war would bookees a powerful incentive to test our sincerity.

our national existence directly even if by means less than all-out

areasal. The same would be true if the Soviets sought to threaten

as heretofore and we could resist by using every weapon in our

with an all-out surprise attack on us the same relation obtaining

according to rules established well in advance. If the war begins

in case of a local Soviet attack limited war could be fought

any case on permitting the other side to strike the first blow.

unilaterally since our strategy for an all-out war is based in

We would lose nothing even if we made such an announcement
during the course of military operations.

inspection, the inspectors to remain in the battle zone even
unclear weapons against cities declared open, and so verified by
zone (say 500 miles); that within this zone we would not use
cities located more than a certain distance behind the battle
that we would not attack the enemy retaliatory force or enemy
explosive equivalent, unless the enemy violated the understanding
use "clean" bombs with minimal fall-out effects for any larger

use "clean" bombs with minimal fall-out effects for any larger
explosive equivalent, unless the enemy violated the understanding
use "clean" bombs with minimal fall-out effects for any larger

VII

X-47

To be sure, it is not likely that the Soviets will formally accept such a proposal because the belief in the inevitable horror of nuclear war is the condition of atomic blackmail. In order to undermine the willingness of the non-Soviet world to resist the Soviets have every interest to paint the consequences of war in the most drastic terms. But whatever the utility of the pronouncements of impending doom for paralyzing resistance, the Soviets would face a considerable dilemma if we maintained our position even in the face of a Soviet rejection. Whatever their distrust, they would possess a powerful incentive to test our sincerity.

The limitation of war described here is impossible however without a strategic doctrine adapted to nuclear weapons. It presupposes an ability to use force with discrimination and to establish political goals in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public opinion which has been educated in the realities of the nuclear age. A program of war limitation, in short, cannot be used as a cheaper means of imposing unconditional surrender.

A program of war limitation, in short, cannot be used as a
opinion which has been educated in the realities of the nuclear
survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public
enlisted political goal in which the question of national
survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public
age. A program of war limitation, in short, cannot be used as a
opinion which has been educated in the realities of the nuclear
survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public
enlisted political goal in which the question of national
survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public

It preempts an ability to use force with discrimination and to
however without a strategic doctrine adapted to nuclear weapons.

to test our sincerity.

Whatever their contrast, they would pose a powerful incentive
maintained our position even in the face of a Soviet rejection.
resistance, the Soviets would face a considerable dilemma if we
the utility of the pronouncements of impending doom for paralyzing
the consequences of war in the most drastic terms. But whatever
Soviet world to react the Soviets have every interest to paint
blackmail. In order to undermine the willingness of the non-
unavailable horror of nuclear war is the condition of atomic
formally accept such a proposal because the petition in the
To be sure, it is not likely that the Soviets will

X-47

X - 45 a

immoral art undertaken for its own sake and we have come to
think of resistance to it more ~~as~~ in terms of
balancing risks. But the usual case of aggression has a specific
objective. It is not necessary to threaten destruction of the
home base of the enemy to inhibit it; it is sufficient to prevent
the aggressor from attaining his goal. An aggressor would seem to
have no motive for an attack if he cannot calculate with a
reasonable chance of success.

Above all, if one balances the catastrophe of the failure
of a policy of deterrence which relies on all-out war against the
possibility that a less absolute strategy may weaken the deterrent,
the advantages would seem to be with the latter course. A wise
policy will not depend on a threat it should be afraid to implement.

The United States should therefore shift the emphasis of
disarmament negotiations from the technically almost impossible
problem of preventing surprise attack to an effort to mitigate
the horror of war. Such a course would have the additional
advantage of enabling us to make a distinction between Soviet

advantage of enlisting us to make a distinction between Soviet

possibility that a less absolute strategy may weaken the deterrent,
of a policy of deterrence which relies on all-out war against the

Above all, it one balance the catastrophe of the failure

reasonable chance of success.

have no motive for an attack if he cannot calculate with a
the aggressor from attaining his goal. An aggressor would seem to
home base of the enemy to inpenitit if; it is sufficient to prevent
objective. It is not necessary to threaten destruction of the

balancing risks. But the usual case of aggression has a specific
think of resistance to it more as punishment than in terms of
immoral art undertaken for its own sake and we have come to

s 42