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It is done unobtrusively and in an unobjectionable way, and may be as much for
my protection as to ascertain whom I see and what I do.

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

January 30, 1916.

We arrived at Bale at one o'clock. The German officials had been
instructed to expedite matters consequently we had no difficulty whatsoever at
the frontier. The Swiss Government did as much for us, and we were enable to
catch a two o'clock train for Geneva, where we arrived at half past seven o'clock.
I immediately wrote out a cable to the President, a copy of which is attached to
the diary.

January 31, 1916.

Ambassador Penfield came in last night at ten o'clock and we have con-
ferred frequently throughout the day. Minister Stovall arrived during the morn-
ing, and I was in conference with him also. I shall embody my conversation
with Penfield in a letter to the President which will cover all points of in-
terest.

Captain Gherardi came over from Ouchy, where he is on a vacation, for a
conference, and altogether I have had a busy day. We leave tonight for Paris.

PARIS, FRANCE.

February 1, 1916.

Hugh Frazier of our Embassy was at the station to meet us. My working
staff consists now of Lanier Winslow, of the Berlin Embassy, Clifford Carver
and my confidential secretary, Miss Denton, and I manage to keep them all busy
as well as additional members of the embassies where I happen to be.

I asked Frazier to make appointments with the Prime Minister and
Jules Cambon as soon as possible, thinking it would be perhaps tomorrow. I

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was surprised to have them respond at once, and I saw Briand today at half past two, and will see Cambon tomorrow at eleven.

Frazier acted as interpreter. We passed compliments, but did not say much of importance. Frazier returned to the Embassy when we had finished and wrote a fairly correct resume of what was said. This memorandum is attached. I told the Prime Minister I would talk freely to Cambon tomorrow for he understands English, and Cambon could act as interpreter for both. I asked that what was said should be considered as confidential between the three of us.

Photographers and newspapermen in numbers have been after me. I arranged to see representatives of the press at five o'clock at the Embassy. They asked many questions, few of which I answered. The clippings from various French newspapers indicate about what was said. My conference with the Ambassador was unimportant.

A copy of the Berlin Tagblatt containing what purported to be an interview with me reached Paris before we did. In this interview I am supposed to have said among other things that "every time I visit Germany, I love it more". The French reporters asked whether I was correctly quoted. As is my rule, I would neither confirm nor deny the statement. I could feel the bad impression this made, but I stuck to it. When the conference was ended I told the reporters of two leading Paris papers that I had given no interview, therefore could not have said what was quoted. This was passed about, and all was serene once more.

February 2, 1916.

I had an hour's conference this morning with Jules Cambon, who is perhaps directing head of the Foreign Office despite the fact that Briand holds the title. I talked to him very frankly, letting him know of our controversy with Germany over the Lusitania incident. I did not hesitate to tell him that I was doing all I could to avert a breach with Germany over this af-

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fair. My belief was that a break could only be deferred and not averted, but it would place the United States at a disadvantage to go to war over an incident ten months old, and one which the American people thought had been practically closed. In my opinion, Germany would give us another opportunity if we desired one, as the pinch of the blockade would cause her to revert to her original undersea warfare. I told him of the difficulties one had in dealing with democracies like Great Britain and France, and the enormous advantage an autocracy like Germany possessed in time of war. I did not minimize Germany's present potentiality, and I did not create any delusions as to the future. I even leaned in the other direction, and tried to convince him what a terrible gamble this war was for both Great Britain and France and where it might finally lead. I pictured to him, as I had to Grey, Lloyd George, Bryce and others, the danger there was in Germany's attempt to make a separate peace with Russia. I impressed upon him the necessity of good relations continuing between the United States, Great Britain and France, and I urged that France use all her influence with Great Britain to have her meet the demands the United States was making regarding illegal features of the blockade.

I informed Cambon of my discussions with the German Chancellor, von Jagow and Zimmermann regarding peace terms. He was pleased with the answers I had made, and seemed to accept them as interpreting the position of the Allies. I told him, in my opinion, unless something unforseen occurred, it was not probable the Allies would be able to have a decisive victory on any of the fronts spring and during the coming summer, and in the Autumn the same situation would face them as now, with the exception that the position of the Allies would be improved somewhat and that of the Central Powers less so.

I thanked him for the courteous treatment I had received from the French public and press, and indicated it was largely due to him, a compliment he blushingly brushed aside. He seemed glad to have me say that America drew closer to

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France and England when their fortunes were at low ebb. This is true, and the reason for it is plain.

Newspaper correspondents, French and American visitors etc. have kept me and
my entourage busy all day.

February 3, 1916.

Mr. Richardson of the Rome Embassy arrived this morning with confidential letters and messages from Thomas Nelson Page. His statement of the situation in Italy is not reassuring.

I have a cable from London stating that our Ambassador at Madrid desires to see me, and asks if he can meet me here.

Today has been largely a repetition of yesterday.

February 4, 1916.

The main incident of importance today was the dinner given us by Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp. The Prime Minister was the most notable guest. After dinner Briand and I got together, using my old friend, d'Estournelles de Constant, as interpreter, and talked the entire evening. The British Ambassador, who was also a guest, arose to leave before the Prime Minister, which is the British of it. I suppose he was irritated by our continued talk in which neither he nor the American Ambassador were invited to take part.

Our conversation covered principally the philosophy of government. I started it by telling of my visit to Berlin, Paris and London in May and June of 1914 prior to the war. Briand was more interested than ordinarily he might have been, because the Kaiser invited him to come to Kiel at that time, and he has often wondered since if his acceptance might have had favorable results. He believes not, but there is always a doubt. I analyzed the different governmental systems of Germany, France and Great Britain and the United States, and enlarged upon the advantage an autocracy had over a democracy in time of war.

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For many years I had been hoped the United States would become as democratic as Great Britain and France, but I now wondered whether we were not better off than they at present. I startled them when I made the statement that no sovereign in Europe was so powerful as our President for the limited term of his office, and I explained why this was true.

I spoke of my present difficulties in both England and France in trying to obtain action and reach definite conclusions. I could get from each Cabinet official his individual view, but it was almost impossible to get the collective view of the Government upon any question. In France, we had no feeling of security because the Government shifted so frequently that continuity of policy could not be relied upon. In Germany and the United States more definite results could be reached in a day than in a month in either England or France. The curious feature of the German Government was that in many ways it was socialistic with all its military autocracy.

We discussed different phases of the situation as it is now, as it might be at the end of the war, and the effect the war may have upon the future of civilization. Briand thought if Germany had not made war when she did, she would have made a peaceful conquest of the world. This follows my own conclusions. His idea is that France would have become lazy and indifferent, and would have furnished the necessary wealth. Germany would have furnished the initiative, and finally would have dominated both countries. De Constant agreed with this. He thought France would have taken some of Germany's efficiency through contact with her, and that Germany would have become more refined in thought and purpose by contact with France. In this way both would have benefited and neither would have dominated. I agreed with Briand rather than with de Constant, although there is much to be said for his point of view.

Our conversation went on uninterruptedly until the British Ambassador

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took his leave which broke up the party. It was a delightful dinner. The
house is attractive, the appointments good and the food was delicious.

February 5, 1916.

Elmer Roberts of the Associated Press gave me an interesting luncheon
today at Henri's Besides Ambassador Sharp and the Marquis de Chambrun, there
were many prominent men representing the French press.

I did little or no talking but listened. At five o'clock Sharp and I called at the Elysee Palace to see the President. He was exceedingly cordial, but the conversation was unimportant. I thought it best to do nothing more than pass the compliments of the day, which we did for some ten minutes and then took our leave. Frazier has written the substance of the interview and it is practically correct.

We dined with the Princess Lusinge. There were some eight or ten other
guests including the Ambassador. I did no talking but listened.

February 6, 1916.

I lunched with Mr. and Mrs. John Coolidge. Loulie and the Sharps went
to visit the Battlefield of the Marne, something I did not care to do even if
I had the time.

The Coolidge are sweet wholesome people and I enjoyed the hour with them.
There were no other guests. After lunch I had a conference with Ambassador Wil-
lard, putting him en rapport with the situation to as great an extent as I con-
sidered prudent. He agreed with my conclusions regarding the Lusitania con-
troversy, and so does Sharp and Hugh Wallace. They are the only three with
whom I have conferred here.

One of my most interesting conversations was with Joseph Reinach. I told
him of President Wilson, of his Pan-American policy and its bearings upon Mexico.

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Reinach saw the light for the first time, and was good enough to say he would
write an article in *Le Figaro* calling attention to its importance. I intimated
that he had a European policy even more important, and that in the end Europe
would be compelled to admit it had misjudged him.

Mr; and Mrs. Hugh Wallace gave a dinner at which the Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp, Ambassador Willard and several others were present.

February 7, 1916.

I called at the Quai D'Orsay at eleven oclock. I was at once shown
into the Prime Minister's room, and M. Jules Cambon acted as interpreter. It
was an important-- perhaps the most important, conference I have had during this
visit to Europe. We had a complete understanding as to the immediate future.

In the event the Allies are successful during the next few months I promised
that the President would not intervene. In the event they were losing ground,

I promised the President would intervene.

I again told them that the lower the fortunes of the Allies ebbed, the
closer the United States would stand by them. I explained the Lusitania sit-
uation, and made them admit that the advice I was giving the President not to
sever relations with Germany at this time was wise.

They promised not to allow the conversation to go beyond the three of us,
and it was understood they were to keep in touch with me through Jusserand at
Washington. They agreed not to let the fortunes of the Allies recede beyond
a point where our intervention could save them.

I slowly and emphatically outlined the danger of delay and of too much
optimism. I saw nothing in the situation to warrant it. They asked if Ger-
many could hold out economically. I thought she could. They wanted to know
it it would be possible for France to regain Alsace and Lorraine. If that
could be done, the French Government could justify itself before the French
people for making peace. That, too, I thought might be accomplished by giving

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Germany a part of Asia Minor, and compensating Russia in the same way. Cambon
exclaimed, "then you would wipe out Turkey?" This, I said, was in my mind.
I earnestly begged them to use their influence with England regarding the block-
ade, so that all sources of friction between the United States and the Allies
might be removed, and the President be given the power to carry out the plan I
had outlined.

Cambon wrote down the essential features of the interview, while Briand
and I made a poor attempt at conversation in French. When Cambon had finished
he read me what he wrote and I affirmed its correctness.

The conversation lasted some thirty or forty minutes. I gave them
my plans for the next few days, which include a visit to the King of Belgium,
and we parted with every manifestation of friendship. They seemed to realize,
as I did, the importance of the conference and its bearing upon the war.

I met the newspaper correspondents at the Embassy at twelve o'clock.
They quizzed me for fifteen or twenty minutes, but were unsuccessful in getting
anything. They asked if the statement in the Herald concerning Loulie purchasing clothes in Paris was true. One of them said that this seemed likely to be
the only information of a positive character they were to receive during my visit
to Europe. They were very good natured, and understood how impossible it was
for me to talk.

I took lunch with the Ambassador. The other guests were Ambassador Wil-
lard, Boggiano, Consul General Thakara, the Military and Naval Attachés, and a
number of others.

M. Stephen Pichon, one time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, now
Editor of the *Petit Journal* called in the afternoon. Sharp thought it impor-
tant for me to see him because of his influence with Briand and other members of
the Ministry, as well as his general influence throughout France.

We dined with Baron and Baroness d'Estournelles de Constant. We

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had to leave shortly after dinner, much to my regret as a musical entertainment
had been provided for our pleasure.

February 8, 1916.

We left Paris today at 8.45. A beautiful salon car was placed at our disposal. The Chief Engineer of the Railway, some of the Directors of the Chemin du Nord, and the Chief of Police were at the station to pay their respects, and to do what they could to make our journey comfortable.

Many times while I was in Paris I heard it remarked that there would be no Zeppelin raids while I was there. While indeed there were no Zeppelin raids, my being there doubtless had no more to do with it than the rise and fall of the tides. Another curious thing is the number of people desiring to cross the ocean on the same ship with me, believing that safety is thereby insured. This, however, is not a fallacy, for undoubtedly unusual care is taken for our protection.

We arrived at Boulogne about two o'clock. The Commissioner of Police, the British Provost Marshal and King Albert's Aide de camp met us. I turned the rest of the party over to the Provost Marshal and Commissionaire, and went directly to the King's motor which was waiting to take me and my aide, Clifford Carver, to La Panne.

For the first twenty-five miles we drove at a terrific pace, estimated by Carver at seventy-five to eighty miles an hour. We reached Calais in twenty-five minutes, having lost five minutes on the road by having to slow up for traffic. After that we went at a more reasonable pace. Both Carver and I thought perhaps they were trying us out, to see whether we would ask them to travel more slowly, for the Aide de Camp asked me several times if we were driving too rapidly, a fact which I declined to admit. We made the trip of sixty miles to La Panne in about an hour and a half including many stops. The worst of it was that it

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the roads were slippery from recent rains and in places clogged with army traffic.

There was practically no civilian population to be seen, but soldiers were everywhere in countless thousands. Our route took us quite close to the front and among barbed wire entanglements, trenches, forts, moats, etc. etc. We saw buildings in Dunkerque and other places that had been demolished by shells and the Aide de Camp told us it was so common to have shells dropped from aeroplanes that they no longer attracted attention.

Since we left New York, death has been our playmate so many times that one ceases to think in terms of danger. Bombs have been dropped on both sides just before and after our trains have passed. And so it is with those who live directly in the war zone.

We arrived at La Panne in the rain. We were saluted by many officers, and I was received upon getting out of the motor by Generals and I walked with them as quietly and slowly through the pouring rain without an umbrella as if it were all to my liking. As soon as I reached the house and my overcoat and hat were taken, the King entered and we talked for an hour and a half. I cannot say the conversation was of much importance, or that it justified the trip. The King has but little power to carry out any policies he may have in mind. There is no monarch in Europe more completely led by the people. He admitted this and was cautious about expressing what Belgium would or would not do. He deplored the war and the folly of people in other nations desiring it to continue, believing decisive results could be obtained. That is, each side believing that in time they could defeat the other.

He spoke in complimentary terms of the President, and of America, asking me to express his thanks to President Wilson for all that the United States had done for his people. I, in turn, told him that the valor of Belgium had lifted his country upon a high plane, and that history had no record of a more heroic defence.

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We discussed peace terms, and I asked whether he would be willing to let the German军队 in Belgium and France in Alsace and Lorraine go to Germany in the event she paid for it. This, I thought, would aid in settlement, for the reason that France demanded something in Alsace and Lorraine, and South Africa was insistent that Great Britain should not allow Germany to become again their neighbor. If the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Africa could be purchased by Germany, and if Germany could obtain a sphere of influence in Asia Minor, it would perhaps justify her government with the people in making peace.

The French people would be satisfied with Alsace and Lorraine, or a part of them. This would be a good basis for a peace parley, and I hoped he would not find it inconsistent to consent to such an arrangement. He replied that his uncle had created the Belgian Congo, and he could not justify himself before his people by consenting to let it go. However, he intimated quite plainly that as far as he was concerned, it might be done, provided it were done over his protest.

I asked him if Belgium was insistent upon indemnity. There, again, he was non-committal, but eagerly accepted my suggestion that an indemnity be paid Belgium by all the belligerents. He thought his people would be unhappy with any peace terms, that did not contain something which would help repair their shattered fortunes. I thought the entire world desired good terms for Belgium, and that he would find strong influence exerted in behalf of justice for her.

The King struck the same note I have heard everywhere, that is the fear that troublous times are in store for the world, through either peaceful or turbulent revolution. The thoughtful of every belligerent nation seem to hold this fear.

He asked if I saw any indications of peace. I did not. I told him matters were just as they were when I was here last year, with the exception that in Germany the hate was not so strong, but in England and France it was stronger. He

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intimated that the French, among the poorer classes, wanted peace. I replied that this was true of the poorer classes in each of the belligerent countries. They had nothing to win and nothing to lose and were merely pawns. He thought it was a mistake to believe the belligerents (he did not mention Germany by name but it was clear he included her) were in an exhausted condition, either in men or economic resources. I concurred in this.

The main idea I gathered from him was that he is not intensely anti-German, and that perhaps before the war his sympathies may have been with that country. I had a feeling he was more critical of France and England than he was of Germany, though he did not absolutely indicate it by what he said. It was clear, though, that he knew of the bitterness the Belgian people feel toward Germany, and he also knew it was unalterable. He spoke time and again of having to be a good citizen, and do what the people thought a good citizen ought to do. To interpret what he said fairly, meant that he should not give vent to his own feelings or his own thoughts, but should think as the Belgian people think and feel as they feel.

I was anxious to return to Boulogne, and since the conversation had covered all the ground necessary, I grew quiet as I have done before with monarchs, which indicated, as far as I was concerned able to do so that the interview was finished. He asked me have tea, which I declined, telling him I desired to hurry back to Boulogne. He bade me a cordial farewell and, before parting, sent further messages to the President.

Our ride back was as wild as the one going, for it was very dark and wet and we made the sixty miles in two hours, including the many stops. It was a weird and exciting experience. Infantry, cavalry and artillery would loom up out of the mist like ghosts for the space of a few seconds, and then disappear. We reached Boulogne in time for a late dinner to which I invited the King's Aide, who returned with us.

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London,
February 9, 1916.

We crossed on a troopship leaving Boulogne at 12.15. There were a thousand and or more troops returning home, some wounded and some on leave. There were no civilians excepting Lord Curzon. The weather was clear and the water smooth and we were amply convoyed. When we were within five or six miles of Dover there was a sudden stop. A secret service man, the presence of whom I had not known, asked Carver to tell us to come on deck and stand by one of the lifeboats. It seems that a tramp steamer had just been torpedoed and sunk quite near us, and in addition to that, there were two German seaplanes dropping bombs on the Kentish coast. In order to avoid the submarine we made for Dover instead of Folkestone, and, under Admiralty orders, remained stationery for a half hour. It was thought at one time we would have to return to Boulogne.

Two British airships circled over us looking for submarines, and also to protect us from the German seaplanes. No one on the boat knew, excepting ourselves, what had happened, or what was imminent, although everyone had lifebelts on. When we steamed up it was decided to run along the coast to Folkestone which we did at top speed.

There was a tremendous crowd at Victoria to greet the arrival of our train in order to welcome the homecoming veterans.

The Ambassador called at the Ritz Hotel with a half hour after our arrival. He was as pessimistic as ever. He frets me to such an extent, that I fear I talked to him rather roughly. Everything the President was doing was wrong, the contempt of the British and Europe generally for us was growing stronger every day, and the United States was in bad odor everywhere. In reply I literally played him, and I was surprised afterward that he took it so kindly. The man hinders me in my work because he tries to discourage me, and would totally do so if I were of a different temperament.

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Telegrams, cables, notes, letters and newspaper clippings were awaiting me. Newspaper men began to call but I refused to see anyone, stating I would meet them at four o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

The most interesting cable was from Brand Whitlock, asking my opinion and advice as to his acceptance of the Russian Ambassadorship. He has also sent a special messenger from Brussels to take back by word of mouth my views. Richards of the Belgian Relief, whom he sent, tells me how much Whitlock values my advice. I appreciate this because, while I have known him but a short time, I have grown to have a real affection for him.

Hotel Ritz,
London, February 10, '16.

Among the many callers was the Lord Chief Justice who came immediately after breakfast. I had an engagement and could only spare him a few minutes. He called to say that Lloyd George wished to see me alone within the next day or two, to continue the conversation we had when I was here before. I asked Reading to arrange it. We agreed, if possible, he should arrange a dinner for Monday evening and to invite the Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George and Ambassador Page.

I urged him to be expeditious and to tell those mentioned that if the work we had in mind to do was to be accomplished, there must not be the usual British delay.

At 10.30 I went to 33 Eccleston Square. Among the notes received last night was one from Sir Edward Grey saying he would reserve that time for our conference. I gave him an account of my visit to Germany, and of what was said and done by government officials with whom I had talked. I let him read Zimmermann's letter concerning the Lusitania controversy and undersea warfare, and we discussed these phases of the situation at some length, Grey taking the ground that it was best for us to enter the war, I controverting it and convincing him to the

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contrary. His argument was that if we were in the war we could at any time say to the Allies we were ready to make a separate peace with Germany, naming conditions upon which we would treat. This, I thought, impracticable. If once in, in my opinion, we would have to remain until all sides were exhausted, or a decisive defeat had been brought about. I argued the matter earnestly and convinced him that for the good of all it would be best for us to smooth over the Lusitania incident, and intervene by demanding a conference of the belligerents for the purpose of discussing peace terms.

We finally agreed it was best for the President not to set any conditions whatever, but we merely demand that war cease, and a conference be held. We decided to take into our confidence, Asquith, Balfour, Lloyd George and Reading. It was further decided that I should make the initial talk tomorrow when the Prime Minister, Balfour and myself meet at Grey's for lunch. Page, Lloyd George and Reading are to be brought into the discussion at Lord Reading's dinner Monday night.

Grey wondered whether it would not be best for Great Britain to give up her blockade. I thought not unless Germany would consent to a more humane warfare both undersea and overhead.

Before Grey consented to having the President intervene, I laid bare the plight of the Allies and the possibilities of defeat, particularly the possibility of Great Britain finding herself alone in the contest. He was interested in what I told him of my interview with Briand and Cambon, and expressed gratitude that I had taken the matter up with them direct so as to relieve his Government of the suspicion of being the one desiring peace. That, he felt, was the point to be guarded. If the Allies thought Great Britain was preparing to discuss peace, something like a panic might ensue.

I outlined the general feeling among the Allies regarding Great Britain. Russia, I told him, was dissatisfied, Italy, I knew, to be and France would pro-

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bably grow to be. Belgium, if I interpreted the King rightly, was ready for a
reasonable peace. I said it was my habit to think of myself as the other man
and determine what I would do if I were in his place. This had led me to the
conclusion that Germany would first try to secure peace with Russia, then with
Italy, and later with France, and finally defy Great Britain. I gave him my
views upon the social and economic condition of Germany, maintaining that Germany
could still place as many men on the western front as she needed to hold the line,
and that she was in no great economic distress, and that no revolution would dis-
turb her equilibrium until after the war.

Another advantage Germany had was the fact she was a military autocracy,
and Turkey, Austria and Germany were welded together and acted as a single ma-
chine, whereas, the Allies being democracies and widely separated were acting
disjointedly and not always efficiently.

I left Grey to go to the Embassy, and after a few minutes with Page, I
wanted to lunch at Lady Paget's to meet Dr. John Dillon, an authority on Southeastern
Europe. Lady Minot, Colonel Reppington, and several others were present.

Dillon is a conceited, well informed and interesting personage, and I enjoyed my talk with him.

In the afternoon I received some fifteen or more English and American news-
paper correspondents. I gave them no information, but it was amusing to have them
quiz me, and I enjoyed parrying their questions.

Robert Donald of the Chronicle took tea with me, and promised to write furth-
er about the President. I gave him particulars of our Pan-American policy, which
will be incorporated in some future editorial.

We dined at the Embassy in order that Page and I might have a quiet talk.
My entire evening was spent in listening to his denunciation of the President and
Lansing, and of the Administration in general. He thought the State Department
should be "cleaned out from top to bottom". He humorously suggested that they

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Department should not remain in the same quarters, but should take a large tent and place it on the green near the Washington Monument in order to raze the present building to its foundations and start afresh with new surrounding and with a new force.

I did not argue with him. One might as well argue with a petulant woman.
"The President has no policy. He has lost the respect of Great Britain and the
world. Lansing insults everyone with his notes, etc. etc."

February 11, 1916.

Chalmers Roberts took breakfast with me this morning. The foreign correspondent of the Sunday Times called, and I told him of the President's Pan-American policy. He promised to write about it, I hope favorably. I received a letter from Lord Bryce asking me to come to Hindleap for over Sunday, which I regret, it is not possible to do. Letters have come from Lord Loreburn and many others asking to see me. I am Reset on all sides.

The newspapers are full of the interview I gave the reporters yesterday.
They treat me better than I deserve.

Mrs. Asquith called a twelve and remained until I had to leave for an early luncheon engagement with Sir Horace Plunkett, where she dropped me. She asked me to give her a day next week and to let her know the guests I would like her to invite. I like her, peculiar as she is. She told an interesting story of Lord Northcliffe and herself, which happened twenty-odd years ago, and which she wondered whether he remembered well enough to influence him against her husband, the Prime Minister.

The lunch with Sir Horace was unimportant. I ate but little since I had to go to another lunch with Grey, Balfour and the Prime Minister. Sir Horace thought the war had demoralized the usefulness of the diplomatic service, and used

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Page and Sir Cecil Spring-Rice as illustrations. He said I was doing the work in Europe for our Ambassadors, but unfortunately, Great Britain had no one to do her job at Washington.

When I went to 33 Eccleston Square, Sir Edward had already arrived. This gave me time to have a little private talk with him. It seems he mentioned the subject of our conversation to both the Prime Minister and Balfour, but no discussion has taken place. He has also met M. Cambon, French Ambassador, who told him of my first interview in Paris with Briand and Jules Cambon. He had an abstract of it, which he did not show Grey, but of which he told him.

He did not have a memorandum of my second and more important interview of February 7th. Grey asked him to get this. His purpose is to find what the French think of it, so that he and I can better understand the situation. Grey desired that I should know this so there would be nothing left in the background.

As soon as the Prime Minister and Balfour came we began lunch. The conversation was general during the first part of it, but when the meal had been served, Grey stated what he and I had talked of yesterday. I took but little part in the conversation at first but let each of the others outline his position. Balfour was less augmentative than I have seen him, and we got down to the real question quicker than I anticipated.

The Prime Minister thought I was pessimistic as to Russia. I explained that it was not a question of pessimism, but a question of playing for safety; I thought Russia would stick, but was it well to take chances?

Sir Edward thought Great Britain could do nothing until some one of her allies was ready to discuss peace. He took the view that Great Britain had not as yet been seriously hurt by the war, since but few of her men had been killed, and her territory had not been invaded. This seemed to meet both Asquith's and Balfour's views. I raised the point that if Russia should announce she had come

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to the end of her resources, and was ready for peace, it might mean that she had
already concluded a secret agreement with Germany. Sir Edward's idea was that
when one of the Allies proposed peace discussions, Great Britain should say we
were ready to intervene. This, I thought, would not suit Russia, and her reply
would be that she preferred to conclude an agreement herself without the interven-
tion of the United States. They all admitted this would happen, in the event she
had made a separate peace with Germany. The point I made was that it would be
dangerous to wait until Russia was ready to say that the time had come for us to
intervene. If they wait for that, they run the danger of making our intervention
impossible because of the reasons stated.

The next point that came up was how the British Government could let
us know they considered the time propitious for us to intervene without first sub-
mitting the question to the Allies, and if they did not submit it to the Allies,
how to avoid the charge of double dealing.

The solution I suggested for this was that at regular intervals I would
cable Sir Edward Grey, in our private code, offering intervention. He could ig-
nore the messages until the time was propitious, and then he could bring it to the
attention of the Allies as coming from us and not as coming from Great Britain.

I find in England, as I found in France, a distrust of the Russian
bureaucracy. They believe in the Russian people, but they do not trust their
masters. The same question is asked by the people in both France and England
that I find is asked in America when we declare that the war is a war for democra-
cy and against military autocracy, that is, "What about Russia?"

Balfour asked what I desired the Prime Minister, Grey and himself to say,
and what assurance did I wish to take back to the President. My reply was that
I wished a definite understanding whether it would be agreeable to the British
Government in the circumstances outlined, to have the United States propose cessa-

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of war and a conference to discuss peace terms. If I could take a favorable
reply to the President, we would then know what to work to.

I cautioned them again about allowing the matter to run too far. I
declared, if they made the mistake of waiting until Germany had a decisive vic-
tory, or nearly so, they need not expect action from us, for it would be foolhardy
for the United States to enter at so late a day in the hope of changing the result
in their favor. In these circumstances, we would probably create a large army
and navy, and retire entirely from European affairs and depend upon ourselves.

If my plan was adopted, I believed it would inevitably lead to an alliance
between the United States and Great Britain, France and Italy, the democracies of
the world.

I wish to state here that I am not as pessimistic concerning the future
as my remarks to the heads of the belligerent governments would lead one to think.
While the war is largely one between autocracies and democracies, yet if autocrac-
cies win, it does not necessarily mean, to my mind, that the victory will be per-
manent. On the contrary, I believe the hour has struck when the world will ac-
cept the "divine right of kings" to rule. Germany may throw the clock back for
a time, but it can never, in my opinion, be permanently done.

It was agreed that we should leave Grey's house separately. The Prime
Minister went first, then Balfour, and Sir Edward and I left together. We are
to meet at the Lord Chief Justice's at dinner Monday evening with him and Lloyd
George as additional members of the conference. Grey and I are to meet again
at half past ten Monday morning.

I went to the Embassy for tea. Mrs. Whitelaw Reid was there. She
had asked to invite us together. I did but little talking. As I was about to
leave, Page took me in another room to say he thought it best for him not to take
part in any peace talks I might have with the Cabinet. He was more depressing

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than ever, literally damning the President and Lansing for their lack of fore-
sight and policy. He declared it would be ridiculous for him to talk about
closer relations with Great Britain, when we were doing every day everything we
could possibly do to irritate them. He said that in the years he had been in
London, there had not been one mite of sympathy heard from our Government to the
British Government, and he thought it was folly to expect them to believe in any
protestations of friendship or help which we might offer. I did not argue with
him, because it suited my purpose to have him remain out of the conferences, since
in his frame of mind he is a hindrance rather than a help.

At eight o'clock I went to 32 Curzon Street to dine with Lord Reading and
Lloyd George. We had a quiet and satisfactory discussion largely along the lines
followed in the conference between the Prime Minister, Grey, a Balfour and myself. It
is evident that Lloyd George is somewhat distrustful of the Prime Minister, Grey
and Balfour, and they are equally so of him. Neither group wants the other to
have the advantage, and both are afraid to go as far in the direction in which I am
pushing as their inclination would lead them for fear capital might be made of it
by the others.

Both Reading and George assured me that a peace proposal would be the most
unpopular move that could be thought of in England. George said England was
now aroused for the first time. John Bull had grown fat and lazy, but he was working off his flesh and getting as lean and fit as an athlete, and had no fear of the
result. George believes the war had done the nation good-- greater good than
harm; that it had aroused the best in the people, and that they will come out of
it rejuvenated, with better impulses and purposes.

I talked George and Reading out of the belief that it was best for us to
enter the war at this time upon the Lusitania issue. George accepted this, but
said the best thing at all would be for us to enter upon another such issue which

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was alive and burning. I disagreed with him, and thought the best procedure for them and for us was to suddenly intervene, either by peace proposals or actual intervention, upon the ground I have before indicated.

Reading agreed with me and so also did George after I had stated the position. Reading had not invited anyone else for Monday night, but I told him I had asked Asquith, Grey and Balfour and they were reserving that evening for our conference. He promised to write them notes after we left.

At luncheon, both Asquith and Balfour spoke of my interview with the newspaper correspondents. I told them that the first time I had seen the President do it I almost shivered with anxiety, but after doing it myself, it was so simple that I wondered why I had so greatly overestimated the ordeal. Lloyd George said the interview had created much amusement, and London wondered how I could meet all the correspondents in town, and tell them nothing, and get away with it. He felt certain he could not do it. As a matter of fact, there is no man who could do it better than George.

We talked about the war and its conduct and its mistakes. I thought the Allies had lacked genius and initiative. I asked if they had anything new for the spring and summer campaign, or whether they were merely trying to make themselves as efficient this year and the Germans were last. He admitted this was about all that was expected.

I told them a story of a certain political campaign I directed in Texas. The opposition candidate had nearly all the chances in his favor. When the campaign was well started I noticed the opposition were copying our methods, but always a little late. I told our people we would win, and when asked the reason for my optimism, I replied it was because they had no initiative of their own and were merely following our trail. We were, I told George, always one or two laps ahead, and in this war on land, the Germans were always one or two laps ahead.

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In order to cheer them, I averred that the British Navy was always one or two laps ahead of the Germans, and that was why there was no German commerce upon the high seas and their fleet lay bottled up. I asked George why the French did not give the English the coast to hold, and why they injected themselves between. He did not know unless it was that the French were suspicious and the British once there might want to remain. He thought it a mistake. He said the English were like WALKER'S WELDRUS or a seafowl, they liked one wing in the water. They did not know what to do in the interior, but if they could flap one wing in the dear old ocean occasionally, no power on earth could dispossess them.

He gave his estimate of the different British commanders, and we discussed the question of munitions, artillery, the possibility of breaking through, etc. etc. They were interested to know that I considered Falkenhayn the ablest man now directing the land forces of the Central Powers, and I enlarged upon the advantages the Germans had over the Allies by their single minded direction.

Later we fell to talking of the commanders in our Civil War. They considered Lee and Jackson easily the first in point of ability. I told them of the blockade in the South, and how it was run as I recalled it as a little child when my father owned jointly with the Confederate Government, certain ships that went out from Galveston, he having the outgoing cargo of cotton, and the Confederate Government having the incoming cargoes of munitions and supplies.

Lloyd George dropped me at my hotel around eleven o'clock. My letters and cables to the President of the past few days are parts of the diary.

February 12, 1916.

Sir Horace Plunkett called this morning very much disturbed about the disarming of merchantmen. I argued the question from Lensing's viewpoint, but asked him to formulate some suggestion fair to all and I would discuss it with him

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later. He is to see Balfour and do this.

February 13, 1916.

This has been a comparatively quiet day. Sir Horace Plunkett came to discuss the controversy now going on regarding the disarming of merchantmen. A cable from the President has come and some minor matters have occurred.

I lunched with Hoover. Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Harcourt were there but nothing was discussed worth recording

In the afternoon we took tea with Lord and Lady Rayleigh. In the evening we dined with the Barkers.

February 14, 1916.

Today was enough to drive one mad. Callers, telephone calls, newspaper people, photographers and everything else that could cause confusion.

Sir Horace Plunkett came but I could only give him ten minutes, for a
I had an engagement with Sir Edward Grey at 10.30.

Grey and I discussed the forthcoming conference at Lord Reading's, and outlined a plan of action. Grey views the situation much as I do, and I find in him a colleague far more sympathetic than Page. Sir Edward Believes the time has come for the President to demand a peace conference, but this feeling is not shar-ed by the other members of the Cabinet, or if it is, they do not dare express it. Public opinion were would condemn any minister who would dare endorse such a pro-posal, and Grey believes they would even go so far as to smash his windows. How-ever, he lacks nothing in courage and has less regard for his personal fortunes than any statesman I have met in Europe. If Grey continues in the Government until the end of the war, he will probably become a great figure because of his unselfish outlook, broad vision and high character. I have never known him to suggest a mean or unworthy thought.

I walked with Grey a part of the way to the Foreign Office and left him

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to go to the Embassy.

I have a telegram from Hugh Wallace insisting that I have Laszlo paint my portrait. I called on Laszlo and found him pleased with the idea. He was very busy, but he seems to be a statesman in embrio for he kept me more than a half hour telling how the European situation should be settled. Since he is to paint my portrait, I thought it wise to be patient with his views.

The Swedish Minister axakkad came to tea and, as I anticipated, he desired to talk about the British Order in Council that is interfering with neutral trade. He spoke with much feeling, which I neither encouraged nor discouraged. I simply let him have his fling. He presented me with a memorial sent by his Government, which they desired me to present to the President.

Page came just as the Minister left, and kept me silent for more than an hour while he told again and again how badly the President and Lansing were conducting our foreign affairs. He said the President was simply not a man of action; that he was like Jefferson whom he said ran away from Richmond when he was Governor of Virginia because of his fear of the British. It was as much as I could do to contain myself. I sat still and quiet looking into the fire until he had relieved his mind.

Donald, Editor of the Chronicle, told me that Page was more British than any Englishman he knew. I intimated to Donald that a large part of my time here was spent in arguing with Page.

The dinner at the home of the Lord Chief Justice was for 8.30 o'clock. I arrived first, then Lloyd George, Grey, Balfour and Asquith in order. Reading had the Prime Minister to his right, me to his left, Sir Edward next to me and Balfour next to the Prime Minister and Lloyd George at the other end of the table.

The conversation was general while the dinner was being served, and was largely about English domestic affairs. When the butler withdrew there was general discussion of the conduct of the war, the mistakes that had been made, and

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possible remedies. They talked quite freely before me, discussing the question
of ammunition on hand, the wasteful way in which the Russians were expending what
Great Britain was sending them, the general morale of the troops etc. etc.
I gave it as my theory that the Germans would probably attack the Allies on the
west and perhaps at Verdun, and would attack quickly, not waiting for the spring
weather to open. My reasons for believing this were that they could not get into
the Russian field until the end of April, and the fact that they were not pushing
matters in the Balkans convinced me they would almost immediately open a violent
offensive on the western front. My theory is that the Germans are still at
their highest point of efficiency, and if they could strike a decisive blow and
knock out of the war, break through and capture either Paris or Calais, it might conceivably
end the war.

All of them thought my diagnosis of the situation was probably correct,
though I do not believe they had thought of it before. The discussion ran
along the lines of new inventions, and what the Germans had "up their sleeves".
My whole idea in leading the conversation in this direction was to make them
feel less hopeful and to show them, as I have often tried to do, what a terri-
ble gamble they are taking in not invoking our intervention.

It was 10.30 before we got down to the real purpose of the meeting. Lloyd
George began by making some such speech as he did at the first dinner that he,
Reading and I had together before I went to Germany. I stopped him in a mo-
ment and said "let us get the setting just as we all now think it might be"-
"Sir Edward and I in our conference this morning have thought it would be im-
possible to have a peace conference called at Washington, and I have promised
that the President will come to the Hague if invited and remain as long as nec-
essary. Then, let us assume that the conference is at the Hague and that the
President is presiding over it. With that setting, please proceed with what
you think would happen".

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Before George started again the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour expressed pleasure that the President would consider coming to Europe, giving the same reason Grey and I had each thought of, that is, it would be impossible for the leading statesmen of Europe the belligerent countries to leave Europe for so long a time and go such a great distance as Washington. Besides there would be too much needful data which could not be obtained readily except in Europe.

George then began to outline what he thought the peace conference might do. I shall not go into this because it was pretty much what I have stated before, with the exception that the Prime Minister and the rest of us joined in commenting upon the different phases of the questions as they arose.

For instance, the nationalization of Poland was discussed at great length, and the objections which might be raised by Russia. Balfour thought if Poland was made an independent kingdom, becoming a buffer state between Russia and Germany, it would leave France at the mercy of Germany in any future war, for the reason that Russia would not be able to reach Germany without violating the neutrality of Poland. He thought this would be a serious objection from the French viewpoint, and also from the Russian, and if it happened, it would probably cause an end of the alliance between Russia and France.

We all cheerfully divided up Turkey, both in Asia and Europe. The discussion hung for a long while around the fate of Constantinople. George and Balfour were not enthusiastic over giving it into the hands of Russia, and Grey and Asquith thinking if this were not done, material for another war would always be at hand. I suggested the neutralization of Constantinople, and also that Russia might secure a warm seaport in Asia Minor. Some thought this could be done, others that it could not.

It was growing late, and I drew them back to the point of our meeting.

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That is, when should the United States demand that the war should cease and a
conference be held. I drew George out upon this subject and thoroughly com-
mitted him to the idea that the President should act in this capacity. But
he was rather chary of naming a definite time. Grey was evidently leaning
toward an immediate venture in this direction. The discussion then ran as to
how the Allies could be approached and what had best be done about them.

Asquith asked my opinion as to the proper time. I thought if the Allies
could make an impression on the German lines of sufficient importance to dis-
courage Germany, that would be the psychological moment. Asquith agreed with
me heartily, and it seemed to be tentatively agreed by all that this course
should be followed. I asked them, however, to consider this feature: if the
Allies made a deep dent in the German lines, the opinion in Allied countries
would be heartened and they would feel they must go further. Therefore, there
would be considerable public feeling against peace proposals. Asquith thought
this would not be true unless the success of the Allies was greater than he now
considered possible.

Lloyd George and Balfour were inclined to take the risk, which I held up
before them, and postpone action until sometime later.

It was now twelve o'clock and the Prime Minister made a move to go.

While the conference was not conclusive, there was at least a common agreement reached in regard to the essential feature, that is, the President should at some time **kakax** to be later agreed upon, call a halt and demand a conference.

I did not expect to go beyond that and I was quite content.

Asquith asked what we would do in the event Russia and France made sepa-
rate peace with Germany before Great Britain could bring them into an agreement
for the President to act. I replied that we would probably immediately set
about building a large navy and army and withdraw entirely from any interfer-

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ence with European affairs.

Lloyd George was inclined to insist that we reach an agreement as to terms of peace before it was agreed that the President should intervene. I discouraged this view. Asquith again asked what the President would do in the event he presided at the peace conference, and the Allies proposed a settlement which he considered unjust. I replied that he would probably withdraw from the conference and leave them to their own devices. On the other hand, he wished to know what the President would do in the event Germany proposed something totally unfair, and against the interest of civilization and humanity. In these circumstances, I thought the President would throw the weight of the United States on the side of the Allies. In other words, he would throw the weight of the United States on the side of those wanting a just settlement-- a settlement which would make another such war impossible, and which would look to the advancement of civilization and the comity of nations.

Lloyd George brought me to my hotel in his motor, and we had a few moments of conversation alone.

February 15, 1916.

I called at 33 Eccleston Square this morning at 10.30 in order to see Grey for a moment, before going to Buckingham Palace where I was to meet the King at eleven o'clock.

Sir Edward was visibly pleased with the result of our meeting last night. He congratulated me upon committing Lloyd George so thoroughly to the proposition of intervention by the President. He said he did not wish to do this himself, and he was wondering how it was possible to bring it about. It was his opinion, the British Government had not faced so momentous a decision as the one I had asked for, since July 1914 when the question of war or peace was before them. He showed considerable emotion, walking up and down the room

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as he talked, making it clear, as far as he was concerned, he thought immediate action should be asked for so that the lives of millions of men might be saved, and the havoc which would follow another spring and summer campaign might be avoided.

He said he knew it would be unpopular in England-- so unpopular indeed, that he would expect to have the windows of his house broken by angry mobs, nevertheless, he is ready to face it because he feels he is right. He thought it would be necessary to place the proposal before the entire Cabinet, but believed it would be best not to do so until after I had left England, a decision which I readily concurred. He is to write a memorandum of our understanding which is not to be signed but which I am to take with me. He thought it would not be necessary to have another meeting for general discussion, but that he and I could button up the details better alone. This also met with my approval.

Grey drove me to the Palace and left me at the Privy Entrance. After a few minutes conversation with Lord Stamfordham I was shown up to the King's Study where we had nearly an hour's talk. I shall not go into the details of our conversation for it was really of but little importance. We discussed submarine warfare, disarming of merchantmen, my trip to Germany, the Kaiser, German feeling against the United States, etc. etc. He was pleased when I showed him a fifty mark piece upon which was stamped, "Gott strafe England und America".

I asked if he had seen the "John Bull Number of Life". He surprised me by saying that he had taken Life for twenty-five years and read it with much pleasure. He was delighted to hear something of Edward S. Martin. He sent most cordial messages to the President and deplored the criticism of him in English papers. He even resented such editorials as was in the Times and Post

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as a nation, they immediately gave me editorial clippings from the London press stating directly the contrary. These statements were freely circulated among the German people, who were led to believe that England not only desired to annihilate them as a nation, but wished their entire trade. Such articles worked directly into the hands of the military party, and helped them hold the German population as a unit against the Allies.

They all agreed that the point was well taken, and there was quite a discussion as to how it could be changed, though none of them were optimistic that it could be done.

I talked to both Spender and Donald along these lines, and asked them to help along the cause.

We went to the theater with Lady Paget to see "Caroline" a new play by Somerset Maugham.

February 16, 1916.

I spent the morning at Laszlo's studio sitting for my portrait. He seems interested in the work and I think will give it the best that is in him.

Sir Horace Plunkett called a few minutes before I had to go to Lady Essex's for lunch. The other guests there were Mr. Balfour, Lady Waynflete, Wenyss Lady Leslie and Lord Davenport. After lunch I drove with Balfour to the House of Commons in order that we might have a few minutes private conversation. He, too, appeared satisfied with our meeting of the other night, but expressed regret that the Prime Minister was willing to sit, as he termed it, "as a passenger and not take a directing hand in the discussion". He said this was the Prime Minister's weakness, though he did not believe he realized it. Balfour declared he would not care to be Prime Minister under present conditions. I thought Asquith did hold the reins of government firmly enough, but that he drove with too loose a rein.

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I confessed to a feeling of disappointment that it was necessary for me to go from one Cabinet Minister to another to discuss matters which I thought should be discussed solely with the Prime Minister. I thought I should receive authoritative answers from him, and that he should be the one to see his colleagues and bring them into line so as to give me the united opinion of the Government.

We went to the Embassy for dinner. The other guests were Lord and Lady Albermarle, Lord and Lady Silo, Sir Arthur Walsh, Master of Ceremonies to the King, and Lady Clementina Walsh.

February 17, 1916.

The Lord Chief Justice called this morning. He came to say that in his opinion the conference at his home the other evening was a great success. Like Sir Edward Grey, he thought it remarkable that Lloyd George, Balfour and Asquith should talk so freely before one another. He considered a great work had been accomplished by getting them all committed to the general proposition in the presence of each other. There was no way now by which one could attack the other to his disadvantage. This is because Reading knows, as I know and they know, that peace discussion at this time would be about as unpopular in England as would be the coronation of the Kaiser in Westminster Abbey.

I told Reading that both Grey and Balfour had complimented Lloyd George upon the breadth of vision and courage displayed. They both said they had not believed it was in him. This, however, I did not add. Reading thought the Prime Minister had committed himself more strongly than he had any idea he would. He thought Asquith had in the back of his mind the feeling that the President was being represented by proxy, while whatever he, Asquith, said was at first hand. He could not repudiate, while the President might conceivably do so.

Reading considered it inadvisable to tell the other members of the Cab-

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inet at present. In this I agree with him. He said it would leak, and would
probably lead to a certain cabal getting together to defeat the object we had
in mind. I was going directly to see Grey and told Reading I would call
this to his attention.

I went to 33 Eccleston Square at half past ten o'clock. Grey and his
Secretary, Eric Drummond, were as usualy busy with the morning's work. Before
Drummond left, Sir Edward offered to send us to Falmouth, where we take ship,
in a special train and at any hour we care to go. I declined this, for it
seemed so entirely useless since the train service is very convenient.

After Drummond left we got down to our work. He showed me a memorandum
he had written received from the French Ambassador giving in detail my second
conversation with Briand and Jules Cambon. The account was correct with a
few exceptions. They reported me as saying that no matter how low the fortunes
of France got, that when they said the word, we would intervene. I asked Grey
to be certain to correct this impression in their minds because it is important
for several reasons. The main one being that if the Allies put off calling
for our assistance to a time when our intervention cannot serve them, then we
will not make the attempt.

I am trying to force early action by making both the English and French
feel that they run the risk of losing our support entirely unless they act
quickly. Grey and I drew up a memorandum covering what I actually said, not
only in Paris, but at the meeting the other night at Lord Reading's. He is to
show this to the French Ambassador and is to give me a copy before I leave so
there may be no mistake as to how far I committed myself the President and upon
what lines.

Our conversation dealt principally with the subjects I have gone over be-
fore in telling of the conference Monday night, therefore I shall not repeat it.

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Sir Edward and I did not differ as to the importance of acting quickly. We both think there is more to gain for Great Britain by the President's intervention now, than there would be if the Allies won a complete victory a year from now. He believes, as I do, that the good which would come by having an active working arrangement between Great Britain and the United States in the settlement of the world's affairs, and the number of lives which would be saved by immediate action, rather than deferred action, would more than offset a complete victory.

I called attention to the fact that if the Allies were completely victorious, Russia, Italy and France would undoubtedly make demands and do things Great Britain would not approve, and which would not be in the interest of permanent peace. I drove in as hard as I could the gamble they were all taking by postponing action. One of the gambles Sir Edward had not thought of was the possible death of the President, either from natural causes or by assassination. I told him what would happen in the event Marshall became President. All our plans would go up in smoke, and Europe would have to struggle along in the interminable fight without help from the United States. I called attention to the fact that the President only had another year of office, and of the uncertainty of his re-election. If the republicans won, it might be very much the same as if Lord Curzon became Prime Minister here with a reactionary Cabinet. The United States might depart from peaceful paths and become jingoistic and imperialistic.

Grey said with much feeling, "history will lay a great charge against those of us who refuse to accept your affair proffered services at this time".

We left the house together in his motor, and went as far as St James Park and walked there for some distance in order to have further conversation. We are to meet again next Monday morning for a final conference.

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start with; they were loaded with coal to the guards which reduced their speed
another knot or two. Fisher advised the Japanese to coal as lightly as possible,
just enough in fact to reach the Russian fleet and then manoeuvre. The
result was the Japanese were able to steam in front of the advancing Russians
and pick them off one by one.

He claims, too, that he has now recommended to the Admiralty a type of
vessel which will revolutionize naval warfare as much as the dreadnaught did.
I thoroughly believe in Fisher's theory, and I shall carry it home to the President
to aid us in the construction of our new navy. He spoke enthusiastically
of the United States and said: "That was a great old bird that hatched the American
Eagle".

General Hamilton told of the Gallipoli campaign, of its trials and
heartaches. He believes it was a mistake to abandon it, and that with a little
further effort it could have been put over. He claims not to have been
supported at critical times.

I talked to Fisher and Hamilton almost exclusively. Fisher is very much
the more forceful man, and I can readily understand, after talking with Hamilton,
why the Gallipoli campaign was a failure.

Fisher told me of his advice to the British land forces, which was something
unique. He wanted the French to give the British the entire coast to defend.
He then wished to bring up the fleet and shell the German trenches from the sea.
He thought in this way they could have shoved the Germans back all along the
coast for a distance as far as the British naval guns could reach. He said
General French approved, but Joffre would not permit the British to occupy the
seacoast exclusively, threatening, if the British insisted, to make a separate
peace. Fisher said he would have told Joffre to make a separate peace
and go to hell; that Great Britain had control of the seas; had all the German

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Colonies; was putting up all the money, and had to do the fighting on land as well. If they wanted to make a separate peace Great Britain was ready, and was the only nation that would come out of the war successful. Fisher made the statement which I have often made myself, that is, it takes imagination and daring to win wars. I told the same story I have told different members of the Cabinet, that they should be one lap ahead of the enemy instead of one lap behind, for in that was the difference between success and failure.

I talked with General Henderson of the Flying Corps. He gave much interesting information, but which I shall not give here. He told how he was protecting London and of its difficulties. He thought there was more value to Zeppelins than was generally believed, and advocated the building of a fleet of them by Great Britain. Henderson said he was impressed with Fisher's theory that one had to act regardless of orders, and in the future, he would take some chances. I thought that was the reason of General Lee's success in nearly all his battles during the first two years of the Civil War, and it was that which enabled him to continue the war two years longer.

February 18, 1916.

I sat to Laszlo for my portrait again this morning. After lunch Mr. Arthur Henderson, Labor Member of Parliament, called to talk of labor conditions in England, and of labor's attitude regarding the war. I refused to see anyone this afternoon after Henderson left and broke off engagement which Lady Stratford was giving in our honor. I had a cold and felt I could not afford to take any chances.

February 19, 1916.

Lord Bryce called at noon and remained for an hour and a half. We discussed disarming of merchantmen, undersea warfare, Germany, peace conditions,

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Anglo-American contentions, etc. etc. I shall not go into details for we covered ground I have covered before. I asked him to write me a letter, giving his argument against disarming merchantmen, so I might present it to the President with other arguments I have gathered. He said if I had no good way to reach the British Government, I could always do so through him. I replied that this was not necessary.

Walter Page, Henry Roberts, Sir Horace Plunkett, Lady Paget and others came in during the afternoon. We went to dine with the Waldorf Astros. They were kind enough to allow me to name the guests. I asked them to invite Sir Horace Plunkett and two Editors of the Round Table, Philip Kerr and Robert Brand.

After dinner I did practically all the talking, outlining the international situation as I saw it, and advising as to what Great Britain should do under given conditions. We left early for I was not over well.

February 20, 1916.

I have letters from Lord Bryce and Brand Whitlock, both of which are parts of the diary. Hugh Gibson of the Brussels Legation took breakfast with me. He evidently thinks Whitlock has outlived his usefulness in Belgium because of his ill health and of conditions there which he cannot control and which will perhaps reflect discredit on him. He believes he should leave Brussels and take the Russian Ambassadorship. Whitlock, it seems, would prefer Spain, which suggested to me that Willard might be sent to Russia and Whitlock to Spain. I am making this suggestion to Lansing and also that Gibson be made Chargé d'Affairs at Brussels, and later be raised to Minister there. Gibson thinks Whitlock would be glad of this change, provided it was forced upon him in a way to justify his leaving the Belgian people in their distress. Whitlock's letter gives his views better than I can, and is a part of the record. What he says does not altogether tally with what Gibson and

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Richards tell me.

Herbert Hoover, of the Belgian Relief, came to pour out his troubles and ask me to do what I could to help. He thinks Whitlock should leave Belgium, largely on account of his health. He does not think he is in physical condition to maintain himself against the machinations of the Germans and the Spanish Minister, who is in league with the Germans.

I told Hoover what I had already suggested to Lansing which pleased him. I am inclined to be suspicious about these stories of Whitlock. It looks as if an effort was being made to put him out of Belgium and to put Hoover and his men in full control there.

We took lunch with the Marquis and Lady Lansdowne. There was no one present excepting the family, and Lansdowne and I withdrew to the library where I told him some of the things I have told the rest of the Cabinet, and which I said would be given in more detail by Grey. I stated that while the President had practically given me *carte blanche*, that the proposals I had made were of such a character that I felt that he, the President, should hear of them from me in person, before an actual commitment was considered as having been made.

I had a conference with the Chilean Minister before lunch. He said his Government was pleased with the proposed pact between the American Republics. He mentioned the fear Chile had of Japan. He spoke of the advantage Chile could be to the United States because of her coast line as a base, and because of her nitrate and copper deposits. He believe that Chile during the coming year would take second place among copper producing countries. While talking with him, it occurred to me it would be a good time for Great Britain to indicate that she was in sympathy with the Pan-American Pact, and I told Eduardes I would suggest to Sir Edward Grey tomorrow that he have some member of the House of Commons put a question to him asking if the Government was cognizant

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of this pact, how they regarded it, and what effect it would have upon Great Britain. I shall suggest that Grey reply that Great Britain views it sympathetically; that being one of the largest American Powers, she looks with favor upon any arrangement which will make for a closer union of American States.

Eduardes was delighted with this suggestion. Later in the day I proposed it to Lansdowne. He was startled, and said it was a matter needing careful consideration because Japan might consider it was directed at her. I thought Japan should be taken at her word. She has repeatedly said she had no designs in the Western Hemisphere, and Great Britain need only accept her assurances at their face value. Lansdowne favored the proposal, but declared it of such importance that careful thought should be given it.

Garvin of the Observer writes a leader this morning in which he strongly approves the President having sent me abroad, and suggests the British follow his lead and name Bryce to go to the United States. He deprecates the attacks upon the President, which indicates that the seeds I have been sowing are bearing fruit.

Laszlo called. Gibson came in and several others I did not permit to come up. Altogether it has been and interesting and profitable Sunday.

February 21, 1916.

My first caller this morning was Hirst of the Economist. I have not seen any of the pacifists until now for reasons which seemed to me wise. Hirst has not changed his view from that of last year and looks upon the war as the greatest piece of folly in history. He wished very much for me to see Lord Loreburn and we drove to No. 8 Eaton Square in order that I might ask him to remain at home until I had finished my conference with Sir Edward Grey who lives close by. Loreburn was glad to do this.

The first question I took up with Grey was the suggestion which came to

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me yesterday regarding the Pan-American Pact. I told Grey I had mentioned
it to Lansdowne and he thought it a great move, provided it was so guarded as
not to offend the Japanese. Grey took the same attitude I did, that the Jap-
anese could not possibly consider it directed at them. He enthused over the
idea and asked me to dictate the question I thought should be put to him in
Parliament. I did so while he wrote it down. It was, whether the Government
was taking cognizance of the Pan-American Pact recently announced, guaranteeing
the political and territorial integrity of the American Republics and what effect
it would have upon the British Dominions in America. Grey then wrote his
answer stating that the Government had taken notice of it and considered any
agreement that was to the advantage of the American States was also to the ad-
vantage of the British Colonies in America.

Sir Edward asked what he should say if he were asked if this would lead
to preferential tariffs between the American Republics. I advised him to say
that nothing of a commercial nature was contemplated in the pact, that it was
entirely political.

The thought then occurred to me, and I expressed it to Grey, that after
this was done and after I had consulted with the President, the British Govern-
ment might join the American guarantee as far as their American Colonies were
concerned. This, I told him, was one way to bring about a sympathetic al-
liance not only with the United States, but with the entire Western Hemisphere.
In my opinion, it was an opportunity not to be disregarded and its tendency
would be to bring together an influence which could control the peace of the
world.

Grey was excited over the proposal and thought too it should be done.
I afterward cabled the President, telling him what I had proposed to Grey,
but without giving details.

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Dropping this subject we went into the French-Anglo-American understanding under discussion. He has shown the French communique to Asquith, Balfour and George, and has also shown them the memorandum which he and I agreed upon last week. He has seen the French Ambassador who asked Grey how serious he thought my proposal was; whether the President and I were in earnest, or whether we had in mind merely the influencing of the British and French favorably to the President, in order that it might have a bearing upon the Presidential campaign.

Grey assured Cambon my proposal was genuine. I asked Sir Edward to tell him that he had been thinking about what he, the French Ambassador, had said, and he thought he should remind him that the President and I could not have any political advantage in mind, for it was a well known fact that adverse foreign comment was a political asset to any candidate running for President in the United States. Grey smiled at this, but recognized its truth and said he would be certain to convey it to Cambon.

cautioned

I asked Grey again about not allowing a written copy of our agreement to get abroad. While he might show it to different members of the Cabinet, I warned him not to give them copies. He said, however, it was necessary to give it to the French.

In discussing the best time for the President's proposal, Grey thought it depended upon the opinion of the military leaders of the Allies. If they considered the situation warranted waiting a few months for military success, it would be necessary to yield to this opinion. He understands, however, that the President and I desire to act as soon as possible.

We walked together from 33 Eccleston Square toward the home of Lord Loreburn. Grey had given me his photograph and smilingly said I had better not let Loreburn see it if I wanted to keep him in a good humor.

Lord Loreburn was alone waiting for me. He asked what I thought of his making a speech in the House of Lords denouncing the blockade. I cautioned

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him against doing this, urging him to say instead that the Allied Governments
ought not to do anything to needlessly irritate either the neutrals or the
germans, but to do those things which had real military value. Great Britain,
in a way, was doing, I said, in the blockade what Germany was doing with her
Zeppelins. While one was not atrocious as the other, at the same time, they
each had an irritating effect and caused solidity and hardening of public opinion.

Loreburn made notes of what I said, and promised to bring it out in his
speeches. I urged him to bring out the fact that England should cease
stating through her press and public men that this was a war of annihilation,
both of the German nation and German trade. On the contrary, it was a war, as
far as Great Britain was concerned, to prevent a few selfish individuals from
phunging the world into war for their own purposes. I thought if he would
strike this high note, it would hurt militarism in Germany and would make clear
the purposes of the Allies. A high note had not as yet been struck, and while
the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey meant to voice it, if they failed to do
so, he should.

Loreburn made notes of this point and promised to send me a copy of his
speech. I gave him a summary of what I had told Grey concerning the Pan-American
Pact, and what Grey had promised to do in the House of Commons, provided
the Canadian Prime Minister approved. Grey felt that a matter appertaining
solely to American affairs should first be submitted to the Canadian Government,
and this was being done by cable.

I suggested to Loreburn that he prepare a speech in advance, without
saying anything to Grey, so when the announcement was made in the Commons, he
could give it his warm approval in the House of Lords. He was eager to do
this, for he said it presented to his mind a magnificent prospect.

In discussing the world war and its effects, I expressed the opinion

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as I have done before, that it was not the breaking down of civilization, but
the breaking down of statesmanship; that kixxwas the affairs of mankind were al-
ways within the keeping of a few men, and their governing motives were largely
selfish. It was always what this or that measure meant to them and their per-
sonal fortunes, rather than what it meant to the people whom they represented.
Loreburn heartily agreed with this, and said that Aristotle, some twenty-four
hundred years ago, expressed much the same sentiment. He quoted in Greek the
quotation which translated means: "Men first think well of themselves".

Loreburn excoriated Sir Edward Grey for being drawn into the war. He
thought there was no need for even a tentative alliance with either Russia or
France, and said Grey had deceived him, either intentionally or otherwise, by
not informing him during the trying days prior to the war that there was an
alliance between France and Great Britain. He said later Grey declared in a
public speech it was impossible for England to ignore her obligations to France.
He does not think well of Grey's ability, though he admires his character. I
begged him to support Grey, saying he was the one man of whom I had hope, and I
thought that he, Loreburn, ought not to allow anything which had been done pre-
viously, interfere with what good might be done now by working together. Lore-
burn promised he would do this, though he admitted it was a bitter *dissatisfaction* dose.

We lunched today at Crewe House. The other guests were Lord Hugh Cecil,
General Coldwell, Mr. Addison, Lady Herbert and some others whose name I did
not catch.

This afternoon, Frederick W. Wile, Hugh Gibson and several others called.
I went to Mrs. Asquith's for tea. I was nearly an hour late. She was alone
and waiting for me. We had rather an intimate talk, she telling about the
official family in general and Mr. Asquith in particular. She was distressed
at being considered pro-German, and was annoyed because of the suit she insti-

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tuted against the Globe, in which she will probably be a witness. She started to criticise the President, for she has a free tongue and says what comes first to mind, but I silenced her by saying she did not know conditions or anything of the situation, nor did she know what the President had in mind, and has gotten the usual prejudiced view of him which was untrue and unfair.

When I returned to the Ritz, Lady Paget was there and remained until eight o'clock. She is serving our cause well, and is one of the few Americans living in London who is loyal to her country and maintains it on every occasion. In this she has the respect of the English people.

February 22, 1916.

The Lord Chief Justice called. He wished to tell me of a private talk he had with the Prime Minister concerning our conference at the Reading dinner. He said Asquith talked to him much more strongly in favor of the agreement than he had at the conference. It is the intention to make a push in the west at the earliest possible date, so that the President's proposal may come as soon as possible. I feel the responsibility I have taken in this matter, for it is upon my assertion that the agreement will be carried out, that they are preparing for this quick and powerful offensive.

Reading had also seen Lloyd George and he, too, is cordial in his support of the understanding, though he does not believe with Asquith and Grey that the time will be auspicious as soon as they think. I asked Reading to persuade Asquith to caution Grey not to give the memorandum to the different members of the Cabinet. I thought it best to confine it for the present to those who were at the dinner. Grey, on the other hand, is insisting that it be given to the Cabinet as a whole. Reading believes this would be a mistake, and is taking means to check it.

I told Reading that Grey was no more eager than I for the moment to come

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when the President could propose a conference between the belligerents, but it
was a matter of such vital importance that I did not wish it bungled by precip-
itate action. Reading promised to see me again tomorrow and let me know the
result of his endeavours during the day.

Howard Whitehouse, Liberal Member of Parliament, called to ask me to urge
the President to again offer his services in mediation. I obtained considera-
ble information from him by questioning him closely and without telling him any-
thing. He said the entire Irish party, of about eighty members, would be will-
ing to accept mediation now, and that more than one hundred of the Liberal Party
would join them. I asked what effect it would have if the Liberals members
of the Government, and such Conservative members as Lansdowne, Balfour and Bonar
Law would accept the President's proposal for a peace conference. In that
of one hundred
event he thought there would be at least a majority in the House of Commons who
would favor it, and that the country would sustain them by an overwhelming ma-
fority. I asked Whitehouse to give me his estimate of the views of the dif-
ferent members of the Cabinet regarding mediation. I was surprised to find how
accurately he stated it. The only mistake of importance was concerning Lloyd
George. He thought Lloyd George would oppose it as vigorously as Lord Curzon.
In this he must be wrong. I was surprised because Whitehouse was at one time
Lloyd George's Parliamentary Secretary.

Sir Horace Plunkett came to lunch. He is preparing a memorial to the
Cabinet concerning American affairs. He wished to read it to me before sub-
mitting it. It is an able document, and I heartily approved it.

Herbert Hoover called to say that Hugh Gibson had better go to Berlin and
find out definitely from the German Government whether they would consider him
persona grata as Chargé d'Affairs at Brussels. Hoover had an interview with
Lord Northcliffe this morning concerning Polish relief measures. It is essen-

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tial that the British Government permit food to go through the Relief Committee as it has in Belgium. Northcliffe is opposed to this and said he would fight it. Hoover is as pugnacious as Northcliffe and brought him to a somewhat more moderate view.

A. G. Gardiner came to tea. We talked for an hour. I outlined the President's purposes as to his Pan-American policy and also vaguely touched upon his European policy. I thought the people would consider him, Gardiner, a prophet when his forecast of what he believed the President would do came true. I asked him to use his influence toward restraining the press and people of this country from throwing obstacles in our way. We do not ask them for help; we do not ask them for praise, we only ask them not to hinder. It was not the President or his political future I had in mind, for if we cared to descend to low politics we could use the abuse heaped upon him in Europe to elect him President as had been done in American before, But we scorned to use such methods, and if he could not sustain himself upon the ground he had taken, he was willing to go down in defeat.

We talked of government, of men and their purposes, and of the motives which controlled them. There is little disagreement between us for we "speak much the same language".

We dined with Lady Paget at the Carlton Hotel and went to the theater.

February 23, 1916.

Sir Edward Grey and I conferred for an hour or more this morning. He had prepared and gave me a copy of the understanding to which he, Asquith, Balfour, Lloyd George and I have come. He intended giving each member of the Cabinet a copy, but upon my strong protest, he agreed he would read it to them instead. I asked Grey to send Lord Reading to the United States in the event I cabled for him, in order that he *might* go with me to the President and take

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back direct word of any modification or amplification of our agreement. I
would have suggested Lord Bryce, but his age forbids. I indicated to Grey
that I might use the British Ambassador instead and have him go with me to the
President, and have the President sanction what I had done in London, although
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice need not know all that such a sanction implied.

I am considering this as a precautionary measure and for my own protection.
The President might agree, and I would cable as much to Grey, then something
might arise to cause the President to change his mind and I would be censured
here in unmeasured terms. Meanwhile, the Allied Governments might have gone
ahead with this understanding in mind, and followed a course which they would
not have done, had they not had the agreement with me. Since the plan does
not rest with me alone, the President is the one to give the final word.

Grey and I covered some minor points. He told me what their answer
would be to our note of last October. He told me, too, that Bonar Law was of
the opinion it would be somewhat hasty to have the question asked in the House
of Commons, and an answer given just now about the Pan-American Pact. He has
cabled the Canadian Prime Minister and the matter will be brought out at the
time considered most opportune. Grey expressed the hope that the time would
not be far distant when I would visit him in his Northumberland home, when we
could arise each morning and greet each other with the salutation, "the war is
over." He was affectionate in his expressions of friendship, saying I could
never know how much my coming into his life has meant. He used the old ex-
pression of mine that I have often used to him, "you and I speak the same lan-
guage."

The Government are doing all they can to facilitate our getting away
comfortably. They offered a special train which I declined, but I accepted a
private car. Since we are returning on a Dutch steamer, they are sending
with me a secret service man from Scotland Yard to guard my papers.

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I spent an hour and a half with Page and the Embassy staff, and later took lunch with Irwin Laughlin. Page is in great good humor because he believes the United States will be at war with Germany within a month. He still contends it will not cost us a single life.

He was full of Brand Whitlock. He claims he is crazy, that he "was off his head" some years ago and that the same indications are apparent now. He says Whitlock believes nothing can prevent his nomination for President after Wilson's term is over. Page had written a long letter of this tenor to the President. He read it to me and then tore it up. The entire letter related to Whitlock and the craze which now possessed him. I have my doubts about the matter. I have a feeling that Hoover thinks Whitlock has received more credit for the Belgian Relief work than he deserves, and I believe Page is being influenced quite unconsciously. Whitlock, being in Brussels, is so inaccessible that I am afraid I cannot get at the bottom of it. I do not mistrust Hoover excepting I think he is exceedingly jealous of the work he has done for Belgium, and whether he has done it all and Whitlock nothing, as he and Page suggest, is something I cannot tell. I like Page, I like Hoover and I like Whitlock, but of the three, I like Whitlock best. His type of mind, his personality and his high ideals appeal to me.

Sir Horace Plunkett called to read me the final draft of the statement he is making the Government on Anglo-American affairs. A copy of this is to go in the diary.

A cable from Thomas Nelson Page came asking if the situation between Germany and the United States was as critical as the papers indicated. I replied that it was. I have made arrangements to be kept informed by wireless of any developments while at sea. The Holland-American Line have cabled the Captain of the Rotterdam to give me each day all the wireless news he receives.

I have had a continuous stream of callers of low and high degree. The

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British Intelligence man will appear on the ship list as my valet.

Sir Edward Grey sent me a revised statement of our understanding. I had asked him to number the lines in order that I might refer to any line by number and this he has done.

Books, notes, flowers have arrived in numbers; and callers came in so rapidly at one time that I had to use my bedroom to keep them separated.

The Government has placed a private sleeping car at our disposal until the ships sails. We leave here at 9.30 P. M. for Falmouth.

Falmouth, England.
February 24, 1916.

We arrived at Falmouth this morning. The Rotterdam does not arrive here until tomorrow morning. The Admiralty engaged accommodations for us at one of the local hotels, and the hotel refuses to accept any payment stating the Government has instructed that no charge shall be made. Motors have also been at our disposal all day. We returned to the car to sleep. The weather is unusually cold and an engine has been attached to the car to keep it heated.

February 25, 1916.

I have a cable from Lansing saying when Brand Whitlock declined the Russian mission, before my despatch came suggesting Willard for Russia and Whitlock for Spain, they had offered Russia to David L. Francis of Missouri and he had accepted.

I have a cable from the President stating he has traced the leakage in the Lusitania matter directly to the German Embassy in Washington. His cable and my reply are parts of the diary.

The Admiralty sent us out to the S. S. Rotterdam this morning in one of their boats. There have been several British Naval officers in attendance

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during my stay at Falmouth, and the Government is not holding the Rotterdam
to search for spies, contraband etc. as they have recently been doing. The
ship is full to its capacity and largely, I am told, because of our being on it
which has been widely advertised. There is a general belief that no mishap
will come to it from submarines or other causes on account of the presence of
our party. I hope their faith may be justified, although nothing would proba-
bly happen anyway.

I shall discontinue the diary now until just before landing which we
hope will be Sunday March the fifth.

At Sea,
March 4, 1916.

Our voyage has about come to an end. It has been a long and rough
one, but restful for me. The usual number of people have demanded to see me
and I have been bored by some and enlightened by others.

D. H. Heineman of Brussels made himself known by a letter from Whitlock.
He is the most interesting man I have met. He is a cosmopolitan having been
born in the United States and having lived largely in Europe. He knows the
Berlin Government well, and he tells me the Central Powers are willing for the
President to intervene at once if he will do so. This is important and coin-
cides with my own information. Heineman said he was told they could change
public opinion in Germany within a week and have it favorable to intervention
also
by the President. This I believe is true.

The Captain has delivered to me each day his Marconi messages. In
them I find that the President and Lansing have gotten themselves into deep
waters, brought about by their ill-timed proposal as to the disarming of mer-
chantmen. I have received two wireless messages from the President, one
asking me to come at once to Washington, and the other warning that Bernstorff
was waiting in New York to see me and advising that I avoid him.

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In precipitating this controversy with Congress and by making the situation so acute with Germany, I feel that the President and Lansing have largely interfered with my efforts abroad. If they had held the situation quiescent as I urged them to do, I am sure my plan for intervention by the United States to end the war would have gone through without trouble. I am deeply disappointed, but I hope matters can be ironed out in a way to yet make the plan possible.

Yesterday a fearsome storm fell upon us with such fury that we were compelled to lay to for ten hours. The snow fell so thickly and the wind was so high that it was necessary to have to and ride the storm out. Home which looked so near last night seems distant this morning. Many shipwrecks must have occurred for it takes a staunch vessel to weather such a storm.

New York,
March 5, 1916.

We arrived in the lower harbor this morning around noon. I had an early lunch and at one o'clock a revenue cutter signaled to the Rotterdam to stop. Gordon and Dudley Malone were on the boat and they took Loulie and me off. On our way to the Navy Yard Club Pier, Dudley had time to give me an outline of the situation, both national and local. He remained with me most of the day.

I telephoned to Washington and found the President was not expecting me until morning, and had gone away for Sunday on the Mayflower. I therefore concluded to take the midnight instead of the Congressional Limited, and Dudley insisted upon sending one of his men along to protect the papers I was carrying.

I found a letter from the German Ambassador asking for an appointment. Acting upon the President's advice I ignored it, although my judgment was that it would be better to see him before I went to Washington rather than afterward, since in the one case I would supposedly know nothing of the sit-

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uation, and would naturally expect to get information from him and give nothing
in return.

I took the drawing room and Mr. Lamb of the Neutrality Squad, acting upon
Malone's orders, is to sit up all night.

I forgot to mention that I have been bombarded with reporters. One of
the questions asked me was whether I was the author of Philip Dru. I declined
to either affirm or deny it, and let it go at that.

The White House,
Washington, D. C.

March 6, 1916.

One of the White House automobiles was waiting at the station. Irving
Hoover said he had just received a telephone message from the Navy Yard saying
the President and Mrs. Wilson would be up at eight o'clock to breakfast with me.

We did not have much conversation at the breakfast table or afterward,
having agreed to leave the important discussion until after lunch.

I saw the Attorney General and Postmaster General and other members of the
Cabinet, but nothing of importance passed. They gave a review of the happen-
ings during my absence.

After lunch the President, Mrs. Wilson and I took an automobile ride
of something over two hours. During this time I outlined every important de-
tail of my mission. The President, on our return, dropped me at the State De-
partment, and I had an interview of an hour with Lansing, giving him a summary
of what I had told the President. I returned to the White House and the Pres-
ident and I went into session again until nearly seven o'clock. I showed him
the memorandum which Sir Edward Grey and I had agreed was the substance of my
understanding with France and Great Britain. The President accepted it into
only suggesting that the word "probably" be inserted in the ninth line after
the word "world" and before the word "leave." He also suggested that tomorrow

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we write out the full text of the reply which I shall send Grey.

I had an engagement to dine with the Postmaster General, and when I arose to leave, the President placed his arm around my shoulders and said: "I cannot adequately express to you my admiration and gratitude for what you have done. It would be impossible to imagine a more difficult task than the one placed in your hands, but you have accomplished it in a way beyond any expectations".

I replied that it made me happy to know he felt satisfied, for I knew he had been criticised for sending me, and I rejoiced that he felt I had justified his action. I spoke of the pride I would feel if the plan could be realized and I could see him sitting at the head of the counsel table at the Hague. He said, "my dear friend, you should be proud of yourself and not of me since you have done it all".

These generous expressions touched me deeply. I shall not go into any general discussion of our conferences for it has all been related before.

I had a pleasant dinner with Burleson who had Gregory for his other guest. I went from there to see McAdoo and had an hour's talk with him, and then returned to the White House.

March 7, 1916.

The most important happening of today was the writing of the cable to Sir Edward Grey. After some discussion, the President took down in shorthand what he thought was the consensus of opinion, and then went to his typewriter and typed it off. This document is a part of the diary, and a most important part. The fact that he has approved in writing all I have done, gives me great satisfaction.

I have seen Phillips and Polk of the State Department and have discussed the diplomatic corps, promotions and demotions in the service being agreed upon. I have also seen members of the Cabinet including McAdoo, Houston, Burleson and

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Gregory.

In the afternoon the President, Mrs. Wilson and I went to the Mayflower to bid Secretary and Mrs. McAdoo and other members of the Pan-American party goodbye.

After that we drove for an hour and the President told of an interview Mr. Bryan had with Lane, which Lane had at once reduced to writing and given him. The President was somewhat worried about it, and wished my judgment as to what was best to do. He seems to have come to the parting of the ways with Mr. Bryan. We thought the real cause of Bryan's displeasure was that the President is standing for a second term, and the support of the Administration has not be thrown to Mr. Bryan instead. I recalled Bryan's asking me a year or more ago whether my remark that if he desired to be President he should first become Secretary of State in a Democratic Cabinet and make a record which would inevitably bring about his nomination for President, was the view of the President or entirely my own, and how disappointed he was when I told him it was my view alone.

Mr. Bryan complained to Lane that the President had never given him his confidence. When Lane replied that he had never discussed with any of his Cabinet matters appertaining to other departments, Bryan said, "That is well enough with the balance of the Cabinet, but my position is different. For sixteen years I have been the leader of the Democratic Party, and I am entitled to be consulted upon all matters of importance".

Bryan has told others that I was Secretary of State and not himself, and that the President had never taken him into his confidence. In answer to this the President says he is glad Bryan knows no more of the inside of his mind that he did before they ever met, and if he had been foolish enough to have made him his confident, the result of Bryan's feelings toward him would not be different, but he would possess an advantage which he does not now hold.

I saw the British Ambassador today for an hour and had a satisfactory

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talk. Among other things discussed was the reply the Allies should make concerning disarming of merchantmen. The Ambassador said his Government would be willing to put their refusal to accept the proposal in the most advantageous form possible. I promised to advise with the President and let him know what was thought best.

Spring-Rice told me what Lansing said to the Italian Ambassador, an indiscretion of which I am sorry Lansing was guilty. He told him that his purpose in proposing the disarming of Allied merchantmen was to please Germany and get a favorable settlement of the Lusitania controversy. This is exactly what Lansing and the President have been charged with.

I returned to the White House and discussed the matter with the President. He thought the best reply the Allies could make was a promise that they would strictly adhere to international law, and would not transgress it in any particular, and that their armament would be for defensive and not for offensive purposes. The President took occasion far to blame himself and Lansing for allowing this controversy to crop out. I thought it more Lansing's fault than his. Nevertheless, the President insisted upon taking the blame along with Lansing.

I thought the last clause in the Lansing proposal the most dangerous one and was inconsistent. He admitted it was unfortunate, but the only thing to do now was to make the best of a bad situation. The President showed an admirable spirit in refusing to shirk responsibility for an unnecessary blunder.

The President, McAdoo, Burleson and I discussed what was best to do about the McLemore resolution now pending in Congress. Many times yesterday and today I have been in conferences concerning this fight.

There was a large musicale given at the White House tonight. I remained on the outside talking to different members of the Cabinet. When it was over

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I took the midnight train for New York. Mr. Lamb of the Neutrality Squad had been instructed to remain in Washington until my return and accompany me back.

New York,
March 8, 1916.

In the diary of yesterday and the day before I have not gone into details of telegrams, letters and importunities of people desiring to see me. Today I have been busy with mail and have refused to see almost all callers. I shall try to seclude myself for several days in this way.

I sent a despatch in our private code to Sir Edward Grey, and received a cable from Sir Horace Plunkett concerning the controversy between Balfour and Churchill.

It is my purpose to curtail the diary more and more, putting in only what seems of value. I feel, though, I may not use the best judgment in this, and that Lord Bryce may be right in thinking that we often exaggerate the unimportant while the historian wonders why nothing was said of matters which seem at a later date of vital interest.

March 9, 1916.

I received a delightful letter from the President today in which he again speaks of his gratification of what I did while in Europe.

Newspaper men have pestered me today about one matter or another. Cleveland Dodge says there is a rumor in Wall Street that the main purpose of my trip to Europe was to gain the consent of the governments over there for the United States to purchase Northern Mexico. I authorized him to make a denial. He said he was ready to give more money for Page in London. He has given to date $25,000.

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March 10, 1916.

This has been an unusually busy day, not only because of callers but because letters to Europe had to be written so as to go on the Rotterdam tomorrow. Most of them go by hand, some by the British pouch. The Intelligence man who came over with me returns on the Rotterdam and will act as messenger.

Captain Guy Gaunt and Chief Flynn of the Secret Service came separately to give information concerning their activities. Gaunt tells me that Bernstorff sent word to the commanders of the interned German ships to be ready to act upon instruction already given. Gaunt does not understand the meaning of this, and thought I might be able to throw some light upon it. He said an order had gone out to all Austrian consuls in the United States to have Austrian citizens disarm and bring their arms to the consulates. This, too, Gaunt wondered at. Neither of us could think of a satisfactory theory.

Flynn was full of his own activities which were even more interesting than those of Captain Gaunt. All the principal German telephone wires are now tapped, and he is getting conversations from day to day as to their plans and activities. He tells me I am now known as "Stayer", also as "Palace". "Chicago" is used for Berlin. There is evidence of the free use of money to influence what they term "the Hill" meaning Congress. It seems clear that a number of Congressmen and some Senators are in German pay. It is a humiliating revelation. Flynn said the manner of procedure is this: A Senator or Representative is urged to get up a meeting for the purpose of influencing public opinion about an embargo on arms, disarming of merchantmen, warning Americans not to travel on belligerent ships, etc. etc. A large sum of money is paid ostensibly for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the meeting, but which, as a matter of fact, is a bribe.

Bernstorff's intrigue with a certain well known married woman is fol-

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lowed almost from hour to hour, and much information is gathered in this way.
Bernstorff's weakness in this direction is being utilized to his undoing.

I have a letter from the German Ambassador stating that he will be here Saturday and Sunday. I have written giving him an appointment at ten on Sunday. To show how closely his movements are known, Flynn knew of this appointment I had made with him. Flynn considers it advisable to have my telephone wire tested, and this will be done each week.

The life I am leading transcends in interest and excitement any routine. I cannot begin to outline here what happens from day to day, how information from every quarter pours into this little unobtrusive study. I believe I am the only one who gets a view of the entire picture. Some get one corner and some another, but I seem to have it all.

March 11, 1916.

I have seen but few people today, and have confined myself to my correspondence. The telephone, however, has been unusually active which is always annoying and nerve-racking. I sometimes wonder how I live through the days.

H. H. Childers has written an article about me for the North American Review. Harvey, it is said, will publish it, though I have my doubts. There are many inaccuracies which I have not corrected, preferring to leave it that way. The World sent a man to write an article for their Sunday edition. I tried to discourage him but he said he had his orders and they were final and begged me to tell him something of my former activities. I advised him to talk of the present rather than of the past since that has been done to death. ask

Reporters of the World, Times and Sun came to about the story that my visit to Europe had to do with the purchase of Northern Mexico. I told them I did not know I had gone to Europe for that purpose until after my return, and assured them if Washington was doing anything toward purchasing any part

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of Mexico, it was being kept a secret from me.

R. W. Woolley, Director of the Mint, took lunch with me and reported on
political conditions as well as the activities of the committee of which Chas-
R. Crane, Henry Morganthau and Cleveland H. Dodge are members. Woolley thinks
the President will have to see more people now that the campaign is on. He
says his inaccessibility is common complaint.

Dr. Grayson called to tell of some of Tumulty's activities against me. It
seems that Grayson is now in the inner Tumulty trenches and gets much informa-
tion concerning him.

Dudley and Mrs. Malone, Dr. Grayson and Miss Gordon, and Gordon and
Janet took dinner with us and went to the theater.

March 12, 1916.

Some of the papers have headlines concerning the purchase of Northern
Mexico. They write a column about it and then give my denial in small type.

Count von Bernstorff called at ten o'clock and remained for an hour. My
letter to the President today covers the principal part of our interview. I
repeated what I had told his Government in Berlin concerning their senseless
Zeppelin raids upon England and France, and proved to his satisfaction that it
was of military advantage to England and harmful to Germany.

We discussed the entire international situation and speculated as to what
would happen in the event the United States joined the Allies against the Central Powers. I believe I convinced Bernstorff that the only hope of ending the war soon was for the United States to intervene. If we can get the Allies to give the word, I believe Germany will acquiesce, but delay is dangerous.

March 13, 1916.

Nothing worth recording happened today. We were invited to the opera but
I declined.

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March 14, 1916.

Today has been very much a repetition of yesterday. Sir Herbert Tree
sent us a box for the opening of his Henry the Eighth. I did not go but we
gave a dinner to Mrs. Marcus Daly, Miss Iselin, Montgomery Hare, Clifford Car-
ver and Janet, who with Loulie, filled the box.

March 15, 1916.

I have a letter today from A. G. Gardiner enclosing a piece he has
written entitled, "Mr. Wilson's Policy and the Pact of Peace". It is one of
the best things Gardiner's has written. It was published in the Daily News
the day I left England and just after I told him the real facts.

I am worried over the Mexican situation. We are not prepared for war
and the President will come in for much criticism if we have sufficient trouble
there to develop our weakness. I have urged him repeatedly to at least fill
up the army quota to the number authorized by Congress, and to have in good
working order the small force available. If I were President or Secretary of
War I would caution our soldiers to be careful of the sensibilities of the
Mexican soldiers cooperating with us. This is almost certain to be done un-
less the officers are impressed with the necessity for not allowing it to be
done. It is almost invariably true that Anglo Saxons offend the Latines in
such circumstances. Great Britain has done this with France during the pres-
ent war.

I dined with Mr. Frank Trumbull to meet Mr. Robert Fleming of London.
Fleming is a very rich, canny Scotsman. He is patriotic, but is counting the
pounds war is costing Great Britain and evidently desires that the end may
come soon.

March 16, 1916.

came
called for the
of the Saint Louis Convention, called for the

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purpose of arousing interest in favor of national defence, and of its attitude
toward the Administration. He asked me to arrange an interview for him with
the President and I have done so.

United States Marshal McCarthy and several others called. I received
a large mail from Europe, two of the letters being from Ambassador Gerard.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Adrian Iselin. Among the guests were Mr. and
Mrs. Joseph Choate, Senator and Mrs. Wetmore, Mr. and Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt,
Mr. and Mrs. Whitridge etc.

March 17, 1916.

B. W. Huebsch called to discuss the renewed demand for Philip Dru. I
expressed regret for having put it out without re-writing it. He thought I
should have written it as an economic work and not as fiction. He believes
it an impossibility to embody as many economic theories as I have in the book,
and still make it an interesting novel. I know he is right and the same ob-
jection occurred to me when I wrote it, and yet if I had it to do again I
should probably follow the same lines for the reason I was able to bring in
some things I could not have embodied otherwise. While there is much in the
book which I should like to cut out, in the main, it is substantially what I
think and I am willing to stand or fall by it.

I lunched today at the Princeton Club with Clifford Carver. The other
guests were Croly and Lippmann of the New Republic and Lincoln Colcord. I
talked rather freely upon European affairs, though not at all of the partic-
ular mission upon which I last visited Europe.

The Attorney General came at six to remain to dinner and go to the
theater. I was not well enough to do the latter and Gordon took my place.
Gregory telephoned during the day that he had a matter of great importance
to tell me-- something which could not be told over the telephone. It was this

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He said Tumulty had told Burleson that a despatch had come from El Paso stating that one of Carranza'a Colonels had declared he would immediately attack our troops if they crossed the border. In reply to this the President told Tumulty and the Secretary of War that if this were the case he would not send our troops across the border, because it would mean intervention and war with Mexico. Tumulty argued with the President desperately, saying if he did not send our troops after Villa, or if he hesitated a moment to act, he might just as well not contemplate running for the Presidency, since he would not get a single electoral vote. That even such pacifists as Bryan were in favor of the move. It is to be remembered that the President has already issued orders to "catch Villa dead or alive".

Tumulty was unable to convince him or change his determination, so he went post-haste to Burleson. They agreed to call in Houston, and the three of them outlined a letter, which Tumulty signed, telling the President what a mistake he was making. Tumulty sent this letter to the theater where the President happened to be. After it was sent, and before Tumulty saw the President again, it was found that the despatch from El Paso was a fake so the matter ended there.

I am curious to know the truth of the story, for I have some doubts about it.
I cannot believe the President would be unwise enough, or lack the courage, to take drastic action in such circumstances. It is inconceivable that he should not better understand the temper of the American people. It would not only destroy him in the United States, but it would destroy his influence in Europe as well. The world loves boldness and courage and is willing to endore many actions that are unwise and inexpedient if only they are courageous.

Gregory, Burleson, Houston, Tumulty and others around the President think he lacks courage at critical moments. I am not willing to accept this. His determination not to allow Germany to force him into intervention in Mexico

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could account for his action. I shall ask him about the matter when I go to Washington.

Gregory and I discussed a suitable appointee for the vacancy in the Federal Circuit Court here, but came to no conclusion.

March 19, 1916.

Gregory and Corporation Counsel Hardy met here at noon. Gregory remained to lunch and did not leave until 4.45. Sidney Brooks also lunched with us, and we had an interesting talk afterward. Brooks was anxious to have me write an account of the Baltimore Convention. He said there were so many tales, and so many men who had been responsible for the President's nomination that the world should know the truth. I pointed to Gregory and said, there is another man who was responsible for his nomination, and, curiously enough, Gregory indirectly admitted it by telling how he had made an arrangement with the Underwood forces not to go over to Clark under any circumstances, thereby preventing, with the Wilson vote, a possible two thirds majority.

Brooks asked if I kept a diary, a question I evaded. He thought I was the only man in the world who knew every side of the European tragedy and should record my knowledge. He does not know that I am trying to do so. However, in reading over the diary, I often seem to fail to bring out clearly the most important facts. I unconsciously take so many things for granted and do not enlarge upon them as fully as I should. This is due somewhat to the fact that I am counting upon my letters and cables to the President, and upon his to me, and various other correspondence to cover some of the essential details.

I have been thinking how best to organize the peace conference, in the

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event the President should preside according to the plans we have laid. I
have concluded that it would be unwise for anyone other than the President to
sit at the peace table, that is, from the United States. I do not care to be
a member myself. I should prefer to work on the outside, believing in this way
I could have more influence with the members and could more thoroughly bring
about the best results.

If I can influence it, it is my purpose to have a single conference com-
posed of both belligerents and neutrals with the Prime Minister and Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs of each belligerent take part, and the Secretary
of State of each neutral sit in. This would not make the conference unwieldy.
The belligerents should have voice and vote upon matters appertaining to a
peace settlement between themselves, and both belligerents and neutrals should
have voice and vote only upon questions affecting all, such as the future con-
duct of war, restriction of armaments, freedom of the seas during war, etc. etc.

I shall try to have an effective organization to help influence members of
the conference toward proper solutions of the problems before them, urging this
country to give way here, and that country to give way there. I have this
force pretty well picked out in my mind now. I should want to have informa-
tion just as available as if I were in a library with every book at my command,
excepting the information would be immediately obtainable through people instead
of through books.

March 20, 1916.

I had a slight operation performed last night which will confine me
to the house for several days. It is painful but unimportant.

I received letters today from Mr. Balfour and Sir Horace Plunkett. There
was a significant sentence in Balfour's letter intimating, if his judgment was
correct, that it would not be long before he should see me again. These letters

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and the one I wrote the President are parts of the record.

March 21, 1916.

I saw few people, Morganthau being the most important. He is anxious to resign as Ambassador to Turkey, and do political work for the President. He wishes me to ask the President to allow him to do this.

March 22, 1916.

Morganthau left me a letter to read which he proposed sending the President in which he offers his resignation. He said it was a composite affair prepared after conference with Crane, Lane, Houston and others. I cannot imagine the two latter having had anything to do with it. It is so unspeakably bad that I am willing to take his statement, for surely no one man could have done it so wretchedly by himself. I dictated another which he said he would send.

Sidney Brooks came to get some information to cable to the Northcliffe papers.

March 23, 1916.

Captain Guy Gaunt was my most interesting visitor today. He brought me a cable from Sir Horace Plunkett sent in the Admiralty cypher. It was a foolish suggestion, and I am surprised that Sir Horace thought it worth while, It is a part of the diary and I shall not repeat it.

Gaunt told some interesting things about Captain Boy-Ed. Boy-Ed's fiancee is in Washington and the British Government are opening his letters to her, a not very gallant act, but I suppose it is excusable in time of war. Boy-Ed wrote her that I had asked to have him attached to my "staff" while I was in Berlin, and that the German Admiralty consented to do so. I told Gaunt of the difficulty I had while in Berlin in avoiding Boy-Ed and the Navy clique general-

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ly. He was surprised because he thought Boy-Ed's statement was true.

Boy-Ed did not remain in Berlin while I was there, though I did see him when he called. He probably told the Admiralty I had expressed a desire to see him, which is indeed correct, and the other story grew out of this.

Frank Trumbull called to recite the grievance of Wall Street against the President. He claims to be a defendant of the President and I believe he is. He says the quarrel is not with the President personally but with his Cabinet, especially, McAdoo, Williams, Daniels and Burleson.

March 24, 1916.

There is nothing of particular importance to record. Mrs. Vanderbilt sent us her box at the opera for tonight, and we are inviting a few friends to go. I am not well enough as yet to be of the party.

March 25, 1916.

My most interesting visitors today were Don Seitz of the World and Roy Howard of the United Press. Howard believes Hearst is deliberately inciting to the country to war with Mexico by sending his papers from the border false and sensational telegrams. He thinks it would be unwise on the part of the President to seize all the telegraph offices along the border, and have their files gone through in order to see if is doing this if, indeed, it is being done.

Sidney Brooks is almost a daily visitor and brings his cables for me to O. K. before he sends them.

March 26, 1916.

John Lind, of Minnesota, called today. Lind wished to tell me of political conditions in Minnesota and the West and also about the finances of the Carranza Government. I like to believe that Lind is honest and disinterested, but somehow all those who take an unusual interest in the different Mexican factions, come under my suspicions.

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S. R. Bertron was full of the mistakes of the Administration, not so much of the President, as of those near him. I have come to the conclusion that it is practically impossible for any administration to deal fairly with the Wall Street group, and not come under the ban of their displeasure. The Banking and Currency Act is the most beneficent measure for the relief of business that has ever been enacted in this country and yet no appreciation is coming to the President because of it. His effort to place the railroads upon some such broad basis as the banking interests are, is also forgotten. No President within my memory has done so much in a legitimate and wholesome way for business and yet the eternal cry is for "more".

March 27, 1916.

It looks as though we were in for bad weather. The Mexican situation is not promising, and the submarine activities of the Germans during the last few days bodes ill for the plan I so laboriously worked out. It looks as if we should have to act this time without further parley. I am hardly well enough to make the trip to Washington, but I feel I ought to be there to advise the President during these critical hours. I am afraid he will delay and write further notes when action is what we need.

Sidney Brooks arrived at the house this morning before I was out of bed to get me to visit his cable to the London papers.

March 28, 1916.

Loulie and I took the 11.08 train for Washington this morning. Cleveland and Mrs. Dodge were also on the train. I obtained information from Dodge concerning the politics of the New York financiers and their reasons for swinging over to Roosevelt. Perkins is a near neighbor of Dodge's, and he has an admiration and affection for him. He believes Perkins will be the greatest asset

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Roosevelt will have because of his capacity for organization.

The White House,
Washington.

When we arrived at the White House the President was golfing, but I had an immediate conference with Frank Polk. We discussed the foreign situation and also the domestic as far as it bears upon other countries. He cautioned me about Lansing. He said Lansing has a high regard for me, but he saw some evidence of pique the last time I was over, because I was attending to matters which were entirely within his province. Lansing said the President should consult him more or, at least, let him know in advance of decisions.

It seems when the President wrote the letter to Senator Stone, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the first Lansing knew of it was when he read it in the papers. I spoke to the President about this and asked him to be careful. He was not inclined to pay any attention to it, and said Lansing must understand that he, himself, was conducting foreign affairs, and he would do it in the way he thought best.

In connection with the President's request that I button up the South American Pact, which has been allowed to drag interminably, I thought Lansing would resent it, but the President was determined that I should do it anyway.

We had a few minutes before dinner, and agreed to postpone a more detailed discussion of affairs until tomorrow. We talked enough, however, for me to fathom what was in his mind, and from the way he looked at me, I am inclined to believe that he intends making excuses for not acting promptly in this new submarine crisis forced upon him by the sinking of the Sussex. He evidently does not wish to back up his former notes to Germany upon this subject. He does not seem to realize that one of the main points of criticism against him is that he talks boldly but acts weakly. It would be better to talk weakly

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and act boldly.

The President had to go to a Press banquet at half past seven o'clock and return later to attend the musicale which was being given at the White House. I started to bed at half past nine, when the musicale began, but before I could succeed in getting under cover, Burleson came to my room and was followed later by Gregory and they remained until half past eleven. The President had told Burleson he would not appoint Johnson Postmaster of New York until after he discussed it with me again, and Burleson was trying to convince me it was the best thing that could be done. I did not argue with him because Burleson could never understand the reasons why Johnson should not be appointed.

I had a few minutes alone with Gregory and we talked of the vacancy in the New York Circuit Court. Gregory tries to get high class men and we have no trouble with him.

March 29, 1916.

The President, Cleve Dodge and I talked for about a half hour after breakfast mainly upon general topics. The President and I agreed to have an executive session at six o'clock and to continue after dinner as long as necessary. This gave me the day fairly free.

I saw Burleson again in the morning. With him it was the inevitable post-mastership of New York and his version of the Mexican crisis which I recorded when Gregory told me of it last week.

Frank Polk came and remained for nearly an hour. The President asked me this morning whether I still thought of Polk for National Chairman. I said I had not changed my mind as to his availability, but I hoped he would say nothing of to anyone for if he did, there would be much confusion and disagreement. Polk is not keen to accept the undertaking but is willing to do so if my judgment approves. I convinced him that he and McAdoo thought more alike than he and some of the others around the President and with whom he was far

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more likely to clash.

Neither the President, Lansing, Polk nor I can understand the new submarine activity by the Germans. Bernstorff has not come near the State Department, and from all we can learn, he is not worried in the slightest.

Joseph Davies of the Trades Commission followed Polk. He tells me that bituminous coal people and the lumber people are desirous of the Government to regulate the output, price and marketing of these two important commodities. Davies asked what I thought of it. At first it occurred to me, if this were done for lumber and bituminous coal, it would have to be done for anthracite, iron ore, petroleum and some of the other fundamental resources as well. After considering the matter further, I later concluded perhaps it might do to start with bituminous coal and lumber and see where it would lead, and whether it could be worked out satisfactorily for the public and the owners.

Davies explained that they were losing money, and were marketing their products in a way to deplete the supply, unless some regulation could be had. I urged him to take the matter up directly with the President, and if he favored it, to go ahead with the undertaking.

Loulie and I took lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Lansing. At my request, there was no one present excepting Mrs. Lansing's father and mother, Ex-Secretary of State Foster and Mrs. Foster, with whom the Lansings live.

Mr. Foster and I reminded about the Grant and Hayes Administrations. He told how he first got his appointment as Minister to Mexico, which was given him at the request of Senator Oliver P. Morton. He was interested to know that the Mortons were warm friends of mine, and that during the Grant and Hayes Administrations I visited Washington and had a rather intimate view of inside affairs even at that early age.

Immediately after lunch, Lansing and I went into executive session. We first took up the New York situation and found that we did not disagree

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at all as to men or measures. I had suggested to the President this morning
that ex-Governor Glynn should be made Temporary Chairman of the Saint Louis Con-
vention. The President brought up the subject by saying that Burleson had
suggested Champ Clark, and he wished to know what I thought of it. I did not
think well of it. Clark is not amenable to suggestions and the man who makes
the key-note speech should be one for whom it could be written, either in part
or in whole.

After we finished the New York situation we took up foreign affairs.
He showed me the latest despatches regarding submarine attacks upon the Sussex,
Englishman and other boats. He read a letter he had written the President con-
cerning the controversy in which he strongly advised sending Bernstorff home
and breaking relations with Germany. His letter was calm and met with my ap-
proval, provided the subsequent facts justified his desires.

We both believe the President will be exceedingly reluctant to back up his
own threats.

Lansing drove me to the White House where I had some minor engagements.
At six o'clock the President and I went into another session. We discussed
the coming campaign as to men and measures. We decided upon Morganthau's
resignation and his substitute. I favored Brand Whitlock but feared his
health was not up to it. The President gave his estimate of Willard. He does
not think as well of him as I do. He said Willard always seemed to regard
the perfectly obvious as something new, which no mind had hitherto worked out.

We then took up the foreign situation. I explained what I had planned
regarding the membership of the proposed peace conference, that is, the prime
minister and foreign minister to be the only ones to attend from belligerent
countries, and that members from neutral nations should be confined to ministers
for foreign affairs. In other words, the belligerents should have two repre-
sentatives and the neutrals should have one member each.

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The President asked how this could be regulated since we would have nothing
to do with arrangements for the peace conference. I expressed a belief that
if he would let me undertake it, I could bring it about. I suggested himself
as the only member from the United States. No other I thought would be necessa-
ry. I outlined what I wrote in the diary the other day concerning the staff
we should have around us. This seemed to please him, and make him more comfor-
table over the situation.

He is determined not to intervene in Mexico. He even goes so far as to
say that he will address Congress demanding that in no circumstances shall we
intervene at this particular time, because of the foreign situation, and because
the enemies of the United States so ardently desire it.

I was glad to hear him say that he was pleased with Newton Baker. I had
heard some pleasant things from other members of the administration concerning
him and these I repeated to the President. Polk, who has considerable to do
with the War Department, gave it as his opinion that Baker would make a better
Secretary of War than Garrison, since Garrison was away so much of his time and
depended almost wholly upon his staff for advice.

No one outside the family were at dinner. After dinner we went into
the sitting-room upstairs and I asked the President if he had read A. G. Gar-
diner's sketch of him in the London News which I had sent him about a week ago.
I asked him to get it and read it aloud. When he finished, everybody commented
upon the brilliancy with which Gardiner had written, and of the complimentary
way in which he had brought forth the best features of the President's policy.
The President smiled and said: "I seem to see something of the Colonel's fine
Italian hand in this article".

We finished this and went into his study and again took up our work
and continued it until half past nine o'clock, when he had to leave for a Red

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Cross function which he had promised to attend.

I asked him what had been done about the Pan-American Pact. He said he was continually prodding Lansing, but somehow or other he could not get him to move with celerity. I suggested that the Germans and others interested in keeping the pact from materializing had something to do with the delay. He admitted this, but thought it should be pressed to a conclusion, even if Chile and Brazil should not at the moment consent.

Chile, it seems, does not wish to subscribe to the clause "guaranteeing republican form of government" alleging that it restricts her to what form of government she shall have. The President and Lansing thought and suggested to Chile that a clause could be inserted by which, if she desired to adopt a monarchical form of government, she could withdraw from the pact. I did not approve this. I thought we should insist on their agreeing to the clause as it is. In my opinion, it is better for Chile to remain out than to have the entire pact spoiled by a tacit admission that any republic in the Western Hemisphere might at some future time desire a monarchical form of government.

The President again insisted upon my taking hold of the matter regardless of Lansing's sensibilities. He said no man's feelings must stand in the way of such important work. Gardiner's eulogy of him for having put this Pan-American Pact into motion, evidently stirred him. As a matter of fact, Gardiner had merely repeated in that part of his article what I had told him, and had given my estimae of its importance.

The President does not seem to me to be up to the mark. In discussing the New York Postmastership, he surprised me by frankly confessing that he would like to appoint Johnson because it would please Murphy, and Murphy could help him carry out some beneficent legislation and help in other directions where he thought needful. For instance, he said, he thought it desirable that Fitzgerald should not be re-elected to Congress, as he was detrimental

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to the public service. Murphy could accomplish this if he desired. I was silent, and he knew I disapproved. He therefore asked me the direct question whether I thought his reasoning sound. I replied that I did not; that he could accomplish Fitzgerald's defeat himself without the help of Tammany. I told him Tammany was not to be trusted; that they had no desire whatever for his re-election; that they were playing for position in order to re-elect a Tammany man Mayor of New York in Mitchel's place a year from now; that the national and state situations were unimportant to them in comparison with the City, for it was there that the loot lay.

He still clung to the belief that it was wise to appoint Johnson, affirming Burleson declared he was the best man that had been brought before him. Johnson was honest, he was able, he was not a Catholic, which was desired by the Protestants.

The President appeared almost more interested and absorbed in these local situations than by the foreign crisis. I myself am so little interested in them that I talk of them with reluctance, and it is immaterial to me whom he appoints. Ordinarily, I should insist that he should not appoint one of Murphy's henchmen, but it seems so insignificant compared with the vital questions now on the boards, that I find myself not caring what he does so he drops it from our discussions.

There is another thing I cannot bring the President to realize, and that is the importance of making ready to meet the crisis which may fall upon him any day. He was compelled to go into Mexico at a moment's notice. The same will happen in the European situation, and yet, we are as inert as if it were a remote possibility of some future age. I have urged him ever since the war began to make ready, and we are no more ready today than we were two years ago. For the first time the depletion of the army is beginning to be filled, and this only because of the chase after Villa, and the consequent realization

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that we have no army worth speaking of. I tried to get him to do this last
summer, and I tried to get him almost a year before the war began to pay atten-
tion to the army as this diary will show.

March 30, 1916.

I called for E. S. Martin and took him to the Department of Agriculture where we had some talk with Secretary Houston. Senator Newlands was there and it was agreed that Newlands, Houston, Senator Stone and I should get together upon my next visit to Washington and talk of foreign affairs. They are all deeply interested in them and desire to hear something of my trip.

From there I went to call on Senator Culberson at his apartment. I feel I should see Culberson each time I go to Washington on account of his physical condition. I took him to the Senate and then drove to the French Embassy.

Jusserand and I talked for nearly an hour. He was gratified at having received from his Government a memorandum of what I had done in Paris, and my estimate of him. Jusserand believes if our plan is carried out it will be under great difficulties. He does not believe the American people will quite rise to the occasion. He thinks, however, it would be a mistake if the United States should fail to actively take part, or at least cooperate, with the Allies for the purposes we have in mind.

And this reminds me that in the recent conferences of the Allies in Paris, the French used their best endeavor toward getting concessions for the American position in regard to certain trade matters. This is in line with what they promised when I was in France.

I returned to the White House at five minutes of one o'clock to find the Director of the Mint and Thompson of the Department of Justice waiting for me. I had been asked the President's consent to speak at the banquet which the Common Council Club is to give on Jefferson's birthday, and they desired an addi-

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tional concession from the President that he would talk over the telephone to
the banquets to be given by khx democrats throughout the Nation.

After lunch the President and I went into executive session again.
I put the matter of our controversy with Germany quite strongly to him. He
was afraid if we broke off relations the war would go on indefinitely and there
would be no one to lead the way out. He was repeating the argument I have been
giving him for the last six months and somewhat to my embarrassment. I told
him, however, I had thought of another way by which we could lead them out even
though we were in.

I suggested that when he sent von Bernstorff home, he should make a
dispassionate statement of the cause of the war and what the Allies were fight-
ing for. I suggested that he should say nothing unkind of the German people
but should strike at the system which had caused this world tragedy, and con-
tend, when that was righted, the quarrel with Germany, as far as we were con-
cerned, would be ended. Then I thought at the right time, which would per-
haps be by mid-summer, I could go to Holland and after a conference with the
Allies, and with their consent, I could open negotiations directly with Berlin,
telling them upon what terms we were ready to end the war.

I thought the same arrangement could then be carried out I had planned;
that is, he should preside over the conference and we should take part. This
would make our participation more effective than as a neutral, and we could do
greater and better work in this way than we could in the event we planned.

now
He was visibly pleased at my suggestion and I believe will be more
inclined to act. What I tried to impress upon him was, that he would soon
lose the confidence of the American people, and also of the Allies, and would
fail to have any influence at the peace conference. I tried to make him see
that we would lose the respect of the world unless he lived up to the demands
he has made of Germany regarding her undersea warfare.

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He promised to come to New York April 15th to make a short talk to the Young Men's Democratic Club, an invitation extended through me. I did this at Gordon's insistence.

Mrs. Wilson told Loulie that she wished we would come to Washington to live, and said she was sorry I did not remain longer and be with the President more. She also expressed to me her lack of confidence in Lansing's judgment, saying he had gotten the President into two or three bad situations. I excused him as best I could by saying the times were so critical that it was difficult not to make mistakes.

Frank Polk and Dudley Malone were waiting when the President and Vice President finished. The President desired me to see Bernstorff and say to him that we were at the breaking point and that we would surely go into the war unless some decisive change was made in their submarine policy.

Polk said Bernstorff had returned to Washington, but he would let me know when he was going to New York again. He was doubtful as to the expediency of my seeing him. He read me some letters and reports of conversations of some of the German Embassy staff with their lady friends, which have been obtained through our Secret Service. It seems that from the Ambassador down they have affinities, and with the tapped wires, the Secret Service Corps keep in touch with all their activities. I have never approved of such methods of obtaining information even in wartime.

The Germans have changed my name from "Stayer" to "Palace". One affinity thought the situation was exceedingly dangerous and that a break was imminent, but the attaché declared that matters were not bad; that it could not be proved the Sussex was torpedoed and no trouble would come of it. They thought "Palace" would advise against a break. This shows how lacking they are in perception. I suppose they are deceived because I have been so entire-

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ly frank and have constantly given what I considered good advice. In giving them good advice, I feel I am serving my own country and doing what is best for all.

Loulie and I took the Congressional Limited for New York. I had a few minutes conversation with Senator Lodge on the way over. Dr. Grayson and Otto Carmicheal were fellow passengers and talked to me most of the way.

New York,
March 31, 1916.

There have been so many visitors and telephone calls that I have been unable to touch my accumulated mail.

Morganthau has a great idea. He wants Brandeis to be confirmed by the Senate and then decline to serve as Justice of the Supreme Court and run for the Senate against Henry Cabot Lodge. Before approaching Brandeis he wished my approval. I gave it provided he did not mention my name to Brandeis. It would be far more profitable to the President to have Brandeis in the campaign. He would make an effective force, and his resignation would be dramatic. Morganthau is planning to meet him tomorrow and make the proposal.

Sidney Brooks was my most persistent caller. I had to see him and after we had discussed his proposed cable he wanted to come back again and read it to me in its final form. I suggested that he write it here which he did laboriously. It took him something like an hour and a half to write it. He apologized by saying the environment was new, and he could not collect his thoughts well.

Kearney of the Trenton Times came at five o'clock. He wished to talk about Record's candidacy for Governor of New Jersey. Although Record is running for the republican nomination, he is so pro-Wilson that Kearney thought some good would accrue to the democrats from him.

Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher called at half past five. I wished to

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talk with him concerning Chile's attitude toward the Pan-American Peace Pact. I extracted some information from him, and I found the situation better than I had thought. The trouble has been with Ambassador Suarez and not with the newly elected Chilean officials. Suarez is to be removed and a new Ambassador appointed. I told Fletcher I would ask the President to delegate him to the task of accelerating the pact, and have Lansing direct him to take up the work at once. He is to report to Lansing and keep in touch with me. This, I think, is the easiest way to accomplish our purpose without hurting Lansing's sensibilities, and I have so written the President.

When I first suggested the plan, I accomplished within a week nearly all the work that has so far been done. If I had had two weeks longer before going to Europe, and had not been handicapped by Secretary Bryan, I am reasonably sure it would have been finished by now.

Fletcher agreed to forget everything said to him upon the subject by me, and to hear of it for the first time when Lansing approached him.

Dr. Grayson and his fiancée took dinner with us and afterward we took them to see Mrs. Fiske in "Erstwhile Susan".

April 1, 1916.

I was able to take up my correspondence today, although interrupted frequently by callers and the telephone.

Mrs. Borden Harriman came in the morning, and in the afternoon Frank Polk, H. D. Heineman, Charles R. Crane and Jas. H. Skinner called. Polk and I went over the domestic situation in so far as it related to foreign affairs. I told Polk of the agreement I had made in Paris and London. He was interested and began to understand for the first time how anxious the President was not to break with the Central Powers. However, he thought that unless he acted now as the situation demanded, he would lose all influence both at home and abroad and the

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agreement I made would come to nothing.

Henry Morganthau telephoned that he met Brandeis at New London today, and they talked for three hours over Morganthau's proposal. Brandeis did not decide whether he would act upon his suggestion, but did not absolutely decline to consider it.

The North American Review for April has the article about me written by H. H. Childers. There are some inaccuracies.

Polk talked of the activities of the Secret Service men, and is hopeful of getting something valuable soon. Bernstorff writes saying he will come over at once if I wish, otherwise, he will be here next Saturday and Sunday. I already knew he would be here Sunday through our Secret Service.

April 2, 1916.

Chas. R. Crane telephoned this morning to say that David L. Francis was with him and wished to see me. I have invited them to lunch on Tuesday. Francis sails for his new post Thursday and there are some things I would like to say to him before he goes to Russia.

We lunched with Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Brooks. The other guests were Mr. and Mrs. Burke Cochran and Mr. and Mrs. James Byrne. I had to leave before coffee was served in order to meet William Phillips, who was leaving on an early afternoon train for Washington.

Phillips is much disturbed, as indeed are all the President's friends, regarding his lack of action in the present crisis. They are afraid he will allow Germany to do pretty much as she pleases, despite all his notes of protest. Phillips begs me to come to Washington and see if I cannot move him to action. I half-way promised to go, ostensibly on other matters.

Grayson followed Phillips and he, too, is worried. He says the Saturday

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Evening Post is about to turn against the President because of his inaction, both as to Mexico and Germany. Grayson thinks the President is a man of unusually narrow prejudices and is intolerant of advice. I did not argue the matter with him as I feel that while the President is not unwilling to accept advice from me, Grayson's general characterization of him is correct. Grayson says if one urges Wilson to do something contrary to his own conviction, he ceases to have any lik-ing for that person. He does not like to meet people and isolates himself as much as anyone I have ever known.

Grayson realizes that a great crisis is impending and the President's place in history is at stake. The President's penchant for inaction makes him hesitate to take the plunge, but if he once takes it, I have every confidence he will go through with it in a creditable manner. Anyway, his immediate entourage, from the Secretary of State down, are having an unhappy time just now. He is consulting none of them and they are as ignorant of his intentions as the man in the street. I believe he will follow the advice I gave him last week, but even to me, he has not expressed his intentions. This, however, is not unusual as he seldom or never says what he will do. I merely know from past experience.

April 3, 1916.

The most important visitor today was Governor Folk who came from Washington to discuss his proposed candidacy for the nomination as Governor of Missouri. He tried to make it appear that he was running solely for the benefit of the Administration and the party, but it would surmise me if he did not have other things in mind for himself. At the moment, he desires me to get the support of the Saint Louis Republican through Governor Francis.

Cleveland H. Dodge was another visitor of interest. I spoke of my suggestion to the President concerning the appointment of a commission to mobilize our industrial forces in case of war, and we discussed the names of men

whom we thought might be available. I wish the list to be ready so that in
the event of trouble I will be able to present it to the President at once.

April 4, 1916.

I gave a small luncheon today in honor of Governor Francis. The other
guests were, Henry Morganthau, S. E. Mezes, Sidney Brooks, Charles Grasty, Louis
Wiley, Ran Stannard Baker and Chas. R. Crane. I had a curious and interesting
time with them. Each had something to say to me alone, excepting Mezes and
Brooks, and I was button-holed first by one and then the other. Baker desires
to write an article on the President and I gave him some suggestions.

We took dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Morganthau. I was surprised to find Mrs.
Morganthau strongly pro-Ally, although German born. She makes an arrangement of
the Germans in Turkey which explains her feeling toward them.

William Church

The only other guests were Mr. and Mrs. Osborn. Osborn came to discuss
State politics with me. He is opposed to Harris for Chairman of the State Com-
mittee, and wants me to interfere. I cannot make them understand that I will
not take any part in local politics.

Billy Phillips telephoned that Lansing was anxious for me to come to
Washington tomorrow in order to take up the South American Pact matter, and
also the question of German submarine warfare. I promised to go.

April 5, 1916.

I am taking the 11.08 for Washington. Dudley Malone called just be-
fore I left in order to try to straighten out the New York Chairmanship contro-
versy about which Osborn is so exercised.

The White House,
Washington.

Gordon and I arrived at 4.30 and were met by a motor from the White
House. The President insisted upon Gordon remaining as his guest with me.

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The President and I had only a few minutes conversation. Lansing came at six o'clock and we talked for nearly an hour. After the President received my letter of April 3rd, he evidently made up his mind to follow my advice and take more vigorous action, for he told Lansing to prepare a memorandum for Gerard to present to the German Government. Lansing showed me what he had drawn up. It is an exceedingly vigorous paper and one which I think the President will modify greatly before he sends it. It was well written and very much to the point. It recalls Gerard and notifies the Imperial German Government that Count von Bernstorff will be given his passports.

Lansing was so full of our troubles with Germany that I could hardly bring him down to the Pan-American Peace Pact. I finally did this, and he gave me what memoranda he had upon the subject to look over and we are to confer again tomorrow. I promised to get the President to arrange a conference for the three of us tomorrow.

Gordon, Miss Bones and I went to the theater. When we returned the President had gone to bed.

April 6, 1916.

Before the President started his dictation, we held a conference where we met in the hall just outside my room, and it lasted so long that he gave up all thought of his mail and dismissed his stenographer so we might finish.

I told him, it seemed to me, a break with Germany was inevitable. They were torpedoing boats without warning contrary to their solemn pledge not to do so, and that the Sussex case was in a way as bad or worse than the Lusitania. I definitely thought he ought to make up his mind what he intended to do and if he agreed with me that a break was inevitable, then he should prepare for it from today in order to give us the advantage of two or three weeks time to get ready before the Germans knew of our purpose.

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We discussed whether it would be advisable to give the Allies a last chance to accept our offer of intervention. There were many arguments for and against it. The suggestion was originally mine, made in my letter of April 3rd, but I was uncertain as to the advisability of doing so. He thought, too, it might cause them to think we wished them to act in order to save us. The President did not wish to indicate any weakness in this direction. And yet he thought they should know that, in our opinion, the war would last longer with us as a belligerent than as a neutral.

The President asked me to frame the despatch to Sir Edward Grey, but I yielded to him and insisted that he do it. My reasons for this have been explained before. The despatch as finally drafted by him in his own handwriting, as we call his little typewriter, is as follows:

"Since it seems probably that this country must break with Germany on the submarine question unless the unexpected happens, and since, if this country should once become a belligerent the war would undoubtedly be prolonged, I beg to suggest that if you had any thought of acting at an early date on the plan we agreed upon, you might wish now to consult with your allies with a view of acting immediately."

He wrote first, "and since if this country should once "get its teeth in", to which I objected because in a cable it would not read smoothly without proper punctuation, and I suggested using the words "become a belligerent".

I gave this cable to Gordon and had him take it to New York on the Congressional Limited for my Secretary, Miss Denton, to code and send.

The President telephoned Lansing to come to the White House at two o'clock for a conference.

Polk came and remained for an hour and a half. I will not go into the details of our conversation for it would be something of repetition. He was tell-

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ing how unsatisfactory the London Embassy was in presenting protests, or business of any kind, to the Foreign Office. He thought Page and his staff went to the Foreign Office and said, "Here is another damn fool request from our Government which you need not pay any attention to."

I told Polk in confidence, which he promised to keep, how Page felt about the State Department, and how he suggested that they should all be discharged and, for fear the new force might be contaminated by going into the same offices, a tent should be erected south of the White House and they should be broken in there. Polk seemed to find less humor in this than in other things I told him.

I took a short motor drive with my friend Alfred Millard of Omaha who is visiting Washington, and then I returned to the White House for luncheon.

At two o'clock the President, Lansing and I went into conference. We first took up the Pan-American Peace Pact and it was agreed, as the President and I had planned, to have Fletcher go immediately to work upon it after first conferring with me. This plan, as I have stated before, is a concession to Lansing, since Fletcher and I have already had our conference in New York.

We then took up the foreign situation which the President tried to evade, but which Lansing and I rather forced upon him. I did this for Lansing's sake for, as a matter of fact, I should have preferred talking to the President alone about it. Lansing showed him the draft of the letter he had shown me. The President merely glanced at it, and said he would look it over later. He caught enough of it, however, to see that it was to be our last word with the Imperial German Government.

We went over pretty much the same ground as Lansing and I did last night, Lansing doing most of the talking. Before finishing with the Pan-American Pact they began to argue about certain minor clauses, and asked my opinion as to one of them. I thought it was of no consequence and the main thing was to get Clause 2 adopted, and get it adopted quickly, and let the other clauses take care of themselves. The

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President replied, "I believe you are right and suppose we let it go that way".

When the President left, Lansing and I had a few minutes conversation alone.
After he left, I drove for an hour with the Secretary of War. I like Baker and we
got along famously. I wished to see him so as to tell him just how critical our
relations with Germany are and to suggest that he find out at once what troops would
be available for the protection of New York, Chicago and the larger centers, and
whether we had sufficient without withdrawing troops from Mexico. If there were
not sufficient, I thought the pursuit of Villa should be abandoned and our forces
be properly distributed.

I asked him to please treat my information as confidential, and to use it
merely in the way indicated. After some discussion, and he decided he would go
to New York tomorrow and confer with General Wood, and later have the Commanding
General in Chicago meet him at Cleveland so as to get the situation in the West.
I urged Baker to use a firm hand in the event trouble should manifest itself in any
way. I thought it was mistaken mercy to temporize with troubles of this sort;
that such a policy would merely cause it to grow and in the end much suffering
would ensue.

He cordially agreed to this and promised to use the iron hand. He was in
favor of giving up the Villa chase and bringing the troops back from Mexico. He
thought the purpose had been accomplished, that is, the Villistas had already been
dispersed and it was foolish to chase a single bandit all over Mexico.

I cautioned Baker, too, about mentioning General Wood to the President, tell-
ing him the President did not like Wood. I thought in this crisis Wood should be
used conspicuously, for he was known to be unfriendly to the Administration and
close to Roosevelt and republican leaders, and if the President passed him by and
trouble followed, it would invite criticism of the administration. Baker said it

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was his purpose to put pronounced Roosevelt men to the front. We went over every phase of the situation from a military viewpoint, including the militia, the police forces of different cities, etc. etc. I believe Baker is an able man than Garrison and that time will prove him so.

I had to return to the White House at 4.15 in order to meet Secretary Houston. I put the problems confronting the administration to Houston so as to get the benefit of his judgment. He knew nothing of what was going on. He thought we were moving in the right direction with Germany, but he was much opposed to withdrawing our troops from Mexico. His argument was that we had better take a gamble upon rioting than to receive the certain abuse which the bringing the troops back would entail. He thought too, that the "hyphenates" would have just cause for resentment if they saw plans were being made for their suppression. His argument was that if the troops were withdrawn from Mexico, Villa would come back and make further raids and we would have to go in again and thus indicate a weak and vacillating policy.

Secretary Lane followed Houston and gave exactly the reverse opinion. He thought Villa should not be chased any further, and that the troops should be re-called. He thought that eighty percent of the American people wanted peace at almost any price, and he doubted whether Congress or the people would sustain the President in breaking with Germany. He was very pessimistic. He thought I should be in Washington more. He said it was generally known that I was the only man to whom the President gave his inner thoughts, or in whose counsel he had any confidence. He said the Cabinet never knew anything except what they read in the newspapers, and that Lansing was considered merely a clerk.

I tried to bring him to a more cheerful frame of mind, but he was determined to see things darkly. I had to leave him to dress for dinner and meet the President a few minutes before it was ready.

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I told the President of my conversations with Houston and Lane. Here are two of the ablest men in the United States-- admittedly so-- and yet their views are totally at variance. It wearies me to have consultations where I get nothing but confusion of thought. The President was sympathetic to this view, as I knew he would be.

I told him of my conversations with Baker, Lansing, Polk, Lane and Houston, and we summed up by making Lane, Polk, Baker and Lansing for with-drawing the troops, and Houston against it. Strangely enough, just after dinner, Lane telephoned to change his views. I remembered that Houston was taking dinner with him so there was not much difficulty in finding the reason. The President had gone, but I gave this information to Mrs. Wilson to tell him when he returned.

Gregory's opinion, whom I saw later, coincided with Houston's, so the sum total was there was Lansing, Baker and Polk on the one side, and Houston, Lane and Gregory on the other. As a matter of fact, I believe it is a question of chance and either may be right. If the troops are not withdrawn and a conflict with all Mexico should come about because of their presence there, the President would be censured for permitting war with Mexico at the moment when a break with Germany was contemplated.

I spoke to the President about Morganthau and he asked me to tell him he had definitely decided to accept his resignation, and would so confirm it in writing in a few days. He did not think well of the idea of Brandeis resigning from the Supreme Court if he was once confirmed. He said it would amack too much of Hughes. This amused me.

The President had to go to another banquet, and Mrs. Wilson and I had a talk of an hour or more. We decided that the most helpful things that could be done for the President at this time, would be the elimination of

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good Josephus Daniels and Joseph Tumulty. She undertakes to eliminate Tumulty if I can manage the Daniels change. I do not know which is the more difficult feat, but I shall approach it with some enthusiasm and see what can be done.

Mrs. Wilson said the President felt somewhat less disturbed over the foreign situation, now that he had practically made up his mind. This is as I thought; it was the indecision which was giving him the worry. She spoke of the threatening letters she was constantly receiving, and she wondered whether it was increasingly dangerous to go to New York. I thought it was, and yet we arranged for them to come over on the 14th to be our guests for Friday, Saturday and Sunday.

Henry P. Fletcher called at half past nine. I read him the riot act in a few words. I told him I was entirely responsible for his having charge of the Pan-American Pact, and that I had affirmed he could close it in ten days. He rather winced at this, but thought he could make good progress in ten days. I outlined the method I considered it best to adopt, and told him to send cables in unrestricted volume if necessary, both for our Government and for the smaller republics, so that correspondence might be avoided. I requested him to do this in Lansing's name, and to keep the Secretary in touch with what he was doing, but to confer with me frequently by letter and telephone. I promised to return to Washington Tuesday to see what progress he had made, and expressed the hope we would not be disappointed. Fletcher was eager to do this work when I first spoke to him about it in New York, but I think he has some doubts now. I told the President it would take longer than ten days, but that was the limit set for Fletcher.

Gregory telephoned asking if I would not come to the Department of

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Justice tonight on my way to the train. I explained that engagements would prevent me from getting there before half past ten, but he promised to wait for me.

I asked Fletcher to try to arrange to have Eduards, the Chilean Minister at London, transferred to Washington, and to send despatches to this effect tomorrow. It will be a great help if we can have him here.

Gregory and I were in conference for an hour. He had a strange tale to tell about a man Senator Owen had brought to him this evening, who had had close business connections with J. P. Morgan & Company. He asserted that Morgan, Cortelyou, who was then Secretary of the Treasury, George W. Perkins, and a number of others, had deliberately brought about the 1907 Panic. He claimed to have documentary evidence and he desires Senator Owen to introduce a resolution in the Senate making inquiries as to the cause of that panic. Owen is willing to do this, provided the President will back him. Owen's informant declared that $48,000,000. was divided among the syndicate of which he was one. Owen states that his informant told him about the panic well before it occurred, and that he arranged for his bank in Oklahoma to put its house in order. I asked Gregory what object the man had in making an expose at this time, and was told that business differences between his firm and J. P. Morgan were at the bottom of it.

We talked of foreign affairs and of Mexico, but since I have already given his opinion about this, I shall not repeat here. I took the midnight for New York.

New York,
April 7, 1916.

The usual demands upon my time after a few days absence made the day a strenuous one. The diary, dictated from notes made in Washington, accumu-

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la
ted correspondence, telephones, telegrams and cables all contributed to my
work.

Phillips telephoned from the State Department saying a cable had
been sent to Chile regarding the transfer of the Chilean Minister from Lon-
don to Washington. He asked me to suppliment this by a private cable to
Eduardes urging him to accept.

I forgot to mention yesterday that Gregory's visit to New York re-
sulted in obtaining permission from the Presidents of the Western Union and
Postal Telegraph Companies to go through their files of the Mexican Border
stations. The unfortunate part of it is that Hearst has a leased wire
that is available from seven in the evening until midnight, and is operated
by his own staff, therefore no records are obtainable. This is something
of a tragedy, as it was felt that a charge of treason might have been made
against Hearst.

Cleveland H. Dodge and Henry Morganthau called to tell of conditions
in Turkey. There are 500,000 Turks starving and they have appealed to
the American public for aid. Dodge thinks it would be impossible to get
any response because of the feeling here against the Turks on account of the
Armenian atrocities. He and a few friends, however, have decided to give
$50,000., and notify them that it will be useless to expect other contribu-
tions. Morganthau is to see Bernstorff and urge him to get the German Gov-
ernment to care for the situation.

Otto Carmicheal came to express his belief that a little friendly
talk to some of the leaders in Wall Street might bring them around to the
President's support. I am thoroughly distrustful of Carmicheal, and I
see him merely because he us in such close touch with Tumulty, and he was
such a devoted friend of the late Tom Pence, Secretary of the National Dem-
ocratic Committee. I shall be very glad however when he takes his infor-

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mation and suggestions elsewhere.

Dudley Malone and I discussed the New York situation, but I shall refuse to do so with others unless an exceptional occasion should arise.

I wrote the President about the withdrawal of troops from Mexico.
This letter is a part of the diary. I wrote an important letter to Sir
Edward Grey, and a short note to Sir Horace Plunkett.

April 8, 1916.

Edward S. Martin was my first caller. He was afraid I would be of-
fended at the "Humiliation Number of Life" as indeed I am. Martin said he
did his best to prevent them from putting such a number out, and what he
writes editorially is rather an antidote to the balance of the edition. I
showed it later to Bernstorff and told him that Life was crazy upon three
subjects: Germany, Daniels and vivisection.

The German Ambassador arrived promptly at eleven o'clock. He re-
mained for nearly an hour. I advised him of the seriousness of the crisis.
He admitted the outlook was not promising but he was surprised to hear me
say it was as critical as it is. I made him confess that the President
could not do otherwise than break with Germany, if it was shown that pas-
senger ships were being torpedoed with warning in spite of their pledges to
the contrary.

Bernstorff says he does not understand the action of his Government
any more than we do, and I believe he is honest in this. He asked what he
could do to help matters. I advised sending a despatch to his Government
stating that Washington felt the situation to be hopeless and a break inevi-
table and imminent. That the attitude of the Reichstag and the increased
activity of the German submarines was making a break necessary, and the

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United States Government had concluded that they did not intend to hold to their promises. I also advised him to see the Secretary of State.

Bernstorff insisted that a break must not come, and that the Chancelor is sincere in his effort to bring about better relations between the United States and Germany. I told him the most infortunate part of the situation was that if we were drawn into the war now, it would prolong it indefinitely, whereas, if we continued out until mid-summer, I thought the President would intervene. He asked why he did not intervene now. My answer was we were waiting until the spring and early summer fighting had been tried out. That Germany was making her drive at Verdun which seemed to be a failure and that later the Allies would undoubtedly try their hand. If that resulted in failure, the President would feel justified in calling a halt. He was very interested in this and will doubtless communicate it to his Government.

The Ambassador expressed more than once the hope that the President would intervene. He asked me whether the President desired to break with Germany. It had been suggested that the political exigencies made it desirable for the President to do this, and he wondered if that would have any influence. I replied that I had been the adviser of many public men, and I had always insisted, as I was insisting now, that politics should have no part in decisions about public affairs. If one's personal fortune becomes entangled with one's duty, disaster is certain to result. The best politics is to serve the public best.

Roosevelt

He spoke of firebrand, bombastic, etc. etc. and he did not believe he would act very differently from the President if he were in his place.

Charles E.

I asked him if he knew Hughes' opinion regarding international affairs.

He disclaimed any knowledge of Hughes' thoughts, but said the only side light

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he had obtained upon Hughes was that on October 9th, 1914, he, Justice Hughes, had called on him, Bernstorff, to express his sympathy. I did not press him further, for I had gotten an important light upon Hughes,

Bernstorff keeps his temper and his courage, and it is impossible not to admire these qualities in him.

I have two letters from Sir Edward Grey which are parts of the diary. As also my letter to the President about them.

We dined tonight with Mr. and Mrs. Burke Cochran, and went to see Grace George in Bernard Shaw's play, "Captain Brassbound's Conversion". The other guests were Lady Colebrooke and Mr. Benjamin Guiness.

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April 9, 1916.

Sidney Brooks called and remained an hour and a half. He got some material from me for a cable, and we discussed the foreign situation pretty thoroughly. He said my frequent visits to Washington were a source of comfort to the Allies, for they had confidence in me and but little in the President. In the event of a break, he urged me to try to steer the President straight in what he said, believing he might do the right thing in the wrong way. Brooks seems anxious to serve the President and to be his friend, although he is impatient with his slowness of decision. He forgets, as do others, that the President has the responsibility and the welfare and happiness of a hundred million people largely in his hands. It is easy enough for one without responsibility to sitdown over a cigar and a glass of wine and decide what is best to be done.

In the event of a break, Brooks thought I should advise the British Government about who should take over British interests in enemy countries. I suggested that this would be impertinence. He thought otherwise, because he believed I knew more about conditions in enemy countries than any person connected with his Government. When I declined to do this, he asked if I had any objection to his cabling my conclusions without mentioning my name, further than to state that the best American opinion was, if a break came between the United States and Germany, Norway would be the best country to take charge of the interests of the Allies in the enemy countries.

In discussing the matter with him, I eliminated Spain because of the intrigue Germany is now carrying on with her. I eliminated Switzerland, Holland and Denmark for the reason they are too near Germany to assert themselves. Sweden would not do because of her pronounced pro-German sentiment

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as reflected in court and governmental circles. The South American countries are not close enough in touch with Anglo-Saxon feelings and interests. This left Norway as the only alternative. None of them, I thought, would have the power to assert themselves in the event of disagreements as to the welfare of prisoners, but Norway would at least give the Allies fair and honest reports of conditions.

Frank Polk came in the afternoon and we talked over foreign affairs for an hour. He reported that my last trip to Washington put Lansing in a thoroughly good humor, and he does not anticipate any further trouble from that source for the present at least.

I have decided to go to Washington tomorrow night instead of Tuesday morning so as to have a clear day.

April 10, 1916.

My first caller was John Hays Hammond who wanted me to use my good offices with the President to get him to speak at a meeting which "The World Court Congress" is to hold May 2nd in New York.

Martin followed. My time was taken up with him largely in denouncing Life's "Humiliation Number" which seems both unpatriotic and inexcusable.

Then came Chas. R. Crane and Norman Hapgood to say that Harper's Weekly was trembling on its feet, and they would have to throw up the sponge unless Cleveland H. Dodge and the Jones Brothers came to the rescue. Originally the three of them put in $50,000. apiece, which was promptly exhausted. Since then, Crane has put up an additional amount which makes his losses to date, $250,000. Dodge and the Jones brothers stopped when their $50,000 was gone, but Crane has continued to feed the hopper until he, too, must call a halt. They are running behind some $7000. or $8000. a month and the question is whether it is worth while to carry the paper over the campaign, or

to merge it with the Independent now. They wished me to feel out Dodge upon the subject. I told them it was not necessary, that Dodge had expressed himself so clearly the last time we were together that there was no doubt of his decision. However, I asked Dodge over the telephone and he confirmed what I had told them.

Lincoln Steffens took lunch with me. We discussed Mexico almost exclusively.

A disturbing incident this morning is a complimentary comment by Mark Sullivan in Collier's, which Louis Wiley of the Times sends me in advance of publication. It is this:

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These are the things I fear most. I hope the President is too big a man to allow them to affect him, and yet I should not want too much of this sort of comment to appear in such influential publications as Collier's.

Joseph Johnson, Tammany candidate for Postmaster, called. He said he thought in all fairness I should see him since I had been seeing his detractors. He had sense enough to remain only fifteen minutes, although I had assigned him thirty. I think I know his type which is not very high, though shrewd and aggressive.

Mr. Bridges called as a friend of Judge Seabury in order to develop whether the Administration has any candidate for Governor of New York. I assured him the President was taking no part in the selection of candidates for state offices in New York or elsewhere; That if anyone represented that they were speaking for the President, Judge Seabury might be assured from me that it was without authority.

David Starr Jordan called after dinner and remained for an hour. I got nothing new from him and told him nothing of importance myself. Henry Ford is thinking of putting up money for Jordan and, perhaps, Mr. Bryan to go to Stockholm upon some indefinite peace plan. Jordan seems to have good sense in regard to it and is not carried away by illusory hopes. I leave tonight on the 12.30 for Washington.

The White House.
Washington,

April 11, 1916.

I was met by one of the White House motors. I took breakfast alone, the President being indisposed.

At nine o'clock he came to my room and we went to his study to take under consideration a note which he wrote last night to Germany on the submarine issue. He had discarded Lansing's note entirely and had written a much abler one covering all the facts from the beginning and argu-

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ing against the use of submarines on merchantmen. I could see that the data I brought back from England, which included a very able presentation of the case by A. H. Pollen, had and also one from Sir Horace Plunkett, had had their effect.

The President's voice was weak, and he seemed not at all well, having not recovered from the digestive spell which seized him a few days ago. I objected to the last page of the note as being inconclusive, and as opening up the entire question for more argument. The President did not agree with me, but at my suggestion, cut out the last paragraph which strengthened the note somewhat. He also inserted the word "immediately" which strengthened it further. Mrs. Wilson declared it weak and unsatisfactory at the end. He patiently argued the matter with her, but refused to admit any sort of weakness in it.

His contention was that if he did as we advised, it would mean a declaration of war, and he could not declare war without the consent of Congress. I thought if he left it as it was, it would place him in a bad position, for the reason it would give Germany a chance to come back with another note asserting she was willing to make the concessions he demanded, provided Great Britain obeyed the letter of the law as well. This seeming willingness of Germany to be fair would make a large part of the American public believe the German people were being treated unfairly, and that the President was unduly insistent. He saw the danger of this, but contended that he was helpless. I urged him to keep the note as he had written it and after eliminating the entire last clause, which he did, to say if Germany declined to agree immediately to cease her submarine warfare, that Ambassador Gerard was instructed to ask for his passports. This, I told the President, would come nearer preserving the peace than his plan, because the alternative of peace

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or war would be placed directly up to Germany in this single note, whereas, the other wording would still leave room for argument and in the end, war would probably follow anyway.

Another point we discussed at much length was his promise to Senator Stone that he would not break off diplomatic relations with Germany without first notifying Congress. The President spoke with much contrition for having foolishly made such a promise, but having made it, he was determined to live up to it, both in form and spirit. This makes the situation awkward. In going before Congress and explaining the matter before he has taken any action, makes a weak statement a necessity. What I should like is for him to go before Congress after the break is made, and deliver a philippic against Germany, not indeed against the German people, but against the cult that has made this calamity possible. No one as yet has brought the indictment of civilization against them as strongly as it might be done, and I would like the President to do this in a masterly way.

We were in conference for two hours, or indeed, until the President had to leave for an eleven o'clock Cabinet meeting. He was undecided whether to read the note to the Cabinet. He said he did not care for their opinion and was afraid to trust them with it; that the contents would be in the afternoon papers if he did so. He finally decided to read them the note almost in its entirety, but as an argument he had in his own mind against submarine warfare, and not as a note which he had prepared to present Germany.

As soon as the President left, I got in touch with Ambassador Fletc her to find what progress he had been making in the South American Pact. I was disappointed to find it had gone no further when I was here last week. The Chileans are contending for this, that or the other. They want us to practically guarantee the validity of the their territorial disputes with both Peru and Bolivia.