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SUBPANEL I - U.S. INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

The definition of a national purpose and a set of operating concepts is a particular problem in the international field. For example, a nation's actions are limited only by technical feasibility and by what is considered just by most citizens, but internationally it is affected also by the will and therefore the purpose of other sovereign states. And because sovereignty implies an independent will, another state will always have somewhat the character of a force to be balanced and international relations are inseparable from the problem of security. Could a nation achieve all its wishes, it would aim for absolute security, a world free from foreign danger and where all problems have the manageability of its moral side of its national life, which is also necessary for the security of other states. But since absolute security for one power means absolute insecurity for all others, it is never obtainable as part of a voluntarily accepted settlement.

An international order which is accepted and not imposed will therefore always appear *somewhat* insecure to any one of its components in the sense that it does not satisfy all its aspirations. Paradoxically, the generality of this dissatisfaction is a condition of stability because were any one power *totally* secure, all others would

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have to be **totally** insecure and a revolutionary situation would ensue.
The foundation of a stable order is the **relative security** -- and therefore
the **relative insecurity** -- of its members. Its stability reflects not
the absence of unsatisfied claims but the absence of a grievance of
such magnitude that redress will be sought in overturning the settlement
rather than through an adjustment within its framework.

But if an international order expresses the need for security
and an equilibrium, it is constructed in the name of a legitimizing
principle which reflects an aspiration of justice. Because a settlement
to be durable has to be accepted by most states comprising the
international order, it must attempt to translate national purposes
into general advantage. To be sure no major power will give up its
minimum claim to security merely for the sake of legitimacy. But
although there never arises an exact correspondence between the
maxims of what is considered just and the conditions of the settlement,
stability depends on a certain commensurability. If there exists a
substantial discrepancy and a major power which feels disadvantaged,
the international order will be volatile. It will be equally unstable if
there exists a major power which does not accept the legitimizing
principle of the settlement. For the relations between the powers or
groups of powers which accept the legitimacy of international
arrangements and those which do not cannot be based on a shared

DRAFT/9

aspiration of justice or purpose but only on force or the threat of
force.

The major problem of an international order then is so to relate
the aspirations of legitimacy to the requirements of security that no
power will express a dissatisfaction in a revolutionary policy and so
to arrange the balance of forces as to deter aggression produced by
causes other than the conditions of the settlement. It is therefore
the task of statesmanship to create the widest possible international
consensus, for the greater the shared aspirations the wider the basis
of legitimacy, the more international growth will take place
spontaneously, cooperatively and without the threat of force.

Two conclusions follow: the first having to do with the nature
of policy, the second flowing from the nature of the current
international situation. The connection between security and justice
and of justice to the domestic structures of various states demonstrates
that it is no more possible to speak of "purely" military than of "purely"
political considerations. For policy is defined in the area where these
two meet: justice without security will be futile, but security without
justice will be sterile. What is considered just will depend in part
on how secure states feel and what is considered secure depends in
part on how compatible states consider their aspirations. Nor is it
possible to "sell" a policy by words alone; psychological strategy in

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these terms is not a task of relating words to common aspirations but
one of identifying actions with the hopes of humanity. For this reason
policy will be considered here as indivisible, including psychological
strategy, security, and economic measures in addition to what is
commonly considered "political". The objectives defined by the
subpanel to be valid should therefore hold equally for the subpanels
on Security and Economic Policy, and for all aspects of
the domestic life.

The definition of objectives in a revolutionary period presents
particular problems. For the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary
power like the U.S.S.R. is not that it feels threatened -- a measure
of threat is inherent in an international order based on sovereign
states -- but that nothing can reassure it. Thus relations between
it and the rest of the international order tend to be based on force or
the threat of force, as supported by political and psychological maneuvering, and supplemented by the support of peoples outside the orbit of the U.S.S.R.

One of the crucial problems of this period therefore becomes:

which of the contenders can identify itself with the aspirations of
humanity? Which can create the widest basis of legitimacy? There
is no reason why we should be afraid of a revolutionary struggle.

America was a vision before it was a great power and we can remain
great only if we retain the genius by which we grew. Nothing is more
important therefore than to recapture abroad the spiritual elan which

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has made this country the hope of the world throughout our history.

If we become too concerned with preserving what we have rather
than helping humanity fulfill its hopes, the image of us by the rest
of the world will become that of an opulent outsider incapable of

compassion and undeserving of sympathy.

Nor is this a task set to us merely by the existence of the
U.S.S.R. The new-found aspirations of humanity would exist even if

They have been primarily awoken by our own Communism had never been heard of. If we fail to identify ourselves with them, we will be isolated not only physically but also spiritually and not by Communism but by the loss of our own dynamics. The spontaneity of our institutions and our well-being should therefore inspire us and source of strength become an example to the world rather than an object of envy. The American experience in these terms would not be the happy accident of a fortunate people but the example of what freedom can achieve through social cooperation and a sense of purpose.

It is against this background that the subpanel might address
itself to some of the following problems.

Nowhere is this more difficult than in the field of national policy. For
the raw material of concepts here are not physical entities but
abstractions: the relations of individuals which make up a society and
those between states which constitute the international order. And yet
nowhere is it more crucial. For in the confusion of day-to-day events,
a pattern of consistent action can emerge only through concepts which
enable us to understand phenomena which although basically similar
may appear in various guises. Without a concept of the nature of
colonialism and of our interest in relation to it, we will spend more
time trying to understand individual events than mastering them. Had
Newton examined each apple as it fell from the tree there would never
have been a modern physics. The concepts must be specific enough to
enable us to classify the truly significant features, but not so specific
that every case will seem different from every other; they must be
general enough to enable us to relate various problems and opportunities
to each other, yet not so general as to be truistic and to fit no
experience because they fit every experience. To return to colonialism:
A concept to deal with it would have to ask itself whether _all_ countries
subject to foreign rule represent the same phenomenon or whether the
more useful distinctions are not drawn more narrowly: for example
between colonial peoples and as India under British rule where the
boundaries were drawn to create a viable administrative unit and those,
such as the Arab states, where the boundaries were drawn precisely

because they were not viable and thus dependent on foreign help or
subject to foreign manipulation.

writings

A study of Soviet or Chinese Communist meetings demonstrates the importance they attach to conceptualization. All the speeches of Lenin or Stalin amount to an exhortation to dominate a situation by inflexible purpose and flexible tactics. "Know your enemy and yourself and you can fight a thousand battles without danger," said Mao.

There is no inherent reason, however, why we should shrink
from this contest. Any reading of the writings of the Founding Fathers,
say in the Federalist papers, demonstrates that our Constitution is not
a happy accident. On the contrary, it was made possible by an ability
to translate a strong purpose into effective concepts. The justification
for the Constitution advanced in the Federalist papers by the Founding
Fathers was not based on problems of day-to-day administration but on
concepts of checks and balances, governmental stability and the nature
of democracy. And in our day, the superiority of American management
methods over those of other countries resides precisely in a superior
concept of organization and control. To be sure, concepts by themselves
will not lead to action; they must still be translated into policy. An
individual may know that he does not wish to be burned (a purpose) and
that a hot stove burns (a concept); but this knowledge will prove useless
if he cannot recognize a hot stove. A nation may be aware of the

implications of a revolutionary situation; yet this concept will prove
empty if it cannot _recognize_ a revolutionary situation. Thus the Special
Studies will operate on these interrelated levels: that of national purpose,
that of operating concept and that of policy to the extent that the latter
illustrates the relationships. And just as none of these three levels
in
can be considered an abstraction, so none of the six following areas
of problems and opportunities can be isolated. For it is the ability to
relate these areas and the sense of proportion it reveals that defines
the dynamism of American society.

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10/24/56

# MAJOR ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PANEL

## THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL PURPOSE:

**Introduction:** There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period. On the physical plane, the power of modern weapons is out of balance with the objectives for which they might be employed; as a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find THAT SOME OF THE INHIBITIONS TO THE USE OF OUR STRENGTH ARE PRODUCING OURSELVES-INHIBITED by the implications of our own weapons technology.

On the political plane, many of the newly independent powers continue to inject into their international policies the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence. On the ideological plane, the contemporary ferment is fed by the newly awakened hopes and expectations of hitherto inarticulate peoples end by the rapidity with which ideas can be communicated. And these factors, of themselves serious enough, are aggravated by the policies of the Soviet Bloc, which, to exploit all doubts and dissatisfactions for its own ends,

Although the problems and opportunities of the next ten to fifteen years will present themselves as a series of individual cases, they cannot be solved in those terms. For the world situation is revolutionary, precisely because concepts held for a long time no longer seem to fit new conditions and because millions are groping for a new definition of themselves and of society. A revolutionary period is distinguished by its dissatisfactions which join in protests against the existing order.

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10/22/56

but can propose no clear substitute. As long as these sentiments are unchannelled revolutionary ferment will continue, for a revolution cannot be mastered by understanding along. A revolution can be constructive only to the extent that its hopes and resentments are given a sense of direction.

A revolutionary period for this reason, brings into sharp focus, this emphasis one of the basic problems of international relations: How to relate a nation's vision of itself to the vision of its purpose, as seen by others. To itself a nation is an expression of justice because people will accept laws voluntarily only if they believe them to be in the general interest. (Totalitarian states find themselves obliged to erect elaborate propaganda machines to achieve this agreement.) But the international experience of a people may be a challenge to the universality of its notion of justice because the international order depends on the reconciliation of different national purposes. # Insurgency

If the objectives and the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order are sufficiently similar, this may not become apparent. When the national purpose is well understood and uncontested, foreign policy resolves into a series of technical problems. In a revolutionary situation, however, national purposes of different nations will clash and their conflict will underlie all relationships. In such a case, technical problems are insoluble unless we relate them to our image of ourselves and unless this image can be given a more general

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STC have to be totally insecure and a revolutionary situation would ensue.

The foundation of a stable order is the relative security — and therefore —

and the convention that all states will seek redress for their injuries by adjustment
ought to be made by the settlement itself and not by adjusting it.

The relative insecurity — of its members. Its stability reflects not
the absence of unsatisfied claims but the absence of a grievance of
such magnitude that redress will be sought in overturning the settlement
rather than through an adjustment within its framework.

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11/2/56

# STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND NATIONAL POLICY

A commitment to a national purpose or the understanding of it does not of itself supply an answer to the problem of a nation's role in the world, however, for ultimately a nation is judged, by itself as much as by others, not merely by what it believes, nor yet by what it says, but by how it acts. The connecting link between its purpose and its policy is formed by its concepts which furnish the tools and the mechanism for action.

Concepts are not abstract, theoretical or impractical. Actually, they are applied consciously and unconsciously in every day of our lives. The necessity of concepts arises from the fact that the range of experience in any field is too varied or too complicated to be understood as a series of individual cases. Thus individuals who run large organizations or discover great opportunities do so because in the mass of generally available data, they are able to discover a certain regularity or a significant pattern and to act on it. An individual too much concerned with detail will become a prisoner of events; a person too concerned with theory runs the risk of being dogmatic and inflexible.

A concept functions as the bridge between our purpose and the world of day to day concerns. It furnishes criteria which permit a distinction between the factors essential to the solution of a problem (what is significant) and what is beside the point. This can perhaps be illustrated by the following colloquial example: A man seeing an

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11/2/56

elephant for the first time would not know what he was seeing; he would possess no standard with which to compare it. When he saw a second elephant, he might be able to name it by abstracting from its individual appearance. He would be able to form a concept of "elephant" not because all elephants are identical but because they are sufficiently similar for purposes of classification.

Every word of the language is a concept which classifies a range of experience and the choice between them is not a question of fact but of purpose. The Eskimos have different words for the various kinds of snow. This is because of the role snow plays in the life of Eskimos and the importance of understanding it properly. They therefore classify snow more precisely, i.e., they establish narrower criteria of significance than we, whose primary purpose is to distinguish snow from rain. Similarly, Newton whose purpose was to formulate general laws saw in an apple a falling body. This definition would hardly satisfy an apple grower whose primary purpose would be a concept to enable him to classify the variety of apples and who would therefore insist on a more precise definition.

Conversely, if Newton had confined himself to what is considered significant by an apple grower, the expert or specialist in this illustration, Newton's law, would never have been "discovered". Had Newton examined each apple as it fell from the tree there would never have been a modern physics.

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11/2/56

Whether a concept proves useful reveals whether the features of
experience it defines as significant are really those which contribute
to the understanding or the solution of a problem or to the ability to grasp
an opportunity. Nowhere is this more difficult than in the field of
national policy. For the raw material of concepts here are not physical
entities but abstractions: the relations of individuals which make up a
society and those between states which constitute the international
order. And yet, nowhere is it more crucial. The prerequisite of effective
policy is precisely the ability to discern a pattern in the confusion of
day to day events. Thus, without a concept of the nature of colonialism
and of our interest in relation to it, we will spend more time trying to
understand individual events than mastering them. A concept of
colonialism, to be useful however, should not be so vague as to be
truistic; it would have to ask itself whether all countries subject to
foreign rule represent the same phenomenon or whether the more useful
distinctions are not drawn more narrowly; for example, between colonial
peoples such as India, under British rule, where the boundaries were
drawn to create a viable administrative unit, and those, such as the Arab
states, where the boundaries were drawn precisely because they were
not viable and thus dependent on foreign help or subject to foreign
manipulation. In short, concepts must be specific enough to enable us
to classify the truly significant features but not so specific that every
case will seem different from every other; they must be general enough

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11/2/56

Despite our national suspicion of a conceptual approach, there is a great deal in our national past as well as in our current experience to demonstrate its validity. Any reading of the writings of the Founding Fathers, say in the Federalist papers, demonstrates that our Constitution is not a happy accident. On the contrary, it was made possible by an ability to translate a strong purpose into effective concepts. The justification for the Constitution advanced in the Federalist papers by the Founding Fathers was based less on problems of day-to-day administration than on concepts of checks and balances, governmental stability and the nature of democracy. And, in our day, the superiority of American management methods over those of other countries resides precisely in a superior concept of organization and control.

To be sure, concepts by themselves will not lead to action; they must still be translated into policy. A nation may be aware of the implications of a revolutionary situation; yet this concept will prove empty if it cannot recognize a revolutionary situation. Thus the Special Studies will operate on these interrelated levels:

(a) that of national purpose

(b) that of operating concept, and

(c) that of policy to the extent that the latter illustrates the relationships.

DRAFT/2

11/2/36

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And just as none of these three levels can be considered in abstraction,
so none of the six following areas of problems and opportunities can be
isolated. For it is the ability to relate these areas and the sense of
proportion it reveals that defines the dynamism of American society.

October 29, 1956

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT OF THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund is:

1. To seek to define the problems and opportunities that the United States may face over the next ten to fifteen years.

2. To review our national purposes and objectives in terms of these problems and opportunities.

3. To develop a framework of concepts and considerations on which policies and decisions to implement our purpose might be based.

PROCEDURE

The Special Studies Project proposes to proceed in four stages:

1. The commissioning of experts to do papers outlining the trends in their special fields of competence and the alternative measures for dealing with them. These papers are conceived as analyses which can form the nucleus of subsequent discussion.

2. The formation of a panel of outstanding Americans who will seek to develop an integrated approach to the challenges of the next decade. In view of the scope of the study, it is proposed that at its initial meeting the overall panel form a number of sub-panels.

3. The presentation of the papers to these subpanels, which are to be composed of members of the overall panel, authors and specialists. It is proposed that each subpanel, in the light of the discussion of the basic papers and of related topics, submit a report covering its field.

4. The preparation and publication of a report based on the deliberations of both the subpanels and the Overall Panel.

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# ORGANIZATION OF STUDIES

## The Overall Panel

The Overall Panel will be composed of leaders experienced in education, business, labor, law, science, publishing and government. The aims of the panel would include:

1. Outlining the nature of the problems and opportunities which, in its judgment, will confront the American people over the next decade.

2. Analyzing American purposes and objectives in relation to these problems and opportunities.

3. Developing the considerations on which policies and decisions designed to secure these values and to attain these objectives might be based.

The panel would undertake this by guiding the work of the subpanels and by considering a report designed to integrate the deliberations of the subpanels into an overall conceptual framework.

Because our sense of national purpose is inseparable from our attitude toward the moral and philosophical challenge of our time, the Special Studies Project has established a close relationship with an interdenominational group of theologians and philosophers whose members last year included Louis Finkelstein, F. E. Johnson, John La Farge, I. I. Rabi, Lyman Bryson, Robert M. MacIver, Ernest Nagel and Dorothy Lee. During the coming months it is hoped that this group will consider the topic, "The Problem of the Relation of Moral Insights to the Survival and Growth of Democracy". The group is prepared to meet from time to time with members of the overall panel and to discuss with them its conclusions or its views on problems raised by members of the overall panel.

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## The Subpanels

In order to facilitate discussion of the problems and at the same time to make it possible for the Project to receive the benefit of the thinking of a larger number of persons experienced in the fields being considered, six subpanels will be formed. Each group of approximately fifteen persons will include the following:

a. A Chairman and three or four members drawn from the Overall Panel.

b. Four or five individuals with experience in the field with which the subpanel deals who can bring their background and imagination to bear on the papers prepared by the experts.

c. Three or four of the authors who have prepared papers for the consideration of the subpanel.

d. A Subpanel Secretary who will prepare an analytical report growing out of the discussions of the subpanel.

All papers to be considered by a subpanel at a given meeting as well as synopses of related papers which are being discussed by other subpanels will be circulated beforehand to members. The full text of any paper being prepared for the project will be made available upon request.

## Schedule of Meetings

It is anticipated that the Overall Panel will meet four times between November 20 and April 15.

Each subpanel probably will meet between three and five times during this same period.

## The Papers to be submitted to the Subpanels

The papers are 30 - 50 page analyses outlining the author's assessment of trends over the longer term in his field, the objectives which we might set ourselves, and the alternative ways of thinking about the problems. Where appropriate, they include recommendations concerning the basic concepts that should underlie our policies in the area.

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Coverage

Problems have been grouped into six categories, each covered by a separate subpanel as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I.</td><td>U. S. International Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will attempt to discuss the trends in various areas over a 10 to 15 year period, the long term objectives the U.S. can reasonably hope to achieve, and what instruments are available to achieve them.</td></tr><tr><td>II.</td><td>U. S. International Security Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the implications of modern weapons systems for our strategic planning, our budgetary policy and our diplomacy.</td></tr><tr><td>III.</td><td>U. S. International Economic Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the relationship between economic and political stability and the considerations that might underlie our aid policy, as well as our international trade policy, over the next 10 to 15 years.</td></tr><tr><td>IV.</td><td>U. S. Economic and Social Policy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the relation between domestic and international objectives and policies, with particular reference to governmental responsibility for economic growth and stability and for individual and social welfare. Such topics as taxation policy, farm policy, utilities policy and the problem of natural resources will be covered insofar as they relate to the above.</td></tr><tr><td>V.</td><td>U. S. Utilization of Human Resources</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the problem of our utilization of manpower over the longer term, with particular attention to the determination of critical fields, adequacy of existing incentives for channeling manpower into these fields, and the problem of creating and training the leadership groups required for the various fields.</td></tr><tr><td>VI.</td><td>U. S. Democratic Process-Its Challenge &amp; Opportunity</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider those strength and weaknesses of our democratic system which significantly affect the ability of the U.S. to carry out its role in world affairs. Particular emphasis will be given to the problem of arriving at and implementing long-range policy decisions and to the relationships among the Departments and between the Executive and Congress.</td></tr></tbody></table>

10/31/56

LETTER SENT TO OVERALL PANEL MEMBERS

Dear _________:

Just a note to confirm that the first panel meeting of the
Special Studies Project will be held at the Plaza Hotel in New York
on November 20th and I understand you will be able to attend. The
meeting will start at five in the afternoon and continue until about ten.
You will receive details of the agenda shortly but I wanted to write you
briefly about the organization of the panel and to send you a list of
members.

As you know, we plan to form six subpanels which will meet
four or five times between now and Spring. This is being done to facilitate
discussion of the wide range of problems and at the same time to make it
possible for panel members to receive the benefit of the thinking of a
larger number of persons experienced in the various fields. Enclosed
is a brief description of what each subpanel will consider.

We would like very much to have you participate on the
subpanel which deals with the United States International economic
objectives and strategy. Mr. Milton Katz has agreed to chair this
subpanel. Messrs. Bowles and Cowles, some of the authors and other
individuals with wide experience in this particular field are also being
asked to participate in its deliberations.

I would appreciate it greatly if you would let me know as soon
as convenient if you are willing to join this subpanel or if you would
prefer to sit on one of the others.

With best regards,

September 25, 1956

PURPOSE
---

The purpose of the special studies project of the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund is:

PROCEDURE
---

1. The commissioning of experts to do papers (such as those listed on pages 5 - 11) outlining the trends in their special fields of competence and the alternative measures for dealing with them. These papers, a number of which are already in progress, are conceived as analyses which can form the nucleus of subsequent discussion.

2. The formation of a panel of outstanding Americans who can bring their experience and imagination to bear on the implications of the papers prepared by the experts and who can develop an integrated approach to the challenges of the next decade. In view of the scope of the study it is proposed that at its initial meeting the overall panel form a number of sub-panels.

3. The presentation of the papers to these subpanels, which are to be composed of members of the overall panel, authors and specialists, as described on page 4. It is proposed that each subpanel, in the light of the discussion of the basic papers and of related topics, submit a report covering its field.

4. The preparation and publication of a report based on the deliberations of both the subpanels and the overall panel.

# ORGANIZATION OF STUDIES

## The Overall Panel

The overall panel will be composed of leaders experienced in education, business, labor, law, science, publishing and government. The aims of the panel would include:

Because our sense of national purpose is inseparable from our attitude toward the moral and philosophical challenge of our time, the Special Studies Project has established a close relationship with the Institute of Religious and Social Studies. This is an interdenominational group of theologians and philosophers whose members last year included Louis Finkelstein, F.E. Johnson, John La Farge, I.I. Rabi, Lyman Bryson, Robert M. MacIver, Ernest Nagel and Dorothy Lee. During the coming months it is hoped that this group will consider the topic, "The Problem of the Relation of Moral Insights to the Survival and Growth of Democracy". The group is prepared to meet from time to time with members of the overall panel and to discuss with them its conclusions or its views on problems raised by members of the overall panel.

- 3 -

## The Subpanels

In order to facilitate consideration, problems have been grouped into six categories, each covered by a separate subpanel as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I. International Security Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the implications of modern weapons systems for our strategic planning, our budgetary policy and our diplomacy.</td></tr><tr><td>II. International Political Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will attempt to discuss the trends in various areas over a 10 to 15 year period, the long term objectives the U.S. can reasonably hope to achieve, and what instruments are available to achieve them.</td></tr><tr><td>III. International Economic Objectives and Strategy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the relationship between economic and political stability and the considerations that might underlie our aid policy, as well as our international trade policy, over the next 10 to 15 years.</td></tr><tr><td>IV. U.S. Economic and Social Policy</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the relation between domestic and international objectives and policies, with particular reference to governmental responsibility for economic growth and stability and for individual and social welfare. Such topics as taxation policy, farm policy, utilities policy and the problem of natural resources will be covered insofar as they relate to the above.</td></tr><tr><td>V. U.S. Utilization of Human Resources</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the problem of our utilization of manpower over the longer term, with particular attention to the determination of critical fields, adequacy of existing incentives for channeling manpower into these fields, and the problem of creating and training the leadership groups required for the various fields.</td></tr><tr><td>VI. U.S. Problems of Leadership and Organization</td><td>Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider those strengths and weaknesses of our democratic system which significantly affect the ability of the U.S. to carry out its role in world affairs. Particular emphasis will be given to the problem of arriving at and implementing long-range policy decisions and to the relationships among the Departments and between the Executive and Congress.</td></tr></tbody></table>

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The subpanels will be composed of three categories of participants:

1. Some of the authors who have prepared the papers which will be on the initial agenda of the subpanel.

2. Specialists in the field with which the subpanel deals.

3. Those members of the overall panel who desire to participate in the work of the subpanel. (Members of the overall panel will have the option of joining the subpanel of their choice.)

The Chairman of the subpanel will be in every case a member of the overall panel. A Subpanel Secretary will prepare for the overall panel an analytical report growing out of the discussions of the subpanel.

Summaries of pertinent documents will be made for the convenience of panel participants and the full text will be made available upon request. To keep all members of the overall panel informed of the progress of the various subpanels a monthly status report will be circulated.

## Schedule of Meetings

It is anticipated that the overall panel will meet four times between October 15 and April 15.

Thus, those members of the overall panel who join a subpanel will, on the average, only attend about one meeting a month.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PAPERS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUBPANELS

The papers are 30-50 page analyses outlining the author's assessment of trends over the longer term in his field, the objectives which we might set ourselves, and the alternative ways of thinking about the problems. Where appropriate, they include recommendations concerning the basic concepts that should underlie our policies in the area.

- 5 -

SUBPANEL I - INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Within the framework established by the overall panel this subpanel will consider the implications of modern weapons systems for our strategic planning, our budgetary policy and our diplomacy. Papers commissioned for it include:

<table><thead><tr><td>TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER</td><td>AUTHOR</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Problems of integrated strategic planning (weapons & missions)</td><td>General James McCormack, Assistant to the President Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Impact of technological trends on political requirements</td><td>Ellis A. Johnson Director, Operations Research Office Johns Hopkins University</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of protracted or limited war</td><td>William R. Kintner Operations Research Office Johns Hopkins University</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of guerrilla and civil war</td><td>James Cross Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Budgetary implications of various levels of defense projected over a 10 - 15 year period.</td><td>Roswell Gilpatric Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Former Undersecretary of the Air Force</td></tr><tr><td>Naval strategy</td><td>Willard Bascom National Research Council National Academy of Sciences</td></tr><tr><td>Non-military defense</td><td>N.E. Halaby (Formerly Director, Office of Military Assistance Programs, Department of Defense)</td></tr><tr><td>Theory of Alliances</td><td>Roger Hilsman Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress</td></tr></tbody></table>

7

SUBPANEL II (Continued)

| TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER | AUTHOR |
|---|---|
| **Southeast Asia** | |
| Trends & US policy toward Southeast Asia | Edwin F. Stanton<br>Former Ambassador to Thailand |
| **Soviet Orbit** | |
| Trends in Soviet Orbit | Philip E. Mosely<br>Director of Research<br>Council on Foreign Relations<br>(Formerly Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University) |
| Impact of internal trends on Soviet foreign policy, etc. | Frederick C. Barghoorn, Professor<br>Yale University |
| Extent to which US policy can affect Soviet development | Merle Fainsod, Professor<br>Harvard University |

Papers are also being prepared
on Latin America, Africa and
the Middle East.

-S-

SUBPANEL IV - UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

Within the framework established by the overall panel this sub-panel will consider the relation between domestic and international objectives and policies, with particular reference to governmental responsibility for economic growth and stability and for individual and social welfare. Such topics as taxation policy, farm policy, utilities policy and the problem of natural resources will be covered insofar as they relate to the above.

TITLE OR SUBJECT OF PAPER

The nature of growth, its consistency with stability, and the role of monetary compared to fiscal policy

Trends in American economy
(changing technology and energy
requirements)

Taxation policy

Effect of taxation policy
on economic growth and
stability at various levels

Farm problem

Farm policy

Relationship to world food
problems

Utilities and power:

Trends and concepts for power
development, including nu-
clear

Individual and Social Welfare

Political implications of social welfare

Relation between industrial-
ization and social welfare

AUTHOR

Dexter M. Keezer, Vice President
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company

Grover W. Ensley, Staff Director of
Research, Joint Economic Committee,
Congress

William J. Fellner, Professor,
Yale University

Richard A. Musgrave, Professor,
University of Michigan

Theodore W. Schultz, Professor,
University of Chicago

J. Norman Efferson, Dean,
Louisiana Agricultural and Mechanical
College

Edward Morehouse, Vice-President,
General Public Utilities,
New York City

Robert A. Dahl, Professor,
Yale University

Lester B. Granger
National Urban League

Chairman's letters -- to Subpanel members

TO: Area specialists

(do not date)

Dear ____________:

I understand that you have been asked to participate in the Special Studies Project which the Rockefeller Brothers Fund is sponsoring. I am delighted by the prospect of working with you on this Project, which I believe will be interesting and worthwhile.

I am particularly pleased to hear that Mr. Rockefeller has asked you to serve on Subpanel ____________, as I have agreed to serve as Chairman of that Subpanel and will greatly value the contribution I know you will make.

I am looking forward to seeing you at the meetings of the panel.

Sincerely,

TO: Overall Panel and Authors

Dear ____________:

(do not date)

I understand that you have agreed to participate in the Special Studies Project which the Rockefeller Brothers Fund is sponsoring. I am delighted by the prospect of working with you on this project, which I believe will be interesting and worthwhile.

Sincerely,

Panel Secretary: Townsend Hoopes

J. H. Whitney & Company

| FUNCTIONAL PAPERS, and AUTHORS | PAPER NUMBER |
|---|---|
| Problems of Integrated Strategic Planning (Weapons and Missions) -<br>General James McCormack, Jr.<br>Massachusetts Institute of Tech. | I-1 |
| Integrated Strategic Planning in the Defense Department -<br>George S. Pettee<br>Operations Research Office,<br>Johns Hopkins | I-2 |
| Implications of Technological Trends -<br>Ellis A. Johnson<br>Operations Research Office,<br>Johns Hopkins | I-3 |
| Relation between Technological Trends and Impact on Political Requirements -<br>T. F. Walkowicz | I-4 |
| The Communist Strategy of Protracted Conflict -<br>William R. Kintner<br>Operations Research Office,<br>Johns Hopkins | I-5 |
| Political Instability in the Underdeveloped Areas -<br>James Cross<br>Center of International Studies,<br>Massachusetts Institute of Tech. | I-6 |
| Notes on What Lies Ahead for the United States Defense Establishment -<br>Roswell Gilpatric<br>Cravath, Swaine and Moore | I-7 |
| Old Uses for a New Navy -<br>Willard Bascom,<br>National Research Council<br>Civil Defense | I-8 |

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL I (Continued)

FUNCTIONAL PAPERS, and AUTHORS
PAPER
NUMBER

Non-military Defense -
N. E. Halaby

I-9

Same - Willard Bascom
National Research Council,
Civil Defense

I-10

Supporting:

Nuclear Technology and Alliances

II-5

Theory of Alliances

II-6

Same

II-7

The National Interest

II-1

Organization for Decision-making

VI-7

Problems of Strategic Planning

VI-8

AREA STUDIES, and AUTHORS

Primary:

Trends in NATO (military) -
H. A. DeWeerd,
The RAND Corporation, California

I-11

Germany and NATO -
Richard Scammon,
Governmental Affairs Institute

I-12

Iceland Case Studies -
Sol M. Levitas,
The New Leader

I-13

Same - Porter McKeever
Committee on Economic Development

I-14

America, Japan and the Asian Nations -
Paul M. A. Linebarger
School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University

I-15

Trends and US Policy in Japan -
Robert A. Scalapino,
University of California, Berkeley

I-16

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL I (Continued)

Supporting:

<table><tr><td>Europe</td><td>II-11,12,13,14,15<br/>16,17,18</td></tr><tr><td>Latin America</td><td>II-19,20,21</td></tr><tr><td>Far East</td><td>II-22,23,24,25,26</td></tr><tr><td>Southeast Asia</td><td>II-27,28,29,30,31</td></tr><tr><td>Middle East</td><td>II-33,34</td></tr><tr><td>Africa</td><td>II-35,36,37,38,39</td></tr><tr><td>Soviet Orbit</td><td>II-42,43,44,45,46</td></tr></table>

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL II - INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Panel Secretary: John King

Harvard Law School

| FUNCTIONAL PAPERS, and AUTHORS | PAPER NUMBER |
|---|---|
| **Primary:** | |
| **The National Interest -** | |
| Walter W. Rostow<br>Center for International Studies,<br>Massachusetts Institute of Tech. | II-1 |
| **Conflict of Ideas -** | |
| Stefan T. Possony<br>Georgetown University | II-3 |
| **Projection of Race Problem Abroad -** | |
| Lester B. Granger<br>National Urban League | II-4 |
| **The Role of Alliances** | |
| Nuclear Technology and Alliances -<br>Roger Hilsman<br>Chief, Foreign Affairs,<br>Library of Congress | II-5 |
| Theory of Alliances -<br>Byron Dexter | II-6 |
| Same - George S. Pettee<br>Operations Research Office,<br>Johns Hopkins University | II-7 |
| **Colonialism and the Emergence of Dependent Peoples** | |
| The Colonial Problem -<br>Froelich Rainey<br>University of Pennsylvania, FPRI | II-8 |
| American Policy and the Politics of Underdeveloped Countries -<br>Lucien Pye<br>Center for International Studies,<br>Massachusetts Institute of Tech. | II-9 |

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL II (Continued)

Prerequisites for Political Stability in

Backward Countries (Africa) -

Max F. Millikan

Center for International Studies,

PAPER
NUMBER

!

II-10

Supporting:

International Security Objectives and
Strategy Papers

I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,

13, 14, 15, 16

International Economic Objectives and
Strategy Papers

III-1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8,

9, 10, 11, 12

AREA PAPERS, and AUTHORS

Primary:

Europe

Present and Future Relationships

between US & Western Europe -

Lloyd A. Free

Institute for International Social Research

II-11

Trends in Europe -

Waldemar A. Nielsen

II-12

Europe in Transition the next 10-15 years -

The Ford Foundation

Howard Whidden, Newsweek

II-17

Trends in NATO (Political) -

Robert Strausz-Hupe

Foreign Policy Research Institute

II-13

Trends in Germany -

Fritz Kraemer

Office of Military Government, Army

II-14

Germany and NATO -

Richard Scammon,

II-15

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL II (Continued)

<table><thead><tr><th>AREA PAPERS, and AUTHORS</th><th>PAPER NUMBER</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Iceland Case Studies -<br>Sol M. Levitas,<br>The New Leader</td><td>II-16</td></tr><tr><td>Same - Porter McKeever<br>Comte on Economic Development</td><td>II-18</td></tr><tr><td><u>Latin America</u></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Trends and American Attitude -<br>Adolph A. Berle</td><td>II-19</td></tr><tr><td>Trends and US objectives -<br>Bryce Wood</td><td>II-20</td></tr><tr><td>Trends within Latin America -<br>Arthur P. Whitaker<br>University of Pennsylvania, FPRI</td><td>II-21</td></tr><tr><td><u>Far East</u></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>America, Japan and the Asian Nations -<br>Paul M. A. Linebarger<br>School of Advanced International<br>Studies, Johns Hopkins University</td><td>II-22</td></tr><tr><td>Trends and US Policy in Japan -<br>Robert A. Scalapino,<br>University of California,<br>Berkeley</td><td>II-23</td></tr><tr><td>Trends and US Policy in China -<br>Richard L. Walker<br>Yale University</td><td>II-24</td></tr><tr><td>Same - Howard Boorman<br>Columbia University</td><td>II-25</td></tr><tr><td>Some Considerations Pertinent to a<br>China Policy -<br>Lt. Col. Robert Ekvall<br>American Consulate, Geneva</td><td>II-26</td></tr></tbody></table>

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL II (Continued)

| AREA PAPERS, and AUTHORS | PAPER NUMBER |
|---|---|
| **Primary** | |
| Trends and US Policy toward Southeast Asia -<br>Edwin F. Stanton<br>Former Ambassador to Thailand | II-27 |
| Problems and Trends in Southeast Asia -<br>William Phillips<br>School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University | II-28 |
| American Attitude toward -<br>William Henderson<br>Council on Foreign Relations | II-30 |
| Trends & US Policy in India -<br>John Cady<br>Ohio University | II-31 |
| **Middle East** | |
| The Dynamics of an American Policy for the Middle East -<br>Max Thornburg | II-33 |
| The Arab-Israeli Dispute -<br>Edwin Wright<br>Foreign Service Institute, State | II-34 |
| **Africa** | |
| Political Evolution of West Africa -<br>Gray Cowan<br>Columbia University | II-35 |
| Trends and Development in South Africa -<br>Cornelis de Kiewiet<br>President, University of Rochester | II-36 |
| South Africa -<br>Eugene Dvorin<br>Bureau of Governmental Research<br>University of California, Los Angeles | II-37 |

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL II (Continued)

<table><thead><tr><th>AREA PAPERS, and AUTHORS</th><th>PAPER NUMBER</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Africa</strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>East Africa -<br>Carl G. Rosberg, Jr.<br>African Research & Studies,<br>Boston University</td><td>II-38</td></tr><tr><td>Belgian Congo -<br>Van Bilsen,<br>College of Overseas Territories,<br>Antwerp</td><td>II-39</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Soviet Orbit</strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Trends in Soviet Orbit -<br>Philip E. Mosely<br>Council on Foreign Relations</td><td>II-42</td></tr><tr><td>Same - Walter W. Rostow, CENIS,<br>Massachusetts Institute of Tech.</td><td>II-45</td></tr><tr><td>Same - Mose L. Harvey, National War<br>College</td><td>II-46</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Soviet Domestic Developments and the<br>Future of Soviet-American Relations -</strong></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Frederick C. Barghoorn<br>Yale University</td><td>II-43</td></tr><tr><td>Extent to which US Policy can Affect<br>Soviet Development -<br>Merle Fainsod<br>Harvard University</td><td>II-44</td></tr></tbody></table>

October 18, 1956.

SUBPANEL III - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Panel Secretary: Forrest D. Murden, Jr.

Ford Motor Company

Primary:

Economic Aid and Trade Policy as an Instrument
of National Policy -
  Lincoln Gordon
  Harvard Business School
III-1

Memo on Foreign Economic Policy -
  August Maffry
  Vice President, Irving Trust Co.
III-2

Foreign Economic Policy -
  Thomas Schelling
III-4

Economic Aid and Political Institutions -
  Harlan Cleveland
  Syracuse University
III-6

Companion paper: Soviet Policies
toward Underdeveloped Countries -
  Wladyslaw W. Kulski,
  Syracuse
III-7

Industrialization and Human Resources -
  Frederick Harris Harbison,
  Industrial Relations Section,
  Princeton
III-8

Effect of Foreign Resource Trends on Political
and Economic Stability -
  S. H. Ordway, Jr.
  Conservation Foundation
III-10

Problems of Oil Resources -
  Walter J. Levy
III-11

Effect of Foreign Population Trends on Political
and Economic Stability -
  Kingsley Davis
  University of California,
  Berkeley
III-12

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL III (Continued)

| **FUNCTIONAL PAPERS. and AUTHORS** | **PAPER NUMBER** |
|:---|:---|
| Prospects for Population Growth and their Implications for Economic Development in India, 1956-1986 -<br>Edgar Hoover, )<br>IBRD, Washington ) | III-9 |
| Arsley Coale, )<br>Princeton University) | |

**Supporting:**

| | |
|:---|:---|
| The National Interest | II-1 |
| Psychological Strategy and Policy | II-3, 4 |
| Theory of Alliances | II-5 |
| The Colonial Problem | II-8 |
| International Security Objectives and Strategy Papers | I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6<br>7, 8, 9, 10, 11,<br>12, 13, 14, 15, 16 |

AREA PAPERS, and AUTHORS

Primary:

| | |
|:---|:---|
| Agriculture in Underdeveloped Countries (Case Study India) -<br>Arthur T. Mosher<br>Cornell University | III-13 |

| | |
|:---|:---|
| Demographic Difficulties and United States Problems in Asia and North Africa -<br>Irene Taeuber | III-14 |

Supporting:

| | |
|:---|:---|
| Europe | II-11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 |
| Latin America | II-19, 20, 21 |
| Far East | II-22, 23, 24, 25, 26 |
| Southeast Asia | II-27, 28, 29, 30, 31 |
| Middle East | II-33, 34 |
| Africa | II-35, 36, 37, 38, 39 |
| Soviet Orbit | II-42, 43, 44, 45, 46 |

October 18, 1956

| PAPERS and AUTHORS | PAPER NUMBER |
|---|---|
| **Primary:** | |
| Governmental Responsibility for Economic Growth and Stability -<br>Dexter M. Keezer<br>McGraw-Hill Publishing Company | IV-1 |
| America at the Threshold of Abundance -<br>Gerhard Colm<br>National Planning Association | IV-4 |
| Trends in American Economy -<br>Grover W. Ensley<br>Joint Economic Committee, Congress | IV-5 |
| **Taxation Policy** | |
| Effect of Taxation Policy on Economic Growth and Stability at Various Levels -<br>Wm. J. Fellner<br>Yale University | IV-6 |
| Effect of Taxation Policy on Economic Growth and Stability at Various Levels -<br>Richard A. Musgrave<br>University of Michigan | IV-7 |
| **Government Responsibility for Individual and Social Welfare** | |
| Concept of Social Insurance -<br>Herman Somers | IV-8 |
| Political Implications of Social Welfare -<br>Robert A. Dahl<br>Yale University | IV-9 |
| Relation between Industrialization (and Migration of Negroes) and Social Welfare -<br>Lester B. Granger<br>National Urban League | IV-10 |

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL IV (Continued)

PAPERS and AUTHORS

PAPER
NUMBER

Farm Problem

A Working Paper on Agricultural Policy -
Theodore W. Schultz
University of Chicago

IV-11

Relationship to World Food Problems
Some Concepts and Long-time Objectives
of Agricultural Policy -
J. Norman Efferson
Louisiana State University

IV-12

Distressed Areas

Uneven Industrial Growth

IV-13

Utilities and Power

Trends and Concepts for Power Development,
including Nuclear -
Philip Sporn
President, American Gas & Electric
Company

IV-14

Resources

Effect of Domestic Resources Trends -
Joseph L. Fisher
Resources for the Future, Inc.

IV-15

Resources and Population Reports
"think" piece -
Franklin A. Lindsay

IV-16

Supporting:

Utilization of Human Resources papers

V-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

October 18, 1956

SUBPANEL VI - PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

Panel Secretary: Charles A. H. Thomson
Brookings Institute

PAPERS, and AUTHORS

PAPER
NUMBER

Primary:

Analysis of Democratic Structure

The Moral Basis for American Foreign
Policy -

William Elliott
Harvard University

VI-1

Role of Executive

Executive Branch Organization for the
Formulation and Execution of National
Security Policy -

William R. Kinter
Operations Research Office,
Johns Hopkins

VI-2

Integration of Presidential Control of
Foreign Policy in the Federal Government -

VI-3

Role of Congress and the Executive in
the Formulation of Policy Decisions -

Arthur Vandenberg, Jr.

VI-4

Same - Stephen K. Bailey
Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton

VI-5

Role of Budgetary Process to National
Policy - Arthur Smithies

Harvard University

VI-6

Department of Defense

Organization for Decision-making -
General C. H. Bonesteel

VI-7

Problems of Strategic Planning -

N. E. Halaby

VI-8

October 18, 1956