Letter from E.J.W. Barnes to Henry Kissinger dated August 6, 1964

Personal notes

...Your article is most interesting and I am sure that we are all going to have to give a good deal of thought in 1965 to the structure of the alliance, on both the political and military sides. Whether we can create a political body at the highest level, as you suggest, seems to depend on a number of factors. Would France play? What would those left out say? And so on.

But I think there is much to be said for trying to coordinate Western political and military strategy on a world scale (i.e. bringing in countries who are not members of NATO as necessary). The problem of course is how to do it.

Bringing in countries who are not members of NATO as necessarily). Western political and military strategy on a world scale (i.e.

But I think there is need to be said for trying to coordinate

Would France play? What would those left out say? And so on. level, as you suggest, seems to depend on a number of factors. sides. Whether we can create a political body at the highest structure of the alliance, on both the political and military all going to have to give a good deal of thought in 1962 to the ....... Your article is most interesting and I am sure that we are

Personal notes

Letter from E.J.W. Barnes to Henry Kiesinger dated August 6, 1964

[L.C]

70 PINE STREET
NEW YORK 5

July 17, 1964

Dear Henry,

Thank you for your note and for the
reprint of the article. It was a good one. Here
is where you cash in on your little known study
of the Congress of Vienna. I like your idea of
a new, high-level, political body to concert
policy. Let us hope it will operate with rela-
tive obscurity--at least until viable consensus
on Atlantic purpose and the scope of autonomous
action could be reached.

With kind regards, I am,

Faithfully,

Adolf A. Berle

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, Retired
U. S. Army

One William Street
New York 4, N.Y.

Dear Henry,

I appreciated receiving your article which I have read with considerable care.

While I have long felt that NATO must be changed if it is to survive, I have never felt that we had sufficiently crystallized our own thinking to take the lead. This I still believe. Unless and until our Government is clear as to what it wants in NATO and equally clear as to its political objectives in Europe and its political relation with the west European countries, it can not effectively pursue a policy of change.

I hope we can meet again soon; perhaps in an early New York visit, you can lunch with me.

With warm regards,

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International
Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Letter from Francois de Rose to Henry Kissinger dated July 27, 1964

Personal Notes

... What in the future of Europe after last week's press conference I do not know. I am more and more in the dark. Your article had brought me some comfort, since you analyzed in a clear and dispassionate way the difficulties of international relationship in a nuclear age. I thought that perhaps these difficulties were, more than anything else responsible for our plight. I wonder . . . and I worry because, between you and me, I begin to be genuinely afraid that there is no great idea whatsoever. I cannot see what our future will be if for another eight years we are not capable of constructing anything.

My hope is that I am so stupid that I fail to understand and that one day I shall. But hoping is not believing. There is no satisfactory explanation. And I don't know which is worse. Either to believe that you are governed by someone irrational or by someone so immensely more intelligent than you that you can't follow.

8/4/64

8/4/64

You are governed by someone irrational or by someone so immensely more
explanation. And I don't know which is worse. Either to believe that
one day I shall. But hoping is not believing. There is no satisfactory
My hope is that I am so stupid that I fail to understand and that
amusing.

will be it for another eight hours we are not capable of constructing
that there is no great idea whatsoever. I cannot see what our future
I worry because, between you and me, I begin to be seriously afraid
than anything else reasonable for our flight. I wonder . . . and
nuclear age. I thought that perhaps these difficulties were, more
baseless way the difficulties of international relationship in a
brought me some comfort, since you analysed in a clear and dis-
I do not know. I am more and more in the dark. Your article had
... What in the future of Europe after last week's press conference

Personal Notes

Letter from Francoude de Rose to Henry Klaasinger dated July 27, 1964

June 23, 1964

The Honorable Theodore C. Achilles
Atlantic Council of the United States, Inc.
1616 H. Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

Dear Ted:

I wonder if the strange reluctance of the State
Department to take up the Inter-Governmental Commission
proposal can be explained, at least in part, by the
following passage from the July 1964 "Foreign Affairs"
(page 539):

"The always difficult problem of coalition diplomacy
is magnified by three factors: ............"

"The internal workings of modern government are so
complex that they create a variety of obstacles to
meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it
so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that
they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in
international forums. The tendency of the United
States to confine consultation to elaborating its own
blueprint reflects less a quest for hegemony - as
some of our European critics occasionally assert -
than a desire to avoid complicating still further
its own decision-making process.

What do you think?

I hope you will give consideration to printing Henry
Kissinger's good piece on "Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear
Age" (from which the above is taken) in ACQ. What do you
think of his proposal on pages 544-5?

/T

- 2 -

This bogged down reaching agreement on minute details. There was also the problem of coordinating the position of SACUER and various working groups in SHAPE with the Washington machinery. The problem was discussed from time to time in the Permanent NATO Council with considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the smaller nations that all decisions were being taken by the Four in Washington. However, since those Four had special treaty responsibility for Germany they seemed unavoidable.

All in all, the problem of reaching the consensus without this government is a most formidable one. I nevertheless continue firmly convinced that in the cases where we have presented a partially formulated policy for consultation in the NATO Council it has emerged both a better policy and a more fully accepted one by other governments than in those cases where we have merely expounded a policy which had already been crystalized.

THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, New York 10015

DAVID ROCKEFELLER President

July 17, 1964

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

I have read your penetrating analysis of the troubles of the Atlantic Alliance contained in your article "Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age" in the recent issue of Foreign Affairs. I think you have come close to the heart of the problem when you say that the Atlantic nations need to develop procedures for a common diplomacy, taking account of our differences, as well as our common interest, and that we should be aware of the broad range of alternative means to achieve this result. We should certainly not adhere blindly to a rigid concept of the Alliance which, regardless of its merits at an earlier time, can no longer perform what should be its main function, that is, to retain the adhesiveness within the Atlantic Community to the extent that our underlying goals permit.

You suggest that we should consider creating a new political body at the highest level, composed of the major North Atlantic nations, which could debate and formulate policies regarding the Western position. Yet, the bulk of your analysis shows clearly that what is needed is a fundamental change in thinking--particularly in the U.S., but also in Europe--regarding the nature of the Western coalition. Without such a change it is difficult to see how a new political body could serve a useful purpose, even if it could be formed. And if these changes do come about, might not the necessary degree of cooperation be achieved within the present institutional framework? In any event, I suspect that you would agree that the change in our approach to these problems must precede the attempt to create any new North Atlantic institution.

I wish to thank you for a most thought-provoking essay. It has helped me to clarify my own thinking on this difficult issue.

With best regards,

[LC]

Letter from Ernst van der Beugel to Henry Kissinger dated August 5, 1964

Personal notes

I have read your article in *Foreign Affairs* with complete admiration and nearly complete agreement. I have very rarely seen an article in which so many wise and right things are said.

My agreement is practically complete. There is only one point which you know is one of my hobbies and which is not fully covered by your article. I mean the discrepancy between talking about Europe, European policy, and European attitudes which you do in your first sub-chapters and to the fact that in your last sub-chapter you very rightly point to the fact that Europe is more diversified than is generally assumed and you imply again rightly that all this talk about European strategic and political concepts are a gross-over simplification.

This then leads to the question whether what should be the contents of "some capacity for autonomous military and political European action". I still do not see it and do not desire it, but if you could give me some clarification on this point, we might reach the 100% agreement.