[Lc]

THE BALANCE IN HARD TARGET KILL POTENTIAL - CMP (nY²/³/CEP²)

Consistent with SALT II

| | <div align="center">1977</div> | | <div align="center">June 18,<br>1979</div> | | | <div align="center">1982</div> | | <div align="center">1985</div> |
|:---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:|
| | U.S. | S.U. | U.S. | S.U. | U.S. | S.U. | U.S. | S.U. |
| **ICBMs** | | | | | | | | |
| - MIRV | 22,539 | 10,464 | 22,539 | 105,194 | 46,175 | 211,169 | 45,279 | 211,169 |
| - Non-MIRV | 13,188 | 24,036 | 13,188 | 4,933 | 13,188 | 29,170 | 13,188 | 126,912 |
| TOTAL | 35,727 | 34,501 | 32,727 | 110,127 | 59,364 | 240,340 | 58,467 | 338,082 |
| **SLBMs** | | | | | | | | |
| - MIRV | 9,377 | 336 | 9,899 | 3,024 | 14,059 | 13,871 | 14,723 | 18,469 |
| - Non-MIRV | 697 | 3,040 | 697 | 2,968 | 697 | 2,702 | 348 | 2,254 |
| TOTAL | 10,074 | 3,376 | 10,597 | 5,992 | 14,757 | 16,574 | 15,072 | 20,724 |
| **TOTAL PROMPT<br>CMP** | 45,801 | 37,877 | 43,324 | 116,119 | 74,121 | 256,914 | 73,539 | 358,806 |
| **HEAVY BOMBERS (ALCMs, SRAMs, Gravity Bombs)*** | | | | | | | | |
| **TOTAL DELAYED<br>CMP** | 148,675 | 16,000 | 147,875 | 15,600 | 158,729 | 8,000 | 229,112 | 33,000 |
| **TOTAL CMP** | 194,477 | 53,877 | 191,199 | 131,719 | 232,851 | 264,914 | 302,652 | 391,806 |

*It should be noted that bomber CMP differs from missile CMP in that the former arrives in 6 to 10 hours in comparison to 10 to 40 minutes for the latter.

NOTE: Decimal points not rounded off.

4

[LC]

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

January 10, 1979

This is just a note to tell you that I finally
had an opportunity to read your extensive inter-
view in the New York Times. It was very im-
pressive and I greatly appreciated your most
generous comments with regard to me -- coming
as they did before what I know was unquestionably
a very hostile interrogator.

Whenever time permits, I would greatly appreciate
it if you would send me whatever statements you
have made or may make in the future in response
to what I believe to be unjustified criticisms
of SALT I. I know you will address this subject
in your book but I would like to be kept informed
during the period prior to the time your book is
scheduled for publication.

As I am sure you have noticed, I see that the Rand
Corporation has put out a study blaming the fall
of Vietnam on the assurances that I gave to Thieu
in 1973. It is interesting to see how the revision-
ists just can't bring themselves to put the blame
where it belongs -- on the Congress for first
castrating the presidency insofar as any power
he has to implement foreign policy, and cutting
off funds in total rejection of commitments we
made in the January 23rd peace agreement.

Nixon
Right

Lofton

San Clemente
Sun Post

January 19,
1979

WASHINGTON — On April 30, 1970, President Richard Nixon went on national TV to announce a limited, joint U.S.-South Vietnamese incursion into the Fish Hook area of Cambodia, the purpose of which was to shut down the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in Vietnam (COSVN) and to clean out the major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong-occupied sanctuaries being used to launch attacks against Cambodia, and against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. This operation was bitterly criticized by Nixon's adversaries. But now, more than eight years after it occurred, the central rationale for the president's Cambodia incursion has been corroborated by a most unlikely source: the Cambodian communists themselves.

Following his decision to go into Cambodia, President Nixon was bitterly denounced by numerous so-called anti-war activists. Peter Dale Scott, an associate professor of English at the University of California at Berkeley who co-authored "The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam," accused Nixon of being not only 'misinformed' but also "probably lied to" by U.S. intelligence agencies seeking to "induce a crisis." Stating flatly that U.S. military sources in Saigon had "no knowledge" of a communist buildup in Cambodia, Scott said that what this intelligence blunder illustrated was "yet again the old maxim that the objectivity of official intelligence tends to vary inversely with its relevance to impending strategic decisions."

Another critic of Nixon's Cambodian incursion was Noam Chomsky, a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Like Scott, he felt that it was possible that "faulty intelligence" was to blame for the president's move. However, "for the most part," Chomsky said the incursion was probably "capricious or vengeful" and motivated by the U.S. military's attitude that it has the right to "defoliate or crater" any country that interferes with U.S. plans. He labeled as "hypocrisy" Nixon's reference to communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Franz Schurmann, professor of history and sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, portrayed the president's Cambodia action as a

simple cave-in "tailored to the Pentagon's desires." He declared: "Rather than reject the Pentagon's invasion plan, Nixon resorted to the transparent lie that the communists were building up in the sanctuaries for an impending massive assault in South Vietnam."

So now it is more than eight years since the 1970 U.S.-South Vietnamese move into Cambodia. In recent weeks, two Western reporters, have been allowed into Cambodia — Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and Elizabeth Becker of The Washington Post. Here is the startling admission buried in a Post story by Becker, beginning with the 36th paragraph

> "While my two-week journey does not enable me to provide a definitive report on the military situation throughout Cambodia, I was given a remarkable new document in which Cambodia confirms for the first time the extent to which the Viet Cong used the country for sanctuary during the early 1970s.

> "The 94-page 'Black Paper,' which bitterly details instances of Vietnamese aggression and perfidy... reports that 'in 1970, the figure of Viet Cong in Kampuchea (the communist name for Cambodia) reached 1.5 million to 2 million.'

> "The 'Black Paper' also discloses that when former President Richard Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia in 1970, there were in fact some 200,000 to 300,000 Viet Cong in the northeastern region of Cambodia, including 'the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Party' — the long-sought COSVN.

> "In fact, the Viet Cong had no territory in South Vietnam," a high-ranking official told me one night. 'They had to come here. We had to provide them with food, hospital care, transportation for their military. At that time, there were 80,000 wounded VC in our hospitals.'

John Lofton is a columnist with United Feature Syndicate.

RICHARD NIXON

February 14, 1979

Dear Mr. Chairman:

With regard to your letter of February 2, I must respectfully decline your invitation to testify before your subcommittee. I see no useful purpose to be served by my trying to second-guess President Carter's P.R.C. normalization decision. Any one of us might have handled the situation differently, but now that the decision has been made we should look to the future and not to the past.

With regard to the questions you raised in your letter, Dr. Kissinger and I had extensive discussions with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai on the Taiwan issue in 1972. We could not reach an agreement and consequently stated our positions separately in the Shanghai Communique. In that document the U.S. "reaffirmed" its support of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. I consider that to be an unequivocal moral commitment. In my view U.S. policies toward the P.R.C. and Taiwan in the future should be formulated in a way to honor that commitment.

The Editorial Notebook

The Spirit of Kissinger Past

The Senate's SALT II debate turns on one voice more than any other — a voice without a vote. If Henry Kissinger opposes the arms control treaty, or supports crippling amendments, its demise is virtually certain. But to do that, the former Secretary of State would have to repudiate his own works in two Republican Administrations.

Republican and conservative critics argue that President Carter's treaty would lock the United States into "strategic inferiority" because the Soviet Union possesses more and bigger intercontinental ballistic missiles. But that "inferiority" was established in the Kissinger-Nixon treaty, SALT I, in 1972. The United States had a big lead then in warheads, bombers and missile accuracy, and Mr. Kissinger argued correctly that this lead made the two strategic forces essentially equivalent.

But SALT I did not bar Moscow's effort to narrow or overtake the American lead. That effort would result only in more overkill were it not for an American invention that now could threaten American security — MIRV multiple warheads. They give one Soviet missile, carrying six to ten big warheads, the ability to destroy several American land-based Minuteman missiles in their underground silos. So by the mid-1980's, a third of the Soviet ICBM force might in theory be able to wipe out the bulk of America's 1,000 Minutemen in a surprise first strike.

It was President Nixon who opened

the way for this vulnerability. He refused to seriously discuss a MIRV ban in SALT I and pressed ahead with a MIRV deployment that Russia was certain to imitate. Belatedly, in late 1973, Mr. Kissinger tried to limit Soviet MIRV deployments in ICBM's to a few hundred missiles. But Moscow refused, and in November 1974 Mr. Kissinger and President Ford settled for high but equal SALT II limits on missile-launchers and bombers — 2,400 on each side, 1,320 MIRVed.

Then, in January 1976, Mr. Kissinger proposed the deal that eventually resolved the main remaining SALT II issues: a constraint on American cruise missiles and exclusion of about 300 Soviet Backfire bombers in return for a comparable reduction in total Soviet missiles and bombers.

It is essentially this Kissinger treaty that the Carter Administration will put to the Senate next month — with one major gain. In two years of difficult talks to close all imaginable loopholes, Secretary Vance also obtained some curbs on ICBM improvements. Despite temporary verification problems, these qualitative restraints set a significant precedent for SALT III.

That leaves a remedy for Minuteman vulnerability back where the Ford Administration had also left it in American hands alone. While restraining Russia's buildup, SALT II puts no real restrictions on present

Pentagon programs for bigger or more accurate missiles, including 3,000 cruise missiles and a mobile replacement for Minuteman triple its size. Defeat of the treaty, however, would probably rule out the replacement that SALT critics favor — the "shell-game" type of mobile land missile, each with 20 launching sites. For without SALT II, Moscow could add warheads faster and more cheaply than the United States could build more launching sites.

The real issue posed by SALT's critics does not, in fact, lie in the treaty. That is whether the country would carry out the strategic programs needed to avoid the feared "missile gap" of the mid-1980's. "The euphoria always generated in the United States by signing a treaty," says the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, "might well produce further cutbacks, as was the case after SALT I."

But the Carter Administration does not intend to repeat the Nixon-Breznev embrace of 1972. It warns against the illusions of détente and sees Soviet-American competition continuing alongside a growth in cooperation. It is this rivalry that makes it essential to put a cap on the nuclear arms race, even at a high level, and to begin the process of missile reductions and qualitative constraints. SALT II will do that. Mr. Kissinger was right to start the process. He would be wrong now to finish it off.

ROBERT KLEIMAN

JUN 8 1979

PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

# Is Kissinger A War Criminal?

Watching the old Vietnam doves these days, one is reminded of poor, pathetic Alger Hiss, his reputation forever ruined, making his endless rounds seeking to establish an innocence that does not exist.

Four years after the fall of Indochina, the dust has settled — and the hawks were right.

The Vietcong, the "National Liberation Front," was only a front for Hanoi's program of Communist conquest of Indochina.

The Khmer Rouge and Viet Minh have behaved even more barbarically than we predicted. The fate of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were indeed intertwined. America's credibility around the world did suffer the predicted damage from the collapse.

And when one witnesses American acquiescence in the Cuban intervention in Africa, and American paralysis at the overthrow of the shah, Richard Nixon's depiction of the United States becoming a "pitiful, helpless giant" does not appear hyperbolic.

Their expectations dashed on the rocks of reality, some of the antiwar crowd have hit the sawdust trail to the mourners' bench.

Joan Baez and dozens of leading lights in the antiwar movement have taken out full-page ads protesting the "imprisonment and torture" of tens of thousands of "prisoners of conscience" in South Vietnam.

Others, however, are still grasping for the straws of self-justification.

So it is that they have embraced passionately a bigoted book by British writer William Shawcross, which argues that American military policy toward Cambodia was unconstitutional and criminal, and ultimately responsible for the tragedy that befell that country.

It is not an easy case to make: To blame the Communist terror in Cambodia upon the two American officials — Nixon and Henry Kissinger — who fought longest and hardest to resist the Communist takeover.

One emerges from the labyrinth of Shawcross's tortured logic with the facts of that conflict uncontradicted.

Fact: It was not the United States which first violated the neutrality of Laos or Cambodia, but the North Vietnamese who used the former as their avenue of military resupply and the latter for staging areas from which to attack American and South Vietnamese troops.

Somogyi attack German positions in neutral Belgium?

Fact: The 14 months of secret bombing of Cambodia was not made public — for the best of reasons. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian chief of state, would have been forced to denounce it. That he and his government approved of those American air strikes is evidenced by the fact that not once did he or his ministers fly to the U.N. to protest the bombing of which they were aware.

The conclusion is inescapable. Sihanouk did not protest — and thus halt — American action, because he wanted the North Vietnamese base camps destroyed, while the fiction of neutrality was maintained by all — Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Washington.

Fact: Unlike the Ngo Dinh Diem coup which had the concurrence, if not active complicity of President Kennedy, there is no evidence that Nixon or Kissinger was involved in the coup which deposed Sihanouk.

Fact: While American bombings in Cambodia, for months secret, then public knowledge, did take some innocent civilian lives, so too did British bombings of neutral Norway, Denmark and Belgium in World War II.

Indeed, those American air strikes on Cambodiar soil were far less destructive of innocent life than the

British and American raids on neutral countries and Germany, which Joseph Goebbels characterized in his diary as "allied air terror" principally responsible for Germany's defeat.

Fact: Despite Shawcross's disparagement of Lon Nol and his army, the two resisted the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge for a far longer period of time, and sustained a higher rate of casualties, than did the French — in World War II.

Fact: For every Cambodian civilian killed in those five years of war between April 1970 and April 1975, 10 Cambodian civilians died in the first year of peace imposed by the Khmer Rouge.

It is not Kissinger and Nixon who need to be dragged into the dock for their conduct of the war.

It is the congressional doves who said that a cutoff in American aid to Cambodia and Vietnam was necessary so the "killing could stop."

It is those dupes who told us Vietnam was simply a civil war and the Vietcong were fighting for national independence and neutrality in the Cold War.

The undicted co-conspirators of the Communist crimes in Indochina are the antiwar apologists, who contributed mightily to the Communist victory.

Chicago Tribune-N.Y. News Syndicate

## COMMENTARY

# Medals For Talent

By WALTER McARTHUR

Granting of a special Congressional gold medal to actor John Wayne is a reminder of the paucity of recognition that this republic affords to merit.

A Congressional medal is a splendid tribute but it is a rare one. For every talented person who has achieved the adulation accorded to Mr. Wayne and the award to go with it, there are scores of other fine talents who merit some recognition and receive none.

Perhaps the United States should adopt a system of awards such as those enjoyed by the citizens of Italy and France. The Italians have a finely tuned system that awards meritorious achievement in almost any field with the title of cavaliere. This title is conferred upon the advice of an official commission and from then on the recipient is universally addressed as "cavaliere" on all formal occasions. Even higher accomplishment merits the distinction of "commendatore," in this republican order of knighthood.

The French, of course, have solved their problem by inventing the Legion of Honor.

The Founding Fathers were distrustful of titles that smacked of old-world aristocracy, but perhaps they should have left a little room for the consistent recognition of simple egalitarian merit.

If one were a respected author, say, or a well-regarded shoemaker or chef, would it not be appropriate to be addressed by acquaintances with a title of respect, or to display in the lapel the rosette of an American

JUN 18 1979

JUN 18 1979