INTRODUCTION

This study will examine some of the inter-relations between two
of the central problems of contemporary international politics: the
orientation of Germany and the political and strategic implications
of nuclear weapons. There is no dearth of writings on each of these
questions in isolation. Since the early post-war period journalists
and academics have contributed to a steady stream of works on Germany,
and in recent years a large number of American scholars and theorists
have turned their attention to the problems of nuclear strategy.
However, with some few notable exceptions, the strategic literature
has paid remarkably little attention to the political problems which
not only complicate strategic choices, but may even, to use a current
idiom, determine the rules according to which the game of strategy
is to be played.

It is one thing to deplore the separation between the two universes
of discourse, the political and the strategic, quite another thing to
relate them in practice. There are no simple relationships between
strategy and politics, indeed no simple boundaries between the two:
military strategy is an integral part of foreign policy, like economic
policy, for example, in the case of domestic policy. Just as many
politicians know no economics, and some economists lacht political
judgement, strategists and politicians tend to inhabit different worlds.
This mutual incomprehension is reflected in the two opposing complaints,
the strategists' lament that governments do not take military considerations

-1-

-2-

seriously, and the charge of many politicians that western diplomacy has been hamstrung by the dominance of the same military considerations.

The substantive questions underlying these kinds of reactions will be examined in the course of the study. The immediate point is that these formulations indicate the indeterminate nature of our concepts of the political and the military. The "predominance of military considerations" could refer to something non-controversial, the fact that NATO membership imposes significant constraints on the diplomatic freedom of its members; it becomes controversial if it is argued that NATO policies have prevented desirable political settlements with the Soviets, as is in fact argued by many critics of western policy. In another sense, the charge of the dominance of military factors is misleading: by the mid-1950's, all of the western leaders concerned in the decisions to press forward with German rearmament, for example, were far more interested in Germany's political relationships--its firm alignment with the West--than with its military contribution to NATO. The strategists' complaint, however, is directed not against this broad priority of political objectives, but against the politicians' typical lack of concern with the implications of decisions in military policy, in a period when the options available, and the level of risks, in future crises or wars, depend greatly on the priorities and choices of the present time. The strategist is thinking not of a greater influence by the military (service interests and pressures may impede overall design of policy) but of a firm co-ordination of military policy, based on a systematic examination of contingencies and evaluation of different military options. One purpose of the present study is to suggest in some detail what might be implied in such an approach to contemporary European military problems.

-3-

Any contemporary study will be deeply influenced by the circumstances of the time of its writing. This is usually described, rather misleadingly, as the problem of keeping up with events; what is much more important than the stream of events as such is the way in which international situations undergo a process of gradual change, the perception of which alternately lags behind or advances beyond the "objective" changes in situation. Thus, the period starting in the later 1950's was one in which the balance of power within the western alliance was changing. Europe's economic strength, America's corresponding balance of payments problems, and de Gaulle's successful termination of the Algerian war created a new freedom of manoeuvre for France and brought about a new climate of opinion in which Europe would no longer, as in the 1950's, almost automatically follow the American lead in alliance policy. De Gaulle's rejection of the Nassau agreement and the British bid to enter Europe, in January 1963, ushered in a brief period in which it appeared likely that Europe as a whole might support his challenge to American leadership; by the end of 1963 it was clear that most Europeans wished to preserve existing links with the United States, but also that there would have to be some modification of the responsibility for, as well as the burden of, European defense--but quite unclear how this might be realized in practice.

German attitudes in this period have been influenced, first and foremost, by the Berlin crisis, which tended to reinforce an already strong sense of dependence on the western alliance, or more accurately, on the United States. Though critical of some aspects of American policy, Germans were confirmed in their belief in the need for an Atlantic framework for defense. One of the more important of today's

-4-

uncertainties is the effect of a prolonged relaxation of Soviet pressure on Berlin--if indeed the relaxation since the end of 1962 should prove to be more than temporary. A study completed in 1964 necessarily bears the marks of this particular phase of Atlantic and East/West relations and uncertainties.

The work is divided into four parts. Firstly, it discusses the evolution of German foreign and military policy, not in all its detail, but in an attempt to set out its principal phases. What is most striking is the extent to which, within a basically uniform situation, the concrete objectives, issues and preoccupations behind policy have been transformed several times in West Germany's short history, by the need to adapt to changes in American and Soviet policy.

The remaining parts examine three aspects of the German-allied relationship prominent in one or more of the phases of German post-war history, and likely to remain so. Part II analyzes in some detail certain of the strategic questions in European defense, taking as its starting point the differences between the American and the German approaches, the latter being for the most part representative of the wider European approach. This part of the study necessarily draws heavily on the American strategic literature, the only body of writing which has examined the problems of nuclear strategy systematically in the light of the insights of a wide range of scholarly disciplines. If the conclusions in the main lend support to the prevailing American strategic doctrine, this is perhaps less significant than the attempt to apply to specific European problems a dimension of analysis absent from most European thought on military policy.

-5-

Part III turns from speculation on hypothetical extreme contingencies to an examination of the actual political struggle between the Soviets and the western powers, initiated by Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum of November 1958, conducted always in the shadow of thermonuclear war. For four years the two sides engaged in a protracted contest of will, evenly matched with respect both to caution and obstinacy, each apparently determined to avoid a show-down, Khrushchev as reluctant to abandon his challenge as the West to make any substantial political concession to purchase a relaxation of Soviet pressure. The Cuban crisis of 1962 provided a dramatic denouement, suggesting that Khrushchev may have failed fully to appreciate the risks in any political challenge at the present time when the stakes are high. In mid-1964, however, it is too early to say whether his ensuing circumspection has represented a basic change of political strategy, or merely a characteristic tactical fluctuation. Whether or not the Berlin crisis is revived, the Soviet attempt to influence the political balance in Germany can be expected to continue.

Finally, Part IV examines the most uncertain factor in Germany's orientation and its relations with its allies, the issue of German reunification, dominant in the German political debate from 1952 until 1955 or even later. There is no natural convergence of German and allied interests on reunification: it is necessary to ask whether, given a strong but not over-riding interest in common action, a basis can be found for such a common policy, and whether and in what circumstances German reunification might become feasible. Closely related to German unity, the central problem for any permanent political settlement in

-6-

Europe, are the questions of military disengagement, arms limitation and political détente. If German unity is the latent source of discord in German-allied relations, these issues, nearer the surface, provide irritants capable of seriously straining the relationship.

Chapter One

GERMANY'S ALIGNMENT WITH THE WEST, 1949-51

I. Adenauer's Foreign Policy¹

From the early days of the Federal Republic Adenauer dominated the conduct of foreign policy, not only conducting all negotiations with the allied High Commissioners, but frequently taking the most vital decisions before consulting his cabinet. His subsequent electoral success and his control over the Christian Democrats enabled him to retain the decisive voice in foreign policy. To an exceptional extent, then, the study of West German foreign policy must be based on an appraisal of Adenauer.

It is true that his policies can be viewed as a reflection of the basic values of the West Germans: a sense of community with the Western powers, extreme aversion to the prospect of Communist rule, and commitment to the "European idea" in place of a discredited nationalism. But German values were in fact more complex and contradictory: public opinion as a whole remained more nationalist than European (in contrast to "elite" opinion) and reunification was as prominent as the other values mentioned.

Furthermore, public opinion refused to admit any need to choose between different values or objectives; Adenauer showed a marked capacity for decisive choice.

¹There is as yet no scholarly study of Adenauer's foreign policy. The authorized biography by Paul Weymar, *Konrad Adenauer* (London, Andre Deutsch, 1957) contains useful material for the period to 1955. Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1960) contains a comprehensive collection of articles and papers which offer valuable insight into the thinking of the German government.

-8-

It can be argued that in reality West Germany "had no choice" in the major decisions fixing its alignment with the West: Adenauer acted as any German government would have had to. But while a strong case can be made out for this view, it does presuppose the existence of an effective and responsible government, conditions which can hardly be taken for granted. Moreover, Adenauer's absolute priority for the Western alliance over the search for reunification--his most disputed political choice--was so controversial among responsible Germans that it cannot be rightly described as the only possible course open to Germany.

Adenauer's claim to greatness in foreign policy rests, not so much on his firmness in committing Germany to a western orientation, as on his persistence in working toward an ideal which may come to transform the European state system--political integration. No other European leader was for so long in a position to influence the fortunes of European integration; Adenauer, though seldom the initiator of new ideas, consistently provided the indispensable support of a leading power for each European initiative.

Adenauer took little interest in the details of military policy. He saw the German military contribution as a prerequisite for the achievement of his objectives: only by participation in the alliance could Germany claim allied protection, without which its political freedom would be constantly threatened. If the vision of a united Europe served as a long-term objective, Adenauer's more immediate goals were to recover for Germany a place in the Western community, to promote the solidarity of the alliance, and in particular to promote Franco-German co-operation. Only after 1960, partly through disagreement with the new

-9-

military strategy of the Kennedy Administration, partly as an inevitable consequence of the growth of the Bundeswehr, did certain distinctive German views on military policy begin to become apparent. Although Germany remained more singlemindedly committed to NATO than any other European member-state, its special geographical situation rendered it apprehensive of the new tendencies in American strategic thinking.

Inevitably, Adenauer also sought to increase Germany's strength and influence: the achievement of his broader aims tended to strengthen Germany's position, which in turn lent weight to his European and alliance policies. What is remarkable is the restraint with which Adenauer sought to enhance German influence. In the military field, for example, while resisting any discrimination imposed on Germany from outside, he adhered unconditionally to the unilateral renunciation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, offered to NATO in 1954 as part of the political framework for Germany's entry into the alliance. Moreover, Germany has been the only member-state willing to place the whole of its armed forces under NATO command; in marked contrast to Gaullist France, Germany has not sought greater national military independence, has not sought to use the commitment of troops to NATO as a source of bargaining leverage, but has held out the ideal of military integration as the goal appropriate to all NATO members. Further, by renouncing a national command structure or a general staff¹, and by encouraging logistic interdependence, especially

¹The Planning Staff in the German Defense Ministry is very small, its members of relatively junior rank, and it regards itself as subordinate to SHAPE, working within its guidelines.

-10-

with the United States forces, German policy has deliberately renounced
options for independent military action.

Thus, the notion that beneath the surface of the European statesman
lurked a traditional German nationalist--that German strength was in
reality Adenauer's overriding objective--need not be taken seriously.
His record speaks eloquently for the genuineness of his commitment to
the uniting of Europe. While documentation of Adenauer's private thinking
on foreign policy is still lacking, chance provided the *Spiegel* with a
unique opportunity to record a private discussion between Adenauer, Spaak
and Bech (of Luxemburg)--the *Spiegel* reporter having overheard a midnight
conversation during the London Conference (late September, 1954) which
worked out the basis for Germany's entry into NATO after the collapse
of EDC; the general accuracy of the report was not challenged.

"That I should be compelled to remake the German national
army is nonsense, Herr Bech. It is grotesque...!

"I am one hundred percent convinced that the German national
army, to which Mendes-France is driving us, will be a great
danger for both Germany and Europe. When I am no longer there,
I do not know what will happen to Germany if we have not yet
succeeded in creating a united Europe...

"The French nationalists are just as ready as the German to
repeat the old policies, in spite of past experience. They would
rather a Germany with a national army than United Europe--so long
as they can pursue their own policy with the Russians. And the
German nationalists think exactly the same way; they are ready to
go with the Russians."

Adenauer seemed completely possessed by the fear of a revival of
a cynical, narrow German nationalism, which deeply disturbs him.
Again and again, raising his voice, he charged his two listeners
to believe him: "Believe me, the danger of German nationalism is
much greater than is realized. The crisis of European policy
emboldens the nationalists, they are becoming self-confident, and
winning supporters..."

Again and again, he used the words "when I am no longer there,"
"Make use of the time while I am still alive, because when I am no
more it will be too late--my God, I do not know what my successors
will do if they are left to themselves; if they are not obliged

-11-

to follow along firmly preordained lines, if they are not bound to United Europe."

If this represented Adenauer's basic thinking, his final period of rule is puzzling: in this phase he increasingly aligned himself with de Gaulle, who as a French nationalist was hostile to the idea of a supranational Europe and indifferent to NATO, seeing military policy in almost exclusively national terms. It will be necessary to make a special inquiry into the reasons for this modification of Adenauer's policies: it will be seen that a variety of factors, including the Berlin crisis and the change of Administration in Washington were relevant. In the new circumstances of 1961-63, Adenauer's objectives for the first time came into conflict with one another: previously, Germany's revival, European integration, Franco-German co-operation and the strengthening of NATO had all pointed in the same direction; when this was no longer the case, Adenauer was confronted with unfamiliar, and highly unwelcome, choices. In the earlier years ther had been tactical problems, but Adenauer seems to have had little anguish in choosing his course.

## II. Adenauer's Early Leadership: Steps toward European Unity

Adenauer's first government was formed in September, 1949. In a fast-changing situation, he was to take a succession of decisions demonstrating a remarkable ability to strike a balance between German

¹Der Spiegel, No. 41, 9 October 1963, pp. 36-39; a partial English translation is in Alastair Horne, *Back into Power*, London, Max Parrish, 1955, pp. 302.

-12-

interests and those of the Western Powers, and at the same time to shape
events in a desired direction. A deceptive impression of inevitability
came to characterize Germany's advance toward equal status and its
participation in the defense of West Europe. In fact, four years after
the war, the obstacles in the way of a successful resolution of
Franco-German differences, especially, were very great; granted that
events played into Adenauer's hands, he showed a remarkable command of
the situation before this had become clear.

At the outset, the Germans were largely preoccupied with the
occupation restrictions: dismantling, occupation costs, and the
existence of an International Ruhr Authority.¹ France, while moving
away from its earlier policy of dismemberment, had not yet arrived at
the policy of close union with Germany. The establishment of a Saar
Republic, with separate membership in the Council of Europe, on
March 3, 1950, amounted to a continuation of the former policy, Adenauer,
perceiving West European integration as the framework within which
these conflicts might be resolved, was not yet in a position, less than
five years after the war, to take the initiative in pressing for it.
However, he made the most of the limited means of action open to the
German government. Having obtained an assurance from the Western
Powers that the Saar's independent status and membership in the

¹The Petersberg Agreement (November 24, 1949) negotiated between Adenauer and the Allied High Commission, was bitterly attacked for its "acceptance" of the International Ruhr Authority; in return, Adenauer obtained concessions on dismantling; the German commitment not to rearm, on the other hand, was not controversial in the existing climate of German opinion. Paul Weymar, *Adenauer* (London: Deutsch, 1957), pp. 328-9, emphasized this contrast.

-13-

Council of Europe were provisional, he was able to obtain sufficient support from public opinion to apply for associate membership of the Council of Europe, the indispensable first step symbolizing West Germany's desire to work its way back to acceptability within Europe.

Realizing that this step was of slight practical importance,¹ Adenauer resorted to the method of interview with foreign journalists, which he was frequently to use as a way of throwing out informal initiatives in foreign policy. On March 21, 1950, interviewing Kingsbury Smith of the American "International News Service," he suggested the desirability of a customs union between France and Germany as a way of approach toward full political union. His special interest in the Franco-German relationship was already made clear. If the immediate French response was cool--that Franco-German relations could be conducted only within a wider framework of European unity--the real response to Adenauer's overtures came with the Schuman plan, put forward on May 9, 1950. Schuman proposed the pooling of French and German coal and steel production in an organization open to other European countries, as a first step

¹"It may be objected that the Council of Europe is an inadequate institution, and it is doubtful if it is open to constructive reform in the present circumstances. But in any case it is a fact that the European States have taken the way to Strasbourg and now invite the Federal Republic to follow them. In practice there is no other way to membership of the West European Community of states. The Federal Government is in absolutely no position to indicate another way to the absolutely essential goal of European unity... If we wish to approach the goal, we must take the way that has been prepared by others. There can be no German claim to leadership." A enauer, speech to the Bundestag, quoted in Europa-Archiv, Vol. V, No. 12, June 20, 1950. In the early years Adenauer was at pains to persuade his audience; later he resorted increasingly to simplifications and slogans.

-14-

toward European federation. Adenauer, who appears not to have been informed in advance, immediately announced his acceptance of the "basic idea and general tendency of the plan."¹ But his major contribution to the creation of the Coal and Steel Community was to maintain Germany's support for it, against considerable industrial and political opposition, in the period after the outbreak of the Korean War, when Germany's bargaining position had become very much stronger: before the Korean attack, the Schuman plan had opened the way to equality for Germany; after the attack, with America pressing for German rearmament, equality could be expected as a natural concomitant of the new American policy.² To Adenauer, the long-term political objective of European federation was more important than the economic interests at stake.

Adenauer's policy on rearmament closely parallelled that on European integration. In this case the situation was even more delicate: in the existing climate of opinion in Europe it was unthinkable that the Germans should propose rearmament. As early as 1948 there had been discussion in political circles in Germany as elsewhere: Adenauer was reported to have accepted the German military view that thirty German divisions would be necessary.³

¹Paul Weymar, *Adenauer*, p. 349. For an account of the circumstances of Schuman's proposal, see Diebold, *The Shuman Plan* (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 1-4, 8-46.

²Diebold, *ep. cit.*, 67-75.

³*Der Spiegel*, Oct. 9, 1963 (Special issue on Adenauer), p.66
The first press discussions of the possibility (usually negative) were in 1948; the first public statements favoring German rearmament, by senior military leaders (Montgomery and Clay) not until late 1949.

-15-

In December 1949, following an visit to Europe by Acheson which had sparked rumors of plans for German rearmament, Adenauer publicly raised the issue, in the first instance through an interview with the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* followed by a clarification given to *The Times*. Adenauer expressed his opposition to rearmament, stating that the allies were responsible for German defense, but adding that if they should demand German participation in defense he would oppose a national German force, and would propose instead a German contingent in a European force. This position was reiterated before C.D.U. meetings and finally before the *Bundestag* on December 16,¹ Thus, without provoking serious foreign concern, Adenauer was able to signal his readiness to sponsor a German contribution, and his support for the form of rearmament which would minimize foreign opposition as well as promoting the cause of European integration.

### III. The Decision to Rearm Germany?

The question of German participation in western defense began to be raised by military planners shortly after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949). A long-term plan was drawn up for the requirements for defending Europe against all-out "conventional" attack; at this point tactical nuclear weapons had not yet been developed, and there was no concept of a strategy depending on them. It soon became

¹ P. Weymar, op. cit., pp. 330-334. He also foreshadowed his later position in hinting that the Germans could not be "mercenaries," but must have equal rights with other members of the European force. (footnote 2 on next page)

-16-

clear that forces of the required magnitude would not be supplied by Britain, France and the smaller countries; hence, the planners were led very early to propose the arming of Germany. In the autumn of 1949 the American Army General Staff drafted a plan for the creation of German divisions, which was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, 1950. The Administration did not yet adopt this as official policy; for the time being the State Department prevailed holding that European political objections were too strong.

Indeed, before the Korean War it was unclear whether NATO would become a full-fledged military alliance, or would remain merely a political guarantee by the United States to intervene if any of the members were attacked. The rather indeterminate conflict between these two concepts has been analyzed by Robert Osgood. On the one hand, European leaders were reluctant to increase their arms effort at the price of delaying economic recovery, and even more reluctant to contemplate German rearmament; and American public opinion found it difficult to conceive of peace-time defense budgets substantially

(footnote 2 from previous page)

The extensive discussions of NATO's early military planning and the decision to rearm Germany include the following:

R. Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr, Ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 11-22;
S. P. Huntington, *The Common Defense*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1961), and Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1962) pp. 28-51, 64-74. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 47-64, provides a concise account of NSC68, which is examined in detail by Paul Hammond, "NSC68, Prologue to Rearmament", in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, *The American Decision to Rearm Germany*, in Harold Stein (ed.) *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Birmingham, University of Alabama Press, 1963) pp. 643-665, is a definitive case study of the American Administration's decision.

-17

higher than the existing level (13 billion dollars). On the other hand, Europe shrank from the prospect of further war fought on European territory, (in the phrase of Henri Queuille, this would amount to "liberating a corpse"):
NATO was compelled to adopt a declaratory policy of "forward strategy", though totally lacking the forces to implement it, and indeed European leaders were willing to commit themselves to a future military build-up provided United States assistance was supplied. Within the United States Administration the balance was shifting in favor of a military build-up: one indication was the appointment of Paul Nitze as Head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, in place of George Kennan, the leading advocate within the Administration for restricting NATO to a political guarantee. In response to the first Soviet atomic explosion (August 1949) Truman had set up a high-level inter-departmental committee to undertake a broad reassessment of American military policy. The initiative for the reappraisal came largely from the State Department, which had become increasingly critical of the effects of budgetary limitations.

The ensuing document, NSC68, recommended a major expansion both of general war and limited war capabilities, and the strengthening of American's allies: a special point was made of allied weakness in Europe. The report estimated that the danger of a major Soviet attack could become acute by 1954, when it was expected that the Soviets would have built up a sizeable strategic nuclear force. The report thus tended to support the prevailing view that there was no immediate military danger.

Despite the increasing pressure for a build-up, it appeared unlikely in the early summer of 1950, before the Korean attack, that the United

-18-

States would make more than a marginal increase in the defense budget for the following year.¹ It seemed equally unlikely that NATO would have decided on a rapid build-up or on German rearmament. Nonetheless, the pressures for a build-up were likely to increase. American military aid to Europe had been initiated with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (October 1949), and Congressional thinking from the outset tended to make American assistance conditional on greater efforts by the Europeans. The three major policy innovations of September 1950-- the establishment of a NATO Supreme Commander, the reinforcement of the American troops in Europe, and the decision to rearm Germany-- had already been widely discussed, and it had become clear that they represented a potential "package", the first two being sought by Europeans and obtaining State Department backing, the latter being the *quid pro quo* likely to be insisted upon by the Pentagon and Congress: if the United States was to make unprecedented military commitments in Europe, then the Europeans would have to create an effective military defense.

The Korean war precipitated a rapid American decision, in the form of a Pentagon-State Department agreement on the policy innovations as an inseparable package. European opinion was, momentarily, as shocked by the North Korean attack as American: on 11 August 1950, the Council of Europe passed a resolution sponsored by Churchill, calling for the creation of an integrated European army, which was understood to

¹ Huntington, op.cit., p. 53, suggests that the most likely outcome would have been a compromise, a marginal upward adjustment to 17 to 18 billion dollars, for the fiscal year 1951.

-19-

presuppose German participation, by an overwhelming majority (89 : 5 with 27 abstention). But the European governments were extremely reluctant to accept German rearmament. As a counter to the American proposal for German divisions, France proposed that the German force should be integrated into a supranational European force "at the level of the smallest possible unit" (the Pleven Plan, October 1950). Protracted negotiations ensued: by the end of the year a modified version of the Pleven Plan had been accepted as the basis for negotiation. The United States began to transfer reinforcements to Europe (four divisions being sent between May and December 1951) and all NATO members undertook vastly expanded arms programs, which were to impose serious strains on the British and French economies.¹ NATO's final force targets were not laid down until the NATO Council Meeting at Lisbon in February 1952, which adopted the military recommendations for a total force in Europe of 96 divisions, including reserves. Germany was to contribute the equivalent of 12 divisions for the standing force, the level of intended German reserves not being made public. The treaties for establishing the European Defense Community were not signed until 26 May, 1952.

¹Defense expenditure of Britain, France and the United States was as follows (taken from Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years (Utrecht: Bosch, 1955), p. 111.

| | 1949 | 1950 | 1951 | 1952 | 1953 |
|:---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
| Britain (Million lbs. sterling) | 779 | 849 | 1,149 | 1,561 | 1,689 |
| France (Milliard Fr. Frs.) | 479 | 559 | 881 | 1,297 | 1,451 |
| United States (Million US $) | 13,300 | 14,300 | 33,216 | 47,671 | 49,734 |

-20-

IV. The West German Political Reaction

In August-September 1950 the West German government had very
little choice. With twenty-two Soviet divisions in East Germany, and a
seventy thousand-strong armed "People's Police" which was expected to
double in each of the following years, it was wholly dependent on
protection by the NATO powers. Adenauer in fact anticipated by a few
days the final crystallizing of the American position. In a memorandum
to the Allied High Commission on August 29, 1950, he requested additional
American protection and stated that West Germany would be willing to
make a military contribution within the framework of a European force.¹
As in the case of the signing of the Petersberg Agreements and the
initial acceptance of the Schuman Plan, Adenauer acted before informing
his cabinet--which in this case precipitated the resignation of Minister
of the Interior Heinemann, whose opposition to rearmament proved to be
fundamental. Adenauer's tactical sense was very sound: to have delayed
the German offer in an attempt to bargain for good terms at the outset
might well have led to Europe's rejection of German rearming. His
decision parallelled Truman's announcement of American reinforcements for
Europe (September 9) before pressing NATO to accept German forces; and
attempt at hard bargaining, in the delicate state of Western relationships,

¹The text was not published until February 1952. See Deutscher Bundestag, *Verhandlungen*, 191 Sitzung, Feb. 8, 1952, pp. 8159-60.
(German Parliamentary Debates, cited below as *Verhandlungen*, 98 S., Nov. 8, 1950, p. 3564.)

-21-

was likely to prove self-defeating--confidence-building gestures were
more likely to bring about a consensus.

The S.P.D.,¹ the main opposition party, whose basic orientation
as western-democratic as that of the C.D.U.--it had taken the lead in the
political struggle for Berlin's independence--did not raise fundamental
objections to rearmament in the initial phase, but advanced three reasons
for opposing the Government's stand. Firstly, it argued that the specific
proposal in question, the Pleven Plan, implied unequal treatment for the
Germans, a point taken up in the subsequent negotiations. Secondly,
it criticized Adenauer's tactic of offering the German contribution in
advance, thus destroying Germany's bargaining leverage in pressing for
equality and the removal of the occupation restrictions. The third point
was one of principle, sound in itself, and indeed a continuing theme in
German-allied relations, but of slight relevance to the actual
circumstances. "Only if the Anglo-Saxons and the other democratic
powers of the world unite their own national and military fate with the
German fate, can a major German contribution be expected."² It was
correct to point out, as Schumacher did, that the Germans were concerned
with the first battle, not merely the last, but, in the light of the
American reinforcement and British and French military expenditure, it
was difficult to see what Schumacher's demand could mean as a condition
for Germany's making a contribution. The allies had gone far toward

¹Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, German Social Democratic Party.

²*Verhandlungen*, 98 S., 8 November 1950, p 3571.

-22-

satisfying his condition; Germany could not expect total protection
before it rearmed. Schumacher's alternative to Adenauer's policy
amounted to virtually unlimited national self-assertion.

The SPD position was influenced by Schumacher's tactic of taking
a nationalist line in order to avoid the Left's being stigmatized as under
the Weimar Republic, as anti-nationalist; it was not unaffected by the
extent of public opposition to rearmament, wholly unexpected by the Western
powers. The prevailing "ohne mich" sentiment reflected a rejection of
involvement, of personal sacrifice for political ends. The responsible
opponents of rearmament, including many of Germany's staunchest
liberals and democrats, were concerned for its effects on the infant
German democracy as much as its tendency to deepen the German division.¹

In the case of public opinion as a whole, opposition to rearmament
was never overwhelming; the strong feeling and articulateness of the
opponents gave an exaggerated impression of their numerical preponderance.
Opposition was greatest in 1950 (in one poll, 48:33) after which the
numbers fluctuated unevenly, support on balance being equal to opposition.
The general public, unlike the political elites, favored an independent
national army rather than participation in an integrated European force.²

¹The opposition to rearmament, and the government's policy on military reforms and civilian control for the new armed forces, is discussed by Gordon A. Craig, "NATO and the New German Army", in W. Kaufmann (ed.), *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956) pp. 194 ff.

²See Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, *Jahrbuch der Öffentlichen Meinung 1947-1955* (Allensbach: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1956), esp. pp. 360-61, 372-73; ibid., 1957, p. 296. For a later poll somewhat more favorable to rearmament (support, 1954-57 ranging from 54:34 to 68:24) see Divo, *Umfragen 1957* (Europaischer Verlagsanstalt, 1958), p. 72.

In 1951-52, the situation in Korea having stabilized, the negotiations on the terms of German membership in a European Defense Community proved arduous. Over and above the complex technical problems of sharing costs and designing a supra-national armed force, the main political problem was to reconcile the French demand for controls over Germany with the German demand for equality. Adenauer demonstrated his pragmatism and restraint by the degree to which, though insisting on the principle of equality, he tacitly accepted a number of inequalities.¹

¹For example, Germany did not insist on a General Staff, it accepted France's right to maintain national forces outside EDC, it renounced the production of atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons, and did not insist on immediate membership in NATO. For a detailed account of the negotiations, see P. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs, 1951* (London: O.U.P., 1954), pp. 60-70, 105-111, and *Ibid.*, 1952 (London: O.U.P., 1955), pp. 55-136.

Chapter Two

WESTERN ALLIANCE VERSUS NEUTRALIZATION, 1952 - 1955

I. Lost Opportunity?

In the second period, which can be dated from the Soviet note of
March 10, 1952, proposing that Germany be united, neutralized, and armed
within limits to be determined by a peace conference, the principal
issue in German politics was whether rearmament within E. D. C.
subsequently within NATO) should take precedence over the search for
reunification through agreement with the Soviets, or whether the German
military contribution should be treated as negotiable in exchange for
reunification. The Adenauer Government, determined to bring West
Germany into the Western Alliance, asserted that reunification could be
achieved only through a policy of strength; the SPD held that German
membership of the Western Alliance would prevent reunification.

The Western refusal to negotiate on the basis of the
Soviet offer of German armed neutrality has given rise to the thesis of
the "lost opportunities":¹ it has been widely argued in Germany that
reunification could have been achieved during the period when the Soviet
offer was open (1952-55). Supporters of the Adnauer policy, on the
other hand, have seen the Soviet proposal as merely a tactical maneuver
to prevent the ratification of the E.D.C., and later the Paris Treaties.

¹This has been asserted by many SPD and FDP (Free Democrat) spokesmen. For a detailed presentation of the thesis, see P. Sethe, *Zwischen Bonn und Moskau* (Frankfurt: Verlag Heinrich Scheffler, 1956).

-25-

-26-

More recently, a number of analysts of Western diplomacy in the
1950's have taken an intermediate position: since the West did not
explore the Soviet offer, the question of the chances of German
reunification in this period must necessarily be left open.

Certainly Stalin's offer of March 1952 still strikes
one as intriguing. Whether the Soviet dictator actually
preferred a neutral but united and armed Germany, as
stipulated in the Soviet proposal--a Germany which most
assuredly would have been non-communist--to West German
rearmament within the then projected European Defense
Community, is indeed a moot question.¹

Since the Soviet negotiating position of March 1952
was never really explored, it is not of course possible to
identify the note with certainty as a true "bargaining bid,"
rather than a "delaying bid"... From the vantage point of
hindsight, the months from early 1952 to mid-1953 look like
the best negotiating time for the West, at least judged on the
basis of relative strength.²

Coral Bell is highly critical of Western diplomacy for
for failing to explore the possibility of trading German rearmament for
reunification. Similarly, Philip Windsor, examining the Berlin problem
in the context of the Soviet notes of 1954 and 1955, writes that:
"It is astonishing that the Soviet offer was so summarily dismissed...
Every conceivable concession was tried out, in appearance at least,
to test Western reactions. Unhappily there were none."³

¹Melvin Croan, "Soviet-German Relations," *Survey*, No. 44-45, October 1962, p. 18.

²Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 105, 214.

³Philip Windsor, *City on Leave* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 187-8.

-27-

It is true that if the question is posed in exclusive terms (was this a bargaining bid or a delaying bid?) then the answer can only be that we do not know, and are confined to speculation. But this may be to ask the wrong question. To Western decisionmakers at the time other questions may have been more relevant: what were the chances of achieving agreement on the many indeterminate formulas within the note, on terms which would have prevented the Soviets from gaining a controlling voice in German affairs? And what were the risks in suspending the policy of Western integration in favor of what would necessarily have been protracted negotiations on the terms for uniting Germany? The Soviet note contained at least two provisions which could be used to secure stron Germany; that "organizations hostile to democracy and the cause of maintaining peace" should be prohibited in Germany and that limits on the size and armament of the German forces should be laid down by the peace treaty.¹ Depending on circumstances, the note could open the way to either a major expansion or restrictions of Soviet influence in Germany. The most natural interpretation of the note was that the ultimate Soviet willingness to enter into a bargain would depend on the amount of influence which circumstances, and the specific provisions of the treaty, seemed likely to secure for them. In other words, the note was both a delaying bid and a bargaining bid but, in the light of the postwar Soviet-Western differences over Germany, held out little hope of arriving at an acceptable bargain.

¹For the text of the note, see Appendix I.

-28-

It is true that Western policy on German reunification was more openly one-sided: by insisting that an all-German government chosen through free elections should be permitted to join any military alliance of its choice, the West was in practice demanding that the united Germany should join NATO. But it is hardly surprising that a neutral Germany should have appeared to Western policymakers too uncertain a gamble: they shrank from the twin evils of a weak neutral state in a position to play East and West against one another.

Whatever the final verdict on Western diplomacy at this period, it is clear that West Germany's freedom of maneuver was extremely restricted. While the incentive to explore possibilities for reunification was greater, the disincentive was also greater: depending entirely on Western protection, the German government could not afford to alienate Western support; directly exposed to the pressure of the Soviets, who already occupied one third of Germany's territory, the German government had little option but to give first priority to establishing a more permanent framework for its relations with the Western powers. Before returning to the broader question of the Western choice, we may examine the nature of the choice taken by the German government and the alternative suggested by its critics.

## II. The West German Choice

Adenauer's critics have advanced extreme and incompatible hypotheses to explain his failure to seek negotiations of the Soviet offer. Some have suggested that his protestations of concern for reunification were insincere: far from regarding the Soviet notes as

-29-

mere delaying tactics, he believed and feared that they were genuine,
reflecting a Soviet preference for a united neutral Germany over West
German membership in NATO. On this view, Adenauer deliberately
misrepresented the Soviet position in order to achieve his objective
of Western integration. The second, more frequent criticism is that
Adenauer was led astray by the belief that a Western "policy of
strength" could induce the Soviets to give up their control of East
Germany. Some have supposed, finally, that since he can scarcely have
expected this, the policy of strength was merely a euphemism for the
use of force to unite Germany.

The first view is over-Machiavellian, and overlooks the formidable
obstacles to reunification on acceptable terms. The last criticism is
even less plausible: not only was the mood of West Germany in the 1950's
profoundly averse to war, but there is no indication that Adenauer ever
contemplated the use of the Bundeswehr to unite Germany, and much evidence
that he conceived of it as part of a defensive force against the Soviets--
hence his readiness to subordinate German military planning and organization
entirely to NATO. Belief in the policy of strength, i.e., optimism as
to the possibility of political gain as a by-product of military power,
was, certainly, one facet of Adenauer's policy, which can be illustrated
by frequent statements, especially from the period 1952-3. One
example was his first speech on the Soviet note, at Siegen on March 16,
1952;

Our policy must be to help make the West strong
enough to induce the Russians to want to compromise...
I believe that the latest Russian proposals are a proof

-30-

that if we continue to do this the point will soon be
reached when the Russians are ready to negotiate sensibly.¹

However, ladies and gentlemen, there is no other way
to arrive at negotiation with the Soviets, no other way to
reunification, than to make the West as strong as possible.²

The second example suggests an unquestioning acceptance of
"negotiation from strength", but while it seems true that this was
Adenauer's belief, it would seem that this was not the mainspring of
his policy, but rather a highly opportune rationalization which enabled
him to avoid a sense of choosing between Western integration and Germany's
reunification.

In justifying his policy, Adenauer and his supporters advanced
three lines of argument, which taken together amounted to a very strong
case. Firstly, they pointed to the double-edged character of many of
the Soviet formulations; the Soviet conception of "free elections,"
and the above-mentioned restriction on German armaments and prohibition
of "organizations hostile to democracy and the cause of maintaining
peace" (which, it was argued, could be construed to include the CDU).
Secondly, they put forward the more fundamental argument that neutral
Germany would be insecure: deprived of the protection of the Western
alliance it would be exposed to Soviet military pressure and political
subversion. Thirdly, basing themselves on an awareness of Germany's
precarious political situation in the aftermath of the war--the
difficulty of winning acceptance and respect among the Western states--
they argued that to postpone military commitments to the West for the

¹Quoted in Bell, op. cit., p. 104

²Verhandlungen, 255 S., March 19, 1953, p. 12306.

-31-

sake of necessarily tortuous and probably fruitless negotiations with the Soviets would be to endanger the hard-won confidence of the Western powers, to risk the substance of West German security for the shadow of reunification talks. In order to secure political freedom in West Germany it was necessary to reach a decision on participation in the Western defensive system.¹

Adenauer himself seldom offered sustained justifications for his policy, but typically attacked the SPD not infrequently misrepresenting its arguments. This proved a successful political tactic: driving the SPD onto the defensive. Adenauer hammered on the theme of neutrality: his main argument against the Soviet proposal was that neutrality would necessarily lead to Communist control of Germany.

Soviet Russia has wanted a neutralized Germany for years. But that would mean a standing control of Germany... with no allies and a restricted army. It would mean, further, that the U.S.A. would very probably completely change its policy toward Europe. The end of the story would be that even a reunited Germany, deprived of alliance in a world of continuing extreme tension would be conquered by the Soviet Union in the course of the cold war.²

¹In speeches in April and July 1952, the latter being the debate on the first reading of the E.D.C. Treaty, Adenauer voiced all of the themes which were to form the Government's case. See Verhandlungen, 204 S., April 3, 1952, pp. 8751-53; 221 S., July 9, 1952, pp. 9789-8901. Other major Christain Democrat presentations in 1952-3 were those of Gerstenmaier loc. cit., pp. 9801-07; Kiesinger, loc. cit., pp. 8791-95; Strauss, ibid., 22 S., July 10, 1052, pp. 9851-63.

For CDU presentations in 1954-55, see Adenauer, Verhandlungen, 46 S. October 5, 1954, pp. 2227-2234; 47 S., October 7, 1954, pp. 2282-85; von Brentano, 47 S., pp. 2242-49; Keisinger, 47 S., pp. 2274-82 and 69 S., February 24, 1955, pp. 3531-38; Strauss, 69 S., pp. 3568-81.

²From a speech in Lüneburg, April 14, 1955, quoted in Kanzlerworte Industriedruck AG, Verlags-Dienst, Essen, 1961, p. 61.

-32-

We dare not and will not leave the slightest opening for Communism to establish its power in the Federal Republic and from there to enslave the whole of Europe.¹

He insisted on the need for a decision. "A postponement of the decision not justified by the merits of the case would be tantamount to prevarication," and would be regarded as a disguised form of rejection.² The rejection of the treaties would not lead to further negotiation on a similar basis but would be a fiasco which would lead to a reappraisal of Western policy and improve the Soviet chances of achieving German neutralization.

Other Christian Democratic speakers, similarly, emphasized the consequences of Germany's rejection of the treaties. The most sustained and forceful argument for the government's choice was put forward by Franz Josef Strauss. The SPD, he alleged, could indulge in fantasies because it did not have to shoulder the responsibility for the decision.

But

> We Germans must be clear on two points: without Germany Europe cannot come into existence. But one must also realize that without the uniting of the peoples of Europe, a free Germany cannot survive even in its present form of the Federal Republic.

German neutrality could not be likened to Swiss or Swedish neutrality, because

German neutrality would prevent the uniting of Europe and cause the U.S. within a short period to withdraw and abandon

¹From the foreword to the official report, Deutschland im Wiederaufbau, 1955; quoted in ibid., p. 62.

²Verhandlungen, 9 July 1952., p. 9792.

-33-

Europe in its present condition--its present condition!--
to terror, because the Red Army, rifle in hand, would stand
before its unprotected door.

Germany should guard against a false illusion of security:

We cannot stand, hands in pockets, relying on the
guarantees of the Western powers or the goodwill of the
Soviets. The question is now posed if we will contribute
our share. It is posed now; the answer must be given now--
not because there is an immediate threat of Soviet attack,
but because the first step can be taken only with our
participation--to place Europe including Germany on a secure
basis.

The SPD was able to make some effective negative criticisms of the
Governments's policy, but failed to advance a viable alternative. It
argued convincingly that the Soviets could not be compelled through a
Western military buildup to renounce control over East Germany, that
reunification could be achieved only through agreement among the four
occupying powers, and that the Soviet notes could best be tested,
not by textual criticism, but by negotiation. SPD speakers protested
against clichés on neutrality, but did not, in 1953-54, discuss how
a reunited Germany would maintain itself between the two blocs,
scarcely going beyond the formula that Germany should "bind itself to the
West in ways which the East need not find dangerous."² In response
to the argument that German security depended on Western protection,
the SPD rather defensively argued that the dependence was mutual. In sum,

¹*Loc. cit.*, pp. 9854-9856,

²Carlo Schmid, *Verhandlungen*, 221 S., July 9, 1952, p. 9817

-34-

while showing that the Government's policy would not achieve reunification, the SPD could not show how it proposed itself to achieve "reunification in freedom." In the 1953 election the CDU succeeded in taking the offensive contrasting its own clear-cut, constructive European policy with the allegedly vague and uncertain SPD policy, and placing the onus on the SPD to clarify its position.¹

After the French rejection of the E.D.C. in August 1954, the situation was less favorable to the Government in its effort to obtain early ratification of the Paris Treaties (signed October 1954), under which Germany was to be a full member of NATO, placing its national forces at the disposal of the allied command. There was little objection to government's undertaking "not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons" (the expanded Brussels Treaty organization, renamed Western European Union, was given the responsibility for supervising this).²

But there was less support among the politically articulate for a national army than for the creation of an integrated European force, and armed neutrality now appeared somewhat less dangerous in the context of the post-Stalin "relaxation of tensions." It also appeared more feasible: the Soviets were now categorically proposing free elections

¹For an account of the foreign policy issues in the 1953 election, and in particular the CDU "four questions to the SPD," cf. W. Hirsch-Weber and K. Schütz, *Wähler und Gewählte* (Berlin and Frankfurt: Verlag Franz Vahlen GMBH, 1957), esp. pp. 121-125.

²For texts of the London and Paris agreements on German entry into NATO and the WEU protocols, see Peter V. Curl, ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954* (New York: Harper, 1955), pp. 107ff; or Lord Ismay NATO: the First Five Years (Utrecht: Bosch, 1955), pp. 235ff. The German renunciation of nuclear weapons production forms Annex I to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, on the Control of Armaments; text in Curl, *op. cit.*, p. 112, Ismay, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

-35-

to unite Germany if the West refrained from ratifying the Paris Treaties.¹

The SPD succeeded in mobilizing a substantial section of opinion against the Government's policy, culminating in the Frankfurt Paulskirche rally of January 29, 1955, at which a number of leading public figures supported their "German Manifesto." The Social Democrats now put forward the concept of a collective security system, a treaty binding both blocs to maintain Germany's non-aligned status, as an alternative both to NATO and neutrality; but this conception was not developed in detail nor pressed vigorously. The CDU scarcely referred to it, but maintained its attack on neutrality, on which it found much support from independent opinion.²

Though thrown onto the defensive, the government forcefully defended its decision. As before, the principal argument was the need

¹In 1952 they had merely hinted at free elections, mentioning them not in their principal note (March 10) but in a later, more polemical note on April 9. And an exchange of notes and official declarations by the East and West German governments late in 1951 had confirmed the West German impression that the East would reject its interpretation of free elections; Grotewohl had been evasive in response to West Germany's spelling out fourteen specific conditions. Now they had become a major theme of Soviet diplomacy. For texts of Soviet statements of December 2, 1954, January 15 and February 8, 1955, proposing free elections for a neutralized Germany, see H. von Siegler, *Dokumentation zur Deutschlandfrage* (Bonn: Bundesdrückerei, 1959), pp. 260-272, 282-284. Partial texts are in Siegler, *The Reunification and Security of Germany*, Bonn, Verlag für Zeitarchive, 1957. pp. 87-88.

²For the SPD proposal, see Verhandlungen, 47 S., October 7, 1954, p. 2272 (speech of Carlo Schmid), and F. Erler, "The Struggle for German Reunification," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1956, esp. p. 385. Erler offers only a brief description of a collective security system: the potential aggressor would be included in the system but not names: whoever attacked any member would meet with the collective opposition of the rest; in the light of U.N. experience, it was essential that the system should not be paralyzed by the veto.

-36-

for a German contribution to the Western defense system as a prerequisite
for German security: Western arms offered security, but only on the
understanding that Germany would make its contribution; it was not that
the twelve divisions as such were vital, but the Western powers would
not indefinitely protect Germany without them.¹

 Pressed on the issue of negotiation, the Government speakers
 argued that they favored this after the ratifications of the treaties.
 The Soviet threat that this would make reunification unattainable should
 not be taken literally: the Soviets would negotiate if they judged
 that it was in their interests, and it was argued that the period
 between ratification and implementation would be as significant as that
 preceding ratification. On the reunification issue in isolation the SPD
 had the stronger case: it was now quite implausible to argue that to
 bring West Germany into NATO would induce the Soviets to give up East
 Germany, and it was bewildering for the Government to claim reunification
 as the highest goal of policy, yet refuse to negotiate on the Soviet
 suggestion of free elections.

The Government case would have been more persuasive if it had
acknowledged that, in the circumstances of 1954-55, it was necessary to
choose, at least in the short run, between security and reunification;
on security its arguments were far more compelling. Such a conflict of
objectives was tacitly admitted, in that the Government argued that
neutrality (the other side of the Soviet offer) was unacceptable. But
by refusing to acknowledge the conflict among its objectives, the
Government placed itself in the untenable position of insisting that

¹See especially, the speech of Strauss, in Verhandlungen, 69 S., February 24, 1955, pp. 3568 and ff.

-37-

its policy was leading to reunification. The SPD, likewise refusing to
acknowledge the conflict, argued that the security of a united Germany
outside NATO could be maintained through a collective security system,
a conception which had not been discussed, let alone accepted, by the
Americans. The SPD had a good debating point in arguing that German
non-membership of NATO would not automatically lead to an American
withdrawal from Europe. But to the Government, concerned with West
German security, the question was whether there was a serious risk that
it might. And this could scarcely be denied.¹ Adenauer acknowledged
that his moment of greatest anxiety had been the period immediately
after the collapse of E.D.C. While the U.S. had not implemented
the threat of an "agonizing reappraisal," it had required an exceptional
and uncharacteristic British initiative to bring to life an alternative
plan for European defense. Had the Germans now rejected this, it was
impossible to see where a new initiative for yet another plan for
European security might have arisen. In the light of Dulles' aversion
to neutrality and European suspicions of Germany, the risks were
very great: France's isolation after the rejection of E.D.C. offered
a forewarning of the consequences of Germany's rejection of the Paris
Treaties.

¹Eden's account of Dulles' attitude in September 1954 suggests that the risk was not merely hypothetical; Dulles made much of the congressional pressures against overseas military commitments. Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 162-164.

-38-

III. The Allied Choice

It is somewhat more plausible to argue that the Western leadership
as a whole (rather than that the Germans confronted with a narrower decision)
failed to perceive a real alternative, namely the collective security
idea suggested by the SPD. Germany, unaligned, united and armed within
agreed limitations, would have been guaranteed by each alliance against
attack by the other. Provided some American forces were stationed in
Europe, rendering immediate American intervention possible in the case
of Soviet attack--and provided the available NATO and German forces
were sufficiently strong to prevent a Soviet walkover--Germany's
external security would have been safeguarded. And, provided the
Soviets had in fact conceded free elections in the Western sense, a
politically stable German state might have been established.

But was this logically possible alternative a real political
option? Since it was not explored, it cannot be shown conclusively
that it was not, but any attempt to set out the necessary conditions
for its having been a real option suggests a strong probability that
it was not.

It will be argued later that unless there is an unexpectedly
drastic shift in the Soviet-Western balance of power, the concrete
advantages to the Soviets in controlling East Germany are likely to
outweigh the speculative possibility of gaining control of all of
Germany through a process which risks the loss of control of East
Germany. It is just possible that in 1952-53, the circumstances were
sufficiently different that, from a combination of military weakness and
supposed political strength, the Soviets were willing to take this sort

of gamble, or that they were sufficiently anxious to prevent West German
membership in NATO that they would have surrendered control of East
Germany for this alone. The West was still far superior in nuclear
weapons and it had not yet become apparent that it would never implement
NATO plans announced at Lisbon for a ninety-six division ground force.
Taken together, the present and prospective military balance was perhaps
more favorable to the West than at any other period.¹ Politically, the
Soviets may still have been sufficiently under the sway of the notion of
"Capitalist encirclement" to have been willing to pay a considerable
price to keep Germany out of the Western alliance.

But it seems unlikely that the Soviet interests were purely
"defensive," and even if they were, it is necessary to ask how, if they
were thus perceiving the world in rather simple Bolshevik terms, they
could be sure that a German state under the control of "Imperialists and
militarists" (as West Germany was alleged to be) would not align itself
with the other Western imperialists, whatever its treaty undertakings.
It would seem that the Soviets could have tolerated a united Germany
only if they could gain a position to exercise influence over its
internal politics or if all American military force should be withdrawn
from Europe. In 1952-53 their disarmament diplomacy was pressing for
such an American withdrawal, and, as we have seen, their German

¹See Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 214ff.

-40-

proposals could have been used to justify Soviet intervention in German affairs.¹

The West could not safely contemplate either an American military withdrawal from Europe or a Soviet political foothold in West Germany: the latter might have created a favorable situation for an internal take-over of power by the Communist party, on the model of the Prague coup of 1948: in 1952-53, less than four years after the foundation of the Federal Republic, there was little ground for confidence that German democracy would be more capable of resistance to Communism than Czechoslovakia had been. Further, the West could scarcely have contemplated an arrangement interfering with the development of closer economic--and ultimately political--relations in West Europe, around which hopes for European recovery had crystallized. Finally, though of less importance to the West as a whole, the Government of a united Germany could scarcely have accepted a very small ground force, whatever guarantees had been given by the Western powers, and the renunciation of nuclear weapons would have been more difficult in the case of a non-aligned Germany that would have had to contemplate an independent defense against the Soviet Union.

There was nothing in the Soviet stance which suggested a readiness to give way to Western vital concerns on all of these points--to allow

¹Wilhelm Cornides (Die Weltmächte und Deutschland, Tübingen, Wunderlich Verlag, 1957, pp. 253ff.) suggests that the proposal for a withdrawal from all foreign bases was closely connected with the proposal on Germany; not only would the Soviets then be in a position to influence political developments in France and Germany, but they expected a German break from the American system to deepen the crisis of capitalism.

a united Germany an undisturbed political development as part of the West European community. Had they genuinely preferred this, it should have proved possible to convey their preference to the Western governments; had they strongly prepared it, they could surely have done so.

Thus, there is little to be said for the charge that the Western leaders showed a lack of political imagination in not accepting the alternative of a united neutral Germany which was opened up by the Soviet proposals. The Western governments had in fact become committed to a number of new, imaginative policies going sharply against their previous traditions: American military involvement in Europe, American assistance to European economic recovery, the Franco-German reconciliation, and European integration. These innovatory policies had been conceived of in the period following the collapse of the initial hopes of Soviet-Western cooperation through the U.N. and the breakdown of attempts to achieve a common policy in Germany. In this context, there was no reason to suppose that a common policy could be achieved for the exceptionally delicate task of estalishing an armed neutral Germany strong enough to protect itself yet sufficiently under control not to create instability, and, in the face of such a deadlock there was every reason to perceive the Soviet proposals primarily as delaying tactics to impede constructive Western developments.

There remains the relatively minor consideration that the West incurred a political cost--the myth of the lost opportunities--through refusing to negotiate on the Soviet proposal. This political cost can be exaggerated. If neutralism should become powerful in Germany, this will not be because of the myth--though it will doubtless be voiced--

-42-

but because of future Soviet and Western policies.¹ On the other hand apart from the broader doubts, there would have been serious political costs in attempting to negotiate an acceptable form of German neutrality. This would have weakened the standing of the American Administration before public opinion and possibly endangered the political consensus behind its European policies; in Europe, at a time when postwar recovery and the Franco-German rapprochement were as yet tentative, there was great political value in the single-mindedness with which major governments, notably the American and the German, pursued the goals of European integration and Western military cooperation. An attempt to keep open a broadly different alternative could have made for serious uncertainty and friction in West Europe, and possibly opened up more significant political divisions in West Germany. An appraisal of the Western policy in the actual circumstances of 1952-54, then, suggests

¹Certain former adherents of the thesis of the lost opportunities have, indeed, come to re-examine their position, giving more weight, in retrospect, to the objections to their once-favored alternative. In the special number of *Der Spiegel*, "Konrad Adenauer und seine Epoche," Rudolf Augstein suggests that the statesman capable of testing the prospects for German unity would have had to combine the qualities of Bismarck, Lenin, Gambetta, Gandhi and Talleyrand: such a stateman, he adds, Ghrmans would have had to wage a sustained struggle against the maneuvers of the East German regime, and to make their neutrality acceptable to the West; the latter was "problematical," since they would have been denied an effective army. (He approvingly quotes Machiavelli; "He who has a good army also has reliable allies.") The total of negative imponderables was so great that it now appears "obsolete" to suggest that Adenauer prevented reunification. He was not the Chancellor of the Allies, but "the Chancellor of the West Germans, whose phlegmatic interest in an unpolitical existence he correctly judged, strengthened and manipulated." *Der Spiegel*, No. 41, October 9, 1963, pp. 75-110, esp. pp. 84-85.

-43-

that recent self-criticism has been exaggerated, since it has
lost sight of the considerations which were, at the time, rightly
accorded the higher priority. German neutrality represented too great
a gamble for the Western leadership as a whole, too great a violation
of the maxims of prudence in diplomacy; in the absence of vehement
German insistence they could not choose otherwise. And the German
government, realizing the weakness of its position in a potentially
hostile world, could not run the risk of pressing for neutrality.

Chapter Three

# GERMANY ADAPTS TO NATO'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY 1956-1960

## I. Revision of NATO Strategy, 1954

During the mid-1950's, the military problems of contemporary European defense played very little part in German public discussion, which was dominated by the debate on reunification and the political and social effects of the new army. We have seen that the German Government minimized the military significance of the 12 divisions, arguing that what mattered was the principle of a German contribution to the alliance. The same view was taken by the other members of the alliance: "I thought there were two problems before us: first, a closer German political association with the West; and secondly, the German defense contribution. Her Majesty's Government thought the first even more important than the second."¹ Eden's view was shared by all of the leading governments.

The revision of NATO strategy in December 1954 was influenced by this climate of opinion: although the distinction between deterrence and defense had not yet been popularized, the governments, encouraged by the post-Stalin "thaw", were thinking essentially of deterring war in Europe. In 1953 the new Republican Administration had revised American military policy: the "New Look" did not indeed imply massive retaliation in all circumstances, but did signify a low priority for limited war forces, especially ground forces; the United States was

¹See Anthony Eden, *Memoirs: Full Circle*, Cassell, London, 1960 p.156.

-46-

to aim at 14 divisions in place of 24. So far as war in Europe was now taken into account, it was assumed that nuclear fire-power could be a substitute for manpower, and that the West would remain superior in nuclear weapons. The NATO military commanders were authorized to base their planning on the immediate use of nuclear weapons, although authority to order the actual use was to remain with the governments.

At the same time, the target for the NATO forces was reduced; it soon became known that the goal was a standing force of 30 divisions. In fact, it was misleading to compare this with the previous goal of 96 divisions, since the latter included the Italian and Scandinavian fronts as well as the German, and included reserves as well as standing forces.¹
One important change, however, was that reserves now received low priority. It was expected that war would begin with massive nuclear blows; the ground forces would be the "shield", whose task was to fight a brief action in Germany while the strategic air force, the "sword", would paralyze the opponent.²

¹R. Hisman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context". In Knorr, edited, *NATO and American Security*, pp. 21-22.

²For accounts of the revision of NATO strategy, cf. Hisman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 24 ff., Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 ff., for the "New Look", cf., Huntington, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 ff., and Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953", in Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-524.

-47-

The NATO decision of 1954 was to be a governing factor in German military policy for the rest of the decade, but was little noticed at the time. ¹ In the following year, however, the military exercise *Carte Blanche* in June 1955, in which 1.7 million Germans were "killed" and 3.5 million "incapacitated", caused a short-lived political furor and there was much expert interest in the unorthodox von Bonin plan for a fixed defense based on anti-tank weapons--a strategy which was roundly cirticized by official spoksmen. ² But the political impact of these military developments was still secondary; it was not until the conscription decisions that the implications of NATO's new strategy were to modify German military policy.

## II. The Conscription Issue, 1956

In the summer and autumn of 1956, when the legislation for conscription came up for decision, the military rationale of the German contribution for the first time became prominent in the debate; it soon became clear that the Government's case had not been thought through nor

¹ The professional military journals were an exception. Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and Atomic War* (Evanston, Illinois. Row Peterson & Co., 1957) pp. 127-131, discusses an article in *Wehrkunde*, February 1955 (Joachim Ruoff, "Atomwaffeneinsatz mit Vorbehalt") which already expressed the later German interest in SHAPE's having the right to decide on the use of nuclear weapons.

² For accounts of the Bonin Plan and the political effects of *Carte Blanche*, cf. Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-83, 182-193, and Gordon A. Craig, "NATO and the New German Army," in W. Kaufmann (ed.) *Military Policy and National Security* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 218-232.

-48-

coordinated with NATO thinking in Paris. With the Government declining in popularity and having difficulty in defending its military policy, pressures built up within the Government parties for reducing the term of conscription. (It had been too strongly committed within NATO to the principle of conscription to consider abandoning this.) After arguing for strong conventional forces in Europe during the summer, Adenauer abruptly reversed policy in late September, deciding for two reduced 12 month term of conscription and indicating for the first time an interest in tactical atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr.

American writers have been highly critical of Adenauer at this point. Gerald Freund and Hans Speier, whose interpretations elsewhere diverge, agree in emphasizing the abruptness of Adenauer's switch of policy; they attribute his decision to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr to political opportunism, and treat his appeal to the Radford Plan as justification for the reduction as a feeble pretext, and unconvincing attempt to place the blame on the Americans for his own politically motivated choice.¹

This interpretation reflects a not infrequent American tendency to underestimate the American impact on the options and decisions open to other states. In many respects the most significant feature of the German decisions in 1956 was the extent of German dependence on the policies of the alliance--in the last analysis, on American policies. It is true that the Radford Plan itself was something of a side issue--though the circumstances of its disclosure were such as to cause the

¹Freund, *Germany between Two Worlds*, pp. 144-151; Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-223.

-49-

most serious of the very few crises in Adenauer's relation to Dulles.¹

The most important external factor in Adenauer's decision was the American "New Look" and the NATO strategy of 1954, and this indeed was crucial. The Radford shock caused Adenauer for the first time to examine the military thinking of SHAPE and the American Government. It became clear that this was incompatible with the strategic arguments used by the German Government to defend its conscription policy.

Deprived of the strategic rationale for large ground forces, Adenauer had no incentive to struggle against the political pressures that had built up against an 18-month term of conscription. It would have been quixotic to have risked his Government's existence for the sake of a military contribution which had become of marginal value through the evolution of allied military policy. The episode was instructive, both in bringing out the nature of the German Government's initial strategic reasoning and in demonstrating the minor role of such reasoning in the policy decisions.²

¹For an account of Adenauer's reaction to the Radford Plan disclosure, see Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, *Duel at the Brink* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), pp. 45-48. Adenauer was antagonized because he had not been informed of the Radford proposal for a radical reduction in the American armed forces on his visit to Washington a month before it was leaked to the Press.

² **Chronological Note.**

The main events in the debate on conscription and the revision of German military policy were as follows. On 23 March 1956, the Bundesrat accepted conscription, by a small majority of 21:17, but overwhelmingly favored a 12-month over a 18-month term of service (30:8). On 11 April the SPD after much hesitation, confirmed its decision to oppose conscription; on 27 April the CDU parliamentary party voted for the Conscription Bill but insisted that the term of service be left open. The first reading in the Bundestag took place on 4 May, the second and third reading of 4 and 7 July; the Bill was passed by 269:166, the Government coalition (CDU and DP) being opposed by the SPD and BHE; most Free Democrats abstained, one-third voted against the Bill. Reacting (continued on next page)

-50-

Political pressure against conscription was not simply a reflection of public opinion. Conscription was somewhat unpopular, but not overwhelmingly so; indeed, some public opinion surveys showed a small majority in favor of it. Popular opposition was very much less than that against nuclear arms for the Bundeswehr, which the Government was successfully to defy in 1958.¹

What was of more immediate political significance was the decline in Adenauer's prestige, the inadequacy of his simple appeal to Western

(footnote continued from previous page)

to the Radford Plan leak (13 July), Adenauer called an emergency conference of his leading ambassadors and sent General Heusinger to the United States for closer information on American military thinking, in late July. A special meeting of the WEU Ministerial Council was called to discuss NATO's new strategy in mid-September. On 18 September the CSU came out publicly for a "modern" army and a 12-month conscription period. On 27 September the Government announced a decision in favor of 12 months' service, involving a reduction of the total force from 500,000 to approximately 350,000, and in the following days there were many unofficial reports that the Government favored tactical atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. On 16 October, Strauss replaced Blank at the Defense Ministry.

¹The data from public opinion polls on attitudes to conscription varied according to the way the question was put, but there were only minor fluctuations over time. Of the leading polling institutes, EMNID found a majority of 49:39 in favor of a volunteer professional army over conscription (9 June 1956), Divo almost equal numbers (39:37 in March, 40-40 in July 1956) and in April 1957 a majority, 45:37, for conscription (this was attributed mainly to Hungary). The Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach (March-April 1956) found sizeable majorities in favor of conscription (50:32, 44:37). The strongest support for conscription (58:23, 60:29, 60:26) was in response to the question whether it was good for the training of young men. Deutsch and Edinger (Germany Rejoins the Powers, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959, p. 30) in the course of an otherwise valuable analysis, overestimate the opposition to conscription, citing only those polls and questions which give strongly negative responses. Sources: Neumann, Jahrbuch der Offentlichen Meinung 1957, pp. 301-304; Divo, Umfragen 1957, Europäischer Verlagsanstalt 1958, pp. 72-73; pamphlet of the Institut für Demoskopie, Allensbach, 3 July 1956; Die Welt, 9 June 1956.

-51-

unity and strength of justify a major German military contribution in
the 1956 climate of 'relaxation of tension.'' There were frequent
suggestions that the Adenauer era was at an end, even rumors of political
maneuvers in search of a new Chancellor within the Government parties.¹
If Adenauer's foreign policy stance was losing favor, the Defense Ministry
under Theodor Blank was becoming increasingly discredited. It was falling
behind its optimistic timetable for the buildup of the Bundeswehr, the
Bundestag Defense Committee was unearthing what appeared to be evidence
of gross incompetence concerning weapons procurement, and the debate on
strategy was suggesting that it was unaware of current NATO military
thinking.

The opponents of conscription exploited the prevailing tendency
of Western thinking on the value of ground forces. The military
specialists of the political parties came forward with proposals for
an elite professional force. The Opposition was able to cite British
and American leaders of the declining importance of conventional forces,
and to invoke the authority of such names as Liddell Hart against
conscription. So strong was this current of opinion that the SPD was
led into a spectacular tactical mistake. It successfully pressed for an
independent committee under the most widely respected of the World War II
military leaders, von Manstein, to examine military arguments for and
against conscription; to its surprise, the Manstein Committee came out

¹In August 1956 Adenauer's popularity was at its lowest ever (only 37 per cent were satisfied with his policies, as against 59 per cent a year earlier). See U. W. Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 15; Neumann, *op. cit.*, 1957, pp. 182-3. For contemporary reports of Adenauer's declining prestige, see Der Bund (Bern) July 1, 1956; *Südatische Zeitung*, July 9, 1956; Manchester *Guardian*, September 26, 1956.

-52-

strongly in favor of conscription, going so far as to recommend a period
of 24 months, 6 months more than the Government proposal.¹

The SPD's own opposition to conscription involved a break with the
Party's change of position. The leadership was influenced by the prevailing
tone of expert opinion and by its information on NATO thinking, but
probably even more important was the intense feeling of the Party rank
and file against "militarism" in any form, and in particular against
compulsory military service under the former leaders of the Wehrmacht.²
Moreover, it was felt that conscription would further deepen the division
of Germany.

Finally, pressures from within the Government parties especially
the Bavarian CSU, mounted against stubborn adherence to the original
target. As the strategic situation became more widely recognized within
the Government, Strauss' supporters moved to exploit the increasing
discomfiture of Blank. On September 19 the SCU group in the Bundestag
published a statement calling for a defense program in line with the
technical and strategic revolution, a revision of obsolete military
planning, and a conscription term of 12 months. Strauss hinted at the
policy of atomic arms for the Bundeswehr, asserting that a power without
nuclear weapons would capitulate before any ultimatum of an atomic power.³

¹*Südenutsche Zeitung*, June 21, 1956

²Rank and file opinion was expressed in the debates at the SPD party conference in Munich (July 10-14, 1956) and in the resolutions against conscription submitted to the conference. See SPD Parteitag 1956, SPD, Bonn, 1956. The party attitude to conscription is discussed by Alfred Rapp in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 4, 1956.

Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-199, oversimplifies the SPD decision,
attributing it solely to electoral motivation.

³*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 19, 1956.

-53-

Strategic Differences

The strategic debate in 1956 forms an ironic prelude to that of 1961-62, in which the German Government defended a tactical nuclear strategy against the new American emphasis on conventional forces.

In the conscription debates in 1956, the Christian Democrat spokesman argued for the value of a large NATO ground force, using arguments very close to those of the American conventional strategists in the later period. Adequate conventional forces would improve the chances of localizing conflict, avoiding an automatic expansion of the level of violence. They would free the West from the dilemma of accepting defeat or having recourse to a suicidal defense; they would make possible a defense of Germany that did not necessitate a self-defeating use of nuclear weapons.¹

However, the Government made a poor showing in the parliamentary debates, it had no reply to the argument pressed insistently by Fritz Erler for the SPD, that NATO planning had no place for a non-nuclear defense of Germany, even in the case of a German military contribution of 500,000 men. Erler argued that the NATO Command, consistent with the 1954 revision of policy, planned on the basis of the immediate use of nuclear weapons against any attack. The reason for SHAPE's interest in

¹Speeches of Kliesing, Berendsen and Liesinger, Verhandlungen, 143 S., May 4, 1956, pp. 7484-7493; 159 S., July 6-7, 1956, pp. 8766-8772, 8810-8815.