CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA AT 46TH STREET NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017 CABLE ADDRESS INTERPAX OXFORD 7-3131

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

10 December 1968

Dear Bob:

I am writing you about certain proposals of the American Foreign
Service Association that I have been, or will be, brought to your attention.

As you know, I organized and was a member of the Committee on
Foreign Service Personnel, of which the late Secretary Christian Herter was the
Chairman. I have retained a continuing interest in the problems of foreign af-
fairs personnel and in the organization of the Government to handle its foreign
relations.

Being convinced that no effective change could take place unless the Foreign Service favored it, I welcomed the efforts of the new leaders of the American Foreign Service Association to bring about reform. I cooperated with them to the best of my ability, although I had no share in the preparation of their recent report, *Toward a Modern Diplomacy*, which I saw for the first time after it was in print.

One of the major recommendations of this report is in substance the
same as what I have always regarded as the most important recommendation of
the majority of the Herter Committee. I became convinced during that Commit-
tee's work that neither the Secretary of State nor his deputy can in fact ever devote
the time, energy, and thought to the management of foreign affairs that is required;
their attention to problems of management must always be essentially discontinuous
and sporadic. I therefore have supported and continue to work hard for the concept
that the third ranking officer in the Department should be in effect its chief opera-
tions officer. This does not in my opinion mean that he must be interjected on
policy matters between the Secretary/Under-Secretary and the Assistant Secre-
taries; it is essential that on day-to-day and even long-term policy issues,
Assistant Secretaries have direct access to the Secretary/Under-Secretary. It
does mean that one person, who should travel very little, will have all the threads
of the management of foreign affairs, within the Department and on an interdepart-
mental basis, in his hands.

I see no point in this letter in discussing the question of titles raised
by the AFSA report. All I want to do is to urge that when the new administration
comes into office it establish from the very beginning the principle and the practice
that the No. 3 man in the State Department be given responsibilities along the lines
set forth by the reports of both the Herter Committee and the American Foreign
Service Association. I believe the case is well made on pages 25-26 of *Toward A
Modern Diplomacy*, although I differ with the authors of the AFSA report about the
title to be given to the No. 3 man.

Robert D. Murphy, Esq.
Hotel Pierre (39th Floor)
New York, New York

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA AT 46TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK
CABLE ADDRESS INTERPAX

19 December 1968

COPY

Dear Mr. President-elect:

The Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace have felt increasing concern about the threat to world peace posed by recent developments in strategic weapons technology. At their request, I invited a small group of private citizens to meet last June in New York to consider how the Endowment might contribute to increased public understanding of these complex issues.

As a result of that meeting, the Endowment asked Dr. George Rathjens to prepare a paper on "The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's." Enclosed is a finished version of that paper, together with a summary; Dr. Rathjens' background is described on page one of the paper. This final version reflects the counsel given Dr. Rathjens at two meetings I convened for that purpose, as well as at a number of sessions he had with various individuals.

My own conclusion, as a result of my deep involvement in this exercise, is that the issues raised by new strategic weapons will be among the most fundamental and difficult that the United States will face during the next four years and beyond. In particular, I am concerned about the implications of the recent decisions regarding the deployment of a light anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system and multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's). My concern is shared not only by those who attended the meetings, but by others with whom I have been in touch.

Because of the great significance I attach to these problems, I wanted to get a copy of the paper into your hands as soon as possible, prior to its publication. I should welcome the privilege of bringing Dr. Rathjens and one or two participants in our meetings to discuss these urgent matters with you at an early date.

Faithfully yours,

Joseph E. Johnson

The President-elect
Hotel Pierre
Fifth Avenue at 61st Street
New York, New York

New York, New York
Fifth Avenue at 62nd Street
Hotel Hiette
The President-elect

Joseph E. Johnson

Faithfully yours.

these urgent matters with you at an early date.
Dr. Ratliffene and one or two participants in our meetings to discuss
prior to its publication. I should welcome the privilege of bringing
I wanted to get a copy of the paper into your hands as soon as feasible,
Because of the great significance I attach to these problems.

with whom I have been in touch,
separated not only by those who attended the meetings, but by others
individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRA's). My concern is
deployment of a light anti-palliative missile (ABM) system and multiple
cerned about the implications of the recent decisions regarding the
tace during the next four weeks and beyond. In particular, I am con-
among the most fundamental and difficult that the United States will
exercize, is that the issues raised by new strategic weapons will be
My own conclusion, as a result of my deep involvement in this

at a number of sessions he had with various individuals.
Dr. Ratliffene at two meetings I convened for that purpose, as well as
bade one of the papers. The final version reflects the counsel given
together with a summary; Dr. Ratliffene, background is described on
Options for the 1970's. Enclosed is a finished version of that paper.
Ratliffene to prepare a paper on "The Future of the Strategic Arms Race:
As a result of that meeting, the Endowment asked Dr. George

understanding of these complex issues.
to consider how the Endowment might contribute to increased public
I invited a small group of private citizens to meet last June in New York
recent developments in strategic weapons technology. At their request,
have felt increasing concern about the threat to world peace posed by
The Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dear Mr. President-elect:

COPY

19 December 1969
CYEAR ADDRESS INTERIM
NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK
UNITED NATIONS BLDG. AT 40TH STREET

[Tc]

[LC]

Participants in meeting of 25 June 1968

Harding F. Bancroft

Lincoln Bloomfield

Charles G. Bolté

Hedley Donovan

Paul Doty

Bernard Feld

Joseph E. Johnson

Carl Kaysen

Henry A. Kissinger

George Kistiakowsky

Burke Marshall

John J. McCloy

Robert S. McNamara

Norman Ramsey

George Rathjens

Oscar Ruebhausen

Marshall D. Shulman

Charles W. Yost

THE FUTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE:
OPTIONS FOR THE 1970'S

George W. Rathjens

Visiting Professor of Political Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Summary

Although American strategic forces were built up rapidly during the early 1960's, their level has been almost constant during the last two years. In contrast, Soviet strategic forces have recently been growing at a fast rate, although according to most measures of strategic strength, the United States continues to have "superiority."

In the present context, the concept of "superiority" may have outlived its usefulness.

The present strategic balance might be more meaningfully characterized as one of "sufficiency" in strategic forces in the sense that each side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other, regardless of the conditions under which nuclear war might develop. Thus, further increases in strategic force levels are not likely to offer either country new political options. Yet on both sides there have been vigorous research and development programs that now make probable the deployment of new strategic systems.

There was hope a few years ago that during the early 1970's the strategic balance might become stabilized, with both the Soviet Union and the United States willing to base the planning of their strategic forces on the view that they could serve little purpose other than to deter a Soviet-American thermonuclear war. It now seems possible that this hope of stability based on mutual deterrence may not be realized; there is no evidence that the expansion in Soviet strategic forces is tapering off;

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technological advances have made possible new strategic weapons that are likely to be deployed; and the emergence of China as a nuclear power may be a stimulus to the expansion of strategic forces.

At the heart of the difficulty in moderating the arms race is the fact that the United States is likely to react to any deployment of new strategic forces by the adversary by making compensating or over-compensating improvements in its own capabilities; the same is probably true of the Soviet Union. Indeed, because of the time required to translate decisions into operational capability, both sides often react in anticipation of possible adversary deployments. The problem is exacerbated by the great uncertainty of each side about its adversary's capabilities and intentions. These factors must be taken into account in any attempt to control the arms race by agreement--and in unilateral decisions regarding new weapons choices.

Some of the weapons systems that now appear on the horizon, particularly anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses and multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), are likely to introduce large uncertainties into the calculus of the strategic balance, and thus are especially likely to stimulate adversary reaction or over-reaction.

Despite the lateness of the hour, it may still be possible to head off a new escalation of the arms race. However, this may require a reversal of some decisions already made. The most promising approach would be through negotiations between the superpowers, although the importance of reciprocal unilateral restraint regarding new weapons choices should not be discounted. It should be added that strategic arms talks, even if they do not result in a formal treaty, may still serve a useful purpose if they help dispel some of the uncertainties that fuel the arms race.

In any case, fundamental clarification of U.S. objectives is required as a basis for making specific decisions regarding weapons choices and negotiating positions. In this connection

we are confronted with two difficult dilemmas: that of reconciling our desire to minimize damage to ourselves in the event of war with our desire to escape the adverse consequences that may flow from developing damage-limiting capabilities; and that of minimizing the likelihood of escalation while relying on it as a deterrent.

There is a desire on the part of both Americans and Russians to try to limit to very low levels damage to their own countries in the event of war, and a desire on each side to ensure that it will emerge from a nuclear war less damaged than its opponents. Yet attempts to develop and deploy forces that might contribute to the attainment of these specific objectives are likely to have two adverse effects: an increase in the probability of thermonuclear war; and a build-up in strategic forces leading not only to greater expense for both sides, but probably even to an increase in the total damage that each might expect in the event of war.

As for the second dilemma, the consequences of thermonuclear war are rightly judged so horrible that major efforts to avoid it are justified. Yet there is a tendency in the United States and elsewhere to rely on the danger of escalation as a deterrent to limited aggression, particularly in Europe--a tendency that is incompatible with minimizing the possibility of a thermonuclear war occurring.

It is suggested that it is in the interest of the United States to resolve this second dilemma by moving away from reliance on the likelihood of escalation as a deterrent to limited aggression.

As regards the first dilemma, we should give greater weight than we have in the past to curtailing the action-reaction cycle that drives the arms race, even at the expense of our deep-seated desires for "superiority" and for development of effective "damage-limiting"

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capabilities. If the Soviet Union can accept similar limitations on its objectives, there would appear to be a basis for negotiations to limit strategic armaments.

This neither requires nor implies a resolution of the fundamental political differences that pervade Soviet-American relations. But moderating the pace of the strategic arms race may make possible cooperation in other areas and help to accelerate a resolution of some of these political conflicts.

December 1968