CHECK-LIST -- NEGOTIATIONS

Role of NLF

Free Elections -- Meaning? Level? How do you determine will of people?

Cease fire

Surfacing of VC units

Recognized control

Return to '54 award -- Get text --"See they can't win." Why do they negotiate?

Verification of stoppage. Is international machinery better than our intelligence collection?

Political stability in Vietnam

NLF representation

SVN -- When brought in? How?

DVR role in political structure of S.

Who negotiates? Multilateral? Bilateral? What?

Radio traffic

Who is opposite?

Timing -- Who stops what? When?

What will be position if negotiations fail? Have VC then in fact dug in?

If we stop air attack and Hanoi then withdraws from negotiations, are we then stuck with NLF?

What feelers exist?

List of negotiating forums.

Free elections: Plebiscite on persons?
Referendum on issues?
How do you run local government?

RANDOM NOTES:

Even if DVR is negotiating partner, why not threaten them that price goes up if they delay?

Can DVR make VC quit? If not, what can they do to affect outcome? If not, what is purpose of bombing? Will VC quit to spare DRV damage?

Can direction be moved to Hainan? Laos?

Can we bomb radio transmitters?

Why do we not squeeze North Vietnam with negotiating pressures and indicate that the price goes up the longer the war lasts.

What can we make DRV fear?

Who should negotiate?

Lindberg baby good case of too many cooks can destroy negotiations

Political process: History indicates that unrest usually starts in cities, especially in underdeveloped countries. Cities make opposition. Cities plus countryside make revolution. Conclusion: (a) very hard to placate city population of rootless intellectuals and rising middle class;

(b) Partition which leaves SVN with urban population would leave it with most unstable group.

RANDOM NOTES

Rather than ask for regrouping wouldn't we be better off if we
would define things we want to be able to do during cease-fire.

(a) Free movement of GVN. What else?

****

****

****

****

If we win VC have three choices

(1) accept *fait accompli*

(2) negotiate to salvage what they can

(3) lie low

Lie low incentive

-- Do not want to acknowledge defeat

-- Don't trust negotiations

****

****

****

****

Problems of cease-fire:

(1) contested areas

(2) Recognized VC control in some areas. Either
SVN falls apart or, what is the same thing,
VC get recognized areas and legitimization.

****

*****

****

Individual participation of VC in S. Vietnamese political affairs is
amnesty. But how do you keep them from coalescing under some other name.

CATEGORIES OF OUTCOMES

I. Victory

A. If you believe that this is worth the effort, then you want to affect convictions of others about risks of such a course. In that case, is it enough to "win" in S. Vietnam. (Assumption it is directed from outside) Have shown (a) that Soviets don't dare do anything significant; (b) that Chinese don't dare do anything significant; (c) willingness to do punitive action; and (d) Do we have to prove anything else -- Lesson for Indonesia. Do we want to have humiliation plus defeat of VC?

B. Free and stable S. Vietnam

C. Discredit Communists depends on how it is viewed.

D. What exactly is criteria for defeating VC?

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RANDOM NOTES (continued)

- 2

Assuming that military victory is possible, what does it take to
preserve it? How many American troops? How long?

Unilateral Outcomes

A. Victory

1. Criteria

2. Per cent of country under control

3. What can we realistically expect

a. How much of it is maintainable without American support?

(b. ... My reading of French interviews here is not peace at any price.)

B. Victory plus settlement. Why settlement at this point?

1. To reassure N. Vietnam about absence of foreign bases.

2. To obtain agreed status for S. Vietnam

3. Who should negotiate?

4. What forums are available? Which are most desirable?

Criteria for Victory:

A. Do North Vietnamese have control and what does it take to shake their expectation of victory? Why should Hanoi be more inflexible than we? Why should we assume that we will quit before they do?

B. Schelling: What is our real objection to VC victory. Do we want unified South Vietnam (or unified Vietnam) closely tied to us?

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RANDOM NOTES (continued)

- 3

C. Do the VC prisoners have political line? What is political motivation?

D. Are VC slowing down? Or are we not contesting areas?

E. Do we want N. Vietnamese to acknowledge influence or do we settle for tacit outcome?

Can they let it atrophy quietly or must they make formal agreements?

Is it in our interest to let DRV maintain posture that S. Vietnam war is indigenous?

Talk to them about stopping outside interference.

We then defeat and/or negotiate with VC to arrange their surrender.

F. Do we know who culprit is, VC or DRV. (1) Do we know they carry out agreement? (2) Do we know they do _not_ carry out agreement?

If we don't know, we are really in trouble. Cheating may be lesser of problems. (3) What does it take to destroy authority of VC in hard-core areas.

G. What does it take to defeat VC and maintain it?

H. What do they have to risk to continue?

## II. Negotiated Outcomes

### A. Four issues:

1. Preconditions for cessation of attacks on DVR

2. "end fire"

3. Political structure SVN

4. International Status of SVN

5. Policing and supervising machinery for the above