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and against foreign invasion. I don't think there's much
we can do about Iraq. Thirdly, if we act skillfully and
bring Egypt into a solution of the Lebanon problem, then
we can demonstrate to the other Arabs that it was the moderate
Arabs that participated in the peace process that solved not
only the question of war and peace but that helped solve the
Lebanese problem. Solving the Lebanese problem I would
define as an attempt to restore a central government that can
handle any indigenous forces, the disarming or withdrawing of
all foreign forces with perhaps a small Syrian presence in
the northern edge of the Bekaa valley closest to Damascus.

I believe the best forces for southern Lebanon would be
Egyptian forces rather than American forces, or at least
an Egyptian presence together with others, because I think
American forces which I read in the newspapers would be an
absolute disaster. It would get us involved in policing
operations and in a direct confrontation and into negotiations
with groups we shouldn't negotiate with on local reasons.

This is roughly my view on the Middle East so I believe if
we act now, if we get Egypt involved in Lebanon and Jordan
on the West Bank and group Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan in
a series of tacit understandings and get Israel to make some
concessions on the West Bank of significance, I think we
can demonstrate that any creative thing that happens in
the area will occur as a result of American policies and
that the road to solution goes through Washington or moderate
Arab governments and not through the radicals backed by the
Soviets. If we fail in this I think two years from now we

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4

will be much worse off than we were when this crisis started.

I feel very strongly that we have very little time to lose.

The Israelis have to make much more concessions than they have been prepared to make on the West Bank and the Arabs have to accept much less than they have asked for. The best that can be achieved now in my view is a return of Arab populations to Arab control in an interim negotiation, except Jerusalem which has to be given a separate interim status and leave key strategic areas with Israel and then to have another negotiation to take care of the rest five to eight years from now. The issue isn't details but the strategic direction and the ability for the first time to relate the various pieces of this puzzle together so that concern about Soviet penetration, concern about radical penetration and concern about Arab-Israeli problems can all merge in one issue.

Let me make two more comments at last about East-West issues.

I will only make one point about the Alliance. The point I want to make about the Alliance is I think a point I have made previously to this group which is that any alliance has the problem of defining how much unity it needs and how much diversity it can stand. There is no great theoretical answer to this problem. If one looks at the Alliance, it is clear that it is not possible, maybe not even desirable, for the allies to agree on everything. The fact of the matter is that they don't seem to agree on anything. Whether the issue is East-West trade, East-West policies, North-South relations -- I mean there was something absurd, if our

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British friends will forgive me, about American journalists saying we had a duty to support Britain in the Falkland Islands as an old ally after twenty years of being told that the NATO obligations had no relevance except outside the NATO area. I think we should have supported Britain on the issue of the use of force for fifty other reasons.

The fact is that we have not agreed on any of these fundamental problems and the issues we discussed yesterday. The fact that Europe's economic position is going to decline and that the domestic politics of all of our countries will take place in a no growth situation. Give domestic politics in all NATO a sharpness that they have never had because now, up to the early seventies the domestic disputes concerned the allocation of a growing pie so that some groups were relatively better off than others but all of them were better off. Now, the richer groups can gain only at the expense of other groups so that domestic politics becomes much nastier and foreign policy becomes an aspect of the domestic positions of the various participants so that a serious strategic dialogue or balance of power dialogue becomes as difficult as it is absolutely essential. At a time, moreover when the domestic imperatives in most countries do not produce great leaders so that you go from meeting to meeting, from summit to summit, and the public is given the impression that something important happens but when nine people meet and each makes an opening statement of 45 minutes, you've already spent your whole day making one statement. The meetings are only for a day and a

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half so it is organically impossible to have serious dis-
cussions and yet there is a big media event that takes
place every year on documents produced by low level
bureaucrats and that are finished when these people meet so
that the demoralization of our body politic -- when I read
these accounts of how Reagan said this and was answered .. --
these documents were finished. There was no discussion
unless things have changed totally. There was one play made
for television and in the long term this is our great
Alliance problem on top of the fact that the domestic situation
in Germany in an enormous state of change but I want to talk
about East-West relations.

I don't want to talk about the purely military problem but
about the problem of how one conceives long term relations
between us and the Soviet Union to evolve. I think there the
difficulty, that I mentioned in the beginning, between how
we perceive foreign policy domestically in the United States
has tended to paralyze our domestic disputes because those
who are interested in negotiations with the Soviet Union have
at least a subconscious tendency to think that there are
some negotiating formulas, some building of goodwill, some
individual moves that can be made that can ease the situations
and they're opposed by people as we've seen through ten years
of SALT negotiations that use any negotiation as a symbol of
Soviet evil and that will not accept the proposition that in
a negotiation you must make some concessions in order to gain

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Soviet concessions. Much of the SALT debate, for example, did not concern the issue of whether the concessions that were made were valid but on a compulsive demonstration that concessions were made at all. Almost never is there any study of the trends that would have occurred independent of the negotiations so that force levels that were military had established totally unilaterally without any reference to discussions with the Soviets became unbearable the minute they were written down in an agreement. As soon as we got the right to build more we stuck to the original force levels that had been established by the agreement and then they became quite bearable just as long as they were not part of an understanding with the Soviet Union.

This is an American domestic issue that in my view is going to emerge very strongly within the next year. I think the Reagan Administration has caught on to sort of a gimmick which is to take the program of the peace movement and go 50% further than anybody thought they would go in some formal proposal, put it on the table and they have managed to receive a fair consensus with it because many of the sensible people in the peace groups are so relieved that the Reagan Administration has committed itself to any negotiation at all that they support proposals that they know to be intellectually without any considerable merit. I don't think that this Eureka speech will withstand systematic analysis by Paul Doty. Paul has supported it, I have supported it, we've all supported it because we think it gets us on the right course even though when you analyze

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the figures two conclusions seem to me self evident. One,
the Soviet Union cannot possibly accept this proposal.
Secondly, if they accepted it, it wouldn't be in our interest.
It wouldn't be wildly against our interests but the situation
would be marginally worse than it was before-- not enough to
go on the barricades over but enough to say that you cannot
in good conscience say a great progress has been made. In
such an atmosphere foreign policy East-West relations become
ruthless (rootless?). I had a discussion yesterday with one
of the ladies here on the peace movement and I am very much
afraid that we are going to slide into a situation like the
Vietnam war debate again where people think that parading around
with placards in acclamation of peace is a contribution to
peace, and where asserting that nuclear weapons are horrible
is considered to be a moral act. It's been known by every
serious person on every side of this argument that nuclear
weapons are horrible. The question is how in a world where
tens of thousands have been proposed where nobody can come
up with any rational proposal of getting the level down to
zero. You can reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, make some
progress, get some hope without generating an attitude of
unilateral disarmament and without demoralizing yourself by
believing that the issue is the moral iniquity of your own
people. There the intellectual community has a major res-
ponsibility to make sure that the debate does not take the
self-destructive form it did ten years ago. And the
government has a major responsibility to do it.

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I don't think it's soluable with multiple warheads and I think that the only sensible approach now is to try to find that if we could get a requirement that multiple warheads be abolished and that even larger numbers of single warhead weapons were produced we'd be better off than in a situation where no matter what you do there's always an inequality in favor of the attacker. Therefore, if you go down in numbers you may even make the situation more unstable.

I want to talk about one aspect of problems which is what is the implication for western policy of the knowledge that the Soviet system is weak. We've all been basing our policies on the assumption that the Soviet system is strong. To get at that let me put before you six or seven things that might happen in the next fifteen years towards which we need ..... what are the real dangers we face on the issue of war and peace? There is the danger of an all-out surprise attack by the Soviet Union. I think if we behave half seriously, there is next to no probability. I do not see that governments that have nevered fired more than three missiles from operational silos will suddenly believe in theoretical calculations of what a thousand missiles fired simultaneously in a direction in which they have never been fired experimentally will do and how that screwed-up Soviet system will believe the theoretical calculations of its scientists about accuracy anymore than we will. I think this is very low.

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Secondly, there is a danger of a war that could happen like World War I. That I think is serious. That a series of events occur of marginal significance in which the two sides simply don't know how to get off the bus. Third, massive attack on Europe I think is very unlikely for the first reason. Massive attack on China is highly possible and could happen.

What protects China right now is its weakness. If the Chinese put together five years of 5% growth and the Soviets see a China that ten years from then will be as strong as Japan in the middle sixties. Will they hold still for that; I don't know. What do we do? What is the obligation for the West, for industrial democracies when that happens? I don't know any systematic thinking that has taken place even though the geopolitical consequences of an attack on China are no less serious, or hardly less serious, than an attack on Europe.

Soviet evolution -- what will the Soviets do when their weakness becomes apparent to them as it must. The fundamental Soviet problem is the problem of the communist countries which is what do you do with the communist party in a communist state? There is no function for the communist party in a communist state. But, there is also the certainty that once you tackle the problem of the control apparatus, you may create such a period of weakness that you may have a certain temptation to try to clean up as much of the foreign environment as you can before you get to the domestic environment. Can the United States help this evolution? Certainly we have to prevent foreign adventures. But what can we do with the

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Soviet Union in terms of its own evolution. This is the big
unanswered problem. How can we have a dialogue with the
Soviet Union that encourages not the settlement of this or
that dispute which brings out the absolutely worst tendencies
in Soviet negotiators, but that enables then to come to grips
with their fundamental structural problems in a manner in
which they don't think they have to dismantle everything that
they have that to them is worth living ( at least of the
control party). Is it in our interest to ease their economic
condition or is it in out interest to let them stew in their
own juice? I have made up my mind frankly about one thing:
the worst thing we can do is to help their economic evolution
without having a fundamental discussion with them. The worst
thing is to give grain and credits for nothing, or based only
on economic conditions, which help them to patch together their
military machine without some political price. Then what is
the political price we want? What is it we want them to do?
That we haven't thought through as a society. I'm not saying
there aren't individuals who have thought about it but in
our government at no time that I know from the containment
days on when people said a moment will come when the Soviets
will be forced to talk with us. Had the Soviets come to
Dean Acheson in 1951 and said alright we're ready to talk,
I don't think he would have known exactly what he was going
to ask of them. Even if he knew I don't think any of his
successors who followed the same policy knew what exactly
we would ask of them. I think it is not beyond the wit of

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man if you look at the evolution that might happen and it is
not beyond the wit of man to imagine a situation in which the
Soviets miss their window with China and where China develops
and becomes like Japan. It is not even beyond the wit of man
to imagine a situation where Japan and China then become very
close together. At that moment it is quite possible that
Russia will be driven towards the West by the much derided
balance of power considerations. In any event, the alignments
15 years from that moment on will be so different that we
can't even imagine it. Should one fight an internal civil
war when all these things are possible? There must be some
Soviets who are thinking about what this evolution could be.
I would think that if one could imagine, for example, that
arms budgets went down by half, not the trivial stuff that
people are now talking about, but really fundamental changes
that eliminate or sharply reduce the capacity of major powers
to conduct significant foreign adventures. Again, that would
have to be studied what that level would be. Then one could
imagine a level of economic relations between East and West
infinitely beyond what even the more irresponsible capitalist
countries are now doing provided one can get some assurance
that while this process is going on it is not used to strengthen
an eventual assault on Western society. Maybe people can
imagine fifteen futures rather than the seven that I have
mentioned here but it seems to me that this is a framework
for East-West negotiation but that requires a greater debt is
one of the most important reasons for unity of conceptual
approaches among the alliances. The present tendencies where

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people a domestic breathing space by trying
to elicit American proposals in the arms control field that
they themselves can have no conviction about and then lead
them to endless negotiations that become self-sustaining,
really have a tendency to produce the worst possible situations
in which no government faces its fundamental problems and in
which some day some crisis is going to occur like in southern
Lebanon which draws in the various parties and in which they
raise the ante slowly. I think the six weeks prior to World
War I are much more instructive for our period than World War II.

I don't think anybody wanted the kind of World War I that
developed and every leader would have been absolutely horrified
had he known the world of 1917. Yet, once they got going they
neither knew what the consequences were nor how to stop, even
if they had wanted to stop. Our big problem is to prevent the
objective conditions from arising where this could occur and
to develop some future vision that can be put before our people
and before the Soviet leaders in a more fundamental negotiation
than the present framework permits.