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In short, the United States has three broad choices in pursuing an Atlantic nuclear policy: (1) It can seek to suppress other nuclear forces in the Alliance and insist that nuclear defense is an American responsibility with our allies playing an advisory role. This is the course preferred by the Pentagon. (2) It can try to eliminate the existing nuclear forces by bringing the non-nuclear Allies into the nuclear field as part of a structure in which the United States retains a veto. To reduce the significance of national forces, the new nuclear force would have to be of sufficient size to dwarf the British and French nuclear programs. This, in effect, is the road of the MLF. (3) It can base its nuclear policy on the existing nuclear programs and seek to coordinate them by strengthening the process of political consultation.

Of these options, the first is precluded by the refusal of France and, for all practical purposes, of Great Britain simply to abolish their nuclear forces. The second course has the disadvantages described in the previous chapter. Thus the most constructive avenue for Atlantic cooperation would be to build on the existing nuclear programs rather than bring a new force into being.

Such a policy is also more consistent with the eventual emergence of a European nuclear force. In the long term, nuclear proliferation in Europe can be reliably arrested only by the development of an Atlantic political community involving a real sharing of sovereignty or by European political unity. Of these developments the latter seems more attainable.

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If Europe could organize itself politically, it would reduce the number of nuclear powers. A European nuclear force would then replace the British and French nuclear programs, and other countries in Europe could be related to it through whatever European political mechanisms emerge.

United States policy has been extremely ambivalent about the prospect of a European nuclear force. From the technical point of view, central command and control is complicated by a united European force as much as by the existing national forces. This is why the Pentagon has been cool to the idea of a European nuclear force. It has refrained from making its opposition explicit only because the kind of political unity postulated by the State Department as the condition of American acquiescence is extremely remote. State Department views--and occasionally those of the President--appear more forthcoming. Official statements assert that once Europe creates a central political authority capable of speaking with a single voice, the United States would recognize that a new situation exists. What conclusions we would draw from this "new situation" is rarely spelled out, though the implication has been strong that we might then accept a European nuclear force. At the same time, there have been thinly veiled threats that a redeployment of American forces will be inevitable if European national forces persist.

However, to state a condition which according to the most optimistic advocates of European unity cannot be realized for decades, is to confuse the present debate. The immediate issue is whether a European force should develop--if at all--out of the existing European nuclear programs or whether

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it should grow out of a new structure, such as the MLF. To be sure, the MLF may well wreck any prospect of a European nuclear identity because of the divisions within Europe which it will inevitably produce and also because countries having once left the nuclear field are not likely to re-enter via the supranational route. But if it should lead to a European nuclear force--as some of its proponents urge--the MLF will have shifted the nuclear balance within Europe toward presently non-nuclear countries, which are much more vulnerable to pressures than Britain and France. Thus the MLF is either a poor starting point for a European force or it will bring into being the kind of European nuclear force which would create the greatest long-term difficulties.

On both sides of the Atlantic serious individuals oppose a European nuclear force because they fear that it would lead to a reckless European policy and to an eventual withdrawal of the United States from Europe. But what exactly is the danger posed by European autonomy in the nuclear field? Is the problem the essentially technical one of coordinating legally autonomous forces in a common strategy? Or is the concern deeper? Are we really worried lest, for whatever reason, Europe may feel so desperate or behave so irresponsibly that it would be prepared to go to nuclear war against our wishes and in the full knowledge that this would mean the end of its existence as a functioning society?

If divisions in the Atlantic ever reach this point, the Alliance will have come to an end whether or not a European nuclear force exists. If our

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Allies should feel this forsaken, they would sooner or later re-enter
the nuclear field or else withdraw into sullen neutralism. A wise United
States policy will not invest American prestige in forcing our Allies
into a structure which makes autonomous action _physically impossible_.
Rather it will create a structure which grants autonomy while reducing
the desire for it.

With such an attitude, the coordination of technically autonomous
nuclear forces should not prove an insuperable problem. Indeed it is
likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity.
In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States
involves, at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations
for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military
matters--and particularly in the nuclear field--the closest association
between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of both
sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is inconceivable that our Allies
would _prefer_ to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available
or in prospect for them and _without_ the support of our necessarily preponderant
arsenal.

Finally, it is high time to end the threat that our commitment to
the defense of Europe is conditional on one particular organization of
nuclear forces. The fact is that we cannot withdraw from Europe even if
we do not obtain our preferred strategic arrangements. To threaten to do
so is both dangerous and empty. It is dangerous because it indicates

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that our commitment is conditional; and it is empty because we can
no more withdraw from Europe than from Hawaii.

Of course there is a very real concern with arresting the
spread of nuclear weapons. But there is no evidence that the nuclear
program of Communist China was in the slightest influenced by the
example of Great Britain or that its willingness to end its nuclear
efforts depends in any sense on the actions of our European allies. The
same is true of the possible nuclear programs of India, Israel or Egypt.
If anything, were Britain to leave the nuclear field, this might provide
an additional incentive for India to enter it. When the real danger of
nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands
of anti-Western countries, it is not clear that the first remedial step
should be the elimination of the nuclear programs of our closest allies.
Would it not be wiser to concentrate our anti-proliferation policy, which
is important, on countries which may join the nuclear club in the future?

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nuclear matters. To Soviet and European critics, the MLF has
been advocated as decreasing, if anything, the role of its
members in the decision to go to nuclear war. Thus Gerard
C. Smith, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for
the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by multi-
lateral agreement, rather than by bilateral agreement as in the case
of these earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus increase the
number of states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than on
the nuclear trigger. [emphasis added.]

There would be no increase of risk of compromise of weapons
design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial procedures would
assure that individual countries had no greater access to informa-
tion about how to design and manufacture weapons than at pres-
ent under the NATO atomic stockpile.

J.Gerard C. Smith. "The Nuclear Defense of NATO," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1299 (May 18, 1964). p. 785.

The dilemma of how to reconcile the requirement of cen-
tral control over nuclear weapons with the sovereignty of our
Allies is real. But for the long-term vitality of the Alliance it
would have been better to face this issue head-on than to
present different versions of the control problem to different
audiences. If there is a German demand for nuclear weapons
—as the advocates of the MLF have alleged—it is unlikely to
be satisfied by "increasing the number of states with fingers on
the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger." If other
countries do wish to enter the nuclear field, they are not
likely to be put off by a device which creates the illusion of
participation while giving "no greater access to information
about how to design and manufacture weapons than at pres-
ent." The MLF cannot at one and the same time satisfy de-
mands for nuclear sharing and assuage concerns about nu-
clear proliferation.

Originated to fulfill SACEUR's military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions that gave rise to the military requirement. Rather than heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multiply divisions. There is something absurd about trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear field, often with only their reluctant assent. It makes no sense to attempt to revitalize NATO with a project which, because of the opposition of France and other Allies, will have to be set up outside of NATO. It is contradictory to advocate European political unity while urging a scheme which is certain to produce a rift between France and the Federal Republic.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every
measure to strengthen the Alliance. But before embarking on
a collision course, we should be sure that a disputed scheme
commands wide support and that it will in fact bring about a
structure which enhances the long-term vitality of the
Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of
these requirements. Though the proponents of the MLF have
tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of short-
sighted men, the opposition of France, Belgium and the Sec-
retary General of NATO, the indifference of most other NATO
Allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be

tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of short-
sighted men, the opposition of France, Belgium and the Sec-
retary General of NATO, the indifference of most other NATO
Allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be
simply shrugged off. Outside the Federal Republic there is
not one country whose agreement to the MLF represents any-
thing more than acquiescence in American pressure.

Proponents of the MLF often compare their project to the
Schuman Plan, which, despite heavy initial criticism, laid the
basis for European economic integration. However, while
many constructive innovations have had to withstand criti-
cism when first proposed, not everything that is criticized is
necessarily constructive. The Schuman Plan promoted
Franco-German cooperation in areas where long-term inter-
ests were parallel. The longer the Coal and Steel Community
lasted, the more obvious were the benefits of common action.

The opposite is likely to be the case with the MLF. Once
established, the conflicting motives of the participants will
become increasingly apparent. There is a latent difference of
opinion between the Federal Republic and the United States
and Great Britain about the size of the force as well as about
its composition, specifically about whether land-based mis-
siles should supplement the sea-based MLF. It is likely that
the Federal Republic regards the MLF as the first installment
in meeting SACEUR's requirement for medium-range missiles
while the United States and Britain consider it a final satis-
faction of existing needs. Though this will not become ap-
parent in the early stages of the project, it is bound to lead to
difficulties later on.

Another potential dispute derives from the fact that the
Federal Republic favors the Multilateral Force partly to in-
crease its share of nuclear control. Most other countries—
especially Great Britain—participate in order to prevent an
increase of German control. This difference can be obscured
in the early stages of the MLF; it, too, will become more and
more acute as time goes on.

Finally, an extremely divisive debate in the Federal Re-
public can be avoided only if the MLF treaty contains a "Eu-
ropean" clause providing for the possibility of transforming
the MLF into a European nuclear force once European politi-
cal integration is further advanced. The Italian government
(whose parliamentary support for the MLF is dubious in any
event) has taken a similar position. Great Britain, on the
other hand, will not agree to such a prospect; indeed, its
participation in any new nuclear arrangement is conditional
on a British veto over any structural changes. It is one thing
to create an institution whose evolution is likely to
strengthen common objectives; it is quite another to stake so
much on a device where conflicting interests have been kept
latent only by avoiding consideration of the key issues.

The MLF may therefore strengthen the very tendencies it
seeks to combat. In its advocacy of the MLF, the United States

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has granted almost all of the propositions of its European
critics. It has agreed that possession of nuclear weapons is a
criterion of equality. It has granted that ownership of some
strategic forces is essential for participation in strategic plan-
ning and political decisions. It has admitted that influence in
the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic nuclear
arsenal. It has differed only about the nature of ownership
and the way control should be exercised. But since the con-
trol procedures of the MLF patently favor United States he-
gemony, they can be used by the nationalists and extremists as
a proof of American bad faith. If the Federal Republic finds
itself at odds with the United States about control, or with its
other allies about the evolution of the force, a serious back-
lash could develop.

The MLF may backfire even with respect to its primary
objective of preventing Franco-German nuclear collabora-
tion. Having made access to nuclear weapons the test of
equality, we have given an incentive to the Federal Republic
to seek alternative arrangements if the MLF fails or if its con-
trol arrangements prove unsatisfactory. Disappointment
could then justify a Franco-German nuclear collaboration for
which prior to the MLF no significant support existed within
the Federal Republic.

It was to render a poor service to the Federal Republic to seek to restore Allied cohesion by a scheme which involved access by Germany to nuclear weapons. If the MLF succeeds, the Federal Republic will be embroiled with France. If it fails, leaders who have staked a great deal on following the American lead will be discredited. Participation by Germany in a nuclear fleet has resurrected instinctive fears all over Europe. Within Germany, pro-American and pro-French factions have rent the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union. The MLF thus threatens internal German stability and creates the danger that the Federal Republic will become isolated internationally.

Advocates of the MLF often argue that it is easy to pick
holes in any existing nuclear control plan but much harder
to offer a constructive alternative. To be sure, if the issue of
nuclear control is, in fact, the cause of Allied tensions, the
MLF proponents have a point. However, the issue of nuclear
control is a symptom, not a cause, of NATO's difficulties. There
exists no neat solution for it so long as NATO is composed of
sovereign states. Nor does the MLF "solve" it. The basic prob-
lem in the Alliance is political and not strategic. There is
something incongruous about NATO's absorption in techni-
calities of mixed-manning while it lacks a common policy
toward the Communist world, flounders dividedly in the for-
mer colonial areas and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine.
To devote so much energy to the problem of who pushes the
button in the remote contingency of nuclear war while neg-
lecting the issues which confront the Alliance daily comes
close to being escapism. Insofar as the German conversion to
the MLF was not the result of American missionary zeal,
it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be
excluded from further East-West negotiations and to create
another organic link between the United States and Europe.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve these goals.
In fact, it reverses the correct priorities. Political unity must

It reached above all a desire to establish a claim not to be excluded from further East-West negotiations and to create another organic link between the United States and Europe.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve these goals. In fact, it reverses the correct priorities. Political unity must precede, it cannot follow, nuclear integration. To pursue nuclear multilateralism while foreign policy remains national must emphasize divergent interests. The imagination and dedication expended on the MLF would, therefore, have been better spent in strengthening political cohesion. Our allies are not likely to be convinced that their interests will be taken seriously during the improbable eventuality of general nuclear war when no consensus exists for the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and for crisis situations. Rather than take the detour through the MLF, it would have been wiser to aim directly for coordination of policy by setting up a body to develop common policies for many unsolved problems of the Alliance in East-West relations, strategic doctrine, trade policy, arms control or relations with the emerging nations. If France had refused to participate, the disruptive intent would have been obvious. France would have stood apart from an effort which commanded a real consensus. Moreover, a future French government could participate in such a group more easily than in the MLF, in which French membership could well be precluded by financial considerations alone. If a political steering body for the Alliance had then decided to include the Federal Republic in the ownership of strategic weapons, the political context would have been entirely different. It would have represented the common view of all Allies rather than the pressure of one. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the MLF, a political body to coordinate Alliance policy and to manage crises remains essential.¹⁰ If it

For an elaboration of such a policymaking body, see Chapter 8. should be argued that the Atlantic Alliance will never be able to develop a common political program, the emptiness of nuclear multilateralism becomes apparent. Nations that cannot develop common negotiating positions are not likely to be able to concert a common strategy for an apocalypse.

Even in our bilateral relations with the Federal Republic, the strengthening of political consultation should have had priority. If we had created institutions to give the Federal Republic access to our strategic and disarmament planning and the conduct of East-West negotiations in general, these could have been used as a brake on eventual Franco-German nuclear collaboration much as the Franco-German Treaty turned out to be one of the factors thwarting the MLF. By reversing the process, we brought on what we feared most. We whetted German nuclear appetites without giving satisfaction to the political concerns. It is questionable whether it is in our interest to discourage Franco-German intimacy, but at least it should not be based on disillusionment with the United States.

The MLF, as originally conceived, is not likely to be realized. So much opposition exists that even the most passionate

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Troubled - Kissinger 9731 11 Baskerville 24-13 E-4 advocates will have to modify the scheme. It may be useful, however, to inquire what lessons can be drawn from the experience.

The most important one is not to try to solve political problems with technical expedients. Confronted with a political and philosophical challenge in De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, American policymakers reacted by staking everything on a scheme of nuclear control which they had previously treated with indifference. They then spent two years negotiating its mechanical aspects. In the process, the deeper causes of NATO's disarray were neglected. The ends and means became confused. At its best, the MLF was irrelevant to the fundamental problems of NATO. It would have repeated within its framework many of the disputes which it was supposed to overcome.

In Washington, this was obscured because one group in the government had become so deeply committed to the MLF that it acted as a lobby rather than an organ for calmly weighing alternatives. In the words of one acute observer, engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe . . ."¹⁸ This has made

A'lastair Buchanan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?" The New Republic, Vol. 151, Nos. 6-7 (August 8, 1964), pp. 19-21.

it difficult to determine whether what appeared in Washington as the European opinion did not really reflect European acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of one segment of our bureaucracy. The result was a whole series of misjudgments. European support for the MLF has been grossly overestimated. Despite the repeated criticisms of the MLF by British Labor leaders when in opposition, it was expected that the new British government would agree to a treaty setting up the MLF within two months of coming into office. The divisive impact of the threat of a German-American nuclear partnership was misjudged. The capacity of the German political structure to withstand strain was completely misconceived. Throughout, some American officials acted as if getting agreement to the MLF was an end in itself. By using whatever argument was convenient to this purpose, a number of partially contradictory promissory notes were handed out.

The pressure of a relatively small group of officials in the State Department gave our Allies a misleading impression of American unanimity and commitment. The Pentagon had accepted the MLF only on the assumption that ultimate American control would remain unimpaired. The group in the State Department that originated the MLF proposal and pressed it on our Allies was much more sympathetic to the ultimate emergence of a separate European nuclear force. Indeed, it occasionally urged the MLF as a means to this end. Although the cohesiveness of our society depends on understating conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major international innovations unless we are clear about our ultimate direction.

All this suggests the need for a re-examination of some governmental procedures. We need a planning focus less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures. Our

governmental procedures. We need a planning focus less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures. Our own aims must be clear before we commit our prestige. We should not use the process of negotiations to make up our own minds. Not to reveal what we intend to do is a question of tactics; not to know is to mortgage the future.

Fortunately, partly because of the initiative of the new British government, partly because of President Johnson's removal of previous time limits, an opportunity exists to take a new approach to the issue of nuclear control. The wise, if abrupt, decision of President Johnson to reduce the pressures for the original MLF project and Britain's initiative have smoothed the way for a new study of the entire problem. This should enable us to determine the real wishes of our Allies before irrevocable decisions are taken. In any reassessment, we must, of course, keep in mind that in many countries, notably in the Federal Republic, leaders have staked their careers on our previous proposals. Though another approach to the issue of nuclear control would have been preferable, future policy must consider that simply to abandon the MLF now would have a different significance than earlier. Moreover, some of the objectives that the MLF has sought to realize are important. For example, the goal of political equality for all members of the Alliance is crucial. Means must be found to achieve those objectives of the MLF project essential to Allied cohesion. The controversy about the MLF will have served some useful purpose if it permits the Alliance to return to fundamentals: the definition of common purposes and an answer to the question of what the members of the Alliance really want in the nuclear field.

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CHAPTER SIX

The Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here?

STRATEGIC WEAPONS

The nuclear problem in the Alliance has four com-
ponents: (1) The United States would like to establish cen-
tral control over the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. The
ideal solution from the point of view of the Pentagon is to
deprive all Allies of the physical capacity to act autonomously
in the nuclear field. (2) Two of our Allies, Great Britain
and France, have national nuclear weapons programs.
(3) It is desirable to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
within the Alliance and elsewhere.

The MLF negotiations have established or confirmed (depending on the point of view) the claims of non-nuclear allies to participate in nuclear control and, perhaps, to some form of ownership of nuclear weapons.

No program could perfectly reconcile all these objectives,
partly because each Ally has two somewhat contradictory
aims with respect to nuclear policy, partly because there is an
inherent inconsistency between the attempt to establish cen-
tral control over nuclear weapons and the jealousy with
which each major Ally, including the United States, has here-
tofore guarded its sovereignty.

The two contradictory aims of the Allies sometimes tend
to cancel each other out: Each Ally wants to avoid being
forced into nuclear war against its will, and it wants to be
certain of nuclear support when its existence is at stake.

What our Allies understand by nuclear support is less
clear. They want the *appearance* of nuclear support so that
the Soviets never challenge their vital interests. Whether they
are actually prepared to face the consequences of nuclear war
is ambiguous. Their tendency to base NATO's military policy
entirely on deterrence suggests that many of them may be
above all concerned with their veto if nuclear war seemed
imminent. They may be more interested in not being forced
into nuclear war against their will than in being able to force
us into a nuclear war against our will.

The ambivalence of our Allies underlines the incompati-
bility between central control over nuclear weapons and un-
diluted sovereignty. If no conflict of interest among the Allies
were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering
ability would not exist. But as a sovereign state is the final

bility between central control over nuclear weapons and undiluted sovereignty. If no conflict of interest among the Allies were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering ability would not exist. But as a sovereign state is the final judge of its interests, absolute reassurance is unobtainable. No one can predict with certainty how hard-pressed leaders will react under the unprecedented stresses of imminent nuclear war—not only with respect to the decision to use nuclear weapons but also with respect to the many nuances of bargaining during crises. The single-mindedness with which the United States has always guarded its freedom of decision is as significant a symptom of this dilemma as France's excessive claims to independence.

American proposals—including the MLF—have largely avoided this problem. The United States, starting from the technically unexceptionable premise that the conduct of nuclear war should be centrally controlled, has tried hard to create a structure in NATO which deprives our Allies of the physical capacity to act independently. We have been less ready to face the inevitable corollary: Those nations which are being asked to entrust their nuclear defense to the United States will urge, in return, a commensurate surrender of American sovereignty in the political field. To insist on centralized strategy while diplomacy remains national guarantees the perpetuation of all disputes.

France, on the other hand, has expressed the implications of sovereignty clearly and correctly, but it has neglected the technical requirements of nuclear strategy. In the face of the risks of a nuclear holocaust, no country can have complete freedom of decision—least of all a nation with a nuclear force strong enough to start a nuclear war but far too weak to finish it. While the United States has overemphasized the technical aspects of central command and control, France and those Europeans agreeing with her have pushed the legal implications of sovereignty to a point where they clash with the technical realities of the nuclear age.

We react bitterly when Europeans suggest that no one can foresee how even the most solemn commitments will be interpreted in the stark circumstances of a nuclear showdown. But when we argue *against* the nuclear forces of Britain and France, we seem to understand the problems produced by sovereignty very well. Then we tend to reverse the field and use the arguments which our nuclear European Allies invoke against us and thereby generate suspicions where none had been articulated before. Thus J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, explained why even a joint Franco-British nuclear force which shared command and control responsibilities with other European countries would still not meet the need as he saw it:

> [An agreed European control mechanism] would still not answer the basic question of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement—the

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powers which owned and operated the nuclear forces—in fact
consult and collaborate on an equal basis with their associate
members?

✓ J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1965-69), pp. 565-566.

Carrying Schaetzel's argument one step further, it may be relevant to ask why, if our European Allies cannot rely upon formal commitments among themselves, they should have absolute trust in the United States, which is 3,000 miles away and has a recent history of isolation.

The nuclear issue thus turns in part on how crucial it is for the United States to obtain physical control over all the nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Heretofore we have considered the objective so important that we have been prepared to bring the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear business—as long as they accepted an American veto—in the hope that this might thwart the efforts of our nuclear Allies. We have been less concerned about the proliferation of nuclear know-how which the MLF is bound to bring than about the already existing centers of nuclear decision within the Alliance. We have preferred establishing yet another nuclear force—provided it was subject to an American veto—rather than concede in theory the autonomy which France and Britain already possess in practice.

The debate engendered by this policy has been more conducive to self-righteousness than to sober thought. By placing so much stress on the actual conduct of nuclear operations, we have forced our Allies into inherently misleading justifications of their nuclear programs. They have projected the remote nightmare of the failure of the Alliance into the present; we in turn have confused their fears with their preferences.

But the real concern behind pressure for European autonomy goes deeper. Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to the fallibility of human foresight. They have had too much experience with nuances of interpretation which can all but nullify formal commitments; indeed, at some point, all of them have felt obliged to leave some ally to his fate. The concern for a European role in nuclear affairs expresses above all a desire to obtain a measure of insurance against the unforeseeable events of which European history is so full.

Some argue that the British and French nuclear programs jeopardize our own security because they may force us into a nuclear war against our will. But this is carrying logical extrapolations to extremes. France and Great Britain must know at least as well as we—though we can hardly expect them to advertise this fact—that using their nuclear forces independently against the Soviet Union would be a desperate last resort. The French and British nuclear programs are not a strategic preference but an attempt to provide insurance against a disastrous contingency within Europe and against nuclear developments in other parts of the world. Taking out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary, it may prevent a remote possibility from turning into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive tasks.

For their limited objectives, the British and French nu-

For their limited objectives, the British and French nuclear forces are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. The ratio of the combined British and French forces to those of the Soviet Union is more favorable than was that of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States in the fifties. Despite the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States, no one would maintain that the Soviet strategic force had no deterrent value. And certainly in relation to any threats from new nuclear powers, the British and French forces would be formidable.

Of course, the Soviets could launch a pre-emptive blow at the bases of European nuclear forces. However, such a course would be extraordinarily risky. As long as the NATO treaty is operative at all, it would be extremely foolhardy for the Soviets to undertake a nuclear attack on Europe without taking into account the near certainty of American involvement. The nuclear forces of our Allies should not be viewed as an alternative to United States strategic power, but as a complement. The fear of some American officials that the French nuclear force of less than a hundred delivery vehicles could be seriously considered as possible replacement for our arsenal of thousands is to give little credit to the ability of our Allies to perceive their own interests. Close coordination between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by self-interest; and Europeans have more to gain from it than the United States.

In short, the real choice before the United States is whether to try to build NATO nuclear policy on the existing programs of our nuclear Allies or whether to seek to counteract these programs by creating yet another nuclear force—the MLF. The former alternative seems far preferable, especially if the non-nuclear countries are given equal status in political and strategic planning.

Basing NATO nuclear policy on the existing nuclear forces rather than the MLF is also more consistent with the eventual evolution of a European nuclear force. In the long term, nuclear proliferation in Europe can be reliably arrested only by the development of an Atlantic political community involving a real sharing of sovereignty or by European political unity. Of these developments the latter seems more attainable. If Europe could organize itself politically, it would reduce the number of nuclear powers. A European nuclear force would then replace the British and French nuclear programs, and other countries in Europe could be related to it through whatever European political mechanisms emerge. Such a framework would avoid what must in the long run be a highly demoralizing relationship in which the United States is alone responsible for the nuclear defense of the entire non-Communist world.

On both sides of the Atlantic serious individuals fear that a European nuclear force would lead to a reckless European

53

policy and to an eventual withdrawal of the United States from Europe. But it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field competition between Europe and the United States involves at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military matters—and particularly in the nuclear field—the closest association between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of both sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is inconceivable that our Allies would prefer to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and without the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal.

Finally, we cannot withdraw from Europe even if we do not obtain our preferred strategic arrangements. To threaten to do so is both dangerous and empty. It is dangerous because it indicates that our commitment is conditional, and it is empty because we can no more withdraw from Europe than from Hawaii.

Of course there is a very real concern with arresting the spread of nuclear weapons. But when nuclear weapons have already been acquired by Communist China and may soon be in the possession of other anti-Western countries, it is not clear that nuclear proliferation is best arrested by wrecking the nuclear programs of our closest Allies. Would it not be wiser to concentrate on eliminating the programs of those countries which in fact threaten our security?

This is not to say that the United States should promote a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should show more restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for an alternative—the MLF—which will in time cause much greater difficulties. No final solution is possible so long as the Alliance remains composed of sovereign states. Any interim arrangement should therefore be consistent with the most constructive evolution of European and Atlantic relationships.

Until either Atlantic or European political cohesion progresses further, the nuclear policy of the Alliance should be three-pronged: (1) There is need for a political mechanism to plan long-term policy, to manage crises and to control the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. This may require the establishment of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy and a rotating representative of the smaller countries. (2) The military advice to this Committee

The functions of this Committee are described in Chapter 8.

should come from a group of senior officers from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It might be useful to charge the NATO Standing Group with this task. In that case it would have to be expanded to include the Federal Republic, and its seat would have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) An Allied Nuclear Force should be constituted from the strategic forces of the United States, Great Britain and France and

ing Group with this task. In that case it would have to be
expanded to include the Federal Republic, and its seat would
have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) An
Allied Nuclear Force should be constituted from the strategic
forces of the United States, Great Britain and France and
from the long-range weapons in Europe under the double-
veto system. The proposals made by the British government
seem to move in this direction.

Will an attempt to base NATO nuclear strategy on the
existing nuclear forces, with the Federal Republic sharing
equally in political and strategic planning, meet German
desires? This is difficult to answer because it is doubtful
whether, after two years of being told by American policy-
makers what their ultimate wishes might be, German leaders
know what their actual desires with respect to nuclear control
are. Not the least useful aspect of changing the framework of
negotiations is that it gives all partners an opportunity to
become clear about their actual priorities. For example, if
the main interest of the Federal Republic in the MLF is to
obtain a voice in eventual East-West negotiations, it should
be possible to achieve this objective by less divisive and more
direct methods than the MLF. If the real German aim is to
participate in joint strategic planning, an effort should be
made to determine whether a major German role in the
targeting and deployment of existing nuclear forces might
not fill the need.

But, one might ask, is not discrimination inherent in the
continued existence of national nuclear forces—even if they
are assigned “irrevocably” to NATO—as Britain has proposed?
Would this not place the Federal Republic in the position of
a second-class ally? It has been argued, for example, that un-
less Germany obtains exactly the same status in the nuclear
field as Britain and France, its loyalty to the Alliance might
be shaken. But is this really true? Is it wise to encourage even
the implication that the German commitment to the Alliance
depends on access to nuclear weapons? Some argue that an
Allied Nuclear Force composed of national contingents con-
tains no assurance that these forces will not be withdrawn in
a crisis. The British government has sought to get around this
problem by offering to assign its strategic forces “irrevocably”
to NATO. But it seems futile to devote energies to quibbling
over such phrases as “assignment” and “irrevocable.” It is
not healthy for the Alliance to waste energies in termino-
logical exercises which obscure reality. No sovereign govern-
ment is going to be forced into war against its will—no mat-
ter what the arrangement of nuclear forces and whatever the
label under which they are grouped. Should Britain be pre-
pared to wreck NATO, it could also break the additional com-
mitment inherent in “irrevocable assignment.” In other
words, the Allied Nuclear Force is no protection against
situations in which the Alliance has already collapsed. But
neither is the MLF, which could be even more easily paralyzed
by a single veto. There is no technical or legal expedient
which can serve as a substitute for political unity or which
could protect the Alliance against failure to achieve it.

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Almost all responsible people in the Federal Republic understand that the Alliance could probably not survive German national ownership of strategic nuclear weapons. The real test of equality for the Federal Republic must be in the political field and in strategic planning. In the long term, the solution to the nuclear problem requires the fostering of European political unity and Atlantic cooperation. The former would diminish the role of the nation state; the latter would make the Federal Republic part of a structure capable of assuring its security. The most dangerous course is one which in the name of integrated strategic planning magnifies the divisions within Europe.

Even in the present framework, care must be taken to assure full political equality to the Federal Republic. Participation in vital negotiations should not depend on the possession of a national nuclear arsenal. The Federal Republic must have a real opportunity to contribute to the formulation of positions in such fields as disarmament while they are still fluid. In other words, political unity must precede nuclear integration. To seek to reverse the process is to sow the seeds of unending disputes.

What would be the mission of an Allied Nuclear Force drawn from national contingents? It would appear that its most useful role would be deep interdiction, say, from a distance of some 300 miles behind the combat zone. It would be important to recognize, however, that effective counterforce operations against several hundred MRBM's are unlikely. Whatever its targets, the Allied Nuclear Force should be designed so that it is able to conduct discriminating nuclear operations according to the principles of "flexible response."

All the weapons suitable for its mission should become part of the Allied Nuclear Force. It should include major portions of the British and French national forces and a comparable contingent of American strategic weapons, probably in the form of Polaris submarines. The longer-range nuclear weapons now in Europe, such as the Pershing missiles and the F-104 airplanes, which are now under the double-veto system should also be assigned to this force.

With respect to the MLF, the best course would be to admit frankly that it was a mistake and to satisfy German desires by improving the process of political consultation and by giving the Federal Republic an equal role in the control of the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. But if it appears that the German desire for access to nuclear weapons has been so stimulated as to be irreversible, we are honor-bound to proceed with a mixed-manned element as a part of the Allied Nuclear Force. However, in that case, the purpose and size of the MLF should be redefined.

In the context of an Allied Nuclear Force, the previous extravagant claims for the MLF could be abandoned. It should no longer be the central focus of United States nuclear policy. There would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant Allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of the element should not be determined by the political objective of dwarfing the British and French nuclear programs but by the military goals of the Allied Nuclear Force.

The Allied Nuclear Force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO Strategic Command. To symbolize a greater European influence in strategic matters, the command could be headed by a senior European officer and should be located in Europe. The purpose would be to place in one command all the weapons—European and American—relevant to deep penetration of hostile territory. Tactical nuclear weapons of ranges up to 300 miles would remain under SACEUR.

In bringing such a force into being the United States has obvious interests in insuring that its European components meet certain criteria. The following seem most important: (1) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability. (2) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction. (3) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response. (4) They should be coordinated as part of a common NATO strategy.

Some European Allies will undoubtedly object to the creation of a separate NATO Nuclear Strategic Command. They will see such a command as the first step toward nuclear disengagement. These Allies seem to feel that, since SACEUR is located in Europe, he will be more sensitive to European needs than the President in Washington. But such attitudes are not healthy in the long run.

SACEUR's primary responsibility should be the land battle; he should not be burdened with military or political missions irrelevant to that important and complicated task. From a military point of view, operations that involve large sections of Soviet territory cannot be conducted as an adjunct to ground operations in Europe. SACEUR does not have sufficient information about the over-all strategic context; he will be too preoccupied with conditions within the European theater of operations. Deep penetrations of Soviet territory should be carried out only as part of an over-all plan for general nuclear war. The location of a NATO Strategic Command in Europe could allay concerns that Europe's interests would be neglected; in fact, by giving it the mission to conduct the portion of general nuclear war directly relevant to Europe, a forum for fulfilling Allied needs in the strategic field would be created.

The notion that unfavorable arms control measures can best be prevented by freezing the existing NATO command structure underlines the need for a focal point within the Alliance to develop common political objectives. The issue of arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance for many years. It has been evaded because some Allies have

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been reluctant to express their fears and others have been
loathe to voice their hopes. The absence of a consensus guar-ntees that the issue will always arise at a moment of
maximum embarrassment. Decisions will be taken by subter-
fuge and under stress. Distrust will grow. A military com-
mander cannot possibly be used to paper over this problem
indefinitely. Its solution must be sought by developing a po-
litical program for the Alliance as a whole.

Within the framework of a newly created NATO Strategic Command and a corresponding political control body, the Alliance could finally address itself to the tasks which must be undertaken rather than spend energy on legalistic debates about who has a right to do what in circumstances that no one can describe. With some insurance available for the improbable contingency that the United States might interpret its interest differently from those of Europe, our Allies are likely to come to conclusions very similar to ours about the desirability of a strategy which provides multiple options.

Such a system would be more flexible than the MLF. It would give the existing strategic forces a clearly defined mission. It would create a structure that France could ultimately join, if not under its present government, certainly under its successor. As compared to the MLF, the United States would sacrifice some measure of physical control, but the Alliance as a whole would gain in political cohesion. This arrangement would differ from previous assignments of nuclear forces because it would include a political mechanism for managing crises for the Alliance as a whole and because it would create an explicit Allied doctrine for strategic war.

Such an arrangement provides the greatest flexibility with
respect to the future. If European political integration pro-
gresses, the European contingents in the Allied Nuclear
Force can merge into a European nuclear force. If desired by
the European members, the Western European Union could
be given official status in the Allied Nuclear Force from the
beginning. If integration proceeds more slowly the major
Allies can contribute individually to the planning of the
Allied Nuclear Force. In either case, the United States will
remain closely linked to Europe through a structure in which
the Europeans can develop under their own initiative. An
Allied Nuclear Force in which an American contingent is an
integral part and which controlled all the weapons relevant
to its mission would be a better symbol of the indivisibility of
Atlantic interests than an MLF whose strategic role would be,
at best, marginal.

For this to be achieved a change in attitude on both sides
of the Atlantic is needed. The United States would have to
abandon its futile insistence on maintaining physical control
of all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Some of our Allies
would have to stop extolling the theoretical virtues of au-
tonomy and begin dealing with the problem of how autono-
mous nuclear forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We
have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical vir-
tues of "integration." But our Allies—especially the French—
bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs
because they have never spelled out concretely what they
mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and
doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current dis-
putes is far from hopeless. Arguments about the right of in-

bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs because they have never spelled out concretely what they mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current disputes is far from hopeless. Arguments about the right of independent action in the nuclear field are acute only when they are theoretical. Any crisis serious enough to cause the Allies to consider the use of nuclear weapons is also likely to reveal the underlying community of interest. It is this community rather than American physical control which is the best guarantee of the cohesion of the Alliance. A wise United States policy will not invest American prestige in forcing our Allies into a structure which makes autonomous action physically impossible. Rather it will create a structure which grants autonomy while reducing the desire for it.

TACTICAL/NUCLEAR/WEAPONS

One of the consequences of the obsession with the MLF has been that many issues requiring urgent attention have been swept under the rug in order to maintain the momentum behind the Multilateral Force. One of these problems concerns the role and control of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons have had a checkered history in NATO strategy. They were first introduced into the NATO arsenal in the middle fifties to offset what was then believed to be a permanent numerical superiority of Soviet manpower. As a result, thousands of nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe. They included almost everything from artillery pieces with ranges of about fifteen miles to Pershing missiles with ranges up to 700 miles (in the improved versions). The term tactical was defined to include all weapons placed under the authority of SACEUR even though some of the longer-range weapons would be indistinguishable from those controlled by SAC. From its beginning, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent raised formidable problems of coordination that remained dormant only because the dominant American strategic doctrine predicted that any nuclear war was likely to be massive and all-out.

The advent of the Kennedy Administraton in 1961 changed this. Committed to a strategy of flexible response, the new administration began to evaluate the suitability of the nuclear establishment on the Continent for discriminating military operations. Its conclusions were skeptical: Early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

² Roswell L. Gilpatric. Press Conference on June 6, 1961, *New York Times*, June 7, 1961.

Alain Enthoven insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no obvious "fire-break" exists short of large scale thermonuclear war. Secretary McNamara spoke deprecatingly of a limited

³ Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," *Survival*, Vol. V, No. 3 (May-June 1963), p. 96.

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nuclear war below some "ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange." These views were given urgency by the problem

✓Robert S. McNamara, "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," speech made before the Economics Club of New York, New York City, November 18, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16, 1963), p. 917.

of exercising political control over the nuclear weapons sta-
tioned on the Continent. Controlling a few hundred strategic
weapons during military operations is difficult but soluble.
Controlling thousands of weapons of many different ranges
and characteristics in the confusion of combat is another
matter.

At the same time, while skeptical about the utility of
much of the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, both the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have muted their
doubts in order not to complicate further the disputes over
the role of the conventional weapons and the MLF. Indeed,
tactical nuclear weapons have been used as a means to
reassure the Europeans about the continued validity of our
nuclear guarantee and to insure German support for the
MLF. As a result, the tactical nuclear establishment on the
Continent has been substantially increased since 1961-by
some 60 per cent according to Secretary McNamara's an-
nouncements. The thousands of nuclear weapons on the
Continent thus exist in a shadow land. To many of our
Allies, they have become a touchstone of the American com-
mitment, while American planners regard them with ex-
traordinary ambivalence. To build up the tactical nuclear
establishment without clarifying its mission would seem to
emphasize the worst features of all available options.

The question whether so much reliance should have been
placed on tactical nuclear weapons ten years ago must not
obscure the need to deal with the current situation, which is
dominated by the following facts: (1) On the Continent
there exists a large and growing arsenal of tactical nuclear
weapons without a clearly defined mission. (2) The United
States is solemnly committed to maintain this arsenal in Eu-
rope. (3) The Soviet army is equipped with tactical nuclear
weapons; therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons is no
longer entirely up to the West. (4) NATO ground forces are
inadequate to withstand a full-scale Soviet onslaught. Even
the proposed build-up of NATO ground forces to thirty divi-
sions would leave the West numerically inferior to a fully
mobilized Soviet army—and this does not take into account
the inevitable disadvantage of a coalition when confronting a
single state. (5) The tactical nuclear establishment in Eu-
rope is extremely vulnerable. Because strategic weapons are
relatively secure, fears that they will tempt a disarming, pre-
emptive blow are usually exaggerated. But the classic pre-
emptive situation does exist with respect to the tactical nu-
clear arsenal in Europe. As now deployed it is capable of
inflicting severe damage; it is, in turn, highly vulnerable to a
first strike. This may well add to deterrence; at the same
time, it increases the probability of escalation should war
occur.

There exists yet another inconsistency between NATO's
military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon
officials have indicated a clear preference for resisting even a
major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same
time, they have announced repeatedly that if a conventional

There exists yet another inconsistency between NATO'S military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon officials have indicated a clear preference for resisting even a major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same time, they have announced repeatedly that if a conventional defeat were imminent, we would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Considering the extreme vulnerability of the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent and the fact that the Soviets would not attack without expecting to win, these two propositions tend to cancel each other out. If there is large-scale aggression—an admittedly improbable contingency—the Soviets have every incentive to seek to neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal by launching an attack against it.

All this suggests that it is imperative to reconsider the mission and deployment of the tactical nuclear arsenal on the Continent. Some argue that all nuclear missions—including the so-called tactical ones—can be performed by the strategic forces, which are more easily controlled and more suitable for discriminating operations. They maintain that any use of nuclear weapons would bring about so much confusion that the situation in the combat zone would appear relatively unimportant. Finally, some officials have implied that the nuclear arsenal in Europe is militarily unnecessary. Secretary McNamara has on occasion seemed to share this view.

The notion that all tactical missions can be performed by strategic forces must be assessed in terms of three problems: (1) the probability of uncontrolled escalation if battlefield weapons are used, (2) the suitability of strategic forces for tactical operations and (3) the feasibility of conducting nuclear operations confined to a battlefield.

The problem of escalation has two aspects: escalation within the theater of operations and escalation into general war. As long as NATO's tactical nuclear establishment is so vulnerable, the danger of escalation of any military operations within Europe is enormous even if they begin with conventional weapons. The precondition of any effective use of tactical nuclear weapons—as of strategic weapons—is to enhance their invulnerability.

The probability of escalation to general war depends on the vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. If the strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, any use of nuclear weapons is likely to expand very rapidly. In that case, any large-scale military operation—even a conventional one—in an area as vital as Europe would involve risks out of proportion to any conceivable gain. In short, the doctrine of massive retaliation will remain valid.

When retaliatory forces grow increasingly vulnerable, as Secretary McNamara has postulated, the pressures against rapid escalation would probably be great. There may be no logical stopping place once nuclear weapons are being used. There is, however, a very crucial psychological obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great

57

military advantage, neither side can be very eager to let escalation proceed automatically. Both sides are likely to look for excuses to limit, not expand, military operations.

This is not to say that in case of a full-scale Soviet attack on Europe our responses should be confined to battlefield weapons. On the contrary, there are important reasons for making sure that the Soviets are under no misapprehension that a full-scale attack on Europe could be confined to Europe. If the Soviets have shown a willingness to conquer Europe, the war is by definition no longer local. It cannot end with the *status quo ante*. If the Soviets come to believe that their territory would be spared but we would devastate Europe by confining the use of nuclear weapons to the combat zone, they may have an incentive for aggression. Such a strategy, even if it succeeded in stopping the attack, would eliminate Europe as a factor in international politics; it would guarantee that any other threatened area would surrender.

Nevertheless, even though a full-scale attack on Europe would inevitably bring the strategic forces into play, there is a problem of relating their action to local operations. Strategic forces are not designed to affect a local situation directly. Whether used demonstratively, punitively or in discriminating counterforce operations, their purpose is to force the aggressor into ordering an end to his local attacks, not to blunt the attacks themselves.

But is it wise to neglect the local outcome? It is at least possible that once strategic weapons are used, however discriminably, all other considerations could become submerged in the desire to end a spiral toward ever greater devastation. If the aggressor has made major advances, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable him to consolidate his gains.

This suggests that, together with an agreed doctrine for the use of strategic forces, the Alliance requires a nuclear capability to deny an aggressor a significant territorial advance. Tactical weapons used early in the face of a full-scale attack could perform this role. If a standstill in military operations can be forced, a major objective of the defense will have been achieved. Aggression would have no object if it were certain to result in a stalemate.

Thus the nuclear components of NATO must have two aims: (1) they should be able to force a standstill of the initial onslaught and (2) they should be able to inflict sufficient punishment on the aggressor so that he is forced into negotiations. The aggressor must not believe that our response will shift all the risks of nuclear devastation to the victims of aggression. But there must also be a local response capable of preventing a *fait accompli* and an attempt to negotiate on the basis of it.

To achieve these objectives, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent must be adapted along the following lines: (1) its mission must be redefined, (2) its vulnerability must be reduced and (3) its deployment must be changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use of battlefield weapons, according to purely military criteria

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use of battlefield weapons according to purely military criteria would surely obliterate the combat zone, and this cannot be in the interest of any threatened country. Thus the mission of the tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered in isolation from the other, primarily strategic, operations which will be taking place. This makes it necessary to redefine some traditional military missions. For example, given the range of modern weapons, air superiority can be obtained —if at all—only by deep penetration of hostile territory on a scale indistinguishable from general nuclear war. Such operations should not be conducted by a theater commander fully occupied with the land battle. This is why all weapons above a certain range (say 300 miles) should be put under the Allied Nuclear Force/described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons that remain under SACEUR's command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine the requirement of relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, presents different problems when close to 10,000 weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communications system could withstand such a strain.

During the Presidential campaign of 1964, it was proposed that one way of solving this problem would be to delegate authority to a military commander, specifically to SACEUR. This was justified with the argument that communications between Washington and Paris might be interrupted. But such a scheme would create more problems than it solves. For one thing, no other member of the Alliance would be prepared to make such a delegation of authority. Also, SACEUR would be extremely ill-advised to resort to nuclear weapons without making sure that SAC is alerted. If communications are adequate for that purpose, they should also be adequate for political control to be exercised. Moreover, the real communications bottleneck is not between Washington and Paris, but between NATO headquarters and the field commanders. But if authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons were delegated to field commanders, this would mean that nuclear war could be started by officers least familiar with the strategic context and most subject to immediate pressures which may or may not be symptomatic of the overall situation. Field commanders do not have access to strate-

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gic intelligence about the Soviet Union or to plans for gen-
eral war. Thus the initial decision to use tactical nuclear
weapons will have to be made by Washington (or by the
Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).
Once the decision is taken, they will have to be released by
category of range, yield and above all geographic location.
This underlines the urgent need for an agreed NATO strategic
doctrine.

Another subject requiring careful reexamination is NATO
deployment. Currently it is an uneasy compromise between
the desire to retain a conventional option and the reality that
nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the equip-
ment of all military units. This reflects a real dilemma. To
fight a conventional war, military units must concentrate; to
be effective during nuclear operations, they must disperse.
Units deployed for conventional operations present tempting
targets for nuclear attack and may thus invite it. Units de-
ployed for nuclear war are too dispersed to resist an attack
with conventional weapons. In all likelihood, it will be im-
possible to shift from one mode of deployment to another
during military operations, particularly if the opponent has
introduced nuclear weapons first. But current NATO deploy-
ment involves precisely this danger. Units are concentrated as
if the likely attack would be conventional. At the same time,
even their forward echelons are equipped with nuclear weap-
ons. This concentration coupled with the ambiguity of NATO
doctrine and the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons
gives an aggressor a high incentive to use nuclear weapons
first.

It has become increasingly clear that NATO will not raise
sufficient troops for a purely conventional defense of Europe
—all trends, in fact, are in the opposite direction. It is there-
fore crucial that deployment on the Continent take into ac-
count the realities of NATO in the next decade. NATO'S con-
ventional forces are suitable for two major roles: (1) to act
as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack is, in
fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures of
NATO territory and (2) to furnish a reserve to resist aggres-
sion on the flanks of NATO or in areas outside of Europe
where the Alliance might agree on joint action.

NATO deployment should reflect this. There should be a
screen of conventional forces deployed forward and organized
for purely conventional combat. The size of this screen
would depend on the total NATO forces available and on a
military estimate of what is required to force a major Soviet
concentration before aggression can have any chance of suc-
cess. The remainder of NATO's divisions—deployed behind
this screen—should be equipped and organized for nuclear
war. With such a deployment, it would be obvious to any
aggressor that once operations reached a certain magnitude
nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO
deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives
for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsi-
bility for operations should not be assigned to any level
lower than corps. Weapons should be released to these com-

nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsibility for operations should not be assigned to any level lower than corps. Weapons should be released to these commanders only by an appropriate political authority (preferably the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).

✓See Chapter 8.

In addition, there should be a strategic reserve capable of conducting either conventional or tactical nuclear war and organized to intervene rapidly either in a land battle in Europe or in distant theaters.

## CONCLUSION—THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

The military organization of the Alliance would then appear as follows:

1. There would be an Allied Nuclear Force. It would be constituted from existing NATO weapons above a range of, say, 300 miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States, together with long-range delivery vehicles now on the Continent, and an eventual French contribution. If the MLF survives the reexamination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.

✓See Chapter 8.

2. SACEUR would retain tactical nuclear weapons up to a range of, say, 300 miles. However, their deployment would be altered in order to create real conventional and nuclear options. Their number would be related to the existing missions.

3. The deployment of conventional forces would clearly reflect their primary mission of acting as a screening force and furnishing a strategic reserve.

However, no arrangement of military forces will, of itself, solve the problems of the Alliance. The ultimate challenge lies in the political field. It is whether NATO can develop common purposes and whether it can devise a political structure that combines community with flexibility.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany

There is a curious disproportion between the energy de-
voted to nuclear control and that spent on the issue of the
future of Germany. This is no accident. Nuclear control, for
all its complexity, has the advantage of seeming concrete.
Solutions permit technical analysis. Absorption in this prob-
lem can therefore serve as an escape from issues that are in-
tangible and much less amenable to mechanical remedies.
Yet it is probable that over the next decade the cohesiveness
of the Alliance will be tested more severely by the problem of
German unity than by the issue of who presses the button for
nuclear war.

Basic to any policy regarding the future of Germany is a
common conception of East-West relations.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement
within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the
early years of NATO our European Allies feared above all that
we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, there-
fore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about
the American understanding of the Communist threat. If
anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of
the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did the rest.
America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew abso-
lute. In American thinking, the danger of Communist ag-
gression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic
aloofness from international affairs was great.

After the death of Stalin, the previous Allied unanimity
about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated.

Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each
country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that
NATO was provocative.

Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the
schisms within the Communist world, differences in the
Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became appar-
ent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries
tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning
of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Com-

schisms within the Communist world, differences in the
Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became appar-
ent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries
tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning
of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Com-
munist moderation was hailed as a basic change in the Soviet
system. In these countries the predominant view was that
Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form
of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent
of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Fed-
eral Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and re-
peatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in So-
viet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major
shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Repub-
lic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful
that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the
division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with
the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks
regarding Berlin. They have been uneasy about most of the
schemes advanced at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
France rejected—as the Federal Republic would have liked to
do but did not dare—the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

United States policy has oscillated between these conflict-
ing views. American pronouncements include many of the
phrases about Soviet intransigence characteristic of the early
days of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral
dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting
views of its Allies but not reconciling them, the United States
has retained the liturgy of the Cold War while adopting a
good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of relaxa-
tion of tensions.

As a result, much of the Allied debate about East-West
relations has concerned not the content of a program for
negotiation but the nature of the Soviet system. Those who
assume that there has been a change in Soviet policy tend to
stress the impact of modernization on Soviet purposes. To
them a great deal depends on establishing good personal rela-
tions with Soviet leaders and on bringing about a general
atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangea-
ble nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society im-
mune to the erosion of time—an achievement which would
be unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in
dispute. The only sensible debate can concern the question
of how peace can be achieved and then made secure. The
issue is not whether tensions should be artificially maintained,
but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Is
the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have
deeper causes? Is a lasting detente reached by improving the
atmosphere first and moving from there to specific settle-
ments? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied
from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding
issues? Above all, what exactly is to be understood by a settle-
ment? These are the questions which the Alliance must an-

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Troubled - Kissinger 9731 11 Baskerville 24-13 E-4
swer for itself if it is to determine whether a given peace
offensive represents a change of tactics or a change of policy.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history. Peaceful co-existence has been avowed since the advent of Communism in Russia. It was stressed particularly between 1924-1939; between 1941-1946; at the time of the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khru-shchev's visit to the United States in 1959; and following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each occasion the reason for the detente was some internal or external strain on the Soviet system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, which was followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges; in 1941-1946 it was the German invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle after the death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to push the Allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused by the shock of the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself. The period of tranquillity after 1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, the Baltic States and one third of Poland, as well as an attack on Finland. World War II led to the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to an attempted penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the spirit of Camp David was succeeded by another Berlin crisis which did not end until the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the West—including some who thought of themselves as staunchly, sometimes almost religiously, anti-Communist—hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. This demonstrates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.

— Michael T. Florinsky, World Revolution and the USSR (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 216.

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the late Senator Tom Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts." ✓ In ✓New York Times, May 23, 1943.

1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance." ✓ This is matched by

✓U.S. Department of State Press Release. No. 92, February 25, 1956. Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people."

Secretary Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D. C. on February 25, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1290 (March 16, 1964), P. 393.

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken—
except Secretary Rusk's, which it is too early to judge. The
reason is not obscure. Any system has its own dynamism that
shapes its leaders and affects what is considered reasonable
in internal discussions. There is need for an assessment of
those factors in the Soviet system that produce belligerence
and those that encourage accommodation. These are deli-
cately balanced. It should be the goal of Western policy to
give a maximum spur to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist
world: the qualities of the men who rise to leadership posi-
tions and the ideology on which the Communist system is
built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of
the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any
decade with its membership at the end of that decade illus-
trates the precariousness of high office in the Soviet system.

"The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows by Severyn Bialer in "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," New York Times Magazine, November 1, 1964, p. 27:

Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still mem-
bers of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary
importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikailov,
the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the
Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed
from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-
rate post. Only two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev
and are now in the front ranks of the post-Khrushchev leadership.

Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable
leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves pub-
lic disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and
complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any
public activity.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is
that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at
least have the consolation that the enormous risks they run
are on behalf of their own ambitions; those on the lower
levels may find themselves submerged as a result of events
totally out of their control. Loyalty may turn into a source of
personal danger; subordinate officials will often share the fate
of the leader even though they may have had no real
alternative.

All this creates an atmosphere of suspicion—even of
conspiracy—in the Communist leadership groups. There is no
legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruth

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less enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich, whose protégé he had been, and turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they nevertheless overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career—indeed their survival—has been advanced by the ability to dissemble. Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for his rivals to organize against him. Suspiciousness is therefore inherent in the domestic position of Soviet leaders. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world is more benign. There is no reason for them to treat foreign statesmen more gently than their own colleagues or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically this means that the power of potential competitors must be broken. Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that they feel secure only when all conceivable rivals have been reduced to impotence. Wary of even his closest colleagues, the type of man who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of forces and will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure makes them possible competitors of the U.S.S.R. This does not make crises inevitable or settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever their experience, are cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend on their pronouncements alone, it would not be very secure.

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because these writings are too contradictory and too dependent on tactical considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory that will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of any Communist system, in the im-

lishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of any Communist system, in the immediate future ideology continues as one of the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation.

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an invaluable tool in understanding historical trends and the relation of forces existing at any particular moment. According to it, "subjective" factors, such as the personal convictions of statesmen, matter less than the "objective" factors they reflect. These objective factors include the social and economic conditions of society, the nature of the economic process and, above all, the class struggle. Communists consider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to distinguish between appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism" inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "adventurism" that risks a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains why Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a choice between Western goodwill and a territorial or political gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the latter. The friendship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establishing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of penetrating the Middle East. The spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin. The many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable.

The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions" because they believe that concessions are made to reality, not to individuals. They may change their position, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients: no matter what is said, they think that they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. This is one of the reasons that exercises in personal diplomacy—even at the highest level—have been so futile. No Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposition that he has been impressed by the personal qualities of a

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capitalist statesman. Settlements are possible; but to be meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect "objective" conditions and not a personal relationship.

The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class struggle causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable philosophical hostility toward the non-Communist world. Even while advocating political co-existence, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. declared:

> The C.P.S.U., [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truths, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.

⁷ "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter referred to as CDSP), Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

Thus peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own
the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges
sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow
that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the
policy of "peaceful co-existence":

Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the
development of the revolutionary class struggle in the capitalist
countries, the upsurge of national liberation movements?

⁸ "Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3; *CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

In yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet
Communist Party affirmed:

We fully support the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.

⁹ "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," op cit., CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20.

Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet leaders not as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition. This proposition has elicited the following exasperated comment from George F. Kennan:

... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside
Russia in ... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles
of international life ... by pleading that such an attachment flows
inevitably from the nature of the social and political system pre-
vailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the
Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not
possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change
in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence ...

¹⁰ George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 174.

These factors, which almost overnight could produce
again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be
balanced against restraints that, over a period of time, may
become dominant. First, there is the power of modern weap-
ons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of
nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that, if
they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the
risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice
over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West
—even if it is not an ideal one—Soviet planners will not be
easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct

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they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West —even if it is not an ideal one—Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to be have extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge. To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action, and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself with reasonable prudence, the traditional methods of military pressure can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible to implement one interest which the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is in the West's interest to see to it that it remain so.

Another factor which acts as a restraint on Soviet foreign policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering. It is a symptom of weakness that, over forty years after seizing power, the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession. Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor.

In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office. In the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian people may support such a style of government. At some point, however, cynicism and demoralization are likely to set in. Sooner or later, the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a system which constantly invokes the universality of its maxims can produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of "objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration—again by its own account—the "cult of personality."

The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability of Communist countries to deal with each other. Communist ideology does not admit the possibility of conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear wherever. Socialism has triumphed. In the absence of any provision for the settlement of disputes, Communist leaders try to deal with disputes among Communist states as they conduct their own internal struggles: by seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents. But among sovereign states, such tactics cause disputes to harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, demonstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be interpreted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence.

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