[Lc]

- 3 -

qui ne pourront indéfiniment s'ignorer. Peut-être songera-t-on en Amérique qu'une solution consisterait à abroger les dispositions qui autorisent des accords de coopération sur les applications militaires de l'énergie atomique. Mais une action dans ce sens intervenant contre la Frande serait un acte politique grave.

## B. Hypothèse d'un accord à Genève.

Cet accord répond, pour le gouvernement américain, au désir d'empêcher la prolifération des armes nucléaires. C'est là un objectif que la France peut faire sien à condition qu'il ne joue pas contre elle. Cela revient à dire que si elle n'a pas d'autres ressources pour mettre au point son arme nucléaire que de procéder à des expériences, elle ira de l'avant. Si, au contraire, un accord avec les Etats-Unis la dispensait de faire ces expériences, elle pourrait adhérer à un traité de suspension des expériences.

Or il est probable que si la France n'adhère pas à un tel traité, celui-ci restera lettre morte? Il n'y a donc pas d'autre solution, dans cette hypothèse, que celle d'un accord franco-américain de coopération.

Un tel accord bi-latéral est d'ailleurs assez facile à "vendre" à l'opinion et même au Congrès. En effet si les Puissances occidentales dans leur ensemble se déclarent prêtes à mettre fin aux expériences nucléaires, le seul pays récalcitrant ne pourrait être que la Chine. On voit combien sur le plan politique un refus chinois servirait la cause de l'Occident et mettrait le camp communiste en difficulté (qui sait même si la tactique d'obstruction de l'Union soviétique à Genève n'est pas en partie commandée par la certitude que les Soviets auraient de ne pouvoir amener la Chine à

que les Sovets auraient de ne pouvoir amener la Chine à
tirre à Genève, n'eat pas en bâtie commandé par la certitude
(dut est tâme et la tactique d'opposition de l'Union sovi-
de l'Occident et mettra le cœup communique en citoyenité
au le beau boltoque mu rems chinoise servirait la cause
récofiant ne pourrait être due la Chine. On voit complé-
ter les plusances occidentales dans leur exemple se déclarant
cite à "vendre" à l'opinion et même au Congrès. En effet et au
Un tel accord di-lateral est d'ailleurs seees la-
d'un accord franco-américain de coopération.

sera à un traitement de subvention des expériences.

La disbenaisit de laite ces expériences, elle pourrait admet-
ge l'avant. 21. an contraire, un accord avec les Etats-Unis
ame n'ouïeure que de broder à des expériences, elle ira
elle n'a bas d'autres reasons pour mettre au point son
du'il ne tont bas contre elle. Cela revient à dire que et
C'est là un optéotit que la France peut faire siens à condition
an dear d'embacher la broillement des armes n'ouïeures.

Cet accord rébouy, pour le Konveruement américain,
Habitation d'un accord à Genève.

bollition grave.

tion dans ce une intérêtant contre la France serait un acte
applications militaires de l'anguide stompke. Mais une ac-
quisition d'un autorisant des accords de coopération sur les
on en Amérique du nme solution consisterait à saper les dis-
dut ne pourrait indéfiniment à ignorer. Pût-être songer-t-

- 3 -

[Ir]

- 4 -

signer un tel accord ?)

## 2°) Problèmes de l'OTAN

Les Européens sont animés par des préoccupations contradictoires. Certains craignent avant tout d'être entraînés dans une guerre nucléaire contre leur volonté. D'autres paraissent surtout redouter que les Etats-Unis, par crainte de représailles soviétiques, n'utilisent pas leur deterrent en cas de conflit.

Le même pays peut d'ailleurs avoir successivement les deux préoccupations suivant que la crise susceptible de mener à la guerre l'intéresse directement ou non.

Il est évident qu'aucune formule ne peut régler simultanément les deux problèmes.

Les récentes déclarations de M. ACHESON et de M. FINLETTER constituent un pas important pour rassurer ceux qui craignent que les Etats-Unis n'interviennent pas avec leurs moyens stratégiques. Si, en effet, les moyens stratégiques situés en Europe passent sous le commandement du SACEUR, il devient inconcevable que leur emploi n'entraîne pas celui des moyens situés aux Etats-Unis. Tout ce qui va dans le sens de l'imbrication des forces stratégiques avec les forces du bouclier augmente la dissuasion car elle accroit le danger pour l'URSS d'engager une opération en Europe.

Certes ceci ne donne pas aux Européens la certitude que les Etats-Unis seront toujours d'accord pour que le SACEUR utilise ces moyens stratégiques. Mais cette certitude ils ne l'auront jamais dans aucune situation, quand bien même ils

l'amount tamate dans aucune situation, dans pien même ille
utilise ces moelle stratégiques. Mais cette certitude ille ne
dine les Etats-Unis seront fontonne d'accord pour lui le SACEUM
Certes ceci ne digne pas aux Eurobènes la certitude

q'engager une opération en Europe.

anglement la dissension car elle accroît le danger pour l'EUROPE
ution des forces stratégiques avec les forces du ponctuer
situés aux Etats-Unis. Tout ce qui va dans le sens de l'impr-
incendieable que leur emplif n'entraine pas tout des moelle
en Europe basent une se le commandement du SACEUM, il devient
moyenne stratégique. Si, en effet, les moyennes stratégiques atti
centraient que les Etats-Unis n'interagissent pas avec leurs
BUREAU conjointement au plus important pour rassurer ceux qui
les récuses déclarations de M. VACHEM et de M.

tament les deux propômes.

Il est évident qu'aucune tomme ne peut régler atmo-
Y la Guerre l'intérêt directement on n'ou-

doux broccolations suivant dune la cire susceptible de mener
le même bate bent d'ailleurs avoir enoccasiatement les
conflict.

asfillies avantageuses, n'ont pas de leur rester en ce ce
sont autant reponter que les Etats-Unis, par createe de repre-
dans une guerre non faite contre leur afront. D'autre parois-
contradictoires. Certaines omissions peuvent tout d'une entraine
les Eurobènes sont animés par des broccolations
5.0) Propômes de l'OTAN

arguer ni tef accorq ?)

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[1]

- 5 -

[Lc]

disposeraient de moyens stratégiques propres, britanniques, français. Même l'emploi de leurs moyens ne leur donnerait pas la garantie que les forces du SAC interviendraient en soutien.

Par conséquent c'est de cette imbrication des moyens stratégiques et des moyens tactiques dans les éléments de la défense de l'Europe que doit être recherchée cette amélioration de la dissuasion qui est au fond le seul objectif de la politique de défense de l'OTAN. Cette imbrication serait certainement renforcée si le déploiement et le "targetting" de ces forces stratégiques étaient confiés non pas au seul état-major de SHAPE mais aux autorités militaires de l'Alliance qui ont un caractère moins nettement américain, c'est-à-dire avant tout le Groupe permanent.

Reste le problème politique de la décision d'emploi. Il semble que sur ce point il ne faille pas chercher à être trop formaliste. Si on relit l'art. V du Pacte Atlantique on voit qu'il n'a jamais été dans les intentions d'établir que l'opposition d'un membre du Conseil interdirait aux autres de prendre les mesures qu'ils jugeaient nécessaires en cas d'agression contre l'un d'eux. Si l'on prétendait établir l'obligation de l'unanimité pour la décision d'emploi de l'arme atomique, on aboutirait à rendre inopérant cet article V. Ceci serait évidemment absurde et chacun comprend qu'en fait quelles que soient les conditions dans lesquelles une décision serait prise, nul ne peut contraindre un gouvernement à faire ou ne pas faire la guerre, et s'il possede des armes atomiques, à les employer ou à ne pas les employer.

Par conséquent il est sans doute sage de prévoir que la décision d'emploi sera prise par les gouvernements qui possèdent ces armes et par ceux dont les forces sont appelées à les

doutent ces armes et bar ceux dont les forces sont abattues à leurs décisions d'emboutir ainsi brieza bar les Konverneuments d'un basic par conséquent il est assuré toute acee de prêoir une

agence des armes atomiques, à les embloyer on & ne pas les employer. que nul Konvernement à faire on ne basa faire à la guerre, à l'ordre des les ledelles une décision serait brieza, et ne peut contraindre inobérant cet article V. Cet seroit eigenement spange pour la décision d'emboutir de l'arme atomique, ou apportera y d'ennemys. Si l'on bretailait étapir f'opposition de l'union暴teur d'infanterie nécessaires en cas d'agression contre l'union d'un membre du Conseil interdit aux autres de prendre les d'if n'ouvrir dans les intentions d'étapeur de l'oboutiformificate. Si on relit l'art. V du sheet Affaires on voit semble que aux ce point il ne tait quecher à une probante le prochaine boitonne de la décision d'emboutir. Il

ment.

moins nettement américain, c'est-à-dire saut tout le grand bermais aux autorités militaires de l'Alliance qui ont un caractère stratégique étant coulié non pas au seul état-major de SHARPE renforcée de le dépouilement et le "targeting" de ces forces d'une défense de l'OTAN. Cette imprecision serait certainement de la disantation qui est au fond le seul objectif de la politique de l'Europe une doit être reprise cette amélioration stratégique et des moyens budiques dans les éléments de la défense consécutivement à cet imprecision des moyens budiques bro, prises en

garantie que les forces du SVO interviennent en soutien
dans. Même l'emboutir de ces moyens ne leur donnerait pas la
déboeament de moyens stratégiques propres, prises en

[n]

[1c]

- 6 -

utiliser. Mais le mécanisme de cette décision devrait être au moins aussi souple que celui qui, dans le Traité, prévoit des mesures de défense individuelles ou collectives. Dans ces conditions on devrait pouvoir donner satisfaction aux pays qui ont accepté que leurs forces utilisent des armes nucléaires américaines.

Le problème ici encore est essentiellement celui de l'Allemagne. Mais dans une telle conception si le gouvernement de Bonn et celui de Washington se trouvaient un jour seuls d'avis qu'il convient d'utiliser les armes nucléaires, ils pourraient le faire.

C'est là la garantie maximum puisque rien ne donnera jamais aux Européens la possibilité d'utiliser des armes américaines si les Etats-Unis ne sont pas d'accord. Cette disparité résulte de la nature des choses. Mais sur ce point l'Allemagne n'est pas plus mal servie que les autres. C'est donc par une très grande souplesse du mécanisme d'emploi des armes atomiques de l'Alliance que l'on doit chercher la solution au problème de la "n + 1" puissance atomique, c'est-à-dire de la solution assez attrayante et sûre pour que l'Allemagne ne suive pas les précédents britannique et français.

Mais le problème de la décision d'emploi pose une autre question. Comment les gouvernements européens peuvent-ils donner leur accord à l'emploi des armes atomiques même tactiques aussi longtemps qu'ils sont maintenus dans l'ignorance du nombre et de la puissance de ces armes ? En d'autres termes est-il conceivable qu'ils décident d'employer

.../.

tres termes eat-if conceavable du, ila décident d'employer
ranee qu'nomre et de la briaisance de ces arme & En d'an-
tactiques ansi longtemps du, ila seantintenna dans f'igno-
ita donner ferm accord à l'emploi des arme atemiqulae mème
autre dnation. Comment les Konverneutls enrobedène venent-
Mata le proplème de la décision d'emploi bée une
besa les précédente primitiviste et tranchale.

Inution sases attrayante et augre bours de l'Villemaque ne avoit
plème de fs "n + 1" briaisance atomique, c'est-à-dire de le so-
gne de l'Avance que l'on doit chercher la solution au pro-
gne très grande onpassee du mécanisme d'emploi des arme atemi-
gne u'est pas bien fait activer de les autres. C'est donc par
té reaulte de la nature des choses. Mala amr ce bont l'Ville-
ricines et les Etats-Unis ne seuf pas d'accord. Cette gapart-
jemate aux Eurobènes fa bostéfitté d'utiliser des arme amu-
C'est là la garantie maximum biacone rien ne donnera
bonnirrent le faire.

d'avant d'ii convient d'utiliser les arme anciennes, ila
de Bonn et ceuf de Washington se tronvaient mu fom aens
f'Villemaque. Mala dans une telle concéption al le Konverneut
le proplème fof encore est essentiellement celui de
américaine.

ont accepté une femme teresse utilisent des arme anciennes
conditions on devrait bavoir donner satisfaction aux batai duf
mennes de défense individuelle on collectives. Dans ces
moins anat onble que celui duf dans le Traité, brevoit des
utiliser. Mala je mécanisme de cette décision devrait être au

- 6 -

[r]

[Lc]

- 7 -

les armes nucléaires alors que les effets de cette décision
constituent pour eux des inconnues? Il ne s'agit pas seule-
ment des effets sur le territoire ennemi, c'est-à-dire celui
des satellites européens de l'URSS. S'il apparaissait que
la guerre nucléaire n'implique pas les moyens stratégiques,
l'URSS pourrait répliquer par les mêmes moyens. Quelles
seraient les conséquences de cette guerre atomique limitée e
sur la vie de l'Europe, son économie, la santé de ses popu-
lations, les possibilités de survie, tout cela est absolu-
ment inconnu.

Il est peut-être bon qu'il en soit ainsi puisque
apparemment aucun gouvernement n'a jamais soulevé cette
question mais qui sait si au jour de la décision cette igno-
rance ne paralyserait pas les gouvernement ?

rance ne paralyserait pas les gouvernement ?
déception malgré tout soit à son jour de la décision cette fono-
abaremment anémون gouvernement n'a jamais offévé cette
Il est bent-être pour qu'il en soit strictement biaisé

ment inconnu.

fations, les bpassépifés de amrve, tout cefs est apsou-
ur la vie de l'Europe, son économie, la santé de ses bob-
serient les conéances de cette Guerre atomique limitée e
f'URSS pouvait réppliquer par les mêmes moyens. Quelles
la Guerre n'opérait n'impédie bas les moyens stratégiques,
des satellites émboînés de l'URSS. 8'il abparaissait dûe
ment des étlets aux le territoire ennemi, c'est-à-dire cefni-
consititent pour aux des inconnues? Il ne s'agit pas de senfe-
les armes nucléaires slors que les étlets de cette décèsfon

- 1 -

[x]

[LC]

## BOARD OF EDITORS

Raymond Aron, P. W. Bridgman, John E. Burchard, Clarence Faust, Etienne Gilson, Clark Kerr, Konrad Lorenz, R. M. MacIver, Archibald MacLeish, Paul B. Sears, Harlow Shapley, Paul Tillich, George Wald

Gerald Holton, *Editor in Chief*

Stephen R. Graubard, *Managing Editor*

Katharine Strelsky, *Assistant Editor*

J. Alden Nichols, *Publication Manager*

Dorothy A. Collins, *Assistant Publication Manager*

## ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Daniel Bell, Joseph Campbell, Harlan Cleveland, Saville R. Davis, Karl W. Deutsch, Frank Freidel, Dell H. Hymes, Joseph Palamountain, Richard Pipes, Gardner C. Quarton, Elliot L. Richardson, Philip Rieff, Lloyd Rodwin, Walter A. Rosenblith, Carl E. Schorske, Seymour Slive, Robert M. Solow, Krister Stendahl, Richard Wilbur

EDITORIAL OFFICE: *Dædalus*, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Little Hall 33, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Massachusetts. All communications to the Editor should be sent to that address.

PUBLICATION OFFICE: Wesleyan University Press, 356 Washington Street, Middletown, Connecticut. All business correspondence should be sent to the Wesleyan University Press. Issued from 1250 Fairwood Ave., Columbus 16, Ohio.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: *Dædalus* is published quarterly. Subscription rate in the U.S.A. and Canada $5.50 a year; foreign $6.00; single copies (regular issues) $1.50. Subscription orders should be sent to the Publication Office, Wesleyan University Press. CANADA: Burns & MacEachern, Ltd., 266 King St., W. Toronto 2 B, Ontario. GREAT BRITAIN & EUROPE: W. S. Hall & Co., 696 Keizersgracht, Amsterdam C., Netherlands.

Published jointly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Wesleyan University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 12-30299

Second-class mailing privileges authorized at Columbus, Ohio

Copyright © 1960 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

[LC]

HENRY A. KISSINGER

# Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear?
## A Reappraisal

### *The Nature of the Debate*

FEW ISSUES have aroused more controversy than the relative role of conventional and nuclear weapons in Western strategy. Its resolution is of vital significance for our strategy, our policy in alliances, and the future of arms-control negotiations.

Two facts need to be understood at the outset: no war in the nuclear age can ever be completely free of the specter of nuclear weapons—at least, not until arms-control measures are much further advanced and much more reliable. In a war between nuclear powers, even if no nuclear weapons are used, both sides would have to take account of the possibility that they *might* be. The tactics would necessarily differ from those of World War II; deployment would have to guard against the sudden introduction of nuclear weapons. Diplomats would have to negotiate with the knowledge that any prolonged conventional war may turn into a nuclear conflict, if not a final show-down. Every war henceforth will be nuclear to a greater or lesser extent, whether or not nuclear weapons are used.

A second fact is equally important: the choice between using conventional or nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to us. The Soviet nuclear arsenal is growing. Soviet military journals report tactical exercises with nuclear weapons. We cannot gear our strategy or stake our survival on the assumption that nuclear weapons will *not* be used against us. Even if we prefer to resist with conventional weapons, we have to be prepared for nuclear war as well. Only our being ready for limited (in addition to general) nuclear war will give us the option of a conventional strategy.

Based on a chapter from the author's forthcoming book, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers in press).

800

## Conventional or Nuclear War?

### Arguments for a Nuclear Strategy

With this background, we can summarize the arguments for both sides. The advocates of a nuclear strategy—a strategy of initiating the use of nuclear weapons in limited war—emphasize the disparity in mobilizable manpower between the Communist bloc and the free world, a disparity made even more acute by the Communist ability to concentrate their whole weight against states much smaller and much less well-equipped. Nuclear weapons, it is claimed, can serve as a substitute for manpower. At the very least, they will force an aggressor to disperse his forces and prevent breakthroughs of established defensive positions and the consolidation of occupied territory.

The proponents of a nuclear strategy admit that if nuclear weapons were simply added to the tactics of World War II the result would probably be the complete devastation of the combat zone. They point out that such a course would be senseless. The cost of a nuclear strategy must be judged in terms of the tactics appropriate to nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons are so destructive and at the same time so easy to transport, large military formations cannot be maintained in the field. And they are unnecessary because fire power is no longer dependent on massed armies. To concentrate is to court disaster. Safety resides in mobility. Logistics must be simple. The traditional supply system is too cumbersome and too vulnerable. Accordingly, a great premium will be placed on small, self-contained units of high mobility. In such circumstances, it is argued, damage would not be excessive; indeed it might be less than that of a conventional war of the World War II variety with a flankless front line rolling over the countryside.

A nuclear strategy according to its proponents would have these advantages. (a) The dispersal of troops would separate the requirements of victory from those of controlling territory. To prevail in a nuclear war, it is necessary to have small, highly mobile units. To control territory, larger concentrations are required, particularly in the key centers of administration. For example, the Soviet army required some twenty divisions to crush the Hungarian rebellion. Crushing the rebellion, it is argued, would have been clearly impossible if the Soviets had had to face nuclear weapons. (b) Nuclear war would complicate the aggressor's calculations—if only because it is an unfamiliar mode of warfare. The Soviet Union and Communist China possess many “experts” in conventional warfare; but with respect to nuclear war, the calculations are theoretical. There

801

[LC]

HENRY A. KISSINGER

would always remain the inevitable uncertainty of embarking on a course in which no experience is available. (c) Nuclear war would be an effective device to weaken the Communist control of Soviet dominated areas. The small detachments that are appropriate for nuclear war will be extremely vulnerable to guerilla activity and can be handicapped severely by a hostile population. Since the population on the Western side of the Iron Curtain is more loyal to its governments than are those under Communist rule, a nuclear war is thought to be the best means of exploiting Soviet political difficulties—at least, in Europe—and therefore the most effective means of deterring Soviet aggression. (d) Nuclear weapons are our “best weapons,” the result of our most advanced technology. To forego using them is to deprive ourselves of the advantages of a superior industrial potential. (e) Any other course would impose impossible force requirements. It is admittedly impossible to fight a conventional war against a nuclear enemy without having a nuclear establishment in the field—otherwise, the temptation for the aggressor to use nuclear weapons and sweep all before him might become overwhelming. This means that we would need a well-protected retaliatory force, a capable limited war force, and increasing conventional strength. Since the expense of maintaining each category even at present levels is multiplying, and since the military budget is shrinking, any attempt to build up conventional forces must result in a fundamental, perhaps fatal, weakness in each category.*

*The Arguments for a Conventional Strategy*

The advocates of a conventional strategy reply that the decision to use nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the very concept of limitation. Pointing to such military exercises with nuclear weapons as “Carte Blanche” in Europe and “Sagebrush” in the United States, they stress that the inevitable consequence of nuclear war will be the desolation of the combat zone and the decimation of the population. No country would wish to be defended at that price. Even a “successful” nuclear war would provide a conclusive argument for future Soviet blackmail.

Moreover, once nuclear weapons are used, so this school of thought reasons, all restraints may disappear. It will be difficult

* For a fuller discussion of limited nuclear war, see the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1957), ch. VI, "Problems of Limited Nuclear War," pp. 191 ff.

802

Conventional or Nuclear War?

enough to establish the limits of a conventional war. Because of their very unfamiliarity, nuclear weapons would make the task nearly impossible. The very fact that there exists a continuous spectrum of destructiveness in nuclear weapons, so often invoked by advocates of a nuclear strategy in defense of their thesis, is used by their critics against them. If the distinction between the low-yield and high-yield weapons is so difficult, if so much depends on the manner of employing them, any effort to set limits based on explosive equivalent will be meaningless. The temptation to resort to even more destructive weapons will be overwhelming.

Proponents of a conventional strategy question not only the possibility of limitation but also the efficacy of the tactics thought to be appropriate for nuclear war. Small detachments, they contend, whatever their nuclear fire power, would be extremely vulnerable to harassment and defeat by conventional forces. When confronted by an opponent possessing both a nuclear and a conventional capability, they are almost certain to lose, for they would be largely defenseless against small conventional raiding parties. Nuclear weapons, it is contended, are not a substitute for manpower. On the contrary, because of its high rate of attrition, nuclear war would probably require more manpower, not less.

Finally, our industrial potential will be less significant in a nuclear war. Since nuclear weapons provide greater destructiveness per unit cost than do conventional explosives, reliance on them enables economically weaker nations to redress the strategic balance much more easily than they could with conventional forces. A point is likely to be reached for any given objective or area at which additional increments of explosive power are no longer strategically significant. When this "saturation point" is reached, superiority in nuclear weapons may be meaningless. And nuclear weapons place a premium on surprise attack and sudden thrusts to which the defender is much more vulnerable than the attacker. To rely on a nuclear strategy, it is urged, would thus be adopting a course of conduct which rewards the qualities in which potential aggressors excel.

A conventional strategy according to its advocates would have these advantages. (1) It would provide the best chance to limit any conflict that might break out. (2) It would use our industrial potential to best advantage. Since the destructive power of individual conventional weapons is relatively low, victory can be achieved only through a substantial production effort which puts a premium on our special skills. At the same time, the relatively slow

803

HENRY A. KISSINGER

pace of military operations—at least, as compared to nuclear war—
and the need to build up supplies before such a new advance give
the maximum opportunity for attempting a political settlement.
(3) Conventional defense provides the best means of preventing
the occupation of threatened countries. The concept of a flankless
line which advocates of a nuclear strategy wish to abandon is likely
to be considered by threatened countries as the best guarantee of
their safety. Liberation will always be a less attractive prospect than
protection. (4) If, after all, nuclear weapons were used, the onus
of initiating such a war would be shifted to the Communist states.

Deterrence vs. Conduct of the War

One of the difficulties in resolving these arguments is that the
moral fervor of the debaters sometimes obscures the nature of the
issues and often causes them to claim too much: those who think
that to forego nuclear weapons is an offense against progress have
as their counterpart those who are passionately convinced that even
to consider modalities of nuclear warfare is to insult morality. As
a result, arguments that closer examination would reveal at least
as imprecise and sometimes as erroneous have been elevated into
dogma.

For example, it is often said that a nuclear war cannot be limited
because neither side would accept defeat without resorting to even
larger weapons. Now there are many good reasons for concern
about the possibility of limiting nuclear war. But the argument that
neither side will be prepared to accept a setback implies that it is
somehow worse to be defeated in nuclear than in conventional war.
In reality, it seems much more likely that the decision as to whether
a war is to be expanded depends more on the value attached to the
objective than to the weapons used to attain it. It is not clear why
a country should be more willing to acquiesce in a conventional than
in a nuclear defeat. Whatever the technical difficulties of limiting
nuclear war, the political argument that it makes defeat unaccept-
able does not bear scrutiny.

On the other side of the debate a nuclear strategy is often justi-
fied by the spectrum of available weapons. The smallest nuclear
weapons, it is said, are less destructive than the most powerful
conventional devices. There is therefore no technical reason to recoil
before nuclear warfare, and every reason to use our most "advanced"
technology. However, the effort to base a nuclear strategy on the
discrimination of nuclear weapons surely goes too far. The chief

804

motive for using them is, after all, their greater destructive power and their lower weight per explosive equivalent. Nuclear weapons no more destructive than conventional ones would probably not be worth the increased risk of "escalation" inherent in an unfamiliar mode of warfare.

The frustration in the debate is all too often caused by the fact that both the proponents and the opponents of a nuclear strategy are right: their disagreements arise from the perspective from which they consider the issue. Looking at the problem from the point of view of deterrence, the advocates of a nuclear strategy argue that nuclear weapons are the most effective sanction against the outbreak of a war. Considering the actual conduct of a war, the opponents of a nuclear strategy are above all concerned with reducing the impact of military operations and increasing their predictability. The destructiveness of individual weapons and the uncertainties of an unfamiliar mode of warfare which are correctly adduced as contributing to deterrence can, with equal justification, be cited as working against effective limitation.

Much of the debate therefore turns on the question of what should be stressed: deterrence or the strategy for fighting the war. Obviously, an overemphasis on destructiveness may paralyze the will. But an overconcern with developing a tolerable strategy for the conduct of war may also reduce the risks of aggression to such a degree that it will be encouraged. While the deterrent threat must be credible, the quest for credibility must not lower the penalties to a point at which they are no longer unacceptable. The frequency of warfare since the Middle Ages demonstrates the difficulty of achieving deterrence with conventional weapons alone. On the other hand, a course of action that increases the opponent's uncertainties about the nature of the conflict will generally discourage aggression. If war should break out, however, through accident or miscalculation, it may make limitation extremely difficult.

## Direction for United States Strategy

Some years ago this author advocated a nuclear strategy.* It seemed then that the most effective deterrent to any substantial Sino-Soviet aggression was the knowledge that the United States would employ nuclear weapons from the very outset. A nuclear strategy appeared to offer the best prospect of offsetting Sino-Soviet

* See *Nuclear Weapons*..., pp. 174 ff.

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HENRY A. KISSINGER

manpower and of using our superior industrial capacity to best
advantage.

The need for forces capable of fighting limited nuclear war still
exists. However, several developments have caused a shift in my
view about the relative emphasis to be given conventional forces
as against nuclear forces. These are: (1) the disagreement within
our military establishment and within the alliance about the nature
of limited nuclear war; (2) the growth of the Soviet nuclear stock-
pile and the increased significance of long-range missiles; (3) the
impact of arms-control negotiations. The first of these considerations
raises doubts as to whether we would know how to limit nuclear
war. The second alters the strategic significance of nuclear war. The
third influences the framework in which any strategy will have to
be conducted and determines the political cost.

While it is feasible to design a theoretical model for limited
nuclear war, the fact remains that fifteen years after the beginning
of the nuclear age no such model has ever achieved general agree-
ment. It would be next to impossible to obtain from our military
establishment a coherent description of what is understood by
"limited nuclear war." The Air Force thinks of it as control over
a defined air space. The Army considers it vital to destroy tactical
targets which can affect ground operations, including centers of
communications. The Navy is primarily concerned with eliminating
port installations. Even within a given service, a detailed, coherent
doctrine is often lacking. The Strategic Air Command and the Tac-
tical Air Force almost surely interpret the nature of limited nuclear
war differently. Since disputes about targets are usually settled by
addition—by permitting each service to destroy what it considers
essential to its mission—a limited nuclear war fought in this manner
may well become indistinguishable from all-out war. At least, it
would diminish our assurance and subtlety in an operation in which
everything would depend on the ability to remain in control of
events.

The disagreements between our services are repeated in relations
with our allies. Few of our allies possess nuclear weapons. Those
that do have emphasized the retaliatory and not the tactical aspect
of nuclear warfare. Public opinion in most allied countries has been
mobilized against nuclear weapons by a variety of agents. And
these attitudes are reinforced by current trends in arms-control
negotiations. In these circumstances, it will become increasingly
difficult to concert a strategic and tactical doctrine that is accepted
by the alliance and maintained with conviction in the face of Soviet

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pressure. This raises doubt as to whether the West will possess either
the knowledge or the daring to impose limitations. If it relies
entirely on a nuclear strategy, its vulnerability to nuclear blackmail
both before and during hostilities would be considerable.

To be sure, any limitation of war is to some extent arbitrary.
There is probably some disagreement even as to the nature of limited
conventional war. The problem of communicating intentions to an
opponent during a conflict will be difficult regardless of the mode
of warfare, but this makes it all the more important that the limita-
tions which are attempted be reasonably familiar. Even with the
best intentions on both sides, a nuclear war will be more difficult
to limit than a conventional one. Since no country has had any
experience with the tactical use of nuclear weapons, the possibility
of miscalculation is considerable. The temptation to use the same
target system as for conventional war and thereby produce vast
casualties will be overwhelming. The pace of operations may out-
strip the possibilities of negotiation. Both sides would be operating
in the dark with no precedents to guide them and a necessarily
inadequate understanding of the purposes of the opponent, if not
their own. The dividing line between conventional and nuclear
weapons is more familiar and therefore easier to maintain—assuming
the will to do so—than any distinction within the spectrum of nuclear
weapons. This uncertainty may increase deterrence. It will also
magnify the risks of conflict should deterrence fail.

These considerations are reinforced by the strategic changes
wrought by the advent of the age of nuclear plenty and the long-
range missile. When nuclear material was relatively scarce, it was
possible to believe that tactical nuclear weapons might give the
West an advantage in limited war. Under conditions of nuclear
scarcity, the Soviet Union would have had to make a choice: it could
not simultaneously push the development of its retaliatory force and
also equip its ground forces for nuclear war. Whatever alternative
was chosen would produce a weakness in some category. Since the
logical decision for the Soviets was to give priority to the retaliatory
force, it was then held that tactical nuclear weapons could be used
to offset Soviet conventional preponderance.

In the meantime, the Soviet nuclear stockpile has multiplied. A
nuclear strategy will now have to be conducted against an equally
well-equipped opponent. In these circumstances, numbers become
again important. Because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons,
the casualty rate among combat units is likely to be high. The side
which has the more replacements available therefore stands to gain

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the upper hand. The notion that nuclear weapons can substitute for numerical inferiority has lost a great deal of its validity.

The development of missiles has accentuated the strategic prob-
lems of limited nuclear war. As long as delivery systems were com-
posed of airplanes, air domination over the battle area on the model
of our experience in the Korean war was conceivable. And tactical
skill in handling the weapons *within* the combat zone might lead to
victory on the nuclear battlefield. However, as missile forces grow
on both sides, as even airplanes are equipped with medium-range
missiles, this possibility steadily diminishes. For one thing, it seems
unnesessary to introduce major nuclear forces into the combat zone,
since nuclear weapons can be delivered accurately at considerable
distances. More importantly, the only way of achieving what used
to be considered air superiority is to destroy most of the opponent's
medium- and intermediate-range missiles. Such an operation is
difficult to reconcile with an attempt to limit hostilities. If, however,
the areas where these missiles are located become sanctuaries, it
would appear that a stalemate is almost inevitably the outcome of a
limited nuclear war.

Of course, such a result must not be minimized. An aggressor,
certain that his attack would be checked, would presumably be
deterred. The difficulty is the devastation of the combat zone, which
would be the price of a stalemate. In some situations, it may be to
the Communist advantage to settle for the *status quo ante* in a war
that obliterates the disputed area. If a Soviet attack on Western
Germany should lead to the desolation of the Federal Republic, the
Soviet Union would score a major gain even if it offered at some
point to withdraw to its starting point. The devastation of Germany
might be a means of convincing all other threatened areas of the
futility of resistance. An "unsuccessful" attack of this nature might
insure the success of all future Soviet blackmail.

Finally, it would be idle to discount the impact on strategy of
the pattern of arms-control negotiations. At each conference, nuclear
weapons have been placed in a separate category and stigmatized
as weapons of mass destruction without any distinction as to type or
device. The goal of eventual nuclear disarmament has been avowed
by all states. A moratorium of nuclear testing has been in existence
for two years, and it is probable that a formal agreement will be
signed. Future negotiations will almost inevitably reinforce this
trend. The consequence will be that the inhibitions against using
the weapons around which the West has built its whole military
policy will multiply. Whatever the other consequences of a nuclear-

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test ban, it will reinforce the already strong reluctance to use nuclear weapons in limited war.

These factors will create an extremely precarious situation if the free world continues to rely primarily on a nuclear strategy. The more the pressures build up against *any* use of nuclear weapons, the greater will be the gap between our deterrent policy, our military capability and our psychological readiness—a gap which must tempt aggression. The years ahead must therefore see a substantial strengthening of the conventional forces of the free world. If strong enough to halt Soviet conventional attacks—as in many areas such as Europe they could be—conventional forces would shift the onus and risk of initiating nuclear war to the other side. Even where they cannot resist every scale of attack, they should force the aggressor into military operations which leave no doubt as to his ultimate aim. They would thereby make an ultimate recourse to nuclear weapons politically and psychologically simpler, while affording an opportunity for a settlement before this step is taken.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of conventional defense and of "hordes" of Communist manpower are either fallacious or exaggerated. Both in total available manpower and in its industrial potential, the free world still is superior. And conventional warfare favors the defense. It has been truly remarked that but for the development of nuclear weapons, the defense would long since have achieved ascendancy over the offense. Even in World War II, the attacker generally required a superiority of three to one.

To be sure, in other areas the problem is more complicated. In the so-called "gray areas" of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the Communist bloc can concentrate its manpower and material against countries weaker and less closely allied than are those of the North Atlantic Community. On the other hand, these are also the areas where the political penalties for aggression would be the greatest. An attack on an emergent country would antagonize all the other uncommitted nations and would lead to an increased mobilization of Western resources. Moreover, difficulties of terrain and communications place a ceiling on the number of troops an aggressor could effectively utilize even there. The inability to protect every area locally is no excuse, nor is failing to secure those areas where protection is possible.

At a minimum, the conventional capability of the free world should be of such a size that a nuclear defense becomes the *last* and not the *only* recourse. The best situation is one in which the

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conventional forces of the free world can be overcome *only* by
nuclear weapons. There is no technical reason why this should not
be possible, in Western Europe, at least. Such forces would remove
many opportunities for Soviet gains achieved merely by the use of
threats. They would increase the flexibility of our diplomacy. They
would enable us to negotiate the control of nuclear weapons with
confidence.

## Some Consequences

While a substantial build-up of conventional forces and a greater reliance on a conventional strategy is essential, it is equally vital not to press the conclusions too far. In their attempt to prove their case, many of the proponents of a conventional strategy have thought it necessary so to deride *any* reliance on nuclear weapons, or to paint so awful a picture of atomic war that they may defeat their own object. For, against an opponent known to consider nuclear war as the worst evil, nuclear blackmail is an almost fool-proof strategy. Conventional forces will be of no avail if an aggressor is convinced that he can probably force surrender by threatening to use nuclear weapons. A greater emphasis on conventional defense presupposes that the aggressor cannot promise himself an advantage either from the threat or the actuality of nuclear war. However much conventional war may be preferred to the use of nuclear weapons, limited nuclear war is preferable to all-out war.

Conventional forces should not be considered a substitute for
a capability of waging a limited nuclear war, but a complement to
it. It would be suicidal to rely entirely on conventional arms against
an opponent equipped with nuclear weapons. Such a development
would probably provide the precise incentive an aggressor needs
to employ nuclear weapons and to sweep all before him. A conven-
tional war can be kept within limits only if nuclear war seems more
unattractive.

This becomes apparent when we analyze what options we have
if, despite our best efforts in the conventional field, nuclear weapons
are actually used against us. We would then seem to have three
choices: to accept defeat; to resort to general war; or to seek to
conduct limited nuclear war. If we are unwilling to accept defeat—
and to do so under such circumstances would make us forever sub-
ject to nuclear blackmail—our choice resolves itself into all-out war
or limited nuclear war. All-out war will become increasingly
senseless as the missile age develops. Hence, conventional war can

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be kept conventional only if we maintain, together with our retaliatory force, an adequate capability for limited nuclear war. The aggressor must understand that we are in a position to match any increment of force, nuclear or conventional, that he may add. This realization would reduce the incentive to engage in aggression, and should deterrence fail, it will provide the best chance of limiting hostilities.

It may be argued that this line of reasoning demonstrates the absurdity of a greater reliance on conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons must favor one side or the other. If they favor us, we should use them. If they give an advantage to the Communists, they will use them. But this is not necessarily the case. Unless the superiority of one side grows overwhelmingly, the increased risks of an unfamiliar mode of warfare may outweigh the purely military benefits.

The relation between conventional and nuclear capabilities is subtle and complex. If we are serious about placing a greater reliance on conventional forces, we must reassess a notion which has become almost axiomatic in our military establishment: that our military forces can be equipped and trained as dual-purpose units capable of fighting both nuclear and conventional war. This concept has merit as regards the Navy and the Air Force—or any other unit not in constant contact with the opponent and therefore subject to more or less continuous control from higher levels. But it is fallacious with respect to ground operations. To be sure, troops can be trained to use both nuclear and conventional weapons. They should at least be aware of the elementary forms of protection against nuclear attack. But once committed to combat, the units actually engaged in military operations must opt for one mode of warfare or another. For one thing, it is probably impossible to shift from conventional to nuclear war at the opponent's initiative. The side using nuclear weapons first can disperse, while the side relying on conventional weapons must remain concentrated in order to have the necessary fire power. The front-line units of the side conceding the first nuclear blow will almost certainly suffer heavily should the war turn nuclear. Their protection is not so much nuclear weapons of their own as to have *available* within striking distance *other* units capable of conducting nuclear operations.

If nuclear weapons become an integral part of the equipment of every unit, it will be next to impossible to keep a war conventional, regardless of the intentions of both sides. Even if the intention is to employ nuclear weapons only as a last resort, this becomes empty when the interpretation of this step becomes more and more decen-

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tralized. A regimental or even a divisional commander should not be the judge. Lacking the over-all picture, he will always be tempted to utilize all his available weapons. When he is hard-pressed, it would require superhuman discipline not to use arms which he believes may solve his difficulties. And the further down a unit is in the chain of command, the less can its experience be taken as a guide to the general situation. Regiments or divisions have been destroyed even in the midst of an over-all victory.

While a great deal of attention has been given to the diffusion of nuclear weapons to new countries, the diffusion downward of nuclear weapons *within* our military establishment is also a cause for concern. The more foci of control, the greater the possibility that these weapons will be used—not so much by the action of the "mad" major of the horror stories of accidental war as by the best judgment of a hard-pressed officer in the confusion of combat. An action which would bespeak our increased emphasis on conventional weapons more convincingly than any declaration would be to create nuclear and conventional commands for purposes of combat. The units could be trained interchangeably. But once committed, the conventional forces would not have nuclear weapons at their direct disposal. Deterrence as well as the conduct of nuclear war would be in the hands of separate commands whose weapons would be made available to the conventional forces only on the basis of an explicit decision at the highest level.

The need for separate commands indicates that a conventional capability cannot possibly be accommodated within present force levels. In the absence of reliable arms control, larger military budgets will almost surely be required. This is a price worth paying. But we should not imagine that the shift to a greater reliance on conventional weapons requires only the decision to do so. It will involve substantial efforts, intellectual and material, and it will be neither cheap nor easy.

It is sometimes argued that a conventional strategy does not necessarily require an increase in conventional forces. Our national history reminds us of many wars where we prevailed, despite initial defeats, because of the might of our industrial potential. An aggressor, so the argument goes, would be more deterred by the possibility that we would build up our strength during a conflict than by the forces-in-being available to us at the beginning. The Korean war is only the latest demonstration of our ability to build up fairly quickly, provided only that we are able to hold the initial thrust of the aggressor for some time.

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This view has great merit. Conventional weapons have a relatively low order of destructiveness and yet require a fairly substantial production effort. They therefore do place a premium on the West's industrial potential. At the same time, care must be taken not to draw extreme conclusions from this fact. In both World Wars our side not only had a superior industrial potential but also a vast preponderance of manpower. Nevertheless, victory required a build-up of nearly two years and protracted campaigns whose bloodiness must not be obscured by the horror of nuclear warfare.

Whatever the significance of prolonged mobilization in the era of what is now called conventional technology, it becomes an extremely risky course in the nuclear age. When both sides possess nuclear weapons, there is always the danger that they will be used, regardless of declarations and perhaps even intentions. The risk of "escalation" is a product of two factors: the nature of the limitations and the duration of the conflict. A limited nuclear war lasting one day may involve a smaller danger of "escalation" than a conventional war lasting a year. Aggression may be tempted by the prospect of dramatic victories and the possibility that the free world may not be willing to run the risks of nuclear war inherent in a prolonged mobilization. Forces-in-being are therefore more important than at any previous time in our history. This does not mean that they must be able to hold every square inch of every threatened area. It does indicate that enough of an area must be protected so that the governments concerned consider resistance not simply a quixotic gesture. And the prospect of restoring the situation must be sufficiently imminent so that the aggressor sees no prospect in creating a *fait accompli* and then "out-enduring" his opponents. In short, greater reliance on a conventional strategy implies that we are prepared to maintain conventional forces and mobilizable reserves in a higher state of readiness than ever before. It is as dangerous to think of a conventional strategy as if somehow nuclear weapons could be eliminated from our calculations as it is to continue to consider nuclear weapons from the perspective of our now-ended invulnerability.

These considerations bear importantly on the question of how the decision to place greater reliance on conventional weapons is to be made manifest. Many thoughtful persons have proposed that we should strive in arms-control negotiations to bring about a mutual renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. We should, it is urged, resist Communist aggression with conventional forces and resort to nuclear weapons only against nuclear attack. Nothing less, so the argument goes, will induce us to develop the necessary con-

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conventional forces and doctrine. It would end the possibility of nuclear blackmail. It would remove the immediate danger of a nuclear holocaust.

There is no doubt that such an agreement has many tempting aspects. It would be a stunning initiative if we proposed a formal agreement to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and perhaps a serious Soviet political setback if it were rejected. It would force us to come to grips with the problems of conventional strategy more urgently than seems otherwise possible. Indeed, if a mutual renunciation should be thought desirable, it may well be that a unilateral Western step would be the wisest course. A formal agreement has the advantage that the Soviet Union would have to violate a solemn treaty if it resorted to nuclear weapons or to nuclear blackmail. But this inhibition would hardly be greater than one produced by a unilateral renunciation by the United States. Nuclear blackmail would put an end to our renunciation, and a fortiori, so would the first Soviet use of nuclear weapons. In both cases the onus for returning to a reliance on nuclear weapons would be placed on the Soviet Union—within the limits of certainty produced by what will almost surely be a highly ambiguous situation. The slight additional advantage of a formal agreement would be more than made up for by the clarity and initiative achieved by a unilateral declaration.

However, the propagandistic gain does not outweigh the political and strategic disadvantages. A really effective renunciation would imply that either side—or at least the side renouncing nuclear weapons—would prefer to be defeated by conventional weapons rather than employ its nuclear arms. This in itself will be a hard decision to make. Would we be prepared to lose Europe to a conventional attack? If we are not—and we cannot be—a formal renunciation may be meaningless. On the other hand, if the aggressor accepts a renunciation of nuclear weapons at face value as indicating a decision to accept a defeat by conventional forces, aggression may actually be encouraged.

Assuming that it were possible to return to a pure conventional strategy—with either side preferring a defeat by conventional weapons to a nuclear war—what would be the consequences? It seems inevitable that deterrence would be weakened. The history of warfare in the conventional era indicates that it is not easy to convince an aggressor of the risks of embarking on war. Because of the relatively low destructiveness of individual weapons, the side which can suddenly mass its forces can usually achieve a breakthrough. The key to success is the ability to concentrate more forces at any

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given point than the opponent. In both World Wars, Germany began the war even though it was numerically inferior, relying on tactical skill and mobility. Victory was ultimately achieved only after prolonged and ruinous conflict, which indicated that the certainty of defeat required for deterrence is not easy to obtain with conventional weapons. Arms control can ameliorate this situation, but not eliminate it. Even if forces on both sides are stabilized, it will not be easy to stabilize tactical skill and mobility.

On the historical record, then, conventional weapons are not very effective for deterrence. This situation may even be magnified in the nuclear age. An aggressor may seek to achieve a victory by conventional means and then protect it by nuclear arms. We will then face the dilemma of either accepting the defeat or engaging in a kind of warfare which our renunciation of nuclear weapons was designed to avoid and which seems incapable of depriving the aggressor of his prize. If the Soviet Union should succeed in overrunning Europe or even Iran with conventional forces, it could then offer peace while threatening to resist the restoration of the *status quo ante* with nuclear weapons. It would appear extremely difficult to land on a hostile shoreline or to fight our way across the Continent, say, from Spain, against an opponent prepared to use nuclear weapons. In short, the combination of a conventional strategy for an overwhelming initial victory, coupled with a nuclear strategy to prevent a recapture of lost territories, may be the most effective form of Communist aggression.

All these risks, however, would be run for a gesture which may be meaningless. For, regardless of what we tell the aggressor or even ourselves, we could not guarantee that if pressed too hard we would not use nuclear weapons after all. This uncertainty about whether we "meant" our renunciation or knew our own mind would add to deterrence. It indicates, however, that at best a formal renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons would not weaken deterrence; at worst it may open a new scope for blackmail.

In the nuclear age, therefore, actions speak louder than words. What we tell the Communist countries is less important in the first instance than what we tell ourselves. We should make immediate and energetic efforts to restore the conventional forces of the free world. We must adjust our doctrine accordingly. But it would be extremely risky to create the impression that we would acquiesce in a conventional defeat in vital areas. Once the conventional balance of forces is restored, we could then responsibly announce that we would employ nuclear weapons only as a last resort, and even then in a manner to minimize damage. To the extent

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that the Communists are unable to defeat the conventional forces of the free world without resorting to nuclear weapons, the practical effect will be to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. Even where this is not the case, strengthened conventional forces would pose an increased risk for the aggressor and provide opportunities either for the mobilization of additional conventional forces or for negotiations before we make the decision to use nuclear weapons. The inability to defend every area with conventional forces should not be used as an excuse for failing to build up our strength. The free world must not become a victim of asserting that if it cannot do everything, it will not do anything.

The course we adopt with respect to the relation between conventional and nuclear strategy will determine the future direction of our strategy as well as our diplomacy. This is particularly evident with respect to arms-control negotiations. In this respect, the present state of our military establishment places us at a severe disadvantage. Given the disparity in Sino-Soviet and Western conventional forces, many measures such as a percentage reduction of forces or a troop freeze may be a means of perpetuating an inequality which will be an increasing source of danger as all-out war becomes more and more senseless. The same effect will be produced by our concentrating on nuclear disarmament without addressing ourselves to the gap in conventional forces. We can escape this vicious circle only if we realize that the price of flexibility is sacrifice and effort. If our military establishment continues to be built around nuclear weapons, and if we refuse to make the sacrifices involved in a greater reliance on conventional weapons, the current emphasis of arms-control negotiations must be shifted. In such circumstances, it will not be wise to lump all nuclear weapons into a separate category of special horror. Rather, we should then elaborate as many distinctions between various types of uses and explosive power as possible in order to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear war. On the other hand, if we really believe in the need for a greater emphasis on conventional weapons, we must be prepared to accept the paradox that the best road to nuclear-arms control may be conventional rearwardment.

This is not to say that arms control should be reserved for the nuclear field. On the contrary, the balance in conventional forces should be based on a combination of an increase of our conventional strength and control schemes to stabilize an agreed level of forces. But we cannot rely on arms control as a substitute for an effort in the conventional field. For, if the disparity in local power becomes too

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great, the Soviet Union will lose any incentive for responsible negotiations. No scheme of arms control will then seem to enhance its security as much as its existing superiority. And the requirements of inspection become excessive when the strategic position of one or both sides is so precarious that it can be overthrown by even a minor violation.

This is the measure of the task ahead: simultaneously with building up our capability for limited war and our conventional forces, we will be embarked on arms-control negotiation of crucial import. Our leadership must convince public opinion that we have to increase our military expenditures even while making earnest efforts to negotiate on arms control. The danger of slighting one or the other effort is enormous.

Yet history will not excuse our failure because the task is complex. The divorce between diplomacy and strategy will produce paralysis. If we want limited war forces we will get them only by a major effort. If we are serious about disarmament, we must restore the balance of our military establishment. To continue to combine incompatible policies must lead to disaster.

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