PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 1, 1976

No. 407

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT A RECEPTION FOR THE HEADS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA DELEGATIONS
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SEPTEMBER 1, 1976

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Let me first of all express my appreciation to all of you for coming here and for giving me an opportunity to talk to you briefly.

My visit here performs several functions. One of them is to provide an alibi for our delegation in case this Conference for any reason should not have the maximum success that it deserves. [Laughter] The second is so that I can get blamed in Washington for any concessions which we may make to you. [Laughter]

But I wanted to say a few words. We have distributed a prepared text of staggering profundity, but I may not understand everything that is in it. [Laughter] So I will stick with that text but make a few extemporaneous observations.

You will all remember, of course, that my native language is German so that if verbs appear only at 10-minute intervals you will understand why. [Laughter]

I believe very deeply, and so do all of my colleagues, that the negotiation in which all of you are engaged is the most significant international negotiation that is now taking place. It is not as dramatic as some other events that catch the daily headlines, but what other group has had the opportunity to establish international norms for three-quarters of the earth's surface? When else have a group of diplomats been able to assemble and establish a legal order for a part of the globe that contains so much of our resources and that will affect so much of our future?

And I know that in the tedious negotiations that go on daily, we will never lose sight of the fact that we're engaged on a historic enterprise and it is an enterprise that simply cannot afford to fail.

For further information contact:

PR #407

-2-

We, therefore, should not deal with each other with threats of confrontation because the advantages that can be gained on this or that issue pale in significance compared to the long-range benefits — not just to this or that nation but to all of mankind — that is inherent in this process.

This is the basic attitude of the United States Government. This is the reason, and not any economic necessity nor any negotiating pressures, that compelled us to make a maximum effort to bring matters forward to some sort of conclusion.

I believe, therefore, in the two weeks or so that are left in this Conference it is extremely important that we move matters to a point in which we can say to ourselves, can say to our people, that on the Law of the Seas the nations of the world are making progress and that we do not export into the sea all of the conflicts that have made life complicated on land.

And, conversely, if we should succeed in that arena, it must have the profoundest significance on our other relations as well.

We are working essentially in three Committees. I believe that in Committee II, the debate of whether the economic zone is *sui generis* or whether it has attributes of high-sea status, can, in my view, after the discussions we have had this morning, be resolved in a practical and satisfactory manner to all of the parties concerned. It will require further efforts, but I believe that an understanding can be reached.

Similarly, with respect to scientific — marine scientific research of Committee III — if all of the delegations work with the spirit that has characterized them so far, I believe that a satisfactory conclusion can also be reached.

We must keep in mind in both of these negotiations, first, that we are starting a new international regime in these 200-mile zones that has not existed previously but also that there are certain practical problems that must be solved if the interpretation of our texts is not to lead to endless future disputes.

Now, let me say a few words about Committee I and the deep seabed. And you notice I did not say that if Committee I continues to work in the spirit it has exhibited up to now, that success is probable. [Laughter]

I believe that Committee I has clearly the most novel and the most complicated issue. And it is important that in solving it we do not approach it too much from a theoretical point of view and that we do not attempt to use it to prove ideological points for which there are many opportunities to vindicate them.

With respect to the deep seabeds, we face two realities. One is that the developed countries — a few developed countries at this moment — alone possess the technology with which to exploit the seabeds — why don't I use a more happy word? — to mine the seabeds. [Laughter]

PR #407

-3-

On the other hand, there is the concept that the deep seabeds represent the common heritage of mankind and, therefore, there is a certain conflict between the realities of the capabilities of certain countries and the theoretical conviction of many other countries.

From the point of view of those who possess the technology, many of the proposals that have already been made represent very significant concessions in the sense that they represent self-imposed restrictions on what would otherwise be an unrestricted freedom of action.

From the point of view of many of the developing countries some of these concessions, in view of their convictions, are not considered concessions at all but tend to be taken for granted.

At the last session, the United States proposed the system of parallel access in which, concurrently with any state or private mining of the deep seabed, a similar site would have to be set aside for the international community to be exploited or mined by the international community. And this concept was reflected in the negotiating text which emerged from the last session.

On reflection, many countries have expressed reservations about this concept on many grounds — more familiar to the delegates here than to me, I'm sure — but one of the principal grounds was that it did no good to set aside a part of the mining sites for the international community if the international community did not possess the financial resources with which to mine or to put its enterprise into business and if there were no provisions for the transfer of technology to the international community.

We have taken these views into serious consideration. And, therefore, on the occasion of my meeting with some of the members of Committee I, I proposed on behalf of the United States Government that the United States would be prepared to agree to a means of financing the enterprise in such a manner that the enterprise could begin its mining operation either concurrently with the mining of state or private enterprises or within an agreed time span that was practically concurrent. We proposed also that this would include agreed provisions for the transfer of technology so that the existing advantage of certain industrial states would be equalized over a period of time.

We have also taken into account the views that have been expressed by some delegates that it might be premature to establish a permanent regime for the deep seabeds, for the exploitation of the deep seabeds, at the beginning of a process of technology and to freeze it for an indefinite period of time.

For this reason we have proposed today that there could be periodic review conferences at intervals to be negotiated — for example, 25 years — in which the methods by which mining in the deep seabed take place and the apportionment between various sectors could be periodically reexamined.

PR #407

-4-

In other words, the United States has made a serious effort to move
forward on this deep seabed question.

I have heard, since I was here, the view that perhaps a settlement is premature
in the light of our unsettled domestic situation. (Laughter) Of course, some of us
consider our domestic situation more settled than others. (Laughter) But I would
believe — I would consider it highly unlikely that the basic principles are likely
to be changed that I have put forward with respect to the deep seabeds.

And I do not have the impression that they are the subject of partisan
discussion, as is reflected by the bipartisan composition of the
Congressional delegation that participates in these meetings.

We obviously will not be able to settle all of the issues now. And this
afternoon, for example, some proposals were made — including by the
distinguished delegate from Nigeria — in the discussions of Committee I
that we will examine with great care. But I would urge that the time
has come to put aside the theoretical debates. I believe the issues
are too crucial to try to prove abstract ideological points.

The United States has made its proposals, which represent significant
restrictions on our freedom of action for the sake of international
peace and international harmony, and for the purpose of demonstrating
that in this new area of mankind's activities we will make every effort
to avoid the sort of rivalries that characterize colonial exploitations
of the Nineteenth Century.

But there are limits beyond which no American leader can go. And if
those limits are attempted to be exceeded, then we will find ourselves
in the regrettable and tragic situation where at sea — just as pre-
viously on land — unilateralism will reign supreme.

We in the United States would not, in the short term, have any dis-
advantages from this — quite the contrary. But we are part of mankind,
and we believe that an opportunity would be lost that may not come again.

So, on behalf of the American delegation, I want to assure you that in all
of the Committees, and on the crucial issue of dispute settlements, we
will work with dedication and conviction and with a profound sense of
responsibility that what we are doing here — or rather, what you are
doing here — is of historic significance. And we hope that in this
spirit we can use the next few weeks to move matters forward to a point
from which a final solution in the early part of next year becomes so
inevitable that even the brilliant negotiators assembled here cannot
find enough fine points to interfere. [Laughter]

Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 1, 1976

No. 409

REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AFTER MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HAMILTON SHIRLEY AMERASINGHE
PRESIDENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Thank you, very much. I came here first of all to pay tribute to the President of this Conference for the impartial and thoughtful way in which he has conducted what is probably the most important negotiation that is now going on anywhere. With three-quarters of the world surface being put under the possibility of some international legal system, the stakes could hardly be higher. And the issues are, of course, extremely complicated. The United States will make a major effort to bring these negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. Satisfactory must mean, as the President correctly pointed out, a solution that all groups and all nations can accept. And it is not possible for one nation or for any group of nations to seek to impose its views on the others. Now in the three committees that are working: in Committee II dealing with the so-called economic zone, and in Committee III dealing with scientific research we believe that reasonable progress is being made and we are quite optimistic that an agreed solution of at least a general outline can be found at the end of this session. In Committee I, it is our view that the negotiating tactics have been too confrontational and that there has been too much of a tendency to seek to approach it by means of bloc approaches. That will not work. No group can impose its preferred solution on the other. The United States has proposed at the last session the so-called "dual access system" in which one part of the ocean is available for nations and their firms and the other is mined by an international Enterprise and all of it is put under a general international authority. We cannot give up this principle, but what we can do and what I'm here to discuss with my colleagues is how the international Enterprise can in fact function so the international Enterprise will in fact have the financial resources and the means to proceed. We are also prepared, since we are talking about a long-term future, to agree to periodic reviews of that issue, all the more so as we cannot in any event begin mining for about ten years. The President and I agreed, I believe, or at least I suggested to the President, and he is considering it, that we should strive at the end of this Conference to have some common text which becomes then the basis for a final conclusion and that some means be found within the remaining two weeks to reduce the various positions to a common text to which then formal amendments can perhaps be offered but which will provide a framework for the negotiation. The President and I are going to meet again for breakfast tomorrow in which I will review with him my impressions of my consultations today. I would like to stress the commitment of the United States to come to a solution that is in the interest of all mankind. We know that no agreement can

-2-

PR 409

last that is not freely accepted by the overwhelming majority of mankind. We hope that others here come to the same view, and we hope that everybody will realize that if we can establish a peaceful and legal solution to the problems of the ocean, a great step will also have been made towards peace on land. Thank you very much.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, some countries here want to stand pat, think that they will have better prospects under a new Administration. What can you tell me?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, first of all, there won't be a new Administration, and secondly, I will tell them that the foreign policy of the United States is conducted on the basis of the best judgment of the permanent interests and values of the United States and I'm confident that any group studying this problem is going to come roughly to the same conclusions. I think it would be a great mistake for foreign nations to attempt to second guess the American domestic political process. On the views that we have expressed here, I find a wide consensus and I have not encountered any significant disagreement among any of the experts that we have consulted about the American position, and I think that this would be a great mistake and if the negotiation deadlocks completely, there is a much greater danger that the United States will act unilaterally than that the United States will change its position.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said last night that you were coming here with a new proposal. Will you tell us what those new proposals are?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have indicated the areas in which we will keep discussing it, that is financial, how do you make the enterprise financially operative, review clauses, and we are willing to discuss other aspects of the views of our colleagues. I think it would be more appropriate if I had the discussions and then made it public than if I announce now, because this might inspire the rhetorical impulses of other delegations. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Are you going to address the Conference tomorrow?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have no such plans but I'm giving a reception for the delegation tonight and I plan to address them then informally.

**QUESTION:** With the extension of the exclusive economic zone to 200 miles and the power to search vessels within that zone, without use of the hovering vessels (inaudible).

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I'll tell you the truth, this is a degree of detail my associates have not yet revealed. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Are you working on a consolidated text?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I tried to avoid the word consolidated text, because I want to leave the nomenclature to the Conference. I believe that some common text that brings together the work of the three committees in a document that can then be the basis of negotiation, would be supported by the United States and would be a logical outcome of this Conference, and we are hoping that the President of the Conference will take leadership in that direction.

**AMB.AMERASINGHE:** Thank you very much Mr. President, if you don't mind I think I must excuse myself. Once again may I say how grateful I am to you for your presence here and for the encouragement you are offering us. Thank you.

-3-

PR 409

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, referring to the funding of the enterprise are we speaking in terms of U. S. grants or loans, or are we thinking of somehow convincing U. S. companies to invest?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, there are two aspects, one is the principle of finding financing for the enterprise; second, the means by which this is achieved. I think the second issue is subsidiary to the first because if we agree to find financing it will be negotiated in such a way that it is acceptable to the countries concerned. We think it is a reasonable proposition on the part of some of the developing nations to be sure that the enterprise does not become a paper institution but that it has an opportunity to function in what has been called the common heritage of mankind. The details of how we do this is open to negotiations. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 2, 1976

NO. 410

REMARKS TO THE PRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING

AT THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

September 2, 1976

**SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM:** Ladies and gentlemen, I had a useful and very interesting exchange of views with the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, on the international situation in general and special problems concerning the United Nations. We discussed the Middle East, the situation in southern Africa, the question of Cyprus, and of course the Law of the Sea Conference.

I am most grateful to Dr. Kissinger for this opportunity, especially because all of the problems we have discussed this morning are on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations. It was, therefore, most helpful to me to know the position of the Government of the United States.

This is all I wish to say, and I now give the floor to Dr. Kissinger.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would like to express the appreciation of the United States Government for the distinguished role which the Secretary-General is playing on all of the key issues with respect to peace-keeping and improving the international climate in which he is involved; and we talked about the Middle East, about Cyprus, about southern Africa, about the Law of the Seas. And I would only add to his description -- to his adjective "useful" -- the adjective "cordial" for our talks.

Thank you very much.

I'll be glad to answer some questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did your discussions about economic financing of the regime go well last night?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, all of the delegations will have to speak for themselves. I had a good discussion yesterday with

PR 410

- 2 -

about sixteen members of Committee I. I met this morning with the head of the Mexican delegation and with the Peruvian delegate in Committee I, Sri Lanka, Norway. And I have the impression that there is now an understanding that some progress will have to be made on all sides and that our proposals of yesterday may provide a basis for some counter-proposals by some others -- and, even if not for some precise counter-proposals, to move forward perhaps towards a consolidated text which can be an instrument of negotiation at the next session.

With respect to Committee II and III, I am very hopeful that we will reach a substantial conclusion of the effort. So, altogether, if the Conference continues on the course which we believe possible, it will have made a significant step forward.

**QUESTION:** Are you prepared to state what that economic proposal was?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have proposed that we would see to the financing of the international Enterprise; and, also, we have agreed to a 25-year, or some agreed period, review clause. Considering the particular concern of many of the Group of 77 was that the international Enterprise might not have the financing or the technical capability to proceed, our offer to put it into business concurrently -- or nearly concurrently -- with private or state Enterprises should go a long step towards meeting their needs. And you have to remember that in a situation in which the United States at this moment possesses practically a monopoly of technology, we have agreed to put all of it under an international regime -- half of it under an international Enterprise -- and to provide the financing for the international Enterprise, and to provide a review after 25 years. So we think we have made a significant contribution.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the question of the admission of Viet-Nam is coming to the UN again next week. Could you tell us whether the United States intends to use the veto again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I would not want to deprive you of the suspense that is inherent in this question prematurely. For us, the issue of missing-in-action is of course a key issue, and we want to see whether any progress can be made there.

**QUESTION:** When you see Prime Minister Vorster at the end of this week, are you prepared to press him hard on these two points: First, that elections in Namibia come off in a matter of months, not years; and secondly, that they come out -- that they are undertaken -- not under just international supervision, as I believe Mr. Vorster has mentioned, but under United Nations supervision?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have made several statements this week about our position with respect to southern Africa which

PR 410

- 3 -

have achieved the unique result of being criticized both by some
black members of the Congress and by Prime Minister Vorster. I
think, considering that I will be meeting him within 48 hours, I
should not go beyond what I have already stated publicly and leave
something for the discussions that will then take place.

**QUESTION:** Do you intend to --

**QUESTION:** -- the Magnuson bill and the effect of the conservancy
zone --

**QUESTION:** -- terrorist resultuion, a topic to be discussed at the
upcoming General Assembly?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What did you say? Would you begin again?

**QUESTION:** Yes, sir. Mr. Secretary, terrorism is an issue that has been before the UN --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes.

**QUESTION:** -- for some time now. An effort is being made, has been
made. Do you, as the United States representative, see any prospect
for a solution to this issue here?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we beleive that terrorism is an issue
that affects the whole international community and which must be
solved by the international community. The use of innocent people
to effect decisions in which they have absolutely no role and in
which they have no capacity for action is unconscionable. And the
United States will support any effort by others -- and, failing
that, will make major efforts of its own to get an international
agreement that will bring the common action of the world community
to bear of the issue of terrorism.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, has the United States changed its postion on admission of Angola to the United Nations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As we pointed out repeatedly, our concern with
Angola is not the regime that is in power in Angola. Our concern
is the issue of the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force of very
substantial size in that country. That, too, is an issue in which
informal consultations are taking place here now, and we are not
prepared to state our position now.

**QUESTION:** Have any of the Cuban troops been withdrawn?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We, frankly, have great difficulty determining
whether there has been a net outflow of Cubans. Some Cubans have
been withdrawn; others seem to have arrived. And we do not have
a clear perception of whether there has been a significant net
outflow.

PR 410

- 4 -

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on your planned trip this weekend when you talk to Prime Minister Vorster, is it your plan also to talk with him and the black African leaders on this particular trip -- and, two, is there any likelihood of you having any discussion with Ian Smith himself directly, which might lead to repeal, for example, of the Byrd Amendment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Whether I will go on from Zurich to Africa has not yet been completely decided. I want to have consultations with the Government of Great Britain, which has itself been in consultation with key African countries and which has an important role to play there -- especially in Rhodesia -- and I want to make an assessment of where we stand after those talks. There is a possibility that I will go to discuss the issues -- especially of Namibia and Rhodesia -- with the presidents of black African states and see whether some progress can be made.

I do not think a final solution of these issues is likely in the very near future. But if I believe that some progress can be made, I may undertake the trip.

I have no plan now to talk with Ian Smith, and I consider it almost out of the question that I would be meeting with him.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in Lebanon, you now have two emissaries working with the Christian side. Does this indicate that the US is moving towards recognizing a partition?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. The United States is opposed to the partition of Lebanon. It maintains the independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon. However, our Embassy in Beirut has found it impossible to communicate with the Christian part of Lebanon; and when our Ambassador attempted to cross over, as you know, some months ago, he was assassinated. We have, therefore, found it technically more convenient to send in people via Cyprus. They will be there for about a week of consultations, and they will then return. And our hope would be that conditions will soon exist in which the Embassy in Beirut can perform its functions in both parts of Lebanon and not force us into the present measures.

We will not support partition of Lebanon, and this visit is simply an opportunity to get the views of the Christian leaders that we have not had an opportunity to obtain for the last few months.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how would you assess the passage of the Magnuson bill and the unilateral extension of a 200-mile conservancy zone at this particular time under bargaining position of the United States and upon the success of this particular Conference?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we were opposed to the unilateral extension of the 200-mile zone as an Administration, and we went along with it because we were afraid that it would lead to a set of unilateral moves by other countries -- which, indeed, it has contributed to.

PR 410

- 5 -

However, I believe now that Committee II, which is dealing sub-
stantially with that issue, is close to a solution. And if that
should prove to be the case, then I would have to say that even
though we did not favor the Magnuson bill it has not impeded the
progress of the negotiations.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in your speech in Philadelphia you stated that the United States would not accept what you call the one-sided and unilateral declarations that were issues at the Colombo Non-Aligned Summit. In those declarations the non-aligned countries stated that unless there was substantial progress at the Paris North-South talks, that they were prepared to take some unilateral step, particularly on the question of the question of general debut moratorium.

What would be your response to a declaration along those lines by
either a group of or a number of Third World countries?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I am not saying that every last statement that was made in Colombo had the character of a one-sided declaration. In general, we do not believe it is appropriate for any country or group of countries to proceed with the threat of a unilateral action in issues that require really multilateral solutions. We have been opposed to a general debt moratorium because it is our believe that this will penalize those countries that have made a major effort to put their house in order.

We are prepared, however, to engage in discussions about general
principles of debt relief that can be applied on a case-by-case
basis; we are prepared to let others put forward their proposals
in the North-South dialogue and to examine them with an open mind.

What our reaction would be in a hypothetical case that hasn't arisen,
I cannot now predict because it isn't possible for debtors to put
a debt moratorium unilaterally into operation without serious con-
sequences to themselves.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, last year the United States proposed a resolution at the General Assembly calling for amnesty for political prisoners. Do you foresee any similar initiatives being taken by the United States this year in the UN?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not yet decided the full range of the initiatives that we are going to put forward at the General Assembly.

**QUESTION:** Will President Ford address the General Assembly?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not know whether I want to deprive myself of an opportunity to speak to all of my colleagues here. This is a decision that the President has to make in the light

- 6 -

PR 405

of his other schedules here. There is no present plan for him to
speak at the General Assembly.

I will take one more question.

**QUESTION:** The question of the Middle East was discussed between yourself and the Secretary-General. Can you tell us whether any new initiative -- either on your part or on the UN part or anything -- was discussed and you knew of the making or sensed it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the Secretary-General was kind enough to give me his impressions from the Non-Aligned Conference and of the attitude of those Arab leaders that he had an opportunity to exchange views with at the Non-Aligned Conference. And I would not expect a specific initiative -- at least, on our part -- and the Secretary-General would have to talk for himself in the immediate future. But our general concern that progress in the Middle East towards peace is necessary, that negotiations will have to be resumed, and that the current situation should not be frozen, have reaffirmed this position and we will be continuing to exchange views on how to bring progress.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have to go on to Washington. I will have to make this the last question.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, to what degree might this -- an election year -- help or hinder your efforts in South Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have not noticed that it being an election year greatly helps the efforts.

The reason for action in southern Africa has nothing to do with elections in the United States, because any study of our electoral arithmetic makes clear that this is not a significant issue. The reason we are concerned with making progress in southern Africa is because there is a guerrilla war going on in Rhodesia today, that it is certain to escalate -- the loss of life is going to increase, the complexities are going to mount -- and it simply cannot wait for our electoral process.

With respect to Namibia, which is a separable problem, there is a time limit before the international community. And there, too, the situation is going to deteriorate substantially -- both on the ground and internationally -- unless a serious effort is made.

We are conducting our policy in order to bring peace to a troubled area and to serve the national interests of the United States. It can have no impact on our election that I can discern.

Thank you.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 4, 1976

No. 412

REMARKS TO THE PRESS
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
THE HONORABLE ANTHONY CROSLAND
BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY
IN
LONDON, ENGLAND

September 4, 1976

**QUESTION:** Is this a crucial time for Africa as a whole and southern Africa in particular?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It's a time at which perhaps some progress may be possible. We reviewed this morning the visits of the British and the United States missions to southern Africa. We have exchanged ideas during these missions and we reviewed our conclusions which were quite parallel. We also discussed my forthcoming meeting with the South African Prime Minister and the prospects for making progress towards independence in Rhodesia and Namibia.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you discuss guarantees for white settlers in Rhodesia and did you come to any conclusions about that or a figure?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Both the British and U.S. Governments are working very closely together on the general concept by which progress might be made. There is no need at this point to reach any final conclusions because the negotiating isn't at a point where such decisions are necessary. But in our general approach we are very close - that is between Britain and the United States.

**QUESTION:** Do you expect to be going on to visit other leaders of Black Africa after your meeting in Zurich?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As you know there's a meeting in Dar es Salaam this weekend of five presidents and various liberation movements. My present plan is to return to the United States after my talk with the South African Prime Minister and my return to London to exchange further thoughts with British officials and ministers. We will then send Secretary Schaufele to Africa and depending upon his report I would be prepared to go to Africa next week.

**QUESTION:** Do you think this is likely sir?

PR 412

-2-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to prejudge what the African presidents are going to decide or what will come out of my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster. I believe that the conditions for progress in Southern Africa exist. They require very serious, very difficult negotiations, and there are many obstacles that have to be overcome, but matters having been brought to this point it would be a pity if they were discouraged.

**QUESTION:** And bearing in mind the violence of the situation do you think it makes it even more urgent to get something on the stocks, get something rolling?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think we all agree that if there is no progress violence will increase throughout southern Africa and that this is the time to prevent the escalation of bloodshed.

**QUESTION:** Do you think we can do that, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We will make a major effort.

**QUESTION:** Good, thank you very much, sir.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[1c]

September 6, 1976

NO. 416

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
HOTEL DOLDER GRAND
ZURICH, SWITZERLAND

PC 108

September 6, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I want to express my appreciation to Mr. Eagleburger for letting me get some words in before the press. He has done a distinguished job in the last few days. He has gotten his name too frequently into the newspapers, but we will take care of that later. (Laughter)

Ladies and gentlemen, let me explain first what we are trying to do; secondly, the evolution of these negotiations; and third, the various elements that have to be reconciled in these negotiations. And then I will take your questions.

The United States is making an effort to bring an end to the mounting crisis in southern Africa. The United States is conscious of the fact that an escalating guerrilla war is already taking place in Rhodesia, that conditions in Namibia will inevitably lead to a similar crisis. And, of course, we are also aware of conditions in South Africa. The United States is making a serious effort in order to see whether we can achieve the following objectives: majority rule and minority rights; a peaceful end to the disagreement; and negotiation that enables all of the communities to live side by side under conditions of dignity and progress. We do so in the interest of world peace, because continuing conflict in Africa will inevitably bring in the interests of outside powers and runs a major risk of turning Africa into an area of contention of non-African countries. We do so in the national interest of the United States, because of our interest. We have a profound interest in a world of peace, in a world that respects human dignity and in conditions of economic advance. And thirdly, and above all, we do it in the interest of the peoples of the area. They will be those who suffer most from a continuation of conflict. They will have to pay the price for any failure of negotiations. And they will have to be considered, as alternatives to peaceful resolution are being considered.

Now to the talks that have been taking place here in the last two days. The purpose of these talks has not been to develop a joint American-South African program. The evolution of these talks

PR 416

- 2 -

and what has brought us to this point is as follows:

On my visit to Africa in April, all African leaders urged a solution to the problems of southern Africa through quiet discussions with the Prime Minister of South Africa; that for many of these problems, the policies of his government held the key if a peaceful solution was to be achieved. Based on these views, we initiated contact with the Government of South Africa. Prior to my meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Germany in June, we solicited the views of the black African governments as to the subjects to be discussed, and as to the conditions under which they believe a peaceful solution to the problems of southern Africa was achievable. We presented their considerations to the South African Prime Minister in June. Those discussions led to a certain amount of progress. After those discussions the United States sent two missions to the black African states. The United Kingdom, whose role is crucial in all of these actions, which has a historic responsibility for Rhodesia, and to whose cooperation and wisdom in this matter I would like to pay tribute, also sent two missions to Africa. On the basis of these two American and two British missions, a new set of considerations was developed which formed the basis for my discussions with the South African Prime Minister over the last two days. Those discussions have been fruitful. I believe that progress towards the objectives, which have been jointly developed by the United States, the United Kingdom and the states of black Africa, has been made. It is our view that a basis for further negotiations exists, though work still remains to be done. In assessing the prospects you have to keep in mind that we are dealing with a negotiation of extraordinary complexity in terms of the issues involved and in terms of the parties involved. In attempting mediation there is first of all the United States and the United Kingdom. We have worked together in close harmony and with no significant differences, but we have had to coordinate our positions and we have done so successfully. Within Africa we are dealing internationally now with two major problems -- the problem of Rhodesia and the problem of Namibia. They both have the same objectives; that is to say, independence, majority rule, minority rights, and assurances for economic progress. The United States and, I think I am safe in saying, the United Kingdom strongly support these objectives. But in achieving these objectives we are dealing with two different sets of parties in each case. The problem of Namibia is between South Africa, the various groups that have formed the constitutional conference within Namibia, and certain outside groups such as SWAPO, which had been excluded from the negotiations up to now, plus such neighboring states as Angola that has -- with which our communications are not, shall we say, ideal. With respect to Rhodesia, the problem is between four so-called front line states, that is states that are bordering Rhodesia -- four black states bordering Rhodesia; three independence movements; Rhodesian white authorities that are not recognized by either the United States or the United Kingdom, and South Africa, which does not recognize the