DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:59 a.m., December 19, 1970

P: This news summary this morning on that psycho O'Brien; he continues to be making these charges. I told Haldeman to tell Laird and Defense they were to destroy him.

K: That is my understanding. I will get after it immediately.

P: What are you doing?

K: I'm in my office.

P: Do you want to ride out with me to see Senator Russell?

K: Yes, sir, I'll be right there.

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By

NARA, Date

5/20

TELECON

Under Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger

11:37 a.m., December 19, 1970

I: Hello, Henry. I have a couple of things, one of them urgent. Dave Abshire is with me. The Secretary signed off on a letter to Senator Church for Dave yesterday which follows up on a discussion Abshire had with Senator Church. [Secretary Irwin read the letter which related to Section 6 of H. R. 11991] Section 6 is the new Cooper/Church amendment which prevents ground forces from going in but takes out the language that made it impossible to expend funds for foreign troops.

K: We have to keep it free to let the Vietnamese go in.

I: Yes; it said, you may be assured that our programs for Cambodia in no way conflict with Section 6 expressed in the colloquy.

K: Can we drop that sentence?

I: No. This sentence does not go beyond what the President said in the Press Conference.

K: I don't see why we constantly nail ourselves into positions.

I: I understand this is because it really caused a split in the Foreign Relations Committee.

K: What does it mean concretely? What if we want to send supply planes in?

I: It's the wording of the amendment. The reason for it is Dave Abshire feels there is flexibility on the hearing this morning.

K: My problem is where we will be a month or two from now. I just had a call from Stennis saying a State Department Assistant Secretary was undercutting everything I was telling him.

I: It prohibits use of funds on introduction of U.S. ground forces or military advisors into Cambodia. It doesn't prevent, as I am told, the use of funds that would help our Vietnamization program.

K: There is an operational problem. There are a number of operations in which we will have to fly in supplies in American planes.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

11:37 a.m., December 19, 1970

I: This says ground forces. Abshire interprets it as being able to fly in airplanes, but we can't introduce ground forces and military advisors. This was a letter Bill wrote yesterday and it just came to me this minute by Abshire on the grounds he told the Secretary I would clear it with the White House. They were concerned that you knew about it.

K: Just make sure you are not hampering U.S. supply operations for Vietnam operations. That is our major concern.

I: This is apparently the language the President used in the Press Conference. Is there any news on Davis?

K: I have not had a chance to get the final word from the President.

I: Korry was in to see me this morning. He doesn't know what is happening.

K: Korry feels he needs to be there till April.

I: I agree with him.

K: I do, too. There is no reason to pull him out faster.

I: If that is your feeling, I will move on that. I will see what the Secretary's feeling is. Unless there is a problem, that is what we will do. There is one other thing -- I would like to talk a little on the Laird statement on SS-9's. I think we should talk it over with him. I would be glad to talk to him.

K: I think the President is going to issue a directive.

I: You know, and I know...

K: It is an outrage, and it's not an isolated instance either.

I: I'm going to New York this afternoon; I'll be back Monday.

K: I'll talk to you Monday.

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By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Saville Davis (CSM)

11:45 a.m., December 19, 1970

D: Good morning, Henry.

K: I had one thought. I don't know whether you have given up.

D: No.

K: I haven't.

D: I asked your office about noon yesterday to see you. Miss Matthews was not there. I said I was calling in response to a conversation you and I had had and asked for an appointment at your earliest convenience, and said that I would bring Courtney Sheldon, who is our new Bureau Chief and who is taking over as our White House correspondent.

K: My office didn't tell me that.

D: I spent the whole of Friday morning pursuing the matter further.

K: Elliot Richardson knows how the China policy was developed. One thing he wouldn't tell you was it was imposed on a reluctant White House by an over-eager State Department.

D: I could easily talk to him.

K: I don't know whether he would want to make any comment.

D: He is an old friend; he might be willing to talk for background purposes. I wanted to find out the particular things that concerned you and then to see the best way to handle it. There are a variety of ways. One is for me to write a piece to put the record straight. Another way is to make a correction as such which raises some complications because Bill Selover is defending the sources in his piece. His attributions are wrong. I have gone carefully to the question of sources.

K: Are you convinced that members of my present staff said anything like these things?

D: May I again talk between ourselves for private information. It's very complicated and not entirely a clear business. In my judgment, he overwrote the piece -- he overwrote it from several different sources which I now know. And only one of the sources included present members of your staff. The things in my judgment were overwritten from the sources. It isn't a clear yes or no answer. That is as near

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Saville Davis

11:45 a.m., December 19, 1970

KK as I can approach the accuracy of the thing. There is in my judgment not a justification.

K: I find it almost inconceivable that any member of my staff could say the Secretary was the fourth choice. I don't know that he was the second choice. I had nothing to do with his choice. He was appointed simultaneously with me. I have never for that reason been in the position to discuss it, assuming it would ever be discussed, which is highly unlikely.

D: It makes no sense to handle the attributions so it implicates you. The attribution was 'the key Kissinger staff.'

K: Any member of my staff who made such an observation would have to be somewhat deranged.

D: How should I put this? I have checked as far back as I could check on the matter. I am trying to be as careful as I can from the newspaper policy standpoint of protecting the sources and trying to be as forthcoming as I can. I would say that, peculiarly enough, if I had the same sources of information, I would not have repeated that. I am not sure just what any individual may have said about that. I have been told the individual did make that statement and was asked who were the other two and KK said, 'I can't tell you.'

K: I bet that is true, because he didn't know there was another one.

D: I am not impressed on that particular aspect of the situation with the person who reports hearing that.

K: On some of the other things, I can see where stupidity could distort something with a slight basis in fact.

D: It boils down to the wisdom or unwisdom of repeating things like that.

K: On the China thing and the way it was handled -- it was really a case which the President initiated. I can't take credit. I told Richardson we wanted to do this but wanted his Under Secretaries Committee to make the proposal. I can see somebody at the fourth level seeing the flow of papers could twist it. That's the exact truth of the way it was handled.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Saville Davis

11:45 a.m., December 19, 1970

D: This particular thing on China came from a different source than the other things attributed to the Kissinger staff. This came from another source and which I would not, myself, have felt would know the whole story. I have been around long enough to know you can't conclude that it necessarily happened this way. Poor Bill who was new and not so experienced was not astute enough to perceive it. Just as the sort of stuff came from the third source. Unfortunately, I am afraid this is in the disgruntled area. One of the most damaging statements was in the section on SALT, regarding the State Department as a security risk in dealing with the Russians. I groaned at that one.

K: When you come in, I will tell you exactly how we managed the SALT thing. You can form your own judgment.

D: You have already told me some things.

K: I feel SALT we have done best.

D: I have the same feeling and have often written about it.

K: I know. There is nothing personal. You could not be able to write anything before Monday anyway.

D: I thought I should talk it out. It took all Friday morning to do it.

K: Do you want to come in Monday? How about 10:30? I am in no hurry. The thing that disturbs me most is at a time of profound national issues, people could be so petty as to worry about who recommended what and set up issues tough enough as they are about a reluctant White House being beaten to death by another agency. The whole effort has been to avoid having one bureaucratic group win battles.

D: I appreciate this.

K: I don't want a correction that says the White House is brilliant and the State Department is a bunch of klucks. I would like people to think we are serious people trying to do together a serious job. At least we are serious and not doing it in order to score points.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Saville Davis

11:45 a.m., December 19, 1970

D: I am not in a position to say what is a wrong and right judgment. This is the kind of thing I thought I might be able to write to set the record straight. I will have to see if it meets your points and fits the case generally. The awful twist to this thing -- some day when the world quiets down, I will tell you some of the rest of the curious twists to this thing. It is a kind of ironic and tragic twist. All the information on which the major part of this story was based came from hawk to hawk. The information was then passed to Bill who is a passionate dove and who saw in this essentially, I guess, that you are the villain in the piece. So that you have this bizarre twist in information which came when the fellow hawks were talking and then passed it to a dove who probably -- he is not that experienced -- saw a beautiful chance to write a story which would put the hawks in the wrong.

K: That is how it read.

D: It is obvious on the face of it--the bizarre aspects of how it got off the trolley. May I ask you a personal question? I don't know quite how to ask. When I was out at the opera last night, my wife got an anguished call from Sperling saying in a rather unusual and abrupt way that breakfast had been cancelled on Monday. Was this a result of what had gone on? He was uncomfortable and I also.

K: I will tell you why I cancelled it when I see you. It had nothing to do with the story or with Sperling whom I like very much.

D: I couldn't think this was the case. I thought I had been forthcoming.

K: More forthcoming than any other newspaper would have been. It had nothing to do with it, but with internal White House arrangements where the press people thought this was scheduled without their knowledge. I will reschedule it the first week of January with their clearances.

D: I have satisfied myself that this has nothing to do with it.

K: I didn't want internal fight over a breakfast I can have anytime.

D: That is between you and me. I will simply say you and I had a conversation about other matters. We discussed this between ourselves and I satisfied myself that the Selover affair had nothing to do with it. I will be there at 10:30 Monday.

K: All right.

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