Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
5/25/71 11:08 a.m.

By: KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

R: I have just talked to Ambassador Bruce -- he wants to be out by July 1. He has serious health problems. The President should see him.

K: Oh yes, he should see the President. I talked to the President about it. He would like him to make the resignation effective August 1. He could take leave in July. It's just a question that he doesn't want to have a whole debate now about where we are going in the negotiations.

R: He really does have a serious health problem, and will put it on health grounds. Has the President got a successor in mind?

K: No.

R: Then let's talk about that tomorrow too.

K: Okay. Secondly, the more I think about the 7th the more I think it is not the right time. Letter ______ among other activities. I don't think the combat announcement is worth it.

R: I don't either. We can support what we said. XX The combat responsibility has been largely transferred anyway.

K: I am going to raise it and schedule a meeting tomorrow for us all.

R: Good.

TELECON
Henry Brandon

5/25/71 11:28 a.m.

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

K: You got away before I could see you yesterday.

B: I am sorry; I asked David Halperin whether you wanted me to come back and he thought not.

K: He thought wrong. It doesn't make any difference. In the meantime I have read your article. Where did you get the impression that this was worked out by Smith on the boat?

B: I thought that was part of it.

K: Whoever your source was he should never be believed again.

B: That is good to know. I am sorry.

K: Doesn't make any difference. As far as public record is concerned I don't mind that appearing. But I wouldn't write it in my book because you wouldn't want it part of x the permanent record when it is so totally wrong.

B: It had a certain color to it. What do you think of the rest of it?

K: I thought it was good, and this is so unimportant it doesn't make any difference Who xxx or where it was worked out.

B: I tried to play it down . . .

K: I read it more with amusement. When Haig and I read it we said 'they'd ______ anything.' But really it is unimportant and affects your story not at all. If I go to England on that little exercise I would appreciate your suggestions on how to use my time. Seeing bureaucrats is part of my trip, but I'd like to see people one doesn't usually see outside of it.

B: Any fix idea when you are going?

K: Probably the 17th or 18th, not certain.

B: Let me think about it. You interested in having Thompson have a lunch for you?

K: Yes, but only London Sunday Times people? It might be fun to have some of the other better journalists there. I have just got to get that egregious ambassador off my back. I would like to see some of the more interesting people. Actresses I take care of myself.

TELECON
Henry Brandon

5/25/71 11:28 a.m.

p. 2

By KNV NARA, Dato 5/12/04

B: Can you look at your calendar whether you have another evening?

K: Not this week.

B: How about next?

K: The evening may be tough, but let's aim for lunch or Saturday morning the fifth.

B: Okay, lunch on the fifth?

K: Yes.

B: Here at the house?

K: That depends on what you are going to serve.

B: Anything you like.

K: That's what you say now. . . . some of the provincial studies we've done. Part of the background judgment; not part of our policy . . .

B: Could I see the St. Pierre paper before I see you again?

K: Yes.

B: So I can be more intelligent. Have you seen Anderson's piece yet?

K: Yes. It's disgusting. It looks like my summary of a military commander's report sent in here. It doesn't look like my own views. It's certainly not a memorandum by me because I wouldn't claim to be in control of that area. It is conceivable that it is a summary I made of someone else's memo.

KXX

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Senator Brooke

5/25/71 12:02 p.m.

B: I'm returning your call.

K: I called you last week on the day of the SALT announcement just to tell you what you then later said publicly that we feel the close contact we have had gave us the moral support to go in that direction. I hope to stay in close touch with you.

B: That's good news to me; I would like to talk to you from time to time.

K: You can be sure of that.

B: And I applaud what you have done and I'll be in touch with you.

K: Let's stay in touch. We appreciate everything you have been doing.

Mr. Kissinger/U.A. Johns

May 25, 1971 12:45 p. m.

jlj

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Alex, on that airlift. If we do it on the basis you indicated yesterday. That is one exploratory plane -

J: One exploratory mission -

K: Make the initial offer for 2 weeks and then extend it but make it clear it will be for no more than a month.

J: I agree with that. I will have it rewritten over here in that vein and send it out.

K: Alex, on that other matter. I am having the memcons put together which give more detail than that which you looked at yesterday.

J: Good. Some questions came to mind and -

K: I am having it put together now and it will give you a clearer picture.

J: We have a DPRC meeting today and perhaps after -

K: I will have it tomorrow.

J: Tomorrow would be better for you?

K: Yes. Let's do it after the 40 committee meeting.

J: Let's see we have a WSAG on Pakistan also and then the 40 committee.

K: We won't get through the 40 committee in 45 minutes. Well, let's do it either before or after the 40 committee.

J: OK, Henry. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CNARA Date 05/25/87

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 p.m., May 25, 1971

K: Anatoliy, how are you?

D: You are too late at your desk.

k: What do you mean?

D: I called and your secretary said, "He is not here."

K: I thought you had closed-circuit television into my office and knew where I was.

D: I'm working on it, but not yet.

K: You remember, you brought me a present once. Our people examined it first to see if it had a microphone.

D: I am sure about it. I received a letter signed by Chairman Kosygin. Anytime you wish, I could come today or tomorrow.

K: Not today; the President is not here.

D: You give me a call tomorrow.

K: Let's do it tomorrow.

D: No problem. Just call me. I would like if possible that our letters be dated the 20th.

K: We will date ours the same date.

D: That's the day of the announcement -- for history.

K: We will date it the 20th.

D: It's the only thing I would really like/to take care of. You will give me a call.

K: Okay. Good.

lds

By KH V NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

12:50 p.m., May 25, 1971

K: Anatoliy, how are you?

k: What do you mean?

K: Let's do it tomorrow.

K: We will date it the 20th.

D: It's the only thing I would really like to take care of.
You will give me a call.

K: Okay. Good.

lde

Mr. Kissinger/Gov. Rocke

May 25, 1971 2:40 p.m.

jlj

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

K: Hello Nelson.

R: Henry, how are you?

K: Fine. Nelson, you remember you talked to me regarding the Gleason trucks case. I just wanted you to know we are going to approve it.

R: Ahhh---

K: The Gleason Gear Company I believe.

R: My memory fails me at the moment. Isn't that terrible?

K: Located in Rochester.

R: Yes, Yes, now I remember. I talked to you some time ago about it.

K: Yes. I thought you might want to call them and take the credit for it.

R: Aren't you nice.

K: Could you wait until tomorrow morning. I have told no one here yet. We will tell them this afternoon. I thought maybe you want to call and say because of your intervention this was approved or whatever you want to say.

R: You are great. My friend Henry did it again. We had a meeting on revenue sharing up here last night. That bright boy Don ---

K: Rumsfeld.

R: He is bright. Tough but bright.

K: I would not like to have to repent when time is against him.

R: I called him Ricklehouse for awhile and he didn't like it. We had Seller and Carey and William Buckley and both minority and majority leaders. Trying to get some money for the City. Ricklehouse is smart (laughter) or whatever his name is. Very smart and ruthless.

K: Ruthless and very much out for himself.

R: He said that he was thinking about going back to Illinois. I presume the President knows that.

K: He is in the best tradition of Illinois politicians from what I have seen.

HTELECON
Secretary Stans

5/25/71 ca. 3:45 p.m.

By: KHU NARA, Dato'

5/12/04

K: If you will send the Gleason case over now we will approve it.

S: Very good.

K: I don't think you'll fight that.

S: Not at all.

K: Also, I understand you have $200 million worth of machine tool requests. Can you pick XXX $30 - 40 million of the least strategic of them and send them over?

S: Okay.

K: We want to put it out with an eye-dropper so don't ______ the whole industry/

S: You mean release them a little at a time.

K: Right, but send over $30 - 40 million of the least sensitive ones.

S: Okay.

K: You'll do that this week?

S: Yes. I'm trying to see you about my trip to Europe. Have you got half an hour some time soon?

K: Sure, how about noon tomorrow?

S: That's okay.

K: Okay good.

S: I'll come over.

By KHLU

NARA, Dale

5/12/04

TELECON
Attorney General
5/25/71 3:56 p.m.

K: I just wanted to let you know we are going to approve the Gleason case.

M: That is just great.

K: It's not officially done yet, so/don't know whether we should do any notifying.

M: How will it come out?

K: I have asked Stans to send it back over and we will approve it.

M: Very good indeed. I'm glad to hear it, and appreciate your calling. Everything else okay?

K: Everything else is fine.

M: Good, see you tomorrow afternoon at the 40 Committee meeting.

By KML NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Lester Be:

May 25, 1971 5:56 p.m.

jlj

B: Dr. Kissinger. We have been having sort of a Naval Board of inquiry on this story. There is more than one correspondent involved. They have a number of sources which form a consistent pattern. It has sort of a Rashaman (phonetic) effect.

K: There is no Rashaman effect. This is not a world shaking event but there are no editors or newsmen to whom I talked about editorials or stories. Acheson did all the calling. Now I do not know where they could have gotten this information.

B: Our reporters were thorough and I am sure they were acting in good faith.

K: Oh no. There is no question about that!

B: I am embarrassed about this. I hate to feel you have cause for being upset and on the other hand I have a feeling of loyalty to these reporters and their sources.

K: Were any of these White House sources?

B: I am afraid they were. But I am satisfied that everyone was acting in what they thought were best interests. I am will to speculate that it might have been done out of spite against you but even that I would doubt.

K: Yes. Except I take general position - Is the point of not having a public voice. I called two or three senators about their vote. I did this because I was a NATO expert and felt I could do so on a personal basis. It just makes me look like I actively took part in this. But your reporters acted in good faith. I do not want to put you in bad position and if your reporters had good sources. I can understand that. It is embarrassing for me because it puts me in the position of being a lobbyist. I happen to like Mike Mansfield very much and he has behaved very honorably to us and me personally and I do not want Mansfield and the other senators to think I am lobbying. However, I do not see what good a retraction would do now.

B: Trying to detach my ownself from the matter, I do not think a retraction would serve the point at this stage. A retraction generally does not do any good and in this case it would be difficult.

K: If I thought that your source was malicious but your reporters were not being malicious, I do not believe the source was malicious. I won't ask for a retraction.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

B: I do not think they were. There was lots of pride because they were as effective as they were in defeating this.

K: I do not doubt it but I feel that what the country needs now is not victories but reconciliation.

B: The article made plain how anxious the President was from keeping this a battle against Mansfield.

K: I understand your problem. If it were an issue involving my honor I would ask you to correct it but this is not going to serve any purpose. One thing I might tell you. The way things work around the White House, not as many people know what is going on as say they know. If your people would give me a chance to comment on it when it involves me like this. Then they could weigh it against their other sources.

B: We would be delighted to. I will speak to Hubbard. Any matter in which you are involved we will talk to you. I am sorry you did not have a chance to speak on this.

K: Let me make clear I do not doubt the integrity of Newsweek. You have never heard me complain about Newsweek. I respect it.

B: We will try our best and consult in anything that involves you.

K: Thank you.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971

K: Mr. President.

P: How are you?

K: Okay. I hope you had some good weather down there.

P: It was pretty hot.

K: Actually nothing much has happened. The casualties this last week were 34 and they didn't include the 31.

P: Did not.

K: No.

P: Why not?

K: Because they hadn't notified the next of kin yet and they won't release these until the next of kin has been notified.

P: Oh, I see.

K: We can spread them over the next few weeks.

P: Yeah.

K: Only 5 this week, not a bad week.

P: There were 34 without any of the 31. It is good to have 34 this week. I am planning a conference on Friday and I don't want to come up with too high figures.

K: Are you planning to have it in the evening.

P: Oh, yes.

K: I have heard some conflicting --

P: Oh, it has to be at night.

K: I got some word you were reconsidering.

P: No, nobody talked to me about that.

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04", "e 2", "TELCONE\nThe President", "8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971", "K: Mr. President, one thing I wanted to mention to you is the meeting with Thieu. I have had research done on how many times the end combat has been announced. Laird only announced it 15 times and Rogers announced it about 7 times.", "P: Doesn't mean much.", "K: My grave concern is the minute you announce -- With Vietnam now on the back pages of the newspapers, the minute you announce a meeting with Thieu you will have --", "P: Think you can get out of it, not to announce to go out and --", "K: By the middle of June, we will know whether the Vietnamese will accept. If they accept, they will make the announcement. If it isn't --", "P: You mean go out and make it a joint . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

3

TELCON
The President

8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971

P: On Thieu --

K: We have to see him this month.

P: ??

K: Between the 20th and 30th and it would be a lot more effective. Even if we make a troop announcement then it will be closer to when the combat announcement ______. I am sending you a memo which has the whole record of what has been said.

P: I don't know what more we can say. Don't know if --

K: If we announced the end of combat and make the offer of withdrawal, we know it will get turned down.

P: Withdrawal of a certain time next year.

K: The way you got Thieu to agree to Midway.

P: Let me say I haven't got a fix on it but with the debates coming up we are going to have heavy shelling from Congressional people about the drafting business and all the rest -- but you don't think this is enough?

K: I am just afraid it isn't enough.

P: We may have to go. If it isn't enough, there is no reason to do it.

K: ................... and Haig quite independently came to the same view.

P: Well, it seems to me --

K: The average American may not have heard all these things Laird and Rogers have said.

P: The average American -- you know, have you checked the polls? They don't even believe we are going to get out, we can't repeat it too often.

K: By the end of the month -- by June 25th, you will see your cards much more clearly.

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By: KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04", "TELCORN", "The President", "8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971", "P: Yeah.", "K: Mr. President, one thing I was going to suggest to you tomorrow -- we ought to give the Russians an ultimatum in about two weeks. If they don't deliver now, we will just delay till next spring on the Summit.", "P: This is June -- in 2 weeks you say we would do this?", "K: Yes. We have announced a Summit or know we are going to get a\nSummit.", "P: I don't know if you can get anything out of them on that.", "K: We have just given them the Gleason __________, a huge package on economics they want --", "P: I spoke to these editors down there today -- I talked generally about the whole thing. I said it could open to other things but a lot of negotiating to go forward and so on.", "K: They are trying to play Berlin. If we get a commitment out of them, _______________ pressure on SALT.", "P: A commitment isn't enough.", "K: I mean an announcement. They are going to harvest everything and we will end up losing.", "P: You didn't talk about SALT today?", "K: No, no; on Monday. He said if these things work out, bigger things will follow.", "P: What the hell bigger can follow?", "K: We can speed up the Berlin negotiations. If there isn't a Summit -- there is no earthly reason to refuse a Summit now.", "P: And we have settled on SALT -- I mean . . . . . . . . . . . .

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCORN

The President

8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971

K: (cont'd) -- and he came back in 24.

P: We will just say we will have to postpone it indefinitely.

K: Then let's just forget about it.

P: As far as this year is concerned.

K: That's what I mean. We have all the cards in our hands. We will know yes or now from them. We will have the Chinese answer and see Thieu and they won't scream so much.

P: Yeah. Well, that doesn't bother me any to push them on that. The only thing that worries me is that it appears we are begging for the goddamn Summit. I would think they would want it too.

K: They want it. They are playing a cute game. I think this way if we keep giving them economic aid --

P: Gleason is all we are going to give them.

K: And the computer. You had already given them your approval when Heath was there.

P: The computer, yeah.

K: We have a chance to give them more economic things --

P: I would do it in a weak thing.

K: On the 2nd or 3rd of June.

P: Right after Memorial Day, Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

K: Exactly.

P: Alright. On the Thieu thing, I must say I have mixed emotions. I am inclined to think it would mean more than you think on the combat thing.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
The President

8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971

K: As soon as you announce it, Harriman will be on every national broadcast ... and we will have nothing to top him with.

P: If you could come ... when you went to see Thieu you had this plus an offer. It is awfully hard for those who have been talking deadlines to talk ceasefire. How in the hell can you talk about deadlines without talking about ceasefire?

K: I saw Sainteny today -- he was in town -- and he said just to do it for the prisoners is too little.

P: Yeah.

K: He mentioned exactly the package we have developed although I didn't bring it up. If they refust it, we can make it publicly.

P: Why don't you have him go back, he would be good cover. Can he be back in Paris?

K: He will be in Paris tonight. He left already.

P: You can say you went over to see an old friend.

K: I will hold off talking to Thieu.

P: No, no; if he has to know --

K: [I can hold off on talking to him.]

P: I have no strong feeling about the damn thing. Let me put it this way -- Bill Rogers feels we should not have it ...

K: Exactly.

P: He realizes we have to have a meeting.

K: We promised it.

P: Promised it?

K: When Bunker was here last time.

P: Bill has no objections to meeting, just doesn't want to have it now.

By KM U NARA, Dato' 5/12/04

TELCON
The President

8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971

K: No.

P: Did he suggest a peace time we can open?

K: .........

P: Don't open this to Laird -- don't tell him a damn thing! When does he go to Europe?

K: Next Tuesday.

P: Well, under the circumstances defer the Thieu thing to the last part of June. Get the message off.

K: Right.

P: I can see the problem. June 20th.

K: I will check a date with Haldeman tomorrow morning but I think we should have an alternate date available.

P: Yeah.

K: I will check the date and send a message.

P: That's all right, do it. Take a crack at it. Anything else new -- You think the SALT thing is eventually going to get understood by everyone?

K: It is understood now.

P: By people that know anything about it.

K: By people that don't know anything, they think you have achieved something they don't understand. The whole press [and.everyone] very positive. Henry Brandon had a very good article in the London Sunday Times although I don't know what distribution is here -- a very good response.

P: It is kind of like the China thing, it has the same positive response.

K: Everyone feels in foreign policy you know what you are doing.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
The President

8:30 p.m., May 25, 1971

P: Except in Vietnam. Really the problem -- our enemies and press, people like Resor keep hacking away. We are carrying a burden then we have to make a sale nobody will buy.

K: People will buy it.

P: Except in Vietnam. The polls are pretty rough and they have some affect on the jackasses that read them. Well, we will hope for the best. Go right ahead with the Thieu thing and get it out of the way. I don't mind putting it off.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
5/26/71 10:00 a.m.

K: I talked to the President last night about the plan. He is willing to go along with putting it off till end of the month. I told him my impression was -- and this will have to be corrected if I am wrong X -- that on the whole you thought it wasn't good to see him anyway. But it would be better at the end of the month than now.

R: I just don't know what the plusses are. Let more visibility, and doesn't achieve anything.

K: It's at least a month later. We may have had some other developments by then.

R: I agree with that. I think we can hold it in abeyance. What about the Chinese thing . . .

K: I'll try to get a time set today or tomorrow.

R: Good. I want his views on MBFR. I know what the paper said, but I want his overall thinking.

K: Okay.

R: Right, fine.

By: KML NARA, Dato' 5/12/04

TELECONR
Prof. Jerome Cohen

5/26/71 10:35 a.m.

C: I don't want to be a post, but I was in Ottawa yesterday. I wanted to check a few things. The message I got the last time I was here and you have heard too -- Mentioned it the last time. The problem that the people-to-people contact doesn't include direct trade. It's a change from the policy of the 50s. No direct trade until a fundamental change in U.S. policy in the resolution of the Taiwan problem. The only explanation I could get is related to a passionate nationalistic policy. In thinking rationally there is nothing more important in influencing ______ than letting business-men go over. There could be nothing better than to enable business men to go to China and let them see. But direct trade will be the last, not the first, step. Then they started talking about achieving a Taiwan resolution. Said couldn't be removed till diplomatic relations had been established. That might take years. Then they said "Why doesn't your President come to China to discuss these things; we've invited him; why doesn't he come?" The handling of politicians is the most difficult problem in person-to-person diplomacy. For instance, are they going to admit Kennedy, Muskie and these other birds instead of the President who has done so much for them.

K: Well, first of all, they have not invited the President; they have sent signals but more as a 'why don't we talk about it' as at a high level?'

C: Well Huang Hua (?) is going to be in Ottawa in two weeks (he is the Ambassador and a man of some parts). He is a man who will make decisions; not a mere ambassador. It would be a fruitful thing; you might want to consider talking with Huang Hua.

K: If it could be done secretly.

C: That's what I am suggesting. I find these talks in Ottawa very helpful; they're relaxed. And they want the President to come. I am sure you have to think of the implications.

K: Well, it's out of the question this year. It hasn't even come up. It is easy enough to say they have invited him but it's nonsense.

C: He hinted in a way that there had been signals and he was calling for more. He said they would like for him to come to China. It may be premature for reasons of scheduling and others. But if you have the time and inclination a talk with Huang Hua might be of some utility.

K: Let me think about it. You know we are very serious and energetic about it. But you don't start a process like this by even talking about a Presidential visit.

C: He was not saying this for propaganda. He had no reason to think I would ever pass this on. But it seemed that it would be a relief to break the logjam by having the President come. . . . The Chinese can't seem to figure

TELECON
Prof. Jerome Cohen

5/26/71 10:35 a.m.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

out how to take the initiative, but they may/

K: In principle I would be glad to see him, if we can figure out a way.
Good. This is extremely helpful.

C: Are you going to add to your China staff someone else from the State Department -- you might need to be more strongly staffed.

K: Do you have any suggestions?

C: I am sorry Herb Levin has left, though he may not be the best in the field; he's good. There are people like Bill Gleisteen (?) and Paul Krisberg (?) who are not only well-informed scholars -- their hearts are in the right place, nothing but the best. This is just gratuitous. Anyway Huang Hua will be in Ottawa in two weeks.

K: Can you keep this information about their general interest in high-level contacts to yourself so I can look into it?

C: Yes, certainly. I didn't know whether any of this was new but wanted you to know about it and wanted to know whether there was anything to it.

By KML NARA, Dated 5/13/04

TELECON

Ambassador Smith/Mr. Kissinger

10:43 a.m., May 26, 1971

S: Henry.

K: Gerry, how are you?

S: On the question of notifying Semyonov about our lack of interest in the NCA, I recognize that... I wonder if it would cause trouble if I didn't do that at this time. I mentioned to General Allison that I intended to do that, and it gave him some concern.

K: The hell with General Allison. It happens to be the President's position. Conceivably, I think we have to make clear that it is going to be Safeguard.

S: All right.

K: That is what the President told you, and told him yesterday it would happen.

S: It was my understanding that you had...

K: It will not come as news to Semyonov.

S: That is the reason I thought it was essential to do it at this time.

K: It is absolutely essential to tell him. Say our position will be Safeguard. But I leave it to you. Make that clear. It would save two weeks at the beginning next time.

S: All right. I will do it. I wanted to be 100 per cent clear.

K: You are meticulous. Tell Allison there is nothing to argue here.

S: All right.

K: Thank you, Gerry.

S: Thank you. Goodbye.

lds

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Pete Peterson

5/26/71 12:08 p.m.

K: I have told Stans yesterday to send over the Gleason Case. Also he tells me he has got $200 million of machine tool cases.

P: Right.

K: Could you pick $40 million of the least defense-oriented?

P: Yes.

K: If we could do that in the next week or so...

P: What you want is a $40 million package on top of that?

K: On top of the Gleason case.

P: Sure.

K: How are we doing on the _______ thing?

P: The study won't be completed till June 20.

K: Good -- want to hold it off till July.

P: Incidentally, I am trying to bring in that group of wise men. They can do it on June 2. You apparently had accepted a dinner date on that night.

K: Yes.

P: Any way out of that? The first they can't do it.

K: No other date around that, like the 4th?

P: No; they are leaving. You had told me the second when we talked.

K: And then you told me you couldn't do it.

P: Then I said the first...

K: I will do my demnedest to come on the second, at least for a while.

P: How early can you start?

K: 6:30 or 7:00 -- unless you could do it earlier.

P: Yes, earlier.

K: 5:00 or 5:30. P: Yes. K: Sure, that I can do.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Vice President
5/26/71 2:28 p. m.

A: You see the Newhouse syndicated story in the Star today?

K: No.

A: " Rogers Reported Irked by South African Agnew. " (Reads)

K: Don't tell me any more.

A: You know what it is?

K: No, but you can see the Italian hand.

A: I got back from New York and had a call waiting from Bill. He said he didn't cancel any meeting, he had none scheduled. He doesn't know where it came from.

K: I know.

A: The African bureau over there?

K: Sure. Don't you think?

A: Yes. Says 'seems to be in line with White House policy however.'

K: It didn't come out of here.

A: Of course not. The only thing that bothered me . . . Rogers is quick to den this. That's what he tells me, but no one will correct it publicly.
! . . . delicacy of balance . . . "

K: Who's the writer?

A: James Stout. I never heard of him. But what bothers me . . . same report of what was said in the meeting. But it's incorrect.

K: Was a State Department fellow present?

A: The Ambassador and no one else.

K: But he will have made a report to the ________.

A: I suppose so. . . "Agnew reportedly gave Moulder assurances . . ." That was not even discussed.

K: I am the worst person to make this complaint to. The President will think if I mention it that this is just part of my private feud. If you call

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

TELECON
Vice President

5/26/71 2:28 p.m. p. 2

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Haldeman it will be very useful. This is an outrage. I'll reinforce it and tell the President, but also it would help if he heard that some other person had heard from you about it.

A: Okay.

K: I talked to the President again about your trip. I must say he is not very much in favor of Greece. He's not worried about your family going there. He thinks you might step in Iran, Austria, Germany if you wanted to...

A: Trying to build something around that would be awfully hard.

K: If things go the way they may, maybe in October or November we can get that other one.

A: All right. Let me think how I can work in the other countries without it being a slight.

K: If you are going back from Korea it would be a big help to us for you to stop in Iran. They have been trying to get the President to come but he won't be able to to make it. __________ is another place they wanted the President to visit and he won't be able to do it.

A: Do you think it is possible to stop someplace else and not Greece.

K: I think so. If I could think of some way of your stopping without making it official, just going to your family place or something like that.

A: Any chance of working out something on the Cypriot situation?

K: Sure. Going to Cyprus is easier than going to Greece. That might not be bad to consider.

A: Will you look into that some more? See if that would work. Is that a security problem over there.

K: I think not. One other thing: are you doing something for Sinatra one of the evenings he is here?

A: I expect I will.

K: Just so I don't have to worry about it. I'll take care of him one evening.

A: Good. As soon as you find out about that will you let me know?

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON
Vice President

5/26/71 2:28 p.m. p. 3

K: Yes. There's no problem about your family going.

A: No chance of Spain or Portugal?

K: No, that might be okay.

A: What about Scandinavian Countries?

K: I mentioned that to the President. He is afraid they'd demonstrate.

A: Yes, they probably would. Maybe Germany and Austria. How about France? Probably not?

K: I have no fixed view about that.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELECON

Taft Schreiber

(in Len Garment's office)

5/26/71 2:38 p.m.

K: I just wrote you a note on Monday to thank you for everything you had done while I was in California.

S: You are very sweet, but notes are unnecessary. I just wanted to say hello.

K: How long will you be here?

S: I leave on the 5:30 plane.

K: Have you got time now to come over?

S: I've got one more meeting and I'm with Len Garment.

K: I have got a meeting at 3:00 too, but if you would like to drop over I would love to see you. You can even bring your friend.

S: Here, talk to Len.

G: This fellow's doing his fabulous things for the next year. We want to keep this cooking along without too many of our Jewish friends picketing the White House.

K: About what?

G: Soviet Jewry.

K: Come on over.

G: Okay.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

May 26, 1971 2:55 p.m.

jlj

S: I was wondering if you had seen the Jack Anderson column. He says the US is picking up on radio GVN messages including those of President Thieu.

K: Oh no.

S: I have checked with the Pentagon and they have issued a full blown investigation and he reports this too. If he is reporting this, he is a step away from talking about other things.

K: I still have not found the memorandum from which he is quoting.

S: I have some reason to think maybe if somebody talked to him. What if appealed to him by one John Scali to lay off?

K: Wouldn't do any good but you can try.

S: Why do you say it wouldn't do any good? I know a couple of times I was asked and it worked with me.

K: With you yes. If somebody asked will it work with John Scali I would have said yes but I do not believe it will work with Jack Anderson.

S: I do not want to do it unless you think it would do some good.

K: If you think - there is nothing to be lost by talking to him. Think about it and talk to me before you do it.

S: Oh yes. I would talk with you and tell you exactly what I would say. I just wanted to check with you about what you think of the idea. I will think about it. I just wanted to check with you if you had learned anything in checking on that memorandum. Thanks Henry.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
5/26/71; 6:45 p.m.

By KHL NARA, Dato' 5/12/04

(Missed the first part of this conversation.)

P: At a later time when you do meet him he will unbend. He really has an understanding of the Chinese.

K: I thought he was acute in his judgment.

P: He is really thinking in terms that so many of our people don't understand. He is thinking in long-range terms.

K: Not at all tactical.

P: Not taking cheap shots as the Russians do. I thought you would find it amusing. If you do make the trip you will want to stop someplace on the way and it would be a nice place.

K: I did not have a chance to tell you about the Harvard professor -- he is a Chinese expert. He went to Canada. He said this thing needs a political settlement -- they said we need President Nixon.

P: Did they really say that? Oh, oh, I have to go -- It's Hoover on the phone.

5/26/71; 6:50 p.m.

P: Are you going out to dinner in a little while or was that an excuse?

K: No, I am going out to dinner -- dinner for the Mosbachers tonight.

P: You would have a lot of fund at Alice's.

K: I would have loved to go.

P: I was just delighted with Bruce -- he went on to say he would support me. If we get a chance to send anyone to China, he goes.

K: He is the best.

P: Murphy would be terrible and Lodge would be worse.

K: Once he has resigned the Chinese would take him. He is a great patriot. I showed him what we are planning to say. He thinks your policy on Vietnam is superb. I don't know whether you heard him at the end. He said you are the right man in this job -- he has seen many Presidents.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

-2-

P: I brought him back to a miserable job.

K: You brought him back to amiserable job.

P: What a guy he is compared to the clowns. There aren't many people like him. Rush has his character. I don't want him to stay over there and get sick. I think he ought to skip a meeting now and then.

K: He is a pretty good judge.

P: He can take care of himself.

P: On the Canada --

K: They said secondly that Nixon has done more for us than any of these guys that want to go to China and they don't want to irritate him.

P: I don't know what they are going to respond. Do you think they will bite?

K: They may insist on somebody going publicly.

P: If we do then it is Bruce.

K: I suspect they will bite on this.

P: Then I think we might let Bruce go anyway. It keeps things going. When you talk to them say Ambassador Bruce is resigning then he will come to make public arrangements for the President's visit.

K: I thought we would have tremendous impact if you announced the visit in August and we would send Ambassador Bruce there to make arrangements. . .

P: You think the meeting did have some significance? I suppose he was going up for Muskie or your friend Tony Lake.

K: No. He is Professor Cohen.

P: Harvard Law -- Oh, I know him

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

5/26/71; 6:45 p.m.

-3-

K: I said I didn't want these guys to start screaming around -- we want this to be a surprise. I said this was just a figure of speech.

P: Did you know we beat the Hughes Amendment?

K: No, I didn't.

P: Do you know what it is about? They beat the Nelson Amendment today. The Hughes Amendment proposes $2billion 700 pay increase and get rid of the draft. The Senate voted it down. I asked him why we were winning. According to Colson because of our strong intention on NATO and when we hit them with the Soviet thing they were scared to death.

K: I have M. Childs here, Mr. President.

P: Is it there with you now?

K: No, I have sent him out to wait in the lobby.

P: Give him my best. I like him and respect him. Just tell him what I said. I remember it was 20 years ago when I was a young Congressman.

K: He said the Democrats look sick. All they talk about is Vietnam.

P: You tell him Vietnam is finished. You can argue about when but it is over. The main thing is what is going to happen to Russia, China, the Middle East and the economy of the U. S. Emphasize this with Childs -- we are thinking about the future and they are thinking about the present.

K: I told him it was our easiest problem (Vietnam?)

P: It gives us the most heartache, though. One other guy I wish you would see is William White.

K: I will see him within the week. I will see him before the end of the week.

P: When do we meet with Rogers?

K: Right after the lunch.

P: Get me some talking points.

K: Right, Mr. President

feg

TELECON

Gerard Smith
(Secure Phone)

5/27/71 9:43 a.m.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

S: Did you get my message this morning?

K: Yes, and it's absolute nonsense. . . . . they have said it was to be
NCA; we have said it was to be Safeguard . . . . . must be simultaneous.

S: Can you get Dobrynin to give the message to Semenov?

K: I will see him this morning.

S: I will be back to Vienna this afternoon; if you can send me a message
that will be fine.

K: Okay, but there is no possibility of a misunderstanding. . . .
I have put it all together and you look at the transcript of the conversations
and you can check for yourself.

S: Sex I am sure you are right -- I just want to ameliorate a possible
bad situation tomorrow.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Ambassador Cromer

5/27/71 9:52 a.m.

C: I haven't had a reply about the dates yet.

K: They are not firm. 14 and 15 are definitely out for me. 17 and 18 or 11 and 12 are possible.

C: Okay.

K: But it's totally out of my control. So it's either the date I suggest or nothing.

C: That I recall. You remember we had a word about China. The Secretary of State and Home are meeting on June 4. At that meeting our Foreign Secretary will want to discuss fairly definitively with the Secretary of State what we have in mind to do. I didn't want you to be bounced into something you didn't know would happen.

K: That's very courteous. The Secretary will be prepared to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary. We are meeting on it today as a matter of fact.

C: Okay. I understand I'll be seeing you at dinner tonight.

K: I look forward to it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-258

By CHNARA Date 5/2/71

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin

10:43 a.m., May 27, 1971

K: Anatoliy, I will see you in an hour, but there is one problem with time urgency connected which I wanted to raise now. You seem out of breath.

D: On the contrary. You are calling me on your birthday. My very best wishes.

K: Aren't you nice. Let's hope we will do some good things together this next year. The problem is Semyonov in Vienna has been saying to Smith that his understanding is first there will be negotiations on ABM agreement and afterwards there would be discussions on offensive limitations, which is not my understanding. But I don't want to get that issue settled today. However, Smith is afraid that Semyonov will say publicly tomorrow at the closing session that this the understanding. If he says it publicly, Smith will have to say the opposite publicly. And the negotiations will be ending on a note of disagreement. This is the plenary session which closes the negotiations in Vienna.

D: It's a closed session.

K: Yes, it is a closed session, but I wanted to recommend -- and I just talked to the President -- that neither side states anything. We can get this worked out during the month. We now have agreement and we should not immediately record disagreement. My understanding is that we will discuss offensive limitations while the other is being discussed.

D: My understanding -- I did not specifically mention it to him recently but said it in a telegram long before when we discussed that, -- that there would be two parts so to speak. There was no specific agreement between you and me. My understanding is that at the beginning of the first part we will discuss this one, but on the second part, we will begin half-way.

KXXX They will do ABM and the second part when they begin to discuss this one.

K: We can work that out. My understanding is they will begin on ABM but well before that is completed they will have to discuss offensive limitations. I don't think you would find in the record "half-way." But this is not an issue that cannot be worked out. The major thing is there would be no useful purpose served if there is a record of formal disagreement at the closing plenary session tomorrow. Whether it is half-way or a third of the way...

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101358
By CHARA Date 6/1/71

10:43 a.m., May 27, 1971

D: My understanding is they would concentrate on ABM and when a substantial part is completed, continue on ABM and then proceed with the other one. That was my understanding which I sent to Moscow.

K: What sort of ABM agreement, whether it would be capitals, or what else...

D: I didn't go into details. I didn't send what kind -- SALT or what else. It was a simple understanding -- not a specific question.

K: We don't have to settle it this minute. The major thing is it would be very helpful if we ended the session tomorrow on a positive note. Nothing can be accomplished by recording disagreement tomorrow. If you could get that word to Semyonov. I will show Smith's cable to you when you come.

D: It will be 11:30.

K: And in my office. We have Arabs running all over the place.

D: Between the Executive Building and your office.

K: Do you think there's time enough to get word to Semyonov?

D: I don't know whether... when are they meeting?

K: In the morning.

D: It's now 11:00. In Moscow, it's 7:00.

K: That is why I am calling you to see if you could do something.

D: There's no problem to send a telegram. I'm just counting the hours really.

K: The only result of it will be we will go through our records -- we make a formal statement, and you make a formal statement. That way, we start with a legalistic argument.

D: I will try to have time to tell him.

K: Can you send it now? You can come a few minutes late to see me.

D: I will send it now.

K: That is why I called you.

lds

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELECON

10:43 a.m., May 27, 1971

II: On the contrary. You are calling me on your birthday. My very best wishes.

D: It's a closed session.

Mr. Kissinger/Ambasss

10:43 a. m., May 27, 1968

By: NARA, Dated: 5/12/68

D: It will be 11:30.

K: In the morning.

D: I will send it now.

K: That is why I called you.

1ds

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Alex Johnson

5/27/71 11:12 a.m.

K: I have that record all put together. You can come any time you want to look at it.

J: It will have to be this afternoon.

K: Any time. Just call my office.

J: Okay. It will be some time this afternoon.

K: Okay fine. Good Alex.

J: Right, thank you.

By KHL NARA, Dato' 5/12/04

TELECON

Phil Farley

5/27/71 12:14 p.m.

K: I just wanted to check with you on exactly where we stand on accidental war and the hotline discussions. As I understand the hotline is essentially finished.

F: That's right.

K: How about accidental war?

F: There five points of bracketed difference and it's going to be left that way for Helsinki reports.

K: My understanding from Gerry is that if we wanted to sign this in June they are in a state to do so.

F: The hotline yes, but not the accidental war. No major differences but that will require a different kind of push from what they've had before.

K: Was our new formulation been presented?

F: Yes, and it has been initially judged insufficient. It will end up with bracketed proposals and counter-proposals.

K: So if we want to have Semenov over here it would be for a hotline agreement only.

F: Yes. There is still the question of third countries on accidents. We said don't press us; let us think about it.

K: Parsons is staying over there?

F: No.

K: So that by definition will have to be left.

F: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012557

By CHARA DATE 01-01-85

Telcon
Ambassador Dobrynin

May 27, 5:30 p.m.

D: ..... from Moscow in connection with our talks in this morning which said telegram sent to Mr. Semenov should go into any detail understanding with you in tomorrow's official meeting between him and Smith.

K: Excellent.

D: So you see, in connection with your birthday how easy that was?

K: The only trouble you are telling me is the next time you tell me it takes two weeks for a decision, I won't believe it.

D: (Laughter). My impression it was Smith who interpreted his intention but it was not Semenov who said so. So in this case it was very easy to confirm.

K: You know I showed you the telegram, so I will just say nothing.

D: I didn't believe that Semenov would say nothing.

K: I will not say anything about it.

D: I will not say anything about his interpretation of the understanding.

K: That is all we want. I also want you to know that we have given instructions that any complaint to you, no matter how minor, has to be checked with us.

D: It is better. Then they will understand. But for me, I could understand, but for them it will be better to have a more clear picture.

K: We have ordered this after our meeting today.

D: OK.

K: Can I tell this to Smith?

D: You may.

K: He will see it automatically.

D: You might tell him everything I mentioned to you but not to discuss with Semenov. This is official.

K: Good. Fine

Telcon
Under Secretary Johnson

May 27, 1971; 5:40 p.m.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: Actually the one thing I wanted I have found out. You have had a chance to read through that book?

J: Yes. I had to read it very fast.

K: It is still available to you.

J: I wanted to ask you one question. There is one question open which I really wasn't able to follow through on the conversations going back and forth.

K: Those conversations are always keyed to some document.

J: I just didn't have time to get the documents out. The one question is that last letter was from us to them, that is on the 19th of May. You delivered it to him on May 19.

K: Yes, well I...

J: That talks about discussing the question of phrasing... the nature... before ABM is completed. Then I saw your conversations with him in which he accepted your statement that the agreements should be simultaneous.

K: That's right.

J: What I wasn't clear about is how the phrasing of the letter of the 19th came about. The phrasing of the letter of the 19th is not consistent with the public statement to begin with, but he also used the statement, the oral ABM statement you made to him.

K: The point was he said he could get the letter changed but it would take almost three weeks and therefore he suggested the oral statement.

J: I see.

K: He said the oral statement, plus the public statement, covered the point.

J: Yes, I saw that. Did that phrasing in the 19th letter come from them?

K: That came from them.

J: I see. But we delivered that letter to them, did we?

K: Today, and they gave us their copy today.

Under/Sec Johnson

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

J: Is their letter identical?

K: Exactly except the first two paragraphs.

J: The controlling factor is the text of your public statement plus your oral statement which he accepted.

K: Yes.

J: That relieves my mind.

K: And if you look at the record of the phone conversations, they make that clear.

J: The last statement on oral was by phone.

K: And I read that to him and he said that was exactly right.

J: That relieves my concern for the room for misunderstanding. How do you want to handle this -- Verification Panel. What are our guidelines now?

K: Why don't you and I get together tomorrow or Saturday morning? I think we should let the Verification Panel go ahead doing analytical work and you and I decide what outcome we are going to try to steer at.

J: That is what you and I have to decide.

K: I will get together with you. And this book is available to you any time. And where you see handwritten things in there they will put in their suggestions.

J: I was very interested in the early portions on the ABM. The political problem versus the military problem and their sidelines on their bureaucratic problem. It sounds real to me.

K: I don't see anything he gets out of telling me that, do you? Don't you think he came quite a good distance from his early position to where he finally wound up?

J: His first move to you, was it in January? - of silos they have under construction and they wouldn't want to stop them -- was it before we had seen those new ones?

K: You are right.

J: He raised the question.

Under/Sec Johnson

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: But they will take a chance on January 1. That' is we give them some lead time.

J: But he raised the question of silos being under construction - wasn't that before we had seen these new ones?

K: You are right. That was January 28.

J: That is right. January 28 the problem of silos started but not yet completed.

K: That is right.

J: When was it we first saw...

K: The first time I heard of them was on February 14 when I was in Key Biscayne.

J: It seems to me it was around that time.

K: I remember because I walked right over to the President.

J: He told you on January 28 that they had stuff under construction but not completed.

K: Isn't that interesting? And I hadn't focussed on it until now.

J: I found that very interesting.

K: I tried it simply as a theoretical statement.

J: He must have assumed we had already seen them.

K: And we probably had but had not got the read-out yet. They may not know how quickly we get it. Only we weren't sure they had stopped at that point so I did not pay any special attention to it. Now that you call my attention to it I read it as sort of half-theoretical statement.

J: I am not quite clear - the ABM thing went back and forth so much. Then they went back to their old position.

K: One thing I can say - they can have no doubt about our position.

J: But they ended up with their old position and it is going to take quite a bit of hassling to get them to an equal movement of their sites and our site.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Under/Sec Johnson

K: It depends on how eager they are.

J: I found very interesting their statement that SALT did not mean much to them. You came back damn well on that. Was that emotionalism or what on his part?

K: He is usually not emotional.

J: I take it, as far as ABM's we are both back to our original positions.

K: That is right and I suspect that they have to make a record on it.

J: I think we can stick hard on that. But their willingness to set a cut-off date on new construction...

K: That may not survive.

J: Of course not, but there were attitudes there.

K: He was obviously thoughtful about it - he raised real issues in connection with it.

J: It is not a weak point and a court of law would find you agreed to this or that, but the development of the attitudes as the thing went on was interesting.

K: I leave it to your discretion, and we will get together within the next two or three days to plan strategy. I won't do anything until I have talked to you.

J: All right, Henry.

ms

By KHLV NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

5:46 p. m., May 27, 1971

K: Anatoliy, you can't stay away from me.

D: In connection with the talks about the White House and State, I have just seen UPI 117 [read it] to the effect that the U. S. today publicly condemned Russia for the conviction of the four Jews. The ticker said it was the strongest ever issued by the Department.

K: God-damn them!. When was it issued. I gave them instructions at 1:00...

D: It's on the ticker.

K: Oh, God-damn. You have to believe me -- I did not know about this. The President did not know about it. I will have to check into it, I haven't seen the ticker, but I'll look at it immediately.

D: It is the strongest ever.

K: Tell them that I instructed the Department...

D: What kind of fools do they have? It is our law. Why should the Department be involved in our condemning them. I just want to know.

K: Tell them that you brought it to my attention.

D: And that from now on you will use much more control on this

K: From now on, I will take responsibility for matters of this kind. I will find out what happened.

D: It definitely looks political.

K: It may be something that was authorized three days ago. I will look into it and give you an informal opinion tomorrow.

D: You don't have to give me an opinion. It's public -- on the radio.

K: You mention to them this was done prior to my discussion with you.

D: Okay.

lds

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
5/27/71 6:40 p.m.

R: I am just calling on that damn statement Gray made at the briefing.

K: Yes, I mentioned to the President that you were mortified and it was a mistake and he understands.

R: I said if the question was asked we should express our concern and say we *also* still believe in the Human Rights Convention and that people should be able to emigrate. Said don't know about evidence in the trail. Instead of that we volunteered a statement.

K: The *also* President feels, for obvious reasons, that he would like to cool the debate between us and the Soviet Union.

R: I think there is this to be said -- and I'm not trying to justify the mistake; it was a mistake and I was screaming about it before I heard *also* from over there -- but the only bright side is that this may help cool those who might help the JDL. Every time the JDL gets aroused it causes additional problems in the Soviet Union.

K: I think that is right and it's done now, but we are going to make sure we don't make any beligerant statements. We can always go back to the hotline.

R: This is just one of those mistakes. You don't have to send any memo to me. *also* One other thing, if we do this thing we talked about today I think we should do it before the Senate . . .

K: In the end of June or early July

R: I thought it was a good meeting.

K: Yes, I thought it was; we should do it more often.

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin

5/27/71 6:48 p.m.

K: I just wanted to tell you that I have had looked into this and it was done before our instructions reached them, or so they say now. At any rate, we will send out a Presidential order tomorrow preventing this, and you can assure them that what I told you is correct. No department will be permitted to say anything about the Soviet Union that has not been checked in the White House. I regret that this happened and so does the President with whom I have taken this up personally.

D: Thank you for calling.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL256
By CNARA Date 5/27/71

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

5/27/71 6:48 p. m.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I just wanted to tell you that I have been looking into this and it was done before our instructions reached them, or so they say now. At any rate, we will send out a Presidential order tomorrow preventing this, and you can assure them that what I told you is correct. No department will be permitted to say anything about the Soviet Union that has not been checked in the White House. I regret that this happened and so does the President with whom I have taken this up personally.

D: Thank you for calling.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
5/28/71 9:00 a.m.

R: I am upset about the Berger story.

K: Haldeman is raising cain. He told everyone yesterday to keep it quiet till into June.

R: Of course it's been _______ ing around, but it looks to me like a clear leak from the State Department.

K: No one here knows the proposition. Incidentally, everyone here knows there's no leaking out of your office. It must come from the fellow who worked on the paper.

R: I think so it. The thing that annoys me is that it says what's in the papers. We'll just say "no decision has been made."

K: That's right. That's what we'll tell Ziegler to say.

R: I think what profoked it was the story about Austria on the ticker yesterday.

K: If we don't blow it up too much it will go down as another of those speculative stories.

R: You could almost manufacture . . .

K: But the _______ formula is correct. If that story had appeared last week it wouldn't have come to your attention or mine probably. I think the best thing is to follow the course we discussed yesterday.

R: It's not going to be a big thing.

K: No, the President will understand that this happened before our conversation and was a low-level leak. It just happened too fast.

R: Tell him I'm sorry about it. But _______ from the standpoint of Taiwan was phrased pretty well.

K: Something like that may leak when you talk to people.

R: It's bound to. We've talked about these things in a general way yesterday. I talked to Faisal yesterday in a general way about it. He had his UN Ambassador there. I said we were concerned about it.

May 28, 1971 11:00 a.m.

jlj

D: Good morning. You are just now getting back from yesterday's Kennedy party?

K: As soon as I heard from the Secret Service that you left I got there. It was a nice party.

D: I left just after Kennedy arrived to go to the next affair.

K: I stayed until one as your agents no doubt told you.

D: I know this myself.

K: I have x two or three things I wanted to go over with you. I had a cable from Smith who said it worked out very well. Semenov carried out his instructions and didn't ask for any interpretations at all so Smith took out one sentence which asked for interpretation. Said he was not given any interpretations so we took ours.

D: Do you see how easy it is to make our two boys there happy.

K: Smith says that x two of youx a junior member of your delegation - Kikilov (phonetic) said he was not happy about having to change the interpretation. He said it to one of our junior delegates who didn't know anything.

D: He probably did not have instructions. I receive a telegram that said no interpretations were to be given. Otherwise no one will specifically look what he is saying.

K: I told the President about the exchange and he was very pleased. Second, the foreign ministers idea you raised with me yesterday.

D: You mean on...

K: Berlin. If you could avoid raising it any place else because the President is very much opposed to it.

D: OK

K: Thirdly, clarification on these items for licensing. We are approving $64 million rather than the $40 million we talked about yesterday.

D: Machine?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOL2558
By CHNARA Date StatoL

K: For truck manufacturing tools other than for Cama (phonetic) River project which will not be included in this.

D: Cama River you say

K: Is not included in this decision. We took that out and decided the other things rather than have them piddling out.

D: $65 million is the $40 million you mentioned to me yesterday?

K: Yes. We are approving all the Gleason plus the ____ for machine tools. This clears the books except for the big one which we will treat separately as I told you.

D: Thank you.

K: Good and we will be in touch.

D: Of course.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012358
By CNARA Date 01/01/85

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Joseph Sisco/Mr. Kissing

May 28, 1971 11:10 a.m.

jlj

S: I sent up to Ted Eliot in memorandum form from him to you our analysis of this accord and I -

K: What is your analysis?

S: It is this, Henry. The first part's obviously legal ____ around arrangements which are very political and psychological true in the area. It assures long-range support - political, economic and military over next 15 years. Undoubtedly Soviet initiated due to the internal events in Egypt and to keep them from making overtures to the U.S. I think it will cause waves in other countries in which they hope the influence without treaty will be decreased.

K: What do you mean?

S: In countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, etc. they may make overtures to the United States if they do not have a treaty with the Soviet Union.

K: Loosen their ties.

S: Yes. These are countries which are on our side of the fence anyway. Now where this leaves Sadat. Gives pledge that ____ they will not be involved in the internal affairs and an ex post facto changes made by Sadat are OK with the Russians. There is a firm commitment to consultations with the Egyptian Government. There is an overall packet on consultations. From Sadat's point of view it eases his pressure on the military. The military is dependent on the Soviets and if he has an agreement with the Soviets that solves the army question. This will leave Sadat with as much or as little influence as he had before. The Principle impact is on the Israelis. First, those that think it will polarize the Arabs will obviously be very upset about it. Secondly, it will make it more difficult to work out some sort of "Canal" agreement but it keeps the door open on both sides. Israel will (a) increase pressure on us to make long range commitments to them on the basis that Egypt has an opened ended commitment because of the treaty. We will see not so much change on substance - just manifest procedurally because Russians want to be in if there is any settlement. The Russians are saying to us that nothing will happen unless we get in. The balancing act is still in effect. I continue to feel that this guy (Sadat) will settle on interim agreements if he can get some symbolic crossing of the Canal by Arab troops. Strange enough, this is still open with the Israelis. Israel opened ended ceasefire and this we are in agreement with. However, we should watch this very carefully.

That's pretty much what I said in my report.

K: I will be fascinated in seeing it.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

S: Yes. It is interesting. This thing looks like it is a Soviet draft. It has been concocted in a hurry.

K: It seems to have been happening often lately.

S: We had no advance warning that this was coming. It could be we have lousey intelligence or -

K: It couldn't be true!!

S: Or the Russians drafted it and we knew nothing about it. There is no such treaty in existence in other places. In a quick capsule form this is a political move to protect their major commitment in that area and they are putting the rest of the world on notice that they plan to be there for a good long time to come.

K: Thanks Joe.

TELECON
Director Helms

5/28/71 5:50 p.m.

By KM W NARA, Dato 5/12/04

H: Happy Birthday.

K: Thank you.

H: That's what I was calling about . . .

K: I appreciate it. I had a question: Are you sure the Soviet submarine is nuclear powered?

H: No, I am not. We had a conversation about that yesterday. It is not clear what that submarine is. TASS has made an announcement to the effect that it's going to be there.

K: But if it's nuclear powered and cruise missile . .

H: It's okay.

K: Well, technically, but I would then let Dobrynin know that they are getting to the limit of the understanding and it's a hell of a time to annoy us. But if it's a deisel submarine it's okay. We haven't even heard that it might be a y-Class submarine.

HK: It might be some kind of communication link between two things. But it was too inconclusive and couldn't be proven. Garry you find x

KM: Can you find out for me as fast as possible if it is nuclear-powered with cruise-type missiles?

HK: I don't know if I can . . .

K: It's supposed to be an #-2 typs submarine.

H: I'll K check on that.

K: Would you and give me the best judgment of your people?

5:55 p.m.

H: You had more information than I had faster than I did. It is an E-2, nuclear powered, with cruise missiles. There was a photo taken.

K: That you are sure about?

H: Yes, no question.

K: If I reraise hell about that . . .

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By CHARA Date Elstot

TELECON

6:05 p.m., May 28, 1971

K: Anatoliy, I am unhappily calling you about the matter we discussed a week ago today. I gave you the wrong information about the submarine. I told you at the time we thought the submarine was a diesel. You told me nuclear subs were under the control of the Politburo.

D: It was announced as a submarine without telling what...

K: I wanted to inform you there is a submarine tied up together with the tender. It is nuclear-powered and has 8 missiles on it of the 250-300 mile range.

D: That was not a condition of a "visit."

K: The understanding -- as we understand it -- is servicing of nuclear submarines and submarines carrying offensive weapons in or from Cuban ports.

D: What servicing? In what way are they servicing?

K: If a submarine is there independently -- but it is tied up with the tender. We will not debate it, but at the best, it is at the very edge of the understanding. I wanted to point out that our information last Friday was not good.

DL: I don't have any information except what was published in our press.

K: The appearance of a nuclear submarine with missiles of a 300-mile range and tied up with the tender is... You can have no doubt how gravely we would consider violations of the understanding. Whether this is a violation we don't have to debate now, and we will not make any public statement for the timebeing.

D: The understanding in Moscow is that a visit which is published beforehand...

K: It's a combination of the visit of the nuclear submarine and the tender and those two being together is a very unfortunate incident.

D: I will transmit that you say this is unfortunate. As it was announced, I don't know whether they do anything about it.

By KML NARA, Dale

5/12/94

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Pobrynin

6:05 p. m., May 28, 1971

D: I don't have any information except what was published in our press.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Douryin

6:05 p.m., May 28, 1971

K: I am not asking for anything in particular.

D: I will send to Moscow what you say.

K: There is nothing else to do for the timebeing.

D: I will send right away a telegram -- with missiles.

K: With missiles with a range of some 300 miles. They are not ballistic but the other missiles.

D: The small ones.

K: Like the German V-1.

D: Not long-distance.

K: They are 300 miles -- when it becomes a violation of the understanding, it will be a first-class crisis.

D: In Moscow, the understanding is that if it were announced.

K: I told you last week we thought it was diesel. I have to point this out now as a matter we have to consider unfortunate.

D: I will send a telegram on what you mentioned to me for their own information.

ids

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Stans
5/28/71, 6:25 pm

S: Henry, on these permits to ship to Russia?

K: What we would like is some noticeable foot dragging. The Russians have done something which is a cheap shot and I would like to harrass them for a week or so. Is there some way we can slow up the permit without actually withdrawing it?

S: I just wanted you to know that our procedure is that we notify the companies involved immediately, then we notify the Senators. Also we got word that Rockefeller had gotten the word from Dr. Kissinger. What would you think of issuing one or two, then waiting three or four days and issue several more a few days later and so on.

K: I would like to drag it out a couple of weeks. Let the Gleason one go and then drag the rest out a couple of weeks bureaucratic. It would be a big help if you could drag it out for a few weeks. I have your interests at heart but we want you to teach them discipline at the start of this thing. Sorry I am such a son-of-a-bitch.

S: It's alright Henry. We will do it your way.

mlh

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telcon
Mr. Ehrlichman

May 29, 1971; 10:40 a.m.

E: We have a sort of Laird-type problem.

K: With whom?

E: On drugs.

K: With Laird?

E: Yes. Since you are the sole and exclusive contact with DOD I wanted to call this to your attention. Last night's TV was full of Packard's directive to the Defense Department that they immediately come up with a solution to the heroin problem in the Services. It was all over TV saying it is obvious we don't have any way to deal with this. Said that Packard has gallopped into the arena and is going to solve it.

K: You want him to shut up?

E: His directive is almost word for word with ours - they tried to get in ahead of us and take the credit away from the President, knowing he is going to have them over on the carpet Thursday morning. I have told Ziegler to put out to the pool on the airplane the reason Packard did this is that we directed him to.

K: Absolutely.

E: Either you or I should call Packard and tell him you don't play that kind of ball game and if you do that one more time we will put out some stuff that will sink him.

K: He is looking for an excuse to resign.

E: I don't care.

K: He didn't do that on his own -- Laird helped him. I completely agree with you. Call Packard, but don't give him a chance to grandstand.

E: I think you should call him.

K: I will if you wish, but you can be more outraged than I can because you know the facts. I will do it, but I would have to say that Ehrlichman is beside himself and that I agree with him.

By: KHLN NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telcon

Mr. Ehrlichman

May 29, 1971; 11:46 a.m.

K: I have talked to Dave Packard and he says he hasn't issued the directive yet.

E: Baloney!

K: I am just saying what he said. All he told them was to get up a directive.

E: It was quoted in the newspaper this morning.

K: I said I don't know all the details, but the President has to get credit for that and you can't go out preempting it. He said all he wants to do is show he is working and only the President is to get credit for it. Why don't you get in touch with him and tell him what he is to do and he will do it. I think that is more important right now than anything else.

E: All right.

K: Dave is a decent guy. All these other guys are barracudas but Dave does not mean any harm. All this was done on the telephone between Laird and Pursley.

E: I agree.

K: If you have any trouble, let me know.

E: OK.

ms

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Packard
12:45 pm, 5/29/71

K: Dave, I am calling you because John Ehrlichman is almost beside himself and I thought I could act somewhat as a buffer about the drug thing you put out yesterday. His feeling is he thought he had negotiated a directive in order to show Presidential initiative and then Defense put out as its own something that he was eager to get the President credit for.

P: The only thing is we were worried about this and felt we should get going. We can put this package together and let the President get credit for it.

K: His argument was the package you put out was what they were going to put out next week.

P: No, I asked Kelley to put together a package and we can submit it to the President. The only thing I am concerned about is we need better cooperation on this. We can put together a plan and do some good.

K: I will tell Ehrlichman that you will cooperate with the President and that you will relax.

P: Tell John I am anxious to get something out.

K: The only reason I am calling you is that these people over here are opposed to channel these things through us.

P: Tell John we will put a strong package together and let the President get credit for it.

K: Okay Dave.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telcon
Mr. Ehrlichman

May 29, 1971; xx 1:40 p.m.

K: I don't know whether the President got hold of you before he left.

E: About Rockefeller. Yes. It is not a very good idea. Who worked on it?

K: All I know is I heard he promised some money to Rockefeller. You knew he promised something. I had nothing to do with the conversations but he said much of it may be committed already and he said but John Ehrlichman can always find a way if he wants to and he will talk to you. You know, if Rockefeller thinks he has been promised something he won't be wrong.

E: We only have $90 million of discretionary money for that whole country's programs. I talked to Packard and to Jerry Freidhiem. It turns out he is the culprit in this thing.

K: It sounded to me as if Packard was honest about it.

E: Friedheim is the dirty bird. I said you should have told us. He said, we did. Al Haig called Pursley. Oh, channel 2 is going to play a rerun on drugs in the armed forces. Now, and I am going to watch it.

ms

By K.Y. NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telcon

Under Sec/State U. Alexis Johnson

May 29, 1971; 3:20 p.m.

K: Alex, I don't know whether you want to talk today about the SALT problem or play golf. I have somebody who has already waited an hour because the President was in a talkative mood, but I could see you around 11:45.

J: I could do that. Let's do that. I could have about 40 minutes in there perfectly all right.

K: We can do it in one-half hour easily.

J: That's fine with me.

ms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telcon
President Johnson
May 29, 1971; 3:25 p.m.

J: Hello.

K: Mr. President, two things. First I want to tell you what a great day it was last Saturday.

J: You looked mighty young up there with all those girls, Julie, Linda Bird and Lucy, in the front row.

K: They put me there. I was very flattered. Everyone I talked to who was there feel it was very warm and human and no one else could have pulled it off.

J: How nice of them. It was nice of you all to come.

K: I found the chapters especially fascinating. As I told Bill Jordan it was a valuable historical record. The only thing I am not sure about not having read the domestic ones is whether or not a chapter of your own reflections on what it adds up to might not help the reader understand. But except for that I thought it was extremely objective and extraordinarily fascinating.

J: I am highly pleased that you did not find anything that gave you trouble.

K: No. There was nothing in there that gave me trouble.

J: A lot of people are writing in connection with Vietnam, and what happened here and there. It opened the eyes of McNamara, Bundy and some of the others.

K: Some of the people don't look good when their memos of years ago are read.

J: Clifford has no memory whatever. Johnson (?) went to shorthand school and took notes on the Security Council meeting. When I gave it to him, that morning he went over those notes. He signed for it. It was his signature. Rusk got a Foreign Service officer to sign for it, but Clifford's signature is personal, but he has no memory of it happening.

K: I think the steps that led to your March 31 speech are absolutely fascinating. It makes people like Hoopes look ridiculous. I think this book will be an eye-opener to a very many people.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

J: I will give it to Galbraith and Schlesinger. They will review it and by the time they get through...

K: That is the problem. This fraternity of book reviewers is such that they scratch each other's back. But you have quoted so many of the documents and added strength to the book by doing almost no editorializing. You are letting these people speak for themselves. It isn't you against them; it is really they against themselves.

J: One thing the President told me you are going to do is to see that they declassify everything that can be declassified as soon as possible.

K: What can I do k to help with this?

J: We will have to send a memorandum to you. Under the archaic procedures they have at Defense and State they wouldn't release over 30 percent of the papers. They want to keep them another 20 to 30 years and by that time anybody who knew anything about them has lost interest or is dead. Bobby Kennedy didn't hesitate to release the letters from Krushchev. He made sure they did.

K: And that really did hurt.

J: They got a group to come down, and Rogers and Laird sent two or three men each. They spent about a month. What was concerning to them was to keep everything Secret. What is compelling to us from my Administration standpoint and from your Administration standpoint, because they have almost the same foreign policy, is let the truth get out.

K: We have the same enemies.

J: For 200 years we haven't declassified anything in 25 years. But the next 25 years are going to be different from the last 200. We are going to declassify everything unless you can prove that it will be harmful.

K: If Walt will send me a memorandum with some concrete directions so that we will know how to order them. Otherwise we will have to go back to the Departments and get the same old baloney. But if Walt can make a complete list of categories we can get a direct order.

J: When the President makes his commitment, two things he ought to specify. One is that the government supervise and go over this declassification because it would break him and all his friends if he had to do it. The second thing, I would certainly say that this gift to

By: KML NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

the government is made under the laws as they exist today. Williams changed the tax laws on me, not on Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover. He came down here in 1969 and he wrote amendment that took away any tax benefits you get from it. So the situation is that today I haven't got a collection of papers. Rusk hasn't sent his. McNamara. You get no benefit from them. Dean Rusk got just enough to pay for his room rent. The Rusk papers - I don't know what he will ultimately do. But some of the papers will be sold to Charles Hamilton and we will buy them back. Because this mean old man Williams went along and the Library of Congress says there has been not been one important gift of papers after that amendment has been adopted. So you just kill history.

K: I am going to make both these points late this afternoon when the President gets back.

J: There are 500 people whose papers I should have. I have not received one set since this amendment was adopted.

K: The other point you make about the declassification that they be settled before one leaves office because if you don't think the bureaucracy is as much opposed to our foreign policy as it was to yours. And they have a vested interest to leak out their secrets and prevent you and us from getting ours out. I look forward to getting this memorandum. And of course, as you know, I have no discretion myself but I will push it very hard.

J: Thank you so very much, my good Doctor.

ms

DECLASSIFIED
MJD 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

May 29, 1971 4:00 p.m.
President/Dr. Kissinger

P: You really missed a great day up there. That was magnificent. Did you ever see them do it? A magnificent ceremony.

K: I understand Haig was almost beside himself. He thought it was a tremendous speech, the best thing that has ever happened to West Point in its recent history and apparently you went into the mess hall.

P: Oh sure, that's routine. But the point is that is was as it turned out a damn good speech--it really hit the right thing and some things that needed to be said. Of course, the press will play up seeds of peace germinating, but on the other hand, the Corps and if we can get it broadly circulating, people in the Armed Services should read this and get a little hope. We have got to reestablish confidence in the military. Goddamn it, you know, I think Laird should do a better job on this

K: And the military ought to keep their pride in themselves.

P: I don't know if Laird is going out and making this kind of speech--I guess he is.

K: Laird has the problem that no one takes him seriously, no matter what he says.

P: That is what is needed. Somebody has got to inspire these men. Give them a little feeling. We gave them a little inspiration today.

K: Well, I understand that it was a tremendous success, and it turned out to be a good speech too.

P: Well, it wouldn't get any play--but that is irrelevant--the point is that it affected them, and they will circulate it.

P: Okay, you are all set for your trip, huh?

K: I am all set--we agreed on that speech exactly as you suggested. I am going to get right to the point--

P: You will just lay it right in there, and as the other things come along, you sort of zing em in whenever you feel it is the right time, you know.

K: You know you are absolutely right. What we have to do is to convince the other side, that this is indeed our final offer. And we can't do that by talking around the point.

P: Talking around the point, and saying that well, we are ready to be flexible again, and we have proved our good faith, etc.--the hell with all that!--they don't have any good faith--we don't either. Now we have got an offer--you can take it or leave it. This is it.

K: In fact, I put in that there is not time left for philosophy and long expositions. We both know others views, here is our final offer.

P: Great. And I think it will read well historically. It may work, who knows, it may shake them. But if they go back and turn it down, we know what our course is. But listen, if they turn it down, don't just think we're going back and make a peace offer. I am going to use whatever goddamn bombs we've got and we are going to bomb a hell of a lot in the North.

K: They may in fact turn it down Monday, Mr. President. Because they must have a pretty good idea what it is going to be.

P: If they turn it down Monday, then we are in a perfect condition to go forward and crack them. And crack them pretty damn good.

K: That's right. So I think we will be in a better position Monday, which ever way it turns.

P: Good luck, Henry. Have a good flight.

K: Thank you and congratulations.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger
Frank Sinatra
5/29/71, 6:05 pm

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Fine Frank. How are you? I thought you were performing tonight.

S: I am. I am leaving for the airport in 20 minutes to go to Memphis. It is only about an hour and 40 minute flight.

K: I just wanted to check with you. Are you coming down here Tuesday?

S: I will get in about 4 PM and I will call your office.

K: Which would you prefer? I will do it either way.

S: I will leave it up to you. If you want to have dinner along, fine, or if you want to have a few people, fine. I will be at the Madison Hotel and will call your girl and let her know that [REDACTED] I am in.

K: And maybe you can come by here.

S: Yes, perhaps at the end of the day.

K: Okay Frank, have a good weekend.

S: Thank you Henry.

mlh