FINAL

Library of Congress
Henry Alfred Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy
and International Relations

Inaugural Lecture by Henry A. Kissinger

October 10, 2001

It is a great honor for me to have this opportunity to speak here at the Library of Congress about foreign policy. When this speech was planned, I intended to present a theoretical discussion on the nature of leadership in the conduct of foreign policy. But so many things have happened in the interval that I will give my remarks a more contemporary cast.

All of us probably remember where we were when we learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. I was in Frankfurt, speaking to a group of businessmen, and I was supposed to go from that speech to the airport to take an airplane to China. I was just winding up the question period when a journalist asked an especially unfriendly question. At that point, the chairman stepped up to the podium and announced that because there had just been an attack on New York and Washington, the meeting would have to end. The journalist shouted, "You've got to answer that question first." And I did. As I was walking out, the journalist stopped

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me and said, "You don't really believe this story of an attack in New York."
And indeed it was difficult to believe. In my view, that attack marks a
seminal change in the way Americans will conceive foreign policy and the
way in which the world will conduct foreign policy, or should conduct
foreign policy, in the future.

Had this been a normal evening, I would have spoken about the unique
character of America's approach to foreign policy; the fact that the United
States had never experienced a direct threat; that Americans had never lived
with tragedy caused by foreign actions in their own country; and about the
belief that Americans have traditionally held, to the effect that we could
choose the degree of our participation in world affairs and withdraw almost
at will. To be sure, at the end of World War II, we became involved but with
the attitude that we were solving a specific set of conditions within precise
time limits. The impact of destruction in downtown New York and at the
Pentagon have a far more profound psychological impact.

In retrospect, the 1990s were a period of self-satisfaction which
generated the theory that political history was over and henceforth that
economics and social policy would dominate. That illusion was ended three

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weeks ago. Similarly, the debate whether Europe should find its identity
primarily by differentiating itself from the United States will have a different
content from now on.

The nature of alliances, our relations with Russia, our relations with
China, the fact that we are in a coalition, however fragile it may turn out to be
in some cases, with countries that only yesterday were considered permanent
enemies or long-term adversaries--all of this will have a major impact on the
way Americans will look at foreign policy. I have been in this country now
for nearly sixty years. I was here at the time of Pearl Harbor, and I have seen
this government function in many critical periods. I have never seen a
demonstration of such defiant unity as in the last month, and I have never
seen such a dedication to overcoming the factional divisions that have been
existing at least since the Vietnam period.

But let me first say a few words about the immediate situation.
Terrorism is usually described as a shadowy new form of warfare, without
front lines, without visible enemies, and without political purposes that
would permit a negotiation, even if one wanted to. All that is true. On the
other hand, the fundamental challenge of the attack on the social order and

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CYJ

civil society that we have witnessed here is not so elusive. The terrorists, to
be able to operate in a way that undermines social order in a systematic way,
require some bases. Without these they become random criminals and can be
dealt with more or less as individuals or small groups. The fundamental
challenge that is posed by the terrorism we have experienced is the state
support, tacit or explicit, that these various organizations receive. Some of
that tacit support derives from fear on the part of the host countries. This
occasionally leads to a tacit bargain which allows the terrorist groups to
operate with relative safety so long as they don't aim their activities at their
host government, or at their host country. A few countries support terrorism
as a method of diplomacy and as a method of warfare. In other cases the key
to defeating terrorism is to cut off the terrorists from government support. If
that can be achieved, the actions of the individual terrorists become much
more a criminal problem for the police and much less an international
problem.

And so at this moment the profound challenge that the United States is
trying to meet and for which it has found up to now such widespread support
is to separate the terrorists from their bases in various countries. I believe

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that the administration has conducted a wise, strong, and decisive policy, and
I am very impressed, not only by the vision they have shown but by the
support we have received from so many countries, and especially from our
European allies.

With respect to the immediate situation in Afghanistan, the objective
cannot be just one terrorist leader, no matter how many cells he personally
has created nor can it be only the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Now that the operations have started, they should not end while leaving the
Taliban in power. The problem will therefore be whether we can maintain
unity during Phase I and whether we can maintain unity as we organize some
kind of structure in Afghanistan. This effort cannot be based only on the
Northern Alliance; it has to include the Pashtun population in the southern
part of Afghanistan. But we must be careful not to let ourselves be drawn
into the sort of conflict that every outsider seeking to pacify Afghanistan has
experienced. An attempt should undoubtedly be made to create a
broad-based structure in Kabul. But once that has been achieved, the
organization of the country will have to be turned over to some kind of
international body formally, perhaps the United Nations, maybe a contact

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group composed of all the neighboring countries that are part of the overall
coalition, plus those countries that have participated in the military
operations. This might bring about a kind of cooperation between countries
that have not in the past looked at the stability of the Middle East as a joint
problem. But it cannot be the task of the U.S. alone to organize a
government in Afghanistan. But it also cannot be that we stop this operation
and leave the matter to total chaos. So this operation should, in my view, be
continued until the Taliban has been removed, until some alternative
structure has been created and then we have to deal with a new challenge to
coalition policy.

That Phase III will test what the President has repeatedly affirmed, that
any country that supports terrorism will be treated as an opponent of the
United States. At that point we will confront the fact that the coalition that
has been so skillfully created by the President and the Secretary of State for
Afghanistan is composed of many divergent elements. At this moment, it is
an à la carte coalition in which every member can choose that activity most
compatible with its domestic structure or stay out of direct action altogether.
But sooner or later the different purposes will surface: of traditional allies; of

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traditional adversaries who, in this case, share our objectives; of countries
that share our purposes but are afraid to affirm them; of countries that do not
share our purposes but use participation as a means of escaping embarrassing
challenges.

Hopefully we will be able to hold together all of the coalition through
succeeding phases. But the basic principle that must be affirmed is that no
historic grievance and no present cause justifies the undiscriminating attacks
on civilian populations with the often exclusive purpose to make civil society
untenable, and to undermine any concept of legal government. To affirm this
principle, it is not necessary for us to take sides in the traditional political or
military conflict. I believe that the President means what he says, that this is
a conflict that we will pursue. But when there is an attack on the territory of
the United States and thousands of people are killed within minutes, there has
to be a determined American reaction, not just for the self-respect of America
but for the safety of all the people of the world who depend on us or depend
on some concept of order.

But beyond the war against terrorism, I look at this period not just from
the point of view of eliminating the fundamental challenge that has been

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posed, but as being comparable to the period immediately following the end
of World War II. An isolationist America confronted a world it in no way
had expected. President Roosevelt told Churchill as late as 1944 that any
idea of keeping American troops in Europe for more than two years after the
war was out of the question. Nevertheless, in a great burst to creativity,
America, in the decade following 1945, devised a whole series of measures to
bring structure and security to the world. Together with its allies, it helped
secure democracy in Europe and Japan and laid the basis for the victory over
the Soviet Union in the 1990s. So now we and those countries that cooperate
with us have another historic opportunity. We no longer have one particular
enemy. Rather, we face a problem that can surface in many parts of the globe
without being tied to one set of national objectives. In this respect, what
happened a month ago has accelerated the changes that are already taking
place but also given them a new perspective.

Three months ago, it would have been considered highly improbable
that our European allies would express unanimous solidarity on any current
issue with such clarity. Therefore the relationship of America to Europe can
be addressed from a new perspective. On the European side it has become

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clear that there are some dangers that still unite us, even in the security field.

There is no European country that would be in a position to respond with the same speed and effectiveness to a similar attack on its own capital or principal cities.

At the same time, the question of European identity can be considered from a perhaps less cautious perspective by America. To be sure, Europe has its own history and will define its own purposes but, in the long run, European identity need not and should not be based on what differentiates it from the United States. In the long run, North Atlantic cooperation is a more central challenge. The impact of the British Prime Minister's political support and public declarations, not just on Anglo-American relations but on the American attitude toward the importance of allies, has been enormously significant. At the same time, on some of the issues that have concerned Americans, such as European security policy, we can take another look at whether it is inevitable that a European security policy which achieves a degree of autonomy from the United States must inevitably be to our detriment. Similarly, the issue of missile defense, which seemed for a while to split the alliance and ironically to split the alliance more than it threatened

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our relationship with Russia, can now be viewed in a new light. If the attack
on New York had been launched with a missile and if the American people
knew that technology existed to prevent this which its government had
refused to adopt for a variety of ideological reasons, it would seriously
undermine public confidence. For this reason, I am convinced that the issue
of missile defense in the months ahead will find its solution, not only in
relation with our European allies but in a closer relationship to Russia.

That relationship has undergone a fundamental change beyond the
issue of terrorism. It is defined not only by the disappearance of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Communist system, but by the attempt of the new
government of Russia to come to grips with the end of the Russian empire
going back to Peter the Great. On this basis, Russia's new relationship to the
west and to the rest of the world becomes the challenge of how to give Russia
a place in the international system. How to relate a status of equality that
respects Russia's history, its dignity, and the institutions that have developed
in the postwar period, such as NATO--that is a challenge that had been posed
even before September 11 and with respect to which President Putin has put
forward interesting and often very constructive ideas. I am certain that the

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issue of missile defense is not one that will divide Russia and the United
States for any extended period. And, in fact, after I had had a meeting with
President Putin, a Russian journalist asked me what I thought of the issue of
missile defense. I said, "We will probably come to an understanding with
President Putin before we come to an understanding with the American
media." The challenge posed by the Russian president for equal participation
in the dialogue among America, Europe, and Russia is one that should be
looked at from a new perspective in the light of recent events.

The temptation has been to find some way to squeeze Russia into the
NATO structure and to find some formula by which one can have Russia as a
prospective member without quite having it enter NATO itself. Were Russia
to become a full-fledged member, NATO would lose its meaning for
especially the new members from Eastern Europe, for NATO does not protect
its participants against each other. Far more creative to create a new political
consultative mechanism that does not dodge the fact that NATO is
fundamentally a military alliance. Instead, we should aim for a system of
consultation that makes Russia a participant in major political decisions
organically. Such a political mechanism should include America, Europe

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(however Europe chooses to organize itself), and Russia. In such a system, the issue of attack from Russia is made hopefully irrelevant by the intensity of consultation, but the essential defense mechanisms remain for whatever common military efforts Europe and the United States want to undertake together.

Our experience on cooperation regarding the terrorism issue has demonstrated that we can work in harmony with Russia very effectively on common security threats on a bilateral basis.

Now as far as America itself is concerned, I served in this city at a period of enormous division in this country, where what was at issue most of the time was not so much the individual policies as motives and purposes. And the bitterness of that debate in many respects has gone on for several decades. But the experience of the last month has provided an opportunity to transcend the debate that is so characteristically American, whether foreign policy should be essentially moral or essentially realistic. No country, no matter how powerful, can impose all its preferences on the world without evoking universal resistance and without overextending itself. Similarly, no nation can insist that its ideals alone are the criterion by which all others can

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be judged. Any thoughtful American foreign policy must understand that, on
the one hand, one of the glories of this country is the unity and dedication
that has been so evident in the last month. But, at the same time, we owe it to
ourselves to understand the histories and the cultures of other societies, and
to comprehend that the evolution of different countries has produced various
conceptions of what is legitimate and what can be achieved. That does not
mean that we have to compromise our values--our values enable us to
persevere in difficult circumstances and to make hard choices--but it does
mean that to create an international system, the art of the powerful is to create
a degree of consensus.

When I was a young professor I called on President Truman, who had
left office, and I asked him what he had done of which he was most proud.
He replied, "I am most proud of the fact that we totally defeated our enemies,
and then we brought them back to the community of nations as equals."
Today we face a comparable challenge. We have to defeat our enemies, and
we have to defeat them completely. And we cannot stop with some partial
successes in an isolated outpost. But, at the same time, we must use this
occasion to create a new community and a new sense of participation in

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the international system. President Truman concluded his remarks by saying, "only Americans would have done that." Now I don't believe that only Americans can meet the present challenge, and so I look at this moment of crisis as a moment of great opportunity.

Questions and Answers

Q: In the light of the events of September 11, how would you amend the conclusions reached in your latest book, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*

A: That would force me to admit that anything I have written needs amendment, which would be an historic event. I did not foresee in writing this book that an event such as the September 11 attack was conceivable. I did not take account of that at all. I treated terrorism as something that happens on the whole on other continents, but not to the territorial United States. Secondly, I think I would modify my view about the relationship between America and Europe, if what we have seen from Europe represents

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something in addition to simply gaining an influence over actions that they knew we might take any way. The manner in which, after American military action started, the leaders of France, Germany, and Italy expressed solidarity with the United States, I would not have expected. So I would modify my analysis of European-American relationships, and I would also extend my analysis of Russian relationships. I was indicating the direction that I outlined, but I think the process has gone faster than I would have expected before September 11.

Q: Rogue states like Iraq and Libya have done less to radicalize Islam than Saudi Arabia--witness the way they have subsidized Pakistan's Koranic schools. What can we do to change Saudi perspective?

A: I stated in my remarks that as we go through the various phases of the policy the President has announced, no country should be immune and no country should have the privilege of subsidizing terrorism directly or indirectly without reaction from the United States. But it is also only fair to recognize that Saudi Arabia has given us strong support on many issues for

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decades, that many Secretaries of State have had reason to be grateful to
Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the Saudi government somewhere in this
process will have to face the necessity of cutting off the financial support to
organizations that preach or support terrorism. They are trying to balance the
fear of what these groups might do inside Saudi Arabia against the
necessities they feel of preserving stability in the region. So we should deal
with Saudi Arabia with understanding and compassion for their problem, but
we cannot let any country escape the consequences of their actions in support
of terrorism.

Q: You have met with Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. How might China's foreign policy evolve under the next generation of leaders? Do you expect that China's entry into the WTO or the international war on terrorism might radically alter the tone of relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C.?

A. We have experienced, in the building of the recent coalition, the necessity of cooperating with countries with which we had disagreements on

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philosophical and moral grounds. When we began to cooperate with China, it was done on the basis of a common enemy. In the meantime, China has undergone transformations that nobody would have thought possible in the 1970s. The China of today is not the China of Mao. I do not consider China a Communist country in the sense of that Communism was understood in the Cold War period. It is a one-party country, but not one that is an ideologically Communist country. I believe that the successors of Jiang Zemin face the challenge of not representing a pre-existing legitimacy. Mao brought about the unity of China, Deng brought about the reform of China, Jiang Zemin was anointed by Deng and now has begun to face the consequences of rapid economic change outstripping political adaptation.

The successors of Jiang Zemin will face the problem of how to adjust their political institutions to a pluralistic economic system and of achieving legitimacy by performance. How will this affect their foreign policy? The foreign policy of China has been on the whole restrained. And, even with respect to Taiwan, it has been substantially restrained. For their own reasons they want a decade of peace. They pay great attention to the Olympics of 2008 which they view as a way to demonstrate their country's achievements.

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The problem in the next phase of China is whether nationalism becomes the organizing principle of China to replace the previous face of Communism, and how that nationalism will be interpreted. And therefore it should be one of the tasks of American foreign policy to enable that nationalism to be expressed in some form other than rabid opposition to the United States. Of course, if we should be challenged by it, we will resist. But I do not think it is inherent in the Chinese situation. For the next ten to fifteen years, China has no conceivable motive to engage in a confrontation with the United States; therefore I believe that they will engage in a non-confrontational foreign policy, provided that there is a thoughtful handling of the Taiwan problem on all sides.

Q: To what do you attribute the extreme rage of Muslim fundamentalists?

A: Scholars whose opinions I respect hold the view, which I tend to share, that some of this rage results from a sense of historic humiliation, that the Islamic societies had great empires and were in the vanguard of progress for long periods of history but, in the last few hundred years, they have not

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managed to modernize to the same degree as many of the surrounding societies. And this sense of falling behind is then blamed in part on western materialism, western imperialism, western values. Some of the criticisms even have merit-- although they do not justify the rage with which they have been expressed, and part of it is a combination of falling behind and a sense that the West is weakening, and that therefore there is an opportunity to topple it and find a shortcut to reachving the lost eminence. But, of course, the hope and the purpose of foreign policy has to be to confine that rage to a small minority and to reduce that minority to less and less significant proportions and, in time, to eliminate it.

Q: Do you agree with those who say that not finishing the war by getting rid of Saddam Hussein was one of the great foreign policy blunders of the 20th century?

A: I would say two things. First of all, I think it was a mistake, but I also remember that President Bush created a coalition and organized the resistance against Saddam Hussein in the face of considerable opposition in

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this country and with great doubt among many of our allies. At the time I testified on behalf of the administration before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was holding hearings on whether embargo might not be the better policy. The vote in the Senate was relatively narrow. So I think when one talks about "mistake", one also has to pay tribute to the administration in office at the time for having recognized the profound danger that this would represent to all the democracies and to all countries if Saddam were not opposed. I believe it was probably a mistake not if you put the issue in terms of should we have gone on to Baghdad. But I think if we had destroyed Republican Guard divisions systematically and thereby undermined the basis of Saddam's rule, he would have been overthrown, and that would have created a demonstration in the area that it was very dangerous to challenge the United States and the existing order. Such an accomplishment was within our reach. So, from that point of view, I think it was a mistake, but it was a mistake by people who had pushed through the right policy and who deserve tremendous credit for having saved the whole region by their decision to resist and to risk American lives and spend American lives for the safety of the whole area and of the world.

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NO. OF PAGES: 21 DATE: June 18, 2002
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RECIPIENT:

NAME: Mr. Prosser Gifford
Library of Congress
FAX NO: 202/707-3595

SENDER:

NAME: Theresa L. Cimino
Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

MESSAGE:

Dear Sir:

The following is the final version of the Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and
International Relations inaugural lecture Dr. Kissinger delivered on October
10, 2001. As you requested, I have also sent you the file via e-mail.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I may be of further assistance.

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