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CNN Transcript - Early Edition: Ki...eally Unacceptable' - May 11, 1999

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Kissinger: 'Chinese Behavior is Excessive and Really Unacceptable'

Aired May 11, 1999 - 7:41 a.m. ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

CAROL LIN, CNN ANCHOR: Let's get more on the diplomatic strains between the U.S. and China over the NATO bombing of Beijing's embassy in Belgrade.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger now joins us from a New York.

Good morning, Mr. Kissinger. Thanks for joining us.

HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE: Good morning, how are you?

LIN: Very will, thank you.

Getting back to our top story here, by all accounts on CNN, if there have been strains brewing between China and U.S. and relations are strained, why do you think the Chinese officials have chosen this time and this particular bombing to stir this anti-American sentiment?

KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I want to stress that I think the Chinese behavior is excessive and really unacceptable, even for those of us who have always advocated the closest relations between China and the United States.

But to give an explanation, I believe that over a period of months, and maybe more than that, strains have been building up. The administration, on the one hand, has conducted a policy with which I generally agree, on the need for cooperative relations with China, which has the largest population in the world and impact on its neighbors.

At the same time, it has thrown bones to its domestic opposition on a number of cases. So I think the cumulative impact has been a considerable humiliation for the Chinese, such as the Chinese prime minister coming here expecting to sign an agreement and being told

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minister coming here expecting to sign an agreement and being told
about 12 hours before that it wouldn't be signed, after he had already
arrived. And a number of other incidents like this.

And I think this gave them an occasion to blow off their frustrations on
an issue on which they didn't look as if they were begging us for help.
That's my interpretation.

In addition, I think that probably domestic forces in China are opposed
to a policy of closer ties with the United States, and they may fuel this
is occasion.

But, whatever explanation one gives, this is a very unfortunate
development.

LIN: So after four very public apologies to China, what do you think
China really wants now?

KISSINGER: First, I think we should stop apologizing. We have made
it absolutely clear that this was an accident. I believe it was an accident,
and there's nothing more we can do about this particular issue.

China is opposed to what we're doing in Yugoslavia because it looks at
it as a precedent for what might happen to its own minorities, outside
intervention with respect to its own minorities.

So I expect diplomatic opposition by China on the face of negotiation
that is now going on.

LIN: Do you agree with "The New York Times" op-ed peace today that
China is making a political bet that the United States is willing to
engage them at any cost at this point?

KISSINGER: No, I do not think the Chinese have that. I think that the
Chinese believe, first of all, they believe that they are entitled to have
their opinion on the Yugoslav issue, and I believe they will probably
try to slow down the negotiations.

LIN: And that is certainly what they are trying to do at this point. They
have the veto power of the U.N. Security Council, China is making
demands that the NATO bombing stop before any consideration of this
peace plan go before the council. Do you agree?

KISSINGER: I believe that that is what they are doing. But I think we
should think twice about rushing headlong into a confrontation with a
country of this magnitude. I think we should stop apologizing and we
should also stop taking a great macho posture. We should pursue our
own policy in Yugoslavia. I don't think we can make any significant
concessions with respect to the NATO program. And then we will just
have to tough it out.

LIN: So, Mr. Kissinger, what does that mean then with the peace plan
on the table now and the bombing continuing, where does NATO go at
this point then?

KISSINGER: NATO will have to -- actually, no, I did not favor getting
into this war. But now that we are in it, I think we have to prevail; the

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future of NATO is at stake.

And I think also, or the issue itself, we have a strong argument.
NATO's goal is to continue its military operation which, sooner or
later, will prevail. And continue on the track of the negotiations of last
week and I think that will lead to a conclusion.

LIN: Do you think that this diplomatic rift with China then is just really a political pause in the ultimate goal of NATO to get these refugees back into Kosovo, and that, ultimately, Slobodan Milosevic, with this partial withdrawal of troops from Kosovo, is capitulating?

KISSINGER: I think he is trying to drag out the negotiation, and to raise doubts about the need to continue the bombing. I am strongly opposed to a bombing halt because it will be very difficult to start it again and it lead to demand after demand to extend it.

I think that Milosovic is weakening. I think we can get the refugees back into Kosovo. And we should insist on some kind of international regiment for Kosovo, and I do not see how we can reach those demands. You cannot expect Kosovars to live under Serbian rule after what has happened.

LIN: Mr. Henry Kissinger, former secretary of state, thank you for joining us on EARLY EDITION.

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CNN Transcript - Crossfire: Former...the Kosovo Crisis - March 23, 1999

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Crossfire

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Gives His
Perspective on the Kosovo Crisis

Aired March 23, 1999 - 7:30 p.m. ET

ROBERT NOVAK, CO-HOST: Tonight, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the situation in Kosovo, on allegations of Chinese espionage. Plus a look back at the foreign policies of the two presidents he served under, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, as Kissinger writes about in his latest memoir, "Years of Renewal."

ANNOUNCER: From Washington, CROSSFIRE. On the left, Bill Press. On the right, Robert Novak. In the crossfire, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, author of "Years of Renewal."

BILL PRESS, CO-HOST: Good evening. Welcome to CROSSFIRE.

After a year almost exclusively focused on one domestic issue, foreign policy dominates early 1999, starting with NATO air strikes against Serbia, ever more imminent after last minute talks between U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic went nowhere.

And Chinese espionage at Los Alamos nuclear lab.

On foreign policy, one name stands out, tonight's guest, Henry Kissinger, former national security adviser and former secretary of state for Presidents Nixon and Ford.

From the Middle East to Latin America, his fingerprints are everywhere. He's credited for ending the war in Vietnam and slammed for prolonging it, praised for opening the door to China, and now, as a consultant, criticized for cashing in on that relationship.

Kissinger has just published the third volume of his memoirs. He's here tonight to talk Kosovo, China, Middle East. and every other hot spot we can squeeze in.

Bob?

NOVAK: More correctly, Dr. Kissinger. I think you're here to talk

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NOVAK: More correctly, Dr. Kissinger, I think you're here to talk about your book. You didn't as a foreign -- former foreign -- former secretary of state come down here to attack the administration's policy on the eve of war.

HENRY KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE: Thank you for saying that, but...

NOVAK: But we're going to ask you the questions anyway.

KISSINGER: But we scheduled this two weeks ago.

NOVAK: That's correct.

Dr. Kissinger, this -- as Undersecretary Pickering -- Undersecretary of State Pickering has said, is an act of war if we are about to attack Serbia. Do you think the facts on the ground justify an act of war?

KISSINGER: I would make a distinction between two things. I can understand American military action either to punish genocide or to prevent imminent genocide. The next step of moving troops into Kosovo to bring about a final settlement on -- in terms of the agreement that is now on the table, that I think would be a terrible mistake.

NOVAK: But even beyond that, sir, if there is no response by President Milosevic to the bombing, should we send in combat troops to fight the Yugoslav army?

KISSINGER: I would be opposed to it.

NOVAK: Mr. Secretary, the president today...

KISSINGER: You know, one has to consider, to use NATO to detach a province from a country with which we are not at war is an unprecedented gesture.

NOVAK: Almost without precedent in history, isn't it?

KISSINGER: Well, I don't want to go that far, but certainly unprecedented for NATO, and I think it's unprecedented for the United States.

NOVAK: The president today, Dr. Kissinger, made a speech to a labor group in which he gave a kind of an impromptu justification of the war policy. And he cited the anti-hate crimes legislation in Washington, in Congress, and said this is the same thing...

KISSINGER: The anti-what?

NOVAK: Anti-hate crimes against -- prejudice against -- crimes against gays and minorities. And he said that this has something to do with what's happening in Kosovo. And let's take a look at what the president said.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED

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STATES: Well, that's what Kosovo's about. Look, all over the world people are still killing each other out of primitive urges because they think what is different about them is more important than what they have in common.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

NOVAK: Is this a cause for war by the United States, when we object to the reason for people all around the world killing each other?

KISSINGER: No, I would totally disagree with this statement. I do not think American military forces should be used -- put in harm's way for that purpose. Anti-hate campaign that is within America, that is a domestic thing. If the president said a genocide has been committed or is about to be committed, and it is so offensive to our deepest values, I can understand it. But it would be a very unusual use of American military power.

PRESS: Mr. Secretary, I don't want to put words in your mouth, but there are those who have said that genocide or ethnic cleansing has been committed in Kosovo as it was committed in Bosnia, as it might have been committed in Croatia, and that the air strikes are to, as you said, both to punish those responsible and to prevent further bloodshed. Under those conditions, are you saying you would support air strikes against Serbia?

KISSINGER: Look, it goes against every grain of mine, having been in high office, to oppose the president of the United States on the eve of military operations. And I have never done it. I've supported every military move of the Clinton administration.

But I must express my uneasiness. If the president launches a one-time air campaign of one, two, three days, I don't want to put a limit to it, that I can barely understand. But if the purpose is to force Milosevic to come to a conference to sign an agreement, which I believe to be deeply flawed, unenforceable, and put American ground forces into Kosovo together with NATO ground forces...

And let me explain what bothers me about the agreement. The agreement speaks of autonomy for Kosovo, and the president has twice said within recent days that this is the -- Milosevic has to understand this is the best way to retain Kosovo. The Albanians do not autonomy, they want independence. They will therefore not accept this objective.

The agreement calls for the disarmament of the Albanian forces. That will never happen. The agreement calls for 12,000 Serbian police and a number of Serbian military in Kosovo. How are they going to relate to the Albanians?

And therefore, I would like to know what these ground forces are supposed to do there. That is the part at which I gag. And this is what I wish the president would reconsider.

PRESS: Meantime, we see the killing that's going on in Kosovo. We see the villages being burned as we speak. How -- even if this is a part of Serbia, which it is, how can the United States stand by and see people who are being slaughtered or moved out of the villages simply

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for who they are, and not for anything they've done? I mean, haven't we learned that lesson before?

KISSINGER: I think it is a terrible thing, and -- well, if you look around the world, we could identify 10 or 20 places...

PRESS: Absolutely. KISSINGER: ... where this is going on today. And I don't think you would argue that we should use American military force in each of them. I believe if this policy had been designed from the beginning to exclude the ground intervention and use economic and other pressure and an occasional punishment air attack, we would have achieved our basic objective, though we might not have saved every life.

But I think the course on which we are going to cost a lot of lives too.

NOVAK: One more question on this, Dr. Kissinger. There was a report that Prime Minister Primakov of the Soviet Union -- not the Soviet Union, of Russia -- I'm going back to the cold war days -- has canceled his visit to the United States because of the imminent U.S.-NATO action against Kosovo.

Is that a serious danger for the United States, a breach in the relationship with Russia?

KISSINGER: Well, the Russians have been the historic protectors of Serbia, and World War I started on this precise issue. I do not believe that Russia has the capacity to interpose itself militarily, and it will -- we will not pay a military price for this. But for this I think we will pay a political price in relations with Russia, always keeping in mind that Russia is very weak and very dependent on our support now.

So if we were ever going to do it, this is the best time to do it vis-a-vis Russia.

NOVAK: Let me change the subject. This town has been in a turmoil over the revelation of a security breach at the Los Alamos laboratory where nuclear weapons secrets allegedly were given to China, and that there was no report to Congress by the administration.

There are a lot of people in the Republican Party who really believe that this should -- this is the reason for overhauling U.S. relations with China, if they are now an adversary rather than a friendly nation. What do you think of that?

KISSINGER: I think when you're the technologically most advanced nation and the major superpower, the only superpower, you have to expect that others will try to steal your secrets. And I would be very disappointed if we did not do the same thing to the Chinese. So I think the real concern ought to be with the American security system that permitted this to go on for years. I do not think that itself is a reason for overhauling our relationship with China.

NOVAK: You think it's on a sound basis now, the U.S.-Chinese relationship?

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KISSINGER: I think the objective stated by the president is correct. I think it often happens in this administration the phraseology is too exuberant, and he has not given it any concrete context. But as an objective that we should stay engaged with China, I support the administration. PRESS: Real quickly, in terms of relationships with communist countries, I was impressed to read in your book, Mr. Secretary, that in 1975 under President Ford you reached out to try to normalize relationships with Cuba. Didn't happen then. Should it happen today? Is it time to end the embargo and normalize relationships with Cuba?

KISSINGER: I have proposed a bipartisan commission of respected people to make recommendations on Cuba policy so that it does not become a partisan issue. I believe it is time to look at this policy again. And inexplicably, the administration has rejected this proposal. I think it's a good way for them to get themselves off the hook on a partisan basis.

NOVAK: OK, we're going to have to take a break. And when we come back, we will, indeed, turn to Henry Kissinger's book, "Years of Renewal," and memories of some unhappy days and the fall of Vietnam.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

NOVAK: Welcome back to CROSSFIRE.

Henry Kissinger has just published "Years of Renewal," the third and final volume of one of the most literate and certainly the most complete memoir ever written by an American statesman.

We're talking to Dr. Kissinger about a book that mainly covers his service as secretary of state under President Gerald Ford, but also provides lessons about the present. Bill?

PRESS: Mr. Secretary, you spent a lot of time in your book and in your life in Latin America, working in Latin America. I want to ask you about -- particularly you talk about Chile, and you were secretary of state when Salvador Allende was president and later General Pinochet.

This is a memo from a CIA letter dated 16 October 1970, from our station in Santiago. It says, "It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It is imperative that these actions be implemented clandestinely and securely so that the U.S. government and American hand be well hidden." What business did we have trying to overthrow a president of another country, Mr. Secretary?

KISSINGER: Well, our -- this, of course, was canceled a few days later.

PRESS: But it was under way at the time. I mean, what -- why should the CIA be involved in it?

KISSINGER: Well, but the point is, it didn't happen. We were deeply concerned that -- and this was -- much of this was conducted on the recommendation of an ambassador -- our ambassador in Chile, who was a Democratic appointee from the Johnson administration and was

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held over.

Our concern was that Allende, who had been elected by about 30 percent of the vote, was going to bring about a communist government in Chile, and that it would then be an irreversible process.

What we were really trying to engineer, which this thing does not mention, is, he got in through an electoral fluke, that is to say, there were three people voted -- three candidates, and he had the largest number among these candidates. And -- but the vast majority were on the anti-communist side. But it was split.

So what we were trying to do, wisely or unwisely, was to try to engineer another election between two candidates in which the previous president had agreed to run.

PRESS: OK. Now, a few years later, you went back to Chile. You gave a speech at the Organization of American States in Santiago, where you made a strong statement about human rights and how important that was in American foreign policy. At the same time, you met with General Pinochet, or President Pinochet, privately and in a Department of State memorandum...

KISSINGER: You know, I know (INAUDIBLE)...

PRESS: ... of your meeting. .

KISSINGER: I know what you have.

PRESS: You said to him, to the -- to Pinochet, quote, "We are sympathetic with what you are trying to do." This is in a private meeting. "We wish your government well." You continue...

KISSINGER: In fact...

PRESS: ... "The speech is not aimed at Chile. My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going communist." So you were criticizing Pinochet in public and cozying up to him in private.

KISSINGER: No, no. First of all, I explained in this book in great detail what our position was. We preferred Pinochet to Allende, and I said this in the book. We did not agree with his human rights practices. So what I was trying to do here is to preserve his government but modify its human rights.

And if you read through this report, and especially at the end, I said specifically, "It's not enough for you to release prisoners occasionally. You have to bring about constitutional guarantees and the right of habeas corpus." And I rejected every request he made for aid by saying, "This is incompatible with human rights -- with your human rights practices."

I also -- I had to navigate a very narrow line. I was in Chile attacking his country publicly, meeting the head of state, who was in charge of the country, and I was trying to tell him, It's not aimed at Chile, which

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means, in effect, what we are trying to do is modify your policies. And it's quite correct, we prefer the Pinochet government with human rights to an Allende government. NOVAK: Dr. Kissinger, first, congratulations on a brilliant book. It's one of the most readable memoirs I think you can find. And -- but I tell you, I had tremendous pain in reading again about the betrayal of Vietnam.

KISSINGER: I had enormous pain writing about it.

NOVAK: Did you -- do you feel -- you don't quite come out and say it, but do you feel that if it hadn't been for Watergate, there would have a different outcome in Vietnam?

KISSINGER: Yes, I believe that but for Watergate, we could certainly have preserved Vietnam well into the next administration. And maybe forever, as South Korea was preserved.

NOVAK: The -- you also have a paragraph which is very haunting when you talk about the fact we went on bended knee at the end to the Soviets to try to get some help. You said, quote, "We were in the humiliating position summed up by British historian Edward Gibbon: that persuasion was the resource of the feeble, and the feeble can seldom persuade. What made our situation so especially harrowing was that we had been made feeble by choice, not by necessity," unquote.

When you left office, being made feeble by choice, did you have a low expectation for the -- for our survival as a superpower?

KISSINGER: Well, I had faith in the resilience of America, and I think President Ford did a lot to restore a sense of reconciliation and a sense of feeling. And then in the Reagan administration, I think this culminated.

But what you're describing, often people say we should have helped in the last six months. My concern was different. The Congress got economic and military aid to Vietnam by 50 percent each year of its independence, and legislated a prohibition against using any kind of military force in enforcing the agreement on the basis of which Kuwait would have been reoccupied in the Gulf if that had happened.

So that by the time the final offensive came, I have the correct figures in there, but a large percentage of Vietnamese air force was grounded, ammunition was rationed. And of course their forces were demoralized. And it was a grueling experience to watch this.

NOVAK: Do you think Richard Nixon would have just overridden those obstacles as President Ford could not?

KISSINGER: Well, he couldn't -- neither Nixon nor Ford could override legal obstacles. I don't think the Congress would ever have passed these restrictions in an undamaged presidency.

PRESS: Mr. Secretary, almost out of time, just a quick question. Now that you've completed your memoirs, your papers have been in the Library of Congress under your instructions that they stay there until five...

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KISSINGER: No, wait a minute...

PRESS: ... years after your death.

KISSINGER: Let me explain this.

PRESS: Right? Will you now -- my question is, will you now release all your papers and your telephone transcripts?

KISSINGER: My -- the answer is yes, and they've always been released. I have no paper in the library of which an original does not exist in the State Department. So anybody has whatever access -- I can't give access to classified papers that they cannot get in the department. My telephone conversations, which is the only other thing in the library, I've released to the State Department already last year on my own. It is a total lie to say that I have exclusive use of these papers.

PRESS: Mr. Secretary, thanks very much for joining us, and congratulations again on a good book.

Bob Novak and I will be back with our closing comments about Henry Kissinger and "Years of Renewal."

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

PRESS: Bob, you wouldn't expect to agree with everything in a book like this. I think on China, on the Soviet Union, and in the Middle East, Henry Kissinger, brilliant leadership. On Vietnam and Cambodia, I think he made some of the biggest mistakes in American foreign policy.

NOVAK: Well, I think I'm more supportive of General Pinochet than he was. But I want to tell you one thing. Henry Kissinger does not want to attack the administration before we go into combat, but he has tremendous dread and foreboding about this senseless military venture in Kosovo. So do I. And I think in your deepest nonpartisan heart, so do you.

PRESS: No, Bob, I'm against ethnic cleansing. From the left, I'm Bill Press. Good night for CROSSFIRE.

NOVAK: On the right, I'm Robert Novak. Join us again next time for another edition of CROSSFIRE.

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