FOREWORD for Richard Helms' memoirs:

"A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency"
by Richard Helms, William Hood (pub. Apr. 2003)

REVISED-2/20/03

## Foreword

by Henry A. Kissinger

America's relationship to its intelligence activities has always been ambivalent. Secure behind two vast oceans for most of its history, its margin of survival was so great that it felt liberated from the need for precise information required by less fortunate nations.

Thus America's attitude toward intelligence was aloof, if not reluctant, leaving it in embryonic form to the military services. "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail" was Secretary of State Henry Stinson's verdict in 1929 when he disapproved funding for the department's code-breaking unit.

2

World War II and the Cold War changed these attitudes. Long-range nuclear weapons shrank the American margin of safety and created the danger of surprise attack; Communist ideology merged foreign and domestic threats. Terrorism added a new dimension of privatized danger. Groups heretofore considered private or at least nongovernmental – such as political parties and, more recently, terrorist cells – were in a position to pose threats to the national security and to the global balance of power. Precise information became a condition of survival. And covert operations were needed to deal with threats in the gray area between diplomacy and military strategy – a type of intelligence in which the American government had no expertise and the American public no experience.

3

Richard Helms was a key figure in the building of America's intelligence capability for this new world. He gives a gripping account of the 35 years during which he rose through the ranks at the Central Intelligence Agency, mostly in the Directorate of Plans, which recruits and trains foreign agents and conducts covert operations. Appointed Director of Central Intelligence by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, Helms continued in office under President Richard Nixon until relieved of his position in February 1973 in a move of surpassing pettiness six weeks before he would have reached the automatic retirement age of 60.

After his death in October 2002, some obituaries snidely described Richard Helms as the holder of secrets, as if this inevitable aspect of intelligence work reflected his character or his predisposition.

4

Those of us who observed Dick over the decades and who admired his
patriotism, his dedication, and his character, regretted that his sense
of duty prevented the nation from sharing his accomplishments. This
Helms has now remedied in this thoughtful book.

As National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State under
President Nixon, I consulted with Dick on a daily basis as DCI and
regularly, under President Ford, in his subsequent post as ambassador
to Iran. There was no public servant I trusted more or who
contributed more to the understanding of the challenges facing our
nation.

No department head has a more difficult assignment than the
Director of Central Intelligence. He wears two partly incompatible
hats: He heads the Agency, which is responsible for the collection of

5

intelligence on foreign countries and the conduct of covert operations;
at the same time, he is Director of Central Intelligence for the entire
United States Government. In the latter capacity, he has to
coordinate the actions of his own department with the separate - and
occasionally competitive - intelligence activities of the State and
Defense Departments and other agencies charged with intelligence-
gathering by technical means.

All department heads are technically under the authority of the
President. But the Director of Central Intelligence, unlike his
colleagues, is not to have a stake in the political fortunes of the
administration in office; he represents "objective" truth on matters
where objectivity is itself often at issue. The DCI must be prepared to
challenge the favorite theses of powerful political personalities.

6

LYJ

Dick Helms navigated these shoals with remarkable skill and extraordinary integrity. Each administration presents a unique challenge to the intelligence community, reflecting differences in personality and political outlook. Helms' account is fascinating, acute, and subtle about the various administrations in which he served: the increasing reliance on covert operations in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Richard Nixon's ambiguous attitude toward the Central Intelligence Agency and its director.

President Nixon's view of Helms reflected his characteristic ambivalence. On the one hand, he considered the position of DCI nonpolitical, and when he assumed the presidency, he emphasized continuity by reappointing Helms. At the same time, he regarded Helms as a member of the "Georgetown social set," which Nixon

7

believed - not incorrectly - to be more sympathetic to Democratic
administrations than to his own. He therefore coupled Helms'
reappointment with an attempt to insulate him from the policy
process: The DCI was to attend National Security Council meetings
only to give a briefing; once discussion turned to policy, he was to
leave the Cabinet Room. Helms accepted this directive, which it fell to
me to convey, with characteristic discipline albeit slightly raised
eyebrows. In the event, Nixon was so impressed by Helms' briefings
that he wanted to hear his views on policy - or at least the CIA's
assessment of the consequences of various policy options, which is
what policy discussions, in the end, are all about. Nixon solved the
problem after an early NSC meeting by inviting Helms after a briefing
to join the group for lunch.

8

From that point on, Dick Helms was an integral member of the
NSC team. The Agency under his leadership was indispensable in
supplying analyses and - even when I thought they stuck too closely
to conventional wisdom - beyond criticism as to its motives. As time
went on, Helms was given many opportunities for private meetings at
the White House, most frequently with me, to make sure that all the
implications of his department's recommendations were available to
the President. It was also Helms' responsibility to report which, if any,
American agents abroad might cause foreign policy difficulties if
exposed. (For reasons of security and deniability, we preferred not to
know their names unless they fell into this category.) Helms' conduct
with respect to this sensitive issue was impeccable.

9

The CIA's role in covert operations became controversial at the end of Helms' tenure. Traditional diplomacy seeks to affect the conduct of states; military force exists to sustain the balance of power. But during the Cold War – and now again in today's war against terrorism – the threat often comes from non-state actors, such as political parties or terrorist groups, financed from abroad.

The CIA did not deserve the opprobrium various investigations heaped on it. Most of its operations were designed to prevent radical forces from taking over countries considered important to American security and interests and where our adversaries had instruments of action not available to us. Not all were well-designed, but all were approved – and, in the most controversial cases, ordered – by the

10

presidents of every Cold War administration, even when the paperwork
was conducted to provide deniability.

After Helms left office, he and some of his colleagues came
under attack for having been assigned to defend these new and
intangible frontiers – which their superiors had defined for them – on
behalf of a society accustomed to more conventional enemies. The
men and women who undertook these thankless tasks, veiled in a
secrecy imposed on them by their superiors, were deprived of credit
and, as it turned out, the protection to which they were entitled. Their
actions were often challenged well after the event when the necessities
that had given rise to them could be recalled only with difficulty by a
new generation.

11

Dick Helms became one of the most prominent victims. He was
charged with having committed perjury while testifying before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during confirmation proceedings
for his appointment as ambassador to Iran. Following established
procedures, Helms had denied covert operations before a committee
not authorized to receive such information. But in classified hearings,
he had already briefed the members of Congress in the House and
Senate designated by the congressional leadership for that purpose -
including the SFRC member who had posed the incriminating
questions. It was a grievous injustice, rectified to some extent when
President Ronald Reagan awarded Helms the National Security Medal
in 1982* and later came to dinner at his house.

* This needs to be checked.

12

Helms discusses this episode that was to blight his life for many
years without self-pity. He was proud of all aspects of his service, as
he had every right to be. His lodestar was a sense of duty, his
motivating force public service. There was no public servant I
respected more. It was an honor to be Richard Helms' colleague; it
enhanced my life to be his friend.

Amazon.com: A Look over My Shoulder. A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency: Books: KIC... Page 2 of 13

influenced geopolitical developments in ways that benefited the U.S. The strength of the book is in the breadth of history it encompasses. Helms's career spanned WWII, the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. role in the ouster of Chile's President Allende, Vietnam, numerous Middle East meltdowns and much of the Cold War. Along the way he battled with the Pentagon about the relative troop strength of the Vietcong and with the Department of Defense over the nuclear capability of the USSR. Helms's impressions of the moment of his times, from Hitler to Reagan, makes for sometimes surprising reading. For example, President Johnson is sympathetically treated, while Sen. Frank Church, who headed Senate hearings into the CIA, is depicted as an ambitious political opportunist. Although it is only by implication, Helms raises provocative questions about the proper scope of congressional oversight of the CIA that are especially relevant in the post-September 11 world. Photos not seen by PW.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.

## From Booklist

Helms was director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 1966 to 1973. "This is a memoir I never expected to write," he says in the preface to the memoir we're glad he did write, for in looking over his 30 years in the intelligence field, he presents a book as compelling as a good thriller. (Perhaps a lot of credit for the fluidity of the prose should go to his coauthor, but, ultimately, that's an unimportant issue in terms of a profession, Helms was involved first in journalism--in Germany during the Third Reich--before during the war and postwar years, circumstances drew him into intelligence gathering. He was high in CIA during such bruising times for this country as the Vietnam War and Watergate; his character insights into Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon are gut-real. Helms has a point of view, of course; readers won't be naive to think otherwise. For instance, he insists that when it comes to the government's need to gather intelligence, "Americans will never believe that secrecy is essential." We learn spy talk here--such as what "counterintelligence" is and does. Particularly in the post-September 11 climate, inside information on the CIA is bound to generate considerable reader interest. Brad Hooper
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

See all Editorial Reviews

## Product Details

**Hardcover:** 496 pages

**Publisher:** Random House; 1st edition (April 8, 2003)

**ISBN:** 037550012X

**Product Dimensions:** 9.5 x 6.5 x 1.6 inches

**Shipping Weight:** 1.77 pounds

**Average Customer Review:** ★★★★☆ based on 4 reviews. (Write a review.)

**Amazon.com Sales Rank:** #273,645 in Books (See Top Sellers in Books)
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**In-Print Editions:** Paperback (Reprint) | All Editions

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## Inside This Book (learn more)

### First Sentence:

The telephone call that set in motion the events that would eventually end my intelligence career came to an end on Saturday, June 17, 1972. Read the first page

### Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPS): (learn more)

White House, United States, New York, President Johnson, Allen Dulles, South Vietnam, World War, St. Petersburg, Department, Eastern Europe, Frank Wisner, General Donovan, National Security Council, North Vietnam, Viet Cong, Communist Party, Soviet Union, Henry Kissinger, President Eisenhower, Top Secret, Bay of Pigs, Robert Kennedy, Cold War, Dick Bissell, President Truman, Radio Liberty

http://www.amazon.com/Look-over-My-Shoulder-Intelligence/dp/037550012X/sr=1-1/qid=1163... 11/16/2006

1396 WORDS

FINAL (2/18/03)

Foreword
by Henry A. Kissinger

2

3

LYJ

After his death in September 2002, some obituaries snidely described Richard Helms as the holder of secrets, as if this inevitable aspect of intelligence work reflected his character or his predisposition.

4

5

6

7

LYJ

8

9

10

President, even when the paperwork was conducted to provide
deniability.

11

* This needs to be checked.

12

[Y]

1380 WORDS

2/17/03-#3

Foreword

America's relationship to its intelligence activities has always
been ambivalent. Secure behind two vast oceans for most of its
history, the United States did not believe it required intelligence
services (such as those of European powers). Its margin of survival
was so great that it was liberated from the need for ambiguous
judgment required by less fortunate nations. Thus America's attitude
and left in embarks from the military needs
toward intelligence was aloof, if not reluctant. "Gentlemen do not read
each other's mail" was Secretary of State Henry Stinson's verdict in
1929 when he disapproved funding for the department's code-breaking
unit.

p. 1

Feb 18 03 08:50a

2

World War II and the Cold War changed these attitudes. Long-range nuclear weapons shrank the American margin of safety and created the danger of surprise attack; Communist ideology merged foreign and domestic threats. Terrorism added a new dimension of privatized danger. Groups heretofore considered private or at least nongovernmental - such as political parties and, more recently, terrorist cells - were in a position to pose threats to the national security and to the global balance of power. Precise information became a condition of survival. There evolved the concept of covert and機密的 werden needed to deal with threats operations, actions falling in the gray area between diplomacy and military strategy - a type of intelligence in which the American government had no expertise and the American public no experience.

P.2

Feb 18 03 08:50a

Those of us who observed Dick over the decades and who admired his
patriotism, his dedication, and his indispensable, regretted that his

Presidents Nixon and Ford, I consulted with Dick on a daily basis as
under President Ford.
DCI and regularly (in his subsequent post) as ambassador to Iran.

No department head has a more difficult assignment than the
Director of Central Intelligence. He wears two partly incompatible
hats: He heads the Agency, which is responsible for the collection of
intelligence on foreign countries and the conduct of covert operations;
at the same time, he is Director of Central Intelligence for the entire

Feb 18 03 08:50a

p.5

Feb 18 03 08:51a

President Nixon's view of Helms reflected his characteristic
ambivalence. On the one hand, he considered the position of DCI
nonpolitical, and when he assumed the presidency, he emphasized
continuity by reappointing Helms. At the same time, he regarded
Helms as a member of the "Georgetown social set," which Nixon
believed - not incorrectly - to be more sympathetic to Democratic
administrations than to his own. He therefore coupled Helms'

9.0

Feb 18 03 08:51a

7

reappointment with an attempt to insulate him from the policy
process: The DCI was to attend National Security Council meetings
only to give a briefing; once discussion turned to policy, he was to
leave the Cabinet Room. Helms accepted this directive, which it fell to
me to convey, with characteristic discipline albeit slightly raised
eyebrows. In the event, Nixon was so impressed by Helms' briefings
that he wanted to hear his views on policy - or at least the CIA's
assessment of the consequences of various policy options, which is
what policy discussions, in the end, are all about. He solved the
problem after an early NSC meeting by inviting Helms after a briefing
to join the group for lunch.

From that point on, Dick Helms was an indispensable member of
the NSC team. The Agency under his leadership was indefatigable in

P.7

Feb 18 03 08:51a

8

supplying analyses and - even when I thought they stuck too closely
to conventional wisdom - beyond criticism as to its motives. As time
went on, Helms was given many opportunities for private meetings,
mostly with me, to make sure that all the implications of his
department's recommendations were available to the President. It
was also Helms' responsibility to report which, if any, American
agents abroad might cause foreign policy difficulties if exposed. (For
reasons of security and deniability, we preferred not to know their
names unless they fell into this category.) Helms' conduct with
respect to this sensitive issue was impeccable.

P·d

Feb 18 03 08:51a

9

The CIA did not deserve the opprobrium various investigations heaped on it. Most of its operations were designed to prevent radical forces from taking over countries considered important to American security (and interests), and where our adversaries had instruments of action not available to us. Not all were well-designed, but all were – and in the most controversial cases ordered) approved by the President, even when the paperwork was conducted to provide deniability.

p.9

Feb 18 03 08:52a

10

Dick Helms became one of the most prominent victims. He was
charged with having committed perjury while testifying before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during confirmation proceedings
for his appointment as ambassador to Iran. Following established
procedures, Helms had denied covert operations before a committee
not authorized to receive such information. But (in classified

p.10

Feb 18 03 08:52a

11

hearings, he had already briefed the members of Congress in the House and Senate designated by the congressional leadership for that purpose [- including the SFRC member who had posed the incriminating questions]. It was a grievous injustice, rectified to some extent when President Ronald Reagan awarded Helms the National Security Medal in 1982* and later came to dinner at his house.

Helms discusses this episode that [was told] blight his life for many years without self-pity. He was proud of all aspects of his service, as he had [every] right to be. His lodestar was a sense of duty, his motivating force public service. There was no public servant I respected more. It was an honor to be Richard Helms' colleague; it enhanced my life to be his friend.

* This needs to be checked.

p.11

Feb 18 03 08:52a

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/16/03 06:07pm

All department heads are technically under the authority of the
President. But the intelligence advice the Director of Central

Intelligence gives is supposed to be objective. He is not to have a

stake in the political fortunes of the administration in office; he must
"objective" himself, since objectivity is itself after all
elaborate.

distinguish between his personal view and the collective judgment of
the intelligence community. The DCI must be prepared to challenge
the favorite theses of powerful political personalities.

Dick Helms navigated these shoals with remarkable skill and
extraordinary integrity. Each administration presents a [unique]

P.5

Feb 17 03 04:07P

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/16/03 08:07pm

challenge to the intelligence community, reflecting differences in
personality and political outlook. Helms' account is fascinating, acute,
and subtle
discreet about the various administrations in which he served:

the increasing reliance on covert operations, especially in the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and Richard Nixon's complex
attitude toward the Central Intelligence Agency and its director.

President Nixon's view of Helms reflected his characteristic
ambivalence. On the one hand, he considered the position of DCI
nonpolitical, and when he assumed the presidency, he treated
empowered

 continuity in national security policy as essential and therefore
 reappointed Helms. At the same time, he regarded Helms as a

p.6

Feb 17 03 04:07p

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/16/03 03:07pm

than to his own. He therefore coupled Helms' reappointment with an
attempt to insulate him from the policy process: the DCI was to
attend NSC meetings only to give a briefing; once discussion turned to
policy, he was to leave the Cabinet Room. Helms accepted this
directive, which it fell to me to convey, with characteristic discipline
[albeit] slightly raised eyebrows. In any event, this division of
functions was to survive only one or two meetings. Nixon was so
impressed by Helms' briefings that he wanted to hear his views on
policy - or at least the CIA's assessment of the consequences of
various policy options, which is what policy discussions, in the end, are
all about. He solved the problem by inviting Helms after a briefing to
lunch with the National Security Council.

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/16/03 00:07pm

8

From that point on, Dick Helms was an indispensable member of the NSC team. The Agency under his leadership was indefatigable in supplying analyses and - even when I thought they stuck too closely to conventional wisdom - beyond criticism as to its motives. As time went on, I fell into the habit of keeping Helms behind the White opportunities for private meetings to make sure House meetings to make sure I had understood all the implications of his department's recommendations. It was also Helms' (responsibility) to inform the President - through me - which, if any, [American] agents abroad might cause foreign policy difficulties if exposed. (For reasons of security, we preferred not to know [their] names [unless they fell into this category.] Helms' conduct with respect to this sensitive issue was impeccable.

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/16/03 08:07pm

The CIA's role in covert operations became controversial at the end of Helms' term in office. Traditional diplomacy seeks to affect the conduct of states; military force exists to sustain the balance of power.

But during the Cold War - and now again in today's war against terrorism - the threat often comes from non-state actors, such as

frequent American covert actions were assistance to democratic

parties or at least resistance to Communist or extremist groups.

During the end of Helms' tenure, he and some of his

these new and intangible frontiers - which their superiors had defined

for them - on behalf of a society used to (more conventional

enemies). The men and women who undertook this thankless task,

Feb 17 03 04:08p

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/16/03 08:07pm

10

veiled in a secrecy imposed on them, were deprived of credit and, as it turned out, the protection to which they were entitled. Their actions were often challenged well after the event when the necessities that had given rise to them could be recalled only with difficulty by a new generation.

Dick Helms became one of the most prominent victims. He was charged with having committed perjury while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during confirmation proceedings for his appointment as ambassador to Iran. Following established procedures, Helms had denied covert operations before a committee not authorized to receive such information. But he had already briefed the members of Congress in the House and Senate designated by the (The Sun報 only asked the Ambassador last in fact been briefed in advance congressional leadership for that purpose. It was a grievous injustice,

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/15/03 09:36pm P. 002

2

operations; at the same time, he is Director of Central Intelligence for
the entire United States Government. In the [latter] capacity, he has
to coordinate the actions of his own [department] with the separate -
[and] occasionally competitive - intelligence activities of the State and
Defense Departments and other agencies charged with intelligence [-
gathering] by technical means.

All department heads are technically under the authority of the
President. This is true in an administrative sense - the Director of
Central Intelligence [in that he], like (his Cabinet colleagues), can be
removed by the President. But the intelligence advice he gives is
supposed to be objective; he is not to have a stake in the political
fortunes of the administration in office; The Director of Central

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/15/03 09:36pm

Intelligence must be prepared to challenge the favorite theses of
powerful political personalities.

At the same time, he is in charge of the implementation of
covert operations: national security objectives assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency that fall into the gray area between diplomacy and
military operations - a sphere of policy [to] which the American public
has little [exposure] and [one that] tempts the executive branch to
use it to escape scrutiny and outside critics for witch hunts. The latter
danger, in fact, has been greater than the former.

Dick Helms navigated between these shoals with [remarkable]
skill, his compass course being his extraordinary integrity. The greater
part of his career was in the Directorate of Plans, which recruits and
intelligently reflects differences in personnel,
[deploys] foreign agents and conducts covert operations approved by
and political pushback

g.p.

Feb 16 03 05:08p

JODY WILLIAMS

703 8414072

02/15/03 09:36pm P. 004

the President (or by mechanisms set up to insulate the President from
the formal decision). Helms' primary responsibility for most of his
career was in handling foreign agents. He gives a fascinating account
of the various administrations in which he served: the increasing
reliance on covert operations, especially in the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations, and Richard Nixon's complex attitude toward
the Central Intelligence Agency and its director. Since I am most
familiar with that period, I will describe Helms' conduct from the
perspective of the Nixon White House.

President Nixon's [view of] Helms reflected his characteristic
ambivalence. On the one hand, he considered the [position] of DCI
nonpolitical, and [when he assumed the presidency,] he thought
as essential to the cause of continuity in national security policy would be enhanced by

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/15/03 09:36pm

5

reappointing Helms despite [the] change of administration. At the same time, [however,] he [regarded] Helms [as] a member of the "Georgetown social set," which Nixon believed - not incorrectly - to be more sympathetic to Democratic administrations than to his own. He therefore coupled Helms' reappointment with an attempt to insulate him from the policy process: the [DCI] was to attend NSC meetings only [to give] a briefing; [once] discussion turned to policy, he was to leave the Cabinet Room. [I recall] Helms accept[ing] this directive, which it fell to me to convey, with [characteristic, discipline [but]-] slightly raised eyebrows. [But] this division of functions [was to] survive only one or two meetings. Nixon was so impressed by Helms' briefings that he wanted to hear his views on policy - or at least the

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/15/03 09:36pm

7

The CIA's role in covert operations was the most controversial at the end of the Helms period and where Helms had a special competence. The need for such activities arose out of the privatization of foreign policy. Traditional diplomacy seeks to affect the conduct of states; military force exists to sustain the balance of power. But during the Cold War - and now again in [today's] war against terrorism - the threat often comes from non-state actors, such as political parties or terrorist groups, financed from abroad. The most frequent American covert actions were assistance to democratic parties or at least resistance to Communist or extremist groups.

During the end of the Helms period, he and some of his colleagues came under attack for having been assigned to defend these new and intangible frontiers - which their superiors had defined

01.p

Feb 16 03 05:09p

JODY WILLIAMS

703 9414072

02/15/03 09:36pm P. 008

for them - on behalf of a society not used to defending an intangible
balance of power. The men and women who undertook this thankless
task, [veiled] in [ah-imposed] secrecy, were deprived of credit and, as
it turned out, necessary protection. Their [actions] were often vilified
well after the event when the necessities [that had given] rise to them
could be recalled only with difficulty by a new generation.

Dick Helms became one of the most prominent victims. He was
charged with having committed perjury while testifying before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee during confirmation proceedings
for his appointment as ambassador to Iran. It was a grievous
injustice. Following established procedures, Helms had denied covert
operations before a committee not authorized to receive such
information. But he had already briefed the members of Congress in