TELCONE

Bill Safire/Kissinger

10:57 a.m. - 8/8/73

K: Bill.

S: Good morning, Henry.

K: Bill, just one procedural point - nothing I said to you was for quotation or attribution.

S: Yes.

K: We understand that.

S: Right. However, nothing you or Len told me compromises my use of
any information as long as I don't attribute it to you or any administration
source or anything.

K: That's right.

S: As far as I'm concerned it's deep background.

K: That's right. You know you have to make the judgment of what purpose
it would serve at this point, but you make that judgment.

S: I know we disagree about that, but I'm going to try to make an argument
in the column that might even persuade that it might be a good time to
put this out and get it behind us. The way it's going now is tearing and
bending your thing and that's silly.

K: I've told you everything I know and I've urged Len Garment to tell you
everything he knows.

S: He called me late last night.

K: I have literally told you everything I know so from now on I just have
nothing else to tell you.

S: Meanwhile I'm working on my book and I just want to report it's coming
great.

K: I will see you next week.

S: Good.

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Telcon--Wednesday, August 8, 1973

Pierre Salinger 11:03 - 11:06 a.m.

S: I am just back from 17 days in Scorpios, one of the better islands.

K: If you know the owner.

S: And 12 days in Sardinia.

K: I expected naked pictures.

S: Jackie looks terrific. And it was great to get to know the kids. John is the spitting image of his father.

K: I saw both of them in March in Acapulco.

S: I was wondering if we could get together for lunch some time this week or next. How is your schedule. I am doing an article on "Where America is in mid-Watergate."

K: mid-Watergate should be reached in 1977. Okay, this week, maybe Monday or Tuesday. Call Dick Campbell.

S: Monday morning.

K: No, call him tomorrow.

S: Okay, Henry.

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Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Meg Greenfeld
8/8/73; 11:35 a.m.

G: Hi, Henry. Have we committed a crime?

K: Meg, I have had three days to stew about your long Watergate editorial.

G: How does it come out after three days?

K: Whatever I am going to say is not rash. Let me say why I am calling. It seems to me that at this time the ability to make distinctions is quite important. To link Cambodia with Watergate is grossly unfair. Afterall Watergate was an illegal act committed for partisan purposes. By what theory is it wrong to bomb troops that are killing Americans that are located on neutral territory when you are doing it at least with the acquiescence of Congress and particularly at the request of the neutral government. What is wrong with this neutral act. Then there is a second question about the reporting. But then that, too, is different from Watergate. This was not an attempt to cover up something. It was an attempt. . . . The false reporting arose from internal bookkeeping requirements in the Air Force.

G: It was authorized. It's Phil's view and my view -- our view . . . .
I think the two connections he was making -- maybe he should have made
more of a distinction.

K: In fact the Plumbers did not result from the Cambodian bombing. The plumbers resulted from the Ellsworth . . .

G: There was some talk of the Cambodia leaks -- the policy of having to do something that you could not publicly explain.

K: I think this Administration won't last forever and even the Democrats are going to come back some day . . . . Knaves and Murders do not conduct XXXXX policy.

G: I agree with that and if that was conveyed, it is a mistake.

K: I am willing to admit -- what I certainly will think about in the future in imposing justified secrecy whether one is really producing an overwhelming need for secret -- false reporting. But I can tell you if McGovern had been elected he would have had the problem of secret operations also.

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Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Meg Greenfield
8/8/73; 11:35 a.m.

-2-

G: We should be much more careful with the term of Watergate -- it
refers to criminal acts.

K: In Cambodia -- an enemy in war using neutral territory, attacking and killing Americans -- and the neutral Government has asked us for help. If we had started bombing Indonesia in total secrecy that would have been another thing. Now then, there is a second question -- reporting -- and there I think we did not know about the false reporting and I think we have to accept the responsibility. If we make too serious demands on secrecy then we have to accept the consequences

G: When We talk I shall communicate this.

K: Not in a sense of bitterness.

G: When I talk to Phil. . . .

K: I understand. I tell you I did not call the New York Times. It makes
the same point much more persistently.

G: We are still in the ballpark of argument.

K: Our concerns are still in the same area.

G: I appreciate your calling.

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TELCON

Stu Alsop/Kissinger

11:57 a.m. - 8/8/73

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Stuart, how are you?

A: I'm pretty good.

K: Stewart, one point we forgot that was relevant to our discussion yesterday It isn't only the tendency to cut down our forces, it is also the tendency retroactively to destroy the whole theory on which you can base an effective foreign policy. You take the constant lumping of the Cambodia bombing with Watergate. Watergate was an illegal act. Cambodia bombing wasn't even a bombing of Cambodia; it was a bombing of North Vietnamese in Cambodia who were killing Americans by shuttling back and forth across the border at the request and the acquiescence of the Cambodian government.

A: Including Mr. Sihanouk.

K: It's a fantastic theory of neutrality that an enemy can use the neutral territory but you can't pursue him there even with the acquiescence of the neutral government.

A: Joe wrote a good piece about that today, did you read it?

K: No, but I shall.

A: Brother Joe covered that well and rather completely. But, of course I agree with you.

K: It's this whole pattern now of investigating all intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. After all, what were we trying to do? We were trying to strangle supplies that were coming into South Vietnam through neutral territory. It wasn't a war against a neutral country. In each case done with the approval of the government.

A: I saw the CBS news show the other night and it makes you a little angry because they had a long diatribe in which it was never mentioned either that Sihanouk had acquiesced in the bombing or that the people being bombed were North Vietnamese who had invaded Cambodia. Those two essential facts were utterly overlooked.

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K: And who from Cambodia were killing Americans.

A: Oh God, I remember only too well what happened to me after we went into Cambodia. Joan Braden had had arranged a party with all the New York radical sheiks and Kay Graham sat up and had these people get up and tell their views about this thing. The word they used was "obscene". Then she called on me and I had just come back from <u>Cambodia</u>. Vietnam a few weeks before and said I had just flown over the place and you could see clearly that Cambodians were hitting out people on that side and we couldn't cross the border to hit them back. You couldn't make a war that way. At which point a universal cry of the word "obscene" went up all through the party.

K: It is an absolutely insane situation.

A: It is an insane situation.

K: Watergate. . .

A: The thing that really bothers me is I cannot see any way out of particularly after this Agnew thing. There's just no way out. The <u>____</u> with an assist from Watergate that all government is evil and all foreign policy is based on cheating and lying to the people.

K: And you know that there were no honorable motives. After all, in any normal situation we would be more justified accusing our critics of treason than they are justified in accusing us of murder. They wanted us to lose a war; they wanted us to betray an allied government.

A: They still do.

K: What did we want? We wanted a settlement which under normal conditions would be the absolute minimum, that we do not overthrow the government and kill the people that have been relying on us for 10 years.

A: If you look at the news shows or read most of the columns you would suppose that your sole interest was a passionate desire to kill Cambodian peasants.

K: None of which lived in that area. Oh, it's all so pathetic. Well, Stewart, I think we shall pull it together if we get a little pause.

A: A little <u>pause</u> and an awful lot depends on your boss. If he can bring himself <u>to</u> do that easy political way, he can bring himself to acknowledge the most serious errors of judgment and if he can bring himself to take a kind of a - you know he has a helluva advantage because he won't be running for anything anymore.

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K: If I told you my speech of what Hitler would have said - he would said some people tell me to kill 6 million Jews, other people tell me to kill no Jews, but I took the difficult middle course I killed three million Jews.

A: I think I'll call you by name with that story.

K: No, I agree with you, a lot depends on him and if he can just -- you know in a curious way Watergate has liberated him if he understands it. All his life he's been assailed by the fear of the horrible disasters. Now everything that can possibly happen to him has happened. In an attempt to stave off the worse, it's all been brought on so the only chance he's now got is to be a great President and to govern well.

A: If the politicians will let him which is a big if.

K: The first problem is for us to stand for what is right and we can really do it now without any concern for policy.

A: And as I say ______ has one enormous advantage and that is that he can say in any way in which he will believe - look, I'm never going to run for anything again. All I have to do is serve my term out as President and this is not only my problem, it's your problem too.

K: But the venom in this country now is unbelievable. OK, you looked well yesterday.

A: I feel pretty good. The good news is it's very stable. But I don't manufacture my own blood but as long as I get it from my son and my brother, what the hell. Theirs is as good as mine ever was, so there.

K: Good Stewart, see you soon.

A: OK, Henry.

TELCON

Walter Stoessel/Kissinger

5:02 pm - 8/8/73

K: Hello.

WS: Were those two members of your senior staff that you were having lunch with today?

K: No, one of them was my lawyer and the other was his son.

WS: One was your lawyer and the other one was the go-between for the money that you sent to, let me see, couldn't be Moscow anymore, has to be -- what would get you into serious trouble? Money sent to the Arabs, huh?

K: Money, no, I think selling Government documents is the only thing left.

WS: Did you ever think you'd live through this?

K: No.

WS: Have you seen the Vice President?

K: No.

WS: He was pretty good.

K: What did he say?

WS: Well, he said that he was appearing because there had been the -- the excuse for his appearance was that there have been leaks from the prosecutor's office that, he thought that this was bad and he was, he said he was innocent of it and he answered a few questions. He did, unfortunately, because that will be headlined tomorrow, he did raise the point under questioning that possibly he wouldn't appear before the grand jury because he wasn't saying that he'd evoke executive privilege, but he said that would have to be considered. So there will be a big scoop about that tomorrow, I am sure. Well, anyway, what I wanted to ask you was, the Watergate being over, how about doing 15 minutes or 10 minutes on European TV about Europe?

K: Well, let me see what the President's plans are for his speech. I don't want to be on when he is on.

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WS: Well, we wouldn't ask you about Watergate. I mean we won't say anything about Watergate.

K: I'll almost certainly do it, but can I call you? What's today? Wednesday? Can I call you no later than Monday?

WS: Well, I'm going up to New Hampshire for the weekend, but if you were going to do it I'd come back.

K: Well, when are you going to be back?

WS: Well, I'm going to be sort of back and forth, but naturally I'd want to be here the day you might do this.

K: Oh no, we can set a mutually convenient day.

WS: Well, if you don't mind, why don't you let me call you Monday? I don't know what my telephone number is.

K: Yes, call me Monday.

WS: I'll call you Monday and leave word.

K: You're just afraid I'll get Joanie. (laughter)

WS: Well, I won't care. How are you anyway?

K: I'm fine.

WS: Are you bearing up pretty well?

K: Yes, I'm bearing up o.k. From now on it's got to go up. The one thing about this latest event is, I really do think we have now reached a point where everybody has to start pulling together pretty soon. Then what else can you do?

WS: That's right. Nothing. I don't think it's possible where it can get any lower. You're probably right that it will go up.

K: Unless they now indict the Secretary of State.

WS: Yes, or catch you selling Government documents for a high price.

K: Yes, but that money went into a Swiss bank account. O.K. Bye.

WS: Bye.

TELCON
Stewart Alsop-Mr. Kissinger
5:15 p. m.

August 8, 1973

A: Hello.

K: Hello, Stewart. I invited your brother Joe to dinner and I wanted to know if you were in town. Would you like to join us?

A: That sounds lovely.

K: OK, we were going to his home for a drink first. Do you think your brother will receive you in his home?

A: Yes, I think so.

K: OK, We will see you about 8:00 p. m.

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TELCONE

HAK/David Bender

August 8, 1973/5:40 p.m.

B: I am writing about the Year of Europe. I had some talks with State Department people and your Deputy, Sonnenfeldt and I heard the President may not even go this year.

K: The trip by the President isn't a ____ by itself. We are talking background here. We feel there are Atlantic requirements. In any event we are responding to European needs and requests. We just want them to proceed WTK at a reasonable pace but it is much to early to say the President is not going.

B: As I understand it, it is quite possible to obtain the desired requests in terms of a firm interest--that you could wait awhile. Say until January or February.

K: January and February are bad times for the President to be out of the country. We are still counting on this year, however no firm arrangements have been made.

B: I get the impression the apprehension of Japan is going.
that

K: The Japanese--this is a complex question, and they are trying to form that. This has nothing to do with the ______ between Europe and the U.S. They are progressing and they are letting it sit three or four months which we will need but on a whole they are progression in the direction we want.

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TELCONE (Secure Phone)

Schlesinger/Kissinger

10:05 a.m. - 8/9/73

K: Hello.

S: Hello.

K: Jim, just as I came back I was told by Haig who was told by Laird
that the Pentagon was turning over every White House directive on
all the bombings, memos and memcons to the Committee.

S: Not to my knowledge. I will have to check on that. I think what
maybe in reference is that some of the orders from the JCS to the
field

K: That is your problem but the White House -- we are not hiding
anything.

S: What you say is news to me. I will have to check on it.

K: If it is done here then CIA and State also will have to do it.

S: I understand the problem. It's just news to me. Let me check on
that and find out the facts. If there is a problem, we will deal with it.

K: Can you let me know?

S: You bet.

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TELCONE
The President/HAK

August 9, 1973/3:12 p.m.

P: Hello

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry how are you?

K: OK. I know you called me earlier but

P: No, I just called but I didn't--it was just something that I'd worked out with Al. It was nothing. It was on nothing of importance.

K: Right. Well, I've had lunch with Dobrynin and at least that part of our foreign policy is....

P: Still alive, huh? (Laughter)

K: Because we've got--we are working on next year's summit.

P: Right. I noted in the summary of course, the fact that they did test their first successful MERVE. It shows why they are against the MERVE ban.

K: Well we are making some progress from the result that they have tested the MERVE. They shall have to take a different ______. I think its already foreseeable.

P: Well with Dobrynin at least it was still cordial.

K: we're already plotting out the elements of an agreement. Of the series of agreements we've now begun to make a breakthrough on SALT. At least a breakthrough to indicate how it might go and we're talking about MBFR. Of course, I am convinced Mr. President we will have that European declaration no later than early next year and in many ways it will be better for us next year than this year.

P: Yes. You haven't heard from the British yet?

K: NO, but we can't until Heath comes back from Ottawa

P: Yes.

K: We had another bit of a discussion yesterday with their charge. Because they briefed all the other Europeans when Bert Trent was in here and didn't tell us ahead of time and wouldn't even tell us afterwards what they had said so I demanded the briefing and then they said they would do it on a one time basis but they didn't feel obliged to tell us what they discussed with the Europeans. So now I'm cutting them off from intelligence special information they are getting here. I mean if they are going to share everything with the Europeans we can't trust them for special relationship. I am putting it on the basis that we are reassessing all liaison relations. I am not doing it from the White House, I'm having the Agency heads do it.

P: Yes. Well, who do you think is up to this? Who is playing this game?

K: Well, you know he has these tacky tendencies Mr. President and he -- I think he is trying to take a free ride on us in getting into Europe.

P: Yes.

K: I think they'll come around but they are going to be tough because they will want to steal de Gaulles' line from the French. It was a horrible mistake that we pushed them into Europe. We didn't do it.

P: Yes. It was never my idea. But never the less.

K: And they are doing that now with the same single-mindedness that they pursued the special relationship with us before.

P: I think they're determined if they are going to be in Europe, they want to wheel Europe and that is it and they don't want us to wheel in.

K: Yes, but if that is what they are going to do there is no sense in arguing them the information which they then can market in Europe. We are better off doing it directly.

P: Sure. No special relations. Correct. They'll have the relation with the French.

K: That's right.

P: With them and a few others.

K: (laughter)

P: That's alright. It is just part of the international game.

K: Oh no. This is...

P: It is a passing thing.

K: That is a phase where we just have to show our teeth. Absolutely confident.

P: Right.

K: You already see articles in the European press saying now they think the Declaration of Principles is a good idea. Where three weeks ago they were picking on it all the time.

P: Yes. Look. The main thing is as far as we're concerned though lets not be too eager. We are not eager with them, we are not eager with our Chinese friends. Understand?

K: That's right. Well the Chinese... Dobrynin gave me another interesting piece of information. They have a speech--they have now a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which we did not know. But they obviously have sources in the Chinese Communist Party and at that meeting Chou En-lai made a very long speech on the international situation.

P: Yes.

K: And that mostly the domestic situation but in the international section he violently attacked the Soviet Union.

P: Yes, and the Soviet Union has violently attacked him.

K: Yesterday, in reply.

P: Oh, that's why it came.

K: That's right, and so as long as that is the case the Chinese just can't afford to take us on.

- 4 -

K: Well, we've got another cable from Graham Martin today whom we were called that son of a bitch and he is very optimistic about South Vietnam. He thinks even Cambodia might be held off.

P: Hmm, wonder why? You never know. You never know. These things are not going to go that quickly unless there is a hell of a psychological crack but basically lets fact it, the Khmers don't have any Air Force.

K: No that's right. Its a question of... Well we could still continue bombing. We'd probably even win because right now...

P: I know. I know that because I could tell from even reading the thing this morning they were doing rather well, the little guys. You know they, in their molasses-like way they took this back or they rolled this back. You know what I mean.

K: That's right.

P: And we all know it because frankly I was glad to see you got those up to 48.

K: That's right.

P: That's alright. Let them hit a few things. As long as we're there lets don't go out with a whimper. So, on Cambodia he feels that maybe even that they will hang on awhile does he?

K: That's what he thinks. Yes.

P: He didn't give any basis for it did he?

KK: Well, he went over there.

P: I know he went over but he didn't get his reasoning.

K: That's right.

P: He didn't get any reasons for...

K: No, no he didn't give any basis for his reasoning, that's what I meant.

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P: He didn't tell anybody probably. We don't know. And incidentally, what frankly he guesses is as good as our guess, I don't know. Let's just pray for the best.

K: It's entirely a question of psychology. They have the resources to hang on.

P: Why sure. They have the resources without the bombing Henry. You know that.

K: Well, if we had had a decent Ambassador there--that's one of my mistakes there. I should have insisted on getting that son of a bitch...

P: I know, I know.

K: I don't mean this year. This year wouldn't have made any difference.

P: Let me see. But right now--

K: But two years ago.

P: But right now though they have, in terms of military resources, ground forces and so forth, they are not inferior to the Khmers are they?

K: Oh no, they are superior to the Khmers.

P: That's my point.

K: But they don't have the discipline and the dedication.

P: That's the point. I understand. So therefore, the chances of the Khmers going in and cutting them up and so forth and then their collapsing are considerable. But let me say this. That isn't going to mean the fall of South Vietnam and it'll frighten allot of people. It'll frighten the Thais and it'll frighten allot of others but I don't intend to get--we can't get discouraged about any of those things.

K: Well, in this one you were right. The longer we could have held on in Cambodia the surer the situation in South Vietnam would have been. But even with that he thinks South Vietnam can hold six years which he says there is realistically but would get into the next Presidential period. His major concern is that the new President in 1976 have your conviction. After that he thinks it doesn't make any difference what happens.

P: Yes.

K: I mean he put it as coldly as that.

P: You mean he thinks it could hang for six years.

K: That is what he thought.

P: I think he's right. We've started a legacy there. Let's not...

K: Mr. President, if you had had the support that Ike had after the
Korean war, that thing would be in -- 76 would be seen as a triumph
and I must tell you honestly I didn't think it could hold beyond 1974,
much beyond 74.

P: Yes. Well we'll see. You want to remember too that the North has
its problems. They are trained and it maybe the Russians aren't
helping them quite that much and the Chinese haven't got that much
to put in there. You know what I mean. Let's fact it.

K: I don't think either of them are putting in a hell of a lot.

P: Yes. That's my point. I mean the situation has changed a great
deal, Henry. I mean we've got our problems, psychological and
others on our side, but they've got -- we'll see what they come up...
Qell, anyway on the Chinese side they owe you an answer and you
all don't expect to get one do you for awhile?

KK: They may not give us an answer not until their Central Committee
is over or they may not give us an answer until after August 15th.

P: Yes.

K: It doesn't make any difference because we didn't propose a date
until September.

P: Well, my point is... Is their Ambassador back yet?

K: No, he is a member of the Central Committee so he would be staying
over for the...

P: Yes. Well, that's all right. I just feel that sometimes we tend to...
It's hard to you know, to sort of pull ourselves up by the bootstraps
all the time with some things we are going through here but dog
gone it we--with the Europeans... My attitude is so what--if they
want to play this kind of a game. Fine. You know. Henry, you could
find--I mean I wouldn't like it to happen to Europe but there are
worse things than the American/Russian condominium now. Let's face it

- 7 -

K: Mr. President, the Europeans will be on their knees by the end of this year. They cannot do without us. All they have to understand is that they can lose us.

P: That's right because you see... You talk about these forces for Europe and that sort of thing but Good God, I mean what the hell are the Europeans going to do when you say -- each of them on their ways to Moscow. Now what in the hell do you think Brezhnev wants with Pompidou?

K: They've been taking us too much for granted.

P: That's right. We're going to have... That we have to stay, that we need them and that we're going to maintain the rein and so forth. Alright, we don't have to stay Henry. We just don't have to necessarily. You understand that?

K: I couldn't agree more.

P: Let me say, we do have to stay in Japan and Korea but that's a different thing.

K: Well, I think we have to stay to some extent in Europe but...

P: No, nobody even in Europe---I would play a different line and say alright and that means... It's up to you, you can't have a free rein, they are not going to confront us and have us stay now. That's all there is to it.

K: They cannot exclude us from their deliberations and expect us to give them an undiluted nuclear guarantee. That just cannot be.

P: That is right.

K: But it is certainly not going to come to that point.

P: Right. Right. Well, I'm up here at Camp David. Its not as hot as in Washington but having to work on this dog gone speech and statement, boy oh boy. I'll be glad when this week is over.

K: It is a difficult period Mr. President but you have come through so many agonies.

P: Yes sure.

K: I know it isn't...

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P: Its more difficult for reasons that we're -- I can't talk about you know but nevertheless we'll come through it Henry.

K: I have every certainty of that.

P: The thing that your liberal friends have always underestimated. They've always felt that I was like--strangely enough--would react the way they would. I mean there isn't a one of your liberal friends not a none, that wouldn't have crumbled 2 months ago. They'd have thrown in the towel. Right Henry?

K: Oh, no question. They would have had nervous breakdowns.

P: Really, I mean they would have.

K: I know it.

P: And the thing that astonished them, they wonder why the hell I didn't.

K: You've astonished them with many periods in your Presidency.

P: And don't you run into that in your private chats with some of them. What's the matter with--they constantly try to say well, how does he look or...

K: They keep asking me whether you saw any sign of strain and I always tell them in crisis you never do.

P: (laughter) That's the best way to talk. Well anyway, take care old boy. I'll get back to work.

K: Right. Bye.

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Warren Beatty

4:00 p.m. (?) 8/9/73

HK: Warren, I threatened nuclear war unless they did what you wanted.

WB: Wonderful.

HK: I thought we owed that to our citizens, but he thought it was a good idea

WB: Oh really?

HK: Yeh and he said if you write him a letter referring to our conversation, you will get your answer fast and he thinks it will work.

WB: That's terrific, I should write him a letter, huh?

HK: That's right, what you want to do there.

WB: I wonder if I should talk to one of his people--

HK: He didn't think so, he thought if you wrote him a letter, then he would decide what is worth doing.

WB: Very good, where do I write?

HK: To the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

WB: Okay.

HK: And if you send me a copy I can sort of keep an eye on it.

WB: I will do that immediately. And what will he do then--check back in the Soviet Union to see whether they want to do that or not?

HK: That's well-right and he'll get you an answer quickly--that is what he said.

WB: I'll do that right away, then. Thanks a lot.

HK: Good, see you soon. Bye, Warren.

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TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Walter Stoessel

4:45 p. m. 8/9/73

WS: Hello, Henry?

HK: Walt, I just wanted to check, I think you might as well give it to all NATO countries.

WS: Yeh, good, I think that is the right thing to do.

HK: Because for us the NATO forum is better than the AEC forum.

WS: Right.
And I think it could cause recriminations

HK: As long as you might make it clear that there are no--that this is very
provisional and is not the formal U.S. position and that we may change
our own minds.

WS: Sure, sure.

HK: But can you do it before the British do it?

WS: Oh, I think so. I've done it already with the Belgians and I'm seeing
the Greek in about 10 minutes and then all the others tomorrow, so it
will be all done tomorrow afternoon.

HK: Good, fine.

WS: Okay. Henry, what about sending it out to our Ambassadors--think that we should do that by cable or pouch or do you have a feeling?

HK: I just don't want it all over the place--our ambassadors--do you think
Volpe is capable -- well I suppose our ambassador have it if their
foreign officers have to

WS: I think they really do.

HK: Well can you send it by pouch? For the ambassadors only and make
clear it is a working draft and this stick with the NSC draft.

WS: Yeh, that's what we are doing.

HK: Because otherwise the confusion will be --

WS: No, we are just doing that one and we'll pouch it out then.

HK: Thank you.

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TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Fred Buzhardt

4:50 p. m. 8/9/73

HK: We've got another NSC staff member who is in a panic--who the press
is saying has been bugged. Would you be able to know whether he was
or not--do you have a list?

FB: I guess I can find out Henry, who is it?

HK: Dick Allen

FB: Oh to my recollection is that hot shot wasn't there.

HK: He was not?

FB: No.

HK: That's what I would have thought.

FB: No, Dick wasn't. I'll check Henry, but I am almost certain Dick was not
on the list.

HK: That is what I think.

FB: But I'll check it out for you.

HK: Because after all none of my enemies were

FB: Well hot shot wasn't ______ was he?

HK: No hot shot was nothing.

FB: Now that would ____ him, Henry. I don't think he was on it but I'll
check on it.

HK: Will you check for me and maybe tell him he wasn't.

FB: I think we can tell him. I'll have to do some telephoning to do it.

HK: Will you call me back?

FB: I have read all those summaries and I have never seen his/mentioned

HK: That is my recollection

FB: Don't think he is on the list. I'll let you know.

HK: Thank you

name

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TELCONE

General Haig/HAK

August 9, 1973 / 6:37 p.m.

H: Hello.

K: Hello Al

H: Yes Henry, how are you?

K: OK

H: It's been a hell of a day.

K: It has. Yes.

H: Yes

K: Well I called you earlier but I didn't know you were on the way up because I, the President had just called me and said that he had done--settled it with you and I wondered what it was.

H: What he wanted was-- I wanted him to get you up here to help with this speech and I know I'm doing you no favors. But I just think it is quite important. Because I think you have a better feel for....

K: When does he want me up?

H: Well, now, this is the problem. Ray's first draft which I just left him on and he had a total tantrum. It is a disaster. I mean it is so bad that I'm not sure he can ever get it back and I've given him another one to start on and we won't be ready until late your time until Saturday morning. He'd like to have you come up on Saturday morning.

K: OK

H: Now, I don't think you're going to have to stay to long. It's up to you.

K: No, no.

H: I don't like to eat up your little time you do get but I really, we really.

K: No, look I couldn't do anything more important.

H: That's right.

K: So I'll come then Saturday morning and hopefully I can leave Saturday afternoon.

- 2 -

H: OK. I'm going to ask Bryce to come too but nobody else.

K: I think you should. That's right. Would it help you if I got an
outline of what I thought should be done up to you by tomorrow
morning.

H: It would be very helpful. It would be very helpful.

K: And what he really has to do Al is to get into his head what his
basic strategy ought to be. And I really feel very strongly. It
isn't just that he has to make a conciliatory speech and then go
all out. He has to be a national President. He has to be a
national President. He has to be the father of his country now.
Not a raving maniac and therefore I think the VFW speech. I
think that not the attacking the investigators. I think what he
should say is we've just have some hearings that uncovered some
bad things. But-- we have a national duty to make a distinction
between those things that were in the national interest and those
that were not. Now let me tell you about Cambodia. Of which
I am proud -- which we would do again. You know what I mean?

H: Exactly right.

K: And then he doesn't have to say those guys got us in and
then didn't let us get out. Let's let him say what we did and say I
am proud we did it. There are many people who opposed us
who are now using that as an excuse and lets keep our sense of
proportion and our national pride. See what I mean?

K: I'm trying to

H: Exactly. Well, this is what I'm/get in this speech. The trouble is
Ray came in with the God damnest softest, demoting, breast-beating
graveling.

K: He shouldn't be graveling.

H: It cannot be.

K: It should be the speech of a strong man who is strong enough to admit
that somethings were wrong but who says now we must save this country
and govern this country.

H: Well, this is what I've just given Ray exactly along those lines. To
start out he takes care of his own personal culpability as based on the
hearings but that ain't enough. Something went wrong. What was it
that was wrong and what were the reasons.

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K: Exactly.

H: And then I said--in the 1960's we got successes of the 70's.

K: That is right. And he can say people are--that I was trying to end the war. I did not want the U.S. to lose the war or to have all these people die in vain and I was confronted with a minority that by force and brutal methods try to do it-in the process we made these mistakes.

H: Exactly right.

K: That he can say. Then he has to say. I have already taken steps so that this can never happen again.

H: There you end up with a high note.

K: And then he should go to the future. But he should not again push foreign policy into the full front but meat prices are high.

H: No, no inflation.

K: He should say we have these things to get done and we will get them done including foreign policy but he should not say -- he should not be the traveling president.

H: No, no.

K: That is incidentally why I am not so eager for him to go to Europe in any event this year.

H: I agree. He's got to solve the problem at home. Inflation is the biggest issues. We've got to continue with that....

K: It's got to come in.

H: OK Henry that's very helpful. Anymore out of our sniffling friend over there who he's so mad at he can hardly see.

K: No except I just think we just absolutely have to get it done in order to move.

H: Oh, no question. It's --

K: I thought even McNamara for your information and Kay Graham wanted to tell me that I shouldn't do it so that's why they asked me over I read it in the paper.

TELCORN

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

7:11 p.m., August 9, 1973

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: Ron, what did old Safire have to say?

Z: He was not hung up on the tapes at all.

K: No, he's got a meal ticket that's a month's exercise.

Z: No, I don't think he's going to be dwelling on it. At least that was the impression I got.

K: Well.

Z: He feels what we should do is to meet the FBI just to give these goddamn wiretap files back to the 17 who have been taped.

K: Oh, he's ridiculous. That would make it look as if we had done some- thing illegal.

Z: Yeah.

K: He's wrapped up in his own little ego.

Z: Yeah, but he wasn't too emotional about it. Of course everyone claims that you did it.

K: Of course I did it. Why would I do it? I barely knew him.

Z: I'm just kidding.

K: And he had no access to classified information. What are you sitting at the table with the President and showing off?

Z: No. Why -- do I sound that way? I'm alone and showing off, which is even more embarrassing when you say that. (laughs)

K: (laughs) Okay.

Z: No. Quite frankly, I was going to get into the tapes with him and I did -- I mean, the taps with him and I did a little bit. But he didn't seem to be all that stewed up about it. I mean, he's stewed up personally about it but I don't think he's going to be vindictive about it, Henry.

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TELCORN

Mel Laird/Kissinger

9:38 a.m. - 8/10/73

K: Hello.

L: Hi, Henry.

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Pretty good. How are you doing?

K: O.K. Mel. I just wanted to check base with you before the news-
papers start picking at everyone on the hearings yesterday on
Cambodia.

L: Well, they're dumping everything, you know. They've even got those memos between Al and a colonel over at - in which, you know, Wheeler sent me a memorandum on - which we would start on using some bombing in South Vietnam and then carry it over into the sanctuaries.

K: Yes.

L: And that cover story was worked out between your staff and the Joint Staff. There were several discussions on it and I approved it. I don't deny that.

K: Well, Schlesinger claims they gave nothing except one look at an
Execute Order.

L: No, they gave them the memorandum, too, and the Execute Order.
The Execute Order doesn't have my initials on it, the memorandum
does.

K: What memorandum is that?

L: Explaining the 42 strikes. They gave them a memorandum from
Wheeler to me asking me to go to the President and get approval of
42 strikes in Cambodia in a two-day period.

K: But what's the reasoning? Why did they do that?

L: It's a memorandum from Wheeler to me asking me to go to the
President. And then a day later on the bottom of the memorandum
I say "Approved. MRL", because the last paragraph said we want
you to take this immediately to the President.

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K: But why did they do that?

L: I don't understand it, Henry. I don't understand what's going on here. I think they think they are a new team and because they are a new team they want to start clean. Now the President was the Commander-in-Chief back at that period, too. I don't understand - you can't be a completely new team, you know.

K: I couldn't agree more with you, Mel. I'm shocked at this thing. I called Schlesinger yesterday and I said, "I do not think it is a good idea to turn over military orders to these committees."

L: Well, once you start you will have to give them all. Now they are going to have to give -- I understand they have two of the memorandums now of conversations between Al and some colonel over there. Now they came before the memorandum came up to me. You know what I mean, Henry?

K: Well, I don't know about these conversations.
shouldn't

L: Well, those things be released anyway, Henry.

K: And in any event you know these staff conversations go on all the time. I bet you didn't know what the colonel said necessarily and I didn't know necessarily. You know, we see the final product.

L: Well, you know it - and the final product - you know - but it - but even the final product shouldn't be sent over in verbatim. You know what I used to do when they wanted those things? I'd have Fred Buzhardt go through them and paraphrase certain parts. You know what I mean?

K: Certainly.

L: But now they're giving them the raw material.

K: Are you sure they did it because Schlesinger swears they didn't.

L: Well, from what I understand. I am going to have a press conference here in Chicago at 12:00 and I just talked to Baroody and Baroody says they have the original memorandum plus the original Execute Order. The Execute Order doesn't have my initials on it but the memorandum covering the Execute Order does and they even have that with my initials on it. And this was given to them openly.

K: Well, that's nuts. Don't you think that's nuts?

L: Why sure. I don't know what they are trying to prove. I am not sure. I don't care. I can ride it out. Henry. That doesn't bother me, but I just --

K: No, but Mel it is going to hurt the country. I mean, we didn't do anything wrong, for the love of Pete.

L: Well, you're never going to be able to do anything anymore around here, Henry.

K: I agree.

L: Now, if you just want to drive everybody up and if you're going to start giving out orders, Execute Orders, Operating Orders, all the confidential memorandum and everything else, we might as well close the Department of Defense down, there is no use having any deterrent.

K: I couldn't agree more.

L: You might as well just forget about the Defense Department, cut back your weapons, do away with your budget.

K: Are you going to say that?

L: That's the way I feel.

K: Are you going to say it?

L: Well, I feel like saying it, I'll tell you that. I don't like to take on the people that are there, though, that's my problem.

K: Well, let me raise hell with Schlesinger. But what we ought to do is be more aggressive about the original decision. What happened?

L: Yes, but no one will defend that. I will.

K: I know it, but these @*%¢* over there are acting as if it happened on the moon.

L: Yes, but what is the use of having a Department if you can't utilize some of the assets?

K: Well, you were always for Schlesinger. I know that.

L: Yes, I know that. I was for the other man, too. You know that, too.

K: Oh well, that other guy --