DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon

Jim Cannon

5/22/70 8:12 a.m.

C: I'm in Watertown, having come up with the Governor. I just wanted you to know you'd have been proud of his support of the President before about 500 angry ~~mx~~ students trying to get him to disavow the President.

K: Tell him I didn't see it but I'm proud of him.

C: The Times is in such travail that they can't report anything unless it happens before noon.

K: and agree with their editorial position.

C: Right. But I just wanted ~~mx~~ you to know about this.

K: Please give him my warm regards.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
9:20 am 5/22/70

K: Can't we quiet down on this now that we have made our position? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

Z: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (I can't just ignore point blank questions or it dooks like I'm trying to cover something up and it makes big headlines.)

K: Look at this SOB Allen.

Z: He should be fired within two weeks.

K: Bonnie Angelo said she wanted to use that thing on the wooden triangle.

Z: No, it would be a big mistake, because it shows the President's key advisor making light of the operation.

K: OK.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Yoshida

9:26 am

5/22/70

K: I just wanted to tell you what you probably know but I think it's important for you to understand. We are now under a legislative limitation. If we don't get something in 3 weeks we have to have a Congressional act. We have run out of time. You can read the statement to Congress to that effect. I wanted you to know there has to be a solution within three weeks. Or we will have to permit the legislative solution.

Y: Are you aware -- I'm reading newspaper reports -- our Ambassador is in Paris and is working very hard on the older (proposal?) I sent/

K: I know they are working hard.

Y: I will get in touch with my friend and pass on your message to him. I certainly hope there will be an acceptable solution in three weeks. I will let you know as soon as I have something from my friend.

K: Fine. This is all really I wanted you to know. I know our Secy, Stans has offered to meet Miazawa.

Y: I cannot understand.

K: One of our people has offered to meet with your Commerce man.

Y: I will pass on your message to my friend within a few hours.

K: Very good.

Y: I will be getting in touch with you again.

K: Always good to hear from you.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

9:30 p am 5/22/70]

K: The President called me last night about this report that Hencken had said we know where COSVN was. He said why don't we hit it. I gave him Abrams message. He says if you want to use 52's it's okay.

L: I gave Abrams that authority.

K: I thought he hit it.

L: He did within the 30 km. He got part of it.

K: I just wanted you to know his concern. You gave him that authority.

L: yes even when he didn't have a target. You have a copy of the execute which was issued.

K: I haven't seen it yet.

L: On the briefing yesterday, we decided to go (public ?)

K: I had no problem with it. I wasn't unhappy with it. I just wanted to make that point.

L: We will be there at 3:00.

K: You know his position on ARVN. If they are needed for clean up after we leave in the sanctuaries, or should they want to go back in or have to go back. After we are out of there.

L: We are always trying to show that there's a division between your background on what the President said to the leadership ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? I'm trying to give a little running room. Some people say I'm not supporting the President. It's ridiculous.

K: You are doing fine.

L: Until the President says I should change my position, I'm not going to.

K: You are absolutely right.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Timmons/Kissinger

10:13 a.m.

5/22/70

K: I was at a dinner party with Hugh Scott the other night. He made a little speech in which he in effect said the WH should now make a compromise. I said I didn't care what his private views are but I wished he wouldn't (find fault with the President in my presence). I really laid into him. He thinks the House will go with the Cooper/Church in another two weeks. The President said check it out.

T: He told us that but we checked around and they wouldn't. We talked to Morgan and he is strong on it and he will appoint the conferees. Scott's concern is that public opinion is going against us so that the rank and file of the House is going against us. I don't believe that. There are some defections from our ranks but not enough to be concerned about. We can't defeat the Cooper/Church on the Senate floor. I don't know if we can amend it but we can take a shot at that. Mansfield put on party pressure. But it's hard to vote against the President's having the right to defend troops.

K: We can hold it for two weeks?

T: Yes.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

S. Alsop/Kissinger

11:11 am

5/22/70

A: I have written a piece on the basis of my work. Let me read you the theme. "The decision the President reached on the basis of? ? ? ? not decide if he is right. The first myth is that ? ? ? ? ? ?. He cabled Abrams on the eve of the decision. ? ? ? ? ? ? the President would have been mad not to consult his chief advisors. The second myth is that he is so removed from ? ? ? ? ?. And aide warned him ? ? ? ? that some universities might burn. ? ? ? ? ? other advantages were outweighed."

K: If you could delete that sentence that some universities would burn. That tags it too closely to me.

A: OK. "? ? ? ? ? ? ? bit at last the President's scribbles suggest that it was not the decision of a fool but that ? ? ? ? ? ? His chief motive was to ? ? ? ? ? ? ? withdrawals. It will soon become clear if it's objective will succeed." I have other scribbles -- "time is running out," "only symbolic."

K: Military aid would be only symbolic.

A: Strength ? ? ? ? ? to hold out against an assault ? ? ? ? ?. You are particularly sensitive about Penom Penh so here is "? ? ? ? ? ? ?" That's all Alsop. Two more scribbles "if we don't move now and they don't either" -- this could make it impossible for ? ? ? ? ? ? attacking a neutral government.

K: What he meant by the Cambodian situation was that Cambodia would become a base and we could not react. A de facto communist base. The if you added that sentend in explanation. It wounds now that he couldn't ______ to go after these sanctuaries one way or another. ? ? ? ? ? and we couldn't prevent it's use.

A: I have another one which may be too sensitive "it may divert the communists from an attack on Penom Penh and it may ? ? ? ? ? to negotiation ______."

K: If you could leave out Moscow for other reasons. There's an enourmous sensitivity.

A: You don't want to say that they can attack Penom Penh and we won't do anything.

K: You could say it may keep the communists from taking over the whole country and drop Moscow.

A: I have a paraphrase. The risk ______ also in the President's mind was a communist attack on Penom Penh. Meaning that they would take over the whole country.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

RS Alsop/Kissinger

11:11 am

5/22/70

-2-

K: That doesn't bother me. That's a contingency response and that's all right.

A: "Considering the possibility of using SVN troops alone which would ? ? ? and reduce the danger of the ? ? ? which the President had ? ? ? for the Fish Hook operation."

K: Which would have had very inconclusive results.

A: I put that in. Cambodia was a reserve for guerillas.

K: One point -- some news reports say there was no intelligence estimate. There was one and it turned out to be correct on the reaction of major countries.

A: Good and I think it will be a good piece. I know exactly how it will heppen. I will be called a flack of Nixon's but so be it.

K: As one flack to another --