PR #452

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-- We do not accept the proposition that the strengthening of Atlantic unity and the defining of a European personality are incompatible. The two processes have reinforced each other from the outset and can continue to do so now. The United States has repeatedly and explicitly welcomed the European decision to create an independent identity in all dimensions -- political and economic. Indeed, we have long -- and more consistently than many Europeans -- supported the goal of political cohesion.

-- We have no intention of restricting Europe's international role to regional matters. From our perspective, European unification should enable Europe to take on broader responsibilities for global peace that ultimately can only contribute to the common interest. The American initiative was meant to mark Europe's new preeminence on the world scene as well as within the North Atlantic community.

-- A comprehensive reexamination of all aspects of our relationship -- economic, political, and military -- is imperative. It is a fact that our troops are in Europe as a vital component of mutual defense. It is also a fact -- indeed, a truism -- that political, military and economic factors are each part of our relationship. In our view, the affirmation of the pervasive nature of our interdependence is not a device for blackmail. On the contrary, it is the justification for conciliatory solutions. For the specialized concerns of experts and technicians have a life of their own and a narrow national or sectarian bias. The purpose of our initiative was to override these divisive attitudes by committing the highest authority in each country to the principle that our common and paramount interest is in broadly conceived cooperation.

## The European Identity

Since last April Europe has made great strides toward unity -- particularly in political coordination. The United States strongly supports that process. But as an old friend we are also sensitive to what this process does to traditional ties that in our view remain essential to the common interest.

Europe's unity must not be at the expense of Atlantic community, or both sides of the Atlantic will suffer. It is not that we are impatient with the cumbersome machinery of the emerging Europe. It is rather the tendency to highlight division rather than unity with us which concerns us.

PR #452

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I would be less than frank were I to conceal our uneasiness about some
of the recent practices of the European Community in the political field.
To present the decisions of a unifying Europe to us as faits accomplis
not subject to effective discussion is alien to the tradition of US-
European relations.

This may seem a strange complaint from a country repeatedly accused
of acting itself without adequately consulting with its allies. There is
no doubt that the United States has sometimes not consulted enough or
adequately -- especially in rapidly moving situations, but this is not a
preference; it is a deviation from official policy and established
practice -- usually under pressure of necessity. The attitude of the
unifying Europe, by contrast, seems to attempt to elevate refusal to
consult into a principle defining European identity. To judge from recent
experience, consultation with us before a decision is precluded, and
consultation after the fact has been drained of content. For then Europe
appoints a spokesman who is empowered to inform us of the decisions taken
but who has no authority to negotiate.

We do not object to a single spokesman but we do believe that as an
old ally the United States should be given an opportunity to express its
concerns before final decisions affecting its interests are taken, and
bilateral channels of discussion and negotiation should not be permitted
to atrophy -- at least until European political unity is fully realized.
To replace the natural dialogue with extremely formalistic procedures
would be to shatter abruptly close and intangible ties of trust and
communication that took decades to develop and that have served our common
purposes well.

The United States recognizes the problems of a transitional period
as Europe moves toward unity. We understand the difficulty of the first
hesitant steps of political coordination. But we cannot be indifferent
to the tendency to justify European identity as facilitating separateness
from the United States; European unity, in our view, is not contradictory
to Atlantic unity.

For our part we will spare no effort to strengthen cooperative
relationships with a unifying Europe, to affirm the community or our
ideals and to revitalize the Atlantic relationship. That was the purpose
of our initiative last April. It remains the central goal of our foreign
policy.

## The Common Challenge

The leaders of the European Community meet this week. They will
consider the nature of European identity; no doubt they will adopt common
policies and positions. In the light of this important meeting, let me
outline the position of the United States:

-- Detente is an imperative. In a world shadowed by the danger of
nuclear holocaust there is no rational alternative to the pursuit of
relaxation of tensions. But we must take care that the pursuit of detente
not undermine the friendships which made detente possible.

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-- Common defense is a necessity. We must be prepared to adjust it to changing conditions and share burdens equally. We need a definition of security that our peoples can support and that our adversaries will respect in a period of lessened tensions.

-- European unity is a reality. The United States welcomes and supports it in all its dimensions, political as well as economic. We believe it must be made irreversible and that it must strengthen trans-Atlantic ties.

-- Economic interdependence is a fact. We must resolve the paradox of growing mutual dependence and burgeoning national and regional identities.

We are determined to continue constructive dialogue with Western Europe. We have offered no final answers; we welcome Europe's wisdom. We believe that this opportunity will not come soon again.

So let us rededicate ourselves to finishing the task of renewing the Atlantic community.

First, let us complete the work before us; let us agree on a set of declarations equal to the occasion so that they may serve as an agenda for our governments and as an example and inspiration for our peoples.

Second, let us then transform these declarations into practical and perceptible progress. We will restore mutual confidence if our policies begin to reinforce rather than work against our common objectives. And let us move quickly to improve the process of consultation in both directions. The United States Government made concrete suggestions in this regard at the recent meeting of the foreign ministers in the North Atlantic Council.

But let us also remember that even the best consultative machinery cannot substitute for common vision and shared goals; it cannot replace the whole network of intangible connections that have been the real sinews of the trans-Atlantic and especially the Anglo-American relationship. We must take care lest in defining European unity in too legalistic a manner we lose what has made our alliance unique: that in the deepest sense Europe and America do not think of each other as foreign entities conducting traditional diplomacy, but as members of a larger community engaged, sometimes painfully but ultimately always cooperatively, in a common enterprise. The meeting to which the foreign ministers of the Community were courteous enough to invite me marks a significant step forward in restoring the intangibles of the trans-Atlantic dialogue.

Let us put false suspicions behind us. The President did not fight so hard in Congress for our troops in Europe, for strong defenses, for a conciliatory trade bill, for support for allies around the world; he did not strive so continually to consult on SALT and develop common positions on MBFR; he did not stand up so firmly to challenges in crises around the world -- suddenly to sacrifice Western Europe's security on the altar of condominium. Our destiny, as well as the full strength of our military power, is inextricably linked with yours.

PR #452

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As we look into the future we can perceive challenges compared to which our recent disputes are trivial. A new international system is replacing the structure of the immediate post-war years. The external policies of China and the Soviet Union are in periods of transition. Western Europe is unifying. New nations seek identity and an appropriate role. Even now, economic relationships are changing more rapidly than the structures which nurtured them. We, Europe, Canada and America, have only two choices: creativity together or irrelevance apart.

## The Middle East and Energy

The Middle East crisis illustrates the importance of distinguishing the long-range from the ephemeral. The differences of recent months resulted not so much from lack of consultation as from a different perception of three key issues: Was the war primarily a local conflict or did it have wider significance? Has the energy crisis been caused primarily by the war or does it have deeper causes? Can our common energy crisis be solved by anything but collective action?

As for the nature of the Middle East conflict, it is fair to state, as many Europeans including your Foreign Secretary have, that the United States did not do all that it might have done before the war to promote a permanent settlement in the Middle East. Once the war began, the United States demonstrated great restraint until the Soviet effort reached the point of massive intervention. Once that happened, it became a question of whether the West would retain any influence to help shape the political future of an area upon which Europe is even more vitally dependent than the United States. We involved ourselves in a resupply effort, not to take sides in the conflict but to protect the possibility of pursuing after the war the objective of a just permanent settlement which some of our allies have urged on us ever since 1967.

At the same time, we must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israeli war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of worldwide demand outrunning the incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a cronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when pre-war production levels are resumed. The problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain.

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The only long-term solution is a massive effort to provide producers an incentive to increase their supply, to encourage consumers to use existing supplies more rationally and to develop alternate energy sources.

This is a challenge which the United States could solve alone with great difficulty and that Europe cannot solve in isolation at all. We strongly prefer and Europe requires a common enterprise.

To this end, the United States proposes that the nations of Europe, North America and Japan establish an Energy Action Group of senior and prestigious individuals, with a mandate to develop within three months an initial action program for collaboration in all areas of the energy problem. We would leave it to the members of the Nine whether they prefer to participate as the European Community.

The group would have as its goal the assurance of required energy supplies at reasonable cost. It would define broad principles of cooperation, and it would initiate action in specific areas:

- To conserve energy through more rational utilization of existing supplies;

- To encourage the discovery and development of new sources of energy;

- To give producers an incentive to increase supply; and

- To coordinate an international program of research to develop new technologies that use energy more efficiently and provide alternatives to petroleum. The United States would be willing to contribute our particular skills in such areas as the development of the deep seabed.

The Energy Action Group should not be an exclusive organization of consumers. The producing nations should be invited to join it from the very beginning with respect to any matters of common interest. The problem of finding adequate opportunity for development, and the investment of the proceeds from the sale of energy sources would appear to be a particularly important area for consumer-producer cooperation.

As an example of a task for the Energy Action Group, I would cite the field of enriching uranium for use in nuclear power reactors. We know that our need for this raw material will be great in the 1980's. We know that electric utilities will wish to assure their supply at the least possible cost. We know that European countries and Japan will wish to have their own facilities to produce at least part of their needs for enriched uranium. Such plants require huge capital investment. What could be more sensible than that we plan together to assure that scarce resources are not wasted by needless duplication?

The United States is prepared to make a very major financial and intellectual contribution to the objective of solving the energy problem on a common basis. There is no technological problem that the great democracies do not have the capacity to solve together -- if they can muster the will and the imagination. The energy crisis of 1973 can become the economic equivalent of the Sputnik challenge of 1957. The outcome can be the same. Only this time, the giant step for mankind will be one that America and its closest partners take together for the benefit of all mankind.

PR #452

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We have every reason of duty and self-interest to preserve the most successful partnership in history. The United States is committed to making the Atlantic Community a vital positive force for the future as it was for the past. What has recently been taken for granted must now be renewed. This is not an American challenge to Europe; it is history's challenge to us all.

The United Kingdom, we believe, is in a unique position. We welcome your membership in the European Community — though the loosening of some of our old ties has been painful at times. But you can make another historic contribution in helping develop between the United States and a unifying Europe the same special confidence and intimacy that benefitted our two nations for decades. We are prepared to offer a unifying Europe a "special relationship," for we believe that the unity of the Western world is essential for the well-being of all its parts.

In his memoirs Secretary Acheson described the events of his visit to London in the spring of 1950. He described the need of his time for an "act of will, a decision to do something" at a crucial juncture.

We require another act of will - a determination of surmount tactical squabbles and legalistic preoccupations and to become the master of our destinies. We in this room are heirs to a rich heritage of trust and friendship. If we are true to ourselves, we have it in our power to extend it to a united Europe and to pass it on, further enriched and ennobled, to succeeding generations.

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U.S. Embassies Alerted in Europe, Mideast

'Heavy' Armor Shielding Kissinger's Safety

By JOHN P. WALLACH

Herald American Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — State Department officials this week ordered armored cars and other “heavy” defense equipment into place because they took the assassination threats against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “very seriously,” an important administration official said Wednesday.

He disclosed that “a quick alert around the horn” of all U.S. embassies in Europe and the Mideast was sounded Friday after foreign intelligence reports meshed with previous Central Intelligence Agency information that the Black September Arab guerrilla operation was masterminding the assassination plot.

"There was a confluence of information which forced the conclusion we had a real problem on our hands," a high-ranking polycmaker said. He explained that the threat was "more serious" than any of the numerous threats made against President Nixon whenever he travels abroad.

"Initially it was limited to Europe but they're going to have to watch themselves really carefully in Damascus (Syria) and

Amman (Jordan)," another U.S. official said. Kissinger is scheduled to begin Thursday a tour of several Arab capitals, including also Cairo and Lebanon, after concluding the European part of his trip.

The "alert" to U.S. diplomatic posts specifically requested that "heavy" equipment such as armor-plated limousines, sub-machine guns and a whole range of lethal and non-lethal weapons be used to protect Kissinger on all future stops, including those remaining in Europe.

A Secret State Department study recently concluded that Europe would be the most likely spot for a Black September attack, zeroing in on Great Britain, Austria and Germany as the three most dangerous European nations.

The reasons for this conclusion were the relatively large Arab populations in each country that could afford protection to potential assassins; the benevolent Democratic governments that permitted large-scale freedom of movement, and the relative weakness of the national police forces compared to "tough, armed cops" like those in France or Spain.

A high-ranking Secret Service agent disclosed in an interview that he got an "urgent" call at home late Friday requesting specifications on the "type of equipment" that would be required to beef up local security forces. "I knew some heavy action was going on," the agent said.

"If they're showing submachine guns at London Airport, they really must be concerned," he added, explaining that British police traditionally have opposed use of heavy arms for security purposes. Another agent was incredulous at the use of sub-machine guns at Heathrow Airport.

"You just don't do it in London," he said in amazement. "They're (the British) just not going to have a lot of foreigners running around with grease guns." U.S. security abroad is largely dependent on host countries' cooperation and they jealously guard that right, the agent said.

The "original" tipoff of a plot came from a foreign intelligence service and was "well documented," an administration source disclosed. This included reports of a leading Palestinian terrorist who was seen leaving the Middle East for Europe and allegedly

was laying the groundwork for the assassination attempt.

"We try to keep tabs on these people," a State Department official said, indicating however that it would be impossible to know the whereabouts of guerrilla leaders without full cooperation of other police and intelligence services.

State Department officials confirmed that at least 100, "maybe more," Secret Service and State Department agents had been assigned to protect Kissinger on the trip, fanning out to all 11 nations he is visiting. Such arrangements are unprecedented for anyone but the President, these sources said.

Kissinger normally receives protection from the State Department's security force but in his dual role as President Nixon's national security adviser, he also has a Secret Service guard.

Early security planning, according to officials here, had concentrated particularly on Kissinger's stop in Syria and Lebanon where there are active contingents of the Black September and other Palestinian commando groups that have boasted of numerous aircraft hijackings and terrorist acts.

# Kissinger Proposes Allied Action Group

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

United Press International

Henry Kissinger is toasted after London speech.

LONDON, Dec. 12 — Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger proposed tonight that the industrialized nations of the world establish an energy action group to cooperate in all areas of the energy problem.

The group, to consist of "senior and prestigious individuals ... should not be an exclusive organization of consumers," Kissinger said. "The producing nations should be invited to join it from the very beginning with respect to any matters of common interest."

Kissinger's proposal was clearly designed to prevent a worsening of the scramble by the United States, Europe and Japan for the world's supply of oil while trying to avoid a confrontation with the producing nations. Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Sheikh Zaki Yamani had warned several months ago that any attempt by the consuming countries to

unite against the producers could mean "war."

The proposed group should, Kissinger said, develop an initial action program within three months, just as the oil shortage is expected to be causing severe winter hardship in Europe.

Kissinger made his proposal in a speech to The Pilgrims, an exclusive Anglo-American friendship society. In his statement, said to have gone through more than 10 drafts in preparation, Kissinger delivered some of his warmest praise for the growing political unity of Europe.

Before an audience of Englishmen he offered to expand the "special relationship," which until recently characterized Anglo-American ties, to Western Europe. "We are prepared to offer a unifying Eu-

See KISSINGER, A22, Col. 1