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Please send me:

__ Tickets for 2 people to the film series ($15)

__ Tickets for 1 person to the film series ($7.50)

Tickets for films checked below ($2 per person per film)

__ Feb. 20, __ March 6, __ March 20, __ April 3, __ April 17

Enclosed find check for $ ...... payable to: World Affairs Council

Name ....................................

Address ..................................

City ..................... Zip ................... Phone ..................

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THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

PRESENTS

A FRIDAY EVENING FILM SERIES

THE ART OF WAR

Alternate Fridays, at 8 p.m.
World Affairs Council
70 Hereford Street, Boston

February 20

LES CARABINIERS

directed by Jean Luc Godard. An allegorical account of the comic and chilling adventures of two soldiers. An indictment of poverty, ignorance, and illusion - the main ingredients of war.

"It eats into the mind like acid. If this is not a masterpiece, it will do until one comes along." - Kenneth Tynan

"It is pure art, ready to hold its own with art in any other medium." - Renata Adler, New York Times

March 6

OVER THERE, 1914-1918

by Jean Aurel, written by Cecil Saint-Laurent. Compiled from newsreels, official army films, suppressed and contraband films, propaganda productions, and films shot by amateur soldier-cameramen. *OVER THERE* shows the great battles of Verdun, Mons, the endless trenches. Motion and still pictures of the Kaiser, the Czar, Lenin, Clemenceau, Foch, Petain, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Mata Hari - alternate with pictures of everyday life, of a soldier rowing between two beautiful women in the Bois de Boulogne.

March 20

OPEN CITY

directed by Roberto Rossellini, written by Federico Fellini and Sergio Amidei. This film went into production even before the German occupation of Rome was ended, and brought international fame for its director, Rossellini, and for his star, Anna Magnani, - and, most importantly, it ushered in the modern realist cinema.

The story centers on two Resistance leaders - one a Communist, the other a Catholic priest - their joint efforts, and eventual betrayal. A people at war in their own streets are depicted with a quality of impassioned urgency and immediacy.

Grand Prizes at Venice and Cannes Film Festivals.

April 3

THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS

directed by Gillo Pontecorvo. This stunning and starkly realistic re-enactment of the rebellion against the French received eleven international awards, including the Golden Lion at Venice.

"An uncommonly dynamic picture ... of amazing photographic virtuosity ..." - Bosley Crowther, New York Times

"... an astonishing piece of work ... extremely objective in its depiction of the heartbreak of any fight for liberation, how neither the oppressed nor the oppressor can really survive at ease with his conscience." - Judith Crist

April 17

THE GENERAL

with Buster Keaton. Selected recently as the "Second Greatest Comedy of All Time" in an international poll, this film depicts a Civil War story about "The Great Locomotive Chase". The title refers not to Keaton, but to his engine. Written and directed by Buster Keaton and Clyde Bruckman in 1926.

and also

AN OCCURRENCE AT OWL CREEK BRIDGE

written and directed by Robert Enrico, based on the short story by Ambrose Bierce. This short film won the Grand Prix at Cannes in 1962, and the Academy Award.

"Faithful to the time and tone of Bierce's Civil War tale, the film builds a mood of poetic suspense into a shattering tragedy ..." - Judith Crist

We are offering to Council members only a special series subscription rate of $7.50. A limited number of Individual tickets will be available at $2.00 each to non-members and non-subscribers. Since space is limited, we urge you to make reservations as soon as possible by returning the enclosed card to the World Affairs Council, 70 Hereford Street, Boston, 02115. For information phone CO 7-6674.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

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TELEPHONE: AREA CODE 801
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July 31, 1975

Miss Bonnie Andrews
Personal Private Secretary
Hon. Henry Kissinger
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Miss Andrews:

No doubt you have seen Kissinger's *Atlantic Charter* by my former
teacher, Sir George Catlin. Recently he sent me the incomplete
manuscript of his latest book, which will be entitled *Detente or Sliding
into War*, with the option of forwarding it to you if I thought it of
sufficient interest. I do indeed think that the danger of nuclear war is
very grave, that *detente* is the most hopeful development in a generation,
and that much remains to be done, as Sir George argues.

I hesitate to impose on your time, but perhaps you could scan the ms.
and determine whether this closely reasoned support of his policy is likely
to interest the Secretary. The book will be completed and published
shortly.

I enclose also a sheaf of documents some of which make personal
reference to you.

FDW/kd
Enclosure

RECEIVED
NOV 25 1975
CENTRAL FILES

प्रपान मंत्रो भव्य
PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE
NEW DELHI

[LC]

Jammu,

April 14, 1975

Dear Sir George and Lady Catlin,

Your Christmas and New Year card
reached me just a short while ago, probably
after wandering over the high seas, on a
voyage which I envy. With all its convenience,
air travel has deprived us of much.

I hear all kinds of good things about
your daughter. She is obviously one of the
best in Britain's political life.

With all good wishes,

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1974

Dear Sir George:

It was good of you to write me on
November 26, offering your assistance as a
consultant.

Unfortunately, I have no way at this
time to take advantage of your thoughtful
offer. You may be sure that it will not be
forgotten, however, and should the occasion
arise it is heartening to know that your ex-
perience and wisdom can be called upon.

Good luck at Hartwick.

Warm regards,

Professor Sir George Catlin
Hartwick College,
Oneonta, New York.

1

[LC]

# I

## The Need for Leadership.

In the summer of 1959 I happened to be crossing the Atlantic on the Canadian-Pacific Line. My wife and I were placed at the same table as the returning Governor-General of Canada, Lord Alexander of Tunis. At breakfast one morning, in a mood of semi-jocularity doubtless induced by the summer weather at sea, I asked: "Milord Alexander of Tunis, what are your views about Tunis?" I expected a reply in like vein. The reply was startling and by no means jocular. "The damned French <u>colons</u> have ousted the Arabs and taken over most of the best land. They should be put in ships; and shipped back to France."

It was not for me to query the logistics of a Field-Marchal or to repudiate the politics of a Governor-General. The odd thing is that precisely what Earl Alexander then recommended was within a few years actually done by a colonel, recently created brigadier and later general, Charles de Gaulle, who very nearly paid the penalty of assassination by the pro-colonial O.A.S., who regarded his act as a betrayal of France and himself as a traitor.

What did occur to me was the analogy, in what Lord Alexander was saying, with Ulster where also crude exploitation has been protected by dogmatic fanaticism. It can be said that the situation in Tunisia and the Magreb was not, to any significant degree, that of the Irish Wars of Religion which, after four hundred years, still rages in Ulster with the IRA and its murder area (but not in the rest of Ireland) and which was outstandingly expressed in the Neanderthal bigotry of certain fanatical Orangemen. These also called themselves 'loyalists' in the sense in which white Rhodesians do the same - that is in the sense of demanding that those to whom they are 'loyal' should support their bigotry with enthusiasm. English troops in Northern Ireland confronted (not without success) all the rigours of guerrilla war by outlaw forces, some condemned earlier in Dublin, then in London. The British Minister for Northern Ireland in Belfast was threatened by assassination by one Orange 'loyalist'.

2.

[L.C.]

One reply to all this can be, and is, made that the battle of the Boyne and all that took place three centuries ago and is archaic history, irrelevant to present problems. Unfortunately this is not so. It is indeed a foolish reply. The Negro problem in the States, due to the importation of African slaves, is at this moment in Boston a very live problem indeed and it is such whether its roots are recent or bedded in ancient history. Admittedly this is largely irrelevant to the present need for vigour and decision. A Bill of Rights which bans racial, national and colour discrimination in Britain needs an equivalent Bill of Rights to ban religious discrimination throughout Ireland. Ireland is cursed by 'too much history'. It needs a clean sweep. And this is what is relevant now.

The crucial point where the French colonial situation, on which the Field Marshal commented, and the Ulster situation, which today confronts a Britain on the way to becoming only England, lies in a resemblance in past British and French policy, and in consequent issues of privilege which endure. This policy was 'colonial' in the most profound sense (if here a pejorative sense) of the word. For dynastic reasons the unadmirable James VI of Scotland (and James I of England) shipped large numbers of his Scottish compatriots over to Ireland and to the lands of Hugh O'Neil, with the dynastic purpose of holding down the native Irish - despite the fact that Ireland was by papal donation an older part of the United Kingdom than Scotland. He did more. He instituted the order of baronetcy ( badge, the Red Hand of Ulster) precisely to advance the fortunes and to reward those lairds and gentry who were prepared to share in the venture. This is still live history today and, not unreasonably, among those discriminated against, it is quite naturally bitterly resented. Westminster would do itself great good by publicly admitting and declaring this and 'confessing its sins'.

The dynastic policy of 'Dutch William' and of the House of Hanover was shaped, for obvious reasons, in the same fashion. The Orangemen were there, not to affirm the separation of church and state, the principle of repudiation of religious discrimination or economic advantage and social privilege connected directly therewith but, on the contrary, to uphold

3.

[Lc]

an Establishment based on the politico-religious predominance of one sect or, later, the key power of allied sects or sub-sects opposed to ecumenicism.

The restoration of Canterbury Cathedral, the mother church of St. Augustine and of England (not Scotland), where the Queen - or in effect her Prime Minister - is still Supreme Governor as she is not in other areas of the Anglican Communion, is doubtless an admirable objective. Whether in the next century the parish churches of the country can be structurally maintained, and not fall into irrecoverable ruin, until vague words about 'common charity' are replaced by the ecumenical use of these structures, by common sense and common contributions to the costs, is very doubtful. Charitable sentiment fades away when ingrained prejudice, under the name of 'principle', takes charge. The Treasury won't do all the paying. Important, however, although these material improvements may be, it can be even more important that Archbishop Coggan should display the admirable courage of his predecessor at Canterbury, Archbishop Ramsay, in exhorting all professed Christians to be ready to pray alongside each other - even if his courage did issue in illegal 'brawling in church' by sectarians who had to be forcibly ejected. Here a part of the Presbyterian Church of Northern Ireland, repudiating the disapproval of the cowardly but aided by the Anglican bishop of Down and Connor, by the end of 1974 had much to its credit.

However the Ulster affair (which also has its aspects of economic exploitation) is primarily political. What is needed is a statesman who will break with the deplorable and discreditable past, which poisons the British good name, and who will declare flatly that the Orange population for the most part are precisely *colons*, just as the French farmers were *colons*. To do so indeed requires adherence to historic truth, and a granite integrity. In the words of the Field Marshal, 'damned *colons*'.

I am not here suggesting - and there are, in the balance, many Irish in Glasgow who are tolerable good citizens - that, in Lord Alexander's stinging phrase, the *colons* should be 'shipped out'. Maybe, if Scotland becomes more autonomous, Ulster should

4.

[Lc]

be transferred to be, not an affair of England, but a Scottish
affair, for the Scots to set straight... All that is required
is a sober political commonsense and the damnation of fanaticism.
They cannot all be expected to be shipped back to Paisley or
elsewhere in Scotland, there maybe to join the Scottish
Nationalists. There is the possible slogan: 'Get out'. The
land was originally not theirs. Thanks to a political partition -
in Ireland sometimes called 'jerrymandering' - what was a minority
in all Ireland, itself with Britain now in what is called 'the
European Community', has been converted into a two-to-one majority.

Merely I would suggest, to this majority of a minority,
that it seek to cultivate charity, prudence and community sense
instead of being led and shaped in thought by an intolerable,
outmoded and contemptible fanaticism.

Perhaps a few philosophy dons from Cambridge might be
sent over to Queen's College, Belfast, to disseminate new and
critical thought. Probably more political means than logical
analysis are required for the new movements. However, tribal
fanaticism, especially when there are alleged advantages at stake,
is not confined to Northern Ireland nor the problem unique there.
Economic advantage or exploitation are, despite Marx, not the
only or main cause of war. Fanaticism can be and is another.
If some moderates, going beyond the balance and scrupulous
judgement of reasonable men, lack militancy, fanaticism, on the
other hand, is a form of political superstition.

On about November 15, 1974, at the time of the Rabat
Conference, the risk of the outbreak of World War III, an
atomic war, was very real. The general civilian public was
unaware of the danger. Anyhow it was not thought of as their
danger. What is sometimes called apathy can be only the profound
human (and ostrich) tendency to bury from view something that
it is sensed could be very unpleasant.

The British public at large, before the First World War, was
quite unaware of the likely consequences in action of the
assassination at Sarajevo, although the War Office, with prudent
foreight, had gone at an early stage to make commisariat
arrangements for any Expeditionary Force, down even to the number

5.

[LC]

of bottles likely to be required of Cooper's jam. What Lord Lothian called to me 'the war time-table' - which, he added, was very difficult to put into reverse - had gone into effect.

The war-dangers at this moment are no less, and the prospects consequent on war are much worse, than in 1914. The immediate dangers from the Rabat Conference have been, for the present, averted by the negotiating genius of the tireless Henry Kissinger - as thanks for which the more powerful American journalists have, in the context of their patriotism, showered him with abuse. Mr. Secretary Kissinger has his many enemies of diverse degrees of responsibility or of sheer party vindictiveness. And whether his peace policy will prevail, against fanatical obstinacy and the blind personal ambition of some senators, is as yet quite uncertain.

On the assumption that the dedicated policy of partizan idealists, and the ill-balanced fears of a *détente* that might concede too much, will issue in a military timetable of action which can afford to concede nothing, then the clash between an America, over-stimulated by the influence of Israeli intransigence, and a Soviet Union, preferring to run high risks for the control of the Eastern Mediterranean, will emerge into action. Again, anyone who imagines that, in the event of such a war, Western Europe will be allowed to remain uncommitted, is an optimist indeed. France, moreover, is far too weak to add to its *gloire* by playing the arbitrator between the Super-Powers. Such clever efforts are rather likely to be mischievous. France is more likely to be once again occupied. The cry may be for the pre-emptive military occupation of Arab territories - if the Russians permit it and there is oil enough to fly the airplanes. Or it may be, on the contrary, a cry never to repeat Vietnam by yet another armed intervention in the East, and for a reversion to isolationism.

War can arise from the terrorism of some at least of Mr. Arafat's supporters - here the surrender, contrary to their pleas, of the Tunis hi-jackers to the P.L.O. is a small encouragement - or from a Jewish fantasy of invincibility or a fatalism - the Masada complex - about the outcome, as well as

6.

[lc]

from the terrorism of those of the same mind as the 'Stern
gangsters' supporters. Isolated and desperate Israeli efforts
will be made to get the United States irretrievably committed,
including the possibility of preventive war such as Churchill
advocated in the 'Thirties against Hitler. The pressure here
will be for Zionism and orthodoxy, and against any secular
compromises in Palestine. Peace-minded folk, confused by
appeals to 'justice for us' made by both sides, may deplore
but they will not be able to prevent. They will, unless
steeled by fierce determination, suffer the usual fate of
'reasonable people', confronting the flood of brute passion.
In Ulster it may be that their numbers and confidence will be
adequate to avert disaster by mutual massacre. In the more
violent climate of the Middle East the fanatics are more numerous
and the result more in doubt.

One activist factor in the production of war is precisely
fanaticism, which is incidentally not itself an issue of material
advantage but of an inflamed mental condition attached to ones
own obsession with power.

The issues, hence, before us are two-fold. The first is
as old as Immanuel Kant: How to ensure stable peace in the
world. Slavery indeed can be abolished. It has been, except
in remote areas. The snag here is that it was abolished by
war. But how to abolish war? To this we shall return.

The second issue is not so fundamental nor so much a
matter for scholars working on the sociological, economic and
allied problems with Nobel Prize intensity. Incidentally, it
is odd that Nobel attached so much importance to the peace issue
as to establish Peace Prizes but, by a strange lacuna in his
reasoning - convinced although he was of the importance of
'science' so that he established a range of prizes to encourage
research in the physical, biological and medical sciences - he
quite overlooked the key contribution which economic studies
(this now remedied) and the political and social sciences and
anthropology could make. The omission cries aloud for remedy.

The second issue is the more circumscribed but the more
urgent one, never answered by the agreements of 1918 or 1945.

7.

[LC]

As a practical matter, if the League of Nations was, and the United Nations will prove to be, ineffectual, how to prevent the outbreak of war, maybe an atomic war, now? How to prevent its outbreak this year or at least during our life-time, the passions and sense of moral outrage of men being so strong and their reason, unless founded by a steel cold reason, being so ineffective and powerless as it still is.

More than for the student in his study or for the scientist, save in a subordinate position under orders in his laboratory, the demand for leadership, political, personal. How to convert the singularly unpopular and ostracized Churchill of 1936 - I was on the committee under Katheryn Atholl to get him thrust from mere Ministerial into Cabinet position - into the dominant Leader, whom no politician could get support in challenging, of 1940? How to demand this leadership, with a public more interested in bingo or exorcism, without giving the reply: Only war itself can give the impulse - the impulse to accept leadership. War against the Soviets? Or civil war within the Atlantic Community - with another Oran and, this time, the American (not British) fleet bombarding the French navy - and the British shuddering, craven, north of Dover? An isolationist disentanglement, if practicable, from war? Or an interdependence in policy of the major countries, competent in power to impress their will on the chauvinists, anarchists and believers in international anarchy. ❌

## II
The French Tradition.

At the end of the Second World War it was only to be expected that those politicians in the enemy states who had steadily opposed the Nazi and Fascist leadership, and who surveyed the damage done to their countries, had as their prime object of policy to bring the enemies of the Allies, Germany and Italy, back into the main stream of democratic politics and to restore, not indeed the Balance of Power, but the Concert of Europe.

In so far as this had been, not merely a diplomatic ideal, but a political reality, it was with relief throughout 'the free world' that the prospect seemed to emerge of establishing concord in at least the European area, 'the European Balkans'. There seemed to be a prospect of ending, finally, the civil war which had recurred for centuries, since Louis XIV and earlier between Bourbon and Hapsburg - and indeed since the age of rivalry for leadership of the Crusaders, whether under the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa or under St. Louis of France. Not all gestures to establish good relations, such as the marriage of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, had been singularly successful. The requirements of peace seemed to demand, from men of good will and indeed of common sense, every support for this policy of interdependence.

The need was articulated, after Victor Hugo and, later, Austide Briand and Stresemann, by Coudonhove-Kalergi and by Jean Monnet. A very early pioneer of the revival of the Roman imperial idea of union was, interestingly enough, William Penn, the American founder of Pennsylvania.

What, however, tended to be forgotten was that, although Gaullists might support a European integration - in effect a partial and Western European integration - Frenchmen could not be expected to abandon overnight a centuries-old belief that **la civilisation c'est la France** and that the integration of Europe (West) had to spell the diplomatic, as well as the cultural, primacy of France. Few would go on record against the new Franco-German accord. But what was forgotten was that this new Franco-German relation was a smaller thing, and not at all

9.

[LC]

the same thing, as the integration of the whole Western or Atlantic world with its far larger population, wealth and prospects. Even the interests need not inevitably be the same.

Dr. Conrad Adenauer, non-Prussian and Rhinelander German, made himself the especial exponent of the 'European Movement'. He so far received support from Robert Schuman, French Premier and Foreign Secretary, Alsation-born, and in Italy from de Gasperi, emerging from refuge in the Vatican, that even the prospect of a European Federal Union, following on Clarence Streit's wider crusade for the world principle, seemed not too remote.*

It was not irrelevant that most of the leaders shared common values as Catholic, an element emphasised at the Mass at Rheims attended by Adenauer and de Gaulle. It was yet not necessary to look back to the 'Gothic' age of Charlemagne. An authentic 'new age' in politics, at least in the Western European semi-continent (relic of the old Western Roman Empire) seemed to be indeed on the horizon. Many enthusiasts developed as their own conceit almost a 'European religion', based on the supposed superiority of a declining half-continent.

Only the attitude of France, when Charles de Gaulle succeeded to the M.R.P. administration and to Mendès-France, was ambiguous. Maybe here for France, in return for the boss of an Empire, some species of Western European integration was the exchange - or maybe not. As Adenauer shrewdly commented, de Gaulle could make the whole unification process a reality or he could 'ruin' the entire project. (In effect de Gaulle actually did ruin it, since he demolished, by his interpretation of the Rome Treaty, the proposal by the founder-pioneers, of a European Federal Union or United States of Europe, and substituted a modification of traditional French policy.)

The original European Movement, urged by such political organisations as the Nouvelle Equipe Internationale, was itself led by such emergent figures as Adenauer and Maurice Schumann. These led the respective N.E.I. delegations of Germany and France. I chanced to do the same for the British Delegation at the N.E.I. Luxemburg Conference of 1949, there finding myself the opposite number to Maurice Schumann and to an Adenauer embarrassed by a Foreign Office encouraged representative of the old German middle Party, the Centrum.

The N.E.I. was certainly not anti-American. It was quite prepared to take what was later called 'the Second or Atlantic Step' - a step later much forgotten by those obsessed by their new and largely bogus 'European identity'. (The true cultural area was indeed rather Mediterranean than pan-European.)

*G. Catlin: For God's Sake Go (Smythe), 1972, p.369. (Autobiography and a criticism of Edward Heath's policy.)

10.

[Lc]

It was after the N.E.I. Luxemburg, Bad-Ems and Hague
conferences that - following, as also with Lippmann, activity
in shaping the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations -
the effective and excellent work of Jean Monnet in building the
functional 'sovereign authorities' in coal and steel and the
rest, got off the ground.

That this movement was in fact a tying together of the
ex-enemy Powers of 1939, Germany, Italy and a France Vichyite
only yesteryear. It was already, at Luxemburg, without
American or Canadian delegates included. It could hence carry
the risk of being someday a submerged threat to the Allies of
the Second World War, America, Britain, Canada, Australasia.
This, however, was not yet appreciated in those days of a euphoric
and fraternal mind. In this sense - but in this sense only -
the enemy had "won the Second World War".

A British presence at minimum, as Churchill saw, was
essential. Here was the "first step". Was it to world peace?
Or was it regional Continental peace? Doubtless the 'second
step', including the Allies who won the war, would come, granted
sufficiently ardent faith.

Maybe, in the end, it was the Germans who actually won
the war, although this would disappoint the designed victors,
the French. War, as usual, issues in results quite contrary
and dismaying to those who first enter upon it. Far from
regarding this 'European' (i.e. primarily Franco-German) concord
as disastrous I regarded it, for one regional section, as being
admirable and I supported it. I did not fully allow for the
force of Gaullism. Certainly an amalgamation for a limited,
confederate customs union, and for functional purposes, was
all to the good. I supported it even if, as Mr. Heath perhaps
injudiciously pointed out, it actually achieved, if by more
civilised means, the central 'European unification' plan of
Hitler's Third Reich and of the Emperor Napoleon. I merely note
the oddity of what was to issue, with the new capital, if not
in Aachen, then in Brussels. (Or mm. V Paris?)

That the centuries-old civil war within Europe, even if
concealed as a Balance of Power, should be terminated was such

11.

[LC]

obvious common-sense, such progress, that few could be against it. True that it omitted North America and the Commonwealth, which had played some part in the First and Second World Wars, and true that this unification had been the objectives of both Napoleon and Hitler. But this was all to be democratic and economic and in quite a different, new style. Moreover, there would be a 'second', Atlantic step, following the 'first' one. For this programme the benevolence of Britain, voiced by Winston Churchill at Zürich - as he had likewise voiced the desire "to march together with America" at Fulton and before the Legislature of Virginia (as I learned when I later myself spoke at Fulton) - was a necessity, just as the actual accession of Britain would be an ideal benefit. The policy outlined at Fulton was indeed that 'alternative', of which Eisenhower was highly conscious but which some EEC crusaders, with obsession, assert 'does not exist'.

If there was ambiguity in French tactics on policy, one of the advantages in interpreting the broad lines of French diplomatic strategy was and is its remarkable consistency on fundamentals.

The disapproval by Franklin Roosevelt of what seemed to be the extravagant claims of a French brigadier, recently colonel, to a place amid the top four dictating post-war policy nearly led to the exclusion of de Gaulle from the Yalta Conference; to an Allied interim occupation of France; and to France not being allocated a zone of occupation in Germany. De Gaulle, repudiating a humiliating indebtedness (which, at least among his countrymen, he could not politically afford to admit) to Britain and America, and no longer under sentence of death from his compatriots, the official government of his own country, had to take up the task of reasserting the traditional great position of France. The more traditional the public position the more solid was his own position as against his ex-associates, the Communists. This spelled, not idealistically to outline some new international order which could involve limitations on French sovereignty, but - which was congenial enough to him - to look back on France's past grandeur and to make the target of policy to be its consistent reassertion.

12.

[lc]

To assert this policy there were several possible routes - whether with Germany and Adensuer; or with Russia, as the past member in Eastern Europe of the Dual Entente; or even as one of a ruling Triad with America and Britain, as put forward at Bermuda, which left France in the clear position of representative, spokesman and premier of all (Western) 'Europe' - a 'Europe', be it noted, which did not include Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Scandinavia or the entire Slav East of Europe, once a member of the old Eastern Roman Empire; and of which the title 'Europe' was hence bogus and dishonest. The remaining Western European mainland countries would move on a lower diplomatic level than France.

Churchill expressed benevolence towards this unification of the countries of Europe but did not fully commit himself. De Gaulle had no anxiety to see any British entry which could displace his own preponderance. He advised the British frankly to keep out - and added that, in time to come, the British electorate would thank him for the advice. At least 'de Gaulle's Europe', unlike Schumann's, did not seem 'Britain in'. That was a sudden piece of good policy, but nevertheless of Britain's startling lack of self-confidence, it was clear that there was later bitingly to refer.

Since the days of Cardinal Wolsey England had sought to play a policy of Balance of Power, but this was, not to dominate the Continent (despite illiterate comments to the contrary), but precisely to be able to maintain its own detachment from it. If Britain could indeed reconcile itself to abandoning 'balance' or a decisive interference in Europe, and turn its attention to (as for centuries it had) over-seas, this would be advantageous for France but also, as de Gaulle bluntly stated, would be the traditional and best policy for Britain.

Rightly or wrongly, this very French plan of a triumvirate was rejected, not least by Britain. It is true that in the late 'Forties the chair of the Council of Europe was vacant for Britain - for Churchill - to take had she so wished. Later many British businessmen had the pathetically false belief that, if Britain 'entered' Europe, the oyster of new wealth was all theirs, the British, to consume.

13.

[L]

Unfortunately the vacillating American Congress, whatever
may have been the case with President Kennedy, its divided mind
wrongly concentrated, so far as it could be concentrated, on
S.E. Asia, did not grasp the implications of de Gaulle's thought.
Already obsessed with power in the Pacific as the prime
American area, it was content to use the facile but perilously
ill-considered phrase: "Europe should stand on its own feet".
It would reduce the draft and save taxes. But not, of course,
the Europe of Moscow or of Spain... Rather a pro-American
and so-grateful Europe, where not even France put France first.
Later, ex-Under-Secretary George Ball, not to be confused with
Senator Ball, a man of quite other views, became a leading
exponent of this folly and, in many ill-informed European
quarters, was thought to express 'the voice of America'.

There was yet no clear reason why French diplomats should give away the primacy of France, at least in the Western European Continent, for which Frenchmen have fought since the expulsion of the Plantagenets and the later break-up, in effect since the Treaty of Augsburg, of the German Imperial Reich.

The policy of de Gaulle was continued, in a fashion less
blunt but perhaps more subtle by M. Pompidou, but sufficiently
brutally by his Foreign Secretary, Marcel Jobert.*

Recently M. Jobert has said more clearly what other
Europeans have muttered to the dismay of 'the Marketeers': that
it might be a good thing if Britain kept out of their private
'Community'. Industrialists concerned with making large money
on the Ruhr and fearful of a Communist takeover in France and
Italy, naturally take another view. For them the slogan is
that, for Britain, 'there is no alternative', a baseless view - indub-
stantly with insufferable dogmatism. No alternatives have been
officially explored. How surprising then that they are not
to be found... In the comment of the *Herald Tribune* (30 March,
1975) on the issue: "The British empire is finished, the
Commonwealth is finished, the special relationship with the
United States is finished, the European Free Trade Association
is finished." Much of all this can be ascribed to what his

*Vide M. Jobert: *Mémoires d'Avenir* (Bernard Grasset, Paris, 1974).

16.

[L]

patronage in Europe. If only France were a little richer - if
only France were what France is not, "cut down to size" [Bulwer-Lytton, John Bulwer-Lytton,]

Not only must this prospective American hegemony be checked,
it was maintained by M. Jobert, and rebutted in the European
region. The French rôle was not regarded, even in a France
which had scarcely survived the German assault, as merely
regional. Historically France had played, even recently, from
Indo-China to Québec, from the Franco-Russian relations of the
Dual Entente to Syria, a world role. It would not be prepared
to yield it. When France had asked American aid to restore
its colonial regime, in Indo-China, after the Dien-Bien-Phu
defeat, Eisenhower had refused it. Why then expect affection,
La Fayette or not? Anyhow La Fayette had been sent not from
reasons of affection for liberty and republicanism, but for
reasons of the French policy of the ancien régime.

Without polite ambiguities Jobert told the story of the
two Foreign Ministers, Jobert and Kissinger, sitting in opposite
chairs, confronting each other in total silence. M. Jobert is
always described by himself as possessing 'perfect calm' - but
tells of Kissinger on one occasion stating: "Your policy is about
as anti-American as mine is anti-French." With what can best
be described as insufferable patronage, Marcel Jobert
nevertheless described Kissinger, the calculator, as having
"a good heart" [Dijon le amateur].

Oil-consumer policy for European countries, in relation
to the producers and to Arab claims, according to Paris, should
be made regionally at a European conference. Indeed in March-
April 1975, in Paris, it was made - and it was a catastrophe.
A conference of world oil-consumers, with or without producers,
in Washington was yet an impertinence - by the world's biggest
single consumer. French-Arab policy and Washington-Arab
policy could and would differ.

It was not, it was felt in the French press, for the
American Secretary to take on the role, here or in Cyprus or
elsewhere, as the chief negotiator. Did the Greeks, piqued
by inadequate support against their co-NATO members, the Turks,
quit NATO, then an invitation to the Greeks was hurried to Athens
for them to indicate that they could join what diplomatically

17.

[Lc]

had become the rival organisation, EEC - and potentially a very
dangerous rival in what is rather misleadingly called 'the
Western World'.

As for Britsin, according to the leading *New York Times*
journalist, Mr. Sulzberger, in Washington in December, 1974,
Mr. Giscard opined that Britsin "so totally lacked self-confidence"
(for which the Gaullists were notorious) that it no longer
could be taken seriously as ranking among the prime European
Powers. It is not a phrase that should be forgotten. England's
neck had been effectively wrung, as had been said long ago at
Vichy, maybe to the satisfaction of the N.W. European countries
(especially ex-Vichy France) who really counted. That such
assessments are likely to give satisfaction to Moscow, even
were it more benevolent than it may in fact be, is overlooked.
Whether, instead of Gaullists, and semi-Gaullists, a French
administration under M. Mitterand, in uneasy association with
the Communists, would give even more satisfaction it is difficult
to assess.

Even friendly remarks to France from Washington could, as
late as October, 1974 and in the days of M. Sauvagnargues,
M. Jobert's successor, cause resentment. A statement by
Secretary Kissinger to the effect that the present government
in Paris had brought an improved and "new tone" into Franco-
American relationships, evoked the remark of a French official
that Kissinger "has not made M. Sauvagnargue's job any easier".
Improvement of itself caused alarm as a threat to EEC's
continental consolidation, identity, unanimity and difference
from the rest.

The 'New Atlantic Charter' planned by Kissinger and
signed in Ottawa of non-exclusive accord was held in significant
quarters to be a threat to N.W. Europe. At best it was regarded
as outdated stuff (a relic of the war-time pact in Placentia Bay,
at which France, Vichyite or otherwise, was not originally
represented) and of negligible importance for the Europeans.
There is seldom unity unless we can pick on a common devil, hate
being one of the strongest of human passions. It is controlled

*Vide my Kissinger's *Atlantic Charter* (Colin Smythe), 1974.*

18.

[L.C.]

by force and fear. Beter, it was felt in Continental quarters, to be realistic and regard the Americans as 'big business', to which the correct attitude, was stated by M. Servan-Schreiber, is *Le Défi*. For the editor of the London 'Europe House' propaganda magazine, himself interestingly a Pole by birth, 'the Atlantic Community' was 'a menace'. (However, he has not yet been expelled.) As for the Atlantic Community, this was held to be merely a conglomerate of nations that happened to be situated on (the opposite sides of) the Atlantic. Even the Atlantic Treaty Alliance, to which France still adhered, was held to be not really necessary since France could, on her own, come to terms with Russia - although whether, humilistically enough, Russia was really interested was another matter.

In March, 1975, Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, for Britain, launched the notion of a summit meeting in Brussels at the same time as the NATO Council meeting, as a prelude to a 35 nation security conference, probably in Helsinki (including the Warsaw Pact nations). President Ford, in his April 'State of the World' speech supported the Anglo-Saxon proposal. "I expect to join with the other leaders of the Western Alliance at a Western summit in the near future." However the French official statement of April 15 ran: "France does not see the usefulness of an Atlantic Alliance summit. Present pressing problems (n.b.) such as Vietnam and the Middle East are not related to the alliance and questions relating to NATO were dealt with last June during the NATO ministerial meeting." Any French presence at such a conference was to be understood to be of only peripheral importance.

As Marcel Jobert had said earlier, there were certain "imperatives", non-negotiable, in their own private judgement by Jobert and the Quai d'Orsay, in French policy. One of these in effect was that the Atlantic Community was merely an 'alliance' or maybe a Partnership (ambiguous phrase), or a Defence Organisation from which, in one outstanding case, France could disassociate itself as Washington-dominated. There was ideologically only one unit. This was to wit, as said, *The Community*, being

*Wherever, in this book, *The Community* is referred to, it means the Atlantic Community. Any other interpretation (the U.N. apart) should meet organised resistance.*

19.

[LC]

distributed sections of Western Europe, not including Spain, Switzerland, Sweden or the whole vast area, half Europe, that once was the Eastern Roman Empire.

Under M. Gissard and as now recently voiced by M. Sauvagnargues, French policy has to date optimistically taken a change in the direction of greater balance and more collaboration. After all la Nouvelle France has to be thought of. Indeed it is believed that in the U.S. Bicentennial year M. Gissard proposes to cross the Atlantic and to address Congress in memory of the old pre-Nineteenth Century alliance - and to address them, moreover, in the alien language of Shakespeare, English.

Although France has insisted on manifesting its political presence from Rabat to Jerusalem, along lines which have not made Mr. Kissinger's job any easier, nevertheless attention has rather been rightly directed to Continental institutional problems which are only dangerous if given, which is not inevitable, an exclusive shape. That Europe itself, after two millennia, is of yearly decreasing importance in the world is overlooked.

It has for long been patent that the effective drawing together of the Atlantic Community involves, not only the principles but, no less, the establishment of institutions, infrastructures and functional practices which would bring together, several times a year, not as exceptional but as a regular, organic and constitutional affair, the concerned heads of state and, moreover, under them the senior officials of relevant departments, not only military but, no less, economic, fiscal, educational and cultural. Here can be the facilities for both formal confederate association and for the informal personal contact of politicians and secretariat.

It is precisely the organisation of this infrastructure that matters. In 1940 I advocated, not so much a stiff 'federal' and legalistic union as an 'organic' and habitual co-ordination - which advocacy of mine was quoted, as of key importance, by Walter Lippmann in his U.S. War Aims, 'Aim One'. At the 'summit level', in the discussion of policy the telephonic or personal communications of heads of state tends to replace the

20.

ancient and more protocol encounters and interchanges of
embassadors. It is precisely in this revolution in diplomatic
practice, as interesting as when Venice (and Richard III)
instituted permanent accredited ambassadors, that Henry Kissinger's
Secretaryship is likely, stirring bureaucratic controversy, to
be remembered. It is hence interesting that President Giscard
thought it worthwhile to offer him an interview with the custom
greetings - to no one else had it occurred that it was worthwhile
to do this - and thus to move from formality to personal
intimacy. But this development of new and personal international
communications, if we are to build an authentic community,
whether Atlantic or European, is of basic importance.

It is interesting that the meeting in America (but skillfully
on the French island of Martinique) in 1974, was felt to
inaugurate a new era of Franco-American relations, where the
French President was able, for some purposes, to speak for the
whole of Europe including Britain.

However, although patent, it cannot be said that either
the White House and Senate or for that matter Ottawa,
embarrassed by French nationalism, has taken new practical steps
to establish these organic and constitutionally recognised
connections. We remain in the immemorial relations of
formal diplomacy and of ephemeral Alliances or undefined
Partnerships - no more. There is still no official, and
hence officially recognised, NATO or civil Atlantic
Parliamentary Assembly, still less an executive body and
secretariat. This issue, if we are in earnest, has to be
confronted.

Such being the present case M. Giscard and his ministers
cannot be blamed for making or proposing to make a practical
beginning of an official political kind in the local region,
that of N.W. Europe, with which in economic and commercial
(but later probably in many other terms, not only technical or
EEC) they are concerned. On the contrary, this reinterpretation
of national sovereignty in international terms is to be welcomed
and supported. It is a departure from the excessive and perhaps
archaic stress on state sovereignty of de Gaulle and of Jobert.

21.

[LC]

Perhaps even Canadian sovereignty might be analytically re-
examined.

Kissinger has introduced (to the resentment of some)
an entirely new and more mobile style in diplomacy. This
fluidity has also got to be maintained in the infrastructure.
Precautions have to be taken that an international dynamic is
maintained, which does not become frozen and limited at EEC
boundaries, maybe on the Pyrenees and the Oder. The start of
global organisation, a much wider integration than semi-European
continentalism, and less parochial, or than United Nations
advisory impotence, has without relaxation to be built up by
men of determination.

This means that the historic impulse, since Louis XIV or
earlier (and checked by Marlborough and Wellington) towards
French diplomatic primacy and cultural hegemony has to be
abandoned, in their wider interests, just as frankly as de Gaulle
abandoned the tradition of French military colonialism and
imperialism. Granted that the alternative plan becomes clear
and emotionally attractive to the various electorates, and
granted also the luck of adequate statesmanship, this ambition
has a fully practicable, as well as desirable, goal.

Granted a transfer of sovereignty already existing in
particular functional areas (but not necessarily in all areas)
as an EEC commitment, what has to be agreed is how extensive
these areas of transfer can technically and appropriately be.
Short of world systems, for the present Atlantic systems, for
example in transport or money, can be as practicable and more
desirable than 'Continentalism' and merely local EEC proposals
recently advocated by Mr. Heath and by his henchmen and appointee,
Sir Christopher Soames. This does not mean that these last
are to be rejected. It means the exact contrary: that they
are too narrow, exclusive and inadequate. They must be
supported just in so far as they are not shaped by anti-
American prejudice but are deliberately part of a wider and
hence better, richer framework in the world.

19.
22.

[7.]

III

The United States. I.

Until the turn of the Twentieth Century the United States was primarily still an agricultural country, its finances and resources underdeveloped, more emergent than emerged. Europe had replaced, for two thousand years, Asia in the main stream of history (and until the Sixteenth Century rather a Mediterranean Europe than that of the Atlantic sea-bord). Not only was America separated from that Europe by an ocean but, inhabited by farmer immigrants from Europe in search of a pioneer freedom and individual self-development, the American farmers preferred their own 'American Experiment', a countrywide republic which attracted de Tocqueville's studies, to what Europe, whether 'upper-class' or 'lower-class', would offer.

The character of the country shaped what was taken over from the political philosophers of Europe and especially the political doctrine of Locke and Montesquieu, much certain of their Seventeenth and Eighteenth century theory was deeply implanted in the American Constitution of checks and balances and of the Separation of Powers. The doctrine traced back to the declaration of the individual rights against the King by the barons, even licensing rebellion, although modified by the ecclesiastical influence of Cardinal Langton and of the Papal Legate Pandulf, which declaration took form in Magna Carta.

After the Tudors, reassertion of individual rights and distrust of the royal executive, as 'them' not 'us', dominates the thought of the Parliamentarians (until the Lord Protector arrived) and later that of the Whigs and the Country Party'. The Whigs demanded Freedom and Civil Rights, at least for aristocrats, land-owners and what Disraeli called 'the Venetian oligarchy'.

The rural temper of the Founding Fathers of the United States was predominantly Whig and distrustful of the Executive. Even although the President was elected by the people themselves on a wide property franchise, the Chief Executive was still suspect and needed to be checked. Congress stood to President in an 'adversary' relationship; and peculiarly so when, as happened so often, they belonged to different Parties.

The basic error lies in confusing Whiggery with Liberty (undefined) and this with the Ten Commandments. Liberty is not 'freedom' without any moral context or common consent. Liberty is such under law; and the law, not arbitrary but formal, is nevertheless enforced and made by men capable of judgement and of changing their minds. Not all law is Natural Law, shaped by reason. Some is shaped and dictated by the tradition or, again, by the occasion. Sometimes 'the Senate and People decide'. But not always.

Franklin Roosevelt was fortunate, in that he had, in Congress although not in the Supreme Court, a 'checking body' of his own outlook. Eisenhower was fortunate in that he had campaigned against the policy of his predecessor, Truman, for interfering with the rights of Congress and had no Party impulse to reverse himself. Some said he was 'weak' or, at least, 'no politician'. Some said he was consistent and constitutional.

The fundamental fear which the Parliamentary system arose to meet was of a tyrannical King. It was there to present complaints, and, if the complaints were not met, to refuse to agree to new taxes. First met by explicit threat of rebellion, the resistance developed as control of the Executive with the increasing costs of government. If the King could no longer live on his own private estates, there should be no taxation without representation and consent. County representatives in England waw no reason, if their counties did not border on the sea, why they should pay, unconsulted, for the navy. Later, in the American Colonies, the colonial legislatures saw no reason why they should pay new taxes voted by a remote parliament across the Atlantic on which their representation (through the borough of Greenwich) was purely symbolic.

After long hesitation and despite Tory dissent the colonists rebelled against the British Parliament - but, for sound propaganda reasons, rebellion against Parliament was re-cast, as ideologically better grounded, as revolt against the King - that is against the Executive with all its tendencies to abuse power. To make the case yet better, attention was not so much given to

21

24

[Lc]

what powers, as pragmatic fact, George III actually exercised but to those powers of abstract sovereignty which the conventional lawyers, Blackstone and the rest, in their law books asserted him to have. These were the books read in the Colonies.

On the contrary - and reminiscent of the old doctrines of Natural Law and even of Edward Coke's exposition of Common Law - there was in America to be a 'rule of laws and not of men', interpreted by the nine old men, not elected and sometimes very dogmatic, of the Supreme Court. It was, of course, rhetoric apart, a rule of men who made the laws or who interpreted the man-made laws.

The Executive, headed by the President, was indeed still 'the King', but the King 'cut into four year periods' and checked from extension of his powers by the said Supreme Court and by a Congress to which was reserved the rights of legislation, taxation and declaring war. The whole system was formulated in the American Constitution. However, in the course of the Philadelphia Debates on the drafting of the Constitution, it was asserted without denial that, in the United States, the real equivalent of 'the King' was the People itself as sovereign.

Having myself had a share in the recommendations which led to the Repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, I am well aware that the Constitution can be changed by a difficult and lengthy process involving co-operation not only by Congress but by the States. Nevertheless, it remains broadly true that America is directed, not indeed by men and by the majority of the electorate but, most conservative of all, by *mort-mai*, 'the dead hand' of the Founding Fathers, and by their conventional wisdom.

The advice of no other than Thomas Jefferson has not been followed that the Constitution should be, by democratic vote, radically revised every generation, i.e. as he said, every nineteen years. Arguably indeed there is a strong case for doing precisely what Jefferson recommended, that is for setting up a Constitutional Commission for revising the Constitution every generation, from the First Amendment on, from end to end with a view to submitting recommendations to the electorate.

22.

25

[lc]

(The claim on the right to bear arms could indeed be met by periodical decision under which those claiming it were required to be registered members of the militia.) On the contrary there is continuity.

What has emerged is a Senate, its members elected by their respective States; a House of Representatives locally elected (to which very local support the representative naturally turns to collect votes); a Supreme Court which is not elected at all; and a President who alone is, subject to Party selection and very narrow caucuses, the elected Representative of the whole people; but with powers severely if often ambiguously restrained by the Constitution, Judiciary and Legislature and by the constitutional powers of the States. Congress cannot be dissolved and sent packing back to the People by the President for the renewal of its mandate, as obtains in France, or by the Prime Minister, backed by a Commons majority, in Britain. Congress is, short of impeachment, 'stuck' with its, possibly non-cooperative, President for four years; and the President 'stuck' with his maybe adverse Congressional majority.

Is then, in the phrase used in the Constitutional Debates in Philadelphia, the People really 'King'? Congress and President can, and often do, belong to different Parties. Likewise, whatever the supposed Popular Will, the President does not depend upon the vote of Congress and cannot be deposed, until his four year term is up, except by the extreme processes of impeachment for malfeasance in office. He remains as either 'a dead duck' or as a political nuisance. He, in turn, has no whip hand over Congress as, since de Gaulle, has the French President or as a British Prime Minister who can usually force a General Election by handing in his own resignation and declining to enter a coalition.

Only recently the novel, non-legal and non-constitutional claims of the Press and like Media to be a 'Fourth Estate' have arisen for consideration as perhaps the actual holders of political power. Its power, in so far as objective and professedly impartial, not simply concerned with the sensational, notorious,

22a.

20

[lc]

trendy and partisan, has increased; is increasing; and can be
more dangerous, by 'brain-washing', uninhibited cartoons and
control of democratic publicity, than any constitutional monarch.

Recent public opinion polls in Britain, it is interesting
to recall, show that of all occupational groups in the country
journalists as a trade are among the least trusted by the
electorate. When President Nixon visited Peking, the Chinese,
ever meticulous on protocol, after the statesmen had left their
plane and passed over the red carpet, removed the red carpet
before the pressmen could get onto or pollute it... Although
asserted, in the Philadelphia Debates on the Constitution to
be the sovereign and 'King', the constitutional rights, as
distinct from informal Public Opinion Polls, of 'the People'
of America arguably seem to be at a discount. To the
constitutional tool of Referenda and to their purely democratic
implications, despite examples from Athens to the Swiss cantons,
no adequate attention has been paid by those who profess the
subjects. In Britain indeed the astonishing statement has been
made that Referenda are 'undemocratic' - by which nonsense
phrase is in fact merely meant 'unParliamentary'.

As in '1984', the mind of the People can be shaped and
brain-washed by what the 'investigative reporters' of scandal,
the paid journalists of the big combines and the editors of the
capitalist 'free press', choose with their very real power to
suppress what they, as a privileged class, don't like. Their
own sources of information are protected, just as the legal and
(perhaps) clerical professions are protected, against free
judicial enquiry.

That the justification of a free press lies in the consideration
that it is necessary for the healthy working of democracy is a
claim or justification which, it is too often forgotten, rests
on the so frequently violated condition that the information it
offers shall be, not commercially dictated by what is sensational,
notorious, a 'good serial', but objective, impartial, responsible
and rigidly subject to the laws of libel. Were this last
condition observed, with all anonymous 'sources' checked under
penalty as made in good faith, with all reasonable enquiry,
many a publisher would be in prison. Many a cartoonist would
be in court, charged with bringing their victims into 'contumely
and contempt'. An over-clever individualism which tends
basically to anarchism would be subjected to the consideration
that 'liberty' in social practice has to be 'under law', even
if the law itself has to be rationally up-dated.

What, in effect, one gets is a constitutional system
operating in terms of an 'adversary' or suspicious relation
between the Congress and the Executive. A like 'adversary'
relation is explicit in the case of the Press and President.
Congress again is biased in attention and concern towards strictly
 domestic issues, local, fiscal and moral. The same responsible
attention has not been given to external non-domestic issues.

Historically Parliament and Congress had concerned themselves with grievances and complaints, not least about taxes. Adept in bullying the President, Congress became obviously out of its depth where its legislation was irrelevant and where it was, in foreign affairs, endeavouring to interfere, in the name of its own principles, with the no less sovereign policy of other states.

The electorate of the House of Representatives was and is
not僅是國會選民。Some men, it may be said, are more parochial. So often was its performance. Even in this
century, from the days of Woodrow Wilson onwards, the record of
Congress, including the Senate, has too often been negative,
confused and timid. In the days of President Harding there was
the fight against joining in with the League of Nations. The
emphatic campaign of Senator Cabot Lodge was indeed later tempered
by the later advocacy by Mr. Secretary Kellogg of appealing to
an amorphous something called World Opinion. The appeal was
pious, non-committal in detail, pacific, moral, unlikely to stir
the edge of opposition. In brief it was popular and so remained

25

2-9

[lc]

decide unilaterally to cut off support. In the hard world of international politics Congress, as the Legislature of one inter-dependant constituent country of NATO, had as matter of fact to take into account what Turkey, sovereign in its own sphere, would do. Not isolated, Congress had to form a policy, if not imperialist, then taking into consideration the policy and pride of others, no less sovereign, and to reach some kind of consensus which yet might be objectionable enough to make Congressmen want to vomit. The policy had to be contingent on diplomatic considerations of which many members of the Legislature, as distinct from the Executive, might not even be aware, whatever the abstract morals of the situation.

Some years ago I happened to be a member, with Norman Angell and others, of E.D. Morel's 'Union for Democratic Control' in foreign affairs. Its concern, not least the sale of arms (a matter taken up by Senator Borah), related to a historical curiosity of the traditional British Constitution. The British Cabinet and Ministers were (and are) formally 'Ministers of the Crown'. For the most part this was an empty term - but not entirely. Ministers, also indeed members of one or the other House, were not Ministers of Parliament and Legislative. They were (in Lockeian-American terminology) Ministers of the Executive. In the ordinary domestic affairs of the Commons problems were scarcely likely here to arise, although the power of the Cabinet and, within the Cabinet, of the Prime Minister had risen, and continued to rise, decade by decade - albeit subject to dismissal if he lost his supporting majority. But foreign affairs and treaties were a different matter. Those were affairs of 'the King's Ministers' in which, not indeed the King, but these Ministers took the decisions.

It was not unconstitutional, in 1914, for Herbert Asquith, as Prime Minister, and Edward Grey, as Foreign Minister, to take the vital decision. It certainly neither required nor received a Parliamentary vote. These were matters of the Executive and not for the Legislature to make the judgement. It was against this Executive power that the U.D.C. was built to protest. It succeeded in that today a more bland rule of informal consultation,

26.
30
[LC]

'testing the feeling of Parliament', and of Ministerial proposal and Commons confirmation prevail.

In neither American nor Britain is the Legislature competent to decide - as distinct from the confirmation of treaties or, which it shirks, the House of Representatives right to declare war - on the detail of foreign policy and on negotiation with other no less sovereign states, for which it is not entitled to legislate. It is and has to be remembered that it is not for the task, although it is entitled to request consultation and to expect communication.

A country cannot expect to lead in world politics which accepts a dominant right of a Legislature to decide which, when this Legislature does not, from fear of its electorate, know its own mind and tends to pass unpleasant and unpopular decisions, for example on Vietnam, over to the Executive, which, not with Johnson but with Nixon, belongs to a hostile Party. Politics cannot be defined as the art of the possible in the sense that a great statesman can show plans to be possible where lesser men had assumed defeat. What is possible is not known until the reserve potential powers have been called up from the deep. But such powers will not be called up in foreign affairs if all is undecided in the wrangle of domestic conflict between equal constitutional authorities.

Hence the trouble is that the United States, thanks to its democratic constitution - not that the original Constitution with its Electoral College and non-elective Supreme Court was intended by the Founding Fathers to be democratic, as distinct from republican - becomes a singularly difficult country with which others may hope to negotiate.

The most outstanding of American Presidents have tended to assert, as did Franklin Roosevelt, the full powers of the President's Presidency and have not indulged in debauched Whiggery. Recent trends in Europe, for example in France, have moved in the opposite direction of increasing the powers of the Executive, not the Assembly; and of decreasing that of the Legislature. If America chooses to move against the tide, it must beware of the dangers, which can end in impotent chaos. It is thus impotent in Europe.

There is yet a more reassuring side to the picture. In France, not only is there no danger of a revolution, but there is no danger of a revolution in Europe.

27.
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Europe there are fears, often more neurotic and jealous than substantial, of Washington hegemony or so-called 'imperialism'. In so far as these fears are real, they rather relate to 'industrial imperialism' -- what de Gaulle described as *affaires de la Bourse* which is capable of being controlled by firm anti-monopoly legislation, while yet indicating the wisdom of international political institutions -- than being themselves governmental or 'political'. (Their danger lies in the fact that their very real industrial powers, which are outside the pattern and powers of the Constitution of the United States.) It is of importance and reassuring that, far from any American urge to imperialism, the whole American political tendency is to avoid international responsibility; to aid but not to administer; to fight shy of admirals and generals. This habit is ingrained in the centuries' old tradition and cannot easily be violated.)

The heavy drawbacks of the Whig-liberal philosophy, inherited from a distant and different pioneer age, when America was but a small country of small power and some Congressmen might indeed be little more than 'hicks from the sticks', has as an ingrained part of the American tradition certain massive advantages, almost the converse in character to the imperial traditions of Germany and Russia and of the treasured professional diplomacy of a centralised France. If America, for long decades chose to remain provincial, these countries were self-consciously metropolitan. Historically they were empires. Nor did they always cease to be ideologically such, even when their political character had changed in the European sub-continent from czar to commissar.)

Occasionally the American 'big stick' is shown. But the quest is for a consensus, where American chairmanship is democratic and welcome. There is, for America in peace-time, the picture of a free or Atlantic community. Whatever the policy of Washington, the electorate of the United States actually prefers to be 'King'. The diplomatic danger is isolationism, not imperialism, just as the domestic danger is an individualistic anarchy and uninhibited permissivism and not social cohesion and sense of common purpose. If the need, to check war, is indeed international *détente*, the problem is to get common purpose even in this, without unacceptable danger.

Vg

W

[LC]

Russia and Detente

There are purists and purists who will explain that they do not understand what is meant by 'detente'. Since they are a minority it probably does not much matter whether they understand or not. Certainly 'detente' or disengagement from conflict and a firm posture of entagonism does not mean the same thing as 'entente', cordial or otherwise. Further it is quite wrong to suppose that, because there cannot be, as of the moment, an emotional and trusting entente, therefore there cannot be an effective pragmatic detente, especially on limited, functional or technical issues, such as astronautics, which are susceptible to definition.

Senator Jackson, of Washington State, has patent or at least ill-concealed aspirations of leading the Democrat Party and indeed of becoming President in 1976, the Bicentennial year. The State which he represents in the Senate, Washington, is one of the hardest hit by the current economic depression. Just as California heavily benefited by the war industries of the Second World War, so the major industrial concern of the State of Washington, Boeing, unlike the general damage, would have the condition of its workers alleviated by war demands. As for Senator Jackson, his aspirations for even higher office are not novel. Ex-Governor Ronald Reagan comes into the same category, although he, like the Rt. Hon. Anoch Powell, in Britain, is not unavailable to lead a Third Party. Nor is the support of an ethnic group vote, or of a Zionist vote, unacceptable to Senator Jackson on issues of 'liberal principle' and like matters.

In public addresses, such as his Pilgrim Address in London in 1974, very properly Senator Jackson advocated a NATO policy and also a bi-partisan policy; and hence received a standing ovation, as did Secretary Kissinger in the previous December - both of which, I should add, I instigated and led, by standing my ground.

The two major points made by Senator Jackson in his Pilgrim address in London were especially acceptable, both in terms of what he did not say in criticism of his usual target, the

2

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Secretary of State, and in terms of his recalling the bipartisan policy very successfully pursued under the emphatic leadership of President F.D. Roosevelt, with the enthusiastic co-operation of Senator Vandenberg of Michigan, Senator Jackson insisted that, even as a matter of <u>detente</u> itself, defence forces should <u>without excessive mutual trust</u> only be reduced by satisfactory common agreement, but he did not encourage the suggestion that American BATC forces should be phased out and new BSC forces substituted.

A far more controversial matter has been raised by the Senator, as for him a central theme of liberal principle in Washington. The philosopher Kant held that the free right to emigrate, not least by those who were aliens (his ancestry was Scottish) in the first place, was one of the very few fundamental and basic natural rights of man. Critics may denounce this as a piece of noble nonsense, a subversion of national sovereignty. This right was yet recognised, at the beginning of the century, by the Communist exiles of the day, some of them stateless men, in a clause of one of the earliest Constitutions of the International Communist Party itself. Every man should be regarded, primarily not as a national and patriot, but as a <u>Welt-burger</u>, a 'world citizen'.

However, the free right to emigrate is hollow unless a place is available to which to immigrate. Hence, the natural claim to emigrate moves over to a general right, as with Israel into Palestine or Ganaan in the Mandate period after World War I, to immigrate to a land which long ago they had conquered from the Palestinians. This is a claim which the Immigration Departments, whether of the United States or elsewhere, despite the case for the abolition of visas, will find hard to accept. If, indeed, there is a Social Contract (as Rousseau and Kant thought) individually accepted, a basis for the rights of the <u>any</u> individual in society, as distinct from hereditary national loyalties, then it follows that the individual who disapproves of the particular community obligations of his adopted place of residence (for example, the Ukraine) should, on this assumption, be free to quit and to immigrate elsewhere. Where?

It is relevant that, earlier in the century, Canadians

Statistics assert that in Britain between 10% and 12% of all inhabitants have been arc or will be in mental institutions at some period in their lives. The American figures are unlikely to be lower. Fortunately for democratic systems all these defectives do not vote together and in the same way. But whether they should enjoy equal rights with the more fully stable and stable is problematical.

3.

[LC]

complained that the United States, by not imposing a stiff Canadian quota restricting the right of Canadians to emigrate to the United States, gave encouragement to the depletion of Canada of useful citizens who preferred to leave for the States. Scotland might make the same complaint. What does appear plain is that any fundamental right to emigrate, which could be held to override the local regulations of sovereign states, by implication involves a like human right of individual choice to immigrate, if not here, then there.

It does not yet follow that, because one happens morally to disapprove of the regulation by a sovereign state of the emigration of those who, by their own admission and claim, are citizens and pro tante disqualifient in their choice, one will find it prudent to quarrel with that foreign State because it does not do what the citizens of New York or Washington or even Mississippi consider to be the proper thing. As well might the Russians dictate, to Washington, D.C., what the United States should do to give equality of opportunity to Negroes or charter rights to aboriginal Amerindian native sons. Such policy in denouncing other States can be condemned as mere Western democratic presumption and confusion of local morals with world politics. The morals of Massachusetts cannot be enforced by law on Iran nor should any prudent statesman think they should be imposed by arms. It is all no business of the citizens of Massachusetts. Pharoah, on the other hand, in dealing with a slave people who had entered Egypt as the followers of an alien and invading dynasty now ejected, the Shepherd Kings, had some right to decide whether he would keep them or 'let that people go', to invade Jericho or Jebus by arms and with slaughter.

It is effrontery for the U.S. House of Representatives to demand public commemoration of Turkish massacre of Armenians over sixty years ago, just as it would be folly to demand a public commemoration annually of Guernica or of every evil the Nazis may have wrought in Germany or, again, of the murders of Katyn Forest or, for that matter, of unarmed civilians in Vietnam. "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord" and so is the final judgement of history. It is not a matter for vote-hunting and 'head-line' hunting politicians.

4.

[LC]

Good diplomacy involves common sense, not least about abstract principles, and tolerance of diverse views on principle, without any creaven desire to please a mob or even a minority ethnic group or a discreditable obsession with collecting votes. To be alive to the popular prejudice of ones immigrant voters is not the same as to abjure judgement or to become the kind of weather-vane politician who should not be trusted, any more than it is to become a fanatic. Nor does a prudent politician, who is moreover not an isolationist, feel that he can agitate in a fashion offensive to another great country with impunity and expect no reaction. It may raise a mob-support vote. But so to act is to be a fool and a dangerous fool.

For some people to express doubts about détente, especially when accompanied by arms reduction, is their professional métier. It is the task of a Secretary of Defence to be alert to military danger. So is it of a general, whether he be a General Westmorland prophesying the assurance of military victory in Vietnam or a general in Ulster expressing his distrust of any good faith in the I.R.A. He is not a politician and one can almost foretell what his advice will be. It has to be taken into account, but it is not final. A statesman has to consider the probably conclusion of the matter and its acceptability.

"Compromise is unthinkable." "It is impossible," i.e. "I repudiate it." "Peace - but only on our own terms. We define what is just." I heard this slogan in Moscow and also in Berlin. Cease to think and to balance; and the military timetable, when no general can afford to yield an inch of advantage, goes into effect. While all explain their innocence, their hypocritical righteousness, war begins. It is the intransigent righteous who begin wars.

To advocate détente, as being the furthest agreement at present feasible, is not to be the naive advocate of trusting the other side, in the international chess game, in every move which it may make. Every move has to be, and be seen to be, to the advantage of both players, not only one. It has to be always made clear that the move has to be, in the total game, to the detectable advantage of both. Sometimes only the army

5.

[LC]

has to be convinced, sometimes the common people, the electors as brain-washed by the journalists. This is seldom impossible.

In the memorable words of Mr. Khruschev, one has to recognise that civilization cannot be built on a heap of radioactive smouldering embers. To change the metaphor, Russia has a very appropriate totem animal in the bear, who will merrily beg for buns if offered them. However, if the time comes when the bear begs for another bun and the donor refuses, but still puts his hand outside the window, he will be lucky if the bear does not clout his head and crush his skull. The wise bun-giver will bear this in mind. He must allow for what the bear really wants and decide whether it is to his own advantage, as well as the bear's, to accommodate him.

Instead, to twist the bear's tale, whether in the shifts of politics he was accommodating or not, and to think that (doubtless on the grounds of the highest international principles such as appeal to rural voters) one can go on doing this, is to slide towards war without even realising what, with proud or obstinate nations, one is about. It may be the tactic of a local politician. But it is fundamentally not a political attitude, a statesman's attitude, being that of somebody who does not really understand how power lies or what politics is about or the nature of its compromises.

If one considers the self-described security of a national of a nation of a few million as more important than that of the entire United States, an attitude of fanatical egotism, then, of course, the voter's attitude can change. The intention indeed is not war, but morality; but the conclusion, having substituted denunciation for amity, can be war. Peace is always a fragile plant to be nurtured. Not 'interdependence' but strictly looking after one's own military security - the Welsh looking after the 'security' of Wales and so forth - is not always the wisest way of cultivating peace.

The Vietnam war was not immoral. Merely it emerged as ill-supported by Congress and as strategically ill-chosen. Today the question is whether the American Congress or people

6.

[LC]

will welcome another Vietnam war, equally divorced from American home-interests. The Dulles policy in S.E. Asia did not exceed American powers. Merely it failed to understand the unfriendly relations historically of Vietnam with China, Communist or otherwise. And secondly it mis-estimated the willingness of the American people and its quarrelsome Congress to pursue through, and to pay for, a war not as easy as, generals and officials, who did not allow for the constitutional power of Congress to restrict, or over-concentrate, the Constitutional power of the President, to restrict, or over-restrict, the powers of the President.

Moreover it is idle to suppose that the statesman with whom one is negotiating (while one is playing to the press by denouncing his country) is without political opponents. Mr. Brezhnev could indeed be replaced, as Mr. Kissinger could be replaced, but without the prospects for peace being in any way better. It should be enough that the man who wants *détente*, for his own policy interests or for those of the Soviet Union, is in charge and should be kept there. His private theology, be it that of Lenin, Trotsky, Peter the Great or whoever, is irrelevant. What matters is the conduct and our trust in it.

Like all policies, a policy of *détente* has its risks and is controversial. Those who oppose it in effect want to see whether they can depose the negotiator - and thereby risk substituting a policy of *non-détente*. If Mr. Brezhnev died next year, it would be a disservice for everybody - for the American people, for every little fellow busy stirring up the cold war. The Russian generals would doubtless obligate.

To suppose that one can safely and noisily go on attacking one's formally recognised allies is like supposing that, if the President of the United States sponsors a policy, this, inadequately defended, may not be denounced and reversed by persons perchance more irresponsible than able. This 'cause of peace' is allowed to deteriorate into some very minor, and even suspect, position of ambitious but light-weight politicians. For decades it has been a charge that the United States, essential as an ally, is nevertheless always confused in policy since a commitment officially given by the President, and so accepted, may be overturned by a Congress only alive to its own constitutional and even irresponsibly partizan freedoms. The serious question then arises whether the United States, for over a century, politically oriented to domestic issues, can in the outside world ever remain for long a Great Power.

8.

[LC]

the lesser evil. It is for the statesmen of 1945 to shoulder
the responsibility - or for the United Nations.

The case of Czecho-Slovakia is different. In judging Czech
relations, one has to recall the original Czech (not so much
Slovak) huzzabs of enthusiasm admittedly not by all members of
the largest single party, the Agrarians, with which the Russian
troops were welcomed into Prague at the end of the Second World
War. Here was the Slav Big Brother. As the Czechs made their
beds, in those days before the suicide or murder of Jan Masaryk,
so they must lie on them.

As for the recognition of balanced spheres of influence, it
is one of the oldest themes in diplomacy, although it must not
be supposed that the declaration of such spheres is diplomatically
a good and peaceful thing in itself. The fundamental question is who
keeps the Balance stable.

Nor must it be supposed that those who do the negotiating
themselves are in total control or have no critics who are prepared
to bring them down and replace them in the conflicts of political
power. In the Russian political constellation the army has
traditionally been one of the three decisive elements, along with
the Party and the Secret Police. It is automatic that the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in its own eyes 'a fuller
democracy' (and here supported by so many millions), will deny
that it is imperialist, even in extensive Moslem and Tartar lands,
but, if interested in 'reaching warm water', it is no less
interested than Russia has for centuries been in the army, and in the
history and tradition of the Eastern Roman Empire whose successor,
through the Czars, it is.

Hence it is immeasurably dangerous to world peace and the
avoidance of war for every citizen if someone whose voice can
be made resonant by the radio, whether from motives of public
passion, private ambition, anxiety to secure some group or
ethnic following or mere scent of success, sets out to blow on
the embers of a cold war from which the world seems recently to
have in part escaped, or to rake its fires. The basic conditions
of peace are détente with one's major opponent, fortified by allied
power for oneself. Détente with the Soviet Union and an alliance

9.

[LC]

of power for oneself are not opposite but are two sides of one policy, each side dangerous without the other.

Speaking at George Washington University, on February 7th, 1975, sometime Senator William Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat, blamed the impetuosity of Senator Henry Jackson, the Greco-Turkish imbroglio in Cyprus apart, for the collapse at the time of the U.S.-Soviet trade agreement and even for the connected cut-back in Jewish emigration from Russia thanks to the Soviet sense of affront to its sovereignty.

"Senator Jackson and his supporters are entitled to full credit for the results... Most likely if Mr. Jackson and his allies had been able to restrain themselves from boasting of their victory, the Russians, for the sake of trade and credits, would have gone along with an informal arrangement for freer emigration."

Not even the American people, Congress, farmers and Press, can afford to take on the Russian Empire in war as part of the rhetorical and democratic indulgence of being as hectoring, insulting and morally aggressive as Congressmen and Press habitually are with their own President. They will catch the clout of resentment. Washington must recognise that its table talk and responsible diplomacy are not the same thing. Nor, again, is it the same thing as democracy. [werldw. m.]

"The world capital of talk is in full spate as American policy in S.E. Asia tilts towards ruin... the blabber of a city in love with the sound of its own voice... Nowhere else are the 'opinion-makers' of Press and television given so free a rein, issuing their lordly decrees on the great issues of the day from a consensus reached at the dinner tables of Georgetown hostesses or the stampede of the pundit pack."

(London Evening Standard, 9 April, 1975.)

However, not less dangerous than the actual or potential threat from Russian arms is the panic alarmism of those who feel and can make others feel themselves to be threatened. 'Twisting the bear's tail' can become a way of life. Not, it so happens today, Indochina or even Berlin, but Korea, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East become areas of critical danger - incidentally none of them within the technical NATO ambit. In all these areas, especially the last, there can be not only the Russian threat but - which can be so blown up as to be the threat itself -

10.

the rumour of the Russian threat.

Nothing that is said here should be construed as advocating lack of prudence in arms. To condemn the dangers of public indulgence in bellicose talk is one thing. Is it really necessary is the question that has to be asked. To let down the guard of national defence for the sake of some fatter way of life, spending money not on defence and sufficient arms but on the prospect of a Hollywood style of life for all equally, is something quite else again. The Super-Powers are more likely to stumble into war, by being offered from lack of prudence too great gambling chances of advantage, due to divisions in their own house, than to plan war. And, of two evils, 'the Roman orty' can be a greater danger to Rome than an excess of Roman legions. Nevertheless, the real danger from the Soviets of being able to in fact 'bury you all', as Islam may bury parts of Africa but far more extensively, I would suggest lies in another quarter, the quarter of Russian diplomacy backed indeed by empiric force, but above all waiting for the opportunity for a break-through offered by the divided or the permissive and pacifist West itself.

The disaster for the West might not come from direct Russian military aggression. It could equally come from opportunities for politico-strategic expansion almost forced on the Soviets (whatever their doctrinal creed) by American lack of respect for Jusqu'il leadership; a lack of any consistent and centralised, if bipartisan, policy; and by Atlantic policy divisions between America and Europe.

Let us make certain not-unrealistic hypotheses. Let us assume - although here there is no need to assume: it is a fact - that there is no united NATO strategic front. One of the major components, France, although not as important and glorious as it may think itself, from pique has walked out. At the NATO Conference of 1975 in Brussels the French President had, in effect, to invite himself to dinner with the King of Belgium because it would be impolitic to be left out. Further, the northern limb of NATO is weak in enthusiasm. And the members of the southern limb are busily engaged gripping each others throats. Let us

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[c]

assume that in the west Portugal and the Azores are closer in their sympathy to Mr. Brezhnev than to Senators Jackson and Reagan. Further, if Israel is an ally, the size of Connecticut, not as 'far from base' as Vietnam (a much bigger place), it nevertheless is too far from base for ready defence and its land is heavily populated with Arabs. To reach it, the American forces would have to run the gauntlet of Libyan submarines and French disapproval. The French Communist party apart, let us assume that the Portugese, Italian and Greek Communist Parties effectively control policy for the Mediterranean or can play a major role.

Let us assume that, when it comes to crisis centred far from American shores, the common people always wants peace sauced by moral denunciation. Whatever may be the views of 'youth' and 'teeny-boppers' (soon to be voters), the mass of voters will be in no haste yet again to go to war for remote countries about which they know little.

Under such contingencies, such a collapse of an Atlantic concept in détente with the U.S.S.R., there would be no need for a bombing war, no need for Russian brigades with or without 'snow on their boots' to march across Alaska. The Soviet Union, with the doors open, could make its demands. It would be in effective diplomatic control of the divided chancellries and of the anti-American or at least rival foreign offices of Europe; and Washington could be instructed from across the Atlantic as to what it had to do and would have little option but to do it. Here then, in rejecting a sober and consistent policy of balancing defence and détente, but in the joy of unrestrained electioneering propaganda and the uninhibited quarrels of ambitious politicians, lies for America, and indeed for the West, the national and international danger.

One begins with an unrealistic policy which makes of certain issues of ideology, such as 'capitalism' or 'opposition to Communism' almost a religion, provocatively pursued. One ends with a political position which is one of 'permissivism', strategic division, rivalry and weakness...

The best prospects for a long present are likely to lie in a policy of modest confidence but of mutually respected power,

12.

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each Power in its own sphere. In the Western area of the Atlantic Treaty alliance, defence for this confidence was to be found in NATO - although, ironically, actually war in the last three decades has tended to be outside the strict North Atlantic frontiers, drawn by the Pentagon. Clearly this strategic safeguard was, if not broken, yet damaged, when a major Power such as France, wrongly thinking its territory to be indispensable for the Western defence - France could in fact be treated as French North Africa was treated in the last war - walked out of the organisation, while retaining, as Portugal may seek to retain with NATO, an observer's seat in the Alliance.

There is, it is now suggested, to be a reconstruction of NATO. The power of SACEUR may be evanescent. Instead of an Atlantic Community, American isolationists could be gratified to remain in their remote continent; and a quite separate and even jealous Western European Great Power (with its own policy and diplomacy, even in explicit clash with the Americans) could be shaped, built around the old Napoleonic Franco-German power concentration, and with its primarily Mediterranean pre-occupation. What would be left in substance would be the Napoleonic concept of a Franco-German integration - maybe directed against 'the Anglo-Saxon powers'.

Any Russian statesman concerned with plain issues of power would not have to be a fanatical Marxo-Leninist, concerned to 'bury doctrinal opposition' - this would be irrelevant - to see a superb historical opportunity. In Moscow the Communist Parties of France, Italy and even of Portugal and maybe of Spain, perhaps of Jugoslavia and Greece, would beckon to him. Decisions taken by the Fraesidium in Moscow could be effective throughout almost the whole of the so-called European Community. In long range policy and in short range economic exploitation, France and America would be in conflict. The red Czar would meet no effective political opposition this side of Communist China.

We do not need or want another Great Power, jealous of North America, breaking up the Atlantic Community and giving to every expansionist in Russia a heaven-given opportunity. Indeed the

13.

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whole EEC structure, if - and it must be emphasized that this need not be the case - carried across into an isolated system of defence and hence of foreign policy is, so taken in isolation, incompatible with a consolidated NATO end with a consolidated Atlantic Community leading, not inward, but outward towards world peace.

Or would it actually work out so? Would not the Americans menace intervention? Would not even isolationists determine that there must be limits to this novel European *diktat*?

Would not even Congress, despite talk about the privileges of the American Constitution, make up its mind in time?

Can we yet today be so confident? Confident in days when Washington and its 'human liberties' and Brussels/Paris with their 'regulations' have, with their rival Communities, drifted apart across the ocean? The grave strategic miscalculation of Vietnam has taken its toll. Traumatic in electoral experience and Congressional sensitivity, the cry would be loud: 'Not another Vietnam! Not another commitment and war! Let the Jews and

Europeans defend themselves. Or let the Russians take charge of European affairs in a new shaping of European unity.'

Policy ends in decision; and war by powerful diplomacy can be waged, as has been said - and Communist interest imposed - by other means than guns and the immediate use of armaments. Diplomatic control can be enough, backed by a military force which no country is prepared actually to challenge in battle. Russia might well be tempted to test its strength - "in the cause of social justice" - and to go on beyond its conventional area of power, an area wide enough to exercise all its talents in a condominium based on consensus with the United States, a condominium comparable with that of Eastern and Western Rome.

The answer lies, not in damning *détente* for lack of confidence in ones own diplomats - the feeling of every Senator and press reporter that he could do things better himself - but in straining every nerve to maintain the integrity beyond challenge, short of world government, of the Atlantic Community, with no excessive qualms about the sensitivities of chauvinist nationalists or of Little Europeans. We seek the Great Region.

VI

B5

[LC]

WAR WHILE YOU WAIT

Is 'To End War' a dream; or is it the most practical issue of the moment?

At the Rabat Conference, in Morocco in 1974, to which reference has already been made, of the Arab States, the official leadership of the Palestinian Arabs by King Hussein of Jordan was, outside that Kingdom, replaced. His position was, by agreement of the Conference, here taken by Yassir Arafat, one of the Palestinian guerrilla leaders whom Israeli politicians preferred to describe as 'terrorists', just as later, in January, 1975, Arafat was to denounce certain Arab hijackers as terrorists. The Rabat Conference decision was quickly followed by the award to Arafat of semi-official recognition as leader and representative of the Palestinian Arabs, indeed as quasi-head of state, by the United Nations Assembly, influenced by the so-called Asia-African bloc.

The President of the United States, Gerald Ford, publicly explained, with a direct conflict emergent between an Israel, not prepared to yield to U.N. demands for a settlement as understood by the U.N. Assembly itself, and the newly confident Arab states, ranging from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, that the prospect of instant war, while contingent on Russian policy, was then and there present and could spell world war. This means a war which would directly affect the family of every single reader of this book. The Israelis were in no mood to yield territory, self-selected as vital to them, while Arab enthusiasm could well regard the present, with the Jewish political forces unexpectedly isolated in an Israel about the size of Wales or Connecticut, as the time to strike.

The character of the crisis has been stated again, even more emphatically, by King Hussein of Jordan. As reported in the *International Herald Tribune* (Jan. 27, 1975) the King said, in an interview, that there will probably be another Arab-Israeli war and it will be 'a catastrophe', with unprecedented bloodshed and possibly with big-power involvement, resulting, he implied, from Zionist obstinacy in defence of the land that Joshua conquered by arms so long ago. "The question I ask is not whether such

2.

a catastrophe can be avoided but for how long it can be avoided."
The same warning, in May, 1975, came from high officials in
Saudi Arabia.

It could, it may be added, of course be avoided if the
Super-Powers could act together and make it clear, ahead of time,
that such war would not be tolerated. This lack of courage was
also Churchill's complaint of the wars of 1914 and 1939; the
Powers would not declare themselves outspokenly. Rather than
war, the world effective Powers could themselves occupy the
battle areas and hold them by force or at least by U.N. troops.
The minor countries, so confronted by power, would in effect
have to make what General Grant called 'an unconditional surrender'
and take what the effective Powers agreed to be objective justice.

But would the Super-Powers act together? Further, as
Mr. Secretary Kissinger gave, as against King Hussein, the
encouraging comment that the issue need not come to this. He
added, in March, 1975, reassurance, however hesitant. War,
he cautiously declared, is "not inevitable". However, by
June 1st, 1975, "an American senior official" (sometimes a
diplomatic circumlocution for Dr. Kissinger) said that, unless
some progress is made to Middle Eastern peace settlement, "it is
mathematically certain that a war will break out in six months to
two years..." (italica mine). On June 2nd Premier Yitzhak Rabin
encouragingly began a tank thinning out on the borders of the
Suez Canal, which, however, did not prevent General Sharon, on
the same date being appointed as Rabin's adviser, who declared
that he (Sharon) 'regarded Henry Kissinger as the most dangerous
man for Israel and the Administration in over 27 years of existence."

Certainly the Super-Powers are in a different category from
those little ones which the U.N. chooses to call 'sovereign'.
Should these Powers choose to act together, thanks to détente,
then they can develop a common policy (which could in fact, on
suitable occasions, be a non-European, Russo-American policy,
able to flatten opposition).

That the peoples of the Western World have regarded the
situation with relative phlegm need give no cause for surprise.
It is felt to be a matter for diplomats. And, by extraordinary
chance, despite the chaos of the Nixon White House, American

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[L.C]

diplomacy happened to be in the hands of the ablest - and, be it added, most masterful - Secretary of State of the century, not excluding Lansing, Dulles or Acheson. Those who can recall, as I can, the Britain of 1914, will remember, as mentioned, the almost total lack of comprehension by the public of the likely consequences of the assassination of an Austrian archduke, of whom most of the public had never even heard of, or, for that matter, of the Serbian conspirator, Izvolsky, and the Russian Foreign Secretary.

There was an especial reason for complacency when, after the retirement of President Lyndon Johnson, American foreign policy was reversed and Dulles policy re-examined first of all, confrontation with the Soviets and, later, of counter-check, arguably too ambitious in either case.

"Send the army to a battle-field 10,000 miles from home?" said the indignant Eisenhower before the General of the Armies, a Republican, showed his disapproval by going off to play golf. He honoured undertakings of support by sending into Vietnam 'military advisers'. Democrat President Johnson, in his second term, declared that he would not be the first President to see American defeated and stiffened up his armed support for Saigon - encouraged by the generals in a war which uncompromising toughness might indeed have won had Congress shown any inclination to pay the costs - which it did not - to the required degree.

In the United States, finally under pressure from Senator McGovern, pushed on by newly enfranchised adolescents, a S.E. Asian war was in the end terminated to which the country was deeply committed - a war indeed morally unjustifiable (although, like the British Boer War, controversial) but strategically mistaken - "too far from base", unlike Cuba, as Chairman Mao commented and as President Eisenhower re-affirmed as against his own Vice-President, Nixon. It was, commitment apart, a side-show never of any great importance. (Neither the Chinese or Russians in fact moved militarily.) But the Russian Congress and people thought it was - and, anyhow, it offered a relief from preoccupation with the possible enemies and uncertain allies in Europe. It

4.

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was terminated, thanks to popular demonstrations and Congressional
ambivalence in probable favour of quick peace.

In the words, in a novel theological style, of the great
Lenin, "by the will of God Almighty Himself the young are stupid."
If it takes two to make a war, it takes two to make a peace.
The young, in the midst of war but in defiance first of a
Democrat and later, to less degree, of a Republican President
and of a Congress which was more interested in re-election than
in responsibility, decided that they wanted to be quit of of their
allies and to be quit of the war. As the phrase went, 'They
want to cop out'. It was the wrong war, at the wrong time and
in a wrong place. What mattered was the draft, taxes, the economy
and the Election. And - a thing quite novel in history - the
young voters had shown in 1968-70 that they, the new pacifists,
not just beatniks, had the power radically to reverse national policy.

American foreign policy did not have to win in war just
because it was 'American'. The war would not be won without
Congressional support - Congressional support maybe for General
Westmorland and the others who would, for example, unless their
hands were bound, be prepared like the French to bomb Haiphong -
and this at short notice. The generals, as ever professionally
over-confident, had however no such uncompromising support. Congress,
as a body of civilians, wanted the war to be won in a limited,
temperate and not over-expensive fashion. Perhaps the war was
a radical error, not in giving moral support to friends (who yet
should defend themselves - as some did) but of strategic judgement.
As for a new war - maybe any new war - it was (to use a frequent
phrase of facile politicians), 'unthinkable' (although some
thought it).

Nixon emerged with a peace programme, so shaped as to please
Congress and also to push Hanoi into releasing the American
prisoners of war. Henry Kissinger, in Paris in 1973, put
through the programme, which both Hanoi and Saigon were inclined
to violate, with the Washington politicians and the uninhibited
press 'breathing down his neck'. He was blamed by the Press
for putting it through - it was unfair to Saigon to which the

4a

President had made (but not kept) so many promises, maybe formal, maybe not; whether he was blamed by the Press for not putting it through successfully when Hanoi moved on Saigon. After all Kissinger was "a Nixon man" - which he was not - and nothing was too bad for a Nixon man as the New York-Washington Press - Anthony Lewis and all - pointed out. The side-show, now denounced as such, in effect was over.

Nevertheless, in October, 1974, the lever of war was, in Rabat, nearly pressed. Nor must it too confidently be supposed that an Arab-Israeli war would not involve a Russian-Western war, a war from which Western Europe would have no option to keep out.

There has been an additional but false reason for complacency. For a century and more professional historians in the various universities have been lecturing and writing books, the minutest detail not overlooked. They were paid large salaries by society. But I cannot recall a case of any historian who has pointed out that after almost a thousand years of Arab Empire, extending not only over the Eastern Mediterranean but to Sicily, the French south coast and Spain - and followed by some centuries of Turkish Empire extending at length to the walls of Seventeenth Century Vienna - the revival of such an empire again, and indeed the resurgence of an Arab-Islamic culture, not to speak of the Persians, was entirely on the cards which statesmen should take into account. Nor did the oil-men contribute enlightenment in the Press. This vast change was foreseen no better by the electorates than the economic depression of 1945 was announced by the economists - or than that of 1930 was announced in the days of President Hoover. At least in these cases there was the excuse that accurate prophesy might produce despondency. The implications of the importance of Arab revival had not necessarily to involve despondency. It did involve foresight.

Great Empires could not indeed be expected to collapse in the West without a compensatory change in the balance of power, a reassertion of the immemorial power, along with population, of Asia, including the ancient Persian Empire, and of the Arab lands from Egypt to Morocco.

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Further, until the other day the image in the public mind,
naturally encouraged by Israel and Jewry (interlocking words),
was of white night-shirt clad Arabs fleeing, as fast as their
legs could carry them, before on-rushing Israel weaponry, leaving
their guns in the desert sands as they fled. Professor Alastair
Buchan has recently published a book which, with irony, he has
chosen to entitle *Change without War.* Oil has replaced guns.
We do indeed now find ourselves confronting, with more alarm
than confidence, change without war, industrial and technological,
as well as, maybe, change with it.

The older Western Powers have indeed perfected the weapons
of war (too miraculously sophisticated machines indeed to be
effective in the water-sodden paddies and river-lands of S.E. Asia).
But the greater the technological delicacy the greater, as in
the industrial world, the vulnerability. Without oil the mighty
air armades are grounded, while their navies are of diminished
importance. Roughly the Arabs and the rulers of the ancient
Empire of Persia, the land of Cyrus, have the oil. And the
Westerners, at least since Alexander the Great and the Romans
so long the imperialists, do not.

Immense change does indeed come - maybe 'without war'.
Economic ministers, controlling oil or mutually realous because
they do not control it, bargain around tables. Maybe old-
fashioned war can be confined to the deserts. There may perchance
be no wars - although it seems improbable. But there will be
new masters - and a new population dominance. "You cannot shake
your fists at us," said the Shah-en-Shah. "We will shake our
fists at you."

The quest for 'Peace and Justice' - I saw the banners with
these slogans alike in Moscow and in Berlin - 'Peace and Liberty',
'Peace and Individual or National Rights' is immemorial. Cannot
we bring War to a stop as we (with some Arab exceptions) brought
Slavery. We have to pause to reflect that we abolished Slavery
through and by War. How then, as I have already said, shall we
abolish War? This is the issue.

*Professor Alastair Buchan: *Change without War* (Reith Lectures, 1975), Chapto and Windus, London.

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One helpful remark here, although it distresses idealist rhetoricians, was made by Immanuel Kant in his brief book, *Eternal Peace*. There can, he said, be no justice where there is not a recognized tribunal.⁷ Each man, nation, state cannot and must not be sole judge and jury, as well as plaintiff, in its own cause. He has ruled himself out of court - if there is a court. In world political affairs there is, as yet no such political international tribunal.⁸ World Opinion, vague, diverse, much applauded by those who propose to do nothing more costly than express an opinion, provided a city of refuge for isolationists in the days of the Kellogg Pact. To many it appealed because of its warm moral character. Once indeed general opinion had approved of slavery, nor had St. Paul taken exception - although seldom recently had it approved of cannibalism as providing protein. Distinguished professors went further. They found their refuge in World Law, did it but exist. Even on a merely national level, with an established hierarchy of tribunals, it had one major flaw, which was well expressed by President Andrew Jackson in comment on Chief Justice John Marshall. "John Marshall has delivered his decision. Now let him execute it."

The trouble in practice here lies in the utopian belief that "all men are naturally good". The anarchists, sometimes co-operativist enthusiasts such as Kropotkin, have this belief with one addition: "but all governments are naturally evil". The governors should be righteously and indeed justly terrorized and assassinated by the just. For the rest, a permissive society. It was the view of Freud, on the contrary, that men are not naturally kindly and good animals. There is original sin, chiefly of arrogance, love of private individualistic power and the will to dominate; and it is very real. Everyman is the cousin of the not entirely pleasant anthropoid ape - and he is, unlike the ape, not wholly innocent.

On the contrary, said Aristotle, by nature he is one of the cruellist of animals. Some men indeed, by hereditary and training, may be good natured, naturally just. Perchance many men may be more such than otherwise and even more good at some than at other times. About 12% of the population in Britain

7.

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and America are, have been or will be in mental hospitals. But there remains a residue, and a very powerful residue, sane or not, who are not kindly; find malice pays; and have to be confronted not only by education - indeed they may be clover calculators - but by 'justice holding a sword'. And if this applies to individuals, it applies also to herds of peoples." Beyond and around this criminal residue, man is shaped by two instincts - the animal tendency to follow a leader and the animal tendency to imitate.

Alike in Turkey and in the Egypt of the Pharaohs the 'Sublime Porte' was a 'gate' from which justice was administered. The Chinese Emperors, the Kings, declared the law and what was objectively just. In particular cases *Caesar vult*. There was a tribunal. 'Caesar', himself Tribune of the People, 'wills it'. This was final.

When the Jews, under Vespasian and Titus and again under Hadrian, acting on their ethnic religious convictions, twice arose against the imperial rule, the legions marched and the Jews, inspired by a strange suicide complex (which yet could involve others) were crushed at Masada and at Jerusalem. As touching this issue, there was the *dissidia* and nearly two thousand years of quasi-peace. War recurred indeed, with pogroms and with Hitler's barbaric persecution of the Jews - this primarily *after*, not before, the world war in defence, ironically, of Poland had begun.

Nevertheless, what Caesar declared as law was in principle derived from a fundamental and rational 'natural law', the sole source of so-called natural rights, bases of fundamental civil rights. Caesar ruled - and it was so declared in the days of the Emperor Justinian, *armis legibusque*. The Emperor for the whole Roman Empire or, as the New Testament puts it, 'the inhabited world', not only expounded the law. He also enforced it - by arms. Arms might be circumscribed and limited. Occasionally the world might be objectively at peace, with the gates of the Temple of Janus shut. But arms were certainly not abolished. Nobody suggested disbanding the legions. Peace depended on justice; and justice on arms. Accommodation for the

*vide Trotter: *Herd Instinct in Peace and War*.

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general good can indeed be reached by reasonable men. But reason may have to be backed by an armed tribunal to decide who is 'reasonable'.

One of the world's greatest historians from his expert knowledge declared that, asked to choose a time when he would wish to have lived, he would choose not to return to the Swiss republic and cantons, nor to the France of Voltaire and La Fayette, but to be born in the days of the Adoptionist Roman Emperors - Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius - 'Commanders in Chief' (like the President of the United States) but also magistrates. Slowly, slowly the Empire declined - as Gibbon said, thanks to barbarians, the comfortable provincials preferring to evade military service, and to bishops who distracted attention to an other-worldly community. (Later schismatic churches, in the name not of public reason but of private conscience and self-assertion, took to quarrelling among themselves and left decisions on mundane justice to secular princes.)

Hesitatingly the notion evolved of what was called a Concert of Europe, the French having broken the prestige of the Empire as standing alone. An international law based on the old Roman Law shaped in Spain and Holland. But the most effective international peace, backed by arms, rather outside Europe than within, was the <u>nax Britannica</u>, a matter of naval power - and of willingness to use it. Sincered British attachment was to Free Trade as its own oyster and Britain had maritime limits to its strength, <u>its power</u> was nevertheless effective until this century. Whether the United States, within the rules of debate and of divisional powers of the American Constitution, has the same willingness and sense of political responsibility (especially if consensus <u>be</u> based) we have still to discover. In Britain Parliament <u>can</u> be controlled by a strong Prime Minister with a majority. Congress may prefer to discuss but not to act - except to check any President of another Party than its <u>own</u> majority, is still open to international debate.

Attempts made to replace such effectiveness by the body, <u>substantive</u> lacking arms, of the League of Nations and later of the United Nations, were more conspicuous by a well-intentioned weakness than by positive effectiveness. Certainly Israel would not

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admit the international right of the United Nations, with or
without the Security Council, to over-ride what each nation
might declare to affect its own vital interests and security.
Justice was for the individual nation to decide.

If indeed we could decide what, in the cause of peace, were
the interests of humanity, then indeed, as in the days of Rome,
any tribe or nation, small, medium or great, opposing this could
be smitten down by force. There are limits to presumption in
national or tribal or religious claims.

The very idea of 'absolute' sovereignty, as the current
diplomacy of France shows, is today in transition. There is
an accepted claim to sovereignty yet limited by the duration of
particular treaties or international law. There are local
claims to sovereignty of a strictly functional character, as
of a 'Sovereign High Authority' for Coal and Steel; or locally,
under the Constitution, for individual American States. The
Austinian absolutism is yet challenged. The State which
presses its national rights against the agreed and recognised
interests of humanity has indeed no rights, national or inter-
national, at all. They are void.

The conclusion of this logic, if we accept the priority
of peace among human issues, is the need, not for a World Court
without force, but for a World Government. Power may corrupt,
but impotence corrupts and absolute impotence corrupts absolutely.
Within a century, from among the Super-Powers which today alone
have the population and resources and can afford the costs,
one can expect to emerge one Super-Power seeking to claim an
international consensus, but yet capable of effective change
with power of decision. A consensus is required - but maybe
China could both have the will and be acceptable as chairman.
Its Confucian, highly civilized and pacific culture, its population,
resources and willingness to assume responsibility (which some
individualists and democrats lack) are recommendations. Nor
may its present campaign, not least in Africa, against Super-
Powers continue were it recognised to be premier itself.
Indeed few peoples might arrange the affairs of the Africans
better, in view of Chinese confidence in Chinese civilization.
Changes might take place in Chad, Urundi and even in Uganda.

[L]

These planetary arrangements, however, are very much for another century. The contemporary problem is that of the rational arrangements of power now. The United Nations, a conglomerate of sovereigns, is unlikely to assume more centralized and effective military power than its Security Council will agree upon or indeed than the two Super-Powers, plus China, can tolerate.

One plan, also advocated by Professor Alastair Buchan as a general receipt, is 'multi-polarity'. This in effect spells recognizing, increasing and basing world peace on the power, not of petty sovereigns without effective force - how much effective force Kuwait or the Arab countries have is a related question - but of the Middle or Third-rate Powers such as Britain or indeed France.

One can hold, with Professor Hans Morgenthaler of Chicago, that the fundamental decisions in politics turn on 'interest'. This, however, omits to define what here precisely is meant by 'interest'. Is it the immediate and material advantage, financial or otherwise? Or is it a people's 'real interest', understood in terms of standard of living and of successful international relations. Is the issue indeed one of communication and of understanding by all of the common and long-range advantage, even if we do not presume to dogmatise about 'the real good'. Many a war has been fought about what the future has shown to be a misconception of advantage so that, a generation on, it may appear that not the victor but the loser, even materially, did best out of the conflict. It is the Germans who are today able to confer the benefits on others - and the Japanese.

As distinct from a haggle over disputed advantages, it would appear more sound to maintain that the more Powers are brought in to arrange the early scheme-work of a settlement, and hence to advance peace, the smaller are the chances of agreement being reached, even privately and not only on the plane of press sensation and publicity. The more the participants, without clear display of effective will, the worse the chances of peace. Certainly the need for atomisation is not there, quite the contrary - but, granted the resilient strength of 'chauvinist-nationalism', the practical conclusion of the poly-centrism

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advocated by Buchan could well be a return of that 'international anarchy' deplored by Lowes Dickenson and G.P. Gooch. Peace will flow from a principle advocated by Rousseau - that democratic minorities, as they mature, have a civil and moral obligation to concur with the majority will, preferably instructed by expert and impartial knowledge. If there is to be community, they should shut their mouth about negative inherent rights.

If this be granted, then the target has to be the consensus of the **widest executive group** which can be brought together on a common view; and at least **detente** between those groups which cannot be so harmonised. Peace does not 'come naturally'. For the moment to expect effective and 'true' harmony of purpose between the Super-Powers of the world is to expect more than is, as yet, likely to be achieved. But the repudiation of those who, having nothing effective themselves to offer, yet want positive negotiation, not with their own group in formulating policy interdependently, but at the table of a world group, jealous in its members of each others' but hoping to embarrass negotiations by bringing in dissentients, is a sound caution.

The small table and the private discussion, with no treachery, leaks and recommendation on the long road to the achievement of durable no press sensationalism, is the best and enforceable peace. Lasting peace is the work of trained diplomats, of a Tallyrand or a Metternich, constructed in an atmosphere of intelligent and maybe cynical benevolence, perhaps the agreements openly announced but at least good in duration for a century rather than constructed in a climate of **jihed** and of hot emotion. Justice is an adjustment, not a conclusion in geometry.

Appendix.

The Principles of 1940.

In 1940 I received a letter from Professor Raymond Buell, of Harvard, saying that he had been seconded to act as adviser on foreign affairs (with reference not least to the Monetary Conference in London) to Wendell Willkie, Republican Candidate for President, who later ran Franklin Roosevelt closer than any of the other candidates during his four term Presidential tenure. He wrote to me that he wanted to be more fully informed on "Britain's needs and powers to resist".

I took this request sufficiently seriously to approach (I received no indication that they had been approached before) some Ministerial friends, especially A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, Arthur Greenwood, Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, and Hugh Dalton. The dossier I received in reply from the Admiralty was especially complete and was especially concerned with the loan of the "fifty old destroyers", then laid up in U.S. dockyards.

This dossier was of key importance, not only navally but also constitutionally, since the U.S. Neutrality Act was still in force and, if a transfer were made, the Republican Candidate was in a strong position - which would almost certainly have been used had Robert Taft, 'Mr. Republican', been selected as the Republican candidate, to challenge Roosevelt's constitutional right to infringe neutrality even to the extent of this transfer. The transfer, so essential for convoy duty on Britain's maritime lines of food supply, would not have been made.

The dossier was taken by me across the Atlantic and on to Kansas City, where Willkie was. The details of this episode are described in my autobiography, *For God's Sake, Go* (Colin Smythe, 1972). However, on arrival, I was dismayed to learn that Raymond Buell had gone to hospital that day with a brain affliction from which he later died. I consulted a sometime Cornell student of mine about what to do and, on his advice and introduction, I met Russell Davenport, Willkie's campaign manager. He explained the difficulty, on foreign affairs advice, in which Buell's sudden illness had placed them and, without more ado,

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asked whether I would take on. A decision was required on the spot. There was certainly no time to consult Whitehall on nice points of tactic - or even a good personal friend such as Philip Lothian...

In the United States I had no party affiliations, although I had been received by Frenklin Roosevelt in both Albany and Washington and was also to be both week-end guest of Mrs. Roosevelt at Hyde Park and her host in London. On the other hand I had been, in 1926, national director of a Rockefeller-financed study of the Operation of the XVIIIth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Prohibition) and could scarcely claim entire detachment from American political life. (The issue, after the report of the Wickersham Commission, was Repeal.) On a thirty second judgement I accepted, postponing a commitment in Minneapolis; and was told to report on Willkie's Campaign Train the following day. Drafting speech memoranda, used by the Candidate in San Diego, and putting my Admiralty dossier in the files, I accompanied the Candidate to California. Later, in January 1941, in London, Willkie gave an interview to the London press supporting, among other things, a 'common citizenship' of "the U.S.A. and the British Commonwealth" - a proposal not so startling in view of Churchill's proposals on French citizenship.

Before I left America for London in November, 1940 (my ship, The Western Prince, was torpedoed in mid-Atlantic) in a speedy ten days in Santa Barbara I put together a little book, One Anglo-American Nation, later reprinted with few modifications (except that ex-enemy Powers had become friendly Powers) under the title The Atlantic Community (1959).*

The original book of 1941 (Dekers and Macmillan, Canada) following a review of mine of Clarence Streit's Union Now, a both an Anglo-Saxon and American balance of facts on the independence of India, delivered in a Westermanial audience.

*Under a book of the same name (1963, Praeger) edited by F.C. Wilcox and H.F. Haviland, Stanley Hoffmann states that Clarence Streit, in his Union Now with Britain (1941) and earlier Union Now, and my work at this time, quoted and supported by Walter Lippmann in his U.S. War Aims, Number One, made us the progenitors of the idea and the fathers and founders of the Atlantic Community concept. However, my own concern was for a constitutional, organic but consultative approach rather than for the legalism, based on the federal constitution of the American founding fathers, of Streit's theme.

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emphasised as central the notion of an Atlantic Community as
its political goal and anticipated by ten years the idea of an
exclusively European Union for which, with genius, Jean Monnet
had found a first focus in specific and pragmatic functional
authorities such as that for Coal and Steel, along with the
establishment in 1950 of the much vaguer and, compared with
ECO, less effective Council of Europe at Strasbourg.

My book of 1941 earned a card of thanks, in his own hand,
from Winston Churchill. (The Duchess of Atholl had indeed
invited me onto a small committee, also including Duncan Sandys,
designed to press for Winston Churchill's promotion, which soon
took place, from the Ministry under Neville Chamberlein to the
Cabinet.)

In view, however, of the main theme of the present book
it seems not only of historical interest but fully relevant to
reproduce here the comment which the earlier book, which ran to
two editions, received at the time. It is well to reflect on
the considered views and even enthusiasm of British Ministers
at that time of war (although later replaced by enthusiasm,
the League of Nations being still nominally in existence, for
Roosevelt's United Nations). It is also well to reflect that
what the inadequately informed today brush on one side as 'not
a starter' was, by no means so regarded at that most critical t
time when we had to ask, as we may have to ask again, not who
are our bankers and stockbrokers but who are our friends.

ONE ANGLO-AMERICAN NATION

Introduction by the Rt. Hon. J.C. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.D.
Preface by Professor Ernest Barker, D. Litt.
(Dakers 3/6. 2nd Edition; Macmillan, Toronto.) (1941.)

First Opinions

Lord Sankey
Sometime Lord Chancellor

"It is a book which should be 'chewed and digested' by all who can influence the shape of things to come... Your scheme holds the field. I wish it well. It may want the banner and anvil, but if it succeeds you will have deserved well of two hemispheres."

Lord Beaverbrook
Member of the British War Cabinet

"It is an immense project, and Lord Beaverbrook is happy
to think it is getting such powerful advocacy."

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The Rt. Hon. A.V. Alexander
First Lord of the Admiralty

"I feel sure that only good can come from wise and temperate advocacy of many of the broad ideas which you put forward in your book and I wish you success in your endeavours."

The Rt. Hon. L.S. Amery
Secretary of State for India

"I have read your book with the greatest interest and with a considerable measure of agreement as touching the co-operation of the British and American peoples. I am glad that you did not commit yourself to any rigid federal constitution and realise that progress can only be by stages and as the idea of closer union gains ground."

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Brown
Minister of Health

"I am glad to say that I have read your persuasive book 'One Anglo-American Nation' with great interest and much agreement. It is valuable because of the project it advocates, because it sets out the difficulties in a straightforward manner and because the case is argued with sweetness and light. I hope those who read it will also read your larger book 'Anglo-Saxon Tradition', which has given me much pleasure."

The

The Rt. Hon. Leslie Hore-Belisha
Secretary of State for War

"I congratulate you on the inspiring plea you are making for Anglo-Saxon. It would, as you say, be but a reunion. It would also be a revitalisation. This is the greatest constructive idea in the modern world, and I hope that out of the pangs of war it will come to life."

Col. The Rt. Hon. Josiah Wedgwood, P.C., D.S.O., M.P.

"Go step by step no doubt; but start now."

Sir Thomas Drummond Shiels
Secretary of State, Colonial Office

"I consider it one of the best informed and best balanced statements of the Federal case that we have yet had."

The High Commissioner for New Zealand

"Before the day of the Post-War Conference, I hope you will express to me some of your opinions, and I am sure they would be worth while putting forward at such a Conference.... anything which comes from your pen can be read with advantage by all."

Archbishop Temple, of Canterbury

"I have now had the opportunity of reading your book and found it extremely interesting and, I think I must add, very persuasive. It seemed to me to state the case for union with America at this stage better than I have seen it done from the British standpoint. Some of the propaganda put out from America ignores our special position."

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Mr. George Gibson
President, British Trades Union Council

"Civilization must co-operate or smash, and while I am in
sincerest sympathy with the movement for a Federal Europe, and
with the desire to see revived and made effective the League of
Nations, I feel that with all the obstacles of language, race
and tradition, the project necessitates long and arduous organi-
sation. On the other hand, we have within the ambit of the
British Commonwealth of Nations, plus the American States, over
200 million English-speaking white people, and 500 million
coloured people in India, the Dominions and the Colonies... I
welcome your book as a constructive and practical contribution
in the discussion of post-war policies, and it would indeed be
historic restitution if the United States, lost to the British
Commonwealth through the vagaries of a German king, could now
decide to become partners with the British Commonwealth of
Nations in a great new effort at world reconstruction as a con-
sequence of Adolf Hitler... I hope your book will be read by
everybody."

Professor Gilbert Murray, O.M.

"I have read your little book with very great interest and almost complete agreement. You show the most comprehensive knowledge of all the current points of view and answer every one of them with a 'sweet reasonableness'... I agree with you that the question is absolutely vital. If America will stand in with the British Empire, we can save civilisation."

Señor Salvador de Madariaga

"An Anglo-Saxon Federation is coming and is inevitable - what you have usefully called Anglo-Saxony. It is an indis-pensable necessity. The English and Americans will keep awake because the Germans will not let them go to sleep. My views on whether it will be good or bad are like Aesop's on tongue. It will depend upon the spirit in which its powers are used."

Sir Walter Monckton, K.C.V.O., M.C.β, K.G.
Director, Ministry of Information

"I share the feelings which I see Mr. Amery has expressed about it."

Sunday Express, 27th July, 1941. Three-quarters of a column of extracts.

Picture Post References in two succeeding issues.

"The Observer" - 27.7.41.

'Book of the Day': "A most persuasive, interesting and constructive book."

J.A. Spender, "Sunday Times" - 6.7.41.

"If anyone wishes to have brought home to him the inner meaning of the struggle which is going on in Europe, he can hardly do better than read side by side Mr. Clarence Streit's

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sequel to his 'Union Now' and Professor Catlin's 'One Anglo-American Nation'... Mr. Streit and Professor Catlin are doing essential pioneer work in clearing the ground for this great debate of the future."

"The Scotsman" - 17.7.41.

"But he is noticeably more modest in his expectations than some other advocates of Federal Union, and in this he is more realistic."

"The Spectator" - 8.8.41.

(Political Improbability) - "The difficulties which could be created by ingenious politicians are ignored."

"The Yorkshire Post" - 23.7.41.

"His vision is as wide as Mr. Streit's, his aim as high, but he argues with more detachment, greater scholarship and appreciation of realities, and much more humour."

"New Statesman and Nation" - 2.8.41.

"Professor Catlin's *One Anglo-American Nation* is a much more persuasive book. He, too, wants to unite the English-speaking parts of the British Empire with the United States in a realm he calls Anglo-Saxony'. But he admits the difficulty of Britain's geographical position... Professor Catlin, however, faces the dangerous alternatives honestly, and states his own preference with a moderation which contributes usefully to the Federal discussion."

"Times Literary Supplement" - 5.9.41.

Book recommended - front page review, five columns.

"The Times" - 7.8.41.

Letter from a Correspondent: "Until he was called to official duties, Lord Lothian occupied a place in the Federal Union Movement somewhat similar to that now held by Dr. Catlin."

Maurice Fanshawe
League of Nations Union

"In the welter of books coming and come out - one seems to me to be unusually helpful. Do you know it, 'One Anglo-American Nation' by George Catlin: introduction by Wedgwood and Ernest Barker (Dakers 3/6.)? It seems to me to be full of good and possible things, and a very effective reply to some of the moonshine of Streit. If you don't know it, I am sure it will really interest you to read it - easily written, inspiring, even dominating. And he is no fool about the League."

Free Press, London, Canada:

"Hitler, Anglo-American Union - Whose New Order?"

Manchester Guardian

"Mr. Catlin is the founder in this country of the idea of a close union of the United States and the British Empire. He first proposed this policy sixteen years ago."

GENERAL

FG-6-11-1/KISSINGER, HENRY A.

CO160

KISSINGER, HENRY A./W*

Peregrine Worsthorne
Deputy Editor, The Sunday Telegraph (Telesun)
Fleet Street
London, E. C. 4, England

Delighted to hear that you will be coming to Washington and look forward to seeing you. My schedule, by necessity, must remain flexible but I would like to suggest that we lunch together Feb. 3 at 1:00 in my office.

To ensure that nothing unplanned has come up and to confirm the time and date, please call my office 456 - 2234 when you arrive on the first.

RECEIVED
MAR10 '71
DEPT'L. FILED