THE ASAHI SHIMBUN, JAPAN
AMERICAN GENERAL BUREAU

794 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004

STERLING 3-0523 3-0524

May 19, 1978

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was so nice, pleasant, and useful for us to have had an inter-
view with you. Here is the full transcript of our conversation.
I hope you do not mind that some of the questions and responses
that we were engaged in were transcribed as though they took place
between you and Mr. Kishida.

As we had agreed, you are absolutely free to delete, add, or
modify any part of the transcript. However, we would appreciate
it if you would keep the deletions to a minimum. We also welcome
and appreciate any additions that you might make, in order to
strengthen and make the conversation more interesting.

There are two requests we should like to make. One is, regarding
the questions on Taiwan, since Dr. Brzezinski will have returned
to Washington by the time our story appears, we would appreciate
it if you change that part of your response in accordance with
the new time frame. The second request is that; since your
prediction on Japan's rearmament would not only be interesting
but useful for us Japanese, would you also predict on the possibility
of Japan's nuclear armament. In other words, with your historical
perspective, and the reality in existence, do you predict that
Japan will eventually come to possess some kind of nuclear weapons?

Thank-you again for sharing with us your thoughts, opinions, and
your precious time. We look forward to the publication of the inter-
view, to our continued working relation and in the meantime we hope
that you will be able to examine the transcript as soon as possible.

With the assurance of our highest esteem,

K.M/lcd

STERLING 3-0523 3-0524

May 19, 1978

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This is to confirm that the Asahi Shimbun will not syndicate
the story regarding our interview to any country or area outside
of Japan.

As a matter of fact even within Japan we would not syndicate any
part of our interview to any other publishing companies or
institutions other than the Asahi Shimbun.

The Asahi Shimbun intends to use the content of the interview in
the form of a series of stories, and perhaps making use of the pic-
tures we have taken, we may use part of the interview in the
Weekly Asahi or the Asahi Evening News, both of which are published
solely by the Asahi Shimbun Company.

KS:1cd

MR. KISHIDA: Ever since the Nixon Doctrine was announced in Guam in July 1969 the U.S. posture in Asia, regardless of the change of administrations, seems to have been a continuous disengagement from the region. This trend has become more conspicuous since Mr. Carter took office, thus creating among non-communist countries in Asia a sense of uneasiness for being abandoned.

Was the Nixon Doctrine announced on the premise of U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam? Under what considerations and prospect was the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam implemented in terms of U.S. strategy toward the Pacific and Asia?

May I also ask if the U.S. is considering to pull-back its forward defense lines to an island-chain in the Pacific in order to avoid involvement in the Asian land-mass? If so, specifically where would the defense lines be drawn? How do you assess Asian countries' concern in the absence of visible U.S. presence in the area?

DR. KISSINGER: The Nixon Doctrine was announced in [order to get] a rationale for American policy in Asia [and] the withdrawal from Vietnam. It assumed that there would be a withdrawal from Vietnam, but it also assumed that we would withdraw under honorable conditions.

On the second question, is the United States considering pulling back its defense line, I do not believe that the United States can possibly afford to pull back its

defense lines to an island chain in the Pacific. Our
defense line in the Pacific must [stay close to] Japan and
Korea and the Philippines. We must have a forward defense
in the Pacific.

What particular troop deployment we have at any
given moment, that has to be decided by each Administration.
I personally favor a visible American presence, because if
you change the visible American presence, you raise doubts
about

whether we intend to defend a particular area.)
I therefore
do not favor a withdrawal from Korea, at least [do] not [favor]
total withdrawal from Korea, and I think there should be a
forward presence of the United States. And I do not favor
a withdrawal to an island chain.

MR. KISHIDA: Your proposal for solving the Korean
questions, delineated in your speech at the General Assembly
of the United Nations on 22 September 1975 were well received
as a fresh and realistic approach to the problem.

Do you consider your thoughts on this question need
not be revised even today? How do you interpret the staunch
attitude of refusal by the North Korean authorities to such
proposals?

DR. KISSINGER: The first fundamental point I want
to make is that the United States must not talk about the
future of Korea without the presence of South Korea. In other
words, we must not talk alone to North Korea. This is the
fundamental principle.

47

Now, I would prefer it if China joined such a discussion. If China does not want to join the discussion, then I would be prepared to see a discussion between North and South Korea and the United States. I would not favor a discussion only between North Korea and the United States.

The reason that the North Koreans do not wish to talk to the South Koreans is because they want to undermine the legitimacy of the South Korean government and they want to maneuver themselves into position where they become the authentic spokesman for all of Korea. They would like to pursue some of the same tactics that Hanoi pursued at the Paris Peace Conference.

I think we made a mistake then in giving them too big a role. We must under no circumstances do this with North Korea.

MR. KISHIDA: Are you saying, then, without full participation of the South Koreans, there could not be such a conference over Korea.

DR. KISSINGER: Exactly.

MR. KISHIDA: Would you comment on the view that a real democratization of South Korea is essential for the domestic stability of that country?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is desireable, but I think one also has to look to other factors -- the historic

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[y]

tradition of the country, and the actual situation in which
it finds itself. I of course would prefer a greater
democracy in South Korea, but I would not want to create so
much chaos in South Korea that it becomes a temptation for
North Korea in aggression.

I think one has to have understanding for the prob-
lems of a country, where there are major concentrations enemy
forces 30 miles from its capital, and a dedication to over-
throwing the whole system by North Korea. But with those
qualifications, of course I would prefer [a democratic---

I prefer a democratic to a non-democratic government
also I prefer a non-communist to a Communist government.

MR. KISHIDA: In this respect, what role, if any,
do you think Japan can play?

How can Japan be able to participate in the proce-
dure, if, for example, a four-party or a three-party confé-
rence takes place on the question of the Korean Pennisular?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, I'm more qualified to
speak about American policy than about Japanese policy. But
there are a number of realities. Korea is extremely important
to the security of Japan, and to this degree, the destinies
of Korea and Japan have a certain interconnection.

Secondly, Japan has a natural economic relationship
with Korea. Third, I believe it is historically inevitable
that Japan will play a larger role in its own defense. And,

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therefore, it will have to reflect about the security of
South Korea. When I say 'historically inevitable,' I mean
over 10, 15, 20 years. It is not natural for a country
that's as powerful economically as Japan not to have some
relationship to its security problem that's commensurate
with its economic strengths.

in
on
[with] Korea, my instinct would be that Japan would not want
a formal role, but I believe that a wise American Administra-
tion would make sure that we make no significant move in
Korea that we do not discuss ahead of time with Japan.

MR. KISHIDA: As we've seen, the Carter Administra-
tion is trying to withdraw the combat troops from Korea be-
ginning this year. In your view, what would be the procedure
of withdrawal, how should it be done, and also, over what
extended period should it be done?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, as I said, I'm opposed to the
withdrawal of all our combat forces from Korea. If it has
to happen, I'd want it over the most extended period of time,
and related to the conduct of the North Koreans. I am glad
that the Administration has delayed the withdrawal into the
1980's and I hope that after the election in 1980, they will
take another look at the situation in the light of the new

conditions that will then exist, [so that] while I disagreed with the original decision, it is now being implemented in the best possible way.

MR. KISHIDA: Your historic visit to China in the summer of 1971 was a major breakthrough for a new U.S. China policy under Nixon administration. In relation to the overall world strategy and in particular Asian strategy, what considerations or visions did you hold in undertaking such a dramatic move? If the situation, you then envisaged, still remains, when and under what conditions would the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China be realized? In what manner, do you expect, were the Taiwan questions to be solved?

DR. KISSINGER: [well,] our view was that you could not have peace in the world without the participation of 800 million Chinese, that the Chinese were too important a people by their weight, by their culture, to be excluded from international relationships. So it was also important for the peace in Asia and we thought it was important in terms of the overall relationships in the world to have China as a participant in the international system.

In addition, we committed ourselves to the normalization of relations. It has always been clear that there were two separate problems—one was our common interests or concern about what the Chinese called hegemony. The second was the problem of normalization, and we had to proceed on both of them simultaneously.

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M

I cannot give an exact deadline when we would have
done it, but we would have done it at the earliest possible
opportunity.

MR. KISHIDA: The concept of "hegemony" has also been introduced in the normalization of relations with the Japanese, and while we were engaged in negotiations with the Chinese, the Chinese said that the word hegemony, the concept of it, had been introduced by Dr. Kissinger. Is that true?

DR. KISSINGER: I forget who introduced it, but I wouldn't quarrel with my Chinese friends on that subject.

MR. KISHIDA: In the process of normalizing relations with the Chinese, how would you conceive the Taiwan question to be solved?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, Mr. Brzezinsky, I has visited Peking.

I wished to see him every success on his trip, and the trip seems to have been very successful.

MR. KISHIDA: Our impression is that the United States will not be able to normalize relations with the Chinese with the Taiwan's position being jeopardized. Would that be a fair assumption of the U.S. policy?

DR. KISSINGER: [well], the Chinese have publicly stated that what they want is something like the Japanese formula. In our case it has an additional problem, because

4

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the Japanese formula
our
of defense relationship with Taiwan. So it has an additional
complication for us.

MR. KISHIDA: In your thinking, what effect has a
development in the U.S.-Chinese relationship since Mr. Nixon's
visit to Peking had on U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union?
How do you evaluate the role China could play in this context
in the future? What is the significance of a closer relation-
ship between China and Japan in terms of U.S. policy? Do you
favor the Chinese stand against hegemony?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I have never
objected to closer relations between Japan and the People's
Republic of China. And the People's Republic has never objected
to closer relations between Japan and the United States.

And within this framework, I think both sides can
develop their relationship. As far as the Soviet Union is
concerned, our relationship with China is not aimed against
the Soviet Union. Speaking about the United States, and I'm
sure the same is true of Japan, we have an interest in an
independent China, and a strong China. China has an interest
in a world in which no country can dominate.

So our interests tend to be parallel in certain
respects. On the other hand, neither we nor China have any
intention of threatening the Soviet Union. So if the Soviet
Union has no aggressive intentions, it has nothing to worry
about in friendly relations between the United States and
China.

X

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So it is not aimed against the Soviet Union, it's aimed at the development of what are natural relationships.

MR. KISHIDA: Do you foresee that there will be some major military conflict in the Soviet Union and China?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I notice the Chinese *today* have said that a conflict is inevitable. I read that in the paper.

It is not my view, but the possibility cannot be excluded, in the sense that they have had military clashes over the last ten years with which we are familiar.

MR. KISHIDA: What is your view of the present Chinese administration?

Do you see the current Peking Government as a realistic administration, well-stabilized, and will continue to maintain its stability?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know *Hua Kuo-feng*.

I am familiar with Teng Hsiao-ping. I found him, as I did indeed all the Chinese leaders whom I met, as extremely able, extremely realistic. My impression is that it's an attempt to modernize China rapidly, and given the talents of the Chinese people, and the abilities of this leadership group, I think they will succeed.

What was the rest of the question?

MR. KASHIDA: Well, whether you would foresee the stability will continue?

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(Y)

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I expect stability will continue.

MR. KASHIDA: Given that situation, he is going to continue to stabilize the country, continue to develop its military power, how do you foresee if this present trend continues, the development of Chinese military forces?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it depends in part on the degree to which the Chinese industry becomes modernized, because the Chinese will probably want to be largely self-sufficient in their military forces.

But I would think that their [forces] would be somewhat smaller in number, but much better equipped than they are today.

MR. KISHIDA: My impression is that, despite their attempt to become economically independent themselves, they will need to introduce the technologies from the U.S. and Japan, and perhaps make best use of the Western technologies in their effort of modernization.

DR. KISSINGER: I think that's right. And I have always favored enabling China to acquire Western technology, or Japanese technology.

MR. KISHIDA: Would it be possible to ask China to participate in the stability of Southeast Asia, participate with the United States, Japan and other Western countries?

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Also, in terms of Chinese participation in inter-national efforts in various fields, what about the timings, conditions under which China might participate in the disarmament conference?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the disarmament conference, I don't think that China will participate until its military power is greater so that it can speak from a more equivalent position. And there has been an ideological opposition on the part of China to participate, partly because they fear that it will be used to impose an unequal relationship on China for an extended period of time.

But I would leave that decision up to China. Now, as far as the situation in Southeast Asia is concerned, this is primarily a question of economic development. I don't know whether China has the resources to spare to play a significant role at this moment. And, of course, there is some uneasiness in some Southeast Asian countries.

On the other hand, I think Japan and the United States should keep China informed about what we are doing, and let China make its own judgment as to its own role.

MR. KISHIDA: Let me go to Southeast Asia. Does the U.S. have a realistic prospect for normalizing the relations with both Vietnam and Cambodia? Is the U.S. willing to give Vietnam three billion dollars worth of aid for reconstruction which they claim to be a precondition for the normalization? Under what conditions do you believe is a compromise with these respective countries possible?

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YI

DR. KISSINGER: Let me take the first question, the
prospect of normalizing relations with Vietnam and Cambodia.
First let me take Cambodia. The United States has no quarrel
whatsoever with Cambodia. We would like Cambodia to be inde-
pendent and to progress, and we don't want Cambodia to be
dominated from Hanoi or from anywhere else. That was the only
interest we ever had in Cambodia.

On the other hand, this is maybe the most murderous
government that now exists in the world. They must have
killed 15 percent of their own population, and it is the most
barbaric government that now exists. And while I am usually
in favor of paying, above all, attention to the national
interest, there is a limit of immorality which we cannot
accept, beyond which we cannot let the national interest
dictate.

So I'm in the position that with any even normally
Communist government in Cambodia, I would favor normalization
there. But with this government in its present murderous
frame of mind, I don't see that we can have anything to do,
even if it's against our short term interests.

Now, as far as Vietnam is concerned, the Vietnamese
do not have an excessively low estimate of their importance.
And they think they are doing us a great favor by letting us
normalize relations with them. I think they have to under-
stand that, as far as we're concerned, now they're a secondary

X

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in terms of our interests. We have
country. [And we've] withdrawn from Indochina. There isn't
much they can do for us, and we will pay no price for
normalizing relations with them. If they want normal
relations with us, fine. If they don't want normal relations,
we can survive this. We have lived for the greater part of
our history without normal relations with Hanoi, and I do
not go to bed at night worrying about whether there will be
a Vietnamese ambassador in Washington.

Now, as to giving them three billion dollars, that
is an absurdity. They cannot make an agreement, break every
provision of the agreement except one, which defines an
American obligation, and then say that one obligation remains,
even when
but all other obligations have been broken.

And I think it's too insulting even to discuss. I
have said that in terms of our priorities of economic aid,
Vietnam should be put in alphabetical order, which is [near] the
end of our alphabet. But the quicker that they stop talking
about this nonsense of three billion dollars, the better off
we all are, even if our Administration wanted to do it, and
they don't, the Congress would never approve it.

MR. KISHIDA: Did you anticipate at the time of the
signing of the peace treaty the current conditions in Indo-
china, including the on-going conflict between Vietnam and
Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but I did not foresee that our
Congress [countries] would cut aid to South Vietnam by 50 percent each year.
I did not foresee that we would be prohibited by the
Congress [conquerors] from enforcing the agreement. And I thought it
would be like the Korean conditions, where we would have the
right to maintain the agreement and [maybe would] give assistance
to our allies. And if that had been done, South Vietnam would
still exist, just as South Korea still exists.

MR. KISHIDA: Do you suppose you have a feeling that it's extremely difficult to have a viable agreement with a Communist bloc of nations?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I can't say with a Communist bloc of nations. We have found that the Chinese have always kept their agreements with us. The Soviet Union has substantially kept its agreements. Vietnam has never kept its agreements. So you have to make a distinction between the various countries.

MR. KISHIDA: Why I brought up this question is, I will be touching on the subject later, but for instance, in case of the Helsinki Agreement, the Russians tend to abide by the part of the agreement that is convenient and acceptable to them, while posing difficulties in the area where they are not happy such as exchange of information and personnel.

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet record is uneven. Hanoi's record is very consistent.

all agreements.

[v]

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MR. KISHIDA: Now, you're saying that the Vietnamese never kept the agreements. But at the time when you were talking with them in Paris, didn't you believe that they would keep the agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I believed they'd either keep the agreement or if not, we would have the means to enforce the agreement. If they would not keep it, we would be able to enforce the agreement, either by our actions or by the actions of others. I felt the South Vietnamese were strong enough without our assistance to maintain their independence.

MR. KISHIDA: Is such an interpretation possible and viable that the relative stability we see in the ASEAN countries at the moment is an outcome of the reduction in the U.S. military presence?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think so. I think it's the result of an international equilibrium that exists, and it is for this in turn we bought time through our actions in Vietnam.

MR. KISHIDA: What about the possibility of the Russians increasing significantly their involvement in Asian affairs or Southeast Asia?

- 1 / -

[Y]

DR. KISSINGER: I think Soviet actions in Southeast Asia would be unfortunate for the peace of the area. They would be considered by China as a threat to its national interest. They should be considered by us as a [threat to American interests, and as a threat to Japan's long-term interests.

MR. KISHIDA: How do you evaluate the present situation of ASEAN region, where Japan is increasing its involvement both economically and politically? How do you assess the "Fukuda Doctrine", by which the Japanese Prime Minister committed himself in aiding the ASEAN when he visited those nations in 1977?

DR. KISSINGER: I think Japan is playing a very constructive role in Asian region. I think there is an opportunity to strengthen the economies and the political cooperation of these countries. By themselves they are too weak to do it. It is helpful that Japan plays a greater role and the United States should back that up.

MR. KISHIDA: Would it be likely at all that there would be a coordinated common policy between the United States and Japan towards Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: There is a common interest, which is sometimes even more important than a common policy. I don't know to what extent it is expressed in a formal common policy, but I think there is a common interest which dictates parallel policies.

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MR. KISHIDA: In the U.S. policy toward Asia, it has been reported the present Administration is placing a great emphasis on the European theater. Despite all the efforts that's been set by Secretaries Brown and Vance, and Dr. Brzezinski's going and Vice President Mondale's recent Asian trip, don't you generally perceive the present condition as relatively stable, strategically favorable to the United States, and therefore you are less, shall I say, interested in doing anything that may change the present situations in Asia and Pacific?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it depends. But we certainly don't want the present situation to be changed against us. I think, if you look at it historically, the center of world gravity will certainly move more towards the Pacific than towards the Atlantic. And therefore, the United States must have a creative policy for the Pacific, because all the countries that are really succeeding -- South Japan, Korea, China -- they're all in the Pacific area. There's no reason why Indonesia should not develop. Then you have Australia and New Zealand.

I am not

saying Europe will decline, but I am saying that the Pacific will come up, and we cannot just leave things alone in the Pacific. It isn't possible.