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After this preliminary I now spoke with much deliberation and seriousness, using words which I had agreed with my colleagues and advisers. It was my duty to make it clear that the British Government would stand by and co-operate with their Western allies. Because of my anxiety as to the direction in which events were now moving I felt it right to leave the Soviet Government in no doubt. Nor could Britain be separated from her allies by attacks upon their leaders. I recognised that Khrushchev felt strongly about the Soviet position. The British Government and their allies felt equally strongly about theirs. I would be no use in the promotion of peace unless I acted in a sincere and true manner, behaving loyally towards the United Kingdom's friends and allies. Khrushchev would not respect me if I behaved in any other way.

I thought it necessary to make this rather formal declaration because so much of Khrushchev's speech, the pleasant as well as the harsh things—the offer of a pact of non-aggression to Britain as well as the threats—were all clearly intended, if somewhat clumsily phrased, to separate Britain from her allies. I knew that whatever might be the outcome, I must make this position clear. I went on to say that all the large questions which Khrushchev had referred to in his speech, although of vital importance, were nevertheless negotiable. These included the withdrawal of forces from foreign territories, the disposal of armed forces on each side, disarmament, the limitation of armaments, the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the control of nuclear tests. All these were important, indeed supremely important questions. I felt that all of them could be discussed and in time all of them resolved. They could not be solved in two or three days even with the Heads of Governments meeting together. We had both some experience of that. But by an agreed process of negotiation it should be possible to solve some of these problems and to make progress on others. 'Meanwhile', and here I used words which I had carefully memorised after discussion in the frozen park of our *dacha* with my colleagues,

it is my duty to emphasise two points. I hope Mr. Khrushchev will take careful note of them. The first is that the German situation is full of danger and could develop into something

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tragic for us all. The second is that it must surely be possible to avoid this by sensible and co-operative work.

There followed a pause—during which Gromyko and Mikoyan looked at each other and then at their boss. Then the discussion was continued and lasted till after 5 o'clock.

Khrushchev was obviously put out, but in the early stages of his reply he kept his temper. He began by saying that I had no need to apologise for the length of my opening statement; he himself owed me an apology for the great length of his own speech the previous day, of which I had thought it necessary to take note and to which I had replied. He would speak with equal sincerity. But conscious of the logical weakness of his position he then began to show a certain petulance. He pretended not to be able to understand what the West wanted of the Soviet Government. He had advanced certain proposals about Germany. We had advanced none. Our last note of 16 February was not a reply to his note—it had no connection except a reference to the date. He simply could not understand why the West wished to keep a state of war with Germany. Nor did he understand why we wished to preserve the dangerous character of the Berlin situation. Was it because we wanted to maintain the possibility of moving from the state of armed truce which now existed to a state of real war? Were we arming the West Germans to make use of them in a future war? It seemed to him that this must be so for we produced no argument other than the statement that the situation was dangerous. That was not an argument at all. The Soviet Government had always been in favour of negotiations, he had said so over and over again. The truth was that the West were threatening the Soviet Government and trying to preserve a state of war under cover of threats. At this point Khrushchev began to show, or perhaps simulate, real anger. I was never sure at this or at other meetings with him how far this ebullition of temper was genuine. At any rate he now began to accuse us straight out of wanting war, preparing for war and choosing our own time for war. The Soviet Government would gain nothing by the proposal for a 'free city'. We said this was unacceptable; we seemed to think that the Soviet Government should make concessions. But what concessions—territorial, political or economic? He wanted to get the position

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stabilised by the signature of a peace treaty. He was sorry if his position was misunderstood; it was not his fault. After a good deal of talk on these lines he ended by a statement parallel to mine.

The Russian Government intend to conclude a peace treaty with the D.D.R. and with any other country which is prepared to join in. They will follow out this plan whether the Western Governments agree or not. If the West wish to maintain a state of war the responsibility lies on them. History will condemn them. The burden and blame will lie upon them.

After saying this in a solemn way, he added that the Soviet Government were prepared for negotiation at any time. This repeated accusation of the allied desire to 'preserve the state of war' was, as he well knew, the common jargon which it suited the Russians to use in the complicated situation which followed the occupation and division of Berlin. By a curious paradox the freedom of West Berlin was and is still maintained by a nominal state of war, or at any rate the absence of a peace treaty with the whole of Germany. The Russian plan would involve the surrender of the people of West Berlin and their ultimate absorption into a Communist society.

In the course of a long discussion in which Selwyn Lloyd and Gromyko now took a leading part, one or two interesting points emerged. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that it was of no military advantage to us to maintain our garrisons in West Berlin. On the contrary they were somewhat of a liability. He had asked Mr. Gromyko why the Berlin situation worried the Soviet Government so much, and Mr. Gromyko had referred to our espionage organisations in West Berlin which he said numbered more than one hundred. Khrushchev intervened in an excited way and said that West Berlin was a Western base on the territory of a Soviet ally. It was of no advantage to the Soviet Union to maintain Russian troops in East Berlin. Espionage was important but it was not a vital issue. The Foreign Secretary next referred to the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had himself admitted a greater flexibility in the Western position. Why then produce a plan with what amounted to an ultimatum, a threat that if it was not accepted war would result? Khrushchev intervened angrily saying that he had never uttered any

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threat of war. Selwyn Lloyd then referred to his own speech in which he had declared that any infringement of the territorial integrity of East Germany would be followed by war. To this Khrushchev rather sulkily replied that that would certainly be the case *after* a peace treaty had been concluded. This interchange continued not very satisfactorily until at last Khrushchev asked me a direct question. If it were true that West Berlin was of no importance from the military point of view, why did we wish to maintain our troops in occupation? I answered by saying that there were two reasons. It was the Soviet Government's position that the effect of their signing a peace treaty with East Germany would be to extinguish Western rights. This the Western Governments strongly disputed. The Soviet Government could not take away our rights. Secondly we had a duty towards the population of Berlin. This was accepted by both political parties in the United Kingdom. My concern was to find a solution which would preserve our rights and enable us to continue to carry out our duties. If the Soviet Government said that there was no ultimatum this would help. All possibilities could be discussed. But nothing was to be gained by either side trying to put pressure on the other. This fact must be recognised and a settlement must be found which was honourable to both.

After this the argument began to degenerate. Khrushchev somewhat angrily declared that we neglected altogether his proposal for a 'free city'. Anyway nothing would deflect his Government from signing a peace treaty with one side of Germany alone if they could not do it with both. After all the Western powers had signed a peace treaty with Japan disregarding the rights of the Soviet Government. It was obvious that the West wanted to help Adenauer to liquidate the D.D.R. He must add that if there was any violation of the D.D.R. after the signing of a peace treaty the consequences would be very grave and it would be the fault of the West. The West went on saying 'give us access', and for this reason were trying to maintain a state of occupation, that is to say of war. If a peace treaty were signed it was clear that all agreements which were a consequence of the capitulation and occupation would come to an end. It was a strange situation to join with the defeated enemy and to welcome that enemy as an ally when the question of a peace treaty with him

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was being considered. Dr. Adenauer was a negative influence and served only the purpose of blocking agreement.

After this outburst Khrushchev referred to the Shah of Iran. It was quite clear how disappointed he was at the failure of his own intrigue. 'We know all about Mr. Sandys's talk with the Shah. I could supply you with a full record.' He then asked me whether I had read a recent statement by the United States Secretary of the Navy about the number of minutes it would take to destroy the Soviet Union. All this seemed to be leading to very little good, and I did my best to bring the discussion to an end. It only remained for me to summarise our position. We were all for negotiation, but not for negotiation under pressure. We were ranged loyally with our allies but I felt certain from my personal knowledge both of General de Gaulle and of President Eisenhower that our allies would be as ready to negotiate on reasonable terms as we ourselves. It was the spirit of such negotiations that mattered.

Now Khrushchev was clearly disturbed and angry, and did not respond to the attempts of Mikoyan and Gromyko to restrain him. His final sentence was significant. The Soviet Government had proposed a free city of West Berlin in which the population would be free of all danger and they were ready to surround this arrangement with all necessary guarantees. In their replies, the West talked about rights of access and occupation status which merely meant a continuation of the state of war. The West talked about defending three million people who did not need to be defended. But, when they talked about war, what was really involved were the deaths of hundreds of millions of people.

The end of the conference was a signal for a return to geniality and common sense. Tea and vodka and other drinks were freely consumed and Khrushchev observed to me jovially how much he looked forward to seeing me and my friends at the Bolshoi Theatre that night. I would certainly enjoy the ballet.

The gala performance of the ballet *Romeo and Juliet* at the Bolshoi Theatre was indeed a remarkable occasion. The theatre was packed with what we were told was the 'cultural élite' of Moscow. As I walked into the State Box in the centre of the first balcony, the cheering was loud and enthusiastic. Khrushchev made a gesture

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towards me and then joined in the applause himself. We then shook hands. After the interval during which we were entertained at a most sumptuous dinner and again at the close of the performance Khrushchev repeated his friendly gestures and the applause was thunderous and prolonged. In the last act we moved from the State Box to the Government Box by the stage, only used by Khrushchev and other leading ministers. I was told afterwards that never before had a state guest been invited to use it. No doubt all this had been arranged before the coolness which followed Khrushchev's speech and our afternoon meeting. Nevertheless my host was assiduous in his attentions, and it was clear that he had not yet made up his mind as to the next step.

After the performance the Foreign Secretary and I and our staffs returned to the Embassy where we were able to consult together in the comparative secrecy provided by the special precautions. Although we had as yet little information as to the effect of Khrushchev's speech at home or in the world in general, I felt comforted by his attitude in the evening. He had apparently taken in good part what I had said in the afternoon and seemed as buoyant and demonstrative as ever. We were soon to be disillusioned.

Another formal meeting had been arranged for the morning of 26 February and this duly took place in the same room as that in which we had met before. I had with me Murray and de Zulueta, both Russian-speaking, as well as the Foreign Secretary and the Ambassador. The Russians fielded their usual team, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Gromyko, Malik and an interpreter. I began the meeting by referring to a number of subjects which had been mentioned at earlier meetings and which I thought might now be further discussed. The first was 'cultural relations' on which I asked the Foreign Secretary to report on his talks with Gromyko. This item was dealt with satisfactorily, Khrushchev observing that he thought the proposals acceptable. It would make a beginning to co-operation in this field. There was then a useful discussion on trade conducted in a very sensible and business-like way. There was a general agreement that we wished on both sides to increase trade and make better arrangements for credits. We would propose to send a British mission, headed by a Minister, to study the whole problem in detail.

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This was warmly welcomed by Khrushchev. After some discussion of a reciprocal air service between Moscow and London, which again was handled in a pleasant atmosphere, Khrushchev began upon the international situation. In the course of this he worked himself up into a state of considerable emotion; whether genuine or assumed, it was hard to tell. He began with a tirade about British policy in the Middle East combined with an attack upon Sir Anthony Eden. The British Government had started the war in Suez which had ended shamefully. Now the Soviet Government was being threatened with regard to Berlin. He must tell me in all seriousness that the Soviet Government intended to carry this thing through. It would of course be better to conclude a peace treaty with both German states, but Adenauer would doubtless refuse and the British Government would have to follow him. If we did not wish to sign the treaty the Soviet Government would conclude an agreement with the D.D.R. 'with all the results that will follow from this liquidation of the state of war'. He went on to say with growing emotion that if the NATO allies rejected the peace treaty his Government would use all their power to 'rebuff the aggressor'. He asked whether there was not a parallel between the present meeting and that when the British and French delegation came to Russia in 1939 to talk about stopping aggression by Hitler. The deputation stayed a month, but nothing was done and war broke out. If that should happen again the responsibility would lie with us. He wanted peace and friendship; he would sign a treaty of non-aggression immediately. This he felt sure would be welcomed by the British people. He was sorry to differ and to part in a worse spirit than the one in which we had met. I had created this situation by what I had said yesterday. At the end of this tirade he thumped the table and said, 'That is all !'

I thanked Mr. Khrushchev for having spoken so frankly. I would not say anything about Suez or the beginning of the Second World War which seemed to me quite irrelevant to our purpose today. What I had said yesterday I thought it my duty to say. There was a certain contradiction in Khrushchev's remarks to which he himself called attention. He wished to conclude a German peace treaty as a contribution to peace yet admitted that it led to a

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dangerous situation. If a situation of the kind envisaged by Khrushchev existed surely we had to try to deal with it by negotiation. My purpose was to bring about the opening of negotiations and ensure their success. That must be the object of all statesmen who saw the danger ahead. I could only add that I hoped that my visit had strengthened this purpose. I would certainly go home better able to contribute in concert with my allies to the peaceful solutions of the problems we had discussed.

Khrushchev then accused the British Government of 'planning the liquidation of the Socialist achievements in Eastern Europe'. He wanted peace; we and our allies seemed to want war. What I had said today was 'not in keeping with the threats which were uttered yesterday'. Those who uttered threats against the Soviet Government took a heavy responsibility. He had nothing more to say. Khrushchev seemed at this point uncertain whether to work himself up into a new outburst of indignation or to let the matter rest. I merely thanked him for what he said and added that we were due to meet again in formal session on 2 March, chiefly for the purpose of preparing a communiqué. Perhaps it would be better for the Foreign Ministers to discuss the draft. Khrushchev cynically observed that they would have a narrow basis on which to provide an interesting communiqué, to which I replied that our colleagues had wide and imaginative minds. By this time Khrushchev seemed to have made up his mind and in a short but offensive intervention went back to Suez, to the sale of arms, to Russia's enemies, and to a general attack on Selwyn Lloyd, as a man whose 'imagination' was dangerous. I tried to keep my temper and merely said that I was sufficiently friendly with Mr. Khrushchev not to answer his remarks but that did not mean that I could accept them. I thought it better to leave things on a joking tone in which Khrushchev had spoken. 'When guns fire,' declared Khrushchev in reply, 'it is not a joke, and guns fired at Suez.' However, there was little more to be said. He had made his protest. There was a short interval during which nobody spoke and then Khrushchev stood up and began to say goodbye in his normal manner. I thought the interview was over, when suddenly he said that he understood that I and my friend were leaving for Kiev. He had hoped to accompany me, but he had

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to have a tooth filled, and he thought it better to attend to it at once, since at his age new teeth would not grow, and without teeth a Prime Minister was no use. He would be sorry to disappoint his daughter, who lived in Kiev, and his other friends in that city. I said that I was very sorry indeed that I would not have the pleasure of enjoying his company on this journey. I hoped his tooth would soon be put right. I could hardly imagine him without teeth. On this Khruschev said that for the time being his teeth were good; he wished them to remain strong and sharp. He would seek the aid of science and technology. On this somewhat bizarre note the meeting ended, and the Foreign Secretary and I withdrew.

Thus began one of the most whimsical diplomatic episodes in history—the famous story of the tooth. When we got back to the Embassy there was much discussion as to what line we should take. That Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Gromyko—the three leading members of the Soviet Government—should have planned to come with us on our trip both to Kiev and to Leningrad was, of course, a marked honour. It had been announced as such and had been widely welcomed as an exceptional act of courtesy. The Press on 26 February was already aware of the coolness caused by Khrushchev's election speech. So far as we knew, little had leaked about our afternoon meeting, although the French commentators had already referred with unconcealed pleasure to my humiliation. When the story of the tooth and the change in plans for our tour became known the situation was bound to become tense. Moreover, the President had also made a statement which was, as far as we could obtain reports, rather tough. He declared that he could see no hope for a successful Summit meeting. What course then should we follow? One plan was to order our Comet and go home in a mood of affronted dignity. This did not attract me very much. A gesture of this kind can seem at first sight impressive and even command sympathy and support. But as my whole purpose was to bring about better relations and to lay foundations for a Summit meeting, it seemed a foolish and shortsighted reaction. Both the Foreign Secretary and I thought it better to continue in the calm spirit in which I had ended the last interview. Let us go to Kiev and Leningrad, enjoy ourselves, see the sights and wait upon events. We

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would have to face an immediate criticism among our allies when the story of the tooth became known; but in the long run we should be acting with greater dignity and in conformity with our overriding purpose. We therefore left by air after lunch, attended, not by the leading figures in the Soviet Government, but by pleasant Mr. Malik and a couple of under-secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So far as public criticism was concerned the first reactions were as I had expected: 'Mr. K. snubs the Premier and wrecks the talks', 'The talks have for practical purposes ended', 'The toothache insult', and similar headlines filled the front pages of almost every newspaper. The *News Chronicle* called my journey a 'monumental flop'. Khrushchev's discourtesy appeared all the more marked when it was known that, whether he had visited his dentist or not, he had spent the afternoon, when he should have been on his journey with us, in receiving a deputation from Iraq.

Harder to bear than the criticisms of our opponents were the condolences of our friends. I continued to send frequent telegrams to the heads of the three great Western allies, and received in return telegrams of genuine or affected astonishment at Khrushchev's discourtesy. Eisenhower regarded 'this latest instance of deliberate bad deportment as an affront to the whole free world'. To Adenauer in particular I made it clear that I expressed my resentment at what had been said about him and my determination to stand loyally by my friends. We also had to give as much information as possible and our best appreciation of the situation to our Cabinet colleagues at home. The general view was that the reason for Khrushchev's sudden change of position may well have been twofold. First he perhaps realised that he had made a serious mistake in going so far in his speech of 24 February. He therefore in typical Russian fashion was trying to put the blame on me. He may also have been genuinely disappointed at my determination to stand by my friends and to refuse any detailed negotiation on Germany. In the circumstances it seemed best to leave Pat Dean and Peter Hope behind in Moscow in order to do their best to give guidance to the Press. Harold Evans was to come with me to Kiev where he could talk to those correspondents who chose to come on the tour.

Telegrams continued to arrive both from London and from Paris.