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McAdoo followed Roper and I took him to the station. McCormick thought he had satisfied him about not delegating him to speak in New York, but I found him in much the same mind as when last we talked about it.

Polk talked with me three times today over the telephone from Washington, about the U-boat raid along our coast. Newspaper reporters and others have been trying to get some expression from me which I have refused to give.

The President's speech at Shadow Lawn Saturday shows what a remarkable mind he has. I wrote him Friday suggesting the matter of the speech. He could not have received the letter before eleven o'clock Saturday, and it was hardly possible for him to have given the matter much more than an hour's thought before he delivered the speech. And yet he wove everything he said around the two or three suggestions I made.

October 10, 1916.

This has been a nerve-racking day as yesterday was. The French Ambassador called at ten o'clock and remained for an hour. I found him less aggressive and not quite so firm in his assertion that France would fight until complete victory crowned her efforts. I called attention to what I considered the mistakes of the Allies. It was reiteration, but I wish to reiterate until I impress my point of view upon him. He admitted I had been right in many of my forecasts. I again predicted that the Allies would not make material advances on the Western front, and if victory should come it would be by putting Austria out of commission in Southeastern Europe.

Jusserand asked me to lunch or dine with him when I go to Washington, something I cannot very well do at this time. I told him that the Allies by with our aid could have made as favorable a peace six months after the war began as they could now. He controverted this, but I insisted that the Allies made a

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mistake in not carrying out the tentative agreement I made in Paris and London last February, which would have brought the war to a close in all probability and would have given France a favorable peace. If not, it would have involved us in the struggle.

I noticed a softer note in Jusserand's tone than when I last saw him. He contended that France wanted nothing except an assurance of permanent peace. In reply I thought this could be as easily obtained now as later, for I believed the Germans would be gun-shy for at least one hundred years after the war. He thought the war should continue until "Germany admitted she was ashamed of what she had done". This of course is nonsense, for what nation having fought as the Germans have fought could ever be brought to say such a thing.

Edward Filene followed Jusserand to tell of the shift in candidates in Massachusetts for the United States Senate. We are trying to get Fitzgerald out and ex-Governor Douglas in and with some hope of success. I had some difficulty in getting rid of Filene before Ambassador Gerard and Secretary Lansing arrived for lunch.

There was no one present excepting the three of us, and we discussed the German situation from beginning to end, Gerard doing most of the talking since it was to hear him the lunch was given. He told of the political situation in Germany and of the feeling there toward the U-boat controversy and the United States' attitude. I shall not go into it fully as it dealt so largely with pending matters which may or may not be of permanent interest. Gerard is looking well. He was given a fine reception upon arrival.

I did not go to meet him because of the comment it would have caused at this time when there are so many rumors regarding his visit. The U-boat raid along our coast and the persistent stories regarding peace make his arrival particularly interesting to the public, although, as a matter of fact, it is a co-incident that he should have arrived at such a time.

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I was so generous to Gerard when I was in Berlin, and he is so loyal to the President. Lansing's visit has excited renewed interest but that too was merely a coincidence and had nothing to do with Gerard's arrival, though it would be impossible to make the public believe it. Their coming to lunch with me was also without significance. I should have had Lansing in any event and I should have had Gerard at the earliest possible moment after his arrival.

I did not want Gerard to have any such experience as Walter Page had. Page was here for weeks before he could get an interview with either the President or Secretary of State. I was on the North Shore at the time, otherwise I should have tried to get the President to see him sooner.

A letter came from Frederick Penfield today enclosing a check for $10,000. as his contribution toward the campaign. He sends the money to me as a gift to do with as I please evidently fearing criticism. I shall give it quite openly to the Committee in his name, for I do not approve of any subterfuge about such matters.

The Postmaster General came to talk of the campaign. He was followed by Ambassador Fletcher who thought he had found some new points in international usage as to the submarine controversy. I asked him to submit what he had to say in writing so I could take it up with the State Department and the President if it seemed worth while.

The Editor of the Milwaukee Journal called to tell of that paper's activities in the campaign and of the situation generally in Wisconsin.

Huston Thompson, who is now directing the Speakers Bureau, came for further conference concerning his duties.

Edward S. Martin came in in the evening to get the news of the hour.

October 11, 1916.

My first caller was the German Ambassador. He wished to tell me of his

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his interview with the President yesterday. The President was unusually pleasant to him and Bernstorff commented upon it. The President asked him to send a cable to his Government warning them of the danger of submarine activity along our coast. He made it clear to Bernstorff, if the practice continued, trouble would ensue, and he hoped in behalf of good relations they would heed his warning. The President told him he would do nothing toward mediation before election, but if he were asked after the election he would do so. Bernstorff replied that no belligerent would ask him, and if it were done it would have to be on his own initiative. Bernstorff seemed disturbed about this but I assured him he need not be for if the President thought the time had come when he ought to make an offer of mediation, the fact that he had not been requested to do so would not deter him. I expressed the hope that U-boat 53 had returned home and would cease depredations along our sea-board. He fervently echoed my hope as he sees only too clearly the risk of such activities.

Just before calling upon me Bernstorff saw Gerard at the Ritz Hotel where they are both stopping, and he said he had the greatest difficulty in shaking off the newspaper men so as to come to me. He is quite proud of his achievements in coming here so often without being caught.

A reporter or two followed the German Ambassador and I was thankful they did not meet him.

Mrs. Gerard called to ask some questions about returning to Germany. She would like to go via England if I thought it could be done without criticism. I promised to get information for her directly from the British Government. The Germans did not wish her to go from Berlin through England and the English may have the same feeling. I cautioned her about talking even to her intimate friends and urged her to keep the Judge constantly alert on this point. She was surprised to hear me say that the German Government had

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had some of our Embassy staff followed into neutral countries to find what
they were saying. This was done in the case of Lanier Winslow when he went
to Switzerland last Autumn. Every word he said after he crossed the border
was taken down and reported to the Foreign Office. Fortunately, he was dis-
creet.

Polk telephoned yesterday to read me an article written by Herbert
Swope of the World who came over in the Frederick Xlll with the Gerards, and
which the newspapers are giving wide publicity as being Gerard's views. Polk
wished me to use my judgment as to whether Gerard should deny that it expressed
in any way his views. I concluded it was best for Gerard to do as Polk sug-
gested. The account in the Evening Post is what Gerard says under his own
signature. The information I gave the reporters is also used but without
mentioning my name.

Harris of the State Committee and Senator Wagoner called to ask if I
would not arrange to have the Tammany Hall Rally at Madison Square Garden on
November 2nd, turned into a meeting at which the President would consent to
speak. I advised that the entire program be revamped and changed from a
political meeting to a non-partisan welcome to the President by New York, in
order to give the people an opportunity to show their gratitude because he had
kept them out of war and because the country was happy and prosperous.

Walker Vick called with General Vidal of Santo Domingo. I did
not allow them to talk very long before I suggested that they put their re-
marks in writing in order that I might submit them to the State Department in
the form in which they desired to have them considered.

Justice Dowling followed. He is disturbed about the Catholic question
future saying,
and desires the President to make a statement in a speech attacking he would in-
sist upon religious freedom in any settlement with Mexico.
I asked the

Judge to put what he thought the President should say in writing and I would submit it. He thought it was a mistake to appoint John Mott on the Mexican Commission rather than a Catholic. He considered it a mistake that a Catholic had not been put on, but even worse that the head of the Y.M.C.A. should have been chosen. Dowling is one of the cleanest and best of the Tammany men and one in whom the President has much confidence. I asked him to keep in touch with me from now until election and make suggestions as to the best way to help the President in the City and State.

Just as I was dressing for dinner and theater to which we had asked Mr. and Mrs. Richard Washburn Child, Henry Morganthau telephoned much perturbed over an article Herman Ridder was giving to the press in answer to Norman Hapgood's criticism of Hughes' speech in Philadelphia in which he claimed Hughes made the speech under promise to German leaders. Ridder makes counter claim that Burleson, Senator Stone and others are trying just as hard to get the German vote. My name was brought in incidentally by Ridder's statement that Kent Keller had represented himself as a messenger from me. I never saw Keller and I never heard of him until I read his name in Ridder's article.

October 12, 1916.

The day started briskly. Bernard Baruch rang me up to say he was sorry the President had appointed him on the Council of National Defence. I doubt his sorrow as much as I doubt the wisdom of the President's making the appointment. He might have chosen a more representative business man. As it is it places two Jews on the Council. The Council in every other respect is as the President outlined it when I was at Shadow Lawn.

Norman Hapgood called while I was having breakfast to read an answer he is making to the Ridder statement. I suggested many changes which he really accepted.

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October 13, 1916.

We gave a luncheon today to Ambassador and Mrs. Gerard. Among the guests were Frank Polk, Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Wallace, Etienne Grosclaude, the French writer. Secretary Baker came in before we had finished lunch and altogether I had a strenuous time.

Polk arrived early and we had an hour's conference before lunch. He tells me when the papers made the statement that Lansing was about to resign and he, Polk, was to be appointed in his place, he could feel a difference in the atmosphere as far as Mrs. Lansing was concerned. He says Lansing is not well and he notices a lack of mental alertness.

Several of the Ambassadors have mentioned, in a discreet way, Lansing's brusqueness with them. It is the same tone that crops out in his notes which I have tried so hard to get the President to look out for and eliminate. I feel sorry for Lansing. He is doing his work conscientiously but it is clear that his health is not equal to the strain. When he was here the other day at lunch he looked drawn and I noticed he drank three large cups of coffee. A man cannot keep up on stimulants. I never try to stimulate myself no matter how hard my work or what pressure I am under. I go as far as my strength will allow and then I rest by lying upon my back as inertly as possible. The result is better than if stimulants are taken.

I have Gerard working upon his Tammany friends and I believe he will get good results. They seem fond of him. He telephones at frequent intervals for advice. It makes me feel like guiding and pushing him as far as his abilities will permit.

Mrs. Gerard says the feeling was general among the diplomatic corps that Walter Page is more pro-British than the British themselves. Egan, our Minister at Copenhagen, was the latest to express this view of him. She also

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said the manner in which our Embassy in London treated the American Embassy in Berlin about sending supplies was unpardonable. I took this up with Polk afterward, asking him to write the London Embassy instructing them to be more generous in the matter.

Billy Phillips sent me a most interesting batch of letters and memoranda from Joe Grew of the Berlin Embassy. He tells of his visit with Gerard to the Kaiser at Charlestown in April.

October 14, 1916.

Ambassador Sharp lunched with us today. He is an incessant talker and I had little to do but sit quiet until he relieved himself.

R. W. Woolley and Matthew Hale of Massachusetts came to discuss the ad-
visability of Hale running for the United States Senate in place of Fitzgerald.
We are hoping that ~~Governor Douglas~~ will consent to make the race, but if he
does not, Hale will be proposed as a substitute.

Gerard telephoned tonight asking me to dine with him tomorrow to meet
William Randolph Hearst. We had a good deal of conversation about it and I
finally told him that unless Hearst came out for the President I did not care
either to dine with him or have him come to see me. It is embarrassing to
pretend to be on good terms with him and to receive social invitation from
him which I cannot accept.

October 15, 1916.

I went to Garrison today to see Janet and Louise who are visiting Mrs.
Auchincloss. I spent a delightful day with them.

October 16, 1916.

My letter to the President explains itself. The campaign seems to be
going well. When I came down from Sunapee everybody was in a panic, but I

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felt certain if we kept our heads and did the best we could that the ship
would right itself.

The campaign outlined at Sunapee with different members of the Committee
is being worked out intelligently and well, and the result is showing itself
every day. If the election was held today we would win, but I trust we have
not yet reached the crest of the wave and that there may be no recession during
the next three weeks. The republicans have made a series of blunders, the
principal one being to advise Hughes not to commit himself upon pending issues,
but
to become what might be termed, the national scold. The people are not
interested in these critical days as to past mistakes. What they want is to
be shown the road they are to travel in the future. Hughes declines to do
this, believing if he does not offend anywhere, the regular republican vote
of the country is large enough to elect him.

Mrs. Wallace tells us that an intimate friend of Mrs. Hughes said the
reason Mr. Hughes entered the race for President was because his children
were growing up and were beginning to demand more money for their needs than
a Supreme Court Justice obtained, and he thought it would be wise to use the
nomination to retire from the Court. If he wins, his salary will sustain
him, and if he loses he can obtain a large practice in New York, particularly
after having been a candidate for President. If anyone will turn back the
pages of this diary to the time of Hughes' nomination, they will find I made
this same diagnosis then.

John Fitzgerald, nominee for the Senate from Massachusetts, telephoned from Boston today saying Governor Douglas had declined to run in his place. Fitzgerald desired me to express a preference and indicated that Matthew Hale would be the strongest candidate in the circumstances. I agreed with him. He was afraid Macfarlane of the Boston American would not support Hale, and he wished me to telephone Macfarlane and get him in line. I had Woolley do

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this and received word back that Macfarlane would support Hale. I am to see
Macfarlane Thursday.

Tumulty telephoned from the White House Offices that Durant, of the
General Motors Company, desired to see me and he, Tumulty, thought it im-
portant that I make an appointment with him. I asked Woolley to get in
touch with Durant. The result was that he came around tonight at ten o'clock
and remained for an hour. He started in by telling me that the President still
had a possible chance of election, and he had such a high regard for the Pres-
ident that he desired to help make that chance a better one. I allowed him to
talk for a few minutes and then told him he was the real situation and of the
organization we have in the doubtful states. He evidently wished to make
the impression that we were a sinking ship, but that he was willing to help
us keep afloat until we could limp into port.

I changed the situation with the facts and before he left he seemed
anxious to sail into port with us. He agreed to sent at his own expense
experienced men throughout the upper part of this state to convert wavering
republicans. He is to send his man, Edward O. Wood, around in the morning
to meet Roper who will be here to take charge and direct him.

Gerard is hoping to get Hearst for the President in a few days.
Personally, I think it is doubtful, and I should much prefer having him continue
his present attitude. In talking to Tumulty about the matter he said the
President wished me to use my own judgment as to having a conference with
Hearst. I asked the President to make an appointment with Gerard which he
did for next Monday for lunch. I also asked him to set a day to meet Judge
Parker and this he will do tomorrow.

October 17, 1916.

At Omaha last night Mr. Hughes declared that he "desired a Government
through two Houses and not three". The papers are headlining this and I

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am wondering whether they will try to make an issue of it. Hughes seems pleased with the pun. Hapgood writes "I suppose you are amused to have Mr. Hughes use you as an excuse for making a most trivial fool of himself". As a matter of fact, Hughes was led to do this because of the President's attack upon "invisible government" in the event of his election. I hope the President will not reply unless Hughes pushes the matter further, and then he might say that what he had in mind was invisible government to promote special interests and not invisible government to promote the interests of the people.

Burleson, Woolley, Roper, Thompson, Wallace, Wood, Dowling etc. etc. have had their say with me today. Dowling asked me to urge the President to say something further regarding religious freedom in Mexico. I thought the best way to reach this was for him to write out a statement and let me submit it to the President. He gave me the statement which is mild enough for anyone and is in line with what the President has said himself time and again. Why they wish him to repeat it is beyond my ken.

October 18, 1916.

McComick and I met the President and party as they came in from Shadow Lawn at 12.25 o'clock. They left on the New York Central for Chicago at one o'clock. This gave me ample time to talk with both the President and Mrs. Wilson and to tell them of the campaign as I saw it. I advised the President as to his speeches, particularly in reference to the one he is to make to the farmers on Saturday. I asked Mrs. Wilson to see that at all stops in New York and Indiana the President appeared on the platform.

I disapprove of a candidate for President going about the country making a spectacle of himself, particularly where he is up for re-election. It seems to me bad form and poor politics. Some men have been elected in spite of such tours, but they would have been done better by quietly remaining at

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home. The President agrees with me in this, but the members of the Campaign Committee do not, hence these occasional junkets. Hughes, in my opinion, has steadily lost ground because of his periphraginations around the country.

I have a letter from the President asking me to represent him at the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary Services at Old Saint Paul. His letter is attached.

October 19, 1916.

I received an important letter today from the German Ambassador. The letter with memorandum are attached. It is clearly a threat to resume submarine warfare in the event the President does not immediately intervene in the European war. My letters to Frank Polk and the German Ambassador, and the one I shall write the President tomorrow cover the matter. I am not writing the President today because he is away and I do not wish the letter to lie at Shadow Lawn during his absence.

It occurred to me yesterday to suggest to the President, in the event of his defeat, to ask both Marshall and Lansing to resign, and then appoint Hughes Secretary of State. He should then resign himself making Hughes President of the United States. Times are too critical to have an interim of four months between the election and inauguration of the next President. If the submarine warfare should be re-opened, the President would not wish to take any action which might embarrass the incoming administration. It would be the brave, it would be the patriotic and the proper procedure to allow Hughes to assume the reigns of government at once.

The defect in our Government shows itself here, and its negative quality, as I pointed out in Philip Dru, is a source of weakness at such times.

Today McCormick and I discussed the campaign. Tonight we dined with Mr. and Mrs. Henry Morganthau to meet Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp. The only

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other guest was James Stillman. He was surprised to hear me refer to him as
my oldest friend in New York since he had no recollection of ever having met
me before. When he found I was a son of T. W. House it became clear what I
meant, for as a very small boy I used to go with Father to the offices of Wood-
ward & Stillman when they were his New York cotton agents.

October 20, 1916.

My main activity today was to have ex-Congressman Buckley of Cleveland,
Ohio, come with papers making an exposé of the German-American traffic with the
Republican Campaign Committee and Mr. Hughes. I went over it carefully, look-
ing down the road as far as I could to see there were no snags anywhere in
sight if we should decide to use it.

Before Buckley left, McCormick and Woolley called to get my views as to
the advisability of publishing it and when. We agreed to give it out Monday
and follow it up Wednesday with substantiating material. Woolley has excel-
lent ideas as to the best way to obtain publicity and we accepted his judgment
in this respect. The conference lasted several hours, for we all feel it to
be an important move and one requiring careful consideration.

Ambassador Gerard called and I showed him the memorandum sent me by
Count von Bernstorff. Gerard denied he had made any promises to the Kaiser
or to the Chancellor when he was at Charleville last April. From what Gerard
tells me, and from what I gather from the United Press despatch sent me yester-
day, I am of the opinion that Bernstorff and the German Government "played us"
in order to get Gerard home. It will be remembered that Bernstorff told me at
Sunapee his Government wanted to convey to us unofficially their belief that
Gerard was in such a nervous condition that it would be of benefit to both
countries if he were brought home for awhile on vacation. As a matter of

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fact, they wished him here so as to press peace moves. They talked with
Gerard before he left Berlin and got him to agree that the President might well
initiate peace negotiations at once. As soon as Gerard arrived and talked
with me about the subject, he understood the situation and realizes now as well
as we do that such a procedure is out of the question until after November 7th.

I had Gerard change his luncheon date with the President from Monday until
Tuesday, giving Judge Parker Monday. This is one day to the good. When Ge-
rard returns Wednesday I shall write Bernstorff that I shall be glad to see him
at the end of the week, or the beginning of the week following. This will be
close upon election and nothing can be done.

Gregory took dinner with me and we went to the theater afterward. I
told him of my suggestion to the President that he resign in the event of de-
feat. Gregory was startled and was silent for full five minutes. He then
gave the plan his unqualified approval. He believes the announcement should
be made before election, for he thinks if the American people knew that a vote
for Hughes would mean Wilson would abdicate at once, it would create something
of a panic. I told Gregory he might mention to the President that I had told
him what I advised in the event of Hughes' election.

I thought our chance of winning the election was so good that I hes-
itated to throw such an issue into the campaign at the last moment. If I
were President I should be willing to do it, but I am not willing to advise
the President to take the chance.

Gregory and I went over many of the judicial appointments he has to
make in Ohio, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas and the District of Columbia. He
thought of his former partner, Judge Batts, for the Texas appointment. I
tried to persuade him out of this, not that Batts is not as able as any lawyer
he could appoint, but he is an Austin man and there have been so many taken

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from Austin that it has almost become a national issue. I remember talking with Asquith, Lloyd George, Grey and Balfour about this at one of our meetings and they thought no small community ever had at one time so many men in influential places. So the fame of Austin and the Third Ward, from which all of them came, has gone beyond our shores.

I tried the suggestion that the President resign in case of defeat on Mezes and Gordon and they both approved as heartily as Gregory. These three are the only ones I feel I can trust, but I wished to get their judgment and reaction as to its feasibility and advisability.

October 21, 1916.

I went down to see Ambassador Sharp off this morning. He said there was not a man in the Paris Embassy who was not my friend. He said there were three men to whom he felt under great obligation, the President, Senator Pom-erere and myself, and he hoped we would call upon him for anything at any time. He said if there was a vacant place in the Cabinet and the President thought him suited for it he would like to have it, or if the President desired to give his present place to some other friend he would resign so the other man might be honored as he had been.

October 22, 1916.

Today has been very trying. Woolley spent several hours with me going over the exposé of the German-Alliance and their relations with Hughes. He has gotten it in excellent shape and it will be given out from National Headquarters rather than through one newspaper. There is some risk but it is thought sufficient proof is in hand to justify publication.

Dudley Malone followed Woolley for more than two hours conference upon political matters. Dudley tells me he is answering Hughes' reference to me.

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Governor Clynn telephoned from Albany and read his ten minute speech to be
made at Madison Square Garden November second. I was not pleased with it. It
is too high-flown. I wish I had outlined it for him and brought him nearer to
earth. I may do this after he sends me the written copy. He made such a suc-
cess at Saint Louis that I was inclined to turn him loose.

McCormick and I conferred regarding political matters and as to the ad-
visability of announcing that Tumulty would resign as Secretary to the President
after the election to accept another office. McCormick is taking this up with
the President. We find that Tumulty is becoming an issue. The A. P. A. and
other organizations do not like a Catholic censoring the President's mail. They
are willing to have him in another capacity but not where he is.

October 23, 1916.

We are delighted at the success of the exposé brought out this morn-
ing. Hughes admits he saw the committee of the German-Alliance, though he de-
nies he made them any promises further than he would uphold American rights.

Secretary Lansing, McCormick and I conferred with morning. It was
largely devoted to ways and means by which Tumulty could be safely gotten rid
of. Lansing thought the President should act at once. I thought Tumulty
should be approached and persuaded to do what so many of his friends claim
he is capable of, that is, sacrifice himself for the good of the President.
Roper has many letters urging that some statement be made concerning Tumulty
and asking whether he is to retire after the election.

I have a letter from Frederick Dixon of the Christian Science Monitor concerning the report of a secret arrangement having been made with Germany in the Lusitania settlement. I took this up with Lansing and wrote Dixon there was no truth in the report. My letter to him explains this.

Lansing and I also discussed Bernstorff's last letter to me in which

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he enclosed a memorandum from his government containing a threat to resume
undersea warfare.

Lansing is looking better, very much better than when I last saw him. I
am delighted for his health gave me serious concern.

Polk telephoned from Washington to say the British were still much exer-
cised over the raid on our coast by the U-53. Our Naval Attache in London
has cabled that even the King is wroth about it. Polk is sending me this cable
and some other data in connection with it. He wishes me to write Viscount
Grey. I hesitate to do this before the election.

Samuel Untermyer called to relate his grievances against the adminis-
tration. He considers that he has been badly treated. I sympathized with
him in looks rather than in words, and he left with the promise that he would
aid the campaign fund by a very liberal subscription, although I asked for noth-
ing.

October 24, 1916.

There was a rush of visitors today but altogether political and unimportant except for the moment.

I have a letter from the President which is attached. I wrote Viscount
Grey which is also a part of the record.

October 25, 1916.

Again a busy day politically. I had the Committee that has charge of
the big rally at Madison Square Garden November 2nd meet here. I desired
to enthuse them and try to get things going. I shall have them meet here
again tomorrow.

A number of foreign letters came today and I have written a number.
Among them are letters to Ambassadors Penfield, Thos. Nelson Page, Noel Buxton
etc. etc.

Sidney Brooks took lunch with me and told of his experience at the

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front and with the fleet. I received valuable information from him about the British military and naval departments. He believes England has lost to date about one million killed, wounded and missing, and the French about four millions. A large number of the wounded, however, return to the ranks.

October 26, 1916.

The Committee in charge of the November second rally met with me again this afternoon.

Captain Gaunt called after dinner to deliver some letters and remained until nearly eleven o'clock. The British Consul, during Gaunt's seven or eight day's absence, has been sending cables to England which have excited them greatly. Some newspaper men told him the President was about to offer mediation and he cabled it to his Government. Gaunt was angry because of this indiscretion. I talked to Gaunt frankly and he admitted it would be best for Great Britain and the Allies for the United States to continue her benevolent neutrality for the present. He also admitted that if the Germans turned loose their full power upon British commerce, a very serious situation would arise, and the help American might give by coming in, would not compensate them for an unbridled submarine warfare.

Gaunt has promised to cable his Government and try to undo some of the mischief done by the Consul. We decided that after the election he had better go to England for a few days. He is to confer with me in advance and we will plan just what action he will take there.

I told him it was very difficult for the United States to play the part of a benevolent neutral when there was so much hostile sentiment against us in the Allied countries, and when they accepted as true every foolish rumor started. He asked me to remember that when people were at war they did not reason calmly.

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October 27, 1916.

Frank Polk was my first caller. He told of the naval report of the activities of U-53. The British have received an erroneous idea of what happened and are working themselves up into a fine frenzy over nothing. Polk and I think it necessary to make the report public and this will be done within the next few days, though the Navy Department opposes it.

I told Polk of my suggestion to the President that he resign in the event of Hughes' election. He seemed as deeply impressed as Gregory and thought it would have a good effect upon the country if it were known in advance of the election that he would resign if defeated. I told him I could not bring myself to advise injecting such a startling issue into the campaign when everything was going well with us.

recently
Secretary of War Baker has been attacked for alleged disparagement of our Colonial troops. These attacks have been so violent that Baker asked Polk to bring the matter to my attention and find whether I thought in the circumstances he should resign, or whether it would be to the advantage of the President if he did so. Polk is to wire Baker today. Of course I vetoed such foolish action, for it would do the President harm and would ruin Baker politically. However, it shows the fine qualities of the man and his loyalty to his chief.

Polk agreed with me that unless the British helped in some way, unrestricted u-boat warfare may soon begin. We think the British foolish not to give way on the blacklist, and to arrange for less rigorous censorship of the mails. It is a question how far the President will be justified in straining our relations with Great Britain rather than consent to their insolent methods of conducting their blockade. A note has just come from Great Britain about the blacklist which Polk considers offensive, although Lansing thinks otherwise. He did not bring a copy of the note because it had just

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come and he was afraid to have one made. The State Department will try to
suppress the note until after the election. Polk thinks the President is
likely to give them a jolt which will not increase good feeling toward us. He
suggests two methods to bring them to their senses. One is the restriction
of further loans and the exportation of gasolene. He thought we might do
both under pretext of domestic necessity and in a way which would not justify
retaliation.

Sidney Brooks called before Polk left and they had a few minutes talk
together. I had arranged this. Brooks read me a long communication he is
to send to the Northcliffe papers regarding the election. It is evident that
Brooks, like most of his countrymen, has not definitely decided whether he
dislikes the President or Hughes more.

Roper came to go over election matters. He was pleased that we had
been able to get as good an organization as we have in the few weeks that have
been devoted to it. I recalled to his mind my injunction at Sunapee that we
should run the President for Justice of the Peace and not for President, and
therefore we need not consider the disposition of sixteen or seventeen million
voters, but the disposition of the voters in individual precincts. Roper has
done this in an effective way. What we lack is party machinery to utilize the
organization to the best advantage on the day of the election. If it had not
been for McCombs we should have had this machinery in perfect working order.

Mr. Hawkins of the United Press read me a cable they had received from
London, and asked my advice as to the wisdom of publishing it.

Lewis Antisdale of Rochester followed to make arrangements to see the
President and try and persuade him to give a day to Rochester and Syracuse.
My letter to the President indicates my feeling and advice in regard to this.

George Rublee, of the Federal Trades Commission, called to ask advice

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as to whether he should vote for the President or Mr. Hughes. He wishes to vote for the President because he says Hughes has converted him into a Wilson man, but he thinks it would be awkward for the President in the event he reappointed him as a republican. Rublee votes in New Hampshire so I advised him to stifle his conscience and vote for Hughes.

He talked at length about the personnel of the Trades Commission which he believes should be revamped. Chairman Hurley sent word by Rublee that he would like to see me after the elections and discuss the advisability of renot signing, because of any dissatisfaction, but because of business and domestic reasons.

Don Seitz of the World telephoned about the election. I gave him some figures and advised him of the vulnerable places in the opposition where the World might attack.

October 31, 1916.

The days have now become a mad whirl of telephone talks and visitors. I shall not attempt to go into detail for most of it is of passing importance. Occasionally Captain Gaunt or someone like him drops in and, much to my relief, foreign matters are discussed. However, even Gaunt is mostly interested in the campaign and wishes to hear of how it is going.

November 1, 1916.

Everyone has been busy today preparing for the President's visit to-morrow. I visited Headquarters for the first time since it was opened. I wished to meet the entire force and compliment them upon the admirable work they have done in the campaign. I could see I was looked upon with considerable curiosity, for there was not a department that did not know their chief had been a constant pilgrim to our apartment.

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Final touches were given this afternoon to the rally at Madison Square Garden. I hope everything will work out as planned, though there is danger as they will not, for much must depend upon luck. imxuuxh matters ximuxu are supposed to happen spontaneously which are really prepared for in advance. For instance, the head of the parade must be down at Thirty-fourth Street & Fifth Avenue at 8.30. At twenty minutes of nine o'clock the President must come out of the Waldorf Hotel and start for the Garden, stopping at Thirty-fourth Street and Madison Avenue for ten minutes to receive the cheers of the crowd and review the parade for that length of time. Glynn is to commence his speech at the Garden at fifteen minutes of nine so as to count on five minutes of applause. The speech is to take ten minutes to deliver and the President must walk on the speakers platform just as it ends in order to receive continuous applause of heaven knows how many minutes. The idea is to have the applause unbroken after Glynn's speech.

November 2, 1916.

Everything today has worked according to schedule so far. The President arrived promptly at nine o'clock. McCormick and I met him and went with him to the Mayflower which is anchored in East River. We talked to him for an hour and a half and it was the most acrimonious debate I have had with him for a long while. He did not like the New York program, he did not like the Republican expenditure of money to defeat him as evidenced by the full page advertisements in the morning papers. The Republicans had sixteen columns to our one and a half. He thought New York "rotten to the core", and should be wiped off the map.

I defended democratic newspapers for taking republican advertisements and so did McCormick. I thought it was much more to our advantage to

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be able to get into the republican press in that way than not to be able to
get in at all. I also defended New York by telling him he had as many
friends here as in any other part of the Union, even if they were not among
the moneyed class. He thought both McCormick and I had "New Yorkitis" and
that the campaign should be run from elsewhere. He was absolutely certain of
the election without New York.

I have that story so often from candidates that it makes me tired.
They go about receiving adulation everywhere, hearing people declare that they
look upon them as their savior, until they begin to look upon themselves in
that light. I have seen Bryan three times when he came to New York upon
the eve of his elections, and each time he believed he could win without this
State. As a matter of fact, I think Wilson can win without it, but his be-
lieving it is not based upon conditions as he knows them.

The President thought organization amounted to nothing and that the peo-
ple determined such matters themselves. If he had been in politics as long
as I have, and knew it from the point of a worker rather than as a candidate.
he would understand how easy it is to change the vote of a state in one way
or another. To hear him talk you would think the man in the street under-
stood the theory and philosophy of government as he does, and were actuated
by the same motives.

It is true we have organized wealth against us, and in such an aggregate
as never before. On the other hand, we are pitting organized labor against
it, and the fight is not an unfair one. I feel it good sport to fight with
the odds against us, for the United States is normally republican.

The President reminds me of a boy whose mother tells him he has rid-
den long enough on his hobby-horse, and that he must let little Charlie have
a turn. If left to the boy it would never be Charlie's turn. His attitude
is not unlike that of T. R. who has never forgiven the electorate for not

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continuing him indefinitely in the White House.

However, before we left, the President put his arms around us both and expressed appreciation for what we were doing, saying we must not mind his not agreeing as to the advisability of today's program.

Just as we were leaving I told him I was glad the Marine incident had not come sooner because a decision could now be deferred until after the election. I thought the matter looked bad from news we were getting. His reply astonished both McCormick and me. He said: "I do not believe the American people would wish to go to war no matter how many Americans were lost at sea". He said he was sorry that this was true, but nevertheless it was his opinion. He also stated it was a merchantman and not a passenger ship, and that our understanding with Germany was as to passenger boats. I was surprised at this and argued the point for a moment, for our demand and Germany's promise clearly covers all merchantmen and their crews. McCormick was disturbed and after we left expressed the hope that the President would not take that view of the matter if the final analysis showed Germany had violated her pledges of May 4th.

The balance of the day has been taken up in seeing that the arrangements at the Garden and elsewhere were properly being carried out.

Tonight I went to the Garden to see how large the crowd was and whether we could count upon the crush expected. I then walked up the Avenue to Thirty-fourth Street to see whether the arrangements there came off as scheduled. I was gratified to find there was as much precision as could be expected in the circumstances. After the President had passed down the Avenue I returned to the Garden to find it packed to the doors and the streets beyond. I merely looked in to hear the cheering, and to find that everything was going as planned, and then left for home. All reports say it is the biggest demonstration of the kind ever given a President or a candidate for President in the City of New York.

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November 3, 1916.

Lansing, Burleson and Roper lunched with me. Burleson and Roper came to talk of the campaign and Lansing remained after they left in order to discuss international affairs. He was alarmed when I told him what the President had said about the Marina. He replied that the question of passenger ships and merchantmen had been discussed to a finish, and it had been agreed that American sailors were more entitled to protection, if anything, than ordinary travellers. The sailor is dependent upon going to sea for his work, but it is largely optional with travellers whether they take the risk.

We discussed the probability of war in the event we sent Bernstorff home. Lansing believes it would not necessarily mean war. I disagree with him unless a plan I suggested is carried out. He said Austria will soon send an Ambassador to replace Dumba, and I thought if he arrived we might reverse the existing order. That is, Bernstorff could be sent home, and the Austrian Ambassador could be retained unless that country committed some overt act.

Lansing explained the much talked of postscript to the Lusitania Note. I had heard the President's version as well as Burleson's, Gregory's and Tumulty's. Tumulty tells it as if he had discovered the postscript and had talked the President out of sending it. The actual facts are as follows:

After the Lusitania note was written, Mr. Bryan persuaded the President to insert a clause urging the adoption by Germany of the Bryan arbitration treaty. Nearly every country in the world excepting Germany and Austria accepted this Treaty, and Bryan's thought was that it was an opportune time to suggest it to them again. In a moment of aberration the President consented. In his jubilation, Bryan mentioned the matter to several people, Lansing among the number, and, I take it, to Dumba also. Lansing was so disturbed that he took the story to Secretary Garrison under the seal of confidence as far as he, Lansing, was con-

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cerned, because he felt in a way it was a betrayal of Mr. Bryan. However, he felt justified because of the service he felt he was doing the President and the country.

Secretary Garrison, in turn, told Tumulty, and gave his opinion as to what the effects would be of such a clause. Tumulty took it to Burleson and they together went to the President and persuaded him to eliminate it. The President telephoned Mr. Bryan that he had changed his mind, and Mr. Bryan did not know the method by which the clause was dropped.

I spoke to Lansing of my suggestion to the President about resigning in the event Hughes is elected, permitting Hughes to become President at once. Lansing was somewhat staggered at first but recovered himself and finally expressed approval. He said he had worried considerably over the thought of the interim between November 7th and March 4th in the event of the President's defeat, but the way would be immediately cleared if the President would do as I advised.

I thought to carry the plan out as I had in mind, it would be necessary for Hughes to reappoint him, Lansing, Secretary of State, and then take his time as to removals and the formation of a new Cabinet.

Vance McCormick and Burleson followed Lansing. We discussed the final statement the Chairman is to make before election.

November 9, 1916.

It has been impossible to even think of the diary in the past few days. For nearly forty-eight hours I have been steadily on the telephone or in consultation with the Cabinet and party managers.

Election Day was fairly quiet until about four o'clock in the afternoon when the first news began to come in. The first returns were given me by the Press Associations and were from Ashford, Massachusetts., a small town which had all its registered votes in by 10.30 A. M. The afternoon returns were fairly

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favorable to the President since most of them came from Kansas strangely enough, where they seem to count the votes as fast as they are registered. Then came the deluge. By seven o'clock it was certain New York had gone heavily against us. Later Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana seemed lost. At one time Ohio was said to be threatened.

The campaign managers had prepared an elaborate banquet at the Biltmore hotel to which I was invited, but to which I declined to go. While I did not expect defeat, I did not wish to be at such a gathering without knowing whether the President was successful. McAdoo, Lansing, Lane, McCormick, etc. etc. all attended and they tell me there was never such a morgue-like entertainment in the annals of time. It soon became evident that my little study was receiving more accurate returns than Headquarters, and it was not long before those at Headquarters and the Biltmore feasters were calling upon me for information.

The United Press, the Associated Press and the different newspaper offices were in constant touch with me, as were distant cities throughout the country. When things were at their worst, Gregory who was with me for the evening thought it well to look into the question of the President's resignation, as suggested by me and in which the President seemed to concur. Gregory was not certain as to some points of law and it seemed to him, as indeed it was beginning to seem to me, that the President's defeat was imminent, so we went to the Bar Association to look up the Federal Statutes on the subject. We found it would be necessary for the President to call the Senate in session so that Hughes might be confirmed as Secretary of State before he would be eligible to the Presidency. Then we looked up the question as to how much notice must be given the Senate before the date of assembly was named.

Gregory left me and went to his hotel under the firm impression we were defeated.

I had not given up the ship for the reason that the vote I had given

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the President was being confirmed state by state. When he was here Thursday I told him that in my opinion he would carry the states, a list of which are appended, which would leave him thirty-six votes short of an absolute majority.

It is a queer list for a democrat to make with any expectation of winning. Never in the history of the United States, as far as I know, has a President been elected by either party without either Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Indiana or Illinois. Some of these states have always been necessary, but in my list none of them are to be found. Then, too, the list I made was widely scattered and seemingly without purpose. Of course, it was based upon absolute figures and the result has justified the organization in question and which now has so admirably carried out. I expected indeed that we would carry many states we lost, but I at no time considered them certain and we lost no state I had placed in the certainties. I regard this with some degree of pride. The President was sceptical regarding the value of organization. I wonder if he is now, for it had not been for organization we could not have forecasted the result, and we could not have carried the states we did, since we would probably have scattered our strength and lost everywhere.

It seemed certain if we were to win it must be by the votes in the Far West, and these returns would not be in before the early morning. I therefore went to bed by eleven o'clock and left Gordon and Janet in the study to receive returns, which they did until three o'clock in the morning. By five o'clock while still in bed, but with the telephone at my bedside, I again got into the game. At daybreak the returns began to come in from the Far West favorable to us, and it became evident that the election was to be a close and, perhaps, a memorable one. I immediately got in touch with Headquarters where a force had been on duty all night, and told them to send telegrams to the county chairmen of every doubtful state, urging them to be vigilant and to pay no attention to

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press reports that Hughes was elected. I called up the World and other news-
papers as well as the United Press and urged them to undo, as far as possible,
the harm done by the morning press in conceding everything to Hughes. I was
afraid if this was not done everything would go by default, and states which we
carried in the West by close margins, would be neglected and we might be robbed
of victory.

I shall not go into details here of the strenuous hours which have fol-
lowed up to this moment. It seems to me everyone I knew was telegraphing, tele-
phoning or wanting to see me.

I visited Headquarters to find a motley mob. The Campaign Committee
were running about in a frenzy, totally disorganized. The all night vigil
and the certainty of defeat followed by hope had been too much for them. There
was not an old stager around excepting Hugh Wallace who was more composed.

I asked the Attorney General to remain over until tonight, and I have
been in constant consultation with him regarding measures to protect the ballot
boxes in states where the votes were still being counted and which were in doubt.

Last night, Governor Stanchfield, de Lancey Nicholl, Tom Chadbourne, Bernard
Baruch and Morganthau came up for consultation. It was futile pilgrimage for
everything they suggested in regard to protecting the count had already been
done.

The President has left everything in our hands and has not telephoned,
written a suggestion or given a word of advice, although his fortunes are so
wholly at stake. He seems to have been confident that every means were being
taken to protect his interests, and he has allowed it to rest at that. Several
times he has had the White House Offices telephone me to ask how things were go-
ing and what I thought of the outcome.

I believe I can truthfully say that I have not worried a moment. If
I had, I could not have stood the strain. It was not that I was altogether

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to worry about
certain of the result, but I never permit myself matters over which I have no
control.

The German Ambassador called today and I gave him fifteen or twenty min-
utes. There was nothing of importance said. He did not undertake to make me
believe that the German-Americans had voted for the President. On the contrary,
he told me, as he did before, they could not be brought to support the President
because of his terming them disloyal.

Bernstorff was disturbed because a package of letters being brought from
Germany had been stolen and he did not know the contents of them himself. The
celebrated Armagaard Graves came to him and offered to get the letters if paid
a certain sum. Bernstorff declined to do this, telling me with a quizzical
smile that he knew full well they had already been photographed. He said his
Government assures him that the submarine warfare will not be resumed.

I have declined to see other callers excepting on the business we have
in hand, i.e. looking after the President's re-election. Everyone seems to un-
derstand this and have not unduly pressed me.

November 12, 1916.

Friday, Saturday and today have been taken up largely by party leaders
coming to tell me how they did it. I try to be patient because it is hardly
fair not to give them a hearing and let them get what pleasure there may be in
relating these stories of their achievements. They are a good lot, the best
I have ever known in a political campaign, clean, able and intelligent, and they
deserve much credit. The desire to talk, however, seems to be a passion which
largely
some people make a vice. I believe clube are frequented in order to talk.

I care but little to talk of the past, preferring to discuss the future. My
mind is ever looking forward rather than backward, and when it begins to turn to
the yesterday
again of a yesterday, I shall feel that my work is ended.

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Headquarters are practically closed with one or two minor officials in charge. The President has been in Williamstown visiting his daughter, and when I saw him today as he passed through New York, he seemed a happy and contented man. I talked to Mrs. Wilson for the few minutes they were here rather than to the President, for I did not want to burden him with serious discussion, and that would have occurred if we had talked at all. I gave him a couple of telegrams which I thought demanded attention, and asked him to please answer them. In parting he said, "in a few days I shall ask you to come to Washington."

He wondered why Hughes had not sent him a letter of congratulation. I replied that he must remember Mr. Hughes was a very conservative man.

Sidney Brooks called today to get a review of the situation. He asked about the President's and Mrs. President's activities. He asked about the administration's progress. He asked about the President's and Mrs. President's personal and official activities. He asked about the administration's financial condition. He asked about the administration's prospects for the future. He said that he was very pleased with all that he saw. He said that he was much interested in his glimpse of me in action.

Telegrams, Letters and cablegrams of congratulation have poured in for several days. Such compliments are mainly froth and do not impress me greatly. However, some have surprised me. Paul Warburg for instance writes among other things: "You have done more for this country than anybody during these last four years; and I am praying for your continued strength and success during the coming four years of your administration".

Frank Polk writes: "You have been the Bibraltar of the situation and everyone on our side owes you a debt of gratitude."

Wilbur Marsh, Treasurer of the National Committee, telegraphs among other things: "At critical times in the campaign you saved the line" and so the story goes.

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A. G. Gardiner cables: "Sincere congratulations and deep thankfulness".

It will take another week to listen to the stories told about how the campaign
was won, and then I hope to get down to regular work.

November 13, 1916.

Sidney Brooks seems to have pretty close connection with Wall Street, particularly with the Morgans, and I took occasion to tell him yesterday that the sooner Wall Street realized it was best to keep out of politics, the better it would be for Wall Street. During the war Wall Street has done its work creditably from the domestic and foreign viewpoint. They should let it stand at that, and not undertake to run the country politically. They will come to grief just as the railroads came to grief through such methods. I tried for years to get the railroads in Texas to realize this. They would sometimes guess right and sometimes wrong politically, and when they guessed right they were worse off than if they had guessed wrong, for the reason they went beyond the bounds of good sense and reaction from their arbitrary methods set in. It is true of Wall Street. The Government would be inclined to let it alone if it will let the Government alone, but in a contest between the two, it is difficult to predict which will come out ahead.

I have a telegram from the President today which reads:

"Would be delighted if you would come down in time for dinner tomorrow and spend a little while with us.""

I answered that I would be there tomorrow in time for dinner.

Telegrams, cables and letters continue to come in and I am trying to keep up
with them and not allow an accumulation.

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The White House,
Washington.

November 14, 1916.

I left New York this morning arriving at the White House at six o'clock.
The President immediately came to my room and we had a long conference. We went
at once into the matter about which he called me to Washington.

The President desires to write a note to the belligerents demanding that
the war cease, and he desired my opinion. His argument is that unless we do this
now, we must inevitably drift into war with Germany upon the submarine issue. He
believes Germany has already violated her promise of May 4th, and that in order to
maintain our position, we must break off diplomatic relations. Before doing this
he would like to make a move for peace, hoping there is sufficient peace sentiment
in the Allied countries to make them consent.

My reply to this was that the Allies would consider it an unfriendly act if
done at a time when they are beginning to be successful after two years of war;
that they will also see that his object in making the move now is to avoid a cri-
sis with Germany on the U-boat controversy, and it would appear as if he wanted
to reward Germany for breaking her promises to us and acting in total disregard
of international obligations.

He was much worried over my position and asked me to think it over
further.

Only the family were present at dinner. After dinner the President
asked me to go to the Raleigh Hotel where he was to speak before a farmers organ-
ization. I begged to be let off, and he promised to return as quickly as possible.
I was surprised when he returned in a half hour. By a quarter to nine we were
seated in the study ready for further discussion of what he had in mind.

The President wondered if the matter could be furthered by my going to
Europe and visiting each of the belligerent countries. We dismissed this after

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some discussion because of the time it would take to do it, and because of the
adverse criticism which would be created in each of the Allied countries before I
could make the round of capitals, knowing, as they surely would, that I had come
upon a peace mission. He then suggested that I go to England and France and
upon my arrival he would give out the message, letting me brave the British and
French Governments and public. I was entirely willing to do this if it were
thought best, although my feeling was that I should prefer hades for the moment
rather thase those countries when such a proposal was put up to them.

We then talked of Page and of the impossibility of utilizing him to
advantage. We both thought Page perfectly honest in his belief that the best
thing that could happen to this country and humanity was an alliance between
Great Britain and the United States. He is so obsessed with this idea that it
is practically impossible to make him view the situation from any other angle.

I gave the President some idea of Page's feeling toward him. Page, I said,
thought that he was an exceedingly able man and in many ways served the United
States well, but he did not believe he would fight under any circumstances what-
ever. In this he classed him with Jefferson. The President naturally was
not pleased with Page's view of him, although he did not resent it. He talked
calmly of the best method to follow in the circumstances, even to recalling Page
if it were necessary to carry out what we considered for the best interest. He
declared no man must stand in the way.

The President said he thought Viscount Grey had much the same opinion of
him judging from some of his published statements and he wondered whether he had
gotten that opinion from Page. I was sure he had not because I did not believe
Page would be so disloyal.

I told the President that practically every member of our London Embassy
shared Page's views, and if Page was recalled the others should be dispersed and a
new force placed there.

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We then argued over and over again the question of what was best to do, I holding that for the moment nothing was necessary and we should sit tight and await further developments. The President holding that the submarine situation would not permit of delay and it was worth while to try mediation before breaking off with Germany. I argued again and again that we should not pull Germany's chestnuts out of the fire merely because she desired it, was unruly and was gradually forcing us into war. He wondered whether we could not have a separate understanding with the Allies by which we would agree to throw our weight in their favor in any peace settlement brought about by their consent to mediation.

In reply to this I thought the Allies would begin by asking for our views as to peace terms, and we would soon get into a hopeless tangle. It would be easy as far as the evacuation of France, Belgium, but what would be say about Alsace and Lorraine? What would be say about Poland, Serbia, the Balkans, Constantinople etc. etc.? It would be like sitting in a peace conference in advance to determine what the best terms should be.

It was eleven o'clock before he proposed going to bed and I could see he was deeply disturbed.

November 15, 1916.

I breakfasted alone. The President was unusually late which bespoke a bad night. I was sorry, but it could not be helped. I dislike coming to the White House as his guest and upsetting him to the extent I often do.

By nine o'clock we were in the study hard at it again. He had seen the papers that our Government had protested against the deportation of Belgians by Germany. He was much disturbed and so was Mrs. Wilson. He said Lansing had acted without consultation with him and that he had no right to do so. He called Lansing over the telephone and the conversation was rather spirited from the President's end. We could indistinctly hear Lansing's replies which seemed to put a different light upon the matter.

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It had been a question of routine departmental work and our Embassy in Berlin had protested against it for the Belgian Government which we represent. The President's viewpoint was that it was ridiculous for us to protest about the deposition of Belgians, when we did not protest over the violation of their territory.

I disagreed with him again. I thought it was one of the most brutal and indelible acts Germany has yet committed. The tearing away of fathers, brothers and young girls from their families to be taken into foreign territory to become practically slaves, is something I thought we might well make a protest about.

The President did not defend the German position, but took my view excepting that he did not think we should protest. I used this action of the Germans as an argument against making a peace move at present.

The President said we should never get anywhere in the discussion unless he wrote his views in concrete form, and he had made up his mind to write his message and then write a note to the belligerents. That after he had written it and made his points clear, we could go over it again and discuss it with more intelligence.

I did not yield a point in my opinion that he would make a mistake if he finally sent it, nor did he yield in his argument that it might be effective. We dropped this subject, for the moment, and discussed his message to Congress.

He said he had in mind to write a very short message and practically re- commend only the passage of the Eight Hour Law and the laws affiliated with it as he had promised, and a corrupt practice act. I agreed this was wise, but I urged caution in regard to the corrupt practice act. I thought if we were not careful we would make the money power more potent and those fighting it less able to contend against it. I cited the fact that most of the great newspapers and periodicals were in the hands of the interests, and if we were restricted to certain expenditures we would be shut off from the public. I am, and now I am, hourly in favor of a corrupt practice act, but I feel that such a law should never be exercised in its making -

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Before we parted for the morning, he suggested I see the German Ambassador, and I suggested that I also see Lansing and Polk. I left him with a vast accumulation of congratulatory telegrams and letters.

I asked Polk to come to the White House. When I told him of the discussions the President and I were having he was much disturbed, and thought the President would wreck his administration if he undertook to carry out his views. He did not consider the submarine issue was now so pressing, or that the cases in hand were so offensive as to make it necessary to break off diplomatic negotiations.

This morning in discussing these matters with the President, he went so far as to say if the Allies wanted war with us we would not shrink from it. This was in reply to my contention that a proposal of peace would be accepted by Germany and refused by the Allies, and that Germany would then feel that she could begin an unrestricted u-boat warfare. This would lead him to try to break with Germany, but our people would not follow him for the reason that Germany having consented to peace parleys, would be thought more or less justified in employing unrestricted submarine warfare.

I also told the President that in the event Germany did not do this, and did not violate international law further, we would inevitably drift into a sympathetic alliance with her, and if this came about, England and France might, under provocation, declare war against us. He thought they would not dare resort to this, and if they did, they could do this country no serious hurt. I disagreed with him again. I thought Great Britain might conceivably destroy our fleet and land troops from Japan in sufficient numbers to hold certain parts of the United States. He replied they might get a good distance but would have to stop somewhere, to which I agreed.

In repeating this conversation to Polk, he thought the probable stopping place would be the Gulf of Mexico. Polk thought I should talk to Lansing, so we

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went to the Secretary's office. He put off his other engagements in order that we might talk over this serious situation uninterruptedly.

Lansing was as emphatic as Polk in believing that our people would resent such a policy. He thought the immediate result of the President's note demanding peace would be received favorably in this country, but when the real outcome began to be understood, a storm of indignation would be aroused against him.

I suggested to Lansing that he "soft pedal" on the u-boat activities and not press the President to action on the Marina, the Stephano, the P & O liner or any of the recent bad cases. I thought if this were done we could drift for awhile until we could get our bearings. We were unanimous in our belief that it would be stupendous folly to wage war against the Allies. If war must come, we thought it should be on their side and not against them.

Fortunately, I went in and out of Lansing's office without the reporters seeing me. However, I met them in full force at the Executive Offices. They did not think my visit to Washington had any significance but was merely one of my many visits to discuss pending matters with the President.

When I reached the White House the President and I were met by Tumulty who told us he had been talking with Maurice Low, Washington correspondent for the London Post, and that Low had said he had reason to believe that peace proposals would not be badly received in either England or France. I regretted this, because the President immediately stiffened in his attitude and asked me to see Low. I asked Tumulty to make an appointment with Low for three o'clock, and when the President and I walked away I insisted there was nothing in it and that Tumulty was mistaken. The President, however, was insistent that I should probe it to the bottom.

There was no one present at lunch excepting the family and we talked of campaign matters and some of its humorous features. Someone had sent Mrs. Wilson

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from Wilmington, N. C., a letter stating that a Mr. ---- had in his possession a rooster stuffed by young Woodrow Wilson when he lived in Wilmington. The President was considerably hacked at the story. He said it was a fable pure and simple.

It has been proposed to have Sargent paint his portrait, and he admitted he was afraid to have him do so because of Sargent's alleged faculty of bringing out the latent soul of his sitter. I considered it one of those legends which Sargent himself had probably permitted to grow until it was generally believed. I thought Sargent painted into the features of his sitters something good or bad as the sitter appeared to him.

After lunch the President went out on the golf links.

I saw Low and found, as I thought, Tumulty had entirely misunderstood him. Low thought peace would come soon, and by soon he meant six or eight months, because the Allies would break through the German lines.

After seeing Low I went to the Attorney General's office to tell him that his dream of resigning on the fourth of March was useless. The President would have none of it.

The President and I talked of possible Cabinet changes. He will retain them all if they desire it, even Daniels. If McAdoo resigns he spoke of putting Houston in the Treasury. I urged him to take Carter Glass instead, but did not give my real reasons which would not have been altogether complimentary to Houston. The President had thought of Glass for the Federal Reserve Board. My suggestion was to reverse the order with Glass for the Treasury and Houston for the Federal Reserve Board.

While the President and I were discussing these matters Mrs. Wilson asked, what about Tumulty? The President replied that he would offer him the Appraisership. Mrs. Wilson wished the President to compel Tumulty to take this, but he said he would not do this. He asked if I thought Vance McCormick would

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take the office of Secretary to the President. I told him I had tried this
out last spring and McCormick would not take it. I urged Daniel C. Roper as
a proper man and he seemed to accept the suggestion. I did not believe it
made any difference where he put Tumulty if he only took him away from the hand-
ling of the mail. That was where the objection lay in the eyes of the ~~people.~~
~~Many ~~protestants~~

Many believed him to be merely an agent of the Catholic Church and resented the
fact that he occupied such a position.

Gregory and I talked of the appointments of Federal judges in differ-
ent states. I told him the President would certainly name him for the Supreme
Court. He declared he could not take it because of his deafness. In speaking
to the President afterward, he said it was nonsense, that Gregory could hear as
well as most of the Justices now on the Bench and that he intended to appoint him.

There was no one at dinner except the family. After dinner the President
and I talked until half past ten o'clock. I had told him that Lansing, Polk
and others did not see any crisis in the U-boat controversy, and asked him to
forget the entire matter for the present. This quieted him appreciably and
put him in better spirits. He had been depressed. I believe, as a matter of
fact, Lansing had been urging him to break off diplomatic relations with Germany,
when he sent the telegram for me to come to Washington. I also have a notion,
though not confirmed, that Tumulty is doing his best to persuade him to call a
peace conference.

While we were talking, I received a letter from ex-President Taft enclos-
ing an invitation to the President to speak at a dinner which the Leage to En-
force Peace is to give November 24th. We discussed this for a few minutes and
decided it would not be wise to accept. After a few routine matters were got-
ten rid of we launched into a two hour talk on governmental changes. We both
desire more representative government, and the argument ran as to how this
could be brought about.

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The President believes that a slight amendment to the Constitution making members of Congress eligible to Cabinet places and, at the same time, retaining their congressional membership would be the only move necessary for its accomplishment. I am not altogether sure he is right, but his argument is convincing. He believes the best talent of the country would go into the Senate and House rather than striving for the Presidency, and if they once reached either the Senate or the House, they could compel any President to place them in the Cabinet, and the President would be largely under their control.

At some future time I intend arguing this question out with him. He is interested in such matters, as indeed I am, and it was a joy to have the discussion.

He did not know until he suggested bed that I was to leave on the midnight for New York. Both he and Mrs. Wilson seemed genuinely sorry and said they had expected me to stop all week and over Sunday. The President asked if I would not return for the dinner he is giving Vance McCormick, but I asked to be excused. He placed his hand upon my shoulder and said: "how will it look for me to give such a dinner and have my best friend absent". I thought it would not make any difference if his best friend came back and stayed with him a day or two afterward, which I promised to do. He begged me not to wait for an invitation but to do as I had always done, come at my pleasure and stop as long as I conveniently could.

His manner assures me that his re-election has left him just as he was before, an unassuming gentleman.

During my visit the President took occasion to thank me for what I had done during the campaign; I did not allow him to go far in this, for Miss Bones told me he had said during the campaign that he was not concerned about it because I was directing it. I knew he had this feeling because he never wrote, never telephoned and never made any suggestions.

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New York,
November 16, 1916.

I forgot to mention the other day that Snowdon Marshall, United States District Attorney, called last Monday and asked if he might resign at the end of his term. It was a peculiar request to make of me, and I wondered why he did not go to the Attorney General. He partially explained it however by saying that he understood the Attorney General intended to retire himself.

Ambassador Gerard called to talk about my visit to Washington. He believes Germany will finally push us into war because of her desperation. He wishes me to return to Germany with him. I told him this was out of the question, and I thought when matters were finally adjusted between the belligerents, it would not be necessary for me to go to Germany; that in some ways it would be better for me to look out for the Allied countries and not create criticism by going into Germany.

Hamilton Holt came at five o'clock to bring M. de Sillac, who belongs to the French Diplomatic Corps and is in this country for the purpose of observation. He desires to find the amount of sentiment here regarding a league to enforce peace. My letter to the President tomorrow will tell of our conversation, for the President wished me to see de Sillac. I found him more reasonable than Frenchmen usually are. He understands that the Germans, detached from the Prussian military machine, are a peaceful and quite harmless people. We did not disagree in our estimate of them and of the evil to be overcome in order to secure a lasting peace.

November 17, 1916.

Dr. David Starr Jordan came apropos of nothing. We talked of the European situation in general and he expressed his profound thankfulness that the President had been re-elected. He thought Roosevelt had been an important factor in our success. Max Warax, Jordan was in Germany just before the war and after,

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and he tells me he has conclusive proof that the German military plan was not to go through Belgium so much as a military convenience to reach Paris, but to take and hold it. They had in mind to take Holland later and to hold the French coast as far west as Boulogne. When I say hold it, I mean permanently. This would have been the stragetic plan and it is reasonable to think they had it in mind. The reason they diverted to Paris, according to Dr. Jordan, was because the German bankers urged the Kaiser to do this in order to recoup financially. One wonders what the outcome would have been if they had followed their first plan.

In thinking of the war I am more and more convinced that the critical point is Southeastern Europe. I pointed this out to the Allies almost at the beginning of the war, and suggested they make that their point of attack. I have never changed my mind, and it now seems that many are coming to the same conclusion.

Captain Gaunt followed Dr. Jordan. He says the feeling in Great Britain against the United States grows apace. The working people feel it, and in the trenches every shell that goes over and does not explode is called "a Wilson". Gaunt deprecates this feeling and says he does everything he can to quiet it. His explanation is that his people have lost all sense of proportion. He considers it a dangerous situation. He sails secretly for England the last of next week. No one known of his departure excepting the British Ambassador, whom he has not yet told. I am planning to send some letters and confidential messages over by him. With their state of feeling, and with the President's growing distaste of their methods, I regard the situation as serious.

I had a long conference with Polk. He agrees with me that we are in deep and troublous waters. I urged him to have Lansing keep in close touch with me until the skies are clear. We must do team-work and keep our wits about us. We not only have foreign countries to deal with, but the President

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must be guided, for he has no background of the European situation. He has always been more interested in domestic problems than in foreign affairs, and I have never been able to get him to devote sufficient time to inform himself so as to act intelligently. This gives me much concern. His tendency to offend the Allies in order to keep clear of war with Germany is likely to lead us into trouble with the Allies. If we are to have war, let it be with Germany by all means. She has forfeited every right to consideration and the situation demands, for our own protection, that we hold with the Allies as long as we can possibly do so with dignity.

I will confess that the Allies are irritating almost beyond endurance. It is evident they are trying to force us into war with Germany. Our prosperity and growing strength maddens them. I believe this is confined largely to the governing class, nevertheless, the danger is the greater because this is true. They cannot understand why we do not feel that they are fighting our battles. We have no fear of Germany and feel entirely able to take care of ourselves.

November 18, 1916.

I had a great run of visitors yesterday. Gerard called with a request from Cardinal Farley about an unimportant matter.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey called to show an outline of the suggestions he is to make the Secretary of War about the Council for National Defence.

We are on the verge of war and not a move is being taken in the direction of immediate preparation. The general defence plans are in process, but it will be years, at the rate we are moving, before they are of any value. What we need now are men in charge of the Navy and Army with free hands and with a driving force which would soon place us in immediate condition. The President is not a man of action and seems incapable of delegating work to others.

Ellery Sedgwick, of the Atlantic Monthly, took lunch with me. Our talk

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was largely of the campaign.

The most interesting caller I have had recently was Mr. Whitehouse, a
liberal member of Parliament, who is here for the purpose of bettering relations
between Great Britain and the United States. He would like for the President
to intervene. I shall write the President tomorrow or next day and I shall
cover the details of our conversation in that. It is hard to come to a true
estimate of the situation since one hears so many contrary opinions and from
persons equally well informed.

November 19, 1916.

I forgot to mention in telling of my conference with the President at
Washington that I asked him the direct question whether he had made up his mind
before the election to follow my suggestion about resigning. He said he had
absolutely decided to do so and that it was in line with his lifetime views upon
the subject, and he had taken the precaution to write Lansing before the elec-
tion in order to put himself on record so that he could not be charged with
doing something hastily from pique. I asked how soon he would have resigned
and he replied "immediately". By immediately he meant just as soon as the re-
sult of the election was definitely known.

It seems that during the uncertain hours of Tuesday night, November 7th,
both the President and Mrs. Wilson were cheered, as I was, by the thought of the
dramatic denouement we had in mind in the event of defeat.

Vance McCormick and Tom Chadbourne of the Finance Committee came
for a conference regarding the half million dollar deficiency in the campaign
fund. This deficit was largely brought about by the extravagance of the Pub-
licity Bureau. They went wild at the last moment trying to keep within reason-
able distance of the republican advertisement program. The republicans must
have spent the largest sum any national committee ever spent. Our reports are
that they literally carpeted the doubtful states with money. That is the rea-

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son they were so confident of success. They concluded if they put sufficient money in, success was certain. They missed their calculations mainly by not knowing the feeling in the West. I have no doubt if each party had spent an equal amount, the President would have won overwhelmingly.

Secretary Houston and Chas. R. Crane called. Crane left Houston with me awhile to give him a chance to talk of his personal affairs in relation to the Washington University and about remaining in the Cabinet. He would like to remain in Washington if the University will consent to another four years of absence. President Eliot has already written the Chairman of the Board of Trustees, and the plan is to get the President to also write.

I told Houston that the President had him in mind for the Treasury if McAdoo resigned, or for the Federal Reserve Board. He expressed no preference.

Baruch came to report upon several matters. He desired to resign from the Board of Trustees of the City College which I vetoed on Mezes' account. He asked whether he should continue to look for a place for Secretary Daniels in order to get him out of the Cabinet. I asked him not to go further until I had a chance to talk it over with the President.

S. R. Bertron says he has gotten a place for McAdoo should he resign. There seems a determined movement to place McAdoo somewhere out of the Cabinet. I do not believe it is directed so much against McAdoo as it is against John Skelton Williams. They feel if McAdoo goes, Williams will automatically follow. I do not know what to do about it. It looks like buying him out of useful service, and yet McAdoo's financial condition is such that he cannot well afford to remain in the Cabinet.

It is a pity that our law makers do not give Cabinet officers better salaries. The United States is about the largest corporation in the world and surely we should be able to pay fair compensation for services.

Governor Folk called to say he might have an ambition to go on the

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Interstate Commerce Commission rather than remain Counselor as now.

November 20, 1916.

It has been a stirring day. The German Ambassador called at half past ten o'clock. My letter to the President of today tells the essentials of the interview. The Germans intend to push us to the closest point in the submarine controversy in order to force us to intervene rather than go to war with them.

Gerard followed Bernstorff. A large dinner is being given him tomorrow and he wanted to submit his speech for criticism. We agreed upon what was safe to say and eliminated doubtful points. Gerard shows an increasing distaste to returning to his post in Berlin. I do not blame him. He believes the Germans still have an idea that their atrocities really frighten people and that it has some effect upon our unwillingness to go to war.

In my opinion, the President's desire for peace is partially due to his Scotch Presbyterian conscience and not from personal fear, for I believe he has both moral and physical courage.

There were many other callers today but not of sufficient importance to note. Bertron came to say he hoped I would give some attention to the rail-road situation and help work out a satisfactory solution.

Hugh Wallace is over from Washington and says Grayson told him yesterday that the President had advised Tumulty to accept the appraisership and is insisting upon his taking it. Tumulty is making a terrible fight to remain and is begging the President in the most abject way to save him from what he terms ruin.

Polk telephoned from Washington that Tumulty's friends are advising him to accept the position offered with grace as if he thought it a promotion and at his own request. They are trying to work this out today. I feel sorry for Tumulty. He has many good qualities but the President will show lamentable

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weakness if he permits him to stay after he has once indicated he would like
him to go.

November 21, 1916.

I failed to mention that when I was in Washington I told the President there
was a good chance of Roosevelt being the republican candidate in 1920, in which
event I expressed the hope that he would run against him. I am opposed to a
third term, but if we are to have it, I should naturally prefer it to be Wilson
rather than Roosevelt. The President remarked that he would not run unless
the party agreed to nominate a man for Vice President to whom he could turn the
Government over in the event he wished to resign.

The President and I have never agreed on the third term proposition.
He holds a man should serve as long as he is of value to the people. That would
all right if the executive were subject to the control of the
Albert Bigelow Paine lunched with me today. Mr. Honnold of the Belgian
their
Relief called to show me a cable from London office and to ask advice. The cable
indicates trouble is brewing with the Commission because of the arbitrary action
of some of the governmental officials in Belgium.

Lynch, Cleveland H. Dodge, Marwick etc. etc. came in quick succession
upon various matters.

November 22, 1916.

Mr. and Mrs. Bryan are in New York. Loulie ran into W. J. while
calling at the Holland House the other day and he was exceedingly cordial.

Dr. Morton Prince of Boston was one of the many who came. His visit had
to do with a proposal that the President make some statement expressing sym-
pathy for the Allies, Belgium in particular. I could not make him understand
that what he proposed was impossible, at least in the way he desired.

De Lancy Nicholl called to ask why Thos. Fortune Ryan was persona non
IGNATA, not only with the President, but with the President's advisers, and why

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his contribution to the campaign ~~should~~ be refused. He wondered whether it
was because of his connection with George Harvey, and wished me to know that
he had not seen Harvey for two years. I told Nicholl I would find out how
much, if any, feeling the President had in the matter.

November 23, 1916.

Gerard tells me that Mr. Bryan wishes to see him. He is to call upon
him tomorrow. Gerard is wondering whether he is to remain here longer or re-
turn to Berlin December 5th.

Sidney Brooks was lunching with Roosevelt the other day. He said Roosevelt talked so hard during lunch that he forgot to eat, and after lunch he stood in the middle of the room for two and a half hours and "talked very entertainingly about nothing". Among other things, Roosevelt told of his contempt for Wilson's want of courage. The fact that Wilson shrinks from flinging a hundred million people into war is the only excuse Roosevelt has for such an accusation. He probably would feel differently himself if he were President.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey came to present a more complete plan for national defense. I put him in touch with Bernard Baruch, who is another member of the Commission.

I received today a letter from Viscount Grey of Fallodon, a copy of which
is attached.

The President's letter of day before yesterday is important and a
part of the diary.

November 24, 1916.

The German Ambassador's letter of November 23rd is attached. The State
Department asked me to make memoranda of my conversations with Bernstorff and
other diplomats since it can no longer be said they are unofficial.

Professor Irving Fisher, Senator Blanchard, Judge Lovett and others were

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among the callers. My letters to Viscount Grey, A. J. Balfour, Sir Horace Plunkett, etc. etc. are attached.

November 25, 1916.

The President sent us his box for the Army-Navy Game. A severe cold prevented him from coming over. I did not go, but Loulie took Mrs. Willard, Judge and Mrs. William McAdoo, Mrs. Lewis Hancock and Clifford Carver.

I have an important letter from the President today which is attached. He has evidently written the note which he purposes sending the belligerents. I am fearful of its effect. I am writing that I will reach Washington tomorrow at 4.20.

Vance McCormick kept me up until late bedtime talking over party matters.

November 26, 1916.

Frank Polk telephoned and I told him I would be in Washington tomorrow. He is to meet me at the station. There are some cables from Germany he desires me to see before I talk with the President.

I called on Mr. Bryan at the Holland House on my way to the station. It is the first time we have met since he left the Cabinet. He was most cordial. He asked me to say to the President that he expected to be at the Peace Conference in any event, that is, if the President did not commission him to represent the United States, he would go in the capacity of a private citizen. He also said that, in his opinion, he could stop the war if the President would give him proper authority and credentials and allow him to go to Europe. He said, "They are all Christians and not pagans, and he could talk to them in a Christianlike way and be sure they would heed."

The deluded man sincerely believes this. He wished to know why the President had not replied to his telegram of congratulation. My reply was

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that he had doubtless answered it and sent it to Lincoln. He asked me to tell
the President he would be in Washington December 1, 5th and 6th and that he
would call upon him.

The White House,
Washington.
November 26, 1916.

Polk met me at the station and gave me the despatches he referred to over
the telephone. I dropped him just before we reached the White House.

The President received me in the hall and asked me to take tea with
Mrs. Wilson and Mrs. Gerard. After tea I was dressed for dinner and joined
the President in his study where we talked of things of minor importance.

After dinner we went to the study and began the discussion of the object
of my visit. He read several letters and despatches from abroad which Polk had
already shown me. He then read a draft of the proposed note to the belliger-
ents urging them to state what terms they demanded as a basis for peace.

It was a wonderfully well written document, yet, strangely enough, he
had fallen again into the same error of saying something which would have made
the Allies frantic with rage. I have called his attention to this time after
time and yet, in almost every instance where he speaks of the war, he offends
in the same way.

The sentence to which I objected was: "the causes and objects of the war
are obscure". I told him the Allies thought if there was one thing clearer
than another it was this; that their quarrel with him was he did not seem to
understand their viewpoint. They hold that Germany started the war for con-
quest; that she broke all international obligations and laws of humanity in
pursuit of it. They claim to be fighting to make it impossible, and to
so break Prussian militarism that a permanent peace may be established.

*such another war*

I urged him to insert a clause in lieu of the one to which I objected
which would make the Allies believe he sympathized with their viewpoint. I

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thought he could do it in a way to which Germany would not object and might
even take as vindication of her own position.

I also suggested another clause, which he inserted, stating specifi-
cally he was not trying to mediate or demand peace.

He again insisted that I go over and be in England when this note was de-
livered. I should dislike to do this for many reasons. His note may be re-
ceived with great indignation and contrued as a move in favor of Germany and,
besides that, my going may bring about a crisis with Page. I called the Pres-
ident's attention to this phase and he expressed indifference to Page's attitude.
He thought it would not affect anyone excepting Page, and he felt quite content
to have him resign in any way he would.

I do not share this view. Page could resign stating that he did not
approve the President's overtures and it would make him popular in England and
the President correspondingly unpopular. It would also be a blow at the propo-
sal. We argued this earnestly from various angles, but I did not convince
the President that it was a serious obstacle. He asked me to think out the
best way of sending the note without cabling it. He thought if it were ca-
bled, it would become public property immediately and before it reached the dis-
tant belligerents. It would reach England and France within a few hours, but
would take days to reach Russia, Germany and Austria.

I thought he should prepare a better background than he now has for
the reception of the note, particularly in the Allied countries. This, I
thought, might be done by making a firm protest in regard to Belgian deportations.
I told of my having a cable sent over, with the consent of Lansing, giving the
true story of the part our Navy took in the activities of U 53. This I felt
would create a favorable impression. My whole idea is to delay until the time
seems propitious. It is too important a matter to bungle, and if he is not

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careful, that is what he will do.

I repeated my conversation with Mr. Bryan. Bryan has gotten upon the nerves of the President because of the insistence of the Bryan clique that Bryan has again won the election for the President by his campaign in the Far West. The dinner to be given Mr. Bryan in Washington also seemed to disturb him. This is a foolish move on the part of Bryan enthusiasts, and if they wished to give him a dinner it should have been held elsewhere.

The President wished to know how much of his former influence I thought Bryan had recovered. My opinion was that he stood about where he stood before the election and that he need not be considered as a menace to the President's leadership unless the President himself aided him by treating him unkindly.

I outlined my views as to what the situation would be four years from now. I do not share the general view that the Western States that voted for the President this time can be counted upon in the future, and if we assumed that the solid South and the Trans-Mississippi country will work together, we should labor under a delusion. I thought the pendulum in the East would swing back to the Democratic Party, and if the democrats four years from now nominate an Eastern man, the republicans would probably nominate Hiram Johnson of California and the old alignment of the East and South would again be successful. The President expressed some astonishment at this view because, since the election, everyone seems to hold a contrary one.

The President had a letter from Gavit, of the New York Evening Post, which he read to me. Gavit desires him to do several things and, strangely enough, the President was rather inclined to do them all. I shall arrange to see Gavit when I return and have a talk with him.

One of the things the President wished to talk about was the advisability of taking up prohibition and advocating it. I did not give a definite opinion

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but was inclined toward acquiescence. Politically it would be bad for the Democratic Party, but I have come to believe that prohibition carries with it so much more of good than evil, that it must eventually prevail. It cannot become effective until it is nation-wide, and if the President threw the weight of his great influence in its behalf, I am not sure that he could do anything better. The result in Russia during the war must have convinced fair-minded people of the beneficent effects of prohibition. It was about the last thing I thought the President would suggest or consider doing, and I am sure from what he said, that Mr. Bryan's advocating it as an issue in 1920 had much to do with his leaning in that direction. His idea is, I feel certain, to take the question out of Mr. Bryan's hands into his own, which would eliminate Bryan as a political force in the party.

~~But Mr. Bryan has imagination but little sense. He originates many great ideas, and someone more practical than he uses them. Among others Roosevelt robbed him in this way.~~

November 28, 1916.

and Mrs. Wilson

I had breakfast alone, the President deciding to play an early game of golf. He offered to forego this if I had anything of importance to discuss, but I told him I had finished last night so far as I was concerned. They wished me to go to the links with them but I thought I had better see Lansing, Polk and Phillips at the State Department.

Polk came to the White House from his home and we went to the State Department together where I had nearly an hour's conference with Lansing. I spoke of the President's desire for me to go abroad and asked him to use his influence toward postponing it, since I did not dare express my own views too strongly for fear the President might think I was unwilling to go.

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Lansing does not think much of the League to Enforce Peace. He believes if it is inaugurated, only democracies should be eligible for membership. Forming a league with such limitations would be difficult and would give offence.

After leaving Lansing, I went to Phillips' office, and had him walk with me to the White House in order that we might talk en-route. When I reached the White House I found the President had returned, and I left Phillips and went into the study where the President was signing answers to innumerable congratulatory election telegrams and letters. It was mechanical work and we talked for nearly an hour.

The President indicated a purpose not to be bound by party ties, but to appoint the best men to office he could find. We took up the Postoffice Department and outlined a way by which he could bring practically the entire service under the Civil Service law. He asked whether I thought the country would approve and whether it was desired and would be popular. I believed it would.

He was sorry to have me leave and expressed the hope I would soon come again. Polk and I took the 12.30 train and were soon joined by Carter Glass who was also going to New York.

New York.
November 29, 1916.

Edward Hurley, of the Trades Commission, and Joseph Davies and R. W. Woolley were among my visitors today.

Captain Gaunt came early to get the packet for England. He sails today. I sent my very warm regards to Balfour and Grey, and asked him to tell them in confidence that I might be in England soon, and if I should be, I should not go into Germany. I thought it well to let them know this.

November 30, 1916.

While this is Thanksgiving Day I have been as busy as usual. My most

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interesting visitor was J. P. Gavit of the Evening Post. It looks as if Gavit was the man who helped put into the President's head the move for peace at this time, although the President evidently misunderstood the lengths Gavit thought it wise to go. He told of the suggestions he had made, which the President had already shown me. He was pleased to hear that the President was impressed with the suggestion and had in mind to carry some of them out.

We went to a family dinner with the Edward S. Martins, Mrs. Madama Selenka, the German pacifist, called.

She has been in touch with Mr. Bryan and she wished me to express a preference as between Bryan and Taft as the one most available to go to Holland for a conference regarding peace. I was discreet in what I said, but rather indicated it would be well for them both to go if they cared to do so. I take it neither will accept because the President will not favor such procedure.

December 1, 1916.

Robert Fleming, English financier, and Charles Sherrill, our Minister to Argentine, were the most interesting callers.

I talked to Fleming about the folly of continuing the war, urging that they stop trying to punish Germany, and to make a peace which would give them practically all they were contending for. He came round to my way of thinking. I urged him to do more than that, and to use his influence when he reached home toward creating a sentiment for peace. He promised to do so. I pointed out some ways in which this might be done, and the folly it was for influential men like himself to fold their hands and allow the war party to carry everything their own way. I thought sentiment could be turned in Great Britain if those thinking as he did would put their shoulders to the wheel and start counter propaganda.

The German Ambassador telephoned from Washington to ask for an in-

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terview Saturday morning. I asked him to come at half-past ten o'clock.

Charles A. Sherrill came to present a plan for military training of school children throughout the country. He did not have his plan sufficiently outlined for me to give him more than a general opinion. He told of some of the inside workings of the Republican Campaign Committee of which he was a part. I expressed regret that the Democratic Committee's finances were in such condition that we could not offer to pay for certain undertakings of the republicans during the campaign. I thought we were in honor bound, for instance, to pay for the "Golden Special" which they sent to the West, and I thought it only fair we should pay for Mr. Hughes' trip to California.

Sherrill admitted our liability for both of these ventures, and said there were other items which might properly be added to the list. He thought the entire campaign was wretchedly managed and blamed William R. Willcox and Herbert Parsons mainly. He said Hughes was stubborn and would not take advice from those who were most capable of giving it, principally Murray Crane. I insisted that I must refuse to listen to criticism of Willcox or Hughes because gratitude forbade it.

Another interesting thing he told me was that Henry P. Davison, of J. P. Morgan & Co., Shaeffelin and several others whose names I do not recall, wished him to undertake the management of Mr. Root's campaign for the nomination, offering to furnish the necessary funds.

Mr. and Mrs. Jas. W. Gerard gave us a dinner last night at the Ritz. Mr. and Mrs. C. B. Alexander, Frank Munsey and a number of others were present. I do not resent the manner in which Munsey has criticized me, because he has done it in a decent way and it is to be expected in politics.

Frank Polk telephoned from Washington and among other things said the Washington Post had answered the Sun editorial entitbed, "The Upper House".

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by a very complimentary editorial entitled "The President's Friend". I attach
both to the diary.

Gerard and I had lunch at Delmonico's with Roy Howard, President of the United Press, and Mr. H. H. Hawkins its Vice President. We had lunch in a private room so as to converse freely. Howard had seen in the newspapers rumors of my going abroad and he thought it would be a mistake. I asked for his reasons for this opinion in a letter which I could send the President. He has done so and a copy of the letter is attached. It is so complimentary to me that in making a copy for the President I shall modify some parts of it.

December 2, 1916.

Arthur W. Little of Pearson's Magazine called to read me the manuscript of an article he is writing about me. I made some corrections but let it go pretty much as written. I seldom make suggestions in such articles when submitted to me, and often permit mistakes to remain because if I did not, it would seem as if I had authorized the article.

Count von Bernstorff came at 10.30. He had seen Lansing who had told him the President was prepared to move in the direction of peace, but he could not do so because of Germany's deportation of Belgians. I felt it worse than useless to expect the Allies to be in a frame of mind to make peace so long as Germany practicised such methods. I called attention to their Zeppelin raids as one of their mistakes which irritated England and did Germany least good. I estimated that at least a million men had been added to the British Army who would not have joined if it had not been for the Zeppelin raids.

I told Bernstorff in confidence that the President was ddrafting something with a view to peace. He was pleased at the stand taken by the Federal Reserve Board regarding Allied loans.

I showed him Lady Paget's cablegram requesting the President to send

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some message wishing success to the American Matinee to be given in London in behalf of the Red Cross. I suggested it would be a good thing to do provided it would not be misunderstood in Germany; that it could do Germany no harm, and it would be one of those little bits of sentiment which might make the President more popular in England, and that was the thing to be desired just now. The war party would utilize the President's unpopularity to further their interests and if we could bring about better feeling for the President, the reverse might be done by the peace party.

Bernstorff was uneasy over Gerard's return to his post. He said his Government had instructed him several times to make it clear that Gerard was not the most useful man for our good relations. That he was brusque and offensive the sensibilities of many people. Bernstorff gave an experience of his own when he saw Gerard the other day in Washington. I defended Gerard as best I could, knowing what Bernstorff said was true and that his manner is unfortunate. I thought, however, it would be a mistake to make a change at this time since Gerard was thoroughly in accord with our views and would carry them out loyally. A new man would be an experiment and we might be worse off than now. Bernstorff promised to cable this view to his Government.

I surprised him by saying that in my opinion if the President had been defeated on the seventh of November, Houghes would have become President by the fourteenth of November. I told him of my suggestion to the President, but did not let him know the President had accepted it.

When Polk telephoned yesterday he told me how much concerned the British Ambassador was over the action of the Federal Reserve Board in cautioning our banks against accepting Allied Treasury notes. He has talked to Harding, Chairman of the Board, about it. I thought the Federal Reserve Board while right should have done it in a different way so as to have avoided hurting the

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credit of the Allies in the United States. Polks wishes me to see Harding
which I should prefer not doing.

He said Lansing had a long conference with the President and the
President was now willing to accept our view that he had best not act hastily.
He is perfecting the note and we are to determine later whether it is to be
sent and how. Lansing told the President he thought it an injustice to ask
me to go abroad at this time. The President thought perhaps he was right and
said he would not insist upon it. This relieves me very much for I regard it
as a mistake to consider my going at present.

December 3, 1916.

Loulie and I went to the station to meet the Presidential party this
afternoon. I only had time to shake the President's hand for I did not care
to go on the Mayflower down the Bay to see the illuminations. Loulie, however,
went with them.

Mr. and Mrs. Edward S. Martin came for dinner and we took them to the
Waldorf to hear the speaking. Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt's box was near our's.
In talking with her before the President spoke she was not enthusiastic in her
references to him, but after he had made his address she seemed overcome with
admiration for him.

I talked to Dr. Grayson most of the time while others were speaking, he
having come to the guest table to talk with me. He desires to be appointed
Rear Admiral and I shall do what I can to further his ambition.

The most important visitor of the day was the French Ambassador who
called with Madame Jusserand. They did not come until fairly late and when we
at last looked at the time we found it nearly half-past seven and we all had
dinner engagements for that hour.

I have covered most of our conversation in the memorandum I made for

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the State Department. He was critical of our Government and at times our conversation was spirited. The difference between Jusserand and Bernstorff is that the latter has never criticized the United States Government for what has been done to Germany and yet, heaven knows, he has had sufficient cause. He is always agreeable, uncritical, and polite and calm, trying to make relations better and doing nothing to irritate. There would be a different story to tell if Great Britain, France and Russia had representatives here with Bernstorff's diplomatic ability.

Jusserand wished to know what he could cable his Government tomorrow to better matters. He promised to regard anything I told him as confidential except as to his Government. I suggested that he start by cabling them of the President's speech last night at the banquet in which he indicated strong sympathy for France and a leaning toward the Allies.

(2) I have suggested That we were trying to undo the harm which the Federal Reserve Board has done regarding their credits.

(3) To say the President had warned Germany concerning U-boat activities in American waters.

(4) This country was doing what it could to protect communications with the Allies and their communication with one another as well as with neutrals by holding down to a minimum the activities of U-boats.

(5) The United States had practiced benevolent neutrality toward the Allies which the Allies in no way appreciated. We had gotten the enmity of Germany and had not received corresponding benefit from the Allies.

Jusserand promised to embody all these suggestions in his cable.

We took up the question of Tarnowski, newly appointed Austrian Ambassador, to the United States, and his safe conduct which the Allies have refused. Jusserand asked whether it was true the President had in mind sending a battleship

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to bring him over. I evaded this direct question, but insisted that Tarnowski must come in some way. The conversation grew very warm at this point, but he finally said if the President was very desirous of having Tarnowski here he would so inform his Government and something might be done. I replied that we cared nothing for Tarnowski, it was a question of our rights that we were insistent upon.

I cannot understand how an ambassador from one of the Allied countries could think it wise to initiate such a conversation with me. If I had not determined to keep my temper I could have found grounds for saying things he would have remembered a long while.

I could not understand why the Allies did not accept our proposal made in February. In my opinion the war might last for another year or for another two years, and the lines remain practically as they now are. Jusserand agreed to this and at one time seemed to consent to the advisability of adopting our proposal to make peace. But at the last moment he said they would fight it through to the last man. I spoke of the folly of such an attitude and what it would mean to France.

December 7, 1916.

I have been too occupied all week to consider the diary. The calls upon my time seem to grow greater rather than less, and I am seriously considering leaving New York for awhile in order to break the connection.

The President's letter which came on Monday, one from von Bernstorff and one from Trevelyan to the President, sent through me, and my letters to the President speak for themselves.

Howard Whitehouse has been a constant visitor as my letters to the President will show. I am keeping in touch with him because of the British

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Cabinet crisis which has now culminated in Asquith's downfall and Lloyd George's
rise to the Premiership. I wrote Lloyd George today, subject to the President's
approval, and I sent the following despatch to Viscount Grey of Fallodon.

"These are anxious days. Is there anything you can say to guide us here"

I do not know that Great Britain can better herself in the way of a Cabinet,
although I can understand why there is general resentment at so many failures.
I believe if Asquith had more force and had driven his Cabinet with a firmer
hand, matters might have been different.

Sir Edward Grey's great weakness has been in the choice of men for diplo-
matic posts. He allowed Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to remain here at the most cri-
tical time in the history of the two countries, and the results show that Great
Britain has also been inadequately represented in Southeastern Europe. Grey
failed to see that conditions demanded radical changes and that the ordinary
diplomatic corps was unequal to the new situation brought about by the war.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt last night. The
Russian Ambassador and Madame Bakhmateff, Governor and Mrs. Beeckman of Rhode
Island, and Frank Hitchcock were among the guests who numbered about forty. The
others were mostly society people. The Bakhmateffs gave us a pressing invita-
tion to dine with them when we came to Washington, so also did Governor and Mrs.
Beeckman should we be passing through Providence.

Walter Rogers called to bring H. N. Rickey of the Cleveland Press and
W. H. Culver of the St Paul Daily News. We reminded about campaign events.

Howard Whitehouse came to discuss British Cabinet changes. He does not
believe Lloyd George will last very long.

December 14, 1916.

I have been too busy again to keep a daily diary. The number of people
I have seen, the telephone calls and other matters have kept me on the run
from morning until night.

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Sunday evening we dined with the Mezes. Robert Underwood Johnson was there and read us some of his unpublished poems. He invited us to dine with them Saturday to meet James M. Beck.

On Tuesday, at eleven o'clock, we took the train for Washington to attend the first Cabinet Dinner of the year given by the President. There were a number of acquaintances on board the train to prevent my getting any quiet or rest. Governor Clynn, Walter Lippmann, Albert Roberts and others.

Besides ourselves the house guests at the White House were President and Mrs. Gerfield of Williams College, Thomas Jones of Chicago, Joseph Wilson and several others.

The President handed me the memorandum he had prepared to send the belligerents and asked me to read it carefully and give him my opinion. Lansing had already gone over the note and his letter and notes were attached.

The President seemed depressed because the Germans had launched their bolt today asking for a peace conference. I tried to show him it would be of advantage rather than otherwise. As a matter of fact, my desire for peace is so much keener than my wish to bring it about personally that I feel a certain elation not felt for a long while. In my opinion, it will be impossible for the belligerents to get together completely without the aid of the United States.

I did not altogether agree with Lansing's criticism of the note, which was largely as to verbiage rather than ideas. Lansing's criticism excuse for criticising some of the President's expressions was that they could not be translated into foreign languages. This I suppose is true, but the substitutions made the document less forceful and less characteristic of the President.

I did agree with Lansing's suggestion that there should be no threat in the note in the event one side or the other failed to respond. I told the

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President I felt strongly about this, since it would not do to place ourselves
in an attitude which might make us an ally of Germany.

I had an opportunity of talking to Secretary Daniels at the Cabinet Din-
ner. I obtained enough from him to know that my worst fears as to our un-
preparedness were confirmed. I asked Daniels how well our coast was defended
by mines. He replied we were getting mines now from England, but he was in-
sisting that they permit us to manufacture them over here under their patents. I
asked how well we were prepared for war if it should come tomorrow. He said
"war with whom?" I replied with Great Britain. There was no need to await a
reply since his face told the story. He thought in a year we should have
enough mines to protect the coast fairly well.

I am convinced that the President's place in history is dependent to a
large degree upon luck. If we should get into a serious war and it should
turn out disastrously, he would be one of the most discredited Presidents we
have had. He has had nearly three years in which to get the United States
into a reasonable state of preparedness and we have done nothing. Neither
the Army nor the Navy are in condition to meet an enemy of the class of Rou-
mania or Bulgaria, provided they could reach us. The few machine guns we
have in the Army are borrowed or requisitioned from the British. If we had the
75,000 or 100,000 we need we have not the men to use them. We have no large
guns. If we had them we have no trained men who would understand how to handle
them. We have no air service, nor men to exploit it, and so it is down the
list.

A combination of Great Britain and Japan could put us out of business
just as rapidly as they could march through the country. It would be utterly
impossible in these days of secrecy and censorship to know what troops Great
Britain and Japan were transporting to Canada. They could assemble a large
army there without our knowledge and we should be as helpless to resist them

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as Belgium and Serbia were to resist the Germans. If Great Britain and
Japan wished to combine against us they could pretend to be conveying Japanese
troops through Canada to France, and in this way we could not know just what
they were doing or how many men were in Canada.

I believe the President will pull through without anything happening, but
I could not sleep at night if I had this responsibility upon my shoulders and
had not properly met it. The European countries are just as well aware of our
condition as we are ourselves. The greatest security for peace at this time
would be complete preparedness for war. If Great Britain and Russia had kept
pace with Germany in military affairs, this war could not have happened because
Germany would never have attempted to bring it about.

I told the President what Daniels said, and I urged him not to
place our country in the position where we should either have to back down or
fight the Allies. The trouble is the President does not know what is going on
in any of the departments. He does not follow their work and has an idea that
every department of the Government is running smoothly and well. As a matter
of fact, most of them are, but a few are inefficient. I have complained of this from the beginning of his administration. He could remedy it
easily if he would go at it in the right way.

Domestic legislation is the President's forte. No one has ever done that
better or perhaps so well. But as an administrator he is a failure, and it
is only because of a generally efficient Cabinet that things go as well as
they do.

I dislike to record this criticism of the President because he is one
of the great men of the world today, but he sadly lacks administrative ability.

After the dinner Tuesday the different Cabinet officials took me aside
for talks. Lansing is disturbed over the foreign situation. He also wished

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to discuss the selection of a proper man for First Assistant Secretary of State in Osborne's place. We decided sometime ago to give Billy Phillips first place and get a new man for Third Secretary. There is great difficulty in finding a democrat, a man of means and one with ability to do the work creditably.

Gregory still wishes to resign. I told him to leave it in abeyance for the moment because I thought it unfair to upset the President at this time.

I asked Phillips to come over to the White House Wednesday to discuss foreign appointments. We both think it would be well to send Morris to Argentine and give Norman Hapgood Stockholm. In suggesting this to the President he said he did not want to do anything Senator Lewis of Illinois would even indirectly feel was done for him. The President exhibited his usual prejudice in this. Nearly every time I see him there is some new man on his blacklist and he seldom removes one when once there. I cannot understand how he permits such small matters to disturb his equinimity. I mentioned The Independent to him the last time I was here, and found it had come under the ban of his displeasure simply because it did not support him, although it was certainly fair and nearly all the staff voted for him.

On Wednesday, the President undertook to revamp his note to the belligerents so as to have it conform with changed conditions brought about by Germany's offer to parley. He read me most of what he had written, not having finished it all before I left. He has done it exceedingly well as, indeed he does everything of this kind.

I suggested that it might happen that a peace agreement might stall upon the question of indemnity for the restoration of Belgium, Poland and Serbia, in which event, I was in favor of the United States stepping into the breach and offering to restore the devastated part of those countries at our own expense. This interested him, but he did not express an opinion; some-

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thing he seldom does.

The President has a letter from Walter Page which he says he has not read but which he has given Mrs. Wilson to look over and get the sense of it. He now seldom reads Page's letters. He often holds them for my coming. This is the usual penalty for verbosity. I find myself doing the same thing when my correspondents cannot hold themselves within reasonable limits.

The President said Page had offered his resignation and he asked whether I thought he should accept it. I did not answer directly, but asked how sincerely Page had offered it. Mrs. Wilson thought he had offered it with a view of having it refused. I proposed Thomas Jones of Chicago as a suitable man. The President was afraid Jones could not be confirmed by the Senate since he was once rejected for the Federal Reserve Board. I then proposed Hugh Wallace. He did not think Wallace sufficiently serious minded, and while he did not say so, I could see he did not think he was of the intellectual caliber needed now. I may suggest Frank Polk as a suitable man for the place.

We left for New York on the 12.30 with Secretary McAdoo and a number of other acquaintances. McAdoo talked to me a large part of the way over. He feels discouraged at the President's attitude. He feels he should revamp his Cabinet and get rid of the weak members. He also feels that the President is not following the work of the departments as he should. In other words, he feels just as I do. McAdoo said the President had no business head, and what the office needs now is someone with that kind of ability. It is to be remembered, however, one seldom finds a man who has what the President has and administrative ability as well, so I suppose we should be content.

McAdoo discussed his own plans. He said he would like to be President but he would not let that ambition eat his heart out. If it came to him he would like it, but if it did not, he would not be disappointed.

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The letters I have written the President and those he has written me, and
my other correspondence both foreign and domestic, and my cables to Viscount
Grey and his to me are parts of the diary.

Sidney Brooks called to discuss the German peace proposal and the
answer the Allies should make. In the course of the conversation, Brooks was
good enough to say he wished I would do for the railroads what I had done for
the banking system. He said if he were President, he would ask me to take three
months away from every other problem and work out a satisfactory plan. He does
not know that I could not work to advantage in that way. If I should undertake
a solution of the railroad problem I should get in touch with the proper author-
ities in the Senate and House, and gradually mold a measure which, in the end,
they would be certain to believe was their own handiwork. It would then go
through with less opposition.

December 15, 1916.

Thos. F. Logan, Editor of the Washington Post, took lunch with me.
After a two hour discussion of many subjects, he proffered his services in this
way: He would keep me informed confidentially of every thing going on in Wash-
ington *whichever* was of interest. He declared he had no axes to grind, and I
could depend upon his disinterested services. He said he had sought an inter-
view with me because so many mutual friends had spoken of me and each had given
him a different view. Polk, for instance, had told of my international work,
and he had conceived the idea from Polk that was my main interest. On the other
hand, Hurley of the Trades Commission, had told him of my help in his department.
He was curious therefore to see what he termed "all the facets of my mind".

Henry Morganthau called apropos of nothing. He desires me to see
to
Rabbi Wise, and request that certain potential helpers in the campaign should be
invited to some of the White House functions.

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Messrs Honnold and Barr Baker, of the Belgian Relief, came next. They thought it would be of great benefit to the Commission if the President would say something complimentary of its work, and disabuse the German and Belgian idea that it was not a thoroughly American enterprise. I suggested a means by which this might be done. Baker has just returned from Europe and had an interesting interview with the Pope while there. He tells me that he spoke to the Pope about the Irish-Catholic political activity in the United States. The Pope expressed surprise and said he would put a stop to it.

December 16, 1916.

My most interesting callers today were President Lowell of Harvard and Rabbi Wise and the Belgian Minister, M. Havenith.

President Lowell wished to find out what more the League to Enforce Peace could do, and suggested that in transmitting the German note to the Entente powers, the President should emphasize the potentiality of this League to secure future peace. I assured him the President was using that thought in every way advisable at this time, and that no suggestion could be made that he had not thought of to place it to the fore. I outlined some propaganda for the League to use in this country and indicated the way in which they should conduct it.

Rabbi Wise came to enlist my sympathies in the Zionist movement to recover Palestine for the Jews under the suzerainty of Great Britain. I agreed to look into it and see what could be done at the proper time. He hoped I would have a potential part in peace negotiations and he further hoped he might live long enough to read my memoirs, which he felt certain I would write. He gave an interesting account of the summer of 1912 which he spent in a place where Justice Hughes was also summering. He said Hughes told him at that

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time that under no circumstances would he ever be a candidate for the Presidency.
He felt he was now neither republican nor democrat, and that it was unthinkable
for the Supreme Court to be dragged into politics.

It was Rabbit Wise who gave out, at Hughes' request, the statement which
we used so widely during the campaign, stating that "a man on the Supreme Court
who would run for political office, was neither fit for the office he held nor
for the one to which he aspired".

The Belgian Minister called to thank me for my many efforts for Bel-
gium. He seemed to appreciate all I had done and am trying to do.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Robert Underwood Johnson. The other guests
were Mr. and Mrs. James M. Beck, Mr. and Mrs. Pratt, State Forrest Commissioner,
It was impossible for Beck and I to do much talking for everything either of us
said reminded Johnson of something the telling of which interrupted the flow of
ideas. Beck and I agreed to get together later.

December 17, 1916.

Hugh Wallace came from Washington to show me a letter he had received
from Walter Page. It is a characteristic letter. He strikes at the President
covertly and cruelly, and expresses the hope that he will turn the American
people loose so they may speak their true minds about the war, and take part on
the side of the Allies. He thinks half or two thirds of the administration and
those near the President, which I suppose includes me, should be discarded for
better men. He gives it as his opinion that the President would have been de-
feated if a first rate man had been his opponent. Charles Evans Hughes would
like this reference to him/

Sir William Wiseman came with a letter of introduction from the
British Ambassador. He proved to be the most important caller I have had for
sometime. The substance of what he said is embodied in a letter I have sent

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the President. We talked for an hour and a half and covered the ground pretty
throughly. I had him outline the exact message he purported sending his Govern-
ment. I made several suggestions and eliminations, all of which he accepted.
The message tells the British Government that if they think it advisable and
will defer an answer to Germany until Friday or Saturday of this week, I will
undertake to find out unofficially the terms Germany has in mind. We hope to
receive a reply, provided they acquiesce, by tomorrow afternoon. I shall imme-
diately send for Bernstorff and set things in motion.

December 18, 1916.

The British Embassy received a reply from their Government stating it
would be impossible to postpone a statement by the Prime Minister regarding
peace terms. They asked that their thanks be given me for my proffered ser-
vice. My letter to the President yesterday and today are attached.

Among my callers was Mrs. Abby Scott Baker, who is a leader of the
Woman's Suffrage Party. I had to laugh at her because of her failure in the
West. When she left me at Sunapee in June she said she was going West to re-
main until the President was defeated. They now wish to enlist the President
in the movement for a constitutional amendment.

Dudley Field Malone came to say he was thinking of resigning as Collector
of the Port. He believes he has gotten all of value there is in the office
and should go into private life. I advised him to do so.

December 19, 1916.

Sir William Wiseman called this morning. We had a long talk about feeling
in England against the United States and how best to meet it. My letter to the
President today tells something of my views.

Cleveland H. Dodge and Henry Morganthau came to talk over several matters,

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none of which were important.

Senator-elect King of Utah asked for an engagement but I had no time to give him. Governor Bamberger of Utah called to tell of the election out there. He incidentally told me that the Senator-elect (King) was not to be trusted.

I have had any number of telephone calls from Washington and local calls from newspaper people etc. etc.

December 20, 1916.

The President sent me today the original draft of the note which he has sent to the belligerents and neutrals. He asked me to return it so I took a copy with the eliminations and changes just as he had made them. I thought it might sometime be interesting since the President may destroy the original.

I have seldom seen anything he has written with so many changes. My letter to him tells of my thought on this subject. They do not tell, however, that I deprecate one sentence which will give further impetus to the belief that he does not yet understand what the Allies are fighting for. That one sentence will enrage them. I talked to him for ten minutes when I was there and got him to eliminate from the original draft a much more pronounced offense of the same character, but he has put it back in a modified form. He seems obsessed with that thought, and he cannot write or talk on the subject of the war without voicing it. It has done more to make him unpopular in the Allied countries than any one thing he has done, and it will probably keep him from taking the part which he ought to take in peace negotiations.

I find the President has nearly destroyed all the work I have done in Europe. He knows how I feel about this and how the Allies feel about it, and yet the refrain always appears in some form or other. Lansing, too, is afflicted with the same disease, but in his case it is not so serious as with the Pres-

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ident.

Sir Horace Plunkett took lunch with me. He shows the result of his recent illness. He, too, confirms everything I have heard about the dislike of the United States among the people of England, and he did not deny there was a possibility of future trouble between Great Britain and this country. I am writing the President about this tonight. I wish I could make him realize the seriousness of the international situation and could open his eyes to the state of mind and their feeling toward us. I do not see how he can figure largely in an international adjustment as long as they feel toward him as they do. It is all so unnecessary. He could have done and said the same things he had said if done them in a different way.

Whitehouse came to make some further suggestions.

Miss Ida Tarbell called to discuss the President's offer of a place on the Tariff Commission which I made her on Sunday. We talked for nearly an hour. She has an interesting mind. I did not try to persuade her as I could see she is not strong and should not undertake such arduous work. Then, too, her personal affairs are not in shape to allow it. She has a fine sense of public service and does not desire to decline a call of duty.

Vance McCormick brought Breckenridge Long of Saint Louis in order that I might look him over as a possible Assistant Secretary of State.

December 21, 1916.

The storm broke this morning with the publication of the President's note to the belligerents. The United Press telephoned this afternoon and were chagrined that the note was not given out in time for the afternoon papers. I explained as best I could the reasons for it.

We gave a dinner last night to Ambassador and Mrs. Jos. E. Willard. The other guests were Dr. and Mrs. William M. Polk, Mr. and Mrs. Adrian Iselin,

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Mr. and Mrs. Montgomery Hare and Mr. and Mrs. S. R. Bertron.

Don Seitz, of the World, talked with me about the paper shortage and high prices. I agreed to send for George W. Anderson, Federal District Attorney of Massachusetts, whom the Department of Justice has placed in charge of the matter and talk it over with him.

I have been constantly on the telephone with the United Press, Washing-
ing etc. etc.

Lansing gave out an interview without consultation with the President.
Tumulty caught it, took it to the President with a sensational interpretation,
and the President called for Lansing and had him modify it in another state-
ment. It all shows bad teamwork. Lansing should not have made the
statement without first consulting the President, but after he had made it, the
President should ask have let it stand. It would have done no real harm and
perhaps would have done good. The great trouble is lack of coordination.

I talked with Cleveland Dodge and Mr. Honnold about a general European
Relief Commission. I asked them to get it in better shape before submitting
it to the President.

Dr. Roosevelt, of the International Court of Holland and the Hague, was a
caller. He is a "light weight" but I got some information from him. He was
naive enough to tell me that the people of Holland considered Americans vulgar.
He also said the French thought the Dutch were all cowards, and while the Ger-
mans treated them badly, the German Legation were as "sweet as honey". On the
other hand, the British were domineering and arrogant. As far as I could gather,
they hate everybody and everybody hates them.

It has been a very trying day and I wonder how I have gotten through with
it.

I lunched with Clifford Carver to meet Herbert Croly of the New Republic. We
had an interesting discussion, mostly upon our international relations.

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December 22, 1916.

Sir Horace Plunkett was my first visitor this morning. He is terribly exercised over the President's note. He is sorry that he sent it and regrets the verbiage. He called attention to the fact that it contained the same old refrain. He had made memorandum of sentences taken from the President's speeches during the campaign, notably the one in Cincinnati, and started to read them. I begged him not to do so, saying I could repeat them backward. I asked him to write out his views and send them to me so I might transmit them to the President if I thought advisable.

Plunkett hopes the new British Government will serve his country well, but he has no confidence in Lloyd George. He does not believe him to be a man of integrity. He looks upon him as a brilliant, rather cheap opportunist who would do pretty much anything for personal advancement.

Lincoln Colcord was one of my callers. I have recommended him to the
Philadelphia Public Ledger syndicate.

Malcolm McAdoo, a brother of the Secretary, came to present his grievances against Secretary Daniels. McAdoo is connected with the Electric Boat Co. They bid on 27 submarines and while their bid was lowest, Daniels gave them only 17, and awarded 10 to the Lake Company. His reasons for doing this was probably to have some competition in the future, but McAdoo resents it as unfair. He showed me an autograph letter from Daniels asking him to help his, Daniels', brother, a lawyer recently from North Carolina. McAdoo secured him a place through the influence of Converse, who is the mainstay of the Electric Company. McAdoo says that Daniels was not satisfied with the $5000.00 salary which was given his brother and asked for $25,000. He had no evidence for this assertion and I doubt it. Secretary McAdoo told me something of this matter before, and I had thought to take it up with the President, hoping to avoid a scandal, for Malcolm McAdoo is vindictive and would not hesitate to make the story public.

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B. M. Baruch and Tom Chadbourne came in much excitement to say that Baruch has been charged with having received inside information concerning the President's note and Lansing's statement, and made a large sum of money on the Stock Exchange by selling stocks short. He denied having received any information directly or indirectly and asked my advice as to his making a statement to that effect. I was inclined that he should do so. Chadbourne was inclined to the contrary. I did not press the matter.

There is no end of criticism of Lansing for making his statement, and McAdoo is linked up in the public mind with Baruch and the supposed millions he made from the leak.

We went to dinner at the Plaza with Mr. and Mrs. William A. Tucker, Mr. and Mrs. Harding, Mr. and Mrs. Robinson and Mr. and Mrs. Shaddock.

December 23, 1916.

I have been in constant communication with Washington regarding foreign affairs. The State Department is worried sick over the President's laissez-faire policy. Every day Lansing and Polk urge me to come to Washington to talk to him. I have promised to go next week, but I have no stomach for it. It is practically impossible to get the President to have a general consultation. I see him and then I see Lansing, and the result is, we get nowhere. What is needed is consultation with the three of us, and a definite program worked out and followed as consistently as circumstances will permit.

I have avoided seeing as many people as possible today because I have laryngitis.

December 24, 1916.

I still suffer with my throat and am trying to be quiet which the holiday makes easier than usual.

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December 25, 1916.

We took dinner with the Mezes in the middle of the day and had them here in the evening. It has been a quiet Christmas. McAdoo telephoned very much disturbed over the report that he had made millions out of the recent drop in the stock market. He declares he will find who is responsible for the story and bring suit.

December 26, 1916.

Judge McAdoo was my most interesting caller today. He is disturbed at the lack of good feeling toward this country by Canadians. They are losing men and wasting treasure and we are growing stronger and richer every day. He has some plans for bettering relations which I heartily approved.

December 27, 1916.

The German Ambassador called this morning. He is not pleased with Germany's answer to the President's note. He wishes to advise his Government that the only thing to do now is to give terms. He does not believe, however, not they would make them public. He thought they would be willing to send them through the State Department because there are so many leaks from there.

It was arranged, therefore, that if the President thought well of the plan, he should cable his Government suggesting they give terms through him to go no further than the President and myself. I suggested to Bernstorff the advisability of having his Government take a high stand on the high ground of permanent peace. I thought they would be in an unassailable position if they could say to the world that no matter how the war began or what the interests of the different belligerents were in the beginning, it had not gotten into such a frightful state that all should unite upon a satisfactory plan to prevent such another war in the future. That the question of territory was unimportant compared to

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this one central fact.

Bernstorff agreed to do this. My letter to the President of today will
explain how the matter stands.

Chairman Harris of the State Executive Committee called to talk of
State political affairs.

December 28, 1916.

The President's code message is the most important document I have today.
It is attached herewith, and my letter to Bernstorff and to the President are
also attached and explain my actions.

Walter Lippman of the New Republic was an interesting visitor.
Both he and Croly assure me they wish to do everything possible to uphold the
President's hands at this critical juncture. They asked me to give direction
and keep them on the right track.

I explained to Lippman how very difficult it was to please the Allies, par-
ticularly Great Britain, because they had not been successful in the war and
were looking about to place the blame. I indicated how necessary it was for us
not
to write of them as we would in ordinary times, but to give a sympathetic tone
even if not altogether sincere, making allowance for their state of mind. Even
this, I told him, might be carried to a point where it would react, and they
would say our actions did not coincide with our words.

Ambassador Fletcher followed Lippmann. Fletcher is getting resting
with having nothing to do. He believes the Mexican situation is not improving
and made some suggestions which I may pass on to Washington, although I deter-
mined long ago not to inject myself into that situation.

Whitehouse followed Fletcher. He is not disturbed over the President's
note. He thinks it will now be impossible to keep down peace discussions in
all countries, and even if the war does not end immediately, it will be impos-

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sible for the militarists to carry it over longer than another spring and summer.

December 29, 1916.

Cleveland H. Dodge, Jerome Green and E. H. Brougham, of the Public Ledger, came during the day. Dodge and Green had a better worked out plan for united foreign relief. They gave a list of names for my approval which are to be passed on to the President. The idea is to raise a hundred million dollars for the sufferers of Europe, to be expended now and after the war. They believe this can be done if they can unite all efforts now being made in that direction. They desire the President to name a commission and invite them to the White House for a final discussion of plans. It is the intention to have the plan well worked out in advance with a small executive committee and let the White House meeting amend or reject or confirm the plans and committee as a whole.

I called their attention to the fact that no one seemed to be thinking of Canada. She has not been considered in their plans and I insisted that she be included. Both Dodge and Green adopted this suggestion and promised it would be carried out.

Brougham came in pursuance of his plan to organize a bureau by which better and more accurate news could be disseminated throughout the country. He had a list of papers that would cooperate in the plan. It is intended that the men doing the actual news service shall be selected by the President and myself as a guaranty of good faith. He left a copy of a letter of invitation he is sending out which is attached. Lincoln Colcord was selected for the first assignment, which will be to the belligerent countries.

Ambassador and Mrs. Willard took lunch with us. After lunch Willard and I went into conference. He told several things of interest. In August

1914, the King of Spain told him in confidence that King Albert of Belgium had agreed to let the German troops through Belgium without molestation in the event of war with France. Albert could not make his promise good and the consequent disastrous result followed.

Alphonso told Willard that the Kaiser had tried to buy, by decorations, flattery and special favors, the smaller monarchs of Europe. He had tried his blandishments on him. He said if he had been in Albert's place and his people had defended their country rather than submit as he had promised, he, Alphonso, would have abdicated and joined the Belgian Army as a private and fought throughout the war. I wonder?

He also told Willard, in the event of war, he would never lead his men into a danger he was unwilling to share with them. Again, I wonder? Willard wrote this conversation down, but has told it to no one, not even to the President.

This reminds me of that part of my diary which relates to my visit to the King of the Belgians at La Panne in February of this year. It will be noted that I mentioned that he seemed to have a slight pro-German leaning. There was nothing he actually said that made me think this, nevertheless, I had that impression while I was with him.

Willard said that on the 10th of May, King Alphonso sent for him and asked him to transmit a message to the President to the effect that he would like to know whether the President did not think the time was growing propitious for a peace move. Willard sent the cable and the King asked him several times whether he had received an answer. Willard repeated the message and then repeated it again, but he did not get a reply until the 15th of August.

Willard says it has ruined his influence at Madrid and he felt that it would be wise to transfer him to another post since he had noticed a distinct

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difference in the *differenzen* King's attitude, and he does not believe
he can ever be on the same terms with him or the Spanish Government.

It is hard to believe that the President would show so much discourtesy
if he received the message.

December 30, 1916.

Benjamin Ide Wheeler called. He thinks the President has a great oppor-
tunity to build up a new Democratic Party, and he hoped he would avail himself
of it. I called his attention to the extraordinary demands upon the Presi-
dent's time because of foreign affairs and how impossible it was to give as
much direction to this as would be necessary.

We talked of the war and of peace. He is fair-minded but rather inclined
to be pro-German.

Herbert Bayard Swope called to present a copy of his book, "Inside the
German Empire 1916", and to exchange views regarding Germany.

Don Seitz and George W. Anderson, who has charge of the investigation of
high prices for the Government, took lunch with me. The lunch was arranged to
have Seitz and Anderson meet to discuss the cause of the high price of print
paper and to suggest some method by which it might be lowered. I let the two
of them do the talking, and each maintained himself well. It gave me a better
opinion of both.

Francis Doyle of Philadelphia called to pay his respects. He is a
Philadelphia attorney who figured in the Casement trial.

Lincoln Steffens followed Doyle. He has been lecturing through the coun-
try and told how different points in his lectures concerning Mexico were receiv-
ed. The more I see of Steffens the more I like him. While he has the radical
viewpoint, he is always fair and generous to his opponents. He is anxious to
go to Europe with me should I go again and I promised to let him know in advance