Draft Chapter I -- Overall Report

September 10, 1957

# CHAPTER I
## AMERICAN HORIZONS TODAY

I

Throughout history, contemporaries have had difficulty in understanding the transformations through which they are living. Great events are often understood as such only by posterity. For the next generation faces a problem of perspective. It is torn between its past, from which it derives its identity and its future which presents its challenges.

The history of a nation appears to it as a series of continuous occurrences. But its future unfolds in the form of difficult and often perplexing choices. History records only the event or the decision; not the anguish which accompanied it. The present, on the other hand, is desperately aware of the complexity of its alternatives, though of the sense of direction which alone can resolve them. The past often gives the impression of an inevitable progression because each accomplished action sets in motion a train of events which soon obscures that other decisions were in fact possible. Nothing is more difficult than to imagine how things might have been otherwise. It is only when a society contemplates its future that it comes to realize that there was nothing automatic about its decisions and nothing foreordained about its course. Its achievements reflected the strength of its purpose. Its ability to master its challenges derived from the strength of its convictions.

ment reflected the strength of its purpose. Its ability to master its challenges about its decisions and nothing foreseen about its course. Its achievement how things might have been otherwise. It is only when a society can imagine that it comes to realize that there was nothing automatic

each accomplished action sets in motion a train of events which soon obsolesces them. The past often gives the impression of an inevitable progression becauseplexity of its alternatives means that the sense of direction which alone can resolve accompanied it. The present, on the other hand, may be more aware of the choices. History records only the event or the decision; not the andaman whichences. But the future unfolds in the form of difficult and often baffling

It is torn between its beat, from which it derives its identity and perspective. It is torn between its beat, from which it derives its identity and underfood as such only by posterity. In each generation faces a problem of the transformations through which they are living. Great events are often

I

AMERICAN HORIZONS TODAY

CHAPTER I

September 10, 1927
Draft Chapter I -- Overall Report

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September 10, 1957

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As the 20th century nears the end of its sixth decade, America confronts a world in swift and often turbulent change. Both within our borders and beyond, enormous transformations -- in human aspirations, in the structure of society, in economic development, in scientific knowledge -- are reshaping the pattern of existence at a speed without parallel in history. And these upheavals occur not only in the form of big, dramatic events, but also and perhaps predominantly in a series of almost imperceptible changes, a slow social drift, the cumulative impact of which will nevertheless fundamentally affect our destiny and that of the rest of the world.

It is above all in dealing with the challenge of the unclear, the ambiguous, the seemingly trivial that we will be tested most severely. For fate has been kind to us. Secure in a vast continent, absorbed in the task of developing its resources, we have been able to concentrate domestically on tasks presented to us by the environment, and internationally primarily only on problems which appeared as overt threats. Having overcome many obstacles we are tempted to believe that any crisis can be resolved by reacting with redoubled effort. We have shown great resolution in withstanding adversity and great imagination in dealing with challenges once they were recognized. The task before us is to understand that our challenges henceforth will be subtler, though if anything even more momentous than those of the past. At home, it will lie not so much in conquering a physical

those of the past. At home, it will be not so much in conducting a physical
henceforth will be a subler, though if anything even more momentous than
were recognised. The task before us is to understand that our challenges
ing adversity and great imagination in dealing with challenges once they
acting with redoubled effort. We have shown great resolution in withstand-
obstacles we are tempted to believe that any crisis can be resolved by re-
only on problems which appeared as overt threats. Having overcome many
on tasks presented to us by the environment, and internationally primarily
of developing its resources, we have been able to concentrate domestically,
to date has been kind to us. Secure in a vast continent, absorbed in the task
bienous, the seemingly trivial that we will be treated most severely. For
it is above all in dealing with the challenge of the unclean, the am-
deslion and that of the rest of the world.

the cumulative impact of which will nevertheless fundamentally affect
also and perhaps predominantly in a series of almost imponderable changes.
And these upheavals occur not only in the form of pig, dramatic events, but
reaching the pattern of existence at a speed without parallel in history.
ture of society, in economic development, in scientific knowledge -- are
and beyond enormous transformations -- in human abstractions, in the attrac-
tors a world in swift and often turbulent change. Both within our borders
As the 20th century nears the end of its sixth decade, America con-

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Brett Chapter I -- Overall Report
September 10, 1987

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September 10, 1957

environment but in giving meaning to this conquest. And abroad, it will be a
chall
whether we are able to contribute a sense of direction to a world seeking to
bring into being new values, new purposes and new institutions,
as well as a
heretofore un-
known material
well-being.

We will have to learn too, that the recognition of a challenge may be
even more difficult than the solution of it. For the strength and ingenuity of
a society is revealed by its reaction to adversity, but its greatness depends
on the tasks it sets itself: what it considers a problem; what it treats as an
opportunity among the many choices open to it.

This becomes particularly apparent in a revolutionary period like the
present, for such a period multiplies the choices that must be made. Its
characteristic feature is the disintegration of many traditional forms, the
groping of millions for a new orientation, the sudden realization that concepts
and patterns of action of a more secure past seem no longer to have relevance
to a situation in rapid and often violent flux.

The recurrent shock of our age is the

But choice without purpose leads to paralysis or to fitful or erratic be-
havior. And power without a sense of direction may merely drain our life of
its meaning if it does not destroy humanity altogether. Our problems therefore
require for their solution not only a high degree of technical competence, but
even more importantly a strong conviction. And our opportunities depend not
only on a state of fact, but also on a state of mind.

It may seem a strange proposition to other peoples in other lands that
America can master its future only by searching its soul. For to them America

America can matter its future only by searching its soul. For to them America
only can be a state of fact, but also on a state of mind.
Even more importantly a strong conviction. And our opportunities depend not
regardless for their solution not only a high degree of technical competence, but
its meaning if it does not destroy humanity altogether. Our problems therefore
require power without a sense of direction may well drain our life of
privilege. And power without a sense of direction may well drain our life of
choice without impulse leads to paralysis or to titill or errant pe-
to a situation in rapid and often violent flux.

and patterns of action of a more secure past seem no less have relevance
according to millions for a new orientation. The hidden realization that concepts
characteristic feature is the disintegration of many traditional forms: the
present, for such a pattern multiplies the choices that must be made. Its
This becomes particularly apparent in a revolutionary period like the
opportunity among the many choices open to it.

We will have to learn too, that the recognition of a challenge may be
printed into being new values, new purposes and new institutions
meeting, we are able to contribute a sense of direction to a world seeking a
environment put in giving meaning to this conduct. And abroad, will it be

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September 10, 1957

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often appears to stand on a pinnacle of power more formidable than any it has
ever before attained. ~~And~~ from the perspective of our material wellbeing it
may appear a curious proposition even to Americans. But we would be wise
to regard our achievement with humility and to consider that it defines a duty
and not a respite. No society can rest on its accomplishments. History bears
witness to the decay of many great nations who sought their future in their
past. It is the tragedy of history and its glory that no exertion can ever be
final, that no society can ever be spared the task of earning anew the mean-
ing of its existence.

II

What then are some of the prospects before us? Abroad we see a
world in revolutionary ferment. At home, we face the possibility of unparal-
leled economic growth but also the problem of whether our spiritual and moral
dimension can keep pace with our material achievement. We also confront a
problem of adjusting our perspective: of understanding that the terms domestic
and foreign are no longer meaningful, if they ever were, that policy both at
home and abroad must be of one piece, that our power and wealth derive mean-
ing only from our sense of responsibility.

As we look at the American domestic scene for the next 10 - 15 years
we face a paradox: where most of the world remains either still oppressed by

we face a paradox: where most of the world remains other still opposed by
we look at the American domestic scene for the next 10 - 12 years
and only from our sense of responsibility.

home and abroad must be of one piece, that our power and wealth derive a mean-
and foreign are no longer meaningful, if they ever were, that policy both at
problem of adjusting our perspective: of understanding that the terms domestic
dimension can keep pace with our material achievement. We also confront a
related economic growth but also the problem of whether our spiritual and moral
world in revolutionary ferment. At home, we face the possibility of universal-
What then are some of the prospects before us? A proved we see a

It

ing of its existence.

final, that no society can ever be abated the task of earning away the mean-
beat. It is the tragedy of history and its story that no exertion can ever be
witness to the decay of many great nations who sought their future in their
and not a reable. No society can rest on its accomplishments. History bears
to regard our achievement with humility and to consider that it defines a duty
may appear a curious proposition even to Americans. But we would be wise
ever before attained. ... from the perspective of our material well-being it
often appears to stand on a pinnacle of power more formidable than any it has

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September 10, 1925

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September 10, 1957

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the gulf between its aspirations and reality, the U.S. faces the problem that
in many areas of national life reality has *caught up* with its aspirations.
Today the overwhelming majority of Americans are, or soon can be, comfort-
ably fed, clothed and housed. The steady increase in American productivity
has not only eliminated much of the physical misery with which our forefathers
had to cope, but has endowed us with a hitherto unimaginable amount of
leisure and opportunity for education and creative effort.

Both the population and the national economy are expanding at pheno-
menal speed. If the existing birth rate maintains itself, the population of the
U.S. will reach 220 million by 1975. By the year 2000 it will have swollen
to 365 million, equal to the present population of India. Most of this in-
crease will occur in metropolitan areas -- specifically 90% of it in the sub-
urbs of cities. It has been forecast that in time the entire Atlantic seaboard
will become a single homogeneous urban mass, an unbroken paved apron,
extending from Boston to Miami. Thus grave problems lie ahead in the realm
of community planning, public housing, highway construction and transport-
ation. The possibility of water shortages, even now critical in some parts of
the nation where hills have been deforested, soil eroded and underground
water tables depleted, will necessitate conservation measures on a new and
enormous scale.

These problems, however, are not the most vexing ones confronting
America today. For by any standard the prospect of our economy is impressive.

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September 10, 1957

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Since World War I our national output of goods and services has been aug-
menting at a rate of four percent a year, and in the next 20 years ~~our production~~ is ex-
pected to double. If the present growth rate is continued, the national in-
come, which was $390 billion in 1955, will be $814 billion in 1975.

What will this mean to the individual citizen? If the 1975 popula-
tion reaches its estimated level of 220 million, there will be roughly 70
million families or households in the U.S. The average income per family
or household will thus be approximately $7,500 at the current dollar evalu-
ation. This figure must be regarded not merely as a crude increase over
our corresponding average income of about $5,500 today; it must also be
considered in the light of other expected characteristics of the 1975 econ-
omy. There is no doubt, for example, that it will be earned in a work week
of 35 hours or less, for the trend of worktime has shown a steady decline in the
past six or seven decades. It may further be assumed that it will be under-
pinned by a greater amount of welfare services, and that it will be more
dependable than present incomes by virtue of more effective public control
over economic fluctuations.

These forecasts, it must be clearly stated, are not predictions of
what *will* be, but of what *can* be. They outline the opportunity that lies
well within our capabilities; they provide the blueprint for an economy for
which we have all the necessary material, energy and skills. Our task,

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September 10, 1957

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domestically, of course, is to convert this opportunity into reality. What
is significant here is not just the quantitative aspect of the figures, but
the qualitative value of the level of life which such figures make possible.
For the promise of the economy of 1975 represents the upgrading of an entire
society to the point where its representative family enjoys an income com-
parable to that of the upper middle class today. It is the first approach to
a society in which the average person may enjoy not merely the perquisites
of civilized existence but a modest share of its luxuries as well. Such a
social environment has never before existed save for a limited sector of
any community. Its realization will add a new dimension to social experi-
ence.

This extraordinary possibility is the proper measure of the oppor-
tunity before us. It is not, let us hasten to say, a vision of Utopia. At
the very best, 1975 will be far from a perfect society. Laggard sections
of the community will undoubtedly remain. Great and necessary works will
remain to be performed. Troublesome, perhaps even grave problems of
economic policy will assuredly assert themselves. Nevertheless these
hard realities at best obscure the underlying achievement. If the American
economy performs according to its capacities, we shall have created a
society different in kind, as well as degree, from any heretofore.

Yet, if the future holds great opportunity, it also poses grave
difficulties. There is danger in the natural feelings of national pride and

hat, if the future holds great opportunity, it also poses grave
good difficulties. As well as degree, from any heretofore,
society performs according to its capacities, we shall have created a
hard reality at best, but the underlying achievement. If the American
economic policy will seemly adopt themselves. Nevertheless those
remains to be performed. Troublesome, perhaps even grave problems of
the community will undoubtedly remain. Great and necessary works will
be very great. 1938 will be far from a perfect society. Leggett sections
furnish before us. It is not, let us heated to say, a vision of Utopia. At
this extraordinary possibility is the proper measure of the oppor-

ence.

For the promise of the economy of 1938 represents the supreading of an entire
the qualitative value of the level of life which such figures make possible,
is significant here is not that the quantitative aspect of the figures, but
domestically, of course, is to convert this opportunity into reality. What

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September 10, 1938

Draft Chapter 1 -- Overall Report

[lc]

September 10, 1957

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self-satisfaction which the vision of a society of universal abundance
inspires. There is a peril of failing to understand that our wealth in a
world of poverty can be justified only by the moral concern with which we
employ it. There is a danger that we may confuse _more_ with _better_, and
of assuming that because we may bring about an environment of relative
plenty, that this will necessarily be an end in itself.

It will not. Indeed, if the prospect of a society of wealth "solves"
some age-old questions of economics it opens new questions of a still
deeper nature. There is not, in a society of abundance, the same easy
rationale for the single-minded pursuit of private gain, or for the high
estimation of economic activity itself, which prevails in a society still
coping with the exigencies of want and need. In the past, American soci-
ety has not had to ask the purpose for which it worked so hard, saved so
much, built so furiously: the answer was apparent in the needs of the
people themselves. But when those needs have been met and more than
met, when additional economic effort yields not just a dimunition of dis-
comfort but a proliferation of luxuryry, the question of the purpose of eco-
nomic activity itself cannot so easily be evaded.

Henceforth the question of *quality* will assume a higher degree of
importance than quantity; the meaningfulness of work will weigh more
heavily in the social scales than its monetary rewards. With the solu-
tion of many of the problems of want, we will have the means and the

tion of many of the problems of work, we will have the means and the
power to do it in the social scale than its monetary rewards. With the ac-
insurance then quality, the meaningfulness of work will weigh more

Henceforth the question of quality will assume a higher degree of
importance itself, cannot so easily be avoided.

comfort but a proliferation of luxury, the question of the purpose of eco-
ner, when additional economic effort yields not just a diminution of dis-
people themselves, but when those needs have been met and more than
much, built so introduction: the answer was apparent in the needs of the
city has not had to ask the purpose for which it worked so hard, saved so
cooping with the existences of want and need. In the past, American acci-
dent of economic activity itself, which prevails in a society still
rational for the single-minded pursuit of private gain, or for the high
deeper nature. There is not, in a society of abundance, the same easy
some side-evident questions of economy it opens new questions of a still

It will not, indeed, if the prospect of a society of wealth "sofies"

plenty, that this will necessarily be an end in itself,
of assuming that because we may bring about an environment of relative
employ it. There is a danger that we may confuse more with better, and
world of poverty can be justified only by the moral concern with which we
inspire it. There is a belief of failing to understand that our wealth in a
self-satisfaction which the vision of a society of universal abundance

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September 10, 1925

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September 10, 1957

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motive to turn our attention away from an absorption in wealth. The real
justification of our domestic achievement is not the mere creation of wealth
for wealth's sake, but the bringing into being of a society and of a world
environment in which each individual may realize to the full whatever capa-
cities for self-expression he may possess. The material mechanism of
American society must be made the servant of life and not its master; it
cannot be the goal of our striving, but the tool which gives this effort
meaning both here and abroad. Otherwise, we will inevitably succumb to
the nemesis of too much leisure, too much prosperity, and too few chall-
enges to the creative energies that enable man to transcend his preoccu-
pation with mere material comforts. Our most urgent and immediate domes-
tic challenge, therefore, is to our imagination and vision. America's
internal need at mid-century is to define a new concept of frontier, to
find new scope for the national genius heretofore directed to the conquest
of the physical environment.

III

And yet our domestic problems and opportunities are dwarfed by the
challenges of the world beyond our shores, a world in turmoil where stand-
ards and institutions which had remained unchanged for centuries are either
disintegrating or are ~~being~~ considered oppressive by millions. Western

September 10, 1957

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Europe, the fountainhead of our civilization and for centuries the arena of world affairs, has lost its position of pre-eminence and is now painfully readjusting to its new circumstance of diminished influence. Across the great land mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa, new nations are rising in the place of colonial empires.

These transformations raise issues of philosophical even more than of political import: For every change requires a psychological adjustment. In some areas it is to find a meaning in a world where events can no longer be commanded; in others it is to replace the exhilaration of the struggle for independence with a less dramatic but more permanent motivation capable of perpetuating the freedom so hardly won. And this quest for a sense of identity is all the more difficult because it is taking place on a world stage over-hung by the shadow of two dark realities: first, the existence of an intransigently hostile group of states, the Soviet bloc, eager to exploit all dissatisfactions for its own ends, and prepared to threaten or employ all means to achieve those ends, and second, the deadly peril presented by the new weapons technology, which is literally capable of obliterating all man-civilization kind.

The revolution abroad has gained urgency as distances have shrunk and states have grown increasingly interdependent. For the first time in history, international relations have become truly global. Until relatively recent times the hemispheres were divided: the ancient civilizations of India and the Far East developed independently of western culture. They

India and the Far East developed independently of Western culture. They
recent times the hemispheres were divided: the ancient civilisations of
history, international relations have become truly global. Until relatively
and states have grown increasingly interdependent. For the first time in
the revolution spread the gained agency as distances have shrunk

new weapons technology, which is literally capable of obliterating all races
means to achieve those ends, and second, the deadlyผล presented by the
disastrophes for its own ends, and prepared to threaten or employ all
internationally hostile group of states, the Soviet bloc, eager to exploit all
over-laid by the shadow of two dark realities: first, the existence of an
identity is all the more difficult because it is taking place on a world state
of perpetuating the freedom so hardly won. And this threat for a sense of
independence with a loss dramatic but more permanent motivation capable
be commanded in others it is to replace the exultation of the struggle for
In some these it is to find a meaning in a world where events can no longer
of political import: an every change requires a psychological adjustment.

These transformations raise issues of philosophical even more than
rising in the face of colonial empires.

Great land mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa, new nations are
resulting to its new circumstance of diminished influence. Across the
world affairs, has lost its position of pre-eminence and is now painfully
Europe, the foundation of our civilization and for centuries the source of

September 10, 1937
Draft Chapter I -- Overall Report

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September 10, 1957

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were virtually unknown to the classical Greeks and Romans. In the Middle Ages they impinged only slightly on the occidental consciousness. It was not indeed, until the outbreak of World War II that diplomacy ceased to become the exclusive province of the major European powers. Today the hemispheres are inseparable and isolated states no longer exist anywhere on earth. The crucial fact is that every country on earth is a part of something bigger than itself. When ideas can circle the globe in a matter of minutes, when missiles are being designed to carry destruction to distant targets thousands of miles away, when self-sufficient economies are extinct, it is evident that no national state can stand alone -- not even the United States of America. Henceforth the foreign policy of every state must begin with the premise that its consequences will be world-wide.

Another factor which has altered the character of international relations: throughout the world today the conduct of diplomacy is no longer exercised as the privileged activity of an elite social or professional group. Foreign policy has become democratic; its implications reach into every aspect of national existence; the nature of its objectives and the effectiveness with which they are pursued are determined by the strength and dynamism of the popular support behind it. In its deepest sense the foreign policy of any nation stands as a symbol of that nation's purpose and character. Its objective is the hearts and minds of mankind.

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September 10, 1957

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Thus the "revolution of rising expectations" which is sweeping the
vast areas of the globe is far more than an economic phenomenon. It is the
quest of man for independence, the demand for participation in decisions
that affect his own destiny, the stirring of political, economic and social
aspirations within hitherto dependent and underdeveloped lands. In such
countries the collapse of colonialism and the swift transition from an agri-
cultural <u>or</u>
into a tribal society has been a disrupting process. Like all suc-
cessful revolutionaries the leaders of the newly independent states find
that the overthrow of the previous system is not the end of their task but
the beginning, <u>and that</u>
the effort to build a new state requires purposes and
skills different from those which achieved independence. A revolution breeds
habits of opposition which can sometimes be channeled only with difficulty
into tasks of construction. It creates the illusion that all problems can be
dealt with by the same impatient methods which proved so useful in over-
throwing the previous system. This impatience may create a psychological
climate in which the promise of immediate solutions may seem more important
than the surrender of freedom to a new form of enslavement.

Thus one of the most vital tasks which the United States and the
Western World has to face is to foster the values in which we believe and
in which we find a common ground for universal aspirations. Our responsi-
bilities include the sharing not only of dollars and machines, but also of
institutions and ideas. Unless the newly independent peoples recognize the

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September 10, 1957

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relevance of democratic principles to their lives, it may require the harsh
reality of communist enslavement to bring home the fact that material prog-
ress is hollow and meaningless unless coupled with respect for the dignity
of the individual. By then of course it will be too late, either for the vic-
tims or the rest of the world.

We have reason to be optimistic in this task, for the revolution in
the formerly colonial states is the outgrowth of our own traditional concepts
regarding freedom and the dignity of man. Most of the leaders of these
states were educated in the West and drew their inspiration from the tenets
of the British, French and American revolutionaries who preached the doc-
trine of the inalienable "right" of self-government. Thus the upheavals in
the newly independent states and in those still under colonial rule repre-
sent one of the greatest conversions in history. As the political principles
of the colonizers regarding the nature of human liberty became diffused the
basis was laid for the destruction of colonialism itself. The challenge now
presented by the newly independent countries to the West is for the West to
live up to its own values. They are playing a role drawn from a Western
script.

The communist challenge, on the other hand, is an attack on the very
basis of these values. It uses the traditional terms of freedom and human
dignity as the rhetorical tools of slavery. Communism is irreconcilable be-
cause Leninist theory recognizes no lasting peace between antagonistic

There is
some danger
in believing
that all
Communist
States are dogma-bound. That in
itself is a dogma.

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September 10, 1957

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economic and social systems. Its intervals of peaceful coexistence have always been conceived as tactical pauses wherein to disarm resistance and to prepare positions for the inevitable showdown. While the revolution of the colonial states represents an effort to *enter* the international system based on principles of respect for human dignity and national sovereignty, the communist revolution is an attempt to *subvert* this system and the principles on which it is built. The thrust of communist imperialism has converted diplomacy into propaganda and international conferences into elaborate stage plays which seek to win over still uncommitted countries. With respect to the newly independent states we can hope to build a community based on shared aspirations. With respect to the communist challenge our security resides in our strength and in our ability to help bring about conditions in the free world which minimize communist efforts to divide and subvert.

Thus the world is rent by conflict at a time when peace was never more necessary. It is fragmented at a critical moment when all the pressures of history and technology urge integration into ever larger units. Through the millions of years that man has been dominant on earth the structures of society have grown ever larger -- from family to clan, to tribe, to feudal aggregates, to nations, to coalitions of nations. At the present time man's loyalties are governed by entities called nations. He has not yet

Great Danger in presenting Communism as sheer "wickedness" Comm. is attractive because it offers some things we won't or don't, i.e.

1) ec. planning

2) the "security of authority.

3) more open-mindedness on certain social questions.

4) a philosophy of history.

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September 10, 1957

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reached the point where his perspective can encompass the larger community
of mankind.

Yet in spite of the existence of hostile ideologies and the effort by
one group of states to achieve world domination, the forces of technology
as well as the demands of the human spirit insist that man must arrive at
this perspective. For many of our most urgent problems can be solved only
on a far greater, if not yet a truly global, scale. As the population of our
planet inescapably increases, it is certain that all existing arable lands, as
well as those which may yet be developed by irrigation and fertilization will
prove inadequate to supply man with food. We will then have to exploit the
richness of the oceans -- to cultivate or even domesticate the flora and fauna
that live within the great watery mantle that covers most of our planet. But
in so doing we will be faced with the choice between strife and cooperation.
Who will define the limits of territorial waters? Who will own the great un-
touched pastures of the seas?

Other problems will present themselves as the nuclear age unfolds.
Vexing international issues have already arisen in connection with the fallout
of radioactive particles from the testing of hydrogen bombs. It is less gener-
ally recognized that the peaceful use of atomic energy will present as many
international difficulties as its military employment. For example, there is
the question of the disposal of radioactive wastes in the ocean. No less
serious is the crisis that may arise as the result of an accident in a nuclear

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September 10, 1957

- 16 -

reactor -- or in the dismantling of a nuclear reactor -- which could spread
lethal radioactivity in the midst of populated civilized areas. Since the winds
of earth recognize no man-made frontiers, it is inevitable that the development
of atomic energy for peace, as well as for war, will make standards of safety
a matter for regional and perhaps global concern. We have today examples of
international cooperation imposed by technology: i.e., the assignment of wave
lengths for broadcasting or the agreements governing international aviation.
An ever larger array of such agreements will become necessary as science
evolves.

Our developing knowledge of meteorology will also present international
problems. Long-range weather forecasts require the assembling of data from
observation posts around the entire planet. In the future it is likely that we
will be able not only to predict but to control -- or at least influence -- the
weather. If man should succeed in extending his control of the weather be-
yond his local environs to the higher reaches of the atmosphere -- if he should
for example, find ways to direct and canalize the flow of currents from the
permanent air mass above the North Pole, the whole pattern of life of huge
areas of the earth may be transformed. And with the launching of earth
satellites the control of outer space, becomes a momentous international im-
port. Such developments are no longer implausible today than the unleashing
of nuclear energy appeared two decades ago.

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September 10, 1957

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Thus internationally as well as domestically our problems at the same time define our opportunities. The impatient aspirations of the newly independent states can rend the world or they can serve to galvanize an ever wider effort of international cooperation. The decline of European Empires may produce bitterness and frustration; it can also serve to spur the integration of a great and creative continent. The explosive rate of technological change is capable of producing weapons which can destroy humanity, it may also enable mankind to achieve undreamed-of levels of well-being. The communist challenge may find us unprepared for sacrifice. It can also serve to make us more deeply aware of the principles by which we should live.

## IV

These then are some of the vistas of America at Mid-Century. The scale of experience which has shaped our traditional notions of policy is rendered obsolete by enormous contingencies of the unfolding future. The radical nature of the changes before us, and the incredible rapidity with which we have been catapulted into the center of world affairs present our nation with a situation unique in our history; we find ourselves today in a new world, wherein concepts formed in the more tranquil past are proving inadequate guides. There is a discontinuity in our historical experience which makes it imperative to look closely at our national traditions and national purposes and ask how they can be given a new and cogent affirmation.

nationalistic complexes and ask how they can be given a new and coherent illumination; which makes it imperative to look closely at our national traditions and paradigms of thought. There is a discontinuity in our historical experience of new world, wherein concepts formed in the more transtual past are proving with a situation unique in our history: we find ourselves today in a which we have been encapsulated into the center of world affairs present on our radical nature of the changes before us, and the incredible rapidity with rendered obsolete by enormous consequences of the unfolding future. The state of experience which has shaped our traditional actions of policy is these facts are some of the issues of America at Mid-Century. The

IV

to make in more deeply aware of the principles by which we should live, communist challenge may find us unprepared for sacrifice. It can also serve also enable mankind to achieve undreamed-of levels of well-being. The change is capable of producing weapons which can destroy humanity; it may form a great and creative continent. The explosive rate of technological may produce patterns and variations; it can also serve to spur the integrative effort of international cooperation. The decline of European empires independent states can read the world or they can serve to advance an ever same time define our opportunities. The inherent aspirations of the newly Thus internationally as well as domestically our problems at the

- 13 -

Drift Chapter 1 -- Overall Report
September 10, 1987

[LJ]

September 10, 1957

- 18 -

A value system is crucial to the survival of any society or nation. Society cannot carry its tolerance of other value systems to the point of acquiescing in its own destruction. It cannot treat its survival as negotiable. Its values will determine the sacrifices it is prepared to make to insure its survival. In any conflict, spiritual or physical, the side with a stronger faith has a decided advantage. It is willing to make greater sacrifices because its purpose will be stronger.

Beyond the elementary needs for survival lie the positive goals of a society, both domestic and international. The distinction between societies is to be found in the "positive" part of their actions, in their view of the nature of man and his place in the universe. If we did not have such values we would not greatly care what happened as long as our immediate security were assured.

The actions of a society can be placed into two categories. Certain measures are dictated by the requirements of survival; others are produced by the desire to create a world harmonious with a society's aspirations and values. The first category of actions is _imposed_ by the environment; it is defensive. The second class of actions is an attempt to _shape_ the environment; it is constructive. Without a well-defined value system or even if the existing one is not clearly understood any nation is liable to drift aimlessly in the stream of history. Its actions will prove haphazard. Its policies

[lc]

September 10, 1957

- 19 -

will evolve from impromptu reactions to crisis situations. It will become,
inevitably, a prisoner of events.

Unfortunately this has been America's approach to its problems for
most of this century. Time and again the U.S. has mustered its immense,
latent energies only at the eleventh hour, when confronted with an obvious,
immediate, deadly danger. We entered World War I only after German sub-
marines had sunk American ships, invaded American waters and threatened
to dominate the Atlantic Ocean. We entered World War II only after Japan
had bombed Pearl Harbor and threatened to dominate the Pacific Ocean. The
new economic and social concepts that emerged in the 1930s were the products
of an economic crisis that threatened the foundations of American society --
and that no one had believed could occur. In each such emergency, the U.S.
only belatedly mobilized its resources, creative skills and innate idealism
to combat concrete and inescapable dangers. In none of these emergencies
did the nation perceive its peril in advance or act soon enough to forestall the
ultimate violent storm.

The explanation for our behavior lies deep in the American heritage.
For the U.S. has been, at least since the passing of the philosopher-statesmen
who directed its first formative decades, a nation inclined to operational rather
than abstract or conceptual thinking, to action rather than reflection, to facts
rather than theory. By and large Americans today like to regard themselves as
a **practical** people. We feign to be scornful of prophets, idealists and

[L]

September 10, 1957

- 20 -

philosophers. We are more interested in the result than in the theory which produced it. We tend to forget that great results are unattainable without great concepts. This nation was populated and established by men of ideas -- by apostles of political and religious freedom, by men of reason who had studied the teachings of British and French rationalists like Locke and Voltaire, by philosopher-statesmen like Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, and by men of good will like Roger Williams who invaded and conquered the wilderness to foster the intercourse between man and God. All the great charitable and public welfare institutions, the churches, the endowed foundations, the universities and medical schools, the hospitals and the whole complex of public education, are the creations of men in whom vision was the essential prerequisite of action. No social problem has ever been solved, no social advance has ever been achieved, except through the force of concepts formulated by men of vision, dedication and reason. One need only contemplate the influence of John Dewey on American education, the influence of Albert Einstein on science, technology and modern warfare and the influence of Sigmund Freud on the field of social morals and mental health, to discern the incalculable effect which conceptual thinking exerts -- though often belatedly -- on the behavior of mankind.

More than a century ago, the French observer, De Tocqueville, discerned the pragmatic predilection of our society. Commenting on the American approach to the unfolding vistas of science, he wrote: "In America the purely

[L]

September 10, 1957

- 21 -

practical art of science is admirably understood . . . On this head the Ameri-
cans always display a clear, free, original and inventive power of mind. But
hardly anyone in the United States devotes himself to the essentially theoreti-
cal and abstract portion of human knowledge." As a consequence of this tend-
ency, as it has been extended to politics and the conduct of external affairs,
America has met each recurring crisis on the basis of a last-minute decision
and shaped more by immediate circumstances than by a lasting standard of
values. Along with our distrust of conceptual thinkers, we have also tended
to distrust any system of thought, any articulation of long-range principles
and ideals.

Over and above our antipathy to abstract thinking, we have also culti-
vated an historical image of ourselves which has served to impede the formu-
lation of any basic definition of the abiding national interest. It has been
built in part by our Puritan inheritance -- the ethical conviction that power
is essentially evil, inevitably corrupts, and may be mobilized only tempo-
rarily for temporary power crises. Another distortion in our perspective has
been created by our view of geography which asserts that the oceans are bar-
riers rather than highways, that economic areas are necessarily defined by
national boundaries, and that we can exist safely in isolation on our conti-
nental island without concern for contingencies beyond our shores. A third
factor has been our recurring peacetime rejection of our military tradition.
Though victorious in every war we have fought, each has been regarded as

Lincoln
Washington
Jefferson
F.D.R.
??

[c]

September 10, 1957

- 22 -

an unhappy, temporary episode induced by unfortunate temporary circumstances
unlikely to arise again. We have approached our great wars of the 20th century
somewhat in the light of technological exercises in production or logistics,
quite divorced from the continuum of international politics or the problems of
diplomacy which can be met by other methods in times of peace.

In essence, we have adhered tenaciously to concepts of history en-
gendered in the more stable past, and attempted to solve 20th century problems
with a kit of tools manufactured in the 19th century. Today, the nature of our
situation is such that the U.S. can no longer afford to conduct its affairs on
the basis of 19th century images. Nor can we afford in a world in transition,
wracked by revolutionary upheavals in social and political thought and overhang
by the dark menace of nuclear destruction, to continue to meet one crisis after
the other by reliance on industrial strength, wealth, technology and inspired
improvisation.

Action alone is not enough to meet the challenge to America today. For
~~to~~ act with assurance in the face of vast challenges, both domestic and inter-
national, to meet the ideological challenges that divide men, we require above
all *philosophical* insight. Although we have at our disposal *both* an immense
capacity for gathering facts we have sometimes seemed bewildered by the very
mass of available data. We have moved from crisis to crisis without a clearly
discernible sense of direction. Without such direction all our tremendous eco-
nomic and technical power may prove self-destructive. Any society, to be vital,

[L]

September 10, 1957

- 23 -

requires a set of beliefs held firmly enough to serve as a rallying point against
the onslaught of incompatible principles and at the same time sufficiently uni-
versal to encompass the aspirations of mankind as a whole. Not only the United
States but the whole world has need today of clearer vision and a common set
of purposes.

It is possible -- at least we would like to think it possible -- that the
American tradition may contribute direction and hope to the aspirations of a di-
versified world. For our nation is itself diversified. Indeed the unique charac-
teristic of American society, its distinguishing characteristic is its pluralism
and diversity. The genius of America is essentially its ability to synthesize the
objectives of a multifarious population and to reconcile, combine and coordinate
them into a community of outlook and a community of principles and ideals --
the binding force of a nation. And it has been able to do so because the ideals
on which our society has been built -- the freedom of the individual, justice
based on moral law, peace and order preserved not by force but by reason and ad-
vancement of the general welfare -- seem to reflect universal aspirations.

The world has become an international community of which we are in-
extricably an important part. Though we are confronted by an irreconcilably
hostile bloc of states, each nation which remains free to shape its destiny must
find the strength and purpose to contribute to the unfinished moral business of
our time: how we can help bring peace to a divided and belligerent family of
nations, justice to a world of injustice and inequality, security to a world
threatened by communist enslavement, freedom to a world of multiple oppres-
sion, welfare to a world of misery.

plus a
lucky
new
continent
which
was
"new" in
1600