-3-

In other words, De Gaulle's clashes with America
reflected entirely different sets of historical experience
and perspective.

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged
from its historic isolation into a position never enjoyed by
any other nation. With less than a fiftieth of the world's
population, it was producing over a third of all the world's
goods and services. It possessed an atomic monopoly. Its
involvement in wars had been to respond to major threats
perceived as temporary after which it seemed safe to with-
draw again into isolation. Its commitment to foreign econom-
ic programs reflected the conviction that domestic strains
result above all from discrepancies between expectation and
reality and can be overcome by the mobilization of resourc-
es.

The two great post-war American initiatives - NATO and
the Marshall Plan - marvelously responded to immediate

problems even though they were based on premises about the
nature of international relations that were as unique,
indeed idiosyncratic, as America's history: that cooperation
among nations is its own justification, that peace is
natural and that division of labor is adequate motivation
for the conduct of each ally.

De Gaulle emerged from a diametrically opposite histor-
ic experience. He led a country turned cautious by too many
enthusiasms shattered, sceptical by too many dreams proved
fragile, and conditioned not by his nation's sense of power
or cohesion, but by its latent vulnerability.

De Gaulle did not believe that peace was the natural
condition among states. "The world is full of opposing
forces...the competition of efforts is the condition of
life...international life, like life in general is a bat-
tle." Whereas American leaders stressed partnership, De
Gaulle emphasized equilibrium. While Washington wanted to

-5-

assign each ally a part in the overall task, De Gaulle
believed that cooperation was meaningful only so long as
each partner had a real choice. Washington, conscious of
America's stability, focussed on immediate, practical tasks;
it urged an alliance structure which in the name of integra-
tion made separate action physically impossible. De Gaulle,
governing a country wracked by generations of war and civil
conflict, insisted that the manner of cooperation was as
important as the goal itself. France, if it was to recover
its identity, had to be perceived as acting voluntarily and
therefore had to have freedom of choice.

De Gaulle inevitably opposed a NATO in which French
forces were placed under foreign command and a Europe which
dissolved French identity in a maze of supranational insti-
tutions. He warned that supranationalism was incompatible
with France's identity as if "self-renouncement were hence-
forth its sole possibility and even its only ambition..." He

considered this view not inconsistent with his advocacy of a
united Europe "so that gradually there may be established on
both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the
Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influen-
tial...complex in the world." And he never strayed from
affirming the importance of the American alliance even while
doubting that America could, or wanted to, retain indefi-
nitely its commitment to Europe - especially in the nuclear
field. In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis, American
officials were as astonished as they were pleased by De
Gaulle's all-out support.

Americans had a tendency to accuse De Gaulle of delu-
sions of grandeur. The fact was that American leaders,
though personally humble, were cocksure about the future. By
comparison, De Gaulle's arrogant style was in part designed
to reinsure against the French nightmare in which the
unexpected formed the most central historical experience. It

[Y]

-7-

was in the end a case of personal humility and historical
arrogance clashing with personal arrogance and historical
humility.

I bring up these ancient quarrels because the upheavals
of the past year have suddenly given De Gaulle's view a new
relevance. He would not have been surprised by the diffi-
culties in which the Soviet system finds itself. Indeed he
might well claim to have foreseen it at the height of the
Berlin crisis of 1959: "...there is in this uproar of
imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets something
so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to attribute
it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambi-
tions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from great
difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more
plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and
acts of force in which the Communist system encloses the
countries which are under its yoke, and despite certain

collective successes which it has achieved by drawing upon
the substance of its subjects, actually its gaps, its
shortages, its internal failures, and above that its charac-
ter of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more by the
elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult to
deceive and to subjugate."

Yet the suddenness of the collapse would have confront-
ed De Gaulle with a contingency he could neither foresee nor
sardonically dismiss: the sudden emergence of a powerful
united Germany. In the Sixties, De Gaulle obviously believed
that it was possible to construct European equilibrium based
on French political dominance, the division of Germany, West
German economic strength and a continued though reduced
American presence. In this scheme everybody had some role:
the Soviet Union would see to the division of Germany; the
United States would defend Western Europe against the Soviet
Union; and France would in time take over the political

-9-

leadership of Western Europe backed by German economic
strength.

The pattern was however too Cartesian, that is to say
too intricate. It left too little scope for the unpredict-
able. At any rate, it has collapsed. De Gaulle would surely
recognize that the Soviet military threat has declined; that
the American commitment to Europe is being reassessed; and,
that France simply does not have the strength to organize a
new European equilibrium by herself. The traditional French
option to contain Germany by rapprochement with Russia is
precluded by either of the foreseeable outcomes of the
Soviet internal conflict: if there is chaos, Russia will be
too weak to act as a counterweight to Germany; if Russian
nationalism prevails, a Soviet Union with thousands of
nuclear weapons might rediscover hegemonial aspirations. Nor
in a Europe of 18th century diplomacy is it a foregone
conclusion that the Soviet Union would opt for France as a

partner. In any event, the least attempt to encircle Germany
would almost surely reawaken the very nationalism that is
France's nightmare. So at the end of the road designed to
make America more dispensable, the United States has emerged
again as the key to the European equilibrium - though it
remains to be seen whether Washington understands that
opportunity.

In these circumstances, I suspect that De Gaulle would
pursue two courses: he would accelerate his long-range goal
of European political unity. And he would rediscover new
virtues in the Atlantic Alliance.

De Gaulle would not in my view convert to the
supranational concepts of Jean Monnet. More than ever, he
would reject the counsels of integrationists looking to
strengthen supranationalism in the field of economics. His
attitudes in that respect would not differ too much from
those of Prime Minister Thatcher.

-11-

But he would part company with the doughty British Prime Minister with respect to European unity in the political and security fields. Given his faith in the primacy of foreign policy, I am convinced that De Gaulle would make every effort to build a united Europe in the political and security fields. Paradoxically, side by side with resisting a supranational bureaucracy, he might well espouse a system of majority decision in the Council of Ministers, calculating that such a system would give France two options: his preference would surely be the closest association with Germany. He would go to great lengths to avoid a Franco-German conflict; to even greater lengths to achieve common positions. But if despite all efforts, the temptations of Germany's central position become too great, De Gaulle might resort to the option of closer cooperation with the other nations of Western Europe. Either option would enable France to have a decisive impact on the majority

[Y]

-12-

vote. De Gaulle's goal would be not rivalry, however, but
European unity leading to the creation of a European defense
system under European command to which France together with
Britain might contribute part of their nuclear forces
especially with respect to threats to Germany.

Ironically, the collapse of Soviet power and the
emergence of Germany would transform De Gaulle's approach to
America's European role. As a cool calculator he would
recognize that the French and British nuclear forces are
last desperate resorts accentuating rather than attenuating
the need for American assistance in all other circumstances.
He would understand too that while ethnic rivalries and
economic crisis have changed the nature of the Soviet
conventional threat, the Soviet nuclear stockpile of over
ten thousand warheads is essentially unimpaired. He would
therefore seek an American commitment to the nuclear defense

[4]

-13-

of Europe which he would regard as substantially empty
without an American presence.

But De Gaulle's reasoning would not be simply or even
primarily military. The fear of American domination which
governed his actions twenty-five years ago would have
largely disappeared under the impact of a greater balance in
the world's economy, the imminent withdrawal of a large part
of America's ground forces from Europe and the emergence of
European institutions for foreign policy and defense.

Regarding the American presence in Europe as an essen-
tial component of the European equilibrium, De Gaulle would
see the advantage of relating Germany to a Western superpow-
er and to the confidence inspired in the rest of Western
Europe by the presence of a country that three times in this
century proved essential to preserving the balance of power
in Europe. Yet as a student of history, De Gaulle would also
recognize and fear the strong forces proclaiming that

[Y]

-14-

America has won the Cold War and should now leave Europe to the Europeans. So he would calculate that America cannot be present in Europe politically without a revival of a sense of Atlantic community with some common tasks for all its members.

Thus De Gaulle would probably come full circle as an advocate of NATO. He would know that a united Germany could not remain part of an integrated NATO command indefinitely unless France joined as well. And this decision would be eased by the emergence of a unified European voice within NATO. In such a structure it is likely that some American troops could again be stationed in France.

Of course, De Gaulle would insist on an equal voice for Europe in global policies. And he would maintain a friendly option towards the East designed to counterbalance the French fears of German aberration and American isolationism

[4]

-15-

without pushing the Eastern option to the point where it
evokes these dangers.

This is surely an unsentimental picture of a leader
sentimental only about his own country. But De Gaulle was
convinced also that his approach was far from selfish: "The
battle which our country is waging," he said "tends to unite
and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate
and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful to its mission
which always was and which remains human and universal."

Perhaps De Gaulle's greatest achievement was to insti-
tutionalize his approach to foreign policy. Every successor
of whatever party has more or less followed his basic
philosophy. So it is possible that much of what is described
here will emerge as French policy in the not too distant
future. Then it remains to be seen whether French rationali-
ty can manage the intangibles: Britain's willingness to join

DR. KISSINGER'S DE GAULLE ARTICLE

FINAL 4/25/90

In this, the 100th year of De Gaulle's birth and the
20th anniversary of his resigning from office, it is fitting
to reflect on how the great French President would have
reacted to the extraordionary upheavals of our time.

My own encounters with De Gaulle were brief and
one-sided. The first occurred at an Elysee reception during
President Nixon's Paris visit in 1969. An aide ushered me
into De Gaulle's presence. The President wasted no time on
pleasantries. Eying me aloofly, he opened with a painful
question: "Why do you not withdraw from Vietnam?" "Because,"
I replied somewhat lamely, "it would undermine our credibil-
ity." "Where?" De Gaulle demanded. "In the Middle East," I

[x]

-2-

suggested. Gazing into the distance with seeming melancholy, De Gaulle said: "How very odd. In the Middle East, I thought it was your adversaries who have the credibility problem."

The encounter was quintessential De Gaulle. He did not believe that diplomacy required charm or personal relations but rather, and above all, a proper perception of the relations of forces. If these are correctly calculated, diplomacy can be successful. If not, neither good will nor charm can serve as a substitute. A basic aim of De Gaulle's foreign policy was to liberate France from the vagaries of personality. This embroiled him into frequent clashes with the United States. American leaders were outraged by what they considered doubts about their good faith. But De Gaulle was trying to provide for the time when his American contemporaries would be gone from the scene and America would become absorbed in its own problems or with other continents - a time which may not be too far distant.

-3-

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged from its historic isolation into a position never enjoyed by any other nation. With less than a fifth of the world's population, it was producing over a third of all the world's goods and services. It possessed an atomic monopoly. Its involvement in wars had been to respond to major threats perceived as temporary after which it seemed safe to withdraw again into isolation. Its commitment to foreign economic programs reflected the conviction that domestic strains result above all from discrepancies between expectation and reality and can be overcome by the mobilization of resources.

[Y]

-4-

[y]

-5-

assign each ally a part in the overall task, De Gaulle believed that cooperation was meaningful only so long as each partner had a real choice. Washington, conscious of America's stability, focussed on immediate, practical tasks; it urged an alliance structure which in the name of integration made separate action physically impossible. De Gaulle, governing a country wracked by generations of war and civil conflict, insisted that the manner of cooperation was as important as the goal itself. France, if it was to recover its identity, had to be perceived as acting voluntarily and therefore had to have freedom of choice.

De Gaulle inevitably opposed a NATO in which French forces were placed under foreign command and a Europe which dissolved French identity in a maze of supranational institutions. He warned that supranationalism was incompatible with France's identity as if "self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition..." He

[Y]

-6-

considered this view not inconsistent with his advocacy of a united Europe "so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential...complex in the world." And he never strayed from affirming the importance of the American alliance even while doubting that America could, or wanted to, retain indefinitely its commitment to Europe - especially in the nuclear field. In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis, American officials were as astonished as they were pleased by De Gaulle's all-out support.

Americans had a tendency to accuse De Gaulle of delusions of grandeur. The fact was that American leaders, though personally humble, were cocksure about the future. By comparison, De Gaulle's arrogant style was in part designed to reinsure against the French nightmare in which the unexpected formed the most central historical experience. It

[Y]

-7-

[Y]

[Y]

-9-

[Y]

-10-

-11-

But he would part company with the doughty British
Prime Minister with respect to European unity in the politi-
cal and security fields. Given his faith in the primacy of
foreign policy, I am convinced that De Gaulle would make
every effort to build a united Europe in the political and
security fields. Paradoxically, side by side with resisting
a supranational bureaucracy, he might well espouse a system
of majority decision in the Council of Ministers, calculat-
ing that such a system would give France two options: his
preference would surely be the closest association with
Germany. He would go to great lengths to avoid a
Franco-German conflict; to even greater lengths to achieve
common positions. But if despite all efforts, the tempta-
tions of Germany's central position become too great, De
Gaulle might resort to the option of closer cooperation with
the other nations of Western Europe. Either option would
enable France to have a decisive impact on the majority

[Y]

-13-

-14-

[Y]

-15-

APR 24 '90 16:09 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

P.2

4/24/90

In this, the 100th year of De Gaulle's birth and the
20th anniversary of his resigning from office, it is fitting,
to reflect on how the great French President would have
reacted to the extraordinary upheavals of our time.

My sole encounter with De Gaulle was brief
and one-sided. The first encounter
indirectly led to an Elysee reception during President
Nixon's Paris visit in 1969, an Presidential aide ushered me
into De Gaulle's presence. I wasted no time on pleasant-
ries. Eying me aloofly from his lofty height, he opened with
a painful question: "Why do you not withdraw from Vietnam?"
"Because," I replied somewhat lamely, "it would undermine
our credibility." "Where?" De Gaulle demanded. "In the

M

APR 24 '90 16:10 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

P.3

[Y]

-2-

Middle East," I suggested. Gazing into the distance with a somewhat melancholy, De Gaulle said: "How very odd. In the Middle East, I thought it was your adversaries who have the credibility problem."

The encounter was quintessential De Gaulle. He did not believe that diplomacy was eased by charm or personal relations but rather by a proper perception of the relations of forces. If these are correctly calculated, diplomacy can be successful. If not, neither good will nor charm can serve as a substitute. A basic aim of De Gaulle's foreign policy was to liberate France from the vagaries of personality. This embroiled him into frequent clashes with the United States. American leaders were outraged by what they considered doubts about their good faith. But De Gaulle was trying to provide American time to protec... for the circumstance when his contemporaries had disappeared and America was absorbed in its own world.

XI

APR 24 '90 16:12 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

-5-

De Gaulle did not believe that peace was the normal condition among states. Where American leaders stressed partnership, De Gaulle emphasized equilibrium. "The world is full of opposing forces...the competition of efforts is the condition of life...international life, like life in general is a battle."

While Washington wanted to assign each ally a part in the overall task, De Gaulle believed that cooperation was meaningful only so long as each partner had a real choice. Washington, conscious of America's stability, focussed on immediate, practical tasks; it urged an alliance structure which in the name of integration made separate action physically impossible. De Gaulle, governing a country wracked by generations of war and civil conflict, insisted that the manner of cooperation was as important as the goal itself. France, if it was to recover its identity, had to be perceived as acting voluntarily and hence had to be free to act otherwise.

freedom of choice.

P.7

De Gaulle therefore opposed a NATO which were placed under foreign command and a Europe which dissolved into supranational institutions. He warned against a supranationalism as incompatible with France's identity as if "self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition..." He also advocated a united Europe "so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential...complex in the world." And he never strayed from affirming the importance of the American alliance even while doubting that America could, or wanted to, retain its commitment to Europe - especially in the nuclear field. In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis, American officials were astonished and pleased by De Gaulle's all-out support.

M

APR 24 '90 16:13 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

P.8

-7-

Lave Shem

relevance. He would not be surprised by the difficulties in
Indeed he might
which the Soviet system finds itself. At the height of the
well known to Lave Shem even if he had known it
Berlin crisis of 1959, he said, "...there is in this uproar
of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets some-
thing so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to
attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of
frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention
away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems
all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions,
isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system
encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite
certain collective successes which it has achieved by
drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its
gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that
its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more
by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more
difficult to deceive and to subjugate."

B

["difficult to receive and to absorb.\n\nby the elite and the masses, whom it is more and more\nits character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more\ngaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that\ndrawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its\ncertain collective successes which it has achieved by\nenclose the countries which are under its掌握, and despite\nisolation and acts of force in which the Communist system\nall the more plausible to me since, despite the corroboration,\naway from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems\ngrandiose ambitions, or to the degree of drawing attention\nattribute it either to the premeditated unmasking of\nthing so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to\nof impressions and demands organized by the Soviet some-\nberlin criteria of 1929, he said... there is in this most\nwhich the Soviet system finds itself. At the height of the\nwhich the Soviet system finds itself. At the height

P.9

-8-

Yet the suddenness of the collapse would have confront-
ed him with a contingency he could neither foresee nor
[de Gaulle] sardonically dismiss: the [sudden] emergence of a powerful
[reunified] united Germany. In the Sixties, De Gaulle obviously believed
that it was possible to construct European equilibrium based
on French political dominance, the division of Germany, West
German economic strength and a continued though reduced
American presence. In this scheme everybody had some role.¹

The Soviet Union would see to the division of Germany,¹ the
United States would defend Western Europe against the Soviet
Union,² and
France would in time take over the political leader-
ship of Western Europe backed by German economic strength.
Loveace

The pattern was (too Cartesian, that is to say too intricate. If left to the little hope for the impossible.) Intimate. At any rate, it has collapsed. De Gaulle would surely recognize that the Soviet military threat has declined; that the American commitment to Europe is being reassessed; and, that France simply does not have the

reseafered; and, that France simply does not have the
clined; that the American commitment to Europe is being
surely recognise that the Soviet military threat has de-
intimate. At any rate, it has collapsed. De Gaulle would
initiate it with the little men for the uncomprehensible
The pattern was too Catholic, that is to say too
rough of Western Europe backed by German economic strength.

France would in time take over the political leadership. The Soviet Union would see to the division of Germany, the American presence. In this scheme everybody had some role. German economic strength and a continued though reduced on French political dominance, the division of Germany, West that it was possible to construct European equilibrium based on Germany. In the sixties, De Gaulle obviously believed sardonically diabolical: the rise and emergence of a powerful enemy with a contingency he could neither foresee nor

Yet the audacity of the collaboration would have contrived

MAR 24 1968 16:14 Protection Business Services

APR 24 '90 16:14 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

strength to organize a new equilibrium by herself. The

> *European*

*Traditional*

 historic French option to contain Germany by rapprochement

~~newly-named~~ way well in 1917 ~~Russian~~ independent

Russia will be too weak to act as a counterweight to Germa-

~~the least~~

France as a partner. In any event, ~~any~~ attempt to encircle

that is France's nightmare. ~~Thus,~~ at the end of the road

~~the United States~~

designed to make America more dispensable, ~~it has emerged~~

~~Washington~~

*letter*

~~opportunity.~~

whether it understands that role in the new conditions

remains to be seen.

P.11

-10-

De Gaulle would not in my view convert to the concepts of Jean Monnet. More than ever, he would reject the counsels of integrationists looking to strengthen supranationalism in the field of economics. His attitudes in that respect would not differ too much from those of Prime Minister Thatcher.

But he would part company with the doughty British Prime Minister on the subject of unity in the political and security fields. Given his faith in the primacy of foreign policy, I am convinced that De Gaulle would make every effort to build a united Europe / European unity in the political and security fields. Paradoxically, side by side with resisting a supranational bureaucracy, he might well espouse a system of majority decision in the Council of Ministers, calculating that such

decision in the Council of Ministers, calculating that such
democracy, he might well establish a system of majority
democracy, aside by side with reserving a subnational

Europeans in the political and security fields. Para-
effort to build a common foreign policy. I am convinced that De Gaulle would accelerate security fields. Given his faith in the primacy of foreign Prime Minister on the subject of unity in the political and foreign policy. He would be a part company with the greedy British

not deter too much from those of Prime Minister Thatcher.
the field of economics. His attitudes in that respect would
of integrationists looking to strengthen subnationalism in
of Jean Monnet. More than ever, he would reject the concept
De Gaulle would not in my view convert to the concepts
vitality in the Atlantic Alliance.

of European political unity. And he would rediscover new
burge two courses: he would accelerate his long-range goal
In these circumstances, I assure that De Gaulle would

-10-

APR 34 1980 14:14 PROFESSIONAL BUSINESS SERVICES

APR 24 '90 16:15 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

a system would give France two options: his preference would surely be the closest association with Germany. He would go to great lengths to avoid a Franco-German conflict; to even greater lengths to achieve common positions. But if despite all efforts, the temptations of Germany's central position become too great, De Gaulle might resort to the option of close cooperation with the other nations of Western Europe. Either option would enable France to have a decisive impact on the majority vote. De Gaulle's goal would be not rivalry, however, but European unity leading to the creation of a European defense system under European command to which France together with Britain might contribute part of their nuclear forces especially with respect to threats to Germany.

Ironically, the collapse of Soviet power and the emergence of Germany would transform De Gaulle's approach to America's European role. As a cool calculator of the

-12-

de Gaulle) he would recognize that the French and British nuclear forces are last desperate resorts accentuating rather than attenuating the need for American assistance in all other circumstances. He would understand too that while ethnic rivalries and economic crisis have changed the nature of the Soviet conventional threat, the Soviet nuclear stockpile of over ten thousand warheads is essentially unimpaired. He would therefore seek an American commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe which he would regard as substantially empty without an American presence.

But his reasoning would not be simply or even primarily military. The fear of American domination which governed his actions twenty-five years ago would have largely disappeared under the impact of a greater balance in the world's economy, imminent, a large part and the certain withdrawal of many of America's ground forces from Europe, he would no doubt believe that a united

["He would not believe that any forces from Europe. He would not believe that any

APR 24 '90 16:16 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

P.14

Europe with its own foreign and security policy could not fact hold its own in any cooperative enterprise. In these circumstances, De Gaulle would come to regard the American presence in Europe as an essential component of the European equilibrium. He would see the advantage of relating Germany to a Western superpower and of the confidence inspired in the rest of Western Europe by the presence of a country that three times in this century proved essential to preserving the balance of power in Europe. In his commitment to European equilibrium, yet as a student of history, De Gaulle would also recognize the strong forces in America urging that having won the Cold War, America should not leave Europe to the Europeans. So he would calculate that America cannot be present in Europe if its political presence would not be possible without revitalizing a consciousness of a sense of Atlantic community with some ongoing common tasks for its members.

Thus De Gaulle would probably come full circle as an advocate of NATO. He would know that Germany could not

indefinitely remain part of an integrated NATO command

eased by the emergence of a unified European security

organization that could fit into NATO, without subordination

to America. In such circumstances it is even conceivable

France.

Of course, De Gaulle would insist on an equal voice for
Europe in global policies. And he would maintain a friendly
option towards the East designed to counterbalance the
French fears of German aberrations, and American isolationism
pushing it further, option to the fore, without
actually evoking them...

De Gaulle

This is surely an unsentimental picture of a leader
sentimental only about his own country. But De Gaulle was
convinced that his approach was far from selfish: "The
battle which our country is waging," he said "tends to unite
and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate

["and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate\nand not to fight, to wage and not to die, to suffer and not to\nconquer, to suffer and not to die, to fight and not to be\nconquered, to suffer and not to die, to win and not to\nbeconquered, to suffer and not to die, to lose and not to\nconquer, to suffer and not to die, to win and not to be\nconquered, to suffer and not to die, to lose and not to\nconquer, to suffer and not to die, to win and not to\nbeconquered, to suffer and not to die,

APR 24 '90 16:17 PROJECTIONS BUSINESS SERVICES

-15-

Perhaps De Gaulle's greatest achievement was to insti-
tutionalize his approach to foreign policy. Every successor
of whatever party has followed more or less his basic
philosophy. So it is possible that much of what is described
here will emerge as French policy. Then it remains to be
seen whether French rationality can manage the intangibles:
Britain's willingness to join Europe; German self-restraint;
and, America's understanding of a role at once more modest
and more crucial.

4/24/90

In this, the 100th year of De Gaulle's birth and the
20th anniversary of his resigning from office, it is natural
to reflect on how the great French President would have
reacted to the revolutionary upheavals of our time.

My sole encounter with De Gaulle provided only an
indirect clue. At an Elysee reception during President
Nixon's Paris visit in 1969, a Presidential aide ushered me
into De Gaulle's presence. He wasted no time on pleasant-
ries. Eying me aloofly from his lofty height, he opened with
a painful question: "Why do you not withdraw from Vietnam?"
"Because," I replied somewhat lamely, "it would undermine
our credibility." "Where?" De Gaulle demanded. "In the

[Y]

-2-

Middle East," I suggested. Gazing into the distance with some melancholy, De Gaulle said: "How very odd. In the Middle East, I thought it was your adversaries who have the credibility problem."

The encounter was quintessential De Gaulle. He did not believe that diplomacy was eased by charm or personal relations but rather by a proper perception of the relations of forces. If these are correctly calculated, diplomacy can be successful. If not, neither good will nor charm can serve as a substitute. A basic aim of De Gaulle's foreign policy was to liberate France from the vagaries of personality. This embroiled him into frequent clashes with the United States. American leaders were outraged by what they considered doubts about their good faith. But De Gaulle was trying to protect France for the circumstance when his contemporaries had disappeared and America was absorbed in its own

-3-

problems or on other continents - a time much like the present.

In part these clashes reflected entirely different sets of historical experience and perspective.

At the end of World War II, the United States emerged from its historic isolation into a position never enjoyed by any other country. With less than a fiftieth of the world's population, it produced over a third of all the world's goods and services. It possessed an atomic monopoly. Historically, the pattern of its involvement in wars had been to respond to a major threat conceived as temporary after which it would be safe to withdraw into isolation. America believed that domestic tensions reflect not fundamental schisms but some gap between expectation and reality that can be bridged by the mobilization of resources. The two great post-war American initiatives - NATO and the Marshall Plan - marvelously responded to immediate problems. But they

-4-

were based on premises about the nature of international
relations as unique as America's history: that cooperation
among nations is its own justification, that peace is normal
and that division of labor can provide the motivation for
each ally's conduct.

De Gaulle emerged from a diametrically opposite histor-
ic experience. He led a country turned cautious by many
enthusiasms shattered, sceptical by too many dreams proved
fragile, and conscious not of France's strength or cohesion,
but of its latent vulnerability. Americans accused him of
delusions of grandeur. The fact was that American leaders,
though personally humble, were cocksure about the future. By
comparison, De Gaulle's arrogant style was in part designed
to insure against the French nightmare that the unforseeable
is the most constant historical experience. Personal humili-
ty and historical arrogance clashed with personal arrogance
and historical humility.

-5-

De Gaulle did not believe that peace was the normal condition among states. Where American leaders stressed partnership, De Gaulle emphasized equilibrium. "The world is full of opposing forces...the competition of efforts is the condition of life...international life, like life in general is a battle." Thus, while Washington wanted to assign each ally a part in the overall task, De Gaulle believed that cooperation was meaningful only so long as each partner had a real choice. Washington, conscious of America's stability, focussed on immediate, practical tasks; it urged an alliance structure which in the name of integration made separate action physically impossible. De Gaulle, governing a country wracked by generations of war and civil conflict, insisted that the manner of cooperation was as important as the goal itself. France, if it was to recover its identity, had to be perceived as acting voluntarily and hence had to be free to act otherwise.

-6-

De Gaulle therefore opposed a NATO which placed French forces under foreign command and a Europe which dissolved French identity in supranational institutions. He warned against a supranationalism as incompatible with France's identity as if "self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition..." He also passionately advocated a united Europe "so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential...complex in the world." And he never strayed from affirming the importance of the American alliance even while doubting that America could, or wanted to, retain its commitment to Europe - especially in the nuclear field. In fact, during the Cuban missile crisis, American officials were astonished and pleased by De Gaulle's all-out support.

-7-

relevance. He would not be surprised by the difficulties in
which the Soviet system finds itself. At the height of the
Berlin crisis of 1959, he said: "...there is in this uproar
of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets some-
thing so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to
attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of
frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention
away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems
all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions,
isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system
encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite
certain collective successes which it has achieved by
drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its
gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that
its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more
by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more
difficult to deceive and to subjugate."

-8-

Yet the suddenness of the collapse would have confront-
ed him with a contingency he could neither foresee nor
sardonically dismiss: the rapid emergence of a powerful
united Germany. In the Sixties, De Gaulle obviously believed
that it was possible to construct European equilibrium based
on French political dominance, the division of Germany, West
German economic strength and a continued though reduced
American presence. In this scheme everybody had some role.
The Soviet Union would see to the division of Germany, the
United States would defend Western Europe against the Soviet
Union, France would in time take over the political leader-
ship of Western Europe backed by German economic strength.

The pattern was too Cartesian, that is to say too
intimate. At any rate, it has collapsed. De Gaulle would
surely recognize that the Soviet military threat has de-
clined; that the American commitment to Europe is being
reassessed; and, that France simply does not have the

-9-

strength to organize a new equilibrium by herself. The
historic French option to contain Germany by rapprochement
with Russia is precluded by either of the foreseeable
outcomes of the Soviet internal conflict: if there is chaos,
Russia will be too weak to act as a counterweight to Germa-
ny; if Russian nationalism prevails, a Soviet Union with
thousands of nuclear weapons might rediscover hegemonial
aspirations. Nor in a Europe of 18th century diplomacy is it
a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union would opt for
France as a partner. In any event, any attempt to encircle
Germany would almost surely reawaken the very nationalism
that is France's nightmare. Thus, at the end of the road
designed to make America more dispensable, it has emerged
again as the key to the European equilibrium - though
whether it understands that role in the new conditions
remains to be seen.

-10-

But he would part company with the doughty British Prime Minister on the subject of unity in the political and security fields. Given his faith in the primacy of foreign policy, I am convinced that De Gaulle would accelerate European unity in the political and security fields. Paradoxically, side by side with resisting a supranational bureaucracy, he might well espouse a system of majority decision in the Council of Ministers, calculating that such

-11-

a system would give France two options: his preference would surely be the closest association with Germany. He would go to great lengths to avoid a Franco-German conflict; to even greater lengths to achieve common positions. But if despite all efforts, the temptations of Germany's central position become too great, De Gaulle might resort to the option of a close cooperation with the other nations of Western Europe. Either option would enable France to have a decisive impact on the majority vote. De Gaulle's goal would be not rivalry, however, but European unity leading to the creation of a European defense system under European command to which France together with Britain might contribute part of their nuclear forces especially with respect to threats to Germany.

-12-

relation of forces he would recognize that the French and British nuclear forces are last desperate resorts accentuating rather than attenuating the need for American assistance in all other circumstances. He would understand too that while ethnic rivalries and economic crisis have changed the nature of the Soviet conventional threat, the Soviet nuclear stockpile of over ten thousand warheads is essentially unimpaired. He would therefore seek an American commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe which he would regard as substantially empty without an American presence.

But his reasoning would not be simply or even primarily military. The fear of American domination which governed his actions twenty-five years ago would have largely disappeared under the impact of a greater balance in the world's economy and the certain withdrawal of many of America's ground forces from Europe. He would no doubt believe that a united

-13-

Europe with its own foreign and security policy could in
fact hold its own in any cooperative enterprise.

In these circumstances, De Gaulle would come to regard
the American presence in Europe as an essential component of
the European equilibrium. He would see the advantage of
relating Germany to a Western superpower and of the confi-
dence inspired in the rest of Western Europe by the presence
of a country that three times in this century proved its
commitment to European equilibrium. Yet as a student of
history, De Gaulle would also recognize the strong forces in
America urging that having won the Cold War, America should
leave Europe to the Europeans. So he would calculate that a
political presence of America would not be possible without
a renaissance of a sense of Atlantic community with some
organic common tasks for its members.

[4]

-14-

indefinitely remain part of an integrated NATO command unless France joined as well. And this decision would be eased by the emergence of a unified European security organization that could fit into NATO without subordination to America. In such circumstances it is even conceivable that some American troops could again be stationed in France.

Of course, De Gaulle would insist on an equal voice for Europe in global policies. And he would maintain a friendly option towards the East designed to counterbalance the French fears of German aberrations and American isolationism without actually evoking them.

-15-

-4-

personally humble, were cocksure about the future. While De Gaulle's arrogant style was in part designed to obscure the French nightmare that the unforeseeable is the most constant historical experience, and to insure against it the noblest task of statesmanship, personal humility and historical arrogance clashed with personal arrogance and historical humility.

De Gaulle did not believe that peace was the normal condition among states. Where American leaders stressed partnership, De Gaulle emphasized equilibrium. "The world is full of opposing forces...the competition of efforts is the condition of life...international life, like life in general is a battle." Thus, while Washington wanted to assign each ally a part in the overall task, De Gaulle believed that cooperation was meaningful only if each partner had a real

choice.

Washington, conscious of America's stability, could
immediately start practical tasks.
concentrate on the achievement of its technical preferences.

-5-

it urged an alliance structure which in the name of integration made separate action physically impossible. De Gaulle, governing a country wracked by generations of war and civil conflict, insisted that the manner of cooperation was as important as the goal itself. France, if it was to recover and time had led it to be free & at liberty from otherwise its identity, had to be perceived as acting voluntarily. De Gaulle therefore opposed a NATO which placed French forces under foreign command and a Europe which dissolved French identity in supranational institutions. He warned against a supranationalism which is incompatible with France's identity as if "self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition..." But at the same time he wanted a united Europe "so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential...complex in the world." And he never ceased affirming the importance of the American alliance even while

-6-

doubting that America could, or wanted to, retain its domi-

commitment to Europe, especially in the nuclear field.

In addition, especially in the nuclear field, the United States are now facing a serious mobile crisis. America's interests were antagonized and placed by de Gaulle's all-out attack.

In addition, especially in the nuclear field, the United States are now facing a serious mobile crisis. America's interests were antagonized and placed by de Gaulle's all-out attack. This has been discussed by some of the ancient quarrels because the United States are now facing a serious mobile crisis. America's interests were antagonized and placed by de Gaulle's all-out attack.

The upheavals of the past year have suddenly given De Gaulle's view new relevance. He would not be surprised by the difficulties in which the Soviet system finds itself. At the height of the Berlin crisis of 1959, he said: "...there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its

-7-

By the suddenness of the collapse would have confronted
him with a contingency which he either never foreseen or
sardonically dismissed: the rapid emergence of a powerful

united Germany. In the Sixties, De Gaulle obviously believed
that it was possible to construct European equilibrium based
on French political dominance, the division of Germany, West
German economic strength and a continued though reduced
American presence. In this scheme everybody had a role. The
Soviet Union would see to the division of Germany, the
United States would defend Western Europe against the Soviet
Union, and France would in time take over the political
leadership of Western Europe with German economic
shockwave.

-9-

would not abandon his traditional opposition to the inte-
grated Europe of Delors. He would do his utmost to retain a
national autonomy in the technical economic fields for he
would believe that the Delors route would lead to German
economic hegemony on the technical level. He would favor a
kind of Thatcherism provided the doughty British Prime
Minister could bring herself to believe in a genuine Europe-
an mission.

At the same time in the political and security field, he would seek a rapid promotion of European unity. While he would resist a supranational bureaucracy, he might well urge a system of majority decision in the Council of Ministers.

He might calculate that such a system would give France two options: to favour a preference would surely be the closest association with Germany. He would go to great lengths to avoid a Franco-German conflict; and to even greater lengths to achieve consensus positions. But if against all hopes

-10-

and efforts to transform Germany's central position
become too great, De Gaulle could seek by close cooperation
with the other nations of Western Europe to prevent others
would enable France to have a major influence
give nationalism through a system of majority voting. His
impact on the majority note De Gaulle's
hope would be, however, not rivalry, but European unity
leading to the creation of a European defense system under
European command to which France together with Britain might
contribute part of its nuclear forces especially with
respect to threats to Germany.

Ironically, the collapse of Soviet power and the
emergence of Germany would transform De Gaulle's approach to
America's European role. As a cool calculator of the rela-
tion of forces he would recognize that the French and
British nuclear forces are last resorts of desperation
accentuating rather than attenuating the need for American
assistance in all other circumstances. He would understand
while ethnic rivalries and economic crisis (change) the
nature

-11-

[4]

Soviet conventional threat ~~while~~ the Soviet nuclear stockpile of over ten thousand warheads is essentially unimpaired. He would therefore seek an American commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe and he would ~~consider that~~ *essentially empty without an American presence.*

But his reasoning would not be simply or even primarily military. The fear of American domination which governed his actions twenty-five years ago would have largely disappeared under the impact of a greater balance in the world's economy and the certain withdrawal of many of America's ground forces in Europe. He would ~~also believe that a united Europe with its own foreign and security policy could in fact hold its own in any cooperative enterprise,~~ *in these circumstances de Gaulle would* Above all, he ~~would convince himself that an American presence in Europe is essential for political reasons. He would see the advantage of relating Germany to a Western superpower and of the confidence inspired in the other ~~as enmity & respect for the component of the European equilibrium.~~

4/23/90

My sole encounter with the great French President
provided only an indirect clue to how he might have reacted
to today's tumultuous events. At an Elysee reception during
President Nixon's Paris visit in 1969, a Presidential aide
ushered me into the presence of President de Gaulle. De
Gaulle wasted no time on pleasantries. Viewing me aloofly
from his lofty height, he opened with a searing question:
"Why don't you withdraw from Vietnam?" "Because," I replied
somewhat lamely, "it would undermine our credibility." "Like
where?" De Gaulle wished to know. "The Middle East," I
suggested. De Gaulle looked into the distance with some

-2-

melancholy: "How very odd," he said. "I thought your adver-
saries had the credibility problem in the Middle East."

The encounter was quintessentially De Gaulle. To him,
diplomacy did not depend on personal relations but on a
correct perception of the relations of forces. If these are
correctly calculated, diplomacy will be successful. If not,
good will cannot serve as a substitute. It was this convic-
tion that foreign policy had to be liberated from the
vagaries of personality that embroiled De Gaulle into
frequent clashes with the United States. And that difference
reflected totally different historical experiences.

The United States had emerged from its historic isola-
tion at the end of World War II in a position never enjoyed
by any other country. With less than a fiftieth of the
world's population, it produced over a third of all the
world's goods and services. It possessed an atomic monopoly.
Its involvement in wars had been directed against apparently

-11-

Soviet conventional threat while the Soviet nuclear stockpile of over ten thousand warheads is essentially unimpaired. He would therefore seek an American commitment to the nuclear defense of Europe and he would consider that empty without an American presence.

But his reasoning would not be simply or even primarily military. The fear of American domination which governed his actions twenty-five years ago would have largely disappeared under the impact of a greater balance in the world's economy and the certain withdrawal of many of America's ground forces in Europe. He would also believe that a united Europe with its own foreign and security policy would in fact hold its own in any cooperative enterprise.

Above all, he would convince himself that an American presence in Europe is essential for political reasons. He would see the advantage of relating Germany to a Western superpower and of the confidence inspired in the other

and eforts the temptations of Germany's central position
become too great, De Gaulle could seek by close cooperation
with the other nations of Western Europe to prevent exces-
sive nationalism through a system of majority voting. His
hope would be, however, not rivalry but European unity
leading to the creation of a European defense system under
European command to which France together with Britain might
contribute part of its nuclear forces especially with
respect to threats to Germany.

Ironically, the collapse of Soviet power and the
emergence of Germany would transform De Gaulle's approach to
America's European role. As a cool calculator of the rela-
tion of forces he would recognize that the French and
British nuclear forces are last resorts of desperation
accentuating rather than attenuating the need for American
assistance in all other circumstances. He would understand
too that ethnic rivalries and economic crisis change the

-9-

At the same time in the political and security field,
he would seek a rapid promotion of European unity. While he
would resist a supranational bureaucracy, he might well urge
a system of majority decision in the Council of Ministers.
He might calculate that such a system would give France two
options: De Gaulle's preference would surely be the closest
association with Germany. He would go to great lengths to
avoid a Franco-German conflict; and to even greater lengths
to achieve consensus? positions. But if against all hopes

-8-

This intricate pattern has collapsed. De Gaulle would
surely recognize that the Soviet military threat has de-
clined; the American commitment to Europe is being reas-
sessed and France is not strong enough to organize a new
equilibrium by itself. The historic French option of con-
taining Germany by rapprochement with Russia is precluded by
either of the foreseeable outcomes of Soviet internal
conflict: if there is chaos, Russia will be too weak to act
as a balancer: if Russian nationalism prevails, a Soviet
Union with thousands of nuclear weapons might rediscover
hegemonial aspirations. Nor in a Europe of 18th century
diplomacy is it a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union
would opt for France as a partner. In any event, any attempt
to encircle Germany would almost surely reawaken the very
nationalism that is France's nightmare.

For all these reasons, I suspect that De Gaulle would
accelerate his long-range goal of European unity. But he

But the suddenness of the collapse would have confront-
ed him with a contingency which he either never foresaw or
sardonically dismissed: the rapid emergence of a powerful
united Germany. In the Sixties, De Gaulle obviously believed
that it was possible to construct European equilibrium based
on French political dominance, the division of Germany, West
German economic strength and a continued though reduced
American presence. In this scheme everybody had a role. The
Soviet Union would see to the division of Germany, the
United States would defend Western Europe against the Soviet
Union and France would in time take over the political
leadership of Western Europe.

[4]

-6-

doubting that America could, or wanted to, retain its domi-
nance.

I have discussed these ancient quarrels because the
upheavals of the past year have suddenly given De Gaulle's
view new relevance. He would not be surprised by the diffi-
culties in which the Soviet system finds itself. At the
height of the Berlin crisis of 1959, he said: "...there is
in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by the
Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is
led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of
frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention
away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems
all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions,
isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system
encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite
certain collective successes which it has achieved by
drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its

[y]

-5-

it urged an alliance structure which in the name of integration made separate action physically impossible. De Gaulle, governing a country wracked by generations of war and civil conflict, insisted that the manner of cooperation was as important as the goal itself. France, if it was to recover its identity, had to be perceived as acting voluntarily. De Gaulle therefore opposed a NATO which placed French forces under foreign command and a Europe which dissolved French identity in supranational institutions. He warned against a supranationalism he considered incompatible with France's identity as if "self-renouncement were henceforth its sole possibility and even its only ambition..." But at the same time, he wanted a united Europe "so that gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel the most powerful, prosperous and influential...complex in the world." And he never ceased affirming the importance of the American alliance even while

[y]

-4-

personally humble, were cocksure about the future. While De Gaulle's arrogant style was in part designed to obscure the French nightmare that the unforseeable is the most constant historical experience and to insure against it the noblest task of statesmanship, personal humility and historical arrogance clashed with personal arrogance and historical humility.

De Gaulle did not believe that peace was the normal condition among states. Where American leaders stressed partnership, De Gaulle emphasized equilibrium. "The world is full of opposing forces...the competition of efforts is the condition of life...international life, like life in general is a battle." Thus, while Washington wanted to assign each ally a part in the overall task, De Gaulle believed that cooperation was meaningful only if each partner had a real share. Washington, conscious of America's stability, could concentrate on the achievement of its technical preferences;

[y]

-3-

a temporary major threat after which it was safe to withdraw
into the historic isolation. It believed domestic tensions
reflected not fundamental schisms but a gap between expecta-
tions and reality to be bridged by the mobilization of
resources. The great post-war American initiatives - NATO
and the Marshall Plan - marvelously responded to immediate
problems. But they were based on premises about the nature
of international relations as unique as America's history:
that cooperation among nations was natural, that peace was
normal and division of labor in an alliance enough of a
motive force for each ally's conduct.

De Gaulle rejected a diametrically opposite historic
experience. He led a country grown cautious by many enthusi-
asms shattered, turned sceptical from many dreams proved
fragile; conscious not of its strength and cohesion but of
its vulnerability, Americans accused him of delusions of
grandeur. The fact was that American leaders, while

[4]

-12-

countries of Western Europe by the presence of a country that three times in this century proved its commitment to European equilibrium. And he would calculate that a political presence of America would not be possible without some organic common tasks.

Thus De Gaulle would probably come full circle as an advocate of NATO. He would know that Germany could not indefinitely remain part of an integrated NATO command unless France joined as well. And this decision would be eased by the emergence of a unified European security organization so that integration would no longer be subordination to America. In such circumstances it is likely that some American troops could again be stationed in France.

Of course, De Gaulle would insist on an equal voice for Europe in global policies. And he would maintain a friendly option towards the East though not more than is needed to counterbalance the national temptations of either.

[4]

-13-

This is an unsentimental picture of a leader sentimental only about his own country. But in his policy, De Gaulle would be governed by principles which he would consider far from selfish: "The battle which our country is waging," he said "tends to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase, to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful to its mission which always was and which remains human and universal."

[Y]

constant pressure to divert attention by foreign adventures.

> "...there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult to deceive and to subjugate."

Since in De Gaulle's view Soviet aggressiveness does not reflect a real grievance but domestic instability, it must be resisted and not accommodated by the West. To yield to Soviet