Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC U

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
9:27 a.m. 7/18/71

P: After we have been on the plane about an hour I will get
together with you and Rogers to go over the game plan for
tomorrows meeting particularly with the bipartisan leaders and
Mansfield.

K: I have sent you suggested talking points.

ß: I have those. I have some other questions which may come
We will have to be prepared for them. We have to answer about
bipartisan leaders what consultations we will have. It might
come up but it probably will. We will have to finesse some of
those. If we can find just enough to tell each group. With
your meeting of conservatives at night and the Republicans the
next day is to tell them enough to give them a nudge but not
whole thing.

K: Did you see the Frankel article yesterday? He made the
point about secrecy. Good to see the Government could keep
secrets. What gail! Ecstatic about you.

P: The morning papers played the pictures.

K: But also a lot of articles.

P: Pictures make the story. It's an enormous story because
of the excitement of it.

K: Now they are speculating you will go to Hanoi.

P: I saw that.

K: And you have offered to meet with leaders of North Vietnam

P: They are trying to speculate so they won't get off base
again.

K: The delegation is peaceniks over there. I will get a cable
Bruce.

P: Cooke talking about an offer of 31st.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

2/18/71 10:10 a.m.

K: Say this was not made as a formal proposal and we do not believe that it will be. This is right. We have information that it won't.

Z: Okay, now, give me a morning charge on Cuba. Refer to the Preside and . . .

K: Just don't go beyond it. Say the Soviets are & clear about the understanding and this is all we need to say about it. There's no sense in repeating it all constantly. W Say we expect them to live up to it.

Z: Okay.

K: But I wouldn't say it unless . . .

Z: They are pressing.

By KCLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

4:00 p.m., July 19, 1971

K: You called?

Z: Did Al discuss that AFP thing with you?

K: Let's under no circumstances comment on that. Tell all the departments to shut up.

Z: They haven't said anything yet, have they? We will flat "no comment."

K: We will get a lot of this. There is no news in this. They have always said this. They won't put into the press what they said to me. Under no circumstances let us comment. And will you make sure no department comments?

Z: No problem at all. No comment.

By KM U NARA, Date 5/12/04

TelCon-4:30 - 7/19/71

Mr. Kissinger/Mc. George Bundy

B: Henry since I left the White House I am jealous. It is just fabulous.

K: That is nice.

B: Just tell the President that it was just a great show. You must have an enormous problem though talking to the papers. . . Re Chou En l

K: He is the most fascinating person I have talked to. I talked to him for about 20 hours with no notes. He is really quite funny with a sense of humour. While he is ideologically motivated, he is not indoctrinated on details.

B: He is more free to make his own moves. It was a great performance and just beautifully carried out. I hope you didn't have to pay too much of a price in Islamabad.

K: No, none at all. I really don't think that Yahya has had as much fun since the massacre. He just lacks imagination.

B: Yes, he is a dumb guy.

K: There were no conditions literally put by them.

B: It was probably great fun for them. I remember when (something at President's Johnson's trip to Europe - couldn't hear)

K: He had a great time.

B: Well, Henry I won't take up anymore of your time.

K: It was very generous of you to call me. When you come back into town do call. I would love to have lunch or dinner with you.

B: It was a great job.

K: Thank you.

By KM U

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. - 7/19/71

R: Oh, Henry, how are you?

K: Good, how are you?

R: I think you are all enjoying the report of my conversation with the Chinese Ambassador. Did you see the report of the French?

K: Yes, I think we should just no comment it. First of all, it isn't true.

R: I don't know if we can no comment it or not.

K: If we start commenting we will get started into a whole going back and forth. I think we should just be quiet. What is to be gained by commenting?

R: We don't gain much. It's just a question of how much we lose. If it is not taken seriously, we can label it a false report, but you saw it in your retreat from Indochina.

K: It's dangerous. You know he made each of these ______ at some time but you have seen what he said.

R: I haven't seen the last one. I saw the one but it didn't really contain much on the substance of the talks on other matters.

K: Well he did talk about Japanese militarism, but he made none of this as any condition and you just said that these are, but I don't think we should start commenting on it.

R: Well, I think you're right now. In all of my discussions you will see that I said we couldn't win on the substance of what you said. It was for the purpose of cutting away the brush; that it largely was a re-statement of our positions.

K: Right, that's it exactly.

R: There wasn't any attempt to reconcile the policies or differences. That was something the President had to do. The real problem is going to be with the Japanese. They have a considerable one. Their Ambassador made a very good statement. In the end it was quite emotional. They just pointed out that the Asian outlook was quite different from ours and that the Japanese were concerned about their position in the world. They

By: KMLN

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

supported the effort, but it was a traumatic experience for them. They relied on us to such an extent that they are concerned. It was a tough thing for them.

K: Yes, it was rough on them.

R: I just finished with the Australian Ambassador. I think that is in pretty good condition. I think the meeting went well with the Leadership today.

K: Did you see Mansfield today?

R: I had that postponed to Wednesday.

K: I saw Dobrynin today. He said it meant that we weren't willing to meet with their leaders. I will send you that report.

R: Well, so far so good. We will see.

K: I don't doubt now that each side has to keep covering up. Did you see the report from Vientiane accusing the Chinese of chauvinism saying never send your children to Chinese schools?

R: I will say, we got everyone mixed up. Well, I am going to see the South Koreans tomorrow.

K: Well, I think it certainly seems to have turned the mood around. McGeorge Bundy who never says anything good about us called and said how excited he was. So did David Rockefeller.

R: Good, well, I'll be talking to you.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/94

TelCon-5:47 - 7/19/71

Mr. Kissinger/Mary McGrory

M: Henry welcome back. I wish I could say it in Chinese.

K: I wouldn't be able to understand you.

M: I will have to invite you to dinner. I had dinner with the Hands(?) ar we thought we should invite you to dinner but I went to the briefing and we were told we were told not to speculate.

K: Who told you not to speculate.

M: Ron said we were not to speculate - it is not hopeful.

K: Well we told him not to speculate.

M: What excitement. It is just glorious.

K: What is moving to me besides the significance of it is that it has moved so many people. In search of hope it proves we are still an optimistic people.

M: Re Strom Thurmond who is such a strong hawk. He said if it is going to get us out of Vietnam, OK. The right wing has really been quite astonished told Ron Ziegler I was so happy for 48 hours but not any more.

K: No we really don't want to speculate. We don't want to get people into detracting - we would just freeze everything and not be able to get going.

M: I was saying this morning everything is just great.

M: I think we should have you for dinner before rather than after the trip. The stakes will be too high. I will look through the cook books.

K: Try something Central European.

M: Yesterday we bombed again. That throws me off. If we are going to have peace let's start right away.

K: I haven't seen the papers. I will look into it.

M: We will start working on the guest list. Invitations will be forthcoming. I was going to write you a note, but I figured it would never get to you.

K: No it would have, but this is even better. Glad you called.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
7/19/71; 7:05 p.m.

K: I talked to the President on this matter and our view is this: we would be glad to consider a meeting after we have been at the first place but to announce it before we have been there but after the date has been definitely fixed. First fix date with Peking then we can fix a tentative one with you and as soon as the other one is set, within a few weeks we will be glad to announce a date with you. I think April would be a realistic date.

D: Realistically speaking April or May -- just in a way of thinking as of now.

K: What I think we should do, if this is okay with you, is for us to fix a date for planning purposes which is realistical then we move up the date with the other side a little bit -- earlier than we would on a more leisurely schedule. As soon as that date is set we would announce it with you.

D: Just for a way of thinking -- April?

K: Right.

D: Just to give them a perspective. Okay, I think that is clear now.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOLASSER
By CNARA Date 6/2/71

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: What I think we should do, if this is okay with you, is for us to fix a date for planning purposes which is realistic then we move up the date with the other side a little bit -- earlier than we would on a more leisurely schedule. As soon as that date is set we would announce it with you.

K: Right.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
7/19/71; 9:20 p.m.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

P: I thought you were all finished. . .

K: I was in the mess eating, actually. The reaction was very, very good. Very warm. Wilson is just delighted -- Noyes (Sp. ?) was also delighted. I made most of the points that were in that memo. The reaction is just so different, Mr. President. All of the questions were trying to make us look good. Phil Potter gave me a problem -- but was very mild. He thinks we are selling out Vietnam.

P: He must know better than that!

K: No, he is okay. That fellow from the Chicago Tribune -- everybody was enthusiastic.

P: How long did you spend with them?

K: Until ten to 9:00.

P: How many were there?

K: About 15-20.

P: Wilson was good?

K: Very strong, very enthusiastic.

P: Good, he is the important one.

K: Haig was there and I wanted to make sure my judgment was correct. I can't even say I sold them -- they were sold when I walked in. Howard K. Smith was beside himself -- tremendous move. Stressed the fact that the whole country is looking up. They think this has changed the mood of the country.

P: That's good.

K: At the end I made a little speech -- please don't overwrite this -- we are trying to nurse it.

P: That's good. You got across the point that we can't say much. One of the things I noted -- I hope you got it across -- there is a legislative leaders thing in the morning, are you going -- the point that I make is: there is some talk to the effect that this is just like Eisenhower going to Geneva.

By KM W NARA, Dato. S/12/04

-2-

K: I hit that hard!

P: This is an altogether different game. This is not a goodwill trip.

K: That's what I hit very hard. When Eisenhower went there were two
preceding summits. This one is produced by reality -- both sides have
necessities that can be settled only at the highest level by direct talk.
They ate that up. I will be willing to bet anything that you will get only
favorable comments from these fellows. Sidey is almost beside himself
with pleasure. I gave them a bit of the earlier background and some
philosophy. Sa id is this going to settle the Vietnam war? I said look -- a
none of you will remember what Mme Binh said. What the President is
concerned about is to build a more permanent peace and for that we need
Mainland China, etc. That concerns the President -- we are not dealing
with little issues. They were all nodding yes. If I would have called
the seven points a little issue a week ago, they would have killed us.

P: That's good.

K: Just as this Lincoln Sitting Room has played very well, I think this
will also begin playing that way.

P: I think that a very good point. Two men without notes, two men who
have grace but who are tough as hell. They like that kind of buildup. Like
a sports contest. You have done a good day's work. Tomorrow you take
on the conservative leaders. Republican leaders we should treat then
just like the other leaders. These people ought to be coming in saying
don't tell us too much -- they ought to be happy. If Dominic pops up, I
will let Ford give him the answer. It is ridiculous for them to raise . . .

K: Klein made a survey of conservative publishers. Loeb was against
us. Knowland is for us. McKnight is for us. He sent you a memo which
I have a copy of.

P: I knew Loeb would be against us. The main point is now to have it
ride -- which I think we are now accomplishing.

K: They were all for us. I think we ought to let it ride now.

P: I couldn't agree more. I am not going to say a word. Some of these
senators will want to come in and talk. Percy will call and want a briefing.
Don't you give him a briefing!

By KM V NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Haldeman

7/20/71 11:22 a.m.

K: I had a call which I haven't taken yet, but they left a message from Sidey wanting to do a human interest story on the Nixon/Rogers/Kissinger planning sessions in the Lincoln sitting room. I think this is going too far.

H: Yes, you can only lie so far.

K: I think we should say Rogers knew about dt, but the planning was done by the President with me doing the staff work. We should put the focus on the President, don't you think, and to whatever extent necessary on me.

H: Yes. You don't have to give him a story on anything.

K: No, but he is going to write it anyway.

H: But say the sessions in the Lincoln sitting room were with the President alone, and he called you up to go over special areas. They were his evening work, not formal sessions with the Secretary.

K: We can't invent history. The guy didn't know anything. So far I've built him up.

H: But you shouldn't build him up any more, and you can't say he was in these Lincoln sitting room sessions. They start asking for dates and hours and you are going to have a real problem.

K: There were some between the President and me there, when the messages first came.

H: When you came in with your hands trembling.

K: I?!

H: Yes, the first message; he told me all about it.

K: Oh yes, and he was cool as a cucumber.

H: I said a little to keep him quiet, but I don't think I secured anything. What you are going to do is say you are worried; they he'll play it to me that you are worried, and I'll say I think you should be because this means they are escalating.

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04", "TELECON", "Joe Sisco", "7/20/71 11:30 a.m.", "K: Of what accomplished fact are you trying to inform me?", "S: I'm seeking your advice.", "K: That means you are in trouble.", "S: No, I'm not this time. Henry, my impression from that meeting the other day -- I wanted to see if yours is the same -- is that I intend to come back with a sympathetic positive recommendation because I feel that the situation requires it obviously on the basis of timing of our choosing and whenever the President can make it.", "K: The President is ready.", "S: That's the impression I got from him.", "K: It doesn't make any sense. We are squeezing them now.", "S: It makes sense because if you announce a decision now . . .", "K: No, but if we had kept the pipeline open without putting a terminal date on it . . .", "S: We couldn't do that in terms of how the Israelis handled the situation last February, March and April. But I wanted to make sure my judgment was correct.", "K: That is correct.", "S: And the next stage in all of this will be made in September. And we would hope by then to be able to give the Israelis a secret commitment doing XY Z fin terms of __________.", "K: If they withdraw.", "S: Even short of their withdrawing. Whereas the Israeli position is impossible, and unjustified insofar as ideas on an interim settlement, their ideas are as reasonable as anything from Cairo. Both sides are going to have to __________ in order to make an agreement. Again, congratulations Her. . . . . . . . . . .

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/13/04

TEEECON

7/20/71

Sisco 11:30 a.m. p. 2

K: I am assuming that if they were not in too extreme they wouldn't want the meeting. They took more of the initiative than we.

S: Is that right. Well, a common interest is there. You are taking risks if you do, or if you don't do something.

K: I will say this Joe, you and I have not taken risks by not doing anything

TELCONE

Hugh Sidey/Kissinger

12:00 Noon - 7/20/71

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

S: Good evening last night.

K: Was it?

S: It went well. I don't know how you managed to do it.

K: I tell you I just want to shut up now.

S: The reason I called is we have got to get high-powered people like
Edgar Snow and those who write for Life and so forth . . .
What I am writing . . .

K: Could I make a point here which is ungracious, but when the President
mentioned. In that Lincoln Room there were only two people.

S: That is fine. You mean yourself and Nixon.

K: Right. I don't give a damn about my part but he is very sensitive
about this.

S: I understand, but I just wondered if you had some thoughts of how
this fit together with Rogers handling the diplomatic end and you
handling the manning of it and putting the thing together. I gather
it was done quite beautifully. There wasn't a hitch?

K: No, it all worked well. Would you like to come in?

S: I would, yes.

K: Why don't you come in about 3:30 this afternoon.

S: All right. I'll see you then.

By KCLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TelCon: 1:10-7/20/71

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

R: Hello Henry. I thought there was one thing I would mention to you before I forgot it. That is the UK has given me their com-munique they are working out with the PRC. I won't give you the details now just what it is they are going to do - they are going to remove their representation from Taiwan - break it officially and have full representation with PRC . . . . against Taiwan membership no matter what we do.

K: No matter what we do. I haven't seen your conversation with Chien (? spelling) yet.

R: You should read it.

K: Was it sent over here? Maybe it was in a regular telegram.

R: The erosion was so fast. Read it and then we will talk about it.

K: OK.

R: It is important that we be coordinated now. I had a meeting with the top people in the Department and ~~had~~ down the law - no speculation whatsoever.

K: We ought to stop briefing the Congress now. It was a long meeting yesterday. The questions keep coming and it is unbelievable. ] is just terrible.

R: The President shouldn't do that. He shouldn't have these meetings.

K: He is not in a position to have to apologize. You can't tell them something and tell them not to speculate.

R: That is right. If they don't do it right away, they might do it next week.

K: We are doing absolutely nothing.

R: There are two things I would like to do and one is to read the MemCons.

K: I don't know why you haven't seen them. They were sent to you. They are ready.

R: Also, the book.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

R: And the input.

K: The input, from where?

R: From the State Department if you want it.

K: On this subject I will ask you only.

R: What I am going to try to do is to protect this and have it sent to you or the President directly.

K: I will ask you personally how you get it and not ask anyone else instead of going thru Eliot.

R: We have got to turn the President off on these discussions. anytime

K: I just die/everything one of these meetings happen. Like with the arms control if we tell them what we are doing with the Russians they will just go up the wall.

R: That's right.

K: I will send the MemCons and the book to you. The book is just brief talking points and it may have been taken apart but I will get it over to you.

R: I think you will see in my reporting telegrams they coincide with the game plan.

By KML

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON

Dave Packard

7/20/71 2:05 p.m.

P: I have a very important subject to take up with you. Are you going to be able to get away for the Grove?

K: This weekend definitely no. Let me see about next. I loved it out there last time.

P: But Mosbacher is coming the following weekend and you could come with him, or if not, we can make arrangements to get you there.

K: Are you going to be there?

P: Yes, both weekends. I will have the arrangements set up so you can come any time you wish, and you don't have to det me know in advance.

K: You'll stay at the Grove?

P: No, I'll go to my home in Los Angeles between weekends. But all you need to do is let my office know. You can fly to Hamilton field and get a car to take you up. I'm coming back on Monday and you can come with me. I'll have everything set up and my office will advise me if you just let them know if you want to come up.

K: Aren't you nice. That would be great. Thank you very much.

By KCLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TelCon:5:40 p.m. -7/20/71

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

L: Hello Henry. How are you. I thought I ought to give you a feel on my meeting with Stennis this afternoon. We met for two hours this afternoon regarding the draft legislation with regard to the Mansfield proposal and the 50,000 deduction that he believes is necessary on the Army - 2 on the ABM and 3 on Laos. He believe Mansfield is not softened up and feels Mansfield will compromise but Stennis feels that something has to come from this or we won't get anything on the draft. On the 50,000 reduction in the Army - I had the Army brief the committee today on that. Stennis has taken our budget . . . 14,000 withdrawal and protracting that through saying we aren't going to decrease that rate and the 150,00 you have in the budget is over stated in the ways of bullets and we should have cut you 100,000 instead of 50,000.

K: If these guys want to sell out the country when we are trying to save it let them do it.

L: I am not trying to get the President involved, but the situation is that Stennis is not a fighter like Dick Russell.

K: Should I call him?

L: You will have to give us some help on it.

K: I will certainly call him. When you tell me to call him, I will do it.

L: Yes, you should call him by Thursday of this week.

K: The President wanted an announcement to support his policies. Can he get that?

L: I think he can get something that expresses the national policy of the country without have a date in it.

K: Well let me talk to MacGregor tomorrow and I will call you in the morning.

L: I am going to have to appear on Thursday on Laos. I want to tell you what happened on the ABM and Laos.

K: I am sorry - I have to leave right now, but I promise to call you tomorrow.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Joe Kraft

7/20/71 11:15 a.m.

HK: I just found out you called last week.

K: You must have been very busy. I wanted to talk a little. Do we have some time to talk.

HK: Sure, not this minute, but this week some time. We might have
breakfast one morning.

K: That would be good for me.

HK: How about Thursday?

K: That's fine.

HK: You want to ask me?

K: Polly has gone . . . but . . . We have bought a house in
Do you want to be our first guest there?

HK: In principle, yes. How about Thursday morning at 8:00 at the
Metropolitan Club?

K: Wonderful.

HK: Good, see you then. I thought what you write today was very sensible. And reflected our view. It's nuts to play them off against each other. It's going to be tough, but we would like to have good relations with both, and have a three-cornered thing. We'll work at it and just for your information I had a talk with Dobrynin on this. At SALT yesterday I got a report back from Smit that there was no change in atmosphere.

K: I'm delighted to hear that. I take it because Dick was there with you then did some North Vietnam business.

HK: I don't want to comment on the substance.

K: Okay, see you Thursday.

By KM U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Ron Ziegler

7/20/71 11:15 a.m.

Z: Don't tell me just to shut up Henry.

K: What is it?

Z: I need guidance. There's word that the President sent a letter to the Chinese promising to honor commitments . . . I will be asked about that. It seems to me I should say the President made it clear in his announcement . . .

K: Just say, yes the letter is correct.

Z: If you want me to.

K: Actually it was an oral message I thought.

K

K: I'll just say it's correct

K: Just say such a message was sent by the President. We shouldn't even have done that.

Z: Why not?

K: It will trigger Peking into yelling at us.

Z: They're not moving heavily on it.

K: Just say the message was reported is correct, and speaks for itself.

Z: And you don't want me to refer to the speech?

K: No.

Z: That might dampen it.

K: No, these guys will just go on and on.

Z: Not with me. I'll cut it off.

K: I think the lowest key thing you can say is yes, the message is correct.

Z: I'll say the President made it clear in his speech that we would honor our old commitments; yes, the message is correct.

TelCon-11:40-7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/William Atwood

A: Henry, hello.

K: How are you Bill?

A: I have been reading about you in the papers. I just got back from China myself. I am calling because I will be in Washington on Tuesday. Had a meeting with Chou En Lai (?) and had some long talks with Sihanouk that I didn't write about. Thought it would be too embarrassing to some people and to you and would love to share my info with you. If you have a minute at any time on Tuesday I think it would be useful.

K: What time are you coming in?

A: On Tuesday morning. I plan to stay over that evening and could stay longer if I had to.

K: God damn it I can't find my schedule. Why don't we set it up tentatively for 4:00 o'clock on Tuesday.

A: Fine, I will call your office.

K: Good, we can then confirm the time.

TelCon-1:10-7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/Congressman Gerald Ford

F: Hello Henry.

K: Hello Jerry. I was just talking to the President. He was talking to me about the Ford Mack truck deal. We are looking at it and are trying to be sympathetic but it hasn't yet been approved.

F: When will it be?

K: I will tell you this. We need to keep the Russians in line during this phase. We will approve parts of it as soon as we can. If we would just get our industrial companies to stop pressuring us.

F: Will it be approved in a reasonable period of time?

K: Yes, in time when it will be helpful, but don't tell them that.

F: From our point of view, one of the companies who has $150 million in machine tools - it is not in my district - but we are being pushed because it means 200 or more workers being guaranteed two or more years of work.

K: But we are using this with respect to Peking. . . . They may draw back on SALT and political problems.

F: I understand your problem.

K: I understand your problem. We are being very sympathetic but the chances are much better if we are not pressured.

F: I haven't said anything to the papers, but I did send the President a note.

K: That is all right. The President wanted me to call you.

F: All right. Just keep me abreast.

K: I will keep you informed of everything I do.

F: The reaction I get to your trip and the President's forthcoming trip is just excellent. It is marvelous. Only John Smith and Russell(?) were the only ones who do not seem to approve but then they were both with the John Birch Society.

TelCon-3:05 - 7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/ Secretary Laird

(Got on a little late)

L: We finished two parts of it. We talked about the Mansfield approach that the President made and the Mansfield approach that Stennis made. His announcement, you know what it is based on.

K: You explained it to me.

L: It is based on the more rapid withdrawal. . . we are below the budget he doesn't believe we will be below the 150,000. . . We wanted to use those supports - we wanted to build up our in-country strength.

K: I understand that. First I understand that according to our strategic plan our cut should be only 23,000.

L: I told him 23,000 to 26,000.

K: Right, that is what we could live with but you are holding out on that.

L: What he does before the Army Committee- We do not have 10,000 places in Europe at the start of the year. . . We have always been around 302 to 306. So he takes the 10,000 and uses that as part of his cut. . . He agrees that we have already announced withdrawal rate of 14,200. . . he just multiplies that used from December through June and comes out with about 70,000 places that we have. . . He just simply will not yield.

K: On Laos, I talked to Alexis and you are to appear together.

L: Good, with Ambassador Godley.

K: We have no ceiling but $400 million is the lowest we can live with.

L: . . . Stennis and the Foreign Relations Committee have all the material on the figures. I have to tell him what the service funding is $284,000. They can take the figure of $325 million and they can determine by subtracting the service funding what the CIA funding amount is. In the closed hearing I have to be forthcoming with that figure because they could figure it out anyway. We need $150 million to cover the bombing so we come up with a figure say of $500 million.

K: You will let me know when I have to call Stennis.

- 2 -

L: Also, I have to testify on the Humphrey amendment which is ABM. With regard to SALT we should limit the funding to two sites.

K: I would be opposed to both of them.

L: I will be also. I am in favor of the 12 sites program until we have an agreement.

K: Exactly. Should we have breakfast just to catch up with each other. I have nothing in particular to discuss. Just to catch up.

L: Let's try to do it Monday or Tuesday of next week. No, I can't do it Monday, have to testify.

K: What about Wednesday for breakfast?

L: OK. Good. I will have my girl call your girl.

K: Fine. I read your trip report and it sounded very interesting.

L: Kraft and Marcy(?) have apologize.

K: Look I know your views and I know you wouldn't do that.

TelCon: 3:30-7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/Henry Brandon

K: Hello.

B: How are you?

K: OK.

B: You must be more than OK. You must be on top of the world.

K: No, because I know what could happen.

B: I was wondering about having a little chat with you before Sunday.

K: Why before Sunday?

B: In case one wants to write about China and the whole picture.

K: I am extremely busy as you can imagine. I will try to find some time
before the end of the week.

B: OK. But Henry - history has been made.

K: Not if everything goes to pieces.

B: Don't be so pessimistic.

K: I am not trying to be but I don't want to raise . . . my own judgement
is that the Chinese have made a major decision and have made a
major price. . . I think that part will go well, if it doesn't I won't
agree to it.

B: What are you worried about?

K: Nothing. We have to put other pieces into place.

B: I don't know what you think, but I think the Russians will be only
more interested.

K: I believe this.

B: I disagree with the Joe Kraft and the others.

K: I think this will improve our relations. I just don't want you to think
we are cocky with assurance.

- 2 -

K: It was good to see you the other day.

B: We called you at the restaurant.

K: What time?

B: at about 10 o'clock.

K: We were still there.

B: Well in my discretion, I didn't ask for you in your name. We phoned
after we got out of the theater.

K: Look, even if I don't see you, may I bring Nancy to your swimming pool on Saturday around 11 o'clock or so.

B: What about lunch?

K: I will check with Nancy and let you know tomorrow.

TelCon: 3:34-7/21/71

R: How are you. I read those memcons and sent them back to you.
I tried to get Fulbright. They are in Executive Session.

K: I think they are irresponsible.

R: I don't think they realize the significance of it. At the time it was
being considered by the Committeeewe sent up a letter saying that
the Gulf of Tonkin made no difference -- and their position is that
this was one of the things left over and it was just a routine thing.
They thought it was just old business. I asked Marcey if we could
get a reconsideration. He said it was better to talk to Mansfield.

K: Exactly.

R: There is no point in making a big fuss about it.

K: I think that is right.

R: We will tell the Foreign Relations Comittee.

K: We all agree on some XXXX guidance that says just exactly what
you just pointed out. On another matter, I talked to Peterson on
the General Trade Preference and something has to be submitted.

R: Our Latin Americans nations are really getting sour as hell. It
is on the tickers that we can't talk about anything.

K: sThey will have us in the position that if there is any leaking, it
can only come out from here.

R: I think on the whole it is going as well as it can go. When the
President is ready to see us about the representation issue, let
us know.

K: Let's try to do it tomorrow or Friday.

R: I sent the new amendment up to Stennis, tomorrow. Don't think
he will buy it but lets try it.

TelCon-5:15-7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Javitts

J: You remember I asked you about Hess.

K: Yes and I got word to you.

J: Collins(?) got hold of me. I can't approve him. Said he will send his name up if I will approve him. I told him no, not on my approval. You have to have White House approval before it is sent up here for our approval. Something is going on there. I haven't given them any approval.

K: No, I understand you want someone with stature.

J: Someone like Dickey or Goheen(?)

K: Good, is very good, both of them.

J: Dickey was good at Dartmouth . . . .

K: I understand - you want a man with stature. Dickey was very good but I don't think his name is coming up. Let's have lunch sometime next week.

J: You just tell you people to arrange it when you can.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01287
By LARA Date Elstol

TelCon:4:15-7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin (Sorry - I just could not hear Ambassador Dobrynin)

K: Hello Anatoliv, how are you. Anatoliv I was going to give you an answer about Cabinet members(?). We don't feel that this is the best time because what we want to handle is better handled by Peterson so if you could avoid proposing it it would save some difficulties.

D: I won't have difficulties . . . .

K: Let me tell you what we have on our mind. Dave Rockefeller talked to your Prime Minister but we don't know if you have seen the report.

D: No not yet . . . .

K: I would like to propose the following and have discussed it at some great length with the President. After you find out what your Prime Minister has in mind you should then talk to Peterson . . . but our primary reaction to the report of Dave Rockefeller was quite positive but we want to find out just exactly what your Prime Minister said.

D: . . .

K: What your Prime Minister said to Dave Rockefeller . . . if we want to explore it. That is what Dave Rockefeller understood but it didn't make any sense to me.

D: . . .

K: I tell you the thing seems so confused.

D: I will be very honest with you . . . . While . . . . I don't raise this question. I don't ask them to invite me. . . . but I am sure my people at home thought the same way.

K: In the Commerce Department.

D: . . .

K: That is the only reason why I hesitated on Monday. As I told you on Monday we are quite prepared to proceed and accelerate on a number of issues with you.

D: What is your proposal.

K: My proposal is if you are really interested in discussing it with Peterson.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folio 54
By: CNAR Date 9-1-61

D: It was up to the Prime Minister.

K: Not the problem with Stans, but what it was what he was proposing to Dave Rockefeller.

D: Just to make it more specific

K: But if you could explain it to me what your Prime Minister proposed to him we could authorize Peterson to discuss it with him.

D: ... now in connection with the Prime Minister speaking to Rockefeller ... that it is better for him to talk to Peterson on this project.

K: Yes, that is exactly our view and we will authorize Peterson as soon as we have your viewing to start talking to you about it. What we would really like to work out with you is some comprehensive package with you and then Peterson should go.

D: ...

K: Exactly, and you will let me know about the ______ part of the river project. ... I can tell you informally we are practically ready to approve it. Let's get that other business settled and then we will know where we stand. We will then be in touch with each other. We are planning a great tour for you on the West Coast.

D: When are you going out there?

K: In the middle of August.

TelCon:5:05-7/21/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Mr. Ehrlichman

K: I returned your call. You wanted to see me.

E: It is about a story in the Washington Daily News to the effect that the Secret Service will have 100 men accompanying the President. But the burden of this is on the communications people who do this and they should be called.

K: Should I do it?

E: Absolutely and get the word out they should shut their mouths.
***

K: They should just have the absolute minimum.

E: They can't have a 100 guys walking along beside him. If I could have just about five minutes of your time on Friday.

K: I will be here until Sunday.

E: Well you won't be here on Monday, let's do it sometime on Tuesday.

(had to get off the phone in the middle of the conversation) ***

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
7/21/71; 7:30 p.m.

L: Something came up that I think you should be aware of -- we are going up on ABM again tomorrow. Evidently there is a report that has been sent to you by the Under Secretaries Group recommending against the Cannekin tests.

K: I don't give a damn what they recommend.

L: We stood firm and got votes on the Senate floor -- carried by 20 on two role counts to go ahead with the tests. They have a bunch of smart, young guys . . .

K: I know, I know! It will not be approved! Just relax.

L: I wanted to make sure. I just have to take a strong line on this. Regardless of how many safeguard sites you have, you have to have this.

K: There is no question about that. You are going to hang tough on Laos? We are counting on it. Some people are saying you are putting out so many figures . . .

L: I didn't put that out! You know when that was first put out! Bill had a press conference and he was pinned down. I haven't put out any figures but I have to testify to them now that they are in the public arena. I am not for a ceiling.

K: I just don't see what the point of it is now in this phase.

L: I don't know what people are talking about -- I have not put any figures out. Every figure out has been put in the public record or put out by Dick Helms.

K: I would never have repeated that but . . .

fingers

L: I don't go for this bullshit of people pointing fingers at me. This bullshit gripes me a little bit.

K: You have been the guy to stand on the firing line for the Administration. You have taken all the tough ones.

L: Now if they are going to throw up this tomorrow about ABM . . .

K: If we have Safeguard, we have to have that weapon. We will not approve that here!

TelCon-10:20-7/22/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Secretary Rogers

R: Hello Henry. I want to talk to Mansfield today, nothing specific just in general principle. Stennis agrees that is the way we should do it today, but we should work it out this week or the week after. I have a few minor changes in the proposal. Do you have a copy in front of you?

K: No, can I get it and call you back.

R: No, not necessary. I would like to change their point one to number three.

K: I have it here now.

R: Good. They will say though why did we do that.

K: If we have the cease fire in the top paragraph I don't care about the others.

R: I agree with you about the order, if we get the first paragraph where we want it. Stennis wants the date of withdrawal to coincide somewhat with the Mansfield amendment.

K: I tell you I haven't look at it carefully. That again makes it contingent only on American prisoners. Oh, you would make it number two and not number one. That is OK. If you don't make it number one then I don't mind.

R: No I plan to make it number 2. . . I put the words in there under international supervision. I don't care though if they are left in or not.

K: But that would help.

R: Well, I'll try to put them in. I will have this preliminary discussion with Mansfield today.

K: I have this book already but do you mind if I give it to you with some of my hand-written notes on it.

R: No, not at all.

K: It will give you a feel.

- 2 -

R: Your MemCons were primarily what he said and your book would give me a feel of what you said.

K: Good, if I don't have to retype the pages, you will have it by the end of the day.

R: I think things are going pretty well.

K: I think so. Your talks with the Ambassadors seem to be going pretty well.

R: Next week we have got to say something as soon as the Chinese come back.

K: Yes, definitely. I will talk to Chapin tomorrow night.

R: The reason we want to vote for the Chinese representation . . . they have more opportunity for universality. I don't think it will fly because it brings in other problems.

K: If you can put universality in a good pragmatic way.

R: The question is whether will we really support the PRC in the Security Council.

K: May be it would be more graceful to leave it up in the air.

R: Yes, OK.

K: I will get back to you tomorrow.

TELECON
Secretary Irwin
7/23/71 8:40 a.m.

I: I was going to talk to you about something this afternoon, and I still want to, but I am in New York and learned something last night that I thought I ought to speak to you about this morning. On the Padina(?) there are 400 - 600 parachutes. These apparently should have been listed under munitions license, but they were not. They were put on this ship under a commercial license. I don't know exactly why. But I understand that if items on a ship which should be licensed under munitions list but were not, the normal procedure is for the customs people to take them off. The ship docks for the last time in Houston tomorrow. Now, should we take them off or leave them on? The Kennedy subcommittee on refugees knows they are on there . . .

K: The way things work we might as well publish everything in the papers. The whole SALT position is there this morning.

I: I didn't see that. The question is how this affects the Gallagher amendment for halting aid to Pakistan. I was going to mention this to you this afternoon, but I thought since the ship docks the last time tomorrow . . .

K: I want to talk to the President about this, but I would be amazed if he countenanced taking them off.

I: Sisco thinks this could be done quietly. We could talk to the Pakistani Ambassador today and explain it. I will see that some material is being sent over to you this morning giving you more background and will talk with you this afternoon.

K: Okay, and I will talk to the President.

I: But wait till you've gotten the background memo.

K: But could we keep it from bouncing around the whole department?

I: It already has somewhat.

K: So the news story will be the White House vetoed it?

I: It could be. What happened was we sent a memo to San Clemente, but I gather in all the excitement he didn't bring it up.

K: It couldn't have just been buried?

I: I could have been, but there was some reference to it in the subcommittee on refugees.

TELCON
Geo. Ball/Kissinger

11:55 a.m.

7/23/71

B: I go to Europe and you do exciting things.

K: I was going to write you but you did (great) things on the Pentagon Papers.
Which isn't surprising.

B: The NYTIMES wrote that I was against going to China which is exactly opposite to my feelings.

K: I didn't see it.

B: I wanted you to know. I said it was symbolic外交 symbolic diplomacy and said the form of the trip is as important as the substance of trip. I have to testify on the Foreign Affairs on Tues. I am concerned about Japan. People are coming to see me who are worried about Ping-Pong Diplomacy and them.

K: I will have my office call yours this afternoon or Monday morning.

B: I am testifying at 10:00 Tues morning. It will be two hours.

K: I am tied up for lunch. I will make a suggestion. I will call you this afternoon or Msn. morning or my office. I want to see you. If I have any concern about anything you say, I will call you

B: I will send this for the record. The Guardian got it right. the NYTimes must have a bad stringer.

K: I didn't read it.

TelCon-2:55-7/23/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Mr. Jack Valenti

V: Hello Henry. I had nothing on my mind the other day when I called
you. I was just so proud of you. It was first rate.

K: You are great. You were a good friend when everyone was jumping
all over us.

V: When I appeared on the TV show, they were trying to get me to
knock Nixon. I said hell no, I know what Presidents go through.
Honestly, it was just first-rate.

K: You are a good friend and it was very nice of you to call.

V: I keep in touch with what your doing through ________? and Kirk Douglas.

K: Well let's keep in touch with each other ourselves. That would be
even better. Let's stay in touch.

V: Good. Thanks Henry.

TELCONE
Greenspan/Kissinger
early afternoon 7/23/71

G: I stayed in Washington x to see you and it's easier in person.

K: I can't see you k now. How much time to you need?

G: How much time can you spare me?

K: I thought it was explained.

G: There was a _____. Can you give me 15 mins. on the phone now?

K: Come over at 3:45 and I will see you for 15 mins.