TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>FOREWORD</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>PART I: THE PRESENT STRATEGIC BALANCE</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Background</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Measuring Strategic Strength</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Conflicts about Objectives</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>PART II: FACTORS THAT WILL AFFECT OUR NEAR AND MEDIUM TERM DECISIONS REGARDING STRATEGIC POLICIES</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>The Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Possibility</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>MIRV's</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>The Consequences of MIRV and ABM Developments Occurring Concurrently</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>China and the Sentinel Decision</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>The Role of Uncertainty in the Dynamics of the Arms Race</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Some Economic Considerations</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>PART III: OPTIONS FOR THE SEVENTIES</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Unilateral Steps</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>Negotiations with the Soviet Union to Curtail the Arms Race</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>A Final Note</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>APPENDIX: ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>Kinds of ABM Systems</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>The Effectiveness of ABM Systems</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>The Sentinel Decision and the Performance of the System</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>REFERENCES</td><td>54</td></tr></table>

FOREWORD

As we near the end of the decade, the United States and the Soviet Union must face major decisions regarding strategic forces and policies that will set the pattern for the 1970's. These decisions must be taken in the light of the inescapable fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union bear responsibility for the fate of the whole world; for a thermonuclear exchange would imperil the survival of mankind.

Specifically, both countries must consider

(1) whether to procure major systems such as new manned bombers, new strategic missiles, and ballistic missile defenses;

(2) what strategic force levels are appropriate--a problem of particular immediacy for the U.S.S.R. because of the current rapid growth of its missile force;

(3) what positions they should adopt regarding negotiations to end the arms race.

Unfortunately, there has been much confusion about these points. Thus, there is

(1) dispute about the appropriate measure of adequacy for strategic forces--
in particular, about the relationship between quantities of strategic weapons
and their possible political utility;

(2) a serious problem in weighing short-term advantages of decisions regarding strategic weapons against consequences that, in the longer run, may be harmful, considering probable adversary responses;

George W. Rathjens is now visiting professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was, until last June, Director of the Systems Evaluation Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses and before that, Special Assistant to the Director at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

-2-

(3) an unresolved conflict between the desire to minimize the probability of nuclear war and the desire to minimize damage should it occur;

(4) the question of what should be our response to the emergence of China as a nuclear power.

The author does not claim to treat these issues with complete impartiality. The paper will serve its purpose if it alerts the reader to the fact that this is a critical time of decision regarding the strategic arms race, and if it persuades him that decisions regarding procurement of specific weapons ought not to be made without most careful consideration of the relationships between such factors as the qualities of weapon systems, the objectives to which acquisition of strategic nuclear forces will contribute, the national interests of the U.S. and its adversaries, and America's responsibilities toward its allies and the rest of the world.

PART I

THE PRESENT STRATEGIC BALANCE

## Background

To a large extent present U.S. strategic capabilities represent the realization of plans developed during the last years of the Eisenhower Administration and at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration.

In part this is a consequence of the long lead-time required for the translation of a concept for a new strategic weapons system into an operational capability. But it is also due to the fact that the broad directions in which we and the Soviet Union were headed became apparent during the Eisenhower Administration. The development of the hydrogen bomb and ballistic missiles made the 1960's a period of mutual deterrence during which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could derive any winning advantage in a nuclear war. They could now destroy each other regardless of who struck first, even if they had defenses. Recognition of those facts set the pattern at the beginning of the 1960's for the strategic forces that we have since deployed; and the size of those forces was all but established by the end of the first year of the Kennedy Administration. Thus, by the time of the presentation of the budget for fiscal 1963 (late 1961), it was clear: that the Titan II force would be limited to 6 squadrons; that there would not be an expansion of the B-52 force beyond 14 wings nor an operational B-70 force; and that the size of the Polaris fleet would be set at 41 boats. The number of Minutemen was set at 800, raised to 950 the following year, and still later to the present level of 1000.

This rapid growth of U.S. strategic forces was in large measure due to concern that the
Soviet Union might have a significant superiority in strategic systems during the early sixties--

-4-

a concern that arose at the time of the election of 1960 but which was rapidly dissipated
by improved intelligence indicating that the "missile gap," if any, would be in our favor.

The projected size of the U.S. strategic force was set as large as it was--at 1054 inter-
continental ballistic missiles, 41 Polaris boats each with 16 missiles, and about 650 inter-
continental bombers--in part because of uncertainty about possible Soviet actions and the
importance given to hedging against the worst possible contingencies. However, there
was another factor that made a large force attractive--a desire to have a capability to limit
damage to the United States by destroying Soviet offensive capabilities. Indeed, there was
pressure, particularly from the Air Force, to expand our "counterforce" or "damage-
limiting" capabilities even further by enlarging our strategic offensive forces beyond the
levels finally decided on.

This pressure was resisted because of: (a) the probability of a compensating or over-
compensating expansion in Soviet offensive forces; (b) the unlikelihood of a war developing
in a way that would permit a U.S. attack to catch a significant fraction of the Soviet bomber
and missile force on the ground; (c) the relatively small diminution in damage to us that
would result from additional U.S. counterforce capability, even if circumstances should
develop under which we would attack before all of the Soviet strategic offensive force had been
launched. With time, the last of these arguments became increasingly persuasive since it
became apparent that the Soviet Union would emulate the United States in making its forces
relatively invulnerable by increasing emphasis on dispersing its ICBM's in "hardened" under-
ground protective sites, and by building a submarine-based missile force. Thus damage-limiting
arguments played a diminishing role in the rationalization of our strategic force posture as
shown, for example, by a comparison of former Secretary McNamara's Ann Arbor speech and
his testimony before a Senate Subcommittee in April 1968.¹

-5-

The demand by the Army to improve our "damage-limiting" capability by deploying an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system was also resisted simply because its performance seemed inadequate. To those with the decision-making responsibility it seemed clear that any ABM deployment by us would easily be offset by modest improvements in Soviet strategic offensive capabilities.

Thus, the line against further expansion of U.S. strategic forces was held during the early and mid-sixties. Nearly all of the important procurement decisions regarding major new strategic systems were negative: the decision not to develop a rail-mobile Minuteman; the decision not to proceed with the B-70 bomber force; the cancellation of Skybolt; and deferrals of decisions to go ahead with a full-scale ABM system and a new advanced manned strategic aircraft. Consequently, the budget for strategic forces dropped from over eleven billion dollars in 1962 to less than seven billion for fiscal 1966, as the major strategic weapons programs came to fruition without any major new procurement decisions.*

While the size of the U.S. strategic force approached the levels specified at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, Soviet strategic forces were growing rapidly, and they continue to do so. However, this growth has lagged several years behind ours, and still lags far behind in intercontinental bombers and especially in Polaris-type submarines (see Table 1). In numbers of ICBM's the Soviets are rapidly approaching the United States; but some of theirs are still "soft" or unprotected against the effects of a nuclear explosion, while in the case of the United States all the soft missiles were phased out several years ago.

* These figures, and others that appear later, do not reflect the total cost of our strategic program since certain research and development and other costs are not included. Also, the figures may be slightly deceptive in another respect since they are not converted to constant dollars. However, relative to the year-to-year budget changes, the correction for inflation would be small.

-6-

Table 1
2

UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>United States<sup>1</sup><br>Oct. 1968</th><th colspan="2">U.S.S.R.</th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Oct. '67</th><th>Oct. '68</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBM launchers<sup>2</sup></td><td>1054</td><td>720</td><td>900</td></tr><tr><td>SLBM (Sea launched ballistic missiles)<br>launchers<sup>3</sup></td><td>656</td><td>30</td><td>75-80</td></tr><tr><td>Total intercontinental missile launchers</td><td>1710</td><td>750</td><td>975-980</td></tr><tr><td>Intercontinental bombers<sup>4</sup></td><td>646</td><td>155</td><td>150-155</td></tr><tr><td>Total force loadings, approximate number<br>of deliverable warheads</td><td>4206</td><td>1000</td><td>1200</td></tr></tbody></table>

¹ The size of the U.S. strategic force has not changed significantly since mid-1967.

² Excludes ICBM test range launchers which could have some operational capability against the United States. The Soviets also have Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM's) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) which are capable of striking Eurasian targets.

³ In addition to the SLBM's on nuclear-powered submarines, the Soviets also have SLBM's on diesel-powered submarines whose primary targets are believed to be strategic land targets in Eurasia. The Soviets also have submarine-launched cruise missiles whose primary targets we believe to be naval and merchant vessels.

⁴ In addition to the intercontinental bombers, the Soviets also have a force of medium bomber/tankers capable of striking Eurasian targets.

-7-

Measuring Strategic Strength

The rapid growth in Soviet capabilities, coupled with the fact that the numbers of U.S.
launchers and strategic aircraft have been constant, and are expected to remain so for some
time, has naturally led to questioning, particularly in Congressional Hearings, about whether
the United States continues to have "superiority" in strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union; about whether the loss in "superiority," if it has occurred, could have been prevented;
about future trends; and indeed about the whole range of questions regarding feasible and
desirable objectives for strategic forces.

Until recently the most common measure of strategic strength was the number of delivery
vehicles possessed by each side, that is, the numbers of bombers and deployed missiles.
By this measure the United States has maintained superiority over the Soviet Union for several
years--superiority in numbers of intercontinental bombers, in numbers of Polaris type
submarines, and in numbers of ICBM's (or at least ICBM launchers). The measure was not
entirely satisfactory, however, in that it did not take into account qualitative differences in
the various missile and bomber systems. U.S. bombers and submarines were generally
believed to have superior performance capabilities. In addition, some bombers and missiles
carried substantially larger payloads than others.

As we enter the era of multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), the
measure is even less satisfactory, since some missiles may carry several warheads, while
others carry only one. Thus, in the last few years, when discussing the question of force
strength, Administration spokesmen have argued that the number of warheads is a more
meaningful measure than numbers of missiles and bombers.

Critics of Administration policy, however, have claimed that the Soviet Union has, or soon

-8-

may have, greater strategic strength than the United States because its missiles, while fewer
in number than ours, could, in the aggregate, carry more "megatons" since a larger fraction
of their missiles are large ones.

If any of these measures--number of delivery vehicles, number of warheads, or number
of megatons --is to be meaningful, it is necessary to take into account the expected inter-
actions during a nuclear exchange. To do that, survivability and penetrability factors have
been introduced. Thus, the Administration has spoken of the number of warheads that could
be delivered on target as the most appropriate measure of strength. But even that is not
entirely satisfactory.

To get to the ultimate measures, that is, the capability to inflict damage on the adversary
and to limit damage to oneself, one must also take into account the match of the weapons with
the targets. When this is done the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States are
not significant. Even if there were a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union weighted heavily
toward attempting to destroy our strategic offensive capabilities, we could with high confidence
inflict over fifty per cent fatalities in retaliation. And the situation is symmetric. In former
Secretary McNamara's posture statement for fiscal 1969,³ it is estimated that in an all-out
nuclear exchange in the mid-1970's each country could inflict 120 million fatalities on the
other in retaliation. This is probably a lower limit on the actual expected damage, in that
indirect and delayed effects of a nuclear attack, such as fatalities due to fire storms, maldistribu-
tion of resources and fall-out are generally not fully considered in making such estimates.

Despite some uncertainty about the absolute levels of damage that each side might experience
and about the recuperative ability of such heavily damaged societies, there seems little reason
to doubt that in a full-scale nuclear exchange at this time, the United States and the Soviet Union
would suffer about equally and grievously. The fabric of society in each country would

-9-

certainly be destroyed.

In view of the damage-inflicting capabilities of the two sides, the present situation is one of considerable stability. Even, and perhaps particularly, in the event of extreme crisis where attack seemed imminent, there would be a powerful moderating effect on both sides. Preemptive attack would be unlikely, since neither could hope to reduce damage to itself to a degree that would make such an attack seem rational if there were any possibility of avoiding the holocaust.

Yet despite the stability that does exist, there remains concern about instability and the consequences of escalation. Thus, the very existence of strategic forces may also serve to deter or at least inhibit the superpowers from commitments of conventional forces or even political commitments, if there is a significant risk of a superpower confrontation that could lead to uncontrollable escalation.

## Conflicts About Objectives

There would be little disagreement with the foregoing assessment of the present strategic balance. Yet, there is disagreement about the objectives that have been and might be served by our present strategic forces.

First, there is dispute about two closely related issues: whether during the last few years the numerical superiority that the United States has had in strategic forces has conferred on us some advantage in dealing with the Soviet Union; and whether strategic "superiority" would be meaningful in the future. The figures in Table 1 do indicate a continued large U.S. superiority in numbers of bombers, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and warheads. For all practical purposes, however, the present situation can be characterized as one of strategic "parity," in the sense that both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. can wreak unacceptable damage on each other.

-10-

But in fact, neither "superiority" nor "parity" are at this point very useful concepts, nor are they likely to be in the foreseeable future. Even quite large changes in capabilities could not be translated into useful political power. In the view of many this was already true by the early 1960's. They would hold, for example, that the Cuban missile crisis was resolved as it was because the United States was prepared to intervene with _conventional_ strength that the Soviet Union could not match; and that the existence of strategic forces for both sides served simply to deter escalation. Others argue, however, that it was not just the strategic strength on both sides and the fear of escalation, but rather actual U.S. _superiority_ in strategic strength that served to deter the Soviet Union from moving on Berlin or elsewhere as a response to our "quarantine" of Cuba.

While there may have been a basis for the latter argument in the early 1960's, it would be difficult to make such a case under present circumstances. The strategic forces of both sides are too large. Thus, as far as deterrence is concerned, we have certainly passed the point by now, if not in 1962, where both sides have "sufficiency"--probably a more useful concept for describing the present strategic balance than either "superiority" or "parity."

If the Soviet strategic retaliatory force were either doubled or halved, while ours remained constant, there would very likely be no discernible effect on U.S. resolve to stand up to the Soviet Union in a crisis. Yet, there continues to be a feeling among many Americans that we should still strive for "superiority." This feeling is grounded not in the expectation that numerical superiority in strategic strength could be translated with confidence into any politically useful option, but rather in a desire for a return to an earlier era when it seemed that our wealth could almost guarantee our superiority in any contest we chose to enter.

During the last decade we have become aware that our industrial capacity does not provide us

-11-

with the kind of superiority in exploitable strategic strength that we had vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. in the 1950's; nor does it solve our other problems such as Viet Nam and our cities. This has been a disillusioning and frustrating experience, and it is not surprising that we should wistfully seek to recapture the past and look for scapegoats who can be blamed for letting it escape.

Second, despite recognition that both societies would be destroyed by an all-out nuclear exchange, it is argued that our forces should be structured so that we can, in the event of war, "come out a little better than they do."⁴ Or, as Senator Richard Russell put it, "If we have to start over again with another Adam and Eve, then I want them to be Americans and not Russians--and I want them on this continent and not in Europe."⁵ Whatever their reaction to Senator Russell's apocalyptic remark, most Americans would probably agree that the first quotation expresses a desirable objective. But many believe it could only be pursued at the expense of an increase in the absolute level of damage to us or in the risk of war, or both, and doubt whether it is worth the price.

Third, there exists a difference of opinion regarding the extent to which we can or should rely on the possibility of escalation as a deterrent to actions by the Soviet Union other than direct attack against the United States. This controversial point has been one of the two critical considerations in NATO policy during the last few years (the other being the question of Soviet intent).

Finally, there is dispute about whether strategic weapons could serve as a deterrent or a response to Soviet or other non-nuclear attacks of limited objectives. The possibilities seem unrealistic or remote. Vis-à-vis the Soviet Union the risks of escalation seem too large. And as regards other adversaries, including China, it is difficult to imagine a

-12-

realistic provocation that could not be dealt with by other means, and to which a limited
strategic nuclear attack would be judged an appropriate response.*

That there is as much consensus in the United States as there is both about the con-
sequences of a nuclear exchange and about the present roles and limitations of strategic
forces is in part due to the fact that the Soviet-American strategic balance has not changed
qualitatively in several years. Although the Administration submissions for strategic
weapons have increased dramatically--some forty per cent from the fiscal 1967 budget
to that for fiscal 1969--because of the time lag between the obligation of money and the
impact on operational capabilities, our present posture does not yet reflect this recent
escalation in strategic budgets. In fact, the present operational force is probably changing
less rapidly than at any time since 1945--a reflection of the low strategic budgets of fiscal
1965 through 1967. Thus, there has been time for argument, and at least some resolution of
differences and maturation of opinion about the present situation, if not about future prospects
and objectives.

But unless we modify our present plans, our posture will soon begin to change qualitatively
and rapidly as our operational forces begin to reflect decisions made during the mid-1960's
regarding such new systems as Sentinel, Poseidon, Minuteman III, and the FB-111 bomber.
Soviet operational forces, in addition to growing rapidly, may also change in new qualitative
ways if the U.S.S.R. deploys some systems it apparently has in development, such as
fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and land-mobile ICBM's.

*The problems of objectives will continue to be serious ones as we develop policies and postures for the 1970's. They are discussed further in Part III of this paper.

-13-

We are in effect at a crossroads. We and the Soviet Union now have a better chance than we are likely to have in the foreseeable future to make decisions that may enable us to avoid or at least moderate another sprial in the strategic arms race. Such a race will not only be expensive and dangerous for both countries, but may produce even more disagreement in the United States about realistic and desirable strategic force objectives.

-14-

PART II

REGARDING STRATEGIC POLICIES

During the early sixties there was hope, albeit without real encouragement from the Soviet Union, that even if we could not see an end to the Soviet-American competition in the strategic area, we might at least see a period of stability commencing in the late 1960's and carrying on into the 1970's--a perpetuation of the kind of qualitative balance that actually obtains today. This would imply willingness of each side to rely on the capability of its strategic forces to deter any attack by the other, and an acceptance of the fact that with "sufficiency" in strategic offensive forces, little would be gained either by further growth in those forces or by deploying active defenses against them. Three considerations now make the realization of that hope questionable.

First, there is no evidence of a leveling off in the growth of Soviet strategic offensive capabilities, despite the fact that, at least as regards ICBM's, the Soviet force is now comparable in numbers to ours.

Second, the development of some sort of nuclear capability is becoming easier for the lesser powers as the technology and the use of nuclear power become more widespread. Of particular concern is the fact that the Chinese nuclear program has moved ahead more rapidly than we had expected at the beginning of the decade.

Third, technological developments have led some to believe that there may be an increased

-15-

possibility that in the event of a nuclear exchange, the superpowers might be able to limit
damage to themselves to levels substantially below those that would result with present
capabilities. This might be done by preemptively attacking the adversary's delivery systems
before launch, by deploying active defenses, or by a combination of the two.

We may enhance our chances that the present stable situation will continue into the
seventies if some restraint can be placed on these developments. We may be able to buy time
through the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and by reaching agreement
with the Soviet Union to constrain the deployment, and possibly the development, of new
strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. Realistically, however, we have to recognize
that, even if implemented, such agreements may not suffice. For example, the fact that
China will not be a party is a serious defect.

On the other hand, it is probable that without such agreements, or at least reciprocal
unilateral restraint, a new spiral in the arms race will be one of our burdens of the seventies.
In the United States the beginnings are already reflected in the sharp rise in the budget for
strategic systems.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Possibility*

With the possible exception of the $n^{th}$ country problem, it has long seemed that the most

*Unless otherwise specified, references here to ABM are to systems designed exclusively or primarily to defend population and industry. For further discussion of the ABM problem, see the Appendix.

-16-

serious threat to stability is the possibility of an offense-defense race: deployment of ABM
systems; followed by compensating or over-compensating expansion of adversary offensive
capabilities; followed in turn by further improvements in defenses, and so on. In the United
States it has generally been recognized that such a cycle of action and reaction would be a
futile exercise leading to no improvement in either American or Soviet security and to greatly
increased expenditures for both nations. This conclusion, which contributed to the refusal of
the U.S. Administrations of the last decade to deploy an anti-Soviet ABM system, was based
on two considerations:

(1) no technology appeared in sight that would permit deployment
of a defense that could not be offset by less expensive improvements
in adversary offensive capabilities;

(2) the Soviet Union would, it was believed, react to any U.S. defensive
deployment by making just such improvements in its offensive
capabilities.

On the first point there has been little dispute: certainly, little in the U.S. technical
community. The second is more contentious. It has been argued by ABM proponents that
we cannot be sure the Soviets would react to a U.S. defensive deployment as former
Secretary McNamara and others have postulated they would; they might continue to expand
their offensive capabilities, without fully compensating for the effects of a U.S. active defense.

On the Soviet side, there was no evidence during the early sixties that decision-makers
were prepared to accept the prevailing American views about the action-reaction phenomenon,
or about the intrinsic advantage of the offense and the futility of defensive deployment.

-17-

Within the last few years there have been changes that might indicate some convergence of Soviet and American views. We have noted that the Soviet ABM program is not proceeding as rapidly as the Americans had expected. Indeed, there is no evidence of deployment of any system other than that around Moscow. This, plus the professed Soviet willingness to enter into negotiations to control both offensive and defensive systems, may be indicative of some disillusionment regarding the feasibility of deployment of really effective defense systems; of concern about the very large costs; or of concern about the action-reaction arms race implications of ABM deployment.

On the U.S. side there has been increased interest in ABM defense, in part triggered by concern about the more-rapid-than-expected development of nuclear capabilities by China, but also based on a somewhat changed view regarding the technical problems and possibilities of defense.

Although most of the American technical community would agree that the offense continues to have an advantage over the defense, there is an enormous range of views held by experts regarding the difficulties of penetrating defenses. In recent months this has been brought out especially in discussions about the probable effectiveness of a defense (Sentinel) to cope with the Chinese offensive threat (see Appendix). At one extreme, Drs. Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe have argued that overcoming a defense such as Sentinel would be relatively easy, and that even the Chinese could, and quite likely would, incorporate in their first generation of ICBM's the necessary penetration aids to enable them to do so.⁶ At the other end of the spectrum, Administration spokesmen have maintained that it is within our capability, at a cost of only three to five billion dollars, to limit damage to the United States from a Chinese

-18-

ICBM attack in the seventies to a very low level.

The most extreme claims have been made by Dr. John Foster, the Pentagon's Director of Defense Research and Engineering: "I have reasonably high confidence that the Sentinel system, when first deployed, will provide damage _denial_ against the Communist Chinese;" ⁷ and by Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze who stated, "We are confident that this sophisticated defense can provide us with high assurance of denying damage to the United States from the type of attack the CPR _/_ Chinese People's Republic _/_ will be able to launch in the mid-70's. With further foreseeable improvements we believe we can maintain such protection at least until the 1980's." ⁸

The difference in judgment regarding the effectiveness of Sentinel is in part due to a
difference in opinion about Chinese capabilities; but beyond that, there is a great range of
opinion in the technical community regarding how well Sentinel could be expected to perform
against the Chinese or the Soviet Union. Some sceptics argue that the defense may fail
catastrophically, considering its great complexity and the fact that it will never be possible
to test the system adequately in peacetime.

MIRV'S

One of the few comforting things about the present strategic balance was noted earlier: even if a nuclear holocaust seemed imminent, there would be little incentive for either of the superpowers to initiate a preemptive counterforce attack, because their strategic forces, particularly those of the United States, have been developed and deployed so that they can

-19-

"ride out" an attack against them. Our bomber force is in a sufficient state of alert so that, given the warning of missile attack which we can reasonably expect, a large fraction could be airborne before the arrival of Soviet missiles. The part of the Polaris force that is at sea--and it is the larger part--is believed to be almost invulnerable, considering present Soviet anti-submarine warfare capabilities. And our ICBM's have been deployed with sufficient spacing between them so that it is unlikely that more than one could be destroyed by a single Soviet warhead. Further, the underground silos are believed to provide considerable protection against the blast effects of a nuclear explosion. Consequently, given the combination of yield and accuracy which, it is believed, characterize the present Soviet ICBM force, several Soviet missiles would be required on the average to destroy a single Minuteman or Titan.

The most serious threat to this stability is the possibility of the development of systems for delivering several warheads from a single booster, each against a separate target, all with greater accuracies than have been realized so far. Such multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) now appear technically feasible, and the U.S. has announced its intention to equip both some of its land-based missiles (Minuteman III) and its sea-based missiles (Poseidon) with such reentry vehicles. This raises the at-least-theoretical possibility that with a preemptive attack the U.S. could destroy all of the Soviet fixed missiles, and other targets as well, with a U.S. missile force smaller than the force it was attacking.
Conversely, the Soviets could in principle destroy the U.S. Minuteman and Titan force with a few hundred ICBM's, if each had several warheads that could be delivered with high accuracy.

-20-

The MIRV threat is not an immediate one to either side. It will take a major effort to develop the concept and the accuracies required for an effective counterforce capability. But there is no doubt that it is technically feasible. It is just a matter of time, engineering effort, and money--probably lots of all three.

The United States decision to go ahead with the Minuteman III and Poseidon programs was taken only partly because of desire to have a greater "damage-limiting" capability than would otherwise be available in a missile force with a fixed number of launchers. The actual decision to procure systems employing MIRV's has been specifically keyed to concern about Soviet ABM developments,⁹ and to the view that we must have a capability of inflicting some specified level of damage on the Soviet Union with a _high_ degree of assurance. We could have relied on a number of other options as the prime means of defeating a possible Soviet ABM defense, e.g., precursor nuclear bursts to produce radar blackout; electronic jamming; decoys and chaff; saturation of radar discrimination capability; targeting of ABM radars; or combinations of these things. Certainly, with a heavy emphasis on such penetration techniques, we would have had a high probability of getting through any defenses. Such options do not offer quite the assurance of success that exhaustion through the use of MIRV's might (_assuming_ that the number of adversary interceptor missiles is known.) But neither are any of these other measures, or combinations of them, quite so likely to produce an expansion in Soviet offensive forces, for they do not pose a threat to those forces. MIRV's must, in Soviet eyes, just as Soviet MIRV's would to us.

In our attachment to "assured destruction" as a measure of deterrent adequacy, and in focusing on MIRV's to maintain it, we may end up paying a price that in the long term could

-21-

be a heavy one. Such high assurance was not always one of our requirements. In the pre-
missile era there was considerable uncertainty, probably more than many liked to admit,
about how well bombers could penetrate defenses. We had an adequate deterrent because
there was a reasonably high probability of our being able to inflict a very high level of damage
on the Soviet Union. It may be that with the uncertainties that ABM defenses will introduce,
we will want or be forced to rely again on a reasonably high probability, rather than on near-
certainty, of being able to inflict a high level of damage on our adversaries as a deterrent.
This will be particularly true if in striving for near-certainty, we fuel the arms race in ways
that may result in a net diminution in our security. The "assured destruction" concept
probably served to limit expansion of our strategic forces in the past few years. But in the
years just ahead, as the uncertainties now implicit in ABM's and MIRV's become explicit,
this concept could be used to justify almost unlimited expansion of strategic forces.

There are, of course, possible threats to strategic retaliatory forces besides MIRV's
and ABM's. But none of the others seems quite as serious. The development of fractional
orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) could enhance Soviet capability to attack our aircraft
on the ground by surprise. But that development is being countered by improved warning systems.
Advances in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) could lead to some increase in the vulnerability of
our Polaris fleet if we did nothing to counter the development. But ASW is likely to be a losing
game for some time, since any improvements will be offset, or more than offset, by improvements
in the missile-launching submarines or, if need be, by extension of the range of the missiles
they carry.

-22-

While the possibility of either ABM or MIRV development provides a stimulus to the arms race, in their combination there is a more serious threat. It is conceivable that one of the superpowers, with an ABM system, might develop MIRV's to the point where it could use them to destroy the bulk of its adversary's ICBM force in a preemptive attack. Its air and ABM defenses would then have to deal with a much degraded retaliatory blow, consisting only of the sea-launched forces and any ICBM's and aircraft that might have survived the preemptive attack. Problems of defense in such a contingency would be formidable; however, they would be significantly less difficult than if the adversary's ICBM force had not been seriously depleted. The defense problem would be relatively simple, particularly if the bulk of the adversary's retaliatory capability were, as is true for the United States and to a far larger degree for the Soviet Union, in its ICBM's, most of which would presumably have been destroyed.

It may seem unlikely that either superpower would initiate such a preemptive attack, in view of the hypothesized capabilities, the great uncertainties in effectiveness, particularly as regards defenses, and the disastrous consequences should even a relatively small fraction of the adversary's retaliatory force get through. But with both MIRV's and ABM's such a preemptive attack would not seem as unlikely as it does now. It would not necessarily be irrational if war appeared almost certain, and if by striking first, one could limit damage to a significantly lower level than if the adversary were to strike the first blow.* In short, if

*This point is discussed further in Part III.

-23-

one or both of the two superpowers had such capabilities, the world would be a much more
unstable place than it is now.

Obviously, neither superpower would permit its adversary to develop such capabilities
without responding, if it could, by strengthening its retaliatory forces. But the response
problem becomes more difficult if the adversary develops both MIRV's and ABM's than
if he develops only one.

Against a MIRV threat _alone_ there are such obvious responses as greater reliance
on sea-launched or other mobile systems. Such responses are likely to be acceptable
because, while the costs of highly survivable systems are high (perhaps higher by an
order of magnitude than the costs of simple ICBM's), only relatively small numbers of
such secure retaliatory weapons would be required to provide an adequate "assured destruction
capability." Indeed, a force the size of our present Polaris fleet might be adequate.

The response to ABM _alone_ might also be kept within acceptable limits because the
expenditures required to offset effects of defense are, as indicated earlier, likely to be
small compared to the costs of the defense.

But if it is necessary to acquire retaliatory capabilities, which are costly on a unit
basis because of the MIRV threat, in sufficient numbers to saturate or exhaust ABM defenses,
the total cost could be very great. Indeed, if one continued to rely heavily on exhaustion of
defenses as the preferred technique for penetration, the offense might no longer have a
significant cost-effectiveness advantage over the defense.

Thus, the concurrent development of MIRV's and ABM's raises the spectre of a more
precarious balance of terror a few years hence, a rapidly escalating arms race in an attempt

-24-

to prevent the instabilities from getting out of hand, or quite possibly both.

## China and the Sentinel Decision

It is difficult for us to grasp the implications of new technological factors for a rational strategic force policy for the seventies. This would be so even if we only had bilateral U.S. - U.S.S.R. relationships to consider, but the emergence of China and possibly other states as nuclear powers compounds the difficulties. The problems have begun to come into focus as we have been forced to consider

(1) whether it is desirable to try to inhibit the spread of nuclear capabilities to other countries;

(2) what price we might be willing to pay to do so;

(3) what the chances of success might be;

(4) what our response should be to developments that we cannot prevent.

The first three questions have been at the heart of the debate on such issues as the NATO multilateral force (MLF), U.S. policy regarding control of fissionable materials and technology relevant to nuclear weapons development, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The first question--whether it is desirable to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons-- has been answered in the affirmative, at least by the United States and most other countries. Not only have we decided that the spread is undesirable, but we have also applied fairly

-25-

stringent controls on our exports of nuclear fuel and equipment, despite some political and
economic costs. And, in agreeing on a formulation of the non-proliferation treaty acceptable
to the Soviet Union, we have incurred criticism, whether justified or not, from some quarters
in Europe.

Nevertheless, the prospects for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities are
not good. The technology for building both warheads and delivery systems is now within the
reach of perhaps a dozen powers that do not have nuclear weapons; and with the growing use
of nuclear reactors, an even larger number of nations will soon have quantities of plutonium
adequate for limited stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Development of capabilities that would
be significant against one of the superpowers could be an expensive proposition, particularly
if we were to deploy limited ABM defense systems and if the emergent nuclear power desired
high confidence of penetrating that defense. But such nuclear capabilities as Israel might
consider adequate against the Arab states, or India against Pakistan, could be acquired at
costs that are not large compared to the present defense budgets of those nations.

There is some hope that these developments can be prevented or at least delayed by the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But even if that treaty comes into effect, accession by India,
for one, appears unlikely. And in any case there is the particularly worrisome problem of
China.

Whether our strategic offensive forces would alone be adequate to deter a Chinese
nuclear attack requires judgments about the vulnerability of China and the rationality of its
leadership.

-26-

Because a relatively small fraction of China's population is urban, it is far less vulnerable than that of the U.S. or the Soviet Union to nuclear attack (except to an attack with large yield weapons relying heavily on fall-out). However, China's modern industry is heavily concentrated and could be destroyed with a small number of nuclear weapons. These could be delivered without significantly compromising our capabilities against the U.S.S.R. This is true not only because our strategic offensive capabilities are so large relative to our actual requirements for retaliation against either country, but also because Chinese air defenses are so poor that we could use bombers with great flexibility, and with only moderate losses, to deliver an attack of almost any weight against China. As former Secretary McNamara has stated, "We possess now, and will continue to possess for as far ahead as we can foresee, an overwhelming first-strike capability with respect to China." 10

Thus, the only impediment to relying on our strategic offensive capabilities as a deterrent to Chinese nuclear attack is possible irrationality of the Chinese leadership. On this point there is an extraordinary divergence of opinion. Some, for example, General J.P. McConnell, the Air Force Chief of Staff, argue that the Chinese are highly irrational, 11 but the record hardly suggests that. On the contrary, despite a notorious record of vituperation, the Chinese have been quite careful in the actual use of force, particularly when there was any likelihood of open conflict with the United States or the Soviet Union.

However, one does not have to subscribe to the McConnell view to admit the possibility of Chinese nuclear attack, particularly in response to great provocation. As long as there is any possibility, possession by China of an intercontinental nuclear capability will serve to some degree as an effective deterrent to large-scale U.S. actions against China. This is

-27-

particularly true considering that (a) the interests in the Far East over which the United
States and China might come into conflict are not likely to be vital to us; and (b) the damage
we might suffer should the Chinese retali ate could be very great.

Indeed, the desire to have a deterrent vis-à-vis the U.S. may well have been one of
the major motivations for the extraordinary effort China has made to develop a nuclear
weapons capability. (Other plausible reasons are prestige, and possible use to coerce
its neighbors in Asia.)

Recognizing that a Chinese nuclear attack, however irrational, could not be discounted
completely, we made the decision to deploy Sentinel. But one must wonder about its
effectiveness in coping with China's nuclear capability. Former Secretary McNamara
made it clear that Sentinel was to be bought largely because of its anticipated effectiveness
in reducing damage to the United States in the event of a Chinese ICBM attack in the seventies.¹²
This is an objective it may well accomplish. Will it have any other value? It will hardly
diminish the prestige that China has acquired through possession of a nuclear capability;
on the contrary, our decision to deploy Sentinel will tend to magnify the importance of the
Chinese achievement. And Sentinel is hardly a direct response to the possibility that China
might threaten its neighbors with nuclear attack, although it was claimed by the Administration
that Sentinel would reinforce confidence in Asian states that the United States would come
to their aid if they were threatened by China.

Sentinel could conceivably restore whatever freedom of action we might have felt we
had to intervene in Asia before the acquisition of a Chinese intercontinental nuclear capability,
but only if we had extraordinarily high confidence in its effectiveness. Otherwise, the

-28-

Chinese nuclear capability would still be able to serve what may have been its primary purpose: deterrence of the United States. Can we have that high confidence? Probably not, considering the many uncertainties involved in the effectiveness of ABM systems (see Appendix).* But that is only one side of the coin. The other, more ominous, possibility is that we might base vital decisions on misplaced confidence in Sentinel.

Another aspect of the decision to deploy Sentinel is its possible impact on the Soviet-American strategic relationship (see page 31). In short, it would appear that the Sentinel decision has very serious implications. The issue is whether the possible utility of Sentinel in saving lives in the unlikely event of a Chinese nuclear attack is sufficient to justify

(1) the costs;

(2) the risk that we might act based on a misplaced confidence in its effectiveness; and

(3) the undesirable impact of the decision on the Soviet-American strategic balance.

Any conceivable flexibility Sentinel may give us in dealing with Chinese aggressiveness or with the accidental launch of missiles against us is probably negligible compared to the other considerations.

* This argument seems sound to the extent that one is concerned about most kinds of action we might take against China. In a contingency where we would be prepared to use nuclear weapons in the numbers required for an effective attack against Chinese ICBM capabilities, we might have some confidence that Sentinel could actually intercept whatever, if any, Chinese ICBM's had survived our preemptive attack. That is the one option that might be significantly more acceptable if we had Sentinel than if we did not.

-29-

As has been seen throughout this paper, uncertainty about adversary intentions and capabilities may well be the most powerful stimulant of the arms race. Its pernicious effects can be illustrated by several examples:

(1) our reaction, indeed over-reaction, to uncertainty in the case of the "missile gap;"

(2) the Soviet decision to deploy the so-called Tallinn air defense system, possibly made in the expectation that we would go ahead with deployment of B-70 bombers or SR-71 strike reconnaissance aircraft; and

(3) the Sentinel decision.

An even better illustration is our response to the Tallinn system (which, until recently, we thought might be an ABM system) and to the _possible_ extension of the Moscow ABM system into a country-wide system. In order to have high assurance of our ability to get through _possible_ Soviet ABM defenses, we have embarked on the development of various penetration aids and even of new missiles--Minuteman III and Poseidon.

All these examples have in common the fact that if doubt exists about adversary capabilities or intentions, prudence requires that one respond, not on the basis of what one expects, but on a considerably more pessimistic projection. We generally base our plans--and make much of the fact--on what has become known as the "greater-than-expected threat." In so doing, we--and presumably the Soviet Union--have often over-reacted. The extent of the over-reaction is directly dependent on the degree of uncertainty about adversary intentions and capabilities.

-30-

The problem is compounded by lead-time requirements for response. According to the Johnson Administration, our decisions to go ahead with Minuteman III, Poseidon and Sentinel had to be made when they were because of the possibility that in the mid-seventies the Soviets *might* have a reasonably effective ABM, and the Chinese, an ICBM 14 capability. And the Soviets had to make a decision to develop the Tallinn system (if the decision was made because of the B-70 program), long before we ourselves knew whether we would deploy an operational B-70 force.

Once the decisions to respond to ambiguous indications of adversary activity were made, it proved impossible to modify the response, even when new intelligence became available. For example, between the time of announcement of our Sentinel decision and the time of Congressional debate on the appropriation for it, evidence became available that the Chinese threat was not developing as rapidly as had been feared. Yet, despite this information, those in the Congress who attempted to defer the appropriation for Sentinel failed. Similarly, at this writing, as the Poseidon and Minuteman III programs begin to move forward with momentum, it seems much less likely that it did at the time of their conception that the Soviet Union will deploy the kind of ABM system that was the Administration's main rationale for these programs. On the Soviet side, the Tallinn deployment continued long after it became clear that no operational B-70 force would ever be built.

Of the kinds of weapons development that can stimulate over-response on the part of one's adversary, it is hard to imagine one more troublesome than anti-ballistic missile defenses. Besides uncertainty about adversary intentions, and the need, because of lead-time requirements, for early response to what the adversary *might* do, there is the added fact that the uncertainties about how well an ABM system might perform are

-31-

far larger than in the case of strategic offensive systems. The conservative defense
planner will design his ABM system on the assumption that it may not work as well as
he hopes; that is he will over-design it to take into account as fully as he can all im-
aginable modes of failure and enemy offensive threats. But the offensive planner will
assume that the defense might perform much better than he expects; so he will over-
design his response. Thus, there is over-reaction on both sides. These uncertainties
result in a divergent process: an arms race with no apparent limits other than financial,
each round more expensive than the last. Also, because of over-reaction on the part of
the offense, there may be an increase in the ability of each side to inflict damage on the
other.

All one needs to make this depressing possibility a bleak reality is a triggering
mechanism. The Soviet ABM program, by stimulating the Minuteman III and Poseidon
programs, may have served that purpose. And, perhaps unintentionally, the Chinese
nuclear program may also have triggered an action-reaction chain, of which our Sentinel
response is the second link.

It can be assumed that there will be considerable pressure and effort to make
Sentinel highly effective against a "greater-than-expected" Chinese threat. But such a
system will undoubtedly have some capability against Soviet ICBM's. Soviet decision-
makers, who must assume that Sentinel might perform better than they expect, will at
least have to consider that possibility as they plan their offensive capabilities. More
important, they will have to respond on the assumption that the Sentinel decision may
foreshadow a decision to build an anti-Soviet ABM system. Although the Johnson

-32-

Administration has argued that there need be no such response, * several facts seem to contradict this:

(1) there has been support for the Sentinel decision as a first step toward an anti-Soviet ABM deployment, particularly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such influential Senators as Richard Russell of Georgia.**

(2) Secretary Clifford has acknowledged that Sentinel will complicate the Soviet attack problem;***

(3) Sentinel will include components that could easily be integrated into an anti-Soviet system; and

(4) because of the Sentinel program, production lines will have been established that will shorten the lead-time for an anti-Soviet ABM deployment.

Thus, it is probably not a question of whether the Soviet Union will respond to Sentinel. Rather one must consider whether it will limit its response to one that does not require a U.S. counter-response; and whether it is too late for us to stop the Sentinel deployment.

*Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke has argued, "...because our proposed deployment poses no possible threat to the Soviet deterrent, it need lead to no acceleration of the Soviet-American strategic arms race."16 And former Secretary McNamara has stated, "There will not be any misunderstanding by the Russians because they are sophisticated enough to see, in the development plans that will be made public, the distinction between Chinese-oriented and Soviet-oriented population protection systems."17

**General Wheeler stated he was satisfied with the Sentinel decision because "everything is being done that will contribute to the type of defense which the Joint Chiefs have been advocating [i.e., a full-scale ABM]."18 He and General Johnson also alluded to the possible expansion of Sentinel to a Nike X(i.e., anti-Soviet) type system.19 Senator Russell has stated "...I consider it [Sentinel] primarily the beginning of a system to protect the people of this country against a Soviet missile atomic attack."20

***This is also apparent from former Secretary McNamara's last posture statement, which included an estimate that, should the Soviets fail to respond to our Sentinel deployment by providing penetration aids for their missiles, U.S. fatalities would be reduced from 120 million to about 100 million in the event of an all-out war in the mid-seventies.21

-33-

With such examples in mind, it is apparent that reduction in uncertainty about adversary intentions and capabilities is a sine qua non to curtailing the strategic arms race. There are a number of ways of accomplishing this (in addition to intelligence collection, which obviously makes a great contribution).

First, there is unilateral disclosure. In the case of the United States there has been a conscious effort to inform both the American public and the Soviet leadership of the rationale for many of our decisions regarding strategic systems and, to the extent consistent with security, of our capabilities. This has been done particularly through the release by the Secretary of Defense of an annual posture statement--an institution which hopefully will be both continued by the United States, and emulated some day by the Soviets. It would be in their interest as well as ours. Because there has been no corresponding effort by them we probably over-react to Soviet decisions more than they do to ours. (At least, it is easier to trace a causal relationship between their decisions and our reactions than vice versa.)

Second, negotiations to curtail the arms race, even if abortive, or any other dialogue, may be very useful if they result in any reduction of uncertainty about the policies, capabilities, or intentions of the parties.

Finally, some weapons systems may be less productive of uncertainty than others that might be chosen instead. For example, it is likely to be less difficult to measure the size of a force of submarine-launched or fixed missiles than that of a land-mobile force. Similarly, it would be easier to persuade an adversary that a small missile carried only a single warhead than would be the case with a large vehicle. Such considerations must be borne in mind in evaluating alternative weapons systems.

-34-

In short, while uncertainty about adversary capabilities and intentions may not always be bad--in some cases, the existence of uncertainty contributes to deterrence--we, and the Soviet Union, would seem well advised to make great efforts to avoid giving each other cause to over-react to our decisions because of inadequate understanding of their meaning.

## Some Economic Considerations

It has been pointed out that in terms of total obligational authority, the annual U.S. budget for strategic forces has risen some 40 per cent in the last three years: from some 6.7 billion dollars for fiscal 1966 to 9.6 billion for fiscal 1969. A major part of this increase arises from the three new strategic programs--Poseidon, Minuteman III and Sentinel. The estimated total cost of the three amounts to about 10 billion dollars over several years.

If no other new strategic programs are begun before these are completed, we might get through the next few years without the budget for strategic forces growing much beyond that proposed for fiscal 1969. However, that seems unlikely. Aside from the probability that the actual costs of the aforementioned programs will exceed the estimates, other developments are in sight.

Administration spokesmen have made it clear that Sentinel will have to be upgraded to take into account improvements in Chinese capabilities. This could be very costly since it would probably require the addition of terminal defenses for cities and a comprehensive fall-out shelter program. Thus, upgrading Sentinel could easily cost an additional 1 billion to 3 billion dollars per year, starting in the early seventies, and with the costs increasing rapidly thereafter.

-35-

Second, there is the possibility of expanding the Sentinel system into a full-scale anti-Soviet ABM system. In that case the costs would probably be at least 5 billion dollars a year shortly after the expansion began.

Third, there is a proposal to develop an improved air defense system involving an air-borne warning and control system (AWACS) with a ten-year cost of 10 billion to 12 billion dollars.

Fourth, there is pressure for a new advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA) to replace the B-52's, a program that may well cost 10 billion dollars spread over several years.

Finally, there is a possibility, already under consideration, of new U.S. strategic missile programs. The possible vulnerability of our strategic forces to a Soviet MIRV threat would provide one impetus for such programs. A massive Soviet ABM program would be another. The character and magnitude of the U.S. response would depend on which of these Soviet developments was of concern to us. If both were, our response could well cost 3 billion to 5 billion dollars per year.

Thus, if one considers only the programs now under way and under serious consideration, during the early seventies, we can expect annual budgets for strategic forces of between 12 billion and 25 billion dollars. By the late seventies, costs could well be higher.

The impact of these high levels of expenditure, particularly over a long period of time, on economic growth and on our ability to meet other demands of our society, cannot be dismissed lightly. If our economy would otherwise be operating with substantial unemployment, the effect might be relatively small, even at a level of 25 billion dollars per year.

-36-

However, even then a large fraction of the country's advanced engineering talent would be committed to endeavors that produce little spin-off relevant to our major social problems. If one makes the more optimistic assumption that we could otherwise maintain a high level of employment, the social costs of allocating 2 per cent of our GNP in the early part of the next decade to a strategic weapons program, and possibly a larger fraction during the latter half, are even more glaring. If we achieve full employment as a consequence of large military programs, we may avoid short-term economic problems. However, in so doing, we will deny ourselves the long-term benefits of investing the same resources in our capital plant, in education, and in the other foundations on which our society is built.

But the direct costs inherent in high levels of defense expenditures are not the only drawbacks. Military programs and the fortunes and influence of the military-industrial complex, of which President Eisenhower spoke in his farewell address, are dependent on the maintenance of conflict or at least on a high level of international tension. It would be a mistake to claim that armaments are the sole, or even the primary, cause of such tensions. But it would also be wrong to deny that armaments cause tensions--witness the Cuban missile crisis. In a very real sense the arms race feeds on itself with adverse effects on international relations.

In this connection the impact of an expensive arms race on Soviet society should also concern us. Some Administration witnesses have testified that they are not particularly unhappy about the prospect of Soviet expenditures on defenses. Thus, they argue for AMSA on the grounds that it would divert to air defenses Soviet resources that would otherwise be available for improving Soviet offensive capabilities, which would cause us more concern.

22

-37-

This argument is open to serious question. In the Soviet Union, probably to an even greater degree than in the United States, demands for new weapons systems, whether defensive or offensive, will almost certainly be met largely at the expense of the civil economy. And there is little basis for doubting the capacity of the Soviet economy to meet these demands.

It would be a mistake to believe that by spending enough on arms we can force the Soviet Union to accept second class status simply because of its smaller economic and industrial capacity. Long before that point is reached our own growth will have been stunted and our society badly distorted by the military demands placed on it.

The effect of the arms race on Soviet decision-making must also be considered. A rapid growth rate and increased consumption and consumer influence in the Soviet Union are almost certainly in the long-term U.S. interest. Conversely, the greater the Soviet defense budget, the stronger will be the hand and the longer the tenure of those elements in Moscow most inimical to us.

Thus, we should view increased allocation of Soviet resources to the arms race as triply disadvantageous to us: by increasing the threat to us; by requiring that we devote our own resources to responding; and by delaying changes in Soviet society which are the long-term hope for a more stable, peaceful world.

-38-

PART III

OPTIONS FOR THE SEVENTIES

Unilateral Steps

As we look to the future, we are confronted with two broad dilemmas: that of minimizing the likelihood of escalation while relying on it as a deterrent; and that of reconciling our desire to minimize damage to ourselves in the event of war with our desire to escape the adverse consequences that may flow from developing damage-limiting capabilities.

The first seems the easier to deal with. Escalation to an all-out nuclear war is properly seen as such a disaster that extraordinary efforts seem justified in order to minimize this risk. Yet our interests have sometimes been served by the possibility of escalation, because it deterred the superpowers from involvement in political or military confrontations.

Relying on escalation is the cheap defense for Western Europe and particularly for Berlin. But unless we can limit damage that the Soviet Union can inflict on the United States to low levels--which seems unlikely--it is an extremely risky option. Relying on the threat of escalation may lack credibility, and if it is put to the test we lose either way: whether escalation results or whether it does not.

It is within our power to increase the likelihood of escalation. This has happened as a result of our deploying large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems