believed that the fortunate accident of history that has placed us geographically far away was also a reflection of moral superiority. And at the end of World War I and during the course of World War II, the United States sought nothing more than to be able to withdraw once again into its previous solitude. President Wilson at the end of World War I insisted that the United States should have nothing to do with such concepts as the balance of power. We thought of world organizations and even ideas of world government. And most Americans believe that Americans have an obligation to improve the world, and not just manipulate it. When President Truman went to the Potsdam Conference, he refused to meet with the British Prime Minister ahead of time, because he did not want Stalin to think that we and Britain

were ganging up on the Soviet Union. The secret dream of most Americans at the end of World War II was to play the role that now is done by the non-aligned, that is, to be an arbiter of the conflicts between, at that time it was thought, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, to take aloof position and an independent foreign policy.

I mention all of this, because conflict with the Soviet Union was not a natural propensity of Americans and the disputes with the Soviet Union arose against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Americans.

Let me say a few words about Russian history. For reasons that are quite understandable, Located as the Soviet Union is and imperial Russia was on an open plain with no natural frontiers, the history of Russia has been a history of expansion, towards both the west and the east, through Siberia in the 19th century and into Europe in the late 18th and early 19th century. It is often said that Russians have a right to feel insecure because they have often been invaded. And this is true. They have often been invaded. But it is also true that if you compare in any historical atlas, the map of Europe and of the world and of Asia at the end of any century with the map of the beginning of any century, there has been a seemingly inexorable advance into Asia, into the Middle East, and into Europe. Before the Soviet Union could occupy Afghanistan, imperial Russia occupied many independent principalities that were located to the west of Afghanistan in the second half of the 19th century.

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It has sometimes been said that historically whoever ruled in contem-
porary Russia has not felt secure unless he has troops on both sides of the
border. This is the problem that arose at the end of World War Two. The
United States suddenly found that the Soviet army was establishing govern-
ments in Eastern Europe and that the relationship with the Soviet Union which
many Americans have thought would be one of cooperation turned into hosti-
lity. And so the post-war period has seen considerable tensions between
the two countries. But it is a mistake treat these tensions, as exactly
equivalent in the origins. The fundamental problem of East-West relations
seems to me to be quite simple as far as the United States and the Soviet
Union are concerned. If the Soviet Union is prepared to be a country like
other countries, it is possible to work out principles of co-existence and
concrete arrangements to live together with the Soviet Union. If the Soviet
Union thinks it is a cause that can establish such principles as the Brezhnev
Doctrine whereby it has the right to impose its preferred government or to
intervene anywhere where what it accepts as the correct government is
threatened, then tension will continue.

I have noticed that China in its relations with the Soviet Union has
stated that there are three conditions that must be met before relations
can improve. The United States is less systematic, less precise and offer
all, our national history is shorter than that of almost any Chinese
dynasty. So, we have not expressed our requirements with equal precision.
But fundamentally I believe that the issue is exactly the same for the
United States as for China. If the Soviet Union is prepared to co-exist
within its present frontiers, then, some means can surely be found to work
out some concrete arrangements. Otherwise, we could serve nobody's in-
terests, not Americas', nor those of people dependent on us directly or
indirectly, if we pretended that there is a possibility for settlements
without some significant adjustments. It's in this spirit that I would
like to talk about, make a few observations about the contemporary situa-
tion just prior to the summit meeting. If one analyzes the situation as a
professor, abstractly, one would have to say there are many reasons why one
could argue that a period of relaxation of tensions is desirable for all
sides. In the West, this is often described to the personality of the new
Soviet leader. But I do not think I need to stress to an audience that
has had some training in Marxism that personalities are less important than
objective conditions. It is not probable that a system like that of the
Soviet Union generates pacifists in the role of general secretary of the

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Communist Party. But the reason why I believe that there may be motivations to bring about a relaxation of tensions is: certain objective trends in the Soviet Society faces and one which at least abstractly it should concentrate.

The first of these seems to me to be the need to recognize the system of government which as it is now depends too much on personalities, and has not yet achieved the rotation in office that, for example, China has introduced in recent months and years. If that problem is not solved, period leadership struggles are inevitable. But in order to solve the problem, a period of *quiet* is important.

The second problem has to do with the nature of Soviet economy. Experience has shown that economies that are entirely run by central planning organisms and that permit no scope for decentralization and initiative produce stagnation and can not achieve the fulfilment of the aspirations of the society. That again is a field in which the Chinese experience has taught or should teach crucial lessons to other countries. It is not an issue, as far as I'm concerned, of who owns the means of production. It is an issue of centralization or decentralization of decision-making and of the role of incentives at various levels. If one reads what Soviet leaders are saying to their own public on the radio end in the press about the problems of the Soviet economy, one can also understand why they would not want to undertake the process of reform in an atmosphere of international tension. So I think objective conditions exist for the improvement of relations and that compounded by the fact that in the nuclear age, many of the traditional assumptions of military power are no longer relevant. In the nuclear age, it is highly probable that a war can not have victors and can not have defeated, but everybody will lose. And that at the end of it, it will be hard to remember what the issue was that started it, but surely conditions will have greatly altered. All of these reasons indicate that there is an opportunity for the Soviet Union and the United States to come to some practical understandings. There are, however, certain obstacles as well. One is that in the United States, very many people have the tendency to think that foreign policy is a sub-division of Psychiatry. And they therefore believe that relations among nations is like relations among people. There is a temptation to settle for surface appearances rather than for fundamental remedies. On the Soviet side, there is the problem that the elements that might want to reform the economy also find it difficult at the same time to be flexible in foreign policy, so that on the Soviet side, there may be a similar tendency to create a relaxation without settling any of the issues before us. It is often argued in the West that the overwhelming problem of our time is

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n

arms control. And to some extent, the limitation of arms is of course im-
portant, but it is also true that the cause of international tensions is
not primarily the answer to it.

The cause of international tensions is political conflicts. It is
the attempt to expand one's power. It is an attempt to impose unilateral
solutions. I would therefore suggest that the summit must deal with three
fundamental principles, with three fundamental set issues: one: regional
conflicts. There can be no peace so long as weak neighbours can be at-
tacked by powerful countries with impunity. There can not be a universal
Brezhnev Doctrine. And there can not be a principle that one can fuel
international conflicts by the introduction of arms. And therefore both
sides must exercise restraint and of course as an American I believe
that the Soviet Union has been by far the more aggressive of the super-
powers. Secondly, the two superpowers must establish, in their relations
to each other, some code of conduct embodying mutual restraint, expressed
in concrete political arrangements. In other words, they should not be a
threat to reconciliation, and they should not be a threat to each other.
And only third, and third of equal importance, is the issue of arms control.
Now that is an issue of enormous technical complexity. I would like to
stress that it is easy to formulate numerical relationships that sound
impressive but are really quite meaningless. Today there is a great deal
of conversation about the proposal to cut forces of the two sides put for-
ward by the Soviet Union by 50%.

But the fact of the matter is that since there are over 10 thousand
war-heads on each side, a cut of 50% in the absence of any defensive
forces does not alter the situation. If before it is possible to destroy
mankind 20 times, and afterwards it is possible to destroy it only 10
times, one has not achieved any fundamental improvement.

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Part III

I believe a government has a moral obligation to seek to protect its
population. And I believe that the most effective arms control is
one that establishes that relationship between offensive and defen-
sive forces. It is least likely to produce nuclear war and it's most
likely to reduce casualties if there should be a war for whatever
reason. I am convinced that this is achievable if we pursue what I
may perhaps call the Chinese negotiating method. If we make very
clear what we consider to be the essential elements of stability in
both the political relationship and in the strategic relationship.
Now let me say a few words in this connection about the role of
China in world peace and towards US-Soviet relations. China and
the United States reestablished relations--first contacts and then
relations because both countries recognized that it was not possible
to construct a secure world without understanding each other's point
of view.

Part III p.2

The United States has a profound interest in the integrity, independence, and development of China, not as an anti-Soviet move and not because we have an agreement to that effect, but because a country with this history, of this size and of this importance cannot be left out of this international equation. there were some Americans some years ago who said that the United States should play the so-called China card. That is absurd. China is not a card that the United States can play. China is a reality and it must be dealt with as a reality. And China, so long as it is independent and strong, will by its own weight contribute to the global equilibrium. In this sense, an independent Chinese foreign policy is in the world's interest. Now, people are sometimes speculating about the possible improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations and how this might affect the United States and US-Soviet relations. Let me tell you my own opinion on this subject. It is not in the American interest to have conditions of extreme tension, even less of war, between the Soviet Union and China because that radicalizes the whole international situation. Nor is it in the American interest that China return to the situation of the fifties when it was a close ally of the Soviet Union. But finally, these issues will not be decided in Beijing by what is in the US interest but by what is in the Chinese interest. And I believe that the Chinese and the American interest in this respect are very similar. It cannot be in the Chinese interest to have extreme tension. It cannot be in the Chinese interest to move into an alliance with the Soviet Union. It cannot be in the Chinese interest to be in a position of conflict with the United States as an ally of the Soviet Union. Between those two extremes it is up to China to find its own position. As for the United States, it has been placed by history into the position that unless it defends the integrity and independence of many friendly nations in the world, there can be no equilibrium. As history develops, as other nations grow in strength, part of that burden can be taken off American shoulders and that could be welcomed by many Americans. Americans should certainly welcome any opportunity to ease tensions. When I was in government, I was associated with the policy of detente with the Soviet Union, a policy I still believe to be correct, provided it is based on realism and provided it leads to a real restraint and not simply to formal proclamations. I have said to you that I believe the objective conditions for progress exist. Whether they can be achieved can only be measured by whether certain specific conditions are met. And all the statesmen can do is to

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Part III p.3

maintain the dialogue and to make sure that the people of the world understand what we understand by conditions of peace. As far as China and the United States are concerned, a strong and developing China is very much in the common interest. Those of us who saw China in the early seventies must admire the courage and the imagination with which the Chinese government and the Chinese people have adapted to changing circumstances and they have undertaken the immense and heroic task of modernizing over a billion people. So as far as the United States and China are concerned, it is important that we maintain a dialogue in which we understand each other's conception of the world and conception of the requirements of peace. Each will have its own view. Each must be independent to pursue its own interests. These interests converge on some fundamental issues of principle and differ on some tactical issues. On the question of peace there is no disagreement. And on the question that you put to me, on US-Soviet relations, all I can say is: there has been a profound problem. There exists a great opportunity. We would delude ourselves if we pretended that that opportunity can be seized by slogans. But if we are willing to work on it, I think we can have a prolonged period of peace for the benefit of all the peoples of the world. And that in this process the US relationship to China will play a cardinal role. Thank you very much.

Question: As an old friend of China, Dr. Kissinger, what do you think are the prospects for Sino-US relations and what in your opinion should the US do to improve them?

Kissinger: I think basically, Sino-US relations are good. We have gone through three phases. There was the initial phase after the opening in 1971, which was rather romantic, primarily on the American side. Then there was a period in which the frictions caused by Taiwan and other causes came to the surface which were, however, overcome substantially and now I think we have a good, steady relationship. If I may express one concern, it is the following. Too much of this relationship is in the economic field. I strongly favour the maximum degree of economic and technological cooperation between the United States and China. But it is necessary that this is supplemented by frank, political exchanges so that we understand each other's point of view and so that actions that either of us might take can be properly understood by the leadership of the other. I do not think any relationship between great powers can be sustained exclusively on the economic level. And this is one area where

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I believe some--much improvement is possible.

Question: In your "White House Years" you write: "Without philosophy, policy will have no standards." Now, would you enlighten us on President Reagan's philosophy of US foreign policy in general and on his China policy in particular?

Kissinger: Well, since this is a diplomatic school, you know, you put me into a complicated position. Those of you who have followed American internal politics will know that, for example, in the Presidential election campaign of 1976 President Reagan did not always express himself about me with the same admiration my mother feels ... So it has no doubt that President Reagan's previous views on China were quite contrary to the views I have expressed here. It is, nevertheless, extremely significant and very important for long-term Chinese-American relationships that even a President who had started out with a point of view with respect to China that was certainly quite one-sided has, in the performance of his office, come to the conclusion that Chinese-American relations are a central part of American foreign policy and that he took a trip to China in which the essence of the speeches he gave was not essentially different from those of President Nixon or President Ford, the other two presidents who have visited here. And since relations to China were opened by a Republican President who was fairly conservative, namely, President Nixon, and since formal relations were established by a Democratic President of rather liberal views, President Carter, and have now been continued by a President whose whole previous history was quite different from his current policy vis-a-vis China, I think we have here an example of how reality imposes its own necessities and from this point of view I think the fact that President of Reagan was initially not particularly understanding/the role of this great country, the fact that he has moved to his current position is of great historic consequence and guarantees the permanence of the relationship from the American side.

President Reagan's philosophy in general with respect to foreign relations. Some of it... it was based on a conception in which you could classify countries in very absolute categories. And again I would say that in his relations to the Soviet Union, for example, he has moved from a position of almost total rejection of any negotiation to a position of, that is, again in the main stream of American postwar foreign policy. He started out, without any question, with a much simpler view of the realities of foreign policy. But he has learned from reality and I believe that is in the field of general foreign policy as well as of China

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policy of great consequence for the future of American foreign policy because
it ends one of the major divisions that characterized the American debate
previously.

Question: Dr. Kissinger, in your long and distinguished diplomatic career, who have impressed you most of all the political figures and statesmen you met, and why? Kissinger: I think, first let me explain what impress me in Stakesmen. I think statesman has two obligations. One, to understand reality, the objective forces that shape events because if he does not understand those clearly he can not really shape. Secondly he has to understand the margin of choice he has available to it. You can transform reality up to a certain point. If you have no idea about transforming it, then you will be doom to stagnation. If you simply imagine a better world without any relationship to reality you will become irrelevant. So those statesmen that impressed me most, that I have met, had a good grasp of the historical circumstances and had a capacity to alter them. I believe out of Americans, among European Statesmen, I was very impressed by President de Gaulle for the reasons that I have given to you. I was deeply moved by President Sadat of Egypt who sought the opportunity for peace in a complicated set of conditions and had the courage to achieve it. I think I don't say it out of politeness. I've written this that the Chinese leaders that I have met have very much impressed me. I thought Chairman Mao as incarnation of willpower, Premier Zhou because of his subtlety and humanity and Chairman Deng for the heroic manner in which he has moved this country into present reality.

Question: Dr. Kissinger, because you have been so successful in many fields. What do you plan to do in the future? For instance, will you go to work in the U.S. government again? Or write another memoir or carry out some sort of personal diplomacy so as to promote disarmament negotiations?

Kissinger: I don't think diplomacy is a field for private enterprise. I will write in due course the 3rd volume of my memoirs and I am also planning to write a sort of philosophical brief history of major diplomatic events of this century and the underlying forces. About entering government, that is not a matter in my control. But that is also not something I particularly aspire to at this moment.

Question: Dr. Kissinger, may I ask, how do you evaluate the impact the SDI if realized, U.S. relationship with Western Europe? Will there be a growing tendency of centralism in Western Europe and will there be a come back of isolationism in the United States?

Kissinger: I favor this Strategic Defence Initiative for the reasons which

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I gave before. I do not believe it is possible to face military strategy on massive extermination and maintain any kind of public support. Secondly I believe that the most fruitful method of arms control negotiations is one in which both offensive and defensive weapons are limited, but in which defensive weapons are not put into any special category of evil. I believe that the attempt to ban defensive weapons altogether can only spring from the motive that somebody wants to maintain a position of nuclear blackmail. Now what will be the effect on Western Europe? It is argued as you asked that this leads to American isolationism and to the separation between Europe and the United States. I consider that argument nonsense. I do not understand why American vulnerability guarantees European security. If this argument were correct one would have to say that Europe was less secured when we had atomic monopoly than it is today when they are substantially open to Soviet attack. That is absurd. If the United States could achieve the defense, it would certainly be better for all of the countries that directly or indirectly depend on the American willingness to engage themselves in their defense because it would increase our willignness. And quite frantly, I consider it an example of escapism to which many Europeans are prone that for the sake of agreement for its own sake they are clinging to almost any argument that criticizes strategic defense because it has been said by the Soviets that that is the easiest way to achieve agreements, My experience has been with the Soviets that after a while they are quite capable of adjusting their position. And I have not noticed that China alters its position just because the Soviet Union rejects it and I think we should adopt the same method. But go back to your question, I believe a strategic defense on the American side will assist the defense of Europe. And I want to repeat, from my point of view, we should, of course, prepared to negotiate about strategic defense, but only on the same level as about offensive weapons. And the reduction of offensive and defensive weapons should take place proportionately and in relation to each other. And we should not begin by excluding defensive weapons altogether.

Question: On Oct. 31 President Reagon said to the effect that only after all the offensive strategic weapons were destroyed would SDI be deployed. Then on Nov. 6 President Reagon said something quite different that if no agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union on the disarmament of offensive strategic weapons, SDI will still be deployed once it was ready. So, Dr. Kissenger, my question is how would you account for this change in President Reagon's statements, and do you think that they departed, in any way, from the U.S. refusal to link SDI to any disarmament talks on offensive strategic weapons?

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Kissinger: Since this is the last question I hope you all understand here that I am speaking as a private citizen and not as a spokesman for the U.S. government. I said that for the equanimity of the American embassy. Now how do I account for the difference in a duplication? I can't tell you what President Reagon meant on Oct. 31 but I think what he said on Nov. 6, what I unsderstand to be the American foreign policy. I believe that, of course, it doesn't make too much sense to say that after all offensive weapons are destroyed, we will then deploy defensive weapons. In fact, I would say after all offensive weapons have been destroyed, then we can also destroy defensive weapons. But I do not believe that situation will realize, quite frankly. Is impossible to reduce offensive weapons and to build defensive weapons of a nature that make nuclear war less likely and less destructive? And I believe that this is possible and I believe that this is what the negotiations should do. Should I concern themselves with. It is my impression that this is what President Reagon is getting at. And one of the reasons for some of the variations in the American public statements is that in the period prior to the summit our newsmen keep trying to extract comments which the policy-makers will later regret. And sometimes they succeed.

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