I V - 2

countries possessing nuclear weapons, the possibility
of nuclear war obviously increases. And nuclear war once
started even on a small scale and even among minor powers,
(according to this school of thought), may spread into a
halocaust. At the least, the struggles of the minor powers
will increase the fall-out peril for all of mankind. And
the unchecked diffusion of nuclear weapons is believed to
raise the specter of what has been called "catalytic" war --
a conflict started by an irresponsible smaller country with
a nuclear attack on a major nuclear power. Since in the
missile age, the direction from which the blow comes may
be difficult to determine, the attacked nation may react
by an all-out blow against its chief opponent. Even the
Soviet Union, it is argued, cannot look with equanimity on
the emergence of a powerful China armed with nuclear weapons.
These considerations impose a strong common interest on the
major nuclear powers to prevent the further diffusion of
nuclear weapons.

V - 3

Many of these arguments have great force. The unchecked
spread of nuclear weapons must almost inevitably add another
element of instability to an already sufficiently volatile
situation. At the same time, if control measures are to be
effective, it is essential to understand the nature of the
danger posed by the n-th country problem. This obliges us
to distinguish two sets of relationships: that of small
nuclear countries to the major powers and that of the
n-th countries towards each other. The danger of increased
instability can mean a greater readiness to go to war with
a big power, a greater capacity to blackmail a big power,
or a greater willingness of the n-th countries to
go to war with each other. These dangers have to be seen
in relation to the motives for possessing an independent
nuclear establishment. Four suggest themselves: (a) Fear
of one of the larger powers, (b) A desire to be independent
or fear of
of the established nuclear powers. (c) Rivalry with other

V - 5

country, vis-a-vis an established nuclear power. While nuclear weapons would give a smaller country a greatly increased capacity to inflict damage, they would also doom it to destruction if they were used. The big nuclear powers have difficulty protecting their retaliatory force, the task would seem insuperable for smaller nations.

No foreseeable n-th country would be able to withstand a pre-emptive attack by a major power. Indeed, they would be almost totally vulnerable even to a second-strike; a surprise attack by any foreseeable n-th country on a major nuclear power would not reduce the latter's power of retaliation significantly. The disparity in stockpiles, training and sophistication in the use of weapons would seal the fate of smaller countries if they initiated hostilities and even more decisively if they suffered an attack. Indeed n-th countries would have to be extremely cautious about even threatening nuclear war. For if they

too high; the desire to be achieved too propitious; the
be discovered and applied to overwhelming retaliation seems
The propensity that the country launching the pion would
major powers have destroyed each other seems too spurious.
hostilities. The hope of inflicting the world after the
direct its retaliation elsewhere would seem the height of
disturbing period on the off chance that the action would
and be destroyed. But to launch auncer attack in a
during a grave because it would immediately result itself
on the attack. It therefore cannot launch a pion
origins of the attack. It will have to work the
immediate political damage because it will have to work the
uncertain attack on a majoruncer power. It cannot achieve
reasoning which would impel a small country to launch a
smaller

In these circumstances it is difficult to imagine the
a position reargiess of the existence of u-ti countries.
to have a powerful incentive to brace themselves into such
before negotiating recalcitation. And though sides would seem
to come to an extent of the pion and the direction from which it came

A - 8

V - 9

risks out of proportion to any objective -- particularly if one considers that even if successful in its objective, the country launching the war might become the victim of major fall-out. And if the major nuclear powers are aware of the risk of catalytic war -- as they would have to be -- and were not looking for a pretext to launch an all-out or were not otherwise on the verge because of some other crisis, attack on each other, they may even unite to destroy the country which brought them so close to the abyss.

Indeed, the existence of several independent nuclear capabilities may even stabilize deterrence among the major powers. For while nuclear establishment of any foreseeable except China, and possibly Germany and Japan, n-th country is likely to be woefully inadequate as long as the major retaliatory forces are intact, it may become decisive if the two big nuclear powers should decimate each other. Unless the aggressor should achieve a crushing superiority quickly, an additional restraint will thus be placed on the decision to launch a surprise attack. Or put another way,

V - 10

if an aggressor does not want to have a third party gain the benefits of the risks he runs, his margin of superiority will have to be sufficiently large so that he can overwhelm the smaller nuclear powers as well if necessary. Thus the diffusion of nuclear weapons may make deliberate all-out war less likely by increasing the force requirement of an aggressor and by complicating his calculations.

The spread of nuclear weapons upsets not so much the over-all deterrent equation as the relation of n-th countries to each other--particularly when relations are already tense.

If the spread of nuclear weapons is not symmetrical, the country acquiring them first may have a very strong incentive to exploit an advantage, which it knows to be transitory.

If the spread is symmetrical, if the chief opponents acquire nuclear weapons more or less simultaneously, the situation will be unstable for somewhat different reasons. If one considers only destructiveness of nuclear weapons, it is

conceives only destructiveness of unclear weapons, it is
will be useful for somewhat different reasons. If one
unclear weapons were or were simultaneously, the situation
It the abrogation of aymetricity, the quiet obITUeUTS SUCURS
to exploit an advantage, which it knows to be transitory.
country submitted them that may have a very strong incentive
If the abrogation of unclear weapons is not aymetric, the
to escape other--particularly when refought are strictly tense.
over-all deterrent education is the relation of u-nation countries

The abrogation of unclear weapons abrogates not so much the
abrogation of unclear weapons as well as well it necessarily.
war less likely by increasing the force requirement of an
the situation of unclear weapons may make deliberate silt-out
the amplifier unclear powers are well known to us, and we can
will have to be sufficiently far away so that we can overcome
benefits of the risks we run, die margin of ambiguity

it is abrogation goes not out to have a third party gain the

A - 10

V - 13

through developing them on their own or through acquiring them from the established nuclear powers. To control either method of diffusion is far from simple.

Because production of nuclear weapons is primarily an engineering problem, inspection against it becomes extremely complicated. Within a decade many countries will possess nuclear reactors, some of them furnished by the advanced nuclear countries. But the end product of most nuclear reactors is plutonium, the basic component of the cruder versions of nuclear weapons. Any country possessing a nuclear power plant will be able to produce some nuclear weapons if it wishes to make the effort. Only the strictest accounting of fissionable material can reduce this danger and then only before substantial stockpile of plutonium comes into being. As for existing stockpiles, no scheme capable of accounting for them seems to be feasible. It will be extremely difficult to control the diffusion of nuclear

itself protected from
And indeed any major
China. Any country authorized by Communist China would find
conflict properly not print meaningful breather on Communist
would be very medias in at least. Will of them together

Moreover, the countries comprising the non-uncles cnp
area-s-are even medium sized powers.

in their debate with laser; it is of little significance
one or two uncles mesbous in a very country may be important
members of the non-uncles cnp so a very small data. Secretion of
machinery would be set up for what may seem to at least some
scantires uncles mesbous or vice versa. Time is elapsate
triest to exclude it is not significantly increased if China
the potentiate participants of the non-uncles cnp. The
maintaining it. But the latter is extremely medias so long
the adiuvance with which it is observed and the motive for
More importantly an inspection system is no better than
agreement.

A - 16

V - 18

of Soviet nuclear blackmail.

Finally, a non-nuclear club to be effective requires the cooperation of the established nuclear powers. For one thing, for the foreseeable future the most effective source of supply of nuclear weapons will be from the stockpiles of the established nuclear powers. No potential large n-th country can develop a respectable arsenal by its own efforts for at least a decade. Hence, the major powers could defeat the non-nuclear club by giving or bootlegging weapons to client states and they could prevent sanctions from being applied against countries violating the agreement. At the same time, in so far as the non-nuclear club is supposed to increase the security of the major powers--and it would not make too much sense otherwise--they would have to participate in the control agreement arrangements. The inspection system would have to be so designed that they could reassure themselves rapidly. They would have to be able to check on the division of fissionable material from peacetime uses as well as about the secretion of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. A non-nuclear club without the participation of the

["means of delivery. A non-unclear club without the participation of the\nuse as well might as appoint the secretion of unclear weapons and their\nto be able to check on the division of radioactive material from radioactive\ndivision\nso designed that they could resume themselves rapidly. They would have\ncontrol. Arrangement. The inaction of states would have to be\nmake common sense otherwise--they would have to participate in the\naboard to increase the security of the major powers--and it would not\nagreement. At the same time, in so far as the non-unclear club is\nprevent sanctions from being applied against countries upholding the\nclub by giving or poaching weapons to client states and they could\nat least a decade. Hence, the major powers could defeat the non-unclear\nunif country can develop a readequate\nintensify its own efforts for\nfrom the stockpiles of the established unclear powers. No beneficial\nfuture the most effective source of subsidy of unclear weapons will be\nof the established unclear powers. For one thing, for the foreseen\nof the established unclear powers. No beneficial\nfuture the most effective source of subsidy of unclear weapons will be\nof the established unclear powers. For one thing, for the foreseen\nof the established unclear powers. No beneficial\nfuture the most effective source of subsidy of unclear weapons will be\nof the established unclear powers. No beneficial\nfuture the most effective source of subsidy

V - 20

heightened sense of impotence. Or else such an agreement between us
and the USSR may have the result of spurring local efforts to develop
nuclear weapons as our allies seek to achieve independence from so
unreliable a position. Finally, having signed an agreement which de-
clared the undesirability of nuclear weapons in the hands of our

(see referenced Article 1 above) resist?
European allies, we would be in an almost impossible position to visit

(we shouldn't resist)
Soviet pressure on to denuclearize Europe, and to blackmail those of

(We should blackmail such allies ourselves - there comes a point when our allies which seek to develop an independent nuclear capability. An ally ceases to be an ally)

The result may well be the expulsion of even the American nuclear
establishment from Europe. (This has already happened in France, on exactly such grounds - do you feel disturbed in consequence? I don't.)

Such a denuclearization of Europe would, however, have disastrous
strategic consequences. As the retaliatory forces grow more awesome and
invulnerable, increased reliance must, as we have seen, be placed on local
defense. But against an aggressor equipped with nuclear weapons even a
conventional defense is impossible unless nuclear weapons are stationed
in or near the control zone. Any area not so equipped will be paralyzed
in the face of nuclear blackmail. Its security will depend entirely on
the United States willingness to risk all-out war, the threat of which
is becoming more and more incredible. Our policy should seek to create

V - 21

a maximum number of alternatives to resort to the most cataclysmic form
of defense. Arms control must not become a device to polarize our options
between surrender and suicide.

It can be argued that this line of reasoning when pushed sufficiently
far would counsel the distribution of nuclear weapons all around the
Communist periphery. If no area can defend itself by any means without
possessing a sanction against Communist nuclear blackmail, the unchecked
diffusion of nuclear weapons around the Soviet periphery, for all its
perils would turn into the lesser of two evils. But the argument pushes
a valid conclusion too far. As long as Western Europe remains strong
and capable of resisting Soviet nuclear blackmail, a Soviet nuclear
attack on the peripheral areas is extremely unlikely. Such an action
would cause the Soviet Union to lose enormous prestige in the eyes of the
uncommitted world. It would evoke a redoubled effort in Europe and it
would be extremely risky even militarily as long as the North Atlantic
Community maintains a substantial military establishment based in what
would then be the Soviet rear.

would then be the Soviet rest.

Community maintains a separate military establishment based in what would be extremely risky even militarily as long as the North Atlantic uncommitted world. It would evoke a seconded effort in Europe and it would cause the Soviet Union to lose enormous breathless in the face of the attack on the periphery areas it is extremely unlikely. Such an action and capable of resisting Soviet nuclearatakia, a Soviet nuclear a valid conclusion too far. As long as Western Europe remains strong, belliger would turn into the lesser of two evils. But the argument bases diffusion of nuclear weapons around the Soviet periphery, for all its boasering a sanction against Communist nuclearatakia, the unbocked Communist periphery. If no area can defend itself, any means without far would connect the distribution of nuclear weapons all around the

It can be argued that this line of reasoning when bashed sufficiently between surrender and suicide.

Arms control must not become a device to belittle our obvious
of defense.

a maximum number of alternatives to resort to the most catalytic form

A - 51

V - 22

Only Europe is "worth" the risk of nuclear blackmail to the Soviet

we cannot take a calculated risk. With respect to all other areas
denuclearization can become the subject of direct negotiations between
the US (and other Western nuclear powers) and the USSR. Even in Europe
it is possible to agree on a control to the diffusion of nuclear weapons
into national possession provided there is previously created a NATO
nuclear system or at the least a European Atomic Community along the
lines described in the previous chapter* and provided there is sufficient
political cohesion, so that Soviet pressure is not tempted by the belief
that we will take the interests of our allies less seriously than our own.

However much we may desire to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
we must take care that negotiations with respect to it do not give our
European allies the impression that they have become objects of bargaining.
And the West cannot accept the denuclearization of Europe. To avoid these
dangers the North Atlantic Community should establish the nuclear system
described in an earlier chapter. Even more importantly, it should

* See above Ch. ___, p. ___ for a fuller discussion

V - 23

move in the direction of political integration. With respect to arms
control negotiations, particularly on the n-th country problems, the
NATO allies should negotiate as a unit with a single negotiating team
and a single position. The West can go no further than an agreement
that nuclear weapons stationed in Europe remain under NATO or European
control and that they will not be sold or given away to countries outside
NATO.

Admittedly such an arrangement is difficult to control. No system
of inspections will be able to verify command arrangements sufficiently
to insure that in crisis periods the nuclear weapons do not revert to
national control after all. On the other hand, there are some advantages
in this state of affairs. The element of uncertainty of these command
arrangements undoubtedly adds to deterance; it raises the risk of
retaliation in case of aggression. The question arises whether the
command arrangements of a NATO or European force are so vague as to
deprive the Soviet Union of any incentive to agree to such a scheme. If
the Soviet Union is concerned about offensive measures from European

the Soviet Union is concerned about offensive measures from European
deprive the Soviet Union of any incentive to agree to such a scheme. It
command arrangement of a NATO or European force are so vague as to
refutation in case of aggression. The question arises whether the
arrangements undoubtedly able to deterrence: it raises the risk of
in this case of attack. The element of uncertainty of these command
institute control after all. On the other hand, there are some advantages
to name that increte horde the nuclear weapons do not reach to
of inferences will be able to verify command arrangements sufficiently
admittedly such an arrangement is difficult to control. He states
NATO.

control and that they will not be sold or given away to countries outside
that unless weapons stationed in Europe remain under NATO or European
and a single position. The West can do no further than an agreement
NATO should negotiate as a unit with a single negotiating team
control negotiations, barterably on the u-th country problems, the
move in the direction of political integration. With respect to arms

A - 53

V - 24

territory the system which treats the West as a unit for n-th country negotiations and which pools nuclear weapons stationed in Europe into a common arrangement, would seem to offer an adequate guarantee. The possibility of reversion to national control would exist only when the country concerned considers itself in danger. No NATO or European system would ever be permitted to be used in the pursuit of a single nation's quarrel with the USSR. No component of NATO would be in a position to initiate nuclear war against the USSR--unless the vital

(The S.U. seems to worry about NATO in this.) interests of all members were involved. The arrangement of NATO control

would pose no additional threat to the USSR. Conversely, denuclearization of Europe would improve the Soviet offensive but not its defensive position for we will require European bases less and less in case of

all-out war.

Finally, it is important to remember that the key goal of an n-th country agreement must be to prevent the quarrels of presently non-nuclear areas from being waged as nuclear wars. Any more ambitious conditions scheme is likely to appear to create a unilateral weakness for the West.

V - 25

But if Europe is to retain nuclear weapons, how can Communist China
be prevented from acquiring them? It is likely that China cannot be
prevented from becoming a nuclear power--probably not even by the USSR.
By the time any n-th country negotiation is far advanced, it is probable
that Communist China will have exploded a nuclear device. For this reason,
any agreement to control the spread of nuclear weapons will almost certainly
have to include Communist China as a nuclear power.

In any case, nuclear weapons stationed in Europe do not significantly
add to the Chinese incentive to acquire an atomic arsenal. They do not
affect China's strategic position materially. A nuclear establishment
in Europe may be used as an excuse for a Chinese nuclear effort; it does
not provide a motive for it. This suggests also that the denuclearization
of Europe and of China is not a symmetrical process. Europe denuclearized
might turn into an important appendage of the USSR; Communist China de-
nuclearized has proved willing to engage in military adventures around
its periphery. A sense of impotence is the least of the problems of
Communist China.

V - 26

The situation is asymmetrical also in another respect. Were we to
bargain the denuclearization of Europe for that of China, we would
[X] increase the peril of our friends to increase our own security--hardly
the ideal posture for the leader of an alliance. Similarly asymmetrical
[X] is the problem of evasion. The threat to Europe will not gax grow
significantly if Communist China acquires a nuclear arsenal. Europe,
once denuclearized is likely to remain so whatever Chinese violations.

The limits of any US-Soviet negotiations with respect to the n-th
country problem are therefore set by the essential requirement of
protecting Europe against Communist pressure. Any arms control agreement
which overlooks this fact will magnify our danger. And since control of
the n-th country problem requires a world-wide system, it is in any case
impossible to institute it entirely by US-Soviet negotiations.

C. <u>A Possible Solution</u>

A serious effort to deal with the n-th country problem would thus
have to combine an agreement among the major nuclear powers with the
formation of a non-nuclear club. A possible solution would be an agreement

V - 28

and which would set up controls to be devised by a technical conference.

Chalk this up as another reason why your nuclear-NATO scheme is unattractive. It is easier to discriminate against all countries except the U.S. + S.U., perhaps the U.K., as is essentially being done now.

Such a scheme undoubtedly discriminates against the regions. Outside the NATO and Warsaw Pact treaty structure. This will be the price they must pay if the N-th country problem is to be deal with and, as in the case of the control system against weapons attack, it would be foolish to deny that it is a price. Countries such as India would be at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis a nuclear China. In the case of Communist nuclear blackmail, the arguments without nuclear weapons would be dependent more than ever on Western support. On the other hand, the basic situation in this respect will not be altered significantly by the kind of agreement outlined here. None of the so-called uncommitted nations could today (Switzerland could not be taken by Soviet forces) resist Soviet or Chinese pressure without the assistance of the West.

Their neutrality depends on the existence of an equilibrium between the two blocs. And as we have seen, Communist nuclear blackmail against the uncommitted nations would entail political and strategic risks out of proportion to the objective to be achieved (the North Atlantic community maintains a substantial military establishment).

V - 29

The control system outlined here will therefore not obviate major efforts to maintain the security of the free world. It will not eliminate the danger of nuclear war among the major powers -- the scheme against surprise attack is designed for that. Its major utility will be in keeping the conflicts among the smaller countries from becoming nuclear. Even if some evasions occur, they will not upset the equilibrium unless they are very substantial. A country possessing clandestine nuclear weapons will not be able to use them for diplomatic pressure or for blackmail. To do so would be to admit the evasion and invite sanctions (Hence the absence of need for inspection for possession) from all signatories of the control scheme. Clandestine weapons can only be employed in an extremity. They are useless as a diplomatic tool. At the same time, since the weapons cannot be tested and since, if the inspection system is adequate, troops cannot train with them, they will probably not be considered sufficiently reliable for launching a surprise attack. This system could be tightened even further by installing the inspection system against surprise attack described earlier in troubled areas.

Nothing is easier to detect than atmospheric nuclear bursts; even without the bomb-test agreement, we should know of them.