January 23, 1961

Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener T
Harvard University

Dear Arthur:

It was so thoughtful of you to send me a copy of your book. The inscription means a great deal to me. As soon as I receive some, I will send you a copy of mine.

For selfish reasons, I hope the rumors that you are going to Washington are not true, though if they are you may turn me into a registered Democrat.

Kind regards.

P.S. I thought the Inaugural Address *excellent*.

Dictated by Mr. Kissinger but signed in his absence.

February 8, 1961

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Arthur:

My publisher finally let me have
some copies of my own book. I would like you to
have one.

I hope I will be seeing something
of you on my visits to Washington. I appreciated
very much your talking to me on Sunday when you
must have been pretty exhausted. One of the
temptations of going down there is the possibility
of being associated with you.

With kind regards as always.

May 1, 1961

Mr. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Arthur:

I understand that an M.I.T. conference
at the Center for International Studies from May
18th to the 21st in which I am participating is
also bringing you up here. Two questions:

(1) Would you like to stay with us?

(2) Could I have an hour of your time sometime?

I must make some decisions about various things on
which I would greatly appreciate your advice and
I would also like to give you some reactions about
the foreign policy scene. In the jargon of
disarmament, with which I have lately been concerned,
these two problems are not interconnected.

All the best.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1961

Dear Henry:

I have just returned from a few days in Europe to find your letter of May 1. I am still hoping to come to the M.I.T. Conference, though, as you can imagine, these commitments are highly vulnerable to last moment cancellation. If I do come, I think I shall probably stay with my parents. But I will count on our getting together then if we do not succeed in doing so before then in Washington.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International
Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

I spoke to Mac about a possible appoint-
ment with the President.

You may be interested in the attached
cutting from Sunday's Observer.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
Special Assistant
to the President

Memorandum by John Lukacs

1 June 1961

Two Considerations.

I. RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE. One must never allow the Russians to gain the impression that one negotiates with them out of weakness. This is not a platitude but a practical and historical condition which has been observed by everyone who knows something about the history of Russian foreign policy or who had the experience of negotiating with Russians or who understands something about their curious and enduring psychological inclinations.

The Russians have problems of their own. We must let them know that we are aware of these. But we ought to do this not always in the sense of a sharp bargaining spirit; we must manifest our understanding of their problems.

Besides the possible and long-range problem of China, the Russians have their problems in Eastern Europe. And this is very important for their control over Eastern Europe is a primary requirement for their own concept of security.

It could be said, indeed, that Stalin's principal war aim was not the extension of international Communism but his acquisition of as much of Eastern Europe as was possible. And, to a considerable extent, this policy has been followed by Khrushchev to keep Russian control over Eastern Europe, no matter how bad the consequences for international Communist prestige might be. This was very evident during the Hungarian Rising of 1956.

For -- and this is very important -- in Central and Eastern Europe the world-wide progress of Communism has not been successful. In that vitally important sphere for Russia, the Russians -- contrary to the generally prevalent impressions of their progress -- have actually retreated. At the end of the war, in 1945, they stood further to the West than they stand today.

In the first place, they moved out from their Finnish naval bases; they retreated from Eastern Austria and Vienna; they had to acquiesce in the independence of Communist Yugoslavia. In the second place, their absolute control over the political life of certain Eastern European nations, including some of their satellite, is less strong now than ten years ago. I am referring not only to Poland but to Communist Albania as well as to democratic Finland, and even to subjugated Hungary. For, in the third place, a Russification of these national lands and cultures has not been undertaken. (The Tsars did attempt this, at times and in places, with varying degrees of success). The Polish nation has not become less Polish, the Hungarian not less Hungarian, the Czech not less Czech during the last fifteen years. Perhaps they have even become more national. In sum, Russia could not wholly digest her great European conquests of the last world war -- which is, perhaps, the most encouraging (and, potentially, the most explosive) factor of the entire cold war.

How does this affect the United States -- now?

Eastern Europe is not vitally important for the U.S. Hence her gradual abandonment after the last war, for the sake of containing Communism and maintaining freedom in Western and Southern Europe. But this is just what the Russians, with their mixed suspicious and aggressive mentality, did not quite comprehend. The superficial "liberation" policy, even though it was never seriously meant by the Eisenhower Administration from 1952 to 1956, left this issue further confused. At the time of the Hungarian Rising, in 1956, there came a turning point. For there is much evidence that Khrushchev, having seen the cautious American reaction in his Hungarian troubles, was during

considerably relieved. Indeed, there is reason to believe that in November 1956, for the first time, Khrushchev could tell himself and his colleagues that the U.S. was to be trusted at least to the extent of not interfering with the Russian empire in Eastern Europe. Thereby, to him at least, the conditions of a future improvement of Russian-American relations were set,

On the other hand, after 1956 we have gradually given up our confused and half-hearted efforts to change the Eastern European status quo. A new policy has emerged instead: to encourage, by peaceful means and contacts, an eventually more democratic evolution, and the cultural liberalization, of the Eastern European satellite nations. During his campaign the President supported such a policy quite clearly and cogently.

This is still our policy now. It is in many aspects (though not in all of these) practical, moderate, meritorious. But we must look at it with Russian eyes; and from a long-range viewpoint.

We must not give the Russians the impression that, because of our relative weaknes, we have definitely written Eastern Europe off.

We could let the Russians know that, aware as we are of potential popular sentiments in Eastern Europe, we might feel constrained to revive the subversive competition of the cold war there if, for instance, the Russians were to increase their subversive activities in Latin America to an extent clearly injurious to our national interests.

This is the quid-pro-quo argument that the Russians -- whether Tsarist or Soviet -- have always understood. But this is an extremely delicate matter. And thus it should be perhaps communicated only by the President himself in person, and by the spoken word. For this is not an argument that should be employed in a tone of threat or with bluster.

The reasons for this are various. In the first place, the Russians know that we won't risk war because of Eastern Europe. We cannot bluff too much. In the second place, the Russians have constantly been extremely sensitive about any indication that we or the Germans might challenge the Eastern European status quo. Consequently we would do well to impress them that we do not necessarily wish to profit from their eventual distress. More concretely, I believe that they might react favorably to a personal suggestion that we do, after all, understand (even if we do not officially recognize) the primacy of their strategic concerns in Eastern Europe.

Eventually this might lead to a greater issue. The time may come when the President could tell Khrushchev that we do not object to the transformation of political structures in many places in this world -- under certain conditions. I am inclined to think that Khrushchev was very much impressed with the condition that, after all, we did not decide to crush Castro with our military might -- unlike what he did in Hungary. This contrast, between their actions in Hungary and ours in Cuba, provides an argument which might be used in private conversation with him, even though his reaction might be unreasonable and aggressive, (which in part because he would understand what the President is driving at). He may have to be told that we would not like to be compelled to stir up trouble in Eastern Europe but that, under certain circumstances, such a revision of American policy might be forthcoming; but that, on the other hand, a more reasonable balance of Russian-American relations must flow from a mutual, if necessarily tinct, understanding of the primary geographical and security interests of these two Great Powers.

Such an understanding may become necessary especially now when, in a gradual manner, the post-war absolute primacy of Russia in Eastern Europe, and of the U. S. in Latin America may be changing. We ought to let the Russians know that we are not unalterably opposed to these changes; but that the reciprocal encouragements of these respective transformations must remain within certain bounds.

For we must keep one paramount, though often obscured, condition in mind. The shrill revolutionary claims of international Communism ought not obscure the condition that in the, to them, most important area of Eastern Europe the Russians, for some time now, have been in the position not of an expanding but of a status quo Power. They may not be able to keep the status quo there forever; but they want to keep it now and for some time to

come. We may be able to bring the Russians around to certain accommodations in view of this
condition -- keeping in our minds, at the same time, that our interests to solidify the
Eastern European status quo but that it is not in our interests either to help create
explosive situations there.

II. EAST BERLIN. It will appear from the foregoing that we must alleviate a condition which, in the long run, may become an intolerable headache. It is that all critical international problems are now taking place on our side of the so-called iron curtain -- by necessity or, rather, by Russian choice.

To a considerable extent this is applicable to the Berlin Problem.

The status of Berlin originates from the provisions made in 1944-1945; and these, of course, involved *not* West Berlin but the entirety of this now divided city.

I do not see why we do not suggest to the Russians that we might go along with some of their proposals for a Free City of Berlin -- but that such a proposal *must* include all Berlin, East Berlin as well.

Should the Russians reject this suggestion categorically, and out of hand, we would have lost nothing. Indeed, we may have gained a propaganda advantage. For, after having probed them once more, (in order to find out whether their rejection is really rigid), we may publicize our plan to the world. It would be a Fresh Approach to that dreary and worrisome Berlin Tangle; and it will be evident how the Russian proposals have not been reasonable but blatantly aggressive and unilateral ones.

Should the Russians eventually go along with such a proposal, we would gain much another, and a very significant, Communist retreat in Eastern Europe; within East Germany, too, the area of freedom would be considerably enlarged, in a geographical as well as in a psychological sense.

I suspect that we did not make such a clear proposal before because of certain strategic considerations and, perhaps, West German fears. These may suggest that the mutual withdrawals of American and Soviet forces and influences from Berlin might become a precedent for a future and neutral Germany. But is it not true that, by now, the eventual advantages of such an all-Berlin settlement could far outweigh its eventual risks and disadvantages? Besides, it may be made clear to Russians and Germans alike that, from the viewpoint of the United States, the creation of a free, independent, and "neutral" All-Berlin must not be construed as if it were a precedent for the future status of Germany.

ALAN G. GRANT, JR.

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW
SUITE 806 METCALF BUILDING
ORLANDO, FLORIDA

TELEPHONE GA 2-4767

May 10, 1961

Mr. Lee White
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: The Freedom Academy Bill, S. 822

Dear Mr. White:

It was very good to meet with you early in March and to learn
that new ideas can be presented at the higher levels of the Kennedy
Administration.

Although we talked for more than an hour, the Academy proposal
was not covered in the desired depths, and in this letter I am outlining
some additional thoughts which will supplement my briefing and the material
I left with you (especially the unanimous favorable report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and Senator Dodd's speech of August 26, 1960, report-
ing the bill to the Senate).

In the non-military area, the Communists are assaulting the Free
World with an extraordinary variety of conflict instruments. Following
Lenin's admonitions, they have mastered all methods and means of conflict
and these have been integrated into a many directional strategy. They are
using every promising avenue to approach their objectives and are demon-
strating exceptional organizational capabilities in penetrating and manipulating
a wide range of political parties, institutions and organizations in Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and Far East.

Even today few of our people appreciate the remarkable research,
development and training program in conflict technique and management
which has been in high gear in the Soviet Union for nearly forty years. This
program has enabled the Communists to develop and integrate the full
spectrum of conflict instruments and to train "conflict managers" capable
of orchestrating all of these instruments in carefully patterned and calibrated
aggression in which the widest possible range of non-military weapons and
weapons systems are used against us in an intelligent, sustained and
systematic manner. Guerrilla warfare, subversion, propaganda, blackmail,
culture, aid, and diplomacy are all intermixed in a thousand pronged
offensive.

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It is not only the ability of the Kremlin leaders to orchestrate the cold war. They have also carefully developed the many organizational means and especially the trained, motivated cadres which enables them to *implement* their strategy in all of its dimensions.

The well developed nature of Soviet conflict technique makes our problems of defense and offense in the non-military area extremely difficult. Forty years of intensive preparation are now paying off. The situation is beginning to develop rapidly. It is conceivable the Communist Bloc can substantially isolate the United States and a few allies in a hostile world in a few years -- unless we develop, and quickly, a far greater capacity in the range of countermeasures potentially available to us. This is the greatest challenge to the Administration and will determine its place in history.

When we speak of developing a greater capacity to meet the Communists in the area short of hot war, what must be done? What are the requirements for preparing a pluralistic society to meet the Communist cold war attack on a global basis? It is only by keeping these requirements in mind and the difficulties of meeting them that the present bill can be understood.

At the risk of dwelling on the obvious, let me list these. In doing so it is assumed the global struggle is indeterminate -- that is, it may go on for decades, and that the present capabilities of the Communist Bloc are such that we cannot rely on half measures but must develop our *full capacity* to engage in the new dimensions of conflict.

First, the public must have greater understanding of Communism, especially Communist conflict technique, and the nature of the global struggle. This is necessary to maintain the will to victory and to overcome apathy in a long and tedious struggle. It is necessary if the public is to support wholeheartedly the difficult and often distasteful things we must do in the coming years. In a free society, policy, to be effective, must have public support. A widening fissure between public knowledge and policy can spell disaster. For defensive purposes alone this knowledge is essential, if public opinion is not to be confused and manipulated by the deceptions and blandishment of skilled propagandists who understand us and our desire to be left alone too well.

Second, the private sector must know how it can participate in the global struggle in a sustained and systematic manner. There exists in the private sector a huge reservoir of talent, ingenuity and strength which can be developed and brought to bear in helping solve our cold war problems. A wide range of interrelated programs can be implemented, if certain preconditions are met. Whether these things are done or not done can be the difference between victory and defeat in a close contest in which the enemy has mobilized his entire society to win the cold war, as well as to prepare for hot war.

- 3 -

Third, policy makers and cold war agency personnel at many levels must understand Communism, and again with special emphasis on Communist conflict technique. It is not enough to have experts available for consultation. This is basic "battle knowledge" which must be widely disseminated in the agencies, if planning and implementation are to be geared to the conflict we are in.

Fourth, policy makers and those who advise them must understand the full range of measures potentially available to us in the public and private sectors to meet the entire Communist attack and to work toward our national objectives systematically. This means they will have to master a broad range of non-military measures which have yet to be thought through and systematized. They must be able to organize and interrelate these measures in an integrated strategy in which our national objectives are approached from many directions, using every promising method and means and fully utilizing our national capacity to compete in the new dimensions of struggle.

Fifth, at all levels, agency personnel must be trained to understand and implement this sophisticated strategy. Unless there is a substantial "common fund of knowledge" about the nature of the enemy, the global conflict, and the vast array of negative and positive measures available to us, there cannot be the integrated team play necessary to carry out a complex strategy with vigor and elan against a dedicated and skilled enemy.

There are other requirements, but the above are basic. By and large we have failed to meet these, because we have not understood that the necessary capacity can only come about through a systematic, large scale research and training program. This generalization irritates some people in the agencies and universities who have devoted much of their lives to solving cold war problems. I do not intend to deprecate work already done, nor to imply that in all areas it has been inadequate. I do say that our research and training program in the area of non-military conflict, considered as a whole, is grossly inadequate and has failed to achieve to a substantial degree any one of the above five requirements. This should be self-evident, but there is a built-in ability within the agencies to resist this fact and the conclusions to be drawn.

Actually an increasing number of people in the agencies are aware of this. Nevertheless, when a group of outsiders state these things in generalities, they assume we do not know of much work that is being done, and suspect we are unsophisticated in the complexities of many problems.

Of course, no small private group, like the Orlando Committee, can know everything the government is doing, some of which is classified. However, over the years, we have collected considerable data on what is being done and not being done, with emphasis on research and training in non-military

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conflict. We have been over the curriculum of the War Colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, the USIA training program and the research and training programs of leading university centers dealing with international affairs, and area studies. We have checked our findings with various experts across the country and within the agencies. We have done heavy reading in the area. We have reviewed all cold war legislation. And, I expect we may have given as much thought to what the private sector can contribute as anyone else.

The conclusion is inescapable that the problem of formulating and implementing an adequate research and training program in non-military conflict has been approached on a piecemeal basis. Fifteen years ago, when we realized we were entering a cold war, our policy planners began formulating some rather minimal ideas and programs for meeting the non-military challenge. As the crisis deepened and the massive nature of the Soviet assault on our civilization became evident, various research projects were instituted at our universities, RAND and within the agencies; there was a beefing up of language study at the Foreign Service Institute and greater emphasis was placed on the non-military area at the War Colleges. However, I can find no evidence that anyone sat down and thought out the overall research and training program which would be necessary to fill systematically and adequately the five fundamental requirements I have listed. Rather, the problem was considered in bits and pieces, and the programs instituted met bits and pieces of the problem. Possibly 80% or more of the research and training program needed to develop fully the capacity of this country in the non-military conflict area has not been instituted.

Let me be specific.

Take something as basic and fundamental as Requirement No. 3 -- the need for wide understanding of Communism and especially Communist conflict technique in our agencies. There is little evidence of a comprehensive, organized effort to fill this requirement.

The War Colleges may devote two weeks to a month to coverage of the Soviet Bloc. Within that period the specific treatment of Communism and Communist conflict techniques rarely exceeds two or three days. Yet this is a difficult subject which requires considerable, systematized study, and it is absolutely essential to an understanding of the conflict we are in. It is true, of course, that the rest of the instruction is related to the Communist threat. But this is an indirect tie which in many cases presupposes a more complete understanding of Communist operations than the student actually possesses.

The Foreign Service Institute has a two-week seminar on Communism and the Soviet Union. This is a broad survey course, which can give only

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light treatment to Communism and Communist conflict technique. By trying to cover everything in ten days of actual training, the course is necessarily superficial. For example, it provides 1 1/2 hours of lecture-discussions each on Communism in the Far East, South Asia, Africa, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the United States. There is one lecture-discussion on such involved, encyclo-pedic subjects as subversion and "coordination of forces" to stop the Communist advance. Considering the very few points even a first class lecturer can get across in one lecture, the superficiality of the course is self-evident. This is no criticism of the teachers -- they just don't have enough time.

The Basic Foreign Service Officer's Course (8 weeks) required of all junior officers on appointment and the Mid-Career Course in Foreign Affairs (12 weeks), which are the mainstay of FSI training (out side language training), offer almost nothing. The Basic Course has six hours of lectures by CIA experts "covering" the Soviet Union, the international Communist movement, the organization and strategy of Communism, Soviet global pro-paganda, and how to answer criticisms abroad originating from Communists. (In Orlando we considered seventeen hours on the same subjects too skimpy for high school seniors.) The Mid-Career Course includes only a two hour lecture on Communist doctrine and practice, two hours on the role of behavioral science in Soviet strategy, and two hours on Soviet political organizations. (There is time, however, for five hours on "Philosophy of Administration" and four hours on "Origin and Diffusions of Myths and Rites.")

In 1958 FSI inaugurated the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, a nine months course, for about twenty senior officers at a time which appears to be the FSI counterpart to the War Colleges. This devotes five days to "Communist Strategy," and a good part of this time is spent in discussion groups or attending optional films. Actually there are just five lectures by four guest lecturers, who are, however, top men, and several short training films. Thirty-one books are recommended to the students, together with certain classified material, but this lengthy list must have been drawn up with tongue in cheek for a five day course. Again, much of the remainder of the course relates to the Communist threat, but as in the case of the War Colleges, this is an indirect tie which presupposes more knowledge about Communism than the student usually possesses.

The USIA training program has no course on Communism, but makes use of the two week FSI Seminar.

The FBI I am told, has a one week course for its internal security people.

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A limited number of agency personnel are assigned to various universities taking courses, practically all of which, insofar as they are connected with Communism, are of the area study type devoted to the Soviet Union or China rather than study in depth of Communism and Communist conflict technique.

The various Russian research centers are not suitable for instruction but are devoted to research. (This is also true of RAND which in this field has gone to sleep.) A person attending these institutions does so in order to write a research paper or a book. Research on specific operational matters is rarely done by these institutions which are overly academic. This should be obvious from their literary output.

None of these programs provide an adequate coverage of Communism. Furthermore, only a small fraction of our agency people have had even this minimal, formal exposure. Nor is there any systematic follow-up with those who have graduated. Much of what little is offered is more concerned with area studies and the history and philosophy of Communism than Communist conflict technique, though the latter is the pay-off phase.

Minor exceptions are seminars run by Kissinger at Harvard and Possony at Georgetown. These are small seminars with a handful of agency personnel, but I understand they do give a little more coverage to Communism and non-military conflict problems.

As far as I can determine, there is no government operated school or private institution where agency personnel are sent which gives coverage in any real depth to Communism and Communist conflict technique. A partial exception may be one CIA school about which I have only sketchy information.

When I checked this with Dr. Stefan Possony of Georgetown University, a leading authority on Communism, lecturer at the National War College and FSI, and adviser on Soviet affairs to the Department of Defense, he advised, "there is, to the best of my knowledge, no school within the government which specializes in Communism, let alone operational Communism."

He further commented, "without detracting in the slightest from the value of the War Colleges and the agency trade schools, it cannot be seriously argued that these schools provide an adequate coverage of Communism. There is indeed a coverage in broad outline, but no intensive study and there are large gaps in the coverage. This cannot be otherwise because literature dealing with Communism also shows wide gaps; furthermore, there are no textbooks which allow a student to tackle the whole problem matter within two covers. Instead, anyone who wants to be knowledgeable on Communism is

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compelled to read a minimum of two or three dozen books, and such an
undertaking simply is not in the cards within a ten-months course (length
of War College courses), most of which deals with other subjects, let alone
courses lasting only a few weeks. The very fact that there is no textbook
on Communism is a good enough illustration for the necessity of a Freedom
Academy."

Please note the above deficiency deals only with instruction about
Communism, not the deficiencies in political warfare, etc.

Consider Requirement No. 1 -- adequate public knowledge about Communism and the global struggle. Again there is no evidence of an organized effort which can hope to fill the gap.

It should be emphasized here that even adequate generalized know-
ledge about Communism and Communist conflict technique can only be obtained
through a systematic training program or a heavy amount of organized reading.
It is no answer to say that our news media give excellent coverage of world
events. They present a hodge podge of uncorrelated facts which leave the
untrained individual with a blurred image of Communism. Nor is it any
answer to say there are many good books about Communism in our libraries,
when no significant number of people are reading these books, or reading
them in sufficient quantity.

It should be kept in mind there is little in the experience of our
people to prepare them to understand the present struggle. The type of enemy
we face, the dazzling and confusing array of methods and means used against
us, the skillful deception, the ambiguous nature of enemy moves, the mis-
leading vocabulary, the slow and often concealed erosion of our position, the
seemingly disconnected events in all parts of the globe, subversion raised to
the level of a science, are all foreign to our experience.

Our secondary schools and universities are an obvious place to
make a beginning in organized instruction about Communism and the world
conflict. Yet by and large they offer almost nothing. Allen Dulles, in his
speech last August to the VFW (which I left with you, commented:

"In our schools and colleges we can find many courses in
ancient history, in philosophy, courses on the great move-
ments of the past, the conquests of ancient times from
Alexander the Great to Napoleon. Courses on Communist
theory and practices are few and far between.

* * * * *

"By and large, however, in our educational institutions,
except in the graduate field or in specialized schools and
seminars, these subjects are not generally taught.

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* * * * *

"There is a real urgency to build up our knowledge on the entire background of the Communist thrust against our civilization.

* * * * *

"The people of this country are and will continue to be basically opposed to Communism in general. This opposition is based more on instincts than on knowledge. This is not enough. Our people should be sufficiently educated in all of the ramifications of communistic intrigues and its historical background, its purposes and programs adequately to contribute toward an effective answer.

"The initiative for new knowledge comes more often from those of us who want to learn than from those who teach. But let us also call on our educators, and on those in authority who have influence over the development of our educational system to begin to expand the realistic teaching of the history and policies of Communism."

Mr. Dulles was overly generous in his reference to the graduate field. Dr. Possony, in a recent letter, advises, "I do not think there are more than half a dozen courses in the entire country that cover Communism as such and, if so, discuss operational technique rather than political philosophy and history. If there are more such courses they would be outside regular degree curricula." A course covering political philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries in which the student reads the *Communist Manifesto* and *State and Revolution*, does practically nothing to prepare him to understand the conflict we are in. Nor do a few chapters on Russia since 1917 in a Modern European History course. Yet this is about all that most colleges offer.

As Dulles emphasized, this instruction should begin in our secondary schools. Here the gap is almost complete. Actually some public pressure is developing to institute courses on Communism versus Democracy in our high schools. However, even if our schools wanted to do this, and some now do, they are stymied, because no teachers have been trained to give such courses, or to include the subject in adequate form in social science and history courses.

Nothing demonstrates our research and training failure better than this failure to teach the teachers. Again and again civic organizations, the American Bar Association for example, have urged such instruction. And

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each time they run up against the same roadblock. There is little
evidence our teachers' colleges and state universities are doing anything
to remedy the situation or that they have instructors themselves, in many
instances, who are prepared to teach these things. In the coming years,
here and there, something may be done, but there will be no organized
effort to fill this appalling gap without the Freedom Academy. It is un-
realistic to expect our busy teachers to educate themselves in this difficult
subject. Under mounting pressure, courses will begin to appear in our
high schools, but there quality, in the absence of systematically trained
teachers, will leave much to be desired.

There are a few bits and pieces, small scale attempts to over-
come public ignorance. The War Colleges bring in a few private citizens,
mostly reserve officers, for one or two week Strategy Seminars. These
range over such a wide area they can provide only the skimpiest coverage
of Communism. Some private groups have initiated schools on Communism,
usually of two or three day duration. These have been given in only a few
cities and there is no systematic follow-up, so the initial impact is soon
dissipated.

It is when we come to Requirement No. 2, however, -- not merely
understanding Communism but knowing how the private sector can contribute
to winning the global struggle that the extent of the research and training
gap really becomes apparent.

Let me emphasize this. The Orlando Committee, after years of
considering the problem, is convinced that many of our most difficult cold
war problems are susceptible of partial solution, at least, through a wide
range of method and means which can be implemented by the private sector --
provided that our private institutions and civic organizations have among
their members some who have received at least a little systematic training
about Communism, the global conflict, and what the private sector can con-
tribute. Without such trained and motivated people, what the private sector
can do is limited. With them, even in comparatively small numbers, the
range of activities is almost unlimited. Yet, as in the case of school
teachers, we have neglected to provide anywhere a training program which
would enable any significant number of private citizens to learn about these
things.

Today the private sector wants to participate. From personal
experience, and this has been confirmed by others I have talked with, I can
testify a marked change has occurred recently in the public's attitude toward
the cold war. Responsible citizens who showed little concern even a year or
two ago, are now crowding forward to ask "what can we do?" They are
worried. They sense that the business as usual civic projects now engaging

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their time, are a little silly in terms of the present world situation. Many
display eagerness to involve themselves and their organizations in worth-
while projects that have some real bearing on winning the cold war. These
are responsible civic leaders, who understand the battle must be won in
Latin America and Africa as well as Hoboken, and by a combination of
positive as well as negative programs.

By and large, however, this increasing desire to participate has
been frustrated by lack of trained leadership at the community, state and
national levels and advanced knowledge on what the private sector can do.

This is disturbing, because every day opportunities are slipping by,
some never to reappear, where the private sector could make an important
contribution. But our civic leaders lack the training to enable them to
visualize these opportunities, or the methods and means their organizations
would employ to take advantage of them.

The little training that is available, like the Strategy Seminars and
the short schools on Communism, have one common failing. They get the
student all stirred up and then suggest little or nothing he can do.

There is a good reason why. The things the private sector can do
are not as obvious as some imagine. Knowing something about the enemy is
not sufficient preparation for making an effective contribution.

This is a tough and complex struggle. It will require a concentrated,
systematic research program involving a broad cross-section of experts with
a maximum cross fertilization of ideas and experience to think through the
many methods and means the private sector can employ -- if the private sector
is to participate on a sustained and systematic basis.

A number of private organizations are making some contribution
here and overseas. Certain foundations are spending substantial sums over-
seas on a range of projects that have at least an indirect bearing. The
AFL-CIO has done considerable work in Latin America, Africa, Europe and
Asia attempting to build up free labor against the Communist onslaught.
Several universities offer short courses to businessmen going overseas. If
you go through the whole list of private participation, at first glance it
appears impressive.

In fact it is not. Only a tiny fraction of the ingenuity, talent and
strength that could be brought to bear here and overseas is being utilized.
The great majority of our civic organizations are uninvolved. Much of what
is being done is mediocre in terms of what it could be, if we had trained,
motivated people to carry out these programs.

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To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive, organized effort going on anywhere to research and think through the full range of methods and means the private sector can properly employ. Nor does any existing center have the staff, funds or directive to undertake this enormous and challenging job. Yet, until the problem is considered whole, until a wide range of expert knowledge is focussed on the problem, we can never know what the true capacity of the private sector is.

In planning our strategy in the non-military area, we tend to downgrade the role of the private sector and this is realistic, considering its present limited capacity.

The point is that we can very likely develop a tremendous capacity to participate with the right research and training program. Instead of bemoaning the lethargy, indifference and seeming incapacity of the private sector, we should recognize these are the natural and expected results of our neglect to institute an adequate research and training program.

Today no one (not even the Orlando Committee, we must confess) really knows what that capacity can be. No one can know until the type of research and training program envisioned for the Freedom Academy is undertaken.

Requirements 4 and 5 are again especially illustrative of the inadequacy of our research and training program in non-military conflict.

In approaching our national objectives, we are employing only a fraction of the methods and means potentially available. Again and again an objective is approached along a few well worn avenues, when a whole complex of access roads lead directly or indirectly to the same goal. Ours has been a limited approach to strategy, while the Communists have mastered and employ all methods and means.

Possibly our greatest weakness is that we continue to plan too much in terms of present capacity rather than in terms of systematically developing capacity in the new dimensions of global conflict. This means developing the full range of operational knowledge and then training people to use it.

At the higher levels we need conflict managers on our side who have assimilated a wide range of background knowledge and operational knowledge and can visualize, organize and manage the whole range of interrelated measures and countermeasures by which the global conflict will be determined. The field is so vast, the interrelationship between programs so sophisticated, that it cannot be mastered except through systematic and intensive study. Yet today there is no training program or combination of training programs which can produce rounded cold war strategists. Of course there cannot be, in the full sense, until a much wider range of operational knowledge has been re-searched and systematized.

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Lacking an adequate training program, our cold war strategists have had to learn on the job, with tragic consequences. Furthermore, in coming up the ladder, the conceptual thinking and experience of careerists is often limited to one agency. While they may serve on various inter-agency boards and even attend one of the other agency schools, they are short on operator knowledge outside their agency. There are exceptions -- non-careerists like Robert Lovett and Gordon Gray come to mind, who have moved around quite a bit.

This stands in marked contrast to the preparation of Soviet conflict managers who have been schooled in political warfare throughout their careers and have been known, particularly in recent years, to serve successively in the KGB, the Army, the AGITPROP, and the foreign service.

Henry Kissinger, in his remarkable study, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, commented on this (page 434):

> "Whatever the qualities of Soviet leadership, its training is eminently political and conceptual. Reading Lenin or Mao or Stalin, one is struck by the emphasis on the relationship between political, military, psychological and economic factors, the insistence on finding a conceptual basis for political action and on the need for dominating a situation by felible tactics and inflexible purpose. And the internal struggles in the Kremlin ensure that only the most iron-nerved reach the top. Against the Politburo, trained to think in general terms and freed of problems of day-to-day administration, we have pitted leaders overwhelmed with departmental duties and trained to think that the cardinal sin is to transgress on another's field of specialization. To our leaders, policy is as a series of discrete problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet system has had many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an amateur. Even a mediocre professional will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the amateur does not know what to do, but because he cannot react with sufficient speed and consistency. Our leaders have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while doing, and this has imposed too great a handicap."

The nearest thing we have to a multi-dimensional training program is at the War Colleges. Originally designed to emphasize military subjects, the Colleges have reoriented their courses to give to national and international affairs something approaching a co-equal role. Their primary purpose is to give the officer, often insulated from non-military matters prior to

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World War II, a grasp of the broader aspects of national strategy. Tiny quotas are also assigned from State, USIA, CIA, ICA, Treasury and Commerce.

Many factors which go into formulating national policy are considered. In terms of providing a broad survey of our cold and hot war machinery, an understanding of the interplay between existing programs, and a survey of current political, economic, military matters around the world, the War Colleges do a reasonably good job and they enjoy considerable prestige.

However, the War Colleges, despite their excellence, fall far, far short of training rounded conflict managers. Their purpose is more modest. Such central subjects as Communist conflict doctrine are, as noted, given only the lightest coverage. The all important subject of psycho-political warfare is mentioned, but not really studied, and so forth. The same is true of the Senior Officer's Seminar at FSL. They hardly begin to open the students' eyes to the whole new range of operational methods and organizational forms which we must develop and master, if we are to successfully resist Communist protracted conflict from the student organizations of Latin America to the jungle villages of Viet Nam.

Dr. Possony in a recent letter summarizing some of the gaps that exist in present government cold war training programs, says:

> "If we look at specific gaps, we find that there is nowhere any instruction on political warfare. Sometimes the word is used but the speaker usually has no solid background of information nor is documentation handy. Nowhere, to my knowledge, is the subject treated comprehensively, and even if one agency does devote some attention to this, I doubt that there is enough competence throughout the government. Hence not only our own operators, but also those large segments of the U. S. Government who are the very target of political warfare, are left in ignorance about the matter.

> "Similarly, there is no place where ideology is being studied. Ideologies are studied in universities, of course, but only in terms of Hegel, Marx, etc. In a deeper operational sense, notably in view of offensive or defensive manipulation, ideology is not on the instructional map. I would go so far as to say that there is no instruction throughout the government designed to protect us against hostile propaganda. It is naively taken for granted that our people understand propaganda techniques and have no trouble distinguishing propaganda from genuine communications.

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"Going beyond propaganda, I am unaware of any government effort dealing with psychological warfare including such important features as motivation, will, perseverance, conversion, anxiety neuroses, and other factors from the area of psychology and personality.

"There is unquestionably some pragmatic experience in economic warfare, but there is no agency where this problem is studied comprehensively.

"With respect to technological warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces has been making some progress, but, essentially, this school continues to deal with economics in the traditional sense.

"The inter-relationships between psychological and technological warfare such as they manifest themselves in the test-ban agitation are studied nowhere. The many scientists who are called upon to advise the U. S. Government on technological matters are kept in blissful ignorance about the most essential points on which their advice has a bearing.

"Academic instruction is one thing and operational training another. The operational training the U. S. Government has been providing, even in its trade schools, is quite inadequate, partly because operational records are kept highly classified and are withheld from instruction. Once a particular operation is terminated, the data and the lessons learned could be incorporated into the instructional materials, but this is not done, possibly with the occasional exception of one trade school.

"There are several efforts to acquaint reserve officers and civilian leadership groups with communism and other strategic problems (Strategy Seminars). But these programs are intermittent, improvised, and have too broad or narrow an audience base. No effort is really made to give the facts to such key segments of the American people as the communications industry. Nor is a real effort made to acquaint public opinion with the facts of life. Add to this the unfulfilled or largely unfulfilled need to increase the knowledge on communism in allied countries, and to give a proper instruction to exchange people and foreign students, and you have a good list of the many things we are not doing."

These gaps in political, economic, psychological, technological warfare and propaganda, as well as operational Communism, could hardly

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be more critical, for they are in the very subjects which are essential to
an understanding of the conflict we are in.

Without intensive, systematic study of these subjects, how can a
cold war strategist possibly hope to develop strategy attuned to the world
conflict? To say that specialists are available to advise him on these
matters is like saying experts on strategy and tactics are available to a field
commander who has never gotten around to studying these things himself.
Washington advised Braddock about those unconventional Indians and well
before the ambush. Unless the policy maker has himself mastered these
central subjects and can think conceptually about the conflict we are actually
in, the availability of specialists will not make a strategist out of him.

When these grave deficiencies are pointed out, the stock answer is,
we know government training programs are inadequate, but this is supple-
mented by sending regular quotas to the better schools of international studies
at our universities. As one State Department official put it to me, "we like
our people to get the Harvard viewpoint, the John Hopkins viewpoint, the MIT
viewpoint, rather than just the viewpoint of a Freedom Academy." (No one
has suggested the Freedom Academy would replace these centers.)

Well, no one in his right mind is going to argue against the Harvard
viewpoint with this Administration.

The point is that our universities are concentrating on language and
area studies and not on developing or teaching non-military conflict. Who ever
heard of a course in political warfare? Yet it is total political war in which
we are engaged. Their programs are weak in essentially the same areas as
government training programs. Possony's comments apply equally to our
universities.

I do not argue against the desirability of exposing agency personnel
to many viewpoints. I do say that when these training programs, in sum, skim
over or bypass the subjects most essential to an understanding of the war we
are in, they are in no sense a substitute for the Freedom Academy. Language
studies and area studies are important. But until the strategist has also
studied in depth Communist conflict doctrine and political, ideological, psy-
chological, organizational, economic, para-military conflict from our view-
point, as well as the Soviets, he cannot relate the other knowledge to the con-
flict we are in.

The urgent need is for rounded cold war strategists. Our universities
are attuned to developing scholars and specialists. The urgent need is for
operational-organizational know-how in the new dimensions of struggle. Our
universities are attuned to language and area studies, or to international law
and diplomacy in a more conventional context.

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There is another most important reason why our universities fall short. This has to do with motivation and the will to victory. Motivation is the most essential element we must instill in our people at all levels. We are constantly told that the Communists work harder with more dedication than their opponents. This is true because the Communist training program, the whole process by which they mold their cadre, concentrates on achieving a complete personal commitment. We naively assume motivation. Our armed forces understand its importance. Paratroop, Marine Corps, and Ranger cadres have it, and it has been carefully cultivated in training, because their tough combat missions require it. Yet non-military conflict tests the human will in more subtle and deadly ways than military combat, and the will to win is crucial. The university atmosphere is simply not conducive to developing a complete personal commitment. Sometimes it will, but this is by accident rather than by design.

Many of the programs which are potentially available to us are conditioned on highly motivated as well as trained personnel to implement them. Men and women ready to accept any financial sacrifice or physical rigor if it contributes to victory, who will not permit themselves to be affected by the apathy of their associates, or the psychological pressures of the enemy.

Our training program is, of course, severely handicapped by the grossly inadequate research and development program in non-military conflict. This has kept us from understanding our true capacity and instituting a training program oriented to this capacity.

Much work has been done at our universities on area research, especially on the Soviet Union. The Russian Research Center at Harvard has produced a number of books going into many facets of the Soviet state. There is an increasing awareness of the need for African, Latin American and Eastern studies, and many area studies are underway at our universities. Language training is being stepped up. Hundreds of books have been published in recent years on the Soviet Union and Communism.

Yet we must keep constantly before us the distinction between studying Communism and the languages, institutions, economies and histories of foreign countries on the one hand and researching and developing the operational-organizational know-how and the conceptual framework for non-military conflict which makes it possible to understand the conflict we are in in all its dimensions and to apply the full range of methods and means potentially available in an integrated, sustained and consistent fashion.

It is this operational-organizational knowledge and a realistic conceptual framework for a global struggle between Freedom and Communism which is neglected at our universities.

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The Soviets also engage in extensive area and language studies, and in African studies they are probably ahead of us. But it is not this which gives them their great advantage. Rather, it is the systematic way in which they have thought out and mastered all the organizational forms and operational techniques which are possible in a total power struggle and the way in which they apply these flexibly yet systematically and consistently with clearly understood purpose within an all encompassing conceptual framework.

I do not mean to imply that nothing is being done about these things in our universities. Here and there an individual professor, or a small group is doing some work.

By and large, however, we have hardly more than begun to think through the full range of methods and means we can employ in the government and private sectors. We are far from achieving the capability of applying all of these methods, when and if they are developed, flexibly yet consistently. We simply do not know what our capacity for non-military conflict is.

Take a specific case.

One of our major problems is the deep Communist penetration of Latin American universities and student organizations. Keeping in mind our policy of non-intervention, what operational methods, organizational forms and programs are possible in the public and private sectors which can help solve this serious problem? The conventional methods of cultural programs, student exchange, USIA libraries immediately come to mind, but these are entirely inadequate.

From how many directions can this problem be attacked? What can the private sector contribute now -- what could it contribute if the Freedom Academy had been in operation the last few years and many of our civic organizations and universities had Academy graduates? What direct or indirect methods are possible in the government sector other than those employed now?

I suggest that if three intermediate level graduates of the Freedom Academy, with experience in Latin affairs, were locked up with this problem over a weekend, they would find there is an almost limitless range of inter-related programs in the public and private sectors which could be brought to bear -- and with minimum risk of successful accusations of Yankee Imperialism and with no violence to our democratic ethics -- provided again that the activating organizations possessed a few Freedom Academy graduates.

Today there is almost no chance these things will be done. There is little awareness of the infinite variety of operational-organizational

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possibilities inherent in a total political-ideological struggle, and we do not have the trained, motivated people deployed where they could plan and implement these things, especially in the private sector.

The President's recent speech indicates the Administration has turned a corner in its comprehension of the inadequacy of our strategy and the means of implementation in non-military conflict. I was particularly struck by these sentences:

> "We dare not fail to see the insidious nature of this new and deeper struggle. We dare not fail to grasp the new concepts, the new tools, the new sense of urgency we will need to combat it, whether in Cuba or South Viet Nam. And we dare not fail to realize it is this struggle which is taking place every day without arms or fanfare, in thousands of villages and markets and classrooms all over the globe. . . . No greater task faces this nation or this Administration. . . . Too long have we fixed our eyes on the traditional military needs. . . . We intend to profit from this lesson. We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and our institutions here in this community. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war."

If I understand the President right, he is saying what I have been saying -- we must fully develop the capacity of this country in non-military conflict and we must do this rapidly with a sense of urgency. Previous administrations never turned this corner.

So the question now is how.

Does the Administration yet understand this capacity can only be achieved in time through an intensive, systematic, large scale research and training program?

Capacity in non-military conflict does not come easily or quickly. If the enemy is given enough lead time, as in missiles, we may never stop him. Further, we can pass the point of no return, without this country being aware of it. We can leave the enemy uncontested in the villages, the classrooms, the markets, just so long, when he has the capacity the Communists have demonstrated, then the trend may become irreversible short of a nuclear spoiling attack.

Already the OAS has been partially neutralized by Communist penetration of student organizations, intellectual groups, labor and the peasantry. Africa, considered safe a few years ago, is now in doubt with

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a strong tide running against us in Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Ghana, Somalia and within the FLN. There is deep though hidden penetration of the Nationalist parties in most of the new African nations. The guerrilla-political attack now inundating Laos and Viet Nam seems destined to spread across the remainder of Southeast Asia. A serious guerrilla-political potential is building in the backlands of Columbia and in the northeast provinces of Brazil. The Japanese Teachers' Union remains captive and the government seems helpless to prevent the systematic subverting of large numbers of school children. With every day's news the net is pulled more tightly around us.

The most alarming aspect of this snowballing situation is not Communist gains to date, but their capacity for non-military conflict vis-a-vis the West. The question must now be asked in all seriousness whether Communists capabilities are such that they can complete the isolation of the West before we can develop sufficient countercapabilities. The Communist research, development and training program, beginning with Lenin's three little schools of revolution in Italy and France prior to 1917, and expanding during the twenties into the most massive research and training program in all history has given them truly frightening capabilities.

We cannot hesitate or fall back on half measures. Only a crash program backed by the full weight and prestige of this government will be realistic in terms of the challenge we face.

I have noted the President's interest in guerrilla warfare. This is significant and encouraging. (Incidentally, I organized the Harvard Guerrilla Warfare Unit in 1942, my sophomore year, and taught guerrilla strategy that summer and fall as an unpaid instructor for the college. My term paper in English A-1 was on guerrilla warfare and I advanced the radical notion for those days that an advanced guerrilla strategy could be decisive in itself.)

Guerrilla warfare is a substrategy of political warfare, as are ideological, psychological and economic warfare.

These substrategies cannot be developed in isolation. Rather they are so closely intermeshed that our concept of political warfare, or non-military conflict, must be developed as a whole. Otherwise, we cannot grasp the interplay, the nuances, the range of possibilities.

The Freedom Academy is attuned organizationally to the development of our overall capacity in the new dimensions of struggle. For the first time we will be able to bring under one roof the necessary range of knowledge and experience to consider non-military conflict whole. Only when considered whole can we take the measure of the challenge and generate an adequate

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response. Only in this way can we see clearly the extent of our research and training failure and define the many gaps to be filled.

The organizational structure of the Freedom Academy encourages maximum cross fertilization of ideas between the various substrategies and disciplines and with the least time lag, since our people will be under one roof. It maximizes the opportunities for synthesis.

The range of expert knowledge will enable us to consider all avenues leading toward our national objectives with relevant procedures from each strategy and discipline brought to bear systematically. Strategic objectives now approached along a few routes will be seen to be approachable along a network of crisscrossing roads leading into the objective from every point of the compass.

Further, strategy will not be considered in a vacuum. There will be a concentrated effort to devise the organizational forms and the operational techniques which will make possible complete implementation of a multi-dimensional, multi-directional strategy.

The Freedom Academy seems the best organizational setup to give us a badly needed conceptual framework for non-military conflict within an acceptable period of time.

The development of a conceptual framework and thinking through the many interrelated methods and means available in non-military conflict may avail us little, unless this knowledge is rapidly incorporated into a training program designed to meet the requirements I have listed. Too much of the little we have researched and developed in non-military conflict has not been assimilated by our operators.

Let me reemphasize a few points.

At advanced levels the Freedom Academy would seek to train a rounded cold war strategist in non-military conflict. This, unfortunately, is going to take time, and the curriculum will be inadequate until we begin to get some results from the research side. The students will be mature individuals, many of whom already have substantial operator experience in some phase of the cold war. Two years is probably a minimum estimate of training time, with three years preferable for at least some advanced students. This may be cut down later, when the basic material is more widely taught in our universities and other government training programs.

This should be a prestige course. At this level the Freedom Academy will be operating as a National War College for Non-military Conflict.

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The graduate in the breadth of knowledge attuned to non-military conflict should be well ahead of almost anyone we now have. He should have deep knowledge of Communist conflict doctrine, a thorough understanding of political, ideological, psychological, sociological, economic, para-military conflict in all its dimensions, a knowledge of the wide range of tools in the public and private sectors which can be developed and utilized, a conceptual framework for non-military conflict so that these many tools can be employed flexibly yet systematically with clearly understood purpose, a grasp of the infinite variety of organizational forms and operational techniques inherent in a global struggle between Freedom and Communism, a grasp of the systemic revolution sweeping the world and an understanding of the range of positive and negative programs, many still to be researched and developed, which can assist the new nations toward freedom and an open society. No existing training programs, or combination of training programs, can even approximate these objectives.

It may also be desirable for a rounded strategist to have a variety of operator knowledge and study should be given to rotating promising personnel through several agencies, but this is outside the scope of the bill.

At the intermediate level, courses will probably run from six months to a year, and from a few weeks to several months at the basic level. Much thought should be given to developing these courses and to selecting students so as to meet Requirements 1, 2, 3 and 5.

Training of government personnel at the intermediate and basic levels is to create capabilities for implementing an advanced, integrated strategy in the non-military area with vigor and elan. A rounded expert, at the level to which we are trying to advance the art, can hardly be trained in six months or a year, although he may already have considerable operator experience. But he can acquire a working knowledge of operational Communism, a conceptual framework for a multi-dimensional, multi-directional strategy in non-military conflict, an eye-opening exposure to a wide range of positive and negative measures available to us, and practical, operator usable knowledge in a wide range of conflict situations with some detailed case studies.

The intermediate level training will provide major benefits up and down the line. First, an increasing number of agency people will acquire a broad "common fund of knowledge" in the central subjects of non-military conflict leading to a more general comprehension of our problems and commonly accepted premises enabling the various parts of our government to move in unison in planning and implementing a far wider range of programs. Second, the man in the field or behind the desk will be aware of a whole new range of tools available for problem solving and he will be far better equipped to diagnose and anticipate enemy activity. His reports and recommendations

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should be more imaginative and better attuned to the protracted conflict. Third, the graduate will be strongly motivated to think in terms of countermeasures and to seek out solutions. I have never known a man who has looked deeply into Communism whose life and attitudes have not been profoundly changed. The added stimulus of knowing there are answers to conflict problems which seemed insoluble before can do much to induce the complete personal commitment, the driving desire to seek out solutions and carry the fight to the Communists so essential to victory. Finally, a whole range of new operational-organizational methods and means will become capable of implementation and not as individual programs, but as part and parcel of an integrated strategy, as the agencies acquire an increasing number of graduates who understand these things.

Even the limited training in non-military conflict provided at the War Colleges is beginning to have a beneficial effect as the graduates of recent years rise in the hierarchy. This should be some indication of the benefits to be derived from the Freedom Academy.

The basic and intermediate courses for private citizens are to increase understanding of Communism, the nature of the protracted conflict between Freedom and Communism and how the private sector can contribute. Courses going no further than describing Communism and our cold war problems can accomplish more than is often recognized, particularly in maintaining the will to victory, understanding enemy moves, and supporting policies that call for real sacrifice. To stop here, after the student has been motivated to participate, would be to forego the biggest dividends. As the research side of the Academy gets into full swing, we will begin to understand the true capabilities of the private sector and I am sure a vast range of interrelated programs will open up which can play an important role in Latin America, Africa and the East, as well as the U. S. For the first time we will be in a position to develop the full capabilities of the private sector in an organized fashion. We can determine the type of institutions and civic organizations which can best implement specific programs; the availability of their members for training, the number of trained people they will need; the follow-up material to be provided by the information center; the type of training which can provide maximum capacity in minimum time, and so forth.

The Senate Committee and Senator Dodd have indicated some of the training programs and the areas from which we would expect to train private citizens. There is no point in repeating this.

So little thought has been given to what the private sector can contribute outside of the obvious that I believe the government is in for a pleasant surprise, provided the Freedom Academy is adequately staffed and funded.

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The Orlando Committee is prepared to make a separate presentation on this, if you so wish, rather than lengthen this letter any further.

Let me try to answer some of the objections or counterproposals which are being made.

I have not seen the agency evaluations of the bill, but from my talks with their representatives, I believe much of the debate centers around the question of whether the existing schools and research centers could do the job better with less confusion and overlapping.

From what I have already said, I hope it is clear the debate should be whether they _could_ do the job better, and not whether they are doing the job.

I am fearful the Administration may be persuaded that some re-orientation or beefing up of the existing programs will do the job. This would be an easy way out. I submit it would also lead, inevitably, to a continuation of our piecemeal approach to non-military conflict, both as to training and research with little hope of meeting the basic requirements I have enumerated.

An additional seminar at FSI, or a few more lectures in the Basic or Mid-Career Courses, or another month at the War Colleges on non-military conflict is no answer.

For too long non-military conflict has been a stepchild in institutions which take note of its existence, but do not study it in depth. May I repeat -- this is a vast and complex subject. What we need is a research and training institution designed from the ground floor up to concentrate on this.

This does not mean the existing programs -- training or research -- will be preempted by the Academy. The Academy would not take over language or area studies which are collateral to non-military conflict, and most certainly we would not want the Academy to be burdened with the special training functions of the agency trade schools.

On the research side the Academy would pull together in one place our existing knowledge in non-military conflict so we can see where we are, define the gaps which must be filled to meet the requirements I enumerated, make an organized effort to fill these gaps, interrelate, systematize, synthesize this knowledge to produce new ideas, new programs, new operational-organizational approaches, a new conceptual framework for non-military conflict.

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Under present circumstances such an effort is practically impossible. Each agency has its assigned area of responsibility, and all are concerned with non-military conflict to some degree. As various problems materialize, these may be farmed out to this or that university or research group. But non-military conflict is never considered whole, and no existing research center is staffed or funded to consider it whole. Further, each problem can only be attacked within a limited conceptual framework because the supplementary and complementary material, the related strategies and organizational-operational methods and means, have not been developed and brought forward together, and the new insights, the new approaches they would offer are not considered. The result is an ad hoc approach to research and development in which only pieces of the conflict spectrum are studied, and then within comparatively narrow limits.

At the Academy the development of the strategies can be brought forward together with maximum cross fertilization and synthesis and within an ever expanding conceptual framework. There is no need to duplicate good work where it has been done, nor would it prevent the Academy from utilizing existing research facilities at our universities. Rather, by considering non-military conflict whole, we would be in a position to know and evaluate what has been done, to make maximum use of this in developing new knowledge, to know what still needs to be done and to go about the further development of this art or science in a comprehensive, organized fashion. Where adequate research is going on on parts of the problem, let it continue. Encourage more research rather than less at our universities. But let all of this knowledge be assembled at the Academy.

We are on dead center. No one below the President and his close advisers has the responsibility to consider non-military conflict whole. Obviously they can't do it. Who can? Where is the impetus to come from? Where is the organization which is staffed and funded and has the directive to organize and coordinate this tremendous research and development job?

The FSI and War Colleges can't do it. They are primarily training institutions. No university or research institution, including RAND, has the combination of expert knowledge and experience to cope with it in the necessary breadth and depth.

As things now stand the comparatively few who are qualified by expert knowledge and demonstrated motivation are widely scattered where, to the extent they are being utilized, they are working on bits and pieces of the problem. They simply are not in a position to make an organized assault on the total problem. Further, our agencies are fully engaged with immediate, pressing day to day problems. They do not have the time or extra manpower to organize or coordinate such an effort.

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There is another limiting factor often overlooked. Development should be practical. There is no point in evolving operational methods or programs which our people are not trained or organized to implement. Consequently, present development work in non-military conflict tends toward conventional solutions that can be implemented by available personnel within existing organizational patterns.

This brings out a key point in favor of the Academy. There training will keep pace with research. In determining, for example, what the private sector can contribute, practical considerations will not limite the inquiry to projects falling within the present narrow capacity of the private sector. Rather, the researcher knows the training program will create additional capacity attuned to new programs. This will unshackle research. Admittedly, capacity to implement will always lag behind research, but there will be the knowledge that capacity is being systematically built up on the training side.

In evaluating this bill, you must keep in mind there is a research gap and a training gap. If we establish just a training school, the training, with some exceptions, will be limited to existing knowledge. If we establish just a research center, then the production, again with many exceptions, to the extent it makes a breakthrough, will be in danger of being entombed in the stacks. It is of utmost importance that our research program and our training program move forward together.

Non-military conflict is so new to Americans that we lack a consensus on how to go about it or even what the term covers. Certain editorial writers and agency officials have jumped to conclusions, some completely unwarranted, as to what the bill proposes.

These might be summarized under three headings. Overt versus covert operations. Negative versus positive programs. Dogmatic, doctrinaire approaches versus a multiplicity of viewpoints reflecting a pluralistic society. Let me take these in order.

There is a tendency in some quarters to see political warfare exclusively in terms of covert operations in which we try to fight fire with fire. The nature of the struggle compels us to use covert operations in certain situations and we must guard against becoming inhibited about this when the nation's very existence is at stake. However, I believe that most of the methods and means a free, open society can employ most effectively are in the overt area and it is here that the Academy will concentrate.

Yet, even when this is understood, some still seem to feel the Academy proposes to wage the global struggle with "sterile," anti-Communist

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measures which may repel the leaders and people we are trying to impress, rather than positive approaches such as programmed long term aid which will show up Communism and convince the uncommitted their best interests lie with freedom and the West.

Let me say that anti-Communism has never struck me as sterile. In the struggle for the minds of men we could make no greater mistake than to soft pedal the crimes of Communism or to fail to point out at every opportunity what agricultural reform means behind the Iron Curtain. Let us not be manipulated into the inhibited, defensive attitude that these things merely exacerbate the cold war. And just because our inadequate programs of the past have permitted an atmosphere to develop which makes it difficult for the truth to be believed, is no excuse to throw in the oars and drift with the tide. Further, in preparing our people for the struggle ahead we must never forget that being against an evil has been as great a motivating force in history as being for something -- and we can be both. In the operational area recapturing a student organization or a labor union strikes me as a positive accomplishment, and developing the operational-organizational know-how to do this should be essential training at the Freedom Academy.

However, let me doubly emphasize that the authors of the Freedom Academy bill recognize the prime importance of affirmative, positive programs to win the global struggle ranging from the development of alternatives to Communism for the uncommitted nations and the ability to articulate these clearly to the use of technical assistance and aid programs.

The point is that we are still far from thinking through the range of positive and negative measures which can be implemented by the government and private sectors. Equally crucial we lack an advanced conceptual framework to permit us to employ these methods and means purposefully in the environment of the total political war being waged against us.

The philosophy of the Freedom Academy bill is that we must make an organized crash effort to research and develop these means, both positive and negative, and to think through organizational forms and operational techniques to implement them.

Yet we cannot do this effectively or realistically until we understand the new dimensions of warfare in which we are engaged. And the war we are in cannot be understood by area studies, international relations, and military studies with a smattering of operational Communism, and political, ideological, psychological, economic, para-military warfare thrown in.

When the latter subjects have been mastered, then, and then alone, will our strategists be able to interrelate the spectrum of positive and

- 27 -

negative programs in a patterned strategy employing our resources to the best advantage. Then, and then alone, can they comprehend the range of means available to us.

Last February the New Republic, in a remarkable example of editorial shooting from the hip, declared the purpose of the Academy is to "propound dogma."

The operative language of the bill, Section 6, reads:

"The principal functions of the Commission and Academy shall be-

"(1) to carry on a research program designed to develop an integrated, operational science that benefits and bespeaks the methods and values of freemen and through which the free world will be able to meet and defeat the carefully patterned total aggression (political, ideological, psychological, economic, paramilitary, and organizational) of the Communist bloc, and through which we, as a nation, may work in a systematic manner for the preservation and extension of freedom, national independence, and self-government. To achieve this purpose the full range of methods and means is to be thoroughly explored and studied including the methods and means that may best be employed by private citizens and nongovernmental organizations and the methods and means available to the Government other than the methods and means already being used. This research program shall include the study of our national objectives and the development of proposals for intermeshing and integrating the full spectrum of methods and means into a coordinated, short and long range strategy for victory, seeking the utilization of our full potential in the public and private sectors; and

"(2) to educate and train Government personnel, private citizens, and foreign students concerning all aspects of the international Communist conspiracy, the nature and dimensions of the global struggle between freedom and communism and the full range of methods and means that freemen should employ to meet and defeat the entire Communist attack in the non-military areas and to work systematically for the preservation and extension of freedom, national independence, and self-government."

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Having participated in the drafting of this section, I can say categorically such was not the intent. It never occurred to the drafters that any reasonable person could arrive at such a tortured construction.

I have seen dozens of other editorials in liberal, moderate and conservative papers in support of the bill, and I am sure most of these would have been hostile, if they thought the intent was to propound and teach dogma.

The New Republic did not stop there, but stated the concept contained in the bill had originated ten years ago among exiles from Communist tyranny impatient with Americans' undogmatic approach to political matters and hopeful of creating opportunities for themselves in the policy apparatus! The idea, of course, originated ten years ago in Orlando, Florida, and all members of the parent Orlando Committee are native born and most, if they were so inclined, could qualify for the Sons of the American Revolution. (See my testimony beginning page 9 of the hearings for a history of the Freedom Academy idea.)

Ours is a pluralistic society. An attempt to arrive at a detailed consensus of our philosophy of government is probably impossible. Two high level government efforts have failed, as might be expected. Yet this does not mean we must continue to mumble when it comes to articulating the alternatives to Communism in Asia, Africa or Latin America, or in explaining our national purpose. These things should be studied and freely discussed at the Freedom Academy. The War Colleges have studied our national purpose for many years. I participated in one of these discussions at the Naval War College and it was a stimulating affair which I believe did much to crystallize the students' thinking. There was no attempt to impose a solution from above. The Senior Officers Seminar at FSI brings in a number of guest lecturers who discuss our ethical values and the national purpose. The New Republic, to my knowledge, has never accused the War Colleges or FSI of propounding dogma. Why is it assumed the Freedom Academy will go off the deep end?

Is it the use of the expression "operational science?" Our colleges have professors of political science and offer degrees in political science. Obviously our colleges do not intend to codify the principles of government and produce rigid, dogmatic solutions. Why the strained construction here? Do I sense a double standard?

The Communists have dominated non-military conflict for so long that many have been conditioned to think of political warfare in Communist terms. Since the Communists propound and teach dogma, that must be the function of the Freedom Academy, etc., etc.

- 29 -

The purpose of the Freedom Academy is to develop non-military conflict in accordance with the requirements and needs of the Free World. Those who think we cannot do this without aping the Communists have lost faith in themselves, this country and freedom. And those who are unwilling to even try are already defeated.

After fighting for a Freedom Academy for ten years the Orlando Committee is heartened to note that others are now calling attention to the gap in our training facilities.

The Sprague Committee established by President Eisenhower to study our information activities abroad included in that part of its report released by the White House January 9, 1961, this additional recommendation:

> "Beyond these steps, there is need to provide high-level training in the interrelated economic, political, informational and military aspects of the present world struggle for more of the top officers of agencies dealing with international and security affairs. The Committee therefore recommends that consideration be given to the establishment of a National Security Institute for this purpose under the National Security Council, which among other things, would provide concentrated exposure to and study of Communist ideology, techniques and operations world-wide as well as our total governmental informational resources and how best to orchestrate and use them."

The members of the Committee were George V. Allen, Allen Dulles, Gordon Gray, Karl G. Harr, Jr., John N. Irwin II, C. D. Jackson, Livingston T. Merchant and Phillip Reed.

While such recommendations are encouraging, there are two serious weaknesses. First, the training would be limited to top officers of cold war agencies, so that Requirements 1, 2 and 5 are not met at all. Second, the research gap is not emphasized and I wonder if the Sprague Committee grasps how far we still have to go in researching and developing non-military conflict. Unless the intent is broader than appears in the report, as released, this proposal would go little further than partially meeting Requirement 4. I say partially, because the training of top officers will be substantially in terms of existing knowledge unless there is a crash effort on the research side. Further, the report seems to emphasize government informational activities when it comes to countermeasures, and this is only one part of the spectrum of non-military conflict.

This recommendation is the type of half measure or quarter measure which I am fearful the Administration may consider an alternative

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to the Freedom Academy. It is too late in the game for such fundamental error.

Dr. Strausz-Hupe's group in their sequel to *Protracted Conflict* have come out for the Freedom Academy bill. At page 263 of this excellent new book, *A Forward Strategy for America*, they say:

> "The United States has established academies to train men for war and a Foreign Service Institute to train diplomats. No comparable establishment trains Americans in the art of psychological warfare. Yet the need for professional competence in the field of psycho-political warfare is just as great as that for military and diplomatic skills. It is in the field of revolutionary conflict techniques that the Communists hold a decisive margin of superiority over the Western powers. . . . Although these methods are studied closely by several agencies of our government, an Academy of Psycho-political Studies should be entrusted with training career specialists."

In an accompanying footnote the authors note, "A major step in this direction was taken by the United States Senate during the 1960 Special Session of Congress when it passed, with no recorded opposition, the Freedom Academy Bill."

Of special interest to you may be the letter of then Senator Kennedy to Dr. Blair Q. Rogers of September 9, 1960. Dr. Rogers in a letter to the New York Times had proposed that a Free University of the West be established on Ellis Island. In commenting on Dr. Rogers' proposal, Senator Kennedy said:

> "You will likewise have read of a bill passed recently by the Senate proposing a Freedom University for training our people in techniques for fighting the Cold War. I feel certain that something will come of this proposal."

Those are heartening words indeed.

I believe I left with you editorials or stories from the Big Three -- *Life*, *Reader's Digest* and *Saturday Evening Post*, strongly supporting the Freedom Academy. Also editorials from the Cleveland Plain Dealer and Cincinnati Enquirer. I thought you might also like to see the enclosed editorials from last week's Atlanta Constitution and Tampa Tribune and the comments in *Newsweek*.

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Despite the unusually strong favorable report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee followed by Senate passage, I believe the bill has
little chance of clearing the Congress without strong White House support.
This time it has gone to Foreign Relations on the Senate side and I believe
Senator Fulbright is waiting for White House reaction. In the House it
has been sent back to the Un-American Activities Committee where
Chairman Walter has kept it buried for two years without hearings. If
the White House remains neutral, I am afraid we are dead.

If the President gets behind the Freedom Academy, this can be
a turning point in the Cold War. At long last we will be able to set about
systematically to understand and develop our national capacity for non-
military conflict. At long last we can begin to graduate highly trained and
dedicated men and women who will give their lives to our side in the global
struggle between Freedom and Communism. These graduates can shatter
forever the image of America as a complacent, self-satisfied, status quo
power, unwilling to give up its soft ways to contest the Communists in the
villages, the market places, the classrooms, the labor unions, and wherever
else this total struggle is being fought.

The President has called on the American people for sacrifice. What
better sacrifice can the private citizen make than to attend the Freedom
Academy and learn how he can contribute?

It is impossible in this letter to answer all the questions or
criticisms that may be raised about this legislation. The Orlando Committee
has worked hard on this proposal off and on for ten years. I believe we can
answer, in depth, most of the points that can be raised. May I urge you to
give us the opportunity to answer any objections to the bill which the White
House may consider important? I will be more than happy to come to the
White House at any time, at your convenience.

AGG/w
Encls.

August 18, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. David E. Bell
Director, Bureau of the Budget

SUBJECT: The Freedom Academy

The following memorandum seeks to deal with the
Freedom Academy proposal. It discusses (1) the origins and
the practical significance of the proposal, (2) the intellectual
objections to the proposal, and (3) the best way of disposing of
it as a political issue.

****

I. The Freedom Academy Proposal

1. The Freedom Academy idea springs from a very particular (and minority) analysis of the Communist problem -- an analysis associated with such names as Stefan Possony, Gerhart Niemeyer, Robert Strauss-Hupe and William Kintner. This analysis rests on the belief that Communism has succeeded because of its satanic efficiency as a conspiracy -- that for half a century the Communist conspiracy has unfolded with calm and Machiavellian premeditation according to a calculated time table and a fixed master plan. This school believes that Communism has developed an "operational science" of conspiracy which it instills into its agents at the Lenin Institute and at a vast network of subsidiary institutions. It believes that somewhere in the Kremlin there is a blueprint according to which all Communist activity everywhere in the world is systematically and ruthlessly coordinated to advance the Communist cause.

2. If Communism has made its immense gains because of its mastery of the "operational science" of conspiracy, the United States can defeat Communism only (in the words of the Freedom Academy bill) by "the development of counteraction to the international Communist conspiracy into an operational science"

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Two

and "the education and training of private citizens . . . in the
science of counteraction to that conspiracy."

The bill calls for the establishment in the executive branch
of a full-time, seven-member Freedom Commission empowered
to set up "an advanced training and development center" known
as the Freedom Academy and designed to indoctrinate American
and foreign nationals in the "operational science" of anti-Com-
munism.

The bill says nothing, oddly enough, about the faculty for
the Freedom Academy, but apparently a full-time staff of experts
is envisaged. Senator Dodd's report on behalf of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Senate Report No. 1812, 36th Cong., 2nd
Sess., June 30, 1960) says: "At the Academy will be brought
together the wide diversity of knowledge and talents necessary
to explore and develop the full range of counteraction to the
vital aggression of the Communist bloc. . . . These experts
would be relieved of other duties so they can devote full time
to development and training." Alan G. Grant, Jr., of Orlando,
Florida, who has been the active lobbyist for the Freedom
Academy, observed to similar effect in his testimony before
the Judiciary Committee, "We must assemble at the Academy
persons with a wide diversity of knowledge and talents, who
have been relieved of other responsibilities and can work full
time on this problem."

As for the students, Mr. Grant proposes "people, both in
private life and government, who will receive 1, 2, 3, even 4
years' training in this Academy and related schools so they can
understand the overall problem and intermesh the whole
spectrum of counteractivity into a true operational science."
In his letter to Lee White, Mr. Grant gives two years as a
"minimum estimate of training time." Mr. Grant also envisages
a one month course for businessmen ("For example, suppose an
oil company wants to send people to Latin America") and summer
courses for high-school teachers.

The object of training is to provide not only information
but "motivation . . . the most important goal in our training

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Three

program" (Senator Dodd). In the words of Gerhart Niemeyer, "I would say that the Freedom Academy and Freedom Commission would both miss the main point of the whole enterprise if they did not motivate their students to go out and do something about it." "Counteraction can no longer be entrusted to half-committed people," says Mr. Grant. "To paraphrase Lenin, we need people who will devote to counteraction not merely their spare evenings, but the whole of their lives." "It would furnish this country," said C. D. Jackson, "with a professional and dedicated corps of political warriors."

What would these dedicated political warriors do after graduation? One of their assignments would be to fan out through the country and indoctrinate their fellow countrymen as they have been indoctrinated themselves. "I have commented," says Senator Dodd,

on the failure of our great civic organizations to orient themselves toward the survival question. I would, therefore, like to see all of our civic organizations, at the national and local levels, send selected members for basic and intermediate courses, so then on their return they could provide the leadership and ideas to enable their organizations to play a meaningful role in winning the cold war.

The job of national indoctrination is to be carried out through an Information Center, authorized by the bill "to prepare, make, and publish textbooks, and other materials, including training films, suitable for high school, college, and community level instruction." In the words of Mr. Grant, "The information center working with the Academy and Hollywood could, for example, turn out a series of high-caliber training films to be used for high schools, colleges, and community study groups."

The 'professional and dedicated corps of political warriors' would thus begin its main work after graduation. As Mr. Grant puts it, "We can expect those who have trained together to cooperate with each other when they have left the Academy. This is most desirable. We can expect them to

Academy. This is most desirable. We can expect them to
together to cooperate with each other when they have left the
As Mr. Grant but it, "We can expect those who have trained
warriors, would then begin their main work after graduation.
The professional and dedicated corps of political
and community study groups."

Hollywood could, for example, turn out a series of high-
"The information center working with the Academy and
and community level instruction." In the words of Mr. Grant,
including training films, suitable for high school, college,
preparatory make, and published textbooks, and other materials,
through an information center, authorized by the pill "to
The job of national indoctrination is to be carried out
winning the cold war.

ample their organizations to play a meaningful role in
return they could provide the leadership and ideas to
torial and intermediate courses, so then on their
the national and local levels, send selected members
therefore, like to see all of our civic organizations, at
themselves toward the survival question. I would,
on the future of our great civic organizations to orient
mented," says Senator Dodd,

as they have been indoctrinated themselves. "I have com-
through the country and indoctrinate their fellow citizens
graduation? One of their assignments would be to fan out
What would these dedicated political warriors do after

"with a professional and dedicated corps of political warriors" lives." "It would turnish this country," said C. D. Jackson, action not merely their share of life, but the whole of their
barbarianism. 'I am, we need people who will devote to counter-
entrusted to half-committed people," says Mr. Grant. "To
something about it." "Contaction can no longer be
but if they did not motivate their students to go out and do
milation would both miss the main point of the whole enter-
"I would say that the Freedom Academy and Freedom Com-
program" (Senator Dodd). In the words of Gerhard Niemeyer,

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Four

form their own liaison committees without any intervention
by this Government. Unless they do this on a voluntary
basis, their training has not been very effective." If one
takes all this literally (and how else is it meant to be taken?),
the Freedom Academy is designed to turn out an elite corps
of individuals specially 'motivated' to propagandize and
indoctrinate their fellow citizens.

3. But what would be taught in the Freedom Academy?
What is the 'operational science' which everyone must study?
In his 31-page, single-space letter to Lee White, Mr. Grant
writes that the graduate

should have deep knowledge of Communist conflict
doctrine, a thorough understanding of political, ideolog-
ical, psychological, sociological, economic, para-
military conflict in all its dimensions, a knowledge
of the wide range of tools in the public and private
sectors which can be developed and utilized, a
conceptual framework for non-military conflict so
that these many tools can be employed flexibly yet
systematically with clearly understood purpose, a
grasp of the infinite variety of organizational forms
and operational techniques inherent in a global struggle
between Freedom and Communism, a grasp of the
systemic revolution sweeping the world and an under-
standing of the range of positive and negative programs,
many still to be researched and developed, which can
assist the new nations toward freedom and an open
society.

It is evident that Mr. Grant is arguing the need for two
separate things: (a) more information about Communist
modes of operation, and (b) "an integrated operational
science for our side" (in the words of the Senate Judiciary
Committee report) "which will meet the entire Soviet political-
economic attack and work toward our national objectives in a
systematic manner."

No one can object to (a). But (b) raises questions. The

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Five

doctrine of "an integrated operational science for our side"
is central to the case. But the proponents of the Freedom
Academy never make clear what their "integrated operational
science" consists of. They apparently have in mind a
monolithic body of theory which will serve as a key to the
future. It is hard to say, because they discuss it in the most
God-forsaken flood of jargon I have ever heard in a long and
tormented academic career -- words which bitter experience
has persuaded me people use when they want to sound
important and don't have the slightest idea what they are
talking about. Let me cite a few examples from Mr. Grant's
letter to Mr. White:

It will require a concentrated systematic research
program involving a broad cross-section of experts
with a maximum cross-fertilization of ideas and
experience to think through the many methods and
means the private sector can employ.

Researching and developing the operational-organiza-
tional know-how and the conceptual framework for non-
military conflict which makes it possible to understand
the conflict we are in in all its dimensions and to apply
the full range of methods and means potentially
available in an integrated, sustained and consistent
fashion.

4. No one says anywhere what the "operational science" consists of; but everyone is certain that it is there and that we must learn it -- this is the faith of the Freedom Academy. In advancing this faith, the proponents are quite openly modelling themselves on the Soviet experience. "Only fools refuse to learn from their enemies," says Dr. Possony, quoted approvingly by Mr. Grant. They evidently yearn for

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Six

the intellectual certitude which devout Communists find in
dogmatic Marxism. An exchange between J. G. Sourwine,
chief counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee, and
Mr. Grant is instructive:

**Mr. Sourwine.** Conspiracy simply means the grouping
together of individuals with a purpose of common
action toward a common objective. Is that not exactly
what we are doing here when we are trying to fight the
world Communist conspiracy? We are entering into a
conspiracy of our own, open, if you please, and avowed,
but for the purpose of making our joint effort come to
bear upon the joint objective of defeating the world
Communist conspiracy. Is that not true?

**Mr. Grant.** Yes, sir. I agree with that completely.

**Mr. Sourwine.** . . . What we will be teaching here are
the techniques of conspiracy against communism.

As Joseph Zack Kornfeder, a Lenin Institute graduate, told
the Internal Security Subcommittee, "If I understand the
purposes of S. 1689 clearly, you aim to create with that
measure the type of college for political counterwarfare
similar to the Lenin School but only in reverse."

"The bill," says Senator Dodd, "is the free world's
answer to the Lenin Institute." Dodd goes on to call for
"free world Lenins to show us how to develop our own
operational science and train our own leaders." He concludes,
"The political warfare of free men, though its objectives and
methods are quite different, is no less a science and . . .
those who represent our side must be trained with equal
vigor and intensity."

So far as I can see, the Freedom Academy is supposed
to train an elite group of political propagandists, imbue them
with a fanaticism equivalent to that of the Communists, and
set these "free world Lenins" loose in the United States and
abroad to practice their integrated, multi-directional, overall,
conceptual but thus far undefined "operational science."

The ultimate logic of this position can be discerned in

The ultimate logic of this position can be discerned in
conception but thus far undelivered "operational science."

applied to practice their integrated, multi-directional, overall,
set these "tree world Leinins" loose in the United States and
with a tutelage equivalent to that of the Communists, and
to train an elite group of political probes/gadgets, impale them
So far as I can see, the Freedom Academy is embosomed
vigor and intensity."

those who represent our side must be trained with equal
methods are quite different, is no less a science and . . .
"The political warfare of tree men" through its objectives and
operational science and train our own leaders." He concludes,
"tree world Leinins to show us how to develop our own
answer to the Lenin Institute." Dodd goes on to call for
"The pill," says Senator Dodd, "its the tree world's
similar to the Lenin School but only in reverse."

measure the type of college for political countermeasure
purposes of 21. 1989 clearly, how aim to create with that
the Internal Security Subcommittee, "If I intend the
As Joseph Eack Kornacker, a Lenin Institute graduate, told

the techniques of conspiracy against communists.

Mr. Sormine. . . . What we will be teaching here are

Mr. Grant. Yes, sir. I agree with that completely.

Communist conspiracy. Is that not true?
Bear upon the joint objective of defeating the world
put on the purpose of making our joint effort come to
conspiracy of our own, open, it how because, and so on,
world Communist conspiracy? We are entering into a
what we are doing here when we are trying to fight the
action toward a common objective. It is not exactly
together of individuals with a purpose of common
Mr. Sormine. Conspiracy simply means the grouping

Mr. Grant is instructive:

chief counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee, and
dogmatic Marxism. An exchange between J. C. Sormine,
the intellectual certificate which devotes Communists and in

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Seven

Senator Dodd's statement: "The Soviets have mobilized their entire society to win the cold war. . . . We must not fight with one hand tied behind our backs. We must also organize. . . . We must be able to mobilize and utilize the vast array of organizations and talents in the private sector." Mr. Grant talks similarly of surveying "all types of private organizations at the community, state and national level to determine how they can participate in the cold war in an effective, sustained and systematic manner." In his view, the Freedom Academy is evidently seen as the fulcrum for the mobilization of the individuals and groups in American society in almost Leninist terms -- "free world Lenins."

It is interesting to compare the conservative and liberal theses concerning mobilization for the cold war. The conservative thesis rests on the *allocation of people* -- their indoctrination, motivation and assignment to specified tasks; property is to be left alone. The liberal thesis rests on the *allocation of material resources*, leaving people as free as possible. Nothing in all the Freedom Academy literature argues that it is important for us to use our national wealth differently from the way we are presently using it. Everything is focussed on the argument that we should train our people to think in terms of a uniform 'operational science.'

## II. Intellectual Objections to the Freedom Academy Proposal

5. The Freedom Academy thesis rests on two propositions:

- that Communism has succeeded essentially because of the Communist mastery of the "operational science" of conspiratorial warfare

- that the way to defeat Communism is to develop an anti-Communist "operational science" of our own.

Both these propositions, in my judgment, are demonstrably

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Eight

defective.

6. Let us examine first the thesis that Communism has succeeded essentially as a conspiracy. The Senate Judiciary Committee report, for example, says:

> The Soviets have been able to expand their empire during this period of inferiority, because they have developed a science of protracted conflict in which they are able to gradually increase their relative power position, using a well integrated combination of political, economic and military methods while avoiding a sufficient provocation to invite massive retaliation. Central to their science of protracted conflict is their skill in political and economic warfare. . . the result of a massive development and training program extending over several decades.

Senator Dodd puts it this way:

> The Soviets have been winning the cold war because they have from the beginning accepted it as a total war, to be waged with all their resources and on every plane, and, second, because they have, through their specialized training institutions, developed scores of thousands of practitioners in the art of total political warfare.

Mr. Grant says:

> Soviet cold war gains have been made possible by the systematic development of the science of political warfare and conflict management, by the intensive long-term training of leadership groups in this science, and by the creation of the diverse organizational structure which can fully utilize the new science and the superbly trained cadres and leadership groups.

> I do not know any really serious historian of Communism who would accept the conspiratorial-organizational argument as the main explanation of Communist success. What the

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Nine

FA boys forget is that Communism is both a conspiracy and
a movement -- and that, over the long run, the conspiracy
has been effective because the movement has been effective,
and not vice versa. The basic source of Communist success
has been, not the skill of Communist manipulation, but the
magnetism of Communist faith. It is this faith which has
softened up people for conspiracy and conditioned them
to overlook and forgive the clumsiness of the conspirators.

It is historical fantasy to speak of the Communists as
magicians of conspiracy. As conspirators, the Communists
have been spectacularly inept through long stretches of their
history (in China in 1927; in Germany in 1930-33; in the U. S.
during the depression; in Yugoslavia in 1948; in Latin America
in the 40's and 50's when they expended so much of their
effort in supporting the Perons, Batistas and Perez Jimenez;
in Albania today -- for a more extended recital of Communist
imbecility, see D. W. Progan's *Is Innocence Enough?*). Time
and time again, the stupidity of Communism as a conspiracy
has been bailed out by the appeal of Communism as a movement
and a faith. Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* is an extended com-
mentary on this proposition. A recent example is Cuba where
Castro has gone Communist, not because of the skill of the
Communist conspiracy (the masterminds who run the Cuban
Communist Party opposed Castro until he came into power)
but because of the power of the Communist world view -- a
world view which ultimately led Castro to forgive the local
dunderheads.

The conspiratorial theory of history is *always* wrong as
a long-term proposition. History shows that Communism
has succeeded, not because of the diabolical efficiency of the
Communist conspiracy, but because of the mass appeal of the
Communist movement -- an appeal which at times has been
enhanced and at times retarded by the Communist conspiracy.

To erect a Freedom Academy on the conspiratorial
thesis would be to commit the United States government to a
theory of history which is stupid, wrong and beneath the
dignity of a great nation.

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Ten

7. The second FA proposition is that, in Senator Dodd's words, "an integrated operational science for our side" is possible; or, in Congressman Judd's words, "We have to develop a science of total warfare." The very use of the word 'science' in this context, by the way, is part of the mimicry of Communism which underlies the whole program.

If the phrase 'integrated operational science' of political warfare means anything, it means that political warfare can be reduced, like physics, to a monolithic body of integrated abstract propositions capable of governing all conceivable contingencies. The belief that such a thing is possible is simply nonsense. There is no such thing. The Communists do not have it; nor do we. If our sociologists cannot develop an 'integrated operational science' of something so isolatable and manageable as small groups, why in the world should we suppose that we can develop such a science in an area like political warfare characterized above all by an infinitude of variables?

Some of the people who argue for this really see it as a means of advancing their own particular ideas by claiming them to be more 'scientific' than the ideas of their competitors. Others see in the mouth-filling jargon of 'integrated operational science' a form of magic which will win the cold war on the cheap. Thus Congressman Herlong, co-sponsor of the bill:

> I submit, Mr. Chairman, that a program of the type suggested in this bill, properly handled, will greatly reduce the necessity for such large defense expenditures when we get to the point where we can fight the cold war on even terms with the Communists. Until we reach that point, we are going to have to continue these enormous defense expenditures. . . . We have here an opportunity, by spending just a little money, to save billions of dollars.

To erect a Freedom Academy on the theory that an integrated operational science of political warfare is available would be to make us look like a pack of fools.

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Eleven

9. I have no doubt that most serious students of Communism in the west would agree with points 5 and 6 above. I can easily imagine how Hugh Seton-Watson or Isaiah Berlin or Raymond Aron would respond to Mr. Grant's manifesto. I have no doubt either that most responsible members of the U. S. academic community would respond the same way.

This means that if an Academy were ever established on the basis of these two propositions, it simply could not command reputable intellectual support. I cannot imagine who could be induced to serve full-time on the Freedom Commission, and the faculty would unquestionably consist of the Possonys, the Strausz-Hupes, the Niemeyers and their satellites, all engaged in propagating a theory of Communism repudiated by most experts in the field.

Also I would think that even the sponsors of the bill might consider it odd to name an institute dedicated to the study of Communism the *Freedom Academy!* If it were dedicated to the study of freedom, would they call it the Communism Academy?

### III. How to Dispose of the Freedom Academy as a Political Issue

9. Despite the array of senators nominally behind the Freedom Academy, I do not think it has great potential as a political issue. Only supporters of the bill testified in the 1959 hearings. In any representative group of scholars and experts, adverse testimony would far outweigh favorable.

I wonder if this fact does not provide one way of dealing with the question. Could not the President say that he has asked a committee of well-known scholars to look into the question and report to him on it before the next session of Congress? All the members of this committee should be men known both for their knowledge of Communism and for their hostility to it. I would suggest the following: Merle Fainsod (Harvard), chairman; Henry Kissinger (Harvard),

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Twelve

Hans Morgenthau (Chicago), Max Milikan (MIT), Marshall Shulman (RAND), Bernard Brodie (RAND), Philip Selznick (California), Philip Moseley (Columbia), Henry Roberts (Columbia), Louis Fischer and Chip Bohlen. If such a committee turned down the idea, it would be dead.

10. One other question remains: suppose one were to divest the Freedom Academy proposal of the nonsense about 'integrated operational science,' is there a residue worth consideration? Are there gaps in our training to meet the Communist issue which ought to be filled?

One consideration to be borne in mind is that, just as Communism has succeeded, not as a conspiracy, but as a movement, so it will be stopped, not by a counter-conspiracy, but by a counter-movement. No amount of technical training of C. D. Jackson's "professional and dedicated corps of political warriors" will be worth very much unless the general purpose and posture of the United States inspire confidence and enthusiasm. Techniques are no substitute for ideas and faith. Another Wilson or Roosevelt would be much more effective in setting back Communism than any number of Freedom Academies. The Cuban disaster was based on the argument that being operationally tough was more important than preserving the world reputation of the American President. In accepting this line, we diminished our greatest national asset of March 1961 at perhaps incalculable cost. Let us not make this mistake again. I cannot imagine anything more pathetic than a group of Freedom Academy graduates trying to organise guerrillas in North Vietnam in the name of what? -- 'integrated operational science'? Moral and political purpose create the setting in which operations become possible.

11. Yet within these limits, certain areas of technical training in political warfare are indispensable. These areas include

(1) language training

(2) a historical understanding of the Communist movement

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Thirteen

and of the Communist conspiracy and of the relationship
between them

(3) interdisciplinary research and training programs
in specific geographical areas (with particular emphasis
on such phenomena as tribalism, nationalism, the
sociology of the development process, etc.)

(4) operational training in combatting Communism in
villages, in trade unions, among students and
intellectuals, in new nationalist parties, etc.

Functions 1-3 are performed in a piecemeal way by private
institutions. These institutions could do a better job if they
had more money. Probably the government should consider
the possibility of a subsidy policy for such programs. The
fact that it will be done piecemeal is inherent in the subject
matter. There is not (and will never be, in my judgment) a
monolithic, integrated science of human behavior.

Number 4 raises the hard question. Should there be an
institute in which Americans going overseas -- State, CIA,
USIA, AID, Defense, Peace Corps, private labor, business
and educational representatives -- could receive appropriate
instruction?

In the abstract, there is an argument for this. Yet I
find it hard to visualize such an institution along Freedom
Academy lines. If it turned out a crowd of US 'operatives'
indoctrinated with a highly schematic and rigid theory of
Communism, it would do us more harm than good. And the
kind of faculty which would be 'motivated' to come full-time
to such a school would be likely to have precisely such
schematic and rigid views.

My recommendation therefore is that a continuous train-
ing program be set up for Americans going overseas, with
courses subdivided according to geographical areas and
also according to target groups (intellectuals, labor,
political parties, business, etc.). This program might have a

Memorandum to David E. Bell - Page Fourteen

resident administration, but its reading lists should be pre-
pared by outside consultants and its lectures given by outside
experts (as at the war colleges). This training should
obviously take place in Washington. Each student should
choose an area and a target group and take an intensive six-
week course. If any students show particular aptitude for
specialized work, then it is up to CIA or USIA or AID or what-
ever to advance their education. This program should not be
called a Freedom Academy and should be presented without
fanfare as a routine training process. It might well be put
under the general supervision of the Research and Intelligence
Bureau of the State Department and be funded under the State
Department budget.

If political warfare training for Americans going over-
seas seemed a good idea, it might be the positive recommenda-
tion of the Fainsod Committee.

I do not think there is any case at all to be made for
setting up a school to indoctrinate Americans to indoctrinate
fellow-Americans.

As for foreign students, they should be trained in
indigenous schools along the line of the Political Institute at
San Jose, Costa Rica.

cc: Dr. Henry Kissinger

The events of August 13, have put a damper on spirits here. I detected more than one tone of desperation in the emotional outburst which greeted Lyndon Johnson and the men of the 18th Infantry. The closing of East Berlin robbed the West Berliners of their last hope for the future, which lay in the re-unification of Germany and the establishment of its capital here. Ulbricht's action underlined, in terms too clearcut to ignore any longer, the fact that this hope had been based solely on illusions. As a result, the local population is swinging over to a pessimism which can only have the slow death of West Berlin as a consequence. The maintenance of the present situation, or even a return to the status quo ante (to which, I believe, the Russians would never agree) would leave us, within a few years, guarding nothing but a giant home for the aged.

I am becoming more and more convinced, that the only hope for settlement of the whole German question lies in a seizure of initiative by the United States. We should propose the calling of a German peace conference, or at least the preliminary discussion of a treaty on the four-power level. As basis for a settlement it might be possible to offer the Russians the tacit de facto recognition of the GDR and the permanent acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line in return for the incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic and the placing of the chief access routes under joint East and West German control. Their free use being secured through international guarantees, possibly via the United Nations.

Such a proposal would, it seems to me, have some chance for acceptance by the Sowjetunion since it grants two things of vital interest toher. It would yield nothing of our position which has not, for all practical purposes, already been lost. And it would provide a securer basis for the future of West Berlin, to whose maintenance we are committed, then the ephemereal four-power status on which we now insist. If we must hold on to the idea of eventual German re-unification, we could label the above arrangement as temporary, pending the establishment of a single German government through agreement between the two now existing. But who really wants a united Germany? Not even the West Germans. Adenauer's talk of resurgent neutralism in the event of a change in present US commitments strikes me as a form of blackmail prompted by the exigencies of the election campaign and completely without foundation in fact. Germany needs NATO far more than NATO needs Germany, and they would need it still more if Berlin were to be reunited with the Federal Republic.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR
DR. HENRY KISSINGER

There is an interesting point or two in
the attached.

Liberation of East Germany instead of
Reunification - THIS IS THE MOMENT

When Germany was occupied and divided at the end of the last war, it seemed natural to assume that in the course of time, Germany, albeit a reduced one, would regain her sovereignty and be reunited. Reunification became the popular demand and the first order of business on nearly all agendas of the many conferences on Germany. What the western nations, including western Germany should have demanded much more emphatically and consistently, is the liberation of East Germany from its satellite government, even at the cost of reunification.

Most students of German history are probably familiar with the arguments about Grossdeutschland and Kleindeutschland, the merits of the Bismarckian State, so that it is not necessary to go over these aspects of German history. The fact is that the German National State under Prussian hegemony failed and brought untold disasters to Germany, Europe and the world. Prussia is no longer, but the idea of the German National State dies hard within Germany and without. To strive for the resurrection of a united Germany is a political error of the first order, enachronistic and not feasible. It is true that the majority of the German people have continuously and loudly proclaimed their urgent desire for reunification. The western nations have supported this claim because they live in unified national states themselves and feel uneasy about the unnatural sundering of German lands. Division, however, is nothing new in German history and is plainly visible in present day Europe. We just have to look at all the people of German or Germanic extraction, living on the borders of Germany: Austria, Switzerland, Alsace, Holland, the southern part of Denmark and formerly in many parts of the Eastern European

[L.C.]

United East German Government.

In order to obtain the liberation of East Germany it may even be worthwhile
to offer to withdraw allied troops from West Germany. One might even go
further than that, but such concessions should be held in reserve for the
actual negotiations.

The ultimate concept for Europe should be for West Germany to become in-
tegrated with Western Europe and East Germany with Eastern Europe. The
German element will ferment in both parts and make great contributions to
the development of Europe, and by the assimilation with the other European
nations and separation from each other lose its poisonous sting.

There is no doubt that England and France will support this plan, and it is
likely that the consent of West Germany can be obtained. The approach should
not be made through official channels, but in a direct and unorthodox manner,
otherwise it might bog down under pressure of conventional German public
opinion.

Unfortunately, there is little chance that Russia will agree in good faith
to the withdrawal of her troops and to free elections, though they have done
in the case of Austria. The proposal may also strike a respondent cord among
other East European nations, particularly Poland. Fear is still abroad among
them, including Russia, of a resurrected powerful united Germany, and this
may be the way to eliminate their apprehensions. Whatever the chances of
success, little can be said by Russia against the logic and justice of this
idea.

G. R. Petersen

September 14, 1945

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

congratulations.
course it is unacceptable.
with the idea of a free East Germany, but of
for letting me see Peteresen's paper. I agree
This is just a note to thank you

Dear Arthur:

Washington, D.C.

The White House

September 28, 1961

October 3, 1961

Dear Arthur:

Thank you for your note of September 27th about Fabregat.

I cannot quite agree with the historical analogy. The
situation would be analogous if the French had established a govern-
ment in Richmond against the will of the Southern states and if
the North had been pressured by Great Britain to accept this fact.
What do you think? this would have done for future United States-
Great Britain relations for a generation?

My nightmare remains that a continuation of present trends
will lead to a resurgence of nationalism in Germany and to Soviet-
German deals on a national basis, wrecking the achievements of
fifteen years of European integration. I am willing to be flexible
on security questions, on access procedures and similar matters.
I have long been an advocate of taking the initiative in negotiations.
But to give up the principle of self-determination as it applies to
Germany will have catastrophic consequences. I would be delighted
to be wrong.

Warm regards as always.

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards as always.

to be wrong.
Germany will have catastrophic consequences. I would be delighted
But to give up the principle of self-determination as it applies to
I have long been an advocate of taking the initiative in negotiations
on security questions, on access procedure and similar matters.
twelve years of European integration. I am willing to be flexible
to German deals on a national basis, wrecking the achievements of
will lead to a resurgence of nationalism in Germany and to Soviet-
My nightmare remains that a continuation of present trends

What do you think? Would we have done for future United States-
ment in Richmond against the will of the Southern states and it
situation would be analogous if the French had established a govern-
ment in Richmond against the will of the Southern states and it
I cannot quite agree with the historical analogy. The

Thank you for your note of September 3rd about the debate.

Dear Arthur:

Washington, D.C.

The White House

October 3, 1961

November 29, 1961

Dear Arthur:

This is just to confirm what I told you on the tele-
phone this morning.

I think the Richardson Foundation is a semi-political
organization engaging in activities which really do not seem to
me properly the function of a foundation. They support something
called the National Military Industrial Conferences, at which I
spoke once five years ago. I did not return after I saw what it
was.

They have also supported summer strategy seminars
at the National War College. I have spoken at the latter twice.
As far as I could observe, these seminars were conducted in the
regular war college manner, and the guest speakers included the
usual roster of war college speakers. The invitations were extended
on war college letterhead by war college personnel, and when I
was invited I actually did not understand that the Richardson
Foundation was financing the seminar. This in itself is a
worrisome thing. I have accepted these invitations in line with
my policy of never refusing invitations from war colleges or
other governmental schools if at all possible.

My view is that no private foundation should be per-
mitted to <u>conduct</u> seminars under war college auspices. This view
has nothing to do with the substance of the program itself, which
I was no able to judge. I have never participated in any of the
regional seminar, and have no views about their substance, but,
again, I would still feel that military units should not sponsor
programs financed by private organizations or give the impression
that they themselves originated them. I would hold this view
no matter what the substance of the program.

All the best.

Conduct