of France because they both desired Milan.

It may be argued that the solution (is to construct the international order on the model of domestic arrangements, with compulsory arbitration and an agency with a monopoly of force. But such a solution is [deceptively simple]. In a society of sovereign states, international arbitration can work only if all parties accept [a more pronouncement of justice, not backed by preponderant force - a condition not even realized domestically. If courts did not possess enforcement machinery their verdicts would soon be disregarded; as long as the United Nations is confined to passing resolutions it will settle only the most tractable disputes or persuade only the most tractable Powers. It will be ineffective either on issues which involve a matter of life-and-death of a major Power or against a state prepared to defy its resolution. International arbitration will therefore prove least helpful against the most serious sources of international conflict; a major Power whose notion of vital interest is inreconcilable with that of the remainder of the international community, as is demonstrated by the relative impact of the United Nations resolutions on Egypt and on Hungary.

As for an international force, its inevitable structure would have to mitigate against its effectiveness. In a dispute between the

As for an international force, its unstable structure would
of the United Nations resolutions on Egypt and on Hungary.
of the international community, as it is demonstrated by the relative impact
notion of vital interest is irreconcilable with that of the remainder
most serious sources of international conflict; a major Power whose
International arbitration will therefore prove least helpful against the
of a major Power or against a state prepared to defy its resolution.

be ineffective either on issues which involve a matter of life-and-death
fractible disputes or berande only the most fractable Powers. It will
Nations is confined to passing resolutions it will settle only the most
chinery their verdicts would soon be disregarded - as found as the United
even realized domestically. If courts did not bazeaa enforcement mas-

cement of Justice, not packed by preponderant force - a condition not
tionsal arbitration can work only if all parties acceptably were brouou-
or concordance.

tion is [deceptively simple]. In a society of sovereign states, interna-
sarbitration and an agency with a monopoly of force. But each a solu-
national order on the model of domestic arrangements, with compulsory
It may be argued that the solution is to construct the inter-
of France because they both desired Milan.

This is a technical term, meaning in this sense a non-technical term.

14 (ED)

United States and the Soviet bloc, the other nations can add little to the strength of either contender and therefore add little compulsion to the power already possessed by the protagonists. Thus the United Nations' power of compulsion vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc is no greater than that which the United States is willing to support; if we gear our policy to the willingness to take risks of the other Powers, a vacuum On the other hand, will inevitably be created. (At police force, however, which excludes the major powers will be ineffective for both physical and psychological reasons; it will lack the power to impose its will on the other powers and it will lack the will to use its power. The very quality which make Powers acceptable to arbitration bodies or international police forces, that they have no interest in the dispute, will inhibit their willingness to run risks. There is an inevitable disparity in international bodies between the readiness to pass resolutions and the willingness to back them up, except against a threat so overpowering it obliterates all disagreements about its nature or about the means for dealing with it. These ideas are discussed at greater length in Chapter VII, p. ...)

Thus, at least as long as the international order remains constituted as a society of sovereign states, a Power which renounces the 1. These ideas are discussed at greater length in Chapter VII, p. ...

use of force also surrenders its negotiating position. Even during
periods of greatest harmony, international relations were not conducted
entirely on the basis of good-will; this is the illusion of posterity
which confuses the form with the substance of settlements. It was always
understood that recourse to force was the ultimate pressure during ne-
gotiations. The consciousness of this was one of the factors in the
success of diplomacy, just as the [availability of courts] leads to many
settlements without formal appeal to the [law]. In a society of sovereign
states, moreover, no state can make its survival dependent entirely on
the continued good will of another sovereign state, if only because the
[only guarantee for the will remaining good is not to attempt it by too
great a disproportion of power.] The crucial problem of statesmanship
becomes [xxxv] how to relate the intentions of another power to its potential. If
the international order possessed the sanctions that prevail in domes-
tic arrangements - a system of courts coupled with a monopoly of force -
- international relations could be conducted largely on the basis of
what states assert their intentions to be. end. In exceptional cases,
this has been the case between nations favored by history or by geog-
raphic position, whose notion of vital interests therefore did not con-
flict, such as in our relations with Great Britain or with Canada.

But the usual sanction in an international order composed of sovereign states is the possession of superior force; any adverse change in power relationship involves the possibility that the gain in strength will be used with hostile intent. Throughout its history Great Britain fought innumerable wars to keep Antwerp out of the hands of a major power. These wars were not directed against a hostile intention, but against a hostile potential. They reflected the conviction of British statesmen that the survival of their country depended upon the control of the Narrows and that this was inconsistent with the possession of the mouth of the Scheldte by a major power.

Force and diplomacy are therefore not discrete realms; on the contrary they complement each other; force deals with actual, diplomacy with potential hostility.

This is not to say that force is the only arbiter of international disputes. There have been periods where a community of values and the absence of clashing interests has created the consciousness of harmony which reduced the recourse to force to a minimum. There exist states-to-day with which we share aspirations and dangers so that the settlement by force of such disputes as might arise is inconceivable, and as our relations with Canada and the West European states.

ceivable, and as our relations with Canada and the West European states
that the settlement by force of such disputes as might arise is incon-
existing states to-day with which we share aspirations and dangers so
of harmony which reduced the recourse to force to a minimum. There-
and the absence of clearing interests were created the consciousness
of national disputes. There have been periods where a community of values
This is not to say that force is the only arbiter of interna-
cy with potential hostility.

contrary they complement each other: force deals with actual diplomas
(Force and diplomacy are therefore not discrete regimes on the
of the month of the Scheldte by a major power.)

trol of the Harrows and that this was inconsistent with the possession
statesmen that the arrival of their country depended when on the con-
against a hostile potential. They reflected the conviction of British
power. These were not directed against a hostile intention, but
fought unimpressive war to keep Antwerp out of the hands of a major
be used with hostile intent. Throughout its history Great Britain
would confer the possibility to impose a power's interpretation of
relationship involves the possibility that the gain in strength will

states is the possession of superior force; any adverse change in power
But the usual sanction in an international order composed of sovereign

18

Moreover, we should do everything to extend this pattern of relationships. But we should have no illusion about bringing about a world motivated entirely by the consciousness of harmony. The interest in harmony, particularly in a period of revolutionary ferment increases to the extent that irresponsibility is penalized, just as many citizens are kept from breaking laws by the knowledge of its consequences. And whatever our responsibilities with respect to the rest of the world, we are confronted by two revolutionary Powers, the USSR and China, which pride themselves on their superior understanding of "objective" forces and to which policies unrelated to a plausible possibility of employing force will seem either hypocrisy or stupidity. Because harmony between different social systems is explicitly rejected by Soviet doctrine, the renunciation of force in the face of it will create a vacuum in which the Soviets can move with impunity. Because the Soviets pride themselves on their ability to "see through" the protestations of our peaceful intentions, our only possibility for affecting their actions resides in the possession of superior force. To the extent that the slogan " there is no alternative to peace " is taken seriously by the Soviets, as a statement of American intentions, it will remove a powerful brake to Soviet probing actions and any incentive for the Soviet

ful praxe to Soviet proping actions and any incentive for the Soviet
Sovieta, sa a statement of American intentions, it will remove a power-
slogan: "there is no alternative to peace" is taken seriously by the
resides in the bosessation of superior force. To the extent that the
beaceful intentions, our only possibility for affecting their actions
themselves on their ability to "see through" the protestations of our
which the Soviete can move with impunity. Because the Soviete brida
the renunciation of force in the face of it will create a vacuum on
different social systems is explicitly rejected by Soviet doctrine,
force will seem either hybrisy or atsvidity. Because Harmony between
and to which policies unrelated to a plausible possibility of employing
bride themselves on their superior understanding of "objective" forces
we are confronted by two revolutionary Powers, the USSR and China, which
whatever our reasonebilities—with *x*max respect to the rest of the world,
are kept from breaking loose by the knowledge of its consequencee. And
the extent that irresponsibility is benefited, just so many citizens
mouney, particularly in a period of revolutionary ferment increase to
vasted entirely by the consonance of harmony. The interest in her-
ship? But we should have no illusion about bringing about a world motif
Moreover, we should do everything to extend this pattern of relation-

Union to make concessions. For whatever the horrors of nuclear war
the Soviet leadership has made every effort to retain its militancy.
It has been careful to insist that no technological discovery, however
powerful, could abolish the laws of history and peace was attainable
only after the whole world has become Communist. " We will be bury
you"
Kruschev has said and the democracies would have been spared
much misery but for their penchant on insisting that dictators do not
mean what they say. "Political power" Mao has said grows out of the
barrel of a gun.... Yes we are advocates of the omnipotence of the
revolutionary war which is good and Marxist."

The discussion that nuclear weapons have made war "inconceivable"
has, however, performed this useful purpose: it has drawn attention
to the strategic fact that our weapons technology and the objectives
for employing it have become incommensurable; that we are in dire need
of a strategic doctrine to bring them into harmony. But
the quest for a strategic doctrine is inhibited by the very novelty of
the challenge. Until power is used, it is - as Colonel Lincoln from
West Point has wisely said - what people think it is. But except for
the two explosions of now obsolete weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
no nuclear weapons have ever been set off in wartime; there exists,

2. New York Times

3. Mao Tse Tung, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers 1954),
V. 2, p. 272; for an expansion of these ideas, see below, Chapters VIII,
VIII and IX.

no nuclear weapons have ever been set off in wartime; there exists
the two explosions of now obsolete weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
West Point has wisely said - what people think it is. But except for
the challenge. Until power is used, it is - as Colonel Lincoln from
the quest for a strategic doctrine is inhibited by the very novelty of
of a strategic doctrine to bring them into harmony. To become, the
for employing it have become incommensurable; that we are in dire need
to the strategic fact that our weapons technology and the objectives
has, however, performed this useful purpose: it has drawn attention

The discussion that nuclear weapons have made war "inconceivable"
revolutionary war which is good and Marxian."

3) parallel of a gun.... Yes we are advocates of the omnipotence of the
mean what they say. "Political power" Mao has said grows out of the
much misery put for their penchant on insatiating that dictators do not
you" Krueger has said and the democracies would have been asred
(2) only after the whole world has become Communist. " We will then
triumph of Communism"
bowful, could spoil the law of history and peace was attainable
the 1950s

It has been careful to insist that no technological discovery, however
the Soviet leadership has made every effort to refight its military
Union to make concessions. For whatever the horrors of nuclear war