Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

10:20 am

3/12/70

K: Can you get me -- I am holding up sending that until I have that sentence.

S: I sent it to Hal Saunders.

K: He is more active for you than me. I will get it from him. Are you still in favor of giving it? Then we will send it over.

S: And I will put it to the Secretary. The way to sweeten this timing is to inject the proposal of replacement. I don't say whether it should be public or private.

K: Blame me for it.

S: You and I will sink together on this. I'm a swinger. You didn't know that.

K: I just have to look at your wife to see that.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
8/12/70 10:25 a.m.

K: The DPRC went very well. I want to make one thing clear to you Mel. I am not going to get involved in the individual weapons systems. I am not going to get into your business on this.

L: I understand. I just wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding.

K: And the way Dave handled it was just what we had in mind.

L: Good. I got your memo on draft and the all-volunteer business. I sent a memo to the President on that yesterday. You have it. . . it might have been channeled into Marty Anderson, but I wanted you to have a copy. Do you want me to send you another copy?

K: Why don't you send me another?

L: I've gotten a memo saying there is going to be a meeting in the White House on Tuesday, chaired by Ehrlichman on this. Are you going to be at that?

K: I think I better.

L: Should I?

K: Have you been asked?

L: Yes.

K: Then you better. You want it in the NSC, right?

L: I think we should look at it at some time there. This will affect our national security posture for years to come.

K: You have made that point.

L: I worry about it going the domestic action route and that's where it is now.

K: I understand. I think you better go to the meeting and make the point.

L: Okay.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

3/12/70 10:25 a.m.

K: I got your memo on the Vietnam negotiations.

L: When I talked to Thieu, . . . I was worried because
I think he's getting ahead of . . .

K: Well, on the cease-fire we are getting into good shape,
and we are cranking the other things up. I think it was a useful jog.

!

By: K.L. V. NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON

Frank Pace/Kissinger

10:57 am

3/12/70

P: After my discussion with you I came to the conclusion it didn't make sense to ask the President to see the Board. So I will ask him to see David, Geo. Woods, and myself. It's not something he is aware of and a larger meeting is not justified use of his time. Do you agree?

K: There's a lot to be said for it.

P: I didn't want to send my letter until I had talked to you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHLN NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Amb. Robert Anderson/Kissinger

1:07 pm

3/12/70

A: I have several small items. I appreciate being invited tomorrow to the Review Group Meeting on Panama but I won't be able to attend because my mother is dying from bone deterioration. So I am going to Texas.

K: That's awful. That's awful. Does she know she's dying?

A: In her lucid moments -- she's under a great deal of sedation and medication. But she's in her 80's and she's had a great life. I would like to send John K. Shiffy (?) who is on this and has been on the hearings. I have talked to Dan Hoffman.

K: Right.

A: Also, tell the President how much I appreciate having Dan. He's top-notch.

K: One of the very best.

A: The President has the seabeds thing before him. I went into this at great length during the Eisenhower Administration. Whatever we do to limit will not be reciprocated by other nations. Even though we set an example, it will not be followed.

K: Do we need to do something unilaterally?

A: When I get back I would like to discuss this with you to give you the benefit after these worlds (?) of study.

K: I would be glad to do that.

A: I will call your secretary when I get back. Thirdly, I am going to the M. E. April 1. I will be the house guest of King Faisal to discuss mineral development. I will, of course, also listen to him on the political situation. After that I am going to Cairo and Kuwait. Rabin=called me yesterday and I am seeing him next week. The CIA is seeing me too. If there is guidance you or anyone else wants to give me

K: Before April 1? Let's combine that with seabeds.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
3/12/70 2:25 p.m.

R: I'm trying to get some ideas for this afternoon as to what you thought was likely to come up.

K: They didn't get the important papers done. I'm just going through a series of cats and dogs: freedom to MIG's (?); land mobiles, qualitative restrictions, and nuclear accidents. We have to have a meeting next week on MIRV, ABM and SAM upgrade problem.

R: When on negotiating options?

K: Next week too. We'll have to have two meetings next week.

R: The ABM thing wasn't enough finished?

K: They were going to do another.

R: I thought that paper that just came in was damn good.

K: It was good. We will have some discussion of negotiating options today.

R: That would be useful. I am jarred by the discovery in the last 10 days at developments in MIRV and ABM that I didn't understand before.

K: Like what?

R: On the problem of upgrading an ABM system comparable to a Soviet threat to the Safeguard system in the US. The upgrade problem is really hairy once you have a system as big as the one we propose for ourselves. There's the xxxg chance of degrad-ing ____.

K: What is hair-raising to me is a system as large as they have and to upgrade.

R: Before we negotiate ABM levels which give them enough for their area defense comparable to what we want, then the risk of upgrade seems important.

K: But supposing you have a low ABM level; then the problem of SAM upgrade becomes worse.

Telecon
Elliot Richardson

3/12/70 2:25 p.m.

By KHC NARA, Dalo

R: No it doesn't, because the SAM is then easier to detect.

K: Why?

R: Let me back up; I'm getting ahead of myself. I'm assuming there's some force in State's CIA's and ACDA's arguments regarding the risk of SAM upgrade.

K: That's right.

R: But I discover not even State or ACDA will offer reassurance against the prospect of SAM upgrade if the other side has enough radar capability so that it feed in more becomes undetectable.

K: What shakes me; I was at SAC for a briefing about war plans. They have some limited options--take out something with a few bombers and an enormous number of missiles, this number or missiles to take on the SA-5. They treat it as an anti-missile weapon. They were just showing me what they could do in a limited mode. I made them back up. They told me they've discovered some radars which make sense only with the SA-5.

R: My God!

K: That really shook me. They had no reason to suppose I would question the discrepancy between missiles and bombers.

R: I'll be damned. That's interesting.

K: And on this happy note I will leave you.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
3:00 pm 3/12/70

K: I called you this morning to ask if you thought this phrase, "replacement as required" was enough. You can discuss with Rabin

S: I suggested that you provide additional aircraft as well as replacement.

K: If they are As they are required, you had. But if leave that out

K: I changed it to "should require it."

K: That's right.

S: It gives us flexibility. Our judgment is to stick with the language we have discussed.

K: We would have to amend the contracts to give them 8 Phantoms and 20 Skyhawks.

S: Remember the language on the private scenario -- later we will review with you what replacement is.

K: The President wants to go further. You wouldn't have to amend the contract.

S: But make a commitment to amend the contract. I would have to think about it.

K: Isn't that what he was told?

S: An area of that was without a contract. Now you want to be more explicit and say at that time we will amend the contract. We give you the language in the private scenario very carefully. I will have to look at that.

K: That's what the President has and wants me to send over. I gave him all the working group options. He disapproved the reductions of 16 - 24 and he approved the 8 - 20.

K: I see and I understand. It still doesn't clarify what you want.

K: Whether it's in the statement.

S: It should not be in the statement. What you are saying is something more precisely on ? ? ? ? of the scenario. I will look at that.

K: The President wants to delete the words "1971-72" from that first sentence.

I*

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/84

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

3:00 pm 3/12/70

-2-

S: It was in because most American people think it's <u>REK</u> in terms of aircraft right away.

K: He doesn't care if you use it in the background.

S: So we will put a period after the word "aircraft". I will reflect on that other and I will be back at you.

K: I must look at the private scenario.

S: Does that mean we have to re-write the <u>REKEX</u> scenario?

K: ? ? ? ? ? the instructions. They are not very specific.

S: Do you have them in front of you?

K: They never have in front of me what I need.

S: Well, I will work on it and get back to you.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
5:52 pm 3/12/70

K: I am just trying -- I would like to get this thing sent over and wrapped up by the weekend. I don't understand where we disagree.

S: Did Hal talk to you?

K: Not fully.

S: Would you like me to come over?

K: Can you come at 6:30?

S: Tonight?

K: I have to see the German Ambassador.

S: OK. Delay him a minute and I will come right over with Atherton.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Len Garment/Kissinger

6:55 pm

3/12/70

G: I called you to see if you could give me some guidance on what is going on. What did the old lady have to say?

K: She was bitter and threatening. She threatened to go to war. Rabin has been called home.

G: When? Today? Who is holding the fort? Shlomo?

K: Yes. A number of things are going on that I can't tell you about. Nest week we will have to tell you and we will have to get going. W How much advance do you need?

G: I have some statements

K: You had better keep yourself loose Tues. & Wed. There are some things that will need to be done with delicacy. They have to know who their friends are and they will have to stop being stupid.

G: You will tell me and I will do it.

K: On Tues. or Wed. we will want you to start talking. Who has influence on the Jewish newspapermen.

G: They can be contacted. I am trying to think what might be helpful. I have a good relationship with Argov.

K: I like Argov. I think I can handle that and probably will. It might not hurt. You might get them to do certain things I can't ask for. For your personal information what might have been a national major disaster for the U.S. and Israel has been narrowly averted but that might not be self-evident.

G: Many of the Jewish leaders will be in Washington the week after next.

K: What's the occasion?

G: The meeting of the national something. The Annual Jewish Committee meeting. Generally the drift of things.

K: It's being handled with extreme delicacy and no one knows what's being done.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Min. Argov/Kissinger
7:06 pm 3/12/70

A: The Ambassador left an hour ago.

K: I knew he was leaving tonight.

A: He left at 6:00/

K: I had a message that is not crucial. I don't think

A: I haveno problems in communicating with him.

K: I think I had better not communicate with him. If I change my mind I will
let you know tomorrow morning. How do you do it?

A: I can aable him personally in a way that only he will get the communication.

K: I will think about that and perhaps phone you in a little while. It's nothing
earthshaking. If I don't call you I will communicate with him when he gets
back.

A: I'm at home.

By KCL- NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telcon

Secretary Stans (incoming call)

March 13, 1970: 9:00 a.m.

S: I'm sorry to have missed you last night.

K: I have talked to the President and have called Shimoda in. I am
giving him 3 days to come up with a proposal or we will break off.

S: I think that's the way to do it. In the meantime I am not going to say anything publicly.

K: I will give him until Tuesday. If they don't move by then I am going to say there is no sense talking any more. We have gone through this exercise for the past six months.

S: Does the President agree?

K: Reluctantly, but he agrees. If they had made any movement we could have gone to the fall-back position. But we will start next round at the fall-back position. My first instinct was to go the other way, but after we talked yesterday, I became persuaded that this is the only thing to do. I think the President is convinced.

S: This isn't the end of the ball game.

K: They can't afford it. I will report to you if there is anything to say.

S: Good enough.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dale

5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
3/13/70 9:15 a.m.

K: I am sending over to you on an unofficial basis the President's decision on the Middle East deal. I'm sending you a copy of the directive he sent to the Secretary of State. I just wanted you to know so you wouldn't distribute it.

L: There will be no distribution.

K: I think you will agree with it.

L: Very good. How did your meeting go with the Admiral?

K: I liked him. I talked to the President about him and he said if you liked and I liked him we should proceed.

L: Okay, we've got a little time.

K: When are you going to move on Moorer?

L: Probably not until the end of the month, until these hearings are over. When Wheeler speaks we want him to be in a position where he's still talking with one voice.

K: We'll leave the timing up to you.

L: I don't want to rush it. About the Peers (?) Report, I think the Army JAG or ________ should talk with you or Al Haig, so you've seen the stuff.

K: You think we should do it?

L: At least the game plan.

K: Yes.

L: How about Saturday or Monday?

K: How about Tuesday?

L: Well, I think he's releasing it on Tuesday.

K: I'll set something up.

L: I'd like you and Al to take a half hour or so Monday some time. I'll have Pursley get in touch with Al.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

10:05 am

3/13/70

L: I have a problem. I have been testifying on MAP funding for '71. We have this thing to take $10 million out of other country funding and give it to Indonesia. We have to take that off China & Korea. The State Dept. has told Indonesia they will get more.

K: The President feels he made a commitment to Suharto when he was there.

L: You can't do it without going the supplemental route. I want to do that for Korea. We cut China from 35 to 25 million. Turkey and Greece -- in the other areas you just don't have the money to cut. Let me send you a note. This puts the pressure on us on this Korea thing. I hate to take it out of their item.

K: No, we shouldn't. Can't we give them surplus from VN?

L: We could use some excess stock but it commutes (?) the funding memo from 15 to 5 million.

K: He feels he has a commitment to them.

L: And he wants to take them from other countries?

K: No. Can't we do a supplemental for Korea and Indonesia?

L: I will go on that and see if I can get it approved.

K: The President wanted me to touch base with you. He is thinking in order to pre-empt Fulbright on the Laos policy, so they can say they support our decision, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

L: XXXXXXXXXXXX Air power for VN.

K: Is that do-able?

L: Yes, if you can protect Americans in VN and not use ground troops XXXX there without presidential approval and airpower in Laos is for the protection of Americans. That would preempt Fulbright.

K: I will take it up with Harlow and come back to you.

L: Don't take it on Accords.

K: No, on the basis you indicated.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Mr. Sisco (incoming call)
3/13/70; 10:55 a.m.

S: The Secretary of State feels that what you and I worked out last night is eminently satisfactory. There is only one thing - he still feels very strongly and I tried to talk him out of it and will continue to --

K: That he wants to do it at a press conference.

S: He feels it will give him a great opportunity to put the emphasis on the opportunity this decision offers to press ahead on efforts towards a peaceful solution -- along the lines of the last half of the public announcement. This kind of preemption might be feasible.

K: We will leave how he makes the announcement to him.

S: You have got to be very sure Mel Laird knows about this, but in a way it won't get leaked all over the Pentagon. You have got to make sure the Pentagon is in a position to implement the kind of decision the President is making, that they are in a position to respond quickly and sign contracts and make planes available without horsing around.

K: I am going to Laird on an Eyes Only basis because if I call him he is under no restraints. After the decision is announced I will get Packard in and tell him the second part of what you said. I am afraid if I do it before, they will leak.

S: Allright, I will leave that to you.

K: On the press conference, it would be greatly appreciated if in this past initiative you put the emphasis not just on the negotiation but also on the restraint in arms shipments so we have an issue for delivering arms if the pressures get too great.

S: Allright, I will do this. I will get to the Secretary on the date, but he wants Thursday or Friday.

K: Well, we don't want it before Thursday.

S: OK.

ms

By KHC

NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

TELCON
Blatchford/Kissinger
11:45 am 3/13/70

B: I have sent you those two memos a couple of days ago. I didn't specifically ask for a reversal of the decision on Afghanistan.

K: I understand the problem and I will try to work it out. I should be able to let you know within a week.

B: I would appreciate it before the news gets out. I would be happy to see the President for 15 mins. to explain.

K: Did you pull two people?

B: Yes, 2/who wrote letters to the VP in with the letters from the volunteers and told them that staff members cannot do this and I expect them to exert more influence. If they don't want to work with this administration they could get out. The Ambassador I gave them a couple of days and then sent them back. The Ambassador praised the work of the director there. The news story

K: That was what pressed the problem.

B: A lot of volunteers are getting out but that's the only way we can make the changes and bring in the people.

K: Let me get back to you if there are any questions.

B: I have tried to keep the Secy. of State informed and he said he would be glad to go with me to talk to the President re the larger problem.

K: I will see if I can get you a favorable decision.

B: Tell him Neil Armstrong has accepted and Geo. Meany is anxious to get recruits. Neil and I would like to talk to the President about this.

K: Take this up with Haldeman.

B: We are working with the labor field very closely on this.

K: I will tell him.

I*

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

11:45 am

3/13/70

K: I'm sorry to be g bugging you. The President just read that announcement and as I warned, he is sticking on that point.

S: What is that?

K: Replacement. He wants it more strongly. While we are not increasing them we will see that it stays at the present level.

S: I will work at it in 15 mins., just as soon as I get out of this meeting.

K: Page 2 -- the strong conviction (?) is in peace and not in restraint.

S: That can be changed. No problem there. Let me see what I can come up with.

K: Let's talk before lunch again.

S: Before 1:00.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Cong. Adair/Kissinger

11:55 am

3/13/70

A: That was a pleasant dinner party at the Ceylon Embassy.

K: I enjoyed it.

A: I want to convey to you as I have to the Secy. of State the fact that there's dismay on the Hill on the Rhodesian situation. You are probably aware of this and it's quite deep.

K: It would be much better if you could write to I could show it to people who are interested.

A: Many people have been asked to sign Mr. Gross's letter who have not signed because they don't want to bother the administration.

K: Write me a letter and you can be sure it will go to the right people.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Shakespeare/Kissinger

12:14 pm

3/13/70

S: I sent over an option list on the Romanian library situation. My feeling is that it would be madness to indicate to them in any way to go along with their assumption that because rents are high in NY we should pay a commensurate rent. I would tell them to forget the whole deal rather than do that. And we should be sure they understand. Everyone knows what rents are in NY, Paris, and London. If they want to go to a higher floor or better yet go to another city such as Cincinnati, that's fine. They control the rents there in Bucharest and we will pay a fair competitive rent. If they don't want to do that we will just drop it. How do you feel?

K: I agree.

S: In effect I put that in on the option I recommended. I don't want to get into a precedence-setting situation. I am disturbed by the fact that Eunice Shriver said that it would be fine.

K: That's irresponsible.

S: The annual Press Awards group dinner in NY will be April ____. 15 or 16 awards are handed out. They asked if I would ask you to speak.

K: It gets reported in the press doesn't it? I will not do that. Is it supposed to be a serious speech?

S: It would have to be.

K: A serious analysis. I cannot do that. I cannot speak for the record.

S: You could not speak for this size group and have it off the record. They would probably accept you on that but I don't think you should. I will tell them the answer is k no. I am seeing the VP this afternoon.

K: I would let my hair down to him.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCOM
McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger
12:25 pm 3/13/70

B: Have you got a totally off-the-record minute?

K: Certainly.

B: My friends in the education world are in desperation on ______ of the NDEA. All foreign area studies -- it will produce an impact on whether anyone understands the Soviet Union in the next 5 - 10 years.

K: What is the decision being made?

B: To destroy it. I just talked to Pat who is in the business of preparing a memo to the President. I am not clear that the substantive impact of this can get through to the President via Pat.

K: No, it aannot. The only road on this is through me or Ehrlichman. Technically this would be in Ehrlichman's bailiwick but you don't know him, do you?

B: No.

K: It would be best if you came down and I take you up or you write me and I will take it up with him.

B: Suppose I write you and tell him anyone in the education field can come whenever he wants.

K: Carl Kaysen was in here this morning on a similar problem. ? ? ? ? ?
budget list contrained until the last minuted and then they raised it with
the President. This is disaster.

B: Someone in the administration doesn't like ?? ? ? ? . What was Carl's problem? I don't want to overlap

K: Science -- some of the heavy expenses for astro-physics. It's the same
sort of problem -- where things will be 5 years from now. I told him to write
ma a letter. if the come in together I can make a case obt of it.

B: That's what I wanted to know.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Stans
3/13/70 12:30 p.m.

K: I wanted to tell you about the talk I had this morning with Shimoda. I was very tough. I told him our people considered the last Japanese aide memoire an insult and totally useless as a basis for discussion. I said we were going to make no counter proposal and we were going to break off negotiations. I told him that would be done Tuesday. Shimoda asked me if this was an ultimatum. I said no, an ultimatum is when you ask somebody to do something; we're not asking for anything, we're just telling you. I said on Tuesday we will break off negotiations and tell our textile people to seek recourse in Congress. I said the President is outraged. He said this will put our government in an impossible position.' I said that's your problem. And he said 'I guess we better get busy.' Now Maury, would you just make sure State doesn't do any crying and weeping about this?

S: Yes, I've told them not to do anything. There has been meeting after meeting among labor and industry. And there will be a storm. But that will be to our advantage; it will be read in Japan. Mills believes the statement about unwillingness to trade partners for this will be read by the rest of the world. He believes that a statement that Japan would be unwilling to negotiate voluntarily an agreement will bring pressure from other countries on them to negotiate. Okay, I will tell you what happens on Tuesday.

K: Good.

*

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
3/13/70 ca. 1:45 p.m.

(Immediately after Mr. Kissinger returned from long session with
the President at lunch time.)

R: The point you must tell Laird and Ron--low-key it. Explain it, but don't make a big thing out of it. This is silly business of course they were military, but they were on contract to Lockheed, operating a radar station. They were not in ground combat.

K: You shouldn't be bothered with a problem like this. This is an easy case.

P: They were 12 people working on a radar station--not combat. You tell Laird that's what he's to say.

K: I don't think we should get into that distinction on this. A, it was a radar station, and B, it was run by Lockheed.

P: They were military people assigned to that purpose. Another ploy is, we could give this to the Staf as an exclusive and let them run it. Have Horner ask him the question.

K: He could just say for example that in this 50, there were 12...

P: ... who were operating a radar station.

K: I think that's a good way of doing it.

P: He could say he has been checking all week--give it to him as an exclusive, and right away so it could get in this evening's Star. These facts are incontrovertible. These are not new figures--this is exactly the way it was. He should get Horner and work him in that way.

K: And he could still give that answer this afternoon if he doesn't want to do that.

P: Yes, but he's got to learn how to play our friends. Screw the Post; give it to the Star. And tell Laird to quit emoting. This is not 15 new ones--it's the same ones.

K: This is the easiest problem we've got.

P: We've already told it. Incidentally, you are working on that Houst Resolution? You're going to give it to Harlow?

K: Yes.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
2:30 pm 3/13/70

R: Do you have a minute?

K: I have the Review Group waiting. I have two minutes.

R: One thing I had meant to take up and had better do now is on seabeds. I sent over yesterday

K: I have it in front of me.

RS: There's a hell of a lot of lobbying going on.

K: You would like the President to act?

RS: The sooner he can the sonner they can be stopped. When I said yesterday when you had Stans and Johnson it would be good to get a decision because the committee is in session now. Chris Philips thinks it would be desireable by the last week in March. It might not be possible to do it before that. Therefore, it might be helpful to have a WH memo for considering ______ but to cool it in the meantime.

K: I will get that out this afternoon.

RS: Do you have any feeling to see if it goes to the NSC for discussion?

K: Can I give you my view on Monday?

R: I have written a memo of my own recommendation which you have but it's meant to be fairly self-sufficient.

K: I will work it over tonight.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Richardson
2:30 p.m., 3-13-70

K: I just don't know what to say. I was on my way out and a public relations problem broke out. He knew you were here but he would not let me go. I think in the future we should meet over there.

R: That would be good I think. I think it has (our meetings) kept this thing going. And I don't know what we would do about it without them (the meetings).

K: Once I am called, it is out of my hands. I can't walk out on the President. I can tell him you are waiting but he says one more minute. You have a senior position. You should not have to wait. Let's do it in your office from now on.

R: This is the third week in a row we have missed. If we go over until next Thursday, we would have missed a lot.

K: I was going to New York today but I could come by at 3:45 pm.

R: I have appointments on the Hill today starting at 3:00 pm and will not be available until 5:30.

K: I can't do it then.

R: How about Monday?

K: I may have to go to New York to see my father who is not well.

R: I am testifying on Monday on the Mathias Resolution.

K: The President wants to take a harder line on that. We should use the greatest restraint and not get into substance. Not with regard to you particularly but with reference to the transcript.

R: It would be impossible to avoid substantive answers. What I am doing is getting Presidential and all other official statements together so that I can quote them if necessary. I am simply going to take the position -- I will undoubtedly questioned by what authority we are engaged in bombing in Laos. I am generally going to take the line that authority that has been invoked is academic. It is what previous Administrations have been doing with full acquiescence of the Congress. In so far as Quemoy and Matsu, basically it

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

would be along the lines of the question of whether or not we would be involved in Quemoy and Matsu even since our ratification of our treaty with the Republic of China. The question of whether this would be necessary missions in fulfillment of our treaty obligations. That kind of thing certainly will come up. The hearing is to take place only in the morning. I think I can handle it as well as anyone.

K: You can handle it better than anyone.

R: Well, if Monday is out and I am going to have lunch with Dobrynin on Tuesday.

K: How about breakfast on Wednesday?

R: By that time we might as well wait until Thursday.

K: I will come over there.

R: Rather than try to do it now, I will go over my notes and see what might need action or response before then and I will talk on the phone with you or we can get together briefly.

Note: Secretary Richardson later called General Haig and gave him a list of about 4 or 5 items that he felt needed attention

mlh

By: KML NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger
The President
3:00 p.m., 3-13-70

P: I was thinking about the Chinese thing. Did they offer to conduct talks in Warsaw? I want talks in Peking. I do not agree with idea that it is just a question of timing. I suggest they tell them in essence we agree. Who is in charge of that? Tell them that the President has decided that and that we do it. I want to be sure they don't XW screw it up.

K: We have to clear every speech they make.

P: We are going to have the talks and we will work it out. Second, what have you decided on that other thing?

K: Ron is going to toss it off at 4:00 as you suggested. He will get the question planted, he will answer it and give that answer. He will say there was a radar station and it was said it was manned with civilians.

P: The reason XHMX that we are imprecise is that the records for the previous administrations were imprecise. Sometimes they were carried as military -- for example, there was a radar station run by Lockheed but they were military but they were not support ground combat. He is not to get into the fact that there was anything new or an oversight. You don't do that in this business and he doesn't understand.

K: Right. I agree that it should not be

P: apologetic or defensive.

as

K: And if you said, even the wildest dove wouldn't think we would run this thing from a radar station.

P: This was a radar station run by Lockheed. What could be further from ground combat? And everyone knows we have air operations over Laos. And you tell Laird he's not to say anything else.

K: I can't reach him for half an hour but I have his PR man here.

P: There were Russinas in Egypt killed last week in a radar station. And you know there are no ground combat troops there. We will handle this with finesse and preempt it. Emphasize that there were less than 50 total.

K: Right.

P: On military -- I don't want Marshall Green to turn this down. We will delay the XH time and you tell the Dutchman that we will agree in principle. When do we want to go? at the emissary level. I will not have some half-assessed ambassador go to Peking.

K:: Somebody you can trust. P: That would drive the Russians up the wall.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Marvin Kalb/Kissinger
3:50 pm 3/13/70

MK: I wanted to check with you on some bits and pieces of information on the Israeli plane deal which conflict decidedly with what these people were saying a month ago. A month ago it was very much on the positive side and now its one the negative side. Can you steer me? You don't have to.

K: I cannot go into the decision. I have to be the one guy who doesn't talk.

MK: It's an awkward position when people I respect don't wish to talk and then eat around the edges of the problem.

K: MY biggest help to you is to explain decisions that have happened and not speculate on what might happen.

MK: Will there be a statement soon?

K: I don't want to get into this. ? ? ? ? ? Thank you for your letter.

MK: I was surprised that they got into Laos for 98% of the time. I thought it would be France, Pompidou and like that.

K: That's what I thought too.

By: KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

TELCOM
Gov. Dewey/Kissinger
4:07 pm 3/13/70

D: I am coming to Washington tomorrow morning. I will do some more of my homework.

K: I will get some documents together.

D: Haig will be there won't he?

K: Yes, he will but I will be in NY.

E: I will simply rely on him.

K: When are you arriving? I will have a car meet you.

D: At 10:37 on American Airlines.

K: On how the Metropolitan Opera. The President will not be able to to this.

D: The VP is coming. I don't know what happened. I just assume the fellow you turned it over to would let me know. Tucker told me Agnew is coming and I didn't give it to him. It's conceivable it came through two channels.

K: It must have because the President didn't do it. One other thing. The President wanted at some point to send someone around to various capitols to focus interest on POW's. He wondered if you would be interested.

D: When would it be? (In essence) it's a PR thing.

K: Yes, but also you would be in VN things.

D: I guess I won't see you tomorrow.

K: Maybe at dinner but it's a mob.

D: I can think this over and talk to you. How long a jaunt would it be?

K: A few weeks.

D: Asia as well as Europe?

K: We could extend it and keep you on that problem in some way.

D: I'm not asking in any way.

K: That's what makes you so attractive.

D: I will have to focus on that. I will see you tomorrow night. I will look forward to seeing those documents and I hope the Zerox hasn't taken off the date like with those others. (It's the dardnest thing to try to read documents when you don't know when they were written.)

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
4:15 pm 3/13/70

K: I wanted to inform you of one thing. Lucet was in with one of his messages. from Pompidou. This one was in writing. The bastards have sold 14 light and 14 heavy helicopters to Libya. They are sending instructors and they are doing a study on radar curtain. Mesaid its better we do it then the Russians. I said not if you do worse than them.

R: The timing is so miserable. After the President went out of his way to be so pleasant.

K: There are probably more men than they say.'

R: And probably they will use Wheelus. And they said it would not be there.

K: They don't say where but I don't know where else.

R: No place w else where they can use mirages.

K: I was ice cold and I didn't argue with him. XXXXXXXXXXXX He said this didn't go to any others but I said "come on."

R: Did they say they didn't announce it?

K: I asked and he said he would have to query Paris.

R: The last time they said khny that and then went running.

K: I will send you a copy of the letter. It says nothing of an announcement. The first page and a half is what they are doing and then says it is defensive and they will keep a careful watch over it.

R: You can be sure it's the y beginning of a war (?) of wills.

K: If they are only sending 10 technicians they are sending more. The pretense that this is only for Libya is absurd. They will have an airplane for every 10 people there soon.

R: And an airplane for every 4 pilots. Thank you for calling.

By: KML NARA, Dato

TELCONE
Dr. Weisner/Kissinger
3/13/70

W: Your predecessors allowed Greece to be taken over. There's been a professor here by the name of Μιλισσοff (?). He wants to see you and I said I would call you. I told him you are very busy. He will be in Washington March 25 and April 1.

K: It would be best if he called my office.

W: It would be good to hear his point of view. Your phone probably already hear a lot.

K: It's hard to know what's ?? ??? ?? so many people. I'm sorry I missed you when you were in town. Call me and let me know whenever you are.

W: I will and I will tell you. Try to see him.

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
3/16/70 9:50 a.m.

By KML NARA, Dalo.

5/12/04

K: Two things: On this Spanish business, I can't get to the President before 11:00. But I think I know his views well enough to tell you to go ahead. I'll take the responsibility.

J: Thanks very much; that's very helpful.

K: I'm certain that he will want to do what is necessary. I'll take the responsibility for it, I just want to know ... it makes a difference whether I'm overruling you or supporting you. Secondly, Shimoda wants to see me urgently this morning.

J: I've just gotten a telegram from Armin this morning. It seems that what Yoshino gave Trezise yesterday is their last position.

K: What do I tell Shimoda? Can you send me some talking points?

S: Trezise gave me what Yoshino gave him, and his comments.

K: Why don't you just send that over?

J: Okay.

K: I'll move the appointment with Shimoda to a little later so I have time to read it.

J: I'll send Armin's telegram and Trezise' comments.

K: You consider that unsatisfactory?

J: Yes, they don't want to change on those 8 categories.

K: They're really playing a rough game. They said can you be selective. I said what about the list of 10 or 12. They said ask for 18. But I never said I would do it.

J: And then Miazawa alledged that I made a proposal, which I didn't at all. You can't do business this way. I'll send this over to you right away.

K: That's what I'll tell him. I appreciate it, and I'll keep you informed.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Yoshida
3/16/70; 9:40 p.m.

(I didn't hear the first few words)

Y: ... worked overnight and have just produced a new proposal which contains specific items. The cable is now being sent to Ambassador Shimoda. In addition to the regular diplomatic channels of negotiation, would you please meet with either Shimoda or Yoshino -- or both if necessary -- and talk with them.

K: Has that proposal already been made?

Y: No. The cable is being sent to Shimoda -- about three hours ago. My friend has personal confidence in you and greatly appreciates what you are doing.

K: Let me tell you, if he gives me an opportunity to be constructive I would do my best to exercise it.

Y: Yes, I know and my friend knows. Could you make arrangements to meet with Shimoda or Yoshino?

K: Before they present it?

Y: Probably. I do not know what instructions are being given to Shimoda and my friend would like you to meet him beforehand. I do not know exactly what the proposal is -- but my friend plans to continue negotiations and we must avoid a breaking of them. It would be disastrous to both of our governments. I beg you to withhold final decision to break off. This proposal has some flexibility. If you or your friend have anything to say, please call me at any time. I am ready to talk to my friend and will do my very best -- whatever I possibly can.

K: I appreciate that and you can be sure we will approach it in a positive attitude. We have no interest in having a confrontation with you. We have every interest for the greatest partnership between the US and Japan. Let me look at your proposal and if I can discover anything positive in it I will do my very best.

Y: In order to avoid any misunderstanding, my friend did not say anything on specific grounds of the new proposal and by now Shimoda has it.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Yoshida/Kissinger

3/16/70; 9:40 p.m.

-2-

K: You don't know whether or not he has already presented it?

Y: Made the proposal to your negotiating people? I don't know -- I doubt it. Do you have a channel to get in touch with Yoshino or Shimoda tonight?

K: I will call them. I don't tell them that you and I have already discussed it, do I?

Y: That's right -- without mentioning this channel could you ask Shimoda to come in -- I am sure he is ready. If there is anything my friend can do, please call me and I will ask my friend to intervene immediately.

K: I will call you tomorrow if I have anything to say.

Y: Then I will talk to my friend. If you think of anything that would be helpful, please call me.

K: Let me study it.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
3/16/70; 9:50 p.m.

K: I just got a message from my contact in Japan. He claims they are working on a new proposal -- what he does not know exactly. He also said that there is a lot of flexibility. He said that I should just tell him what we need and his boss would try to get it. (Laughter)

J: He did not know whether anything else was coming?

K: He told me to call Shimoda.

J: Shimoda does not know any more -- I am sure he gave me all.

K: He told me Shimoda should talk to me and get my intervention.

J: What does he mean -- intervention?

K: Why don't I get Shimoda in and ask him if there is anything more than meets the eye?

J: I think Yoshino gave Phil (Trezise) all that he knows. If there is anything more coming, I doubt if Yoshino knows any more about it.

K: Shimoda?

J: No.

K: Should I stay out of it? Yoshida said it was still being worked on about three hours ago. How can I call the Japs and ask if they have another proposal?

J: Let me suggest this -- we will wait through the night. If we don't hear anything during the course of tomorrow morning I will ask whether he expects anything further, or you can do so.

K: Are we going to break them?

J: We have two versions -- Kendall's version which had more substance and Yoshino's version. No, I don't think we break -- I think we should keep this going.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

U. Alexis Johnson/Kissinger
3/16/70; 9:50 p.m.

-2-

K: Wait, I told them we would break.

J: I agree on that. The trouble is that we have two versions and both of them are pretty thin. Considering the decision we took the other day and what you told them and what I discussed with Shimoda, yes, I would be inclined to use the word break. This is just not enough to deal with.

K: Okay, I will sit tight and I will let them get in touch with me.

J: If we don't hear from them by tomorrow morning, I will call them. I will use the word break and they will have to make their own decision as to how they are to proceed.

K: I will stay out of this until someone gets in touch with me. I should not elicit this. If they have instructions to produce it, they surely will. If Trezise could send me a one or two page summary of what's wrong with their proposal, it would be helpful -- if he calls, I can tell him what we are objecting to.

J: Okay. Trezise says the textile people think we are crazy if we give in(?)

J: Now that I have you, you know my major interest is Canada. You got our memo -- the phone call hasn't been placed yet?

K: It has not been.

J: The Secretary spoke to him this morning before he had all the details.

K: I was in New York all day, but I can tell you it is not a high priority item with him.

J: No urgency, but I want him to do it.

J: Re Spanish EEC negotiations -- my word from Bergsten, indirectly, is that you thought it should be put back up to the President.

K: Will it help you in your talk with Bravo?

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

U, Alexis Johnson/Kissinger

3/16/70; 9:50 p.m.

-3-

J: Without it, we won't have much to say to him.

K: I will get it done. I will get it approved before 11:00 a.m.

TELECON
Kissinger/Rostow

10:10 p. m.

3-16-70

K: Did he have a heart attack?

R: Heart pains . . . and a hardening of the arteries. They kept him in the hospital and the blood flow opened up. The doctors want him to keep his weight down and not be self-indulgent. He should have another 15 years. He has been eating and enjoying himself. He has been working very hard and his blood ______. He *did not* have a heart attack.

President Johnson gave orders to all cabinet officers to mimeograph the papers. Dean Rusk gave orders. We found the way it was executed at the State Department was to put it on microfilm. It might have been a sabotage by the bureaucracy. What we would like to have is the file of the Office of the Secretary of State under President Johnson. We have all the other cabinet members' files. Dean Rusk was very distressed.

K: You know my problems with State but I will do my best. They should obey instructions. If I find the answer I will let you know.

R: There are two other questions. Al Haig said President Nixon was troubled by some democrats - 4 doves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Take what I tell you as my own report on a mood. What he (President Johnson) said was my heart goes out to him. I used to have 26 doves. You can never appease them. If you throw them a piece of meat, they will ask for more.

K: Absolutely.

R: In conclusion, the only lesson I can draw from this situation is "do the right thing." There is no comfort in trying to appease them. Don't think I don't know the cost of doing the right thing.

K: I shall report it first thing to the President.

R: He (President Johnson) also reacted with great compassion. There is a third thing. It is a small thing. It will help the country, the President. I have followed the land reform through the Senate into lower house. Good land reform ought to be done by autocrat.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

Kissinger/Rostow
10:10 p.m. 3-16-70

- 2 -

R: In the next month you will get a land reform bill out of Saigon. My advice is to get Ellsworth Bunker to focus with the South Vietnamese on how to dramatize that bill. History of the bill, titles, ... we particularly need something favorable out of Saigon politically.

K: You are right and I think it is very good advice.

R: Pass it along. . . . raise this at the right moment. Could get a lot of votes if it were done well. This is the kind of thing that is sluffed off.

K: I agree with you. Everyday I am here I appreciate your dignity and your reason even more.

R: I appreciate what you are doing.

K: ______ It is a vicious bunch.

R: The position and democracy of the press is like Indians on horseback circling ______. But it's the best system devised.

K: The press doesn't bother me. It's the bloody liberal Senators.

R: Don't worry. That's not where the strength of the country is.

K: Good night.

*

By: KLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telcon

U/Sec Richardson (returning HAK's call)

3/17/70; 9:00 a.m.

K: I was out of town yesterday when the President called you. I just want you to know.

R: He probably would have gotten you to call if you had been there.

K: I had to go to New York to see my father who is 83 and had a blood infection. I just wanted you to know that if I had been there it probably could have been avoided. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

R: Well, I hope it came out all right.

K: Everyone here is happy how it came out. The President last night said he felt a little badly to have put it to you so bluntly. He thinks he hung up just after he made his views clear. I just want you to know he didn't ask me to tell you this. He did not feel you had done anything wrong, he just wanted to make sure his view was getting through.

R: He did that all right. I tried to get across our concern about any misinterpretation attached to that report; these resolutions without any report we had already sent up. I think the ball came out OK. The game there was also on Constitutional power.

I find a conflict which I should bring to your attention, because of White House interest in the matter. The Verification Panel has been moved until 10:00 tomorrow and that happens to be the time I had expected to testify before the Church subcommittee on the President's recommendation for the creation of the Under Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

K: You have got to be there. We were going to do it in the afternoon.

R: It was originally scheduled for this afternoon.

K: Well let me see whether we can move it until tomorrow afternoon.

R: That would be very helpful if you could because of the interest the President has taken in this since it is his proposal.

K: I will move it if it is at all possible. I will just make it possible.

R: That will be fine. Let me know if for some reason it is impossible. I do want to be there. If you can't I will call Church and see if he can move that.

K: OK.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Joe Sisco
3/17/70 9:00 a.m.

K: I wanted to check the schedule.

S: The Secretary hasn't finally decided yet. Every hour that goes by assures that it can't be before Wednesday.

K: Wednesday was out of the question anyway.

S: I think he wants to announce it Thursday afternoon.

K: Right.

S: As soon as I get definite word I will call you or leave word with your secretary. You have got a part in the scenario, you know.

K: I know, with the Jewish leaders.

S: With Garment and Fisher.

K: We've got that cranked up, but I don't want to do it before the announcement by too much.

S: No, the closer you do it to the announcement, the better.

*

TELCON
Mosbacher/Kissinger

9:15 am

3/17/70

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

M: I am calling in regard to the wire from Kenneth Rush and Willy Brandt having a week at Camp David.

K: I thought that was off.

M: The Secy. said he hoped it was. It's fine with us if it is.

K: When did the cable come?

M: Yesterday afternoon.

K: That pain of an ambassador said he didn't want it anymore. I was told that Saturday.

M: This has been on and off. If our ambassadors would stay out of it and leave these arrangements to the foreign ambassadors and us, we could do something.

K: I think it's a bad idea. If we use it for a vacation retreat we will have trouble saying no at another time.

M: I have instructions to use it for using it overnight if they want it.

K: That's not good either but OK.

M: I called and asked Annenberg about using the plane for the little people. We don't do that.

K: What people?

M: Prince Charles and Prinness Anne this summer. He says the President had OK'd it and he went to the Palace and offered it.

K: The President keeps offering these things. Let's see if we can avoid it.

M: Maybe we can offer another plane. If you see my friend Miss Ryan over there with the Irish Ambassador when he presents his credentials, say "hello".

K: I will.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Stans/Kissinger

9:30 am

3/17/70

K: I got a call last night from the Japanese contact saying they have another offer. That ploy worked beautifully. Haig told you about what happened this weekend? I ran into Alex Johnson at the Gridiron dinner after he'd had a few and he said I really laid it to Shimoda and he said Yoshino had gone to see Trezise and Trezise said exactly what he shouldn't have. On Sat. night I heard from my Japanese contact and laid into him. I told him that I was tired of ?? ( and said that what I said goes and to listen to me.)

S. Sato in Japan said that this had to be resolved.

K: You'll have to be an SOB with State. Don't make me the only one.

S: ?? he was not talking along the lines we were talking but along different plan and it got into the newspapers.

K: They are unbelievable.

S: I would like to work closely with you.

K: Have you talked to Alex Johnson about this?

S: I have a call into him now.

K: Yell at him so I'm not the only villain in town. These bastards made a commitment and we delivered something difficult for us and they can do the same.

S: We are backing up a Presidential decision so it's more than that.

K: I will keep you informed.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCONE

Sisco/Kissinger

12:45 pm

3/17/70

S: Do you have this document in front of you? Both the memo to us and the public announcement.

K: I have it.

S: On the first page of the memo to us -- put your secretary on the phone and I will dictate this:

"We will review with Israel at a man early date the attrition problem with a view to amending present contracts to provide add-on deliveries to replace losses. The add-on arrangements agreed to would need to be kept secret as in the case of the earlier amendment of the A-4 contract."

K: In other words, it's open handed.

S: Now, the public announcement -- in the second paragraph strike the first sentence. Alter the next sentence -- "consequently the President has decided to hold it in abeyance now" -- strike the next and add 24 Phantoms and 100 skyhawks. Strike the next sentence and add -- "in doing so he has instructed that a close watch be kept on the balance and that the U. S. limit itself for now to replacing losses while remaining in a position to provide additional aircraft promptly if the situation requires it." See what we have done?

K: Yes.

S: The next sentence is OK and in the last sentence on that page strike the word "meanwhile." On the next page -- at the top of the page. Rather than "this step" say "this decision is taken in the strong conviction that the ultimate security ? ? ? ? ? ? ? peace is restraint and we believe our restraint will contribute to this end.

K: I will check this with him.

S: I haven't checked this with anybody here and maybe the Secretary of State will object. This in my judgment will be received by the Israelis as not too bad. They will not cause a major donkey brook. There will be disappointment but they will come in and work it out. As for the Arab world, it will be less desirable but my judgment is that it's not the kind of decision that will get attacks on our interests.

K: Nothing positive?

S: No.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Sisco/Kissinger

12:45 pm 3/17/70

-2-

K: What do you recommend?

S: In my judgment it's better to let it stand as it was. It has no real practical difference. We were going to do precisely ______ under the old formulation. You will have a slightly less adverse domestic ______. It's a question of what the President feels on the domestic flack against what happens overseas.

K: Right.

S: I haven't

K: Let me go to the President. There's nothing in between what you have and what you gave me.

S: Not that I could think of.

K: Let me call you back before 2:30.

S: I have a luncheon with the Germans but you can interrupt me.