MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

President: GENERAL SIR RICHARD GALE, G.C.B.

President Emeritus: CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART, D.L.

Vice-Presidents:
ADMIRAL SIR WILLIAM DAVIS, G.C.B.
BRIGADIER W. F. K. THOMPSON, O.B.E.

Founder and Hon. Secretary:

MAJOR E. HINTERHOFF, V.M.

Hon. Treasurer: W. CHARLTON, ESQ.

Hon. Secretary's Address:

10, VICTORIA GROVE, W.8

Telephone: KNLightsbridge 8835

June 4, 1965

JUN 22 REC'D

Profesor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University, MASS.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

I was sorry to miss your lecture at the Institute for Strategic Studies in London but I was ill as I had recently a major operation from which I am recovering.

I enclose 2 cuttings from The Tablet with my latest articles, dealing with the problems, I am sure, of the greatest interest to you, namely with Vietnam, and I would be delighted to have your comments on them.

In particular I would be most grateful, if you could possibly enlighten me
why the U.S. prefers to "go it alone" in Vietnam, risking not only to involve itself
but also all its allies in NATO, instead of bringing about a coalition of militarily
strong, non-Communist Asiatic states (apart from SEATO, which is worthless...) to consist
of South Korea, Formosa, Philippines and possibly Japan; the military potential of
those countries-even in peace time-is well over I mil men, organised in some 60 divi-
sions with the modern air force, and more than sufficient not only to tackle Vietcong
but even to undertake an offensive action into North Vietnam and possibly into the
China proper. Obviously the appearance on the Chinese soil of the troops of Asiatic
countries-and, for God's sake, not of Americans-could result in a levee en masse
against the Communist regime. Furthermore, if such an Asiatic "confrontation" could
come into being, it would very mucg complicate the situation for the Russians.

Finally, it would be the application of the strategy of "indirect approach",
which had been applied with such a success by the Communists over the recent years.

I would be most grateful for your views on this matter.

Yours sincerely

June 23, 1965

Major E. Hinterhoff, V.M.
Military Commentators' Circle
10 Victoria Grove, W. 8
London, England

Dear Mr. Hinterhoff:

In Professor Kissinger's absence
I am writing to acknowledge your letter
of June 4th.

He is expected to return to the
office early in July and I will bring
your letter to his attention at that time.

July 19, 1965

Major E. Hinterhoff, V.M.
Military Commentators' Circle
10 Victoria Grove
London W. 8, England

Dear Major Hinterhoff:

Thank you for your letter of June 4th which I could
not answer before this because I was out of the country.

I found your analysis of the Vietnam situation very
challenging. The difficulty is that what you propose should
have been done a few years ago while now we need a few years
in order to make up the lapses of the past. I do not think
that we can organize a group of Asiatic countries to step
into the breach quickly enough to affect the situation.

I also regard a neutralized Southeast Asia as the
best obtainable ultimate solution. I am not clear how it
can be brought about until the military situation has been
stabilized.

Thank you for sending me the interesting article.

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

Founder and Hon. Secretary:

MAJOR E. HINTERHOFF, V.M.

Hon. Secretary's Address:

10, VICTORIA GROVE, W.8

December 23, 1965

DEC 31 1965

Profesor Henry Kissinger
The Center for International Study
Harvard, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

It gives me a great pleasure in enclosing a cutting
from the quarterly "Poland & Germany", published in London,
with my article, in which I referred to yours in The Reporter
and to your plans for the solution of German problem; I hope,
you'll excuse me, if I do not agree with them 100%, na-
ley, I would have thought that the formula, which you are
suggestion for Eastern Germany should be applied to the who-
lea area of Eastern Europe and to both Germanies-as a matter
of fact, this is the gist of Gaitskell-Healey Plan, as well
as "Deutschland-Plan", which, for eletione purposes was shel-
ved indefinitely. I have dealt very extensively with a si-
milar solution in my book "Disengagement", which was published
in December 1959, with the Foreword by Sir John Slessor; if,
you have not seen it-and it is still very topical, indeed,
I would be only too happy to send one copy to you.

I take this opportunity to enclose the outline of my
planned book on armed forces of satellites-as a component
of the Warsaw Pact; I am trying to obtain a grant from the
Center for Strategic Studies, in Washington; I wonder, whe-
ther you would be good enough to allow me to mention your
name as a reference. If, at the same time, you may wish to
make any comments on the enclosed outline, I would be delig-
ted to receive them.

Although I am quite hopeful for a favourable de-
cion of the Center, I wonder-in case I shall not succeed-
whether your Center would be interested in sponsoring the
publication of my book.

Hoping to hear from you soon,

POLAND AND GERMANY

Vol. IX, No. 4 (34)

LONDON

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1965

CONTENTS

ARTICLES: Page

After the West-German
Elections
S. Kudlicki 3

Poland and the Battle
of Britain
F. Kalinowski 10

Some American Views on Germany
and Eastern Europe
E. Hinterhoff 13

FACTS AND FIGURES:

The Polish Western Territories:
Twenty Years After
W. Poznanski 22

PRESS NOTES:

The Catholic Hierarchy in Poland. — Pro-
testant Church calls for New Approach. —
Resolution of the Free Poles. — The Ger-
man Elections.
42

BOOK REVIEWS:

Gordon A. Craig: The Politics of the
Prussian Army, 1640-1945.
A. K. Tomlinson 50

SHORTER NOTICES 55

C I J

SOME AMERICAN VIEWS ON GERMANY
AND EASTERN EUROPE

by E. HINTERHOFF

MUCH HAS ALREADY been written about an article by Professor Z. K. Brzezinski of Columbia University on "Peaceful Engagement: a Plan for Europe", which appeared in the London review *Encounter* (April 1965) and simultaneously in *Die Zeit* of Hamburg. Incidentally, an expanded version appeared in book form (*Alternative to Partition*) published in New York. As could have been expected, Professor Brzezinski's views met with very diverse reactions, some most enthusiastic and others highly critical.

Undertaking a brief analysis of some of his theses, we have chosen a middle course by comparing them with other views on the same issues expressed by prominent American professors and political commentators selected at random as also by some politicians, an approach which has the advantage of providing a kind of general background for this examination. It also reveals a very wide range of views and, at the same time, the remarkable flexibility of attitude adopted by American public opinion towards the problems of central and eastern Europe.

It should be remarked, first of all, that Professor Brzezinski's fame rests primarily on the published findings of his research on various problems of the Soviet bloc; he has made a name for himself as a leading expert in his chosen field; as a result of his profound knowledge and understanding of the wide range of problems in this connection, he has been frequently consulted by high levels of the U.S. Administration and was in close touch with the inner circle of the late President Kennedy; this will explain why his views to a large extent reflect the official thinking which has been going on for long past in the air-conditioned rooms of the U.S. State Department, and it can probably be accepted as giving additional weight to the views he expresses in his many published works.

As a matter of fact, a more searching examination of Professor Brzezinski's views—those outlined in his plan for Europe particularly—does lead one to think they have an affinity with some of President Johnson's pronouncements, especially with his Message to the Union in which he stated that the reunification of Germany remains one of the main goals of American foreign policy and added immediately after that, as far as eastern Europe is concerned, the goal of this foreign policy is to bring about "the erosion of the Iron Curtain."

[13]

14

POLAND AND GERMANY

However, a thorough analysis of Professor Brzezinski's penetrat-
ing articles and books, bristling as they are with original ideas and
suggestions, would require a very long article if not, indeed, a
special essay. It would therefore be more practical to limit the
present contribution to a brief appraisal of only a few issues of
more immediate interest and likely to lead to a better understanding
of those relevant to German reunification, the Oder-Neisse frontier
and the problems of eastern Europe.

The crucial sub-chapter in Professor Brzezinski's article is entitled "Poles and Germans". In this context, he recommends a reconciliation "somewhat on the model of the Franco-German reconciliation" of the nineteen-fifties, stressing that it is a "sine qua non of peace and stability in the East." He rightly points out, however, that "the pursuit of this goal raises the difficult and sensitive issue of the Oder-Neisse frontier," whilst "anti-Germanism" is considered by the Gomulka régime of Poland as one of its major assets and as the trump-card in the pro-Soviet propaganda which insists that the Soviet Union is the only guarantor of the present Polish frontier with Germany.

Yet, instead of unambiguously pointing out that an American initiative coupled with American pressure upon the West German government for official acceptance of this frontier would act as a psychological time-bomb for bringing about peace and stability in that region besides restoring the confidence of tens of millions of people behind the Iron Curtain in the foreign policy of the United States, Professor Brzezinski recommends that American diplomacy act with extreme caution in order "not to rupture American-German relations" and to avoid the possibility that the Germans may feel "betrayed" by the Americans. This attitude has much in common with statements by Mr A. Butler, during his term as Foreign Secretary, on the problem of Germany. Thus, he said: "Nothing ought to be done that could disturb the cohesion of the alliance." As Germany on various occasions disliked proposals aimed at regional disarmament which could even indirectly imply recognition of the existing demarcation line or of the frontiers in the east, Mr Butler's attitude could not but give the impression of the half-forgotten appeasement with which he was, by the way, connected in his younger days just before the war.

Professor Brzezinski does, however, recommend opening American
consulates, say in Wrocław or Szczecin for instance; although
such a step would doubtlessly raise a storm of objection and criticism
in the Federal Republic, it would probably be followed by humble
explanations and excuses in Washington at various levels—as was
the case after the very successful air-lift exercise in October 1963,

15

[LC]

when even President Kennedy solemnly declared that the air-lift of an American division was not the first step towards American "disengagement" from Germany. Professor Brzezinski also recommends that NATO issue a pledge "to oppose the use of force to change the existing frontiers" and that the American president make a similar declaration on "some appropriate symbolic occasions." It is impossible not to suspect that all these roundabout methods, for that matter certain to evoke German opposition, are advanced as an escape from the straight-forward and direct action which ought to be taken by such a great Power as the United States, namely, its acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the definitive Polish-German frontier.

In fact, such action ought to have been taken many years ago. It would no doubt be followed by a similar declaration from the government of the United Kingdom and could have resounding implications not the least of which would be that all German long-term plans and schemes for another ambitious *Drang nach Osten* would be cut short while at the same time allaying Polish and Czechoslovak fully justified fears of German expansion supported by Germany's growing military might.

The main weakness of Professor Brzezinski's approach to this highly sensitive and crucial issue is that he fails to recommend direct American official recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier —as General de Gaulle did, without impairing his relations with the German Federal Republic. This omission is all the more regrettable because Professor Brzezinski evidently realizes the implications of the present situation; in an article entitled "The danger of the German Veto" (*New Leader*, 20th January 1963), he boldly pointed out the ambiguous formulation by the Germans of their territorial aims in the East and ascribed this to their probable intention of keeping the whole situation as fluid as possible.

In this respect, several prominent American intellectuals of no lesser standing, Professor George Kennan for instance, have not hesitated to adopt a more decided and clear-cut attitude than Professor Brzezinski. Writing on "Polycentralism and Western Policy" in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1964), Professor Kennan came to the sad conclusion that German re-armament coupled with growing territorial claims—with the tacit support of the Great Powers—is pushing the countries of eastern Europe into the arms of the Soviet Union and that very much against their will. He returned to this point in a speech delivered at the *Pacem in Terris* Convocation in New York (February 1965) when he stated: "Greater assurance could be given to Poland and to others on the question of Germany's eastern borders, if not as a unilateral concession then at least

16

POLAND AND GERMANY

hypothetically, as one component in a possible accomodation on
East-West differences."

Another prominent American, Professor Henry Kissinger, writing
on "A Price for Germany Unity" in *The Reporter* (22nd April 1965)
did not hesitate to state unequivocally that "... it is essential to
recognize that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontier will
have to be part of any responsible program for reunification" (see
also the expanded, book-form version of that article: *The Troubled
Partnership*).

Professor Ronald Steel, an ex-official of the U.S. State Depart-
ment, contributor to many American periodicals and author of that
highly controversial book *The End of Alliance*, holds much stronger
views on this issue, as witness his statement: "Having made Ger-
many the kingpin of the Atlantic Alliance, Washington cannot
extricate itself from Germany's eastern claims without weakening
the alliance." He goes on: "The Germans fed themselves on a series
of myths: that the war Germany waged against her neighbours
should not have any damaging results for Germany herself; that
her pre-war borders are Germany's moral birthright, and that the
purpose of NATO is to help her recapture the lost provinces in the
East." (p. 105) Finally, Professor Steel concludes:

The reunification of Germany is a problem which is of great concern to the Germans and one for which her friends may have some sympathy. But the territorial ambitions of a nation which unleashed the Second World War, which exterminated six million people, brought death and untold misery to millions more, and which opened the gates of eastern Europe to Communism cannot be allowed to prevent the settlement of the cold war.

Professor Warner Neal in his leaflet *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union* (published by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions) deplores the refusal of the Western Powers to recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier. He writes: "There is no doubt that American policy towards Germany and the Oder-Neisse Line is an important factor motivating many Poles and Czechs towards accepting strong Soviet influence." (p. 49)

Of special interest in this context are the views expressed by
Dr Gerald Freund, an eminent scholar, author of several books on
the German problem, and director of the Rockefeller Foundation.
Thus, he writes in his *Germany between Two Worlds* (p. 253):

The chief task of West German diplomacy in the immediate future
is to reduce the fear of Germany in Eastern Europe, particularly in
Poland, and to create conditions there which favour reunification of
Germany on a basis acceptable to the majority of its people... The only
meaningful assurance to this effect would be West German recognition of
the present borders as final.

17

Dr Freund draws interesting conclusions from the German attitude
towards this matter: "Bonn's refusal to deal with the satellite
States and to recognize the existing boundaries while insisting on
German reunification, can only be interpreted as a means of holding
out for a future bilateral Russo-German settlement which would
be intolerable for the Western allies... U.S. policy must work to
reduce the chances and remove the opportunities for Bonn to adopt
policies that are in conflict with the best interests of the West."
It may be mentioned, in passing, that similar views were expressed
by Professor Kennan in his article entitled "Disengagement Re-
visited", in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1959).

Let us now pass to another matter, namely, to the method of
German reunification, first as suggested by Professor Brzezinski
and then to solutions advanced by other American intellectuals
already mentioned herein. Professor Brzezinski advances a plan
under which the Russians would withdraw their troops from East
Germany, which would remain demilitarized, whilst the German
Federal government would extend its sovereignty over both parts
of the country although only West Germany would remain a member
of NATO.

Rather similar suggestions were made a few years ago by some
European politicians. M. van Zeeland, then Belgian foreign minister,
presented the NATO Council in Paris during December 1953 with a
plan (reconciled previously with President Eisenhower and Mr Dulles
during a visit to Washington a few weeks earlier) whereby Germany
would be reunited as a sovereign state provided that the Soviet
garrisons were withdrawn from East Germany. Whilst under Pro-
fessor Brzezinski's plan, the Federal Republic would remain a
member of NATO, under M. van Zeeland's plan "on both sides of
this completely demilitarized zone, two partly demilitarized zones
should be set up: Poland, in which the Soviet troops would withdraw
east of the Vistula and which have its own national armed forces,
and the Federal Republic, which would be allowed to have its own
national forces and from which all NATO troops would withdraw
to west of the Rhine."* It should be borne in mind here that M. van
Zeeland's proposal was made some years before the Warsaw Treaty
Organization was established.

Another variant of the idea of a demilitarized East Germany was
presented by Dr Adenauer at a press conference in May 1957.
Suggesting a plan for the reunification of Germany, he stated that
East Germany would be wholly demilitarized and its People's Army
units disbanded whilst neither neither NATO nor Bundeswehr units

* E. Hinterhoff: *Disengagement*, pp. 164-165.

18

POLAND AND GERMANY

[LC]

would be stationed on the territory of this demilitarized eastern Germany. Finally, the idea of a demilitarized East Germany reappeared in the so-called Berlin Declaration of 29th July 1957 with its twelve points signed by the foreign ministers of the three Western Powers and by Herr von Brentano on behalf of the German Federal Republic. While any idea of neutralizing a reunited Germany was rejected, the Declaration suggested the complete demilitarization of eastern Germany coupled with guarantees that NATO would take no advantage of the withdrawal of the Red Army formations from that territory. The suggestions raised in the Berlin Declaration were rejected by the Soviet government on August 2nd of the same year as "useless as a basis for solving the German question." To anyone familiar with the processes of Soviet strategy and with the working of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet rejection of this idea came as no surprise: after all, East Germany is not only a valuable deployment area for the Red Army but also has an important part in the Soviet anti-aircraft defence system—that territory has very many airfields and airstrips for Soviet interceptor fighters besides numerous radar early-warning stations of vital importance in Soviet strategy.

Professor Kennan dealt with this topic in his well-known Reith lectures and in his *Russia, the Atom and the West* (p. 39):

Now the question at once arises as to what would happen in such a contingency, in the contingency that a future united Germany should choose to adhere to NATO. What would happen then with the garrisons of the various allied powers now stationed on German soil? The Western position says nothing specific about it. But the Soviet Union is, of course, not a member of NATO; and while British, French and American forces would presumably remain in Germany under the framework of the NATO system, one must assume that those of the Soviet Union would be expected to depart. If this is so, then Moscow is really being asked to abandon—as part of an agreement on German reunification—the military and political bastion in Central Europe which it won by its military effort from 1941 to 1945, and to do this without any compensatory withdrawal of American power from the heart of the Continent.

A somewhat similar suggestion for the demilitarization of eastern Germany re-appears in Professor Kissinger's article on "The Price of German Unity" published in *The Reporter* (22nd April 1965). According to him, the western allies should announce their readiness to accept the temporary existence of the East German state provided its government emerges from free elections and as an intermediate fifteen-year stage towards reunification; it would have a status similar to that of Austria; finally, he suggests a loose confederation of the two Germanies with the proviso that East Germany remain an independent, neutral and demilitarized State, and that both German States recognize the Oder-Neisse frontier. Professor Kissinger deals

["AMERICAN VIEWS ON GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE", "19", "[LC]", "\"at length with the above ideas in his recently published *The Troubled Partnership* where, however, he adds the pessimistic comment that \"nevertheless, it is improbable that any negotiating formula will advance German unity... Even the most reasonable program is likely to be rejected by the East.\" With all due respect for Professor Kissinger as an authority on problems of strategy, it is difficult to understand why he advances a suggestion detrimental to the interests of Soviet strategy in Europe which he expects the Russians to accept without the slightest reciprocity on the part of the West.", "James P. Warburg, author of several books on the German problem and one of the U.S. State Department's wartime consultants on German affairs, has an approach which basically differs from Professor Brzezinski's. He stated in a lecture at Sarah Lawrence College in New York: \"The Germans are living in a dream-world conjured by Chancellor Adenauer—a world in which they made themselves to believe that the East German communist state does not exist and that, some day, they will wake up to find it happily absorbed in a united Germany as part of the anti-Soviet alliance.\" In an article published in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* (Philadelphia, October 1963), he wrote: \"Dr Adenauer and his adherents only cling to the myth that Germany can achieve both reunification and continued membership in NATO... they refuse to see that the German problem can be solved only in the context of reduced East-West tensions in Central Europe—that a German solution cannot be made the pre-condition of a détente.\"", "It was in 1962 that Mr Warburg outlined his own plan as follows:", "If the Soviet Government will permit the establishment of a more moderate Communist regime, as it has in Poland, we might put forward the following proposals for discussion:", "(1) That the de facto existence of the German Democratic Republic and the permanence of its Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland be recognized and that both German states be admitted to the United Nations; that the two German states be left for ten years without outside intervention of any sort [...]
[...]
[...]
[...]
[...]
[...]
[...

20

POLAND AND GERMANY

[LC]

military alliances, and that both sides have developed vested interests in the division of Germany [...] Both America and Russia, victims of their own inability to forge a German settlement, periodically approach the brink of nuclear war over the question of German reunification that neither desires. (p. 121)

It would be unthinkable not to present the views of the doyen of American political columnists, Walter Lippmann, considering his personal knowledge of the Soviet bloc countries, and above all, the several lengthy discussions he had with Khrushchev reported in an article of his entitled "The Two Germanies and Berlin" and published in the *New York Herald-Tribune* (7th April 1959). He wrote there: "By seizing the initiative and making the indefinite perpetuation of a divided Germany the basis of their policy, the Russians have a chance to accomplish two large objectives: one to stabilize the East German régime and the satellite orbit by extinguishing the hopes of adherence to the West."

Senator M. Mansfield advocated in an article on "NATO's Fifteen Nations", published in October 1961, that a free Berlin be set up, one consisting of both parts of the city and given guarantees simultaneously by the East and the West German governments; this would imply the de facto recognition of the two German states.

Professor Brzezinski definitely rejects any solutions which embody the idea of establishing a neutral zone or of disengagement. Thus he affirms: "The creation of a 'neutral' or disengaged vacuum through the co-operative efforts of the two adversary super-powers would simply mean the creation of new 'hunting-grounds' for the two opposed sides unless that step was preceded by profound changes in their political goals. By that time, the scheme would no longer be necessary."

However, it would perhaps be of interest to quote some views of Dr G. Freund in this connection. He has delved deeply into research on the mechanism of regional disarmament measures and of disengagement in particular; he has moreover adopted a stand which radically differs from Professor Brzezinski's. Thus, he considers:

> The Western Powers can agree to the creation of a denuclearized and limited arms zone starting in East and West Germany and gradually broadening to include Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary without impairing their essential defensive positions provided that the first disengagement step has been taken [...] The possibility of German military neutrality, whether through East-West negotiation or a German initiative leading to reunification, has raised a number of fears in the West. Officially, the Western Powers have rejected the establishment of a militarily un-neutral Germany on the grounds that the NATO alliance would be critically weakened if West Germany withdrew; this, in effect, rules out German reunification.

It would be well, as a point of historical interest, to quote what

# THE POLISH WESTERN TERRITORIES: TWENTY YEARS AFTER

by W. POZNANSKI

IN THE life of a nation, twenty years represent a very small period of time indeed. Poles all over the world will be celebrating next year the millenary of Poland's conversion to Christianity. The process of building the Polish state must have began about a hundred years earlier. Why should it then be appropriate to make a more detailed study of the Polish western territories after twenty years of Polish rule?

There are good reasons for this. At the end of the second World War, there was some feeling in Great Britain about the extent of the area ceded to Poland. It was doubted whether Poland would be able to repopulate these recovered territories, whether the Poles would be able to restore the economy of the region and contribute to the provisioning of devastated Europe. In the light of this legitimate interest which the Polish western territories arouse in the West, and in particular in Great Britain and the United States, the present realities in the Polish western territories, twenty years after the war, supply a significant testimony to the justice of the decisions taken by Poland's allies in 1945.

In the West the Polish western territories are principally regarded as a kind of compensation to Poland for her territorial losses east of the Curzon line and for her enormous human and material losses suffered during the war at the hands of the German invader. The Polish people, however, also regard the return of their western and northern territories as the legitimate recovery of their former provinces and their original western frontier, lost gradually in the course of conflicts between Poland and Germany—a story mostly of German pressure, conquest and colonization further and further beyond the original Polish boundary, culminating in two attempts to destroy Poland altogether: in the Partitions of the late 18th century, and in 1939.

## I

### WHAT POLAND TOOK OVER IN 1945

#### The Potsdam Agreements

The present Polish western territories recovered by Poland under the Potsdam Agreement comprise 101.9 thous. sq. km, and constitute

21

[LC]

Walter Lippmann stated in his book *The Cold War: a Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (1947). He pointed out then: "For, if, and only if, we can bring about the withdrawal of the Red Army from the Yalta line to the new frontier of the Soviet Union and simultaneously, of course, the withdrawal of the British and American armies from continental Europe can a balance of power be established which can then be maintained." (p. 35)

Reverting to Dr Freund's persuasive argumentation in favour of disengagement—rejected by Professor Brzezinski, the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon—it would be well to cite the following passage from his above-mentioned book: "The over-riding requirement today is a political strategy to effect a Soviet military withdrawal from Central Europe [...] A reciprocal withdrawal is the only possible policy which stands a chance of bringing about German unity and a more dependable European security arrangement into the realm of possibility." (p. 248)

Rejecting disengagement, Professor Brzezinski advocates instead the method which he calls "peaceful engagement"—the development of East-West trade as well as cultural relations, considered by Washington as likely to bring about a "liberalization" of the present Communist regimes and the slackening of police methods in the various countries of eastern Europe. In fact, Professor Brzezinski devotes nearly a half of his *Encounter* article to this topic, discussing in great detail the methods and possibilities of such co-operation which could eventually lead to "a grand settlement and a reconciliation with the West." Summing up, he writes that "there is again a need and an increasingly ripe historical opportunity for a bold and creative idea."

And yet, if Professor Brzezinski's plan and ideas were accepted as guide-lines for the official policy of the West, the outcome would be—to all practical purposes—definitively to dash all the hopes of millions of people in eastern Europe that real freedom and independence will be restored to them. Increased trade or cultural contacts would never be a substitute for these prerogatives. While the Professor's "plan" and the official policy of the United States make the reunification of Germany their maximum ambition and thereby possibly satisfy the national aspirations of the country which unleashed the last war, silence is maintained regarding efforts for the restoration of independence to the nations sold down the river at Yalta into Russian bondage by their allies; indeed, if Professor Brzezinski's plan is ever implemented, it would be tantamount—as far as eastern Europe is concerned—to the perpetuation of the present *status quo*, one that he himself describes as "far from satisfactory."

An outline of my planned book: *The Soviet's unwilling allies-the armed forces of satellites.*

## Foreword

The basic aims of the Soviet Communism-the setting up of a Communist-dominated world state.

Communist strategy and tactics for the implementation of these aims:a brief summing up; the role of military power in furthering of these aims;its impact upon the Soviet foreign policy,and the reasons for its"brinkmanship",backed by the periods of a"position of strength",based upon military power.

The doctrine of "just wars",and of"wars of"liberation".
The conquest of Eastern Europe,meant not as setting up of buffer against any hypothetical aggression from the West,but as a bridge-head and advanced base for further expansion.

The"Sovietisation" and integration of armed forces of satellites- an inescapable and logical conclusion of Soviet political strategy.

## Part I.

Chapter I- The Soviet efforts to set up ,during the Bolchevik revolution in 1917-18 ,of military formations,consisting of nationals of Eastern Europe and of the Baltic States:their role in the"Civil war" in Russia in 1918-20.

Chapter 2-Activities of Communists from Eastern Europe and Germany, in Russia as well as in their own countries.

## Part II

### Period between two World Wars.

Chapter I-The Soviet Union and Germany-the paramount importance of Germany in Lrnnin's planning:his aims and efforts for setting up of a Communist Government in Germany-Communist uprisings in Germany and their aftermath.

Chapter 2-The Communist revolution in Hungary; the role of Bela Kuhn and of M. Károlyi; the aftermath.

Chapter 3- The Polish-Bolchevik war in 1918-20-a secondary episode in Lenin's mind, as compared with his designs on Germany; Poland's role in stemming Communist advance towards Germany; Soviet attempts for setting up of Communist formations in Poland; a nucleus of a future puppet regime-in case of victory, which seemed so near- as a part of Tukachevsky's staff in his advance towards Warsaw.

Stalin's role in Tukachevsky's defeat; the final reckoning in 936; Stalin's ambitious plans for carrying the Communist revolution into Hungary and the Balkans.

2

[lc]

Chapter 4-Defections and desertions from various armed forces in the countries of Eastern Europe, to the Soviet Union; the role allocated to those deserters in the Soviet long-term planning; some of them have risen in their own countries, like Rokossovsky, Bondaras, and others, to the highest posts.

Chapter 5-Soviet penetration into Spain during the Civil war in 1936-38, and the role of Communists from Germany and Eastern Europe in the International Brigade, which, for some of them, has become a training ground and a jumping board for the highest jobs in their own countries.

## Part III-war period

Chapter I-The Soviet long-term policy towards Germany and Eastern Europe; efforts to implement this policy; lack of understanding by the West of that policy and the implications of military and political nature.

Chapter 2-The setting up in Moscow-in implementation of those plans of various nuclei of future Communist puppet regimes in Germany and in Eastern Europe: "Free German Committee", and The Union of German Officers' "Union of Polish Patriots", group of Czechoslovak Communists, headed by Gottwald, and others.

Chapter 3-The setting up-after the evacuation from Russia of General Anders's Army Corps- of military formations, consisting of national forces of the countries of Eastern Europe; their participation in war against Germany, alongside the Red Army; a brief history of their actions.

Chapter 4-Activities of Communists in Eastern Europe, during the German occupation; the role of various Communist formations in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and in the Balkans, against the Germans, and in paving the way to the subsequent Soviet domination of their countries.

## Part IV-Ist decade: from 1945-55

Chapter I-The implementation of Soviet policy towards Germany and Eastern Europe.

Chapter 2-A sub-period from 1945-49; Stalin's lack of confidence in the armed forces of the captive countries; purges of former gular officers; strict control by the Soviet "advisers" of the new军 created armed forces; measures for their indoctrination; obsolete war material supplied by the Russians to the satellites; shortage of petrol for their air forces, in order to prevent escapes to the West etc. the setting up of Soviet Military Missions (except in Poland).

Chapter 3-Sub-period from 1949-55; Stalin's reactions to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, by concluding a series of bilaterally treaties with the countries of Eastern Europe; appointment of Marshal Rokossovsky as C.I.C of Polish armed forces, and similar appointments in other countries; a progressive build up of the armed forces of those countries; the training of commanders and of pilots in the Soviet Union; supplies of better equipment and more modern training; beginning of war production in Eastern Europe.

3

[LC]

Chapter 4-A brief Ordre de Bataille of the armed forces of satellites, as well as of police and para-military formations.

## Part V-II decade :1955-65

Chapter I-The signature of the Warsaw Pact-its political and military background; its structure, role and implications.

The omitting of Eastern Germany from the original membership in chapter 2- of the WTO, and the reasons for it; its admission in January, 1956.

Chapter 2-The reorganisation of the armed forces of WTO on the Soviet pattern, and their increasing integration into the Soviet military system; an increasing value of WTO.

Chapter 3- Events in Poland in summer and autumn 1956; the role of Polish armed forces; subsequent withdrawal of Marshal Rokossovsky and of Soviet military "advisers"; the reorganisation of Polish armed forces.

Chapter 4-Hungarian uprising; the inability of Hungarian armed forces to play a more active role in the uprising, and the reasons.

Chapter 5-A thorough re-appraisal by the Soviet High Command of the situation arising from those events; strict measures taken by the Russians as well as by the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe for a political control; new agreements dealing with the stationing of the Red Army units on the territories of Eastern Europe.

## Shaxx Part VI

Chapter I-An analysis of Soviet strategy and its evolution; operational "options", especially in Europe; possible employment of satellite armed forces -in offensive and defensive situations.

Chapter 2-An evaluation of the potential political and military role of the Warsaw Pact; the morale of satellites and their reliability.

Chapter 3-An importance of psychological warfare in Soviet political strategy, and, in this case, in the process of integration of armed forces of WTO; the applications of psychological warfare methods by the Communists and by the West.

E.Hinterhoff

Henry A. Klausinger

Sincerely yours,

With best regards.

Studies in Washington,
name to the Center for Strategic
Please feel free to mention my

the most interesting article.
December 33rd and the encyclopaedia
Thank you for your letter of

Dear Major Hinterhoft:

London, England
10 Victoria Grove, W.8
Military Commentators' Circle
Founder and Hon. Secretary
Major E. Hinterhoft, V.M.

January 4, 1966

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

Vice-Presidents:

Founder and Hon. Secretary:

MAJOR E. HINTERHOFF, V.M.

Hon. Secretary's Address:

10, VICTORIA GROVE, W.8

February 7, 1966

FEB 11 1966

Profesor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Study.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

Thank you very much for your letter, dated January 4th, 1965, and, above all, for your kind permission to use your name in my application to the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, for a grant in order to complete my book on the Warsaw Pact.

Unfortunately, I am getting absolutely no reply, in spite of all my letters, from Mr. Richard Allen, Chairman of Program Study on Communism in the Abide Center, and I am slowly losing hope to get any answer at all.

On Professor Brzezinski's kind advice (he has a strong interest in my project) I am writing to you direct, asking whether it would be possible to obtain a financial help from your Center for this purpose.

I enclose the outline of my planned book, together with the attrstation from r. MMackintosh (I am sure, you must know him) as well as 2 photocopies of letters from Deputy Secretary-General of NATO and from Liddell Hart, whom, of course, you know very well, indeed.

I believe that all these documents could be sufficient to induce the interest of the Center in my project, and to obtain its sponsorship and assistance, which would be essential, in view of the amount of a research work, which will be necessary.

I wrote already to Prof. K. Dziuranowski, a former colleague of mine, but, so far received no answer from him; I suppose, he must be away.

Hoping to hear from you soon, and with a good news..

I am,

E. Hinterhoff

[lc]

NOTE REGARDING MAJOR EUGENE HINTERHOFF

I first became acquainted with the military writings of Major Hinterhoff more than thirty years ago, when I was struck by the grasp he showed of the potentialities of armoured forces in future warfare - a vision and comprehension that was then exceptional in most European armies.

In more recent years he has been a regular contributor to a number of more serious periodicals on the Continent as well as here, and his writings have dealt with a wide range of subjects in the spheres of defence and disarmament. They are distinguished by a capacity for imaginative and farsighted treatment of problems. His book on "Disengagement" has become a standard work of reference indispensable to students of this question.

He is Founder and Hon. Secretary of the Military Commentators' Circle - of which I was the first President, my successors in turn being Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor (former Chief of the Air Staff) and, now, General Sir Richard Gale (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1958-60). Throughout its existence Major Hinterhoff has been the mainspring of its activities in creating a forum of discussion to which many eminent visitors from the Continent, the United States and other parts of the world have come as speakers.

I have rarely met anyone who has such sustained enthusiasm and energy as Major Hinterhoff, combined with a long and wide background of experience.

(B.H.Liddell Hart.)

10th March, 1964.

States House,
Medmenham,
Marlow,
Bucks.

[LC]

A short outline of my planned book :
"The reluctant allies-the satellites contribution to the Warsaw
Pact".

## Foreword.

The basic aim of Soviet Communism: the setting up of a Communist-
dominated world state.

Communist political strategy and tactics in implementing this
aim: the role of military power and its impact upon Soviet foreign
policy; the "brinkmanship" of Soviet foreign policy, backed by the
"position of strength" (real or imaginary), based upon military
power.

The doctrines of "just wars" and of "wars of liberation", and
their successful application.

The motives behind the conquest of Eastern Europe-on the
one hand, as a security buffer against a potential danger of a
theoretical aggression from the West, and, on the other hand, as
an advanced base for further Soviet political and military expan-
sion westwards.

The "Sovietisation" and integration of the armed forces
of the countries of Eastern Europe-an inescapable and logical con-
clusion of Soviet political strategy.

## Part I.

Chapter I-Soviet efforts during the early days of the Bolchevik
revolution in 1917-18 to set up military formations, consisting
of nationals of Eastern European countries: their role in the "Ci-
vila war" in 1918-20.

Chapter 2-The activities of the Communists Eastern European Communists in Russia as well as in their own countries.

## Part II.

The period after the end of World War I.

Chapter I-The Soviet Union and Germany-the paramount importance
of Germany in Lenin's planning: his aim in setting up a Communist
Government in Germany: the Communist uprisings in Germany, and
their aftermath.

Chapter 2-The Communist revolution in Hungary: Bela Kuhn and M. Károlyi; the civil war and its aftermath.

Chapter 3-The Polish-Bolchevik war in 1918-20; a secondary episode
in Lenin's eues, as compared with his "Grand Design" on Germany;
Poland's historical role in stemming the Communist advance to-
wards Germany; Soviet attempts to set up Communist formations in
Poland; the nucleus of a future Communist-puppet regime in Poland-
in the event of victory-as a part of Tukhachevsky's staff, in his
advance towards Warsaw. Stalin's responsibility for Tuckachevsky's
defeat before the gates of Warsaw; the final reckoning in 1936..
Stalin's ambitions at that time for carrying the Communist revolu-
tion into Hungary and the Balkan States.

Chapter 4-Defections and desertions from various armed forces
in the countries of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union; the role

2

[L.C.]

allocated to those desetrers in the Soviet long-term planning; some of them rose, in due course, to the highest posts in their countries, like Roko sowsky, Bondaras, and others..

Chapter 5-A short survey of the activities of Communist parties in Germany and Eastern Europe between the wars.

Chapter 6-The Communist penetration into Spain in 1936, and the role of Communists from Germany and Eastern Europe in the International Brigade, which-for some of them-became a training ground and a jumping board for top jobs in their own countries.

## Part III.-war period.

Chapter I-The Soviet long-term policy towards Germany and Eastern Europe; efforts to implement it; failure of the West to understand these moves and to grasp the implications of a military and political nature.

Chapter 2-The setting up in Moscow of various nuclei of future Communist-puppet regimes in Germany and Eastern Europe: "Free German Committee", "The Union of German Officers", "The Union of Polish Patriots", the group of Czechoslovak Communists, deaded by future President, Clement Gottwald, etc-their role and activities.

Chapter 3-The setting up -after the evacuation from the Soviet Union of General Andre's army corps-of military formations, consisting of nationals of Eastern Europe; their participation in war against the Germans, under the Soviet Command.

Chapter 4-The activities of Communists in Eastern Europe during the German occupation: the role of various military formations in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as in the Balkans, in the struggle against the Germans, and in paving the way to the subsequent Soviet domination of their countries.

## Part IV-Ist decade: from 1945-55.

Chapter 2-The period from 1945-49: Stalin's lack of confidence in the armed forces of Eastern Germany and of Eastern Europe; purges of former professional officers' corps; strict control by the Soviet "advisers" and Communists; measures for indoctrination; obsolete war material, supplied by the Russians to satellites, as well as to Yugoslavia-until Tito's break with Moscow in 1948. Lack of petrol for training of satellite air forces, to prevent escapes to the West, etc. setting up of Soviet Military Missions (except in Poland); economic exploitation of satellites (and of Yugoslavia).

Chapter 3-Period from 1949-55; Stalin's reactions to the setting up of N.A.T.O.; a series of bi-lateral treaties with the countries of Eastern Europe and of Eastern Germany; the appointment of Marshal Rokossovsky as a C.i.C. of Polish armed forces, and similar appointments in other countries in Eastern Europe; a progressive

3

[LC]

build up of armed forces; the training of commanders and specialist in the Soviet Union; better war material; the beginning of the war production.

Chapter 4-A brief Ordre de Bataille of armed forces and of police and para-military formations.

## Part V- II decade: from 1955.

Chapter I-The signature of the Warsaw Pact in May, 1955; its background, structure and purpose (both military and political) as well as various implications.

The omission of Eastern Germany from the original membership, Chapter XX and the reason for it; her admission in January 1956.

Chapter 2-The reorganisation of the armed forces of satellites, belonging to WTO, on the Soviet pattern, and their increasing integration into the Soviet military system.

Chapter 3- The events in Poland in summer and autumn 1956-as a consequence of the process of "de-Stalinisation"; the role of Polish armed forces; Gomulka's advent to power; the withdrawal of Rokossovsky anf of other Soviet "advisers"; the reorganisation of the armed forces.

Chapter 4-The Hungarian uprising; the inability of Hungarian troops to take a more active part in it, and the reasons for it.

Chapter 5-A thorough re-appraisal by the Soviet High Command of the situation in the area of WTO, arising after those events: strict measures taken to prevent their repetition; a political control by the Communist regimes of their armed forces; new agreements on the stationing of the Red Army on the territory of Eastern Europe.

## Part VI.

Chapter I-A brief analysis of the evolution of Soviet "Grand Strategy"; a growing accent on nuclear warfare, and an-all round adaptation of Soviet and satellite troops to it; joint exercises in Eastern Europe, and their purpose.

Chapter 2-The potential use of satellite armed forces in offensive and defensive "options"; the evaluation of their morale and reliability.

Chapter 3-The importance of the psychological factor in Soviet political strategy, and, in this case, its impact upon the integration of satellite armed forces into the WTO; the application of this factor by the Communists and by the West in a comparison.

E. Hinterhoff

IO, Victoria Grove, London W.8

December 3, 1968

DEC 5 1968

Profesor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6, Divinity Avenue, Vambridge, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

It was a great pleasure for me to see you at the occasion
of your lecture at the I.S.S. on chances for peace in Vietnam,
and I was sorry that I could not attend the seminar in Oxford,
what would have given me an opportunity of discussing this prob-
lem with you in detail. I do hope that you have been able to read
my article, which I have handed to you, after your lecture, and
was delighted that you have recognised me.

However, the main purpose of my letter has little to do with the problem of Vietnam; I am writing it on suggestion of Prof. Zavodny, who is at present at St. Anthony College in Oxford; if you, perhaps, remember, I have approached you in February 1966 with a request for financial help in order to produce a study on the Warsaw Pact, unfortunately, at that time, reactions everywhere I went, especially in the U.S. was more than lukewarm...

I enclose the photocopy of a letter from Dr. R. Holko-
wicz from the Inst. for Defence Analyses, in Washington, whom I am
sure, you must know, which shows a dramatic change of attitude to-
wards this problem which for years have been remaining as a cin-
cerella. .and I wonder whether, in planning your budget for the
next year, you could give a thought to it now.

Prof. Zavodny was telling me that it would be much wiser course to make these approaches sometime next spring, but I thought that, as you'll be making now some long-term planning, I could take a calculated risk in putting my problem before you. In case of your interest, I would be only too glad to submit a formal application, following Prof. Zavodny's good advice

I enclose-as a specimen-the cutting from Dutch magazine
ONZ LEGER, with my article which I wrote before Soviet invasion
in which I have, however, forecast its pattern, in the form of an
airborne assault upon Prague....equally, I enclose a photocopy
of a letter from NATO, which, I believe, speaks for itself.

Hoping to hear from you soon,

Yours sincerely

E. Hinterholl

P.S. If I'll be given an opportunity of writing my book about the Warsaw Pact, I'll deal with the methods of causing greater erosion of its morale and reliability of its armed forces.

[L]

E. Hinterhoff

# The erosion of the Warsawpact and its implications

Op deze pagina's beschrijft ONS LEGER-medewerker Hinterhoff de situatie in en rond Tsjechoslowakije. Zijn verhaal is geschreven op het moment dat de bezetting van Tsjechoslowakije voor mogelijk, maar niet voor de hand liggend werd gehouden. De communistische broeders zochten pratend in Cierna een oplossing. Met dit tijdstip dient men rekening te houden. De actuele gebeurtenissen in Tsjechoslowakije maken het artikel van de heer Hinterhoff te meer lezenswaard.

Schrijver vangt aan met een duidelijk historisch overzicht van het ontstaan van het Warschaupact. Vermeldenswaard, in verband met de toestand in Tsjechoslowakije, is het feit dat de reeks aan het Pact voorafgegane bila-terale veiligheidsovereenkomsten aan-ving met het Tsjechisch-Russische ver-drag van 1944, dat President Benesch te Moskou ondertekende.

Moest het Warschaupact oorspronkelijk worden gezien als tegenmaatregel tegen de toelating van West-Duisland tot de NAVO, later, nadat de strijdkrachten van de satellietlanden qua bewapening en opleiding gelijkwaardig aan de Russische waren gemaakt, bleek het van onschatbare politieke en strategische waarde te zijn.

Zijn opzet en organisatie, wellicht om „uitwisselbaarheidsredenen”, gelijk aan die van de NAVO, een belangrijk ver-

schil blijft dat elk NAVO-land afzonderlijk kan uittreden. De Warschaupactlanden kunnen dat niet, hetgeen door de kwestie Hongarije in 1956 duidelijk werd aangetoond.

Schrijver geeft ook een beeld van de sterkte van zowel het Russische als het satellietgedeelte van de Warschaupactstrijdkrachten en maakt duidelijk dat zowel defensieve als offensieve bedoelingen een rol spelen.

De Russen beschouwen het Warschaupact onder meer als een goed controlemiddel op de satellietlanden. De mogelijkheid dat de Tsjechen uittreden is volgens schrijver dan ook de reden dat Rusland zo actief reageert op de gebeurtenissen in Tsjechoslowakije. Hij bespreekt vervolgens de twee alternatieven, die de Russen hebben ter bezwering van de Tsjechoslowaakse crisis, te weten:

- gebruik van geweld;

- onderhandelingen, waarbij kan worden getracht de Tsjechen zoveel toezeggingen af te dwingen, dat militair ingrijpen onnodig wordt.

Voor wat betreft het gebruik van geweld gaat de schrijver verschillende mogelijkheden na, waarbij hij tot de conclusie komt dat militaire resultaten snel en beslissend kunnen worden bereikt, doch dat het vooral de vrees voor het overslaan van de Tsjechische

gevoelens op andere communistische landen of zelfs het misbruiken van de situatie door de Chinezen hen ervan weerhoudt hun strijdkrachten daadwerkelijk in te zetten, ondanks het feit dat zij weten dat het Westen werkloos zal toezien.

Zelfs het slagen van een militaire actie zal volgens schrijver zoveel anti-Russische gevoelens oproepen, dat gebruik van geweld uiteindelijk toch nadelig is. Schrijver geeft ook het belang aan van het stationeren van Russische troepen op Tsjechisch grondgebied, zodat dit bij onderhandelingen een belangrijk punt zal blijven.

Hoe dan ook, de verbittering en de vernedering van de Tsjechen zullen ernstig genoeg blijken om anti-Russische gevoelens ten gevolge te hebben, zodat Tsjechoslowakije nu als de zoveelste zwakke schakel in het Warschaupact moet worden beschouwd.

Schrijver eindigt dan ook met de conclusie dat een dergelijke pyrrusoverwinning op de lange duur het begin kan blijken van de verbrokkeling van het Warschaupact. Dit laatste kan de Russische bedreiging van West-Europa doen afnemen, hetgeen mogelijkheden opent voor constructieve onderhandelingen ter oplossing van diverse Europese problemen. (Redactie).

4

MA TSJECHOSLOWAKIJE

De plaats buiten Tsjechoslowakije waar het nieuws van de inval in dat land het eerst op de tafel van de verantwoordelijke leiders kwam, was Washington. Het was ook uit deze plaats dat het nieuws, 's nachts tussen twee uur en half drie, wereldkupdig werd gemaakt.

Op dat moment breekt minister Rusk een toespraak af en even later blijkt dat president Johnson in verband met het binnenrukken van Russische troepen in Tsjechoslowakije de Amerikaanse veiligheidsraad bijeen heeft geroepen. Een uur later volgen berichten van Radio Praag. Eerst dan draaien de verbindingen in Europa binnen de NAVO op volle toeren, maar achteraf ontkent men binnen NAVO-kringen toch niet dat de berichtgeving wel wat aan de late kant was.

Gesteld wordt dat ruimschoots tevoren door de politici was geëvalueerd dat de bedreiging van Tsjechoslowakije, die gelegen was in de aanwezigheid van een kleine dertig divisies rond dat land, voor de veiligheid van de NAVO niet opportuun was. Bij een aanval op NAVO-territoir was er een andere politieke evaluatie geweest en daardoor ook een grotere militaire aandacht, zo hoort men in NAVO-kringen. Dat het Westen pas uren nadat de opmars van de Russen c.s. was begonnen hiervan iets merkte, heeft niettemin in de NAVO-landen de geloofwaardigheid van politieke en militaire waarschuwingstijden aangetatst.

De droevige situatie in Tsjechoslowakije heeft het Westen duidelijk gemaakt dat de bedoelingen van de Sovjets niet veranderd zijn. De noodzaak van een pijlsnel reagerend en bedrijfsklaar gereed staand defensieapparaat in het westen is wederom aangetoond.

De geschiedenis rechtvaardigt o.i. de vraag:

ZOUDEN WE HET OVER EEN PAAR MAANDEN ALLEMAAL WEER VERGETEN ZIJN?

3

The third phase began by the signature in Warsaw of a fully-fledged, multilateral military alliance on May 14th 1955.

The setting up of the Pact must be considered as the culmination of the Soviet efforts to prevent the integration of Western Germany into the Atlantic Alliance.

Already in November 1954, the Soviet Government notified the Western Powers that, in case Western Germany will be admitted to NATO, the Russians will take the necessary counter-measures; in the same note, they reiterated their proposals for the convocation of a European conference with the participation of the U.S. in order to discuss the possibility of an agreement on an European Security Pact. After Khrushchev's arrival to power, all negotiations between the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe in this matter have been speeded up. After the ratification of the Paris Agreements in May 1955, the Soviet Union annulled its treaties with France and Great Britain and 2 days after Germany's admission to NATO a conference began in Warsaw, which led to the signature of the Warsaw Pact. This brief historical review could show that the setting up of the WTO must be regarded as a measure of political retaliation to Germany's integration into NATO. Similarly, the inclusion of Albania into the Pact could be regarded as a counter-measure for the setting up of the Balkan Pact in Belgrade in August 1954, threatening Albania with isolation, in spite of her bilateral alliance with Bulgaria.

The structure of the Warsaw Pact and its terminology were closely modelled on NATO; perhaps, this symmetry was the expression of intentions to allow Soviet negotiators to treat the Pact as an 'exchange currency'. It provides for a Consultative Political Committee, which is supposed to be the equivalent to NATO's Council, while the Joint Armed Forces Command, with its HQ in Moscow, was supposed to be the equivalent of SHAPE.

Yet, these similarities were only superficial. During the whole existence of the Pact the Political Consultative Committee met only a few times, mainly as a rubber stamp for Soviet positions on current military and political problems.

The Joint Command could be regarded as even a stronger proof of ruthless integration and subordination of satellites to their Soviet overlords and masters; the appointments of Soviet officers to all senior command posts, immediately after the setting up of the Pact contradicted Marshal Bulganin's lofty words during the ceremony of the signature of the Pact about the 'equality' of all members of the Pact.

The most important difference between NATO and TWO is that, whereas every

member of NATO can withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance no such thing can be even contemplated by any member of the Pact; the events in Hungary in 1956 demonstrated forcefully what would be the fate of those who would dare to do so; one of the reasons of present crisis in Czechoslovakia is the Soviet fear that the Czechs began moving along the road, which lead them towards their withdrawal from the Pact.

Although the Pact was meant originally as a manifestation of Soviet reaction to the admission of Germany into NATO, it gave to the Russians very considerable political, and in the long run, strategic advantages. The immediate and perhaps one of the most important implications of the Pact was the legislation of the presence of Soviet troops — after the signature of the Austrian Treaty — in Hungary, Roumania, Poland and Eastern Germany. During the Hungarian uprising the Russians referred to the relevant clause of the Pact to justify the re-entry of their troops into Hungary to crush the uprising. In order to embellish the appearance of legality the Soviet Union signed in 1957 new 'status of forces' treaties with Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germany and Roumania; in 1958 the Russians withdrew from Roumania; they must probably bitter regret now for having done so.

The presence of Soviet troops in the countries of Eastern Europe has played an enormous role and the possibility of their re-entry contributed enormously to sustain in power the Communist regimes subservient to Moscow, keeping the whole area in the Soviet sphere of political influence and economical exploitation. It is for these reasons that the Soviets, since the beginning of the liberalisation process in Czechoslovakia, were trying to introduce their troops into that country in order to bolster the pro-Soviet elements inside the party and administration and in this way to maintain Soviet influence.

The events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 — as well as the Berlin riots in 1953 — have undermined confidence of Soviet military leaders in their 'allies', which resulted in considerable delay in re-equipping their armed forces with modern weapons. There are good reasons to believe that during the second Berlin crisis in 1961, following the erection of the 'Ulbricht Wall', the combat value of the satellite armed forces must have been found not too satisfactory by the Soviet High Command. New, more subtle methods were needed to stop the rot and to achieve necessary cohesion and better combat value of satellites. In this respect great credit is due to the dynamic Marshal A. Grechko, present Soviet Minister of Defence, who, after having succeeded in 1961 Marshal Koniev, by re-equipping the satellites with the modern weapons,

by encouraging joint manoeuvres with increased responsibility of senior commanders from satellite forces and by tightening the machinery for consultation and integration, succeeded in transforming within a few years the satellite armed forces into a strong, well trained fighting force, being a valuable component of the Warsaw Pact.

It must be borne in mind that, while speaking about the Pact one must understand that it consists in fact of 2 components the Soviet and the satellite ones, with the Soviets providing the bulk of the ground-troops and the aircraft as well as the warships.

The Soviet component consists of 26 divisions outside the USSR (20 in Eastern Germany, 2 in Poland and 4 in Hungary), all at full strength. According to 'The Military Balance: 1967-68', published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, these 26 Soviet divisions, could be increased within a month to about 70 if mobilisation and movements were not impeded by interdiction/bombing. No doubt, the main source of these reinforcements would come from some 60 divisions stationed in European Russia, which, as one could safely assume, are assigned to the Pact; one also ought to add to these ground-troops some 1,600 aircraft, mainly of interceptor-fighter types and the Baltic and Black-sea fleets with operational missions.

The satellite component consists — according to the same source — of 12 Bulgarian divisions (4 armoured) and 600 aircraft, 14 Czechoslovak divisions (4 armoured) and 600 aircraft, 6 East-German divisions (2 armoured) and 300 aircraft, 6 Hungarian divisions (1 armoured) and 140 aircraft, 16 Polish divisions (5 armoured) and 820 aircraft, 9 Roumanian divisions (2 armoured) and 240 aircraft — plus their navies, destined for coastal operations and since the last few years also for short-distance amphibious operations. One must also not forget that the Soviet Union and its satellites have also several hundred thousand men under arms, organised in various security units, frontier guards, workers's militia and especially in Eastern Germany, the so-called 'Kampfgruppen', consisting of some 300.000 fanatical Communists; all these formations represent an additional source of manpower and reinforcements.

Consequently, the aggregate military potential of the Warsaw Pact, consisting of Soviet and satellite components could be estimated — in the initial phase of hostilities — as over 90 divisions, with some 20.000 tanks and some 4.800 aircraft; the naval power of the Pact could be estimated as 10 cruisers, 87 destroyers and 160 submarines, with the Polish, Eest-German, Roumanian and Boulgarian navies representing only an insignificant fraction of the total.

6

Roumanians, of the Soviet ABM system, which, while providing for an anti-ballistic missile screen for the USSR, would leave their countries defenceless in the face of Western missiles. This is no doubt why Causescu — like de Gaulle — can argue that the membership of WTO offers to Roumania risks of involvement without any additional guarantee to their security.

It is as a result of such trends that the Roumanian leaders have been advocating openly since a few years simultaneous winding up of both military alliances, raising at the same time objections to appointment of Marshal I. Yakubovsky to the post of C.I.C. of the Pact, suggesting instead a rotation system. In his speech in May 1966 at the 45th anniversary of the Roumanian Communist party, Causescu said: 'The existence of blocks as well as the sending of troops to other countries is an anachronism inconsistent with independence and national sovereignty of peoples and normal relations among states.' These words, which no doubt have aroused an enormous interest all over the area of Eastern Europe, did not remain without consequence. On April 1968, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister, Vaclav Plascot, speaking before the UN Economic Council for Europe in Geneva, said: 'We think that the objective conditions have entered the stage when the elimination of military blocs has become a historical necessity'.

Obviously, such words, advocating the eventual winding up of the Pact, which presents for the Russians the best media for controlling their satellites, sound like an anathema. Much milder criticism of the structure of the Pact, by Czechoslovak general V. Prhlik, resulted recently in the merciless Soviet pressure for his dismissal from his post. The Russians have become increasingly aware that, if even one country-member of the Pact would be allowed to withdraw, the whole fabric of the Pact would crumble in a few months, if not weeks.

All this explains why the Russians have put such merciless pressure to bear upon the new Czechoslovak leadership to stop as much as possible the whole process of liberalisation, because — unless halted in time — it could create a situation in which the Czechs, in spite of their protestations of loyalty towards the Pact, could begin thinking, or even talking — as Nagy did — about leaving the Pact and adopting a policy of neutrality.

It is against this background that the present Czechoslovak crisis and motives of the Soviet Union could be better understood.

Theoretically speaking, the Russians can embark upon one of the two following alternatives in order to settle the present Czechoslovak crisis: either by use of force, or by negotiations during which they

would endeavour to compel Dueck to make as many concessions as possible, which would make military intervention unnecessary; each of these alternatives carries certain risks.

As far as a possible use of force is concerned the Russians will have to crack a nut much harder than Hungary in 1956; after all, the Czechs have 14 divisions of which 4 armoured and 600 aircraft, without counting several hundred thousands of workers's militia, which could offer a bloody resistance. As in the case of Hungary, one could safely assume that the greater part of the armed forces and of the population will be ready to fight, especially as the Soviet pressure has resulted in growing anti-Russian feelings.

The main handicap, as far as the Czechs are concerned, will be the lack of sufficient reserves of ammunition and petrol; another handicap will be the fact that whereas the Russians have been able to call as many reservists as they wanted and have been deploying their troopconcentrations in accordance with their carefully laid out plans, the Czechs can do neither of these things in order to avoid provoking the Russians and giving them an excuse for an armed intervention. There is no doubt that, in case of an armed intervention, the Russians will not fail to take advantage of these handicaps.

Although at the moment of writing a Soviet armed intervention would still seem rather unlikely, it would be of interest to make a brief analysis of a hypothetical Soviet action: obviously, they'll have to move starting from the Ukraine across the rather difficult area of Slovakia, not abounding in good roads and enabling the Czechs to conduct a delaying manoeuvre. They could also enter into Slovakia through the mountain passes of Uzpk and Lavoczno from former Polish territory, which was annexed by the Russians in 1939.

As the Russians would like most likely to achieve a military solution as quick as possible, avoiding a slogging match with the Czechs conducting a delaying action in Slovakia, they ought to strike from as many directions of the compass as possible. This brings us to the problems of passing through the territories of Hungary and Poland and using their troops stationed in Eastern Germany.

As far as operations through Hungary are concerned, one could assume that a pressure would have to be brought upon Kadar to compel him to agree; any use of Hungarian troops, side by side with the Russians, ought to be ruled out. As far as Poland is concerned, there is little doubt that Gomulka would make no objections to Soviet passage through Polish territory.

Whether he will agree to the use of Polish troops is open to some doubt.

Finally, as far as the use of Soviet troops in Eastern Germany is concerned, the Russians would be reluctant to denude that country from the Red Army altogether. Consequently, one could take into account that only a few divisions could be used for a concerted action against Czechoslovakia; at any rate, the frontier between DDR and Czechoslovakia, running along the mountains, would also allow the Czechs a possibility of a delaying action.

There is still a possibility of a Soviet airborne assault upon Prague or some neighbouring cities; one of the task of the Soviet forces remaining on Czechoslovak soil — in spite of several promises made by Marshal Yakubovsky to withdraw them — would be to seize as many airfields as possible in order to allow a landing of Soviet airborne forces.

This brief analysis of various hypothetical situations — a typical staff work... — could lead to a conclusion that the Russians could hope to achieve a decisive result and in a short time; and yet, as history has shown that in spite of all most careful calculations made by the staffs of an aggressor, armed conflicts which were assumed to be limited ones and of short duration, escalated into much larger and even world wars...

Nobody could guarantee that, in case of brutal methods of suppression of the Czechoslovak resistance, Hungary and Roumania could remain absolutely passive; perhaps, the same goes for Poland as well; furthermore, President Tito, who has been encouraging the Czechs, could also have something to say what could be unpleasant to the Russians. Finally — in case of a hypothetical escalation — China could also take advantage of the Soviet involvement in the West and try to recover some of her territories, which have been claimed by Mao; the fear of such a Chinese move is perhaps one of the strongest deterrents for Soviet armed involvement in the West.

The Russians can be certain only of one thing, namely that the Western Powers — like in 1956 — will not lift a finger to take advantage of the situation into which the Russians have manoeuvred themselves. On the contrary, the West and especially the United States, have been trembling on the sidelines lest they should be thought to be involved. They have made it clear both to the Czechs and to the Russians in the first place, that they will not wish to rush with any economic aid for Czechoslovakia lest it could appear to the Kremlin as an attempt to fish in the troubled Communist waters. All this ought to be most embarrassing to de Gaulle, who during his visits to Eastern Europe has been inflaming nationalist feelings and encouraging moves towards greater independence from the USSR...

8

De Tsjechoslowaken hebben dit gedu-
rende vele weken aan den lijve moeten
ondervinden. Dat zij in belangrijke ma-
te aan de openlijke en geweldige poli-
tieke en vooral ook militaire pressie,
voor zover thans kan worden beoor-
deeld, weerstand hebben kunen bie-
den, is een onverwacht succes. Dat kan
hoop geven voor een — waarschijnlijk
nog verre — betere toekomst. Maar het
harde feit blijft dat de Tsjechoslowa-
ken, naast een grotere economische
binding, heben moeten instemmen met
een verhoogde defensie-inspaning en
militaire samenwerking met het Sov-
jet-blok. Ook de achter het IJzeren
Gordijn stelselmatig aangekweekte
haat en achterdocht tegen het Westen
zal de mogelijkheden voor een militaire
ontspanning beslist niet bevorderen.
Hoe gewenst onderhandelingen over
wapenbeheersing en - beperking dan
ook mogen zijn, slechts een onverant-
woord optimisme kan daarvan zeker
op kortere termijn, enig zinvol resul-
taat verwachten.

Niettemin zal de Navo daartoe toch
zo snel mogelijk een initiatief moeten
nemen, want geen enkele poging mag
worden nagelaten om ook op dat ge-
bied een goede wil te tonen. Dat kan in
politiek opzicht ten aanzien van de nog
ongebonden landen van niet te onder-
scheiden betekenis zijn. In dit verband
geeft de regering in de defensienota
blijk van een praktisch inzicht door
aan een étappengewijze benadering de
voorkeur te geven boven een alles om-
vattende ontwapeningsconferentie.

Maar het blijft teleurstellend dat het
initiatief daartoe nog steeds niet is ge-
nomen en dat moet los staan van de
hoop op meer of minder succes.

Een werkelijke ontspanning zal echter
zeer waarschijnlijk meer worden be-
vorderd door de reeds bestaande con-
tacten en samenwerking tussen de Na-
vo-landen en die van het Warschau
Pact op cultureel, economisch en tech-
nisch gebied te intensiveren. Wellicht
groeit dan het besef dat slechts in
vreedzame samenwerking de weder-
zijdse doelstellingen kunnen worden
gerealiseerd en dat de huidige bewape-
ningswedloop daarvoor geen aanvaard-
bare oplossing kan scheppen.

Onze hoop is daarbij gevestigd op de
jonge generatie die de hoge leidende
functies zullen gaan vervullen in alle
landen van deze wereld en dat zij zich
zullen kunnen bevrijden van dat deel
van hun geestelijke erfenis waarvan
haat en wantrouwen de grondslagen
vormen.

J. G. S.

J. G. S.

December 9, 1968

Professor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Study.

DEC 13 1968

Dear Professor Kissinger,

I read yesterday in the Sunday Telegraph about your lecture last Thursday, delivered at Princeton University for the Association for Cultural Freedom,

Obviously, I was trying to get its text, or some gist from the Press office at American Embassy in London, but, unfortunately it was not available.

I wonder whether it would be possible for you to let me have a copy of your speech, which I would like to use for my writings on the problems of defence of the West.

I hope that my letter dealing with my project of a book on the Warsaw Pact reached you and that you have given to it a few precious minutes of your time.

Hoping to hear from you