proposing a study on the end of a totally disarmed world is to show clearly that there are enough internal difficulties in complete disarmament so as to make it practically unworkable, and that the world will be an anxious fearful place to live in for the next few hundred years or so. The important point to him is to attempt to bring about conditions under which we can live most securely in this armed world. Feld dissented somewhat, expressing the view that, although there were many idealists and even crackpots championing the cause of general and complete disarmament, it was by no means clear that it was not worth long hard work at possibilities. Brennan agreed with this. Schelling remained of the opinion that it was a fruitless subject. Gewirtz thought that it might be valuable to assign probabilities to the extent it is possible, to certain states along the road to disarmament. If the end state gave a reduced probability of war, it might be worthwhile to risk an increased probability for some of the intermediate states. Kalkstein noted that, from the viewpoint of an intermediate stage of disarmament, the picture may change, and that it was always dangerous to make wild extrapolations.

On the subject of Khrushchev's sincerity, Schelling noted that it was a poor argument either pro or con to try to judge this strictly in terms of the proposals which are ground out by the Russian diplomatic machine. Khrushchev is not a completely free agent in these matters. Brennan noted that it was impossible to design a strategy for a response to all conceivable Soviet alternatives, and he felt that the importance of a suggestion of Gewirtz that we ought to try to make a better personal appraisal of the men in the Kremlin lay in narrowing the spectrum of alternatives for which we would have to design strategies. Schelling reiterated his contention that it was important to make a pattern of our actions toward the Soviet clear to Khrushchev. It is desirable to find how he views our actions and what his main international interest at a given time is. The main objectives of the Soviet may be entirely at cross purposes with any counterstrategy we may devise. Schelling concluded the discussion by warning that, in the guise of disarmament, it is possible to get back into a strategically weaker position which the enemy can then exploit. We must move with caution because of this.

Participants:

A. Barber
D. Brennan
W. Smith
A. Hadley
J. Phelps
M. Gewirtz
B. Feld
T. Schelling
R. Luce
M. Kalkstein
R. Coward
H. Rowen
D. Cavers
T. Milburn
A. Smithies
P. Noel-Baker
R. Wilson

MG, WS

200

NOT FOR PUBLICATION * NOT FOR QUOTATION

Attributed remarks, based on notes taken at
an informal seminar, have not been approved
by participants and are not to be considered
authoritative statements of their positions.

ACS-E1/2

7/12/60

SOME DUBLICATIONS OF A 200-MISSILE
STABILIZED DETERRENT AGREEMENT

Roberts Coward
Bernard T. Feld
Marvin Gewirtz
Arthur Hadley
Thomas C. Schelling
Winthrop Smith

Part 2--Problems of Inspection

An outline of informal remarks and discussion
in a seminar on July 12.

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I. ARMS CONTROL:
INSPECTION, EXAMINATION, AND REGULATION

T. C. Schelling

ACS-E1/2

7/12/60

This paper is based on an exercise oriented toward the "problems of inspection" of an illustrative arms limitation. The particular limitation chosen, not for its evident merit but as a basis for exploring problems, was a ceiling of 200 on the number of strategic missiles that each side could possess, each side being the USA and the USSR. The technique of research, engaged in by half a dozen of us, was to sit together and speculate and argue. We could not "solve" the problems we identified, so we did not try to; instead we tried to see what the problems were. We all had somewhat different ideas, I think, not only about what the particular problems were, but about what kinds of problems we should be looking for. What follows is one particular blind man's impression of the elephant, based on his own groping and discussion with others who were groping from somewhat different angles. Unlike the blind man I do not have a distinct and well integrated image; the rambling discourse that follows will show that, unlike the blind man, I have seen enough to be confused.

The paper will emphasize several points. Most relate to my belief that "inspection" is too narrow to characterize the problem adequately. "Inspectors" and "inspectorate" suggest a detective-like, or police-like, or intelligence-like effort to get at the facts, with a view to seeing whether the enemy is willfully cheating on an agreement, it being supposed that if he is cheating he will try to hide it but that, given the facts, one can tell whether or not cheating has occurred. The more I think about it, the more the job seems to entail judgment and interpretation, administration, regulation, and a certain amount of continual argument and negotiation. The "inspection" concept may be adequate if the correct analogy is fraud or rum running; if the analogy is tax evasion, enforcement of the food and drug laws, regulation of monopolies, or enforcement of international trade agreements, "inspection" may be not only inadequate but somewhat off the central point.

I find two analogies helpful. One of these is the budget process. The Budget Bureau and the Office of the Secretary of Defense try to enforce a variety of limits, ceilings, and restraints on the military services; the military services try to evade or avoid them with all the skill and persistance they can muster, sometimes with an excess of zeal that might be mistaken for plain dishonesty and conspiracy if it weren't such a familiar mode of behavior among ordinary people. The Budget Bureau does not "inspect" the Air Force to see whether it is "cheating" in the budget to get more aircraft than it deserves. Rather it "examines" the Air Force to see whether the Air Force is "justified" in its "interpretation" of the consequences of its budget program. Budget padding is a well-known phenomenon, and the agency or service under examination likes to depreciate the equipment it possesses, to exaggerate the obsolescence rate, to discount its spare parts inventory, to exaggerate the need for a flow in the "pipeline," to pad the reliability coefficients, the absentee rates, the proportion of rejects, and the high cost of living. Getting the facts is only part of the examiners' job; the hard part is arguing over the interpretations, projections, forecasts, and estimates of the significance of the facts at hand.

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A second analogy is like arms control in reverse. In NATO, and under some of our mutual security agreements with other countries, we call on other countries, and they sometimes call on us, to meet particular arms goals. In NATO there have been agreements among the participating countries about the forces they were "committed" to make available. Similarly, countries have had to justify their military assistance requests by indicating the forces that were ready, or would be ready, to utilize the equipment and supplies made available. Here the problem is to prove, not that one's forces are less than some ceiling, but that they exceed some agreed minimum. My experience is that arguing about whether a country has or has not met its commitment to put three divisions in the field, or to have 500 aircraft "operational," the problems have less to do with detection of willful fraud than with evaluations, interpretations, and forecasts. Whether French forces in North Africa are "available" to NATO; whether a particular Dutch division can be considered 75% combat-ready; whether a British aircraft production program is consistent with a target figure for operational all-weather aircraft by a particular date, is not like the question of whether the temperature outdoors is 30 degrees or 40 degrees, but like the question of whether one is justified in carrying an overcoat or a raincoat on a weekend trip. Evaluation, prediction, justification, interpretation, and negotiation are required, it being perfectly obvious that men of good will, well informed and even equally informed, may argue without necessarily reaching an agreed interpretation. And this may be true whether they are of different countries, of the same country, or even of the same service or agency within a country.

The foregoing is introduction. Let me turn now to the particular case of the 200-missile limitation. This particular limitation is almost unique in its simplicity. "A missile is a missile" comes closer to being true and precise than does "a division is a division," "a squadron is a squadron," "á ship is a ship," "a taskforce is a taskforce," or "an officer is an officer." If we'd said 20 squadrons instead of 200 missiles we'd have had a more ambiguous limit; if we had measured the missiles in terms of their capabilities, we'd have had to deal with payload, yield, range, reliability, and readiness state, with exchange rates and discounts of many kinds. In other words, 200 missiles seems like a pretty clear-cut thing.

On the other hand, I am reminded of my bank, which requires a minimum balance of $300. Everybody knows exactly what $300 is. But this limitation is not perfectly clear. Does the $300 minimum refer to the average balance during the month, the average balance on any day of the month, the minimum reached at the close of any day, or the minimum reached at any moment during banking hours? How do they count deposits made but not collected by the bank yet? How do they treat bookkeeping errors? Can a person who has two accounts average them? If a person has overdraft facilities, is he "covered" as long as he is ready to pay interest? And what happens if the balance does go below $300, by some definition?

Most people don't know the answer; and the reason they don't is that there are no answers. The $300 minimum is a kind of benchmark that the bank wants us to be aware of; it gives them an excuse to close our account if, after a long period of time, we've had too small a balance to be worth the trouble. It provides a presumption that they owe us a little less courtesy if we keep small

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balances rather than large ones.

If we go back to the missiles we have some definitive questions that flow out of the bank analogy. Does it mean 200 on the average over a year; on the average over a month; or at any given moment? If one goes over momentarily, even inadvertently, is he to go under for awhile to compensate; is he to pay a penalty; is he to permit the other side a similar excess for a similar period; or is he accused of cheating and thrown out of the organization? If he has exceptionally good luck in the production of replacements, and ends up with a few more ready missiles than he expected and runs over the ceiling, must he destroy them or can he impound them and use them at a later date when he's under 200. And if one is allowed to compensate overage with some underage, working toward an average of 200 missiles, how does the other tell whether the first is abusing the scheme by developing excessive peaks justified by previous troughs?

Spare parts are significant, both in the possibility of putting an extra missile together in a hurry out of spare parts, and in terms of how many of the 200 missiles are ready to go. The strategic significance of 200 missiles depends on how many could be fired at once on short notice, how many could be fired within an hour, within four hours, within a day, within a week, and so forth. The schedule relating missiles ready to the elapsed time from the decision to fire may depend on the spare parts allowance. If this means that one may have all the spare parts required to be virtually certain that he could fire 200 missiles almost at once, without ever having more than 200 missiles in the aggregate, superlative maintenance facilities would be implied, with a suspiciously large stock of crews, maintenance people, spare parts, and so forth, around. Furthermore, there must be some trade-off between the spare parts allowance and the number of missiles. One can arbitrarily limit a spare parts supply, in terms of months of normal supply, or absolute numbers of parts, keeping the spare parts supplies so low that they never constitute a significant set of components for extra missiles. But to do so may mean that the number of missiles ready to go is appreciably less than 200; one might have a better missile force with more spare parts and a lower limit on the number of missiles. So if one wants an arms agreement that limits the number of missiles to the minimum required for "security," or "stabilized deterrence," one may have to choose between 200 missiles and a stingy spare parts allowance, or 190 missiles and a more adequate spare parts supply. It is not obvious that the former combination is the more desirable.

Similarly on components in the production process. As long as there is current production of missiles, there is going to be inventory, and goods in transit, all the way from the launching pads back to the assembly lines, from the assembly lines back to the producers of components, and so on back to the raw materials.

Similarly there is a problem of how to deal with out of commission weapons. A squadron of Atlases may be assigned ten weapons, with launching facilities for nine. On the average it may take about ten weapons available to keep nine in condition to be fired. The tenth is a spare to replace whichever one of the nine is momentarily out of commission. If the agreement is based on a number that is presumed to be ready to fire on short notice, one would have to multiply the minimum number by some factor, like the 10/9ths for an Atlas squadron.

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to find out what gross number of missiles would be required to provide one a ready force up to the limit. This itself requires defining "readiness" under a variety of conditions, both in terms of minutes, hours, and days before a weapon is ready to fire, and in terms of how much advance notice is received, as well as possible some allowance for climate, season, quality of the crew, basing configuration, dispersal, and mode of operation of any mobile missiles.

There is the problem of the pipeline. If there is going to be any replacement of these missiles, we either do count or do not count finished missiles en route to installation. There is also the problem of rejects; if this were artillery ammunition, rather than Atlases, occasional lots would be found below standard after they were produced, and rejected by the procurement officer. Knowing this, more would be produced than were desired, in full knowledge that some fraction would not be good enough to count as available ammunition. If it turns out that there are significant inspections that a missile must pass late in the production stage, such that the entire missile, or much of it, must be either rejected or sent back for reworking, there will always be a gross number of missiles in process exceeding the net number anticipated to be finished and accepted. But what the relation of this gross number to the net number should be is a projection, or estimate, not a "fact."

The replacement rate is a critical parameter. Missiles are presumably replaced both to improve them and because things happen to them. If missiles are replaced at the rate of 10% per year, required production capacity would be low in relation to the finished inventory, and one would have to run his factory for several years to use his replacement production for additions to stock. If instead one can replace them at the rate of 10% per month, one may readily double his inventory in a year's time by using current production for additions to stock rather than for substitution. So the significance of current productive capacity, if the latter is geared to the replacement rate, depends a good deal on what replacement rate is allowed.

Similarly for testing. Test missiles not only represent missiles that must be either included or excluded, but they represent production, and productive capacity, additional to the "normal" productive capacity required for replacement and improvement.

So far my remarks have been aimed at the point that, however clear and precise the notion of 200 missiles may be, the detailed implications are fairly complicated. This means, among other things, that either the agreement itself must be extraordinarily detailed in covering all of the parameters suggested by the questions raised above, or the agreement must be taken as giving just a few benchmarks, such as a "normal" finished-missile inventory, from which all of the ramifications are to be derived by negotiation, argument, analysis, adjustment, and trial and error. Since an agreement detailed enough to cover all of these points would be an awful nuisance unless it were subject to easy and continual change, it seems evident that either way there needs to be a continual process of judgment, accommodation, negotiation, evaluation, and forecasting.

I doubt whether we can assume that an agreement, once reached, if understood by both sides, with a will to make it work, necessarily implies a sufficient understanding on these questions to make it fairly evident whether, in subsequent examination and negotiation, the participants are behaving in reasonable accordance with the agreement. The reason I doubt it is that it seems to me

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likely to be hard enough to reach agreement on weapon limitations; to suppose
that agreement was reached on the intent of the agreement, on every aspect of
its interpretation, on the motives behind it, on the context it fits into,
and on what it is supposed to lead to, is to ask much more of a sensitive
agreement between enemies than one asks for an ordinary piece of domestic
legislation. What makes statutory law possible in democratic society, and
what may make arms control agreements within the realm of possibility, is
that people can agree on actions, restraints, laws, and programs, without
necessarily agreeing on their purpose. And a limitation on the number of
missiles could have a wide variety of purposes, including a number of alter-
native purposes that had never been the subject of articulate agreement within
the government, to say nothing of agreement between governments.

Consider a few examples. One possible interpretation of limitation on the num-
ber of long-range missiles to 200 is that this is a proper number to have, in
the sense that more would be too dangerous in case of war, fewer would be too
dangerous in terms of lack of deterrence. Therefore 200 is just right.

Another interpretation is that 200 is just right for the time being, but we
hope to get to zero, that 200 is a step on the way to zero, and that anybody
who had reached agreement on 200 had implicitly reached agreement in spirit
to go below 200 as rapidly as possible, so that when in doubt make an inter-
pretation on the stingy side so that the expected trend will be downward.

A third interpretation is that the correct number of missiles to have on hand
is zero, but that neither side wants to be completely without productive ca-
pacity in the event the agreement is denounced. Therefore each side is inter-
ested, in principle, in having a "proper" level of productive capacity, with
some minimal number of missiles just to keep the crews trained, to permit
test programs, to experiment with base configurations, and so forth. In other
words, the whole force is a stand-by force, not in stand-by for the event of
war, but in stand-by for the event of rearmament. The 200 is a "cadre" to
make expansion possible; and "200 missiles" is simply a shorthand way of
saying 200 missiles, with production facilities, crews, training facilities,
test facilities, research and development, and so forth. It is a benchmark
to suggest the general level of activity. To put it differently, the notion
may be that the number of finished missiles on hand provides a nice bottle-
neck for specifying a general scale of activity.

A fourth interpretation is that both sides hope, by reciprocal unilateral
actions, to reduce substantially their strategic forces, have not yet been
able to agree on limits on aircraft, etc., but are experimenting with a re-
duction of their missile programs, but really intend this limitation to sym-
bolize the kind of thing that in principle they mean to apply to the rest of
their forces. In that case one might say that the 200 missile limitation is
essentially an experiment, a symbolic gesture, a practice run, a test of each
other's intentions, and that the purpose of inspection, examination, and so
forth, is not so much to see whether the 200 missile limitation is being met
but whether the entire national strategic activity is consistent with the
attitude symbolized by this particular agreement.

And there must be other interpretations. If so, one cannot relegate the kinds
of questions raised above to the negotiators, and say that the inspectors will

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be provided with answers to them. This may be tantamount to saying that the inspectors' task will be guaranteed to be feasible by a process that guarantees the impossibility of reaching any agreement in the first place. In any case, whether these questions are taken to be concerned with operations under an agreement, or with the terms of the agreement itself, they are representative of an array of questions that are bound to be pertinent.

To go on, there is the question of exchange rates among missiles. Two hundred missiles says nothing about size. We could say that a missile is a missile, whether it carries 500 pounds, 5000 pounds, or 50,000 pounds of payload, whether it has a single warhead or multiple warheads, whether it is dispersed as an individual target, clustered with other missiles in a silo, or is shipmate to a dozen other missiles on a submarine. Just as missiles may differ from each other in their penetration and payload capability, they may differ from each other in their target significance; three missiles in a silo may be like one missile in their vulnerability. All of this suggests that one may need exchange rates among missiles. True, the problem can be simplified by saying that a missile is a missile; but the fact that the problem could be so simplified does not mean that it would be wise to simplify it in that way. It may be inefficient to fail to recognize that individual enumeration is not always the best way of measuring the significance of a force.

It may mean that each side is forced into the largest missiles when it might have been willing to have a lesser force in yield and payload if it could have had, say, fifty large missiles and 250 small ones. And to reach an optimally effective mix of missiles may require recognizing that not all missiles are equivalent. Possibly one should measure the force not in missiles but in, say, deliverable megatonnage. This, too, is simply a crude index of force effectiveness, and may lead to peculiar distortions in, say, the size and number of missiles. To take another example, a limitation on the total number of Polaris missiles, in a way that paid no attention to the way missiles are clustered on a submarine, might lead to the dispersion of missiles among smaller submarines, in the interest of greater versatility and lesser vulnerability. This might not be a bad thing, but also it might be wasteful, much as a tax is wasteful if it leads to the excessive growth of fringe benefits that are comparatively desirable only because of a discriminatory tax.

Many of these problems are aggravated by the fact that the operation of the agreement, if not the agreement itself, is going to be asymmetrical between the USA and the USSR. The inspection problem will be different for a force of submarine-based missiles than for a force of fixed-site land-based missiles, different again from rail-mobile or airborne missiles. If for reasons of cost, technology, geography, or sheer preference, we and the Russians develop qualitatively different missile forces, the inspection problems will be very different on both sides; and on questions like those raised above, the problem would not be simply to arrive at answers both sides could agree on, but to arrive at dissimilar answers for the two sides that made sense in relation to the weapon systems on both sides and were yet in some sense "equivalent."

(As a matter of fact, one might even raise the question at this point whether the agreement would involve equal numbers of missiles for the two sides. In suggesting that there might be exchange rates among types of missiles, and that the two countries might have different mixes, I have implicitly suggested that)

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the actual numbers on both sides would be different.)

To go on with the list of problems, what has been said about missiles, spare parts, replacement rates, and so on, could also be said about launch sites, crews, etc. Suppose it is easier to hide missiles than crews, or at least easier to keep hidden missiles in good condition than to keep hidden crews in good condition. One then needs an excess of crews relative to the permitted number of missiles. What is an excess number? This depends on whether crews work in four-hour or eight-hour shifts, whether they rotate among jobs and sites, the ratio of time on duty to time off duty, the allowance for sickness and other absenteeism, base configuration, and dispersal, and so forth. (The more dispersed the crews are, the greater will be the spare personnel, as well as spare parts, requirements.)

But the supply of crews depends also on the reserve status of crews that are out of the service, the enlistment period, and so forth. This may be especially true if one is concerned not so much with what the enemy could do in a moment's notice if he launched a surprise attack after cheating, but with who's ahead in case the arms race is resumed. Trained crews, if they involve load-time, may be as important as missile production capacity in the event of a sudden resumption of the arms race. The question of which side is in a better position six or twelve months after the agreement breaks down may depend a good deal on which side nas not only expandable productive capacity but crews in reserve. Here again we are dealing with a matter of judgment, both on the strategic significance of trained crews in existence, and on the necessity or justifiability of a particular table of organization, manning doctrine, and military personnel policy.

Phasing in of new missiles seems to be an unavoidable problem. I cannot imagine such tight limitations that technological improvement would be ruled out; certainly defects in design, improvements in reliability, cost reductions, and so forth, imply that superior missiles will be replacing old ones, and that the replacement rate will be affected by the urge to improve one's weapons. This further complicates the productive capacity, pipeline, replacement-rate, inventory, and spare parts issues raised above.

(This raises the question of whether implicitly or explicitly there would be limitations on research and development, or qualitative limitations on the missiles themselves, particularly limitations designed to prevent radical improvement. An interesting possibility is to consider whether qualitative restraints on the missiles might be designed to make the agreement easier to monitor. Whether or not there are strategic or economic reasons for requiring all missiles to use refrigerated fuels, one might argue that a great advantage of liquid-fuel missiles as compared with solid-fuel missiles is that the former are harder to hide, harder to transport clandestinely, and so forth. It is sometimes thought that an important difference between, say, rail-mobile missiles and fixed-site missiles, or submarines and ground-based missiles, is that it is much harder to monitor an agreement with mobile missiles than with the others, (or vice-versa depending on the technique of inspection). In other words, one purpose of qualitative limits on the missiles themselves may be to require the acquisition and use of the kinds of missiles that either are themselves easy to monitor, or involve production facilities that are easy to monitor.)

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If the agreement is reasonably easy to monitor in terms of the inventory of finished missiles, or at least if the excess number that could be obtained by padding the force, or clandestine evasion, would not be strategically significant, one is likely to be mainly concerned with the productive capacity in missiles that the other country has. Productive capacity is relevant to the question of what happens if the agreement breaks down. Each side wants to be reasonably sure that the other side is not in a dangerously advantageous position to resume the arms race. But productive capacity has many dimensions, including a time dimension. Productive capacity can probably for some purposes be described in terms of the size of missile force that could be achieved by different dates starting from some moment that the agreement was broken. One wants to know where the enemy would be in thirty days, ninety days, one year, three years, ten years, if the arms race were resumed. For the short period it is the inventory plus the pipeline and the components; for an intermediate period it is goods in process; for a somewhat longer period it is production and assembling capacity; for an even longer period it may be research and development. In all cases the analysis must include launching facilities, crews, communications, and any other vehicles required, as well as the various resources that go into the missiles themselves.

Looking at it this way gives us another interpretation of the missile limitation. One may view it essentially as a warning system. A limitation on the number of finished missiles, if it can be adhered to, essentially means that neither side can attack the other until some period of time after it has broken the agreement. The length of time required to build up a dominant force then depends on productive capacity, bottlenecks, and so forth. A breakdown of the agreement is the "warning" that either side requires in order to step up its own production. In this interpretation, one views the agreement not in terms of the significance of 200 missiles on each side; what is significant is that he gets warning and time to respond as a result of the lead time involved in the other side's acquiring a substantially increased inventory. If, starting from an inventory of 200 finished missiles and commensurate productive facilities, it would take the other side a year to speed up production and achieve enough missiles to attack one's own 200 missiles, then one can expect a year's warning to increase (or better to defend) his own strategic force, or to take appropriate military and diplomatic action.

But this interpretation raises the question of whether what one wants to examine in the other country relates solely to the operation of the agreement. Here is an agreement that relates to a missile force; suppose it to be understood that that implies productive capacity, crews, tests, and so forth. What about airplanes, air defense, or civil defense, or ground troops? Obviously if these have been covered by the agreement, or if in spirit they have been implicitly covered, one may want to examine them. But suppose it is fully understood by both sides that there is no limit on active defense, civil defense, ground forces, or strategic air forces. Is there any reason to inspect or examine these activities?

There may be. The reason is that the strategic significance of any bulge in the other side's missile inventory, or missile productive capacity, any suspicion that the other side is cheating and hiding missiles, any evidence that the other side is engaging in research and development designed to shorten the lead time in the event the arms race is resumed, needs to be

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interpreted in the light of all possible evidence about the other side's in-
tentions and capabilities. If there is evidence that the other side is able,
in a crash program, to double the number of his missiles within a few weeks
by hastening assembly, utilizing spare components, speeding deliveries, and
intensified maintenance of the missiles he has, this is dangerous or not,
strategically significant or not, depending on whether he is taking other
action consistent with intentions to launch an attack within a few weeks. In
other words, a limited agreement that leaves certain military forces and ac-
tivities unrestrained may provide important reasons for observing many acti-
vities that go beyond the agreement. The reason is that these provide the
context within which possible evasions of the agreement, of the exploitation
of legal loopholes in the agreement, are to be evaluated.

So the inspection associated with an agreement limited to missiles may not
itself be limited to the missiles. That is, the scope of inspection is not
necessarily coterminous with the scope of the arms limitation. The purpose
of inspection is not simply to see whether the agreement is being adhered
to, but also to see whether other activities within the country are of a kind
to make the agreement itself tolerable and strategically desirable, and of a
kind to make tolerable whatever potentialities of legal or illegal evasion
are available.

The sample of problems I have raised above is not intended to b complete,
but is raised as evidence of my contention that "facts" are not enough. "In-
spection" is only part of the problem. The question is not simply one of
cheating or playing fair. I have been trying to suggest that the process
may be more like a regulatory function than a criminal procedure. True, there
may be willful cheating on a large scale of a sort that, if one can find evi-
dence, one can recognize as willful cheating on a large scale. But there may
be enormous room for differences of opinion about the evaluation and inter-
pretation of a country's military activities. What looks like cheating may
just be the equivalent of budget padding. Even willful cheating, just as one
finds in the lower echelons of a government agency during a budget hearing,
may not have been commanded, or even hoped for, by higher echelons. Govern-
ment agencies, including military services, often try to circulate memoranda
or instructions to subordinates engaged in budget planning, to the effect
that henceforth they are to develop scrupulously honest estimates, to avoid
all padding, both for the sake of economy and for the sake of developing a
clean record with the examining agency, the comptrollers, the budget officers,
and so forth. Yet I believe that equally often the subordinates who do the
budget planning violate their instructions out of a sense of bureaucratic
zeal and responsibility, discount the instruction as window dressing, anti-
cipate that the instruction is a passing phase, like a New Year's resolution,
and should not be taken as binding, or assume that the examiners will never
believe that there is no padding and will cut to compensate the invisible
padding, and pad accordingly. It can be difficult for the top level of an
agency to keep lower levels from padding the budget, from hiding inventory,
from exaggerating requirements and depreciating assets. In any case the mat-
ter is one of evaluation and interpretation, almost never one of "facts"
alone.

This budget-bureau analogy suggests that the techniques available to the
examiners, especially if they are small in number relative to the job of

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policing a nation's productive activity, may not be best characterized by the term "inspection" with its detective-like connotation. Budget examiners do a good deal of snooping around and visiting, but they also learn a great deal through the ordinary formalities of cross-examination. They require the other side to state in detail what it proposes to do, give evidence that it is going to do it, relate future programs to past programs, justify planning factors, etc.

In this they have a few advantages. One is that budget examiners are professional examiners; the people they examine are not professional evaders. For the most part they can't be. The examiners have some control over whom they call in to examine, or at least some discretion in judging the appropriateness of the people who are sent in to be examined. The commander of a missile base, the superintendent of a weapon establishment, the designer of a communication system, has to be reasonably good at his own job and cannot be selected for his unique ability to pull the wool over the eyes of an examiner. Furthermore, the examiners can look into the consistency of the story that is given, following leads as they find them, probing for minor imperfections in the enormous fabric of facts, estimates, and justifications. They can be opportunistic and engage in shrewd sampling, to test the general reliability of the material given to them. In this they are often helped by the fact that, while their knowledge is truly meager, the people they are examining cannot be quite sure what it is that they know and what it is that they don't know.

I may be exaggerating this budget-examiner analogy--the regulatory function in contrast to the detective function--but I feel sure that it needs some emphasis. If this is the nature of the problem, there are implications for the kind of inspectorate or examining or enforcement body, for the talents required, their relation to the host country, the techniques they use, the relation to clandestine and other unilateral intelligence, some of the public relations of their role, the question of their nationality and loyalty. There are also implications for what happens when one detects an evasion, or suspects one, or finds something untoward. In the analogy of the detective vs. the criminal, one gathers his evidence and springs it on the subject with all the implications of guilt vs. innocence, black vs. white, willful breaking of the law vs. normal bending of the rules, tight conspiracy vs. disorganized bureaucracy. In the one case you indict your enemy, in the other you argue with him. In the one case he either is guilty or is not (whether or not you can prove it); in the other case it is a matter of judgment, with room for genuine differences of opinion, and with a possible gamut of motives between the extremes of willful, conspiratorial, hierarchical cheating on the one hand, and utopian innocence on the other.

It is too bad that the EDC was never ratified, because the international wrangling among France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg over the interpretation and evaluation of their relative military efforts might by now have provided a nice batch of experience to prepare us for coping with arms control. Maybe haggling with an enemy is not altogether different from haggling with an ally over comparative military programs. In one case you're trying to prove that the other country is doing less than it ought to; in the other you're trying to prove that it is doing more than it ought to. But the processes may be similar, and our conception of this process may still be rudimentary.

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I have not been emphasizing these points because I think I've quite hit on the correct bureaucratic or governmental administrative analogy to arms control, and want to substitute it for the concept of "inspection." But I have come to feel that "inspection" may be the wrong concept, or but a small part of the correct concept. I am not sure that we yet have identified quite what the process is that we are involved in, once we have to make arms control work.

Maybe we are in somewhat the position that nations would have been in if, down through the centuries, they had never engaged in "diplomacy"—had never had agreements with each other, never negotiated differences, never exchanged am-bassadors, had never struck bargains, formed alliances, and so forth. Then one day someone invents the concept of diplomacy. It suddenly occurs to him that nations may deal with each other, much as firms or persons do, may enter agreements, negotiate, form alliances, exchange facilities and privileges, regulate joint activities, share costs, and so forth. Some of the people to whom this concept of diplomacy occurs are utopians and idealists, some are businessmen, some are hard-headed realists; some are selfish and want to exploit other countries, some are generous and want to help other countries. They all write articles about the new idea of diplomacy, the need for it, whether it should be the business of a new agency of government or should be handled by the departments of agriculture, commerce, interior, and so forth. Some of them stress diplomacy as a matter of trade relations, others as a matter of military alliance, others as a matter of protecting one's own citizens abroad, managing postal systems, standardizing weights and measures, and so forth. Everybody approaches this new idea of "diplomacy" from his own particular angle. He can see certain aspects of it that relate to his own preconceptions or his own experiences. But he cannot imagine, and history does not show, the full richness of the subject or the true nature of diplomacy; and there is no way to characterize this new activity in familiar domestic terms because people have not completed a well-balanced survey of what may be involved in diplomacy.

Maybe we are at that point in thinking about arms control. We think of it as something concrete, particular, and well-defined; and we conceive of the administrative problems in a particular way. Eventually diplomacy became such a broad and diffuse subject that few would try to characterize it and its processes and procedures. Maybe that's what we will come to with arms control. We may eventually discover, by trial and error, what arms control is all about, what relationship it involves between countries engaging in it together, what the administrative and regulatory and negotiatorial and bureaucratic problems are.

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## II. PROBLEMS OF THE PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF INSPECTION
OF A 200 MISSILE LIMITATION AGREEMENT
Roberts Coward

By the "Physical Aspects of Inspection," we mean the problems involving the
physical objects which must be examined by the inspectors in order to assure
the compliance of the participating nations with the agreement. While there
may be additional appropriate categories, we may tentatively divide the clas-
sifications of these items into the following six divisions:

1. Launch sites

2. Missiles in being

3. Components

a. In production

b. In storage

c. In development

4. Production facilities

5. Warheads

6. Testing facilities.

In attempting to note some of the problems involved in the inspection of the
proposed agreement, we will examine each in turn.

### 1. Launch Sites

Launch sites may be divided into two categories: fixed and mobile. The fixed sites are much the easier of the two to inspect. They are generally large, complex, and involve considerable construction effort. Since they do not shift in position, concealed sites are more likely to be picked up on successive inspection tours. In order to increase the chance of such detection it might be well to provide for a rotation system for the inspectors, assuring a varied approach or "eye" which might pick up hitherto unnoticed items.

On the other hand, it would probably be possible to spread the necessary tracking, fueling, and so forth, facilities over some area in order to make a site more difficult to detect. Moreover, even if discovered, clandestinely constructed sites would provide no inconsiderable advantage in a renewal of the arms race. Once discovered, however, important target information would be available to the opposing side.

If the agreement permits alterations in launch sites in recognition of changing
technology, the inspection system must be able to check out these and to ver-
ify the legitimacy of such actions. It might be possible to conceal the ad-
dition of a new development in the activity surrounding a legitimate altera-
tion.

Whether mobile launch sites were permitted or not by the agreement, the in-
spection system would have to encompass them. The problem of locating and
determining numbers of Polaris submarines is difficult and while mobile
Minutemen present somewhat fewer problems there remain some no less complex
ones. We must separate the problems of detecting completely forbidden mobile
launch sites from those of monitoring a system of the same as a part of the
legitimate 200 missiles. In the case of the former, the problems are somewhat

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easier since inspection may concentrate upon only the detection of such weapons. Once found, it is clear that the agreement is being violated.

Given that such mobile weapons systems as the Polaris and Minuteman are permitted by the agreement, the problems can become more complex. In this case there is a certain noise level behind which to hide illegal activities. Unless there is some clear and uncounterfeitable way to identify each of the 200 legitimate missiles, it might be possible to hide a certain number of illegal ones among the constantly moving array with which the inspectorate must cope. This might be countered either by putting one man with each of the legitimate missiles, a solution which has serious economic and psychological drawbacks, or by devising a code of identification by which each legitimate missile was "stamped" when it was produced. If any missile were found without this code, which might be made of some combination of radioactive isotopes, it could be immediately labeled as illegal. The problem would then become one of maintaining the secrecy of the code.

If it were to be attempted to put inspectorate personnel on the spot of each mobile site, this might create the need for an unwieldy inspectorate, which must itself be kept under control. It is also possible that such inspection might vitiate the deterrent effect of the weapon system by providing valuable target information to one side or the other if nationals are used as a part of the inspectorate, as seems most likely. In any event, it would seem that the inspection of mobile missile launch sites as well as fixed ones is fraught with the risks which must be taken in order to obtain any arms limitation agreement.

## 2. Missiles in Being

The problems of inspecting mobile and fixed launch sites may be associated in part with the inspection of missiles on those sites. Another problem providing a certain noise level behind which clandestine activities may be carried on is the need to allow for replacement of missiles on the sites in order to assure that the highest level of the 200 are in operational condition. In formulating the agreement we must determine what the necessary level of replacement is, how it is to be done, what facilities are required for the production of these missiles, and how these are to be inspected and controlled in order to keep each side on an even basis with no important head start on a renewed arms race, should it come about.

In replacing missiles and in having them inspected, we must consider the problem of maintaining the effectiveness of the deterrent. If the inspectors find a serious weakness in the on-site missiles, or if one side finds a weakness requiring a massive operation of replacement, the other side may be prompted to decide that this is an opportune moment to attack.

The loyalties of the personnel of the inspectorate could be very important, since a coordinated effort at sabotage by nationals of one country, ostensibly engaged in the inspection, could pave the way for an attack. Thus security measures would have to be instituted, which will complicate the job of the inspectors in achieving a satisfactory assuring survey.

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### 3. Components

#### a. In Production

The inspection must take into consideration the possibility of concealing the manufacture of important missile components within legitimate production. This production could be of an unrelated nature, (e.g., electronic products, civilian aircraft) or behind the noise of legitimized missile production for replacement. In addition, it might be possible to construct a missile building facility to a high degree of readiness, or to similarly alter a legitimate presently standing production facility, while concealing its purpose. While it should, no doubt, become obvious to an inspectorate what the factory was designed to do during latter stages, this might be a crucial head start in an arms race emerging from the breaking of the agreement.

Another possible noise level behind which either complete missiles or components could be produced would be the allowance of space exploration by the agreement. Many of the components of a space probe missile might not be useful for the purposes of weaponry, but some portion of clandestine manufacturing of weapons missiles might be done within this. The problems involved here could be approached by having the inspectorate assure itself that all components manufactured under the exploration program did indeed go into space probe rockets, but this would involve very close surveillance.

#### b. In Storage

The problems here are similarly subject to the noise levels of legitimate programs and in the detection of clandestinely manufactured or pre-agreement manufactured missiles. In the case of components, however, there is the added advantage of size reduction for those wishing to conceal. While many parts of missiles would be immediately recognized as such, there are many others which are only missile parts when they have been inserted to complete the weapon, otherwise serving many other purposes.

#### c. In Development

Included in components, we must consider fuels. The inspection of liquid fuel production may be somewhat easier than that of solids due to the special refrigeration needed to keep these fuels. It is also true, however, that the manufacture of liquid Nitrogen, Oxygen, and Hydrogen is a common activity and carried on, without great expense, for many legitimate purposes. Thus the important aspect of inspection would be in linking such fuels, liquid or solid, to launch sites and missiles. This is a case where a combination of several aspects may insure the ultimate safety of the agreement.

### 4. Production Facilities

Many of the problems of inspecting production facilities have been mentioned in discussing the possible production of components. A number of other possible inspection problems of production may be met in the inspection of production records and/or personnel. Otherwise, time forbids further discussion here.

4

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### 5. Warheads

While the contemplated agreement need not encompass limitations on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, there are some problems of inspection of that stockpile and its development which are relevant. Since the agreement might allow a certain limited testing program as well as space exploration program, the location of warheads may be of some import. Obviously, the space probe rocket or the testing rocket is legitimate only if it does not have, and cannot be easily and quickly equipped with, a nuclear warhead. It is also possible that certain weapon rocketry would be permitted to go on as not relevant to the strategic deterrence problem dealt with by the agreement. If so, this rocketry could be made much more relevant by a significant breakthrough in warhead technology, as say, in the reduction of the size of the warhead in order to give a significant increase in the yield per weight ratio. Thus a certain amount of inspection of the stockpile, location of warheads, and nuclear weapons research should be incorporated in the agreement, increasing, no doubt, the difficulty in reaching it.

### 6. Testing Facilities

In inspecting testing facilities, the agreement must allow for adequate inspection of the testing facilities which are allowed by it, and for the detection of clandestine testing grounds. Since many important developments may stem from static tests or from limited flights of rockets, these must be checked out, as well as possible gains made through other legitimized research programs such as space research. Important to the security of the second-strike deterrent force contemplated is the hardening, and tests on this aspect must also be subject to monitoring. These testing problems may be approached, as with all R & D, from the point of view that any improvements derived from test programs must be mutually beneficial, or may be attacked from the negative side by attempting to cut off possible unstabilizing developments.

In the cases of all of the above categories we have the problem of the verification of declarations of the participants to the agreement as to their status at the commencement of the pact. Careful preparation by one power or another for cheating could make this very difficult indeed, and it would require the satisfaction of both sides in the verification in order to reach agreement at all. Hopefully it would be possible to accomplish this within a certain limited risk so that the agreement could be reached. It should be emphasized, however, that this is, in all probability, a problem which must be approached before any satisfactory agreement can be reached, and is not necessarily to be included in the agreement, except insofar as the ensuing revelation of the failure of the verifying procedure would be sufficient grounds for termination of the pact or for some similar satisfaction given to the offended party.

It is also necessary to consider in the inspection of such facilities as we have discussed, the fact that these may be located in, and owned by, nations other than the US and the Soviet Union, as well as China. While the expense of a comprehensive missile program sees to be presently a limitation on the number of such facilities outside the greater powers, it would not be incon-

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ceivable that one or the other of the participants might finance such a program, clandestinely, for the benefits derived in a nation not included. Thus, while it is not likely that such a program could go undetected, participation by all nations in such an agreement, especially on the inspection aspects is to be desired. In this, as in the case of some other categories, however, it must be recognized that a time factor is involved, and that less than comprehensive agreements might be adequate to the job for the time being. They could only succeed, however, by providing a mechanism to cope with other problems which arise over time.

### III. INSPECTION OF ACTIVITIES INDIRECTLY RELATED TO A LIMITATION ON MISSILE DELIVERY SYSTEMS

#### B. T. Feld

An agreement for the limitation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, in order to be effective, will probably require restraints on activities relating to missile development and production. In the following, we outline briefly the types of activities which require some monitoring by an inspection agency, with particular emphasis on the types of peripheral activities in which an alert inspectorate would be interested. It is assumed that, in particular, the direct physical inspection problems and the problems of personnel inspections are treated in detail elsewhere.

The types of delivery systems of primary interest in a missile limitation are:

1) Long range ballistic missiles (ICBM).

2) Polaris carrying submarines, especially nuclear-powered.

3) Air-to-ground missiles capable of being launched from aircraft.

4) Missile delivery systems suitable for installation aboard ships.

5) "Doomsday" machines, a la Herman Kahn.

With respect to all of these systems, the type of activities to be monitored fall into the following categories:

1) Research and development, especially testing: While the non-physical inspection techniques, particularly these relating to personnel inspection, are most relevant to these activities, a number of other types of surveillance procedures are applicable to this respect. Thus, we may assume that most important new developments in missile technology will require relatively full scale testing to assure their reliability and usability in a working weapons system. (In this connection, however, it is important to investigate the extent to which a missile can be reliably developed without the necessity of full-scale testing of prototypes.) If this is the case, a system for missile firing detection, such as that studied by Brennan, will insure a complete knowledge of all missile test firings. The problem here is one of defining, in the agreement, acceptable limitations on the types of tests which are permitted under the missile limitation. In particular, it may be assumed, without great danger of contradiction, that legitimate "space research" will be permitted under the agreement. If so, it will be necessary to establish criteria for distinguishing between legitimate space experiments and experiments.

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ments aimed primarily at the enhancement of weapons capabilities. In this
respect, it is important to note that certain types of missile improvement
will tend to render the agreement unstable: Thus, any order-of-magnitude
improvement in missile accuracy should be regarded as a destabilizing fac-
tor and, if it cannot be prohibited in the agreement, arrangements must at
least be made for the observation by the inspectorate of the achievement of
such progress. Fortunately, it may be possible to ascertain whether missile
firings are designed for this purpose by a relatively simple inspection
arrangement, such as that described in the appendix. In summary, then, the
surveillance of R and D activities, especially testing, is a critical in-
spection activity in an agreement for missile limitation.

2) Missile production: Factory inspection is the obvious device for checking on this activity. But there are additional approaches, whose application can enhance the reliability of the inspection system. In particular, the possibility of inspection of industrial and governmental records, particularly the inspection of fiscal records, could supply much relevant information concerning the degree of the effort aimed at missile production (see Melman's book). Still, relatively large-scale activities can be hidden, as witnessed by the successful budgeting of the Manhattan project during World War II without any specific or direct budgetary assignments. On the other hand, the universality of bureaucratic practices speaks in favor of the effectiveness of accounting procedures in uncovering relatively large governmental and/or industrial efforts.

3) Stockpile detection: In the absence of any "divining rod" for the discovery of hidden missile stockpiles, their detection represents a formidable problem. Personnel (psychological) inspection seems to offer the greatest promise here, but it would appear important to seek other devices. Thus, it is possible that the maintenance of the missile stockpiles in readiness might require special types of activities which would be observable by an alert inspectorate.

4) Deployment: Missiles, to be used, must get to the "launching pad." In the present and foreseeable future state of the art, launching devices--be they fixed sites, submarines, or aircraft--are detectable and observable by relatively straightforward techniques. It would be one of the primary concerns of research and development surveillance to become cognizant of any radically new developments of simple methods of missile launching. Another aspect of this problem relates to the deployment of the nuclear warheads for the missiles. In this regard, agreement for the limitation of fissionable materials stockpiles are directly relevant to the problem. Without the warheads, missiles are unimportant, and the control of the weapons themselves would ease, to a large extent, the problem of limiting the missile delivery capability of any nation.

5) Related activities: An important problem for the inspectorate is to ascertain the state of readiness of the various nations for the rapid production of missile delivery systems in the eventuality of breakdown of the agreement. This requires not only a knowledge of the capabilities for missile production, but also a knowledge of the industrial capacities which would be capable of easy conversion to the production of missiles. This is not an easy problem since the industrial activities which are divertable are many and varied. Thus, factories which produce toy gyroscopes may be

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easily convertible into the production of missile guidance systems. It is
precisely for the purpose of coping with such problems that it is necessary
to require that the inspectorate shall be provided with the possibility of
independent research activities to insure that the inspection team shall be
at least as capable and knowledgeable as any of the national research groups.

# Appendix: A Possible Self-Inspecting Arrangement for the Control of Satellites

We seem to be approaching a state where both the United States and the USSR
will be capable of launching, into accurately predetermined orbits, satel-
lites with relatively large payload capacity capable of carrying instruments,
weapons, cameras and, possibly in the near future, men. Already there seems
to be a certain amount of fear, possibly rather exaggerated but at least
publicly expressed by our representatives at the 10 Nation Disarmament Ne-
gotiations in Geneva, concerning the use of satellites for the delivery of
nuclear weapons. It has been suggested that such satellite uses be banned,
although as yet there have been no concrete suggestions concerning what the
system for banning weapons satellites might be. In the meanwhile, satellites
carrying cameras have already been sent by us into orbit and reconnaissance
satellites, capable of photographing large areas of territory in considerable
detail, are in the relatively near future. Although there seems to exist
some kind of a tacit agreement that satellites do not violate the normal
concepts of air space sovereignty, this situation may only reflect the in-
ability, on the part of the nations whose air space is being violated, to
do anything about it. Thus, we may be building up to a situation (something
like the U-2 incident) where, just as soon as missiles are developed which
are capable of shooting down satellites, the problem of sovereignty will be
raised and, indeed, may lead to a considerable amount of embarrassment, if
not conflict. Under the circumstances, it would seem to be advisable to try
to arrive at some kind of arrangement, tacit or otherwise, concerning the
types of satellites which nations can launch without it being regarded as a
hostile act. Such an arrangement should also provide assurance that those
satellites which are launched do, indeed, not carry an "undesirable" payload.

It appears to me that an agreement in this respect is not only desirable, but
possible, and that such an agreement could take a very simple form. In fact,
I can conceive of such an agreement which is essentially completely self-
inspecting and which, therefore, would not require any kind of elaborate con-
trol machinery, inspectors, serious violation of sovereignty, etc. The pos-
sibility of such an agreement requires that both sides have achieved the ca-
pability of destroying or at least rendering unusable any satellite passing
over their territories. In this circumstance, the existence of a satellite in
orbit will depend on the acquiescence of the other party. Then it will be
necessary to come to some kind of an understanding concerning what can and,
in particular, what cannot go into satellites. It should be easy to agree
that satellites cannot carry weapons. It may be necessary also to agree that
satellites cannot carry cameras, or at least cameras capable of resolution
beyond a certain value.

If we regard such an arrangement as desirable, we could easily institute it
on a unilateral basis, inviting the UN to send a commission to view the con-
tents of each satellite before it goes up. The USSR could hardly refuse to
follow suit. But if they don't, after a certain preannounced time limit, we

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could withdraw the offer.

Such an arrangement applies only to earth satellites, which can be detected on a unilateral basis. If we and the USSR want to extend it to all satellites (moon, sun, Mars, etc.), arrangements might have to be made to monitor all satellite launchings, a task which does not seem to offer great technical difficulties. But it would be sufficient, for some years to come, to control earth satellites. What counts, again, is the simplicity of the control system and the establishment of a pattern of cooperation in this field.

#### IV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSPECTION IN A 200 MISSILE STABILIZED DETERRENT SYSTEM

Winthrop Smith

It is important to distinguish between inspection and control. Control of R & D would be a more difficult scheme to negotiate and for this reason might better be contemplated as a second step, if it is decided that control is feasible at all. A combination of inspection with control, however, has the advantage that control would aim at the development of the types of missile systems which can be most easily inspected. Liquid fuel missiles, for example, lend themselves to detection more easily than a smaller solid fuel, Minute-man type.

One central problem in R & D constraints, as has been mentioned, is to distinguish between military and non-military R & D, since we would presumably want to stifle "legitimate" space research as little as possible. One way out of this difficulty is quite attractive but of dubious feasibility: a completely open world in space research. This would mean free access to all missile and space research labs by both the US and Russia. We would agree not to produce certain types of missiles of primarily military value if the Russians didn't, and at the same time could put any of their new ostensibly peaceful rockets into production ourselves to keep up the balance, just in case. A critical element in such a system would be the limitations in the economic resources of the two countries involved together with the response time necessary for us, say, to put into production a new Russian missile and thus to keep in step. If China came into the picture there would be further difficulties: would we want to reveal to China all of our new missile developments as we would have to in an open world; would she agree to the thoroughgoing inspection required in the full realization that because of her less developed technology, her slower response time would not permit her to keep pace without the advantage of secrecy? It is of course conceivable that part of our agreement with the Soviets would entail their not giving any technological aid to the Chinese in the missile field as a result of which, US and Russian missile forces would be so far ahead of the Chinese ones as to constitute an effective deterrent toward any Chinese adventures. Needless to say, the kind of open world I have imagined here will have to wait for a considerably improved political atmosphere between the US and Russia, but might possibly come in after a more modest arms control scheme had been working for some time.

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Several people have remarked that an inspection team should have some positive purpose beyond their intelligence function. Since R & D inspectors would obviously have to have comparable technical competence with the inspectees, why not make them research workers themselves? Although it again requires a better political atmosphere, joint research by the US and Russia or by the UN on all missile and space programs would have many advantages. Work would go on at widely separated centers in many countries, with a substantial exchange of scientists and research management officials, perhaps on a rotating basis. US nations in Russia for instance, would report either to the US government or to a UN agency if they detected any attempt at "illegal" activity. Dr. Brennan has mentioned the figure of perhaps 10% of the lab force as a minimum for effective inspection of electronic guidance system manufacture. Thus the exchange would have to be on a scale at least as grand as this; and exchange of 30-40% would be even better. These combined research men-inspectors might be supplemented with a smaller force of full-time inspectors. I think a desirable goal might be an arrangement like CERN in Geneva. Although a lab might be located in Russia, say, it would be strictly under international management and control. A prelude to this during the early stages of an arms control agreement might be to have the lab managed by Russia but with 10% or so of the R & D force American dispersed throughout the divisions. The language problem may be a barrier to this wholesale exchange, but perhaps in a few years not an insurmountable one.

If we don't succeed in bringing into being either of these somewhat idealistic schemes—an open world with free competition in R & D (with or without production controls), or joint research—what then? Controls on military R & D would then be the goal. Brennan has suggested what seems to me the only feasible means to do this: the deliberate stymieing of peaceful development with military applications in such a way that space exploration is still possible although less efficient and more expensive. I worry, though, that this "self-made stumbling block" scheme might run counter to both human and engineering nature. Melman's book mentions the most critical points, aside from the warhead, at which missile inspection with an aim to distinguish military from non-military uses might be applied. These are the guidance system, the air-frame, and the fuel used. As to the guidance system, it has already been mentioned that the terminal guidance system for a Mars probe and an ICBM are quite different. The Mars probe requires less accurate guidance but over a longer period of time. We might agree to permit the somewhat cruder Mars type of guidance system to be produced and not an ICBM guidance system, but we would then need to constrain research on a possible "IC-not B-M" which might be guided during its entire flight by a Mars type guidance system. Because of their less exacting guidance systems which could easily be produced clandestinely, we might want to constrain further production and development of ASM's. This would be a tolerable amount of hindrance, so far as I can see, to a peaceful space research program. As far as air frames are concerned, it seems to me that it just might be possible to design them with a distributed load for peaceful purposes and with a sufficiently weak structure so that the frame would not support the concentrated weight of a large warhead. Dr. Brennan informs me that it is quite easy to cable-on a warhead to any of our present day large missiles. As to fuels, we might want to constrain the use of solid fuels despite their advantages to get ease of inspection. The constraining, for as long as possible

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sible, of the development of missile defense systems might help to preserve
the stability of the 200 missile deterrent system, but it seems impossible
to avoid a destabilizing technological breakthrough indefinitely. For this
reason the reliance on a mix of weapons for the stabilized deterrent, rather
than a fleet of Polarises alone for example, seems essential. There would
have to be a provision in the agreement for the sufficiently slow and moni-
tored evolution of the deterrent force composition to keep the balance. The
conclusion seems to be that direct R & D inspection and control in an era of
rapidly expanding technology is fraught with difficulties, but not entirely
out of the question when coupled with weapons stockpile inspection, missile
production and testing controls, research fiscal inspection, etc. The best
form of inspection at any point prior to inspection of missile tests as sug-
gested by Dr. Feld, seems to me to be international joint research. In
spite of the difficulties of negotiating such, it might be easier to get
scientists to agree to it than almost any other group of people if they can
make their influence felt.

V. PERSONNEL INSPECTION PROBLEMS

Marvin Gewirtz

## Introductory Note

The assignment was approached with the intention of describing the general
area of personnel inspection problems and suggesting, in a broad way, some
possible solutions. No attempt was made to explore the detailed technical
problems of implementation, particularly the resistance one might meet from
recalcitrant governments or individuals. This important difference between
what one might want to do and what one is able to do (i.e., what each side
agrees to allow) needs considerable attention.

In all attempts to regulate human behavior the major emphasis should be in
the direction of motivating positive actions rather than merely discouraging
negative actions. This principle is particularly relevant to the present
problems; the list of suggestions under section II was written with this
emphasis.

The second, and possibly more important, principle that seems most relevant
here is that of working towards an "open society" as the way to eliminate
the distrust that exists between the East and West. Large scale contacts be-
tween the scientific communities may go a long way towards creating the ante-
cedents of trust.

For the purpose of this discussion a fundamental breakdown was made between:
(I.) techniques for identification of personnel and their activities, and (II.)
techniques for exerting some influence on the nature of such activities.

I. Techniques for the identification of personnel and activities

A. Lists to be submitted to inspectorate:

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1. Science academy and professional sub-groups

2. All recent and current scientific and technical school records, yearbooks, etc.

3. Personnel of all government, industrial and academic laboratories and military installations

4. Fingerprints to accompany all of above.

B. The up-to-date accuracy of all such lists may be checked by:

1. Regular system of reporting to central inspectorate office at periodic intervals or when changing activities

2. Periodic but irregular sampling checks of all of above

3. Opportunity to interview any individual at time and place of inspectorate's choosing.

## II. Techniques for influencing personnel activities

A. Large scale joint research projects on peaceful applications of technology

B. Possible mandatory period of work with some international research or control body

C. Greatly expanded exchange program for scientists and students—very liberal grants for this

D. Annual or semi-annual meetings of international professional bodies— all expenses paid and possibly mandatory

E. Liberal rewards and assured sanctuary to all individuals reporting violations of agreement.

## VI. THE ARMS CONTROL TEAMS

Arthur Hadley

This paper will consider the composition, location, and orientation, as well as the relationship to the participating nations, of the control teams involved in the 200 missile stabilized deterrent agreement.

### Composition of the Teams

The teams will no doubt be composed of roughly equal numbers of Russian and American members as well as others drawn from the other participating nations.

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## Orientation of the Teams

The orientation of teams raises a host of questions. Are they inspectors or are they preventers? Should they assume that everyone is cheating them, or that they are there to help the host nations provide the enforcement that it also wants to provide? Are they there to report overt violations only, or are they to seek clandestine violations? Do they report to their own nations or to the international body? Are they under the United Nations or are they a separate organization of their own? Are they permitted to be kind to old ladies and such, or are they to be kept isolated?

Answers to some of the above questions might be the following: Placing the team under the United Nations will use and strengthen an already existing agency, and will also be able to use some of the already existing bureaucratic machinery. Moreover, it would have the symbolic protection of an organization which many already believe to be a "good thing." If the teams believe that they are controllers and not inspectors, they will have a more positive attitude toward their work. They should be encouraged to have good relations with the general public. They are not an FBI; they are the cop on the corner helping the kids to school. In this fashion they are more apt to receive the assistance of the host populace.

## Relationship of the Teams to Participating Countries

Since the teams exist to strengthen the agreement, the nations should not force the teams to do things which would weaken it, nor should they do things to the teams which would weaken the agreement. The teams should not be subject to vilification and should try to settle disputes rather than provoke them. The results of their findings should be published. The teams should not be used for espionage. Intelligence activities would no doubt continue. However, they should be done clandestinely, not by the teams. The teams should have status and high pay. Their activities should all be overt. They will have to cope with demands for privacy on the part of individual citizens and industries within nations.

A number of questions are related to the reporting of violations to the teams by citizens of the host countries. How is the security of the individual from reprisals guaranteed? Does he inform by mail, in an interview, or through social contacts? What are the rewards, both material and psychological? What punishment for false information?

## Types of Teams

There can be a variety of types of teams: area, mobile, technical, strategic, or spot. There might be special teams used to inspect special security areas. Different teams might be needed to guard against different forms of possible attack.

Area teams could be used to check out specific area, staying out of other excluded areas except at stated times. These would probably be something on the order of four man teams and would operate principally by just looking. They could also have the job of collecting records and conducting

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some inspections for the technical teams.

Mobile teams could be used for overflight inspection, sampling of water, infra-red monitoring, and such activities.

Technical teams would visit plants, checking to see what is going on. These, too, could be four-man teams, but with a strong technical background. Strategic teams should be located at some central place with data collecting equipment. It would be their function to evaluate the records and data assembled by the other teams, putting it together in a "large view."

The question arises as to whether national teams should be permitted. These would probably be useful at the strategic level, both sides wanting to take home copies of the relevant data for thorough study. An international strategic team would exist to give a supposedly unbiased evaluation of the date.

It would probably be useful to have a provision for the rotation of team personnel. This way no nation will be able to get on to and use the fact that McSnerd, covering area B, wouldn't know a missile base if it fell on him.

## Communications

There should be extra fast and secure communications for inspection teams on missile bases. Even though this may not do too much good, it will at least exercise some inhibiting factors on surprise attack operations. The less national the communication, the better. But as long as communication to the strategic team headquarters is reasonably rapid and secure, this should not create too much of a problem.

## Types of Personnel

Such questions arise here as who would be the best finders? How important should the ability to make friends be? Is being an inspector a life-time work, or just a temporary duty? What sort of social level should the team members be recruited from?

One very sticky problem is that of how a team member can be relieved for personal breaches of discipline without putting undue strain upon the agreement.

## What to Do about Violations

Teams finding violations should probably not start yelling immediately. The information should be reported to headquarters, which would be allowed to act.

24

225

SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline Station, Massachusetts

PSYCHOLOGICAL and PERSONNEL INSPECTION

I

Seminar: The Role of Psychological and Personnel Inspection.

Opening Remarks by: B. T. Feld

We have spent some time this summer considering the theory of personnel inspection. Now we would like to get into the hardware and technique of this type of inspection. Since the general aim of the group is the alleviation of the danger of an all-out nuclear war, our arguments are not over the desirability but over the possibility of a satisfactory arms control agreement. The possibility of such an agreement rests upon the ability of the two sides to agree upon and to produce sufficient inspection and assurance measures.

There are several types of inspection. (1) Physical. The problems of physical inspection are characterized by those in the test ban situation. In this case we are checking for air, ground, sea, and underground weapons tests by various monitoring means. Other such inspections systems might be a radar net in order to inspect a missile ban, or the checking of key points for force deployments, or the monitoring of the production of fissile materials. (2) Records Inspection. Several types of plans for inspection of this type have been suggested including budget inspection. This would endeavor to detect expenditures on weapons development through the detailed examination of the national fiscal records. Considering the degree of secrecy which shrouded the expenditures on the Manhattan Project during World War II, it is obvious that this type of inspection is fraught with difficulty. Probably a more fruitful type of records inspection would involve those of the cycle of industrial flow in the manufacture and use of fissile material. Not only would a number of cross checks be available along the way, but through examination of past records one could get information on how much material had been produced prior to the time of the agreement.

Any arms control agreement is faced with the problem of its technical instability. Some kind of restraint upon technical development must be contemplated, either in the research or in the development stage. One solution to this would be an open world in which there were no secrets. This would seem highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

ACS-16

8/17 & 18/60

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It is difficult to envisage adequate monitoring of research and development through records since the anti-gravity machine (our symbol for an unbalancing technological innovation) could well be developed in a very small garage-size laboratory. However, there is one other component, the people in the system. Any evasion requires someone's action in order to accomplish it, and requires someone's knowledge of it in order to make use of it. Therefore we have Type (3) Psychological or Personnel Inspection. In considering psychological inspection there are several areas of problems, 1) the problem of whom to inspect, 2) the information extracting system, 3) how to assemble and analyze information, 4) how to motivate people to disclose violations.

A number of other questions have been raised by Lewis C. Bohn in his paper on the subject of Psychological Inspection (Rand Corporation Publication #P-1917, Feb. 19, 1960). Of considerable interest is the list of 26 questions which begins on page 15.

## B. Discussion

There is a definite need for a perspective on the role of psychological inspection, said Tom Milburn. As Barber has suggested, there is a continuum of thought on the subject. At one end we have a black box with such techniques as polygraphs. At the other end are the questions of attitudes and cultural matters. To quote Ithiel Pool, "The essential notion of psychological inspection is that resources are not adequate for an adequate job of psychological inspection unless the loyalty of large populations can be won for the inspection system itself". This would imply that behavior is more easily changed than attitudes are, an idea which has been fairly well substantiated by a number of studies. Also, (quoting Pool), "The possibility that persons loyal to the inspection system will reveal cheating constitutes an effective inspection device, but clearly depends upon the creation of new international identifications".

We need to examine the basic purposes of psychological inspection. How does system mesh with other techniques of inspection? If the purpose of psychological inspection is the improvement of relations between countries by improving trust, this implies that it is to be used as a substitute for or an antecedent to trust. The purpose must be considered in evaluating techniques, asking of each one whether it will contribute to the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, and to what degree.

We must also be concerned with whether an inspector may ask questions pertinent to the personal life of his subject. The subject may want to know what will be done with the information which he gives, and certainly will not wish to reveal items which might subject him to punishment.

Our problem now is that we do not have enough trust to reach an arms control agreement. When and if we gain enough for an agreement, we may not need techniques such as we contemplate for psychological inspection.*

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*Remarks by Lewis Bohn

"In my view, the true relation between psychological inspection and international trust is importantly different from the view attributed above to Milburn and Pool.

(1) The purpose of psychological inspection is not "the improvement of relations between countries by improving trust". Rather, it is the same as the purpose of physical inspection or records inspection: namely, first, to uncover violations of an agreement, and, second, to deter violations by having some capability to uncover them.

(2) Psychological inspection, like physical and records inspection, would be unnecessary if the degree of trust among nations were so high that there were no weapons, no dangers of aggression or war, and, therefore, no need for arms control in the first place. It is only because U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S.-China relations are far poorer than, for example, U.S.-U.K. relations and trust, that we need weapons, and perhaps arms control and the means to inspect arms control, including psychological inspection.

(3) Far from requiring a high degree of international trust, psychological inspection, therefore, assumes a low degree, and must be designed to function in this environment.

(4) The "possibility that persons will reveal cheating" does not depend "upon the creation of new international identifications." Rather, it requires only that some of the individuals with conscious knowledge in any form of violation of the agreement, will not be so completely in sympathy with a violation of the international agreement that idealism, assurance of sanctuary for themselves and their families, fear of punishment for failure to report, rewards for reporting, and the like will all fail to move them to report the violation. Alternatively ( in the case of those who cannot be so motivated), it requires that lie detectors, questioning and the like, when properly applied with full safeguards for the legitimate rights of the subject, can give enough information despite the subjects' wish to conceal it, so that useful leads can be developed for further investigation. These requirements can be met, if the second is technically feasible at all ( only much research will establish whether it is or not), even in the absence of "new international identifications."

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(5) Measures to implement psychological inspection may well cause international frictions, and in other ways adversely affect international trust. But so may physical inspection: the presence of inspection posts, the investigations of roving teams, disagreements over the interpretation of evidence, disputes over "good faith" in implementing the agreement, etc. all may cause problems in the absence of any psychological inspection. The existence of any inspection system, is itself evidence of mistrust. The real task is not to bewail these adverse effects, but to minimize them while retaining effective inspection. This can be done for psychological inspection as well as for more conventional inspection systems. It is certainly not easy. -

Lewis C. Bohn

## B. Discussion continues:

Barber suggested that out of the spectrum of techniques we might break psychological inspection into three classes. The first class would be negotiable items such as the use of polygraph as an inspection technique. The second type would be negotiable items which would be desirable but not essential to the strategic posture, such as open areas for travel in order to foster the open society. The third type of question would concern non-negotiable items such as the qualifications for personnel which are important but not proper subjects for the content of the agreement. There would seem to be a fundamental conflict between the use of the lie detector and attempts to build trust between the two sides.

Pool suggested that there was frequent confusion in our discussion of the purposes of psychological inspection. Often there is the implicit assumption of the objective of maximizing knowledge in order to make us feel safer in an agreement with a closed society. This is not likely to be the most profitable approach. It is much better to attempt to maximize the risks of undesirable behavior, thus to use psychological inspection as a deterrent to evasion. As an example of this we might note that the large-scale interview agreement and techniques for the evaluation of the resulting information might gain us a useful big study of the Soviet Union but would produce a small chance of evasion information. On the other hand, an agreement allowing either side to choose anyone from the other country to come for a six months vacation or interview session would give us little general information about the Soviet but would put a great element of risk of the leak of information concerning any evasion efforts. Furthermore, any technique which antagonizes the opposite side is likely to be unproductive. As Festinger's experiments in dissonance theory indicate, such action is likely to only increase the intensity of identification and solidify the group. A better use for psychological inspection would be in using it to minimize inspection and maximize risk.

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Discussion continues:

Stevenson was concerned that the Soviet citizen remained ignorant of the activities and agreements of his own nation. Questions concerning the U-2 incident indicate that the Soviet citizen believes that the USSR uses no espionage. Thus, how can we play on guilt feelings as there are none, as there are in the U.S. However, noted Feld, the Soviet government can, if it wills, use the communication channels in order to get the idea across. Naturally, we would have to agree to this and monitor the channels to assure ourselves of compliance.

Our insistence on proof has engendered a hostile environment, said Feld. Would it not be better to attack the problem by having each side look for ways to prove to the other side that it was not cheating. This of course assumes that we have a common motive for getting into the agreement.

It is the prevailing view of the role of inspection that it must serve as absolute insurance of compliance with the agreement, noted Philps. This is unfortunate because any uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of the inspection system makes us turn it down. In short, we require too high a confidence level. On the other hand, if we examine our present military policy, we find that it is made on the basis of a good but far from perfect intelligence, such as that gained from the U-2 missions. Certainly the degree of perfection is much less than we would get in any sort of agreement. Thus there is a double standard set up. If we realize that all policies are based on the total information available, either past or present, this makes a basic change in emphasis. Thus, an arms control agreement would add sources of information to those presently available to us. These include published information, exchanges of people, physical gadgets such as radar, air space inspection, etc. To these we would be able to add inspectors at control posts and other points and psychological inspection.

To be sure all policies are based upon the information available, said Feld, but this also depends upon the degree of nakedness to which one is subjected. Now we have a certain flexibility in altering our policies on reevaluation of the information. In any arms control agreement in which the emphasis was towards zero armaments, this would not be true. This is so, added Barber, but we are not likely to push towards zero soon. The first steps will be considerably short of that and we can determine where to go from there by whether the situation deteriorates or grows better.

Hadley's gem for the day: "Only the dead are stable."

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Sources of data on psychological inspection.

Laboratory experiments

Field studies

POW knowledge

Criminal investigation

Psycho therapy

Social psychology research

Industrial psychology—( Milburn et al.)

There seems to be a difference in the way in which we talk about psychological inspection as opposed to other types, said Pool. We have been laying a great deal of emphasis upon the question of intent and reassurance here. If, however, the Soviet Union were pursuing a policy of reassurance, they should have welcomed the fact that we reduced our military effort on the basis of the U-2 information. However, they were not pleased about this and apparently are not pursuing a policy of reassurance, but wish to pursue the traditional policy of bargaining from strength. Since they are not pursuing this course of action, some of our psychological inspection techniques may be inapplicable.

Some skepticism was shown as to whether we knew enough about the Soviet mentality to really evaluate which methods such as the lie detector would be val id when applied to them. In point of fact, said Mika Salpeter, they don't go very much for lie detectors. Furthermore, what can be done by interview under a high degree of control and what can be done under the conditions of inspection may be entirely different. The fragility of totalitarian control over most of the population will serve us little purpose, said Pool, since those who really count will be amongst those who are kept under control.

Psychological inspection techniques are likely to be used only in the long run and not in the immediate future, said Feld. Thus, it should be our job here to evaluate whether we know enough about these techniques to contemplate their future use. Leiderman pointed out that there was considerable disagreement amongst the field as to the effectiveness of these techniques.

Pool proposed a simple and inexpensive personnel inspection system. This would be the provision for the ability to take any citizen out of the other country for a two day secret interview. Whatever speculation as to what occurred during this interview were to develop, it would introduce a large measure of uncertainty into the system.

Leiderman suggested that we use personnel inspectors to follow up hardware inspectors. Psychological techniques should be applied to the

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choosing of both types of inspectors, testing them for paranoid tendencies and so forth, which might be valuable in certain positions, but which must be known. A paranoid type might be very useful in the position of a receiver; however in the position of an evaluator it would probably be disastrous. We might also apply such techniques to the testing of our own personnel to make certain that we have no dangerous types in button-pushing positions, for example.

Several presently existing patterns for inspection were suggested. Leiderman noted that the Pure Food and Drug Administration actually placed its inspectors in plants doing work along the assembly line. Even more applicable to the psychological or personnel techniques which we have been discussing was the inspector general situation in the army, suggested Feld. Despite the fact that the military system discourages complaint by the lower echelons, the inspector general system does work. American corporations use both internal and external auditors, said Stevenson. The internal auditors are elected by the stockholders. Such a pattern may be very useful in regard to arms control.

### Bernard T. Feld

L. B. Sohn

A. Hadley

A. Barber

R. Coward

M. Gewirtz

J. Orear

I. Pool

M. Salpeter

E. Salpeter

T. Milburn

N. Hoepli

M. Halperin

E. Stevenson

A. Leiderman

RC

## II

Seminar: Techniques of Psychological Inspection

To summarize our discussions of psychological inspection thus far, this is not a likely technique for use in the near future. However, in the long run it is possible that this would do much to increase confidence. The more drastic the disarmament measures are, the more important such techniques as this may be. There are two types of situations in which psychological inspection might be used. The first is where the inspectorate is attempting to find information.

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The second is to increase confidence that the agreement is being kept, in other words, to allow people to prove that their declarations are in good faith.

We must examine two aspects of psychological inspection from the point of view of techniques. (1) How good are they at extracting and evaluating the veracity of information? For example, would they be useful in asking questions of key persons such as Khrushchev? (2) How can these techniques be used in a statistical fashion in order to find a suspicious area of activity? Many possibilities of use lie between these two extremes.

Let us not be concerned at this time with whether we could get agreement on such techniques but let us discuss the cross-cultural applicability of them. In other words, let us evaluate whether we wish to seek an agreement involving these techniques, remembering that the technique which increases tensions rather than the opposite is not worth having.

Remarks by: H. Liederman

Liederman opened the discussion by suggesting that we abandon the use of the term "lie detector", which, as a specific device, may prove not very useful. This is symbolic only of devices measuring changes in physiological responses and is quite a jump from those which observe behavioral responses. A better symbolic term would be polygraph. This indicates that no single measure is adequate for all persons since different people react differently.

We may make a list of physiological response techniques:

- Electro encephalography

- Eye-movement (now being used in studies of dreaming)

- Skin potential and resistance

- Oxygen saturation of the blood stream

- Gastric motility

- Respiration

- Muscle tension

A technique now being used in research in Russia which measures changes in the volume of the limbs.

These techniques are not standardized but have individual responses. A person, however, may have a particular pattern which characterizes him in several of these.

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An interesting possibility with such reactions is telemetering the results over a distance. Thus, key people could be monitored by wearing transitorized devices which measured these reactions and transmit the results. However, we have the question of what to do with the data. It requires a great deal of experience to evaluate this data, especially for each individual. A great deal of research is needed in this field and might take the direction of computer techniques for the correlation of data.

## List of behavioral techniques:

**Depth interviews** ( These allow the interviewer to gain intimate knowledge as to how a person reacts and so forth)

**Hypnosis and drugs** ( These two are not very useful on persons wishing to conceal information. Research indicates that the information given is frequently what the subject believes the interviewer wants.)

## C. Discussion

The information available through the use of truth serum is of the type which is not usually given for reasons of internal defenses, said Kardner. This is not ego-controlled information and does not include information which is so consciously willed not to expose. Deutsch pointed out that it could, however, be used to release information when guilt feelings were associated with it.

Field noted that the FBI considers alcoholics as grave security risks. This raises the question of how one might use this best known of all drugs as a disinhibitor. On the other hand, the attitudes of Soviet leaders, such as Khrushchev, seem to indicate that they might be very different than our own attitudes. Through the use of alcohol, through sexual relationships, and other techniques much information can be gained that is not otherwise disclosable, said Leiderman.

The use of polygraph techniques in inspection may be somewhat less complicated than in its usual context. In the usual context the baseline for one individual must be determined before we can check on untruths. However, in inspection we are dealing with a group lie, not a personal lie. Thus the baseline is determined by several individuals at one time rather than one person over a period of time.

The unfortunate part of these techniques, said Kardner, is that they are untried weapons. They have all been aimed at very different goals than those which we are after. We thus may be making a quixotic undertaking since there really is no technique presently known to elicit information which a person wishes to conceal.

235

It is also true that information can be slanted to make it so misleading that in essence it is a lie, despite the true content.

In response to a question, Loiderman noted that a number of countering actions could be taken. Thus, a person who is normally a cardiac reactor might secretly induce a raised pulse rate or lowered rate through drugs administered immediately before interviewing. It is even possible to train an individual to counter the effects in an interview situation. However, it is possible for a well-trained interviewer to detect many such evasions and training.

Mika Salpeter noted that there are a number of problems inherent with this as other types of inspection, such as how the subjects for interview are selected and so forth. However, over and above this we are concerned with whether, given the population to interview, we can find out the lie through these techniques. We must remember that this lie may be a patriotic, socially acceptable, group lie. In fact, there has been very little research done on this area. It is also true, said Milburn, that telling a truth which can harm friends and nations may prove quite as alarming as lie telling.

There was general agreement that however useful the utilization of psychological inspection interviews might be to do extensive research on Russian character, that this was not within our objective. It is very likely that such a use would arouse great fear on the part of the parties to the agreement of disclosures of weaknesses. Thus it might well create more tensions.

Bloomfield said that there were great problems involved in the focus in values involved in this sort of a system. If physical penetration is a threat to the Soviet Union, psychic penetration would be much more so. A change in their attitude would require such an alteration in the political situation that no doubt we would have no need of psychological inspection. The problem is more to look toward these techniques for a minimum of supplementation of an inspection agreement.

Many of the more hopeful stories which one reads concerning these techniques are unfortunately not to be believed, said Leiderman. The polygraph frequently gives false negatives and false positives. In the case of a false negative the machine indicates that a person is not lying, when he is, in fact, lying. In the case of a false positive the machine indicates that a person is lying when he is in fact not lying. Thus, the technique is less than very useful.

The only techniques which seem to hold much hope are those in which we look for the motivation to reveal rather than to conceal, said Deutsch. But generally speaking, the consensus of the group was that while the

236

techniques do not seem too hopeful, a great deal of research is needed
in this area.

B. T. Feld

J. Orear

L. B. Sohn

M. Gewirtz

Dr. Kardiner

T. Milburn

M. Deutsch

Mikah Salpeter

H. Leiderman

Dr. Salpeter

R. Coward

A. Barber

D. G. Brennan

L. P. Bohn

M. Kalkstein

W. Smith

RC

### III

Seminar: Inspection by the People --General Intelligence Techniques

Feld listed some general questions to be discussed at this session.

Among these is the question of the merits of an international secret
service for collecting information supplied by the people, and in
augmenting this with its own independent data. What possible means
could be used by a nation to defeat such a system? Would the inter-
national secret service be under U.N. auspices? Is the idea of in-
spection by the people acceptable to citizens of the United States
and Russia, in particular those groups which are involved in the
production and use of weapons?

### D. Discussion

Orear, who has helped with the writing of those parts of the Melman
book on this subject, had some comments. He noted that Melman's
system of inspection for disarmament places great emphasis on inspec-
tion by the people. A treaty incorporating such a scheme should
include a provision which states explicitly that it is the duty of the
citizens of a country to report violations of the arms control agree-
ment to an international inspectorate. It is desirable that the
citizen should directly contact the inspectorate with signed or perhaps
unsigned letters, which could be sent by mail to some well-known ad-
dress (e.g., Box 1, Moscow). It must be possible to insure, or at
least to check, that these letters reach the inspectorate without the

237

possibility of tampering or censorship. Orear listed some figures
which came out of a poll by George Gallup, held in six Western nations
on the question of public acceptance of inspection by the people,
assuming that such a system has been written into a treaty. 73% of the
sample of United States citizens were in favor of this provision in the
treaty, and 11% were opposed. In West Germany, France and Britain, the
figures for acceptability are respectively 80%, 71% and 54%. Assuming
that such a treaty is in force, this same group was asked whether they
would report clandestine evasions to an international inspectorate.
The figures here for the United States, India, France and Great Britain
are respectively 80%, 63%, 63%, and 50% would report. Two special
groups in the United States, scientists and American Legion commanders
were asked the same question. 89% of the scientists said they would
report, as opposed to 59%, still a substantial number, of American Legion
commanders. Dr. Kardiner said that these figures are interesting, but
that he considered it unlikely that people actually would do what they
said they would in this case. Orear agreed and noted that his group was
getting out a questionnaire for scientists which would attempt to probe
the question more deeply. In particular, it asks the respondents what
they think other people should do, if the proposed inspection treaty is
set up. The only significant conclusion that can be drawn from the
Gallup poll, according to Pool, is that the idea of inspection by the
people seems appealing enough so that one could say there is some latent
positive response to national leadership in favor of psychological in-
spection.

There was some discussion as to why psychological inspection should be
as acceptable as indicated and what measures above could be taken to
insure that it would be effective. On the first question, Deutsch
noted that psychological inspection (P.I.) was probably so acceptable
because it was based on already established virtues of honesty, patriot-
ism, and so forth. Mika Salpeter noted that the efficacy of P.I. might
depend on a conviction of the reporting person that real cheating is
going on, not merely the supposition of cheating; he must feel that he
can be of real use in exposing an evasion, not merely an insignificant
supplement to a professional inspection team or a D.O.D. administrator.

Assuming that it is national policy to live up to an arms control
agreement, it is then important to know whether a small, non-government
supported, group of scientists could successfully evade such an agree-
ment. Halperin raised the point that an individual, say a production
worker in a weapons plant, is not in a position to evaluate an evasion
unless the agreement prohibits building any of some component. If a
certain number are permitted to be made each year, correlated checks of
the whole production picture must be made. Barber disagreed with this
point on the grounds that you would have ordinary inspectors at legiti-
mate production plants and that people would be informed as to the
location of these plants, so that evidence of production in any other
location could immediately be recognized as an evasion.

238

As Bloomfield saw it, the central question is whether the evasion is
by some independent group or by one's own government. If the evasion
is seen by the people as a national, patriotic effort, it will be
much more difficult to get it reported. Pool said that regardless of
whether the violation is sanctioned by the President or not, a
psychological inspection clause in an arms control treaty would have
the effect of increasing, somewhat, the probability of reporting an
evasion no matter what is the allowed number of missiles to be pro-
duced each year. The provision would not necessarily eliminate all
evasions, but sould certainly reduce the likelihood of cheating.
This is particularly true, Deutsch observed, since the international
inspectorate is not the only group which is uncertain as to whether
it will get knowledge of an evasion. The uncertainty of the govern-
ment leaders themselves will tend to inhibit any support of evasion
on their part.

Rowen felt that it would be difficult to get the Russians to agree
to a psychological inspection clause in an arms control treaty,
since opening up the Soviet Union would result in increased military
intelligence, as well as evasion information. Presumably the Soviets
feel that one of their great military advantages lies in the fact
that their land is terra incognita. The Russians themselves would not
be particularly motivated toward psychological inspection from their
own point of view in his opinion, since he feels that they would not
worry much about U.S. evasion anyway.

Bloomfield wanted to get a definitive answer to the question of the
technical possibility or impossibility for a non-government group to
build a missile or bomb. Feld thought that it was technically possible
for such a group to build a missile, particularly some of the smaller
solid fuel missiles; however, national psychological inspection might
reveal this easily, assuming that the government is sincere in keep-
ing the arms control treaty. In addition, Barber believes that such
an effort could not remain covert if there is any thorough inventory
of input and output of material. This is particularly the case with
explosives whose transportation requires extra precautions and public
notice for safety reasons. Orear, however, suggested that there are
certain types of activities which might be hidden; for example,
Livermore might set off a clandestine underground explosion. Schelling
questioned that there was a clear distinction between cheating with
the approval of the government and private cheating. Even if all the
objective facts of the situation are known, it may not be possible
to clearly fix the responsibility for the evasion. Orear replied that
there are certainly some things like underground nuclear explosions
the existence of which at least would be clear-out, and Feld noted
that an agreement doesn't necessarily require that the blame be fixed
but merely that evidence of an evasion be produced which would then
evoke the appropriate countermeasures.

Brennan summarized his short paper on inspection by remarking that

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the role of inspection is in a way analogous to our present system of detection, and has some of the same uncertainties. Inspection, particularly psychological inspection, does allow one to monitor a closer approximation to intent than we now have in espionage. Halperin mentioned the fact that psychological inspection might have some unforeseen consequences one of which might be less arms control, not more; i.e., discovery of a minor evasion might precipitate an arms race. Feld said that in setting up an arms control agreement, one would take this risk because he would assume as a major premise that the agreement would bring greater security to both sides, and hence, that it would be in the interests of both sides to discourage evasion.

Rowen wanted the opinion of some of the psychologists about the degree of difficulty in recruiting people to evade once an arms control agreement was in force. Deutsch thought that it would certainly be somewhat more difficult to recruit people to cheat, and Hadley noted that this would depend upon the world situation at a given moment and the degree of tension between the opposing sides.

Feld initiated a discussion on some of the "hardware problems" to be faced in gathering intelligence information directly from the people, and he listed some questions for discussion:

1. What would be the function of the inspectorate under various types of arms control agreements that might be imagined?

2. What is the time scale required for changing national attitudes towards the kind of inspection we envisage (information on this might be gained by a study of the change in U.S. attitudes toward fingerprinting during World War II).

3. What about spoofing? In other words, would it be possible to flood "Box 1, Moscow" with false evasion reports. Assuming that this is not too difficult, what means could be used to sift these false alarms away from the legitimate information reported?

Milburn said that the number of false alarms might very well be a function of the state of neurosis of the people as a whole, giving as an example the fact that patients in mental hospitals frequently express anxiety about imagined Communist plots.

Schelling suggested that the loyalty security program in the U.S. during World War II which used public informants would be worth studying to find out how to deal with false leads. In setting up a psychological inspection program, it must be kept in mind that

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it is just as important not to falsely accuse the innocent as to find
the guilty. Feld remarked that in his experience with national
security programs, the people who were attracted into this type of
intelligence work were the type who tended to see Communists under
every bed, i.e. they tended to be oversealous and to turn in too much
information. The anxiety of the innocent and the fair-minded, however,
was somewhat alleviated when the requirement was made that the evidence
of these security agents be sifted by an independent, disinterested re-
view board. The "information gathering type" may very well be a differ-
ent person from the "reviewing type" of person. Bloomfield noted that
the structure of the security program would depend to some extent on
whether it was primarily interested in checking information or in
checking personnel. Intelligence teams seeking evasion information
would probably be more concerned with the fact of evasion than with
who is responsible. One of the difficulties with review boards is
that, judging from experience with the U.S. security system, people
will not take the initiative to evaluate an individual favorably when
a trivial amount of "bad" security information comes in. This means
that inertia results in a certain number of false positive responses
of the security system. Barber also not ed that many U.S. security
inspectors tended to obey the precise routine set out for them to the
letter, and that this rigidity made it possible to design an effective
evasion. For this reason, an inspection system should include some
random elements, inspectors who would be encouraged to use their
imagination and avoid routine predictable procedures.

What criteria should be used for selecting the members of an inter-
national psychological inspection team? First of all, they should
preferably be people who are "internationally minded" rather than
"nationally minded". Sohn pointed out that the United Nations got a
number of misfits and international bums during the early years of its
existence, since there were not sufficient incentives for able people
to work for the organization. High salaries are one type of incentive
which is very effective, but this is not the only factor. The United
Nations got many of its ablest people from those countries, usually
small nations, which made U.N. work a matter of competition, honor
and prestige. This was not so in the United States. There followed
some discussion, instigated by Schelling, about whether any groups in
the nation could be exempt from psychological inspection, such as
cabinet members. He noted that people who have a security clearance
accept a special responsibility in return for their privilege of ac-
cess to secret information, and this special responsibility involves
a particular loyalty to the government which they serve. These people
would be conscience torn even more than the ordinary citizen if the
government should decide to undertake clandestine evasion. Certain
people such as the President, should be understood to have supreme
loyalty to the national interest rather than an international agree-
ment. Deutsch disagreed with this and felt that if a nation under-
took an agreement involving psychological inspection, no one, includ-
ing the President, should be exempt. Sohn recalled that in the Nuremberg

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trials, top government officials were punished personally for not abiding by the treaty. Bloomfield said he could not agree with the Nuremburg principle of personal responsibility for the actions of governments. Acceptance of international law as applied to governments themselves is difficult enough to engender. He feels that discipline of individual citizens should be left to the jurisdiction of their own country. Legally a treaty can be renounced by a nation but not violated unilaterally without cause, or public repudiation. Feld quoted Lewis Bohn as having stated that exactly the place one would want to look for possible violations is in the cabinet and therefore that cabinet officers should not be exempt. Deutsch objected to Schelling's assertion that if the President and the cabinet decided that it is in the national interest to cheat in an agreement, it was legitimate for a nation to do so. His objection was on the grounds that this would mean a citizen gives up his power to assist and take part in national decisions by acquiescing beforehand to the possibility of the President deciding it was in the national interest to cheat. If the electorate feels that cheating is indeed in the national interest, after the fact, it can then be free to express its approval or disapproval. Brennan noted that there is an implicit restraint on actions which the President can take, for example, although he might have the power to initiate a preventive war against Russia, it seems unlikely that he could do this without losing the support of vast numbers of people. Clearly also, the President cannot decide that he won't implement the 14th amendment "in the national interest". Luce noted that national security may not be the highest value in the world, and that under some circumstances a President might well decide to place human security above national security. This might tend to argue against the idea of evading an arms control agreement "in the national interest". Assuming that all parties to an arms control treaty enter into it with the support of their people and in good faith, it seems desirable to find a simple mechanism for de-emphasizing any motivation to evade on the part of government officials. At the same time, it is clearly undesirable that governments would be seriously disrupted through the activities of the inspectors. One possible gimmick suggested by O'Sullivan is to take away an official's security clearance, if he fails to report violations of the agreement. This threat can be made more credible by informing the officials that a certain number of false leads will be introduced. If these false evasions are not reported to the inspectorate, it would then be empowered to revoke the individual's security clearance. Given popular support for the treaty, a political leader reporting an evasion would have a lever against his government to prevent punishment on the grounds that his actions were dedicated to "keeping the peace". Orear mentioned Sxilard's idea of positive rewards, e.g. a million dollars or a vacation in Austria, for revealing an evasion to the inspectorate.

Feld and Bloomfield agreed that a consequence of a major violation of the agreement would have to be renunciation or some specified sanction. Presumably there would be a more or less well defined threshold of

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evasion seriousness, written into the treaty, which would be under-
stood as sufficient cause to abrogate the agreement. The threat of
abrogation is a real deterrent to evasion. It is clearly undesirable
to allow renunciation of the treaty for completely trivial causes.
Some sort of judicial process should be specified to decide whether
there is due cause for abrogation, otherwise the treaty would be un-
stable with respect to small political perturbations. O'Sullivan
noted that it is not necessary to include a provision to punish an in-
dividual or group responsible for evasion, but merely to determine
whether or not a violation has been committed which is serious enough
to justify scrapping the treaty. Barber was not sure whether one could
adjudicate the repudiation of a treaty. He feels that such an action,
judging by the past, is basically a power-play which is put into effect
when the national interest of one of the parties so dictates.

B. T. Feld

L. Bloomfield

D. G. Brennan

A. Barber

I. Pool

J. Orear

T. Milburn

M. Deutsch

H. Rowen

W. Smith

A. Hadley

L. Sohn

T. Schelling

T. O'Sullivan

R. Coward

M. Gewirtz

M. Halperin

M. Hoepli

WS

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Seminar: Dr. Joseph Kubis

Kubis first reviewed the various methods for picking up physiological changes in the person. Among the ones that have been used for polygraph techniques are blood-pressure, perspiration, movement and changes of skin resistance (PGR). There are four variables involved in the process: the person being tested, the interviewer, the machine and the questions. The process has not been standardized for the population at large. The basic assumption is that the individual will be physiologically disturbed when lying. Questions should be able to compare the responses when giving the truth and when lying. The problem is to distinguish between how much different the pattern has to be when the person is lying as compared to his own normal truthful pattern.

Kubis showed a number of slides of records of PGR and blood-pressure and respiratory measurements. It was pointed out that the questions were asked after the individual returned to his original electrical resistance, and were of three types: those relating to knowledge of an event, guilt about the event and possession of some object. It was shown how the record of one guilty individual had peaks on the PGR at questions that referred to guilt, knowledge and possession, while an accomplice had peaks on the questions referring to knowledge only. Other records were shown relating PGR to EEG (brainwaves). This was an attempt to relate the conscious brain patterns to the involuntary movements picked up on the polygraph. Kubis said that he has not made any large scale research effort on this problem but that he plans to return to it shortly. In addition to the questions relating only to the crucial subject matter there should be two other types of question employed: one, matter of fact questions which are used as buffers; second, emotional questions of a standard type against which the emotional response to the crucial questions can best be compared. The ideal situation is one in which only the investigator and the subject know about a specific bit of information.

Kubis emphasized that at this point there are no standard techniques and that all lie detection work is done on intuitive and clinical basis. He is now engaged in an attempt to use a computer to compare pairs or triads of responses. He feels that this would be a very fruitful area of work.

Regarding evasion attempts, knowledge of the lie detection process can cause a feed-back effect which disrupts the records. If a person can assume an attitude that he doesn't give a damn or isn't lying then he may be successful in fooling the investigator. However, if he can be gotten to see the situation as an intellectual challenge then there will be less possibility of beating the machine. Kubis said that a person of superior intelligence is the easiest type of person to get on a lie detector. He believes that he can

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correctly tell whether a person is lying in 90% of all the cases presented to him with a very high degree of certainty. Hadley asked about Dr. Orne's comment that he could in three months train 500 people to evade a lie detector. Kubis commented that he felt it was too large an estimate. He said that other techniques may be used where the individual does not know that he has guilty knowledge being tested for--in other words, he is not actually aware that he is guilty; but this technique is a long way off and probably could not be readily attained with any large numbers of people. Feld asked if one can detect a suspicion that something is going on by testing large numbers of people. Kubis replied that if something suspicious were going on it would come out and that this is one of the easiest kinds of response to get. Kahn asked whether you can erase knowledge about someone having hidden a bomb. Kubis replied that it would be very difficult. He cited one possibility that Erikson has used by creating a second personality through hypnosis and having the second personality be the dominant one. Kahn asked, if you picked any ten top leaders in the Soviet Union to violate an arms control agreement, could it be picked up. Kubis replied that he felt it could. Feld asked whether the technique could have a statistical usefulness, that is, if it could be used over a large community in order to weed out those individuals who show some signs of guilty knowledge and who could then be more closely interrogated. Kubis replied that if the individuals are contradicting some social standards they can be caught. If what they are doing is acceptable to the entire community, then it would be more difficult. Kubis cited some examples of a community in the midwest where lying is a normal aspect of this subculture.

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23 August 1960

THE ROLES OF INSPECTION IN ARMS CONTROL

D. G. Brennan

In the absence of any overt and explicitly agreed arms-control inspection, the United States is, nevertheless, in possession of some information about the military establishments, strategic views and doctrines, and possible or likely intentions of our prospective opponents. In the present environment, the extent of our information of this type leaves much to be desired. Broadly speaking, we may state that the primary role of inspection in arms control is to improve the quality and quantity of information of this type. We may thus view inspection as an information-gathering process, the output information from which is used as a basis for adjusting our own military establishment, doctrine, and intentions. This is, however, merely a general statement of principle; a sufficient elaboration of this principle constitutes a largely unsolved problem. Some discussion of this point may help clarify the nature of the problem. In order to simplify the language of the following discussion, it will be assumed that the only parties of interest are the United States and the Soviet Union.

Our present information on Soviet military plans and on the Soviet military establishments stems from articles in Soviet military journals and the Soviet public press, from overtly observable Soviet actions, and from espionage activities of various kinds. There are two aspects of this information that are important: first, the extent of this information is not negligible, and it constitutes an important guide to our own armament policy; second, the information is terribly incomplete, often misleading, and sometimes, downright false. To illustrate the last point first, it is widely known that our own B-52 bomber program was based, in part, on an exaggerated estimate of Soviet bomber production. In fact, however, the Soviets largely bypassed the technological generation represented by long-range bombers and were concentrating their efforts on the development of missiles while we were engaged in an expanded B-52 program. This same incident also illustrates the importance of the fact that some of our information is sometimes not so misleading or inaccurate. If we had absolutely no information whatever on the state of the Soviet military establishment, we might feel obliged to be maintaining and improving our military establishment at the maximum level the economy would withstand. We might feel terribly insecure even if our armament program were limited solely by economic saturation. The presently relatively relaxed state of our missile and air defense programs (among others) presumably reflects information, possibly gathered in part by the U-2 flights, about the actual state of Soviet military preparations in such weapons -- or, rather, our leaders' beliefs about the actual extent -- and reflects the fact that the Soviets are not engaged in all-out development of such facilities.

The Soviets do not seem to realize the extent to which our information on their military establishment serves to limit the intensity of the arms race. Their evident lack of understanding of this point is most unfortunate; if they were sufficiently aware of this fact, their outlook toward inspection would probably be quite different. In the extreme case mentioned above, if we had absolutely no information whatever on the state of the Soviet military establishment, the United States' defense budget probably would be at least twice that at present. The Soviet economy could not at present support defense expenditures at twice their present level, and if we were to

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double our defense budget, the world would be much more dangerous for the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, to the Soviets' advantage that the United States should possess information on the force levels of the Soviet military establishment. One difficulty, of which the Soviets are quite well aware, is that certain types of inspection of certain types of strategic forces would make those forces highly vulnerable to surprise attack. There are, however, many possible combinations of inspection techniques and strategic forces in which the forces would not be made excessively vulnerable by suitable inspection; and they do not feel a need for information themselves, because they already have all the information they need on the strategic force levels of the United States. However, they have never thought the problem through to the point of discerning that it is, in fact, to their own interest to provide the United States with reasonably reliable information on their own strategic force levels. A simple exchange of information of this type, even in the absence of any explicit constraints on force levels, would be likely to have a highly stabilizing influence on the arms race. It is worth some intensive effort to make the Soviets aware of this fact.

One might identify the central problem currently facing the United States decision-makers as that of adjusting our own armament policy in the light of the available information on the military establishments and views of our possible opponents. Exactly the same problem would be present in an arms-control environment. The role of inspection in arms control is, primarily, to provide the information on which the requisite decisions must be based. The inspection apparatus may well be designed to discourage or deter evasions as well as detect them; decisions may well be taken in advance of the information itself, simply on the basis of an agreement to provide the requisite inspection apparatus; the personnel of the inspectorate may well have constructive functions to perform that are not directly related to their monitoring function. None of these considerations alters the fact that decisions must still be made on the basis of incomplete and possibly misleading information, though, hopefully, much better information than is presently available.

These considerations emphasize the fact that there are relations between the extent and reliability of inspection on the one hand, and our armament policy on the other. These relations need not always be in the direction of less arms in exchange for more information; it might happen that more or better information would disclose some areas in which increased effort was needed; and inspection might be used simply to monitor the state of readiness of existing forces. Apart from these possibilities, however, there is, broadly speaking, a possible trade-off between degree of inspection and required armament (and/or deployment or development of armament). The central problem associated with arms control inspection is the evaluation of this trade-off.

This problem may be broken down in three parts, as seen from the U. S. point of view. First, there is the problem of determining the purely technical efficacy of an inspection system -- what information the system definitely will get, what information the system definitely will not get, and what information it may or may not get with some degree of likelihood, all for a given degree of effort. Second, there is the problem of assessing the likelihood of various possible Soviet courses of action especially in those areas in which the inspection system would provide equivocal information or no information. Third, there is

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the problem of determining what policies and postures (including possible
arms limitations) would be appropriate in the light of the answers to the
first two problems. (Exactly the same problems would confront the Soviets.)
These three problems are not, of course, completely independent; there is
appreciable interaction among all of them. However, it is useful to employ
this breakdown for preliminary discussion; and it should be emphasized that
these problems are not different in kind whether the "inspection" consists
purely of unilateral intelligence activities or consists of the inspection
associated with very comprehensive arms-control programs, employing thou-
sands of inspectors.

In the present situation of no explicitly agreed inspection, the first two
of these problems are evaluated (in the very highest degree of secrecy) in
the Executive branch of the government, largely on the basis of information
furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency and related sources. Such policy
as emerges from the evaluation of the third problem is largely public, and is
released through Congressional hearings and other channels. These remarks
point to the fact that we do cope with the "trade-off" process at the present
time, though the efficacy and adequacy of the process are matters of much
debate. In other words, we do have some understanding of these problems in
the present environment.

When applied to any specific arms-control measure or program, or for that
matter, any armament policy differing appreciably from our present policy,
we do not have even this very imperfect understanding of the problems invol-
ved. In the particular case of a nuclear test ban, we are beginning to have
fairly good understanding of the first problem (the purely technical efficacy
of the inspection systems), although the technical information involved is
still in a state of flux. Even for the simple case of a weapons test ban,
however, evaluation of the second and third problems, which involves the full
range of military and foreign policy, is a matter of the most vigorous debate.
Most of this debate is based on inadequate understanding of the second and third
problems, in the sense that most of the participants of the debate have not yet
identified more than a small fraction of the (very complex) issues involved.
For example, the opposition of opponents in this debate is quite often based
on differing underlying assumptions about the probable nature of, and relative
desirability of, different kinds of warfare, although these underlying assump-
tions are hardly ever brought into the argument explicitly.

Some work has been done on the technical efficacy of inspection systems to
monitor the production of fissionable material. Beyond this and the nuclear-
testing case, however, virtually no information is available on any of the three
problems as associated with any arms-control measures involving explicit con-
straints on the development, production, or deployment of military forces or
weapons. A specific example may be instructive. In the case of a seismic moni-
toring network to inspect a weapon test ban, it is known that a certain number
of seismic stations in the Soviet Union, distributed in a certain way, employ-
ing certain kinds of instrumentation, and permitting a certain number of on-
site inspections per year, will yield a specified probability of detection of
an underground weapon test of specified yield and specified environmental con-
ditions. This information constitutes a reference mark in evaluating the tech-

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nical efficacy of the inspection network. No similar reference mark, or even vaguely analogous reference mark, is in any way known for inspection systems to monitor the production and deployment of ballistic missiles and military aircraft. We simply do not presently have any clear idea of the information that would or would not be obtained, or might be obtained, by any configuration of inspectors and observation techniques. In the absence of this information, it is rather difficult to assess the possible (much less the likely) courses of Soviet action in areas in which the inspection system would yield uncertain information, because we do not know what those areas are; given such massive ignorance, the determination of sensible policies is, of course, quite impossible. In short, we simply do not have a detailed understanding of the possible role of inspection in connection with arms-control measures intended to stabilize force levels of conventional strategic delivery systems. The same difficulty obtains for measures to constrain the development of deployment of space weapons, for zonal force deployment restrictions, and for most other arms-control measures that have been proposed.

Although our understanding of "inspection" by unilateral espionage in our present environment is not all that might be desired, it so far exceeds the understanding we have of the detailed role of explicit inspection in an arms-control environment, that the difference is worth some comment. The first major difference appears to reside in the fact that we do have some understanding of the technical efficacy of present information-gathering processes, i.e., both the capabilities and the limitations of these presently operative processes are known. (Much of this information is only known to policy-makers and advisors, but this is sufficient.) Similar information on most types of inspection systems has not yet been developed. The second major distinction appears to reside in the fact that there are many people who are more or less well-versed in the information appropriate to the present environment and skilled in the utilization of this information. Apart from the fact that the relevant information for arms-control inspection largely does not exist, there is no similar body of "professionals" familiar with this information and skilled in its evaluation. Both of these difficulties appear susceptible of remedy; studies of sufficient scope would yield the requisite information, and would simultaneously develop a body of people familiar with the information. It seems likely that "understanding" in this context is nearly equivalent to "familiarity".

The foregoing discussion has emphasized the similarities of arms-control inspection to the information-gathering processes employed in the absence of arms control. It is worth pointing out that there are important differences in the evaluation of the information, depending on whether there are or are not explicit, mutually agreed constraints on the armament being monitored. In the case of monitoring explicitly agreed constraints on forces, which constraints entail rather specific cooperation as well as the armament itself. (It is sometimes useful to think of arms-control inspection as useful for monitoring cooperation, which is observable, but not useful for monitoring good faith, which is not observable.) There is, therefore, a sense in which inspection of explicit constraints comes somewhat closer to monitoring intent than does simple inspection of force levels in the absence of constraints.

An example may help illustrate this last point. Let us assume that at some time the Soviets have a missile force of 200 missiles, and at some later time they

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increased this force to 250 missiles. In the first instance, if there were no explicit constraints on missile forces, the information that a 25 per cent increase had transpired would be rather difficult to evaluate. It would be highly equivocal as to what it signified about intentions. In the second instance, if there had been a specific and agreed constraint to limit missile forces to 200 missiles, the information that a 25 per cent increase had taken place would be viewed very differently, although the actual change in force level would be the same. In this latter case, we would call the increase an evasion; it would signify Soviet intention at least to discontinue the previously agreed cooperation, and might possibly suggest even more hostile intentions; and we should react very differently than in the case when no constraints were present, as, e.g., by undertaking a massive rearmament program.

The subject of evasion brings us back to the similarities of explicit arms-control inspection to "inspection" by unilateral espionage, and the "trade-off" process mentioned above. Many Americans seem to hold the view that inspection of explicit arms control must be foolproof, so that no clandestine evasion whatever is possible. This view is quite erroneous; it is the Western counterpart of the Soviet failure to perceive *their* advantages in *our* inspection of them. There is nothing at all "foolproof" about the "inspection" we presently have of the Soviet military establishment. It is utterly foolish to demand that inspection be foolproof when, first, this is impossible of attainment, and second, our current practices and postures indicate that it is not necessary. The basic problem, as mentioned above, is to try to understand the "trade-off" process. It is certainly true that this process would be easier to deal with if "foolproof" inspection were feasible; but the fact that it is not feasible should not hide the fact that we do deal with this process now and should continue to deal with it as best we may.

In particular, it is useful to think of evasion of explicit multilateral agreements as follows. Our total posture should be such that whatever gaps or uncertainties there may be in the information about our opponent's forces, they are not sufficient to hide capabilities that are likely to be disastrous. In order to enhance further the degree of credibility of our information for this purpose, i.e., to be more confident that the stated constraints are being observed, it is desirable to arrange the total posture, including force levels, degree of inspection, and possible responses to violations (such as a "rearmament reflex") so that the *risks* of evasion would outweigh the likely gains. It obviously does not require certain detection of an isolated violation in order to do this. A small, isolated evasion could not lead to any significant gains for the evader, whereas the detection of such an evasion might well lead to dangerous consequences -- such as, for example, reopening the arms race. The inspection system need only be able to detect "significant" violations. Of course, what is "significant" for this purpose will depend on the total armament posture and the context, and whether or not the inspection system would detect such evasion will depend on such factors as the scope and duration of activity required for a significant violation. Once again, we see

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that we come back to the same trade-off process identified previously.

The preceding discussion has considered the primary role of inspection. It is possible and useful to identify certain secondary effects and roles of inspection. The secondary effects of interest might be termed "irritation hazards". The operation of inspection systems may introduce political irritations in any of several ways. For example, inspection has sometimes been called "institutionalized distrust", which, in fact, it is. An irreducible minimum of irritation is likely to arise from this fact alone.

On the other hand, however, it is possible in principle to employ an inspectorate for constructive functions in such a way that the inspectorate might lead to net gains in the international climate, and to the reduction of tensions. It is possible to find cases in which the addition of relatively small increments of men and money to an inspectorate may provide relatively large gains in its constructive utility. Such examples would include: (1) the use of a network for detecting bomb tests so as to provide a permanent continuation of the International Geophysical Year; (2) the use of radar monitoring systems for missile-control purposes in connection with the peaceful exploration of space; (3) the use of inspectors of nuclear production to do radiation monitoring as a public health measure; (4) the use of inspectors of industrial production to provide industrial census information and production statistics.

I do not know whether all these examples are feasible, and they are obviously insubstantial, but they suggest an approach that should be useful. In the first instance, the use of an inspectorate for such constructive functions would provide the host country with a minor vested interest in the successful operation of the inspectorate beyond that provided by the successful implementation of the arms-control measure itself, and it would attract higher-caliber personnel to the inspectorate. These potential gains, while minor, are fairly clear. But the main motivation for employing inspection systems in this role is as a device to provide experience in the cooperative operation of constructive international services, which might tend to reduce national hostilities. It would be quite difficult to maintain continued national hostilities and conflicting national goals in the face of a continually increasing extent of international operation of constructive services and functions. The scientists, engineers, administrators, civil servants, and others who would be involved with the operation of such systems constitute important elements of the society in both the Soviet Union and the United States. The possible gains that might be obtained from this potential role of inspection are therefore very large. On the other hand, of course, one cannot be confident that these gains would, in fact, be achieved.

Note, added 21 December 1960: The foregoing paper, written in August 1960, was originally intended only for preliminary discussion. I am especially indebted to Lewis Bohn and Herman Kahn for such discussion; some independent papers, embodying similar notions, by John Phelps have also been helpful. It did not prove possible, however, to produce a final version incorporating the results of these discussions, or other and later ideas on the subject, in time for inclusion in this collection. I owe apologies to Bohn and Kahn (at least) for this fact.

D. G. B.

252

INFORMATION AND ARMS CONTROLS

-- John B. Phelps

In this short paper I shall take the view that, in a fairly
fundamental sense, the failure to make major progress in arrest-
ing the arms race in the postwar years may be considered to stem
from a lack of understanding on both sides of the nature and role
of information in relation to arms controls. This view, somewhat
in the manner of a fruitful hypothesis in the sciences, seems to
illuminate a variety of phenomena and to provide some valuable
insights. I shall try to illustrate the usefulness of the infor-
mation viewpoint by touching briefly on the role of inspection and
of disarmament itself, and I shall suggest some ways in which
progress seems possible if a few misconceptions can be removed and
a better common understanding achieved. The kind of understanding
I wish to emphasize does not require prolonged negotiations, nor a
fortuitous drop in international tensions, nor major concessions
by either side; it has, I think, the great advantage of requiring
mainly a reasonable amount of homework by each side.

I

The present East-West dispute over whether disarmament or
inspection should in effect come first illustrates one aspect of
the dilemma of information and arms controls. The West emphasizes
inspection and the necessity of assembling detailed information on
existing forces and weapons before significant disarmament takes
place. The Soviet government stresses the military intelligence
advantages to the West if inspection precedes disarmament. It
recommends instead that some disarmament take place first as a
demonstration of good faith and that inspection and controls follow.
But the West, skeptical of Soviet intentions, is at this point
firmly committed to the "no disarmament without foolproof inspec-
tion" position. So the situation stands.

There is some obvious justification for each side's position.
It is true that the West would gain a great deal of militarily
valuable information in an initial inspection of Communist forces.
Because the West is a relatively "open" society, its relative infor-
mation gain would be much greater if approximately equally stringent
inspection were applied in each direction. On the other hand, if
orderly disarmament is to take place over a period of time and in
a manner which prevents either side from gaining an advantage by
cheating, a verified inventory of each side's original forces seems
to be a very reasonable first step.

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It can usefully be argued that what each side seems to lack most in this situation is an adequate understanding of its own and the other side's information requirements. The Western governments, intent on preventing any cheating by the Soviet Union, demand excessively high confidence levels of an inspection system. In the absence of reassuring information from other sources they are prone to assume the worst about Communist intentions. The point here is not that the Western stand is too rigid -- although I, for one, think it is -- but that too much emphasis is placed on and too much is asked of only one source of information, namely an inspection system tailored to more or less particular technical requirements. The Western governments also apparently fail to see the value of some small first steps in the direction of disarmament as a means of furnishing to the Soviets some genuinely reassuring information about Western intentions. These steps, however small, would be looked upon by most U.S. leaders not as demonstrations or reassurances but as substantive concessions, and as such they are unacceptable.

The Soviets on their part fail to comprehend the legitimate Western fears which arise from relatively great ignorance about military activities and preparations in the Soviet Union. These fears account for, for instance, a particular Western interest in surprise attack warning (or "unwarning") information. To a significant degree the lack of "openness" in Soviet society and the absence of a variety and depth of reassuring information flowing to the West tends understandably to stiffen the Western insistence on specially designed inspection systems.

The present disarmament deadlock leads us to consider the role of disarmament and inspection -- presumably two simple and well-established concepts -- from the standpoint of information.

It is the information which is fundamental and most important. What each side really needs, after all, is enough reliable reassuring information about the possible actions of the other side. These actions are determined jointly by the other side's intentions and its capabilities. Since intentions are not ordinarily verifiable by inspection or other means, the next best thing is to remove the means for mischief or aggression. Ordinarily and traditionally this means disarmament. Viewed in this light, disarmament is only one way of furnishing a worried potential enemy with an assurance that he is not going to be hurt. I suggest that this view of disarmament, as a means rather than an end, greatly facilitates the thoughtful consideration of an enlarged spectrum of possible first steps for resolving the dilemma of the arms race.

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It can of course be argued that disarmament is the most reliable and most convincing kind of reassuring information. I happen to believe that the ultimate goal toward which we must work is the substantial elimination of national armaments. But disarmament is not necessarily the only means of advancing or maintaining peace and security among nations. If it were somehow possible, through physical or "psychological" inspection or other means, to provide a very high degree of permanent assurance that weapons, even though stockpiled by nations as a means of meeting perceived threats, would never be used for aggression, the world could continue to exist in a reasonably satisfactory way.

Information about the military capabilities and intentions of one nation may be either helpful or harmful, depending on its nature and the use to which it is put by other nations. From the viewpoint of stabilized deterrence, we say that the information is either stabilizing or destabilizing. Stabilizing or helpful information is information which facilitates effective arms controls or disarmament. Thus if the West, for instance, knows reliably that the number of Soviet long-range missiles does not exceed some maximum number, it may feel reassured enough to reduce its own forces. (At the present time this reduction might be made in the name of economy, but it would still be a reduction.) But if the West also knows the location of all the operational Soviet missiles accurately enough to destroy most of them in a first strike, this information is destabilizing and a reason for legitimate concern on the part of the Soviets.

These arguments, in terms of stabilizing and destabilizing information, are probably familiar and I shall not elaborate on them here. But they point up both the necessity and the difficulties of thinking through possible arms control schemes from the standpoint of information exchanges. There are frequently some very complex questions involved in determining whether a particular type of information involved in a proposed arms control arrangement is, on balance and in the long run, stabilizing or destabilizing.

It is generally assumed that inspection will accompany disarmament. A good deal of effort has already been devoted to studying the technical problems of inspection, particularly the problems of nuclear test detection. But it is not always clear, when one considers the question carefully, what the precise role of the inspection and the information it provides should be. In the United States, there are at least two distinguishable views. One view, probably

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reflected in most statements by national leaders, considers inspection as an essential means of insuring compliance with international disarmament agreements. It is more or less implicit in this view that inspection and disarmament will begin at about the same time, that each will continue as long as the other does, and that there will be a kind of proportionality between the degree of inspection and the degree of disarmament possible at any time.

There are some very desirable features in this "insured-compliance" view of inspection. The role of inspection is easily understood and related to broadly accepted ideas of the desirability of detecting wrongdoing. Negotiators can start with some agreement on principles and feel somewhat less obliged to rationalize all their proposals for the watching world. Opportunities for propaganda and accusations may be minimized. Inspection can, at least in principle, be applied equally to all nations, and the development with time of international, as opposed to national, security concepts may be facilitated.

But the insured-compliance role of inspection has drawbacks. The inspection is largely a negative function, aimed only at detecting violations, and its enforcement may disturb the inspected country in many ways. The close binding together of inspection and arms controls may lead to a fragile package. Small disturbances in the inspection process or even normal technological progress could bring about the collapse of the whole arms control structure, although this danger could hopefully be reduced by some form of built-in adjustment. And, as the present nuclear test ban situation illustrates, national leaders who assume the worst about the intentions of other nations may demand of the inspection system excessively high confidence levels.

A second view of the role of inspection, generally of more recent origin and linked more with "arms controls" than with "disarmament," considers the aim of inspection to be the improvement of information about the military resources and alternatives of a possible enemy, with the intent to use this information to adjust appropriately one's own military establishment and policies. This view seems to have several points in its favor. For one thing, it may make some sense operationally. It now seems likely that progress toward the ultimate goal of disarmament will involve in the next few years at least some emphasis on a stabilized deterrent balance. Many of our present concepts of national (military) security will still prevail. Each nation will probably, in the last analysis, judge the desirability and stability of the deterrent balance from the standpoint of its own security. The judgment will be made by national leaders who will have no logical reason to separate information received from an arms control inspection system from ordinary intelligence or other information. And, if national leaders are slow to adjust their thinking on security to internationally-oriented concepts, the

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notion of arms control inspection as a supplement to national
intelligence resources may be a kind of initial selling point.

But this 'military-information-supplementing' view of the role
of inspection has some drawbacks. A most obvious disadvantage is
that its ennunciation in negotiations would lend credibility to
the Soviet fear that most Western inspection proposals are really
put forward in the interest of military intelligence. A major
obstacle to the successful negotiation of arms control agreements
is the requirement that each side have a satisfactory understanding
of the other's security problems. The military-information-supple-
menting view of inspection may compound this problem by requiring of
Western and Communist negotiators a degree of sophistication suffi-
cient to permit consideration of an inspection system in relation to
each other's intelligence deficiencies. As of the present, this is
probably asking too much.

II

A sufficient flow of reassuring information from one nation to
another is an absolutely essential feature of any international arms
control system. Starting from this proposition with its emphasis
on reassuring information, we are led to some useful insights on
the nature of the arms race and some possible means for slowing it
down.

First of all, it is important to note that a substantial amount
of reassuring information already passes between East and West.
Exchanges of people, publications, diplomatic missions, and so on,
and the reports of "neutrals," provide a quantity of information
we ordinarily do not stop to consider. It is of course no secret
that espionage activities on both sides are aimed at getting certain
kinds of information not otherwise available. Some information --
news of the development of new weapons, for instance -- is certainly
not reassuring information. But taking all the information together,
leaders on each side are able to sketch an over-all picture of what
the other side is doing and to shape their policies accordingly. The
point is that the information which now passes between East and West
is, on balance, reassuring, and it is a major brake on a really
unlimited arms race. If each side lived in nearly complete ignorance
of what the other side was up to, the world would be in a state of
maximum insecurity and nations would probably be working desperately
to build up armaments to meet the maximum imaginable threats to
their security. It is safe to say that on the basis of experience
so far all the information each side has about the other, including
intelligence information, has been far more stabilizing than destabil-
lizing. This is a very simple but probably valid argument for an
across-the-board increase in information flow.

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There is good empirical evidence to support the proposition that a nation will be willing to limit its arms if it has some reassuring information about the activity of its potential enemies. Historically, nations not bent on aggression in the first place have armed or disarmed in response to the threats or lack of threats they perceived to their security. We in the United States have recently seen a particularly timely example of this phenomenon. Until about last May, defense officials of the Eisenhower administration were under fairly vigorous partisan attack for not pushing U.S. strategic weapons development at a faster pace. Secretary of Defense Gates was particularly criticized for gearing the U.S. program to his estimate of Soviet "intentions" instead of Soviet "capabilities." Following the disclosure of the U-2 overflights, it was generally assumed that the administration actually had a fairly reliable idea of, among other things, Soviet missile deployment and was justified in gauging Soviet intentions on that basis. Criticisms of the administration policy, at least until the recent election campaign, became notably less vigorous and the defense officials were occasionally commended for their wisdom in heeding reassuring (intelligence) information.

Certainly this information on what the Soviet Union was doing was not the only determinant of U.S. policy, and this is a less than ideal example of arms control. Yet limited reassuring information -- very limited in comparison with what would be available in almost any arms control agreement -- probably did have a decisive influence. From this standpoint the U-2 overflights, however reprehensible they may have been on legal grounds, were of direct benefit to the security of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Unfortunately and in spite of some conspicuous postwar breakdowns, intelligence information -- secret, pieced together from sources of varying reliability, and certainly limited -- is still regarded by many U.S. leaders as more believable and somehow less suspect than the sort of more reliable and complete information that might be available in an arms control agreement. We are dealing here with the general process by which information is used to shape national policy. This process is probably not very clear in any real government. But I suggest that there may be a tendency to apply a sort of double standard for information: information which is obtained through unilateral intelligence and other means is more readily acceptable in policy formulation than is information from an arms control inspection system. In the U.S., this double standard seems to be illustrated on the one hand by the U-2 overflight instance and on the other hand by the demand for "foolproof" inspection of a nuclear test ban. It seems that a significant step forward would be made if policymakers could be led to evaluate by a single yardstick all the information which is at their disposal in guiding national policies.

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A most important aim in the design of all arms control systems, formal or informal, should be to maximize by all possible means the flow of reassuring information among nations. Various types of inspection and other techniques for increasing the information flow should be considered in this light. It is perhaps unfortunate that so much emphasis has been placed on the technical problems of inspection without more thorough and thoughtful consideration of the role of inspection in relation to other sources of information and the objectives of arms controls. Many types of inspection seem likely to have "irritation hazards" for the inspected nation. These types of inspection should be planned only when careful examination of all the information which may be available indicates that they will be necessary to the functioning of the arms controls.

There are some large and almost completely unexplored research problems involved in the interrelationship of information and arms controls. There is the question of how various types of information can be brought together to satisfy the information requirements of the arms controls in a manner which is least objectionable to the participating countries. Reassuring information may come from: exchanges of people and various groups of people; exchanges of papers and publications; meetings and conferences; diplomatic negotiations; "neutrals," in various ways; public reporting; reconnaissance satellites; overflights by aircraft; seismographs; radars, infrared, and other sensory devices; industrial inspection, including on-the-spot physical inspection of facilities; inspection of fiscal records and government budgets; inspection of input-output economic data; personnel monitoring; "psychological inspection" with all its variants; inspection of ports, airfields, railroad stations, etc; an international "secret service"; controls on research and development; various kinds of inspection by sampling; unilateral espionage; and so on. Clearly the list is very long. We have as yet little real idea of how much information of use in an arms control context can be obtained by most of these means. All I can do here is point to the research problems.

Some thoughtful attention to realistic information requirements may suggest ways in which each side can work to convince the other that it is not cheating in an arms control agreement. This involves but is not limited to the idea of "self-inspection." One side in arms control negotiations should have the option of suggesting ways in which it might satisfy the (sensibly formulated) information requirements of the other side. It would be very desirable to separate as far as possible the concept of information in relation to arms controls from the troublesome police functions usually associated with inspection. This will take some realignment of our present thinking.

A kind of extremely valuable flexibility in policy and action may be achieved if national leaders can be brought to accept the idea that the degree of arms control or disarmament to which a nation

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can prudently commit itself depends on the totality of the reassuring information it has. Two conspicuous advantages of this "total-reassuring-information" view come to mind.

There is now going on in the United States a great deal of discussion of the relative merits of working for arms controls through formal, negotiated agreements as has been the tradition, or through planned, hopefully reciprocated, unilateral actions. Unilateral actions will frequently take the form of demonstrations of non-aggressive intent. Inspection in some form will be a concomitant of most negotiated agreements. But both of these approaches will add to the total amount of reassuring information and together they offer a wide spectrum of alternatives and combinations.

Another current debate centers around the relative desirability of "openness" compared with negotiated, enforced inspection procedures. Both approaches aim essentially at providing needed information and, if an emphasis on the whole of the reassuring information as the main determinant of arms control policy is maintained, the two approaches can be made to supplement each other very advantageously.

2 November 1960

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authoritative statements of their positions. SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline Station, Massachusetts

A Suggestion for Phased, Proportional Disarmament

J. Salerno

(6 September 1960)

In this note, a rudimentary scheme is suggested that permits two adversaries, characterised by mutual distrust, to disarm in a proportional manner while not seriously disadvantaging either side. Furthermore, an attempt is made to minimize inspection that might initially be regarded as espionage although the success of the plan does presuppose that each party has already in hand a moderately good knowledge of the other's military arsenal. A major aspect of the proposal is a mathematization of the arms inventory determination that seeks to minimize the amount of detailed negotiation needed to effect the disarmament plan.

Briefly, the plan consists of four steps.

1. The total number of offensive units (ou) possessed by the Soviet Union is determined as

$$V_{su} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} N_{i}v_{i}$$

where $N_i$ is the number of item i in the inventory as declared by the Soviet Union and the $v_i$ is the value ascribed to item i by the United States. There will be no inspection to verify $N_i$. However, the Soviet Union would be required to give a crude indication of the location of critical elements such as missiles, nuclear weapons, aircraft, etc. The location should be adequate enough to make spot inspection feasible but not so good as to increase appreciably the vulnerability of the item declared.

2. If the disarmament is to be accomplished in T time increments and if it has been agreed that each country at the end of disarming period will be allowed to have $V_o$ ou, then at the beginning of each disarming period the Soviet Union will deliver to a central depot on its own territory $(V_{su} - V_o)/T$ ou, the composition of which will be determined by the Soviet Union. This depot will have enough UN personnel to be able to determine continuously the pool inventory and to be able to transmit the information to UN headquarters continuously.

3. Since point (1) above did not permit any verification inspection of $N_i$, and since the probability is good that $N_i$ may not be accurately reported, we suggest that the United States can declare, before reductions actually start, that the Soviet Union really has $M_i$ more item i than declared, and what's more these can be found

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in the following specified places. A search by a suitable inspection team
will now be permitted to test the United States assertion with the proviso
that if the United States is correct, the Soviet Union will be credited with.
(N₁+M₁+P₁) of item i, and if the United States has been unduly suspicious,
the United States will be credited with a number of item i that is P'₁
greater than the number it declared. Since the effect of increasing the
number of item i in the inventory beyond the true value (this is the point
of P₁, punishment points in kind) is to force a more rapid disarmament
relative to the other country, each country has a vital interest in not being
caught lying or in not being unduly suspicious. P₁ and P'₁ should be left
negotiation with respect to P₁ and P'₁ would very likely reflect the estimate
of each country of

1) The extent and value of its intelligence about the arsenal of the other country (A country having poor intelligence would argue for high P₁ low P'₁.),

11) How much the other side can be expected to cheat by low declarations (A country expecting the other side to declare low would probably want to make P₁ high and P'₁ low.),

111) How much the declarer plans to cheat by low declarations (A country planning to do extensive cheating would want to make P₁ low and P'₁ high.),

iv) How much the other side will try to use declared suspicion as a technique for "legal" espionage (A country that believed this whole plan was just a ruse to do "legal" spying would want to set P'i much higher than P_i.),

In other words, the negotiations on P and P' would be the place where each
country would attempt to equalize its position or at least to reduce any un
desirable dissymmetries between the two sides.

(3. A variation on point 3 that may be better in that it requires less inspection and penalizes lying more heavily is the following. The United States declare that on the basis of its estimates of the Soviet Union inventory, the presence increment of reduction in item i should be (Mᵢ+Nᵢ)/T rather than Nᵢ/T. Now the United States uses its inspection rights to verify Mᵢ/T rather than Mᵢ. This method requires less inspection and less a priori knowledge of the Soviet Union inventory, while in effect penalizing lying more heavily than suspiciously. This conclusion is suggested by at least five considerations.

1) It is easier to find M₁/T undeclared weapons than it is to find M₁ weapons.

11) A valuable indication of the accuracy of United States suspicions may be given by the Soviet Union composition of its disarmament increment.

111) If the United States has enough information to prove the non-declaration of M₁ weapons, it loses nothing by taking note of M₁/T of them at each increment. However, if the United States indicates piecemeal its knowledge of low Soviet Union declarations, the Soviet Union cannot make long-range plans based on the assumption that it has deceived the United States into believing the low declarations. Compare this with the fact that there is no rush to arrest a spy once you know he is spying; he is more valuable loose than imprisoned, up to a point.

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iv) The United States may gain information after the plan starts. Under the M₁/T idea, one can take advantage of such new information.

v) By only having to disprove a low declaration to the extent of M₁/T rather than M₁, the United States doesn't give the other side as accurate an idea of its intelligence.)

4. A potential source of difficulty in paragraph 3 arises if each one of item 1 is not serially marked. To meet this objection, the United States would supply the Soviet Union with non-counterfeitable, serially numbered tags. One way, suggested by Dr. Frisch, of minimizing counterfeiting of tags is to let each tag consist of polished metal, a photomicrograph of which is retained by the country issuing the tag. To reduce the possibility of moving tags, the tag-issuing country can require of the other country a photomicrograph of adjacent pieces of the tag and the material that was tagged.

The four points given above have been stated in terms of Soviet Union disarming; completely parallel points are intended with the United States disarming.

There are a few comments about this plan that come to mind immediately.

a. An implicit assumption of this suggested scheme is that both the Soviet Union and the United States have an over-kill capacity. If, in fact, one country does not really have this capability, the plan exposes that fact, thereby reducing the possibility of negotiating the plan.

b. Item (3) above presupposes our intelligence of the Soviet Union is quite good. If, in fact, this is not so, we may not have a good lever by which to get an honest declaration of N₁ without a good deal of detailed inspection or a suitable ratio of P₁ to P'₁.

c. To avoid acrimonious discussions about when item 1 is not item 1, each item 1 should be sufficiently well defined so that the other fellow can be frequently given the benefit of the doubt without jeopardizing ourselves unduly.

d. The lack of inspection in paragraph (1) has the added advantage that each party has given information about the number of weapons but no dangerous information about their location. For nations having over-kill capability, this should mean that no one has become more vulnerable because of the inventory declarations.

e. In order to give this suggestion a good workout, I would suggest a number of war games, the first of which would assume perfectly honest declarations. If the proposal does not have merit under this assumption, the long-range prospects for it are dim. If it meets this minimal test, I would suggest that further war games be played with the amount of intelligence possessed by each side used as parameters. These latter games should seek to determine the "tolerable" amount of cheating for various amounts of intelligence.

JS:kw/vf

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# PHASING OF ARMS CONTROLS: THE TERRITORIAL METHOD

By Louis B. Sohn*

## I. Introduction

By the end of the 1950's, the Western Powers and the Soviet Union had come quite close together on the goal of general and complete disarmament and on the main components of a disarmament plan. They continue, however, to disagree on the steps which should be taken at various stages, and on the amount of supervision needed at each stage to ensure that both sides fulfill their obligations in good faith. In particular, they disagree about both the measures of disarmament and the controls which should be introduced in the all-important first stage.

The Western proposals stress the need for strict controls from the very beginning, while the Soviet proposals envisage limited controls at the beginning which would grow into full controls only at the end of the disarmament process. The principal current plans envisage a reduction of armaments by stages, either by percentages (by 10, 25 or 33 per cent in each stage) or down to specified figures (e.g., to 2,100,000 in the first stage, to 1,700,000 in the second stage, etc.). This approach requires, according to the Western proposals, almost complete control over the whole territory of the participants, even in the early stages. The Soviet bloc objects that in these plans the amount of control is not proportionate to the amount of disarmament and that, especially in the beginning, 90 per cent of controls would accompany 10 per cent of disarmament. On the other hand, the idea that only limited controls will accompany the crucial early stages of arms reduction is unacceptable to the West.

It seems desirable, therefore, to devise a compromise solution in which disarmament and controls would go hand in hand. Such a solution might, for instance, combine the present quantitative approach with a territorial one. If this method were adopted, each cut in armaments would be accompanied with the extension of controls to a specified part of a nation's territory, the size of the controlled territory growing in proportion to the amount of the arms reduction.

* This paper is based on the author's privately circulated memorandum on "Territorial Disarmament" of 2 November 1959, a mimeographed memorandum on "Disarmament through Territorial Demilitarization" of 15 December 1959, and an article on "Problems of Arms Control" published in the Harvard Law Record on 4 February 1960. See also J. B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems", Daedalus, Fall, 1960, p. 915, at 930. Similar ideas are contained in a mimeographed paper by Melvin Mooney on "Total Disarmament by Territorial Divisions", circulated in February 1960.

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In this connection one would have to distinguish, of course, between two types of controls: continuous on-the-spot controls over certain activities or establishments and unrestricted inspection by mobile inspection teams looking for clandestine activities in violation of the disarmament agreement. The Soviet Union has accepted the principle of fixed control teams at military bases, airfields, ports, launching sites, and at factories engaged in the production of weapons, missiles and fissionable materials. Such controls would be introduced as soon as disarmament steps relating to these establishments would come into effect. On the other hand, the Soviet Union objects to opening all her territory to roaming inspection teams authorized to go anywhere. Rightly or wrongly, she believes that such teams might be used for espionage purposes; only when all armaments have been abolished and there are no longer any military secrets, the Soviet Union would be willing to allow complete freedom of inspection.

The territorial method of arms control would apply only to the mobile component of the inspection system. It would be in addition to the fixed teams monitoring important military installations and crucial production facilities.

The proposals made here must be distinguished from other proposals based on territorial concepts. It may be noted, for instance, that during the discussions on measures against surprise attacks, the United States has made proposals for aerial inspection and other controls over specified territories of the United States and of the NATO countries, on the one hand, and of the Soviet Union and other members of the Soviet bloc, on the other hand. The Soviet Union rejected these proposals on the ground that they envisaged inspection without disarmament. This objection would not apply, however, to a proposal which would contemplate simultaneous disarmament and control steps, starting in one part of a nation's territory and extending gradually to other parts.

Territorial limitations have also been envisaged in various proposals for disengagement, especially in those relating to disarmament zones in Central Europe. They were rejected principally on the grounds of discrimination against Germany and of perpetuating the division of Germany. These objections could not be raised with respect to proposals which would be applicable equally to all States.

The suggested method of progressive territorial demilitarization and control cannot be discriminatory; it must apply equally to all States. But to simplify the explanation of this approach, the following analysis will be confined primarily to the United States and the Soviet Union. Once an equitable method is developed for them, it should not be too difficult to apply it to other States as well.

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## II. Application of the Territorial Method to the United States and the Soviet Union

There are various ways of approaching the question of territorial disarmament and control and their relative merits need to be considered carefully. The following example of practical operation of this method should be considered merely as an illustration, and various details can easily be modified if they should prove too difficult from the technical or political point of view.

To simplify the problem, let us assume that there is an agreement to introduce certain disarmament and control measures over a six-year period, i.e., a period 50 per cent longer than the four-year period recently proposed by the Soviet Union. In such a case, the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union would be divided into six regions, and each year the disarmament measures and the accompanying controls would be introduced to one of these six regions. At the end of the six years all the territory of both sides would be covered, all the agreed disarmament measures would be executed and there would no longer be any limitations on controls.

Before the beginning of the first year of arms control, each country would submit to the international control agency two lists, prepared in accordance with an agreed questionnaire. One list would contain an enumeration of all the military installations and production facilities which would be subject to continuous supervision by fixed inspection teams. A second list would contain, in the first place, the national totals of various armaments, installations and production facilities which are subject to arms controls, and, in the second place, regional totals of these objects of control. To test the accuracy of the lists, it will not be necessary to check every item on them or to inspect every nook and cranny; it will be sufficient to inspect thoroughly one part of the territory and to check the accuracy of those items on the list which may be found in that territory.

It may be expected that each nation would delimit the regions in such a way that they would contain a more or less equal amount of armaments and other objects of control. The choice of the region to be made subject to disarmament and control in a particular year would be in the hands of the international agency (or of the other party to the disarmament treaty) and the nation concerned would not know in advance which region would be chosen. Consequently, if a nation should put a disproportionate number of its armaments in a particular region and should not report all of them in the preliminary list, its deception would be easily discovered if that region should be chosen as one of the first areas to be thoroughly inspected. This deception would bring with it its own punishment, as the nation concerned would have to make a larger cut in its military forces and armaments in the region in order to retain only one-sixth of the national total of the amount of residual armaments permitted by the disarmament agreement in each disarmed region.

6

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Even before the choice of the region to be disarmed and inspected, inspection teams would be stationed in all places subject to continuous inspection. In order to prevent last-minute shifts between regions, inspection teams would also be stationed, at the beginning of each year, temporarily on the borders between regions, at principal rail and road centers and at airfields. After a region has been selected, the inspection teams on the boundaries of the selected region would remain there, but all the other teams would be withdrawn from the boundaries of other regions and would aid in the inspection of the selected region.

Immediately after the selection, the nation concerned would submit a detailed list of armaments and other objects of control located in the selected region, the totals of which should not differ from the general list submitted in advance. Mobile inspection teams would be entitled to check the accuracy of the list and to investigate whether any non-listed control objects are located in the region. They would also supervise the actual process of disarmament within the region, and would see to it that by the end of the year armaments, installations and production facilities within the region would be reduced to the number agreed to in the disarmament agreement.

This process would be repeated in the second year with respect to a second region, and so on until all the territories of both sides would become subject to random inspections and all armaments, etc., would be reduced to agreed treaty limits.

### III. Application of the Territorial Method to Other States

The areas of other countries would be similarly divided into six zones, and the zones subject to disarmament and control would be chosen each year by the international control agency. Even if there should be some territories which have been partly demilitarized at an earlier stage of the disarmament process, they would have to be further disarmed in accordance with these proposals. It is possible, however, that the process of disarmament might proceed faster in some parts of the world than in others, and with the consent of all the States in a particular area, it might be feasible to complete disarmament of that area prior to other areas, thus permitting a more efficient use of the international inspection teams and their better training for the more difficult task in other areas.

In conclusion, it seems that the territorial method of arms control is more practicable than some of the other methods previously proposed, as it permits gradual extension of random inspections in proportion to the progress in actual disarmament. If it is combined with fixed controls over the principal military installations and production facilities, it should provide suffi-

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SEMINAR: Role of International Agencies; Legal Problems

SPEAKERS: Roger Fisher, David Cavers

Remarks by Roger Fisher

Arms Control is the process of applying limits (i.e. laws) and hence pro-
cedures used in domestic law might provide insights into the most effect-
ive methods of arms control. Many rules applicable to governments are
unenforceable just as international agreements are unenforceable. For
example, government contracts and the Constitution cannot be enforced a-
gainst the government. Unenforceable laws, however, may be significant
since in many cases, as in the case of the Constitution, they have effective-
ly the force of law and also serve as a guide for action.

Treaties generally have been conceived of as a substitute for statutes, but the need for restraint may not imply the need for precise written limitations. Many common law restraints, for example, including disorderly conduct, are purposely vague and are more effective precisely because they are vague. Therefore demonstrated unilateral restraint on both sides is a more promising method than negotiated international treaties for developing a system of arms control. There are a number of difficulties with the treaty route which are as follows:

(1) It is a long, hard and difficult process to negotiate a treaty.

(2) As Bob Bowie has pointed out, an arms control treaty would have to be terminable at will and therefore is not more of a commitment than a unilateral declaration.

(3) An agreement on a treaty is very difficult to define precisely since the problem would be to define what one is not going to do. For example, to draft a treaty to close down an American base in Turkey would involve many legal complications and it would probably be impossible to devise a treaty which would be effective. However, it would be very easy for the United States just to close down the base unilaterally and to make it quite clear to the Russians that we were in fact closing down the base.

(4) In the bargaining process to negotiate a treaty one "gives up something" and this produces the danger of a charge of appeasement being leveled against the government carrying on the negotiations.

(5) If a treaty were signed, military pressure would force the United States up to the edge of the treaty and perhaps around it (as in the automobile speeding example analogy). Each side would try to be as strong as it could without violating the treaty. On the other hand, with a unilateral declaration, where the rules were not spelled out precisely the tendency would be to be very cautious in order to convince the other side that you were in fact conducting an arms control operation.

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(6) A treaty will always fall short of what it negotiated and hence both sides must demand more than they want creating additional complications since in fact what is accomplished is not what each side promises to do, nor what each side agrees to inspect, but rather what each side can in fact inspect and discovers the other side is actually doing.

There are, however, several advantages of the treaty process which should be noted. They are:

(1) Treaty negotiations indicate precisely what bothers the other country, and suggests what can be done to alleviate tensions.

(2) The writing of a treaty defines precisely the conduct which is being carried on or not carried on.

(3) A treaty has its own momentum and is likely to be obeyed within each country after it is signed.

However, the method of unilateral demonstrated restraint promises to be most effective in developing arms control. This process is very similar to the process by which wars are kept limited by unilateral restraints on each side. It was also practiced during the Second World War as, for example, when the United States flew weather planes without bombs over Japan and the Japanese did not attack the planes.

Finally, at the present time both sides carry on a series of unilateral arms control acts by not doing those things. For example, neither side has a large civil defense program. Acquiring or not acquiring a military system is part of the same process, that is, one does not arm in terms of one process and disarm in terms of another. Rather every decision to do or not to do something is part of the same process. The reasons to arm and disarm are the same ones, the desire to reduce the likelihood of war, or the danger of losing a war.

The problem for the United States is to decide what it can do to alleviate tensions and what things it can leave undone which would serve to reduce tensions. For example, the United States might announce that it would not send up any nuclear warheads in satellites and invite in the Soviet Union to see that the United States was carrying on the activities that it promised. In this way the United States could define the terms of inspection which it considered adequate and take the action unilaterally. Vague rules of this kind are better particularly if they are inspectable as this one would be.

It should be kept in mind that it is not possible to permanently cripple the abilities of either country to fight a big war. Arms Control Agreements could only limit the ability to fight the big war or to keep small wars from becoming big ones, or keep small wars from starting at all.

**Hadley** asked when the process of unilateral action would work in prompting an Arms Control Agreement. **Fisher** replied that it will work whenever there is a community of interest and he pointed out that where a treaty is possible a unilateral declaration is much more likely to be effective and much more likely to take place.

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**Feld** argued that unilateral action would only be taken when the subject was a relatively trivial one. He asked whether it would be possible to get near to total disarmament through a series of unilateral steps. **Fisher** replied that it may in fact be easier to get down to their levels of armament by unilateral steps. He pointed out that it would be far easier to cut the defense budget by unilateral action than to try to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union reducing defense budgets. **Smithies** pointed out that the method might be effective for small steps even down to total disarmament but clearly could not be used for a big jump to total disarmament as a negotiated treaty might be.

### Remarks by Don Brennan

It is possible in principle and perhaps in practice to structure treaties to avoid difficulties. Any arms control system should provide a mechanism such as a Security Adjudication Board to make proposals as to how agreements should be modified in case of changes in technology. Suppose we follow Barber's idea of retaining some specified amount of hardened Minutemen on the assumption that the Russians had only one-half mile c.e.p. But, in the course of arriving at an agreement with the Russians on this plan we discover that they actually have a one-tenth mile c.e.p. Several options would then be open for the S.A.B. to suggest:

(1) that the Russians alter their guidance system so as to increase their c.e.p. or

(2) that Polaris be added to the Minuteman in order to overcome the Russian technological advance.

The problem is to arrange matters so that the Board would be able to implement changes of some substance but not too much so. For example, it could not raise a 2 million man international security force.

**Schelling** made two comments: the first was that taking a unilateral step is a starting-up device to get off dead centre and as such has much to recommend it. The second point was that the more that coordination is required the more it is practical to have written agreements. He then described the collective bargaining agreements used in industry and pointed out that they are usually very detailed. But very important things are left out like starting a fire if the agreement fails. These unwritten restrictions usually apply to weapons of a vicious and destructive nature and the assumption is made by both sides that neither will engage in such activities. On the other hand, arms control agreements deal explicitly with destructive things that will be in the form of denials. It would be impossible to list them all but rather those will be listed that one might be expected to do if it were not explicitly noted that they would not be done. Obviously, it is harder to draw a line here.

**Smithies** drew the analogy between the European common market and treaty agreements in arms control. He felt that European common market has resulted in much more liberal trade agreements than unilateral action could - that the common market people created an aura that it was good to belong to the "club" and that the members would be reluctant to tear up the agreement.

**Halperin** commented that it would be better not to set up formal mechanisms that the nations will find their own way out of a particular situation as it arises. In response, **Brennan** stated that Larson has found that the

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most flexible treaties had the better chance of working out. Feld stated the only way you can sustain things like the test moratorium is by continuous negotiation. Fisher said that a Security Adjudication Board is good for working out the communication process just as treaty conferences do, but negotiating a treaty is not the best means of communicating. Rather, inviting them to attend a meeting to show them something is better than to call a meeting to get them to agree to do something. And, in addition, it is better propaganda to do something than to propose something. On the other hand, you can tie your hands just as much by a unilateral statement as you do by a treaty. You can send it around and file it with the UN and thereby commit yourself irrefutably; but you can start the process of restraint by simply doing it and defining what you do clearly. This puts great pressure on the other side. Luce asked to what extent is symmetry needed in this process of unwritten actions. Fisher replied it is precisely in non-symmetrical situations that it is easier to carry out these actions. For example, if we can agree not to fly over 10,000 feet and Russia agrees not to require passes to go into Berlin, we have worked out a tacit unsymmetrical agreement. It is precisely when you try to do symmetrical things that you have to define exactly what you are going to do and run into difficulty.

## Remarks by David Cavers

With the arms race going on as it has been, it would be very difficult to bring about Roger Fisher's plan, but I am more optimistic about this happening than our entering into treaty agreements.

In the postwar talks, the Russians have always insisted that an agreement in principle first be adopted, and the United States and the British have required that the technical problems be resolved first. This reflects two different styles of legal approach. American legal agreements are vastly more detailed than those of the Continent.

I wonder whether we are not reaching the point where it would be wise to work out agreements in principle before trying to implement them. It is difficult to work out such agreements that can be properly interpreted, but it is conceivable that this can be done. Against this is the hazard of embarrassment we run if we enter into such an agreement and the whole negotiation on implementation collapses. Agreement in principle has also been opposed on the grounds that it would relax our effort in the arms race. That is a risk I would view with some equanimity. Part of the problem is that we have not ourselves made up our minds on the question of principle. An enforceable agreement is something we may be more likely to get at a time when, as a result of relaxation of tensions, we no longer needed it. General agreements on principle may make unilateral actions as well as treaties easier to put into effect. Gewirtz commented that the process of unilateral actions had still another advantage over formal treaty procedures in that it set up the proper psychological milieu which is more favorable to moving forward on arms control steps.

This is on the assumption, of course, that such unilateral actions are made in good faith and not simply for propaganda purposes. It would be important to have a series of such steps outlined in advance so that the atmosphere can be continually improved as each of the steps is made.

## PARTICIPANTS:

<table><tr><td>J. Phelps</td><td>T. Schelling</td><td>R. Coward</td></tr><tr><td>A. Hadley</td><td>D. Cavers</td><td>D. Brennan</td></tr><tr><td>M. Gewirtz</td><td>R. Luce</td><td>N. Hoepli</td></tr><tr><td>B. Feld</td><td>A. Barber</td><td>M. Halperin</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>A. Smithies</td><td>R. Fisher</td></tr></table>

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CONSTRUCTING RULES THAT AFFECT GOVERNMENTS

Roger Fisher

An explicit premise of this paper is that arms control requires rules - that the task at hand is to design, create and maintain rules that effectively restrain governmental conduct. In the light of rapidly changing technology and political conditions one might suggest that nations should not be tied up by rules but should be left as free as possible to alter their conduct quickly to meet new circumstances as they arise. That suggestion must be rejected. The problem is to create order out of chaos, and the essence of order is rules. Just as collisions on the highways are reduced by such rules as driving on the right, so the chaotic conditions of the arms race are reduced by rules restraining governments.

Much discussion of arms control rests on the assumption that the only way of creating rules to limit the arms race is to negotiate a treaty. It is suggested here that in fact there is a variety of ways in which restraints upon governmental conduct may be created. To appreciate the spectrum of rule-creating procedures one must understand what it is that causes a government to respect a rule.

## Why Governments Comply with Rules.

Before turning to international rules that may guide governmental behaviour, it should first be recognized that within a country the laws that restrict governments are quite different from the laws that restrict individuals. If one makes a contract with an individual and he breaks it, there is a third party, the government, which will use the superior force of the state to make that individual either comply with his contract or pay damages. If the individual does not pay, his property may be seized by the sheriff and sold. But if one makes a contract with the government, and the government does not pay, there is no third party to make the government do so. All that a court can do is to say that the government ought to pay. If the government does in fact comply with court decisions and with the Constitution it is not because of the physical power of any marshal or sheriff.

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The same is true with rules in the international field. Short of world government there will be no superior force to compel compliance by the major powers with such rules as may be applicable to them. Governments comply with treaties and other international rules as they do with constitutions and other domestic rules by a process of composite self-restraint.

If, having signed an arms limitation treaty, State A decides that it now wants to abandon that approach and go full steam ahead in the arms race, there is no way to "enforce" the treaty. The most that State B can do is also to go full steam ahead in the arms race or take actions that are even more warlike. Short of world government there is no physical control in arms control. If an arms control rule is broken, the most that the community can do is to destroy the rule; it cannot as it can in the case of a violation of a municipal ordinance against carrying guns, re-establish the rule. Any country, certainly a major power, acting as a unit, is physically free at any time to terminate a rule restricting its conduct, no matter how clearly it was written or how many times it was signed. In some ways a treaty is just the scrap of paper that Bismarck said it was. A treaty cannot be iron-clad. It is egg-shell thin, within the power of a state to smash it, and all the king's horses and all the king's men cannot put it back together again. And a treaty, like an egg, is kept from getting smashed by the enlightened self-interest of those who deal with it, not by anything inside it.

Among the limitless considerations which affect a governmental decision there appear to be four basic factors which tend to cause a government to respect rules - rules which it as a unit, always has the physical, factual ability to violate.

1. **Apprehension of action by "the other side".** One factor causing governments to respect rules is the apprehension of the action which would be taken by those directly benefitted by the rule - those on the other side of the rule. The decision of the United States Government to respect the Constitutional limitations on its power is influenced by an apprehension of what the people of the United States might do if the Constitution should be ignored. Similarly, the United States respects a treaty by a process of self-restraint which is influenced by a fear of what the other party to the treaty might do.

In the case of non-treaty rules, and even in the case of treaties such as those governing the Panama Canal, to divide governments into those on one side of the rule, those on the

*Although the discussion is directed at the problem of controlling the major powers, most of the discussion is equally applicable to the small powers. A big power cannot automatically compel a small power to respect a rule. E.g. the United States may not be free to compel Cuba to respect the international law protecting foreign investments.

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other side, and third states appear to ignore the China problem and is obviously a simplified model. But for any given act by the United States even such diverse countries as Egypt, China, India, Brazil, France and the U.S.S.R. can probably be divided among those "on our side," those who might take prompt action hostile to us, and those where our primary concern would be with the long range effects.

The deterrent effect of the fear of retaliatory action by those "on the other side" is well known. It supports not only rules against using gas, but rules establishing diplomatic immunity, rules keeping arms out of the Antarctic, and most other rules limiting the behaviour of one government with respect to another.

2. **Apprehension of the effect on third parties.** A government is concerned not only with what the party most directly affected by the breach of a rule might do, it is also concerned with the effect of the breach on others. In the international sphere this concern is usually with what is called "world public opinion." Should the United States resume U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, one category of consequences that we would fear would be the steps that the Soviet Union might take, such as to hit with rockets the bases or carriers from which the planes had taken off. A whole additional range of feared consequences would be, for example, political action in the United Nations and the loss of confidence in us by other countries.

If a government were convinced that it would have to violate an undertaking in order to maintain a military position necessary for survival, it would no doubt do so, and hope that it could justify its action to the world. But in some circumstances the views of third states may be more feared than retaliatory action. Presumably the Soviet decision to respect the rule of non-intervention in the Congo was brought about in significant part by concern for the views of third states. In a world in which actions speak louder than words, governments which engage in propaganda weigh the effect of their actions on third states.

3. **Individual morality.** In addition to the two types of external consequences that may cause a government to respect a rule there are two internal factors which tend to work in the same direction. The first of these is that by and large man is a moral creature who must convince himself of the "rightness" of a proposed action. However evil we may think particular governments or individuals to be, we cannot ignore the extent to which people's behaviour is influenced by their own notions of what they "ought" to do, independent of their judgment as to what the rewards or punishments might be for the particular act.

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The fact that a government cannot afford to trust a potential enemy does not make the morality of individuals an unimportant consideration in arms control. Rules will have greater practical strength when they are reinforced by the moral principles of the individuals in the governments affected. We could expect rules against assassination of officials of a foreign government to be respected for reasons going beyond a cold calculation of the consequences. On the other hand, rules requiring officials of one country to inform upon their colleagues might be violated because of moral scruples despite a recognized theoretical advantage in compliance. Moral strength may depend not only upon the substance of rules but on the process by which they were established. When solemn promises are given or rules of recognized authority established many government officials will tend to respect them because of their belief that they "ought" to, without basing each day's continued compliance upon a Machiavellian weighing of the pros and cons.

4. **Institutional resistance to breaking rules.** The second internal factor affecting a governmental decision to comply with rules is the restraint that results from the fact that a government is not a single unit but an elaborate political structure involving a great many people. Once a rule is established and a government is complying with it, any breach requires a change in governmental direction. Sooner inattention will tend to keep the government doing what it was doing before. Any change of policy requires recommendations, conferences, memoranda, and some kind of collective decision.

In particular, a decision to break a rule will have to overcome the individual moral notions of those who might think the rule should be respected. It will also involve attempts to reconcile differing appraisals of what the external consequences of the breach would be.

Finally, a government is a structure that is held together and operates on the basis of rules. The entire power of a government depends upon the officers and employees within it continuing to function in accordance with an elaborate scheme of rules. The government's ability to break a rule depends upon whether that particular rule can be sorted out and ignored, leaving respect for the other rules intact. Within the United States the government is not free to ignore decisions of the Supreme Court or to ignore the Constitution without jeopardizing the whole governmental structure. For many government officials direct respect for the Constitution would outweigh respect for a Presidential request to ignore the Constitution. Currently, treaties and other international rules are not so interwoven into the governmental fabric. But in the future, government officers may acquire a higher loyalty to an international rule, particularly to a rule that seems to them essential for world

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survival, than the loyalty which they have to the request of a superior. The critical point comes when the government officer considers the international rule as applying directly to him, rather than as applying to him only through the governmental chain of command. Once an individual official recognizes a direct duty to the rule, that government's freedom to break the rule is seriously reduced. Such a rule has become an element in the structure of a government which depends for its strength on respect for rules.

If the above analysis is correct, rules governing governments can be created by any process which defines a norm of governmental behaviour and which marshalls in support of that norm one or more of the forces which tend to bring about governmental compliance: fear of retaliatory action, fear of the effect on public opinion, the moral views of government officers and institutional resistance to breaking rules.

The durability of a rule will depend upon the strength of the forces behind it. This strength will depend to some extent upon the rule-creating process. An act of acceptance by a state will create a moral commitment of some of its officers, will set up institutional resistances to change, and will require a state to consider the effect of a breach upon public opinion. The same forces will support any rule that is created by a process which makes it "law". The more solemn and formal the procedure was, the greater the commitment. Also, because of the force of public opinion, a rule accepted as binding by most of the countries of the world is by that fact alone a rule with which every other state must reckon. Public opinion and moral scruples will be less upset if the rule is in a form which can be "terminated" without "breaking" it, although the consequent action to be expected from the other side would often be the same.

The retaliatory action to be expected depends in part upon whether the rule was being respected by the other side and, if not, what an appropriate response to a breach would be. (There are rules about breaking rules: concern for public opinion, moral scruples and the fear of further retaliation tend to deter one government from retaliating more than in an amount justified by the original breach.)

Because democratic institutional arrangements require clearing a decision with so many people, the less autocratic a government the greater the strength of a rule accepted by it. Even in a democracy, however, the possibility of a secret breach reduces substantially all the forces which tend to support compliance. Fears of consequential action by the opposing party

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and an adverse public opinion are discounted to the degree
that it is thought that the secret can be kept. Moral and
internal resistances to breaking the rule exist only among
the reduced number who are privy to the secret.

The strength of public opinion will further depend upon
such factors as how clear it is that there is a rule, how
clear it is that the rule applies to this case, and the ox-
tent to which the rule is easily understandable and appeals
to common sonso. An arbitrary rule will not have the strength
of one that has a rational, historical or geographic basis.

From such considerations it is apparent that the forces
that produce governmental compliance with legal rules in-
cluding treaties are also available in support of non-legal
rules of governmental behaviour. Although the breach of a rule
recognized as legally binding will usually involve more moral
and institutional resistance and more of an adverse effect on
world public opinion than in the case of a rule not considered
to be one of law, this need not always be so. And the re-
talitarian considerations may be just as great in the absence of
a treaty as with a treaty. Arms control need not be limited
to rules that are thought of as legal.

## Ways of Creating Arms-Control Rules

The science of game theory has shown that an understanding
of international relations may be acquired by comparing the
rules of governmental conduct to those of a game. In such
terms what we are concerned with here is the kind of a game
in which one makes up the rules as one goes along. Take, for
example, a situation in which several boys are starting to throw
snowballs at each other. How does it become understood that the
activity is to be limited to a snowball fight, and that neither
side is to grab boys on the other side, or to wrestle with them,
or to punch them in the nose? If one player thinks there ought
to be a rule against putting stones in the snowballs, what is
the best means of getting the rule established? Should he
build up a reserve of snowballs with stones in them and agree
to give them up in exchange for an agreed adoption of the rule,
or should he promptly declare: "No stones in snowballs! "?

What we need to become is experts in the art of creating
new rules to the game while the game is being played. There is
scope for ingenuity. The other players do not have a veto
over all the ways of creating rules. The following are
suggested, in roughly ascending order in terms of the clarity
and strength of the resulting rule, as illustrative types of
processes for the creation of arms restraints.

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**Engaging in a course of conduct.** A single nation may create a norm by a uniform course of conduct which conforms to that norm, even though the implied rule which it is respecting is never made explicit. A series of precedents creates a rule. The more years that go by without maneuvering near the Soviet border the more unusual and hence provocative such an act would be. A pattern of conduct may tie a country's own hands.

If many nations follow a similar course of conduct the rule that is established may affect not only themselves but all nations. If most nations conduct their military affairs consistent with certain restraints those restraints tend to turn into custom. And the violation of custom involves, to a lesser degree, the same considerations of external consequences and internal restraints that are involved in breaking a rule recognized as binding.

**Articulating a rule.** Making explicit a particular norm may create a rule whether or not that norm reflects a contemporaneous course of conduct. If the articulation does define a course of conduct it adds strength to any rule established by the conduct itself. Consider, for example, rules about testing long range missiles. If the United States were to test a missile by firing it directly toward the Soviet Union but so arrange the missile that it would alter course and drop into the sea thirteen miles off the Soviet coast, would this violate any existing rule? So far as I know, neither country tests its missiles by firing them toward the other, but no rule against it has been mentioned. When the first person, looking at the specific facts upon missile testing, articulates the concept of not shooting missiles toward the other country the rule begins to take life. A significant fact about a rule is the frequency and extent to which the underlying concept is articulated, repeated and accepted as a valid concept, whether or not it is accepted as a rule to be followed.

To some extent the process of creating restraints through effective articulation is in the field of propaganda. The public hue and cry against atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons created a norm against such conduct, a norm that induced considerable self-restraint on all countries of the world even without the corroborating effect of declarations and promises. But drawing lines is not simply a matter of words. The line articulated should reflect a concept that has internal validity, has a physical, practical or historical basis, is readily understandable, and distinguishes a pattern of restrained conduct from a pattern of conduct that is meaningfully different and less restrained. A rule drawn along the line between conventional and nuclear weapons has more vigor and may be less easily abandoned than an arbitrary rule such as against bombarding on even days of the month. Before countries can respect lines, the lines must be created, and some lines will work better than others. Through study and effort valid concepts of arms restraint can be articulated.

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A country is not only able to tie its own hands by making
articulate the restraints which it is respecting, it can also
tie the hands of the other side. If there is conduct in which
we are not engaging and in which we would like the Soviet Union
not to engage, defining the line we have not crossed in terms
that appeal to common sense and public understanding would, by
that fact alone, cause the Soviet Union at least to pause at
that line and appraise the consequences of crossing it. Such
articulation by one side makes it increasingly easy for the
other side to recognize the line as a convenient place to main-
tain a modus vivendi if it wishes to do so. Dually possible,
though more difficult, is the articulation of rules which the
other side is currently not respecting but which thereafter it
will be persuaded to respect by the feared external consequences
of not respecting it, the moral views of its officers, or both.
Articulation can most effectively be done, perhaps, by govern-
ments but it can also be done by organs of the United Nations,
by private citizens, and by public and private groups.

Making a unilateral promise. A course of conduct, or the articulation of a course of conduct, contains at most an implied promise. Unilateral restraints can also be created by express promises. A country may undertake, on its own, to behave in a certain way. The United States might, for example, promise never to place a nuclear war-head in a satellite or might promise not to fly any of its military aircraft within fifty miles of the Soviet Union. Either of these promises would create a rule which would have a significant restraining influence on the future conduct of the United States. Breach of the rule would require overcoming appreciable internal resistances to going back on a promise - and some concern over the external consequences of the breach.

Unilaterally limiting capability. A promise of future conduct can be made absolutely binding for a while by a country's limiting its physical capability to act contrary to its promise. Switzerland may promise never to use nuclear weapons and may so conduct its affairs, by not training personnel and by not producing any nuclear weapons, that at any given time the world is sure of what Switzerland's conduct will be for some time in the future.

Another illustrative restraint in this category would be the unilateral disarmament of weapons that do not presently seem decisive. The total elimination of existing nuclear stock-piles seems extremely difficult inasmuch as it is not subject to verification. On the other hand, the military risk of unilaterally disarming types of middle-grade weapons, like poison gas, would be comparatively slight. It need not be conditioned on reciprocal action by the other side; to the extent that it was not, the deterrent for the other side's using the "prohibited" weapon would depend upon a credible fear of retaliatory use of bigger or worse weapons among those which were retained.

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If two men, A and B, each armed with their fists, a knife and a gun, are hostile and may become involved in a fight, it might make sense for A to throw away his knife. Such a move would create a rule against using knives and would have a tendency to keep any fighting at the fisticuff level. A now pressure would have been created against B's using his knife. If B should pull his knife A might have no reasonable choice except to draw his gun, and if B is going to get into a gun fight he would not want to start it with a knife but would want to be the first on the draw. (Of course, there is always the danger that A may end up being shot by quick-drawing B, or having to fight B's knifc with his fists, having in turn been deterred by other factors from using his gun. But the example does suggest how a unilateral limitation on capability can create rules for the other side.)

It should be noted that in the rule-creating processes considered so far, the restraint is created unilaterally* without any aspect of agreement. The rule, which a state may be caused by the factors previously discussed to respect, is established without a treaty or even a tacit understanding. To be sure the restraint is effective only if the restrained state "voluntarily" complies, but the forces, such as world public opinion, tending to cause such compliance are basically the same as those which would tend to cause compliance with rules that had been agreed upon.

**Unilateral action plus United Nations articulation.** Still without any acceptance by the other side, either the Soviet Union or the United States might be able to tie the other's hands quite effectively by a resolution of the General Assembly recommending a particular restraint for all countries. The United Nations, to a very real degree, has legislative powers. The rules it "onacts" can have the same types of compulsion behind them as do treaties and general rules of international law. They may be stronger or weaker but this will depend upon many factors including the inherent morit of the rule. It may sometimes be easier for a country to explain to the world why it had to break a bilateral promise than to explain why it had to act contrary to the expressed consensus of the world.

Working through the United Nations has its risks. The U.N. might recommend a rule which we would be unwilling to abide by, for reasons, for example, such as the difficulty of verifying compliance. But a country's day to day concern that particular rules might not be to its liking should not obscure its fundamental and long range interests that there be rules.

*Some discussion of "unilateral" measures fails to recognize that the number of states restrained by a rule may not be the number involved in creating the rule. A rule which binds only one country may have been established by treaty, and a rule that creates a restraining influence on two or more states may have been created by the unilateral act of a single state.

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**Unilateral but reciprocal self-restraints.** A process for limiting the arms race is for each side to demonstrate self-restraint. The more self-control that one side undertakes the more self-control the other side can afford to undertake, and vice versa. This is the process by which limited wars are limited. The process would seem equally applicable to limiting preparations for war. Although no clear line can be drawn between the case where the restraining influence is established by the act of one side (but respected by the other) and the case where the rule is established by the reciprocal acts of the two sides, the core concepts should be distinguished. In the first, the restrained government finds itself "trapped" by world public opinion and other forces in support of a rule announced and respected by the other side. In the second, rules are established by a deal -- by a tacit agreement under which, as under an express agreement, performance is exchanged for performance. The essential difference between unilateral but reciprocal self-restraints and bilateral agreements would appear to lie in the fact that one side takes the first step without having the promise of the other side that it will take any step whatever.

There are infinite variations on the process. The continuance of the action taken by the first state may be made expressly or impliedly contingent upon the overall restraint exercised by the second state, or upon the second state's demonstrating that it is subjecting itself to the identical restraint. The United States, for example, may conclude that it will not engage in an all-out nuclear shelter program so long as the Soviet Union does not launch such a program. Another form of reciprocal self-restraint is where the second state adopts a quite different restraint which may be considered an appropriate quid pro quo. Examples of such reciprocal restraints may be taken from the limited warfare area. In Korea, U.N. troops did not fight across the Yalu, and North Korean forces did not bomb Pusan harbor or Japan.

The process of unilateral self-restraint, contingent upon reciprocal self-restraint, lends itself more readily to some kinds of rules than to others. It would seem easiest when the action being restrained is action in which neither side has yet engaged, and when compliance with the rule is subject to ready verification at any time by the other side. The process seems least useful where the first step taken by one side would require a major shift in conduct from that in which it is currently engaged and the risks are such that if the other side did not follow suit the first state would feel obliged to shift back to its original course of conduct. The United States could hardly scrap all of its long range missiles, and promise not to have any in the future conditioned upon the Soviet Union's doing likewise. Should the Soviet Union fail to follow suit, the United States would promptly have to recreate its whole missile program.

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A major difficulty with the unilateral approach lies in the very fact that the determination of what step shall be taken and what reciprocal action will be deemed satisfactory is made by only one country. Assuming that the first state is seeking a fair and equivalent restraint on both sides rather than seeking to gain a military advantage, it still may not have appraised the risks and benefits in the same manner as does the other side. Unless there is a good deal of negotiation and communication between the two sides they will not know what is bothering each other, what stops each side thinks it can undertake, and what stops it considers equivalent.

The measurement of the respective military positions of the Soviet Union and the United States is not so fine that any single step of a modest sort could be said to alter the balance. The gamble that one side takes in not attempting a few unilateral steps toward military restraint is probably greater than the military risk that those steps would involve. But a basic issue that must be faced in suggesting that a particular step be undertaken unilaterally is whether the first state would do better to hold out and get a promise of something in exchange for the restraint that it is adopting. In resolving this issue it must be recognized that to rely wholly on bilateral agreements gives the other side a veto power over the creation of rules in support of which one may rally world public opinion.

Forces similar to those that would persuade the other side to honor an agreement once signed can be brought to bear through unilateral action. A series of unilateral steps by the Soviet Union - disarmament through deeds, not words - would bring some pressure on the United States. Also, the United States could be expected to take steps simply in order to encourage the Soviet Union on. We would far rather see their defense budget go down than up. And any encouragement, to be effective, would have to be demonstrated. If this analysis is correct, it is equally valid with the roles of the countries reversed.

One side can tailor a unilateral restraint on its own conduct to get the maximum effect toward military stability with the minimum interference with strength it considers essential. It can recognize that the other side, in reciprocal action it may take, may have to tailor its restraints similarly. The process is thus well suited to situations where the identical rule would affect the two sides quite differently.

Where one side judges the action it can afford to take on the basis of the actions which the other side has demonstrated it is taking, there is no necessity of negotiating out first the promised performance, and then the promised inspection. Of course neither side will rely on what the other says it is doing. But neither could it rely on what they promised to do if there were a treaty. In either case, it must judge from day to day what military preparations it must make and what restraints it can afford to exercise in the light of what the other side has demonstrated its performance to be.

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Bilateral or multilateral negotiation of mutual obligations.

The process of negotiating an international agreement is well understood. It has the great advantage of disclosing at least in part the relative interests and positions of the two or more sides. In the negotiating process the full pressure of the bargain can be brought to bear: "I won't unless you will." If a treaty is concluded obligations are defined that are acceptable to both sides. A government that concludes an arms limitation treaty will be more firmly committed to that policy than it would be if comparable actions were taken unilaterally. Therefore it is easier to take bigger first steps since it is quite likely that the other side will take the first step that it has agreed to take.

The negotiation of a reasonably detailed, general, overall disarmament agreement is an extremely complicated task. Any comprehensive treaty would require the participation not only of the United States and the Soviet Union but of Communist China and many other countries of the world. Once a treaty was negotiated there would be ratification problems of which obtaining the advice and consent of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate would not be insignificant.

After a treaty has been negotiated, signed and ratified, each side has the bare promise of a potential enemy which it is physically free to ignore at any time. Each side will be under pressure to construe the agreement favorably to itself and to take all military action which it can legally take up to the edge of the agreement. We, in the United States particularly, tend to believe that if a proposed action is legal it is all right to take it. However comprehensive a disarmament agreement might be it could not proclude the possibility of the opposing side's conducting an arms race around its edges. If the two sides did not conduct such a limited arms race it would be because of self-restraint - restraint which, perhaps, they could have exercised without the treaty.

A quite different kind of treaty might be one which simply tried to set the tone for a joint policy of arms limitation. A joint declaration by the heads of state that each side would adopt a policy of limiting its weapons and of demonstrating to the other side that it was not preparing a surprise attack, might be quite useful if it was not taken as a substitute for action.

Assuming that a comprehensive arms control treaty is sufficiently valuable so that great effort should be made to obtain one regardless of the difficulties and regardless of the substantial chance that it could never be obtained, the question still remains, should each country put all its arms-control efforts in the treaty framework? Should it accept the policy of all-out defense while trying to negotiate an arms control treaty? Should each side assume that it is safer to exercise no self-control except along lines agreed to by the other?

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Conclusion

Within a country the line between legal rules and other rules is fairly sharp. In general, a rule which is legally binding upon an individual, has not only such moral force as it may carry with it, but the superior physical force of the state behind it. In the international sphere, and more broadly in the sphere of rules that regulate governmental conduct, the line between legal rules and non-legal rules still exists, but the consequences of that line are quite different. Legal rules carry with them a greater sense of "ought" than do other rules. But the same forces which persuade a government to comply with a legal rule can be marshalled in support of other rules.

Those who are concerned with reducing the risk of catastrophic war by developing rules of governmental conduct should not confine their activities to the attempt to create legal rules, through an international treaty or otherwise. The technical possibilities of desirable rules should be explored in the widest way. Potential rules of governmental conduct should be worked out having in mind not only the military aspects but the factors such as ease of comprehension and appeal to common sense which add strength to a rule. And for each potential rule all possible avenues for establishing that rule as one to be accorded respect should be explored.

Roger Fisher

October 18, 1960

12/15/60

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Unilateral Restraints v. International Agreements

by Louis B. Sohn

1. The negotiations with the Russians over the last 15 years with respect to arms control have been directed toward an international agreement on the subject. Recently, arguments have been made that this effort has been misguided and that better results might be reached through unilateral restraints. The alleged benefits of this approach will be explored in this memorandum.

2. It is true that it is a long, hard and difficult process to negotiate a treaty. This is due to the fact that both parties to the negotiations try to find a median position between their desires for security and their wishes to be free of burdensome restrictions on their freedom of decision and action. Only through prolonged negotiations is it possible to find out what the other side might be willing to sacrifice in order to reach an agreement.

These difficulties are not limited, however, to the treaty-making process. The proponents of unilateral restraints seem to assume that a particular restraint adopted by State A will immediately appeal to State B and that State B will take the necessary reciprocal action. More likely State A will be groping in the dark and will have to try various measures before it may hit by accident upon the combination which will appeal to the other State. Very often, the desired result is reached not really through unilateral action but through prolonged negotiations which are as complicated as those leading to a treaty. The end product is frequently put down in informal agreement almost indistinguishable from an executive agreement reached through an exchange of notes.

3. It has been alleged that an arms control treaty must be terminable at will, and therefore does not constitute more of a commitment than a unilateral declaration. In the first place, it is not necessary to postulate that an arms treaty must be terminable at will. One can easily imagine special provisions in the treaty limiting the right to terminate to cases of gross violations of the treaty, and authorizing an international court or commission to pass upon the existence of such a violation. Secondly, a unilateral declaration properly accepted by the other party cannot be terminated at will but is subject to almost the same rules as a more formal treaty, i.e., it can be terminated only in accordance with its terms or the general rules relating to termination of obligations in changed circumstances. Thirdly, it is a debated legal point whether a unilateral declaration can survive the official who made it, and it would create a complete chaos if we had to start the whole process all over again every time either party changed its President or Prime Minister.

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4. The argument has been made that it would be difficult to define precisely in a treaty what one is not going to do. If this were true, most of the existing treaties would not have been concluded. In many treaties States have agreed not to engage in such activities as slavery or traffic in narcotic drugs; other treaties prohibit mistreatment of aliens or the taking of their property without compensation. Some treaties define rights, others contain obligations not to interfere with the rights of other States or their nationals. No treaty draftsman was ever stopped by the allegedly negative character of the obligation to be defined in the treaty.

In particular, it would not be very difficult to define a duty of a State to close all, or some of, its bases in a certain territory. The United States reached an agreement on the subject with Morocco without difficulty once the basic principle of evacuation was accepted by the United States. While the obligation to close a base is, in fact, an obligation to do something rather than to refrain from doing something, it should be as easy, if not easier, to formulate a restriction on the establishment of new bases in a territory.

The alleged simplicity of closing a base through unilateral action is not due to any avoidance of need of legal definitions or to special ease of supervision. The other side would argue about these matters in exactly the same terms regardless of the fact that a unilateral declaration rather than a treaty would be involved, except that in case of a unilateral act it would raise these issues after the event rather than before. The snickering attitude taken by the United States toward the Soviet demobilization of several divisions constitutes a case in point. If the United States should unilaterally abandon a few bases, it would not be interpreted as a concession but more likely as a sign of weakness in response to local pressure.

5. The possibility that charges of appeasement will be raised in connection with "giving up something" during treaty negotiations is almost unavoidable. Even in negotiations designed to maximize the security of both parties, each side would have to make some concessions. But in answer to the charges, one would be able to point out, at least, that the other side has also given up something in return for our concession. On the other hand, in case of unilateral action, there will be no immediate reciprocal concession, and possibly no such concession at all. By the unilateral method we are more likely to give up something for nothing than through properly conducted negotiations.

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6. The argument that, on the one hand, under a treaty both sides would try to push up to the edge of the treaty, and that on the other hand, after a unilateral declaration each side would be very cautious in order to convince the other side that an arms control operation is being conducted — is spurious. It is not the type of instrument that is relevant here but the willingness of the parties to create a propitious climate for arms control. If both sides should believe that they got a good bargain, and that it is in the common interest to stop the arms race, they would try to prove to each other that they are executing the treaty in good faith. It is not likely that they would attempt to upset the new-found balance by a too narrow interpretation of the letter and spirit of the treaty.

7. It is inherent in any bargaining process that each side would try to demand more than it actually wants. The unilateral method is not much different, however. Each side usually puts a greater value on its action than can be objectively attributed to it. Most steps proposed for unilateral action are in fact of negligible military value and might leave the national forces stronger rather than weaker. One can easily anticipate that the other side would see through the hollowness of these "concessions." There is an inherent suspicion that a "free gift" does not have much value, and the party making a concession would have a difficult burden in proving the importance of that concession.

8. The basic value of a treaty is that the parties can define precisely the area of agreement and the steps they would be willing to take to put the treaty into effect. A treaty which is considered by the world public opinion as an important step toward the common goals of arms control and the avoidance of war would have its own momentum; it would be difficult, therefore, for any country to refuse its execution or to be niggardly in its implementation.

9. While the number of steps which might be taken unilaterally, without compensatory action by the other side, is limited, the possible content of a treaty is unlimited. A treaty may be restricted to a few general principles or it may contain a wealth of technical and legal details. A treaty may rely on mutual interests of the parties for its execution, or it may provide a special machinery for its implementation. A treaty may be very rigid, providing for no departure from the agreed formulae, or it may be flexible, providing adequate methods for coping with changes in circumstances.

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(L1)

10. In conclusion, it might be pointed out that the superiority of the treaty method is more apparent where both sides are clearly interested in reaching an agreement. One cannot deny the value of the unilateral method for proving to the other side the existence of a real interest in reaching an agreement. Each concession made during the negotiations is in fact an application of the unilateral method. Unilateral acts can contribute to a diminution of tensions, but they are no substitute for a well-balanced agreement in the execution of which each party would be equally interested.

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ACS-W10

9/23/60

THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS

Louis B. Sohn

Peacemaking is a difficult process; it is not merely a matter of goodwill and devotion to peace, but requires a tremendous amount of well coordinated work. The interdependence of nations, the many delicate networks of alliances and counter-alliances, the sensitive balance of deterrence dependent on multiplicity of technological developments -- all these factors make peacemaking in the second half of the Twentieth Century even more difficult than ever before.

Most people have forgotten the great effort that went into the creation of the League of Nations, and the complicated negotiations which preceded the rather simple Briand-Kellogg Pact outlawing war. There is, however, another example, closer to our times which should give us pose -- namely, the preparation of the Charter of the United Nations.

In the midst of a great conflict, when all the resources of the nation had to be geared to winning the Second World War, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Cordell Hull, had the foresight to order the preparation of comprehensive plans for an effective world order to be established after the war. A group of dedicated persons was assigned to this task and a wide network of consultations was established with private groups working in this area. Many ideas were considered, some of which were quite radical; and through constant discussion a cohesive plan was hammered out. After consultations with Congressional leaders and other influential citizens, the plans were revised and presented unofficially to our closest allies. Further revisions followed and the general outlines were presented to other nations for their comment. At the Moscow Conference at the end of 1943, an agreement was reached with the Soviet Union on a few basic principles, and a way was opened for the preparation of a detailed draft. A technical conference of experts from the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and later China, was held at Dumbarton Oaks and a set of proposals was agreed upon.

While these proposals were based mostly on the American drafts, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference also considered sets of suggestions prepared by the British and Soviet delegations, including a Soviet suggestion for an international police force. It was due to the insistence of the Chinese delegation that proper references to international law were included in the draft Charter.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were immediately published and widely discussed. A few points unsolved by the experts were settled at the summit meetings at Yalta. The support of the Latin American Republics was obtained at a special conference at Chapultepec, and finally a conference was held at San Francisco of all the nations concerned. The United States delegation to the Conference included a group of important Senators and Congressmen, and some fifty national organizations were consulted daily.

about the developments at the Conference. A concerted effort was
made to explain the crucial issues to the general public, and whole-
hearted support by most of the influential newspapers was enlisted.
Consequently, no strong opposition was encountered in the Senate of
the United States and the Charter of the United Nations was approved
by a Senate vote of 89 to 2. Only four months after its signature,
the Charter came into force, and a new era thus began.

One might contrast with that our present feeble efforts to strengthen
the United Nations to the extent necessary to prevent a nuclear war.
Recent statements by Secretary Herter and Mr. Eaton, the American
delegate to the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference, for the first time
have brought official recognition of the fact that disarmament is not
an end in itself, that the security of the United States in a disarmed
world would require the strengthening of various international insti-
tutions -- the establishment of a strong international police force,
the development of better methods for solving international disputes,
and the creation of new rules of international law which would protect
nations against injuries to their vital interests by means short of war,
such as subversive activities, economic boycotts, etc. In the recent
debate in the House of Lords on the defense budget, Lord Hailsham has
also recognized the need for an international peace authority.

The acceptance of an idea is not enough, however; words must be followed
by deeds. A large research program is needed to formulate the details
of an effective peace plan and to study the interrelationship of various
proposals for the supervision and enforcement of such a plan. In the
past, only a few individuals have devoted some time to such problems,
and the gaps in our knowledge on the subject are tremendous. What we
need is at least to duplicate the effort which went into the creation
of the United Nations. There we developed a great idea and nurtured it
until it was ready to be accepted by all nations of the world. Now we
need new ideas which would provide the United Nations with added strength
to maintain peace.

Perhaps what is needed can be done by a joint effort of governments. But
governmental employees are usually bound by inflexible instructions, are
are interested as much, if not more, in propaganda and upmanship as in
reaching results. The matter is important enough to justify a new
approach. One might think, for instance, of the establishment of an
international peace commission empowered to study the problems of peace
in an impartial and objective manner and to prepare detailed proposals
for disarmament, an international police force, settlement of international
disputes and development of underdeveloped countries. Members of the
Commission should be private individuals who, while serving on the
commission, would have a status similar to that of officials of the
United Nations, i.e., they should not seek or receive instructions
from any government and should be free from any governmental pressure.
Great effort should be made to obtain the best men in each field, and the
final selection should be in the hands of a person trusted by all. It
would seem, therefore, appropriate to authorize the Secretary-General of
the United Nations to call for nominations by governments and various

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private international organizations, and to select from among the nominees fifty persons which he should deem best qualified to accomplish this task.

It might be hoped that persons like Lester Pearson of Canada, Jean Monnet of France, Charles Malik of Lebanon, Victor Belaunde of Peru, Carlos Romulo of the Philippines would be willing to serve on the commission, or, at least to assist in its organization and selection. To achieve a balanced composition of the Commission, it would be desirable to have about ten persons with experience in the work of the United Nations, ten international lawyers, ten political scientists, ten scientists with a knowl with special technical knowledge in the field of disarmament, and ten economists. In the composition of the group as a whole, there might be fifteen persons from Western Europe and the Americas, fifteen from the communist nations, and twenty from Asia, Africa and the neutral nations of Europe. Adequate salaries should be provided to enable the members of the Commission to spend at least half of their time on the work of the Commission, and to provide them with full-time research associates, part-time consultants and secretariat assistance. While each professional group within the Commission might be assigned special tasks, there should be a large amount of joint discussions and interdisciplinary investiga tions. A strong chairman should be appointed and an executive committee of fifteen (three from each professional group) to coordinate activities and to make the necessary administrative decisions.

The Commission should be required to finish its work in three years. The first year would be devoted to the collection of the necessary data and to the preparation of a comprehensive outline. In the second year, a detailed peace plan would be prepared with an exhaustive commentary. In the third year, the plan would be revised and refined in the light of comments received from governments, private organizations and interested individuals. It would then be presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations, who would either appoint a special committee on which all governments would be represented or call an intergovernmental conference to discuss and approve the plan, with such changes as might be necessary.

If the plan proposed is deemed by most nations to be objective and adequate, it would create such a wave of enthusiasm around the world that no nation would dare to oppose it.

Of course, it is possible that the Commission would not be able to agree on an effective plan and that the effort and the money would be to some extent wasted. Compared, however, to the time and money being wasted on obsolete armaments, the cost of this project is minuscule. Some risk might be involved here, but such risk is worth taking.

The international project here proposed is not to be considered as the only way of dealing with the problem of peace. This problem is so important that it is not desirable to limit ourselves to one approach. It might be desirable to work simultaneously on the national level and to try to formulate detailed national policies on the subject. In the United States, for instance, it might be desirable to have national groups working on this subject, both in the government and independently. A National Peace Agency and an Arms Control Research Institute have been proposed

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and their creation would contribute important technical knowledge. But these projects are not ambitious enough, and only a concerted effort to study not only the technical but also the political and legal implications of various approaches is required. Other countries should also establish similar research projects, as one can never foresee where the crucial ideas are going to originate. If the nations of the world were willing to devote one-hundredth of the resources spent on armaments to the problem of exploring the road to peace, an effective plan would soon take shape. The problem is difficult, but not insoluble.

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ACS-11

7/1/60

SEMINAR: Stockpile Problem

SPEAKERS: Brennan, Kalkstein

Remarks by Brennan

The "stockpile problem" is the problem of the stockpile of nuclear weapons now in the possession of the United States and the Soviet Union. Some history might provide a useful background. The Anglo-French proposal of 1954 and the Soviet proposal of May 1955 included a plan for the complete abolition of the possession of nuclear weapons and the U. S. subscribed to the Anglo-French position. In about June 1955, Harold Stassen placed a reservation on all previous U. S. proposals. This was prompted mainly by an increasing fear of the clandestine stockpile problem and a feeling that it would be impossible to find all weapons.

The stockpile problem provides one of the main motives for strenuous psychological inspection proposals. But even psychological inspection is unlikely to yield the certainty of catching all weapons. U. S. practices have been such that even the government could not be sure that it had destroyed all its fissionable materials. However, this is not the really critical problem.

The real problem is the 5 to 10 per cent uncertainty in discovering stockpiles which exist. Among the means used to check the stockpile would be to inspect production plants and records and to make estimates of past production. **Schelling** asked how high up people would have to be in the bureaucracy to be able to hide bombs. **Brennan** replied that they could be fairly low down. For example, group leaders at Los Alamos would probably have been able to steal a little material for weapons some time ago. **Orear** noted that U. S. scientists had not done this. **Brennan** agreed that this was true but argued that the problem was to convince the Russians that they had not and for them to convince us that their scientists had not. **Hadley** asked whether this material could be put in one's pocket and carried out. **Feld** said that it could. **Schelling** argued that a well placed group should be able to create accidents, mix up the accounting system and steal material. **Brennan** stated that falsifying records would be really difficult and that the people would have to be really ingenuous. He pointed out that it would be a tremendous job to alter the books at Oak Ridge; in effect the solutions of 2,000 simultaneous equations would have to be altered. **Feld** pointed out that there were a number of approaches to inspection including checking mining, checking waste and production methods. He argued, however, that either side could phony up the records to the point that there would be uncheckable 5 per cent uncertainty. **Orear** reported that each side would have to balance their books perfectly; if each side came up with a 5 per cent uncertainty, the agreement could not go into effect.

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## Remarks by Kalkstein

A system of control which did not completely prevent evasion but which made it more difficult and costly would be an effective arms-control measure. The government has probably not expended great effort to develop physical methods for detecting hidden nuclear weapons. Intensive effort might yield new methods which would increase sensitivity by orders to magnitude of 1 to 3. Evasion of an agreement on a nuclear stockpile would be different from evasion of other agreements in that violation would be of a passive nature. Nothing would have to be done to the stockpiles after they are stored except if there was tritium in the bombs, in which case they might have to be replenished every two or three years. Hadley noted that he had been advised that tritium was no longer needed in the production of thermonuclear weapons.

Kalkstein continued pointing out that the lack of a need for positive action would make psychological inspection more difficult. It would also be difficult because less people would have to be involved and they would not have to be top level scientists. Even if one side found undeclared materials, it would not be clear whether there was really cheating or just overlooking of the material.

The major question would be of discovering the level of existing stockpiles. Monitoring of air for radioactive products of plutonium production plants allows some estimate of gross production (Russians, British and ours). These numbers probably would not be better than about 10 per cent. Since these are gross numbers, you would have even larger error after subtracting off known U. S. production. In the process of separating plutonium, careful records are kept so that one could hope for 1 to 2 per cent accuracy. However, there are problems which may make greater accuracy impossible. For example, in the case of U-235 isotope separation, samples of hydrogen fluoride which is used at Oak Ridge now contains 1 part in a million of 80 per cent enriched uranium and probably most of the hydrogen fluoride in the United States has at one time or another passed through Oak Ridge. Uranium separation doesn't leave as much evidence and would be much more difficult to keep track of. Probably any agreement on stockpile levels would permit each side to have an amount at least equal to the amount that probably could be hidden. This might be a very large amount. If the United States has thirty kilo-megatons, then 5 to 10 per cent for cheating is such that each side would be left with a very significant quantity of fissionable materials. If you have effective controls, means could be devised to maximize the time that each side would need to prepare for war after an arms control agreement broke down. This might partly be done by controls of the peaceful uses of fissionable material.

## Discussion on Stockpiles and Related Problems

It was pointed out in a discussion initiated by Schelling, Kalkstein and Orear that there is no one-to-one relationship between the amount of fissionable material available for a bomb and the degree of destruction to human or military targets of which it is capable. A few clandestine

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weapons made "dirty" with a cladding of a suitable material, for example, might give enough fallout to kill a substantial fraction of the United States' population. Kalkstein answered a query by Schelling as to whether these fallout-producing claddings could be controlled in the negative. He pointed out that any one of a number of elements could be used whose activation products scan a broad spectrum of half-lives. For military purposes, a cladding which produces a large amount of short-term fallout might be used. Orear noted that an arbitrary amount of lithium deuteride added to two kilograms or so of plutonium would yield one package of any desired megatonnage, e.g., the "Doomsday Machine." Such a super-bomb would be extremely hard to detect and to control, and might be useful as a deterrent or a blackmail lever; it would hardly make an effective weapon, in the ordinary sense. Brennan asserted that at least some control of a cladding like natural U-238 was possible, but Cavers emphasized the difficulties inherent in control of a material which occurs in substantial quantities throughout the world. It was generally agreed that a limitation on stockpiles of fissionable material would give control over quite a broad spectrum of military and deterrent capabilities, but that even a small amount of fissionable material "properly used" could inflict enormous damage.

Although there is perhaps no limit to the explosive power obtainable from a critical mass of fissionable material surrounded by an arbitrary amount of fusable material, Feld indicated that the limit in payload capacity of a delivery system, nonetheless, imposes a practical limit on the size of a weapon. Kahn's "Doomsday Machine" might be used for blackmail, Gewirtz noted, and a five to ten percent error in the estimate of a stockpile would leave plenty of fissionable material for this purpose. However, Schelling indicated that a "Doomsday Machine" roughly the size of a ten-story building was not necessarily suicidal, but, to be effective as a weapon, would have to be delivered. Delivery is impractical, except possibly by a boat which is relatively easy to inspect.

Orear mentioned an AEC statement that it can make a thermonuclear explosive device which is only four percent fission at the present time. This means that a 20 KT tactical fission weapon can in principle be made into a one-half MT strategic weapon. It was suggested that the important factor in stockpile limitation is the number of bombs, not their size. On the other hand, if the size of a delivery system is the important criterion in determining allowable stockpile size, Feld estimates that, if the delivery capacity of a missile in the next decade is less than ten megatons, a delivery limitation to 200 missiles would require a stockpile of no more than 2 KMT. If an orbital bomber is used instead of an ICBM, Barber estimates that 200 to 300 MT could be delivered in a single package. The experimental NOVA missile now under development can put 75 tons (150,000 pounds) into orbit; using unclassified recent estimates of one to two KT explosive power per pound gives the NOVA this capacity of around 200 to 300 MT. Schelling suggested that the delivery of extremely big weapons, albeit with low accuracy, might be possible through redesign of planes, submarines, ships, etc.

Kalkstein mentioned some aspects of stockpiling as related to the Nth

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country problem. A weapon made from U-235, which emits a small number of stray neutrons, might be built in rather an unsophisticated manner. To get maximum efficiency, and to minimize the danger of a premature explosion, it is desirable to keep the number of stray neutrons in the fissionable material as low as possible until after the critical mass is assembled. Thus, a weapon made from plutonium 239 contaminated with plutonium 240 which emits a larger number of neutrons than pure U-235, requires a more sophisticated technology to make it reliable. Thus, one way to prevent another country from using fissionable material, obtained from us for peaceful uses, to make weapons would be to contaminate it with plutonium 240. The first test of a bomb by a country seeking admission to the atomic club is likely to be extremely uncertain unless that country is in possession of actual blueprints of a U. S. or Russian bomb. This is particularly true, Brennan pointed out, when it comes to thermonuclear weapons which are quite complex when compared to a Hiroshima-type bomb. Schelling agreed that this was a type of control upon unsophisticated 1/5th countries, but that it would prove no limitation in an arms-control context upon an already sophisticated nation which could get all the blast and fallout desired from one critical mass of fissionable material. In relation to this problem of the complexity of bomb design, Orear wondered if there was any unclassified information available as to whether all plutonium bombs require a built-in neutron source. Kalkstein replied that one spontaneous fission neutron is sufficient and that plutonium weapons could be made without a neutron source, although they may be less efficient or reliable.

Feld did some calculations to arrive at a rough estimate of the number of bombs which could be hidden if stockpiles were ascertained to within five percent. Using General Medaris' 20 KMT figure for the size of the stockpile and assuming five percent fission (which may be much too low) and 95 percent fusion bombs, one KMT of fissionable material would be required in the stockpile. Assuming that a modern pure fission-type bomb has an explosive power of 100 KT, this 1 KMT would be enough to produce 10,000 bombs. Five percent of this gives 500 bombs as the estimate of the number which could be hidden. These have a combined explosive power of 1 KMT, if they are all fission-fission type (5 percent, 95 percent) or about 50 MT, if they are all "tactical" weapons. Orear was not satisfied that this five percent noise figure and stockpile estimate was correct, in view of Brennan's earlier remarks. Solving Brennan's 2,000 simultaneous equations will show if the books are consistent to better than five percent, he thinks. With regard to control of the non-fission part of a stockpile, Feld noted that it is possible to buy at least small quantities of deuterium on the open market, although purchase of large quantities might, indeed, arouse suspicion. Kalkstein indicated that lithium deuteride, which might form the greatest part of an H-bomb, has no radioactivity and is chemically stable at room temperatures, which makes storage easy and detection difficult. Tritium, another possible component, is not readily available on the open market in large amounts. Production of tritium is costly in terms of reactor operation and can be checked. It's relatively short life of 12 years means that stocks of tritium must be replenished periodically.

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Smithies raised the question whether there was any purpose in a stockpile limitation, assuming a complete foolproof agreement was reached for control of delivery vehicles. Brennan said there was still some value in a stockpile limitation in case war broke out and all agreements were off. If bombs are scarce, it is much less likely that the military will want to use them, particularly in a limited war situation. Also, since a foolproof agreement over delivery vehicles might be hard to come by, Feld considered the stockpile limitation as second-string to the arms-control bow. Regardless of ease of inspection, Cavers pointed out that it is a less delicate matter politically to propose an agreement to inspect missile production, launching sites, etc., than to inspect the production and stockpiling of fissionable materials.

Some further questions were raised on inspecting the stockpiles themselves. Even if the Russians allow us a certain amount of inspection, Halperin wondered how we can be sure that we know all the plants the Russians have. Feld said that this would depend on whether the plants were running or not. An idle plant might be quite difficult to detect. Brennan mentioned Herter's statement that, up to 1 May of this year, there has been roughly 100 U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. Hadley then expressed the belief that, from U-2 and other information, we know about most of the Russian plants. In any case, he pointed out, they cannot be sure which ones we do know about, and which ones we don't. Cavers remarked that inspection of the part of a stockpile which had been alloted to the armed forces in the form of tactical weapons, offered even greater uncertainty because of the presumed looser control of these weapons in the field.

The seminar concluded with a brief discussion on how to dispose of fissionable material if the stockpile limitation agreement were reached. Orear said that he had once made the proposal that this material be placed in sealed containers which could be dropped into the ocean with a time release mechanism to return them to the surface after a period of 40 years or so. Another suggestion was that this material might be loaded into huge rockets and disposed by shooting it into the sun.

## Participants:

<table><tr><td>A. Barber</td><td>T. O'Sullivan</td></tr><tr><td>D. Brennan</td><td>J. Orear</td></tr><tr><td>R. Coward</td><td>J. Phelps</td></tr><tr><td>B. Feld</td><td>T. Schelling</td></tr><tr><td>M. Gewirtz</td><td>W. Smith</td></tr><tr><td>A. Hadley</td><td>I. Pool</td></tr><tr><td>M. Halpern</td><td>D. Cavers</td></tr><tr><td>M. Kalkstein</td><td>A. Smithies</td></tr></table>

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adding a small computer in the missile which included the launch position and trajectory to reach the target the vehicle can determine its own correcting signals and thus be independent of the ground guidance system. Early liquid missiles depended upon radio guidance; the Titan and Minuteman will have inertial guidance. At the present time radio guidance systems are more accurate. Consequently the NASA program to date has depended upon radio guidance. As there is usually only one ground guidance system for a group of missiles and only one missile can be controlled at the same time, radio guidance places limitations on firing rates.

The engine controls necessary to follow the guidance signals are as important as the guidance signals themselves. Here liquid engines which can be throttled have a distinct advantage over solids. In a typical liquid engine firing the main engine would fire up until the target velocity is nearly achieved. Then the main engine will be turned off by the guidance system and small velocity corrections will be made by small sustaining engines which adjust the final velocity by a few percent.

Solid rockets are obviously more difficult to cut off but recent novel ideas have made it possible to achieve cut off accuracies which will permit tolerable CEP's.

The third area of problems is re-entry. While the design of nose cones for our ballistic missiles has received less publicity than the rocket, it represents a very great technical achievement. The fact that the nose cone on the 90x40 mile firing into the Indian Ocean burned up in the earth's atmosphere indicates that much remains to be done.

When a body reaches the extremely high speeds necessary for space flight, the earth's atmosphere acts like a wall of solid steel when it is struck. Whether one is designing a nose cone, a Mercury capsule, or a Dyna Soar, it is essential that one considers the altitude velocity profile which looks approximately as follows:

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The temperature limit represents the speed altitude domain below which the vehicle will burn up. The lift ceiling represents the area above which the vehicle will "free fall" uncontrolled. Below that line in the cross-hatched area it is safe; that is, it will have lift, maneuverability, etc. It is possible to go above the maximum lift above and survive a fall. However, there is a recovery limit above which a vehicle cannot be safely operated. Above the recovery limit a vehicle would fall so fast through the lift area that control could not be regained before it entered the temperature limit and burned up. Nose cones and the Mercury capsule will operate at times uncontrolled above the lift line. Note that all of these vehicles, however, must pass through the narrow bottleneck at about 250,000 feet. While nose cones need not maneuver, any reliable manned space vehicle must be maneuverable. The Dyna Spar is designed to operate throughout the complete re-entry corridor, coming out of orbit to land as easily as a F-104 at a given airfield. This will be a tremendous advantage over schemes like the Mercury capsule whose accuracy has been termed as plus or minus one continent.

The United States could probably put a manned expedition on the moon by 1968-70 if we were willing to pay for it. This would assume the high priority development of nuclear rockets. In fact, we have made an auspicious start due to the support of Congress for the nuclear rocket program. By 1965 the United States should be ahead in rocketry across the board due to the highly concentrated effort which has been stimulated by recent Soviet successes in the field. Since the U.S.S.R. does not seem to do business when they are behind in the armaments race, it would seem that now is the time to promote a joint program for space research. At the present time it is possible to make some distinction between military and non-military rocket technology.

If both sides in the cold war develop hardened type solid fuel missile systems, a test ban on vehicles might have unfortunate effects. There are two types of testing: (1) development and (2) reliability. In the case of a hardened type system we could continue testing of the second variety and stop the first.

A modest investment of money would enable us to detect from outside the Soviet Union any significant space vehicle launchings made by that nation. While an high altitude atmospheric probe might not be detected by this system, anything the size of an Atlas would be. It would detect, certainly, anything which could put 8000 pounds into orbit. Since it would not be possible to design and complete a nuclear weapon delivery system with any degree of accuracy which would weigh less, such a surveillance system would detect any militarily significant tests.

To reiterate a proposal made earlier in these seminars, it would be possible for us to announce that we would shoot down any satellite which had an unknown payload. In order to assure us of the peaceful intent of such a launch, we could request that we be allowed to inspect all satellites which the Soviets were to launch and offer to allow them to do the same. There are, however, several problems involved in killing a satellite. It is possible to use a nuclear warhead which would "kill" the satellite if caught within

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its fire-ball, or to use a shrapnel-type warhead which would riddle the satellite with holes. In either case, there is the problem of telling when the satellite has been killed. A recent NASA announcement states that the Saturn booster would be available in 1964. If we wished, we should be able to use a Dyna Soar vehicle with such a booster shortly thereafter to permit a man to check on the satellites.

Another upcoming space development is SAMOS, the reconnaissance satellite. Melman in his book states that satellites can have a 20-foot or better resolution. There are two possible approaches which we may make politically with this development. They may be characterized as the U-2 approach and the Open-Skies approach. In the former case, we would announce nothing and just take pictures. If no incidents occur, then there is no flagrant insult to the Soviets which they feel it is necessary to counter. In the case of an open-skies approach, we would presumably paint a UN symbol on the satellite, attempting to give it international status as a space instrument for the prevention of war. As things presently stand, the U-2 approach is probably the better one. SAMOS could be either a stabilizing or an unstabilizing influence. It very much depends on what is happening when it reaches operational status. If the Soviets have soft missiles, the Soviets can be understandably apprehensive about SAMOS.

The following items might be useful in the space program: (1) The static testing of solid fuel rockets might contribute more to stability than a complete cessation of all tests. (2) Solid fuel missiles will be primarily useful for military purposes, while liquid fuel and nuclear rockets will be useful for the exploration of space. (3) It would be possible to develop a comprehensive radar surveillance system which would cover all launchings going higher than an altitude of 100 miles. (4) It would also be possible to set up an emergency portable surveillance station on a Texas tower. This could be quickly moved to wherever it seemed needed. (5) It is now possible and necessary to develop a satellite defense system. This need not be able to kill the satellite on the first pass. While there will be problems of evaluating what has been done to the satellite, the use of Dyna Soar as an inspection vehicle may solve this. (6) We must decide how to make SAMOS acceptable to the Soviets. The political problems, such as choosing the U-2 or Open-Skies approach, are more difficult than the technical problems.

## Discussion

Hadley noted that one argument in favor of using the U-2 approach with SAMOS was that, if the pictures were openly available in the UN file, the Soviets would be able to find out when they were escaping detection. This might vitiate the effectiveness of our deterrent Feld noted that SAMOS is not just a deterrence device, i.e., one which tends to prevent the other side from making a first strike, but a spy device. It can be used to gain information useful in making a first strike.

While it is possible to harden large liquid fuel rockets, said Brennan, one of the limitations to this is the delicacy of this type of vehicle. While they possibly could be hardened to 1000 p.s.i., the shock from a

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nuclear explosion may still make them unlaunchable. While this makes solid fuel rockets advantageous, there is still some sentiment for storable liquid fuel rockets. In these, the fuel could be pumped in and kept in the rocket for several weeks at a ready-to-fire status. Schelling also agreed that there was some sentiment for storable liquid fueled rockets over the solid fuel ones. These liquid fuel rockets have an advantage of having a larger payload. It is also not a question of hiding the entire fueling complex, but just the rocket which can be fueled within its silo by portable facilities. Barber, however, believed that sentiment was running toward solid fuel missiles for military purposes and, while storable liquid rockets could be used for space exploration, the sentiments seem to be running toward nuclear rockets for this.

It is possible to test reliability statically, said Brennan, while some development testing requires flights. In considering a surveillance system, added Feld, we must realize that much can be learned from a flight even though the rocket is destroyed before reaching a very high altitude, although the accuracy cannot be so tested. It is, however, very difficult to tell what achievements have been made in guidance, even though a flight is observed. Due to the fact that it is much easier to mount a missile test than to dig a large hole for an underground bomb test, Brennan suggested that, with loose surveillance, one could probably carry on 100 undetected missile tests in the time it took to carry on one underground bomb test. Thus, there should be much more concern about missile testing if we are going to worry as much as we do about underground bomb tests. He answered the suggestion that a missile testing site was fairly obvious by noting that the Germans had initially lost most of their V-2 rocket launching facilities when they were obvious. The result of this was that they learned how to launch their missiles from a variety of mobile launching devices. Furthermore, while we concentrate a great deal of equipment at such sites as Cape Canaveral, these facilities could presumably be spread out, making it far more difficult to detect them.

## Remarks by Donald G. Brennan

While many people are concerned with the legal niceties in the control of outer space, such as the rules of the road, how high is up and so forth, these would seem to have more relevance only in the long run. More to our point is the question of military deployment problems. These include constraints on putting up too many satellites, on putting up nuclear weapons, and on missile stockpiles.

As long as defense against ICBMs seems to be nearly impossible, there is no real motive for putting up weapons of conventional size into orbit. There might be more motivation for putting up a weapon of one KMT or so, which need not even be brought down in order to do great damage. Such weapons would appear very dangerous and highly unreliable. The KMT-type weapon looks enough like a "dooms-day machine" to have been cut off in military developments as such. Nevertheless, controlling the development of space technology is a very difficult problem.

In missiles as in nuclear weapons, we have the Nth country problem. With the possibility of diffusion of these weapons, it would not be in the

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