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(to)

responsible regimes in the area increase. It is hard to conceive of any U.S. or Soviet interest in the Mediterranean or the Middle East sufficiently important to justify nuclear war as a plausible policy option. One can only hope that the Soviet leaders in their own deliberations have reached the same conclusion.

It seems clear, then, that if there is any area of the world currently crying for international mediation and peacekeeping, the Middle East is it. This is all the more so because we may now be seeing, at long last, the beginning of the beginning of the end of the war in Vietnam. And with it, providing hostilities in the Middle East do not erupt in the meantime, will come, at last, an opportunity for a fresh look at the world in general, and Asia in particular. Vietnam has so preoccupied Washington policymakers over the past four years that other areas of the world, other international problems, have been residual claimants for time, attention and resources. Hopefully, the new President will undertake such a reappraisal even before a settlement is reached in Paris; the results of such a review may even have a bearing on the kind of settlement we should press for or agree to in the Vietnam negotiations.

A reappraisal of strategic issues as they relate to Asia is likely to conclude that, despite the events of the past several years, the center of gravity of United States' interest in the Far East lies in Japan, Korea and, of course, China. Thus, with the end of hostilities in Vietnam, U.S. policy preoccupation with Southeast Asia is virtually certain to be corrected. Which is not to say that the next Administration is going to be able simply to walk away from this part of the world. From narrow political considerations, Mr. Nixon cannot leave himself vulnerable to a new version of an all too familiar refrain:

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"Who lost Vietnam?" The United States will have to achieve a settlement which, although almost by definition, will smack little of the heady scent of "victory," will nonetheless leave behind in Vietnam a measure of non-Communist power and stability. Moreover, our broader strategic considerations dictate a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in a manner and under circumstances sufficient to make our commitment to our Southeast Asian allies credible. This credibility can presumably best be retained through tangible acts involving some form of continued U.S. military presence, rather than through hortatory policy pronouncements. How to accomplish this without engaging in real or apparent acts of provocation against China raises strategic issues which call for careful deliberation now, rather than crash decisions made on the eve of a Vietnam settlement. If an example of how not to proceed is required, the reappraisers need only study the circumstances surrounding the birth of SEATO.

In the quest for world order, our China policy must be high on the list of reappraisal requirements. Not since the early months of the Kennedy Administration has there been an examination, at the national level, of our relations with Peking. (This one, incidentally, offered nothing more than that we should do more of the same.) Between 1961 and the present, a series of events, not the least of which were the Vietnam war and the Cultural Revolution, gave ample excuse for postponing another intensive look at how the United States can best reach a modus vivendi with Red China. Obstructing a clear view, even now, are the events in China, itself. Although the nature of the Chinese regime, and indeed the shape of China will probably be unpredictable over the next several years, we are beginning to see faint signs of stabilization. The hot-eyed left is being displaced and its disciples are being exiled to the countryside. Within the leadership, the balance

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seems to be shifting in the direction of pragmatists and conservative military folk.

Peking's recent reference to "peaceful coexistence" is probably an effort to buy time, but this time can be as valuable to us as it is to them. It provides us with an opportunity to get on with the job of reviewing and then articulating our own broad policies. If the Chinese leaders are in a state of flux and uncertainty as to their future course, it may be well for them to have a clear idea about our own, lest miscalculations with grave consequences ensue.

Our Asian position is complicated further by the Sino-Soviet situation. It is going to be very difficult for either Moscow or Peking to change its position substantially over the near future. The possibility of a military confrontation between them is not entirely remote and each nation must contemplate this probability in its weapons development programs and strategic policies. This will serve to bring into existence additional weapons, about whose ultimate use or targets we have no reassurance.

*

*

*

For a host of reasons, sentimental as well as strategic, Western Europe remains at the core of every new Administration's reappraisal. Perhaps more intensively than at any time since 1952, our economic, military and even political relations with Western Europe as a whole, and with particular countries of that region, are likely to be subject to review during the next several months. The invasion of Czechoslovakia may have pumped some adrenaline into NATO, but NATO is still a frail old man due for a comprehensive checkup and in need of massive therapy. And the recent monetary crises call for a reappraisal not only of the Free World's monetary systems, but also the political future of the Western European Community, and especially of the German and French roles in it. Our relations with France must be restored to a point of mutual

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confidence and close cooperation in the pursuit of our common objectives. And we
cannot wait for a post-deGaulle government, which, in any case, may prove no easier
to deal with.

We in the United States are not even sure of the direction in which we would like
the Western European Community to evolve. Would we like to see this region develop
into a closely knit economic and political community which can play a meaningful and
independent role, not only in European but in world affairs? Or would we like to see
the countries of that area, individually and collectively, remain sufficiently dependent
on the United States to be subjected to our influence, possibly even direction, in matters
of strategic policy, especially as they relate to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?
In confronting this choice we display symptoms of schizophrenia. Is there possibly
some third form - some middle course - that we and the West Europeans would prefer?

Perhaps as nagging a question as any is the level and nature of United States military
deployment in Western Europe. Subsumed under this, of course, is a large array of
other issues, not the least of which are economic and financial. It is ironical and, if
the matter were not so important, it would be amusing, to observe how the economic
tail has increasingly begun to wag the strategic dog. I recall that when the British White
Paper was issued in 1957, many astute observers in the United States were sharply
critical of the all too evident attempt to bend strategic considerations to fit into the
constrained limits of England's economic capabilities. One hears very little such
criticism in Washington, these days, because we have had to do much the same thing.
This is probably inevitable in the light of other demands on our resources. But the
important thing is that we not kid ourselves: the Soviet threat does not vary in direct

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proportion to the balance of payments positions of the various NATO countries. It may
well be that the scale and nature of the threat to Western Europe has substantially
 diminished in the past decade (I suspect it has), but this is an appraisal that should be
made on a basis other than the domestic, economic or political climates in the United
States and other NATO countries. Perhaps a clue to our future military posture in
Europe follows from what has already been noted above: the odds of a massive Super-
Power confrontation in Europe are low, because such a confrontation is not only
unthinkable, it is inconceivable. It follows from this that we and the other NATO countries
must probably come to grips with the problem of local defense, with conventional arms.
The role of tactical nuclear weapons must be carefully re-examined in this connection.

Having said all this, it is useful and sobering to remind ourselves that reappraisal
is one thing, consequential changes in important areas of domestic and international
policy are another. We tend to exaggerate the power of the Presidency, and underestimate
the limits and constraints on the President's ability to act. It is not only that our
Constitution has carefully circumscribed the limits of Executive power - although this
must be taken into account by any President, particularly a President whose party is in
a minority in Congress; at least as important are the constraints of public opinion -
constraints amply demonstrated during President Johnson's tenure, when he did have
a large majority in both houses of Congress and a sympathetic Supreme Court. To take
a slight liberty with a remark made recently by Prime Minister Trudeau, "There is no
great authority called the (President) who gets messages from God - who makes great
laws. If we come up with more ideas, they will only be accepted if the people are
prepared for them . . ."

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But the President's problems are not limited to his relatively narrow Constitutional mandate and the ebb and flow of public opinion. In his recent book, *The Strength of Government*, McGeorge Bundy (who should know) points out that "The Executive Branch is . . . dangerously weak in its own internal capacity for sustained, coordinated and energetic action."

Most new Administrations come into office well aware of these limits; few Presidents think they can easily translate campaign oratory into a program of action, or a State of the Union Message into immediate implementation. I recall asking John Foster Dulles, after his lecture at the National War College in December 1952, how much, within the limits posed by no-appeasement and no-preventive-war, the Eisenhower Administration thought it could change our foreign policy. "About 5%," he replied, "but, hopefully a critical 5%."

In the intellectual progression from reappraisal to the expectation of action we, and more to the point, those in high policy councils, should be warned by Lord William Strang. We should not assume, he wrote, "that statesmen have a free hand to do as they will, when in truth they so often have to act in compelling situations which they have inherited and under pressure of circumstances which they cannot control . . ."

*From Britain in World Affairs.*

My time is up, and I am almost done. The subject is by no means exhausted.

I hope this also applies to my audience.

Luckily, the United States is moving into its Time of Reappraisal while Canada is still immersed in its own. I would submit, in all humility, that the broad national

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objectives - the survival of the nation and the development of world order - I have ascribed to the United States are probably also valid for Canada. I would also put the case that the strategic issues I have set forth as calling for a Reappraisal are of more than passing interest to Canadians; indeed, some must be as much a part of Ottawa's policy review as they are of Washington's.

An ancient and terrible Hebraic curse was to wish someone that he would "live in interesting times"! We seem to have been so cursed. But as we brood about the United States and the World, and as we in Washington embark on our Reappraisal in this Time of Trouble, Canada in terms of its own interests cannot regard this as a spectator sport. I believe firmly that we are going to have to ride through these "interesting times" together. And if we are both to move toward our national objectives, we should undertake our Reappraisals in close consultation and coordination.