JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN

ESTES KEFAUVER, TENN.
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, S.C.
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., MO.
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, ARK.
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, WYO.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.
JOHN A. CARROLL, COLO.
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.

ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.
WILLIAM LANGER, N. DAK.
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL.
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
KENNETH B. KEATING, N.Y.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
UNDER S. RES. 366 (81ST CONGRESS)

SUBCOMMITTEE:
JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS.,
CHAIRMAN
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, S.C.
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C.
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, NEBR.
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL.
KENNETH B. KEATING, N.Y.

J. G. SOURWINE
CHIEF COUNSEL

May 13, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Associate Director
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I enclose for your information a copy of
the speech on "The Summit and the Test Ban
Fallacy" which the Senator delivered in the
Senate yesterday. It covers a lot of territory,
and I think you will find it interesting.

DM:td

Encl.

1960

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

9411

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## MONITORS-TEAMSTERS CONTROVERSY

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, in 1957, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America held a convention during which a new international constitution was adopted. This was followed by an election of the union's officers.

In September of the same year, some members of the union filed an action to set aside the election on the ground that the convention and the election were "rigged." They also alleged "various breaches of fiduciary duties and responsibilities" by some union officials, and asked that a "temporary receivership be established for the limited purpose of assuring and supervising elections and a convention that would be conducted in strict compliance with the international constitution."

Evidently there was sufficient substance to those charges so that a trial was held.

After several days of trial, the parties to the dispute agreed on a compromise which was embodied in a consent decree entered on January 31, 1958, by Judge F. Dickinson Letts of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, who had presided over the trial.

The settlement provided, among other things, that a board of three monitors should be established to serve until the holding of a new convention for the election of officers; that election, which the union's general executive board was authorized to call, was to be held, as I recall, 1 year from the date the consent decree was promulgated; the union officials who were elected at the 1957 convention were to serve provisionally until the new election.

In accordance with the agreement, one member of the board was to be appointed by the union; one member, by the dissident members; and the other, by the court. The board of monitors had had membership troubles, one member of the board has been replaced for alleged ineffectiveness while another has refused to resign on invitation.

I am informed that the union's general executive board, pursuant to its authority under the consent decree, issued a call for a new convention and election for March 1959. However, the court having found that conditions for a new convention were not yet ripe after a year of operation under the consent decree, ordered, on February 9, 1959, slightly over a year ago, that the consent decree be modified to make the time for the new convention "subject to recommendation by the board of monitors to

the general executive board of the international brotherhood, with the exact time of holding the convention being subject to the final approval of the court."

In the meantime, charges and countercharges have been hurled by both parties against each other.

The action of the monitors has been questioned; the action of the judge has been questioned; and there has been continuous questioning of the officers of the union itself.

Mr. President, it is not my purpose at this time to justify these charges or countercharges, one way or another. I am sure they have been extensively and exhaustively presented by the parties concerned through all the available media.

However, there are several questions which I think are of concern to Congress. One is the question of whether or not the workers are to be given the right to hold a free election under proper conditions.

It is a fact, I believe, that the holding of the union's election has been postponed for almost 2 years since the establishment of the monitorship under the consent decree.

If the problem is with the union, the election should be postponed. If the problem is with the monitors, it seems that that is a matter of concern to Congress. If the problem rests with the court, then the court itself should look to its own internal affairs.

The second question relates to whether or not the legislation passed by Congress last year is adequate to meet a problem of this kind, one with which the court, it appears now, is attempting to deal.

The third question really relates to the second one, and is the basic one of how much of an administrative burden is to be put upon courts or court-appointed monitors or trustees in other cases, not only in a case involving a labor union, but also in the case of industry or finance or any nongovernmental institution or activity in the United States.

It seems to me that there are enough questions with regard to this problem that the committees of the Senate and the House which are properly concerned in the matter—the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare or the Committee on the Judiciary—ought to give some attention to the problem.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. MOSS. Is it not true that earlier this year we passed a labor bill, one of the provisions of which was to limit the time during which there could be a trusteeship of the parent labor union over a local union?

Mr. McCARTHY. That is correct. We set a limit.

Mr. MOSS. Therefore, would it not follow that it would be considered improper or undesirable to have a period of monitorship or trusteeship or control from the outside over a labor union?

Mr. McCARTHY. I believe it is certainly true, whether it be a labor union or a steel corporation or any other non-governmental institution or activity.

Unless there are compelling reasons for court supervision, it should be terminated.

Mr. MOSS. As I understand the Senator's position, it is that some action should be taken at this time to resolve this impasse which has continued for 2 years, I believe the Senator said.

Mr. McCARTHY. I would hope that it might be resolved. At least we should get somewhat more complete information to Congress as to what the real difficulty may be.

Mr. MOSS. I thank the Senator for his remarks. I should like to concur in his general approach to the matter, without indicating to what extent I believe the matter ought ultimately to be resolved. However it seems to me that there has been a long period of stalemate and impasse, and certainly Congress should examine into the matter and find a way of concluding the matter.

Mr. McCARTHY. I agree with the Senator. There is no question about interferring with the courts, since the main problem seems to be with respect to the court-appointed monitors who carry on a quasi-judicial but principally an executive function. That should be of concern to us, particularly because we have passed new legislation dealing with the problem of the internal conduct of labor unions, and we ought to look into the problem to see where justice lies and what course of action should be followed.

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am reluctant to engage in this discussion today, and I have not done so on previous occasions, because I was counsel, with others, for the dissident group which instituted the proceedings that resulted in the appointment of the monitors.

I understand the attitude and view of my colleagues the Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from Utah, who as I understand them want to know more about the proceedings.

I intend, if necessary, to make a full and complete statement in the Senate, since the matter has come up here, and has come up in the other body as well. However, because I have had such active personal interest in it as a lawyer before I came to the Senate, I have been reluctant to do so.

The monitors were appointed, I might point out briefly, after the plaintiffs had put in their case in the District Court for the District of Columbia. It was a settlement mutually acceptable to both sides.

It might be well at a later time to describe more in detail what took place. I wish to assure the Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from Utah that I shall be happy to shed light on the situation. Something perhaps should be said to clear up some of the confusion with regard to the appointment of the monitors. I cannot speak from personal experience about what has happened since the appointment of the monitors, because I have not been in the case for some time.

But I believe I know what happened when the monitors were appointed and why they were appointed and I have excellent facilities for getting the facts on what has happened since they were appointed.

COPY

May 16, 1960

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller
Governor of New York
Albany, New York

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

I am enclosing for your information a copy of the
statement on the nuclear test ban which I made to the Senate
last Thursday.

Although we are separated by party lines, I have been
filled with admiration for your readiness to talk sense on the
test ban issue. In defense of my own party, I can point to the
fact that we have at least one man of comparable stature,
former President Harry Truman, who has had the courage to
urge the resumption of testing. But on the whole, I am afraid,
the issues are not understood by Congress or by the public
for the simple reason that the facts have never been presented.

I have a suggestion which I should like to submit for your
consideration. So far, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
has had it all its own way. They have flooded the country with
literature. During the past week alone, they have run full-
page advertisements in many leading newspapers across the
country. I have no figures to go by, but I should not be sur-
prised if this single advertising junket cost them in excess
of $100,000.

I recognize that the great majority of the people who

of $100,000.

priced it the single advertising junket cost them in excess country. I have no figures to go by, but I should not be surprised advertisements in many leading newspapers across the literature. During the past week alone, they have run full-page ads for it all its own way. They have dotted the country with consideration. So far, the Committee for a Safe Nuclear Policy I have a suggestion which I should like to submit for your

for the simple reason that the facts have never been presented the issues are not understood by Congress or by the public unless the resumption of testing. But on the whole, I am strait former President Harry Truman, who has had the courage to act that we have at least one man of comparable stature, test pan issue. In defense of my own party, I can point to the filled with admiration for your readiness to talk some on the

last Thursday.

statement on the nuclear test pan which I made to the Senate I am enclosing for your information a copy of the

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

Albany, New York
Governor of New York
The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller

## Persons and Confidential

May 16, 1960

COPY

2 COPY

participate in or support this movement are dedicated citizens who abhor Communism, and who, for very human reasons, are fearful of the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe. But it is also a matter of record that over the past several years the test ban has been item number one on the agenda of the International Communist Movement. Under the circumstances, it would only be normal to expect a heavy Communist infiltration of the entire pro-test ban movement. For your private information, I want to state at this point that the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, of which I am vice-chairman, has in fact received conclusive evidence of such infiltration.

There is a desperate need to communicate the true facts to the public. But how can we do this? I have been wondering whether it would not be possible to establish a Committee for a Safe Nuclear Policy for the specific purpose of presenting the facts to the people by means of periodic reports and studies. If such an organization were set up, it seems to me that it should be a small, tight organization rather than a big, national organization with chapters all over the country.

I hope that this next proposal does not seem far-fetched, but if you and President Truman could consent to serve as honorary chairmen of the organization, this by itself would be enough to ensure an immediate public impact. If you are willing to consider this proposal, I shall be happy to approach President Truman, with whom I have enjoyed a friendly relationship. For my own part, I am prepared to pledge my complete cooperation to such an organization, if it comes into being.

With all best wishes,

TJD:md

Encl.

June 23 1960

Senator Thomas J. Dodd
United States Senate

Dear Senator Dodd:

This is just a note to thank
you for sending me a copy of your remarks.
I appreciate your
test pan movement. With kind regards,
thoughtfulness, and found it most inter-

With kind regards.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT ON THE CONGO CRISIS
BY SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD (D.-CONN.)
ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE

September 13, 1961

THE UN DECLARES WAR ON CONGO ANTI-COMMUNISTS

(The statement which Senator Dodd originally prepared was distributed to the Press in advance, on September 12. This supplementary statement has been made necessary by developments on the morning of September 13).

Mr. President, the statement I made to the Senate immediately after the morning hour was prepared only yesterday. I felt at the time I prepared this statement that we had only days or weeks in which to act. But events in the Congo have moved even more rapidly than I had anticipated.

The morning teletype brought ominous news. At 4:00 a.m. this morning, a United Nations force made up of Ghurka and Swedish soldiers attempted to take over the Post and Telegraph Building in Elizabethville, which was guarded by Katanga Army units. The Katanga Army units refused a demand that they surrender, and heavy fighting broke out. After one hour, the United Nations was able to claim victory.

At 6:59 a.m. this morning, the teletype reported that the Tshombe government had fallen, that President Tshombe has gone into hiding and that two of his cabinet ministers had been arrested by the UN.

The same teletype report quoted Prime Minister Adoula, head of the heavily weighted coalition government in Leopoldville, as saying that he had sent an administrator to Katanga to take over control of the province, and that meanwhile he had asked the UN to take over essential services. He told newsmen that he planned immediate measures to bring the Katanga Army under the control of the central government.

Mr. President, what has been done in the Congo in the name of the United Nations is a scandal of the first magnitude. It is a scandal that cries out for immediate and energetic counteraction.

It is not the business of the United Nations Army, financed largely by United States money, to go about overthrowing anti-Communist governments and installing pro-Communist coalition governments. There is absolutely nothing in the Charter of the United Nations or in the resolutions of the Security of Council which authorizes the actions taken by the UN Command in the Congo over the past several weeks.

These actions are entirely arbitrary. They are so fraught with evil political consequences that it is difficult for me to believe that they have been taken in simple innocence or muddleheadedness by so-called "international civil servants," who owe loyalty neither to one side or the other side in the cold war.

With all the earnestness at my command, I warn the leaders of the United Nations and the UN representatives in the Congo that, if the Congo goes Communist, the American people and Free World opinion will hold them responsible and will demand an accounting.

With all the earnestness at my command, too, I again appeal to the Administration and to the Department of State to intervene immediately with the UN authorities.

The UN Army must be ordered to desist from its illegal and arbitrary actions, or else we should immediately withdraw all financial and logistic support from it. It must be ordered to reinstate the government of President Tshombe, and to release all those whom it has placed under arrest with police state arbitrariness.

There is no time for delay. This is a situation which, quite literally, calls for action within the coming 24 hours.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD (D.-CONN.)
ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE

September 13, 1961

MOSCOW CLAIMS VICTORY IN THE CONGO

Mr. President:

Last Friday I rose in the Senate to warn that UN policy in the Congo, if it were not quickly reversed, would inevitably lead to a complete Communist takeover in that country.

On Monday, I introduced in the Senate a resolution calling for the establishment of a select committee of the Senate to investigate the Congo situation. Simultaneously, I sent a telegram to Ambassador Stevenson urging him to insist that the UN suspend all action against the government of President Tshombe of Katanga and against white officers and white advisers serving under this government.

Only hours after I had introduced my resolution on Monday, there came to my attention an article in the official Soviet periodical *New Times* which claims a complete victory for the pro-Soviet side in the Congo and which paints a far blacker picture than I myself did on the basis of the information available to me Monday morning.

The article to which I refer appeared in the Russian language edition of *New Times*, for September 8, which arrived in this country only Monday morning. The English language version of *New Times* should reach this country within the next week. Meanwhile, because I consider the article of such critical importance, I wish to present a translation of the text at the conclusion of my remarks. To the best of my knowledge, this will be the first translation available in the English language.

The article on the Congo in the *New Times* points out

- that "the members of political parties of the national bloc which was headed by Patrice Lumumba have 23 seats in this government, or an absolute majority."

- that "the decision of the Parliament permits the new government to carry out all decisions made earlier by the Lumumba government."

- that Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula has accepted the request of Vice-Premier Gizenga to appoint General Victor Lundula as Chief of the United Congolese army, and to fill the position of Minister of Defense and representative to the United Nations with Gizenga followers.

- that Adoula has further agreed to take certain unspecified measures against Colonel Mobutu, and that Gizenga is now demanding the removal from the army of "all soldiers and officers who are against the unity of the country."

- that Gizenga, in a telegram to Adoula, had called for an end to "the separatist activity in Katanga, to preserve the territorial unity of the republic within the framework of the policy of Patrice Lumumba, our adherence to which we have declared."

The article boasted that "the decision of the Parliament commits the new government to carry out all decisions made earlier by the Lumumba government, and factually cancels as illegal the decisions of the so-called 'Neo government'."

Mr. President, in the light of this information I believe the situation in the Congo is even graver than I have previously described it. I believe that unless the United States can use its influence to reverse UN policy or else to bring about a stay in the execution of this policy until there has been time for a reappraisal of the entire situation, the Congo, within a matter of months, will be irrevocably lost to the Free World and to the Congolese people.

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2

If there is anyone who still cherishes illusions about the possibility of achieving a "middle-of-the-road" solution through the coalition government which the UN has fostered and to which it is now giving all-out support, I would urge them to read the article in *New Times*.

There is no talk in this article about any "middle-of-the-road" solution or of compromise with the non-Communists. The language of the article, on the contrary, is completely uncompromising. It speaks of nothing less than total victory and of the elimination of all those who oppose the institution of a Krushchev-Gizenga new order in the Congo.

Because I consider this article in the Moscow *New Times* to be of such grave significance, I forwarded a translation to President Kennedy, as soon as it became available to me Monday afternoon.

The press has hinted in the past that the Administration was not altogether happy about United Nations policy in the Congo. In my wire to Ambassador Stevenson, I expressed the hope that present UN policy in that unhappy country did not enjoy the sanction and approval of the United States. For my own part, I simply cannot believe that President Kennedy has been provided with all the facts on this tortured situation.

Mr. President, the situation in the Congo can be redeemed. If the Kremlin had to act in its own right and with its own resources in the Congo, it would be completely helpless because of the thousands of miles that separate it from the African heartland. Geographically and logistically the Congo belongs to our sphere of operations, not the Soviet sphere.

There is no reason why the Congo should go Communist. There is every reason why it should remain free. But the dismal fact nevertheless is that the Congo is rapidly slipping under complete Communist control. If the Congo does go Communist, it will not be because of Soviet strength or because the Congolese people want Communism: it will be because of United Nations policy in the Congo and because of the perverse folly that induces us to support this policy with out prestige and our money.

The words "perverse folly" are strong words, but I have used them with all deliberation. We are paying more than half of the $100,000,000 that the United Nations has already budgeted or spent in the Congo. Could there be any folly greater or more perverse than financing the destruction of our friends and the victory of our enemies?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the Record at the conclusion of my remarks the translation of the article entitled "The Development of the Events in Congo" by E. Primakov, which appeared in *New Times*, #37, September 8, 1961. I also ask unanimous consent to have inserted the text of my letter transmitting this translation to President Kennedy.

In the light of this article in *New Times*, Mr. President, I again express the hope that it will be possible for the Senate, before Congress adjourns, to pass on the resolution I presented Monday calling for the establishment of a select committee on the Congo.

COPY of letter from Senator Thomas J. Dodd to President John F. Kennedy

September 11, 1961

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

This morning I introduced a Senate resolution calling for the establish-
ment of a select committee of the Senate to investigate the situation in the Congo.
I did so because, as I stated in a Senate speech last Friday, September 8, I
was alarmed by the increasing evidence that UN policy in the Congo, as it is
currently being applied, is systematically undermining and destroying the anti-
Communist elements and systematically strengthening Communist influence.
The only result of such a policy must be a complete Communist takeover in the
Congo.

Within the last hour there has come to my attention an article in the
most recent issue of the official Soviet periodical, New Times, (New Times,
#37, September 8, 1961) which completely bears out the interpretation I have
placed on events. If anything, it paints a blacker picture than I did, on the basis
of my previous information.

The article claims a complete victory for the pro-Soviet side in the Congo,
and it adds details about the extent of this victory which have not yet appeared in
the American press. Among other things, the article points out

- that Adoula has accepted Gizenga's request to appoint General Victor Lundula as Chief of the United Congolese army, and to fill the position of Minister of Defense and representative to the United Nations with Gizenga followers.

I consider this article, which claims so sweeping a victory for the Soviet
side, to be so significant that I enclose herewith a translation of the most
relevant portions.

On the basis of this information and of information that has reached me
privately from Stanleyville, I now believe that the situation is even graver than
I had indicated in my statement of last Friday or in my statement this morning,
on submitting my resolution calling for the establishment of a select committee
on the Congo situation.

Unless the present trend of UN policy in the Congo is immediately
reversed, there is no doubt in my mind that the Congo, within a matter of
months, will be under complete Communist control. If this should happen, it
will not be because of the indigenous strength of the Communist movement or
because of Soviet intervention in the manner of Laos. If the Congo goes
Communist under the circumstances to which I have referred, it will be thanks
above all to the misbegotten policies of the UN and the actions of a UN army
that is largely paid for by American funds.

This morning I sent a telegram to Ambassador Stevenson urging him to
insist within the UN that, until there has been an opportunity for a reappraisal
of the entire situation, the UN command in the Congo take no further action

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2

against white officers or white advisers in Katanga province; that it release those
officers and advisers now in custody and permit them to resume their positions;
and that it take no further measures to force the submission of President
Tshombe to the coalition government in Leopoldville, in which the Vice-Premier
and the Minister of the Interior are both Prague-trained Communists, and
which will, in addition, shortly be saddled with a pro-Communist minister of
Defense.

I bring these details to your attention, Mr. President, in the earnest
hope that you will be able to take the necessary action before the situation
deteriorates beyond the point of no return.

Sincerely yours,

THOMAS J. DODD

TJD;ms

Attachments: (1) Article by E. Primakov entitled "The Development of the Events in Congo," New Times, No. 37, September 8, 1961

(2) Text of Senate Resolution #207, urging the establishment of a select committee on the Congo.

(3) Pages from the Congressional Record containing my statement of September 8th, together with supporting documents.

Moscow New Times, No. 37, September 8, 1961

Excerpts from -

The article by E. Primakov, "The Development of the Events in Congo"

...On August 2, a new government was formed in the Congo composed of 27 ministers and 17 state secretaries. ... Cyrille Adoula was appointed Prime Minister. ... According to the Stanleyville newspaper, 'Uhuru', the members of political parties of the national bloc which was headed by Patrice Lumumba have 23 seats in this government, or an absolute majority. The composition of this new cabinet proves that the adventurous effort to liquidate the government of Lumumba completely failed.

"The decision of the Parliament commits the new government to carry out all decisions made earlier by the Lumumba government, and factually cancels as illegal the decisions of the so-called 'Neo government.' In accordance with this decision Adoula invited all the countries recognizing the legal government of Lumumba-Gizenga who had their diplomatic missions in Stanleyville to transfer their missions to Leopoldville.

"On August 16-19, Cyrille Adoula carried out in Stanleyville negotiations with Antoine Gizenga on different questions of internal and international character. Valentin Lubuma, chief of Antoine Gizenga's Chancery, announced:

'In the course of negotiations Gizenga and Adoula expressed mutual desire to liquidate the crisis and help to pacify the country, continuing the work of the Congolese Parliament in this direction.'

In accordance with this, Prime Minister (Adoula) and first Vice-Premier (Gizenga) made important decisions which are indicated in the telegram from Gizenga to Cyrille Adoula, released by Valentin Lubuma at his press conference on August 28. Gizenga is asking Adoula to inform him how the decisions about the appointment of the General Victor Lundula as Commander-in-Chief of the United Congolese army and about appointments of Gizenga followers to the posts of Minister of Defense and Representative in the United Nations have been carried out. Gizenga in his telegram emphasized immediate necessity of transfer of the post of Commander-in-Chief of Congolese army to Lundula "in order to stop mass murders of civilian population in different areas of the country, to end the separatist activity in Katanga, to preserve the territorial unity of the republic within the framework of the policy of Patrice Lumumba, our adherence to which we have declared."

"Lubuma released to the journalists the text of another telegram sent by Gizenga to Adoula. Here is the text:

"'Simultaneously with taking the necessary measures in relation to Mobutu as we agreed in Stanleyville, it is necessary to remove from the army all soldiers and officers who are against the unity of the country. The complete restoration of security in the country is impossible without solution of the army problem.'"

"Antoine Gizenga at the meeting on August 18 declared:

'The genuine nationalists realize that certain persons who played very negative roles in the fate of our country had entered into the new government.'

"The participation of such elements in the government became possible as a result of direct intervention of imperialist forces. The Secretariat of the United Nations has broken its promises to guarantee the complete freedom of self-expression to the members of the Congolese Parliament during the formation of the government and discussion of the candidacy for the ministerial posts."

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD (D.-CONN.)
ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE
Saturday, September 16, 1961

KATANGA: THE SHAME OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. President:

This morning brings more grim news from strife-torn Katanga where the government and people are defending themselves against flagrant intervention and aggression by the UN forces.

The fighting did not end with an easy surrender on Wednesday, as the UN pronouncement pretended. On the contrary, fierce fighting is raging in Elizabethville and at many points in Katanga, fighting that is without mercy on either side. President Tshombe has been interviewed by the British press and has proclaimed his intention of fighting to the death against UN intervention. All the indications are that he has the complete support of his people.

In my statement on the Congo crisis on Wednesday of this week, I warned the leaders of the UN and the UN representatives in the Congo that, if the Congo goes Communist in consequence of their actions, the American people and Free World opinion will hold them responsible and will demand an accounting.

At the same time I appealed once again to the Administration and to the Department of State to intervene with the UN authorities in an effort to persuade them to terminate their illegal and arbitrary actions and to reinstate the government of President Tshombe.

I said that UN actions in the Congo were so arbitrary and so fraught with evil political consequences, that it was difficult for me to believe that these actions had been taken in simple innocence or muddleheadedness by so-called "international civil servants," owing loyalty to neither side in the cold war.

Mr. President, the facts about this tragic situation have not been given to the American people.

One of the things that convinces me that the real facts are not being given to the press by official sources is an editorial which appeared Thursday in a metropolitan newspaper for which I have the greatest respect. The editorial in general supported the UN actions in terminating the secession of Katanga and described this as a wholesome development. The editorial writer said that Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Adoula seemed to be solid moderates but that within the coalition government -- I quote "as Connecticut Senator Dodd has just observed in possibly a too alarmist fashion, are some exceedingly far left personalities."

Mr. President, I cannot escape the impression that the writer of this editorial has gone not to the basic facts for his evaluation, but rather to some ostensibly knowledgeable official in our Department of State who assured him that the coalition government was really under control and that Senator Dodd has a habit of seeing Communists under every bed. This, of course, is not a new situation.

I would remind my colleagues and I would remind the American people that there were certain individuals in the Department of State who told us, at the height of the Chinese Civil War, that the Chinese Communists were really 'agrarian reformers' and not Communists. It was this monstrously false definition that was ultimately responsible for the China policy disaster and for all the blood and suffering this disaster has cost us and will cost us in the future.

I would remind my colleagues that there were certain individuals in the Department of State who told us that Fidel Castro was not a Communist but some kind of agrarian or social reformer whom we ought to encourage with offers

-more-

of friendship and support, and that, in line with this concept, our State Department exerted itself to topple the Batista dictatorship without troubling to prepare a non-Communist alternative to replace it.

I would remind my colleagues that we have recently been told that perhaps Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana is not really a Communist but some kind of nondescript, radical who can be won over to our side if we are prepared to be nice to him and to lend him enough money. And these statements have been made, Mr. President, in the face of the massive documentation compiled by the British Royal Committee, which proved in the most conclusive way that Cheddi Jagan and his wife are Communists, and which made this charge in so many words:

> Today the "agrarian reformer" thesis -- that most shop-worn political fraud in history -- is again being plied, with minor variations in language, in an effort to persuade us that the coalition government established by the UN in Leopoldville is not really Communist or weighted in favor of the Communists, but is essentially a coalition of solid moderates like Kasavubu and Adoula.

> Let us take a hard look at the facts, Mr. President.

No one challenges the fact that Antoine Gizenga, the Vice-Premier in the Leopoldville government and boss of Oriental Province, is a Prague-trained Communist.

No one challenges the fact that the Minister of the Interior, Christophe Gbenye, who holds complete police power, indeed, the power of life and death in this key position, is also a Prague-trained Communist.

No one challenges the fact that the Minister of Justice, Remy Mwamba, is a Gizenga appointee.

The newspapers this Thursday reported that Egide Bochely-Davidson, who has been appointed Administrator of Katanga Province by Prime Minister Adoula, is an ardent Lumumbist and that he is believed by Western diplomats, in addition, to be strongly pro-Communist. Mr. Bochely-Davidson has served as High Commissioner of State in the rebel government of Antoine Gizenga in Oriental Province. I have information from a private and highly reliable source, who knows Bochely-Davidson, that Bochely-Davidson is, in fact, an agent of the Soviet secret police. Here is another set of facts.

As for the other members of the Cabinet, Party membership cards may be difficult to produce. But the document from the Moscow New Times, which I introduced into the Record on Monday, proves that Gizenga has been given the right to designate the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and that he has designated for this position, General Victor Lundula, who was associated with him in Oriental Province; it also proves that Gizenga has been given the right to designate the Minister of Defense and the Ambassador to the United Nations.

As I have said, it may be impossible to produce Communist Party membership cards for all of Gizenga's designees. But it would be sheer lunacy to assume that a trained Communist would designate anti-Communists or neutralists to key government positions. Common sense and prudence both demand that we accept the unpleasant fact that Gizenga's designees will be men who share his viewpoint and are obedient to his discipline.

So here we have a so-called coalition government in which the Vice-Premier, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of the Interior, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Defense, the Ambassador to the United Nations, and the Administrator of Katanga Province are all either proven Communists or hand-chosen designees of Antoine Gizenga, the No. 1 Communist of the Congo.

-more-

-3-

It may be possible for a coalition government to survive a minor dose of Communism. But the dosage of Communism prescribed for the coalition government in Leopoldville by the UN doctors, is far in excess of what would be lethal.

No one with even a rudimentary knowledge of how the Communists have used and exploited coalition governments in the past could believe for a minute that a coalition government so heavily weighted on the Communist side could produce anything but a regime completely subservient to Moscow.

But just as there are people in our State Department who advised the press that the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers, and at a later date told them that Castro was an honest national revolutionary and social reformer, today, it would appear, there are people in the Department of State who are purveying to the press reports about the "middle-of-the-road" composition of the Leopoldville government which are just as false and potentially just as disastrous.

Mr. President, let us make no mistake about it: the UN has not installed any "middle-of-the-road" coalition government in the Congo. It has installed a pro-Communist government that is only several small steps removed from complete and total Communist domination.

I believe something should be said about the manner in which the UN has installed this government and has overthrown the government of President Tshombe.

It was an operation which, for its perfidy, its careful calculation, and its utter ruthlessness, would have done credit to the Kremlin.

The UN proceeded step by step, employing the salami tactics that have been made famous by the Communists.

First of all, they had to get some troops into Katanga, which was solidly controlled by President Tshombe. So they gave President Tshombe their solemn assurance that the UN units that entered his territory would be used solely for the purpose of maintaining public law, in accordance with UN directives, and that there would be no interference in the internal affairs of Katanga. Acting on the basis of this assurance, President Tshombe last August gave the UN permission to land certain units at Katanga airfields.

After the first UN units entered Katanga, there was a steady buildup in their strength.

On April 2, of this year, they felt themselves strong enough to attempt to seize control of the airfield at Elizabethville. The Katanga Army and the people of Katanga reacted so vigorously that the UN was obliged to retreat. It solemnly agreed to restore and respect the status quo ante, by returning the airfield to Katanga control.

In the month of June, however, when President Tshombe was under arrest in Leopoldville, the UN, ignoring its solemn agreement, took advantage of the situation to again seize control of the Elizabethville airfield. This time it maintained control and continued to build up its forces, primarily with Indian and Ghurka troops.

By the first of this month the UN had concentrated in Katanga 12,000 of the 16,000 troops under its command in the Congo.

On Monday morning, August 28th at dawn, the UN Army took the next step. In a surprise attack, it surrounded the barracks of the Katanga Army, arrested the 200 Belgian officers and several hundred white non-commissioned officers, and ordered them immediately expelled from the country.

The Katanga Army had now been decapitated, and the ground had been prepared for the next step.

-4-

Simultaneously, the UN command began to arrest and expel Belgian and other white technicians working in the Congo in various capacities.

They were arrested and expelled, as I have pointed out, without any due process, without any hearing, without any habeas corpus, without any right of appeal. It was a police state operation, pure and simple.

Meanwhile, the UN representatives in Katanga, headed by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, continued to assure President Tshombe that they had no intention of intervening in the internal affairs of Katanga, and no intention of employing force against him.

Only on Monday of this week, Dr. O'Brien, while not denying that he had been endeavoring to persuade Tshombe to submit to the central government, denied categorically that he had issued any ultimatum to Tshombe. Let me quote from the New York Times:

> "Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien, chief United Nations representative here, said he had simply told Mr. Tshombe that this was the last time he would ask him to meet with the Leopoldville leaders.

> "If you refuse this proposal, I will take your refusal as definitive and final and will not renew it," Dr. O'Brien said he had told the Katanga President.

> "Dr. O'Brien said he had offered to accompany Mr. Tshombe on any visit to Leopoldville and had given a guarantee of full United Nations protection in addition to the guarantee being offered by the central Government."

It is now clear that this statement was intended only to deceive and that, at the time it was made, the UN was already preparing its action against the Government of President Tshombe.

On Wednesday, two days after Dr. O'Brien issued this statement, the UN troops, again striking in the early morning hours, surrounded the Post and Telegraph Building, which was of critical importance because of its control of communications and radio, and demanded its surrender. What other measures they took simultaneously is not clear. What is clear, however, is that within a matter of hours the UN had deposed, or claimed that it had deposed, the legal government of President Tshombe, had arrested several of his ministers, and had handed Katanga over to the control of the Leopoldville government and of an Administrator whom everyone acknowledges to be dangerously pro-Communist.

The UN issued various explanations of its action. One explanation was that it had acted in self-defense after a speech by the Katanga Finance Minister, Jean-Marie Kibme, threatening military action. Another explanation was that it had intervened in order to prevent civil strife -- and this explanation was offered up in the face of the undisputed fact that there has been far more law and order in Katanga than in any other part of the Congo, and that the Katanga government has threatened no one.

These demonstrable fabrications were characteristic of the dishonesty and bad faith of the entire UN operation. The same newspaper articles which carried these explanations in releases from United Nations in New York, carried this statement issued by the UN command to newsmen in Elizabethville. I quote:

> "The United Nations action was taken at the request of the central Government, which is sending a state commissioner to Katanga as soon as possible.

> "The United Nations motives in complying with the request was to avoid the alternative -- invasion of North Katanga by central Government troops and a prolonged civil war...

> "UN troops explained their mission to the Katanga

-5-

gendarmerie (police) guarding the post office and assured them there
was no intention of disarming them.

"Unfortunately the gendarmerie opened fire and the fire was returned. A sharp action followed, with casualties on both sides.

"We profoundly regret the casualties and wish to pay tribute to the Katanga gendarmerie for their valor."

The hypocrisy of the UN statement is almost pathetic. As the New York Times commented editorially on September 14: "In Korea the United Nations were to war to check outright aggression. In Katanga it seeks to avert civil war by removing a potential belligerent, and not the one threatening to attack." The same editorial warned that the United Nations was setting a precedent in Katanga "of world-wide implications and considerable risk to itself."

Mr. President, not only was the UN action in Katanga brutal and dishonest, but it was so arbitrary and so far in excess of the authority of the UN or of any international organization, that I gravely fear this action will sound the death knell for the UN if it is not promptly repudiated.

I have said that the UN action was completely without authority under international law or under the Charter of the UN or of the UN resolutions on the Congo.

Paragraph 4 of the Security Council Resolution of August 9, 1960, reaffirmed the policy that the forces of the UN would not be party to any internal conflict, and that they would not intervene in any fashion in such a conflict and would not be utilized to influence the constitutional outcome of such a conflict. This position was again reaffirmed in the Security Council Resolution of February 21, 1961. I challenge anyone to justify the UN action in the light of this resolution.

I do not think that those who have so blithely applauded the UN action in Katanga have fully weighed its historical, political, and legal implications.

Let us take the case of Dr. O'Brien's own homeland. Dr. O'Brien, as an Irishman, should know something of the meaning, should understand something of the implications of the action he has just taken in Katanga.

If the UN could take this action in Katanga at the request of the central Government, conceivably a UN task force could have taken similar action against the Irish secessionists at the time of the Irish Revolution acting on the request of the central Government in London. Or it could today take similar action against Northern Ireland on the request of the Dublin Government and on the excuse that it had to act thus to prevent civil war because the Dublin government was threatening to invade Northern Ireland.

Does the United Nations now plan to take military action to end the secession of Senegal from the Mali Federation, if the Mali Government requests such action? Does the United Nations now deny the right of secession and does it plan to take similar action against secessionist movements on the territory of any member nation?

(more)

-6-

The chief justification advanced by apologists for the UN action is that the Congo could not be made economically viable without the wealth of Katanga Province, and that the incorporation of Katanga into a single unified Congo will pave the way to economic stability.

This position is false in principle and false in practice.

It is false in principle, because unity can be achieved within a federal structure as well as in a centralized state structure. President Tshombe has been willing to discuss unity on the basis of federation, and even President Kasavubu has, in previous statements, indicated a preference for a federal structure. Now, however, in the name of unity, we have rammed down the throats of the people of the Congo unity under a centralized state government in which the Communists and pro-Communists hold the overwhelming preponderance of power.

The argument is false in practice because the mineral wealth of Katanga Province is meaningless unless these resources are intelligently and efficiently exploited.

If Katanga has enjoyed prosperity while the rest of the Congo has been going down-grade politically and economically, this is largely because of Belgian capital and Belgian know-how and the excellent relations that have existed between the Belgian technicians and advisers and their Katangese counterparts. The forced withdrawal of white advisers and personnel would be bad enough. But the UN's action, in addition, is bound to result in a flight of foreign capital. Instead of taking over a prosperous Katanga that can share its well-being with the other parts of the Congo, the UN action will create poverty and economic chaos in this once prosperous province. Such a situation, of course, would be grist to the Communist mill.

The argument is false for another reason. It fails completely to take into account the impact on our Belgian friends of their forced withdrawal from economic participation in the Congo. The economies of a number of European countries, including Belgium, are now very precariously balanced. I have been advised by competent authorities that the loss of Belgium's very sizeable investment in the Congo may be the straw that breaks the back of the economic camel. And if a serious recession starts in Belgium, no one knows where it will stop in Europe.

There was much to criticize in the previous record of Belgian colonial rule in the Congo. But there is absolutely nothing to the charge of colonialism in the case of the Katanga-Belgian relationship of today. The Katangese are masters in their own house. The Belgians are there to help them with their capital and their know-how. There is, or was, a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship. In destroying this relationship, we have not merely acted against our Belgian allies, and against the sentiments of all our NATO allies, we have also acted against the best interests of the people of Katanga, of the Congo, and of Africa.

I say that "we have acted," because it is now apparent that the UN action in Katanga was taken with the approval of the Department of State.

I must say that until Thursday afternoon, when the Department of State publicly pronounced its sanction of the UN action in Katanga, I was under the impression that the UN representatives in the Congo were arbitrarily interpreting their authority, without reference to the United States government or to the other members of the Security Council.

I believed this, in part, because of previous reports in the press about differences between the United States and the United Nations Administration over the handling of the Congo situation; in part, because I simply could not believe that our own State Department had been a party to the disgraceful and historically disastrous action against the Katanga government.

--more--

It is with a heavy heart that I now realize that I was wrong in this
assumption.

The shame of Katanga is not merely the UN's: it is our shame as well.

Mr. President, I still cannot believe that the President and the Secretary of State and those responsible for our policy at top level have had access to all the facts or have been properly briefed on the events in the Congo. I feel that this is still another in a long list of instances where our policy has been mis-guided by the nameless subordinates at desk positions who prepare analyses and position papers.

A master architect is heavily dependent on his draftsmen. And the fact is that, to a very large degree, those who are responsible for our policy are dependent on the publicly unknown, but tremendously important, subordinates whose task it is to sift all information that comes in from the field, to present the salient facts to their superiors, and to indicate general policy lines. This dependence is particularly heavy when our policy makers are called upon to deal with remote places like the Congo, about which they have little or no personal knowledge.

I believe that these nameless subordinates at desk positions have been responsible for many of our policy disasters.

I believe that the continuity of disasters under both Democratic and Republican Administrations can be traced to a continuity in this personnel at desk level.

I believe that the time has come for a critical review of this entire situation, and that those responsible for briefing us into disaster after disaster should be dismissed or transferred to non-policy making posts where their penchant for wrong-headedness can do no harm.

It should not be necessary to make a charge of treason or disloyalty in order to demand dismissal. In the Armed Forces an officer who lost battle after battle would automatically be transferred to a minor position, on grounds of general incompetence.

We can afford to be no less realistic and no less firm in the field of foreign policy.

Those subordinate advisers who have been wrong time after time in their facts and in their evaluations, who have got us into trouble time after time, and led us to defeat time after time, should be dismissed on grounds of general incompetence from the positions they now hold.

Perhaps the Congo disaster can be made the beginning of a fresh approach to the problem of policy-making and to the problem of staffing our policy-making departments. I believe that some setup is necessary under which the drafters of presentations and the formulators of policy papers are no longer nameless, and under which Congress, or the relevant committee of Congress, will have access to those basic papers that play so crucial a role in determining our policy.

-8-

Mr. President, the Free World has very little time left in which to realign its policies and reform its ranks. We cannot afford any more "agrarian reformer" follies. We cannot afford to indulge in wishful thinking about the Castros and the Cheddi Jagans and the Gizengas, in the face of overwhelming evidence that they belong to the enemy camp. We cannot afford the luxury of destroying our friends and financing the victory of our enemies.

The time has come for an end to retreats and defeats, for an end to muddleheadedness and confusion, for an end to self-deception about "agrarian reformers" and coalition governments, for an end to carelessness in policy-making, for an end to the perverse blindness that has led us, in situation after situation, to destroy our friends and support our enemies.

Let us start in the Congo, Mr. President, because if we do not, the whole of Africa will be lost to Communism.

########

September 25, 1961

Mr. David Martin
Office of Senator Thomas J. Dodd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is just a note to thank you
for sending me a copy of Senator Dodd's statements
on Katanga and the Congo's anti-Communists, both
of which I read with interest. It was thoughtful
of you to send them to me.

April 9, 1962

Honorable Thomas J. Dodd
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Dodd:

This is just a note to thank you
for sending me a copy of your speech on March 22nd,
"Is the UN Worth Saving?" I have read it with
interest.

All good wishes.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

March 14, 1963

Dear Senator Dodd:

I certainly appreciated the kind personal references to me in your Communication of March 7 to The Washington Post and assure you that they are reciprocated. I agree with you that it is important that the merits of the nuclear test ban issue be the subject of intensive public discussion. I have studied your Communication carefully and find that there are some things in it with which I disagree and, as a result, I would like to carry the dialogue one step further in putting before you the considerations which have led the national security advisers to the President to the view that a nuclear test ban treaty, of the type now under consideration, is in the interest of the national security of the United States.

As I read your letter there are basically three reasons why you believe the United States should not sign a test ban treaty: 1) because you believe we have lost our lead in nuclear weapons; 2) because you believe such a treaty, in your judgment, would prevent us from dramatically strengthening the security and peace of the free world by decisive new discoveries resulting from continued testing; and 3) because, in your judgment, the proposed U.S. treaty does not provide a system of inspection which gives reasonable assurance that the Soviets are not cheating.

The first

The Honorable
Thomas J. Dodd,
United States Senate.

- 2 -

The first two of these three arguments are
not directed against the position which the United
States now has on the table at Geneva but are
rather directed against any comprehensive treaty
banning nuclear weapons tests which might be
negotiated. All of them overlook the risks
implicit in continued testing by both sides of
the nuclear arms race.

First, the United States has not lost its
lead either in nuclear weapons or in our strategic
military posture which includes nuclear weapons as
one of its elements. The current nuclear arsenal of
the United States is larger and more diversified and
more sophisticated than that of the Soviet Union. We
have produced nuclear weapons in large quantities and
have developed the necessary nuclear warheads for all
of the U.S. long-range missiles and tactical weapons.
It is true, however, as the President has stated many
times, that the continuation of the arms race is
giving the United States less, rather than more,
security. This is not because our lead in nuclear
superiority has been lost to the Soviet Union, but
because the longer the race goes on, of which
unlimited testing is a part, the more the nuclear
forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will tend to equal
each other. An illustration of this fact is that it
is generally recognized that the United States would
have been better off, in its nuclear position, had
the efforts made during the Eisenhower Administration
to obtain a nuclear test ban been successful. Moreover,
the technology developed by unlimited testing may not
remain a possession of either the United States or the
Soviet Union unless an agreement is reached to curtail
testing. Unless an agreement is reached to curtail
testing sooner or later this technology will become
available to many other countries.

Second, the security and peace of the United
States and the free world would be strengthened more
by an effective test ban treaty than by continued
testing to develop and produce new advances in nuclear
weapons.

There is no question that further nuclear testing
can and would bring advancements to the total U.S.
stockpile of nuclear weapons. Continued testing,

however,

- 3 -

however, would also bring advancements to the Soviet stockpile. Any agreement to turn down the arms race, whether in the field of nuclear testing or otherwise, will be open to the argument that it precludes some field of weapons development which might otherwise be open to us. This is a factor which certainly must be taken into account. Any such agreement should be entered into only if, in the light of our current weapons posture and the restraints which will be placed on the Soviet Union, such an agreement will be, on balance, in the interests of our national security. The present U.S. position was recommended to the President not only by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency but also by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission as meeting these criteria. In the deliberations which led up to this position, consideration was given to both the effects of this position on the development of the AICBM and the pure fusion weapon.

With respect to the AICBM, the most important problems relate to the development of a system which can handle the problem of separating actual warheads from penetration aids. This is the key problem needing solution. We now have warheads available for an AICBM without further testing. So far as the constraints on the Soviet Union are concerned, development by them of important new data on nuclear effects as they influence AICBM systems could not be accomplished without an extremely high probability of detection.

With respect to the pure fusion bomb, it should be pointed out that the development of such weapon is by no means certain. Moreover, as you know, we have already made significant advances in the direction of tactical weapons with a smaller fission as compared with fusion component. There is, therefore, a real question as to the utility of a pure fusion bomb over weapons already available. We must gauge the difference between a pure fusion weapon and weapons now available not only from the risk of fall-out, or of damaged property, but from the risk of escalation. Frankly, I don't think a possible reaction to the tactical use of nuclear weapons by us would be very much different whether it were a matter of our developing and using pure fusion weapons or an enhanced radiation weapon of a type now available. I believe that, if such pure

fusion

fusion weapons were developed, their primary
significance would be in providing a cheaper
substitute for the explosive component of our
very large stockpile of fission weapons. However,
considering the very large numbers of nuclear
-weapons that would be available to both the United-
States and the Soviet Union in the time period when
such a device might become available, its existence
would not appear to constitute a great advantage to
either side. Such a weapon would be of greater
significance to other countries that do not as yet
have a nuclear capability. For this reason, an
inhibition to the development of fusion weapons
would be to our net advantage.

Third, the treaty which the United States
is prepared to negotiate does provide adequate
assurance that the Soviet Union could not conduct
a significant test series without our knowledge.
Perhaps earlier descriptions of the U.S. position
which you have read have not been sufficiently
clear or detailed. Your statement that, "For 16
years the Soviets have rejected this principle
(i.e., adequate on-site inspection and control)
and we now yield to them by saying that our reliance
is on a system of outside monitoring and that the
token inspection inside the Soviet Union is only
'supplemental' and unimportant," does not describe
our present position. We are, in fact, emphasizing
the necessity of an adequate number of properly
conducted inspections and at no time has anyone
said that these inspections were 'supplemental' or
'unimportant.' We have proposed an outside monitoring
system since the technical facts based on the actual
operation of our existing intelligence detection
system indicates that such a system would have almost
the same detection capability as a system located
inside the Soviet Union according to the original
Geneva specifications and might in practice actually
be more effective since it would be fully under our
own control and could be put into operation immediately
upon treaty signature instead of requiring 2 to 4 years
to build.

Further,

- 5 -

Further, in challenging the effectiveness of our proposed detection system you rest your argument primarily on the assertion that "it is now possible for the Soviets to test secretly in outer space and to test large weapons underground without any possibility of detection." With regard to testing in outer space, there are several detection techniques that can detect from the surface of the earth nuclear explosions out to the distance of the moon and other satellite-based systems are within the state-of-the-art that could detect explosions at distances of hundreds of millions of miles (beyond the distance of the sun). With regard to the possibility of testing large weapons underground, I assume that you are referring to the possibility of testing in very large underground cavities. Continued examination over the past few years of this technique indicates that such underground cavities would be extremely difficult and costly to build. In attempting to undertake a project of this extent, a potential violator would run a serious risk of being detected by non-seismic means long before he even reached the point of testing. I believe that you have not given sufficient consideration to the vast technical problems and large expenditures that a violator would face in attempting to conduct a significant series of tests in outer space or in underground cavities in a manner calculated to avoid detection. In view of the many uncertainties involved in these complex methods of evasion, a violator could never be sure that his attempts at clandestine testing, no matter how elaborately conceived, would not be discovered by a national detection system whose total capabilities the violator would not know in detail.

Your letter contains an extract from Mr. Foster's testimony before the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee which you believe points to a contrary view. In the extract which you quote Mr. Foster was recapitulating his reply to a question directed to the contribution of stations on Soviet soil to the problem of identifying an event as an earthquake, a contribution which, although noticeable, could not be called a breakthrough. His testimony, as a

whole,

CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX., CHAIRMAN

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, WASH.

STUART SYMINGTON, MO.

JOHN STENNIS, MISS.

STEPHEN M. YOUNG, OHIO

THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.

HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.

SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, FLA.

J. HOWARD EDMONDSON, OKLA.

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE

CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA

CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.

KENNETH B. KEATING, N.Y.

EVERARD H. SMITH, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES

March 29, 1963

Mr. Adrian S. Fisher
Deputy Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Fisher:

I am grateful to you for the considerate attention
you have given my several communications on the subject
of the nuclear test ban. I believe that our exchange
of letters has served to give the public a better
understanding of the issues involved; and because of
this I welcome your proposal that your detailed letter
of March 14 be inserted into the Congressional Record.
In doing so, however, I am taking the liberty of
relying to several of your more important contentions.

In your second paragraph you construe my position
as meaning that "the United States should not sign a
test ban treaty." I do not see how you could have
read this interpretation into my several statements,
because I have repeatedly made it clear that I do
favor a properly safeguarded test ban treaty and that,
despite all the difficulties, I strongly support the
quest for limitations on the arms race.

Indeed, it is precisely because I believe that we
must strive for realistic disarmament, that I am
opposed to the test ban treaty now under discussion.

It is my belief that the draft treaties we have
recently proposed do not provide us with adequate
safeguards against the possibility of Soviet cheating.
I know that you differ with this estimate; but the
irrefutable fact remains that the many concessions

-2-

we have made at Geneva have resulted in widespread
misgivings, both in Congress and among the American
people; and these misgivings have unfortunately had the
effect of undermining confidence in the prospect of
legitimate disarmament.

This is an issue on which the broadest public
unity ought, ideally, to prevail. Instead, there is
grave and widespread disunity. I deplore this disunity;
but I believe it can be overcome, or reduced, if we
are prepared to insist on increased safeguards for a
test ban treaty.

Surely there is room for honest differences as to
what constitutes adequate safeguards; and, surely, we
should be able to conduct this discussion without one
side charging that the other side is opposed to any
kind of test ban treaty or, conversely, without charges
of a "sellout" by the second side against the first
side.

In my speech of this February 21st, while I urged
a frank reassessment of our status, I also warned
against the abandonment of the test ban negotiations.
I said that the original Geneva formula, although it
was unsatisfactory in many ways, at least called for a
significant measure of opening up on the part of the Soviets
and that it might have led, and may yet lead, to an
acceptable treaty.

In my speech of May 10, 1960, in which I first
addressed myself to the test ban negotiations, I called
for a unilateral cessation of all test that contaminate
the atmosphere, even in the absence of a treaty. I
still believe that the national interest and the
interest of world peace would be served if, recognizing
the difficulty of achieving a treaty, we committed
ourselves to the suspension of all such tests -- with
the understanding, of course, that we would be free to
resume such tests if the Soviets failed to observe a
corresponding moratorium, and that every effort would
be made to keep our facilities in a state of readiness, so that
there would not again be a time lag of almost one year while
the facilities and personnel essential for the conduct
of atmospheric tests were reassembled and readied.

-3-

I take this stand because I consider it essential
that we take every possible initiative to reduce the
dangers that may result to the human race from continuing
atmospheric fallout. I do so despite very serious
misgivings about the ability of a democratic state to
keep testing facilities in readiness while it is
adhering to a moratorium on testing. President Kennedy
dealt with this matter frankly in the following state-
ment made on March 2, 1962:

"But in actual practice, particularly in
a society of free choice, we cannot keep top-
flight scientists concentrating on the prep-
aration of an experiment which may or may not
take place on an uncertain date in the future.
Nor can large technical laboratories be kept
fully alert on a standby basis waiting for some
other Nation to break an agreement. This is
not merely difficult or inconvenient -- we have
explored this alternative thoroughly, and found
it impossible of execution."

The differing conclusions we arrive at stem, I
believe, from three principal sources: (1) conflicting
evaluations of what constitutes the major threat to our
national security; (2) conflicting estimates of Soviet
intentions; (3) radically different estimates of the
potentialities of nuclear technology.

On the first point, if I understand your position
correctly, you apparently consider the proliferation of
nuclear weapons -- the menace of the so-called "nth
nation" -- to be the prime source of danger. I am
concerned with this matter, and I believe that we must
strive to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But this
in my opinion is a minor danger compared with the mortal
danger to our national security if the Soviets should
ever achieve nuclear superiority over us. It is, more-
over, a danger that belongs to a period ten or twenty
years in the future, while the peril posed by Soviet
communism belongs to today. Instead of permitting our-
selves to become obsessed with the hypothetical danger
posed by a hypothetical "nth" nation in decades to come,
we would do well to concentrate on the real, immediate,
and desperately urgent problems posed by the existence
of Soviet imperialism.

In your letter you argue that "the longer the nuclear race goes on, the more the nuclear forces of the U.S. and USSR will tend to equal each other." You state further that "it is generally recognized that the United States would have been better off in its nuclear position had the efforts made during the Eisenhower Administration to obtain a nuclear test ban been successful."

I believe that this statement may accurately be described as the premise for your entire argument. I differ with this premise on several counts.

I do not believe that nuclear technology has reached the ultimate point of its development, or that it has leveled off. I believe that this technology, which is still in its infancy, will witness many more revolutionary advances.

I do not believe that Soviet technology was bound to catch up with ours, or is bound to catch up with ours in these areas where we still lead, simply because of the fact that both sides engage in testing. On the contrary, I believe that we had the scientific brains and the resources to maintain our lead in all phases of nuclear technology if we had made a serious effort to do so.

If the Soviets have now pulled even with us in strategic weapons technology, it is not because we continued to test or because there was no test ban treaty. On the contrary, it was because we suspended our test program for more than three years, under the terms of a moratorium which gave the Soviets all the advantages of a test ban treaty, so far as our side was concerned, without any of the disadvantages or inhibitions of a monitoring apparatus or on-site inspections.

Obviously, if the Soviets continue to run as fast as they can, while we stop running for years on end and then dawdle along at a fraction of capacity when we resume running, the Soviets are not only bound to catch up with us but will ultimately surpass us.

In the light of the known record, I simply cannot understand how the relative progress scored by the Soviets in nuclear technology can be blamed on the failure to achieve a test ban treaty, or how it can be used to

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than we. They have had many more big thermonuclear explosions than we. They are not fools. Through these repeated tests they are finding out more information. On the basis of any valid, commonsense arguments, they should be ahead of us today. --- It is my guess, and it is only a guess, that today the Russians are ahead of us in nuclear weapons."

That the Soviets have at least pulled even with us in strategic technology has, I believe, been demonstrated by our analyses of their massive series of atmospheric tests.

In the very large yield areas, that is, tens of megatons, we are very clearly behind by virtue of the fact that we have neglected to do any testing in this region. In the yield area which ranges from about one megaton up to several megatons -- that is, the range which encompasses most of our strategic missiles, such as Atlas, Titan and Minuteman -- we have a statement from Dr. Hans Bethe, Chairman of the panel which evaluates Soviets tests, that the Kremlin in its several recent test series, placed very great emphasis on warheads of this magnitude. As Teller suggests, the Soviets may very well be ahead of us in these yields; the sad truth is that we really do not have the technical ability to judge.

We have much less ability to evaluate Soviet progress in the low yield range, which embraces air defense weapons as well as tactical weapons. Conducted underground, most of these tests would defy detection, let alone analysis. As for the neutron bomb, since it produces no significant radioactive debris, it could probably be tested, if required, in the atmosphere and still deny any hope of assessment by us.

While you contend that we still retain an impressive lead over the Soviets, it is interesting to note that the responsible Soviet authorities have spoken in considerable detail of the lead they now enjoy over the United States in nuclear weapons. Let me quote, as an example, a statement from the recent Soviet book, "Military Strategy," put out by Marshall Sokolovskii, former Chief of the General Staff, and fourteen other senior Soviet officers:

"In the 1960's nuclear weapons were supplied already to all branches of the Soviet armed

forces -- strategic missile forces, ground forces, air forces, the navy and air defense forces. Along with this, our armed forces received nuclear warheads with yields from several tons to tens of millions of tons. Considering that thermonuclear weapons were created in the Soviet Union earlier than in the United States -- and most important of all -- that the USA does not possess super-powerful thermonuclear warheads of several tens of millions of tons which the USSR has, we consider that our superiority over the Western bloc in nuclear weapons is indisputable."

Perhaps this statement is exaggerated at certain points, but it is always a safe maxim to overestimate one's enemy rather than underestimate him. I believe the Disarmament Agency is putting itself in a posture that invites criticism when, with no tangible proof to back up its assertion, it assures the American people that our lead is secure and all is well.

You say that I "overlooked the risks implicit in continued testing by both sides." I do not overlook this risk. As I have pointed out, it is precisely because I recognize it that I believe we must strive for a realistic test ban treaty. But whereas you seem to think that there is only a risk that the Soviets would endeavor to cheat, I take it as a certainty that the Soviet government, which is publicly committed to our destruction, which has violated more than a thousand treaties and agreements in its brief life span of 45 years, and which has time and time again displayed a monumental contempt for world public opinion, will cheat if there is something to be gained from cheating, and if the chances of verification are non-existent or marginal.

This is why I believe that a test ban treaty must incorporate far more rigorous safeguards against cheating than our present position at Geneva calls for.

I believe that a test ban treaty can safely be extended to cover all those areas where we can, with today's technology, maintain an effective monitoring system. On the other hand, I also believe, as I have stated several times, that we would be endangering the national security

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if we extended the treaty to cover areas where monitoring is clearly impossible or where there is no serious chance of detection and verification.

The recent testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy offered little encouragement about our current ability to detect small underground tests, or larger underground tests conducted in a cavity, or tests in outer space.

As you no doubt know, Dr. Carl F. Romney, Assistant Technical Director of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (who is generally recognized as one of our top seismologists) estimated that, even without decoupling, a series of underground tests conducted in alluvial soil below the level of 3 kilotons would probably escape detection.

This testimony took on added significance in the light of a statement by Dr. Jack Ruina, Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, that half our underground tests have been below the 3½ kiloton level, and of a statement by General A. W. Betts, Director of the Division of Military Applications, Atomic Energy Commission, that at this level tests could be conducted which had application to large-yield strategic weapons as well as to small tactical weapons.

You told me in your letter that space detection presents no serious problem and that "satellite-based systems are within the state-of-the-art that could detect explosions at distances of hundreds of millions of miles."

On the day that we have demonstrated our ability to verify tests in outer space up to a distance of several hundred million miles, I shall be willing to support a ban or moratorium on all such tests. But I note that, in his testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee last September, Mr. Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, admitted frankly that we have no present capability to detect tests in outer space.

I note further that Dr. A. W. Schardt, Deputy Director of the Nuclear Test Detection Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency, in his recent testimony before the Joint

-9-

Committee on Atomic Energy, made it clear that the
capabilities of which he was talking were all in the
future. In reply to a question about our present
capability to detect tests in outer space, he replied,
"We do not have a satellite up, and I would say our
present capability is zero."

Finally, I note that Dr. Schardt was careful not to
claim any foolproof ability for the projected space
system. He pointed out that tests might be very much more
difficult to detect: (1) if they were shielded by large
metalized space balloons; (2) if they were conducted on
the other side of the moon, and; (3) if they were made to
coincide with solar flares.

While tests in outer space are completely feasible
with today's technology, the art of verification in outer
space is still on the drawing boards and it may take
many years to emerge as an operating system. For this
reason I am opposed to the inclusion of outer space in
a test ban treaty at this juncture.

In your letter, you repeat the statement that "an
inhibition to the development of fusion weapons" -- that
is, the neutron bomb -- "would be to our net advantage."
Your generalized statements about our detection capabilities
for small underground tests are considerably more
optimistic than those of Dr. Romney. But even if under-
ground tests of one kiloton could be detected and veri-
fied -- and I know of no one who has gone beyond this
claim -- I still fail to understand your reasoning when
you say that a comprehensive test ban treaty, incorporating
no threshold of detection, would inhibit the Russians from
developing the neutron bomb.

The neutron bomb, as I understand it, is conceived as
a weapon ranging from a yield of 1 ton, or even lower,
to 1 kiloton. In my speech of February 21st, I quoted from
a statement by a Soviet Red Army Colonel, describing the
tactical implications of a neutron bomb equivalent to
40 tons of T.N.T.

I should therefore like to ask, first, whether you
seriously believe that we have any ability at all to detect
tests at a 40 or 50 ton level, or whether you believe that
such a capability lies just beyond the horizon. My own

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understanding from the recent testimony before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy is that, while there are only
some hundreds of large earthquakes each year, there are
many thousands of small earthquakes which resemble sub-
kiloton yields; and, when you go low enough on the
earthquake scale, there are so many minor events that an
ultra-sensitive seismograph would record them as almost
a continuous rumble.

In short, unless there should be some revolutionary
breakthrough in the science of detection, the chances that
we will be able to detect a neutron bomb test, or series
of tests, of 50 or 100 tons magnitude, or even more, are
precisely nil. When Dr. Romney, in his recent appearance,
was asked about the possibility of detecting a 100 ton
underground test, he was frank in stating that this was
"out of the question."

The second question I should like to ask is, whether
you believe that the men of the Kremlin, knowing that
our chances of detecting such tests were zero, would
refrain from conducting such tests out of considerations
of honor.

On the one hand, you argue that a test ban agreement
on the terms now under discussion would be to our advantage
because it would inhibit Soviet development of such a
weapon; from this, one would include that the neutron
bomb would be a weapon of serious significance. On the
other hand, you argue that our tactical nuclear weapons
arsenal is already so highly developed that it would not
seriously affect our position if the Soviets did succeed
in achieving the neutron bomb. This is a rare instance
of two arguments which contradict each other and each of
which, separately, is demonstrably false.

I have already explained why a comprehensive test
ban treaty could not, by any stretch of the imagination,
inhibit the Russians from developing the neutron bomb.
Let me now deal with the other part of your statement.

I am aware that there are a number of people who
share your estimate that the neutron bomb would have no
revolutionary advantage over some of the tactical nuclear
weapons now in our arsenal. I am also aware that, before
we got the H-Bomb, there were some scientists, including

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several who have held key positions as advisors on
the test ban, who argued that the H-Bomb would not have
the revolutionary implications claimed by its proponents,
that there was nothing an H-Bomb could do that couldn't
be done just as well by a beefed-up A-Bomb.

You say that it is not at all certain that the neutron
bomb can be made. But the entire past experience of
nuclear technology has been that those things that are
theoretically feasible, ultimately turn out to be feasible
in practice. I know of no exceptions to this rule.

I consider it of some significance that the
scientists, who today dispute or question the scientific
feasibility of the neutron bomb, include those: (1) who
expressed negative opinions concerning the feasibility
and the advisability of making the H-Bomb; (2) who have
advised us into our present disastrous posture in the
test ban negotiations, and; (3) who have had no serious
experience with the developmental work that has already
been done in this area.

I also consider it of some significance that the
scientists who have been concerned with the development
of the neutron bomb and who have firsthand knowledge of
the project, have been reluctant, because of the
excessive secrecy which surrounds the project, to discuss
its feasibility publicly. I have reason for believing,
however, that your reservations concerning the feasibility
of the neutron bomb does not accurately reflect the opinion
of these scientists. Perhaps it would be helpful to the
American people in assessing this matter if the cloak of
secrecy were lifted so that the scientists who are
associated with the project and believe in it, could be
heard.

I think you will agree that there are some highly
competent scientists and military men who have gone on
record with an evaluation diametrically opposed to your
own. They believe that the neutron bomb would have
revolutionary implications because of its numerous advan-
tages over the tactical fission weapons on which we now
rely. The pure fusion weapon would be far cheaper to
produce in quantity; it would be much more effective

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than fission weapons; it would do little damage to our allies' urban centers; and, of great importance, it would virtually eliminate wide-spread fallout. On the one hand, this would enable our troops to follow up on a tactical nuclear barrage without delay and without danger to themselves. On the other hand, the absence of significant fallout would reduce the political opposition of our allies to the use of tactical nuclear weapons and, to this extent, would make the resort to such weapons far more plausible.

You contend that the neutron bomb would not have any critical advantages over the fission-fusion weapons which we already have in our development program. This development has been known to me for some time, but I have hesitated to refer to it because of its classification. I am delighted that you have chosen to bring the existence of our fission-fusion weapons into public discussion, since it enables us to discuss the entire problem more frankly.

I find it difficult to understand the processes by which you arrived at the conclusion that the major difference between the pure fusion weapon, or neutron bomb, and the fission-fusion weapons we possess today, is essentially one of cost. Actually, the pure fusion weapon would have numerous advantages. It could be tailored in far lower, more discriminating yields. It would be considerably lighter and therefore more versatile and effective.

In terms of nuclear costs, it would be cheaper by a factor of 10 to 100 fold, or even more, than fission weapons or fission-fusion weapons.

You imply that we have an adequate supply of plutonium and of tactical nuclear weapons. I feel that this estimate can only be explained in terms of the official rejection of the possibility of limited nuclear warfare, which I criticized at length in my Senate statement of February 21. As you may recall, I argued at that time that the advent of the neutron bomb would make tactical nuclear warfare far more plausible, and that we had to face up to this prospect realistically.

Having said this much about the superiority of the neutron bomb, I nevertheless wish to express the hope that top priority will be accorded to the fission-fusion weapon you describe, as an interim system, until the neutron bomb becomes available. I should be grateful if you could

-13-

informe me whether production requirements for this
weapon have actually been established by the Department
of Defense.

If it ever comes to limited nuclear war, tactical
weapons may be needed in the many thousands. As you are
aware, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have several times urged
the expansion of our plutonium production, so that our
tactical weapons might be produced in larger quantity.
The production of a pure fusion weapon would liberate our
armed forces from this limitation, and make tactical
weapons available in quantities adequate for any contin-
gency -- at only a small fraction of the cost of our
current tactical weapons.

You challenge my assertion that the development of
an effective anti-missile missile is also tied in with
the problem of underground testing, specifically as it
relates to the neutron bomb development. I am, of course,
aware that the missile and radar components of an anti-
missile system can be tested even under the conditions
of a test ban treaty.

I am also aware that perhaps the single most
important problem relating to the anti-missile missile
has to do with the development of a system capable of
separating actual warheads from penetration aids. If the
enemy should carry this offensive technique one stage
further, and employ penetration aids in the form of
multiple warheads, our currently envisioned anti-missile
capabilities would be completely inadequate. The
technological possibility of multiple warhead attacks, in
fact, constitutes one of the most formidable obstacles
to the effective defense of our industrial and urban
areas.

It is precisely from the standpoint of overcoming
this obstacle, that the pure fusion, neutron bomb type
of warhead would be of key importance. In the first
place, it is generally accepted that this warhead would
have a far more effective "kill" capability than a con-
ventional nuclear warhead. In the second place, and
most important of all, the extremely low cost of the
pure fusion warhead would make it possible to develop an
anti-missile defense system quantitatively capable of
dealing with saturation raids even by multiple warhead
missiles.

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You question my statement that even quite large
tests could be conducted underground without fear of
detection. I do not know why it is that the proponents
of the present test ban treaty persist in belittling
the "big hole" theory with the tortured argument that it
would be extremely expensive and extremely time-consuming
to create a 500 foot spherical cavity such as Dr. Latter
postulated in presenting the "big hole" theory.
Dr. Latter's 500 foot cavity, according to his calcula-
tions, would reduce the seismic impact of an underground
shot by a factor of 300, so that a 300 kiloton shot would
register as 1 kiloton. In downgrading the possibility
that the Soviets may use the "big hole" technique for
purposes of cheating, your letter ignores the fact that
a much smaller hole would still result in a substantial
reduction of the seismic impact of an underground test.

I have been informed by people who are competent in
the field that at the 20 kiloton level, and even lower,
tests can be conducted that have application to our
largest multi-megaton weapons. If the Soviets were to
excavate a hole big enough to reduce the seismic impact
of such a shot by a factor of only 30, 20 kilotons would
produce a seismic signal of less than 1 kiloton. This low
signal would probably not even be detectable, let alone
verifiable. Yet, this level of decoupling would involve
a cavity of relatively modest size, which would be cheaply
and easily constructed.

I would also point out for the record that the recent
testimony established that a substantial reduction could
be achieved in cavities that are elliptical or flattened
rather than spherical. Such cavities are much more
easily engineered, and for that matter, are frequently
found in nature.

Your letter makes obscure reference to the possibility
of detection by non-seismic means, by which I assume you
mean conventional intelligence operations. There is always
a mathematical possibility that some conscience-stricken
Soviet scientist may decide to cooperate with American
intelligence in reporting a Soviet test ban violation. But
on the basis of our intelligence record to date, I do not
think that we can attach any serious weight to this
possibility. I would remind you that our intelligence
community had no advance knowledge of the Soviet A-Bomb,

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no advance knowledge of her H-Bomb, no advance knowledge
of Sputnik, and no knowledge of the emplacement of
Soviet missiles in Cuba until they were photographed in
position on their concrete emplacements. It is worth-
while recalling, in this connection, that the Soviets
denied point blank that nuclear missiles had been installed
in Cuba until we produced the irrefutable photographic
evidence.

In recapitulating this record, I do not mean to
criticize our intelligence community. I simply wish to
make the point that intelligence operations in a closed
totalitarian society are incredibly difficult and that
the Soviets have been consistently successful in conceal-
ing from us even the most massive technological and
logistic operations.

It has repeatedly been stated that so long as there
is "a chance" of detection and verification, this would
serve as a deterrent to any Soviet treaty violation. I
believe the American people are entitled to a precise
statement, or at least to an approximate estimate, of
what is meant by "a chance." If it means 1 chance in 2,
or 1 chance in 5, most people would agree that such a
probability factor would act as a deterrent. But if
"a chance" means 1 chance in 1,000 or 1 chance in 100,000,
it clearly would not constitute a deterrent to a
determined and aggressive cheater; nor would it command
the confidence of the American people.

I propose to examine some of the problems connected
with detection and verification because, as I see it,
there are so many improbabilities at so many different
points in the entire process, that 1 chance in 1,000 would,
if anything, be an optimistic estimate.

Your letter completely ignores the tremendous
difficulties that monitors would inevitably encounter,
first, in endeavoring to locate the site of a suspected
explosion with some precision, and, second, in obtaining
concrete proof, or verification.

Mr. Ruina testified that, whereas before the GNOME
underground test, it was felt that we could locate the
precise origin of seismic events within a radius of some
10 kilometers, the GNOME event "surprised the community
of scientists working in this field" by producing a 30

-16-

kilometer error in the calculation of point of origin. Such an error would mean that an inspection team would have to cover more than 3,000 square kilometers or 1000 square miles to verify one event. In the light of the GNOME experience I find it difficult to understand why we have now offered to confine any given on-site inspection to an area of 500 square miles. But 500 square miles, so it seems to me, would still be a tremendously large area to inspect.

It was also estimated in the recent hearings that it would require a minimum of two weeks after the detection of a suspected seismic event before an inspection team could be assembled, the matter could be processed, and a team flown in to the area in question.

It was also estimated that, apart from their normal logistical supplies, the team would require 100 to 200 tons of drilling equipment, which, in remote areas, would have to be moved from point to point by air, as one drilling after another failed to produce the evidence for which we were looking. I think it pertinent, in this connection, to recall some of the testimony presented to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in its hearings of April 1960.

Dr. C. E. Violet of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory estimated the probability of locating radioactive debris from a 1.7 kiloton underground test at 1 in 100,000.

Dr. Richard Foose of Stanford Research Institute offered little grounds for encouragement. Dr. Foose estimated that, provided the area of suspicion could be cut down to 500 feet in radius, it would require only 63 drill holes in triangular grid patterns, to insure a 100 percent complete search. The drilling of 63 holes, it was pointed out, would involve a total footage of 75,600 feet, or the equivalent of 3 Mt. Mt. Everests, and would require 1,008 man-days of drilling. Dr. Violet did, however, point out that if one were willing to settle for a 1 in 20, or 1 in 10, chance of verification, fewer holes would be necessary.

In the light of all this, I cannot help wondering whether we have faced up realistically to the stupendous problems involved in achieving verification.

-17-

Much has been said about the techniques that have been evolved for surface observation; but, in small type, it is admitted that most of these techniques would be thrown into a cocked hat if the Soviets chose to make surface observation difficult by conducting their tests in their northern areas under cover of the long Arctic night, or if they conducted them under shallow waters, or deep underground.

In reply to a question I have put to ARPA, I have been informed that it would require weeks to disassemble a drilling rig after a first failure, transport it to another point, reassemble it, and drill to a depth of 10,000 feet.

Under these circumstances, how many holes can we realistically expect to drill in each on-site inspection and what probability of verification would this number of drillings actually give us?

There is a simple mathematical fact which has not been given the consideration I feel it deserves.

Before it can be certified that a test has taken place, there are four separate hurdles that have to be crossed: (1) detection; (2) identification; (3) location; and, (4) verification. There is a probability factor attached to each one of these hurdles; and all of these probability factors have to be compounded in order to calculate the chances of final verification.

No one has seriously attempted to calculate these probabilities. But from everything I have read, I would be surprised if the final probability figures were any better than 1 in 1000.

Finally, there are political factors that enter into the equation of detection and verification which, I believe, have not been given sufficient consideration.

If a comprehensive test ban treaty calling for 5, 6 or 7 on-site inspections annually, is ever signed, I can conceive of the Russians permitting us to squander half of our inspections during the first half of the year on genuine seismic events; and, after it had been established that these seismic events had been caused by genuine earthquakes, I am sure that there would be no dearth of innocent people who will construe this as proof that we were wrong to distrust the Russians.

-18-

I can even conceive of the Russians permitting us to conduct an on-site inspection in an area where an underground test had actually taken place, confident that the odds were more than 1000 to 1 in their favor.

But if the inspection team ever decided to erect a drill rig in the vicinity of a clandestine underground test, I simply cannot conceive of the Russians permitting the team to complete its operation and come up with a radioactive core for presentation to the bar of world opinion.

If past behavior is any indication of future behavior, the Kremlin at this juncture would probably order the inspectors out of the country on the grounds that they had been engaging in espionage, charge that it had incontrovertible evidence that the United States had engaged in clandestine testing, and, if we objected strenuously enough, abrogate the treaty on its own initiative rather than waiting for us to do so.

We have been told that if we catch the Soviets cheating, or if they refuse to cooperate in an on-site inspection, or if they themselves abrogate the treaty, we would consider ourselves free to resume resting. All of this has been said in a manner which strongly implies that there is nothing to be lost. But I find small consolation in the prospect that we will be free to resume testing if the Soviets violate the rules. By inactivating our nuclear technology during the recent ill-fated moratorium, the Soviets were able to wipe out an estimated 3 to 4 year lead in strategic weapons technology. If they could similarly inactivate our technology for another 3 to 4 years under the terms of a test ban agreement, we might one day discover that the Soviets had been cheating all along; and we might simultaneously discover that they had forged ahead of us in nuclear technology in several critical respects. It will be an ominous day for the free world if such a situation should ever arise. Our own resumption of testing might come too late to do any good.

Specifically, I should like to urge again:

(1) That we return to the original Geneva formula for a monitoring network, which called for 20 stations in the Soviet Union, manned by non-Soviet nationals.

-19-

(2) That tests in outer space and underground tests below the threshold of detection be exempted from the treaty, with the provision that these exemptions be narrowed as improved methods of detection are devised.

(3) That we withdraw our offer to accord the Soviets a veto over the budget of the control organization.

(4) That we return to the position we held for almost two years on the question of on-site inspection -- that is, that we have the right to inspect any seismic events above the level of 5 kilotons that cannot clearly be identified as earthquakes, and 20 percent of the seismic events below this level which have been recorded but cannot be clearly identified.

(5) That if the Soviets reject these terms, we let them know in advance that we will instruct our laboratories to push full steam ahead at every point of nuclear weapons technology.

(6) That if the Soviets refuse to accept a realistic test ban agreement which would give both sides assurances against the possibility of cheating, we challenge them to join us in a moratorium on all tests that contaminate the atmosphere.

(7) That, if the Soviets refuse to consent to such a moratorium, we commit ourselves before the world to conduct no such tests so long as the Soviets abstain from them.

In your closing paragraphs you expressed the hope that I would withhold judgement on the treaty, pending the outcome of negotiations. I assure you that I shall at all times give the most careful consideration to the information developed by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in support of its position in the test ban negotiations. I also want to assure you that I have not spoken out lightly against the draft treaty we are currently discussing at Geneva. On the contrary, I have given the matter much study and thought and I have spoken only because I felt conscience impelled to do so before a commitment was made at Geneva. I would be disastrous if the Administration committed itself to a treaty which the Senate then felt obliged to reject. It is for this reason that I believe the debate should not be deferred until a treaty is signed.

Perhaps I may yet vote for the treaty, if you can satisfy me that our national security would not be endangered if the Soviets, after agreeing to a treaty, continued to test in space and underground below the threshold of detection; that the development of the neutron bomb and the neutron anti-missile warhead would not give the Soviets a critical military advantage over us; and that the art of detection and verification has truly advanced to the point where the treaty we are now discussing would constitute an adequate deterrent against Soviet cheating. In the light of all the information I have seen to date, however, I must say that I have the gravest misgivings on these scores.

I believe that our exchange of correspondence, if it has not succeeded in bringing us together, has at least served to give both of us a better understanding of our respective positions. It has also, I hope, served to give Congress and the American people a clearer insight into the basic issues.

Finally, I hope that the mutual respect which has characterized our exchange will help to discourage extremist statements on both sides by establishing that honest men, sharing the same values and goals, can still differ sharply on the means to be pursued in achieving their common objectives.

With my thanks again for your consideration, and with every best wish,

helicopter (HEART) is made available for the operation, it would be possible
to move the equipment and personnel from the airfield to the drill site
within a period of about 10 days. The third step in the operation is assem-
bly of the drill rig on site. With an experienced U. S. crew this would
take approximately 10 days. The fourth and final step is the actual
drilling. It is difficult to predict with accuracy the time required to
reach any given depth because of possible variations in composition of the
earth's crust. However, for typical conditions as encountered in the
Southwestern United States, it might take about 30 days to reach a depth
of 10,000 ft. From the above we conclude that with the transportation as
specified, it would take approximately 55 days to complete one drill hole.
Disassembly of the rig would take approximately 10 days and movement to
another location would be similar to step two described above.

The above discussion does not take into account such activities as
establishment of a base camp at site, supply of replacement parts for the
drilling operation, provision of food and other services. It is assumed
throughout that the host country would take care of these problems as they
arise. Also, it should be noted that movement of the equipment could be
speeded up by use of more aircraft and/or helicopters.

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, OHIO
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.

ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.
FRANK CARLSON, KANS.
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

January 7, 1963

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Enclosed is the confidential correspondence I promised to send you. When you are through with it, I should be grateful if you could return it to me, by registered mail, to my home address, 2309 Belair Drive, Bowie, Maryland.

I have not found the time to put together the chronology you asked for. However, the background pages from the Struelens Report which I have clipped together and enclosed will provide you with a chronology of the major events until early 1962.

I also enclose for your information a copy of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security Report on the Struelens case which I would strongly urge you to read _in toto_.

Finally, I enclose a copy of Senator Dodd's letter to Sir Leslie Munro, Chairman of the International Commission of Jurists, urging an investigation of the UN's role in the Congo.

I do not think the Katanga situation is closed by a long shot. In fact, I believe that if Kolwezi were to fall, the UN's problems would only begin. They have succeeded in temporarily unseating, and they may succeed in destroying, the only reasonably efficient native administration, federal or provincial, in the entire Congo. They have converted the one region in the Congo that was self-sustaining into a deficit area. Productions of Union Miniere have stopped throughout Katanga. In Elisabethville there is only a seven-day supply of food left and the UN must now bring in emergency shipments. Where it will all stop, God alone knows.

I shall call you in a few days when you have had a chance to go through the enclosed material.

With best wishes,

"Almost everywhere you go you get the impression that the Congo is quietly going back to the bush."

## Ambassador Lodge and Viet Nam

Viet Nam was also the scene of a mysterious change of American ambassadors before the coup of last November 1. Frederick Molting, a distinguished career officer, had taken over as Ambassador in May of 1961. Under his ambassadorship, some remarkable progress had been registered. During the first six months of 1963, the tide of battle had turned definitely in favor of the Government forces and against the Viet Cong; on this all reports were agreed. The strategic hamlet program had made impressive progress and it was beginning to take hold in the minds of the peasants. Both industrial and agricultural production recorded marked increases.

Then, in May of last year, the so-called Buddhist crisis broke. Instead of keeping Ambassador Molting there to cope with this crisis, the State Department decided to pull him out and replace him with Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, our Ambassador to the United Nations under the Eisenhower Administration.

Ambassador Lodge is a man of integrity and culture. He is also a skilled debater who represented us ably in many of the discussions in the General Assembly. But he had had no personal experience in Southeast Asia, and, for that matter, no experience as a foreign service officer in the field. Even more important, he had never demonstrated that he possessed the special attributes required of a crisis ambassador.

The Hungarian revolution confronted him with his most serious test, because here the events pressed in so rapidly that he was more or less on his own. His performance in this one test certainly did not inspire confidence in his ability to deal with crisis situations.

Ambassador Lodge's performance on the question of Hungary was characterized by a total lack of initiative and by an artlessness that certainly did not suggest any profound familiarity with the facts of life in the age of the cold war.

He did not suggest, as he might have done, that the UN immediately dispatch a team of observers to Hungary on October 27, the day the revolution triumphed and the government of Imre Nagy was announced. Nor did he exert himself to force the seating of the delegates of Imre Nagy. During the six days that elapsed between the formation of the Nagy Government and the crushing of the revolution, he did not, to my knowledge, suggest a single concrete measure that might have somehow protected the revolution and restrained the Russians.

On November 1, Prime Minister Nagy notified the UN that, far from withdrawing from Hungary, new units of the Red Army were pouring into the country. He asked the UN to give immediate consideration to the question of Hungary. Still there was no initiative from Ambassador Lodge. Perhaps he was too obsessed with the Suez crisis to pay much attention to Hungary.

When the Security Council met on the afternoon of Saturday, November 3, to consider the question of Hungary, it was not at our request, but at the urgent insistance of Dr. Emilio Portuondo of Cuba,

At this meeting, the Yugoslav delegate, Dr. Brilej, stated that negotiations between the Hungarian government and the Soviet government appeared to be making satisfactory progress, and he, therefore, moved for adjournment. Ambassador Lodge supported the Yugoslav delegate. "We believe," he said, "that adjournment for a day or two would give a real opportunity to the Hungarian Government to carry out its announced desire to arrange for an orderly and immediate evacuation of all the Soviet troops."

Ambassador Lodge's statement is all the more difficult to understand, because it came 48 hours after Premier Nagy had appealed to the UN as a matter of urgency to take up the question of Hungary, and had notified it of the new influx of Red Army troops.

Just before midnight that very day, November 3, the UN received the news that the Red Army had attacked Budapest.

This was the record of Henry Cabot Lodge in the one serious test of his ability to cope with crisis situations. In light of this record, I find it difficult to regard Mr. Lodge as an appropriate ambassador for a crisis situation in Vietnam or anywhere else.

In view of the diffidence of Ambassador Lodge in the Hungarian situation, I marvel at the self-confidence and dispatch he displayed in dealing with our allies in Vietnam. For, according to Marguérite Higgins and other correspondents, he no sooner arrived in the country than he threw his entire weight behind those elements in the Embassy and in the Department of State who sought to overthrow Diem.