y Presidency into the scales
of justice on the side of leni-
cy.”

'Work Way Bak'

The President said that he
continued to oppose "uncondi-
tional blanket amnesty" but
said that he foresaw the time
when those who refused to
work in the Vietnam war would
work their way back" to full
Citizenship and attain "earned
entry into a new atmosphere
hope, hard work and mutual
trust."

The V.F.W. resolution today
effect reaffirmed the
organization's opposition to
wanting any form of amnesty
to a position that it has main-
lined for at least five years
and one that coincided with
that of President Nixon.

The resolution which was
adopted without any personal

criticism of Mr. Ford, said:
"We sustain total opposition
to both general and selective
amnesty for draft dodgers and
military deserters" who "should
be required to stand trial for
their crimes and shall pay such
penalties upon conviction as
the laws prescribe."

Submitted Sunday

The resolution adopted by
the 1.8-million-member veter-
ans group concluded with an
expression of "our total com-
mitment to pursue the "no am-
nesty doctrine" through our
membership to the Congress
and to the American people
and to be firm in our stand not
to relinquish, dilute or com-
promise this position."

The "no amnesty" resolution,
a consolidation of similar docu-
ments submitted to the conven-
tion by V.F.W. chapters in most

To Se-
say
$144

ny Times

8-21-74

# Israeli's Annoyed at Kissinger For Saying Rabin Will Visit Soon

Special to The New York Times

TEL AVIV, Aug. 20—Secretary of State Kissinger was criticized in Israel today for having announced at a news conference yesterday that Premier Yitzhak Rabin had been invited to Washington in the first half of September.

Officials in Jerusalem said that Mr. Kissinger spoke before Premier Rabin had accepted the invitation. Such action, they said, "unheard of." They noted that the Israeli Premier had not yet taken the matter up in the Cabinet, whose approval he needs for the mission.

The Tel Aviv newspaper Maariv said in an editorial that Mr. Kissinger's announcement was not merely a breach of protocol but also a crude attempt to dictate a timetable for Israeli political action.

The newspaper described the Secretary of State as "the godfather of the disengagement treaties." It said his news conference statement made the invitation to Mr. Rabin "an offer he can't refuse."

## Link to Cyprus Seen

A number of commentators here said Mr. Kissinger was in a hurry too get things moving between Israel and the Arabs to cover up the debacle in Cyprus. Some said he acted out of fear that the violence on the nearby Mediterranean Island might prove contagious.

During a recent visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon discussed with American officials the possibility of a visit by Mr. Rabin in November. The message requesting an earlier date reached Jerulsalem last week.

The Israelis want Mr. Rabin to go to Washington later in the autumn, after a visit by President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt. They reason that this might enable the Americans first to explore what the Arabs might be prepared to offer in return for the concessions they demand from Israel.

The Israelis themselves have not yet crystalized their pro-

posals for the next stage of the peace negotiations.

This was the second time in two days that Israelis were unhappy with news from Washington. There was surprise at Sunday's joint American-Jordanian statement at the end of King Hussein's visit to Washington, since it promised consultations on such issues as a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

Mr. Allon had left Washington with an understanding that the United States would not support Jordan's demands, which in effect would involve an Israeli withdrawal from occupied areas before peace negotiations.

Mr. Kissinger explained yesterday in his news conference that agreement to consult did not mean endorsement. He sent a more detailed clarification to Mr. Allon, but the concern among Israeli officials and members of Parliament was not dispelled.

Opposition members of Parliament demanded today that the house, which recessed last week, should be reconvened urgently to discuss the developments.

## 19 Tourists From East Injured in Coast Accident

SAN MATEO, Calif., Aug. 20 (UPI)—Nineteen tourists from New Jersey and New York were injured when a station wagon slid into the side of a Grayline tour bus on the Bayshore Freeway in San Mateo, Calif.

The accident occurred yesterday as the bus was returning from Monterey to San Francisco International Airport, where the passengers were scheduled to catch a plane for Las Vegas.

California Highway Patrol investigators said only two persons were seriously injured, the driver and a passenger in the station wagon.

The 19 injured persons on the bus were treated at Chope Hospital in San Mateo, a suburb 15 miles south of San Francisco.

MOSCOW PRESSED
BY FORD ON ARMS
NYTimes
8-21-74

Kissinger Says U.S. Seeks
New Talks While Keeping
Its Defense Level High

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 20—Secretary of State Kissinger said today that President Ford, as one of his first acts of office, had called upon Soviet leaders to join the United States "in an intensified effort to negotiate an effective and equitable limitation of strategic arms."

In a speech prepared for delivery tonight at the national convention of the American Legion in Miami Beach, Mr. Kissinger combined a pledge to work toward further accords with an assertion that, in the absence of such agreements, the United States would maintain strategic strength "whatEver the cost."

"The President has asked me to emphasize that in his view the choice is clear," Mr. Kissinger said. "We will maintain the nuclear balance by unilateral actions if we must and by negotiations if at all possible. I

Continued on Page 6, Column 1

had a responsibility to collaborate to this end.

The same theme was voiced by Maurice Strong, director of the United Nations Environmental Program.

"Of compelling importance of course, is the right of each nation to determine its own optimum population level," he said. "But equally important is the need for each nation to accept the corollary responsibility to assure that the demands of its population on resources and environment beyond its national boundaries do not impair the rights and interests of others."

The United States proposal was delineated by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Caspar W. Weinberger, who is head of the American delegation. He spoke to an audience of delegates from 131 nations in the main auditorium of Rumania's Palace of the Republic.

## Stronger Action Is Asked

He called for strengthening of the conference's draft plan of action, a compromise document calling for only a small reduction in the world's population growth rate of 2 per cent a year. Mr. Weinberger continued:

"We believe the plan should be the commencement of a serious effort by both developed and developing countries to

# Ford and Kissinger in Tribute to Slain Cyprus Envoy
[LC]

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 21—
President Ford and Secretary
of State Kissinger led the
mourners at Andrews Air
Force Base outside Washing-
ton today as the body of Am-
bassador Rodger P. Davies,
who was slain in Cyprus on
Monday, was returned.

"A professional Foreign
Service officer has come
home," Mr. Kissinger said to
several hundred officials, dip-

lomats and friends of Mr.
Davies. "He returns not to
joy but to sadness, not to pa-
rades but to solemn cer-
emony."

Mr. Ford, who flew by heli-
copter from the White House
for the brief ceremony, said,
"this is a very sad occasion
for all Americans as we gath-
er to pay tribute to a great
patriot, one of our most re-
spected and admired diplo-
mats."

After returning to the
White House, Mr. Ford named
William R. Crawford Jr., cur-
rently Ambassador to Yemen,
as Mr. Davies's successor in
Nicosia.

On Monday, shortly after
Mr. Davies had been shot
inside the United States Em-
bassy in Nicosia, Mr. Kis-
singer sent L. Dean Brown,
Deputy Under Secretary of
State for management, a for-
mer Ambassador to Jordan,

to direct the Cyprus Embassy
until a replacement was
named.

The speed with which Mr.
Crawford was nominated un-
derscored the American de-
sire to assure the Cypriote
Government that it was not
being held responsible for Mr.
Davies death.

Mr. Davies's coffin remained
aboard the Air Force 707 jet

Continued on Page 9, Column 1

accept the American Express Card.

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oners, including former ministers, are being held on charges of corruption and malfeasance in office.

The wave of arrests carried out by the armed forces has so frightened the bureaucracy that many officials are either staying away from their desks or not daring make decisions. That is why the consulting engineer cannot get an appointment. The administrative paralysis has even slowed export sales of coffee, an important cash crop.

As for the rural areas where most of the population live, destitute farmers are scratching the thin topsoil or raising cattle and paying tithes to their feudal overlords, as they have for centuries. It took months before Addis Ababa officials would acknowledge that a catastrophic drought was causing many thousands of deaths in some regions.

Now international help in the form of grain shipments and money is trickling in. But even the best-informed

FORD IN TRIBUTE
TO CYPRUS ENVOY

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

at had brought in from Nicosia. His two children, who were pecked up in Beirut where they had been living since the fighting broke out in Cyprus last month, descended the ramp from the Air Force plane and were greeted by Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger.

The children, a 20-year-old daughter, Dana, and a 15-year old son, John, joined in the ceremony on a platform on the tarmac. Miss Davies wept throughout the 19-gun salute, the playing of the national Anthem, and the prayer by the Rev. John Rivers, who was Mr. Davies's pastor, and eulogies by Mr. Ford and Mr. Kissinger.

After the ceremony, the children accepted on behalf of their father the Secretary of State Award, the highest honor possible for a Foreign Service officer. The citation read:

"Ambassador Rodger P. Davies: For inspiring leadership, outstanding courage and dedication to duty for which he gave his life, Nicosia, Aug. 19, 1974."

The Air Force 707 was to fly to Hamilton Air Force Base, Calif., and the body was to be cremated in a private ceremony in Berkeley. Mr. Davies's wife died last year.

# FTC to Probe
High-Protein
Supplements

By Erwin Washington
Washington Post Staff Writer

Highly concentrated protein supplements might be harmful and even fatal to the elderly and to infants under the age of 1, according to the Federal Trade Commission.

The commission has launched an industry wide investigation into the protein supplement industry after a probe of Shaklee Corp., of Emeryville, Calif., revealed, that too much use of several varieties of protein supplements on the market could create in users a condition called hypernatremic dehydration.

The condition occurs when the supplements are given to the elderly who have kidney and liver problems, and to infants when they are dehydrated because of mild fevers or hot weather.

Protein supplements often are given to infants who have anemia, or who don't eat enough regular protein foods. Elderly persons often take the supplements to increase energy.

Infant formulas that carry warnings that consumers should consult a doctor before buying them, will not be investigated.

"Mothers should not give their infants under 1 year of age highly concentrated protein products without consulting a physician," said Harrison Sheppard, assistant director of the FTC regional office.

"In a matter of two or three days an infant can develop liver, kidney complications, damage convulsions,

The commission will investigate the protein products of 30 national companies to determine whether or not adequate warning is on their labels, Sheppard said.

Shaklee Corp., whose product Sheppard says is much less potent than many others on the market, was required to warn mothers not to give the Shakslee product, instant Protein, to infants without consulting a doctor.

The product had carried statements that said Instant Protein could be fed to infants from the first day of eating solid foods, and also that it alleviates problems of the elderly.

The commission provisionally accepted a consent order which requires Shaklee to put warnings on its labels and in its advertising saying that doctors should be consulted before use by infants and the aged.

Shaklee counsel Larry Farren, said the company decided to comply rather than get involved in lengthy litigation. Farren said the only argument his company had with the commission was in the amount of the protein necessary to cause a hazard.

"We feel there is a remote likelihood of adverse effects from" the protein supplement, said Farren, who added that too much of anything could be hazardous.

The FTC investigation will seek to determine whether or not other companies will have to put new warnings on their

By Harry Nalchayan—The Washington Post

Secretary Kissinger greets Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam.

# Kissinger Sees Syrian Official On Negotiations

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam met with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger yesterday and said that negotiations on the Middle East should be given an opportunity to achieve a "permanent, durable and just peace."

Kissinger said that he and Khaddam agreed that the negotiations "must be given an opportunity to succeed in an atmosphere conducive to negotiations." The two men spoke with reporters briefly after a working lunch Kissinger hosted at the State Department.

The secretary's remarks, combined with Khaddam's conciliatory tone, left the impression that Syria might be prepared to agree to an extension of the mandate of the U.N. force deployed along the Golan Heights to observe the disengagement agreement signed last May.

The mandate for the force runs out in October. The Israelis, noting recent heavy Soviet arms shipments to Syria, have expressed concern that fighting may be renewed at that time unless the life of the force is extended.

Khaddam, Kissinger told reporters, is the first Syrian foreign minister to visit Washington in many years. Diplomatic relations were severed by Damascus during the 1967 Middle East war and were renewed only two months ago.

Khaddam's visit is one of the many by Middle Eastern

officials during what is becoming known at the State Department as "Middle East month." Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was the first, followed by Jordanian Prime Minister Zaid Rifai, then by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, King Hussein of Jordan, and now Khaddam. Next week Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf is expected in Washington.

Kissinger is holding discussions with all of these officials to determine the next stage of the Middle East negotiations. One of the major deadlines against which he is working is the expiration of the U.N. force on the Golan Heights. It is felt that some progress must be registered before that time. The Egyptians have indicated they are prepared for the renewal of the U.N. force in the Sinai, whose mandate expires in late November.

Each of the officials who has visited thus far has also discussed prospects of U.S. economic aid. There is a $100 million special fund in the 1975 budget, much of which was to be earmarked for Syria for reconstruction in the areas evacuated by Israel as part of the disengagement agreement.

But Kissinger has told Congress he made no pledge of any money. An amendment has been added to the aid bill, which, if approved by Congress, could limit this aid to Syria.

The New York Times Book Review

AUGUST 25, 1974 SECTION 7

By JAMES CHACE

The love affair between the Amer-
ican public and their Secretary of
State reached its apogee in the sum-
mer of 1974 when a Harris Poll found
Henry Kissinger the nation's most ad-
mired man. Perhaps Kissinger was
right two years ago when he told an
Italian interviewer the main reason
for his growing popularity "stems
from the fact that I've always acted
alone" and "Americans admire the
cowboy leading the caravan alone
astride his horse, the cowboy entering
a village or city alone on his horse
... aiming at the right spot at the
right time." There is little in this biog-
raphy, which concentrates on the
years of the Nixon Administration, to
challenge his assessment. "Kissinger,"
by two noted C.B.S. correspondents,
is the most detailed study yet of
American diplomacy in the post cold-
war era: it is worshipful, gravely
flawed and indispensable. Moreover,
it contains a dirty little secret that
many people would prefer to ignore
after the denouement of the sordid
scandal of Watergate.

If the Kalbs' account is correct —
and it is difficult to check the authen-
ticity of much of their material since
it is based on private interviews—
then it was Richard Nixon, not Henry
Kissinger, who was the main architect
of United States foreign policy. Kis-
singer the great conceptualizer turns
out to be best at crisis diplomacy,
not least because of his ability to per-
suade his interlocutors to trust him;
but it is Nixon who appears to have
been instrumental in making the key
decisions that led to the "conceptual
breakthroughs," which Kissinger so
dearly loves. These include the opening
to China and the accords with Russia

James Chace, managing editor of
Foreign Affairs, is author of "A World
Elsewhere: The New American Foreign
Policy."

Kissinger

By Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb.

Illustrated. 577 pp.

New York: Little Brown & Co. $12.50.

on strategic arms limitations—the two
most signal achievements of the Nixon
years. The only notable instance where
Nixon remains out of the picture is
during the Arab-Israeli negotiations in
the winter of 1974. Thanks to Water-
gate "the cowboy" could really act
alone.

Surely the most detailed and con-
troversial part of the book is the tale
of the Vietnam settlement. And here,
as much as anywhere else, one sees
the guiding hand of Richard Nixon. The
President believed — wrongly, in my
view—that the road to peace in Indo-
china ran through Moscow. In order
—to woo the Russians into a new and
cooperative approach to a Vietnamese
compromise,” Nixon dangled an allur-
ing bait before them at the very out-
set of his first Administration. The

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, trade,
an easing of tensions around Berlin,
a European Security Conference — all
these might become possible if the
Russians would only force Hanoi to
come to terms. Essentially, this atti-
tude was transformed into the cele-
brated theory of linkage, a concept
that Kissinger could provide the Pres-
ident with in order to justify Nixon's
instincts.

Linkage, as the authors point out,
"was an up-to-date application of
Kissinger's theories about the balance
of power." Since the Soviet Union "had
always been the potential upsetper" of
a world order that would only sur-
vive on a balancing of rival claims,
"it was time for the Soviet leadership
to be educated in the fine art of
balancing their country's interests

The balance-of-power
and cowboy theories and
a dirty little secret

with those of the other great powers.
Consequently, every problem between
the United States and the Soviet Union
was linked with every other problem;
and progress on one would affect
progress on all." Thus, "Kissinger's
ideas about maintaining the balance of
power and Nixon's instinct for impli-
cating Moscow in a Vietnam settle-
ment combined to establish linkage as
the basis of United States policy to-
ward the Soviet Union."

Though the Kalbs point out how
often the Administration trotted out
the theory in order to justify its be-
havior, linkage simply didn't work.
Had the theory been soundly based,
the Soviets would have possessed the
necessary influence over the North
Vietnamese to make them settle on
terms other than those Hanoi chose
to accept. Very early in the game,
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin declared
that Russia "simply did not have the
clout to deliver North Vietnam." Nei-
ther Nixon nor Kissinger believed him.
According to the Kalbs, Kissinger told
the Russians that "if they didn't pro-
duce a settlement," the United States
would "escalate the war." This seems
to be precisely what happened.

The limits of Soviet power were
nowhere more apparent than during
the Vietnam negotiations when the
Americans were seeking a "decent in-
terval" in which to extricate them-
selves from the Vietnamese quagmire.
As the Kalbs tell it, in secret negotia-
tions with the North Vietnamese in
1970, Kissinger switched the terms of
the proposed settlement from a de-
mand for withdrawal of both United
States and North Vietnamese troops
from the south to a ceasefire in place,
followed by a pullout of United States
troops alone. By no longer insisting
on North Vietnamese withdrawal,
Washington expected that Hanoi would
understand that the North Vietnamese
would retain de facto control of the
territory they already held. However,
when questioned by the press, Kissin-
ger refused to spell out the full im-

*Continued on Page 16*

© 1974, The New York Times Co. All rights reserved.

Cover that shows more than it hides

# Dress And Society

1560-1970.

By Geoffrey Squire.

Illustrated. 176 pp.

New York: The Viking Press. $16.95.

By ANNE HOLLANDER

The subject of dress has been largely neglected by serious students of art history and the history of ideas. The field has been left to those who practice a kind of historical fashion-journalism, superficially observing the fluctuations of past modes in the light of modern psychology and so-ciology. For theatrical designers there are many books containing processions of historical costume examples, usu-ally redrawn in one single illustrative style from unidentified originals, but most of these works display the se-quence of past fashions as a self-contained curiosity unconnected with other cultural facts. Costume plays and movies have consequently taught many people that clothes from the remote past all look rather alike, the same way "old masters" may all seem to look alike.

The dress of more recent periods, on the other hand, has been so well documented on film, and the films so continually revived and studied, that everybody now knows the exact dif-ferences between clothes of the twen-ties and thirties or the thirties and forties. There is also the currency of self-conscious nostalgia about them in new films, which increases the gen-eral awareness of recent period cloth-ing. But since movies still tend to treat all costume from the centuries before 1900 as if it were modern dress with a few signal period refer-ences added on (like a full skirt or a powdered wig) people are less well-trained to perceive the minute details and subtle variations of style in older historical dress. Our simplified theat-rical notion of historical clothing is as limiting as any other kind of miscon-ception about the past. And yet, de-spite the recent, well promoted modishness of style, fashion has still to acquire the prestige of art and literature in the study of history.

In "Dress and Society 1560-1970" Geoffrey Squire has not just produced another costume book. He has in fact written an essay to demonstrate the

way fashionable clothes have them-selves been a complex artistic me-dium with a power equal to that of painting and architecture to embody the whole esthetic spirit of a society. He has removed clothing from the category of frivolous minor art and sociological phenomenon to show how esthetic conceptions expressed in dress have again and again remade the vis-ible world as profoundly as any school of painting. Besides this rather obvious visual dimension of clothing, Mr. Squire has shown its indissoluble connection with mythology and litera-ture, where conceptions of beauty, sex and society first crystallize before they are reflected in the visual images created to correspond to them. He at-tempts indeed to integrate dress with all the traditional manifestations of high culture; and he concentrates on that historical span which for us seems the richest in those manifestations, the most vital and most dense: the High Renaissance, Baroque and Rococo centuries in Europe and England, with due consideration of what led up to them and followed after them. The dates in the subtitle are actually rath-er misleading, since his close study of how clothing has functioned as a vehicle of expression actually stops in the middle of the 19th century.

At the beginning of his short final section "1860 and After," Mr. Squire nevertheless describes an Important fashion phenomenon unknown until the middle of the 19th century—the development of fashionable women's dress as "a true art, the conscious product of an individual mind which had elected to use the clothes of oth-ers as a medium for its own expres-sion." It was only with the establish-ment of the House of Worth in Paris in 1858 that women's clothes came to be "designed"—as total entities in our modern sense of the word—in an ef-fort to approach a unified ideal image. After that, the expression of individu-ality on the part of the fashionable woman—both esthetic taste and per-sonality—became a matter of choos-ing the work of one artist in prefer-ence to that of another.

During all the earlier periods of ex-traordinary and elaborate clothing, the burden of creation was on the wearer, who had to make an instinc-tive assemblage of pieces of craftwork and arrange them herself (or himself). Among the centuries of craftsmen in question, of course, were unsung men and women of genius, who might per-sonally design a hood or a cape or shoes and—by the mid-17th century—even a coat, waistcoat and breeches en suite—that is, a suit. But the tailor or milliner never got the credit or the

Continued on Page 14

Illustrations from "Dress and Society 1560-1970."

Anne Hollander has contributed to
Commentary and other magazines.

# Kissinger

*Continued from Page 1*
plications of the new policy in
public.

Nevertheless, by informing the Soviet Ambassador, Kissinger made sure Hanoi got the message. Despite the fact that the Soviet diplomat cabled Hanoi, pointing out the significance of the change, the North Vietnamese continued for two more years to insist that Washington also guarantee their political victory in the south by dumping the Thieu regime.

Then, in 1972, when the United States position regarding a ceasefire in place and United States troop withdrawal became open and explicit, Moscow again did little but transmit the message to Hanoi. Indeed, when Brezhnev met with Kissinger in the spring of 1972, the Soviet leader "stressed that Russia was not in the driver's seat in Hanoi." As it turned out, North Vietnam was not convinced that this was a new concession since, by Washington's own strategy of unilateral withdrawals, America was hardly in a position to "concede" a permanent pres-

ence of North Vietnamese troops in the south.

Apparently neither the President nor his foreign policy observer fully appreciated the ability of a small power to manipulate great powers when there is a conflict among the great. The Sino-Soviet split had always given Hanoi significant pressure to bear on both Moscow and Peking. Ho Chi Minh understood perfectly that unless the great powers are prepared to act in concert to impose their will, balance-of-power politics give great scope for maneuverability to the small.

Outside of the Indochina drama, the Kalbs concentrate their narrative on the China opening, the exercise in symmetry with the Russians, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the diplomacy of triangulation, allowing the new relationship between Washington and Peking to appear as leverage in our dealings with the Soviet Union, must be counted a real achievement, the success of the policy of détente between Washington and Moscow is more questionable.

After the summit meeting between Brezhnev and Nixon at San Clemente in 1972, both Nixon and Kissinger were taken aback by the military and diplomatic support Moscow gave the Arabs in the early days of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In short, while relations between Washington and Moscow may continue to improve on a bilateral basis, the notion that a conceptual breakthrough will occur that will make it possible to extend the umbrella of détente over a host of conflicts and, as yet, unforeseen issues is highly dubious. Détente, like linkage, is a handy word that implies more than it delivers.

Where the Kalbs can be most seriously faulted is their omission of any extended treatment of what could be seen as Nixon's and Kissinger's failures: the lamentable lack of understanding of international economic issues and the insensitivity to allied relations. It simply won't do to say: "The 'Year of Europe,' Kissinger concluded, had become an indirect casualty of Watergate." In fact, the strain between the United States and Europe came long before the implications of

Watergate were apparent to the Europeans.

In his uncharacteristically sloppy Atlantic Charter speech of April, 1973, Kissinger deeply widened the rift that had been growing between Washington and its traditional allies. Along with its rhetoric calling for "a new era of creativity in the West" was a rather crude demand for protection money, as Kissinger underlined the linkage between the continuing United States security role in Europe and concessions in the trade and monetary fields; and there was the offensive phrase that the European role was regional while America's interests were global. In the year that followed, there were recriminations on both sides of the Atlantic.

While Washington cannot be blamed for European dissonance, it is difficult to excuse the worldwide military alert that Washington called during the Middle East war without either consulting or informing its allies. And to term the Europeans "craven," to declare that getting our allies to realize our "common interests" was a greater problem than

"regulating competition" with our enemies—such Kissingerian statements are hardly those of a diplomatist. The move to re-establish relations with mainland China without informing the Japanese Government beforehand and the 1971 imposition of a 10 per cent surcharge on imports are more likely to drive Japan toward a Gaullist posture inimical to United States interests than to bind Japan into the structure of peace the Administration constantly proclaims as its goal.

After finishing the Kalbs' account of Kissinger's stewardship of Nixon's foreign policy, it seems true to conclude with the authors that "Kissinger's greatest successes have been with dictators or strong men; his greatest difficulties with popularly elected leaders."

In his Bismarckian search for a moderate world order based on balance-of-power concepts, Kissinger has been best described by his former Harvard colleague Stanley Hoffmann as a man who, more than most, "would probably agree with Goethe's statement that disorder is worse than injustice." ■

"...But There Are Always Miracles"
This is one of them

by Jack and Mary Willis

One minute life held the prospect of success, excitement, love, marriage, children, and health for Jack Willis and his fiancée, Mary. The next: death... or life as a quadriplegic. For while he was body surfing on the beach at Southampton, a wave broke Jack Willis's neck.

"...But There Are Always Miracles" is his true story. His and Mary's. The story of weeks in traction, tubes and tongs in his helpless body, operations, bleak days and bleaker nights. And then the miracle: Jack was able to get the first of nine hundred dead muscles to move.

This is a book to make you ache with compassion and weep with admiration for the courage and honesty of these two people – and to cheer for their miracle and for their never-ceasing hope that it would happen.

"A beautiful story of courage, love,andelible will of human beings."

Photo by Jeff Young

Kissinger Completes
Parley With Syrian;
Silence on Results

8/25/74
by Timas

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 (Reuters)—The Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam, today concluded a series of talks on the Middle East in a one-hour meeting with Secretary of State Kissinger at the White House.

No statement was issued after the meeting. Mr. Kissinger said earlier that it had never been intended to put out a communiqué on the talks, although communiqués were issued following talks here with King Hussein of Jordan and Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy of Egypt.

Today's meeting was an addition to Mr. Khaddam's schedule. Sitting in on the talks was the United States ambassador to Syria, Richard W. Murphy.

Officials said they did not view the absence of a communiqué or the additional meeting as a sign that the talks had foundered.

The series of discussions on the Middle East is intended to lay the groundwork for a new round of peace negotiations in Geneva. Two more visitors are scheduled—Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf of Saudi Arabia and Premier Yitzhak Rabin of Israel.

With a New Boss
Kissinger Seeks
New Arms Talks

Secretary of State Kissinger has disclosed an overture by President Ford to Moscow for an "intensified effort" to reach agreement on strategic arms limitations, and the initiative may have signaled the renewal of a struggle within Washington's national-security bureaucracy. In that contest, the combatants are usually described —in too-simplified fashion—as the "moderates" led by Mr. Kissinger and the "conservatives" led by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Senator Henry M. Jackson.

The disagreements between the Kissinger and the Schlesinger-Jackson camps are not over matters of substance. Both groups support the current level of military spending and the essential strategic concepts of the Pentagon. Their differences center on other questions, primarily the following:

* **Negotiating goals.** Should the United States strive for a comprehensive agreement, replacing the current temporary ceilings on offensive missiles with a permanent limitation, or should the next round of talks be confined to control of multiple warheads, on which the Americans have a commanding lead? Mr. Kissinger favors the broader, Mr. Schlesinger the narrower, approach.

* **Negotiating tactics.** Should the United States, as Mr. Schlesinger holds, stake out a position and hold to it, to impress the Russians with American determination and make them yield; or, as Mr. Kissinger prefers, should the American team take a more flexible approach?

* **Meaning of numbers.** The two camps disagree on how much of an edge the United States can give the Russians in numbers of missiles to compensate for the American technological lead. Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Jackson believe numbers project an image of strength that could influence allies and adversaries. Mr. Kissinger places less importance on this psychological effect, inasmuch as both countries have enough missiles to destroy each other many times over.

The next round of talks is set for September, but some observers doubt the American position can be agreed upon in time. A postponement is possible.

Attorney
tonomous F.B.I.; a lower White House
would, by reducing the President's
aff, make him less able to do mischief.
atergate committee has recommended
ent of an independent public attorney.
ermanent special prosecutor so that
y those in high office might be pur-
interference by politically motivated
ral. The danger in freeing law enforce-
ns from political control is that they
accountability to the public.

It comes down to is the capacity
system to produce better men than
After Watergate, as before, our coun-
ren who have the intelligence and
us strong leadership. It is painful to
at they should in addition have an
acquired respect for the rights of
should be capable of self-restraint,
should be personally honest. Such
President, and our own vigilance, are
against future Watergates.

well to imagine an Archibald Cox,
ski, fearlessly prosecuting scoundrels
chell sought to protect. But what if
erector were a Joe McCarthy, vested
estigative and prosecutorial powers,
from removal during a fixed term?
I. liberated from the President's and
ral's political control, began investi-
gn-born citizens? And how could a
resident be certain that a bigoted, inde-
red Attorney General would enforce
laws? Justice can be shaped by politi-
ons under the present system, and
ad thing. But it would be much worse
our ultimate protection against per-
nsible politics.

hat the Presidency can be forced back
proportions by reducing its budget
to be said for it, at least psychologi-
t number of technicians and staff.
s a modern President may, in time,
ccustomed to almost universal defer-
e about him, he may assume that he
are entitled to it from the public at
is to do his job well, if he is to be
sprawling, often unresponsive agen-
ment according to policies that the
when they elected him, he must be
sted. The Presidency can do without
copters and parade hats (and certain-
bers units), but it must have enough
ors.

e institutional attempts to meet the
dem, or the swollen-Presidency prob-
have prevented the cover-up. Those
succeeded in limiting Mr. Nixon's
power would also have impeded a
the proper use of it.

It is a Washington attorney who was
President Johnson.

# Cyprus: Whose Crisis Is It?

By WILLIAM V. SHANNON
(c) New York Times News Service

WASHINGTON — The Ford Presidency has begun with another of those futile, irrelevant "crises" that have distracted and worn down American presidents for so many years now.

On Tuesday, Aug. 13, Secretary of State Kissinger, called away from dinner at the Egyptian embassy to be told of the Turkish decision to conquer northern Cyprus by military force, awakened President Ford with a telephone call to pass on the news.

As the Turkish Army advanced that night, Ford had his rest disturbed by two more bulletins.

DURING THE next several days, worse was to follow. Kissinger took up the President's time giving him lengthy briefings on each new Cyprus development. Ford's prestige was needlessly deployed by an invitation to Greek Premier Constantine Caramanlis to come to see him. His prestige was then diminished when Caramanlis, quite properly from his standpoint, rejected the invitation.

Now the American ambassador in Cyprus has been murdered, and U.S. senators are roiling the water with attacks on American military aid to Turkey.

IT IS TIME to call a halt to all this nonsense. Cyprus ought not to be an American responsibility. The crisis there is no direct concern of the American President or the American people. The military defense of the U.S., and its major European allies does not depend on anything Greece or Turkey can do.

The populations of what are now Greece and Turkey were fighting one another 2,000 years before the U.S. was founded. In all likelihood, they

will be fighting one another when Kissinger and Ford are forgotten names in a dusty history book.

There are some controversies — such as those between Greek and Turk, between Protestant and Catholic Irish in Ulster and between Hindu and Moslem on the Indian subcontinent — that are so ancient, so complicated and so bitter that only the participants can fully comprehend the memories and emotions that are involved. Those participants should be left to sort them out by themselves.

THE BRITISH after World War 2 decided that they could no longer be policeman and judge in other people's quarrels. Only in Ulster are they still engaging in this profitless pursuit. The United States ought to emulate their discreet withdrawals and stop trying to manage the unmanageable.

This country is now the scapegoat for the defeat of the Greek Cypriots because we have unwisely involved ourselves far too deeply in Greek affairs. Under the Johnson Administration, this country apparently gave the Greek colonels a tacit go-ahead to overthrow the civilian government installed by King Constantine. Under the Nixon Administration, we went out of our way to show approval of the Greek junta, even shifting the Sixth Fleet's base from Italy to Greece. For many years, the Central Intelligence Agency has paid bribes to important Greek politicians and Army officers.

This whole record of American meddling in Greek internal affairs is morally obscene. It is profoundly repugnant to everything the United States used to stand for in the world — and ought to stand for again — that our government should be using our money to pay Greek thugs to suppress freedom in that country, to torture people and to drive Greek intellectuals and artists into exile. Nothing the U.S. has gained in military "security"

in the Mediterranean in the past decade could justify this squalid involvement.

IF THE U.S. had kept the Sixth Fleet based in Italy, which has a friendly, democratic government, if we had maintained a detached, diplomatically correct relationship with successive Greek governments, and if we had stayed strictly neutral in previous Greek-Turkish arguments about Cyprus, the present crisis would be none of our affair.

Now that Turkey has at least for the time being resolved the Cyprus dispute by the harsh arbi-trament of force, it would be a further mistake for the U.S. to try to undo that decision by military or diplomatic pressure. This country is not called upon to be an "honest broker" in this affair.

Secretary Kissinger is faintly ridiculous in offering to fly to Cyprus to reconcile the antagonists. He appears to mistake himself for a medieval Pope who cannot allow two distant tribes to go to war without his pronouncing on the respective rights and wrongs and offering to mediate.

Let Sen. Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut and his colleagues also stay their hands. There is no need for mischievous amendments to cut off military aid or for bringing up the irrelevant issue of Turkish opium growing. Turkey is not going to be intimidated. As for Turkish heroin, every addition study shows the health of America's youth is in far greater danger from Kentucky bourbon and North Carolina tobacco.

Most of the real problems confronting America are here at home. It is time we had a president and a Congress who concentrated on them. If Secretary Kissinger wants to call someone late at night, let him call his mother.

THE WASHINGTON POST, SUNDAY, AUGUST 25, 1974

Joseph Kraft

Ford's Foreign Agenda

> "The easing of tension with the Communist world can only be managed safely in the context of cooperation between the United States and its friends."

The Cyprus issue is not, as some imagine, an irrelevant nuisance which serves only to mar the debut of President Ford. On the contrary, it reflects in small the large problem which heads the foreign policy agenda for the whole Ford administration. That is the matter of reknitting relations with this country's friends and allies, notably in Europe.

At the root of the problem is a dramatic waning of the cold war. The European allies are no longer afraid of Soviet aggression.

China has entered the world system and virtually abandoned revolutionary subversion. There is an easing of pressure on regimes in Asia, the Mideast, Africa and Latin America. In effect, the confrontation which gave shape to world politics in the postwar era has dissolved and there is now no dominant structure in world affairs.

The absence of structure defines the new perils to international security. Probably the most immediate threat to security all over the world arises from antagonism between countries once linked by their mutual security arrangements with the United States—Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan, and Israel and the Arab states.

The second most immediate danger lies in the winding down of authoritarian regimes sustained in the past by the United States as a part of the anti-Communist cause. Countries in Europe (Spain, Portugal and Greece), Africa

(Ethiopia and Morocco), Latin America (Paraguay and Brazil) and the Far East (South Vietnam and South Korea) all fit the category.

Competition for status between this country and its friends also has nefarious affects. Even the easing of tension with the Communist world can only be managed safely in the context of cooperation between the United States and its friends. A bidding for the favors of Moscow makes detente dangerous.

Finally, there is inflation. It is in large measure an international issue—the biggest spur comes from the hike in oil prices by the cartel of producing countries. Next there is the food shortage, and after that the bidding up of other commodities in the international marketplace. Unless the main trading countries cooperate in managing their economies, the effort to check inflation will either fail or, worse, lead by a concatenation of deflationary measures to a spreading world recession.

No rule book exists for reviving

friendly and allied relationships. But a couple of important lessons may be learned from the failure to fulfill the promise of what, in 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called the year of Europe.

For one thing, military security cannot be the handle. The Europeans and Japanese did not respond last year, nor will they in the future, merely because the United States intimates that they may be in danger. Rightly or wrongly, no one is scared anymore. The appeal has to be based on political cooperation, not on a covert threat to security.

Secondly, no progress can be made against the grain of internal politics. President Georges Pompidou of France stood to gain politically by a show of spitting in the American eye. Prime Minister Edward Heath in Britain and Chancellor Willy Brandt in West Germany preferred the wrath of Washington to the wrath of Paris. In Japan, Kakuei Tanaka apparently calculated that his best interest was to

show that he did not need American patronage to cut deals with China and Russia.

Now there's an unmistakable change. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a strong leader who is more American than the Americans in his approach to security and inflation, has become the decisive figure in Europe. The new leaders in France and Britain—Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Harold Wilson —do not have complexes about their relations with Washington. Rampant inflation, not to mention a poor showing at the polls, should presumably have taught Mr. Tanaka a lesson.

Conditions, in other words, are far better now than they were last year. The important thing is to find an occasion for beginning the reknitting. Presumably it will have to come after the elections this November. Almost certainly it should precede further steps toward detente with the Communist world.

Perhaps the right vehicle could be a visit abroad by the new President. An even better opportunity probably will come when the foreign leaders begin to pay their calls on Mr. Ford. For this time the state visits will not be pure formalities. There is critical work to be done in rebuilding harmonious relationships, and that work ought to be the central foreign policy objective of the Ford administration.

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

Syrian Sees Kissinger,
Concludes Talks Here

Reuter

Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam yesterday concluded a series of talks on the Middle East with a one-hour meeting with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at the White House.

No statement was issued after the meeting. Kissinger said earlier that it had never been intended to put out a communique on the Khaddam talks, although communiques were issued after talks with Jordan's King Hussein and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi.

Yesterday's meeting was an addition to Khaddam's schedule. Sitting in on the talks was the ambassador to Syria, Richard Murphy.

U.S. officials said they did not view the absence of a communique or the additional meeting as a sign that the talks had foundered.

The series of discussions between Kissinger and emissaries from Israel and its Arab neighbors is intended to lay

the groundwork for a new round of peace negotiations in Geneva. Two more visitors are scheduled—Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf and Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin.

Khaddam's visit was made against a background of an increase of tensions in the Middle East, with Israel announcing plans to hold a practice mobilization and reports of a new arms buildup in Syria.

Khaddam met President Ford on Friday. The White House said afterward that Mr. Ford viewed the minister's visit as underlining the importance the United States attached to the Syrian role in peace-making.

A spokesman said the President had told Khaddam that he was determined to strengthen Syrian-American relations and had expressed pleasure at the progress made since diplomatic relations were re-established on June 16.

NIXON POLICY: 'THAT OF A MUCH-TRAVELED PROVINCIAL'

Ex-French Minister Assesses an Ex-President

BY MICHEL JOBERT

So Gerald Rudolph Ford has become the
38th President of the most powerful nation
on earth, through a quirk of history and a
constitutional detour. And he has nominat-
ed as Vice President Nelson Rockefeller,
who will take his seat in the antechamber
where others have waited sometimes with-
out any hope. Nixon was one of those who
waited in the '50s.

Today, with his career having run its full
course of triumphs and defeat, the former
President is reduced to taking walks in the
beautiful garden of his San Clemente
home, where Henry Kissinger explained to
me in July, 1973, the virtues of the political
nuclear treaty signed with the Soviets on
June 23. Has Nixon really thrown in the
towel? A politician never renounces the
image of himself as a man of action.

Will the world recall Nixon's work once
the controversy has died down, and what
will Americans remember of a period dom-
inated by Nixon's measured smile and his
usually made-up features? Seldom had the
United States looked more powerful in a
rearguard fight.

It was already so on the domestic front,
remember. First there were disorders on
the campuses, and then in the streets.
Whole city blocks blazed. The great repub-
lic was going to pay for its colonial past,
and wouldn't even the country which has
absorbed so many different faces also end
up by no longer being able to distinguish
those that were black? Nothing has been
settled so far, but the cities are not going
up in smoke, and "streaking"—artlessly
fresh from the garden of Eden—is what
agitates the campuses.

Under Nixon, the United States' econom-
ic life didn't stagnate, but saw change.
Americans got used to two ideas which
they seem to abhor: devaluation of the dol-
lar and rising prices. What was important
for Americans was that they should not
suffer as a result. With the power to back
them, they had an easy time passing on
their problems to all their customers who
can only count, buy or sell in dollars.
There is always a solution abroad to diffi-
culties at home, and every nation in the
world acknowledges this readily—so long
as it is in their interest that America

should be in a sound position. The interna-
tional monetary system made willing vic-
tims of them.

Nixon's foreign policy—that of a much-
traveled provincial—managed to glorify
the national idea and dismiss the puerile
isolationism deep in every American heart.
Taking over from France in Indochina, the
United States got bogged down there and
had to get disengaged. This was the advice
an irritated Charles de Gaulle gave and
which Nixon, who admired him, later fol-
lowed. The war continued in Vietnam, but
it was no longer a domestic issue.

The dialogue with the U.S.S.R. had broken down, and in China it was still the rober American who got thrashed in plays obviously meant for mass consumption.

Known for his anti-American policies,
Michel Jobert was the foreign minister of
France until late May. This article is from
Le Monde.

Rockefeller's journey to Latin America
ended in riots, and the Third World knew
that the key to their chains lay in a colon-
naded palace on the banks of the Potomac.
The Soviet Union kept steadily and suc-
cessfully infiltrating the Mediterranean and
the Indian Ocean. As for Europe, it was do-
cile and its ambitions vague. Only Gen. de
Gaulle spoke real home-truths, but May,
1968, stripped him of power. His successor
remained.

Nixon managed to get along with all this
by flattering national consciousness not
only in his own country but also all over
the world. Who can deny that he has left
behind a country more powerful, more re-
spected and even more accepted? Look at
the changed attitudes in Romania, Egypt,
Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan and
black Africa.

Now Kissinger is turning his charms on
Latin America. They had already worked
in China and in Russia—even on the public
there. They are having a far greater effect
on European peoples' republics than these
countries care to admit. In 1973, Europe,
egged on by France, seemed to have be-
come a problem. Who in America today
worries about that?

Nothing ideological in that. With Nixon,

the United States chose to be attentive to
the world, understanding the truth that it
is a world power and that, on the whole
(or in the main), it is well suited to be one.
Nixon probably failed to persuade all the
citizens of all 50 states of this, but in the
United States it would have been enough
for the administration to accept it as true,
for the Army to welcome it, for the busi-
ness world, never slow to seize an opportu-
nity, to profit from it. And the machine
would sensibly run on, its operations caus-
ing no concern.

Never did a President seem to have
more power in his hands. Weakened
though he was by the scandal over politi-
cal spying, he was able to gather around
him—when he arrived in Paris to attend
the French president's funeral—statesmen
who were eager and overjoyed to be seen
in his company. It cannot be doubted that
he did a great deal for his country.

What of the future, now that Nixon with
his stubborn determination and policies has
been replaced by a courteous figure? It
would be tempting to say that little or
nothing would be changed. Kissinger is still
in place, all-knowing and learning from
setbacks to temper his stubbornness. The
American government is aware of the
country's worldwide economic and ideolog-
ical interests, and will abandon none.

Only the weakness or the languidness of a
nonelected President could cloud so much
determination. We too, in France, have our
doubts about vice presidencies and plans
which would remove candidates to the
post of President of the Republic from the
people's direct suffrage.

ngeles man with impor-
t political connections.
The case, made by agents
to the Treasury Depart-
ent's Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms Bureau, was
considered ironclad — but
was never prosecuted.

"We're really picking up
the pieces after the Water-
gate committee." said
Manuel, "and there seems
to be plenty of pieces left."

Considering the myriad
possible directions the cur-
rent probe could take, one
investigator was asked if it
could eclipse Watergate.

He arched his eyebrows
and answered simply:

"Yeah."

Both Vesco and Richard-
son, investigators said,
have denied any knowl-

edge of the reported gun-
running that led to seizure
of the stockbroker's jet.

In a reply to authorities
in San Juan, Costa Rica,
Vesco called the gun
charges "ridiculous and
absurd," but made no men-
tion of the call girl airlift.

Richardson told The
Times it would have been
"impossible" for his Lear
Jet Model 25 to have trans-
ported either women or
weapons to Costa Rica.

In support of his denial,
he exhibited a contract
showing he had leased the
plane to a Texas company
from May 22, 1973, to Feb.
22, 1974, for $13,500 a
month.

The Texas firm con-
firmed it had "custody" of

the aircraft from the 1973
date until at least Feb. 11
of this year.

However, The Times
learned the Senate investi-
gators have developed
evidence which appears to
contradict this claim —
showing that Richardson
controlled the executive
jet at least as early as last
January.

Richardson leased the
plane out at the end of
April to a firm called
"Connex Press, Inc.," con-
trolled by Norman Le-
Blanc, a Canadian associ-
ate of Vesco.

Between February and
April of this year, Richard-
son conceded he had flown
to Costa Rica "two or three
times" to visit Vesco. But

he insisted "only three
women went along" on
any trip — his girlfriend
and the wife and sister of
his personal pilot.

For months, the Senate
probers have been examin-
ing the curious circum-
stances surrounding an
undercover agent's claim
that Vesco had planned to
bankroll a $300,000 heroin
smuggling scheme.

The undercover opera-
tive, Frank Peroff, con-
tends federal agents
backed away from the al-
leged smuggling plot after
he told them that Vesco
was supposed to be the fi-
nancier.

Vesco has vehemently
denied any connection
with the scheme.

Peroff worked as an in-
former for three U.S. agen-
cies—Customs, the Drug
Enforcement Administra-
tion and Secret Service—
as well as for French and
Canadian authorities.

He reportedly obtained
information about Vesco's
involvement from the re-
puted organizer of the
smuggling plot in which
federal agents had pre-
viously expressed high in-
terest.

But, Peroff said when
Vesco's name came up, the
investigation collapsed.

About a year ago, the in-
vestigators said, Peroff
contacted the Senate sub-
committee and gave mem-
bers evidence to support
his claims.

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Associated Press

FIDDLING — Sen. Robert C. Byrd plays his fiddle for West Virginia Broadcasters

Association. Group gave the Democrat its first citizens award, shown at right.

# Analysis of Donors' Blood Finds Monoxide Level High

MONOXIDE, From A1

levels are higher than we

per cent above 1.5 per cent; 1.5 per cent average).

Washington and its

live where there are faulty furnaces — common in inner

The Ford administration's conditional amnesty plan will require at least "an act of contrition" and, at most, two years of work in public service, Attorney General William B. Saxbe said yesterday.

"What we're talking about is that we're going to give these people a chance if they want it," Saxbe said in a discussion of proposals for allowing Vietnam-era draft dodgers to escape prison sentences.

"And it's not going to involve prison," he continued "We're going to say 'you come back and you're not going to prison.'"

The Attorney General discussed the issue in an interview on the public television program, "Martin Agronsky: Evening Edition."

President Ford has asked for Justice and Defense Department proposals for ways to allow fugitive draft evaders and deserters to return to the United States on certain conditions. The plan also would affect violators living underground in this country and probably those who already have been convicted of draft evasion.

Saxbe said he envisions a system applied on a case-by-case basis.

He said the administration will insist on "an act of contri

said today that President Ford has asked him to stay on temporarily and help reorganize the White House staff.

"He wants me to carry on for a while to handle some of the problems on personnel and I said I'd give him an answer Wednesday night," Scranton told a newsman in

Downtown Stores

At G Str
Odds

# How to Lose an Ally

## By Graham Hovey

Secretary of State Kissinger still seems oblivious to the dimensions of the disaster sustained by United States foreign policy in the Cyprus tragedy and insensitive to the hurt of people who feel let down by Washington.

How else explain his ill-timed offer to mediate the Cyprus crisis and his bland invitation to a harried Greek Premier to come to Washington to talk things over—at a time when Turkey was grabbing the northern third of Cyprus and drawing only a wrist tap from the State Department?

Did Mr. Kissinger really believe that Greece's Premier Caramanlis or Foreign Minister Mavros could accept a summons to Washington at that point and survive? As former United States Under Secretary of State George Ball said, the Kissinger mediation offer in that context exhibited "an insensitivity beyond belief."

And at whom was Mr. Kissinger aiming his warning of last week that "a foreign government must not expect that every time there is a crisis, the Secretary of State will come rushing into the area and spend all his time settling that particular crisis?" Was anyone asking for what he grandly calls "the personal shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary of State"?

Mr. Kissinger did promise that in any negotiation, Washington would "take into full account Greek honor and dignity," but he felt it necessary to add a warning that this country would "not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the [NATO] alliance" nor by unjustified anti-American demonstrations.

But the Secretary surely misreads

the political signals from Athens if he regards the pullout of Greek forces from NATO and the anti-American demonstrations merely as ploys by the Caramanlis Government, rather than reflections of utter disillusionment with an alliance and a superpower ally that could not prevent Turkey's blitz and Greece's humiliation on Cyprus.

In fact, Mr. Kissinger's trouble from the onset of the Cyprus crisis has been a lack, in dealing with allies, of the sensitivity that was an ingredient of his success in the Middle East and Vietnam negotiations, as well as in the initiatives that led to President Nixon's visits to China and the Soviet Union.

The United States is not omnipotent and, as Mr. Kissinger reminds us, can-not stop "every local war between smaller nations." No one can prove that any feasible Washington effort this time would have halted Turkey's invasion of Cyprus.

One is forced to recall, however, that President Johnson twice got Turkey to call off a scheduled invasion of Cyprus: In 1964, with a tough letter to Premier Inonu; in 1967, through a skillful, even-handed negotiating job by envoy Cyrus Vance.

Once a shaky military regime in Athens had staged a putsch against President Makarios, clearly aimed at enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece—there was only one way to prevent Turkish intervention: to demonstrate that Greece would not be allowed to get by with it. Washington could have made the point by backing Britain in refusing to recognize the new Cyprus regime and in demanding that Athens recall the Greek officers who had directed the coup.

Instead, the United States gave Tur-

key and the world every reason to believe it accepted the coup. Washington refused to pin responsibility for it on the Greek dictatorship and even hinted that on Cyprus it preferred the swaggering murderer, Nikos Sampson, to the devious Makarios.

Turkey's initial invasion of July 20 was the inevitable result. This at least accomplished the salutary secondary results of blasting out of power both Sampson and the Athens junta. At that point the imperative was to persuade Turkey to go no further.

Ankara had made its point: it would not accept enosis and it intended at any cost to protect the Turkish Cypriote minority. The Turks could now negotiate from strength. They could expect American and British backing for constitutional revisions to give the Turkish Cypriotes a large measure of autonomy.

But the invasion had been heady wine for Turkey and Washington again seemed to blow a timid trumpet. At the showdown in Geneva, Turkey presented a drastic plan for division of Cyprus as an ultimatum, refusing to give the Greeks and Greek Cypriotes even a 36-hour recess to concult.

Turkey's blitz killed hundreds, displaced some 200,000, sowed new seeds for protracted intercommunity strife, provoked Greece into pulling its forces out of NATO, and increased instability in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It also dealt a heavy blow at United States credibility and the reputation of Henry A. Kissinger. More's the pity that he seems not to understand why.

Graham Hovey is a member of the Editorial Board of The Times.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, Aug. 26, 1974

C27

# Greece to Shut All Its NATO Bases

By Jack Anderson

Public statements to the contrary, Greece is already making plans to shut down every NATO base in the country within a year, thus leaving a gaping hole in the fabric of the Western world's defense systems.

So secret are the new Athens civilian government's plans that even top U. S. officials are unaware of the seriousness of the threat. Just a few days ago, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was speaking honestly when he said he had "little indication" of such a move.

Our information, however, from high but confidential diplomatic sources who backed up their talk with documents, is that the NATO shutdown is already a matter of Athens policy, barring a radical change in the current U.S. attitude toward Cyprus.

The importance of the Greek NATO bases is difficult to overestimate. Naval, bomber, missile and communications facilities in Greece give NATO a striking power directly beneath the belly of Soviet Russia and her satellites.

At the same time that Greece was setting its course on NATO, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was assuring a private meeting with President Ford and Republican leaders that the U.S. policy on Cyprus is neutral.

"We have made major efforts to elicit concessions from both the Greeks and the Turks," he said, according to confidential minutes of the White House meeting. "We will take a new look if the Turks cross the cease-fire line."

The restive Republicans wondered why Kissinger had not simply halted aid to Turkey. Kissinger replied, according to the minutes, that this "would not have stopped the three-day occupation."

Indeed, Kissinger warned, such drastic action "Would have enormous consequences on NATO, Turkish nationalism and (the) possible approach to the Soviet Union." One "possible solution," Kissinger said, "may be a federalized republic or a Cantonal structure" — in short, a semi-partitioning of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey each controlling part of the island.

Added President Ford hopefully, "I think we'll come out all right as friends of both parties."

Kissinger also met privately with five congressmen of Greek descent who gave him a far more obstreperous going over than the Republican leaders. One of the Greek-American legislators who attended the off-the-record meeting told us they tore into Kissinger "in a manner to which he is unaccustomed."

The congressmen were Louis Bafalis, (R-Fla.), John Brademas

(D-Ind.), Peter Kyros, (D-Maine) Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), and Gus Yatron (D-Pa.). At one point, they told Kissinger he was personally responsible for a "grievous policy. The U.S. has egg all over its face."

The strong-willed Kissinger was "patient" but "stuttered, reeled back and reddened" under the onslaught, we were told. At one point he left the meeting for a telephone conversation with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. But at the end of the meeting, Kissinger courteously invited the lawmakers to come back again.

Despite appearances of evenhandedness, we are told by high diplomatic sources that Kissinger tentatively and confidentially agreed in recent meetings with British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham to a Cyprus plan drawn up in London.

To the distress of the Greeks, it would, in effect, chop Cyprus into Greek and Turkish enclaves. The Turks would make an ostentatious pull-back to a line running across the northern third of the island to pacify world opinion a move they had intended anyway.

When the plan was delicately put to deposed Cypriot president Archibishop Makarios in London by Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Calla-

ghan, the peppery Makarios was outraged, we were told.

In Athens, Greek leaders are also fuming. For years, they have gone along with almost every twist and turn in American policy, while the Turks have often refused to cooperate with Washington. A few weeks ago, for instance, Turkey defied the United States and resumed cultivation of opium.

Meanwhile, we have learned that Athens risked her good relations with the Arabs by secretly permitting the United States to use Greek NATO bases for shuttling supplies to Israel during the Middle East war last October. As a result, Israel is secretly grateful to Greece and hopes it will keep its NATO ties.

During the October War, Greece also allowed U.S. intelligence services to use a communications station outside Athens to monitor Soviet and Arab radio broadcasts. Turkey, on the other hand, reportedly permitted the Soviets to overfly her territory to deliver arms to the Arabs.

Footnote: At the State Department, a spokesman denied Greek bases were used by the United States to resupply Israel. He also said the British initiative was not yet "developed." It does not have any "arms or legs" yet, he said.

©1974, United Feature Syndicate

Reflections on the 72-Hour Week [LCT

AS PRESIDENT FORD proceeds to restore a sense of balance and perspective to government, he might consider the virtues of a 50-hour week for the men who serve him. Far longer hours have become, over the years, a collective bad habit among senior officials—a kind of perverse status symbol. Long days and nights have always been the style during crises, but it was in the Kennedy administration that they became routine. The 75-hour week has become the customary demonstration of devotion, stamina and general machismo. Whether it has invariably improved the quality of government is very much open to doubt.

Conventional fatigue is only part of the effect on men whose office schedules invariably begin with the crack-of-dawn staff meetings and run well into the evenings. The man who spends literally all of his time on his work begins to drift out of touch with the world as most others know it. The dangers of isolation in the life of the palace were well demonstrated in President Johnson's administration, let alone President Nixon's.

The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is currently setting a flabbergasting record of vigor and endurance. But the very breadth of his activities creates difficulties for him and for American foreign policy. They were neatly illustrated in a passing exchange with a reporter several days ago. The reporter asked if the Secretary were willing to undertake an attempt at shuttle diplomacy on Cyprus. "What?" responded the Secretary. "Start a shuttle between Nicosia and what's that town in the south. . . . Yes, if they asked." The Secretary is backing himself into a box. Foreign governments are increasingly persuaded that unless Mr. Kissinger takes up an issue personally and does the negotiating himself the United States is indicating that it does not take the matter very seriously. As a method of statecraft, it

takes inadequate account of the possibility that there may even be limits to Mr. Kissinger's endurance.

The Secretary of State is not the only example in the present Cabinet. William E. Simon's hypertonic schedule may have been temporarily necessary last winter when he was organizing a new agency, the Federal Energy Office. But he has let that frantic pace become his normal one now that he is Secretary of the Treasury. He arrives early, works through meals, leaves late and tries to be in the middle of every question that has—or might sometime conceivably have—any importance whatever. Like the example at the State Department, the performance commands respect. But it raises troubling questions about the over-centralization of immensely important public business on one man.

When the man at the top sets a killing pace, a wide circle of his staff get drawn into it. As time goes on, the less desirable effects of the 72-hour week become more pronounced while the advantages diminish. Moderation is a difficult virtue to preach in a city like Washington that loves drama and panache. A lot of voters evidently take comfort in the idea that they are governed by men of superhuman ability, and for some years have applauded those people in succeeding administrations who could stand up under the burden of very long and draining days. But the results of this hyperactive approach are not uniformly encouraging, to say the least. Perhaps we have now arrived at a moment in the rhythm of the country's life to think twice about the usefulness of perpetual motion as a political style. With more time to devote to relaxation and reflection, our leaders and policymakers might have thought better of some of the follies of recent years—the Bay of Pigs, say, or the Tonkin Gulf Resolution or the Watergate cover-up. At the very least, there would have been less time available for carrying them out.

Cuba Stance Eased

8-29-74

By Laurence Stern and Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writers

President Ford yesterday signaled a significant softening in the oft-repeated public U.S. stand opposing a relaxation of economic and political sanctions against Cuba.

The President laid heavy stress on U.S. action "in concert with" members of the Organization of American States, where there has been a strong surge of support for ending the 1964 hemispheric sanctions against the Cubans.

Official analysts here concede that as many as two-thirds of the OAS permanent council — certainly a majority — are now prepared to vote for an end to the economic blockade and support restoration of diplomatic relations with Havana.

OAS Secretary-General Galo Plaza of Ecuador acclaimed Mr. Ford's statement on Cuba and observed that "it is clear that a majority of the countries [in OAS] are now willing to lift the sanctions against Cuba."

He added that it is "highly satisfying to hear that President Ford intends to act through the mechanisms of the OAS."

The President said that U.S. policy toward Cuba "is determined by the sanctions voted by the Organization of American States, and we abide by those actions that were taken by the members of that organization."

He also said that the United States would exercise the option "to change our policy" if, as he put it, "Cuba changes its policy toward us and toward its Latin neighbors." In pursuing any such action, he added, "we would certainly act in concert with the other members" of the OAS.

It is widely conceded at official levels in Washington that the Cubans long ago abandoned the effort to export socialist revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere. The chief political justification for the 1964 sanctions was to repel the spread of insurrectionary socialist movements from Havana to other Latin American countries.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in the past has suggested to Latin American foreign ministers that they not rush the Cuban issue to confrontation.

There was also apprehensiveness within the administration about the effect of an abrupt reversal on Cuban policy before the November elections. Mr. Ford's statement yesterday was the first hint of a new flexibility on the question.

See DIPLOMACY, A19, Col. 7

Secretary Butz, left, and
Market Commissioner Lardinois
explain mutu-
European p

ajó Leaders See
Key to Strife in N.

ol W. Cagle

The Washington Post

TON, N.M., Aug.
leaders charged to-
the white power
e is engaging in a
ort to exploit and
dian culture.

Navajo people
freedom, no pur-
e,” said Wilbert
ler of the Coali-
vajo Liberation.
ajo people have
swallow the bit-
te racism, white
exploitation.”

other Navajos
and county offi-
lying before the
advisory commit-
S. Civil Rights
which opened
hearings on ra-
n this area.

divisions were
by the “welcom-
of Farmington
Webb, the lead-
of the coalition,
to “the many
arges and insinu-
have been made
together under
tances.”

residents, Webb
hearings as “an
t is uncalled for
less spending of
rs.”

glo teen-agers were charged in connection with the murders and the newly formed coalition began a series of public marches and demonstrations.

"Nazism is alive and well hidden in the lily-white community of Farmington," said John Redhouse, a Farmington high school graduate and University of New Mexico student. He charged Anglos with the "illegal occupation and trespass on stolen Navajo land" and said, "The growth of Farmington's economy is based on continued exploitation of our resources."

Noting that the city govern-
ment has recently approve

# President Hints Softer Stance on Cuba

## DIPLOMACY, From A1

OAS Secretary-General Plaza indicated yesterday that there has been strong pressure within the OAS for a meeting of the permanent council within the next two months to deal with the Cuban question.

The foreign ministers of Costa Rica, Venezuela and Columbia have been pressing for OAS action designed to normalize Cuba's political place in the hemisphere. Venezuela was the initiator of the 1964 motion in the OAS to impose the sanctions against Havana.

Panama quietly last week sent a full diplomatic mission to Havana, ending the 10-year rupture of relations with Cuba. This action is expected to be followed by other moves to restore diplomatic relations.

While most of the questions at the press conference involved domestic affairs, President Ford dealt with several other foreign policy issues.

Mr. Ford said that an effort is under way to develop a U.S. position for the next round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Pentagon and State Department officials said negotiations will resume in Geneva in the second half of September.

The President said that there is now "an effort being made to bring the Department of Defense, the State Department and others together for a resolution of...the United States position regarding SALT II. This decision will be made in the relatively near future. I don't think there is any basic difficulty that cannot be resolved internally within our government."

Differences were known to have existed between Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger as to the timing and tactics on a SALT agreement prior to the last Moscow summit. These were superseded by the decision to conclude a 10-year agreement. Administration officials say the current discussions within the U.S. government have not reached a point where there are fixed departmental positions that require a presidential decision.

President Ford said Kissinger would be meeting with representatives from the Soviet Union "in the near future, I think in October." This was a reference to a trip Kissinger is planning in late October to discuss with Soviet leaders prospects for a SALT agreement.

Kissinger told reporters yesterday that he is also considering a brief separate trip to the Middle East in mid-October, before the Soviet visit, to expediate negotiations toward a settlement there. That trip, to unspecified Middle East capitals, would follow talks here with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and meetings with various foreign ministers in September at the time of the opening of the U.N. General Assembly.

The President yesterday sidestepped a question about

moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a suggestion he had made in 1972.

"Under the current circumstance and the importance of getting a just and lasting peace in the Middle East," he said, "I think that particular proposal ought to stand aside. We must come up with some answers between Israel and the Arab nations in order to achieve a peace that is both fair and durable."

For Keeping the Heat On

[L.C.]

Times 8-29-74

By Francis L. Loewenheim

HOUSTON—Since Richard M. Nixon's resignation, several themes have dominated public discussion of the departed Administration.

The first was sounded by President Ford in his brief remarks after taking the oath of office, when he declared that "our long national nightmare is over." The second is the even more frequently heard assertion that while Mr. Nixon, despite his famous protestation, may well have been "a crook," he was a considerable success in foreign policy, and fortunately for all of us left behind Secretary of State Kissinger, who helped to make possible those achievements in foreign affairs.

From these assumptions, most people—many in the press and perhaps a majority on Capitol Hill—appear to be drawing two conclusions. One is that now that Mr. Nixon is out of office he should not be hounded with further investigations, indictments and threats of imprisonment. The other is that we should by all means continue the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy.

I dissent. Indeed, I believe that we

would be committing grave errors of judgment and public policy by terminating investigations of the Nixon scandals and by continuing the foreign policies.

How was it possible that the Congress and the news media had no inkling of the nature and scope of Mr. Nixon's designs and schemes until they began to be uncovered in the aftermath of the Watergate break-in?

What are we to make of those of Mr. Nixon's close associates who sat by silently while the unprecedented scandals of his Administration became a matter of public record?

Is there any possible connection between a self-styled "law-and-order" Administration that at home turned out to be the most lawless in American history, and abroad made far-reaching and dangerous concessions to the Soviet Union, China, their allies and satellites—concessions the full meaning and magnitude of which most of our people probably still do not understand?

It should have come as no surprise that an Administration that seemed to have no scruples about violating the laws at home, that evidently believed that the end justified the means, would not hesitate about entering into compacts, agreements and understandings, published and otherwise, with the utterly unprincipled rulers in Moscow, Peking, Hanoi and East Berlin.

Nor should it have come as a surprise that a President who was perfectly willing to do, or to permit, almost anything to achieve his domestic political objectives would turn around and toast the leaders of the most brutal and ruthless dictatorships in their capitals and ours—and call the result "détente" and "building a structure of peace."

Nor, it should be added, did the Moscow radio let down Mr. Nixon in his hour of disgrace, informing its captive audience, with characteristic veracity, that Mr. Nixon was "the victim of partisan politics, the economic situation in America, and the malicious propaganda of the 'mass media.'"

As for the Nixon Administration's remarkable ability to preserve its cover-up for several years, this is perhaps less a reflection on the investigative vitality of the press and the Congress than it is further evidence of the unprecedented nature of the conspiracy, and the spiritual and psychological kinship of the conspirators.

Indeed, the very tenacity and success of their cover-up seem all the

more reason for the Congressional and judicial investigations—including those of Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski—to continue until we have the full story of what former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, who doubtless knew what he was talking about, has called “the White House horrors.”

If these investigations are now summarily terminated, many people may well conclude that the real target of these investigations was Mr. Nixon himself, rather than the scandals of his Administration, and there will doubtless be many others who will conclude, not without reason, that, once Mr. Nixon has resigned, the Congress promptly lost much of its recently developed investigative and reformist zeal. As the Democratic Congressman Jonathan B. Bingham of New York put it rightly on the House floor: "Until the full story of . . . the Watergate cover-up and abuse of Presidential powers is known, history and the American people may forever suffer an incomplete understanding of these traumatic events and the lessons they must teach."

And, finally, what of Mr. Nixon's associates, especially his Secretary of State? Did Mr. Kissinger believe that he could—or should—continue to serve an Administration whose scandalous conduct was unprecedented in American history? Did he believe that he could shut his eyes and continue to lend his presence and reputation to such an Administration? Did he believe that an Administration that acted criminally and subversively at home could and would—in the long run—be trusted and respected abroad? That it was possible for the Nixon Administration to "build a structure of peace" in the world while at home it had no hesitation about taking long strides toward an authoritarian or police state?

The conclusions seem clear. Our principal problem is not what to do about Mr. Nixon. Our principal problem is to ferret out all that he and his accomplices, active and passive, did, and sought to do, while he was in the White House.

As for his faithful Secretary of State, who seemingly knew nothing, sensed nothing, asked nothing and protested nothing, the time has come for him to follow Mr. Nixon once more, and to resign.

Francis L. Loewenheim is associate professor of history at Rice University.

> An argument against a letup in investigating the Nixon scandals and continuing his foreign policies.

Douglas Florian

NYTimes C

31

8-29-74

# Sand in My Shoes

By William Safire

WASHINGTON — Nothing succeeds like succession.

The suddenness of President Ford's emergence, the delight with which he is widely embraced for the virtue of not being his predecessor, and the correctness of his demeanor have combined to create the atmosphere of success in which success is more likely to be achieved.

Consider the question of Cuba, which was raised and neatly sidestepped at President Ford's first press conference. Richard Nixon's personal dislike of Fidel Castro, along with Bebe Rebozo's passionate espousal of the cause of the anti-Castro Cuban refugees, froze U.S. policy toward Cuba—and, therefore, toward the rest of Latin America—throughout the period of spectacular “normalizations.”

United States policy was—and, as the President indicated, still nominally is—to isolate the police state in the Caribbean. Everybody knows that the policy, like a bawling baby, is waiting to be changed.

One reason why: The quarantine is becoming ludicrous, since six members of the Organization of American States have opened embassies in Havana and more are to follow soon. The old fear that Castro would export his Communist revolution has diminished, because dictatorship of the left is not as efficient as dictatorship of the right.

Another reason, which will provide the figleaf for the American turnaround, is that Premier Castro has been looking for the moment to drop his overt hostility and the best moment is the succession of a new U.S. President. The half-billion-dollar-a-year Soviet subsidy does not satisfy him; because he thinks he can do better in normal relations with Western Hemisphere neighbors, he has been sending signals of amity.

In one of the most bizarre examples of diplomacy in a television age, Premier Castro has set forth a series of conditions about ending the freeze via a filmed television interview with news entrepreneurs Kirby Jones and Frank Mankiewicz. But that olive branch on film awaits sale to a U.S. television network; like a diplomatic note sent across the seas before the invention of the wireless, it makes its stately way to overtake events.

With your policy coming apart in full view of the world; with the express reason for your policy—the hostility of the Castro regime—now being removed; and with a need to show that you, too, are capable of “bold, new initiatives,” what would you do if you were a new American President?

You would change the policy and be

## ESSAY

a hero, right? Only partly right; the way you handled it would make all the difference.

If you were to handle it Kissinger-style, you would order up a top-secret National Security Council memorandum; you would dispatch your national security adviser to a secret meeting on a fishing boat within sight of the lights of Havana; and you would announce on national television, with a mystery guest standing in the wings puffing a large cigar, that you have ended the threat ninety miles from our shores that plagued three previous Presidents.

That would be The Easy Way, and it is to be shunned if we are to create a foreign policy to advance our interests rather than to interest our advance men. There is no need to follow the Nixon shokkus in Japan with any Ford choques in Latin America. Former Assistant Secretary of State Sol Lino-witz, heading an independent committee to pave the way for U.S.-Cuba relations, says: “The greatest irony would be to take such a step in a way that would alienate the very Latin-American leaders who want us to take that step.”

Neither our Latin-American friends nor the American public needs another twist of *fait accompli*: We can let the nations of O.A.S. dicker with Cuba individually as we debate the pros and cons of establishing relations with Mr. Castro's Government out in the open.

The Senate Kissinger Relations Committee, formerly the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would ordinarily be the proper forum for this examination of developing policy, but the committee members and staff are too hopelessly committed to promoting the restoration of relations with Cuba to permit a real debate, and too much taken by Henry's flattery to offer him more than a sounding board.

Is there a House Foreign Affairs Committee? Is there any forum, within or without Government, that will call attention to the drawbacks inherent in any necessary change of international relations, pose questions about what the change will cost taxpayers, make at least a few moral peeps about encouraging totalitarianism, and suggest certain standards to be met before a deal is struck?

Our Secretary of State, accustomed to dealing in secret with dictators, is now the agent of a President with a different-style. He would do well to surprise us with no surprises, go public to make his case, and thereby use the fact of Mr. Ford's succession to turn the Cuban anachronism into our Latin-American opportunity.

HAK 32M

"ALL
THE
NEWS
THAT'S
FIT TO
PRINT"

In October, 1896, Publisher Adolph S. Ochs and the editors of The New York Times condensed their news policy into these seven words.

At the same time, Mr. Ochs offered a prize of $100 to anyone who could come up with a better slogan of 10 words or less.

Thousands of Times readers submitted slogans like "All the News That's Fit to Read," "All the News Worth Telling," "Free From Filth, Full of News," "News for the Million, Scandal for None."

The prize winner, selected by