January 6, 1959

Dear Bill:

I read your piece ("Organizing for Conflict") with great interest. The review of our present confusion is masterly, and your own proposals are challenging. Alas, I feel that our malaise is too deep to be cured by improvements in structure -- and, if we had what we need, then improvements in structure would be unimportant.

I think one can rationalize and institutionalize administration too far. One thing I wish you experts would put your thoughts on is the sources of creativity in public policy. Where do good ideas come from? and how do they insert themselves in the processes of decision? My guess would be that, viewing the matter historically, few good ideas have been generated according to the procedures blessed by formal codes of administration. I would even go further and suggest that very many good ideas were produced and adopted in ways which the formal codes regard as illegitimate. I would deduce from this that, if you want creativity in government, you must have a looser, more personal and more flexible organization of government -- one characterized by competition, duplication, overlapping jurisdictions and even disharmony -- rather than a more rational and rigid organization. A rational and rigid organization is good for dealing with predictable problems. It is not much good for dealing with the unpredictable; and government in this age must be oriented, not toward meeting old problems in routine ways, but toward innovation. Creative government, I would suggest, is more likely to be government conducted to some degree outside of channels rather than government rigorously confined to channels.

Obviously an organization designed to induce creativity and to develop the capability for innovation will have dangerous centrifugal tendencies -- unless it has on top a man with sufficient vitality, vision, drive, intelligence and capacity for sheer hard work to hold the thing together. You talk about the need for "a strengthened staff in the Executive Office." This is all very well, but unimportant. What we need infinitely more than that is a strengthened and revitalized conception of the Presidency. One reason I regret the concentration on structural issues is that it implies that somehow through proper organization

["Issue is that it implies that someone through proper organization\nfrequencies. One reason I request the concentration on structural\nthan that is a strength and revitalized conception of the\nall very well, put me on guard. After we need sufficiently more\nto a strengthened staff in the Executive Office.\" This is\nhard work to hold the staff together. You talk about the need\nvitality, vision, drive, intelligence and capacity to stand\nstrong against the vagaries of the mind with which we are\nengaged the capability for innovation will have dangerous con-\nsequences. — Unless it does so, man with such a mind with such\nstrong tendencies — must be a man with such a

2

the Eisenhower conception of the role of the President can be
made to work. What we must understand is that no amount of
structural tinkering can make up for a President who has not
the vitality to do a full day's work nor the knowledge to roam
widely in public issues across the board. I would have hoped
that the Eisenhower experience would leave in the public mind
a clear idea of the extraordinary range of personal qualities
which a successful President has to have. I fear that the em-
phasis on revising the machinery of decision has diverted att-
ention from this fundamental point.

The other point I would make is that organization derives its
vitality ultimately from the condition of the national will.
If the nation is slack, apathetic, indifferent, our national
organization will be the same. Our foreign policy, after all,
is an expression and projection of our national community. For
example, we have been effective in psychological warfare abroad
only when our slogans abroad were underwritten by what we had
been doing at home. The reason why the rhetoric of Wilson and
FDR carried conviction to the world and the rhetoric of Eisen-
hower and Dulles carries none is that Wilson and FDR earned the
right to talk about freedom, opportunity, etc., because they
had fought for these things at home. It was the New Freedom
which validated the Fourteen Points, as it was the New Deal
which validated the Four Freedoms. We are never going to be
effective in the world unless our slogans express the vital and
visible realities of our national performance. In short, we
will have to have a national political-moral revival before we
will be effective in psychological warfare; and I would say that
we equally will have to have a national political-moral revival
before we will get effective organization of government. Ef-
fective organization comes from a spirit of dedication and
leadership which welds men together, concerts their purposes
and imbues them with a sense of a common cause.

This letter has taken all too long to make the simple point that
you can't have effective organization in a vacuum of purpose and
leadership, and, that if that vacuum is filled, then the mechani-
cal problems of organization become much less consequential.
They seem important now because it looks as if they are the only
things we can do anything about. But if you could do everything

Things we can do anything about. But it won't do anything
They seem important now because it looks as if that are the only
 problems of organization come much less consequential.
Leadership, and, that it that would be better, then the greatest
 you can't have effective organization in a vacuum of purpose and
This letter has taken all too long to make the simple point that
and implies them with a sense of a common cause.

Leadership which we get together, concerts their purpose
active organization comes from a spirit of dedication and
before we will get effective organization of government. It-
we certainly will have to have a national political-moral revival
will be effective in political matters and I would say that
will have to have a national political-moral revival before we
have effective results of our national performance. In sport, we
effective in the world unless our egotism expresses the vital and
which amplified the fourteen points, as it was the New Deal
had longed for these things at home. It was the New Freedom
right to fair and equal freedom, opportunity, etc., because that
power and buffer carries none is that Wilson and the President
had carried conviction to the world and the rhetoric of White-
been going at home. The reason why the rhetoric of Wilson and
only when our egotism is proud were underwritten by what we had
exemplary, we have been effective in political matters a proud
is an expression and projection of our national community. For
organization will be the same. Our foreign policy, after all,
is the nation is free, authentic, intelligent, our national
vitality independently from the condition of the national will.
The other point I would make is that organization derives its
enthusiasm from this fundamental point.

Europe on revising the machinery of decision was divested att-
which a successful President has to have. I know that the em-
a clear idea of the extraordinary nature of personal duties
that the President experiences would leave in the public mind
wholly in public issues across the board. I would have hoped
the vitality to do a full day's work not the knowledge to read
structural sinkholes can make up for a President who has not
made to work. But we must understand that no amount of
the President's conception of the role of the President can be

2

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Room 102 - 133 South 36th Street
PHILADELPHIA 4, PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

January 30, 1959

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Associate Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass

Dear Henry:

By the time this letter reaches you you should be back
from Germany if you are not already adding distinction to the
Cambridge community. I wrote a note to Ann telling her that
I had, I believe, successfully substituted for your "outstanding"
presence although I at times felt somewhat peculiar acting as a
stand in. But the ceremony was both impressive and tastefully
done. I asked them to send the trophy directly to you. I trust
that it has arrived. It quite beautifully symbolizes your well
deserved honor.

I mentioned to General Trudeau the possibility of you
two getting together in mid-February. He would very much
like to see you. In my opinion, he is one of the best men we
have and I am sure you would be stimulated by knowing him.

Dr. Kissinger

2

January 30, 1959

In this connection, the FPRI is having a meeting in Washington on the
13th on the general subject of proceeding with phase two of the pro-
tracted contract study. Robert and I would both hope that you would
be able to join us. We could probably work out a luncheon with Trudeau
the same date. Please call me as soon as you can and let me know
whether this date seems possible.

I look forward to having a chance to get your impressions on
the current situation in Germany.

jc

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH

STUDY OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL WARFARE STRATEGY

The study will consist of an analysis of objectives and inner
content of communist political warfare strategy. The past record of
communist performance will be cited to illustrate how the communists
have already achieved notable successes in utilizing political warfare
to infiltrate and undermine the Free World. It will demonstrate how
communist psychological and political warfare exploits the vulner-
abilities of free society. The failure of the West to understand
communist political warfare and the consequent inadequacy of Western
organizational structure, both national and international, presents
communism the opportunity to continue upon its course. The study will
point up communist vulnerabilities and conclude with a chapter dealing
with insights whereby the West can exploit these weaknesses.

The plan for organization of the book is as follows:

Part I. **Introduction.** A statement of purpose of the book elaborating on the above summary.

Part II. **Evolution of Communist Political Warfare Doctrine.** A Review of the development of political warfare doctrine in relation to the base of communist power. Among other items, the survey will review the significance of Stalin's drive against the peasants and his usurpation of the original revolutionary Party leadership. Soviet expansion during World War II will be briefly covered. Finally, the new class structure in the Soviet Union will be examined to assess its effect on the power position of Party leadership. This section will analyze the continuing peace drives of communist propaganda pointing up the relationship between the content of the peace offensives and the objectives of communist policy.

2

## Part III. Psychological Invasion.
This section will deal with the basic methods employed by the communists in conducting non-violent warfare against their enemies. It will describe the use of agitation and propaganda, the use of various tactics including alignment with nationalism, the use of popular fronts, the undermining of belief in basic western concepts, the distortion of history and the reinterpretation of enemy symbols. This section will relate how the communists have employed these tactics to soften up their targets for subversion. Included in this treatment will be the efforts of the communists to take over Western socialism, to infiltrate liberal and progressive movements and to penetrate Western intellectual elites. The use of the appeal of "democracy" and the uses of glorification of life in the USSR will be analyzed. The section will conclude with a discussion of how the communists capture civil liberties movements in democratic societies and, at the expense of genuine liberalism, seek to bring about the disintegration of the institutions of a democracy.

## Part IV. The Party's Organizational Weapons System.
The methods of control and direction of party subversive activities will be detailed in this section. The organizational features of the Leninist party will be discussed initially. Other subjects to be treated include: vertical and functional methods of control and direction, specialization for specific targets of subversion, and the use of Party elites as centers or bases for campaigns into new areas. As an essential part of the organization of the Party program, the financing of Party activities will be examined. The use of fronts and unions in collection of funds and reliance on other sources for financial support will be discussed.

A final part of this section will deal with the total organization of mass activity in which the Party engages when it is in power. Once the communists emerge from their role in the opposition to become the ruling group, they, of course, have access to an infinitely greater variety of instruments of control and manipulation. This section will point out how the communists make use of all methods of control available to the governing force of a society.

3

**Part V. Political Warfare in Soviet Strategy.** This section will deal with the manner in which the Soviets operate as a state in the political arena. The accumulation of power by the Soviet bloc provides vast new opportunities for the communists which were not available prior to World War II. The Communists can exercise this power to complement the activities of party organizations in the Free World. The effectiveness of this interlocking mechanism is magnified greatly in the present strategic situation. As the Soviets reduce the Western lead in military technology, they increase the opportunities for subversion through highly disciplined Party channels penetrating all parts of the Free World.

**Part VI.** *Communist Vulnerabilities.* This will be an objective analysis of those aspects of Communist control society which are vulnerable to political warfare conducted by the West. This section will treat the problems of national communism, particularly the development of Yugoslav communism and the Yugoslav-Russian rift. The dissatisfactions created by Soviet economic policies, the fears produced by police state methods, the tensions resulting from power struggles within the top hierarchy, and the consequences of pronounced change in the structure of society produced by the Soviets' own intensified economic efforts will all be examined.

**Part VII. The Challenge to the West.** On the basis of the discussion of vulnerabilities in Part VI, this final section will deal with the means open to the West to reverse the communist monopolization of political warfare.

I would like to support the application of William R. Kintner for a study on Communist political warfare strategy. I have known Colonel Kingner for 7 years and have been associated with him on various efforts both governmental and academic. He combines to an unusual degree political experience and academic training. Through all the years of my acquaintance with him he has been growing constantly and this particular topic is one which has long concerned Colonel Kintner. I know he would make a major contribution.

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

March 6, 1959

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Associate Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

It was good to get together with you again in Washington last week and I trust that you enjoyed meeting and talking with General Trudeau, as I consider him one of the most solid men we have and in many respects rate him higher than his predecessor. Unfortunately, despite the tenure of our conversation at dinner that night, the administration is apparently not going to do anything of any significance until Mr. Khrushchev starts pulling the trigger.

I enjoyed reading your article in the Reporter. You have put your finger on many crucial aspects of the problem. One that has always impressed me is that our top level administrative types are generally ill at ease in the face of any theoretical problems we encounter. While on the subject of articles, I trust you will keep in mind the discussion we had regarding a contribution to ORBIS. I know your schedule is a busy one so it might be helpful if I would tell you that the deadlines for the Summer and Fall issue are May 1 and September 1 respectively. I know that any subject that you would care to write about would make a distinguished contribution to our publication.

I believe I mentioned to you the plan for holding a National Strategy Seminar for selected reserve officers at the National War College this Summer. The J.C.S. has approved the plan and the Foreign Policy Research Institute will be conducting the instruction. The Seminar is now set up for the period July 12 to July 25, inclusive. We are now in the process of designing the curriculum. I hope that you might be available to participate in some way in this effort even though I realize it might be at the same time as your own Seminar.

March 23, 1959

Colonel William R. Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 102-133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your nice letter of
March 6th. I very much enjoyed the meeting
with Trudeau. I have the feeling of living
in a nightmare in which one knows that one is
heading for a precipice but can do nothing to
arrest it.

I have Orbis very much in mind and
when I do something suitable I will discuss
it with you.

In principle I would be delighted to
participate in the National Strategy Seminar
during the summer. You know however that I
am conducting my International Seminar at
that time and it will have to fit into that
schedule.

Kind regards.

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

March 27, 1959

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Associate Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Street
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

Robert called me today and told me that you would be able to talk to the National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers on 13 July. A formal invitation will be extended to you in the near future. For planning purposes, we expect to hold a reception for the group on the evening of 12 July. There will be three lectures the first day, the first to be given by Frank Barnett on the general purpose of the course, the second by you on a net evaluation of our general across-the-board situation vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the third to be given either in the afternoon or evening on some fundamental misconceptions regarding communism. We are in the process of doing our fourth draft on the curriculum. If you would have an opportunity to look at and comment on the existing draft, I would be happy to send it to you but I imagine you are pretty well up to your neck by now.

I understand that General Trudeau is going to be talking in Boston on April 2 at the State Club. I hope that you will have a chance to sit in on his talk so as to gauge the reaction of the local mandarins to it.

April 2, 1959

Colonel William R. Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 102 - 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of
March 27th. I will do the talk before
the National Strategy Seminar out of
friendship. But I would appreciate it
if it could be scheduled as early in
the morning as possible so that I can
get back to Cambridge by afternoon.

All good wishes.

May 27, 1959

Dear Bill:

Many thanks for your note, and
more for the copy of *Protracted Conflict*.
I am very glad to have it.

So far the responsibilities of
parenthood have not been too onerous,
and we are enjoying Elizabeth.

I am sorry I missed seeing you,
but hope to see you soon.

November 19, 1959

Colonel William Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 203 - 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

I read the report of your
Princeton meeting in the newspapers
with admiration. I simply want to tell
you how very much I respect you for your
dedication and for taking on seemingly
hopeless tasks. It is important that
some people stand up against the prevailing
tide and it is comforting to know that
you are around.

Warm regards.

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA 4, PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

January 15, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Street
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

I understand that you, too, will be appearing on the platform of the strategy seminar at Fort Devens. I will be talking there in the afternoon and hope that we might get together that evening for dinner.

For the past year I have been in touch with a John P. Gardiner
with whom I believe you are acquainted. He tells me that he has
suggested that you, he and I and Bill Elliott meet that evening. Per-
haps we could, if agreeable to you, meet for an hour or so early in
the evening. Please let me know so that I can plan accordingly.

It appears as if Khrushchev believes as if he thinks he
just about has it made.

All the best,

January 22, 1960

Dr. William R. Kintner
University of Pennsylvania
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 102-133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of January
15th. Unhappily, I will not be able to attend
the strategy seminar at Fort Devens as I had
originally hoped to do. I am trying to finish
a book and I simply must stop all activities,
however worthwhile, until this is out of the
way. I find the only way I can write with the
inevitable pressures from New York and elsewhere
is to give up everything else.

I'm afraid this goes for the Orbis
article also.

I would like to see you, however,
when you are up here. How about calling me a
few days before, and lets fix a time.

With warm regards as always.

Dictated by Mr. Kissinger but signed in his
absence.

appliance.
Dated by Mr. Klaasinger put in life

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards as always.

few days before, and feta fix a time.
when you are up here. How about calling me a
I would like to see you, however.

article also.
I'm afraid this goes for the Orphee

is to give up everything else.
Inevitable breather from New York and elsewhere
way. I find the only way I can write with the
however, worthwhile, must find a way out of the
s book and I simply must do all activities,
originally hoped to do. I am trying to find
the strategy seminar at Kent University as I had
12th. Unwillingly, I will not be able to attend
Thank you for your letter of sympathy.

Dear Bill:

Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania
Room 105-133 South 36th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Dr. William R. Kirtner

January 55, 1960

February 10, 1960

Col. William R. Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Room 203, 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

It was good to see you over the weekend, even though I was distressed to have made you unhappy. I realize that it must sound preposterous that one should not be able to spend an hour for a friend, but then this merely proves that my life has become preposterous. When the cup is full, another drop of water makes it overflow and it is then futile to say that is was only a drop. The only time I have available that I can be sure I can work on the weekend, and if I do not discipline myself brutally, I simply will not get done the things that in my judgment must get done.

This was particularly the case last weekend when Nelson took all of Sunday. You can of course argue that if the things don't get done this is no great tragedy, but I believe both you and I are convinced that we are heading for disaster on our present course, and I don't think either of us could live with ourselves if we did not do everything in our power, however futile, to fight against this trend.

I want you to know, however, that we have been friends for a long time, and that I would do nothing to harm this relationship; indeed, I hope that in the tasks that will be ahead for all of us we can continue as before to support each other, if only by the consciousness that wherever we may be, we will be working in the same direction.

As for the Stanford Research Institute, I must say that I take much less kindly to Dick Foster's criticisms. When he asked me to be a consultant I had known him for five minutes and knew absolutely nothing about him or, for that matter, the Institute. The way it was put then I had the impression that they were primarily interested in my name in order to get contracts in Washington, and that I refused to do. Moreover, while I greatly admire Dick's work and have been a great booster of his, it is a fact that they have used the relationship that I have afforded them with Nelson for promotional purposes. At the

Col. William R. Kintner

-2-

luncheon in Washington introducing the Journal, they replied to a question about their impact on senior people by saying that they were one of the chief groups advising Nelson. This, even if true, would not be a tactful thing to say publicly. My whole relationship with Nelson depends on the fact that he must have the confidence that I am not a spokesman for any organization. I think it is risking a great deal to turn such a relationship into promotion, and the risk is not to me personally but to one of our leading national figures who adheres to the principles in which we all believe.

I think it would be helpful if you could make this point clear to Dick Foster on some occasion. Incidentally I do want to emphasize that he is one of the most brilliant people I have met and one who I otherwise admire very much indeed.

You must understand that the course I have chosen is not a particularly pleasant one. I have had the option of going the way of the committee chairman or becoming a great success on the model of Joe Johnson or turning myself into a spokesman for a pressure group. By taking an independent position I am likely to make everyone unhappy at some stage of the game.

I write you at such great length because of our long relationship and because I was sincerely sorry about what happened last weekend.

Warm regards as always.

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA 4, PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

February 12, 1960

Dear Henry:

It was good to see you and Ann last Saturday. I was very much impressed with Elizabeth.

Is there any chance that your Sunday visitor will ever sit down long enough to get a real briefing on what we are facing in the defense field as the schedule of all who might be involved requires some advance planning?

Don't knock yourself out writing your new book, and after it is done I look forward to seeing the modified-Henry emerging from the cocoon.

All the best.

[2c]

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA 4, PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

March 9, 1960

Dear Henry:

I am glad the meeting on Friday worked out so well. This
seems to be both your and Dick's consensus despite any under or
over emphasis.

Yesterday I learned that Nelson had turned down SRI's
invitation to speak at the West Coast Seminar. Subsequently,
Bill Platt wrote you asking whether the invitation could be re-
vived. I talked this over with Dick and Bill Platt and suggested
the best thing would be to kill it. I will send a copy of this note
to Bill Platt so that a reply from you to him will not be necessary.

I hope that something can be done to highlight the civil
defense question in New York. It is hard finding a news angle how-
ever.

Meanwhile, all the best.

cc: Mr. Platt

April 12, 1960

Col. William R. Kintner
University of Pennsylvania
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 103--133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

Just wanted to say many thanks.
to find your note of March 28th, and
my office after an absence of two weeks
I've just returned to

Beat regards.

June 30, 1960

Mr. William Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 102 - 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

I have turned you down again. I hope you will not be angry with me. Along with many delays of my trip to Europe, I have finally had to finish my book as well as work with Nelson on some of the blasts he has been letting loose about six months too late. I will, therefore, not be able to help you on your chapters.

My plans now are to leave for Europe tomorrow and hope to be able to stick to them. Perhaps I can help when I return in August.

Kind regards.

Henry V. Knaufner.

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

when I return in August,
stick to them. Perhaps I can help
Emohe tomorrow and hope to be able to
My plane now are to leave for
you on hom chamber.

I will, therefore, not be able to help
ting loose spont six months too late.
on some of the plate he has been let-
down took so well as work with Melon
Emoke. I have tinsley had to tinsley
Viong with many delays of my trip to
I hope you will not be angry with me.
I have turned you down again.

Dear Bill:

Billets butts 4th Pennsylvania
Room 105 - 133.South 30th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Mr. William Kintner.

June 30, 1960

[x]

January 5, 1961

Col. William Kintner
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I enjoyed the meeting with your
group very much, and look forward to seeing
you again soon.

As far as my expenses are concerned,
what I propose is that you take care of round
trip New York to Washington, which amounts to
$36.54. Since I had other business in New York,
my fare from Boston to New York has been paid.
I will cover taxis and other miscellaneous
expenses myself.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

I will cover taxis and other miscellaneous
my fare from Boston to New York has been paid.
$36.24. Since I had other business in New York,
trip New York to Washington, which amounts to
what I broach is that you take care of round
vs far as my expenses are concerned,
you again soon.

Gronb very much, and look forward to seeing
I enjoyed the meeting with you.

Dear Bill:

Washington 22, D.C.
The Pentagon
Department of the Army
Col. William Kintner

January 2, 1961

August 23, 1961

Colonel William R. Kintner
3203 38th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Kintner:

Even after speaking with Mr.
Kissinger today about your paper, "Command
Post U.S.A.", I have been unable to locate
it.

I hope that I shall be able to
mail it to you as soon as possible after
his return to the office next week.

My apologies.

Secretary
Elizabeth Theiler

Sincerely,

My apologies.

His return to the office next week.

Mail it to you as soon as possible after
I hope that I shall be able to

it.

Post U.S.V., I have been unable to locate
Kissinger today, so my letter, "Command

Even after speaking with Mr.

Dear Colonel Kintner:

Washington, D. C.
3503 38th Street, N. W.
Colonel William R. Kintner

August 23, 1961

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, Director

November 20, 1961

Dear Henry:

I was delighted to have had a chance to see you a few hours
last week.

I am also distressed that Nelson has had such a bad streak
of luck. I guess it will be some time before you have a chance to go
over things with him. If you have not already done so, could you
either call or drop a note to Tom McCabe. A call would be preferable
as far as specifics go. I understand he is going to be speaker at the
Pennsylvania dinner on New York, December 9, and I would like to have
a chance to talk to him there. I will try to call you on Wednesday afternoon.

With all good wishes,

WRK:kec

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts