PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.

Explanatory Note

The following notes were written every evening at the end of each day -- except for a few entries. The notes were completed before I left San Francisco two days after the Convention ended.

This diary makes no attempt at an objective assessment. It describes the impressions of one participant at the fringes of the Convention during a period charged with emotion.

Only seven copies of this document exist. This copy is being shown to you in strictest confidence. I would be grateful if you did not show it to anyone or share its observations with anybody else.

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.

REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

July, 1964

July 6

Arrived 1300 at the Sheraton Plaza. Joined a meeting of Hinman, Pfeiffer, Perkins, Deardourff and Wells. Hinman was worried and ferret-like. Perkins had his usual mimeographed forms with him. Wells was making cynical comments. The general atmosphere was one of dejection. This could have been NAR's show. As it is, everyone present had his own regrets and his own theory for the failure.

The immediate problem was to establish a mode of cooperation with the Scranton camp. This is not easy. Scranton's organization is non-existent. His strategy is completely unclear. It is not certain, for example, whether Scranton envisages the discussion about the platform as a way of clarifying issues or of improving his position for an eventual compromise. A Steering Committee has been formed. NAR's intelligence and that of Scranton do not match. The NAR staff was of the view that some people invited by Senator Scott (Scranton's chief lieutenant) are leaning towards Goldwater (i.e. McCulloch of Ohio). It was not clear whether Scranton wanted the Steering Committee to include the widest possible consensus or only those people on whom he could count. There was some desultory talk about a letter Scranton has written to the platform committee to be released the next day. Apparently Scott had not been informed of this.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.

- 2 -

At 1400 I went to see Gene Lipscomb, a Representative from California who is acting as Laird's assistant for foreign policy. (I had consistently opposed this for fear that they would later use my name on material I could not approve. Perkins insisted that I owed it to NAR to go over NAR's foreign policy planks with the Committee.) Lipscomb was at first extremely suspicious and aloof. Even after he warmed up, it was clear that NAR is not a force he reckons with. He seemed much more concerned about the reaction of the Goldwater side. He said that some Goldwater supporters wanted a plank urging the United States to withdraw from the United Nations. I told him there were three issues of principle in NAR's planks: (a) maintenance of our membership in the U.N., (b) continued recognition of the USSR, and (c) no delegation of the decision to use nuclear weapons. The rest of the conversation consisted in an explanation of the Governor's platform planks.

At 1800 there was another desultory staff meeting for the purpose of giving assignments to the research staff.

At 2000 Clare Booth Luce spoke to the platform committee -- an icy, poised presentation of the views of the Citizen's Council. It was presented with little conviction as if Clare Booth Luce did not herself much care whether these views were accepted. There was one technical question about the Panama Canal which she sharply cut off.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.

July 7

The day started with a breakfast meeting with Deardourff, Moore and Perkins. There was some desultory talk and a report by Perkins about the Steering Committee. Apparently McCulloch of Ohio had taken the position that he would mediate between Goldwater and Scranton. More effort was expended trying to find compromise language than in developing a common strategy.

We then went to the airport to greet NAR. I rode in with the NBC correspondent covering NAR. He said that NAR lost the California primary partly because of Nelson Jr.'s birth, partly because his campaign had lacked any substance.

NAR then spoke to the platform committee. It was on the whole well, if somewhat monotonously, delivered. Romney was there -- dapper and suave. He distributed a text of his own statement for the next day. It turned out to be a political science essay on federal-state relations. His assistant Van Dusen asked me what I thought of it. I said that there was nothing in it to which Goldwater would object nor did it indicate any over-all course for the GOP. It was a holding action. Privately it struck me as characteristic of the GOP moderates, not one of whom -- except NAR -- has the moral courage to draw an issue of principle and each of whom holds himself available either for the unexpected here or at least as the heir presumptive of the Goldwater following for 1968.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. ____

- 5 -

This was followed by lunch. Present were: NAR, Carlino, Pfeiffer, Wells, Ronan, Perkins, Moore, and Hinman. Carlino reported that the Platform Committee was 75% in favor of Goldwater. Even though N.Y. has the largest delegation and is the most thoroughly Republican state, none of its members are on the Drafting Committee.

Hinman reported appalling confusion in the Scranton camp. He had been appointed Vice-Chairman of the Scranton campaign without even being consulted or informed. He read about it in the newspapers. He could not name a single delegate who had switched to Scranton. Some interpreted Scranton's letter in the morning as an indication that he would settle for Vice President.

This led to a discussion about NAR's stance if Scranton pulled out of the race. I expressed the view that NAR should go ahead and let his name be placed in nomination. He should use the argument that he did not want the party of Lincoln to be turned over to Goldwater's forces by acclamation and he wanted to give the delegates a choice. The professionals (Hinman and Wells) strongly objected saying that it was an amateurish proposal: NAR would be left with perhaps fifty supporters. I said that two years from now people would remember his stand, not his defeat.

The issue was left unresolved until the week-end -- though NAR leaned towards my point of view.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. ____

- 6 -

The same argument was repeated about the platform. What was our stance if the Scranton forces compromised. I urged a floor fight. Hinman and Wells objected. This too was left unresolved.

During the meeting, a call came from General Schulz -- Ike's aide. He said he was "returning" NAR's call. NAR said that he had not placed a call. Schulz then suggested that as long as the connection was made why not talk to the "Old Man." Ike then came on and asked NAR how things were going. NAR said that all those who had believed in Eisenhower Republicanism were disheartened. The Convention seemed in the hands of the Goldwater forces. Everything Eisenhower Republicanism had stood for seemed doomed. Ike asked what NAR thought he should do. NAR said he should indicate his preference for Scranton -- nothing less would help now.

Ike said that he could not go back on his position of the past 18 months, that he would not dictate to the Convention. NAR said rather icily: You will have to decide, Mr. President, whether consistency is the highest value.

At this point, Representative Miller came to the suite asking for NAR's support for the Vice Presidential nomination. The conversation was in a private room off the dining room. NAR told us that he had flatly refused.

The disorganization of the Scranton forces is shown by the fact that it has proved impossible to plant questions designed to bring out

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. ____

- 7 -

Goldwater's position in the Committee even among Scranton's supporters.

Van Dusen (Romeny's man) has flatly refused. Seibal would not ask a question about extremism, arguing that he had done his duty by introducing an amendment condemning it. Moreover, it is doubtful that Laird would recognize hostile questions.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No.

July 8

Morning meeting with Perkins to discuss strategy. I urged taking
a stand on some issues of principle. The anti-Goldwater group was running
for history not only for the Convention. Moreover, it was quite clear
that the Goldwater forces could not possibly be conciliated. Perkins
promised to take it up with the Steering Committee. We drafted some
planks on the UN, nuclear weapons control, etc., which could then be
submitted to the Platform Committee.

I then attended hearings listening to Romney, Meany, and Lodge.
Romney's passion could not obscure his emptiness. He advocated basing
economic development abroad on private enterprise but he did not explain
how this was to be done. He spoke on behalf of civil rights but insisted
that it was in part a local responsibility and had to take place "in the
hearts of men." He advocated a trade policy based on the reduction of
US tariffs on raw materials in return for the reduction of the tariffs of
underdeveloped countries on consumer goods -- in other words, the classic
definition of imperialism. In short, it was the characteristic straddling
of the self-styled moderates desperately trying to find a position in the
middle of whatever may be at hand. They are the prisoners of events which
they then arrange in an arbitrary hierarchy with themselves in the middle.
In this case Romney tried to distinguish himself from both Scranton and
Goldwater.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL