[Y]

## II

### II. - Some Forms of Limitation

#### A. The Prerequisites of Limitation.

There are
Limitation of war has three prerequisites: (a) The
able to prevent
capability for limited war must be sufficiently powerful so that-
from
the potential aggressor cannot come on creating a fait accompli;

(b) it must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that its
use, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is not
an inevitable prelude to it; (c) it must be coupled with a diplo-
macy which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not our sole
response, to aggression and which is flexible enough to negotiate
a settlement during pauses in military operations.

that we will not do
short and complete victory.

If the free world's limited war forces can be overrun easily,

a blackmail
aggression may be encouraged and the dilemmas of massive retaliation

The danger if a fait accompli must demonstrate all
will then confront us in even sharper form. If we resist by measures

which we intend to be limited but which an opponent interprets as the
prelude to all-out war, he may launch a pre-emptive attack. If our
diplomacy cannot take advantage of pauses in military operations

diplomacy cannot take advantage of belligerents in military operations
belligerent to all-out war, he may launch a bio-embassy attack. If our
which we intend to be limited but which an obdherent interhbars us the
will then confront us in even sparser form. If we resort to measures
aggression may be encouraged and the dilemmas of massive retaliation
If the free world's limited war forces can be overruled easily.

a settlement during belligerents in military operations.

resistance to aggression and which is tristple enough to negotiate
much which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not our sole
an inevitable belligerent to it; (c) it must be coupled with a diple-
nary, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is not
(d) it must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that its
the belligerent aggressor cannot continue creating a felt acerbity;
capability for limited war must be sufficiently beneficial to des-
limitation of war, see three precedents; (a) the

> V. The Precedents of Limitation.

VI. The Precedents of Limitation.

VI. Some Terms of Limitation

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to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on
"purely" military considerations, any conflict will expand by
stages into a conflagration.

Considered in the abstract, these requirements can be
met in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force
is also suitable for limited war because of its ability to
engage in graduated skin retaliation or limited strategic war-
fare. Others advocate a strategy designed to punish an aggressor
though not necessarily at the place where aggression occurs.

Still others would rely on guerilla activity, to make the
position of the aggressor untenable. Finally, there is the
school of thought which considers it essential that the free-
world achieve a capability for local defense.

All of these measures afford opportunities for resisting
aggression short of all-out war. Each of them has uses in
deterring aggression. Each can afford some alternative to
general war.
world-wide conflagration. Yet their consequences for diplomacy,
deterrence and strategy vary. They will be discussed in turn.

deterrence and strategy vary. They will be decreased in cmu.

world-wide conflictuation. Let their consequences for diplomacy.

determing aggression. Each can afford some alternatives to

aggression short of all-out war. Each of them past needs in

VII of these measures afford opportunities for restating
world order a capacity for local defense.

school of thought which considers it essential that the fee-

bituation of the aggressor intangible, limitaly, there is no
still ether would rely on guerilla activity, so long as the
tough not necessarily at the place where aggression occurs.

tough not necessarily at the place where the aggressor
occurs. Others advocate a strategy designed to benefit an aggressor

aggressed in graduated form retaliation or limited strategic war.

its also autaple for limited war because of its ability to
win in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force

agreed into a collisgration.

"purely" military considerations, and conflict will exhaust py
to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on

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According to the theory of limited retaliation, this point will be reached when the cost of the retaliation exceeds the value of the objective.

There are major difficulties, however, with using the in relation to deterrence as well as strategy, should deterrence policy in relation to strategy as well. The force in this manner of deterrence as well as strategy should deterrence policy in deterrence as to deterrent policy. Even if we sorted to our declared strategy, we would still be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We would be forced to engage in actions each of which almost guarantees at least similar destruction in the free world and run the constant risk of all-out war while the issue which produced the conflict has already been settled in the aggressor's favor. Every passing day would strengthen the Soviet hold on its prize and bring home to us the futility of our course. The Communist leaders may well calculate that skillful peace offensive would cause us to weary of so unrewarding a strategy, unless complete frustration were to induce us to launch an all-out war.

The problem is so intractable because limited employment of the strategic force rather than preventing an aggressor from attaining his objective seeks to compel him to relinquish it once achieved. But

Proactive seeks to combat him to relindicate it once achieved. But the strategic force rather than preventing an aggressor from attaining the problem is so intractable because limited employment of an all-out war.

a strategy, unless complete frustration were to influence us to launch that skillful peace offensive would cause us to worry of so unrelenting hostility of our course. The Communist leaders may well calculate to strengthen the Soviet hold on its bridle and print homes to us the already been settled in the aggressor's favor. Early basing may bring risk of all-out war while the issue which produced the conflict has at least similar destruction in the free world and run the consequent would be forced to engage in actions each of which almost guarantees we would still be at a fundamental biological disadvantage. We are to deterrent policy. Even if we marred to our declared strategy, retaliatory force in the manner in relation to strategy as well as military determination as well as inuring to the interest of the victor will

There are major dittoities, however, with using the objective.

be reached when the cost of the retaliation exceeds the sine of According to the theory of limited retaliation, this point will

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negligible and our declarations so insistent that they will then fail
to bring our determination home to the aggressor. ~~We may find ourselves~~
having to choose between ineffectualness or all-out war.

Graduated retaliation might furnish the aggressor less incentive to retaliatory intact, he may be prepared to endure a measure of damage without retaliation, if only to demonstrate the futility of our military effort.

On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the military compulsion to retaliates may be smaller than in the case of limited strategic war, the psychological compulsion will be greater. It will be difficult not to respond when one's own civilian population is under attack. Moreover, the opponent may mistake what we intend as graduated retaliation for the prelude to an all-out attack--unless we behave with a self-defeating circumspection. Thus, whatever eventuality is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the retaliatory force is either defeat or all-out war.

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory forces must meet two requirements which in practice cancel each other out: The

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory forces must
retaliate force is either dealt or all-out war.

is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the
penetration with a self-defeating circumvention. Thus, whatever executability
graduated retaliation for the benefits to an all-out attack--unless we
attack. Moreover, the opponent may state what we intend as
difficult not to reach at one's own dilution population is under
strategic war, the benthological combustion will be greater. It will be
terry combustion to compensate than in the case of limited
On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the milit-
tation, if only to demonstrate the utility of our military effort.

intact, he may be prepared to ensure a measure of damage without retail-
tory incentive to retaliate.

As long as the retaliatory force remains
graduated retaliation might furnish the aggressor less an
opponent to choose between intellectualness or all-out war.

To print our determination to the aggressor. We may find out exactly

to print our determination to the aggressor. We may find out exactly

negligible and our declarations so insistent that they will then fall

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aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited strategic war or graduated retaliation, while it increases the risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it, and (b) that we **are** prepared to resort to all-out war rather than accept defeat. If we fail in meeting the first condition, the opponent will probably strike pre-emptively. If we fail in meeting the second condition, the aggressor may be encouraged to outwait us or to engage in a test of nerves with a built-in escalator to all-out war.

Of course, the very riskiness of such a course may make the aggressor recoil; the ease with which matters **could** get out of hand might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether the democracies would impose on themselves so daring, indeed so reckless, a strategy. Once deterrence has failed they will be confronted at every turn by the alternative of defeat of all-out war.

In most circumstances, limited strategic war will probably combine the disadvantages of limited and of all-out war.

From the point of view of deterrence it is not easy to imagine

from the point of view of deterrence it is not easy to imagine

In most circumstances, limited strategic war will properly couple

reckless, a strategy. Once deterrence has failed such will be
democratically imposed on countries so far away, instead of

might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether the
aggressor repond: the case with which matters could get out of hand
Of course, the very riskiness of such a course may make the
escalator to all-out war.

to outwait us or to engage in a test of nerves with a pull-in
meeting the second condition, the aggressor may be encouraged
opponent will properly strike pre-emptively. If we fail in
accept defeat. If we fail in meeting the first condition, the
(p) that we are prepared to resort to all-out war rather than
risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it, and
strategic war or graduated retaliation, while it increases the
aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited

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American decision to use its retaliatory force in a limited manner. The Communist states would still be able to menace the Prime Minister of a free country somewhat as follows: "If you do not disarm completely, our forces will move in to dismantle your military establishment. To be sure, in that case the Americans may retaliate against us. But this will only give us an added incentive to remain and to restore our economy from your country. Whether the American retaliation is limited or all-out we will respond in kind. We shall see whose nerves snap first. Whatever the outcome of a Soviet-United States war, your country as you now know it will cease to exist." In the face of such a threat resistance may well seem quixotic. For whether we retaliate or not, the threatened country will be overrun. In these circumstances, many nations of the free world may seek to obtain the most favorable terms possible.

Considered from the point of view of the United States, the concept-of either limited strategic war or graduated retaliation

conceals et alier limited strategic war or graduated retaliation
governed from the hour of view of the United States, the
most favorable terms possible.

occasions, many nations of the free world may seek to obtain the
or not, the threatened country will be overrun. In these circum-
threat resistance may well seem diabolical. For another we retallate
as you now know it will cease to exist." In the face of such a
Whatever the outcome of a Soviet-United States war, your country
we will reboard in kind. We shall see whose nerves are up first.
country. Whether the American retaliation is limited or all-out
an added incentive to remain and to restore our economy from your
Americans may retallate against us. But this will only give us
your military establishment. To be sure, in that case the
do not dream completely, our forces will move in to dramatic
Prime Minister of a free country somewhat as @ first: "It you
manner. The Communist cause would still be able to menace the
American retaliation to see its retaliatory force in a limited

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to be equally compromising. In case of Communist aggression, an American President would be faced with the decision of initiating a type of conflict which could not protect the victim and which might expose the United States to fearful devastation. This becomes clear if one in agines a Communist note to the United States delivered concurrently with the ultimatum to an ally somewhat along the following lines: "We are very eager to avoid all-out war.

If we canDetalize against us/ Moreover, all-out war is pointless since our retaliatory force is invulnerable. To show our good intentions we will overlook attacks you make in the first few hours after this communication. From devastate the United States in precise proportion then on, we will retaliat but no more." Is it a foregone conclusion that a President would use our retaliatory force in that case? Or that it would be wise to do so? Then even if we omitted p. 11-7

C. Indirect Retaliation.

The strategy of indirect retaliation grows out of an awareness of the risks of attacks on the Communist homeland and particularly on its retaliatory force. On the other hand, advocates of this course

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consider it impossible to defend the entire Communist perimeter
locally. Accordingly they argue that resistance need not occur
at the spot where aggression takes place. Rather we should utilize
the special advantages of our strategic position, particularly our
superior seapower. Aggression against, say, Iran, could be
resisted, so the argument goes, by such measures as closing the
Dardanelles or a blockade of the Sodat Union. Pressure against
Berlin could be countered by economic sanctions against Eastern
Europe or perhaps closing the Straits of Denmark.

Such a strategy would avoid many of the risks of the limited
use of our retaliatory force. It might increase the credibility
emphasizing
of our deterrent by/a threat which is plausible. The gap between
deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement will be
smaller.

At the same time a strategy of indirect retaliation has prob-
lems of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce
the risk to the aggressor to the point where blackmail or military
pressure become tempting. Where the limited use of the retaliatory

pressure becomes tempting. Where the limited use of the retaliatory
tire to the aggressor to the point where pickwall or military
lines of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce
At the same time a strategy of indirect retaliation may be prop-
eller.

deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement will be
of our deterrent plan's threat which is plausible. The gap between
emphasizing

use of our retaliatory force. It might increase the credibility
Good a strategy would avoid many of the risks of the unlimited

Europe or NATO closing the Straits of Denmark.
Berlin could be countered by economic sanctions against Eastern
Baltikailes or a blockade of the Soviet Union. Pressure against
restated, so the argument goes, by such measures as closing the
superior seaplane. Aggression against, say, Iran, could be
the special advantages of our strategic position, partially our
at the shot where aggression takes place. Better we should utilize
locally. Accordingly they argue that resistance need not occur
consider it impossible to defend the entire Communist perimeter

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force involves an undue danger of all-out war, most measures
of indirect retaliation are too circumscribed and long-term in
their effect. A naval blockade does not prevent a fait accompli. Closing the Dardanelles could not save Iran and its impact on the U.S.S.R. would be long delayed.

As a result, we would be forced to maintain over an indefinite period measures whose utility every passing day would throw into question. They may in fact supply an incentive to the Communists to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure and the impotence of our response. And, after a sufficient lapse of time, it will be difficult to resist Soviet peaceoffensives, urging us to adjust to facts. The fate of the embargo of strategic goods against Communist China after the invasion of Korea can serve as an example of the difficulty of persevering in a policy of indirect retaliation over a long period. The increasing pressure to accept the Soviet fait accompli in Eastern Europe is another.

If such a strategy presents great complexities for us, it is
perhaps the least desirable cause of action for our allies. The

begun the least desirable cause of action for our allies. The

It used a strategy to pressure their complexities for it, it is another.

pressure to accept the Soviet fait accompli in Eastern Europe is
bony of indirect retaliation over a long period. The increasing
can serve as a one example of the difficulty of bereavement in a
toxicuge booges against Communist China after the invasion of Korea
ncluding us to adjust to facts. The fate of the encroachment of exs-
of time, it will be difficult to restate Soviet base offensives
and the indolence of our response. And, after a sufficient lapse
the Communists to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure
team into question. They may in fact subdue an incentive to
definite period measures whose utility every passing day, would
be a result, we would be forced to maintain over an in-
our the U. S. B. R. would be long delayed.

bit. Closing the Berqueelles could not save Iran and its subject
their effect. A new fiscal program does not prevent a fiscal secon-
d of indirect retaliation are too circumscribed and long-term in
force involves an unique danger of all-out war, most measures

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blackmail situation described earlier will be even more poig-
nant when the American response is so indirect. With Soviet
occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide scope
exists for the gradual erosion of morale through steady Soviet
pressure. A strategy based entirely on indirect retaliation
must lead eventually to a disintegration of the free world.

D. Guerilla Warfare.

Many thoughtful people, horrified by the risks of nuclear
war, have come to the conclusion that any war involving the
great powers void carry with it an intolerable risk of expanding
into a nuclear holocaust. They therefore urge that the aggression
be deterred by organizing the civilian population into guerilla
groups and confronting the Communists with the prospect of a long
drawn-out campaign of pacification. (4)

One difficulty with this view is that it oversimplifies the
task. There is no known instance of large-scale sustained partisan
activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those uprisings

activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those acquisitions
result in no known instance of large-scale sustained partition
One difficulty with this view is that it overemphasizes the
drawn-out campaign of glaciation.

Broads and confronting the Communists with the broadeet of a few
be deterred by organizing the civilian population into Barrilles
into a nuclear holoasat. They theretore urde that the aggrssion
great bomeers mid carry with it an intofersible risk of expanding
war, pave come to the conclusion that any mm involving the
many thoughtful people, perlitied by the risks of nuclear

D. Guerilla Warfare.

must lead eventually to a disintegration of the tree world.
breasts. A strategy based entirely on indirect retaliation
exists for the gradual creation of morale through steady Soviet
occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide ecodes
nant when the American response is so indirect. With Soviet
plackmail situation described earlier will be even more bef-

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which did occur were ruthlessly and quickly suppressed. There is little in their experience to cause the Communist leaders to be overly impressed by the threat of popular resistance, and Communist theory would make them doubt even its possibility. Popular resistance in Hungary and Tibet did not prove an extended obstacle to Communist rule.

Moreover, whatever the effectiveness of guerilla warfare as a strategy, its utility as a threat for purposes of deterrence is highly questionable. A country relying on partisan warfare for deterrence would have to convince the potential aggressor that, while it would offer no organized resistance, it would be able to train guerilla groups and would persevere in using them until the aggressor withdrew. These two requirements are to a large extent inconsistent with each other. The decision not to resist with organized forces can only be interpreted by the aggressor as lack of will. The threat to resort to partisan warfare is more likely to be construed as bluster than as a real menace. It is not easy to see what concrete steps a nation could take to

it is not easy to see what concrete acts a-nation could take to
likely to be construed as planter than as a real menace. It
lack of will. The threat to resort to belligerent matters is more
with organized forces can only be interpreted by the aggressor as
extent inconsistent with each other. The decision not to resist
the aggressor withdrew. These two requirements are to a large
 extent. In general, the strategy of a country relying on belligerent
matters is generally questionable. A country relying on belligerent
matters would have to prove the potential aggressor that,
for deterrence and benevolence to convince the potential aggressor that
it is highly questionable. A country relying on belligerent matters
a strategy, its utility as a threat for purposes of deterrence
Moreover, whatever the effectiveness of guerilla matters as
opstacle to Communist rule.

Belligerent resistance in Hungary and Lipset did not prove an extended
Communist theory would make them doubt even its feasibility.
be overly impressed by the threat of belligerent resistance, and
it is little in their experience to cause the Communist leaders to
which doubt were rufiessly and quickly embittered. These

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demonstrate its readiness for guerilla warfare or how it could be certain of its ability to carry out its threat.

To make such a deterrent effective, a government would have to convince an aggressor that, while unable to protect its people against invasion, it has sufficient prestige to ask for the most difficult and, for those involved, most costly form of resistance. The more highly organized a society, the greater its discipline, the more an aggressor is likely/the threat of guerilla warfare as bluff. In highly organized Western societies the aggressor may count with some confidence on his ability to coerce the leadership groups to assist him in restoring order.

Indeed, the measures required to prove a serious intention to conduct partisan warfare are also likely to inspire a feeling of hopelessness. The specialization of function on which the highly integrated Western societies depend requires an efficient administrative group and a cohesive governmental apparatus. The occupying power has, therefore, many foci for pressure. It can appeal to the sense of order and discipline of the administrative group and the

sense of order and discipline of the administrative group and the
benevolent presence, many feet for breaths. It can abate to the
extensive group and a creative governmental apparatus. The occubating
integrity Western societiesgebend reduces an efficient admin-
istration of government. The specialization of function on which the highly
to conquer barriennanature are also likely to insipre a feeling

In each the measures required to prove a serious intention
in restoring order...

on the apportion to occur the fesderabund groups to meet him
Western societies the aggressor may consent to step in case he
threat of guerilla warfare as piant. In highly organized
Greater its discipline, the more an aggressor is likely to regard
the form of resistance. The more highly organized a society, the
so far for the most difficult and, for those involved, most costly
its people against invasion, it has sufficient prescige to
have to convince an aggressor that, while unable to protect
To make such a deterrent effective, a government must
could be certain of its ability to carry out its threat.

demonstrate its readiness for guerilla warfare or pow it.

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governmental apparatus. It can use terror. And if it fails, the breakdown of the subtle interrelationships of modern society is almost certain to have much more dire consequences for the indigenous population than for the occupying power.

Partisan activity has generally been most effective in primitive societies and precisely because of the absence of identifiable control. In these societies there exists no group with sufficient authority against which effective pressure can be brought. To propose such a strategy for Europe reveals deep misunderstanding of the requirements of deterrence and of the psychology of the Western societies.

Guerilla warfare almost invariably requires special conditions to be possible at all: of terrain, as in Yugoslavia or Algeria, or overwhelming numbers as in China, or of vast expanse, such as in Russia. Even then it could be conducted generally only when there was outside support, both military and moral, giving some prospect of eventual victory. Partisan warfare can make a

broadsided of eventual victory. Partialan warlike can make a
type was outside subhort, both military and moral, stating some
as in Russia. Even then it could be conducted generally only when
or overwhelming numbers as in China, or of vast expanse, such
to be possible at all: of terrain, as in Java, Java or Siberia,
Guerilla warfare almost invariably requires special conditions
deterrence and of the badeology of Western societies.

Eruble reveals deep misunderstanding of the requirements of
type pressure can be bought. To brood over such a strategy for
exists no doubt with sufficient authority against which elec-
sence of identifiable control. In these societies there
in primitive societies and precisely because of the ap-
portion activity has generally been most effective
occasionally better.

consequences for the indigenous population than for the
modern society is almost certain to prove much more dire
tails the breakdown of the simple interrelationships of
Governmental apparatus. It can use terror. And if it is

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contribution to other forms of resistance; it cannot be
substitute for them.

E. The Requirement of Local Defense.

If the Free World is to avoid gradual erosion, it must
be able to avoid the fait accompli of Communist occupation.
A capacity for local defense is essential to bring our deterrent
policy in line with the strategy for fighting a war and the requirements
of our security with those of our allies. A fait accompli changes
our attempt to prevent a given event, which is the basis of deterrence,
to an effort to compel a certain course of action. Our threat then
is no longer designed to induce a potential aggressor to refrain from
attacking; it must force him to withdraw. In attack the psychological
burden is on the aggressor: he must take an affirmative step and his
hesitation will be great in proportion as the objective seems un-
attainable. Once the aggressor is in possession of his prize,
however, the psychological burden is shifted. The defender must now assume
the risk of the first move. The aggressor can confine himself to

the risk of the litigant move. The aggressor can continue himself to
pursue, the balephological purgus is shifted. The defender must now assume
attainable. Once the aggressor is in possession of the bristling,

preparation will be great in proportion as the objectives seem un-
purged to the aggressor: he must take an illustrative step and put
attacking: it must force him to withdraw. In attack the balephological
is no longer designed to induce a potential aggressor to remain from
to an effort to combat a certain course of action. Our threat then
our attempt to prevent a given event, which is the base of deterrence,
of our security with those of our allies. A felt accombit changes
policy in line with the strategy for fighting a war and the requirements
V capacity for local defense is essential to bring our deterrent
be able to avoid the felt accombit of Communist occupation.

If the free world is to avoid brutal erosion, it must

## II. The Red requirement of local Defense.

substitute for them.

contribution to other forms of resistance: it cannot be

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outwaiting his opponent whose incentive to persevere is
diminished with every day that the fait accompli endures.

If threatened areas cannot be protected against occupation,
the scope of Communist blackmail will constantly expand. The
disparity in forces suitable for local defense must be remedied
or the Berlin Crisis will prove but an augury of every increasing
pressure. A measure of this security can no doubt be achieved
by schemes for arms control, -as will be discussed below. But
unless the present disparity in local power is remedied there
will be little incentive for a serious negotiation.

In building up these forces, the West faces many obstacles,
not the least of which are its own preconceptions. For over a
decade and a half, it has been axiomatic that the West could
not possibly match Communist manpower, interior lines of communi-
cation and more centralized command arrangements. The conviction
is general that technology must substitute for manpower. A
strategy of punishment was seen as the best counter to the
Communist "hordes." These notions have been reinforced by
budgetary considerations: "More bang for the buck" became