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# CHAPTER VIII
## WHAT KIND OF ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP?

On too many vital issues--from Suez to the Congo, from Southeast Asia to Berlin--the policies of the major allies have been unilateral or divergent. Two solutions are usually offered for this state of affairs:
(a) an improvement in the process of consultation; (b) the development of a united Europe with federal, supranational institutions as the precondition for an Atlantic partnership among equals.

### The Problem of Consultation

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified under present conditions by three factors:

(1) The firm commitment of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the existing balance of power provides their allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

(2) The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums. The American tendency to confine consultation to an elaboration of its own blueprints often reflects a desire to avoid complicating still further our own increasingly complex decision-making process.

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(3) As governments have found in their own domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, differences are almost certain to arise. And they are likely to be intensified because the histories of the states vary widely and because of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

The American historical experience causes our policymakers to be reluctant to admit that the process of consultation may have objective limits. United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise. A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that agreement is sure to emerge if the interested parties gather around a table. This produces a temptation to conduct alliance diplomacy by analogy to the domestic policy of stable societies.

However, the most difficult issues of coalition diplomacy are more complicated. Differences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. The analogy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled generally consider maintenance of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if they do not, domestic policy acquires some of the characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy and, in extreme cases, leads to civil war.

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In stable societies those who are overruled retain the hope of winning another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists the possibility of changing the government with the next election.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves are not available. Legitimacy resides in the individual governments. Decisions require their consent--this is the essence of sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by majority vote--a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with NATO--their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the treaty. In short, those who dissent and are prepared to insist on their sovereignty cannot be bound indefinitely.

If fundamental differences among sovereign allies persist, the partners are torn between the desire to maintain the appearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate their views. The need to present a facade of harmony has at least three consequences: (a) It puts a limit on the sanctions that can be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (b) One of the few pressures available is to mobilize domestic pressures against an obstructive partner, thus multiplying resentments. (c) Because misgivings are sometimes subordinated to an appearance of amity, the real views of the governments cannot always be deduced from their formal statements. Simultaneously--and somewhat contradictorily--a premium is placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use their partners' desire for harmony to impose a desired course. But if this happens too frequently, there is a dangerous build-up of frustration which cannot be smothered indefinitely by declarations of friendship. This has been happening in the Atlantic Alliance.

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Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of assessment or of interest. It works best in _implementing_ a consensus rather than in _creating_ it. Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the primary objectives of the Alliance.

Many of our schemes for strengthening NATO have taken the form of making our predominant position psychologically more acceptable; we try to create a structure which ______ physically prevents any ally (except the United States) to act autonomously. This tends to turn our allies into advisors in an American decision-making process.

It then becomes relevant to inquire whether such a system healthy for the long-term political vitality of the Alliance.

The effectiveness of any process of consultation is tested by the answers to the following questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three questions do not necessarily have identical answers.

Many agencies in our own government have a right to express their views, but not all carry the same weight. When some Europeans ask for a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up some of their military autonomy, the issue they raise is: compared to whose voice _within_ the United States government? That of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In

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our interdepartmental disputes, the outcome is clearly affected by the constituency which the agency or department represents. The weight given to advice is inevitably related to the competence that it reflects and this in turn depends on how seriously a given department takes its role.

These considerations apply even more strongly in an alliance of sovereign states. The challenge is less to provide a forum for the expression of a point of view--important as this is--than to bring about a framework which encourages the emergence of responsible attitudes. Setting up lines of communication without paying corresponding attention to what flows through them is to evade the key problem. If the United States insists on retaining a dominant position and complete freedom of action, we will probably find that in time Europe's political will will be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view, it must be convinced that its views matter, not only by the grace of a senior ally but also because of structural necessities. If coalition diplomacy becomes an exercise in affecting essentially American decisions, most of our allies will lose the incentive to make responsible judgments. The kind of leader comfortable with such a relationship may be only too ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders; this very quality may make him an unreliable partner when he is most needed in times of crisis. Tutelage, in short, cannot be made into a healthy relationship.

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American policy has not always been sensitive to the psychological prerequisites for effective consultation. It generally holds that influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company: the partner with the largest number of shares in a common enterprise is supposed to have the greatest influence. Roles are assigned according to the principle of division of labor.

Influence is, of course, an intangible quality. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle, with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality, has put his finger on the fact that as long as the Alliance remains composed of sovereign states, a too rigid conception of "integration" can easily lead to an evasion of responsibility. Difficult decisions can be avoided and failure can be blamed on other allies. Even a major effort may not result in a corresponding increase in influence. In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real--as opposed to his formal--role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement. To combine technical integration with insistence on sovereignty can in time erode the moral basis of joint action.

Heretofore, American policy has assumed that the chief obstacle to close United States-European cooperation on a global scale is that the resources of the European nation-state are inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. According to this school of thought, a politically integrated Europe will be prepared to share our world-wide burdens.

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Under Secretary of State Ball has expressed the American view as
follows:

The problem will never be fully solved until Europe
gets on further with the achievement of its own unity--
until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with
the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The
undertaking of world responsibility requires a world
view. The discharge of such responsibility under
post-colonial conditions must be based on the command
of vast resources for defense and foreign aid--and
on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has
more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe
cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common
effort and a common view.³

The nature of world responsibility is rarely defined; it is assumed
to be self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador to Germany, George
McGhee, spoke on July 16, 1964, as follows:

This Atlantic partnership entails increasing
contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam
and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany,
have only recently acquired the ability to contribute.⁴

American policy seems to consider that its goals in these areas are in
the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge; what it desires is
a sharing of the cost.

3. George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 216.

4. George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964, *DOSB*, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), p. 138.

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But is it really true that the willingness to assume global responsibilities is ~~related~~ to availability of resources? The American national experience would seem to contradict this assumption. Through the greatest part of its history, the United States possessed the resources but not the inclination to play a global role. Conversely, many European states maintained overseas commitments when their resources were much smaller than they are today.

For many European countries, the combination of decolonization and two World Wars has been traumatic. Having been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they no longer consider that their security is directly affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United States looked at Europe's quarrels until 1941.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions--often moralistic in tone--between "responsibility" and "interest." Under Secretary Ball, echoing similar statements by Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

> We Americans have few national interests--in the narrow sense--outside our own territory but we have assumed vast world responsibility. . . . The willingness to accept

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world responsibility--as distinct from the preservation
of national interests--is, in our observation and
experience, not universal among the NATO membership.⁵

Aside from the fact that our European allies are likely to
consider a "disinterested" foreign policy as mecurial and unsteady,
the distinction misses the central point. The chief reason for
the reluctance of most of our allies to assume world responsibility
is precisely because in the past decade they have been obliged to
give up their global interests. Sharing our burdens would supply an impetus
to Atlantic cooperation only if the Europeans had the same view as we
of what is at stake outside of Europe and if they believed that the United

5

Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *op. cit.*, p. 215.

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States would curtail its commitments but for their assistance. Neither condition is met today. The very commitment of the United States to a global role--our often-invoked sense of world responsibility--reduces the incentive of our allies to share in it, much as the commitment of Britain and France to the European balance of power permitted the United States to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941.

The problem can therefore be defined as follows: For responsible attitudes to emerge, the participants in a consultative process must be something more than advisors. Influencing another country's actions or sharing its burdens is demoralizing in the long run.

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There are two choices before the Atlantic Alliance: the gradual merging of sovereignty into a new North Atlantic political structure or a traditional alliance of sovereign units--with Europe perhaps forming a single entity. If we follow the first course, we must be prepared for a much greater surrender of our freedom of action than anything we have so far envisaged. In the long run it will prove impossible to combine our preferred strategic doctrine with an uncompromising insistence on our sovereignty. If we claim freedom of action while depriving our allies of theirs, either NATO will collapse or else our allies will grow into impotent appendages to our decision-making process. This will cause them to become completely absorbed in themselves, indolent and essentially irresponsible.

As long as the United States does not seem prepared for the surrender of sovereignty which a real North Atlantic Political Community would imply, the issue becomes what system is most vital in the long run in an alliance which will remain composed of sovereign units. Is it better to create a structure that automatically involves all its partners in every crisis around the world? Or is it wiser to build a system that grants its members some autonomy? On many issues--particularly East-West relations--united action is essential. With respect to others, some degree of flexibility seems useful. Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will almost certainly consider that their vital interests are not at stake in these areas.

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If the Atlantic Alliance is completely centralized, policy may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only on doing nothing. The Soviets may use our involvements in other Continents as a pretext to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point.

If we look beyond the immediate future and visualize an increasingly powerful China fomenting the already strong tendencies toward turmoil in other parts of the world, the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be too great if we remain the sole trustee of Europe's policy as well. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny.

If we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence. Each partner will regain a measure of flexibility. The temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Europe could assume greater responsibility for its defense and its future. Put positively, the Atlantic Alliance will have to decide whether to emphasize immediate convenience or long-term political

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vitality. At any given point of time, centralization of decisions guarantees the greatest degree of coordination. Critics of such schemes can always be put on the defensive by being accused of fomenting distrust. In the long term, however, excessive concentration of decision-making in the hands of the senior partner may deprive its allies of the incentive to be responsible and it may create profound fissures when a conflict of interests becomes apparent.

If the Alliance cannot constitute itself into a more embracing political community--and realism compels us to confess that this is unlikely in the next decade--a structure which makes possible a variety of coordinated approaches could enhance the vigor of our policies and the self-confidence of our allies.

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The Grand Design and European Integration

A self-reliant Europe assuming increasing responsibilities in
international affairs is thus in the long-term interest of the United
States. And American policy since the war has consistently fostered the
emergence of such a Europe. However, progress has been slowed in recent
years under the impact of De Gaulle's challenge and two somewhat contradictory
American tendencies: (a) A passionate commitment by the United States State
Department at least to one form of European integration as the only possible
one. This may have the result of foreclosing the attainable with visions
of the desirable. (b) Despite our pronouncements, American policies have
sometimes unintentionally undermined a European sense of identity.

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961, the United
States has argued that the most effective structure for Atlantic cooperation
is a partnership between the United States and a united, supranational Europe.
"When one partner possesses over fifty percent of the resources of an
enterprise and the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the
relationship is unlikely to work very well." Real partnership, according
to American spokesmen, is possible only among equals.

As a result, American pronouncements have often assumed that before
Europe could be an effective partner of the United States it would have to
unify. This concept of Atlantic partnership, strongly urged also by such
wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, has been described by the image of "twin
pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary of State Herter has written:

1

George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSE, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962), p. 366.

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I believe the present Administration [the Kennedy Administration] holds the . . . view, which has come to be termed the "dumbbell" concept--meaning that an economic and political alliance is stronger if it has been agreed to by partners of equal weight on both sides.²

The European side of this partnership is to be a United States of Europe organized on federal lines with supranational institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents one form of Atlantic partnership. But an excessive, almost doctrinaire commitment to it runs the risk of treating a symbol as the only possible reality. This may cause us to beg the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept has been pursued obscures three questions: Is it true that partnership is possible only among equals? What has been the real progress toward European political integration? To what extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that partnership should be said to be possible only among equals. The assertion that we can deal effectively only with countries of equal strength is notconducive to inspiring confidence among the weak nations of the world which constitute a majority. Moreover, the proposition is open to doubt. History would seem to indicate that the most difficult and rigid partnerships are those among equals--witness for example the alliance between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I.

2

Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1963), p. 301.

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In Atlantic relationships we should be prepared to pay the price for the improvement in Europe's bargaining position toward us which is inseparable from an increase in European strength and cohesion; but we should recognize that it is a price we would have to pay.

Granting that a strong and united Europe is on balance in our best interest, we must nevertheless inquire whether it is wise--either from the point of view of Europe or from that of the United States--to insist that there is only one reliable method of bringing about that unity: that of federal, supranational institutions. In the aftermath of De Gaulle's abrupt rejection of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it has become almost a commonplace that the willful act of a single individual interrupted what would otherwise have been smooth advance toward political integration. According to this view, once Britain would have entered the Common Market, an "outward looking" Europe would have been constructed. Progress toward European, federal, supranational, political institutions would have been continuous. In the view of the integrationists in Europe and in the State Department, European integration was to grow out of a "community spirit" which in turn was to be fostered by supranational commissions. Expert judgment unaffected by considerations of national interest was to move European political integration forward, step-by-step, toward a final culmination where the supranational authorities were dominant.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences ascribed to De Gaulle. For De Gaulle's policy to prove so disruptive, significant underlying factors must have been operating.

It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which economic integration had been achieved could be applied automatically

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to the political arena. The "community" approach--which equates method and purpose--works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in defining this common objective.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, this was obscured because Europe had been so shattered by the war that immediate needs were overwhelming. Leaders did not think that their problem was to choose among different objectives; on the contrary, the task of meeting minimum necessities absorbed all their energies. Most countries on the continent had governments so weak or a past which they were so eager to overcome--or both--that an abdication of some of their sovereignty seemed a respite from overwhelming uncertainties. For many in Europe, economic activity became a means to avoid facing nearly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that the governments were only too glad to turn them over to supranational experts.

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the national state, the traditional repository of European loyalties. This process took place with varying intensity in each country. Germany and Italy, partly to escape their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a federal Europe than Britain and France. Smaller countries accustomed to the protection of some major power had less difficulty with the supranational concept than those states which had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain--with the longest history as national states--have consistently opted for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution; that is, a

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structure which preserves the identity of the states and in which decisions
will be taken, at least initially, by governments. Four years before
De Gaulle came to power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated
the obstacles faced by a supranational approach to political integration.

But if De Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole
obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible
for confusing the debate about the future of Europe in at least two ways:
(a) The controversy between the federalists and the confederalists has
become a test of attitudes toward De Gaulle. The line-up is not a reliable
guide to the real views of the participants because many who strongly
oppose De Gaulle's style and domestic policy are in agreement with him about
the organization of Europe. (b) Some of the most ardent advocates of
Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents of a
federal Europe which in turn is as unacceptable in London as in Paris.
Thus, opponents of European integration have often combined forces with
dedicated advocates of it to advance sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed
by the French President.

This confusion has been magnified by the role of the United States.
Our strong support of supranational, federal institutions has contributed
to the stalemate in European discussions. While not sufficient to bring
about our preferred solution, our influence is strong enough to block
approaches of which we disapprove. Moreover, despite our ardent support
for a European unity, our impact has often been the contrary of what was
intended. While affirming the need for European integration, we have
unintentionally tended to undermine a European sense of identity.

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During the long period of American predominance, a group of experts comfortable with the existing relationship has grown up on both sides of the Atlantic. Having worked well together for many years, they tend to see problems from the same perspective. They resist the implication that the capacity for pressure may be inseparable from the political process. Though they generally favor European integration, they consider the quest for European autonomy inherently divisive. According to them, if United States policy is wise, European autonomy will be unnecessary. If United States policy is mistaken, an independent European policy would only magnify the problem. Thus, both in Europe and the United States, many who urge European integration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European policy--which in turn is one of the likely results of European integration.

This attitude is particularly noticeable in the field of defense. Were Europe thrown on itself, it would probably unite sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to do so. But, having been sheltered by American power for nearly two decades, many Europeans are concerned lest the emergence of a European identity in the area of defense undermine the American guarantee and force them into assuming direct responsibilities. American pronouncements sometimes encourage this. The threat to withdraw American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic views. Proposals such as the MLF have the practical consequence of preventing the emergence of a European point of view on nuclear matters. The American attitude has, on the one hand, inhibited a European quest for autonomy; on the other hand, it has caused some advocates of European identity in the defense field to give their case an anti-American cast.

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This problem could well be accentuated by the manner in which European
unity is achieved. History teaches that the more abrupt political transitions,
the more drastic have to be the efforts to re-establish some sort of cohesion.
A Europe which grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties must
have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its
existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to European unity could produce either
a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of
nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *patries*.
A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced

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There may be various roads to Atlantic partnership and European cooperation. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan--calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and sub-cabinet officials --is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future and thus put an end to the process of demanding the desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.

Every European state was formed through some process of integration during the past four centuries; and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than one hundred years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to achieve unity. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness. History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates further that stability in Europe is unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries in the name of

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As for immediate measures, irritation with De Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposals of 1958 for a Directorate, he pointed out what has remained the key problem of NATO: If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy--or at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to devise a common military strategy is likely to prove futile. As long as the Alliance cannot agree even on a common trade policy toward the East, it will be impossible to convince allies to relinquish their freedom of action over decisions affecting their very survival. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic. Such a body could well be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. If it should be argued that the Atlantic Alliance will never be able to agree on a common foreign policy--or an agreed range of divergence--the emptiness of nuclear multilateralism becomes apparent. Nations that cannot agree on common negotiating positions are not likely to be able to consert a common strategy for an apocalypse.

Organizational devices should never be confused with substantive solutions. Nevertheless the following outline of how such an Executive Committee might operate could serve as an illustration of a desirable direction if not as a detailed blueprint for action. The Committee could be composed of six members: five permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic, and Italy) and one rotating member representing the smaller NATO countries. The rotating member could

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be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members
are excluded thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The
allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape
clauses to be described.

The Executive Committee should formulate common Atlantic purposes
and define the limits of autonomous action where interests diverge. It
could give political guidance for the military arrangements described in
the previous chapters. It should be the political authority for the
proposed Allied Nuclear Force. It should be charged with developing a
common strategic doctrine.

As long as the Alliance is composed of sovereign states there will
be clear limitations to the delegation of authority which are possible.
Thus each ally, whether or not a member of the Executive Committee, would
be given the right to appeal its decisions to the NATO Council where a
two-thirds majority would carry. Each ally could be given the right, for
an interim period at least, to refuse to be bound by such a vote. However,
it should be required to make a formal declaration to that effect within
a given time. A negative vote either in the Executive Committee or in the
NATO Council would not be enough. Instead, a formal notification that a
country refuses to carry out the common decision would be required. The
purpose of separating the two stages would be to enable allies to record
their disagreement and yet to carry out the majority's decision for the
sake of unity.

Within this framework, the European countries could, if they wished,
form a closer association. For example, the Western European Union might well

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be given the responsibility for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Force and, indeed, the European contribution to joint NATO plans. As Europe gains structure, the Executive Committee could approach the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic partnership, in this approach, would not have to await European unity to become operative. Atlantic partnership and increased European cohesion could be pursued concurrently with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on a two-pronged basis.

Conceivably such a policy could end the sterile debate over the relative benefits of integration and coordination. It might heal a rift which, if continued, is bound to hazard everything that has been painfully built up over fifteen years. It would leave the internal evolution of Europe to the European countries and concentrate our efforts where we can be most constructive: in the elaboration of Atlantic relationships.

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A Final Word

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949, no one would have thought it possible that within fifteen years its pervasive problem would turn out to be the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe. In the face of what was believed to be the imminent threat of Soviet aggression, it would have seemed absurd to predict that fissures would open because the fear of Communist invasion had largely vanished. When Europe dreaded the return of America's traditional isolationism, it would have been incredible that someday our allies would feel so confident of our support that they would consider it safe to disagree with our policies or even to oppose them.

In a way, then, many of the difficulties in the Atlantic Alliance could be a source of pride for the United States. They are the result of the success of policies ushered in by the Marshall Plan and consistently pursued through four post-war administrations. The West today is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance.

Yet it is easy to draw too much comfort from this. History is the tale of civilizations which sought their future in their past. There are no plateaus in international affairs; what is not a stepping stone soon becomes the beginning of a decline. Succeeding generations will not be able to draw comfort from the fact that a challenge which was not met had been produced by great achievement.

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[Y]

In the life of societies and international systems a point
is reached where the question arises whether all the possibilities of
innovation inherent in a given structure have been exhausted. At this
point, symptoms are taken for causes; immediate problems absorb the
energies which should be devoted to determining their significance. Events
are not shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-intrusive.
However impressive such a structure may still appear to outsiders, it has
passed its zenith. It will grow ever more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had centuries
of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic upheaval. Its propensity
for disaster has been high; but, heretofore each tragedy was followed by
a new burst of creativity. Are the stresses of today a sign of consolidation
or the first symptoms of decay? Will they lead to renewal or to disintegration?

For a while longer the West can continue along familiar routes. The
traditional machinery of the Atlantic Alliance is well designed to produce
the appearance of amity. But if the Alliance continues to confuse form and
substance, energy will increasingly have to be spent in reconciling illusion
with reality. Each nation will be thrown on its own resources and will
emphasize policies which magnify divisions. At each previous critical
juncture the West--though with much travail--found political forms adequate
for its needs. It made the transition from feudalism to the nation-state.
Its challenge now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger
community and draw from this effort the strength for another period of
innovation.

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Its ability to master this problem will largely determine whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world. Confronted by turmoil and hatred in the former colonial areas, the West desperately searches for means to demonstrate its good faith to its erstwhile subjects. But every demand which is satisfied spawns new pressures. The inward insecurity produced by centuries of subordination is not allayed by dealing with its manifestations any more than a tidal wave is understood by studying the surface of the ocean. In many of the new nations, popularity is unattainable partly because of the memory of colonial rule, partly because these nations often do not know what they really want. Their greatest need is a sense of purpose. But this can only be conveyed by example not by preachments or by efforts to ingratiate which compound the new nations' sense of insecurity with our own.

What the West can mean to others depends therefore in great part on what it means to itself. In the heyday of colonialism, ~~Western political forms were widely imitated.~~ The leaders of independence movements fought their oppressors in the name of principles they had acquired from them. The reason was that for all the wrongs it committed, the West appeared dynamic, creative and vital. If the West is to contribute to the rest of the world, it will have to begin by demonstrating that its well-springs of creativity have not run dry in its internal relationships.

The opportunity is great. The dynamic periods of Western history occurred when unity was forged from diversity. This is the task once again. The struggles for prestige and influence can be salutary if at some point they

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lead to a heightened sense of community. Conversely fifty years from now no one will care who was "right" with respect to the issues which form the headlines of the day if in the process the West has torn itself to pieces.

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength. Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened by the European sense of tragedy. And the European consciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bureaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recognized. The solution of the immediate has priority over the shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse creativity with a projection forward of the present. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

In the decades ahead, the West will have to lift its sights. When technique becomes exalted over purpose, men become the victims of their complexities. They forget that every great achievement in every field was a vision before it became reality. Both sides of the Atlantic would do well

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to keep in mind that there are two kinds of realists: those who use
facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as
men able to create their own reality.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements of the
West with rifts in the Communist world. But this comparison fails to
do justice to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist
world schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have
been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer because at their
best they have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from the
shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the
West can render a great service by demonstrating that if history has
a meaning it is up to us to give it that meaning.