Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin

Page 2

1/29/72

HAK: You wouldn't have to do it yourself.

AD: ...... Chief of Council

HAK: Let him sign it. Let me know Monday or Tuesday

AD: Yes, and by then you will find out how to handle it in a more
precise way

HAK: Okay, I have made only discrete inquiries.

EC 1/29/72 2:36
01/29/72 1:40

TELECON

Barbara Walters

1/29/72 8:33am. 10:50 a.m.

K: It's not going to be possible to show the films.

W: He's not going to Camp David?

K: He's going, but not until 2:00. But I will try to do it next weekend.

W: Okay, it's easy for me to come down.

K: I'll call you during the week, and we'll count on doing that.

W: You are a very nice man. I don't care what they say.

K: Just with girls.

W: And Henry, don't say anything about my discussing the Haldeman interview with you.

K: You can count on it.

W: Did you have a nice time Thursday?

K: Yes, I rather liked it.

W: I'll count on next weekend, and if you do have the list I talked to you about . . .

K: I'll check on that.

W: And when we get there, will you go on the air instead of me?

DEC 22 1972 4:00 PM

TELECON

Katherine Graham

1/29/72 11:00 a.m.

G: I didn't have any big message, except that I am aware of obviously what everybody is thinking and, you know Thm and Rowley bith me last night about the editorial.

K: Oh no. I have never complained to you about editorials.

G: No, you didn't but there's been a lot of fallout.

K: It was not a good editorial since you raise it. It raised issues even the other side hadn't raised.

G: Without my trying to get between you and phil, I was thinking out loud. He is going to go back at it. We have a State Department letter, as you know . . .

K: Yes.

G: I have trouble with some of the thing.

K: But you are absolutely right not to interfere with editorials.

G: He could have stated what he thinks a little lower key. It was a tremendous whallop.

K: And some of it was factually . . . there is an enormous amount of difference between the October proposal and this one. The October proposal had cease-fire at the beginning of this process. It said cease-fire first and then negotiations and then settle everything else. This time . . . what we have in there about the cease-fire is in the order and much of the language of the other side.

G: I am just thinking . . . and you may not want to do this . . .

K: Should I call Phil?

G: He is not going to change his mind. I think I perhaps agree with most of it too. I essentially agree with his position.

K: But then you are wrong.

G: But I don't want to argue that. I told him that he overstated it.

K: There's no strain anyway.

G: But I think you and he ought to talk before he goes back at it today.

F 01 1008 27 36
OCT 22 1976

TELECON
Katherine Graham

1/29/72 11:00 a.m. p. 2

K: Should I call him?

G: I'll have him call you.

K: Could he call me around noon? I have to go into a meeting.

G: Yes.

K: But let's you and I have a deal that whenever there is a strain I go to you personally. There is no strain.

G: But there should be.

K: There will be on these things between serious-minded people.

G: I don't want to play that I'm not involved. I am. I stayed awake most of the night. I talked to Phil about it last night. Stewart was in a rage.

I was up at an analysts meeting on Thursday and I hadn't seen the editorial till I read it. But it did sort of draw in my breath. It was that kind of a thing.

K: I would be glad to talk to you some time about the substance of it, apart from the editorial, and I'll be glad to talk to Phil today if he calls around noon.

EC 1202 27.76
02/24/72

TELCON

Henry Kissinger/Phil Geyelin

1/29/72 1:00 p.m.

HAK: You wanted to talk to me. When have I protested editorials?

PG: We have M<sup>ar</sup>arshall Greene's letter in any case which we are
running tomorrow.

HAK: I have not initiated any comments--some people cam to me
and said it was a lousy editorial--I have not taken an initiative. This is
the first time, though, I have have seen such poor analysis from you.
Your basic point is that there is no difference between Indochina
proposal and ......

PG: We didn't say that--we are saying that these differences didn't
really change the basic objections of the North Vietnamese.

HAK: The question is what is it that we are after: Are we after (1) ______ or (2) is it our duty to make a proposal that concerned liberal, human, moral people can ______ when they make a serious effort to be sincere and just. We have said that we have made a proposal to the best possible thinking. Just in case, they are sincere. I want to make it absolutely clear that I don't expect to get you to change your policy.

PG: No, but I respect your judgment. We took note of Marshall Greene's
letter.

HAK: One of the particular things that is happening domestically is
that people are raising issues...........objection to ceasefire issue is
(1) only in connection with withdrawal, in that connection I could ask
for a ceasefire, but the second is a ceasefire as a part of an overall
settlement in that is from their own proposal.¹

PG: But our ceasefire would take place after the Thieu government
had been brushed aside--we are not wanting that--we said you had
the right to go on bombing and the left really dumped on us because
of the bombing issue

HAK: We have a 9-point proposal--we accepted eight of those
pulling out only reparations and putting that into a separate context
so that isn't an issue. Therefore, we have accepted overall that
there will be a political solution to all sides and in that content

EC 1/29/72 1:00 p.m.

TELCON

Page 2

Kissinger/Geyelin

a ceasefire is inevitable. So it is the political thing that is the
hang up. We agreed on six of the points in the proposal.

PG: Is it really unfair in saying that about the political aspectss-
that is what the war has been for 30 years. I can't believe they wouldn't
object to it. They have always wanted the political solution but one
of the things offered in the President's announcement is that he said
we have offered exactly what our critics have asked for (Mansfield
amendment)

HAK: That shading I accept.

PG: I wouldn't think it has been offered.

HAK" It has been rejected.

PG: Leaving that aside, the only news here is that it is not off--
they are going to buy it because .....

HAK: Wrong, in your analysis.. What we are proposing is that the
______ within reasonable time the Commission for a good chance
at getting it.

PG: I don't understand why President Thieu seems so eager to
step aside in a month.

HAK: I am not sure he will be a candidate in the next elections.

PG: Is that right, and his gang too?

HAK: What the other side is asking is that we recognize organized
non-communist forces then they will take in the ______ non-
organized non-communist forces.

HAK: But I think there was a shortness of tone and an implication
they tried to put one over again.

E-1403 8/21/96
08/21/96

FELCON

Page 3
Kissinger/Geyelin

PG: Maybe, but I had the feeling that the President was trying to say that he did what we told him to do and it won't fly.

HAK: But that wasn't the point--we made public what we did secretly.

PG: The major position is simply that we should set a fixed date for withdrawal and exchange of prisoners.

HAK: It does include ceasefire. It says the way to accomplish this is the following: the ceasefire is first.

PG: That is not the way it comes out.

HAK: Read the Mansfield amendment.

PG: I am not judging as to who is right, Henry. It cant be disposed of by saying it has been offered.

HAK: The Mansfield thing has been essentially offered.

PG: Okay --it is a fuzzy thing and watered down.

HAK: It is still insistent on having our way before. If we only offered a ceasefire, it would be news. A lot of public figures said that.

HAK: My view and everyone's is that the only settlement we will make is one that they willkeep. We will move to the point that they won't ask us to do it.

PG: I can assure you this is the stand will will take.

HAK: For my personal view this is the area in which I felt I had an obligation to keep the faith of my personal associates. I saw for the first time last summer that we were moving towards something positive. That we were going through the motions that they were beginning to talk details that weren't consistent with their expecting their own way. I told them we know your traditions are different, just make us any proposal other than asking us to put your people in. I am sure the only way we can get out is that we manage to wind it up in some form of decency.

DEC 22 1969
4:02PM

TELCORN

Kissinger/Geyelin

PG: What happens in one month:

HAK: Certainly, the elections.
wasn't

PG: It is the election machinery that was wrong--didn't he do it
by getting his own people in place. They have a right to not believe
in the system.

HAK: Of course, if they talk on that level then we will talk seriously.
Do you think we can slip a political proposal past them that doesn't
even give them a fair chance so the questions is whether they are
talking about a fair chance or domination. If they are talking
about a fair chance, then we would break our back.

PG: This is what it is going to come down to. We didn't think you
weren't trying.

HAK: You have never heard me complaining. But this was a
little sharp.

PG: When are you Off?

HAK: To China? -- on the 16th

PG: But some of my colleagues have stirred up Kay

HAK: I have never protested editorials, Phil.

EC 1-500 27.36
06/07/84FD

TELCONE
Safire/Kissinger

10:35 a.m. 1/31/72

S: They are good stories.

K: Time is good but Newsweek is a nothing story.

S: Time has worked harder but Newsweek is a good thing.

K: It's an amazing performance. I have been thinking of calling Elfin. For them to mention the NSC system without the NSC is quite a feat.

S: That's not the point.

K: The SRG does not report to the President. They report through me.

S: It's a good story.

K: Miss Maginnes is mad because they show her squinting.

S: They have a good piece with her on Flip Wilson. On the __________ it makes the case more clearly then Newsweek __________ about State bitching. More subtle. The idea of clandestine and serious life. And Time where it picked up the philosophy.

K: Time is good but Newsweek __________ the public wouldn't understand.

S: If Time didn't have a piece we would think Newsweek is a hell of a piece.

K: Really?

S: Amusing that headline is identical.

K: That's amazing.

S: Time cover is sympathetic. All in all --

K: I thought Newsweek would be a big plus -- just the opposite.

S: Sidey had a lot of Time piece.

K: Hk Newsweek has been working for 6 weeks.

S: So has Sidey. And Schechter admires you. The question in your mind is, is it too much? I have thought about it. When you pull the hat trick with Time, Life and Newsweek one usually goes underground. You cannot sustain this pitch but don't do that.

E C. I. M. 2. 0. 7. 6
OCTOBER 1972-73

Safire/Kissinger

10:35 a.m. 1/231/72

-2-

K: Shall I try for Sports Illustrated?

S: Don't make an effort to down play or a worry that you have too much publicity. You are comfortable when these things are revealed. These too will pass and let's go on.

K: If you can pass that along to the PR people.

S: I will. Today. There will be envy but don't over react to it.

K: I appreciate everything you have done in the last two weeks.

S: It's been fun.

EC 1/20/21 10:21

TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
10:40 a.m. 1/31/72

D: I would like to raise two points. One is about those people we discussed. I received a reply from Moscow. They appreciate a quirk reply on matter. They agreed to two points you mentioned. The question about first point. We are prepared to have the ______ but some suggestion on text but now it's something like this. This is 235 (?) with men and xx women who are citizens of Soviet Union and while in transit through the U.S. they lost their documents. Is that enough?

K: I think so. I will check. Send it unsigned on a blank piece of paper.

D: To you. I will ask Vorontsov to be in touch with Haig.

K: On a blank piece of paper.

D: The text. It will be blank piece of paper. You will look on this matter. Secondly, about this place. Immigration?

K: It would be easier if at the State Dept.

D: No publicity there?

K: We will guarantee it. Otherwise we can do it at the airport. Attract less publicity at State. Or Immigration office. They will be asked if they are going back voluntarily. They will say yes. No cross examination. I will clarify case and let you know tomorrow or Wed. at the latest.

D: 3rd point -- Our Aeronautic Agency in NY received a copy of all your airlines and maritime companies about those people.

K: You want us to be sure the exit is cleared. That's easy.

D: A routine letter.

K: There will be no snag. We will be able to work it out this week.

D: I will wait your reply tomorrow or the day after. Another point. We discussed Hearside. I would like to clarify. It should be applied to both sides or only one side.

K: U.S. and USSR? Yes.

D: One base against capitol and 50%.

K: Along those lines. Thinking out loud.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOL1956
By CNAR Date 5/30/72

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:40 a.m.

1/31/72

D: Not a proposal. Our delegation is that my impression that they have made a weak proposal along those lines on 29th.

K: Our side?

D: No, our side.

K: But not sure because in Russian and not English so I don't know words they pronounce. It's a private talk. Something from their position to ______ at us. Don't know if Hearthside. Don't know if the same. Want to be sure it's with you. I thought something along those lines was passed to you on an unofficial meeting. It's clear. I will check with them and see if it is the same. I will tell you.

K: Exactly.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: Foulkes
By: NARA Date: 5/1/72

TEELCON

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

2:37 p m

1/31/72

S: Have x to testify on the House Foreign Affairs Committee on POWs. One area they will want to touch on is negotiations and one question we will get is how we view the Mansfield amendment in the form it took x in the procurement act. It's 6th month date of withdrawal contingent upon return of prisoners and negotiation for ceasefire by all parties in Indochina. It's difficult but I feel I should say it is an unacceptable feature and don't know how President wants to approach this thing.

K: One way we don't want is y way it's in Newsweek. Ceasefire is an obvious non-starter. Get your people under control.

S: I hadn't hear that. The point here is that cease fire is a feature of Mansfield Amendment.

K: Say it's consistent with May 31 proposal.

S: Seems to me the best way is to say Mansfield Amendment has taken several forms and then spell out May 31 proposal and say no problem with that. Have you seen that he wants to put in his amendment again because we didn't separate it?

K: I didn't see what he said.

S: He felt we hadn't separated it enough. Should I make it clear?

K: You should bring it out but don't move away from latest proposal.

S: But say flexible enough to ? ? ? ? ? ?.

K: Other on table in two ways. We are sending over docuements to the Secy. today.

S: NVN put out documents in Paris today.

K: They support our case. In our big proposal we indicate the sequence in which it can be done which also involves ______ and also the May 31.

S: The only thing has political overtone would be what is wrong with Mansfield? In it's various forms i t has many metamorpheses but each takes some of May 31

K: Talk with me on Wed. afternoon again. You go up on Thurs. ?

S: Thurs. morning.

06/22/72
C-5324-ND

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger

2:45 p.m.

1/31/72

S: A brief report since Rabin came in this morning. Your call was helpful. They have come part of the way. It's narrow further. What it amounts to because I will have to go another round with them. They agree whatever we do is subject to consultation and not subject to their veto except they want an absolute veto -- Rabin didn't agree with his govt. -- a veto on key aspect of relationship. What is interim agreement and overall settlement. I will be back at you later in the week.

K: Let me know what you put to him before or after?

S: I can. It's so -- I can come over and show it to you when I work it out.
It's so narrow.

K: In case he calls me. I don't give a damn.

S: Let it with me. If he calls say you and I are in touch. I want to settle with
him. It's not a bad picture of you on Newsweek. You look healthy.

K: You will break the heart of some of your colleagues.

S: I enjoyed your comment at Women's Club when you said you wouldn't resign because it was more than 20,000 at State who wanted to be there. But the real impact was the last two pages. It was really well written. It was one of the nicest evenings. Church was tough on you but everyone in good spirits.

K: I didn't mind what Church did.

S: Everyone was looking at you to make sure you smiled which you did at the right time. If anything more I will give you a read-in.

K: Keep me informed.

S: Only you and I are talking about this. I am trying to keep this in my hands.

FEB 28 1972
DEC 28 1972

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

3:22 p.m.

1/31/72

K: I wanted to find out on the President's plans x for this weekend because we want to give the annual report to the press on Sat. but if in Key Biscayne that mightn't work.

H: x Why not?

K: Because I don't want to go down there.

H: I don't know. He has not decided. We have Friday - Sunday clear. He will either go there or up to Camp David.

K: Then press would be here if at Camp David?

H: Yes.

K: When will you know?

H: Thurs. afternoon.

K: When we give this out I should be there and brief after they have read it. If in Key Biscayne, it will be Thurs. night.

thought
H: Up until now there's been no contact of Key Biscayne,

K: I assumed it.

H: He is thinking now it might be best x way to go down there. Planning to go the following weekend.

K: He shouldn't go two weekends in a row. I would like to know as soon as you know.

H: The decision will be made on Thurs. afternoon.

DECEMBER 31, 1972

JANUARY 1, 1973

TELCOM

J. Alsop/Kissinger

4:15 p.m.

1/31/72

A: I knew you would call me back.

K: I can't get involved in the internal feuds of the Alsop family.

A: I have written a piece about you. I want to speak to you about it. Balance of power consideration that arex the essence of the President and your thought. You get on well with one anohter. You think alike.

K: The President and I? I appreciate it Joe but I hope no invidious reference to anyone else.

A: Only to American intellectuals. Only say they don't read history, which is true.

K: That's true.

A: I said this was the basic one. Nothing to worry about. I would like to talk with you. The other thing is a personal matter.

K: I will when I can. We are putting the world report to bed.

A: I know but I was amused to find you had lunch with Stu. I wanted to tease you.

K: I am having dinner with you on Thurs.

A: That's not business. There's one thing and that is my going to China. I don't know if I brought you up to date on that.

K: You have. Your conversation in NY.

A: Very encouraging. I don't want to go when the President is going. It eliminates an enormous logistics problem. I would like to go in March with Susan Mary. I am sure you are in touch with people.

K: Probably the way to do is over there.

A: Under cover of Miss Maginnes. I wrote here a letter saying I was shocked she was used as a cover.

K: I told her k yesterday that if I ever behaved wrongly towards her there were at least 4 Alsops who would come after me.

A: I wrote here a little, funny letter. I am not quite sure. The main thing is they have the thing under consideration now and if you are in touch with them it is better to say a word before they have made their decision. If they make a

J. P. HARRIS & CO.
1301 K Street, N.W.

BANK OF AMERICA

J. Alsop/Kissinger

4:15 p.m.

1/31/72

decision negatively and then you say a word in Peking it will be hard to turn
K: into it around.

K: I will see if there's a way.

A: I think it is something in balance. The irritation it will cause is my reason for going there.

K: They won't make decision until after trip and although I cannot activate channel now because of things going on a word from me in China will be decisive.

A: I will be afraid they will make a decision before you go.

K: I will see what I can do.

A: When is the world report?

K: Next week.

A: Getting out of foreign affairs tomorrow but I would like to see you next week after it's out. Let's have a lunch. What day?

K: My office doesn't believe I should have any information about my life. I don't have my calendar.

A: I will have Miss A call Julie.

K: Yes.

A: Any day next week.

01/31/72 AM

TELCORN

H. Sidey/Kissinger

4:37 p.m. 1/31/72

K: I just wanted to check that we were absolutely clear on our understanding. I don't know how much you read this morning. You won't quote from them?

S: No. I would like to quote a line or two and won't without checking with you. One place you said you would play the devil's advocate. Cast you in difficult situations. Only a mood.

K: Did you reveal that I showed you papers?

S: No. When I have this done I will come over there to show it to you. The whole thing. Factually you can correct me and we can argue judgment.

K: That would be more than decent of you. I will not contest your judgment.

S: I have done this with others. Don't bother me if you disagree.

K: If you do this the only thing I will contest are factual points.

S: No security is compromised.

K: That's my main concern.

S: Devise picked up in fragments. How your mind works in meetings. Just write it from standpoint of this is the way it is. On my own. No attribution. I thought your reference to German history -- whole spector of what we are talking about.

K: Those are the policy making aspects and not WSAG which is crisis.

S: ?? and shift to other alternative and try that and historical references and technical details. They help a great deal. I will go over it with you. I will write through the night. It's tough because so much has been written about you. I should have read nothing. There's a good amount of compilation about you.

K: Most not good. Collier is good. This past week's TIME piece is good.

S: Except for old stuff about the girls. That's been printed before.

K: That's getting boring.

S: You will see how it fits and it should not be a great deal of trouble.

FEB 24 1972
GEO

TELCON
Amb. Lucet/Kissinger

5:55 p.m. 1/31/72

K: I was just talking with the President and he has an odd idea which we want to put to you. He wants to know if possible for him to talk with Andre Malraux before he goes to China. Wonders if Malroux could come over here.

L: I know he is not feeling well but I will transmit it.

K: We suggest Mon., Feb. 14. We would give a dinner to which you would be invited.

L: Very kind. I will be in touch with Paris and let you know as soon as possible. I will get in touch directly with you?

K: Yes.

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

5:58 p.m

1/31/72

K: As I understand we have settled that matter we discussed the other day.

D: It looks so.

K: You can approach Mr. Davis whenever you want. Do it on Consular level.

D: Vorontsov is in touch with him on several occasions.

K: I spoke with the President about Yevteshenko. He will see him at 3:00 on Thurs. A poets call. No official aspect.

D: Fine. I will be in touch with him.

K: This is not misunderstood in Moscow. Intention is to see a leading cultural figures before we go on our trip.

D: I see no problem. President shows interest in Soviet literature. Just a visitor. I will tell him. Thurs. at 3:00. I am sure he can make it and come. I will consult with him. Maybe we decided we would go next week to the Corcoran gallery. Let me know on Friday.

EC 1.1.10 27.10.36
06/04/1976

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

6:04 p.m.

1/3/72

P: I was just thinking that you might in the morning check to see how the news played this stuff of theirs and then attack without covering all their points put the most vulnerable ones. It is important to keep the propaganda on our side. what you suggested is excellent. Zeigler can tell. Maybe from news summary. My feeling is that what may be involved -- these people will be making points that are very inaccurate. But we have to keep in mind that this press is press. They have to play their side. We have to attack them for that reason. Don't you agree?

K: Absolutely.

P: I don't want a debate.

K: Let's see how it plays.

P: We are not going to let them get away with lies on them. Call to Mansfield and Frankel. The other would also work. You can judge it in the morning. I have to go to the Prayer Breakfast and won't be in until 10:00. Can do what you think is right and I will be in about 9:30 or 10:00.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joe Kraft
1/31/72; 7:30 p.m.

K: I thought I ought to keep you abreast is something happened. The Chinese called today and said that I was to go to Paris to pick up a visa for a month's trip beginning February 15.

HK: Oh, great! Isn't that great. I have a little influence left in some places.

K: I'll say.

HK: The one problem that now exists, Joe, is that you are certain to be on our list, too.

K: My gosh!

HK: Because I have just arranged that today.

K: I have to give a speech in Montego Bay on Thursday. Could you give me until Friday to sort things out. You can always put somebody else on.

HK: It would be a little bit embarrassing now. It was a stupendous effort. Maybe if you are on our list they would give you 30 days later.

K: That's what I gave them as my preference. Let me give them a call.

HK: Your name was given to them as an addition and there can't be a conceivable way for them to turn it down. You can still get your visa. That would be my strong recommendation. Let me know.

K: Your best preference would be for me to go in with you and stay a month after. They suggested I go in on the 15th.

HK: We can always say you made your own efforts when you did not hear from us.

K: Understood -- absolutely.

HK: It's a happy situation to be in.

K: I will talk to you for certain on Friday.

HK: Do whatever is best.

K: Are you going to be around here for the weekend. Could you see me on Saturday.