K: My experience is I have never had problems with strong men.

E: I will say this, if Holton won't take it

K: If Holton won't take it I will stick with Davis.

E: OK, I don't know when he is available.

K: Well he is available now. I might go to the Middle East, leaving Thursday night. I don't suppose you would want to go along?

E: I'll be glad to go along. Anything you want.

K: I'll kill you on the next one.

E: Laughter, Well, I'll be glad to go. I'll be in the morning.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: NARA Date: 6/15/58</td><td>EO 123958</td></tr></table>

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER ________ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON

Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger

January 8, 1974

6:05 pm

S: I am not going to a dinner this evening. I am playing it cool.

K: Who is giving the dinner?

S: Plimsoll, the Ambassador.

K: He didn't even ask me. I have been told he is one of the better ones and at the reception yesterday, he told me he wanted to help straighten out the relationship.

S: And here is his Prime Minister saying the alert was

K: No, he pulled back from that.

S: Well, he is

K: He is SANITIZED

S: Yes.

K: I would let him know that we are highly displeased.

S: OK.

K: Let me .. you noticed my briefer backed you up.

S: No, I'll ask Friedman about it.

K: Just stick with it. I may go to Egypt at the end of the week, in the process of pulling this across.

S: Damn good. You talked to the President about this?

K: Yes, he wants me to go.

S: Good. Good time of the year to go to Egypt.

K: Yes.

S: Take care.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>Authority: E012958</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>For NARA Date: 4/28/84</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

January 8, 1974

6:07 PM

K: I just found out that Governor Holton of Virginia may be interested in the Congressional Relations job. I don't think I could pull him off still.

SANITIZED

S: I've heard rumors that Holton is very good.

K: You don't think I'll hurt his (Davis) feelings?

S: I don't think he's that eager to __.

K: I talked to Timmons, he's enthusiastic. I wonder if I should call Holton.

S: Why not? It may be useful.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: NARA Date: 6/26/64</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr></table>

TELECON

David Abshire/Secretary Kissinger

January 8, 1974

7:36 PM

A: I think Governor Holton would have a brilliant appeal. Everything checks out. Civil rights appeals to liberals. He's a young 49 or 50. Getting Governor Holton in there would help you.

K: Let me call him.

A: I think it would be great. The problem would be getting him to take it. It just would be great in every way. What I would do is tell him you're going to build up the job. That you want to take him on some of your trips. Give him two top deputies. Pick two top deputies. I think a third deputy should be added to the bureau.

K: Let me talk to him.

A: I think it's great.

K: Good. Thank you David. I'll call you.

END.

<table><tr><td>By</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td> Authority</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td> NARA Date</td><td>6/9/64</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

January 8, 1974

7:40 PM

(Missed the first part)

D: But I have the full text of the meeting. They understood very well there is no problem whatsoever. They were ready to discuss ____.

K: That's on Monday.

D: No - even on Friday. They remarked several times they're interested.

K: At any rate they told the Russians that you proposed a 45 kilometer withdrawal.

D: That's ridiculous. That have never been even an informal proposal. That was when he was trying to understand the possibility of ____.

K: Someday you have to explain that to me. What purpose ____.

D: He thought he was playing with models. That is the answer.

K: As a diplomat, why should you play with models when you have no intention of using them.

D: I agree with you. That was why he was ____ he didn't know what harm it could do.

K: I told him about that plan of having UN forces move into the West Bank.

D: That's nonsense.

K: They gave that on January 1.

D: There is nothing in what happened on Friday that can ____.

K: I know it can, and it has. The only question is, now, one more cleverness and we are done for.

D: Ever since we had that meeting on Friday, everything has changed. I can understand quite ____ going in the other direction.

K: Just for my information, on whose authority did he do it?

D: He did it because Dayan was away, and he thought he would

<table><tr><td>By: 01 NARA Date 6/26/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr></table>

go one step further. I agree with you that it could have been
interpreted wrongly.

K: Dobrynin has no information of his own. He read me what
the Egyptians told him. We went through this with the Yarov
thing.

D: The Yarov thing was worse, but I agree with you. I have
nothing to say to that.

K: No more leaks.

D: No more leaks. I just passed this information to
for our own personal made the official announcement. I'm
sorry about that.

K: That's alright. I just want to make absolutely sure that
I didn't

D: OK.

END.

<table>
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      <td> Authority</td>
      <td>EO 12958</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td> NARA Date</td>
      <td>6/8/64</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELECON
Governor Holton/Secretary Kissinger

January 8, 1974

7:45 PM

H: How are you Mr. Secretary?

K: How are you Governor? Governor I was going over some personnel problems here in the Department. I have been looking for months for an Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations and I took the liberty of thinking that perhaps you might be interested in such a position. It requires close association with me on details of foreign policy.

H: Dr. Kissinger, I could consider that very very ______. I would want to have you assure me that it would mean close association with you. I can't be a messenger boy at this stage.

K: If I wanted a messenger boy I could take a Junior Foreign Service officer. I know you want to be a man of your own ideas. Of course, to some extent, there is an element of messenger boy in the sense as to politics.

H: I don't mean to belittle it. I understand the messenger boy thing. I would be your man.

K: It would be essential for ______. The only way we can do ______. So that the Congress will listen to him as a man in his own right.

H: Would Congress know if I speak, I would be speaking for the Secretary?

K: Yes. You would be sitting in on staff meetings. You would, of course, take trips with me. I would do a number of Congressional briefings myself. So you would be my ______ in all of that. What somebody of your stature would do for me. A lot of thinking entirely for myself. The only way you could take over ______. To have you work closely with me.

H: You describe it as I would like to do it. I must discuss this first with my wife. She's very interested.

K: Can you call me tomorrow?

H: This is a great advantage if I want to do it.

K: I haven't discussed it with anyone else. You can see it's advantages if you want to do it.

H: Thank you very much. I'll call you tomorrow.

END

TELECON

January 8, 1974

7:50 PM

K: I think the chances are 4 out of 5 he'll do it.

A: Wonderful. That's marvelous.

K: All I have to do is handle my boy Davis. I don't think Davis was all that interested.

A: I think we got a little concerned ______.

K: The way he was treated by Timmons.

A: Henry, for the overall, I'm not concerned. I just think this is great. I think Nat would appreciate that. He's a good man. I think he would have done a good job.

K: He's a ______.

A: That just would be tremendous. I just ______ any little think I can do. I just think it's great.

K: Good. OK.

A: I would add a third deputy.

K: I'll get him to talk to you as soon as it's done.

A: I've got some ideas on that whole operation.

K: He would be much more ______ as with the policy than a Foreign Service officer.

A: He's got the advantage of not even being a formal Senator or Congressman, he's a governor. I just think that's tremendous.

K: Good, wonderful. Dave, many thanks.

A: I'll be in touch.

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

January 8, 1974

8:20 PM

K: Al, how are you? I have a minor problem. I've been thinking of Nat Davis as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. I've now had a better idea, which is, Governor Holton from Virginia wants the job.

H: That's great.

K: Timmons is beside himself. Holton had remember he sat next to me at a football game. I just took a chance and called him. He said he wanted to think about it over night. Chances are 4 out of 5 he'll take it.

H: We've been trying to find a place for him. He was talking about some cabinet level.

K: He wants to check with his wife.

H: That's the best news I have had here.

K: You take a load off my mind. I think it's a better solution.

H: I think the boss will be delighted.

K: I think it will give us some strength.

H: He got the horses end.

K: I'm sending out those 2 letters which will be released Thursday to get two more days of ____. You should announce it at San Clemente. That will give us a ____.

H: You'll give us a text?

K: Don't you think that would be best if I announce it.

H: That's exactly the way to do it.

K: He had not done anything any how. I think if the Israelis had been _______. We would really make it, but the hell with it.

H: I wish you luck.

K: What?

<table><tr><td>By: AT NARA Date: 6/26/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

January 8, 1974

S: On the Nat Davis thing. Jerry Jones is doing them. He thinks it is easier for him to make the contacts.

K: OK.

S: George Gowan called who talked with Al about the Presidential letters. Who can I work with at State on this? Who is handling it.

K: Donaldson. But they are only to announce the fact of the letters. Not release them.

S: Announce tomorrow.

K: That the President has sent letters to the following consuming countries and the members of the EC....and the Secretary of State has invited the Secretary-General of the OECD, because he is on my level.

S: And the letters will be released Thursday morning and you and Simon are giving a joint-conference Thursday afternoon.

K: Yes, the letters released from San Clemente Thursday morning.

S: Dan Rather called and said CBS is doing a special on the Middle East alert and he wanted to see the Sit Room.

K: Do it but say you were sitting under the table taking notes because you are not a regular member and you were the only Christian in the room.

S: (Laughter) OK. I'll show him, but no pictures of course.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT<br/>NARA Date: 4/29/74</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

2

H: What did he say?

K: Well, it was a novel idea--he said if it is to be done, it better be done before you get used up.

H: That's right.

K: I did it in the context of what is needed to make the military responsive to political needs.

H: Hm huh.

K: I was you know--we were going through the list of possible assets.

H: Yeh, yeh.
Little thin over there.

K: That's what we concluded.
But Al we better get an answer by noon on this.

H: All right Henry. You are going to send the cables out.

K: There is only the cable from Cairo.

H: Okay, I'll know when won't let him see that.

K: No, no, why not. That just says Sadat wants me.

H: Okay. Okay.

K: But the Israelis have asked for me to do it. I think it is the only way if you want it done within a week, that's the only way to get it done. Otherwise, you've got a six week negotiation with uncertain outcome.

H: That's right.

K: And tell him we will stage it so that the embargo lift--first of all that he will announce the settlement, not I and that the embargo lifting will be done by him. Anyway he can have my resignation. After last night, I don't think there is a basis for my continuing anyway.

H: Yeh, I don't know what the hell that's all about.

K: What ever it is all about--Al--it means he's been in separate communications with the foreign government in the middle of a crisis.

H: ---some first-class jerk called him in the middle night says _________
in the movie

Page 3

K: No, it's been going on for a week Al and Rose told Scowcroft two weeks ago they were in touch with Numayri and to keep me out of it--or a month ago--Scowcroft told me about it at the time and I just thought it was some first-class jerk carrying things back and forth and I never thought anyone could take Numayri seriously--here is a guy who can't event try two ____ assassins of an American ambassador.

K: Yeh, that's right. Henry, as soon as he gets circulating this morning, I'll be to him.

K: Good, thank you.

Telcon
Joe Sisco
Secretary Kissinger
1/9/74; 9:24 a.m.

K: Joe.

S: Mr. Secretary, there are several things we need to do this morning in connection with the visit.

K: Well, first of all, they sent me over here the cable on the administrative thing but they haven't given me the substantive cables. There must be a substantive cable.

S: Oh, there is. I will call Pickering and find out why you got only the administrative cable because there is the cable which says okay.

K: Well, wait a minute, here we are. No, no, that's my outgoing. They didn't give me the reply.

S: Well, I can read it to you if you like.

K: Well, could you.

Loutfi

S: Undersecretary KIMKIM said he had a telephone call from Fahmi in Aswan indicating that President Sadat concurs in your coming on Friday directly to Aswan as suggested.

K: And do they understand that I am going to shuttle back and forth?

S: They do because you indicated that and I am assuming that Herman -- there is nothing in the cable that says this -- that Herman gave them a full picture. Herman then goes on to say that in answer to my query whether Fahmi still planned to depart for Moscow Saturday, Loutfi didn't know and he said he hasn't discussed this matter with Fahmi. Loutfi urged -- asked for the aircraft number and the flight and so on, which there was one other cable that went out.

K: You know the Koreans are flying out of Aswan.

S: Koreans?

K: North Korean fighters.

S: Military thing. Herman has sent one in saying the reporters have to be careful about photographs and that kind of thing. What I think needs to be done -- )1) We are getting over to you a suggested announcement as well as some Q&A's because we think some questions will arise. Secondly I assume you cleared this with Dinitz in terms of making this announcement at noon. And if you have, can I send a brief cable telling Keating otherwise

<table><tr><td>By</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DT</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date</td><td>4/8/64</td></tr></table>

2

Keating will hear it over the radio.

K: Yes.

S: Third, I think you ought to call Waldheim sometime this morning to let him know what you are going to do.

K: Good idea.

S: And I am now preparing a very brief message -- one for Saqqquaf and Rifai just leetting them know before the announcement what you are going to do.

K: Good but you let Atherton draft the Saqquaf one because you are Under Secretary for Political Affairs of every country except Saudi Arabia.

S: All right. (Laughter) My job is being reduced already.

K: That's right. I just wanted you to know that.

S: By the end of this three-year stint, we'll add up and see how well or poorly I have done with Saudi Arabia.

K: You are giving me more time than I give myself.

S: Well, whatever. Life is short.

K: Will you take three weeks.

S: Three weeks or whatever. Now is there anything else that comes to your mind that we ought to . . .

K: No, can you get all of this stuff over here to the White House fast.

S: Yes. The announcement and the Q&A's I am sending up on the wire now to you.

K: Okay.

S: You will take care of the telephone call to Waldeheim.

K: Yes and I have to make a call to Dobrynin, too.

S: Yeah.

3

K: Now you know of course the Egyptians have briefed the Soviets that the Gur thing was a proposal.

S: Oh they have. This I didn't know.

K: Yes, because that's what Dobrynin told me yesterday. So I want to meet with you when I get over there say around 11:30 and Atherton, to plan just where the hell that leaves us all.

S: Well I don't believe that based on what we're getting from Herman that the Egyptians really believe this and you know I have a feeling this is another Russian ploy applying pressure.

K: That's right. Well the Russians then wanted to know what the Russians are confused about is where the line of disengagement is so I said that if I know the Israelis it's probably somewhere near Alexandria so when they said 45 kilometers.

[Laughter]

But it did confuse them. They said 45 kilometers is what Gur used so I said well, if I understood the Israelis at all that's between the main forces and if I understood the Israeli proposal it says that the Egyptian main forces should be way back of the Canal.

S: Sure.

K: Well we can play with this....

S: I think there is a problem as a result of what Gur has done but I have think you've made it crystal clear that the Israelis have not put anything on the table and particularly in that cable as you revised it last night -- my cable. You made this very very clear.

K: Do you think Herman presented that.

S: There isn't any doubt. Herman is the most precise guy in the world. You don't have to worry about that.

K: Alright. Get that stuff over here.

TELCONE

Sisco/HAK

1/9/74 - 9:56 a.m.

K: Hello. Joe, shouldn't you -- I've called Cromer -- should you call the French and German Ambassadors.

S: I think so. I'll do that. I think that's enough. I don't think we have to tell anybody else.

K: The Japanese.

S: The Japanese. That's it. I'll take care of all three of these.

K: Will you take care of those. Call the Japanese first.

S: Alright.

K: Say it was just decided this morning. Has somebody told the Israelis?

[Sisco has already hung up so HAK calls Dinitz]

TELCONE

Dinitz/HAK

1/9/74 - 9:59 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I have missed hearing from you. Where were
you all night?

D: I thought I would give you one evening a break.

K: OK. Had you been told that I'm definitely going.

D: Yes, you told me.

K: Well, we haven't had the confirmation yet from the Egyptians and
we have it now.

D: I see. I was figuring that that was certain yesterday when you
told me but...

K: So then he is going to announce it at noon today. Now please hold
the position in Israel that you have not yet made a concrete proposal.

D: Yes.

K: Yes, but you linked it to my -- to there not being a concrete trip.
But you see now that there is a concrete trip now maybe the other thing.

D: I already took care of it. The trip will become concrete by noon
the proposal will not.

K: OK. But will you make that clear.

D: Right. I have already done so I reemphasize.

K: But I mean let them in Israel say they are now waiting for me
in order -- before they can develop a concrete proposal. Do you think
they can say that.

D: Yes. For the Secretary before developing a concrete proposal.
In fact tomorrow I'm speaking to the ......

K: I don't -- but can they say that in Jerusalem.

D: They will and I will say it here too. I'm speaking to the National
Democratic club tomorrow so... But they will say it today in Jerusalem.

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K: Good. Then my plan is then I will arrive in Jerusalem Saturday night and I haven't decided yet whether to leave Sunday night or Monday morning.

D: Well, I have said to tentatively schedule a Saturday night dinner session and meetings all during Sunday and if there need be then you'll stay overnight. We'll be very glad to have you.

K: Good. Where is it. In Jerusalem?

D: I didn't hear from them yet but I'm pretty sure that it will be Jerusalem. It's nicer anyhow.

K: It's nicer in Jerusalem?

D: Of course. In terms of more quiet, nicer atmosphere, nicer city too.

K: It is a lovely city. If I stay Sunday night you'll arrange an active night life for me.

D: That could be done. I'll tell them to keep Sunday night open and then we can have dinner with Dayan and then maybe go out to the night spots.

K: But how would I get to Tel Aviv?

D: By car. It's 55 minutes drive. It's no problem.

K: Oh really.

D: Or by helicopter. 10 minutes only.

K: We can worry about that later. We can plan it because we can plan it in such a way that it looks... so something concrete came out of it.

D: Right. That I told them to plan the meeting Such that it will be a hard negotiating day. And then that we will have to also...

K: But let's talk about Syria while I'm there.

D: I will mention it to them.

K: You know I'm not eager to do it but it could serve a little bit maneuvering. I mean we'll have to talk about it sooner or later anyway.

D: Right. OK. I will tell them that maybe they will prepare some talks

K: And what this engagement scheme might look like out there.

D: That's what I mean. But you have no plan of going to Syria this time.

K: Well I haven't -- frankly I thought I might leave it up to Sadat. If it helps him to be able to tell Asad that I'm going. I might go for a day and then of course I'd raise the prisoner issue.

D: Yes. Because I know that our people will not consider talking business to the Syrians before they make this move on the prisoners.

K: That's understood. That's clearly understood. And you will come under no pressure from us in that respect.

D: I understand. Good, so I will tell them about the possibility of jotting down some thoughts on the Syrian separation.

K: I think we ought to talk about it. It's going to come up. We have a day -- we don't really have a hell of a lot to talk about in the other disengagement.

D: Right. We'll do this.

K: Good. And I'm bringing along Bunker, Sisco, Atherton and I'm bringing along the head of our legal department, somebody called Maw, who I'm grooming really to become more substantive.

D: Yes. I think I saw him once when Eban was here you brought him in.

K: Yes, he's outstanding. He was senior partner in Kreber, __ & __.

D: Good so I'll inform them about this too that you're coming with... You are not taking Eagleburger with you.

K: Well, he's been sick.

D: Yes, he couldn't take the pace.

K: I'll take him if he absolutely wants to go but I would like him to get a rest.

D: And Peter is coming of course.

K: Of course Peter is coming.

D: Can't move without him.

K: Your source of information.

D: He's such a lovely boy. He's afraid to ask me even how the weather is. Maybe he would leak....

K: I have said he is the only person I know who went from boyhood to sainthood without the convening manhood.

D: That's excellent.

K: OK.

D: Fine, so you will be leaving by tomorrow night.

K: Midnight. When are you leaving.

D: I'm leaving tomorrow afternoon about 6:00. In fact I'm taking my daughter with me because....

K: Mr. Ambassador, for 6 hours I'll be without your supervision I may take a girl out. Is that alright.

D: Well, if it's alright with Nancy it's alright with me. I wouldn't say a thing.

K: OK. Well, I'll do anything else to assure you, for six hours I won't do anything serious.

D: Fine, I appreciate it.

K: Like my mother-in-law used to say to me. When I'm gone you'll appreciate me.

You know the story -- where one fellow says to the other

D: So you did huh? / You know I'm going to get married. He says, who is the lucky girl. He says their mother. [laughter] So you don't feel there would be need for us to meet.

K: No, we'll meet for half an hour.

<table><tr><td>By: NARA Date 6/26/58</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELCON
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/HAK

January 9, 1974 - 10:16 a.m.

W: This is Waldheim speaking.

K: Hello Mr. Secretary General. How are you?

W: My very best wishes for the new year.

K: Good wishes for the new year to you Mr. Secretary General.

W: I wish you good success, good health and good nerves.

K: The latter I need more than anything.

W: I understand that fully. Thank you very much for your kind letter. I answered it immediately.

K: I have received it and I'm very grateful to you. Mr. Secretary General, I called you to tell you we've been trying to get the Israelis to come up with a complete proposal. You are of course familiar that they put out models and they destroy them and they dance around. So the President has therefore asked me to go to Israel to force them, force them is the wrong word, but see whether I could get a concrete proposal.

W: Yes.

K: And if that succeeds we will then inform the Egyptians and then have it put up in Geneva. I just wanted you to know Mr. Secretary General that I will be just taking a quick trip to with a stop in Egypt and to Tel Aviv and then I'll come right back here. Of course we will keep you immediately informed.

W: I had the intention to contact you from my side but I highly appreciate your calling me. I hope this trip will be successful and that we can overcome the difficulties. I had thought that it was more or less settled, this disengagement, of course not definitely. But I had a good feeling that this disengagement problem will be settled within the next few weeks, before the end of the month. Do you still feel that this is possible.

K: I still think this is possible but we were afraid from the way these talks were going in Geneva that they were talking themselves into a deadlock.

W: Yes. Well if you can come out there. I thought this was in connection with the fact that the Israeli government didn't want to make any final decision in this regard before the new government was.

K: That may be the case. And I think it is going to make good progress.

W: About this misunderstanding apparently during the Dayan visit with you. You know that our people did not leak anything.

K: No, there was no misunderstanding. We just wanted to find out what your understanding was. There was no problem.

W: I'm glad to hear that. Because we were not quite sure. We had the impression that perhaps the Israelis thought that....

K: No, we just wanted -- I wanted to understand from your people because we were getting one report from the Israelis and a different report from the Egyptians.

W: About the models...

K: Yes, so we wanted to find out what your people thought.

W: No, they were very clear in regard to this and they only spoke of models yes?

K: Yes. Although frankly you know from a diplomatic point of view I've never heard a procedure where you put up a model...

W: There is apparently thought that the Israelis didn't want to put forward concrete proposals.

K: But you know it's dangerous to put up a model that you're not willing to accept.

W: No, I'm very glad that you have this approach. I think it is really necessary and high time now that they are coming out with concrete ....

K: Well, you see my concern Mr. S. G. is, if everybody waited for the elections. Now if we are all waiting for the cabinet it can be February and the President thought whether, if we could crystallize a proposal we will then have it negotiated in Geneva.

W: Exactly.

K: But Alternatively what I would do if we can get an agreement in principal on something I would write you a letter the way I did the 6 foreign agreements. And send it to you and then you could handle it the way you handled the other thing.

W: Fine. I would certainly appreciate this procedure very much indeed.

2

TELCONE

Gov. Linwood Holton/Kissinger

10:32 a.m. - 1/9/74

K: Hello.

H: Mr. Secretary, Governor Holton. You've got yourself a man.

K: Well, I am delighted that you are doing it. It means -- to tell you the truth, I already offered it to someone in the State Department - the best foreign service officer I have. I had offered it to a man whom I really made Under Secretary. It is going to be painful to me to tell him I wanted someone more politically astute.

H: Oh, I recognize that. I hope I didn't breach any confidence by talking to Governor Rockefeller last night.

K: Oh, no.

H: He told me he left your office thinking this was done and couldn't be undone.

K: Afterwards I thought about it and said why not go for the best man.

H: We are flattered. My family is one who discusses things like this and the children are delighted that you chose me.

K: I hadn't even told this to Nelson. When he left my office he had to think it was done and I couldn't do anything. Lin, here is the procedure. We have to go through a security check so it can't be announced for about a week. That doesn't make any difference to you, does it?

H: Not abit.

K: Also, I am going Thursday night to Egypt and Israel again and I ought to be back by the middle of next week. Then, with your approval, I ought to announce it next week or the following week. I want to be in the city when it is announced so I can make a personal comment on it.

H: That's all right. I finish this job on Saturday noon this week. There are a couple of details I need to mention. I am going to have a helluva problem adjusting to a salary when I have had all the other things. What is the salary?

2

K: 42.5 or maybe less. I don't know for sure. It could be 38.5.

H: Will you do everything you can to get the highest possible salary.

K: I will get you the highest salary the law permits. But I think that is absolutely fixed by law.

H: But if you can get me the highest. One other thing is an appropriate time to tell Hugh Scott.

K: We are going to tell Hugh Scott. Give me a few days. I have got to handle that State Department fellow first.

H: I understand.

K: Certainly, we all have to tell Hugh Scott, but if you want to do it first that is fine.

H: He won't violate the confidence, will he?

K: (Laugs)

H: Or will he? He is my key man over there, I've got to tell him.

K: You have got to tell him but wait until I get back here. I will talk to you again before . . .

H: Thank you. I look forward very much to working with you. When do you think I would be coming up there?

K: Well, you have to be confirmed. I will put up your name on January 21st and I think they'll confirm you in a week and I will swear you in so by February 1st you ought to be aboard. I want you to get on top of that Congressional session fast.

H: I want to do that. I am very excited about it.

K: You can teach me a helluva lot about politics. Where are you now?

H: In Richmond. I will be in Roanoke in my home. I'm listed in the phone book but I don't remember my number.

K: Be sure my office knows where to reach you.

H: Right.

K: Good, and I will talk to you when I get back.

TELCONE
Secretary Kissinger - Governor Rockefeller

January 9, 1974

11:25 a.m.

K: Will you stay out of my office from now on? You've upset the personnel structure of my whole office. I've just hired Gov. Holton.

R: Already? You're kidding.

K: He just accepted.

R: Oh, Henry, he's the most wonderful person. I'm so pleased it's happened.

K: So, I've got a governor on the political side.

R: I think that's the most exciting thing. I'm so delighted. Really.

K: Well, I called to tell you since I told you I wouldn't do it.

R: I don't know how you did it, and so fast.

K: You must have talked to him.

R: Well I did talk to him, but...he was being offered the head of that railroad, you know...

K: AmTrak.

R: Yes, and I told him I thought that was going to be a headache and couldn't begin to compare ....

K: I think he's going to be terrific.

R: Oh, yes. He's very bright. He's a brilliant guy.

K: After telling you I want to do it I thought about it and thought. I would try it. I had so much opposition by the political people from the other.

R: I have a feeling you won't regret that.

K: I'm sure I won't. Thank you for coming in, too.

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td> Authority: E0 12958</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">NARA Date: 6/8/84</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Jerry Warren/Sec. Kissinger

Wednesday, Jan. 9, 1973

11:45 a.m.

K: Jerry, on this trip, can you say on background that it was
at the specific request of the Israeli Govt and the Egyptian
Govt.

W: Specific request of Israelis...

K: Yes. That I am coming over to work out the details of this
game and of the Egyptians, but don't let them attribute it to
anybody. Deep background. For their guidance. Can it be done?

W: I think so -- at specific request of Israeli Govt and at the
invitation of the Egyptian Govt.

K: Right. If you want to explain why I am going.

W: Yes. To help work out the details.

K: And to see if we can get the process of this negotiation
really underway. You understand if we can get some approaching
of the positions we will then put it into Geneva. O.K.? You
can also say we have talked to the Sec. Gen. of the UN.

W: O.K.

K: And we have also informed our allies and the Soviet Union.

W: O.K. Thank you.

K: Fine.

END

<table><tr><td>By</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td> Authority</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td> NARA Date</td><td>6/8/84</td></tr></table>

TELCONE
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

January 9, 1974

11:50 a.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I was lonely and I thought I would talk to you just to say we have had another day without any leaks from Israel.

D: There was no leak.

K: I know, I just called to tell you you haven't screwed anything up today. Just for the guidance of the press, we have said we are coming out at the suggestion of your government. So don't deny it, will you.

D: No, no. How are you going to present it, that the President....?

K: That the President has sent me to Egypt and Israel to work out more concrete proposals there...to be helpful.

D: Yes. I had a session this morning with your friend Marvin Kalb on his book and I was giving him the scenario of the airlift. When it will be published Schlesinger will not be happy. That's the talk....

K: Was it new to him?

D: Yes. The fact that five days after the war yet Schlesingers office tell me there are five planes a day.

K: We couldn't figure out how to send half a plane.

D: We were talking about the phantoms, you remember.

K: I remember it very well, you came to my office right after that.

D: That was a dramatic night.

K: The Defense people have been told to behave themselves.

D: Good. Schlesinger had breakfast with you yesterday, right?

K: Monday or Tuesday.

D: Yesterday, right. It was a good breakfast I heard. I asked Scowcroft to keep a watchful eye on them. If they don't change policy by Thursday, and we get a good report. If they come again with a negative report, that would not be good.

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2.

K: Can you come at the end of the day for a brief talk?

D: Of course, about 6:30? To the State Department. You never invite me anymore to the White House. Is it because you are ashamed of me?

K: You think that's a more important place? Well if you want to come there you could.

D: I was kidding.

K: I have a limited sense of humor.

D: That's not a fault anybody can accuse you of. Dayan said that about your sense of humor. The trouble is I told him half of the time when you are joking you are really serious.

K: Don't disillusion me.

<table><tr><td>By</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By NARA Date</td><td>6/8/64</td></tr><tr><td>REMARK</td><td>4/28/64</td></tr></table>

TELCON
Sen. Pell - Secretary Kissinger

January 9, 1974

2:40 p.m.

P: I have two points which are somewhat related. First, the constitutive subcommittee on ocean, environment and scientific affairs is in the process of setting up, which was finally enacted into law, is filling the Assistant Secretary job I wanted to put in a word for a fellow for his technical knowledge, background and such, Fitzhugh Green who is one of the candidates on the list. He worked for me setting up __________, worked for me in USIA, then ran for Congress in my state (did not win).

K: What's his name again.

P: Green. His background in oceans, worked with me, in environment he worked with Ruckleshaus, or whoever is running it now, and having run for Congress as a Republican, I wanted to make this push for him as you go over the different names.

P: I appreciate it very much. I haven't looked at his papers yet. I'm not really ready to make that appointment yet. I will do it in the next three or four weeks.

P: Well he's a first class man, of excellent character and he could do the job very well. The other point I'm calling about concerns the Senate resolution calling for some executive response in connection with environmental warfare treaty. The hang-up is not at State but over at Defense. I thought with your double hat (the NSC position as well as the other) there might be something that could be done to get a reaction from the administration to get it moving ahead with the treaty. It has received the approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there was an 80-12 vote in the Senate. The US could take the lead in a field where the determination would have pretty wide acceptance. The Defense reasons for holding it up are not known to me (maybe they have some hot new intelligence, but) but I thought you might be persuaded to take a look at this and perhaps help to get it moving ahead.

K: Let me take a look at it.

P: Thank you. I highly appreciate it. I do think this is an area that could give us a position in the world we have not had. Thank you and God bless you for being on the phone.

K: If there was a time you couldn't reach me at least on the phone then I should leave.

P: Thank you I appreciate what you say more than I can say.

<table><tr><td>By: 01 NARA Date 6/26/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E0 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

January 9, 1974

5:25 pm

K: I am talking here to the Vice President and I think he ought to get a briefing along the lines of that briefing we had yesterday of the various missile types of the Soviet Union. So that when the SALT issue comes up he can start from a base of knowledge.

S: That would be useful.

K: Why don't you arrange that for him?

S: I will.

K: Get in touch with General Dunn. Let ______ do the briefing. And have them use the charts they used at the Verification Panel Meeting.

S: I agree. I'll set it up.

END

<table><tr><td>By: 10 NARA Date: 6/26/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Secy Schlesinger/Secy Kissinger

8:23 a.m., January 10, 1974

K: Jim, I am off tonight and I just wanted to make sure that when the
Israelis come over today -- they're not seeing you but I understand
they are coming over to see your military people.

S: I believe Wickham has got that straightened out but I'll check on that.

K: Right. I understand that they had a much friendlier message on the
phone. But since that will be the last time they hear from Defense
before I get there --

S: Right.

K: If we could be particularly forthcoming.

S: Right.

K: And this is the best time to wrap it all in together anyhow.

S: No question about that, Henry. I don't know how that got off the rails;
I thought the signals were very clear throughout the system.

K: You know, I'm not saying this critically. I'm just wanting to make sure
that there are no slips. The second problem is Vietnam military
equipment. I feel that if we could get in some visible anti-tank weapons --

S: I've got them working on that now.

K: Good. Terrific.

S: Now, Henry, I remind you of your letters to Sadat and to Faisal in which
we indicated that it would be difficult for us to be forthcoming while being
discriminated against.

K: Right. The strategy that we are pursuing, if you agree, is we will get
the agreement done. And then there will be not one Israeli moving
back a yard until the embargo is lifted.

S: That's fine with me. Just as long as those fellows know who has got
the muscle.

K: There will be no move of Israelis until the embargo is lifted.

S: Great. Now you're talking.

K: Okay.

S: Good piece of work. K: Thank you.

TELCOM
Donald Kendall/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, January 10, 1973

11:10 a.m.

DK: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

DK: Fine, thank you. I don't know whether you have heard but they have kidnapped another one of our people in Argentina.

K: Pepsi?

DK: Yes. They took one in August. I talked to Jamison of EXXON. They took one of their people also. I told him I thought it was about time the US companies called a halt to this. We are not going to pay anymore ransom. The one before they started with a million and a half? and they finally came down to $70,000 and when we got him back turned out he was mixed up in it. This one is for real. They contacted us this morning and told us to name a figure of how valuable he was. Our people are anxious to offer some nominal fee -- enough so they could keep it going -- $110,000. There are eleven guys involved and that would be $10,000 a piece. If I do this, I am planning then to take a full page add in an Argentina paper and will say we are announcing we are not paying anymore ransom money for people. We have advised our people and if they are worried to pull out of the country. Regardless of what they do we are not going to pay anymore -- even if they kill someone.

K: I am in favor of that.

DK: I think the other companies should do that and may be it would be useful for one of your guys down there to call a meeting of the companies down there and call a halt to it. Otherwise, it will just keep on.

K: Good, I agree. I would prefer to wait until Bob Hill gets down there. That must be within a week.

DK: I don't know where he is but I will try and get in touch with him. When you get settled down with your present problem I would like to have lunch with you someday.

K: Good. Let's do that. I will be back by the end of next week. Get in touch with me then.

DK: Good. Thanks.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT<br/>NARA Date: 4/2/44</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

January 10, 1974

6:14 PM

K: That I'm talking to the Egyptian Ambassador today. Or
that I have.

V: That you have. Right, sir.

K: To talk about my forthcoming trip to Egypt.

V: Who was with you, sir?

K: Sisco and Anderson.

V: Fine. OK. I'll make sure, Anything else?

K: NO.

V: Did you get the memo I wrote sir, on a plummers story?

K: I haven't seen the memo yet.

V: I sent the memo earlier today.

K: I'll get the newspaper on the plane. ____ building you up.

V: No problem with the Washington Post.

K: Why?

V: I'm picking up Marilyn Berger and copies of the Post on the
way to the plane.

K: I don't know the story as yet, but I have a rough idea.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date: 6/8/84</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

January 10, 1974

6:38 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: ______ is to get a formal, definite proposal from Israel.

D: Maps so to speak.

K: With a map, so that we don't have to say this is a model
or ______ about 45 kilometer withdrawals. ______ where does it
start. And then I will propose to have it put into Geneva.

D: As a proposal. Then you will go through your representative?

K: Well, I haven't really considered how to do it.

D: I understand. Matter of importance to make a proposal
which could be announced.

K: I will take Bunker with me on this trip. I will not bring
him back here. He will go to Geneva, and I will tell him to
do nothing until I return.

D: Are you going yourself to Geneva?

K: No. I will only go to Cairo and Aswan.

D: I agree. I know - it's a nice place to meet. It serves
American auspices.

K: Exactly. I have no intention of going to Geneva. If
our friend in Amman has a heart attack, than I may jump over
for an hour to the airport. I certainly will not go to
Saudi Arabia and other major ______. I just don't want to
mislead you. If I go to London for instance, I might meet
Douglas Holme at the airport. I will not stay in and other
country.

D: You will be back by a week.

K: I'm certain I will be back by Tuesday night.

D: OK.

K: Well, you know, I can't negotiate this thing, it's too
complicated. My major purpose is to stop the games.

D: To make a proposal and lay it down.

K: And it's too dangerous.

D: It's too important to begin really with something. Really a push for them to go - otherwise for the first time they are sitting together.

K: Exactly.

D: ______ I should think not only ______ but dangerous.

K: Exactly right. And that's why I. ______. It's really a lousy assignment.

D: You mentioned to me on Thursday, maybe Israelis will give you some reply.

K: ______ that she was still sick.

D: They cannot make any decision.

K: They will not give a decision until I get there.

D: ______ reply which you mentioned to me.

K: Didn't you see the statement he made? He came to tell me they wouldn't make a decision until I get there. After our meeting on Tuesday, I called him. ______ until she was well. He didn't ______. That's when I really decided we had to use strong measures.

D: But first you will go to Cairo.

K: I'm just going for a half-day.

D: And then to Israel.

K: Well, the last thoughts that he had ______.

D: He is puzzled.

K: Frankly, between you and me, I don't want to go to Dayan and run to Tel Aviv as if I were an errand boy. I don't have to talk with Dayan until I get their plan.

D: You know the position. There is nothing very much on this.

K: Anatol, as a chess player, you know my tactics, we want to ______ right to Tel Aviv. I want to make them a little nervous.

D: It's a good tactic.

K: That's between you and me.

D: It's quite clear ______. I wish you the very best. Something should be done.

January 10, 1974

6:48 PM

S: He said we move Strausz-Hupe to Sweden. He wouldn't
mind that, I don't think.

K: We don't have relations with Sweden. That has to wait
a while.

S: Rush has to call Firestone before noon tomorrow.

K: I'll let Rush do it, but I don't want to assign something
for Sweden until we talk to the Swedes.

S: The story is going to break tomorrow. Any guidance for me?

K: I haven't read the story. Keep me informed of what it says.
My view is that I should say on the trip that I'm not going to
make any comment while I'm in these negotiations. If forced
into it, I'll say that the investigation was being conducted by
Ehrlichman. Ehrlichman told me some of these allegations,
which happens to be true.

S: Apparently that's where the story comes from. That's what
Timmons says.

K: Those unbelievable SOB's. I don't know what twist they're
going to five the story. I guess it's that we didn't tell
them enough and therefore they had to spy on us. Is that the
twist?

S: That's what I understand - Moorer spies on White House.

K: What can we say? My tendency would be to play it down. To
say the usual bureaucratic stuff. I would not take on the
military.

S: No, I don't think so. And that part probably could be
denied, couldn't it? Any, well, I'm just concerned that while
you're gone we don't make statements that don't fully protect
you.

K: I will not hold still again with what they did on May 22nd
with the National Security statement. Next time I'll take a
public position. Check them out with me before they put it
out.

S: Either no comment or it has to be cleared with you.

K: Well, I'll talk to you later.

END

<table>
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TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

January 10, 1974

7:53 PM

K: ________ energy meeting.

S: You mean for the big international one? I gather that
all sorts of task forces are being set up in the Department.

K: Well, you know task forces are for the birds - they
never produce anything.

S: Why don't I get together with Donaldson in the morning?

K: I want some think-pieces.

S: Maybe Winston and Bill and I should get together.

K: Of ________. Do you think Donaldson can make it?

S: Yes, I think so. I think you have to be patient. It's
all very new and different for him. I think the French will
be a problem. I think we'll have a meeting ________.

K: I think they'll be pigs when they get there.

S: I think they'll be like the Russians in the M__ meeting.
Well, I hope you have a good safe trip.

K: Successful?

S: Give my love to my NATO friends.

K: I won't stop there. I'll send Sisco.

END

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TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Senator Stennis

January 10, 1974, 8:12 p.m.

S: How are you?

K: O.K., Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I'm going off tonight to the Middle East, and I know the story about Admiral Moorer allegedly spying on me is going to hit the newspapers tomorrow.

S: Yes?

K: I just wanted you to know the ______ was handled by Ehrlichman except ______ comments which were made to me. It's possible an absurd charge because Admiral Moorer was a close collaborator of mine. It was this yeoman who was leaking documents, as it turned out, to the newspapers. I have complete confidence in the Chairman. I have no independent knowledge of the allegations. On the face of it, they seem absurd to me.

S: I'm certainly glad that you called me - for you to tell me so directly. I'm glad to know it. I imagine they'll be calling me or Mr. Hebert.

K: I think the Chairman deserves your support, Mr. Chairman. They've attacked so many institutions that I don't know what's going to happen.

S: I don't either. Just between us. I might - I don't like - I might just announce rather early that I was going to go into it, take jurisdiction of it. Otherwise some other Committee might.

K: I'm speaking personally.

S: I want you to

K: On a personal basis, I think that would be a statesmanlike thing to do. I would rather for your committee than some of these that we are out for publicity. You know the military. You understand what various things mean. In Executive Session I would be delighted to tell you everything I know, which isn't a great deal. Just for your information, ______ handled some of the most sensitive things for us - on the China thing, for instance. Why he would want to steal documents is beyond my comprehension.

S: And it's contrary to the pattern of the man.

K: It's contrary to the pattern of the man.

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>Authority: NARA Date: 6/25/58</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr></table>

-2-

S: Well. He called me about 30 minutes ago. Just called me to tell me the thing was coming out. He said he had talked to you briefly.

K: I just wanted you to know. I wouldn't bother you except that I'm going on this trip. I don't feel in foreign countries I should be holding press ____.

S: Well, it's quite helpful for me to have your call.

K: Speaking as friends, some of these people at the White House like Ehrlichman were very often doing these investigations to build up their own importance.

S: I agree.

K: And he may have given it a twist that any knowledgeable man would never put on it.

S: In the atmosphere that's been generated now, some people will believe anything regardless ____.

K: I would think, Mr. Chairman - my knowledge isn't definitive. I'm taking it ____ on my knowledge of the Chairman as a man. To protect the integrity of the military would be a national service. I have no question about the Chairman.

S: I'm just -- that's very good indeed. I remember once you and I were in with the President. I asked about calling Moorer in on a military question. I know how closely you worked together.

K: Exactly.

S: I saw it in operation from time to time. If they call me in the morning, I'll say I don't believe a word of it.

K: You know, there's undoubtedly something to it, but not what they're saying. I wouldn't necessarily assume that no documents were taken, but I don't think the Chairman

S: No party to it at all concerning you.

K: Exactly. I think if you backed up the Chairman

S: Well, I wish you well now on the trip. Walter Cronkite carried a good statement about you tonight, and I've been feeling it every day - appreciating every day what you're doing.

K: You've been a good friend and supporter.

S: You're entitled to any encouragement and support I can give many times over.

K: I'll take the liberty of calling on you when I return.

S: You're doing a great job for our country. Best wishes. Good-bye.

K: Good-bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARA Date

6/26/64

TELECON

Secretary Kissinger/Congressman Hebert

January 10, 1974, 8:22 p.m.

K: I just want to check up how things are going in Louisiana.

H: In Louisiana we have beautiful weather and rotten weather.

K: You've got everything. The reason I called -- I've just been told there's a story breaking in the newspapers about alleged spying by the Joint Chiefs who were <u>supposedly</u> doing ______, and since I'll be in Egypt, I just wanted to say I have no information. It was <u>XXXXXXXX</u> something which was being conducted by Ehrlichman. It's absurd since the Chairman had access to all relevant information. And it's totally inconsistent with his basic pattern as a man anyway.

H: I agree with you.

K: While I'm gone, I'm not going to be making public statements on such a tawdry subject.

H: On the whole, the - and as far as the Committee is concerned, because it involves the military, I'm still affirmative.

K: I just don't think we ought to get the military dragged into this mess.

H: I'm not going to do it. I'm not going to take ______

K: ______ that I have confidence in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

H: I appreciate your call.

K: This is on a personal basis.

H: ______ I'm not going to get involved either. When are you leaving?

K: At midnight. Good, Mr. Chairman, see you when I get back.

H: Good luck to you.

K: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END

<table><tr><td>By: NARA Date: 6/8/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELECON

January 10, 1974

11:50 pm

........

D: It was a misquotation because not only Peter was there but every other newsmen got it.

K: What do you mean Peter was there? Does he accompany you to all your press conferences.

D: No, no. He was escorting me. He accompanied me up to your office. He was standing on the side. I know you would believe me even without Peter. I said we had invited Secretary Kissinger to come to Israel to help us formulate a proposal.

K: The statement was in the Times. It was excellent.

D: Yes and the Post and the ___ . Oswald Johnson was the only one who ...

K: If you would confine your comments to Jewish newsmen whom you could control.

D: I know, I know, but

K: This fellow is Oswald Johnson, who you don't control.

D: Yes, well he wanted to present the article this way. He said the mission, according to the Israelis was initiated by Nixon and Kissinger.

K: My recollection is that it was Dayan.

D: Yes. I said.

K: OK, fine. Will you to the extent that you are asked, now, don't bring it up, that would just call attention to it, to the extent that you can, would you put out the idea that it was done at your request.

D: Of course.

K: It is just for our domestic policies.

D: Of course.

K: Good. I just saw it this morning.

END

<table><tr><td>By: NARA Date: 6/28/84</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>