Coord: GTZsueger
HAK:DM:UZC:mlp (3\571\69)

WH Uie - 1
HAK Chron - 1
Secretariat - 3
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02128
& Divinity Avenue
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Professor Samuel P. Huntington*

Henry V. Kissinger

Best regards,

How,
complete it and, as my schedule permits, to discuss it with
I would be pleased to have a copy of the full study when you
high on the agenda for our review of policy in Vietnam,
unplanned. The question of political accommodation is very
it explores an area which is both important and yet largely
appreciated. Your study is particularly useful to us since
Your thoughtfulness and counsel are as useful as well much
during these first weeks.

As you know, the pressure of business has been very heavy
a draft of your study on a political accommodation in Vietnam.
Please excuse the delay in responding to your letter enclosing

Dear Sam:

C.E.

S. F.

February 27, 1969

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Frank G. Thomson Professor
of Government
Harvard University
Center of International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Dr. Huntington:

This is in reply to your letter of February 19, 1969 to Henry Kissinger, through which you extended an invitation for a member of Dr. Kissinger's staff to attend an interagency session on Tuesday, February 25, 1969, conducted by Joe Mendenhall. Your letter also enclosed an excellent paper on political competition in South Vietnam which I have taken the liberty of furnishing to our Vietnam expert in Henry's absence.

Unfortunately, as a result of Henry's departure for Europe with the President, attendance at the meeting slipped through one of the administrative cracks that still exist in our budding organization. I apologize in Henry's absence that we did not provide you with an earlier reply and can assure you that in the future we will do better. Henry is expected back here on March 3d and I anticipate that you will be hearing from him shortly thereafter.

Revised
First Draft

1/24/68

2/8/69

# Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam

Samuel P. Huntington

## Summary

### I. A Strategy for Political Competition

The US needs to develop a strategy for political competition in Vietnam to supplement its military and diplomatic strategies and to be closely geared to those strategies. The US will have a significant although less important role to play in political competition than it has in military and diplomatic conflicts. A political strategy, unlike the military and diplomatic strategies, has a double goal: to persuade the enemy to compete politically and then to beat him at that competition.

### II. National Power and Local Control: Incentives to Play the Game

The NLF will want an extensive share of national power and full local control of the areas it dominates. It is in the interest of the US and GVN to trade local control for national power. The NLF can be permitted to have a substantial degree of autonomous control of substantial rural areas without serious damage to US-GVN interests.

### III. Political Competition: Arenas and Influences

Low levels of political competition are likely in NLF-controlled rural areas, communal-controlled rural areas, and the district and provincial towns. Political competition in the metropolitan centers will be continuing and intense but not polarized. Competition in the contested rural areas will be intense, polarized, but temporary, as one group or another will establish predominance quickly. Hence US efforts to develop political organizations should be concentrated in those areas.

The three crucial elements in a political competition are:
(a) the rules of the game;
(b) the number and identity of the players; and
(c) the resources which they have at their disposal. The US can influence these in descending order.

### IV. Fixing the Rules of the Game: The Electoral System

Electoral laws significantly affect the outcomes of political competition. The Vietnamese constitution permits considerable flexibility

in setting up an electoral system. Voting in Vietnam has been highly fragmented, and under the existing electoral system the NLF would have serious advantages. Vote fragmentation has been associated with: (a) low levels of group cohesion; (b) high levels of urbanization; and (c) high district magnitudes. Reducing district magnitude should reduce the fragmentation. A single-seat plurality system would accomplish this goal, but also would reduce proportionality and pose electoral risks to both GVN and NLF. A run-off majority system with multi-member districts would offer the best mix of pay-offs in terms of proportionality, cohesion, and minimizing NLF opportunities to manipulate the system.

## V. The Players and How We Can Help Them

The postwar Vietnamese party system will reflect the strength of the NLF and the degree of coalescence by non-communist groups. A one-and-a-half party system would be most desirable from the US viewpoint but a four or file party multi-party system seems most likely.

Local political competition will be intense in contested rural districts and the metropolitan centers. In the former competition will decrease rapidly as one group -- communist or non-communist -- establishes effective control. Consequently, the US should give top priority to short-run projects to build non-communist organizations in these districts, with particular attention to the role of communal groups and small intellectuals.

In the metropolitan centers competition will continue to intensify over a number of years. The cities will be susceptible to mass movements and will be the center of opposition to the government. It is consequently crucially important to encourage non-communist opposition leaders and groups and to prevent the NLF from monopolizing the urban opposition to the government.

Among the political resources which the GVN and the US can employ to counter the organizational strength of the NLF are: (a) popular, charismatic candidates; (b) the mass media, and (c) opportunities for constituent service by existing assemblymen.

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Revised Draft

2/8/69

GETTING READY FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Samuel P. Huntington

I. A STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

For three years the United States has encouraged the South Vietnamese to develop the constitutional framework, electoral process, political institutions, and administrative machinery required for a legitimate, responsible, and effective political system. Simultaneously the US has been fighting a major war and carrying out a military strategy designed to provide minimal security against invasion and subversion. In April 1968 a second, diplomatic, front was added to the military competition, and it became necessary for the US to devise and to apply a negotiating strategy for the Paris talks with Hanoi. At some point during the coming year, it appears likely that the conflict will be extended to a third, political, level as the GVN and the groups associated with it engage in open political competition with the VC and NLF. At this point the political progress and preparation of the past three years will be put to the test.

The purpose of this paper is to identify, in a very preliminary way,* some of the problems involved in this political

*This paper is based on brief talks with perhaps a dozen Washington officials and casual reference to a few documents. It clearly is only the beginning of a consideration of a subject which deserves much closer attention than it has thus far received.

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(w)

competition and the factors affecting its outcome and to
suggest the outlines of a strategy for the US to follow
and for the US to urge upon the GVN.

Three points affecting this discussion should be
made clear at the outset.

First. While the US has played the overwhelmingly
dominant role in shaping allied strategy on the military
and diplomatic levels, it will play a much less important
role in shaping strategy on the political level. Ideally,
it might well be desirable for the US to play no role
whatsoever in the political competition, but to leave the
determination of the rules of the game and the playing of
the game to be worked out by the GVN and the VC-NLF, with
the US confining itself to negotiating with Hanoi the
arrangements to end the military conflict. Such a situation
would have many attractions, not the least being avoidance
by the US of deeper involvement in the subtleties and
complexities of Vietnamese politics.

Yet it is extremely dubious whether the US can, in
fact, duck the issue so neatly. It is also highly debatable
whether it should even try. Much of our grief in Vietnam
has come as a result of our not becoming deeply enough
involved in Vietnamese politics during the late 1950s and
again during the two years immediately after the fall of
Diem. Both times we consciously refrained from taking action

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to shape the course of Vietnamese political development.
The results in one case were the increasing alienation of
the government from its people and in the other almost two
years of coups and chaos.

Since early 1966, on the other hand, we have played an
active role in attempting to develop a viable political
system in South Vietnam. The accomplishments have been
substantial. These accomplishments plus the American stake
in the political future of Vietnam plus the sacrifices and
costs which we have incurred in the effort over the past
three years to influence that future - all dictate against
our simply washing our hands of the problem and limiting
ourselves to the military and diplomatic sides of the
conflict. On the other hand, it is clear that the South
Vietnamese role in shaping the political competition and
in engaging in that competition will be much more important
than it has been in the military and diplomatic struggles.

Second. At the present time the struggle is going
on simultaneously on the diplomatic and military fronts.
This imposes a need to coordinate negotiating strategy and
military strategy. It is possible that the military and
diplomatic struggles will end before the political competi-
tion in South Vietnam really gets underway. It is also
possible and even likely that the political competition
will go on simultaneously with negotiations at the diplo-
matic level. Some more overt forms of political competi-
tion are already getting underway long before the achievement

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of a military cease-fire. Undoubtedly all three forms of competition will continue to overlap in the coming months. But also, undoubtedly, political competition will tend to become more important and the military and diplomatic struggles less important.

**Third.** The problem of formulating a strategy for political competition is more complex than those involved in formulating military or diplomatic strategies. In the latter, the goal is simply to win as much as possible from the opponent in the struggles on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. In devising a political strategy, however, the first requirement is get the opponent to agree to play the game, that is, to work out an agreement on the rules, and then, secondly, to beat him at the game which he has agreed to play. This is obviously a subtle and tricky business requiring a complex balance of inducements and guarantees for both sides.

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## II. NATIONAL POWER AND LOCAL CONTROL:
### INCENTIVES TO PLAY THE GAME

#### A. Local Control as an Inducement to Political Competition

The NLF's principal incentive to engage in political competition is the beating it is getting in the military competition. If, however, political competition offered at best only an equal chance of losing, it could well conclude that the best course was to continue the military fight in which it would retain greater freedom of action to adjust its tactics and level of operations to its own convenience. An NLF shift to political competition, in short, requires not only increasing costs from the military contest but also some chance of benefits from the political contest. At a minimum, it seems likely that the NLF will agree to participate in political competition only if the structure of that competition:

(1) insures its continued survival as an organization;

(2) offers a reasonable probability of its being able to achieve national power either through political competition or by later reopening a military struggle on more favorable terms.

These minimum aims could be achieved by a negotiated agreement for NLF participation in a coalition government (presumably headed by a neutralist but including some elements

II-2

now in the GVN) and/or by acceptance of NLF authority in those
areas of the countryside where they exercise de facto control.
The NLF would probably be prepared to sacrifice some elements
of local control in order to achieve a greater share in national
power. It would appear to be clearly in the interest of the US
and the GVN, however, to make substantial concessions in terms
of NLF local control in order to minimize concessions of
national power to the NLF. These concessions could cover:

(a) the degree of autonomy and authority conferred on
NLF local structures; and

(b) the extent of the territory in which such NLF hegemony
was recognized.

At both these levels there is ample room for substantial inducements to the NLF without serious injury to the interests of the US and GVN.

B. Possible Arrangements for Local Control

The past two years have seen an accelerating trend toward
the decentralization of power and authority in the Vietnamese
political system. Simultaneously, economic development, population
movements, the growth of a rural market economy, improvements in
transportation and communication, all have tended to multiply the
linkages between rural and urban areas. Economic integration has
been the partner of political decentralization. The extension of
both these processes to the areas currently controlled by the NLF
would provide a basis for the immediate political autonomy and
physical security which the NLF will demand and, at the same time,
prepare the way for the incorporation of those areas into the

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national economy which will eventually undermine the NLF power base.

The processes of economic integration complement political decentralization in non-NLF areas and also reduce the risks of granting autonomy to NLF areas. Clearly, however, there are some limits beyond which the GVN cannot go in granting local autonomy. In any arrangements for local control, the NLF presumably would have to agree to at least the following:

(1) acceptance of the formal authority of the GVN as the national government;

(2) a guarantee of free movement and security in and out of and within the designated districts for all civilians, including local population, international peace-keeping observers (if such should be created), and civil officials of the Saigon government;

(3) a guarantee of the free movement and security of goods and commerce in and out of and within the district;

(4) acceptance of the functioning within the district of (potentially selected) civilian ministries of the Saigon government such as agriculture, health, and education.

In return for these concessions by the NLF, the GVN could be prepared to concede any or all of the following:

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(1) recognition of the NLF Liberation Committee structure as the only legitimate government of the area;

(2) confirmation of the authority of the existing officials of the Liberation Committee as local officials of the GVN;

(3) a guarantee that no subsequent appointments of GVN officials within the local government will be made without the approval of the local authorities (a concession comparable to those which the GVN has in the past made to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao);

(4) acceptance of the VC-NLF guerrilla-militia units as the Popular Force-Self Defense units of the district (as has also been done with Hoa Hao and other communal units);

(5) a guarantee that no regular ARVN units will enter the district except with the approval of the local government (again a commitment somewhat like those made to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in some provinces);

(6) recognition of local control over taxes and the uses of tax revenues (a procedure already operative within GVN-controlled rural areas);

(7) recognition by the GVN of the legality of previous NLF-Liberation Committee decrees on land tenure and

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other local issues;

(8) provision by the GVN (and ultimately, presumably, the US) of material assistance for reconstruction in the district;

(9) immediate representation of the district in the lower house of the National Assembly by election of a representative to one of the 63 "unfilled" seats.

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C. Extent of Area to be Subject to NLF Local Control

The areas to be conceded to NLF local control would undoubtedly have to be defined in terms of villages and districts, although in some cases, particularly in the Delta, hamlets within a village might have to be divided between NLF and non-NLF control. The specific definition of the areas would clearly be the result of prolonged negotiation. In preparation for this possibility, it would seem highly desirable that negotiating positions be developed identifying which villages and districts could be most reasonably conceded to the NLF, which might be conceded, if necessary, and which should definitely not be allowed to become subject to NLF rule. Such an inventory would have to be based on the most recent and accurate results of the HES and other sources of information.

D. Advantages for US-GVN of Local Control

If NLF local control can be negotiated as a substitute for substantial NLF participation in the national government, the advantages for the US-GVN are considerable.

(1) It prevents the NLF from gaining through negotiation what they have not been able to win through military means, i.e., an open foothold in the cities. If, on the other hand, the NLF did get control of a

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substantial number of Saigon ministries, it would
be in a position to give substantial help to its
former underground urban organization in developing
political appeal and strength in the cities. If
the future of Vietnam lies in its cities, it is
worthwhile from the US and GVN viewpoint to pay
a significant price to minimize the NLF presence
in the cities.

(2) Local control undermines the image of the NLF as an equal of the Saigon government and instead reduces it to the level, in the eyes of Vietnamese, of a communal group like the Hoa Hao or Montagnards. Vietnamese traditionally tend to think of the government as an entity more or less endowed with the "mandate of heaven" and existing above conflicting social and political groups. The NLF is laying claim to that mandate. No matter how much territory or how many people the NLF may control locally, if it allows its claim to be an equal to the government to be undermined, it will suffer a severe setback.

(3) In contrast to shared national authority, local control will tend to enhance the importance of political competition at the provincial and local level and to reduce its significance at the national

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level. Fragmentation and disunity among noncommunist
groups are likely to be greater at the national
level than in any particular locality and the un-
desirable consequences of that disunity are also
much greater there. The NLF is, after all, the
most powerful purely political national organization:
at the national level of competition, its organiza-
tion in areas which it does not control would be
weighed in the balance along with its strength in
the areas it does dominate.

(4) The underlying problem in Vietnam has been to bridge the gap between the countryside and the cities. The VC-NLF propose to do this by bringing a mixed urban-rural leadership group to power by mobilizing support in the countryside. Constrained by urban leadership divorced from the countryside, neither the Diem nor post-Diem GVN has been able to bridge this gap.

The US, however, has been bridging the gap through two means: (a) inducing substantial migration of people from the countryside to the cities; and (b) promoting economic development in rural areas and marketing and transportation links between them and the cities. In one form or another these developments will undoubtedly continue after the end