# INTRODUCTION

The civilian Secretaries in the American defense establishment are politically responsible appointive executives. Their responsibilities are of two kinds. As managers they are charged with the efficient conduct of the operations which they oversee. As policy-makers they are responsible, within the limits set by Congress and the President, for the substance of what is accomplished under their direction. For the purposes of this paper, two types of policy-making (certainly not the only ones) need to be distinguished.

The first is *program policy-making*, which is the establishment of basic, overall policy, or the general objectives of all the activities of the organization administered. In a military department it is concerned with forces, weapons, and military strategy, manpower and materiel supply, and ultimately, military requirements and economic limitations, or national strategy. Once these larger matters are settled, the smaller ones which derive from the coordination and implementation of general policy can follow accordingly.

The second is *democratic or popular policy-making*, which refers to the requirement in a liberal democratic society that the bureaucracy must respect private individuals and institutions. More pragmatically, it is the recognition by the public administrator that little matters can be as politically potent as big ones.

It should be observed that democratic policy-making can interfere with program policy-making in two ways. It can nibble away at policy programs until they are substantially changed; and it can be so time-consuming for the executive that he has not enough time left to accomplish his program.

With these simple distinctions in mind let us now turn to an examination of the position of the civilian executive in the service departments.

## I

The Department of the Army has followed a characteristic form of organization since the establishment of the General Staff in 1903. Centered on the Chief of Staff as the apex of a monolithic structure, Army departmental organization has always had a difficult time providing an adequate explanation for the role of its civilian executives, since their responsibility as Presidential appointees has made it necessary that they have clear authority over the Army establishment, while the requirements

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of modern warfare have made imperative the centralization of authority in
the Chief of Staff. At the time the National Security Act of 1947 was passed,
the Army Department was organized under directives only a year old which
had abolished the wartime administrative command of the Army Service
Forces and turned its operating responsibilities over to the General Staff,
the Special Staff, and the technical corps. 1

No substantial changes were made in Army organization again until
1954. The reorganization which occurred then is important because it is
the most recent change. But it is more important for our purposes because
it was based on a careful examination of the administrative problems of the
Army Department, and a thoughtful consideration of the role of the civilian
executive in the department.

The need for improvements in Army organization was first made
clear publicly in November, 1952, by Robert Lovett in his special report
to the President on Defense Department reorganization shortly before his
retirement as Secretary of Defense. 1/2 Lovett singled out the "Techni-
cal Services" organization of the Army for particular mention as being in
need of modernization and improvement. The following April the Rocke-
feller Committee recommended that the organization of the three military
departments be re-examined in the light of the "principles recommended
in this report regarding the Department of Defense as a whole." 1/3
The ammunition shortage hearings of that spring served to reinforce these
requests for Army Department reorganization, as well as to press through
the reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In his letter
of transmittal for Reorganization Plan No. 6, which accomplished the
latter purpose, the President announced that

the Secretary of Defense is initiating studies by the three Secre-
taries of the military departments of the internal organization of
their departments with a view toward making those Secretaries
truly responsible administrators, thereby obtaining greater effec-
tiveness and attaining economies wherever possible. These
studies will apply to the organization of the military departments
some of the same principles of clearer lines of accountability
which we are applying to the Department of Defense as a
whole. 1/4

These studies resulted in the Davies report in the Department of
the Army, the White report in the Department of the Air Force, and
the Gates report in the Department of the Navy.

The proposals of the Davies committee centered upon its intention
to emphasize the monolithic structure of Army departmental organization
in order to clarify operating responsibilities. Three changes were expected

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to accomplish this.

The first was to get the General Staff out of operations; the second, to get the civilian secretaries out of the General Staff; and the third, to recognize that the Chief of Staff was the "operating manager of the Army Establishment." /5 In order to get the General Staff out of operations, the same method was proposed as had been used in the wartime reorganization of 1942: the establishment of functional commands which would take over the operating responsibilities then being performed by the General Staff. Two commands were proposed, a Continental Army Command for training troops, and a Supply Command which would have "full responsibility for direction and control of the Technical Services," while policy-making functions would be performed in the General Staff by a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply. /6 Concerned also with instruments of executive control, the Davies committee proposed the establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management to whom the Army Comptroller would report, and the extended and improved application of the Army's Primary Program System.

Since the establishment of the office of the Chief of Staff in 1903, never in an official document had the command responsibilities of that office been recognized so explicitly as were they in the Davies report. To be sure the actual power of the Chief of Staff had become universally recognize throughout the Army; yet, it was part of Army cant to insist that the Chief of Staff had no command authority, but only acted in behalf of the Secretary. /7 While this concept was useful some fifty years ago in emphasizing the desired close relationship of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary, and was perpetuated undoubtedly because it made it easier to explain the role of the civilian executives in the monolithic Army departmental organization, it had never quite corresponded with fact. As the committee put it,

> The view is often expressed in the Army that the Chief of Staff commands no one and is merely chief of the Secretary's staff. In practice this is not the case. He is the operating manager of the Army Establishment. He should be recognized as such and be held fully accountable to the Secretary for all operations of the Department. /8

The recognition of the operating authority of the Chief of Staff emphasized the problem of chain-of-command. The Chief of Staff was, according to the Davies report, the "operating manager" of the Army whose responsibilities "must embrace all operations of the Army." /9 Clearly, he stood at the top of the Army chain-of-command. Where, then, did the civilian Assistant Secretaries, with their functional responsibilities, fit in?

The Rockefeller Committee had stated some general principles upon which reorganization of the military establishment should be based.

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"The Committee believes," its report stated,

that to provide the proper method of enforcing responsibility, it
is essential to have a single channel of command or line of ad-
ministrative responsibility within the Department of Defense and
each of the military departments. It does not believe that it is
possible (for administrative purposes) to make a sufficiently
clear distinction between military affairs, on the one hand, and
on the other hand civilian affairs (such as political, economic,
and industrial affairs) to serve as a practicable basis for divid-
ing responsibility between military and civilian officers, or for
establishing two parallel lines of command. /10

The Davies Committee agreed with both of these points, and stated
clearly the principal assumption upon which its reorganization proposals
were based.

Within the authority granted by law, the President and the
Secretary of Defense, the basic policies by which the [service]
department achieves its objectives are the personal responsi-
bility of the [service] Secretary. In their formulation and
consideration he can be aided both by civilian and by military
assistants, but the decision -- and the responsibility -- is his.

On the one hand, the Secretary may delegate authority for
managing all operating activities to the Chief of Staff. On the
other hand, he may relieve the Chief of Staff of responsibility
for managing major segments of the Army's operations and
require his civilian assistants to assume responsibility for
directing and managing these operations.

The Committee has weighed these alternative methods by
which the Secretary may organize for the discharge of his
responsibilities. On the basis of extended consideration of
these alternatives, it rejects the proposal of investing operating
responsibilities in the civilian appointees. It recommends that
the Secretary fix full operating responsibility upon the Chief of
Staff. /11

In pursuit of this objective, the functions and authority of the Assis-
tant Secretaries were described elsewhere in the report in terms which sug-
gested that they were to influence but not supplant the "single channel" of
control held by the Chief of Staff. "The contribution of executives at this
level", the report stated, referring to the Assistant Secretaries, and ignor-
ing the applicability of the statement in some respects to the Chief of Staff
as well, "is that of influencing policy and objectives and evaluating per-
formance -- not that of becoming involved in day-to-day operations. The
role of the civilian is to inject an outside point of view, to improve business
practices, to review operations, and to assume responsibility for adherence
to policies." /12 The report referred with disfavor to existing assigned
responsibilities of the civilian executives because they implied "that each

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shall direct and conduct those areas of the Army Staff's work for which he
is assigned responsibilities for operations." /13

It is clear that the Davies Committee intended to draw a distinction
between "operating" and "supervision"; and to assign the former to military
command channels, and the latter to the civilian Assistant Secretaries on
a functional basis. But, it should be remembered, the report also proposed
to take the General Staff out of operations by the creation of two new Army
commands, persumably so that the General Staff could concentrate upon
planning and supervision, also. The theoretical difference between the
supervisory activities of the General Staff and the Assistant Secretaries
was not stated. It remains today, as it has for the past half century, a
mystery of Army organizational theory.

The whole concept of civilian control in the Davies committee re-
port rested on the very tenuous distinction between "supervision" and
"operation". Evidently this weakness was observed in the Office of the
Secretary of the Army when the Davies report was considered there, for
the Secretary's reorganization plan, as it was approved, blurred that
distinction, and consequently avoided any reference to a single line of
authority or command. /14 Nevertheless, it followed the same basic
proposals made by the Davies group. The Chief of Staff is today the chief
operator of the Army; the civilian executives are supervisors, although
their functions are stated more strongly (if less clearly) than were they in
the Davies committee proposals. And since supervision is the function of
any top executive -- civilian or military -- the theoretical distinction be-
tween the civilian executives and the Chief of Staff in the administration
of the department is ambiguous.

But as a practical matter, the single chain of command prin-
ciple in Army organization -- not just for combat operations, but for the
management of the whole department -- has historically served impor-
tant purposes. It was the basis for subjugating the politically entrenched
bureaus, and of shielding the department from the decimation of its pro-
gram policies by domestic political forces which were disinterested in
the legitimate functions of the military. But its most lasting purpose has
been the one so clearly endorsed by the Davies committee. Whether or
not a single chain of command to the Chief of Staff is the only approach
to the management of an organization as large and diverse as the Army,
whether, indeed, that principle of organization is rationally tenable or
not, in view of the recognized need for civilian supervision within the
Army Department, it has provided, as it does now, a focus on the ulti-
mate military purpose of the Army: the capability of applying where and
when necessary adequate military force effectively. If the civilian exec-
utives in the Army Department seem to bear a curious relationship to
the organization in the accomplishment of this function, it is only because
they are in a curious position, by any normal standards of management.

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Before inquiring more closely into the implications of Army Department organization for the role of its civilian executives, it will be convenient to broaden our examination, first to include the Air Force with its major similarities and minor variations, and then to include the Navy with its many surface contrasts.

The Department of the Air Force really began in March, 1942, when the Army Air Forces were set up as one of three separate commands under the Chief of Staff in the Army. War Department policy established at that time gave the Air Force as much autonomy as was possible so as to avoid the frictions which would develop if that 'colony' were to insist upon independence before the common enemy was defeated. Although it was set up as an Army command, in fact the Air Force occupied an even more special status, for its commander sat on the Joint Chiefs, and, although its service functions were administered by the Army Service Forces, it had direct control over them. It also had its own Secretary (the Assistant Secretary of War for Air). In short, it had most of the advantages it could hope for under a separate department, without many of the headaches.

Nevertheless, it was not a separate department, but an Army command. It did not run its own service and supply functions, and it played a secondary role to the Army General Staff in strategic planning. The central organization of the Air Force followed Army organization principles, but on the command level rather than the department level. When it became a separate department, in 1947, the command functions of the ranking Air Force officer remained inseparable with his duties as Chief of Staff, and at the insistence of General Vandenberg, the Air Force Organization Act of 1951 did not alter the status of his office, but imbedded it in statute. /15

Thus, like the Army, the Air Force is organized on the basis of a single chain of command, which reaches in every case to the Chief of Staff; and, unlike the Army, the command and operating responsibilities of the Chief of Staff have always been recognized explicitly. He provides, as does that office in the Army, a focus for his department upon its ultimate strategic purpose.

Despite this fundamental likeness of Army and Air Force organization, there are significant differences between them, in addition to those which stem from the origins of the Air Force as an Army command. Many of these differences can be explained by the fact that the Air Force was established as a centralized organization, whereas Army centralization was a process of slow and painful growth. The central management functions of the Army have, since early in the century, been performed by the Army General Staff, which was superimposed upon the decentralized bureau structure of the Army. Yet the Army bureaus -- the technical corps of the Army -- are still separate entities within the department (as are the historic bureaus of the Navy in that department). The powers and functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army, and of the Army General Staff, have been shaped

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in conflict with these bureaus and with other intrenched interests in the
Army which survived from its long period of decentralization. But the
Air Force has had to reckon with no tradition of decentralization, either
in its command or its service structure. /16 Hence, the units of its
operating level are without claims to independence. They are clearly
creatures of the Chief and his Air Staff. While he may be protective of
his authority, he does not need to be so defensive about it as has the
Army Chief of Staff had to be. The civilian executives in the department
profit, to some degree, from this lack of internal tension within the Air
Force. As in the Army, the Assistant Secretaries are geared into the
monolithic structure under the Chief of Staff on the basis of functional
responsibility. In both departments, while the Chief of Staff is the 'oper-
ating' manager of his whole service, the Assistant Secretaries have di-
rect authority and responsibility for their assigned functions. The Davies
committee pronouncements and the Rockefeller Committee principles not
withstanding, this authority is parallel to, and therefore potentially con-
flicting with, that of the Chief of Staff. Although the internal tensions
within the Army have complicated this dual chain-of-command there, in
the Air Force it has worked with relatively little difficulty. It is note-
worthy that the self-examinations of service department organization
initiated at the time of the implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 6
led to recommendations in both the Navy and the Army to correct diffi-
culties in this bureau-service chief-Assistant Secretary relationship;
but no such difficulties were found worthy of notice by the White com-
mitee in the Air Force. /17 There, where central authority has
never been questioned, the flexibility of the chain-of-command in prac-
tice is evidently so great that it can easily be bent until it is unrecog-
nizable where it is related to the roles of the Assistant Secretaries, for
these officials have, in the functional areas assigned them, authority
commensurate to that of the Chief of Staff. /18 In both departments,
to be sure, the Assistant Secretaries are expected to 'supervise',
rather than 'operate'. As was made clear in the analysis of Army de-
partmental organization, while this distinction no doubt has significance
to the civilian and military executives of these two services, it does not
eliminate the potential conflict in authority between the Assistant Sec-
retaries and the Chief of Staff in each service.

The experience of World War II was revolutionary for Naval
administration. Unable to stretch its administrative traditions to fit
the new practices which arose, the Navy Department had to construct
new ones to take their place. It did so quickly. On November 7, 1945,
an "Informal Board" consisting of the Under Secretary, an Assistant
Secretary, and four Admirals, after four months' deliberation, sub-
mitted to the Secretary their "Recommendations Concerning the Exec-
utive Administration of the Naval Establishment." /19 The Gates
board, as it came to be called, after Under Secretary Artemus L.
Gates, took a realistic look at the organization of the Navy Department
as it had evolved during the war, thoughtfully turned that description into
a coherent scheme, and layed out a plan for the organization of the naval

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establishment which became -- and still is -- the major exposition on the subject.

The scheme of organization conceived of by the Gates board was complex enough to encompass the varied activities and relationships which constituted the Naval Establishment. Briefly, the Board found that the Naval Establishment comprised three distinct parts, the Operating Forces, the Navy Department, and the Shore Establishment; that the executive organization of the Navy consisted of the Secretary, the "Civilian Executive Assistants to the Secretary," and the "Naval Professional Assistants to the Secretary," (consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, Chiefs of Bureaus, etc.); and the tasks of the Navy's executive organization consisted of "policy control," "naval command," "logistics administration and control," and "business administration." That is to say, the Gates board began its work by identifying three parts to the Naval Establishment, four executive groups in it, and four general tasks to be performed by it. /20 (In this respect, it should be noted, the Army and the Air Force identify only one task -- command -- and all else is in theory merely contributory to its performance.)

The plan of organization proposed by the Gates board, adopted first administratively by Forrestal in 1946, and incorporated in statute in 1948, /21 set up two major subdivisions of authority immediately under the Secretary of the Navy: the Chief of Naval Operations on the one hand, as the Naval Command Assistant, and the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries on the other as the Civilian Executive Assistants to the Secretary. Subordinate to the command and executive assistants were the three parts of the Navy, the operating forces, the Navy Department, and the shore establishment, and the rest of the Naval professional assistants, called the Naval technical assistants. No single pattern of subordination existed, since each of the four tasks of the naval establishment involved a different relationship between the two groups of assistants under the Secretary and the parts and groups subordinate to them.

The result of the Gates board scheme was a description of a highly organic organization, one in which the various parts were not merely related to each other, but subtly inter-related. Instead of the simple chain-of-command concept of Army organization, with only the staff relationship as relief to its monotony, the Navy emerged from the Second World War with a conception of organization which could do justice to the infinite variety of relationships which are bound to develop, and are bound to be needed, in an organization of the size and complexity of the Navy. James Forrestal must have regarded it as quite an accomplishment.

The simple and practical meaning of the Navy's postwar organization, despite the Gates board's complex conceptualization of it, have been, first, that the central management of the Naval establishment was related to the operating parts of the Navy in much the same way as was the central management of the Army (the General Staff and the secretariat for the most

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part) to its operating parts, except that the Army retained the concept of a
single chain-of-command to the Chief of Staff (even if in fact it was some-
what of a fiction). Since explicit recognition was given in the Navy to the
complexity and variety of central management relationships with the opera-
ting parts of the Navy, the procedure of these relationships, particularly
where they involved the civilian executives, were described more accurate-
ly and developed more consciously by the Naval executives than were com-
parable relationships dealt with in the Army, and to a lesser extent in the
Air Force.

The further practical meaning of the Navy's postwar scheme for
organization has been that, while the operating parts of the Navy answered
on various matters to various parts of the central management, in general,
the business side of the Navy has been run by the civilian exectives, and
the fleet side by the Chief of Naval Operations, so that the general division
of functions which were developed during World War II have continued to
prevail.

Although from the top this organization appears wholly (indeed,
impressively) rational, from the working or operating level it has seemed
less adequate. As the spokesman for one Navy bureau has put it, with
evident exaggeration,

The Bureau is subjected to nineteen areas of control from the
top management of the Department of the Navy, and this [is] a
definite trend towards centralization. These numerous, and in
many cases duplicating or overlapping controls are having an in-
creasingly serious effect upon the ability of the bureaus to per-
form their missions satisfactorily, and at present are having a
frustrating effect upon efficient performance. 22

When the Navy undertook a re-examination of its departmental
organization in 1953, in compliance with the President's request to all
three services to do so, the problem of multiple supervision was an im-
portant item of consideration. The Committee on Organization of the
Department of the Navy, headed by the Under Secretary, Thomas S. Gates,*
recommended that the Under Secretary be made boss of the Assistant Sec-
retaries, and be given direct control over the Navy bureaus. Two additional
Assistant Secretaryships would be created, making a total of four, each of
which would exercise functional supervision of some type over the bu-
reaus. 23 The problem of multiple supervision of the bureaus was
thus to be solved by establishing a single chain of command to the Under
Secretary, which would place the Assistant Secretaries in a kind of staff
relationship to him, and would subordinate (although not eliminate) the
supervision of the bureaus by CNO.

* Not to be confused with Artemus L. Gates, who as Under Secretary headed the Informal Board to study the organization of the Navy Department in 1945.

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Most of the Gates committee proposals have been incorporated into the organization of the Navy Department. In practice the Under Secretary has had gathered in his office the functions of business management and producer logistics supervision of the naval establishment. On the other hand, the Chief of Naval Operations has centered in his office the functions of the 'military side' of the Navy, so that the Secretary is confronted with a division in his organization between what are primarily military and what are primarily business activities.

A general comparison of Army, Navy, and Air Force departmental organization would not be appropriate here, but some mention of the common and contrasting problems connected with the role of the civilian executives in the three services should be helpful.

To begin with, comparisons will help us to clear away some fallacies:

1. An Army-type departmental organization is not necessary, as the Davies board implied, in order to keep inexperienced and short-tenure Assistant Secretaries from too much involvement with details. Naval organization stresses the importance of the executives' confining their attention to general supervision, and they seem to do it as well as do the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, despite the radically different form of organization in the Army. The Army's business side remains, among the services, the least satisfactory -- by reputation at least. Undoubtedly conditions peculiar to the Army have contributed much to its difficulties with top-level supply administration, but its experience is scarcely proof of the Davies committee's endorsement of the single chain-of-command concept *throughout the whole Army Department*.

2. Conversely, Navy experience between 1945 and 1954 has made it fairly clear that a single chain-of-command structure in some part of an organization, even though it may in some respects be fictional, or in others, inflexible, is helpful to the subordinate working elements of that organization, if not to the immediate needs of its central management.

3. Reference to Air Force organization should indicate that the problems of administrative control, whether they be civil-military, or within the military, arise as much from the inertia of tradition, established practice, and intrenched interest, as they do from the formal structure of authority.

4. Finally, the whole organization of all three departments, despite their obvious differences, is focussed upon their ultimate purpose: effectiveness in war; and the civilian role in each, like the role of every other of its parts, is conceived to be contributory to that end.

Thus, the civilian executive plays fundamentally the same role and faces the same fundamental problems in each of the service departments. Because he does, his role in each of the departments can be considered together.

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II

Viewed from within their departments, and in historical perspective, the powers of the service secretaries are impressive. No longer are important elements of the military establishment relatively autonomous. No longer is the central management of the department so inadequate as to render the Secretary helpless to direct its parts. The greater centralization in the organization of both the War and Navy Departments brought about by World War II clearly enhanced the powers of the civilian secretaries within their departments, but it enhanced even more the powers of central military command. This corresponding increase in the powers of the military command assistants (as the Navy might call them) has had a profound influence upon the role of the service department Secretaries over the past decade.

The most obvious function of a civilian executive in an armed service department is to see that the materiel requirements of the operating forces are met efficiently and in conformity with public policy. In all three services the primary attention of the service secretaries has been concentrated upon this function. On the whole, the size and importance of the materiel side of the military establishment, which has particular sensitivities to domestic pressures, has not suffered from lack of civilian control on the service department level. Problems of business management have persisted, and they will undoubtedly continue to do so. By and large, the civilian plays an adequate role in their solution in all three services. In each there are now four Assistant Secretaries who have functional responsibilities which are primarily concerned with the business activities of that department. Indeed, the Navy has given over its Under Secretary as a general business manager. The form of organization in the other two services has made it impractical for them to do likewise, but the emphasis of the attention of their civilian executives on business management is nonetheless clear.

This emphasis is understandable, but its implications should be noted. The business side of a military department does not justify itself, but is justified only as it helps to ready and support the armed forces for war. That is to say, its ultimate purpose is to perform housekeeping or staff functions for the military side of the department. Hence, in concentrating upon business administration in the military establishment, the civilian executive assistants are devoting themselves primarily to _assisting_ the military in the accomplishment of their objectives, but not to _controlling_, _supervising_, or _participating with_ the military in the determination of those objectives.

It should be noted that, for the moment at least, the Secretaries themselves are not included in this statement.* Unlike the Assistant Secretaries, and the Under Secretary of the Navy, they sit at the lively center of their departments, drawing information, viewpoints, and advice from a

* Neither, indeed, are the Under Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force.

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variety of sources down the chain of command, or from within both of the major subdivisions of their departments. On the organization charts they sit at the top. Their legal authority is relatively unlimited throughout their departments. The professional military personnel who form the backbone of the organization which the service Secretaries manage are well indoctrinated with the principle of civilian control and their duty to obey the Secretary. All of these things suggest that the Secretaries of the three services have a more balanced position within their departments than do their assistants vis-a-vis the public policy for which they are presumably responsible. And undoubtedly that position is more balanced. Yet, at the same time, they can have only a limited influence upon the process which formulates the policies they are expected to administer, and not a great deal more influence in laying down the general guidelines to be used in that administration.

Part of their problem is the Joint Chiefs of Staff channel to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, and the President; part of it is OSD; part, also, is the nature of centralized military planning in an armed service department. The influence of the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the role of the service department Secretary in policy-making for his department was noted by the Davies committee on Army reorganization. It likened the Secretary of the Army to "the president of a major subsidiary of a huge enterprise subject at all times to the direction of the president of the parent company." But it

found that, unlike his industrial analogue, the president of this major subsidiary was not often permitted to participate in the discussions of the board of directors and the top management -- i. e., the National Security Council and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense -- by whom policies affecting his enterprise were considered and determined. /24

Indications are that this point had -- and has -- much substance. To be sure, the service Secretaries sit with the Secretary of Defense regularly as the Joint Secretaries; and, with the Chiefs added, as the Armed Forces Policy Council. Each of them can get his views into the staff processes of the NSC both through his chief of staff, with whom he has continuous contact, and by utilizing the primarily civilian channels of OSD -- the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, most particularly, and of course, the Secretary of Defense himself. But the exclusion of the service Secretaries from vital policy-making has not been because the upper regions where national military policy is settled are not open to communication from the service department Secretaries. On the contrary, their opportunities to communicate are numerous. Nor is it, as the Davies committee suggests, primarily a matter of having a service Secretary sit in on NSC meetings regularly for information (and undoubtedly prestige) purposes. Surely that would help, for among other things, it would give him an advantage over his department's military Chief in the sedate scramble of policy-making by super-staff. Yet it would do little to alter the situation which makes the service department Secretary's relationship to policy-

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making for his department so unsatisfactory. The Davies committee, perhaps because it was preoccupied with borrowing from the administrative experience of the business world, or perhaps because the situation looked hopeless, overlooked that situation completely. Symptomatic of his committee's oversight were the analogies Davies used in his own ex-position of the Army reorganization committee's recommendations. The analogy in the last quotation, which equated the Secretary of the Army to the president of a major subsidiary of a huge business enterprise, is clearly inaccurate, for it excludes the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army General Staff as factors relevant to the role of the Secretary.

The analogy used to explain the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army for functional supervision repeated this oversight. It reads:

> When Charles E. Wilson was the president of General Motors, his vice president for engine production did not himself manage an engine plant; he supervised, counseled, and appraised a group of five operating vice presidents who managed engine manufacturing plants. The recommended role of the assistant secretary may be likened to such a "group vice president." /25

The role recommended for the Assistant Secretaries in the Army was -- and is -- not at all like that of a General Motors "group vice president" because of the centralized command and strategic planning structure of the Army.

Although it is obviously risky, further comparison may help to clarify this point. It will be recalled that earlier two elements of the policy-making responsibilities of a government executive were identified as program policy making, and democratic policy-making. The ultimate basis of General Motors' program policy must be its balance sheet. From this central criterion, and with no slight to its sense of responsibility to the public intended, General Motors derives its operating program policy. But the ultimate basis of a military department's program policy is never so obvious, indisputable, or constant; and much of the attention of its high-ranking staff is, upon occasion, given over to the determination of that central criterion. What measure is there for planning the policy program of a military department comparable to the profit and loss statement of a private business? The national interest is, of course, a basis for planning, but it is hardly measurable. What, indeed, is the national interest? Is it to prepare for limited wars, or for a final general war, or for both, or for no war at all? Is it in the national interest to expand or to contract the military establishment? To increase or lower military expenditures? To concentrate upon strategic air power, or upon strategic surface forces? These questions must be dealt with through the channels of military planning which originate deep in each military department, but extend past the Secretary of the department, through the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and into the National Security Council and the White

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House. Because it failed to take account of this aspect of the defense establishment, the Davies committee made no place in its plans for the process of program policy-making in the Army.

This is the situation which makes the service department Secretaries' relationships to policy-making for their departments so unsatisfactory. It is not just because their advice may be ignored by their superiors, or because they are often excluded from the highest councils; or alone that the professional military spokesmen of their departments can by-pass them and deal directly with the Secretary of Defense. More important than any of these reasons is the fact that their own base in departmental administration provides them with no independence from the military core of their department. In each of the service departments, in spite of variations in organization between the Army general staff system, its Air Force modification, or the so-called balanced organization of the Navy, although the civilian secretariat performs important and necessary services in the management of the department's business, supply, and supporting functions, and in the policy coordination and democratic policy-making which flow from those services, the Secretary can have little legitimate effect upon the making of the program policy which he must administer, for by the time it reaches him within his department he is no match for the size, skill, and claims of professional competence of the military staffs organized under his military Chief.

The position of the Secretary at the apex of his department imposes upon him a much broader range of responsibilities than do the positions of his Under and Assistant Secretaries; but he is faced with the same problem as are they, for he is primarily an implementer, and not a formulator of policy. He coordinates, he supervises, he queries, he criticizes, he probes, he discusses; he is the chief spokesman for his department: he is a very busy man. He knows that he is a subordinate of the Secretary of Defense and a creature of Congress. These are enough reasons why he should be only a policy implementer, and not a policy-maker. But since his own subordinates, the military core of his department, are the working-level of policy planning for the military establishment -- are policy-makers themselves -- the responsibility of the service department Secretary, even if it is confined to policy implementation, is to some extent anomalous, for while he may be very active in his department, the major policy questions are just beyond his reach.

The budget process is illustrative of the kinds of basic decisions which are made outside the scope of the service department secretariat's determination, despite its active and constructive participation in the process. Guidelines for the budget-making process are set by OSD and the Joint Chiefs, (the latter by setting force levels), and are then sent down through the departments to be filled in. As Secretary of the Army Brucker recently described the process in the Senate hearings on air power:

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The Army staff starts its work on the budget, on the basis of certain war plans which the Joint Chiefs of Staff get together on. Upon this basis they start their planning. As they plan and move along, the civilian assistant secretarial group gets into it along with the comptroller and other military forces of the Army, until finally the time comes when the budget is presented to the Secretary of the Army. It comes up of course --

Mr. HAMILTON, [the committee counsel]. Presented to the Secretary by whom?

Secretary BRUCKER. Well, it is presented formally by the Chief of Staff, but it is presented in reality by staff members concerned with financial matters along with the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and the Under Secretary of the Army.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do the civilians participate in the formulation of the budget proposal?

Secretary BRUCKER. They do but not in the beginning. They participate in it as it comes along and has been formulated to the point where some of the basic decisions have been made related to money. They get in it at this point and carry along with it until it comes through the Chief of Staff to my office. I select the people to go with me when the matter is considered by the Department of Defense.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you review it in your office?

Secretary BRUCKER. Yes. . . /26

But Brucker went on to say that he had made no change whatsoever in the fiscal 1957 (his first) Army budget, and that he hoped to get into the budget for the following year his own idea about what its general size should be. /27 Perhaps there was more meaning than he intended in his concluding remark on this subject: "I feel that I have freedom to carry out the policies of the Army." /28

Although Secretary Brucker is new to his present job, the budgetary pattern which he briefly described is somewhat typical of all three services. The budget guidelines which come down to the service department Secretaries are based on crucial program policies. /29 Later, the budget estimates come up to them for review from within their military staffs. Since they are presented with a budget agreed to by their major assistants, reviewing it would be difficult, and they ordinarily have not undertaken to do so. The fact that the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management has worked on the budget is not a great deal of help to the service department Secretary at the point of his review, for the Assistant Secretary's job is conceived to be largely a business management function, which assures review from the standpoint of efficiency, but not from the stand point of major program policies. Indeed, the policy guidance needed in the making of budget estimates usually comes for the military Chief of the department. As a result, the first independent review of the budget is carried on in OSD. Recently, it should be noted,

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efforts have been made to develop independent review of budget estimates, and of logistics requirements as well, /30/ within the services themselves.

In budget-making as in other areas which involve important policy matters of all kinds, the department Secretary is faced on the one hand with the advice of his functionally oriented civilian managers, and on the other, by the highly centralized military command and staff organization headed by his military Chief, which is primarily oriented towards military planning, programming, and operating. The civilian group tend to be neutrals when it comes to the larger policy issues; the military chief spends more of his time providing advice to the Secretary of Defense than does he advising his own service chief. /31/ Consequently, neither type of assistant is adequate help to the Secretary in his own making of program policy.

In practice, as was just noted, the independent evaluational responsibilities of the Assistant Secretaries have been stressed; this has meant that the focus of program policy-making upon the Chief of Staff has continued unchallenged on the service department level. /32/

Thus, the situation of the civilian executives with respect to policy formulation and administration within the service departments can be stated as follows: while they have active policy coordination and democratic policy-making functions to perform, they are primarily implementers of program policy. They are, that is, expediters but not formulators of the military plans and programs of their departments. Essentially, they are business managers, trying to manage an enterprise which, not alone in size, is very much more than just a business. But whether they operate it, or supervise it, or just plain watch it, they will not make the program policy for it, even to the limited extent that seems possible, until the Secretary has the will and the administrative capability to do so. Such a change would undoubtedly cause frictions within his department, and an attendant loss of efficiency. It would, that is to say, be bad business practice. Then, in at least momentary despair, let us abandon our search for a positive program policy-making force in the service departments and turn our attention to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

### III

The Secretary of Defense is boss of the largest operating organization in the free world. Whatever measurement of size is used, the Defense Department is several times larger than any private business corporation. At the same time, its policy-making and implementing problems are vastly more complex than are those of any business organization, and are in many respects not comparable to them.

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OSD was created in response to wartime experiences in World
War II which indicated the need for more coordination and centralization
in the military establishment, and in hopes that unification would mean
greater economy in defense expenditures. /33 Both of these influences
have continued to play an obvious and important part in its development.
OSD has been the focal point of both Congressional and Presidential econ-
omy programs, and of the interest of both in consolidation and integration
in the administrative, operational, and planning activities of the military
establishment. The strategic necessities which created the Joint Chiefs
of Staff have perpetuated and, in some respects, augmented their functions.
The utilization of the NSC mechanism has further centralized the policy-
making process.

As a result, the military establishment has operated, since World
War II, under considerable pressure towards centralization.

From the view point of executive control, the public status of the
defense establishment, with all the implications it has in the context of
American national government, is a second factor crucial to an under-
standing of the development of OSD. Primarily it has meant that however
strongly committed Congress or the public have been to centralized re-
sponsibility in the military establishment, or to decentralized administra-
tion, Congress has not given up its traditional role of checking the perform-
ance of the bureaucracy at any level it chooses, or of holding OSD respon-
sible for the failures in performance it finds. The result, as we noted at
the beginning of this paper, was to make it impossible for the public exec-
utive to concentrate his attention only on those matters which he considers
to be most important to the accomplishment of his objectives as a manager.
He cannot, that is to say, concentrate upon the achievement of his program
policies, but at times may have to give more attention to policy coordina-
tion and democratic policy-making. He may, that is, be expected to answer
not only for the whole of his administration of the Defense Department, but
for any one of its minor parts.

Besides the pressures for centralization, and the public context
of defense administration, a third factor -- not really a new one here --
should be mentioned as helpful to an understanding of the development of
OSD. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are to OSD what the military Chief is to
the Secretary of his service: the internal source of central direction for
the military establishment in the accomplishment of its ultimate purpose,
which is the capability of applying effectively adequate military force where
and when necessary.

These three factors help to explain the pattern which has unfolded
in the development of Department of Defense administration. Briefly, that
pattern has been the continual increase in the number of functional controls
held and the amount of actual operating performed in OSD, which has been
all out of proportion to the small increase in the systematic making by OSD
of program policy for the military establishment. In other words, OSD,

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[c]

like the Service Departments, has tended to emphasize the performance of
functions most comparable to those encountered in business administration,
with the result that the Secretary of Defense has been poorly prepared to
deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of program policy for
the Department of Defense. This is not to say that his influence has been
small in program policy-making, as the influence of the Service Secre-
taries has tended to be in their departments. He has the rank and power
which the Service Secretaries lack, and has not hesitated to use it. But
he has done so sporatically. He has not shown a measured and consistent
position, distinguishable from the necessarily partisan views of his civilian
and military subordinates, but has seemed to support one or the other,
with little apparent awareness of their limitations. It would be foolish to
ignore personal causes of this behavior, or to apply this description equally
to all five Secretaries of Defense, or uniformly to Wilson's nearly four
years as Secretary of Defense.

But, despite these personal variations, the forces described
above have had a continuous influence upon the development of OSD. For-
restal was disappointed in his effort to borrow from British government
methods because the policy control by the British government is based
upon cabinet solidarity, party discipline, and a very strong civil service
tradition, all of which were lacking in the situation in which Forrestal
sought to apply it. 134 In the end, he asked for more power to accom-
plish what, in a sense, British government accomplished by willing co-
operation. Despite his personal preference for another method, Forrestal
eventually sought an increase in his administrative powers; only Marshall
among his successors has failed to do likewise.

The pressures for centralization, the established prestige and
functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the public status of the Defense
Department, have all pushed OSD more and more into active functional
control of the business management activities of the service departments.

The pattern of functional growth is quite clear. Financial con-
trols developed first and remain the strongest. They have grown on the
political attractiveness of budget-cutting, and as a parallel to the central
control mechanism in private business. They have been followed by
numerous other functions (of varying utility as control mechanisms) now
administered by ten Assistant Secretaries of Defense and a General Coun-
sel. Intended to improve the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense's
control over the Defense Department, while allowing decentralized ad-
ministration, they have increased his control, to be sure, but only at the
expense of involving the Secretary in more and more business manage-
ment, and centralizing further the performance of administrative tasks
in the military establishment. In most instances any augmentation of his
capabilities as a program policy-maker has been doubtful. 135

It is significant that the extent of centralization which has occurred
in Department of Defense functions was not intended or anticipated. The

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Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization recommended that the Assistant Secretaries of Defense' be staff officials not "in the direct line of administrative authority." 136 This proposal was included in Reorganization Plan No. 6. 137 The former legal counsel to the Rockefeller Committee, writing as General Council of the Department of Defense some eight months after the plan was adopted, confidently stated that

The Secretaries of the Military departments have not been submersed. They are not subject to orders from the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. They do not have to go through the Assistant Secretaries to reach the Secretary of Defense. The channels of communication are just as simple and direct as the lines of authority.

The additional Assistant Secretaries have facilitated the delegation of operating authority to the Secretaries of the military departments. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense are not operators or commanders. Strange as it may seem, they are just exactly what they were intended to be -- top-level staff assistants to the Secretary of Defense. 138

Whether this statement was accurate or not when it was published in January, 1954, it is not accurate now. Two of the Assistant Secretaries, Comptroller and International Security Affairs, have explicit line responsibilities. Indeed, the latter now even by-passes the Chief of Naval Operations to deal directly with his staff divisions on certain matters. 139

Presumably, he does the same with the other two services. And others of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense have become, in reality, 'operators', in practice directing the performance of their functions within the service departments. Perhaps the most notable of these 'operators' is the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations). Because of the interest of Congress in the acquisition and utilization of real estate by the armed forces, this supposedly staff officer has, in order more effectively to deal with Congress, become very much of an operator. His most famous directive, the one on when and how to mow the grass at government installations, 140 was not wholly unrepresentative of the nature of his activities.

Clearly then, the hopes of the Rockefeller Committee, and of the originators of Reorganization Plan No. 6 in OSD, that the Secretary of Defense could be strengthened in his control over policy without at the same time further centralizing administration in the Defense Department, were ill-founded. Evidently the reorganizers failed to appreciate the pressure at the top of the defense structure for the performance there of detailed supervision of administration. Like the reorganization committees which followed them in the service departments, they were too closely wedded to the analogies of business administration, and the guidance which they provided, to appreciate the strength of the simultaneous pressures for central policy control and detailed central direction in the military establishment. As a result, they have failed to see that a scheme which would

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assure decentralization in private business could not do so in the Defense Department.

IV

The Defense Department has continued to grow more centralized in its administration, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to become more weighted in favor of business administration operations. Since the services have been so set upon not dying, and the Defense Department reorganizers have been so confident that the department can be decentralized in its operations and still adequately centralized in its policy-making and managerial controls, the services have been expected to perform the major functions of a military establishment at the same time that OSD has been developing duplicate functions. The result is a growing duplication of staffs, and the "re-reviewing," as one Congressional committee has put it, of work already adequately reviewed and sufficiently supervised. /41 If the secretariat in either OSD or the service departments were primarily involved in the development of program policies which spanned military and business administration interests, their activities might be less duplicative. But both are primarily concerned with business administration, to the exclusion of program policy-making; and the review of supervision by both suffers from the same consequent limitations.

Forrestal's vision of a policy-oriented OSD has proved far more illusive than anyone imagined it would be, and is now further from achievement than is generally recognized. No doubt an important factor in its eventual achievement will be the development of the administrative control and reporting techniques necessary for the effective management of the defense establishment. The success with which these techniques are now being developed is encouraging. But sooner or later attention will have to be paid to the less gigantic task of seeing that the Secretary of Defense, in the course of combining administration policy with military requirements and managerial limitations, and making the basic determinations of program policy for the military establishment, is enabled to do so in a balanced, consistent, and circumspect manner.

The mere paying attention to the problem will be encouraging. But more will be needed than that. The present tendencies are for OSD to become more and more like the service departments, with the civilian secretariat getting more and more involved in the performance of functions, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff focus the activities of the defense establishment on its ultimate military purposes. Whether this makes the Defense Department a monolithic organization like the Army and the Air Force Departments, or a divided or balanced organization like the Navy, makes little difference, for, as we have seen, regardless of their organizational differences, the services have basically the same problem with respect to program policy control by civilian executives.

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Program policy-making will not be the central function of the civilian executives in the Defense Department at any level so long as the organizational problems of the Department and the role of its civilian secretariat are viewed in terms of business administration. This, of course, is the old battle for an understanding of the unique problems of public administration. While that cause seems at present to have few friends in high places, its ranks are neither thin, nor inexperienced, nor unskilled. But if they are to have any constructive effect upon the role of the civilian executive in the Defense Department, they, too, have lessons to learn. First, they must realize that much of the fascination of the Defense Department and its critics and helpers with business methods has been necessary because of its size. And second, they must recognize that the necessary focussing of every aspect of organization, administration, planning, operations, and even policy-making within the Defense Department upon its ultimate purpose -- which is military -- creates special and profound administrative problems for the department, particularly with respect to the role of its civilian executives.

Does this make the Defense Department unique in administrative experience? Undoubtedly it does: at least unique enough to require the use of great caution in the solving of its administrative and organizational problems by the process of comparison; and unique enough to justify new efforts to analyse the organization of the Defense Department and describe it accurately, with the aid, but without the incumberance, of established conceptions of business, public, and military administration, all of which have been used too freely heretofore.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. Department of the Army, *The Army Almanac* (Washington: G. P. O., 1950), pp. 54, 55, and 61.

2. Robert A. Lovett, Letter to the President, November 18, 1952, summarized in *New York Times*, January 9, 1953.

3. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization*, April 11, 1953, Committee Print, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), p. 4.

4. U. S. Congress, *Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 Relating to the Department of Defense*, Committee Print (1953), pp. 3-4.

5. Department of the Army, *Organization of the Army*, Report of the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, 18 December 1953 (mimeo.), p. 21.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

7. *E. g.*, see U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Army Organization Act of 1950, Hearings, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), p. 16, where General Collins, in the course of opposing a proposal to assign command control to the Chief of Staff, said, "We feel that the lack of this provision of command responsibility guarantees the civilian control that you are concerned about."

8. *Organization of the Army*, p. 21.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

10. *Report of the Rockefeller Committee*, p. 3.

11. *Organization of the Army*, pp. 17-18.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

13. *Ibid*.

14. *Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization*, June 14, 1954 (mimeo.), pp. 7-11.

15. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing to Provide for the Organization of the Air Force*, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), pp. 43-46, 102-3; P. L. 150, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., approved September 19, 1951.

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16. The Air Force has had to fight to keep it that way. When the Air Force Organization Act was under consideration in Congress, the Secretary of the Air Force told a House Armed Services subcommittee: "... we were very anxious to have a centralization of authority of the Air Force and not to have separate bureaus, organizations, corps, et cetera, set up which would interfere with the direct line of authority and responsibility." House Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to provide for the Organization of the Air Force..., p. 60. Both Secretary Finletter and the Chief of Staff, General Vendenberg, continued to insist upon this point throughout the hearings. Ibid., pp. 77, 85, 86, passim.

17. Memorandum for Mr. Talbott, *Organizational Review of the Air Force Establishment*, May 5, 1954, from H. Lee White (mimeo.).

18. For instance, the White report specified that each Assistant Secretary should be "responsible for direction, guidance and supervision over all matters pertaining to the formulation, review and execution of plans, policies and programs in the functional fields" assigned to him. *Ibid.* It should be noted that, with only minor exceptions, the recommendations contained in this report were adopted.

19. U. S. Navy Department, *Recommendations Concerning the Executive Administration of the Naval Establishment, Prepared November 1945 by an Informal Board (mimeo.)*.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-8.

21. Navy Department, G. O. 230, January 12, 1946; P. L. 432, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., approved March 5, 1948.

22. U. S. Navy Department, *Summary of Comments by Bureaus and Major Offices on Navy Organization, Prepared for Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, October 29, 1953 (mimeo.)*, p. 8.

23. U. S. Navy Department, *Report of the Committee on Organization of the Navy Department, April 16, 1954 (Washington: Navy Department, 1954)*, pp. 19-33, 41-42.

24. Paul L. Davies, "A Business Look at the Army," *Harvard Business Review*, XXXII (July-August 1954), 56.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

26. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Study of Air Power, Hearings, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 1299-1300*.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 1288, 1300-6.

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28. *Ibid.*, p. 1322.

29. They are not very determinative guidelines, however. Arthur Smithies, *The Budgetary Process in the United States* (New York: The McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1955), p. 254.

30. For an excellent, though already slightly outdated description and evaluation of budget estimate procedures in the service departments see *Ibid.*, pp. 252-6. More recent though less adequate descriptions of the budget-making process and other management techniques can be found in the Defense Department replies to the second Hoover Commission's reports, especially *Department of Defense Comments on the Hoover Commission Report on Business Organization of the Department of Defense, March 1956 (mimeo.)*; *Department of Defense Views on Implementation of Report on Budget and Accounting By Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, October 1955 (mimeo.)*; and *Department of Defense Comments on the Hoover Commission Report on Military Procurement, December 1955 (mimeo.)*; and in *Study of Air Power, Hearings, pp. 1288, 1299-1306, 1365, 1411-16, 1424, 1429-30, and 1438-40*.

31. General J. Lawton Collins, then Chief of Staff of the Army, estimated in 1950 that he spent 60% of his time on JCS business. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Army Organization Act of 1950*, Hearings, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950), p. 41.

32. *Department of Defense Comments on the Hoover Commission Report on Business Organization of the Department of Defense*, p. 15.

33. For a summary see Carroll F. Miles, *The Office of the Secretary of Defense 1947-1953; A Study in Administrative Theory* (Ph. D. Thesis, Harvard Univ., 1956), pp. 3-10.

34. See Admiral Arthur W. Radford's highly interesting comments on the inapplicability of the British organization model here in *Study of Air Power*, Hearings, pp. 1460, 1462.

35. "It is the view of the [House Appropriations] Committee that the basic concept under the National Security Act contemplated that the Secretary of Defense would issue the necessary broad instructions and policy guidance under which the military departments would be operated and see to it that such policy directives were carried out. Adequate program and fiscal controls must of necessity be maintained for each military department on a general category basis and not in the great detail that seems to prevail at present. The impression conveyed to the Committee, however, is that many of the officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense are concerning themselves with the issuance of detailed instructions and detailed and endless reviews of actions, proposed by the military departments in day-to-day operations. One example which

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tends to bear out this impression is the enormous amount of review and
re-review, on a line item basis, in the field of military construction in-
volving authorizations, apportionments, and expenditures. Another is
the requirement that each military department again justify, both to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget, each of
its appropriations when they request their quarterly apportionment of
funds, or more often in the case of program changes.

"It does not seem to the Committee that the Office of the Secretary of Defense can or should attempt to involve itself too deeply in the daily operations of the military departments. The Committee has observed, especially in connection with directives covering procurement procedures and obligations of funds, that little, if any, emphasis has been placed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on seeing to it that instructions are being carried out. Accordingly, it is suggested that the Secretary of Defense consider transferring a substantial portion of his large staff now engaged in unnecessary and cumbersome details of control and utilize that staff to follow up the implementation and execution of the more important orders and reduce or eliminate the effort going into the preparation and dissemination of detailed instructions and reviewing in detail the routine operations of the three Services." U. S. Congress, House Rept. No. 2104, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1957, May 3, 1956, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 11-12.

36. Report of the Rockefeller Committee, p. 11.

37. Reorganization Plan No. 6, p. 3.

38. H. Struve Hensel, "Changes Inside the Pentagon," *Harvard Business Review*, XXXII (January-February 1954), 106.

39. U. S. Navy Department, *Management of International Security Affairs in the Department of the Navy Including Mutual Assistant Program and International Facilities*, Prepared for Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, January 5, 1954 (mimeo.).

40. House Rept. No. 2104, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 12.

41. U. S. Congress, House Rept. No. 2638, *Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957*, July 7, 1956, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 11-12.

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