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12/10/64

FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE OTHER SIDE

By Jaroslav Šedivy

First there reached us the book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in 1957 in New York. Its author, the young American professor of history, Henry A. Kissinger, set off a discussion here which pictured him as the originator and defender of the so-called strategy of limited nuclear war, and his book used to be quoted as proof of American preparations of a new war strategy. In 1960, his second book *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy*, was published. In it the author discusses the dilemma of atomic terrorization and already puts a question mark at the end of the Chapter "Limited war: nuclear or conventional"? In January 1961, President Kennedy brought him to the White House as a member of his "brain trust" and as close collaborator on politico-strategic questions and problems of disarmament.

Last September H.A.Kissinger, as a member of the American delegation, took part in the so-called Pugwash Conference at Karlovy Vary. It seems that Professor Kissinger's opinions are undergoing a certain evolution toward a deeper political realism and understanding of our problems.

"Mr. Professor" (one really does not want to use this title for a personally likeable chap of 40 who reminds one of anything but a sedate professor) gave a lecture in Prague for experts in the

By Jaroslav Sedivy

First there reached us the book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published in 1957 in New York. Its author, the young American professor of history Henry A. Kissinger, set off a discussion here which pictured him as the originator and defender of the so-called strategy of limited nuclear war, and his book used to be quoted as proof of American preparations of a new war strategy. In 1960, his second book, *The Necessity for Choice - Prospects of American Foreign Policy*, was published. In it the author discusses the dilemma of atomic terrorization and already puts a question mark at the end of the chapter "Limited war: nuclear or conventional". In January 1961, President Kennedy brought him to the White House as a member of his "brain trust" and as close collaborator on politico-strategic questions and problems of disarmament.

Last September H.A. Kissinger, as a member of the American delegation, took part in the so-called Pugwash Conference at Karlovy Vary, where the conference which came out in favor of a nuclear freeze in Central Europe, for nonatomic and demilitarized zones in various parts of the world, for the present European borders, and for the draft of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw pact nations. It seems that Professor Kissinger's opinions are undergoing a certain evolution toward a deeper political realism and understanding of our problems.

"Mr. Professor" (one really does not want to use this title for a personally likable chap of 40 who reminds one of anything but a sedate professor) gave a lecture in Prague for experts in the

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During the discussion, Kissinger protested that his answers should not be viewed as a press conference. If I here try to reproduce some of his opinions, I surely do not mean to violate a promise; I am primarily concerned with the essence of some of his ideas - as perceived by an ordinary member of the audience. Furthermore, Kissinger's presentation was in part a paraphrase of the last chapter of his book, *The Necessity for Choice*, called "The Policymaker and the Intellectual."

We might try the thing in the form of an interview.

> We say that foreign policy is a continuation of internal policies; we talk about the minimum and maximum character of our state organization, about its socio-economic structure, etc. Even to such a question we would get an answer from you, but you, in contrast to us, would begin by considering the type of people who make foreign policy.

The influence of the internal structure of a state on its foreign policy is great. It in essence determines what kind of people carry out foreign policy, what kind of arguments they use, how they solve disagreements. The type of person who works in the area of foreign policy in a socialist state is different from his counterpart in a capitalist society. In the USA, foreign-policy workers are people who are more pragmatically oriented toward the events that are currently taking place. Many conflicts between East and West are due to the different sociological viewpoint of the people who are in charge of solving them.

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In the USA the people, brought up on pragmatic principles, think that what is being said at the conference table is important. In Socialist countries, on the other hand, act on the principle that what is important is not what their representatives say but what they represent. ( We would have to digress again and remark that we have long since outgrown Stalin's paraphrase of the well-known Clausewitz doctrine that "war is a continuation of the policy of armed peace" -- "politics may therefore be a battle without armed force," where of course the main role was played first by force and then by words.)

It is interesting how at times our vocabularies agree - we say the same thing to Western politicians. Wherein then lies the lack of understanding - in the different ideologies perhaps?

No matter what the ideology on either side, we should not think that one side is more stupid than the other.

We certainly agree with this. Underestimating the other side usually leads to disagreeable surprises. What do you consider as the important factors in present-day international relations?

First of all, the growth of strength and self-confidence of nations. Second, the change in the relations of the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition. At the end of the war, the US and the USSR found themselves confronted by an extremely economically atypical Europe, economically reduced to shreds as a result of the German occupation. After the war the European nations became dependent either on the US or on the USSR - for economic or defense reasons. From this there arose the illusion that America persisted for years that world events could be solved unilaterally either in Moscow or in Washington.

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Third, there is the destructive force of the weapons. This today leads to a certain rigidity in the foreign policies of both sides, because each country is afraid of disturbing the status quo. Diplomacy is today carried out more on the level of deliberations. Foreign policy will perhaps have to be built on a more pragmatic basis because it will have to operate in a more limited space. And this now offers opportunities to both sides.

Fourth, it is the influence and at the same time the weakening of ideologies. I believe that peaceful coexistence remains a mere phrase so long as it does not have some concrete day-to-day content.

Various Western politicians and journalists accuse us that we use "peaceful coexistence" as a tactical means. They do not understand the meaning of the concept. It means that what an important matter of life and death peaceful coexistence is - and this not only for Czechoslovakia.

Should "peaceful coexistence" prove to be no more than a dummy matter of tactics, things would be bound to take a bad end.

We would certainly continue our discussion. From these general considerations we would arrive at concrete questions. We would agree that history really moves in only one direction; however, we would probably not agree on the forces which make it move and on the direction in which it moves. If we referred to professor Kissinger's books and his military-strategic considerations, professor Kissinger would probably surprise us by answering: "In the scenario of a possible war I have not foreseen that the US might be the aggressor." And it would be seen that he does not envisage this possibility even today. He does recognize that the US military bases in Europe do not make any sense in terms of a so-called strategic nuclear war, but he con-

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siders it right that the American bases remain here for so-called
local defense. This means then that American policy has not given
up the idea that a local war might be possible even in Europe.

One would also talk about NATO; western Europe does not want to
be an American protectorate any longer. This the professor would
certainly agree with and he would probably emphasize that with the
growth of European authority the Northatlantic Treaty will undergo
changes, one of which is indisputable - the role of America will be
diminished.

And it would be impossible to omit from the discussion the policies
of the French President, of whom Kissinger says that "few people
have a greater talent to anger the American people than General
de Gaulle."

And we would probably accept the truth of Kissinger's words that
many political events take place only because old views continue
to have an effect and live on, and people do not want to改变 them
以改变人们 changing their mind to make the effort to change them or run the
risk of changing them.

When a representative of Czechoslovakia gives a political lecture
in the West, he defends his views. It is foolish to assume that a
Western scientist and politician will tell us only what we want to
hear and can agree on. Another approach gives rise (provokes) further
thoughts. This applies to us, and I bet, to professor Kissinger as
well.

12/10/64

By Jaroslav Sedivy

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fields of international political and economic relations. He showed that he can brilliantly formulate his ideas, and he does not lack a sense of humor. We wanted to ask him some questions - but did not succeed. However, his lecture answered a series of questions - the ones he is asking himself and the ones we are asking ourselves.

In years past we have often judged international developments according to some stereotype which, however, was insufficient to do justice to the many different aspects of these developments. Now these days are behind us, but at times a bit of this lack of perceptiveness still persists. H.A. Kissinger probably knows this, because he asked several times that we should not view American foreign policy as a product of the whim of American monopolistic capital only. (This, of course, is really not being done here any longer, in serious discussions.) And in front of his audience he proceeded to discuss foreign policy and international relations in a manner somewhat different from that we are used to here.

The basic difference is that in judging international relations, we must take as our starting point objective economic, political, military and ideological criteria; hence we lose sight of the immediate creators of these policies and of their greater or lesser capabilities. In contrast, professor Kissinger in considering this area of human activity starts with the people, with their sociological limitations, and via these, i.e. via the practical problems, reaches his evaluation of general conclusions. And this leads him to a continual emphasis on the pragmatism of American policies. (However, in the discussions, professor Eisler of the University of Economics, correctly interjected that pure pragmatism might lead to the loss of the capability of prediction.)

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We say that foreign policy is a continuation of internal policies; we talk about the administrative character of our state organization, about its socio-economic structure, etc. Even to such a question we would get an answer from you, but you, in contrast to us, would begin by considering the type of people who make foreign policy.

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In the USA the people, brought up on pragmatic principles, think that what is being said at the conference table is important. In Socialist countries, on the other hand, act on the principle that what is important is not what their representatives say but what they represent. ( We would have to digress again and remark that we have long since outgrown Stalin's paraphrase of the well-known Clausewitz doctrine that "war is a continuation of the policy of armed peace" -- " politics may therefore be a battle without armed force," where of course the main role was played first by force and then by words.)

First of all, the growth of strength and self-confidence of nations. Second, the change in the relations of the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition. At the end of the war, the US and the USSR found themselves confronted by an atypological Europe, economically atypical economically reduced to shreds as a result of the German occupation. After the war the European nations became dependent either on the US or on the USSR - for economic or defense reasons. From this there arose the illusion that it persisted for years that world events could be solved unilaterally either in Moscow or in Washington.

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Fourth, there is the influence and at the same time the weakening of ideologies. I believe that peaceful coexistence remains a mere phrase so long as it does not have some concrete day-to-day content.

Various Western politicians and journalists accuse us that we use "peaceful coexistence" as a tactical means. They do not understand the meaning of this coexistence. What an important matter of life and death peaceful coexistence is - and this not only for Czechoslovakia.

Should "peaceful coexistence" prove to be no more than a utopian matter of tactics, things would be bound to take a bad end.

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And we would probably accept the truth of Kissinger's words that
many political events take place only because old views continue
to have an effect and live on, and people do not want to mummify
march on Washington to make the effort to change them or run the
risk of changing them.

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190 Main Street
Wakefield, Mass.

12/5/1964.

Miss Joan Blanchard
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Miss Blanchard:

Enclosed is the translation of professor Kissinger's "non-press
conference" in Czechoslovakia. I am terribly sorry for the delay,
but I was very busy at the office plus having to contend with an
Aunt whom I hadn't seen for 25 years and who suddenly decided
to stop off in Boston on her trip around the world, as well as
with a flood in my house due to some broken pipes. Since I know
that you are anxious to get the translation, I am sending you
the first rough draft and trust that you will not mind having
it typed in a somewhat more esthetic form. I did not take me
long enough to warrant a bill.

I hope professor Kissinger is satisfied.