Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
10:00 am 1/16/70

Z: pertaining to April, Nov., and Dec. speeches

K: The only course of action that remains. No plan to change. As in the November 3 speech, includes 3 criteria.

Z: It remains in full force

K: What did he say in April -- I don't remember an April speech

Z: Watch out boys. No later than that was in May. Then I will get into T&A's.

K: Right.

Z: Will combat forces be withdrawn before support?

K: I wouldn't get myself into a general. . . It's amazing there wasn't more play.

Z: Eventually we will withdraw combat and then all.

K: Say eventually all, according to a plan.

Z: I should not say forces unprotected.

K: NO. We will have to leave forces for protection.

Z: We are not going to leave support forces there unprotected.

K: Why such detail?

Z: We don't have to -- just in case.

K: I much prefer reports from the Pentagon from time to time.

By KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

U. A.Lexis Johnson/Kissinger

10:25 am 1/16/70

J: I'm sorry but I'm afraid I will have to ask you to go through your channel on the Japanese issue.

K: Where is it stuck?

J: On substance. I had a showdown with Shimoda last week. My assumption was that we'd move toward comprehensive substance. I've been working on the scenario to help the Prime Minister. I needed to be clearer about what the end result would be. His word from the Prime Minister was we are not working on comprehensive substance. I told him to confirm this again with the PM. He has not yet received a reply.

Aichi talked with Meyer and he confirms what Shimoda said. With the new Cabinet and the other proposal, I think we should go back.

K: They said they were willing for voluntary controls. We said we could not. What time is it, midnight there?

J: Yes

K: I will get word over there that we are not amused.

J: We cannot go on much longer.

K: Yes

J: It's time to go on this.

K: I will be back to you as soon as I know.

J: I will be back tomorrow. I'm going to Airly House this afternoon. Thanks.

While I have you on the line, I want to say that the DPRC meeting was very good yesterday.

K: I'm glad you were there and that it gives you a chance on formative issues.

J: Bux and I worked it out that some of my boys would get together with some of his. Again, it was a great meeting

K: Thank you. I appreciate your saying that.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger

12:40 ; 1/16/70

R: . . . lunch for Departing Assistant Secretary of State for public affairs --
Phillips. Going to Mexico City as Consul General

K: Someone says you are bringing in Sears for Cargo's job? I guess they're
not right. We are trying to push the paper on France through the NSC.
It's held up in your office or Cargo's. We want to move it prior to
Pompidou's visit.

R: I will push it. I am meeting with Cargo later today.

K: I want to talk with you about moving European issues. I have a note
from the President about injecting European issues in NSC meetings
from now on.

R: Do you have the Southeast Asia papers I sent?

K: When? This morning? I still don't have them but they are probably being staffed

R: I got everything into three sentences.

*

By KCL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
G Smith/Kissinger
1:00 pm 1/16/70

S: Beleu is at the White House about the briefing

K: I gave instructions that it be set up

S: I guess White House relations hasn't gotten to it.

K: It will be done this afternoon. I will get it.

S: I have called Gore's office. He is out of the city. I will have a personal chat with him. tell him not to get excited.

K: Yes

S: Another thing. Childs had talk with Rogers and ______ will be bargaining on SALT. I think President should get us all together.

K: That's all set up. The meeting on Friday on safeguards. We will have instructions as you requested.

S: I would like it in writing.

K: It will be in writing

S: I found that helpful in Helsinki

K: The President is cosetested and I can only talk with him during certain hours. But I will

S: OK. Thanks

further conversation 3:50 pm

S: There was a SALT delegation meeting yesterday and it might be useful if members could meet with verification panel and get an overview.

K: Good. I told Sonnenfeldt an hour ago that we needed that. We will schedule.

S: For an alternative, you might meet with us and verification panel at my house. Lunch or something.

K: Yes, thank you.

S: What is a good day. K: I will have my staff call you. (final decision was mtg. in sit. room on 1/21)

By KHC

NAHA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON

The President/Kissinger

2:20 pm 1/16/70

President: I felt that my intuition was right. Rogers speech did not get much play. It wasn't even on the first page of the Times or Post. Where did he make it?

K: Attn State before a group of correspondents. He had wanted you to speak originally. Generally the Times would print the text.

President: I wonder why they did not publish.

K: I don't know. It was public and on the record.

President: Perhaps they didn't think there was enough new.

K: We put out that correction today. Your instinct was correct.

President: Well, in any event, we will just have to ride it through.

K: My concern was the impact on Hanoi but that was handled.

President: They are just trying to hard line things.

K: They will do that until shortly before they yield, if they do. I don't see how they can ignore the Sino-Soviet development. Three months ago this would have been front page.

President: You mean about the Chinese?

K: No, irreversibility

President: yest, of course

K: The sister of one of my staff -- he's alright -- is very active in the moratorium. She sdays they are getting out of VN because the President is doing what he can.

President: Going into environment?

K: Yes, but you are ahead of them on that.

President: Its very curious. None of them were giving a thing in VN. They are lashing out at the system. I think the problem has been solved.

K: It's the emptiness of modern life. It's a middle class existence without a purpose. They like to think they are tough cynics. They are against parents and teachers who have pulled everything apart and cannot

By: KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

President/Kissinger
2:20 pm 1/16/70

-2-

put it back together again.

President: Bill saw no problem?

K: No. He called Zeigler and thanked him. Rogers said when President said irreversible he meant plan but the plan contains three points.

President: What are your feelings about Biafra, Nigeria? I am not comfortable. This concerns

K: I think we should have this conference. We must emphasize post-war reparations in Nigeria so as to to say Biafra. You might consider giving it Monday or Tuesday. State will want to keep it low.

President: I saw where State said that we would work through the Nigerian Government. We cannot. We must show concern. Ojukwu says 4 million people are about to starve and I believe him. It's just like out own civil war.

K: ... unbeatable after a certain point. If there is Sino-Sovietthing we will have to consider other move.

President: Hanoi is concerned with a Sino-Soviet altercation.

K: We have a Pakistani memo between Chou-en-Lai and which shows security threats to be Soviet Union, ?, and the U.S.

President: When do you expect to hear from Walters?

K: In two weeks. Bill's remark bothers me most. Hanoi but I think it is clear now.

President: They pick up every nuance. It has to be believable

K: The Russians will get it to them if they don't see it themselves.

Regarding the draft -- there are no striking passages. It's OK if it has a centralizing theme. Nothing hits you -- but perhaps the first three pages are the best.

President: There's nothing to hit with. We only have three issues: crime, environment, and inflation. Re environment, we may have allowed the intellectuals to suck us in. They have made this a big thing. We have to preempt them intellectually. One problem -- the food budget will cost 2 billion 300 million dollars -- and this is apart from welfare.

By KHL W NARA, Dato. S/12/04

-3-

Take environment -- its of some use but over period of time communities
would work on it. After you preempt, nation gets bogged down on liberal
issue. Then there's not enough for survival. That's what bothers me.

K: I called Pachman and Laird and its better for you to save 40 million then
for Laird to make grand-stand play. Very helpful.

President: Purpose of the NSC -- short and brief -- only on ABM. We can
give them marching orders. You are getting out the memo?

K: Yes. I mentioned the Finney article and made it very strong. That will
calm Dubridge down for about 6 months.

President: Maybe we are not being tough enough on control of national
security.

K: It was an unfair article because the military had agreed. Durbridge is
against military. Helms felt it compromised his intelligence operation.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
2:40 pm 1/16/70

R: There is to be a meeting of the Nigerian work group. Elliot tells me the President wants to do something. What is it?

K: Good question.

R: Have to be careful. Gowan will be key in Africa. He is resentful of too much intrusion. As practical matter we cannot do anything he doesn't want. We don't want to be in that posture. I want to say we agree and tell them whatever he wants to use, we will help. He did not like military people flying planes in.

K: I understand. Because of reasons, the President wants leadership in domestic areas.

R: I could issue a press release

K: Forming up what we have done this week. That would be helpful. He just called on the State of the Union but wanted to know what is being done in Nigeria.

R: A lot

K: If you could prepare a release, that would be best.

R: We must put it in a way not to get in trouble with Gowan. He thinks relief prolonged the war.

K: Probababy right

R: We will see what we can do.

R: The latest figure from Lucet is 110. I asked him about a break down. He just hemmed. They don't make it easy to be pro-French.

R: I saw Ziegler's item on my speech. I just re-stated what I had said before

K: The President heard it last night and wanted the press to be sure, it was understood. Zeigler wanted to confirm

R: It's the same as my testimony.

-------further conversation in evening

R: Following up on Nigeria. There will be a draft press release on what has been done this week. During the weekend we expect to fly in 50 jeeps for relief.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Rogers/Kissinger

1/16/70

K: Can we announce that?

R: Yes. We have asked permission from Gowon

K: Exactly what the President wanted to do.

R: Fergueson is coming back on Monday. Perhaps the three of us could meet with the President and release that I am going to Nigeria.

K: He may not want to announce it. But you should be there. He may be going back to Camp David to work on the State of the Union.

R: I will try to havetomorrow formalizing Elliot Richardson's committee. Then another one Sunday. Then after Fergueson can announce about medicines and such.

K: What about the Brandt visit. We should tell the Germans it's to enable you to be there.

R: SEATO meeting

K: Do you think that you will skip Saigon?

R: Saigon and then Phillipines and then back here for Brandt visit.

By: KHU NARA, Dato

TELCON
Mayo/Kissinger

4:57 1/16/70

M: What about the U.S. building? 20 million in. Doesn't spend this in a year. Would Rogers scream.

K: Rogers would scream but I would take it on. How much - 20 million?

M: Just a minute. There'd be no spending in '71 so we'll stay with the commitment. Sorry. Nice talking with you

K: I understand the Deputy Secretary of Defense said if you cut he would fly to California and if you cut, the Secretary of Defense said we would fly back from California.

M: Thank you Henry.

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Chapin/Kissinger
5:25 pm 1/16/70

C: Secretary Rogers called because he wanted to see the President about some items. Amb. Fergueson and Neuman are coming back. Rogers will add Nigeria to his trip

K: I will take care of it.

C: Also two other items in town

K: Is the President coming next week.

C: If it's urgent

K: It would be good to do on Monday.

C: Send a schedule thing up then. It's a form telling of request for appointment with the President.

K: OK It will give us a good thing on Biafra. What about Brandt

C: Trying to find out about Fri. or Sat. meeting. Rogers must be here.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Semple

11:29 a.m., January 17, 1970

(Got in late on the conversation) They were discussing Semple's
article for the New York Times which he is writing at the moment
and for which he wants to clear quotes with Mr. Kissinger.

K: You may have to come to my apartment in the morning.

S: I am very flexible. There is a lot of interest in the story.
The real problem is writing a piece of history in the middle of a
daily newspaper on Monday. I have an artificial way of doing that
to get me into the story without having the reader think I am talking
about the forthcoming State of the Union message.

K: How you write the story is up to you. I would like the opportunity
of seeing whether you have the facts all right. A lot of it is delicate.

S: That is what I want, too. In going over my notes, I have a
couple of questions.

K: You won't have it written until tomorrow morning? If foreign
affairs were like dealing with you, I would be out of business.

S: If I hadn't gone to Safire's for dinner last night... Barbara
Hower was there. She had Ray Price cornered on the couch.

K: He's a bachelor, too. Maybe Maxine Cheshire will get a new
topic.

S: I didn't know how he would handle her. He stood up under it
very well.

K: We will be in touch tomorrow.

S: This will give me time to rewrite the story according to your
emendations.

K: It sounds like a reasonable procedure.

Ids

By KHC NARA, Dale

5/12/04

TELECON

Marshall Green

11:40 a.m., January 17, 1970

K: I wanted to call you about the instruction to Warsaw. I
am always careful to make sure you are aware of the status of
comments. I have talked in a general way with the President. He
has not had a chance to go over it line by line, but he agrees with
the general comments; i.e., it has his general endorsement. My
major problem is of tone which I haven't been able to fix and haven't
tried to. It seems we are trying a little too hard to prove our good
intentions.

G: You mean we are defensive?

K: That is a better word -- we are protesting too hard. I think
we will be more impressive to them if we give the feeling of moderation
produced by strength.

G: That is tricky to do.

K: I have some specific suggestions. Paragraph 4 on the Nixon
Doctrine. I don't know whether they give a damn about our view of
other countries being able to defend themselves. Our arming Thailand
would be a greater security threat to them. Do we need that paragraph
at all?

G: The intention was to give an overall statement of our policy
and indicate there was no weakness in our policy -- we are not
moving back.

K: The next paragraph does that anyway.

G: "The U.S. will honor its commitments but has no intention..."

K: Why not go from national interests in this area to "in this
sense..." This gets into a reduced military presence.

G: That will make it much more palatable.

K: I realize this is the opposite point from what I made theoretically.

G: I think it is wise to take out anything that is likely to raise
hackles. This is the cold-war response.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

*

K: Then take out paragraph 4.

G: We will take it out except for 'commitments' which we could work into the next paragraph.

K: I have no problem with paragraphs 6 and 7. On the Taiwan point, the President is a little sensitive. The sentence, "I can assure you that the U.S. does not seek to impose its own views..." Do we need that? "Our only concern is the issue not be resolved by force of arms..." Just go to the next sentence...just leave the next sentence out also. Say "In this spirit, we will also (not) support.... without prejudice to any future peaceful settlement..."

G: That covers it. I don't see why we can't leave it out.

K: The President will not like, "and will strongly oppose..."
Can we say, "and will discourage"? I know what you are trying to do.
Or simply say, "we will not support..."

G: This, in fact, is our position. You could say, "will not support and in fact will oppose." "Discourage" is too weak.

K: I did check this idea of eventually reducing our presence on Taiwan with the President, and he thought that was fine.

G: It is the key to the whole thing. We may have a tacit formula here -- we can have Taiwanese government.

K: The President likes it if we play it cool.

G: Your changes are good.

K: On "disarmament," why go into partial death-plan and non-proliferation.

G: I don't know why we went into the test ban and non-proliferation.

K: Take that out and instead of making two sentences, I would say something like, "the talks which the U.S. and Soviet Union are engaged in on strategic arms limitations..." The problem of controlling this is vital. Leave the first sentence -- drop the next. Combine the next two into one. The only other suggestion: the President would like some sentences on U.S. /Soviet Union collusion in general -- refer to it somewhere.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

G: We could say, "we do not support..." And not mention the condominium.

K: If you are willing to make these changes, you can let it go.

G: There is a question on the date of the next meeting. (He read a proposed telegram and explained that the U. S. and the Chinese take turns suggesting the next meeting.) Our instruction is you may accept any date ______ (head of the Chinese delegation) proposes.

K approved the telegram.

G: We will put these changes in and get it out.

K: You can sign me off.

lds

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/84

TELECON

Bill Sullivan (State)

2:05 p.m., January 17, 1970

S: I have two or three Vietnam things. You are aware of Fulbright's desire to have hearings?

K: Again?

S: This time on several of our programs out there: Coords, U.S. military advisory effort, U.S. aid, information.

K: Does that bother us?

S: Not particularly. We were in touch with Fulbright's Committee yesterday. The issue still between us is whether they should be held in Executive Session or open. Fulbright has offered what he calls a compromise -- the ones on civilian programs would be open with each witness able to identify what he considered sensitive, and those would be taken into Executive Session. We want to warn the field. The Committee has asked for witnesses by name: Bill Colby as lead-off, John Vann, Bill Hitchcock who runs the refugee program.

K: I don't think we can refuse.

S: I don't see how we can. I want to send a message to the field and tell them to prepare themselves for the week of February 16.

K: The feeling in this building would be based on the Symington Hearings -- to be surer of what the witnesses are going to say.

S: I think they should submit their proposed statements in advance. Stevenson here has set up a meeting on Wednesday of next week (Jan 21) with Ehrlichman and group on getting general guidance.

K: On the Vietnam part of it?

S: It had already been set up for the Symington Hearings and now we will go into the subject of the Fulbright hearings.

K: I will make sure that I participate. I think it would be helpful to send a wire to the field.

S: Phil called me before he sent in his message on what he hoped to do next week.

By KM U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I haven't seen it.

S: He wants to try to get the GVN to carry the primary ball
next time and emphasize what Thieu previously said, particularly
in his July 11 speech -- and draw out the intransigence of the other
side. The week after that, he wants to do one on their intransigence
with regard to troop withdrawals; and then another on POW's. This
is to build up their intransigence in case, when he comes back here,
the decision will be to tell him to go and be more sticky on the plenary
sessions.

K: That is a good point -- it is an excellent scenario.

S: There is a message over there for clearance.

K: Can it wait until Monday?

S: Saigon wants to talk to the GVN and wants our comments
before Monday Saigon time.

K: Let me look at it.

S: He has talked to Phong(?), acting head of the GVN.

K: Unless you hear from me by 3:30, you clear off on it.

S: On Phil's return, do you have anything on the President's
seeing him. (In response to query from K, S said he is returning
on Friday, January 23, and wants to go back the next Tuesday night).

K: I will get a meeting with the President for him, but I don't
have a date yet.

S: On that basis, we will tell him to come ahead.

K: I definitely want to see him.

S: Finally, I have a message here which came through Al Haig
concerning a Presidential inquiry about using Bob Thompson in Vietnam.

K: He sort of wanted to use him in charge of a constabulary force.

S: There are two or three problems with this. Almost anything we
do on a direct-hire basis sounds like a pay-off. Any other command

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

line function is a bit of a problem with the foreign nationals.

K: I think we should send him back again to make another report after a period of time.

S: He is on a retainer basis with RAND and can go back in that capacity.

K: If you could figure out any advisory role for him, the President would like it.

S: A two or three-month advisory role in terms of his current arrangements with RAND.

K: Come up with a proposal and I will see what we can do with it. A line responsibility is not good especially in view of what you said about it looking like a pay-off. Actually, his report isn't all that useful -- it's very sketchy for a four-week effort.

S: If he would flesh out the last part of the report... I will ask our people to send you a suggestion for using the current RAND arrangement with effort being undertaken to get him an advisory role -- perhaps in the police or constabulary area.

K: I think it would be considered very favorably.

S: I don't think we have any other crash problems.

K: I would like to sit down with you soon on a personal basis to get your thinking about where you think this whole effort is going. Everyone is happy on our side with what everyone is doing. But I would like your own judgment on what this adds up to. Maybe when Phil is here, the three of us could sit down and discuss it. This is nothing operational -- I want to clear my own mind. I cannot believe the other side, which has fought for 25 years, will now roll over and play dead.

S: I don't either.

K: We ought to discuss that.

Ids

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Ehrlichman/Kissinger

10:00 am

1/19/70

K: I have a whole list that State has ignored.

E: I'll tell you one way I have been handling these problems. I send a memo telling them what dates I have set up. I ~~in advance~~ I say that by way of recapitulation the President has said this and that. In lieu of something from you, I am assigning these dates. I also check with the President.

K: They are completely ignoring these.

E: Set some dates. We will have some completion dates and ~~we will~~ I will call a meeting ~~every other day~~ for preliminary evaluation
a week from to-

K: OK John and thanks

*

TELCONE
Zeigler/Kissinger

1X 10:10 am 1/19/70

By KHU NARA, Date 5/13/04

Z: ... the Secretary's statements. We are ready to help Nigeria

K: Nigeria isn't moving to help. I want a record that we are pushing.

Z/ I am calling only for advice. Should I make it a face Presidential
statement or should I just say it.

K: Just say it. Just say we want to bring you up to date on what has
happened, but give the President credit for it.

Z: OK. We will do it that way.

*

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Yoshida/

10:30 am 1/19/70

Y: I am fine thank you, how are you,

K: Fine

Y: I had a good talk with my friend. He is also getting concerned about the progress so far made. My friend *asked* that assured that he will honor the understanding between the two friends at the earliest occasion. The question is how and in what form. He feels the sooner the better. The only question is how to proceed. How to get things through the two bureaucracies. My friend wishes to keep the understanding to himself. Among out working people there has been some confusion and there he is under duress. My friend wondered if you could handle the matter in such a way that there is a little easier to handle for our working people.

K:: Like what?

Y: Not using the word comprehensive. Make it look more . . .

K: Yes, we can do that

Y: Second, on the surface of it for you to accept some Japanese principles. You will still have the substance agreed upon.

K: What principles?

Y: He was not clear. I am not an expert. All he is *asking* is a change and modification of tactics. A specific suggestion: that is to make use, in the most natural fashion, of your Ambassador here to get in touch with Niasara (sp?), the newly appointed Minister of Commerce, counterpart of yours.

K: I understand

Y: My friend specifically chose him because he speaks good English.

K: What should our man propose to him?

Y: They could have good talks. This new man and Aichi, both are the key men. They will be given tomorrow new instructions to accelerate. From our point of view the sooner the better. My friend not specific on the point you just raised. Let me repeat, could you handle the matter in such a way and form that is easier for following for our people concerned.

K: That is easy.

By KCLW NARA, Dato

5/13/04

Yoshida

10:30 am 1/19/70

-2-

Y: Looks like more ? ? ? . On the surface of it you accept Japanese principles. Since I am not an expert I am not clear . . .

K: I am not either. I will look into it.

Y: On the surface

K: I understand

Y: All he is asking is a change of tactics

K: Thank you very much and I will be in touch with you. If you don't hear from me you can assume we are getting in touch with our man and he will get in touch with you.

Y: They can have very good talks

K: Alone?

Y: Yes, without interpreters. Please handle ? ? ? bureaucracy.

K: You can rest assured that our understanding is private and no reference has even been made to it.

Y: And no reference to this line of communication.

K: For God's sake, no! You can be assured of this. People here don't even know clearly that there is such a channel. That is the best way to avoid confusion.

Y: Best way

K: It's impossible for them to leak what they don't know.

Y: Only my friend knows

K: The same situation here. That's why they don't understand their instructions.

Y: My friend has the same problem.

K: When we write diplomatic history years from now no one will believe it.

Y: Regards to you and please convey assurances from my friend to yours and warmest regards.

K: I will and many thanks

By: KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
U. Alexia Johnson
1/19/70 10:40 a.m.

K: That kabuki play--I've had one complaint: You surfaced that a position they were supposed to surface.

J: At their specific request. . . Okay, we won't get into "who hit John?" I see, I see.

K: Well, the story I get . . . since no one in his bureaucracy knows of his commitment, he's got one hell of a problem. He needs some 'hanging tough' on our side (?). What he is proposing . . . he stands by his commitment. What he needs is a little help, like removing any reference to the word 'comprehensiv,' and the acceptance of some Japanese principles, which don't change the substance, but which they can point to as their achievement. Do you know what they are talking about?

J: Well, . . . our acceptance of their showing damage.

K: It doesn't change the substance though. My problem is the guy I'm talking to doesn't understand either. Their proposal is that it would be easiest for him to ask handle tax it now if our ambassador were instructed to do the next round with their new commerce minister and do it alone--with no interpreter--since the man speaks perfect English.

J: But the new commerce minister doesn't . . .

K: First, there is to be no reference to an agreement.

J: No, I understand.

K: He says he will give specific instructions tomorrow.

J: To Shimoda?

K: No to their commerce minister. MYYEX Meyer should see him alone--be tough on our demands, but do something on the word 'comprehensive' and on some other unspecified principles, whatever that means. And then it will be settled soon.

J: Okay.

K: I'm sure this is clear to you.

J: Okay.

K: I didn't intend to get into it.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Johnson

1/19/70 10:40 a.m.

page 2

J: No, you had to. Shimoda said it was personal from the Prime Minister . . .
He said Shimoda is the one to handle it.

K: That's what he told the President.

J: Yes, the word he had from the Prime Minister is what I gave you.

K: He said there would be new instructions tomorrow.

J: Well, according to how they wanted to play it--I've taken the position
that I'll handle it however they want to play it.

K: From where I sit, it's been handled with exquisite tact. They just
haven't been able to handle their bureaucracy.

J: I've been going through some charades to help them at the Prime
Minister's request. I thought it was okay. Now it's not any more.

K: Well, get him to see the Commerce Minister alone, and give them what . . .
the word I got specifically is that the substance would not be changed. He would like
a little help by being able to point to something.

J: Okay. Do you know Hira sawa?

K: Yes, I'm not eager to talk with him about textiles though.

J: He wanted to see me and you. It's Shimoda's impression that Hirasawa
"knows everything."

K: Yes, but we don't know whether Shimoda knows everything.

J: This is the problem. It's clear to me that Shimoda doesn't know about
the piece of paper.

K: No one knows about it. I talked to him and -- I lied to him--I said no
one here knows about it. We are just issuing directives from here.

J: I've told Armin.

K: He won't make a slip?

J: No, I didn't tell him about the piece of paper. Are you going to see
Hirasawa?

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Johnson

1/19/70 10:40 a.m.

K: If you think I should.

J: No. You have no word he's the Prime Minister's man?

K: No, and he had every opportunity to introduce this--this fella I'm talking to.

J: Okay. I'm seeing him on Wednesday.

K: If you feel after seeing him that he knows anything -- my man was imploring me that nothing be said about the piece of paper. I am sure he would have said this man was authorized to speak.

J: Okay.

K: You can't write history after you've seen a thing like this. Documents have nothing to do with it. It's a kabuki play.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
10:50 am 1/19/70

R: I don't want to bother the President. However, perhaps you could let him know when you are speaking with him. Moscow has announced that tonight at 7:30 pm they will have radio programs transmitted to our country of interviews with our prisoners. I think it offensive. They tell us they are trying to stay out of it and now this.

K: I think we ought to tell Dobrynin

R: I think so too and tell the President we are getting to him right away.
I think we should make some sort of statement after we talk with Dobrynin.

K: I know he will agree completely.

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM

Gov. Nelson Rockefeller/Kissinger

11/10 am 1/19/70

R: I am great. I have been wrapped up in my own problems

K: I missed hearing from you

R: You have yours and I have mine. There have been meetings with the press, and so forth. Subways, buses, and so forth. Two little things. I understand 16 people have been cleared to see the President this year and Mr. Balaguer isn't on the list.

K: We are taking care of that in the next two weeks

R: The situation in Venezuela is critical. My suggestion would be, in view of oil pact, if the President does anything...

K: We will keep that screwed up for a year

R: It would help to stabilize the situation in Venezuela, which is working hard at being a democratic government, to have him up.

K: If we have him, we'll have to have the fellow from Guyana too.

R: That would be great. Also, the little fellow from Uruguay is the greatest.

K: That will be harder to sell

R: He's really the greatest and he's fighting hard for democracy. What's happening in Brazil on the Ambassadorship? Do you keep up with that?

K: Not usually. Is Elbick pulling out?

R: He's definitely leaving.

K: Do you have a candidate?

R: my cousin is interested and he would be good?

K: Aldridge?

R: Yes. He speaks the language and is loved down there and would be very popular.

K: Right.

R: The Under Secretary. If that goes through but Meyers is openly opposed to whole thing. He's been taken in by the system.

By KHC W

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Rockefeller/Kissinger

11:10 1/19/70

-2-

K: Nelson, when you come down. . . I know you are disappointed by the lack of support.

R: Not in you.

K: I can get anything done that does not generate a protest higher up

R: If you get undersecretaryship and had a man working with you. Not Meyers

K: Meyers is weak. I am setting up an advisors commitee and moving action over here. I am mad about those heliocopters. It's just not acceptable that the President's orders should get circumvented this way.

R: If I can buy some. . .

K: It's outrageous. I want them to do it the way it's ordered.

R: You need a strong undersecretary.

K: Do you have a candidate?

R: I'm leaning more and more towards Joe Carlino. He's about the ablest guy I know.

K: Will you be down?

R: I have been most. . .

K: I have been watching you with admiration. You are a believer in the frontal attack. After some of my experiences it looks better and better to me.

R: How about the Middle East policy?

K: I don't think you'll see any more dramatic moves like you have seen. They will quiet down.

R: Is the President going to talk with these guys?

K: The Jewish community? The President is sending them to State and letting State explain what they have been doing and draw the fire over there. I am not the man to meet Jewish leaders. I don't want to defend our policy too much. The problem is the President needs them and then he will have to defend. . .

R: Sisco has always been against Israel. LBJ sat on him but Rogers won't. If someone could sit on him.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
11:25 am 1/19/70

S: There are two pieces of paper over there. One is the suggested reply to the Soviets and the other is a message to Eban.

K: The President is bogged down with the State of the Union message. My only concern with the Eban message is that it is too forthcoming and too defensive

S: We think a little oil on the water is a good thing. But I'll keep that in mind. No point in being too defensive.

K: Try to get back to you at the end of the day.

S: Right and thank you.

By KHC

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Gen. Norstad/Kissinger

2:20 pm 1/19/70

N: I talked with Jack McCloy yesterday after you did.

K: He reached you finally

N: I suggested he call you today. He indicated he dictated a memo to me from Florida. Jack and I are in agreement on this.

K: Right

N: The group that met on Saturday felt that they would like to raise with the WH informally whether they had considered the influence from a negotiating standpoint going beyond number 1.

K: Did they understand what No. 1 is?

N: Yes, for this purpose. Of going beyond they are keeping to the general scenario. The group was not making any recommendations and the committee is not taking a position. They would like to feel that it is a decision that has been weighed. / ? ? ? a very short time. Going beyond that, this entire committee is very sensitive to the danger of being a kibitzer and don't feel that they should try to influence. Since the group doesn't know what the situation is, we have given the impression of following the situation more closely than we actually have. No action will be taken beyond what we have taken.

K: How do you want it conveyed to the President? in Writing?

N: I don't think anything should be in writing but it's entirely up to you as to how you convey it to the President.

K: Why don't you write me a personal letter and then no one can say I confused the issue.

N: All I would say is that group in discussion had raised the question and obviously it could have some impression on the negotiations. That's all from this side.

K: If you would say it without saying we should not do it. In making deployment decisions we should do it this way.

N: I'm not going that far. I gave you yesterday the whole substance and I will not go into that more than I have now. Completely ? ? ? with regard to dispositions made by the government.

*

Norstad/Kissinger

2:20 pm 1/19/70

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: I can tell you k now that I will forward the letter as it stands to the President.

N: After it is written I will call you privately because it is difficult to have things sent back. Given more time, we might have had interest in this. Some of the people have a precise knowledge and others don't have and it's not enough in this committee for a total decision.

K: And some decisions have already been made.

N: We may expand more fully on weapons.

K: Thank you. It's a pleasure to do business with you.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
John Ehrlichman
Mr. Kissinger
1-19-70, 2:30 p.m.

(Missed first part). Picked up where E was talking about McClintock's conduct through this whole episode. E stated there was a marked lack of sensitivity as to Presidential loyalty. At first we thought he had not been instructed, but learned that he had been. E said this stopped Elliot in his tracks. E said he recovered enough to ask for a copy of the memorandum that John Lehman did. E said I think Lehman should excise this with the thought in mind that it will go to Rogers. E said it should be a memorandum from me to Rogers saying the memorandum contains essentially the following information.

K said I think that it is the right way to do it.

mlh

By K.L. NARA, Dale

TELCOM
Haldeman/Kissinger

2:30 pm 1/19/70

H: The President said he doesn't want to see you anymore. He wants you to send a memo instead. Seriously, he wants to avoid getting into anything.

K: Are you going to be talking to him?

H: No, but he wants you to call him at 6:00

K: Yes. He only needs to know in case he gets a call from someone or is concerned with it.

H: Only if it's necessary

K: I know how it is. Any time you break you rythm it's totally out of proportion to what you take. Five minutes can mean a half hour. 6:00 is fine.

H: OK Good

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
2:50 pm 1/19/70

K: The President is in seclusion and only emerges once in a while. I have two questions. The President is pleased about what you are doing with the Russians and thinks it is exactly right. Have you done it yet?

R: He was called in at 12:30 I think

K: Was it Dobrynin?

R: No, Tchernykov came in without any explanation. We told him our problem and then told the press.

K: In meeting VP, speaking in regard to spirit of partnership. We have heard that he achieved a great success.

R: Might say we heard from the media that it was a success.

*

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/70

TELCON

Gerard Smith/Ksinger

4:50 pm 1/19/70

S: Do you have any word on the Congress and SALT? Our people didn't make much progress. Bilieu feels

K: I don't care what Bilieu feels. He is to do it. What does he say.

S: He wants to check with Brice.

K: It's been done. I will get on it right away

TELCON
? /Kissinger
5:10 pm 1/19/70

? . . . 6:15 meeting and I cannot go to dinner for the Apostolic Delegate because I am feeling ill. Do you mind?

K: No. Benelli wants to discuss Italian polication situation with the President.
Did you know that?

?: No, and I would be glad to have you add that to the talking points.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Kraemer/Kissinger
5:23 pm 1/19/70

Kr: Did you see page 23 of the NYTimes? Tells of origin of Nov. 3 spec. You should read it carefully.

K: What do you think?

Kr: From the information I have the description is wrong. Read it carefully. You may want to put it down for the future. Tje reader ________ Mr. Kissinger who warned the President about doing such a thing. So read it carefully. The Washington Post

K: This was probably put out by our public relations people

Kr: This one today purports to tell in detail about the Nov. 3 speech

K: That's what I mean.

Kr: To show complete independence, and so on? I would not have called you if I didn't think

K: They interviewed them before it happened but I didn't dispute them because he thought image

Kr: Image is an important thing. I sent over today some things that areless marginal

K: You can be absolutely sure

Kr: My views were very much like yours on irreversibility.

K: I have been putting out public statements all along

Kr: I can see what you mean. I read it because many things in Europe are now leveling. The entire European world is breaking. Now comes the U. S. and undoes good that he has done. Therefore, we have better Nov. 14 speech.

K: You don't have to convince me. It's a disaster.

Kr: One Cabinet member was here.

K: You told me last week.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCONE
The President/Kissinger

6:12 pm

1/19/70

K: I don't have much. One item: Moscow radio said that it would broadcast a series of messages from our pow's back to their families. I talked to Bill.

P: That's rough stuff

K: I told Bill it is an unfriendly gesture. He called in Tchernykov -- Dobrynin was out -- and then put out a press release.

P: Good. We don't take that from anyone. When do you next see Dobrynin?

K: I haven't set it yet. I thought maybe next week. Maybe I should wait awhile after this

P: I would wait a week. I have a feeling after reading those books that if the Americans have made a mistake, it's been that we have been sucked in. Let's play it tough. Tough in a sensible way.

K: I agree completely. Even if we carry out our September plan we have plenty of time.

P: This is only January. I think they need it. I have a feeling that this thing on China.

K: That gets them. Dobrynin says we are doing rough business on that.

P: State is bragging about the fact that they opened way to China. We know we did that.

K: They didn't even know about it.

P: I have a fairly good record on that. My foreign affairs piece even before the election was on China. Adenauer and de Gaulle said if you have two enemies play them against each other.

K: You have a consistent basis

P: I have your foreign policy stuff. It's very good but the length.

K: I know it's too long

P: Not too long because I need more on VN -- when it's such an issue you can't just have it fill in a pause -- but the little business on the principles of peace were very good. I have to decide if I want to drop it here.

*

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: The annual report

P: I put it in the first report but I am afraid it will be cut out.

K: Did you see the NYTimes piece on your speech?

P: No, How did it go? Where did they put it?

K: On an inside page but they gave it most of the page.

P: What was the thrust?

K: They said the speech was by you along and he had seen some of the drafts and it was all by you except for center part where you had only factual help.

P: Usually people pick things up in the Times. Only other person I would have given it to is Sidi but I don't think he can get in anymore.

K: NO, I don't think Shepley has anything in/

P: The publishers are terrorized by the intellectuals.

K: I think they will go the way of the Herald Tribune. I don't think they have what Newsweek has.

P: Life but Look especially is working on sensationalism. Playing to the ghetto sidewalk of NY. It's part of many cities but it isn't part of Kansas City or Orange County, for example, and that's what they are forgetting.

K: Sidi makes the point that you have an overwhelming majority of the people.

P: Is there anything new on Vietnam?

K: I have just spent an hour with CIA's chief analyst. Many things are beginning to bother me. We are only getting infiltration in Laos but not in VN. Where are the people? There are lots of trucks.

P: I hope we are bombing the hell out of those trucks.

K: Yes, we are. Maybe there is to be a new thrust.

P: There's nothing left for a new thrust.

K: One thing that would be useful would be for you to name the new chairman on the Joint Chiefs. No one wants to make a move and rock the boat.

By: KH U NARA, Dato_5/12/04

-3-

P: I guess it has to be the Admiral

K: I guess but Abrams has designs on the job. No one will move until they know.

P: I don't get your point. It's important to win there.

K: Haig is optimistic after one day.

P: He is? Generally there is a tendency for people going to say it's turned around. Before they were reflecting what the generals told them but now they can see if for themselves. I am concerned (lost next couple of sentences -dcm)

K: ... how fragile this is. ... bad blow they can survive it.

P: Mrs. Martin was telling me a story about a professor who raised butterflies. The butterflies were in a cocoon and the professor decided to help them along by cutting the cocoon a little. The butterflies came out but soon died because their wings weren't strong enough because they hadn't struggled enough.

K: Very good

P: That's the point of our Asian policy. People have to struggle a bit.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Haldeman/Kissinger

7:25 pm 1/19/70

K: What is the President's schedule tonight? Is he working on the speech? Does he want to read anything?

H: NO

K: How much time?

H: You can pretty much figure he doesn't have any.

K: Not tomorrow?

H: He has Ehrlichman writing 25 words on narcotics -- that's how bad it is.

K: What about the 12 noon meeting. Perhaps we should put that off.

H: He wants that. He has a break anyway with the V. P. and Benelli

K: That's fine but

H: Then he has the March of Dimes kid, etc. Later he'll go back to the speech.

K: My concern is that we might have 2 million dead in Biafra. I don't want him to be snowed by State.

H: What can he do?

K: Get medical team in there. Can I seem him at 10:45?

H: 10:45 or after Benelli

K: He will take his time with Benelli

H: Don't let him. If he is cranking then like he is now, he won't.

K: Well, see if you can get me in. Anyway, there is no need to get my staff going on Biafra tonight. I will get it done tonight for tomorrow morning. Then 5 minutes at least.

H: OK

K: Before Rogers

H: In break from speech which starts at 11:00