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significance of this alliance is very great.

How durable is it? Well, if I look ahead five to ten years, my nightmare is not communism so much in the West as opportunism. If every country is going to be run by clever manipulators who figure out the short-term angles and who calculate how they can get the maximum benefit for their next year's election, then the result will be that no one will be able to subordinate short-term interests for the longer gain and then we are going to see a disintegration of all these structures. This is what I fear most in the western world today.

Question - what would you do if you were Secretary of State?

Let me first of all make an uncharacteristic remark for a Harvard professor, which is that I do not know the answers to every question that may be put to me. Occasionally I have had the fleeting thought, which I then suppress very quickly, that 30,000 people in the Defense Department and 20,000 people in the State Department, if they all put their minds together, might come up with answers almost as good as mine.

I say this because even if you find my answer unsatisfactory, that does not mean that the problem I describe does not exist. It is easier to diagnose a broken bone than to set it.

Now what I would do if I were Secretary of State? I think that the tone, the style, the purpose of our foreign policy tends to set an example for all other countries. If the United States behaves very manipulatively, the kind of leaders that come to the top in other countries are also very manipulative. In all the allied countries the ability to get along with the United States is still an important asset. So when we have bright, brassy, quick, erratic leaders, we get bright, brassy, quick, erratic leaders in allied countries. So the first thing one would have to do - and this is not a

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specific measure - has to do with the tone and style of our foreign policy.

I would do a negative thing. I would stop many of the brilliant men, many of whom are close friends of mine, from running around all over the world trying to sell their ideas before they have fully articulated them. I would also try to get them to understand that to sell an idea when you work for the American government, you are speaking for that government and not just for your latest inspiration. Some order and cohesión will have to be brought into our public posture.

Secondly - this is again a negative thing - I would avoid bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. Wherever possible, I think it is essential that before we negotiate with the Soviet Union, we develop a common position with our allies. Then if we cannot develop a common position with our allies, we can still decide whether our national interest compels us to disregard them. But I consider it a great mistake to do what we did last summer - to go to Moscow, to sign an undertaking to take up the non-aggression treaty with our allies, and then go back to our allies. What are our allies going to think? Are we for or against a non-aggression treaty? If we are for it, why did not we discuss it with them first? If we are against it, why did we put them on the spot? Bilateral negotiations with anybody are therefore in my view a danger.

Thirdly, I think that the western alliance ought to be able to develop an agreed strategic doctrine. It is not helpful that every three to four months the same squabbles break out over the same range of issues. One difficulty is that the only organ that exists for the discussion of these issues, the NATO Council, is so overwhelmed with day-to-day decisions that it never can address itself to the fundamental problem. I believe we ought to create a planning body for the NATO alliance, the members of which have highest governmental standing - they should be of Cabinet rank - who address themselves not to the question of what procurement policy to pursue over the next six

months to a year, but what kind of western alliance they want to create
over a period of five to ten years. Such a body could also work out a
position on Berlin, on arms control or on any of the other issues that come
before the West. I would think that this would be of crucial importance.

Above all, I want to return to my first point, which is not a very
spectacular one. It is to call for more steadiness and more purpose and to
remember that the long-range relations with our allies are more important
than quick spectacular agreements obtainable with the Soviet Union.

Seminar with Henry A. Kissinger
and students and faculty in
International Relations at
The Claremont Colleges.

Fred Warner Neal, moderator.

Harper Hall,
Claremont, California

November 18, 1963

I would like to make clear that I am not spending all my time trying to get a war started some place in order to get my theories proved correct, or incorrect. Having studied the nuclear question does not necessarily mean that one loves to have a war get started, but rather that one believes we live in a certain kind of age whose characteristics one has to understand. I say this with some feeling, having been a rifleman in the last war and remembering my experiences with not an excessive amount of pleasure.

Now, do I think there can be a conventional war in Europe? No, I do not believe there can be a conventional war in Europe of any size. I have supported in the past a more flexible military establishment than the one we were creating. In the previous administration I was very much concerned about the fact that we were relying excessively, it seemed to me, on the threat of general nuclear war and the doctrine of massive retaliation. I thought that this would in time undermine our credibility and force us into a kind of diplomacy we were not willing, and really not equipped, to conduct. At the same time, and this is one of the troubles when intellectuals get into government, it never occurred to me that my theories would be applied so literally. I am not saying this because they were my theories. But to say that one wants to have a more flexible response is a far cry from saying that a full-scale conventional war is possible in Europe. I do not believe that for a number of reasons.

We have said innumerable times that we would not accept a conventional defeat in Europe. Therefore the Russians would presumably attack in the expectation that they would win. Knowing that they would win and being told

that we would not accept a conventional war, they would have to be pre-
pared for the introduction of nuclear weapons in some form. Now I am in
favor of some increase of conventional capabilities in Europe, but looking
at it from the point of view of the kind of calculations a Russian aggressor
would have to make in order to attack, I think that a full-scale conven-
tional war in Europe, on the model of World War II, is one of the least
probable events. I think it is a mistake for us to gear so much of our
prestige to getting a substantial build-up of these forces, all the more
so as all the pressures in our country are to reduce forces rather than to
increase forces. All you have to do is to see Mr. Eisenhower's latest
pronouncement and to speak of some of the things we have done.

Question about U. S. forces in Europe.

Well, there is to be sure an ambivalence on both sides with respect
to the forces in Europe. If one asks oneself, "Why did we put forces there
to begin with?" I think it is true that the first forces that were put
there were put there in order to serve as a symbol of American determination
to defend Europe. We wanted to make sure that the Russians knew we were com-
mitted. A verbal guarantee was not enough. We wanted a physical presence.
And so did the Europeans want it -- a physical presence. In fact, I think
if one is very honest with oneself and asks oneself, "Why did the Europeans
want American troops in Europe?" I think they wanted them there essentially
for a reason that Marshall Foch gave when he was asked how many British sol-
diers he wanted at the outbreak of World War I. He said, "Give me one on the
first day, and I'll make sure he gets killed." That's a rather cynical thing
to say, but I think the Europeans wanted to have some American armed forces
on the continent as hostages. They wanted to make sure that an attack on

Europe would involve the United States. This being the case, the Europeans had a vested interest in keeping the portion of our forces to theirs as high as possible. They were eager that our military establishment on the continent would be large enough to serve as a token of our commitment, but not so large as to give us any idea that it was the only commitment.

Now then the question is, "Why did they make a contribution?" I think they made a contribution because it was patently absurd to keep American divisions on the continent without having a European contribution. I do not think they seriously believed that their contribution was intended to fight a war. Their contribution was a kind of admission into the NATO guarantee. When the Kennedy Administration came in, it suddenly tried to develop a more rational military posture. There was a cry of alarm in Europe. They wanted to make sure that we were fully engaged with our entire nuclear power. There is no law of the universe that says 250,000 or 300,000 American troops in Europe is the number that is correct.

Having said all of this, I must make a number of qualifications. If in 1961 the new administration had said, "We must re-study this whole question of troop commitment to Europe and together with our NATO allies come up with a rational posture," it would have been one thing. We might have said, "We give the Europeans two choices. One is a local defense of Europe, in which case we will keep X number of troops there provided the Europeans add enough to make it worthwhile. Or else we go to a different posture, in which, to be sure, we rely more heavily on nuclear weapons, but then with fewer American troops in Europe." That too would have been decent. That would have been impossible if we had presented it as a choice.

Instead, we started saying the only feasible defense of Europe is one requiring a heavy increase in conventional manpower to which we were willing to contribute. We staked a great deal of our prestige on the theory that a largely conventional defense of Europe was essential. Two years later all

the signs point in the opposite direction. It is not just Eisenhower calling for the removal of five out of six divisions. It is also the behavior of the Administration that makes it pretty clear that if we could just sneak some troops out of Europe, we would do it. Political considerations are now what keep them there more than other considerations.

Now this change in policy is a very worrisome thing to the Europeans and to anybody else, because it means that the United States is a dangerous ally. Every two years we come up with a new theory. In 1958 we put intermediate range missiles into Europe. Many European statesmen staked their prestige on having these missiles there. Four years later we pulled them out, using the same argument that the opposition parties had used in 1958 to oppose their being put in in the first place. I think a great country has to consider how often it can reverse policy. It does not matter so much whether it is right or wrong. It is a question here that other countries have to gear their policy to what you tell them. Sometimes they will go along with a policy that they think to be wrong because they want to retain American friendship, as long as they know that it is going to be consistently followed. But to stake their prestige on our policies and then have us switch signals every two or three years is enormously disconcerting to them. Now, this is one reason.

The second reason is that now these troops have become such a moral and psychological commitment that it is dangerous to have a drastic change.

Thirdly, if they are pulled out, at least we should not delude ourselves about the airlift. I do not believe that in critical periods we can put a lot of troops in there with an airlift. These 15,000 troops were flown over after weeks of preparation, after all their equipment had been pre-positioned. They were put into three airfields within 80 to 100 miles of the Soviet border with all the equipment sitting there under ideal flying

conditions, using all the available airlift for the United States. In
a crisis period some of it would have to go to SAC and to other things,
and to imagine that we would fly 15,000 men into Germany while the Rus-
sians were attacking and have them fighting is a pipe-dream. The least
the Russians are going to do is to knock out these air-fields. After that
it is very hard to get troops in. If we want to pull troops out, let us
say, "Any attack on Europe is general nuclear war," and pray to God that
we can ride with this threat. But I would give very little weight to the
airlift as one of the factors.

Question about continuity of policy while permitting necessary change.

Well, this is a tough problem to answer in the abstract. On the one
hand it is perfectly clear that we should not pursue wrong policies just
for the sake of consistency. On the other hand if we change our policies too
often, it is also clear that no one will be able to rely on us any more.
So what we have to do is to strike a balance between what we consider to be
correct policy and the requirement of our reputation for reliability. Cer-
tainly we are in an age of very rapid technological change. On the other
hand anybody who has been in Washington knows that very often the way a
certain decision comes out depends upon accidents of personality and acci-
dents of pressures.

Our government has a peculiar tendency. A decision may be very close
when it is taken and could easily have gone either way. But as soon as it
is adopted, everybody fights for it like a zealot.

You mention General Taylor. At some point the man who is Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is going to be very influential. I just wish
that he also keep in mind the requirement for continuity. This has two

attributes: (a) we should not commit ourselves to policies so readily;
(b) having committed ourselves, we ought to stick to them. If they involve
major commitments to Allies and if we do have to change them, and if we are
right, we ought to consult our Allies and try to convince them before we do
it.

A great deal of our policy towards Europe today depends on the argument that they can always trust us. Therefore they do not need nuclear weapons and they can rely on a lot of other things. Yet, how can they always trust us if we change our minds so often? It is not a question of trustworthiness, it is a question of our not knowing our own mind. We probably made a mistake fighting so hard for the conventional build-up in 1961. I think we did make a mistake. I never was persuaded that the right response to the Berlin crisis was to fly two divisions over there. This was not going to be a conventional war anyhow. Having done this, to reverse it so fast is also tough. So I think we need a system that permits more careful consideration and more continuity.

But certainly we have to be free, when we become convinced that a previous policy was wrong, to change it.

Question about possibility of complete disarmament.

I do not see disarmament in the foreseeable future. An absolutely minimum requirement is to understand what we mean by disarmament. I am on an advisory committee at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That is probably putting a goat in charge of the cabbage patch. But I have seen these plans develop, and it is really very hard to get a definition of what is meant by disarmament. Just take a few examples.

Is the world safer when both sides have a hundred missiles than when both sides have a thousand missiles? When a hundred missiles with hundred

megaton warheads are enough to destroy all of human life on both sides, is the world safer then or not? One interesting thing in the disarmament field is that the people who advocate low numbers also advocate very blood-thirsty strategies. That is, if you have very small numbers of missiles, obviously the targets of these missiles have to be civilian populations. And they say, if you attack the civilian population, there will be no war. If there is an accident, some people would probably want to surrender and others might want to fight the war. Be that as it may, low numbers imply blood-thirsty strategies.

High numbers give a certain possibility for counter-force strategy which theoretically are less blood-thirsty. At any rate, these weapons are so destructive today that it is not obvious that low numbers of nuclear weapons necessarily increase stability.

Secondly, you have the problem of evasion, or of inspection. Assuming you could visualize eliminating all nuclear weapons - and I have never seen anyone come up with a scheme that does that - you would then have to do a study of how many weapons the Soviet Union might be able to hide. Then the President of the United States would have to decide what posture he was going to take. Was he going to rely on the word of people who, after all, have betrayed the leaders of the Hungarian uprising while negotiating an armistice with them and who did execute them after promising them safe conduct and who have on occasion broken treaties before. Or is he going to try to hide an equal number of weapons to deter the others? The Russians would have to make the same study. They would have to find out how many weapons we could hide and since their estimate of us is as bad as our estimate of them, they have no more reason to trust us than we have reason to trust them, or so they think.

So then we have the question, "All right, supposing both sides hides

enough weapons to protect themselves against hidden weapons on the other side, what would you have achieved?" You would have substituted a hidden arms race for an open arms race.

Take another question about complete and general disarmament, the question of reserve forces. Take a state like Israel or Switzerland. Standing armies are very small. On the other hand, almost every able-bodied citizen is a trained soldier and can go to war at a moment's notice. How do you deal with reserve forces? In a way you are putting a premium on the military section of society. How do you deal with internal security forces? What if a country is weak? Diem might need more forces than Kennedy, because he is in a more precarious domestic position. But the point I am making is that the absolutely minimum requirement is to come up with some conception of what is meant by general and complete disarmament. I have never yet seen anyone do that.

While patients are of course not the best judges of their own psychological condition, I would say that the problem of disarmament is particularly acute when you have an atmosphere of distrust. It is easy enough to say you must trust them, but if you can trust them you do not need arms or disarmament.

The British have enough nuclear weapons to do a grave amount of damage to the United States if they attack us in a surprise blow. I have never heard anyone suggest that we should have an inspection system or disarmament arrangement with the British, not even with the French. So you have to assume distrust. That is the framework within which the disarmament agreements take place. This is one of the essential pre-conditions.

Another essential pre-condition is that no new political tensions are raised. It is again exceedingly unlikely that you could have a disarmament agreement - even a limited one - while the Berlin crisis is going on, or

while a war is being pursued in Southeast Asia. And I think that the
Soviets will have to decide what it is that they want - a disarmament
agreement or political progress. But the short answer to your question is
regretfully that I (a) I do not quite see what the content of a general and
complete disarmament agreement is and (b) even if I could describe the con-
tent, I do not think the conditions are right for it.

Let me just make one other observation. When I write as a disarmament
expert, it is easy enough for me to say, "We ought to give up the notion of
nuclear superiority, that one condition to get an agreement is for both
sides to accept a roughly equal number of missiles." Quite frankly, if I
were President of the United States, I doubt seriously that I would ever
agree to such a proposal. Some of the disarmament experts say it is to our
interest to make the Russians sophisticated and teach them to protect their
weapons. I must say as a responsible political leader I would be apt to
think that we are better off when the Russians are vulnerable than when they
are invulnerable. While I recognize the fact that the day will come when
they will become invulnerable, I do not know that it is our job to hasten
that. So a lot of these things depend on the perspective from which you look
at it, and mine may be unnecessarily unimaginative.

Question

Well, the present Administration is terribly ambivalent. On the one
hand they have a strategic theory that depends very much on their being
able to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. On the other they have on
occasion said in their public statements that it is to our interest to make
the Russians feel secure in the possession of their nuclear force because
some theorists believe that if they do not feel secure they will attack us.
I have never understood why with an inferior force, even when they feel in-

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ferior, they should attack us. They will only hasten their end. I think there are some elements in the Administration who believe that it is to our interest to teach them invulnerability. Quite frankly, I believe this is super-sophistication. It is becoming increasingly difficult to conduct a counter-force strategy, and I think it is risky to rely on a counter-force strategy for the decade ahead. I am not in favor of a counter-force strategy. But this does not mean that we have to teach the Russians how to make their forces invulnerable. I think we have troubles enough on our side without worrying about theirs.

## Question

Well, I've heard this theory. According to the theory the Russians are more deterred if we are ambiguous than if they are certain about us. That depends on what they are certain about. If they are certain that we will react, that ought to deter them more than if they are not certain that we will react. If they are not certain that we will react, that will deter them more than if they are certain that we will react. I think there is this degree of validity in the theory - that you do not have to give 100% guarantee of what you will do in each case in order to pose a risk. Probably if the gain is small, even a 10% possibility of American intervention might be enough to deter them. But I think in every case, certainty of American intervention is better than uncertainty. Only there are some situations in which it is almost impossible to get certainty, where you will have to settle for uncertainty. But if you adopt an ambiguous posture you had better be sure that the lower range of risk which is encompassed by your ambiguity is still unacceptable to the Russians, because if you are ambiguous in a way by which one of the possibilities included in your ambiguity is that you do nothing, then you really are in a dangerous position.

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Question

I think by itself the test-ban treaty does not mean a great deal. I would say in fact that by itself it either does not mean a great deal or it is dangerous. If you read the justifications that have been given for the test-ban treaty in terms of its own intrinsic merit, the major argument is that we can continue the arms race by alternative roads, and therefore we will not fall behind. And the phrase "we have designed around it", meaning we have maintained our superiority, indicates this.

Now if it turns out to be wrong that we can design around some of the
uncertainties that it creates, then it could be dangerous if the other side
licks the problem. But on the strictly military level, it may mean nothing.
That is, it may retain the existing military balance. I think it does have
a utility in slowing down the developments of nuclear weapons elsewhere. It
makes it harder or at least makes it more expensive to develop nuclear weapons
for countries that have signed the treaty.

But again you have to qualify that. About 70% of the French tests are taking place under-ground now, and you can develop most of the nuclear arms now under-ground. You can not develop thermonuclear weapons, but for countries like the Arabs and Israel, they can do enough damage to each other with nuclear weapons without getting into the thermonuclear field. So I think it has a certain limited utility.

Whether it has a greater significance depends on whether it is possible
to move from there to more fundamental agreements. And of that I don't see
any signs.

Well, the dangerous aspects, looking at it from a purely military
point of view, would be if one side continues its weapons development very
actively, and the other side tends to slow down in its weapons development.
Then the side which spurs its weapons development could gain advantage. It

-12-

is going to be harder for us than for the Soviets to keep first-class people working - recruiting them to work in weapons laboratories under conditions where experimentation is not possible. As late as March, 1962, the President said flatly that it would be impossible to keep the scientists working without atmospheric testing. These are some of the risks that are involved from the purely military side.

But I don't insist on those. I personally would have voted for ratification.

### Question

Oh yes -- it is the core of our foreign policy. Our relations with Western Europe are essential to our security and to our future. If Western Europe becomes neutralist or turns away from us, the political and psychological impact of that around the world would be enormous. The European impact in its former colonial areas is still very great - that is, its moral impact - and we would wind up to be isolated.

### Question

I think our relations with Russia are very greatly influenced by our relations with Europe. I think if Russia gained the neutralization, or even better the communization of Europe, this would give it such an enormous psychological uplift and such a very great political leverage that it would worsen our relations with Russia too.

Question about an alternative to NATO

Well, it depends on what you understand NATO to be. The alternative to the military guarantee of Europe by the United States, and a political structure embracing the United States and Europe -- I would say the alternative to this is a Europe which would try to make its own deals with the Soviet Union and would attempt to pursue an increasingly neutral course, in addition to having grave problems of domestic structure.

Question

It has never happened in history that any given political organization retained its particular form indefinitely. I am not saying that NATO in its precise present form has to continue for the indefinite future. In fact, I have considerable sympathy for President De Gaulle's view that the relationship of the Allies will have to be redefined. My concern is to maintain the alliance. But whether in its present NATO structure, or whether there is some other structure that will work better, this is a different question. I am more inclined to believe that some other structure will have to be adopted as Europe becomes stronger and more self-confident, but that would still be part of the NATO system. It would simply be a different system.

Question - is it possible for two major powers in Asia to go to war without involving the U.S.?

Like China and India?

Well, it depends what you mean by full-fledged war. I do not think that it is possible for China to launch a major attack against India without involving the United States at least indirectly. Then if you ask what

is the Soviet Union going to do, you also have to ask on which side? I think if China looked as if it were beating India we would almost certainly intervene. Even if it looked as if it were not beating India, I am certain that we would give a great deal of material and logistic support and military advice to India. Whether this would spread into a general conflagration with Russia helping China I would doubt. I think at the present state of China's relationship with the Soviet Union this is unlikely.

## Question about a joint Soviet-American effort against China

No, I know this is what Nehru's policy is trying to achieve. I can see some political cooperation -- that is that India tries to play a game by which it retains our support but in a way that does not alienate Russia, hoping that Russia would use whatever influence it has on China, to keep China from attacking. I think however if the United States got physically involved in the sub-continent, I cannot conceive that there would be a joint Soviet-American effort against China. That seems inconceivable to me.

## Question

I do not think that anything we did really provoked a split between China and Russia. I think that the split between China and Russia is inherent in the confrontation of two quasi-religious systems. After all, communist ideology starts from the premise that it is true and that it represents the correct interpretation of history. The unforgiveable heresy of the Chinese as far as Moscow is concerned is that they maintain the right of a separate interpretation. This is more bothersome to the Russians than specific disagreements. It is as unacceptable to the Russians, if I may make

a church comparison, as it would be to the Pope to have some Bishop main-
tain the right of a separate interpretation. It is the same kind of con-
flict that existed between Rome and Constantinople in the early Chris tian
period. This the Russians could not accept even if the Chinese happen to
agree with them.

Secondly, if you look at the dispute between the Chinese and the Rus-
sians over a ten-year period you will find that their positions are con-
stantly shifting. Today everyone says the Chinese want war, the Russians
want peace. In 1954, '55 and '56 the hope of everybody was China. Every-
body said China representing this great civilization is the more peaceful
country, Russia starting from a barbaric background is the more bellicose
country. In 1956 China intervened in eastern Europe on behalf of Gomulka
and others for a greater liberalization of Russian policy in eastern Europe.
But the Chinese were one of the hopes of the east Europeans at the time. So
I believe that basically the split between the Chinese and the Russians re-
sults from the inner dynamic of the system and not from anything we do or
fail to do.

Of course if the Russians want to lessen the burden of armament, this
is something that we should look at very seriously. But I do not think that
this will greatly affect their stance vis-a-vis the Chinese. I do not think
it will improve their position vis-a-vis the Chinese very much. When Harri-
man came back from Moscow, he said that one reason the Russians might have
had for signing the agreement is to prove to the Chinese that peaceful co-
existence pays. I frankly believe that this was an extraordinarily naive
conception of how disputes are carried out within the communist party. Be-
cause the Chinese do not doubt that you can get an agreement with the West.
They have never accused the Russians of being unable to do that. Their argu-
ment is that these agreements with the West are not pushing the world revo-
lution forward. In order to impress the Chinese, the Russians would have to

-16-

demonstrate (a) that they can get an agreement and (b) that through that
agreement they can demoralize and weaken the West and that they can achieve
their objectives without war. If they can make that demonstration they win,
against the Chinese. But simply to get an agreement is not an argument that
impresses the Chinese.

Therefore my answer to your question would be as follows -- in making
an agreement with the Russians, we should assess the intrinsic merit of the
agreement. We should not analyze it much in terms of its impact on Sino-
Soviet relations, which follow their own dynamics and in which we sometimes
may get a fortunate bonus.

If American policy in 1953 had gathered the wisest men available in
this country and said, "Design a policy to split these two countries apart,"
we could not have done it. We operated on the principle that they could not
be split apart, and they split. Therefore I think it proves conclusively
that communism follows its own inward logic.

Question

When I hear two people debating how they are going to kill me, one
saying that they can do it without my noticing it and perhaps even with my
cooperation because I might swallow the poison when it tastes like tea, and
the other one saying, "He will never be so crazy as to take this tea with
the poison in it - you've got to club him over the head," I may have an
aesthetic preference for one or the other, but I am not overwhelmed by the
difference.

As far as I can see, the debate between the Russians and the Chinese
concerns the method as to how to encompass our downfall. Certainly I think
the Russian analysis is more correct than the Chinese. From reading the

statements of Khrushchev, I cannot help believing that he despises us. He believes that he can basically maneuver us into a position where we give up step by step, and that the Chinese are absolutely foolish to run major risks in foreign policy.

Up to 1955 the communist operating assumption was that the capitalists were wicked and dangerous. The belief was that no matter what their leaders said they were really preparing aggressive action against the communists and that therefore the communist world had to be very aggressive and very wary. This was the Stalinist notion.

My view is that Khrushchev's contribution to this process has been that he went to Geneva and met Eisenhower and said, "You know, they really are the way they seem. There isn't anything else behind them. They don't pretend. They really are naive. They are not just putting this on for our benefit." And if you look at his actions after the Geneva Summit meeting which, if you read the press, was hailed just like the test-ban treaty last summer, it led to an intensification of pressures which I can detail.

I think the basic dispute is this. The Russians believe that they can gradually expand their communism across the world without war, that they can ally themselves with the opposition elements in various countries, that they can go through popular fronts and so forth, and gradually bring about a situation where a cohesive free-world policy is no longer possible.

The Chinese believe that the West is not going to fall for this and that in their attempt to bring this about, the Russians are going to lose militancy, and the West is going to get an advantage. The Chinese believe that a more militant policy is safe.

In a way both of their convictions reflect their experience. After all the Chinese took us on when they had just barely won a civil war and fought us to a draw, which took an enormous act of courage on their part. Also I do not believe this argument that the Chinese are so absolutely reckless. If you look at their actual policy compared to what they say, they like a reputa-

tion for recklessness, but they behave very cautiously. They have not really
engaged since 1953 in major actions, except once for the shelling of Quemoy.
India was a different problem, because that did not run the risk of involving
us.

Well, I think you could make an argument - and my friend Walt Rostow
would make this argument. It is possible that the Russians will pursue a
policy which they start as a tactical device to defeat us, which later on
freezes and becomes an end in itself. It is not inconceivable to me that the
Russians start a peaceful co-existence policy which they believe will really
be a way to disarm us and then it turns out that this is going to be their
permanent policy. This has happened before in history. It is also possible
that in the process of doing it you are going to get a lot of left-wing
parties in power all over the world and that the dynamics of the process are
going to produce a collapse of the western position. So this is a question
of what you guess is going to happen.

Is it less or more dangerous to us? I frankly do not believe that we
should mix into internal communist politics. From what I have seen of our
politicians they have enough trouble playing politics at home for me to have
excessive confidence in their knowing which side it is more in our interest
to support, the Chinese or the Russians. I would simply not make the guide
to our policy whether we should support Khrushchev or Mao. This is one of the
great skills of Khrushchev. He makes everybody in the West believe we have
an interest in keeping him in power. He is so eager to stay in power, he is
not going to get out of power if he can help it. The problem of his staying
in power, or of what faction gets the power in the Soviet Union is too un-
certain for me to pay any price. I would do nothing that I would not want to
do otherwise in order to support one or the other tendency. This is not the
current view in Washington.

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Question about the causes of Sino-Russian split

(1) It seems to be the case that the Russians and Chinese just as people hate each other's guts. I do not know whether it is a racial characteristic. I sometimes attend conferences with Russian scientists, and I have always been struck by the fact that the two people they really genuinely seem to dislike are the Germans and the Chinese. Long before this split became obvious, it was very hard ever to get them to say anything very friendly about the Chinese. When they said it, it was the way the British say friendly things about the Germans with whom they also happen to be allied. But you have a sense that their heart is not really in it.

(2) Then from a purely political point of view, it must be worrisome to the Russians. They have about 30 million people in Siberia. The Chinese have about 600 million people just south of Siberia with tremendous population pressures. So that there is this geo-political problem.

(3) I think you have the difficulty that communist countries have really no way of settling disputes among each other. According to communist theory, there are not supposed to be disputes. They have a tendency to pretend for a long time that there are no disputes and therefore exaggerating them more and more.

(4) What gives a particular sharpness to the dispute is the ideological problem. What the dispute concerns is after all the leadership of the world revolutionary movement. This gives a sharpness, and it also sets limits to it. It is very hard for me to conceive how the Russians could become a nationalist, bourgeois state, which is what some people think, without losing their raison d'être. They might do this if there were no other communist power in the world, and if they could say that this is communism now. But if the dispute has to do with ideological orthodoxy, it is very hard for them to resign from what has been in the past their distinguishing features. So they are going to be under constant pressure to prove that their methods are more successful than the other methods.

On the other hand there are certain limits to the dispute. The churches
in the early Middle Ages - the churches of Constantinople and Rome - were not
on very good terms with one another. At the same time when it came to fight-
ing against the Mohammedans they usually managed to cooperate. The commun-
ists' split may have the same characteristics. Khrushchev said last week
that their dispute with the Chinese is minor compared to their basic problem
with the capitalists.

The reason for the conflict is an amalgam of a lot of factors, but it
derives its particular characteristic from the ideological.

Question about communism losing momentum.

I think it is not inconceivable. Certainly it has always been true
in history that revolutionary movements have lost their impetus at some
point. I see no reason why communism should be immune to this. To us the
interesting question is the time-scale on which this occurs. It was no con-
solation to Carthage that 300 years after it was destroyed, Rome turned into
a peaceful, status-quo country. For us the interesting question is whether
the communist revolution is going to lose its impetus while we are still a-
round or afterwards. I would imagine it is possible that over a period of
time, communism would change its character. It is also possible that at
some point the conflict between China and Russia will take an increasingly
nationalistic turn, rather than an ideological turn. I think this is quite
possible.

Question

If Russia and China get into actual military confrontation, it would
certainly ease our problem. They would not have energies left for outside

activities. On the other hand, supposing the Chinese and the Russians make this estimate that you just made - that sooner or later they will have to fight - they could draw the conclusion that they ought to make a settlement with us, or they could draw the conclusion that they better clean up their rear while they can - particularly the Russians - since sooner or later they will have to face the Chinese. Both conclusions are possible. But it is to our interest.

## Question

The Soviets are extremely cautious in actual military confrontations with us. They are very cautious because, contrary to Hitler who thought he had to settle things in his life-time, they believe that they have history on their side. As a result they feel under no compulsion to score their victory immediately. So I think you can draw the conclusion they will shy away, as long at least as they think they are militarily inferior, from direct military confrontation.

On the other hand, Cuba indicates that if they think they can get away with it, they are willing to run considerable military risks. The so-called reckless Chinese have never run a risk compared with the one the Russians ran last year.

Question about Russian action in Cuba, 1962.

I think they made a very grave mistake. It is always difficult to analyze a mistake. What did we think we were doing in the Bay of Pigs? Maybe Cuba is a country that encourages exaggerated thought. At any rate I think what the Russians thought they were doing was this: they had dealt with us

for a year and a half on Berlin. I think that Khrushchev had not formed
exactly a high estimate of Kennedy when they met in Vienna. At least he
told anybody who would care to listen that he did not have a very high
opinion of Kennedy. We had threatened on a number of occasions and done
nothing. We had then started these negotiations on Berlin against the
will of the French and the Germans. And all of this may have led him to
believe that if he could turn the screws once more he could get away with
it.

My estimate is that what he had planned to do was to put the missiles
into Cuba and then go to the United Nations as a great peace-maker and offer
in the guise of a generous settlement a resolution on his terms of the Ber-
lin problem, plus a few others, maybe offering to withdraw his missiles if
we got out of Berlin and a number of other areas. At any rate he thought he
could score a major break-through with this act. He did not appreciate, it
seems to me, that putting missiles into Cuba was different from putting up a
wall in Berlin. To us Cuba really was such a sensitive political issue that
this is something that could not be tolerated. The symbolic effect of having
Russian missiles in Cuba would have meant that we would have lost Latin Amer-
ica. At any rate the demagogic elements there would have become very much
stronger. This is what I thought he was doing but I think he miscalculated
and he over-played his hand.

I do not think militarily it was such an important move.

Question

We had given him a great opening by making the distinction between
defensive and offensive weapons, which overlooked the fact that it was the
symbolic act of Soviet presence ninety miles from our shores that affected

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our position in Latin America. If the Russians had put two divisions into Cuba, purely defensive, well-equipped, this would have had a major impact on Latin America. It would have been a proof all over Latin America that the Russians could protect their power 6,000 miles from their frontiers into the Caribbean and get away with it. "Defensive" or "offensive" had absolutely nothing to do with it. It was a projection of Soviet power. It would have had the same significance as if Rumania became a member of NATO tomorrow morning. That would not change the military balance either, but it would be a dramatic change in the over-all political situation.

## Question

But then to put the missiles into Cuba, he simply played right into the things we said we would not tolerate in the offensive build-up, and he lost his position. Now did he put his missiles into Cuba in order to prevent an American invasion? I doubt it. I read something in the Letters of Correspondence that explained the theory that he always meant to go in and go out. I do not believe this. I do not believe it because of his deployment. It is not just that he put these missiles in there. He put the most advanced anti-aircraft defenses into Cuba of a kind that they have never permitted outside of their territory. None of the satellites have this. This was a very expensive, very sophisticated operation. But if he was worried about an American attack on Cuba, if he had put two Russian divisions in there, if he had said, "These are there for defensive reasons. If you attack us then we will use ICBM's." That would have been more effective than putting IRBM's with Russian crews into Cuba, which were relatively easily knocked out and to which there was a strong possibility of outreacting. I do not believe that governments deliberately court humiliation in order to prevent an American attack. When we moved, the whole behavior of the Rus-

sians showed panic and confusion. They pulled out of it very nicely, because Khrushchev has great skill in getting out of difficulties he himself creates.

### Question

I do not think we came out of the Cuban affair as well as we might have. If that is what you mean. I would not have let them wind up the crisis point so fast, having once gotten into that position, but I think we still came out with a net gain in the affair as it finally developed.

### Question

You began with Cambodia, and right or wrong, I think the King - or Prime Minister - he keeps changing his position so often - it is hard to tell what he is. It is always prince, but sometimes he acts as king and sometimes he resigns as king and acts as prime minister. Well, Sihanouk has obviously decided that we are through in Vietnam. He said that two years ago. He said that Americans are going to get tired of this war. He has always adopted this possibility of accommodation to the communists because he felt that this was his best protection against eventual communist overthrow.

Secondly, you ask me what will be the effect if we lost Vietnam. After all the events in which we have been involved directly or indirectly, if we lost Vietnam, all of southeast Asia is gone. If we lose Vietnam, it will mean that every country in that area will realize that a promise of American support is meaningless, that they cannot be protected by the United States, that they have to make their accommodations with the Chinese. Now what form

this accommodation will take will depend in part then on the Chinese, and
it might take the form of the Burmese policy, in which Burma in effect has
a policy subordinate to the Chinese policy in return for which they can have
internal autonomy. They are almost like one of the former autonomous pro-
vinces of China. It might take this form. And it might take the form of
increasingly aggressive policies of countries like Indonesia. At any rate
American influence will be expelled from this area, and it will become pri-
marily a communist domain.

Now what policy should be adopted in Vietnam? It is getting very late
in the day. I have always believed that we have not thought through the im-
plications of what we were doing in this area. We have, it seems to me, two
choices. We could either defend Laos, or we had to resign ourselves sooner
or later to lose Vietnam. It was not possible to sacrifice a pro-western
government in Laos and win a war in Vietnam. The neutralization of Laos
seems to me to have had fundamental psychological consequences. After all,
a guerilla war is primarily a psychological war. The purpose of the gueril-
las is to demoralize the existing government and to convince it that it can
never establish an ordered administration without coming to terms with the
guerillas. It does not matter whether they ever score a victory as long as
they can demoralize the existing framework. In turn the ability of the
guerillas to sustain this war is directly due to the fact that they believe
they can win. There was no guerilla movement in Algeria before 1954 not be-
cause the French were less oppressive -- in fact they were probably more op-
pressive -- but because everyone "knew" that you could not win a guerilla
war, and therefore it was never tried.

The settlement in Laos taught the Vietcong that we were capable of
sacrificing an ally. He might have been a corrupt ally, an incapable ally -
never mind - we were capable under certain conditions of sacrificing a
government to which we were committed. We taught the government of Vietnam

that under certain circumstances it might turn out to be dispensable.
And whether the increasing repressiveness of Diem was cause or effect becomes hard to tell because this is the essence of these guerilla wars, that the longer they go on, the more corrupt the existing government becomes. Incidentally, I think the new one will be no better than the old one in a year or so.

Then militarily the neutralization of Laos opened up the whole Laotian-Vietnamese border to communist infiltration. It opened another 260 miles for infiltration, sanctuary and supply bases and gave the communists a direct frontier with Cambodia. So I think we still have the same problem we had before. We either have to give up the policy of neutralization of Laos and then perhaps we can win in Vietnam, or sooner or later the war in Vietnam is going to be lost. Sooner or later, in my view, the pressures for neutralization of Vietnam are going to multiply and solutions on the Laotian model are going to be sought and the consequences then will be the ones I described - all of southeast Asia will go.

## Question

I think we have to make up our mind. If we want to win in Vietnam, I think we have to stop the supplies coming in from Laos. Moreover, I think if we do not, all of Laos is going to become communist. Every year just before the rainy season starts, the communists leap 50 miles. Then a tremendous furor starts, and then the rainy season begins and bogs everything down anyway. Then headlines. Compare the armistice line to the present line. They have moved forward to the Thai border - I do not have the distances - but they have taken a good chunk of Laos. It is not that the present neutralization line is a permanent line. They are simply moving 50 to 100 miles every six or seven months, and the only area that is not yet under communist

rule is the Mekong River Valley. Almost all the rest of Laos is under com-
munist rule, and they are infiltrating into the Mekong River Valley now.

Question

Yes, it is a situation like this that we can use nuclear weapons. But
also we have to understand what we want to achieve. You know two years ago
it might have been possible, if we really wanted neutralization, to neutralize
both Laos and Vietnam, and then insist that it be a real neutralization.
Maybe. I am not saying it was possible, but it seems to me that under pre-
sent conditions and policies, I do not believe the war in Vietnam can be won.

Question

Legally, we are not at war. We are there with 16,500 troops now which
can hardly be called non-involvement in the eyes of the world. Legally we do
not have to be involved. Legally we have no commitments. We could pull out
tomorrow morning, and we would not legally have lost a war because we are not
in a war. We are legally there to help the Vietnamese forces win the war. In
terms of our political prestige, whatever that means, in terms of our inter-
national standing, in terms of what the other threatened countries of that
area believe, we are involved. We played a major role in the over-throw of that
government. Not directly. We did not organize it. But again, in the eyes
of the spectators who matter, we are heavily involved there now. Therefore
the loss of Vietnam has to be assessed as an American defeat.

Three years ago this was not necessarily the case. Two years ago this
was not necessarily the case. Today morally and politically it is the case.
We are involved.

Question

I would predict that if we maintain our present efforts in Vietnam, what will happen is the guerilla war will continue to go at about its present level. We will continue to claim innumerable victories, notwithstanding that it is in the nature of guerilla war that the regular forces win every battle but happen to lose the war. Two weeks ago I read the great victory of the Vietnamese forces with American assistance. What was the victory? The Vietcong had occupied two towns, and held them over night. The next morning we broke them out. That is not an American victory. As long as they can take a town for six hours - they never intended to hold that town forever. The purpose of these guerilla actions is to create so much insecurity that regular administration no longer becomes possible. When gangsters dominate an area of Chicago, they do not have to be able to fight it out with the police on the street. They just have to terrorize enough people so that they will give enough allegiance to them to keep them in business. This is the guerilla problem, and they can make a regular administration next to impossible, because one of their chief targets are the civil administrators. If they assassinate enough of them, there are only two types who then become administrators - a small percentage of highly dedicated ones, a large percentage of very corrupt ones who want to clean up fast.

In addition now that the coup has occurred, it is the history of military coups - without knowing anything about Vietnam - that it will create a tremendous ferment in Vietnam. These generals will probably start fighting among each other, and many of the political exiles who have returned will start their own political activities. I do not think an advanced country is likely to be capable of tolerating so much activity when a guerilla war is going on, and I am pretty sure Vietnam is not. So there are going to be increasing domestic tensions. We are in over our head as it is, because by

-29-

taking such an active part in the anti-Diem thing, we are now pretty
heavily committed to their successors. On the other hand, we have an elec-
tion here next year, and the President is not just about to send 100,000
American troops.

Question

He is going to pull a few hundred troops out of there, there is going
to be just enough of an effort to keep things reasonably quiet, and beneath
the surface the rot is going to continue, and I would guess by 1968 Vietnam
is lost.

Question about the things that need to be done.

Let me tell you what I think needs to be done to win the war. Now
whether we should do it is a different question. But what needs to be done
to win the war is a heavier American military presence in Vietnam, an end of
the supply line through Laos, and probably the threat of an attack on supply
bases in North Vietnam.

We will not do this. Can we do it? I do not know. Will we do it?
No, not in an election year certainly. And therefore I think we are going
to lose.

Question

Do I think the United States will pull out of Vietnam? No. I do not
believe so. I believe the effort of the Administration is going to be to keep
the present situation, to get some amelioration within the present framework