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Every so often there emerges out of the fog of official statistics that envelop our German policy a fact that illustrates better than sheafs of reports, the true nature of our occupation difficulties. Like a stroke of lightning in the dark, it outlines its object but briefly. But, like the first attacks of cancer which pass quickly, they are danger signals that can be ignored only at a grave risk.

Such was the case of Dr. Semmler, the head of the Bizonal Economic Council, the de facto cabinet of Western Germany. Dr. Semmler, a member of the rightist Christian-Social-Union party, a person who owed his appointment primarily to American support, nevertheless in 1948, in a public statement, violently attacked the very basis of American policy in Germany, the Export-Import program designed to insure dollar-credits for the purchase of food-stuffs for German consumption. That this man knowingly falsified the very policy he was charged with implementing is, however, no more significant than that the violence of his attack on occupation powers omitted the one country which, both because of Dr. Semmler's political views and because of its harsh attitude in Germany, one would have expected to be the butt of his criticism: the U.S.S.R. Why is it that this man, a practical politician, the head of an organization, at least part of the objective of which is the economic stabilization of Western Germany to prevent Communistic infiltration, gratuitously insulted the Commanding General of the American Occupation Forces, while by implication praising the foresight and tact of the Soviet Commander? And why did Dr. Semmler's party, upon his dismissal from his position by the U.S. and British Military Governments give him a rousing vote of confidence? What could impel the German press, almost without exception, to take this

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occasion to start a violent diatribe against the undemocratic activities of
the Occupation Forces?

No amount of soothing press-releases can obscure these facts or answer
these questions. They illustrate, any statistical evidence regarding
democratization or de-nazification to the contrary notwithstanding, the
extent of our failure in Germany. Statistics and press-releases will not
rehabilitate our position when it is too late. There is a type of folly
even worse than ineptitude and that is self-deception. Germany today is
a seething cauldron of frustration. Its only common denominator is an
almost universal disdain of the U.S.; Bavarian Separatists, Hessian
Socialists, Ruhr Communists are unanimous in this feeling.

Again the question arises why the country that has been most lenient in
its treatment of conquered Germany, that was the first to turn over the
civil administration to the Germans, finds itself in this position. Apologists
will be quick to point to the food situation. Yet the food situation is
worst of all in the French Zone of Occupation and no such trends are apparent.
Yes, it will be countered, but other countries did not allow criticism. This
is a valid objection. Yet it remains to be asked just how wise it was to
turn over unlimited freedom to the types of Germans that now exercise it.
For therein lies the key to our failure. It is not so much a mistake in
objective, but a fallacious application of methods and yardsticks to
conditions that psychologically and historically were not receptive.

The American policy of the 4 D's (de-centralization, de-industrialization,
de-nazification and democratization) was sincere in its objective. De-
industrialization, in a continent clamoring for consumer goods, was obviously

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a mistake and has been abandoned. De-centralization running counter to the
experience of most modern states looks good on paper, but is in the process
of disintegrating. Even more power is being concentrated in the hands of
the central agencies, the Bizonal Economic Council and the "Parliament of
Bizonia". Yet these failures are only relative. There is no historical
evidence to the effect that federal countries are more peace-loving than
integrated states. These problems were at the fringe of the basic issue.

There is no technical way in which moral issues can be solved. And it
is a moral issue whether Germany, the heir of the Bismarckian tradition of
authoritatianism, the Prussian concept of service to the State as an end,
culminating in the Nazi ideology of man's ultimate realization in the mass
and the establishment of success as the only criterion of values, can be
imbued with ideas which are, after all, the very basis of American democracy:
the Jeffersonian belief in the inherent value of the individual, the Puritan
approach to the group as a collection of individuals who by the diversity
of their views contribute to the advancement of the whole. This in its
precise sense is what de-nazification and democratization—the last two
D's—imply. There are, of course, any number of intellectuals, who
demonstrate by charts how economic conditions and balance-of-payments
produced Nazism. But it is exactly these people who have all along mis-
understood the symptoms that Nazism represented and who are responsible
for the impasse of our policy in Germany today.

Nazism was NOT an economic movement. It is true, part of its support
came from the lower middle-class, hard-hit by the inflation. Admittedly,
the world-wide economic depression gave it impetus. But Nazism was above

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all an instinctive reaction by a cross-section of the population to the
collapse of all values which marked Germany between 1918 and 1933. The
debunking, the destruction of everything that seemed permanent, left a
crying void that was only aggravated by the economic insecurity of the
period. A good friend of mine, a German university professor of inter-
national law, who spent the Nazi regime in exile, once told me: "The German
republic died because it was boring." He meant that during the republic
in this vacuum, no better alternatives were offered, but balanced budgets
and dry statistics.

The Nazis came to power because they grasped the psychology of the moment. In place of dry figures, they offered faith, instead of balance-of-payments they asserted belief. They appealed to that most pronounced form of all German traits, the quest for certainty in an uncertain world, the desire for understanding the incomprehensible, the mystic drive for an Absolute. The Nazis exploited the instinctive revulsion against the all-pervading rationalism that had merely destroyed and not created. The Nazis were no creatures of economic conditions. Leaders that can believe in a victory with Allied armies surrounding Berlin, that study astrology charts and distrust expertness in any field, were more in the nature of Indian dervishes, of vindictive Old Testament prophets. Yet these people ruled Germany for twelve years. Under a reign of unparalleled oppression, under the most thorough propaganda apparatus in history, a new generation of Germans grew up. Can one really assert that all that is needed is to establish a favorable balance-of-trade and Germany will, by definition, become peace-loving and democratic?

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This then was the problem posed by Nazism. It had exalted the group to offset the inner loneliness of the individual. As a member of a group it had absolved the German of all personal responsibility, and it was indeed not uncommon to find individuals who had perpetuated the most outrageous cruelties, protesting vehemently and sincerely their personal innocence. De-nazification was not, as an American general so glibly stated, a question of punishing the "Ins" by the "Outs", nor again was it a problem of "collective guilt" as others equally callously asserted. It was a problem of eradicating the seeds of forty years of militarism and twelve years of Nazism, to get away from the idea of "collective" guilt or innocence and begin with the simplest assertion of individuality: individual justice.

This principle becomes all the more important if one considers the heterogeneous composition of the Nazi party. Besides the hard core of fanatics, there were many opportunists and people who wanted to play it safe. A large group represented the Civil Service and others were forced to join merely to prove that nobody could stand against the community. Lastly, there was the youth of Germany. In many ways they were the most fanatical, but also the noblest of all Nazis. They had done nothing but believe all their life. They had spent two years in labor corps, two years in the army and then six years of war. They had suffered and believed and fought and believed. And when the crisis came, when everything collapsed, their elders who for twelve years had vied with each other in asserting their devotion to the 'cause' were the first to protest their innocence—their hatred of Nazism, their love for democracy. The youth of Germany was alone and embittered.

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De-nazification is out of favor today. Many people think it was a mistake and the prevalent cynicism is not conducive to abstract argument. Yet, de-nazification is the key to American policy in Germany. Its failure and subversion by certain elements of the population spells the collapse of American prestige. De-nazification was the test of America's mettle. Without it the war was reduced to a test of power, morality became the advantage of the stronger.

De-nazification was a more subtle problem than the mere removal of individuals from office, What yardsticks were to be used? Was a Civil Servant, on whom all sorts of pressure could be exerted, as culpable as a rich industrialist, whose financial independence allowed greater freedom of action? Was a professional soldier who by being in the army was debarred from politics innocent? And was a little shopkeeper, whose horizon ended at the street corner, guilty just because he finally, after great turmoil of the soul, paid his monthly dues? Then there were individuals who had joined the Nazi party out of sincere idealism, who had learned their mistake, who for years had done everything to escape, but were now part of the great conspiracy. Could one ever remedy a mistake once made?

Yet, with all these difficulties, there were certain encouraging factors. The few anti-Nazis who had suffered for years in Concentration Camps, who had subsisted miserably at the very fringe of society, now with tears in their eyes greeted the Americans as liberators. For them the Nazi regime had been twelve years of terror. They had been reviled, sneered at, jeered. But now the night was over, and in the dawn of the new day the ideals which alone justified their misery would be resurrected.

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Moreover, even the fanatical Nazis were convinced, by the one criterion of values that Nazism had established, the value of brute strength, that America represented superior values. They had tried faith and it had failed. The conquerors had established their virility and thereby their right, by the mere fact of military occupation.

Today, with two years of hindsight, we know that the opportunity was fleeting and is now past. Probably the wisest course would have been the rapid elimination of the fanatical element from public office and letting the rest work its way home. This would have allowed the vast majority of the population to identify itself with an American policy. Since decisive action to the German is an indication of moral worth, it would have greatly increased U.S. prestige.

Instead, Military Government Law No. 8 was formulated. This declared all Germans collectively guilty. Nazi party members were barred from public office, or responsible positions in industry. Two categories were established. Individuals who had joined the Nazi party before May 1, 1937, were relegated to the status of manual laborer without any possibility of appeal. Those that joined after the deadline were given a chance to clear themselves before tribunals.

Law No. 8 looked simple on paper. However, by declaring the whole population collectively guilty, a unity of purpose was achieved where none had existed before. Law No. 8 had intended to load the scales against the defendant by declaring him guilty unless he could prove his innocence. But this very fact worked in the accused's favor. A person could call any number of witnesses to prove his innocence. To testify for one another became a

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matter of practical necessity for one day one might need defense witnesses
oneself. To testify for the prosecution involved ostracism. The chief
sufferers were the persons who had been unpopular even during the Nazi
regime, for they could find no friends to testify for them. And the more
Machiavellian among the populace did not fail to press the irony of bringing
to account the very individuals to whom the Occupation Forces had appeared
as liberators.

The situation was aggravated by the indifference of the lower echelons
of Military Government. The Army by training and temperament is impatient
of abstractions. Its God is Efficiency and de-nazification was undermining
the smooth operation of government. Efforts were consequently made to save
key men. And benevolent tolerance greeted such subterfuges as discharging
individuals only to rehire them for the same position, at identical salary
with the title of "manual laborer".

The population noted that one of the major policies of the Occupation
Forces seemed to be carried out for the record only. They saw glowing
accounts of a 90% successful de-nazification, against a background of an
only insignificant turnover of personnel in their immediate area. The
opportuntists, the Nazis who had been stunned by the first shock of defeat,
re-emerged. To them the American leniency was not a sign of magnanimity,
but an indication of weakness, a token of softness, of naivete.

When Military Government finally formulated the Law for Liberation
from National Socialism and Militarism, it was too late. This law established
five degrees of Nazi activity to be determined by all-German tribunals.
Penalties ranged from ten years in jail to monetary fines. But it was too late.

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De-nazification had a united public opinion against it. Appointment to the tribunals became a political football, a sure way to eliminate one opponent from any future elective office. Only the Communists seemed eager to assume responsibility, and in this fashion acquired an influence totally out of proportion to their numbers.

De-nazification turned into a farce. It became a means of eliminating unwanted employees, a weapon of personal retribution, a potent organ of shady machinations. The individuals who for twelve years had opposed Nazism, suffered for it and have been persecuted for it, were persecuted again. They became a symbol that individualism was not feasible, to stand against the mass inadvisable, that concepts of morality were relative.

Two of the most flagrant examples will be cited here. An individual who for twelve years had violently opposed the Nazis, whose shop had been closed, whose daughters had been inducted into the forced Labor Battalions, and who in the year 1943 finally joined the Nazi party, was refused clearance by his denazification board. This entailed the inability to do business, to drive a car, or engage in any activity, and these are almost all-inclusive, requiring government license. When the chairman of his de-nazification board was asked why clearance had been withheld, he stated that during a bombing attack the individual in question had put out a fire in his own house, but had not attended to the houses of his neighbors. This, alleged the chairman, had made him very unpopular. And isn't it undemocratic to clear an unpopular person before more deserving individuals had been taken care of?

A Civil Servant, who in 1933 had been demoted by the Nazis for what was called "political unreliability" supplied information about his immediate

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superior to the de-nazification tribunal as, under the law, was indeed his
duty. Subsequently he was arrested. With a perfectly straight face the
following reason was given. The superior was a democratic official. Anybody
denouncing a democratic official is by definition "undemocratic". And who
is undemocratic but a Nazi?

The cycle had indeed come full turn. The opportunists who had played
it safe for twelve years were on the right side again. Efficiency was
triumphant. Morality was something for starry-eyed idealists, to be found
in textbooks, to be invoked frequently, but never to be practiced. American
prestige was severely diminished. It is a truism of politics that an
announced policy that is not being enforced, or even subverted, is more
dangerous than no policy at all. The anti-Nazis were bitter, the Nazis
triumphant. De-nazification had become re-nazification.

With de-nazification a failure, democratization was foredoomed.
Nevertheless, it was implemented. It is Army tradition to consider an order
issued as good as carried out. While this may be admirable in combat
operations, it creates a state of mind which accepts a paper plan as an
existing reality. Democratization of Germany was planned like a military
operation. A series of target-dates were set, each marked by a free election
on a successively higher level. Within eight months all levels of civil
administration were popularly elected and constitutions framed. The slogan
was invented that "the best way to learn democracy is to practice it".

The first election was held only nine months after V-E day. It is
difficult to see by what line of reasoning it was expected that a people
would vote intelligently which had, after fifteen years of democracy, voted

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Hitler into office, that had been exposed to authoritarian propaganda for twelve years, which had fought a total war for Nazism for six years, that for three months after the armistice had had no newspapers or mail service, the communications of which were even then totally disrupted. The predictable occurred. The people went to the polls as they were ordered to. They voted for whatever political party they had voted before 1933. And Military Government announced that the best indication of progress on the road to democracy could be found in an election-day turnout of 87%.

Now the people understood.

Democracy was a matter of percentages.

Democratization was thus ruined by the same fallacy that had marked de-nazification. It was for the record only. The democratic institutions were subverted to as much of a likeness of former institutions as Military Government laws permitted. Proportional representations and the list system of voting compounded the evil. Representatives in German Parliaments today owe their primary allegiance to their party. They vote as a bloc. Their purpose would be just as well served if one man sat in parliament with a number of votes equal to his party strength.

Today Germany is a seething cauldron. The Germans have learned that outward appearances are of primary importance and that as long as a façade is maintained, almost anything goes. Consequently, the word "democracy" is one of the most frequently invoked. It shields in key positions professional soldiers who, because debarred by law from joining the Nazi party, now pose as anti-Nazis. Democracy has become what is pleasant, a flexible abstraction, adaptable to the needs of the moment, not an idea to be understood,

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but an expediency to be exploited. Democracy means that one should forget
the past and stick together against the conqueror. Democracy is the covering
up of twelve years of martial glory, the necessity of the hour, the forms of
which are strange, but whose representatives are quite familiar.

Democracy covers a multitude of sins. It is used by a cabinet minister
to justify his voting for Hitler in the German Parliament of 1933. Why, he
avers, to give Hitler dictatorial powers, was a vote for democracy. The more
power Hitler had, the quicker would be his ruin. If the calculation did not
work out, it was the Americans' fault, who had supported Hitler financially.

The threat of the Bavarian Prime Minister on the floor of Parliament to
have a particularly obdurate opposition member arrested is merely another
indication of the superficial hold that real democracy has in Germany.

Today, three years after V-E day, the U. S. is in many ways in a worse
position than at the end of the war. The anti-Nazis are bitter and dis-
illusioned. The great mass of the population see in our vacillating policy,
our ever greater turning over of responsibility, a confession of failure.
Since no major policy of the U.S. has ever been pushed to completion, the
feeling is prevalent that America lacks moral stature. In the testing for
the limits of authority which is one of the outstanding traits of the German
character, no boundaries of American toleration have ever been reached.
Every German probing has found a weakness in the American shell. The attempt
by Military Government to present as pleasant a picture as possible to Congress
has resulted in frequent attempts to suppress unfavorable news. The fact that
the German agriculture ministries in a year of acute food shortage under-
estimated their yield by 75%, was played down. Instead of a severe reprimand,
the responsible ministers received assurances of continued Military Government
confidence.

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It is not surprising to find, therefore, that Dr. Semmler's successor in the Bizonal Economic Council almost immediately repeated the identical charges, if in somewhat more polite form, that had led to Dr. Semmler's dismissal.

Democracy in German eyes has been tried and found wanting. Hitler's allegation that power was the ultimate end of political activity, and the only criterion of values, seems to them confirmed. Germans think that they have become a pawn in power-politics; all American concessions are interpreted in this fashion. With the self-righteousness of people who feel they have been correct all along, German governmental officials present their cases. Every move, every speech, is magnified into a portion of the great contest of proving the German's inherent and superior value.

This, too, explains the fact that German officials, carefully refrain from attacking the U.S.S.R. If moral values are indifferent, if power is the ultimate standard, then one must be sure, by all means, to be on the winning side the next time. And Russia, hated though she is, offers in her firmness of purpose, her ruthlessness, her toughness, a greater assurance of strength than the vaillances of the U.S. Military Government. To be sure, every advantage obtainable from America will be accepted, not gratefully, but as a matter-of-fact. Yet, in the final analysis, when the chips are down, the Germans in power today are the last people to count on.

This, then, is the extent of our moral failure in Germany. It is a moral failure, for we started with infinite advantages over the other occupation powers. We were, in the eyes of many sincere Germans, the hope of Europe. It is a moral failure, for we have utterly missed in firing the

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imagination of Germany, or even in impressing them with the vitality of American principles of government. If we keep stressing balance-of-payments, we are merely deferring the issue to the day when another power can outbid us economically.

We will never succeed in Germany as long as intellectuals, political advisors to Military Government, who should know better, deliver themselves of such glib statements as: "Democracy is failing in Germany, for it is difficult for an army, built on autocratic lines, to teach democracy." This begs the issue. It implies that the U.S. Army is curbing natural German inclinations towards more democracy. The contrary is true. It is too little supervision, too little assumption of responsibility, that is to blame for the present impasse. On almost all echelons of government, there are at most two American officers, frequently dependent on their German interpreter, who have the task of supervision. Is it really alleged that these officers with minimal powers hamstring German striving towards democracy?

No, the failure is more basic. It is a problem of lack of convictions among the personnel implementing U.S. policy. Little can be expected in the democratization of Germany if the head of one of the branches of the Political Affairs Division of Military Government can tell an incoming group of new officers to go easy on the Germans for, after all, don't we have poll taxes and lynching in this country? America represents something more than poll taxes, and one does not cure a patient of one disease by injecting him with another one.

The slogan that democracy is learned by practice might be better phrased that democracy can't be learned except by understanding and education. A

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certain firmness of purpose might do more to establish democracy in Germany
than any amount of rhetoric. On the one occasion that Military Government
stood firm, at the threat of a strike in Greater Hesse, German officials
were slavish in their attempt to shift responsibility. It may be laudable
to want to establish American institutions, but democratic principles must
precede. Morphine addicts are not broken of their habit except gradually.

The U.S. mistake then has been to attempt solving a problem formally,
the only solution of which lay in the realization that human beings do not
respond too well to standardization, that varying psychologists need different
remedies. The mistake is in overlooking intangibles that in the long run
could benefit us more than any special orders from Army Headquarters.

I can't help thinking of a young German with whom, at the end of the
war, I had argued all night about the relative merits of democracy vs.
totalitarianism, and whom I took the next day to a concentration camp we had
just captured. When he saw the rows of tar-paper huts, the creatures on
narrow boards who had to be pushed to tell the dead from the living, he
turned to me and said: "All right, I was wrong. But don't you see how empty
the world is without belief. I must believe in order to live."

This, rather than any economic statistics, symbolizes the problem of
Germany.

Are we so weak, so little sure of ourselves, that we could lose 300,000
men in a war, but cannot make people believe in democracy—which is, after
all, believing in themselves?

Such was the case of Dr. Semmler, the head of the Bizonal Economic Council,
the de facto cabinet of Western Germany. Dr. Semmler, a member of the
rightist Christian-Social-Union party, a person who owed his appoint-
ment primarily to American support, nevertheless in 1948, in a public statement,
violently attacked the very basis of American policy in Germany, the Export-
Import program designed to insure dollar-credits for the purchase of food-
stuffs for German consumption. That this man knowingly falsified the very
policy he was charged with implementing is, however, no more significant
than that the violence of his attack on occupation powers omitted the one
country which, both because of Dr. Semmler's political views and because of
its harsh attitude in Germany, one would have expected to be the butt of
his criticism: the U.S.S.R. Why is it that this man, a practical politician,
the head of an organization, at least part of the objective of which is the
economic stabilization of Western Germany to prevent Communistic infiltration,
gratuitously insulted the Commanding General of the American Occupation
Forces, while by implication praising the foresight and tact of the Soviet
Commander? And why did Dr. Semmler's party, upon his dismissal from his position
by the U.S. and British Military Governments give him a rousing vote of confidence?
What could impel the German press, almost without exception, to take this

What could under the German press, almost without exception, save this
by the U. S. and British military governments give him a resounding vote of
confidence?

**Commanders?** And why did Dr. Semmler's party, upon his dismissal from his staff
**forces**, while by implication basing the forecast and fact of the Soviet
**Stratification** identified the Commanding General of the American Competition
economic stabilization of Western Germany to prevent Comunistic influence,
**the head of an organization**, at least part of the objective of which is the
**his criticism**; the U. S. A. R. Why is it that the man, a practical politician,
**the baneful attitude in Germany**, one would have expected to be the butt of
country which, though because of Dr. Semmler's political views and because of
**than that the violence of his attack on occupation powers emboldened the one
policy he was charged with implementing is, however, no more significant
**attila** for German consumption.** That this man knowingly falsified the very
**import process designed to finance collateral credits for the purchase of food-
**violently attacked the very base of American policy in Germany, the Export-
**ment primarily to American aid, nevertheless in 1948, in a public statement,
**rightist Christian-Government party, a person who owed his abhor-
**the de facto cabinet of Western Germany. Dr. Semmler, a member of the

Such was the case of Dr. Semmler, the head of the Bundes Economic Council,
that can be ignored only at a grave risk.

the first attacks of cancer which pass quickly, they are danger signals
of lightning in the dark, if outlines life object but briefly. But, like
of reports, the true nature of our occupation difficulties. Like a stroke
that envelop our German policy a fact that illustrates better than sales
Every so often there emerges out of the mass of official statistics

2

industrialization, in a continent clamoring for consumer goods, was optionally
democratization and democratization) was sincere in its objective. De-

The American policy of the 4th Ds (democratization, de-industrialization,

conditions that beneficently and historically were not receptive,
objective, but a full-fledged application of methods and standards to
For therein lies the key to our failure. It is not so much a mistake in
turn over unlimited freedom to the types of Germany that now exercise it.
It is a valid objection. Yet it remains to be asked that how while it was to
Yes, it will be considered, but other countries did not allow criticism. This
worst of all in the French Zone of Occupation and no such trends are apparent.
will be quick to point to the food situation. Yet the food situation is
still administration to the German, thus itself in this position. Abolishers
its treatment of conquered Germany, just as the latter to turn over the
At last the question arises why the country that has been most fallen in
Socialists, but Communists are manumose in this feeling.

almost universal disdain of the U.S. European democracies, Hassan
a seeking confusion of illustration. Its only common denominator is an
even worse than inequitude and that a self-occupation. Germany today is
reassessate our position when it is too false. There is a type of lefty
extent of our failure in Germany. Statisticians and press-releases will not
democratization or de-identification to the country notwithstanding, the
these questions. Then illustrate, and statistical evidence regarding
No amount of scathing press-releases can opine these facts or answer
the Comintern forces?

Occasion to start a violent disturbance against the democratic activities of

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3

There is no technical way in which moral issues can be solved. And it
is a moral issue whether Germany, the heir of the Bismarckian tradition of
authoritarianism, the Prussian concept of service to the State as an end,
culminating in the Nazi ideology of man's ultimate realization in the mass
and the establishment of success as the only criterion of values, can be
imbued with ideas which are, after all, the very basis of American democracy:
the Jeffersonian belief in the inherent value of the individual, the Puritan
approach to the group as a collection of individuals who by the diversity
of their views contribute to the advancement of the whole. This in its
precise sense is what de-nazification and democratization—the last two
D's—imply. There are, of course, any number of intellectuals, who
demonstrate by charts how economic conditions and balance-of-payments
produced Nazism. But it is exactly these people who have all along mis-
understood the symptoms that Nazism represented and who are responsible
for the impasse of our policy in Germany today.

the worldwide economic depression have had an impact. But Maastricht was above
came from the lower middle-class, hard-hit by the inflation. Accordingly,
Maastricht was NOT an economic movement. It is true, part of its support
for the impulse of our policy in Germany today.

understood the symptoms that Maastricht represented and who are responsible
produced Maastricht. But it is exactly these people who have all along made
democracies by charts how economic conditions and balance-of-payments
DIE—infinitely. There are, of course, an number of officials, who
precipitate an era in which the identification and democratisation—the last two
of their views contribute to the advancement of the whole. This in its
approach to the world as a collection of individuals who by the diversity
the telecommunication belt in the inherent value of the individual, the individual
imposed with ideas which are, after all, the very basis of American democracy:
and the establishment of success as the only criterion of value, can be
enjoying in the Maxi ideology of man's ultimate realization in the mass
authoritarianism, the Prussian concept of service to the State as an end,
if a moral issue whether Germany, the heir of the Prussian tradition of
There is no technical way in which moral issues can be solved. And if
integrated states. These problems were at the core of the basic issue,
evidence to the effect that federal countries are more peace-loving than
Bismarck. Yet these failures are only relative. There is no historical
the central agencies, the Bismarck Economic Council and the "Parliament of
democracies." Even more power is being concentrated in the hands of
experience of most modern states looks good on paper, but if in the process
a mistake and has been abandoned. De-centralization running counter to the

there is no technical way in which moral issues can be solved. And if
integrated states. These problems were at the core of the basic issue,
evidence to the effect that federal countries are more peace-loving than
Bismarck. Yet these failures are only relative. There is no historical
the central agencies, the Bismarck Economic Council and the "Parliament of
democracies." Even more power is being concentrated in the hands of
experience of most modern states looks good on paper, but if in the process
a mistake and has been abandoned. De-centralization running counter to the

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The Nazis came to power because they grasped the psychology of the moment. In place of dry figures, they offered faith, instead of balance-of-payments they asserted belief. They appealed to that most pronounced of all German traits, the quest for certainty in an uncertain world, the desire for understanding the incomprehensible, the mystic drive for an Absolute. The Nazis exploited the instinctive revulsion against the all-pervading rationalism that had merely destroyed and not created. The Nazis were no creatures of economic conditions. Leaders that can believe in victory with Allied armies surrounding Berlin, that study astrology charts and distrust expertness in any field, were more in the nature of Indian dervishes, of vindictive Old Testament prophets. Yet these people ruled Germany for twelve years. Under a reign of unparalleled oppression, under the most thorough propaganda apparatus in history, a new generation of Germans grew up. Can one really assert that all that is needed is to establish a favorable balance-of-trade and Germany will, by definition, become peace-loving and democratic?

become peace-loving and democratic.

Established a favorable balance-of-trade and Germany will, by definition, Germany grow up. Can one really assert that all that is needed is to the most thorough propaganda apparatus in history, a new generation of Germany for twelve years. Under a reign of unrelieved oppression, under despotism, of addictive Old Testament prophecies. Yet these people ruled that superfluity in any life, were more in the nature of Indian with Allied armies arming Berlin, that adroitastrology grants and greatness of economic conditions. Remember that can believe in victory rationalism that had merely cat Approved and not created. The Masses were no Masses exploited the ineffective revolution against the all-pervading understanding the incomprehensible, theistic drive for an absolute. The first, the great for certainty in an uncertain world, the desire for that asserted belief. They supposed to that most pronounced all German In place of dry lignes, they offered faith, instead of balance-of-trades. The Masses came to power because they trapped the pathology of the moment.

and dry statistics.

in this vacuum, no better alternatives were offered, but balanced budgets, republic died because it was boring." He meant that during the republican national law, who about the last regime in exile, once told us: "The German period". A good friend of mine, a German university professor of economics said that was only aggravated by the economic inequality of the debunking, the destruction of everything that seemed permanent, felt a collapse of all airlines which marked Germany between 1918 and 1938. The all an insidious reaction by a cross-section of the population to the

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emphysema.

Nazism, their love for democracy. The youth of Germany was alone and to the 'cause' were the first to project their innocence—'their hatred of who for twelve years had lived with each other in asserting their devotion believed'. And when the criteria came, when everything collapsed, their others and then six years of war. They had sullied and believed and fought and their life. They had spent two years in labor corps, two years in the army put into the nadest of all Nazis. They had done nothing but believe all there was the youth of Germany. In many ways they were the most fanatical, merely to prove that nobody could stand against the community. Isafly, A large group represented the Civil Service and others were forced to join fanatics, there were many opportunists and people who wanted to play it safe. Deteriorating composition of the Nazi party. Reaches the and core of this principle becomes all the more important if one considers the simplest assertion of individuality: individual justice.

away from the idea of "collective guilt" or innocence and begin with the fine ideas of forty years of wittiness and twelve years of Nazism, to feel guilt" as often equallyлоfally asserted. It was a problem of eradicating of punishing the "Inn" by the "Onus", not again was it a problem of "collective De-naturalization was not, as an American general so easily stated, a question of promoting a sense of individuality and sincerely their personal innocence. Not uncommon to find individuals who had perpetuated the most outrageous if not abhorred the German of all personal rationality, and it was indeed to offset the inner logic of the individual. As a member of a group This then was the problem based by Nazism. It had exalted the group

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alone justified their misery would be reconnected.

But now the night was over, and in the dawn of the new day the ideate which
been twelve years of terror. They had been reformed, altered at,जeeed.
their eyes were greemed the Americans as liberators. For them the Mass regime had
had unprecedented misery at the very verge of society, now with tares in
The few anti-Maske who had outlived for years in Concentration Camps, who
Yet, with all these difficulties, there were certain encouraging factors.

confronted. Comb one ever remedy a misguide once made?
who for years had done everything to escape, but were now part of the great
joined the Mass party out of sincere idealism, who had feared their misguide,
of the sort, paid his monthly dues? Then there were individuals who had
at the same corner, quietly, that because he finally, after great turmoil
from politics innocent, and was a little apopheeper, whose horizon ended
of actions? Was a professional soldier who dy being in the army was departed
a rich industrialist, whose financial independence allowed greater freedom
of individuals from office. What nadiricks were to be need? Was a Civil
War.

De-nasification was a more subtle problem than the mere removal of
advantage of the stronger.

Without it the war was reduced to a feat of power, morality became the
American prestige. De-nasification was the feat of America's meekness,
and supervision by certain elements of the population abate the collapse of
Yet, de-nasification is the key to American policy in Germany. It's false
mistake and the previous conviction is not conducive to a strict argument.
De-nasification is out of favor today. Many people think it was a

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of whom some to prove he was a prisoner. To testify for one another became a
fame very fast worked in the same way. A person could call and under
defendant by declaring him guilty must be could prove his innocence, but
had existed before. Law No. 8 had intended to load the scales against the
benefit collectively guilty, a unity of purpose was achieved where none
law No. 8 pocketed envelope on paper, however, by declaring the whole
fugitive.

that joined after the despatch were given a chance to clear themselves before
to the status of military prisoner without any possibility of appeal. Those
individual who had joined the Militaryuty before May 1, 1933, were transferred
offices, on reasonable positions in industry. Two categories were satisfied.
All Germany collectively guilty. Mostuty members were put from public
offices, Military Government Law No. 8 were terminated. This declared
increased U. S. breathe.

action to the German as an indication of worst worth, it would have greatly
the population to identify itself with an American policy. Since decides
the rest work it's ray home. This would have allowed the great majority of
each elimination of the least efficient from public office and feeding
training, and it is now best. Properly the wages system would have been the
today, with two years oflicht, we know that the opportunity was
wasted of military occupation.

were due to military occupation.

The consumers had satisfied them with quality and generally their right, by the
represented suborder values. They had tried faith and it had failed. The
of values that Mean had satisfied, the value of pure strength, that America
never, even the functional base were convinced, by the one criterion

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Penalties ranged from ten years in jail to monetary fines. But it was too late. The degrees of Nazi activity to be determined by all-German tribunals.

From Nationalist Goldstein and Military men, it was too late. This law established when Military Government finally formulated the law for liberation.

But an indication of weakness, a token of softness, of unfeeling, unemerged. To them the American fencemans were not a threat of annihilation, opportunities, the USA who had been stung by the first shock of defeat, only insurmountable turnover of personnel in their immediate area. The accounts of a 300 successful annihilation-saturation, against a background of an forces seemed to be carried out for the record only. They saw flowing

The budget noted that one of the major policies of the Occupation which the title of "mammoth fencemans".

Individuals only to repress them for the same position, at identical salaries, low men. And penitentiary tolerance restricted as far as possible the smooth operation of government. Efforts were consequently made to save of subscriptions. Its God is Efficiency and de-annihilation was understanding of Military Government. The Army by training and personnel is important. The situation was aggravated by the influence of the lower classes as firemen.

To account the very individuals to whom the Occupation forces had subjected Macdavellian among the populations did not fail to press the front of striking regime, for they could find no friends to reason with them. And the more southerns were the persons who had been unmodular even during the last illness. To reason with the presentation involved extrapolation. The chief matter of practical necessity for one day one might need defense witnesses

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was called "political inactivity," implied information about his immediate
causes of?

clear, an unimpressive person before more deserving individuals had been taken
from the crowd, and made him very unappealing. And isn't it unemocratic to
put him out of the house of his neighbor? This, affected
pompeting attack the individual in question had put out a fire in his own
house, and he had not attended to the house of his neighbor. This, affected
by his demobilization board. This entitled the individual to do business,
and who in the near future would join the war party, was refused clearance
closed, whose computer had been induced into the forced labor battalions,
who for twelve years had violently opposed the War, whose shop had been
Two of the most famous examples will be cited here. An individual
march insubordinate, that concept of morality were relative.

became a symbol that individuals was not feasible to stand against the
sullied for it and have been berated for it, were berated again. They
said manifestations. The individual who for twelve years had opposed the War,
unmanned employee, a weapon of personal retribution, a potent organ of
the individual who for twelve years had opposed the War, whose shop had been

De-activation turned into a force. If because a means of stimulating
proportion to their numbers.

reasonability, and in the fashion acquired an influence totally out of
from any future elective office. Only the Committes seemed eager to assume
triumphs because a politicalasad, a sure way to eliminate one opponent
De-activation had a united public opinion against it. Appointment to the

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Now the people understood.

adaptation, adaptable to the needs of the moment, nor in ideas to be understood, now base as anti-Marxist. Democracy has become what it pleases, a flexible, flexible soldiers who, because desired by law from joining the War party, is one of the most frequently invoked. It suffices in key positions to - it maintained, almost anything goes. Consequently, the word "democracy" outward appearances are of primary importance and that as long as a state Today Germany is a securing coalition. The Germans have learned that number of votes equal to the party strength.

Purpose would be that as well served it one man as in parliament with a one their primary reliance to their party. They vote as a bloc. Their of voting combinations exist. Representatives in German Parliaments today Government laws benetited. Proportional representations and the like. systems were supposed to as much of a likeness of former institutions as Military demobilization. It was for the record only. The democratic institutions Democracy was thus ruined by the same effect that had marked

Now the people numerate. How the people understand. How the people went to the polls as they were ordered to. They voted the communications of which were even then totally disrupted. The predictable for three months after the annihilation had no newspapers or mail service, twelve hours, which had found a total war for Western for six days, that Hinter office, that had been exposed to autocratic proclamations, for

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This, too, explains the fact that German officials, carefully refrain from attacking the U.S.S.R. If moral values are indifferent, if power is the ultimate standard, then one must be sure, by all means, to be on the winning side the next time. And Russia, hated though she is, offers in her firmness of purpose, her ruthlessness, her toughness, a greater assurance of strength than the vassillations of the U.S. Military Government. To be sure, every advantage obtainable from America will be accepted, not gratefully, but as a matter-of-fact. Yet, in the final analysis, when the chips are down, the Germans in power today are the last people to count on.

of Europe. If it is a moral failure, for we have already started in giving the
occupation powers. We were, in the size of many other German states, the hope
moral failure, for we started with infinite advantages over the other

This, then, is the extent of our moral failure in Germany. If it is a
down, the German in power today are the last people to count on.
but as a matter of fact. Yet, in the final analysis, when the cause are
even, advantage obtainable from America will be accepted, not frugally,
strength from the advantages of the U.S. Military Government. To be ame,
firmness of purpose, her influence, her strength, a greater assurance of
winning side the next war. And Russia, based though she is, offers in her
the ultimate advantage, then one must be ame, by all means, to be on the
from attacking the U.S.A. It was, of course, the greatest, it power is
This, too, explains the fact that German officials, certainly, remain
of proving the German's inherent and superior virtue.

Many move, easily speech, ischlified into a portion of the great combat
been correct all along. German Government officials present their cases.
in this fashion. With the self-righteousness of people who feel they have
have become a law in power--politics; all American concessions are intuited
only criterion of virtue, assem to them confided. Germans think that they
affection that power was the ultimate end of political activity, and the
Democracy in German eyes has been tried and found wanting. Better, a
chivalrous.

Change, if in somewhat more polite form, that had led to Dr. Semmler's
in the Biennial Economic Council almost immediately repeated the identical
If it is not surprising to find, therefore, that Dr. Semmler's successor

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Just democracy can't be learned except by understanding and education. A

The slogan that democracy is learned by practice might be better expressed with another one.

Polt taxes, and one does not come a patient of one disease by injecting him taxes and thinking in this country? America represents something more than of new officers to do easy on the Germans for, after all, don't we have poll political affairs Division of Military Government can tell an income group the democratisation of Germany in the end of one of the branches of the among the personnel implementing U.S. policy. Little can be expected in No. 3. The failure is more basic. If it is a problem of lack of convictions democracy?

that these officers with minimal powers pampering German arriving towards German interpreter, who have the task of supervision. Is it really affected there are at least two American officers, frequently dependent on their to frame for the present influence. On almost all telephone of government, too little supervision, too little examination of responsibility, that is German institutions towards more democracy. The contrast is true. It is this basic the issue. It implies that the U.S. Army is coming natural little effort for an army, built on automatic lines, to reach democracy." of such kind statements as: "Democracy is failing in Germany, for it is advices to Military Government, who should know better, deliver themselves We will never succeed in Germany as long as infidels, politicians

we are merely deterring the issue to the day when another power can oust American principles of government. If we keep addressing balance-of-balance, imagination of Germany, or even in expressing them with the vitality of

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all, believing in themselves?

men in a war, but cannot make people believe in democracy—which is, after
all, so weak, so little, and so weak, that we could lose 300,000
germany.

This, rather than any economic statistics, symbolizes the problem of
the world if without perfect, I must believe in order to live.
Turned to me and said: "All right, I was wrong. But don't you see how empty
narrow paths who had to be paved to tell the dead from the living, he
just captured. When he saw the rows of tar-paper huts, the creatures on
follistatanium, and whom I took the next day to a concentration camp we had
war. I had strung all night about the relative merits of democracy as.

could benefit me more than any specialist organ from Army Headquarters.

The mistake is in overlooking intangibles that in the long run
remedy. The mistake is in overlooking intangibles that in the long run
reason too well to standardization, that anything background needs different
the only solution of which lay in the realization that human nature do not
The U.S. mistake then has been to attempt solving a problem formally,
preceded. Monoprene addicts are not proven of their habit except by success.
To want to establish American institutions, put democratic principles must
were existed in their attempt to shift responsibility. It may be improbable
at least film, at the threat of a strike in Greater Hesse, German officials
than any amount of rhetoric. On the one occasion that military Government
certain timeliness of purpose might do more to establish democracy in Germany

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[Y]

matter of practical necessity for one day one might need defense witnesses oneself. To testify for the prosecution involved ostracism. The chief sufferers were the persons who had been unpopular even during the Nazi regime for they could find no friends to testify for them. And the more Machiavellian among the populace did not fail to press the irony of bringing to account the very individuals to whom the Occupation Forces had appeared as liberators.

The situation was aggravated by the indifference of the lower echelons of Military Government. The Army by training and temperament is impatient of abstractions. Its God is Efficiency and de-Nazification was undermining the smooth operation of government. Efforts were consequently made to save key men. And benevolent tolerance greeted such subterfuges as discharging individuals only to rehire them for the same position, at identical salary with the title of 'manual laborer.'

The population noted that one of the major policies of the Occupation Forces seemed to be carried out for the record only. They saw glowing accounts of a 90% successful de-Nazification, against a background of an only insignificant turnover of personnel in their immediate area. The opportunists, the Nazi who had been stunned by the first shock of defeat, re-emerged. To them the American leniency was not a sign of magnanimity, but an indication of weakness, a token of softness, of naivety.

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Today, three years after V-E day, the U. S. is in many ways in a worse position than at the end of the war. The anti-Nazis are bitter and dis-illusioned. The great mass of the population see in our vacillating policy, our ever greater turning over of responsibility, a confession of failure. Since no major policy of the U. S. has ever been pushed to completion, the feeling is prevalent that America lacks moral stature. In the testing for the limits of authority which is one of the outstanding traits of the German character, no boundaries of American toleration have ever been reached. Every German probing has found a weakness in the American shell. The attempt by Military Government to present as pleasant a picture as possible to Congress has resulted in frequent attempts to suppress unfavorable news. The fact that the German agriculture ministries in a year of acute food shortage underestimated their yield by 75%, was played down. Instead of a severe reprimand, the responsible ministers received assurances of continued Military Government confidence.

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It is not surprising to find therefore, that Dr. Semmler's successor in the Bundesrat, the Economic Council, almost immediately repeated the identical charges, if in somewhat more polite form, that had led to Dr. Semmler's dismissal.

Democracy in German eyes has been tried and found wanting. Hitler's allegation that power was the ultimate end of political activity, and the only criterion of values, seems to them confirmed. Germans think that they have become a pawn in power-politics; all American concessions are interpreted in this fashion. With the self-righteousness of people who feel they have been correct all along, German Governmental officials present their cases. Every move, every speech, is magnified into a portion of the great contest of proving the German's inherent and superior value.

This, too, explains the fact that German officials, carefully refrain from attacking the U.S.S.R. If moral values are indifferent, if power is the ultimate standard, then one must be sure, by all means, to be on the winning side the next time. And Russia, hated though she is, offers in her firmness of purpose, her ruthlessness, her toughness, a greater assurance of strength than the vacillations of the U. S. Military Government. To be sure, every advantage obtainable from America will be accepted, not gratefully, but as a matter-of-fact. Yet, in the final analysis, when the chips are down, the Germans in power today, are the last people to count on.

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We will never succeed in Germany as long as intellectuals, Political Advisors to Military Government, who should know better, deliver themselves of such gib statements as: "Democracy is failing in Germany, for it is difficult for an army, built on autocratic lines, to teach democracy." This begs the issue. It implies that the U. S. Army is courting natural German inclinations towards more democracy. The contrary is true. It is too little supervision, too little assumption of responsibility, that is to blame for the present impasse. On almost all echelons of Government, there are at most two American officers, frequently dependent on their German interpreter, who have the task of supervision. Is it really alleged that these officers with minimal powers hamstring German striving towards democracy?

No, the failure is more basic. It is a problem of lack of convictions among the personnel implementing U. S. policy. Little can be expected in the democratization of Germany if the head of one of the branches of the Political Affairs Division of Military Government can tell an incoming group of new officers to go easy on the Germans for, after all, don't we have poll taxes and lynching in this country? America represents something more than poll taxes, and one does not cure a patient of one disease by injecting him with another one.