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aloud and had not yet consulted anyone else in Washington. It seemed that he was contemplating a nine- or twelve-month suspension from a certain date, to include or exclude underground tests as might be agreed. The date would of course be settled with us to protect our next series. Writing to Lloyd I made it clear that I would have to get Cabinet approval, which during the holidays could not be done quickly. Moreover I pointed out that since the General Assembly was not due to meet until 16 September I did not see the urgency for an immediate statement. As regards the date, I would have to consult the experts as to when our next series of tests could be finished. Nor was I clear why underground tests should be excluded. Was it because the Americans wanted to go on with them? Or was it because they did no harm? Then there was the question of 'small' tests, which the Geneva talks had shown could not be detected by any existing system. We would also have to be fully satisfied as to the continuing information which we would receive from our American friends. Our experts were not due to begin until 27 August the vital talks in Washington which followed the amendment of the McMahon Act. We could not really have a firm policy until we saw how these conversations proceeded. I added as perhaps the most important consideration the need to protect the position of the French:

> Here we must be careful not to let them feel that we and the Americans have betrayed them. We must consider most carefully what to do, especially in relation to de Gaulle. There is much at stake there including the economic structure of Europe. The important point is for the Americans to decide what they are prepared to do to help the French and what stage the French must reach in their atomic programme to qualify for American help. Is it enough for them to have an explosion? One advantage of the formula in excluding small tests ... is that it would allow the French to carry out a few small explosions without having to do so in moral isolation.

I now thought it best to announce our next test. This was done on 18 August. I hoped that my holding messages would give us at least a little respite; but, alas, I was mistaken.

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I was looking forward to a quiet evening, and leaving tomorrow morning for Bolton Abbey. But tonight (about 10.30 p.m.) two telegrams arrived from Selwyn which raise the most serious questions. The Americans (led by the President, who seems determined to show his strength) want to announce abolition [or suspension] of nuclear tests as from 1 October. What will be the effect (a) on our programme, (b) on our relations with France, the Americans are too much in a hurry even to consider. I shall have to put off my journey and deal with this tomorrow. I made a first draft of a possible reply to the Americans.¹

Accordingly, on the following day a conference of officials was arranged to discuss the draft reply. Sir Norman Brook, helpful and calm as usual, Sir Patrick Dean from the Foreign Office, wise and resolute, Sir Richard Powell, Ministry of Defence, full of resource, and Sir Edwin Plowden of the Atomic Energy Commission, skilful and determined, and one or two others met to discuss its terms. The Foreign Secretary was in Washington; other Ministers concerned were, very properly, on holiday.

Meanwhile, another message—personal from the President— promising (if we agreed to suspension of tests on the basis of their proposed declaration) full information ‘so far as the law permits’. I told my advisers that I thought this message should be answered separately and that I should ask straight out the 64,000-dollar question. ‘Does the law permit U.S. to give us full information on “vulnerability” of the Bomb and on making small bombs, but with megaton power.’ The first is essential, for we believe that otherwise a bomb can be ‘immunised’; the second is equally essential if we are to be able to make our own warheads for rockets, whether the rockets themselves are American (like Thor) or of our own design. Apart from my reply to President on this vital point—a satisfactory answer to which would of course make further tests unnecessary for us—there are all the general political arguments against precipitate action by the Americans. For one thing, the French will never forgive another act of what they will call ‘betrayal’.²

¹ 19 August 1958.

² 20 August 1958.

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After a full discussion, I sent two messages to the President. The first dealt only with the British position. If we were to abandon tests with a clear conscience we must be satisfied that we would receive full information on all the vital problems; above all on the two which I specified. On the larger issue I felt while some response must be made to the forthcoming report of the Geneva experts, we ought not to abandon tests until our long-held position requiring practical measures of inspection and control could be implemented at least partially. Moreover since the United States series of tests would not be finished until mid-October surely it would be wiser to link any Western initiative with the opening of the United Nations Assembly rather than with the experts' report. The Foreign Secretary when in New York had striven hard to point out to Dulles how we felt the cards should best be played. The President however in one of his messages seemed unusually excited—'We are up against one of those moments that we regard as psychologically correct.' Moreover Selwyn Lloyd reported that after discussing it with the French Ministers at the United Nations, they appeared to be altogether unconcerned, since the French had no intention of abandoning tests whatever anybody else might say or do. Naturally while all this was going on, there was no hope of starting any holiday. The grouse would be undisturbed by me at any rate for this season.

Great activity from London in the afternoon and evening. The President has sent a most categorical reply, pledging himself and his Government to give us *all* the information on nuclear weapons which we need and declaring that the law allows him to do so. Replies were drafted for me to send, which I approved. But again ! cut our answer into two—sending one on the atomic pledge and another on the general question. I want the correspondence on the American nuclear promises to be short and self-contained. Since most of the other points seem to be met—the French do *not* object—I have agreed to associate U.K. with the U.S. action. The Americans have altogether changed their plan—at our suggestion—because they are not now offering to abandon tests *absolutely*, but only if Russians agree to negotiate on the control system. From our point of view, I think that we can rely on the American promise, which replaces the not altogether

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satisfactory 'bilateral' agreements [so far] made under the McMahon Amendment Act. This will save us both time and a great deal of money.¹

Since Dulles redrafted his proposal to allow us to finish our proposed tests and assured me that the Americans would not feel prohibited from resuming tests if a control system was not agreed, I gave a cautious approval to the plan. proposed. I made it clear, however, that my concern had not only been to protect the British nuclear programme; I was anxious to extract the maximum advantage from the experts' discussions at Geneva. I did not want the Russians to escape without paying at least some price for the suspension of tests or to throw away the prize which we all hoped to gain of making them accept some system of international control—the essential condition for any progress in general disarmament, whether in the unconventional or the conventional field.

In my final message to the President on 21 August I emphasised these political considerations.

Two factors, in particular, weighed heavily with me. First, I thought it would be a profound mistake to concede suspension without securing Russian acceptance of an international control system. Secondly, I was seriously apprehensive about de Gaulle's reaction. On both these points I have been reassured by your messages of today. On the first, I think that Foster's new draft is a great improvement. Though, even now, I am not sure whether the Russians will accept a truly international system of control. If they should take the line that each country should man the control posts within its own territory, we shall not have achieved our essential purpose. I hope we shall both keep a careful eye on this. On the second, I would feel happier if I knew what de Gaulle himself was thinking. But I am relieved to know that Couve [de Murville], at any rate, seems to be taking this quite quietly. I think that I must send the General a personal message about this just before the announcement is made. Perhaps you would consider whether you could do so too.

Early next morning I heard that the President and Dulles had accepted four out of five of our amendments and that both seemed

¹ 21 August 1958.

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extremely pleased that we had reached agreement. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, had been seen both by the President and by Dulles, as well as by the Foreign Secretary, and had raised no objections. Messages were sent to all the NATO powers, and on 22 August a formal statement was issued by the American and British Governments in similar terms, welcoming the successful conclusion of the conference of experts on the detection of nuclear explosions, pointing out that the next task was to solve the practical and political problems relating to the organisation, installation, and functioning of a control organisation, and announcing their readiness to enter into negotiations on 31 October for an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests under effective control, which would, it was hoped, also facilitate early negotiation on measures of disarmament. At the same time both Governments announced that from the date of the opening of negotiations they would be prepared to refrain from further testing for one year provided the Soviet Union and all Governments which had tested nuclear weapons did not resume testing in that period. This restraint would be continued on a reciprocity basis for successive periods of one year if satisfactory progress were made towards installing and working an inspection system and towards the adoption and execution of measures of disarmament. In addition it was stated that the British Government would complete their own short series of tests as soon as possible. The United States Atomic Energy Commission later announced that the current American programme of tests would be concluded by 31 October. On the next day I noted:

> Our announcement about nuclear tests has had quite a good press, including even *Manchester Guardian*. The first of our Christmas Island tests was done today—a small kiloton 'trigger' explosion. The megaton test is timed for 8 September or so. The question now arises about going on with it. In principle, we can rely on the latest American understanding. In practice, it might be as well to have the knowledge which we shall get from this test.¹

I have described this episode in some detail because it emphasises the close and intimate relations between Washington and London

¹ 23 August 1958.

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and the willingness of both the President and the Secretary to meet our points in detail as well as to treat us as full and equal partners on grave points of principle. It also shows our anxiety to meet French susceptibilities. In looking back over these years this relationship is my outstanding memory. If we sometimes felt a little impatient with the continual changes of policy and uncertainties of programme which emerged from Washington, it was gratifying to know that we were not merely informed about the projects or decisions of our partners; we were taken into full confidence at the early stages. This close co-operation and sense of comradeship was easy to sustain at our many meetings; but I was happy to feel that even if we could not speak in the same room we could, through our representatives and personal messages, maintain an equally full and fruitful dialogue.

This spirit was by no means confined to the White House or the State Department. The talks between the British and American nuclear scientists, which took place in the second half of August, proved to be of exceptional value. I was particularly glad to hear that, somewhat to the surprise of our friends, it was found that the specialist information was not all on one side. I had a talk with the leading members of our team on their return.

> Meeting of atomic experts, just returned from U.S. The talks have gone off very well. Two important facts emerged: (a) Americans are doing ten more kiloton tests before end of October and would *not* wish us to stop before them; (b) in some respects we are as far, and even further, advanced in the art than our American friends. They thought interchange of information would be all *give*. They are keen that we should complete our series, especially the last megaton, the character of which is novel and of deep interest to them. This is important, because it makes this final series complementary rather than competitive—and therefore easy to defend in Parliament.¹

It is indeed remarkable that our small team of British scientists and technicians had been able to achieve such notable advances with an expenditure of money and effort almost derisory compared to that

¹ 1 September 1958.

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provided in America. I was so pleased with this that I thought it
right to send a letter to Sir Edwin Plowden in the following terms.

I have had a very interesting talk with [Sir Frederick] Brun-
drett, [Sir William] Penney and [Sir William] Cook about their
discussions in Washington last week, and I have been very
impressed by the results which they achieved. It is clear that the
Americans were amazed to learn how much we already know and
that this was a major factor in convincing them that we could be
trusted with more information than they probably intended
originally to give us. I hope that these discussions will be only
the first of a series, in which Anglo-American co-operation in
this field will become progressively closer. But if we do succeed
in gradually persuading the Americans to regard the enterprise
as a joint project in which we are entitled to be regarded as equal
partners in terms of basic knowledge, it will be because we have
got off to a flying start under the bilateral agreement; and the
credit for that must go to the team of scientists and technicians
who have enabled us, single-handed, to keep virtually abreast of
the United States in this complex and intricate business of
nuclear weapons development. It is a tremendous achievement,
of which they have every right to be very proud.

I tried to say this to them at our meeting; and I hope that
there may be some opportunity for me to say it publicly in due
course. But whether that opportunity occurs or not, I wanted
you to know—and, if you can, to tell your staff—that the Govern-
ment share the satisfaction which you yourself must feel at the
outcome of the Washington talks and that we are very conscious
how much the country owes to the devoted work of the men who,
under your leadership, have kept us so well up in the running in
this critical race.

The question of atomic tests continued to occupy much of our time and attention, but public opinion seemed satisfied with our action. Meanwhile the Anglo-American consultations continued to move on satisfactory lines. The only point at issue (and on this John A. McCone, the American negotiator, proved very reasonable) arose about the exchange of information on the civil side.

Although we believe in and practise full publication of scientific
and technological information, we are not willing to exchange

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drawings of industrial designs, except (as agreed with the
President) in the military field. Naturally, this is a very important
matter for us, as we have a very good lead in this sphere.¹

On 30 August the Soviet Government sent notes to the British and American Governments announcing their agreement that talks should open on 31 October. On the same day the Geneva Committee of experts published a report, the most important feature of which was that it was technically feasible to instigate 'a workable and effective control system'. Khrushchev made a statement published in *Pravda* expressing his full agreement with the conclusion of the experts. All this seemed hopeful; for it was clear, from the experts' report, that if the Russians really accepted an adequate system of control real progress was within our grasp.

In connection with the work at Geneva I thought the President
would be interested in Penney's report to me and wrote to him
accordingly.

The recent expert conference at Geneva on suspending nuclear
tests was clearly an outstanding success. This has been under-
lined by Khrushchev's willingness to open substantive talks with
us on the subject on 31 October.

I feel that a great deal of the credit for this success should go
to your scientists led by Dr. James B. Fisk. Under his leadership
the whole Western team worked in harmony and effectively. I
think that Dr. Fisk is to be commended for the way he managed
the Russians, who, I am told, were proficient and pertinacious
on both technical and political matters. Sir William Penney
described Dr. Fisk's performance as magnificent. If it is in
order I would be glad if you would convey my personal thanks
to him.

I also felt it appropriate to write to Churchill who still followed
these affairs closely. He had deeply resented the exclusion of
Britain under the McMahon Act and had continually urged its
amendment. Accordingly on 13 September I wrote:

You will be interested to hear that we have reached a most
satisfactory arrangement both on the highest political level and on

¹6 November 1958.

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the technical side with the Americans over the question of our co-operation. It has worked out much better than I could ever have hoped when the first suggestion of amending the McMahon Act was made a year ago at Washington. It is a great triumph for our scientists, and the Americans now realise how much we have done in a much shorter time and with fewer resources. We are by no means the junior partner so far as the genius of our scientists is concerned. All this amply justifies your decisions throughout and ending with the decision to make the hydrogen bomb.

On 30 September the Russians resumed their tests giving as a reason that they were entitled to continue until they had reached the number equal to the tests carried out by Britain and America since the last Russian test in March. All this, including the statement of the Russian delegate at the United Nations on 27 October that his Government would decline any proposal to suspend nuclear tests for one year, did not cause undue concern; for everything must depend upon the talks at Geneva. I was more worried by hearing of the line which the Americans now intended to take. It appeared that the American delegation were to be instructed not to be satisfied with a mutual suspension for a trial year; even the first year's suspension was to be conditional on the achievement of agreed measures not only of inspection but also of disarmament in general. I felt that while British public opinion would accept the first stipulation—an effective control system—they would regard the second demand as unreasonable.

On H-bomb tests, the Americans have suddenly and surprisingly turned round. Too weak in August, they are being too tough in October.¹

To insist upon the second demand—progress in disarmament in the conventional field—seemed not only impolitic but unnecessary. This view was confirmed when the three-power conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests met on 31 October; for at the first session the Russian delegates announced that they had brought with them a draft treaty providing for the immediate and permanent

¹ 18 October 1958.

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suspension of nuclear tests. If Britain and America would agree and sign such a treaty, then plans could be elaborated for the establishment of a control system on the lines proposed by the experts. This, of course, was quite unacceptable. The two must go together.

Nevertheless negotiations and discussions continued at Geneva, although somewhat confused by the opening of a ten-power conference on measures to be taken against 'surprise attacks'. The interchange of papers between the delegates of both sides continued without interruption, and by the end of the year when the conference had adjourned four articles in a proposed draft treaty had been agreed. But formidable and fundamental issues remained to be settled. The question of the link between disarmament in conventional weapons and forces and the abolition of nuclear tests had fortunately not arisen, and the doubts whether agreement could ever be reached upon the first seemed to make it still more inadvisable to introduce the second issue. Public opinion was so clearly on our side about inspection and control that it would be folly to allow it to become confused by extraneous and supplementary questions. There had been at least some concession by the Russians in that the conference, when it reconvened, would be able to discuss the problem of control. I therefore sent a message to the President on 1 January 1959 urging that we should drop our conditions directly linking the abolition of tests with general disarmament. Although we knew that the Americans attached great importance to the latter, to insist now seemed to me wrong. Since this was a matter which, as well as being of real substance, I knew would have great political importance at home, I elaborated my argument in a personal message:

> After the first four weeks of stalemate at Geneva, there has been a move forward. The conference is now able to discuss controls and get down to drafting a treaty. But despite what they say, the Russians are still trying to get out of having an effective control system on their territory. They have cleverly disguised their position by making what they claim to be concessions, resulting in agreement on the first four articles in a draft treaty. We know that these articles are meaningless without a proper control organisation. But the Russians are now in a better position to fool the world into believing that it is we who are preventing agreement