The Washington Daily News, Thursday, February 10, 1972

Resumption of aid

# Nixon's carrot for India

NEW DELHI (UPI) — President Nixon's call for talks with India was an attempt to regain lost prestige in South Asia without admitting he was wrong in backing Pakistan in the recent was, an Indian government source said yesterday.

There was no immediate government comment on Mr. Nixon's call for a new "serious dialogue with India on the future of our relations" in his annual foreign policy message to Congress.

However, the source said the overture was essentially Mr. Nixon's way of trying to justify his "past wrong policies" while seeking to restore his position by the carrot-and-stick method.

## CONSTRUCTIVE

Mr. Nixon told Congress he would seek a more constructive role for Big Power relations in Asia during his missions to Peking this month and Moscow in May.

He said Washington was prepared to discuss resuming foreign aid to India but was also interested in New Delhi's position towards its neighbors. Diplomat observers said linking the two was "highly objectionable."

The government source was highly critical of Mr. Nixon's statements.

"While not repenting his unwise policies, much against public opinion in his own country during the Bangladesh crisis, he appears to be telling India that if she treated the United States the same way she treated the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and even China, the United States will offer a new economic aid and political dialogue with India," the source said.

He said that if Mr. Nixon believes India "will seize the opportunity to get U.S. aid resumed, he will be sorely disappointed." The source said India has reconciled itself to a more austere budget to overcome its dependency on foreign aid.

The message claimed there was "convincing evidence" that during the war, New Delhi was preparing to destroy the West Pakistani armed forces and enter Kashmir.

At a news conference yesterday, Henry Kissinger

## U.S. doctors to help
Bangladesh rape victims

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A team of American doctors will go to Bangladesh this week to perform abortions on women raped by Pakistani soldiers.

Dr. Harvey Karman told a news conference that six to ten doctors and researchers would make the trip. He estimated that as many as 200,000 Bangladesh women were raped by soldiers from West Pakistan during the Pakistani occupation and subsequent war in which Bangladesh won its freedom.

Bangladesh husbands, by Moslem custom, will abandon the rape victims who become pregnant, and the children.

was pressed for details on that evidence, but he refused to elaborate.

Asked if the American people must take the President's statement on faith, Dr. Kissinger replied: "That is correct."

In other developments:

* Two aides of Sen. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., arrived in New Delhi yesterday and said Sen. Kennedy will fly to Dacca on Feb. 14 for a two-day visit to Bangladesh and talks.

* Japan recognized Bangladesh and will establish an embassy in Dacca.

* About 28,000 Bengali officials and men of the defense service of Pakistan and another 12,000 Bengali civil servants in the central government will soon be repatriated to Bangladesh.

* A new communist party, claiming alignment with neither Moscow or Peking, has surfaced in Bangladesh; it is the New Bangla Communist Party.

* Vittorio Winspear Guicciardi, chief of the United Nations European office, headed for New Delhi on orders from Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. It was believed Mr. Guicciardi would travel to Bangladesh in an effort to stop persecution of the non-Bengali moslems there.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1972. PAGE A18

Mr. Nixon's View of the World

From "A New Strategy for Peace" (1970) through "Building for Peace" (1971) to "The Emerging Structure of Peace" released yesterday, the titles of Mr. Nixon's three reports to Congress on the state of the world fairly describe the central ambition of his Presidency and the extent to which he believes he has fulfilled it. Unsurprisingly, his own tentative but generally upbeat judgment is that he is well on the way to succeeding. "We know where we are going," he concludes. "We are moving with history, and moving history ourselves." But of course his various intended audiences—in the public, the Congress, the bureaucracy, the embassies—will return their own verdicts. So will history. And so will the voters next Nov. 7.

Indeed, as one starts through the report's 236 pages, that last group—the electorate—seems first on the President's mind. It is as though the world were going to hell in a hack before Mr. Nixon, by sheer personal virtuosity, assembled a panoply of "new" policies and singlehanded (or, if you will, doublehanded, with Mr. Kissinger) turned the world around. He acknowledges no debt to his predecessors for making possible and, in some cases (SALT is one example) beginning some of the developments whose fruits he intends to reap as his own. He nowhere concedes that a large part of his work has consisted of coping with events, many of them relative reverses in the American power position, and of putting the best possible face on a sequence that was moving in a certain direction anyway.

What progress there has been in making agreements with Moscow, for instance, has not hinged merely on Mr. Nixon's diplomatic artistry but on decisions the Kremlin has taken for reasons of its own. That he is going to Peking is the result not just of his own initiatives—the feeling must have been mutual—but of the winding down of the Vietnam war which began in effect in March, 1968, and of Peking's fear of Moscow as well.

Nonetheless, the report remains by and large the most helpful, serious and intelligent exposition of Mr. Nixon's policies so far available from the administration's own hand. The surprise and pleasure of the report is that it illuminates much of the thinking behind policy, in some instances (SALT, in particular) explains the still-open alternatives, and concedes "sharp disappointments," as in Vietnam and South Asia. The substantive part of the

report is no puff job. It is an important piece of work. It should be especially useful to departmental bureaucrats, who, in this administration, do not always receive adequate guidance from above.

Characteristically, Mr. Nixon puts the responsibility for easing Soviet-American tensions almost exclusively on Moscow, and thereby indicating his pre-summit bargaining stance. At this pre-summit point, he is perhaps entitled to assert that his policy of claiming rectitude and showing firmness has a chance of paying off. Whether the SALT talks move smoothly from the limited agreement contemplated in the first phase to broader agreements in subsequent phases will be one test. Another will be provided in the Mideast, a region towards which the President has recently made a subtle but major shift in emphasis, one that leaves him quietly but fully in support of the Israeli contention that patience and strength are the prerequisites of peace.

A becoming sense that the world is not Washington's to direct and manipulate comes through not only the rhetoric but the substance of Mr. Nixon's report on our friends and allies. For one thing, there is relatively little of the old emphasis on the inherent magic of the "Nixon Doctrine." Instead, he concedes that his gestures to adversaries indeed jostled relations with allies, and he promises to keep up diplomatic repairs. Striking in this regard is his admission that the Latins have in fact formed their own caucus in the hemisphere, as a result of the frustrations they encountered in seeking aid and independence from Washington at the same time. With some vigor, Mr. Nixon insists that the United States can no longer hold out great hopes, or panaceas, to the world's poor. His "realism" perhaps has its reasons in congressional orneriness but we cannot help thinking that a stronger display of presidential priorities could make a difference too.

Finally, Mr. Nixon encourages the notion that the country's future depends in some unspecified but large measure on his forthcoming trips to Peking and Moscow. The drama of these journeys is undeniable; each in its own way has a potential for improving the state of the world. We remain unpersuaded, however, that Mr. Nixon is wise to make so much of them. Summitry has not proven to be proof against crises and tensions in the past, and history will continue unfolding—after Peking and after Moscow, and after November, as well.

AMS 5
NIGHTLEAD HAIG (SCHEDULED)

BY JAMES PRINGLE -

PEKING, JAN. 3, REUTER - AN AMERICAN ADVANCE PARTY FLEW INTO CHINAS SNOW-COVERED CAPITAL TODAY TO MAKE FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR PRESIDENT NIXONS VISIT NEXT MONTH AND HAD THEIR FIRST CONTACT WITH SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIALS WITHIN A FEW HOURS.

THE 31 AMERICANS, HEADED BY BRIG. ALEXANDER HAIG, NIXONS DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, AND INCLUDING PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RONALD ZIEGLER, WERE DRIVEN TO PEKINGS GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE, WHERE STATE GUESTS ARE NORMALLY ENTERTAINED.

THEIR PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH THE CHINESE CAME SOON AFTER PRESIDENT NIXON TOLD AN AMERICAN TELEVISION INTERVIEWER THAT THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA HAD AGREED IT WAS BETTER TO TALK ABOUT THEIR DIFFERENCES THAN TO FIGHT ABOUT THEM.

HAIG IS AUTHORIZED TO HANDLE ANY SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENTS VISIT. HIS DISCUSSIONS WILL BE MUCH MORE TECHNICAL THAN THOSE HELD BY NIXONS CHIEF SECURITY ADVISER,, HENRY KISSINGER, ON HIS SECOND TRIP TO PEKING IN OCTOBER.

PRESS ARRANGEMENTS FOR NIXONS VISIT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE WILL BE AMONG THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WITH OFFICIALS DURING THE AMERICAN DELEGATIONS STAY, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO LAST FOR AT LEAST A WEEK.

OBSERVERS NOTE THAT BOTH SIDES MAY WANT TO DISCUSS VIETNAM. CHINA MAY WISH TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE RENWED U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM LATE LAST MONTH.

HAIG MAY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MAKE PRELIMINARY CONTACT OVER AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM. NIXON SAID IN HIS INTERVIEW HE WOULD RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH THE CHINESE LEADERS IF NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE WITH HANOI BEFORE HIS CHINA TRIP.

THE GENERAL AND HIS DELEGATION ARE STAYING AT PEKINGS MINORITIES HOTEL, ON THE MAIN AVENUE OF ETERNAL PEACE. THE WHOLE BUILDING HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER FOR THEM, AND MONDAY NIGHT POLICE WERE FORBIDDING OTHER PEOPLE TO ENTER THE GROUNDS.

MORE MB/VGA 1245

FBIS 25 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U.S. ADVANCE PARTY ARRIVES IN PEKING

C031432 PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1357 GMT 3 JAN 72 C

(EXCERPTS) PEKING, 3 JAN (AFP)--A U.S. TECHNICAL MISSION THAT WILL HELP PREPARE PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHINESE VISIT NEXT MONTH LANDED HERE TODAY AT 1600 (0830 GMT).

THE ARRIVAL OF THE DELEGATION WAS FAST AND DISCREET. ONLY 15 MINUTES ELAPSED FROM THE MOMENT IT TOUCHED DOWN AND THE TIME IT LEFT THE AIRPORT AND DROVE OFF TO THE CITY CENTER.

THE GREY AND BLUE BOEING THAT BORE THE U.S. FLAG AND THE WORDS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WAS GREETED AS IT CAME TO A HALT BY A LINE OF 30 CARS THAT SURGED OUT FROM BEHIND THE BUILDING AND PARKED (BESIDE) THE GANGWAY. LEADING FIGURES WHO WERE TO GREET THE VISITORS WALKED OUT OF THE BUILDING. THEY WERE OFFICIALS FROM DEPARTMENTS AND SERVICES WHO ARE TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL DETAILS OF THE NIXON VISIT WITH THEIR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. GREETING THE 25 AMERICANS WAS HAN HSU, HEAD OF PROTOCOL.

3 JAN 1526Z COZ/GWG

January 5, 1972

The Washington Post.

Communist forces re reported near Route 13, pos-
sibly as part of campaign against base at Long Cheng-

BBC Program
Stirs Controversy

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, Jan. 4—Despite
tiff opposition from the Brit-
h and Ulster governments,
the BBC will televise its
banned inquiry into Northern
eland on Wednesday.

The decision, announced
day, appears at first glance
affirm the traditional inde-
pendence of the state-financed
broadcasting corporation,
deliberately admired and envied
throughout the world.

Those close to the broad-
sting scene, however, fear
is may be a costly victory.

The last few months, BBC
affairs have been complain-
ing with increasingly stronger
ords that their freedom to
port the crisis has been cur-
led through self-censorship
sensitive television execu-
tives. Today's decision is ex-
pected to heighten the pres-
ure in television to reflect
a government's view.

The government's deep hos-

program will present several
persons, including Miss Devlin,
who will not condemn terrorist
tactics by the Irish Republican
Army. It provides a platform
for two politicians from the
Irish Republic, and official
Belfast and official London in-
sist that Dublin has no formal
standing in the bitter dispute.
Finally, the format partakes
of the nature of a judicial in-
quiry because the Devlin
panel consists of three leading
legal lights.

This opposition was so
strong that last week the
BCC said it could not go for-
ward with the program with-
out appearances by the Lon-
don and Ulster governments.
But several newspapers, nota-
bly the Guardian, the Times
and the Belfast Telegraph,
urged the Corporation against
backing down. This week, the
BBC has apparently recovered
it's nerve.

U.S. Mission in Laos Terms
CIA Base No Longer Vital

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Jan. 4 —The U.S. mission in Laos has begun downgrading the military importance of the threatened Meo base at Long Cheng, according to informed U.S. sources.

Since the shift of all com-
mand and supply operations
south to safer areas, the CIA-
supported base is now re-
garded merely as a tactical po-
sition rather than a strategic
area, the sources said.

However, other American
sources said the downgrading
is an effort by the U.S. mis-
sion to hide the significance of
the partial abandonment of
Long Cheng. These sources
said that loss of the base,
which is about 60 miles north
of here, would be a bench-
mark in the Laotian war since
it has become the most impor-
tant political-military symbol
in Laos with the exception of
Vientiane and the royal capi-
tal of Luang Prabang.

North Vietnamese and the
insurgent Pathet Lao forces
have been stepping up pres-
sure on Long Cheng since
sweeping the Meo and their
supporting Thai artillery units
from the nearby Plain of Jars
Dec. 20. The base has periodi-
cally come under heavy shell-
ing and has on at least one oc-
casion been subjected to a
raid by a demolition team.

An all-out attempt to take
the base is believed imminent.
However, U.S. sources have
said there is no intention to
defend it against a sustained
attack.

Gen. Vang Pao, commander
of the Meos, has moved his
headquarters to a mountain-

top 10 miles to the southwest
and CIA personnel have gone
with their electronic equip-
ment to the village of Ban Son
in the same area.

Long Cheng now serves as
part of the defense perimeter
for support units constructing
new positions to the south and
southwest of the base.

Informed sources speculated
today that Communist troops

may be trying to put pressure
on Long Cheng from another
direction—from the northwest
down Route 13.

The road is the only direct
land link between Vientiane
and Luang Prabang and
traffic between the two towns
came to halt this week when
the Communists took positions
overlooking the road at a
point 115 miles north of here.

China Criticizes'
Nixon Economics

Reuter

HONG KONG, Jan. 4—China issued today a sweeping indictment of the economic measures announced by President Nixon in August, saying nothing could cure the “cancer” afflicting the American economic system.

In a lengthy commentary
the New China News Agency
said, "the 'new economic pol-
icy' of the U.S. government
has run into snags everywhere
and is now on the verge of
bankruptcy only 4½ months
after it was elaborately formu-

TUESDAY MORNING, 14 DECEMBER 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, Dec. 14, 1971

...R

B15

# U.S., Soviet Vessels in Bay of Bengal

By Jack Anderson

A dangerous confrontation is developing between Soviet and American naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.

President Nixon has ordered a naval task force into those troubled waters as a restraint upon India. Now heading for the Bay of Bengal are the aircraft carrier Enterprise, amphibious assault ship Tripoli, guided missile frigate King, and guided missile destroyers Parsons, Decatur and Tartar Sam.

At the same time, Soviet naval ships have been spotted steaming into the Bay of Bengal ostensibly to bolster India.

Even more ominous, intelligence reports claim that Soviet technicians are aboard Indian naval craft that have attacked Pakistani harbor and shore installations. U.S., British and other foreign merchant ships have been hit in these attacks.

Rockets fired from under the ocean have also been tracked. The Pakistani Navy has urgently requested U.S. help in determining whether the rockets could have been launched from a Soviet submarine.

Inside the White House, meanwhile, the President has made no attempt to hide his favoritism for Pakistan. He has developed a close personal

relationship with Pakistan's dynamic President Yahya Khan.

Mr. Nixon, accordingly, has ordered his crisis team, known formally as the Washington Special Action Group, to find ways short of direct intervention to help Pakistan. The hush-hush group, headed by presidential policymaker Henry Kissinger, has been meeting almost daily in the White House's fabled secret Situation Room since the Indian-Pakistani outbreak.

## Nixon's Secret Ire

At the Dec. 3 meeting Kissinger snorted: "I'm getting hell every half-hour from the President that we're not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He doesn't believe we're carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

Adm. Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed the military situation. CIA Chief Richard Helms also reported what his agents had found out about the fighting. Then Kissinger brought up the United Nations.

"If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively," he growled, "its utility has come to an end, and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East."

"We'll have a recommendation for you this afternoon,"

promised Assistant State Secretary Joseph Sisco.

"We have to take action," pressed Kissinger. "The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear."

"That's ideal!" retorted Sisco cheerily.

There was discussion about a statement that had been prepared for Ambassador George Bush to deliver at the U.N. Kissinger thought it was "too evenhanded" and ought to be tougher on India.

To maintain a diplomatic balance, Sisco suggested that economic steps could be taken against India but that similar moves against Pakistan should be announced as "under review."

"It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan," grumped Kissinger, "if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step."

## U.S. Too Gentle?

At the next secret meeting on Dec. 4, Kissinger reported that the President was still fuming over the gentle treatment U.S. spokesmen were giving India.

"The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions," said Kissinger, "not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress."

Mr. Nixon, meanwhile, has disregarded several secret, ur-

gent appeals from Kenneth Keating, the American Ambassador in New Delhi, that the U.S. should be careful not to alienate India.

He reported that he had received personal assurances from Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh not only that the populace welcomed the liberation of East Pakistan but that India had no intention of annexing the conquered territory. India had no wish, said Singh, to provide "even a semblance of Indian administration" but would permit the Bengalis to rule themselves.

In another secret message, Keating sharply disputed a story put out by the White House about the Indian-Pakistani developments.

"I have made the foregoing comments," he concluded, "in the full knowledge that I may not have been privy to all the important facts of this tragedy. On the basis of what I do know, I do not believe those elements of the (White House) story either add to our position or, perhaps more importantly, to our credibility."

It would be ironic if Richard Nixon, who mounted the political soapbox in times past to accuse the Democrats of "losing" China to the Communists, should be responsible for pushing India into eager Soviet arms.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

AP043R

-320-

(SAIGON) -- NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE FIGHTING ON THE VOLOVENS PLATEAU IN SOUTHERN LAOS TO PREVENT LAOTIAN FORCES FROM INTERFERING WITH HANOI'S HO CHI MINH (HOH CHEE MEEN') TRAIL. INFORMANTS SAY THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS AND USPPLIES ALONG THE ENTIRE 255-MILE NETWORK.

THE LAOTIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY IN VIENTIANE (VYEN-TYAHN') SAYS REINFORCEMENTS HAVE RAISED NORTH VIETNAM'S STRENGTH TO 8,000 TROOPS IN SOUTHERN LAOS.

LAOTIAN MILITARY SOURCES REPORT THAT GOVERNMENT TROOPS ABANDONED THATENG, A WAY STATION ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL AT THE JUNCTION OF ROUTES 16 AND 23, AFTER SUFFERING HEAVY CASUALTIES.

HOWEVER, OTHER SOURCES IN VIENTIANE SAY A BATTALION OF GOVERNMENT REINFORCEMENTS REACHED THATENG AND HAD CONTROL OF THE TOWN. THESE SOURCES SAID LAOTIAN CASUALTIES IN THE FIGHTING LAST WEEK WERE MODERATE.

SOURCES SAY NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS CONTINUE TO POUR SUPPLIES THROUGH THE MOUNTAIN PASSES ON THE BORDER AND INTO THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL. MILITARY SOURCES IN VIENTIANE SAY THE TRAFFIC IN THE CURRENT DRY SEASON HAD INCREASED TO ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS LAST YEAR.

INFORMANTS IN SAIGON SAY RAINS AND OVERCAST SKIES THE PAST THREE DAYS HAD RESTRICTED U-S AIR STRIKES IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE.

IN NORTHERN LAOS, INFORMED SOURCES SAY U-S AIR FORCE PLANES DROPPED SEVERAL 5,000-POUND BOMBS IN AN ATTEMPT TO BURY ABOUT 30 NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS HOLED UP IN A CAVE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN RETURNING FROM A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION NEAR THE U-S CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S LONG CHENG BASE WHEN A LAOTIAN PATROL SPOTTED THEM EIGHT MILES EAST OF THE BASE. THE RESULTS OF THE AIR STRIKES WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY KNOWN.

IN CAMBODIA, THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF ANY MAJOR FIGHTING IN THE CHUP (CHOOP) RUBBER PLANATION. SIX THOUSAND SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS OPENED A THREE-PRONG DRIVE YESTERDAY TO DESTROY A NORTH VIETNAMESE HEADQUARTERS IN THE 75-SQUARE-MILE PLANTATION.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ATTACKED A GOVERNMENT OUTPOST JUST BELOW THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THIRTEEN NORTH VIETNAMESE AND FOUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE REPORTED KILLED, AND FIVE GOVERNMENT SOLIDERS WERE WOUNDED.

RS-GS400AES DEC. 14

AP053R

THIS JUST IN...

(SAIGON)--MILITARY SPOKESMEN SAY SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOP TODAY SEIZED THE CAMBODIAN RUBBER PLANTATION TOWN OF CHUP (CHOOP) WITHOUT ANY OPPOSITION. ONE OFFICER SAYS: ''WE NOW CONTROL CHUP.'' HE ADDS THAT RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS HAVE FANNED OUT INTO THE 75-SQUARE-MILE PLANTATION.

TUESDAY MORNING, 21 DECEMBER 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST
Tuesday, Dec. 21, 1971

E 15

# U.S. Task Force Didn't Frighten India

By Jack Anderson

The dramatic appearance of a U.S. naval task force in the Bay of Bengal on the eve of the Pakistani surrender, it now appears, didn't intimidate India at all but merely strengthened her ties with Russia.

In New Delhi, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai M. Pegov gave India secret assurances that "a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and . . . will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene."

He also promised, in case of a Chinese attack across the Halalayas, that Russia "would open a diversionary action in Sinklang." In short, he promised Soviet military action against both the U.S. and China if they intervened on Pakistan's side.

The fascinating story of big-power intrigue during the Indian-Pakistan fighting is told in secret diplomatic dispatches and intelligence reports.

It was precisely this sort of secret maneuvering that got the U.S. deeply embroiled in the Vietnam war before the American people realized what was going on. We believe it is in the public interest, therefore, to publish excerpts from the secret documents.

In earlier columns, we told how presidential adviser Henry Kissinger assured reporters the U.S. wasn't anti-India at the same time he was instructing government policy-

makers to take steps against India.

"The President does not want to be evenhanded," Kissinger emphasized at their secret strategy sessions. "The President believes India is the attacker."

## Wrong Side

The State Department's professionals argued that, morally, the U.S. should be on the side of the Bengalis, who wanted their independence from Pakistan. The experts also warned that President Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy would only drive India into Soviet arms.

Kissinger gruffly disputed this, saying of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: "The lady is cold blooded and tough and will not turn India into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique."

Heeding Kissinger and disregarding the professional advice, Mr. Nixon took a tough stand at the United Nations against India and ordered the Seventh Fleet to send a task force into Indian waters.

This was definitely intended as a "show of force," although the flotilla had the additional mission of evacuating stranded Americans from embattled Dacca if the need arose.

Plans were made, meanwhile, to arrange provocative leaks in such places as Djakarta, Manila and Singapore of the task force's approach. By the time the ships had assembled in the Malacca Strait,

both the Indians and Soviets were well aware they were on the way.

This merely served to bring India and Russia closer together. A secret intelligence report, giving a "reliable" account" of Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov's conversations with Indian officials, declared:

"Pegov stated that Pakistan is trying to draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, however, does not believe that either country will intervene.

"According to Pegov, the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effort by the U.S. to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces.

"Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene.

## Soviet Threat

"If China should decide to intervene," said Pegov, "the Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinklang. Pegov also commented that after Dacca is liberated and the Bangladesh government is installed, both the U.S. and China will be unable to act and will change their current attitude toward the crisis."

Another intelligence report, giving the secret details of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov's mission to

India, indicates there had been some Soviet impatience over the pace of the Indian blitzkreig.

Kuznetsov, after his arrival in New Delhi on Dec. 12, told Indian officials that the Kremlin was "impatient with the Indian armed forces for their ability to liberate Bangladesh within the ten-day time frame mentioned before the out break of hostilities."

Kuznetsov pointed out, according to the secret report, that Soviet opposition to a cease-fire "becomes more untenable the longer the war goes on in the east."

"While Kuznetsov said the Soviet Union will continue to use its veto to stall any efforts to bring about a cease-fire for the present, he stressed the importance of quick and decisive Indian action in liberating Bangladesh in the shortest time possible.

"Kuznetsov delayed his scheduled return to Moscow because he is awaiting special instructions from Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party regarding India's request that the Soviet Union sign a defense agreement with the Bangladesh government after Soviet recognition of Bangladesh."

"According to Kuznetsov, Brezhnev was not in Moscow when Kuznetsov sent him the request for guidance."

The American people, meanwhile, are entitled to straight talk from their leaders.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

NEW YORK TIMES - 21 DECEMBER 1971 P-11

# U.S. Troops: Security Blanket in a Changing

## Europe

The following article is one of a series by the Washington correspondent of The New York Times assessing reaction abroad to United States foreign policy.

By MAX FRANKEL

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 19—Britain's essential problem with the United States these days can be stated fairly simply: The people are indifferent toward almost anything American, the Government is annoyed with much that is done in Washington and the official policy is to do everything possible to keep

News Analysis

American troops and commitments fully engaged in Europe. In fact, nervousness about

a reduction of the American forces—even a reduction matched by Soviet disengagement in Central Europe—is the most conspicuous common element in the current policies of Britain, France and West Germany.

The allies cling to the merican presence as to a security blanket, not because they oppose change in Europe but because they fear that the changes already under way may tip the balance to the overwhelming political advantage of the Russians. They cling to the harder because they realize that the prospects for a genuine European defense policy remain slight and remote.

Reliance upon credible American protection has made for a "nice and comfortable" balance on the Continent and stability

The diplomacy of the Conservative British Government of Prime Minister Heath is widely felt here to have a Gaulist tinge. It betrays a more rigorous effort than before to define British national interests and to pursue them independently of the United States and of vague notions of international amity.

Mr. Heath risked political turmoil by leading Britain into the European Common Market. He defied the climate of improvement in East-West relations by evicting a hundred Soviet spies and accepting the retaliatory chill in relations. He does not disguise his resentment of the Nixon Administration for failing to consult about the President's journeys to Peking and Moscow and for treating the allies as adversaries throughout the trade and monetary crises.

Restoring a decent measure of consultation and collaboration is listed here as Mr. Heath's principal objective in his Bermuda meeting with the President. Furthermore, as several influential officials and observers here remark, the desire to keep the United States militarily engaged in Europe is so great that the allies will take —and give—a good deal for it.

### Doubts and Uneasiness

There are deep doubts throughout Europe about the capacity of the United States to maintain its forces, no matter how often President Nixon reasserts his commitment. Moreover, there is increasing uneasiness about the widening pattern of direct Soviet-American negotiation and accommodation because they work to diminish Washington's sense of prior commitment to Western Europe.

### New Bond With France

The British feel less menaced by institutional collaboration among the allies, but they sense a developing bond with the French in the diplomacy of balance. Both are worried about neutralist tendencies in West Germany and both will be trying to hold the Bonn Government tied firmly to the West as well as to keep the Americans at full strength in Europe.

The German Interest in American troops flows from a desire to preserve maximum bargaining strength in the active pursuit of a new relationship with the Soviet Union and East Germany. As a result Bonn has taken the lead in Europe to help ease the financial burden for the United States.

The West Germans have also taken the lead in pressing for the continental security conference that the Russians seek as a means of ratifying Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and of winning a still larger measure of recognition for the independence and sovereignty of East Germany. While the West Germans work to preserve a secure rear in the West, it is in the East that they find diplomatic adventure and potential profit.

The British and the French, for their part, are far from trusting about Soviet intentions in Europe and far from reassured about the cohesion of the non-Communist nations on the Continent. They are afraid that West German policies will gradually facilitate the growth of Soviet influence and a reduction in the American presence. The view of the Government of Chancellor Willy Brandt that

Moscow acts as a barometer of public opinion in Europe, and the British are progressively drawing down their troops in Germany for the force in Northern Ireland.

The proportions of military spending will not be increased by the allies and the rising costs of equipment will add further pressure for manpower reductions. It is commonly felt that if the United States reduces its forces in Europe, even in exchange for Soviet withdrawals, then West Germany will feel compelled to demobilize some of its forces while the smaller countries in the alliance relax their modest efforts even further.

The Germans feel so little confidence in the alliance that they insist on dealing directly with Washington to arrange their growing payments to offset the dollar drain of the American presence.

### Only a Peon Substitute

They are also unenthusiastic about the incipient talk of nuclear cooperation between the Heath and Pompidou Governments. Even in the unlikely event that it could someday grow into collaboration and win the necessary American technical support, the Germans would see the result as a British-French deterrent, not an allied force, and in no sense a substitute for their dependence on American nuclear power.

It is against that background that the Europeans nervously watch the pressures for troop cuts in the United States Senate, a budget-conscious Pentagon and a dollar-defending Treasury. All see President Nixon's declared readiness to confer with the Soviet Union on mutual reductions in Europe as a device for resisting those pressures and for eventually

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, Dec. 30, 1971

D 19

# Jungle War Blunders Are Cited

By Jack Anderson

Publication of the secret Pentagon Papers exposed, all too late, the miscalculations and misrepresentations that entangled the U.S. in a jungle war in faraway Vietnam.

Without waiting for history to overtake the Indian-Pakistani war, therefore, we have decided to publish highlights from the secret White House Papers dealing with the crisis.

These papers bear a variety of stamps—"Secret: Sensitive," "Eyes Only," "Special (special category) Exclusive," "Noform" (no foreign dissemination) and other classifications even more exotic.

Yet astonishingly, the documents contain almost no information that could possibly jeopardize the national security. On the contrary, the security labels are used to hide the activities—and often the blunders—of our readers.

We believe the public is entitled to know about these blunders.

Here are our conclusions from studying the White House Papers:

## Blunders Cited

* President Nixon, apparently because he liked Pakistan's strongman Yahya Khan and disliked India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, placed the U.S. on the side of a minor military dictatorship against the world's largest democracy. Thereby he aligned

the U.S. against the Bengalis, whose freedom Yahya had brutally repressed. He overturned their free election, jailed their elected leader and sent troops to terrorize the populace.

* The President gruffly erroneously the advice of the State Department's professionals who urged him to use his special influence with Yahya to stop the Pakistani persecution and to grant the Bengalis a measure of autonomy. When the Indian Army finally came to the aid of the Bengalis, the pros pleaded with Mr. Nixon to remain neutral if for no other reason than Pakistan looked like a sure loser. Instead, he supported the repressor and associated the U.S. with Pakistan's eventual humiliation.

* In a fit of petulance, the President sent a naval task force to the Bay of Bengal and risked a military confrontation with Soviet warships.

* As a reward, the Russians are expected to seek military bases on the subcontinent. "The Soviet military ambition in this exercise is to obtain permanent usage of the port of Visakhapatnam," suggested Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy chief, at a secret strategy session. An intelligence report also declares that Bangladesh, the new Bengali state, has "already offered military bases in Chitta gong to the Soviet Union in exchange for economic aid."

* At the height of the two-

week war, the White House scrambled around for some way to rush arms shipments to Pakistan. This would have been a violation of our own 1965 arms embargo against both India and Pakistan.

## Secret Minutes

Here are excerpts from the "Secret Sensitive" minutes of Kissinger's White House strategy sessions:

> "Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan," declare the Dec. 6 minutes. "Mr. Van Hollen (Asian expert, State Department) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient.

> "Mr. Sisco (Assistant State Secretary in charge of Asian affairs) went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat, we will be getting emergency requests from them. Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests...

> "Mr. Packard (Deputy Defense Secretary) then said we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed but said it should be done very quietly."

The Dec. 8 minutes pick up the subject again: "Dr. Kissinger referred to an expression of interest by King Hus-

sein relative to the provision of F-104s to Pakistan...

> "Ambassador Johnson (Ambassador-at-large) said that we must examine the possible effects that additional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104s might not make any difference once the real war in (West Pakistan) starts. They could be considered only a token...

> "Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved..."

The following day, a secret message was flashed to Ambassador to Jordan L. Dean Brown: "You should tell King Hussein we fully appreciate heavy pressure he feels himself under by virtue of request from Pakistan. We are nevertheless not yet in a position to give him definite response. Whole subject remains under intensive review at very high level of USG."

In New Delhi, Ambassador to India Kenneth Keating received a copy of the secret orders to Brown. Keating sent an anguished message to Washington, pleading: "Any action other than rejection (of the plan to ship planes to Pakistan by way of Jordan) would pose enormous further difficulties in Indo-U.S. relations."

We will print additional excerpts from the White House Papers in future columns.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 30 DECEMBER 1971

# Is Britain bluffing with Malta pullout order?

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

London
The British have called Dom Mintoff's bluff. Or did they?

It is a question that is going to be of some importance to NATO. British, and also NATO, forces could now be withdrawn from the strategic Mediterranean island of Malta.

Mr. Mintoff is the island's Prime Minister. Ever since he assumed office in June of this year—with only a majority of one in the legislature—he has been trying to get more money from Britain for the base facilities which the British (and NATO) have hitherto had in Malta's fine natural harbor at Valletta.

Mr. Mintoff has repeatedly set deadlines to send the British packing if they do not meet his terms. The British Government of Prime Minister Edward Heath has tended to react throughout with a studied calm and a refusal to panic in the face of Mr. Mintoff's virtual ultimatums.

London's reaction to the most recent of these Wednesday was the laconic announcement that it was setting in hand immediately preparations for the withdrawal of British forces from Malta.

It still remains to be seen, however, whether this is the final word—in other words, just how much bluff there might be in these exchanges.

Mr. Mintoff originally declared he would give the allies notice to quit if their yearly aid to the island was not increased to £30 million (then $72 million). He then signed a new aid and friendship agreement with oil-rich Libya. Now he has successfully negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Union, which among other things will enable Soviet ships, including warships, to be repaired in

NEW YORK POST
29 DEC 1971 (30)

## He 'Heals' Wounded By Phone

By GALE TOLLIN

MINNEAPOLIS (AP)—His friends call him “Doc” but Felton Jenkins is a physicist-engineer and not a physician. He does his healing in the basement of his home, using eight powerful short-wave radios and three telephone lines to deliver therapy to wounded servicemen in Vietnam.

"It's my way of saying thanks to the boys," explains Jenkins.

For the past four years Jenkins has been devoting much of his time and money to putting wounded soldiers in voice contact with their families. Six days a week— with Sundays off—he is up at 6 a.m. seated among his microphones, dials and speakers. He handles 25 to 30 contacts each morning, in about three hours, and the number has

NEW YORK TIMES 30 DECEMBER 1971

## Malta's Stormy History Linked to Strategic Site

By JOSEPH COLLINS
Special to The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 29—The stormy history of the island of Malta has been linked through the ages with its geographical position—right in the middle of the Mediterranean.

As Winston Churchill said during World War II: "The record of the Maltese people throughout that long history is a record of constancy and fortitude."

Such qualities could stand Malta in good stead if Britain severs her military connection with the island and takes her economic props away.

In 1940, the island became a bastion against the combined might of Germany and Italy. But Malta had been a focal point for wide struggles right from the Middle Ages. Then it was the fight between Cross and Crescent.

In the 16th century the Byzantine Emperor Charles V established the Knights of St. John there.

In a war between Britain and France, Napoleon's garrisons capitulated there in 1800 and thus the French lifeline to Egypt and the East was severed.

British Colony in 1814

The island became a Brit-

sure on Malta because, although Mediterranean convoys could no longer take shelter there, the British submarines based on Malta harried German and Italian shipping to North Africa.

Several squadrons of British Hurricanes and some Spitfires were installed on the island and they provided an umbrella for the convoys that brought in the food to the islanders.

Many freighters were lost on the dreaded run through the Strait of Gibraltar and 1,000 miles up the Mediterranean. They faced the threat of dive bombers most of the way.

### Air Shelters Are Dug

Later, the British squadrons went on the offensive and by the fall of 1942 were attacking Rommel's armored divisions in Libya.

Often the young pilots, fresh from England, were more worried about an attack of Malta Dog than attack by the enemy. This was a stomach complaint common among newcomers on the hot, dusty island.

The resolution of the civilians was strengthened by the merciless bombing of their towns.

Lieut. Gen. Sir William

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, Jan. 1, 1972

B7

# U.S., U.N. Damaged by Indian Blitz

By Jack Anderson

Pakistan wasn't the only loser of the bloody, two-week war over Bangladesh. The Indian blitz also badly damaged two bigger victims.

We have already shown from the secret White House Papers that the United States suffered a strategic defeat. Thanks to President Nixon's bungling, Russia has emerged as India's partner, and the United States is out in the cold on the Indian subcontinent.

The other big loser is the United Nations, which failed dismally to keep the peace between India and Pakistan. The U.N.'s impotence, as it groped for an international consensus to end the struggle, caused President Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, to blurt at a secret White House meeting:

> "If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end, and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East."

America's U.N. Ambassador, George Bush, suggested in one secret report that Secretary General U Thant's ineffectiveness might be attributed to "physical strain due to his recent illness." But Kissinger put the matter more bluntly by calling the U.N. wrangle a "farce."

Kissinger made clear his contempt for the U.N. at a

White House strategy session on Dec. 4.

> "We will have difficulty in the U.N.," suggested Samuel DePalma, the State Department's specialist in international organizations, "because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do."

> "We have told the Paks we would make our statement," replied Kissinger. "Let's go ahead and put in our own statement anyway regardless of what other countries want to do. We need now to make our stand clear even though it has taken us two weeks of fiddling."

## Kissinger's Comments

The secret minutes continue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N. itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war."

At this point, Kissinger declared: "Nothing will happen at the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce."

> "The Soviet tactic will be to stall, as they do not want a cease-fire yet," agreed Christopher Van Hollen, another State Department expert.

DePalma said the Indians "could shilly-shally for three or four days"—long enough,

chimed in CIA director Richard Helms, "for them to occupy East Pakistan.

Footnote: When Indian troops threatened Dacca, Secretary General U Thant's first reaction was to evacuate the U.N. mission.

This brought stern, secret instructions from State Secretary Bill Rogers to Ambassador Bush: "Request U.S.U.N. (U.S. delegation) to convey to SYG (Secretary General) or appropriate senior official our deep concern regarding decision of SYG to withdraw all U.N. officials from East Pakistan as demanded by Indian government.

> "In earlier message from Dacca, U.N. group in East Pakistan was cited as having been instructed by U.N.N.Y. (U.N. headquarters) to 'defer evacuation of U.N. officials so they may be in place for possible assistance in arranging ceasefire..."

> "Suggest in course of discussion you stress critical role which U.N. can play in protecting human rights and seeking peace during current crisis."

## Washington Whirl

Reverse Justice—We reported earlier that the Justice Department was trying to reduce a U.S. Court of Claims commissioner's damage recommendation to a Miami Herald photographer named Doug Kennedy who was wounded by American Marines in the Dominican Republic six years

ago. The court recommended Kennedy receive $100,000. Subsequently, however, he was stricken with cancer. So the Justice Department promptly sought to cut down his award on the ground that cancer had reduced his life expectancy. Now Kennedy has died and his wife and child need the award more than ever.

PX Blues—Three separate surveys taken by the Pentagon, a civilian research firm and the Army itself have turned up widespread dissatisfaction with the multibillion-dollar commissary system. The Pentagon study found "customers rated commissary service unsatisfactory." The civilian survey showed 76.9 per cent of commissary customers wanted a better selection. The Army discovered that, out of eight aspects of military life, the commissaries and post exchanges ranked seventh. Meanwhile, despite revelations of waste and corruption in the system, the generals in charge continue to assure Defense Secretary Mel Laird that all is well.

Dole's Dunning—Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.), the brassy Republican National Chairman, has sent out letters soliciting $50 and $75 contributions for the Senate campaign of his old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (R-Mich.). But the letters were sent to non-Michigan money men, thus angering other GOP candidates who see the dunning as poaching on their homestead preserves.

© 1972, Bell-McClure Syndicate

B8

Saturday, Jan. 1, 1972
...R1

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Gunman on Bridge Took His Own Life

SHOOT, From B1

another resident of the 413 N. Washington Street apartment reported to them that a man he knew as John S. Jones stole a .22-caliber rifle from his apartment.

Police said that rifle was apparently the weapon used to disarm the park policeman. It was found Thursday night in a flower bed near the Jefferson Memorial.

On Dec. 23, police said, Jones, listing himself as a student, applied to the Potomac Arms Company in Alexandria to purchase a Browning .380 caliber automatic pistol. But by Thursday, the necessary police clearance had not come through.

Jones' father, John S. Jones Sr., lives at North Manor Circle, Takoma Park. Since his return from the Marines, Jones had been living there with an aunt, Gladys Ellison, in Fairfax.

Jones said his son was at home in Takoma Park on the morning of the day he was shot and he said he did not know where the son was going when he left home.

He said his son was receiving psychiatric care.

The aunt, Mrs. Ellison, said Jones was studying for the ministry at Columbia Union College—a Seventh-Day Adventist institution—and she said he attended elementary and secondary schools in Takoma Park.

Police said yesterday that Jones had changed his name to Richard Mingus after his discharge and had been known recently by both names. Police first identified him late Thursday night by the name of Mingus.

According to the city medical examiner's office, powder burns on the right side of Jones' head and pieces of flesh and blood on the gun and on Jones' hand indicated that the fatal wound—a bullet in his brain—was self-inflicted.

Jones used the weapon. he had taken from the park policeman to shoot himself, police said.

After disarming the park policeman, Jones apparently fled in the direction of the 14th Street Bridge. The police called in reinforcements including the metropolitan police department's helicopter equipped with search lights and several officers accompanied by police dogs.

The helicopter crew spotted Jones on the Washington side of the southbound lanes of the 14th Street Bridge and four park policemen approached him on foot.

Climbing over a wall separating the express bus lanes from regular traffic, Jones

The

open
(Ne
from 12

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST, Tuesday, Jan. 18, 1972 B11

# Protesters Leak Their Own Secrets

By Jack Anderson

The planners in the White House basement, who howled in pain over our disclosure of their India-Pakistan secrets, have slipped fragments from the same secret documents to their friends in the press.

This illustrates how the White House uses official secrecy to control the flow of news to the public. Favorable facts are leaked out; unfavorable news is suppressed.

The official leakers are now spreading the word that President Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy was not the disaster it appeared but really saved West Pakistan from dismemberment.

As evidence, the boys in the basement leaked a few selective secrets to our columnwriting colleague, Joseph Alsop, who has excellent contacts at the highest levels of government.

Alsop stated "on positive authority" that the U.S. government had "conclusive proof" of India's intention to crush the main body of the Pakistan army in West Pakistan. This positive proof, he wrote, was "the centerpiece of every one of the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the crisis period."

We have read the CIA's daily reports to the White House during the India-Pakistan war. They are stamped "Top Secret Umbra," a desig-

nation reserved for thedarkest of the CIA's secrets.

## Alsop's 'Proof'

Alsop told us he never read the CIA reports himself. He had no way of knowing, therefore, that his sources gave him only part of the story.

These CIA digests, true enough, raised the possibility of an Indian attempt to crush West Pakistan. But the same digests also suggested India would accept an early ceasefire.

Here is a typical excerpt: "There have been reports that (Indian Prime Minister) Gandhi would accept a cease-fire and international mediation as soon as East Bengal had been liberated ... On the other hand, we have had several recent reports that India now intends not only to liberate East Bengal but also to straighten its borders in Kashmir and to destroy West Pakistan's air and armored forces."

The strongest CIA warning was sent to the White House on December 10: "According to a source who has access to information on activities in Prime Minister Gandhi's office," declared the report, "as soon as the situation in East Pakistan is settled, Indian forces will launch a major offensive against West Pakistan."

But the CIA also took note of repeated Indian assurances to American Ambassador Ken

Keating that India has no territorial ambitions and wished only to end the conflict with the least possible bloodshed.

## Dubious 'Proof'

It is clear from the secret documents in our possession that the CIA had no "conclusive proof" of an Indian plan to dismember West Pakistan. The CIA had received a number of reports that a major Indian offensive might be imminent on the western front. But these were discounted by both the State and Defense Departments.

Only Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy czar, seemed eager to believe the worst.

Alsop's sources also told him that President Nixon intervened with the Kremlin, threatening "an ugly showdown," to stop Mrs. Gandhi's army from carving up West Pakistan.

In response, Alsop claims that the Kremlin hurriedly dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznestsov to New Delhi on December 12 to tell Mrs. Gandhi not to attack West Pakistan.

The secret CIA report on his mission, however, doesn't mention any ultimatum against attacking West Pakistan.

"Vasily Kuznestsov arrived in India on 12 December to discuss the political recognition of Bangladesh by the So-

viet Union ...," according to the CIA. "Kuznestsov has told Indian officials that the Soviet Union is not prepared to recognize Bangladesh until Dacca falls and until the Indian army successfully liberates Bangladesh from Pakistani forces."

The question of an Indian offensive against West Pakistan was brought up the next day by Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov. Reported the CIA:

"Pegov pointed out that India has achieved a marvelous military victory. Pakistan is no longer a military force, and it is therefore unnecessary for India to launch an offensive into West Pakistan to crush a military machine that no longer exists.

"If India should decide to take Kashmir, Pegov added, the Soviet Union would not interfere, but India would have to accomplish this objective within the shortest possible time."

Joseph Alsop is an entering and conscientious columnist. He acknowledged to us that "it is possible to be lied to on the very highest level." But he assured us his source had "never lied before."

The evidence in our possession, however, suggests that the White House is playing peekaboo with CIA secrets to distort the truth.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

THE WASHINGTON POST

B12

Tuesday, Jan. 18, 1972

HEALTH

# High Blood Pressure

By Dr. T. R. Van Dellen

ZORBA, THE GREEK

Anthony Quinn

Movie 20. 8 PM Tonight.

WDCA TV 20
CHANNEL

Call 233-6100 for Circulation, and order The Washington Post guaranteed home delivery.

More than 17 million persons in the United States have high blood pressure. Luckily, remedies developed in the last 20 years have cut the death rate from the disease by 50 per cent. Obviously, more lives can be saved and millions will be spared disabling complications by using antihypertensive drugs, especially during the early stages of the disease.

Several studies have demonstrated the wisdom of keeping the blood pressure within normal limits. And medicines are available to do this. Several years ago, a large number of patients with hypertensions were divided into two groups; one

group received antihypertensive drugs, and the controls were given placebos. The individuals were further divided into subgroups. Those with blood pressures above a certain level were put in one subgroup and those below a certain level in another.

Within a short time, the study involving the higher blood pressure subgroup had to be terminated. Twenty-seven receiving placebos were in trouble, as compared to only two being given active antihypertensive drugs.

The investigation was continued on 380 individuals with hypertension of a lesser degree. Over a five-year period, the estimated risk of developing complica-

tions, including death, was reduced from 55 to 18 per cent by treatment. As might be expected, the incidence of complications was greater in older hypertensives than in the younger sufferers. But regardless of age, treatment was effective in reducing the number of complications.

At one time there was doubt in the minds of many physicians as to whether treatment altered the ultimate outcome of high blood pressure. They reasoned that although drugs lowered blood pressure the medicines did nothing to eliminate the cause. Their effectiveness was compared to lowering a fever without treating the infection.

© 1972. Chicago Tribune

Curtis Bros
ON FURNITURE SHOWCASE

2

C

Published Daily. Second-Class Postage Paid at
New York, N. Y., and at additional mailing offices.

THE NEW YORKER

# Anti-India Remark Is Laid to Kissinger

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 31 —

The syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported today that Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential assistant for national security affairs, told senior Administration officials during the India-Pakistani crisis that President Nixon "does not want to be even-handed."

"We are not trying to be even-handed," Mr. Kissinger was reported as saying. "The President believes that India is the attacker."

Mr. Kissinger was also reported by the columnist to have told top Administration aides that "we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind."

Warned that United States criticism might turn India toward the U.S.S.R., Mr. Kissinger is said to have replied that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was "cold-blooded and tough" and that her country "will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique."

"We should not ease her mind," he is reported to have said, adding that any aide who objected to this approach could "take his case to the President."

The views attributed to Mr. Kissinger were published in Mr. Anderson's column, which is syndicated to 700 newspapers, about 100 of them foreign. Mr. Anderson, a colleague of Drew Pearson, took over the column on Mr. Pearson's death in September, 1969. Mr. Anderson's reporting of highly classified Government documents in recent weeks has reportedly incensed the White House.

Throughout the India-Pakistan war, Mr. Anderson has repeatedly asserted that his disclosure of top-secret Government documents involved no threat to national security, but rather exposed the "activities

and often the blunders of our leaders."

The Kissinger comments reported today came from notes of "secret sensitive" strategy sessions at the White House on Dec. 6 and 8, according to Mr. Anderson. The India-Pakistan war broke out Dec. 3 and ended Dec. 17.

Mr. Anderson charged that the American people "again were misled by their leaders."

Specifically, Mr. Anderson contended that the White House explanation of the reasons for sending the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise, plus escorting warship, from Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal during the India-Pakistani war was deceptive.

## Evacuation 'Secondary'

Contrasting the official explanation that the mission of the task force was to "evacuate American citizens from embattled Dacca," Mr. Anderson said that perusal of confidential documents in his possession showed that there were in fact four primarily military reasons. These were, he reported:

* To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the United States task force.

* To weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan.

* Possibly to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its military mission.

* To force India to keep planes on defense alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground troops.

"The evacuation of American citizens was strictly a secondary mission," Mr. Anderson wrote, "adopted more as the justification than the reason for the naval move."

Mr. Anderson wrote that "those anonymous aides who whisper the latest word from

the White House into the ears of newsmen" had now stopped "pretending" that the task force was intended to evacuate stranded Americans.

Instead, he said, they were now "leaking" the story that President Nixon learned of a Soviet-Indian plan to "dismember" West Pakistan and sent the task force into the Bay of Bengal as a "deterrent."

Earlier this week, Joseph Alsop, another internationally syndicated columnist, reported that "on the eve of the final cease-fire" the United States had "unchallengeable" information of the Indian Government's determination to "cause the dismemberment of the surviving western half of Pakistan."

Mr. Alsop, who has had high-level sources through successive Administrations, reported that India's aim was to destroy the Pakistani Army and also to deprive the Pakistani remnant state of any common frontier with Tibet, and thus with Communist China.

Such was the situation, Mr. Alsop wrote, when President Nixon ordered elements of the United States Seventh Fleet to steam toward the Indian Ocean. In his column, Mr. Alsop attributed to Dr. Kissinger a comparison between Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the "strong possibility" that India would become a "vast new Soviet strategic base area."

Administration officials, who declined to be named, said today that a security investigation was under way to determine who "leaked" information to Mr. Anderson. There was no indication, however, that a security investigation had been ordered to determine the source of the "unchallengeable" information cited by Mr. Alsop.

Continued

Pakistanists

Times

CITY EDITION

Weather: Sunny, cold today; fair tonight. Chance of rain tomorrow. Temp. range: today 22-38; Friday 26-46. Full U.S. report on Page 36.

72-

Higher newsstand price in air delivery cities

15 CENTS

Transit Negotiators Press
For a Contract Agreement

Mediator Terms Inaction of Legislature
'Bad News,' but Both Sides Appear
Optimistic as Deadline Nears

By DAMON STETSON

Transit negotiators pressed their efforts for a contract agreement last night despite the failure of the State Legislature to act on a plan that would hold a prospective fare increase to 5 cents.

Vincent D. McDonnell, one of the "three mediators in the dispute, described the Legislature's inaction, as the city faced a possible bus and subway strike today, as "bad news."

While he said that the critical negotiations taking place at the Americana Hotel could still be concluded, satisfactorily, he did not minimize the problems faced by negotiators for the Transit Authority and the Transport Workers Union.

Mr. McDonnell reported that Dr. William J. Ronan, chairman of the authority, and Matthew Guinan, president of the union, had begun "head-to-head"

as timing is concerned, even though there are many difficult things still to be resolved."

A generally optimistic mood appeared to prevail at the hotel despite many imponderables, such as the Legislature's delay, the extent of the probable fare increase and the effect of Federal wage and price controls.

Leaders of the Transport Workers, representing 38,000 bus and subway workers, and the Amalgamated Transit Union, representing 2,000 bus drivers in Queens and on Staten Island, have given assurances that their members would work until 5 A.M. today, allowing time for New Year's Eve merrymakers to get home. But they also reiterated their traditional policy of "no contract, no work."

Bargaining talks went on

LEGISLATURE FAILS
TO ACT ON TAXES;
RESUMES MONDAY

Duryea Is Unable to Garner Enough Votes to Fulfill a Pact With Steingut

GOVERNOR GIVES PLEDGE

Says He and the Leadership of Both Parties Will Win Package After Recess

By WILLIAM E. FARRELL

Special to The New York Times

ALBANY, Dec. 31—The emergency session of the Legislature on the state's shaky fiscal situation degenerated today into a hubbub of partisan accusations in which no action was taken on a proposed $413-million tax program or on bills to limit an increase in the New York City transit fare to 5 cents.

After hours of stalling, while rank-and-file members waited

Secrecy bomb ticks in Washington

By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The so-called Anderson papers are such that in a parliamentary system they would precipitate a Cabinet crisis and might even cause the fall of a government.

In the United States they are being dealt with in America's own way, through powerful extragovernmental channels, with news-

papers and TV commentators carrying on the role of inquiry and appraisal that the opposition party would normally take in parliament; the administration in embarrassed silence, and newspapers around the world, from London to New Delhi, banner-ing the revelations.

Cast in the role of chief prosecutor is private citizen and modern muckraker, Mormon-born Jack Anderson, syndicated in 700 newspapers with potentially 50 million readers, occupying a position that is almost quasi-official, and that would be unthinkable in a parliamentary system, as he unfolds top-secret official verbatim documents that have been leaked to him, presumably by disgrunted officials.

Angry commands

These show the workings of the White House machinery at a time of world crisis, only a month past, with paraphrased comments by top leaders; curt, angry commands coming from the President through his mouthpiece, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and portraying the scenes as vividly as though they had been photographed live by a motion-picture camera.

In one sense, the publication of the paraphrased comments at meetings of Dec. 3, 4, and 6 of top-level White House strategy conferences tell little that was not known before: the Nixon administration's strong

opposition and reaction to India's military support of East Pakistan that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

In another sense, it was a spotlight turned into a dark room.

Credibility problem

It indicated, for example, that the so-called White House Security Action Group (WSAG), which is supposed to help supply collectivized counsel from top diplomatic, military, and similar agencies in time of international crisis, did little more in this crisis than gather information (not always accurate) and that it was completely dominated by the absent President, speaking through Dr. Kissinger, who repeatedly complained that the President was angry at failure to carry out his desires.

It disclosed in a related secret cablegram (Dec. 8) from Kenneth B. Keating, U.S. Ambassador and former Republican Senator from New York, that he had been countermanded or ignored on basic policy points in the growing India-Pakistan clash and that, for example, the USIA's International Press Service, paraphrasing Dr. Kissinger, declared, "Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent." Ambassador Keating himself (Nov. 12) had informed Secretary of State William P. Rogers that war is "imminent."

★ Please turn to Page 12

entists has suggested that the government postpone by a year the 1975 deadline for automobile manufacturers to come up with a 90 percent pollution-free automotive engine for light-duty motor vehicles.

Estimated expense to the consumer of meeting present requirements of the Clean Air Act of 1975 vehicles—in comparison with those of 1973 vehicles—includes a $200 increase in cost; a 3 to 12 percent increase in fuel consumption; increased maintenance costs; and “a deterioration in driveability of the car.”

Therefore, the group said in a report to Congress and the government's Environmental Protection Agency:

> "If enforcement of the requirements of the act for 1975 vehicles were deferred for one year, the opportunity thus provided for further development and field testing would enable manufacturers to significantly improve the performance and reliability of vehicles equipped to meet the requirements in the hands of the customer."

★Secrecy bomb ticks in Washington.

Continued from Page 1

It inevitably raised questions of Dr. Kissinger's own credibility in his press backgrounder due to apparent conflict revealed by the extraordinary juxtaposition of two unforeseeable disclosures:

His confidential backgrounder to newsmen of Dec. 7 which was put in the Congressional Record of Dec. 9, by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R) of Arizona, and the subsequent Anderson disclosures.

For example, Dr. Kissinger told the press (Dec. 7), for their use without attribution: "There have been some comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate." (He qualified this, however, by disapproval of India's course in Pakistan).

In contrast, the minutes of the WSAG meetings repeatedly show a determination to "tilt" toward Pakistan and, for example, the entry: "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

(Presumably Dr. Kissinger would reconcile comments by saying the U.S. is friendly to India in general but not in the Pakistan affair.)

Furthermore, the revelations show that in this crisis, at least, the prestigious and supersecret DSAG had little personal contact with the President. In fact, Dr. Kissinger addressed the WSAG meeting like a coach dressing down a football team that

has done badly in the first half—a team that included the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others.

There is another towering conclusion in this affair.

No government can long proceed without considerable difficulty if secret, top-level documents are spread on the record.

It is agreed here, even by critics of White House policy toward India, that any government, to operate, needs a measure of privacy.

Columnist Anderson's sensational revelations are justified variously — a reporter's duty to present information, the exaggerated classification of official documents (now to be investigated again in Congress by the House Armed Services Committee), the particular circumstances of the Indian crisis.

But the search for the perpetrator of the leak goes on and most observers think he will be uncovered. It is generally felt, however, that no damaging defense disclosures were made.

The final question that is made more, rather than less, mysterious by the disclosures, is why the administration tied its policy to the sinking ship of East Pakistan. What was its overriding rationale?

Many here ask if Mr. Nixon was placating Communist China. According to this theory, Mr. Nixon was paying the price for a journey to Peking which may open up China and aid world peace.

The turned comedian was wiping tears from his eyes.

In the course of a year Hugh and Shirley play before three million people in sports arenas and night clubs around the world. Currently the playing partners are a feature attraction with Ice Capades.

Both are excellent badminton players and skaters. But out of necessity the two athletes had to go one step further and become entertainers.

During the 1930's, which is when Forgie got his start, there was a future for the professional badminton player. Those days are apparently gone forever.

"Ten million badminton rackets are sold each year," Forgie says, "but the number of people who have seen good badminton is nil." It might be added that the number of people interested in seeing top flight badminton is also nil.

Realizing that, Forgie set out to create an act that could hold an audience's attention. Hugh and Shirley are a comedy team. Shirley plays the "straight man"—the badminton champion in this case, while Hugh, disguised in a clownish-looking outfit, is the bumbling novice.

## Selling suspense

Shirley obviously is the superior player, but her partner manages one amazing return after another. "It's suspense we're selling," Forgie says. "Shirley has to make the audience think I'm too far out of position to recover.

"It's like baseball. If the batter sails one out of the park or pops up there's no suspense. But when the outfielder runs and runs, then makes the catch to save a possible triple, that's suspense. Shirley has to hit

my boss."

Shirley also found the switch from competitive to exhibition badminton a tough one. The Minneapolis native once was special in-structor of racket sports — badminton, tennis and squash — at Wellesley College.

When she first teamed with Hugh 13 years ago, the temptation was to hit "winners." Forgie would become infuriated when Shirley kept skimming the net with low liners. "As long as she gets the bird over the net I can entertain the audience," Forgie says, "but with the bird on her side the act is dead."

Many people believe that Hugh and Shirley must use strings and magnets when they perform. Their act is so flawless that one critic described it as "impeccably choreographed"—a description that angers Forgie.

"We have a format, but we're athletes," Hugh argues. "Jack Nicklaus usually hits a long drive straight down the fairway, but it's not automatic." Hugh and Shirley seldom miss a shot, but perfection is still something they're striving for, too.

## Backstage warm-up

Shirley always warms up for 25 minutes before going on the ice. Cramped for space, loosening up involves volleying against a concrete wall, a feat that requires a very strong shot.

Even after stepping into the spotlight, the pair always exchanges at least six shots before Shirley begins to run Hugh ragged. "We may be well warmed up before the show, but that doesn't mean we have our range," Forgie explains. "The atmosphere and conditions of the ice are different everywhere we go. But wherever we're performing they'll turn off the air conditioning."

Hugh and Shirley are both masterful performers, they consider themselves far

... Western Europe, p. 2

... Japan, p. 6

... India, p. 8

... Soviet Union, p. 12

# IMPLICATIONS OF "ANDERSON DOCUMENTS"

## Summary

Overseas media--especially in Japan and India--have given moderate-to-heavy news attention to columnist Jack Anderson's release of secret documents dealing with U.S. policy on the India-Pakistan war and on relations with Japan.

Initial comment in Western Europe suggested that release of the documents has caused deep embarrassment to the Nixon Administration, and that the disclosures 1) "represent interference in the current decision-making process" (Muenchner Merkur, Munich); 2) have brought into the open a "smoldering conflict between the press and the Administration" (Sueddeutsche Zeitung of Munich); 3) "are far more damaging than the so-called Pentagon Papers" (Times of London), and 4) "show how deeply and personally committed President Nixon was throughout the crisis to the Pakistani cause" (London Financial Times).

Japanese TV and newspapers gave heavy and favorable newsplay to the Nixon-Sato talks and reported at length on statements by Japanese officials challenging the authenticity of the Anderson documents. Editorial comment today was sparse.

Indian media sharply criticized U.S. policies and Administration officials, saying Anderson's "exposures took almost every decent American by surprise" (All India Radio). Mrs. Gandhi's National Herald declared that "the disclosures... confirm the worst suspicions about the anti-Indian bias in Washington."

Moscow media promptly picked up the story and have steadily exploited it, alleging that the revelations prove "double-dealing and cynicism by official Washington" and will result in "a further drop in U.S. prestige abroad" and "greater distrust" in Washington's official statements and actions.

Communist Chinese media have not mentioned the documents.

* * *

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Munich: "Interference in Decision-Making Process"

This morning's West German papers gave wide newsplay to the leak of U.S. secret papers under headings such as "Jack Anderson Causes Embarrassment for Nixon" (Die Welt of Hamburg).

Independent-conservative Muenchner Merkur of Munich wrote:

"This leak and the preceding ones increasingly paralyze the Nixon Administration. While the publication of the Pentagon Papers could be considered as an excursion into the recent history of the Vietnam conflict, the present leak represents interference in the current decision-making process.

"Nixon's opponents are deliberately trespassing into the political field... by supplying Sato with secret files before his meeting with Nixon."

"Exposes Absurdity of Exaggerated Secrecy"

The Washington correspondent of Munich's independent *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* commented:

"The publication of secret papers of the Washington Special Action Group represents part of an offensive launched by American mass media against the Government's policy of secrecy.... It may have an impact on the Administration's entire information policy. The apparent presence of so many leaking spots in the Government machinery exposes the absurdity of the Administration's exaggerated secrecy....

"The whole affair is awkward for Kissinger, whose credibility has come into question....

"Actually the papers do not contain any sensational news. The Administration's anti-Indian attitude became apparent long ago....

"The smoldering conflict between the press and the Administration has broken into the open."

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Many dailies and both West German TV networks ran extensive speculative reports on the Nixon-Sato talks.

Rome: Leak Affects Nixon-Sato Talks

Most Italian papers today carried factual reports on the documents released by Mr. Anderson. Television and radio broadcasts did not mention them.

Rome's middle-of-the-road _Messaggero_ wrote:

> "The 'difficult' summit between Nixon and Sato has begun in an atmosphere which is heavier than expected because of the leak of secret White House documents on Washington-Tokyo relations..."

Socialist _Avanti_, also of Rome, ran excerpts of the documents under the heading, "Sensational Disclosures by _The Washington Post_: Japan Intends to Change Its Pro-American Policy and Acquire Atomic Weapons."

London: "Far More Damaging Than Pentagon Papers"

British papers today gave front-page play to the controversy surrounding the Anderson documents under these headings: "Kissinger Lied, Says U.S. Envoy to India" (Guardian); "White House Claim on Mediation Disputed by U.S. Envoy in Delhi" (Times), and "Japan's A-Power Threat 'Revealed in Secret Papers'" (Daily Telegraph).

The independent _Times_ of London commented in an article:

> "Mr. Anderson has certainly offended Presidential privilege. What is more, Mr. Anderson has embarrassed the U.S. Government in revealing its less-than-evenhanded approach to India and Pakistan.

> "The diplomatic consequences could be considerable and to that extent the revelations are far more damaging than the so-called Pentagon Papers."

The paper added, "Reflective and informed reporting is seen to be vital in a democracy. How can it be provided unless both sides recognize certain rules?"

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"Effort to Discredit Dr. Kissinger?"

The conservative London *Daily Telegraph* stated in an editorial today:

"The American Government is clearly up against a big problem here. If the leaking of secret documents to the communications media, presumably by officials who oppose the Government's policies on this or that matter, should spread--as it now shows signs of doing--the Government may have to act. At present there is nothing equivalent in America to the British Official Secrets Act."

The paper declared that "the most plausible motive for the secret leaks is that officials in the Administration are using Mr. Anderson in a calculated effort to discredit Dr. Kissinger. The motives are thought to be interpreted less in terms of domestic politics than opposition to the foreign policies of the White House and to the way they are conducted."

"Yawning Credibility Gap"

The liberal Manchester *Guardian*'s front-page story said:

"The Nixon Administration's yawning credibility gap in its policies toward the India and Pakistan war widened embarrassingly today with the publication of a secret cable to the State Department from the U.S. Ambassador in India, complaining of the Government's lack of candor."

The paper's editorial on the Anderson documents concluded, "If this is a true interpretation of the way in which foreign policy is made the world should tremble a little."

Yesterday, the paper called the documents "a major challenge to the Nixon Administration" that "cast revealing light on a highly sensitive issue."

The paper declared on Tuesday that disclosure of the documents "promises to lead... to the biggest bureaucratic witch-hunt since the Pentagon Papers affair.... The leaks (in Jack Anderson's column) not surprisingly have touched off a flood of recriminations within the Administration. The White House suspects, with some cause, that the leaks come from the State Department..."

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## "Fascinating Insight"

The independent *Financial Times* said of the documents, "Their immediate interest is that they show how deeply and personally committed President Nixon was throughout the crisis to the Pakistani cause...."

"In the first place, they provide another example of the Nixon Administration's poor relations with the press....Secondly, they offer a fascinating insight into President Nixon's chosen role as the sole fount of foreign policy."

## BBC Radio Coverage

BBC radio on Tuesday carried an interview with Jack Anderson in which he was sharply critical of Dr. Kissinger. "Everything he does is classified," Anderson said. "The Congress has protested loudly because they can't find out what he's doing. The State Department, which is supposed to manage foreign affairs, doesn't know what he's doing. The Defense Department...doesn't know what he's doing. Newspapermen know only what he tells them..."

## Treatment in Paris

Paris-based commercial Europe One radio ran this report from its correspondent in San Clemente: "Jack Anderson is becoming Nixon's pet aversion. The Japanese are rather bitter..."

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## Japanese Newsplay on Nixon-Sato Talks

Japanese television networks and papers gave prominence to reports from correspondents in San Clemente highlighting the "friendly reception" given Japanese officials and the "complete meeting of minds" between Mr. Nixon and Premier Sato "on the necessity for both nations to improve their ties with China without causing any damage to the basic U.S.-Japan relationship." There was no editorial comment today on the meeting.

## Interview with Jack Anderson

Today's independent-moderate Yomiuri of Tokyo published an account of an interview with Jack Anderson, who told the paper's Washington correspondent that he has "a total of 15 official documents" on U.S.-Japanese relations. The report stated that Anderson's Washington Post column of yesterday was based on three of the documents and that the remaining 12 would be revealed "in the light of the results" of the San Clemente conference.

According to Anderson, the documents--State Department reports to the White House and Embassy-Department cables--cover such topics as U.S.-Japan economic problems, Okinawa, reports of Mr. Kasuga's talks in Washington and U.S. evaluation of Japanese anti-security treaty groups.

## Ambassador's Press Conference

Tokyo's independent-liberal Asahi reported on page two today the press conference called by Japanese Ambassador Ushiba at San Clemente to deny statements in Anderson's column about the possibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. The correspondent reported that the Ambassador declared that Japan has "no intention to acquire nuclear weapons." His report continued:

> "Mr. Ushiba denied the authenticity of the secret papers by saying that it seems improbable that such documents could have been leaked from the U.S. Government. He described the contents of the papers as not so well grounded.

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"The envoy conceded that it is a fact that there is general concern in the U.S. about the danger of possession of nuclear arms by Japan, but added that it is inconceivable that the White House is taking the same view."

## Party Leader's Denial

The paper also gave page-two play to a report of a press conference in Tokyo called by Mr. Ikko Kasuga, chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party, "to deny strongly as contrary to the truth part of an account" by Anderson of Kasuga's December 1 meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard. The report stated:

"Mr. Anderson quoted Mr. Kasuga as saying that a treaty (between Japan and the U.S.) was needed because it would provide an effective deterrent against (China's) potential nuclear power even if the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Japan seemed unnecessary, but the opposition leader stressed that he did not make such a statement."

## "U.S. Ambassador's Report Accurate"

Under the headline, "Foreign Ministry Analysis: U.S. Ambassador's Report Accurate," today's *Mainichi* of Tokyo reported a Foreign Ministry spokesman's press conference remarks on the Anderson documents and U.S.-Japan relations. The spokesman was quoted as saying that the papers "are nothing but documents classified by the U.S. Government." Of the report attributed to Ambassador Meyer on Japanese uneasiness about future defense policy, the spokesman's briefing was summarized:

"In regard to the development of Japan into a military big power, Presidential Special Assistant Kissinger once expressed uneasiness about the revival of militarism in Japan. Even within the U.S. Defense Department, the cautious view is strong that, depending on circumstances, Japan may acquire strong military power in order to be able to speak out politically, commensurate with its economic power. In short, the U.S. Government as a whole has a sort of latent feeling of guardedness toward Japan.

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"Therefore, the following analysis will be made in America:
'If Japan is placed within the scope of the U.S. - Japanese security treaty, then it will be possible to block the increase in Japan's power.'

"In other words, the U.S. plans to keep Japan within the scope of the security treaty for a long time."

## News Treatment in Seoul

Seoul papers today played prominently an AFP report on the Anderson documents. Stories said Anderson contended that the Nixon Administration was worried that Japan might gradually move out of the sphere of U.S. influence, join the nuclear powers and establish independent relations with Peking.

Seoul media highlighted the Nixon-Sato talks, noting that Mr. Sato was believed to have expressed to Mr. Nixon Japan's opposition to American troop withdrawal from Korea.

## U.S. Comment Replayed in India

Indian media have given front-page treatment to the Jack Anderson columns and the texts of minutes of three WSAG meetings which Anderson released. News reports and editorial comment emphasized Dr. Kissinger's "lies" and President Nixon's "anti-India bias." American media comment critical of the Administration has been given wide play.

## TV: "Three Important Implications"

In an interview on Indian TV, the dean of the New Delhi School of International Studies, said that he did not believe that the Nixon Administration would be able to "muzzle or intimidate Anderson" because of the "precedent" set by the Pentagon Papers. He also felt that the Anderson papers would not be "an important election issue."

The research director of the Indian Council on World Affairs, interviewed on TV, found three "important implications" in Mr. Anderson's "sensational disclosures:

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"First Nixon acted in a dictatorial way, against the advice of Congress, the State Department and the American Embassy in New Delhi, to help Pakistan; secondly, he tried to throw dust, not only in India's eyes, but also into the eyes of the whole world, by telling Foreign Minister Swaran Singh and Prime Minister Gandhi that he would not aid Pakistan, although he tried to send arms to Pakistan even during the hostilities; thirdly, the American Administration has felt uncomfortable at the firmness and toughness with which India has withstood all the pressure."

The director also said that the cessation of U.S. aid to India was a "golden opportunity for India to learn self-reliance."

### Radio: "Took Every Decent American by Surprise"

All India Radio judged yesterday that Mr. Anderson's action was a "signal service" in "exposing the sordid conspiracy of a small group around the U.S. President to involve the U.S. in a 'dirty war' against the people of India." It declared:

"The exposures took almost every decent American by surprise, because they had been lulled into the belief that the U.S. Administration was sympathetic to the plight of the Bangla Desh people...

"Americans are long used to CIA plots and intrigues, but perhaps they didn't expect their President in an election year to say one thing and then act differently."

### "A Wave of Anger"

A Wednesday commentary on the English-language General Overseas Service of All India Radio said that "comments in a vast number of American papers show how much the Nixon Administration's policy concerning the recent events in the Indian subcontinent have outraged public opinion at home." It contended that Anderson's "disclosures" have "generated a wave of anger in the U.S., where popular opinion has been consistently opposed to Washington's unjust support of the brutal and undemocratic military regime of Pakistan." The commentary quoted extensively from Tom Wicker's column in *The New York Times* of January 4.

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"Nixon Even More Biased Than Thought"

The Washington correspondent of conservative *Hindu* of Madras, the leading English-language daily of southern India and which is generally favorable to the U.S., reported that the Anderson documents "expose Nixon and his aides more clearly. Perusal of the texts shows that Nixon was even more biased in favor of Pakistan that he was thought to be."

The Washington correspondent of the independent-conservative *Hindustan Times* of New Delhi said that the documents "gave a new turn" to the U.S.-Indian controversy in that they show that "Kissinger's lie" that the U.S. is not anti-India "comes out clearly."

"Little Prospect of Indo-U.S. Dialogue"

The paper similarly stated in an editorial:

"As was the case of Vietnam, the 'Anderson Papers,' like the 'Pentagon Papers,' show that the U.S. Administration consistently lied to its own people and to the world. President Nixon's credibility has further suffered in the U.S. and abroad.

"It is, however, equally true that the actions and attitude of President Nixon have disgusted and shamed large sections of the American public who have been able to view the recent sad events with some objectivity and perspective. Unless things change very much in Washington, the conclusion would appear to be that there is little prospect of an Indo-American dialogue as long as President Nixon is in office."

"U.S. Press Sets Example"

The *National Herald*, published in New Delhi and Lucknow by Mrs. Gandhi, declared in an editorial yesterday that "it is clear that the President's credibility is being rapidly eroded in the U.S. and outside, and his headlong collision with some of the best known and respected sections of the American press has done little to repair his damaged image.

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"The disclosures made by columnist Jack Anderson confirm the worst suspicions about the anti-Indian bias in Washington....

"Of special interest is the fact that the documents... indicate the extent to which the U.S. Government can and does mislead the public in the pursuit of what the President and his advisers decide is in the national interest....

"In fighting the President unflinchingly, the American press sets an example for the press in other democratic countries."

## Tel Aviv: "Another Chapter in Ongoing Confrontation"

Tel Aviv papers gave page-one play to reports that the U.S. Congress plans to hold hearings on the Government's security classification system.

The independent pro-Government *Jerusalem Post* carried its Washington correspondent's view that the Anderson documents "provide yet another chapter in the ongoing confrontation between news media and the Administration." The correspondent referred to "observers in Washington" who believe that Kissinger or President Nixon himself may be the source for the leaks.

"With personal summitry on the agenda in Peking and Moscow, President Nixon wants Chinese and Russian leaders to know they are dealing with a tough American executive and--so the theory goes--he is anxious for the Indo-Pakistani story to get out despite domestic criticism. Kissinger has virtually taken over execution of foreign and security policies from State and Defense to an extent heretofore unknown. Leaking secret documents is a weapon in the struggle for retention of power."

## Mexico City: "Serious... Alarming"

Mexico City newspapers have reported the Anderson documents on front pages for five successive days. Progressive, influential *Excelsior* headlined its story yesterday, "Proof That U.S. Government Lied," and leftish *El Dia* used AFP reports under a headline declaring that the U.S. followed a "two-faced policy" in the Indo-Pakistani war.

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Mass-circulation *La Prensa* ran a columnist's opinion that Mr. Anderson's revelations "have implications and complications that are much more serious and alarming than the commotion created by Daniel Ellsberg and his 'Pentagon Papers'...

"The 'secret' debates of the Washington Action Group reveal that the secret and inscrutable trio of Nixon-Kissinger-Helms has once again tried to fool and confound American and world public opinion."

## Soviet Exploitation of Documents

Moscow media promptly picked up the Anderson documents story and have steadily exploited it in comment to both domestic and foreign audiences, alleging that the revelations prove "double-dealing and cynicism by official Washington" and will result in "a further drop in U.S. prestige abroad" and "greater distrust in Washington's official statements and actions."

TASS summarized on Wednesday a commentary in *Izvestia* which asserted that the documents "show that the pressure on India was planned thoroughly, with consideration for economic, political, military and propaganda impact..."

"It is absolutely clear that on top of everything else, American strategists hoped that an expanding war in the Hindustan peninsula would divert attention from the lackluster U.S. venture in Indochina."

"Now there is documentary proof that American diplomacy simultaneously brought pressure to bear also on the U.N. in an attempt to turn it into an instrument of its hypocritical policy."

But "the world saw through the double-faced game," the commentator declared, and "only the Maoists continued to come out in line with those who express the interests of the most reactionary monopoly uppercrust of the U.S."

## U.S. Paper Quoted

A TASS dispatch datelined New York, Wednesday, reported comments by *The New York Times* to the effect that "the documents published by Anderson show the extent to which the Government can delude the public." It quoted the American paper as saying that "the fact that Pakistan's brutal repressions of Bengalis were ignored and that all aid to India was stopped while at the very same time secret ways were explored of arming the Pakistanis is simply repulsive to the conscience of Americans."

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TASS said _The Times_ "notes that this position of the U.S. in the Indo-Pakistani conflict was motivated by the Government's intention to strengthen America's alliance with China.... This was at best a dubious policy as a result of which American influence in India has dropped to the lowest level, while Soviet influence in the Hindustan peninsula has sharply risen, the paper concludes."

## "Gross Deceit of Public Opinion"

A TASS commentator yesterday saw "vicious parallels" between the Anderson revelations and the Pentagon Papers. In both cases, he said, "the springs were revealed which are the motive force behind American foreign policy--the widely practiced methods of pressure, blackmail, provocations, deliberate misinformation and gross deceit of public opinion."

He noted that neither the White House nor the State Department has challenged the authenticity of the documents. Among the consequences of their publication, he said, is "a further drop in U.S. prestige abroad, greater distrust in Washington's official statements and actions, even on the part of America's closest allies, which are systematically denied access to the facts and circumstances related to the working out of American policy in periods of acute international crisis..."

"Of no small importance, of course, especially in this Presidential election year, is the circumstance that the new facts of misinformation and gross deceit of the American public that have now come to light abundantly feed the 'credibility crisis' which has not abated in the U.S. for a long time now."

## Peking: No Mention of Documents

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["In the field of public education, Hearnies said that his recommended budget will contain a", "direct their attention to these priority items:", "Tions: (1) We will keep the\ncov in my barn: (2) you will", "Anderson's Security Breach", "Sensation-seeking columnist Jack Anderson was not justified in breaking national security to publish documents detailing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action group.", "This simply was an attempt to harpoon Henry Kissinger and the Nixon Administration at the expense of damaging our relations with India.", "Anderson was attempting to prove that the President's special assistant advocated a hard line against India at the secret sessions with other government officials but later publicly denied that the administration was anti-Indian.", "This newspaper believes the government has an obligation to be truthful in its dealings with the public and that the press should report the facts without pulling punches.", "But when the government makes a decision that it is discussing a matter that involves the national security and its public release might harm national security, it has the right to protect this information by declaring it secret.", "Jack Anderson does not have the right to personally declassify secret information simply because it is placed in his hands by someone who makes this unauthorized use of such documents. Neither does any other private citizen have this right.", "If Anderson or anyone else wants to challenge the classification of a document as secret he should take the issue to court. The court can decide if the government acted properly, not Anderson.", "It is harmful and dangerous to the interests of the United States for anyone, including Anderson, to make capricious use of secret information involving national security. Anderson tries to justify his actions by saying he was motivated by what he called \"colessal blinders\" of the Nixon Administration.", "Anderson is entitled to his opinion on administration foreign policy. But he cannot justify his violation of national security simply because he disagrees with the government's foreign policy. If he doesn't know this, we suspect he will find this out very shortly.", "furnish 90 per cent of the feed, and (3) I will keep 90 per cent of the mill.", "For long, horse traders have been warned to \"look a gift horse in the mouth.\" Perhaps Missouri and St. Louis would do well to examine a \"gift airport\" in the hangars.", "THEO. S. SMYLIE,\nPastor Emeritus\nOak Hill\nPresbyterian Church", "Muskie's Mistake", "Sen. Edmund S. Muskie's formal entry into the race for the presidency had to be greeted with a thud betwixt yawns, because he gave the public no chance to react any other way.", "Peculiarly, perhaps thinking it added to his mystique, Muskie went off to his summer cottage in Maine, where he hired a television crew to tape him delivering a non-fireside chat Monday night.", "Then Muskie went back to Washington, where he watched himself on CBS television Tuesday night, presumably hoping a lot of other people were doing the same thing. The canned production cost the Muskie camp about $35,000.", "It was the first time in the history of modern", "communications that a man chose such a wooden Indian means of declaring himself a serious candidate for the highest office in the land.", "Strangely, Muskie did not once mention he was a Democrat. He did mention Abraham Lincoln who, if memory serves, was a Republican.", "Perhaps Muskie is brooding over a current Gallup Poll which shows Democrats prefer Teddy Kennedy, a non-candidate, over Muskie.", "Anyone who addresses himself on canned television, rather than facing up to the give-and-take of a news conference, is too little for President.", "Muskie's bid for mystique was a big mistake.", "Police Warning", "A suit seeking to invalidate Missouri's statute pertaining to the use of firearms by policemen raises a very important issue: Under what circumstances should law officers be permitted to use their service revolvers in the line of duty.", "The suit was filed in federal court here by the American Civil Liberties Union to declare unconstitutional the state law allowing police to fire warning shots and to shoot at fleeing felony suspects.", "The suit seeks to restrict police to shooting at fleeing suspects only in situations where there is \"reasonable apprehension that such persons will cause injury\" to police or others.", "Common sense dictates, certainly, that discretion always should be used by law enforcement agents in the discharge of their", "Shots Justified", "dered ineffectual in protection of the public.", "Whether gun-use regulations for lawmen are rigid or relaxed, in the final analysis to shoot or not to shoot has to be the individual decision of the man in the field.", "He is the only person in a position realistically to appraise a given situation.", "A too-strict statute which prohibited a policeman from firing a warning shot at a fleeing fugitive could prove another set of handcuffs on law enforcement efforts. Bold criminals surely would become even more openly defiant of the law.", "At a time when policemen are being killed in record numbers in the line of duty, and with the crime rate in most areas rising rapidly and the crime rate