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outside intervention in the form of attempts to play the
various German states off against one another. United, it faced the geopolitical reality that any country capable of defending itself against all its neighbors simultaneously would also be in a position to defeat them singly.

Structurally, therefore, a purely national German policy
always ran the risk of what Bismarck had deemed the "le[s] cauchemar des coalitions"--the nightmare of hostile coalitions.

When Germany cast its lot with the West and gave
priority to Atlantic and European integration over national
unity, it took on a set of foreign policy challenges not
shared by any of its allies. Germany would not be keeping
faith with its people unless it affirmed the need for German
unity. On the other hand, none of Germany's allies could

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possibly have the same interest in ending Germany's division
as the Federal Republic--and in truth several of them had no
such interest at all. If the issue was left dormant for too
long, the division of Germany might become frozen; if it was
pressed too insistently, ancient suspicions would be aroused
in the West and perhaps bellicosity in the East.

That Germany unity was achieved despite these obstacles
owes much to the skill and tenacity of Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, who served as Foreign Minister for twenty years.

Any German foreign minister operates to some extent in a
vacuum. Germany's relatively late emergence as a national
state had the consequence that the country never developed a
clear consensus on the nature of its national interest.
Only twice in modern history has this problem been solved--
by Otto von Bismarck in the establishment of a unified

5

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P.05

Germany, and after World War II by Konrad Adenauer and his successors. Bismarck chose dexterity, seeking to arrange relations within Europe such that Germany would always have more options than any possible rival, thereby preventing the formation of hostile coalitions.

Adenauer and his successors opted for reliability.

Adenauer reasoned that Germany's past conduct generated too much distrust to allow for Bismarck's subtle combinations, and that German romantic [✓] tendencies inhibited the sense of proportion crucial to a freewheeling Bismarckian approach. He, therefore, sought to dissolve Germany's temptations in a rigid commitment to Atlantic cohesion. And all of Adenauer's successors have followed suit.

It was Genscher's specific contribution that he managed to leaven Adenauer's rigid approach with a degree of

6

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Bismarckian flexibility during the crucial period leading up to unification. The conventional Atlantic wisdom might well have pointed in the direction of Germany waiting passively at the side of its allies for the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. But no German foreign minister really had this option; a native of East Germany like Genscher least of all.

A specifically West German response to these national aspiration was initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt under the slogan of Ostpolitik and pursued by Genscher under two chancellors--first Helmut Schmidt, then Helmut Kohl. At the culmination, German unification required, with all sensitivity to allied concerns, some separate arrangements between the Soviet Union to ease its fears of a resurgent Germany after unification.

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previous experience could have prepared him. The cold war led
ended, and with it the necessity to orient German policy
 toward both of the superpowers at the same time. With
Soviet armies 600 miles farther east and the former Soviet
Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was bound
to weaken; no European nation, German included, would
henceforth submit to America's priorities to the same degree
or pay the same price for its protection. The dissolution
of the East German state made it seem less necessary for
Germany to legitimize itself by subordinating itself to West

European, especially French, prescriptions.
community and an unbalanced European scene left
emerge from these new circumstances

By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers,

Genscher's tactical skill and intelligence, reinforced
his country's new bargaining position, gave him a prominence

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passages among two superpowers and a number of suspicious
mentored
neighbors. Genscher managed these international
crosscurrents with the same dexterity he applied to the
domestic ones, and with the same general result: achieving
for his country an influence and a prestige beyond
calculations of relative power, even before unification.

When I first met Genscher in June 1974, he was so
inexperienced in foreign policy that his familiarity with
the subject could most charitably be described as
incomplete. When Genscher left office in 1994, he was the
dean of the foreign ministers of the Atlantic area, met simply
in turn, of length of service but also in actuality,
Genscher's tactical skill and intelligence, reinforced by
his country's growing economic power, gave him a growing
influence on the international scene. Genscher brilliantly
maneuvered within the narrow margin of survival acceptable

(4)

Draft #1 1/2/97

In December 1993, Mikhail Gorbachev and I accompanied
Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Halle where some sort of honor was
bestowed upon him. The visit came about in a manner that
demonstrated Genscher's enormous faith in the future of his
people. It had been his habit to extract from his many
interlocutors a promise that they would accompany him to
Halle once Germany was reunited. Considering that the so-
called German Democratic Republic was still under Communist
rule, this invitation was at the same time a challenge. It
took faith when made to Western leaders; it required
considerable courage vis-a-vis Soviet leaders and me. For
Gorbachev it was easy to give a promise that would never
need to be implemented; indeed he was in a position to

prevent the contingency to which the promise referred from
ever occurring.

But German unification did come to pass and German
foreign policy played a significant role in bringing it
about. Though I was born in Germany, my emotional ties to
my mother country date from the immediate post-war period.
Attached to an American infantry division, I saw the
devastation that had transformed most German cities to heaps
of rubble. To have the courage to begin rebuilding took
extraordinary spiritual strength and tenacity. And the
Federal Republic not only started the long way back with the
Western community, but it did so by means of an
extraordinary act of self-abnegation. In March 1952, Stalin
made explicit what he had been hinting for several years:
he offered to unify Germany in return for German neutrality.

2

We cannot know how serious the Soviet offer was; it
might well have evaporated into thin air had it been
explored. Nevertheless, it is to the eternal credit of
Germany's post-war leader(s) that they resisted the
temptation put before them. They refused Stalin's overture
because they were convinced that even if it led to a
negotiation--which was far from certain--they would not risk
a repetition of the tragedies that had led to Germany's
division. A German national state in the center of Europe
without institutional ties to any of its neighbors might
well fall victim to the central dilemma of German history,
that Germany was either too weak or too strong for the peace
of Europe. Divided, it tempted constant intervention via
attempts to play the various German states off against each
other [one another?]. United, it suffered from the

8

3

geopolitical reality that any country capable of defending
itself against all its neighbors simultaneously would by the
same token be in a position to defeat them singly.

Structurally, therefore, a purely national Germany always
ran the risk of what Bismarck had called the ______ of
hostile coalitions.

In 1952, Germany boldly cast its lot with the West and
gave priority to Atlantic and European integration over
national unity. This saddled German foreign policy with
unusual challenges. It could not be true to itself or keep
faith with its people without affirming the need for German
unity. But some of Germany's allies could possibly have the
same interest in ending Germany's division as the Federal
Republic. If the issue was left too long dormant, the
division of Germany would become frozen; if it was pressed

8

4

too urgently, old suspicions would be aroused and perhaps
bellicosity in the East.

That Germany unity was brought about in the face of
these dilemmas owes no little to the skill and tenacity of
Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Even without the legacy of two
world wars, this would have been an unusually formidable
task. Due to Germany's late emergence as a national state,
the country never developed a clear consensus as to the
nature of its national interest. Only twice in modern
history has this problem been solved--by Otto von Bismarck
at the establishment of a unified Germany, and after World
War II by Konrad Adenauer. Bismarck chose dexterity,
seeking to arrange relations within Europe such that Germany
would always have more options than any possible rival,
thereby preventing the formation of hostile coalitions.

8

5

Adenauer opted for reliability. He reasoned that Germany's past conduct generated too much distrust to allow for Bismarck's subtle combinations, and that the German tendency toward extremes inhibited the sense of proportion crucial to a freewheeling Bismarckian approach. He sought to dissolve Germany's temptations in a rigid commitment to Atlantic [Allied?] cohesion. And all of Adenauer's successors have followed this tradition.

It was Genscher's specific contribution that he managed to combine Adenauer's pro-Western orientation with Bismarckian flexibility during the crucial period leading up to unification. Atlantic conventional wisdom might have implied that Germany wait passively at the side of its allies for the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. But as a native of East Germany, Genscher could not wait while

(4)

8

6

his own people lived under foreign-imposed totalitarian
rule.

In time, the majority of Germans came to insist on a
specifically West German response to their national
aspirations. Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Willy
Brandt and pursued by Genscher under two chancellors--first
Helmut Schmidt, then Kohl. And a German national response--
however sensitive to allied concerns--inevitably required
special assurances to the Soviet Union to ease its fears of
a resurgent Germany after unification.

The Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage
with tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go major
credit for its day-to-day tactical handling--even if the
final push to unification was masterminded by Kohl.
Genscher's subtle tactics at times caused twinges of

7

uneasiness among his allies. But Genscher had problems of
his own. He had to work with six American secretaries of
state, each insisting on his distinctiveness from his
predecessor. This produced an understandable temptation to
take out reinsurance in the space of American gyrations that
moved from deploying medium-range missiles to removing them
entirely within the space of four years. Genscher saw few
attractions in a residual nuclear deployment that left
weapons whose range covered only German territory, even
though his position annoyed both Washington and London.

Through all these controversies, Genscher maneuvered
with consummate skill. History will surely record as his
monument the tour de force of unifying his country while
sustaining Germany's Atlantic relationships. After German
unification, Genscher found himself in a world for which no

(Y)

8

previous experience could have prepared him. The cold war
ended, and with it the necessity to orient German policy
toward both of the superpowers at the same time. With
Soviet armies 600 miles farther east and the former Soviet
Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was bound
to weaken; no European nation, German included, would
henceforth submit to America's priorities to the same degree
or pay the same price for its protection. The dissolution
of the East German state made it seem less necessary for
Germany to legitimize itself by subordinating itself to West
European, especially French, prescriptions.

By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers,
Genscher's tactical skill and intelligence, reinforced by
his country's new bargaining position, gave him a prominence

88

9

that--perhaps unintentionally--emphasized Germany's national
role. But to what purpose and for what end?

That indeed it [is?] the question will keep
recurring(?) in Germany in the decades ahead. Now freed of
the incubus of division, Germany together with its neighbors
must redefine the unity as well as the limits of Europe.
And with the Soviet threat having largely disappeared, what
is the common destiny of the Atlantic nations?

That these questions can even be asked is a measure of
the success of Genscher's policy. He took office as the
leader of a relatively small party which had to navigate
between the two largest German parties. And he managed to
maneuver this party into a position of being indispensable
for forming an effective government. Similarly, as foreign
minister Genscher was obliged to navigate through the narrow

10

passages among two superpowers and a number of suspicious neighbors. Genscher managed these international crosscurrents with the same dexterity he applied to the domestic ones, and with the same general result: achieving for his country an influence and a prestige beyond calculations of relative power, even before unification.

When I first met Genscher in June 1974, he was so inexperienced in foreign policy that his familiarity with the subject could most charitably be described as incomplete. When Genscher left office in 1994, he was the dean of the foreign ministers of the Atlantic area.

11

to Germany. For if German policy is too passive, it runs
the risk of being engulfed by the storms swirling around the
center of the continent. But if German policy is too
active, it may magnify those storms. The democracies owe a
debt of gratitude to Genscher for having maintained their
alliance even while unifying his country. His country's
adversaries will respect him for his untiring efforts to
build bridges and open lines of communication. And his
friends will not forget that his personal loyalty matched
his diplomatic skill.

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INTERNATIONAL

Germany's Master Builder

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

Hans-Dietrich Genscher is to resign today as German foreign minister after 18 years in office. The news last month gave me a sense of almost personal loss—an odd reaction because, as much as I value Genscher as a friend, I have not always agreed with the foreign policies he conducted. But he was a master builder of diplomacy in the cold-war era, and a chief architect of his country's reunification. Genscher's resignation is an occasion for reflections not only on the past but also on Germany's future—and on the role he might yet play in it.

My first encounter with Genscher was shortly after he took office, in Bad Reichenhall at the southern tip of Bavaria. It was in June 1974, in thewaning weeks of Richard Nixon's presidency. And though in those early days Genscher's grasp of foreign policy could be most charitably described as minimal, he conducted himself with extraordinary aplomb at a time of great unease in the Western Alliance. He announced a "gentleman's agreement" to ease tensions between the United States and what was then the Common Market, and proved as good as his word.

Over the next three years, we worked closely together. There was no foreign minister in whom I had greater confidence. Genscher's grasp of foreign policy grew at an astounding pace. As he developed into the dominant foreign minister in Europe over the next decade and a half, we saw each other frequently. I maintained a special affection for this clever, dedicated, vulnerable man—passionate in his convictions yet wary of frontal battles, sensitive to personal slights yet prone to maneuvers inviting those slights.

Genscher approached his goals so obliquely that his dazzling skills occasionally obscured the high purpose that animated them. In later years, some of his complex maneuvers worried me. Without them, Germany probably would not have achieved such a high level of diplomatic influence. But there was a danger that, in less subtle hands, the Genscher style might jeopardize a hard-earned confidence in

German steadiness. That such ambivalence could be generated by a solitary individual who represented (and did not even lead) a small party is in itself a tribute to an extraordinary personality. His resignation reminded me of the diplomat at the Congress of Vienna who is said to have reacted to the death of a colleague with the remark "I wonder what his motive could have been." Was Genscher's departure a withdrawal, or a move into a new role?
I do not pretend to know the answer.

tion are to be avoided. Genscher may calculate that if his Free Democratic Party stays in the current coalition through the 1994 elections, it would end up sharing the blame and suffer serious losses.

For the past four decades, the German Constitution has produced extraordinary political stability. The statutory provision that a party must win at least 5 percent of the popular vote to be represented in Parliament prevents the emergence of small splinter parties. For most of Germany's

postwar history, there have been three principal parliamentary parties. Over the past two decades the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats have oscillated between 34 percent and 49 percent. Genscher's Free Democrats ran from 7 to 11 percent. Whichever major party exceeds 40 percent typically combines with the Free Democrats to form the government. In the 1990 elections, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats polled about 44 percent, the Free Democrats about 11 percent, the Social Democrats about 34.

**Increased options:** In the present Parliament, the Free Democrats can form a government only in combination with the Christian Democrats. On the other hand, as the most popular German leader, Genscher may reason that his resignation will enable his party to avoid criticism for switching sides in the middle of a crisis and yet increase its options for the future: perhaps by means of a coalition of all the major parties to deal with the emergency, as is favored by many leaders, or by an alliance of the Free Democrats

with the Social Democrats in the 1994 elections. Any of these combinations could bring Genscher back as federal president, or as the architect of a new coalition after the 1994 parliamentary elections.

Genscher's foreign policy has been driven by similar dynamics. Just as his party had to maneuver between the two dominant parties, his country had to navigate through the narrow passages among two superpowers and a number of suspicious neighbors. A native of Hallo, in former

(Continued on page 61)

ALLAN TANNENBAUM—SYGMA

Ambivalence about allies: With Secretary of State James Baker

Genscher was passionate in his convictions yet wary of frontal battles, sensitive to slights yet prone to maneuvers inviting those slights.

Perhaps Genscher does not know either. From the point of view of his place in history, Genscher chose an ideal moment. Behind him is his triumph in forging German unification while retaining the Atlantic alliance. At the same time, his resignation coincides with a moment of unprecedented turmoil in postwar German politics. Unification is exacting ever-greater sacrifices; the disciplined support for a national economic policy characteristic of the German labor movement is eroding; austerity seems inevitable if inflation and stagna-

44 NEWSWEEK: MAY 25, 1992

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INTERNATIONAL

(Continued from page 44)

Communist East Germany, Genscher was initially an outsider in the Federal Republic and perforce drawn into the German national question with an intensity not shared by all West Germans, nor by any of Germany's allies. Genscher managed these international crosscurrents with the same dexterity he applied to the domestic ones, and with the same general result: achieving for his country an influence and a prestige beyond calculations of relative power, even before unification.

Even without the legacy of the two world wars, the conduct of German foreign policy would prove to be an unusually formidable task. Germany is more powerful than any other European country, and it has more neighbors. Whenever Germany has attempted a purely national policy, it has frightened its neighbors and contributed to instability. Germany's military strength encouraged the formation of hostile coalitions. And its diplomatic attempts to achieve a global role isolated it because no one wanted to be junior partner to such a restless and ambitious country.

Historically, these difficulties were compounded by Germany's late emergence into nationhood. Until 1871 a loose confederation of independent states, it was the last of the major European countries to come together. Expending so much energy on achieving unity, Germany seemed to lack the ener-

gy to define its national interest. No wonder this problem has been solved only twice in German history—by Otto von Bismarck at the establishment of a unified Germany, and after World War II by Konrad Adenauer. Bismarck chose dexterity, seeking to arrange relations within Europe such that Germany would always have more options than any possible rival, thereby preventing the formation of hostile coalitions.

Subtle combinations Adenauer opted for reliability. He reasoned that Germany's past conduct generated too much distrust to allow for Bismarck's subtle combinations, and that the German tendency toward extremes inhibited the sense of proportion crucial to a freewheeling Bismarckian approach. He sought to dissolve Germany's temptations in a rigid commitment to Atlantic cohesion today, Chancellor Kohl represents the Adenauer tradition. Genscher tried to combine a pro-Western orientation with Bismarckian flexibility. But how long can such a policy be sustained? For if flexibility is measured by having an option to all sides, the charge of disguised nationalism is bound to raise its head; hence the occasional rumblings against Genscher in Allied capitals.

Fairness compels us to recognize the special challenge Genscher had to face as the

foreign minister of a divided country. If the junior partner in a coalition automatically follows the senior partner, it runs the risk of losing its identity—even of abandoning its reason for existence. Atlantic orthodoxy might prescribe that Germany wait passively at the side of its allies for the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. But a native of East Germany could not be expected to wait while his own people lived under foreign-imposed totalitarian rule.

In time, the majority of Germans came to insist on a specifically West German response to their national aspirations. Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt and pursued by Genscher under two chancellors—first Helmut Schmidt, then Kohl. And a German national response—however sensitive to Allied concerns—inevitably required special assurances to the Soviet Union to ease its fears of a resurgent Germany after unification.

The Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage with tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go major credit for its day-to-day tactical handling—even if

farther east and the former Soviet Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was bound to weaken; no European nation, Germany included, would henceforth submit to America's priorities to the same degree, or pay the same price for its protection. The dissolution of the East German state made it seem less necessary for Germany to legitimize itself by subordinating itself to West European, especially French, prescriptions. And even European unity began to seem less urgent to many.

**Tactical skill:** By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers, Genscher's tactical skill and intelligence, reinforced by his country's new bargaining position, gave him a prominence that—perhaps unintentionally—emphasized Germany's national role. But to what purpose and for what end? For the master diplomat, a new opportunity had opened up: to maneuver among the multiplying international institutions—such as NATO, the European security conference, the Common Market, the West European Union—with partially overlapping, partially competing, purposes. There

is a danger in these multiple affiliations: when everybody is allied with everybody, special obligations cease to exist, and national interest predominates. But skillfully used, international machinery could be turned into a tool of national policy. For example, Genscher's analysis of the Yugoslav crisis was superior to that of most of his European partners. Still, he prevailed less by the force of his argument than by moving back and forth between the European Community, the European security conference and the threat of unilateral action. By the same token, Genscher's latest project—"Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver"—threatens to dissolve existing relationships in a structure so vast and vague that the national interests of each party will predominate.

In the end, tactical skill can obscure, but not change, reality. And Germany's reality is a narrow margin for maneuver: too passive, it runs the risk of being engulfed by the storms swirling around the center of the Continent; too active, it threatens to magnify those storms. For 18 years Genscher used that narrow margin brilliantly. He did not widen it, but then that may be inherent in Germany's position.

When all is said and done, the democracies can thank Genscher for having maintained their alliance through many storms. His country's adversaries can honor him for his effort to build bridges. And his friends will not forget that his personal loyalty matched his diplomatic skill. Genscher will surely go down in history as one of the most important statesmen his country has produced.

## Germany's margin for maneuver is narrow: too passive, it risks being engulfed by Europe's political storms; too active, it may magnify those storms

the final push to unification was masterminded by Kohl. Genscher's subtle tactics have at times caused twinges of uneasiness. The ambivalence of some of Genscher's colleagues toward him was paralleled by Germany's ambivalence toward its allies. After all, Genscher has had to work with six American secretaries of state, each insisting on his distinctiveness from his predecessor. These were an understandable temptation to take out reinsurance in the face of American gyrations that moved from deploying medium-range missiles to removing them entirely within the space of four years. Genscher saw few attractions in a residual nuclear deployment that left weapons whose range covered only German territory, even though his position annoyed both Washington and London.

Through all these controversies, Genscher maneuvered with consummate skill. History will surely record as his monument the four de force of unifying his country while sustaining Germany's Atlantic relationships. After German unification, Genscher found himself in a world for which no previous experience could have prepared him. The cold war ended, and with it the necessity to orient German policy toward both of the superpowers at the same time. With Soviet armies 600 miles

NEWSWEEK: MAY 25, 1992 61

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DR. KLAUS KINKEL
BUNDESMINISTER DES AUSWARTIGEN

Bonn, den 18. Oktober 1996

Herrn
Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington D.C. 20006
U.S.A.

Lieber Herr Kissinger!

Hans-Dietrich Genscher feiert am 21. März 1997 seinen 70. Geburtstag!

Wir wollen Herrn Genscher zu seinem Geburtstag mit einer Festschrift ehren. Als Herausgeber möchte ich Sie sehr herzlich bitten, sich mit einem Beitrag an der Festschrift zu beteiligen.

Herr Genscher hat den politischen Weg Deutschlands in der Nachkriegszeit mitgestaltet: als Bundesminister des Innern, über 18 Jahre als Außenminister, als Vizekanzler, als Bundesvorsitzender der Freien Demokratischen Partei. An der Deutschen Einheit, dem glücklichsten Ereignis unserer Geschichte in diesem Jahrhundert, hat er großen Anteil.

Als Zeitgenosse von Hans-Dietrich Genscher haben Sie diese Epoche mitgestaltet und Verantwortung getragen. Ihr Beitrag ist für die Festschrift wichtig.

Den Redaktionsschluß mußten wir auf den 1. Januar 1997 festsetzen. Die Länge Ihres Beitrags sollte zehn Druckseiten nicht überschreiten. Bitte haben Sie dafür Verständnis.

Ich hoffe auf Ihre Zusage und bin sicher, daß Herr Genscher sich darüber ganz besonders freuen würde.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihr