DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON

Amb. Rabin

12/1/71 9:20 a.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

R: First, have you got from the other parts something about the papers?

K: No.

R: No?

K: No.

R: Then it has not reached the President.

K: Mine have, but not theirs.

R: All right. Second, about the meeting today. I think that you have to
make your understanding and position clear to prevent any misunderstanding.

K: What do you think my position is?

R: How you see the situation.

K: Domestically.

R: Yes. If it's possible.

K: Oh yes. I am always frank.

R: And three, I will wait for you at 5 minutes to one at the entrance to
the Shoreham.

K: Wouldn't it be better if I just came up?

R: All right. . . because I can arrange somebody who is less
conspicuous than me.

K: I think that it better.

R: I think Minister Idan will be there.

K: All right. Five minutes to one. I'll be with the President, but will
call your office if there's any delay.

R: All right.

K: It can't be any more than five minutes because he's leaving.

R: All right.

K: I will look forward to it then and will speak with great frankness.

R: All right.

K: If necessary, brutal frankness.

By.

NARA

Dato 5/26

Telcon
Secretary Rogers
1 Dec 1971; 4:25 p.m.

R: Henry, I didn't mean to get you out of the meeting. They said you were out to lunch and would call me back. I wanted to put my speech out - gathered the President didn't get to read it.

K: No. But it's no problem to me. I think it is a good statement. It leads well into this meeting you have next week.

R: I think so. The NATO people are causing considerable uproar. Did you get a report on that first session? Deputies meeting in Rome?

K: I can't make out what is going on. No, I haven't had a report.

we

R: The first session was rough as hell. The U.S. said they were going to make it public. It threw them into a tizzy. They never publish these sessions except by an agreement. Either a communique or public statement. They were madder than hell.

K: Then it apparently did get published.

R: Not the whole thing. Now apparently John feels they might want to prolong the meeting, but it looked awfully acrimonious the first day. I hope the second is better.

K: I haven't seen that.

R: If they are not close to a settlement this is going to make it difficult for the President - these meetings.

K: Let me see when I can get together with you. If they were totally deadlocked it won't be possible for the President to give some.

R: It is a tough one for him because Pompidou knows a great deal about it.

K: We thought we could get the changes in rate and leave the gold one open for Pompidou and the President.

R: Apparently the table along that line went over like a lead balloon. Whether that changed yesterday I don't know.

K: We had such a huge change in exchange rates.

R: That is right. I think we have lost something in negotiating position.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

- 2 -

I think we have to come up with something after the first of the year.

K: I think it is intolerable for us to wreck our whole alliance for 2 to 3 points in exchange rates. Your position with the President today. I wasn't at the meeting, but Haig was. I agreed with it.

R: I am not sure what John is talking about, "burden sharing." It is true the Germans should do more. And we can work out an agreement.

K: We have more barriers against the Europeans than they against us.

R: I know. This NATO meeting - I don't know what I am going to say. We are going to ask the Italians to make direct contribution.

K: We must stay away from that static contribution. If they are going to do more they should do it for their own forces. I thought Johnson's instructions were to stay off the burden-sharing on this trip.

R: He keeps coming to me - what do you want us to do? I say tell them build your own barracks and don't worry about us. That's contrary to what the President is saying.

K: Lots of luck on your speech.

R: Well, it is not a good speech.

K: Well, I think it a sensible speech.

We had such a!

That is right. I am.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Amb. Kennedy/Kissinger

5:12 p.m. 12/1/71

K: We have had difficulty getting together.

HAK: We sure have.

K: I found conven over here about conditions and our policies. The money
crises touched it off. The trade problem and other things are a constant concern
with people I have been talking with and absence of an ambassador at Brussels
and NATO is a cause.

HAK: We are waiting for your reply.

K: Looking it over thoroughly and along lines we have talked if the President
thinks I can be helpful I will do it. I would continue to keep my office in
Washington as we talked but will go to Brussels and other areas because the need
help on this. With the problems you have coming out I don't know what
problems are with Heads of State meetings. I imagine you are going ahead
with these issues.

HAK: President out of town. Let me talk with him tomorrow.

K: I think I would want a strong deputy there so he would have freedom
to be in Washington a good share of the time and keep in touch that way. A
special assignment on the present title I have and then I could follow through
on shoes and textiles on GAT. Talked with Schatezel today and he needs help
on the Common Market so I would want an understanding that he would have to
coordinate with me.

HAK: I will raise it with the President and I will talk take it up with Rogers. I
think it's alone the lines he had in mind.

K: It's how we talked. I will talk with him when I get back.

HAK: When?

K: Monday.

HAK: I will call you tomorrow to confirm conversation. Thank you and I am
delighted.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Stu Alsop/Kissinger
5:50 p.m. - 12/1/71

K: Stuart, I wonder whether you are free for dinner on Friday. The willowy blond is in town and I wondered whether you and your wife were free for dinner.

A: Gee, I would love to, Henry. Hold the line for just a minute. (Goes off for a minute) That would be lovely.

K: Good, well we will have to do at some restaurant. I will tell you where. You know, of course, what a dinner entitles me to.

A: What?

K: Well, a hell of a lot more than lunch. How are you and your brother getting on?

A: Good. He seems to have changed a bit.

K: Fine. I will call you tomorrow about time and place.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
TaftS chreiber
12/1/71 p.m.

S: I just wanted you to know I am in New York tomorrow and will be there for 10 days. I may have to come to Washington.

K: If you come down I want to see you. Where are you staying in New York?

S: At our apartment in the Sherry-Netherland.

K: I may come up on the 10th. Let's aim for that.

S: Okay, and we'll take you and your date out to dinner.

K: I am not absolutely sure I'll stay through dinner, but let's aim for the 10th.

TELECON
Secretary Laird

12/2/71 10:30 a.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: Over here at OMB they are going through a dance on the defense thing. There was a group: Wayne Smith, Tucker and Damm. It has been reviewed by the President. We would like to send you where this stands now. But I would like to send it as a personal letter from me. Then if you have any problems it isn't frozen in concrete by a Presidential letter. And then in any event let's have breakfast next week.

L: Why don't we do it right after I get back from the NATO meetings.

K: When are you going?

L: Monday.

K: Let me get this to you today. I think it's alll aboard.

L: Good.

K: The only things that might give you problems, the air defense and cutting back on volunteer force -- they are the only aspects which might give you some concern.

L: Would you get it over right away?

K: I think they are basically non-controversial.

L: But you are sending it over to me?

K: Yes, by early afternoon. They have a Presidential letter for you, but I am holding up on that. After you and I agree we'll write a Presidential letter together.

L: These include some of the add-ons too?

K: Yes, for the submarine speed-up.

L: Good.

K: I think you'll be pleased with it.

L: Okay, send it over. But we'll How are we coming on the NATO Ambassador? I hate to bug you, but they are giving me hell.

K: For your information, we are talking to Dr. David Kennedy -- I think he's going to accept it. All he wants is Cabinet rank and precedence over all the other cabinet members.

L: Okay. He'll be all right. No problem with Kennedy. That's fine, but I think it should be someone like Sprague, or someone just to get someone over there.

K: I supported him, but then someone objected.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird

12/2/71 10:30 a.m. p. 2

L: I think State raised hell. They want him out of that Ambassador-at-Large job. They want him out, or to get Schoetzsel (?) in.

K: Also, about the figure, there's a bookkeeping problem that I don't fully understand. They have $78.5 but it's over 80 billion in obligational authority.

L: That's an expenditure rate. Do they have a program rate in there?

K: Let me send all this over to you and talk again this afternoon.

L: And they would have the President make a statement on the volunteer service// that we would slip it.

K: Let me send it over.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Secy. Laird/Kissinger

10:34 a.m.

12/2/71

L: Make sure that's sent right to me.

K: Sent personally to you. HAnd carried. Let me ask Haig how quickly we
can have it over. 1:00.

L: I have all these various operational possibilities worked out that we talked about. Something may be tomorrow afternoon or Monday I should send them and let you see what's available.

K: Urgent because the President wants to do it. On two or three day basis.

L: 24, 48, 72. A lot of options. Should I recommend or would the President want to look over all of them?

K: Let us see all of them.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Henry Brandon/Kissinger

11:00 a.m.

12/2/71

B: I heard you tried to reach me last night.

K: I had a whole pile of documents to hand over to you but you're too late.

B: I would be glad to come at anytime.

K: Too late. Everything in life is timing and you missed it. Nancy is in town this weekend and also the van der Beugels and I wondered if you and Muffie would like to have dinner with us on Sunday.

B: I think so.

K: I hope Nancy feels guilty about being at your house so many times and not for other reasons.

B: I have to rely on Nancy to see you.

K: You see more of me then the Secy. of State.

B: You were right not to go last night.

K: Overseas? Was I?

B: Yes. Especially in retrospect. It was very mediocre and I thought it was ridiculous to make a small speech with questions afterwards at an anniversary dinner with everyone in a mood of relaxation rather then work. Also an unfortunate choice.

K: I can't claim credit for not going. I was asked to speak at the Business Council last night.

B: Lisagore said in his introduction that you passed Rogers in the State Department halls and said I must tell you about my China trip sometime.

K: That's brutal. He is insecure and you should not speak to him like that.

B: Poor taste. That's why it's good you didn't come.

K: It's too close to the end so this about who is or not is not for anyone's gain.

B: It's repititious.

K: It keeps coming up.

B: I hear on the economic question there was a new alliance between Kissinger and

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Brandon/Kissinger

11'00 a. m. 12/2/71

-2-

Rogers.

K: It's true. We are not brawling. Institutionally there are bureaucratic problems but not that kind of fight going on.

R: I wrote you a little note. Did you see it?

K: Not yet.

B: Also those clippings about the Mix Bismarck collection.

K: Let me call you about it. 7:30? I don't know what restaurants are open on Sunday night. I will determine it and call you. Is La Grande Scene open?
I will find out.

B: I have no idea.

K: I shall find out.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Jos. Alsop/Kissinger

11:08 a.m. 12/2/71

K: Your columns have improved to the degree that you cut me out of your
circle of sources.

A: I have missed you very much and I long to see you.

K: Nancy Maginnes will be in town this weekend and to my sorrow she has a
crush on both of the Alsop brothers. I have invited them to dinner tomorrow
and wondered if you would like to come too. I will call tomorrow about the time
and place. What do you recommend?

A: No preferences.

K: Let me find one that's quiet. I will call about 8:00 tomorrow morning.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

11:21 a.m.

12/2/71

K: On the Connally devaluation business no one here knew it was going to be floated out there. I want to bring you up to date. We had a meeting here before he left and he fought against even mentioning it in internal discussions. He should indicate a willingness for realignment. He should reserve right for devaluation before meeting with Pompidou. We don't know what to say to the press.

R: Freezing money markets all over.

K: Connally said in the EOB that be sure the President won't consider it after the meeting because Burns will leak it.

R: We will see progress being made. Nothing else to say.

K: We will say the same thing.

R: It is the only way to play it. I talked with Connally and said this is how I feel. Can't talk with anybody. I said business leaders feel the same way.

K: Just mention the business community. This is only deal that seems possible and he accused me of orchestrating my approach to you, which isn't true.

R: We got the cat out of the bag. The other ministers were speechless.

K: To go to 10%.

R: 5-6 was what I had in mind.

K: That's right. It's a new ball game.

R: We will have a settlement now. Can't avoid it.

K: One other thing. I was invited to the Overseas Writers thing and I turned it down because I had to speak before the Business Council. I didn't know that you were going to speak.

R: It's a dull speech but answering questions after was fun. Sitting in on the meeting with Golda?

K: No. They will be alone.

R: If someone sits in, for cosmetics it's better if Al does.

K: OK but the intention is that they will meet alone.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Raza/Kissinger

12:18 p. m.

12/2/71

R: I just got finished talking and I got a letter from the President of Pakistan. I would like to come and bring it to you.

K: I am tied up until 2:30.

R: Could we make it a time that suits you? Kindly convey the following message from the President to President Nixon.

K: Could you come at 2:30 for 10 mins? I have the Isreali PM coming in so if I am called to the President you may have to speak with Haig.

R: I will be there at 2:30.

K: You will be pleased to know that the President has announced cut off.

R: I haven't presented credentials so I don't know if I can see him.

K: Today is impossible. We are XXXXX moving.

R: The President wants to take further actions.

K: He should wait until we have completed ours.

R: "I am therefore seriously considering to make an approach to you for a final attempt ? ? ? a catastrophe." I will be there 5 minutes before 2:30.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Secy. Connally/Kissinger
2:45 p. m. 12/2/71

K: I called you in the Azores in order to know how to position Zeigler on stories on devaluation. We just no commented it.

C: I talked with George Shutlz about it.

K: By that time -- I haven't gotten to George yet. I think everything under control here.

C: I said we should simply say a very frank and candid discussion. No offers or decisions made but to get it into a meaningful discussion we had to get it in percentage and ?? on realignment. ?? on country.

K: That makes good sense to me. That is the line we will stick to and you will be back soon.

C: In addition if anything else said there is one important matter that came from the meeting that they are committed to proceed immediately for negotiations on freight letters (?) and burden sharing and will want to talk to you tomorrow about it.

K: We will not comment further until you get back. Look forward to seeing you.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

3:09 p.m. 12/2/71

K: I caught the President before he fell into the clutches of the lady. He under stands doing it tomorrow but feels strongly that it must be done. He told Mrs. Gandhi. He said I will send a written order. I said not disagreement in principle. You did what I transmitted. Did not do less then told.

R: Our first choice was the other way too.

K: He knows. If anyone is in trouble it's not you. Why don't we proceed for noon briefing tomorrow?

R: I don't think we need to give more notification.

K: We will do just have Keating bleeding over you.

R: Tell the fellow here. I will touch base with him tomorrow.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Jos. Alsop/Kissinger
5:30 p. m. 12/2/7'

A: About all these festivities.

K: Which?

A: For my beloved two yards of woman, whom I adore. Would you like to come here and have Stu and Tish to come here and then out to dinner? We can have a little hor-d'oeuvres. Also Tom Johnson -- Bobby Kennedy's one really able guy. He is really going to come along. He is with Jock Whitney's firm. He and he charming French wife are coming down and we are having a Kennedy type blast. Would you and Nancy --

K: I am having a party for my staff. It will go on?

A: Dinner at 8:00 and black tie.

K: Can we come by, informal? We will come around 10:30 or 11:00. What time tomorrow night? 7:30, 8:00?

A: f&x 7:30. We bax will have a cracker and drink and then go on wherever you choose.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger
9:05 a.m. 12/3/71

K: You have the best secretary employed. She gets me on the phone first every time

S: Have you seen the reports?

K: On the west?

S: Yes. The secretary is on his way in and we will review it. You will probably want a WSAG in a few hours.

K: Schedule now for 11:00.

S: We don't know if reports are accurate. It's obviously the beginning of more serious action in the West. We have a strong public statement on cut off and reply to Yahya. My instinct is that we should go to the Paks and be more direct. We need to get it in the UN.

K: I am for it.

S: We have looked at this and let's get it in.

K: We could take it there ourselves.

S: That's the point. And one interesting feature about this. We are the only major power who can play the Tashkent role. Russians cannot because of Pakistanis.

K: My view now -- have you got a statement?

S: Secretary has not seen and on his way in.

K: Will be released at noon?

S: Yes.

K: It's the President's decision. Either here or in Key Biscayne. We want you to do it.

S: I think it's just as well.

K: Can you send a copy over here?

S: It's being typed clean and send to you with understanding it's not been seen by the Secretary.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger
9:15 a.m. - 12/3/71

S: Since you and I talked the President has conveyed some other ideas but I am not quite clear.

K: Well, there are two options. One is the long statement and the other on background. But you think we should do the whole thing?

S: Well, I want to look over the situation. My instinct is to look it over and do the statement...

K: Well, that is my order. The other is just for a contingency basis.

S: If the thing is to be broadened out, we should have a broad overall statement, but let me...

K: But we will go at 12 in any event.

S: One way or the other. But we can move rapidly enough if there is to be some kind of announcement that we are calling the Council this date.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

10:15 a.m. - 12/3/71

R: Henry, I think in view of the developments in India and Pakistan, we ought to seriously consider delaying this thing until this afternoon or, in any event, we got to change the statement because it is out of date in view of what's happened. Have you been in touch with the Pakistanis at all?

K: Today, no. Yesterday they brought that letter, but that was just a minute.

R: Well, as you know - you have probably been briefed this morning - it has deteriorated very quickly and it looks as if there is military activity in the West. The Paks say there is a good deal of ground fighting in the West.

K: I think we have no choice whether we should make the long statement or not. I had my own doubts about that this morning, but I don't see how we can cut out the military part.

R: We can't talk about it in view of yesterday's news, it has to be done in view of today's news. It is getting to the point where none of these things have much significance because it is deteriorating so fast. I think we have to decide whether we want to talk to the Paks regarding the Security Council or . . .

K: I think if these actions in the West are confirmed we might as well pass off the parts . . .

R: We don't have to take a ______, but I think we ought to take it to the UN simply because the Soviets don't want to.

K: We ought to wait until the afternoon hours after the reports are confirmed.

R: Let's do this. Hold up the announcement on the cutoff of the pipeline until 4:00.

K: I don't know if I can agree with that. I don't see where one is related to the other.

R: Well, if it is any source of embarrassment to you. . .

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELCOM
Amb. Raza/Kissinger
10:23 px a. m. 12/3/71

K: Do you have any information about all these reports of action in the west?

R: None whatsoever. I sent a telegram this morning saying this is what's
appearing here. What do you say? There are so many lies on both sides,
one cannot say. Just now a man brought a ticker -- India attacking positions
along W. Pakistan border but denied in India. Could I see you, sir?

K: Yes. I will see you during the day. The other thing I want to say is it's
our view the issues should go to the Security Council. If you don't ____.

R: Personally I think so. It cannot go on like this. Fairly good article
in the Economist of 3 Dec. "India Across the Line."

K: This is what we are planning to do.

R: I will send a telegram. May I use your channel?

K: Certainly. You will get official information but I wanted you to know.

R: Will you call me during the day?

K: Yes.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. - 12/3/71

R: Hello.

K: Hello, Bill. I just talked to the President. He is agreeable to the Security Council thing as soon as we get all the facts in. He is absolutely adamant about getting a statement out at noon. He is raising cain again. I am getting the hell. He wants it to tilt towards Pakistan. He doesn't want it to be __?__ (Laughter). I agree with you, and I told the President that, that we should not go into the long history. We should save that for the UN, but I think we should put out the statement at noon.

R: I am in favor of that. I just hesitate putting out a statement con-
demning India.

K: No, no. I agree with you that we should not put out the long statement at noon, but I think we should put out some of these facts in the background pages.

R: The facts we are speaking about are old hat as far as the news is concerned so a review statement to the press is like water off a duck's back.

K: I told the President that the argument the people will give is it's like Finland attacking Russia; that they were provoked into it and didn't have any choice.

R: The question is: Should we take a judicial role ourselves and decide who is guilty? I think it would be better placed in the Security Council.

K: What I recommend, Bill, if you agree, is that the gist of what we had in that statement be used.

R: I would say something like this: In view of the deteriorating situation in the area, we are cutting off all military shipments to India now. If this develops any interest on the part of the press then when Bush goes to the Security Council he can outline the steps about Pakistan.

K: That is correct. We should do it on that basis. Another thing the President said is that we are considering cutting off economic aid.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Raza/Kissinger

11:04 a. m.

12/3/71

R: Just now the ticker has come from radio Pakistan. Says India armed forces attacked Pakistan along the --

K: I saw this.

R: Also India ____ over. Tried to show world the Bengla Desh problem but no ____.

K: We are almost certain to take it to the Security Council.

R: Rogers has called for me at 2:30.

K: How about after Rogers.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

11:10 a.m.

12/3/71

P: I wondered if you thought I should give Bill a call on India thing and tell him. Is he on salvo now?

K: They are now. Putting out statement.

P: Have you raised Kennedy with him yet?

K: No. I was going to raise it after noon-day briefing out of way.

P: I will call him now and say I would like to try the Kennedy thing.

K: He will bleed all over you on India and my concern is that he will issue statements to the Dept. saying they came from you.

P: He is putting out instructions. When does he leave for Europe?

K: Tomorrow.

P: I could nominate him and he could go to the meetings.

K: If we could have moved two weeks ago.

P: I moved.

K: Every instruction took 4 days to be implemented. You were way ahead of all of us.

P: He knows I have a cold down here.

K: He is not unhappy.

P: If I call he will raise the questions.

K: And then interpret the answers as he wants.

P: On Kennedy thing, say the President has a brilliant idea. He has an assignment and play a line on economic side. We will say that to him. I won't call him.

K: That's better.

P: On India, is there anything else we can do? Going to announce taking it to Security Council?

K: Waiting for a few more facts but this afternoon we will announce it. We have to get a tough speech on Pakistan there.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

11:10 a.m.

12/3/71

-2-

P: Let him make announcement. Will Bush say what we want?

K: That's it. He will say what we want.

P: Nothing new on the Cambodian front?

K: No that's not one of those --

P: Not as critical.

K: You remember last year when I had to brief a group of Senators? In Dec. and January they begin their operations. Cambodians are over extended there like last year.

P: Like Laos -- back and forth.

K: That general in 3rd Corps area is no good.

P: Tell them to get off their ass. It's important to keep pressure on these people.

K: I will get Moorer after this meeting.

P: We are throwing bombs in there. Moorer will have more than patch work crap on this strike.

K: Have a session with him and Packard. Laird away next week.

P: Congress might get out end of next week. I doubt it but certainly by Thurs. of the following week. We want to go after that and whip them. In addition, to passes, their air field's

K: The trouble with air fields you blow them up and two weeks later they are in action. I would rear up supply dumps in southern panhandle. And Doung Ho and Vinh.

P: Johnson hit it.

K: We haven't.

P: Knock the hell out of it. They may think we will bomb again.

K: A whole days strike just for airfields.

P: I see your point. We will look at that. Moorer working on it himself? We can depend on him?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Amb. Ushiba/Kissinger
11:59 p. a. m. 12/3/71

U: Can you do me a great favor and spare just about 15 minutes for Mr. Kasuga?

K: The trouble is this India-Pakistan question.

U: It's a very troubled situation. But he cancelled all appoints in NY to see you today.

K: I will see him then.

U: It's a great favor. We are in great difficulty.

K: 4:00?

U: I will tell him that. I will confirm with your secretary.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCOM

Connally/ Kissinger

12:20 p.m. - 12/3/71

K: John, how are you?

C: Well, I'm fine, Henry. How are you?

K: With the Washington Post writing favorably about you, I am beginning to worry.

C: I don't know who it is, but I am going to find out. Where are you? Are you in town?

K: Yes, I am in my office.

C: Well, I just thought if you weren't otherwise engaged for lunch, I would buy you a lunch.

K: I am tied up for lunch today. We have a tentative date for Monday. Is that OK?

C: What time?

K: Anytime. One o'clock?

C: Fine. You want me to come over? I understand we are having a Quadrad meeting Monday.

K: Yes, have you heard they are filming "A Day in the Life of the President" and I tell you every public relations hotshot in this building has a bright idea. I am trying to get the two minutes that they gave to the dog. Say, it seems to me George Shultz is having 500 heart attacks because of the gold thing.

C: What about?

K: I don't think they taught him in his economic courses that you should raise the price of gold.

C: I am sure he is having heart attacks over raising the price of gold. We did discuss the possibility. We talked about the French and devaluing the dollar in terms of the price of gold the same way the French will revalue the franc in terms of the price of gold. We want to be fair. We want to meet people half way.

By.

NARA, Dalo 5/26

2

K: So, will it be necessary for the President to get into it with Pompidou?

C: Hell, yes. Henry, I have got to come and talk to you. Rogers is leaving tomorrow to go to NATO. I have got to somehow get Bill briefed and I guess the best way is to get the President to talk to Bill.

K: The President is in Key Biscayne.

C: I know. He would have to do it on the phone.

K: Well, what do you want Bill to know.

C: I want Bill to hold firm. We had four hours on trade and we have to keep them down. Tom Barber made himself look silly saying he didn't realize this was a matter under discussion. He didn't think this was a matter of serious concern. I said we have been trying to tell him that for three-and-a-half months. You can be sure there is not going to be a solution to the problem until something is done. You can be sure there will never be an Administration requesting changing the price of gold unless it is accompanied by trade matter changes on the measure. The net of it was we can't do it here. So I said, Let's bring in Barr and the agricultural experts. We had Eberly who talked to the Germans, French, etc. He called the British and they politely said no. The French said no. We read that off in the meeting. This went on for four hours. We had a real rough one stirring on this. You aks us to take you on, to have faith in you when you have done nothing for three months. We got Barr in there and told him to get negotiations going immediately. So Eberly is going back there Monday with agricultural people. The thing we have to realize is that we are not going to get the alignment we could.

K: I don't think we are going to get any alignment unless we change the price of gold.

C: My judgment is that if we ______ to give on the price of gold what do we get. Not a goddamn thing. The only thing I can get are some stuff on burden sharing. The Germans told me we could get something on trade, and specifically the following:

1. An agreement on grain storage for this year and next. This is enormous in the farm belt.

2. An agreement on pricing - agricultural pricing. Maybe even a declaration on farm pricing.

3

K: That I don't think we can get.

C: Well,

3. We can get something on the tobacco tax to stay where it is.

4. And something on citrus.

That is one of the things that have a political impact in this country. When you start talking about grain, citrus and tobacco, the President can claim a major victory. What we have to do on every front is insist. We do have to have help. The Germans volunteered the position with respect to the Smith-Laird agreement to have a $6 million budget. That is what every secretary wants. That's what McNamara wanted.

K: Well, it sounds as if you really got things moving in the matter. It was the maximum you could achieve, but the problem is if we don't pursue it. . .

C: Do you want me to drop by there this afternoon?

K: Yes, or I could drop by there.

C: There is a Cost of Living Council meeting which I am not sure I will make. How about 4:00?

K: I have a 4:00 meeting.

C: How about 4:30?

K: Good, I will come by.

price of a

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

12:40 p. m.

12/3/71

K: I haven't hear you bleeding on the defense budget.

L: I will have something for you Tuesday. Not a major thing. On RAD we could make some changes.

K: Not change the figure.

L: 79 instead of 78.5. And what sorties do.

K: Who's a taking it out?

L: It's in the direction.

K: How did that slip by me?

L: It brings it to lower level but it means a lower capability during rainy weather. That's what BOB wants.

K: I will look at that.

L: Send it Tues. or Wed. Memo to you or President?

K: Me or President. Do it to the President.

L: I will not reference your memo. On basis of these tentative --

K: You can so we know what we are talking about.

L: No one here seeing that memo.

K: You will not issue guidance in interval that will pre-empt decisions?

L: No. Our guidance is that we are working on 79.7. I will have to cut back.

K: Shultz bugging me to meet with you. You will go ahead otherwise unilaterally.

L: Nothing until I hear from you on this. Otherwise I will have to reduce it which I don't want to do now.

K: Forces included in memo.

L: On CIA deputy direction who should I work on it.

K: Dick Walters.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

12:40 p. m. 12/3/71

L: They are coming in with recommendations. We want this to go through.
It requires promotion of other star.

K: That's what we want.

L: Never told to do it.

K: That's right. Want him there another month or so.

L: Start feeler going on his replacement. Nothing else. No actions taken until I hear from you. Memo delivered to you Tues. or Wed.

K: You will be in Europe.

L: I am working on it this weekend. I appreciate your support.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger
12:46 p. m. 12/3/71

K: One other thing. The President's mind is perulating. He offered some weeks ago the NATO job to Kennedy. He has accepted it. With some condition. One is that he can come to Heads of State meeting. I see no problem on that.

R: All or just NATO countries?

K: He says all but I don't see how he can go to Sato.

R: Oh, I mean Russia and China.

K: No. Also attend NSC meetings and status and ? ? ? ? . And economic ambassadors will keep him informed of his activities. If you agree with this, why don't you tell him.

R: I will do it. Tell Kennedy.

K: The President talked to you. Do you want to do that? I have discussed conditions with him and the President agreement to it. Call to you will be for between 9:00 and 10:00 our time.

R: I am hesitant about whether he should go with this (war?). Mrs. Ghandi making an address at 1:30. I guess she will declare war.

K: She will recognize Bengla Desh and Pakistan will declare war. India has declared state of emergency. That doesn't say much. Moorer is ov the fiew that inx inprobably that Pakistan will attack because these are minor airfields.

R: Only one military. The others are commercial.

K: I don't understand why they will attack those airfields. Maybe a knee-jerk.

R: I think going to the Security Council is best thing. If its not up there we will have to do something. I will call Kennedy. Has a good second man over there and xxx can rely on him.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
President/Kissinger

2:45 p.m - 12/3/71

P: Henry, I noticed as I was reading the news summary that one of the networks used Church's name in which he charged that the Administration did not even have a word of sympathy for the refugees in Pakistan. Did you see it?

K: I saw it and it is an outrage.

P: What has been done about it?

K: I have Scali in here now. Haig is talking to him to push out some of these figures.

P: Why hasn't it been done before. I assumed we put it out 100 times before.

K: The news wouldn't carry it.

P: Somebody ought to take him on directly. State ought to directly by name say the Senator is incorrect and if State doesn't want to then somebody from the White House will have to do it or somebody in the Senate. He knows better because he is very much up on it. We appropriated the money. They try to create the impression we are not doing a thing. What about the rest of the stuff?

K: It was announced today at noon that we cut military shipments. We have now made an analysis of the Pakistan-India border and it looks like the Indians are making the attacks rather than the Pakistanis. The airfields are being attacked very close to the border. What is more likely is that the Indians started ground action in this area. They didn't attack supply bases right behind them.

P: Yes.

K: But we will know more about that in another 10 - 12 hours or so. Mrs. Gandhi has given a speech putting her country on a war footing. of whites

P: Well, she says she is not going to be threatened by a country/3 or 4 hundred thousand miles away. Well, she didn't object to the color of our money.

K: And when she said the Pakistanis had to leave East Pakistan. That is an unbelievable demand.

BY NARA, Dalo 5/26

P: Well, I guess there is not much we can do. I hope the State people will take the defensive on this. The Russians are not jumping to their defense.

K: Well, I think they are on their side.

P: Yes, but they are going gingerly on it. They are a little bit loose.

K: Oh, I talked to Bill about Kennedy. He is delighted. He is going ahead on it.

P: He says it is a good move.

K: Incidentally Bill has put off his departure on Tuesday.

P: Good, then we will have him in on that meeting. Have him come in personally for that Day in the White House film.

K: Yes, I think that was part of his reason for delaying.

P: The only other thing I noted in the summary which shows how the networks play it is with CBS who said U. S. casualties had . . .

K: I noticed the same thing.

P: I looked and said what the hell are they talking about. It was the most distorted I have ever seen in terms of the media. There is just no honesty in those people. "Sharply increased" - that leaves an impression. The people don't know numbers at all.

K: That's right. They can say it is a 40% increase. I had a good talk with Connally. I am seeing him at 4:30.

P: I know. He told me. Well, they aren't getting much. They will have a hard time.

K: Well, I think you ought to get it settled and I think you will.

P: On the Cambodia thing, the one thing is not to let them blow this into a big thing.

K: I talked to Moorer. He said the South Vietnamese action is going very well.

P: Good. Maybe they can take some pressure off of . . .

By. NARA, Date 5/26

3

K: Well, that's going to happen. He said they are doing it.

P: Let's get on this refugee story. Attack Church. Don't take a positive stand. Someone has got to go out and attack Church for a totally irresponsible statement. Say what we said and what we did. The Senator <u>knew</u> it when he said it. Get a hold of Haldeman or somebody.

P: I will get that done immediately Mr. President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Sisco/Kissinger
2:56 p.m. 12/3/71

S: Just to keep in step. At 3:30 we will see the Pakistan. What I will do at the meeting is make pitch to him. Show him resolution that was in attached paper to show him what we have in mind. In NY we have had a report from George because there's conven over Ghandi's statement. French and ____ are ready. Belgians ready. The Sierra Leone guy has asked for a meeting with George at 5:30. After we have talked with the Pakistanis and no difficulty --

K: The President is on the other line.

S: Call me back.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

2:58 p. m.

12/3/71

P: Be sure to call Kennedy before Rogers calls saying all conditions met and expect a call from Rogers and want to do it as quickly as possible so he can go to meetings. He will want to know he appointed him. It will have to go through State. All conditions are met. Confirm it anyway.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Sisco/Kissinger
3:00 p.m. - 12/3/71

S: Henry, in other words what I was trying to say is given the present circumstances, there is a good possibility we can get others to join. You agree we should take the lead and get as many others as we can to join in the recourse to the Security Council?

K: When? When is this going to be done?

S: The Secretary will talk to the Paks at 3:30. We will send you a press announcement for clearance shortly after that. Then consult with Bush with a view to getting a meeting tomorrow.

K: Yes, but I want it clearly understood. I am getting calls every 15 minutes. The President wants us to tilt towards Pakistan and I don't want any more of this handwriting or we will move every brief on the record to the White House.

S: In your next conversation with the Secretary tell him that. I am sure he knows that but I think you should emphasize it again. I will have him call you after the Pakistani meeting.

K: I don't want to see any press release before we have cleared it here. We don't have to shoot from the hip. We could wait until 6 o'clock.

S: No, there is no problem in that regard at all. Did you get that other business I sent you.

K: What was that?

S: I sent you that other piece of paper.

K: Well, I didn't get a chance to go through all my papers.

S: Well, alert your girl to call it to your attention. That is a very special piece of paper.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

3:10 p.m., December 3, 1971

K: I have those things-- the instruction. The President has been raging about the comment that Church made yesterday that we haven't done enough for the refugees. He wants State to take Church on by name and say it is totally incorrect, put out the facts, and say in light of these facts it is even more incomprehensible.

S: Let me put something together on that.

K: He has called twice.

S: I need 10 more minutes for the Security Council thing.

K: Don't shoot too fast on that. We can do it tonight or in the morning.

S: The Secretary will call you in an hour. If there are objections we will have to review it again.

K: Okay.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

3:45 p.m.

12/3/71

R: On Pakistan Ambassaodr. Has no instructions but thought a good idea.
Communications slow from here to his government so working out an arrange-
ment for him to send through our channels. He feels sure they will not oppose.
They feel same thing in UN.

K: I think we should wait until we here from them. We can wait until tomorrow morning.

R: There's a lot of criticism on why we don't do something. Ambassador had
a press conference today and a lot of press critizing us for not taking action.
Otherwise if we don't do it someone else will.

K: As soon as we hear from the. If we can get an answer tonight, sure.

R: Sooner we have the monkey off our back so the President can say he has
acted.

K: The President does want to act. Wants to take a line to condemn the Indians.

R: It's not a matter of condenming or blaming. It's trying to stop it. If we
blame India a general war will break out.

K: In the subcontinent.

R: We are short-sighted if we think our general approach is castigating India.
It's to bring a ceasefire.

K: And withdrawal.

R: If we say let's condemn India, what does that do? We are trying to bring
about ceasefire.

K: That's what we want to do but not what you get in order to get that we have
to make clear who started action.

R: That's in the Security Council. If we don't take lead for security council
in action then first we have lost the opportunity because someone else will
and no advantage for railing against India now if we have Security Council -

K: I mean before the Security Council.

R: Right.

K: I think we should get the Security Council in a way that's not offensive to
Pakistan if it can be done. So what if the Belgians go to the Security Council?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

3:45 p.m.

12/3/71

R: The President said don't let them blame me and people will. Church saying we are not doing a thing.

K: We should hit back.

R: How can we?

K: We have done a lot. Neglect India on refugee thing. He will hit at us no matter what we do.

R: If war breaks out and we do not move quickly to bring it to the Security Council in conjunction with others, the President will be blamed for inaction.

K: As soon as we know they don't object.

R: This fellow doesn't and getting in touch with ambassador in NY who has been in touch with his government. I don't think we should wait until tomorrow.

K: Let's talk again in a couple of hours.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger

4:10 p.m. - 12/3/71

S: The Secretary asked me to call you. He is prepared to take on Church. We provided him with that material that the White House provided for us. But what he has in mind is that he would make an announcement on going to the Security Council all at one time. He has talked to the Pakistani. The Pak here has reacted positively, but he is having difficulty in terms of communications so he had us, on his behalf, send a flash telegram saying he thinks it is a good idea.

K: Has he given you a text of the telegram to send?

S: No. He asked us to communicate to Islamabad on his behalf. To send his view that he thinks it is a good idea and have Farland take it up with the Foreign Secretary.

K: Has it been sent?

S: Yes, the Secretary has sent a flash to Islamabad now. He (the Pak) is also putting together a cable of his own and he is going to want that sent through our channels.

K: All we want to be sure of is that the Pak Government doesn't find it embarrassing.

S: So there we are. We got Farland out of bed and that's it.

K: Good. Thank you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Amb. Kennedy/Kissinger

4:55 p.m. - 12/3/71

HAK: David, I talked to the President and he is delighted that you will accept it on the conditions which you outlined. They are all agreed to.

K: They are really not conditions.

HAK: No, I didn't put it that way. I said there were some requirements you thought were necessary to do an effective job. Now you will hear from Rogers just to make it formal.

K: Fine. I will be in on Sunday night and will check in on Monday.

HAK: The President is delighted and you are to come to the meeting. There is a slight question whether it is necessary for the Sato one?

K: Yes it is.

HAK: Just in the context of your new job. At any rate, the other three are easy. All the other requirements we will meet.

K: Very good and I look forward to it and I will see you on Monday.

TELCON
Cong. Passman/Kissinger

5:05 p.m.

12/3/71

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

K: I was just talking with the President and we are trying to figure out in regard to the aggression that India is carrying out how much aid. Bureaucracy says $10 billion over years. President says until he gets your figures he won't believe it.

P: Wait a minute. (turns away from the phoen to ask for information). I am yelling at my staff and I have a terrific staff. Do you yell at your staff?

K: Onee or twice.

P: What I should give you is actual disbursement 1946-1971. The net to India has been 8 billion, 3 million, 600 thousand. There's a little more to be added. 16 billion dollars in ? ? ? ?. That covers classified aid such as military. In the 16 billion in all probably a half billion goes to India and aid to simple ? ? ? ? which goes with military and now in world-wide region. We stick with this figure of 8.3 billion dollars. That's a certified figure.

K: I appreciate this. Incidentally, the President says if any of his friends in Congress blast on why we give India so much aid I will not cry.

P: I spent 40 minutes today sweeping down amendment that we would immediately cease giving aid to India until they withdraw drax troops from border. I said you are trying to write policy like Fulbright. I said no. Their PM was here a few weeks ago and we don't know how who is at fault.

K: We don't mind some criticism of India.

P: But not in official reports. We are a money committee. I think Fulbright is a fool.

K: He is not one of my best friends.

P: I call him "Half-bright." I have tried to protect your people today. I feel like a groom at a shot gun wedding with a pregnant bride he has never seen.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Connally/Kissinger

5:20 p.m.

12/3/71

K: Wanted you to know we will set up meeting with Canadians like you want it. I don't think you want to be part of a mass meeting. Why don't we have Benson come to your office?

C: Unless they think by our absence that monetary items are not of concern.

K: We will say military matters are your concern and not on their agenda.

C: They will probably also discuss trade. Trezise, Scott and Petty have gone. They have conducted all trade negotiations.

K: Say economic areas discussed by you and Benson. They will discuss bilateral goodwill. In your office?

C: That's fine.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

5:55 p.m. 12/3/71

K: I am sorry to keep bothering you.

P: I want to keep posted on it.

K: I want to talk about tactics on Security Council issue. Plan now from State is
Rogers go to NY and make production out of it. It puts us in a front of
issue.

P: Feel necessary.

K: And look important.

P: That's the point we make. We must lost on one issue and however we slice
this we will try and loose.

K: We will get into a brawl with the Russians and better to let the Chinese and
Russians get at it.

P: And maybe the Chinese too.

K: It's good for Bush to take it to the Security Council. But let Bush handle it.
But for the Secretary to go into the forefront of arguement we will look

P: Dulles didn't. He let Lodge do it.

K: Dulles went up in the M.E. crises of '56. But that was a first class war.

P: That was different. When he went it was something he could do to effect the
outcome. We are not sure we can do something. You have to be subtle. It's
a good idea but you are a big one and we don't want you committed on prestige
at this point. Let the Russians and Chinese get into it. Why does he want to go?

K: Because of the publicity and the NYTimes says we should go to the Security
Council.

P: We are going.

K: It's a two-day headline after which they will say we failed. I don't mind
using the Security Council to make our case but we should use another country.
If he is up there and Sisco, all hell will break loose.

P: What can we do?

K: Tell him it should be done in lower key way.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

P: Can he be persuaded or do I have to call him?

K: I have Haig call Ted Eliot and say you don't want high level --

P: No, that's not the way. Say I don't want his prestige committed at the outset. I would rather see how the others play it. Hold out possibility. Don't you think that's better.

K: It might be. It could be.

P: I don't mean we don't want to do it at all. You want to say we want it handled by Bush.

K: A low key statement at State saying Bush ask for Security Council meeting. Not Rogers going on TV and say we have asked for it in Secutiy Council. Then it's our responsibility.

P: Without knowing what we can produce.

K: It gets us imbroiled with everybody.

P: Can to talk with Rogers and Sisco?

K: I have been talking but you know how he is with the bit in his teeth. We haven't got Pakistan's response yet.

P: I see, that's why. He knows we don't have a response.

K: It's messy. They have sent a message to Pakistan we will have to straighten out. It's hard to run a crisis this way. It's dangerous.

P: They __________ one out.

K: Told the Pakistan government their xh ambassador here fully endorses idea which is untrue because he wants to ask for instructions.

P: Do it in a way where he wouldn't have to be involved.

K: Best thing is to have Haig transmit a lowkey message to Eliot.

P: They have it down -- what excuse do you give.

K: Not engage the Secy's prestige at this time.

P: Beginning -- at this point when we have no assurances that it will be effective.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

5:55 p.m.

12/3/71

At this point I would rather have Bush to take the handle. Let us see how Russians and Chinese dialogue comes out. He should say that. His people should tell him that. It's like losing the Taiwan thing. They don't blame Rogers, they blame me.

K: And Taiwan thing was presented so hyper that defeat was -- same syndrome. His people are trying to further the Dept.

P: Bush is their man.

K: We don't want the WH involved.

P: That's my point. Let him do TV here.

K: He is willing here but once he goes on TV there's such a huge affair. It's a huge domestic problem and we will fall on our face again. On something that ? ? ? ? .

P: A hell of a lot of people who don't give a damn in India and Pakistan. I don't want to hypo it that much. His prestige should not be committed and let Bush raise the issue and he will discuss it Monday.

K: That's the way to do it.

P: They can do it tomorrow, can't they?

K: They can. But just call Council in NY. It's a good news story and State Dept. aware.

P: I want to stay out of it today.

K: You shouldn't have to.

P: I will be gone in a few minutes.

K: Haig can do it.

P: But not blunt way so it looks like we are overriding them.

K: I talked with Passman and figures I have are right. 10 billion. He was so flattered to be asked. And I talked with Kennedy and he is delighted and he said he would here from Rogers. He will be back Monday.

P: Where?

K: He is in Europe now.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-4-

P: He should stay and go to the meetings with Rogers.

K: He wanted to come home.

P: See if Rogers wants him there. Can you talk with Rogers today about that?

K: That's easy. No problem.

P: Work that out. Let him call Kennedy and tell him to stay there for the meetings.

K: Unless we haven't announced it.

P: We can announce him as Ambassador-designate. Has Rogers raised point with you about going to NY?

K: Ted Eliot mentioned it to Haig.

P: Fine. I thought that he liked the idea of going to Security Council and State should follow up but don't want Secy to use his prestige at this point and should be done at Bush level. Don't want to get into Russian/Chinese thing. And don't want to huff and puff and blow away.

By. NARA, Dato

5/20

TELCOM

Amb. Raza/Mr. Kissinger

7:00 p.m., December 3, 1971

K: Are you and I going to write a book on the bureaucracy together? Get that cable -- I was asking General Haig who is sitting here with me. Will you call us before -- if you get an answer, call us before you call my colleagues.

R: I don't understand.

K: When you get an answer from Islamabad, before you call Sisco call us.

R: ......

K: That's probably true.

R: And he said that he never said that.

K: Hold on a second and I will read it to you. I hope you understand that I'm not dragging my feet. We just want to do what your President wants. The minute you give us the word, we will go to the Security Council. Have you talked to ________?

R: Yes, he has instructions not to move yet. There are other activities going on and must take orders from the Government.

K: Think it is a good idea -- by tomorrow it will be more clear. I think it is the Indians doing the attacking.

R: No doubt in my mind.

K: At 4:30 in the afternoon attacking the airfield ...

R: That I am convinced in my mind.

K: I can't find it (the cable) right now in this mess of an operation I'm running. I will read you the text tomorrow.

R: I said to him very clearly and he said he never said that.

K: I will read you the text as soon as I can find it.

R: CBS said something tonight that was most interesting which I protested. Marvin Kalb went on and said that Secretary Rogers had summoned Ambassador Raza of the Pakistan Embassy and asked that Pakistan ........................ especially with brains built in the U.S.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Raza/Mr. Kissinger

7:00 p.m., December 3, 1971 -- page 2

K: You ought to call Sisco.

R: I did and he said he had never seen the man's face. He was going to find out who said this. We never talked about planes or

K: You never hear stories like this coming out of here.

R: I know that.

K: You make sure I have every scrap of information that you pass on to the State Department.

R: All right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
late afternoon 12/3/71

P: Any late developments?

K: It's more and more certain it's India attacking and not Pakistan. We cut off other military supplies. Secy. wants to go to Security Council and go on TV. I say we can go just as soon as Pakistan says it's all right with them. We are sending a message through our channels to speed it up. I don't think we should rush until we see what they want. And tell the Chinese it's done with Pakistan's concurrence.

P: Why stick our nose in unless they want us.

K: The right way to do it is low key way and call a Security Council meeting.

P: If Rogers goes on TV it's not going to be a plague on both your houses. He understands?

K: I hope so.

P: He knows. They have the same facts we have. Don't they know India--
Everyone knows Pakistan not attacking India.

K: Attacks took place at 5:45 when dusk falling. Three commercial airfields. The other attack at ______. Pakistan could not do it in 15 minutes. Pakistan must be jumpted off and India persuaded. ? ? ? ? You can't follow us and other side has 5 hours on alert. That's what Moorer said.

P: They would do it at dawn to surprise them.

K: And keep up attacks.

P: It's a tragedy the Indians are so treacherous. Her attitude -- not that it is this our attitude but to put it on an anti-colored attitude. How much help is she getting from colored people?

K: We should stop cutting economic aid now. $90 million of letters of credit unsigned.

P: Put a stop order on them. They must be signed by me. I think we should go slow on giving visas to Americans going there. American businessmen and others.

K: Right.

P: Tell them to slow down. We don't want to have to evacuate some jerks and businessmen trying to make investments. What else?

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

President/Kissinger
later afternoon 12/3/71

-2-

K: Administratively the ______ is cut aid next year.

P: That would have to be done in Congress.

Kix K: ? ? ? ? ?

P: I see. Get Hannah busy and let it leak. We told her if they went in it would be tough.

K: Scott made a speech and Morse and Frelinghuysen already said something.

P: He was pro-Indian but an honest man.

K: He turned around.

P: How about your other projects. Kennedy thing on track?

K: Yes.

P: Rogers could see that one. It's basically fine. Is it better for Kennedy?

K: Gives him something regular to do.

P: Use him from there. Had your meeting with Connally?

K: Going in a few minutes. Had a brief meeting withx Burns and he is optimistic.

P: Everything is set if we give on gold but Connally doesn't know what we will get.

K: Burns thinks we x can get trade.

P: He mentioned that but devaluation thing is tough. Scald (?) Connally on the Canadian thing. They were tough over there and British even more.

K: Burns is reviewing what we can do to squeeze the British. We can do it.

P: Do it.

K: Before he gets here and after.

P: If we want to make a deal with them, squeeze before. I want the meetings to mean something.

K: It's my conviction that you will settle it.

By. NARA, Dato' 5/26

-3-

P: Pressure before so we get a good settlement.

K: We can get it settled. They will not yield to Connally but do more for you.

P: He has it positioned well. Nothing more on the Cambodian front?

K: I have talked with Moorer and he is going to Abrams for maximum effort and review again and an answer tomorrow.

P: Keep the pressure on. I don't think it's as bad as indicated.

K: I don't either.

P: Same AP guy. They can't xix write for 6 months that Cambodia is about to fall. What does Scali think of the sharp increases from 5-9?

K: I haven't asked him.

P: The biggest number in 2 months. I remembered it was 9 and it was. It shows what we are up against. On India/Pakistan we are not doing this out of peak or mad at India. They may react like Nasser did.

K: It's not in there interest.

P: It's puts them fully in hands of Russians.

K: It will drive Chinese to us.

P: Can Russians feed 400 million Indians.

K: And Egypt and Cuba? They are getting overextended.

P: You give figure of 6 million dollars worth of aid.

K: It turns out to be 10.

P: Multilateral also?

K: Yes. But 10 is quite a slug.

P: I bet Passman's figure is bigger. Give Passman a call. Say President says 10 billion to India and ask what his figures show. He would appreciate being asked. Going to Gridiron tomoorow?

K: No.

P: Lucky.