RE: SOVEREIGNTY

[Lc]

A. Re. the Cecil-Requin Draft treaty of mutual assistance

The CID met in May 1923 to examine the Cecil-Requin
Draft and drew up a detailed report.

The CID report is not yet available for study, but
judging by the rejoinder prepared by Cecil, its general
conclusions must have been rather critical... The most
serious CID objection apparently concerned the 'surrender
of sovereign rights'. Cecil's reply was as follows:

If indeed the proposal involves a 'surrender
of sovereignty' it is a risk that must be taken,
and a surrender that must be made ... If the
alternative to such risks and sacrifices is the
continuance of the system of war - and I submit
that broadly speaking it is - there seems to me
no choice. Such risks must be taken and such
sacrifices must be made.*

Although remaining in office until January 1924, the
Baldwin Cabinet never came to any final conclusion on either
the Cecil-Requin Draft or on the amended version that was
circulated after the 1923 General Assembly had met.

David Carlton,
<u>Disarmament and Arms Control</u>,
Vol. 3, No. 2. Autumn 1965,
pp.146+162.

* Cecil Me morandum,
June 6, 1923
Cecil Papers. Add 51103.

GREAT BRITAIN

THE MACDONALD GOVERNMENT

Britain's letter of July 5, 1924 rejecting the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance* illustrates the position of the MacDonald Government toward disarmament policy and the related policy of security.

MacDonald is an active supporter of disarmament (especially, in
naval armaments), but is a cautious observer of security arrangements
(especially, if they unduly increase G.B.'s mutual assistance obligations)
as a pre-condition for disarmament.

* It will be recalled that the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was adopted by the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations on September 29, 1923 in pursuance of its duty under Article VIII of the Covenant to formulate a scheme for the general reduction of armaments. The draft was then sent by the Assembly to the Governments for their consideration.
According to Cecil,

"The basic principle of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance is the conviction that in the present condition of Europe no nation will be prepared to reduce its armaments, and thus diminish the security which armaments are held to confer, unless some other form of security equally definite and equally effective can be assured to it instead.

That alternative security the Treaty claims to provide
by giving every nation the assurance that if it is attacked the
other nations bound by the Treaty will immediately come to its
help against the aggressor.

But this itself does not mean limitation of armaments,
which is the essential object of the Treaty. It does, however, make
limitation of armaments possible, for a State can afford to cut its
armies down if it is known that other armies will be at its side in
the moment of need. The Treaty therefore takes the necessary
further step by laying it down that no State shall be entitled to
claim the benefits of the mutual guarantee unless and until it has
limited its armaments to a scale approved by the League of Nations
Council. Thus the Treaty's two main provisions interlock completely.
There can be no limitation without security, but there will be no
security without limitation."

Right Hon. Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, K.C.
Commentary on the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance,
reproduced by J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, Junr. in Information
on the Reduction of Armaments (1925) pp.77-78.

2

[LC]

J. Ramsay MacDonald stating in the letter of July 5, 1924 Britain's reasons for rejecting the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, asserts at the outset:

> "There is no question to which His Majesty's Government attach greater importance than the reduction or limitation of armaments, for they recognise that, as stated in Article VIII of the Covenant, the maintenance of Peace, which is the principle object of the League of Nations, requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

Nevertheless, he rejects the Treaty of Mutual Assistance as the means to achieve this object:

> "The main criticisms of the proposed Treaty fall under two heads, which may be expressed in an interrogative form: Are the guarantees contained therein sufficient to justify a State in reducing its armaments? Are the obligations to be undertaken towards other States of such a nature that the nations of the world can conscientiously engage to carry them out?"

Regarding guarantees, MacDonald cautions against:

(1) no satisfactory definition of what constitutes an "act of aggression";

(2) delay in applying military pressure by the Council;

(3) increasing guarantee obligations and its relationship to armaments;

(4) the side effects of a system of partial treaties superimposed on a general treaty.

### (1) Re. Aggression:

> "The effectiveness of the scheme will be seen to depend to a considerable extent on the ability of the Council of the League to determine by unanimous vote of all Members concerned in the dispute which nation is the aggressor. This difficult question has to be settled within a period of four days from the notification of hostilities to the Secretary-General. It is unnecessary here to deal at length with the difficulties which might confront the Council in reaching agreement on such a point within the stipulated time, or the likelihood that unanimity might never be reached at all on a really controversial issue.... In this connection, the "Commentary on the definition of a 'case of aggression,' " drawn up by a special committee of the Temporary Mixed Commission in collaboration with certain technical members of the Permanent Advisory Commission, is of great interest. .... It is stated therein more than once that no satisfactory definition of what constitutes an "act of aggression" could be drawn up. Consequently the report does not provide that element of certainty and reliability which is essential if the League of Nations is to recommend the adoption of the Treaty by its Members as a basis for reduction in armaments."

3 [LC]

(2) Re. Timing and Military Pressure:

Problems arise in this area due to MacDonald's con-
viction that "as regards military pressure all the technical experts ...
are agreed that no military assistance can be considered immediate and
effective unless it be given in accordance with a prearranged plan."

MacDonald observes:

It is obvious ... that in the case of a General Treaty
of Assistance plans can rarely be prearranged.

The possibility will always exist that the States
most favourably situated for providing the necessary force may at
a given moment not be in a position to do so, owing to
commitments elsewhere, the state of public opinion, or the
political condition of the country at the time. The appointment of
the higher command will itself involve delay. The Council will have
great difficulty in reaching a unanimous decision, for no nation
places its troops under a foreign command without very careful
consideration. A system which involves prolonged delays before the
first step in bringing military pressure to bear on an aggressor
nation can be taken does not reach that standard of effectiveness
which is essential.

(3) Re. Increasing Obligations and Armaments:

MacDonald states:

The necessary measures to carry the general guarantee
into effect are, moreover, made dependent upon the explicit con-
sent of each individual State which may be called upon to render
assistance as a permanent or ad hoc Member of the Council. This
consideration can but strengthen His Majesty's Government in the
view that the guarantee afforded by the draft Treaty is so precarious
that no responsible Government will feel justified in consenting to
any material reduction in its armaments in return. If, as His Majesty's
Government feel convinced, that is the case, the whole object of the
Treaty is lost and its conclusion is objectless. ... if the
obligations created by the Treaty be scrupulously carried out, they
will involve an increase rather than a decrease in British
armaments. The Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for 1922
stated that "in the case of armed assistance, certain forces, such as
aircraft and warships, are the most readily available, and therefore
the most likely to be asked for and to be effective in the initial
stages of war." It is the considered opinion of the British Naval
Staff that a treaty such as is proposed will, if properly carried
out, necessitate an increase in the British naval forces. His
Majesty's Government cannot avoid the belief that the position will
be the same in the other countries.

(4) Re. Side effects of a system of *partial treaties* superimposed on a *general treaty*:

MacDonald comments:

It has been urged against such partial treaties that
their conclusion by one group of States is likely to bring about

4 [LC]

the formation of competing groups, and that the result will be a
reappearance of the former system of alliances and counter-alliances,
which in the past has proved such a serious menace to the peace of
the world. The proposal to meet this objection by bringing the
partial treaties under the control of the League does not overcome
the difficulty, particularly so long as important nations remain
outside the League, and His Majesty's Government cannot but
recognise the force of the above criticism.

A further objection to the scheme for partial treaties
to be embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance is the opening
that would be afforded for conflict between the Council of the League
and individual Governments. Under Article 4 of the draft Treaty it
will be the duty of the Council to decide which of two belligerents
is the aggressor. Under Article 8, States parties to a partial
treaty will be at liberty to decide the point for themselves, before
it is decided by the Council. The possibility of disagreement between
the Council and States between which a partial treaty is operative
is one which cannot be contemplated with equanimity.

Regarding Increasing Obligations, MacDonald adds:

(1) consideration of "dominion rights";

(2) opposition to giving the Council of the League of Nations
executive functions; prefers that the Council performs merely
advisory function

(1) Re. "dominion rights":

MacDonald points to Canada's rejection of the Treaty
of Mutual Assistance in illustrating the problem arising from a country's
geographical location, its Empire status, and the provision of the Treaty
that action under the General Agreement will, in fact, be confined to the
States of a single continent. He quotes the letter from the Government of
Canada to the Secretary-General of the League, dated June 19, 1923:

> It is intended that the obligation to render assistance
> shall be limited in principle to those countries situated in the
> same part of the globe. While Canada is situated in the North-
> American Continent, she is a nation forming part of the British
> Empire, and it seems difficult to devise a scheme which would give
> due effect to these conflicting considerations.

(2) Re. the _appropriate role of the Council_ of the League of Nations:

Under Article XVI of the Covenant the Council can
only recommend action, while even under Article X it can only advise.
By Article 5 of the draft Treaty the Council are authorised to decide
to adopt various measures. Thus the Council would become an
executive body with very large powers, instead of an advisory body.
In any event, the Council of the League is a most inappropriate body
to be entrusted with the control of military forces in operation
against any particular State or States.

5

[LC]

MacDonald concludes:

For the reasons which have been enumerated, the draft
Treaty, in the eyes of His Majesty's Government, holds out no serious
prospect of advantage sufficient to compensate the world for the
immense complication of international relations which it would create,
the uncertainty of the practical effect of its clauses, and the
consequent difficulty of conducting national policy.

It is the policy of His Majesty's Government that,
whenever a favourable opportunity presents itself, the Governments of
the world should meet in conference with the object of devising a
scheme or schemes for the reduction of armaments. Such a conference
should include the Governments of countries which are not yet Members
of the League, and which are, therefore, not represented at the
Assembly.

Among constructive proposals which have been already
discussed are those defining zones of demilitarisation between States
safeguarding special frontiers under some form of international control,
granting further powers to the International Court, and so on.

J. Ramsay MacDonald,
Letter of Repudiation Sent by H.B.M.'s Govern-
ment to the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations, July 5, 1924

reproduced by J.W. Wheeler-Bennett, Junr. in
<u>Information on the Reduction of Armaments</u>
(1925) pp. 81-89.

N.B. Regarding official status of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance:

1) No state signed the Treaty;

2) 16 States approved of it in principle, included in which were
France, Italy, and Japan;

3) 11 States opposed the Treaty, included in which were G.B., U.S., Germany, and the U.S.S.R.

THE MACDONALD GOVERNMENT

MacDonald maintains that a General Treaty of Mutual Assistance must necessarily include a definition of agression and a test thereof.

MacDonald insists on the necessity of compulsory arbitration as an essential, and the agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration was finally decided upon as the test of agression.

Evidence of this attitude is seen in the Joint Resolution submitted to the Fifth Assembly by the British and French Prime Ministers, and unanimously adopted, September 6, 1924. This Resolution provided the foundation for the Geneva Protocol.

13

[LC]

In a speech before the House of Commons on June 29, 1931, MacDonald states:

This committee (the sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence) and this nation must never get away from the fact which meets them straight in the face as soon as the committee begins to consider disarmament, and that fact is the obligation of disarmament, whether we are going to take interest in this subject or not. This nation and this House must never forget the specific commitments to which our name has already been placed. I will venture to take up the time of the Committee by quoting these commitments in their specific and precise terms. Article 8 of the Covenant provides:

'The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.'

It goes on:

'The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and the circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans of such reduction for consideration and action by the several Governments.'

Then the Treaty of Versailles itself, Part V, says:

'In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval, and air Clauses which follow.'

The section of the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German delegation on the conditions of peace, dated June 16, 1919, says:

'The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it would be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.'

Then in final protocol of the Locarno Conference of October 16, 1925, this further declaration and obligation- it is not merely a declaration, but it is an obligation-is found:

'The representattives of the Governments represented here declare their firm conviction that the entry into force of these treaties and conventions will hasten on effectively the Disarmament provide for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. They undertake to give their sincere co-operation to the work relating to Disarmament already undertaken by the League of Nations and to seek realization thereof in a general agreement.'

If we were trying to get away from those obligations we could not do it.

14

[LC]

MacDonald then asks, "How far have we gone in the meantime since the signing of the Treaty?" After reviewing G.B.'s Army, Navy, and Air Force in terms of statistics based on material, effectiveness and budgetary expenditure, MacDonald states:

> My attention was drawn the other day to a poster -- not published in this country -- declaring that, in disarmament, again, Great Britain is just the old perfidious diplomatist. That is absolutely and maliciously untrue. I again say that they may take a million here or a million there off these figures, especially the money, but it makes no difference at all; the impression that I have given to the Committee is absolutely accurate, and can be sustained right up to the hilt. This country has been swift, patient, and persistent in carrying out what it believed to be its obligations, and which were obligations which it held in common with other nations.

MacDonald adds:

> Let us note that, if that were the whole story, our risks would be far too great, but that is not the whole story. The risk to security which a country runs is not expressed in technical military terms. Indeed, it is very often exactly the opposite that is true -- that the strength of armaments is often the measure of war risk. If the figures quoted stood alone, our risks, as I say, would be uncomfortably great, but they do not stand alone. Military security must always be embedded in and subordinate to political security, and it is very often the case that steps taken to produce military security destroy political security -- that nations, imagining that they are arming themselves to avoid war, are doing nothing of the kind, but are arming themselves to try and secure victory should war break out. In that case they are doing nothing to avoid war at all, but everything to continue both the psychology and the political conditions which all history has shown to be the fruitful sources, and perhaps the only sources, of war.

Regarding efforts aimed at security, MacDonald observes:

> Therefore, if the signature of that Treaty on June 28, 1919, twelve years ago, was to any appreciable extent a fulfilling of that oft-quoted dictum during the War, 'This is a war to end all wars', nations in the interval should not only have been taking steps to secure victory in the event of war breaking out, but they should have been taking steps to prevent war ever breaking out; and the best way to do that is to improve the relations of the countries one with another. Therefore, we have been acting in that direction. The peace securities of Europe, we have believed, can be weakened by armaments, but there is a corollary to that -- that, unless the Disarmament Conference of next year is going to put an end to those expansions which have been so evident in the figures that I have quoted, a declaration is going to be made that disarmament is a failure, and that nations are being doomed to tread the old ruts which have always ended in battles, in ill will, and, cynically, above everything, in a Treaty of Peace that demands war, and war in order to strengthen it.

15

[LC]

Regarding problems of disarmament, MacDonald observes:

> The Pact of Paris, for instance, eliminates war from our diplomacy. It does not seem to eliminate arms. I am sure that is only an oversight, and, when the logical and practical discrepancy is pointed out effectively, the oversight will be admitted by everybody. But still we have to keep our eye upon the oversight. There are certain great forces that we are up against. There is a self-regarding nationalism expressing its nationalist spirit in an exclusive economic policy. There is the nature of peace and there is the problem, the most difficult and intricate of all problems, how you are to readjust, not by force, not by will, not by guile of any kind whatever, but by just allowing ordinary natural processes -- I know that word is a very indefinite one, but the handling must also be indefinite -- how we are to enable a readjustment of a Continent settled by force to be made into one settled and enjoying natural relationships -- that is one of the most difficult, intricate, and dangerous problems that any generation could have to face. The transition is bound to be marked by apprehension, and when movements are made of the most simple common sense, they are bound to arouse fears.

(1) Re. factors contributing to fears:

MacDonald observes:

> Here one may say that a country in the position of France is in a peculiarly attackable position in that respect. We are an island. Let us be fair. Let us be just. Fairness and justness do not consist merely of logic. We must be able to use our imagination, to make our fairness a full measure of fairness and our justice a full measure of justice. These people, invaded again and again and again - their fields flattened by the feet of millions of invading soldiers - no Channel, however thin that trickle may be in view of modern invention and the application of science and research - no Channel, but a line drawn upon the ground is their only frontier. What should we feel like if we were in that position? .... Therefore, while we give our figures and ask for our agreements, and beg for our agreements, and negotiate our agreements, do not let us lose that sympathetic touch which is bound to keep France and us together so long as we have the proper imagination to see what a French woman feels when war is talked about and disarmament is being negotiated. All that we have been doing has been on the assumption that we are secure in peace for a certain period.

MacDonald conclude:

> I am not going to say to-day how long that period (of peace) can be, but I do say this, that assumption, on which the policy of every post-War Government has been founded, ought still to be made. It may be good or it may be bad, but 1932 gives all the nations of the world a chance of laying their heads together and relating their military strengths to their political obligations, and it would be folly on the part of this country, it would be madness on our part, if we did not wait until 1932 came to review the situation as it is then.

Speech by the Rt. Hon. Ramsay MacDonald,
in the House of Commons, June 29, 1931
[Hansard] for June 29, 1931, p.905 et seq.

Reproduced in Documents for 1931, p.55

16

[LC]

Proposals by the United Kingdom Delegation at the Disarmament Conference:

The United Kingdom delegation, while of the opinion that the draft Convention provides the best groundwork on which to proceed, suggests that special attention should be directed to such prohibitions or limitations as will weaken the attack and so remove temptation for aggression, and to methods of warfare which are specially liable to cause injury to non-combatants. In particular it suggests (without attempting to draw up anything in the nature of an exhaustive list) that the following questions should be closely stuided, with a view to the adoption of such proposals as may seem practicable:

1. The most practicable course for limiting the number of effectives;

2. The prohibition of mobile land guns above a certain calibre;

3. The abolition (and prohibition) of submarines as a humanitarian measure;

4. Consideration of the most practical method of reducing the size of men-of-war and the maximum calibre of guns carried by them;

5. The practical examination of the whole problem of bombing from the air in its widest possible form.

The United Kingdom delegation attaches great importance to the maintenance of the provisions of the draft Convention relating to gas and bacteriological warfare, and of those providing for the establishment of a Permanent Disarmament Commission.

Synopsis of Proposals by the United Kingdom cited in Documents for 1932, p. 159
For full text see League Document, 1932, ix. 63, p. 144.

21

[L.C.]

Extracts from a speech by Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons, November 10, 1932 further demonstrate G.B. thinking toward disarmament issues.

(1) G.B. clarification of German demand for "equality of status"

(a) the question of permitted weapons

(b) the question of reorganization of German man-power

"I come to the other and tremendous question of disarmament. Let us come straight to the heart of the question. There is a great question raised which is often expressed in the phrase 'Equality of status'.

Equality of status, as the present German Government understands it and expounds it, involves not one thing but two things, and we must have a clear view about both. It involves, first of all, that to which the hon. Gentleman has referred, the question of the list of permitted weapons, the question of whether the world shall go on on the basis that there are instruments of war forbidden to the defeated Powers and permitted to the rest of the world. That is only one of the two applications of this principle which must be steadily examined. The other claim put forward in the German Note is a claim to reorganize German man-power by, for example, reducing the period of service of their long-service army from twelve to six years, or perhaps less, the establishment of a militia for the training of 40,000 men for three months in each year, together with a number of other things. I am not pronouncing either for or against these things at the moment. What I am saying is that any one who really wants to inform himself or who is going to take part in meetings and discussions, as many of us will be doing in the next few days, about disarmament, ought to have clearly in mind that those two things are involved and not only one; first, the question of the permitted weapons, and, secondly, the question of the reorganization of German man-power."

Simon then refers to the French plan for disarmament and notes that there are at least three significant points of the plan which must be considered.
These points are:

(a) "that the home armies of the different nations of the Continent shall all be based upon the same principle of short-term enlistment"

**Significance:** 1. "French effort to meet German demand for equality"

2. "an admission that the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles are not sacrosanct"

(b) "that pacts of non-aggression shall be negotiated to include European Continental nations, which, owing to their proximity to one another, are more particularly exposed to certain common risks."

**Significance:** 1. G.B. interprets this proposal as excluding her. Simon states: "In particular, we note that the French

22

[LC]

proposals do not, as we understand them, ask from this island
anything further than the engagements we have already entered
into on the basis of the Covenant and the Locarno Treaty. .....
... the French plan is not calling upon us to enter into further
engagements of that sort."

(c) that the signature of the Briand-Kellogg Pact involves a
change in the whole conception of neutrality. That is to say,
if war, as an instrument of national policy, has been outlawed by the
signatories, then, in that case, it can no longer be a matter of pure
indifference to the nations not involved in a future conflict that
an aggressor nation has resort to war (doctrine initiated by
Mr. Stimson)

(2) G.B. thoughts on the French plan, and German demand for equality

1. Re. aim of disarmament

Let me in this connexion first say that, in dealing
with the German claim to equality of rights in the matter
of armaments, as it is presented in the German Note of
August 29, it is very necessary, as it seems to the
Government, to insist that the main purpose of disarmament
is to ensure a lasting peace. Disarmament has other
advantages: it saves money. But, after all, that is the
first and primary object which everybody desires.

2. Re. Allied disarmament; G.B. approves

I have never at any stage hesitated to proclaim that
undoubtedly these limitations imposed upon Germany were
intended to be and were expressed to be the precursor of
the general limitation of armaments.

3. Re. moral as contrasted to legal issue

I aimed at getting rid of a series of merely legal
propositions in order to insist that the principal issue
is a moral and not a legal issue

4. Re. G.B. reduction of armaments

But we have come, as the Lord President of the Council
said last night, to the end of unilateral reduction. If
allowance is made for what has been done by every successive
Government during recent years in this country, we are
ready along with others in an international conference, to
promote drastic and effective reductions yet further.
I do not want to quote figures from other countries, but if
those figures were examined it would be found that there are
some prominent countries where the claim which we are
entitled to make for successive reductions over the last
half-a-dozen years certainly could not be made. I say,
therefore, that we recognize that the limitations which were
imposed upon Germany were intended to be and expressed to be
the precursor of the general limitation of armaments.

23

[LC]

5. Re. how are we to deal with the German claim to equality

Now, when an agreement between the nations of the world for the reduction and limitation of armaments is being initiated, Germany claims -- I think she very naturally claims -- that the methods of limitation which have been applied to her, or which are to be applied to her in the future, should no longer be different in nature from the limitations applied to the other nations. I speak with the authority of the Government when I say that the United Kingdom Government have throughout been ready and anxious to join the other Governments represented at Geneva, including Germany, in framing a Disarmament Convention which would fairly meet that claim.

6. Re. difficulties in meeting Germany's claim

Any hesitation which might arise in any quarter does not proceed from the desire to inflict upon Germany permanent inferiority of status. It is said by extremists here and there, but it is not the general intention. The hesitation has proceeded from anxiety as to the use which might be made of the new situation, and from fear of the resulting dangers which might threaten the tranquillity of Europe. That anxiety may be unfounded, but our Governments would most strongly urge that it is, nevertheless, the highest wisdom to endeavour to remove that anxiety.

7. Re. how to deal with feeling of insecurity

We would suggest that, side by side with the fair meeting of Germany's claim to the principle of equality, the European States should join in a solemn affirmation that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between themselves by resorting to force. The world is entitled to this specific assurance. The acknowledgement by others of the moral right of Germany to parity of treatment with other nations entails upon Germany, along with others, the acceptance of this corresponding obligation. ...I do not associate myself with those who may be tempted to say that an assurance of that sort is not worth having. It is worth having, for the disregard of such an assurance on the part of anybody would mobilize world opinion and domestic opinion to a large extent against the disregard of that assurance.

8. Re. how are we to deal with the German claim to equality, G.B. adds that there are three points to be considered:

(a) the question whether the limitation of Germany's armament in the future is to be contained in some special document which is binding upon her, like a peace treaty, or whether the limitation of Germany's armament is to be expressed in the same document and by the same sort of process as the armaments of others

Our view is that the limitation of Germany's armaments

26

[L]

The Declaration of British Policy expressed on November 17, 1932 in a British White Paper indicates further G.B. thinking on the German claim to equality of rights and how that claim should be met. The Paper reads:

> On the assumption that such an assurance (i.e. that "all European States should join in a solemn affirmation that they will not in any circumstances attempt to resolve any present or future differences between them by resort to force") is given, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that the German claim to equality of rights should be fully met in the following manner:

(1) The limitations on Germany's armaments should be contained in the same Disarmament Convention as that which will define the limitations on the armaments of others; that is to say, the articles in Part V of the Treaty of Versailles which at present limit Germany's arms and armed forces would be superseded, and Germany's limitations would be arrived at by the same process and expressed in the same document as those of all other countries.

(11) The newly expressed limitations in the case of Germany would last for the same period, and be subject to the same methods of revision as those of all other countries.

(111) Germany has declared that she has no intention of rearming and that she merely desires that the principle should be acknowledged that the kinds of arms permitted to other countries ought not to be prohibited to herself. If equality of status is to be conceded, this principle must be acknowledged, and the United Kingdom Government hereby declare their willingness, in co-operation with the other members of the Disarmament Conference, to see it embodied in the new convention. By what means and by what stages this principle can be applied must be the subject of a detailed discussion at Geneva, in which it is essential that Germany should join. In the meantime, the United Kingdom Government wish to emphasize two points. First, the object of the Disarmament Conference is to bring about the maximum of positive disarmament that can be generally agreed - not to authorize in the name of equality the increase of armed strength. Secondly, the full realization, in practice, of the principle of equality cannot be achieved all at once. Confidence in the further application of the principle will grow as it is seen that the peace of the world has been made more secure by taking the first step. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, conceive that what is needed is a practical programme of stages, each subsequent step being justified and prepared for by the proved consequence of what has gone before.

Similar principles should be applied and similar methods should be adopted for arriving at and expressing the limitations which will apply to the armaments of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

Declaration of British Policy, November 17, 1932

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 227.

For full text see British White Paper, Cmd. 4189.

27

[LC]

The British Delegation to the Disarmament Conference presented a complete
Draft Disarmament Convention on March 16, 1933. In presenting the text of the draft,
J. Ramsay MacDonald stated that the British had attempted to fit into the framework
of the Draft Disarmament Convention prepared by the Preparatory Commission a more
comprehensive disarmament scheme.

The British draft proceeded from the assumption of the final condition
declared by the Five-Power Declaration of December 11, 1932. The draft stated final
conditions but assumed a transition period. The transition period was one of practical
accommodation.

The British draft laid down five characteristics of the transition period.

First of all, the period was fixed; it was not indefinite; the
draft suggested five years. The second characteristic was that reductions
in armaments were proposed in order to prove the delegation's bona fides
to the world. The present Conference was not a rearmament conference. The
third characteristic was a proposal for international control, in order
to ensure that the Convention, signed solemnly by all the delegations at
Geneva, would be carried out and not shirked by any. The fourth characteristic
was the setting up of bodies like the Permanent Disarmament Commission to
study further reductions and to try and get solutions for unsolved difficulties.
The fifth was the affording of opportunity for political work for the
purpose of restoring confidence, so that the fears with which the Conference
had had to contend would be removed before its next meeting, fixed for a
few years hence.

One thing it was essential to say. There were figures in the draft.
Nobody had ever tried to produce figures before. And why? Because every one
had been afraid to do so. It was, therefore, a bold step to produce figures:
as a matter of fact, in one respect it had been a gratuitous step. But it
had been necessary that somebody should produce figures before the
delegations could get down to the final decisions on the problems
separating them.

Statement by J. Ramsay MacDonald, March 16, 1933

Reproduced in summary form in Documents for 1933, p. 144.
For full text see Minutes of the General Commission
of the Disarmament Conference, Vol. II, League
Document, 1933, ix, 10, pp.352-7.

28

[LC]

Sir John Simon stated on October 14, 1933

... the Draft Convention which the United Kingdom Government put before the General Commission over six months ago, and which has been unanimously adopted as the general framework for the proposed agreement, will require to be in some respects recast. The Draft Convention is at present drafted to cover a period of five years; the discussions which I am summarizing indicate on the part of some Powers a wish that the period should be extended to perhaps eight years, and, so far as I recall, no serious objection to this extension has been raised.

It was further proposed that this period of eight years should be occupied by the fulfillment of a continuous programme, designed to secure at the end of the period two essential conditions:

(a) A substantial measure of disarmament actually realized and completed on the part of the heavily-armed Powers, and

(b) The achievement of the principle of equality in a regime of security which, ever since December of last year, has been the declared objective, not only of the powers who signed the declaration of December 11, but of the Disarmament Conference itself.

### (1) Re. stages

But in order to attain this it is necessary to proceed by steps. Indeed, the method of stages has from a very early date been adopted as the necessary method by the general vote of the Conference.

... the proposed period of eight years would begin with the transformation of continental armies on the lines set out in the British draft, together with the setting up, through the medium of the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of an adequate system of supervision, so that the sense of security which the due observance of the Convention will afford should provide the groundwork for the practical attainment of the two ideas of disarmament and equality.

#### (a) First stage: perhaps four years

... It is a matter for close consideration to determine how much of eight years would be needed for the initial steps to which I have referred. Transformation of armies involves technical questions which will govern the time limit, and in the meantime a real feeling of confidence should develop when it is seen that the whole plan is agreed to and is in due process of execution. Without binding myself finally to the length of this first stage, I report that the period of four years was mentioned by several governments, though others have raised the question whether it could not be somewhat shortened.

#### (b) Second stage:

... in the second stage of the plan which is equally definite -- the results of the abolition of various kinds of armament and of prohibition against their further use will be to constitute a common list of permitted arms which would become the same for all countries, and thus the differential position of the Powers whose armaments were limited by the Peace Treaties would finally cease. Quantities and other detailed regulation would, of course, be in each case the subject of negotiation and agreement.

Simon concludes:

... By accepting the principle of no immediate rearmament, and co-operating with the rest of us in framing a convention which is best calculated to restore the sense of confidence which has recently been so rudely shaken,

30

[L.C.]

Sir John Simon on November 7, 1933 stated:

> ... It is just over three weeks ago that Germany, for the second time, withdrew from the Disarmament Conference, and this time she has given notice of her intention -- an intention which cannot be carried out for at least two years -- to leave the League of Nations.

Referring to Hitler's plan to dissolve the Reichstag and to hold new elections, Simon maintains:

> ... It is obvious, therefore, that the idea, as has been stated, if it has been in any quarter, that the proceedings at Geneva of the Bureau on October 14 were the cause of the German announcement on that very morning, is manifestly quite untenable. ... the step that had been taken is one that had been taken after very long reflection.

Clarifying, Simon states:

> What can be said, and quite fairly said, about this suggested modification (i.e. the British revised Draft Disarmament Convention) is that it did involve certain portions of the original plan of disarmament being postponed. That is certainly true. It involved that the French, for example, would abandon their big weapons, not at once, but according to some programme or schedule which it was not contemplated would begin to operate immediately and might not operate for three years or four years ....

Explaining Germany's withdrawal, Simon refers to an article in the *Manchester Guardian* on October:

> 'If the decision comes as something of a shock to other countries, that is because Germany was on the point of gaining so much of what had hitherto been denied her. The Treaty of Versailles did not give any undertaking that disarmament by other Powers would follow that of Germany either immediately, or within ant given time. It did exact Germany disarmament in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of all armaments. And now, after too long delays, this was, for the first time, promised to Germany. It was, as Sir Jhon Simon said on Saturday, an essential part of the proposed Convention that it should lay down an actual concrete programme for the abolition of the major arms, which would come into force at the end of the first or preliminary period of three or four years. For the first time France, Poland and Germany's other armed neighbours would have bound themselves in the fetters of legal dates and figures, bringing them towards equality with Germany. The price for Germany was submission to a system of inspection'---

Regarding inspection, Simon states:

> 'and abstention for another three or four years from the major arms. The resentment of the German people that nothing was done for ten years to remove their inferiority of status has long been

31

[Lc]

recognized in this country to be just. But, in the Convention they were asked to accept, the advantages to them enormously outweighed the disadvantaged. Herr Hitler talks of "persecution" at the moment when the spirit of persecution of Germany has gone out of European politics. This is the moment when the Nazi Government has chosen to destroy the whole agreement at Geneva, to secede from the League of Nations, and to complete the moral isolation which the triumph of the Nazi system has gradually brought on Germany.'

Regarding Germany's demand for equality: a political problem

I do not wish to say anything that would make its resumption more difficult, but we must face the central fact as it is. The central political issue is how to reconcile Germany's demand for equality with France's desire about security. Regarded as a direct issue, that is a question between those two Powers and their respective peoples. It is a terrible problem charged with the most potent and persistent of all the historic influences which divide nations. That is memory-- the memory of invasion on the one hand and the fear which it leaves behind, the memory of defeat on the other hand and the resentment and sense of humiliation which it engenders. Can one say that either sentiment is unnatural, and that in like circumstances we should not feel it ourselves? I do not think so, and for that reason the whole of British policy has been directed, not to denying or belittling either sentiment, but in the effort to promote reconciliation between them and to meet the supreme need of the world for peace, by turning the minds of both from the past and inviting their co-operation in the future.

Simon then refers to the British role in international politics

I believe that we have a very special role to play, because it was Britain who brought the parties together and secured the signatures of both for a declaration of equality in a regime of security. .... We have the most urgent national reasons for doing so, if only because the present inequality in armaments affects not only Germany but ourselves, and the very last thing we want to see is a process of rearmament either here or

(1) Re. opposition to isolation

I must be allowed to say a word about isolation. We shall not get out our difficulties by crying isolation when the conditions for isolation have disappeared and cannot exist. We shall not increase our influence for peace by declaring that it does not matter to us what our neighbors in Europe do or do not do. We have an immense moral authority to assert, for Britain has disarmed and has a right to speak. We seek to use that authority in the only way open to us, by making no special or select alliance with or against any Power, but by working for friendship and peace between all......

Simon attempt to clarify the meaning of the Locarno Treaty in answer to opposition to said Treaty:

.... The main instrument is a treaty of mutual guarantee

32

[LC]

between the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, initialled in 1925, on October 16.

This Treaty is not an alliance of British and France against Germany; it is an inclusive agreement in which Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy are all parties. The arrangements made are purely defensive and are supplementary to the Covenant of the League. They do not constitute in any sense an alliance between ceratin Powers directed against other Powers. The signatory Powers severally and collectively guarantee the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, the inviolability of those frontiers, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland.

(1) Re. G.B. obligations under the Locarno Treaty

with one exception, the decision to be taken before the Treaty has operative effect must be taken by the Council of the League. The Council can take no such decision unless it be unanimous, and since the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the Council, it is clear that no decision can be taken without our assent. The one exception that I have mentioned arises if it is alleged that there is a flagrant violation of the undertaking not to go to war, and so forth, by one of the parties. Such a case might be so urgent that there would be no time to take it to the Council, and consequently we are bound to go immediately to the help of the injured party, but we are the sole judges as to whether this obligation has become applicaple, and, of course--- a very important fact--- Italy stands in exactly the same position as we do ourselves.

The House will, therefore, observe that no British Govern-
ment is blindly fettered by the Treaty of Locarno

(2) Locarno as a stabilizing force of Europe

Now Locarno was entered into as a contribution to the stabilizing forces of Europe, and I would submit to the House that Locarno has not exhausted its influence in that respect. We shall not increase the power of those stabilizing forces by announcing that we are completely indifferent whether the events referred to in the Locarno Treaty take place or not. It is the fact that we have pledged ourselves not to be indifferent which exercises restraint and which helps to keep solid the fabric of European relationships, and it provides an argument which we will use to all proper lengths to produce the limitation and reduction of armaments in other countries.

(3) Re. the question whether the obligations of G.B. would be ended if Germany, in two years, carried out intention to leave the League

Do not let us speak to-day as if the march of future events
was beyond the control of men of good will. The view of the
Government, after consulting the Law Officers of the Crown, is that
the withdrawal of any party to the Treaty of Locarno from the
League does not of itself and by itself involve the release of all
parties from their obligations under the Treaty. But the with-
d withdrawal of Germany, if indeed it ever were to become effective,
would raise issues of so far-reaching a character that it would be
impossible to make any public statement upon them without careful
consideration in consultation with the other parties to the Treaty.

Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, November 7, 1933 ; Documents 1933, p.298.
From Hansard, Nov.7,1933, cols.41-63.

33

[LC]

Sir John Simon speaking on November 24, 1933 on a question of procedure.

... There was a view held and expressed ... that notwithstanding this lamentable withdrawal of Germany, and the other circumstances, still the Conference should go on from day to day just as if nothing had happened, with a view to framing a complete Convention, and then should tender it and invite the absentee to sign it. May I submit to the House that, apart from the practicability of that procedure, because, of course, it could only be carried out if you were reasonably sure that you were going to get at every stage agreement from everybody else -- apart from that, is there not ground for saying there may be some doubt as to the wisdom of that procedure?

... the only way in which you can reach general agreement is by the method of negotiation, and not by what I call the method of shots at long range.

Toward reconciling divergent points of view:

... the President (of the Disarmament Conference) made an announcement which was then generally accepted by every member of the Bureau. I will call attention to three features of it. First of all, he announced that the suggestion had been adopted that

'the work of the Disarmament Conference would at this stage best be assisted by parallel and supplementary efforts between various States and the full use of diplomatic machinery.'

The second feature was thus expressed:

'These efforts shall be at once undertaken with energy, with a view to advancing in every way possible the work before the General Commission.'

Thirdly, ... that the Governments -- not merely the great States, but any Government which was able to do so -- should keep the President informed of their efforts, and that they should report to him on the final results of those efforts.

In conclusion, Simon states principles of British Policy:

... I shall endeavour to state in two or three simple propositions the view which we take of British policy in this connexion at this time.... First, the adjournment of the Disarmament Conference does not mean the adjournment of work for disarmament. It means the very opposite. The Government intend that this period of suspension shall be devoted without delay and without intermission to exchanging views between the different Governments, in order ... to prepare the ground on which the Conference can resume its work, ground which at present has been so shaken by Germany's withdrawal. ...

I think it would be useful to add a second. ... the Government consider that these exchanges should be conducted through the diplomatic channels in the form of bilateral conversations. Thirdly, we welcome the assurances of Herr Hitler that Germany's one desire is for peace and that she has no aggressive designs. We hold ... that Germany also has her contribution to make in order to render general disarmament possible in practice.

Finally, Simon refers to international insecurity:

... the fact is that Germany's announcement, not merely that she is going to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference, but that she has in her mind two years hence to withdraw from the League -- that announcement, I

say publicly, is in itself a fact which has increased the sense of insecurity,
for, after all, the League is the great central institution, the full
working of which has been recognized as constituting the essential element
of world security.

Simon states Policy Choice:

... The real facts are that the whole world, looking into this
dark future, sees that the choice is going to be between regulated armament
on the one hand and unregulated armament on the other.

Statement by the Rt. Hon. Sir John Simon, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, November 24, 1933

Documents for 1933, p.316

For full text see Hansard, November 24, 1933, cols.
429-36.

35

[LC]

Baldwin in a speech on November 27, 1933 refers to three possible outcomes of
the disarmament discussions. He states:

The present positions are extremely difficult. The absence of
Germany from Geneva, her notice to leave the League, the notice given by
Japan to leave the League, the knowledge that Germany will not discuss
disarmament at Geneva, all make the position one of extreme difficulty.
I think it is well that we should look at facts, and that we should
realize that there are three possible ends to the discussions that have
been taking place. You may have a disarmament of all countries to the level
of existing German armaments; you may have a limitation of armaments at a
point which excludes all large offensive weapons. Their size and quality are very
known to those who are familiar with the technical discussions. In that
event, you would have the heavily-armed nations disarming to a point.
You would have Germany in time rearming to that point. The third alternative
is competition in armaments.

Those are the three possibilities. What I say then is that in no
circumstances must that third alternative be reached.

Speech by Rt. Hon. Stanley Baldwin,
November 27, 1933

Documents for 1933, p.322.

For full text see Hansard, November 27, 1933.

Cols. 650-2.

36

[LC]

The Memo of G.B. on Disarmament dated January 29, 1934 reasserts:

> ... His Majesty's Government must reassert the main objective to which all proposals on this subject are directed. That objective is, as Article 8 of the Convention declares, the maintenance of peace. Even though increase of armed strength may be actuated by reasons of defence, it is an index of fear of attack from another quarter, and a measure of the alarm and disquiet existing between peoples. Conversely, a general agreement securing the limitation of armaments at the lowest practicable level would be the most effective and significant proof of international appeasement, and an encouragement of the mutual confidence which springs from good and neighbourly relations. Consequently, His Majesty's Government regard agreement about armaments not as an end in itself, but rather as a concomitant of world peace and as an outcome of political amelioration. For this reason, they have always acknowledged the relation between the conception of equality of rights on the one hand, and of security on the other. For the same reason, they welcome the indications that Herr Hitler's recent proposals, whatever may be said of their precise content, are concerned not only with technical questions of armament, but with political guarantees against aggression.

> It follows from the above considerations that agreement is most likely to be reached on a broad basis which combines regulation of armaments with assurances in the political field. Protracted debates on disarmament in its limited and purely technical aspect can lead to no conclusion, unless wider considerations touching the equality and the security of nations are borne in mind and provided for.

### (1) Re. rearmament

> It should not be overlooked that the scheme of the Draft Convention itself involves some degree of rearmament for those States whose armaments are at present restricted by treaty. Germany, for example, in view of the numerical increase proposed in her effectives, would need larger quantities of such weapons as she is already entitled to possess. And this is not all. His Majesty's Government have more than once publically stated that an inter-national agreement based on the admitted principle of equality of rights in a regime of security necessarily involves that, within stages provided for by such an agreement, the situation must be reached in which arms of a kind permitted to one State cannot continue to be denied to another. His Majesty's Government ... are convinced that the best prospect for the future peace of the world would be afforded by an agreement which recognizes and provides for this parity of treatment, while it abolishes or reduces to the lowest possible level all arms of a speciall offensive character, and provides by the most appropriate means available for a greater sense of security. So far as Europe is concerned, a reconciliation of the points of view of France and Germany is the essential condition of general agreement

### (2) Re. two choices for future disarmament policy

> ... These two choices are:

(1) To reach agreement in a Convention which will involve the abandonment of certain classes of weapons by the most heavily-armed Powers.

(2) To reach agreement on the basis that the most heavily-armed Powers are unable or unwilling to disarm, but that they will undertake not to increase their present armaments.

> The second course is the one which is indicated in certain quarters as the most that can be hoped for. But His Majesty's Government cannot con-

template as acceptable a conclusion which, though it would provide for a
limitation of armaments, would do nothing whatever to secure their reduction.
His Majesty's Government, therefore, would earnestly press upon other
Governments that the first course, which they most strongly prefer and
regard as more in accord with the main object to be attained, should not be
abandoned, but should be actively pursued.

(3) Re. Disarmament, Security and Equality

His Majesty's Government conceive that international agreement in
the matter of armaments can only be reached by making adequate provision under
the three heads of (a) security, (b) equality of rights, (c) disarmament.
These three topics were all dealt with in the Draft Convention ....

In conclusion, the Memo states:

If agreement is secured and the return of Germany to Geneva and to
the League of Nations brought about (and this ought to be an essential
condition of agreement), the signature of the Convention would open a new
prospect of international co-operation and lay a new foundation for inter-
national order.

Memo of the United Kingdom Government on Disarmament,
January 29, 1934

Documents for 1934, p.360.

For full text see British White Paper, Cmd. 4512
(January 31, 1934)

5

[Lc]

Proposals by the German Government at the Disarmament Conference:

The principles governing the general reduction and limitation of armaments, which the Conference is called upon to lay down, must be equally applicable to all Members of the League and to all countries associating themselves with the League's action for disarmament.

The draft Convention by reason of omissions and defects is unacceptable to the German Government.

The German Government submits certain proposals indicative of its opinion:

## 1. LAND FORCES

### A. Personnel

(1) The personnel of the land forces shall generally be recruited only by means of voluntary enlistment.

(2) Should this solution prove to be unacceptable to the Conference and should, in consequence, the choice of their military system be left to the decision of the countries themselves, it will be necessary, in the case of conscript armies, to make adequate allowance for trained reserves, which are known to constitute the main part of armies in case of war, and to include these trained reserves in the general reduction.

(3) Due regard must be had in any case to the special circumstances of States having a militia system.

(4) The number of officers should be fixed at the lowest possible figure for all countries alike in terms of a percentage of the total effective strength of the armies, and that figure must not be exceeded.

(5) Police forces, gendarmerie, and similar organizations must be limited and subjected to provisions excluding their utilization for military purposes.

..................

6 [LC]

## 2. NAVAL FORCES

### A. Material

(9) The maximum tonnage of the various types of vessels shall be reduced simultaneously with a proportional reduction of the total tonnage. No vessel of war shall, in future, exceed 10,000 tons nor carry guns of a calibre of more than 280 mm.

(10) The maintenance of both naval and land air forces being prohibited under Chapter III, the maintenance of aircraft carriers is likewise generally forbidden.

(11) Submarines shall be abolished and forbidden.

(12) The following 'definitions' shall apply to all vessels except special ships or vessels exempt from limitation:

(a) Capital ships: vessels of war whose displacement exceeds 6,000 tons standard displacement or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 150 mm.

(b) Cruisers: vessels of war exceeding 800 tons of standard displacement or the calibre of whose guns exceeds 105 mm.

(c) Destroyers: vessels of war whose standard displacement does not exceed 800 tons and the calibre of whose guns does not exceed 105 mm.

(13) The non-floating material shall be fixed for each country both as regards categories and quantities.

### 4. GENERAL CLAUSES

#### C. Expenditure

(23) In conformity with the obligations of the Members of the League embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant, to exchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, this exchange must also extend to expenditure for armaments.

**Observation.** The German delegation are of opinion that the numerous deviations from the solid basis of the gold standard which have recently occurred are going to bring about such a decisive and unforeseen change in purchasing power that, for the time being, the method of financial limitation can not be used as an effective measure of disarmament. Under the present economic and monetary circumstances, the application of this method would give rise to continual derogations which would seriously interfere with the steady advance of the process of contractual disarmament. Moreover, the establishment of a common plan for financial limitation would be attended by extraordinary difficulties owing to the great differences which are at present existing in the various countries as to the stocks of material in hand. On the other hand, regard must be had to the fact that any really effective direct disarmament would be automatically accompanied by the indispensable decrease of the heavy financial burdens under which the nations are suffering owing to the exaggerated level of armaments.

8

[LC]

Extracts from a Broadcast Address by General von Schleicher,
Berlin, July 26, 1932 indicate German attitudes toward

(1) Re. the notion of security: French as contrasted to German-

In my short statement to the Army on taking office as
Defence Minister, I express my intention of devoting my efforts
to enable the Reichswehr in future to fulfill its task of
protecting Germany's frontiers and guaranteeing her national
security. This reference to the future has given offence to one
section of the Left. It has been said that in the past everything has
been done to this end. This has honestly astonished me.

The naked fact is that no other European land possesses in so small
a degree the security for which, paradoxical though it sounds,
precisely the strongest military Power in the world incessantly
clamours. The Minister Stresemann, to whom one can scarcely
attribute any bias against the land of his negotiating partner
Briand, has in the Reichstag describe this attribute of our
western neighbor as 'hypocrisy', and I think there are few Germans
who would disagree with him. But sometimes in French, also, the
cat is let out of the bag. For instance, the rapporteur of the French
budget, describing a visit to the new French fortifications,
said: 'France's now completed fortifications stand unexampled in
history.... The German army, no matter how mighty, courageous,
and tenacious it might be ( unfortunately it is only courageous and
tenacious, but not mighty) would break in pieces on such a defensive
system.... Our network of fortifications thus gives complete
security (I repeat, 'complete security') against an invasion
like that of 1914.'

(2) Re. ways of increasing German security-

How can Germany obtain security? Theoretically, there are two
ways:

1. The other Powers could disarm to Germany's level, as they are legally and morally bound to do. After the course taken by the Disarmament Conference to date, few people in the world would believe in such a miracle. Lloyd George himself has said: 'The military and naval experts have been only too successful in diverting the Conference from the great aims and putting bargains and formulas in the place of great decisions with the hidden aim of preventing real progress.'

2. We can attain this security if we so organize our armed forces - by reorganization, not extension ( umbauen, nicht ausbauen) - that they would give at least a certain degree of security, and I wish, in connexion with the German declaration at Geneva, to leave no doubt that we shall take this course if full security and equality of rights are further withheld from us. I well know that timid spirits will point to our serious financial situation. My answer to these critics is that a modern army, capable to some extent of fulfilling its tasks, is not more costly than the army of the Versailles 'dictate', which by regulations that were in part quite senseless compelled us to useless and unproductive expenditure.

Broadcast Address, July 26, 1932

Frankfurter Zeitung, July 27, 1932

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 184.

9

The Final Declaration of the German Government on the July Resolution, dated July 22, 1932 illustrates Germany's insistence on Conference acceptance of "equality of rights" between nations. The Declaration reads:

... its (Germany's) collaboration is only possible if the subsequent work of the Conference is based on a clear and definite recognition of the equality of rights between nations.

Equality of rights is the fundamental principle upon which the League of Nations and the community of States in general is founded. If the Conference wished to establish rules and principles for the general disarmament of States, at the same time excluding Germany or other States from those general rules and principles and subjecting any State to discriminatory treatment, such an attitude would not be compatible with sentiments of national honour and international justice. It would also be contrary to Germany's contractual rights, which she could not renounce. The German Government finds, to its profound regret, that the present resolution does not take these views into account.

The German Government considers that this uncertainty in regard to one of the fundamental questions of the problem of disarmament renders any useful work impossible. It must therefore urge that these doubts be eliminated by a recognition, without further delay, of the equality of all States in the manner of national security and the application of all the provisions of the Convention.

However the German Government must point out at once that it cannot undertake to continue its collaboration if a satisfactory solution on this point, which for Germany is a decisive one, is not reached by the time the Conference resumes its work.

Final Declaration of the German Government on the
July Resolution, July 22, 1932

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 183.

For full text see League Document, 1932, ix.64, p.188.

10

[LC]

The German Aide-Memoire of August 29, 1932 indicates German thinking on disarmament and related issues:

> It (the German Government) is of opinion that a confidential discussion between the German and French Governments, in which the standpoints and wishes on either side are presented with complete frankness, is the best means for achieving an understanding. If the French Government is ready for such a confidential discussion, the two Governments, naturally, are at liberty to inform, in an appropriate manner, the other principal Governments concerned, in particular the British, Italian, and American Governments; and at the proper time to ask them to participate in the negotiations.

(1) Re. German rejection of the General Commission's Resolution of July 23, 1932

> The attitude of the German delegation towards the General Commission's Resolution of July 23 was determined exclusively by the reason inherent in the matter itself, and was unavoidable. The Resolution lays down important points for the ultimate Disarmament Convention, and this in a manner which already permits of the realization that the Convention in the reduction of armaments will remain extradiginally far behind the Treaty of Versailles.

> The German Government, seeing the task of the Conference, in view of this Treaty and the legal and political reason often explained by it, as a much more radical disarmament of all countries, for this reason alone was unable to vote for the Resolution. However, yet another viewpoint was added. In fact, the decisions had no meaning whatsoever for Germany. For, despite the discrepancy between the disarmament scheme envisaged by them and the scheme of the Treaty of Versailles, the question as to whether the decisions taken are also to be applied to Germany remained open in the Resolution. So long as this question is not clarified, collaboration by the German delegation in the future discussions on the ultimate regulation of the individual points of the disarmament problem is impossible.

(2) Re. German claim to equality of rights: methods and extent of disarmament

> ... the Resolution of July 23, 1932 immediately raised the question of principle, which in the discussion hitherto has been characterized as the question of Germany's equality of rights. Germany has maintained her claim to equality of rights from the beginning of the Disarmament Conference, and has repeatedly explained the meaning and import of this claim, not only within the framework of the Conference negotiations itself, but also through diplomatic channels and in non-official conversations between representatives on both sides. In order to avoid any misunderstanding in this respect, the following resume will explain once more what Germany understands by equality of rights and how she interprets the practical realization of this principle.

11

[LC]

It must be said in advance in this connexion that, with the
radical manner of general disarmament desired by the German
Government, there are no provisions which Germany would reject
because of the import of the obligation inherent in them, if the
general scheme to be established by the Convention were applied
to all States. Accordingly, Germany has always demanded that the
other States disarm to a level of armaments which, considering
the special conditions of every country, corresponds in manner and
measure to the state of armaments imposed upon Germany by the
Treaty of Versailles. In this way Germany's claim to equality of
rights would be met in the simplest way. Much to its regret, however,
the German Government was bound to realize from the Resolution of
July 23 that the Convention will correspond neither in the methos nor
in the extent of disarmament to the example of Versailles.

(3) Re. Germany's comments on how to pave the way(by the first Convention) for the necessary equalization of armaments and the realization of national security for all States

... three elements of regulation can be distinguished, namely, (1) the juridical form of regulation; (2) the duration of its validity, and (3) its material content. It is obvious that, with reference to the first two elements, only one solution is possible. The juridical forms as well as the duration of validity of treaty obligations in the future must be the same for Germany as for all other States. If a distinction were affirmed to the detriment of Germany in these two points, then this would mean that Germany in the sphere of armaments would have to continue to play the rôle of a second-rate State. Thus the solution can be only this, that the Disarmament Convention replaces Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, and that with reference to its duration of validity, as well as with reference to the legal state after its expiration, no special provisions are valid for Germany.

(a) Re. "material content"

In contrast to the first two elements of regulation, the
material content of this regulation provides room for negotiations.
However, the German Government cannot forego this, that in the
Convention Germany's right to a state of armaments corresponding
to her national security finds expression in an appropriate
manner. It is ready, however, to content itself, for the duration
of the first Convention, with certain modifications of its state
of armaments, because it is of opinion that upon the expiration of
the first Convention, a second Convention must follow, going much
further in the reduction of the armaments of the heavily armed
States and thus better meeting the German standpoint regarding the
disarmament question. In order to give a picture of what measures
come under consideration for the re-organization of the German
military estallishment, the German Government would like to explain
below a few principal points.

12

[LC]

(b) Re. qualitative disarmament

In the sphere of qualitative disarmament, the German
Government is ready to accept every prohibition of weapon which
will be equally effective for all States. On the other hand, those
categories of weapons which are not generally prohibited by the
Convention, would also have to be permitted to Germany in principle.

(4) German claim to the right of re-organizing its military system

As regards the military system, the German Government
must also claim for itself the right of all other States so to
shape it within the framework of the generally valid provisions
that it meets the needs as well as the economic and social
peculiarities of the country. On the one hand, it is here a question
of changes in organization as, for instance, gradation of the active
period of service of long-service troops and the free distribution
of effectives; on the other hand, of short-term training of a special
compulsory militia for purposes of maintaining internal order, as
well as for frontier and coastal protection.

(5) German comments re. French demand for security

In recent declarations of the French Premier, precisely
in connexion with the question of German equality of rights, the
importance of the security question for France has again been
emphasized. The German Government can hardly take a stand in this
respect, as it does not know the extent of the wishes of the French
Government. However, the German Government will always be ready to
discuss plans which serve to strengthen security for all States in
like manner.

The German Aide-Memoire concludes:

It will materially contribute to the elimination of the
existing tension and to the appeasement of the political conditions,
if the military discrimination against Germany, which the German
people feel as a humiliation, and which at the same time prevents
the establishment of a peaceful equilibrium in Europe, shall at
last disappear.

German Aide-Memoire, August 29, 1932,
Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 185-

For text see *The Times*, September 7, 1932

13

[L.C.]

A letter from the German Foreign Minister, C. von Neurath to the President of the Disarmament Conference, September 14, 1932 indicates German *rejection* of the invitation to attend the session of the Bureau of the Conference which is to begin on September 21, 1932. Reasons for rejection include:

(1) Germany's insistence of equality of rights in disarmament

In the course of the discussions of the General Committee (of the Disarmament Conference), which led up to the adoption of the Resolution of July 23, 1932, the head of the German delegation indicated the reasons for which the German Government was unable to accept the Resolution in question. He pointed out that in view of the stage reached by the discussions of the Conference the question of equality of rights of the disarmed States could no longer remain without a solution. On that occasion he accordingly declared that the German Government could not take part in the further labours of the Conference before the question of Germany's equality of rights had been satisfactorily cleared up.

The Resolution having been adopted, nevertheless, it is clear even now that the future Disarmament Convention will fall far short of the system of disarmament laid down by the Versailles Treaty, and will differ therefrom essentially as regards both the form and the manner of the disarmament.

(2) Germany's concern regarding the application of the disarmament scheme

The question of how the future regime is to be applied to Germany thus becomes a matter of direct and immediate importance. It is obvious that unless this question is answered no settlement of individual concrete points of the disarmament problem is possible.

(3) Germany's demand for Conference acceptance of the German thesis re. disarmament

In the German Government's view only one solution can be considered -- namely, that all States should be subject to the same rules and principles in respect of disarmament, and that no discriminatory exceptional system should exist in the case of any one of them. Germany cannot be expected to take part in the negotiations with regard to the measures of disarmament to be laid down in the Convention, until it is established that the solutions which may be found are also to apply to Germany.

In conclusion, von Neurath states:

.... In these circumstances I find myself compelled, to my regret, to inform you that the German Government is unable to avail itself of the invitation to the session of the Bureau of the Conference which is to begin on September 21, 1932.

Letter from C. von Neurath to the President of the Disarmament Conference. September 14, 1932
Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 198.

For full text see The Times, Sept. 17, 1932.

14

[LC]

Herr von Papen, German Chancellor, in an interview of September 27, 1932 clarifies German thinking on disarmament and related issues.

(1) German intentions re. disarmament as contrasted to rearment

The question is not German rearment, but the fulfilment of the disarmament promise of the other Powers. There is no question of German rearment, but of German equality of status and the treatment of Germany at the Disarmament Conference on footing of equality.

The Disarmament Conference was summoned and opened without reservation in regard to Germany's equality of status. Six years ago Germany was admitted into the League of Nations without any such reservation. Even at Versailles, where the victorious Powers did not hesitate to impose upon Germany the most monstrous terms, nobody dared to demand the lasting disqualification of Germany in the military sphere. Now the development of the last decade, which tended towards the return of international relations to the normal, is to be reversed, and the status of a nation with inferior rights imposed upon Germany. Naturally we cannot put up with that.

(2) German concern regarding the application of the disarmament scheme

The question which has been raised and which has found no answer either in British or French opinion is as follows: What is the application of these decisions to Germany? We ask, of course, that the Disarmament Convention, for which the world has already been waiting for so long, be applicable to us equally as to all other States.

(3) German claim to equality

... we -- naturally within the framework of the Convention - demand the same liberty to adjust our armaments to our social and national needs as is possessed by every other country. We have offered to negotiate in regard to the manner and extent of this adjustment. We demand, further, that the same yardstick be applied to us in the matter of armament factors as to others. At Versailles the view was put forward that certain weapons which were forbidden us at that time were aggressive weapons. To-day it is sought to pronounce them defensive weapons, but still to forbid us to have them, that is to say, theoretically to deny us equality, and practically to limit our right to defence.

(4) German aim re. armament

We are striving for the equalization of armaments by means of a reduction of the general level. Time and again we have declared that any limitation of armaments whatsoever meets with our approval as long as it is applied to all countries, and that in no respect can the Disarmament Convention go too far for us. The Gramat speech (delivered by M. Herriot) proves anew the desire to use two different yardsticks.

..................

15

[LC]

Germany has never demanded rearmament up to the level of her neighbours, but disarmament throughout Europe and the whole world, and equality of treatment in the methods of disarmament and the assessment of the factors of armament. Equality of status and equality of treatment alone can bring about a relief in the tension between the nations; they are the only foundation of peace and of that moral disarmament of which so much is heard. What is at stake here is the fundamental rights of the nations, which no country may deny to another.

(5) Re. the German legal argument

I do not intend to go into the legal arguments of the French and British Governments, because they seem to me absolutely untenable. We base our claims not least upon Article 8 of the Convention of the League of Nations, which those Governments also quoted. But we demand that its provisions should also apply in equal measure to all countries, and consider it absolutely impossible that within the Commonwealth of the League the rights of nations should be divided into two different categories.

(6) German observation re. French disarmament

France certainly demobilized her field army a few years after the War, but what has happened is reorganization rather than armament reduction, which shifts the weight of the French Army to the reserves and material. Is it, perhaps, evidence of disarmament that French military expenditure has risen 100 per cent. in six years? It is no good to compare the number of men with the colours when the real value of France's mighty Army lies in the mobilizable reserves and its technical material, such as heavy guns, tanks, aeroplanes and so on.

(7) Re. question of German "gratitude and ingratitude"

Gratitude for the wiping out of reparations would have been in place if this had been done a year ago and the generous moratorium proposal of President Hoover had had its fullest effect upon the world economic crisis. At Lausanne our creditors merely drew the consequence from an untenable situation. And nobody has thanked Germany for her sacrifice of three billion marks offered by her in the interests of understanding, international co-operation and European economic recovery. Gratitude for the evacuation of the Rhineland can be expected only by those who are unable to imagine anything about the sufferings of the German people under the régime of an enemy occupation.

Reproaches of such a nature do not further the reorganization of political conditions. What is necessary thereto is the will towards understanding, the will to respect the rights of others, and in this case quite particularly, the will to actual and extensive disarmament.

Interview given by Herr von Papen to the Wolff Agency, September 27, 1932

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 205.
For full text see translation published by Volkerbund, No.31, October 7, 1932

23

[LC]

In a Broadcast speech delivered on October 14, 1933, Adolf Hitler

stated:

No war can be a permanent state of mankind. No peace could perpetuate a state of war. A time must come when victor and vanquished must find their way to common understanding and mutual trust. For fifteen years the German people have waited in the hope that when the war ended an end might also come to hatred and hostility. The object of the Peace Treaty of Versailles appears to be not to bring lasting peace to mankind, but rather to perpetuate hatred forever.

The results were inevitable. When right definitely yields to might, a permanent state of insecurity results which destroys and hinders all normal functions in the life and intercourse of nations. When the Treaty was concluded it was forgotten that the reconstruction of the world could not be effected by the forced labour of an oppressed nation, but only by the trustful co-operation of all, and that the primary condition for this co-operation was the destruction of the war psychosis. It is clear that the problematical question of war guilt cannot be settled historically by the victor compelling the vanquished to sign a confession of guilt in the Preamble of a Peace Treaty, but that the ultimate war guilt can better be established from the contents of the dictated treaty itself.

## (1) Re. Germany's peaceful intentions

... As a National-Socialist, I, with all my followers, refuse by reason of our national principles to acquire by conquest the members of other nations, who will never love us, at the cost of the blood and lives of those who are dear to us.

It would be a great day for all humanity if these two nations of Europe (Germany and France) would banish, once and for all, force from their common life. The German people is ready to do so. While claiming boldly those rights which the Treaties themselves have given us, I will say as boldly that there are for Germany no grounds for territorial conflict. When the Saar territory has been restored to Germany only a madman would consider the possibility of war between the two States, for which, from our point of view, there is no rational or moral ground. For no one could demand that millions of men in the flower of youth should be annihilated for the sake of a readjustment, indefinite in scope, of our present frontier.

### (a) Re. Germany's non-military police forces

When the French Premier asks why German youth is marching and drilling, then I reply that it is not in order to demonstrate against France, but to give effect to that political training of the will which was necessary for the overthrow of Communism and which will be necessary to keep Communism in check. In Germany there is only one body that bears arms and that is the Army. On the other hand, National-Socialist organizations know only one enemy and that is Communism.

### (b) Re. weapons

... The demand of the German nation and the German Government has not been for weapons, but for equality of rights. If the world decides that all weapons are to be abolished down to the last machine gun, we are ready to join at once in such a Convention.

24

[LC]

(2) Re. Germany and the League of Nations

... Former German Governments entered the League of Nations confidently and with the hope of finding there a forum for the fair adjustment of national interests, and above all for honourable reconciliation between former opponents. But the essential condition was the recognition of the equality of rights of the German people. With the same condition Germany participated in the Disarmament Conference. For an honour-loving nation of 65,000,000 people and a Government with no less a sense of honour, this degradation to the rank of a member without equal rights, in such an institution and such a conference, is a humiliation not to be borne. The German Government has more than fulfilled its disarmament obligations. It is now the turn of the armed States to carry out their pledges to the same degree. The German Government did not take part in the Conference in order to haggle for a few guns or machine-guns, but to co-operate as a member with equal rights in the general pacification of the world.

(3) Re. Germany and security

Germany has no less a right to security than other nations. If the British Minister, Mr. Baldwin, maintained it as self-evident that, for England, disarmament could be understood only to mean the disarmament of the more highly armed Powers simultaneously with the rearament of England up to a common level, then it would be unfair to overwhelm Germany with reproaches if she decided to stand out for the same point of view as a member of the Conference with equal rights.

(4) Re. Germany's rejection of the League of Nations

Germany cannot tolerate the deliberate degradation of the nation by the perpetuation of a discrimination which consists in withholding the rights which are granted as a matter of course to other nations. In my peace speech last May, I stated that under such conditions we should to our regret no longer be in a position to belong to the League of Nations or take part in international conferences.

Since it has been made clear to us from the declarations of the official representatives of certain great Powers that they were not prepared to consider real equality of rights for Germany at present, we have decided that it is impossible in view of the indignity of her position, for Germany to continue to force her company upon other nations. Threats of force could, if put into practice, only amount to breaches of international law. The German Government is profoundly convinced that its appeal to the whole German nation will prove that the Government's desire for peace, as also its conception of honour, represent the views of the whole nation.

(5) Re. German elections

... I have decided to request the President of the Reich to dissolve the German Reichstag and by means of fresh elections, combined with a referendum, to give the German people the opportunity of making an historic declaration, not only in the sense of approving the Government's principles, but also in that of an unconditional association with them.

Broadcast Speech by Herr Adolf Hitler,

October 14, 1933

Reproduced in Documents for 1933, p. 289.

For text see *Frankfurter Zeitung*, October 15, 1933

[LC]

The French Memo of July 15, 1931 indicates principles and methods of French policy regarding the limitation of armaments. It reads:

The general principles to be followed in the reduction and limitation of armaments were laid down both by Article 8 of the League Covenant and by Part V of the Peace Treaties.

By subscribing to Article 8 of the Pact, the Members of the League of Nations recognized 'that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations'.

They agreed, moreover, that the Council of the League of Nations, 'Taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State should formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments'.

Article 8 of the Covenant is therefore based upon two fundamental conceptions which it is important to emphasize.

(1) Re. the idea of 'common action'

In a system of international solidarity like that of the League of Nations each State must have sufficient armaments to protect itself against aggression until this "common action" can begin to function : if left to its own unaided resources, a State, unlawfully attacked, must be sufficiently armed not to be overwhelmed before having had time to mobilize the whole of its national forces. It will therefore be possible for the reduction of armaments to be the more substantial in proportion as the setting in motion of the contemplated "common action" is less uncertain and likely to be more prompt; (for this reason, successive Assemblies have urged since 1922 that such mutual assistance should be "immediate, effective, and in accordance with a prearranged plan (Resolution XIV, 1922), if it be desired that "every State should be sure of not having to provide unaided for its own armaments, and should be able to rely also upon the organized collective action of the League of Nations" (Resolution V, 1927)).

Viewed from this angle, the limitation of armaments, in conjunction with the development of the systems for the peaceful settlement of disputes and with mutual assistance, is a means of organizing peace. But, in order that it may be carried into effect, the principle of common action must supersede in the minds of the nations that of individual defence. It imples that the League is considered by them as a living reality, invested with positive responsibilities and possessed of effective power.

(2) Re. the idea of security as related to disarmament

... the second essential idea upon which it is based -- Article 8 of the Covenant clearly states that the point below which national armaments cannot be reduced depends upon the degree of security enjoyed by the nation concerned.

A proper estimated of this safety must take into account not only the manner in which the 'common action' of the League will operate, but also the geographical situation and circumstances of each nation.

2

[LC]

(a) notion of diversity

Article 8 of the Covenant therefore clearly lays down the principle that, as regards the reduction and limitation of armaments, there can be no hard and fast rules; the armaments of each State constitute an aggregate which must necessarily be adapted to its own particular case; the notion of diversity governs the work to be undertaken. Any levelling or automatic equalization of forces is, for this very reason, excluded *a priori*, for equality of armaments as between two States would only be justifiable in the unlikely event of their geographical situation and circumstances being identical.

(b) notion of "one fixed element"

In the midst of this diversity, there is, however, one fixed element which is supplied by Part V of the Peace Treaties in close conjunction with Article 8 of the Covenant.

The aim and purpose of Part V of the Treaties is indeed to lay down a definite standard for the armaments allotted to four Powers, which have formally pledged themselves to observe its military, naval, and air clauses.

By thus determining a certain standard of forces for the use of these four Powers, the framers of the Treaties make it clear that their purpose was to 'render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations'.

Clearly, therefore, it is in relation to the armaments allotted by the Treaties to certain nations that it will be possible to prepare the limitation and reduction of the armaments of other nations.

It follows that the strict observance of the standards of forces thus laid down is one of the essential prerequisites of the limitation of armaments.

(c) notion of "inequality of armaments" which France favors; the Memo reads:

It by no means follows, however, that the Member States or the League, whose standards of forces have not been expressly defined by the Treaties, are under the obligation of adopting either the methods or the figures laid down in Part V of the Peace Treaties as regards the general limitation of armaments.

When the Treaties were framed, at no time and at no place was the argument advanced either in speech or in writing, that other States should in their turn place their armaments on the level prescribed for certain States.

The Covenant stipulates, on the contrary, that the reduction of armaments is to be dealt with in a plan drawn up by the League Council and submitted to the several Governments for their consideration and free decision. Account will be taken in this plan of the requirements of national security, of the international obligations imposed by common action, and of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State.

Were it to be admitted that the standards prescribed in Part V of the Treaties for certain States should apply in an equal and uniform manner to other States, Article 8 of the League Covenant would clearly be bereft of all value and all significance.

The Memo adds:

On this system of ideas are founded the principles to be followed
in the matter of the limitation and reduction of armaments, as laid
down in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the Peace Treaties.

The Government of the Republic have strictly conformed therewith

(3) Re. French Disarmament

Since the coming into force of the Covenant, France has of her own
accord proceeded to reduce her armaments, taking into account, on the one
hand, her geographical situation and the circumstances for which her armaments
are intended to provide and, on the other, of the progress achieved in the
organization of security.

(a) notion of "interdependence of armaments" which France insists upon;
the Memo reads:

In close conjunction with national defence on land, the protection
of the sea frontiers, both at home and overseas, and of the essential
communications between these various territories requires the co-operation
of a navy sufficiently powerful to dispense the Government of the Republic
from the necessity of maintaining in every part of their Empire forces
sufficient to cope alone with domestic disturbances which might conceivably
coincide with a foreign aggression. The level, therefore, of the naval
forces of France directly affects that of her land as well as that of her
air forces.

Called upon to ensure the air defence of the home country, and to
co-operate with the land and naval forces, the air service contributes
in addition to the policing and protection of the oversea territories,
which otherwise would require still larger land forces.

This interdependence of the three great categories of armaments is
therefore extremely important for France; she must constantly consider them
in combination with each other if she is properly to estimate the
consequences which a measure adopted for one might have on the others.

(4) Re. French efforts to increase security

As for security -- an essential factor dominating the entire
problem of the limitation and reduction of armaments and acting, one may
say, as a mainspring for the functioning of Article 8 of the Covenant -
the French Government have, in the last ten years, unceasingly striven to
make clearer, stronger, and more tangible the conception of how this primary
requisite is to be assured. They had all the more reason to devote their
energies to this purpose that one of the foremost guarantees of French
security, provided for and relied upon by the framers of the Peace Treaty,
was from the very first inexistent. In consequence they have unreservedly
associated themselves with every effort undertaken at Geneva for the purpose
of defining more clearly and developing on a general plane the principles
of arbitration and mutual help laid down in the Covenant.

The value of those efforts it is by no means their intention to
belittle to-day.

It must, however, be noted that the slow rate of progress hitherto
achieved has not tended to speed up the task of reducing armaments. On the
other hand, in a particularly sensitive European area, and one of vital
interest to France, the signing of the Locarno Agreement, based upon
Articles 43 and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles, made for France, as well

5

[LC]

Proposals by the French Delegation at the Disarmament Conference:

The French Government submitted to the Conference detailed proposals 'for placing civil aviation and bombing aircraft, and also certain material of the land and home forces, at the disposal of the League of Nations; for the creation of a preventive and repressive international force; for the political conditions upon which such measures depend; and lastly, for new rules providing for the protection of civil populations'.

The detailed proposals may be summarized as follows:

(1) The internationalization of civil aviation. Subjects of signatory States would be allowed to construct non-military machines, of a tonnage below a figure to be agreed upon; machines of a heavier tonnage would be confined to continental, inter-continental, and inter-colonial organizations under the auspices of the League of Nations. Only the League should have the right to dispose of heavy bombing machines. In case of 'flagrant aggression' a State that was the victim of an aerial bombardment should have the right, upon the sole condition that the League is notified, to use all its air forces, even those ear-marked to be at the disposal of the League.

(2) Batteries of long-range artillery, vessels carrying guns of more than 8-inch calibre or of over 10,000 tons, and submarines of more than an agreed tonnage should be at the disposal of the League.

(3) An international police force should be created to prevent war and, if necessary in case of aggression, to provide a first contingent of effective troops to come to the aid of the attacked State. This force should be at the disposal of the League, which should organize its command.

(4) New rules for the protection of civil populations are also to be adopted, including prohibition of the use by aircraft or artillery of projectiles containing poisonous gases, &c., and prohibition of bombardments from aircraft or by artillery at more than a specified distance from the front line.

(5) With these measures there should be an acceptance of compulsory arbitration, and 'aggression' should be defined. Precise guarantees should also be provided to ensure rapidity of decision by the authorities controlling the international force and to facilitate the bringing of this action into conformity with international law (which is still insufficiently precise, but of which the permanent and binding elements result from international treaties and pacts). Provision should also be made for international control of the execution of all agreements concerning armaments.

All the above proposals are intended to be taken as a whole.

The plan concludes by affirming the necessity of laying stress upon
the provisions for mutual assistance contained in the Covenant, which have
always been interpreted along the line of least resistance.

Synopsis of French Proposals cited in
Documents for 1932, p. 160.

For full text see League Document, 1932, ix. 63,
pp. 113-16.

7

The French Reply to the German Aide-Memoire dated September 11, 1932
is illustrative of French thinking on disarmament:

Our doctrine is that we must aim not at individual rearment,
but at general and regulated disarmament.

If, alleging that the result hoped for from the convention now being
prepared seemed to it insufficient, the German government declared that
it was entitled to change its own *statut* of armament, it would not only
violate the definite engagements of the Treaty it has signed; it would also
make impossible by its attitude, the final achievement of that general
disarmament which it professes to desire. Our aim is to arrive at a
convention which shall give the nations real guarantees of peace and make it
possible to relieve them of their burdens. If Germany wishes to cooperate
with France, as with other States, in this work, to negotiate for it, and
to discuss it, nothing can be more legitimate and more desirable.

(1) Re. French comments on Germany *statut* of armament

These discussions, in which France means to take part in a
sincerely liberal spirit, would make it possible to decide what the *statut*
of Germany should be within a general *statut* of peace, placed under the
protection of arbitration and supervision.

(a) Legal considerations: France rejects Germany's demand that the Disarmament Convention be substituted for the Treaty of Versailles -

It (the German Government) declares that the Disarmament Convention
must be substituted *ipso jure* for the Treaty of Versailles, and that no
special conditions must be laid down for Germany. On the point of law, the
French Government cannot accept these arguments. There is no clause, either
in Part V of the Treaty or in the League Covenant by virtue of which a general
limitation of armaments should involve the lapse of the permanent stipulations
of the Treaty. With this legal reservation France is ready to take part on
the same terms as all the accepted parties in the examinations of this problem,
with the desire to see due allowance made in the final agreement for the progress
made by the work of the Conference.

(b) Military considerations and German comments re: "material content"-

"... as regards the content, or in other words, as regards the heart
of the matter submitted to the Geneva Conference, the French Government has
no objection to laying down the rule which it will follow. Wishing to
lighten so far as possible the load borne by the nations, and in particular
by the French people, it will regulate its progress, allowing the right to
disarmament inproportion to the guarantees which it finds in the organization
of peace. It withdraws nothing from the declaration which it made at Geneva
on July 22 in the following terms:

' From the day when, in the spirit of the
Covenant, and following its provisions, an international organization is created
which assures security to, and imposes identical obligations on, all,
the settlement of the question raised by Herr Pflugl will be greatly
facilitated.'

8

[LC]

(2) Re. French demand for security

France has been reproached with her use of the idea and name of security. It must be repeated that this is the expression used in the Covenant. Security is the necessity which the German Government legitimately invokes when it writes, affirming an indisputable truth, that Germany has a right to her national security. It is the guarantee which should be secured for all nations, small and great, by establishing international control of armaments, by making arbitration general, and by securing the effective execution of its decisions. Recent statements, deriving authority from the official position of their author, suggested that France, in her support of this thesis, sought to conceal a disguised impulse towards imperialism.

Nothing is more untrue. France claims no privilege. She asks only for her legitimate share in general security. She has made positive proposals on the subject in 1924 with the Protocol, and recently by suggesting the organization of an international force.

(3) Re. French answer to German claim to right of re-organizing its military system

In its seventh paragraph the Note says that the first question to be considered in Germany is that of changes in the organization of the Army, such as, for instance, the rearrangement of the period of service of long-service troops and the free distribution of effectives. It also refers to training for short periods, and to a special militia compulsorily enrolled and intended to keep order in the country and to protect its coasts and frontiers.

It (France) finds a clear demand by Germany for aircraft, tanks, and heavy and anti-aircraft, artillery for her army, and for submarines, aircraft-carriers, and battleships for her navy. There can be no doubt: rearament is proposed.

It must be pointed out at once that this rearament would inevitably spread to all the States which are subjected by treaty to a regime similiar to that of Germany. Thus the whole problem of central and eastern Europe is raised as an immediate consequence, and competition in armaments would begin again on this broad basis. All Europe is therefore strictly affected by the question put to France, who cannot undertake to give an isolated answer to so vast a question.

(4) Re. What to do with Germany's persistent demands? the League of Nations is the sole judge

If Germany persists in her intentions, concerted action will have to be taken. By what agency? Not by that of the Disarmament Conference. First, because the German demand is directly contrary to the essential aim of this Conference, which is to examine the possibilities of reducing, and not increasing, armaments. Secondly, because nations which were not parties to the Peace Treaty are sitting at the Conference.

The necessary negotiations, should certainly not be pursued, or even opened, without consulting the Powers adhering to the Pact of Confidence of July 13, 1932. Germany has expressly adhered to its text.

It states in Articles I and II:

'I. Acting in the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations, they intend, in such an eventuality, to proceed quite frankly to a mutual exchange of views on any possible question of the same origin as that which has been so happily settled at Lausanne, and which concerns the European system. They will, moreover, keep one another informed as to the development of this question. They hope that other Governments will see their way to joining with them in adopting the same procedure.

"II. They intend to work together, and with the other Legations at
at Geneva, to find a solution to the disarmament problem which will be
advantageous and equitable for all interested Powers."

Again, the discussion is dominated by the Versailles Treaty, which cannot be
modified unilaterally, and by Article 164, the second paragraph of which is
in these terms:

'Germany agrees that after she has become a member of the
League of Nations the armaments fixed Table shall remain in
force until they are modified by the Council of the League.
Furthermore she thereby agrees strictly to observe the decisions
of the Council of the League on this subject.'

This text is commented upon by the letter of the President of the Peace
Conference in reply to the German observations. After having set out
certain changes in the military clauses of the Treaty, this document
said: 'No change in the constitutin of the armaments, as stipulated
by the Treaty, will be allowed until Germany is admitted to the
League, which may consent to what ever changes it considers desirable.'

Thus the League of Nations is the sole judge. France cannot fail to keep
the engagements she has taken towards the League, and it is before
it that we reservethe right to set forth, if it need be, the reasons
which prevent us from consenting to the rearment of Germany.

French Reply to German Aide-Memoire, September 11, 1932,
The Times, September 13, 1932

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 189.

10

[L]

The Memo by the French Delegation dated November 14, 1932 indicates further French thinking on disarmament and related issues.

(1) Disarmament: a Political and Technical Problem

From the debates which have been going on since February 2, 1932, certain lessons may be drawn.

It is now realized that 'the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations' cannot be hoped for unless account is taken, as provided in Article 8 of the Covenant, of the geographical situation and special conditions of each State and even of each continent.

It is also realized that the possibility of a reduction of armaments is closely bound up in the minds of Governments with the conditions of security which exist or which may be created. At every stage of the debates, this notion of security, conceived, not only for the advantage of one or several countries, but in the interests of all, has reappeared. Thus the problem before us has revealed itself to be political as much as technical: in the sphere of disarmament and in the sphere of security progress must be made on parallel lines.

France accepting the Hoover proposal, "that the task which lies before the Conference consists in increasing the comparative power of the defence through decreases in the power of the attack," states its method of disarmament:

... reductions of effectives and quantitative and qualitative reductions of material have been contemplated. Considered from the aspect of material alone, there appeared to be a danger that the problem would prove insoluble: then, when effectives came to be considered, the difficulty arose of comparing different types of military organization, each of which has its own special requirements and uses. The French delegation is convinced that the Conference, if it is to succeed, must not hesitate to examine the problem as a whole. It is much less important to inquire whether a particular type of material can facilitate aggression than to determine the form of military organization which in a given area and in given political conditions would make a policy of aggression more difficult. Once this has been determined, the different armies of the area considered will by degrees have to be brought into line with this type.

By this method, and by this method alone, can a solution be found for a problem which has recently arisen in an acute form before the Conference.

(2) Re. French attitude toward Germany's claim to equality

While the French Government has objected to the conditions in which the claim for equality of rights has been put forward, while it does not recognize the force of the legal arguments on which this claim is based, and while it persists in the belief that any solution involving rearmament would be unacceptable as being contrary to the very purpose of the Conference, it has never denied that the problem was among the political problems

11 [LC]

brought up before the Conference, as was stated by the French Prime Minister on July 22, 1932, in the General Commission. The French delegation has every confidence that its proposals would permit of an equitable solution of this problem in the interests of general peace, by the progressive equalization of the military status of the various countries and by an equal participation in the burdens and advantages of the organization of common action, all question of rearmament being ruled out.

The Memo states several French disarmament proposals which are to be considered as parts of "one indivisible whole." Included are:

(3) Re. French disarmament plan

(a) an organization for Europe

... provision should be made for an organization for Europe capable of solving the problem of the reduction of armaments in that continent, both in its political and in its technical aspects. The arrangements to be concluded will fix the reciprocal measures, whether more extensive or more definite, regarding limitation, reduction, and supervision, which the States participating in this organization will accept as a counterpart for mutual obligations in the matter of security and in relation with the conditions peculiar to Europe and to each one of them.

The French Government hopes that this European system will appear, to the Powers which will not belong to it, to be of sufficiently great general importance, from the point of view of the consolidation of peace, for them to render its application possible by agreeing, for their part, to give full effect to the guarantees arising out of the Pacts by which they are already bound; the Pact of Paris or the Covenant of the League of Nations. Without this acceptance the plan would be impracticable.

This proposal appears in Chapter III of *Proposals*:

The special organization for Europe, which has already received a first realization in the Locarno Treaties -- which it must be understood must not be affected by any of the provisions of the present plan-- will involve political arrangements and military arrangements. This organization entails in the first place their acceptance by a sufficient number of Powers, regard being had to their importance and geographical position, in order that the security of each of them should be ensured in all circumstances.

Section A

The fundamental object of the political arrangements will be to define the conditions in which each of the States forming part of the European organization will be entitled to the co-operation of the other contracting States.

..................

Section B

Corresponding to the political arrangements in Section A above, there will be military arrangements aiming, on the basis of an equality of defensive status, at:

12 [LC]

(1) Reducing the offensive character of the national forces in accordance with the principle laid down in the American proposal of June 22 last;

(2) Specializing certain elements with a view to the most urgent operations involved in the *common action* provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 8 and paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(a) The land forces assigned for the defence of the home frontiers of the States of continental Europe will be reduced to a uniform general type -- that of a national short-service army with limited effectives -- not adapted to a sudden offensive

(b) re-affirmation of the principles, which are generally recognized to be a necessary consequence of the Pact for the Renunciation of War
This proposal appears in Chapter I of *Proposals*

a) Any war undertaken in breach of the Paris Pact is a matter of interest to all the Powers and shall be regarded as a breach of the obligations assumed towards each one of them;

b) In the event of a breach or threat of breach of the Paris Pact, the said Powers shall concert together as promptly as possible with a view to appealing to public opinion and agreeing upon the steps to be taken;

c) In application of the Pact of Paris outlawing war, any breach of that Pact shall involve the prohibition of direct or indirect economic or financial relations with the aggressor country. The Powers shall undertake to adopt the necessary measures to make that prohibition immediately effective;

d) The said Powers shall declare their determination not to recognize any *de facto* situation brought about in consequence of the violation of an international undertaking.

And in Chapter II:

... France considers the effective and loyal application of Article 16 of the Covenant as an essential element of the plan she has worked out.

(c) international police force

Each of the Contracting Powers will place permanently at the disposal of the League of Nations, as a contingent for joint action, a small number of *specialized units* consisting of troops serving a relatively long term and provided with the powerful materials prohibited for the national armies.

(d) international control commission

There will be organized among the contracting Powers a *regular* and permanent supervision of the execution of their obligations in regard to their armaments. This supervision will involve an investigation at least once a year.

13

The French Memo reads:

In conclusion, be it noted afresh that the several parts of this
plan constitute one indivisible whole. Examination has shown it to be
based integrally on the application of the Pact of Paris and of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, from which the French Government has
declared its doctrine to be derived. This plan can only be carried out
by stages, each of these stages being justified and naturally introduced
by the experience gained in the previous ones. This means that its success
will depend on the progress of the confidence which must grow up between
peoples and on the loyalty with which it is carried out. It presupposes the
concentration of efforts and the determination to overcome the inevitable
difficulties and not to sacrifice the realities of positive action to
facile negations or criticism.

Text of Memorandum by the French Delegation,
November 14, 1932

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p.217.

For full text see League Document, 1932, ix. 58.

2 [LC]

Proposals by the Soviet Government at the Disarmament Conference:

The Soviet Government desires total disarmament, being convinced
that this is the only infallible remedy. Failing this, it will gladly
consider proposals for reduction, and proposes:

Abolition of all aggressive weapons, including tanks, heavy
guns, vessels of over 10,000 tons, aircraft carriers, military air-
ships and bombing aeroplanes; also the prohibition of chemical and
bacteriological warfare.

It also recommends 'the progressive proportional method as
the most impartial and equitable move for the reduction of
armaments allowing for facilities and exceptions in favour of
weaker countries in danger of aggression'.

Note: On March 23, 1928, the Soviet Delegation submitted to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission a draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments. This document was placed before the Disarmament Conference together with certain amendments on February 18, 1932.

Synopsis of Proposals by the Soviet Government cited in
Documents for 1932, p. 168.

For full text see League Document, 1932, ix. 63,
pp. 125-37.

UNITED STATES

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>1. Proposals by the U.S. Delegation at the Disarmament Conference<br>1932</td>
      <td>p.1</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2. President Hoover, Message to the Disarmament Conference,<br>June 22, 1932</td>
      <td>p.3</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>3. F.D.R., Message on Disarmament<br>May 16, 1933</td>
      <td>p.4</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>4. Norman H. Davis, U.S. Representative at the Disarmament Conference,<br>May 22, 1933</td>
      <td>p.6</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

[L]

Proposals by the U.S. Delegation at the Disarmament Conference:

For the convenience of the Bureau, the delegation of the United
States is submitting the suggestions contained in the speech of the
Acting Chief Delegate on February 9, as was stated at that time. These
suggestions are not exclusive; nor do they purport to be an all-comprehensive
plan. The points enumerated are merely intended to aid in carrying on the
purposes of this Conference.

(1) The delegation of the United States advocates consideration of the draft Convention as containing the outline of a convenient basis for discussion, while expressing its entire willingness to give full consideration to any supplementary proposals calculated to advance the ends we all seek.

(2) The delegation of the United States suggests the possibility of prolonging the existing naval agreements concluded at Washington and London as soon as they are completed by the adherence of France and Italy.

(3) The delegation of the United States advocates proportional reductions from the figures laid down in the Washington and London Agreements on naval tonnage as soon as all parties to the Washington Agreement have entered this frame-work.

(4) The delegation of the United States advocates the total abolition of submarines.

(5) The delegation of the United States will join in formulating the most effective measures to protect civilian populations against aerial bombing.

(6) The delegation of the United States advocates the total abolition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.

(7) The delegation of the United States advocates the computation of the numbers of the armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defence. The former are obviously impossible of reduction; the latter is a question of relativity.

Note: The only criterion for such a computation at present existing is to be found in the military forces maintained by the Central Powers in accordance with the Treaties of Peace, which specify that they were to be exclusively employed in the maintenance of order and policing of frontiers. This would indicate that a study of the ratio of the number of effectives in these countries to the population and territory would give some rough estimate of the number which world opinion has already agreed upon as

essential for the purpose of order; and indicate, when applied to other
nations, that the remaining existing forces were destined at least for
defence, if not for possible aggression, and in the categories for defence
and attack, since these numbers must at present be based on comparisons
with the similar forces of other States and are thus relative. Therefore
stringent reduction may justifiably be sought in accordance with the
purpose for which this Conference was called.

(8) The delegation of the United States agrees in advocating
special restrictions for tanks and heavy mobile guns as arms of
peculiarly aggressive character.

(9) The delegation of the United States is prepared to consider
a limitation of expenditure on material as a complementary method
to direct limitation, in that it may prove useful to prevent a
qualitative race if and when quantitative limitation has been made
effective.

Synopsis of U.S. Proposals cited in
Documents for 1932, p. 166

For full text see League Document, 1932, ix.
63, p. 139.

3

[LC]

The Message of President Hoover to the Disarmament Conference, dated June 22, 1932 is indicative of U.S. thinking on disarmament:

The time has come when we should cut through the brush and adopt some broad and definite method of reducing the overwhelming burden of armament which now lies upon the toilers of the world. This would be the most important world step that could be taken to expedite economic recovery. We must make headway against the mutual fear and friction arising out of war armaments which kill human confidence throughout the world. We can still remain practical in maintaining an adequate self defence among all nations. We can add to the assurances of peace and yet save the people of the world from ten to fifteen billions of wasted dollars during the next ten years.

I propose that the following principles should be our guide.

First: The Briand-Kellog Pact to which we are all signatories
can only mean that the nations of the world have agreed that they
will use their arms solely for defence.

Second: This reduction should be carried out, not only by
broad general cuts in armaments, but by increasing the comparative
power of defence through decreases in the power of the attack.

Third: The armaments of the world have grown up in mutual
relation to each other; and, speaking generally, such relativity
should be preserved in making reductions.

Fourth: The reductions must be real and positive. They must
effect economic relief.

Fifth: There are three problems to deal with-- land forces,
air forces, and naval forces. They are all interconnected. No part
of the proposals which I make can be dissociated one from the other.

Based on these principles, I propose that the arms of the
world should be reduced by nearly one-third.

Message of President Hoover to the Disarmament
Conference, June 22, 1932;

Reproduced in Documents for 1932, p. 169.

For full text see Minutes of the General Commission,
League Document, 1932, ix. 64, p. 122.

4

[LC]

A Message on Disarmament delivered by F.D.R. on May 16, 1933 illustrates U.S. thinking on disarmament and related issues. The Message states that the hope of the U.S. is "that peace may be assured through practical measures of disarmament and that all of us may carry to victory our common struggle against economic chaos." To these ends, the Message continues, the nations have called two world conferences: the World Economic Conference and the Disarmament Conference.

The Message then focuses on armaments and the Disarmament Conference.

### (1) Re. the reasons for armaments

If we ask what are the reasons for armaments, which, in spite of the lessons and tragedies of the World War, are today a greater burden on the peoples of the earth than ever before, it becomes clear that they are twofold: First, the desire, disclosed or hidden, on the part of Governments to enlarge their territories at the expense of a sister nation. I believe that only a small minority of Governments or of peoples harbour such a purpose. Second, the fear of nations that they will be invaded. I believe that the overwhelming majority of peoples feel obliged to retain excessive armaments because they fear some act of aggression against them and not because they themselves seek to be aggressors.

### (2) Re. the objectives of the Disarmament Conference

The ultimate objective of the Disarmament Conference must be the complete elimination of all offensive weapons. The immediate objective is a substantial reduction of some of these weapons and the elimination of many others.

### (3) Re. U.S. disarmament proposals

This Government believes that the programme for immediate reduction of aggressive weapons, now under discussion at Geneva, is but a first step towards our ultimate goal. We do not believe that the proposed immediate steps go far enough. Nevertheless, this Government welcomes the measures now proposed and will exert its influence towards the attainment of further successive steps of disarmament.

Stated in the clearest way, there are three steps to be agreed upon in the present discussions:

First, to take, at once, the first definite step towards this objective, as broadly outlined in the MacDonald Plan.

Second, to agree upon time and procedure for taking the following steps.

Third, to agree that, while the first and the following steps are being taken, no nation shall increase its existing armaments over and above the limitations of treaty obligations.

That all the nations of the world should enter into a solemn and definite pact of non-aggression: That they should solemnly reaffirm the obligations

6

The Statement on May 22, 1933 by Norman H. Davis, U.S. Representative at the Disarmament Conference, further illustrates U.S. thinking on disarmament and related issues.

(1) Re. armaments

At the end of the World War the peoples of all States and their leaders resolved that the suicidal armament policy of the preceding decades must be changed. They were convinced that this policy had been one of the contributing factors which brought about the war. Hence a new policy regarding armaments was incorporated as a fundamental part of the peace settlement. This policy, adopted to prevent a future race in armaments, was based on the principle that armaments are a matter of general concern and that the time had passed when each State should be the sole judge of its armaments.

(2) Re. disarmament: compulsory and voluntary

To carry out this conception, provision was made for the disarmament of the defeated Powers, and at the same time a decision was taken, unprecedented in history, whereby the victorious States voluntarily assumed an obligation to reduce their own armaments.

It would neither have been just nor wise, nor was it intended, that the Central Powers should be subject for all time to a special treatment in armaments. There is and has been a corresponding duty on the part of the other Powers, parties to peace treaties, that by successive stages they too would bring their armaments down to a level strictly determined by the needs of self-defence. While the United States is not bound by the provisions or the implications of those treaties, I have no hesitancy in saying that it is the will of our people, interpreted by President Roosevelt, to join with the other powers in disarming down to that level, and we are prepared to exert our influence to bring this about, not by theoretical statements of good intentions but by decisive and progressive reduction of armaments through international agreement.

(a) Re. economic reasons for disarmament

... National budgets which should be devoted to productive and social ends are burdened with excessive and wasteful expenditures for armament. This leads in turn to an almost unbearable load of taxation on all our peoples.

(3) Re. U. S. approach to disarmament and proposals

As far as the position of the United States is concerned, we are frank to recognize that we have a simpler problem to meet than have many of the European Powers. Fears and apprehensions based on historical and racial grounds have led to the maintenance of large armaments in Europe. These large armaments have caused resentment, particularly in the less-armed countries. The resulting political tension has in turn reacted to keep up the general level of armaments. We are not unaware of the difficulties which lie in the way of reduction in armaments here. It is our very detachment from this situation which gives us hope that we may exert a helpful influence towards the realization of our common objective. But we are prepared to aid in other ways than through exerting our influence, and I shall take this opportunity to show what we are prepared to do.

7

[LC]

1. Re. level of armaments: down to the basis of a domestic police force

As regards the level of armaments, we are prepared to go as far as the other states in the way of reduction. We feel that the ultimate objective should be to reduce armaments approximately to the level established by the peace treaties; that is, to bring armaments as soon as possible through successive stages down to the basis of a domestic police force

2. Re. abolish aggressive weapons

... we are prepared to join other nations in abolishing weapons of an aggressive character, which not only are the more costly to construct and maintain but at present are those most likely to lead to a breach of the peace. To cut the power of offence and remove the threat of surprise attack would do more than anything else to lessen the danger of a war.

3. Re. U.S. approval of G.B. Plan

A few weeks ago the British Prime Minister submitted a detailed proposal which embodies many of the features of the American plan of last year. As the British proposal represents a real measure of disarmament, we accept it whole-heartedly as a definite and excellent step towards the ultimate objective. We, therefore, are prepared to give our full support to the adoption of this plan.

4. Re. U.S. additional contribution to peace-keeping

... we are also prepared to contribute in other ways to the organization of peace. In particular, we are willing to consult the other States in case of a threat to peace, with a view to averting conflict. Further than that, in the event that the States, in conference, determine that a State has been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and take measures against the violator, then, if we concur in the judgement rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, we will refrain from any action tending to defeat such collective effort which these States may thus make to restore peace.

5. Re. international supervision

Finally, we believe that a system of adequate supervision should be formulated to ensure the effective and faithful carrying out of any measure of disarmament. We are prepared to assist in this formulation and to participate in this supervision. We are heartily in sympathy with the idea that means of effective, automatic, and continuous supervision should be found, whereby nations will be able to rest assured that, as long as they respect their obligations with regard to armaments, the corresponding obligations of their neighbours will be carried out in the same scrupulous manner.

The Disarmament Conference has already formulated measures for the establishing of a permanent disarmament commission. The powers now proposed for this commission may well be reinforced. The commission will have many important duties, but none more essential than that of effectively supervising the fulfilment of the treaty.

6. Re. time element of disarmament: stages

We recognize that the ultimate objective in disarmament must be attained by stages, but we believe that the time for the next and decisive step is long overdue and cannot be further postponed.

7. Re. peace-keeping and aggression

... we must definitely make up our minds to settle our disputes around a conference table instead of preparing to settle them on the battlefield. It was with such a thought that the President proposed an undertaking by the nations that, subject to existing treaty rights, armed forces should not be sent across national frontiers. In the long run, we may come

8

to the conclusion that the simplest and most accurate definition of an aggressor is one whose armed forces are found on alien soil in violation of treaties.

(4) Re. obstacles to disarmament

There have been two main obstacles to disarmament. One was the apprehension that Germany proposed to rearm; the other, the reluctance of the armed Powers of Europe in the present state of the world to take a real step in disarmament.

(a) political obstacles

As regards the action of the other Powers, we are not unaware in the United States of the political difficulties which still lie in the way of the reduction of European armaments. We recognize the legitimate claim which any State has to safeguard its security. But we are firmly convinced that, in the long run, this security can best be achieved through a controlled disarmament by which the military strength of the most heavily armed nations is progressively reduced to a level such as that provided for in the peace treaties. To the extent that armaments create political tension, they in themselves constitute a menace to peace and may jeopardize the security of the very nations which maintain them.

Statement by Norman H. Davis, May 22, 1933

Reproduced in Documents for 1933, p. 208.

For full text see: Before the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. U.S. State Department Press Releases, No. 191, May 27, 1933.