THE INSTITUTE ON ETHICS

OF

THE INSTITUTE FOR RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL STUDIES.

THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF AMERICA

3080 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 27, N. Y.

CLARENCE H. FAUST
DIRECTOR, 1958

RIVERSIDE 9-5000

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

LYMAN BRYSON
LOUIS FINKELSTEIN
HUDSON HOAGLAND
F. ERNEST JOHNSON
JOHN LAFARGE, S. J.
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
R. M. MACIVER
RICHARD P. MCKEON
I. I. RABI

January 2, 1958

Dear Doctor Kissinger:

It was pleasant to see your book review in *The Times Literary Supplement* that arrived this morning. In case you do not receive it regularly the enclosed photostat may prove helpful in tracking a copy.

Doctor Henry A. Kissinger
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

ns
enc.

SITUATION ANALYSIS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES
---
WEST BAY COUNTIES CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE

To be considered at January 1958 meeting

16 December 1957

I PREMISES

A basic conflict of ideology and concepts of human behavior exists between the Russian Communist and those nations whose governments are based on the rights of the individual.

The Soviets have repeatedly declared that their system will dominate the world.

There is no reason to believe that the concept of world revolution has been abandoned.

Because of the nature of the Soviet rule i.e. - rule of man not law - decisions can be quickly reached and acted upon.

The United States because of its strength and geographical position has been a deciding factor in the last two World Wars. Today she is by far the strongest opponent of the Russian system.

The United States in an effort to prevent war through misunderstanding has announced:

An attack on an ally will be considered an attack on the United States.

Retaliatory forces will be launched against Russia if an attack is started.

II TYPES OF ATTACK

There is reason to believe that Russia now has the capability of launching a major nuclear attack:

Against U.S. mainland targets -

By manned aircraft

By submarines using short range missiles

Against U.S. Allies' Near East bases, European bases, African bases:

By manned aircraft

By missile

By submarines using missile

Russia claims she now has missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads that can reach the United States. There is reason to believe this to be true. It is virtually certain that if not true now it will be soon.

It is possible that despite our assurances to the contrary that Russia might attack one of our allies on her border using non-nuclear weapons in the ex-pectation that we will be deterred from an all-out retaliatory attack because

of our well known humanitarianism and our desire not to incur the condemnation of uncommitted nations.

It is also possible that Russia will decide on an all-out attack on the United States without prior notice - relying on substantially neutralizing us long enough to overcome our allies - then completing the conquest. This would require extensive preparations which would be difficult for Russia to accomplish in secret.

### III PROBABLE TARGETS

The selection of targets by the enemy would depend on his purpose.

A. If his objective were to neutralize us so that we could not come to the aid of our allies he would:

- Attack our retaliatory forces

- Attack our shipping facilities

B. If his objective were to dispose of his most powerful opponent once and for all he would:

- Attack our retaliatory facilities

- Attack our major cities with the objective of disabling as many of our people as possible in the hopes of destroying our will to resist

The most effective way of destroying the industrial capabilities of a nation is to destroy or disrupt his working force. Before a man can produce planes or guns he must have a place to live and food to eat - so must his family. Our modern economy is so complex that the destruction of our major cities would for a long time prevent the production of the materials of war. Russia needs basic productive capacity - steel, textiles, etc. - it is conceivable that they will be spared to produce for her after the expected conquest is accomplished.

### IV WEAPON SIZE AND PHYSICAL DAMAGE

There is no question that weapons of tremendous power could be used. There are several factors, however, that should be kept in mind. In any nuclear attack there is an area directly under the explosion where it is not practicable to provide adequate protection. The diameter of this area will vary with the cube root of the amount of explosive force used. To double the diameter eight times as much explosive force is required. To increase the diameter from one to ten miles, ten thousand times the explosive force is required. The law of diminishing returns therefore makes the use of very large amounts of explosive in one spot far less effective than several smaller bombs.

Also influencing the choice of what size bomb to use is the number of means of delivery. When this must be done through a strong defense system the assignment of a single carrier with a single bomb becomes less desirable.

-2-

The accuracy of placement will also be adversely affected by strong defensive measures.

No matter what the size of the bomb there will be a comparatively small central area where defensive measures will not be effective. Surrounding this will be a much larger area where protective measures will be effective. Each yard away from the center increases the effectiveness of these protective measures.

## V WARNING TIME

This is a complex subject. It is believed best covered by breaking it down into several sections based on amount of warning time under consideration. There are those who believe that if the signs are read correctly we have been on notice for some years already.

The attitude of the uncommitted nations and of the Russian satellites toward hostilities will largely be determined by how these hostile acts are brought about. If Russia can make it appear that we are the aggressor and that they acted in self defense or even better yet in defense of a small nation seeking independence against imperialism she will certainly do so. Even Russia with their iron control would be much stronger with the backing of her satellites and the tacit approval of the uncommitted nations than she would be if she had to use armed forces to keep her satellites in line by force.

It is entirely reasonable to assume therefore that there may be a steadily worsening international situation that, if the signs are read correctly, may give us weeks of advance notice.

The mounting of an all-out attack would require considerable preparation. It would be extremely difficult even for Russia to make these preparations in secret. If these preparations are spotted and the moves correctly interpreted we should have from several weeks to several days notice.

The Russians claim to have the ICBM and will undoubtedly have them soon if they do not have them now. The ICBM, and the submarines capable of launching rockets, would give little or no advance warning. It is not believed that Russia would rely solely on this method of attack but would also use manned aircraft in order to make the initial blow as devastating as possible. We have completed an excellent radar net completely enclosing the United States and there is every reason to believe that this not would give us several hours of warning of an impending attack by manned aircraft.

There is always the possibility, however, that the first warning we will have will be the blinding flash of a nuclear weapon.

## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The policies of Russia and the United States are not compatible.

A long period of diplomatic warfare could develop into open armed conflict with little or no warning.

There is a possibility of an attack on the United States or one of our allies by nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft or missiles.

-3-

Our retaliatory striking force probably would be the first objective. Destruction of our cities will probably be the second objective. Destruction of port facilities might well be the main objective. Because high altitude bombing and missiles do not have pinpoint accuracy we have no assurance that any area will not be hit.

We do not know what size bombs will be used. We do know that protective measures are effective except in a comparatively small central area and that distance from this area is a big factor in increasing the effectiveness of these measures.

We may have several weeks or days warning of an impending attack.

We may have a few hours warning.

We may have no warning whatever.

DECISION

Because of the many unknowns we must:

Disperse our people if we have prior warning.

Take the best shelter available with little or no prior warning.

In order to accomplish the dispersal we must evacuate our people from probable target areas. This will require very close cooperation with neighbors.

In order to protect themselves in the event of little or no warning our people must know what steps to take.

Radiological fallout is a hazard we must prepare for by providing positive means of determining whether this hazard exists. And what shelter are available?

PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN AN ATTACK

CASE I

WARNING DAYS OR WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF HOSTILITIES

This condition would exist should the President, because of the developments feel that there is a strong probability of an attack, advise the governors of the various states to get their non-essential people out of target areas.

According to State policy this would be a voluntary movement.

The more people who make their own arrangements the less load there will be on public agencies.

This condition would cause a tremendous change in our economy and social order. It may, however, be necessary in order to survive.

REQUIREMENTS

Correct interpretation at the highest level of information available.

Correct presentation of the facts to the American people.

An adequate public information program to insure that everyone understands
what they and this nation is faced with.

Careful planning in reception areas for food - housing - operation of schools.

Urging on the part of target and support areas for people to make their own
arrangements.

## CASE II

### ONE HOUR OR MORE WARNING OF AN IMPENDING ATTACK

This would call for an immediate evacuation of the target areas in order to
secure dispersal.

Dispersal begins immediately - the longer the movement is continued the more
effective it becomes.

The automobile is a better shelter than the average frame house.

Automobiles take up space on the road - not people.

A traffic control pattern which contains no cross traffic is essential to
mass movement.

Every means of moving people out must be utilized.

People who make their own arrangements for housing reduce the work load on
public facilities.

### REQUIREMENTS

An adequate warning system.

Development of plans for the mass movement of people to insure:

Orderly sustained movement out.

Allocation of population to all exit routes to insure maximum use.

Allocation of population to reception areas to insure no area has more
than it can accommodate.

Provision of emergency food and water.

Capacity loading of every vehicle.

Immediate movement of trains.

Knowledge on the part of the entire population of:

The siren signals and what they mean.

-5-

The proper route for leaving the city from where they are.

The family meeting place.

The hazard of radioactive fallout and how to meet it.

Development of an adequate radiological monitoring system.

Development of mass care plans including billeting.

Training of personnel in mass care operations.

## CASE III

### LESS THAN ONE HOUR WARNING

This would call for taking shelter in the best available place in the immediate area.

It means that an attack is imminent.

Because of the radiological hazard people may be required to stay in the shelter for a considerable period.

### REQUIREMENTS

An adequate warning system.

A knowledge of shelter areas.

An understanding of what dangers exist and what can be done.

## CASE IV

### ATTACK - NO WARNING

In this event the first indication will be a very brilliant flash of light - the brightest you have ever seen.

If you see it you are outside the central, total destruction, area and have a few seconds before the shock wave arrives.

Dive under the nearest table, desk or other heavy furniture. In the open lie prone against a wall or gutter or in a ditch if they are available.

### REQUIREMENTS

People must be informed of what to expect and what action will give them the best chance of survival.

-6-

# TASKS TO BE DONE

## Target and Support Areas

1. Inform people of the dangers we face and how they can be met.

2. Provide an adequate warning system.

3. Locate and designate all areas suitable for use as shelters.

4. Provide an adequate monitoring service.

5. Plan for the most efficient use of exit means.

6. Plan for the coordinated use of all Disaster Service.

7. Train personnel in operations of Mass Care Centers.

## TARGET AREAS

Develop all possible disaster operational resources.

All trained personnel report for service in whatever community they find themselves.

## SUPPORT AREAS

Develop all sources of supplies for emergency operations.

Develop mass care plans and staffs.

Develop plans for the integration of refugees into the local organizations.

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

POLITICAL SCIENCE SECTION

CAMBRIDGE 39, MASSACHUSETTS

January 8, 1958

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Director,
Special Studies Project,
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.,
22 West 55th Street,
New York 19, N.Y.

Dear Henry:

I just wanted to add a personal note congratulating you both on your recent book--which I found very persuasive-- and on your timely release of this Rockefeller Report. You and the other members of the panel have certainly performed a valuable public service, and one which was very much needed at this time. I have been greatly impressed by the summaries of the Report which I have read, and am eagerly looking forward to reading the complete Report.

Finally, congratulations also on your new appointment at Harvard. I had intended to express my congratulations in person but I have been too pressed for time to get over to Harvard. In any case you have my very best wishes for success in your new position.

January 23, 1958

Dear Mr. Armbruster:

I appreciated your letter of December 19, 1957 very much. I have been out of town such a great deal that I have not had a chance to reply to it before.

I very much appreciate your nice comments about my book and am glad that you agree with my major views. The Council of Foreign Relations, which has published the book, has made arrangements in Germany with Cornides to bring out a German edition. It was very nice of you, however, to suggest that you might help.

Do let us stay in touch.

Prof. Dr. H. Armbruster
Mainz/Rhein
An der Allee 69
Germany

HAK:bb

Role for Kissinger

To the N. Y. Herald Tribune:

I urge every one who has a
stake in our country to read
Henry Kissinger's book "Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy."

Dr. Kissinger to my mind has
as yet best defined the role our
country is playing in today's
drama in which the Soviet has
gone off with the lead. Besides,
it seems to me in order to reach
for the leading role ourselves,
we need that man Kissinger in
a most responsible office of gov-
ernment, possibly a new office
of psychological direction. Cer-
tainly there we have failed most
so far.
LISA MALSIN.

New York.

Edmond Weil, Inc.
100 Gold Street

Telephone, Cortlandt 7-1066
Cable Address: "Alphonse-New York"

New York 38, N.Y.

January 27, 1958.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger c/o
Council on Foreign Relations
58 E 68th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" is the most significant book in many years. There are few points on which I disagree with you: e.g. your views on colonies and preventive war.

In connection with the latter, did you see Huntington's article "To Choose Peace or War", Naval Inst. Proc. April 1957 ?

Whether limited nuclear war is operational or desirable or not, however, is a question that I sumbit might well have received further treatment.

I write to inquire whether any of the material in your bibliography, or for that matter outside of it, deals with it on a practical tactical basis. I would be much obliged to hear from you on it.

I should also be obliged to know whether in the course of your research anyone, after Theodore Roosevelt died, has urged this country's vital concern and functions in the global balance of military power, prior to 1937.

CAW-TL.

February 1, 1958

Dear Mr. Weil:

Thank you for your nice letter of January twenty-seven.

I agree with you that the question of the tactics of
limited nuclear war needs further attention, although the next
step would seem to me to be now maneuver experience by the
services themselves.

The books in my bibliography which deal with this are
Miksche, Colonel F. O., *Atomic Weapons and Armies*, and Kintner,
William R., *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*.

Kind regards,

Mr. Charles A. Weil
Edmond Weil, Inc.
100 Gold Street
New York 38, New York

HAK:bb

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

58 EAST 68TH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

February 11, 1958

Dear Henry:

I assume you have seen
Augie's review in the <u>Saturday Review</u> of last week. I thought
it was very good.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

Henry A. Kissinger

In Western countries, and above all in the United States, there are influential circles which aim at the prevention of an international agreement on disarmament. In the interest of the war-industry monopolies, which make faulous profits out of supplying arms, they search for any means, and are using various propaganda manoeuvres to maintain international tension, to foment a war psychosis, and to keep the nations in fear of atomic war. Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, recently published in the United States, can serve as an example...Kissinger tries to justify appeals for an atomic war and for a continuation of the policy 'from positions of strength' by unfounded assertions about the 'aggressiveness' of the Soviet Union, and the 'threat' which it allegedly constitutes to American security. However these lying assertions completely betray this unlucky journalist, who tries to turn the wheel of history back and to return the world to a period when the imperialist monopolies ruled with impunity in foreign countries (Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 12, 1957).

[lc]

Red Star, December 17, 1957

SMOKE SCREEN OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS

What is hidden behind the theory of "small" atomic wars?

Recently the American press announced that in governmental
circles in Washington urgent discussions are going on about the so-
called theory of "small" atomic wars. U.S. politicians and military
figures, concerned that their conception of "massive atomic retaliation"
has turned out to be politically compromising, have resorted to this
new theory in order to lull people to sleep, facilitate the unleashing
of a world war and draw other capitalistic governments into it. It
is well-known the American strategy of retaliation, which is based on
atomic blackmail, provides in case of the start of even negligible
military conflicts the plotting of "instant massive retaliation,"
chiefly with nuclear weapons at the choice and discussion of the
American command. In accordance with this, the armed forces of the
United States are preparing for the conduct of total atomic war against
the countries of the socialist camp.

According to evidence of the bourgeois press this conception
of the conduct of the "cold war" against the Soviet Union and countries
of the people's democracy has failed, it could not check the growth of
the national freedom movement in Asia and Africa, it inflicted a serious
blow to the political and moral prestige of the United States, having
built "a significant portion of public opinion" against them, wrote
the NEW YORK TIMES.

- 2 -

[L.C]

Here is why the ideologists of imperialism concern themselves with working out a theory of "small" wars which was called forth to supplement its aggressive military doctrine.

U.S. Secretary of State Dulles even made use of the rostrum of a U.N. General Assembly session to propagate the theory of "small" wars.

A special article of his in the September issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS was addressed to this same question.

According to French press reports, Norstad, commanding general of the NATO pact forces, prepared a special report to the present session of the NATO Council in which "small" wars are examined as an integral part of the strategy of the Atlantic governments.

Special books are devoted to the theory of "small" wars, for example, R. Osgood, "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy," H. Kissinger, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" and others.

Why are American politicians and military ideologists giving such a great deal of attention to this question at the present time?

First of all because the adventurous calculations of the American imperialists for the establishment of world supremacy by unleashing total atomic war finds still less support from its allies in the aggressive bloc. Not without foundation many bourgeois military figures feel that in the event of such a war they will expose themselves to annihilating retaliatory blows, and from means not at the disposal of the West.

According to American press pronouncements, in contemporary terms, when the Soviet Union gives obvious proof of its superiority over the USA in a number of important questions of science and technology, the application of the strategy of "massive retaliation" will be tantamount to suicide for the capitalistic West.

- 3 -

[L]

As expressed by its apologists, the essence of the new reactionary
theory of the American and English imperialists amounts to this, that
they allegedly can carry out their aggressive plans by conducting wars
with small forces in limited regions applying not strategic but tactical
atomic weapons.

It is contemplated to conduct "small" wars with all kinds of
armed forces and army units. For this it is proposed to have ready
for action regular divisions and rockets of the type "Honest John,"
"Little John," "Corporal" and so forth. If the theatre of military action
permits, then warships of various classes up to and including aircraft
carriers of the "Forrestal" type will be added to these forces. In
order not to interrupt the rhythm of life of the aggressor country,
it is considered very important not to declare general mobilization.
Finally, since the imperialists fear the indignation of public opinion
and along with it social tremors, special heed is paid. "History shows,"
writes Kissinger, "that suffering in those cases when the cup is overflowing,
inevitably leads to political or social changes . . . Excessive suffering
can lead to the undermining of a social system."

For the "small" war Kissinger proposes to work out special tactics
based on the formation of small highly-mobile units equipped with nuclear
weapons, operating in the battle zone chiefly from air transport. In an ideal
version the parts and the whole should approximate the aircraft in mobility
to be able to force the adversary either to concentrate his forces and
in such a way turn them into a target for atomic attack, or to disperse
so they could not achieve superiority in the battlefield. In Kissinger's
opinion the ability to carry out a quick deployment of troops acquires
decisive importance in the "small" war.

- 4 -

Land forces appointed to conduct the "small" war must adapt themselves to move quickly to any point where necessary in order to carry out military activities in diverse localities in the absence of constant support from massive units. It is proposed to protect the transport of equipment, troops and supplies with aircraft.

Such troops are charged with the problem of using atomic weapons in battle on tactical targets and at the same time being prepared to conduct battle without atomic support.

The course of war is described by the American strategists in the following manner. Politicians outline the locality necessary to seize. Then suddenly a landing force equipped with nuclear weapons is directed by air or by sea to this locality. The landing receives support from the tactical aircraft. It is possible from the beginning that the aircraft strike the opponent's airfields, important military targets, road junctions, ports, and following this, make landings by sea and from the air. The foreign press notes that in the "small" war the army does not have to rely on the support of the strategic aircraft. It is assumed that the operations will be over in two to three weeks.

The imperialists consider as the first goal of the "small" wars the suppression of the national-freedom movement in colonial and dependent countries, the establishment of colonial regimes in these countries of the East which have just started on the road to independence. According to their affirmation, Egypt and Syria are examples of such countries on which the United States is trying to foist the colonizing "Eisenhower Doctrine". For the suppression of revolts and partisan movements in such small countries as Oman, the military ideologists of

- 5 -

imperialism for political and military-economic considerations consider
the use of atomic weapons inexpedient.

What then is concealed behind this reactionary theory of the
ideologists of imperialism? First of all, it should be noted that the
American reactionaries refuse to resolve debatable questions in a peaceful
way. Having published the theory of "small" wars, they are striving to
find a roundabout way for unleashing an atomic world war.

Dulles, Kissinger and other ideologists of "small" wars are
hastening to calm public opinion with this - that for hitting tactical
targets they will not use bombs of unlimited, absolute destructive force.
But they hide the fact that the destruction caused by one 10-kiloton bomb
is far less than that which they can bring about by the explosion of two
bombs of 5 kilotons each.

It is proposed also to demarcate the bomb targets according
to type and establish which should and which should not be bombed with
atomic weapons. According to some authors, it would be possible to forbid
hitting by these means all towns of a certain size which are not military
objectives of tactical significance. The authors of a pamphlet "About
the Limitation of Atomic War," printed in London, write that such
delimitations "create the real possibility of compelling the Communist
countries to submit to any new rules for conducting atomic war set forth
by the West."

If the diplomatic language of the imperialist governments is
translated into ordinary (language), then it becomes obvious that they
are not opposed to annihilating people, they are only for annihilating
them by the new method. According to the American press, military specialists
in the USA in planning military action for a modern war proceed from the

- 6 -

calculation: one atomic bomb of medium caliber for one small town or
batallion spread out in battle formation. According to Dulles and Kissinger,
two to three bombs of a lesser caliber should be dropped on similar targets.
Thus, the nature of the matter does not change: murder remains murder, war -
war.

Now, let us examine, is it really as Dulles and Kissinger affirm,
possible to limit a modern war to a definite small locality when using means
of massive destruction. This assertion is not sustained by any critic.
Even the very name "small" war is a fiction set forth to hide the predatory
nature of imperialistic wars. Bourgeois military theorists disclaim the
division of wars into just and unjust. To them it simply does not pay.
If they were to recognize such a division of wars, then inevitable they
would clash with their class nature. But bourgeois military theorists
always retreat from this question, declaring it "communist propaganda".
And therefore they invent tens of different definitions if only so as
not to touch on the class nature of war.

It is well-known, in the past the imperialists unleashed so-called
"small" wars. But these wars were not small either for the aggressors or
for the victims of aggression. As a rule the armies of the colonial powers
conducted military operations on foreign territory. Armed to the teeth
with the newest means of war, which only capitalism could create, they
mercilessly made short work of the peoples of the underdeveloped countries,
they destroyed their towns and villages.

Exposing the reactionary character of such wars, V. I. Lenin wrote:
"Take the history of those small wars, which they (the imperialists - Editor)
conducted, as compared to the large, - "small" because few of the Europeans

- 7 -

perished in them, but instead hundreds of thousands of those peoples
perished whom they oppressed, who from their point of view are not even
considered as people (some Asiatics, Africans - are these really people?);
with these peoples they conducted wars of this kind: they were disarmed
and then they shot them with machine guns. Are these really wars? This, you
see, is not even strictly speaking a war, it can be forgotten. Here is
how they border on this continuous deceit of the people's masses."

These words were spoken in May 1917, but they actually resound today.
The opinion of the imperialists about the peoples, whom they are thinking
of annihilating with the help of modern destructive techniques, has remained
the same as it was 40 years ago.

But during this time the same peoples changed. A powerful wave
of national-freedom movement drove through this land, as a result of which
the colonial system is falling to pieces. Attempts of the colonizers to
restore their former hegemony have suffered and are failing. There, where
peoples selflessly defend their independence, the ordinary types of arma-
ments of the imperialist armies have proved insufficient for victory in
an unjust, predatory war. About this convincingly testifies the defeat
inflicted on the armed forces of the imperialistic powers by the peoples
of Korea, Vietnam, Egypt. And this is one of the reasons why now the
imperialists are declaring the necessity for employing atomic weapons not
only in "big," but in "small" wars.

Through the presence of atomic weapons every "small" war inevitably
grows into a "big" war. In modern times there exist large military unions
of governments, belonging to different social systems. The presence of
the aggressive blocs NATO, SEATO and the Bagdad Pact predetermines a wide

- 8 -

range of possible military activities. It is enough for any one country
taking part in these blocs to start a war, whereby this can entail obliga-
tions by one or another agreement of the other powers to enter into it.
In this way an armed conflict can quickly spread to a highly dangerous
size.

In this way, the imperialistic theory about the "small" atomic
war, by which they hope to supplement the theory of the "large war," is
scattered to dust with its very first contact with reality.

Profuse American talk about "small" wars finds itself in an
obvious contradiction from a material-technological standpoint - with the
arming of modern armies, through such means of armed struggle, as aircraft,
intercontinental ballistic missiles and others, it is impossible to retain
a war in definite localities and boundaries. It goes without saying that
massive application of aircraft, guided missiles and nuclear weapons are
typical only of military activities of a wide scale.

Kissinger considers that so long as human and material resources
of the socialistic countries are so large that the United States cannot
"permit itself to measure its strength" with them, it is indispensable to
achieve superiority in other ways. In military terms, such an assertion is
absurd, because through modern means of transport it is possible quickly
to overthrow such forces in any place, immediately liquidating the
superiority of the aggressors in ways selected by them.

The misanthropic theory of "small" wars called forth the indigna-
tion of the progressive world community. Even in the bourgeois press of
the West not a few articles appeared sharply critical of it as an awkward
attempt to justify preparation for atomic war.

- 9 -

In a note of the Soviet Government to governments of states -
members of the UN, and also in messages of the Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR, N. A. Bulganin, to heads of the governments of
NATO, the aggressive preparations of the imperialists and their reactionary
military doctrine are unmasked.

In a message to President Eisenhower of the USA, N. A. Bulganin
stated: One of the reasons cited in military circles of the West as the
basis for the requirement to widen military preparations is the so-called
theory of "local wars". It is necessary in every resolution to underline
that this "theory" is not only completely unsound from the military point
of view, but extremely dangerous in political terms. And in the past,
it is well-known wars of a world scale began with "local" wars. Is it
possible seriously to count on the possibility of "localization" of
wars in our time, when in the world there exist opposing one another
military groupings including in them tens of governments in different
parts of the world, while the operation of modern types of weapons does
not know geographic limits."

Excelling in the invention of new plans for the destruction
of peoples, the ideologists of American imperialism more and more reveal
themselves as the sworn enemies of peace and international collaboration.

And nothing can help them to hide from the people the true
face of the aggressors who are carrying out monstrous plans for unleashing
world war with the application of thermonuclear weapons.

Peaceloving people are vigilantly following the intrigues of
international reaction. At any moment they are prepared to give a crushing
blow to the lovers of military adventure.

Colonel V. Mochalov

Major V. Dashichev

"КРАСНАЯ ЗВЕЗДА", № 294/10371/, 17 декабря 1957 г.

ДЫМОВАЯ ЗАВЕСА АМЕРИКАНСКИХ ИМПЕРИАЛИСТОВ.

Что скрывается за теорией "малых" атомных войн.

Недавно американская пресса воззвила о том, что в правительственных сферах Вашингтона ведутся усиленные разговоры о так называемой теории "малых" атомных войн. Политические и военные деятели США, озабоченные тем, что их концепция "массированного атомного возмездия" оказалась политически скомпрометированной, прибегли к этой новой теории для того, чтобы усилить бдительность народов, облегчить развязывание мировой войны и втянуть в нее другие капиталистические государства. Как известно, американская стратегия возмездия, в основу которой положен атомный шантаж, предусматривает в случае возникновения даже незначительных вренных конфликтов нанесение "немедленных массированных ударов", главным образом ядерным оружием, по выбору и усмотрению американского командования. В соответствии с этим вооруженные силы США готовятся к ведению тотальной атомной войны против стран социалистического лагеря.

По свидетельству буржуазной печати, эта концепция в ходе "холодной войны" против Советского Союза и стран народной демократии провалилась, она не смогла приостановить роста национально-освободительного движения в Азии и Африке, нанесла серьезный урон политическому и моральному престижу Соединенных Штатов, настроив против них, как писала "Нью-Йорк таймс" "значительную часть общественного мнения".

Вот почему идеологи империализма занимаются разработкой теории "малых" войн, которая призвана дополнить его агрессивную военную доктрину.

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Для пропаганды теории "малых" войн государственный секретарь США Даллес использовал даже трибуну сессии Ценеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Этому же вопросу посвящена его специальная статья в сентябрьском номере журнала "Форин афферс".

Как сообщает Французская печать, командующий вооруженными силами Североатлантического союза генерал Норстэд подготовил специальный доклад к нынешней сессии совета НАТО, в котором "малые" войны рассматриваются как неотъемлемый элемент стратегии атлантических государств.

Теории "малых" войн посвящаются и специальные книги, например Р.Осгуда "Ограниченная война — вызов американской стратегии", Г.Киссинерга "Идерное оружие и внешняя политика" и другие.

Почему же в настоящее время американские политики и военные идеологи уделяют ей такое большое внимание?

Прежде всего потому, что авантиористические расчеты американских империалистов на установление мирового господства путем развязывания тотальной атомной войны находят все меньше поддержки среди их союзников по агрессивным блокам. Многие буржуазные военные деятели не без основания считают, что в случае такой войны агрессоры подвергнутся уничтожающим ответным ударам, и притом с помощью таких средств, которых нет в распоряжении Запада.

По высказываниям американской печати, в современных условиях, когда Советский Союз дает наглядные доказательства своего превосходства над США в ряде важных вопросов науки и техники, применение стратегии "массированного возмездия" будет для капиталистического Запада равносильно самоубийству.

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Суть высказываний апологетов новой реакционной теории американских и английских империалистов сводится к тому, что они якобы могут осуществить свои агрессивные планы путем ведения войн небольшими силами в ограниченных районах, применяя не стратегическое, а тактическое атомное оружие.

"Малые" войны намечается вести всеми видами вооруженных сил и родов войск. Для этого предполагается иметь в боевой готовности кадровые дивизии, а также авиацию и реактивные снаряды типа "Онест Джон", "Литтл Джон", "Капрал" и др. Если позволит театр военных действий, то к этим силам присоединяются и военные корабли различных классов, вплоть до авианосцев типа "Форрестол". Считается крайне необходимым не объявлять всеобщую мобилизацию, чтобы не нарушить ритма жизни страны-агрессора. На последнее обращается особое внимание, так как империалисты боятся возмущения общественности и связанных с этим социальных потрясений. "История показывает, - пишет Киссингер, - что страдания в тех случаях, когда чаша переполнится, неизбежно ведут к политическим или социальным изменениям... Чрезмерные страдания могут привести к подрыву социальной системы".

Для "малой" войны Киссингер предлагает разработать особую тактику, основу которой должны составить действия небольших по численности высокомобильных частей, оснащенных ядерным оружием, опирающихся в боевой зоне главным образом на воздушный транспорт. В идеальном варианте части и соединения должны по мобильности приближаться к авиации, быть способными заставить противника либо сосредоточить свои силы и превратить их таким образом в мишень для атомных ударов, либо рассредоточить настолько, чтобы они не смогли добиться господства на поле боя. Решающее значение а "малой" войне, по мнению Киссингера,

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приобретает способность осуществлять быстрое развертывание войск.

Сухопутные войска, предназначенные для ведения "малой" войны, должны быть приспособлены к быстрым переброскам в любой пункт, где в этом есть необходимость, чтобы вести военные действия в различных районах при отсутствии постоянной поддержки со стороны крупных соединений. Переброцу вооружения, войск и предметов снабжения предполагается обеспечивать авиацией.

На такие войска возлагаются задачи использовать в бою атомное ору- жие в тактических целях и вместе с тем быть готовыми к ведению боя без атомной поддержки.

Ход войны рисуется американскими стратегами следующим образом. Политические деятели намечают район, который нужно захватить. Затем в этот район внезапно по воздуху или по морю направляется десант, оснащенный ядерным оружием. Действия десанта поддерживает тактическая авиация. А может быть и так, что сначала авиация наносит удары по аэродромам противника, по его важным военным объектам, узлам дорог, портам, а в последующем высаживается морской и выбрасывается воздушный десант. Иностранные печать отмечает, что армии не придется рассчитывать в "малой" войне на поддержку стратегической авиации. Предполагается, что в течение двух-трех недель операция должна быть законченной.

Первоочередной целью "малых" войн империалисты считают подавление национально-освободительного движения в колониальных и зависимых странах, восстановление колониальных порядков в тех странах Востока, которые уже встали на путь независимости. Примером таких стран, по их утверждениям, являются Египет, Сирия, которым США стремятся навязать колонizationскую "доктрину Эйзенхауэра". При подавлении восстаний и партизанского движения в таких небольших государствах, как Оман, использован

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ние атомного оружия военные идеологи империализма считают нецелесооб-
разным из политических и военно-экономических соображений.

Что же скрывается за этой реакционной теорией идеологов империа-
лизма? Прежде всего следует отметить, что американские реакционеры
отказываются решать спорные международные вопросы мирным путем. Выпус-
тив в свет теорию "малых" войн, они стремятся найти обходный путь для
развязывания мировой атомной бойни.

Даллес, Киссингер и другие идеологи "малых" войн спешат успоко-
ить общественное мнение тем, что для поражения тактических целей не
будут применяться бомбы беспредельной, абсолютной разрушительной силы.
Но они скрывают тот факт, что разрушения, причиненные одной бомбой в
10 килотонн, намного меньше тех, которые могут вызвать взрывы двух
бомб по 5 килотонн каждая.

Предлагается также разграничить объекты бомбардировок по их ти-
пам и установить, какие из них можно и какие нельзя бомбардировать
атомными средствами. По мнению некоторых авторов, можно было бы за-
претить бом бить этими средствами все города определенных размеров,
не имеющие военных объектов тактического значения. Авторы брошюры
"Об ограничении атомной войны", изданной в Лондоне, пишут, что такие
разграничения "создадут реальную возможность заставить коммунистичес-
кие страны подчиниться любым новым правилам ведения атомной войны,
выдвинутым, Западом".

Если дипломатический язык господ империалистов перевести на
обычный, то станет очевидным, что они не против истребления людей,
они лишь за истребление их по новому методу. Согласно данным амери-
канской печати, военные специалисты США при планировании боевых действ-

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[L]

Разоблачая реакционный характер таких войн, В.И.Ленин писал:

> "...Возьмите историю тех маленьких войн, которые они /империалисты - Ред./ вели перед большой, - "маленьких" потому-что европейцев в них гибло немного; но гибли зато сотни тысяч тех народов, которых душили, которые с их точки зрения даже народами не считаются /какие-то азиаты, африканцы - разве это народы?/; с этими народами вели войны такого сорта: они были безоружны, а их расстреливали из пулеметов. Разве это войны? Это, ведь, собственно, даже не войны, это можно забыть. Вот как подходят они к этому сплошному обману народных масс" /Соч., т.24, стр. 370/.

Эти слова были сказаны в мае 1917 года, но они злободневно звучат и сегодня. Мнение империалистов о народах, которые они думают уничтожить при помощи современной разрушительной техники, осталось такое же, как и 40 лет тому назад.

Но за это время неузнаваемо изменились сами народы. По земле прокатилась мощная волна национально-освободительного движения, в результате чего разваливается колониальная система. Попытки колониза-торов восстановить свое былое господство потерпели и терпят крах. Там, где народы самоотверженно отстаивают свою независимость, обычные виды вооружения империалистических армий оказались недостаточными для побе-ды в несправедливой, захватнической войне. Об этом убедительно свиде-тельствует поражение, нанесенное вооруженными силами империалистических держав народами Кореи, Вьетнама, Египта. И этой явилось одной из при-чин того, что теперь империалисты заявляют о необходимости применять атомное оружие не только в "больших", но и в "малых" войнах.

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ходство агрессоров на избранном ими направлении.

Человеконенавистническая теория "малых" войн вызвала возмущение среди прогрессивной мировой общественности. Даже в буржуазной печати Запада появилось немало едких статей, резко критикующих ее как неуклюжую попытку оправдать подготовку атомной войны.

В ноте Советского правительства правительствам государств - членов ООН, а также в посланиях Председателя Совета Министров СССР Н.А. Булганина главам правительств стран НАТО разоблачаются агрессивные приготовления империалистов и их реакционная военная доктрина.

В послании Н.А. Булганина президенту США Эйзенхауэру говорится:

"Одним из доводов, приводимых в военных кругах на Западе в обоснование требований о расширении военных приготовлений, является так называемая теория "локальных войн". Необходимо со всей решительностью подчеркнуть, что эта "теория" не только совершенно несостоятельна с военной точки зрения, но и чрезвычайно опасна в политическом отношении. И в прошлом, как известно, войны мирового масштаба начинались "локальными" войнами. Можно ли серьезно рассчитывать на возможность "локализации" войн в наше время, когда в мире существуют противостоящие друг другу военные группировки, включающие в себя десятки государств в различных частях света, а действие современных видов оружия не знает географических пределов?"

Изощряясь в изобретении новых планов истребления людей, идеологи американского империализма все более разоблачают себя как заклятых врагов мира и международного сотрудничества. И ничто не поможет им скрыть от народов свое подлинное лицо агрессоров, вынашивающих чудовищные за мысли развязывания мировой войны с применением термоядерного оружия.

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[lc]

10

The question of limited war.

Dulles was questioned as to whether there was any understanding at the Geneva conference to the effect that nuclear war was so horrible that it just couldn't happen. His reply was that if there was any such tacit understanding, "it was very tacit." He remarked that technological discoveries changed our own attitudes. Our discovery of the perils and widespread nature of atomic fall-out swung us into the position of visualizing a nuclear statemate where each side had the power of destroying the other side and each would therefore hold back.

[LJ]

But, he remarked, if you begin to be able to make little tactical clean bombs, this revises your whole concept. It is not a question of 10-million people being killed in indiscriminate attack, but of using tactical weapons against specific military targets. The state of our weapons assures that we will use tactical A-bombs in war; we don't have as many small weapons as we will have later on.

Dulles here remarked rather surprisingly that there is still a large margin of error in our atomic tests, that is, we are not always sure as to just how big a bang we will get.

[10]

He was asked about the conclusions in the Kissinger book. He didn't think it would be very practical to try to set up "rules" for limited war, but he said that he felt that a limited Korea-type war could be waged with the use of small atomic weapons, and that this need not bring on a big war. He said one could conceive, in a small war, of using A-weapons simply in place of conventional bombs to wipe out targets such as communications west of the Yalu River, or airfields.

The deterrent which would prevent a small war from becoming a big war would be the prospect that the alternative - the bigger war - would be so much worse. For instance, in Korea there was a tacit agreement on both sides that the war should not be enlarged beyond the Korean peninsula. Under those terms that war could be fought either by conventional or atomic weapons. But in any war one would always have to decide, when the enemy launched its attack, whether the intention was to fight a localized war or whether the attack was to be followed up with a general big onslaught if our side did not fall back, that is, the enemy might intend to launch a general war if we failed to retreat. Dulles said he had not read Kissinger's book through but had got the meaning of it.

Capitaine PICHENE René
S.P. 69.492

Monsieur H.A. KISSINGER

Dear Sir,

I have been very interested reading some parts of your book : "Nuclear weapons and foreign policy". I wrote myself a book about "the tactics and strategy in the ancient periode". Actually I am preparing a new edition which concerns the same subject, but in modern periode, that's the reason why I allow me to transmit to you my own considerations.

- As well as you write it, the total war menaces our society with its complete destruction.

- The menace of general retaliations does not impress much because it stands out of proportion with the object in view. However the indistincte menace risks to cause the union of the russian people behind their directing.

- The veritable strategy does not give the priority to the power but to the mobility which economizes the middles thanks to its surprise.

- In the whole history the wars which have given real victories have been short, because they did not use the vanquisher so much than the vanquished.

- The modern strategy had made shown the importance of the rapidity of tanks then of their power. Those served in a masse on their own turn for the reason of anti-tank-weapons, have lost their power of strategic mobility.

- The airplane with vertical spart and landing reintroduces the mobility in the strategy. This mobility - greater than before- allows to look at new objectifs of strategy.

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- Until the last years the adverse troop has been the object of operations, but in fact, it is only a middle of discouraging the enemy-government in the fighting.

- The rapidity of an air offensive would probably permit to attain the government itself (Moskow) or its key-positions (for example: the governments of the provinces).

- Secondary offensives might be able to paralyse the transportations, and so the reserves and the economy.

- The troops must be able to attack, to disappear and to reappear near other objects.

- Last years, the parachute troops were only operating by getting of initial surprises, because a surprise which does not renew, is no more one - it is obliged to turn over into an action of force. Helicopter troops were to vulnerable as the consequence of the slowness of those engines.

- Only the modern airplanes with vertical start and landing are able to revolutionize the strategy.

- The atomic projectiles will become auxiliaries of this strategy.

- So people would not risk their destruction, because just one enemy would use the middles of a total war.

- The limited war would be integrated into a conception of coherent strategy.

- The russian people would be dissociated from his government from the time of the beginning of an intervention threat, a fact which gives new facilities for propaganda in peace time.

- Alone a strategy of rapidity and mobility has for object the keeping of initiative by Allied Forces. It preserves them of a total war reprisals declared by the enemy near of succombing.

Very truly yours,