Why Henry Kissinger believes
peace is now possible

"This Is Our Time"

HENRY KISSINGER IS CONVINCED THAT THE UNITED STATES NOW HAS "AN HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR A MAJOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION,"

an even greater one than when he and former President Nixon concluded the first strategic arms limitation agreement with Moscow in 1972.

In the most wide-ranging interview on foreign policy that he has granted since the Reagan Administration took office, Kissinger—the most celebrated postwar Secretary of State and still a highly influential voice in world affairs—went far beyond present White House thinking to urge a U.S. diplomatic initiative of extraordinary magnitude and breadth.

In our lengthy and often philosophical discussion at Kissinger's New York office, he offered a detailed blueprint for comprehensive negotiations with the Russians, with an analysis of why the Kremlin, under the new leadership, might respond to an imaginative approach by Washington. Such talks, he suggested, should be initiated in total secrecy.

Kissinger, who said that he has had "widely spaced opportunities" to convey his views on foreign policy in private to President Reagan as well as to Secretary of State George P. Shultz, made these other points:

* "I disagree completely with the people who argue that there is a greater danger of nuclear war than in previous periods. The biggest danger of war now is as a result of events in areas which neither of the superpowers can control... the Persian Gulf or some upheaval somewhere that is not now foreseeable."

* "The Soviet system, while it is militarily strong, has enormous weaknesses. Its economy is stagnant." Kissinger added that Yuri V. Andropov, the new general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, "is not in as secure a position as is generally believed, so that he

needs a period of respite."

* The U.S. has made "a mistake" in neglecting to push hard enough for negotiations for a form of Palestinian autonomy in the Israeli-occupied West Bank of Jordan pending the removal of foreign forces from Lebanon. Kissinger said that "if the West Bank found even an interim solution, Lebanon would not long detain us. A West Bank settlement would bring about a Lebanon settlement." Autonomy talks have been paralyzed since last year.

* In world economics, "a policy of pure, narrow, seemingly selfish national interest will bring disaster for everyone," Kissinger said. He added that if the industrial democracies "do not act in anticipation of foreseeable crises, it is highly predictable that somewhere a crisis will catch us in a catastrophic manner. And the worst thing that can happen to a government is

to look as if it did not foresee a potential catastrophe."

Kissinger's fundamental concern, however, was the question of U.S.-Soviet relations. His conclusion: that the time is at hand for superpower negotiations across the whole spectrum of their essential interests. But this judgment does not appear to be entirely shared by the Reagan Administration, thrusting Kissinger once more into a foreign-policy controversy.

The former Harvard professor applied the historian's method to explain his opinions. He has always believed that new policies must flow logically from the experiences of the past, so that they make sense as shifting realities force today's leaders to rethink earlier strategies.

"As a nation," he said, "we now face for the first time the need to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have had to conduct it in the past. If one looks at American history, we were, for over a century,

Presidential campaign, 1980. Since the election, Kissinger says, he has had "widely spaced opportunities" to convey his views on foreign policy privately to Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz.

Brezhnev, Nixon sign SALT agreement, 1972. Chances for negotiations are even greater now, says Kissinger.

Hans J. Malmberg

BY TAD SZULC

geographically removed from world affairs. Then, when World War II ended our isolation, we possessed overwhelming economic and military power. We had an atomic monopoly; we produced 52 percent of the world's GNP [Gross National Product]. In short, we were in a position to overwhelm every problem with resources and to look at defense in the rather apocalyptic terms of totally destroying any attacker."

Yet, as the world changed, Kissinger said, "that power was applied through preconceptions shaped by our historical experiences." Similarly, over the years, he said, the U.S.'s share of the world's GNP dropped to 22 percent. (This was due largely to postwar reconstruction in Western Europe and Japan.)

Kissinger continued: "As a consequence, the U.S. does not have any longer the resources to deal simultaneously with every conceivable problem, and it must establish priorities. Second, aggression or change in the military balance have a different character than in the immediate postwar period." Third, the international economic problem has turned out to be "infinitely more complex," requiring more creative solutions "than an American relief program for unsettled parts of the world." In other words, he summed up, "we applied the experience of World War II to the military problem and the experience of the New Deal to the economic and social problem."

In American society after Vietnam and Watergate, he said, "all the rewards are for...quick-fix solutions, where in fact what we need is a settled, long-range view of what we consider the requirements of peace, what we understand by the national interest."

I asked Kissinger what the role of U.S. leadership should be in the present situation.

"Leadership," he replied, "consists of developing with respect to the allies a strategy or a definition of purposes that can command support over an extended period of time, and to create enough confidence in one's steadiness and reliability that one can in fact achieve it. Secondly, it requires a performance in matters not purely foreign policy that nevertheless affect the destinies of these nations, specifically in the economics field. Our economic growth is crucial to world economic progress; our economic crises create recessions everywhere. With respect to the adversaries, it requires that they know the limits of what we will accept and also the scope of what we are prepared to negotiate, and that we not oscillate with a constant redefinition of either our limits or our purpose."

Presidents Carter and Reagan, Kissinger pointed out, "have come in stating or implying that their predecessors had done it all wrong, and they promised a total reassessment of American foreign policy. Now, that is

> "They cannot want a major crisis with the U.S. while they have all these other problems"

enormously unsettling for leaders abroad who have geared their course to the previous dispensation."

Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration's policy. Kissinger said, "has been much steadier than its rhetoric, which initially created disquiet, partly because some statements were excessive and partly because there seemed to be such a cacophony of voices that it was not easy to strain out the dominant one...I would have to say, on the basis of my travels, that there is in foreign countries, especially in Europe, the view that American foreign policy is not always steady and that it has been needlessly confrontational. I believe that this is often not justified—but if you ask me what is the perception, that is the perception."

This led us to the specific problem of U.S.-Soviet relations. Kissinger stated his principal policy conviction:

"I believe that we have, in fact, now, an historic opportunity for a major negotiation with the Soviet Union for these reasons: Just as we have been driven to a recognition of the limits of what we can do, so the

Soviets are bound to be driven to a sense of the dead-lock inherent in a policy of pressure—especially if we are wise. The only question is whether it will be taught to them by bitter experience or whether they can get there by insight or by joint diplomacy with us."

What might propel the Russians into negotiating? Kissinger answered: "Instability of leadership: instability of the economy; major problems in the whole structure of society, such as the emergence of a non-Russian majority in the population; major problems in the satellite orbit; a need, sooner or later, to tackle domestic reform. One has to prevent their temptation to balance the unfavorable trends against the hope that if they simply stick it out long enough, the West is going to disintegrate. So these opportunities exist only if the West acts creatively and cohesively."

continued

Afghan resistance fighters. Are Soviets ready to discuss such acts as their invasion of Afghanistan?

Rally in Bonn opposing U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Recent elections in West Germany in effect endorsed U.S. arms there, thwarting any Soviet hopes of their removal by dividing the two allies.

Bonn, Germany

Solidarity rally, Poland. Soviet troubles there and with other satellites improve the climate for talks.

Riga, Latvia

KISSINGER/continued

Kissinger then turned to the personality of the 'Kremlin's Andropov in terms of how it may affect his disposition to negotiate seriously. He told me he did not remember meeting Andropov on his previous trips to the Soviet capital. He said it was important to realize that Andropov's support seemed to come from "the paramilitary security forces and the regular armed forces." At the same time, he said, "the regular party structure, the people that have been running the Soviet Union throughout its history, must be in a state of insecurity and confusion about what all of this means, especially since all the first promotions have been from the KGB [the Soviet secret police]."

At 68, Andropov "is older than any previous Soviet leader has been at a comparable stage of his career," Kissinger said, "which means that he doesn't have all that much time to wait and experiment, and he therefore must hurry up the consolidation of his power."

"But all of this doesn't mean that the Soviets are going to throw in the towel," Kissinger went on. "It does mean that there are many reasons why they should seek a serious negotiation with us to gain time, to consolidate, too, if they want to reform their system.

"We have
an historic opportunity
for a major negotiation
with the Soviet Union"

They certainly cannot want a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations while they have all these other problems to deal with."

Kissinger said that "no matter what happens, we will have a relatively quiet two, three years; the problem is whether we will just rest on them or seek to use them for a major step toward peace." Meanwhile, he added, the U.S. will be making progress if it concentrates on what actual proposals should be made to the Soviets rather than "debate on whether we should negotiate."

He emphasized that, in the past, "almost every substantive proposal that's been negotiated has emerged one way or another from American thinking" and that "we'd probably do better with our own initiative than with their proposal." As an example, Kissinger cited the negotiations over U.S. deployments of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, saying that the defeat in the West German elections on March 6 of the Social Democrats—they opposed the deployments, designed to counter the Soviet SS-20 missiles—"must have deprived the Soviet leaders of any illusion that they could bring about a unilateral abandonment of the program by splitting the U.S. and the German Federal Republic."

"At this point," Kissinger said, "I think the Soviet Union is at the first stage of the process of accommodation. Andropov is still trying to get for nothing the benefits of accommodation without real reciprocity. So far, Soviet proposals have been more or less propagandistic: they are trying to stampede us and our allies."

"I look at the noise that is being made now as the prelude to a real negotiation, especially in the light of the German elections," Kissinger observed. "Our challenge is to turn this general probing into a concrete,

detailed negotiation. This will be the test of our leadership."

Kissinger said the present opportunities to negotiate are even greater than they were in 1972. But then, too, he added, "there was one precise point at which we concluded that conditions were ripe for negotiations. It was December 1970, when there were riots in Poland. At that time, I wrote a memorandum to President Nixon, saying that the moment for serious progress seemed to have arrived. The Soviets, faced with unrest in the satellite orbit, could no longer afford to wait for our embarrassments in Vietnam to paralyze us or, for that matter, to speculate on a Nixon defeat in 1972."

"And since we also knew that we were moving toward the Chinese at that time, we were quite convinced that, once we were in contact with Beijing, the diplomacy between Washington and Moscow would become unfrozen. And we favored that we would seize the opportunity."

Kissinger defined the present opportunity as offering "real progress in arms reduction, in the restraint of international conduct [for example, the avoidance of such acts as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and pressures on Poland], and some realistic definition of some ideas of East-West trade." He said that "if we can get these three things in the next three years, then, I think, the relation may, in fact, stabilize over an extended period, especially as I do not think that the Soviet Union is growing in strength as an historical phenomenon, whatever it does in the military field."

How then, would Kissinger proceed if he were in charge of U.S. foreign policy? He replied that, speaking as "the outside analyst, Henry Kissinger," he thought a number of steps were necessary:

"One," he said. "is to attempt to get an historical perception of how we visualize U.S.-Soviet relations over the next, say, five to 10 years. Where do we want this process to go? This is something that, at a minimum, President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, [national security adviser William] Clark, [Defense Secretary Caspar] Weinberger and one or two other trusted people must talk out among themselves, so that they know what they're after. Otherwise, they are going to get caught in a bog of pettifogging details."

"The second requirement," Kissinger said, "is to translate the general concept into an operational American policy."

"Third, we must strive for an allied consensus.

"Fourth, I think, it is very important to start a private

dialogue with the Soviets as quietly as possible." He explained that this should be done through what is known in Washington as a "back-channel," presumably between the Secretary of State and the Soviet ambassador, keeping the rest of the government largely in the dark. But the "back-channel," Kissinger said. "needs heavy White House involvement, because the Soviets must be sure that there is Presidential backing. And that negotiation, at this point, should, in my view, be largely conceptual: One would give to the Soviets some description of what we are after, what in our view a negotiation should achieve. The Soviets are both very rigid and very systematic. I do not accept the proposition that they have a master plan in which every piece falls into place; they operate more on momentum than on imagination."

Kissinger said that after a few conceptual exchanges, "we should proceed on concepts specific enough so that they can study it, but not yet as a formal proposal. Then, the time would have arrived for a proposal, or a series of them, on European missiles, strategic arms. East-West trade, a code of international conduct. I would urge that this should be done without publicity so that positions are not hardened by considerations of prestige."

Kissinger weighed philosophically the opportunities he believes are now open to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

"I do not imply," he said slowly, "that it will be easy or that the Soviets will suddenly roll over for us and play dead. The horror of a nuclear war imposes the need for coexistence. At the same time, we must not identify peace simply with our own repugnance of war or we will be blackmailed by the ruthless, threatening recourse of force. The problem, therefore, becomes to find modes of coexistence without encouraging Soviet aggressiveness. Now, this is a difficult process."

"But there is no way around it," Kissinger told me. "If we appear reluctant to defend our principles, we run the risk of constant pressures. But if we are confrontational for its own sake, then the issue of peace and war turns into an unmanageable domestic problem in every democratic country. It will be a European problem, and it will become a domestic American problem. The democratic publics have to be convinced that their governments do not seek needless confrontation. We'll get the nuclear freeze movements here. And then we lose the support for any creative—and even for a strong—foreign policy."

Yuri Andropov, Soviet Communist general secretary. At 68, he has to consolidate his power quickly.

JONATHAN H. STOLZ

15

parade

CATHERINE BRADEN HEMLEPP

Director
Newspaper Promotion & Public Relations

Parade Publications, Inc. • (212) 573-7000
750 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017
Writer's direct dial no. 573-7020

April 18, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1100
55 East 52nd Street
New York, NY 10017

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Tad Szulc asked that I send you the enclosed copies
of PARADE's April 25 issue with his cover story on
you.

I hope you are pleased with the article.

CBH/adp

INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER, NEW YORK CITY

FEBRUARY 24, 1983

( I= INTERVIEWER )

( K= KISSINGER )

SIDE ONE

I: This is Parade Magazine interview with Henry Kissinger by Ted Szulc in New York City on 24 February, 1983. so, let's do it as an overview. I obviously read the _Economist_, the _Newsweek_ piece and so on. Where does the United States stand in the world today, given the series of major issues, to wit, the economic issues on which we touch elsewhere - and I'd like to come back to that in detail - sort of a succession, I guess - Western Europe, the Middle East.. What makes you..simply talk, if you would, in a meditative fashion, and then I'll break in with specific questions.

K: All right. As a nation, we now face for the first time the need to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have had to conduct it in the past.

If one looks at American history, we were geographically removed from world affairs (for over a century). Then, when World War II ended our isolation we possessed overwhelming economic and military power.

-2-

K: We had an atomic monopoly; we produced 52 percent of the world's GNP. In short, we were in a position to overwhelm every problem with resource; and to look at defense in the rather apocalyptic terms of totally destroying any attacker. But that power was ~~strained~~ APPLIED through preconceptions shaped by our historical experiences.

One, that agression usually took the form of military moves across recognized, sovereign borders. And second, that political instability resulted from economic dislocations. In other words, we applied the experience of World War II to the military problem and the experience of the New Deal to the economic and social problem. And in Europe and Japan, this approach worked well. Economic development, in fact, produced political stability and NATO prevented military agression. In other parts of the world, it turned out that the political changes were caused by REVOLUTIONARY FORCES, sometimes supported from the outside, but at any rate, to which traditional military solutions were less relevant. Also, economic progress did not necessarily produce political stability, in fact it often led to political instability by undermining existing structures. And all of that happened while the American percentage of the world's GNP was declining each year by ten percent of the world's GNP, so that now we are down to some 22 percent

[Y]

-3-

K: of the world's GNP. As a consequence the United States does not have any longer the resources to deal simultaneously with every conceivable problem and it must establish priorities. Second, aggression or changes in the military balance have a different character than in the immediate post-war period. Third, the economic problem has turned out to be infinitely more complex than an American relief program for unsettled parts of the world. What has made adaptation to changed conditions so intractable is that we became conscious of the need for it partly as a result of Vietnam, compounded by Watergate. These produced profound divisions in American society, and at a time when our political system is undergoing many changes in the electoral process. All the rewards are for semi-demagogic appeals by the various contenders, quick-fix solutions, where in fact what we need is a settled long-range view of what we consider the requirements of peace, what we understand by the national interest.

I: In our own terms?

K: Well, what we understand by it. But if you look at the last two Presidents, they each have come in stating or implying that their predecessors had done it all wrong and they promised a total reassessment

-4-

K: of American foreign policy. Now, that is enormously unsettling for leaders abroad who have geared their course to the previous dispensation. Of course, when you say "on our own terms" with respect to the national interest, an issue of peace and war, statesmen...

I: I meant "in" rather than "on" our terms.

K: Yes, we need to understand it first of all in our terms. At the same time, it is the essence of statesmanship to reconcile our interests with the interests of others, because you can't have a lasting settlement that is not also in the interest of the other party. And so, very often, in our domestic debate, people attack a particular agreement because it allegedly serves the other party's interest. It wouldn't be an agreement if it didn't serve the other party's interest too. As WELL AS OUR OWN.

I: By definition.

K: By definition. The question for American policy is whether a particular agreement serves our interest.

I: That what you are saying, how much has it shifted to get where it is, as you described it, let us say, since the time when you came to the White House in 1969 or since you left, for that matter, in 1977? Where was the historical turning point that brought us where we are now?

-5-

K: Well...

I: Or was there a specific point?

K: I think there are different turning points for different areas of the world. In terms of the perception of the American presidency by the rest of the world, the turning point probably came with the Carter Administration. Until then, there were tremendous dislocations and great upheavals. But they were always considered aberrations abroad and there was always hope that the next President would get things back to more familiar or more predictable pattern. One reason why President Ford enjoyed such enormous personal affection by European leaders was, of course, that he is a very likable man, but also because he seemed to them to represent the return of quintessential American good sense. So then, when the Carter Administration came in proclaiming a seeming revolution of American foreign policy, which really didn't turn out to be...

I: You said "seeming", yes.

K: Seeming, the rhetoric exceeded the reality. And when, at the same time, the Administration could not manage the crises that occurred, like Ethiopia and Iran...

I: Parenthesis. When you...

-6-

K: That was one kind of turning point. Another kind of turning point was the Vietnam War. When I was a junior Professor in the 1950's, whether or not my colleagues were for Eisenhower they did not treat it as a generically hostile enterprise. They might have voted for Stevenson and they surely voted for Kennedy, but they thought it was their government which they would help as best they could. There used to be seminars at Harvard and MIT, on weekends, that would work on questions of strategy and especially of arms control with the expectation that they would have access to government officials and would receive a respectful hearing. In the sixties and the early seventies, that broke down completely. So, the collapse of our domestic consensus occurred in the late sixties and early seventies. So there are different markers for different events.

I: This takes me to one of those impossible things which has been defined endlessly as the "American Leadership in the World". It has been applied to at least the last two Presidents. When you look at it, what is the essence or the reality - is maybe the word - the reality of the American leadership in an intelligent sense of the word:

K: Well, again, there is a huge difference now between the period of the middle sixties and the contemporary

-7-

K: period. Until the middle sixties, we were economically, militarily, and to some extent, politically so predominant that leadership consisted of coming up with ideas that we would then persuade people to follow much as one handles a domestic process of opinion-forming.

But now, a number of things have changed. For one, other nations have become stronger, even Allies like West Europe and Japan. So now, leadership consists of developing with respect to the allies a strategy or a definition of purposes that can command support over an extended period of time, and to create enough confidence in one's steadiness and reliability that one can in fact achieve it. Secondly, it requires a performance in matters that are not purely foreign policy that nevertheless affect the destinies of these nations, specifically in the economics field. With CREATE ECONOMIC GROWTH, OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH IS CRUCIAL TO WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, OUR ECONOMIC CRISIS WITH RESPECT TO THE ADVERSARIES, IT REQUIRE THAT THEY KNOW THE LIMITS OF WHAT WE WILL ACCEPT AND ALSO THE SCOPE OF WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE, AND THAT WE NOT OSCILLATE WITH A CONSTANT REDEFINITION OF EITHER OUR LIMITS OR PURPOSE. AND THAT RESTLESSNESS IN OUR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS NOW OVER NEARLY A DECADE...

I: Which continues today, as you see it?

K: Well, I have very high regard for Secretary Shultz.

I: No, I know that.

-8-

K: I think that this is a problem with which Secretary Shultz is dealing, but it has not yet been solved partly because it goes beyond any one Administration.

I: You travel a great deal. You spend an awful lot of time speaking with people abroad. What is your impression of what is the perception in Europe and Asia - I guess mainly in Europe - of coherence, cohesion, form and style of U.S. foreign policy as it exists at this juncture of events?

K: Let me make two separate points. One, I think that, in fact, the foreign policy of the Administration has been much steadier than its rhetoric, and that, in terms of actions, the Administration has been quite consistent. In terms of its rhetoric, it has **initially** sometimes created disquiet, partly because some statements were excessive and partly because there seemed to be such a cacaphony of voices that it was not easy to strain out the dominant one. And so, I would have to say, on the basis of my travels, that there is in foreign countries, especially in Europe, the view that American foreign policy is not always as steady and that it has been needlessly confrontational. I believe that this is often not justified, but if you ask me what is the perception, that is the perception. And I also think that the Secretary of State is a very stabilizing factor.

I: Which we know ______ since June. It's almost the end of the year.

-9-

K: Yes. About the end of July, really, when he was sworn in.

I: On such more specific issues such as U.S. Soviet relations, that you were so much involved in yourself where does it stand now? Okay, both operationally and in the rhetorics, what is the state of U.S. - Soviet relations? Other than occasional strong statements by this or that person. What is the reality of it, I guess?

K: I believe that we have, in fact, now an historical opportunity for a major negotiation with the Soviet Union for these reasons: One, just as we have been driven to a recognition of the limits of what we can do, so the Soviets are bound to be driven to a sense of the deadlock inherent in a policy of pressure - especially if we are wise. The only question is whether it will be taught to them by bitter experience or whether they can get there by insight or by joint diplomacy with us. The Soviet system, while it is militarily strong, has enormous weaknesses. Its economy is stagnant. Andropov's own description of their system is a massive indictment. When the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has to inveigh publicly against absenteeism, hooliganism, corruption, drunkenness - issues which in other countries are taken care of by police or by plant managers, there is a major structural problem.

CJD

-10-

K: Third, I think Andropov himself is not in as secure a position as is generally believed so that he needs a period of respite.

I: Would you explain that, please?

K: Well, I believe that here is the first General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who has never run a large Communist Party organization *within* the Soviet Union. All of his experience has been abroad as Proconsul in Hungary, as head of the Secretariat in the Central Committee dealing with foreign Communist Parties or as head of the KGB. In other words, his experience is on the foreign side of the Communist Party structure, not on the domestic side. And *what* it looks *like* to me *is* that he has put together a combination of the para-military security forces and the regular Armed Forces. The regular Party structure, the people that have been running the Soviet Union throughout its history, must be in a state of insecurity and confusion about what all of this means, especially since all the first promotions have all been from the KGB.

I: That's right. From Azarbajan(?)

K: That's right. Moreover, Andropov is older than any previous Soviet leader has been at a comparable stage of his career.

-11-

I: He's 68. No, yes. Brezhnev was...

K: He's 68. Brezhnev was 58. Khrishchev was 56.
Stalin was in his forties. Which means that he
doesn't have all that much time...

I: To set his own...

K: To wait and to experiment. And he therefore must hurry
up the consolidation of his power.

I: By the way, had you met him during your many visits?

K: Not consciously. If I've met him, it was on the
two Nixon visits. There were in each case Politburo
dinners and Politburo receptions. If he was there
as a member of the Politburo he left no lasting
impression.

I: You never chatted with him?

K: I never chatted with him, no. If I did, I have
no visual recollection of him. We were certainly
not focused on him as a ...

I: Comer

K: As a comer.

I: By the way, what do we really know about him other than...

K: Well, this is one of the...

I: His zeal for reform?

K: Well, we don't even know very much. We don't really
know anything about him. We don't even know if he's
married or not.

I: He must be because he has a son.

-12-

K: I know, but we don't even know where his wife is. We know he was married, but we don't know whether he now has a wife. We don't know whether he speaks English or not. Some people say that he speaks English. On the other hand, when Vice President Bush was there, he gave no sign of understanding English, but neither did Zhou Enlai when I first saw him, so I don't know. We really know very little about Andropov. I noticed that the French Foreign Minister...

I: That was interesting.

K: Yes. Cheysson considers him a sort of a computer.

I: But I'm not sure I know what that means either.

K: No, I must say that one of the more attractive aspects of Brezhnev was his extreme..

I: Exhuberance.

K: His slightly vulnerable aspect, his need for approbation and recognition by Americans. But all of this doesn't mean that the Soviets are going to throw in the towel. It does mean that there are many reasons why they should seek a serious negotiation with us to gain time, to consolidate, too, if they want to, reform their system. They certainly cannot want a major crisis in U.S. - Soviet relations while they have all these other problems to deal with. So, I think if we could get a moratorium on the debate on

-13-

K: whether we should negotiate or whether we should make proposals and concentrate on what proposals to make, we will be making progress. Take the issue of the Theater Nuclear Forces. The German election must have deprived the Soviet leaders of any illusion that it could bring about a unilateral abandonment of the program by splitting the United States and the Federal Republic. How to deal with this state of affairs is essentially a tactical issue. Should we wait for a Soviet initiative or make our own proposals?

I: Well, that becomes technique of negotiation.

K: That's a technique of negotiation. At some point, I think we'd probably do better with our own initiative than with their proposal.

I: That was your experience in negotiating with them?

K: My experience in negotiating with them was that they seem to be even more muscle bound than we. I had the impression that the wall between their ministries was so total that they have great difficulty generating new proposals. And almost every substantive proposal that's been negotiated has emerged one way or another from American thinking.

I: Well, this was true in your case during the seventies?

K: Yes. But it seems to be..

-14-

K: Yes. But it seems to be...

I: Through SALT and a variety of other cases.

K: Yes. But it seems to be true even now, because if you look at everything that has been said, it we take these Theater Nuclear Force negotiations, I would still think that whatever view one has of the Nitze proposal...

I: The so-called unofficial, unauthorized...

K: The unofficial proposal. It is surely better than the Soviet proposal. It is more thoughtful than the Soviet proposal.

I: Can I take you back on a concept? You said that this is an historical opportunity to have a negotiation with them. When you engage on your negotiations, which led to the first visit, was it your perception at the time that the Soviets at that time needed, historically, the kind of arrangement with the United States which was produced through that which was then called Detente? And are you seeing the same strains or forces at work in the present?

K: I think the opportunity is greater now. But then too there was one precise point at which I concluded that conditions were ripe for negotiations. I think it was 1971, where there were riots in Poland. And for better or worse...

I: December, '70.

-15-

K: Right. December, '70.

I: Yeah. The Gdansk...

K: At that time, I wrote a memorandum to President Nixon, saying that the moment for serious progress seemed to have arrived. The Soviets faced with unrest in the satellite orbit could no longer afford to wait for our embarassments in Vietnam to paralyse us or for that matter speculate on a Nixon defeat in 1972. And history was not necessarily on their side.

I: Because a symmetry was developing?

K: Well, I thought at any rate that they would then feel some heat on them. And since I also knew that we were moving towards the Chinese at that time, I was quite convinced that once we were in contact with Beijing the diplomacy between Washington and Moscow would become unfrozen. And I favored that we would seize the opportunity.

I: So in this context...

K: Let me explain what I mean by opportunity. I do not imply that it will be easy or that the Soviets will suddenly roll over for us and play dead. The horror of a nuclear war imposes the need for coexistence; WE MUST NOT IDENTIFY PEACE SIMPLY at the same time if peace becomes our sole WITH OUR REPUGNANCE OF WAR OR WE WILL BE objective we will surely be blackmailed. The problem BLACKHAILED BY THE RUTHLESS THREATENING RECOURSE TO FORCE. therefore becomes to find modes of co-existence without encouraging Soviet agressiveness. Now, this

-16-

K: is a difficult process. But there is no way around it. Because if we are CONFRONTATIONAL FOR ITS OWN SAKE, co-exist, then the issue of peace and war turns into an unmanageable domestic issue in every democratic country. IF WE APPEAR RELUCTANT TO DEPEND OUR PRINCIPLES WE RUN THE RISK OF CONSTANT PRESSURES

I: It becomes a huge European problem.

K: And it will become a domestic American problem. The democratic publics have to be convinced that their government does not seek needless confrontations.

I: Because then we get a nuclear movement here..

K: We get the nuclear movements...

I: And it's endless.

K: And then we lose the support for any creative, and even for a strong foreign policy.

I: Tell me, to go back again a few steps, as you perceive the Soviet reality, what are the objective conditions which, in your opinion, would lead, let us say intelligent men such as Andropov, who is presumably intelligent, to wish to seize the moment as well?

K: Instability of leadership, instability of the economy, major problems in the whole structure of society such as emergence of a non-Russian majority in the population, major problems in the satellite orbit, a need, sooner or later, to tackle domestic reforms. One has to prevent their temptation to balance the unfavorable trends against the hope that if they simply stick

-17-

K: it out long enough, the West is going to disintegrate -
So these opportunities exist only if the West acts
creatively and cohesively.

I: Having said this, do you have the impression or not
that Andropov's peace offensive or campaign or the
speeches and proposals from day-one - should one
extrapolate from this that he does perceive this
need to accommodate? Where does propaganda end, so
to speak? Where does reality...?

K: At this point, I think, the Soviet Union is at the first
stage of the process of accommodation. Andropov is
still trying to get for nothing the benefits of
accommodation without real reciprocity. So far,
Soviet proposals have been more or less propagandistic;
they are trying to stampede us and our allies. There
may be some marginal merit in some of them, but
they are...

I: But the fact of doing ti?

K: The fact of doing it. I look at the noise that is being
made now as the prelude to a real negotiation, -especially
in the light of the German election. Our challenge
is to turn this general probing into a concrete,
detailed negotiation. This will be the test of our
- as you asked before - of our leadership.

I: Okay.

K: I've always believed, that we might have had a
considerable historic opportunity after the death

-18-

K: of Stalin. But at that time, some rather militant rhetoric on our side was followed by a substantially unprepared Summit Conference confined largely to atmospherics. We went from the extreme of liberation and massive retaliation rhetoric to a Summit Conference which seemed to be its own objective. None of the fundamental problems of the division of Europe, of arms control, or of East-West relations were really solved or even seriously discussed. And after a brief so-called Spirit of Geneva, the crisis broke forth much worse in Soviet arms sales to the Middle East and assaults on Berlin. We must avoid a repetition of that process. No matter what happens, we will have a relatively quiet two, three years; the problem is whether we will just rest on them or seek to use them for a major step towards peace.

I: With them?

K: With them. And so, in that sense, I disagree completely with the people who argue that there is a greater danger of nuclear war than in previous periods. The biggest danger of war now is as a result of events in areas which neither of the superpowers can control.

I: The Persian Gulf, for example.

K: The Persian gulf or some upheaval somewhere that is not now foreseeable. But, I would consider the opportunity

-19-

is whether we can make real progress in arms
reduction, in the restraint of international conduct,
and some realistic definition of some ideas of
East-West trade. If we can get these three things
in the next three years, then, I think, the relation
may, in fact, stabilize over an extended period,
especially as I do not think that the Soviet Union
is growing in strength as an historical phenomenon,
whatever it does in the military field.

I: Several questions come out of this. Number one,
in the current stage as you described it, you get the
sense - I use the word advisedly - that Andropov can
bring his constituencies with him on the accomodation
policy, however, (unintelligible) the military,
you know, the power that brought this...

K: It's a good question. I don't know the answer to
it.

I: It would be a prerequisite. Brezhnev was able to do
it.

K: I don't know it and he may not know it, but we'll never
find out unless we test it.

I: Okay. Are we testing it? Seriously at this point?
The United States:

K: I think we have to separate two things. As of this moment,
when you and I are talking, the Administration is pretending
that it is maintaining all existing positions. I think
this is mostly a question of internal, American, bureaucratic
management because...

-20-

I: That's the Zero Option and etcetera, etcetera.

K: That's right. Because the body language of the Administration, if I can use the word,...

I: Yes.

K: suggests that the Administration is in full movement towards a modification of its positions. And, whether it is doing it with all the skill that's required remains to be seen. I think that is one case where, really, the results of the German election strengthen the opportunity.

-21-

I: Let us imagine that you are today the general manager of U.S. foreign policy, however you want to define this. What would you do today, this week, after the German elections, the balance of this year presumably, and of the TNF negotiations, and beyond that to seize the moment?

K: Well, I would...

I: Back to the larger thing. You used to talk about building blocks. Remember?

K: Well, first of all, I'm not an aspirant general manager of American foreign policy.

I: No, I understand it. It's a theoretical question.

K: Right. And I'd do it, and the answer is therefore what does the outside analyst, Henry Kissinger, what would he imagine somebody else might do?

I: Right.

K: I think that three steps are necessary. One is to attempt to get an historical perception of how we visualize U.S.-Soviet relations over the next, say, five to ten years. Where do we want this process to go?

I: What you had in mind when you came into office? On both sides.

K: Well, yes. I think I did. Well, I'd been thinking about it all my life. But leaving aside now whether I did or not, I think this is something--and I think, in fairness, Nixon had it too--now, this is something

-23-

K: would give to the Soviets some description of what we are after, what in our view a negotiation should achieve. The Soviets are both very rigid and very systematic. I do not accept the proposition that they have a master plan in which every piece falls into place; they operate more on momentum than on imagination. The chief Soviet asset is persistence; whatever their policy--good, bad, or indifferent--they stick with it until their opposite number starts making concessions out of exhaustion or simple boredom.

I: Andropov would fit into that, yes? From the little that we know?

K: I don't know.

I: Or we don't know?

K: That last one, I don't know. If he is as intelligent as is claimed he must recognize that not even persistence can make the present Soviet negotiating positions palatable. We should try to accelerate this process by putting before the Soviets some conception of what we are after. Then see what they say to that. Then, after a few exchanges like this, I would quiet...

I: No specifics, no details? Just concepts.

K: I would urge on on concepts specific enough so that they can study it, but not yet as a formal proposal.

I: Not yet.

K: Then, after a few exchanges the time would have arrived for a proposal, or a series of them on European missiles,

-24-

K: strategic arms, East-West trade, a code of international conduct. I would urge that this be done without publicity so that positions are not hardened by considerations of prestige. At the same time I would make clear that every time we hear their views first through the media or foreign political leaders (especially opposition leaders) the backchannel will stop for three weeks or more. We will judge their seriousness by the willingness to avoid propaganda. And let's see how quickly we can progress by this kind of exchange.

I: We were concluding, I guess, the question of approach to negotiations, and I wanted to ask one, I guess, operational question, which would be this: Apart from the German elections, to what extent the pressures generated by the INF talks, then to Freeze people, given the deadline, the time for deployment supposedly later this year, or not necessarily?

K: I think that the end and the results of the German elections provide the opportunity to get these negotiations moving. In addition the deployment deadline provides an additional impetus.

I: On another major point, economy, I read your piece in *Newsweek*. And I'm thinking of Williamsburg, which is the last days of May. As you see things moving or not moving, is it plausible, viable that Williamsburg could be used, unlike Versailles, I guess, last year,

-25-

I: as a serious forum to move on with some of the ideas that you have? I saw Mitterand in November and I brought it up with him, and he was extremely vague. I said, "Well, what do you have in mind? Do you want a new Bretton Woods?" "I don't know. I would like to have a link between me and __? and the dollar." But it was completely unclear in his mind. How do you see this whole thing?

K: If we have another summit of the industrial democracies without some concrete work program, that institution will fall into disuse. Now, that may not be a disaster, but, when every democratic country is deeply effected by the state of the world economy, it is not appropriate for the world leaders to meet without attempting to find some remedy, especially since each of them knows that the solution can not be found in national policies. So I had hoped that the summit would be used...

I: What it should or should not accomplish.

K: Whatever it is that Williamsburg should accomplish must be decided in its objective almost immediately. You can't simply put an item on the agenda of heads of government; there is not enough time for negotiation. Detailed preparation is essential for significant results to be achieved.

I: And there isn't very much, I kind of gathered?

K: Well, I don't know. If there is, it is not obvious to the outsider.

-26-

I: Specific things. Farm problems between the Community and ourselves. Is this something you see getting out of hand unpleasantly but dangerously?

K: Well, I think, fundamentally, the industrial democracies have to decide among themselves whether they are serious about free trade or whether they are each going to pursue various forms of mercantilism. If the current trend continues, matters will surely get out of hand, farm problems as well as others.

I: Isn't everyone a prisoner of their domestic problems too?

K: Yes.

I: We are, the Germans are, the French are.

K: Yes. If the trends of the last five years continue, then we have to say, then it's probable that we are heading into a mercantilistic world. But that would have very grave implications also for the kind of foreign policy that can be conducted. In my view we would be better off agreeing together on some limited areas of mercantilism--in the name of national security or whatever--instead of proclaiming free trade while practicing cutthroat mercantilism.

I: Because then alliances break down?

K: Because then alliances break down, autarky is attempted, nations line up into trading blocs. It can be done. It's been done before. But it will be a different world.

I: When you were doing your *Newsweek* piece, did you have it in mind--because I'm not sure; I thought it was

-27-

I: fairly clear to me--that time has really come to rethink
the structures to replace that which was Bretton Woods?

K: Yes.

I: Could you be a little more specific on that?

I: The Bretton Woods was a system of fixed exchange rates, buttressed by a number of institutions like the IMF to deal with specific crises. When the Bretton Woods institutions were created, there really wasn't a developing world yet. And I don't think that anyone envisaged that there would be so many independent states so rapidly. Since then three major changes have taken place. One is that the fixed exchange rates were abandoned in favor of the floating system, which meant that the value of currencies were supposed to be determined by market forces.

I: The Smithsonian.

K: Smithsonian.

I: Azores and Smithsonian.

K: Azores and Smithsonian. And then, after..Actually, at the Azores and Smithsonian, we still tried to rescue the fixed system. But afterwards, when the Smithsonian Agreement broke down, a floating system prevailed. The second is the emergence of so many developing countries. And the third is the dislocations caused by the energy crisis that started in the early seventies. The result of all this is that with the floating currencies,

-28-

K: theoretically the market was supposed to provide the corrective. In fact, it has appeared that governments often manipulate the market, and therefore have a great temptation to set the exchange rate of their currency to solve an immediate domestic problem and to obtain an advantage over competitors. This has caused the dollar to be overvalued, the Yen to be undervalued. It has, above all, made currencies fairly unpredictable impeding normal trade and putting a premium on speculation. It has meant that essentially domestic decisions have had vast international implications without the affected countries having a voice in those decisions. That is a very destabilizing element. Finally, the emergence of so many developing countries has created totally new problems of financing that could not be forseen. And the debt crises of many of these developing countries, in my view, cannot be solved by the IMF except on a very temporary basis.

I: As it is being done by De Larrossiere now?

K: As is being done brilliantly by De Larrossiere now, but what De Larrossiere is doing is putting a bandaid on...

I: On Mexico, Brazil.

K: On...and he can't do it a second time with the same methods. An international institution can attempt to impose austerity only once; it cannot act as permanent watchdog without unacceptable intrusion. For austerity in a developing country is a very grave political decision

-29-

K: that may affect political stability. It is in nobody's interest to foster radicalism in the name of economic orthodoxy. In any event it is inconceivable that developing countries will keep on borrowing and increasing their debt so that they can repay interest.

I: Right.

K: And therefore, it seems to me imperative that the developed countries find an approach where one can say as of this day, the process starts again. In that manner it is possible to allocate the burden among governments, bankers and debtors in a creative and hopefully equitable manner. If matters are permitted to slide a new financial system is imposed through progressive defaults, or through a kind of rescheduling that amounts to defaults, then I am afraid we will live in a very chaotic world in which the developing countries learn to deal with the creditors--developed countries--by blackmail. A policy of pure, narrow, seemingly selfish national interest will bring disaster for everyone. After all, more of our export today already go to the developing countries than go to Europe and Japan. So we are all in the same boat.

I: Do you see a debtor's cartel? As a madcap thing.

K: I don't think it will happen explicitly, but it is conceivable that some country will default directly or indirectly. But then, contrary to what people say, it will not be read out of the international financial

-30-

K: community but will, in fact, be rescheduled on more favorable terms than it had before. This will then trigger all of the other countries into the same process.

I: As you see the totality...

K: But, you see, I would like to avoid having the issue discussed as a debt problem.

I: Per se?

K: It should be discussed as a problem of world economic growth because everyone has an interest in world economic growth. And if there is sufficient growth, then the debt problem becomes less serious.

I: You are saying this to the U.S. Congress, among other people, aren't you?

K: I say it to all national leaders in the executive as well as in the legislative branch. They should be less focussed on emergencies and more on long range solutions.

I: You know, if these things do not occur, let's say, during this year, if Williamsburg is another Versailles, does something start giving then?

K: Yes.

I: Great protectionism...

K: In my opinion, you could have growing protectionism...

I: It's a short fuse, no?

K: And growing de factor defaulting. But the reverse is also true. We have an opportunity in East-West relations. We also have a great opportunity in North-South relations.

-31-

K: Everybody is up against it now. We will suffer a financial crisis if the debt problem becomes unmanageable. The developing countries can get rid of their debt, but they can not make economic progress without the cooperation of the developed nations. So, everybody has an overwhelming interest in a program of world economic growth for our country and for the rest of the world. We cannot separate the two anymore.

I: It doesn't exist right now, does it?

K: If we do not act in anticipation of foreseeable crises it is highly predictable that somewhere a crisis will catch us in a catastrophic manner. And the worst thing that can happen to a government is to look as if it did not foresee a potential catastrophe.

I: Could we use the last few minutes on the Middle East?

K: Sure.

I: The question is really very simple. What would you do with all of this: Lebanon, the September 1 Plan, all the criss cross relationships. And also, while we are on the subject, how would you respond to suggestions that some of your friends in print that you should take it on yourself?

K: To take the last question first. I am happy to advise the government on a part time basis, as I do occasionally now. I do not think that it would be a good idea for me to take on an operational job at this point. We have

-32-

K: an outstanding negotiator in Phil Habib and a distinguished Secretary of State. There is no need for yet another appointee; the present structure is more than adequate. As to substance I think it was a mistake to link Lebanon and the West Bank negotiations. The emphasis on Lebanon enables the two countries that have least interest in progress on the West Bank, namely, Israel and Syria, to procrastinate. If this goes on much longer the timetable will become unmanageable. For after the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations end the Syrians will want their turn. And that will not be easy. Then at the end of June starts the Moslem holy month of Ramaden when there is daily fasting for four weeks. Not much business can be conducted then. Then come the Jewish holidays, and then we will be in our own primaries. In other words if we do not move soon we may become stalemated, at least until after our elections.

I: Right.

K: So if the West Bank negotiations are not tackled almost immediately, they will, in fact, not be able to be conducted until after...

I: Separating it entirely from the forces in Lebanon.

K: Separating it not conceptually, but separating it substantially. I believe that if the West Bank found even an interim solution, that Lebanon would long detain us. A West Bank settlement would bring about a Lebanon settlement.

-33-

I: But not vice versa?

K: But not necessarily vice versa.

I: Why don't people understand this?

K: Because the Israeli government opposes territorial change on the West Bank and the Arabs have been reluctant to face the compromises essential for diplomatic progress. For both sides entering into West Bank negotiations is a painful process.

I: Sure.

K: So the Arabs have adopted the argument that they want to see what we can deliver in Lebanon before they commit themselves to a West Bank negotiation. But they are really weakening their own prospects for time is running against them.

I: Does this include Hussein, what you just said?

K: I have very high regard for Hussein; he understands the problem, I am sure. But he is in a very difficult position. Hussein, I think, would come forward if enough of the other Arabs supported him. So it's a vicious circle. The Israelis of course, are in no hurry to rush it. And our people may have been too formalistic.

I: Well, how do you trigger..no, not trigger..How do you crack up a...

K: You can't crack up...

I: A West Bank.

K: The next step has to be Hussein taking the plunge. What does it take to get Hussein to step forward now?

-34-

CYJ

K: For this, I do not know enough details of the negotiations.

I: Well, you saw the PLO in Algiers, which was...which
added nothing and detracted nothing, I guess.

K: Well, by not detracting anything, they really added a
little.

I: Yeah. Enough to give Hussein a plausible margin of maneuver.

K: That remains to be seen, but they could have stopped
the negotiation conclusively if they had wanted to.

I: That's true. Tell me, you mentioned yourself that you
occasionally advise the government. From what I read,
you have advised Secretary Shultz on China, on the Middle
East.

K: Not regularly. Very infrequently on a most informal
basis.

I: No, I understand. You were part of a group where you
were along. But you have been involved in at least these
two areas.

K: I talked to Shultz about China and the Middle East, both
alone and in groups.

I: Are there subjects that you've been called upon?

K: Well, I don't make a habit really to announce these meetings.

I: No. I know that.

K: I have no objection if the Administration wants to tell
you what, if anything, they consult me about, so long
as my role is not exaggerated. It is highly marginal.

-35-

I: Well, they tell me that you? the President about economic issues before the Newsweek piece came out.
Is that correct?

K: No. The President invited me to lunch but not on economic issues.

I: To be fair to you and, I guess, to protect your privacy, what is the best way that you would describe what you are doing now in terms of advising, helping, whatever the word is, this Administration on foreign policy.

K: Infrequently, in response to their requests. I am not part of any governmental process.

I: That's fairly new. Just the last six or eight months, no?

K: No. Actually, the President has been kind enough to invite me in occasionally from the beginning. I see Shultz more frequently than I did Haig.

I: Yes.

K: But I am not a major influence in the making of our foreign policy. I am peripherally consulted.

I: But you are obviously listened to and heard, otherwise they would not be...

I: For their own sake, I hope they have more regular advisors than I am. I am well disposed to the Administration; I support their major policies. Obviously I respond to their requests. I do not volunteer. I am not looking for and would not accept any regular position.

-36-

I: No. The reason I'm asking the question is obvious. Given the fact that you have obviously interesting thoughts, the question comes to my mind as it will to my reader. Whether the sort of things you are saying to me, for example, in part, are also being heard by the Reagan troops (?) and company. That's sort of the professional reason for the question. And I think that you've answered it.

K: You can assume that I say privately the same thing I say publicly.

I: Okay. Shall we photograph you for posterity?

K: Yes.

I: This is not the photographer I had hoped to bring, but there was an accident and we had to change things.

THE END

[y]

FEBRUARY 24, 1983

( I= INTERVIEWER )

( K= KISSINGER )

SIDE ONE

If one looks at American history, we were geographically removed from world affairs, for over a century. Then, when World War II ended our isolation we possessed overwhelming economic and military power.

-2-

One, that agression usually took the form of military moves across recognized, sovereign borders. And second, that political instability resulted from economic dislocations. In other words, we applied the experience of World War II to the military problem and the experience of the New Deal to the economic and social problem. And in Europe and Japan, this approach worked well. Economic development, in fact, produced political stability and NATO prevented military agression. In other parts of the world, it turned out that ~~the~~ REVOLUTIONARY FORCES were caused by indigenous factors, sometimes supported from the outside, ~~but at any rate,~~ to which traditional military solutions were less relevant. Also, economic progress did not necessarily produce political stability, in fact it often led to political instability by undermining existing structures. And all of that happened while the American percentage of the world's GNP was declining each year by ten percent of the ~~world's GNP~~, so that now we are down to some 22 percent

-3-

I: In our own terms?

-4-

K: Yes, we need to understand it first of all in our terms. At the same time, it is the essence of statesmanship to reconcile our interests with the interests of others, because you can't have a lasting settlement that is not also in the interest of the other party. And so, very often, in our domestic debate, people attack a particular agreement because it allegedly serves the other party's interest. It wouldn't be an agreement if it didn't serve the other party's interest.

I: By definition.

-5-

K: Well...

I: You said "seeming", yes.

I: Parenthesis. When you...

-6-

K: That was one kind of turning point. Another kind of turning point was the Vietnam War. When I was a junior Professor in the 1950's, whether or not my colleagues were for ~~Eisenhower~~ they did not treat it as a generically hostile enterprise. They might have voted for Stevenson and they surely voted for Kennedy, but they thought it was their government which they would help as best they could. There used to be seminars at Harvard and MIT, on weekends, that would work on questions of strategy and especially of arms control with the expectation that they would have access to government officials and would receive a respectful hearing. In the sixties and the early seventies, that broke down completely. So, the collapse of our domestic consensus occurred in the late sixties and early seventies. So there are different markers for different events.

-7-

K: period. Until the middle sixties, we were economically, militarily, and to some extent, politically so predominant that leadership consisted of coming up with ideas that we would then persuade people to follow much as one handles a domestic process of opinion-forming.
But now, a number of things have changed. For one, other nations have become stronger, even Allies like West Europe and Japan. So now, leadership consists of developing with respect to the allies a strategy or a definition of purposes that can command support over an extended period of time, and to create enough confidence in one's steadiness and reliability that one can in fact achieve it. Secondly, it requires a performance in matters that are not purely foreign policy that nevertheless affect the destinies of these nations, specifically in the economics field. With respect to the adversaries, it requires that they know the limits of what we will accept and also the scope of what we are prepared to negotiate, and that wenot oscillate with a constant redefinition of either OUR economic growth is crucial to our economic progress. And that restlessness in our decision-making process now over nearly a decade...

K: Well, I have very high regard for Secretary Shultz..

I: No, I know that.

-8-

K: Let me make two separate points. One, I think that, in fact, the foreign policy of the Administration has been much steadier than its rhetoric, and that, in terms of actions, the Administration has been quite consistent. In terms of its rhetoric, it has sometimes created disquiet, partly because some statements were excessive and partly because there seemed to be such a cacaphony of voices that it was not easy to strain out the dominant one. And so, I would have to say, on the basis of my travels, that there is in foreign countries, especially in Europe, the view that American foreign policy is not always steady and that it has been needlessly confrontational. I believe that this is often not justified, but if you ask me what is the perception, that is the perception. And I also think that the Secretary of State is a very stabilizing factor.

-9-

K: I believe that we have, in fact, now an historical opportunity for a major negotiation with the Soviet Union for these reasons: One, just as we will be driven to a recognition of the limits of what we can do, so the Soviets are bound to be driven to a sense of the deadlock inherent in a policy of pressure - especially if we are wise. The only question is whether it will be taught to them by bitter experience or whether they can get there by insight or by joint diplomacy with us. The Soviet system, while it is militarily strong, has enormous weaknesses. Its economy is stagnant. Andropov's own description of their system is a massive indictment. When the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has to inveigh publicly against absenteeism, hooliganism, corruption, drunkenness - issues which in other countries are taken care of by police or by plant managers, there is a major structural problem.

-10-

K: Well, I believe that here is the first General Secretary
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who has
never run a large Communist Party organization
within the Soviet Union. All of his experience has
been abroad as Proconsul in Hungary, as head of the
Secretariat in the Central Committee dealing with
foreign Communist Parties or as head of the KGB.
In other words, his experience is on the foreign
side of the Communist Party structure, not on the
domestic side. And what it looks like to me
that he has put together a combination of the para-
military security forces and the regular Armed
Forces. The regular Party structure, the people that
have been running the Soviet Union throughout its
history, must be in a state of insecurity and
confusion about what all of this means, especially
since all the first promotions have all been from
the KGB.

-11-

I: To set his own...

I: Comer

K: As a comer.

I: His zeal for reform?

-12-

I: That was interesting.

I: Exhuberance.

[y]

-13-

K: Yes. But it seems to be..

[Y]

-14-

K: Yes. But it seems to be...

I: December, '70.

-15-

K: Right. December, '70.

I: Yeah. The Gdansk...

I: So in this context...

K: Let me explain what I mean by opportunity. I do not imply that it will be easy or that the Soviets will suddenly roll over for us and play dead. The horror of a nuclear war imposes the need for coexistence; at the same time we must not identify ourselves with the forces of evil. The problem of how we will BLACKMAILED BY THE RALEIGH RUTHLESS THREATENING WORLD WILL BE BLACKMAILED BY THE RALEIGH RUTHLESS THREATENING WORLD therefore becomes to find modes of coexistence without encouraging Soviet agressiveness. Now, this

-16-

K: is a difficult process. But there is no way around it. Because if we are perceived not to seek to own SAKE co-exist, then the issue of peace and war turns into an unmanageable domestic issue in every democratic country. If we appear reluctant to DEPEND OUR PRINCIPLES WE RUN THE RISK OF CONSTANT PRESSURES

I: And it's endless.

-17-

I: But the fact of doing ti?

I: Okay.

-18-

I: With them?

-19-

-20-

I: Yes.

-21-

K: Well, I would...

I: Right.

-22-

K: that, at a minimum, President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, Judge Clark, Weinberger and one or two other trusted people must talk out among themselves so that they know what they're after. Otherwise, they are going to get caught in a bog of petty-fogging details. You take the INF negotiations where...I was not myself a great fan of the Zero Option, but in the public debate, it is ironic that the Zero Option has emerged as the hard line position.

I: But on November 18th, it was not.

K: It was not. And the soft line position presumably is to be in favor of some missiles in Europe.

I: Exactly.

K: This is...it's a weird reversal of positions. So I think the first need is to restore coherence to our public debate. The second requirement is to translate the general concept into an operational American policy. Third we must strive for an allied consensus. Fourth, I think it is very important to start a private dialogue with the Soviets as quietly as possible.

I: Back to backchannel.

K: Probably through the backchannel, which should be run by the Secretary of State. But it needs heavy White House involvement because the Soviets must be sure that there is Presidential backing. And that negotiation at this point should, in my view, be largely conceptual: One

-23-

K: I don't know.

I: Or we don't know?

I: Not yet.

-24-

[y]

-25-

-26-

K: Yes.

K: Yes. If the trends of the last five years continue, then we have to say, then it's probable that we are heading into a mercantilistic world. But that would have very grave implications also for the kind of foreign policy that can be conducted. In my view we would be better off agreeing together on some limited areas of mercantilism--in the name of national security or whatever--instead of proclaiming free trade while practicing cut throat mercantilism.

-27-

K: Yes.

I: The Smithsonian.

K: Smithsonian.

I: Azores and Smithsonian.

-28-

I: On Mexico, Brazil.

-29-

I: Right.

K: And therefore, it seems to me imperative that the developed countries find an approach where one can say as of this day, the process starts again. In that manner it is possible to allocate the burden among governments, bankers and debtors in a creative and hopefully equitable manner. If matters are permitted to slide a new financial system is imposed through progressive defaults, or through a kind of rescheduling that amounts to defaults, then I am afraid we will live in a very chaotic world in which the developing countries learn to deal with the creditors--developed countries--by blackmail. A policy of pure, narrow, seemingly selfish national interest will bring disaster for everyone. After all, more of our exports today already go to the developing countries than go to Europe and Japan. So we are all in the same boat.

-30-

I: As you see the totality...

I: Per se?

K: Yes.

I: Great protectionism...

I: It's a short fuse, no?

-31-

K: Sure.

-32-

I: Right.

-33-

I: But not vice versa?

I: Sure.

K: You can't crack up...

I: A West Bank.

-34-

I: No, I know that.

-35-

I: Yes.

-36-

K: Yes.

THE END

INTERVIEW WITH HENRY KISSINGER, NEW YORK CITY, FEBRUARY 24, 1983

( I= INTERVIEWER )

( K= KISSINGER )

SIDE ONE

I: This is Parade Magazine interview with Henry Kissinger Szule by Tad Schultz in New York City on 24 February, 1983. So, let's do it as an overview. I obviously read the Economist, the news piece and so on. Where does the United States stand in the world today, given the series of major issues, to wit, the economic issues on which we touch elsewhere - and I'd like to come back to that in detail - sort of a succession, I guess - Western Europe, the Middle East. What makes you simply talk, if you would, in a meditative fashion, and then I'll break in with specific questions.

K: All right. Why don't I begin with this general observation. I think, as a nation, we now face for the first time in a realistic way the need to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have had to conduct foreign policy in the past. If one looks at American history, we are WERE geographically removed from world affairs for over a century. Then, when we got involved as a result of World War II, we emerged into the post war period with one condition and two perceptions. The condition was that we were an overwhelming economic and military power. We had an atomic

EYD

- 2 -

K: monopoly, and we produced 52 percent of the world's GNP, In such a position as we were in, which meant that we really could not only overwhelm every problem with resources and that we could look at defense in the rather apocalyptic terms, that we could totally destroy any attacker. But that power was deemed applicable on some rare occasions, and that was the military and economic in turn, of post-war period from this position of overwhelming superiority, both economic and military, some historical experiences. One, that aggression usually took the form of military moves across recognized, sovereign borders. And second, that political instability resulted from economic dislocations. In other words, we applied the experience of World War II to the military problem and the experience of the New Deal to the economic and social problem. And in Europe and Japan, this spread well. In fact, it worked very well. There, in fact, economic development produced political stability and NATO presumed that there was no military agression. In other parts of the world, it turned out that the political changes were caused by indigenous factors, maybe supported from the outside, but at any rate, to which the military solutions were less relevant. And also, that economic progress did not necessarily produce political stability, but often produced political instability. In fact, it led to political instability. So that one had to have an answer to political organization. And all of that happened while the American percentage of the world's GNP was declining

- 6 -

[YJ]

K: a junior Professor in the 1950's, whether or not they were途of study, were for the Eisenhower Administration, they did not believe that it was a body to which they were entitled to an say. However, they were not a majority. They might have voted for Stevenson and surely voted for Kennedy, but they thought it was not likely that their government would support them. It would not be seminars at Harvard and MIT, nor would that would work on questions of strategy and especially of arms control with the expectation that they would have access to government officials. In the sixties and the early seventies, that broke down completely. So, the end of our domestic consensus occurred in the late sixties, yes, in the late seventies and early seventies. So there are different markers for different events.

I: This takes me to one of those impossible things which has been defined endlessly as the "American Leadership in the world." It has been applied to at least the last two Presidents. When you look at it, what is the essence or the reality - is maybe the word - the reality of the American leadership in an intelligent sense of the word?

K: Well, again, there is a huge difference now between the period of the middle sixties and the contemporary period. Until the middle sixties, we were economically, militarily, and to some extent, politically so predominant that leadership consisted of coming up with ideas that we would then persuade people to follow much as

- 8 -

I: speaking with people abroad. What is your impression of what is the perception in Europe and Asia - I guess mainly in Europe - of coherence, cohesion, form and style of U.S. foreign policy as it exists at this juncture of events?

K: Well, let me make two separate points, with respect to this. One, I think that, in fact, the foreign policy of the Administration has been much steadier than its rhetoric, and that, in terms of actions, the Administration has been quite steady and consistent. In terms of its rhetoric, it has sometimes created disquiet, partly because some statements were excessive and partly because there seemed to be such a cacaphony of voices that it was not easy to strain out the dominant one. And so, I would have to say, on the basis of my travels, that there is in foreign countries, especially in Europe, the view that American foreign policy is not always as steady as it has been, and that I believe that this is often not justified, but if you ask me what is the perception, that is the perception. And I also think that the Secretary of State is a very stabilizing factor.

I: Which we know -? since June. It's almost the end of the year.

I: On such more specific issues such as U.S. - Soviet relations,