DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Stu Alsop/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 11/10/71

A: Henry, my God, it is very astonishing to find you on the telephone first.

K: Yes, I know when I'm dealing with important men.

A: Henry, I will be wanting to write about the President's withdrawal program from Vietnam and get background from you on this. I presume Friday would be too early. I wonder if we could make a date for the early part of next week - either breakfast, lunch or a half hour some time next week.

K: Oh sure. You will be writing on that next week?

A: I will be writing about that next week for the following week. How about Monday or Tuesday?

K: Do you have any special time? I have tentative lunches everyday next week but does it make any difference to you what day?

A: Well, Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday. I write on Thursday.

K: Wednesday I will be out of town.

A: We could always have a half hour in the late afternoon, maybe.

K: Well, how about having a drink with me on Tuesday?

A: Fine. Any time you say?

K: Well, let us say about 6 or 6:30. Are you here this weekend?

A: I will probably be going to the country Saturday.

K: I promised you I would let you know when Miss Mcginnes was coming.

A: Oh, dear, she really does a lot for me.

K: What happens was my office made two different appointments and some of these guests are from out-of-town.

A: Yes, I understand. I get caught in that myself. See you Tuesday at 6:30.

By NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCONE

President/Kissinger

10:10 a.m. - 11/11/71

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Mr. President, there are two things I thought you might like to know. One, Bunker has talked to Thieu about the higher figure which you discussed with me yesterday and he said that is all right.

P: I see. Well, we won't I trust. . .

K: I told him to be absolutely quiet about this.

P: Well, it's not a big thing, but I am not going to let Laird have that satisfaction.

K: That's right. Well, I said this is no big thing. Second, Pompidou is willing to meet with you between the 10th and 14th of December, but the problem is there is no place to meet. He doesn't want to come here.

P: Can we meet in the South of France?

K: Well, if you go to Europe and not other countries that will be tough.

P: Well, what other countries would I go to? I don't want to go to Italy.

K: Luckily, you don't have to worry about Italy. They're having an election there. You would have to consider Bonn and London.

P: We could meet in Bonn. I don't think we have to take a tour. I don't want to do that.

K: Watson suggested to Pompidou Ireland and Pompidou agreed to that.

P: Well, we will meet there. Is that Europe? It's pretty rough there right now.

K: Well, it's rough on the English.

P: We'll talk about it. I'll be over there soon.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELCONE

Bob Henry/Kissinger

10:25 a.m. - 11/11/71

(Came in late)

H: Let's see, we have Carol Channing, who is singing right now, Pat Boone and his family, Bob Hope, Henry Mancini, and Jonathan Winters. Should be a fun show.

K: Well, I am planning to come. How long are you planning to be in town?

H: I am going back Saturday morning after the show. It's a pretty tight schedule. I think Herb Schloesser will be coming too.

K: Good. Well, I would like to see you. If you would like to come by here some time, but I guess you are busy now at rehearsals.

H: The only time I can make it is tomorrow at 10:30.

K: Well, why don't you come about 10:00. Can you do that? Now I am always at the call of the President, you understand that, but if you would like to take that chance.

H: I would. Your office will clear me?

K: Well, that's one thing I never know around here. You have about a 50-50 chance.

H: Would you advise the President to come too. He told Pat Boone last night he wouldn't be coming but if you could get him to come that'd be great.

K: I'm not a very influential advisor for that sort of thing.

H: It would be good for him to get a little more culture.

K: Yes, well, I'll see you tomorrow.

By NARA, Dalo

5/26

TELECON

Senator Fulbright

11/11/71 10:40 a.m.

K: Two things I'm calling you about. You made some comments about the intelligence reorganization. I agree with you that the committee should have been briefed. This was a slip-up. It was done mostly in the Office of Management and Budget, and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was involved. What I would like to do is when George Shultz comes back to me he is out of town now -- have him come up and brief you and Senator Symington. My role has not been enhanced by this at all.

F: It reads that way.

K: I know it does. And you are not unjust in your comments. Now reports have come to me on behalf of the President. We have got a committee of all the consumers, State and anyone interested, to establish borad guidelines. But the test is whether Helms, as his staff and the boards reconstituted for him can get a hold on it and get an integrated approach. It's not to increase White House influence. You didn't make a big case of it, so I'm not complaining. George Shultz is out of town. Are you willing to receive him next week to get a run-down on what his intention was?

F: Sure. Certainly. Glad to.

K: The second reason I'm calling is if you ever feel like having lunch, breakfast, or a meeting with me alone so I can answer any questions you might have which are harder to answer in the larger group, I am at your disposal.

F: Good, thank you. A free lunch. I'll take you up on it.

K: I'll even come to the Hill and ask let you take me.

F: When we get this foreign aid off my desk I will be able to. They have me here from 9:00 in the morning until 8:00 at night. But it's almost over now; we are on the floor with it right now.

K: I will let you go, but whenever you feel you have the time, let me know and I'll do it wherever it's most convenient for you.

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

11/11/71 10:53 a.m.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

HK: They moved their capital to Canton, and I was the first to know it. It's because I couldn't stand any more Peking duck.

K: I haven't been able to see you for two weeks; you must be up to your eyeballs.

HK: It's been hectic.

K: We got a report from one of our foreign correspondents to the effect that he talked to one of our American China experts, that the ground-work for the invitation to visit China was well in the works before the Cambodia invasion and that was aborted by it.

HK: Bullshit.

K: And it didn't get back on track until just recently.

HK: Let me puke first.

K: I said the only thing aborted by the Cambodia thing was the talks in Warsaw.

HK: That's right. Where did you get it -- at State?

K: As I said, it was one of our foreign correspondents.

HK: I won't even dignify it with an answer. It's totally, utterly, and completely wrong. The only thing aborted by Cambodia was the Warsaw talks.

K: And that only temporarily.

HK: That is right. It would be correct to say . . . as you now look back on it, moves that culminated in the visit started two years ago. But the really active part of it started in October, 1970, after Cambodia.

K: Long after.

HK: And if you wanted to say . . . before that, we were just talking about how we can conduct a dialogue and even that was a very vague question. But it was in October of 1970, and no one else knew about it.

K: Are there any events in October 1970 that could be tied to the Nixon trip?

HK: I don't want to . . .

K: Is it known now?

TELECON
Dave Kraslow

11/11/71 10:53 a.m. p. 2

By. NARA, Dato'

5/26

HK: No.

K: So it was after the Ceausescu visit.

HK: I don't want to ~~xxy~~ tie to anything, and I recommend that you don't either.

K: I'm not going to. I just want to knock it down.

HK: You can make a very convincing case that the whole process started in ~~January ?~~ of 1969.

K: Or with the Foreign Affairs afticle in 1967,

HK: That is right. But anything from which the possibility emerged of a visit would be in October 1970.

K: Okay. I have to see you soon.

HK: Yes, you will Dave.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

3:26 p.m., November 11, 1971

L: I was up on the Hill and evidently NEWSWEEK is sounding people out on the basis of the two-month announcement up there. They are attributing it to you.

K: That is ;impossible! I have not talked to anybody!

L: They are trying to get reactions from Members. I thought you should know about it. I told the Members this morning that no decision has been made as of now.

K: I have never discussed the announcement with anybody by implication or otherwise.

L: Well, I thought you should know. So you can get something to Ron when he is hit.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mel Elfin/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. - 11/11/71

(Came in late)

E: . . . Scali to the effect that we are going around town saying that we got secret information about Vietnam.

K: Somebody called me and said, which I can't believe, that you people were going around the Hill checking out information which State allegedly got from me about the length and scope of the announcement.

E: Henry, I had asked our guy, Sam Sheffield, on Tuesday to see what he could find out. He said he talked to Bill Timmons and the best he can tell it will be Friday or Monday. If there is any person in this town, Henry, I want to remain in the confidence of it is you. I spoke to no one. I have not mentioned anything. It was all over the city that there was a Time party. I didn't even want the fact that you were in my house to be published.

K: Mel, you have always treated me like a gentleman. I have no reason to doubt you. I mentioned it to Scali only because it was so absolutely __________. The withdrawal part was such an insignificant part of the conversation.

E: Looking back. We asked if there would be a Vietnam announcement. No answer. Is that because you know but you can't tell us and you said both. That is all I remember.

K: I think I added that you wouldn't have to redo your cover.

E: Henry called Jerry Warren this morning. . . he says look I got a problem and then before he hangs up he says (Jerry) says I would hang loose this week. Look, Henry, there was even a question as to whether we should get an interim memo out and I said no memos even.

K: Look Mel, I enjoyed that evening. . .

E: We all enjoyed that evening. I just don't want to ruin anything. If there is, call me. I apologize.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

2

K: I know you couldn't play such a stupid game. I asked John if there was anything I could have said that could be misunderstood.

E: Look, the word around town is that it will be an announcement instead of a speech.

K: Well, I just won't comment.

E: No, I am not asking. I am just telling you what ...

K: Well, Mel, don't worry about it. I trust you.

enjoyed that evening...

I enjoyed that evening. I just don't want to ruin anything. If you call me, I apologize.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

President/Kissinger

5:58 p.m. - 11/11/71

K: Mr. President.

P: Have you talked to Rogers yet?

K: I haven't reached him yet, but I will call him right away.

P: As soon as you have reached him give me a report, but I don't see any reason for me to go in there and debate the damn thing. There is nothing to debate. I know what the options are. What did Resor want to call me for?

K: I suppose he wants to see if I will the damn thing fairly.

P: Well, I have got the 4 months, the 6 months, all the arguments before me. Tell him I am thinking about the 6 months.

K: All right.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

6:02 p.m., November 11, 1971

H: You wanted me to call urgently.

K: I just talked to Mel Elfin. Scali called Elfin and gave him hell on the basis of the alleged report. Elfin said there is no man whose confidence they want to keep more. The only things they picked up were when he called Timmons this morning, Timmons said the announcement would Friday or Monday. Then when he called Jerry Warren, he said he couldn't tell him anything but he would stay loose on the magazine. So Elfin said of course he could put things together.

H: That's nothing significant.

K: But nobody said anything about the announcement. If I, as the Security Advisor, and Haig say we can't say anything, then these junior officers should be able to keep their mouths shut. Everyone is feathering their own nests.

H: Not really.

K: They are protecting their own version of credibility. The press will respect them a hell of a lot more for shutting up.

H: That's very interesting. Where did they get the numbers?

K: They didn't get numbers. That was a Laird bluff. The President made an interesting point that Laird didn't know it would be two months. He was told it would be 3-4 months. Rogers; has now come back with a 4-month proposal. They are talking to each other and trying to scoop each other. But we should brutalize our own people.

H: I will. On both of these.

lds

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

11/11/71 ca. 6:05pm

K: Haig wrote a memorandum to the President about that suggestion of yours. The President talked to me and then he went to a group dealing with the cost of living council when you called him, and he told Bull to tell me I should fill you in since he will be tied up for a while. He hasn't really finally come down on it, but if he goes for, he can do it in two two-monthly things.

R: I don't have any strong feelings on it. It just builds up excitement each time he does it.

K: The other side may be springing some proposal in December. He has to stay loose to see how to answer them, and with the China thing coming up it will be perfectly natural.

R: Well, I don't care how you play it. It seems to me more natural . . .

K: No, I mean to make two two-month things, and he may yet go for four months.

R: I don't care. It's just PR anyway. Two seems so short to me.

K: Well, he doesn't want to go to seven.

R: No. The reason to go for four is when the China announcement comes out, everyone will say that's why he did it, and it doesn't let him get into a weak position, and when the announcement comes out everyone will say that's pretty clever.

K: He is impressed with that argument. He is trying to decide whether to make it two or four. He doesn't want everyone to know what he is thinking now, and this includes Laird.

R: I'm not pressing one way or the other. I have the feeling that two twos will put him on a spot at a time he doesn't want to be on one. If he continues at an accelerated pace for a little longer it would be a good thing because we are going along so well right now and it related neatly to the trip.

K: That's a good case. On that argument you sold him yesterday. It may be that if a wik whole peace offensive starts up . . . but his present feeling is to keep it low-key in January. He would make no reference to any final announcement at any time. . . . just say announcing another increment for the next two months. Very low-key.

R: No objection to that; that's fine.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
John J. McCloy
11-11-71; 7:30 p. m.

K: While you are mulling this over -- frankly, I called you before while I was with the President. We need a strong man who can sit on the National Security Council on European matters. I tell you this as a friend -- we need a counter to Connally. We can't throw away 25 years of what has been built up for treasury reasons.

M: I sensed that.

K: We have state on MBFR, we have Treasury squeezing the Germans for $50 million and breaking the backs of our closest friends. We have one thing after another.

M: I can see it. No question of the importance of it all. I appreciate your calling.

K: I just wanted you to know -- I don't think you will find anyone to whom I have been indiscreet about our private deliberations in the White House. But I have to tell you I have been telling the President for two weeks we are heading for a catastrophe in Europe. We need to hold our alliances together particularly since we are talking with the Soviets and he agreed you were the man. I just want you to think of this. We have a lot of people on our list but we have no other McCloy.

M: It is flattering but let me mull over it. I have not even told my wife.

K: I am not asking you for an answer now. I just wanted to give you a little . . .

M: I appreciate your calling.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:46 p.m., November 11, 1971

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President, only one thing I wanted to ask you. I want to check with you -- confirmed about the announcement against the Japanese knowing.

P: Of course, tell them!

K: The problem is the time frame.

P: Tell them now!

K: There are two ways to do it. One, to do it backchannel by Connally and the other, tell them through State.

P: Backchannel through Connally. That's a good thing to build him up to.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Fine, Henry, thank you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Warren Beatty (in Virginia, SANITIZED)
11/11/71 a.m.

K: What are your plans?

B: Vague. I think I'm leaving here on Saturday and will be in Los Angeles. I have to stop in Pittsburgh. -

K: There are two possibilities: I'm having drinks with some friends from Harvard around 6:30 today.

B: At 6:30 I have a slight problem.

K: Or breakfast tomorrow.

B: What time?

K: Probably too early for you, around 8:45. Or maybe tomorrow evening?

B: No, I've got to go to . . . having dinner with Ethel tomorrow. Breakfast is fine with me tomorrow.

K: Okay, why don't you come about 8:45?

B: Where do I go?

K: The Northwest gate of the White House on Pennsylvania Avenue, and they'll let you in I hope. They let in one out of three of my guests.

B: I can imagine. Just ask for you?

K: Yes.

B: Good.

TELECON
Senator Symington
11/11/71 a.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: For some time I know somebody I like so much you keep going after me.

S: It's not you; it's the policy. You know that.

K: I know. You're a good friend and when we are all out of here you will still be. I'm calling about the intelligence reorganization. First, you are absolutely right; I don't know why there was no Congressional consultation before. This wasn't done in my shop. My shop was part of the study. . . but that is no excuse. What I am going to do is to ask George Shultz to come up and see you next week when he gets back in town to explain the Office of Management point of view. Secondly, the purpose of this reorganization wasn't to enhance my office, but to give other members of the committee to state their aims. I can levy requirements now on behalf of the President; I don't need a committee to do that. It, if anything, limits me personally, but the major test of it isn't what it does to me. My role is marginal; it actually tends to enhance the role of Helms.

S: Here is where we got off the track. Friday night I began to get around. People came to me and asked what was going on. I hadn't seen anything and I said I didn't know about it. X That's embarrassing to have to say that, but you know this committee hasn't met once this year, and that has got to be changed. So I'm awakened in the morning by an early call from a reporter and I have to say I don't know anything about it. Then I read the morning paper. I came to the office. I called CIA and asked to speak to Helms. He was out of the country. There was no one there who would talk with me. I got upset about it. I got home and finally there was a call, and there was a member of the CIA staff who was kind enough to deliver the White House press release to me at my house on Saturday afternoon. I said 'what does it mean?' He said, we don't know. Henry, you can't run a railroad like that. By that time I was getting calls from all over my state.

K: I don't know what Helms told his people, but he was fully informed, as was the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We ran it through through the intelligence community many times. But the members of the committee should have been informed. There's no excuse for it. And I'm not finding fault with what you said.

S: I know you well enough to know you wouldn't have. There's no one in the Executive Branch I respect more than you. But if these people there aren't going to tell us what is going on, who is going to?

K: I will have Shultz give you a briefing.

TELECON
Senator Symington
11/11/71 a.m. p. 2

By NARA, Date 5/26

S: What about my suggestion that Stennis call his committee together and give it to all of them.

K: Right. Because we ought to try to keep intelligence from being controversial if we can avoid it.

S: Marchetti (?) said there is steadily increasing pressure... My closest friend was Truman's legal advisor. He left plans which assured that it couldn't be administered by the military. Then out comes this general who is a nice guy but as military as they come, who is going to operate it and Helms to coordinate it, and you've got a committee with the Joint Chiefs... and they go off to the races.

K: Helms... to maintain control. If Helms is only coordinating then it's not doing its job. I would complain about that. Some people thought of moving Helms out of the CIA; I urged very strongly that he stay.

S: He won't be a figurehead.

K: No. We want him to have more of a voice in military intelligence.

S: I spent more time with some people on Saturday -- so it wasn't a jumping off of mine.

K: No, you are not immoderate. These are reasonable concerns of a serious man. And I'll do what I can to get a briefing for the committee.

S: And if the committee doesn't want it, then I want it for the Foreign Relations Committee.

K: They should have it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Fred Brisson

11/11/71 p.m.

K: I won't be able to come down. I'm tied up all day.

B: Not even Sunday, just for the evening?

K: There's just a possibility I can still swing that, but I won't know till Sunday morning.

B: That's all right. Where we will be sitting I will have someone else in reserve to use the seats.

K: Oh well, if you can do that . . .

B: If you can come Sunday afternoon some time that will be great and if you have to back that night you can.

K: Where can I call you?

B: Sunday?

K: Yes.

B: At the Waldorf. When will you call?

K: Before noon.

B: The show starts at 7:00. Supper will be at 9:30 or twenty of ten.

K: I would love to come.

B: Then will you still bring Nancy?

K: Yes.

B: Then I will just hold the tickets. And I expect to hear from you Sunday around noon.

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

9:40 a.m. - 11/12/71

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

H: Has he said anything to you about Congressional notification on this announcement today?

K: That it would just come out on the ground that the leaks had gotten so bad.

H: Well, that's a fine ground to put it on, but it leaves us out. . . Shall we do it an hour ahead of time?

K: I think we should.

H: We should at least tell our strong supporters. Maybe even have a briefing.

K: Didn't you talk to MacGregor?

H: I had to tell him we are going to do something today.

K: Shall we do it at Noon?

H: Well, I think by all means we should brief.

K: My instinct is we should because you infuriate people so much when you don't tell them anything and even if it makes leaks it can't get on TV until this evening.

H: That's true.

K: So my instinct is we should do it about 2:30 or 3:00.

H: I think we should raise it with them that we think we ought or . . . the best thing would be having a briefing.

K: Or just call around and just explain.

H: Can you write out an explanation that MacGregor and Timmons could use?

K: Of course, I will be glad: to do it but I think it can be done without it. We can write about a page.

H: We could get a rationale of why. What do we want them to say and what basis will we give them for saying it.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

2

K: I will get it done this morning and we will have it by 1:00

H: By 3:00 they should move fast and get all our friends lined up on the Hill.

K: Well, we can use a backgrounder when we see what the reaction is but that won't be until next week.

H: That depends on the President's questioning.

K: Yes.

H: There is no one like governors that we need to notify?

K: Well, maybe Rockefeller and Reagan we should and I will do those. Rockefeller is coming down today so we can reach him then.

H: What about the Cabinet?

K: I don't think it's that unusual momentous a thing.

H: Yes, but if one of those guys is out of town and doesn't know what his stuff is.

K: Who handles it?

H: Butterfield.

K: I think we should do all of that.

H: Cabinet and Congress.

K: That's about it.

H: We can't do the Cabinet until 3:00 either. And we'll use the same talking paper.

K: Yes, that ought to be a brief paper, one page.

H: OK, Henry.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Clark Mollenhoff/Mr. Kissinger

11:00 a.m., November 12, 1971

M: Are you aware of any problem in connection with racial discrimination in connection with the Mace(?) nomination to Sierra Leone?

K: I'm not familiar with it.

M: A suit has been filed in the Federal District Court in which a couple of Filipino employees have alleged racial discrimination involving Mace. His nomination is presently up before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. You may be aware of the general controversy around this particular nomination.

K: Frankly, I'm not.

M: There is an allegation generally of a lack of due process in grievance procedures up there. It has gone in before the Committee and inaccurate, false testimony was given. The nomination has been passed over and is currently in the process of being investigated by the Committee staff.

K: I honestly don't know anything about that.

M: I am told that the Sierra Leone Ambassador has had this called to his attention. I know he knows about the situation because I had a conversation with him. He declines, as he should, to comment relative to whether he has served notice on the Secretary of State or the State Department on this matter. They might find Mace to be personna non grata. This gets to be a serious problem involving an African country.

K: I don't know enough about it.

M: I was calling to find out if you knew about it and to let you know there is a problem. You can get back with your office there to find out why you don't know about it.

K: You can bet I will do that.

M: I haven't seen you since you got back from Peking. I'm anxious to sit down and chat about it.

K: Yes, it's been a long time. Let's do that sometime.

lds

TELCORN

President/Kissinger

11/12/71 - 1:32 p.m.

NARA, Dale

(Came in late)

P: The letter says - Why are you unwilling to set a fixed withdrawal date when Hanoi suggests that they are willing to do so? - The answer to that is that they have not said that.

K: That's right, they have not said that. They have been masters in making ambiguous statements all of which evaporate when you test them. My experience has been that when I take a very aggressive line on them they have backed off.

P: That is what I wanted to find out. They never said that.

K: Well, they have implied it, but when you put them to the test it it not that way.

P: All right. That's all I wanted to know.

DECLASSIFIED
E O. 12/98, Sect 3-6

Ex. NA/A. Dato 5/6

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:38 a.m., November 13, 1971

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, how did you get along at the Ford Theater last night?

K: It was very nice.

P: Julie said she saw you. She said most of the jokes were on our side.

K: They were very friendly. Of course, Bob Hope was making the jokes. Even the others -- which weren't against us -- were sort of loving jokes. I thought your announcement...

P: I was going to ask you about that. How did it go?

K: Mr. President, it could not have been better. I read in the newspapers and on TV...

P: It has confused the hell out of them, hasn't it?

K: Murray Marder wrote a perceptive piece. He said -- do you want me to get it?

P: Yes. We haven't gotten the POST up here yet.

K: [read excerpts from the Marder column to the President]

P: Good. And in the TIMES -- which is far more important -- had a chart which showed it going up and then going way down. Now the thing that is interesting to me is the two-month thing has another advantage. Making more announcements keeps reminding people that the other side got us in and we are getting out. Remember, Acheson wasn't so dumb -- he said keep telling them.

K: I think it worked beautifully.

P: Certainly from the standpoint, it worked beautifully. I think we have really put it to the North Vietnamese now. I think one thing we did get in was when I said, in the two-month period...

K: ... was the rate of infiltration.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12558, Sept. 30

By. C. NARA, Date 5/26

- 2 -

P: That puts it right to them. If the infiltration comes up, we will watch it. We will bomb them or change the rate of withdrawal.

K: Marder also points that out.

P: He does?

K: In addition to the impact on negotiations, it has an impact on your public image. Even on this, where we are set in our course, you have done the unexpected once again. You have never done the conventional in any announcement. You have done it in a complex way which enhances the image of you as a thoughtful man with long-range plans. That also helps among the sophisticates. It gives some confidence to the people, I spoke last evening to the Executive Vice President of NBC, Herb Schlosser, who is in charge of all programming and who actually had been on our side all along. He said Vietnam now, even among his rabid friends, is a moot point. They all think you know what you are doing.

P: Good.

K: And Mel Laird -- I saw him last night. He said, "God damn it; he screwed me again." But he said it was a good move.

P: He thought he would out-guess us, and didn't make it. The best thing was to go to 45,000.

K: That's right.

P: Now he can't squeal about a thing.

K: We have intercepts that Ihanol is assessing its military situation pretty poorly. We have negotiations about as well set as we can.

P: What about the situation in India/Pakistan? Should anything be done? I couldn't be any more in agreement not to involve them in the UN with the Chinese. But we can't miss any bets.

K: We had both Ambassadors in Wednesday, and I had the Indian Ambassador in on Thursday. There isn't more we can do.

P: What could the UN do?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sept. 30

By. NARA. Date 5/6

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:38 a.m., November 13, 1971

K: If we go into the UN now, it is a trap. The Indians have more support there than we. And the State Department has no intention of supporting Pakistan in the UN.

P: What about China in the Security Council?

K: I think we should find out what the Chinese are thinking. I think we should wait until the 20th.

P: After you have discussed it with the Ambassador. The Indians have most of the UN locked, of course.

K: They have the Security Council votes locked. We don't want to be trapped into voting with the Soviet Union.

P: What Rogers' argument that India doesn't want to go to the UN?

K: I'm not sure they don't want to go. They don't want UN observers. We should ask both sides to stop their military operations.

P: You think just let it wait. If they fight, they fight. India will roll over them pretty fast?

K: We have asked Yahya this weekend to get as much on the political side as he can. The Pakistan Foreign Secretary is arriving tomorrow -- he claims to have a message from Peking. I think we should look at all this before we move. I don't think there will be a war next week. Sisco's great trick is to always say there is a speech. That is how he screwed up the Middle East.

P: The Foreign Secretary's message doesn't deal with our trip?

K: No; with his problem. He was in Peking. They wouldn't give the Pakistanis a message for us.

P: I hope we get the Cambodian answer out.

K: Right. I understand CBS ran 6 minutes of your press conference.

P: The Cambodian answer would be the real one.

K: We should get that one out.

P: Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President. Congratulations.

Ids

DEC LASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 36

By. NARA Date. 5/26

Telcon
Mr. Haldeman
11/13/71: 11:10 a.m.

H: He just wondered if possibly worked the best solution with Pompidou when he gave us the 11th, 12th or 13th.

K: That has to be.

H: Then Heath on the 20th or 21st.

K: He doesn't even know about it yet. (Heath)

H: I know. Then Brandt the 27th or 28th in Florida. Otherwise we are going to get into the horrendous problem of getting past the first week in January.

K: I will do my best and have an answer by the middle of the week.

H: OK.

By. [signature] NARA, Date 5/6/6

Conversation with the President

11/14/71 11:10

HAK:

Good Morning, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT:

Hello, Henry.

HAK:

I just wanted to tell you I briefed Johnson for an hour today.

PRESIDENT:

Good.

HAK:

I know he is on the way to see you. He seemed content. He is upset on the international economic question. He thinks we are proceeding too brutally. He is making a speech Tuesday in which he is taking an oblique attack on our tactics.

PRESIDENT:

Connally is just back so it is an interesting time for him to do it. I am going to see Connally later today so I will see what he has to report.

HAK:

I will be meeting with him before the end of Tuesday.

PRESIDENT:

Tuesday.

HAK:

Tomorrow or Tuesday. Not before you meet him.

PRESIDENT:

On infiltration those Bastards really had to hump it. Now they are saying what we have known all the time.

HAK:

I saw the article in the *Times*. They are playing it just the way you want it. It is not-- now if you do crack at them everyone knows that you have warned them.

PRESIDENT:

And that we are doing it for the purpose of protecting our troop withdrawal.

DECLFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3-6

By: [REDACTED] NARA Date: 5/14

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/President Johnson

11:15 a.m., November 13, 1974

J: Henry?

K: I heard you were in Washington and wanted to ask you, first, how long you would be staying and, secondly, whether as long as you were here you wanted me to drop by and give you a rundown.

J: I don't want to intrude and I wouldn't want to add to your burdens.

K: You couldn't add to my burdens.

J: I would love to see you. I am going down to my daughter's in 25 minutes. I want you to meet that young man; he is going to the University of Virginia law school. You don't have to be partisan; in fact, I think he's a damn Republican.

K: I'm not necessarily Republican.

J: He's a great friend. He's graduating this next year.

K: Will you come back from there?

J: I think tonight or early in the morning. I'm going to see the President before the services briefly and then attend the services at the White House next tomorrow. Then I'm going to New York tomorrow afternoon.

K: Would you like me to come by in the morning?

J: I think that would be fine. I think it would be fine to say 10:00 a.m.

K: Fine, Mr. President.

J: I will let you know as soon as I consult higher authority -- my wife. I will try to come back tonight but, if not, I will come back in time to see you at 10:00 tomorrow. Unless I call you back, it is firm.

K: Unless I hear from you, I will drop by Blair House at 10:00.

J: We will do it at 10:00 tomorrow morning. Thank you so very much

Ids

By. C. NARA, Date 5/6

Telcon
The President
11/13/71; 11:15 a.m.

P: Bob said you had a deal with Pompidou.

K: Yes.

P: Did the Ambassador get it?

K: We are going to start working with it Monday. He doesn't want to meet on a base. He wants to meet in a hotel. We will go to the Portuguese and ask it as a favor.

P: I want to stick it to those God damn Africans.

K: I had a talk with Cromer yesterday. Said we are moving independently. It would probably be embarrassing for the President. He would be the first to see the President so he doesn't look like a bad European. He will probably see Pompidou first.

P: Did you tell him Bermuda?

K: I left it loose. Said Bermuda looks like a good place.

P: On the Brandt thing. How about doing it the week after Christmas? I will be in Florida and it would be a pleasant time - between 26 December and 2 January. Why don't you propose that to him. Push it more in line of thing you want - make it more personal visit.

K: He may have vacation plans. But I will go back to him.

P: What would be another time?

K: The 10th of January.

P: When does Mrs. Nixon get back?

K: The 9th.

P: I will be right in the middle of the State of the Union. Try the week after Christmas.

K: I will do that - through Rush.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/60

P: Call Rush on the horn. I think it would be useful to have a dinner for him in Miami. Do you think that wouldn't bother you, would it? For about 200 people.

K: That would be great. When do you want to see Heath?

P: Right after Pompidou. In Bermuda any time.

K: Around the 20th of December?

P: Excellent. I am going to not do the Christmas parties this year. I will get others to do them. That would be a good time to see Heath.

K: Get it all locked up in a week and announce them all together.

P: I could see Heath the week after Christmas.

K: And keep Brandt on the 10th.

P: There is a possibility.

K: Will try to get Brandt the 26th or 27th, with Heath before, or Brandt on the 10th with Heath the 26th or 27th. Or maybe Brandt the 26th or 27th and Heath on the 10th.

P: Set it up any way you want.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

11/14/71 11:10

HAK:

Good Morning, Mr. President.

PRESIDENT:

Hello, Henry.

HAK:

PRESIDENT:

Good.

HAK:

PRESIDENT:

HAK:

PRESIDENT:

Tuesday.

HAK:

PRESIDENT:

HAK:

PRESIDENT:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOLASSER
By CNARA Date StatoL

Conversation with Anatol Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR

11/14/71 11:30 a.m.

HAK

Hello, Anatol.

DOBRYNIN

Hello, Henry. You shouldn't work Saturday and Sunday after a week of very hard work.

HAK

I have to see that no one does anything while my back is turned. Where were you yesterday?

DOBRYNIN

Everything is quiet on our front so I decided to go outside Washington. You see how I trust you? I paraphrase what you have on your coins, "In Henry I trust".

HAK

Two things Anatol I wanted you to know. Unexpectedly your compatriot, Victor Lewis, showed up here after all.

DOBRYNIN

He had meetings in New York only.

HAK

He came here. I saw him for a half hour. I made very clear to him that my dealings are with you. I think that what he would have liked was for me to tell him something that he could bring back. You can rest assured I told him nothing. He just indicated that if we wanted to pass anything urgently he was a good person to do it. I made clear to him that I was extremely satisfied with present arrangements and it would confuse matters. He asked me about China. I talked to him only---if you read my backgrounders--I said nothing to him I have not said to the press. I gave him no messages.

DOBRYNIN

I understand.

HAK

The only reason I tell you is because I want you to be aware--to know.

DOBRYNIN

Thank you.

HAK

And only because he has that reputation. I don't even know----

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2568
By CHNARA Date StLOT

DOBRYNIN

He has an exaggerated reputation.

HAK

I cannot imagine that your people would send a--

DOBRYNIN

No, no, no.

HAK

He did not pretend to have a message. I would have asked for authentication.

DOBRYNIN

If he had a message I would have been told about it.

HAK

He had no message. He would have been pleased if I had given him one.
We are satisfied with the existing arrangement.

DOBRYNIN

He would have no message.

HAK

I frankly discussed nothing but very general matters. I wondered if
you and I should get together next week.

DOBRYNIN

Yes, Tuesday, what would you prefer?

HAK

Are you free for dinner on Thursday?

DOBRYNIN

You will come to me? On Wednesday?

HAK

Thursday, Wednesday I am out of town.

DOBRYNIN

Eight o'clock Thursday.

HAK

Right 8:00 p.m. Let me tell you one other thing just for your information
because I told you I would keep you fully informed about any move in the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Ecl2158
By: CNARA Date: 9/1/87

- 3 -

Middle East. I have talked to Rabin, in terms of thinking out loud, giving my ideas, to get the temperature.

DOBRYNIN

More or less what we discussed.

HAK

In a vague way if one attended this and--

DOBRYNIN

And afterwards he left for Jeruesalem.

HAK

It is the first time I talked to him about it and he probably assumed I don't just talk. He has no reason to suppose you and I have talked. They probably think this is something we would want to propose to the Egyptians. I did not discuss your own proposal and I didn't discuss anything specific. The way I put the Soviet aspect was if there were any limitation of Soviet military activity, what limitations would you ask for, rather than put it in the terms if you wanted a package that included that what would you ask us to propose.

DOBRYNIN

So he is going to think it over. He will be back by Thursday night?

HAK

That is what I hope, that is why I suggested Thursday.

DOBRYNIN

I understand. That is quite all right.

HAK

I don't see any sense in conducting a theoretical exercise.

DOBRYNIN

I think what you have done is useful. It will give you and us some idea to proceed in what way.

HAK

It will give us a framework in which to put it.

DOBRYNIN

I understand.

HAK

Otherwise we will just be writing seminar papers

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Foulser
By: CNARA Date: 9/1/81

DOBRYNIN

I think it is the right procedure.

HAK

I don't believe they are likely to leak anything about my conversation. It is inconceivable that anything would come out.

DOBRYNIN

You are the only channel they are keeping closely.

HAK

Since I promised that we would do it openly with you---

DOBRYNIN

Do you have anything on SALT?

HAK

We will not make any new proposals.

DOBRYNIN

I understand. Soon it will be time to look into this matter.

HAK

I think we should have a talk on Thursday.

DOBRYNIN

It is really the last session before the summit. They will have an interval about Christmas. I think it will continue up to March or April.

HAK

Smith mentioned to me he will have a rather short one. He will lead the Delegation in Vienna. Smith is running for the Nobel Prize.

DOBRYNIN

Why not. You should encourage him not discourage him.

HAK

You and I should get 10% of the award. You and I should discuss how to handle it.

DOBRYNIN

So, on the other fronts, there is anything new.

HAK

Which one?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Cong. Mahan/Kissinger

12:10 p. m. 11/15/71

M: I saw you at the party at Ford's theater. It was very good. Unfortunately not all our problems are that interesting. I have a difficult situation and that is that Boland of Mass. is offering an amendment to withdraw all military forces from Vietnam by the 1st of June.

K: The irresponsibility of people is unbelievable.

M: Beyond belief.

K: If our policy weren't working, but it is.

M: They want to take over the war here and I think it is bad. It's coming up tomorrow and we could loose. If we adopt this it will go to the Senate and the President will have to veto it. He could not live with it. It would be demeaning and disastrous.

K: Those are the adjectives I would use. I will tell you something you can't use. This is the most important week and worst possible week for this. Couldn't choose a worse week.

M: Because of Russians and Chinese?

K: Because of the whole area of negotiations. You think we can lose?

M: I do and that's why I called.

K: You can say objectively the President is trying to set up ______ and for Congress to do this now destroys all possibility of negotiation.

M: That of course *in ax* is right but how impressive this is because we are there a long time. If they will send our prisoners home.

K: They won't on that.

M: How can you puncture that? When will they *send* them home?

K: They want to cut off military and economic aid and if we do that no ally will trust us again.

M: We *wax* are dealing with hysteria. China has *reached* loose a prisoner from Korean war.

K: One sick prisoner about 6 months ago. That was different.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Mahan/Kissingdr

12:10 p. m.

11/15/71

M: When would our prisoners --

K: They have never said they would.

M: They said if we set a date.

K: No they haven't. Then they will discuss the modalities of release. A totally ambiguous way. I can send you material over there of what they have.

M: I need a one, two and three why we can't do this. If we have a different angle. People are tired of the old angle.

K: When do you need it?

M: Noon tomorrow.

K: I will have it by the end of the day.

M: NOthing attributed to you. I am working with the Democrats and Republican leadership.

K: I will have it at the end of the day.

M: That's good.

K: Let me tell you how much we appreciate the patriotic fight you are making

M: I am sorry about this on the Hill.

K: They are coming at the worst possible moment.

M: Look forward to hearing from you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12557
By CNARA Date 9/1/71

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

12:33 p.m.

11/15/71

K: You have my office bugged, don't you.

D: Do you think it's necessary?

K: Because I was going to call you.

D: Now I can say yes, you are right. You are going to tell me or I will tell you.

K: You talk first.

D: You want the advantage.

K: Because you are so easy to take advantage of.

D: You remember when we met last time and I received an answer on the man who wrote letters on our side. I received a message from him to the President that there will definitely be an opportunity for private talks in Moscow and you tell him. On a confidential basis. Not for public.

K: We don't want it public.

D: On Mrs. Nixon, she will be most welcome in Moscow if she decides to go.

K: That's very generous.

D: So please tell the President.

K: I will and I will be delighted to hear. Two things on my side. When you said yesterday is everything else all right I overlooked the fact that we are extremely concerned about the South Asian situation. India-Pakistan. We will not put it as rudely as this in diplomatic cables. We think India is determined to have a showdown. When I see you I will tell you what we suggested for a reasonable solution if someone could encourage them.

D: Both sides play down.

K: In our view, sending arms into India is adding fuel.

D: I doubt that. I think it's publicity. I will check.

K: I will see you Thurs. night. I think I will have talked with Rabin before I see you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E12358
By CNARA Date 01/15/71

Dobrynin/Kissinger

12:33 p. m. 11/15/71

-2-

D: Maybe we could see each other Wed.

K: Unfortunately I am out of town.

D: If you would call me, I can drop in.

K: Let's save it for Thursday because we will not have a clear cut answer.

D: You expect an answer.

K: I think to hear something.

D: He will be back.

K: Yes. I raised a number of questions on that with you last time.

D: I think I have answers. Thursday at 8:00.

K: Would we do it at 8:30? I am more reliable at that time.

D: What about your plans to go to California. I am checking for my own perspective.

K: We want to exhaust you. You are tough enough in an exhaustive state. Nov. 24-30.

D: For me it's important to know.

K: That would be a good period to be gone.

D: I will see you on Thurs.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Clark MacGregor

1:20 p.m., November 15, 1971

K: I had a call from Mahon who said the Boland Amendment
might pass and asking for suggestions for talking points. I said
I would put some together for him.

M: Mahon is worried about the vote. He said if we don't defeat
it in the Senate, the House will adopt it. We defeated the Church
Amendment two weeks ago, but he said this is a closely divided issue.
I pledged to George Mahon we would do everything we could to help
win this vote. I don't think additional effort by the President is
indicated. As we get assessments from time to time today, we will
have a better feel.

K: This would be a disaster.

M: We will go all out. If you could give us a one-pager, I would
appreciate it.

K: I will give you copies of what I give Mahon.

M: That would be great. I would appreciate it.

lds

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE

Haldeman/Kissinger

1:30 p.m. - 11/15/71

H: Has he mentioned his ideas to include Defense Ministers, Foreign Minister, and Finance Ministers?

K: Yes. The Finance Ministers I agree with, but rather than making it a road show, I think we should focus more on him.

H: Is Finance a good idea as a subterfuge?

K: Finance I can understand. There are good reasons for them and he may want to use this as an occasion for settling that.

H: How can you avoid Foreign Ministers?

K: Well, in practice you can avoid them, but I'm sure the others won't insist on bringing theirs. I am sure the Germans would prefer not to as would the French.

H: The other possibility - the Central Banker - I think is a disaster personally.

K: My view would be to get them involved in the second round. See, if you turn it into a big road show they have to bring staffs. If these counterpart meetings are supposed to do any good . . .

H: Why don't we go back and argue for just making it Heads of Government?

K: That would be the best but would create a hell of a lot of problems.

H: We have to take Connally though?

K: No, although if we get into financial things we better.

H: Well, he raised it over the weekend.

K: Yes, he raised it with me too. We won't have to worry about him. He's a big man.

H: He's a big man until you cross him. He can be really rough if he gets the impression that something is being done behind his back.

K: Oh, really. I've been lucky enough to not have had that experience yet.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Halden

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

2:57 p.m. - 11/15/71

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

C: Hello, I enjoyed my lunch last week very much.

K: I did too. I am going to see you this evening but I wanted to call you about that matter which brings our principals together on which I may have a complete proposition to make. We have explored it with the French. We will probably see them on the 13th and 14th.

C: In Paris?

K: No, in the Azores. We will also see Brandt. Now none of this is known. No firm date is set but we will aim for the end of the month. He has agreed to it but we are just juggling schedules. Now the dates I can propose to you would be the 20th and 21st. We are suggesting Bermuda but we will go to any other British possession.

C: Fine, will do, Henry.

K: The 20th and 21st. Another possibility is January 10th and 11th, although we would like to get it all done this month.

C: Well, the 10th is my Wedding anniversary.

K: That's an overriding factor then. (Laughter) For your information I have put forward on a strictly informal basis the suggestion you made on the monetary thing.

C: Over the weekend I wrote a little note which I might slip into your pocket this evening.

K: Well, just for your information it was not refused out of hand. It was the sort of sums you were talking about. You know they will probably haggle over it but if only to prove that the word would not be somebody else's so I will keep you posted. There are good reasons I think December might be a good month to get it all done.

C: Yes, if it can logically be done then.

By. NARA, Date 5/20

2

K: Were you serious about your being willing to play a role in that?

C: Well, I thought that I said the opposite but I would do anything I was asked to do.

K: I know you aren't offering yourself.

If

C: XXX I was told that this is what I ought to do I would do it.

K: Well, this phase of it I have not surfaced.

C: No, no, no. Many thanks. I will follow up on those dates and look forward to seeing you this evening.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Phil Odeen/Kissinger

3:55 p.m. 11/15/71

K: I am sorry I didn't get back to you last week. If you are interested in the job we would like to go with it.

O: That's fine.

K: Will you work out the details with Haig?

O: Should I call him?

K: If he doesn't call you, call him. I am looking forward to working with you. It's probably the last civil conversation I will have with you.

O: I will treasure it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Dave Kraslow/Kissinger

4:03 p.m. 11/15/71

K: When are people going to get tired of writing stories on your social life? In the NYTimes Magazine.

HAK: That wasn't much.

K: We have a very, very solid report that Harold Gibbons, teamster ______, has been invited to accompany the President --

HAK: That was in a Victor Reissel column two months ago. No one invited and I doubt it will be.

K: No public American?

HAK: There's a one chance in 10,000 but it's probably not possible. For all practical points, no.

K: I would like to see you one of these days.

HAK: Will you be on the West Coast?

K: At Thanksgiving? I don't know. But I would like to see you.

HAK: I would like to see you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Ford/Kissinger
(Franklin Ford)

5:05 p.m. - 11/15/71

K: Franklin, how are you?

F: Just fine. I wanted to say that I thought that was great this morning. Most generally though I want to say I admire what you are doing.

K: Aren't you nice. You know it is awfully hard at those meetings to say anything of substance.

F: I looked at those steely-eyed Germans sitting around there and wondered what they were thinking. But more to the point I want to tell you how great you are.

K: Well, you are very nice. It is hard. It has had its ups and downs. How is your life?

F: Fine and I think sometime when I come down here I would like to have a talk with you.

K: I would like that. Do you come often? Well, Franklin, would you let me know because I would love to see you.

F: Well, keep up your fine work.

K: And, Franklin, if you can give me a week's warning, we can lunch.

F: That would be wonderful. I will let you know.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Ziegler/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. - 11/15/71

(Came in late)

K: I have gotten Jerry Warren to do it for me. Maxine Cheshire was screaming about something. Scali's view was to let her go with the wrong story, but I called Jerry and told him to go with the facts. I don't gain anything by going as a lightweight and then denying it.

Z: I see.

K: I had a breakfast date with Warren Beatty and ran into them at dinner the night before. I turned to Julie and said if you want to come along you are welcome.

Z: We are not going to have any. . .

K: Maxine is below your level, Ron.

Z: Look, we are not going to have any contact with the United Nations, are we?

K: Look, it could develop that way, but at the moment there is no such plan.

Z: Shall I say it could develop that way?

K: No, you did it exactly right. If it develops that way I will tell you so you can collaborate your answers.

Bv. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN
Haldeman/Kissinger

afternoon 11/15/71

H: You missed a Cabinet meeting to end all Cabinet meetings./ The President
has said no more foreign travel for the next year for Cabinet levels.

Volpe gave his trip.

K: Except some exceptions.

H: Of course, not you. I think it's good. These junkets to look at poppies.

K: I am going to Japan for a few days in January.

H: This doesn't apply to you. It applies to Rumsfeld, Finch and Cabinet
members who want to give their wives a trip. They should clear those things
thru you.

KL: They should but they haven't been. I am all for it.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/66

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
11/16/71 9:15 a.m.

R: I'm just talking to George and Marshall Green about the statement. George is going up to the Hill to testify today before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and when he comes out they will be swarming all over him. I think the thing for him to say is to . . . . express disappointment. . . repeat the old cliches. This could hurt the President domestically.

K: I was surprised at the attack on . . .

R: The Korean part didn't. Some of the language did. But I mean part of it seemed gratuitous as hell.

K: I suppose we have to say something, but I talked to the President last night. This morning he is steaming so much about this leak about the withdrawals through June, which is exactly what he told Laird not to do.

R: These things are inevitable.

K: Well let me raise it with him when he gets out.

R: I think we should talk. George is very concerned about the domestic political reaction. Particularly the part about the Indochina thing when he says that's the only way to reduce tensions.

K: On the other hand, they again didn't say "replace Thieu."

R: No, but they blame us for everything. I can imagine them putting it before us as a general proposition, but this is a pretty strong indictment of the United States. It came so late last night that it didn't hit the news shows, but when it hits them what they said it may blow up. George is testifying at 10:00.

K: Why can't he duck it by saying we are studying . . .

R: He can, but then it looks like we are going to make a real statement when we finish.

K: Let me talk to the President and call you back.

R: Okay, maybe all three of us could talk, but George has to be there at 10:00.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

9:22 a.m. 11/16/71

K: You certainly got the President's attention. On the Beecher story in the
NYTimes.

L: I haven't seen it.

K: Read it. Established a withdrawal date for June 30 and figures and haven't planned ahead. He called me at 7:30 this morning.

L: I haven't seen the thing. I want to talk about the situation -- I am testifying right now. Questions on intelligence thing. They want to bring foreign Relations Committee into it. We can't do that. As far as financing our programs, it's impossible. So I am telling them that these will be continued in the Defense budget and continued in the Armed Services Committee and no reason to get other committees involved. We can't take it out.

K: I agree with you. Who wants to shift it?

L: Fulbright and Symington proposals now that intelligence going over to this committee. This would be a mistake because we would have foreign policy guys.

K: We don't want to switch.

L: On the off set thing -- did you read that memo to me?

K: I did. I will talk with Connally.

L: This thing is tied up with the economic thing are causing troubles and British and French are trying to move. I will read the Beecher story. What's he talking about?

K: What you said in his office.

B: The military feels that way. Does he think I said it?

K: in OSD. Take a look at it and see what we can do about it.

L: On the front page of the NYTimes? I will find it right away.

Further conversation -- 9:35 a.m.

L: I read this story. I didn't talk to the President about this.

K: He thinks so.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

9:22 a.m. 11/16/71

-2-

L: It's not even one of my alternatives. There's an AP story that Abrams has a 90 day --

K: I have seen it. We are never without this speculation.

L: You get this with a short announcement. I talked with the Chiefs and staff and said planning figures on these alternatives were not to be mentioned. I k never talked about that plan. Should I call him?

K: It might not be a bad idea. I haven't seen him since 7:30.

L: There will be one tomorrow on 90,000. I will go down and have a press conference if he wants it to quiet them down. But I cannot stop predictions, even when they are wrong. I will be testifying before 11:30. This isn't even one of mine. These bastards will write this because it's cheap journalism.