I. APPOINTMENT AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

HK had met Richard Nixon only once before, at a pre-
Christmas cocktail party given by Clare Boothe Luce at her
elegant Fifth Avenue apartment on December 10, 1967.
According to published reports (Kalbs, pp. 14ff.), HK
arrived early and was on the verge of leaving when Richard
Nixon arrived. Mrs. Luce "promptly shepherded them out of
the crowded livingroom and into the privacy of the library."
They conversed no more than five minutes, reportedly about
HK's writings. Nixon recalled his admiration for Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy; HK remembered receiving a note
from Nixon at the time complimenting him on the work, and
HK said he appreciated it. HK later recalled Nixon as
being stiff at the meeting and himself as being aloof. He
told the Kalbs that Nixon "talked in a gentler way, a more
thoughtful way" than he had expected. "We both hate cock-
tail parties and we were both trying to avoid small talk,"
HK told TIME. (TIME, Feb. 14, 1969)

The night that Nixon won the nomination from Rockefeller at the Miami Beach convention in August 1968, Nixon and Rockefeller spoke by phone after the balloting was over. After the required ritual of mutual compliments Nixon inquired after HK and raised the possibility of HK's joining him in the campaign. HK declined.

Through August and September there were a number of
phone calls from the Nixon camp asking advice on some or
other aspect of foreign policy, and hinting at invitations
to meet with the candidate or join the campaign. There were
also calls from the Humphrey camp with similar bids to join
or help. All overtures were declined. HK was back at
Harvard resuming his teaching duties, keeping his speaking
and lecturing (Naval War College in Newport; Rand Corporation
at Santa Monica), and buying a new car (a white Mercedes).

HK was in New York lunching with Rockefeller on Friday,
November 22 -- they were speculating on rumors that Nixon
would offer Rockefeller the post of Secretary of Defense --
when the telephone rang. It was Dwight Chapin, a young aide
of Nixon, calling to invite HK to meet with the President-
elect at 10 o'clock the following Monday, November 25, at
the Hotel Pierre. HK agreed, expecting (he told the Kalbs)
a general discussion of foreign policy.

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On Monday, November 25, HK was ushered into Nixon's suite on the 39th floor of the Hotel Pierre. The two men talked for three hours about general foreign policy matters and possible people for key jobs. At one point, Nixon summoned H. R. Haldeman into the room and introduced him. Nixon instructed Haldeman to arrange a direct telephone link to HK at Harvard so they could communicate more easily. This struck HK as rather excessive (since no special assignment had been offered or accepted), so HK said he could be reached easily enough through the Harvard switchboard. HK departed, heading for La Guardia to catch the shuttle to Boston in time for the 4 o'clock session of Government 259 -- the National Security Policy Seminar.

The next day, when HK called Rockefeller to tell him about his three hour talk with Nixon, Rockefeller told him that he (Rockefeller) had just been informed that he would not be offered a post in the Nixon Administration after all. Soon afterward another call came in from Dwight Chapin in New York; this time HK was invited to come to New York again, on Wednesday, November 27, this time to meet with John Mitchell. At this point HK realized they were probably more interested in him. He quickly got in touch with his former Harvard colleague McGeorge Bundy, now President of the Ford Foundation, to seek his advice on what kind of post to consider. Bundy advised HK to try for the job of Director of the Policy Planning Staff.

HK flew to New York for the Hotel Pierre meeting with Mitchell on Wednesday the 27th. Mitchell met him at the elevator on the 39th floor and asked him: "Well, are you going to take the NSC job?" HK murmured that it hadn't been offered to him. Mitchell then exploded "Oh, Jesus Christ" and disappeared down the hall. A few minutes later, Mitchell returned, smiling, and announced that Nixon would see him again in fifteen minutes.

In Nixon's suite, Nixon now formally offered HK the job of Assistant for National Security Affairs. HK paused and said he needed time to reflect. Nixon said, "Fine. Take a week." Nixon then launched into a lengthy discussion of foreign policy, touching on a range of subjects, that would take them both past lunchtime, for nearly four hours altogether.

HK spent the next couple of days thinking it over and seeking the judgment of close friends. Rockefeller -- contrary to the canard that HK was "deserting" him for Nixon -- was one of those who urged him most strongly to

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take it. HK sought the judgment of Harvard colleagues (the Kalbs list Bundy, Schlesinger, Hoffmann, Galbraith, Yarmolinsky, Neustadt, Schelling and Guido Goldman), who, almost without exception, encouraged him to take it. Fritz Kraemer had mixed feelings. "As your friend," the Kalbs report him saying, "I can only say this will be an ordeal. The 'right' will call you the Jew who lost Southeast Asia; the 'left' will call you a traitor to the cause. But as a citizen, of course, you have to take it because no one is better qualified and your personal happiness is of no importance."

On Friday of the same week, November 29, HK called Nixon's office and requested another appointment with the President-elect. HK flew down to meet with Nixon that day and told him he accepted the position. The announcement was then scheduled for the following Monday, December 2. The story started to leak. News stories that HK was likely to receive an appointment, either as National Security Adviser or as head of the Policy Planning Staff, appeared in the NY Times on Saturday, November 30 and in the Harvard Crimson on Monday, December 2.

On December 2, the President-elect walked down the aisle through a packed hall of seated reporters at the Hotel Pierre, with HK a few paces behind, both men smiling. HK had drafted a statement of announcement, which Nixon followed as talking points. Nixon announced that he had asked HK to serve as Assistant for National Security Affairs. He said: "I am one who likes to get a broad range of viewpoints expressed, and Dr. Kissinger has set up what I believe -- or is setting up at the present time -- a very exciting new procedure for seeing to it that the President of the United States does not just hear what he wants to hear, which is always a temptation for White House staffers." Nixon assured his audience that "Dr. Kissinger is keenly aware of the necessity not to set himself up as a wall between the President and the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. I intend to have a very strong Secretary of State." He said he wanted to have the NSC restored as a major forum and he wanted HK and the NSC to concentrate on long-term planning, "so that we may not just react to events when they occur." Nixon observed that "men in positions of responsibility and men who really have the ability to do creative thinking too often get bogged down in reading the interminable telegrams, most of which are not really relevant to the problems they are concerned with. I don't want him (HK) to get down to the Situation Room in the White House and spend too much time there going

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through cables." Nixon said he wanted for this job someone who had not spent a great deal of time in Washington, someone with a "fresh approach." Nixon also named Dr. Richard V. Allen, senior staff member of the Hoover Institution and Nixon's foreign policy research director during the campaign, as a deputy on the NSC.

HK told the reporters he had tried for 15 years "to avoid labels like 'hard' and soft.'" He declined to state any views on particular foreign policy matters because he believed his new job "is inconsistent with making public statements on substantive issues." He said he planned to bring nongovernmental experts, such as Alistair Buchan, into the White House for consultation. He remarked that he had "a very wide acquaintance all over the world among intellectuals of all points of view."

The appointment was ecstatically acclaimed. The NY Times in a lead editorial hailed HK as having "ability to keep "military and political factors in balance" and for his my commitment to Atlantic unity and arms control. The New Republic praised the appointment. The Wall Street Journal approvingly noted his "unsentimental" view of the Russians. The NY Times reported laudatory comments from Harvard colleagues such as Arthur Schlesinger ("an excellent appointment"), Adam Yarmolinsky ("I will sleep better with Henry Kissinger in Washington"), Stanley Hoffmann ("a man with a great deal of character and wisdom"), Carl Kaysen ("a very able man"), Francis Bator ("first rate"), and Kistiakowsky ("augurs well for the future"). Max Lerner called it "a happy choice." Le Monde warmly praised the appointment, describing HK as "a man of dialogue, who listens, who is not satisfied with preconceptions."

James Reston called the appointment "a reassuring sign that the new Administration is going to make a serious and objective reappraisal of its security problems and priorities." Reston also found it "odd, in a way, that Dr. Kissinger should have been chosen by Mr. Nixon before the Secretary of State was selected, and this may lead to some friction, for Dr. Kissinger will be closer to the center of power than most top officials at State, and he is a more forceful advocate than the normal run of State Department officials." The Secretary of State (and the rest of the Cabinet) was not named until December 10.

Among the congratulatory messages HK received were the following, some mixed with substantive advice and offers to help:

Adviser said, "I will help."

William Buckley: "Not since Florence Nightingale has any public figure received such public acclamation" (quoted by Kalbs; no original found).

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-- Richard N. Gardner: "Tremendously pleased. . . great thing for the country" (and urged appointment of person with "solid substantive grounding" for UN Ambassador and hoped President would make use of UN 25th Anniversary to study how to strengthen UN).

-- Chester Bowles: "Greatly pleased . . . a reassuring omen" (and enclosed a 32-page memo with four appendices on US relations with India).

-- Yigal Allon: "Delighted . . . will place the right man at the right place, in a very crucial period in the international arena."

-- Raymond Aron: "Mes felicitations pour votre entree dans la grande politique" (and asks for interview with Nixon).

-- Abram Chayes: "First ground for hope in the new Administration. If I can help you in any way I know you will feel free to call me."

-- Moshe Dayan: "Warmest congratulations."

-- Murray Gell-Mann: "New President showing excellent taste so far."

-- Philip Habib: "I am absolutely delighted. It is a good harbinger for the future. . . . That it suits me personally is of no importance compared to the fact that I think it suits the country. . . . The wire services have you saying: 'I believe very strongly that the position of a White House Assistant is inconsistent with making public statements on substantive matters.' You are even more brilliant than I thought, and that is saying something!"

-- Father Theodore Hesburgh: "I am sure that with all your friends I can rejoice in the wisdom you will bring to this high post which is so sensitive to the future of world peace. Government at the highest level needs new thoughts and new direction, and I am sure you will provide both."

-- H. Stuart Hughes: "I hope it will not seem odd to you in view of our past differences that I should send you my congratulations on your new functions. . . . Let me say for my part that I am looking to you as a representative of sanity and balanced judgment in the highest councils of the nation."

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-- Lincoln Gordon: "It is one of those 'impossible jobs,' like trying to govern New York City, but some can fall further short than others. I am sure you will come closer than most, not only on the merits of the issues but in the very delicate balance between helping to think for the President and avoiding intrusion on what properly belongs to the operators in the Departments."

-- Henry S. Reuss: "I am concerned at the state of the international economy. . . . I voice my belief and hope that President-elect Nixon, as a first order of business, will issue a call for an economic conference of the heads of state of the twenty-one leading industrial nations of the free world."

-- Foy Kohler: "Your appointment is good news for the country, for the State Department and Foreign Service. . . ."

-- Max Frankel: "Our warmest wishes in the new job" (and request for interview).

-- Adolf A. Berle: "Best make the most of the honeymoon -- a little later the going will be difficult."

## II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NSC SYSTEM

### A. Origins

When Nixon announced HK's appointment on December 2, he revealed that "Dr. Kissinger has set up what I believe -- or is setting up at the present time -- a very exciting new procedure for seeing to it that the President of the United States does not just hear what he wants to hear . . . ." Left unexplained was how all this could have been accomplished even before the appointment was accepted and announced.

The fact is that HK had already given much thought to the problem of organizational machinery, had devised a proposal for Rockefeller during his 1968 campaign, had participated in a Harvard Transition Study Group on the subject, and had discussed his approach at length with the President-elect -- who had independently, in his own campaign, argued for restoration of the National Security Council.

Candidate Nixon, in a radio speech of October 24, 1968, promised to "restore the National Security Council to its preeminent role in national security planning." He paid tribute to the orderly procedures in the Administration of

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President Eisenhower, in which he had participated, and
contrasted them with the free-wheeling, personalistic, erratic
procedures under President Johnson. He even asserted: "I
attribute most of our serious reverses abroad since 1960 to
the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower's
successors to make use of this important council." What we
had in 1968, he charged, was "catch-as-catch-can talkfests
between the President, his staff assistants, and various
others."

Candidate Rockefeller issued a campaign statement on
June 21, 1969, on government reorganization (Tab A).
Rockefeller deplored the fact that "the National Security
Council mechanism has been largely ignored."

"There exists no regular staff procedure for arriving at decisions; instead, <u>ad hoc</u> groups are formed as the need arises. No staff <u>agency</u> to monitor the carrying out of decisions is available. There is no focal point for long-range planning on an inter-agency basis. Without a central administrative focus, foreign policy turns into a series of unrelated decisions -- crisis-oriented, <u>ad hoc</u> and after-the-fact in nature. We become the prisoners of events.

B

"This has come about at the precise moment when the old demarcation lines among departments are breaking down and the need to analyze available information has never been greater. Until the end of the Second World War, the expert and the policy maker were operating on essentially the same body of knowledge. In our time, however, specialization threatens to paralyze decision-making. In the past, governments suffered mostly from insufficiency of information; today, the U.S. Government is overwhelmed by it. Expertise with respect to current situations is acquired at the cost of an overall view. The Executive Office of the President specializes in crisis management; it is much less well equipped for crisis-avoidance; it is more deficient in the deliberate shaping of events in the light of our purposes."

Rockefeller lamented the "duplication, inconsistency and
fragmentation" of the existing system. "The arrangements
undertaken during the Johnson Administration within the
Department of State for greater inter-agency coordination
have not proved successful -- partly because the need is not
only for coordination but above all for leadership." He cited

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the Pueblo incident and the bombing of Hanoi in December 1966 "in the midst of delicate peace initiatives" as examples of the breakdown of coherence.

"In addition, this system keeps the President from being continuously informed of approaching difficulties. Geared to crises, the present organization inhibits foresight and fails to produce policy alternatives in the light of long-range purposes."

Rockefeller therefore proposed creation of an Office of International Policy and Programs in the Executive Office of the President to replace the existing NSC staff. This super staff would be tasked with the functions of long-range planning, systematic coordination, and program evaluation. It would in addition be responsible for continuous provision of information to the President, as well as "action-options," with "an evaluation of the probably consequences, domestic and foreign, of each such alternative." The watchword was:

"Too much time is now devoted to determining where we are; more should be spent on deciding where we wish to go. Purpose should shape techniques instead of the opposite.

****

"Almost as important as constant monitoring is the ability to present the issues and define opportunities in such a way as to allow time for creative action."

HK had expressed some personal views on the problem of bureaucracy in a seminar with Bernard Brodie at UCLA in the spring of 1968. (See complete text at Tab B). Among the blunt observations were the following:

"Because management of the bureaucracy takes so much energy and precisely because changing course is so difficult, many of the most important decisions are taken by extra-bureaucratic means. Some of the key decisions are kept to a very small circle while the bureaucracy happily continues working away in ignorance of the fact that decisions are being made, or of the fact that a decision is being made in a particular area. One reason for keeping the decisions to small

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groups is that when bureaucracies are so unwieldy and when their internal morale becomes a serious problem, an unpopular decision may be fought by brutal means, such as leaks to the press or to congressional committees. Thus, the only way secrecy can be kept is to exclude from the making of the decision all those who are theoretically charged with carrying it out.

***

"As a general rule, I believe a new President, in the areas where he wants to effect change, must do so within the first four months. He need not complete it within this time, but he must give enough of a shake to the bureaucracy to indicate that he wants a new direction and he must be brutal enough to demonstrate that he means it."

He traced the evolution of Presidential styles and urged trying to combine "the procedural regularity of Eisenhower with the intellectual excitement of Kennedy:"

"It was easy under the Eisenhower administration to ridicule the formalism of the decision-making process. In effect, it was somewhat ridiculous--there were many documents which were really diplomatic treaties between the various departments, and which enabled each department to do what it had wanted to do in the first place. But it had the great advantage of a regular procedure for getting decisions made. Under Kennedy this procedure was dismantled, and he substituted for it a sort of nervous energy and great intellectual activity, which worked well because he was an enormously intelligent man, surrounded by a very lively group of people, so that all sorts of ideas were floating into the very receptive White House. The drawback under the Kennedy Administration was that there really was no regular procedure to getting things done, except on crisis issues, because you never could be sure who was being heard in addition to the constituted people, who did not always present their cases in the presence of the others who disagreed with them. It was a somewhat amorphous process. Under Johnson you had the disorganization of Kennedy without the intellectual excitement, and with somewhat of a fear of the President superimposed on it. The organizational problem seems to be to combine the procedural regularity of Eisenhower with the intellectual excitement of Kennedy. Whether that is possible, I do not know.

Eisenhower tended to operate exclusively with the National Security Council and he had

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"Eisenhower tended to operate almost exclusively with the National Security Council machinery, and he had divided the responsibility so that the current NSC business would be conducted by the staff secretary, while the planning side was conducted by the chief of the NSC staff. The operations coordinating board was the under-secretary's and was supposed to implement the planning decisions of the National Security Council. The drawback of the NSC as it was run under President Eisenhower was that it was terribly formalistic. One way to tell they really weren't doing anything was to take their papers, write down the opposite of what they had said, and see that this involved no policy choice. One is not saying anything by advocating that it is in the American interest to have a pro-American government in country X. No one would argue that is in our interest to have an anti-American government there. It turned into a series of abstract platitudes which were not very effective.

"Kennedy used the NSC primarily as a sounding board; it rarely made important decisions. He had something called the Committee of Principals which met when concrete decisions had to be made -- such as the Berlin crisis. There was no regular staff work for these meetings, it was all done on an _ad hoc_ basis, on a very substantial intellectual level.

"Johnson is compulsively secretive and will not say what he thinks, so it is very hard to discover people who think they know what he wants. There is less of a premium on coming up with new ideas under him. I think something like the Committee of Principals, or the National Security Council with a staff of McGeorge Bundy qualities is needed. There is a staff which keeps groping and is not primarily a diplomatic instrument.

"Probably what is needed is something similar to what McNamara did in the Defense Department, that is, to try to establish some criteria by which to judge success and failure. McNamara got control of the Defense Department by flooding the various agencies with questions which they had to answer and which gave him good information. It took several years to bring home to them that the usual bureaucratic double-talk wouldn't go. Something like that is needed in the national security area, where it is much more difficult to establish, because the criteria are more elusive."

Over the course of 1968, a group of Cambridge luminaries organized a Presidential Transition Study Group consisting of

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Philip Areeda (Harvard Law School), Franklin Lindsay (Itek Corp.), Ernest R. May (Harvard History Department), and HK, until HK dropped out of the group to work for Rockefeller. The group met several times over the course of 1968 with guest speakers, who included General Goodpaster, McGeorge Bundy, General Ridgeway, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Lovett, Gabriel Hauge, Bryce Harlow, Thomas Mann, General Norstad, David Bell, Glenn Olds, and (after the election) Adam Yarmolinsky and Richard Neustadt.

The Study Group presented a "Memorandum for Mr. Nixon" on National Security Organization on November 1, 1968. Aside from some general suggestions to beef up the Executive Office Staff, the thrust of the Study Group's recommendations was to strengthen the efficiency of the bureaucracy, rather than to assert Presidential control over it. Its recommendations were:

"First, "<u>Strengthen the Secretary of State.</u> We assume that you will be your own Secretary of State in the sense of retaining control over policy. We believe, however, that you will be handicapped in doing so unless you have someone at State who can mobilize and manage the diplomatic corps and related groups with effectiveness comparable to that of the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury. To this end, we suggest specifically that you

"(a) appoint a Secretary and Under Secretary who can work interchangeably;

"(b) ensure that the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and the head of the Secretariat are chosen by and work for this team;

"(c) allow the Secretary and Under Secretary a large voice in choosing Assistant Secretaries and a few key ambassadors;

"(d) urge the Secretary and Under Secretary to equip themselves with staff assistance comparable to that of the Secretary of Defense; and

"(d) seek from the foreign affairs community alternative proposals rather than yes-or-no issues."

"Second, "<u>Preserve centralized control of the military establishment but take pains to display confidence in military professionals.</u> You will face the difficult problem of reassuring military professionals that their

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services and advice are valued without at the same
time committing yourself to accept their policy
recommendations or approve their budget proposals.
We suggest that, to meet this problem you

"(a) maintain without major changes the management
power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

"(b) urge the Secretary of Defense to seek cordial
relationships with the service chiefs and other
military professionals;

"(c) acquaint yourself with the military chiefs;
[They urged an early meeting between the President
and the Chiefs. Nixon liked this idea and ordered
a meeting scheduled.] and

"(d) ensure that your staff has some competence in
the defense policy area."

- Third, "Give the SIG-IRG system a trial before reinstituting NSC or other formal consultative machinery; rely on ad hoc groups to deal with issues not suitable for SIG-IRG processing. Aware of the Bay of Pigs and the faulty handling of Vietnam and recognizing also the weaknesses of the State Department, you may feel a strong temptation to restore the more comprehensive and seemingly more orderly NSC-Planning Board-OCB structure that Kennedy dismantled. We recommend that you not do so at least during the early months of your administration. One reason is that it would be easier for you to take such action later than to do away with a formal structure, if you set it up soon after taking office and then decided that it did not work satisfactorily. A more important reason is that we believe you will find it, in practice, more satisfactory to let the SIG-IRG network serve as your basic instrument for interdepartmental coordination."

- Fourth, "Equip your staff with better resources.
Specifically, we urge that you

"(a) organize your staff so that it can cope expertly with the full range of national security issues confronting you;

"(b) ensure that your national security affairs
staff has some sense of your domestic concerns;

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"(c) create a small research staff in the Executive Office, working under the Cabinet Secretary, so that your staff can have access to background information and departmental staff work not currently available to the White House;

"(d) establish also in the Executive Office or perhaps in the Budget Bureau a program evaluation facility, so that on occasion you can cross-check agency estimates of the effectiveness of programs in their charge; and

"(e) adjust the size and strength of your staff to take account of weaknesses in the departments."

-- Fifth, "Take pains to give your staff and principal agency heads understanding of your wishes. Specifically, we would urge you to bear in mind the costs of always keeping as many options as possible open until the last possible moment, to hold meetings with your staff and otherwise keep them abreast of your thinking, and, within limits, to explain to agency heads your reasons for accepting or rejecting their recommendations."

After the November election, HK and the President-elect were deluged with more than a dozen inviduals' suggestions on national security organization. Many were solicited, some were not.

-- Richard Neustadt sent HK a report of a dinner meeting in Cambridge on December 9, 1968. This group's recommendation was for an "Executive Group" of the National Security Council -- chaired by the President and including the Secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security Adviser. It was in effect an institutionalized "Tuesday lunch," but with more regularity (confidential minutes would be kept, for example). Below this would be a "Review Committee" chaired by the National Security Adviser. Below that would be "Area Committees" corresponding to the existing IRG's.

-- Maxwell Taylor sent a memo whose thrust was that the existing White House staff and SIG/IRG machinery were "adequate." He also urged that a Hoover-type commission might be useful for long-range issues, and he hoped that PFIAB would be reconstituted.

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-- Leon Sloss sent a memo on December 21 recommending a strong NSC staff and an expanded SIG staff.

-- General Earle Wheeler wrote to HK on Dec. 6 that he felt the existing SIG/IRG system had not been given a real workout in its short existence but was "showing promise."

-- Francis Bator wrote on December 9 arguing for an unstructured system that made extensive use of ad hoc "task forces."

-- Jerry Friedheim wrote to Bryce Harlow on December 6 calling for creation of a "national objectives planning staff" in the White House.

-- Jonathan Moore urged creation of an "Executive Group" of the NSC, chaired by the National Security Adviser.

-- Seyom Brown on December 6 suggested that the President-elect enhance the NSC staff for planning and the SIG for implementation and coordination.

-- Peter Szanton sent an analysis of the State Department organization and suggested ways to strengthen the Secretary of State.

-- Henry Owen (of the State Department Policy Planning Staff) sent a long memo describing the function of policy planning staffs, but without any particular recommendation.

-- Harvard professor Anthony Oettinger felt there had been a revolution in computer technology and communications (which he combined into "compunications") and that HK should stress this aspect in the new White House.

-- John Eisenhower wrote a memo on November 25 describing his experience with the function of Staff Secretary in the White House.

-- Richard Moose and Laurence Legere sent HK a draft of their book which traced the history of the NSC organization.

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## B. Creating The New System

HK turned to Morton Halperin for assistance in designing a new NSC system in accordance with his and the President's desire for a White House-centered management system. Halperin, only thirty, had been a junior professor in the Government Department at Harvard who had written on limited war and also Chinese nuclear policy. By 1967 he was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in ISA specializing in East Asia.

In response to HK's request, Halperin wrote a memo to HK on December 11, 1968, sketching out the basic objectives of Presidential staffing and the rough organization of a new NSC staff:

> "As you requested, I have given some thought to how one could apply the techniques which Bob McNamara used in Defense to the entire range of foreign policy problems. I take this to mean two things: (1) the use of quantitative and systematic techniques to deal with problems or parts of problems which are illuminated by such methods, and (2) the development of memoranda for the President which describe a problem and then deal in a meaningful way with real options spelling out their costs and gains.

> "In order to indicate how these functions might be performed, I have found it useful to describe them in the context of a concept of what the entire staff might look like. I have also been guided by the strong belief that most of the basic analysis and staff work should be done in the Departments."

Halperin then presented an organization chart and a brief memo suggesting a tripartite NSC staff.

- Senior Staff Members and staff assistants responsible for regional and functional areas and day-to-day operational business.

- Assistants for Planning: 2-3 individuals to plan and develop policy alternatives on major and long-range issues of direct concern to President (Vietnam, Mideast, SALT, NATO) and to task departments for major studies.

- Planning Staff, to do specific in-house studies and contingency planning when interagency studies prove inadequate, and also to participate in interagency studies.

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Halperin included a short paper on program budgeting, which he felt was a useful method of planning and control of aid programs for key countries.

HK and Halperin developed these ideas further at the
Hotel Pierre and developed the design of a new NSC System.
According to Eagleburger's recollection, he (Eagleburger)
joined after the work had begun, and General Goodpaster joined
after the work was well along. This is borne out by the
documents.

In late December Halperin prepared a rough draft of a
memorandum to the President-elect to elicit his decisions on
all aspects of a new NSC system: structure, procedures,
staffing, and priorities. HK and Eagleburger took Halperin's
draft and refined it; they sent their draft to Goodpaster on
December 24 asking for his comments in time for a new draft
to be prepared before a big plenary meeting with the President-
elect in Key Biscayne set for December 28-30. The completed
memorandum, signed by HK and dated December 27, was presented
to the President-elect in Florida.

HK explained in a cover note to Nixon:

"The attached memo . . . outlines my ideas for
organizing the NSC and my own staff. It is based on
extensive conversations with a number of people--
particularly General Goodpaster, who agrees with my
recommendations.

"I apologize for its length, but the decisions you
make on the issues raised here will have an important
effect on how we function in the field of foreign
affairs in the years ahead. I thought, therefore, that
it would be best for you to have as full a description
as possible of what General Goodpaster and I have in
mind."

HK began with a critical analysis of existing practice
in the Kennedy-Johnson Administration and compared it with the
practice in the Eisenhower Administration, reflecting the
perspective of the UCLA presentation described earlier:

"Current Practice

"The Johnson Administration's key decision-making
body is the so-called 'Tuesday Lunch' of the President
and his principal advisers. The lunch group meets with-
out a formal agenda and without any formal followup.

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Decisions are conveyed orally to the Departments, with frequent uncertainty about precisely what was decided.

"A National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) is sometimes issued by the President or his Special Assistant informing the bureaucracy of a Presidential decision, but the NSAM almost never provides any rationale for the decision. While the National Security Council meets from time to time, its principal function is an educational one, i.e., general review of a major issue. In recent years the NSC has not been used as a decision-making instrument.

"The major strength of the existing system is its flexibility and the speed with which decisions can be made. The absence of formal staffing for the Tuesday lunch, for example, permits a free and frank discussion unencumbered by a large group of second-level staff, but the discussants are frequently inadequately briefed and often unfamiliar with the nuances of the issue before them. Because the principals meet without the benefit of staff or previous staff study, there is no guarantee that all the relevant alternatives are considered, or that all the interested parties within the government have a chance to state their views. Since there is no systematic follow-up, it is often unclear exactly what has been decided or why. Nor is there any formal method for assuring that decisions are adequately implemented.

## "Eisenhower Procedures

"The NSC met frequently during the Eisenhower Administration. Participants had the benefit of fully staffed papers, and a systematic effort was made to give all interested parties a hearing.

"A Planning Board (chaired by the Special Assistant to the President, and with representatives from the agencies represented on the NSC) met frequently to review all papers going to the NSC. The Special Assistant for NSC Affairs prepared the agenda for the NSC meeting, summed up the positions taken by the participants, and presented a decision document to the President for approval after the meeting. Implementation of NSC based decisions was the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board.

"If there is any criticism to make of this system it is that its very formality tended to demand too much of the principals' time, while giving insufficient priority to issues of primary Presidential concern.

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"The present task is to combine the best features of the two systems; to develop a structure, using the NSC, which will provide the President and his top advisers with:

- all the realistic alternatives;

- the costs and benefits of each;

- the views and recommendations of all interested agencies.

"The procedures outlined below will, I believe, permit us to reach these goals, while avoiding the dangers of compromise and indecision which can result from an excessively formal system."

The memorandum then outlined the structure of an NSC system, consisting of a revitalized National Security Council and a system of supporting subcommittees:

"A. The National Security Council. The National Security Council should be the principal forum for issues requiring interagency coordination, especially where Presidential decisions of a middle and long-range nature are involved. It should meet regularly, and discussion should be limited to agenda subjects. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs [no longer called "Special Assistant"] -- at the direction of the President and in consultation with the Secretary of State -- should be respoisible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared -- normally by the responsible departments. The NSC staff should assist by synthesizing and sharply defining the options, and occasionally by providing an independent staff study. To keep the meetings small, only principals should attend (with the possible exception of the Under Secretary of State).

"The NSC should consider middle and long-range policy issues as well as current crises and immediate operational problems. By providing a forum for high-level discussion of planning papers, the NSC can insure that senior officials consider the long-range implications of policy choices.

"NSC agenda papers should present a wide range of alternative policy options that are politically and

-19-

administratively feasible, and should avoid the all-
too-frequent practice of setting up extreme alternatives
as straw men to the one course of action being urged.

"The NSC should not be considered the sole forum for
Presidential discussions in the National Security field.
The President will reserve the option of constituting
subcommittees for the expeditious handling of operational
matters (with membership especially adapted to the
particular issue).

"B. **National Security Council Review Group.** An NSC Review Group would examine papers prior to their consideration by the NSC, unless the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President deem it unnecessary. Its role would be to frame the issues to be decided by the NSC, not to achieve a compromise or consensus which hides alternatives. The Group would also assign action to Regional or Ad Hoc groups, as appropriate.

***

"C. **NSC Ad Hoc Under Secretary's Committee.** This Committee would be composed of the Under Secretary of State (Chairman), the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Director of Central Intelligence (and other agencies where appropriate). It would deal with matters referred to it by the NSC Review Group, including matters on which the IRG's have not been able to agree but which do not involve issues requiring Presidential decision or Cabinet-level discussion.

"D. **Inter-Agency Regional Groups.** The currently existing inter-agency regional groups (IRG's), chaired by the relevant Assistant Secretary of State, should be reconstituted as sub-organs of the NSC. . . . The IRG's should perform three functions: (1) discussion and decision on issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions; (2) preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC, stating alternatives, their costs, and consequences; (3) preparation of potential crises contingency papers for review by the NSC. These papers should discuss what steps can be taken to avoid the crisis, as well as actions planned during the crisis.

"**NOTE:** The elaborated NSC machinery makes the continued functioning of the existing Senior Inter-Departmental Group unnecessary."

-20-

As for procedures, HK's memo proposed replacing the
undifferentiated NSAM's with a NSSM/NSDM series, and also
proposed a Presidential Annual Review of Foreign Policy for
Congress, the bureaucracy, and the public:

"A. **NSC Memoranda.** Two memorandum series should be established to inform the departments and agencies of Presidential actions. In order to avoid confusion, the current series of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs) should be abolished and replaced by:

- **National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs).** NSDMs would be used to report Presidential decisions (whether or not the result of NSC meetings) when the President wants the agencies concerned clearly to understand what he desires, and the reasons for his decision.

- **National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs).** This series would be used to direct that studies be undertaken of particular problems (normally for NSC consideration).

***

"B. **Annual Review of the International Situation.** The National Security Council Staff, together with the relevant agencies, should prepare for the President an annual review of the international situation similar to the annual economic message. This report, which would be submitted to the Congress, would permit a more extended discussion of the President's view of the international situation than is possible in the State of the Union Message. The Review would:

- provide a regular framework for defining U.S. security interests and programs to meet those interests;

- give the agencies an opportunity to assure high-level attention to fundamental issues within an overall framework.

"The Review would focus on world events over the past year and set forth the President's view of these events and our future goals. The statement would include some of the material which over the past eight years the Secretary of Defense has presented in his Annual Posture

-21-

Statement to the Congress, but it would not give the details of Defense or other foreign policy budgets. The statement should normally be issued in January."

The new NSC Staff would be divided into three groups along the lines of Halperin's December 11 memo but somewhat rearranged and renamed: (a) assistants for programs, (b) operations staff, and (c) planning staff:

"The role of the Staff would be to provide a Presidential perspective in programs, planning and operations. The Staff's job would be to see that the agencies do the initial work, using existing inter-agency mechanisms. Only in exceptional circumstances would the NSC Staff prepare its own papers.

***

"A. Assistants for Programs would be responsible for the preparation of studies on the long-range implications of major policy issues (e.g., Vietnam, Middle East settlements, and alternative NATO strategies). They would work with the appropriate Departments to provide the President and the NSC with the relevant information and policy options. After it has been decided that a problem will require one or a series of Presidential decisions, responsibility would be assigned to one of the Assistants for Programs. They would develop a strategy for getting the necessary staff work done, and for bringing the issue to the National Security Council in a timely and orderly fashion.

"The Assistants for Programs would be charged with developing a five-year perspective by helping the agencies to: (1) define middle-range goals; (2) propose specific measures to achieve these goals. The responsible Assistant would work with the group considering the issue to insure that all relevant options were kept open. They would also need to work closely with the NSC Operations Staff and Planning Staff if the link between planning and operations is to be maintained.

"B. The Operations Staff would consist of approximately five Senior Members and a small number of Staff Assistants. Each Senior Staff Member would be responsible for certain geographic regions and/or functional activities. They would follow the day-to-day business of the Departments, and would be responsible for bringing to the attention of the Assistant to the President those matters which are of Presidential concern.

-22-

"C. The Planning Staff would prepare the NSC agenda papers, synthesizing agency papers and necessary back-up and follow-up papers. It would undertake specific studies only when inter-agency studies were unsatisfactory or undesirable. Consultants would be drawn upon to work with the Planning Staff in developing options beyond those developed in the Departments. The Planning Staff would also provide back-up expertise for the Assistants for Programs.

***

"The existence of this Staff and its access to consultants would enable the Assistant to the President and the President to receive preliminary studies on complicated and controversial subjects without arousing concern within the Departments before the President had decided what options he wanted to explore seriously.

"D. The Military Assistant would help the Assistant to the President in the development of Staff papers on the full range of military issues, and would be available to provide him with judgments on military questions. He would also assist in monitoring and assembling intelligence materials."

When the new staff was assembled after Inauguration, John Osborne would comment perceptively:

"What comes clear is that the Nixon NSC staff is not fundamentally designed to be either a planning staff or an operating staff. It is intended to be a command staff, through which President Nixon proposes to fasten and keep a firm grip upon the departments, primarily State and Defense, that will be applying or misapplying his policies." (New Republic, Feb. 15, 1969)

HK's memo of December 27, 1968 also identified a number of the policy issues that required early attention: Vietnam, Middle East, Europe, international monetary policy, strategic forces, overall U.S. security policy, crisis contingency planning, Japan, foreign aid, and program budgeting. These were scheduled to be the first set of NSSM's.

Eagleburger recalls that when he first saw an early draft of the new scheme and HK asked his opinion, he replied, "It looks fine, except I wonder what happened to the Secretary of State. He is never mentioned." HK handed the draft back to Halperin and told him to "mention the Secretary."

[P. cantico
"NSC Org." file]

-23-

Eagleburger and Roger Morris also record that General
Goodpaster was a powerful advocate of the strong NSC system.
LSE recalls that when Goodpaster first saw a draft of NSDM 2,
he thought it was far too generous to State and persuaded HK
to strengthen the NSC role substantially.

The President-elect met in Key Biscayne on December 28
with Rogers, Laird, Vice President Agnew, HK, and Goodpaster,
for a general discussion of the proposed restructuring of the
NSC System. Two days after the meeting, Nixon gave his
approval to all of HK's detailed recommendations for the new
structure, procedures, staff system, and issue priorities, as
laid out in HK's memorandum of December 27.

In early January, HK offered some further thoughts on
procedures. A memo of January 6, 1969, entitled "To Raise
with Haldeman" for a meeting of that day, covered a number
of details. HK wanted to ask Haldeman for flexibility with
respect to pay scales to attract good quality people for the
NSC staff; he recommended to Haldeman that the Situation Room
remain where it was, as an essential nerve center for the
President. He also offered to help the President-elect with
the Inaugural Address. Then, the memo raised two interesting
points about NSC procedures:

-- "The President should not be in a position where he must make decisions at National Security Council Meetings. We need to set up a procedure which permits Mr. Nixon to make the final decision away from the assembled group. Perhaps some system which requires a Presidential signature after the NSC has met will do the trick.

***

-- "Under most circumstances Presidential directives should be transmitted over my signature. Too close an identification between the President and an order which he may later wish to disavow can be awkward. In unusual circumstances the President may want to sign the order himself. As a general principle, is this acceptable?"

HK's conception of his own role shows up in some of the
early documentation. A set of HK's handwritten notes (undated
but very early on), presumably from or before a conversation

-24-

with Nixon or Haldeman, lists the following of HK's concerns:

"Job requirements

"Combination of Cutler and Goodpaster

"Title: Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.

"W. H. Office -- Situation Room complex.

"Paper flow to and from departments dealing with
National Security through NS office.

"Exec. Secy of NSC and staff work for me and
selected by me with approval of President.

"Chair 303

"Sit in SIG -- WH staff on IRG.

"Present when he sees Sec. State and Sec. Defense

"Direct access within limits of calendar

"END RUNS

"Planning

"Intellectuals and little groups

"Other W.H. problems:

"Regular meeting with other assistants

"Press."

Rogers began to get worried. HK handwritten notes,
apparently reflecting a conversation with Rogers probably in
late December or early January, show some of Rogers' concerns
and HK's replies and conclusions:

"Let the dept. know whom I see and why."

"Know every German leader -- psychological problem.
Lucet = old friend."

"At least give me some warning."

"General philosophy: keep present powers but
exercise them with restraint."

-25-

The bureaucracy geared up its counterattack on the NSC System only after the President had approved its outline in Key Biscayne. It took a while to sink in. State was the first to launch its attack. HK wrote a memo to Nixon on January 7, 1969, on "NSC Procedures:"

"The State Department has now begun to object to the NSC procedures which you approved in Florida. (Bill Rogers had agreed to the general outline in Key Biscayne, but now -- in light of the objections of his Foreign Service subordinates -- wants to reserve judgment. Mel Laird agrees with the memo I showed you -- with one minor caveat.)"

HK's memo summarized the State Department's proposal that State continue to be the "executive agent" for the President for the conduct of foreign policy, ~~à la the SIG/IRG system.~~ State wanted the staffing of the interdepartmental machinery to be done by State. State also wanted authority over the other departments as well, in order to manage the process, with other departments having the right to take disagreements to the NSC.

HK's memo to the President argued that State was fully represented in the new NSC structure, chairing the IG's and the Under Secretaries Committee and participating on the Review Group and the NSC itself. HK pointed out the inadequacies of State as a Presidential staff: An FSO's skill is operations, not planning, and his forte is compromising differences in order to avoid confrontations; S/P's studies 'have been unrelated to real problems, have had no effect on policy, and have obfuscated rather than clarified alternatives.' State was no better at management of operations than at planning; Vietnam was cited as an example.

HK argued to the President that the issue should be regarded as settled:

"A delay in establishing the new NSC structure will mean a concomitant delay in getting down to business on the many serious foreign policy issues you will have to face in the opening months of your administration. It would not be helpful to begin the Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement -- particularly since it would be over an issue you had already decided at Key Biscayne."

Just to get the point across, LSE sent a memo to Haldeman the same day (Jan. 7) enclosing a xerox copy of RN's

-26-

signature approving the recommendations in HK's memo of Dec.
27.

State continued its rear-guard action to block or alter
the new procedure. A draft memo in early January from HK and
Goodpaster to Nixon (which may not have been sent) explained
the issues:

"The State Department is proposing a change in NSDM2 that would require policy papers prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups for the NSC to be transmitted through the Secretary of State to the NSC Review Group.

"This arrangement is in basic conflict with the concept of direct channels of tasking and response between Inter-departmental Groups and the NSC Review Group, which was the basis on which we proposed retaining the IRG's. It is inconsistent with a strong NSC system in several ways:

"1. Unless transmittal were purely _pro forma_ and hence meaningless, it would carry the power to review, to return for revision, or to reschedule -- all functions that should lie with the NSC machinery.

"2. The proposal thus retains the idea of State Department control over what reaches the President in the NSC, and when.

"3. When the Secretary reviews the substance of the paper in transmitting it his action freezes the position of the State Department man on the NSC Review Group, which should be free to examine papers from a broad Presidential perspective.

"4. The proposed arrangement constricts the Inter-departmental Groups in preparing policy papers to the scope and context of State Department functions, rather than giving them, fully and directly, the broader perspective of Presidential security concerns.

"In overall effect, the proposal would keep the issue open as to whether you are going to have a State Department oriented system rather than an NSC oriented system. To make clear it is to be an NSC oriented system, the proposal should be rejected."

-27-

Alex Johnson did most of the fighting for State. Rogers only barely understood what was happening. (See Roger Morris's book, attached at Tab C, pp. 86-87.) Elliot Richardson sided with HK. Eagleburger recalls:

"Sometime in late '68 -- or more probably, January of 1969, you, Goodpaster, and I met in the State Department in Rogers' transition office with the Secretary-designate and Richardson to discuss the NSDM-2 draft. You let Goodpaster do most of the talking in defense of the draft. ... Rogers knew, in some inchoate way, that he was ~~in the process of being screwed to the wall~~, but was neither sure how or how best to defend himself. Goodpaster was pedantic, a bit old-womanish, stubborn as hell, and rather effective in his arguments. Rogers was incoherent, less than well prepared, and ~~unprepared~~ for a confrontation. Richardson started out on Rogers' side, I recall, but all-of-a-sudden (you could see the bulb go on in his head), totally switched and rather effectively defended NSDM-2. I often wondered if that was the time when EF decided where his bread was buttered and where the power was going to lie, or whether it was simply that the logic of the arguments for NSDM-2 (there were, and still are, many good reasons for the structure you established) finally overwhelmed him. I have always expected it was the latter -- his rather good and precise lawyer's mind was captivated by the sense and symmetry of it all."

The State Department did battle virtually until Inauguration Day. In HK's handwritten notes is a note to himself written in late December and reflecting a conversation with Nixon: "Influence of State Department establishment must be reduced."

Meanwhile, Mel Laird also began objecting to aspects of the new NSC system *after* the President-elect had approved it. On January 3, HK sent to Laird a copy of the long memorandum to the President outlining the new system in detail. HK noted in a cover memo to Laird that the new structure had been discussed with Rogers and Goodpaster and approved by the President-elect.

Laird wrote back on January 9, 1969:

"I have read and re-read your proposal many times and have tried to relate it to the discussion we had in Key

-28-

Biscayne on proposed changes in the National Security Council System. After much study and considerable reflection on the draft proposal, I am forced reluctantly to conclude that as Secretary of Defense-designate, I cannot fully approve the proposal in its present form."

The reasons Laird cited were:

"First, it would institute, as presently drafted, a 'closed loop' in which all intelligence inputs would be channeled through a single source, the Assistant and his NSC staff. Such an arrangement in effect would or could isolate not only the President from direct access to intelligence community outputs but also the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other top-level members of the President's team.

***

"Second, it would place in the hands of the Assistant and his NSC staff the primary right of initiating studies and directing where they will be performed as well as determining which policy issues should be placed on the agenda for NSC meetings. There should be some consultation provided for with the principals in establishing the priorities of these studies. It would also give the Assistant both the power and the responsibility for implementing NSC policy as well as the right of determination of issues arising from the implementation of those policies without requiring consultation or even notification of NSC principals. This could very well result in principals going around the NSC and directly to the President as a regular practice. Here HK wrote in the margin: "How?" This would negate what I believe the President-elect is trying to accomplish. The principals . . . should be able to place policy issues on the agenda subject only to the veto of the President.

"Third, it is my desire, as I know it is yours, to strengthen and revitalize the National Security Council. . . . But in my view, this cannot be accomplished by aggregating to the NSC and through it to the Assistant to the President the major tools that have always been intended to be utilized equally by all of the President's top-level board of advisers in the National Security field.

"... In our conversation today and in my conversation yesterday with General Goodpaster it was made clear

-29-

that the above comments were in line with your understanding of how the NSC would operate. I do feel, however, that the memo creating the new system should formally spell out these important points."

Laird's objections -- the substance underneath the exaggerated puffery -- seem to have been procedural rather than intrinsic to the structure. In any case, they seem to have been accommodated.

By Inauguration Day these counterattacks were beaten back. Indeed, by Inauguration Day the key NSDM's were already prepared and some of them signed. The key NSDM's are dated January 20 but were actually signed by the President-elect on the 19th. HK's memo of Friday January 17th to the President-elect, which forwarded NSDM's 2 and 3 for his signature, said: "You saw and approved them in an earlier draft, but they have been changed slightly -- as I described to you Thursday on the telephone -- to meet some of Bill Rogers' points. They still faithfully reflect your concept of how the NSC should be organized:"

-- NSDM 1 (January 20, 1969), signed by HK, established the NSC Decision and Study Memoranda series.

-- NSDM 2 (January 20, 1969) signed by the President, was entitled "Reorganization of the National Security Council System" and directed formation of the NSC, Review Group, Under Secretaries Committee, Inter-departmental Groups, and Ad Hoc Groups, according to the essential principles set forth in HK's memo to the President-elect of December 27.

-- NSDM 3 (January 20, 1969), signed by the President, was entitled "The Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas." It labeled the Secretary of State as "my principal foreign affairs adviser" and reaffirmed the recent tradition of giving the Secretary overall responsibility for non-military functions abroad.

-- NSDM 4 (January 20, 1969), signed by HK, directed preparation of a series of program analysis studies.

In later weeks and months, the NSC system would be modified in some respects, but in its essential features it

-30-

was in place by Inauguration Day. Important modifications
were:

-- NSDM 7 of Feb. 7, 1969 authorized the Secretary of State to delegate certain functions to the Chairmen of the IG's.

-- NSDM 8 of March 21, 1969, directed the IG's to take
responsibility for contingency planning.

-- The WSAG was created by memo of May 16, 1969, and
NSDM 19 of July 3, 1969 gave it the responsibility
for contingency planning.

-- NSDM 23 of September 16, 1969 created the VSSG.

-- NSDM 26 of October 11, 1969, created the DPRC.

-- NSDM 40 of February 17, 1970, spelled out the respon-
sibilities of the 40 Committee.

-- NSDM 85 of September 14, 1970, upgraded the Review
Group into the Senior Review Group.

Roger Morris has an interesting account of the whole
transition battle, in a chapter entitled "Coup d'Etat at the
Hotel Pierre," which is attached at Tab C.

C. Personnel

Much of HK's time and much of the available documentation
was filled with selecting personnel for the new NSC staff and
the new Administration.

On a sheet of yellow paper probably from very early in
December, in HK's handwriting, the name "Larry Eagleman"
appears. HK eventually got to know him better.

Countless people who wrote to HK or spoke to HK submitted
names. A letter from Henry Cabot Lodge listed "men who have
had remarkable experience and shown great aptitude as regards
Vietnam." His list included Phil Habib, Richard Holbrooke,
and Anthony Lake.

-31-

On December 9, 1968, HK received a letter from Fritz Kraemer with a passionate endorsement of Col. Alexander Haig:

"I have observed Haig over many years. He is, above all, a man of exceptional strength of character, who happens to be also very intelligent and endowed with an innate grasp of politico-psychological intangibles.

***

"In this position of military adviser to McNamara, peculiarly tempting for a young officer, Haig retained his utter integrity to an extent which even aroused the admiration of McNamara himself, whose general capability for admiring others is decidedly underdeveloped. When Haig left OSD to attend the Army Way College, he received McNamara's photo with an inscription expressing the Secretary's respect and admiration in astonishingly strong terms. Califano explained to me that McNamara had remarked, while signing the photo, "This is one of only two Army officers who dare to contradict me to my face." Again Haig had succeeded in making his points fearlessly and yet, at the same time, gaining the respect and trust of a most difficult, near-dictatorial man.

"Individuals of Haig's characteristics have become very rare. Our mass age is not conducive to producing the type. In your fearsomely responsible new position you will be a lonely man and you need at least a very few on whose unshakeable human reliability, integrity and profound understanding you can rely. I have known you for some time and I am convinced that you will be more than well served by this man.

***

"The country . . . is in a very difficult and dangerous situation, and it is necessary that the few talents we have get into positions where they can be objectively most useful, and where they can be loyal and effective helpers of men like yourself on whose performance so very much depends.

"As ever,

"Kraemer."

-32-

A note by HK to Haldeman of January 9, 1969, dealt with a less pleasant incident. During 1968 the FBI had received a critical report about Dan Davidson. The report quoted John Walsh of the State Department Secretariat as saying:

"There is no question whatever regarding Mr. Davidson's loyalty to the United States, and his character, habits, morals, and conduct are good. . . . The big problem with him is that he is indiscreet. He likes to talk."

Davidson had been told repeatedly by his superiors (Harriman, Habib) to be less fulsome with newspapermen, but to no avail. Davidson was confident he could handle himself, but Walsh was less confident: "He's a babler."

This FBI report evidently came up between HK and Haldeman, since HK wanted Davidson on his staff. Therefore on January 9 HK passed on to Haldeman the FBI report "discussed with you earlier." HK defended Davidson and suggested a "compromise" procedure:

"While I am prepared to admit that there is some truth to it, I do not see how I can let him go now that the report has been broadly circulated around Washington. To do so would be unfair to Davidson, and would only play into the hands of those in Washington who use such methods to influence the personnel choices.

"I intend to put Dan on the planning side of my staff, which will limit his access to highly sensitive material. I also intend to ask for a full field investigation on him; if there is any question as a result of the investigation, I will let him go."

The memo records Haldeman's agreement: "OK. H."

The NSC staff as announced by the White House on February 7, 1969, two weeks after Inauguration, consisted of the following:

Operations Staff

Latin America
Viron P. Vaky
Arnold Nachmanoff

The White House was not the only agency whose personnel were being screened. The President-elect sent Rogers a memo on January 7, 1969, urging him to eliminate "dead wood" in the State Department:

"At the beginning of a new Administration I believe that an analysis of the qualifications of all our Ambassadors abroad, career as well as non-career, should be made. While the great majority of career men will probably be retained in their present posts, the beginning of a new Administration is a good time to move some of the dead wood out and to move some of the un-qualified men from one post to a less sensitive one. . . . I think a very hard-headed analysis should be made, just as soon as we take over on January 20 so that any changes can be made within the first two or three months that we are in office."

Personal note from PWR: I recall Nixon stalwarts like John Lehman complaining acidly that Rogers was given virtually carte-blanche in personnel assignments at State. Most middle-level officials were career men and few outside "Nixon loyalists" were brought in. It is clear to me that this only compounded Nixon's often-expressed and almost-total suspicion and distrust of the State Department, which was one of his principal motives for keeping major policy matters in the White House.

-35-

### III. EVOLUTION OF A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

Source material from the Transition on the substance of the new Administration's foreign policy includes:

- Talking points for a HK briefing of the Cabinet-designees on December 12, 1968, apparently the work of Eagleburger but with input from the bureaucracy, and reflecting some known HK views. (Full text at Tab D.)

- Memcons of HK and Nixon with a few foreign visitors and distinguished Americans.

- Papers and ideas, solicited or unsolicited, from several individuals, both insiders and outsiders.

#### A. Vietnam

Among the earliest of the contributors was Henry Cabot Lodge, who wrote to Nixon on October 31, 1968, recommending that the new Administration launch a "quick survey of the Vietnam situation" as soon as possible after the election. He proposed also that the new President appoint a senior civilian "Vietnam generalist" to coordinate the "Washington end of the war." There were too many competing voices in Washington and he urged that someone be appointed, preferably in State, to centralize all operations. Thirdly, Lodge proposed a shift in military strategy. He felt that US forces should shift to a "police/self-help operation" in South Vietnam, behind the "shield" of military operations. By "police" he meant an intensified pacification effort including the RFPF; by "self-help" he had in mind a concentrated community action program to promote economic progress. Such a shift in strategy would be better able to maintain domestic support in the United States.

A similar endorsement of greater efforts on pacification was submitted by Ithiel de Sola Pool who wrote on December 6 to congratulate HK on his appointment as national security adviser:

"We have talked often about the problem of pacification in VietNam. As you know, I have a deep personal commitment to getting some needed reforms made in our program. These are all the more essential now since they are preconditions to the GVN effectively taking over the pacification effort."

Some brief points on Vietnam are included in the talking points for HK's briefing of the new Cabinet on December 12. It is not clear who drafted them -- possibly Eagleburger -- but they hint at some of HK's known views, including the January

-36-

1969 article in Foreign Affairs:

-- "The present state, and future course, of our negotiations is too complicated and sensitive for detailed discussion here.

-- "What is important is that we understand that this war is substantially different from any other we have fought. Our success depends in large measure to our ability to interrelate our economic, political and military policies into a coherent whole.

-- "Also, the Paris negotiations themselves are an important factor, since they have such an impact on the expectations of the Vietnamese populace.

-- "This administration proposes to make Vietnam the first test of the new NSC structure. Very early on we will, after full consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other senior Presidential advisors, present the full range of options to the NSC for consideration.

-- "The NSC task will be to make a rational whole of all our programs, and to end the tendency to make policy by answering cables from Saigon and Paris."

Among the more eminent individuals who expressed an opinion on Vietnam was Walter Lippmann, who lunched with HK on Wednesday December 11 and met with Nixon and HK on Friday, December 13. Lippmann told the President-elect that he believed the U.S. was overcommitted in the world and he believed we should get out of Vietnam, concentrating on the objective of mutual withdrawal in the Paris negotiations.

On the same day, December 13, HK met with Lee Kwan Yew at the Plaza Hotel. Lee told HK that if Thailand, which he called the "linchpin of Southeast Asia," fell to the Communists, the whole area would be in serious trouble. HK said this sounded as if the new Administration had written off South Vietnam; HK stressed that we had not done so. Lee replied that if the U.S. disengaged from Vietnam, it should do so only after allowing a new national leadership to emerge there. So long as the U.S. was tied to an Air Marshal (Ky) and a general (Thieu), the U.S. was in trouble. Lee urged that the U.S. try to bring about a popularly-elected government in South Vietnam, and that the U.S. withdraw carefully in stages.