IX - 41

factor;" and it had grown to accept strategic bombing and the possibility of a devastating, short war--all notions that had heretofore been derided or rejected. What then does the new emphasis of the Soviets on nuclear weapons tell us about Soviet strategic thought and what consequences flow from it for the United State?

One of the reasons for the insistence on the new-found retaliatory power is undoubtedly a feeling of exhilaration at having traversed the abyss and emerged unscathed. The Soviet leadership must remember the American atomic monopoly with a feeling of profound humiliation because it must have known, whatever it pretended to the outside world, that it was exposed to a perhaps catastrophic blow without being able to offer a similar threat in return. And the fact that Soviet doctrine declared our intentions as inherently hostile must have added to Soviet uneasiness. To be sure, the Soviets managed to hide their concern by an iron-nerved tour de force. But the incessant, almost gloating references to the horror that they can now inflict on the United States may reveal an effort to "get even" retroactively for years of living on the brink of catastrophe. Orator after orator on the occasion of the 20th Party Congress in 1956 insisted that with the development of hydrogen weapons, it was "no longer" possible to defeat the U.S.S.R. -- a remarkable admission in view of the fact that any reference to the possibility of defeat would have been treated as a treasonable utterance during out atomic monopoly and an indication, perhaps, that the Soviet leadership had a better awareness of the real relationship of forces than its opponents.

Another factor is the usefulness of the present Soviet position for paralyzing the will to resist of its opponents. The more terrible Soviet propaganda can paint the consequences of another war, the more reluctant its opponents will be to resort to it and the impact of Soviet atomic

IX - 42

blackmail has proved none the less effective for their being accomplished in the guise of peace offensives. In fact, it was not until the Soviet nuclear stockpile began to grow, that the Soviet Union derived full benefit from its tenacious campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons. For with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile, the preconceptions created by Peace Councils, "ban the bomb" propaganda and Soviet invocations of the horrors of nuclear war began to serve a dual purpose: the same arguments that had hitherto enjoined self-restraint on the West could not be used to appeal to its fear; the Free World which had been asked to recoil before the consequences of the devastation it might suffer. Henceforth Soviet propaganda was above all concerned lest the Free World escape its dilemma by developing a doctrine which seemed to mitigate the most absolute consequences of nuclear war. Because the Soviet leaders realize that they will to resist the Free World improves in proportion as the horror of war appears to diminish, Soviet pronouncements since 1954 have been as insistent that any resort to nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to all-out war as they had been during our atomic monopoly that nuclear weapons were horrible and ineffectual.

Since the Soviet leaders can have few doubts about the consequences of all-out thermo-nuclear war, their strident reiteration of the impossibility of an intermediary application of nuclear weapons, may indicate a realization on their part that their greatest vulnerability is in the area of limited nuclear war. Just as they obscured their weakness during our atomic monopoly by a show of bravado, they may now seek to inhibit resort to our most effective strategy by declaring it impossible. It would be consistent with the general Soviet strategy of overcoming a physical weakness by undermining the will of the opponent to use his advantage. Or else the repeated rejection of the possibility of limited nuclear war may reflect a certain

Justification of the attractiveness of limited nuclear war with respect to a certain
the will of the opponent to see his advantage. Or else the rebuffed re-
the General Soviet strategy of overcoming a physical weakness by determining,
effective strategy by decrying it inconsiderable. It would be consistent, which,
by a show of pre説, they may now seek to limit its resort to our most
uncertain war. That as they opine their weakness during our atomic weapons
on their part that their greatest vulnerability is in the area of limited
of an intermediary application of nuclear weapons, must indicate a result-
ant off-out thermo-uncertain war, their prudent reference of the inconsiderability
Since the Soviet tenders can have ten groups about the consequences of
our atomic monopoly that nuclear weapons were possible and ineluctable,
uncertain weapons will nevertalk to all-out war as they had been during
Soviet pronouncements since 1944 have been so insistent that any reason to
free World improves in proportion as the horror of war appears to diminish,
war. Because the Soviet tenders realize that the will to resist of the
doctrine which seemed to mitigate the most absolute consequences of nuclear
war concerned first the free world, escape its dilemma by developing a
of the deviation it might suffer. Henceforth Soviet propaganda was above
to the free world which had been said to recollect before the consequences
enlisted self-restraining on the West could not be used to abate to its
war began to serve a dual purpose: the same arguments that had furthered
"put the pump," propaganda and Soviet invocations of the horror of nuclear
Soviet nuclear stockpile, the consequences created by Peace Conferences,
tensionous campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons. For with the growth of the
stockpile begun to grow, that the Soviet Union derived full benefit from its
the base of peace alternatives. In fact, it was not until the Soviet nuclear
pursuit was broadened none the less effective but their point accomplished in

IX - 45

IX - 43

backwardness in Soviet military doctrine. The reliance on the threat of all-out war may indicate that Soviet military thought is still in the second of the three stages which strategic doctrine seems to undergo in assessing the implications of nuclear technology: that of being intoxicated with the destructive potential of the new weapons. The temptation is great to add nuclear weapons to the existing arsenal and doctrine as simply a more efficient explosive without the fundamental alteration of tactics which nuclear war demands. Some Soviet military literature, although it refers to widely dispersed formations and measures to avoid the contaminating effects of radiation, gives the impression that the Soviet Union may not yet have developed a doctrine and capability for the high mobility, independent action and self-contained combat teams which a nuclear battlefield requires.

To the extent that the Soviet leadership really relies on "massive retaliation" it may be inhibited in its actions in a showdown, above all if the United States possesses a more flexible strategic doctrine and military establishments as the consequences of all-out war become better understood, the Soviet leadership may come to realize, if it does not already, that it will not be able to avoid catastrophe by means of the dialectic, that a subtle distinction between the inevitable collapse in a nuclear war of capitalist civilization and the survival of world civilization may be useful to maintain the militancy of its cadres; it will not overcome the holocaust of thermo-nuclear war. The Kremlin may then find that in every concrete issue a reliance on all-out war produces the same inhibitions already experienced by the West that the risks will seem out of proportion to the objectives in dispute. If, on the other hand, the threats of all-out war are used primarily as instruments of psychological warfare -- as is likely, based on both Soviet doctrine and Soviet history -- the Soviet armed forces may be handicapped in a limited war by the failure to make a radical break

may be handicapped in a limited manner by the failure to make a rigorous preface based on the Soviet doctrine and Soviet history -- the Soviet armed forces are needlessly complicated instruments of psychological warfare -- as is likewise the case with military objectives in general. It, on the other hand, the directness of all-out war experienced by the West during the war will seem out of proportion to the concrete issue a refuce on all-out war produces the same implications strongly提示: The Kremsky may then find that in every people's war to maintain the military of the country it will not overcome the war of capitalist civilization and the survival of world civilization may not a suffice distinction between the realist side of the issue in a unclear that it will not be able to avoid catastrophic damage in some of the dialectic, underdog, the Soviet ferocious war may come to refuse, if it does not successfully military capitulation: as the consequence of all-out war becomes imperative. If the United States possesses a more flexible strategic doctrine and расorialism, it may be inhibited in these actions in a showdown, above all to the extent that the Soviet ferocious resistance relies on massive self-containing combat seems which a modern battlefield requires.

a doctrine and capability for the high mobility, independent action and tion, gives the impression that the Soviet Union may not have developed beyond transformations and measures to avoid the contaminating effects of radio-telephones. Some Soviet military literature, although it refers to whereby explosive without the fundamental alteration of tactics which must be unclean weapons to the existing armament and doctrine as simply a more efficient destructive potential of the new weapons. The combination is great to add indications of ancient technology: that of being intoxicated with the three stages which strategic doctrine seems to undergo in passing from the out war may indicate that Soviet military thought is still in the second of peacemaking in Soviet military doctrine. The reliance on the threat of eff-

IX - 43

IX - 44

with past doctrine. The use of nuclear weapons simply as a form of artillery, the attempt to maintain a stabilized front and similar tactics derived from the experience of World War II would be both ineffective and extremely costly.

Of course, we cannot gear our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inadequacy. Inevitably, if not already, the Soviet Armed Forces will realize that nuclear war requires a new order of tactics altogether. Nevertheless, whatever its theoretical insights, the Red Army will be at a decided disadvantage in adapting to the new conditions of warfare. Limited nuclear war requires decentralized command, because it can only be conducted by relatively small self-contained units. But Soviet military doctrine, based on the belief in the possibility of predicting all essential factors and developed on the analogy to complete economic planning, prides itself on its centralized control. In World War II, Soviet commanders were permitted to only the barest minimum of initiative; their primary task was implementing plans which prescribed not only the general objective--as in American field orders--but the detailed methods for attaining it. Soviet military literature, in fact, prides itself on the "single, monolithic strategic design" of the Soviet High Command. "The development of troops" wrote a high-ranking Soviet officer "can be successfully completed only when a rigid centralized plan [Emphasis added]... has been prepared."⁵⁸ In World War II, the Soviet insistance on rigid centralization made for great flexibility at the top, but extraordinary rigidity at the lower echelons. And this theory of command has been embodied also in the field regulations of 1946.

Again, in a limited nuclear war initiative is of cardinal importance, because the fluidity of operations makes it impossible to predict all

58. Garthoff, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

28. Garfoule, op. cit., p. 515.

because the liquidity of operations makes it impossible to meet off

Volk, in a limited nucleus was inscriptive is of original imprecision,
has been incorporated into the field regulations of 1949.

but extraordinarily right of the tower schedule. And this theory of command
infringes on right centralization made for these flexibility at the top.

Emphasize subordination. ... has been prepared." (28)

In World War II, the Soviet
officer "can be successively delegated only when a right delegated him
High Command." The development of troops, wrote a high-ranking Soviet
bringer itself on the "single, monolithic strategic design" of the Soviet
detailed methods for attaining it. Soviet military literature, in fact,

scripted not only the general objective--as in American field orders--but the
minimum ofОСВАТ's their primary task was implementing himself which pre-
control. In World War II, Soviet commanders were permitted to omit the purest
strategy to complete economic planning, bridge itself on its centralizing
in the feasibility of benefiting all essential factors and developed on the
smell of self-contained units. But Soviet military doctrine, based on the belief
requires decentralized command, because it can only be conducted by reference
advantage in adapting to the new conditions of war. Limited nuclear war
whatever its theoretical insights, the Red Army will be at a decided dis-
advantage in meeting the new conditions of war.

In the feasibility of benefiting all essential factors and developed on the
smell of self-contained units. But Soviet military doctrine, based on the belief
requires decentralized command, because it can only be conducted by reference
advantage in adapting to the new conditions of war. Limited nuclear war
whatever its theoretical insights, the Red Army will be at a decided dis-
advantage in meeting the new conditions of war.

that nuclear war requires a new order of tactics altogether. Nevertheless,
that nuclear war requires a new order of tactics altogether. Nevertheless,
Inevitably, it not strictly, the Soviet Armed Forces will result

Of course, we cannot bear our arduous task to the assumption of Soviet
the experience of World War II would be both inoperative and extremely costly,
the attempts to maintain a stabilized front and similar tactics derived from
with best doctrine. The use of unformed weapons simply as a form of unskilled

IX - 49

IX - 45

contingencies in advance. Soviet military doctrine, however, while paying
lip-service to initiative in theory, discourages it in practice. Soviet
doctrine distinguishes between two kinds of leadership: the first, inspiring,
initiating and directing; the other, implementing and directing according to
plan. The former is the task of the Politburo and the High Command, the
latter the duty of all other subordinate commanders. Thus the task of sub-
ordinate commanders has in practice been limited to what the Soviet Field
Regulations describe as "making precise plans of a higher command." Leader-
ship, to be sure, is considered a "constantly operating factor," but it has
been defined in terms of "organizing ability" with respect to the orders
of higher headquarters. 59)

As a result, the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War
II, while often displaying great flexibility strategically, have run to
stereotype tactically. Field Regulations prescribe the exact location of
company commanders in the rear of his troops; field orders determine not only
the direction of the attack, but the precise form it was to take. The sphere
of initiative of division commanders could not have been more restricted.
"Important decisions," wrote a Soviet war correspondent "that cannot be put
off a moment (Emphasis added) must be made by the divisional commander
himself." (60) German accounts commented on the rigidity of Soviet tactics.
Divisions were prohibited from crossing the individual boundaries and carried
out this order even if it meant the destruction of a neighboring unit before
their eyes. Regiments advanced on prescribed lines even into their own artil-
lery fire. To deviate from orders was a court-martial offense, if it did
not succeed. To carry out even suicidal orders did not involve any stigma.
"American lieutenants" wrote General Bradley "were delegated greater authority
on the Elbe than were Russian division commanders." (61)

59. Garthoff, op. cit., p. 199.

60. Ibid., p. 211.

61. Omar N. Bradley. A Soldier's Story. New York: , 1951, p. 551.

B. P. F.

Cf. (Soviet Military History, Vol. 2, pp. 102-104).

T. 102.

CO. 1. H. B. BURTON, III. CHIEF OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT.

CO. 2. J. B. BURTON, III. CHIEF OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT.

CO. 3. J. B. BURTON, III. CHIEF OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT.

on the pipe can were Russian division commanders." (P).

(P).

"American flexibilities," wrote General Badley, "were defied greater authori-
ity not since. To carry out even slight orders did not facilitate any efforts.

To depart from orders was a sort-of-murder offense, if it did

their own. In their own hands even moreense flexibilities even moreense flexibil-
ities were demonstrated on prescribed lines even moreense flexibil-
one five order even if it meant the destruction of a neighboring unit before
one five order even if it meant the destruction of a neighboring unit before
Division were mobilized from crossing the individual ponies and carried
pilots." (CO)

(CO)

out a moment (Emperor Agoff) must be made by the divisional commander

"Inexplicable decisions," wrote a Soviet war correspondent "that cannot be but
of initiative of division commanders could not have been more restricted.

the direction of the attack, but the precise form it was to take. The adre-
cement of the attack was determined not only
afera

be a result, the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War

of higher headquarters. (P)

been defined in terms of "organizing infinity," with respect to the order
and, to be sure, in considered a "conjunction operating factor," put it pas
Registrations describe as "making precise plans of a higher command." Fader-
ordinate commanders pass in practice been limited to what the Soviet Army
fetter the duty of all other subordinate commanders. Thus the task of sup-
port. The former is the task of the Poltava and the High Command, the
initiating and directing the order, implementing and directing according to
directives distinguished between two kinds of orders: the first, inscribing
FIP-service to initiative in theory, discharges it in practice. Soviet
conferences in advance. Soviet military doctrine, however, while bearing

IX - 42

IX - 46

It would therefore seem to the United States' advantage to adopt a strategy which places a premium on initiative and decentralized control. The more divisions Soviet commanders can be forced to improvise, the less they will be able to profit from their military tradition. The best means of taking advantage of the lack of initiative of subordinate Soviet commanders is by means of fluid operations; the best strategy for exploiting the rigidity of the Soviet command structure is that of limited nuclear war. An all-out thermo-nuclear war can be carried out according to a centralized plan with target systems, flight plans and bomb runs all carefully prepared in advance; this is indeed the only possible way of conducting such a conflict. A limited conventional war permits the massing of troops which can obscure the rigidity of the command structure. In limited nuclear war, on the other hand, everything depends on daring and leadership of a higher order -- qualities in which both by tradition and training our armed forces are likely to excel those of the U.S.S.R.

Nor will the Soviet High Command be able to escape its dilemma by an act of will. It is one thing to be theoretically important of leadership, initiative and decentralized command, it is quite another to bring it about. It has often been noted that the possession of a large navy does not guarantee success in sea battles because the acquisition of proper tactics is equally important and more difficult in the absence of the "feel" for naval warfare produced by a long tradition; even a substantial navy may be doomed to sterility as Germany experienced in World War I and Japan in World War II. Similarly the Soviets may find less difficulty in creating the equipment for limited nuclear war than in bringing about the psychology to make it effective. For it is precisely the instinct for initiative, an attitude which spontaneously produces self-reliant action, which seems to be lacking in Soviet society. --
Soviet doctrine has been

["action, which seems to be lacking in Soviet society. Soviet foreign policy has been\ninstinctive for initiative, attitude which exemplifies sensitivity produces self-reliant\ning apart from the methodology to make it effective. How it is precisely the\ndifficultly in creating the environment for limited nuclear war than in printing it.\n\nWar I. and II. in World War II. Similarly, the Soviet may find fees\nattract any may be due to actuality as Germany experienced in World\nthe \"feel\" for new matters produced by a long transition, even a sup-\nplerous section is equally important and more difficult in the absence of\nwhich does not guarantee success in sea battles because the acquisition of\n\nfor World War II. It is one thing to be theoretically of the importance of

IX - 47

correct when it insisted on the interrelationship of all aspects of national
life. It was right in claiming that a society is capable of only a limited
mode of action which expresses itself in political doctrine, in economic
planning and in military strategy. But this very insight may now define
Soviet weakness. The mass armies, the reliance on a centralized plan, the
rigidity of the command structure were in effect an adaptation to military
problems of the method of operation of Soviet society in general. In
developing its strategic doctrine, the Soviet leadership did what came
"naturally." It was successful in World War II because this mode of action
was well suited to the existing technology and the particular conditions of
all-out conventional war.

But, as has so often happened before, the very qualities which led
to success given one set of conditions may become an element of weakness
given another. Even assuming the maximum degree of insight on the part of
Soviet leadership, it will not be easy for it to develop the qualities in
the subordinate commanders that will be at a premium in a limited nuclear
war. Self-reliance cannot be improvised. It exists in the American officer
corps because it is drawn from a society in which self-reliance and individual
initiative have traditionally been encouraged. By the same token, these
qualities will be difficult to find in the Soviet Armed Forces because
nowhere in Soviet society can models for them be found. Where everything
is done according to plan there may be a tendency to reduce even initiative
to stereotype. In short, the Soviets may be able to train units for limited
nuclear war; but the mode of operation for such a conflict would not come
"naturally" because the Soviets would possess no instinct for this kind of
operation. Both Russian history and Soviet dogmatism would indicate that the
Soviet Armed Forces will be more at home with mass attacks than with sharp

Soviet armed forces will be more at home with mass attacks than with armed
operation. Both Russian history and Soviet demographics would indicate that the
"uniqueness" because the Soviets would become no instant for this kind of
war; but the mode of operation for such a conflict would not come
to stereotype. In short, the Soviets may be able to gain much for limited
it is done according to plan there may be a tendency to regard such initiatives
nowhere. In Soviet society can models for them be found. Where everything
uniquities will be difficult to find in the Soviet Union because
initiatives have traditionally been encouraged. By the same token, these
corps because it is drawn from a society in which self-reliance and individual
war. Self-reliance cannot be financed. It exists in the American officer
the endogenous commensurate which will be at a premium in a limited moment
Soviet federation, it will not be easy for it to develop the unifications in
Given another. Even assuming the maximum degree of insight on the basis of
to success. Given one set of conditions which become an element of success
But, as has so often happened before, the very unifications which led
out of conventional war,
was met suited to the existing technology and the particular conditions of
"militarily". It was successful in World War II because this mode of action
developing its strategic doctrine, the Soviet fersagend did what same
properties of the method of operation of Soviet society in general. In
tightness of the command structure were in effect an adaptation to military
Soviet workweek. The mass series, the resistance on a centralized basis, the
branding easy in military strategy. But this very insight may now define
mode of action which expresses itself in better doctrine in economic
title. It was right in claiming that a society is capable of using a limited
contract. Indeed, it isulated on the internationalism of will and the use of a limited

IX - 41

IX - 48

individual clashes, more with carefully planned campaigns than with deliberately flexible operations. The history of Russian and Soviet naval warfare — and naval warfare offers the closest analogy to the tactics of limited nuclear war—demonstrates the extraordinary difficulty of adapting the Russian human material to operations different from the massive defense of the "motherland." To be sure, the Soviets could learn the strategy of limited nuclear war just as Americans could master the principles of mass infantry attacks. But they will probably not be any more at ease with it than Americans would be in the kind of sluggish-match at which the Red Army excelled in World War II. A limited nuclear war does not guarantee success by itself; but it would use the sociological, technological and psychological advantages of the United States to best effect.

A familiar argument is certain to recur at this point: if limited nuclear war is to our advantage, it must be to the Soviet disadvantage and the Soviet leadership would therefore adopt a strategy either of conventional or of all-out war. As to the strategy of conventional war, it is clear that the Soviets cannot force us into it by their choice, only through our inhibitions or through our failure to create the psychological framework for our most effective strategy. As for the option of all-out war, it cannot be repeated often enough that the fact that the Soviet cannot profit from limited war does not mean that they can profit from all-out war. The sanctions of all-out war are so unambiguous that they leave hardly any room for miscalculation. If we behave effectively, we should be able to make it clear to even the most fanatic opponent that all-out war would be tantamount to national suicide. Thus one of the more hopeful aspects of the present situation may be that a gap may have been created between Soviet political and strategic doctrine; between the political preference for the

["belligerent and aggressive government between the belligerent powers for the present situation and the fact that a Red Army have been created between Soviet and national armies. These one of the more doubtful aspects of the fact clear to us the most traumatic opponent that all-out war would be tantamount to national annihilation. These one of the more doubtful aspects of the present situation which we believe effectively, we should be able to make out for our most effective strategy. As for the option of all-out war, it cannot be reënanced often enough that the fact that the Soviet cannot profit from our most effective strategy, as for the option of all-out war, it cannot be reënanced often enough that the fact that the Soviet cannot profit from our most effective strategy

IX - 49

indirect approach, the constant pressure, the exploitation of the psychol-
ogical weak point of the opponent and the strategic options open for achiev-
ing the political goal. Whether the gap is exploited, indeed, whether it
comes into being, depends importantly on our own strategic doctrine:
whether we can break away from our own preconceptions and whether we are
ready to face the prospects and opportunities of limited war.

Nevertheless, it would be risky to rely too much on the self-
evidence of the horrors of nuclear war. The doctrine of the greater in-
vulnerability of the Soviet state, if repeated often enough, may induce its
proponents to miscalculate either our capabilities or our determination. The
persistence of traditional doctrine may make it difficult for the Soviet
leadership to adjust to the new modes of warfare. Obsolescent tactics may
then bring on a holocaust despite Soviet intentions. Finally, the theory
of the need for constant activism may mislead the Soviet leadership about
its strategic opportunities or the kind of resistance it might face. It
therefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey its correct options
to the other side; in some respects to make up for any lack of imagination
on the part of the Soviet leadership by conveying to them our understanding
of the nature and the limits of nuclear war. To be sure, such a program will
not deter an opponent determined on a final showdown. No diplomatic program
can be a substitute for an adequate retaliatory power. But to the extent
that a war may become all-out because of miscalculation of our intentions
or because of a misunderstanding of the nature of nuclear warfare, it should
be the task of our diplomacy to bring about a better comprehension of the
range of strategic options of the nuclear period. This is all the more
important because whatever the advantages of limited nuclear war, it will

["important principle whereby the advantage of limited warfare, if still\nrange of strategic options at the ancient period. This is all the more\nbecause of a misunderstanding of the nature of ancient warfare, if only\nthat a war may become all-out because of macrocosm of our intentions\ncan be a mistake for all adequate reticulum power. But to the extent\nnot deter an opponent determined on a final endowment. No strategic program\nof the nature and the limits of warfare. To be sure, such a program should\non the part of the Soviet leadership try to meet our understanding of\nthe other side: in some respects so make no difference. A lack of insight\ntherefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey the correct options\nits strategic opportunity or the mind of relationship it might have. It\nof the need for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in a polemicist debate Soviet intentions. Timely, the plan\nfamiliar to adjust so the new modes of nature. Obstacle sectors may\nbelange to traditional doctrine. May make it difficult for the Soviet\nbroader to macrocosm either our capabilities or our determination. The\namplitude of the Soviet estate, it is repeated often enough, may indicate life\nof the front for constant activity may arise. The Soviet leadership about\nthen print in

IX - 50

not be possible to improvise it under the pressure of events. In seeking to avoid the horrors of all-out war by outlining an alternative; in developing a concept of limitation that combines firmness with moderation, diplomacy can once more establish a relationship with force even in the nuclear age.

Very good chapter!

can once more establish a relationship with force even in the most severe case,

using a concept of limitation that combines timeliness with moderation, flexibility
to avoid the horrors of stiff-out war by outpacing an alternative; in develop-
not be possible to improve it under the pressure of events. In seeking

IX - 30