VIETNAM - NIXON SPEECHES - INDEX

Tab

1 Address to the Nation on Vietnam - May 14, 1969

2 Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam - Nov. 3, 1969

3 Address to the Nation on Progress Toward Peace in Vietnam -
December 15, 1969

4 Foreign Policy Report to Congress -- February 18, 1970,
Chapter on Vietnam

5 Address to the Nation on Progress Toward Peace in Vietnam -
April 20, 1970

6 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia -
April 30, 1970

7 Address to the Nation on the Cambodian Sanctuary Operation -
June 3, 1970

8 Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace in
Southeast Asia - October 7, 1970

9 Foreign Policy Report to Congress -- February 25, 1971,
Chapters on Vietnam and Laos/Cambodia

10 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia -
April 7, 1971

11 Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace
in Vietnam - January 25, 1972

12 Foreign Policy Report to Congress -- February 9, 1972,
Chapter on Indochina

13 Address to the Nation on Vietnam - April 26, 1972

14 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast
Asia - May 8, 1972

15 Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement
on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam - January
23, 1973

16 Text of Paris Peace Agreement - Signed January 27, 1973

17 Address to the Nation About Vietnam and Domestic Problems -
March 29, 1973

cont'd

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18 Foreign Policy Report to Congress - May 3, 1973, Chapters on Vietnam and Laos/Cambodia

19 Remarks at Armed Forces Day Ceremonies, Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia - May 19, 1973 (comments on Vietnam)

20 Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation for Funding of Foreign Assistance Programs in Fiscal Year 1975 - April 24, 1974, comments on aid for reconstruction of Indochina

21 Joint Communique following Moscow Summit - July 3, 1974, section on Indochina

## Other

22 Vietnam casualties lists

Richard Nixon, 1969

May 14 [195]

reviewing deferment policies, we can do much to achieve these important interim goals. We should do no less for the youth of our country.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House

May 13, 1969

NOTE: Following a meeting with the President on May 13, Representative Gerald R. Ford of Michigan held a news briefing which touched upon the President's draft reform proposals. The text of the news briefing is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 5, p. 683).

195 Address to the Nation on Vietnam.

May 14, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

I have asked for this television time tonight to report to you on our most difficult and urgent problem—the war in Vietnam.

Since I took office 4 months ago, nothing has taken so much of my time and energy as the search for a way to bring lasting peace to Vietnam. I know that some believe that I should have ended the war immediately after the inauguration by simply ordering our forces home from Vietnam.

This would have been the easy thing to do. It might have been a popular thing to do. But I would have betrayed my solemn responsibility as President of the United States if I had done so.

I want to end this war. The American people want to end this war. The people of South Vietnam want to end this war. But we want to end it permanently so that the younger brothers of our soldiers in Vietnam will not have to fight in the future in another Vietnam someplace else in the world.

The fact that there is no easy way to end the war does not mean that we have no choice but to let the war drag on with no end in sight.

For 4 years American boys have been fighting and dying in Vietnam. For 12

months our negotiators have been talking with the other side in Paris. And yet the fighting goes on. The destruction continues. Brave men still die.

The time has come for some new initiatives. Repeating the old formulas and the tired rhetoric of the past is not enough. When Americans are risking their lives in war, it is the responsibility of their leaders to take some risks for peace.

I would like to report to you tonight on some of the things we have been doing in the past 4 months to bring true peace, and then I would like to make some concrete proposals to speed that day.

Our first step began before inauguration. This was to launch an intensive review of every aspect of the Nation's Vietnam policy. We accepted nothing on faith, we challenged every assumption and every statistic. We made a systematic, serious examination of all the alternatives open to us. We carefully considered recommendations offered both by critics and supporters of past policies.

From the review, it became clear at once that the new administration faced a set of immediate operational problems:

- The other side was preparing for a new offensive.

- There was a wide gulf of distrust be-

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[195] May 14

Public Papers of the Presidents

tween Washington and Saigon.

—In 8 months of talks in Paris, there had been no negotiations directly concerned with a final settlement.

Therefore, we moved on several fronts at once.

We frustrated the attack which was launched in late February. As a result, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong failed to achieve their military objectives.

We restored a close working relationship with Saigon. In the resulting atmosphere of mutual confidence, President Thieu and his Government have taken important initiatives in the search for a settlement.

We speeded up the strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces. I am glad to report tonight that, as a result, General Abrams told me on Monday that progress in the training program had been excellent and that, apart from any developments that may occur in the negotiations in Paris, the time is approaching when South Vietnamese forces will be able to take over some of the fighting fronts now being manned by Americans.

In weighing alternate courses, we have had to recognize that the situation as it exists today is far different from what it was 2 years ago or 4 years ago or 10 years ago.

One difference is that we no longer have the choice of not intervening. We have crossed that bridge. There are now more than a half million American troops in Vietnam and 35,000 Americans have lost their lives.

We can have honest debate about whether we should have entered the war in Vietnam. We can have honest debate about how the war has been conducted. But the urgent question today is what to do now that we are there.

Against that background, let me discuss first, what we have rejected, and second, what we are prepared to accept.

We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield.

We have also ruled out either a one-sided withdrawal from Vietnam, or the acceptance in Paris of terms that would amount to a disguised American defeat.

When we assumed the burden of helping defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women, and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our long-term hopes for peace in the world. A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great nation must be worthy of trust.

When it comes to maintaining peace, "prestige" is not an empty word. I am not speaking of false pride or bravado—they should have no place in our policies. I speak rather of the respect that one nation has for another's integrity in defending its principles and meeting its obligations.

If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

Another reason for not withdrawing unilaterally stems from debates within the Communist world between those who argue for a policy of confrontation with the United States, and those who argue against it.

If Hanoi were to succeed in taking

over South Vietnam, the power engaged—those who advocate risks of war. It would enable them to pose a bigger threat to the United States.

If we are to have a chance of continuing our efforts toend the war, then we must point at a time when we can be sure that the United States will not test our ability to meet the challenge.

Almost all of us know that they would have to withdraw to the security of our own soil.

In determining our acceptable terms of participation in the post-war international system, we want it to be clear that we seek the preservation of the United States' own political independence.

Let me tell you what we want. We want the President to tell the people of South Vietnam that he wants to preserve the status quo until after the general elections in the United States.

The United States cannot afford to lose a single one of its million citizens. What we want is not the people of South Vietnam, but the people of South Vietnam.

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30-861

[2]

Richard Nixon, 1969

May 14 [195]

Background, let me dis-
have rejected, and sec-
prepared to accept.
out attempting to im-
ilitary solution on the

nled out either a one-
from Vietnam, or the
s of terms that would
ised American defeat.
d the burden of help-
Vietnam, millions of
men, women, and chil-
just in us. To abandon
risk a massacre that
smay everyone in the
imma-
tive.

out Vietnamese peo-
jeopardize more than
It would threaten
s for peace in the
I cannot renege on its
on must be worthy of

maintaining peace,
empty word. I am not
le or bravado—they
e in our policies. I
respect that one na-
integrity in defend-
and meeting its

loned our effort in
of peace might not
hat would be done
onfidence in our

not withdrawing
debates within the
between those who
confrontation with
I who argue
succeed in taking

over South Vietnam by force—even after
the power of the United States had been
engaged—it would greatly strengthen
those leaders who scorn negotiation, who
advocate aggression, who minimize the
risks of confrontation with the United
States. It would bring peace now but it
would enormously increase the danger of
a bigger war later.

If we are to move successfully from an
era of confrontation to an era of negotia-
tion, then we have to demonstrate—at the
point at which confrontation is being
tested—that confrontation with the
United States is costly and unrewarding.

Almost without exception, the leaders
of non-Communist Asia have told me that
they would consider a one-sided American
withdrawal from Vietnam to be a threat
to the security of their own nations.

In determining what choices would be
acceptable, we have to understand our
essential objective in Vietnam: What we
want is very little, but very fundamental.
We seek the opportunity for the South
Vietnamese people to determine their
own political future without outside
interference.

Let me put it plainly: What the United
States wants for South Vietnam is not the
important thing. What North Vietnam
wants for South Vietnam is not the im-
portant thing. What is important is what
the people of South Vietnam want for
South Vietnam.

The United States has suffered over a
million casualties in four wars in this cen-
tury. Whatever faults we may have as a
nation, we have asked nothing for our-
selves in return for those sacrifices. We
have been generous toward those whom
we have fought. We have helped our
former foes as well as our friends in the
task of reconstruction. We are proud of

this record, and we bring the same attitude
in our search for a settlement in Vietnam.

In this spirit, let me be explicit about
several points:

- We seek no bases in Vietnam.

- We seek no military ties.

- We are willing to agree to neutrality
for South Vietnam if that is what the
South Vietnamese people freely
choose.

- We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

- We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

- We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will we be a party to such coercion.

- We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of South Vietnam and the people of North Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

At this point, I would like to add a personal word based on many visits to South Vietnam over the past 5 years. This is the most difficult war in America's history, fought against a ruthless enemy. I am proud of our men who have carried the terrible burden of this war with dignity and courage, despite the division and opposition to the war in the United States. History will record that never have America's fighting men fought more bravely for more unselfish goals than our men in Vietnam. It is our responsibility to see that they have not fought in vain.

39-861-71—27

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