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them would be broken, then no one in the world could have confidence in any pledge we made.

However, my feeling that the conqueror theory was obsolescent did not, in my mind, absolve the Soviets from respecting their obligations. I could listen to and perhaps participate in a proposal regarding Berlin that might appeal to reasonable people, but I would not do so on the basis of Soviet repudiation of agreements made earlier among responsible governments; nor would I do so under the shadow of a threat.

We would now have to be adamant in our attitude toward the East Germans in matters so small as to seem almost totally inconsequential. Once we tacitly agreed that the East Germans were in control, then, with a foot in the door, they would later find ways of gradually opening it, with each move so seemingly insignificant as to preclude decisive action on the part of the West.

The line had to be held where it stood. I directed that talks with the French, British, and West Germans begin immediately. We knew that getting agreements acceptable to all would be difficult. The British seemed to stress practical access and tended to downgrade the implications of tacitly recognizing the East German regime. Such an attitude infuriated Chancellor Adenauer, whose political standing rested on the hope of eventual reunification of Germany through free elections. Moreover, among the Germans themselves there were splits. West Berlin's mayor, Willy Brandt, while strong in his support of a stand against the Communists, seemed for a time to be somewhat amenable to Khrushchev's idea of a "free city." To this Adenauer could not agree. In France, President de Gaulle adhered to his position that we should do nothing in a hurry, that immediate response would only show nervousness to the Soviets.

Near the close of this meeting, Vice President Nixon expressed the opinion that Khrushchev was angling for another summit conference. He pointed out the parallel between Berlin and the Quemoy-Matsu situation of 1955, stressing that the Soviets had stirred up trouble in both places as devices to lure us into a meeting. Under Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, while not disagreeing, felt that the difficulties the Communists were having bolstering their regime in East Germany could be a major factor. I myself had no objection to talks, provided they were not under duress, and had been properly prepared.

While giving Khrushchev every opportunity to be sensible, we were determined that he should have no reason to question our readiness and capacity to defend our rights. "In this gamble," I said, "we are not going to be betting white chips, building up the pot gradually and fearfully."

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Khrushchev should know that when we decide to act, our whole stack will be in the pot."

The next day Foster Dulles, just out of the hospital, came to see me on his way to Paris for a meeting of the four Western foreign ministers and, subsequently, of the North Atlantic Council. Our most immediate problem at the NATO meeting would be a grimly related subject: to prod our allies to live up to the NATO force levels they had earlier agree upon.

On December 14 the foreign ministers reaffirmed our resolve never to negotiate under threat. A few days later, the North Atlantic Council issued a declaration on Berlin that associated all the NATO countries with the earlier statement of the foreign ministers. Then coordinated replies from the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany went out to Khrushchev. The messages were carefully worded. The East German regime, for example, was repeatedly referred to in our message by the laborious phrase, "the regime which the Soviet government refers to as the German Democratic Republic." Most significant was the sentence which read, "Since the agreements can only be terminated by mutual consent, the government of the United States will continue to hold the Soviet government directly responsible for the discharge of its obligations undertaken with respect to Berlin under existing agreements."

A note arrived on January 9, 1959, from Harold Macmillan, who was optimistic, but both his note and his optimism were soon overtaken by events. First, a message which in fact contained nothing new came from the Soviets, dated January 10—a long, tedious argument for a German peace treaty and for reunification of Germany through negotiations, not through free, all-German elections. In addition, its insistence that a "free city" would mean only West Berlin, not all of Berlin, dispelled any illusions. The message ended in a characteristically somber tone:

> No one can prevent the Soviet Union from renouncing its functions regarding Berlin and its communications with West Germany, and from settling the questions arising in connection with this through an agreement with the German Democratic Republic.

A week after receiving this letter, I held a forty-five-minute conversation with Mr. Anastas I. Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev's deputies and an expert on trade affairs. His request for a visa was, ostensibly, to permit him to visit Soviet Ambassador Menshikov, but many believed that his journey must have more serious purpose. I hoped that he was prepared to talk constructively. It was not so: I found Mr. Mikoyan a relatively affable personality, but he "mouthed" only the current Communist line.

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I was appointed to find no evidence whatsoever of a softening of the Soviet attitude.

On Mikoyan's trip home, one of his plane's engines caught fire. Fortunately, an emergency landing at our Argentina base in Newfoundland averted disaster for those aboard.

Informed of this news at a dinner, Foster Dulles commented dryly, "Maybe Mikoyan won't yell so loud about our overseas bases from now on."

In late January I called a meeting of Defense and State Department officials to discuss Berlin developments. On the question of the Soviet desire to turn control of Berlin access over to the East Germans, we reaffirmed our demand that the U.S.S.R. observe its obligations. But how to find an effective method for enforcing this demand? It would not be easy to explain to the public why a nation would risk war over an issue so seemingly slight as the nationality of the man who stamps the papers as a convoy proceeds through a checkpoint. The central point was that all rights the allies had in Berlin were brought about by agreement with the Soviet government, not with the puppets they had installed in a fragmented part of Germany. There would be no way in which we could hold the East Germans responsible for carrying out Soviet promises made years before. Chris Herter supplied what I thought was an apt phrase: Acquiescence in the substitution of East German officials for Soviets at a checkpoint would "simply start us down a slippery slope toward East German control of everything."

To show the Soviets that we meant business, the Chiefs of Staff were instructed to send sufficient replacements to Europe to fill out the rosters of all our military units, both combat and support. This routine movement of replacements would be done quietly but quickly; it was certain that the Soviets would detect the movements and probably interpret them correctly as evidence of our determination.

One disagreement at this meeting was between Foster Dulles and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs believed that the United States should be prepared to go into action with a fairly substantial force—one division—on the day the first truck convoy should be stopped. Foster objected; world opinion, he argued, would not be sufficiently mobilized on May 27 to permit the immediate use of a force this size.

I tended to side with Foster, but for different reasons. One division was far too weak to fight its way through to Berlin and far more than

necessary to be a mere "show of force" or evidence of determination. The deployment of an entire division would be played up in the press and would put the pressure on the Soviets to "put up or shut up." Such a move could be regarded, elsewhere, as aggression. Its use would raise other questions. For example, having used military force to open the way, would we not then have to keep open the 110-mile-long road by force? Such a task would require far more than a division. If a mere probe became necessary a much smaller unit should be employed and I so decided.

Once action was called for, the move would obviously have to be swift; delay could only confirm to the Soviets and to the world that we had accepted the new status quo.⁷

The plan, as I approved it at the meeting, included these steps: (a) A refusal to acquiesce in any substitution of East Germans for Soviet officials in checking the Western occupying powers movement to and from Berlin. (While it would be permissible to show an East German official a pass for identification purposes, such official would not be permitted to stamp a pass); (b) A decision to begin quiet military preparations in West Germany and Berlin prior to May 27, sufficient to be detected by Soviet intelligence but not sufficient to create public alarm; (c) Should there by any substitution of East German officials for Soviets, a small convoy with armed protection would attempt to go through, and if this convoy were stopped, the effect would be discontinued and the probe would fire only if fired upon; (d) Transit would then be suspended and pressure would be brought to bear on the Soviets by publicizing the blockade and taking the matter to the United Nations Security Council and, if necessary, to the General Assembly. In these circumstances our further military preparations would be intensified by observable means such as the evacuation of dependents from West Berlin and possibly from all Germany; (e) In the event that this moral and other pressure was not sufficient, use of additional force would be subject to governmental decision; (f) We would at once attempt to bring about a foreign ministers' meeting with the Soviet Union to be held about the middle of April.

One purpose of the meeting would be to provide a means by which Khrushchev could, without losing face, modify his position regarding

⁷ Fortunately the supply situation in Berlin was good. When I checked, I was informed that we had military supplies in the city to last about ninety days; the civilian supply situation was even more favorable. In no category did the stocks fall below a two-month level. Assuming an initial repulse, this supply situation would give us time to maneuver before we found ourselves in a major emergency. On the debit side, General Twining warned that Tempelhof Airport, used in the earlier, propeller-age Berlin airlift, probably could not take our largest jet air freighters.

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Berlin should he not do so, the West would be on notice that a show-
down was imminent.

The meeting at which this program was developed was informal, yet the drama of the hour was not missed by participants. We all knew the potentials of the decisions which had been made. Possibly we were risking the very fate of civilization on the premise that the Soviets would back down from the deadline when confronted by force. Yet this, to my mind, was not really gambling, for if we were not willing to take this risk, we would be certain to lose. Our approach was cautious, controlled, and I was confident it was correct. We were trying to give the Soviets every opportunity to be reasonable without humiliation but we were keeping our powder dry.

* * *

During the following sixteen weeks, Premier Khrushchev executed a remarkable diplomatic retreat. So skillful and subtle was each step backward that its significance was hardly noticed and for this reason the retreat, although absolute, caused scarcely any loss in Khrushchev's public standing. The Western governments deliberately encouraged this evolution.

On the afternoon of February 3, 1959, for example, Foster Dulles, Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and I discussed our expectations for Foster's forthcoming trip to Britain, France, and Germany (a journey we thought desirable, but which none of us dreamed would be his last). We had just learned of Prime Minister Macmillan's decision to make a personal exploratory pilgrimage to Moscow, and it was obviously desirable to reach the best possible meeting of minds among the interested Western governments before his departure on the 28th of February.

Arriving in London February 4, Foster met that evening with Macmillan. Though the Prime Minister had no objection to our plans for meeting an immediate emergency, he still seemed less concerned than we about accepting the East Germans as "agents" for the Soviets; he felt

⁸ One further small evidence of changing times: As the meeting broke up, I was informed that West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt would soon be in the United States. I thought that his flight from New York to Washington might be the occasion to provide him with an escort of the new B-58s, which should prove an impressive show.

On reflection, I realized that B-58s are scarcely designed for such short-run escort duty. If their speed were held down to only Mach 2, their flight time between New York and Washington would be about eight minutes. This flashing "escort" would leave Mayor Brandt's plane behind before he would have time to see them.

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that the status quo in Berlin could not endure indefinitely, certainly not after Adenauer passed from the political scene. He was particularly intrigued by an idea originally advanced by Foreign Minister Rapacki of Poland—a proposed "thinning-out" of military forces in Germany, leading eventually to some sort of neutralization, like that of Austria. Harold believed the Russians would have more to lose than to gain by a mutual withdrawal of troops from Germany.

In Paris, Foster found that President de Gaulle shared our misgivings about East German control of Berlin's access routes. Indeed, remembering the failure in 1936 to resist Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, De Gaulle seemed to be prepared to use force a little more suddenly than we felt advisable.

In Bonn, Foster obtained confirmation of earlier indications that Chancellor Adenauer had become uneasy about British policy toward Germany and particularly about Macmillan's proposed trip to Moscow. The British ambassador in Bonn had reportedly said that sooner or later it would become necessary to recognize the East German government, an idea hardly designed to make the Chancellor sleep better. However, Adenauer and his aides seemed to be satisfied with the United States contingency plans.

When the Secretary arrived home and after we had met for extended consultations, he sent me a note that held disturbing implications. It requested permission to turn over temporarily his duties as Secretary of State to Under Secretary Herter because of the need for an operation for a recently developed hernia. He had also, he indicated, not wholly thrown off the effects of an abdominal inflammation which had appeared the previous December. I could not but feel apprehensive.

As a result of Foster's European talks, we had concluded that a meeting of some type with the Soviets probably would be inevitable; even Adenauer had agreed to this idea in principle. Khrushchev himself seemed to be showing signs of amenability. True, the Communists had held up a Western convoy for over two days, after it had proceeded from Berlin to the very door of Western Germany, and Khrushchev was still boasting of his missile strength. However, at the meeting of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party, he had expressed the desire for an early end to the cold war and, surprisingly, had invited me to make a visit to the Soviet Union, claiming that I would be received with "heartfelt hospitality."⁹ In addition we were getting high-level Soviet hints of a possible postponement of the May 27 Berlin deadline.

⁹ This invitation was highly diluted. It was included in a lengthy speech which also included hostile references to U.S. leaders. On February 6 I put out a statement through Mr. Hagerty observing that it seemed strange that Khrushchev would, if

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When the situation easing ever so slightly it seemed an appropriate time to make a formal proposal for a meeting. Therefore, in replying to the Soviet note of January 10, we proposed a meeting of the foreign ministers of the U.S.S.R., France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with the time and place to be settled through diplomatic channels. Our note stated that the conference should cover the problem of Germany in all its aspects. It was our plan, without giving in to pressure, to reduce tensions by extending the area of discussions beyond the narrow issue of Berlin itself.

In the meantime other, more pleasant, matters engaged my attention. One was a visit to Mexico. On the 18th of February I took advantage of an invitation extended by the new President of Mexico, Adolfo Lopez Mateos, to join him at Acapulco, a beautiful spot on Mexico's Pacific Coast. For two days, in a balmy atmosphere, I was privileged to become acquainted with this dynamic new leader of our nearest southern neighbor. To be sure we had problems too, involving such things as cotton, fishing rights, territorial waters, and border disputes, but it was a relief to be able to discuss such questions in a spirit of amity.¹⁰ My brother Milton, who had often served as my personal representative on visits to many Latin American nations, sat in on our conversations. I was pleased when President Lopez Mateos suggested that he and I keep in close touch with one another by having my brother serve as a traveling intermediary. This arrangement proved to be helpful. When Project Mercury required for its success a control station at Guaymas, Mexico, my brother carried on the sensitive negotiations with President Lopez Mateos and ultimately obtained full Mexican cooperation.

he really welcomed a visit, extend an invitation in such a manner. I had no plans for such a visit under these circumstances. The statement left the door open in event future developments would suggest a visit to the U.S.S.R. in the cause of peace.

In a press conference on February 10, I said, "I would think I would have to wait for some more official type of, and more, let us say, persuasive kind of, invitation than that."

¹⁰ While at Acapulco I learned that agreement was said to have been reached between the governments of Britain, Turkey, and Greece on the future status of the island of Cyprus. The solution had been long in coming but finally, by dint of statesmanship on the part of all three nations concerned, Cyprus was to become an independent nation. There were difficulties yet to be overcome in the implementation, but the accord was of sufficient importance that I sent Harold Macmillan a congratulatory cable from this rather remote location.

Another pleasant aspect of the visit to Acapulco was a chance to meet and talk briefly with Anthony Eden, now retired and vacationing there, attempting to regain his health while writing his memoirs.

Returning to Washington, I learned that Harold Macmillan was leaving on his planned trip to Moscow.

As he had promised, Harold kept me well informed. He was impressed, he reported, by the apparent feeling of insecurity which still persisted among the Soviets in spite of their power, but with respect to Germany and Berlin he detected no signs of weakening in the long-term Soviet purpose. Khrushchev flatly said there was no room for maneuver, or for retreat from his intention to sign a peace treaty with East Germany in the following May. Furthermore, the Soviets would not, at this point, admit any relationship between Berlin, reunification of Germany, a peace treaty, and European security. Discussions on all these, Khrushchev said, would result in a labyrinth of negotiations which might last ten years. To Harold's message I replied on February 24, in part:

> This morning, February twenty-fourth, we received cabled extracts from the statement that he [Khrushchev] made today in Moscow that are seemingly even more belligerent and unyielding than those he has made in the past. ...

> ... it seems that he is intensifying his efforts to create division within the Western group and thus to weaken our resolution. In effect he is saying, "We are destroying the Western rights in Germany and in Berlin, and if you make any attempt to defend those rights you are guilty of aggression and warlike acts."

Tomorrow morning I shall probably have some searching questions put to me by the press respecting the latest statement of Khrushchev, and the rigidity of the line he is taking. I shall say as little as possible, particularly during the duration of your visit. However, I believe I should reiterate that the West is a unit in its determination to defend its rights and to carry out its responsibilities respecting Berlin, and that, while we are completely ready to negotiate where there is any possible negotiable ground, we are not going to be divided or defeated by threats.

With warm regard,

As ever,

Ike

Harold answered on February 26 to the effect that he not only agreed with my assessment of what Khrushchev was saying to us, but had told the Premier that it was he who was threatening war.

While Harold was still in Moscow, Khrushchev took time out from their talks to deliver a hard, even insulting public speech, an act of incredibly bad manners. Harold, however, seemed to take the insult rather

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philosophically. In describing the incident to me he admitted that the welcome in Moscow had cooled ever since he had shown his support of Adenauer, who was Khrushchev's chief personal target. Harold emphasized to Khrushchev that the very danger of the situation required him to understand that the British government would line up with its allies.

About the only agreement that Harold could report from Moscow was that both sides realized the seriousness of the situation. He did not feel that he had shaken Khrushchev's resolve any more than ours had been shaken, but at least Khrushchev could no longer harbor any mistaken notions regarding the strength of British determination. He concluded:

> It is on this rather dark note that I am now leaving for a four-day journey around Russia. I thought that you would like to have my latest news before I set off.

When Harold returned to Moscow the clouds seemed a little less black. He reported that Khrushchev had recovered from his toothache, which had been the Chairman's last-minute reason for failing to accompany Harold on his trip, and Mikoyan had unexpectedly turned up to greet him in Leningrad. This gave Harold encouragement. He hoped that this improvement in Soviet deportment was the result of his own attitude, which I would describe as solid but patient and polite determination.

In a note of March 2, I congratulated him

> ... on the firmness of your presentation respecting Western rights in the Berlin situation. At the very least you demonstrated to the world that strength does not depend upon discourtesy, a great contrast to the provocative attitude and statements of Khrushchev during your visit there. Thank you very much for the care you took to inform us on a day-by-day basis of your Russian experience.

> ... I am quite sure that nothing is so important as to have our ideas and plans concerted among the four of us and, so far as possible, with the complete NATO group. Certain elements of the situation constantly change. ...

Harold was a solid ally—I admired him the more for the frankness in which he always presented his views.

Now, in a long note to the Western leaders, the Soviets reversed their field. After eight pages devoted to speeches, drivel, specious reasoning, and threats, the document called for a new summit meeting. But the men in the Kremlin were well aware of our long-standing insistence that, while we would always go the extra mile to negotiate where there was any logical hope of progress, we would not, in its absence, go to a summit. They therefore added that, if the Western powers insisted, they would

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agree to a meeting of the foreign ministers of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Britain, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—a meeting limited to a German peace treaty and Berlin.

This was a step forward, because only a few days before Khrushchev had scornfully denounced the idea of a foreign ministers' meeting. Despite this concession, world tension did not abate; questions in press conferences clearly evidenced how seriously the Berlin question was on the minds of all. Trivialities were largely avoided and queries dwelled on such matters as the health of the Secretary of State, the necessity for instituting an air alert for the Strategic Air Command, the possibility of negotiation with the Soviets in light of the latest note, the need for improving the defenses of Europe, and the desirability of making use of the experience of Bedell Smith who had been ambassador to Moscow. With the country so concerned, I thought it was advisable to hold a conference with the legislative leaders of both parties. On the morning of March 6, 1959, I met with a few of them, along with some of my closest advisers. The value of this meeting was so obvious to all of us that I held another later that evening with broader congressional representation.¹¹ These meetings, held in ordinary times as well as when the nation approached an emergency, often brought out the best in men. Their concerns reflected the concerns of our people; their sense of national interest could transcend party. This did not mean that such sessions were easy-going, rubber-stamp get-togethers. On the contrary, the quality of brisk give and take was among their finest features.

These encounters also revealed something about the character and interests of the legislators. Sam Rayburn, for example, was always anxious to make certain that the United States would do everything possible to negotiate. Senator Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, appeared to be anxious to be able to take some action, visible to the world, to indicate we had—or the Senate had—strengthened our Armed Forces.

I assured Speaker Rayburn that we would not go to war because of rigidity in attitude and emphasized the recent exchange of notes in which we kept the chances for negotiation open. To Lyndon Johnson, I reiterated my confidence in the nation's military power. In fact, I said, "If we were to release our nuclear stockpile on the Soviet Union, the

¹¹Present were Vice President Nixon, Acting Secretary of State Herter, Defense Secretary McElroy, CIA Director Allen Dulles, Speaker Sam Rayburn, Senators Everett Dirksen, J. W. Fulbright, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Russell, Leverett Saltonstall, Alexander Wiley; Representatives Leslie Arends, A. S. J. Carnahan, Robert Chiperfield, Charles Halleck, Carl Vinson; General Persons, Mr. Bryce Harlow, and Major Eisenhower.