Okinawa 20 Symposium

Speech Delivered by Dr. Kissinger

About forty years ago when I was a young graduate student, I interviewed President Truman for some paper or other that I was doing. I asked President Truman what he would most like to be remembered for, and he said, "What I'd like most to be remembered for is that after the war we brought our enemies back to the community of nations, and I'd like to think that that is a very American contribution."

I believe that was the main point of the Okinawa reversion as well. The decision was first made in the Johnson administration, in which my friend Secretary McNamara served. To discuss and then to execute the reversion of Okinawa was an act reflecting faith in Japan. If you think back to those days, the United States was still engaged in Vietnam and was at the very beginning of a process of extrication, the ending of which it could not then predict. In those days, China was considered an implacable enemy, even though in the summer of 1969, before the Okinawa negotiations were concluded, we began to have some ideas that in the conflict between the Soviet Union and China maybe China was not the aggressor but rather the Soviet Union, and that perhaps we should, therefore, rethink some of our policies. We did not even know how to communicate with China, and we spent a year and a half looking for a channel by which to send messages to China. The Soviet Union was, of course, considered a fundamental adversary.

To give up control over one of our major strategic assets to Japan testified to the conviction of the presidents who initiated it and carried it out that Japan and the United States were likely to be —

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indeed, bound to be—allies in a very turbulent world. And the negotiations were conducted in that spirit. In those days we read a great deal about the difficulty of settling disputes between Japan and the United States. There were many complex issues and Undersecretary of State Alexis Johnson, Marshall Green and Armin Meyer on the American side (with some backstopping from the White House) bore the brunt of the negotiations together with official, and I may say unofficial, Japanese negotiators who showed up in Washington from time to time to smooth the path for the consensus process by which Japan operates.

So the significance of the Okinawa reversion is testimony to the fact that the United States made an inward commitment to permanent friendship with Japan in that period. What we should celebrate today and rededicate ourselves to today is the need for the continuation of that relationship.

Now we hear that so much in the world has changed. There is no longer a Soviet threat we are told and, indeed, it is true. So many of the presuppositions of the previous period no longer apply. The question is raised, do we still need the security relationship with Japan? And what about China when it is no longer a countervailing element to the Soviet Union? And what about an American regional role in Asia?

I believe that we have in the last three or four years seen an extraordinary revolution in international affairs. I do not know of any period in which a nation or group of nations so completely achieved what it set out to do as we did in the period between 1949 and 1992. If one compares what American and Allied, including Japanese, leaders were saying in the early '50s should be the purpose of foreign policy

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and what in fact occurred, one finds an extraordinary correspondence.
On the one hand, that is cause for celebration. On the other hand, it
creates for the United States, and I dare say for our friends, a very
complex set of issues.

For the United States, the so-called Cold War period really
corresponded very accurately with the American historical experience.
We could apply our experience of the New Deal, which taught that the
way to achieve political stability was to close the gap between
economic expectation and reality. We could also apply the lessons of
World War II, which taught that if one is faced with an aggressor one
should mobilize resources, prevent opportunities for expansion, and
then hopefully bring about a change in attitude.

Moreover, in the early phase the United States had a nuclear
monopoly, then a huge nuclear superiority. In the last few days I have
heard a great deal about Japan and the United States having between
them 40% of the world's gross national product. But in those days the
United States alone came close to having 40% of the world's gross
national product. All of these factors produced a particular set of
attitudes in America toward our international affairs: that our
relations even with our Allies were more similar to the relation of
bureaucracies to the leadership of a country than to international
politics in general. Our Allies had a temptation to become part of the
American decision-making process and were not as likely to engage in
the assembly of rewards and penalties by which international politics
have historically been conducted.

The world that is now emerging is quite different. Over the next ten
to fifteen years we shall see four, five, six, more or less equal powers

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emerging. By more or less equal I do not mean that they will be
precisely equal in every category: I mean that on the issues that are
likely to be in dispute, their ability to balance risks and rewards for
each other will be quite comparable. Those countries are America,
Europe or Germany, and Japan. I think China is moving into that
category, maybe India, and something on the territory that used to be
the Soviet Union - certainly Russia, and maybe a decentralized Soviet
Union.

The point is that such a world is bound to be quite different from the
two-power Cold War world with which we've been familiar. And it has
two aspects: one is a traditional aspect, the other is totally new. The
traditional aspect is that when you have a multipolar world you need
some concept of equilibrium. The new aspect is that equilibrium
emphasizes national interest. Yet there are categories of problems that
cannot be dealt with purely on the basis of national interest. The
environment, population, and certain aspects of the nuclear problem
need to be dealt with on a global basis. Both of these challenges are
extremely difficult for the United States, and, from my less than
perfect knowledge, for Japan as well.

Both the United States and Japan, for different reasons, have spent
the better part of their history in isolation. Once the United States
emerged from isolation, it was dominant. For a while Japan was
content to be subordinate. In the world that is now emerging the United
States will no longer be dominant, and Japan can no longer be
subordinate—and it should not be. That requires a new set of attitudes.
In American academic and intellectual literature on international
affairs, equilibrium is always preceded by some invidious adjective.
Most American writers and almost all American presidents that I have

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studied prided themselves on the fact that the United States does not pursue balance of power politics; that the United States defends principle and international law; that the United States has no national interests but a purely disinterested foreign policy. Even in the Gulf crisis President Bush kept insisting that the reason for American actions, which all the nations in the world should recognize, did not have to do with selfish interests but with our serving universal, abstract causes. I have the heretical view that disinterested policy makes everybody extremely nervous because it is impossible to calculate. And there is nothing wrong with having a national interest. Indeed, without a national interest it is impossible to establish criteria and, in the long term, to gain public support; there is also the danger of falling into total capriciousness. The difficult part is to relate the national interest of one group of nations to that of others, because, if that cannot be done, conflict is inevitable.

For different reasons, neither the United States nor Japan has ever had to manage an international system: the United States has only managed an international system in which we dominated; Japan has not had to manage it at all. The greatest challenge now for both countries is to establish a new equilibrium. I would next like to discuss what the new realities of that effort appear to be.

China, I think, serves as a good illustration of the problem. When President Nixon decided to pursue an opening to China, there was a complex set of motives. One motive was to demonstrate to the American people that, in the midst of bitter domestic conflict over Vietnam, its government was capable of beginning to look at a new international system, a new set of international relationships, and was capable of taking dramatic initiatives. Second was the conviction that

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it would be, in the long run, impossible to conduct a constructive policy in Asia without some participation by China. We would not be able to bring the war in Vietnam to a conclusion if China considered itself in permanent opposition to the United States and therefore had maximum incentive to keep that war going to weaken the United States.

But beyond that, knowing the historic and demographic role of China, we did not believe, and I still do not believe, that one can talk of stability in Asia without a relationship between the United States and China. China being an opponent of the Soviet Union was another factor. The sophisticated American policy makers did not think that China was a card the United States could play against one particular country. The China card could only be played by the Chinese. However, to have discussions with China, to assess the national interests of the two countries, we believed, and I still believe, had to contribute to stability in Asia. Without a Chinese-American relationship, foreign policy would become extremely difficult for us and for all our friends. That reality still exists.

I am in disagreement with those in the United States who believe that shaping the domestic structure of China should be the only objective of American foreign policy and that we should continue to penalize China until we have achieved in some undefined way an undefined result relating to its domestic structure. That does not mean that I approve of what has occurred in recent years in China any more than we approved of what was going on in China in 1971. Within the margins that are available, there is no doubt that we should promote values that have been traditional for Americans. At the same time, in the long-term I believe it to be potentially disastrous to pursue a policy that will lead to estrangement between the United States and

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China, an estrangement in which a strategic dialogue between us and China can no longer be conducted, in which every opponent of the United States could count on the support of China, and in which every friend of the United States would have to choose between the risks it runs in having relations with China and the penalties it incurs in having relations with the United States. I can only warn the American Congress about the nearly reckless risks that are being run in that relationship. I know of nobody in Asia who is comfortable with the prospect of the dialogue between Beijing and Washington weakening or coming to an end.

This becomes all the more important if we analyze what the new world is likely to look like. I hold a minority view with respect to the former Soviet Union - that we are only at the beginning of a process of turmoil, that we are celebrating much too early the permanent victory of democracy, market economics and peace. A nation that for 400 years has relentlessly expanded in all directions can be said to have a certain proclivity in that sense, and it is dangerous to assume that one turn of the political wheel will automatically remove this tendency. One does not even have to talk about national character, but simply look at this historic reality: that when great empires collapse, a period of turmoil has never been absent, and the risk of war has always increased. It was true of the Ottoman Empire, it was true of the Hapsburg Empire, it was true of the Chinese Empire. When a vast area suddenly becomes politically undefined, the political relationships in that area should become the dominant theme of international discussion. Therefore, the relationship of the successor republics of the former Soviet Union to each other regarding territory is a crucial element of peace and stability. To ignore this is to mortgage the future.

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As far as Asia is concerned, this would have the following consequence: If the former Soviet empire recentralizes—that is, if the republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Central Asia are reabsorbed under various forms of compulsion—the international environment will again become extremely tense, historic fears will be reawakened, and historic patterns will return. If the republics are not reabsorbed, then the center of gravity of the Russian state will move east towards the Urals, and maybe beyond. That does not mean military aggression but it means greater political activity of the new state in that area. And that new state has, after all, thousands of nuclear weapons.

In the next decade China is likely to achieve the economic progress that many of our commentators expect from Russia. China, I believe, is advancing quite substantially. As I've already pointed out, India is also likely to be a major player, and Korea is likely to be unified. What is the Japanese-American relationship going to be in these circumstances?

If America withdraws from Japan, Japan will have to look after itself. If Japan looks after itself, it will sooner or later develop a substantial military capability. Or it will become subject to the forces around it, though I think that is very unlikely. If Japan has a substantial military capability not tied to the United States, it will awaken profound fears all over Asia and will therefore create again a cycle of conflict in which equilibrium will turn into a real balance of power contest of a kind that has been seen before. Therefore, whatever one's assessment of the Soviet danger or of any other particular danger, I believe it is extremely important for the United States and Japanese security that the political relationship not only continue but that it deepen in the decades ahead. It is the only way an equilibrium in Asia can be constructed that is not explosive and that does not lead the

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various emerging powers to try to fill vacuums. It is the only way that the defensive intent of Japanese policy can be demonstrated. I do believe in a balance of power in Asia, that America should be part of it on the side of Japan, and that it is a subject which we should address.

Let me draw a few conclusions. The first is that, in addition to equilibrium, and I know Bob McNamara will talk about this, there will be problems of a global nature which will require cooperation. How are we going to conduct this cooperation? The American approach to international affairs has historically been that America knew the answers and the others had to be given the opportunity to contribute technical solutions to its conclusions. Consultation was defined as participating in the American decision-making process. Burden-sharing was defined as a technical problem in which others carried burdens that were more or less defined by the United States. That will not work any longer. Other nations will carry only burdens that they consider their own and which they believe would not be carried otherwise—or else they have no incentive to do it. Therefore, some definition of the Japanese national interest in relation to America's is necessary, though it may not always be a joyful experience for every American interlocutor. A more fundamental problem is how Japanese and Americans talk to each other.

I've already described the way Americans tend to approach problems. From my observation, based on possibly inadequate knowledge, the Japanese decision-making process is perhaps deliberately designed to be totally opaque to foreign perception. The consensus system is a marvelous way of developing enormous momentum behind decisions once they are reached. But for those who have to depend on such decisions, it is not always clear what is emerging, to whom one should

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talk, or how to find somebody who has the authority to take a
conclusive position. This is compounded by the fact that the Japanese,
at least those Japanese whom I know, tend to have a horror of
theoretical formulations and abstract approaches to policy-making. So
both sides really should ask themselves how the dialogue about this
new world is going to be conducted.

What I have described is a special relationship with Japan. America
had one in Europe with Great Britain. It operated on the basis that every
policy-maker and every person reflecting on policy knew fifty
Britishers he could call up and check his ideas with; so that by the time
an issue reached the highest levels, the two sides at least understood
what they were talking about.

You, the Japanese in this audience, know this is not the case on either
side. I don't have a good answer to this question. Intellectually I am
convinced that in Asia—where most of the great powers that I have
described are going to emerge in contact with each other—we need to
have some common perceptions. The dialogue cannot be conducted on
strictly military grounds, although the security treaty may provide a
technical means of linking us together. It cannot be conducted by
endless debates on specific economic issues, though I do hope that
these gradually improve. The dialogue needs some sense of where we
are trying to go and why. I think this is the biggest challenge for U.S.-
Japanese relations in the future.

JAPAN CENTER
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE, INC.
(JCIE/USA)

1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, N.Y. 10020 Tel: (212) 921-4260 Fax: (212) 921-4356

Tuesday, June 23, 1992

Ms. Suzanne S. McFarlane
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Suzanne,

I received a most gracious thank you note from Dr. Kissinger. It was indeed an honor and pleasure to work for him in Tokyo. As I told you on the phone, we had lots of fun.

On behalf of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Chairman of the Okinawa 20 Committee, and Tadashi Yamamoto, I am submitting to Dr. Kissinger a copy of the transcript of the Okinawa Symposium for his review and approval before the Committee publishes the symposium report in Tokyo.

The attached transcript, which was lightly edited for clarity, includes Dr. Kissinger's keynote speech and the panel discussion that followed his address. In the latter, Dr. Kissinger made three brief interventions (pp. 12-13, 21-22, and 28-29). Please note that one sentence on page 13 (marked in pink) was inaudible and we need Dr. Kissinger's assistance to clarify that sentence.

We welcome any editing and corrections Dr. Kissinger feels necessary. However, as this is a symposium report, the Committee wants to keep the conversational flow and the text as close as possible to Dr. Kissinger's original statements in Tokyo. To speed the publication of the symposium report in a bilingual English/Japanese edition, Messrs. Takeshita and Yamamoto would greatly appreciate it if you would kindly return Dr. Kissinger's finalized edition to me at our New York office as early as possible.

Suzanne, there will be another transcript coming later – an interview with Dr. Kissinger for the Okinawa Oral History Project, which is now being transcribed and copyedited.

Many thanks for your thoughtful assistance, as always, in this matter.

Enclosures

JAPAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE (JCIE/JAPAN) 4-9-17, Minami Azabu Minato-ku, Tokyo 106 Japan Tel: (03) 3446-7781 Fax: (03) 3443-7580 Telex: J23239 Japanex

Symposium: "The Historical Significance of the Reversion of Okinawa

and

Prospects for a New Era in U.S.-Japan Relations"

Dr. Kissinger: I have one quick comment for Professor Curtis. Equilibrium does not necessarily mean conflict, but I think that we have to be careful not to extol U.S.-Japanese relations in a way that allows everybody to continue to do exactly what they want to do. As a result, they may get into the kind of contest with each other that you say we should try to avoid. We can postulate an abstract congruence of interest that never becomes apparent in any concrete case. I strongly feel that if in this new situation every country simply serves its own domestic constituencies--which is the overwhelming incentive for modern democratic governments-and does not take a long-range view of where it is trying to go, then one could have an abstract theory that the world is interconnected and yet find a few years down the road that we are rubbing up against each other in every specific instance. Then it will be too late to have the dialogue. So we have to try to answer ahead of time some of the questions that Mr. Saeki raised.

In relations between Taiwan and China, it is extremely dangerous
for outside nations to prescribe the course. Not every problem
needs to be given an answer. When we opened to China we found a
formula dreamed up by Marshall Green and Alex Johnson in which we
said that the Chinese on the mainland and on Taiwan agree that
there is only one China and the U.S. does not argue with that
proposition. I think that we should continue along that line. I

think that, de facto, China and Taiwan are now cooperating. I think that it is unwise for Taiwan to try to force the issue of independence and that we need to take no further positions than the one we have taken. Anything else is going to produce a crisis in relationships.

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**Dr. Kissinger:** I am impressed by what Bob McNamara, whom I admire greatly, has said and what others have said. However, I think that within all our countries we are moving beyond the point where such general statements are going to do any good. I do a lot of speaking around the U.S. to groups that form the foreign policy establishment, and I find no support whatsoever for what Bob McNamara has said, elevated as it is. Part of the reason is that nobody has explained to the American public why it should be in the U.S. interest to do this. And for that reason it looks like a giveaway program at a time of economic recession. That is the reality. If I could legislate, I would substantially agree with what Bob McNamara has said, but that is not the political reality of the world in which we live, at least not in the U.S.

Secondly, I really do not see much point in saying we can do this, this, this, this--and then not do it. Nuclear weapons, environment, we all know the list that ought to be dealt with. But unless governments explain why it should be done and describe some procedure of how it is to be done and tell the people, who is going to approach it? We are going to be talking like professors, which I used to be at one time and when I used even longer sentences than

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I do now. I am worried when we say Japan can do ten things. Certainly Japan can do them, but it has not done them yet, and we have to know in what way they are going to get done and for what purpose. We have a problem of governance in most societies in that the pressure on the governments is short-term electability. Almost everything you are talking about will not come home to us for five or six years.

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**Dr. Kissinger:** It is all very well to call for dialogue but you have to know what you want to talk about. There was a distinguished foreign service officer, Trip Bohlen, who used to say, "If you do not know where you are going, any road will get you there." And I really think that you cannot call upon the cure-all of improved dialogue and more consultation if you do not know what the agenda is and have not defined what issues need addressing. I will say something sacrilegious: we can say democracy and free markets are going to solve all the problems in the world so that we do not need to think about foreign policy at all any more; we all can become reformers and act like foundations rather than as nations, but I do not believe it is as simple as that. We need an agenda of the issues to be resolved intellectually and of the programs. Then we can see where Japan and the U.S. stand in relation to the agenda; otherwise, we will be using dialogues as bromides.

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6/17/92

Draft 2

Symposium: 'The Historical Significance of the Reversion of Okinawa

and

Prospects for a New Era in U.S.-Japan Relations'

Mr. Yamamoto: The committee for the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa had the participation and support of 48 representatives from the U.S. side as well as their spouses. They are here with us as guests. Therefore, we would like to extend a warm welcome to our American friends.

We had intended to introduce each of our American guests to you, but, unfortunately, we do not have time for that. However, the program book explains what roles each of our American guests played at the time of Okinawa's reversion. The printed program is very attractive, and I would like to tell you about the symbol on the cover. It was designed by Ikko Tanaka, a famous graphic designer in Japan, and is based on the family crest of the royal house of the Kingdom of Ryukyu. I think the colors actually may be reversed since we could not have possibly copied exactly the one of the Kingdom. Blue represents the color of the ocean around Okinawa; the

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yellow or goldish color is the color of the nobility of the Kingdom of Ryukyu; and the red or orange means "to bring people together."

This Symposium is one of the main events of this commemoration being celebrated among all our friends here from Japan and the U.S. and is the first formal event sponsored by the Committee for the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa.

The Chairman of the Committee, former Prime Minister Takeshita, will say a few words.

Mr. Takeshita: It gives me profound pleasure that we are holding this commemorative Symposium today with so many participants from here and abroad to discuss the historical significance of the reversion of Okinawa and prospects for a new era in U.S.-Japan relations. It was on May 15, 1972 that Okinawa reverted to Japan. At the time I was Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Sato Cabinet. The deep emotions that I felt on the day when Okinawa was returned to Japan remain with me. Reversion was the heartfelt wish of the citizens of Okinawa and, indeed, of the people of Japan.

The reversion of Okinawa was a symbolic event marking the end of one era in U.S.-Japan postwar relations. There had been very few historical cases in which territory, or to be more precise, administrative authority, was returned in a peaceful way. I interpret the U. S.' return of administrative authority over Okinawa to Japan in the midst of the Vietnam War as an indication of the stance that the U.S. government was attaching greater importance to the long-term relationship of friendship and trust with Japan over the military requirements of the time. Japanese citizens should never forget the sincerity and friendship of the U.S. government, the decisive step

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that it took, the action of the U.S. Congress, and the citizenry who
supported this decision. As one who was involved in this matter, I decided to
serve as Chairman of this Committee to Commemorate the 20th
Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa and to coordinate the series of
commemorative events including this Symposium in order to express my
respect and appreciation for the sincerity and friendship displayed by the U.S.

When late Prime Minister Sato visited Okinawa in August 1965, he
declared that the postwar period would not be over until Okinawa was
returned to Japan. This was indeed the feeling of all Japanese. As these words
imply, the return of Okinawa marked an end to that postwar consciousness
in the minds of the Japanese, further strengthened the U.S.-Japan
relationship, and was a leap forward for Japan toward membership in the
international community. Today, the environment surrounding the U.S.-
Japan relationship is changing dramatically. The cold war has ended, and the
world needs a new security framework. Needless to say, in order for Japan and
the U.S. to deal with these issues as global partners, it is of immediate
importance that we work towards realizing each of the specific actions
documented in the Tokyo declaration announced in January.

This Symposium permits us to reflect on the historical significance of the
reversion, to discuss the prospects for the future of U.S.-Japan relations, and
gives us an opportunity to discuss these timely topics. Let me thank Dr.
Kissinger, former Secretary of State, who has agreed to give the keynote
address this afternoon, Mr. McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, and
the other panelists on the Japanese and the U.S. sides. I would like to thank
all of you gathered here today, and I urge you to share in an active and
candid exchange on the themes of this Symposium.

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Mr. Yamamoto: Let us now begin this session. Professor Kosaka will be moderator for the entire panel discussion. Our executive committee chose to commemorate this event by compiling an oral history of Okinawa, and we completed a two-day academic seminar yesterday. This Symposium marks the finishing touch in this series of events. Professor Kosaka.

Professor Kosaka (Moderator): In history there are rules that do not look like rules and things that are not rules but look like rules. Theoretically speaking, things do not change that dramatically after twenty years. However, sometimes interesting things happen on anniversaries. It was the end of April 1952 when Japan regained independence. Twenty years later Okinawa came back to Japan; twenty years after that we are gathered here.

The early 1970s was an eventful time. With the great vicissitudes in the tumultuous world, Japan somehow eked out its existence thanks to a salutary U.S.-Japan relationship. That healthy relationship was, to a great degree, brought about by the reversion of Okinawa, a view unanimously held in the academic seminar in the last two days. In twenty years, the world has changed dramatically, and we must survive this unsettled age with renewed wisdom. In this Symposium, we will look at how things have changed, what our challenges or goals are today and how Japan and the U.S. can pool resources and wisdom.

Let us hear the keynote address by Dr. Henry Kissinger, a gentleman who hardly needs any introduction—who as National Security Advisor to President Nixon in his administration played an eminent role in the negotiations leading to the reversion of Okinawa, and who later served as Secretary of State, I believe that in his foreign policy message in 1972 he

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called the reversion a watershed. He created that watershed. Today is another watershed. We are interested in hearing your thoughts on its meaning.

(Keynote Address by Dr. Kissinger)

Professor Kosaka: It seems that Dr. Kissinger has become a university professor again. Professors like to give problems to students to solve. Since Dr. Kissinger is with us here, we should be able to find the answers.

We would like to divide the discussion into roughly three parts. The problem or issue put forward by Dr. Kissinger—management of the U.S.—Japan relationship—is one of them and will come at the conclusion. Let us begin by about Asia, focusing on China. I think that the attitudes of Japan and the U.S. vis-a-vis China are quite different. Judging from what Dr. Kissinger has just told us, his views on China may not be so different from what the Japanese stance is. However, U.S. policy toward China at present is viewed as problematic from the Japanese side, so we shall discuss that.

Then, we shall move on to global issues. Finally, we will talk about U.S.-Japan cooperation. Unfortunately, speakers can be allotted only five minutes. Mr. Saeki, would you like to lead off?

Mr. Saeki: Let me offer my views on the role of the U.S. and Japan in Asia. What are the challenges that both nations face?

I think there are four issues that must be discussed. The first is the economic development of East Asia and the dynamism behind this development. To be more specific, economic development historically has been a major focus of attention in this region. How can we see a continuation of this dynamism?

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The second issue is how to remove the remnants of political instability that remain in Asia and the Pacific. Or, from another point of view, how can we deal with the remnants of cold war confrontation that remain in this region?

The third issue involves China, Vietnam, North Korea, or, in other words, countries that have continued to have communism and authoritarian governments and are now trying to open up their countries to a certain extent. How can we help socialist countries make a soft landing?

The fourth issue are the factors contributing to competition and cooperation in the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. How can we maintain and foster this relationship? What about the military presence of the U.S. in Asia in order to insure its visibility in the region.

Concerning the dynamism of economic development in East Asia and how to maintain this momentum, two problems have to be dealt with. The first is that the U.S. is calling for respect for human rights, and at the same time respect for market economies. The birth of market economies may be the key to continued economic development in these regions. However, Japan and other Asian nations see economic development as the precedent or precondition for political independence and democracy in Asia. So, how can we coordinate and adjust the somewhat different views that Japan and the U.S. have vis-a-vis economic development?

Another point is that U.S. economic influence in this region has been declining. While U.S. trade with Asia is now one-third larger than that with Europe, U.S. investments or ODA in Asia are much less than Japanese

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investments. Therefore, it may be true that U.S. economic influence and
economic interest both are on the decline in Asia.

On the other hand, when it comes to security, Japan is totally dependent
on the U.S. presence. By relying on the U.S. for security in Asia, Japan has
been increasing its economic influence in the region. Perhaps the U.S. would
not feel comfortable if Japan were to take a leading role and exercise
initiative in assisting the economic development of these countries.

And the second issue, removing factors of political instability in Asia, we
forces us to think about North Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, and about how
to advance smoothly the peace keeping process in Cambodia led by the
United Nations. Since Dr. Kissinger is here with us, I would like his opinion
on that and on what we have to do in dealing with Taiwan.

We have to think very seriously about Taiwan because Taiwan is an entity
on the international political and economic scene, and its status is becoming
more and more important. Taiwan is not thinking about immediate
unification with China, and it may be dangerous for Taiwan to continue to
insist on independence. Taiwan is not going to become independent nor
reintegrate with China; however, its influence on the international political
economic scene has been increasing. How should the international
community deal with Taiwan's growing role? Between Japan and Taiwan
exists an issue of improving their practical relations. However, we must think
about our relationship with Taiwan by looking at the fact that Taiwan is
going to be a major factor and a major influence in the social, political and
economic scene internationally.

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What about the socialist nations that have been under authoritarian rule for many years and now are trying to develop market economies? How should we deal with them? What should our relationship be? I know that North Korea has various problems today, yet it seems to be trying to preserve the status quo. That is the real reason behind North Korea's economic development and why they are trying to break away from isolationism. I do not think that they are going to change the status quo, which makes it difficult for us to decide how to deal with them. Both Vietnam and China are under authoritarian rule today, but I think that it is possible to influence and succeed, to a certain degree, through our relationship, in some reform or liberalization. I think that basically we can and should support such a policy. Will China become a major economic power in the future? If it does and if it continues as a military power with expansionist aspirations, we would face a major problem. However, I think that these dangers will not become a reality. It is possible for us, therefore, to deal with China without worrying about such dangers for another ten or twenty years.

Political democracy alone does not ensure economic development, but to continue to develop economically, political democratization is absolutely necessary. And if this theory holds true, China will have to embark on political democratization. Will China be able to support the communist system which exists today? Will the communist system undergo some reform and revision? If so, the process will be slow. With the process being slow, fast economic development is not possible in China.

I will skip the fourth issue for the time being and will come back to that in the last session.

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Professor Kosaka: Mr. Saeki has put forward a number of issues. I think that China has some relevance in all of these. In short, with the exception of Dr. Kissinger, the U.S. is looking for respect for human rights along with the introduction of a market economy, but the Japanese side is not so insistent on that linkage. It is good to have differences in views. Is there anyone who would like to comment on this?

Professor Curtis: I want to pick up on a point, a more general point, that Dr. Kissinger was making and relate it to the Asia-Pacific situation and U.S.-Japan relations. I think there are other dimensions to international politics these days: the end of the cold war means a return to balance-of-power politics and the equilibrium of the earlier pre-cold war years. Supra-national issues like environment have emerged. Another dimension is that goods and capital flow much more freely across national borders.

True economic interdependence has arisen in the world, and it is strikingly characterized by the relationship between the U.S. and Japan. The 40% of world GNP number has been thrown around a lot, but it has real meaning. It means that with 25% U.S. and 15% Japan contributing, both countries are very intimately engaged with each other. So I do not see how these two countries representing this enormous economic power cannot but be deeply involved with each other. Let us not forget that the U.S. exports more to Japan than to Germany, France and Italy combined. This is an enormous market for the U.S. not to mention Japanese dependence on the U.S. The issue is the relationship between these two enormous powers vis-a-vis a China, where no one can predict what will happen once the current political leadership is gone; a Korea, which if it is unified, will face economic

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problems that will make the problems that West Germany confronts with East Germany seem very mild by comparison; and an India that has a long way to go before it becomes a power. The issue is not equilibrium it seems to me. The key issue is how to avoid a contest, a rivalry for political influence between the U.S. and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region and to maximize our respective powers.

In the Asia-Pacific region what we need to think about now is how to embed this U.S.-Japan relationship in something larger than itself. We tend to bump up against each other frontally and with a lot of power these days since our two countries have become more equal. We need to embed it in something larger. Economically, organizations like APEC can play an important role and on the security side, *ad hoc* security dialogues. Dr. Kissinger made a point about dialogue. We need more dialogues. Japanese engage in dialogue. We need more dialogue on a regional level in which the U.S.-Japan relationship is a key. I think that conceptual issues are very important in determining what kind of concrete agenda to develop, but it also seems to me that we need perhaps to think more about the economic dimension of our relationship.

Ambassador Matsunaga: I more or less agree with what Professor Curtis has said. On fundamental issues, it is important for us to formulate a consensus between the two countries. When we talk about the future of Asia in the Pacific, the friendship and cooperation between Japan and the U.S. is indispensable.

If the cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. is not indispensable for the future of Asia-Pacific, we must think about who would

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fill the vacuum created in the area of politics, security and economics. Is it
possible for Japan alone to fill this vacuum? Or, is there a third country
which will take the place of the U.S. to fill it? I think none of these options
is desirable for the future of Asia-Pacific.

When we talk about future stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific
region, we must remember that a large amount of capital is necessary and
highly advanced technology will be required. That has already been made
clear and it is Japan and the U.S. who have the capital as well as the high
level of technology, which means, therefore, that the cooperative
relationship between our two countries is indispensable for the future of Asia
and the Pacific. This should be a premise to whatever we do.

A second point is that already in this region we have seen the birth of
various frameworks, be it APEC, PECC, PBEC and, in addition, the
ASEAN Ministerial Conference, ASEAN-PMC. Through such frameworks
or forums, it is important that we exchange views in a very frank manner as
Professor Curtis said.

Professor Kosaka: You touched a little bit on China. We are looking
toward a democratic and prosperous China. The Japanese and American
approach may be different, the priorities may be different. As Ambassador
Matsunaga said, various frameworks already exist; and it would be a good
start to use such forums to discuss these matters. The approaches may be
different, but that does not mean that our nations have to get into heated
arguments.

Mr. McNamara: On the subject of China, I agree with Dr. Kissinger and
with Professor Curtis and Ambassador Matsunaga. I cannot conceive how

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