Subpanel II
(Cooke Mock-up)

September 4, 1957

## PART ONE - THE REPORT

INTRODUCTION BY NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

FOREWORD BY GENERAL JAMES McCORMACK, JR.

THE PANEL REPORT

## PART TWO - PANEL DELIBERATIONS AND PAPERS

BACKGROUNDS TO MILITARY SECURITY

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR

OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS AND PROBLEMS

BACKSTOPS OF STRATEGY: DOMESTIC MILITARY PROBLEMS

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR

BACKGROUND TO MILITARY SECURITY

## PART TWO - BANET DELIBERATIONS AND PAPERS

THE BANET REPORT

FOREWORD BY GENERAL JAMES MCCORMACK, Jr.

INTRODUCTION BY NELSON A. ROCKETTELL

## PART ONE - THE REPORT

September 4, 1937
(Cooke Mock-nb)
Subpanel II

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This rough is deliberately overlong. Except for my intros and connectives which are as short as possible, I don't know how much material you want. I don't know how much of tape recorded material is useable either for security reasons or speakers' unwillingness to be quoted.

If a speaker does not wish to be directly quoted and we wish to use his point, his name can be changed to "VOICE"; or his point can be summarized without a direct quote, etc.

The tape recorded material is still roughcut and unpolished. Much more can be done if and when it has been decided to include a given section.

The connecting material, now in caps, should be printed in italics.

It would be very valuable if summary quotes of especially relevant portions of other subpanels were included among the "Papers" material.

Having looked over the reports, if the tape recorded material works out and can be included, most of the papers could be sharply cut and speeded up.

I have included only II papers we now have on hand. We have no papers from McCormack, Halaby, etc.

Rostow on National Purpose could be included as a 1st Section Paper.

Henderson paper on S. E. Asia does not belong in II.

Hilsman on Nuclear Weapons and Alliances belongs (as I have put it) in II.

Critz on Mutual Assistance also should be in II (as I have put it), since most of the paper deals with Military Aid. If wished, a summary of the non-military material in his paper could be part of III Addenda.

The use of the outline form (as in Wilson) I believe would be desirable for much of the Section Two.

debatable for much of the Section Two.

The use of the outline form (as in Milwau) I believe would be
of the non-military material in the paper could be best of III Addenda,
since most of the paper deals with Military Adj. It is best a summary
of the paper does not should be in II (as I have but it).

but it) in II.

Hillman on Nuclear Weapons and Alliances belongs (as I have
Henderson paper on S. R. Vats does not belong in II.

paper.

Roewon on National Purpose could be included as a 1st Section
no papers from McCormack, Heely, etc.

I have included only II papers we now have on hand. We have
and speeded up.

works out and can be included, most of the papers could be simply cut
Having looked over the reports, if the tape recorded material
material.

is included.

It would be very valuable if summary quotes of each article should
be summarized without a direct quote, etc.

itself.

The connecting material, now in cabs, should be printed in
given section.

Much more can be done it and when it has been decided to include a
The tape recorded material is still rough and unpolished.

If a speaker does not wish to be directly quoted and we wish
to use his point, his name can be changed to "VOICE" or his point can

be quoted.

neseable either for security reasons or speakers' unwillingness to be
material you want. I don't know how much of tape recorded material is
connectives which are as short as possible. I don't know how much
This rough is deliberately overlong. Except for my intro and

II - Mock-up (8/4/27)

Before sitting down to write the final report of its deliberations, Subpanel II spent many months in exploratory meetings, discussions and the taking of testimony. A series of papers were written for the subpanel covering in detail certain areas about which it had special interests or misgivings. The subpanel held a series of extended meetings from November of 1956 to May of 1957. It heard testimony, much of which was necessarily off the record, on various crucial areas of decision. And it explored and debated in extended detail various alternate choices and possible lines of progression in U.S. military problems.

Many points and problems considered by the subpanel did not appear in its report. Some of them dealt with less important problems; some of them were left out because of space considerations; some of them were deemed background to decisions or problems dealt with in the report. The second section of the report will consider some of these areas in detail. All the main papers put before the subpanel are included here. But there was also a large body of material which the subpanel debated and resolved or disagreed on. Many of these touched upon sensitive security areas and cannot be alluded to here. But there was also a large body of material in the actual extemporaneous deliberations of the subpanel which may help illuminate the report proper.

The second part of the subpanel report therefore, presents the background papers together with related material from the actual transcript

of the subpanel's deliberations. Although a given point reoccurs in
different forms or in connection with different areas under consideration
in different meetings of the subpanel, no attempt has been made to pre-
serve the temporal sequence in which the ideas occurred; instead the
material has been grouped with the papers which, together with the sub-
panel deliberations, served as background material for the final report.

Panel deliberations, served as background material for the final report.

Material has been brought with the papers which, together with the sup-
serve the temporal sequence in which the ideas occurred; instead the
in different meetings of the panel, no attempt has been made to bu-
different forms or in connection with different areas under consideration
of the panel's deliberations. Although a given point seems in

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# I. THE BACKGROUND OF MILITARY SECURITY

SUBPANEL II WAS IMMENSELY CONCERNED WITH THE BROAD FRAMEWORK UPON WHICH A PEASIBLE SYSTEM OF U.S. MILITARY SECURITY COULD BE ERECTED. THE SUBPANEL WAS KEENLY DESIROUS OF FINDING MEANINGFUL POSITIONS TO TAKE ON THE LARGE U.S. SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT 10 - 15 YEARS -- THE REVOLUTION IN WEAPONS SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY; THE STRATEGIC STALEMATE AND THE NEW CHALLENGE OF LIMITED WAR; THE CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS MAJOR ALLIES, ITS SYSTEM OF BASES AND ALLIANCE, AND ITS MUTUAL SECURITY PACTS; THE ASTRO-NOMICALLY CLIMBING U.S. DEFENSE BUDGETS AND THE CUMBERSOME MACHINERY OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT. BUT BEFORE ANSWERS OR EVEN COMMENTS COULD BE FOUND HERE, FIRST QUESTIONS MUST COME FIRST. UPON WHAT FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL NEEDS AND OBJECTIVES MUST A U.S. MILITARY SECURITY SYSTEM BE ERECTED? WHAT ARE THE MAIN THREATS TO AMERICAN SECURITY? AND FIRST OF ALL, FOR WHAT DO, AND SHOULD, AMERICANS BE WILLING TO FIGHT ... ?

DR. COFFEY: An important element in determining our international security objectives is the question of the extent to which our national interests require us to act, in a hackneyed phrase as the policeman on the

tend to require us to act, in a packaged phrase as the policeman on the
security objectives is the question of the extent to which our national in-
DR. COLEY: An important element in determining our international

LOOK WHAT DO, AND SHOULD, AMERICANS BE WITTING TO FIGHT . . . ?
ARE THE MAIN THREATS TO AMERICAN SECURITY? AND FIRST OF ALL,
OBJECTIVES MUST A U.S. MILITARY SECURITY SYSTEM BE EXECUTED? WHAT
COME FIRST? UPON WHAT FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL NEEDS AND OB-
EIGN COMMENTS COULD BE FOUND HERE, FIRST QUESTIONS MUST
MACHINE OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, BUT BEFORE ANSWERS OR
NOMICALLY CLIMBING U.S. DEFENSE BUDGETS AND THE CUMBERSOME
BILLS AND VILLAGE, AND ITS MUTUAT SECURITY FACTS; THE VISTO-
TIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ITS MAJOR VILLES, ITS SYSTEM OF
AND THE NEW CHALLENGE OF LIMITED WAR: THE CHANGING KET-
IN WEAPONS SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY: THE STRATEGIC STATEMENT
SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT 10 - 12 YEARS -- THE REAUTION
OF LINDING MEANINGFUL POSITIONS TO TAKE ON THE LARGE U.S.
CURRICULUM COULD BE EXECUTED. THE SUBFRAME WAS KEENLY DESIRIOUS
FRAMEWORK UPON WHICH A VERSIBLE SYSTEM OF U.S. MILITARY SE-
SUBFRAME II WAS IMMENSELY CONCERned WITH THE BROAD

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beat. To put it more precisely, for what do we fight? Or in a better
sense perhaps toward what do we build our military policy and forces
as an instrument? Let me cite a specific illustration. If we are to be
reduced to pious mutterings concerning Southeast Asia, we may not
need any air squadrons or naval vessels in the Pacific, we may not
need a base in the Philippines, we may not need to worry about the
doctrine on how we assist in counter guerrilla activities or how we
prevent their arising. Conversely, if our national interests indicate
that the maintenance of freedom in that area is important, this may
perhaps move our military efforts in a different direction even if it does
not add to it. If you look at this in terms of a concept of U.S. interest
which aims at the gradual expansion of the area of freedom and the
growth of democratic values, then you are, I would assume, implicitly
committed to stand and fight wherever and whenever an attempt at ex-
pansion occurs as well as to, in terms of Soviet tactical doctrine, "lean
heavily" against the opponent . . .

MR. DEAN: In searching for an answer to the question "what
do we fight for?" it is useful to take a quick look back into history to
find out what the United States has fought for. The record shows that
we have fought just about everybody in the world at one time or another:

we have fought just about everybody in the world at one time or another:
find out what the United States has fought for. The record shows that
do we fight for? " It is useful to take a quick look back into history to
MR. DREW: In searching for an answer to the question "what
previously," against the opponent . . .

bassion occurs as well as to, in terms of Soviet tactical doctrine, "lean
committed to stand and fight wherever and whenever an attempt at ex-
growth of democratic values", then you are, I would assume, implicitly
which time at the gradual expansion of the area of freedom and the
not add to it. If you look at this in terms of a concept of U.S. interest
perhaps move our military efforts in a different direction even if it does
that the maintenance of freedom in that area is important, this may
prevent their arising. Conversely, if our national interests indicate
deadline on how we assist in counter guerrilla activities or how we
need a base in the Philippines, we may not need to worry about the
need any such adjectives or naval vessels in the Pacific, we may not
reduced to blunderings concerning Southeast Asia, we may not
be an instrument? Let us cite a specific illustration. If we are to be
sense because toward what do we build our military policy and forces
best. To put it more precisely, for what do we fight? Or in a better

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England, Spain, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Bulgaria, Japan -- almost
everybody except France, Russia and the Scandinavian countries. Some
of our former enemies today are our closest friends, as witness both
England and Turkey. Some of our former friends, such as Russia, today
are the greatest enemies.

The Mexican War in the 1840s and the Spanish-American War
were somewhat imperialistic wars of conquests in which we took much
lard after little provocation. But that class of war and type of imperia-
lism is a thing of the past, not likely to be repeated.

Looking to South America, the Monroe Doctrine probably kept us
from having to fight any wars in that area, largely because no European
power ever challenged that Doctrine. And we have also a policy there
of staying out of the local wars in South America and simply holding our-
selves as arbitrators in case of a dispute.

Coming to World War I and II -- the United States entered those
wars very reluctantly and not particularly for principle, although princi-
ple came along after we were in the wars to help us justify what we were
doing. In 1914 we were not prepared to go into the European conflict and
three years went by before we entered and even then we joined the allies

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without much of an army, and entered at a time when a large body of
American public opinion was not even in favor of going into the war.

The same situation describes our entrance into World War II,
the United States had to be insulted a good many times and clobbered
in some dramatic fashion before we would go in. The Japanese settled
the question of our role in World War II by their attack on Pearl Harbor;
an actual attack on American territory. More than that, on American
military might -- the fleet -- it would be difficult to imagine any pro-
vocation much greater.

So if we can generalize about why we have fought in the past,
it is fair to say that we have been provoked into fight and we have
entered only when provocation was close to home where our ships, our
territory, our citizens were involved.

Of course Korea is the great exception to this generality, and
presented the U.S. with a very different situation than we had ever be-
fore encountered. And why did we go into Korea? There has been much
dispute on this point. Broadly speaking, our entrance was based on a
threat to our defense perimeter.

For Americans, this was a new reason for going to war. For the
first time, our action in Korea did not involve our people or our territory.

For Americans, this was a new reason for going to war. For the threat to our defense perimeter.

Dispute on this point. Broadly checking, our entrance was based on a vote encountered. And why did we go into Korea? There has been much presented the U. S. with a very different situation than we had ever presented to Korea. It is fair to say that we have been provoked into fight and we have entered only when provocation was close to home where our ships, our

So if we can generalize about why we have fought in the past, our action much greater.

military might -- the fleet -- it would be difficult to imagine any pro-an actual attack on American territory. More than that, on American the duration of our role in World War II by their attack on Pearl Harbor, in some dramatic fashion before we would do in. The Japanese settled the United States had to be invaded a good many times and clopped the same situation describes our entrance into World War II, American public opinion was not even in favor of going into the war, without much of an army, and entered at a time when a large body of

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ELC3

## II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

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We said we were going into the Korean War to support the U.N. and resist aggression. But basically, this was not our real reason. We went in because the threat was so close to our defense perimeter which included Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines; we would not tolerate so close an approach to that defense perimeter by communist forces on the Korean peninsula.

Today we face difficulties over two other perimeters: the one we have set up with the Middle Eastern Doctrine and our present Pacific perimeter. Both of these are so that what is really involved in both cases is not questions of geography but the fact that the U.S., in all likelihood, now has but one enemy, plus its allies -- Red China and the satellites.

Our problem, therefore, is made somewhat simpler as to what we fight for, where we would fight, and whom we would fight. Certainly the "whom" we would fight has been answered for us by the conduct of the USSR. An overt act of aggression by the USSR, possibly by Red China, an overt act anywhere in the world would probably today mean war with the United States.

We will not fight simply because we are against aggression. We have seen other aggressions on the part of our friends and we

We have seen other aggressors on the part of our friends and we

Red China, an overt act anywhere in the world would probably today
be out of the U2U. An overt act of aggression by the U2U, possibly by
to the "whom" we would fight has been answered for us by the con-
we fight for, where we would fight, and whom we would fight. Cer-

Our problem, therefore, is made somewhat simpler so to what
and the satellites.

all likelihood, now has put one enemy, plus its allies -- Red China
both cases is not directions of geography but the fact that the U.S., in
civilian perimeter. Both of these are so that what is really involved in
we have set up with the Middle Eastern Doctrine and our present pa-

Today we face difficulties over two other perimeter: the one
forces on the Korean perimeter.

tolerate so close an approach to that defense perimeter by communist
which included Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines; we would not
went in because the threat was so close to our defense perimeter

reatat aggression. But basically, this was not our total reason. We
We said we were going into the Korean War to support the U.N. and

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certainly would not have fought England or France over the aggression
that took place in Egypt. So it is inaccurate to say that we are simply
against aggression, that we will stop aggression anywhere in the world.
Today the United States really means it will fight to stop aggression on
the part of the USSR or Red China. Or, to put it another way, the United
States will forcibly block aggression by someone that we do not like or
trust.

This creates a situation very hard to frame with a principle since
we reserve the right to move against aggression only when the victims
of those aggressors are your friends. This is hard to put in principle
form therefore, it is more accurate not to base the why we fight on ag-
gression as such and instead to say the real threat to the peace of the
world is from the USSR. The spread of its conquest in the world by any
means is the thing that we most fear, and the one action that can trigger
us into some kind of war is some kind of aggression.

Now, the difficulty about this aggression is that we have been
dealing in times past, and currently, with a 19th century concept of
aggression. And this is not the way the USSR is proceeding. Employ-
ing much more subtle means than this, these obvious forms of aggres-
sion, the Kremlin uses bribery, chicanery and subversion -- as where

Now, the difficulty about this addression is that we have been
me into some kind of war is some kind of addression.
means is the thing that we most fear, and the one action that can protect
world is from the USSR. The ahead of its condent in the world by any
addression as such and instead to say the real threat to the peace of the
tom therefore, it is more accurate not to pass the way we fight on a-
point of those addressors are your friends. This is hard to but in principle
we reserve the right to move against addression only when the victims
This creates a situation very hard to frame with a plausible since
that's it.

States will forcibly block addression by someone that we do not like or
the part of the USSR or Red China. Or, to put it another way, the United
Today the United States really means it will fight to stop addression on
against addression, that we will stop addression anywhere in the world.
that took place in Egypt. So it is inescapable to say that we are simply
certainly would not have fought England or France over the addression
that we will stop addression

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she exports arms, with the hope that they may eventually be used
against one of the capitalist countries.

We have not been sufficiently realistic in defining or recognizing the type of subversive aggression that we face today and will face in the future, kinds of aggression which may well no longer involve the passage of troops across borders. It should be the policy of the United States to announce that we will not tolerate any aggression -- the term "aggression" we would reserve for ourselves to define -- if it is on the part of the USSR or inspired by the USSR.

This should apply to anywhere in the world on the theory that it is no longer important whether the aggression takes place in South America, Africa, the Middle East or any other place. This is what we go to war for and what we would fight for.

Of course there are some built-in restrictions upon this kind of policy. One is the reluctance of the American people to fight in a cause where it cannot see its enemy at work, where the aggression is not apparent or does not become apparent until it is almost too late. This sort of situation will call for leadership and explanation, and in turn calls for a lot of public understanding as to what we will have to go to war for and be prepared to go to war for.

do to war for and be prepared to go to war for.

turn calls for a lot of bubblin' understanding as to what we will have to
this sort of situation will call for leadership and explanation, and in
not abherent or does not become abherent until it is almost too late.

cause where it cannot see its enemy at work, where the abatement is
of policy. One is the reluctance of the American people to fight in a
Of course there are some built-in restrictions shown this kind
do to war for and what we would fight for.

Americas, Americas, the Middle East or any other place. This is what we
it is no loeder important whether the abatement takes place in South
This should apply to anywhere in the world on the theory that
time -- it is on the part of the USRR or inquired by the USRR.

aton -- the term "addression" we would reserve for ourselves to de-
of the United States to announce that we will not tolerate any address-
volve the passage of troops across borders. It should be the policy
tace in the future, kinds of addression which may well no loeder in-
ning the type of subversive addression that we face today and will
We have not been sufficiently resolute in defining or recod-
against one of the capitalist countries.

the exports arms, with the hope that they may eventually be used

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And for an illustration to pin point the difficulty in defining
aggression: assume there is a successful rebellion in East Germany
bigger and more effective than the 1956 Hungarian rebellion, assume
then that either the Russians moved to quell the rebellion or that the
West Germans moved in to help the East Germans, or that they both
moved simultaneously. What would be the position of the United
States? What is the answer to this problem and what should United
States policy be? And would it be possible in this situation to rally
American support for intervention? It might involve quite a war and
perhaps the risk of a total war. I think it is even harder in the Mid-
dle East perhaps. It certainly is harder than if you had a renewal of
the Korean situation, with the use now of the 21 or so of the airfields
that they now have in northern Korea, if they decided to let loose
against South Korea. This is a different situation. I'd like to have
our group address itself as to what we would do in this situation.

MR. LUCE: Mr. Chairman, I've certainly a great respect for
Mr. Dean's reluctance to define any easily statable principle which
would cover the wars which we have fought or wars that we think we
might fight. Nevertheless I am going to take a shot at it. First of

might fight. Nevertheless I am going to take a shot at it. First of
would cover the wars which we have fought or wars that we think we
Mr. Deane's reliance to define any easilystatable principle which
Mr. FUEG: Mr. Chairman, I've certainly a great respect for

against South Korea. This is a different situation. I'd like to have
that they now have in northern Korea, if they decided to let loose
the Korean situation, with the use now of the 51 or so of the airfields
die East behaue. It certainly is harder than it you had a renewal of
because the task of a total war. I think it is even harder in the Mid-
American arbor for intervention? It might involve units a war and
States policy be? And would it be possible in this situation to rally
States? What is the answer to this problem and what should United
moved simultaneously. What would be the position of the United
West Germans moved in to help the East Germans, or that they both
then that either the Russians moved to deal the rebellion or that the
piglet and more effective than the 1926 Hungarian rebellion, assume
address: assume there is a successful rebellion in East Germany
And for an illustration to bin point the difficulty in defining

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all, I'd like to make one or two preliminary remarks. Looking back
over our wars, Mr. Dean omitted what I should say is by all odds the
biggest war experience in the life of our people and that is the Civil
War. I think there may be some meaning to that. It is most extraordi-
nary that World War I and even more World War II were on a vast scale
and still it seems that what remains the greatest war experience of the
United States has been the Civil War.

I'd like to dissent a little bit, too, from the idea that there was
no principle involved in World War I or II, but that would involve a
rather long argument on my part. As a little evidence, I would go back
to the campaign of 1916, where Mr. Wilson, by a thousand votes in
California, got elected on the basis that he kept us out of war. I'm
not saying that Mr. Hughes was advocating war in that election, but
there was a good deal of feeling about the issues that had arisen across
the sea. A few months later, in April 1917, President Wilson declared
war by saying, "God helping us, we can do no other!" I can't think
that he was thinking primarily of the serious attack on the national in-
terests of the U.S. in terms of the submarine. Well, the same type of
thing could be said about World War II, and even more so because by
1939, even by 1938, the time of Munich, to say nothing of later on, this

1939, even by 1936, the time of Munich, to say nothing of later on, this
triumph could be said about World War II, and even more so because by
troops of the U.S. in terms of the submarine. Well, the same type of
that he was thinking primarily of the serious attack on the national in-
most by saying, "God helping us, we can do no other!" I can't think
thease. A few months later, in April 1917, President Wilson declared
there was a good deal of feeling about the issue that had arisen across
not saying that Mr. Hughes was advocating war in that election, but
California, got elected on the basis that he kept us out of war. I'm
to the campaign of 1916, where Mr. Wilson, by a thousand votes in
rather long argument on my part. As a little evidence, I would do pack
no plausible involved in World War I or II, but that would involve a
I'd like to dissent a little bit, too, from the idea that there was
United States has been the Civil War.

and still it seems that what remains the greatest war experience of the
nary that World War I and even more World War II were on a vast scale
War. I think there may be some meaning to that. If it is most extraordinary
piestest war experience in the life of our people and that is the Civil
over our wars, Mr. Dean omitted what I should say to all odds the
all, I'd like to make one or two preliminary remarks. Looking back

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country was about 90% agreed that Hitler was, if I may use inelegant language, about the all-time so-and-so of world history. The argument was, however, that it wasn't any business of ours.

Now to take a shot at the generalization. I quite agree with Mr. Dean that we have passed into a point new in historical situations in the life of the United States, and I think the Korean War marks it. Paran- thetically, in a way, I would say that perhaps the war which after the Civil War made the deepest psychic impression on us, was maybe this Korean War -- for many reasons, including this strange business of not winning it, and so on.

I might say that what the United States is concerned about and to do and to fight for, is the development of a certain kind of political order. In the Civil War, for example, we were fighting for a kind of political order in this country. Referring now to Mr. Dean's remark about aggression -- I quite agree that the definition of aggression has been some soldier walking across another territory, and that isn't really what we are talking about any more. If that is the 19th century definition of aggression, I suggest that it relates to a 19th century system of order.

Those vast parts of the world such as India, whose order has broken down, had been taken over by the imperial powers. One way of defining that order, but a very crude way, is the Pax Britannia, and so

defining that order, put a very crude way, is the Pan Britannis, and so
broken down, had been taken over by the imperial powers. One way of
those vast parts of the world each as India's, whose order has
aggression, I attest that it relates to a 19th century system of order.

We are talking about any more. If that is the 19th century definition of
some soldier walking across another territory, and that isn't really what
aggression -- I attest that the definition of aggression has been
littoral order in this country. Referring now to Mr. Dean's remark about
order. In the Civil War, for example, we were fighting for a kind of bo-
to do and to fight for, is the development of a certain kind of politics
I might say that what the United States is concerned about and
winning it, and so on.

Korean War -- for many reasons, including this strange business of not
Civil War made thedeepest payable impression on us, was maybe this
didually, in a way. I would say that perhaps the war which after the
life of the United States, and I think the Korean War marks it. Para-
Dean that we have based into a point new in historical situations in
Now to take a shot at the generalisation. I quite agree with Mr.
was, however, that it meant any business of ours.

was, however, that it meant any business of ours.
language, about the all-time so-and-so of world history. The argument
country was about 90% agreed that Hitler was, if I may be informed
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aggression could be called then as a specific act of crossing a bound-
ary.

Now in the 20th century, you do not establish a general system
of world order corresponding in any useful way to the 19th century sys-
tems of order. You are confronted with many countries in the process
of working out their own order. Take any country -- has Indonesia
established its system of order yet? I would say not. It is in the pro-
cess of it. One can even take some European country -- the Republic
of Italy. I would say the Republic of Italy has not yet been fully estab-
lished. I don't mean to be pessimistic about Italy, I think I'm quite
optimistic that, given the breaks, they _will_ establish the Republic. Of
course in Italy, as in France, etc., there is the internal challenge of
the Communist Party. So you do not have, as we believe we have in
this country, a complete consensus as to the nature of the order.

Then to go back to the Asian countries, here there is an even
better example of individual countries trying to work out their order.
And of course, there is the same lack of order, or the lack of a modern
order, in the Middle East. Take Saudi Arabia -- you can say an order
exists there, one would think, which is quite incompatible with the
modern world, whether it is in 10, 20 or 30 years, either by evolution

modern world, whether it is in 10, 20 or 30 years, either by evolution
exists there, one would think, which is quite incompatible with the
order, in the Middle East. Take Sandi Arapie -- you can say an order
And of course, there is the same lack of order, or the lack of a modern
better example of individual countries trying to work out their order.

Then to go back to the Asian countries, here there is an even
this country, a complete consensus as to the nature of the order.

the Communist Party. So you do not have, as we believe we have in
France in Italy, as in France, etc., there is the internal challenge of
optimistic that, given thereaks, they will establish the Republic. Of
lied. I don't mean to be pessimistic about Italy. I think I'm due
to Italy. I would say the Republic of Italy has not yet been fully estab-
lished its system of order yet? I would say not. If it is in the bro-
termes of order. You are confronted with many countries in the process
of world order corresponding in any meaningful way to the 19th century sys-
tem of order. Now in the 20th century, you do not establish a general system
of order.

addressed could be called thus as a specific act of crossing a pond-

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or revolution, there will be some radical changes in the nature of order which exists in Saudi Arabia.

In this world situation, the communists have put forward an idea about world order. In fact they say that the communist world order is what will prevail. They are fighting for the establishment of their order. The purpose of the United States is to prevent the establishment of the communist world order, to restrict it from any progress from where it is now and even reduce the area over which the communist order prevails. The counterpart to that order is impossible to define in nice constitutional terms, the counterpart to check and prevent communism in world order, is to get developed and established a 20th century world order. This does not mean that the order has to be of one world-wide conformity. There can be many types of order. But they must be sorts which are generally compatible with principles such as liberty under law, etc.

I'll repeat one more thing and then I'll be through. The attacks on such 20th century orders as I have been discussing are subtle attacks that are hard to detect and we don't quite know what to do about them. But I would like to make this comment. In many places before such time as the communists feel that they can and want to take over

such time as the communes feel that they can and want to take over
them. But I would like to make this comment. In many places before
takes that are hard to detect and we don't quite know what to do about
on such 20th century orders as I have been discussing are simple at-
I'll repeat one more thing and then I'll be through. The attacks
law, etc.

which are generally compatible with principles and as liberty under
conformity. There can be many types of order. But they must be sort
order. This does not mean that the order has to be of one world-wide
world order, is to be developed and established a 20th century world
institutional terms, the counterpoint to check and prevent communism in
Europe. The counterpoint to that order is impossible to define in nice con-
which will be seen over which the communist order bre-
of the communist world order, to restrict it from any progress from where
order. The purpose of the United States is to prevent the establishment
of which exists in Soviet Russia.

In this world situation, the communists have but forward on
which exists in Soviet Russia.

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and establish their order, their primary interest is to inhibit the estab-
lishment of any order. What they _are_ after is chaos, rather than order.
Here I think the Middle East is a very good example. I'm not saying of
course, that the Soviet Union would not be glad to have the whole Mid-
dle East handed to it on a silver platter. But I suggest, at this moment
that they don't have any very serious intentions of taking over the Mid-
dle East. What they are interested in is a breakdown of such order as
there is represented there, by pipe lines being blown up, and so on, and
so on. They are interested in the inhibiting of the development of decent
order in the Middle East, not in substituting their own order for the min-
ute but just to keep _disorder_. The communists have interest only in dis-
order. So their subtle subversive actions are not so much subversive
for the purpose of upsetting an existing order, but rather just to keep
chaos going right along.

Our problem is a much harder one, it is a real one -- our ob-
jective is to establish a viable order in the Middle East and in various
other places. To summarize it I think that the task of the United States
is to devote all possible efforts, diplomatic and military, to help bring
about the evolution of the 20th century world order, and to maintain and
guard this order so far as we judge it has been developed in various
places.

pieces.

and this order so far as we judge it has been developed in various
about the evolution of the 20th century world order, and to maintain and
is to devote all possible efforts, diplomatic and military, to help bring
other places. To summarize it I think that the task of the United States
ought to establish a viable order in the Middle East and in various
other places.

Our problem is a much more complex one, it is a real one -- on op-
cess doing right along.

for the purpose of offsetting an existing order, put rather just to keep
order. So their subtle subversive actions are not so much subversive
into but just to keep <u>disorder</u>. The communists have interest only in dis-
order in the Middle East, not in offsetting their own order for the min-
so on. They are interested in the offsetting of the development of decent
there is represented there, by the lines being drawn up, and so on, and
the East. What they are interested in is a breakdown of each order as
that they don't have any very serious intentions of taking over the Mid-
dle East handed to it on a silver platter. But I suggest, at this moment
now, that the Soviet Union would not be able to have the whole Mid-
ole I think the Middle East is a very good example. I'm not saying of
language of any order. What they are after is chaos, rather than order,
and establish their order, their primary interest is to inculp it the east-

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MR. DEAN: I probably should amend one of my earlier statements when I said there was no principle involved -- I didn't quite mean that -- in World War I and II. The principle worried about was understood by our leaders, and was understood by segments of our population, in some cases large segments, and in some cases, small segments. But the point that I was making is, that we would not act without provocation, that we did not join in these wars because we decided principle was violated, we may have had principle in our minds to a degree, but without the provocation we were a reluctant participant . . .

MR. ALTSCHUL: Referring to what Mr. Dean said, wouldn't we agree that the basic factor that made us hesitate so long in the cases of two World Wars, was that we had a sort of ingrained belief we were safe between our two oceans, and that the thing to do was to keep out of trouble and hark back to the farewell address of George Washington? We have been brought up in that tradition and it takes a long time to shake it off.

Finally, as World War I developed, we began to realize that somehow or other an enemy power dominating the continent of Europe was a threat to our own national security. In the second World War we were edging towards that sort of belief that our security might be threatened too.

edging towards that sort of policy that our security might be threatened too.
Finally, as World War I developed, we began to realize that some-
itself.

have been brought up in that tradition and it takes a long time to shake
trouble and bank raid to the foreground address of George Washington? We
between our two oceans, and that the thing to do was to keep out of
two World Wars, was that we had a sort of intangible policy we were late
into that the basic factor that made us hesitate so long in the cases of
MR. VITZSCHULT: Referring to what Mr. Dean said, wouldn't we
we were a reluctant participant? . . .

have had a principle in our mind to a degree, but without the provocation
join in these wars because we decided principle was violated, we may
was making it, that we would not act without provocation, that we did not
leave segments, and in some cases, small segments. But the point that I
leaders, and was understood by segments of our population, in some cases
in World War I and II. The principle worried spout was understood by our
when I said there was no principle involved -- I didn't quite mean that --

MR. DEVIN: I properly should amend one of my earlier statements

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We are still governed to a certain extent by this tradition that
these things to a certain extent were out beyond our concern, that we
didn't have anything to do with them. But the safety between two oceans
has now been pretty well blasted. I don't think we have any more confi-
dence in that.

During the early period, while we would like to have had world order,
this was not a primary order that would grow into world security. Today,
I think our interest in world order is that we feel today that the establish-
ment of a world order which is not under the combination of a totalitarian
state, is a thing that is very important to our national security . . .

VOICE: Mr. Chairman, may I just make one statement? This pertains to the Asian situation. I'm concerned that we will, in discussing such questions as what do we fight for, we will not give enough attention to the Chinese situation, say 10 years from now. What happens when the Chinese start shifting from the "soft-sell" in which they are now engaging, to the hard approach, say five years from now? Ten years from now, we will see them as more of an enemy than at that time we will consider the USSR to be. At that time, we may have the USSR under a more manageable situation than we have the Chinese. I recall that General Clay has made the point that the only conceivable hope we have of keeping the

made the point that the only conceivable hope we have of keeping the
aparate situation from us have the Chinese. I recall that General Clay has
USAR to be. At that time, we may have the USAR under a more manage-
will see them as more of an enemy than at that time we will consider the
to the hard approach, say five years from now? Ten years from now, we
Chinese start shifting from the "self-sell" in which they are now engaging,
to the Chinese situation, say 10 years from now. What happens when the
such questions as what do we fight for, we will not give enough attention
to the Asian situation. I'm concerned that we will, in discussing
VOICE: Mr. Chairman, may I just make one statement? This bet-
state, is a thing that is very important to our national security. . . .
ment of a world order which is not under the combination of a totalitari-
ism I think our interest in world order is that we feel today that the establi-
this was not a primary order that would grow into world security. Today,
during the early period, while we would like to have had world order,
dence in that.

has now been pretty well placed. I don't think we have any more confi-
didn't have anything to do with them. But the safety between two oceans
these things to a certain extent were out beyond our concern, that we

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peace and maintaining our objectives, lies in having an outward posture,
and a willingness to fight at some point . . .

MR. ALTSCHUL: Mr. Chairman, we've heard much about military
power. I wonder if it wouldn't be worthwhile to inquire a little bit about
the question of the paralysis of military power, paralysis of the national
will. It seems to me that this is one of the things that's really affecting
our whole situation.

I begin to think that our national policy is predominantly influenced
by fear. I was wondering, as the conversation went on, if it weren't about
time that we added to this group a mass psychologist of some sort, so that
we could find out what we are going to do, first of all to overcome this fear
ourselves, and then find some way of having this spirit that you talk of
spread from our shores once again as it did in the past. It is curious that
in a country like Egypt, where the tradition would be violently against com-
munism normally, you do find such an extraordinarily successful commu-
nistic infiltration. I'm satisfied -- but I admit that I may be quite wrong
in this -- that the reason why this infiltration takes place is that some-
how or other, governed by this fear complex in the West, we're putting on
an exhibition of impotency which lets other people feel that they'd better
make peace with the way of the future . . .

make peace with the way of the time . . .

an exhibition of impropriety which lets other people feel that they'd better
not or else, governed by this test complex in the West, we're putting on
in this -- that the reason why this inflation takes place is that some-
nastic inflation. I'm attached -- but I admit that I may be quite wrong
mumia normally. You do find such an extraordinarily successful comm-
in a country like Egypt, where the tradition would be deliberately against com-
abuse how our alpha once again as it did in the East. It is alone that
ourselves, and then find some way of having this spirit that you talk of
we could find out what we are going to do, that of all to overcome this test
time that we added to this group a mass psychologist of some sort, so that
by test. I was wondering, as the conversation went on, if it weren't spent
I begin to think that our national policy is badly influenced
out whole situation.

will. It seems to me that this is one of the things that's really affecting
the discussion of the barley of military power, barley of the national
power. I wonder if it wouldn't be worthwhile to induce a little bit about
MR. VITSCHUR: Mr. Chairman, we've heard much about military
and a willingness to fight at some point . . .

peace and maintaining our objectives, lie in having an outward posture,
and a willingness to fight at some point . . .

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MR. DEAN: There are two or three general things which it is the
duty of this panel to bring to the attention of the other subpanels. The
very basic thing -- one to which Mr. Altschul refers -- is no matter what
kind of military tools we have, can we get a willingness in this country to
use them? Or have we incapacitated ourselves completely by building up
phobias concerning the use of various types of weapons in various situations?

Now, this seems like an obvious truth, and believe me, the more I
go around on the streets, the more I am convinced that this is the prevailing
view within the U. S. It is our obligation to point this up very bluntly.

DR. JOHNSON: That phobia always disappears once you get into
an actual war. It's one you always have before a war.

MR. DEAN: We've had it before. We've had it before wars, which
delayed wars -- delayed our entry, perhaps, as witness World War I. And
we have had it during wars when the job was a lot harder at home because
of these attitudes. We had it in the draft problem. But it's awfully important
that we get over this one. We keep going back to it all the time. I think
this committee has an unusual opportunity to point this one up.

MR. FLOBERG: Your comment that we always will do what has to be
done, and the fact that our phobias disappear when we get into war, I think

MR. LÖFERG: You comment that we always will do what has to be done, and the fact that our bubble disappear when we get into war. I think

we have had it during war when the job was a lot harder at home because
delayed war -- delayed our entry, because, as witness World War I. And

MR. DEAN: We've had it before. We've had it before war, which

an actual war. If a one you always have before a war.

DR. JOHNSON: That bubble always disappears once you get into
view within the U. S. It is our obligation to point this up very plausibly.
do around on the streets, the more I am convinced that this is the prevailing

Now, this seems like an obvious truth, and believe me, the more I
believe in concerning the use of various types of weapons in various situations?

now them? Or have we incipiently ourselves completely by building up
kind of military tools we have, can we get a willingness in this country to
very basic thing -- one to which Mr. Vitaleui reterà -- is no matter what
duty of this panel to bring to the attention of the other audiences. The

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was disproved at the end of World War II and in the Korean War. This may
be what Gordon had in mind.

It seemed to me at the end of World War II in July, 1945, that any
blind man through his dark glasses could see what was happening. Yet
the whole country was pervaded by the philosophy of "bringing them home."
People who were in the Far East at that time, just routine military people,
could see this great machine we had collapsing all round. A blind man
could see it. This was due to the weakness of character that had not dis-
appeared, but had cropped up again about the middle of '45.

I'm a further member of the school that thinks we are doing poorly
politically in the world. I think that part of the reason we're doing poorly
is that we chickened out in Korea and made it inevitable to chicken out in
Indochina. And we've chickened out in about six other places since then.
It's about time that we faced up to the fact that we didn't have the guts to
follow through when we had the opportunity to do so . . .

MR. WALKOWICZ: Essentially what we are discussing here in on
what statement of principle and at what point the United States will take its
stand. Now, I would like to give an unsophisticated answer.

I think there is a lot more truth than poetry in the words that "no
man dies without our help in the fight for freedom but that a part of our

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freedom dies with him." I'm afraid that this reflects a little too much of a
New England background, and perhaps it reflects, too much, stories at
your parent's kneeside on what it is to be a member of a subjugated race,
what it is like to live as a slave -- with the boot under the heel of an
aggressor. But, essentially, I think it has been patriots' day in the United
States of America since the fall of 1944 when the Soviets first began their
anti-American indoctrination of their front-line troops. The message was
very simple. (Sentence in Russian quoted here) which translates very
simply: "The last symphony which the "God dammed" Americans will hear
will be a Russian symphony, and we'll play it."

Now, Mr. Altschul talks about our foreign policy being dominated by
fear since the end of World War II, I think it has been more than that. It has
been a mixture, of two things: One, a very laudable thing, the restraint that
comes with national greatness. I think, unfortunately, it has been another
less laudable thing and that is, cringing before the enemy. With that back-
ground I would like to answer your specific question by referring to Hungary.

I think that the time of Hungary, meaning at any time, meaning we
should have done this a long time ago, there should have been in being
sophisticatedly located and trained, some indigenous forces with skeleton
equipment, but with a well-worked-out plan for their augmentation. Two or
three wings of aircraft should have appeared, additionally. The U. S. flag

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should have come off, and out of a well-prepared file for this particular
incident there should have been pasted on the wings of those aircraft the
flag of free Hungary. The hold should have been loaded with bazookas,
with ammunition, with medical supplies, and with some messages saying,
"Gents, if you need more, it's ready."

The crew should have been indigenous -- trained both of defectors
from the Central European countries and of American volunteers -- of which
I think there might be found to be a surprising number. I think that this
equipment, these units, should have moved into Hungary as soon as the
fat was in the pan. This might have provoked a chain of serious and grave
events. It is hard for me to believe that if something like this had happened,
particularly if some of the aircraft, fighter aircraft accompanying and
supporting the transports carrying bazookas, it's hard for me to believe that
Poland would have remained quiet for very long. A demonstration of assistance
of this kind would have led to an uprising in Poland, I'm almost certain.

East Germany and the Soviets at that point would have been faced
with an issue. The issue would have been clear cut -- lose the satellites
or lose the Bolshevik system. There is very little doubt in my mind which
alternative they would have chosen. However, if they had behaved in an
irrational way, in an insane way and chosen to lost the Bolshevik system,
then I think we should have faced up to the issue and had been prepared --

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those of us who would have -- to die like men.

I'd much rather spend a short life on earth -- I know I have to die at some point -- a life which comes to an end in confidence that I have done what the people who founded this nation did. They pledged and gave their lives for my freedom, for freedom. I would much rather live that kind of life rather than lead a life of vascillation, a life which is not marked by very great courage, and which in all probability ends seeing my daughters raped and dying in a Soviet concentration camp.

VOICE: Suppose the Soviets had found in the situation no choice? Suppose that they had found that the loss of the satellites was tantamount to the loss of the Bolshevik system? Seems to me that it raises the basic question as to whether general war is in our ultimate interest.

MR. WALKOWICZ: Let me put it this way. There has been with us, since the end of World War II, the risk that the Soviets might precipitate a world war, either accidentally or by design. To my mind, that risk is never decreased; it is always increased, by backing down before every threat which the Soviet has posed. And in some degree we have backed down before every threat with which we have been confronted since August 1945.

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TO SUCH EXAMINATIONS INTO THE OBJECTIVES FOR WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE FOUGHT OR WOULD FIGHT OR SHOULD FIGHT HAD TO BE ADDED MANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PRACTICALITIES ENFORCED ON US INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES BY THE REALITIES AND NEEDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD FRAMEWORK AND US POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. MUCH DATA IN THIS FIELD WAS CONSIDERED BY THE PANEL.

NECESSARILY THE DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY LED INTO NUMEROUS CONSIDERATIONS WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHAT FUNCTIONS COULD THE UNITED STATES COUNT UPON THE UNITED NATIONS TO PLAY IN MILITARY SECURITY? WAS THERE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ENTIRE SECURITY PROBLEM, OR IN OTHER WORDS WHAT LIKELIHOOD WAS THERE OF INTERNATIONALLY EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT? ---

MR. LUCE: What I felt around this table is the tremendous responsibility of the United States for leadership. The problem is -- leadership of what! It is very hard to try to interpret the phrase as leadership in the free world because what is the free world? or a democratic coalition?

The obligation of the United States may be nothing less than to leave for the whole world a future, including all those hundreds of millions of people behind the iron curtain. If so, then first of all, as regards the

people behind the iron curtain. If so, then that of all, as regards the
for the whole world a future, including all those hundreds of millions of
The agitation of the United States may be nothing less than to leave
world because what is the free world? or a democratic constitution?
what! It is very hard to try to interpret the phrase as leadership in the free
pity of the United States for leadership. The problem is -- leadership of
MIL. FUCE: What I felt around this topic is the tremendous reasonableness.

OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY? ---
SECURITY PROBLEM, OR IN OTHER WORDS WHAT FIKETHOOD WAS THERE
IN MILITARY SECURITY? WAS THERE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ENTIRE
COULD THE UNITED STATES COUNT UPON THE UNITED NATIONS TO MY
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHAT FUNCTIONS
STRATEGY LED INTO NUMEROUS CONSIDERATIONS WHAT SHOULD BE THE
NECESSITY THE DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND
OBJECTIVES. MUCH DATA IN THIS FIELD WAS CONSIDERED BY THE SAME.
AND NEEDS OF THE PRESENT WORLD FRAMEWORK AND US POLITICAL
EMERGED ON US INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES BY THE REVOLUTIONS
HAD TO BE ADDED MYANMAR POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PRACTICALITIES
AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE FUGHT OR WOULD FIGHT OR SHOULD FIGHT
TO SUCH EXAMINATIONS INTO THE OBJECTIVES FOR WHICH THE

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military problem, we will have to make perfectly clear the problems of our
own survival. I believe that there's one great consensus around here, and
that is that our own survival is really a serious proposition. Then beyond
that the United States has to take leadership in connection with various
countries in various degrees of alliance or understanding. I think this
report should take great care to define what all of these relationships are.
This brings up the question of the United Nations . . .

MR. ALTSCHUL: In connection with what has been said, it seems
to me that the recommendation we ought to make maybe to some other
panel, is that we should abandon the habit that we are rapidly getting into
of using our real or fancied obligation under the U. N. Charter, as a pretext
for our failure or unwillingness to make courageous decisions. In the case
of the British in Suez -- when they went in there -- we adopted all kinds of
moral principles and found ourselves morally with the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia ...

DR. COFFEY: If the thesis is that we will oppose the expansion of
communism by whatever means and in whatever form and wherever it occurs,
that we will do our utmost, short of initiating general war to reduce the power
of communism; then you have a philosophy which indicates a shaping of our
military policy and structure much different than if we said that we would
rely upon the United Nations as the primary instrument for the determination

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of and repression of aggression and that we would take no actions which are in violation of the United Nations charter and we will react only if, as, and when our immediate allies are directly attacked . . .

MR. ALTSCHUL: In the preamble of the United Nations Charter, the determination of the signatory powers to achieve a number of specified and noble objectives was ultimately expressed. We have ever since tried to live up to the most liberal interpretations of the obligations assumed. And on more than one occasion it has been stated by high administration officials stressing the fact that it is the cornerstone of American foreign policy. So much has happened in the intervening years that it seems to take a fresh look at the United Nations to see what has undergone transformation and to re-examine the nature of our obligations in the light of today's realities. Adopted in an atmosphere of high hopes, the Charter rested on the assumption that the five permanent members of the Security Council were at one in their determination to make it an effective weapon in the cause of international peace and security. It was early recognized that it would be dangerous, if not futile, to attempt to use the charter as an instrument of coercion on any one of the great powers. On this account the United States, no less than the Soviet Union, was insistent upon according the right of veto to the five permanent members of the Security Council. But as the underlying purpose to be served by the right of vetoes

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clearly understood, there was general agreement that it was not to be exercised frivolously. In fact, the four sponsoring powers issued a joint statement that "it is not to be assumed that the permanent members would use the veto willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council."

However, it soon became apparent that these expressions of intent were to be honored by the Soviet Union more in the breach than in the observance. As of today they have exercised the right of veto 79 times, in each instance frustrating the will of a great majority of the Security Council for purposes of its own. This scandalous abuse of the veto power has seriously impaired the development of the prestige on which the ultimate success of the United Nations depends. The UN has been perverted by the Soviet Union from an organization dedicated to the effective pursuit of international peace and security into an instrument for furthering the objectives of the Soviet Union in the cold war. And grave doubts about its future usefulness are quoted with disturbing frequency in European journals of opinion.

At the time of the Korean crisis the fortuitous absence of the Soviet delegate in the Security Council made it possible for the United States to take prompt action. But it was clear this was purely accidental, that under normal circumstances with full attendance at the meeting of the Council, even in such an emergency as was presented by Korea, the hands of the United Nations would be tied. In an effort to break this impasse, at the

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instance of the United States, there was adopted what has come to be
known as the United for Peace Resolution which made it possible,
though not obligatory, for members of the United Nations to act by virtual
recommendation of the General Assembly if adopted by two-thirds of the
majority of those present and voting.

At the time this seemed to be a helpful forward step. It was unlikely
that the Soviet bloc could muster enough votes in the General Assembly to
defeat the world of a predominant majority. But since the United for Peace
Resolution was adopted, things have changed. In the first place the member-
ship of the United Nations has materially increased, and in the second place
the so-called Afro-Asian bloc has come into being with the result that today
the Soviet Union and its Satellites, acting in concert with all or even a
considerable part of the Afro-Asian bloc, can without too much difficulty
muster enough votes to make their will prevail. So the United Nations
finds itself once again in the position where it may be powerless to act just
at the time when there might be impelling reason for action.

This brief survey leads directly to the troublesome question which
can be formulated in the following manner: Do our obligations under the
United Nations Charter take precedence over our inherent right to take
whatever steps may be deemed necessary to defend what we consider to be
of vital interest? Or expressed in other words: Do our obligations under

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the Charter mean that we cannot move to defend a vital interest without
the private consent of the Soviet Union? By way of providing some answer
to these questions reference is generally made to the following sense of
Article 51 of the Charter. Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of an individual in collective self defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security.

But to many, and to me at least, this would seem at best an inadequate
answer, for the circumstances in which members are authorized to have re-
course to the inherent right of the individual on collective self defense is
limited to those occasions in which an armed attack has occurred against
a member of the United Nations. In the world of today, an armed attack is
by no means the only method by which the vital interests of a nation may
be threatened. We have recently seen this with the utmost clarity in the
Middle East -- the Communist arms to Egypt, the gradual infiltration of
Syria, even the nationalization of the Suez Canal itself. If we are to apply
to ourselves the same tortured interpretations of obligations under the
Charter that we have applied recently to our friends and allies in two world
wars, and to the little State of Israel, would this not mean that barring an
armed attack, we would be unable to defend a vital interest of our own?

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Or if we act powerfully to the most intense provocation and harassment
without either violating our obligations as interpreted or first gaining the consent of the Soviet Union?

A discussion of this question seems relevant to the subject of
United States' international security objectives and strategy. For unrealistic
appraisal of the contribution the United Nations can make for international
peace and security may lead us hopelessly astray. And it makes little differ-
ence whether this results from blindness or from a desire to follow what
seems a convenient or expedient course.

MR. GAYLORD: I wonder if this very interesting paper of Mr. Altschul's
isn't bringing us in an area where perhaps there might be a very interesting
development. One of the problems of the military panel is to try to bring
about some new military concept to implement a policy and we say, "Yes,
what is the policy?" Back of the whole thing is the thought that a more
dynamic overall political policy is needed in the country. Now if we know
what that policy is, then our task is greatly facilitated because once we know
what it is, then we can much more readily design a military implementation.
I have wondered, and as I have sensed the whole thing, it should be a more
dynamic policy rather than a defensive one.

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I wonder if we couldn't take that paper of Mr. Altschul's from the starting point, to consider whether there is any possibility of doing something like this: Through, in the first instance, the United Nations, to assume that one of our failures as a nation has been that we have permitted a very aggressive leadership of the communistic world by Russia and an exploitation of the United Nations in so doing, that we have held back and been reticent -- is there any possible thought here that the United States by perhaps a dramatic re-statement of world objectives could announce herself as the more active leader of the freedom of nations of this world?

Shooting right straight into what Mr. Altschul says, that this policy might infer that we might go beyond the United Nations in actual application, such a re-statement of policy might indicate that this nation was committed to give ideological support, economic support and military support to any freedom nation that felt themselves in need of it. Preferably in the first instance through the United Nations, but should that fail, that we reserve to ourselves the right to be the leader of those people.

MR. FLOBERG: (Reporting on deliberations of a subcommittee)
The next question raised was whether or not our membership in U. N. precluded our independent use of force under the right circumstances. This is related to previous questions and we felt that the answer to that was negative, that as the obligations of the charter are presently being interpreted,