Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4

D: (continued) check it with you just in this case. He did not propose it.
Nobody propose me this.

K: You let us know whether he goes to Peking.

D: No, this . . .

K: Because we have to have the head of our Liaison Office at the airport.

D: But Mr. Bruce will be there on the 1st of May on the Day of Proletarian Solidarity.

K: No, no.

D: He will not be.

K: He'll be there about the 14th.

D: I thought he would be just --

K: No, he's leaving here on the 7th and then he's going to Hong Kong and
then on the 14th which I think is a Monday.

D: I didn't count it properly.

K: But the present plan is that he'll be there on the 14th.

D: I see. No, I thought that he may come on the 1st of May as I mentioned
for proletarian solidarity.

K: No, we'll miss it this year.

D: I think it would be a good idea. (laughter) What was reaction of Israel
by the way?

K: To our abstention?

D: No, no, not abstention. I understand what their reaction was. But you
said that you spoke with the Ambassador about this --

K: Oh, oh, well, I told the Ambassador that we would take very serious
measures if they obstructed the MFN. And between you and me, even
going to airplane deliveries.

D: That you mentioned him directly this way?

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

5

K: Yeah. I mean, don't publish this.

D: No, Henry. But did you ever see anything published which we discuss with you?

K: No.

D: I don't know anything we have.

K: No, but I mean, we were very tough. And if you could see the reaction of the Jewish leaders, I think that it was not uninfluenced by them.

D: All right, Henry.

K: We will push it through, Anatol.

D: It was my impression though because many Senators, which I spoke before of, simply mentioned to me about they need some really --

K: Maybe when I am in Russia, we can think of a few minor cosmetic things.

D: Yeah. It could be.

K: But we will keep it going. We have just started.

D: Yeah. No, I understand. My impression now --

K: No, I'm very optimistic now.

D: This is my impression too. Okay, Henry.

K: Good, Anatol.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By: MW Paule
Date: 06/04/70

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Professor Doty
4/22/73; 11:25 a.m.

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Paul, how are you?

D: Okay. Happy Easter.

K: You called me two days ago when we had a rather hectic period here.

D: Yes, I can suppose that is so.

K: And I am doing a speech tomorrow in New York so I...

D: Oh, yes, well you... We of course wondered if you had a chance to look at the papers we wrote and whether you had any reactions and whether they were useful. We hope the "quickie" was something that might make you think about...

K: Well the "quickie" was very helpful. The others I haven't had a chance to look at. We are focusing on some approach to the MIRV problem. And to the SALT problem.

D: Okay, we are just going to have a rump session this afternoon in Washington because everyone is there but we will return if you want us sometime later.

K: I would like to see you -- well let's see, this week -- maybe towards the end of this week and towards early next week.

D: I think we could reassemble -- I'll be all the information this afternoon.

K: I may be free for breakfast tomorrow morning -- are you going to be here?

D: Yes, I'll be there. I'll be at the Watergate.

K: Why don't you call me at 8:00.

D: Call you at 8:00.

K: Why don't we aim for 8:30.

D: Okay, I'll be there.

K: Let's have a quick breakfast.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 1295A
Date: 6/1/73
By: NARA DC: 6/1/73

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Len Garment
4/22/73; 11:35 a.m.

K: Len.

G: Who is this?

K: Henry Kissinger.

G: Oh, I thought they said General Scowcroft.

K: Well, the military are taking over but not yet completely.

G: How are you today, Henry.

K: Okay. How did it go with Burns?

G: He was fine. About two and one-half hours and I don't think too new.
The President has a lot of problems -- but that's self-evident.

K: The newspapers are getting worse and worse.

G: Uh-huh. I don't think so. I've been reading about all the problems the President has had.

K: It may -- there may not be the possibility of keeping the President out of it.

G: No, I don't think that is true but I don't know how much longer -- I think
beyond a certain point I just don't know what will happen.

K: I talked to Ehrlichman last night but they are still totally focused on the
criminal aspect.

G: Uh-huh. I feel very dried up on the subject. I just don't know what more to say or what can be done.

K: I think there is nothing to do now except to wait. And for us to stay in touch.

G: Yes.

K: If anything major happens.

G: Yes, I think that is right. I don't think there is anything else.

must

K: You know the decisions now/be made elsewhere.

DECLASSIFIED

DEWINTERSTELLEN-BOSCHDRUKKERS

*

-2-

G: Burns said that he has been talking with George Shultz and would continue to. I don't know whether..

K: And I'll be meeting with George Shultz.

G: All right. That's fine.

K: Let me talk to George to what extent we should get you involved.

G: Well, I'll leave that up entirely to you.

K: Good.

G: You might find out whether he has been talking to the President about this.

K: Who, George?

G: Yes.

K: I know he hasn't

G: Oh, he has.

K: No, hasn't.

G: Has not!

K: No.

G: Well, okay. By the way the non-absentient worked out okay with modified language there was no problem.

K: Well, that's what I thought.

G: Yes.

K: Because we brought about a major change.

G: Yes. No, that was all right. And I suggested also that we might talk to Jack Javits about the need for some due bills from him.

4/22/73; 11:35 a.m.

-3-

K: Because it would be really totally unreasonable.

G: Max spoke to Dinitz this morning and there is no great problem there.

K: Yeah, we talked to Dinitz. . .

G: Fine. But I think Arthur Burns could be very helpful with Javits.

K: Well, we will be working more closely together and if the Goddamn guy didn't take so much time.

G: Who? Javits?

K: No, Burns.

G: Oh, oh, I see. Okay, those are the current matters. When I last spoke . . . One thing that really baffles me is that John and Bob Haldeman would have the same lawyer. It's as if it was a joint venture.

K: Do they have the same lawyer?

G: They have one NXX lawyer. A partnership.

K: Another stupidity -- isn't it?

G: Have you looked at the papers today?

K: NXX Awful.

G: Well, there is nothing else to say at this moment. It's in his hands to do something.

K: No, there is nothing to do.

G: Notify them tonight and should act tomorrow morning.

K: Never

G: Won't do it. Wonder how the Government will function. It'll be a neat trick. Then you are talking to George.

K: I'll be talking to George tomorrow.

G: All right, fine.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E012955
BY MARA DEC 6 1973

4/22/73; 11:35 a.m.

K: We'll be in close touch.

G: When you get to the point -- if the point is reached about additional people from the outside I have a few thoughts, but there is no point in talking about that now.

K: No, but we will have to do that, too.

G: That should be done simultaneously with any move that he might make. If you are talking to him about that at least hold that for a little while.

K: He's got to visibly change the . . .

G: It's exactly that way. He has to strike everybody out.

K: He cannot just replace. He's got to change the method of government.

G: He has to change that. He has to do a number of very dramatic things and Burns had some very good suggestions along that line. He said -- his feelings was as ours -- that this has to be done simultaneously.

K: That's nice.

G: Okay, Henry, thank you.

K: Good, thank you.

G: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
By: XARA Data: 6/12/91

TelCon
Gen. Haig/Mr. Kissinger

4/23/73, 9:52 am

H: Henry the Association of the US. Army has contacted me with reference to the Marshall Medal which they give each year.

K: You mean they want to give it to me.

H: Yeah.
And they are very anxious--

K: I want to do that. You know I don't know what happened to that invitation.

H: Well they didn't give a specific date yet, I think they just want your agreement in principle.

K: Yeah, I'll do it, Now if you could get Brent to get a letter written to them.

H: Good, okay, I'll take care of that. I heard you/giving a speech today.

K: Well, if they'll ever let me get out of here. They are running it off.

H: Well how do you feel about the other place, with Freddy.

K: My problem is I don't see how we can get anything done in this climate. I mean supposing we start bombing. This will crystalize all the Congressional opposition.

H: Well I think we're just going to have to--

K: And the whole credibility problem will be raised in connection with whatever we say we're doing it for. What do you think.

H: I agree with that. The reason they're doing it, they have now shifted from pragmatism to principle, so that they screw the President on this Water Gate thing. The liberals are going to turn on that poor bastard Ellsberg. Because there's a parallel here. So we are just gonna watch this period. I just don't trust any of those. Which is the other think I wanted to talk to you about. I'm going out there tomorrow.

K: Out where.

H: To LA, to this trial, alleged to talk about the two things. I don't want to get you in a p---ing match with Whiting, I'm just going to do it very cryptically and say that you had him in San Clemente in August of '69.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 1295

By: SARA DAE 6/13/73

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
D: 12 MARA Dae 01/13/01

K: That's just the fact. And say he wasn't working on classified material.

H: Nothing classified. Will you have said anything to him that will enable him to say that we he was an official NSC consultant. He never got paid for it you know.

K: No, that's what he always wanted to sbe.

H: Yes. Okay, well--

K: What I said, in fact, I can't guarantee.

H: Well, I'll stay fuzzy on the thing and just put it--

K: I'd like to talk to you when you get back, I'd like to assess where we stand now.

H: Good, okay, Henry.

K: To me this is looking almost worse than I feared.

H: Yeah, I agree with you. I'm cornered, I just don't know what the hell he can do under these circumstances. The whole God damned thing is up for grabs.

K: Yeah. Unless he just acts with total brutality anddaring.

H: Well, Brent told me you had some kind of soft response. I think they are scared to death.

K: Look I haveno doubt that if it weren't for this mess we'd back them off.

H: Yeah. This could turn it just the other way. Course I'm worried about the Middle East for the same reason.

K: That's right.

H: I want to talk to you about some things that are going on in that area too. To be sure that you are aware.

K: Like what.

TelCon

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

10:06 am, April 23, 1973

K: Hello.

K: Hi.

K: Ron, I'm going up to NY and you won't get much on Vietnam these days will you.

Z: No, I don't think so.

K: Well Khang tight on it.

Z: All right.

K: Where are you.

Z: I'm over at the compound.

K: I see. Where's the President.

Z: He's on his way back to the compound.

K: Oh, he is. Okay, you know I'm making that speech on Europe today.

Z: Sure.

K: And we'll get it down to you soon.

Z: Okay. I've quite frankly, been out of most of that action Henry you know.

K: What action.

Z: I'm sure that people have taken care of the speech text and so forth.

K: Well, in a sort of half assed way, but that's a different issue. Okay fine.

Z: What happened on it.

K: We are an hour late, and I'm going to be 45 minutes late in NY.

Z: Why was it delayed.

K: Because it took them that long to run it off.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO 12955
 B: NARA DEc 6/1/97

TelCon

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 pm, April 23, 1973

T: Hi.

K: How are you.

T: Fine. I liked your statement up there.

K: Thank you.

T: On the Water Gate thing.

K: I'm blanketing my own story. That was an extemporaneous answer.

T: Well, I think it had to be said. Henry a couple of thing I wanted to come by and talk to you about.

K: What are they.

T: One is a I'd like to talk to you about MB FR following the NSC meetings. I get conflicting reports about what came out of it, the options that were discussed. I've not written it because I'm not that sure, but I keep hearing that we're backing off this a) symmetrical reductions in favor of symmetrical reductions.

K: Well you know you hear a lot of nonsense.

T: Right. And the other thing is I wanted to talk to you about the Mid East. You have put me off saying you haven't decided what to do about it.

K: Can you do it later this week.

T: Sure.

K: I'll call you and I'lldefinitely see you before the end of this week.

T: That's fine Henry, thank you.

K: Okay, bye.

T: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

E01295C

Authority

D:12 MARA Date: 6/12/73

*

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Eliot Richardson

4/23/73 7:15 p.m.

HK: I got your memo on the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

ER: Oh yes.

HK: I'm trying to get my blood pressure under control.

ER: Oh?

HK: When we send over a Presidential request--it has to be complied with.

ER: Well, we talked about this.

HK: Now if you want an appointment with the President, we will always request it. But if we request, as has been the custom, three nominations, they have to be sent.

ER: Well, my understanding is that that has not been the custom.

HK: The last time an AF Chief of Staff was selected, he sent over Meyer, Holloway and Ryan/ Now in the Army there was a protracted wrangle-- no he also sent over several names, Davidson, Abrams, and I think that is all. Oh, Weyand--with a recommendation however and in each case the President accepted the recommendation. And I have no reason to suppose that he won't accept this recommendation. It's never been discussed with him. I don't think he knows any of them--accept possibly Vogt ______, one of the three. But I have no reason to believe that he would want to make Vogt Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

ER: Yeh, well the only reason I did it this way was that it seemed to me-- based on what I could find out about the practice in this that it would be better to be able to present to him directly what the alternatives considered were. The problem is that at least so based on talking to people here who had been familiar with the way this had been done in the past was that if we send this over--the files--on several individuals, then the problem is really instead of the President being in the position to get from me directly what were the considerations that went into this and the view which rests on a fairly comprehensive effort to assess the various qualifications in each candidate, there can then occur a situation in which individuals on your staff for instance may have had meeting contact with an individual good or bad which then I have no way of being aware of or doing with.

HK: Well then if you assume that the President would overrule you and not give you a hearing that would be true. I just don't know whether this is

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295F

Dated: 6/13/73
By: XJ MARA

Page 2

the time or whether there is ever a time--you know, to turn everything in to a test of whether there can be--ah, ah--- of this sort, but we can attempt it for a while and see what happens.

ER: Well, I don't want to percipitate a test of strength on whose function or perrogative it is to deal with the issue in a given way--and this seemed to me simply a good way of handling it. If you want to--if the President wants to specifically request that I handle it in any other way, I will do it.

HK: Well, he'll have to assume that when I transmit something, it is a Presidential request. Now we can try a few times whether I am wrong in this, and then we'll have it established. I don't do it unless I am sure of Presidential backing. I have no interest in -- I have no candidate of my own.

ER: Well, ah......... I;ll think about that over night and get back to you. What I was calling about is SALT and the fact that YENX delegation is here, particularly Alex for a little while and reviewing the record of the negotiations in Vienna and the hearing from ______ a summary of the overall Soviet position, it seems to me that we have a good opportunity at this stage to brief key people in the Congress on how things stand and the relatively hard line the Soviets have taken, in terms of seeking to get us to cease ______ issue what we are doing without talking seriously about--

HK: You mean after Congress gets back.

ER: Yeh, it would be only before the delegation goes back a couple of days next week, that I feel if we get at it now, we could set up at least one session that Alex could brief people.

HK: Like who?

ER: The Chairman and ranking members of the Foreign Relations and Arm's Service Committees.

HK: I don't know how much we want to trigger Jackson right now into another assault, but let me do this--I have to see Johnson and I would also like to have a meeting of the Verification Panel, and then we can decide at the end of this week when the President is back.

ER: Okay. Say is it--we are at a critical stage with respect to congressional support for the Trident and the B-1 particularly as well as various R&D efforts that are in the budget and all of which--

HK: I basically think it is a good idea.

ER: Their line is so tough--

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
Date 6/17/94

NARA Dated: 6/17/94

Page 3

HK: The only thing is, if it should suddenly break, then we would look not very credible then would we--

ER: On the contrary -- I think we could say that we had broken in part because we had achieved a relatively united front within the US, reduced the potential opportunity -- Soviets might have to exploit congressional weakness. This would be particularly true if we thought about how to handle not only what was said in the briefings but we anticipated what might be said or leak out from the briefings.

HK: In principle I think we should seriously consider this, why don't we decide it finally after a Verification Panel meeting

ER: Okay, that's fine

HK: And then we see where we stand. The President will have a restricted meeting of the NSC on your paper and on the issues raised by your paper--the paper itself won't be on the agenda--on Vietnam options.

ER: Good, when is that?

HK: Thursday or Friday, depending on when he comes back.

ER: Good.

HK: One final thing to get back to the original point, no member of my staff is given an opportunity to comment, so the only person who could possibly do what you said would be I.

ER: That would give me no problem.

HK: And this is no something that is handled by the staff--and it is something in which I personally have never expressed an opinion in the past and in most cases, I didn't know any of the candidates.

ER: Well that wouldn't worry me anyway Henry. Why don't I on that basis send these over, okay?

HK: Okay.

ER: One other thing I raised with you a week or so ago--have you given any further thought to Bramawitz--as a Deputy to Hill. Of course I would want Hill to make up his own mind, anyway, but I don't even want to suggest it if it is--

HK: You know my view, but I would leave it, if Hill wanted him, I'd -- my view is that he will scrupulously carry out any order he receives, but

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

Dated: 6/13/97

XIMRA Date:

Page 4

generally tilt away from what I think the President's drift is. But I may
be wrong. It would be the difference between Swank and Godley.

ER: Yeh.

HK: You see what I mean--I can't say that Swank ever not carried out an order he received

ER: Yeh, I know what you mean. I found him resourceful and as well as loyal.
a lot

HK: No question. But you know *that* depends on what you think about when shaving.

ER: Yeh.

HK: But this is not a case I would take to the President, however it came out.

ER: Why not for the next step--I have not raised it with Hill. And I think that would be a good next step.

HK: I think if Hill wants him, I would subside.

ER: Fine. Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO12951
D: 12 MARA Date 01/13/91

TELCONE

Mrs. Mosbacher/Mr. Kissinger

7:35 p.m. 4/23/73

M: Henry, I heard excerpts on the radio--you sounded very good.

K: Thank you.

M: Troops in Europe would stay there as long as the Russians did and must uphold the treaties in SEA and very well done--
Henry, I wanted to ask you something--I went to work on the party today and we have found that there is another big dinner that same night.

K: Yeh, the radio/television--

M: And I was wondering since we had so little time--would it be agreeable with you if we did this in the Fall?

K: Yeh.

M: Because I think we could do a better job

K: I frankly would prefer it in the Fall.

M: Bless you dear. May I do this Henry--Could I meet with your Mr. Campbell on May 2--Buzz has to be in Washington--go over what we would propose?

K: Sure.

M: Okay, great. I want to tell you one other thing--I should have begun the conversation. We had such a good time Thursday evening.

K: Oh well Nancy told me you were so nice.

M: You know, Buzz has a mad crush on her--he said--they sat me in the far seat

K: Well I have a mad crush on you, so this works out very well.

M: He said it is so wonderful, she's the first intelligent girl he's ever known that was fun to be with. (laughs with K) --no really she is. And her friend Nancy was so delightful.

K: You are marvelous.

M: We had a great, great time and I'm sorry you could be there--it was our pleasure--and she is a naughty girl, she sent us a beautiful plant.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12950
By: XARA Date: 6/16/73

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

8:15 p.m. 4/23/73

RZ: Hi, Henry.

HK: How are you Ron?

RZ: Good.

HK: You are getting so important

RZ: You got a lot of press today on your statements on Watergate.

HK: Well, I had to make a quick decision, I got 10 questions all of which you know before this very influential group, and I was afraid if I said absolutely nothing, so I took the one that said, how will it affect foreign policy.

RZ: You did well.

HK: And I said, I asked for compassion. They all came up afterwards and thanked me, I Mean, they--

RZ: Well you did a good job, I read it on the wires--you did a very good job.

HK: Well, I don't know if they had the whole thing--

RZ: No, it played well. It was the right thing to say, the right thing to do.

HK: Because otherwise, it would have looked too weak--and as if we were running. But make sure the President understands.

RZ: You did very good Henry.

HK: Okay, how are things going?

RZ: Well, we're moving along. But you did well.

HK: Ask me sometime when we do a foreign policy thing for information-- when we have a foreign policy crisis and I'll tell you also we are moving along.

RZ: You did well Henry.

HK: Where are you?

RZ: At the compound--

CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO 1295F
 By: NARA Date 6/13/73

Telcon

Rolland Evans

April 24, 1973; 9:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

E: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yeah.

E: How are you, sir?

K: Okay. Do you want to suggest another date?

E: Now that Scotty is running you for President, I guess there's no chance for a mere mortal like myself having breakfast with you.

K: I never see Scotty and I do a hell of a lot better with Scotty than I do with you.

E: I thought you'd written that piece.

K: I haven't talked to Scotty in six weeks.

E: (laughing) Oh, Henry, come on.

K: Ask him.

E: I have never seen such good coverage as you got on that. A four-column headline, and poor old Bill, poor old Bill, you've got to go over to page 15, at the end of everything about your speech there's a little shirttail -- I'm trying to find it here -- and the headline says "Rogers cautions on cut in troops."

K: Yeah, but do you think he should have given a speech on Europe the same night that I gave one that the President wanted given?

E: (laughs) How are you? You must have had a good time up there.

K: But if you read the Washington Post you'll think that I gave a speech about Watergate.

E: I watched the news last night. I watched your handling that question on Watergate. I thought you did it extremely well, with high decorum and sense of taste and balance. Excellent, I thought.

K: Thank you.

-2-

E: What's going on right now? Do you see any hot developments on Watergate?

K: Look, you probably know more about it than I do.

E: It's a disaster area of the first order. Henry, I wonder whether there'd be any chance of breakfast with you later this week.

K: Well, don't be so presumptuous, will you?

E: How do you mean? You know, I'm not supposed to even ask for breakfast any more?

K: That's right.

E: Maybe ______. I see you didn't get very far with Kraft. (laughs)

K: Why? What did he do?

E: You haven't read his piece?

K: No. Does he slam me?

E: Well, you'll have to read it. I'm not going to characterize my friends' writings.

K: How..what do I have to do with it?

E: Well, you tried to sell him that line on Watergate at breakfast the other morning and he didn't buy it. He said that Watergate would have no impact at all abroad, that the Russians...

K: Did he say I tried to do...?

E: No, no, no, no. He didn't say - I didn't even talk to him...

K: ...or Friday either.

E: Why? You can't do it Friday? Oh, sh--.

K: Well, don't use such language. Maybe lunch.

E: Well, how about lunch? On Friday?

K: Let's keep that in mind.

E: Shall I get our friend to join us? He's feeling better these days.

K: I think I'm...

E: In fact, I'm going to take him out to lunch today.

K: I think I'm seeing him for lunch tomorrow.

E: Tomorrow, well I might - oh, no, I can't. I'm having lunch with David Bruce tomorrow. Maybe Friday.

K: Okay.

E: Do you want to put that down?

K: Yeah.

E: Definitely?

K: Yeah.

E: I have an idea for the White House, Henry. I want to try it out on you.

K: What?

E: Mel Laird.

K: I like Mel.

E: Top staff man in the White House.

K: I don't think my nerves will be up to it but we'll have a lot of...

E: For six months.

K: Look, Mel is a great fellow.

E: I think it's under serious consideration. He was supposed to be in here yesterday but his brother is very sick and he had to go out to Wisconsin.

K: Oh, really? He called me yesterday.

E: Did he say anything about this?

K: I wasn't here.

-4-

E: Oh, well that may be it. But he was here and then he went out to Wisconsin. He won't be back until tomorrow night. But it's funny how the President spent 2 1/2 hours with Bob Finch out in California two weeks ago. And Bob Finch is the guy who was run out of town by all these sleazy characters - Mardian, Fluorney and Mitchell, Haldeman and company. And he's going back to his antecedents.

K: Yeah.

E: Bill Rogers. It's a tragedy, the whole goddam thing.

K: It's a Greek tragedy.

E: I don't see how it's gonna end. I just wrote a piece yesterday that I don't see how the President can say what everybody wants him to say because he doesn't know what he's gonna be caught up in future unpredictable events.

K: Nor does he know how these...

E: Disclosures.

K: ...how these guys are going...you know I feel that a lot of this could have happened under Kennedy except that under Kennedy one guy would have stepped forward long ago and taken the rap.

E: Bobby.

K: Somebody.

E: Yeah. Well, do you see Bob at all - Haldeman? Around there?

K: No. But I talk to him on the phone. I just won't spit on him now.

E: Is he thinking?

K: Yeah.

E: He ought to be. Well, listen, that's good. Friday at...do you want to go to the club, or where?

K: Yeah.

E: Let's go to the Club.

K: The Club. Do you mean the Federal City Club?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO1729
By: MARA DES 01/14/1974

Telcon
Herb Schlosser

April 24, 1973; 9:40 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry?

K: Herb, how are you?

S: You were excellent yesterday.

K: Thank you. Were you there?

S: No, but the President of the company was.

K: Oh, yes, I met him.

S: And everyone commented on how good you were and the Times has given it marvelous coverage. I'm sure you've seen it.

K: Yes, I saw that. I was very pleased with that.

S: Reston's column was excellent also.

K: Yeah, and I didn't do anything to prepare it.

S: Well, at least there's one bright light coming out of your part of the world.

K: Well.

S: No comment. Are we going to be able to see one another?

K: I'd love to see you. I really would appreciate...I need some wise counsel.

S: Well, look. Let me...If you're not going to be in New York, I could arrange to come down and let's discuss when you could see me then. How's that?

K: Well, I'm going to be in New York this weekend, but whenever I'm there I really ought to see my parents.

S: I see. So dinner Saturday night is out, right?

K: That's almost certainly out.

DECLASSIFIED
Authorship EO 12950
Date 6/17/94

BY XARA

-2-

S: Okay, is there any other time during the weekend I could meet you if you wanted to do that, or are you going to be too jammed up?

K: Well, we could conceivably do it Sunday morning.

S: Great. If you tell me where, I'll be there.

K: Oh, I could come by your place actually.

S: Would you like to have brunch? So we could be alone?

K: You see, that's my uncertainty always on Sundays is...let me check.

S: If I know that you can do it sometime Sunday then I will keep the day free and I have to go out of town for one day, and I'll go out of town Saturday.

K: Oh, no, no. Or do you want to come down for dinner? Could you come down for dinner tomorrow night?

S: Unfortunately, I can't. I would bend every effort to but this is a very tough time for me. Do you think we could do it Sunday?

K: Well let me try for Sunday. I don't have to make any acute decisions, but what I would like to...

S: Just sit quietly.

K: ...is to just get, you know, the categories of thought straightened out.

S: Right. That's what I would want to talk to you about because you are a very important and dear person and it must be murder being where you are at this moment. It's probably worse in many ways than...

K: Well, it's so heartbreaking. You know, it's easy to spit on these guys but they tried to do what they thought was the right thing and...

S: I know it.

K: ...and they just got in over their heads, and the more they tried to recover, the worse.

S: That's right. They were on a treadmill.

K: The worse it became.

S: Yeah, well, look. I'll do what you wish. I will be here next week

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

D: 12 MARA Date 01/13/01

and leaving for the coast probably Friday morning. If you wanted to do it
next week or if you wanted to do it on Sunday, I'd arrange to meet you
whenever you want.

K: But look, if you were gonna go out of town Sunday, maybe we could meet Saturday. Which is easier for you?

S: Well Sunday would be...either day. We have a little summer place which we haven't opened up. We have to go out for about two hours to just take an inventory, but we have no urgency on it. I could meet you either day if you are going to be in the city, wherever you wish to meet. We could sit and chat quietly for as long as you want.

K: Well, Sunday might be a little better for me.

S: Okay.

K: But I could probably shift something around on Saturday.

S: Whichever is easiest for you.

K: It makes no difference to you?

S: No. It really doesn't. It makes no difference to me.

K: Well, then let's do it Sunday. Let's aim for around 10 o'clock on Sunday, or is that too early?

S: No, it's not at all. I'd love to show you our apartment too, because we have a beautiful place.

K: I have a sort of a run-down apartment of a friend in New York.
Otherwise I'd ask you to come over there.

S: I'd love for you to come. We have a library where we could be
totally alone.

K: Good.

S: Would you like to have brunch with us. I could prepare something for you

K: Well, we could have breakfast or...

S: Well, we will have breakfast together at ten o'clock. Is there anything you particularly like? Do you like this smoked fish stuff and all that stuff? We'll take care of it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO1295C

Date 01/12/94
By: XENA

-4-

K: Herb, I leave it to you.

S: We will have a breakfast together and then we'll retire alone to the library and spend as much time as you want.

K: Good, marvelous.

S: Shall I give you my address?

K: That would probably help, wouldn't it?

S: Yes, it would help. I think it would help, because otherwise you might not get there. 784 Park.

K: Good.

S: That's at Park Avenue and 74th Street.

K: Right.

S: 784 Park, and I look forward to seeing you.

K: Right.

S: I feel very important trying to arrange a schedule with you. I'll meet you wherever you want, whenever you want (laughing).

K: Aren't you nice.

S: Okay, I look forward to it, Henry.

K: I look forward to it. You are very nice.

S: Oh, no. Well, for you, anything.

K: Grand. You've been a great friend.

S: All right. Ten o'clock then on Sunday.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
By: XARA Date 0/12/01

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO12657

Date 01/13/04
By: MIRA Dae

Telcon
Bill Bundy

April 24, 1973; 12:38 p.m.

K: Hello.

B: Henry. How are you?

K: Mac. How are you?

B: It's Bill.

K: Oh, Bill. How are you?

B: I'm fine, except that I bring you the very sad news that Ham died this morning.

K: Oh, isn't that horrible. When is the funeral?

B: We don't know yet, Henry. I'll let you know as quickly as we know. And he really was not himself in the last two months, as you probably heard.

K: I heard that, yes. I heard that.

B: So, I'm afraid there wasn't much to live for, but I'm afraid that doesn't diminish the blow.

K: No.

B: So I just thought you ought to know.

K: Will you let me know about when the...

B: I will pass the word just as quickly as I know.

K: Good. If there is anything I can do. One never can do anything in a case like this.

B: Well, I suppose they may ask you for a statement or something of that sort, but let's leave that for the press.

K: Right. Of course I'll do that.

B: Right. And your speech was first-class my friend.

K: Thank you, my friend.

K: Bill, I never answered your suggestion of dropping me from the editorial board, but I think it's a good idea.

B: Well, why don't we. Well, let's call it... I want to be very definite that it's a leave of absence.

K: Or call it a leave of absence.

B: All right. I'll call it a leave of absence. That's the only basis.

K: Right.

B: All right. Well, I'll do that with this issue then.

K: Good.

B: All right, fine. And then we'll be in touch.

K: Good. Bye.

B: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
B: NARA Doc. 6/17/67

Telcon
Victor Zorza

April 24, 1973; 12:50 p.m.

K: Hello.

Z: This is not a journalistic question, but I think you have heard that I'm over teaching a kind of analysis course at SAIS.

K: No, I don't.

Z: It's based on my column. What I do is every week I give the students the research material that have gone through my ______ column and the column in the ______ analytical critiques in foreign affairs. I was wondering if you thought that the time has come for you perhaps to pay a return visit to SAIS after this serious unfortunate thing. The idea is that I find among the students generally they are really turning away from foreign affairs, which worries me because it means there will be less and less able people working in the area.

K: Well, I'm a little reluctant, to tell you the truth, to go to universities these days.

Z: Well, you see, you could...

K: And also the time. That's a hell of a lot of time.

Z: Yeah. Let me tell you. I won't press you, just explain what I have in mind. It's a small class of 12 and you could give an informal talk about working in the foreign affairs area.

K: Could you bring them down here if necessary? if you could

Z: I could do that, yes. But you see the idea is that *people* agree... then to release a summary of it then if this could be circulated to the universities it really would inspire a lot of people.

K: Yeah, but you know any time that I publish something it's now an international event and it's just too...

Z: Well, I would leave the decision whether to publish or not to you after...

K: Well, why don't you let me think about it.

Z: Okay. And if you could call me. And the other thing is do you think the time has come for us to have another talk. I'd very much like to.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E01255J
By NARA Det. 9/1/94

-2-

K: Yes. That I'd be happy to do. You write consistently the most thoughtful columns.

Z: How kind of you to say it.

K: No, seriously. Even when I am pained by them.

Z: Well, let me tell you, the thing you said when you last came to the house, it was that you read the columns only to see who leaks what to whom.

K: No, no, in your case you are far ahead of the leakers.

Z: Well, that's very kind. What I'd like to do is really not to have a long social evening, but maybe if you could come and taste some of my wife's home cooking.

K: Well, either that, or we could meet here.

Z: Well, it would be a relaxed talk if you would like to just come of an evening and have a home dinner.

K: Well my problem these days is my evenings are really very much taken. But let's plan for one or the other.

Z: Okay. So how shall we do that?

K: Why don't you call my office, say, tomorrow, and let's see what we can work out.

Z: Okay. Whom should I talk to?

K: Mr. Campbell.

Z: Right. Thank you very much.

K: Good. Bye.

Z: Bye.

TelCon
Sec. Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

1:00 pm, April 24, 1973

S: .................... your comments on the Water Gate and so on were
marvelous.

K: Aren't you nice.

S: It's a great talk that we need more of, so good work.

K: Well, I appreciate your saying that.

S: Incidentally I sent over and got your final draft and I read through
it and I think it is improved over the version I saw.

K: Did you notice we took most of your comments.

S: And I thought the business of working Japan and it brought that off
well. And away it was good.

K: Thank you. Flanigan is upset.

S: I know it. He just went through the roof with me this morning.
Said did you know about it, I said yes. And I guess that made him even
madder. But anyway we need the--he is sure that he will be involved
in these things and I'll just tell him that I talked to you about it and
that's our intent.

K: Yeah.

S: I had a different problem I wanted to check with you on. Are you
familiar with the question of a vote of a loan to Peru.

K: No.

S: That is coming up.

K: Yeah I was with it once, now I've forgotten it again.

S: Well you know, we have our expropriation policy. There are
various laws and what not that surround it, but the operative thing is
the President's policy that we don't approve loans through international
financial institutions where a country has expropriated without making
compensations for where negotiations are not probably under way. We
have this long standing dispute with Peru over their international
petroleum corporations--

K: That I know.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295C
By: NARA Date 04/17/01

2

S: And more recently they have sold the property that was expropriated and since there were presumably negotiations about that, that seems like a pretty hard line action on their part. Now we had put together a mission that is a secret mission undertaken by a man named Green to see if we couldn't sort of wrap all of the different parts of our Peru problem in one piece and negotiate it out and be done with it. He seemed to be making some progress and then the last go the President got sick and sort of postponed it and whether it is on the track or not is hard to say. There's apparently lots of maneuvering in Peru about who would succeed if he did and he had the difficult typical various elements of radicals, moderates, and so on. Now we have a loan coming up in the Inter-American Development Bank tomorrow. It's possible to postpone the decision for a few days in which there is a difference of view about how we should vote. With the State Dept and the Defense Dept taking the position that we could vote yes for the loan on the grounds that there is this Green mission and that there is at least some expectation he'll be invited back. And that is a show of good faith and we have to be careful that we don't undermine our foreign policy and defense policy with Peru. The NSC had a meeting this morning as well as Flanigan, has the view that we should abstain. Our vote is not going to control this issue, they are going to get the loan anyway, but we should abstain and talk about how we don't like the expropriation. But at any rate this would be a last hard approach and we could see then whether or not they continue on in good faith. The Treasury Dept's view has been that we have our hard line policy on expropriation that clearly they are in violation of it and we should stick to our hard lines. The State Dept and Defense Dept arguing that well if you do that you only encourage the radicals and they will explode over that. And we arguing maybe it would work just the other way around. You have to be willing to stand up to these things in order to make an impact. I call you because under the rules of how this is administered, one of the Departments such as State or Defense have a right to insist that the matter goes to the President, and it can't be decided by the Secretary of the Treasury under those circumstances. I have the authority to instruct our vote. They would go along with an abstention approach such as the NSC, I think an Mr. Jordan was I'm told there, I don't know him, but he was your representative.

K: Yeah.

S: Really it involves from a straight economic commercial standpoint it seems to me clear that we could vote no. The arguments that made have to do with things assessing our foreign policy objectives, our defense policy objectives and whatever anybody knows about the internal politics of Peru, and how--

3

K: When do you have to know. Let me think about it.

S: Well I ought to know, we have to do something about it today and I'm look to you as the proxy president more or less. I don't really see how we can get to the President so he can decide it.

K: Well, we can certainly not vote for it. I mean that's out of the question. The only choice is between abstaining and voting against it.

S: That's my view.

K: What's your view on that.

S: Well my view is that we can vote against. We can undoubtedly get them to postpone the vote for three or four days which puts it right into the context of the IDB meeting that I'll be going to.

K: Let me see if I can get you an answer before the end of the day. I'm not going to take it to the President, but let me think about it.

S: All right, that would be good.

K: I don't tend to lean towards voting against. I tend to lean for a hard line. I think when you are in as much trouble as we are you might as well be tough.

S: Yeah, that's my instinct. But I don't know that much about the other aspects of Peru. Which is why I'm calling you. Now if we are going to go for a postponement we have to get going on that this afternoon, so the sooner you can--

K: I'll call you before 3:00 I hope.

S: Thank you.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authoritatively
EO 1295

By: ARA Date: 6/17/01

TelCon
Adam Walinsky/Mr. Kissinger

1:17 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Hello.

W: Hello Henry.

K: Adam, I was so touched by your letter of some months ago that I've been carrying it around in order to write you a personal reply.

W: Well, you are kind to say so.

K: Well as a result I've never answered it.

W: That's all right. I meant it and--

K: No but I want you to know that of all the letters that I've received it's the one that meant most to me, partly from what your associations were but also it was the most beautiful. And I want you to know that it meant a lot to me.

W: Well, you deserved it, and you know that.

K: Well, that remains to be seen, but i---

W: Now we have another problem Henry.

K: Which is what.

W: Henry I've got to tell you that much as I chortle over the discomfort of this pack of scum and cowards and thieves and idiots, and all of those things.

K: Particularly the last.

W: Yes. But also the thing that has impressed me about it more than anything else is their cowardice. I remember Bobby Baker just took his medicine and went to jail.

K: Yeah.

W: These guys are nothing like that, but much as I chortle over that I have to tell you that I absolutely fear for the country --

K: I do too.

*

2

W: And for the Presidency.

K: I do too. What do you think can be done.

W: Well, I have some ideas on that. I'm going to be in town this week. I'm coming down for the journalism awards on Thursday afternoon and if you like or if you have a moment we can get together for half an hour and I can lay it out for you.

K: Of course, of course. I'm going to New York unfortunately on Friday afternoon, can we get together--let's aim for Friday morning.

W: Do you want to do it in New York.

K: No, in Washington.

W: In Washington Friday morning, all right. What time. What's good for you.

K: Well, oh 11:00 or 11:30.

W: 11:00.

K: 11:00.

W: I will see you Friday morning at 11:00.

K: Where can I reach you in case something happens.

W: When.

K: On Thursday or Friday.

W: Jesus that will be tough.

K: Well why don't you call my office Friday morning just in case. You know I don't exactly know what bounces are going to be happening this week.

W: You want to try for Thursday evening?

K: Well, I have a dinner, but we could get together say 6:30 or so for a drink.

W: Fine. That's good. It probably makes more sense doesn't it.

K: Yes, come to my office, we'll have a drink here.

W: At 6:30. I will see you at 6:30 on Thursday the 26th.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized 012255

BY MRA Date 01/11/01

TelCon
Dep. Sec. Clements/Mr. Kissinger

1:40 pm, April 24, 1973

C: ..... was not anything in which I would have any particular interest, and they suggested that I not go.

K: Well, my only problem is, Bill, if I chair these meetings and then everyone sends Deputy Assistant Secretaries, it just isn't the right level.

C: I am always pleased to be with you and you know--

K: I'm not absolutely sure we ought to have this meeting because it's about a second order subject.

C: That's kind of what Larry told me and he said now I know Elliot is out of town and if you don't feel like that you want to take the time, don't worry about it.

K: Well I'm going to get my eager beavers under control and perhaps not have these meetings on such subjects anymore.

C: Well I'll guarantee you, Henry--

K: But as long as it takes place I think it--that as long as I have to chair it, I wanted my group there.

C: Well any time Henry that you're gonna meet and everything and I really didn't know how you felt about it you see. If you want me there I'll damn sure be there.

K: Well, we'll be through with it in 45 minutes.

C: Because I do enjoy being with you and I do enjoy exchanging ideas and I want you to feel that way.

K: Well, you've been a strong right arm. I really mean that. Now look, Elliot wants Abramowits in ISA. My view is I'm opposed to it if he wants him, I'll reluctantly yield.

C: That doesn't surprise me at all. I felt like that was coming and I was confident that he would probably say something to Bob Hill about it. And I don't have any objection to it Henry. I don't know what it is he wants him to do, do you know that.

2

K: I have the objection that he's tilting wrong.

C: That he's what.

K: That he's just leaning the wrong way.

C: I think that's right. I wouldn't want him, it wouldn't be my choice.

K: I may talk to Hill about it.

C: Well I think it's up to Bob, and if he--

K: Is Hill around these days.

C: [ No, but I think he'll be here in another week.

K: Okay, well I'll talk to him.

C: All right, fine, and I'll see you this afternoon.

K: Thank you.

C: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Data: 6/13/01

TelCon

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

4:15 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Hello.

B: Your modesty last Friday overwhelmed all of us. How could you do that to me.

K: I thought I was pretty clear.

B: You said you were going to give a 10 or 20 minute speech and that it would be philosophical. You're just too shy, that's your problem.

K: Well, you should know me well enough that if I give you an advance tip it must be fairly serious.

B: Henry, I've never had the opportunity to know you well enough. Two questions, you always give me two questions.

K: Well may I make a point about the Washington Post. It is sort of discouraging to have it reported as if the major theme had been Watergate and the secondary theme Vietnam.

B: Well I wonder, you know, was Scotty suddenly listening very carefully, or--

K: I give you my word of honor that I have not talked to Scotty in four weeks.

B: No kidding.

K: I give you my word of honor.

B: Well let me ask you then, we are trying to recoup and do another piece on it and I wanted to check. Can you give me some background on why you chose this particular time to do it. I know you've had invitations any day of the week that you want to pick them up to give a speech. Why now?

K: Because the President is meeting Brandt next week, he's meeting Pompidou later, because he's been talking about the Year of Europe and because we've heard so many reports--I've been talking to McCloy, George Ball, to all the participants I could reach at the Amsterdam conference.

B: Yeah, I wondered if that had something to do with it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
Date 4/14/73
By KARA Dae

K: It had something to do with it.

B: Well I was just reading your speech and I was reading George Ball's speech and you seem to be answering him point by point, a lot of his arguments there. How much was his speech in your mind when you were doing it.

K: I hadn't actually read his speech. I didn't actually read it but I did talk to George Ball to get his sense of what was needed.

B: Oh, you did.

K: Yeah.

B: Can I use that.

but

K: You can say--I can't say, most of the speech was written when I talked to him.

B: Uh huh. But you think what he gathered from the European Conference was something that did have some input on what you were saying.

K: Well, not so much what he along gathered, but the mood that I got from m any reports. McCloy and a lot of others had some inputs, yes.

here is that

B: That's very interesting. Are you--what I see you're calling for an agenda almost to be set up before the President goes to Europe.

K: That's right.

B: That would be a set of principles, an Atlantic Charter, or whatever you want to call it. That would govern the entire gamut of the relationships between the dumb-bells or whatever you want to call them. This is a change for you isn't it. This huge commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.

K: No, I wrote a book about it once.

B: Well but you were much less committed I felt than in this.

K: No.

B: Well, all right. Will--can you tell me when Pompidou is coming or where, or is that still not decided or a secret.

K: It's still not definitely decided. Probably before we meet Brezhnev.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E01295C
Date 01/13/91

BY NARA Dues

3

B: When's Brezhnev coming.

K: That's not definite.

B: Gwerts was telling me today that his wife's having a baby and
hopes it's not at the same time. I hear you said that you didn't know
who coined the term "Year of Europe" but if it comes to work you're
going to adopt it. Is that your comment.

K: I said I blame MX Oriani Fallaci or the Associated Press.

B: Oriani Fallaci, that sounds like senseless remark to me. There's
another feeling that I wanted to clear. This is a very statesmanlike
address at a time when some people were reading as the same book,
let's forget about the other problems and look at the larger issues,
and this is the time for statesmanship and let's all hold together.
How much did the timing of other issues--

K: That had nothing to do--you know it happened that way, and that
happens to be my view but that was not the motive for the speech.
The subject of the speech I decided in the first week of April.

B: After the Amsterdam Conference.

K: Yeah.

B: Well actually that really did have a lot to do with it.

K: Well the mood that was reported to me, I did not actually read
George Ball's speech.

B: Well, it's interesting because you have a point here where I made
a note where you used the same thing about a sense of--oh I don't know,
he says not to let things drift or whatever, it's almost the same words
that he uses in his speech.

K: No, I tell you I didn't read it.

B: Okay. So it was that--the mood there, the--

K: We discussed the xx idea or working that way at the time that
Heath was here. And we've been thinking along this way, but the
particular crystallization of moving now came in San Clemente the first
week in April.

B: What mood did you gather prevailed at Amsterdam.

K: Well that they were sort of out of ideas of just what the Atlantic
relationship meant now. That there was an older generation committed

DECLASSIFIED
Autograph E01295R
BY XAARA Date 06/13/04

to the old relationship but // no clear idea of where we were going.
And the usual complaints about the United States. And the usual
American complaints about Europe.

B: How about this problem that the Socialists had in Germany, did
that have an impact on you.

K: No. Well it's a fact you know.

B: Yeah. Your real concern is Europe going it's own separate ways
toward detente in a weakened way.

K: Well, that's their problem.

B: It isn't really is it.

K: Well, if everyone looses his mind then you can't conduct foreign
policy. This is off the record.

B: I know when to use.

K: Marilyn, I'm devoted to you, I like you, but the trouble when one
answers one question, you keep going.

B: I was just about to say goodbye.

K: Were you really.

B: I really was, doesn't that make you sad.

K: It does make me sad.

B: Many thanks.

K: Nice to talk to you. Will you tell the powers that be about my
view with respect to the coverage. I mean the relative importance they
attached to what was said.

B: Well we all feel terribly guilty about this, but you really told me on
Friday something that made us feel, I mean I quoted precisely what was
said, I took it down.

K: What should I have said.

B: It's going to be a major policy speech on Europe which is what
some other people gathered it was.

K: Which it is. But I did not give anyone advance warning.

B: Okay.

K: Good, bye.

B: Bye

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
D: NARA Doc. 6/13/07

TELCOM

Tom Braden/Mr. Kissinger

4:25 p.m., April 24, 1973

K: Tom, how are you?

B: Okay. I was writing a piece on you and I wanted to make sure -- you know, a couple of things -- this is a private conversation I presume.

K: Of course.

B: And if I make some mistakes, why just tell me. But when you began drafting this AP speech, did you -- I get the impression and I don't want to quote you directly or anything like that, but I get the impression that you were kind of thinking well, this might be a speech that might reestablish a bipartisan foreign policy. I take it that --

K: That is true but it was not geared to Watergate.

B: Oh, of course not.

K: No, what I mean is I started drafting it --

B: Of course, that's my point.

K: Right.

B: And then Watergate came along.

K: That is exactly right.

B: Now I also think that there are a lot of Democrats who dream large dreams, which we all like to do. There are a lot of Democrats -- I mean, I think Edmund Muskie and J. William Fulbright would love to come over to the White House and sit down or be at the airplane when the President left for someplace or other and wishing him Godspeed and murmuring into his ear, you know.

K: Right.

B: In other words, to get back in the ball game.

K: Exactly.

B: I think they regret to some extent that Vietnam became under George's leadership a kind of a struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295C

By: XARA Date: 6/13/07

Tom Braden - 4/24/73

2

K: Right. That would certainly be my impression --

B: Maybe we ought to get out that they would have liked to have argued
the Ways and Means.

K: Exactly.

B: See what I mean?

K: Right.

B: All right. Now that's all perfectly clear but what puzzles me a little bit is whether with Watergate alone -- I'm just thinking out loud; musing now -- was it Watergate alone or was it what happened in Cambodia that also disturbed this -- they expect to go ahead. Incidentally, I think it was a hell of a speech; good speech.

K: Well, we are not rational on the issue of Indochina, Tom, as a country. Right now -- I mean, what's happening in Cambodia, we're trying to show the North Vietnamese that they cannot simply ignore an agreement that was signed three months ago.

B: Isn't it possible the Democrats would support you on that?

K: So we're not sneaking back into the war; we're getting out, you know, circuitously there. There is no chance whatsoever of our getting into Cambodia the way we did into Vietnam. Not one chance in 10 million. We're trying to sell the paths as clearly as possible to discourage them in other areas.

B: Um-humm. And the Democrats may go along with that.

K: They should if they think about it. Look, if the Democrats want to take over the government in 76, and which after all they must want to have in their mind.

B: I'm sure they do have it in mind.

K: Do they want a President who is thwarted in either threats or incentives when solemn American commitments are at stake? I mean, that's what is at issue now in Indochina and not are we going to get into -- I mean, look at the governmental changes we've made or encouraged in Cambodia. We're obviously moving to a negotiation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E01295F
Date: 6/1/73
By: JNA

Tom Braden - 4/24/73

3

B: All right. Then it isn't Cambodia. We could have gotten them along with Cambodia perhaps. Well, at least I think so.

K: Well, it's a tragedy that just when the mood was quieting down, a number of things happened to get everyone way up on edge again.

B: Yeah. Well, mainly Watergate. All right. I just wanted to check that with you. It bothered me about the Cambodian thing but it is possible that you think it is at least conceivable --

K: It is not only con --

B: You could have brought them along on Cambodia on the theory that look, we made an agreement --

K: Look, I have always had the idea that the Democrats who are responsible to a large extent for all the great successes of our postwar foreign policy or many.

B: Um-humm.

K: That they will not want to be the party that has no foreign policy at all. And that the senior people there will at the right moment be talkable to.

B: Yeah. All right, Henry, thanks a lot.

K: Right, Tom.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Date: 6/13/91

TELCONE
Secretary George Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

4:30 p.m., April 24, 1973

S: Hello.

K: George, I got involved in some conversation with our colleagues. After talking to Jordan, I think perhaps we should delay the vote if possible for as long as possible.

S: Well, we can delay it probably till May 1st or maybe another day. In other words, we can't delay it --

K: Well, we should delay it to see whether they can give us a date certain in the interval to renew negotiations.

S: Well, let me -- I got a little information about a half an hour ago. I'll just read to you -- it came from Ortez Amena (sp?) but we cannot expect the Peruvians to set a date for the return of Green. This is because Velasco was a very sick man and quite likely will die. A radical faction in Peru, which is supported by Velasco, feels that setting a date would reveal the true state of his health where would result in a subsequent postponement of Green's visit. Ortez Amena (sp?) does not want a yes vote that would make him look ridiculous; it would make us look ridiculous.

K: No, no; a "yes" vote is out of the question.

S: He feels that abstention would be appropriate because the Peruvians would regard this as a gesture of good faith on our part, unless they would be willing to continue the Greene negotiations.

K: Okay. Well, why don't be abstain then?

S: Well -- I don't know that postponement really buys us much. That is, we're --

K: Yeah. No, well, then --

S: It's not going to change that much --

K: No. Of course --

S: The closer we get to the IDB meeting, the more we throw the thing into that --

K: Yeah. Well, then let's abstain, particularly as voting against won't block it.

DECLASSIFIED
Author:
E01255
Date:
01/24/73
By:
NARA

Secretary Shultz - 4/24/73

2

S: Well, you think that is called for on certain uneconomic grounds?

K: Yeah But it's a closed decision. If I knew they were not going to review -- renew or if they moved against that company -- there's one company, Zoro Company --

S: Yeah.

K: Then I would vote against.

S: Well, suppose we abstain but we go there and we make a little speech about it.

K: I think that would be appropriate.

S: I might even send Simon to do it as a signal that we take this very seriously.

K: Then I think that would be very good.

S: Okay.

K: Good, George.

S: All right. Thank you.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic EO 1295C
By: XARA Data: 6/13/91

TELCONE

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

4:37 p.m., April 24, 1973

HK: Hello.

JK: Henry, how are you?

HK: Joe, how are you?

JK: Fine. Henry, I'm a little bit confused about the use of the word "charter
As you used it when I spoke to you at breakfast, I interpret it to mean
that you want to have a charter from the President for a new Atlantic
policy. It's been interpreted in your speech and I think the speech lends
itself to that interpretation to indicate that you've got a blueprint -- a
whole set of documents that you're ready to pull out of the briefcase and
have signed.

HK: No, that's wrong.

JK: The latter is wrong.

HK: That we have a whole set of documents?

JK: Yeah.

HK: No.

JK: Yeah.

HK: No, we have some ideas in some areas. We have fewer ideas in others.

JK: Yeah.

HK: No, I thought it was a call to start a process rather than --

JK: Yeah.

HK: To agree to our proposals.

JK: Yeah. Because we don't even have organized proposals within the government, do we?

HK: Well, we have on MBFR, we do. On others, we do not; that's true.

JK: ... for example, you cited energy as an area for new cooperation. That thought didn't penetrate the energy message.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
Date 6/17/97

By: NARA Date: 6/17/97

Joe Kraft - 4/24/73

2

HK: No, but that's because we have kept the NSC -- the foreign policy part out of the energy message.

JK: I see.

HK: We don't have nothing but we don't have it completed yet. We are in the middle of a very substantial study on the issue -- The issues that I raised are under very active study in the NSC and they were kept out of the energy message.

JK: I see, yeah. What are the reactions, Henry? I can see that you did reassure the Japanese a good deal and I can see you reassured the Germans a good deal and I can see the British too. Do you have anything from the French yet?

HK: No.

JK: Would you expect do you think?

HK: I would expect more sympathy than most people think but I may be wrong. there

JK: The one reference that I thought I might jive at was the NATO reference.

HK: That might jar them?

JK: Yeah.

HK: On what? Oh, yeah, yeah.

JK: I think -- I can't --

HK: I mean, talking about the common defense?

JK: Yeah. But maybe I'm wrong. I'm probably right out of touch.

HK: No, but you know -- But they know our view on that. They know that we're not going to insist on formal integration.

JK: Yeah.

HK: I mean, we're not going to fight those battles.

JK: To what extent is the President on board here?

HK: I think he is substantially onboard.

JK: Um-humm.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO1295C
 By: XARA Date 6/12/73

TELCOM
Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

4/24/73

3

HK: And having said it as a Presidential speech, he's of course on board.

JK: Well, why didn't he make it himself? You know, if it's -- There are
lots of reasons why he didn't but will he making it? You know, there
are just enough other things --

HK: He will certainly be --

JK: The remarkable thing about this speech is that it should have been
necessary because what it does is unsay a whole of fears that were
engendered by neglect over the years.

HK: Well, Joe, I think that assumes that every difficulty is a cause of
American policy. I wouldn't say they're largely the result of neglect.
Some of them are the result of what you yourself have pointed out,
namely the domestic concern of the Europeans, which makes it almost
impossible for them to have a long-range foreign policy and then any
event that happens produces great disquiet because it's something they
haven't thought about.

JK: Yeah. I didn't mean to put this in -- "neglect" is the wrong phrase
but in any case, there is nothing that you said that anybody could have
regarded as -- that couldn't have been said 6 months ago.

HK: There's nothing that was said that couldn't have been said 6 months ago?

JK: Yeah.

HK: Well, I don't know whether that's quite true either. I don't think 6 months
ago -- Well, the timetable has been pushed back by Vietnam. We've
always wanted to begin that dialogue after Vietnam was finished.

JK: Yeah.

HK: And we had reason to believe that the French weren't ready until after
their elections.

JK: Yeah, that's certainly true. No, I mean in terms of the substance of
the argument. I don't mean in terms of the political timing. I mean,
there's nothing in there that wasn't almost -- with all due respect --
almost a cliche of Atlantic Life.

DECLASSIFIED

Author's

B: 12 MARA Date 04/13/04

TelCon

G. Smith/Mr. Kissinger

4:58 pm, April 24, 1973

S: ...... Congressional Committee to be an acting director.

K: Who?

S: I don't know his name.

K: I haven't got that.

S: Well, I just would urge that since you mentioned the other day
you thought it's useful to have this sort of gadfly organization that--

K: No, no, that I've become deeply convinced of.

S: I would just say take a look at the level types of people that they
are proposing for the Assistant Directorship. We had Jim Leonard
who's a class one foreign service officer. And I think a first rate
fellow. He is being released and I thought they wanted names, but
they are getting an entirely different type of person who doesn't have
his rank or his stature, and getting, Sturgeon as you know is being
released and I think H. Katz or someone like that is being considered
for that spot. Then they have a chap who I think worked on your staff
who is a Colonel--

K: Colonel Bear?

S: Yes, one of your assistants. I don't know him at all.

K: Well he's no genious I can tell you that.

S: But it just seems to me that--

K: He didn't last long with me.

S: I think he went to Panama, and if I understand correctly, going to
be one of the Op men in the agency.

K: Let me talk to Ikle tomorrow.

S: All right, first rate. Now one other;thought, are you, do you
ever hear anything about the fate that they've given to General Allison
because he testified in favor of the President's SALT agreement.

K: No, what?

S: I think it's an awful crime. Senator Jackson I think has just blackballed him. As you know, he was taken off the Delegation and now he's sort of in limbo, doesn't have anything to do and I think he is seriously considering just retiring.

K: I'll talk to Richardson, he doesn't deserve it.

S: I agree. I think he's one of the most effective officers there.

K: His only crime, if that was a crime, was loyalty.

S: I think that's right. He testified that the ICBM's in his judgment were not going to be vulnerable in the short run. And he actually went up and talk to Senator Jackson because this was made perfectly clear that it was because of Jackson's objections.

K: Let me talk to Richardson.

S: All right, thank you very much Henry.

K: Right, Jerry, any time.

S: Thank you.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Date: 6/17/04

TelCon
Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

5:00 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Hello

A: Hello Henry.

K: Joe, how are you.

A: All my congratulations on your speech, it was a marvelous speech I thought.

K: Aren't you nice.

A: And I must say, my congratulations also on that you hadn't answered the question but I do think they might have constituted two stories instead of one along with the Water Gate on the front page of the Wash. Post.

K: Well on the Washington Post the impression is that the major speech was on Water Gate with the secondary theme on Vietnam and a paragraph or two on Europe thrown in.

A: That's a strange way of reporting. I say we are now like a house with the roof on fire and the cellar flooding and the housewife constantly talks about the immorality of the chambermaid.

K: Exactly, exactly.

A: Henry, even though I'm not prepared to threaten you with an attack like my brother George xk Stewart, I still would like to see you, I'm terribly sorry about Sunday night but I'm absolutely conked out.

K: No, no, actually to tell you the truth, it made it a little easier for me. Had you been awake, I would have come over.

A: Forced yourself to do it.

K: No, it would have been, it turned out to be a little easier for me not to.

A: Well I do long to see you because there's terribly many things awfully on my mind.

K: Well, I agree that we should get together. Let me call you tomorrow morning--maybe at the end of the day Thursday or maybe at the end of the day Friday.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
Date 4/13/73

By: XARA Dats

TelCon
Dana Little/Mr. Kissinger

5:56 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Hello.

L: Thank you for calling.

K: Not at all.

L: We understood, I believe through Mr. Bundy whom you saw today, that you would be willing to consider some statement about the death of Mr. Armstrong.

K: Okay. Let me see, I scribbled something down, now my trouble is can I read it,

L: Well, I have all the time in the world.

K: Okay, let me--Hamilton Armstrong was a friend and an inspiration --how much can I give you, the three sentences.

L: As much as you like.

K: Okay. Let me read two more. Ordained, concerned, wise, open to different opinions, he always knew that our common values were greater than our differences, and that American should be true to itself, had to be relevant morally and politically to the rest of the world.

L: All right.

K: It was the spirit of foreign affairs with which his name grew synonymous over half a century. The country will miss him and his friends lives will be empty without him. Okay.

L: Thank you so very much Mr. Kissinger.

K: Not at all. Goodbye.

L: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E01295R
Date: 6/1/97
BY MARA

6:05 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Hello.

C: How are you Bill Henry.

K: Okay.

C: Henry what I'm calling about is I have a memo here from the
Air Force that has to do with Missile Operational Testing.

K: Yeah.

C: Now, I remember very well that they over there at the Verification
Panel meeting when you were making some joke that I took it with some
of the people with respect to the fact that we did not fire any of the
missiles in an operational mode from their silos. And I didn't really
take this too seriously. Tom, on the other hand, came back and
unbeknownest to me transmitted this to Seamans and the Air Force and
now they are getting themselves geared up to actually do some operational
testing.

K: Well, we welcome that.

C: Well, my point here, Henry, is do you really welcome it and do
you really want it and if you do, if it makes that much difference to you,
I'd like to be clued in on why.

K: Because we've never yet fired a God damned missile operationally
in the whole history of it.

C: All right, that's a good reason. You want to do it more than once,
or do you just want to do it once.

K: Well, I haven't thought that through.

C: Un huh. Henry, one of the things that--let me explain to you why
I'm asking these kind of questions, is because it's a--there is some
money considerations involved which are not too important, but there
are some technological implications which I think are important. We
can do this without due difficulty at all and we are ready to do it and all
we need from you is to say the word By God let's do it, and it'll be done.

K: Why don't you send a memo over and then we can decide.

C: All right, that'll be fine, I'll do it that way. The other thing,
Henry, before I let you go, let me run this one by. Out there at

DECLASSIFIED
Author:
E012955
Date:
04/13/74
By:
MARA

Vandenburg we are firing about one of these a month and one of these
missile firings a month represents around $3, $3-1/2, $4 million a
shot, and it's strictly an operational type firing with the same crews
the same missiles completely simulated as opposed to doing it from
the base. Now my question to the Air Force is, by God if you are
firing that thing like that on a fire drill, if you will pardon the expression;
basis once a month at this expense, why are we not from a technological
standpoint improving our accuracy, and their reply was: they really
hadn't thought of this and it might upset the operational side. Well
after spending about 30 minutes with Bob Seamans this afternoon, I have
convinced him that this is not so. From an engineering technological
standpoint we can do this and not upset the operational drill aspect
of it at all, and still under the auspices of this kind of operational testing
be improving our accuracy at the same time. I'm highly in favor of this.

K: I'm very much in favor.

C: Okay, Henry, that's great. I'll send you the memo.

K: Good, thank you Bill.

C: All right, bye.

DECLASSIFIED

JSSS

Authorit

BY MARA DOD 01/14/81

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:25 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Anatol.

D: Hello Henry. That was a good speech you gave yesterday.

K: .................... about the European Security Conference.

D: It think it was quite a speech in general. It was large scale speech. You make a quite good presentation.

K: Good.

D: Henry, why I call you. When exactly did you say you were going to leave. Is it at night you are going on the 4th.

K: Night of the 3rd and arrive the night of the 4th. Or later would be better for me. I can arrive the night of the 5th.

D: Of the 5th!! But first it was 4th, and now 5th---

K: I'll have to leave the night of the 3rd.

D: How exactly--I would like to make this point and this was my---

K: Just make sure that Antonov meets me at the airport.

D: He will be very much proud if you expect him to do that.

K: Maybe we can leave earlier than midnight.

D: No problem. 8:00 or 9:00 is better.

K: Let me find out. We will plan on arriving in Moscow around 8:00.

D: Okay, you just give me schedule of your Air Force.

K: How about your navigator?

D: We will check with him.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: N.M. Simeonov
Date: 04 Apr 1974

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
Date 10-15-75
Volume 2
Page 1-5

K: We can also pick him up in Europe.

D: What place? Where?

K: We will be stopping at an American Air Force Base. We will tell you where he should go.

D: Please send short memo on your recommendations, it is better. In Moscow there is four day holiday, that's why I am checking. So please check on this one.

Can you talk about---

K: It was very helpful.

D: It was good idea.

K: I went out to Walter Reed to talk to Stennis. He signed the Jackson amendment but told me he won't vote for it. We will win this one.

D: Okay, Henry, so tomorrow we will be in touch.

K: When are you going to announce it?

D: Within two days, it---

K: Maybe Friday will be good.

D: Friday or at the latest Monday.

K: Friday will be better than Thursday.

D: Okay, so we will be in touch.

K: Good.

D: Okay, Henry, bye bye.

K: Bye.

TalCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:25 pm, April 24, 1973

K: Amatol.

K: ...about the European Security Conference.

K: Good.

K: How about your navigator?

D: We will check with him.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
Date 6/13/73
XARA Dts