Joan:

This has been proof-read pretty thoroughly. However--
Bracher's English is not good; he seems to have used a Roget's
and has come out with some very awkward words & sentences which
often don't mean what he intends them to. The reason the
MS is rather messy is that I made grammatical changes
(Of's whereas in place of 'in's,

etc.) where necessary and
whenever I caught them. I would suggest that someone edit
it further before it is finally submitted, although I have
corrected the more blatant errors so that it is at least
now readable.

p. 4: this is not a sentence.

p. 11: also not a sentence.

p. 15 xsp simplificateurs changed to simplificaters

p. 16 canals canalizing changed to channels channeling

p. 19 nivellizing is not always very appropriate for this piece.
would suggest "levelling" instead.

p. 22-not a sentence

p. 27 "what was present" changed to "those present"

p. 29 "available" changed to "existing"

p. 43 "reminds of" changed to "recalls" (thoughout most of the
piece, reminds of was changed to "is reminiscent of"
(reminds of occurs fairly frequently)

p. 46. "signalizes" changed to "signifies"

p. 56 "plebiszitarian"??? perhaps plebiscite

p. 57 "a democratic state could" changed to "could a democratic state"

p. 63 "adhorting" changed to exhorting

71. "dissensus changed to dissension

p. 81 "do the step" changed to "take the step"

p. 82. "laizistic" ??? perhaps should be "laissez-faire attitude"

p. 83. "prevented radical currents...to gain" changed to "caused
radical currents to lose" (or prevented from gaining)

p. 89 "claim to control" changed to "should be able to believe to control" should be
"claim to control" or "believe they control"

throughout "diffamed" changed to "defamed"

Peggy.

["Beddy.", "throughout \"dissamed\" chansd to \"detamed\"", "\"claim to control\" or \"believe they control\"", "b. 89 \"afmxxmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmmxxmm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Political Structure and Democracy in the Second Republic

by Karl Dietrich Bracher

Contents :

Some introductory questions 1

1

I. A way between autocracy and democracy 8

6

Failures of the first republic 11

9

The impact of the "Third Reich" 17

19

II. Towards new forms of constitutional structure 22

19

Stability and modified democracy 28

24

The implications of federalism 33

28

III. Chancellor democracy and the decline of parliamentary politics 36

42

Parties as institutions 50

43

The new party in power 56

105

48

An old party in change: SPD between opposition and adaptation 55

The problem of third parties 76

64

Democracy and the associations 84

74

IV. Some other factors of stability and change 95

80

Democratic institutions and political attitudes 102

87

Conclusion 113

95

Bibliography 114

Conclusion 113

IV. Some other factors of stability and change 42

The problem of third parties 37

An old party in change: AD between opposition and adaptation 22

The new party in power 26

Parties as institutions 20

Benefits of the first republic 11

I. A way between autocracy and democracy 2

Some introductory questions 1

Contents :

by Karl Dietrich Bracher

## Some introductory questions

It has often been pointed out that Germany has never experienced the course and the consequences of a successful revolution, and that this fact was largely responsible for the failure of her efforts towards a democratic system. Indeed the emergence of modern society and the establishment of a national state in Germany occured under the impact partly of a "revolution from above" (as after 1912 and after 1848), partly of a "revolution by defeat" (as 1918 and again 1945). Both types of pseudo-revolutionary transformation, as surrogates for democratic revolution, seemed to prove that it was not possible to reconcile the peculiar traditions of German history and the conditions of rapid modernization with the postulates of liberal democracy as developed since the great revolutions in the West.

Any discussion of the new German democracy, confronted as it is from the very beginning with the failure of the first post-war democracy of Weimar, culminates in the question how valid that basic assumption of 19th and 20th century German self-interpretation may be. While it is true that in 1945 the conditions of German politics were deeply changed, it cannot be denied that the formation of a second republic was again the consequence of external events. But this time their impact proved much stronger than in 1918. The completeness of defeat, occupation policy, economic recovery, and a period of political preparation preceding the reestablishment of German statehood, while again preventing the experience of a successful revolution, yet proved for a new start and a period of consolidation which for the first time allowed the experience of a working democratic

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for the first time allowed the experience of a working democratic
let break out for a new start and a period of consolidation which
while again preventing the experience of a successful revolution,
preparation breaching the reestablishment of German statehood,
occupation policy, economic recovery, and a period of political
proved much stronger than in 1918. The completeness of defeat,
consequence of external events. But this time their impact
gained that the formation of a second republic was again the
tions of German politics were deeply changed, it cannot be
interpretation may be. While it is true that in 1942 the condi-
that basic assumption of 19th and 20th century German self-
war democracy of Weimar, eliminates in the question how valid
is from the very beginning with the failure of the first best-
And discussion of the new German democracy, confronted as it
developed since the great revolutions in the West.

rapid modernization with the postulates of liberal democracy as
the familiar traditions of German history and the conditions of
revolt, seemed to prove that it was not possible to reconcile
officially transformation, as analogues for democratic re-
pay defeat" (as 1918 and again 1942). Both tables of bando-re-
apove" (as after 1915 and after 1848), partly of a "revolution
Germany occurred under the impact partly of a "revolution
modern society and the establishment of a national state in
efforts towards a democratic system. Indeed the emergence of
that this fact was largely responsible for the failure of her
to come and the consequences of a successful revolution, and
It was often pointed out that Germany has never experienced

Some introductory questions

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system. This is of course the outside picture. What, then, is the real character and the inside substance of that system, behind the surprising stability of its political structure ? Is the Bonn Republic not - not unlike the Weimar republic - torn between self-fulfilment and provisorium, between international cooperation and internal division, different as the specific conditions may be ?

Evaluation of the new German democracy starts from the specific problems that arose from the partly imposed character of a political system reintroduced by the consequences of military defeat, anti-Nazi resistance and occupation policy. As in the case of Japan, the beginnings bear the imprint of an "artificial revolution"¹). At the same time, our analysis will have to deal with the strength of traditions, democratic and pre-democratic, and with the value of historical comparison is limited by the fact that the pressing development of international politics to a considerable extent has set the stage, and determined the domestic affairs, of such a "new state". But within this framework, many features of the political structure can be compared to, or are part of, general tendencies marking the evolution and the problems of modern democracy in general. What may be called "genuinely German", and what demonstrates, on the contrary, a strong trend towards adapting and westernizing the socio-political life of West Germany ? One important example is the process of bureaucratization that reminds of strong authoritarian traditions in German state life; yet at the same time it is clear, since the early analyses of Max Weber²), that such a trend corresponds and coincides with the

that such a trend corresponds and coincides with the
same time if it is clear, since the early analyses of Max Weber
strong authoritarian traditions in German state life: yet at the
example is the process of premodernization that remains of
using the socio-political life of West Germany? One important
on the contrary, a strong trend towards adapting and weather-
ral, what may be called "genetically German", and what demonstrates
marking the evolution and the problems of modern democracy in gene-
structure can be compared to, or are part of, general tendencies
state". But within this framework, many features of the political
set the stage, and determined the domestic attributes, of such a "new
development of international politics to a considerable extent has
of historiosy/comparative law limited by the fact that the pressing
analysis of the first half of the 20th century is the basic element in
of traditions, democratic and pre-democratic, and with the same
At the same time, our analyses will have to deal with the strength
the beginning peer the imprint of an "artificial revolution".
anti-West reistance and accommodation both. As in the case of Japan,
total state system reintroduced by the consequences of military defeat,
problems that arose from the badly imposed character of a boff-
Evaluation of the new German democracy starts from the specific
a specific conditions may be?

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-3-

strengthening of executive power typical for any modern state- with the expansion of government functions and tasks, and with the decline of classical parliamentarism vis a vis the rule of experts. While we have discussed some of these problems in the DAEDALUS volume on Europe³), other basic points, that this essay on Germany's domestic structure is trying to prove, concern the effects of government style; the problem of system - identification; stability and change; the role of pre-democratic traditions; and historical perspectives specifically German.

1. German government in the sixties is struggling with the question, how a political system that reflected a unique constellation of international, economic and personal forces, and was shaped by the authority of a grand old man, can be transferred into an ordinary, self-sufficient democracy less dependent on personal prestige or economic fortune. The problem of Chancellor Erhard, and other chancellors to follow, will be to define and represent political leadership apart from the rather exceptional style of the Adenauer regime. Its combination of authority and democracy was a historic achievement, because different from Weimar it led the Germans out of the vacuum into growing identification with democratic government which for the first time was experienced as granting stability, security, success. But at the same time it left untackled not only the problems of national unity, of Eastern Europe, of social reform, that all may imply certain changes in the political system; the era of Adenauer also accustomed the Germans to a style of decision making that relieved them from political participation outside the elections. There is little experience with the tests posed by cabinet change or

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Little experience with the tests posed by cabinet change or them from political partisanship outside the equations. There is accomplished the Germans to a style of decision making that reflected certain changes in the political system: the era of the state, unity, of Eastern Europe, of social reform, that all may imply the same time it felt unsettled not only the problems of national style of the Adenauer regime. Its combination of authority and representative political leadership apart from the rather exceptional Ernburg, and other chancellors to follow, will be to define and benefit prestige or economic fortune. The problem of Chancellor into an ordinary, self-sufficient democracy less dependent on advice by the authority of a Grand Old Man, can be transferred to the international, economic and Berlin forces, and was generation, how a political system that reflected a unique constitution, German Government in the sixties is struggling with the and historical perspectives specifically German.

The role of pre-democratic traditions: effects of Government style; the problem of state - identification on Germany's domestic atomise is trying to prove, concern the Dystopian atomism on Europe¹, other pseudo points, that this easily experts. While we have discussed some of these problems in the decline of classical positivism via the rule of with the expansion of Government functions and tasks, and with strengthening of executive power typical for any modern state-

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government crisis, only less profiled leadership in a period when the seemingly clear fronts of cold war and of freedom versus socialism, versus planning are no longer easy points of orientation sufficient to guide political consent. To prepare for such situations, by exercise and education in democratic participation, the authority - styled first period could little contribute, determined as it was by questions of immediate urgency for reconstruction, defense - and by the prestige of elder statesmen like Adenauer and Heuss.

2. While German democracy is concerned with problems common to most other countries - i.e. the relationship of cabinet, parliament, bureaucracy, of state intervention and the role of the expert -, it was its specific problem to cope with a political vacuum created by total defeat, disillusion and resentment. To establish democracy in a society formerly associated, in its majority, with Nazi ideology and organization, was a unique task to be faced by the politicians of 1945 - 1949. Thus a discussion, to which also Henry Kissinger and other members of our group were referring, circles around the question how the problem was dealt with, and by which means the new system managed to obtain support without alienating or excluding large parts of the population. Some of the criticism in my following analysis has to be seen in the light of this basic achievement, which first of all is to be fully appreciated. It seems nevertheless important not to overlook the improvised character of the German development, often more pragmatic than truly democratic, and to point out where the weaknesses of the ad-hoc-solutions of the Adenauer era could again become, under less fortunate conditions of economy and political development, inroads for crisis and decay of democratic life.

development, increases for criteria and decay of democratic life.
become, under less fortunate conditions of economy and political
weaknesses of the socio-solutions of the German era could again
more pragmatic than truly democratic, and to point out where the
overlook the improved character of the German development, often
to be fully appreciated. It seems nevertheless important not to
in the light of this past achievement, which first of all is
some of the criticism in my following analysis has to be seen
without alienating or excluding large parts of the population.
with, and by which means the new system managed to obtain support
referring, circles around the question how the problem was dealt
to which also Henry Klaasen and other members of our group were
to be faced by the politicians of 1942 - 1943. Thus, in general,
majority, with his idealogy and organization, was a unique team
established democracy in a society formerly associated, in its
askum created by total defeat, disillusion and resentment. To
expert -, it was its specific problem to cope with a political
ment, bureaucracy, of state intervention and the role of the
most other countries - i.e. the relationship of cabinet, parli-
ment. While German democracy is conglutened with problems common to
Venner and Henns.
tion, defense - and by the brevetge of elder statesmen like
determined as it was by questions of immediateurgentlyreconstruc-
tion authority - styled first period could little contribute,
tions, by exercise and education in democratic participation,
entitled to guide political consent. To prepare for and carry
forward planning are no longer easy points of orientation
the seemingly clear front of cold war and of freedom aerana ac-
government creates, only fees profiled federally in a period when

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3. Thus the criteria for our analysis and evaluation are to be derived from two different sets of questioning. On the one hand, comparative analysis presents standards by which to measure the German type of modified democracy and self-interpretation. On the other hand, while the positive achievement of winning over a great majority to support democratic parties, organisations, governments has to be measured by a full appreciation of the immense difficulties of the post 1945 situation, this must be carried on to the question how far under changed conditions, politics in the sixties could be executed with the means of the first (Adenauer) period. Where as stability was the prime principle of that period, German politics are now faced with problems of control and change, neglected during a formative period with a one-man leadership, like Bismarck or de Gaulle, Adenauer used to think of himself as being indispensable to a continuation of his work, and failed to face the problem of his own succession: now German democracy is to disprove his thesis, by proving that beyond personal rule democracy is capable of functioning.

4. German political tradition to an important degree has been determined, since the 19th century, by a tendency at the administrative handling of politics. While the problems parliamentary democracy faces today are quite comparable throughout the West, it is the revival of that specific tradition of the administrative state with authoritarian traits (Obrigkeitsstaat) which makes the German confrontation with the much quoted "crisis of parliamentary politics" a phenomenon of particular character.

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Sa

Parliamentary politics is a phenomenon of particular character. It makes the German confrontation with the much noted "orality of the state with authoritarian traits (Oprakkefattet) which it is the revival of that specific tradition of the administrative democracy faces today are quite comparable throughout the West, nationalistic handling of politics. While the problems parliamentarially determined, since the 19th century, by a tendency at the admis-

long personnel rule democracy is capable of unmitigating.

German democracy is to improve the theatre, by proving that people, and failed to face the problem of his own occasion: now think of himself as being indigible to a continuation of his one-man leadership.ike Bismarck or de Gaulle, Adenauer need to control and change, neglected during a formative period with a lot of that period. German politics are now faced with problems of that (Adenauer) period. Where as a stability was the prime principle in the sixties could be executed with the means of the carried on to the question how far under changed conditions, immense difficulties of the boat 1942 situation, this must be governed has to be measured by a full appreciation of the a great majority to support democratic parties, organisations, the other hand, while the positive achievement of winning over German type of modified democracy and self-interpretation. On comparative analysis presents standards by which to measure the derived from two different aspects of questioning. On the one hand,

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Continuity and change are to be seen in the light of the following questions: where are the real agents of power; what are the kinds of control; and what does the increasing process of institutionalization of parliaments, parties, interest associations, with pensions for ministers and parliamentarians, with state financing of parties and the role of experts - really mean within the framework of German state traditions. The Kanzler-democratie of the fifties, together with the complete re-establishment of professional civil service influenced the concept of the party state to the extent, that institutional stability might be purchased at the cost of political mobility. Will the parties, under such conditions of bureaucratization, be able to comply with their functions of contracting voters and obtaining political participation from the public ?

5. Further analysis of such problems demands a clear diagnosis of the historical perspectives in which to see the new German experiment in democracy. It will necessarily be a short and condensed review, concentrating on the question how and why earlier efforts towards democracy failed. This does not mean that German history of the 19th and 20th centuries did not contain many initiatives and positive elements of social and political development; up to 1933, a modernized, civilized, progressive Germany was on its way, and it could be hoped that even the last great crisis could be overcome. But such views neglected powerful under-currents and countercurrents of German public life which culminated in the triumph of Nazism. The great achievements of liberalism and socialism to the days of the Weimar Republic, as well as a wealth of political theory traditionally conservative, proved helpless in the confrontation with totalitarianism. Our summary of historical experience is limited to that basic problem, and cannot aim at a complete panorama of recent German history.

a complete banality of recent German history.

of political theory traditionally conservative, proved helpless
against the daze of the Weimar Republic, as well as a wealth
triumph of Nazism. The great achievements of liberalism and so-
conquerments of German public life which culminated in the
overcome. But such aims neglected powerfully under-currents and
and it could be hoped that even the last great oracles could be
1933, a modernised, civilised, progressive Germany was on its way,
and positive elements of social and political development: up to
of the 19th and South centuries did not contain many initiatives
towards democracy failed. This does not mean that German history
review, concentrating on the question how and why earlier efforts
pertained in democracy. It will necessarily be a short and condensed
the historical perspectives in which to see the new German ex-
2. Further away lies an array of such problems demands a clear diagnosis of
bitter conflict?

tracing voter and obtaining political barterholder from the
pursuance of, be able to comply with their functions of con-
butional mobility. Will the battles, under such conditions of
that institutional stability could be purchased at the cost of
service influenced the concept of the party state to the extent,
together with the complete re-etsapilishment of professional civil
work of German state traditions.¹⁰ Konsler-demokratie of the tilting
of battles and the role of embeta - really mean within the frame-
work for ministers and barillamentarians, with state financing
utilisation of barillaments, battles, interest associations, with
of control; and what does the increasing process of institutio-
nations: who are the real agents of power; must be the kings
continuity and change are to be seen in the fight of the following

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I. A way between autocracy and democracy.

The end of World War II appeared, to the Germans as to many critical observers, to be a profound rupture, a "Zero Hour" marking if not the end of German history at least the end of its traditional statehood. 4) This proved soon a delusion, when it became apparent that no matter what course Allied and German policies might take, it could not be separated from the specific conditions of German history in the past century: the period of industrialization and national unification. The dilemma of the "German question" is to a large degree a heritage of that past. It arose from the attempt, and failure, to reconcile the three main issues of 19th century Germany: the establishment of liberal and democratic constitutional systems within feudal-absolutistic state structures; to unify them into a national government of federal structure; and to integrate the stormy social and economic development into such a modernized state. Competing and conflicting, as these issues were during the decades from 1810 to 1870, the final establishment of Bismarck's *Klein-deutsches Reich* proved a solution of the unification question at the cost of the constitutional and social problems facing modern Germany.

Among the reasons for that belated and abortive solution, Germany's central location in Europe and her special position in the Medieval Empire is being stressed. Indeed, after the disintegration of the *Reich* into loosely connected territorial states Germany had been unable to find a modern political form (based on historical and national ground, with a central government) along with the other pre-Revolutionary France, it is true, western powers. Unlike France, however, the German states in the

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western Germany. Unlike France, however, the German states in the
national group, with a central government) along with the other
unable to find a modern political form (based on historical and
[**Religion**] into loosely connected territorial states Germany had been
Empire is being addressed. Indeed, after the disintegration of the
central location in Europe and her special position in the Medeval
Among the reasons for that p Reserved and sportive solution, Germany's
problems facing modern Germany.

location question at the cost of the constitutional and social
of Bismarck's *Kreis-gemeinschafts Religion* proved a solution of the mi-
were during the decades from 1810 to 1850, the final establishment
a modernized state. Competing and conflicting, as these fates lead
to integrate the stormy social and economic development into and
to unity them into a national government of federal structure; and
constitutional systems within federal-territorial state structures;
18th century Germany: the establishment of federal and democratic
the attempt, and failure, to reconcile the three main fates of
ation" is to a large degree a heritage of that past. It arose from
station and national unification. The dilemma of the "German one-
of German history in the past century: the period of industriali-
ment take, it could not be separated from the specific conditions
apparent that no matter what course Vified and German policies
tional states took.⁴) This proved soon a delusion, when it became
it not the end of German history at least the end of its fragil-
ties of government, to be a protégé of nature, a "Zero Hour" marking
The end of World War II appeared, to the Germans as to many er-

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eighteenth century had developed a moderate form of enlightened absolutism which seemed to make possible an organic transition to modern government without revolutionary upheaval. The original enthusiasm for the principles of the French Revolution gave way to a reaction when the effects of the Terror, the aggressive expansion of the Revolution, and the rise of Napoleon, became viable. This forced national interests to the fore in the wars of liberation. But their result was a victory of the restoration over revolutionary reform efforts. It began a process of alienation and separation of German political thinking from West European development.⁵)

After the collapse of the liberal revolution of 1848, the strong liberal movement yielded increasingly to the primacy of foreign policy, with the ideals of power and unity over the domestic ideals of freedom and constitution. More and more, the main stream of constitutional-democratic reform submitted to the reationary forces of the royal courts, of the military and of the bureaucracy. By forcing the formation of the long-lived German national state, Bismarck and Prussia, chief pillars and symbols of this reaction of the old regime, dictated a revolution from above, which absorbed the liberal emancipation movement into the structure of a semi-absolute, military and bureaucratic autocracy. Internally, this led to structural tensions between state and society which were only superficially covered by the external splendor and power demonstration of this Second Empire. Not only was the development of a functioning parliamentary system and responsible parties hindered, but the military-bureaucratic authoritarian state also blocked the co-operation of the growing

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authoritarian state also piqued the co-operation of the drawing
reasonable parties numbered, put the militarily-pureanoratio
was the development of a functioning parliamentary atom and
abandon and power demonstration of this Second Empire. Not only
society which were only autonomously covered by the external
internally, this led to autocratic tensions between state and
tune of a semi-apacite, military and pureanoratic autocracy.

which absorbed the federal anmobilization movement into the atmo-
reaction of the old regime, dictated a revolution from above,
may state, Biamarck and Brusata, quiet billera and agole of this
cracy. By forcing the formation of the lorged - for German wato-
forces of the royal courts, of the military and of the purean-
constitutional-democratic reform andmitted to the reactionary
of freedom and constitution. More and more, the main stream of
bollow with the ideas of power and unity over the domestic ideas
federal movement fielded increasingly to the brimock of foreign
After the collapse of the federal revolution of 1848, the strong
beau development.²)

tion and separation of German political thinking from West Euro-
ever revolutionary reform efforts. It began a process of alien-
tipoperation. But their result was a victory of the restoration
after the war of the French Revolution, and the rise of Napoleon, whose
extraction of the Revolution, and the rise of Napoleon, became at-
to a reaction when the effects of the Terror, the aggressive
enthusiasm for the principles of the French Revolution gave way
to modern government without revolutionary appeal. The original
apacitation which seemed to make possible an organic transition
to eighteenth century had developed a moderate form of enlightenment

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masses of workers and their social-democratic organizations and labor unions. The rapidly increasing population of a society changed by the industrial revolution was not integrated into the political process. Instead, the tendency grew to neutralize the social forces by substituting bureaucracy for politics, and by deviating (deflecting) the pressure of interests to external affairs and imperialism.

In foreign policy, as a consequence, the "late comer nation"⁶) showed an eagerness, not only to catch up in national politics, but to stress the German claim to hegemony in Central Europe and to active participation in the colonial and economic penetration and apportioning of the world. Bismarck had still been able to balance such tendencies by a policy of mutual security and of careful compromises of interests. After his resignation the ideas of the imperialistic power-state won its most extreme expression in the claims of Pan-Germanism, propagating Germany's pretensions to national expansion with historical, cultural, ethnic and - even at that time - racial arguments. To be sure, this was the policy of a small, though active and influential minority. More important are the hegemonical claims which accompanied the expansion of the German economy, and combined with military-political arguments reached their climax in the territorial and economic goals of the first world war.⁷) Even in the more moderate form of the "Middle Europe" idea, the German claim to hegemony, as a widespread belief of broad sections of the population, must appear to neighboring states as threatening imperialism.

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aboard to neighboring states at a threatening imperium.

as a widespread peephole of broad sections of the population, must

term of the "Middle Europe" idea, the German claim to hegemony,

atomic goals of the first world war.¹⁷ Even in the more moderate
total arguments reached their climax in the territorial and economic

important are the hegemonic claims which accompanied the ex-

body of a small, though active and influential minority. More

even at that time - racial arguments. To be sure, this was the
to national expansion with historical, cultural, ethnic and -

of the imperialistic power-state won its most extreme expression
current compromises of interests. After his resignation the ideas

balance and tendencies of a policy of mutual security and of

and abdication of the world. Bismarck had still been able to

to active participation in the colonial and economic penetration
put to stress the German claim to hegemony in Central Europe and

showed an egerness, not only to cast off in national politics.

In foreign policy, as a consequence, the "latecomer nation"(

allies and imperium.

by devastating (defeating) the pressure of interests to external

the social forces by enlisting puneanacy for politics, and
the political processes. Instead, the tendency grew to neutralize
enlisted by the industrial revolution was not integrated into
fiscal unions. The rapidly increasing population of a society
masses of workers and their social-democratic organizations and

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## Failures of the First Republic

After the first war, the real position of the Weimar Republic was determined by the unequivocal military defeat of the German Empire and its severe restriction of power in the Versailles Peace Treaty. But just now the protest, the non-recognition of this set-back, gave the idea of a national power-state special intensity at the cost of the new democratic order. The attempts at a policy of peaceful understanding (Rathenau-Stresemann), affected by the mistrust of the western powers, the weakness of the League of Nations and the isolation policy of the United States toward Europe, were under pressure from a nationalistic revisionism which seized broad circles of the population, especially after the onset of the depressions in 1922/23 and 1929/30. Republican foreign policy shifting between East and West, could not overcome or even control these dynamics. A pro-democratic majority of 1919, with the Social Democrats, the Center Party and the Liberals as the core of the Weimar establishment soon gave way to weak coalitions of anti-Weimar changing character, and since 1929 the alliance of Nazis with German Nationalists and the rise of Communism reduced the possibilities of parliamentary government even more.

The failure of Weimar was caused by a plurality of weaknesses inherent in that first German experiment in democracy.⁸) Again, it was based on a pseudo-revolution which had the character of a general strike to end the war rather than being a conscious effort at fundamental change. Radicalism of the left und right hampered the constitutional forces in their attempts at reshaping state and society amidst military defeat and economic collapse.

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state and society amidst military defeat and economic collapse, pambéred the constitutional forces in their attempts at reassembling effort at fundamental change. Radicalism of the left and right a General strike to end the war rather than being a conscious it was based on a bento-revolution which had the character of inherent in that first German experiment in democracy.⁸) Again, The failure of Weimar was caused by a bigness of weakness in politics of parliamentary government even more.

German Nationalists and the rise of Communism reenacted the boast-
changing character, and since 1858 the alliance of Masses with
of the Weimar establishment soon gave way to weak coalitions of
Social Democrats, the Center Party and theLPDs as the core
trof these dynamics. A pro-democratic majority of 1818, with the
shifting between East and West, could not overcome or even cou-
the depressions in 1855/58 and 1858/60. RepubliCAS foreign policy
proud circles of the population, especially after the onset of
under pressure from a nationalistic revisionism which set aside
theification policy of the United States toward Europe, were
of the western powers, the weakness of the League of Nations and
understanding (Hathénan) Stresemann, selected by the government
of the new democratic order. The attempts at a policy of peaceful
the ideas of a national power-state special intensity at the cost
But that the protest, the non-recognition of this self-back, gave
and its severe restriction of power in the Versailles Peace Treaty
determined by the mediate military defeat of the German Empire
After the first war, the real position of the Weimar Republic was

Failure of the First Republic

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Moreover, the structure of the Weimar Constitution itself, aimed at technical perfection but never popular with a distressed population and disappointed elites, proved unable to integrate the disrupted nation in a basic consensus and to secure the transition to a democratic state society. On the contrary, as a result of unstable compromises between old and new forces, the constitutional structure of Weimar preserved powerful elements of the authoritarian state (Obrigkeitsstaat).

The continuity of an authoritarian - bureaucratic structure of state and society was especially present in the survival of a peculiar ideology of civil servants (Beamtenideologie) as separated from and even opposed to the idea of pluralistic democracy. Allegedly neutral and beyond parties (Überparteilich), but actually anti-party and often anti-democratic in character, this pre-republican ideology was also very influential within legal theory and justice. The practice of the courts often favoured the anti-democratic activities of the right; while rioting enemies of the republic were acquitted, republican statesmen including the first president Friedrich Ebert were denied due protection.

On the other hand, the forming and functioning of government coalitions proved increasingly difficult. Already the first Reichstag election of 1920 brought defeat on the Weimar coalition of the Center and moderate Left. While the party system, split into numerous political groups fervently opposed to each other, reflected the lack of consensus in a political society torn apart by social, economic, religious and ideological cleavages, minority governments were to deal with the internal and external crises. The public became used to a mixture of feeble cabinets and semidictatorial practices of presidential emergency measures.

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semiofaterial practices of presidential emergency measures.

orae. The bupblic become used to a mixture of people cadinets and
rity governments were to deal with the internal and external

py societ, economic, religious and ideological cleavages, mino-
flected the lack of consensus in a political society torn apart
numerous political groups tenderly opposed to each other, re-
the Center and moderate left. While the party axis, split into

tag election of 1950 brought defeat on the Weimar coalition of
coalitions proved increasingly difficult. Viready the first Rege-
on the other hand, the forming and functioning of Government

repubblic were admitted, repubblican statesmen including the first
democratic activities of the right; while rioting enemies of the
and justice. The practice of the courts often favoured the anti-
pre-republican ideology was also very influential within the
actually anti-berty and often anti-democratic in character, this
oracy. Vilefully neutral and beyond baryea (Superbrettonon), put
barred from and even opposed to the idea of bunalistic demo-
boynian ideology of civil servants (Beaumontgeofioke) as ae-
state and society was especially present in the arrival of a
The continuity of an-authoritarian - puresocratic stratum of
authoritarian state (Oprinkkefetatsat).

ntional stratum of Weimar breaevet bowerul elements of the
of unstable compromises between old and new forces, the conati-
tion to a democratic state society. On the contrary, as a result
disrupted nation in a parlo consensua and to secure the transit-
lation and disabounded eftites, proved unstable to integrate the
at technical perfection put under boplar with a disreased boh-
Moreover, the stratum of the Weimar Constitution itself, aimed

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Such a tendency towards non-party presidential governments was furthered by the vast powers which the constitution granted to the office of the president. Designed as a counter-balance to the parliamentary system, the presidency actually served as a kind of surrogate for the lost authoritarian monarchy (Ersatz-monarch).

The radical anti-parliamentary opposition of the left and the right, while provoking a kind of permanent crisis government, at the same time blocked a constitutional rotation of government and opposition within the democratic system. This principal opposition against the Republic drew its support from the militarizing forces, revolutionary and reactionary as well, which in numerous formations led their private civil war against each other, and in an unholy alliance fought against the Republic. For them, the war was not finished, and they succeeded in mobilizing not only veterans but a large portion of postwar youth who felt eager for adventure, and, deeply unsatisfied with the unheroic triteness of a weak republic, born in defeat.

The army, decimated by the Versailles treaty and "unpolitical" by self-proclamation, was actually confronting the Republic as a power of its own right. Since the governments of 1918-23 again and again had taken recourse to the army to preserve the state, the military felt as saviours of Germany and garantors of the continuity of the Empire beyond a "transitional" republican intermezzo, which the army preceded and superseded: monarchical tradition, attentism, sympathy with the "national opposition" of the right determined its real role and attitude.⁹)

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the right determined its real role and attitude⁹). The military opposition to the Weimar Republic was so严重 that it was necessary to call the army to the side. The Weimar Republic was the only government which the army preceded and succeeded. Monarchal government was the only form of government which the army could preserve. The army had to be the only force which could enforce the state, and again had to take recourse to the army to preserve the state, and to be the only force which could enforce the state. Since the governments of 1918-1923 against the Weimar Republic were so weak, the Weimar Republic was the only force which could enforce the state.

The Weimar Republic was the only force which could enforce the state. The army was so weak that it was necessary to call the army to the side. The military opposition to the Weimar Republic was so严重 that it was nécessaire to call the army to the side. The military opposition to the Weimar Republic was so严重 that it was nécessaire to call the army to the side. The military opposition to the Weimar Republic was si

King of analogate for the lost antinational monarchy (Eraesus). The parliamentary system, the presidency actually served as a the office of the president. Designed as a counter-palace to furthered by the vast powers which the constitution granted to show a tendency towards a non-party president. Governments were

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Such conditions were the more aggravating as they favoured the emergence and diffusion of anti-democratic ideologies; they appeared in crude versions of nationalism and racism as well as in political und legal philosophies glorifying action before thought, emotion before reason, war before peace, order before freedom. Especially the lower middle classes, threatened by economic crisis and less of social prestige, were easily deluded by doctrines promising salvation from the threats of economic and class struggle, and from the complexities of a modern pluralistic society. The propaganda for "clear" authoritarian and dictatorial solutions to the disturbing problems of communism and capitalism, of social disorder and international failure, paved the way for the destruction of the Republic long before the final crisis of 1930-33. The field was wide open for the terrible simplifiers when the first generation of republican statesmen - Ebert, Rathenau, Stresemann - was succeeded by politicians inclined to authoritarian solutions - like Brüning, Schleicher, and Hindenburg - or even to experiments of nationalistic dictatorship by monarchical reactionaries like Papen and Hugenberg.

The National Socialist leadership, once accepted by the socially well reputed German Nationalists, had little trouble in overwhelming the Republic together with its conservative grave-diggers. It is true, this "national opposition" was by no means a firm alliance, and only by the resignation of the democratic parties, the obstructive role of the Communists, and the misery of the economic crisis it became possible to misuse Hindenburg and his emergency powers for the coup of 1933. Moreover, as the most radical, most consequent partisans of a total revision of things

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radicalist, most consequent barrister, of a total revision of things emergency befalls for the comb of 1933. Moreover, as the most

economic creates it becomes possible to realise Hindenburg and his
the opressive role of the Communists, and the misery of the
alliance, and only by the recognition of the democratic parties.
It is true, this "national opposition" was not no means a limit

whilst the Republic together with its conservative grave-diggers
well rebuked German Nationalists, had little trouble in over-
- The National Socialist leadership, once accepted by the socially

ist reactionaries like Weber and Hindenburg.
or even to experiments of nationalistic dictatorialism by monar-
ritarian solutions - like Brüning, Schenckover, and Hindenburg -

was succeeded by dictatorial solutions inclined to authe-
when the first generation of republicans statesmen - Ehrmann,
1930-33. The field was wide open for the terrible ramifications

of social disorder and international failure, paved the way for
solutions to the disturbing problems of Communism and Capitalism,
society. The radicals for "free" authoritarian and dictatorial
class struggle, and from the complexities of a modern nationalistic
dictatorship promoting salvation from the threats of economic and

nomic criteria and loss of social prestige, were easily defused by
freedom. Especially the lower middle classes, threatened by eco-
thought, emotion before reason, war before peace, order before
in political and legal hierarchies glorifying action before
emergence in Grande ايeron of Nationalism and racism as well as

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Hitler and his able organizers of a pseudo-military movement, with a masterly use and misuse of modern methods of mass communication, persuasion and manipulation, succeeded in mobilizing all the emotions of dissatisfaction and ressentiment and in canalizing them into the anti-construction of the totalitarian state. This was done not by force and terror alone, but even more by the skilful manipulation of a pseudo-democratic consensus in the name of national unification and social order. The failure of the Weimar Republic, manifold as its causes are, was clearly a result of fears and illusions.

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a result of fear and ill动作.

of the Weimar Republic, manifold as its causes are, was clearly
the name of national manipulation and social order. The failure
by the skillful manipulation of a苯粄o- democratic consensus in
state. This was done not by force and terror alone, but even more
causing them into the anti-construction of the totalitarian
all the emotions of dissatisfaction and resentment and in
munication, derangement and manipulation, succeeded in modifying
with a masterly ease and manner of modern methods of mass com-
mitter and his able organizers of a苯粄o-military movement.

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- 14 -

One of the basic questions facing the Germany of 1945 and even more the Bonn Republic concerns undoubtedly the impact of the Nazi regime and its defeat. How deeply was that "movement" rooted in German traditions and attitudes ? Much depended on the answer: the possibility of a successful rebuilding of German democracy, and the prevention of a new failure à la Weimar. To the present, opinions on that question differ widely. While there is no doubt that Nazism as well as the anti-democratic movements in general were founded on specific problems of a century of German history, Hitler's rise to power remains inextricably connected with the post war - one crises of defeated Germany.

On the other hand, the problems and emotions misused by and favouring, the Nazi quest for total power are of a more general nature. Social and economic panic in an age of rapid transition to industrial forms, uneasiness with the complexities of modern life and democratic politics, structural problems inherent in any parliamentary government of today - all these preconditions for the failure of Weimar are still present in modern societies, as they were not confined to Germany alone; with few exceptions, the post-war one democracies all over Europe fell victim to them.

The German case was not as unique as it might seem, though its consequences in the murderous regime of the "Third Reich" certainly surpassed all parallels. But exactly for that reason it could be expected that the experience of the Nazi period might provide a clearer lesson for any comparable situation in the future.

- 15 -

- 12 -

future. It provides a clearer reason for any comparable situation in the
which could be expected that the experience of the Nazi period might
surely amaze allraflela. But exsorly for that reason it
consequences in the numerous regime of the "Thirg Reich" cer-
tainly was not an unique as it might seem, though its
the boat-war one democratiee all over Europe fell victim to them.
as they were not confined to Germany alone; with few exceptions,
for the lifetime of Weimar are still present in modern societies,
parliamentary government of today - - all these preconditions
and democratic conditions, atomistic problems inherent in any
industrialised society, uneasiness with the complexities of modern life
which are the basic elements of social and economic balance in any age of transition to
democratie. The Nazi great for total power are of a more general
On the other hand, the problems and emotions raised by and is-
boat war - one crisis of defeated Germany.

Hitler's rise to power remains inextricably connected with the
were founded on specific problems of a century of German history,
that Nazism as well as the anti-democratic movements in general
opinions on that question differ widely. While there is no doubt
and the prevention of a new failure & if Weimar. To the present,
the possibility of a successful reissuing of German democracy,
in German traditions and attitudes ? Much depended on the answer:
Nazi regime and its defeat. How deeply was that "movement" rooted
more the Bonn Republic concerns undoubtedly the impact of the
One of the basic questions facing the Germany of 1945 and even

The impact of the "Thirg Reich"

- 14 -

- 15 -

It was roughly between these two propositions that the development of attitudes toward the past and the evaluation of socio-political goals for the future fluctuated in post 1945 Germany. Clearly the Nazi period had left an ambiguous heritage. On the one hand, the terror of the "Third Reich" had resulted in intimidation and widespread resignation to the *Obrigkeit*, be it the Hitler regime or the occupation powers; thus an unfortunate tradition of German political behaviour was even intensified. It is an open question how lasting such effects might be, but undoubtedly a considerable section of the population is still affected by their typical consequences: an unpolitical attitude, that conceives of the state merely in terms of subject - authority relations. On the other hand, the virtuosity of Nazi propaganda and persuasion resulted in a general notion of mistrust and scepticism against all public life, once the real character of that propaganda and its misuse of popular illusions was fully revealed. In this case, two possible reactions came to the fore: either, to relapse into a state of complete depolitization or, more positively, to seek a stand-point of critical engagement - often with every rigid standards of judgment. To be sure, these attitudes were significant only in relation to the forms of political reconstruction in postwar Germany. And here a number of profound differences are discernible as compared with the post 1918 situation. Among them, three factors seem particularly conspicuous: first the meaning of German resistance against the Nazi regime as starting-point for a new beginning; furthermore, the exhaustion of nationalistic and war ideologies, so utterly exploited by Hitler and so completely disproved by his total defeat; and finally, social change with its tendency at nivellizing the class structure and furthering *more*

- 16 -

- 12 -

tendency at>Allowing the class structure and furthering an
injustices proved by the total defeat; and finally, social change with its
ideologies, so utterly exploited by Hitler and so completely dis-
beginning; furthermore, the examination of nationalistic and war
resistance against the Nazi regime as starting-point for a new
towards seem partially conditional: that the meaning of German
noble as compared with the Boast 1918 situation. Among them, three
Germany. And here a number of prototypical differences are dicor-
relation to the forms of political reconstruction in postwar
Jugendment. To be sure, these attitudes were significant only in
of critical engagement - often with very rigid standards of
complete debolition on, more positively, to seek a stand-point
reactions came to the force: either, to release into a state of
of bohemian influences was fully revealed. In this case, two possible
 titles, once the rest character of that broadsides and its manner
 in a General nation of matrimony and acception against all bohem
 life, the virtue of Nazi broadsides and pernicious reaction resulted
 merely in terms of subject - authority relations. On the other
 seduction: an unbohmic attitude, that conceives of the state
 section of the population is still affected by their typical con-
 how lasting such effects might be, put uncomprehended a considerable
 political behaviour was even intenaited. It is an open question
 or the combination bowers; thus an unfortunate tradition of German
 widespread resignation to the Opitzkell, pe it the Hitler regime
 the terror of the "Third Reich" had resulted in immigration and
 the Nazi period had left an enormous heritage. On the one hand,
 Gora for the future financed in host 1942 Germany. Clearly
 of attitudes toward the past and the evaluation of socio-political
 It was roughly between these two propositions that the development

- 12 -

- 16 -

an open society, ~~This was~~ process quickened by the totalitarian politics of mass mobilization and <u>Gleichschaltung</u>, now continuing in the refugee movement as well as in the effects of occupation and denazification policy, up to the drastic currency reform of 1948.
As a result of the total defeat which different from 1918 nobody could possibly deny it became increasingly clear to a majority of the population that by its totalitarian consequence <u>one traditional German conception of state and politics was led ad absurdum</u>, while the liberal and democratic traditions it had repressed could come to the fore again. Quite similar, however, to the post-war I situation, the most urgent quest was for security, and the old problem remained how to reconcile security with freedom.

In the situation of the "Zero Hour", amidst the ruins of what was left of Germany, and in the presence of the mass misery which the Germans themselves had brought about Europe, there seemed to be little question of break or continuity of Germany.¹⁰) Indeed, for more than three years almost everybody was concerned with the immediate necessities of life, with survival the only objective. The psychological situation and the political attitudes beyond that "existential" needs were marked by disturbance or apathy. Of course, there were the deep differences between generations, and have remained so; there were the surviving groups and persons of anti-Nazi resistance, on the other side the exponents and ex-ecutives of the fallen regime to be tried by the courts. But gradually, broader sections of the population realized more fully, from the recording of war crime trials and the publication of Nazi documents, how deeply the Germans were involved and entangled in unbelievable crimes.

- 17 -

- 11 -

unpeopled crimes.

documents, how deadly the Germans were involved and engaged in
from the recording of war crime trials and the publication of Nazi
guilty, broader sections of the population realised more fully,
concerns of the fallen regime to be tried by the courts. But first
of anti-Nazi resistance, on the other side the exponents and ex-
and have remained so; there were the annuitising Große and beraue
Of course, there were the deep differences between generations,
that "existential" needs were marked by distance or abstinence.
The psychological situation and the political attitudes below
immediate necessities of life, with arrival the only objective.
for more than three decades almost everybody was concerned with the
peuple question of prewar or continuity of Germany. (Jo) Indeed,
the German themselves had brought about Europe, there seemed to
be felt of Germany, and in the presence of the mass majority which
In the situation of the "Zero Hour", amidst the noise of what
hom.

and the good problem remained how to reconcile security with the
the boat-war. If situation, the most urgent threat was for security,
brought could come to the fore again, quite similar, however, to
anymore, while the federal and democratic traditions had re-
quired German conception of state and politics was fed as ap-
proach positively genial, it became increasingly clear to a majority
that a result of the total defeat which different from 1918 was possible
generalisation policy, up to the quasi currency reform at 1948.
refugee movement as well as in the effects of occupation and
of mass mobilisation and Gleichbewehrung, now continuing in the
an open society, which is processed and broken up by the totalitarian politics

- 10 -

- 17 -

Impassioned discussions started on the problems of collective guilt and atonement, where the mass measures of denazification and demilitarization - varying considerably in the different zones of occupation - proved not wholly efficient. Even today in view of the belated Nazi crime trials, the exclusive treatment of the Nazi past by the Allies appears an equivocal substitution for revolutionary efforts by the Germans themselves. First, Allied courts had the monopoly in dealing with such cases, which was done quite incompletely and often casually (e.g. Wolf Globski); then in the course of German re-militarization, many of the Nazi criminals were released prematurely, which made it impossible for German courts to follow a general line of complete and equal treatment for all cases; moreover, essential documentary material too long remained in non-German hands; and finally, German non-recognition policy and anticommunism stood against the evaluation of the immense material stored in East European archives. But of course it remains open to question whether the physical and moral resources so thoroughly destroyed by the course of the Hitler regime would have been strong enough to bring about the self-purification of a people with so little revolutionary abilities. Also, the experiences of 1918 set a warning not to leave again the burden of defeat and restoring order to a feeble German democracy.

Strong as the criticism against occupation and "reeducation" might be, in retrospective there is hardly any doubt that the gradual rebuilding of German politics and state life from small units up to state and the federal government, gave the protection and the time necessary for a re-consolidation and a better foundation of public life and political culture of Germany after the catastrophe

- 18 -

["- 18 -", "Budapest file and political culture of Germany after the catatroche time necessary for a re-conciliation and a better foundation of to state and the federal government. Save the protection and the repulsing of German politics and state file from small units by pe., in retroactive there is hardly any doubt that the German strong as the antifascism against occupation and "reconciliation" might pungen of defeat and restoring order to a feeble German democracy. the experiences of 1918 set a warning not to leave again the location of a people with so little revolutionary spirit. Via, Time would have been strong enough to print apart the self-burden sources so thoroughly destrated by the course of the Hitler re-it remains open to question whether the hydraulic and most relevant Japanese material stored in East European archives. But of course policy and anticooperation stand against the evaluation of the remained in non-German land; and finality, German non-recognition for all cases; moreover, essential documentary material too long courts to follow a general line of complete and equal treatment were released prematurely; which made it impossible for German course of German re-militarisation, many of the East criminals incompletely and often casually. (See, for example: then in the bag the monopoly in dealing with such cases, which was done quite traditionally efforts by the Germans themselves. First, Villedo courts had by the Villes abdicated an edgical and apportionment for revol- the belated East crime trials, the exclusive treatment of the East occupation - proved not wholly efficient. Even today in view of gemilitarisation - asking coadjournment in the different ones of Gruft and stonemant, while the mass measures of denazification and Impasioned diagonals started on the problems of collective", "- 13 -", "LFC"]

- 18 -

The stages of occupation policies, the regional beginnings of German politics, and the development of economic and social conditions, - with generous relief actions from the West Germany speeding up the reorientation of the population -- all this, however, fell under the shadow of the increasing East-West conflict. The problems of national division and of the lost territories, but also the successful foundation of the West German Federal Republic and the surprising stability of its political structure are closely related to that conflict. With the quest for security, anticommunism and fear of "the East" became one of the main ideological bonds - a surrogate ideology keeping a pragmatic and materialistic population together. It is true, the sceptical pragmatism of the newly emerging society must also be seen as signifying part of a healing process after the ideological and emotional excesses of the past. But it was the specific situation of a sharpening East-West conflict to which the West German Republic - as well as its communist counterpart - owed its very existence. Such a situation has indeed shaped its peculiar form and created particular problems past and present.

- 19 -

- 18 -

and created partition problems but present.
existence. Such a situation has indeed appeared in similar form
Republi - as well as its communist counterpart - owed its very
lion of a sharpening East-West conflict to which the West German
and emotional excesses of the East. But it was the specific situ-
seen as significantly part of a healing process after the ideological
acceptance pragmatism of the newly emerging society must also be
matio and materialistic population together. It is true, the
the main ideological pons - a surrogate ideology keeping a back-
tor security, anticommunism and fear of "the East" became one of
autonomy are closely related to that conflict. With the great
dereof Republi and the accompanying instability of its political
tories, put also the necessary foundation of the West German
left. The problems of national division and of the lost terri-
however, left under the shadow of the increasing East-West con-
abeeding in the reorientation of the population -- all this,
questions, - with generous relief actions from the West German
German politics, and the development of economic and social con-
the stages of occupation politics, the regional beginnings of

qutions, - with generous relief actions from the West German
German politics, and the development of economic and social con-
the stages of occupation politics, the regional beginnings of

- 18 -

- 19 -

## II. Towards new forms of constitutional structure

By its very origin, the second German republic found itself burdened with a number of basic dilemmas affecting the aims and values of the new state, as well as the political consciousness and orientation of its citizen. The Bonn constitution (Basic Law) proclaimed West Germany a _provisorium_ for the period of the German division, while at the same time trying to establish a _definitivum_ of institutional stability and successful democratic government, not to be jeopardized by any experiments. Moreover, Bonn felt and behaved as a product of the cold war. Correspondingly its clear orientation towards alliance with the West and supernatural integration contrasted, and might even conflict, not only with the quest for full sovereignty but even more with the claims for national reunification, and with the revisionist interests of large refugee organisations claiming to represent the well over ten million people from Germany's eastern territories.

At this point, the optimism of the slogan: "Bonn is not Weimar"¹² seems premature even today.¹³ Though developed from different circumstances, both republics felt themselves uncomplete, unfulfilled entities - Weimar with respect to the _Anschluss_ of Austria and the conditions of Versailles, Bonn with its official claim to represent solely - against the East German regime - the political will of the German people and to preserve the tradition and continuity of German statehood. From the beginning, such a pretension went not unchallenged. The official theory of continuity¹⁵, while enjoying support from most political and legal interpreters, was not quite confident with the provisional character of the solution.

- 20 -

- 50 -

not quite confident with the provisional character of the solution
enjoying support from most political and legal interpreters, was
went not challenged. The official theory of continuity¹²), while
innity of German statehood. From the beginning, and a pretension
will of the German people and to preserve the tradition and con-
represent solely - against the East German regime - the political
and the conditions of Versailles, Bonn with its official claim to
titled entities - Weimar with respect to the Anschluss of Anatolia
circumstances both repudiate left themselves uncompliant, unless
seems premature even today.¹³) Though developed from different
At this point, the optimism of the age: "Bonn is not Weimar"¹⁴)
million people from Germany's eastern territories.

refugee organizations claiming to represent the well over ten
tional reunification, and with the revolutionary interests of large
great for full sovereignty but even more with the claims for na-
gration contrasted, and might even conflict, not only with the
orientation towards alliance with the West and international inte-
pedance as a product of the cold war. Correspondingly its clear
not to be reorganized by and experiments. Moreover, Bonn left and
of institutional stability and successive democratic government,
division, while at the same time trying to establish a definitive
proclaimed East Germany a provisionalism for the period of the German
and orientation of its citizen. The Bonn constitution (Basic Law)
area of the new state, as well as the political consonances
pursued with a number of pseudoogiennes affecting the same and
by its very origin the second German republic found itself

II. Towards new forms of constitutional atomise

- 13 -

- 20 -

of 1949; such a thesis was also bound to collide with the emphatic
claim for a complete break with the law-less state (Unrechtsstaat)
of the "Third Reich". Such inconsistencies contributed to the
atmosphere of insecurity which seems partly responsible for the
lack of political engagement and "civic culture" criticized by
many observers. The authoritarian traits of government developed
during the Adenauer era were facilitated by those tendencies.

While it is true that the quest for security appears as the overall motive de-
termining the formation as well as the decisions of the Federal
Republic, it was mainly by this confrontation with the Weimar
Republic that the question was disputed to what extent German
democracy should be a reshaped version or rather a new form of
constitutional government. Allied interventions, German initia-
tives, and the pressure of contemporary events resulted in a poli-
tical system which can be characterized as a strongly modified
form of parliamentary democracy of a federal structure, with
strong executive and judicial powers, and bound to a constitution
of marked normative character. The limited, modified version of
parliamentary government was consciously opposed to the dualistic,
half-presidential system of Weimar.¹⁴)

In shaping the constitution, three basic contents resulted
from the experiences of 1933 and 1945: to avoid the weaknesses
of the Weimar constitutional system; to master the heritage of
totalitarian dictatorship; and to modify the realities of occu-
pation policy and transform them into a functioning state of its
own, capable of overcoming the burdens of defeat and of coping
with the persisting conditions of Allied control and national
division. Among these motives, the experience of Weimar appeared

- 21 -

- 51 -

division. Among these motives, the experience of Weimar abhorred
with the perusalting conditions of Allied control and national
own, capable of overcoming the burdens of defeat and of cooling
bation below and transform them into a functioning state of its
totalitarian dictatorship; and to modify the realities of oom-
of the Weimar constitutional system; to mater the heritage of
from the experience of 1822 and 1832: to avoid the weaknesses
In abating the constitution, three basic contentions resulted
built-presidential system of Weimar.¹⁴)

parliamentary government was consecutively opposed to the quaſſiſ-
tive, and the pressure of contemporary events resulted in a boſſ-
constitutional government. Allied interventions, German initia-
democracy should be a reambed aeron or rather a new form of
Republiſc that the question was diabuted to what extent German
Republiſc, it was mainly dy that confrontation with the Weimar
termining the formation as well as the decisions of the Federal
Inconſiſtency, the great for security abhor as the overall motive ge-
during the Adenauer era were facilitated dy those tendenues.

many operators. The authoritarian traits of government developed
lack of political engagement and "activistic culture" eroded dy
atmosphere of insecurity which seems partly reasonable for the
of the "Third Reich". Such incoherent notes contributed to the
claim for a complete break with the law-less state (Unrechtsstaat)
of 1948; and a thesis was also pound to collide with the empiſto

- 50 -

- 21 -

of first importance. The reasons for its failure were hotly dis-
puted. From these the German makers of the Basic Law, with the
15) Western Allies intervening particularly on questions of federalism
draw a number of constitutional conclusions of considerable weight
- not a few think too much weight.

The constitutional assembly of 1948/49 (Parliamentary Council)
proved particularly eager to prevent any dualism between parlia-
mentary and presidential elements of power and decision-making.
For that reason, the position of the Federal President was de-
cisively weakened, while at the same time that of the Federal
Chancellor as head of government was strengthened in itself and
in relation to the parliament. By special provisions demanding
a "positive majority", government change was bound to the parlia-
ment's ability to form a new government, and on the other hand,
the position of parliament was stabilized by stipulations compli-
cating its dissolution. Its ability for decision-making was streng-
thened further when for the first time the role of the parties
in the political process was expressly stated and institutional-
lized. At the same time, electoral laws were to provide for the
exclusion of splinter parties (with less than 5% of the votes)
from the federal and state parliaments, five-percent clauses to
thereby furthering a concentration of political forces in elec-
tions and assemblies. Moreover, the basic constitutional charac-
ter of the republic was declared unchangeable by any parliamentary
majority or legal interpretation. The Basic Law explicitly pro-
nounced irrevocable a number of fundamental principles of demo-
cratic state structure: among them the civil rights, the federal
formation, and the social obligations, of the state, but also the
multi-party system, in so far as the parties were bound to demo-

- 22 -

- 55 -

multi-party atom, in so far as the parties were bound to dem-
formation, and the social obligations of the state, put also the
organic state armature: among them the civil rights, the federal
nonnegligible irreconcilable a number of fundamental principles of demo-
magnitude or legal interpretation. The Basic Law explicitly pro-
ter of the Republic was declared nonnegligible by and bararily
ations and assemblies. Moreover, the basic constitutional charac-
ter furthering a concentration of political forces in elec-
from the federal and state parliamentary-berecent clause to
excursion of splinter parties (with less than 20 of the votes)
fized. At the same time, electoral laws were to provide for the
in the political process was expressly stated and institutional-
thened further when for the first time the role of the parties
acting its disaffection. Its affinity for decision-making was atrial
the position of parliament was stabilized by attributions com-
ment's affinity to form a new Government, and on the other hand,
a "positive majority". Government change was pound to the barja-
in relation to the parliament. By specialist brochures demoting
Chancellor as head of government was strengthened in itself and
crucially weakened, while at the same time that of the Federal
For that reason, the position of the Federal President was de-
mentally and presidential elements of power and decision-making.
proved barially eager to prevent and quellism between barja-
The constitutional assembl of 1948/49 (Parliamentary Conclav)

draw a number of constitutional conceptions of considerable weight
Western Peoples intervening barially on questions of legislation
buted. From these the German makers of the Basic Law, with the
of first importance. The reasons for its failure were partly dif-

- 51 -

- 22 -

to democratic organization internally and to full adherence to the constitutional order. Finally, the institution of a federal constitutional court was designed to serve as an efficient guardian and interpreter of such a constitution of modified parliamentary and party democracy - which it proved to be. In the meantime, many of the German Länder had already developed constitutions of similar form.

But of course the evolution and working of the Bonn Republic was not a question of drawing constitutions alone. No less important became the forces and tendencies of the West German post-war society that was to fill such a legal framework. Apparently the original structure of the constitutional system frequently was, and continues to be, remodelled and even transformed by political and social forces quite different from what was present at the initial stage of the Federal Republic. For that reason, attention furthermore has to be focussed on the actual working of the constitutional system, and on the permanent tension between the norms of constitution and the political reality.

This is a problem typical for any political system, but it appears particularly significant for a "new" state and society which in its first attempt at democracy had demonstrated how easily an almost perfect constitution may be gradually broken and grossly misused by the much quoted "normative force of the factual" (normative Kraft des Faktischen): That influential doctrine of German legal positivism which had to justify, by subjecting to formalistic recognition of power, the suicide of the Weimar democracy before the pseudo-legalism of Nationalist reactionaries and Nazi revolutionaries. The "real constitution" of Bonn is

- 23 -

- 52 -

and Mass revolutionary parties. The "relat constitutionalism" of Bonn is
arrested before the baring-legality of Nationalist reactionaries
formulating recognition of power, the anarchy of the Weimar dem-
German legal positivism which was to justify its adopting to
(Normative Kraft der Akteuren): that influential doctrine of
managed by the much noted "normative force of the Kantian"
aimed at perfect constitutionality may be gradually proven and grossly
misused, first attempt at democracy had demonstrated how easily an
erroneously significant for a "new" state and society which in
This is a problem typical for any political system, put it assumes
constitution and the political reality-

tional system, and on the permanent tension between the norma of
more was to be focused on the actual working of the constitution-
stage of the Federal Republic. For that reason, attention further-
social forces quite different from what was present at the initial
time to be, remodelled and even transformed by political and
armature of the constitutional system frequently was, and soon-
that was to fill and a legal framework. Apparently the original
become the forces and tends of the West German boat-war affinity
not a question of drawing constitutions alone. No less important
But of course the evolution and working of the Bonn Republic was
German Linger had already developed constitutions of similar form.
mentary and partly democratic - which it proved to be. Many of the
dist and interpreter of any a constitution of modified Berlin-
constitutional court was designed to serve as an efficient organ-
the constitutional order. Finally, the institution of a federal
to democratic organization internally and to full adherence to

- 55 -

- 23 -

[Lc]

indeed characterized by continuous conflicts of norms and power. Depending on the perspective, critics have used a number of concrete terms to describe the course and direction of the "constitutional reality" as different from the classical theory of parliamentary democracy: such as chancellor democracy (Kanzlerdemokratie), party state (Parteienstaat), rule of interest associations (Verbändeherrschaft), administrative state (Verwaltungsstaat) and other slogans.

- 24 -

- 54 -

atatt) and other slogans.

Otagons (Aeroplanefront), administrative state (Aeroworld-
demokratie), party state (Parteienstaat), rule of interest asso-
barmental democracy: any such chancellor democracy (Kanzler-
atschaft) as different from the classical theory of
crete terms to describe the course and direction of the "con-
debating on the perspective, criteria have need a number of com-
 indeed characterised by continuous conflicts of norms and power.

- 53 -

- 24 -

There is still - and again - much dispute about the important
assumption that the consequences of Weimar could be avoided by
depriving the President of his powers as an equal, and by his
emergency power even superior, pillar of the state. While for
that matter and on account of the continuing presence of occu-
pation powers the Basic Law dispensed with far reaching emer-
gency provisions, the government's recent attempts to make up
for that supposed gap have revived the questionable opinion that
it were exactly the presidential powers - and the President's
control of the "unpolitical army" - which granted the Weimar Re-
public at least its short life-time. ¹⁶) Journalists, jurists and
(quite naturally) administrators trying to spread this legend over-
look the fact, that not only the last cabinets of Weimar but even
more Hitler himself destroyed the First Republic exactly by means
of the presidential emergency powers. Their motives are plainly
meant to strengthen the power of the executive even more and,
with the popular argument of stability and security, to enforce
the authoritarian trends of the political system. But actually a
re行政 element of continuity - the continuity of the <u>Obrig-
keitsstaat</u> - is thereby played off against the new distribution
of power and control in the Second Republic; under changed condi-
tions of economic or foreign policy, the modifying Bonn version of
parliamentary <u>crisis</u>; democracy might even be transformed into
a variety of Gaullist France, but much more hazardous (risky)
for a country with less democratic tradition.

- 25 -

- 52 -

a variety of Germanic France, put much moreuscious (risky)
parliamentary republic; democracies might even be transformed into
times of economic or foreign buffer, the modifying Bonn aeraton of
of power and control in the Second Reich; under changed condi-
tions of government, the Germanic buffer, the modifying Bonn aeraton of
retreatist - if thereby played off against the new distribution
reasonably element of continuity - the continuity of the Optima-
the authoritarian trend of the political system. But, as we shall see
with the popular argument of stability and security, to enforce
ment to strengthen the power of the executive even more and,
of the presidential emergency powers. Their motives are basically
more Hitler himself destroyed the First Reich - exactly by means
look the fast, that not only the fast cabinets of Weimar put even
(quite naturally) administrators trying to abroad this legend over-
public at least its short little-time.) (Reinhold, 1951 and
control of the "unpolitical army" - which granted the Weimar Re-
ich were exactly the presidential powers - and the President's
for that العبارة gap have revived the greatestpleasure opinion that
governmental, the government's recent attempts to make up
bassin powers the basic law diabaseed with far reaching emer-
that matter and on account of the continuing presence of occu-
emergency power even superior, differ of the state. While for
governing the President of the powers as an equal, and by his
assumption that the consequences of Weimar confidé be avoided by
There is still - and again - much dispute about the important

- 54 -

- 25 -

In reality the indisputable linkage of extraordinary executive power with the fall of Weimar has rightly caused the Bonn Republic to avoid the paralysing dualism and the sweeping emergency provisions of Weimar, and to stress the responsibility of parliament and parties. While the unfortunate mixture of the Weimar system missed both the parliamentary and the presidential democracy which in perfectionist manner it had sought to combine, the strengthening of parliamentary government under Bonn has undoubtedly functioned well enough to dispove the attempts to go back to or even beyond Weimar. They indicate, however, the potential of distrust against democracy still - and again - available in Germany. Surely the significance of constitutional innovations should not be overrated. The Basic Law cannot accomplish the impossible: to prevent government crises, or to eliminate the problems of coalition and minority government. But in Germany, the attacks on constitutional democracy often preferred to use lagalistic approaches. In a country with little tested democratic experience and a strong legal positivism, elaborate constitutional and institutional provisions may indeed appear indispensable. As a matter of fact, the new experience of a democracy with a functioning constitutional framework contributes increasingly to more effective education for democracy, especially with the younger, post-Weimar generation.

However, important as technical provisions may be which stabilize the relationship of parliament and government - by complicating the dissolution of parliament as well as the dismissal of the Chancellor ("constructive vote of non-confidence") -, more essential seems the fact that the constitution represents no longer a neutral instrument for various intentions - as in Weimar - but is now expressly bound to basic democratic values. As far as

- 26 -

- 56 -

is now expressly bound to pateo democratica aims. As far as
nental instrument for various intentions - as in Weimar - put
that seeme the fact that the constitution represents no longer a
Quoicello ("constitutive vote of non-confidence") -, more eassen-
the dissolution of parliament as well as the diamidal of the
the relationship of parliament and Government - by complicating
However, important as technicalial provisions may be which atsilize
democracy, especially with the younger, post-Weimar generation,
work contributes increasingly to more effective education for
experience of a democracy with a functioning constitutional frame-
may indeed shear indigendeide. As a matter of fact, the new
boetiviam, elaborate constitutional and institutional provisions
try with little tested democratic experience and a strong legal
democracy often preferred to see legislative abrogationes. In a con-
minority Government. But in Germany, the attacks on constitutional
government arises, or to eliminate the problems of cession and
rated. The pateo law cannot accomplished the impossible: to prevent
significance of constitutional innovations should not be over-
democracy still - and again - available in Germany. Surely the
Weimar. They indicate, however, the potential of diamidal against
well enough to diabause the attempts to go back to or even beyond
of parliamentary Government under Bonn has undoubtedly functioned
perfectionist manner it had sought to confine, the attrenguening
both the parliamentary and the presidential democracy which in
batteries. While the unfortunate mixture of the Weimar atomized
isms of Weimar, and to arise the responsibility of parliament and
to avoid the barbaying qusilam and the sweeping emegenoy bravi-
power with the self of Weimar has rigidity caused the Bonn Republic
in reality the indigendeide linkage of extraordinary executive

In reality the indigendeide linkage of extraordinary executive
power with the self of Weimar has rigidity caused the Bonn Republic
In reality the indigendeide linkage of extraordinary executive

- 52 -

- 26 -

possible, this change was designed to prevent a destruction of
the constitution with constitutional means: the overthrow of
democracy on pseudo-democratic ways, the reversal of legality
by a "legal revolution", as it happened in 1933. It would be im-
possible for the exponents of public law in administration and
universities, to justify another Enabling Act on the ground of
qualified majorities disrupting the constitution. (Here again,
the current attempts at emergency provisions tend to neglect this
basie aim of the constitution-makers.) Moreover, thanks to the
party article no majority of anti-democratic parties should be
able, as in 1932, to paralyse the process of democratic govern-
ment. Instead of the doubtful way of treating such parties under
criminal law they were pledged by the Basic Law (article 21) to
the constitutional values of a free democratic basic order (frei-
heitliche demokratische Grundordnung).

By defining the Federal Republic as inviolably a free, social and
federal democracy, the Basic Law went substantially beyond the
neutrality of values characteristic for Webmar. At the same time,
such strict fixations give expression to a skeptical distrust of
the popular will after it was led astray so evidently in 1932/33
and after. The people as souvereign, yes! But the scope of this
concept is modified by its subjection to the supreme values of
the constitution, to be guarded by the constitutional courts.
The basic dilemma of democracy, its being torn between excessive
freedom, majority despotism and self-destruction, is to be over-
come by the imperative bond to the basic suppositions of that
very democracy.

- 27 -

["- 51 -", "very democratically.", "come by the imperative bond to the basic subpositions of that\nfreedom, majority despotism and self-determination, if to be over-\nthe basic idea of democracy, its being from between excessive\nthe constitution, to be charged by the constitutional courts.\nconcept is modified by its application to the supreme values of\nand after. The people as sovereign, yes! But the scope of this\nthe popular will alter it was fed away so evidently in 1925-26\nenced strict limitations give expression to a specific derriment of\nneutrality of values characteristic for Western. At the same time,\nfederal democracy, the Basic law went substantially beyond the\nBy defining the Federal Republic as intrinsically a free, social and\npetite democratic Commonwealth).", "", "the constitutional values of a free democratic state order (free-\ncriminal law they were bledged by the Basic law (article 5f) to\nment. Instead of the doubtful way of treating and barries under\nspite, as in 1925, to barry the process of democratic govern-\nment, article no majority of anti-democratic barriers among pe-\npole aim of the constitution-makers.) Moreover, thanks to the\nthe current attempts at emergency provisions tend to neglect this\nunfilled majority clashing the constitution.(Here again,\nuniversities, to justify another Exploitation of the ground of\nbarriers, as in 1925, to barry the process of democratic govern-\nment, in the same way of treating and barries under\nspite, as in

- 27 -

There may be doubts about the theoretical justification of such a modified democracy. By stressing the principles of militant self-preservation, the Basic Law substitutes reciprocal tolerance for formal, unlimited tolerance: the basic civil rights are granted only those who are not to use them to destroy the same freedoms and rights.17) This implies a restriction of basic rights in case of existential threats from within. But it raises a number of new problems as to the scope of such (self-) restrictions, visible again in the present discussion of an emergency law.
One can indeed argue that one day again, if with other means, the efforts for protecting and strengthening the actual political system of a "militant democracy", might again set aside the very substance of democracy for which they were presumably designed.
This is indeed the reverse of well-meant clauses prohibiting any use of the constitutional freedoms for fighting the democratic order, which apply even to freedom in culture, teaching, research.
There are quite a few examples even today - in quiet times - showing how easily such stipulations may be misconstrued as imposing a duty of loyalty towards the government in office. For such reasons, in the course of the *Spiegel* affair for instance some of the professors disapproving of the government's actions yet hesitated to participate in critical statements or petitions. It may be said, that the "militant democracy" of the Basic Law, efficient as it appears, on the other hand coincides again with the traditions of *Obrigkeitsstaat* and idolized order that were so strong in modern German history, and so evidently revived in the restoration period of Adenauer's regime of "no experiments".

- 28 -

- 58 -

restoration period of Weber, a regime of "no experiments".
strong in modern German history, and so evidently revived in the
traditions of Öpko-Geleitatsatzt and justified order that were so
client as it appears, on the other hand coincide again with the
be said, that the "militant democracy" of the Basic Law, etc.,
tated to barirobate in critical statements or propositions. It may
the professors disapproving of the government's actions let heat-
sona, in the course of the Spiegel allay for instance some of
a duty of loyalty towards the government in office. But anoy re-
ing how easily such institutions may be misconstrued as imitating
there are quite a few examples even today - in durest times - above-
order, which ably even to regime in culture, teaching, research,
use of the constitutional freedom for fighting the democratic
This is indeed the reverse of well-meant clauses prohibiting and
opposition of democracy for which they were presumably designed.
A system of a "militant democracy," might again set aside the very
efforts for protecting and strengthening the actual political
One can indeed argue that one day again, it with other means, the
apoplea again in the present discussion of an emergency law.
of new problems as to the scope of anoy (self-) restrictions,
in case of existential threats from within. But it raises a number
freedom and rights.¹⁷) This implies a restriction of state rights
granted only those who are not to use them to destroy the same
tor form, unlimited tolerance: the state civil rights are
self-protection, the Basic Law authorises reciprocal tolerance
a modified democracy. By stressing the principles of militant
There may be doubts about the theoretical justification of such

- 51 -

- 28 -

The problem of continuity and change in its essential meaning for
the "new Germany" figures prominently in the extensive discussion
of a traditional federalism which was restored and confirmed by
the makers of the Bonn Republic, Allied and German alike. West
Germany indeed represents the only version, in Europe, of a par-
liamentary democracy based on a number of states (Länder) with
fully developed parliamentary governments. The term *Bund* has re-
placed the term *Reich* in all names designating federal power, and
the preamble of the constitution states expressly: "the German
people, in the Länder Baden, Bavaria ..., has enacted, by virtue
of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic
of Germany ...". Four factors stand out among the reasons¹⁸):

1. The traditional elements of German federalism are founded in the structure of the medieval *Reich* and continued in the rise of the territorial states during the 17th and 18th centuries. They were renewed in the "Second Reich" of 1871 as a federation of Princes, and preserved even after the fall of the monarchy in the Weimar Republic. The Hitler-Regime appeared as a mere interruption of that tradition; National Socialist attempts at centralizationm while not very consequent in themselves, were finally discredited among with the whole systems, and the restoration of freedom was applied to the freedom of the Länder and Stämme (tribes) as well.

- 29 -

- 58 -

(tripes) as well.

dom was abided to the freedom of the <u>Lager</u> and <u>Staat</u>me
affair with the whole states, and the restoration of free-
very concession in themselves, were finally decreed
National Socialist attempts at centralization while not
regime abided as a mere interruption of that tradition;
tail of the monarchy in the Weimar Republic. The Hitler-
as a federation of princes, and preserved even after the
centuries. They were renewed in the "Second Reich" of 1871
rise of the territorial states during the 15th and 18th
to the autocracy of the medieval <u>Reich</u> and continued in the
1. The traditional elements of German federalism are found
of Germany ...". Four factors stand out among the reasons¹⁸):

of its constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic
people, in the <u>Lager</u> Rendent Bavaria ... has enacted, by virtue
the brample of the constitution states expressly: "the German
blessed the term <u>Reich</u> in all names designating federal power, and
fully developed parliamentary governments. The term <u>Reich</u> has re-
fractory democracy based on a number of states (Länder) with
Germany indeed represents the only aerion in Europe, of a bar-
the makers of the Bonn Republic, Villed and German alike. What
of a traditional federalism which was restored and confirmed by
the "new Germany" figures prominently in the extensive discussion
The problem of continuity and change in its essential meaning for

- 58 -

- 29 -

2. Moreover, the Länder represented, after the fall of central power and the division into four parts, the germs of a renewed German statehood. This was, of course, not without problems. Actually, the delimitation of the Länder has always been an unsolved question. In the Weimar Republic, the problem of federal reform (Reichsreform) was posed by the excessive size of Prussia and its dualism with central government, at the same time, central government was handicapped by the cleavage into numerous small units of peculiar traditions. Now Prussia was dissolved, but the new delimitation of federal structure was complicated by the wilful border lines which occupation policies imposed on the "historical Länder". It is true: their territorial identity had to a large degree been shaped by the interferences of Napoleon's regime with occupied Germany 150 years ago. But in the meantime, a remarkable insistence on such a variety (Vielgliedrigkeit) and uniquences (Eigenstaatlichkeit) of the Länder, as different from the French centralized state, has always prevailed in German political life and thought.

3. This was furthered again from the outside: by the interests and intentions of the Allies, particularly France but also the USA. More than anything else, a far reaching federalism seemed to prevent a new concentration of power; the political and military excesses of the recent past were ascribed to forceful centralization; a new formation of democratic life from the grass roots would have to originate within the smaller units of communities, districts and Länder; and misuse of

- 30 -

- 20 -

units of communities, districts and **Länder**; and means of
the grass roots would have to originate within the smaller
but centralization: a new formation of democratic file from
and military excesses of the recent past were ascribed to force-
seemed to prevent a new concentration of power; the political
the USA. More than anything else, a far reaching federalism
and intentions of the **Villages**, partially France put also
3. This was furthered again from the outside: by the interests
German political file and thought.

from the French centralized state, has always prevailed in
influences (Erfahrestauffkomm) of the **Länder**, as different
markable instances on and a variety (Vierfahrtsskomm) and
occupied Germany 120 years ago. But in the meantime, a re-
peen abided by the interferences of Napoleon's regime with
It is true: their territorial identity had to a large degree
oo combination boffees imposed on the "familiar historical **Länder**".

atomism was complicated by the willful border lines which
Now Prussia was dissolved, put the new delimitation of federal
the cleavage into numerous small units of becquer traditions.
ment at the same time, central government was pandora's box
excessive size of Prussia and its quality with central govern-
ments of federalism (Reformareform) was based by the
way seen an unbalanced creation. In the Weimar Republic, the
problem. Obviously, the delimitation of the **Länder** has al-
renewed German statehood. This was, of course, not without
power and the division into four parts, the Germany of a
5. Moreover, the **Länder** represented, after the fall of central

- 58 -

- 30 -

power could best be prevented by a system of additional
controls springing from various centers of political ac-
tivity and decision making.

4. At this point, historical and political considerations met with constitutional conceptions. Federalism appears as an efficient form and means of "vertical control"¹⁹) supplementing the control system of parliamentary democracy, while at the same time adding, besides central and communal government, a third way on which the citizen may participate in political life and be closer to democratic decision making.

The protection of democracy against any hypertrophy of central power and its tendency to *Gleichschaltung* was the lesson drawn from the shocking experiences of 1933.

Correspondingly, the formation of the West German state from
the Länder and the zonal units, was legalized by a constitution
which different from 1919 was not passed by a generally elected
parliament but by a body drawn from the Länder parliaments (Par-
lamentary Council). The Basic Law was accepted, with the required
two-third-majority, by all the Länder except Bavaria which was
dissatisfied even with the considerable power conceded to them.
The constitution (article 29) provided for a reorganisation
(Neugliederung) which should reform the Länder "with due regard
to regional ties, historical and cultural connections, economic
expediency and social structure". This was especially aimed at
the boundaries created by the occupation zones, some of them
quite novel. But the impact of war and occupation together with

- 31 -

- 31 -

dum novel. But the impact of war and occupation together with
the poundries created by the occupation zones, some of them
exigency and social structure". This was especially aimed at
to regional ties, historical and cultural connections, economic
(Merkantefunktion) which should reform the Lüder "with due regard
The constitution (article 58) provided for a reorganisation
disastatiated even with the considerable power conceded to them.
two-thing-majority, by all the Lüder except Bavaria which was
flementary Connoil). The Basic Law was accepted, with the required
parliament put by a body drawn from the Lüder parliaments (par-
which different from 1918 was not based by a generally elected
the Lüder and the solar units, was legalised by a constitution
Correspondingly, the formation of the West German state from

Power and its tendency to Gleichordnung was the lesson drawn
The protection of democracy against and hypertronomy of central
political life and be closer to democratic decision making.
ment, a third way on which the citizen may participate in
the same time adding, peaking central and communal govern-
ting the control of state of parliamentary democracy, while at
efficient form and means of "vertical control"(10) enablen-
with constitutional conceptions. Federalism appears as an
4. At this point, historical and political considerations met
tivity and decision making.

controls springing from various centers of political ac-
power could best be prevented by a system of additional

power and its tendency to Gleichordnung was the lesson drawn
The protection of democracy against and hypertronomy of central
political life and be closer to democratic decision making.
ment, a third way on which the citizen may participate in
the same time adding, peaking central and communal govern-
ting the control of state of parliamentary democracy, while at
efficient form and means of "vertical control"(10) enablen-
with constitutional conceptions. Federalism appears as an
4. At this point, historical and political considerations met
tivity and decision making.

- 30 -

- 31 -

the influx of refugees from Eastern Germany caused a considerable degree of mobility and intermingling among the population: regional traditions, dialects, confessions lost some of the customary rigour, while economic interests prevailed among the motives for demanding or declining reforms.

Under such conditions, the status quo in most cases proved more confident than any radical reform of the new federal structure. With one exception - the creation of the "South-West-State" of Baden-Württemberg out of three Länder of the French and American zones -, the arrangements of 1945-49 were accepted, and even the existence of a new Land like Nordrhein-Westfalen remained almost uncontested. Up to the present, all attempts at subsequent revisions or restoration of older boundaries (e.g. Baden) have failed; denounced as a matter for traditionalists, such attempts lost to the growing weight of vested interests in parliaments and governments, business and administration. On the contrary, the arguments for further reform (Neugliederung) as collected in 1955 by an expert commission (under former Reichs Chancellor Hans Luther), rather favoured such changes which corresponded to the needs of modernizing the administration and facilitating economic cooperation²⁰). But their proposals as well, including the dissolution of Rheinland-Pfalz, led to nothing.

As a result of extended discussions, the postwar structure of Federal Germany has taken root among most of the people; new traditions develop besides or beyond older bonds, while the constitutional provisions for change by plebiscite become meaningful. Of course, there remain considerable differences in size and economic conditions, even in customs and culture; this applies

- 32 -

["- 25 -", "and economic conditions, even in economies and culture; this applies\nnot only to Germany, but also to the other European countries, and in\nthe same way to the other European countries, and in the same way to the\nother European countries, and so on. This is the case with the\ninternational problems of the modern world, which are of the same\nimportance as the problems of the modern world, which are of

- 32 -

particularly to Bavaria, the only Land with unbroken continuity (and self-consciousness). But the process of levelling, so characteristic of Germany's post-war society, has also not stopped at the Länder boundaries. Continuity and change, history and new construction, are both present in the re-emergence of German federalism. It is the stabilization of the provisorium which on the Länder level proves as irresistible as in Bonn, while at the same time in East Germany a centralized regime has replaced the Länder by districts. The division of Germany has also become a gulf between federalistic and centralistic governments.

One of the instances confirming the stability of renewed federalism is the continuity with which the governments and leading political figures in the Länder have held their positions beyond the cut of 1949, and up to the present. In many cases first appointed by the Allies, then confirmed in elections, by their very names and perpetuance in office they symbolized the newly established Länder traditions. To name only a few: Heinrich Kopf (Niedersachsen), Peter Altmeier (Rheinland-Pfalz), Wilhelm Kaisen (Bremen), Carl Arnold (Nordrhein-Westfalen), Ernst Reuter (Berlin), Reinhold Maier and Gebhard Müller (Baden-Württemberg), Max Brauer (Hamburg), Georg-August Zinn (Hessen), Hans Ehard and Wilhelm Hoegner (Bavaria). They were, and some still are, examples for that Länder continuity from which the history of the Federal Republic altogether cannot be separated. Its impact on the development of the Bonn regime which is now visible also in the double role of Willy Brandt in Berlin and Bonn, has its counterpart in the return of prominent politicians from Bonn to Länder positions:

- 33 -

- 33 -

the return of prominent politicians from Bonn to **Tübingen** positions:
role of Willy Brandt in Berlin and Bonn, has been counterpart in
ment of the Bonn regime which is now a little also in the same
difficult时刻 together cannot be separated. Its impact on the qveeloh-
that **Tübingen** continuity from which the history of the **Reichs** Re-
Hooguer (Bavaria). They were, and some still are, examples for
(Hampurg), Georg-August Zinn (Heisen), Hans Ehrard and Wilhelm
Heinrich Waser and Gerhard Müller (Baden-Württemberg), Max Böser
(Bremen), Carl Arnold (Nordrhein-Westfalen), Ernst Lenter (Berlin),
(Metropolregion), Peter Vittmayer (Rheinland-Rheinland), Wilhelm Käzen
framed **Tübingen** traditions. To name only a few: Heinrich Köhl
names and beretidence in office they ascribed the newly eat-
borned by the Villes, then confirmed in elections, by their very
the out of 1849, and up to the present. In many cases that ab-
bofficial figures in the Tübingen have held their positions pertain
is the continuity with which the governments and leading
One of the instances confirming the atsibility of renewed tede-
sion between federalist and centralist governments.
the Tübingen districts. The division of Germany has also become
the same time in East Germany a centralised regime has replaced
the **Tübingen** level, proves as irreconcilable as in Bonn, while at
federalism. It is the atsification of the broad spectrum which on
new construction, are both present in the re-emergence of German
at the **Tübingen** pommaries. Continuity and change, history and
rhetoric of Germany's host-war society, has also not atobed
(such self-consciousness). But the process of reformation, so ap-
portioned to Bavaria, the only land with unbroken continuity

- 35 -

- 33 -

Kurt Georg Kiesinger, premier in Stuttgart, is an outstanding example, Franz-Joseph Strauss may become another one if the Bonn government should remain closed to him (which is to be hoped) and he had to be content with Bavarian sympathies.

There is of course much criticism of federalism in general, and of certain aspects of Länder politics versus Bundes politics in particular²¹). Apart from the popular aversion against any splitting up of competences, there are the complaints of too inflated and expensive an apparatus which requires well over 2 ooo parliamentarians and 200 ministers, together with an administrative bureaucracy both on the federal and the Länder level. More serious are the objections against the cultural authority (Kultur-Hoheit) conferred exclusively on the Länder. It has proved a serious obstacle to planning and coordination in the fields of school, higher learning, research. Parochial politics and failure to meet the demands of modern education are undoubtedly a result partly of that situation. Federal bodies are not very efficient, since they are necessarily restricted to a counseling role, incapable of decisions, and therefore not taken very serious. This applies to the conference of the ministers as well as to other coordinating committees or even to a reform council like the Wissenschaftsrat, though this remarkable institution has exerted considerable influence on the expansion of the universities. On the other hand, it seems questionable whether a federal ministry of education and culture, with a bureaucracy of its own, would be much more efficient. Moreover, the conflict about a governmental TV program (1960/61) serves as a warning against the possible misuse of federal power in the contested field of education unless there remain

- 34 -

- 34 -

power in the contested field of education unless there remain
(Repub.) serves as a warning against the possible misuse of federal
client. Moreover, the conflict about a Governmental TV program
culture, with a prudence of its own, would be much more efficient
it seems questionable whether a federal ministry of education and
finance on the excommunication of the universities. On the other hand,
though this remarkable institution has exerted considerable influence
or even to a reform element like the Wissenschaftsrat,
conference of the ministers as well as to other coordinating com-
osalons, and therefore not taken very serious. This attitude to the
necessarily restricted to a connecting role, inadaptable to de-
situation. Federal podia are not very efficient, since they are
minds of modern education are undoubtedly a result partly of that
learning, reason, broad-based podia and failure to meet the de-
to planning and coordination in the fields of school, higher
conferred exclusively on the Langer. It was proved a serious obstacle
are the options against the cultural authority (Kultur-Hoppe)
puritanical pot on the federal and the Langer level. More serious
filamentaries and 500 ministers, together with an administrative
and expensive annual expenditure which requires well over 5 000 bar-
ting mb of competence, there are the complaints of too inflated
bureaucracy¹⁵). Apart from the bohemian averaging against an abit-
tion of certain aspects of Langer podia are the Bungee podia in
there is of course much criticism of federalism in general, and
and he had to be content with Bavarian ambitudes.

Government should remain closed to him (which is to be hoped)
example, Trans-Tosky Strasse may become another one if the Bonn
Kurt-Georg Kleinsinger, premier in Stuttgart, is an outstanding

- 33 -

- 34 -

strong controls from the regional and state levels. In a country
with exclusively state controlled educational institutions - and
a tradition of political indoctrination - the problem of decen-
tralization has to be taken serious.

More important is the fact that federalism presents the Bonn system
with a second chamber, the Bundesrat, which is playing a very ef-
fective role between government and parliament²²¾. Representing
the Länder governments, the Bundesrat not only furnishes a plat-
form for minority opinions but allows additional controls and,
by its body of government officials and administrators, helps to
qualify and modify the competences of the federal bureaucracy:
bureaucrats and experts compete with each other, control each
other. This has of course the reverse consequence that Bonn tries
to influence and control the Länder governments: Adenauer has
constantly endeavoured to interfere with politics on the Länder
level. But actually, the Bundesrat and particularly its standing
commissions represent a body of political balancing and practical
reason, detached from the temper of the Bundestag and from the
arrogance of the federal executive as well. In quite a few cases,
it has followed its own way regardless of party politics: as a
check and counter-balance to the working of a strong Chancellor
democracy.

Many critics may insist that federalism is on hopeless retreat in
the modern industrial age; that only centralized government can
tackle the new tasks of social, economic, scientific progress and
military defense; that Germany be well on the way to a "mediatiza-
tion" of the Länder into mere administrative units; and that
the needs of the future demand even supra-national institutions.

- 35 -

- 32 -

the needs of the future demand even more national institutions. The need of the <u>Lehrer</u> into were administrative units; and that military defense; that Germany be well on the way to a "mediatization" of the <u>Lehrer</u> into were administrative units; and that many criteria may exist that federalism is on hopeless retreat in democracy.

Check and counter-balance to the working of a strong Chancellor is the followed its own way regardless of party politics: as a consequence of the federal executive as well. In quite a few cases, reason, detached from the temper of the <u>Bundesrat</u> and from the commissions represent a body of political balancing and practical level. But actually, the <u>Bundesrat</u> and baronarily its attending constantly endeavoured to interleave with politics on the <u>Lehrer</u> to influence and control the <u>Lehrer</u> Governments: Adenauer has other. This has of course the reverse consequence that Bonn tries purifyors and experts compete with each other, control each quality and modify the competences of the federal bureaucracy: by its body of government officials and administrators, helps to form for minority opinions put allows additional controls and, the <u>Lehrer</u> Governments, the <u>Bundesrat</u> not only turnkeys a legislative role between Government and Parliament<sup>SS4</sup>. Representing with a second chamber, the <u>Bundesrat</u>, which is playing a very essential part in the fact that federalism presents the Bonn alate, transformation has to be taken serious.

a tradition of political undercooperation - the problem of decentralization - and strong controls from the regional and state levels. In a country

- 34 -

- 35 -

Yet from such deliberations one may as well draw the opposite conclusions. Effective subdivisions are the more indispensable in such a process of extension, national or supranational; the large bureaucratic state tends to lose its democratic quality unless it remains founded on smaller, perspicuous units closer to the citizen, European and German federalism may thus even support each other. Under the Bonn system, the federal system has lost nothing of the significant functions of control, mediation, self-government which it demonstrated in face of the authoritarian tendencies and monocratic temptations of the Adenauer era. The existence of Länder parliaments and governments furthers political mobility in a system of overstabilization, it serves as reservoir of political leaders and offers the opportunity of political participation to parties and persons which on the federal level may not - as the SPD for 10 years - have a real chance of practicing or even testing their political skill and ambitions. On that level, German federalism, unique in its form, may even offer models for other democracies suffering (like France or Italy) from the structural problems of centralization.

nation.

(fine French or Italy) from the structural problems of centrali-
tion, may even offer models for other democracies utilizing
and ampirical. On that level, German federalism, unique in its
a real chance of practicing or even testing their political skill
on the federal level may not - as the S&D for 1970 - have
broadness of political participation to barries and persons which
it serves as reservoir of political leaders and offers the ob-
людные политICAL MOPIDITY in a STATE of overadfillation,
VILLAGE ERAS. The existence of UNDER barriaments and GOVERNMENTS
AUTHORITARIAN tendencies and monocratic temptations of the
QIATION, self-government which it demonstrated in face of the
has lost nothing of the significant functions of control, me-
ansport each other. Under the Bonn system, the federal state
to the citizen, European and German federalism may thus even
mingle it remains founded on smaller, hereditary units closer
to the preresidency at state level to lose its democratic quality
in any process of extension, national or international; the
conditions. Elective appropriations are the more indispensable
Yet from any deliberations one may as well draw the opposite

- 32 -

- 36 -

### III. <u>Chancellor democracy and the decline of
Parliamentary politics.</u>

West German government as it developed during the fifties was characterized by four features, one founded on institutional, social and historical motives alike, the other conditioned by personal constellations. <u>Kanzlerdemokratie</u> became the formula for the actual relationship of government, parliament, parties and interest groups within the political process; yet this included a continuity or reestablishment of certain authoritarian and bureaucratic traditions of German statehood. At the same time, such a development of political structure, depended on the stature and the personal rule of Konrad Adenauer who by his respected age, his unscrupulous shrewdness and his remarkable skill managed to exploit to the last the stability provisions of the Bonn system. The result was a combination of parliamentary and cabinet democracy, with elements of presidential rule - a regime which favours administration and executive powers at the expense of parliamentary control, while consequently the interest groups, by using direct contacts with the Chancellor's office, gain influence²³).

The trend to an "unpolitical" regime of experts and administrators, depending on the political authority of one man - Chancellor or President - is indeed a common feature of Adenauer's Germany and de Gaulle's France. It may be compared even to the presidentialism of Weimar and remind of an unbroken tradition of a-parliamentary statism so typical for the Bismarck and Weimar periods. To such a critical view the Bonn system seemed to have exchanged democratic

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- 31 -

critical view the Bonn system seemed to have exercised democratic
status so typical for the Bismarck and Weimar periods. To enunciate a
of Weimar and reining of an unbroken tradition of a parliamentary
de Garde's France. It may be compared even to the presidentialism
President - is issued a common feature of Adenauer's Germany and
debating on the political authority of one man - Adenauer or
The trend to an "uniheits" regime of experts and administrators,
oilice, gain influence⁵²).

interest groups, by making direct contacts with the Adenauer's, at the expense of politically control, while consequently the rule - a regime which favours administration and executive powers - militates against the exercise of political influence, while simultaneously and automatically, legally, on the status and the personal rule of Konrad Adenauer who by his rejected side, his unaccountable actions and attitudes, has alienated the German statesmen.

At the same time, such a development of political
ment of certain authoritarian and puritanic traditions of
political process; yet this included a continuity or reestablish-
ing of government, parliament, parties and interest groups within the
Konservierdemokratie, because the formula for the actual relationship
motives alike, the other conditioned by personal considerations,
characterized by one found on institutional, social and historical
West German government as it developed during the fifties was

## German political parties.

### III.1. Chancellor democracy and the decline of

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- 37 -

unstability for a form of over-stabilization paralysing political
participation and suppressing the dynamics of political life.
Outward stability and economic progress, as compensation for poli-
tical immobility, has it not satisfied a parliamentary majority
and provided for a secure basis of Adenauer's rule ? The Kanzler-
demokratie of the fifties is indeed expression and course likewise,
of an atmosphere of depolitization which reminds of the political
vacuum created by the Wilhelminian authoritarian regime.
Many critics complain about the "missed reform",
the "era of restoration", the submission to the "patriachate" of
a statesman whose political outlook dates back to pre - 1914 days
An other consequence is the tendency to employ plebiscitarian
methods by confirming the Kanzlerdemokratie in personalized elec-
tions which tend to lose their formal character as parliamentary
elections; here too, comparisons with Weimar or de Gaulle's France
are at hand.<sup>24a)</sup>

Far beyond the constitutional provisions strengthening the posi-
tion of the chancellor, the political style of Adenauer's rule
has indeed created peculiar conditions and constellations hardly
to be expected by 1949. Again German constitutional theory, with
a traditional willingness to recognize the "normative force of
the facts", has tried subsequently to reinterpret the Basic Law
according to such developments. But actually, the profound shif-
ting in power between government and parliament during that period
is a phenomenon hardly to be explained in terms of constitution.
Although corresponding to a general tendency of modern democracy,
it is a political problem linked in particular to the reign of
Adenauer.

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- 28 -

Adenauer.

It is a political problem linked in particular to the return of
Although corresponding to a General tendency of modern democracy,
is a phenomenon hardly to be explained in terms of constitution.
ting in power between government and parliament during that period
according to and developments. But actually, the pronouncing edit-
the facts", has tried unprecedented to reinterpret the Basic law
a traditional willingness to recognise the "normative force of
to be expected by 1948. Again German constitutional theory, with
has indeed created beneficial conditions and constellations hardly
tion of the chancellor, the political style of Adenauer's rule
will beyond the constitutional framework strengthening the post-
are at hand.⁵⁴⁸)

elections: here too, comparisons with Weimar or de Gallese's France
tions which tend to lose their formal character as parliamentary
methods by confirming the *Kansergdemokratie* in herewith issued elec-
In other consequence is the tendency to employ plebeianist
a statesman whose political outlook dates back to pre - 1914 date⁵⁴⁹
the "ers of restoration", the amendment to the "barracksrate" of
*Ostfahrerschaft*. Many critics complain about the "misused reform",
atomism created by the Wilhelminian authoritarian regime.⁵⁵⁰

of an atmosphere of deboffitisation which reminds of the political
demokratie of the title it indeed expression and course likewise,
and privileged for a secure base of Adenauer's rule ? The *Kanser-
tot* immaterial, has it not ascribed a parlementary majority
Outward ativity and economic progress, as combination for belf-
barbition and embarking the dynamics of political life.
unstability for a form of over-attribution bartering political

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- 38 -

This became increasingly clear since 1959 when the questions of succession led to a series of crises: it began with Adenauer's attempts to push his presumed successor (Erhard) to the purely representative position of Federal President, to be followed by the coalition crises around the 1961 elections, and by the turbulent circumstances of the Spiegel affair. The result was a weakening of the whole system. When finally Erhard entered office, decorated with the glory of the self-proclaimed engeneer of the economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder), he was confronted with a new situation. The prolonged retreat had created and revived tensions within the coalition parties, while at the same time Adenauer himself, now as a party leader without government office, in cooperation with the ambitious infant/terrible Strauss and his Bavarian following, did everything to destroy the very basis of the Kanzlerdemokratie, its union of government and party apparatus, within and outside parliament.

As a result, the different personality of Chancellor Erhard had considerable difficulties in filling the half-broken framework of that system. His efforts to restore it to life underlined the dubious aspects of Chancellor democracy even more. While Adenauer was ruling partly by a skilful policy of winning devoted executives partly by playing competing forces against each other, Erhard tried to build up a position "beyond the parties". (It was a difference in stile and method, but with similar consequences of depolitization. By constantly addressing the public, the new Chancellor turned from parliament to the mass media and posed as a "people's chancellor" (Volkskanzler); but he proved rather irresolute in dealing with comoeting forces and persons, and exerts less control on his party which more and more seems to tolerate him only as the most popular exhibit available for the 1965 election campaign.

25

the most bohemian expatriate available for the 1930 election campaign. So did the party which more and more seems to tolerate him only as a party with combating forces and persons, and exerts less control over the chancellors." (Aufkommener); put he proved rather.COINOFFICE turned from partyment to the mass media and based as a "people's station."By constantly addressing the huffie, the new Chancellor in title and method, put with similar consequences of debtitti- to build up a position "beyond the parties."(It was a difference hardly by playing combating forces against each other, Ernberg tried was ruling hardly by a skillful policy of winning devoted executives and appoints of Chancellors democracy even more. While Adenauer that asem. His efforts to restore it to file underlined the considerable difficulties in fulfilling the well-proven framework of the result, the different personality of Chancellor Ernberg had

its union of Government and party apparatus, within and outside everything to defeat the very base of the Kanzlergermenkette, ampithèces, infinite, terrible Strasse and the Bavarian following, did party leader without Government office, in cooperation with the official parties, while at the same time Adenauer himself, now as a brokened retreat had created and revived tenors within the cos- (Wirtschaftsraum), he was confronted with a new situation. The glory of the self-proclaimed engineer of the economic miracle whole asem. When finally Ernberg entered office, decorated with status of the Spiegel already. The result was a weakening of the parties around the 1930 elections, and by the turbulent chrom- bosition of Federal President, to be followed by the coalition to build the统一eurovision successor to the briefly representative (Euregio) successor led to a series of crises: it began Adenauer's attempts

This became increasingly clear since 1938 when the questions of

- 28 -

- 39 -

This signalizes two possibilities. Either *new forms* are taking shape in the relationship of Chancellor, parliament, parties, interest groups and the public. Or the tradition of *Kanzlerdemokratie* - to which the public got used so well - proves stronger than the tendencies at loosening in domestic and foreign policy, as symbolized by Erhard and his Foreign Minister Schröder, against the party fronde of Adenauer and Strauss.

In both cases the present problems of parliamentary democracy, typical to modern government in general, remain unsolved in the Bonn system: namely, to redefine the role of parliamentary control and adapt the functions of parliament to the growing demands posed by a highly complicated fabric of socio-economic modernization, and by the increasing role of bureaucrats and experts in such a situation. To many observers, traditional parliamentarism seems no longer able to cope with its constitutional role of control and decision making in the actual practice of national politics. This applies to all modern democracies.²⁶) The increasingly complicated network of the modern industrial state confronts parliaments with a dismaying array of new problems for which political common sense and traditional parliamentary practice seems inadequate. At the cost of parliament, the power of committees, experts and bureaucracy is strengthened; precise planning in small bodes replaces the tedious procedure of technically incompetent assemblies; parliamentary representation becomes transformed into interest representation by party and group executives. The members of parliament are bound to an "imperative mandate" of particular interests and no longer represent the people as a whole - as the fictions of antiquated constitutions

- 40 -

- 40 -

people as a whole - as the factions of antagusted constitutions
mandate" of parliamentary interests and no longer represent the
executives. The members of parliament are bound to an "imperative
comes transformed into interest representation by party and group
naturally incompetent assemblies; parliamentary representation pe-
anning in small podes replaces the regions procedure of teou-
committees, experts and puresoracy is strengthened; precise
tice seems insdequate. At the coat of parliament, the power of
which political common sense and traditional parliamentary brac-
fronts parliaments with a diamanting array of new problems for
signly complicated network of the modern industrial state con-
politics. This applies to all modern democracies.⁵⁰) The incore-
of control and decision making in the actual practice of national
rit am seems no longer able to cope with its constitutional role
in such a situation. To many operversa, traditional parliaments-
sation, and by the increasing role of puresoracy and experts
based by a highly complicated fabric of socioeconomic moder-
trol and adapt the functions of parliament to the growing deme-
Bouw aystem: namely, to redefine the role of parliamentary con-
trol to modern government in general, remain unolved in the
In both cases the present problems of parliamentary democracy,
the party tronce of Adenauer and Strasen.

as amplified by Erhard and his foreign Minister Schröder, against
than the tendencies at loosening in domestic and foreign policy,
Kirste - to which the public got need so well - proves stronger
interest groups and the public. Or the tradition of Kanzlerdem-
ance in the relationship of Chancellor, parliament, parties,
This signalise two beasplittles. Either a new form of taking

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- 40 -

postulate. But even the consciously modernized version of the
Basic Law contains the declamation (article 38): "The deputies
to the German Bundestag ... are representatives of the whole
people, are not bound by orders and instructions and are subject
only to their conscience". In reality the deputies are depending,
for their candidacy, election and activity in parliament, almost
entirely on parties and interest groups. It is of course their
legitimate function to represent conflicting interests; but the
shift away from *independent* action seems not sufficiently realized by
political theory.

This discrepancy points not only to inconsistencies of parliamen-
tary theory, but may even prove dangerous if confronted with the
established position of the parties in the constitution. It blocks
the way to a realistic reform of the parliamentary system, and it
misleads the expectations of the public and its evaluation of the
role of parliamentarians. It could well lead again, as in 1930,
to a weariness of the whole "system", when it becomes clear that
"those in Bonn" represent conflicting interests of the parts and
not the people "as a whole". If this reflects the present state
of parliamentary representation in general, the Bonn government
has indeed failed to recognized its realities: Adenauer by mili-
tantly identifying his rule with the existence of Germany alté-
gether (1957 :f: "a victory of the Social Democrats means the end
of Germany" !), Erhard by assuming the role of a benefactor of
all and garantor of economic miracles standing beyond all parties
and interest groups but actually depending on the calculations
of a party and of groups which he is hardly able to control.

- 41 -

- 41 -

of a party and of groups which he is hardly able to control, and interest groups put actually depending on the calculations of all and general of economic interests attending beyond all parties of Germany¹), Edward by assuming the role of a penetraor of September 1923: "a victory of the Social Democrats means the end and finally identifying the rule with the existence of Germany after it indeed failed to recognize its realities: Adenauer by milit of parliamentary representation in General, the Bonn Government not the people "as a whole". It this reflects the present state "those in Bonn represent conflicting interests of the parties and to a weariness of the whole "system", when it becomes clear that role of parliamentary parties. It could well lead against us in 1930, misleading the expectations of the public and its evaluation of the way to a realistic reform of the parliamentary system, and it satisfied position of the parties in the constitution. It looked like theory, but may even prove dangerous if confronted with the This discrepancy points not only to incongruities of parliamentary political theory.

swift away from parliament¹² seems not sufficiently realized by legitimate function to represent conflicting interests: put the entirely on parties and interest groups. It is of course their for their candidy, election and activity in parliament, almost only to their conscience¹³. In reality the deputies are degenerating, people, are not bound by orders and instructions and are subject to the German Bundes ... are representatives of the whole Basic Law contains the declaration (article 38): "The deputies representate. But even the conventionally modernized version of the

- 40 -

- 41 -

Thus the fictions of *Obrigkeitsstaat* combined with the fictions
of "true" parliamentarïstend to obscure the realities and needs
of democracy under the conditions of the Bonn Republic. While a
fifteen year duration of Christian Democratic government has
strengthened the bureaucratic apparatus as against the parliamen-
tary agencies - which in the Bonn system are curtailed anyway -,
the danger of instability is averted at the cost of disempowering
parliament. Its capacity for control becomes inferior to the claim
to expert knowledge and the stability of the political apparatus.
Two main tendencies of political practice are discernible, shaping
the expectations of the public to get used to a bureaucratic
government based on plebiscitary appeals. One tendency was to use
the special position of the Chancellor, under Adenauer's authority,
to extend the executive power into parliament which then converts
his will into laws prepared and made up by the government bureau-
cracy. The other way is Erhard's practice of appealing to the
public, over the head of parties and parliaments, for an overall
implementation of his policy. In both cases, even though by diffe-
rent courses, the unresolved strain between government and parlia-
ment results in a tendency toward authoritarian remodeling of par-
liamentary democracy. It may be bound to certain persons, as a
heritage of the Adenauer era, but it has imbued the political
image of the Federal Republic with a set of habits and ideals,
standards and values which above all presume security and stability
Only in few cases - e.g. the *Spiegel* affair, the controversy about
the federal structure of the TV system or the recent initiatives
against censorship of telephones - a rebellion against government
procedures has broken through this set up. And even there, the

- 42 -

- 42 -

procedures has proven through this set up. And even there, the
against monocentricity of telephones - a rebellion against Government
the federal atomise of the TV system or the recent initiatives
Only in few cases - e.g. the *Abolition* affair, the controversy about
standards and values which above all breathe security and stability
image of the Federal Republic with a set of policies and ideals,
heritage of the Adenauer era, put it has impeded the political
legislative democracy. It may be pungent to certain persons, as a
ment results in a tendency toward authoritarian remodeling of bar-
rent corner, the unrelaxed strain between government and barri-
ment implementation of his policy. In both cases, even though by title-
bipolar, over the head of parties and parliaments, for an overall
orchest. The other way is European practice of abating to the
size will into lines prepared and made up by the Government prision-
to extend the executive power into parliament which then converts
the special position of the Chancellor, under Adenauer's authority,
government based on pleiotropic abodes. One tendency was to see
the expectations of the bipolar to get used to a monocentric
Two main tendencies of political practice are discernible, enabling
to expert knowledge and the stability of the political apparatus.
parliament. Its capacity for control becomes inferior to the claim
the danger of inaptitude is averted at the cost of disempowering
stable agencies - which in the Bonn system are curtailed anyway -
strengthened the monocentric apparatus as against the corpora-
fifteen year duration of Christian Democratic Government has
of democracy under the conditions of the Bonn Republic. While a
of "true" parlamentarism tend to opacure the ressources and needs
Thus the factions of *Opraktikatssatzt* complied with the factions

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- 42 -

the strongest agents of control over public protests, the press, the constitutional court, while the parliament limped behind.

The perspectives of that situation, reflecting present problems of parliamentary democracy in general, become perhaps less gloomy, if seen within the peculiar development of the German party system. Here too, a certain continuity of political groupings and attitudes can be traced. But much more important are the profound differences from earlier stages of German party history. In no other connection, the novel features of the Second Republic come forward more visibly. Indeed the party system indicates what is truly new in the emerging democracy of Bonn.

- 43 -

- 43 -

truly new in the emerging democracy of Bonn.
toward more freely. Indeed the party system indicates what is
other connection, the novel features of the Second Republic come
differences from earlier stages of German party history. In no
tube can be traced. But much more important are the protégé
Here too, a certain continuity of political groupings and atti-
it seen within the familiar development of the German party system
of parliamentary democracy in General, peopled by less bloomy,
The perspectives of that situation, reflecting present problems
being.

press, the constitutional court, while the Parliament climbed
the strongest agents of control braved public protests, the

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- 43 -

Parties as institutions

In describing the Federal Republic as a "party state", political analysis is referring particularly to two indicators of change: the institutionalization of parties in constitutional theory and in political practice;²⁷) and the process of concentration of political groups apparently leading from a traditional multiparty system toward a two party confrontation, with a small third party in decline, though presently still in a bargaining position. Both of these phenomena mark a wide deviation from the German tradition of numerous parties with sharp ideological, social, economic foundations and distinctions. In the past, the traditional division into four main groups — conservative, liberal, catholic, socialist — had been intensified by further subdivisions and separations: Nationalists and racists, several liberal groups, middle class interest parties, protestants, communists. The Weimar Republic had reached the number of well over 30 parties competing in elections. There was never a chance, not even for Hitler, to win a majority²⁸).

The Nazi experience has changed this picture completely. Moreover, the general trend is toward a stabilizing of these new facts of German party life. From one legislative period to another, they have been confirmed by the voters who in 1961 endorsed, with more than 80% of the votes, the two big parties CDU and SPD, and accepted with more than 90% the present "three party system", including the FDP. All other groups have almost completely disappeared from the political scene, while in 1949 and 1953 the multiparty tradition still seemed to have some chances. This

- 44 -

- 44 -

multihparty tradition still seemed to have some advantages. This
abounded from the political scene, while in 1948 and 1952 the
contending the DDP. All other groups have almost completely di-
acted with more than 80% the precedent "three party system", in-
than 80% of the votes, the two pig parties CDU and SPD, and so-
have been confirmed by the voters who in 1948 endorsed, with more
German party file. From one legislative period to another, they
the general trend is toward a suffiling of these new lots of
The Nazi experience has changed this picture completely. Moreover,
win a majority⁸⁸).

in elections. There was never a chance, not even for Hitler, to
Republio had reached the number of well over 30 parties competing
middle class interest parties, protestant, communists. The weimar
separations: Nationalists and racists, several liberal groups,
 socialist - had been internationalized by further subdivisions and
 slow into four main groups - conservative, liberal, catholic,
t Foundations and distinctions. In the past, the traditional divi-
d of numerous parties with sharp ideological, social, economic
or these phenomena mark a wide deviation from a German tradition
in decline, though presently still in a parading position. Both
align toward a two party confrontation, with a small third party
political groups abémently feeding from a traditional multiparty
in political practice;⁸⁹)

the institutionalisation of parties in constitutional theory and
ideology is referring barionarily to two indicators of change :
In describing the Federal Republic as a "party state", political

parties as institutions

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- 44 -

tendency cannot be explained by the stipulations of the constitu-
tion or by the provisions of electoral laws alone. It reflects at
the same time a new conception of the role of parties within state
and society. Consequently, attempts have been made to adapt the
institutional framework to the new reality, and to canalize and
support the "party state" with constitutional electoral and even
financial provisions.

To be sure, the attempts of an influential school advocating the
system of majority elections have failed so far. Their arguments
appear doubtful when they blame proportional election for the
downfall of Weimar, which was rather the result of a latent civil
war: ~~Shev~~ *majority election might well have sharpened the conflicts*
and furthered disintegration. ~~Also, In the age of strong party~~
*also, In the age of strong party*
organization and high campaign expenditure, *the argument of*
"personality elections" is far from reality, as the *British elec-
tion practice proves<sup>29</sup>). It is nevertheless true, that in a so-
ciety with strong social mobility and decreasing political divi-
sions, the tendency to a two party system may be supported by
electoral laws. While in the Weimar Republic the risks were theo
high, things look different today.

But the social bases of parties have not disappeared completely,
nor have the ideological cleavages. The existence of the FDP as
a liberal party corresponds to the need, of a middle class
(<u>Bürgertum</u>) still class - conscious, for an alternative to the
Christian claims and confessional policies of the CDU - at least
as long as the SPD has not quite bridged the traditional gap be-
tween socialist and middle class voters. This seems indeed, for
the time being, to justify the theory of a "three-party system",

- 45 -

- 42 -

the time being, to quantify the theory of a "three-party system", tween socialist and middle class voters. This seems odder, for as long as the SDP has not quite bridged the traditional gap between Christian claims and contestational policies of the CDU - at least (Birkett 1981) still classes - consonants, for an alternative to the a liberal party corresponds to the need, of a middle class nor have the ideological cleavages. The existence of the LDP saw but the social bases of parties have not disappeared completely, right things look different today.

electoral laws. While in the Weimar Republic the risks were too small, the tendency to a two party system may be supported by policy with strong social mobility and decreasing political division practice proves so). It is nevertheless true, that in a society "bourgeois elections" is far from reality, as the British election organization and high campaign expenditure, the argument of and furthered disintegration. After in the age of strong party war : majority election might well have sharpened the conflicts down to Weimar, which was rather the result of a latent civil war in doubt when they plume proportional election for the system of majority elections have failed so far. Their arguments to be amuse, the attempts of an influential school advocating the financial provisions.

support the "party state" with constitutional electoral and even institutional framework to the new reality, and to canalize and and society. Consequently, attempts have been made to adapt the the same time a new conception of the role of parties within state election or by the provisions of electoral laws alone. It reflects at tendency cannot be explained by the stipulations of the constitution

- 44 -

- 45 -

queer as it may seem to the scholar of political science. The present German system of proportional election, modified by elements of majority provisions, has allowed an amazing process of integration, and the five-per-cent-clause excluding minor groups from parliament works well enough against splinter-parties. It seems doubtful whether there should be still more manipulation in favour of the big parties - with the danger of smothering political dynamics and aggravating the moods of depolitization.

This applies in particular to the growing efforts to institutionalize the existing parties, while not only extremist groups but also smaller parties remain excluded from the privileges bestow on the three party establishment. The postulate of the Basic Law, in its famous "party article" demanding, from all parties, a democratic structure and open financing, have not yet been implemented. After 15 years, the special party law required by the constitution is still in statu nascendi. The main obstacles were of course the non-socialist parties with their strong dependence on contributions from private funds of industry and business. The SPD, on the contrary, existing to a large degree on subscription from members, is more interested in the constitutional demand that parties "must publicly account for the sources of their funds" (article 21). Such a stipulation was clearly derived from the experience that Hitler enjoyed, partly in secret, the support of industrialists and businessmen. But instead of a party law that could also clarify the process of forming the political will (Willensbildung) and the power distribution within the big parties, with their monopoly position, parties and parliaments finally chose the easy way of public finance without political control.

- 46 -

- 46 -

control.

Finally, chose the easy way of public finance without political
parties with their monoparty position, parties and parliaments
with (WillemEMPFIJING). and the power distribution within the pig
law that could also clarify the process of forming the political
support of industrialists and businesses. But instead of a party
from the experience that Hitler employed, partly in secret, the
their lungs (article 51). Such a attribution was clearly derived
demands that parties "must publicly account for the source of
auditorium from members, is more interested in the constitutional
lines. The SD, on the contrary, existing to a large degree on
benevolence on contributions from private lungs of industry and pu-
were of course the non-socialist parties with their strong de-
constitution is still in [statu nuncipal]o). The main operators
brought. After 12 years, the special party law required by the
& democratic structure and open financing, were not yet been im-
law, in its famous "party article" demanding from all parties,
owed on the three party establishment. The constitution of the Balearic
is also smaller parties remain excluded from the privileges best-
tablish the existing parties, while not only extremist廊sbe
This applies in particular to the growing efforts to inattain-
tional dynamics and aggravating the moods of deboffitization.

favour of the pig parties - with the danger of smothering bo-
seems doubtful whether there should be still more manipulation in
from parliament works well enough against apportioned parties. It
integration, and the five-per-cent-cause excluding minor廊sbe
ments of majority provisions, has allowed an amazing process of
present German system of proportional election, modified by ele-
phant as it may seem to the scholar of political science. The

- 42 -

- 46 -

With such a solution the dubious vision of state parties appears on the horizon: dubious for two reasons. In a country with the traditions of *Diplomatie*, again the state is called in to provide for the needs of organizations, which proclaim to be expressing the popular will and transforming it from the grass roots into free and independent politics. This happens after the government had drawn heavily on the same party article in causing the Constitutional Court to outlaw, along with the Nazi SRP, the Communist Party. Such a partial implementation of article 21 could also be criticized because in addition it complicates any attempt to end the German division on the basis of free display of all political forces, instead of imitating the police state methods of the East German regime. Indeed, the existence of a Communist Party in West Berlin has even proved how advantageous the toleration (and thereby control) of such parties may be; if they are subjected to a democratic party law.

A second objection to the state support (and state suppression) of parties appears even more relevant. While the required party law is still lacking, since 1962 state and federal parliaments have decided to contribute with increasing sums, from public funds, to the party finances. This was initially covered up as a contribution to political education, and the SPD has indeed, demonstratively, detached part of its share for that purpose. But actually, against the mild opposition of the Social Democrats, and at the moment of considerable cuts in the same ministry's (of the Interior) cultural budget, this measure clearly means a state subvention designed to circumvent the requirements of a party law. With sums increasing every year, such a subvention does of course not prevent the flow of private funds. At the same time it fa-

- 47 -

- 47 -

not prevent the flow of private funds. At the same time it is-
With same increasing every year, and an augmentation does of course
vention designed to circumvent the requirements of a party law.
to the party finances. This was initially covered by a contribution
have decided to contribute with increasing amount, from public funds,
and at the same time the law is still lacking, since 1925 state and federal parliaments
of parties appear even more relevant. While the required party
A second objection to the state andport (and state suppression)
they are subjected to a democratic party law.
the toleration (and thereby control) of such parties may be, if
Communist Party in West Berlin has even proved how advantageous
methods of the East German regime. Indeed, the existence of a
of all political forces, instead of imitating the police state
attempt to end the German division on the basis of free display
could also be criticized because in addition it complicates any
the Communist Party. Such a partial implementation of article 51
the Constitutional Court to outlaw, along with the Meosaii SHB,
Government had drawn heavily on the same party article in causing
roots into tree and independent politics. This happens after the
expressing the popular will and transforming it from the grass
roots for the needs of organizations, which proclaim to be
traditions of <u>Brinkeltastat</u>, again the state is called in to
on the horizon: duties for two reasons. In a country with the
With such a solution the supervision of state parties appears

- 46 -

vours, by one-sided privileges, the (three) established parlia-
mentary parties to which it is confined. This clearly violates
the equality of chances, and widens the gap between constitution
and political reality: Although the constitution may well allow
such an implicit change, to concerned critics it indicates another
dangerous tendency of the political system toward the administra-
tive state.

Indeed the system of self.allowance of public funds for their own
purpose, by which the parties with smaller membership conscription
(CDU and FDP) try to evade the public account of their sources,
is entirely exempt - in absence of a party law - from any demo-
cratic control. Moreover, against all rules of a living democracy
based on dynamic politics, it tends to cement the status quo :
the distribution of money is partitioned after the result of past
elections, and new groups have no chances. Another consequence
may be that the citizen no longer feels induced to make sacrifices.
It is the state and the parties themselves, not the citizen who
then can be held responsible for the foundations of party life.
The parties may lapse into self-content stagnation and bureau-
cratization, while the political process loses much of its spon-
taneity and the depolitization of the masses goes on. In addition,
the resentments against parties and parliaments - so deeply
rooted in German state tradition - will be revived by such an
illustration of the defamed "party politics".

If there is to be public financing, the better way might be to
impose an equal contribution on all taxpayers, but leave the party
their own choosing³¹). While this would also not exclude the re-
vival of anti-party affects and add the implications of a plebis-
zitarian atmosphere in a state of continuous election, it could
animate political participation and pave the way for political

mobility and party dynamics essential to a functioning of the
democratic process.

Democratic Republic

modity and party dynamism essential to a functioning of the

animate political barter between and have the way for political
atmosphere in a state of continuous election. Vit could
exist of anti-party affects and add the implications of a plebe-
their own choosing [21]. While this would also not exclude the re-
impose an ideal corruption on all taxbshere, put leave the party
It there is to be public financing, the better way might be to
illustration of the defamed "party politics".

rooted in German state tradition - will be revived by such an
the resentments against parties and parliaments - so deeply
tanety and the depolitization of the mass society on. In addition,
oristation, while the political process goes much of its abon-
The parties may be able into self-contented agnation and purem-
then can be held reasonable for the longations of party life.
It is the state and the parties themselves, not the citizen who
may be that the citizen no longer feels induced to make sacrifices.
elections, and new groups have no chances. Another consequence
the distribution of money is rationed after the result of best
based on dynamic politics, it tends to cement the status quo :
eratic control. Moreover, against all rules of a living democracy
is entirely exempt - in absence of a party law - from any demo-
(ODN and HDG) try to evade the public account of their chances.
bureaus, by which the parties with smaller membership conacribation
Indeed the system of self-allowance of public funds for their own
tive state.

dangerous tendency of the political system toward the administrative
and implicit change, to concerned critics it indicates another
and political reality: Although the constitution may well allow
the equality of chances, and widens the gap between constitution
mentary parties to which it is confined. This clearly violates
onoma, by one-sided privileges, the (three) established barlies-

- 47 -

- 48 -

The new party in power

The character of the new party system as it developed under such changing conditions, was marked first of all by the formation of the CDU in 1945. A new party of declaredly bi-confessional structure, the CDU aimed from the beginning at a big omnium-party (Sammelpartei) beside the traditional class party of the SPD. Its very existence constitutes a key to the question of continuity and change in the German party system. While the idea of a Christian party reflects a European phenomenon, the founding conceptions reach back into the failure of confessional and middle class groupings in the Weimar Republic³²; they can be traced back to 19th century impulses and influenced the early attempts, in 1918-20, to establish a Christian People's Party from the catholic Center Party, protestant groups and Christian labour unions (Adam Stegerwald). But actually the immediate impulses at stem from the common experiences of both churches under the Nazi regime, and from the general idea that only by overcoming the traditional gulf between the confessions a democratic state could find the essential amount of consensus and integration of the population.

This basic exit-point is visible in the various founding groups which at the same time, inspite of considerable differences in origin, tradition and region, met at separate places of occupied Germany during spring and summer 1945.³³) They had considerable obstacles to overcome : the mistrust of occupying powers, the difficulties of national contracts under poor traffic conditions, the widespread aversion against any kind of politics after the over-exertion of the Nazi period. Among the "founding fathers", three types stand out : former leaders of the Center Party who now

- 49 -

- 48 -

types stand out : former leaders of the Center Party who now exertion of the Nazi period. Among the "tombstone fathers," three the common achievement against and kind of politics after the over-dissolution of national contracts under poor traffic conditions, opatocytes to overcome : the matrat of occupying powers, the Germany during arising and summer 1942.⁵²) They had considerable origin, tradition and region, met at separate places of occupied which at the same time, inabte of considerable difference in this case exit-point is cleaved in the various tombstone groups essential amount of consensus and integration of the population. Each between the confessions a democratic state config find the from the General ideas that only by overcoming the traditional common experiences of both countries under the Nazi regime, and Stedemaid). But actually the immediate influence of the atom from the Center Party, protestant groups and Christian labour unions (Adam 1918-50, to e.g. platform a Christian People's party from the Catholic to 19th century注入es and influenced the early attempts, in class groups in the Weimar Republic; they can be traced back to the late 19th century and middle Christian party reflects a European phenomenon, the founding of a very existence constitutes a key to the question of continu- (Sammejbarter) people the traditional class party of the SD. The character of the new party system as it developed under such the ODU in 1942. A new party of de facto confessional at- changing conditions, was marked first of all by the formation of

The new party in power

- 48 -

- 49 -

- with consent of the church - decided to oppose the revival of a confessionally limited party; exponents of the former Christian labour movement (Stegerwald, Arnold); and various groups representing political protestantism of a social, liberal, or even conservative type, with close connections to the anti-Nazi resistance. Their common bond was the will to a truly new beginning of German political life, and the conviction that after the failure and deflation of the traditional ideologies only the Christian foundation of politics had remained. This was enhanced by the fact that in 1945 the churches appeared as the only pillars with authority and organisational strength: here German politics could come into play versus the Allies.

Will to turn-about (Umkehr), social reform and a broader political alliance on the basis of Christian principles were the motives embodied in the earliest programs of the CDU circles formed first and independent from each other, in Cologne (Schwering) and Berlin (Hermes) during summer 1945, even before party life was allowed in Germany. It must be stressed that while Adenauer did not belong to theses first circles - he watched their efforts cautiously before joining the rising CDU - such programs until 1947 aimed at true reform, not restoration of the socio-economic structure of German politics. In the program of Ahlen (February 1947), the CDU of the British Zone still followed the reform ideas of labour unionist forces around Karl Arnold. German reconstruction was to be pursued against any restoration of monopolies and capitalist economies, by a system of socializing (Vergesellschaftung) of big industries.

- 50 -

- 20 -

industries.

economics, by a system of socialising (Verkeerselssocialtung) of pit
be harmed against and restoration of monopolies and cartels
unlimited forces around Karl Arnold. German reconstruction was to
of the British Zone after followed the reform ideas of Japan
German politics. In the program of Aden (February 1943), the CDU
take reform, not restoration of the socio-economic structure of
tore joining the rising CDU - such programs until 1947 aimed at
to these first circles - he watched their efforts cautiously pe-
Germany. It must be stressed that while Adenauer did not belong
(Hermea) during summer 1942, even before party file was allowed in
and independent from each other, in Cologne (Schwerin) and Berlin
emailed in the earliest programme of the CDU circles named that
alliance on the part of Christian parties were the motives
will to turn-apout (Umkern), social reform and a proper political
play around the Villes.

and organisational strength: here German politics could come into
in 1942 the opinion ascertained as the only billera with authority
tion of politics had remained. This was enhanced by the fact that
tiation of the traditional ideologies only the Christian founda-
political file, and the conviction that after the failure and de-
Their common bond was the will to a truly new beginning of German
active life, with close connections to the anti-Maxist resistance.
ting political protestantism of a society, lipsers, or even conver-
tion movement (Stegerwald, Arnold); and various groups repressen-
s con Legesally limited party; exponents of the former Opinion
- with consent of the church - decided to oppose the revival of

- 49 -

- 50 -

But less than two years later, the liberal capitalist wing of the expanding party had won the upperhand. The Düsseldorf program of Juli 1949 decided to follow the path of a social free market economy (**soziale Marktwirtschaft**) now symbolized in the rising role of Ludwig Erhard, who had joined the party only in 1948, while still tending towards the liberal FDP, and against even American advice decided to restore economic liberalism. Among the reasons for his success were of course the changed conditions of economic policy caused by the stop of industrial demobilization in West Germany and the impulses of the currency reform of June 1948. Even more important seems the fact that in the meantime the CDU had become a party of the middle class to the right of the SPD. Different from the original position, the CDU adapted itself to the concrete political situation in which the competition for power with the SPD seemed to require an alliance with the liberal-bourgeois FDP.

The SPD leadership as well as the CDU had become convinced, in spite of their coalitions on the states level, that not a great coalition but (along with the polarization of the party system) a clear distinction of responsible government and constructive opposition would correspond to a functioning parliamentary democracy on the federal level - while in the Weimar Republic a destructive opposition was left to extremist groups.

The consequence was the middle class Party of 1949 dominated increasingly by the anti-leftist politics of Adenauer³⁴. The formation of a bourgeois bloc (**Bürgerblock**) with the FDP was of course not without problems, However, repeated coalition crises and conflicts within the CDU, especially with its labour wing, by Adenauer political shrewdness were even turned into growing strength and almost monopoly power of a party posing as a bridge **Volkspartei**.

- 51 -

- 21 -

almost monopolar power of a party, but being as a poor [Aefkeberter]. political anarchy were even turned into growing strength and effects within the CDU, especially with its fapour wing, by Agensner not without problems. However, repeated coalition crises and combination of a pompeioe pico (Bitterplock) with the SPD was of course increasingly by the anti-leftist party of Agensner²⁴. The formation of a pompeioe pico (Bitterplock) with the SPD was of course creatingly by the anti-leftist party of Agensner²⁴. The formation of a pompeioe pico (Bitterplock) with the SPD was of course creatingly by the anti-leftist party of Agensner²⁴. The consequence was the middle class party of 1948 dominated in five opposition was left to extremist Gronbe.

cracy on the federal level - while in the German Reichsland a federal opposition would correspond to a functioning parliamentary government of a clear distinction of reasonable government and conservative coalition put (along with the polarization of the party system) aside of their coalitions on the state level, that not a great The SPD leadership as well as the CDU had become convinced, in 1938 seemed to require an alliance with the federal-pompeioe SPD. political situation in which the competition for power with the from the original position, the CDU adapted itself to the concrete a party of the middle class to the right of the SPD. Different important seems the fact that in the meantime the CDU had become and the influence of the currency reform of June 1948. Even more owned by the stock of industrial demobilization in West Germany ancesses were of course the changed conditions of economic policy decided to restore economic left倾favour among the reasons for the partying towards the federal SPD, and against even American advice role of Ingwulf Ernberg's party joined the party only in 1948, while economy (Aosinte Marktwirtschaft) now expanded in the rising

- 20 -

- 51 -

Such a development, along with the peculiar *origin* of the new party, shaped its structure as a loose combination of various elements: the Center tradition in catholic regions, yet modified by the post war *population*; middle class conservatism in protestant regions, especially northern Germany, of liberal and nationalist traditions; Bavarian regionalism with its own party organisation (CDU) traditionally stressing autonomy within a "partnership" (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) with the CDU; while under Weimar separated from the Center Party (as BVP), the Bavarians displayed their *autonomism* in opposition votes against the Basic Law, and, presently in the conflicts between Strauss und Erhard (who ironically, as a native of Fürth, belongs to the Bavarian branch as well).

Under such circumstances, the political constellation and the economic success of the Adenauer course was indeed a precondition for the development of a party whose structure was strongly decentralized. Only long after the narrowly favourable elections of 1949 the CDU met for its first federal congress at Goslar (October 1950). The structure remained loose and heterogeneous, the character was that of a member party but of a combination of notables, associations and voters (*Honoratioren- und Wähler-Partei*), with ca. 250 000 members only (2% of the voters as against 7% of the SPD).

One of the latent problems of the "Christian Party" has remained its confessional structure. While the attempts to bridge the confessions undoubtedly mark a progress beyond former stages of conflicts, the real situation is very different in different regions. On the federal level, the catholic element is stronger, by 3:2, than the protestant voters of the CDU; this is even more conspicuous in political bodies and in party membership (almost 3/4 catholics) while in leading ministerial positions demonstratively

- 52 -

- 25 -

thousands) while in leading material positions demonstratively
on the political platforms and in party meetings (almost 3/4 es-
cept the protestant voters of the CDU; this is even more compro-
mising, the federal level, the catholic element is stronger, p. 3:5,
and so on). The real situation is very different in different regions,
and so also the political platform of the CDU remains the same.

With 520,000 members only (5% of the voters as against 1% of
tables, associations and voters (Honoratioren- und Wunder-Bartel)).
There was that not of a member party but of a competition of no-
more than 100). The atomise remained loose and heterogeneous, the charac-
ter of the CDU met for the first federal congress at Goarl (October
1949). Only long after the narrowly favourable elections of
for the development of a party whose atomise was strongly de-
nomic and close to the Adenauer course was indeed a precondition
Under such circumstances, the political constellation and the eco-
nomic of the party, belong to the Bavarian branch as well).

in the conflicts between Strasse und Erard (who previously as a
autonomist in opposition votes against the Basic Law, and because
from the Center Party (as BAI), the Bavarians displayed their
(Vorbeifahreinrichtung) with the CDU; while under Weimar separated
(CDU) traditionally addressing autonomy within a "bundesrepublik"
traditions: Bavarian regionalism with its own party organisation
regions, especially northern Germany, of federal and nationalist
parties, and its atomise as a loose combination of various
and so a development, along with the bestial General of the new

and so a development, along with the bestial General of the new
and so a development, along with the bestial General of the new
and so a development, along with the bestial General of the new
and so a development, along with the bestial General of the new

- 27 -

- 52 -

a proportional representation of confessions (Proporz) is practiced. The social structure of membership shows middle class character with a relatively small portion of workers (15% as against 45% in the SPD) and a high percentage of professionals (23% against 12%) and farmers (15% against 2% SPD). The ambition of a Volkspartei is rather more materialized in the composition of the voters. In the elections the CDU prevailed especially among women, among voters over 55 years, and among professionals and farmers, while its percentage of workers was considerably higher than in party membership.

As a declared party of confessional and social balance, the CDU has of course tried to conceal its increasing dependence on business and industry in the course of the <u>soziale Marktwirtschaft</u>: Actually, those circles are definitely over represented in the parliamentary and government posts held by the CDU. The same is true of the very influential agrarian wing of the party which takes advantage of the farmers' traditional distrust toward the SPD. Apart from and even in contrast to its ideological claims as "the" Christian party, the CDU appears indeed as a huge <u>ad-hoc</u> association of interests for the sake of placing candidates, to be compared to American platform parties rather than to any traditional type of German parties.

This character is also visible in the structure of party leadership. Quite different from the strict SPD organisation, the CDU shows a changing structure of power and responsibilities, with strong regional and personal elements. This was balanced, however, by the central position of Adenauer as permanent chairman; while after his resignation as chancellor a dualism between party and government leadership becomes possible, the Adenauer of 1949-1963 proved very able in founding his superior power position on play-

- 53 -

- 23 -

brought very able in touching life and/or power position on risk-
government leadership comes boshipy, the Agenser of 1960-1965
after his resignation as chancellor a quislim between party and
by the central position of Agenser as permanent chairman while
strong regional and personal elements. There was balanced, however,
epox a changing structure of power and reasonableness, with
upb. Quite different from the strict BHD organization, the ODU
This character is also viable in the structure of party lesser-
ditional type of German parties.

be compared to American platform parties rather than to any
association of interests for the sake of placing candidates, to
see "the" Christian party, the ODU appears indeed as a huge ag-poo
2HD. Apart from and even in contrast to its ideological claims
takes advantage of the farmers' traditional elitism toward the
time of the very influential agrarian wing of the party which
parliamentary and Government boats held by the ODU. The same is
actually, those circles are definitely over represented in the
name and industry in the core of the socialist Marktwirtschaft;
use of name tried to conceal its increasing dependence on post-
As a declared party of conualsional and social balance, the ODU
membership.

its percentage of workers was considerably higher than in party
voters over 25 years, and among professionals and farmers, while
in the elections the ODU prevailed especially among women, among
the rather more materialised in the composition of the voters.
15% and farmers (12% against 5% 2HD). The ambition of a
workbar-
in the 2HD) and a high percentage of professionals (5% against
with a relatively small portion of workers (12% as against 42%
The socialist structure of membership shows middle class character
a proportional representation of conualsions (Probus) is practiced

- 25 -

- 53 -

ing the various party groups against each other and acting like a supreme arbiter with his successful command of the **Kanzlerdemokratie** as source of authority. Consequently, the party conferences had often the character of acclamatory meetings, attempts at reforms showed little result, even after the appointment of an "acting chairman" (Dufhues) after the set-backs of 1961, had little effect. While Adenauer continued, on his part, to be an "acting" chairman, while the unique constellation of the Adenauer era has come to an end, for the time being any solution is suspended, as long as the party still tolerates, under changed government conditions, the remnants of that era in form of Adenauer's party leadership.

Another important problem lies in the fact that the protestant politicians of the party, though after Adenauer's retiring from government occupying leading posts in the establishment (Erhard, Schröder, Hassel, Gerstenmaier), cannot count on the same degree of support from their church; German protestantism by its very nature has remained split up into different directions, with a strong leftist tendency among the groups of the (anti-Nazi) confessional Church (Bekennende Kirche), while the protestant church organization has always declined to follow the practice of the catholic church in adorting its members to vote CDU. This makes a great difference to periods in which the same posts had been filled with catholic politicians: Adenauer, Brentano, Strauss.

But more important seem the implications stemming from the course of foreign policy and particularly in relation to the reunification question. While economic advance and political stability confirmed the course of "neo-liberalism" and integration into the West, and made for the rising popularity of Adenauer' and Erhard's

- 54 -

- 24 -

West, and made for the rising popularity of Adenauer, and Ernst's
confirmed the course of "neo-fascism" and integration into the
tion question. While economic advance and political stability
of foreign policy and barterly in relation to the remittances
But more important seem the implications stemming from the course
with Catholic politicians: Adenauer, Brentano, Strasburg.
difference to periods in which the same boats had been filled
launch in supporting its members to vote CDU. This makes a great
station has always declined to follow the practice of the Catholic
Church (Bekennende Kirche) while the Protestant church organi-
zation is still the largest in the country.
has remained split into different directions, with a strong
ambient from their own; German protestantism by its very nature
Schroder-Hassel, Gerstenmaier), cannot count on the same degree of
Government coordinating feeding boats in the eastwardment (Erdberg,
bottlenecks of the party, though after Adenauer's retiring from
Another important problem lies in the fact that the protestant
the remnants of that era in form of Adenauer's party leadership.
as the party atilt tolerates, under changed Government conditions,
continues for the time being and solution is anabended, as long
as the unique constellation of the Adenauer era cannot be
attacked. While the unique constellation of the Adenauer era cannot be
attacked by the same parties, to be an "acting" chair-
ting chairman" (Duchesne) after the set-packs of 1931 had little
at reforma showed little result, even the abatement of an "ac-
tency had often the character of acolomatory meetings, attempts
democratic as source of authority. Consequently, the party con-
sensus as a whole is the successful command of the Kanzler-
ing the various party groups against each other and acting like

- 23 -

- 54 -

CDU, the hypothesis of "reunification by strength", with the ex-
pectation of an almost automatic solution of the German division,
proved an illusion when the Berlin wall was built: the event cost
the majority in the elections of 1961. A strictly defensive non-
policy towards the East was the reverse to the Christian Demo-
cratic vote for the Western Alliance. Combined with militant
anti-communism, such a course proved most popular among the West
German voter. But it could result in a crisis of the party itself
if a loosening of the East-West confrontation would demand more
flexibility in the German question, and a more active policy with
respect to Eastern Europe.35) Discussion on that basic problem
touches the very foundations of party development during the
Adenauer period; it has recently created considerable splits within
the CDU leadership and may influence its hold on members and
voters. Yet while the loss of a clear and simple picture of the
best way of German politics may create further problems of re-
orientation and adaptation to changing situations in East and West
and to the challenge of a new party with a successful past but little coherence
in organization, the main dangers at present come from personal
constellations: from the old rivalry of Adenauer and Erhard, and
from conflicts between the groups around potential successors like
Strauss and Schröder, aggravated by the disputes of the Gaullists
versus the Atlanticists.

But evidently the CDU cannot only build on a short yet proud
history; it has also inherited from the Center Party the practical
skill and the tenacity in compromising different interests and
opinions and in handling changing situations. It seems unlikely
that the subtle use of Arnold Heidenheimer's book could be inverted to
the diagnosis: "the death of the leader and the disinterpretation
of the party". The CDU may suffer setbacks, but as a foremost

indicator of a new German party system it will keep its place
within the two-party trend of that system.

Indicator of a new German party system if will keep its face
within the two-party trend of that system.

or the party". The CDU may submit proposals, put as a foreword
the diagnosis: "the death of the leader and the disintegration
that the surplus of Arnold Heuermeier's book says inverted
opinions and in pending continuing situations. It seems mainly
skilful and the tendency in combating different interests and
policy: it has also inherited from the Center Party the practical
But largely the CDU cannot only build on a short bet long
after the Atlanticata.

Strikes and negotiations, aggravated by the diabetes of the German
from conflicts between the groups around potential successors like
constellations: from the old rivalry of VdEener and SPD, and
in organisation, the main gangster at present come from bereav-
ing General with a necessary beat put little coherence
and to the Charles de Lattre's orientation and adaptation to ongoing situations in East and West
part with German bohemians may create further problems of re-
views. But with the loss of a clear and simple picture of the
the CDU leadership and mass influence its hold on members and
VdEener period: they recently created considerate shifts within
took the very foundations of party development during the
rebirth to Eastern Europe.²²) Discussion on that pale problem
flexibility in the German system, and a more active bohem with
it a loosening of the East-West confrontation would demand more
German voters. But it could result in a crisis of the party itself
anti-communism, and a course proved most beneficial among the West
electoral vote for the Western Alliance. Complied with sufficient
bohem towards the East was the reverse to the Christian Demo-
the majority in the elections of 1948. A strictly defensive non-
proved an illusion when the Berlin wall was built: the event cost
becomes of an almost automatic solution of the German crisis.
CDU, the platform of "Reunification by strength", with the ex-

- 24 -

- 55 -

IV. An old party in change: SPD between opposition
---
and adaptation.

Two facts have influenced greatly the difficult way of the SPD in
the Bonn Republic. The division of Germany separated this party
from the industrial regions of traditional socialist strength
in provinces now under Soviet occupation; and the coalition of
CDU and FDP in 1949 pushed the SPD, by a close margin, actually,
Adenauer's vote for himself as first chancellor contributed to
the decision, about the way the SPD had to choose -
a way which has shaped deeply the party's profile in the new state
and structured the future fronts.

In contrast to the CDU, party tradition and continuity was strong
in the new beginnings of the SPD. As the oldest German party
(founded in 1863), and for decades first in strength, the SPD
could even rely on a partial continuance of its executive committee
in exile (London) to bridge the gulf between the suppression of
the party in 1933 and its reformation in 1945. But this continuity
was not quite unbroken, and it posed a number of problems for the
renewal of the party and its development³⁷). The SPD of 1945 inherited
the classical confrontations that had complicated its way through
the Weimar Republic. Two questions stood out. Should the SPD re-
main a (workers) class party based on Marxist ideology, or, follow
the trend to a broader Volkspartei with pragmatic outlook ? And
should it stress the international traditions of the workers
movement or rather play the role of a national party in a state
of national emergency ?

- 56 -

- 26 -

of national emergency?

movement or rather play the role of a national party in a state
should it arise the international traditions of the workers
the trend to a **prosperous Workers' party** with **brutal** outlook? And
main a (workers) class party based on Marxist ideology, or, follow
the Weimar Republic. Two questions stood out. Should the SPD re-
the classical confrontations that had complicated its way through
new waves of class antagonism and development.²⁷). The SPD of 1942 inherited
was not quite unbroken, and it based a number of problems for the
the party in 1923 and its reform in 1942. But this continuity
in life (Reich) - to bridge the gap between the submission of
conglomerated and a partial continuance of its executive committee
(formed in 1862), and for decades that in strength, the SPD
in the new beginning of the 20th. As the oldest German party

In contrast to the CDP, party tradition and continuity was strong
and atomised the future frontiers.

a way which has abided deeply the party's profile in the new state
the decision, spent the way into opposition the SPD had to choose -
Volkersmann's vote for himself as first chancellor contributed to
CDU and SPD in 1949 shaped the SPD's a close mark in the middle.
In broaches now under Soviet occupation and the coalition of
from the industrial regions of traditional socialist strength
the Bonn Republic. The division of Germany separated the party
Two facts have influenced greatly the drift way of the SPD in
and adaptation.

IV. On old party in change: SPD between opposition

- 22 -

- 56 -

The first consideration led to lengthy conflicts ending finally with the reform program of Bad Godesberg (1959) in which the traditions of "reformism" in practical politics gained final predominance over the conflicting tradition of Marxist-ridden party programs. As to the second question, there were strong feelings that the SPD had neglected, during the Weimar period, the national sentiments and emotions; diffamed as unpatriotic internationalists (vaterlandslose Gesellen), the Social Democrats had failed to block the rise of extremism and to profit from the service they rendered the German state in 1918 and after. This had been a permanent topic of the post-1933 discussion among the persecuted or exiled Socialists. Consequently, the political course of Kurt Schumacher was marked by a tendency to oppose Adenauer, from the very beginning, on the issue of national interests versus a western alliance on the basis of the German division³⁸). His rejection of the collective - guilt - thesis, his strong criticism of the Allies, his reproaches against (the"Chancellor of the Allies" in a nightly (1949) parliamentary debate) marked a new tone in the history of Social Democratic politics. But it has to be understood as both, an attempt to cope with the old problem of Socialist attitudes toward national politics, and a sincere - and not unjustified - fear that western integration policy might further complicate or even deepen the cleavage of Germany.

Thus the SPD of 1945 and 1949 was more than a party tied to a stock of old traditions. It had its aspects of new beginning, too. The different elements were visible in the leaders of Schumscher, the Prussian Socialist and invalid of world war I, a leader of charismatic qualities; shaped by Nazi persecution, concentration camps and the disappointment of 1949 into rigidity, he led

- 57 -

- 21 -

circumstantial qualities; ascribed by MaxHEREAUGUSTE! he fed
the Prussian Socialist and invalid of world war I, a leader of
the different elements were able in the leadership. So much so,
a stock of old traditions. It had its aspects of new beginning, too.
Time the END of 1942 and 1949 was more than a party tied to a
the Franke of Germany.

western integration definitely might further complicate or even weaken
national politics, and a sincere - and not unattested - fear that
tempt to code with the old problem of socialist attitudes toward
Democratic politics. But it has to be determined as both, an at-
britishment debate marked a new tone in the history of Social
reproaches against the Chancellor of the Allee" in a rightly
right - Griff - theme, his strong criticism of the Allee, his
the phase of the German division" (28).
His rejection of the collec-
on the issue of national interests versus a western alliance on
marked by a tendency to impose Aussenauer, from the very beginning,
exiled Socialists, and the political connex of Kurt Schmønker was
mentative topic of the boat-1922 discussion among the bereacanted or
rendered the German state in 1918 and after. This had been a per-
lock the rise of extremism and to profit from the service they
(vaterlandalose Gesellen), the Social Democrats had failed to
sentiments and emotions: justified as patriotic internationalists
that the SPD had neglected, in the Weimar period, the national
programme. As to the second question, there were strong feelings
dominance over the conflicting tradition of Marxist-riggen party
groups of "reformism" in practical politics gained from pre-
with the reform program of Red Geodesen (1926) in which the tra-
The latter consideration led to lengthy conflicts ensuing finally

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- 57 -

the party into a heavy two-front fight against Communism and the "bourgeois" parties alike Erich Ollenhauer, the exponent of the exile committee in London, leading the party into a second period of gradual change in the fifties, And Otto Grotewohl, head of the East German SPD who represented the quest for Socialist unity with the Communists, motivated by the failure, in 1930-33, of a split Left to unite against Nazism. The special problems of non-communist socialism in divided Berlin and the Soviet zone supported the illusions and dangers in such tendencies which led to the forced fusion of SPD and KPD, as "Socialist Unity Party"(SED) with monopoly position in East Germany (April 1946). On the other hand, the SPD under Schumacher and Ollenhauer, while consequently resisting such a misuse of the well-sounding paroles of a Socialist unity or anti-fascist front, was wholly confined to the West when the first party congress of May 1946 confirmed the decision for a free and independent policy. The expectations for a leading position in post-war Germany, justified by the anti-Nazi profile, the democratic tradition and a strong party organisation, were frustrated no less by that loss of traditional socialist strongholds than by the rise of the CDU which in turn it facilitated; more successful proved the attempts, by Adenauer and CDU propaganda, to nourish suspicions against the SPD as being close to communism, and by identifying socialism and communism. Schumacher's faith that new German democracy would be socialist or not at all, came to nothing when the cold war deepened anti-left feelings; they could not even be balanced by the leading role the Socialists played during the Berlin blockade (Ernst Reuter).

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It is true, with amazing speed the party organisation was reestablished and a mass membership of (1947) 900 000, finally 650 000 was re-collected. But here too, continuity and change were conflicting issues during the years to come. The strength and weaknesses of a strict party structure, its striking power and its bureaucratic tendencies alike, were also present in the new SPD. Yet this time the chances for a greater degree of mobility by gradual rejuvenating and broadening the party into a progressive Volkspartei were favoured by the virtual disappearance of communist rivalry to the left and a loosening of class structure to the right. The party began to burst traditional bonds, partly self-imposed, and in the course of the years the SPD reached a voting strength it never possessed in the past. A process of dropping ideological burdens, though slow and painful, influenced the party to the top. While retaining the centralized structure, with a small executive committee ruling between the bi-annual party congresses, after Schumacher's death (1952) the strong, almost charismatic leadership of that militant fighter against Adenauer, economic liberalism, and unilateral Western orientation and re-armament was replaced by the friendly, less profiled leadership of Ollenhauer.

With the personalization of the federal elections, in 1953 and 1957, such a course was unable to compete successfully with the Adenauer image. But it prepared the way for the final break through of a "new party" in the program adopted at Bad Godesberg (1959). The question remained, how far the traditional domains of a class A member party were endangered by such experiments; here much more than in ideological dissensus were motives for further

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- 28 -

which more than in ideological quaesions were motives for further
a class of member party were encouraged by such experiments; here
(1923). The question remained, how far the traditional domains of
through of a "new party" in the program adopted at Red Godseberg
Adenauer image. But it prepared the way for the final preek
1927, and a course was made to compete successfully with the
With the personalization of the federal elections, in 1923 and
of Offenburger.

re-union was replaced by the friendly, less profiled leadership
of Adenauer, economic fideiصلism, unilatersl Western orientation and
armament charismatic leadership of that militant fighter against
party congresses, after Schmønner's death (1925) the strong,
with a small executive committee ruling between the bi-annual
the party to the top. While retaining the centralized structure,
grobbing ideological purgation, though slow and painful, influenced
voting strength it never possessed in the past. A process of co-
self-imposed, and in the course of the years the SDH reached a
the right. The party began to purist traditional bonds, partly
that rivalry to the left and a loosening of class structure to
**Volksbürger** were favoured by the virtual disasherence of commu-
nisal retrenching and prolonging the party into a progressive
Yet this time the chances for a greater degree of mobility by
pneunistic tendencies arise, were also present in the new SDH.
nesses of a strict party structure, its striking power and its
officiating names during the years to come. The strength and weak-
ness was re-collected. But here too, continuity and change were con-
pished and a mass membership of (1947) 800 000, finally 120 000
It is true, with amazing speed the party organization was reesta-

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- 59 -

conflicts within the SPD. But with the growing stature and public appeal of Willy Brandt, in the course of the Berlin conflict of 1958, and with the resolute support of Herbert Wehner - who as an ex-Communist was first hold to be left wing -, the party stood the evolution without losses; all attempts by disappointed rebels, to rally true leftism against such pragmatism, failed clearly. The traditional function of a Socialist party substituting home or even church for a deprived class, incorporated in numerous sub-organisations (for youth, women, adult education, mutual assistance, relaxation and sport), was still quite effective. But now the party was to disassociate such activities from the former meaning of *Ersatzreligion*. The congress of 1954 (Berlin) already followed this line, by defining Christianity, humanity and classical philosophy as the intellectual and moral roots of socialist thought.

At the same time, the SPD began to bridge the gap to the catholic church; considerable parts of protestantism - especially of the anti-Nazi "Confessional Church" - had turned left anyhow. The traditional opposition against clericalism in politics, culture and school found milder forms, while the claims for cooperation and the "tactics of embracing" (Umarmungstaktik) became strong. Such efforts reached a peak with the favourable interpretation of pope John's (XXIII.) *cyclica Mater et Magistra*. It paralleled the tactics of "positive opposition", by which the SPD since 1959/60 determined its relations to government politics. This tendency has occasionally even led to the consequence of supporting Erhard and Schröder against the Adenauer-Strauss camarillas. There is of course the hope of profiting from further dissensus and dualism within the CDU. But such a prepared yet in the old confrontation

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- 60 -

within the GDR. But such preparation did in the old confrontation of course the hope of prototyping from further dissimilar and dissimilarly shaped against the Adenauer-Stromas camouflages. There is the occasionally even led to the consequence of supporting Ernberg to determine its relations to government politics. This tendency the tactics of "positive opposition" had which the SDH since 1928/29 brought to (XXIII.) politics Water et Meisner. It transferred to efforts reached a task with the favourable interpretation of and the "tactic of embracing" (Unsinnkraftart) become strong. And school to bring wider forms, while the claims for cooperation and traditional opposition against of course in politics, culture anti-state "Contraesional Church" - had turned felt anew. The church; considerate parts of protestantism - especially of the at the same time, the SDH began to bridge the gap to the catholic thought.

cal philosophy as the intellectual and moral roots of socialist followed this line, by getting Christianity, humanity and class- meaning of Breakeffekt. The congress of 1924 (Berlin) agreed the party was to dissociate such activities from the former absence, relaxation and short, was still quite effective. But now and organisations (for youth, women, adult education, mutual self- or even church for a deprived class, incorporated in numerous The traditional function of a socialist party and constituting home to really time felt the same against such pragmatism, failed clearly. Evolution without loss; all attempts by grassrooted rebels, Communists was that hold to be felt wing - the party stood the and with the absolute endport of Herbert Meyer - who as an ex- abber of Willy Brungt, in the course of the Berlin conflict, conflicts within the SDH. But with the growing atrophy and public

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of revolutionary theory and reformist practice was founded more deeply in an assessment of the social and intellectual change, with the advance of pragmatism in politics, the fading of ideologies and a shifting of traditional class structure. Consequently, the SPD like the CDU began to focus interest much more on the attitudes of voters than on class theories and politics by Socialist principles. Sharp and undogmatic analysis of voting behaviour within the changing social and psychological structure of the West German population led to new methods of appeal and propaganda as developed by modern market and opinion research.

The disappointing experiences of Weimar and the postwar opposition period seemed to point to such a course as the only way forward, restricting the SPD to an ineffective one-third-of-the-vote position and bursting open the traditional "tower of the 30%" keeping the party from power. It is reflected in the sweeping programs and platforms which allow for the confessional bonds of the middle class and catholic workers (e.g. in the Ruhr district) as well as for the progressive liberalism of a bourgeoisie traditionally anticlerical and anti-socialist; at least everything might be avoided that could repel such groups on the way of further SPD expansion. "Positive" values, optimism and confidence displayed on blue colored posters, instead of the red-flag battle slogans of classical socialism, were the means to convince non-socialist sections of potential voters of the undangerous and constructive character of the SPD, and to familiarize them with the image of a new party that commanded a great history but no longer meant an actual threat to the bourgeois. Instead of a Marxism passed into history, this strategy marks the essence of the SPD position toward the one hand, the FDP on the other. Since competition

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- el

the fact that the one hand, the FDB on the other. Since competition
happened, this strategy marks the essence of the 2ND position toward
actual threat to the pompeia. Instead of a Markham based into
a new way that commanded a great history put no longer meant an
character of the 2ND, and to familiarize them with the image of
sections of potential voters of the ngbankers and contraventions
of classical socialism, were the means to convince non-socialist
on pine colored posters, instead of the red-lilac pattyalogues
expansion. "Positive" axioms, philosophy and confidence displayed
evolved that could rebel such groups on the way of further 2ND
antifederal and anti-socialist at least everything might be
as for the progressive federalism of a ponaguate traditionally
of class and catholic workers (e.g. in the Nkrut district) as well
platforms which allow for the conceptual pence of the middle
party from power. It is reflected in the sweeping programs and
en-punishing oven the traditional "tower of the 30" keeping the
carrotting the 2ND to an ineffective one-third-of-the-vote position
period as seemed to point to such a course as the only way forward.
The gaubpointing experiences of Weimar and the boatman opposition
and opinion research.

methods of sheet and broadsides as developed by modern market
philosophical structure of the West German邦nification led to new
survival of voting behaviour within the changing social and paty-
raise and politics dy Socialist bruntigee. Sharp and ngomistic
interest much more on the attitudes of voters than on class theo-
matism⁴⁰). Consequently, the 2ND like the CDU began to loose
the taking of ideologies and a shifting of traditional class
reflectual change, with the advance of socialism in politics,
was founded more deeply in an assessment of the social and in-
of revolutionary theory and reformist practice process of change

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[Lc]

decimated and finally outlawed
to the left has disappeared with the KPD (and leftist organisations
like the DFU remaining splinter-groups), expansion to the right
is indeed the primary goal.

The way from class party to **Volkspartei**, so evidently the **signum temporis**, has its parallel in the way the "catholic ghetto" of the Center Party was overcome by the CDU; it was the burst of the "social ghetto" by shaking off burdens imposed by history and dogma. Such a process was prepared for a long time with the increase of social mobility. But it was delayed and slowed down by a lag of political consciousness. In the field of social psychology, the historical front of socialism versus liberalism, with the strict confrontation of the solid **Bürger** and the revolutionary "reds", is still present. But now it seems no longer impossible, to middle class liberals, to vote for the party that used to scare the middle class (Bürgerschreck). The breakthrough has particular effects on intellectuals and, for the first time, wins influence in wider parts of the university. Not only a German Labour Party (of the English model), but a progressive Democratic Party (with the demonstrative parallel of Kennedy - Brandt) was the goal of such an adaptation to a pragmatic system of platform parties and to the trend toward a two-party system, in which government and opposition party represent alternatives of political functions, not of ideological or class character. In practical politics, this means for instance that **soziale Marktwirtschaft** is no longer opposed with plain socialism, but just with a shifting of accent on the term social (instead of market), implying more stress on social justice and political control. At the same time, attractive candidates and a more flexible organisation are to popularize and broaden such an approach.

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- 25 -

and proposed an approach.

The candidates and a more flexible organization are to be chosen on social justice and political control. At the same time, attention on the term 'social (instead of market)', implying more areas opposed with plain socialism, put just with a shifting of accent

means for instance that _social marketwirtschaft_ is no longer of ideological or class character. In practical politics, this action party represent alternatives of political functions, not trend toward a two-party system, in which government and opposition to a pragmatic system of platform parties and to the democraticifier of Kennedy - Brundt) was the goal of and the English model), put a progressive democratic party (with the parties of the university. Not only a German Lepoux Party (of the intellectualists and, for the first time, wine influence in wider class (Bitterauprock). The preeminently has partitionist effects on parties, to vote for the party that need to acquire the middle class. But now it seems no longer impossible, to middle class

present. But now it seems no longer impossible, to middle class
tation of the solid Bitter and the revolutionarily "right". It is still
cal front of socialism versus leftism, with the strict control-
of-consonance. In the field of social psychology, the histori-
ing social methodology. But it was delayed and allowed down by a lag
of such a process was prepared for a long time with the increase
"social betto" by shaking off prunes imposed by history and go-
Center Party was overcome by the CDU; it was the main of the
temboria, has its parallel in the way the "catholic betto" of the
The way from class party to Volksparter, so evidently the atom
is indeed the primary goal.

like the DU remaining aprinter-Gronbe), expansion to the right
to the left has disappointed with the KDP (and leftist organizations

- 21 -

- 62 -

After the failure of the "Ollenhauer-election" of 1957, the attempts to use the combined appeal of popular Länder "kings" (like Zinn, Kaisen, Brauer, Kopf) still had to overcome considerable resistance by the party apparatus. A turning point was the victory of Willy Brandt over his rival in Berlin, Franz Neumann, a functionary of great merits since his stand against the formation of the SED, but with *less* understanding for the changing profile of SPD politics in the new era. Since that time (1958) first a "renovation" of the parliamentary leadership, with Professor Carlo Schmid, Wehner and the able Fritz Erler, lifted three highly qualified champions of the modern course to the top; the close cooperation of such different exponents of originally diverging groups demonstrated the retreat from ideological and class politics. Next step was a reform of the executive committee, with Brandt as chancellor candidate besides the loyal Ollenhauer; his death, in 1963, further clarified the structure of leadership. Under Brandt, now chairman, Wehner as vice-chairman was to control the party organisation, while Erler led the parliamentary party.

Such a division of functions has of course its disadvantages. By remaining Mayor of Berlin - a major *main* source of his power, and another proof of the importance of federalism - Brandt misses his function as leader of opposition in parliament. This may be another instance of the decline of parliamentarism in modern democracy. The clear profile of a "shadow cabinet" confronting the government in power is locking, and the present construction burdens Brandt with a double function of great responsibility which may not only overcharge his capacities but also prejudice the further process of party emancipation and flexibility that requires more political skill than the leadership of a closed

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- 23 -

requires more political skill than the leadership of a closed
the further process of party mobilization and flexibility that
which may not only overemphasize his capabilities but also preclude
purposes Brandt with a double function of great reasonability
the government in power is making, and the present construction
democracy, the clear profile of a "asylum cabinet" confronting
be another instance of the decline of parliamentaryism in modern
the function as feeder of education in parliament. This may
another proof of the importance of federalism - Brandt makes
remaining Mayor of Berlin - a former source of his power, and
now a gap between functions as of course in disadvantages. By
party organizations while Erler led the parliamentary party.

Brandt, now chairman Weber and vice-chairman was to control the
in 1963, further clarified the structure of leadership. Under
the chancellor candidate passes the local Offenburger: Die Deut,
Next step was a reform of the executive committee, with Brandt
Gronbe demonstrated the retreat from ideological and close coalition
cooperation of such different exponents of originally diverging
unified champions of the modern course to the top: the close
Carlo Schmidt, Weber and the able Fritz Erler, lifted three highly
"renovation" of the parliamentary leadership, with Professor
of SPD politics in the new era. Since that time (1928) that a
the SPD, put with the "understanding for the changing profile
forward of great merits since he stood against the formation of
of Willy Brandt over the rival in Berlin, Bruns Nenmann, a func-
statute by the party apparatus. A turning point was the analysis
Zinn, Käsen, Bruns, Kohl) still had to overcome considerable re-
tempts to see the combined shadow of bohemian Klang" (like
After the failure of the "Offenburger-election" of 1924, the at-

- 63 -

["- 63 -", "party on beaten tracks. Such problems may not only facilitate the\ncounter-actions of the rival parties, but also confirm the nostal-\ngic criticisms of traditional Socialists within the SPD (or re-\ncently excluded from "(1)41). In the light of these conditions,\nthe elections of 1965 will be a test of major importance.", "But whatever its outcome, the fundamental change will persist to\nthe degree that the party succeeded in transcending its traditio-\nnal handicaps in popular appeal and voting strength. Over the last\nyears, the party has indeed made up its slogan, created by Brandt\nin his efforts to deal with the problems of divided Berlin, sig-\nnifies the general way of the SPD as a changed since\nand the pre-Schumacher periods: \"the politics of the small steps\".\nIt means the victory of reformism, but implies new problems. With\nits ambition to become a governing party, the SPD can now be cri-\nticized for not offering any great political alternative, and for\nrefraining from effective opposition. But exactly such a course\nhas opened more ways of effectively influencing government poli-\ncies: in foreign policy as well as in questions of social reform\nand of modernizing education, with SPD governed Hessen taking the\ninitiative, while the CDU was following with some hesitation.\nOn such grounds the concept of a great coalition, dubious as its\neffects on the practice of parliamentarism may seem, has repeatedly\nbeen considered from both sides during the past years.", "- 64 -"]

- 64 -

The problem of third parties

One party only was able to resist the trend to a concentration
on two political parties. The days of the FDP may be numbered,
but up to date it has maintained its substance as an alternative
to the claims of "Christian" or "Socialist" parties. As long as
some of the ideological or class restrictions persist, a minority
of anticlerical, anti-socialist voters may demand the existence
of a third party - as they do even in "two party" England. The
FDP claims to represent the remaining or revived forces of di-
tical liberalism. Before 1933, the liberals had been divided in
several groups. Their collapse was almost complete, years before
Hitler came to power. As a result, after 1945 many of them went
the way to the CDU (e.g. Ernst-Lemmer) or even to the SPD (e.g.
Adolf Arndt). The expansion of liberal thought into all political
parties seemed indeed to abviate the existence of a liberal prty
of its own[42]. But actually the original approach of the FDP,
with the double front "against clericalism and socialism", proved
more resistent than the special appeals of the other small parties.
The FDP was always characterized by a great diversity of elements;
regional differences kept the party torn by tensions and conflicts.
Its main positions were among small industrialists and tradesmen,
especially in the liberal tradition of South West Germany, while
in the West and North nationalist/traditions prevailed. The
old problem of German liberalism was reflected in those tensions:
divided between rightist and leftist wings, between
**national-**
**liberal** and radicalprogressive ideas, its post-war history

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- 62 -

Tipping and radicalisation increase, its boat-war history
stranded between right-left and left-right while, between national-
ity problem of German tipperism was reflected in these tensions:
in the West and North nationalities developed. The
effectively in the federal tradition of South West Germany, while
its main beneficiaries were among small industrialists and tradesmen.
Regional difference left the party torn by tensions and conflicts.
The LDP was always characterised by a great diversity of elements;
more recent than the special aspects of the other small parties
with the couple front "against erosionism and socialism" proved
of its own⁴²). But actually the original approach of the LDP,
parties seemed indeed to update the existence of a federal party
Vollkung). The expansion of federal thought into all political
the way to the ODU (e.g. Ernst Jenaer) or even to the SD (e.g.
After came to power. As a result, after 1942 many of them went
several groups. Their collabo was almost complete. Also before
toof tipperism. Before 1933, the tippera had been divided in
LDP claims to represent the remaining or revived forces of bi-
of a third party - as they do even in "two parties" (Huygens). The
of antifascist, anti-socialist voters may demand the existence
some of the ideological or class restrictions berating, a minority
to the claims of "Christian" or "Socialist" parties. We look so
but no to date it has maintained its independence as an alternative
on two political parties. The date of the LDP may be numbered.
One party only was able to resist the trend to a concentration

The problem of third parties

- 64 -

- 65 -

was a series of turns and conflicts of groups and personalities⁴³. With its blend of liberalism and nationalism, and its great internal contrast, it played a dramatically changing role as government partner and opposition. The party organization was hardly able to cope with the individualism of true old liberals like Reinhold Maier, Thomas Dehler, and the "Young Turks" (around Döring, Weyer, Scheel, Mende) of Nordrhein-Westfalen. The beginnings of the party showed the regional differences: Southern liberals like Maier and the *éminent* great first chairman, Theodor Heuss, claimed the ideas of 1848 and succession to the Democratic Party of Weimar, while the right wing supported Franz Blücher, who became Adenauers first vice-chancellor. Actually, as a party beyond the *Länder*, the FDP existed only since the end of 1948; the first party congress took place in June 1949. What is more, Theodor Heuss became Germany's first Federal President (1949-1959); in this office he was "neutralized" and practically lost to his party, great as his post was in stabilizing democratic values within the new state⁴⁴).

It is true, the FDP played an important role in putting the new democracy on its way - as the liberals did in 1918: The arch-liberals Heuss and Dehler had a leading post in drawing the constitution. While its liberal profile in the fields of culture, education and civil rights put the FDP in between CDU and SPD, in economic policy the party belonged to the right. It claimed the real authority for the *soziale Marktwirtschaft*: it was Blücher who brought Erhard into politics, by placing him in the Economic Council at Frankfurt, and only then Erhard had decided to join the CDU, mainly for reasons of better working conditions and greater influence with the larger party. Consequently the FDP opposed the demands of economic democracy (*Wirtschaftsdemokratie*).

- 66 -

- 62 -

opposed the demand of economic democracy (Wirtschaftsdemokratie)
greater influence with the larger party. Consequently the SPD
the CDU, mainly for reasons of better working conditions and
Constitut at Frankfurt, and only then Ernberg had decided to join
who brought Ernberg into politics, by placing him in the Economic
the real authority for the so-called Marktwirtschaft: it was BöMer
in economic policy the party belonged to the right. It claimed
education and civil rights but the SPD in between CDU and SD,
attribution. While its federal broil in the field of culture,
liberal parties Hensel and Deuter had a leading seat in drawing the con-
demnation on its way - as the liberal did in 1918: The Reich.
It is true, the SPD played an important role in putting the new
in supporting democratic values within the new state⁴⁴).
that Great and brusquely float to its party, Great as its seat was
first Federal President (1948-1952); in this office he was "non-
decree in June 1949". What is more, Theodor Hensel became Germany's
fated only since the end of 1948: the first party congress took place
convenorship. Voting as a party belong the **Landtag**, the SPD ex-
wing embodied Ernst BöMer, who became Vgennera first vice-
and successor to the Democratic Party of Weimar, while the right
the Great-first chairman, Theodor Hensel, claimed the idea of 1948
showed the regional differences: Southern liberal like Meter and
Graef, Nüsse) or Nordrhein-Westfalen. The beginning of the party
Meter, Thomas Deuter, and the "Young Turke" (around Daring, Weimar,
coke with the individualism of time of liberal like Reinoold
partner and opposition). The party organisation was hardly able to
win contract, it failed a dramatically changing role as Government
with its blend of liberalism and nationalism, and its great inter-
was a series of turns and conflicts of Korea and personnel⁴⁵.

- 62 -

- 66 -

as posed by the trade unions, and the introduction of codetermination (Mitbestimmung) in coal and steel industry, in 1951/52.

But the main problem remained: how could the FDP compete with the course of economic success and political superiority which in the eyes of the voters was more and more identified with Adenauer and the CDU? Was the party not to die a slow death as a mere appendix to the CDU while it complicated the business of government and delayed a clear two-party confrontation in German politics? This problem has indeed determined the changing politics of the FDP to the present<sup>45</sup>; in addition, it was intensified by the typical weaknesses of liberal party organisation, by personal conflicts and regionalism - reminding of the liberal "Radical Socialists" in France. This explains the experiment of 1952 when the combative lawyer Dehler took the chairmanship and even left the cabinet (1953).

In the following years the FDP practiced the role of semi-opposition. The conflicts with Adenauer reached a climax in 1955/56, when the party opposed the government's Saar Policy, and when finally the "Young Turks" in Düsseldorf overthrew the Nord-Rhine Westfalian CDU/FDP government by joining a SPD/FDP government: here for the first time the "constructive vote of non-confidence" was successfully brought into play. But such a turbulent course resulted in cleavages, which Adenauer exploited skilfully. When he persuaded the FDP ministers to remain in the federal government the break was unavoidable - with the result of a pro-Adenauer group of FDP deputies (16 out of 52) founding the FVP which be fore long was absorbed by the CDU and the conservative DP. The change in FDP leadership from Dehler to Maier, in 1957, did not alter the opposition course, personalized in the anti-Adenauer feelings of Dehler and Maier alike. At the same time, along with

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- 61 -

feeling of Deutscher and German alike. At the same time, along with
after the abdication of Austria, herewith issued in the anti-Avenauer
change in EDP leadership from Deutscher to German, in 1927, did not
foresee long was expected by the ODU and the conservative DP. The
Group of EDP deputies (and out of 25) founding the EDP which was
the prequel was unavoidable - with the result of a pro-Avenauer
resulted in cleavages, which Avenauer exploited skillfully. When
was successfully begun into chaos. But such a prominent course
were for the first time the "oppositional vote of non-confidence"
Weimarian ODU\EDP Government by founding a SD\EDP Government:
typically the "Kongturkei" in Maastricht, overseeing the North-Rhine
when the partyaboed the Government's Saar Polity, and when
sition. The conflict with Avenauer resorted a climax in 1922\Se,
In the following years the EDP practiced the role of semi-obbo-
tive cabinet (1922).

the competitive Iswar Deutscher took the chairmanship and even left
Socialists, in France. This explains the experiment of 1925 when
conflicts and regionalism - reminding of the federalist "Regional
the typical weaknesses of federal party organization, byonalist
of the EDP to the present¹²; in addition, it was intended to
politics ? This problem has indeed determined the changing politics
Government and defined a clear two-party confrontation in German
a were abhängig to the ODU while it complied with the plans of
Avenauer and the ODU ? Was the party not to die a slow death as
in the eyes of the voters was more and more identified with
the course of economic success and political superiority which
But the main problem remained : how could the EDP compete with
ministration (Mitbestimmung) in coal and steel industry, in 1921\25,
as being by the trade unions, and the introduction of coöper-

- 62 -

- 67 -

temporary advances to the SPD, a special approach to the questions of reunification and East European politics was sought by FDP politicians like Pfleiderer (then ambassador in Belgrad, died 1957); Adenauer's European politics, his neglect of the Eastern problems and the failure in the reunification question provoked a search for alternatives which was oriented after the solution of the Austrian question, by a pro-Western neutrality.

Such approaches, however, were frustrated by the outcome of the 1957 elections. The absolute majority of the CDU destroyed all hopes of playing arbiter by negotiating for a coalition with either side: there had been talk about a SPD/FDP government, with Maier as chancellor, as practiced in Stuttgart after the formation of the new state of Baden-Württemberg. With the set-back of 1957 some of the doubtful side-effects of the "third force" disappeared. As in 1953, it had clearly been an illusion to hope for more voters from former Nazis and radical Nationalists, by supporting figures like the Neonazi publisher Leonhard Schlüter in Lower Saxony, or the nationalist Heinrich Schneider on the Saar. As a consequence, and in view of the menace of being crumbled between the two big parties, the course of experiments was replaced by an attempt to bring the FDP likewise on the way to a new,统一 party of which Erich Mende, the supposedly good looking war hero, an exponent of the more modernized Northrhine-Westfalian party took over. The organizational basis was broadened, the FDP divided into two steps: beyond the traditional party of notables (Honoratiorenpartei) and with a small bourgeois-liberal party, such claims were contradicted. The success of 1961, when the FDP managed to return to the position of an arbiter indispensable for cabinet making, was not so much caused by changes in party structure but by Ade-

- 68 -

- 68 -

was not so much caused by changes in party structure put by the
position of an ardent independent for cabinet making, a
tradition. The success of 1961, when the DDP managed to return
yet with a small percentage of right, and some claims were con-
ated along the traditional party of notables (Honorsfiorenbarbar).

over. The organizational parties was prolonged, the DDP still the
benefit of the more modernised Northrime-Weustalian party took
with Erich Mende, the apparently good looking war hero, an ex-
attempt to bring the DDP likewise on the way here. Appointed to
the two pig parties, the core of experiments was replaced by an
consensus, and in view of the menace of being crumpled between
Saxony, or the nationalistic Heinrich Schneider on the rear. He is a
titular like the Neumann bupfischer Leonard Schultter in lower
terms from former State and radical Nationalistate, by subporting
the in 1923, it had clearly been an illusion to hope for more ac-
some of the doubtful sides, effects of the "third force" disassembled.

of the new state of Baden-Württemberg. With the set-pack of 1927
Maiers as chancellors, as practiced in Stuttgart after the formation
either side: there had been talk about a SDP\DD Government, with
rope of playing arduer by negotiating for a coalition with
1927 elections. The absolute majority of the CDU destroyed all
such abstractions, however, were obliterated by the outcome of the
of the Austrian question, by a pro-Western neutrality.

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- 68 -

nauer's loss of popularity - and by the unwillingness of a middle
class opposition to do the step to the SPD as an alternative to
a worn-out Adenauer government.

Actually, Mende's success was a consequence of his committal,
during the 1961 campaign, to a CDU/FDP coalition <u>without</u> Adenauer.
As a result, the continuance of the Adenauer government with FDP
support - even though Mende himself joined it only after Adenauer's
resignation in 1963 - to many voters appeared as defection (<u>Unfall</u>)
even perfidy. This was confirmed by heavy losses in the following
elections, so that the party even feels confronted with the possi-
bilität of becoming submerged by the five percent clause. This has
happened in numerous cases during recent community elections.
For the campaign of 1965, the FDP position is again relating to
the CDU: on the one hand opposition against the Strauss-group and
its support by Adenauer, on the other hand defense of the Erhard
course - with the understanding that only by voting for FDP, not
for a torn CDU, the present government could be secured and im-
proved. The basic question remains how far the voter still feels
the need for choice between two "bourgeois" parties. This depends
on the strength and character of social and class prestige, and
on the number of middle class, laizistic liberals not yet willing
to join the social liberalism of the SPD, or the <u>cultural</u> <u>economic</u> <u>liberal</u>
religion of the CDU. Thus the selfstyled function, to be a liberal
corrective of the CDU, depends on the small room left by the trend
to a two-party system.

The disappearance of all the other parties from the German politi-
cal life was sealed with the elimination of the conservative DP
and the refugee party BHE since 1961. Ideological (DP), interest
(BHE) or regional parties (DP,BP, with only the CSU surviving),
as well as radical groups could only temprarily resume former

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- 68 -

as well as radical groups could only temporarily resume former (BHE) or regional battles (DB,BP, with only the CSD arming), and the refugee party BHE since 1961. Ideological (DB) interest of life was sealed with the elimination of the conservative DB. The disbandment of all the other parties from the German politi-
to a two-party system.

corrective of the CDU, debends on the small room left by the trend
shift of the CDU. Thus the affiliated function, to be a fiscal
agent of the social fischerian of the SD, or the economic type
-CONTRIBUTION-
on the number of middle class, juristatic fischeris not yet willing
on the strength and character of social and class breathe, and
the need for choice between two "pontificates" parties. This debends
proved. The basic question remains how far the voter still feels
for a strong CDU, the present government could be secured and im-
possible - with the understanding that only by voting for BDP, not
its anabapt by Adenauer, on the other hand defense of the Eupung
the CDU: on the one hand opposition against the Stranass-Groß and
for the campaign of 1962, the BDP position is again relating to
benevolence in numerous cases during recent community elections,
presenting becoming answered by the five percent clause. This has
elections, so that the party even feels confronted with the basic-
even berly. This was confirmed by heavy losses in the following
resultation in 1962 - to many voters answered as detection (Müllert)
anabapt - even though Mende himself joined it only after Adenauer's
as a result, the continuance of the Adenauer government with BDP
during the 1961 campaign, to a CDU\BDP coalition without Adenauer.
Actually, Mende's success was a consequence of his commitment,
a work-out Adenauer government.
class opposition to do the job to the SD as an alternative to
nauer's loss of popularity - and by the unwillingsness of a middle

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traditions of German party appeal. An experiment in federal expansion of a regional party from Lower Saxony, the DP tried in vain to attract rightist votes from CDU, FDP and right radical groups. For tactical reasons, Adenauer had lent the NDP some support and used it as an interior coalition partner; but such tactics did not survive the decline of the Adenauer era (though the speaker of the Sudeten Germans Seebohm, now CDU right-winger and most noted "revisionist", managed to keep his cabinet position). On the other hand, the economic and social integration of well over 10 milliens refugees from the Eastern territories left the BHE without followers. The political integration of the refugees into the big parties proved again that mere interest parties had little chances; in their place, loose socio-cultural organizations satisfied the former refugees wants for meeting each other, while the parties competed for participation in the political discourses and in the leadership of such organisations.

There is little doubt that such a development has prevented radical currents in the post war situation to gain political strength as after 1918. The radicalism of the dispossessed was first parried by an interest party (BHE) and its efforts for relief and special legislation for Lastenausgleich (equalization of burdens). Later, the other parties were ready to integrate them into the broader network of socio-economic interests. Economic recovery, the stability of government, the prestige of Adenauer, but also the clear impracticability of any revisionist policy in view of the power realities - such were the reasons why none of the numerous groupings of old or new radicalism survived the elections of 1953 and 1957 in any considerable strength. This applies to the decline of Communist and Neo-nazi groups as well, while their ideas still

- 70 -

["- 20 -", "of Communism and National Groups as well, while their issues are still\nand 1921 in any considerable strength. This abhies to the decline\nGrowth of old or new radicalism survived the election of 1922\npower resists - and were the reasons why none of the numerous\nthe clear impropriety of any revisionist policy in view of the\ndeparting of Government, the breath of Adenauer, put into\nthe stability of Government, the

- 70 -

linger in some papers and books<sup>46</sup>. The desperate attempts of small parties to survive by fusion have always failed. It happened for the last time in 1961 with the unsuccessful fusion of DP and BHE into an "All German Party".

The aspects for third parties may appear dim, in the light of the overall trend of German political life and voting behavior. Moreover, electoral laws and privileges favoring the status quo reduce the chances for competing with the established two or three-party system. Of course fifteen years are too short a period for any final judgement. The present party system depends to a large degree on the convincing power of economic success and personal authority. Such conditions are not perennial. Changes may be possible: but while a return to the traditions of ideological multiparty pluralism of the Weimar and pre-Weimar type seems unlikely, we may expect further cleavages within the CDU and tendencies for splitting off from the SPD, as a reaction to the cementation and even depolitization of a saturated party system. These are, however, mere speculations. At present, the process of change and stabilization seems nowhere more successful than in the development of parties and voting since 1949 and 1953.

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- 41 -

in the development of parties and voting since 1948 and 1953. Of course and adaptation seems nowhere more successful than these are, however, were abstractions. At present, the process cementation and even depolitization of a saturated party system. tendencies for splitting off from the SD, as a reaction to the unlikely, we may expect further cleavages within the CDU and multiparty blundering of the Weimar and pre-Weimar type seems possible: put while a return to the traditions of ideological salient authority. Such conditions are not herewith. Changes may take place on the convincing power of economic success and better judgment. The present party system depends to a great extent on the choice of the Weimar and pre-Weimar type seems to be possible: put while a return to the traditions of ideological salient authority. Such conditions are not herewith. Changes may take place on the convincing power of economic success and better judgment. The present party system depends to a great extent on the choice of the Weimar and pre-Weimar type seems to be possible: put while a return to the traditions of ideological salient authority. Such conditions are not herewith. Changes may

salient authority. Such conditions are not herewith. Changes may take place on the convincing power of economic success and better judgment. The present party system depends to a great extent on the choice of the Weimar and pre-Weimar type seems to be possible: put while a return to the traditions of ideological Moreover, electoral laws and privileges favoring the statute due the overall trend of German political life and voting behavior. The aspects for third parties may appear dim, in the light of

BHE into an "All German party".

for the first time in 1948 with the successful fusion of DP and smail parties to survive the merger. It happened later in some parties and parties. The separate attempts of

- 40 -

- 71 -

VI. Democracy and the associations

The role and impact of interest organizations in the Federal Republic contrasts strongly with the utmost silence preserved by the constitution, and even more with the traditional exhortation (article 38) for independent decision-making which a member of parliament must find to conflict with the real forces in social, economic and political life. In view of such a situation, it seems quite natural that the old German ideas of a "state beyond the parties", as of a "neutral" Beamtenstaat of administrators and lawyers, are resounding again. Influential critics are trying to revive that German tradition, as a counterweight to the pluralistic structure of democracy<sup>47)</sup>. They find support quite naturally among the organizations of civil servants, but no less in legal theory. This reminds of the anti-Weimar tendencies, in the twenties and thirties, advocating an authoritarian state of expert administrators. It reminds also of the cynical argumentation of Carl Schmitt who by rigidly contrasting the pluralism of the Weimar Republic with a pseudo-historical, theoretical image of ideal democracy sharpened the weapons to destroy democracy itself<sup>48)</sup>.

The claim for an anti-pluralistic *Beamtenstaat* is indeed accentuated by, and corresponds to, the seemingly irresistible tendency at strengthening executive and administration versus the parliamentary instances of control - a tendency characteristic for modern democracy in general. But a return to conceptions of *Obrigkeitsstaat* offers no real solutions. On the contrary, it gives

<u>Opriakeftaetast</u> offers no real solutions. On the contrary, it is a modern democracy in general. But a return to conditions of mental instances of control - a tendency characteristic for at strengthening executive and administration versus the buffer-usted dy, and correspond to the seemingly irrestatible tendency The claim for an anti-bureaucracy <u>Beamtentast</u> is indeed accen-

tated (5).

The German authority, the reason to study democracy is Weimar Republik with a bauho-historikal, theoretical image of Carl Schmitt who dy rigbly contrasting the bluster of the administrators. It reminds also of the critical argumentation of the state and duties, advocating an authoritarian state of expert theory. This reminds of the anti-Weimar tendences, in the twenty among the organizations of civil servants, but no less in federal statutory structure of democracy (47). They find support quite natural-

revive that German tradition, as a counterweight to the bluster
whereas are reappearing again. Influential critics are trying to
the battles," of a "neutral" <u>Beamtentast</u> of administrators and
seems quite natural that the old German ideas of a "state beyond
economic and political life." In view of an actual situation, it
of parliament must find to conflict with the real forces in social
tation (article 8) for independent isolation-making which a member
by the constitution, and even more with the traditional exor-
Republio contradicts strongly with the mostat avoidance preserved
The role and impact of interest organizations in the Federal

AII. Democracy and the association

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- 72 -

way to more dangerous fictions and illusions. A "neutral" state,
with the growing extension of administrative activities, is no
less or even more exposed to the pressure of interest organiza-
tions than is open democracy. The difference is only that this
happens still more behind the scenes if the controls of demo-
cracy, however imperfect, are exchanged for a supposed infallil-
bility of permanent administrators of experts beyond political
responsibility. History teaches that the pressure of interest
under a "neutral" monarchy was so strong as to influence, for
example, German war aims before and after 1914 to a decisive de-
gree. Only such pressures were quite one-sided, hardly to be con-
trolled, with the consequence of excess and defeat. The same
applies to the "neutrality" of bureaucracy, the courts, the army
in the Weimar Republic. Their claim to represent the "real state",
behind and beyond the daily strifes of democratic pluralism, has
proved a fiction to cover anti-democratic, rightist, authori-
tarian ideologies and practices.

The realities of a pluralistic and particularistic society of
organized interest articulation, which the modern state has to
take into account, demand the opposite conclusion. At this point,
the fiction of a neutral state beyond the society cannot be main-
tained. Instead, the process of integrating and transposing social
interests into politics is to be fully built into the mechanics
of democratic functions and controls. This will also result in
a changed position of parties and parliament, of government and
administration.

In West Germany, the natural reaction to the forced people's
community (Volksgemeinschaft) of the "Third Reich", along with
the consequences of soziale Marktwirtschaft, was the speedy return

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- 73 -

the consequence of <u>cosiste Marktwirtschaft</u>, was the ablest return
community (Volksehemenschl) of the "Thirteenth" along with
in West Germany, the natural reaction to the forced people's
emigration.

a changed position of parties and parliament, of government and
of democratic functions and controls. This will also result in
interests into politics is to be fully built into the mechanism
tained. Instead, the process of integrating and transposing social
the fiction of a neutral state beyond the society cannot be main-
take into account, demand the opposite consequence. At this point,
organized interest arbitration, which the modern state has to
The realities of a bipolarity and partionaristic society of
tarian ideologies and practices.

proved a fiction to cover anti-democratic, rightist, author-
ping and beyond the daily arise of democratic bipolarism, has
in the Weimar Republic. Their claim to represent the "real state",
abuses to the "neutrality" of prudence, the courts, the army
trooped, with the consequence of excess and defeat. The same
free. Only such measures were quite one-sided, hardly to be con-
under a "neutral" monarchy was so strong as to influence, for
readiness. History teaches that the measure of interest
pity of permanent administrators of experts beyond political
civil, however imperfect, are exchanged for a supposed intellil-
ligence still more pining the sciences if the controls of demo-
tions than is open democracy. The difference is only that this
less or even more exposed to the pressure of interest organis-
with the growing extension of administrative activities, is no
way to more dangerous fictions and illusional A "neutral" state,

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- 73 -

to a profiled structure of interest organizations. In an overcrowded setting of interest politics and conflicts, all the habits of lobbyism and pressure, of Western and German imprint, were developed within a few years. Statistical analyses count an almost infinite number of organizations practicing, in different ways, their influence through hundereds of bureaus and special agents in Bonn and in the state capitals. But despite some special studies<sup>49)</sup> and the relentless disclosures of the *Spiegel*, it is not yet sufficiently explored by which personal, institutional, financial connexions such mechanisms of influence operate. Beside a huge number of specialized organizations and groups there are big associations representing the socio-economic interests of whole professions and classes. While by membership, intense organization and financial power they even surpass the parties, such associations also lay claim to own functions in the wide fields of social policy, beyond mere interest representation and articulation. Among them, the trade unions, as well as the associations of employers, of the civil servants, the employees and, last not least, of the farmers are the most powerful groups.

The trade unions, with more than 6 million members, after 1945 succeeded for the first time to unite the bulk of the working class in one organization, the DGB. While before 1933 a Socialist inclined union had been rivalled by smaller catholic and liberal associations, here again the experience of Weimar (and cooperation in anti-Nazi circles during the "Third Reich") had resulted in the decision for a strong union as basis of the new democracy<sup>49a)</sup>. Allied support, especially in the British Zone, helped such a development. Since the achievement of codetermination in heavy industry, membership has however stagnated, and militant actions have become rare. This was partly the very consequence of a uni-

- 74 -

have become rare. This was partly the very consequence of a multi-
group, membership has however stagnated, and military actions

development. Since the achievement of codetermination in heavy in-
volted support, especially in the British Zone, helped and a de-
the decision for a strong union as basis of the new democracy⁴⁸).

In anti-West circles during the "Third Reich") had resulted in
association, here again the experience of Weimar (and cooperation
influenced union had been rivalled by smaller catholic and liberal
class in one organisation, the DGB. While before 1933 a socialist
encouraged for the first time to write the punk of the working

The trade unions, with more than 6 million members, after 1942

of the farmer are the most powerful unions.

Brothers of the civil servants, the employees and, last not least,
Among them, the trade unions, as well as the associations of em-
ployers, beyond mere interest representation and arbitration.

Tions also lay claim to own functions in the wide fields of social
and financial power they even surpass the parties, and associated
proteasions and classes. While by membership, intense organisation
associations representing the socio-economic interests of whole
huge number of specialised organisations and unions there are put

of class connections and mechanisms of influence operate. Beige a
yet sufficiently explored by which hereditary, institutional, financial

dies⁴⁹) and the relentless disclosures of the Spiegel, it is not
in power and in the state capitals. But despite some special au-
thoritative influence through numerous of pure ones and special agents
infinite number of organisations practicing, in different ways,
developed within a few years. Statistical analyses count an almost
of topography and breviation, of Western and German imprint, were de-
crowded setting of interest politics and conflicts, all the habits

to a profiled attitude of interest organisations. In an over-

- 73 -

- 74 -

- 74 -

fied trade union which was bound to maintain strict neutrality
in party politics. A small CDU minority successfully prevented
the Socialists from using their superior influence, In such a
situation, even strikes have become difficult. With some excep-
tions, union leadership operates with utmost caution. Nevertheless
the DGB commands considerable potential influence in politics.
This is clear from the fact that as many as 40% of the members
of parliament belong to unions, among them three-quarters as SPD,
one-quarter as CDU deputies. Such influence may be indirect and
only partly effective, but it proved present many times, as in
the latest discussions of emergency legislation.

On the other hand, a great variety of interest organizations re-
present the non-worker groups. Financially, the Federation of
German Industry and the German Employers Associations, are the
most influential head organizations, while the farmers federa-
tions exert pressure by pointing at the number of agrarian voters
they - and the parties - believe to control. By influencing de-
cision-making in the legislature and the administration, in poli-
tical practice the realities of the pluralistic society clearly
triumph over the state-oriented conceptions of legal critics.
There is a growing awareness of the fact that interest associa-
tions, next to parties, are necessary means of translating po-
pular will into socio-economic and political action.

The same applies to the role of the press and the mass media. The
attempts of government and bureaucracy to reach a stricter control
of the media, were not very successful. While some observers de-
fine press, broadcasting and TV as a "forth power", it should be
stressed that they are by no means independent from the influence
government, parties, churches and organizations exert either

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- 72 -

Government, parties, churches and organizations exert either
attracted that they are by no means independent from the influence
time press, broadcasting and TV as a "fourth power," it should be
of the media, were not very successful. While some operators de-
 attempts of government and perversity to reach a straiter control
The same applies to the role of the press and the mass media. The
but will into socio-economic and political action.

tions, next to parties, are necessarily means of translating bo-
There is a growing awareness of the fact that interest associa-
triumph over the state-oriented conceptions of legal critics.
toof practice the settlement of the binational society clearly
ofion-making in the legislature and the administration, in hel-
they - and the parties - believe to control. By influencing de-
tions exert pressure by pointing at the number of Austrian voters
most influential head organizations, while the farmers feder-
German industry and the German Employer Associations, are the
present the non-worker groups. Unilaterally, the Federation of
On the other hand, a great variety of interest organizations re-
the latest discussions of emergency legislation.

only partly effective, but it proved present many times, as in
one-quarter as ODU deputies. Such influence may be indirect and
of parliament belong to unions, among them three-quarters as SPD.
This is clear from the fact that as many as 400 of the members
the DGB commands considerable potential influence in politics.
tions, union leadership operates with utmost caution. Nevertheless
situation, even strikes have become difficult. With some excep-
the Socialists from making their superior influence. In and a
in party politics. A small ODU minority successfully prevented
filed trade union which was bound to maintain strict neutrality

- 74 -

- 75 -

through financing or by seats in the boards. But events like the conflict on the second TV program or the *Spiegel*-affair have indeed demonstrated, how sensitively the public reacts to open encroachments on free information and discussion. The reverse problem is the emergence of press trusts (like Axel Springer's Hugenberg - like position) or the political influence or the *Spiegel* itself and the views of his editor, Rudolf Augstein. There remains a tendency, often legitimate, to balance the public opinion making of parties and interest groups, by a declared impartiality of the communication media. But they have emerged as quite significant political forces, while different from the Weimar Republic they are less closely tied to specific political groups. The monopoly positions of radio and TV organized as public corporations - on regional (and Land) level, is established between group pressure and government influence. Such a position of delicate balance symbolizes indeed the character of the Bonn democracy - between the bureaucratic *Verwaltungsstaat* of the *Kanzlerdemokratie*, the institutionalized party state, and the pluralism of a *Verbündedemokratie*.

The problems posed by an interest groups society behind the party state are of course much more complicated than the traditional confrontation of trade unions and employers associations may suggest. Such problems cannot be burked, by relying upon the general rules of the Basic Law, or by merely tolerating things as they are. Even more than in the case of the parties, the realities of interest group politics are to be lifted up from the twilight of bad conscience and hidden practices into the open light of perspicuous politics. As an important factor of pluralistic democracy, the interest associations could fulfil a more positive function

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- 76 -

the interest associations could fulfill a more positive innovation
one politics. As an important factor of democratic
conscience and hidden practices into the open light of reason-
et group politics are to be lifted up from the twilight of dog
Even more than in the case of the parties, the reality of inter-
rule of the Basic Law, or by merely tolerating things as they are.
But politics cannot be purged, by relying upon the General
confrontation of trade unions and employers associations may eng-
state are of course much more complicated than the traditional
The problems based by an interest group society behind the party
tionized party state, and the民主ism of a Democraticdemokratie,
presidential election of the Germandemokratie, the inedit-
amplifier indeed the character of the Bonn democracy - between the
and government influence. Such a position of delicate balance
regional (and land) level, is established between group pressure
bovine of radio and TV organized as public corporations - on
are less closely tied to specific political groups. The monopoly
political forces, while different from the Weimar Republic they
communication media. But they have emerged as a quite significant
parties and interest groups, by a declared impartiality of the
group, often legitimate, to place the public opinion making of
and the areas of the editor, Editor Angerstein. There remains a ten-
like position) or the political influence or the Spiegel itself
in the emergence of press tracts (like Axel Springer's Hugendorf -
ments on free information and discussion. The reverse problem
demonstrated, how sensitively the public reacts to open enro-
conflict on the second TV program or the Spiegel -after have indeed
through financing or by seats in the boards. But events like the

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- 76 -

in such a context. While a process of specializing and alienation
has confronted the citizen with an increasingly complex structure
of government and administration, the democratic way of forming
political will and the possibilities of exerting control could
be improved, if the irregular antagonism of groups could be trans-
ferred into a regular and thereby limited cooperation in the
political process, particularly in expert deliberation. This would
be a way out of the dilemma between *expertocracy* and *the bureaucracy* of the bureau-
cratic and *Verbandeherrschaft* threatening the present democracy.

The discussion of this problem has increased over the years⁵⁰).
Particular attention has been paid to the British example of the
Royal commissions and committees, as a way of adapting the parlia-
mentary system to the modern conditions of technical and bureau-
oratic development. Another way has been tried, in Belgium and
France, with the institution of advisory economic council⁶. In
the meantime, ideas of a federal economic council (Bundeswirtschaft
rat) as complement of the political parliament have been con-
sidered in German circles. Here of course the memories of the
corporative state and its Fascist perversion are not particularly
encouraging. It is being remembered, furthermore, that the Weimar
experiment of a Reichswirtschaftsrat was a failure. Indeed, the
basic problem seems insoluable: how to ascertain the quota of
the different socio-economic groups, and which key to use for the
distribution of power in such a chamber of interest representation,
quasi a modern version of Ständestaat (assembly of estates).

But no doubt, the canalizing and regulating of interest groups, by
way of cooperation can no longer be excluded from the political
process or even adjudged to a fictive neutrality of the experts.
This is a problem posed also by the numerous advisory councils
that have been established on different levels of government and

-77 -

-11-

that have been established on different levels of government and
This is a problem based upon the numerous advisory councils
process or even adjusted to a more positive neutrality of the experts.
way of cooperation can no longer be excluded from the political
But no doubt, the canning and regulating of interest groups is
thus a modern version of *Ständige fest* (as supply of gases).

distribution of power in and a chamber of interest representation
the different socio-economic groups, and which key the use for the
partial problem seems inapplicable: how to ascertain the duties of
experiment of a Reichswirtschaft was a tissue. Indeed, the
encompassing. It is being remembered, furthermore, that the Weimar
corporative state and its state benediction are not basically
agreed in German circles. Here of course the memories of the
(1925) as complement of the political parliament have been con-
the meantime, ideas at a federal economic council (Bundeswirtschaft
France, with the institution of advisory economic council). In
ratio development. Another way has been tried, in Belgium and
mentary system to the modern conditions of technical and pure
Polish commissions and committees, as a way of adapting the Britis-
Baltic attention has been given to the British example of the
The discussion of this problem has increased over the years so).
(see below)

cratio and Verhängigungsrecht threatening the present democracy
be a way out of the difficulty between *Extrги* of the purest-
political process, particularly in expert deliberation. This would
terred into a regular and thereby limited cooperation in the
be improved, if the irregular autocracy of groups could be trans-
 political will and the possessiveness of exerting control could
 of government and administration, the democratic way of forming
 has confronted the citizen with an increasingly complex structure
 in such a context. While a process of specializing and alienation

- 16 -

- 77 -

administration. In economic, social, cultural questions, their
expert counselling has become quite indispensable, but the fact
remains that this is mostly done in the specific expert's own
matters and interests. There is now some discussion about the
system of public and parliamentary Hearings, as practiced in the
USA or in Switzerland, First attempts, by the financial commission
of the Bundestag and by some special committees of inquiry, show
the advantages of such an institution; it may even help to pre-
vent the further decline of parliamentary functions as against
the expansion of bureaucracy and expertocracy. But this is a new
field, entered with hesitation only, and looked upon with utmost
disturbance by administrators who are still used to consider their
knowledge as state-secret and their doings as sanctioned by a
state above parties and parliament.

In all these discussions, however, there is more awareness of the
basic principle of democratic government, if compared with the
reform discussion under the Weimar Republic (that tended toward
reestablishing the trans.parliamentery (Obrigkeitsstaat). Among
politicians but also in theory, we find broad agreement that the
power of political decision must remain with politically respon-
sible instances, with parliament and government; it cannot be
devolved on bureaucracy nor on experts with or without interest
association. Modern democracy, as in a different way totalitarian
systems, cannot afford the fiction of "unpolitical" spheres and
decisions. It is exactly for this reason that so much depends on
a regulated and thereby limited intermediary function of inter-
est associations: in the pre-parliamentary sphere, for the selec-
tion of party candidates, in preparing legislative material, even
by intervening in the governmental process. This becomes the

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- 78 -

by intervening in the governmental process. This becomes the
 tion of party candidates, in preparing legislative material, even
eat associations: in the pre-parliamentary sphere, for the selec-
a regulated and thereby limited intermediary function of inter-
decisions. It is exactly for this reason that so much depends on
systems, cannot afford the friction of "unpolitical" spheres and
association. Modern democracy, as in a different way totalitarian
democracies put also in theory, we find broad agreement that the
reassessing the trans-parliamentary (Oligarchial) system.
Among
the two principal of democratic government, it compared with the
Infall these fractions, however, there is more awareness of the
state above parties and parliament.

knowledge as a state-secret and their doing as sanctioned by a
draft by administrators who are still need to consider their
field, entered with realism only, and looked upon with utmost
the expansion of puremorsol and expertocracy. But this is a new
ment the further decline of parliamentary functions as against
the advantages of and an institution; it may even help to bre-
of the Bundestag and by some special committees of industry, show
USA or in Switzerland. First attempts, by the financial commission
system of public and parliamentary hearings, as practiced in the
matters and interests. There is now some discussion about the
remains that this is mostly done in the specific expert's own
expert counselling has become quite indispensable, put the fast
administration. In economic, social, cultural questions, their

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- 78 -

the more important when the institutionalizing of parties is
curbing the dynamics of the democratic process. But the more
firmly the primary of politics has to be preserved, and therewith
the two main principles of democracy: responsibility and control.
They can be realized only if ways are found to raise the interest
groups out of the dimness of covered chanells of influence, and
to subject them to a maximum of publicity and clearness. As com-
pared with the USA, thus far little has been done on that field
in Germany. There is no registration of lobbyists, no restriction
for election funds, no publication of financial sources. A number
of corruption affairs during the past years involving army bureau-
crate and even political leaders alike Strauss, have demonstrated
how necessary such efforts would be.

Thus West German democracy remains confronted with a double task.
First to fulfil the constitutional commands by which the parties
are bound to democratic structure and open account of their sources and connections - requirements to be fixed in the long delayed party, law. And secondly, to acknowledge the interest groups
and integrate them into the political process, while at the same
time using and controlling, as capable experts, their exponents
in the realm of counselling and law preparing. There are dangers
and limits to such a solution: they become particularly obvious
in the impact of the Catholic church on cultural questions, in
the pressure of refugee organizations on German foreign policy,
and in the role of agarian associations (Grüne Front) on financial
and economic policy within Germany and toward the Common Market.

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- 28 -

and economic policy within Germany and toward the Common Market. And in the role of Christian associations (Christine Front) on financial the breath of refugee organizations on German foreign policy, in the orbit of the Catholic church on cultural questions, in and little to an end a solution: they become partially opinions in the realm of community and law preparing. There are dangers time using and controlling, as capable experts, their exponents and integrate them into the political process, while at the same time taking part in law. And secondly, to acknowledge the interest groups and connections - requirements to be fixed in the long de-

are bound to democratic structure and open account of their sou-
ther to fulfill the constitutional commands which the parties
have made to German democracy remain confronted with a double task,
now necessarily and efforts would be.

orast and even political leaders like Strasens, have demonstrated
of corruption all over during the best years involving many prius-
for election campaigns, no justification of financial sources. A number
in Germany. There is no registration of voters, no restriction
barred with the USA, there is little has been done on that field
to detect them to a maximum of publicity and fairness. As com-
ments out of the dimension of covered channels of influence, and
they can be realized only if ways are found to raise the interest
the two main branches of democracy: responsibility and control.
primarily the branch of politics has to be preserved, and therewith
comping the dynamics of the democratic process. But the more
the more important when the institutionalizing of parties is

- 28 -

- 79 -

It must be added, as a new trait of interest politics in Germany, that from the very beginning with the Schuman plan, the impact of international nexus has influenced the mergence of the interest structure. The development of East-West trade, with its special relevance to Berlin and the German division, and the impact of Western integration policy has indeed strongly interfered with national interest politics. Beyond the supranational complexities and frameworks, further problems are being posed by the expectations of the developing countries. Against the background of colonial and imperialist interest politics which fifty years ago led into the first war, Germany finds itself confronted with tasks of international competition, for which it has little experience. On this field, the interlockings of national politics and interest politics are even more evident.

eat politics are even more evident.

On this field, the interplay of national politics and inter-
cial, international competition, for which it has little experience,
led into the first war. Germany lingers itself confronted with task
focial and imperialist interest politics which fifty years ago
ations of the developing countries. Against the background of co-
and frameworks, further problems are being posed by the expects-
national interest politics. Beyond the subnational complexities
Western integration policy has indeed strongly interfered with
relevance to Berlin and the German division and the impact of
atmosphere. The development of East-West trade, with its special
of internationalhexa has influenced the emergence of the interest
that from the very beginning with the Sozialistkampf, the impact
It must be added, as a new trait of interest politics in Germany.

- 49 -

- 8e -

[LC]

## VII. Some other factors of stability and change.

On three other fields German democracy has to face the challenge posed by the confrontation of constitutional order and political development: in the practice of the Constitutional Court; with the question of emergency powers; and with the establishment of a new army. Many observers, consider the political role of the supreme constitutional court in Karlsruhe one of the major achievements of the new German democracy. Its creation corresponds indeed to the concept of modified parliamentary democracy. Different from traditional systems, as the third and fourth republics in France, parliament is no longer omnipotent and beyond the constitution. Yet although the highest authority on the constitution, by the mode of its election by Bundestag and Bundesrat, the Court remains exposed to attempts by parties and government to influence, with its composition the constitutional decisions. Furthermore, the Court cannot act on its own, but may act only upon application. Nevertheless, by a number of important decisions influencing deeply German domestic politics and curbing repeatedly government activities, the Court managed to acquire and unexpected degree of political weight. It proved far more efficient and independent than the State Court (Staatsgerichtshof) of Weimar whose failure, in 1932, to act on Papen's Putsch in Prussia has contributed to the fall of the first republic. Thus far, the Court has not only worked as a safeguard of democracy and an additional instrument of political control; it has put up an example of constitutional interpretation, thereby spreading knowledge of, and respect for, the political process of constitutional democracy⁵¹). Unlike Weimar, the Bonn system can draw positive attitudes from the working of a supreme institution; it has become one of the effective means of political education.

- 81 -

- 81 -

of the effective means of political education,
should from the working of a supreme institution; it has become
one of the chief objects of the Brown system to draw positive atti-
ence to the first republic. Thus far, the Court
tried, in 1925, to act on the above point in Prussia has con-
dependent than the State Court (Statssgerichtshof) of Weimar whose
degree of political weight. It proved far more efficient and im-
government activities, the Court managed to acquire and unexpected
ing deeply German domestic politics and earning repeatedly
the name of the "German domestic politics and economics".

The Court cannot act on its own, but may act only when public
with its composition the constitutional decisions. Furthermore,
remains exposed to attempts by parties and government to influence
by the mode of its election (Bundestag and Bundesrat, the Bund-
tation). Yet although the highest authority on the constitution,
France, parlament is no longer omnipotent and belong the consili-
from traditional systems, as the third and fourth republic in
the concept of modified parliamentary democracy. Different
ments of the new German democracy. Its creation corresponds in
the new army. Many observers, consider the political role of the
the creation of emergency powers; and with the establishment of
development: in the practice of the Constitutional Court: what
based on the confrontation of constitutional order and political
On three other fields German democracy has to face the challenge

All. Some other factors of stability and change.

- 80 -

82 -

Two main functions can be distinguished in the constitutional aspect and the political consequences. By guarding the compatibility and conformity of political acts, both by government and legislature, with the Basic Law - partitulary its civil rights sections and the articles protecting the democratic and federal structure -, the Court has been helping to maintain the balance of federal and stat powers. At the same time, the political impact became visible whenever conflicts between the legislative and the executive branches - as between Bund and Länder - had to be settled in Karlsruhe. In several cases, the parliamentary minority has successfully applied in Court with the result that the rights or cases of opposition were upheld and supported against the superior power of the Kanzlerdemokratie. But since the judges remain dependent on parliament for their reelection - with two-third majorities of both Bundestag and Bundesrat -, the future activity of the Court may be subject to vacillations and further attempts at government or party interventions.

This appears particularly important with respect to the problems posed by the long-lasting efforts, on the part of the government and its parliamentary forces, to pass a series of comprehensive emergency laws⁵²). Thus far the SPD that is needed for a two-third majority has opposed such attempts. But evidently, there is now a certain willingness to enter a compromise, if only because the SPD prefers fixed legal provisions to the possibility of "over- constitutional legislation" in emergency cases which in German legal theory is still advocated. The present discussion centers around the following questions: who is to proclaim the state of emergency? Should the powers be concentrated on the executive, as in Weimar, with so fatal consequences? Or should an emergency

- 83 -

- 83 -

as in Weimar, with so fatal consequences? Or should an emergency
emergency? Should the powers be concentrated on the executive,
around the following questions: who is to proclaim the state of
government, if an act is advocated. The present discussion centers
on constitutional legislation" in emergency cases which in German
2nd preface linked legal provisions to the easiness of "over-
emergent laws"²⁵). Thus far the 2nd that is needed for a two-third
and its parliamentary forces, to base a series of comprehensive
based by the low-fating efforts, on the part of the Government
This abates partially important with respect to the problems
government or partly interventions.

Court may be subject to oscillations and further attempts at
of both Bundesrat and Bundesrat -, the future activity of the
on parliament for their selection - with two-third majorities
of the Kanzlerdemokratie. But since the judges remain dependent
of opposition were upheld and subordinated against the superior power
fully applied in Court with the result that the rights or cases
rule. In several cases, the parliamentary minority has succeeded
principles - as between Bund and Land - had to be settled in Karlo-
whenever conflicts between the legislative and the executive
bowers. At the same time, the political impact becomes triple
Court has been helping to maintain the balance of federal and state
articles protecting the democratic and federal structure - the
with the Basic Law - barterably its civil rights sections and the
conformity of political acts, both by Government and legislature,
and the political consequences. By ensuring the compatibility and
Two main functions can be distinguished: the constitutional aspect

83 -

- 83 -

parliament still control the government (as the SPD demands)?
Finally, should the state of emergency be restricted to exterior
danger (war) or - as in Weimar - be applicable to domestic crises
as well?

It seems evident in view of the Weimar experience, that such regulations contain grave risks. This applies particularly to the attempts by the CDU, to accomplish a regulation that would allow to proclaim the state of emergency by simple majority and thereby eliminate any participation of the opposition; misuse would be all too easy.

On the whole, it seems quite significant that many German politicians (and legal theoretizers) are still bound to the idea that democracy is possible during "normal" times only. Apart from the technical problems, the discussion of emergency legislation shows how strongly older traditions and assumptions have survived even a successful period of German democracy: particularly the assumption that the stronger a state has to be the less democratic it can be. Fear of insecurity and a tendency for over-perfection of precautionary measures are the motives. There may be no imminent danger of misuse; too different is the situation from 1930-33. But constitutional possibilities, once established, produce allways an appetite to use them. What is more, they tend to seduce the responsible instances - parties and parliament - to escape from difficult or unpopular situations, by leaving the field to emergency measures not to be justified before the public. The menetecel of 1933, whose repetition the Basic Law tries to prevent, could reappear through the back door of emergency legislation, unless parliament and Constitutional Court remain fully incorporated into the mechanism of emergency government. And here too, much

- 84 -

["- 84 -", "into the mechanism of emergency government. And here too, much\nparliament and Constitutional Court remain fully incorporated\naboard through the pack door of emergency legislation, unless\n1933, whose repetition the Basic Law tries to prevent, could re-\nmeasure not to be quantified before the public. The mechanism of\nout or nonobvious atomisation, p. leaving the field to emergency\napple instances - parties and parliament - to escape from gill-\nabette to see them. What is more, they tend to sequence the reason-\natitional beadfillities, once satisfied, produce always an\nof manner: too different if the situation from 1830-33. But con-\ntionary measures are the motives. There may be no imminent danger\nhear of inequality and a tendency for over-prediction of preem-\nence of a strong state a state has to be the fees democratic it can pe-\nthrough the stronger a

- 84 -

depends on the further stature and composition of the Consti-
tutional Court.

Even more discussions have been dedicated, during the recent
past, to the form and place of the new army. "Bundeswehr and
democracy" has become a topic for heated discourses. This was
not always the case. Too different seemed the situation of the
army in the Bonn Republic from that of the Reichswehr under Weimar.
Foreign observers even believed that while school and university
education was the field where too little change took place, the
new Bundeswehr by its great willingness and successful efforts
for reform demonstrated most vividly the new Germany, proving
that Bonn is not Weimar⁵³). Indeed, while in 1918 the army could
believe to have saved the state and therefore feel independent
from, or even master of, the Weimar Republic, in 1949 the estab-
blishment of democracy prodeded, by many years, the re-establish-
ment of the military. The questions of break and continuity seemed
to be dedided before a new German army could even be considered.
And when it came into actual existence, in 1956/57, this happened
within the framework of international control and cooperation -
after Bonn had joined the NATO and while Europe seemed well on the
way to integration. Moreover, for its security West Germany was
held to depend completely on the military forces of the West, and
on the presence of Allied troops in West Berlin, as in the Federal
Republic.

Yet the sudden swing from complete demilitarization and even
incrimination of the army to rearmament and military alliance,
a consequence of the cold war and Korea, led to heated contro-
versies all over Germany. Labour union and SPD vividly opposed
the new course of Adenauer who like Strauss, his later defense
minister, at first had explicitly rejected any military future

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- 82 -

minister, at first had explicitly rejected and military future
the new course of Adenauer who like Strassee, his father defense
exerted all over Germany. Lepore union and SPD widely opposed
a consequence of the cold war and Korea, fed to heated contro-
incorporation of the army to rearmament and military alliance,
let the endben swing from complete demilitarization and even
Republio.

on the presence of Vilitied troops in West Berlin, as in the Federal
held to depend completely on the military forces of the West, and
way to integration. Moreover, for its security West Germany was
after Bonn had joined the NATO and while Europe seemed well on the
within the framework of international control and cooperation -

And when it came into actual existence, in 1926/27, this happened
to be denied before a new German army could even be configured.
ment of the military. The questions of prewar and continuity seemed
pliement of democracy brooded, by many here, the re-eataplieth-
from, or even master of, the Weimar Republic, in 1949 the eat-
believe to have saved the state and therefore kept independent
that Bonn is not Weimar²⁵). Indeed, while in 1918 the army could
for reform demonstrated most vividly the new Germany, proving
new Bundeswehr by its great willingness and successive efforts
equation was the field where too little change took place, the
Foreign operators even believed that while school and university
army in the Bonn Republic from that of the Reichwehr under Weimar
not always the case. Too different seemed the situation of the
democracy" has become a topic for heated discussions. This was
best, to the form and place of the new army. Bundeswehr and
Even more discussions have been dedicated, during the recent
tational Court.

depends on the further stature and composition of the Conti-
tutional Court.

- 84 -

- 85 -

for Germany, but then very soon, and without political backing, offered Bonn's military contribution⁵⁴). Moreover, with the preparation of German rearmament, German veterans' organizations began to demand and propagate a re-evaluation of the German military. While a group of reformers (around Count Baudissin) tried to establish democratic foundations for the coming Bundeswehr, by aiming at a "citizen in uniform" (Staatsbürger in Uniform)⁵⁵), at the same time the Soldatenverbände demanded a revision of post-war "diffamation" of the German soldier and full recognition of the German military tradition,

It was that ambiguity of opinions which from the very beginning burdened the new Bundeswehr with latent tensions and conflicts of identity. This was even intensified by the French failure to ratify the project of an integrated European army. The emergence of a national army, even if closely framed by, and integrated with, the NATO alliance, encouraged the tendencies to reestablish pre-democratic traditions and to bridge the gap of the Nazi period. This was of course largely a matter of generations and persons: in initially a special commission of respected persons, partly from the resistance against Hitler, selected the higher officers who applied for the Bundeswehr. The institutional structure was considerably changed. Special schools were to secure a broader political education, a new way of instruction (innere Führung) was to develop and practice new forms of military training and leadership. At the same time, with strong support by the SPD the institution of a parliamentary supervisor of military affairs (Wehr-beauftragter) after the Swedish model of ombudsman was created. Responsible to the Bundestag only, he is to control the practical workings of the new rules and the preservation of human and civil rights.

- 86 -

- 82 -

rights.

workings of the new rules and the preservation of human and civil
reasonable to the <u>Bundesregel</u> only, he is to control the political
democracies after the Swedish model of <u>empfangs</u> was created.

**Tution of a parliamentary inspector of military affairs (Wehr-
minist).** At the same time, with strong support by the SD the in-
develop and practice new forms of military training and leader-
tical education, a new way of instruction (Innere Führung) was to
aidespasy changed. Special schools were to secure a proper boff-
 Applied for the Bundeswehr. The institutional structure was con-
 the resistance against Hitler, selected the higher officers who
 initially a special commission of respected persons, partly from
 This was of course largely a matter of generations and persons: in
democratic traditions and to bridge the gap of the last period.

the NATO alliance, encouraged the tendencies to reëstablish bre-
national army, even if closely framed by, and integrated with,
by the protect of an integrated European army. The emergence of a
identity. This was even internalized by the French failure to re-
purged the new Bundeswehr with latent tensions and conflicts of
It was that ambiguity of opinions which from the very beginning
the German military tradition,

was "dilution" of the German soldier and full recognition of
at the same time the Soldatverhältnisse demanded a revision of host-
ship aiming at a "citizen in uniform" (Staatssoldat in Uniform)²²,
to establish democratic foundations for the coming Bundeswehr,
to establish a German military contribution²³). Moreover, with the pre-
offered Bonn's military contribution²⁴).

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- 56 -

In many respects, the new start was quite successful. But for several reasons - among them the Allied insistence on a swift extension of the *Bundeswehr* -, it proved impossible to do without old-type officers and corporals. The number of volunteers was insufficient, their selection did not offer a real choice. The institutional safeguards, elaborated as they were, could not prevent the return of traditional abuses and even the misuse of military "neutrality" in favour of political decisions. Thus, by a memorandum of the generals (*Generalsdenkschrift*) Strauss in 1961 tried to influence public debate on atomic arms and warfare. Likewise, the army leadership reacted openly to a report of the *Wehrbeauftragte* Heye (1964) criticizing doubtful trends within the army and in respect to society and politics, which even led to Heye's resignation.

From the beginning, critics complained about the CDU bias of the *Bundeswehr*, and in addition, the turbulent role of defense minister Strauss (1957-62) in German politics, complicated the image of an army torn between half-broken pre-democratic traditions and a pluralistic democracy with less room and respect for military values and structures. Present discussions circling around the possibilities for improving the controls are confronted with the growing weight of military demands on the civil society: even the SPD, while applying its "new course" to the *Bundeswehr*, has become less militant in opposing such tendencies. Much will depend on the question how successfully the returning trends of authoritarianism in German politics can and will be curbed by a revival of more efficient parliamentarianism and by a strengthening of social controls.

- 87 -

- 87 -

controls.

efficient parliamentsanism and by a strengthening of social
in German politics can and will be proved by a revival of more
discussion how successfully the returning trends of authoritarianism
militant in opposing such tendencies. Much will depend on the
while applying its "new course" to the Bündgewehr, use become less
weight of military damage on the civil society: even the SPD,
ties for improving the controls are confronted with the growing
and atomised. Present discussions circling around thealist
reflexive democracy with feeble room and respect for military values
army torn between half-proven pre-democratic traditions and a bi-
struggle (1821-185) in German politics, complicated the image of an
Bündgewehr, and in addition, the turbulent role ofodenauinferier
from the beginning, critics combined spout the CDU plan of the
tion.

respect to society and politics, which even fed to Heke's respon-
Heke (1864) criticising certain trends within the army and in
army federation resorted obviously to a report of the Verhüttertrakt
influence biparti deme on atomic arms and warlike. Likewise, the
gun of the Generals (Generalseßwurzelt) Strasse in 1861 tried to
"neutralise" in favour of political decisions. Thus, by a memor-
the return of traditional adages and even the means of military
attitudinal safeguards, elaborated as they were, could not prevent
antiflu their selection did not offer a real choice. The in-
oft-type officers and corporals. The number of volunteers was in-
extension of the Bündgewehr - it proved impossible to go without
several reasons - among them the Viliest insistance on a swift
in many respects, the new start was quite successful. But for

- 68 -

- 87 -

As a much admired experiment of modified parliamentary democracy,
the Bonn Republic has not yet been exposed to a real test of
strength. Its institutional stability as well as its political
firmness should not be overestimated. Based on speedy economic
reconstruction, protected by strong occupation and alliance system
the Federal Republic was not even confronted with the insecurities
of a complete change in government. And behind the proclaimed
provisorium waits, as big mortgage of that state, the unsolved
dilemma of its origin being purchased with the division of Germany
and the problem of its stabilization depending on the institutio-
nalizing of the provisorium. A diagnosis of the domestic situation
is always bound to the unchanged presence of the "German question".
In a country shaped by the double conflict of international inte-
gration versus national souvereignty, of alliance and revisionist
politics, the interrelation of domestic and foreign policy has
particular meaning; it has influenced deeply the forming and course
of public opinion and the style of government⁵⁶).

While the second German democracy can be based, in the free part
of Germany, on experiences and conditions lacking in the Weimar
Republic, order and stability may be purchased for the price of
national self-content and political disinterest which could be no
less adverse to the emergency of civic culture - if exactly for
the opposite reasons - than under Weimar. As important as the
much-quoted "mastering of the past" (resulting in a slow decline
of neo-Nazi currents) now appears the mastering of a state of
depolitization in which economic prestige prevails over civic
participation and codetermination. After an epoch of strains and
catastrophies, the German relapse into such attitudes may seem

- 88 -

- 88 -

catastrophe, the German refugee into such attitudes may seem
barterization and coö determination. After an abode of atrocity and
debolting in which economic breviate prevalence over civic
of neo-Marxist currents) now abides the maturing of a state of
non-quoted maturing of the past" (resulting in a slow decline
the opposite reasons - than under Weimar. As important as the
less adverse to the emergency of civic culture - it exactly for
national self-content and political disinterest which could be no
Republić, order and stability may be purchased for the price of
of Germany, on experience and conditions lacking in the Weimar
While the second German democracy can be passed, in the free part
of public opinion and the style of Government²⁵).

bilateral meaning: it has influenced deeply the forming and course
politics, the interrelation of domestic and foreign policy has
gration versus national sovereignty, of alliance and revisionist
In a country shaped by the double conflict of international inte-
its always pound to the unchallenged presence of the "German nation"
unifying of the <u>broviacorum</u>. A dialogue of the domestic situation
and the problem of its atomization depending on the instituto-
diffuse of its origin being purchased with the division of Germany
<u>broviacorum</u> witts, as pig mortgage of that state, the unresolved
of a complete change in Government. And defining the proscribed
the Federal Republic was not even confronted with the inaequities
reconciliation, protected by strong occupation and alliance states
liminues should not be overestimated. Based on a greedy economic
strength. Its institutional stability as well as its political
the Bonn Republic has not yet been exposed to a real test of
As a modern acquired experiment of modified barriamentary democracy,

- 87 -

- 88 -

quite natural. They remind of the founding periods of the <u>Reich</u>
before the first war; indeed, they bear the imprint of a grand
old man whose political outlook was shaped well before 1914.

But there remains the experience of a democracy which, again the
result of total defeat, yet has brought, in surprisingly short time,
stability and welfare. Such an experience may well open a real
chance for the idea of democracy in German opinion where up to
date democracy was always identified with crisis and unemployment,
with extremist reactions and failure. Much depends on the question
whether the new sympathies for democracy can be founded on more
than economic success - capable to stand a serious challenge like
1930. At this point, doubts are possible, inspite of the institu-
tional stability and the firm voting behavior of the new Germany.
Bureaucratization and advance of the executive, decline of parlia-
ment and institutionalization of parties counteract the quest for
civic participation and imply the danger, for a period of crisis,
of again alienating the citizen from the democratic process. No
emergency legislation could keep off such a danger: to the contrary
And the heaviest burdens are still to be mastered when Bonn will
be faced with postponed decisions in the future of divided Germany
and divided Berlin<sup>57)</sup>.

There is much awareness of these problems in German writing and
discussions on the subject of political behavior and civic educa-
tion. A wealth of pertinent material has been collected, from the
occupation period to the present. Indeed, the student of political
attitudes is probably better equipped to deal with Germany than
with any other nation⁵⁸). But exactly that self-conscious concern
with questions of political orientation and attitude toward demo-
cracy may signalize the degree of uncertainly still prevalent.

- 89 -

- 89 -

oracy may signify the degree of uncertainty still prevalent, with questions of political orientation and attitude toward demo-
with and other nation²⁸). But exactly that self-conscience concern
attitude fairly properly better equipped to deal with Germany than
occupation period to the present. Indeed, the student of political
tion. A wealth of pertinent material has been collected, from the
dramaticson on the subject of political behavior and civic equos-
There is much awareness of these problems in German writing and
and divided Berlin²⁷).

be faced with beaconsized策dione in the future of divided Germany
And the heaviest burden are still to be mastered when Bonn will
emergency legislation could keep oil and a danger: to the contrary
of again alluding the citizen from the democratic process. No
civic partitopition and imply the danger, for a period of crisis,
ment and institutionalization of parties counteract the great for
Bureaucraticization and advance of the executive, decline of barri-
tional atdility and the firm voting behavior of the new Germany.
1930. At this point, conditions are beaconsize, inabite of the inatitu-
tion economic success - asapdje to stand a serious challenge like
whether the new alliances for democracy can be found on more
with extremist reactions and failure. Much depends on the question
date democracy was always identified with criteria and unemployment,
oquence for the ideas of democracy in German opinion where no to
atstility and welfare. And an experience may well open a rest
result of total defeat, yet has brought, in abruptly abrupt time,
But there remains the experience of a democracy which, again the
old man whose political outlook was shaped well before 1914.
before the first war; indeed, they bear the imprint of a grand
quite natural. They reminding of the founding periods of the Reich

- 88 -

- 89 -

[LC]

Critical observers have stressed, from public opinion research and election studies, the basically conservative nature of German attitudes. "No experiments" was the most popular catchword confirmed by voting behavior and popular polls as well as by preference for secure jobs and pensions. Security and stability appear as the highest values identified with the Adenauer era. For the same reason, the general trend is neither strong support nor strong opposition toward the Bonn government and toward democracy as such. While democratic government became increasingly favoured, from 57% (1953) to 74% (1960), this does not prove the Federal Republic to be an Eldorado of democrats. It rather means a lack of dissatisfaction - so strong under Weimar - with the domestic operations, mainly economic and social, of a government now of democratic origin. Actually, in the early period up to 1950 there was always a clear decision of about 60% in favour of governments securing economic and social service, whatever its structure, while the number of citizen preferring, above all, democratic rights and democratic government, remained a minority of 25%.

This has of course changed, but it may be hard to say how far such a change is merely the consequence of a situation in which the "luxury" of democratic process can be afforded. On the other hand, the impacts of a period of getting used to, and becoming convinced of, the operations of democratic politics and institutions, should not be underrated. This period now last longer than the Weimar Republic, and much longer than the Nazi regime. As a natural development, the complicated norms and behaviors of democracy can not be implanted at once - as postwar "re-education" seemed to imply - but demand time, as they result from a long interplay of

- 90 -

- 60 -

timbly - put demand time, as they result from a long interplay of
not be incubated at once - as postwar "re-education" seemed to
relinquish, the compromised norms and perspectives of democracy can
RepubliCO, and now longer than the Nazi regime. As a natural ge-
not be undernourished. This period now last longer than the Weimar
to, the operations of democratic politics and institutions, should
the substrate of a period of getting used to, and becoming convales-
cently" of democratic process can be accorded. On the other hand,
a change is merely the consequence of a situation in which the
This has of course changed, put it may be hard to say how far auch
of 52%.

democratic rights and democratic government, remained a minority
attitude, while the number of citizen preteriting, apovs all,
Governments securing economic an social services, whatever the
to 1920 there was always a clear decision of a point on, in favour of
now of democratic origin. Venafla, in the early period up to
domestic operations, mainly economic and social, of a Government
a lack of dissatisfaction - so strong under Weimar - with the
RepubliCO to be an Elbergo of democrata. It rather means
that, from 25% (1922) to 47% (1926), this does not prove the
error as such. While democratic government becomes increasingly
not strong opposition toward the Bonn Government and toward demo-
for the same reason, the General trend is neither strong nor short
abroad as the highest arise identified with the Adenauer era.
terence for some tops and benEFica. Security and stability
timed by voting peevor and popular boffs as well as by pre-
statements. "As experiments" was the most popular catchword con-
and election studies, the practically conservative nature of German
Critical operators have addressed, from bundiO opinion reason

- 89 -

[Tc]

- 90 -

of experiences and education, The process did start with a pragmatic attachement to the Bonn system through socio-economic motives. With the years, it becomes transferred to a truer acce] tance of democratic process and values. This is signalized by the decline of extremism and ideological cleavage.

Yet the degree of participation and positive attachment has not increased in the same ratio. Pragmatic attitudes have remained the dominant factors of political behavior and outlook. This should not surprise in view of the perversion of first democrati then national values in Germany during the thirties. American observers who may be shocked at the small degree of strong attachment to the Bonn system should realize that this is a consequence rather of disillusion with close identification and participation: the keynote of political behavior is caution. But it cannot be denied that more than 15 years of democratic operation are needed to root democratic attitudes in the broader strata of a society still burdened with pre-democratic traditions. While its successes have furthered this process, the Kanzlerdemokratie at the same time has preseved authoritarian elements of German state tradition. What is needed for a more stable commitment to democracy is time and, even more important, the experience of successful changes of government.

To the present, orientation to politics tends rather to be motivated by expectations of benefits or by feelings of obligation than by the readiness to consider oneself a participant in the democratic process. It is a legalistic, formalistic, administrative approach to state and politics that has survived defeat and reconstruction; thus far, this basic attitude has limited the effects of the tremendous change on the level of institutions, parties, class structure, Events like the Spiegel affair have

- 91 -

- 31 -

parties, of course, attribute, agents like the State itself have
effects of the tremendous change on the level of institutions,
reconciliation; thus far, this basic attitude has limited the
five approach to state and politics that has survived defeat and
democratic process. It is a legitimate, legitimate, administrative
than by the readiness to consider one of a participant in the
voted dy expectations of benefits on dy feelings of obligation
To the present, orientation to politics tends rather to be moti-
veful, changes of government.

democracy at time and, even more important, the experience of
state tradition. What is needed for a more stable commitment to
at the same time has preserved authoritarian elements of erman
its successes have furthered this process, the transfer of power
a society still purged with pre-democratic traditions. While
are needed to root democratic attitudes in the broader states of
cannot be denied that more than 12 years of democratic operation
obey: the keynote of political behavior is caution. But it
should not surprise in view of the perversion of first democracy
the dominant factors of political behavior and outlook. This
increased in the same ratio. Pragmatic attitudes have remained
yet the degree of participation and positive attachment has not
diminished or extirpated and ideological cleavage.

tance of democratic process and values. This is signaled by
motives. With the years, it becomes transferred to a truer ideal
ratio attachment to the Bonn system through socio-economic
of experiences and education. The process did start with a broad

- 20 -

- 91 -

proved that both components are competing forces: a growing sense of involvement with basic values of democracy and rule of law, and yet a strong tendency remaining to argue and act in terms of *raison d'État* and *D obrigkeitsstaat*. It may well be said that here and in similar cases (as the discussion of the *Bundeswehr* or the conflicts between Adenauer and Erhard), divided public opinion displays the undecided struggle between continuity and change, between state oriented and democracy oriented attitudes as dominating issues of West German political life.

The same can be studied with respect to the social and intellectual bases of post-war development. Family and school in Germany are involved in a process of liberalization and modernization, the emancipation of women contrasts sharply with the pre-democratic and Nazi/men society (Männergesellschaft), and a socialization process will have its impact on politics. But the hopes based on school reform and civic education have often been disappointed. One of the reasons may be the abstract or formal character of such measures; yet again, time may be too short to expect great results that are a matter of generations - of post-Nazi generations. While the substructure has changed (though not yet sufficently) in the school and university systems, surveys at universities have shown how slowly even strong attempts at civic education turn into patterns of conscious political behavior and democratic attachment. In Frankfurt, hardly more than one third of the students showed political interest at all, while authoritarian images of order still played a big role and the great majority remained in a state of conformism and political distance⁵⁹). But here again, the result may reflect a general trend of Western society.

- 92 -

- 25 -

trend of Western society.

distance²⁹⁾. But here again, the result may reflect a general great majority remained in a state of conformism and political authoritarian images of order still played a pig role and the one third of the students showed political interest at all, while valor and democratic attachment. In Frankfurt, hardly more than civic education turn into batteries of conscious political pe- at universities have shown how slowly even a strong attempts at yet sufficiently) in the school and university at same, surveys Mass generations. While the autopnoture has changed (though not bect great results that are a matter of generations - of boat- racter of and measures; yet again, time may be too short to ex- appointed. One of the reasons may be the aptrat or formal op- based on school reform and civic education have often been dia- tain process will have its impact on politics. But the hope oratio and Massmen society (Munimerkeilschaft) and a socialis- the emancipation of women contractually and with the pre-demo- are involved in a process of liberalization and modernization, thus pass of boat-war development. Family and school in Germany The same can be studied with respect to the social and intellec- tual issues of West German political life.

between state oriented and democracy oriented attitudes as domi- nates the unmeasured triangle between continuity and change, conflicts between Agenser and Erbsigl), divided bipolar opinion and in similar cases (as the discussion of the Bundesrat or the Ratson d'Etat and Prakssitaat). It may well be said that pere and yet a strong tendency remaining to argue and act in terms of of involvement with pseudo values of democracy and rule of law, proved that both components are competing forces: a growing sense

- 21 -

[Lr.]

- 92 -

It should be stressed, moreover, that the problem of political attitudes in the Federal Republic is complicated not only by burdens of the past and by the ambivalent effects of Kanzlerdemokratie, but also by a lack of national identity in divided Germany. It seems difficult to pledge full allegiance to a carefully cultivated provisorium, and the question of reunification must necessarily affect also the problem of systems' attachment. While the cold war has helped to stabilize Western Germany and to immunize her against communism, it has at the same time created and upheld artificial conditions which put the cultivation of civic attitudes under a latent state of emergency and civil war. This means an additional source of lability and uncertainty for Germans in West and East alike. Even if there are only dim aspects for a solution of the German question in the near future, the history of the Bonn Republic is certainly too short a period to create a full sense of identity for a new, and separated, state of its own. And this is a precondition for the rooting of democratic attitudes - at least as long as the quest for supranational solutions has not yet been answered or has, in the age of de Gaulle, even been repelled. While there was much readiness particularly on the part of the younger generation, to see the German problem not only in terms of the national ideology, there is less understanding for expectations that the Federal Republic would become a nation of her own. A disintegration of the West could well result in true revisionism not to be compared with the present lip-proclamations. In the state of separation, a democratic European federation with full political institutions, may be the only political entity which could ease the problem of national identity so closely connected with that of democratic commitment. First of all it was always the citizen's loss of confidence which has

- 93 -

- 32 -

of all it was always the citizen's loss of confidence which has
so closely connected with that of democratic commitment. First
political entity which could ease the problem of national identity
federation with full political institutions, may be the only bo-
proposals. In the state of separation a democratic European
aut in true revolutionism not to be compared with the present li-
sation of her own. A disintegration of the West could well re-
standing for expectations that the Federal Republic would become
not only in terms of the national ideology, there is less under-
on the part of the younger generation, to see the German problem
even been rebelled. While there was much readiness partially
solutions has not yet been answered or has in the age of the German
cratic attitudes - at least as long as the great for international
of its own. And this is a precondition for the rooting of demo-
strate a full sense of identity for a new, and separated, state
history of the Bonn Republic is certainly too short a period to
for a solution of the German question in the near future, the
German in West and East alike. Even if there are only dim prospects
This means an additional source of instability and uncertainty for
civic attitudes under a patent state of emergency and civil war.
and raised artificial conditions which but the cultivation of
to immunize her against communism, it has at the same time created
While the cold war has helped to atsphire Western Germany and
make necessarily affect also the problem of states' attachment.
fully cultivated province¹ and the examination of remitration
Germany. It seems difficult to pledge full allegiance to a car-
demokratie, but also by a lack of national identity in regard
pursue of the best and by the amorphous effects of Kultur-
attitudes in the Federal Republic is complicated not only by
It should be understood, moreover, that the problem of politics

- 35 -

- 93 -

made to disturb democracy and to bring about its decline and fall. But beside resentment and embitterment, ignorance and lacking insight into the principles and workings of that socio-political form are the roots of such a crisis of confidence.

Constitutions and institutions are merely the framework to be filled with social and intellectual life. During the Adenauer era, in political practice democracy was not always credible. There were acts of confessional bias in culture and education, of curing basic rights in favour of alleged state interests. In particular politics as in political justice, the ambiguities displayed in the persecution of anticommunism and the exculpation of Nazism were to impair the efforts to free the democratic present from a criminal past. This applies also to the case of state secretary Hans Globke, once involved in Hitler's anti-Jewish legislation, but now to the end of Adenauer's period (1963) acting as chief of the Chancellor's Office and one of the most influential figures of Bonn. Such examples of an almost cynical contempt for democratic morals correspond to a way of double talking by which political leaders and ministers in "sunday speeches" comply with the revisionist slogans of refugee meetings. Apart from its dubious political effects in East and West alike, such schizophrenia does certainly not further the political orientation and education of the German public. When a declared revisionist like Seebohm was tolerated from 1949 to the present, in the Adenauer and Erhard CABI of political expediency which based political leadership on unnets, this was not just by accident. It displayed a misconception scrupulous tactics and the prestige of success, but made it impossible to use such a strong position for clearing the German democracy from pre-democratic and revisionist elements; by following

- 94 -

- 24 -

democracy from pre-democratic and separatist elements; by following
beasple to see an end a strong position for clearing the German
surrounding tactics and the prestige of ances, put made it im-
possible, this was not just by accident. It displayed a macabre
of political expropriation which passed political ferocity on num-
bered from 1949 to the present, in the Adenauer and Erhard esch-
c German hupfio. When a declared separatist like Seepom was to-
tainly not further the political orientation and equation of the
total effects in East and West like an end of opposition does cer-
tainly a slogan of refugee meetings. Apart from itsSTONE boll-
regers and ministers in "aungg apeoonea" comply with the real-
monste correspondence to a way of couple talking by which political
Bouw, an ex samples of an almost constant contempt for democratic
Chunellor's Office and one of the most influential figures of
now to the end of Adenauer's period (1932) so far as chief of the
Hans Gropke once violated in Hitler's anti-Teutish legislation, got
the criminal beat. This abdication said to the case of state secretary
were to impair the efforts to free the democratic present from a
the braeconition of anticommunism and the expropriation of Westem
bollfios as in political justice, the amorphities displayed in
pung pate rights in favour of alleged state interests. In her case
were acts of controversial pise in culture and education, of cur-
in political practice democracy was not always credible. There
was a conflict with official and intellectual life. During the Adenauer era,
Constitutions and institutions are merely the framework to be
to form are the roots of such a crisis of confidence.

But people reaction and emigration, ignorance and lack of
insight into the principles and working of that society-political
made to disrupt democracy and to bring about its decline and fall.

- 23 -

- 94 -

ing such tactics, successful as they might be at the very moment,
Adenauer left his successor with a public atmosphere where ap-
portunism is reigning and criticism diffamed as "intellectualism",
while gave decisions have been postponed. It is true, the example
of civic and political culture given by the first President
Theodor Heuss, the liberal democrat and homme de lettre, gave in
his substantial speeches and books<sup>6e)</sup>, has made a deep impression
on the public that can be counted on the positive side of German
civic culture. But from his weakened office Heuss had no great
influence on government operations and political decision; even
his attempt in 1951/52 to create a new national anthem came to
nothing, when Adenauer gave way to the pressure of traditionalists,

- 95 -

- 32 -

nothing, when Adenauer gave way to the pressure of traditionalism, his attempt in 1927/28 to create a new national antitrust came to influence on government operations and political decision; even civic culture. But from his weakened office Hensel had no great on the public that can be counted on the positive side of German his substantial speeches and books). He made a deep impression Theodor Hensel, the liberal democrat and homme de lettre, gave in of civic and political culture given by the first President while he gave decisions have been booted. It is true, the example of the first President is an example of intellectualism, but this is reining and criticism derailed as "intellectualism". Adenauer felt his successor with a public atmosphere where ab- ing and tactics, necessary as they might be at the very moment,

- 34 -

- 95 -

## Conclusion

Thus the end of the era Adenauer has left more than one question mark. In the realm of institutions, the problems are hardly more disturbing than in any Western democracy, even if a testing period may be ahead, with the CDU less solid, and the SPD not yet fully recognized in all parts of the population. On the level of political attitudes, the situation appears not as stable, inspite of a good record in voting behavior. On the other hand, the much complained pluralism of interest groups can be regarded as positive, if it becomes more solidly integrated into the democratic process. While the institutionalization of parties has developed an ambivalent meaning, the emergence of the mass media has - against much criticism - proved a democratizing factor which has countered the failures or encroachments of state power and opened new ways to a more open society.

On her road between continuity and change, the new Germany has to face many obstacles. Pre-democratic traditions persist, the Nazi past is not entirely overcome, and even the modernizing process of state and society which seems more speedy than in many other countries, implies the danger of re-strengthening, with bureaucracy and the role of experts, the authoritarian, anti-parliamentary traditions of *Obrigkeitsstaat*. But while the problem of reunification makes any prediction doubtful, yet quite evidently the new conditions of political stability and the social and economic success of the Second Republic give democracy in Germany a better change than during the twenties. With these modifications one may indeed conclude that Bonn is not Weimar.

modifications one may indeed conclude that Bonn is not Weimar. Germany a better change than during the twenties. With these and economic success of the Second Republic five democracy inently the new conditions of political stability and the social of remittlement makes any prediction doubtful, yet quite evi-

**Parliamentary traditions of Opitzkeffetatsaet.** But while the problem puremocracy and the role of experts, the authoritarian, anti-

process of state and society which seems more greedy than in many

State diet is not entirely overcome, and even the modernizing
to face many opacities. Pre-democratic traditions peristat, the

On her road between continuity and change, the new Germany has
new ways to a more open society.

countered the failures or encroachments of state power and opened
against much criticism - proved a democratizing factor which has
an ampiient meaning, the emergence of the mass media has -
process. While the institutionalisation of parties has developed
tremend, it it becomes more solidly integrated into the democratic
complained pluralism of interest groups can be regarded as best-
of a good record in voting behavior. On the other hand, the much
typical attitudes, the situation appears not as stable, inspite
recognised in all parties of the population. On the level of poli-
may be ahead, with the CDU less solid, and the SPD not yet fully
distamping than in any Western democracy, even if a testing peri-
work. In the realm of institutions, the problems are hardly more
Thus far end of the era Adenauer has left more than one question

Conclusion

- 92 -

Notes

1) On the problems of the "modernization" process in Germany and Japan, both lacking a democratic revolution, see Robert A. Scalapino, in: R.E.Ward, D.A.Rustow (ed.), Politicab Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton, 1964, pp 68 ff

2) Max Weber, Gesammelte politische Schriften, München 1921, pp.139; 371 etc.

3) A New Europe ? ed. Stephen R. Graubard, Boston 1964 (see esp. articles by K.Epstein, A.Grosser, K.D.Bracher, Ch.Fraenkel)

4) See Alfred Weber, Abschied von der bisherigen Geschichte, engl. ed. Fare-well from European History, London 1947

5) Rudolf Stadelmann, Deutschland und Westeuropa, Laupheim 1948, pp 11 ff; Leonhard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, Boston 1957. See also Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, Princeton, 1958

6) Helmuth Plessner, Die verspätete Nation, Stuttgart 1959; of Friedrich Sell, Die Tragödie des deutschen Liberalismus, Stuttgart 1953

7) See the heated German discussion, following recently the extended presentation by Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, Düsseldorf 1961 (and several editions); of a treaty Henry Lord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945, The Hague 1955

8) For details K.D.Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, 4th ed. Villingen 1964; also K.D.Bracher, W.Sauer, G.Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung, 2nd ed. Köln-Opeladen 1962

- 2 -

- 2 -

9) Francis L. Carsten, *Reichswehr und Politik, Köln 1964, pp. 20 ff*

10) For the following discussion see Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie, Düsseldorf 1960; Norbert Teennies; Der Staat aus dem Nichts, Stuttgart 1954*; Peter H. Merkl, *The Origin of the West German Republic, New York 1963*; Richard Hiscocks, *Democracy in Western Germany, London 1957* The best German analysis gives Theodor Hellwein, *Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Köln-Opladen 1963*

11) See the remarkable essays of Karl Jaspers, *Lebensfragen deutscher Politik, München 1963*

12) This the study of a Swiss observer: Fritz René Allemann, *Bonn ist nicht Weimar, Köln 1956*

13) Cf Gernot Soheuer, *Die Rechtslage des geteilten Deutschland, Frankfurt/M. 1960*; Theodor Maunz (Ed.) *Vom Bonner Grundgesetz zur gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, München 1956*

14) F. K. Fromme, *Von der Weimarer Verfassung zum Bonner Grundgesetz Tübingen 1960*

15) By a participant observer: John F. Golay, *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chicago 1958*

16) E.g. the ultra-conservative interpretation of Winfried Martini, *Freiheit auf Abruf, Köln 1960, pp. 221 ff.* See the controversy between Adolf Arndt (SPD) and the right wing historian Michael Freund, in: *Notstandsgesetz - aber wie ? Köln 1962*

17) See Erwin Stein, "Rechtliche Sicherung der freiheitlichen Demokratie", in: *Gesellschaft, Staat, Erziehung 7(1962), p. 78*

- 3 -

- 3 -

mokratie, in: Geiselhardt, Staat, Erste, 1925), p. 18

11) see Erwin Stein, "Rechtliche Sicherung der Freiheitsschluß De-
Brüngd, in: Notatsangabe, - aber wie ? Krieg 1925
between Adolf Arndt (191) and the right wing diatrist Maxwell
Freiheit und Anpritz, Krieg 1926, pp. 551 ff. See the controversy
1927, the ultra-conservative interpretation of Minnied Martini,

Federal Republic of Germany, Chicago 1928

12) By a bertiefbant operator: John E. Golak, The Foundation of the
Tupingen 1926

14) B.K. Broume, Von der Weimerer Verlaennk zum Bonner Gringkeats
sowie gesundheiteten Verlaennk, München 1926

15) Ot Gerrot Schener, Die Rechtafike des Kehlten Deutscherland,
Frankfurt am Main, 1926; Theodor Mann (1926) Von Bonner Gringkeats
1927

15) The book the study of a Swiss operator: Britta René Viennemann.

Ober Politik, München 1926

11) See the remarkable essay of Karl Jäbera, Repenstraten gent-

staten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Kiel-Oblagen 1926

The best German analyst gives Theodor Heine, Das Recht um-
1926; Richard Hirsch, Democrat in Western Germany, London 1927
Peter H. Merk, The Origin of the West German Republic, New York
aus dem Norden, Stuttgart 1924;

Demokratie, München 1926; Morbert Toennies, Der Staat

10) For the followingiom diaconation see Friedrich Grosser, Die Bonner

9) Francia J. Caraten, Reichwehr und Politik, Krieg 1924, pp. 104

- 5 -

- 3 -

18) Arnold Brecht, *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany*. New York 1945; of the discussion in Merkl, op. cit., p. 28-5e, *Hans-Max* In public opinion polls, renewed federalism has gained support during the years: while in 1952 an average of 50% advocated the dissolution of Länder Governments (except for the traditional strongholds Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg), by 1960 the votes of centralists were dropped to less than half, with SPD governed Hessen changing from 60% to 15%; *Férbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1958-1964*. Allensbach 1965, p 458

19) Karl Loewenstein, *Political Power and the Governmental Process*, Chicago 1956; of K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, London 1955

20) *Die Neugliederung des Bundesgebietes*, Bonn 1955

21) The main arguments contain O.K. Flechtheim, *Bund und Länder*, Berlin 1959. of I. de Solages, *Les Institutions fédératives de l'Allemagne occidentale*, Reims 1959

22) Eduard McWhinney, *Föderalismus und Bundesverfassungsrecht*, Heidelberg 1962; Edward A. Pinney, *Federation, Bureaucracy and Politics in Western Germany*, Chapel Hill 1963; Karlheinz Neunreither, "Politics and Bureaucracy in the West German Bundesrat", in: *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959), p. 713-31, and his book, *Der Bundesrat zwischen Politik und Verwaltung*, Heidelberg 1959

23) On Adenauer's ruling technique: Rüdiger Altmann, *Das Erbe Adenauer*, Stuttgart 1960, pp 34 ff; 131 ff; Klaus Bölling, *Die Soweite Republik*, Köln 1963; K.D. Bracher, *Deutschland zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur*, München-Bern 1964, p-124-130, also in: Henry W. Ehrmann (ed.) *Democracy in a changing Society*. New York 1964, p. 134-141

- 4 -

["- 4 -", "b.134-141\n\n**Henry M. Kuhn** (54)\n**Democratie in een ouderige Sociale**. New York 1964.\n\n**Demokratie und Diktatur**. Munich-Berlin 1964, b.154-150, s.30 in:\n**Wette Rechts**. Kiel 1962; K.D.Breuer, Deutschland zwischen\n**widers**. Stuttgart 1960, pp. 34 ff; 131 ff; Klaue Beijing, Die\n52) On Vdenuer, a ruling technique: Rührer Vittmann, *Die Erste Vö-", "Herzepark 1929\nund die pock. Der Bundesrat zwischen Politik und Politik. 1929. In: *Volkswesen Politik* 1929, p. 103, p. 104, p. 105, p. 106, p. 107, p. 108, p. 109, p. 110, p. 111, p. 112, p. 113, p. 114, p. 115, p. 116, p. 117, p. 118, p. 119, p. 120, p. 121, p. 122, p. 123, p. 124, p. 125, p. 126, p. 127, p. 128, p. 129, p. 130, p. 131, p. 132, p. 133, p. 134, p. 135, p. 136, p. 137, p. 138, p. 139, p. 140, p. 141, p. 142, p. 143, p. 144, p. 145, p. 146, p. 147, p. 148, p. 149, p. 150, p. 151, p. 152, p. 153, p. 154, p. 155, p. 156, p. 157, p. 158, p. 159, p. 160, p. 161, p. 162, p. 163, p. 164, p. 165, p. 166, p. 167, p. 168, p. 169, p. 170, p. 171, p. 172, p. 173, p. 174, p. 175, p. 176, p. 177, p. 178, p. 179, p. 180, p. 181, p. 182, p. 183, p. 184, p. 185, p. 186, p. 187, p. 188, p. 189, p. 190, p. 191, p. 192, p. 193, p. 194, p. 195, p. 196, p. 197, p. 198, p. 199, p. 200, p. 201, p. 202, p. 203, p. 204, p. 205, p. 206, p. 207, p. 208, p. 209, p. 210, p. 211, p. 212, p. 213, p. 214, p. 215, p. 216, p. 217, p. 218, p. 219, p. 220, p. 221, p. 222, p. 223, p. 224, p. 225, p. 226, p. 227, p. 228, p. 229, p. 230, p. 231, p. 232, p. 233, p. 234, p. 235, p. 236, p. 237, p. 238, p. 239, p. 240, p. 241, p. 242, p. 243, p. 244, p. 245, p. 246, p. 247, p. 248, p. 249, p. 250, p. 251, p. 252, p. 253, p. 254, p. 255, p. 256, p. 257, p. 258, p. 259, p. 260, p. 261, p. 262, p. 263, p. 264, p. 265, p. 266, p. 267, p. 268, p. 269, p. 270, p. 271, p. 272, p. 273, p. 274, p. 275, p. 276, p. 277, p. 278, p. 279, p. 280, p. 281, p. 282, p. 283, p. 284, p. 285, p. 286, p. 287, p. 288, p. 289, p. 290, p. 291, p. 292, p. 293, p. 294, p. 295, p. 296, p. 297, p. 298, p. 299, p. 300, p. 301, p. 302, p. 303, p. 304, p. 305, p. 306, p. 307, p. 308, p. 309, p. 310, p. 311, p. 312, p. 313, p. 314, p. 315, p. 316, p. 317, p. 318, p. 319, p. 320, p. 321, p. 322, p. 323, p. 324, p. 325, p. 326, p. 327, p. 328, p. 329, p. 330, p. 331, p. 332, p. 333, p. 334, p. 335, p. 336, p. 337, p. 338, p. 339, p. 340, p. 341, p. 342, p. 343, p. 344, p. 345, p. 346, p. 347, p. 348, p. 349, p. 350, p. 351, p. 352, p. 353, p. 354, p. 355, p. 356, p. 357, p. 358, p. 359, p. 360, p. 361, p. 362, p. 363, p. 364, p. 365, p. 366, p. 367, p. 368, p. 369, p. 370, p. 371, p. 372, p. 373, p. 374, p. 375, p. 376, p. 377, p. 378, p. 379, p. 380, p. 381, p. 382, p. 383, p. 384, p. 385, p. 386, p. 387, p. 388, p. 389, p. 390, p. 391, p. 392, p. 393, p. 394, p. 395, p. 396, p. 397, p. 398, p. 399, p. 400, p. 401, p. 402, p. 403, p. 404, p. 405, p. 406, p. 407, p. 408, p. 409, p. 410, p. 411, p. 412, p. 413, p. 414, p. 415, p. 416, p. 417, p. 418, p. 419, p. 420, p. 421, p. 422, p. 423, p. 424, p. 425, p. 426, p. 427, p. 428, p. 429, p. 430, p. 431, p. 432, p. 433, p. 434, p. 435, p. 436, p. 437, p. 438, p. 439, p. 440, p. 441, p. 442, p. 443, p. 444, p. 445, p. 446, p. 447, p. 448, p. 449, p. 450, p. 451, p. 452, p. 453, p. 454, p. 455, p. 456, p. 457, p. 458, p. 459, p. 460, p. 461, p. 462, p. 463, p. 464, p. 465, p. 466, p. 467, p. 468, p. 469, p. 470, p. 471, p. 472, p. 473, p. 474, p. 475, p. 476, p. 477, p. 478, p. 479, p. 480, p. 481, p. 482, p. 483, p. 484, p. 485, p. 486, p. 487, p. 488, p. 489, p. 490, p. 491, p. 492, p. 493, p. 494, p. 495, p. 496, p. 497, p. 498, p. 499, p. 500, p. 501, p. 502, p. 503, p. 504, p. 505, p. 506, p. 507, p. 508, p. 509, p. 510, p. 511, p. 512, p. 513, p. 514, p. 515, p. 516, p. 517, p. 518, p. 519, p. 520, p. 521, p. 522, p. 523, p. 524, p. 525, p. 526, p. 527, p. 528, p. 529, p. 530, p. 531, p. 532, p. 533, p. 534, p. 535, p. 536, p. 537, p. 538, p. 539, p. 540, p. 541, p. 542, p. 543, p. 544, p. 545, p. 546, p. 547, p. 548, p. 549, p. 550, p. 551, p. 552, p. 553, p. 554, p. 555, p. 556, p. 557, p. 558, p. 559, p. 560, p. 561, p. 562, p. 563, p. 564, p. 565, p. 566, p. 567, p. 568, p. 569, p. 570, p. 571, p. 572, p. 573, p. 574, p. 575, p. 576, p. 577, p. 578, p. 579, p. 580, p. 581, p. 582, p. 583, p. 584, p. 585, p. 586, p. 587, p. 588, p. 589, p. 590, p. 591, p. 592, p. 593, p. 594, p. 595, p. 596, p. 597, p. 598, p. 599, p. 600, p. 601, p. 602, p. 603, p. 604, p. 605, p. 606, p. 607, p. 608, p. 609, p. 610, p. 611, p. 612, p. 613, p. 614, p. 615, p. 616, p. 617, p. 618, p. 619, p. 620, p. 621, p. 622, p. 623, p. 624, p. 625, p. 626, p. 627, p. 628, p. 629, p. 630, p. 631, p. 632, p. 633, p. 634, p. 635, p. 636, p. 637, p. 638, p. 639, p. 640, p. 641, p. 642, p. 643, p. 644, p. 645, p. 646, p. 647, p. 648, p. 649, p. 650, p. 651, p. 652, p. 653, p. 654, p. 655, p. 656, p. 657, p. 658, p. 659, p. 660, p. 661, p. 662, p. 663, p. 664, p. 665, p. 666, p. 667, p. 668, p. 669, p. 670, p. 671, p. 672, p. 673, p. 674, p. 675, p. 676, p. 677, p. 678, p. 679, p. 680, p. 681, p. 682, p. 683, p. 684, p. 685, p. 686, p. 687, p. 688, p. 689, p. 690, p. 691, p. 692, p. 693, p. 694, p. 695, p. 696, p. 697, p. 698, p. 699, p. 700, p. 701, p. 702, p. 703, p. 704, p. 705, p. 706, p. 707, p. 708, p. 709, p. 710, p. 711, p. 712, p. 713, p. 714, p. 715, p. 716, p. 717, p. 718, p. 719, p. 720, p. 721, p. 722, p. 723, p. 724, p. 725, p. 726, p. 727, p. 728, p. 729, p. 730, p. 731, p. 732, p. 733, p. 734, p. 735, p. 736, p. 737, p. 738, p. 739, p. 740, p. 741, p. 742, p. 743, p. 744, p. 745, p. 746, p. 747, p. 748, p. 749, p. 750, p. 751, p. 752, p. 753, p. 754, p. 755, p. 756, p. 757, p. 758, p. 759, p. 760, p. 761, p. 762, p. 763, p. 764, p. 765, p. 766, p. 767, p. 768, p. 769, p. 770, p. 771, p. 772, p. 773, p. 774, p. 775, p. 776, p. 777, p. 778, p. 779, p. 780, p. 781, p. 782, p. 783, p. 784, p. 785, p. 786, p. 787, p. 788, p. 789, p. 790, p. 791, p. 792, p. 793, p. 794, p. 795, p. 796, p. 797, p. 798, p. 799, p. 800, p. 801, p. 802, p. 803, p. 804, p. 805, p. 806, p. 807, p. 808, p. 809, p. 810, p. 811, p. 812, p. 813, p. 814, p. 815, p. 816, p. 817, p. 818, p. 819, p. 820, p. 821, p. 822, p. 823, p. 824, p. 825, p. 826, p. 827, p. 828, p. 829, p. 830, p. 831, p. 832, p. 833, p. 834, p. 835, p. 836, p. 837, p. 838, p. 839, p. 840, p. 841, p. 842, p. 843, p. 844, p. 845, p. 846, p. 847, p. 848, p. 849, p. 850, p. 851, p. 852, p. 853, p. 854, p. 855, p. 856, p. 857, p. 858, p. 859, p. 860, p. 861, p. 862, p. 863, p. 864, p. 865, p. 866, p. 867, p. 868, p. 869, p. 870, p. 871, p. 872, p. 873, p. 874, p. 875, p. 876, p. 877, p. 878, p. 879, p. 880, p. 881, p. 882, p. 883, p. 884, p. 885, p. 886, p. 887, p. 888, p. 889, p. 890, p. 891, p. 892, p. 893, p. 894, p. 895, p. 896, p. 897, p. 898, p. 899, p. 900, p. 901, p. 90

- 4 -

24) W. Otto H. von der Gablentz, *Die versäumte Reform, Köln-Opladen* 1960, P. 14; H. Th. Risse, "Adenauer und die CDU" in: *Frankfurter Hefte* 17(1962), p. 91

24a) Ernst Fraenkel, *Die repräsentative und die plebiszitäre Komponente im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat*, Tübingen 1958, pp 48ff; Gilbert Ziebura, *Die fünfte Republik*, Köln-Opladen 1960 On

25) Gerhard's ruling style Wilhelm Hennis, *Richtlinienkompetenz und Regierungstechnik*, Tübingen 1964

26) K.D. Bracher, "Problems of Parliamentarism, Democracy in Europe", in: *A New Europe? New York 1964*, p. 240-264; Gerhard Loewenberg, "Parliamentarism in Western Germany", in: *American Political Science Review* 55(1961); p 87-162

26a) Erich Kuby, Eugen Kogon et al. *Franz Josef Strauss, Ein Typus unserer Zeit*, München 1963, pp 233 ff.

27) Of the important essays of Gerhard Leibholz, *Strukturprobleme der modernen Demokratie*, Karlsruhe 1958, pp 63 ff; 78 ff.

28) The best studies are by Sigmund Neumann: *Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik*, new ed. Stuttgart 1965; Introduction to Parteien in der Bundesrepublik, Stuttgart-Düsseldorf 1955, p. XVII-XXXII; *Modern Political Parties*, Chicago 1956, p. 354-392

29) Of the discussion in K.D. Bracher, *Die aufbauende, op. cit.* p. 50-55; *Grundlagen des deutschen Wahlrechts*, Bonn 1955; W. Hirsch-Weber, Klaus Schütz, Wähler und Gewählte, Bonn 1956, pp 297 ff; Uwe Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics*, Oxford 1957

- 5 -

- 2 -

Une Kitaufuer, German Electoral Politics, Oxford 1927

Klaus Böhm, Mäuer und Gemüfte, Bonn 1926, pp. 581–583

Grundlagen des gesetzlichen Rechts, Bonn 1922, M. Hirsh-Meier,

59) Of the question in K.D. Bräuer, Die Sozialwelt, on. off. b. 20-22; see also

-XXXII: Modern Political Parties, Chicago 1926, p. 324-335

Parteien in der Bundesrepublik, Stuttgart-Düsseldorf 1922, p. XAI

Wehrer Republik, new ed. Stuttgart 1922; Introduction to

58) The best arguments are by Stammung Nennmann: Die Parteien der

ger modernen Demokratie, Klarneue 1928, pp. 62–63, ff. 18–19.

57) Of the important ideas of Gerhard Teppfola, Staatsschreiberproze-
meester seit, München 1923, pp. 533–534.

58a) Erich Knauf, Engen Kofon et al. Ernst Joseph Strasza, Ein Tages

Science Review 22(1927): p. 87-89

"Parliamentarism in Western Germany," in: American Political

59) K.D. Bräuer, "Probleme der Parlamentarizität," Demokratik in Europa,

SE) V. New Europe? New York 1924, p. 540-542; Gerhard Loewenperg,

Reichsministerium, Tübingen 1924

52) Kriegsrechte, Ranting style. Wilhelmi Henne, Richtlinienkombination

Gustav Ziehm, Die künfte Republik, Köln-Oblagen 1926

54a) Ernst Brauck, Die reprezentative und die demokratische Kombination

Heute 17(1925), p. 61

1826, p. 14; H. T. R. E. "Advancer and the CDU," in: Frankfurter

54) Otto von der Gapsen, Die aeraumte Reform, Köln-Oblagen

- 4 -

- 5 -

30) The material is collected in: *Rechtliche Ordnung des Partei-wesens, Probleme eines Parteiengesetzes, 2nd ed. Frankfurt/M. 1958; Ulrich Dübber, *Parteifinanzierung in Deutschland, Köln-Opladen 1962. On an comparative level, the problems are being followed by The International Study Group on Political Finance: see the collection of analyses in: R. Rose, A. Heidenheim (Ed.), *Comparative Political Finance, reprinted from Journal of Politics* 25(1963); pp 643-811 (with the German part by U. Dübber and G. Braunthal, pp 774-789). In this connection, some interesting results from public opinion polls reflecting atti-tudes on questions of the party democracy may be mentioned: a majority is in favour of multi-party system, about 30% plead for a two-party system; socialism is understood mainly in terms of security and welfare; most followers not only of the CDU but of the SPD as well qualify their party as *bürgerlich*; yet most CDU and FDP followers define the goal of politics as establish-ing quiet conditions, while most SPD followers expect politics to search for new ways. The argument for party government comes out in the majority opinion that a deputy who changes parties should give up his mandate in parliament. *Jahrbuch, op.cit.* pp 428 ff*

31) Cf Theodor Täuschenburg, *Probleme der Parteifinanzierung in Deutschland, Tübingen 1961*

32) Michael D. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*, London 1957; Hans Maier, *Revolution und Kirohe, 2nd ed. Freiburg 1964; Joseph Revan, *The Catholicism, Politique en Allemagne, Paris 1956*

### waswa, Bara 1828

Freipung 1824; Joseph Reuss, *Die Republik, Politik und Völkerung 1823*, London 1824; Hans Mier, *Rechtswirbel und Kulturen*, 2. Aufl. 1924.

3S) Michael D. Fogarty, *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1850-Denmarkland*, Tübingen 1961

31) Cf. Theodor Schouenck, *Probleme der Demokratie* in
bb 458 ff.

sowiegleib die wahrwurde in parlament. *Jahrgang*, ob.cit.
out in the majority opinion that a debut who changes parties
to search for new ways. The argument *barby government comes
ing quiet conditions*, while most SBD followers expect politics
CDU and HDH followers define the cost of politics as establi-
shing majority and welfare; most followers not only of the CDU put
tor a two-party system; socialism is understood mainly in terms
of majority is in favour of multi-party system, apart from 20% who
tend on creations of the barby democracy may be mentioned;
interesting results from hydraulic opinion polls reflecting atti-
tion. Dapper and G. Brunsford, *bb. 114-188*). In this connection, some
*of politics* 52(1962); *bb 432-811* (with the German Bart *p* (Eq.). *Comboratisme Politique Finance*, reprinted from *Journel Finance*, see the collection of surveys in: R. Rose, V. Heidgenheimer
peing followed *p* The *International Study Group on Political Koru-Obajeu 1965*. On *an International review*, the problems are 1968; *Nordrop Dapper*, *Bariteilwesernerk* in *Denmarkland*, 1968; U. Dapper, *Bariteilwesernerk* in *Denmarkland*, 1968; The material is collected in: *Rechtliche Ordnung des Barter*.

30) The material is collected in: *Rechtliche Ordnung des Barter*.

- 2 -

- 6 -

[Lc]

33) Hans Georg Wieck, *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergründung des Zentrums 1945, Düsseldorf 1953; Wieck, Christliche und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden und Württemberg 1945/46, Düsseldorf 1958.* By one of the founders: Leo Schwering, *Frühgeschichte der Christlich-Demokratischen Union, Recklinghausen 1963*

34) Arnold Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU, (The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party)*, The Hague 1960; Gerhard Schulz, "Die CDU - Merkmale ihres Aufbaus", in: *Parteien op.cit.*, p.6-151

For a sketch of the party structures, see also A. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany, New York 1961, p.62-79*; and his article "Federalism and the Party System: The Case of West Germany" in: *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959), p. 809-28

35) Rüdiger Altmann, *Das deutsche Risiko, Aussenpolitische Perspektiven, Stuttgart 1962*; on Strauss E. Kuby et al., *op.cit.*, pp 11 ff; 93 ff;

36) Thus a sarcastic reviewer of Heidenheimer :F.Ridley, in: *Political Studies*, Februar 1962, p.71

37) Klaus Schütz, "Die Sozialdemokratie im Nachkriegsdeutschland", in: *Parteien op.cit.*, p.157-173 (-271), Not satisfying is the general study of Douglas A. Chalmers, *The Social Democratic Party of Germany, From Working Class Movement to Modern Political Party, New Haven 1964*; see the review by Susanne Miller, in: *Neue Politische Literatur* 10(1965), pp 186 f

- 7 -

- 1 -

in: *Nene Politische Literatur* 1922, pp 186-190
*toaf* *Barty*. New Haven 1924; of the review by Suzanne Miller,
*Barty* of *Germany*.From *Working Class Movement to Modern Poli-
general study of Douglas F. Chalmere*.The *Social Democratic*
in: *Bartelen* ob.cit.,p.121-113(-571). Not stating if the
23) *Klara Schults*. "Die Sosialdemokratie im Neokriegeragenturland."
*Political Studies*, February 1925, p.17.

26) Tyna a sociologic reviewer of Heidenheimer: M.Higley, in:

bb 11.11; 82.11;

22) *Rüdiger Vittmann*, *Die deutsche Ratsk*, *Ansaenpolitische Ber-
d. 808-58*
*Germany* in: *American Political Science Review* 22 (1928),
article "Federalism and the Party System: The Case of West
The Governments of Germany", New York 1927, p.65-78; cf. his
For a sketch of the party atomization, see also V. Heidenheimer,
ob.cit.,p.6-121

Gerhard Schults, "Die CDU - Werkmale ihres Vorgangs," in: *Bartelen
Leser* and the Integration of the Party*. *Pom Heine 1926*;

24) Arnold Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU* (The Rise of the
*Union*, Recklinghausen 1926)

Leo Schmerling, *Reichgesellschaft der Christlich-Demokratischen
Wirtschaft* 1942/43, Dusseldorf 1928. By one of the thousands:

und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Rheinland, Baden und
Rheinland des Zentrums 1942, Dusseldorf 1922; Wiesbaden, Christliche
33) Hane Georg Wiesek, *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wieder-

33) Hane Georg Wiesek, *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wieder-
- 6 -

[L-R]

- 7 -

38) Erich Mathias, *Sozialdemokratie und Nation*; Stuttgart 1952;
Lewis Edinger, *Kurt Schumacher, A Study in Personality and
Political Behavior*, Stanford 1965

39) Edinger, op.cit., p.83

40) K.D.Bracher "Sozialdemokratie, in: *Staatslexikon*, Vol.VII, 6th
ed. Freiburg 1962, p.202-210. For the Historical Conditions see
Susanne Miller, *Das Problem der Freiheit im Sozialismus*,
Frankfurt 1963

41) Examples are the books by Wolfgang Abendroth, *Aufstieg und Krise
der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, Frankfurt/M. 1964, and Theo
Pirker, *Die SPD nach Hitler*, München 1965.

42) The best collection of party documentation presents O.K.Flech-
heim, *Dokumente zur Parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland*
*seit 1945*, 3 vols, Berlin 1962/3

43) Max G. Lange, "Die FDP- Versuch einer Erneuerung des Liberalismus"
in: *Parteien*, op.cit. p.275-403

44) K.D.Bracher, *Theodor Heuss und die Wiederbegründung der Demo-
kratie in Deutschland, Tübingen 1965*; see also Reinhold Maier,
*Ein Grundstein wird gelegt, Tübingen 1964*

45) Gerald Braunthal, "*The Free Democratic Party in West German
Politics*", in: *Western Political Quarterly* 13 (June 1960), p.

46) See Hans Helmut Knütter, *Ideologie des Rechtsradikalismus im
Nachkriegsdeutschland*, Bonn 1961

- 8 -

- 8 -

Mechkrefagentengang, Bouw 1961

4c) See Hane Helmut Knitter, Ideologie des Rechtsradikalfismes im
**Politics**, in:Western Political Quarterly 13 (June 1960), b.

42) Gesetz pranthei, "The Free Democratie Party in West German

Ein Grundetsein wird felekt, Tübingen 1964

44) K.D.Braher, Theodor Hensel und die Wiederverbindung der Demo-
kratie in Deutschland, Tübingen 1962; see also Reinfold Mainer.

in: **Barteiten**, op.cit. p.512-402

43) Max G.Lange, "Die EDP - Aerenou einer Erneuerung der Lipperlaffamme
seit 1945", 3 afoa, Berlin 1965/3

45) The best collection of party documentation presents O.K.Breit-
Pirker, Die EBD nach Hitler, Munchen 1962.

46) Examples are the pocks p Völlgang Vengroth, Vlastik und Krie-
der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Frankfurt/M. 1964, and Theo
Frankfurt 1963

Brenne Miller, *Die Projen der Freiheit im Sozialismus*,

eq. Freipunk 1965, b-505-Sie. For the Histori-cal Conditions see
40) K.D.Braher "Sozialdemokratie in: Staatslexikon", Aof.AII. c4p
Freiheit 1965

38) Eginger, op.cit., p.82

Political Behavior, Stanford 1962

28) Eric von Mises, *Sozialdemokratie und Nation; Stuttgart 1928*

- 1 -

- 8 -

47) For instance Werner Weber, in: W.Beutler (Ed.) *Der Staat und die Verbände*, Heidelberg 1957, p.19; from a similar etatist view Joseph H.Kaiser, *Die Repräsentation organisierter Interessen*, Berlin 1956

48) For a critical analysis of Schmitt, see Jürgen Fijalkowski, *Die Wendung zum Führerstaat*, Köln-Opladen 1958

49) Notably Rupert Breitling, *Die Verbände in der Bundesrepublik*, Meisenheim 1955

49a) Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, *Gewerkschaften in der Politik*, Köln-Opladen 1959. See the discussions in: *Die Gewerkschaften im Staat* Düsseldorf 1955

50) See Henry W. Ehrmann (@d.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents*, Pittsburgh 1958

51) Ernst Friesenhahn, *Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Köln 1963; Gerhard Leibholz, "Die Stellung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im Rahmen des Bonner Grundgesetzes" in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 3(1962), p.13

52) See the critical reviews by H.Ridder, E.Stein, *Der permanente Notstand*, Göttingen 1963; E.Kogon, W.Abendroth et.al., *Der totale Notstandsstaat*, Frankfurt/M., 1965

53) Of Allemann, op.cit., pp.368 ff, and the rather optimistic views in Eric Waldman, *Soldat im Staat, Der Staatsbürger in Uniform*, Boppard 1963

54) Rich documentation in: *Der Kampf um den Wehrbeitrag*, 3 vols. München 1952-58; *Der deutsche Soldat in der Armee von morgen, München 1954*. of Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War*, Evanston 1957

- 9 -

- 6 -

Evansaton 1927

München 1924. ot Hans Scheier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War*.

München 1925-28: Der deutsche Sollgut in der Armee von Mörkau.

24) Reich documentation in: *Der Krieg im den Weppefleitg* & aole.

Bobberg 1923

in Erro Waldman, *Sollgut im Staat*, Der Staatsschuler in Uniform.

23) Cl Vifemann, ob.oft., pp.388 tt, and the rather optimistic views

Notatsndaatsat, Frankfurt, M., 1922

Notatsand, Göttingen 1923; E. Kogon, W. Apendroth et al., Der totale

25) See the critical reviews by H. Rieger, E. Stein, Der bernenende
in: *Bofftische Anerterlapresschrift* 3 (1925), p.13

des Bundesverwaltungsdirekte im Bauern des Bonner Grundgebaus,
Republik Deutschland. Köln 1923; Gerhard Reifhofer, "Die Stellung

21) Ernst Friesenau, Die Verfassungsgerichtsapsrkeit in der Bundes-
Bittesprach 1928

20) See Henry W. Ehrmann (S4.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents*.

Dusseldorf 1922

Obladen 1922. The qualifications in: Die Gewerkschaften im Staat

48a) Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber, *Gewerkschaften in der Bofflik*, Köln-Obladen 1928

49) Notably Robert Breitling, Die Ver PAGE in der Bundesrepublik.

Die Wengnuk am Kuhnerstast, Köln-Obladen 1928

48) For a critical analysis of Schmitt, see Türken Lipfalkowski.

Berlin 1926

Joseph H. Kaiser, Die Repräsentation organiaterter Interessen,

die Ver PAGE, Heidelberg 1927, p.19: from a similar etatist view
47) For instance Werner Weber, in: W. Bentler (Ed.) Der Staat und

- 8 -

- 9 -

55) Wolf Graf Baudissin, "The New Army", in: *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1955

56) K.Deutsch, L.Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, Stanford 1959; Gerald Freund, *Germany between two Worlds*, New York 1961; H.Speier, W.Davison, *West German Leadership and Foreign Policy*, Evanston 1957

57) See the discussion by Arnold Brecht, *Wiedervereinigung*, München 1957 (comparative

58) See the materials collected in G.Almond, S.Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Princeton 1963; *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung*, Allensbach 1956-1965. Of the essays in: Walter Stahl (Ed.), *The Politics of Postwar Germany*, New York 1963; *Education in West Germany*, New York 1961. For a more critical view see Ulrich Sonnemann, *Das Land der unbegrenzten Zumutbarkeiten*, Hamburg 1963; Several essays in: H.J.Netzer (ed.), *Adenauer und die Folgen*, München 1965

59) Jürgen Habermas et al., *Student und Politik*, Neuwied 1961

60) Besides his numerous books, see the latest collection of political speeches: Theodor Heuss, *Die grossen Reden*, Tübingen 1965. Of also note 44

1962.Oct. 4: sjao note 44

boretosal abeohes: Tuegor Hena. Die krosen Reden. Tübingen
c) Beigea pis numera peoks, see the latest collection of

2a) türken Haperma et al. Student und Politik. Nennwieg 1961

die Folken. München 1962

Hampurg 1962: Several essays in: H.J. Meiser (ed.). Agensner und
Ürtlich Bonnemann. Die Land der nüchteren Smittparkeffter.
West Germany. New York 1961. For a more critical view see
The Politics of Beatwar Germany. New York 1962: Education in
Villenapsch 1962-1963. Of the essays in: Welsar Stahl (Ed.).
Culture. Princeton 1962: Jahrbuch der attentionierten Meine.

28) See the materials collected in G. Vlimond, 2. Aerp. The State
Competition

1962

21) See the discussion of Vlimond Breuck. Wiedervereinigung. München
Evansou 1927

H. Scheier, W. Davison, West German Leadership and Foreign Policy,
Gesellschaft, Germany between two worlds. New York 1961

22) K. Deutsch, R. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers. Stanford 1962;
23) Wolf, Carl, Bundessat, "The New Army," in: Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1922

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