April 13, 1973

REMARKS OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
TO THE
FEDERAL CITY CLUB
SHERATON-CARLTON HOTEL

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen: When I handed in my
worksheet to Bob Haldeman this morning -- (Laughter) -- I said that
I would spend the evening at the club, and you can imagine my shock
when I arrived and found so many distinguished members of the
Washington Post present. (Laughter) It is not that this Adminis-
tration is intolerant of criticism; it is, rather, that the Washington
Post does not respect the background rules on which I would like to
put some of these remarks, because I am certain they will not print
tomorrow that I was at the Metropolitan Club. (Laughter) My conso-
lation is that Mrs. Longworth is a very great security blanket, but I
wish I could say the same thing for Senator Cooper or Secretary Peterson.
(Laughter).

Now, while I have this platform with Secretary Peterson, I want
to set at rest the rumors that he left the Administration not entirely
voluntarily. As you know, before joining Bell & Howell, Pete had a
distinguished career as an advertising executive in Chicago, and a
search of the White House records indicates that no member of the
Nixon Administration who ever had any connection with an advertising
agency has ever been dismissed. (Laughter).

Now, Pete made some unfair comments about my ego. Anyone
in my position recognizes the essential necessity of humility. (Laughter).
Every evening I pray for guidance and wisdom, and when I am finished,
I ask God what I can do for Him. (Laughter).

In addition, I have been recently the recipient of many letters
from grade-school students around the country, and they, too, inspire
a certain sense of one's limits:

"Dear Mr. Kissinger: My teacher has told me you are a remarkable
man and that I should write you. Do you have a dog? If so, please
send me his picture." (Laughter)

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Or: "I have read recently that you want to return to Harvard.
Don't do it. School is a drag. I know because I am in school." (Laughter)

But I do not want to make this a conventional speech, and
since I know there are so many newsmen in this group, and that you
are so concerned with the questions of Indochina and so eager to find
out how the deliberations are conducted in the White House, I received
the President's authority to read to you some of the documents we have
received about infiltration on the Ho Chi Minh Trail from the various
agencies--to underline the loneliness of the President.

I would like to begin with the assessment of the Central Intelligence Agency:

"The reader should bear in mind about the parameters of the
matrix that we have very little in the way of direct empirical evidence
of what is getting through. We had our man there hiding under a bush
and counting the bicycles going by. (Laughter). But we had to pull
him out because we needed an extra hand in Santiago. (Laughter).

"Basically, we start with an input assessment reflecting a
conceptual analytical model. The average North Vietnamese is five
feet tall and can carry a hundred pounds on a bicycle. We don't know
how many bicycles they have, but we do know they have a population
of 70 million and the average bicycle per capita figure for developing
countries is 0.74. (Laughter). It is noteworthy that in their latest
recruiting drive, the Hanoi leadership made an intensive effort to
recruit cadres of more than five feet tall; therefore, a substantial
portion of their logistics force may be as tall as five feet six inches.
However, it is not appropriate to extrapolate directly from this that these
cadres are capable of carrying a 10 percent greater load. We flagged
this problem as introducing an element of uncertainty.

"Nevertheless, after taking into account the proportion of their
labor force engaged in other activities, such as entertaining Jane Fonda
we tentatively conclude that they can put in about 10,475.06 tons of
supplies per month at the top of the pipeline.

"However, there is a high attrition factor to be inputted into
this model as the stuff goes down the trail. Anyway, we calculate that
Throughput (T), equals Bicycles Per Capita (BC), times Population (P),
minus Breakage (B-1), Wear and Tear (WT), Misplaced Goods (M),

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Weather Damage (W), and Pilfering (P) by the less disciplined cadre. For the month of March this comes to about 482 pounds of supplies getting through. (Laughter).

"The reader may be surprised at this discrepancy, but our job is capability, not intention. The figure is not based on empirical data, but on a sophisticated analytical model which involves no human judgment whatever." (Laughter).

As you ladies and gentlemen know, the NSC procedure makes it impossible for any one agency, however sophisticated, to prevail with a single analysis, and therefore, we invited the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- (Laughter) -- and their comments were as follows:

"The JCS has recently taken steps to upgrade our information data collecting and assessment capabilities. The North Vietnamese infiltration threat has been assessed by our new Ground Undercover Numerical Gauge for the Ho Chi Minh Trail, otherwise called 'Operation Gung-Ho.' Our preliminary, high-confidence estimate assessment judgment is that a hell of a lot of supplies are getting through. (Laughter). In many war games, we have proved conclusively that to sustain a level of shooting requires a sustained level of ammunition.

"The linchpin of the pipeline is two key bridges in Southern Laos. Each of these bridges has a load capacity of 300 vehicles a day. Some of the supplies, however, are transported on mules. The JCS are divided as to whether a mule can be considered a vehicle. (Laughter). The Army considers that a mule is a vehicle, and this has been traditionally so in military history. The Air Force considers this laughable, as tests have shown that you cannot install a radar on a mule. The Navy is willing to back the mule if it can get Army agreement to appropriations for the training of a company of dolphins for Naval Intelligence.

"With the caveat of this split decision, the JCS have estimated that about 25,000 tons a month are being put into the pipeline in North Vietnam, and that about 30,000 tons a month are entering South Vietnam. (Laughter). The discrepancy is explained by the well known fact that Communists are extremely tricky. (Laughter).

"Our action recommendation is a contingency plan for a high-payoff/low-risk, one-day strike by three aircraft on these two bridges. System Analysis has commented that it is not necessary to take out both bridges completely; in fact, the destruction of 1-1/2 bridges would

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serve the purpose equally well. This would require only 2-1/2 aircraft instead of three --(Laughter) -- and would, therefore, be more cost effective. The JCS have rejected this assessment because the Services cannot agree on which end of the bridge to hit." (Laughter)

Now, we then invited the State Department to comment, but we received only a very brief note which said that the State Department paper is still in the process of being cleared, but as an interim recommendation, the Department proposes setting up an American Consulate in Hanoi. The Department has in reserve a couple of young Foreign Service Officers who have undergone extensive training in infiltration logistics and who will count the number of trucks going by the Consulate (Laughter). This way we can eliminate the need for a CIA man in the jungle and strengthen the authority of the Foreign Service.

In addition, there was a memorandum from the National Security Adviser of very great profundity and complexity, but since part of it is still in the process of being translated -- (Laughter) -- and since we have not yet placed all the verbs into the text, I will not impose it on this audience. (Laughter).

Now, let me make a few serious remarks.

This award means a great deal to me at this time when I hope we are moving steadily away from war. I particularly appreciate it from a group many of whose members I have the impression have shown less than full agreement with the Administration.

For years, one of the staples of our political debate has been that with the end of the war in Vietnam, we could restore our priorities and recover our unity. But the end of the war has shown that the combatants have been rather reluctant to leave the trenches; that the habit of confrontation had proved more difficult to overcome than was sought.

Some day, I suspect sooner than we think, many of our present debates will be forgotten or seem irrelevant, but some of the deepest scars of recent years will linger.

As a nation, we have been shaken by the realization of our fallibility, and it has been painful to grasp that we are no longer pristine, if we ever were. Later than any nation, we have come to the recognition of our limits. In coming to a recognition of our limits,

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we have achieved one of the definitions of mutuality, but the danger is
that we will learn that lesson too well; that instead of a recognition
that we cannot do everything, we will fall into the illusion that we
cannot do anything.

Nothing is more urgent right now than a serious and com-
passionate debate of where we are going, because if we lose the
capacity for great conception, we can be administered but not governed.
I first saw government at a high level over a decade ago, at a time which
is now occasionally debunked as overly brash, excessively optimistic,
even somewhat arrogant. Some of these criticisms are justified, but
a spirit prevailed then which was quintessentially American; that
problems are a challenge, not an alibi; that men are measured not
only by their success, but also by their striving; that it is better to
aim grandly than to wallow in mediocre comfort. Above all, the
Administration then in office, and its opponents, thought of themselves
engaged in a common enterprise, not in a permanent, irreconcilable
contest.

At a time which history will surely mark as one of the great
revolutions, the world continues to need our idealism and our purpose,
and in this respect the spirit of the early 60s was more nearly right
than some of the present attitudes.

In the 1920s, we were isolationists because we thought we
were too good for this world. We are now in danger of withdrawing
from the world because we believe we are not good enough for it. The
result is the same, and the consequences would be similar. So it is
time to end our own civil war.

To be sure, we should leaven our optimism with a sense of
tragedy, and temper our idealism with humility and realism. But
we have had enough of the liturgies of debate, and what we need most
is the unity of which Senator Cooper spoke, which is the prerequisite
for mastering the future and overcoming the past.

Thank you very much.

###

April 23, 1973

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Text of Address to be Delivered at 2:00 p.m. EST,
Monday, April 23, 1973, by Henry A. Kissinger
to the Associated Press Annual Luncheon, at the
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, Embargoed for
Release until 12:00 noon EST.

## THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This year has been called the Year of Europe, but not because Europe was less important in 1972 or in 1969. The Alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all post-war foreign policy. It provided the political framework for American engagements in Europe and marked the definitive end of U.S. isolationism. It ensured the sense of security that allowed Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the stimulus for an unprecedented endeavor in European unity and the principal means to forge the common policies that safeguarded Western security in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation. Our values, our goals and our basic interests are most closely identified with those of Europe.

### A New Era

1973 is the Year of Europe because the era that was shaped by decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of those policies has produced new realities that require new approaches:

- The revival of Western Europe is an established fact as is the historic success of its movement toward economic unification.

- The East-West strategic military balance has shifted from American preponderance to near equality, bringing with it the necessity for a new understanding of the requirements of our common security.

- Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many fields, "Atlantic" solutions to be viable must include Japan.

- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the past two decades diminish, new assertions of national identity and national rivalry emerge.

- Problems have arisen, unforeseen a generation ago, which require new types of cooperative action. Ensuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations is an example.

These factors have produced a dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the West -- a change which is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship. In Europe a new generation -- to whom war and its dislocations are not personal experiences -- takes stability for granted. But it is less committed to the unity that made peace possible and to the effort required to maintain it. In the United States, decades of global burdens have fostered and the frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have accentuated a reluctance to sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility.

Inevitably this period of transition will have its strains. There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidely and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies--also in the name of Atlantic unity.

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Our challenge is whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations.

If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved, and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement.

In the Forties and Fifties the task was economic reconstruction and security against the danger of attack. The West responded with courage and imagination. Today the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspirations from its goals rather than its fears. The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation, equal to that undertaken by the post-war generation of leaders of Europe and America.

This is why the President is embarking on a personal and direct approach to the leaders of Western Europe. In his discussions with the heads of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, the Secretary General of NATO and other European leaders, it is President's purpose to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West.

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively. The political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other. The solutions will not be worthy of the opportunity if left to technicians. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed relations with our adversaries to lighten the burdens of fear and suspicion.

In 1973 we can gain the same sense of historical achievement by reinvigorating shared ideals and common purposes with our friends.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic partners that, by the time the President travels to Europe toward the end of the year, we will have worked out a new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future -- a blueprint that:

- builds on the past without becoming its prisoner,

- deals with the problems our success has created,

- creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose progress Japan can share.

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and ultimately Japan to join us in this effort.

This is what we mean by the Year of Europe.

## Problems in Atlantic Relationships

The problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the Fifties and Sixties the Atlantic community organized itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

- In economic relations, the European Community has increasingly stressed its regional personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives.

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these perspectives, international trade and non-state matters. We must reconcile

international law and non-state matters. We must reconcile
the need to act as part of, and be responsible for, a wider
era of the political personality of the United States, at the same

era of economic relations, the European Community has increasingly

its common enterprise,

consolidated itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of
part because during the Fifties and Sixties the Atlantic community

This is what we mean by the Year of Europe,

as in this effort.

process Japan can share.

-- creates for the Atlantic sections a new relationship in whose

-- deals with the problem out of access has created.

-- battle on the front without becoming its prisoner.

prisoners there;

consolidated a new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future -- a
the President travels to Europe toward the end of the year, we will see
The United States proposes to the Atlantic states itself, by the time

reaffirming shared ideals and common purposes with our friends.
In 1963 we can share the same sense of historical achievement by

lighten the burdens of past and accession.

In 1965 the President transformed relations with our allies to

the highest level.

of the opportunity it left to technician. They must be addressed at
the end of one year against the other. The solutions will not be worthy
hired by reality, not by our own. It is not for the technical purpose of
the policy, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations so
they should be to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively.

a new era of creativity in the West,

European leaders, if its President's purpose to fix the basis for
Germany, and France, the Secretary General of NATO and other
the needs of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of
Spain to the leaders of Western Europe. In the discussions with
this is why the President is embarking on a personal and direct

by the best-war generation of leaders of Europe and America.
It must join in a fresh act of creation, equal to that material
inspiration from its goals rather than its years. The Atlantic
lessened to create and more consistent of other priorities, drawing
relationship a commission a force in building a new structure of peace,
courage and imagination. They need to make the Atlantic
and security against the danger of attack. The West responded with
at the Fifties and Fifties the status was a strategic reconstruction

even greater achievement,

and we shall under our past's opportunity for
been achieved, and we shall achieve it.

Our challenge is whether a nation formed by a common past can

-- In our collective defense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different strategic conditions. The full implications of this change have yet to be faced.

-- Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations, but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation states. The U.S. has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

In short, we deal with each other regionally and even competitively in economic matters, on an integrated basis in defense, and as nation-states in diplomacy. When the various collective institutions were rudimentary, the potential inconsistency in their modes of operation was not a problem. But after a generation of evolution and with the new weight and strength of our allies, the various parts of the construction are not always in harmony and sometimes obstruct each other.

If we want to foster unity, we can no longer ignore these problems. The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity, to serve the common objectives which underlie their unity. We can no longer afford to pursue national or regional self-interest without a unifying framework. We cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others.

We must strike a new balance between self-interest and the common interest. We must identify interests and positive values beyond security in order to engage once again the commitment of peoples and parliaments. We need a shared view of the world we seek to build.

## Agenda for the Future

### Economic

No element of American post-war policy has been more consistent than our support of European unity. We encouraged it at every turn. We knew that a united Europe would be a more independent partner. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our common interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that political unity would follow economic integration; and that a unified Europe working cooperatively with us in an Atlantic partnership would ease many of our international burdens.

It is clear that many of these expectations are not being fulfilled.

We and Europe have benefited from European economic integration. Increased trade within Europe has stimulated the growth of European economies and the expansion of trade in both directions across the Atlantic.

But we cannot ignore the fact that Europe's economic success and its transformation from a recipient of our aid to a strong competitor has produced a certain amount of friction. There has been turbulence and a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations.

In trade, the natural economic weight of a market of 250 million people has pressed other states to seek special arrangements to protect their access to it. The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa appears to be at the expense of the United States and other nations which are excluded. In agriculture, where the

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The gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a determined commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to find cooperative solutions.

The United States will continue to support the unification of Europe. We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help build. For us European unity is what it has always been-- not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership.

This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We shall also continue to press the effort to reform the monetary system so that it promotes stability rather than constant disruptions. A new equilibrium must be achieved in trade and monetary relations.

We see these negotiations as an historic opportunity for positive achievement. They must engage the top political leaders for they require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the experts the inevitable competitiveness of economic interests will dominate the debate. The influence of pressure groups and special interests will become pervasive. There will be no overriding sense of direction. There will be no framework for the generous solutions or mutual concessions essential to preserve a vital Atlantic partnership.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to ensure that economic negotiations serve larger political purposes. They must recognize that economic rivalry, if carried on without restraint, will in the end damage other relationships.

The United States intends to adopt a broad political approach that does justice to our overriding political interest in an open and balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. This is the spirit of the President's trade bill and of his speech to the International Monetary Fund last year. It will guide our strategy in the trade and monetary talks. We see these negotiations not as a test of strength, but as a test of joint statesmanship.

## Defense

Atlantic unity has always come most naturally in the field of defense. For many years the military threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Today we remain united on the objective of collective defense, but we face the new challenge of maintaining it under radically changed strategic conditions and with the new opportunity of enhancing our security through negotiated reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the '50s and '60s to rely almost solely on a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. Because under conditions of nuclear parity such a strategy invites mutual suicide, the Alliance must have other choices. The collective ability to resist attack in Western Europe by means of flexible responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the United States has maintained substantial conventional forces in Europe and our NATO allies have embarked on a significant effort to modernize and improve their own military establishments.

While the Atlantic Alliance is committed to a strategy of flexible response in principle, the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. Flexibility by its nature requires sensitivity to new conditions and continual consultation among the allies to respond

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to changing circumstances. And we must give substance to the defense posture that our strategy defines. Flexible response cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around the defense structure that emerges from lowest common denominator compromises driven by domestic considerations. It must be seen by ourselves and by potential adversaries as a credible, substantial and rational posture of defense.

A great deal remains to be accomplished to give reality to the goal of flexible response:

- There are deficiencies in important areas of our conventional defense.

- There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine, for example, on the crucial question of the role of tactical nuclear weapons.

- There are anomalies in NATO deployments as well as in its logistics structure.

To maintain the military balance that has ensured stability in Europe for 25 years, the Alliance has no choice but to address these needs and to reach an agreement on our defense requirements. This task is all the more difficult because the lessening of tensions has given new impetus to arguments that it is safe to begin reducing forces unilaterally. And unbridled economic competition can sap the impulse for common defense. All governments of the Western Alliance face a major challenge in educating their peoples to the realities of security in the 1970's.

The President has asked me to state that America remains committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic defense. He is adamantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Europe. But we owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared. This is what the President believes must result from the dialogue with our allies in 1973.

When this is achieved the necessary American forces will be maintained in Europe, not simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligible structure of Western defense. This too will enable us to engage our adversaries intelligently in negotiations for mutual balanced reductions.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions which will begin this year. We hope that it will be a contribution to a broader dialogue on security. Our approach is designed not from the point of view of special American, but of general Alliance interests. Our position will reflect the President's view that these negotiations are not a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of consequences. No formula for reductions is defensible--whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale-if it undermines security.

Our objective in the dialogue on defense is a new consensus on security addressed to new conditions and to the hopeful new possibilities of effective arms limitations.

## Diplomacy

We have entered a truly remarkable period of East-West diplomacy. The last two years have produced an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European Security Conference and on mutual balanced force reductions, and a series of significant

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practical bilateral agreements between Western and Eastern countries, including a dramatic change in bilateral relations between the U.S. and USSR. These were not isolated actions, but steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried forward as a collective effort. Our approach to detente stressed that negotiations had to be concrete, not atmospheric, and that concessions should be reciprocal. We expect to carry forward the policy of relaxation of tensions on this basis.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing uneasiness -- all the more insidious for rarely being made explicit -- that superpower diplomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. Where our allies' interests have been affected by our bilateral negotiations, as in the talks on the limitations of strategic arms, we have been scrupulous in consulting them; where our allies are directly involved, as in the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, our approach is to proceed jointly on the basis of agreed positions. Yet some of our friends in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord America the same trust in our motives as they received from us or to grant us the same tactical flexibility that they employed in pursuit of their own policies. The United States is now often taken to task for flexibility where we used to be criticized for rigidity.

All of this underlines the necessity to articulate a clear set of common objectives together with our allies. Once that is accomplished, it will be quite feasible, indeed desirable, for the several allies to pursue these goals with considerable tactical flexibility. If we agree on common objectives, it will become a technical question whether a particular measure is pursued in a particular forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally. Then those allies who seek reassurance of America's commitment will find it not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty, but in an agreed framework of purpose.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In many areas of the world our approaches will differ, especially outside of Europe. But we do require an understanding of what should be done jointly and of the limits we should impose on the scope of our autonomy.

We have no intention of buying an illusory tranquility at the expense of our friends. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others. But the perception of common interests is not automatic; it requires constant redefinition. The relaxation of tensions to which we are committed makes allied cohesion indispensable, yet more difficult. We must ensure that the momentum of detente is maintained by common objectives rather than by drift, escapism or complacency.

## America's Contribution

The agenda I have outlined here is not an American prescription but an appeal for a joint effort of creativity. The historic opportunity for this generation is to build a new structure of international relations for the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic partnership is indispensable for it.

The United States is prepared to make its contribution:

- We will continue to support European unity. Based on the principles of partnership, we will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.

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-- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies. We will maintain our forces and not withdraw from Europe unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defense.

-- We shall continue to pursue the relaxation of tensions with our adversaries on the basis of concrete negotiations in the common interest. We welcome the participation of our friends in a constructive East-West dialogue.

-- We will never consciously injure the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will take seriously our interests and our responsibilities.

-- We are prepared to work cooperatively on new common problems we face. Energy, for example, raises the challenging issues of assurance of supply, impact of oil revenues on international currency stability, the nature of common political and strategic interests and long-range relations of oil-consuming to oil-producing countries. This could be an area of competition; it should be an area of collaboration.

-- Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself, so the Atlantic Community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise.

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. We have before us the example of the great accomplishments of the past decades -- and the opportunity to match and dwarf them. This is the task ahead. This is how, in the 1970's, the Atlantic nations can truly serve our peoples and the cause of peace.

###

APRIL 23, 1973

REMARKS OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSOCIATED PRESS ANNUAL LUNCHEON
NEW YORK CITY

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: I greatly appreciate this introduction, although I must confess it also makes me slightly uneasy, because I remember in 1968, shortly after I was appointed to this position, then President-elect Nixon took me to the White House to meet President Johnson and we were very eager to learn the distillation of President Johnson's experiences and knowledge about foreign affairs.

He said, "The first thing you have to remember is to get the leakers, and I will tell you how you get the leakers. You read the newspapers or listen to newsmen talking, and if anyone in your Administration is called bright and intelligent and profound, you fire him." (Laughter) So I hope the introduction can be put off the record. (Laughter)

I thought today I would speak to you on a subject that is not really covered in the questions, most of which deal with other areas of the world, namely, America's relations with Europe.

This year has been called the Year of Europe. I have even been accused of being the originator of that phrase, and I am trying hard to find out where and when I said it. But in any event, we consider 1973 as the Year of Europe, not because Europe was less important in previous years, but because the era that was shaped by the decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of the policies toward Europe has produced new realities and requires new approaches.

-- There have been a number of changes. The revival of Western Europe is an established fact, as is the historic success of its movement toward economic unification.

-- The East-West strategic military balance has shifted from American preponderance to near equality, bringing with it the necessity for a new understanding of the requirements of our common security.

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-- Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many fields, "Atlantic" solutions must include Japan.

-- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the past two decades diminish, new assertions of national identity and national rivalry emerge.

-- Problems have arisen, unforeseen a generation ago, which require new types of cooperative action, such as insuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations.

These factors have produced a dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the West -- a change which is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship. In Europe, a new generation -- to whom war and its dislocations are not personal experiences -- takes stability for granted. But it is less committed to the unity that made peace possible and to the effort required to maintain it. In the United States, decades of global burdens and the frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have produced a reluctance to sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility.

Inevitably, this period of transition has its strains. There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing its economic self-interests too one-sidedly. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

So we face a challenge: whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared, positive aspirations.

In the 40s and 50s the task was economic reconstruction and security against the danger of attack. The West responded with courage and imagination. Today, the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new structure for peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspirations from its goals rather than its fears.

- 3 -

That is why the President is embarking on a personal
and direct approach to the leaders of Western Europe. In his
discussions with the heads of government of Britain, Italy, the
Federal Republic of Germany and France, with the Secretary Gen-
eral of NATO and other European leaders, it is the President's
purpose to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West.

He will seek to deal with Atlantic problems compre-
hensively. The political, military and economic issues in
Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice,
nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic partners
that, by the time the President travels to Europe toward the
end of this year, we will have worked out a new Atlantic Charter
setting the goals for the future -- a Charter that:

- builds on the past without becoming its prisoner;

- deals with the problems our success has created; and

- creates for the Atlantic nations a new relation-
  ship in whose progress Japan can share.

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and ultimately
Japan, to join us in this effort.

Of course, there are problems in Atlantic relationships.
They have arisen in part because during the 50s and 60s the
Atlantic community organized itself in different ways in the
many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

-- In economic relations, the European Community has
increasingly stressed its regional personality; the United
States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible
for, a wider international trade and monetary system.

- 4 -

-- Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations,
but is essentially conducted by traditional nation states. The
U.S. has global interests and responsibilities. Our European
allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in
conflict, but neither are they automatically identical.

In short, we deal with each other regionally and even
competitively in economic matters, on an integrated basis in
defense, and as nation states in diplomacy. When the various
collective institutions were rudimentary, the potential incon-
sistency in their mode of operation was not a problem. But after
a generation of evolution, the various parts of the construction
are not always in harmony, and sometimes obstruct each other.

The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the
management of their diversity. We can no longer afford to pur-
sue national or regional self-interest without a unifying frame-
work. We cannot hold together if each country or region asserts
its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit, and invokes unity
to curtail the independence of others.

In short, we must strike a new balance between self-
interest and the common interest. We must identify interests
and positive values beyond security in order to engage once
again the commitment of peoples and parliaments.

Now let me deal with our conception of how to approach
each of the areas I have mentioned. First the economic:

No element of American postwar policy has been more
consistent than our support of European unity. We have encouraged
it at every turn. We knew that a united Europe would be more
independent. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our
common interests would be assured by our long history of coopera-
tion. We expected that political unity would follow economic
integration; and that a unified Europe, working with us in an
Atlantic partnership, would ease many of our international burdens,

- 5 -

But we cannot ignore the fact that Europe's economic success has produced a certain amount of friction. There has been turbulence and a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations.

In trade, the natural economic weight of a market of 250 million people has pressed other states to seek special arrangements. The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa, appears to be at the expense of the United States and of other nations which are excluded. In agriculture, where the United States has a comparative advantage, we are particularly concerned that Community protective policies may restrict access for our products.

This divergence comes at a time when we are experiencing a chronic and growing deficit in our balance of payments and protectionist pressures of our own.

The United States will continue to support the unification of Europe. We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help build. For us, European unity remains what it has always been -- not an end in itself, but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership.

This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We shall also continue to press the effort to reform the monetary system so that it promotes stability rather than constant disruptions. A new equilibrium must be achieved in both trade and monetary relations.

- 6 -

We view these negotiations as an historic opportunity for positive achievement. They must engage the top political leaders, for they require, above all, a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the experts, the inevitable competitiveness of economic interests will dominate the debate. The influence of pressure groups will become pervasive. There will be no overriding sense of direction.

The United States intends to adopt a broad approach that does justice to our overriding political interest in an open and balanced order with both Europe and Japan. This is the spirit of the President's trade bill and of his speech to the International Monetary Fund last year. We view these negotiations not as a test of strength, but as a test of joint statesmanship.

Let me turn to the area of defense.

Atlantic unity has always come most naturally in the field of defense. For many years, the military threats to Europe seemed unambiguous. The requirements to meet them were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Today we face the new challenge of maintaining a collective defense under radically changed strategic conditions, and with the new opportunity of enhancing security through negotiations on reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the 50s and 60s to rely almost solely on a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. Because under the conditions of nuclear parity which are now imminent, such a strategy invites mutual suicide, we have sought other choices. The collective ability to resist attack in Western Europe by - means of more flexible responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the United States has maintained substantial forces in Europe and our NATO allies have embarked on a significant effort to modernize and improve their own military establishments.

The requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. Flexibility requires sensitivity to new conditions and continuous consultation to respond to changing circumstances. Flexibility cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around the defense structure that emerges from lowest common denominator compromises

- 7 -

driven by domestic considerations. It must be seen as a credible,
substantial and rational posture.

-- There are deficiencies in important areas of our
conventional defense.

-- There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine,
for example, on the crucial question of the role of tactical
nuclear weapons.

-- There are anomalies in NATO deployments as well
as in its logistics structure.

This task is all the more difficult today because the
lessening of tensions has given new impetus to arguments that
it is safe to begin reducing forces unilaterally. And unbridled
economic competition can sap the impulse for common defense.
All governments of the Western Alliance face a major challenge
in educating their peoples to the realities of security.

The President has asked me to state that America
remains committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic defense.
He is adamantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of United States
forces from Europe. But we owe to our peoples a rational defense
posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens
equitably shared. This is what the President believes must
result from the dialogue with our allies in 1973.

When this is achieved, the necessary American forces
will be maintained in Europe, not simply as a hostage to trigger
nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed
structure of defense. This, too, will enable us to engage our
adversaries intelligently in negotiations for mutual balanced
reductions.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present
to its allies the product of our own preparations for the negotia-
tions on mutual force reductions, negotiations which will begin
this year. Our approach is designed not from the point of view
of special American, but of general Alliance interests. Our
position will reflect the President's views that these negotiations

- 8 -

are not a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of con-
sequences. No formula for reductions is acceptable if it under-
mines security.

Our objective is a new consensus addressed to new
conditions and to the hopeful new possibilities of effective
arms limitations.

A few words about diplomacy. We have entered a truly
remarkable period of East-West diplomacy. The last two years
have produced an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West
Germany and the USSR, an agreement on strategic arms, the
beginning of negotiations on a European Security Conference, and
on mutual force reductions, and a series of significant, prac-
tical, bilateral agreements between Western and Eastern coun-
tries, including a dramatic change in bilateral relations between
the United States and the USSR. These were not isolated actions,
but steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried forward as a
collective effort. Our approach has stressed that negotiations
had to be concrete, and that concessions should be reciprocal.
We expect to carry forward the policy of relaxation of tensions
on this basis.

Yet this very success has created its own problems.
There is an increasing uneasiness that superpower diplomacy
might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other
friends. Some of our friends in Europe have seemed unwilling
to accord America the same trust in our motives as they received
from us, or to grant us the same tactical flexibility that they
employed in pursuit of their own policies.

All of this underlines the necessity to articulate a
clear set of common objectives together with our allies, and we
are prepared to do this. Once that is accomplished, it will be
quite feasible for the several allies to pursue these goals with
considerable tactical flexibility.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In many
areas of the world our approaches will differ, especially out-
side of Europe. But we do require an understanding of what should
be done jointly and of the limits we should impose on the scope
of our autonomy.

- 9 -

We have no intention of buying tranquility at the expense of our friends. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others. But the perception of common interests is not automatic; it requires constant redefinition. The relaxation of tensions to which we are committed makes allied cohesion indispensable, yet more difficult. We must insure that the momentum of detente is maintained by common objectives, rather than by drift, escapism or complacency.

The agenda I have outlined here is not an American prescription, but an appeal for a joint effort of creativity. The historic opportunity for this generation is to build a new structure of international relations for the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic partnership is indispensable for it.

The United States is prepared to make its contribution on the basis of the following principles:

- We will continue to support European unity based on the principles of partnership. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.

- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies. We will not withdraw from Europe unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defense.

- We will never consciously injure the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect, in return, that their policies will take seriously our interests and our responsibilities.

- We are prepared to work cooperatively on new, common problems we face. Energy, for example, raises important issues of assurance of supply, impact of revenues on international currency stability, the nature of common political and strategic interests, and long-range relations of oil-consuming to oil-producing countries. This could be an area of competition; it should be an area of cooperation.

- 10 -

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. We have before us the example of the great accomplishments of the past decades -- and the opportunity to match and dwarf them. This is the task we have set ourselves for this and future years. This is how, in the 1970s, the Atlantic nations can truly serve their peoples and the cause of peace.

Thank you.

* * * * * * *

I have taken the liberty of organizing the questions in three groups. The first group, only two questions, deals more or less with East-West relations. The second group deals with Southeast Asia and is by far the largest, and the third deals with my personal plans and Watergate. (Laughter)

Let me read the questions from each group and give the answers for each group before I go to the next question.

The first two questions are as follows:

Do you consider Mao, Chou En-lai and Brezhnev to be the greatest leaders of the Communist world? That is a question which I cannot win, no matter what I say.

The second question is -- (Laughter) -- I will answer them both. I am just trying to organize an evasive reply. (Laughter)

To what extent are China and the Soviet Union enemies?

Now, with respect to the first question, I hope that Prime Minister Chou En-lai is as right as he often is when he told a group of visiting American newspaper editors that I was the only man he knew who could talk for half an hour without saying anything. (Laughter)

I am sure you recognize that I am not in the ideal position to give an extensive description of my reactions to leaders with whom I expect to have a continuing relationship.

- 11 -

I think one has to understand that the leaders of these two countries, both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, face different problems, have had a different evolution. The Soviet Union is in an advanced stage of industrialization and is governed by the fourth generation of leaders who have grown up within the bureaucratic structure of a Communist Party that has been in power for 50 years and which rose to eminence within a well established apparatus. Their necessities and background, therefore, are quite different from those of a generation of leaders that themselves made their own revolution, for whom a very significant experience is still that of the Long March, a group of leaders who joined their movement at a time when the possibility of success seemed extraordinarily remote, and who govern a country which is still in the process of development.

So I will not attempt to rate the qualities of these two countries, except to point out that they are the product of different conditions and of different stages of evolution.

With respect to the second question, to what extent are China and the Soviet Union enemies, we hear very often that our policy is based on exploiting the alleged enmities of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It would be idle to deny that it is based on the articles that the press in both countries prints that there is unqualified approbation in each country for the policies of the other. However, the differences between China and the Soviet Union were not created by us. They cannot be exploited by us.

We have an interest in improving relations with the People's Republic of China and doing so energetically. We are in the process at this moment of establishing Liaison Offices in Washington and Peking. We are also committed to a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union. We are proceeding in our negotiations there on the basis of very concrete negotiations. We have no objections to any negotiations that may go on between these two countries. We are making no efforts to manipulate whatever differences may arise, most of which are not of direct concern to the United States.

So I would say, in answer to the question, there are obvious disagreements between those two countries, partly produced by ideology and partly by disputes along the Sino-Soviet

- 12 -

border, but our policy deals with the relationship with each
country on its own merits and not on the basis of their relation-
ship to each other.

Let me read the questions on Vietnam or Southeast Asia:

What conditions, in your view, would lead to a resump-
tion of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam?

In the future of Cambodia, would the United States
reject a role for Prince Sihanouk?

Would you say that Southeast Asia is still the world's
Number 1 trouble spot, excluding the Watergate, of course?

When can elections be expected in South Vietnam?

Do you feel that current Communist activity in South-
east Asia represents a breach of faith with what you negotiated
and agreed to?

Under what constitutional authority does the President
continue bombing in Cambodia and Laos now that all U.S. combat
troops have been withdrawn?

What is the U.S. bombing of Cambodia accomplishing,
and how long do you expect it to go on?

What continuing influence do we maintain over South
Vietnam to assure their compliance with the peace agreement?

What real options does the President have if the
other side does not live up to its agreement?

Let me try to make some general observations and
hope that they answer most of the questions that have been asked.

First, what are we trying to accomplish in Southeast
Asia? Our purpose in negotiating the agreement was to end the
American involvement in Southeast Asia, to permit the political
forces in Southeast Asia to shape the future of the area on the
basis of the decision by the people concerned, to reduce and
ultimately to eliminate outside military pressures that would try
to impose particular solutions in the various specific countries.

- 13 -

We went through a very painful process of negotiations, because each of the parties, after over 10 years of civil war, did not really want to accept a settlement that left the political outcome to be decided in the future. Therefore, the United States takes the view, and will continue to take the view, that we will do everything in our power to see to it that the agreement is observed.

First, on our side, I think there have been no real charges that we have not lived up meticulously to the letter and to the spirit of everything that we have negotiated. With respect to the South Vietnamese, I think it is fair to say that in a civil war, or in a war that is at least part of a civil war, neither side is as meticulous, because each side considers its political survival at stake.

We have used our influence with our friends in Saigon to bring about a substantial compliance with the agreement.

With respect to the elections in South Vietnam, it is not Saigon which is the major obstacle to them at this moment; it is, rather, that in the negotiations between the South Vietnamese parties, the other side has shown a great reluctance to fix a specific date for the elections.

I think it is fair to say that we have been very disappointed in the compliance by the North Vietnamese with the agreement. We have believed, and we have said so publicly, that the end of the war in Vietnam should start a process of normalization in the relations between Hanoi and the United States. No one can seriously believe that we are looking for pretexts to remain involved in Southeast Asia. No one can think that after the agony that has been suffered, we would not welcome a peaceful evolution in this country and in all of Southeast Asia.

Yet, it is a brutal fact that on the important clauses of the agreement -- the commitment to withdraw from Cambodia and the commitment to withdraw from Laos, which was unconditional, the commitment not to introduce troops or supplies into South Vietnam, which was also unconditional except through authorized checkpoints, the respect for the Demilitarized Zone, on which we spent four weeks in Paris -- that all of these have been systematically, I may say cynically, violated by the other side.

- 14 -

Now, under these conditions, concerned people should ask themselves: What should the United States do? What is our position if we can neither threaten nor offer incentives, if we are criticized for attempting to maintain the agreement by force and pressed not to provide the economic incentives which might be another motive for keeping the agreement? And we should ask ourselves: Where will we be if what was a very solemn agreement, very painfully achieved, in which we made very major concessions, is simply disregarded?

We have never said we want a particular outcome in any of the countries in Southeast Asia. We have no illusions that history is not going to stop on the day the agreement was signed.

With respect to Cambodia, we are not prescribing one particular government, and we have always said that all significant political forces should participate in all of the negotiations in each of the countries, and we encourage that in Laos, we are encouraging it in Vietnam, and we shall certainly not oppose it in Cambodia.

But the profound problem we face as a nation today is whether we should sign an agreement, and when it is totally violated, act as if the signature which was then endorsed by an international conference should simply be treated as irrelevant.

What tactics we employ, in what particular situation, that is a subject of debate. We are not asking that every particular tactical move we are making necessarily receive everybody's endorsement; but what you should remember when you read about bombing or about our ending the mine clearing is that we want nothing else but the observance of an agreement, freely negotiated; that we want nothing more than to remove the issue of Southeast Asia from our national debate; that we went through all this agony -- and I must say together with our opponents, because I think the objectives are the same -- not in order to start the whole process again, but to bring about a situation where, for the first time in 20 years, the peoples of Southeast Asia can determine their own fate, and in that case they have nothing to fear from continued American intervention.

That is our general strategy, and I think it should answer most of the questions that were put to us.

- 15 -

Now let me read the questions dealing with my own
plans and with Watergate.

Where were you the night they bugged the Watergate?

(Laughter)

You played central roles in the historic developments,
the opening to China and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. With
these accomplishments behind you, what keeps you in the Government?

That comes from the State Department. (Laughter)

Will you comment on reports that Watergate is influen-
cing your decisions on returning to private life?

You are among the men closest to the President. Does
he show any feeling that he was betrayed over Watergate?

Now, with respect to the first question, I usually
have excellent alibis for my evenings. (Laughter)

With respect to the other questions, let me do them
in two parts: One, those that refer to my own plans; and then,
secondly, whatever impact Watergate may have on foreign policy.

With respect to my own plans, I have never been very
explicit about them, partly because I have always believed that
I should leave at a moment when some major task had been accom-
plished and when the transfer of responsibility could occur
under conditions that assured continuity, and that made it clear
that the position was not held for personal motives entirely,
which is always difficult to separate.

Now, at this moment, it is not the time for senior
officials of the Administration to talk about their resignations,
until the framework of the future becomes clearer, and it depends,
of course, also on the President's conception of what one's
duties are.

Now, with respect to the general questions of Water-
gate, I will not comment on the issue itself, except perhaps on
the foreign policy implications.

- 16 -

On the case itself, of course, I know many of the people that you all read about, and, of course, I know them in a different way than you read about them, and it is difficult to avoid a sense of the awfulness of events, the tragedy that has befallen so many people who have, for whatever reason, or are alleged to have done certain things. So without prejudging anything, one should at least ask for compassion.

With respect to foreign policy, a great deal will depend on how foreign countries will assess the degree of authority in this country, the degree of dedication of the public to the objectives of its foreign policy.

I have no question that the President will insist, as he has said publicly, on a full disclosure of the facts. But when that is accomplished and the human tragedies are completed, the country will go on. Then we have to ask ourselves whether we can afford an orgy of recrimination, or whether we should not keep in mind that the United States will be there far longer than any particular crisis, and whether all of us do not then have an obligation to remember that the faith in the country must be maintained, and that the promise of the country should be eternal. (Applause)

END

The Year of Europe

(Apr. 23, 1973)

Address by Henry A. Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs¹

This year has been called the year of Europe, but not because Europe was less important in 1972 or in 1969. The alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy. It provided the political framework for American engagements in Europe and marked the definitive end of U.S. isolationism. It insured the sense of security that allowed Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the stimulus for an unprecedented endeavor in European unity and the principal means to forge the common policies that safeguarded Western security in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation. Our values, our goals, and our basic interests are most closely identified with those of Europe.

Nineteen seventy-three is the year of Europe because the era that was shaped by decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of those policies has produced new realities that require new approaches:

- The revival of western Europe is an established fact, as is the historic success of its movement toward economic unification.

- The East-West strategic military balance has shifted from American preponderance to near-equality, bringing with it the necessity for a new understanding of the requirements of our common security.

- Problems have arisen, unforeseen a generation ago, which require new types of cooperative action. Insuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations is an example.

These factors have produced a dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the West—a change which is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship. In Europe, a new generation to whom war and its dislocations are not personal experiences takes stability for granted. But it is less committed to the unity that made peace possible and to the effort required to maintain it. In the United States, decades of global burdens have fostered, and the frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have accentuated, a reluctance to sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility.

Inevitably this period of transition will have its strains. There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same

¹ Made before the annual meeting of the Associated Press editors at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 23.

May 14, 1973

593

time they ask for a veto on our independent policies—also in the name of Atlantic unity.

If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement.

In the forties and fifties the task was economic reconstruction and security against the danger of attack; the West responded with courage and imagination. Today the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspirations from its goals rather than its fears. The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation equal to that undertaken by the postwar generation of leaders of Europe and America.

This is why the President is embarking on a personal and direct approach to the leaders of western Europe. In his discussions with the heads of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, the Secretary General of NATO, and other European leaders, it is the President's purpose to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West.

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively. The political, military, and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other. The solutions will not be worthy of the opportunity if left to technicians. They must be addressed at the highest level.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic partners that by the time the President

travels to Europe toward the end of the year we will have worked out a new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future, a blueprint that:

- Builds on the past without becoming its prisoner.

- Deals with the problems our success has created.

- Creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose progress Japan can share.

This is what we mean by the year of Europe.

The problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the fifties and sixties the Atlantic community organized itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

- In economic relations the European Community has increasingly stressed its regional personality; the United States at the same time must act as part of, and be responsible for, a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives.

- In our collective defense we are still organized on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different strategic conditions. The full implications of this change have yet to be faced.

- Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation-states. The United States has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

In short, we deal with each other regionally and even competitively on an integrated basis in defense, and as nation-states in diplomacy. When the various collective institutions were rudimentary, the potential inconsistency in their modes of

594

Department of State Bulletin

If we want to foster unity we can no longer ignore these problems. The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity to serve the common objectives which underlie their unity. We can no longer afford to pursue national or regional self-interest without a unifying framework. We cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others.

## Agenda for the Future

### Economic

No element of American postwar policy has been more consistent than our support of European unity. We encouraged it at every turn. We knew that a united Europe would be a more independent partner. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our common interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that political unity would follow economic integration and that a unified Europe working cooperatively with us in an Atlantic partnership would ease many of our international burdens.

of friction. There have been turbulence and a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations.

In trade, the natural economic weight of a market of 250 million people has pressed other states to seek special arrangements to protect their access to it. The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa appears to be at the expense of the United States and other nations which are excluded. In agriculture, where the United States has a comparative advantage, we are particularly concerned that Community protective policies may restrict access for our products.

This divergence comes at a time when we are experiencing a chronic and growing deficit in our balance of payments and protectionist pressures of our own. Europeans in turn question our investment policies and doubt our continued commitment to their economic unity.

The gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major, economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a determined commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to find cooperative solutions.

The United States will continue to support the unification of Europe. We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help build. For us, European unity is what it has always been: not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership.

We see these negotiations as a historic opportunity for positive achievement. They must engage the top political leaders, for they require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the experts the inevitable competitiveness of eco-

May 14, 1973

595

It is the responsibility of national leaders to insure that economic negotiations serve larger political purposes. They must recognize that economic rivalry, if carried on without restraint, will in the end damage other relationships.

## Defense

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the fifties and sixties to rely almost solely on a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. Because under conditions of nuclear parity such a strategy invites mutual suicide, the alliance must have other choices. The collective ability to resist attack in western Europe by means of flexible responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the United States has maintained substantial conven-

While the Atlantic alliance is committed to a strategy of flexible response in principle, the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. Flexibility by its nature requires sensitivity to new conditions and continual consultation among the allies to respond to changing circumstances. And we must give substance to the defense posture that our strategy defines. Flexible response cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around the defense structure that emerges from lowest-common-denominator compromises driven by domestic considerations. It must be seen by ourselves and by potential adversaries as a credible, substantial, and rational posture of defense.

- There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine; for example, on the crucial question of the role of tactical nuclear weapons.

To maintain the military balance that has insured stability in Europe for 25 years, the alliance has no choice but to address these needs and to reach an agreement on our defense requirements. This task is all the more difficult because the lessening of tensions has given new impetus to arguments that it is safe to begin reducing forces internationally. And unbridled economic competition can sap the impulse for common defense. All governments of the Western alliance face a major challenge in educating their peoples to the realities of security in the 1970's.

596

Department of State Bulletin

When this is achieved, the necessary Amer-
ican forces will be maintained in Europe, not
simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear
weapons but as an essential contribution to
an agreed and intelligible structure of West-
ern defense. This, too, will enable us to
engage our adversaries intelligently in ne-
gotiations for mutual balanced reductions.

In the next few weeks the United States
will present to NATO the product of our
own preparations for the negotiations on
mutual balanced force reductions which will
begin this year. We hope that it will be a
contribution to a broader dialogue on secu-
rity. Our approach is designed not from the
point of view of special American interests,
but of general alliance interests. Our position
will reflect the President's view that these
negotiations are not a subterfuge to with-
draw U.S. forces regardless of consequences.
No formula for reductions is defensible,
whatever its domestic appeal or political
rationale, if it undermines security.

Our objective in the dialogue on defense is
a new consensus on security, addressed to
new conditions and to the hopeful new possi-
bilities of effective arms limitations.

Diplomacy

We have entered a truly remarkable pe-
riod of East-West diplomacy. The last two
years have produced an agreement on Berlin,
a treaty between West Germany and the
U.S.S.R., a strategic arms limitation agree-
ment, the beginning of negotiations on a
European Security Conference and on mu-
tual balanced force reductions, and a series
of significant practical bilateral agreements
between Western and Eastern countries, in-
cluding a dramatic change in bilateral re-
lations between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. These were not isolated actions, but
steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried
forward as a collective effort. Our approach
to détente stressed that negotiations had to
be concrete, not atmospheric, and that con-
cessions should be reciprocal. We expect to

Yet this very success has created its own
problems. There is an increasing uneasiness
—all the more insidious for rarely being
made explicit—that superpower diplomacy
might sacrifice the interests of traditional
allies and other friends. Where our allies'
interests have been affected by our bilateral
negotiations, as in the talks on the limita-
tion of strategic arms, we have been scru-
pulous in consulting them; where our allies
are directly involved, as in the negotiations
on mutual balanced force reductions, our ap-
proach is to proceed jointly on the basis of
agreed positions. Yet some of our friends
in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord
America the same trust in our motives as
they received from us or to grant us the
same tactical flexibility that they employed
in pursuit of their own policies. The United
States is now often taken to task for flexi-
bility where we used to be criticized for
rigidity.

All of this underlines the necessity to
articulate a clear set of common objectives
together with our allies. Once that is accom-
plished, it will be quite feasible, indeed de-
sirable, for the several allies to pursue these
goals with considerable tactical flexibility.
If we agree on common objectives it will
become a technical question whether a par-
ticular measure is pursued in a particular
forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or
multilaterally. Then those allies who seek
reassurances of America's commitment will
find it not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty,
but in an agreed framework of purpose.

We have no intention of buying an illu-
sory tranquillity at the expense of our friends.
The United States will never knowingly
sacrifice the interests of others. But the per-
ception of common interests is not automatic;
it requires constant redefinition. The relaxa-
tion of tensions to which we are committed

May 14, 1973

597

## America's Contribution

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6:00 P.M. EDT MAY 3, 1973

MAY 2, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

THE BRIEFING ROOM

10:15 A.M. EDT

MR. WARREN: You have the President's foreign policy report, and I think you have had some time to read it.

Dr. Kissinger, as he did last year, will spend a
little time with you, a brief time this morning, discussing
the preparation of the report and some of the directions in
the report. Then tomorrow morning he will have a more detailed,
substantive briefing beginning at 10:30 here in this room.

You notice on the report there is an embargo for
release until 6:00 p.m. tomorrow. There is no wire embargo
on the report at all.

DR. KISSINGER: I will just make a few comments
today, summarizing the preparation of the report and its
major thrust, and then tomorrow I can talk at greater length
and answer your questions.

As you know, we have been preparing this annual
report every year of the President's incumbency. The purpose
of the report is to provide a coherent statement of the philo-
sophy of the Administration on foreign policy and of the
major directions of American foreign policy, both for the public
and for other countries.

The detailed actions in the various countries of the
world are described in the State Department report that has
already been released, and then there is, of course, the
Defense Department report which deals with the details of
the military program.

We attempt in this report by the President to
explain the overall strategy of the United States, the
national objectives, the relationship of various steps to each
other, and the directions in which we expect to go.

The report this year was somewhat delayed. We have
published it in previous years at the end of February. The
reason is a practical one: that the people who are usually
engaged in drafting the report were engaged in the negotia-
tions on Vietnam and their aftermath, so that we could not
really turn on a full-time basis to the drafting of the report
until after the trip to Hanoi and Peking in February. But in
any event, it would not have made any sense to produce a report
until the outcome of the negotiations in Vietnam had become
clear.

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[L]

This is the first report that the President is sending to the Congress in which the war in Vietnam is not the predominant concern. This is the first time that we can talk about building a structure of peace not as something that will be done with undiluted energy after we have settled the outstanding conflict, but it is something that is actively in progress as a predominant exercise of American foreign policy.

Therefore, we look at this report not only as an account, or even primarily as an account, of the events of the last year, but as attempting to state a mood and an attitude about what the Administration intends to do in the second term of the President's Administration.

If you want to read through the report, the philosophical statements are in the introduction and conclusion, and then, of course, each chapter attempts to relate the theme of the area which is covered to the overall assessment that we made. The theme is one that we have mentioned before, and perhaps emphasized more strongly this year.

When President Nixon assumed office, a major change had already occurred in the conditions in which foreign policy was being conducted, changes that were reflected in the growing strength of allies, that were reflected in the differentiation that had arisen within the Communist world, changes in the strategic balance, and changes, perhaps most importantly, in the domestic attitudes and perceptions of most of the countries that were playing a major role in foreign policy.

In these circumstances, any Administration would have had the responsibility of adjusting American foreign policy to new conditions. All of these efforts were, of course, heavily overshadowed by a conflict in Vietnam that had profoundly affected American attitudes toward the world at large.

In the President's first term, a major effort was made to end the war in Vietnam and to adjust our relationships to adversaries, and to lay the basis for a major advance in relations with old friends.

The last year, 1972, with which this report principally deals, of course, witnessed the President's trip to Peking, the summit meeting in Moscow, and a series of dramatic events in Indochina.

In the visit to Peking, we ended 22 years of isolation between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and set in motion a series of events which has, up to now, brought us to the point where Ambassador Bruce will be leaving this Sunday to assume his responsibilities as chief of our liaison mission in Peking, and where a Chinese advance team is in Washington to prepare for the arrival of the chief of the Chinese liaison mission in the United States.

This relationship, it is the firm intention of this Administration, will continue to develop, and we will expect to accelerate its process.

In the relations with the People's Republic, we had to travel an entirely new road. The relations with the Soviet Union -- these are two great nations which are interacting all over the world; therefore, the negotiations deal with matters that are more concrete, more technical, and which have to be assessed in terms of their cumulative impact rather than in terms of any one dramatic gesture.

MORE

We have moved forward in our relationship with the
Soviet Union on a broader front than at any comparable period
in the postwar era, and in the negotiations on strategic
arms limitations and in the definition of a set of principles
to guide our actions, we have charted some fundamental direc-
tions that we expect to pursue in the years ahead.

All of us in this room met many times on the issue
of Vietnam, and the report attempts to give an account of
the negotiations during the last year, of the end and of the
final conclusion of the cease-fire agreement, which the
United States expects to observe and which we hope all other
parties will equally observe.

As I pointed out, improving our relations with our
adversaries and ending the war in Vietnam only clears away
the obstacles to the construction of a peaceful world. Therefore,
in the next four years we will give major attention to
the articulation of new relationships with other parts of the
world, with Europe, with Japan, and with Latin America, and
with attempting to make our contribution to easing tensions
in such areas as the Middle East and assuring progress in such
areas as Africa and South Asia.

As always, the report discusses the basic principles
of our defense policy and has a rather extensive chapter on
the approach of this Administration to the question of arms
control.

Until the 1960s, the idea that security could be
enhanced by agreement to limit arms was considered, if not
theoretically, at least practically, rather visionary, at any
rate to limit arms in the central systems. We have made an
agreement on numerical limitations. We are now engaged in more
complex negotiations that may involve also the qualitative
aspects of the arms race.

In this report, we have attempted to describe the
President's approach to the question of arms control and to the
problem of security through the limitation and not only
through the accumulation of arms.

This is the basic approach of the report, and you
will, of course, want to read it and tomorrow I will be avail-
able to answer questions in greater detail. I will be glad to
take a few minutes of questions now.

Q I have a question on pages 61 and 65 of the
Vietnam part of the report.

DR. KISSINGER: I didn't think you would read the
report until tomorrow.

Q You say if North Vietnam does not obey the
call for an honorable cease-fire, it would risk revived con-
frontation with us. Could you spell out a little bit more
clearly what you mean there; and secondly, on page 65 you
say we look to outside powers to lend a moderating influence.
This means, first of all, no reasonable justification for
sending Hanoi large arms shipments. Do you expect that to
come up in your discussions in Moscow?

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[L]

- 4 -

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to Vietnam in this report, every year I have had four semi-revolutionary associates working with me on this report whose general dissatisfaction with the state of events has been enhanced by the fact that the press only reported the Vietnam chapter, and nothing else that was written. If you are concerned with tranquility on the NSC staff, mention at least the other chapters in this report, not only Vietnam. But I assured them that this year they could work with particular energy, because certainly we would have Vietnam out of the central focus.

Q Where did you go wrong?

DR. KISSINGER: Where have I gone wrong? It is your fault.

Now, on the confrontation, we have made clear that we mean to have the agreement observed. We are now engaged in an effort to discuss with the North Vietnamese what is required to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement. We have every intention and every incentive to make certain that our side of the agreement is maintained, and to use our influence wherever we can to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement.

But the United States cannot sign a solemn agreement and within weeks have major provisions violated without our making an attempt to indicate it. Now, the particular measures: Some of them are, of course, obvious, and we would prefer, as we state in the report and as we have stated publicly many times, to move our relationship with the North Vietnamese toward normalization, and to start a process which would accelerate, such as other processes normally have.

So the general thrust of this paragraph is that the tension existing between us certainly cannot ease as rapidly as we want if the agreement is not observed.

With respect to the second question, will I raise this issue, the issue of arms shipments to Vietnam, in Moscow. We have consistently said, since the agreement was signed, that it was one thing to introduce large quantities of arms into Vietnam while the war was going on; it has another significance during cease-fire conditions.

The United States is only sending replacement arms into South Vietnam and has repeatedly offered to put its shipments under the control of the International Control Commission, and we continue to maintain this offer. I don't want to go into the details of every issue that will be discussed in Moscow, but you can be certain that the situation in Indochina in all of its aspects will be raised.

Could we have questions that deal with the report, rather than a general press conference?

Q I don't believe that you have said, or the Government has said, very much so far about the extent of re-supply by Peking and by Moscow of the North Vietnamese. The meaning of this paragraph is clearly that there are continuing large armament shipments going to Vietnam. Is that correct?

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[Lc]

DR. KISSINGER: The meaning of what paragraph?

Q This means, first of all, there can be no
reasonable justification for sending Hanoi large shipments
of armaments.

DR. KISSINGER: The implication is that there can
be no justification if they take place. There is no impli-
cation necessarily that they do take place.

Q That is my question. They are not taking place?

DR. KISSINGER: The quantities are still under study.
It is more difficult for us under current conditions to find out.

Q There are some?

DR. KISSINGER: There are some, yes.

Q Are these remarks, Dr. Kissinger, embargoed?

MR. WARREN: I explained that when I introduced Dr.
Kissinger. These remarks are embargoed, along with the report.

DR. KISSINGER: This is not a general press conference.

Q I wonder if we might have an answer to some-
thing that couldn't be embargoed, and that is, there seems to
be a dispute over -- could I ask a question first?

MR. WARREN: Yes, but let me just preface that, if
I may. We said Dr. Kissinger would be talking about the
preparation of the report, and its major directions, at this
time. Tomorrow morning he will have more extensive remarks.

Q This is something which I think Dr. Kissinger
could clear up since we have him here, and that is, is there
or is there not a meeting with Le Duc Tho agreed in Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: I will stand on what Ron Ziegler
said to you. There is an agreement that there should be a
meeting, but since we have not yet agreed on the time of
announcement and similar matters, I don't want to go any further
than that. But what Ron Ziegler said to this press group can
be supported by messages that were received.

Q I have a non-Vietnam question. On page 139
you were talking about the Soviet action in the Middle East,
and you seem to doubt more this year than in the past report
that the Soviets are truly interested in encouraging a
negotiated settlement in the Middle East. Is that a correct
impression?

DR. KISSINGER: What page 139, to which you refer,
means is Soviet actions that, in our judgment, are not neces-
sarily designed to quiet the situation. On the other hand,
one has to point out in fairness that it is a very complex
subject in which outside powers cannot easily decide what
role they should play and how they can be effective. This was
the major implication of that paragraph.

I am afraid that I have an appointment, and I will
take only one more question.

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[lc]

- 6 -

Q This is the Middle East that I wanted to talk about. On the top of that page you speak about the need for a step-by-step approach. I wonder if you could tell us what the United States would consider a reasonable first step, in discussions between the Arabs and Israelis themselves.

DR. KISSINGER: The United States has always favored, all along, an interim settlement relating to the opening of the Suez Canal, and we have always said that at some point in the negotiating process the parties concerned must be in some form of contact with each other. These continue to seem to us reasonable first steps. But it is certainly one way of approaching it. We are openminded to listen to other propositions. It is the best we have come up with.

Ladies and gentlemen, I will see you tomorrow at greater length. Thank you.

MR. WARREN: Before we break up, I should point out to you that I believe it is only fair that Dr. Kissinger's answer to the question he responded to on the Paris meeting, the Le Duc Tho meeting, should be on the record now and not embargoed until the report's embargo is lifted.

I neglected, in introducing Dr. Kissinger, to point out that he spent an hour this morning with the President discussing the foreign policy report and foreign policy developments in general. I think that should be noted at this time.

END (AT 10:40 A.M. EDT)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6:00 P.M. EDT, MAY 3, 1973

MAY 3, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

10:40 A.M. EDT

MR. WARREN: Just a note that the information in this briefing is embargoed until 6:00 p.m., along with the report which you have now read and which Henry will discuss with you.

Q There will be a transcript, will there not?

MR. WARREN: There will be.

Q In Florida, too?

MR. WARREN: Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, you presumably have read the report and I summarized its basic thrust yesterday. Perhaps one word about the process, which by now should be fairly familiar to you, by which this is produced.

We ask each of the departments and agencies that deal with international affairs to submit their recommendations as to what the report should say, and then the report is written by my staff, and the tortured parts by me. After we have discussed with the President what the major direction should be, it is then reviewed by the various departments and submitted to the Congress. So it is a joint effort that is gone over by all of the responsible agencies.

Let me now answer any questions that you may have about the report.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you elaborate on the passage on page 8 in which you explicitly apply the Nixon Doctrine to the Atlantic Alliance?

DR. KISSINGER: The Nixon Doctrine has many aspects. One of the essential aspects of the Nixon Doctrine is that other countries should assume a greater responsibility politically, where appropriate militarily, and economically, and that we are trying to create a new, peaceful structure which is maintained by the commitment to it of all of the countries involved, rather than through unilateral actions and declarations by the United States.

In this sense, the Nixon Doctrine applies, as well, to the Atlantic Alliance. However, detailed views with respect to the Atlantic Alliance are stated in the chapter on the Atlantic Alliance and has been also stated in the speech that I gave at the President's direction on April 23rd to the AP newspaper publishers.

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[LC]

- 2 -

Our view with respect to the Atlantic Alliance is that the relationship between the United States and its European allies is as essential to the new phase of American foreign policy as it was to the last phase of American foreign policy.

The President has affirmed, and the Secretary of State has repeated, that there will be no unilateral American cuts in the commitment of our forces to Europe, and, therefore, the reference of the Nixon Docerine in this paper cannot be interpreted in that sense.

Q Doctor, in the conclusion, is that --

DR. KISSINGER: When he calls me "Doctor", I know I am going to get it. (Laughter)

Q Is the conclusion a step away from the concept of five centers of power in the world that the President and you have enunciated from time to time?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me first explain what this concept is. The President, in his speech in Kansas City in July of 1971, pointed out that in contrast to the immediate post-war period, when there were really only two major powers, there were now five centers of power in the world. This has been interpreted to mean that we were going to conduct a classical balance of power policy in which alliances were going to lose some of their significance.

What this last chapter attempts to do is to explain how we interpret this five-power world, because there are many aspects to the contemporary international environment that are quite novel.

First, of course, is the familiar one of the enormous destructiveness of modern weapons. In the past, it would have been inconceivable to any statesman that he could ever have too much power, and any increment of power was politically useful. In the contemporary period, we are in a situation in which the overwhelming fact for the nuclear superpowers is the knowledge of their capacity to destroy each other and where additional increments do not necessarily have either military or political significance.

A second fact in the contemporary situation which is quite different from any previous period is that there is no necessary relationship between economic strength and military strength.

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[L]

- 3 -

Again, in the past, if you look at history, nations that were economically powerful were generally militarily powerful as well, and there was a direct relationship between the size of a nation, its economic potential and its military potential.

Today we live in a world in which in the military sense there are only two superpowers; that is to say, the United States and the Soviet Union alone possess the full panoply of modern armament.

On the other hand, in the economic field, you would certainly have to include Japan and Europe as superpowers, and in the political field, in the sense of having a major political impact in the world, even though they are not yet an economic or military superpower, you would have to count the People's Republic of China.

It really makes a great deal of difference of what area you are talking about or what area of activity you are talking about.

Secondly, this notion of the five centers of power was interpreted in many parts of the world as an American assertion that it make no difference any more between its friends and its opponents, that it was conducting foreign policy entirely on the basis of a temporary juggling of relationships. Indeed, this was equated with classical balance of power.

Of course, it wasn't even true in the old balance of power that alliances did not exist. Alliances existed throughout history, even in periods when the balance of power policy was pursued.

The difference between classical power politics and the contemporary period is enormous. They are the differences I have already mentioned in the destructiveness of weapons, in the disparity between economic and political and military factors and in the enormously increased role of ideology.

Therefore, we felt it important that in our last chapter of this report we emphasize just what we understand by the international environment today: that we continue to value our friends, that we do believe there must be a recognition of the emergence of other centers of power, but that power cannot be an end in itself in the contemporary period, and that power politics in its purest sense is the most difficult and the most treacherous form of international politics.

Q Doctor, how do you assess the prospects for a real peace in Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the record should show that it took until the third question to reach Southeast Asia.

Q It is Topic "A".

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, one has to ask oneself what is meant by "real peace." If one means a consciousness of tranquility, if one means that the parties to the conflict

-MORE-

in Southeast Asia will live henceforth with a consciousness
of reconciliation, then I would say that that day is very far
off.

The essence of the settlement was that the military
issues were settled in some detail, at least in the document,
and the political issues were left to further evolution.
The political issues were not solved; they were left to hopefully
a political rather than a military contest.

The parties that had fought for 25 years did not
suddenly give up their differences. Therefore, the issue in
Southeast Asia is not whether a consciousness of harmony can
be brought about or the absence of tension but whether the
political evolution that will inevitably occur take place
essentially in peaceful forms or at least without large-scale
conflict.

We have stated repeatedly that we are disappointed
at the way the agreement has been implemented, but is also
true that for all of the parties there is a difficult process
of adjustment.

We are not pessimistic about the long-term prospects
in the negotiations that we are conducting with the North
Vietnamese. We are approaching them with the attitude that
the difficulties can be ameliorated, if not solved, and that
one should look at this as an evolutionary process rather than
a final settlement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how much progress is actually
being made in both Cambodia and Laos toward a political settle-
ment within those countries?

DR. KISSINGER: Just to give myself some possibility of
avoiding some questions later on, I must point out that this is
not exactly related to the subject of this press conference, which
is to explain the report.

The situation in Laos and Cambodia differs in the
sense that in Laos -- they are similar in one respect.
Article 20 of the agreement provides for the withdrawal of all
foreign forces and for an end to the use of Laos and Cambodia
as bases against any neighboring country.

In this sense, the obligation is clear and unambiguous,
and obviously is not being fulfilled. There is a difference,
however, in the sense that in Laos there exists a cease-fire
agreement between the Laotian parties.

We are not formally a part of that agreement, and this
is why the agreement provides that within a fixed time period
after a political settlement, which in turn was supposed to
come 30 days after the cease-fire agreement, all foreign forces
should be withdrawn.

This is not, strictly speaking, in accordance with
Article 20, which makes no prior conditions to the withdrawal
of foreign forces.

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[L]

If this agreement is implemented among the parties, then a definite deadline will exist for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Up to now, the political agreement has not been achieved, so the negotiating problem in Laos would be for the outside countries to encourage a conclusion of the political negotiations, which would automatically produce a deadline for the withdrawal of foreign forces. This, in turn, would achieve one of our principal objectives as far as Laos is concerned.

Q How much progress has been made in that respect?

DR. KISSINGER: Our judgment is that enough progress has been made so that a settlement could be achieved rapidly if it were wanted by both sides. The obstacle to a settlement right now is the reluctance, I would think, to withdraw troops rather than the conditions of the settlement. If a decision were made to have a settlement, it could come fairly rapidly.

Q Dr. Kissinger ---

DR. KISSINGER: I am not finished yet with Cambodia. In Cambodia, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the forces opposing the Government were divided among various factions, some of which were receiving their support from different capitals, it did not prove as feasible to arrange a global negotiation as it turned out to be in Laos.

However, we believe that some of the same process that operated in Laos can be applied also in Cambodia, particularly now as all the opposing forces claim to be rallied under one central direction and that the government in Phnom Penh has broadened its base.

We are not too pessimistic that over a period of weeks, maybe some months, some cease-fire negotiations could start. Cambodia is somewhat behind Laos in this process. What form these negotiations would take, we would leave to the parties.

Q Dr. Kissinger, since three-quarters of the Senate and almost two-thirds of the House are opposing MFN for the Soviet Union, why is there no mention made of this matter in your report to the Congress dealing with the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: We have made very clear -- and I will repeat here -- that the Administration has strongly supported the provision in the trade bill that would enable the President to grant MFN to the Soviet Union.

If this provision is approved, it is the President's intention to grant MFN to the Soviet Union. It is furthermore the belief of this Administration that the issue of MFN for the Soviet Union is part of the whole fabric of our negotiation with the Soviet Union over a period of two years and should not be separated as an issue to be addressed in isolation.

Finally, we believe that the exchanges that took place between the Soviet leadership and the President on the issue of the exit visas substantially meets the concerns that were expressed by many of the signers of these resolutions.

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[L]

We hope that as the Congress studies the problem in
its entire range, and as we continue our discussions with Soviet
leaders on some of the problems that gave rise to these
concerns, that by the time the Congress votes on MFN it will
see matters in the same light.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you proposing some sort of
consortium consumer union with Europe in terms of the energy
crisis in the Middle East, to put the pressure on the Arab
nations to provide more oil? There seems to be some sort of
an ambiguity in the report.

DR. KISSINGER: May I point out, incidentally, that
MFN is mentioned at the bottom of page 34 and at the top of
page 35 of the report.

Q I am thinking in terms of the issue of immigration,
in terms of MFN.

DR. KISSINGER: That issue we did not deal with
separately, it is true.

With respect to Miss Thomas, her question was whether
we were implying a consortium of consumer nations to bring
pressure on the producer nations to produce more oil. Frankly,
we have not thought of this problem in terms of pressure.

Indeed, we have not completed our own deliberations
on the international implications of the energy problem. The
Energy Message dealt primarily with the domestic implications,
and we are now engaged in the NSC process in an investigation
of the international implications.

It is clear that we face here a number of problems with
which we have had no previous experience in the international
field. For example, the dollar reserves of the oil producing
nations are going to increase enormously as the dependence on
mid-East oil and foreign oil increases.

This fact alone creates a new reality for the inter-
national monetary system, and frankly, we have not thought through
all of the implications, but we know we have to study the
implications.

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[L]

It is a fact that many of the producing nations... are operating in the form of a consortium. What that means for the consuming nations is really not clear, and there are totally different points of view on the subject. How you define the national security interests in this respect is, in itself, a question that I must tell you honestly we have not yet fully resolved.

There is one school of thought that argues that it is to produce as much of our energy requirements, at least in the Western Hemisphere, as possible. There is another school of thought that points out that this would deplete the resources in the Western Hemisphere at a very excessive rate, and that, therefore, under peacetime conditions it is best to increase one's imports from the more distant areas and to preserve the Western Hemisphere reserves for crisis situations.

I just want to put before you the sort of issue that we are looking at. If the national security definition were in the sense of relying on Western Hemisphere sources primarily, then the pressure on the producing nations in the Middle East, for example, as far as this country is concerned, would be much less.

So until we have completed this study, we will not be in a position to make any very definitive statements. We have had preliminary talks with some of the Arab nations, when the Saudi minister of oil production was here, and we are in constant contact with the Iranians, and with others.

We are having some preliminary conversations with some European countries, but this is really one of these areas of new exploration where we have to get our own intellectual house in order first, before we can make any definitive statements. But we are definitely not approaching it with the attitude of wanting to bring pressure, because at this point we first have to define what our objectives are.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the European chapter puts great stress on the need for developing a new security concept, especially in the field of nuclear strategy. On one point, would you amplify on that a bit; and secondly, could you explain the concept of the timetable that you have in mind in relation to what is mentioned on page 207; namely, the need for the alliance to set its security goals before it enters into effective negotiations on MBFR, in view of the fact that those negotiations are currently anticipated in the fall?

DR. KISSINGER: The two questions are really two sides of the same point.

With respect to the first question, we have felt that obviously NATO today is in a strategic environment entirely different from the time when it was conceived. When it was conceived in the late '40s, and when it received impetus after the beginning of the Korean War in the 1950s, the security of Europe depended almost entirely on the American strategic nuclear guarantee, and the American forces in Europe were conceived primarily as a means to trigger the American nuclear guarantee and to deprive the United States of any great freedom of action with respect to it.

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But as the years have gone on, as the nuclear stockpiles on both sides have increased and the delivery systems have multiplied, the reliance on strategic nuclear war is bound to have a different significance.

We find ourselves today in Europe with a deployment that was designed in the late '50s. that was adapted at various stages, but which requires an explicit adaptation to new circumstances in a number of areas, and we believe that this is one of the pre-eminent tasks of the alliance.

This task becomes particularly acute as we begin the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reduction.

Murray is quite right: We anticipate these negotiations starting in the fall. We believe that they can be conducted effectively only if the allies first understand what the elements of their security are, so that specific proposals can be related to their understanding of how they affect the security situation, rather than to be caught in a negotiating process in which abstract figures are thrown around, and in which, then, domestic pressures and pressures within the conference room become predominant.

Now, in terms of the timetable, we have submitted to NATO, I believe this week, a document which outlines, on the one hand, our perception of these elements of security in Europe, and secondly, two principal approaches by which one can look at these mutual balanced force reductions from the point of view of security with some additional models by which they could be approached.

We want to elicit from our European allies, first, a response to the security section, and equally a response to the approaches we put before them to the issue of mutual balanced force reduction. That doesn't mean that every figure we put before them is necessarily the final one. It is really a more conceptual approach at this stage of the game in order to define where are we trying to go, how should we look at this problem, how can we have security, how can we have equal security at lower force levels and how do we reach these lower force levels, how can we make the cuts in such a way that they enhance the sense of security of all of the participants, hopefully to reduce both sides' capacities for offensive action, and thereby give each side a sense that the danger has been lessened.

This is the reason why we are linking conceptually the security issue and the MFBR issue, and we are really following a procedure we adopted in the early stages of SALT and which then has enabled us, once the basic principles and building blocks were understood, to move fairly rapidly in the actual negotiations.

Q Can I follow that up?

DR. KISSINGER: First this gentleman who has been very patient, and then I will come to you.

Q Doctor, a rather parochial question, if you please.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know what parish you represent. (Laughter)

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[Lc]

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Q Do you want me to tell you?

When is the President going to visit, this year, Latin America, and what countries is he going to visit? Does he still believe, as he said, that "As Brazil goes, so goes the rest of Latin America," and finally, don't you think that we are being left out on a limb in relation to the whole question of recognition of Cuba, inasmuch as half a dozen countries have already recognized Cuba and others are making noises, and the obvious way to undercut the prestige and effectiveness of an international body, the argument doesn't hold any more, since that prestige has already been undercut?

DR. KISSINGER: The gentleman asked about six questions.

Q In direct proportion to the time I had to wait.

DR. KISSINGER: All dealing with Latin America, specifically, when is the President planning his trip to Latin America, which countries does he intend to visit, what relative importance does he attach to Brazil specifically in the light of a comment he made during the toast for the President of Brazil, and various questions connected with our Cuban policy, particularly as the questioner believes it is being eroded anyway.

Q That is right.

DR. KISSINGER: Now, with respect to the President's trip, he announced some weeks ago that he was planning a trip to Latin America this year. There has been no further, detailed planning on this, and, therefore, I haven't much that I can add to what the President said. He has not yet decided which countries to visit, although it would probably be that countries whose leaders visited here would have a special claim on a return visit.

Now, we attach great importance to Brazil as geographically the largest country in Latin America, the greatest population, and making great progress. Therefore, we attach great importance to our relationship with Brazil, but this does not mean that we do not think other countries in Latin America also play a very major role or that we will hinge our whole Latin American policy on one country alone.

With respect to the Cuban policy, I think the basic considerations have been stated in the report, which are related to the policy that Cuba is pursuing and which can be affected by changes in Cuban policies.

Q Well, this went to Murray's question on MBFR. It seemed to me in reading last year's report you were much firmer against symmetrical reductions on both sides than you are now. You said it was inherently unstable, I think. In this report, it seems to me that you are backing off that position and leaving open various options. Is this correct?

DR. KISSINGER: In the interval we have, of course, made many more studies, and the complexity of our argumentation always increases with the number of studies that we conduct, not necessarily our lucidity. It depends how you define symmetrical.

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[LC]

Basically, our view remains that if you have an unequal number of forces, and if the forces on one side are composed heterogeneously, and the forces on the other side have a predominant element, then having cuts of exactly the same size is not necessarily the most sensible way of approaching the problem. Therefore, if there is an implication in this report that we have backed away from our attempt to wind up with equal security rather than to look at it in terms of the cuts that have to be made, then that is wrong. That is not our intention.

We have this year really made extensive studies. We have looked at eight different ways of approaching it. We finally have gotten it down to two or three.

In general, our approach is that the answers will have to be somewhat complex, and that the straight percentage approach is probably not the most realistic, but since we are in the process of discussing this with our allies, we don't want to pre-judge that question.

Q If you would indulge a question that is not directly related to this report, but which is connected with stories in this morning's paper concerning a former staff member of the NSC who, according to these stories, was implicated in wiretapping efforts, I wondered, first, if you knew about this, or what your response to these stories is.

DR. KISSINGER: First, I have no knowledge whatever of the activities to which this report refers.

David Young, who was a trusted member of my staff, was detailed on July 1, 1971, to join the Domestic Council which, under the direction of Mr. Ehrlichman, was conducting a study of declassification procedures and the security procedures within the Government. These studies led to a new classification system which was promulgated by the President, and this study was publicly announced.

Upon the completion of these studies, or of this report, which occurred in the early fall of 1971, David Young, whose interest was more in the domestic than the international area -- he was a lawyer when he joined me -- remained with the Domestic Council, and he continued to be paid from National Security Council funds because the Domestic Council had no budget of its own, and as most of you will note, most members of the White House staff are paid by some agency that has a budget for them.

He continued to be on the Domestic Council until he left in March of this year, before these stories became known. What his duties were, I do not know, and, therefore, I cannot make any comment about what he did except for the study on declassification. But I knew him as a trusted junior member of my staff.

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[L]

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Q Dr. Kissinger, in the Cambodian section, the report says there has been little progress in Cambodia and the military picture at times has remained spotty and precarious. You said that you were not pessimistic that a cease-fire might evolve in the weeks or perhaps months ahead.

This seems a bit inconsistent with the estimation of the Cambodian situation in the report, and would you please square the two?

DR. KISSINGER: I wanted to point out that in the report, which of course was written several weeks ago, we described the situation as well as we could in the light of the conditions that then existed.

The military situation in Cambodia is uneven, and in some sense precarious. We do not judge that the opposing forces have the military capacity to occupy the whole country and, therefore, the problem is whether the political structure in Phnom Penh will become so demoralized that it collapses.

If the political structure can be maintained, then we believe a basis for a negotiation exists. Recently, the political base of the government in Phnom Penh has been broadened. The rainy season is approaching, there has been no major change in the military situation in recent weeks, and in fact, there has been probably a slight slackening of pressure.

Therefore, we say that the conditions exist for a negotiation. Anyone who would say flatly that he is certain it will come about would, of course, be excessively optimistic.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you possibly provide an answer to the "fundamental question" on page 79 as to the possibility of reconciliation of the old Atlantic concept of unity in defense as opposed to what you call European regionalism and what would happen if European regionalism persists.

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let me explain there has been some comment in Europe that we wanted to confine Europe to a regional European role while we reserved for ourselves the right to conduct a global foreign policy.

The references to regionalism, both in this report and in the speech that I made some weeks ago, were intended to be descriptive and not prescriptive. It has been the whole thrust of American postwar foreign policy to encourage the Europeans to assume a responsibility in the world commensurate with their economic power and their political vitality.

It is the Europeans who have preferred to concentrate primarily on their region. To the extent that the Europeans want to play a global role, we welcome it, and we will be happy and eager to consult with them and to cooperate with them.

In the economic field there are strong tendencies towards regionalism in Europe, and it is the nature of the economic field, in any event, in both the United States and in Europe that as negotiations are prepared, pressure groups and special interests will advance their particular claims, which on their merits are usually quite reasonable and which in the

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absence of an overriding framework are extremely difficult to
resist by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

Therefore, what we are attempting to do, what the
President is urging, is that the political leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic and in Japan first set themselves some
general political goal in the name of which they can then
adopt a more generous, a more flexible and a more farsighted
aproach to their economic relationships.

If regionalism is continued or if regionalism is
enhanced, then the consequences will, of course, be a conscious-
ness on both sides of the Atlantic of constant conflict, of
every negotiation turning into a test of strength. Sooner or
later this is bound to affect other relationships.

When I say this, I am not saying this as a threat.
We expect that there is enough statesmanship on both sides of
the Atlantic and on both sides of the Pacific to recognize the
overriding political imperatives and that, therefore, we believe
we can avoid the development of regional blocs and these
autarchic groupings confronting each other..

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[LC]

Q To what extent do you think oil would be a dangerous destabilizing influence within the Western Alliance? Specifically, as one example, I refer to the differences in posture vis-a-vis the United States and France in the Middle East.

DR. KISSINGER: It is obvious that as energy becomes a growing concern for all of the industrialized nations that it is conceivable that the competition for energy, for sources of energy, will take forms that could threaten other political relationships.

If Western nations engage in a process where if one is expropriated and expelled, the other one moves in to pick up the pieces, as sometimes has been done by every Western nation with regard to every other Western nation, then, of course, you are creating a high premium on all sides to continue this process.

On the other hand, we expect again, as in the other areas, that as we look ahead 10 or 15 years it should be possible to develop policies that assure the energy supplies of all nations and in a manner that is consistent with the dignity of the producing nations.

It has to be consciously pursued from a long-range prospective and in a generous framework. If it isn't done, and if it is permitted to run wild, then the divisive tendencies may easily predominate.

Q Doctor, on page 11 of your report you refer to the political relationship with Japan as not yet having been fully defined. Could you explain that a little further, please?

DR. KISSINGER: As we explained in the chapter on Japan, Japan went through a phase in which its predominant effort was on economic recovery and then on this tremendous industrial expansion.

The degree of political activism was not commensurate to the economic power that had been developed. The political change from the occupation era and the post-war era to one in which Japan pursues a diplomacy that is more in keeping with its economic strength and its new vitality began in the last years of the Sato prime ministership, but took symbolic form when Prime Minister Tanaka acceded to office.

For example, he has now announced the trip he is intending to take later this year is in pursuit of his multi-polar diplomacy, which is a different word than Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers used in the past.

The adjustment of Japan is from pursuing a rather single-track foreign policy to a more complex foreign policy. After all, last year was the year when Japan restored or normalized its relations with the People's Republic of China. They are now engaged in peace negotiations, or of seeing whether they can get them started with the Soviet Union so that the political role of Japan is now in the process of transition.

How we relate ourselves to this change and how we can maintain, as we intend to, our traditional friendship while at the same time taking account of the greater complexity of the Japanese role is the task that the President attempted to describe in this report.

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[LC]

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Q Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify what you said on page 87, where you talk about the need to review the strategic options involved in conducting a nuclear defense, if necessary, and how that would relate to what you said about MBFR and to an alliance role in defense?

DR. KISSINGER: I am just trying to see what you are referring to. I understand.

The question is what we meant on page 87 of the report, in the chapter on Europe, by a review of the strategic options involved in conducting a nuclear defense if it should become necessary, and how we can prepare within the alliance a framework that integrates defense planning and diplomacy. Isn't that what you asked, to explain No. 2 and 3?

Q I was talking about the alliance role in that, and the alliance planning.

DR. KISSINGER: Okay, fine. I will just confine it, then, to the first question.

I keep looking over here. Where is Ron Ziegler when I need him the most to cut off the questioning? (Laughter)

Q Where is he? (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: He is measuring the walls of my office. (Laughter)

Q There is a lot of other empty space around here. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons under current conditions has a different significance and must pursue a different strategy than was the case in the 1950s. Now, the problem of how nuclear weapons are to be used, if that should become unavoidable, the relationship between what used to be called tactical and strategic uses, what rational purposes can be achieved, has to be addressed by the alliance.

There exist several bodies which can do this; for example, the nuclear planning group that was established in the Kennedy Administration to perform this role. What we are attempting to bring about is to shift the discussion from the more formalistic agreement on general propositions to a more concrete perception of what would actually occur in specific circumstances. So the forums exist, but what needs to be done is a more systematic and comprehensive approach to what is a very serious problem.

MR. WARREN: One more question is all we have time for.

Q Mr. Kissinger, I have an additional question.

DR. KISSINGER: You pick it. Why should I make an enemy? (Laughter)

MR. WARREN: This gentleman down here.

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Q You have on page 142 a four-point program for the Middle East. Could you kindly elaborate a little on that? In the first sentence you speak of the process of negotiations. Do you mean by that that the Jarring mission has been abandoned in your future attempts to bring peace?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is, on page 142 where we list four areas or four points with respect to the Middle East, to what extent that represents an American program for the area; and secondly, whether the first point which refers to a process of negotiation with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict means that we have abandoned the Jarring mission.

Actually, our attitude toward the negotiations in the Middle East is more fully covered on pages 138 and 139, and we make very clear that we are in favor of both the comprehensive approach as well as to the so-called interim approach; that we support both the Jarring mission as well as the various schemes that have been proposed that would have a practical consequence of clearing the Suez Canal and bringing about a withdrawal from some areas. We have explained on page 139 that we recognize that there has to be a relationship between the so-called interim approach and the so-called overall approach, and that we recognize the fact that one of the concerns is that if this relationship is not established, a new arrangement may take on the character of permanence.

Our view, however, is also that we should proceed on whichever route seems most promising at a particular moment; that we should be flexible about the modalities by which this relationship is established, and that the process by which progress is made must engage the parties in the Middle East in some form of contact with each other at some stage of the negotiations. This we have spelled out on pages 138 and 139. What you have on page 142 is really a summary that covers issues other than the Arab-Israeli issue, as well.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 11:35 A.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 12, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

THE BRIEFING ROOM

11:28 A.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe all of you know Dr. Kissinger has just returned from meetings in the Soviet Union, and had discussions regarding an upcoming summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union.

I have an announcement to read to you which relates to the summit meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I will read the text to you at this time. It is embargoed until 12:00 Noon, Eastern Time.

At the invitation of the President, extended by him during his stay in Moscow in May of 1972, in accordance with subsequent agreement, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, will pay an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 26, 1973.

As I mentioned earlier, Dr. Kissinger has just returned from a trip to the Soviet Union, and we felt it would be helpful to have Dr. Kissinger here to take some of your questions regarding his trip to the Soviet Union and to take questions regarding the upcoming summit meeting. Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I thought I would make a few observations first about the origin of the trip, the purpose of it, the discussions so far as I am free to talk about them at this moment, and perhaps a few comments about my stay in London.

First, the trip has been planned for many months-- at the latest, since February--and it has always been agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States that some four to six weeks prior to the summit, I would pay a visit to the Soviet Union to discuss with the General Secretary the agenda of the forthcoming summit and the general outline of the agreements that might emerge from the summit.

This, as you know, is a procedure that the President has followed in all of his summit meetings. We have always held the view that summit meetings had to be well prepared; that the outcome had to be somewhat predictable; that when heads of state met they should know the areas of possible agreement and the area of possible discussion, and, therefore, the date for this trip was selected when it became clear that the General Secretary would be free to visit the United States around the middle of June, and then we worked back from that about six weeks, which brought us to early May.

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Now, then, for the visit. Perhaps I should say a
few things about atmospherics first, which are not decisive.

I stayed for four days at the Soviet equivalent of
Camp David, which is a hunting lodge for the Politburo about
80 miles northwest of Moscow. General Secretary Brezhnev,
Foreign Minister Gromyko and other senior Soviet officials
spent the whole time there with me and my staff.

We generally met from about 11:00 in the morning
until 3:00 in the afternoon, and again from about 5:30 until
9:30 or 10:00 o'clock in the evening. The hospitality was
extraordinary. The General Secretary paid enormous attention
to our physical comfort and to giving us an opportunity to see
something of the area.

They took me on a new speedboat they have developed
which, with all respect to him, is a rather harrowing exper-
ience -- (Laughter) -- Mr. Ziegler said particularly with my
weight load, which comes with ill grace -- (Laughter) -- and he
also gave me my first opportunity to go hunting, unsolicited.

Q Did you get anything?

DR. KISSINGER: I acted as his Special Advisor.

Q Did you fire?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I advised him about how to
conduct the hunt. (Laughter)

Q Where to aim the rifle, you mean?

DR. KISSINGER: In which direction. (Laughter)
Ignorance of a subject has never kept a Harvard professor
from offering theories. (Laughter)

Now as to substance. As I mentioned to you last
year at the end of the summit in Moscow, the President and
the Soviet leaders paid particular attention not only to the
specific agreements that were reached, but to the basic prin-
ciples of Soviet-American relations that were announced at the
end of the summit.

We indicated at the time that these were considered
a road map of a route that had yet to be traveled. We paid
particular attention to the statement that both sides attach
major importance to preventing the exacerbation of their rela-
tions and the development of situations that might lead to an
exacerbation of these relations.

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The principles further state that we will do our
utmost to avoid military confrontations and prevent the outbreak
of nuclear war, that both sides recognize that the attempt
to obtain a unilateral advantage at the expense of the other,
directly or indirectly, is inconsistent with these objectives.

This visit gave us an opportunity to assess to what
degree these principles had been implemented and to discuss
what further steps along that route could be taken and we
devoted some time to this project.

We felt that both sides had substantially lived
up to this principle over the last year and intended to
continue to abide by it and to deepen it.

In addition to this general review of the inter-
national situation and the relevance to it of the basic
approach that both sides had adopted, we discussed the whole
range of Soviet-American relations.

First of all, as you know, at the summit last year,
a number of bilateral agreements were signed that were in the
process of negotiation, but whose negotiation was accelerated
by the fact that the two heads of government or that the leaders
of both sides were meeting. This permitted not only faster
progress in these bilateral talks, but it also permitted
some compromises to be made that in the normal course of
events might have been more difficult.

So, we reviewed again the range of bilateral
relations, agricultural research, oceanography, cultural
exchanges, scientific exchanges and so forth, to see which
of them were capable of future and further development.

In addition, we reviewed the major negotiations that
are now going on, such as the negotiations on the limitation
of strategic arms. As you know, I met with Ambassador Johnson
on the way to Moscow and I met with him again in London on
the way back. This does not mean that a major agreement is
imminent, but since we are in the process, at the moment,
of presenting a detailed position in Geneva, we thought it
was important that our negotiator be fully informed of the
nuances of the discussions that had taken place in Moscow.

The second phase of the SALT negotiations is more
complex than the first, because in the second phase of the
SALT negotiations we are dealing not only with quantitative,
but with qualitative aspects of the arms race. We are dealing
not only with numbers, but with technology.

We had extensive discussions of the subject and I
believe that when the President and the General Secretary
meet, the broad directions of subsequent negotiations can be
established and the impetus can be accelerated.

We also reviewed the economic relationships between
the United States and the Soviet Union in two aspects: First,
the normal evolution of trade and middle term credits on the
assumption of favorable action by the Congress on our trade
bill and the most favored nation clause.

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And secondly, a general and more long-term approach to cooperative projects that might be developed over a period of years, assuming that political relations continue to stabilize and continue to improve between the two countries.

There was no attempt to achieve final agreement in any of these areas. There was an attempt to have the frankest sort of exchange so that both sides can prepare themselves and so when the President meets with the General Secretary they can concentrate on the most essential questions, having cleared away some of the peripheral issues in the course of preparation.

There was obviously some discussion also of issues which concern not only the bilateral relations, but relations in which other countries are widely interested, such as the European Security Conference and mutual balanced force reductions. These could be only very exploratory in nature, because we are proceeding in both of these discussions only on the basis of the closest consultations with our allies and we will, of course, keep our allies fully informed of any discussions and we will not proceed without a common position.

This is all I will say about the Moscow part of the trip, though I will be glad to answer any questions.

Let me say one or two words about the stop in London.

This gave us a good opportunity to review again the whole range of the relations between the United Kingdom and the United States and it gave me an opportunity on behalf of the President to explain to the British leaders our general approach to what we have called, "The Year of Europe."

There has been a great deal of discussion about the meaning of the President's annual report and my speech of some weeks ago to the Associated Press. There has been some concern, not so much in Britain, but elsewhere, that we wanted to confine Europe to a regional role while we played a global role, that we wanted to link issues and make them conditional, to make progress in one area conditional on progress in another area.

There will be many opportunities to discuss this subject in detail. For today, we simply wish to point out that any references to a regional role for Europe were intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, that nobody would welcome more a global role for Europeans than the United States, if the Europeans wish to play such a role.

With respect to the relationship of various areas to each other, we were stating a fact, not a condition, and we, above all, want to approach these forthcoming discussions, not from the point of view of driving a hard bargain in particular areas, but from the point of view that the nations of the West require again a new vision of their relationships; that they should not only identify foreign policy successes with relations with adversaries, but with relations with each other.

It is the President's intention, in our relations with Europe, to bring about a new consciousness of the intimate ties between the two sides of the Atlantic, without prejudicing the independence, autonomy, or identity of the emerging European Community in such a way that the two sides of the Atlantic become conscious not only of daily controversy about particular issues but about the deeper purposes that unite them.

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Having said this, I will now be glad to answer questions on both parts.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you come away from Moscow convinced or confident that the Soviet Union is carrying out the responsibilities of the Paris International Conference on restraint of heavy arms equipment to North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: We had, as you can expect, a rather full discussion of the Indochinese situation. We made clear our view that all countries have a responsibility to exercise some restraint and that heavy arms shipments by anybody into the area had a different significance when a cease-fire was in effect than during wartime.

Without going into the details, I think it is correct to say that the Soviet Union recognizes its responsibilities, as a signatory of the Paris agreement, to contribute to the observance of that agreement.

Q Do you feel more optimistic now as a result of your trip about saving the present regime in Cambodia, or how do you feel about it now?

DR. KISSINGER: I will be seeing my old counterpart in many negotiations, Le Duc Tho, on Thursday, and I think I can form a better estimate of what the prospects are in Cambodia and elsewhere after those talks than on the basis of discussions in Moscow.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there are reports this morning that the Viet Cong charged that the United States has been bombing in portions of South Vietnam north of Saigon, along the Cambodian border. I wonder if you have a comment.

DR. KISSINGER: That is not true.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the Russians express any concern about security for Mr. Brezhnev when he came to the United States, particularly in view of the attitude of some American Jews toward that visit, and what did you tell him about it?

DR. KISSINGER: There was no concern expressed by Mr. Brezhnev or any of his senior colleagues about the physical arrangements for the trip. We have assured the Soviet leaders that they would be treated with the courtesy and respect consistent with the considerable importance we attach to the improvement of our relationships, and we have every hope that all Americans will keep in mind that Mr. Brezhnev will be here as a guest of the United States Government for extremely important purposes in connection with the peace of the world.

The Soviet Union is going to send an advance party over here within the next week to look into the physical arrangements for the trip and they will be better equipped to discuss whatever security problems may exist than I would be.

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Q Is he going to do any traveling on his own?

DR. KISSINGER: The itinerary hasn't been finally settled, but I think it is safe to say, in addition to his visit to Washington, that it will include a stop on the West Coast. As for intermediate places, they have not been decided yet.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when the subject of trade was discussed with the Russians, was the topic of Congressional reluctance to improve trade deals discussed in relation to Soviet Jews?

DR. KISSINGER: The Congressional reluctance concerns not so much trade deals as the most favored nation clause, and, of course, the Soviet leaders are aware of the fact that there is some opposition in the form of the Jackson Amendment to the Administration proposal.

We, the Administration, the President, very strongly hold the view which I expressed before I left, that the most favored nation status with the Soviet Union is an integral part of a whole complex of negotiations and should not be isolated as a separate American measure for which we can exact additional concessions.

We have, in the past, brought to the attention of the Soviet leaders the impact of the Jewish question on the American domestic situation. As you know, we have made considerable progress in the sense that the Soviet leaders have formally acknowledged that they are waiving the exit tax and you can assume that whenever we meet an occasion is found to bring this to the attention of the Soviet leaders.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is your reaction to the House vote to withhold certain funds for bombing in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: This happened when I was in Moscow.

Q In London.

DR. KISSINGER: In London, that is right.

Well, my reaction has been expressed in answer to a question before the Associated Press and it is this: No one can expect that an agreement for a cease-fire will be observed simply because it is written down, and the Congress and others have to ask themselves whether it is possible to maintain an agreement without either sanctions or incentives.

This is the fundamental issue that is raised. I don't want to comment on the particulars of any individual vote. We are going to make a serious effort, when I meet with Le Duc Tho, to see whether we can bring about a stricter implementation of the agreement by all sides.

We certainly did not sign the cease-fire in order to find another subterfuge for being involved there, but equally, one has to consider the problem of how the cease-fire can be observed and not simply become a dead letter.

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This is the difficulty we face. We will do it
with the greatest seriousness and the United States cannot
be indifferent to an agreement that it has solemnly signed,
that was ratified by eight other nations, to being totally
disregarded.

I think if Mr. Le Duc Tho -- I was going to say
Special Advisor, but I understand he is going to have a
governmental status when I meet him next time -- meets
us in that spirit, we will be able to bring about a
considerable amelioration of the situation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you regard the House action
as an interference in your negotiations with Le Duc Tho?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the House is a coequal branch
of the government and has every right to express its views
on foreign policy. We would not have recommended that
action, particularly at this time, but the Secretary of State
made that clear before the vote and I have nothing to add to it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, were you aware at the time it
was taking place that the home of one of your staff members
was being wiretapped and did you get any information from
those wiretaps?

DR. KISSINGER: It seems to me that every time I
meet with the press some variation of this question is being
asked and, therefore, let me state once and for all what it is
that my office handles and what it is that my office does
not handle.

The agencies concerned with intelligence in our
government, that is to say, the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, submit reports
through my office when they concern national security. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, these reports are always at
the direction of the Director of the agency or the head of the
agency and follow duly constituted processes.

My office has not handled or been aware of any
activities that were conducted by other processes. The
overwhelming majority of reports that come through my office
from both of these agencies concern matters of foreign
intelligence. In a very few cases where it concerns allegations
of the mishandling of classified information or of the
unauthorized disclosure of classified information that was
within the purview of the NSC, I would receive summaries
of reports from agency heads concerning these activities.
I repeat, these are an infinitesimal part of the total
information.

I must say in fairness, I will not go into individual
cases, but we have asked the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to make a full report of these investigations
and he will do so early next week.

I would like to add in fairness to the individual
concerned, that I never received any information that cast
doubt on his loyalty and discretion and that the individual
concerned left my staff for reasons that were totally unconnected
with any security investigations that may have been conducted.
That is all I will say on that subject.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, while you were in Europe, did you receive any feedback on Watergate?

DR. KISSINGER: Watergate was not mentioned in any of the official discussions in which I participated.

Q On the SALT aspects, do you intend at the summit to have some kind of declaration similar to the one of May 20, 1971, setting forth the negotiating priorities?

DR. KISSINGER: There has not yet been a final decision on what will come out with respect to SALT at the summit. There has been a discussion of the general priorities and of the general direction which the negotiation might take. These discussions will continue in the interval between now and the summit and they will, of course, be discussed in great detail between the President and the General Secretary when they meet.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said you had never received any reports that the tap on Halperin's phone cast any doubt on his loyalty and discretion. Did you ever receive any reports at all resulting from the tap?

DR. KISSINGER: I won't say any more on this subject until the FBI has made a full report of the discussion.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is it fair to assume that Chairman Brezhnev will also have an opportunity to see some of the sights in the country, or is it going to be primarily a working summit and he will spend, say, 90 percent of his time in Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: It will be overwhelmingly a working summit. You can also assume he will spend the preponderant amount of his time in Washington, I would estimate it would be somewhat less than 90 percent, but even when he is traveling, you can assume that the overwhelming preponderance of his time will be spent in conversations with the President.

Q Can we assume the West Coast stop will be San Clemente, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: It hasn't been finally settled yet, but it wouldn't be an unreasonable assumption.

Q There has been speculation as to whether Watergate will affect our practice of foreign policy. You have just come back from discussions in Moscow and London. What is your impression? Has the Watergate scandal at all affected our role in the world and foreign policy?

DR. KISSINGER: On this trip I had noticed no impact of Watergate on our foreign policy.

Q Since the House has voted not to transfer money to pay for the Cambodia bombing, are you making any recommendations or do you think that the Nixon Administration should go ahead with its plans and use Federal money anyway for this purpose?

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Q There is one other question I wanted to ask. You didn't mention the Middle East. Would you expect the Middle East would be an area of discussion?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, the Middle East will undoubtedly be an area of discussion.

Q In your discussions in Moscow, did you see the glimmer of possibility of a two-power approach to the Middle East situation?

DR. KISSINGER: I would rather not comment on that now, but it will undoubtedly be a subject that will be fully discussed by the General Secretary and the President. But as you all recognize, it is an extremely difficult subject for outside countries to state general propositions unless the parties concerned make a contribution.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I wonder if you could predict or give us an idea what other agreements you might be signing with the General Secretary when he is here, in terms of scientific exchanges or whatever?

DR. KISSINGER: I gave an outline of the areas that are now under discussion, and as they get closer to realization, we will --

Q But it is primarily in those areas you mentioned -- agriculture, scientific?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, it is primarily in those areas. That is right.

Q Will Premier Kosygin be accompanying the General Secretary?

DR. KISSINGER: No. Our impression is that the General Secretary will be primarily accompanied by Foreign Minister Gromyko and senior aides, but by no other member of the Politburo.

Q Do you expect negotiations on Cambodia to come out of your meeting with Le Duc Tho next week?

DR. KISSINGER: Cambodia will be included in the discussion.

Q Do you expect some kind of ongoing formal negotiations to follow your meeting with Le Duc Tho?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to predict what will come out of this meeting, but we would think obviously that a settlement in Cambodia at some point will have to include negotiations.

Q Will Mr. Brezhnev, do you think, have a chance to give a speech over nationwide television, as Mr. Nixon did?

DR. KISSINGER: That hasn't been discussed, but again, I see no reason why we would refuse this.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:00 NOON EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 29, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

AT 12:38 P.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: A number of you asked whether or not we could have a briefing prior to the President's trip to Iceland and the meeting between President Nixon and President Pompidou.

Dr. Kissinger has agreed to discuss the upcoming meeting in Iceland with you this morning and that is why he is here.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me summarize where we are planning to go in the "Year of Europe" and the discussions that are coming up between President Nixon and President Pompidou and their relationship to this.

The basic objectives of what has been called the "Year of Europe" have been described in the President's report to the Congress and the speech which I gave to the Associated Press on April 23rd.

Briefly stated, the purpose is to adapt the Atlantic relationships to the conditions of the 70's and 80's to see which of the institutions that were formed in the 40's and 50's need revitalization and which policies need redefinition.

The basic intention is to see whether we can define where the nations bordering the Atlantic want to go over the next ten years in the field of economics, the field of defense, the field of foreign policy and to determine their relationship to each other and their joint relationship to other industrial nations such as Japan.

In these documents, which I have referred to, it was pointed out over the past 20 years there have grown up a series of institutions in various fields whose manner of operation is not necessarily compatible or not inevitably compatible.

In the field of economics, the emphasis is on regionalism. In the field of defense, the emphasis is on integration. In the field of foreign policy, the conduct of affairs is largely on a national basis and inevitably certain strains develop as a result.

Now, in the aftermath of these approaches, there has been a great deal of public debate in Europe, but so far, very little formal official response.

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With respect to the public debate, there has been an argument that the United States is attempting to lump together the negotiations in economics, defense and foreign policy into one grand negotiation in which all these subjects would be discussed simultaneously.

It has been argued that the United States wants to emphasize a regional role for Europe and a global role for itself. And there has been concern that the United States is opposed to the unity of Europe.

Let me make a few observations and then explain what it is we are after and how the forthcoming meeting fits into it.

With respect to the nature of the negotiations, the United States does not maintain the view that there should be one grand negotiation in which all subjects are discussed simultaneously. Obviously, it is more practical for individual subjects to be treated separately, but what the United States does maintain is that these subjects are organically interrelated, not because of an act of policy by the United States and not as an act of choice, but as a necessity.

In other words, it is impossible for the two sides of the Atlantic to emphasize regional egoism in economics, but to maintain the doctrine of integrated defense within the NATO structure. And, therefore, the United States does hold the view that in conducting the negotiations in various fields, the negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic should be aware of the greater political realities and be guided by them in their detailed negotiations.

The same is true in the realm of foreign policy or in the realm of policy altogether.

Now, it is not correct that the United States by emphasizing the relationship of various fields to each other is trying to blackmail its European allies in the economic field. Quite the contrary. The surest way to have a confrontation is to permit economic technicians on both sides of the Atlantic to conduct negotiations on purely economic criteria. This will emphasize the special interests of both sides of the Atlantic and it will make it impossible to make the adjustments and concessions that a larger political framework would dictate.

But our deeper purpose in calling for a reevaluation of Atlantic relationships is not to get a unilateral advantage in this or that negotiation. Indeed, as has been frequently pointed out in public statements of this Administration, a lasting peace, or a permanent relation cannot be built on the unilateral advantage of one side. Only those arrangements will last that each side has a stake in maintaining.

Therefore, the objective of the Administration is to lift the Atlantic debate out of the rut of purely technical controversies where for about a decade public attention has been concentrated.

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We think it is not healthy for any of the nations of the Atlantic group to identify foreign policy successes exclusively with relations with adversaries.

We have been committed and remain committed to a policy of relaxation of tension. But we think it is also important that nations that define common principles with adversaries should be able to find a possibility of defining common principles with friends and that countries that are joined together in a common defense should be able to articulate the purposes of that common defense.

So, we will be discussing with European leaders, throughout this year, the basic principles which we believe should guide our relationship and which they believe should guide our relationship, not as they said of unilateral American proposals, but as a common enterprise. We, of course, have already had talks with Prime Minister Heath and with Chancellor Brandt and we are now embarking on meeting President Pompidou.

The role of France in this negotiation is, of course, quite crucial. In the economic field, the negotiations with the Common Market, France has always played a very important, in many categories a decisive role.

In the defense field, France, of course, has been more aloof, and in foreign policy matters, it has emphasized the national character of its policy.

What we are attempting to do is not directed against the unity of Europe, but assumes it, and for that very reason we consider the participation of France and the understanding of France very important.

We will not, of course, be able to make any final decisions in a two-day meeting in Iceland. What we do hope to achieve is some agreement on procedures that might be followed in articulating the purposes that we are seeking to define, procedures in which the role of France will be, of course, extremely important, so that by the time the President visits Europe toward the end of this year, we will be in a position to conclude, or bring close to conclusion, the first phase of these negotiations.

Whether this meeting will end with a formal communique or not has not, in fact, been decided and is not the most important aspect of these talks.

There are many things, many concrete matters to talk about. France is very eager to discuss the monetary question; also the upcoming trade negotiations. We are prepared to discuss these, as well as all other questions of Atlantic relations. But we would like to set them into a framework of more long-range objectives. But, of course, when the two Presidents meet, each side is free to raise any topic within any framework that they choose, but we look forward to constructive talks which will advance the objectives which I have described to you, and I must say that the preliminary talks we have had have been more positive than some of the reports that I have seen elsewhere.

I will be glad to answer your questions.

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Q You haven't mentioned the new Atlantic Charter.
Is there any reason why you haven't?

DR. KISSINGER: When I spoke of the set of common
principles and purposes that we want to elaborate by the
end of the year, this was one sentence for what we had
expressed previously in the phrase "Atlantic Charter." This
was what we meant when we referred to the Atlantic Charter.

Now, whether it is called a charter or some other
document, it is not an issue over which we should spend
a great deal of time. The major objective, though, remains
what has been enunciated: To state a set of purposes sufficiently
concrete so that they can guide our actions over the middle
term future and to guide the negotiators, who are dealing
with concrete issues, by the end of this year.

Now, whether this is called an Atlantic Charter or
something else is not a matter on which the U.S. Government
is going to spend a great deal of effort.

Q Can you tell us anything regarding your recent
discussions in Paris regarding the Southeast Asia problem?

DR. KISSINGER: I will take that question later.
May I finish questions on this first.

Q I don't know whether this is on the subject
you want to continue on or not, but after their recent
meeting, Mr. Heath and Mr. Pompidou made it quite clear they
were not particularly interested in the so-called European
summit meeting during the President's European trip. What
is our position and reaction to that?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, there are many
definitions of a European summit meeting, almost as many
definitions as there are institutions. There was at one time
a suggestion that the President meet with the Common Market
and with the heads of government of the Common Market nations.
This was defined as the European summit.

This had a number of problems for both sides. For
our side, it had the difficulty that we might be facing a
combined group rather than a free discussion. For the
Europeans, or for some of the Europeans, it had the problem
that they were not sure that in relation to each of them
the President might not be in a dominant position at such a
meeting, so there was a fair amount of opposition to a meeting
of the President with the heads of government of the Common
Market as an institution.

There are other institutions where heads of
government meetings could be arranged, such as NATO and, of
course, such a meeting could take place ad hoc.

As I understand the position of Prime Minister Heath
and President Pompidou -- and you must understand we had
a chance to talk to them individually -- as I understand
their position, it is really very similar to ours. There is
no sense in having a European summit meeting, in whatever
forum it is arranged, unless there has been sufficient
progress in preliminary negotiations to justify it.

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Therefore, if I understood their position correctly, it is to see what concrete progress can be made during this year in specific negotiations and to decide the question of whether then there should be a European summit or a summit of the President with European leaders in the light of the discussions that have taken place this year and that happens to be exactly our view as well.

Q Can you give us any more specific idea of when the President will go to Europe and where he will go?

DR. KISSINGER: This depends, of course, in large part on the negotiations that will not really start until after the meeting in Iceland. I don't expect that we can be ready before the second half of October. The countries he will visit have not been decided yet, although it is highly probable that they will include at least Britain, France, the Federal Republic and Italy. What other countries he will visit has not been decided.

Q If I could follow up just a moment, you said you wouldn't be ready before the second half of October, meaning the trip could take place later than that but not earlier than that; is that correct?

DR. KISSINGER: We are operating now on an estimate. It seems improbable that the visit could take place before that. It is possible that it could take place after that and it really will be geared to the progress of the negotiations, rather than to an abstract deadline that we set ahead of time.

Q The progress of which negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: The progress of the negotiations, and the discussions which are now starting in the economic field, in the defense field with the meetings of the various NATO committees starting next week and of the other discussions related to the outline of the "Year of Europe" as I have described it.

Q There have been some suggestions in the press about Britain and France getting together with their nuclear forces to form the basis of a European nuclear defense force. Have we a position on this? Do we favor it? Do we oppose it?

DR. KISSINGER: We have not yet been approached, nor are we aware of any concrete steps towards forming a European nuclear force based on the British and French forces and until we get a specific proposition or at least an indication, it doesn't make any sense for us to take a position on this.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you sum up the differences between the U.S. and France on the monetary problem at the moment and trade? What is the crux of our problem?

MORE

DR. KISSINGER: On economic questions, I am usually
an argument against universal sufferage.

On the monetary question, the difference between
us and France seems to be on the issue of immediate
convertibility; and secondly, on the French preference for
fixed exchange rates.

We are not opposed to fixed exchange rates, but we
would like to have some automatic factor of adjustments in
the case of imbalance. Our position in general has been
that the convertibility should follow the achievement of
a new international system, rather than precede it.

On trade, there are two basic issues. One is the
issue of compensation produced by the admission into the
Common Market of new nations or of special arrangements that
have been made with new nations; and secondly, the general
trade negotiations which will be triggered hopefully by
the passage of the trade bill by Congress.

Now, most of those tend to resolve themselves into
very concrete and technical issues, and one reason why we
have been so concerned with getting an overall political
framework is because these technical issues are very difficult
to resolve at a high level unless one has the general
objectives one is trying to achieve in mind.

Our approach at this meeting, in the discussions
between President Pompidou and President Nixon with respect
to the economic issues will be this: We will not be able to
resolve the specific issues in technical terms; in fact,
they are not even ready for framing as concrete technical
issues. But we hope to be able to emerge with a decision
by both sides that they would instruct their negotiators
to take a broad view of the problem, not a view to maximize
every large measure for every last issue, because the spirit
in which these negotiations are conducted is almost more
important than what the concrete position is on every last
one of the items that is going to emerge.

Q Do you get the impression, Henry, that the
French wish to sit down at Reykjavik and actually start
monetary negotiations on a detailed and technical basis
in these two days and you are trying to tell them through us,
we can't do this?

DR. KISSINGER: First, of course, you have to
remember Secretary Shultz and the French Minister of Finance,
Giscard d'Estaing, are going to be present, and therefore,
it will be quite possible to have highly technical discussions.

I don't believe the French expect a final solution
of the monetary question.

Q They are pressing for some detailed discussions
in Reykjavik; right?

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DR. KISSINGER: Yes, and we will be prepared to discuss it with them, but we would think that the outcome is more likely to be a general sense of direction than a detailed solution.

Q When Chancellor Brandt was here, I think the joint statement referred to the President meeting with the Common Market and NATO, and Brandt, in his speech, said the level of this meeting was being worked on. Were you saying that this idea is being shelved until next year?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I am saying --

Q I was going to say are you --

DR. KISSINGER: I am at a disadvantage if I let you finish your question.

Q Your answer to the previous questions about the summits left the impression you are waiting to see how all the talks went this year before deciding whether the summits should be held at the Common Market or NATO levels.

DR. KISSINGER: Or at some ad hoc level.

If we can come up with what I call the charter, but which can be called a set of principles or whatever, then the prospect of a summit-type meeting at the time of the President's visit would be greater than if progress toward this were less rapid.

So ideally, if there is to be one, and that, of course, requires the agreement of all other countries, if there is to be one, then we would prefer it to be at the time of the President's visit to Europe and it is not being shelved in our present thinking.

Q In foreign policy, can you touch on that, can you either create a spectrum for us of discussion or be specific?

DR. KISSINGER: In foreign policy we constantly face the concern that the United States and the Soviet Union might be planning a condominium, whatever that means, and we face the fact that many of the nations are conducting quite independent and autonomous policies.

What we would like to see is whether we can define what it is that should be done in comment and how the policy should be concerted and what it is that can and should be done separately, independently.

Secondly, we ought to have some definition of where we want the Atlantic relationship to go in its deepest sense over a ten-year period or five-year period.

Thirdly, there is the question of Japan, how can Japan be related to the other highly industrialized nations, especially in the field of economics, but also in the field of policy. These are the principal types of questions which we will address.

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Now, if you don't mind, since I will have to leave
in about ten minutes -- should I take the question on Vietnam
now?

Q Can you tell us the progress made over there?

Q Does this include the Middle East, for example?

DR. KISSINGER: It includes all areas in which
European and American interests impinge.

Q Did he mention Middle East?

Q Can you tell us did you make progress with
your meetings in Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I cannot go much further than
the statement that I made at the airport in Paris which had
been worked out jointly with the North Vietnamese and
which they confirmed. In that statement it was said that
significant progress was made at the meetings. This is the
position that I would maintain.

We reviewed the agreement very carefully to see
what could be done to bring about a better implementation of
those provisions that either side felt were inadequately
carried out. We had a full discussion on this. We are now
discussing the results with Saigon, no doubt Hanoi is
discussing it with their friends, and we hope -- in fact, we
expressed it more strongly at the airport -- we expect that
next week when discussions resume, that we will conclude
them satisfactorily.

Of course, a great deal depends then on whether
the new understandings will be implemented because the lack
of implementation isn't necessarily a lack of clarity of
the old agreement, but lack of willingness to observe
provisions that are clearly understood.

On the other hand, one would have to assume that it
doesn't make too much sense to go through this extensive
negotiation if one were not prepared at least to make a major
effort to have it implemented. This is certainly our attitude.
We are approaching these discussions in a positive spirit
and with the intention of seeing the results carefully implemented
insofar as this has been in our control or insofar as we have
influence over others.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when you speak of new understandings,
are you suggesting a possibility or probability of substantial
changes in the January 23rd agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: No, this negotiation is different
from the January agreement. This negotiation concerns almost
entirely methods of implementation rather than of renegotiation.

Q Can you tell us what the United States reaction
will be to the Canadian withdrawal this afternoon from
the ICCS?

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DR. KISSINGER: We regret it, especially at this time, when we hope that out of the negotiations now going on in Paris an agreement that will be better implemented and that can be better implemented, because of various adjustments that will be made, will emerge.

On the other hand, Canada made this decision in the light of many considerations, including strong domestic opposition to this cause. I can say we regret it, but we understand it.

Q When I spoke of reaction, I was really asking what will we do in a specific way. Will we try to get a replacement, to put it colloquially, or what?

DR. KISSINGER: We will have to try to find mutually agreeable replacements, and that is good for a four-hour discussion, I am sure.

Q Was Canada aware of the adjustments that may be made, and felt they were inadequate?

DR. KISSINGER: No, of course, you have to ask Canada. I believe the Canadian objections, as I understand them—in the absence of the Secretary of State, I spoke to the Canadian Foreign Minister on Friday and also, the Canadian Ambassador here assured me this was no judgment on our recent discussions; it is their judgment on the nature of the control machinery given its present composition. Also, whatever other pressures they were under. I think Canada should speak for herself, rather than have me interpret.

Q Does your significant progress in Paris include some reasonable expectation that the Communists will reduce or cease ground activity in Cambodia and we will cease bombing in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to make any speculation about specific aspects of this until it is concluded. Then I think it will go much more reasonably.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there are reports out of Saigon that the South Vietnamese Government has agreed in principle to this agreement or whatever you have worked out so far with Hanoi and it calls for stopping the shooting war completely. Is that valid?

DR. KISSINGER: I have given my word that we would not reveal the content of these negotiations. I can't always enforce that on others and I just can't comment on that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the Saigon Government reveal the contents of these negotiations when it was disclosed to newsmen that Ambassador Sullivan came over with a map?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into every news story that comes out of Saigon. Ambassador Sullivan was sent over to explain the position and the tentative conclusions that had been reached. Which of these speculative sources is correct, and which is not, it really wouldn't be appropriate for me to say.

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I will take one more question.

Q As long as we have you here, there are some questions about the wiretapping. Can we ask them now or not?

DR. KISSINGER: Ask your question.

Q There has been some disagreement between what you have said on the record and source stories out of the FBI on your role in identifying the people who should be tapped. I wonder if you could clear up that? Did you specifically identify the individuals on your staff who were to be tapped?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, the wiretapping that went on in 1969 should be separated from some of the other activities that were going on. It was legal. It followed regular procedures in relation to specific leaks and followed criteria which have been spelled out in the statement which the President made last week.

In fulfilling these criteria, my office supplied the names of some of the individuals who had access to the information that was being investigated. That was substantially the role that was pursued by my office in this particular event.

Q Did you supply the names of the newsmen?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q The FBI did that?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know who did it.

Q Could you identify the newsmen?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think I want to go beyond what I have said.

Q Do you know anything about reports in the paper today that wiretap conversations are being shown to other reporters by General Haig?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that is totally untrue.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to your knowledge now, does anybody on your staff have his phone wiretapped?

DR. KISSINGER: The only internal security matter with which I am familiar is the series of wiretaps which were reported by the FBI Director that started in 1969 and that ended later. It ended sometime in 1970, I believe, or early 1971. I have no personal knowledge of any other internal security investigations that were carried on.

Therefore, I would not know.

Q Have you given any thought of resigning as a result of this, as has been reported fairly widely?

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DR. KISSINGER: I have given no thought to resigning.

Q Do you approve of wiretapping newsmen's
telephones?

DR. KISSINGER: I would consider wiretapping in general a distasteful thing. I considered the situation, as it existed, a very dangerous one. My concern was with the protection of classified information that was entrusted to me and not the general problem of other leaks.

Q What do you mean when you say "very dangerous,"
Dr. Kissinger? Can you be more specific?

DR. KISSINGER: Our foreign policy has depended to a considerable extent on the fact that foreign governments who were dealing with us could have confidence that their communications would remain confidential. Many of our initiatives were conducted on this confidential basis, and most of the successes of this Administration depended on negotiations that were conducted preliminarily in a secret way.

Therefore, the protection of that information is in the national interest. What particular methods are chosen from time to time was not within the jurisdiction of my office, although in the case of the particular wiretaps in the period 1969-1970, my office cooperated to the extent I have indicated.

Q Did the disclosures, advance disclosures on the nuclear treaty talk position of the United States, did that actually result in a different treaty than we would have gotten?

DR. KISSINGER: This is extremely difficult to decide in retrospect, because you can never know what the other side would have done. In any event, that happened in 1971, in a different period from the one we are talking about.

Q May I know exactly what you mean by the phrase "my office?"

DR. KISSINGER: I am responsible for what happens in my office and I won't give the names of the people who did it.

Q Who supplied the names of the newsmen or women?

DR. KISSINGER: I have no information on that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how do you distinguish between the 1971 SALT leaks and what happened in 1969?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't distinguish between the 1971 SALT leaks. I believe the leak in 1971 was extremely dangerous and did not help the conduct of the SALT negotiations. I am saying what was done about the 1971 SALT leak occurred at a time when the specific measures were conducted, when my office was not part of the particular measures that were taken to prevent this leak, and therefore, that question has to be addressed to other people.

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I defend the necessity of preventing the sort of leak that occurred in July of 1971. I think it was against the national interest that this leak occurred. The only thing that I cannot answer, with respect to the July, 1971, leak, is the specific measures that were taken to deal with it, since by that time my office was no longer a part of these discussions.

Q I am now somewhat confused. Your office, you say, had no connection or involvement in whatever internal security investigation may have been done about the leak of the U.S. negotiating position on SALT, but you were involved in the earlier wiretapping that began in 1969 --

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q Which basically concerned the leak of the so-called Pentagon papers?

DR. KISSINGER: What?

Q Well, the Cambodian bombing. My question to you on that is this: Since there were internal security measures taken with respect to the leak of the Pentagon papers according to the President, do you lump the Pentagon papers in with the later SALT leak or the Cambodian leak as a threat to the confidentiality or a threat to national security?

DR. KISSINGER: I want to separate my view about the leakage of the papers from the specific measures taken to prevent such a leak. I consider the Pentagon papers leak dangerous to the confidentiality of government and also dangerous to the conduct of government in the sense that if every official has to consider how papers taken out of bureaucratic context will appear five years later, that this will have a serious effect on foreign governments. This cannot be judged simply on the basis of whether an individual paper does damage or not.

The specific measures taken to prevent this leakage were outside the jurisdiction of my office and my office did not happen to participate in them. I make this distinction between the fact there was a serious leak and the specific measures that were taken.

Q Do you disapprove of the measures that were taken?

DR. KISSINGER: I certainly disapprove of burglaries in offices, yes.

Q Do you believe your credibility has been tainted by this, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not the best judge of my own credibility. It was a painful matter, and I have said that I don't find wiretapping a particularly attractive procedure. I similarly don't find the leakage of documents a particularly attractive procedure. I don't know whether it has affected my credibility. To what extent it affects my position is for others to judge, not for me.

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Q Did the Cambodian bombing disclosure do actual damage to national security in retrospect?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, the Cambodian bombing disclosure was not an isolated event. It capped a whole series of leaks, including the leaks of detailed discussions of NSC meetings on the Middle East and of other internal discussions.

Secondly, the concern at the time was that it might force on several of the parties actions that were considered against the national interest.

The decision was made, in the light of the danger as it was then seen, not in the light of the evolution of the entire course of the war.

I think I will have --

Q In other words, it didn't do any damage in retrospect?

DR. KISSINGER: That is very difficult to isolate.

Q The leakers, were they discovered?

DR. KISSINGER: I just don't want to discuss any more details about it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 1:14 P.M. EDT)