Law School of Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

19 September 1969

Dear Henry:

Since our luncheon has been postponed, for reasons I completely understand, this is just to ask two questions about the memorandum growing out of our CFR study group, which I left with you the end of June:

1. As I indicated to you at the time, Ernie May, Graham and I propose to expand it somewhat into an article for Foreign Affairs, and the deadline for the winter issue is October 31st; would it be appropriate for us to do this now; and

2. If so, could we now make the memorandum available to the other members of the study group, or should we continue to hold it closely?

I look forward to seeing you on the 29th,

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

World Politics

[LC]

# The Atlantic Alliance: Storm Clouds Ahead

## ADAM YARMOLINSKY

If Europe seems an exasperating partner today to some Americans, the United States must be a rather frightening partner to most Europeans. Each partner must seem to the other to be particularly self-centered and self-absorbed, but European self-centeredness seems to America to make it more timorous, while American self-absorption seems to Europe to make it more irresponsible. Even the Czechoslovak crisis created more dissension than unity within the partnership: the Europeans suspected the Americans of playing great power politics with spheres of influence, and the Americans resumed fussing at the Europeans over NATO troop commitments. The fact is that if either pattern of behavior is pushed to its extreme, the result will be a kind of neo-isolationism in which genuine alliances among equals or near equals cannot survive.

The United States has entered a period of popular resistance, indeed almost revulsion to government, and particularly to central government. The candidacy of George Wallace was only an extreme form of a more general phenomenon. The continuing political success of men like Ronald Reagan and Lester Maddox is based on a deliberate separation of the person of the elected leader from the machinery of government. Governor Maddox can and does capitalize on the indignation of the voter over the misdeeds of the government of Georgia by joining in that indignation, in a way that leaders of European governments may envy. And in New York City, a once enormously popular mayor is attacked simultaneously by those citizens who support an illegal teachers' strike and those who support illegal activity by a community school board.

Similarly, national government is suspected of usurping the rightful powers of state government. A number of proposals advanced to transfer federal tax funds to state governments, with no strings attached, were supported, at least in general terms, by both major Presidential candidates. The Supreme Court and the President were both so vulnerable that a minority of the Senate could prevent consideration of the President's first choice for Chief Justice, and discourage him from even offering a second choice. Nor is the Congress itself immune from popular discontent, as the popularity of the slogan "time for a change" among congressional candidates showed.

It is difficult to estimate how much of this alienation from domestic government represents a reaction to the twin unsolved problems of race and poverty, as they have flared up in mass violence. But clearly the mood of the country is more attuned to deploring problems than to searching for solutions.

As seen from the other side of the Atlantic, the United States must present a striking illustration of the Yeats prophecy:

> Adam Yarmolinsky is a professor at the Harvard University Law School.

> Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
> Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
> The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
> The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.

The prospects for continuing widespread and serious violence in the cities (twice as many incidents in the first eight months of 1968 as in the corresponding period in 1967), the unhealed wounds of the Presidential campaign, and the narrowly averted possibility that for the first time in more than a century the election might have been thrown into the House of Representatives because no one candidate was able to obtain a simple majority—all these circumstances suggest an Alliance partner so troubled by internal difficulties and divisions that her outward behavior must be regarded with some suspicion.

Europeans must be particularly puzzled about internal American dilemmas because these dilemmas lack substantial European counterparts. There is no problem of poverty in Europe in the sense that the problem exists in the United States. That this is so because Americans have been occupied in raising the ceiling on earnings of the average workingman while Europeans have been occupied more in raising the floor under earnings, does not make the poverty problem any less alien in European eyes. Similarly, Europeans have no experience of a race problem anything like what exists in the United States. The difficulties between white Britishers and colored Commonwealth immigrants, or between Frenchmen of the Metropole and Algerians, are simply not comparable to the American problem in magnitude or intensity. Only in student disorders does Europe rival the United States.

Lastly, American estrangement from the process of government, and particularly of national government, whether expressed in a desire for decentralization or in complaints about the credibility gap, sound more alarming in Europe, perhaps because Europeans by and large seem to expect less of their governments in the way of moral perfection—although they may expect more in the way of services. The US is, after all, the only Western country whose government is not founded on de facto power modified by concessions to popular demand, but sprang full-blown from an ideological declaration.

Europeans are probably not familiar with the American children's story of Chicken Little, who was struck by a falling acorn and ended up leading a parade of animals to the King, all shouting, "The sky is falling, the sky is falling!" But many Europeans would be inclined to agree with the slogan on the buttons worn by American teenagers reading, "Chicken Little was right." Some would regard American society as an enormously powerful engine now running out of control. Others at a minimum would feel that a dangerous proportion of Americans are either

INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

19

in a state of apathy or of outright revolt against civil authority.

If Americans are negative about domestic problems, the complex of attitudes about international problems can only be described as schizophrenic. Foreign aid appropriations are at the lowest level since the beginning of the Marshall Plan. But, despite a quite severe balance-of-payments problem, US troop deployments abroad are not in serious jeopardy. Everything focuses on Vietnam; but at the same time Vietnam is seen as a small and distant country. Instead of seeing the crucial issue there, as it is officially described, as a test of staying power, Americans still expect to wake up some morning and find that it's all been a bad dream—and yet US military strategy seems not entirely consistent with an effort designed for the long pull. Stereotypes about the Cold War still persist very widely; but there is a good deal of popular support for East-West bridge-building initiatives, even in the face of hardening Soviet attitudes.

## Domestic Concerns Outweigh Foreign Oner

Despite the very strong feelings of a minority of Americans, there is probably more popular discontent over the handling of domestic problems than there is over the handling of the war in Vietnam—even with half a million Americans embroiled there. The primacy of domestic politics is absolute. This primacy is in no sense a peculiarly American phenomenon. But its effect in the United States is paradoxically almost the opposite of its effect in Europe. Governments in Europe have relatively little room for maneuver in the world scene, because they cannot mobilize the national concern, and therefore the national resources, to play a positive role in world affairs. The United States, on the other hand, is rich enough and strong enough so that the US government can find the resources to back up its policy choices without being subjected to intensive popular scrutiny. The US military establishment, for example, is a much more readily usable instrument of foreign policy than it has ever been before, and certainly more readily usable than European establishments. Except in the area of foreign aid, the US government has enough weight to use the comparative freedom it enjoys, while European governments do not.

The result is that the United States is seen by Europe to be more adventurous in foreign policy, and Europe is seen by the United States to be less responsive in pursuing common interests. The difference is clear whether one compares the US role in Korea with the British role in Aden, or US and European attitudes toward the ACE Mobile Force. The fact that these differences are more of a function of capabilities than of intentions, and in neither case represent a strong expression of popular will, does not prevent them from becoming sources of irritation on both sides.

The sources of irritation between Europe and the United States are by no means limited, however, to the governmental sphere. As American business expands into European markets, through all the devices of direct sales, subsidiaries, licensing, etc., it creates inevitable resentments, which are only exacerbated by the knowledge that what are critical markets for Europeans are only marginal for Americans. Remarks like General de Gaulle's about American business getting a "free ride" on international credit are only symptomatic of a more general attitude. What

European businessmen see as an unfair advantage taken with the technological by-products of American economics of sale, Americans see as the proper reward for building a broader (and more democratic?) educational base from which to draw a managerial class. But broadening the educational base in Europe will take at least another generation—and meanwhile resentments proliferate.

## Discontent over Military Arrangements

Within the NATO alliance itself, the military arrangements are themselves potential sources of discord. To begin with, there is the disturbing fact for Europeans that the military instrumentality on which the alliance ultimately relies, the US Strategic Air Command, is not itself under alliance control. Then there is the fact that alliance military doctrine has changed radically, from massive retaliation to flexible response, and in each instance the doctrine originated with and was preached, with gospel vigor, by Americans. Now the Europeans have to reconcile themselves further to the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile system—a system that will only be effective against a limited Chinese threat, but that must still make the Europeans worry, despite all assurances, that the United States is changing its doctrine again. Equally troublesome is that fact that the senior military officer in NATO is at the same time an American officer and an international military servant who reports to a committee, while the United States is officially represented in the North Atlantic Council by a civilian Permanent Representative, so that Europeans cannot avoid the impression from time to time that they are hearing inconsistent statements on alliance strategy from official Americans.

There has been building within the alliance over the last two or three years a basis for common understanding of the problems of NATO strategy, particularly through the Nuclear Planning Group—the so-called McNamara Committee. But the process of arriving at agreement on first principles is a painfully slow one, and requires a high degree of stability within the alliance in order to proceed.

That process has undoubtedly been complicated by the debate on the feasibility and the desirability of deploying an anti-ballistic missile system. The American decision to deploy a light anti-Chinese system, while based on a rationale that has no application to the military posture of the alliance, cannot help raising questions about that military posture, and even about the relative effectiveness of deterrence as against defense. The fact is that the anti-Chinese system would only be effective against a very limited Chinese offensive capability, and was designed, originally at least, to supplement deterrence with temporary defense in the period between the time China acquires an intercontinental nuclear delivery force and the time it acquires a secure second-strike capability, so that it will not have to strike first if it is to strike at all.

Because both the United States and the Soviet Union have such a secure second-strike capability, the security of both, and the security of Europe as well, is considerably enhanced. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could afford to permit the other side to develop an ABM system which could not be penetrated, and either side could maintain its assured penetration simply by increasing its offensive force enough to saturate the defensive system. Therefore neither side would stand to gain by

20

INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

deploying such a system, and the only results of deployment would be acceleration of the arms race. It is important to distinguish here between a limited ABM deployment around offensive missile sites, in lieu of an increase in the number of offensive missiles, and the deployment of an ABM system intended to protect population. The former deployment does not affect mutual deterrence, since neither side can strike without receiving a mortal blow in return; the latter deployment would be a futile attempt to upset the strategic balance, a major setback for the political forces opposed to further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and an enormous waste of resources in both countries.

In sum, the projected US deployment of the anti-Chinese system affects neither the US commitment to the defense of Europe nor the strategy of the alliance. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject of ABMs has been raised creates a new, unfamiliar, and therefore disturbing, prospect for Europeans to contemplate. Even if the United States were to begin building a "thick" ABM system, its vital interest in the territorial integrity of Western Europe would remain absolute. But European worries would be considerably exacerbated.

## Different Approaches, Different Outcomes

There are good reasons, then—political, economic and military—for Europeans to be concerned about their American partner's behavior. By the same token, the United States can justifiably express concern on its side. The United States has always seen the alliance as a partnership, while the Europeans have tended to see it as a means to engage US nuclear force—in their view the only really relevant force in the defense of Europe. They are currently cutting back on their military contributions to the alliance. They have already almost completely opted out of commitments in the Third World. The making of Europe has been indefinitely delayed, and the idea itself seems to have lost some of its excitement. The Europeans create unpleasant problems about sharing the international monetary burdens of the common defense, and take unreasonable stands on principle about the disposition of

forces on their territory. Individual states even appear to be dallying, from time to time, with representatives of the power against which the United States is pledged to help defend the alliance, if need be.

None of these frictions, on either side, are relevant to the core of the alliance itself. Without the American nuclear deterrent, Europe would not be defensible. An effective European deterrent could not be created without a unity of effort that presupposes the creation of the equivalent of a new nation-state. On the other hand, the United States could only survive, if at all, alongside a Soviet-dominated Europe, by itself becoming a garrison state. The essential strength of the alliance is that both sides need each other, and will presumably continue to need each other for the foreseeable future.

The great danger is that one side will press the other to assume burdens the other side is unwilling to accept, and in the process essential commitments will be threatened if not destroyed. The danger is not that refusal to assume new commitments (or what appears to one side to be new commitments) will result directly in the abrogation of existing commitments. It is rather that any alliance depends on a degree of mutual trust. And if one party to an alliance reneges on what the other party (or parties) regard as its proper obligations, the atmosphere of mutual trust may be dissipated—or at least somewhat attenuated. It is unreasonable to assume that serious resentments cannot develop, even among members of the Atlantic community—and these resentments can even prevent them from pursuing their common interests.

There are two directions that United States pressure on its European allies is likely to take. The first is toward involvement of the NATO alliance in problems of international security outside the present geographical area of the alliance's concern. The second is away from involvements with the Soviets or the Soviet bloc, which might seem to the United States to compromise the integrity of the alliance. Both of these kinds of pressures are likely to be both ineffective and abrasive.

NATO involvement in Southeast Asia seems almost as clearly out of the question to Americans as it does to Europeans. The European reaction to the Vietnam war can

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INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

21

be contrasted to the European reaction to the Korean
war: then the reaction was, "Thank God, it's happening
over there." Now the reaction is, "My God, if it goes on
much longer it may affect the situation over here." But
it is at least conceivable that if the war in Vietnam drags
on long enough, or spreads far enough to other parts of
Southeast Asia, American policy makers may decide to
try to persuade themselves that alliance interests are di-
rectly involved and alliance resources should be also. The
predictable result would be enormous strains within the
alliance, and no alliance resources for Southeast Asia. But
the attempt may still be made.

Other Possible Pressure Points

If not in Southeast Asia, then perhaps the pressure
point may develop in the Near East, in Africa, or even
conceivably in Latin America. The American motivation
may be primarily actual burden-sharing, or it may be pri-
marily image-building, but in either event the European
response is likely to be the same. Indeed, some of the
same considerations that may lead the United States to
stay away from other potential conflict situations in the
Third World should weigh even more heavily with Euro-
peans as they observe what has happened in Vietnam.

Even if the United States succeeds in controlling its
impulses to attempt to expand the geographic scope of the
alliance, it will take additional self-control to resist criti-
cizing the actions of European allies that seem inconsist-
ent with alliance policy. But some of these actions are
bound to occur, and US criticisms will by and large only
make the situation worse. Just as the United States de-
cided, after the first shock reaction to General de Gaulle's
decision taking NATO out of France, that to fight the de-
cision would not change it, but might multiply its conse-
quences, so the natural US impulse to fight other analo-
gous European decisions ought in general to be resisted.

The thesis has been advanced by some commentators
that although the overt military phase of the Cold War
may be ended—or interrupted—we can anticipate a con-
tinuing effort by the Soviet Union to disrupt the alliance
by political means—and this effort needs to be resisted, if
necessary, by American pressure on its European allies.
It may well develop that the Soviets, having consolidated
their position in Eastern Europe, will pursue splitting
tactics in the West—by offering diplomatic concessions
individually and differentially to European states. But
that the US policy should be one of political intervention
rather than one of political abstention seems extremely
doubtful.

France is not alone among the nations of Europe in a
desire to assert national independence, and at the same
time to make the United States the scapegoat for many
of the things that seem to be going wrong in the world.
Germany in particular has apparently given up on Euro-
pean unification as a solution to its divided state. For a
time she looked to the East with as much hope as she
once had looked to her Western neighbors, and as the
shock of the Czechoslovak affair wears off, she may be
looking in that direction again. To Germans, as to other
Europeans, there is nothing inconsistent in their negotia-
tions with the East and their role in a defensive alliance.
Both are in pursuit of domestic self-interest, and besides,
Europeans are inclined to be somewhat less ideological on
these issues than Americans. They can manage at the same

time to be indignant about US-Soviet arms control nego-
tiations while they are conducting conversations on their
own about closer trade relations.

The United States might be able to compel European
states to choose between US military support and closer
relations with the East. But if the possibility of such re-
lations were abandoned under pressure, the consequences
for the alliance would on balance be negative.

There is still a third direction that Atlanticists on both
sides of the Atlantic might take in pressing for changes
in alliance relationships. That would be to try to trans-
form NATO into an instrument for achieving positive po-
litical goals, both by way of improving East-West rela-
tions, and strengthening ties within the West. The goal is
appealing, but the means may not be appropriate. NATO
is a limited, defensive military alliance. As such it per-
forms a definable and essential function. Whether its
members would embrace additional goals for it today is
at least questionable, and it is scarcely questionable that
the argument over additional goals would strain existing
relationships. It might be the better part of wisdom for
the Europeans to pursue these goals in other forms, with
or without Americans.

American Impatience, European Restraint

If the United States will find it difficult to avoid putting
additional pressures on Europeans, Europe may find it
somewhat less difficult to avoid putting additional pres-
sures on the United States. On the subject of Vietnam,
for example, Europeans have shown admirable self-re-
straint. They seem to react irrationally only when the sug-
gestion is advanced that new developments in military
technology make it possible to modify the disposition of
American forces in Europe. Leaving aside certain tempo-
rary aberrations, it is primarily in the insistence on literal
compliance with military commitments that European
pressures strain the alliance. Here again the process of
mutual education has been proceeding within NATO, de-
spite the debris from the MLF interlude, with generally
useful results. And the very fact of greater interconti-
nental mobility, of the disappearing military need for
bases, makes it clear that the durability of the alliance is
not a function of military technology.

If the United States should be so ill-advised as to under-
take the deployment of a "thick" anti-ballistic missile sys-
tem, designed to try to counter more than an interim Chi-
nese threat (plus some protection for Minuteman silos),
then it would undoubtedly be faced with European pres-
sure for a similar deployment on the continent of Europe.
But this would be only one of many unfortunate conse-
quences of such a decision.

The next few years will be a difficult period for the At-
lantic alliance. The United States is in trouble at home
and abroad, and Europe is marking time, without any
clear sense of the direction in which it should move. It is
a kind of winter of our discontent, on both sides of the
Atlantic. For the time being, therefore, the best course of
action for governments seems to be to respect their part-
ners' freedom of decision, or indecision, and not press for
responses that will be given grudgingly if at all. If the
effect of this course is to treat the alliance as a less com-
prehensive or cohesive structure, the greater flexibility
that it gives to alliance bonds will increase their strength
and durability.

22

INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

RESTRICTED TO GROUP MEMBERS ONLY
NOT TO BE QUOTED OR CITED

**CONFIDENTIAL**
*Not for publication*

DISCUSSION MEETING REPORT

NON-NUCLEAR MILITARY FORCE IN A NUCLEAR AGE

Discussion Leader: David Bronheim
Chairman: Ernest May
Secretary: Graham T. Allison, Jr.
Rapporteur: Sylva Oxenfeldt

Fourth Meeting
January 23, 1969

Digest of Discussion

(This digest has not been edited by the participants.)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

The fourth meeting of the Discussion Group on Non-Nuclear Military Force in a Nuclear Age was held on January 23, 1969, at 5:00 p.m. at the Harold Pratt House. Present were: David Bronheim, Discussion Leader; Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky, Co-Chairmen; Graham T. Allison, Jr., Secretary; Sylva Oxenfeldt, Rapporteur; J. Wayne Fredericks and Abraham F. Lowenthal, Special Guests; Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Robert D. Crassweller, Tom J. Farer, Eugene Fubini, Philip L. Geyelin, Louis Kraar, Franklin A. Lindsay, Gene M. Lyons, Gordon J. F. MacDonald, David W. MacEachron, Rear Admiral Ray Peet, Colonel Sam S. Walker, Captain Robert O. Welander. Mr. May served as Chairman for this session.

The Chairman opened the meeting by remarking that the group had now traveled part way around the globe and that the present session would concentrate on possibilities of intervention in Latin America and Africa. He then introduced the first discussion leader, Mr. David Bronheim, of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

Mr. Bronheim started the discussion by commenting on certain points contained in his paper which had served as background for the meeting.

1. The question of intervention in a particular country with the use of combat forces is oftentimes severely influenced by the amount of military assistance in the form of advisers and hardware that has already been made available to that country. Therefore in order to have a meaningful intervention policy, a careful evaluation of alternative courses of action and their possible consequences should be made prior to the extension of such assistance.

2. It is crucial in the re-examination of foreign policy to bear in mind the close interrelationship between national interest and the domestic process. This has been increasingly evident in the last eighteen months.

**Situations Likely to Raise the Question of Intervention in Latin America**

Situations likely to arise in the future involving the possible use of U.S. combat troops are: a change in the *status quo* in Cuba with heavy military

-2-

aid by the Soviet Union and restiveness on the part of the Cuban element in this
country and/or serious but unsuccessful resistance to Castro within Cuba; a crisis
in Haiti following Duvalier's death or removal and bloodbath following a struggle
for power with possible intervention by Cuba; terrorism or civil war in Panama
with major obstruction in the operations of the Canal; unrest in Guyana caused
by Jagan-led guerrillas or be encouragement by Venezuela; guerrilla activity
in Guatemala involving some threat to the government; two other situations in-
volving only slight possibilities of U.S. intervention could arise in the case
of student dissatisfaction in Mexico reaching the point of urban terrorism and
serious guerrilla activity, and in the case of a sudden reversal in the fortunes
of Castro-supplied guerrillas in oil-rich Venezuela, raising the possibility of
a government takeover; finally, the improbable case but one that would pose a
difficult dilemma for the United States: civil war in Brazil with the outcome
tending to run in the direction of victory for (Cuban or Communist-bloc aided)
insurgents.

A most difficult philosophical question would arise for us if a democrat-
ically-elected leader (President of Venezuela, Colombia or Chile, for example)
made a request for U.S. intervention. Present evidence would strongly sub-
stantiate the contention that the United States would find it hard not to
respond favorably.

In response to a request from the chair for clarification of the point
made on the relationship of military assistance to intervention, the speaker
said that the basic problem was related to the thesis that present U.S. policy
will inevitably involve us with governments in Latin America. The present
policy is to assist every government in the preservation of the existing
system of government and in assuring a predictable form of transfer of power

-3-

by developing military and para-military structures through the provision of military equipment, training, and stationing of military advisers. Having done that, we have often found it easy to take the next step and have provided more advisers and more sophisticated weapons (helicopters and communications equipment) when these structures have not performed adequately. By the time this stage is reached, the investment is too great to risk a loss and it is easy to foresee a situation which could build up great pressure to send military forces in a progressive series of steps starting with the training of local units and ending in the participation of combat troops. The Bolivian case is the most recent one. Before the guerrilla forces were discovered we had a fairly stable system of help. As the existence of these forces was confirmed, we were asked for more and more automatic weapons, helicopters, and other kinds of transport and equipment.

This seems to be the most standard way we have operated in Latin America. The case of the Dominican Republic is a little different. Guatemala is another case where it is not clear what would happen if the rural guerrillas became successful. The chances are the government would ask for transportation equipment, helicopters, radio equipment and then advisers. If success is reached at that point, fine; if not, an appeal will most likely be made to us for increased aid and it will be very hard to refuse. Then the question is reduced to one of deciding whether to follow our action in the Dominican Republic where we flooded the country with troops to put a quick end to the unrest or to adopt another course of action.

The decision has to be made much earlier, and this is where an evaluation of our interest in the evolution of the country should be made. Various contingencies should be considered requiring some form of help and decisions made as to the points at which troops should be dispatched, their numbers increased, or a withdrawal made.

-4-

Mr. Crassweller raised the point that while advance planning was valuable and indeed necessary, it could not always be considered final and certain decisions had to be made at the last moment in the face of changing circumstances. Also it was likely that some countries would receive more careful assessment than others. He also raised the question of logistical considerations which sometimes acted as a constraint on us. The Bolivian terrain would present major problems of a logistical character. Mr. Bronheim agreed that a valid general conclusion on intervention was not likely to be realistic but that an advance determination could, however, be made of the point at which assistance should be given or withheld.

Mr. Farer remarked that we were presently embarked on a disastrous course by permitting the forces of inertia to dominate and allowing the general policy of intervention, as described, to stand. If there are no thresholds how does one prevent the momentum of the situation from determining the course of events to follow? Why not have a policy that one does not intervene in certain areas because they do not count?

Mr. Bronheim replied that that policy would be very difficult to arrive at if intervention were defined in terms of the use of combat forces. He went on to say that the United States viewed Latin America as a unit and our attitudes toward individual countries did not differ. But it was possible that with advances in the transportation and communications fields, our attitudes could be more diversified.

Mr. Lyons wondered what the consequences were likely to be in case we cut off all military assistance to all Latin American countries but retained the obligation to intervene preferably through regional organizations. Mr. Bronheim replied that such a policy would not necessarily affect military

forces in Latin America but would require them to make domestic decisions as to what part of their budget to allot for military forces. Then comes the question where do they procure the foreign exchange to pay for their military expenses?

What we should focus our attention on is our purpose in the area. Our policy over the last seven years has been to force the Latin Americans to develop their internal capability, both military and police. We have also been influential in persuading them to orient their programs in their war colleges toward a situation of national security and tranquillity. But the real question is whether we are interested in the existence of a local government and want the transfer of power to be made in a predictable way.

Mr. Crassweller drew attention to a political aspect: should we decide that we want to support some particular element in a society? This is significant because there has been in the United States among many centers of opinion a belief that the military in Latin America are divorced from the society and are an antisocial element, unpopular with the majority of the people. This may not be true for all countries. In Salvador, for instance, the present regime is composed of men in grey flannel suits and there is no general resentment against them. If intervention against the military is made a blanket policy, in a uniform stance, then unnecessary political animosities are aroused. Also, the power of nationalism in many countries is sufficient to overcome any sense of dislike of the military that may linger. This is something to consider on the political level.

Mr. Kraar queried to what extent our perception of the threat of military upheaval -- a popular notion -- has governed our thinking and actions, and how great that threat is in reality.

-6-

[10]

Mr. Bronheim replied that the Castro phenomenon has conditioned us in our thinking about Latin America. The probability of urban terrorism or rural guerrilla activity is very high today but the possibility of success in their own terms is unpredictable and would vary very substantially from country to country. In Bolivia, if the miners rose in revolt and the peasants did not interfere, the probability of success would be high. But again the question should be: what is the threat to the United States? The United States made the decision several years ago that such an outcome would present a threat to the security of this country requiring some expenditure of funds to prevent that from coming about. This is changing and we are beginning to evaluate countries individually. Brazil, for instance, is more important than Paraguay or Uruguay.

Mr. Kraar, referring to the statement that the chance of terrorism was great, queried as to how strong the elements were to make a real movement that would attract a wide following. He pointed to the difference between armed bandits and large insurgent groups and said that in Latin America real movements are not needed to overthrow governments and it is a mistake to think of success as being dependent only on real movements. Urban terrorism will be conducted by students and a student-related elite in the upper middle class and the extent to which they will be joined by worker groups is very unpredictable and will vary from country to country.

Mr. Crassweller remarked then that the basic unity of the military seemed to be crucial as the only element possessing some degree of cohesion. He added that in the Caribbean, at least, no change is realistic without a split in the up military and brought the examples of Guatemala in 1964 and the Dominican Republic in 1965.

-7-

U.S. Interest in Latin America

Mr. Farer presented a list of the kinds of interests we might have in Latin America and requested comment from the speaker on them.

1. Accelerated development in the area. What is our interest in and long-range concern with development? Does development always come with orderly processes and does stability facilitate development? To what degree do these considerations participate in decisions?

2. Effect on U.S. society of revolutionary changes elsewhere.

3. Bases.

4. Investments. Reasons for this continuing interest despite the fact that in Europe, Canada and elsewhere the returns are significantly higher.

5. Intangible point: general access to the society in part perhaps for the prophylactic control over them.

Mr. Bronheim responded to the first four points as follows:

1. It is hard to find anyone in the government who can discuss the premises behind our policy in Latin America. We are a people who have either in our stomachs or in the back of our minds some notions about the desirability of development but this has not been clearly articulated. Most people seem to link development with democracy in an unspecified way. Greece has been held out as an example of successful economic development but in other areas the connection is not clear. In Latin America we have had an unclear notion that affluence will bring stability. Most of our economic inputs are not clearly thought through but instead seem to be a reaction to the tremendous amount of discussion and research on political development.

2. The effect of change in Latin America, revolutionary or otherwise, on the society of this country is in general very slight. Periodically certain

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kinds of guerrilla or revolutionary movements will catch the eye of the people
but the attraction is temporary and there seems to be no deep-seated effect.
The opposite is truer: any change of some consequence in this country is of
vital interest to the Latin Americans.

3. The importance of bases extends beyond military considerations; in fact, their political significance is far more relevant. Bases also differ among themselves in their importance: we are not likely to give up Guantanamo or our base in Panama, others are of less importance strategically or politically and we may at some point find it in our interest to negotiate a withdrawal. Once again, we must clarify in our minds what our interests are in preserving these bases. The answer to the question whether we need bases is that intellectually we do not need them but economically and for reasons of convenience they are useful: bases are used for training (Panama), as a staging area in case of war in an adjacent territory, for storage of supplies and as tracking stations. It would be costly to duplicate these facilities elsewhere.

Asked (by Mr. Farer) whether the probabilities of the establishment of Russian bases in Latin America were high, Mr. Bronheim replied that the marginal uses that the Russians were likely to get out of them would militate against a decision to incur the heavy costs involved.

Admiral Peet remarked that bases did increase our options in any given situation and Mr. Bronheim replied that those options were likely to decrease with changes in technology. For instance, with the acquisition of sufficient numbers of fighters able to take off from 10,000-foot strips, one use would be eliminated.

4. Our interest in investment is varied. As far as extractive industries are concerned, we are given the erroneous impression that if we lose our investments

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we cannot buy the product. Also, ownership of extractive industries is be-
coming increasingly unpopular. Beyond the extractive industries, investments
vary and are not in products or services important to our economy. Finally,
new investments are not popular, contrary to accepted notions.

A more important but seldom considered point that the United States
could focus upon is the maintenance of a trading and monetary bloc. If all
the Latin American countries were to withdraw from our trading and monetary
bloc serious consequences might follow for our economic and political position
in the world.

In terms of an economic relationship, it should be remembered that we
are more important to them than they are to us: we can buy their products
elsewhere whereas they can only sell it to us. Therefore the loss of invest-
ments would have a net detrimental effect on them and not on us.

Soviet Interest in Latin America

Mr. Bronheim was convinced that the Soviet Union's interest in having
more Cubans in Latin America is not large and its policy seems to be to make
an effort to create maximum embarrassment for the United States at minimum
cost to itself, always avoiding any possibility of confrontation with us.
If these assumptions are correct, it would follow that Soviet interests in
establishing bases in Latin America are slight, that they are more likely
to engage in training local forces than in providing the hardware and that
their efforts lie more in the direction of increasing trade with the area
and of enlarging their missions there.

On the other hand, the realities of the Latin American political system
militate against their establishing a very close relationship with the Russians.
The Latin Americans are closer to us and are not anxious to buy themselves

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connections with the Russians. We tend to be overly anxious about the possi-
bility of Russian arms reaching Latin America in quantity and we need not be
because it would not be hard for us to stop the inflow of arms should it take
place and also because the aggregate of political forces in most countries of
Latin America would not permit it.

Mr. May raised the question whether the Nasser example could look at-
tractive to them. Mr. Bronheim replied that although it might for economic
development, the political implications were not likely to permit such a re-
lationship.

## Situations That Might Invite U.S. Intervention

Mr. Lowenthal remarked that most of the discussion had centered on
Bolivia and Brazil but that in terms of basic purposes it was preferable to
focus on the most likely candidates for U.S. intervention: history has shown
these to be the Caribbean countries, that area to be defined not only in strictly
geographical terms but in theoretical terms as that set of weak, dependent,
semi-sovereign nations in early stages of political development and in an area
where the costs of intervention are low.

Mr. Bronheim, agreeing that the most acute situations were likely to
occur in the Caribbean, started with the most clearly hostile country -- Cuba.
Here the likelihood of U.S. intervention is very low but that is subject to
change in case of overt and observable guerrilla activity. He stressed the
point that our intervention in Cuba would play into Russian hands and that
therefore we would be well advised to stay out. The Panama situation was
unique. The United States was most likely to use military force, if necessary,
to defend the Canal and the base and to prevent interference with the operations
of the Canal.

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Mr. Crassweller remarked that our concept of our national interest both in the classical sense and in terms of what our development effort has been at least unclear and the evidence is that very little thought has been given to it. There is agreement on what we should do but almost total lack of any underlying philosophical notion to support it. When we perceive the need for action, the Protestant ethic impels us to "do something." On balance, it is clear that the over-all psychological interest in the hemisphere dominates all others. Our ability to function in the hemisphere relates to our total world effort. Our symbolism toward this area is larger than that toward any other area. Referring to the statement in Mr. Bronheim's background paper that "a change in the political or military situation in a group of countries in Latin America might have a more than arithmetical effort on the U.S. national interest," Mr. Crassweller went on to say that if anything went wrong in one country we would tend to see an aggregate effect on the hemisphere and therefore on our stance in the world.

Mr. Bronheim disagreed with the latter point, citing the Cuban example as one that had not substantially weakened our position in the world. But he agreed that the strength of the psychological element was overwhelming.

Mr. Farer, calling attention to the fact that the group's main concern was policy formation, said it was misleading to talk in terms of hypothetical notions and situations and on a high level of abstraction. He tried to bring the discussion back to where Mr. Lowenthal had left off and believed the United States ought to make a statement of principle to the effect that we will not intervene in Cuba, Guyana and Guatemala; in the Canal Zone we will have to intervene, especially given the continuation of the war in Viet Nam (60 per cent of our cargo goes through there); we will also intervene in case of substantial Russian involvement.

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No consensus was reached on this point and the session went into the second part.

## Situations in Africa Holding Possibilities for U.S. Intervention

Mr. Wayne Fredericks opened the second part of the session with a statement on the possibilities of U.S. intervention in Africa.

He outlined three situations which stood in the immediate foreground in terms of possible U.S. intervention.

1. Nigeria. Enormous pressures are mounting in the United States and Europe on humanitarian grounds and these cannot be separated from political questions. A group of U.S. senators has urged that increased aid be given to Biafra and if this is done a step toward escalation might have been taken.

2. Zambia. A crisis situation is unavoidable in Zambia given continued crisis in Rhodesia.

3. Racial situation on our domestic scene. There has been a deepening interest on the part of the black community in developments in Africa. CORE, for example, is trying to recruit black people to serve in Mozambique. On the other hand, white regimes in Africa appear to us to be anti-Communist, technologically-oriented, bringing important military considerations with them such as the NATO relationship. Basically the point is that depending on the circumstances in which some kind of genuine race war breaks out in Africa, what effect does this have on our own society and on our difficult racial problems? It is in our best interest to avoid a black-white confrontation in Africa and should one arise our best policy would be not to intervene. But there will be tremendous political pressures which cannot now be foreseen.

## The Situation Inside Africa

African dynamics are such that conflicts are not likely to stop at any frontier. The Anglo-Zambia frontier is presently the most critical in terms

of guerrilla activity. Portuguese forces are firing inside Zambia. Ndola is mostly populated by white South Africans whose sympathies lie with White Rhodesia; this means that Kaunda as President of Zambia may well try to maintain a nonracial policy, but every racial incident inside Zambia poses an internal political threat to him and encourages those elements that want to radicalize the government. It might also be added that no black serves in the governments of Angola and Mozambique.

Guerrilla movements are concentrated mainly in southwestern Angola where Portugal and South Africa cooperate in controlling them; this is due to their common interest in South West Africa. The Rhodesian terrain does not lend itself to guerrilla activity. Nigeria is the most critical country. Russian interest lies in perpetuating the conflict there as part of its Middle Eastern strategy. They are one of the strongest suppliers of arms to the federal government. Once we recognize Biafra, the federal government's dependence on Russia is likely to increase and the latter's position enhanced. U.S. interest lies in bringing pressure to bear on both sides to come to the negotiating table. The black attitude in this country toward Biafra is not clear, and interest at the present time seems to be among the whites only, with extreme right and left positions. Therefore at least with Biafra we do not have a conflict with our domestic situation, and can afford to keep out.

Mr. Yarmolinsky agreed that there was a complex interplay of contingencies and asked what could be concluded about justifications for U.S. intervention. Mr. Fredericks responded that where there was Soviet influence, the possibilities of U.S. intervention increased. The Russians seem to show every intention of trying to implant themselves in Nigeria. Africa seems important

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to them quite apart from reasons of proximity to the Middle East although
Nigeria is only a couple of hours' flight from southern Algeria. The Chinese
are also present in Africa: 600 Chinese engineers are working on the con-
struction of a railroad in Tanzania and this could stretch them out from
Dar Es Salaam to Zambia. They are also infiltrating the Mozambique struggle.
However, they are likely to train local troops and not to participate them-
selves in the fighting. All arms used in Mozambique are from Communist
countries -- China, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

* * * * *

The two speakers then made some concluding remarks.

Mr. Bronheim urged that the United States think ahead, especially given
the cry of "6 or 7 Viet Nams in Latin America." The United States should also
be able to distinguish between various kinds of terrorism and uprisings and
assess their importance to our vital or not so vital national interest. It
should see the cry of "6 or 7 Viet Nams" merely as an attempt to influence
the course of U.S. policy and not as a genuine threat, and rather than react
to these perceived threats, get a better understanding of what various forces
at work in the region are trying to get the United States to do.

Mr. Fredericks said the same remarks also applied to Africa. The kinds
of problems that are likely to arise in Africa involving blacks against whites
are along the lines of what the Biafrans are undergoing. Our system is partic-
ularly vulnerable to this problem and powerful lobbies on the black and white
sides can easily pull us in a direction we may not want to follow.

Mr. Yarmolinsky announced that the next session would consider a European
scenario and the subsequent session the operational constraints emerging from the
kinds of scenarios discussed in all previous meetings, attempting to form some
generalizations about the size and shape of U.S. non-nuclear capability.

Sylva Oxenfeldt
Rapporteur