SDCG:WI

Department of State.
David K. E. Bruce,
The Honorable

Henry A. Klaesser

Warm regards,

our efforts necessary.
unambased dedication to the ideals that make
I thank you for your support and for your

beyond is of enormous importance to me.
regarding the Conference and the broader task
raised by the issue at hand. Your wise counsel
fundamental questions of Atlantic cooperation
qualities in the face of the very delicate yet
Conference. I have called upon your unique
contributing as you did to the Washington Energy
You have my sincere personal thanks for

Dear David:

February 19, 1974

[L.C.]

36 Avenue du Vert Chasseur
1180 Brussels

13 December

Dear Henry,

I can't resist writing you about Mary Seames' reaction to
meeting you and to your speech --- in case you have time to read
a word on your way to Martinique.

She called the day she returned from Washington to say how much
she had enjoyed sitting next to you at the celebrations, of her delight
at meeting Nancy, and of her enormous admiration for your words on
Sir Winston. You had apparently told her that you were the only one
present who had not actually known him, "but" she said, "of all the
distinguished tributes I have ever heard, this was amongst the very
top -- brilliant -- seemed to be deeply felt; so right to have chosen
the period after the war, with emphasis on detente and world leadership.
The quotes from Papa's speeches were perfect. It was an unforgettable
occasion."

You will see that I have not yet mastered the margins on this
typewriter. - It was the greatest pleasure to run that errand
for you yesterday, and I send you and Nancy love and Christmas
wishes

Vangie

7612830

COPIES TO:

S
RF-WS

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1976

Dear Dr. Arzeno:

Thank you very much for the gift box
of Brugal rums. Your thoughtfulness was
most appreciated. I can only say that few
gifts will take so long to enjoy to the full.

Best regards,

Dr. George Arzeno Brugal,
Brugal y Cia,
Avenida John F. Kennedy,
Santo Domingo.

MICROFILMED
BY S/S-L

SEPARATING SECURITY
FROM TERRITORY

# A Plan for
# Peace in the
# Middle East

BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

THERE WILL be no peace in the Middle East if the ultimate Arab objective is the obliteration of the state of Israel, or if the basic Israeli goal is the acquisition of Arab land. There can be peace in the Middle East if the Israelis are primarily concerned with their security and the Arabs are mainly preoccupied with recovering the territory lost in 1967. Its attainment, however, requires American pressure on both parties to the dispute—and determined pressure, to put it very mildly.

If the Arabs desire the destruction of Israel, they will be unwilling to agree to security arrangements that would satisfy the Israelis by

making such an objective very difficult or even impossible to achieve. By the same token, Arab acceptance of effective security arrangements would be tantamount to abandoning the idea of the Jewish State's annihilation.

If the Israelis covet Arab lands, it is simply unrealistic to expect the Arab nations to accept an essentially colonialist and one-sided solution to a situation that is complex in its moral as well as political dimensions. (The problem of Palestine is so painful because there are evident rights and wrongs on each side.) On the other hand, Israeli recognition of the Arabs' basic claim to the territories they 'lost during the Six Day War would be decisive proof that Israel is not an expansionist state and that its concerns are truly defensive.

What is needed in the present situation is to decouple security from possession of land. Israel's security is not dependent on expansion; it is dependent on the denial to potential aggressors of the use of the areas at issue for offensive purposes. Failure to make this distinction has been the cardinal shortcoming of Israel's leaders, who have often

acted as though they were intent on widening their territorial jurisdiction and developing settlements in the conquered areas. In recent years they have dropped increasingly frequent hints that an eventual peace settlement would have to include considerably expanded frontiers, euphemistically described as "security." The result of this has been the sacrifice of 2,500 lives.

Can territory be returned to the Arabs without prejudicing Israeli security? The answer is yes, assuming that both sides are prepared to make the concessions that would match a nonexpansionist Israel with a nonthreatening group of Arab neighbors. The Israelis must yield political control over the Arab lands and peoples held since 1967—following certain minor rectifications, perhaps, to straighten out frontiers—and the Arabs must yield on the exercise of military control. That is to say, Arab officials, acting on behalf of the pertinent states, would

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, a frequent contributor, is director of the Trilateral Commission: A Private American-European-Japanese Initiative on Matters of Common Concern.

January 7, 1974

7

be allowed to perform normal gov-
ernmental, fiscal and juridical func-
tions, border regulation among them,
but Arab armed forces would not
return to all the areas involved. Ad-
ditional safeguards would be writ-
ten into a peace treaty normalizing
Israeli-Arab relations.

Any such arrangement would
present many difficulties, of course,
and probably could best be im-
plemented through a graduated
process designed to build mutual
confidence and guard against one-
sided abuses. Here, for example, is
a possible three-phase plan.

In the Sinai—at present an im-
portant Israeli defense-in-depth—
Egyptian jurisdiction would be re-
stored immediately, and the Israelis
would cease their economic or tour-
ist activities. Meanwhile, the Is-
raeli Army would pull back from
Zone A (see map at right), de-
marcated by a straight line run-
ning from Bir el Abd to Sudr. In
return, Cairo would permit Israel
to use the Suez Canal. During this
first phase, the Israelis would retain
military control over the crucial
Mitla Pass and other passes, and
also over the greater portion of
the peninsula, including Sharm el
Sheik.

The second phase would be
initiated a year later, after both sides
had presumably begun to appreciate
the advantages of peaceful relations.
The Israelis would make a more
substantial withdrawal, vacating
Zone B and retiring to a line that
runs roughly from El Arish to
Sharm el Sheik. And again, if all
goes well, after another year they
would vacate the final Zone C.

SOME ISRAELIS have claimed
that Sharm el Sheik is vital
to them under any circum-
stances. Yet even with control over
Sharm el Sheik, the Israelis would
be helpless in the event of an Arab
blockade at Bab el Mandeb (near
Yemen). Hence Israel's possession
of the seized military station pro-
vides no security, but it is an obvious

affront to Egyptian national pride.
Furthermore, as part of the overall
settlement, Egyptian Armed Forces
would not move beyond Zone A,
except for token units permitted to
show the flag. As Israeli forces pull
back, a permanent United Nations
peace-keeping force would be given
the task of maintaining patrols and
encampments in the rest of Sinai,
thereby acting as a buffer.

In all probability, the best solu-
tion for the West Bank would be to
create on it an autonomous Pales-
tinian-Arab state, linked to Jordan
in a federal union. Jordan would
handle foreign affairs and security
matters, and thus no separate Pales-
tinian-Arab Army would be estab-
lished. The Jordanian military, ex-
cept again for token units, would

not cross the Jordan River, and here
too the United Nations force would
maintain a physical presence within
the new country. Israeli Armed
Forces would evacuate the area
upon the completion of arrange-
ments for the installation of the new
ruling authorities, though perhaps
for a brief transitional period Israel
would be allowed to keep some
forces in key encampments along
the Jordan River.

Although some resettlement
would be necessary, the Gaza Strip
with its large Palestinian population
would probably be part of this new
autonomous state. At the same time,
all Israeli settlements established on
the West Bank after 1967 would be
disbanded. In return, the Arabs
would declare their final acceptance

8

The New Leader

of the 1967 lines with the agreed-
upon minor modifications.

As for Jerusalem, it would re-
main a united city, the capital of
Israel, but its Arab sector would
be the capital of the Palestinian-
Arab state as well and have its own
municipal government (which might
be simultaneously combined into a
joint city administration for a larger
metropolitan Jerusalem). There
would be mixed sovereignty over
religious places, with an Arab-Jew-
ish-Christian council in charge of
the salient sites. Given the fact that
during the October War the Israeli-
Jordanian border remained open,
and that the Arabs and the Israelis
have managed to live together in
Jerusalem and to cooperate econom-
ically, this admittedly cumbersome
hybrid arrangement would be prefer-
able to a new division of the city.
It also would be less offensive to
the Arabs than unilateral control by
Israel.

Similarly, the Golan Heights
would be returned to Syria, but the
Syrian Army would not return to
Golan. Fairly sizable detachments of
the UN peace-keeping force would
be stationed there indefinitely, and
—as an added guarantee—the Is-
raelis might be granted a certain
quota per month for direct surveil-
lance through mobile patrols, to be
sent in at their discretion.

As in the case of Sinai, the Golan
Heights might be divided into three
zones, the first to be vacated im-
mediately upon agreement, the sec-
ond in a year, and the third in two.
If Syria did not accept this kind of
arrangement, the Israeli forces
would stay where they are, although
this would be tempered by an Is-
raeli declaration recognizing that, in
principle, the territory involved be-
longs to Syria, and acknowledging
that Israel would not attempt any
permanent settlements there. Even-
tually, the Syrians might prefer to
exercise political and economic con-
trol in Golan at the cost of military
control.

The components of the scheme

outlined above have at different
times been advanced by Israeli
moderates and by observers in the
West. But two further elements,
I think, must be added. The first
involves a U.S. guarantee for Is-
rael. In effect, Israel already enjoys
such a guarantee. In fact, without
it the Jewish State would have
foundered long ago. Formalizing the
arrangement would enhance the ex-
isting U.S.-Israeli relationship and
have the added advantage of mak-
ing the consequences of any aggres-
sion against Israel much more
serious.

The second element involves a
Mideast economic development plan
designed particularly to help Is-
rael's more backward neighbors. Is-
rael could play a creative role in
this—not unlike that played by Sin-
gapore in Southeast Asia—as the
center for technological-educational
advancement. The movement back
and forth of specialists, scholars and
dedicated young people would help
to create new links between the
Jews and their Arab neighbors.
Along with the U.S., both Europe
and Japan might be expected to con-
tribute to an economic development
plan of this sort, since they also
have a major stake in the region's
stability.

I

SAID at the outset that the at-
tainment of true peace would
require active U.S. participa-
tion. The reasons for this are sim-
ple. Without American involvement,
it is likely that the Arabs will be
tempted by the mirage of Israel's
destruction, and that a portion of
the Israeli population will continue
to advocate an expanded Israeli
state. The United States, moreover,
is the only power that can bring ef-
fective pressure to bear in the Mid-
dle East—and both the Arabs and
the Israelis know it. This gives
Washington considerable leverage,
quite in contrast to the Soviet Union,
whose concern for a genuine settle-
ment is less than self-evident. In-
creasingly, the more intelligent

Arabs are coming to realize that the
Kremlin's true interest is in a
protracted stalemate, and that So-
viet arms supplies are designed not
to give the Arabs a victory, but to
prevent a complete Arab defeat. A
prolonged stalemate, as the Soviets
see it, radicalizes the Arab masses.

The extent of Washington's lever-
age on Israel has been illustrated by
Israel's extraordinary dependence on
American arms supplies during the
October conflict. The United States
should not hesitate to use that in-
fluence to the fullest, for a settle-
ment of the Arab-Israeli conflict is
in the American interest. Indeed,
U.S. intervention is urgently requir-
ed; without it, our position in the
Middle East will continue to de-
teriorate, jeopardizing important as-
sets, while the Soviet position will
become correspondingly stronger.
What is more, so long as there is
no agreement the Arab oil embargo
will wreak havoc within the inter-
national economy, and America's
primary global links, namely those
with Europe and Japan, will be
severely strained.

One may also add that a peace
treaty is a dire necessity for Israel.
Without it, Israel will remain the im-
petus for an Arab modernization
which ultimately must spell disaster
for that small and surrounded en-
clave. Delaying or evading a settle-
ment can only be termed a policy
of national self-destruction.

For these reasons, separating the
issue of security from possession of
land and refocusing it on the denial
of territory for aggressive use is an
urgent task both for American and
Israeli statesmanship. Should anyone
really doubt this, let him look hard
at a map, let him ponder popula-
tion statistics, let him consider the
implications of the steadily rising
toll of Israeli lives from the 1956
war to the 1967 war to the 1973
war, let him think about the im-
portance of oil in world affairs, let
him reflect on the possible future
role of the Soviet Union—and then
let him forever hold his peace.

January 7, 1974

9

BALANCING THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE

# How to Make Plea Bargaining Work
BY RICHARD H. KUH

JUDGE: *What plea is entered on behalf of the defendant?*

COUNSEL: *On behalf of the defendant, your Honor, I enter a plea of nolo contendere.*

JUDGE: *Is that your plea, Mr. Agnew?*

DEFENDANT: *That is my plea, your Honor.*

JUDGE: *It is the full equivalent of a plea of guilty.*

ON OCTOBER 10, 1973, that exchange in a Baltimore courtroom ended the political career of Spiro Agnew, who only minutes before had stood "a heartbeat away from the Presidency." The then Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, speaking in patriotic generalizations, explained the Justice Department's reasons for accepting a "no contest" plea to a single charge of Federal income tax evasion and recommended against imprisonment. Furthermore, he agreed that the Federal Government would not prosecute Agnew for acts of extortion and bribery committed while he was Governor of Maryland and Vice President of the United States.

Although a year and a half earlier the nation had watched and laughed along with the plea arrangements in the opera buffa involving Clifford and Edith Irving's sale of their "authentic" Howard Hughes memoirs, the Agnew case presented something different. Americans questioned whether the ignominy of resignation from high office was punishment enough for an elected official, or whether the penalty for abusing the public trust should be massive and unforgiving. Thus, on the same day that a New York Times editorial approvingly commented, "The settlement in the Agnew case represents an acceptable resolution of an awkward, un-

precedented difficulty," *Times* columnist Tom Wicker protested, "For millions of Americans the lesson of the Agnew case is merely the confirmation of their bitter belief that prison is for the poor and the powerless, while mercy is for those who can swing it."

Whatever the ultimate resolution of the debate stirred by the ex-Vice President's predicament, there can be no doubt that it has drawn attention to plea bargaining. The widespread practice is generally ignored because it is essentially an agreement among defendant, prosecutor and judge, and lacks the compelling element of dramatic conflict inherent in trials. As a result, though, cases that would make the front pages if they went to trial are likely to be overlooked when a lesser plea is entered and minimal punishment imposed.

To be sure, in most small towns, if a migrant who had broken into a haberdashery and assaulted the proprietor were given a mere misdemeanor plea, the local press would instantly inform the citizenry. Consequently, the chances of that occuring are extremely remote, unless an unusually palatable justification can be articulated. But in our largest cities, where crime is an ever-increasing problem, this happens every day. Take the following typical cases (the names throughout are fictional; the facts, unfortunately, are not):

A few years ago, William Townes accosted a woman in the hallway of her building. At knife-point he forced her to admit him into her apartment, where he made

RICHARD H. KUH, a partner in the law firm of Kuh, Goldman, Cooperman and Levitt, served as an assistant district attorney and administrative assistant to New York County Prosecutor Frank Hogan from 1953-64.

10

The New Leader

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

345 EAST 46TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

212 661-1180 CABLE: TRILACOM NEWYORK

MAX KOHNSTAMM
EUROPEAN CHAIRMAN

GERARD C. SMITH
NORTH AMERICAN CHAIRMAN

TAKESHI WATANABE
JAPANESE CHAIRMAN

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DIRECTOR

GEORGE S. FRANKLIN
SECRETARY (N.A.)

WOLFGANG HAGER
SECRETARY (EUROPE)

TADASHI YAMAMOTO
SECRETARY (JAPAN)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

I. W. ABEL
GIOVANNI AGNELLI
P. NYBOE ANDERSEN
KLAUS DIETER ARNDT
KURT BIRRENBACH
ROBERT W. BONNER
HAROLD BROWN
FRANCESCO COMPAGNA
MARC EYSKENS
CHUJIRO FUJINO
PATRICK E. HAGGERTY
YUKITAKA HARAGUCHI
KAZUSHIGE HIRASAWA
YUSUKE KASHIWAGI
JOHN LOUDON
KIIICHI MIYAZAWA
KINHIDE MUSHAKOJI
SABURO OKITA
JEAN-LUC PEPIN
EDWIN O. REISCHAUER
MARY T. W. ROBINSON
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
WILLIAM M. ROTH
WILLIAM W. SCRANTON
RYUJI TAKEUCHI
OTTO GRIEG·TIDEMAND
PAUL C. WARNKE
SIR KENNETH YOUNGER
SIR PHILIP DE ZULUETA

April 16, 1974

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of March 23. Since some mutual
newspaper friends have told me of your negative reactions to
my article, let me suggest that the only remedy is for you
to appoint me as Undersecretary! Then you won't have to
either read my articles nor write me letters.

I know it was not your intent to initiate an extensive debate
by mail, so I will respond briefly and in somewhat general
terms to the points that you made:

With respect to alliance relationships, I think that there is
a basic difference between consultation and information. What
you cite as evidence of consultation I would essentially con-
strue to be information. Given the enormous stakes of the
Europeans in the Middle Eastern issue, I do not believe that
information alone was sufficient.

In regards to detente, which I continue to favor, let me turn
the tables around by citing Kissinger to Kissinger: You have
said to me more than once that linkage is not a theory but a
fact, and I agree with you. What bothers me is that I do see
the Soviets getting most tangible benefits in trade [not to
speak of the so-called space cooperation] while the returns to
us are not so clear-cut, especially in such matters as strategic
relations or closer East-West ties, to which trade concessions
ought to be linked.

With regards to the more specific points that you made in your
letter, let me merely say that in SALT it might have been better

JAPANESE OFFICE
JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
7A HERMANOS AKASAKA BUILDING 8-4-3, AKASAKA
MINATO-KU, TOKYO

EUROPEAN OFFICE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTE FOR UNIVERSITY STUDIES
RUE DE TREVES 47
1040 BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

April 16, 1974

Page Two

somehow to make note of our strategic bomber strength so as to obviate
on the international plane the politically damaging appearance of Soviet
superiority inherent in the specific numerical arrangements; also, per-
haps it might have been better not to have been so eager to get an
agreement while the President was in Moscow. Finally, with regard
to credits, you are right that the preferential credits alone are con-
siderably less than one billion, but I was trying to convey [though my
language was obviously sloppy] the approximate total of the preferential
benefits that have so far accrued to the Soviets from our various trade
arrangements, including the grain deal, not to speak of indirect R&D
benefits from the so-called technological cooperation [which in space,
for instance, has been almost entirely one-sided]. Moreover, as you
know, the Soviets have been using our credits as leverage on the Japa-
nese and the Europeans to get better terms from them also.

With warm regards,

March 23, 1974

Personal - Not for Publication

Dear Zbig:

I have just read with interest, if also amazement, your
<u>Foreign Policy</u> article. Since I will be leaving for Moscow
this evening to continue the pursuit of a detente which you
either support or decry (depending on which Brzezinski you
read), my thoughts will necessarily be both hasty and brief.

I find it difficult to accept that the author of _Peaceful
Engagement in Europe's Future_ can now claim that we were
too soft in the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements we
have thus far reached. Further, a less polemical analysis
would at least have made specific reference to certain
objective facts, among them that:

-- the Congress had cut the defense budget in
each of the five years prior to the SALT
Agreement;

-- the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended
no strategic programs that would have
become operative during the period of the
Agreement;

-- the Soviets, on the other hand, did have
a number of strategic programs that
would come to fruition during the period
of the Agreement;

-- the Agreement can only be classified as
one of "inequality" if air power is not
included in the equation.

Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Research Institute on Communist Affairs,
Columbia University,
420 West 118th Street,
New York, New York.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 3/23/74

- 2 -

I suppose it would be possible to argue that as a result of the Agreement the Soviets stopped only those programs they intended to stop in any event. But we stopped nothing. In fact, we accelerated Trident, the B-1, and Warhead design.

You seem to accept the general European contention that we failed to consult during the Middle East crisis of last October. But the fact is that on October 16 Foreign Minister Jobert told me in the course of a two-hour conversation that France would be prepared to accept whatever arrangement we and the Soviets were able to work out on the Middle East. It is also a fact that I personally consulted on numerous occasions with NATO Ambassadors -- particularly those from the UK, the FRG, and France. I talked to both the British and French Ambassadors personally within hours of my "hasty mission to Moscow"; immediately after concluding my final meeting with Brezhnev I met with the Ambassadors to the Soviet Union of the same two countries and gave them a complete briefing on my conversations with the Soviets. In fact, because of a breakdown in our own communications from Moscow, both London and Paris received their Ambassadors' reports on my conversations before the President here in Washington had heard anything from me.

Your statement that "US credits to the Soviet Union, at extraordinarily favorable interest rates, guaranteed by the US Government and hence subsidized by the US taxpayer, have already come close to $1 billion" is simply incorrect. Let me ignore the rhetoric of your argument, and dwell only on the facts. Total loans to the Soviets granted thus far amount to $643 million -- a figure which even my well-known disdain for economics would not lead me to classify as near the $1 billion mark. Of that total, only $289 million is Ex-Im financed; an additional $289 million is in unguaranteed commercial credits.

These are but my quick reactions to some of the factual inaccuracies in your article. What concerns me far more,

- 3 -

however, is the growing tendency on the part of some -- which
you now seem to echo -- to adopt the same line of attack on
detente that used to be the privileged property of the extreme
right. I would have expected arguments from the latter quarter
on the value of a "relaxation of tensions," and "some conces-
sions with regard to West German access to Berlin"; I would
have understood a bald charge from the right that the USSR has
gained enormously from a "legitimization of its spheres of
influence in Eastern Europe." But a balanced evaluation would
have pointed out that to the degree that Soviet influence in
Eastern Europe had been "legitimized" it was as a result of
Ostpolitik, which we were once accused of opposing, and to
which the Berlin Agreement was the inevitable sequel.

Those who have for so long argued from different
premises leave one in awe at the rapidity with which they
have been able to shift the philosophical ground for their
attack. One can but wonder what has become of earlier
claims that at least a part of the process of building a new
relationship with the Soviets depends upon expanded contacts
between peoples, greater exchange of ideas, and the need
to develop over time a vested interest in both countries in
the maintenance of peace.

If I had more time I would try to demonstrate that your
view of the relationship between detente and Soviet restraint
in the Middle East is distorted; I also believe you have
grossly exaggerated -- as a demonstration of condominium --
the fact of US-Soviet chairmanship of the Geneva Conference.
Surely the Soviets do not share this view, since they accuse
us of ignoring their claims. Perhaps when I have returned
from Moscow and we both have more time for reflection, we
could sit down and go over in more detail some of our apparent
areas of disagreement.

With warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

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ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

I. W. ABEL
GIOVANNI AGNELLI
P. NYBOE ANDERSEN
KLAUS DIETER ARNDT
KURT BIRRENBACH
ROBERT W. BONNER
HAROLD BROWN
FRANCESCO COMPAGNA
MARC EYSKENS
CHUJIRO FUJINO
PATRICK E. HAGGERTY
YUKITAKA HARAGUCHI
KAZUSHIGE HIRASAWA
YUSUKE KASHIWAGI
JOHN LOUDON
KIICHI MIYAZAWA
KINHIDE MUSHAKOJI
SABURO OKITA
JEAN-LUC PEPIN
EDWIN O. REISCHAUER
MARY T. W. ROBINSON
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
WILLIAM M. ROTH
WILLIAM W. SCRANTON
RYUJI TAKEUCHI
OTTO GRIEG TIDEMAND
PAUL C. WARNKE
SIR KENNETH YOUNGER
SIR PHILIP DE ZULUETA

June 13, 1974

Dear Henry:

I have sent to Winston Lord copies of our papers, which contain
-- I hope -- useful recommendations with regard to the LDC problem,
trade negotiations, and trilateral energy matters. I know you
are too busy to be concerned with the papers themselves, but
perhaps the enclosed summaries might give you some idea of what
we are trying to do.

Let me take advantage of this opportunity -- especially given my
special position as a friendly critic (!) -- to congratulate you
most warmly and sincerely on the Middle East. What you have
accomplished there is really outstanding and it represents a
very significant gain for the United States. We are all very
much in your debt.

With warm personal regards,

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Enclosures

A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations: Summary of the Report

Richard Gardner, B. J. Udink, Akira Onishi, April 1974

The time has come for new policies and new actions by the governments of the Trilateral region in their relations with developing countries. There is a crisis in North-South relations that requires two kinds of responses from the Trilateral governments:

First, there is need for a general restructuring of North-South economic relations for the purpose of creating a more just and workable world economic order. Such a new economic order should include, among other things, greater attention by both developed and developing countries to their growing interdependence, greater respect for the equal rights of all members of the world community under international law, the abolition of "spheres of influence," greater recognition of the differing needs and capabilities of different developing countries, the pursuit of cooperation rather than confrontation, the focusing of development efforts on the poorest segment of populations in developing countries, new rules and arrangements governing access to supplies as well as access to markets, and a restructuring of international economic institutions in the light of new political and economic realities.

We propose to deal with the extremely complex questions involved in this restructuring in a later report to be issued early in 1975.

Page - 2 -

Second, there is need to deal with the desperate plight of nearly one billion people in some 30 resource-poor developing countries whose governments cannot pay the increased bills for oil, food, fertilizer and other products. At least $3 billion in extra concessional aid must be found for these countries in 1974-75 to avoid economic disaster. This situation calls for an extraordinary act of cooperation between the countries of the Trilateral region and the oil exporting countries of OPEC. The former bear a special responsibility because they have a vastly greater total national income and the latter bear a special responsibility because of the dramatic increase in their export earnings and therefore in their capacity to invest sums abroad. We believe it would be reasonable for the Trilateral world as a whole to provide about $1.5 billion of this total, with the OPEC countries providing the other $1.5 billion. In response to the appeal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, contributions to this special emergency effort could be made through bilateral or multilateral channels and could take the form of cash, concessional sales of food, fertilizer and oil, and the cancellation or postponement of debt repayment. The Soviet Union should be invited to participate in this emergency assistance effort in the light of its considerable economic capabilities and the fact that it has benefited on the whole from the recent increase in raw material prices.

Directions for World Trade in the Nineteen-Seventies: Summary of the Report

Philip Trezise, Nobuhiko Ushiba, Guido Colonna, April 1974

A major multilateral trade negotiation, as called for by some 100 countries in last year's Tokyo Declaration, is the one most hopeful prospect on the international economic horizon.

This is a time of troubles, when inflation, energy crises, and unprecedented balance of payments problems afflict nearly all nations. The structure of international economic cooperation has already been weakened. It could be pulled down in an ultimately pointless scramble for national advantage. A new GATT round offers the possibility of restoring a sense of common purpose and of strengthening the system of rule and order in world trade.

The backlog of issues for negotiation runs from industrial tariffs, which are by no means irrelevant in spite of progress in reducing them, through agricultural trade, non-tariff distortions, export restrictions, safeguards against import disruption, reform of the General Agreement itself, to trade relations with the third world.

A major reduction in industrial tariffs is needed, both to bring down obstacles to world trade and also to moderate the discriminatory effect of the emerging Western European free trade area. Pending United States trade legislation would provide the basis to achieve deep reciprocal cuts in outstanding levels of tariffs.

For agricultural trade, which has been neglected in earlier negotiations, the need is to reach a bargain which gives the efficient producers greater access to commercial markets abroad and gives importing nations adequate assurance as to future supplies of key commodities. This means an agreement on holding and managing stocks of cereals as well as on improved conditions of commercial trade. It will require commitments to make gradual but important changes in domestic farm policies. A successful bargain here would have far-reaching implications for international cooperation.

Non-tariff distortions in most cases must be dealt with by revising and tightening international rules of conduct, rather than by straight trade-offs. Since few third world countries can be expected to accept stronger GATT rules, many non-tariff agreements will have to be made on a conditional most-favored-nation basis.

Restrictions on exports, the latest of the non-tariff distortions, must be put under rule. At a minimum, advance consultation and the principle of sharing short supplies should be written into GATT. Even if agreement on this is possible only among the industrial countries, it will be a significant step forward.

The question of new safeguards against disruptive imports can best be answered by introducing into the GATT a mediation procedure, based on specific guidelines. This would leave open the possibility of emergency protection, but it would put restraints on arbitrary or unfounded national actions.

Successful negotiations on agriculture, non-tariff distortions and safeguards would call for substantial revisions in and additions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Given that the industrial countries probably will be the only ones ready to assume new commitments, it would be desirable to incorporate

these into a supplementary Code which would be open to every nation but which
would be operated by those subscribing to it rather than by all 80 contracting
parties.

The trade interests of the developing countries will have to be given special
attention. An effort should be made to identify third world products for tariff
reductions; the General Preference schemes should be improved and the United
States and Canada should join Japan and the Western European countries in them;
commodity price stabilization agreement possibilities need to be explored afresh;
and food reserves against potential famine in developing countries must be
created.

This mix of new and old questions foreshadows a lengthy and complex negotiation.
Its outcome, nonetheless, could go to make the inescapable fact of economic
interdependence far less worrisome and far more tolerable than it seems in 1974.

Energy: The Imperative for a Trilateral Approach -- Summary of the Report

John C. Campbell, Guy de Carmoy, Shinichi Kondo

June 1974

The Trilateral Task Force Report on the Political and International Implications of the Energy Crisis assumes that the era of cheap and plentiful oil is over. The industrial countries face major problems of adjustment to uncertain energy supplies, high costs, and new requirements in political relations. Some of these problems are immediate; some are for the coming decade of continuing dependence on Middle East oil; some involve planning for the longer run. They can be met successfully only with policies elaborated in concert rather than in competition. In economics our countries must contend with the short and long term effects of shortages and price increases on their national economies and on the international trading and monetary system, and the need to make early decisions on the development of new sources of energy. In politics, the trend toward politicization of international economic relations will be strengthened by the situation of relative scarcity in energy. Policies aimed at inducing the producers to keep producing and exporting oil will be needed, as will efforts to avert calamity in countries unable to meet the high price of oil. Above all, the trilateral countries must cope with mounting pressures at home and modify accepted habits and lifestyles, while avoiding destructive competition among themselves and preserving their democratic institutions.

The relative positions of the three regions - Europe is threatened with economic and financial crisis at a time of political weakness and disunity. Japan is highly vulnerable because of its energy dependence. The U.S. is in a comparatively strong position, but it cannot take refuge in a policy of self-sufficiency and display unconcern for Europe and Japan without provoking reactions adverse to all. Europe and Japan cannot expect U.S. assistance unless they impose strict measures

-2-

on themselves. Vigorous coordinated action can help them all to reduce their
oil dependence on the Middle East in the next decade.

The imperative to cooperation suggests a common long-range strategy and the
following specific recommendations. (1) Conservation and efficiency of energy use --
Governments and private bodies should develop conservation programs on a priority
basis, including investment, joint research, and generally agreed targets.

(2) Assuring safe and adequate supplies -- Trilateral countries should coordinate policies to maximize bargaining power with the oil-exporting states and create inducements to keeping up supplies, and to develop alternative sources. (3) Emergency sharing -- They should agree now on a plan including (a) the definition of an emergency, (b) stockpiling, (c) conservation, and (d) allocation of supplies.

(4) Finance -- The consuming countries should aim to meet the impact of high oil prices by increasing exports to producers, recycling the latters' balance-of-payments surplus funds to the countries which incurred the deficits, and providing help to those threatened with financial collapse. (5) Sharing of technology and joint R & D -- Governments must promote an extensive sharing of technology designed to increase efficiency and develop new energy sources. Priorities in research have to be established on the main lines of effort in developing sources of energy for the post-oil age.

In their relations with oil-producing countries, the consuming countries must
try to build a continuing relationship in which both sides have a stake. This
collaboration should look ahead to the time when the oil age fades out. Bilateral
deals or regional approaches should take place within an agreed strategy serving
the interests of the trilateral countries as a whole. On political matters, a
greater accommodation of approaches to such questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict or

arms sales to Persian Gulf states would contribute to harmonizing oil policy with
political and military objectives. The Middle East states should be encouraged to
view their oil policies in the broader context of security and cooperation.

In their relations with the U.S.S.R. and China, the Trilateral countries should
explore the possibilities of obtaining increased energy supplies from them while
avoiding any substantial dependence on them. The high costs and risks involved should
be weighed against comparable investments elsewhere. In their relations with the
LDC's, the developed countries should join in measures, to which the oil-producing
countries should also contribute, to help the poorest nations threatened with disaster
by price increases in oil and other essential products.

A master strategy is needed to set broad lines of policy for the trilateral
countries on the energy problem. An energy agency, logically one associated with
the OECD, is required for consultation and coordination of policies.

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

BRZEZINSKI

FOR
FRANKLIN
TARY (N.A.)

G HAGER
TARY (EUROPE)

YAMAMOTO
TARY (JAPAN)

IVE COMMITTEE

L
AGNELLI
ANDERSEN
ETER ARNDT
BRENBACH
W. BONNER
BROWN
CO COMPAGNA
SKENS
FUJINO
E. HAGGERTY
A HARAGUCHI
GE HIRASAWA
KASHIWAGI
JUDON
MIYAZAWA
MUSHAKOJI
OKITA
C PEPIN
O. REISCHAUER
W. ROBINSON
ROCKEFELLER
M. M. ROTH
M W. SCRANTON
TAKEUCHI
RIEG TIDEMAND
WARNKE
NNETH YOUNGER
PHILIP DE ZULUETA

June 13, 1974

Received June 18

Mr. Winston Lord
Director
Policy Planning Staff
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Winston:

I promised Henry that we would share with him whatever papers we produce, and so I enclose three trilateral reports prepared for our forthcoming Executive Committee meeting in Brussels.

Apart from the specific recommendations contained therein, I think there is some intrinsic importance to the fact that these reports constitute a surprising degree of agreement among concerned Japanese, West Europeans and Americans on rather timely and controversial matters.

I hope they are of some use to you and I hope that you will mention them to Henry. I will simply send him the digests, indicating that the full texts have been transmitted to you.

With cordial personal regards,

Enclosures

JAPANESE OFFICE

JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE
HERMANOS AKASAKA BUILDING 8-4-3. AKASAKA
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

EUROPEAN OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 21, 1974

Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Director
The Trilateral Commission
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

Dear Zbig:

Thank you for your letter of June 13 and its
enclosed trilateral reports. I have noted the good
editorial in the *Times* supporting the paper done by
Dick Gardner et al. on North-South economic relations.

The Trilateral Commission is making an outstanding
contribution to public understanding of the central
importance of relations between North America, Western
Europe and Japan, and I know the Secretary is favorably
impressed by this effort.

The subjects covered by these reports are indeed
timely, as you pointed out, and we on the Planning
Staff will find them most useful in our current
endeavors. I appreciate your sending them to me.

With warm regards.

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

FRANCOIS DUCHENE
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

I. W. ABEL
GIOVANNI AGNELLI
GEORGES BERTHOIN
KURT BIRRENBACH
ROBERT W. BONNER
HAROLD BROWN
FRANCESCO COMPAGNA
HERBERT EHRENBERG
MARC EYSKENS
CHUJIRO FUJINO
PATRICK E. HAGGERTY
YUKITAKA HARAGUCHI
KAZUSHIGE HIRASAWA
YUSUKE KASHIWAGI
JOHN H. LOUDON
KIIICHI MIYAZAWA
KINHIDE MUSHAKOJI
IVAR NORDAARD
SABURO OKITA
JEAN-LUC PEPIN
EDWIN O. REISCHAUER
MARY T. W. ROBINSON
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
WILLIAM M. ROTH
WILLIAM W. SCRANTON
RYUJI TAKEUCHI
OTTO GRIEG TIDEMAND
NOBUHIKO USHIBA
PAUL C. WARNKE
SIR KENNETH YOUNGER
SIR PHILIP DE ZULUETA

December 12, 1974

Dear Henry:

You really were very kind to give us so much of your time and to set up such an impressive dinner. All of my colleagues were immensely impressed by the occasion as well as by what you had to say - even though subsequently our joint statement did not echo you in every respect....

I may add that our meeting in general was very successful and the Japanese and European participants went away very much reassured by what the President and Vice President told us in our meeting at the White House, by what you had to say, as well as by their meetings with Cabinet members and Senators. The meeting with you was certainly a highlight of our program, and so I do want to thank you very much for it.

With best regards,

PS - You may be amused that the following request comes from me, but two of my boys very much want to have your autograph, so I wonder if you would be willing to send that to me for them. Their names are Ian and Mark. I never thought at Harvard that someday I would be asking you this!!!

EUROPEAN OFFICE
CENTRE FOR CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
FALMER, SUSSEX BN1 9RF, ENGLAND

FOREIGN POLICY

No.19

Summer, 1975

PEACE IN AN
INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK

by Zhigniew Brzezinski, François Duchêne,
and Kiichi Saeki

There is increasing evidence that the im-
petus to peace in the Middle East, provided
by the October war, is grinding to a stop.

3.

If so, this is not merely a disappointment,
but a lost opportunity that could lead back
to war. Admittedly, a new spirit of realism
and popular readiness for peace, though not
on any terms, is evident in the Middle East.
But peace needs to feed on hope. Frustrated,
the very expectation could add to the ex-
plosiveness of the region. In these circum-
stances a basic "reappraisal," even if not
implying a threat in the style of President
Ford's March letter to Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin, is imposed by the situation itself, ir-
respective of any belated renewal of separate
Israeli-Egyptian accommodation.

The outcome of that reappraisal ought
to be an overt American initiative, outlining
both the substance of an eventual settlement
and the required international framework
for it. Such a framework is needed, since the
United States alone cannot both impose and
maintain a settlement that excludes the So-
viet Union entirely; the substance of the
settlement must also be previewed, in or-
der to break the political and psychological
Arab-Israeli stalemate which the step-by-
step approach cannot overcome.

Ford publicly blamed Israel's lack of flex-
ibility for the failure of the March 1975
negotiations, and thereby raised a furor.
The U.S. government had hoped that Rabin
and his Foreign Minister, Yigael Allon,
would be able to enforce acceptance of the
proposed compromise with Egypt that the Is-
raeli cabinet subsequently refused to endorse.
In a way it was a sign of increased flexibil-
ity that the March breakdown came over
the details of an agreement for Israeli with-
d withdrawal in the Sinai. When Moshe Dayan
first proposed such a deal in 1971, it aroused
more interest in Washington and even in
Cairo than in Jerusalem. But that flexibility
is only relative. The Israeli political situation
is inherently rigid. The siege of the tiny
state is in itself the very type of crisis that
creates inflexible men, a "worst-case" view
of the situation and of the enemy, and a
sense of permanent isolation and defensive-
ness which make far-sighted statesmanship

4.

Brzezinski/Duchéne/Saeki

almost impossible. This is compounded by the complex system of proportional representation in Israel, which gives marginal political groups a power of life or death over the inevitable coalition government. This irresistibly reminds one of the inability of the French Fourth Republic to change policies toward the Algerians, even though wiser heads among the leadership knew some accommodation had to come. In such circumstances, it is to Rabin's credit that his government has resisted the campaign of religious sects to establish new settlements in occupied territories.

Yet, in the end, the limitations of the step-by-step approach transcend the internal problems of Israel, or, for that matter, the divisions among the Arabs. The approach is itself irremediably ambiguous, and Israel cannot give up land in return for inherently ambiguous assurances. This is all that it has so far received or could receive—even from President Anwar el-Sadat. It is true that Sadat badly needs peace to exploit the Suez Canal fully, to rebuild its shattered cities, and to concentrate on improving the standard of living of the *fellahin*, not to speak of controlling the political restlessness of the towns. This alone is some assurance. That assurance is there anyway. But promises of nonbelligerence for a finite five-year period made not publicly to Israel but privately to the United States are no guarantee that when the time that Israel has bought with its withdrawal from the West Sinai runs out, it will not find itself more politically insecure than ever because of its lost military advantages.

The ambiguity is not resolved by the fact that the step-by-step approach might divide the Egyptians and the Syrians. So long as the major aims of Arab diplomacy, particularly the problem of the Palestinians, were not broached, any apparently genuine offer by Sadat of safeguards for Israel in return for a partial settlement of a narrow Egyptian interest in Sinai could only appear a betrayal of the Arab cause. This forced him

5.

to insist on a bargaining advantage, so as to be able to claim that he had promoted wider Arab interests. Thus, with the assumption that political confidence can be sliced up into neat parcels like territory, the step-by-step approach has proved inadequate in an area where hatred and mistrust of future intentions are the heart of the problem.

*No Peace, No War?*

In these circumstances, it may be tempting for some Israelis to argue that the simplest, safest, and most effective way to face the breakdown of negotiations is to accept it and survive as before. There are a number of superficially plausible justifications for such an attitude. One is that there is no obvious alternative: a shift of the negotiations to the Geneva conference is most unlikely to produce any improvement. Sadat seems as convinced of this as the Israelis. With the Soviet Union and a number of the Arab states beating the radical drum, the green table will not be comfortable for anyone who actually wants to negotiate—Egyptian, American, or Israeli. The multilateral forum is not likely to correct the weaknesses of bilateral diplomacy; on the contrary, there is a risk that it will compound them. Such a conference would be quite likely to discomfort not only Israel but the conservative Arab alliance, based on Cairo and Riyadh, which has asserted its pre-eminence in the Arab world since the October war. It would simply maximize the complications.

Moreover, since the October war and its shocks, the military and energy balances have both changed somewhat in Israel's favor. Much of the partially revived self-confidence of the Israelis now comes from the fact that their stocks of war equipment are sufficient to make them independent of American supply for perhaps three weeks or more, a significant period by the standards of the Middle East wars. They would be that much less dependent on an American airlift, likely to be hampered by the conspicuous neutralism in a Middle East conflict of Por-

6.

Brzezinski/Duchêne/Saeki

tugal, Spain, and the NATO allies with U.S. air bases. The Egyptians have confessed that they are short of arms, and though they are being resupplied via Saudi Arabia, and increasingly also again by the Soviet Union, they are made more vulnerable by the reopening of the Suez Canal. Just as significant for the military planner, the technological surprise, so important for the initial successes of the Arabs against Israeli tanks and aircraft in 1973, will be absent. In addition, the West's policies of oil conservation and the building up of oil stocks, coming on top of recession, have blunted the oil weapon which was so effective in 1973. To cap it all, there is every sign that Sadat has been increasingly forced to concentrate on domestic economic development so that internal restlessness in Egypt not threaten his rule.

Arguments that Israel's best friend is its strong right arm, and that Henry Kissinger in effect robbed Israel in 1973 of a military victory against Egypt even more substantial than in 1967, have begun to be heard. These support the view that if Israel sticks to its guns, the signs of new domestic priorities in the Arab countries may put time on Israel's side. Such a policy ensured Israel's survival for a generation. There is not much of an alternative anyway. The pro-Israel lobby in Congress remains powerful enough to ensure U.S. support even if the U.S. Administration becomes critical. No peace, no war may not be very comfortable but it does make clear the fact that the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.

However, to assume that time is on one's side is always hubris and in Israel's present case a particularly dangerous gamble. The power and prestige of the Arabs have grown immensely as a consequence of the new symbiotic relationship created by the industrialized world's dependence on Arab oil. The Arabs' advantages may decline to some extent in the future, but the implicit pressures on the West are likely in one way or another to continue for as far ahead as one can see. It may be that the highly unheroic bending

7.

of Europe, Japan, and black Africa to the Arab wind can be shrugged off so long as the United States supports Israel. But the United States is also keenly aware that its relations with the Arab world impinge on its status as a superpower, and its support of Israel cuts across American raisons d'état. Israel's very success in enlisting U.S. support could lead it to overplay its hand, even while making it more dependent on the U.S.

U.S. arms, U.S. vetoes in the United Nations, U.S. economic and moral support, U.S. diplomatic patronage, U.S. intervention to neutralize the Soviet Union in a crisis, all make Israeli policy increasingly dependent on a single life line. Israeli inflexibility places maximum strain on that vital support. An appearance of intransigence is itself an important factor in an age when public opinion counts. It could sap the good will of statesmen whose own careers, like Kissinger's, are marred by failure in the Middle East. It could strengthen the very forces in the Arab world which are most likely to threaten the existence of Israel. The frustration of hope would undermine the efforts of Arab moderates to negotiate. It would increase the reliance on armaments and war which the Arabs are now rich enough to acquire and wage when they choose. It could bring the Soviet Union deeper into the Middle East, and even unleash oil embargoes. For Israel, it would offer a prospect of more wars with total victory beyond its grasp, opponents whose performances gradually improve, and the specter of total defeat.

It was, after all, the shock of discovering that time might not be on Israel's side which gave a new quality to the October war. To forget that now would be to take inexcusable risks with Israel's future. The tour de force of enjoying complete freedom of maneuver despite unique reliance on the United States, and of exercising military superiority against a potentially more powerful enemy in the hopes of wearing him down, has worked only at increasing cost for 25 years.

8.

Brzezinski/Duchêne/Saeki

Since 1967, Israel has been increasingly on the political defensive. A policy of force might still work, but it could also lead to the loss of more Israeli lives without buying any greater security. It would offer no fall-back position, no alternative resource, no prospect of the exploitation of the occupied territories for any normal relationship with the Arabs. However understandable in terms of a desperate struggle, it seems self-defeating and shortsighted in terms of establishing Israel's future on more solid foundations.

## A Settlement

Israeli regression to a policy of force would pose intolerable risks because it increases the very tensions that threaten Israel while trying to suppress them. To be effective, a solution must thus attempt to treat the whole problem and not simply bits of the infection. This has always proved impossible, of course, because until now the Israelis have assumed that recognizing the central demand of the Arabs—the right of the Palestinians to self-determination—would mean setting up an irremediably irredentist state 12 miles from the sea. The Arabs, whose commitment to the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people” would under the traditional interpretation mean the demise of Israel, would be bound to follow in its wake. The Soviet Union, as the probable patron power of the Palestinian state, would egg it on and gradually control more and more of the region. No peace, no war would continue, but with Israel in an infinitely weaker and more dangerous situation than in 1967, let alone in 1975.

This underlying and understandable fear is so strong that unless it is squarely faced it will totally paralyze Israeli policy—if it has not already done so. Of course, the maximum objectives of the Israelis and the Palestinians are quite irreconcilable. Palestinians and Israelis cannot both have exclusive control of the whole of the former Palestine mandate territory. But that does not rule out

9.

a solution short of the maximum Palestinian demand which Yasir Arafat himself carefully called a “dream” when he spoke to the U.N. General Assembly. Essentially, Israeli policy should aim at trading the occupied territories for Arab acceptance of the partition of the old Palestine mandate territory between Israel and what would probably be the PLO-dominated state of Palestine on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since the real issue for the Israelis should be security and not territorial expansion, the predisposition to seek security through territorial acquisition should be shifted to a policy of seeking security through the denial of the use of territory to potential aggressors.

It is possible, of course, that an agreement which involved Arab recognition of Israel's pre-1967 frontiers, or something very close to them, could not be reached. But even if it were not, at least the negotiations could be based on real political problems and not an evasion of them. Much of Israel's political case could then come back to the fore, in a way that has been impossible since the victory of 1967 put Israel in a public position of seeming to hang on to what does not belong to it. The mere offer of the occupied territories and willingness to countenance a Palestinian state would accentuate the divisions between the Arabs.

Moreover, if an agreement were actually reached, the Arab interest in maintaining it would be very considerable. Egypt has already been trying to settle separately with Israel in the Sinai, at considerable risk to Sadat's position as heir to the leadership of the Arab world, basically because the tensions of a country of 40 million people trying to live in an arable territory the size of Belgium are infinitely more urgent than the grievances of the Palestinians. Egypt cannot say so, with no Palestinian solution in sight, but the situation would be quite different—for Egypt, the major oil producers, and probably also for a realist radical state like Algeria—if a Palestinian entity were set up by an international treaty to which their own sig-

10.

Brzezinski/Duchêne/Saeki

natures were appended. The Arabs' other interests would loom larger than now.

In addition, daily life in a Palestinian state, set up on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, would be inextricably bound to Israel. The relations with a neighbor formidable in economic development as well as in conflict would generate powerful Palestinian opinion in favor of cooperation. That realistic view has been emerging even in the present state of conflict. It would be reinforced by a settlement. Thus, both for external and internal reasons, a political process would be set in motion, downgrading the frustrations on which Arab militants have thrived for the past generation. For the first time, Israel's policy would not be swimming against, but potentially with, the tide. A favorable political process of this kind is the only basis on which Israel's true security can be founded.

Even more than security—for looking beyond the mere threshold of peace one can make a powerful case for an Israel that in time would become the Singapore of the Middle East, a source of technological innovation and financial brokerage for a region that is bound to become increasingly important in the world economy. Israeli know-how and inventiveness could become an asset that the Arabs would come to respect and value. It is not visionary—once peace has been attained—to consider Arab-Israeli economic cooperation, perhaps even institutionalized through some form of a regional economic council, with the Common Market and Japan heavily involved in long-term investment and development schemes. Indeed, increased involvement of both Europe and Japan in arrangements that themselves enhance the value of peace would be most desirable, for their presence would have the effect of spinning an ever larger web of cooperative arrangements and commitments.

## Superpower Guarantees

It would, of course, be naive to rely on gradual Arab-Israeli accommodation for this

11.

kind of a reconciliation. It needs to be shaped. This is where superpower guarantees of a territorial arrangement—as the pre-condition of peace—are not, as Kissinger has recently called them, "icing on the cake," but central to the whole prospect of a peace treaty. The guarantee of any territorial settlement by the superpowers would add a further, and in practice overwhelming, deterrent to those who would wish to overthrow a settlement, and weight the scales in favor of those ready to cooperate. A guarantee by the United States alone might be adequate for Israel, but a joint guarantee by the superpowers, backed up by their participation in an international force patrolling safety zones on either side of the agreed frontiers, would reduce the danger of Soviet exploitation of such a solitary American guarantee to enhance its presence in the Middle East. (One danger to be carefully avoided is that the superpowers allocate themselves separate safety zones, each with its own territory and client. This could bring the Soviet control Israel rightly fears.) Without involvement in such a force, the Soviet Union could pose as the enigmatic supporter of last-resort of Arab irredentists and perhaps even begin to exert direct control over some of the mini-states in the area. But it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to refuse to cooperate in such guarantees, if it were made clear that the return of the occupied territories depended on Israel's security being established in this way. Like the Palestinian extremists, Moscow would then be the obstacle to the return of those occupied territories.

The argument that the Russians might be able to use their restricted presence as a guarantor to threaten the existence of Israel hardly holds water. The nature of the nuclear stalemate is such that cooperation between the superpowers has always gone through direct confrontation and is inseparable from it. There is, if one thinks about it, no situation more impossible than that of Berlin, and yet the rules of superpower

12.

Brzezinski/Duchéne/Saeki

caution were never violated even in the Cold War. With joint guarantees providing the basis for a settlement, any disturbance of the Israeli-Palestinian frontier would thus endanger relations between the superpowers themselves. Thus, the Russians, like the Americans, would by necessity be committed to resolving the crisis. It is not a question of trusting the Russians, but of engaging their self-interest.

Soviet self-interest is also the answer to the objection that the Soviet Union is not likely to want to participate in such a solution. Until now, Moscow—despite its protestations—probably found the conflict in the Middle East to be a unique asset, making possible its penetration into the Mediterranean and the Arab regions. But that has been the case as long as neither war nor peace could endure. With war now the more likely consequence of a stalemate, the Soviet Union has to consider the risks that Syria's defeat by Israel would pose for Soviet interests. Moreover, the Soviets have become increasingly aware of the fact that the conflict in the Middle East adversely affects—indeed, endangers—U.S.-Soviet détente, in which Moscow has an understandable stake.

Finally, an important reason for engaging the Soviets in a constructive approach is that the Soviet Union, while lacking the capacity for imposing its will on the Middle East, possesses the means for obstructing any solution that completely excludes it. This is why a purely American solution cannot work. Moreover, Soviet involvement in joint guarantees could pave the way toward wider international agreements on controlling exports of arms to the Middle East, a necessary element in assuring longer-term stability. Again, a purely American solution could, in contrast, prompt a new regional arms race.

It might be objected that joint superpower guarantees of frontiers would give Israel nothing it does not have now. If the guarantor force were small, a determined assault could breach the superpower screen.

13.

If it were large, the American presence would be overwhelming and Israel would no longer feel free. It is, in any case, most unlikely that the United States could afford, politically or militarily, to make it large. There are four answers to this, corresponding to the different phases of the build-up to a potential crisis. The first is that the presence of the superpowers would reinforce the arguments of the moderates against conflict throughout the Arab world and shift the focus from military confrontation to politics. The second is that the superpowers would see the build-up if there were one and that it would become a critical political issue between them before it ever happened. The third is that if the Arabs did attack in force, it would be difficult for them to know what their war aims were, since they would be attacking the superpowers and ranging them, or even only one of them, on the side of Israel. The fourth is that if the attackers did break through, the pressure from the superpowers to re-establish the preexisting frontier would be enormous since their own prestige would be at stake.

The second objection might be that Israel cannot afford to rely on others, since the United States might sacrifice it to other ambitions elsewhere or the Soviet Union might make threats of withdrawal from the joint guarantor force for reasons which have nothing to do with Israel itself but with superpower relations. The point here is that U.S. credibility toward all its allies will depend upon its credibility to Israel and vice versa, especially after Vietnam. Moreover, Israel will not be giving up its military capability simply because the Americans guarantee its frontiers.

In short, if a settlement could be reached broadly along the lines of Resolution 242 (1967) of the U.N. Security Council but including the foundation of a Palestinian state and guaranteed by some form of presence of the superpowers on the agreed frontiers, the security structure and political process would reinforce each other in creating a

14.

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gradual détente between Israel and the Arabs. Israel would be a great deal more secure than it is today, facing war at any moment, with no escape from the nightmare that at the end of a chain of expensive victories a single defeat might spell catastrophe.

All this, of course, is what Israel at present will not hear of doing. The reason is simple enough: The Israelis fear that acceptance of a Palestinian state is tantamount to acquiescing in the potential destruction of Israel. But if Israel continues to ignore this problem, or to insist that only it can choose the Palestinians with whom to negotiate, it will condemn itself to living perpetually at war, and bring about the very danger that the refusal to speak to the PLO is designed to avoid. One of the aspects of the diplomacy since the October war has been the Israeli attempt to settle the Palestinian negotiation with Sadat and Hussein of Jordan over the heads of the Palestinians. One of the reasons for the failure of these negotiations has been that the chances of Hussein speaking for the Palestinians, and in some sense containing them within his regime, have become more remote than ever. The problem, then, is to find a policy which, in contrast to the step-by-step approach, at one and the same time outlines a goal, provides pressures to maintain movement toward that goal through negotiation, and offers time within which political change can take place. In practice, the only policy that would seem to meet all these needs is one initiated by the United States which would publicly set that goal as the aim of U.S. policy.

## The Next Phase

The point of suggesting the conditions of an ultimate settlement which cannot be immediately implemented is that without a vision of a reasonable goal which takes account of the deepest hopes of the contestants, it is not possible to obtain agreements even on parts of the problem. The Palestine issue is not the only one. The exact delimitation of Israel's frontiers, Jerusalem, compensa-

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tion, freedom of trade, the policing of security zones, these and many others raise problems in their own right. Nevertheless, all but trade and compensation are linked to the territorial issue; and the solution of all is ultimately conditioned by the extent to which both the Israelis and the Palestinians feel that a settlement which offers political assurances for the future in place of the military ones they now seek, can be devised and sustained. Without a willingness to face this central issue, there is no hope of finding—in the state of suspicion generated by the lack of discussion of the basic issues—interim solutions with advantages that are equally balanced for both sides at once.

Accordingly, the United States should announce its conviction that the only settlement which can be sustained is one which respects the security and right to self-determination of both the Israelis and the Palestinians in their different parts of the old mandate territory. Such a solution calls for superpower guarantees which should be jointly accorded, but, if not, will be accorded by the United States alone. Conceivably, especially given the Gromyko statements of April 1975, the United States and the Soviet Union might together negotiate a statement in which they would announce their willingness to provide a joint guarantee for the 1967 frontiers, while leaving the question of devising a scheme for Israeli and Arab presence in an otherwise united Jerusalem to be negotiated separately. Such a joint declaration would put great pressure on the Arabs and Israelis, especially if it were then endorsed by Western Europe and Japan. This might not have immediate effect on Israeli policy, and Israel would no doubt do all it could through the U.S. Congress to change that policy, but a public U.S. posture in favor of such a settlement would exert powerful influence and would probably gain both domestic and international support.

There are obviously difficulties with such a policy. It will certainly be argued that it

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goes too far, and that it puts pressure on Israel when it is Israel's life, not that of the United States, which is at stake. It can also be argued that it does not go far enough: it would not of itself put immediate pressure on Israel to change course and might be constantly under fire from Congress. But if the United States were to make such a declaration, it would maintain the momentum at a time when there is a danger of negotiations running out of steam; it would dramatize the need for a change of course in a way that would impinge on both the Israelis and the Arabs as no other external—or probably internal—influence could; and by pointing to a viable solution when most other indications point only to uncertainty, it could begin to impose a constructive image of an attainable alternative to endless destruction.

It is also true that an interim agreement in the Sinai may still be possible if either Sadat were willing to give a public pledge of temporary nonbelligerence (which might make him appear to be abandoning his allies) or the Rabin government were to accept a private Egyptian pledge to the United States (which is precisely what it has rejected). But even if that were to happen, events since the October war have demonstrated two things. One is that there is no more room for agreements without an attempt to tackle the central problem of the Middle East conflict, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians (which almost certainly means, in practice, the PLO). The second is that for reasons that are too humanly understandable but risk being politically disastrous, none of the parties to the conflict seems capable of making a breakthrough to peace spontaneously and simultaneously. In that case, the United States, as the only power with the capacity to give long-term solidity to coexistence within the old Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state, must now take the initiative for an international settlement.

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