TelCon

Mr. Vorontsov/Mr. Kissinger

2:25 pm, March 3, 1973

K: Hello.

V: Hello Henry, how are you.

K: Uri?

V: Yeah.

K: We've got a tremendous crisis because you're here.

V: What's that, what's that.

K: I just thought I'd scare you a little bit.

V: (Laughter) You scared me a lot.

K: Just want to keep you honest, just want to see how well you keep
your cool.

V: Ahh, we are always cool. Ambassador is cool, cooling his feet
in Moscow. Henry, I got a message from him.

K: Right.

V: He wants you to know that he will here before the 10th but the
exact date is not yet settled.

K: Okay.

V: But he will see you before your vacation.

K: Good.

V: Okay.

K: I don't know why I did this, I should have let him come back on the
12th and blamed the failure of the Summit on him.

V: Laughter--I hope first of all there will be no failure and then the
Ambassador is not of that type who will accept this. We will follow
you to Acapulco or wherever you go.

K: (Laughter) He's the wrong sex. Now, listen, Uri, we--you've
had some discussions with us on having George Shultz come to the
Soviet Union.

V: Yes, that's right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: M.N. Baranov
Date: 03 Mar 73

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: E.W. Mains Date: 06/04/84

K: And we would be delighted to send him, we think it's a constructive time to do it.

V: Wonderful.

K: But before we announce it we wanted to make sure that the dates March 11 to 14 would be acceptable to you.

V: Well, I hope, because that's exactly the dates they had in mind, the first half of March.

K: Can you confirm it for me before we announce it, and we'd like to do it as soon as possible.

V: Fine Henry, I'll cable them already but I will ask them to expedite the answer and I hope I will get it first thing Monday morning.

K: Right. And we will approach--he won't be able to make any definite settlement, but he'll be sent with instructions really to get steam behind the various activities to be agreed on.

V: Good.

K: And you can tell them that.

V: Fine. Okay. And they will be glad to hear that you are backing completely his mission.

K: Right.

V: Okay Henry, I'll call you.

K: Bye.

V: Bye.

2

TelCon

Mr. Vorontsov/Mr. Kisdinger

2:25 pm, March 3, 1973

K: Hello.

V: Hello Henry, how are you.

K: Uri?

V: Yeah.

V: What's that, what's that.

K: Right.

K: Okay.

K: Good.

V: Okay.

K: (Laughter) He's the wrong sex. Now, listen, Uri, we--you've
had some discussions with us on having George Shults come to the
Soviet Union.

V: Yes, that's right.

2

V: Wonderful.

V: Good.

K: Right.

V: Okay Henry, I'll call you.

K: Bye.

V: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Autumn 1958
BY DAVID GILBERT

TELCONE
Secretary Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

12:46 p.m., March 5, 1973

S: I called you sort of in this continuing discussion about Europe and monetary abandonments (?).

K: I think it's coming pretty well.

S: It is. I think the message had a real impact.

K: Yeah.

S: At the same time, I think in many respects they are at a sort of a moment of truth and they know it. And the ability to put together some sort of a joint float is quite testing and I don't really think they can do it. Schmidt and Barber both told me that they rate the chances as less than 50-50. Now I was very much impressed Saturday with the additional perspective on the problem that came from our discussion with the President and with you. That is, to say, they need to put the whole thing in the setting of European problems generally and not regard it simply as a problem in working out an international monetary system. And I mentioned that to the President last night, when I reported to him on the outcome of the Minister's meeting and so on, and he suggested that I discuss this with you and that perhaps we might discuss it with him tomorrow. So I'm really calling to see if perhaps mid-afternoon or so you might have some time. I don't know quite how to start with this but I do have the feeling that there is a fairly decisive set of events taking place and I'll be going now to Paris rather than to Rome on Friday for the meeting and I want to be in a position to understand and represent our views well.

K: Okay.

S: And I have to go back to -- I've been testifying all morning and I have to go back again at 2:00 but I hope I won't be there all afternoon.

K: Well, I have to see a Russian group at 5:00. How about meeting at 6:00 or is that too late for you?

S: 6:00 or so would be fine.

K: Let's do it at 6:00.

S: Okay. I have my monetary group meeting at 4:30 so when we get through, I'll call you.

K: I'll be here -- Do you want to come over here or should I come there?

S: Anything. I'll come over there. Why don't I come over there?

DECLASSIFIED

Advisory E01725f

By: A. HARRIS / Mar 05/73

Secy Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

12:46 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 2 -

K: Okay.

S: All right.

K: Be a great honor.

S: I'm sure. And as I say, I don't know where I'm going here except that as I --

K: Well, as I think this thing through, I lean more and more towards the float and against intervention if it can be arranged. And if we intervene, to do it only as a result of it.

S: Yeah. It may develop that the Germans wind up with a national float and Schmidt said that publicly.

K: Well, Schmidt has a call in to me.

S: I called him this morning and we talked and I asked him was that published report accurate or not. He said it was accurate; that it was their last choice, not their first choice, but they would do it. That's the first time he has been willing to mention those words.

K: Schmidt has a call in to me and I'll -- you know, he's an old friend -- and I'll report to you immediately after we've talked.

S: I suggested to him -- He said what did we think and I said well, there is a line of opinion here that we have to allow some period for the market to sort things out; that we felt that the relationship between the mark and the dollar was basically all right and that he might want to, if it's of any use to him, describe a float as being -- as not that way but just say that the par value remains as they see it and they have eliminated the bands around it for the time being -- that's the same thing -- to let the situation settle out. I think by this time, with all the talk of not only a joint float but an individual float, it would be almost impossible to intervene successfully because you have the principal government that would have to put up the money, namely Germany, has demonstrated a lack of conviction on the subject and the speculators would just murder the situation.

K: Yeah, yeah.

S: At any rate, if we can develop a cooperative relationship with the Germans and cement that relationship in on economic grounds and also with the British, the French election seems to be going badly for Gaullists from --

K: Well, it's too early to tell because you can't tell what these voters will do in the second round when their choice is between communist and Gaullists.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258

BY DAVID P. ALISOFY

12:46 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 3 -

S: Right.

K: But it will certainly go less well.

S: Well, anyway, this is the sort of thing I'd like to try to sort out a little bit.

K: Good. Now, in any event, I think now that we shouldn't go for intervention unless the Germans ask us for it.

S: That is the only condition under which we ought to consider it and then I think --

K: I'm not sure we should do it then.

S: I believe there should -- We ought to be willing to think through with them a set of events where this isn't a set -- a float for a period of time so we let them market place settle out and then settle on something which we would agree to defend.

K: Yeah.

S: We can have that kind of an outline, although even that I think is a question. But at any rate, these are things. Any word from the Russians yet?

K: No. Well, wait a minute -- Vorontsov has a call in to me and probably that's what he wants. Let me call him right away and call you back.

S: Well, I would go ahead with the Russian trip. I don't see that this Friday meeting interrupts that.

K: Absolutely not.

S: I can give you the itinerary. In fact, it only highlights the importance to getting around in Europe and talking to people.

K: Absolutely, George.

S: I talked with Sonnenfeldt last night -- or yesterday afternoon and he told me he would talk with you about a strategy for the discussion as I see it. Has he yet?

K: He has. And it sounds good to me.

S: Okay. Well, I'll try to write it up and send it over.

K: Good.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Article E01756
Byron M. Dalsky

TELCOM

Minister Vorontsov/Mr. Kissinger

12:53 p.m., March 5, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: You called me.

V: Ah, yes, Henry. I had in mind just to warn you not to plan any crisis because Anatoliy is coming today, so nothing will happen. Even if you plan a crisis.

K: Yeah.

V: Yeah, he is coming about 2 o'clock to New York so he will be here about 7 o'clock I suppose.

K: He's probably going to be mad as a hatter.

V: (laughter) So you are wondering when he is coming, that's my answer. He's coming today.

K: I triggered him back very early, didn't I?

V: (laughter) Maybe he will be mad. Maybe not, I don't know.

K: Actually now I may put off my vacation -- not because of him -- by a few days.

V: Yeah, maybe.

K: But not because of that. I have some other reasons for doing it.

V: Ah, I see. But this will be helpful anyhow. It will give you more time.

K: Good. It's good to know he's back even though you did things very nicely. Have we heard about Shultz' trip?

V: Not yet but I think that will be today.

K: Good.

V: I'll inform you immediately.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
By: W.N. Patsy 5/30/73

TELCORN

Minister Vorentsev/Mr. Kissinger

12:53 p. m., March 5, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: You called me.

K: Yeah.

V: Yeah, maybe.

K: Good. It's good to know he's back even though you did think's very nicely. Have we heard about Shultz' trip?

K: Good.

K: Good.

TELCOM

Deputy Sec. of Defense Clements/Mr. Kissinger

2:29 p.m., March 5, 1973

C: That speech that you ducked out on at the Veterans' of Foreign War, I didn't do anything like up to your standards but I got by.

K: Good. I'm delighted. I'm not surprised.

C: (laughter) Well, I know they were expecting you but it didn't go off too badly. Two quick things, your Colonel Kennedy called me about those C-123s that you'd like to process from Bangkok and Unger.

K: Yeah.

C: You know anything about this? Apparently this has to do with the situation out there where they are trying to pacify the Thais on some sort of a --

K: Oh, yeah, yeah, that's right.

C: An interim basis and they've come to us and asked us for --

K: I know. Yes, I know about it.

C: C-123s.

K: Right.

C: How important do you think this is? Is it really a pressing matter?

K: Well, we'd like to do it.

C: Um-humm. Air Force is bucking on it.

K: On what grounds?

C: Well, that they are not really surplus and they'd like to keep them and so forth and so on. But I don't know how much validity there really is in that.

K: Yeah, yeah. Well, let me get back at you later.

C: I mean, you were asking for eight. I don't want to seem niggardly about it but I don't think it's impossible, Henry, I'm not saying that but Col Kennedy didn't really give me a sense of high urgency about it and I'm getting some resistance and I think it can be done. I just wanted to double-check it with you and just see how you felt about it.

RECLASSIFIED

Aut. by HAROLD GLOSSER

By

Secy Clements/Mr. Kissinger

2:29 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 2 -

K: Well, let me check on that.

C: Second quick thing, remember I mentioned to you some time back about Middendorf?

K: Yeah.

C: He is in town. I had breakfast with him --

K: Well, the problem is the President doesn't think he's really up to it.

C: He doesn't?

K: No.

C: Well, forget it then. It's all done.

K: But how do we stand with Chuck Cooper?

C: Well, I want you to take Cooper.

K: Well, I want to take Cooper and actually the President doesn't want you to go ahead with Cooper without checking with us again because he thinks we need him more than you do.

C: All right, that's fine. That just suits the hell out of me because I don't want him.

K: Yeah.

C: I think, you know, if you want him, why I think we should be very gracious about it and say, Henry, you can have him. Now this is an obligation on your part and we want some land yap. (laughter) See you're teaching me how to trade.

K: Yeah. I have yet to see the Texan who had to learn it from me.

C: (laughter) But nevertheless, Henry, what I'm saying is that I think that he more appropriately belongs with you. I think he'll do you a better job. I don't think he exactly fits what we want and I'm not for him for that reason. Nothing personal in it at all.

K: Well, that's what I think.

C: All right. I've already told Eddie how I feel and that I think that he ought to let you have him.

CLASSIFIED
SEPT. 5, 1973
Page 3

Eddie Kissinger
8/22/73

Secy Clements/Mr. Kissinger

2:29 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 3 -

K: Yeah.

C: Hell, if the President feels that way, that ought to be enough said.

K: Yeah. Well, that's how he feels.

C: Well, that's just fine. And you're also saying that he also feels that Middendorf isn't heavy enough.

K: That's his feeling but if I absolutely insist on him, he'll take him.

C: No, I don't want to be in that position. Besides that, I think that if we insisted on it in that sense, Henry, that we'd create a system that is unnecessary with Elliot, which I don't want to do.

K: Yeah, yeah.

C: I mean, I just don't want to do that. Elliot is sensitive about this because of the other situation.

K: Yeah.

C: How can I help on that basis then? I've done I think all I can.

K: Well, let me see whether we have any other ideas which I can float through you.

C: Okay.

K: Good, Bill.

C: That will be fine. Thank you, Henry. And if there is urgency on the on 123s, let me know.

K: Right.

C: All right, thank you.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. by E01725F By A. HARRIS 01/95AM

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Minister Schmidt
3/5/73; 2:45 p.m.

S: This is Helmut Schmidt speaking.

K: Hello, Helmut. How are you?

S: Very good of you to call back, Henry. Oh, I am fine. I just left the hospital.

K: Are you at the hospital?

S: Yes.

K: I saw a picture of you attending a Ministers meeting yesterday.

S: In order to do so I left the hospital, but I am not out of the hospital.

K: Uh-huh.

upon

S: Henry, I call/you because I remember a conversation back in October last year when we said I should call upon you when monetary problems tend to become political problems.

K: Absolutely.

S: Henry, I've been with this now ______ the danger. You will have recognized that within the last few days the dollar was weak at all the exchanges all over the world.

K: Right.

S: There are different reasons for it. I think generally speaking and basically speaking the pound value of the dollar is now okay but there are a number of psychological factors working against the dollar. Among these factors is also an official statement of your Administration that the United States Administration would not do anything in order to maintain the value of the dollar -- would not intervene, in other words. I had a conversation over the telephone with GEORGE SHULTZ.

K: Yes, he told me about it.

S: Pardon?

K: He told me about it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E017258
By DAVID ALISLEY

-2-

S: And he will come to Europe on Friday. I am very happy that he decided to go to Europe. But what I would want to explain to you is that I think it would really be worthwhile if the United States would undertake an effort to show that they will participate in the attempt to defend the new system of ______ which we have found upon my return.

K: In other words, you would favor American intervention?

S: Yes. And I think it is not only Germany who would favor it. Of course, we would have to borrow the money from the American ______.

K: That's right.

an

S: But I think there is a danger of /uneasy feeling vis-a-vis the United States all over Europe now.

K: Yeah, I understand. But how about the common float?

S: I think at the present the common float has a probability of less than 50%.

K: Uh-huh.

S: It will not be decided before funding it.

K: Which would you prefer?

S: We will have to wait for second day -- election day in France.

K: Which would you prefer?

S: I would prefer the ______ of the common float of the ______ countries and this is also with preference of Willy Brandt. But we have grave difficulties not only with the British and the Italians but also difficulties with the French.

organize

K: Well the problem is this: If you cannot/ a common float you then want us to intervene.

S: I think in any case you should intervene even if we did organize.

Byron K. Harlan

Declassified

I think it necessary for the United States to give the impression to the Paris (?) trade partners that there really ____ situation to be a serious loss. And not just because they are foreigners, you know.

K: And we should intervene when -- this week, or next week?

S: Uh, next week.

K: Next week.

(board)?

S: The exchanges are closed all over the world here this week.

K: Yeah, of course. All right, Helmut. Let me -- we've been discussing this and ~~when~~ frankly we've been waiting for some requests of this kind.

S: Yeah.

K: We didn't want to originate it.

S: Well, I understand this. On the other hand, please do understand that I was at the hospital until yesterday, so I was not able to operate.

K: All right, let me call you later this week.

S: Okay.

K: I will call you Wednesday.

S: Okay.

K: And you can be sure that this will be taken very, very seriously.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Where should I call you -- in Bonn or in Hamburg?

S: I will be in Bonn on Thursday.

K: I will call you Thursday in Bonn.

S: Very good.

K: And I really have missed talking to you. I have always been out of the country when you've been over here.

S: Yes, well this is the ~~maximal~~ enormous hectic life, isn't it?

TELCON
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:33 p.m., March 5, 1973

K: Bill, I was talking to the President a little while ago about the lunch at the Department tomorrow.

R: Yeah, um-humm.

K: He didn't know exactly what your ideas were but he thought that if some of the senior people there --

R: Okay. You're not speaking about terrorism. You mean just generally speaking.

K: Generally speaking, oh, yeah. No, no; my impression is that he uses the terrorism as an excuse to do what he wanted to do anyway.

R: Right.

K: As a symbolic thing. But, no, he thought a somewhat more general discussion, if you agreed with that.

R: Sure, that's fine. Good. Well, I think the way we should do it maybe start talking a little bit. Of course, we're not going to have much time. If we do it in an hour, it doesn't leave much time for talking. Oh, hell, what we do is do in an hour -- well, an hour and 10 minutes and have the ceremony say 15 minutes.

K: Sure.

R: And he could talk --

K: Well, he'll of course make some remarks at the ceremony.

R: That's right.

K: Well, that I think would be a nice occasion.

R: Yes, I think it is too. Well, I'll alert those who are there to be prepared to say a few words about the problems in the area.

K: Right.

R: Okay. Everything else is going well. I must say (laughter) I had the discouraging experience to talk to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I went up to talk about the Conference and I gave them a briefing of 15 minutes or so about what we had in mind and how we achieved it. We met our goals and the President was very pleased. And the other Ministers were pleased and so forth. And then let them ask questions.

DECLASSIFIED

5:33 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 2 -

R: (cont'd) Oh, my God, they're all over the lot. They're like the Philadelphia Symphony -- somebody's got to harp and somebody's got viola and so forth and they just play their own instruments unrelated to the problem.

K: Yeah. I thought actually considering what we set out to do, we got everything we wanted.

R: That's what I told them. I said we got really everything we wanted and if you have any doubts about it, I'll be glad to have you ask me questions.

K: I mean, if one compares what we submitted with what came out, that's the best test.

R: That's right. They were fine. Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott both made complimentary remarks about it and so forth. But what was so discouraging is that they keep talking about wanting to know what's going on. They're not smart enough or interested enough to ask any questions.

K: yeah, yeah.

R: They asked questions about what are we going to do by way of an assistance program and I kept repeating what I told them in public a week ago and they wanted to know what about Greece and, you know, everybody has his own pet project. Symington thinks the world is going to fall apart economically and what are we going to do about the monetary crisis and all kinds of silly goddamn things. But it really went very well.

K: But basically I have the impression that these fellows know that they have no fundamental criticism about foreign policy.

R: That's right.

K: So they are just nitpicking around on whatever hobby horse they have.

R: And they're particularly unhappy now that the only real hobby horse they had left is that we wouldn't come up and testify. Now I'm going up and testifying so often, they don't know what the hell to make of it.

K: (laughter)

R: But the --

K: But, you know, the amazing thing is -- Take this Conference. The only one that the North Vietnamese really wanted to settle with was us.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01725f
Byron HARRIS

5:33 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 3 -

R: Exactly. Exactly.

K: The only ones who can talk to both the Soviets and the Chinese are we.

R: (laughter) I know it. And the Chinese and the Russians spend all their time cultivating us.

K: That's right.

R: You know they were both eager. The Hungarians and the Poles told me when I talked to them, how pleased Gromyko had been that I had called him before I met with the Chinese Foreign Minister.

K: That was a very sensitive move.

R: No, it wasn't really. I was pointing out how --

K: No, no, but it was the right thing to do because I think these people are so split, that we don't have to cultivate ...

R: That's right.

K: We can afford to play square with both of them and that's the best way to keep this split going.

R: Exactly. And of course, I treated them exactly alike. We had dinner with both of them. I took Gromyko and his wife out -- Adele and I did. And we had dinner with Chi P'eng-fei (?) and then we had tea with both of them. Just exactly the same. Just about the same amount of time.

K: Tell me something personally. Can you find something to talk about with Chi P'eng-fei?

R: He's a little difficult, isn't he?

K: He is tough going.

R: I know. Fortunately the Ambassador over there --

K: Oh, he's a riot.

R: Yeah.

K: You know, I'd go to him in the evening of these negotiations. Occasionally I'd say look, we'll have to bomb North Vietnam, we'll level them. He'd fill my glass and say "gham bei" (sp?). (Laughter) Just between you and them. No, he's good. And this fellow, Chang. (sp?)

CLASSIFIED

Aero. 802217 MAR 19/73 By: A.

Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:33 p.m., March 5, 1973

R: Yes, he's good.

K: Did they give you any idea whom they might send here?

R: No, they didn't.

K: Yeah. I was wondering whether they might send Chang (sp?) because he's really very good.

R: You know, I think that Bill Sullivan has the idea that we ought to have a very sort of low level group on this Economic Commission. I don't agree with him. I'm going to recommend a little higher level group, particularly initially because it's important that we have someone that will carry some weight with Congress.

K: Well, but we better -- We've given them three names that were recommended by Sullivan and supported by Rush.

R: Who are they? I didn't -- I asked them to wait. Who? (sp?)

K: Weintraub, Marshaller, and somebody Treasury gave,

R: Christ.

K: But we can always send some --

R: Well, my thought was they're going to have Thach there for the first 60 days. The reason Sullivan feels that way is he was afraid he was going to get stuck with it. But I think if they're going to have Thach there who is a hell of a --

K: No, they've changed now. They're going to have a senior guy there for the first week or two and then they've given us a new name. I've got it here somewhere.

R: Oh.

K: Who's about on the Weintraub level.

R: Um-humm.

K: And we can always send over a more senior guy and get a more senior guy from them in.

R: Yeah.

CLASSIFIED

AUG. 01 89 02:25 f
BY: HARMONIAL

Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:33 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 5 -

K: But, actually, we accepted the names we got from --

R: Oh, I understand. I was thinking about -- I think somebody like Maury (sp?
Williams is somebody we ought to consider. We're going to have a hell
of a fight up on the Hill.

K: Well, that's a good idea. We might -- We can always replace Weintrout
with Maury Williams.

R: But Weintraub is fine you know. But he doesn't -- We need him here for
one thing.

K: Look, we'd be very receptive to that. I think the world of Maury Williams.

R: Yeah, I do too. I do too. Or Bill Armstrong. Bill Armstrong is good.
Either one of them is good with Congress but Maury Williams is more
experienced in this type of thing.

K: Yeah.

R: And he would be good with Congress.

K: Well, let's consider that.

R: Okay, Henry.

K: Good, Bill.

R: Fine. See you tomorrow.

K: Right, bye.

R: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Action E017258
By a HARRY DAVIS

TELCORN

Secretary Shultz (Treasury)/Mr. Kissinger

6:03 p.m., March 5, 1973

S: Henry, I'm about to leave to come over there.

K: Are you threatening me?

S: (laughter) I thought that if it's all right with you, I'd like to bring
Bill Simon and Paul Volcker because I think they'll have some useful
inputs for you.

K: Okay.

S: So we'll be along.

K: We've heard from the Soviets and it's okay. So you can make your
announcement whenever you want.

S: All right, we'll do that tomorrow then.

K: Okay.

S: Very fine. See you soon.

K: And I'll tell you about the talk with Schmidt when you come here.

S: Okay. Fine, thanks.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Auto. by E017258
By: D. HARRIS

TELCONE

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

6:17 p.m., March 5, 1973

J: I've got some thoughts on some paper about what I think, you know, some basic principles for the beginning of SALT II.

K: Yeah. Can I have them?

J: Yeah. Now I have an idea in this -- I don't elaborate it -- I allude to it at the very tail end of it. I'd like for a copy to get to the President. I think it could be useful to him. I wish you'd look it over first and if he wants to talk to me, I can talk to him or if you want, I can call him on the phone.

K: Well, why don't you send it to me first. I don't think he's quite ready yet for a discussion because he isn't going to get his own papers on it until about Wednesday.

J: Yeah. The Security Council meets Thursday, don't they?

K: Right. But he won't make any decisions there and I think you'd have a greater impact -- I mean, of course, anytime you want to talk to him, I'll arrange it.

J: Sure.

K: But my suggestion is if you could talk to him after the meeting or shortly before, it would be better for him and more productive for you.

J: Right. Well, suppose I call him at the end of the day on Wednesday.

K: End of the day on Wednesday or better yet, end of the day on Thursday. Because he won't make any decisions before Friday or Saturday.

J: He won't?

K: No. You can count on it.

J: But I would like for him to see this piece of paper.

K: He'll see it before the meeting.

J: That's what I mean. Then I can talk to him. If he wants to talk to me, I'll be available.

K: It will be among his papers.

CLASSIFIED

Acta. E017258
By: A. Kissinger

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

6:17 p.m., March 5, 1973

J: Well, I have an idea here, you see, in which he can wear the white hat in dealing with the Congress. My basic pitch would be that we ought to be for a reduction and get them to come down and even if necessary below our levels. I mean, we could go below ours, you see, the current levels.

K: No, that's not inconsistent with our own thinking here.

J: Yeah. And my idea would be that in dealing with the Defense budget, he could be the guy wearing the white hat. It would be another surprise. And he might ought to go and he ought to give serious consideration of going public on that basic principle.

K: Could you send us your paper?

J: Yeah. Now, listen, I'll have Dorothy bring it down on the way home tonight.

K: Let her do that, to my office.

J: What does she do at the gate? Would you tell them that she'll be at the gate?

K: Absolutely. She'll come in on West Executive Avenue?

J: Which one is that?

K: Is she going to drive?

J: She's going to drive down.

K: West Executive -- that's the one between the White House and the old State Department building.

J: Yeah. Well, you can come in from the South end of it, isn't it?

K: That's the one I mean.

J: Yeah. All right. She'll come by. Dorothy Fosdick (sp?)

K: Right. If I'm not there, let her ask for General Scowcroft. Now as long as I've got you on the phone, Scoop, we are now -- we may make Ikle head of ACDA. We are still thinking though of perhaps moving him to ISA. And putting Herzfeld in charge of ACDA if you think we could get him confirmed. What do you think?

DECLASSIFIED

Audioly E017258
By a HARRISley

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

6:17 p.m., March 5, 1973

- 3 -

J: Well, I'm just worried about that syndrome on -- you know, what I mentioned.

K: Yeah. But do you think we could get him confirmed?

J: Well, Herzfeld is a nice guy but I think it would just raise, you know, a real, real problem on that. As a man, he's a fine person but I think you've got real problems. You understand what I'm getting at. I mean, I can just see with the Church thing coming up, you know.

K: Oh, Chile, oh, I understand.

J: You see. The Chile thing is going to be blowing next -- you know.

K: I hadn't thought of that. No, so we'll go with Ikle.

J: Yeah. It'd do a mistake. I mean, the timing, Henry. God, I --

K: Yeah. I understand. No, no, I hadn't thought of that. Absolutely, we can't put in there.

J: No, no, no. I'd go ahead with what's his name, unless you've got someone else, you know.

K: No. No, no, I want to get somebody into ISA that is sympathetic.

J: Yeah, yeah. Well, I think you'll want to move on ACDA though pretty soon.

K: We'll do it within the next few days.

J: All right. I'll have Dorothy get this down and let me know if I should talk to the President.

K: Well, I'll call you after I've read it.

J: You look it over.

K: Right.

J: Okay.

K: Thank you, Scoop.

wgh

TELCONE

Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger

9:36 a.m., March 6, 1973

S: Hello, Henry, Bill.

K: Oh, yes, Bill.

S: I hear your public address system broke down the other night.

K: You know, they turned into such a bunch of sentimental slobs that even though I gave a lousy speech, they were all enchanted.

S: (laughter)

K: What is your report?

S: I just heard from one or two that everything went well and you were crisp and sentimental and you turned to a sentimental slob.

K: (laughter) Here are these guys who think they are cynical and tough.

S: Right.

K: And nothing. They went through all the rituals of the Chinese banquet. They got up and drank up toasts to each other. It was maudlin. I got so rattled by Elfin's introduction that I forgot all the jokes my colleagues had given me and I just was telling vignettes of what newsmen had done there.

S: Actually, that's the thing you want to hit them with.

K: And I said Helen Thomas beat the world's record for chewing gum. They liked that.

S: (laughter)

K: Now, what do you want?

S: Two things. One, there's a fascinating piece by John Osborne in the *New Republic* this week about Henry Brandon's book, zeroing in on the relationship between you and the President.

K: Me and the President.

S: Between you and the President.

K: Is it going to be damaging?

CLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By DAVID L. CHISKEY

Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger

9:36 a.m., March 6, 1973

2

S: Well, you know, it just quotes liberally from the book. Nobody reads Osborne.

K: In other words, it's going to be damaging.

S: Ah-h, no more than the book was. The New Republic is upbeat now, takes the President seriously.

K: Now you see, that son-of-a-bitch Brandon -- I'm not talking to him anymore. You know, I was very friendly with him, which one I suppose can't do with newsmen on the assumption that when I'm in his house as a guest that that then is not fair to write about.

S: That's no problem really in the selections in the book. There's his analysis of your relationship with Nixon, which is not ........

K: Yeah.

S: Secondly, I'd like to sit down with you and talk about my book.

K: Safire, I have my book to worry about.

S: Exactly. But you have to have a teaser out there, right? I send these memos and make these requests and it's like dropping them in the Grand Canyon.

K: That's true.

S: What I need really is somebody to say Look, Safire, you're never going to get this, stop trying" or "Here it is." But I'm being diddled.

K: You're not being diddled, you're being ignored.

S: That's even -- You know, that's not as bad as being diddled. So what I need to do -- this is very important, Henry, and my tour of duty is coming to an end.

K: When are you leaving?

S: April 1.

K: Oh, really?

S: Yeah.

K: Huh.

CLASSIFIED

Byron HARRIS

TELCONE

Amb. U. Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

9:42 a.m., March 6, 1973

K: Alex, with that superb intellectual input, you're getting from the Chiefs, I think you must be in great shape.

J: (laughter) Oh, boy. Oh, boy. I must say, things aren't --

K: I mean, intellectually, I think this is the most tawdry performance I've ever seen.

J: Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'm very concerned about it.

K: No, no; you put 10 million pounds throw away, 25 hundred delivery vehicles and you've ratified the Soviet strategic system.

J: Oh, yeah, sure thing.

K: And then if you conclude that MIRV -- their MIRVing is in our interest.

J: I don't -- this business on MIRVs comes as a complete surprise to me. I thought MIRVs was the one thing that we were interested in.

K: Well, I tell you honestly, simply as an individual -- I don't know where the President's going to come out, probably with the Chiefs.

J: Do you think he may?

K: Well, if I hit him with it cold now --

J: Yeah.

K: He'll certainly come out with the Chiefs.

J: Yeah, yeah.

K: It will need some -- If I have a few weeks to educate him, I think he'll come out on the right percision. I just think that if we let them -- if we put no limits on their MIRVs, we are going to have an unbelievable strategic problem. It doesn't do us any good if we get equally good MIRVs or even equally many, that just makes it a first strike world again.

J: But the Minuteman -- It's just a matter of buying time on them.

K: Yeah, but time is important.

CLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01258
By D. HARRIS

9:42 a.m., March 6, 1973

2

J: Buying a few years on them. If they improve accuracy on their lighter weapons, they're still going to make the Minutemen vulnerable.

K: Yeah, but then they have to expend them all.

J: Oh, yeah, sure thing, sure thing.

K: Well, I'm not going to bleed for a MIRV ban but I haven't heard an intelligent discussion in the Verification Panel to tell you the truth.

J: No, no, no. I have the impression that Bill Clements is shooting from the hip fairly heavily on this. Have you talked to Elliot on this?

K: Yeah, yeah.

J: I'm going over to see him tomorrow. I don't know -- Where does Elliot stand on this?

K: He hadn't made up his mind when I spoke to him.

J: I'm going over to see him tomorrow. I wanted to see him by all means before the NSC and I'll be seeing him tomorrow afternoon. Well, what I'm calling about is -- What you see the planning outlook to be.

K: I think the best strategy would be for you to go for a week or so -- ten days -- with our current position on equivalents plus exploring what they have in mind with MIRVs.

J: I suggested that myself. I drew back a little bit on exploring on MIRVs over my concern that if we don't want to go for MIRVs at all, why it's very difficult for me to have -- I don't want to have gone too far down the MIRV road with them.

K: Well, but you just find out what they have in mind.

J: Yeah, I can do that I think.

K: I don't think we should state any position. Then within two weeks, I ought to be able to get you a MIRV position. . . . just tell them we just can't go any further now.

J: Yes, yes. All right. Well, I can do that.

K: Or giving your position. That is my present instinct.

CLASSIFIED

Anon. E017258
By: D. M. Olszew

Amb. Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

9:42 a.m., March 6, 1973

J: All right. Then you don't see any point in my staying over for Friday or do you think I should plan to stay Friday and go on Saturday?

K: I think you should go Saturday and see the President on Friday.

J: Friday, in any event.

K: Yeah.

J: All right. I'm going to make that firm then. I need to --

K: I think there's no sense in you seeing the President until after the NSC meeting.

J: No, no; I agree. What I was going to suggest was that I do postpone. I'll just change till Saturday and make Saturday my departure date so I'll be available on Friday.

K: And we'll definitely set something up for Friday.

J: All right, All right. The other subject is the ______ Commission, Henry. We owe them a reply on that. Remember they came at us in January and asked us what we wanted to do or what we were going to do. I sent over -- Or we sent over a memo in January suggesting that we say that for the time being that I would be double-hatting but there's not been any action on that.

K: Okay. I'm sure we'll approve that.

J: And we do owe them a reply and we should give them a reply at Geneva.

K: You'll get a reply.

J: All right.

K: You'll get an answer.

J: Okay. That's all I've got.

K: Okay, Alex.

J: Okay, thank you.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Welcome back!

D: Thank you very much. Brezhnev send me in a rather urgent plane to keep eye on you.

K: I figured that.

D: (laughter) He even gave me a special plane up to London.

K: By, God, you know --

D: Because they didn't know that we will have a chance to get permission of American authority. Otherwise, he was giving me a plane to go directly to Washington, D. C.

K: Anatol, now quite seriously.

D: Yeah, I'm telling you quite seriously.

K: No, no, but you can always assume you will get authority from us. You don't have to check before.

D: Oh, really?

K: No, no; quite seriously, you let me know and we will clear you.

D: Well, that's why I said I will take your plane only up to London and from London I will take whatever airplane takes off. So up to London I was flying in his plane but from London I took --

K: No, just let Vorontsov -- You know, if it should ever arise again --

D: Oh, I see, I will.

K: And in fact, you can assume it's a general proposition.

D: Yeah.

K: You know.

D: Yeah. Okay, thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F012058
By N.W. Pa. 500-0074

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

2

K: You know, I wouldn't send Bison planes over here --

D: (laughter)

K: ... cameras crazy. But any time Brezhnev wants to send a special plane, you can consider it will be done.

D: I understand. Okay, thank you very much. How are things going on?

K: Well, Anatol, you outmaneuvered me again.

D: No, it couldn't be.

K: Yes, I thought I would tell Vorontsov I'm going on vacation. I figured you wouldn't come back, I would then have a good excuse for delaying things another three weeks.

D: (laughter) Well, Brezhnev hoped that you will not go on a vacation until they finish the major things I guess.

K: No, no, no.

D: And before it will be clear that you could go to Moscow.

K: Oh, no, I'll go to Moscow.

D: Yes. Well, that's why he hoped that this will be clear before you went for a vacation.

K: But he didn't put it in his letter.

D: Well, he did -- He called me and I will tell you when I will see you what happened really. I was in from Moscow -- then he called me and he asked me "Did you tell Henry that I invite him?" I said "Yes, I did." But from what I saw in telegram, it is not clear; he wanted it to be in letter. I say, "Well, he would like to show to the President that you put it in writing." "Oh," he said, "do you think he wants to get it in writing?" I said, "Definitely, my impression, because otherwise I mention to him."

K: No, no --

D: Because first he --

K: You see the reason I wanted it was for our own bureaucratic reasons, there's no problem.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958
By: N.M. Dake

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

3

D: No, no, I understand.

K: But you know it helps if we can show the other interested parties that
this wasn't something we cooked up.

D: Yeah, no, I understand. But his call to me was because he thought that maybe I forgot to mention to you when I was in Washington.

K: Oh, no, no, no, you had mentioned to me.

D: Yes.
And it's

K: Clearly understood and there's no problem with the President.

D: Yes. So he called me, "Did you mention it?" I said, "Yes, I did."
He said, "Why he want it?" Then I gave him my own information -- that
I think it should be in written form, the next step so to speak. Probably
this is already written.

K: It's a pure formality.

D: So he said, "It should be done?" I said, "Yes." Then give Vorontsov
permission to put it in letter. I said, "That's all right."

K: He didn't put it in.

D: No, he did, he did.

K: No, not in the letter he sent us.

D: No, no, no, he did. Oh, no, no, on this I'm 100% sure because I wrote
myself a telegram and Gromyko signed it. And Vorontsov report back to
me that it was in time.
Well, then

K: Let me look at the letter again.

D: Well, I have a letter -- he gave me here a copy. Because first thing
I have done when I arrived yesterday was to give me the letter which he
sent and it was there.

K: Well, it's all right. I'm coming anyway. When does he want me to come?
I hope not before the second half of April.

D: When will you be ready to come?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By W.W. Stockton

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

4

K: Well, that depends on you. You're agreeing to all our propositions?

D: Well, this is the point we're going to discuss with you. (laughter)

K: Well, what would make a good impression, Anatol, -- I don't want to suggest to you but I think it would speed the SALT discussions if you proposed that you will dismantle all SS-9s in the next phase of SALT, we would make very rapid progress.

D: Yeah.

K: Just the big ones as a sign of good will.

D: Yeah.

K: (laughter)

D: (laughter) I think it's a good idea.

K: I think Smirnov ....

D: I think it's just a good idea. And for Johnson and Smirnov really because now they will spend another two months I guess just to get acquainted with each other.

K: Well, look, we are -- You and I will have a hell of a lot of work to do because we don't have a lot of time.

D: Yes, really being on the serious side, because Brezhnev really send me that quick in such a way because he really was under the impression from telegram that Vorontsov sent that really now you are prepared to discuss and he says everything --

K: No, no, I'm saying that if he's coming in June, which is now settled I understand.

D: Well, I think we could settle with you now.

K: Yeah. Well, from our side, it's settled.

D: Yeah.

K: So if he's coming in June, it must be a success.

D: Yeah, this is the point.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205540
By: N.A.A. 5-73

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

5

K: If it must be a success if we follow some of the agenda you sent us, you and I will have to work like dogs.

D: Exactly.

K: Because we only have two months to do it.

D: Exactly. This is the point.

K: And, therefore, I just wanted Vorontsov to know that I was going on vacation on March 11th and that if you then didn't come back before that, we wouldn't get together before the 20th.

D: Yeah. No, no; here I am.

K: Quite honestly, I may delay it a few days.

D: Yeah, I think it will be good idea just to have a first round and to report, you see.

K: I may not leave now until the 16th or 17th.

D: I think it will be good idea, really. Because then we will have a first round and give us something to be based on.

K: Okay.

D: I would say so. When I have a chance to see you?

K: When would you like to see me? Today or tomorrow?

D: Today.

K: Today?

D: Yeah.

K: Okay. I'm not in final shape but let's have a preliminary talk today.

D: Yes, just to begin with. What? 6 o'clock? 5 o'clock? Or this afternoon.

K: Let's say 5:30. Oh, let's say 6:00. Yeah, I'll have only an hour but that will be enough.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: WW
Date: 3-10-73

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

6

D: No, I think that will be good too. And tomorrow we'll continue.

[Laughter]

K: Oh, God.

D: (laughter) I'm sure you'll prepare everything. You have all the answers already. It's much more easier. (laughter) I guess maybe they'll also hear our plans and even by ......... we will dismantle all the SS-9s in a year or so, when we ask you to withdraw some other things --

K: No, you dismantle all SS-9s and we will give you good will.

D: I think is good idea too.

K: I know you're so easy to deal with --

D: Yes.

K: You'll agree to that easily.

D: Well, I think it will be time for Mr. Brezhnev to think it over about this proposal while you will be on vacation. To exchange good will on SS-9s.

K: I thought it was a reasonable proposal.

D: Well, I think it will be just about time to think it over while you will be on vacation.

K: (laughter) Okay. But what we ought to do today is have a preliminary talk. And our attitude is -- Well, first of all, we ought to set a date fairly soon.

D: Yeah, okay. And we will go through this once and then we will --

K: Just discuss procedures and, in any event, I want to tell you that I'm under instructions to see to it that the visit will be a notable success.

D: This is it exactly.

K: And now how we're going to do it depends on your needs to some extent.

D: Exactly, because Brezhnev thinks in terms that next year the President will be in Moscow again.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By: A. M. Gorbachev

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

7

K: That's our thinking too.

D: And not only Moscow, but to have him through the country.

K: Well, that will be in principle very acceptable.

D: So this he really asked me to tell to you and to the President and that's why his coming here will be enough on the result that it will be really a buildup for the next successful ______ next year.

K: It's a necessity.

D: Yes.

K: And then I'm willing and, as a matter of fact, I think it's important to go to Moscow say any time from April 15th on.

D: Okay. Brezhnev put to me this way -- that I have to check about your visit and the date as he put it -- any way you would like to have in terms of confidential or it is entirely up to you if it is open.

K: Well, I think it is hard for me to go secretly.

D: Oh, no, it's no problem. He just raised it --

K: Well, make it an open visit.

D: Okay, it is settled.

K: And we will discuss how to proceed with it.

D: Yes.

K: Good. See you at --

D: 6 o'clock.

K: 6 o'clock.

D: Okay, Henry. The usual place?

K: Yes.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Welcome back!

D: Thank you very much. Breshnev send me in a rather urgent plane to keep
eye on you.

K: I figured that.

K: By, God, you know --

D: Oh, really?

D: Oh, Isae, I will.

D: Yeah.

K: You know.

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

D: (laughter)

E: ... cameras crazy. But any time Breshnev wants to send a special plane, you can consider it will be done.

D: No, it couldn't be.

D: (laughter) Well, Breshnev hoped that you will not go on a vacation until they finish the major things I guess.

K: No, no, no.

K: Oh, no, I'll go to Moscow.

K: No, no --

D: Because first he --

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

3

D: No, no, I understand.

D: Yes.

K: And it's

K: It is a pure formality.

D: So he said, "It should be done?" I said, "Yes." Then give Vorontsov permission to put it in letter. I said, "That is all right."

K: He didn't put it in.

D: No, he did, he did.

K: Well, then
Let me look at the letter again.

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

4

K: Well, that depends on you. You re agreeing to all our propositions?

D: Well, this is the point we re going to discuss with you. (laughter)

D: Yeah.

D: Yeah.

K: (laughter)

K: I think Smirnov....

D: Yes, really being on the serious side, because Breshnev really send me that quick in such a way because he really was under the impression from telegram that Vorontsov sent that really now you are prepared to discuss and he says everything --

D: Yeah.

D: Yeah, this is the point.

DECLASSIFIED

Anonymously E01725f
By: Dmytriy Vlasenko

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

5

D: Exactly.

D: Yeah. No, no; here I am.

K: Okay.

D: Today.

K: Today?

D: Yeah.

CLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258
By D. HARRISley

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:24 p.m., March 6, 1973

6

E: No, I think that will be good too. And tomorrow we'll continue.
[Laughter]
K: Oh, God.
D: (laughter) I'm sure you'll prepare everything. You have all the answers already. It's much more easier. (laughter) I guess maybe they'll also hear our plans and even by ......... we will dismantle all the SS-9s in a year or so, when we ask you to withdraw some other things --
K: No, you dismantle all SS-9s and we will give you good will.
D: I think it's good idea too.
K: I know you're so easy to deal with --
D: Yes.
K: You'll agree to that easily.
D: Well, I think it will be time for Mr. Brezhnev to think it over about this proposal while you will be on vacation. To exchange good will on SS-9s.
K: I thought it was a reasonable proposal.
D: Well, I think it will be just about time to think it over while you will be on vacation.
K: (laughter) Okay. But what we ought to do today is have a preliminary talk. And our attitude is -- Well, first of all, we ought to set a date fairly soon.
D: Yeah, okay. And we will go through this once and then we will --
K: Just discuss procedures and, in any event, I want to tell you that I'm under instructions to see to it that the visit will be a notable success.
D: This is it exactly.
K: And now how we're going to do it depends on your needs to some extent.
D: Exactly, because Brezhnev thinks in terms that next year the President will be in Moscow again.

DECLASSIFIED

Autonomy E017258
By DAVID B. CHISLEY

Telcon

Mrs. Joseph Alsop/HAK

March 6, 1973; 3:06 p.m.

K: Hello.

A: Henry, dear. Henry?

K: Yes.

[Chiles]

A: I'm so glad to have a chance to talk to you. Frank/is not in.
I'll see if we can find him for you.

K: No, no, it's not crucial. Is he going to be here the rest of this
week, or is he leaving?

A: No, he's leaving this evening for London.

K: That is what I thought. So my idiot office has scheduled him
for Thursday.

A: Ahhhh! Well, that is just a mistake on Henry Brandon's part.
That's all I can say. So I will tell him. He seemed to, you know,
he enjoyed the evening here and he loved the luncheon Tuesday.

K: You know, I feel very strongly about old friends.

A: You're very old friends. He did tell me that he was longing to
see you in the office for just one or two little moments.

K: Well, I certainly know -- just tell him to come in at 4:30.

A: I'll try and find him and do that.

K: Can you do that?

A: I can do that. And Henry, while I have you, it's great. I had a very
good conversation with Saigon this morning. It surely was.

K: [Unintelligible]

A: Yes. You'll be getting a message from him in a couple of days.
He accepts with gratitude and appreciation your enormous interest,
and the President's, and of course he'll go to Vientiane.

K: Good. Wonderful.

A:

SAINTED

-2-

in the case. This is very much between us, Henry. Right?

K: Right. Of course.

A: Of course. SANITIZED

which is very important sometimes. He can be very helpful. But, Henry, I'm really very pleased because Charlie, you know, wants to serve his country and he was determined after what I told him this morning about your kindness the other night and the message you brought me, and there's no question of wanting Morocco or Bangkok, or anything else. If you want him to go to Laos, that's where he goes. And he is grateful for your caring about him. And you will be receiving a message from me. Pay no attention to a message to Mrs. Andrews from me yesterday. He is coming back by chance on the 22nd of March just to try and and Joe had wondered whether it was necessary for him to come earlier. But Charlie thought that you would not want to see him. I mean you'll get the note...

K: No, no, I'll see him when he is back but it won't be...

A: Yes, but I mean there's no - I mean you'll get a message from him during the next two days. And he said he couldn't send it today You see what I mean - tonight - and again hope that he's decided that whether you want him to go. SANITIZED

but I think that he goes to where

K: Well that's very....

A: For the sake of the US of A. And, uh, also my love, that's wonderful. And so pay no attention. Mrs. Andrews will be fussing you with messages from me, because I've been.

K: Oh, no, she's just given it to me. She isn't fussing.

A: I think there's no urgency for you about Charlies return, because, - uh - I don't know quite your situation about Laos. Do you want him there much faster?

K: No, no. No.

A: Well, he can stay. Well, he'll be coming to Washington, then, and so - there we are, and he was very, very grateful, Henry. I told him

CLASSIFIED

Ad No. E017225
By: A. R. D. L. S. C.

-3-

him about your caring, and he knew that already, but he's ready to face - this is a horrible decision, it really is.

### SANITIZED

K: Well, Susan Mary, I knew you would solve it for us.

A: Excuse me?

K: I knew you would solve it.

A: No, my darling. I was very stupid.

### SANITIZED

you see what I mean.
ripe

K: No, it wasn't right yet.

A: It wasn't right. It would not have been correct.

### SANITIZED

K: Good, Susan.
totally

A: Not that I would probably believe in them, but at least it's a step - one step forward. Now I'll get Frank Chiles if I possibly can and in case I can't reach him, I will call someone...

K: Tell him to call me anyway.

A: Exactly.

K: And extend the profuse apologies for my office's stupidity.

A: Oh, no, I know Henry Brandon has just mucked it up, don't you.

K: Well, that's what it sounds like to me.

A: I have no confidence in the London Sunday Times. I always have great confidence in Frank Chiles.

K: Good. Try and find him for me.

A: All right. Bless you.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively E017258

By DAVID HARRIS 01/05/04

Telcon

Ann Black/HAK

March 6, 1973; 4:18 p.m.

K: Hello.

B: Hi.

K: How are you?

B: Fine, thank you. I must tell you that I've been thinking of calling you. I'm very embarrassed. It's been so long - to congratulate you and tell you how really proud I was to know you.

K: Aren't you nice?

B: Really, I've made my children sit in front of the television set and watch you to say that one day they can say that their mother knew you.

K: Very well.

B: How's everything?

K: very well.

B:] Did you see my film on China?

K: I haven't seen it. I would love to see it. Were you there ?

B: Well, I was invited to go, and I got all my shots so I can get yellow fever, cholera. At the last moment I decided not to go. The trip was just too long. Three months is a long time for me to be away from here, as much as I would have liked to have gone.

K: The Chinese are pleased with the film.

B: Apparently very much so. Mr. Mau of the Ministry of Information sent word from Paris that they were extraordinarily pleased. They want as many copies of the film as they can get. They are going to show it all over the country so that those people who are too far from Peking can get an opportunity to see what the Forbidden City looks like.

K: Can you send it down sometime?

B: Absolutely. I certainly will. I was wondering - did you hear anything about it when you were there?

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. July 50-7258
By DAVID RALEIGH

-2-

K: Yes. They liked it very much.
really

B: It is nice, though. It's ~~very~~ very pretty.

K: And they were just telling me where your cameras were and
what a total nuisance you were about lighting the place.

B: Oh, you can imagine. Well, they had only one generator for one thing, which, as you know - American television people are a little bit difficult to deal with to start with. Lucy in particular. And we had to share the generator with the Chinese broadcasting, and I guess with anybody else who needed it, so things were a little bit hard at first. I gather the Chinese went so out of their way to accommodate them.

K: Good.

B: It all worked out very nicely in the end. There's one thing I wanted to ask you about. Apparently the Chinese are very interested in our coming back. This time I would go. Ruth and I would love to talk to you at some point. But to talk to you before we make any proposals for future shows to see if there are any thoughts on the part of the government and what they think would be an advantageous show to do. From our point of view as well as the Chinese.

K: Well look, I'm going to go away on vacation next week sometime, so it will have to wait until I get back at the end of the month.

B: I'm going too, to Disneyland. Where are you going?

K: I'm going, uh...

B: Or is it a secret?

K: No, no, I'm going to Mexico. Eventually I'll wind up on the West Coast with the President.

B: When will you be back? The end of March?

K: The 26th or 27th, somewhere in there.

B: Well, do you think you'll have any time the last week of March or the first week of April?

K: The first week of April I'll be on the West Coast. Why don't we try

for the second week of April?

B: Second week of April. What shall I do, call your secretary?

K: Yeah.

B: I saw Nancy the other day.

K: Oh, good.

B: I hadn't seen - well, I've seen her in the paper -- both of you -- but I saw her on the street and we plan to have lunch next week one day.

K: Oh, terrific.

B: I'll call your secretary.

K: I'll see you in April then.

B: I'll call her the first week of April.

K: That would be good.

B: You want us to send the film or bring it?

K: Either way.

B: Will you have a chance to see it before? I can send it immediately.

K: Well, why don't you send it and maybe I can --

B: Okay, fine. I'll see you then and have a wonderful trip.

K: Thank you. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Agency EO17258
By DA HARNETT 01/15/64

TELCORN

Frank Giles/Mr. Kissinger

5:50pm, March 6, 1973

G: Hello, Henry.

K: Frank, I'm distressed that my office got our appointment screwed up.

G: Well, it's just too bad and, of course, I'm very disappointed not to see you but I quite understand.

K: Well, I can't quite understand. You're an old friend and that's inexcusable. It was just an accident that I asked when am I going to see Frank Giles. They said on Thursday.

G: (laughter) By this time, I'd be tucked up in bed in London, you see.

K: Well, exactly. When are you leaving today?

G: I'm leaving in about 20 minutes time for the airport.

K: Well, it's absolutely inexcusable.

G: What I do comfort myself is that we did have some good talks in fact. I still would like to have asked you one or two things but that can wait.

K: Well, what I wanted you to know that had I understood that it hadn't been done -- Well, I just didn't -- It seemed inconceivable to me that they wouldn't schedule it because I was -- When I suggested lunch, that showed you how interested I was to see you.

G: Exactly. I wish I could have taken that up.

K: No, no; that is unimportant. Because I took it for granted that an appointment be set some other time.

G: Well, it's sad and too bad. But please don't think that I'm offended or upset. I'm just disappointed.

K: I'm disappointed too.

G: That's all. Well, keep your ______ up, Henry, and come our way if you can. And if that scheme you were speaking of does materialize at all, pray let me know well ahead of time and let me know if there's anything I can do for you.

K: Well, in that case, you'll have me on your hands for several months.

CLASSIFIED

Antonly E01728
By: J. R. DeGleisd

Frank Giles/Mr. Kissinger

5:50 p.m., March 6, 1973

G: If you want anything done or set up or the trail blazed, let me know.

K: I hope to see you before then.

G: Well, I hope so indeed. Okay, Henry. Well, it was lovely seeing you.

K: Well, it was great to see you, Frank, and I'm really disappointed that we meet again.

G: Yes, that's too bad. Okay, Henry, be seeing you.

K: See you soon.

G: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By: D. M. DeGloster

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., March 6, 1973

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: Thank God. What do you do, make me ring 10 minutes?

D: Oh, excuse me, I was in a different room, you see. Henry, excuse me, but I forgot to mention because he specifically asked me to convey his warmest regards to the President and he said he is looking very much to meet him personally in June. And second, the same for you and he hoped to see you in April.

K: Thank you very much.

D: And that was specifically emphasized twice and I just forgot to tell you so it's my fault.

K: No, but the spirit of your comments made it quite clear.

D: Yeah, definitely. But he make it very specifically, that's why I --

K: I can tell you for him that we are really looking forward to this and the President has already told me many times that he hopes that this visit will be a great success. And I mentioned to him the invitation of coming to the Soviet Union next year.

D: Yeah.

K: And he was extremely pleased.

D: No, I think this will be what's going to happen really. Okay, Henry.

K: Good. Anatol, I have one minor thing. The White House photographer was very impressed by a Russian camera which is called Horizon T.

D: Yes.

K: And he would like to buy it.

D: A photographer?

K: Yes. It's a photographer -- he takes all the pictures for the President.

D: Oh, I see. This is called "Horizon."

K: Yeah. He says it is the best camera for a wide picture anywhere in the world.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FA 2058
By: N.M. DeSoto Date: 03/04/73