THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY - November 11, 1990

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MR. DONALDSON: Joining us now is Mohamed Al-Mashat, the Iraqi ambassador to the United States. Welcome.

AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: And joining us in the questioning are George Will and Cokie Roberts, both of ABC News. Mr. Ambassador, we hear a lot of rhetoric these days from you and other Iraqi officials about preparations for the "mother of battles" and that the battlefield will be turned to ashes, but you don't really think that Iraq can win a war with the United States, do you? And it may not even survive a war.

AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT: Well, first of all, we don't want a war. I mean, this rhetoric, so-called rhetoric, came as a response to your threat and your assembling of massive offensive forces even before this week new deployment of forces. And so this was in response to your threat of war intimidation. And I'd like to remind you how things have developed first--and I have been saying all along for the last three months that you sent the troops under the pretext that you are defending Saudi Arabia, which I used to call the big deception, which is not. Now, this is a proof, when you are embarking upon an offensive which we call it naked aggression.

MR. DONALDSON: But no matter what you call it--

AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT: This is--yes, well--

MR. DONALDSON: If I may, Mr. Ambassador, no matter what you call it, do you now have the message that President Bush is serious?

AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT: Well, what I say, that we should negotiate, we should--we are willing to negotiate and sit and solve it on a political and diplomatic level. What are you going to gain by attacking Iraq? Is this your national interest? We feel that you are not acting upon your national interests, because if you hit Iraq, it is going to be catastrophe for everybody, including you and the whole world, and the third world. And you are going to lose all the prestige--and the morals that make a country great is moral, not its gun. You see, in our country, as well as in the world, you have gained respect since World War I when Wilson made his principles, and you are not living up to your principles.

MR. WILL: Let me ask Sam's question again. You said you don't want war. We'll grant that. You say we're not acting on our national interests. That's your opinion. Do you have any doubt that if you get into a war with the United States and its allies that you will be beaten?

AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT: Well, you are a superpower. We are a small country. But certainly--

MR. WILL: Is that a yes?

NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, INC. - (202) 682-9050

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**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** --you will be humiliated and it will be the beginning of the downfall of America.

**MR. WILL:** How will we be humiliated?

**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** Well, definitely, you have the power to level Iraq, no doubt about that. But what you are going to collect afterwards? You are going to collect the animosity of all grassroots Arabs in the whole Arab world. You are going to collect the animosity of all Muslims because you are going to attack Iraq from the Holy Land, and so this is what you are going to get in return.

**MR. WILL:** The president clearly, with the latest announced deployment, is trying to convince Iraq that the United States has the will to fight. Now, Iraq seems to divide its time between describing the United States as inherently aggressive, but in a way lacking the will to fight. Do you now believe the United States has the will to, as you say, level Iraq?

**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** Well, we have that from the beginning, that the United States came into Saudi Arabia in order to attack Iraq.

**MS. ROBERTS:** Mr. Ambassador, you say the United States has the power to level Iraq, so your country could disappear. Right now, you have people in the country who are hurting from the embargo. You are not getting the benefit of the Kuwaiti oil because of the embargo. Why not just get out of Kuwait, end all of this, not have the destruction of your country at hand?

**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** Because we will--I want you to know that we do not act under intimidation and threat. What did we do to you in order to have this fate? Have you ever thought of it? We have--

**MS. ROBERTS:** Invaded a neighbor.

**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** Well, but it is not your business to interfere and intervene between a quarrel of two countries. Did you intervene--

**MS. ROBERTS:** But now it's happened--now it's happened. You are in there, and this embargo is in place, and your people are hurting as a result of it, and you are not getting any of the benefit from having annexed Kuwait.

**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** But we wanted to have negotiation to solve all problem of the area once and for all. And we put our initiative on 12 of August, and we looked positively on President Mitterrand's initiative. Why didn't you look at that seriously and talk to us?

**MR. DONALDSON:** Ambassador, on that note, I'm going to thank you for coming in. Our time is up. Thanks for being here this morning.

**AMBASSADOR AL-MASHAT:** Thank you very much.

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MR. DONALDSON: Ambassador Mashat. Coming next, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Later, House Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin, and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell.

MR. DONALDSON: Dr. Henry Kissinger in Kent, Connecticut, good to see you this morning.

DR. KISSINGER: Good to be here.

MR. DONALDSON: Vietnam--a lot of people say that we're headed in that direction, from the standpoint of a police parallel. Do you see it that way--and, if not, why not?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't know what the parallel is supposed to be. But a myth is being created that we got into Vietnam without anybody knowing it, and we got into the Middle East without anybody knowing it. After all, 500,000 troops were sent to Vietnam, and the Congress appropriated money for it every year. The Congress was in session in August when the president sent troops into Saudi Arabia. As far as I could tell from the newspapers, there was no congressional opposition. So I think that issue is sort of a phoney.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, Doctor, if I may, there was very little congressional opposition at the outset, that's true. But don't you think this matter should be debated in a very serious way, rather than just let it slide?

DR. KISSINGER: But that's up to the Congress. Certainly it should be debated. And I think there should be--I think the administration would be well-advised to discuss it fully with Congress and to make sure that the same debate as Vietnam cannot be repeated.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you mean to discuss it with Congress or just discuss it with a handful of congressional leaders?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that really should be settled between the congressional leadership and the president. And whatever method works best I think should be adopted. But we should not get into a situation in which afterwards it can be claimed or pretended that the Congress did not know what was going on. I would like to say another thing. There is no parallel exactly with Vietnam. Vietnam had a major country at its border; Vietnam had unlimited arms supply from the Soviet Union; and the cause of the war was more ambiguous. In this case, there is clear-cut aggression. There are a thousand American hostages. There is no arms supply for Iraq. And it is, therefore, not as much an open-ended commitment.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kissinger, you were, of course, a presidential adviser and secretary of state while Vietnam was being waged and the problem of legislative consent was a festering problem.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but we inherited--George, we inherited the war. We were not in office when we got into the war.

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MR. WILL: I understand that. But given the experience you had, which was embittering and dispiriting, what is to be said against now calling Congress back in special session now so as to get some kind of specific involvement and deny Congress the ability to second-guess as a bystander later?

DR. KISSINGER: I would hope that President Bush does not go through the nightmare the Nixon administration had to go through in which everything was being second-guessed and no responsibility was taken. And I would prefer some formal congressional expression of agreement with the policy that is being pursued. But I hope, also, that the Congress, in doing this, will not produce 535 secretaries of state and defense, and show some sense for what the national interest has to be in a situation like this.

MR. WILL: Now, your understanding of the national interest is, if I understand it correctly, as follows. The pronouncement we've made having been made and the deployments having been made, the United States must, as a matter of prestige and to maintain its force in the world, achieve its objectives--including, you say, in this morning's Washington Post--including its arms control objectives.
Can you make clear what you think America's objectives are, including arms control?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I said this from the beginning. Once 200,000 troops were sent there, we could not withdraw these troops without achieving our objectives, without the collapse of our entire position in the Islamic world and the high probability of a much more damaging war. These additional troops just bring matters to a head, and actually in my view make war less likely rather than more likely. Our objectives are those that have been unanimously expressed by the United Nations--total withdrawal from Vietnam--from Kuwait; replacement of the government--reinstitution of the government; and release of the hostages.

MR. WILL: But I'm focusing--

DR. KISSINGER: And there is an arms control objective of a military balance in the area so that we can withdraw after this, and do not leave Iraq in a position to repeat what it has done.

MR. WILL: But that means the United States is, in your understanding of it, rationally committed, logically committed, to some form of action that degrades substantially Saddam Hussein's military arsenal, is it not?

DR. KISSINGER: Or a negotiation which brings this about.

MS. ROBERTS: Isn't this how we got in trouble in the first place, Dr. Kissinger? After all, it was in buoying up Iraq against Iran, to keep a balance of power in the Gulf region, that he became as strong as he became. Isn't this question of keeping a balance of power in the Gulf just something that we are just going to keep getting in trouble over?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think ideally we should bring about a situation in which Iraq's offensive capability is reduced but in which we do not create such a vacuum that some other nation like Iran--

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MS. ROBERTS: But how we do that? Once we go in there and decide to bomb Iraq back into the stone age, how do we--

DR. KISSINGER: Nobody says--well, nobody--

MS. ROBERTS: But if we don't do that, then we're talking about a ground war with a loss of
a lot of American lives.

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, nobody says we should bomb them back into the stone age. When this whole thing started, I said we should conduct, if there is a war--we should conduct surgical operations. Everybody had a merry old time with the phrase "surgical," but what it means is to do what is necessary to achieve the reduction of Iraq's offensive capability.

I'm not very much in favor of a large ground attack against fortified positions in Kuwait. That should be done only as an absolutely last resort.

MR. DONALDSON: Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much for coming in. It's always good to see you on the Brinkley show.

DR. KISSINGER: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: When we return, we'll be joined by Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

(Announcements)

MR. DONALDSON: Congressman Les Aspin in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, good to see you.

REP. ASPIN: Good morning.

MR. DONALDSON: Thanks for coming in.

REP. ASPIN: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: The president has ordered a near doubling of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf by about the first of the year. Was this the right thing to do?

REP. ASPIN: Yes, I think it was. I support it, I think, for two reasons: number one, convince Saddam Hussein that he'd better get out, that this whole thing is very serious; but, secondly, if we do go to war, the more troops you've got there, the quicker the job gets done and the less casualties that will result. So I think--yes, sir?

MR. DONALDSON: Well, I was going to say, if Saddam Hussein doesn't get out of Kuwait, does that mean to you that we will go to war--and, if so, should we do it?

REP. ASPIN: I think that the answer is yes. I think that we definitely will, if there's no

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progress; and I think that's the right policy to adopt.

MR. WILL: Given your opinion now, Congressman, let me ask you two somewhat technical questions. First of all, it's been said that the troops there will not be rotated out until the crisis is over. What does that tell the American people? What does that tell you about the time table that we're on?

REP. ASPIN: I think the combination of sending more troops and the no-rotation policy says that the critical crunch-point comes sometime between the end of January and probably the first of March. Somewhere in there is the time that there will be a decision made, probably an ultimatum delivered to Saddam Hussein--and, if he doesn't respond, I think it probably means war.

MR. WILL: In your capacity as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, you're in charge of buying the military assets that we've now deployed. Among the discussions of our options, there has been emphasis on the ability to achieve many, perhaps all of our objectives, cleanly, with minimal casualties, from the air with our smart munitions. We have, however, been disappointed by the role of air power since the end of the First World War through Vietnam.

Do you think that the clean, relatively bloodless, low-casualty air option is realistic?

REP. ASPIN: I think it's a very tough call. I've listened to an awful lot of briefings in the last weeks about how you use air power and how it would work, and things. There's a lot of good arguments that this is different, that we're fighting in the desert, there's no camouflage, there's no cover, that air power here could be decisive in a way in which it was not in Vietnam or the other circumstances. But the difficulty with it is, I don't think you can count on it. I mean, we may get lucky--all those projections may turn out to be true. It may be very quick and very painless and very bloodless. But I don't think any adviser could really tell the president that this is definitely going to happen. I think you have to--if you decide to go to war, you have to make that decision consistent with the expectations that it really will be a costly effort.

MS. ROBERTS: But given that, you now have combat reserves being called up, your Army--I don't know what your briefings have said, some of the information we have is that the Army is really not prepared to go into a long-term combat situation--does that mean going to a draft? And do you think this country is ready to go to a military draft to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait?

REP. ASPIN: I don't think it's a draft situation at this point, Cokie. I think that what you're talking about is sending a large number of troops there to do the job in a relatively quick amount of time. The expectations were that the call-up or the additional troops there would be somewhere on the order of two to three more divisions. As a matter of fact, it was almost double that. This is a major addition of forces. And I think it's--the object is that, if you have to go war--and I say I think that's still the last option and people are trying to get there some other way--but I think that if you go to war, they want to make it quick and they want to make it massive firepower, a massive amount of forces so that it happens quickly.

MS. ROBERTS: Even without a draft, do you think that the American people are ready to see thousands of Americans dead to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait?

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REP. ASPIN: I think that's an important question that needs to be debated. My view is that this policy that we're embarked on is essentially the correct policy; and we always knew that, in the end, if it came to it, war was the final option. It ought to be the final option. You ought to try to embargo; you ought to try diplomatic persuasion--you ought to try a lot of things before you come there.

But if it comes to that and war is the only option, if Saddam Hussein just will not move, my choice will be, yes, that we should go to war.

MS. ROBERTS: One of the reasons that you've been saying that is that you have felt strongly not only that we should go--that we should achieve the objectives the president has outlined, but you've said you think we should go beyond that, that we should get Saddam Hussein either out of Iraq or kill his military, one way or the other, not go back to the status quo ante.

I don't understand why it's better, then, to get into bed with the leader of Syria, with the current rulers of China, in order to achieve that objective. Aren't we just creating new problems for ourselves in the region?

REP. ASPIN: Yes, I think we've got to be careful. I think one of the side effects--well, let me put it this way. What we tend to is we tend to demonize one person, and then put all of our forces and make unholy alliances in order to get rid of that person. And then all of a sudden we find ourselves (having) created a monster.

Clearly, when we opposed Iran, we sided with Iraq; and, after that, we find ourselves with Saddam Hussein. If we put together this coalition to go after Saddam Hussein, the next person in line might be Assad, the leader of Syria.

MS. ROBERTS: And do our boys--and girls--have to go after each one of those people? Do we have to lose American lives?

REP. ASPIN: I think it requires a certain amount of skill here and a certain amount of diplomacy. But I think the collective effort that we're engaged on here is the right approach. I mean, I think working through the U.N., working through the collective security, if there is a vacuum, or even if there isn't a vacuum after this crisis is over, it would be my expectation that there is probably some kind of a U.N. force would have to go into that region, and maybe the U.S. would be part of it and maybe not. But it would involve a lot of countries.

MR. WILL: Congressman, you said a moment ago to Cokie that these are questions that ought to be debated. They're not being debated. You are in Milwaukee and 434 of your colleagues are away.

Is this not a perfect example of a time when Congress should be called into session, as the president has the power to do, and as Mr. Foley and Mr. Mitchell provided in their adjournment resolution last month have the power to do--to call Congress back and debate this now?

REP. ASPIN: I think that we probably shouldn't do it now, George, because I think Congress does not have very useful debates about hypothetical situations. If you had a debate now about the possible use of military force at the end of January, I don't think you'd find it very productive.

But let me put it this way. I think that if the decision is made to use military force, and you've got something specific, that is the time to put it before Congress.

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MR. DONALDSON: Well, put it before Congress. If it comes to war, should Congress be the one to decide? Or are you content to let the president decide?

REP. ASPIN: No, I think Congress ought to decide.

MR. DONALDSON: With a formal vote, or just an informal consultation?

REP. ASPIN: No, I think with a formal vote. I think if you're going to go the route, which it looks like we're going to go the route of the U.N. under Article 42, getting a formal vote in the United Nations of the U.N. Security Council to go to war, you clearly--how can you not, then, ask for a formal vote of the Congress not to go to war? But I think in both cases you're going to have a tough time dealing with the hypothetical. I don't think you're going to get a U.N. resolution to approve some kind of hypothetical use of force in January. I don't you can get it in Congress. But when you come down to it, something specific, we ought to debate it and vote it.

MR. DONALDSON: Okay, thanks very much, Congressman Aspin. It's been very informative. We appreciate your coming in from Milwaukee.

REP. ASPIN: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: We'll be back with Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell in just a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Mitchell, welcome, good to see you.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Thank you, Sam, my pleasure to be here.

MR. DONALDSON: Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution says Congress has the power to declare war. What does that mean to you in this present instance?

SENATOR MITCHELL: It means that Congress and only the Congress can commit the United States to war. The president has no legal authority--none whatsoever--to commit the United States to war. And if there is to be a war in the Persian War or any place else, it requires a formal act of Congress to commit the United States to it.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me give you a situation.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Now, if I could just say, obviously the president has the authority to deploy forces and to respond to attack or to defend American interests and American lives. I don't mean to suggest he doesn't have that right.

MR. DONALDSON: Let me just give you a for-instance. You remember the Tonkin Gulf, the

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C. Turner Joy, the Maddox--the two destroyers out there that were, it was said, fired upon. What if, in fact, U.S. forces are fired upon in some incident? The question--the president has the power, I suppose, to respond. Does he have the response all the way to Baghdad, to level Iraq?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Well, obviously, the president does have the authority to deploy forces, and American forces always have the right of self-defense, as do all forces under such circumstances.

MR. DONALDSON: But can we expand a right to self-defense to an offensive operation against Iraq?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Well, obviously there's no useful purpose in speculating on any number of hypotheticals about what may or may not occur. We'll know it when we see it; and the fact is that the Constitution is very clear--explicit, indeed--the president has no legal authority to commit the United States to war.

MR. WILL: The Constitution may be clear; so is history. And the president rightly says history is replete with examples-- the most recent, perhaps, being Panama--of presidents not going well beyond deploying forces but putting them into combat without the consent of the Congress. You're not disputing that, are you?

SENATOR MITCHELL: No, I'm not disputing that.

MR. WILL: From Jefferson through Bush.

SENATOR MITCHELL: That's right.

MR. WILL: Now, Public Law 93-148, War Powers Act, refers to "situations where imminent involvement and hostilities is clearly indicated." This week, the president, in calling up the additional forces, said it was to make an offensive action possible. The New York Times this morning quotes officers on the ground telling their men to be ready for offensive action within months.

Does that qualify as a situation where "imminent involvement" in the hostilities is clearly indicated and, therefore, triggering the War Powers Act?

SENATOR MITCHELL: The president, when he initially made the deployment to Saudi Arabia, explicitly wrote to the Congress stating that hostilities were not imminent; and we expect to hear from him shortly in that regard with respect to this deployment.

MR. WILL: What if you don't? In your judgment, independent of a letter from the president--in your judgment, are the terms of the War Powers Act now triggered?

SENATOR MITCHELL: No, they're not. I don't think that is the circumstance. I think this is a case where the intention is to use the threat of war to prevent war; and I hope it does succeed in that respect. But, if war is to come, as I've said earlier, then the Congress, and only the Congress,

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MR. DONALDSON: How can he threaten something that he doesn't have the right, according to you, to initiate? How can he threaten war when only you, the Congress, have the right to declare it?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Because the action now does not preclude the--

MR. DONALDSON: He threatens it in your name, but you haven't voted.

SENATOR MITCHELL: But the action now does not preclude a subsequent affirmation by the Congress of the administration policy.

MS. ROBERTS: Senator, hasn't the Congress really ducked this? The truth is, is that in the weeks between the invasion of Kuwait and the adjournment of the Congress, there was a desire not only not to debate the War Powers Act, but even to duck a resolution one way or the other. And there was a lot of discussion in back rooms about not voting for anything--that it might be politically dangerous down the road. I mean, does Congress really want to take the responsibility for war?

SENATOR MITCHELL: With all due respect, the premise of your question is incorrect. There not only was a debate; we voted and passed a resolution which proclaimed support for the president's actions taken to date in the Persian Gulf-but made clear that support for prior actions is not blanket approval for all future actions. So there was a debate and a resolution adopted.

MS. ROBERTS: The resolution came after lots of private conversations in back rooms, though.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Well, that's not uncommon. That happens on almost every piece of legislation.

MS. ROBERTS: Fine. But the question was there, with a lot of people talking--both on and off the record--about a desire not to have fingerprints on this operation, and that the Congress was not really eager to sign on to having American troops in a situation that could get nasty. I mean, how much does Congress want to take responsibility?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Cokie, private discussions occur on almost every bill considered by the Congress, and statements on or off the record by individual members of Congress occur with respect to any legislation. I don't think that can be taken as a statement of congressional intent.

MS. ROBERTS: But do they want to take responsibility?

SENATOR MITCHELL: I think we are required to take responsibility, and we will take responsibility, if it comes to that. I think there should be a full and vigorous debate, if a decision is made to commit the United States to war.

I take it, from the statements by the administration and the president, that that decision has not yet been made; and, until it is made, then this is speculation.

MR. WILL: Don't you really mean if a decision is taken to ask Congress to commit the United

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States to war?

SENATOR MITCHELL: No, that's not what I mean; I meant what I said.

MR. DONALDSON: So you leave it to the president?

SENATOR MITCHELL: No, I don't leave it to the president.

MS. ROBERTS: Sort of an ex post facto debate.

MR. DONALDSON: You said, if the decision is made, the decision being made. Who makes it?

SENATOR MITCHELL: No, Congress and only the Congress can make it. What I've said is--

MR. DONALDSON: So that George is correct--if he decides to ask Congress.

SENATOR MITCHELL: I'll repeat what I said earlier. I take this to be the use of the threat of war to prevent war; and there is no final decision made to commit the United States to war, insofar as I am informed by the administration.

MR. DONALDSON: But if Bush makes a decision to commit the United States to war--

SENATOR MITCHELL: Then he must come to Congress and ask for a formal declaration.

MR. DONALDSON: And if he doesn't get it?

SENATOR MITCHELL: If he doesn't get it, then there is no legal authority for the United States to go to war.

MR. DONALDSON: And he can't.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Of course. That's the Constitution. People have asked me--I was asked yesterday--isn't that inconvenient for the president? My answer is, of course, it is; the Constitution imposes a great many inconveniences on those in power in this country.

MR. WILL: The president can at any time call Congress back into session.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Yes.

MR. WILL: But in your adjournment resolution, you and Speaker Foley made provision explicitly for the two of you, in consultation with Republican leaders, to call Congress back into session.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Yes.

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MR. WILL: Now, that indicates that you might do it on your own.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Yes.

MR. WILL: What might cause you to do that, short of the president saying come back and give me permission? And, second, what is to be said against, now, this week before Thanksgiving, having a debate on this?

SENATOR MITCHELL: What would, in my judgment, necessitate Congress reconvening is either an act of war or a decision by the president to engage in an act of war, in either of which cases, congressional approval would be required under the Constitution. I do not know that either of those--first off, of course, there's been no act of war. And, secondly, insofar as I am advised, no decision has been to commit the United States to that.

MR. WILL: Address the second half of the question, though. What's to be said against calling the members back? I mean, it's essentially the Congress that's coming back in January, anyway.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Because I think, as Representative Aspin rightly said, you're dealing with a hypothetical situation. We take it to be the president--again, I repeat--using the threat of war to prevent war. I hope it succeeds.

MR. WILL: Would that threat not be more credible, and hence more conducive to security in the long run, if Congress came back and said we affirm this threat?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Well, it might be, but I don't think we ought to engage the Congress or the United States in hypothetical discussions about things like war.

MS. ROBERTS: But, Senator, wouldn't it also--

MR. DONALDSON: Senator, are you going to see the president this week?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: What day, and what is the purpose of the meeting?

SENATOR MITCHELL: We were asked to meet with the president on Wednesday. I believe it's further consultation with the congressional leadership, in which the president has previously engaged. We had a meeting a couple of weeks ago.

MR. DONALDSON: Will you tell him to his face that you believe Congress is the one that must declare war, and he has no right to commit U.S. troops unless that happens?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Oh, yes, I've told him that before.

MR. DONALDSON: You have?

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SENATOR MITCHELL: Oh, sure. There's no question about that.

MR. DONALDSON: What did he say to that?

SENATOR MITCHELL: I also want to say: read the Constitution.

MR. DONALDSON: What did he say to you?

SENATOR MITCHELL: Oh, I think the president understands the Constitution. What he is concerned about--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, did he say to you that he--did he promise--because Secretary Baker, in public, on Capitol Hill, pointedly would not promise. He said it would give you, Congress, a blank check.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Give Congress a blank check?

MR. DONALDSON: That's what he said.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Well, the Constitution assigned certain powers to the legislative and certain powers to the executive branch.

MR. DONALDSON: Cokie, very quickly.

SENATOR MITCHELL: In this case, the Constitution is very clear now. I want to emphasize, Sam, so that there is no misunderstanding of my point: clearly, the president has expressed concern, and I believe appropriately so, about American lives and the protection of American interests in the Persian Gulf and in other places. He possesses, under the Constitution, the authority to deploy American forces, and has a responsibility to protect those lives and interests. And I don't mean to suggest that we are in any way saying that he can't take action, should an emergency arise, or should an attack occur, or should American lives be lost or in danger.

What I'm saying is that, absent those events, if there is a specific, conscious decision by the president to proceed to undertake a military attack upon Iraq, then that is an act of war which requires the Congress to give a formal declaration of assent.

MR. DONALDSON: Thank you very much, Senator Mitchell.

SENATOR MITCHELL: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: I wish we had more time--

SENATOR MITCHELL: I do, too.

MR. DONALDSON: --because this is an important subject. Thank you for coming today.