ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND

1290 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10104-0233

Office of the President

April 4, 1997

APR 07 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

On May 14, 1997, a small group of distinguished security experts, journalists, and diplomats will gather at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for a discussion with President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic on global security in the post-Cold War world. I am writing to invite you to be part of that group for what promises to be a rare and valuable opportunity to consider, first-hand, the views of a thoughtful and influential world leader whose nation has been and remains at the crux of some of this century's most remarkable and challenging security developments.

The event is scheduled for 4:00 - 6:00 p.m. It will open with a presentation by President Havel, who is expected to touch not only on current security issues but also on the need for new and broadened approaches to security in a changed and changing world. The President will be introduced by David Rockefeller, whose own perspective on global affairs is uniquely broad and well informed. The afternoon will close with an informal reception.

I hope very much that you will join us for what I believe will be a timely and significant event. Transportation from New York City to the Pocantico Conference Center, which is in nearby Westchester County, can be provided. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have questions. I look forward to a response at your earliest convenience.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue - 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

TELEPHONE 212-373-4200 · FACSIMILE 212-315-0996 · EMAIL rock@rbf.org

ATTN: HELEN

REPLY FORM

A Discussion of World Security with President Vaclav Havel

May 14, 1997, 4:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund

Name Henry A. Kissinger
Organization
Phone 212/759-7919 FAX 212/759-0042

I can / cannot attend (circle one) the event on May 14, 1997.

Please complete and FAX this reply form to Colin G. Campbell at 212-262-9536.

(To inquire about transportation to and from the Pocantico Conference Center, please call Priscilla Lewis, Special Assistant to the President, at 212-373-4244.)

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-KISSINGER ASSOCIATES -

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212 759 0041- ********

ATTN: HELEN

REPLY FORM

Name Henry A. Kissinger

Organization

JUN 27 1997

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

ROOM 5600

(212) 649-5600

June 16, 1997

Dear Henry and Nancy:

You seem to be well aware of my weaknesses since your two
very generous presents were precisely the things I most enjoy
receiving! The two bottles of Chateau Haut Brion 1981 were
wildly extravagant, but will give great pleasure to me and a
small group of wine lovers if I can find ones deserving of such
a treat. I also loved the cheery and very handsome necktie with
sailboats on it. As Henry knows, it was admired by several
members of the Bilderberg Conference where I proudly wore it.

A great many thanks for your birthday wishes, your
generosity and, most particularly, your friendship.

The Honorable and Mrs. Henry A. Kissinger
435 East 52nd Street
New York, New York 10022

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

ROOM 5600

(212) 649-5600

FEB 13 1997 FEB 1 3 1997

February 4, 1997

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for taking the time to talk with us on Monday about the newly-formed Nelson A. Rockefeller Foundation for Public Service. We also deeply appreciate the time Mrs. Kissinger has given us regarding the next Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner, and we hope we will be able to visit with her again soon.

Please find attached summary materials on the Foundation and its current projects -- the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Fellowship Program, and the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner.

We would greatly appreciate your thoughts on this subject, and look forward to talking with you again at a convenient time during the week of February 17, 1997. We will be in touch with your office to set up a follow-up telephone call.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Mark F. Rockefeller

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Jr.

Attachments (3 pages)

NAR43797

2/4/97

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION FOR PUBLIC SERVICE

**General Purpose:** The Nelson A. Rockefeller Foundation for Public Service was formed to commemorate the life of Vice President and Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and his commitment to public service. Governor Rockefeller believed that public service could and should be a positive force in all our lives. He believed in democracy and the American political and governmental systems. Governor Rockefeller dedicated his life to this cause and set an example for all who knew him. It is this dedication and service that the Foundation wishes to honor and inspire in others.

The Foundation seeks to advance public service in all aspects of society, through education of the individual and community in the importance of public service, support of worthwhile efforts dedicated to public service, encouragement of leadership in public service, and honoring those who have advanced the cause of public service.

**Immediate Goal:** The Foundation's immediate efforts are focused on developing a fellowship program to attract bright and talented young people into public service, and to reinstate the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner.

**Structure:** The Foundation has no connection, formally or informally, with the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute for Government in Albany. The Foundation was incorporated in the State of New York on August 16, 1996, and received recognition as a publicly supported tax-exempt entity from the Internal Revenue Service on January 9, 1997. Members of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation are as follows:

Henry A. Kissinger
Mary M. Kresky
Richard D. Parsons

Mrs. Nelson A. Rockefeller
Mark F. Rockefeller
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Jr.

The Officers of the Foundation are as follows:

Mark F. Rockefeller
Nelson A. Rockefeller, Jr.
Marcia A. McLean

Co-Chair
Co-Chair
Secretary/Treasurer

Pursuant to the terms of the By-Laws of the Foundation, a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation must be convened within the first six months of each calendar year. Each Board member is elected at the annual meeting and shall serve until the next annual meeting. The Board will consist of not less than three (3) nor more than fifteen (15) members.

**Funding:** The Foundation currently has outstanding bills totaling $26,992.39. These expenses will be paid for by loans and/or contributions from Nelson A. Rockefeller, Jr. and Mark F. Rockefeller. To date, the Foundation has not undertaken any formal fundraising efforts or received any contributions. We anticipate raising funds initially from receipts from the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner, and eventually to seek support from private foundations, corporations and individuals for all Foundation programs.

**Open Issues:** The following are current open issues with respect to the Foundation:

* Define the Foundation's mission

* Set first meeting of the Board of Trustee within the first six month of 1997

* Finalize funding of outstanding expenses

2/4/97

# PROPOSED NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER PUBLIC SERVICE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
(Sponsored by the NAR Foundation)

**General Purpose:** We would like the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Fellowship Program to provide committed and talented young people with an opportunity to explore career opportunities in public service.

**Program Description:** We are in the process of developing the components of the fellowship program. We have had discussions about two different types of programs. The first focuses on the search for solutions to critical public policy issues. The second focuses on the Fellow, and recognizes academic achievement and a commitment to public service. Whatever direction we take in determining the mission of the program we would like to consider the following characteristics:

* Fellows will be recent graduates of accredited educational institutions throughout the United States and/or young professionals at the beginning of their careers.

* Fellows will be required to complete an application and interview process prior to selection.

* Fellows will work with elected and appointed officials in State and local governments.

* Fellows will prepare final written reports on the issue they have addressed, and their experience in the program and present them at a symposium.

We are currently interviewing consultants to help us address these issues and to conduct research with respect to existing public service fellowship programs, and the receptivity in the marketplace to a new fellowship program.

**Structure:** We envision that the day-to-day administration and operation of the fellowship program will be carried out by an Executive Director and staff. We also have given a great deal of consideration to creating an Executive Council. The Council will be an *ad hoc* committee of the Foundation, and will provide overall guidance for the fellowship program. The Council will also be responsible for making the final selection of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Fellows, and for selecting the recipient of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award. The Council could be a group of no more than fifteen (15) individuals representing both the private and public sectors (i.e., government, business, labor, not-for-profit, community groups and academia). We would like the members of the non-partisan Council to represent both geographic and cultural diversity, as well as, a balance of age and gender.

**Funding:** Initially the Fellowship Program will be funded with proceeds from the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner. It will be the responsibility of the Executive Director of the Fellowship Program to develop a fund-raising strategy for the Program beyond the Award Dinner.

**Open Issues:** In summary, the following are open issues with respect to the fellowship program:

* Agree on the charge of the Executive Council and develop a list of potential members.

* Hire a consultant now, and an Executive Director later.

* Define the mission of the fellowship program.

* Research existing fellowship programs that have a public service mission, and test the receptivity of the marketplace to another public service fellowship.

* Identify and define components and characteristics of the fellowship program including, applicant pools and development of a recruitment program, the application and application process, criteria for selection and selection process, the length of the fellowship, stipend paid to Fellows, and dissemination of information prepared by Fellows.

2/4/97

# PROPOSED NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD DINNER

**Purpose:** The Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner will be held annually to honor an individual who has devoted his or herself to a career in public service, or an individual who is currently developing a career in public service. The Dinner will also promote the mission of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Foundation for Public Service and its fellowship program.

**Awardee Selection Process:** In all likelihood, the 1998 Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Awardee will be selected by the Board of Trustees of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Foundation for Public Service. However, we envision that future awardees could be selected by the Executive Council pursuant to a stated selection process and set of criteria.

**Background:** From 1988 to 1994, the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner was hosted by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany. A Public Service Award Dinner has not taken place since 1994. The Nelson A. Rockefeller Foundation for Public Service is reinstating the Dinner, however, there is no longer any connection between the Dinner and the Institute in Albany.

**Structure:** We anticipate holding the next Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Award Dinner in May 1998. Although we envision the format of the Dinner to be similar to past dinners we would like to minimize the number of speeches, and focus more on the Awardee and the introduction of the NAR Fellows. Dick Parsons has agreed to Chair the Dinner, and we are currently working on putting together various Dinner Committee members. We also need to explore the possibility of corporate underwriting of certain costs associated with the dinner. We have asked Joe Canzeri to organize the logistics of the Dinner. Joe is working with Mamie McDonough and Phyliss Wienberg in this regard.

**Funding:** In the past the cost of putting on the Dinner has been approximately $215,000. Receipts have ranged from $340,000 to $535,000. All "up front" costs associated with the 1998 Dinner will be paid for by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Foundation for Public Service, which will be funded by loans and/or contributions from Nelson A. Rockefeller, Jr. and Mark F. Rockefeller.

Initially, proceeds from the Dinner will be used to support the Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Fellowship Program.

**Open Issues:** In summary the following are current open issues with respect to the Dinner:

* Identify possible corporate sponsors

* Prepare list of Dinner Committee members

* Select 1998 Nelson A. Rockefeller Public Service Awardee

* Define selection process and criteria for future Awardees

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# FOUNDING ACT
ON MUTUAL RELATIONS, COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN NATO AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member States, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other hand, hereinafter referred to as NATO and Russia, based on an enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level, will build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.

2. NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation[ 1]. The present Act reaffirms their determination to give concrete substance to our shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. By making this commitment at the highest political level, we mark the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.

3. This Act defines the goals and mechanism of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action that will constitute the core of their mutual relations.

4. NATO has undertaken a historic transformation - a process that will continue. In 1991 it revised its strategic doctrine to take account of the new security environment. Accordingly, NATO has radically reduced and continues the adaptation of its conventional and nuclear forces. While preserving the capability to meet the commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political functions and taken on new missions of peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the UN and the OSCE, such as In Bosnia-Herzegovina to address new security challenges in close association with other countries and international organizations. NATO is in the process of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. It will continue to develop a broad and dynamic pattern of cooperation with OSCE participating

*Paragraph numbers are only for working purposes and will not appear in the final text.*

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States in particular through the Partnership for Peace and is working with Partner countries on the initiative to establish a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO members have decided to examine NATO's Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe's new security situation and challenges.

5. Russia is continuing the building of a democratic society and the realisation of its political and economic transformation. It is developing the concept of its national security and revising its military doctrine to ensure that they are fully consistent with new security realities. Russia has carried out deep reductions in its armed forces, has withdrawn its forces on an unprecedented scale from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries and withdrawn all its nuclear weapons back to its own national territory. Russia is committed to further reducing its conventional and nuclear forces. Russia is actively participating in peacekeeping operations in support of the UN and the OSCE, as well as in crisis management in different areas of the world. It is contributing to the multinational forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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# 1. PRINCIPLES

6. Proceeding from the principle that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible, NATO and Russia will work together to contribute to the establishment in Europe of common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the Interests of all states.

7. NATO and Russia will help to strengthen the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including developing further its role as a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, as well as in enhancing its operational capabilities to carry out these tasks. The OSCE, as the only pan-European security organization, has a key role in European peace and stability. In strengthening the OSCE, we will cooperate to prevent any possibility of returning to a Europe of division and conflictuation, or the Isolation of any state.

8. Consistent with the OSCE's work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st century, and taking into account the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security, we will seek the widest possible cooperation among participating states of the OSCE with the aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.

9. NATO and Russia start from the premise that the shared objective of strengthening security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the benefit of all countries requires a response to new risks and challenges, such as aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to our common peace, prosperity and stability.

10. This Act does not affect, and cannot be regarded as affecting, the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining international peace and

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security, or the role of the OSCE as the inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in its area and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

11. In implementing the provisions in this Act, NATO and Russia will observe in good faith their obligations under International law and international instruments, including the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as well as their commitment under the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, including the Charter of Paris and the documents adopted at the Lisbon OSCE summit. To achieve the aims of this Act, NATO and Russia will base their relations on a shared commitment to the following principles:

* development, on the basis of transparency, of a strong, stable, enduring and equal partnership and of cooperation to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;

* acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security;

* refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, to sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act;

* respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security. The inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents;

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* mutual transparency in creating and implementing defence policy and military doctrines:

* prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles:

* support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping operations carried out under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

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## II. MECHANISM FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION (THE NATO-RUSSIA PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL)

12. To carry out the activities and aims provided for by this Act and to develop common approaches to European security and to political problems, NATC and Russia will create the NATO Russia Permanent Joint Council. The central objective of this Joint Council will be to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none. If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect within the framework of political consultations.

13. The Permanent Joint Council will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member states or Russia.

14. Our shared objective is to identify and pursue as many opportunities for joint action as possible. As we further build the relationship, we expect that additional opportunities for joint action will emerge.

15. The Permanent Joint Council will be the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis or for any other situation affecting peace and stability. Extraordinary meetings of the Council will take place in addition to its regular meetings to allow for prompt consultations in case of emergencies. In this context, NATO and Russia will promptly consult within the Permanent Joint Council in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.

16. The activities of the Permanent Joint Council will be built upon the principles of reciprocity and transparency in the course of their consultations and cooperation. NATO and Russia will inform each other regarding the respective security-related challenges they face and the measures that each intends to take to address them.

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17. Provisions of this document do not provide NATO or Russia, at any stage, with a right of veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision making and action. They cannot be used as a means to disadvantage the interests of other states.

18. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at various levels and in different forms, according to the subject matter and the wishes of NATO and Russia. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and at the level of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors/permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council.

19. The Permanent Joint Council may also meet, as appropriate, at the level of Heads of State and Government.

20. The Permanent Joint Council may establish committees or working groups for individual subjects or areas of cooperation on an ad hoc or permanent basis, as appropriate.

21. Under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council, military representatives and Chiefs of Staff will also meet, meetings of Chiefs of Staff will take place no less than twice a year, and also monthly at military representative level. Meetings of military experts may be convened, as appropriate.

22. The Permanent Joint Council will be chaired jointly by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member states on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia.

23. To support the work of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish the necessary administrative structures.

¹ This paragraph was formerly paragraph 26.

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24. The Russian Federation will establish a Mission to NATO headed by a representative at the rank of Ambassador. A senior military representative and his staff will be part of this Mission for the purposes of the military cooperation. NATO retains the possibility of establishing an appropriate presence in Moscow, the modalities of which remain to be determined.

25. The agenda for regular sessions will be established jointly. Organizational arrangements and rules of procedure for the Permanent Joint Council will be worked out. These arrangements will be in place for the inaugural meeting of the joint Council which will be held no later than four months after the signature of this Act.

26. The Permanent Joint Council will engage in three distinct activities:

* consulting on the topics in Section III of this Act and on any other political or security issue determined by mutual consent;

* on the basis of these consultations, developing joint initiatives on which NATO and Russia would agree to speak or act in parallel;

* once consensus has been reached in the course of consultation, making joint decisions and taking joint action on a case-by-case basis, including participation, on an equitable basis, in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE.

27. Any actions undertaken by the Russian Federation or NATO, together or separately, must be consistent with the UN Charter and the OSCE's governing principles.

28. Recognizing the importance of deepening contacts between the legislative bodies of the participating states to this Act, NATO and Russia will also encourage expanded dialogue and cooperation between the North Atlantic Assembly and the Russian Federal Assembly

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III AREAS FOR CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION

20. In building their relationship, NATO and Russia will focus on specific areas of mutual interest. They will consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree in the following areas:

* issues of common interest related to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area or to concrete areas, including their contribution to security and stability in this area.

* conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organizations in these fields;

* joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE. and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage;

* Russian participation in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace.

* exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of the Russian Federation and NATO, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes;

* arms control issues ();

* nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum;

* preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combating nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in

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specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation;

* [] possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence:

* enhanced regional air traffic safety, increased air traffic capacity and reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, to promote confidence through increased measures of transparency and exchanges of information in relation to air defence and related aspects of airspace management/control. This will include exploring possible cooperation on appropriate air defence related matters. []

* increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of the Russian Federation and NATO member States;

* reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia;

* coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments, as further detailed below:

* pursuing possible armaments related cooperation through Russian association with the Conference of National Armaments Directors;

* conversion of defence industries;

* developing mutually agreed cooperative projects in defence-related economic, environmental and scientific fields;

* conducting joint initiatives and exercises in civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief;

* combating terrorism and drug trafficking;

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## IV. MILITARY DIMENSION

### Promoting Mutual Military Restraint, Transparency and Confidence

NATO and Russia affirm their shared desire to achieve greater stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The members of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspects of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing nuclear weapons.

Recognising the importance of the CFE Treaty adaptation for the broader OSCE security context and the work on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century, NATO and Russia will work together in Vienna with the other States Parties to adapt the CFE Treaty to enhance its viability and effectiveness, taking into account Europe's changing security environment and the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating states. They share the objective of concluding an adaptation agreement as expeditiously as possible and, as a first step in this process, they will, together with other

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States Parties, seek to conclude as soon as possible a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, consistent with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Iшен in November 1996.

NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-limited equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all CFE States to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

The members of NATO and Russia commit themselves to exercise restraint during the period of negotiations, as foreseen in the Document on Scope and Parameters, in relation to the current postures and capabilities of their conventional armed forces - in particular with respect to their levels of forces and deployments in the Treaty's area of application, in order to avoid developments in the security situation in Europe diminishing the security of any State Party. This commitment is without prejudice to possible voluntary decisions by the individual States Parties to reduce their force levels or deployments, or to their legitimate security interests.

The members of NATO and Russia proved on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States-Parties irrespective of their membership of a particular Alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in Europe as

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a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

The members of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States - Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States-Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting national TLE ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all State-Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States-Parties will take into account all the levels of TLE established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

The members of NATO and Russia reaffirm that States-Parties should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.

Each State-Party will base its agreement to the provisions of the adapted Treaty on all national ceilings of the States-Parties, on its projections of the current and future security situation in Europe.

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In addition, in the negotiations on an adapted CFE Treaty, the members of NATO and Russia will, together with other States-Parties, seek to strengthen stability by further developing measures to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces in agreed regions of Europe, to include Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO and Russia have clarified their intentions with regard to their conventional force postures in Europe's new security environment and are prepared to consult on the evolution of these postures in the framework of the Permanent Joint Council.

NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the UN Charter and the OSCE governing principles as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

The members of NATO and Russia will strive for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to their armed forces. They will comply fully with their obligations under the 1994 Vienna Document and develop cooperation with the other OSCE participating states, including negotiations, inter alia, within the OSCE to promote confidence

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and security.

Expanding cooperation between military establishments

NATO and Russia will expand political-military consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its members and of Russia. They will implement a program of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a throat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly-scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercise and training involving NATO and Russian forces.

To support this enhanced dialogue and the military components of the Permanent Joint Council, NATO and Russia will establish reciprocal military liaison missions at various levels.

To enhance their partnership and ensure this partnership is grounded to the greatest extent possible in practical activities and direct cooperation, NATO and Russia's respective military authorities will explore the further development of a concept for joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. This initiative should build upon the positive experience of working together in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the lessons learned there will be used in the establishment of Combined Joint Task Forces.

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[LC]

Theodore Roosevelt Association

Box 719, Oyster Bay, New York 11771

Phone: 516-921-6319

FAX: 516-921-6481

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

February 26, 1997

MAR 0 3 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am pleased to inform you that the Executive Committee of the Theodore Roosevelt Association has voted to award you, sir, the Theodore Roosevelt Distinguished Service Medal, which is the Association's highest honor.

The Medal dates back to 1923 and is one of the oldest major awards in the United States. It is given, on an occasional basis, to those who have rendered distinguished service in fields reflecting the work and interests of President Theodore Roosevelt. I enclose a copy of the program when we awarded the Medal to the Hon. John F. Lehman, Jr. in 1995, which program gives a list of the recipients over the years and a history of the award. In 1996 the Medal was given to David McCullough.

The Medal is usually given at the Annual Dinner of the Theodore Roosevelt Association, which this year will be at the Officers Club at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, on Saturday, November 1, 1997. We meet at the Naval War College this year to mark the centennial of Theodore Roosevelt's appointment in 1897 as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

TR and Admiral Mahan of the Naval War College are both noted for the kind of realistic and farsighted foreign policies that resemble in important ways your own thinking and your career. We think for many reasons that the Naval War College will be a most appropriate location for the award of the Medal. The only requirement for receiving the Medal is that it be accepted in person by the recipient. The Medal itself is the work of James Earle Fraser, who also designed the buffalo nickel.

If you wish to know more about the Theodore Roosevelt Association, you could speak with either Amb. William J. vanden Heuvel, who is a Trustee of the Association, or retired NY State Justice Theodore R. Kupferman, who is a former President of the TR Association. Please call this office if you have any questions. Best wishes to you, sir.

Sincerely, yours

John A. Gable, Ph.D., Executive Director

Chartered by an Act of Congress 1920

Phone: 516-921-6319

FAX: 516-921-6481

E-MAIL: TRA@sprynet.com

May 5, 1997

MAY 0 3 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I have been informed by your office that it will not be
possible for you to be in Newport on November 1, 1997 to receive
our Theodore Roosevelt Distinguished Service Medal. As outlined
in my letter to you of February 26, we usually give the Medal
at our Annual Dinner. However, the Executive Committee of the
Association has decided to award you the Theodore Roosevelt
Distinguished Service Medal at your convenience sometime next
winter. We would hold the presentation at the Theodore Roosevelt
Birthplace, 28 East 20th Street, Manhattan, and have a cocktail
party. Thus the event could be more easily fit into your busy
schedule.

If this arrangement meets with your approval, please let
me know. We can determine a date for the presentation down the
road at some point.

Best wishes.

P.02

[Lc]

REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL

MAY 23 1997

May 22, 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Thank you for taking the time to write to Secretary Albright and Mr. Berger. Your intervention promises to bring more command attention to the cases of the 31 Nung and will hopefully speed things along. I will let you know the outcome.

It was a closing of the circle for me to talk with you at the IRC luncheon on Monday. The refugee thread which brings us together again was, of course, kept intact by your intervention in 1975 when I asked you to permit me to stay with refugee work. Following our meeting with you, I spent eight years building the Indochinese refugee program as the first U.S. refugee coordinator in southeast Asia and then back at the Department.

I was flattered at your clear recollection of our meeting with you (considering that you held many somewhat more important meetings while occupying that office). Craig and I were truly concerned that we would be dismissed until you broke into a grin and said: "Just don't do it again." I am glad that you are writing the meeting into the next volume of your memoirs.

2839 CONN. AVE., NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20008 • TEL (202) 828-0110 • FAX (202) 828-0819 • EMAIL RI@REFINTL.ORG • WEB HTTP://WWW.REFINTL.ORG

JUN-02 97 12:09 FROM:

TO:212 759 0042

PAGE:01

REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL

2639 CONN. AVE., N.W., SUITE #202
WASHINGTON, DC 20008

TEL (202) 828-0110

FAX (202) 828-0819

FAX
COVER SHEET

DATE: June 2, 1997

TO: Dr. Henry A. Kissenger

FAX #: 212 759 0042

FROM: Lionel A. Rosenblatt

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 1

JUN 02 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Thank you again for your prompt intervention on behalf of the Nung in Hong Kong. It was evident that the NSC had been catalyzed by your note which was mentioned to me by the staff there (we did not indicate any knowledge of it).

In the nick of time, the Nung were allowed to remain in Hong Kong instead of being forcibly repatriated last week as was the plan. This happy result was a very near thing, with the U.S. action being so last minute that some of the refugees were pulled back at the airport from the repatriation flight to Hanoi. Unfortunately, three family members in one case were inadvertently overlooked and were sent back to Vietnam. We have asked U.S. officials to have them returned to Hong Kong or processed for the U.S. from Vietnam, but this will probably be a long process.

Now, the last battle is for INS to treat the cases generously, admitting them to the U.S. without delay. We are pushing for Sandy Berger to make this clear to the top echelon at Justice/INS, but this has not yet been done.

Lionel Rosenblatt

HENRY A. KISSINGER

In response to my article on Bosnia (Taking Exception - 28 September), Richard Holbrooke with characteristic passion rejected arguments I did not make while ignoring my central thesis completely. He makes a good case for maintaining a significant American military presence in Bosnia. I agree with this so long as it is coupled with the development of an exit strategy, on which Holbrooke is silent.

However, my fundamental concern is less the presence of the troops
than with their use. Protecting the ceasefire is a valid objec-
tive. Using NATO military power to bring about a multi-ethnic
state where none has ever existed, against the wishes of the
Serb and Croat populations, is not. Such a state could come into
being only by the use of American forces in backing one side in
a civil war and could be preserved only by a combination of
repression and ethnic cleansing. Slogans like "historical
pessimism" do not answer the question of why America should risk
casualties to abandon the principle of self-determination when
the outcome could be decided by a supervised referendum in
which each ethnic group decides its own future?

The Administration and Holbrooke deserve much credit for
negotiating an end to hostilities. They should not press beyond
this by using military force for nation-building, risking a
repetition of Somalia. And they should abandon the dangerous
argument of equating the future of Bosnia with the future of
NATO -- which strikes me as a reckless example of mission creep.

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

In responding to my article on Bosnia (Taking Exception, 28 September), Richard Holbrooke with characteristic passion rejected arguments I did not make while ignoring my central thesis completely. He makes a good case for maintaining a significant American military presence in Bosnia. I agree with this so long as it is coupled with the development of an exit strategy, on which he is silent.

However, my fundamental concern is less the presence of the troops with their use. Protecting the ceasefire is a valid objective. Using NATO military power to bring about a multi-ethnic state where none has ever existed, against the wishes of the Serb and Croat populations, is not. Such a state could come into being only by the use of American forces in backing one side in a civil war and could be preserved only by a combination of repression and ethnic cleansing. Slogans like 'historical pessimism do not answer the question of why' America should risk casualties to abandon the principle of self-determination when the outcome could be decided by a supervised referendum in which 'eadhethnic group decides its own future'?

Finally, I would warn against making the future of Bosnia a test case for the future of NATO as a reckless example of mission creep.

[11]

In Taking Exception to my article on Bosnia, Richard Holbrooke with characteristic passion rejected arguments I did not make while ignoring totally my central thesis. He makes a good case for maintaining a significant American military presence in Bosnia.
I agree with this so long as it is coupled with a serious development of an exit strategy.

However, my fundamental concern is not the presence of the troops so much as their use. Protecting the ceasefire is a valid objective. Using NATO military power to bring about a multi-ethnic state where none has ever existed is not. Such a state can come into being only by the use of American forces in backing one side in a civil war and will be preserved probably by a combination of repression and ethnic cleansing. Why should America risk casualties to abandon the principle of self-determination? A more reasonable outcome would be to let each ethnic group decide its future by supervised free elections.

Richard Holbrooke

In Bosnia, Patience

Washington Post

28 September 1997

"The fulfillment of America's ideals," Henry Kissinger wrote in his book "Diplomacy." "Will have to be sought in the patient accumulation of partial successes." But his impatient column, "Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia" (op-ed, Sept. 22), minimizes what already has been achieved in Bosnia and advocates a course of action that could not only result in a possible resumption of hostilities but also undermine America's commitment to European security just on the eve of the event he has so eloquently supported: the enlargement of NATO.

One of the most consistent themes in Dr. Kissinger's career has been the need for America to remain engaged in Europe. At the end of the Cold War, he opposed calls to

Taking Exception

withdraw from the field of European security, argued that NATO should remain an indispensable instrument of American policy and called for its enlargement—all views with which the Clinton administration agrees.

Yet, without acknowledging the significant achievements of the American-led peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, he now advocates a series of steps that would essentially dismember the effort just when it is showing significant signs of progress, and create a massive new problem between the United States and its European allies. To follow his views to their logical conclusion would result in the failure of our efforts after a substantial investment and a qualified success, for no apparent reason. We can well afford the costs, and there have been no U.S. or NATO fatalities from hostile action in 21 months—an astonishing record and a tribute to the respect in which NATO is held by all parties in Bosnia. In fact, our partnership with our European allies in Bosnia has defined our post-Cold War American security commitment to Europe.

For this reason, every European leader who met with senior American officials in New York during the U.N. General Assembly meeting last week urged the United States not to proceed with a withdrawal from Bosnia in June 1998, and they further stated that if we leave, they will be forced to do the same. This is not simply a request for a few logistics or headquarters troops: The Europeans want continued American military leadership, and a continued commitment of American combat troops, although at a lower level. They are right. If we pull out on an arbitrary deadline—which should not be confused with an “exit strategy”—the situation in Bosnia will become chaotic, eroding the achievements so far. The very scenario that Dr. Kissinger has so long opposed and feared would occur—a Europe adrift without American involvement, and an America, in his words, which “could turn, psychologically as well as geographically, into an island off the shores of Europe.”

A continued U.S.-led military presence in Bosnia can be sustained, and at a progressively lower cost to the United States. But its role is not simply, as Dr. Kissinger suggests,

"to preserve the cease-fire for a reasonable period." Nor is it accurate to state that "NATO patrols only the line between the so-called Federation and the Serb part of Bosnia." The NATO-led forces, including Russians—a historic and unprecedented example of post-Cold War cooperation—are stationed throughout Bosnia and carry out a wide range of functions. Furthermore, the war surely was not "triggered by the West's misconceived attempt to experiment with a multi-ethnic society." If anything, it was the West's failure to take a strong collective stand against the early acts of Serb aggression that allowed the wars of Yugoslavia to spiral out of control.

One can legitimately ask what our long-term goals are, how long we must fulfill such a role and whether it is worth the cost and risk. These important questions have been answered many times by administration spokespeople, including national security adviser Sandy Berger in a major speech last week. Those who advocate partition on the grounds it would get us out faster would, in fact, sanction Serb aggression. An imposed or involuntary partition would not lead to stability. A resumption of fighting would ultimately be more likely, given the fact that,

despite the massive relocation and ethnic cleansing of the recent past, the three ethnic communities still must live and work together in overlapping areas. Most people in the region appear ready to do this: The Dayton arrangements have widespread popular support, according to several public opinion polls. Why surrender, therefore, to the worst elements in Bosnian society, those that preach and practice ethnic hatred, using techniques Goebbels would have admired?

The clash of civilizations can be much overstated, and leads to a historical pessimism that condemns us to become history's prisoners instead of its students. The United States should not sacrifice its dual role as a central part of the European security system and a leading advocate of universal human values. To do so could set off another chain reaction of tragedy in Southeast Europe at a moment when a combination of American leadership and commitment has already ended a war and brought a measure of hope to the troubled region—with no loss of lives and at an acceptable cost.

The writer was the chief designer of the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

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P.02

management skills, mentor programs and

of the larger efforts include grand pro-
po supply computers and other classroom
ent. For years families and businesses have
the receipt-collection offers of both the
and Safeway chains that have resulted in
us contributions of equipment. Safeway
that since 1992, area schools have earned
an $7.3 million in equipment through its
Giant reports that since 1989, it has
more than $47 million in equipment to
an 3,300 schools in a wide region that
Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, New Jer-
ansylvania and the District of Columbia.
gram also invites and helps other busi-
so adopt schools, set up employee or
tape collection boxes and then to match
amounts of their total collections with
of some percentage donated directly to
cls.

or is open for still more proposals from
s to invest in the education of tomorrow's
ers—and job holders. In this endeavor,
sroom in the region is open for business.

Chara

ers next year. The status quo is not
unbearable to either side. But as the
one war and possessor of the territory,
an still values international acceptance
to which he committed much treasure
ge. The Polisario Front needs an ac-
d place in the new scheme of things.
oms caution that much could still go
re, and even after, a referendum is held.
lar danger lies in the dispersed, floating
nature of much of the territory's popula-
process of identifying and registering
or so eligible voters will give each side
to of which might win in the referendum.
sharpsens the crucial question of
e or the other side is willing to accept
weight of the United Nations as an
nd of Mr. Baker personally will affect
A heavy onus will fall on any party that
his long and laboriously constructed
rescue operation, one in which a
American has played a notable part.

Public Works

of bad judgment and maladministra-
tor Mr. Bernardino to take those disci-

philosophy reflects the poor state of
education today. Computers are a tool:
they do not act as a brain. Without
some knowledge of basic facts, how
can one draw valid, reliable conclu-

ed in the Sept. 24 story, ably expresses
some of the beliefs that have been
foisted on teachers and students for
almost 100 years: The mind is "clut-
tered" by "mere" facts; learning tech-

mation on much
ion, which too
and then stoppe-
er that the reac-
stling to the
e instruction in
cates to the you-
ing to think, bu-
substance to thi-

Learning to t
on technique bu
rial that we ne
about our world
means recogniz-
ing the "facts." Stu-
dents to compare thi
other facts and
they acquire a
knowledge about

We have too
with children abo
real knowledge c
to acquire it.

S

An Open-Ended Mission?

WASH POST
10/14/97

Taking exception to my Sept. 22 op-ed article, "Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia," Richard Holbrooke, with characteristic passion, rejected arguments I did not make while ignoring my central thesis ["In Bosnia, Patience," op. Sept. 28]. He makes a good case for maintaining a significant American military presence in Bosnia. I agree with this so long as it is coupled with the development of an exit strategy, on which Mr. Holbrooke is silent.

However, my fundamental con-
cern is less the presence of the
troops than their use. Protecting
the cease-fire is a valid objective.
Using NATO military power to
bring about a multi-ethnic state
where none has ever existed,
against the wishes of the Serb and
Croat populations, is not. Such a
state could come into being only by
the use of American forces in back-
ing one side in a civil war and could

be preserved only by a combination
of repression and ethnic cleansing.
Slogans like "historical pessimism"
do not answer the question of why
America should risk casualties to
abandon the principle of self-
determination when the outcome
could be decided by a supervised
referendum in which each ethnic
group decides its own future.

The Clinton administration and
Mr. Holbrooke deserve much
credit for negotiating an end to
hostilities. They should not press
beyond this by using military force
for nation-building, risking a repe-
tition of Somalia. And they should
abandon the dangerous argument
of equating the future of Bosnia
with the future of NATO—which
strikes me as a reckless example of
mission creep.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
New York

BY CORINNE DUFKA—REUTERS

False Divide in Turkey

Intentionally or otherwise, Kelly
Couturier's article titled "Turkish Gov-
ernment Cracks Down on Religious
Schools" [news story, Sept. 21] regret-
tably uses the issue of educational
reforms as a stepping stone to suggest
a growing polarization in Turkish soci-
ety between true Islamic believers and
secularists. Such a divide, however,
does not exist when the truth is care-
fully reviewed.

Those who oppose the new govern-
ment's recent decision to reform the

the democratic, secular, parliamentary
and pluralist foundation of modern
Turkish society, which guarantees and
safeguards the freedom of religion.

The opposition's use of the "head scarf" as a symbol of its campaign is dangerous because it fails to make the distinction between those believers who wear the head scarf as they so wish as a practice of their religion and those who use it merely as a political statement. The overwhelming majority of the Turkish

The Federalist

I agree in prin
wood's comment
lacking in the Di
19.]. But officials
ently short-sight-
the democracy we

I did not vote for
am I officially re-
gress. However, I
better represents
want this city to b
Barry and his cadre

My family and I
1961 because of the
racy there, but tha
some are leaving D.
and other thinking
expect a safe city
make-work program
government. I belie
the same thing. It
democracy, but it is
Mr. Barry and othe
elected directly off
opportunities and at

I do not know wh
control board and its
turn the city around
Washington's proble
op overnight. While
have forever, it would
to expect board me-
else, to solve in a
problems that were c
years.

I invite Mr. Fullwoc
complain but do not l
to move into the city
majority that will nev
anyone who abuses de
G

Doing It Right

Now that Cooke S
TOTAL P.02

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DICIAIION

002

[c]

Proof of story HEINZ FAX; Requested by MARANO on 10/03/97 at 13:35:17

♦edtext Taking exception to my Sept. 22 op-ed article, "Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia," Richard Holbrooke, with characteristic passion, rejected arguments I did not make while ignoring my central thesis ["In Bosnia, Patience," op-ed, Sept. 28]. He makes a good case for maintaining a significant American military presence in Bosnia. I agree with this so long as it is coupled with the development of an exit strategy, on which Mr. Holbrooke is silent.¶

♦sk,1 However, my fundamental concern is less the presence of the troops than with their use. Protecting the cease-fire is a valid objective. Using NATO military power to bring about a multi-ethnic state where none has ever existed, against the wishes of the Serb and Croat populations, is not. Such a state could come into being only by the use of American forces in backing one side in a civil war and could be preserved only by a combination of repression and ethnic cleansing. Slogans like "historical pessimism" do not answer the question of why America should risk casualties to abandon the principle of self-determination when the outcome could be decided by a supervised referendum in which each ethnic group decides its own future.¶

♦sw ♦sk The Clinton administration and Mr. Holbrooke deserve much credit for negotiating an end to hostilities. They should not press beyond this by using military force for nation-building, risking a repetition of Somalia. And they should abandon the dangerous argument of equating the future of Bosnia with the future of NATO-which strikes me as a reckless example of mission creep.¶

HENRY A. KISSINGER

New York

9

1

2

2029 Century Park East

Suite 1400

Los Angeles, CA 90067

Telephone 310.286.2WWC

Telefax 310.284.7843

August 1, 1997

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

AUG 1 1 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

In 1994, the United States "made soccer history" by staging the greatest World Cup of the century. The event's success was due in large part to the assistance, leadership and support of our world-class Board of Directors. We are very appreciative of your participation on that Board, and again, thank you for your efforts.

In 1999, the Women's World Cup will be hosted by the United States. Our primary objective is to elevate women's sports events to a new level. We will build on the groundwork laid by the success of women's sports at the 1996 Olympics (including a Gold Medal by the U.S. Women's Soccer Team) and the recent launch of the WNBA.

We are committed to staging a first-class event in large stadiums in major markets, with network coverage and blue-chip corporate sponsors (Budweiser, Coca-Cola, General Motors, MasterCard, McDonalds, to name a few).

Our vision is ambitious, and we face significant challenges. Fortunately, we have the play book from the 1994 World Cup, and we have assembled many of the same executives responsible for the success of the 1994 World Cup and the launch of Major League Soccer. The final ingredient is a world-class Advisory Board to provide us with credibility and visibility with the media, sponsors and the public.

Because of your great work on behalf of the 1994 World Cup, it is with great pleasure that we extend an invitation to you to join the Advisory Board of the 1999 Women's World Cup. I will call you shortly to discuss this further.

Warm regards,

Alan Rothenberg
Chairman
1999 Women's World Cup

NEW COURT
ST. SWITHIN'S LANE
LONDON EC4P 4DU

17 February 1997

FEB 19 1997

I thought you would be interested to have a copy of
the enclosed report on the Pros and Cons of EMU, published
on 17 February 1997 by the Economist Intelligence Unit. I
am taking the liberty of sending it to you, because I
believe it offers the clearest and most dispassionate
analysis yet published on the difficult issues to which the
EMU project gives rise.

You will see from the cover that a number of us in the
City have sponsored the report. The reason for this is not
that we all share a point of view that we seek to prove.
Far from it: our views on EMU cover the whole spectrum.
But we all agree on one point - that far too little had
been done to shed light on the underlying issues in ways
that the general public could understand. We therefore
approached EIU last year and quickly won their agreement to
edit and publish a really impartial report designed to
inform, but not persuade. The agreed aim was to
disentangle the elements in the debate in such a way as to
allow readers to make up their own minds. It was not to
sit on the fence, but to set out clearly and fairly the
basis of the complex arguments involved.

As with any project of this kind, we ran into some
unexpected problems which are explained in the Preface.
But I believe we succeeded in overcoming them. My own
view, and that of all the sponsors, is that the author,

Telephone 0171-280 5000 Fax 0171-220 7108 Telex 888031