II - Report

December 11, 1957

A WORD BY THE PANEL

This Report is the result of a group effort by Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although not every member subscribes to every detail, it reflects our substantial agreement.

Starting in the fall of 1956, we were charged with exploring the International Security Objectives of the United States, the strategies most likely to attain these objectives and, generally, the problems and opportunities in this field which may face the country during the next ten to fifteen years.

We have had the benefit, in committee, of the thoughts of numerous experts in relevant security areas through the media of many conversations and specially prepared papers. We have sought to make our report as specific as possible, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they become critical. On the other hand, too much of the raw material of our consideration will be shaped by events in science and human affairs which have yet to happen for us to have attempted to blueprint every detail of our military posture.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U. S. security policies and operations. The overall U. S. strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense organization in major ways is unrelated to critically important military missions. Governmental systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management

Governmental systems ofึก�, аббризации, и financial management
organization in motor ways is unrelated to critically important military missions.
developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense
batteries and operations. The overall U. S. strategic concept leads behind
If it is our judgment that all is not well with present U. S. security
our military posture.

have yet to happen for us to have attempted to pinpoint every detail of
consideration will be abided by events in science and human affairs which
become critical. On the other hand, too much of the raw material of our
as possible, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they
specific prepared papers. We have sought to make our report as specific
in relevant security areas through the media of many conversations and
We have had the benefit, in committee, of the thoughts of numerous experts
this field which may face the country during the next ten to fifteen years.

Starting in the fall of 1926, we were charged with exploring the inten-
subscribes to every detail, it reflects our substantial agreement.

Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although not every member
This Report is the result of a group effort by Panel II of the Special

A WORD BY THE PANEI.

II - Report
December 11, 1927

II - Report

December 11, 1957

ii

are painfully out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military developments.

We are convinced that sizeable corrective steps can be taken now.

Our Panel therefore hopes that the most important result of the demonstration of Soviet technical competence revealed by the development of an earth satellite may be that it will serve as a catalyst for a genuinely deep review of all of the important basic U. S. attitudes and policies affecting the security of our country.

For the U. S. lag in missiles and space machines, however worrisome, is a symptom and not a cause. It reflects a general complacency over the past dozen years. It is now vitally important to the U. S. to calculate its strategy and security requirements on an integrated and long-range basis, and to set about correcting all significant deficiencies.

long-range bases, and to set about correcting all significant deficiencies.

calculate its strategy and security requirements on an integrated and
over the past dozen years. If it is now vitally important to the U. S. to
worksome, it is a symptom and not a cause. It reflects a general complicity

for the U. S. lag in missiles and space machines, however
affecting the security of our country.

deep review of all of the important bases U. S. attitudes and policies
of an earth satellite may be that it will serve as a catalyst for a genuinely
demonstration of Soviet technical competence revealed by the development
Our Panel therefore hopes that the most important result of the

We are convinced that achievable corrective steps can be taken now.

developments.

are positively out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military

it

December 11, 1963
II - Report