COSMOS CLUB

THE SEVENTH
COSMOS CLUB AWARD

EDWIN HERBERT LAND

Washington, D. C.

April 20, 1970

[LC]

Citation

EDWIN HERBERT LAND

Scientist, inventor and man of practical affairs, Edwin Herbert Land has penetrated the mysteries of light, color and vision and brought his discoveries to bear upon the happiness and welfare of his fellow men.

Endowed with an extraordinary talent for original and creative thought, he has repeatedly surmounted the limits of conventional wisdom and charted new and innovative paths to knowledge. Establishing his first laboratory while still a young student, he left the confines of formal collegiate education to pursue his own exploration of polarized light, human vision and theory of color. His high achievements have now been recognized and honored by many outstanding institutions of higher learning and research.

He has applied his scientific insights to useful purposes in many and varied forms, of which his widely known innovations in photography are but one. As a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and as a Visiting Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he has lent his talents to the solution of problems of high national import and to the stimulation and education of youth. Aware of the threat of mass boredom and mental stagnation in modern, industrialized society, he has encouraged his young associates and employees to seek the stimulus of creativity by engaging in their own projects of original research.

At a time when the complexity and urgency of human problems demand, perhaps as never before, the exercise of that creative thinking which he so well personifies, the Cosmos Club is proud to designate Edwin Herbert Land as Recipient of the Cosmos Club Award of 1970.

[ 5 ]

ADDICTION AS A NECESSITY
AND OPPORTUNITY

By EDWIN HERBERT LAND

Last Christmas, while riding through London, I found that in
spite of my delight in the galleries, libraries, and concerts, there
was within me a deep and insatiable need. I found myself saying
to our driver, "Green, did you know that I am an addict?" He is
of the old school so that he did not turn his head. "No, sir, I did
not know that." "I am addicted to at least one good experiment
a day—sometimes I can arrange it by telephone. When I cannot,
the world goes out of focus, becomes unreal." Possibly somewhat
disappointed, but clearly relieved; "I see, sir."

And then last month I was participating in a student seminar
at one of our great universities. We were in the professor's room.
We sat on the floor, and the boys and girls sat in a circle around
me. The men, including the professor, wore magnificent long
hair and, of course, the whole variety of handsome beards. It was
rather hard for the women to compete with the colorfulness of the
men. Furthermore, the women seemed somewhat restive, with an
inner concern about the relationship to reality of the new world
they were all trying to create together. As we all talked, I found
myself describing the wonders of the scientific experience. I told
of the way in which one yearns for a deep insight in some domain;
of the strange intuitive program of collecting observations; of
the mystery of formation of hypothesis within one; of the
competence of the mind-body system to select the crucial experi-
ment; of the excitement of interaction between experiment and
hypothesis; of the sense of relief and even of nobility when the
hypothesis is proven true by the experiment and the stage set for
the next hypothesis. I remarked on the sense of awe that one
could be the instrument of this process, as if input had flowed into
one and significant outputs emerged from one. I was pleased to
note the comprehension on one of the bearded faces. He turned
to the neighboring girl and said with firm conviction, "Why, it's
just like heroin, isn't it?"

[7]

And, finally, a few weeks ago, sitting with the board of a
foundation, I shared in the sense of helplessness and impotence,
confronted with the problem of how to use money to block the
sweep of drugs across our nation. As an inveterate hypothesis
maker I had an insight into the nature and function of addiction,
and it is that insight I should like to examine with you tonight.

Some years ago, talking to a group of brilliant high school
students about the life of a scientist, I said, "My own recollection
of your age is a curious alternation which, I think, goes on through
life for the scientist. It is alternation between the one mood and
attitude of feeling part of the race as a whole, part of the family,
part of the neighborhood; the mood of being in love with friends,
women, men, people all over the world; the mood of being in love
with what is great in music and art—all that on the one hand
and then, quite suddenly, a separateness from all that—a separate-
ness that comes during the preoccupation with a particular
scientific task. There is a need, a transient need, a violent need
for being just yourself, restating, recreating, talking in your own
terms about what you have learned from all the cultures, scientific
and non-scientific, before you and around you. During that
period you want to be almost alone, with just a few friends. You
want to be undisturbed. You want to be free to think not for
an hour at a time, or three hours at a time, but for two days or
two weeks, if possible, without interruption. You don't want to
drive the family car or go to parties. You wish people would just
go away and leave you alone while you get something straight.
Then, you get it straight and you embody it, and during that
period of embodiment you have a feeling of almost divine
guidance. Then it is done, and, suddenly, you are alone, and you
have a need to go back to your friends and the world around you,
and to all history, to be refreshed, to feel alive and human once
again. It is this interplay between all that is richly human and
this special, concentrated, uninterrupted mental effort that seems
to me to be the source, not only of science, but also of everything
that is worthwhile in life."

In examining this description I want to avoid both the obvious
clichés of drug-taking terminology and the professional character-
izations of Freudian categories. I suggest that this description

[ 8 ]

deals with two different modes of relationship between the indi-
vidual and the world around him. In the first, the social mode, a
perfectly normal and healthy mode, the individual is not at all an
integrated single being. A thousand as yet unnamed and unisolated
components of personality interplay with analogous fragments in
the people around him. Except for his image in the camera, he
has really vanished to become part of the composite creature, a
social group. Through this group entity, feelings, thoughts, hopes
and speculations travel from boundary to boundary, resonating
and reflecting within its confines. Most vicarious participation in
music and sports involves this mode of existence. Talk programs
on radio, the nationally shared entertainment on television, a
poker game, the committee on pollution, the mad ecstasy of riots,
the Easter parade, traffic jams, My-Lai murders—all these are not
groups of individuals in aggregations of units, but examples of
the non-unity of the components of an individual when those
components are intermixed with the components of other indi-
viduals to form the biological unit, the multiple-man. The
multiple-man can be grand, or trivial, or elegant, or decadent, or
noble. He moves through our bodies leaving them rejoicing or
desperate, helpless participants in this mode of human existence.
The interests of multiple-man are only in feeling, affect, emotion,
conquest, discovery, victory, vast inchoate revelation. When the
great symphonies of multiple-man echo through us, our individual
conditioning, background, and predispositions, introduce only
trivial variations on a main theme.

Before we go on to singular-man we should note what a horrible
problem for him multiple-man is. For while multiple-man is
richness, vastness, glory, and triumph, multiple-man is interested
in intellect only as a tool for power, joy, conquest, and the
delights of monumental destruction. For him, indeed, war is an
extension of politics and, more seriously, politics is an extension
of war. Multiple-man can never analyze except for aggrandize-
ment or rejoicing. Facts are slaves for his amusement, to be
toyed with, savored, destroyed, distorted. Life is a game with
ever-changing rules, a game of glorious pretensions for good or
evil, as the winds may blow. The multiple-man is not a vast,
racial, historic composite. Multiple-man is three people, or seven,

[ 9 ]

or fifty, or a thousand, or sometimes a nation. As our world is organized, the government, the universities, the scientific society, the committee, the group of neighbors, all are multiple-man who uses reason and intellect only as one of the most delightful pawns in the electric game of group living. During the time that the components of our personality are part of multiple-man, they exist in that mode.

As I talk I wonder if that mode may not be the only one for animals. My thesis is that for us another quite different mode is frequently possible. This is the mode in which the components of the individual's personality are integrated with each other instead of being cross-integrated with those of the group. In this mode, which we might call singular-man, talents, aptitudes, senses, competences of the individual, serve an entirely different set of purposes. Although the product of this activity may have inestimable significance for the race, again for good or evil, the first function of the total activity of singular-man is to serve himself. The intellect, when it serves himself, can be enjoyed for what it is, a tool for analysis, synthesis, speculation, a tool for hypothesis and experiment. For singular-man, emotion can be controlled, utilized, enjoyed, at his will. He can discover for discovery, learn for learning, be ethical for ethics, be moral for morality, be noble for nobility. He can discover causes and create effects. He is a god in his freedom for self-integration and controlled search. Often his independence and freedom are unbelievably poignant, frequently terrifying, and the trip from singular-man to multiple-man can be as agonizing as that from Jekyll to Hyde. The ready transition between modes is the deepest of human needs, for without it man is either animal or derelict, and yet the transition, as with so many human needs, is not practiced intuitively. Success for an individual may be an accident in the profligacy of evolution. When I was talking with the students, both in high school and in college, about the scientific experience—it could as well have been any newly created aesthetic experience—I was talking about one technique for making the transition. Presumably, there are many. The important point is that the bona fide transition from multiple-man to singular-man involves the full integration of the com-

[ 10 ]

ponents of the individual for a singleness of purpose and for ends of no interest to multiple-man—the purpose, the ends, must be real if singular-man is to survive. The “drug,” the “addiction,” is the pursuit by singular-man of this real purpose—a purpose, the achievement of which provides continuous interaction and satisfaction, feedback if you will, for the integrative process.

My suggestion is that the need for the transition to singular-man is so great that if an individual has been unfortunate enough not to learn bona fide healthy techniques for the transition, if he has not been able to find objectives in the real world to which he can relate in this mode of living, then he will seek escape from permanent entrapment in the mode of multiple-man —he will seek escape from multiple-man to singular-man through artificial means such as drugs. My hypothesis for the evening is that the expansion of consciousness through drugs is merely a synthetic production of integration in the mode of singular-man. Drugs in this concept serve not as an escape from one's self but rather as an escape to one's self. The use of drugs is a short cut, which presumably is also a blind alley, for there is no feedback between the product and the integrative process. In the bona fide situation, the interplay between the integrative process and the artistic or scientific product leads to a strengthening of the integrative process and to increased mastery of the technique of willful transition between the multiple and singular modes. With drugs, tragically, the first phases of integration are achieved along with the wonderful sense of relief of being a singular human rather than part of an animal group, only to find that because of the lack of feedback the process is not self-supporting and self-strengthening. Obviously, we are much too far away from understanding the biochemical differences between the bona fide situation and the synthetic one to hazard any analysis of why one is constructive and the other destructive. The lesson from the hypothesis, however, is that unless we can provide the bona fide techniques of transition, unless we can provide the healthy addictions, disaster will eventuate. Individuals may stay too long in the multiple mode, where in addition to enjoying the rich variegation of the world of feeling, they will also substitute, permanently, the important irrational absurdities of

[ 11 ]

politics, committees, and boards, for the discerning rationality
that can exist only in the mode of the singular-man. Even if
they do not become drug addicts, they are in danger of becoming
habituated to the slap-happy excesses that are as valid for the
multiple-man as are magnificence and grandeur.

It occurs to me as we explore, there are indeed many lonely
souls trapped in the *second* mode, the mode of singular-man.
I suspect that alcohol enables many of them to make the transition
to the first mode of multiple-man. In the few days during which
these ideas have been crystallizing, I have found them very
useful in understanding the mysteries of the Iagos and the
Judases; the astonishing number of small betrayals by men of
honor; the eternal paradox of the politician as a man of honor
at one moment and of low credibility at the next; the deadly
conclusions of decent souls when they gather together to make
decisions; the alternations between inspired insight and un-
believable stupidity of a handful of brilliant scientists en masse;
the magnificent elation that we can feel together; the kind of
transcendency that we can achieve when we are a group, and the
evil that we can perpetuate—all this is an antithesis not between
God and the devil, but between singular-man and multiple-man,
both of which we are and between which we must learn early in
life to migrate skillfully.

Note: Following Dr. Land's address there was an extensive
question and answer discussion. Unfortunately, the microphone
which recorded the answers to the questions was not able to
record the questions from the audience. It is regrettable that
this stimulating discussion cannot be included with this address.

[ 12 ]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02138

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

May 7, 1970

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

It seems to me that I am writing you rather often these days. Still, I feel I must trespass once again on your patience and send you a letter, for what it is worth, about the reaction here to the movement of American troops into Cambodia. I have no idea what your opinion of that step may be; though as you may know, many people assert that you were one of the conceivers of the project. Be that as it may, and leaving aside questions of military strategy that I am incompetent to address myself to, I want to add my voice to those of no doubt many others who have written you to express their dismay at this apparent reversal of American policy and their serious concern for its consequences here at home.

It's the last that I should like to emphasize in this letter. You have no idea, even from news broadcasts and newspaper reports, of the level of passion and hysteria that has seized the academic community. Much of this is the work, no doubt, of systematic campaigning by militant radical groups. The fact remains, they have found now a resonance that they have never had before; and this has been enormously enhanced by the tragedy of Kent State.

This is a reality we have to deal with; and it is no small matter--not only for the present juncture, but for the long-range future of education in the United States. Here I join with Mr. Hickel in the cautions he expressed in his recent letter. We are in effect, by not liquidating this Asian venture quickly, risking far more serious consequences in the United States than could be compensated by any advantage abroad. In other words, the cost of the war is so high now that it would be sheer folly to prolong it a

- 2 -

single unnecessary day.

To be sure, an abrupt withdrawal from Southeast Asia
would necessarily entail certain serious costs--among other
things, the loss of support and confidence among other
countries in that area, or at least among certain sectors
of the elite in such countries. And I would not minimize
this, any more than I accept the proposition that the so-
called "discredited domino theory" is so discredited as that.
I believe in it. But I am trying realistically to weigh
cost against advantage; and it seems to me that for some
time now, the game has not been worth the candle. Far worse,
it is driving us to perdition.

Henry, I am sure I don't have to tell you what all of
this implies for the work of education and research that
you and I both live for. We simply have to find a way to
convince the young people of this country--I am talking of
those young people who still have a great deal of good
sense, good will, love for their country, and respect for
democratic procedures and government--that the United States
still stands for the values they believe in.

I shan't go on any longer. I am sure this letter
repeats what you've already seen more of than you can
handle. But I want to add my voice of concern, if only because
you know, I think, that I have not arrived at this conviction lightly or easily.

Again, we must get together some time--as soon as
possible (though you must be very busy these days)--and
talk of these things face to face.

As ever,

David

David Landes

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

GENERAL

May 27, 1970

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Henry:

It's nice of you to feel that we ought to see each other again. I would have thought that you had had more than your fill of professors. Anyway, I really would like to see you, and if you are free any time from June 3rd on (with the exception of June 10th), I would make it a point to be there at your convenience. What say I call you on this on Monday or Tuesday, June 1st or 2nd?

In that regard, our friend and colleague Nadav Safran tells me that he has been trying to reach you and would also like to see you. Would you want to kill two birds with one stone and have him come down with me? He is, I may say, in matters of Middle Eastern politics, a dovish pro-Israeli--one of the few people here who argued against an agitated response to the State Department proposals of last December. But he is frightened now. I would be pleased if he could join us; but in any case, you set it up as you wish.

RECEIVED
JUL 3 1970
CENTRAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

January 22, 1973

Dear Mr. Landis:

Mr. Kissinger asked me to write to you in
response to your letter of December 15. I
am sorry that his constantly busy schedule
has kept me from replying more promptly.

As the exact contents of Mr. Kissinger's
diet are a private matter, I cannot go into
details about what he eats. He does, how-
ever, as you suggest, have three balanced
meals a day, with great variety and his meats
and vegetables and no snacks in between
meals.

I hope that this has been of some help to you.

Mr. Mack Brody Landis
241 South Street
Pittsfield, Massachusetts

Pittsfield, Massachusetts
241 South Street
Mr. Mack Brody Landis

Henry V. Klaeinger
Personal Secretary to
Julienne L. Piness

Sincerely,

mesa.
and vegetables and no snacks in between
mesa a day, with great variety and good meals
ever, so you suggest, have three balanced
details about what he eats. He does, how-
diet are a private matter. I cannot go into
As the exact contents of Mr. Klaeinger's a
has kept me from replying more promptly.
I am sorry that he constantly puts schedule
response to your letter of December 13. I
Mr. Klaeinger asked me to write to you in

Dear Mr. Landis:

January 22, 1953

KISSINGER, HENRY V.

Henry Landowski
117 West 79th Street
New York, N.Y.
10024

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
c/o the Office of the President-Elect
Hotel Pierre
61 street and 5th Avenue
New York, N.Y.

December 8, 1968

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Ever since the end of the NIXON-AGNEW campaign (for which I worked at 50, Rockefeller Plaza, NYC) I have watched out for the President-Elect's nominations pertaining to National Security, and that's why I am addressing this letter to you.

Based upon my years of experience in research and analysis of Eastern European countries (with the Soviet Union specifically), I have written an outline for the creation of an Eastern European Desk - Research and Executive, which would come directly under the National Security Council.

My experience in this field goes back as far as 1944-46, when as Public Relations Officer to Gen. Anders of the 2nd Polish Corps in Italy I had to brief our American and British Allies on every phase of Soviet activities, available at that time to us. Part of my files I had left later with TIME, Inc, where I worked late in 1946.

Since 1950, when under a special contract with the Free Europe Committee, I worked in Greece, covering from there the Eastern European satellites, I have constantly devoted most of my work to the Soviet march towards world conquest, having covered such refugee centers as Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, Germany and for three years in North Africa. I have also worked as a RFE reporter on Capitol Hill, accredited to the Senate Radio Gallery, where on a few occasions I had to visit Mr. Nixon, then the Vice President.

While in Italy between 1960-66 I was able to give a fully substantiate report and expose Poland's penetration into the Vatican through Boleslaw Piasecki the leader of Poland's PAX movement.

It is because of this background that I feel very strongly that my outline presented to you personally may get responded and that I personally would be able to contribute so largely in the aim set forth by the President-Elect.

To make sure, that in the flow of the present mail reaching your office, you would receive my outline, I am not submitting it with this letter, but I shall wait until I hear from you, or your staff at your earliest possible convenience.

My telephone numbers are: SU-7-4900 (home) or 889-6269 (office)

Thanking you in advance for your consideration, I remain

cc:- Miss Rose Mary Woods

telephone
(Type of request)

6/8/70
(Date received)

xxxx jlp
dem

Name: Daniel Lang, The New Yorker

LANG
(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A. / L A*

To:
From:

Request: Here through June 10 and would like to see HAK re a story he is writing (wouldn't give any information what it is. Said HAK "knows what kind of stories I write"). Staying at the Mx Jefferson Hotel, Rm 708.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: OAB

Additional Information:

RECEIVED

JUN 1 1970

CENTRAL FILES

Resolution:

Jackson Heights, New York 11315
31-30 88th Street
Congregation Tibereth Israel
N. C. S. Y.
Titereth Israel of
Youth Director
Mr. Joseph E. Langer

Henry V. Kissinguer
Personal Secretary to
Julienne L. Pinesu

Sincerely,

thinking of you.
Mr. Kissinguer asked me to thank you for
your work.
will not be able to make a contribution to
for quotation or attribution of any kind, he
followed a policy of not making statements
GREETINGS, and regrets that because he has
honored at your request for a "Message of
in response to your recent letter. He was
Mr. Kissinguer asked me to write to you

Dear Mr. Langer:

May 19, 1971

KISSINGER, HENRY V.

N.C.S.Y. TIFERETH ISRAEL
of
Congregation Tifereth Israel
31-36 88th Street
Jackson Heights, N.Y. 11372

May 7, 1971

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Hon. Kissinger:

Our youth club at Congregation Tifereth Israel, is in the process of
composing a Journal which will be dedicated to the cause of the Jews
in the Soviet Union.

We would truly appreciate your contributing to our work. Could you
please send us a "Message of Greetings" to be included in our Journal.

Thanking you in advance, I remain,

JEL:m1

JET:ml

Youth Director
Joseph E. Ranger

Thinking you in advance, I remain,
kindly yours,

Please send me a 'Message of Greetings' to be included in our journal.
We would truly appreciate your contributing to our work. Could you
in the Soviet Union,
composing a journal which will be dedicated to the cause of the Jews
Our youth club at Congregation Tifereth Israel, is in the process of

Dear Ron, Klaninger:

Dear Ron, Klaninger:

Washington, D.C.
The White House
The Honorable Henry Klaninger

May 3, 1971

Jackson Heights, N.Y. 11322
31-36 88th Street
Congression Tifereth Israel
of
N.C.2.Y. TIFERETH ISRAEL

Copy 8 of 9

Strictly Personal and Confidential

Thank you for the copy of the foreign policy statement. Such
bare truth is refreshing to see. I would like to help such good work
along, since it is in close harmony with views I have pushed on the
inside. . . .

Anyhow, let me sketch in the scene in Vietnam today as it
comes to me from personal sources. The conclusions of the wise fighters
on our side is that we are going to just about lose Vietnam in the next
few months -- and then lose it, either 1964 or 1965, to local neutralists.
At present, these are the same articulate Saigonnsis intellectuals who
were so bitterly anti-Dien. They are picking up a lot of followers
with their advocacy of neutralism (people are worn out tired from the
long, long struggle), their pointing to probable U.S. accommodation of
Cambodia's neutralism even in the face of Sihanouk's insults to the
U.S., U.S. advocacy of neutrality in Laos, and the suspected intent of
the U.S. to get tired of VN and take a neutrality course there eventually --
so, why not take the initiative and make a better, earlier VN deal with
the Communists?

U.S. activities in VN hardly lead to confidence in us. We are
paying from the pocket, not the heart . . . and, I'm afraid, acting a
bit like Scrooge as a consequence. McNamara apparently did so on his
last visit, telling the VN leaders what to do, in terms of a mortgage-
holding banker --not as an American who believes in human liberty. I'm

holding powder --not on an anvil who believes in human liberty. I'm
just visit, calling the UN friends what to do, in case of a warring-
pit like Google on a consequence. I'm sure approximately did to an
acting from the budget, not the heart . . . and, I'm afraid, acting a
U.S. activities in UN fairly fed to conditions in UN. We are
the Communists?

so, why not take the initiative and make a better, earlier UN deal with
the U.S. to get strict on UN and take a neutrality course these eventually --
U.S., U.S. advocacy of neutrality in force, and the respected intent of
Gorbachev's neutrality even in the face of Simeonov's inertia to the
long, long struggle, (that pointing to probable U.S. accommodation of
with their advantage of neutrality (people are won out straight from the
ware so basically anti-Biam). They are pointing up a lot of fallacies
At present, there are the same authentic Simeonovite infidelities who
on one side is that we are going to just about lose Vietnam in the next
come to me from personal sources. The contradictions of the wise flighters
anyhow, let me act in the same way as it
truly . . .

... since it is in close proximity with views I have heard on the
pore trust it retreating so near. I would like to help and feed with
them your copy of the foreign policy statement. So long

Sincerely, Walter and Gail

Only one of 9

Copy 8 of 9

unoccasionally aware that McNamara, such numbers of the Joint Staff as M/Ben "Brute" Krulals (the counter-insurgency "expert" who keeps measuring the win by number of casualties), and State's Roger Hileman are arrogantly certain that they are right and will continue insisting on a sort of Verdun-like attrition against the Communists -- and that these are the views that will prevail. In Saigon, these same views have put Gen. Harkins, whom I've never met, into a position where no Vietnamese officer listens to him seriously, except out of politeness to the American military money-bags.

Apparently Lodge is aware of this -- no longer takes his Country Team into his confidence -- and is now trying to do most of the work by himself. The load is too big for one man.

On the Vietnamese side, there is no real leadership. Strongly, none of the top people of the coup group wants to be the big boss. Premier Tho is a dedicated patriot, but he is inherently shy and hates to make decisions. "Big" Minh is a wonderful follower, inherently shy also, and hesitates to make decisions. Kim is an inside planner, a damn good one, but ambitious only professionally. Don is a personality type who simply hopes to get along with his fellow men -- which he does admirably -- and not be a tough leader who will have to hurt feelings once in a while. Dinh is overly ambitious -- probably would love the top spot -- but really doesn't have the brains to lead a Boy Scout troop along a country.

doesn't have the courage to lead a boy. Some troops lost along a country.
Dip in to easily conditions -- properly would have the job done -- put really
and not be a good leader who will have to put some time in trouble.
Happen to get along with the fellow -- added he does substantially --
put ambitions only brood occasionally. But to a personally able who study
conditions to make decisions. Him to an inside blaster, a man both one,
decalsome. "Big" Mind to a wonderful follower, independently able, and
Tie is a dedicated traitor, put to his independently able and place to some
use of the job because of the comb trash wants to be the job done. Stupid
of the viscousious side, there to no real leadership. Strategy,
the work by himself. The lot to do the job lot one man.

Country Team into die conditions -- and to non fighting to do the rest of
obviously lodge in some of this -- so longer take the die
so the American military launch-date.

Vietnamese officer states to his seriously, except out of必要
place but Gen. Hsin, "when I've never met, introduction done so
on a sort of American-like attrition against the Communists -- and that
are aggressively certain that they are right and will continue existing
measuring the win by number of enemy(ies), and States a Roger Hsin
Milen "Brute" Kruele (the counter-intelligence "subject" who people
necessarily aware that Hsin's, and Kruele's, are the most

***

**Stratagem, Strategy and Confidentiality**

**Date 1**

Gotta ... of 3

Copy of 9

Along with lack of leadership, of course, goes a lack of firm policy. The consequence of course is tremendous uncertainty in the body politic. One evidence is in fear of arrest, sort of a feeling there will be vengefulness by the regime -- which hasn't said there wouldn't be. Government ministries are almost frozen by this fear, a "who's informing on me for being loyal when Dicang was in power?" sort of thing.

Statements of a VN win against the Vietcong by a U.S. leader such as McNamara simply isn't accepted by the Vietnamese. He told the coup leaders that just before Christmas and, in the same breath, told them he was sending more artillery to help out. To them, this equated artillery with a win against the political arguments of the VC guerrillas and just sounded nutty to the Vietnamese. . . .

and just bombarded mostly to the Victorians...
and the statements of a Wm. who against the Victorians by a G.B. officer
of things.

a "nope" interesting one for the first time when I did not know what
she meant by "nope". Government administration are almost lunatic by this time,
there will be an exasperation by the regime -- which doesn't add to their
badly. One evidence is in the year of stress, sort of a testing
Vicar with lack of leadership, of course, there is a lack of him

Statement, Confidential

Date 2

Copy ... of 9

American Physical Society, Sheraton Hall, Sheraton Park Hotel
SYMPOSIUM/ COMMITTEE ON THE PROBLEMS OF PHYSICS AND SOCIETY
8:30 pm Tuesday, 28 April 1970

ABM, MIRV AND SALT

A year ago at this meeting of the American Physical Society we gathered here to discuss the pros and cons of ballistic missile defense, specifically the Safeguard program. Tonight we meet to air the issue of national security as it is affected by the advent of MIRV--the highly sophisticated last stage of a ballistic missile designed to vector a multiplicity of reentry vehicles (RVs) along independent trajectories.

The two U.S. strategic missiles now in the process of being MIRVed are Minuteman III and Poseidon. A total of 500 Minuteman III missiles are to be deployed, beginning this summer. A total of 31 nuclear-powered submarines are scheduled to be converted to launch 16 Poseidon missiles, each of which has 14 RVs but most probably will throw 10 warheads. Eight U.S. submarines are authorized for conversion to Poseidon configuration.

The United States implements its policy of strategic deterrence through the threat potential of 1710 missile launchers which at present have the following throw power:

<table><thead><tr><th>Launchers</th><th>Warheads</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1,000 Minuteman</td><td>1,000</td></tr><tr><td>448 Polaris</td><td>1,344</td></tr><tr><td>208 Polaris</td><td>208</td></tr><tr><td>54 Titan</td><td>54</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>1,710 Missiles</td><td>Total:2,606 Warheads</td></tr></tfoot></table>

If these strategic warheads are city-targeted on the 10 largest Soviet metropolitan areas (total population of 25.7 million according to the preliminary 1970 census) it would be expected that 24 of them would result in 18 million fatalities. Targeting the cities in the 500,000 to 1,000,000 population bracket would yield 12 million fatalities for an additional 24 warheads on target. This nuclear-urban decapitation involving 30 million deaths would seem to impose an impressive risk for Soviet decision-makers.

MIRVing the Poseidons to a level of 10 warheads per launcher would give the undersea arm of U.S. strike forces a throw capacity of 4,960 warheads of approximately twice the power of the Nagasaki A-bomb. Obviously these low-yield weapons hold less threat potential for large city targets since they yield only one-eighth the damage area of a Minuteman warhead. Therefore more Poseidon MIRVs would be required for the largest Soviet cities, but for targets below 750,000 in population one would expect Hiroshima-like damage levels for a single Poseidon MIRV.

On the Soviet side of the strategic fence the missile build-up has lagged behind that of the U.S. by a time delay of two to four years throughout the past decade. The force loadings of U.S. and S.U. ballistic missiles are illustrated by Chart I (lantern slide, copy available at press conference 2:30 pm Sheraton-Park). According to Defense Secretary Laird's speech of April 20th, the Soviet strategic missile arsenal consists of:

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220 SS-9 ICBMs
60 SS-9 " in construction
over 800 SS-11/13 ICBMs
over 200 SLBMs on nuclear-powered submarines
70 SLBMs on disel-powered submarines
Total: 1350 missile launchers

It would appear that the United States and the Soviet Union are approaching a point of parity in the nuclear arms race and that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) at Vienna might be an appropriate time to impose limits on strategic power. One should point out that Secretary Laird's posture statement for fiscal year 1971 gives the U.S. a total of 4,200 force loadings as opposed to 1,350 for the Soviet Union. This would seem to deny any multiple warhead commitment for the existing missile deployments in the Soviet Union.

Although Secretary Laird has stressed the possibility that "the United States, by the mid-1970s, could find itself in a second-rate position with regard to the future security of the Free World." the following 1974-75 strategic force-loadings may be itemized:

<table><tbody><tr><td rowspan="4"><u>Missiles</u></td><td>500 Minuteman II</td><td>500 warheads</td></tr><tr><td>500 Minuteman III</td><td>1,500</td></tr><tr><td>160 Polaris A-3</td><td>480</td></tr><tr><td>496 Poseidon</td><td>4,960</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3"><u>Bombers</u></td><td>45 B-52 C-F</td><td>)</td></tr><tr><td>255 B-52 G-H</td><td>-----2,160</td></tr><tr><td>60 FB-111</td><td>)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Total force loadings 9,600 warheads

Given this projection it would not appear that the mid-70s would be a very propitious time to reach a SALT agreement. It is this prospect that has prompted a number of Americans to propose a MIRV test ban in order to arrest the swift escalation of the arms race.

According to U.S. military leaders the Soviet Union has not as yet tested a "hard-target MIRV" but it has carried out numerous tests of a triplet warhead for its mighty SS-9 missile. The latter has the throw power to hurl a 25 megaton single warhead at 5,000 mile range. It can also throw a cluster-triplet in which each warhead has a 5 megaton yield. Secretary Laird has stressed the threat potential of the SS-9 by asserting that 420 of these could knock out 95 percent of the 1,000 Minuteman silos in a first strike. It is fear of a first-strike that dominates Pentagon thinking on nuclear deterrence.

The development of missiles that can vector a multiplicity of warheads per launcher upsets the whole calculus of deterrence. This is because a Minuteman silo represents one aim point and an SS-9 may be targeted to strike at a multiplicity of aim points. On a purely mathematical basis, MIRV acts to enhance a nation's first-strike capability. The situation is confounded by the inability of intelligence to make a reliable count of deployed MIRVs.

Because a missile silo cover is inscrutable, concealing n warheads where n is any number from 1 to 20 for an SS-9, U.S. planners may make the worst assumptions not only about the value of n but also about the CEP (circular error of probability i.e. the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of the warheads impact) of the MIRVs. Here one must reckon with the MIRV CURVE (Chart II) relating warhead weight to weapon explosiveness. Chart II is specific to a hard-targeted SS-9 i.e. MIRVs aimed at hardened missile silos spaced in clusters. For such targeting the propellant allocations required to vector each MIRV are less than for the case where aim points are far apart.

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<table><tr><td>Warhead Multiplicity</td><td>n =</td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>6</td><td>12</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>MIRV Yield</td><td>y =</td><td>25</td><td>4</td><td>1.3</td><td>0.4</td><td>0.1 Megatons</td></tr><tr><td>Total Yield</td><td>Y =ny =</td><td>25</td><td>12</td><td>8</td><td>5</td><td>2 Megatons</td></tr></table>

Clearly, total weapon yield is sacrificed in splitting up the warhead into n packages. An even greater sacrifice is involved for city-targeting where aim point intervals are greater. I have assumed that Soviet weapon technology is not as perfected in the low-yield range as is that of the U.S.

We now need to consider the range of weapon effectiveness against a 300 psi (pounds per square inch) hardened silo. The following kill-radii and CEP are tabulated for MIRVs of multiplicity n.

<table><tr><td>MIRV number</td><td>n =</td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>6</td><td>12</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Kill radius (300 psi)</td><td>k =</td><td>1.0</td><td>0.6</td><td>0.4</td><td>0.25</td><td>0.16 n.mi.</td></tr><tr><td>CEP95% ssp</td><td>σ =</td><td>0.5</td><td>0.25</td><td>0.18</td><td>0.1</td><td>0.06 n.mi.</td></tr></table>

In this tabulation we see a double dilemma--one for the Soviet planner planning a hypothetical first-strike and another for the U.S. strategist who must worry about a Soviet first-strike potential. There is general agreement that a triplet MIRV configuration for an SS-9 can achieve the accuracy required to effectively target Minuteman silos. But when missile warhead accuracies drop below a quarter-mile value the situation becomes speculative. Yet U.S. planners accustomed to worst assumptioning would be forced to postulate increased warhead accuracy in the future. We may call this "Pentagon-think". By the same token we may label as "Soviet-think" the reckoning that our Minuteman III force equipped with a triplet MIRV of 0.2 Mt weapon yield could achieve the accuracy required to target Soviet missile silos in a first-strike. This double vision of weapons systems confuses the SALT talks. Each side is driven to assuming that the other will acquire the technical excellence granting it a first-strike capability.

For example, suppose that the Soviets were to agree to freezing their SS-9 deployments at the 300 level--well below the lethal 420 figure stipulated by Defense Secretary Laird. Could U.S. planners accept this freeze and rest assured that the United States would not be in jeopardy of a first-strike? They could as long as the SS-9s did not escalate from a triplet to a sextet MIRV configuration. However, a rigid system of inspection would be required to guarantee that such MIRV escalation would not occur. This illustrates how sophisticated a problem arms control has become.

It also illustrates the fact that land-based missiles are not susceptible to arms control. For the United States there is the fear that MIRVed SS-9s could strike first at silos. This would involve a concomitant attack on U.S. cities since the fallout patterns from a heavy attack on Minuteman silos would penumbrate U.S. areas of dense population downwind of the silos. For the Soviet Union there is the "Soviet-think" fear that Minuteman MIRVs are meant for a first-strike.

Kremlin

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The United States ought to aim for a strategic posture in the seventies that would be amenable to arms control and this, in my opinion, means that it should be long range national policy to abandon deterrent dependence on land-based missiles, looking toward the day when sea-based systems would mount the major thrust of the strike forces.

Strategic discussions in Vienna are secondary to the policy decisions that must be reached in Washington. The U.S. Air Force has a $17 billion commitment to Minuteman deployments and the Safeguard program adds many billions of dollars to provide ABM protection for these ICBMs. It would appear to be a dubious national policy that seeks to perpetuate the vanishing asset of ICBM strike power, especially if the national objective would be to phase out Minuteman in the next 4 or 5 years. The commitment to Safeguard would simply compound the problem of phasing out this ballistic system. It should also be remarked that the great throw power of the SS-9 is impressive for high MIRV multipliers when the warheads are aimed at 30 psi vulnerable radars. In this case a 0.1 megaton MIRV striking half-a-mile from the MSR or PAR would destroy it.

While physicists can follow the intricacies of MIRV calculations it should be obvious that the sheer complexity of the problem makes it exceedingly difficult for many officials and military men to understand risk-taking in an arms-control situation. It is therefore quite proper for the Secretary of Defense to make public pronouncements on these risks, although one would wish that they would be more objective than his risk analysis of April 20th. But the Secretary's risk analysis needs to be balanced by some countervailing opinion, such as from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The American people need a White Paper on the subject of ABM and MIRV as related to SALT. Here I believe the efforts of physicists like Drs. Rathjens, Wiesner, Bethe, Panofsky and York have been most valuable for public enlightenment and I would add the names of Teller, Wigner, Brennan, Seitz and those who form up on the other side of the fence. Of course, I include my two colleagues Drs. Scoville and Friel in this company.

When the nation's security is balanced on the brittle knife-edge of the deterrent scales, it is essential that the public debate examine all aspects of the problem. That is why we are met here tonight in this after-hours discussion of issues which derive from the labors of physicists in the service of their government.

I am reminded of some words that the late J. Robert Oppenheimer used not long before his death, when he sought to survey the course of the arms race. "In the discouragement of the day, good example must come to be our firmest ground for hope." he observed. He would certainly have been discouraged by the White House-approved Air Force decision to deploy Minuteman III shortly before the SALT talks opened at Vienna. Given the U.S. strong arm approach to the arms talks, I believe that it would be useful to give some sign to the Soviets that the United States is genuinely concerned with arresting the arms race and I would therefore propose that the U.S. announce a unilateral cut-back in Minuteman deployment. I propose an unconditional decommissioning of 150 Minuteman missiles at the Grand Forks, North Dakota field. This would be followed by a proposal to phase out 150 more ICBMs at the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri contingent upon the Soviet agreement to halt deployment of SS-9 missiles.

This act of faith on the part of the United States might help to get things started at Vienna. It would also allow the Nixon Administration to back off on its Safeguard program rather than face a defeat on it in Congress.

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It will be no easy task for the SALT talkers to reach an agreement on an exchange ratio for the SS-9 and Minuteman III, if the latter is deployed. The triplet warhead missiles are quite different in throw power and their military effectiveness is a function of targeting doctrine. But if the U.S. does not MIRV Minuteman it may be easier to work out the phase-out of the land-based ICBMs. The basic asymmetry of these ICBMs, especially when MIRVed, together with an inability to assess their quality complicates the SALT problem. It should be stressed that the quality of strategic arms looms as more significant than the quantity of launchers.

I believe that the Soviets are unlikely to accept a quality inferiority in strategic weaponry, especially in MIRVed systems. We must however recognize that sea-based systems have hull-imposed limitations on missile throw-power. In a sense, a submarine serves as the first stage of a 3-stage ICBM and the hull dimensions define the size of this first stage. Thus the divergence between an SS-9 and a Minuteman III is not paralleled in the case of Polaris and Y-class submarine launched missiles. In a sense, one accepts the submarine as a unit of firepower. Submarines are also subject to verification by inspection. SALT talkers might seek an agreement to restrict submarine hull dimensions so as to retain symmetry of strategic systems for both nations. Here it is possible that ULMS, the underseas, long range missile system of the U.S. Navy might be a destabilizing factor.

Those who argue that the Poseidon system represents only 31 aim points for a first-strike and that this fact presents an undue risk must realize that the mobility and concealment of the nuclear-powered submarines give them high invulnerability. Furthermore, a single Poseidon submarine could hurl 160 warheads at targets of retaliation in a delayed second-strike. I admit that numerically-minded military men, accustomed to the impressiveness of 1,000 ICBM deployments, find it hard to adjust to reliance on quality as opposed to quantity. We must recognize that the Minuteman fixed base concept must be abandoned.

It may not be possible to reach a SALT agreement on strategic weapons this year. Both sides have waited too long before trying to reach an arms control. Thus they bring to the SALT table a profoundly complex set of issues that may not permit ready solutions. Each side can however exchange views, display their worries and take the small steps that keep them in communication, looking toward the day later in the decade when agreements can be reached. A unilateral cutback of 150 ICBMs by the U.S., followed by a Soviet cutoff on SS-9 deployment would be a good start on the road to arms control in the 1970s.

Ralph E. Lapp

THE CENTURY ASSOCIATION

7 WEST FORTY-THIRD STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

GENERAL

F. G. Missinger, Henry A.
H. Missinger, Henry A.

February 2, 1973

Dear Henry,

I can only add my heartfelt thanks to those the millions
of your fellow-countrymen owe you. Blessed indeed are the
peacemakers, and this act -- against all odds, and not a
little skepticism on the part of many like myself -- will rank
among the most life-giving and restorative in its consequences.

This letter is not without ulterior motive. The President of this august institution has asked me to inquire of you about the possibility that you might be willing, sometime in the not-too-distant future, to address one of the Century's monthly meetings.

"Address" is really quite the wrong word. As you may remember, the speeches are usually short, or else drowned out by the gentle snores of the more elderly. What we would of course hope is that you might enjoy a chance, among friends, to remark informally on some of the less overpowering aspects of your efforts, including such narratives as the one involving Chou En-lai and the Peking Duck, which I hope is not apocryphal.

Please don't let this be a burden, of which you have far
too many, but you would certainly know a large number among
your audience, and you could be assured of their affectionate
interest.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20506

RECEIVED

OCT 23 1973

CENTRAL FILES

SAY IT STRAIGHT!...1

January 11, 1972

(Indian policy)

By Victor Lasky

WASHINGTON -- There's very little about the disclosures in the so-called Anderson papers that troubles the Nixon Administration. All that those documents basically demonstrate is that the White House desperately sought to prevent a war on the Indian subcontinent.

What is of utmost concern, however, is the fact that someone within the federal bureaucracy, for whatever reasons, betrayed his trust by illegally providing a columnist with copies of "secret-sensitive" minutes of three White House meetings dealing with the Indo-Pakistan war.

The White House has every right to keep its confidential in-house deliberations from being publicly spread on the record. You just can't have television cameras inside the Situation Room taping high-level discussions for use on the 7:00 p.m. news shows. If you do, the Government will cease to function.

The New York Times, for example, used to understand the need for utmost secrecy in such Government deliberations. Back in December 1962, the "Times" commented on a magazine article "purporting to tell what went on in the executive committee of the National Security Council" during the Cuban missile crisis. Alleging that "the secrecy of one of the highest organs of the United States Government has been seriously breached," the "Times" asked: "How can advisers to the President be expected to give advice freely and easily and at all times honestly and with complete integrity if they have to worry about what their arguments will look like in print a few weeks later? What kind of advice can

SAY IT STRAIGHT!...2

the President expect to get under such circumstances? How can
there be any real freedom of discussion or of dissent; how can
anyone be expected to advance positions that may be politically
unpopular or unprofitable? Does no one in Washington recall the
McCarthy era and the McCarthy technique?"

Of course, the "Times" has changed its position completely
in recent years. Today Scotty Reston, Max Frankel and John Oakes
are all for publication of anything that will lead to the political
destruction of Richard M. Nixon. They're currently having a field
day with the Anderson papers.

If anything, publication of the documents puts the lie to
repeated leftist-liberal contentions that freedom of the press is
imperilled in this country. In no other free country would publica-
tion of such materials have been permitted.

Anderson said he was disclosing the documents, slipped
to him by a disloyal Government employee, because, he calimed, Dr.
Henry Kissinger had "lied" to newsmen in a background briefing when
the President's national security adviser had stated that this
country's policy was not "anti-Indian."

But in the same briefing, Kissinger had also stated --
and this has been deliberately overlooked by most of the critics --
that the United States, "which in many respects has had a love
affair with India, can only with enormous pain accept the fact
that military action was taken in our view without adequate cause..."

In other words, Kissinger was not being anti-Indian in
general, but only on a specific Indian policy, namely, its long-
standing desire to wreak havoc on neighboring Pakistan. It is

(more)

SAY IT STRAIGHT!...3

difficult to comprehend contentions that the Nixon Administration
should have supported India's military adventure.

Another argument of the critics such as Reston is that
the U.S. has lost influence in India to the Russians. Nonsense!
Prime Minister Gandhi has long played the Soviet game, figuring that
no matter what she does the American suckers will keep paying
India's exorbitant bills. Mrs. Gandhi has never made any secret
of her anti-Americanism. Thus, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., in his
account of the Kennedy years, "A Thousand Days," recorded a visit
Mrs. Gandhi made to the White House with her father Prime Minister
Nehru in November 1961. "During dinner," wrote Schlesinger,
"Indira Gandhi assailed the President about American policy, praised
Krishna Menon, the professional anti-American of New Delhi, and
otherwise elevated the mood of the evening."

As Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi has done nothing to
elevate the mood of Indo-U.S. relations. She has repeatedly kicked
us in the teeth, all the time keeping her hand out for more U.S.
aid money. The time has come to tell her to forget it, that
Uncle Sam doesn't intend to play sucker any more.///

VIETNAM & WORLD PEACE PLAN OUTLINE

Everyone who is asked "Would you vote for any North Vietnamese or Vietcong official for public office?" has had to say "No." Perhaps, there are 'peaceniks' who would say "Yes," but they must be very few, because no public officials anywhere or anytime have ever disqualified themselves more than the aforesaid!

From the time Ho Chi Minh and his communist government got into power, they have pilloried, purged, and persecuted their dissenters and critics mercilessly and murderously in both North and South Vietnam.

"By their fruits you shall know them", and their misdeeds cry to 'high Heaven' over their words! If some Vietnamese (as it's claimed by some of our own critics, probably in exaggeration) look up to Ho Chi Minh as the 'George Washington of Vietnam', because he was one of the guerilla leaders who toppled the French from Colony-control, they could not be worse mistaken; Ho Chi Minh has subsequently shown clearly that his real, ulterior objective was and is to substitute his own absolute dictatorial domination over the people for the much milder and generally humanitarian rule of the French! He uncompromisingly ignores, even wantonly opposes the efforts towards self-rule by the South Vietnamese. He is even commanding his enslaved North Viet people to slaughterous and self-sacrificing aggression! At the same time, at the conference table in Paris, he is using the talks actually as a military strategem, attempting to get the United States to make a second-step concession of stopping all bombing of the North, which would permit him a practically unimhibited ground-offensive against our defending troops!"

The North Viet communist leadership now leaves us no other alternative than the choice We should have made at the outset of their aggression, and that is to walk out of the Paris meeting and into a special session of the United Nations Assembly, there to accuse that leadership of their politically self-disqualifying commands to their own people to complete self-sacrifice in unscrupulous, inhumanitarian total-aggression! We then can produce the evidence and witnesses which are innumerable, and from neutral as well as from our own and enemy sources. Upon submission of the accusation and the proof, we should make a motion for a vote to censure the North Viet government and to issue an order or demand to "Cease and desist military aggression vs. the South Viet. people!"

If the U.N. demand is ignored, additional motions must then be made and passed which would employ successively the sanctions necessary to coerce co-operation by the North Viet gov't. While a defence in the forum of the Assembly should be permitted the North Viet gov't., nevertheless if a censure & stop demand is ignored, sanctions including severance of diplomatic relations, economic boy-cott, and police intervention should be voted and successively carried out as needed.

-1-

-continuation "Vietnam & World Peace Plan Outline"

Once the North Viet aggression is halted, if armed subversion is continued in South Vietnam either by the Vietcong alone or with the aid of North Viet communists or other countries, appropriate U.N. sanctions and actions should be voted and carried-out to limit and stop the perpetrators.

In closing, we point-out that this Vietnam procedure by the United Nations is necessary and proper and even a progressive step for the permanent development of an effective maintenance of world peace both between nations and within nations by the appropriate world organization, the United Nations.

This peace plan outline is submitted with a plea and prayer. The plea is to all public officials, the news officials, the peoples of all the U.N. countries, the religious officials, -yes, even the Communist officials to submit to international rules of proper peaceful order and non-violent ethical means of competition. The prayer is to the one-God-of-all that He in his own way enlighten and convert us all to mutual humanitarian relations. Once a misguided Saul was so enlightened and converted, becoming the Paul who was such a great non-violent power for good. Yes, this could happen to us all, even misguided communists who would then withdraw support of military aggression and violent subversion and terroristic tactics, probably sufficiently weakening the efforts of the unconverted to cause their failure of conquest!

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

JAN 28 1971

Dear Mister Lazarus:

Thank you for your letter of January 18 and for sending me pictures from my visit to the USS TICONDEROGA. I am most appreciative of your thoughtfulness and am pleased to have these nice reminders of a very pleasant day.

Ltjg, John R. Lazarus, USNR
Public Affairs Officer
USS TICONDEROGA (CVS-14)
FPO, San Francisco 96601

jlp:1/26/71

RECEIVED
JAN 28 1971

CENTRAL FILES