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to be one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of American resources. Just
as internally the result has been to create a political and economic structure
of great tensile strength, so externally American thought tends to create an
atmosphere of great gravitational attraction. Not the least of this attraction
lies in the fact that American intellectual life tends to seek and rapidly recog-
nize intellectual achievement abroad; the foreigner, as he increasingly finds
his ideas welcomed here, increasingly seeks to find common ground and
foothold in the unorganized, undisciplined but, on the whole, hospitable
American intellectual world. To have been cut off from Western intellectual
life, and peculiarly American intellectual life, was a major cause of the
Polish and also of the Hungarian revolution last year. Ambassador Bowles
has testified to the intense interest in American intellectual life within the
Soviet Union; the cases of Latin America and of Japan are, of course, common-
place.

IV (d)

Military Capabilities

The military potential of the United States is elsewhere reported on.
It may be estimated as roughly equal to that of the Soviet Union; probably
somewhat greater, because of America's vastly greater economic development.
The excess of American productivity over the Russian is balanced in part by
the higher non-military internal needs of the United States; these are not

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merely required to maintain the American standard of living, but are also
themselves part of the economic process (for example, labor requires auto-
mobiles and gasoline to get to its jobs). Possibly also the American econ-
omy is physically more highly vulnerable to attack than the relatively de-
centralized and sparsely flung Russian plants; this, however, is only a
guess.

Potential is one thing; readily available military power is another.
Neither for offense nor defense has the United States made any attempt to
bring its presently available military power anywhere near its potential.
Probably it should not do so. There is, probably, a substantial balance be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States in terms of modern capacity,
and a fair chance that the United States is slightly ahead for the time being
in that respect. Again, no one really knows.

What the United States does not possess, apparently, is readily avail-
able striking power for small-scale action. This is in part due to the fact
that there is no well crystallized military strategy for handling "local"
situations. The United States does not possess any military weapon compara-
ble to the British nineteenth century naval technique for controlling or dealing
with localized situations. Nor, probably, can such technique be developed
in the absence of an overwhelming American superiority in the field of massive
bombing. The British "small wars" of the nineteenth century were possible
largely because, having overwhelming naval preponderance, she could prevent

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intervention by any other power save where geography permitted the latter to deploy large bodies of troops on land. At the moment, the United States has no comparable capacity to prevent another power, say the Soviet Union or, in certain areas China, from intervening directly or indirectly save by threatening massive retaliation, with the unlimited risk which that implies. Equally, the United States, despite its obvious power, is not so overwhelmingly superior in massive bombing capacity that she could necessarily inhibit intervention by others by direct threat.

Nor, technically, has any means been developed by which the United States could "defend" any territory outside her own borders. (This is a crucial point in alliance policy.) What she can do is to counter-attack, and thereby put an aggressor in great hazard. But this is not the same as being able to keep an enemy from destroying a particular area. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to threaten an attack against Great Britain, there is no present way by which the United States could prevent almost unlimited havoc there. She could merely take a fearful revenge and, perhaps, win the ensuing war. There is no uniformity of opinion among experts as to the result of using "little" atomic weapons in local actions. The only conclusion is that, at the present juncture of affairs, either attacking or defending involves commitment to risks of unpredictable proportion.

The conclusion must be that the chief present value of American military capabilities is negative rather than positive: the existence of her capability,

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as things now stand, tends to inhibit action by the only other power capable of challenging where such action involves risk of general war. On the other hand, in General Maxwell Taylor's words, the existence of such a situation means that the United States, and probably the Soviet Union, as well, will "accept" provocation without going to war which in earlier days neither would permit.

This forces consideration of what is in fact a military capability though not usually so regarded -- "para-military" operations. These at bottom consist in organizing and arming of segments of local populations in other countries for the purpose of enabling them to control the government and resources of such countries. In this form of operation, the Soviet Union and China are obviously far better equipped than the United States in most areas. Creation, in many parts of the world of Communist political organization, accompanied by secret or open supply of Soviet-controlled arms, technicians and guerilla leaders represent a military capacity presently available to the Communist world for which the United States has no adequate counterpart.

The American response has been an attempt to extend her own military capabilities by overt political-military alliances, in which the arms and armed forces of other nations are coordinated with our own. For defensive purposes a high degree of coordination between American armed forces and the armed forces of the other countries of the Western Hemisphere (Treaty of Rio de Janeiro; Canadian-American Defense Treaty) already exists. For defense

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and if need be for striking purposes, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization extending from Turkey to Norway is designed to set up a like coordination. Less directly, support by the United States of the Bagdad Pact countries and supply of arms to them is designed to accomplish such an end. So also do various arrangements in the Far East. Obviously these arrangements are just as valid (and no more) as the conviction among the associates that they must all act together, and their willingness in time of crisis or necessity to do so.

The history of alliances makes it sufficiently clear that too great reliance cannot be placed upon such arrangements where the survival of a component nation cannot be assured. Equally, whether the para-military arrangements worked out in the Communist regime have any greater tensile strength is, of course, questionable. *Prima facie* they would seem to be subject to much the same weakness. The Korean War ended in a stalemate with North Korea holding substantially the area with which she began; but the North Korean state had virtually ceased to exist, becoming (in substance) a province of Communist China. Because the Communist para-military organizations have frequently not been based heavily on nationalism but rather on the spread of Communist dogma, the fact that the "nation" (North Korea, Syria, Indochina or Laos) may not survive, may be less influential in determining action by para-military Communist organizations in those countries. On the other hand, the factor of national loyalty in most areas has a higher "determinative" value; this has proved the case in the Iron Curtain countries and may prove true in the Near East.

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American humanitarianism places the United States at some disad-
vantage in dealing with a system not highly affected by that motive. The
objective of the United States involves not merely her own survival but the
survival of all countries. Dogmatic Leninist Communism would be much
more prepared to sacrifice the entire population of an associated nation --
possibly even a substantial part of its own population -- if its leaders con-
sidered that the result would be to extend the true faith as they see it.
The purely military burden on any group directed by the United States is
thus greater. On the other hand, both Russian-led and Chinese-led Com-
munism is likely to be weakened over the long-run by the willingness of the
central unit to sacrifice other people's lives. Few people are so fanatic
in their devotion to Communist principles that they accept, philosophically,
the possibility of being sacrificed _in toto_ to Communist ends. This may ac-
count in part for the tendency of the Communist group of nations to break;
in any event, it is a subtraction from the ability of either the Soviet Union
or China to increase their own military potential by inducing other peoples
to act in common with them.

In summary, American military capability is great and its potential far
greater. Both have been multiplied up to now by a substantial degree of
ability to induce common action by other governments. The tensile strength
of the areas or groups thus acting or purporting to act together as a military
unit is untested and open to some question. Clearly, American military

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capability (thus multiplied by a factor of assent to common action outside
the United States) is not a "thing in itself": it is a result, both at home and
abroad of a synthesis of ideas and a community of objectives. Men do not
risk the lives of themselves and their families, and the existence of their
countries merely for an "alliance," but rather from deep conviction as to
what makes life worth living. The present problem appears to be to give to
the entire free world a tensile strength comparable to that which the United
States had developed, and to add, as opportunity permits, an increasing
number of peoples to the free world organism.

Judged by current result, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States
has recently made great headway under present conditions. The current test
of the para-military capability of the Soviet Union is probably going forward
in the Middle East now, just as the current test of Chinese para-military
capacity is going on from Malaya to Indonesia and the Far East. Translating
American military capability to para-military tactical force to meet these
tests is one great and unsolved current problem. But this in turn results from
another unsolved problem -- that of attaining a firm consensus with the other
peoples of the free world on values which must be defended to the end.

American objectives are themselves one of the sources of American
capacity in a world of conflict. From them in part is derived the dynamic
force-in-being which is the United States. From them also are derived certain
enduring American objectives in international action. These in turn develop

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American capabilities for international action, economic, intellectual and military. Leadership within the United States, and of the United States on the world scene, can enhance these capabilities.

All of them underline the necessity of wisdom to know, resolution to do, and skill to work out the problems, great and small, of American foreign policy. Unquestionably America has unrivalled potential for moving towards her great objectives. Skill in finding ways and means, in a world groping for new ways and new means as presently will appear, is perhaps a major necessity.

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CHAPTER III

TWENTIETH CENTURY REALIGNMENTS IN POWER AND PRODUCTION:
FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHIC GROUPINGS OF NATIONS

I

Introductory

A result of the deep currents noted in Chapter I, and of the dynamism of the United States noted in Chapter II, and of the polarization exercised by the Soviet Union, has been a remarkable change in the norms of international action. At base, these are probably reactions to the inadequacy of the nation-state unit as a tool for meeting twentieth century necessities. The product has been a series of groupings under various forms and arrangements, dealing with subject matter never before dealt with in modern history.

Until the close of World War II, nations were grouped chiefly by simple geographic constraint or alliances of states. Primarily they were brought together under and into their respective empires, their grouping having been usually compelled by military force or through colonial extension. (The exception was the Western hemisphere with its odd, tenuously held feeling for a Western "community of nations.")

Empires themselves allied for common purposes; the combinations were primarily military, for defense or offense, or both. The Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, Imperial Russia) came into existence to balance the Triple

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Alliance (Imperial Germany, Imperial Austria, Royalist Italy). For practical purposes, each group of empires was able to draw or constrain smaller empires into its general grouping as Germany coerced Turkey into its orbit, or as the natural forces and geography of diplomacy and pressure brought Belgium and Portugal into the British-French sphere; and so forth. The world dealt with and through these units, empires or nation-states, on a flat national plane.

Half a century later the situation has become vastly more complex.

True, nation-states still group together: the Organization of American States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Bagdad Pact countries represent such groups. The Soviet Union has purportedly worked out such a group through the Warsaw Pact, though in this case it is not easy to distinguish between the resulting organism and straight old-style empire. Even the Soviet Union has to feel for grouping outside her strictly imperial sphere: in 1956 she made and continues to make an attempt to set up a "community" of Communist nations which would include Yugoslavia and presumably China.

I - (a)

New Bases of Grouping

Many twentieth-century arrangements of nation-states have the appearance of the old nineteenth century nation-state alliance groups. Analysis

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shows that many of them have other bases as well; also, that quite different
kinds of groups are in formation. Nation-states in a sense are beginning to
slice themselves into functional segments. A grouping for defense (for
example, NATO) does not preclude a slicing off by component states of speci-
fied economic functions (say production of coal and steel) and forming from
the slices a grouping which does not engage the entire nation-state but merely
specific functions of it.

President Eisenhower proposed exactly such a grouping when he advo-
cated a "community" for expansion of peaceful atomic development, whereupon
Europe worked up the project of Euratom. These are merely later developments
of earlier and cruder attempts to accomplish like objectives. The wheat
agreement, the sugar quota agreements, and so forth, are examples. France
or Germany may thus be members of NATO: a nation-state defense grouping.
Segments of them (their coal production, their steel production, and so forth)
find their way into the coal and steel "community" with its capital at Luxem-
bourg, carrying on functions which formerly were reserved to the sovereignties
of states. Persistent pressure exists for the creation of regional currency
unions involving the grant to some non-nation-state authority of control over
banking and credit; and so forth. It is clear that we are entering a phase in
which the nation-state is no longer the sole possible unit. Even more remark-
able, we are entering a phase in which all the attributes of a nation-state

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need not be taken together: community of action may exist with respect to
some of them only.

Of all developments in the management of international affairs, this is
the most striking. From it comes possibilities of development of action barely
suspected in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

1 - (b)

"Private" (Non-Statist) Groupings: The International Corporation

Least noticed, but perhaps most dynamic, is a variety of grouping rela-
tively unknown, or at any rate, little examined by students of international
affairs. These are the great private corporations whose operations are (and
in many cases must be) international in scope.

For the fact is that both in organization and operation a considerable
and essential part of the world's economic activities is carried on, and will
continue to be carried on, and probably in the immediately foreseeable future
must be carried on, by private (that is to say, non-statist) corporations.
Their performance of function is essential to the life of many, perhaps most,
nations. Their function cannot be carried out except in more than one nation-
state, frequently a considerable number of countries. The most obvious group-
ing of this kind has taken place through the great producers and distributors
of oil, a present necessity for the economic life of every non-primitive country;

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this, but though the most spectacular, is by no means the only activity fall-
ing into this new category.

In theory, the great international oil companies (a galaxy) are all
basically "national." This means merely that the corporate form of the con-
trolling parent in each case proceeds from a charter granted in the United
States or Great Britain or the Netherlands, as the case may be, and that their
head offices, most of their directors and presumably (though not necessarily)
most of their stockholders are located in these countries. Therefore it is said
that Standard Oil of New Jersey is an "American" interest; Shell a "British"
interest; and so on. Actually, this "nationalism" of the international corpora-
tion is so vividly modified by necessity that though it is still an element, it
is only a part and increasingly not a controlling part of the motivation and
decision-making actual entity which we here call an "international" corpora-
tion.

As usual, the reason is not theory but practical inevitability.

Standard Oil of New Jersey, for example (its subsidiaries are here
included under the name) produces oil in many parts of the world including
the United States. It was organized here; its stockholders and head offices
are here. But because it produces great quantities in other countries (of
which Venezuela is a good illustration), it becomes a powerful, if not a decisive
factor in the economic life of those countries. That power at once involves
itself in responsibility. In handling its schedules of production, development,

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distribution, and so forth, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey _must_ think of the "interests" of Venezuela as well as of the "interests" of the United States. Presumably the British companies which produce heavily in Iraq, Bahrain and the Persian Gulf _must_ think of the "interests" of those countries. Failure to do so at its crudest might produce political repercussions ending their capacity to produce in these countries. Less crudely, narrowly nationalist United States or British operation might produce depression, inflation, instability and so forth. In a staff conference of one of these companies, the company manager of operations in Iraq or Venezuela not only can but must speak for the interests (up to a certain point) of Iraq or Venezuela -- or he is a bad manager.

It is well enough to say the company is "American;" or "British."
But it is factual to say that the entity must compose diversities, adjust con-
flicts of interests, and make arrangements to make the entire operation toler-
able, and, if possible, attractive and fertile for all the countries within range
of its interests. It must do this in the interest -- if one chooses -- of the
United States (if it is an American company) -- but the "interest of the United
States" is that the interest of Venezuela or Iraq shall be so consulted and so
satisfied that the operation goes on. One might even state that there is and
can be no clearly superior interest of one country in which the corporation
operates as against another. "National interest," if unduly pushed, can
create a situation in which the operation ceases or is imperiled. Neither the

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corporation nor the countries involved can really accept the breakdown of the
system.

The three principal American copper companies, for example, hold
much the same position in respect to copper production in South America
(notably Chile and Peru); the United Fruit Company is in that position in
Central America and much of the Caribbean area. British-controlled copper
companies have a similar relation to parts of Africa. On the continent of
Europe (where the problem is acute because of the multiplicity of nation-states,
their small area, their relatively small markets, and their relative poverty
of natural resource), the great manufacturing companies have been forced into
international groupings, usually by way of cartel arrangements.

Vivid arguments have been made that these arrangements should not
have come into existence; that the sole motive is that of making maximum
profit; that the system is imperialist as well as money-grabbing, and so forth.
There is some historical basis for many of these charges. Yet the fact also
is that no one has yet been able to work out any other solution -- unless the
Coal and Steel Community and Euratom may be said to offer a substitute. Of
many complaints which have been made with or without justification, one has
not and cannot be made: it cannot be said the system of private groupings
through corporations or cartels did not work. It did work. Complaint (other
than by theorists) is commonly directed not to whether these organisms should
exist, but rather to the quality of the performance they have turned in --
everything considered.

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Of interest is the fact that in the Communist complex of nations almost exactly similar arrangements are being made, though the vehicle is not the "international corporation" or "cartel" but the "Soviet Commissariat" or "state trust" for this, that or the other commodity or service, whose international arrangements are as widespread within the Communist area of influence as those of any private corporation.

This report is neither the time nor the place to elaborate on the detail of these non-statist organizations nor to analyze the upset of international theory which result from them. It is enough here to indicate their enormous scope; to underline the fact that not only they do exist but that great nation-states have come to rely on their continued existence and would be crippled perhaps to impotence if they did not exist; and that in the foreseeable future no substitute for them appears probable.

They are, in fact, a part of the process of striating or segmenting various functions of nation-states, and regrouping these into functional aggregates no longer limited to the boundaries of any one nation-state. These aggregates operate as a unity, though they extend into many nation-states at the same time. They are part of the lives of these states and necessary to them, and they add certain national flavors to them. They, in the long run, and in the short run as well, must find a common, which means an international or supranational base, throughout the entire operation, more or less satisfying all of the nation-states in which they operate. It is, fundamentally, no more

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difficult to think of Standard Oil of New Jersey (American) or International
Nickel Company (Canadian) or Anaconda Copper Company (American) or
N. V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken (Netherlands) or Shell Oil Company
(British) as "quasi-sovereign" entities than it is to think of the European
Coal and Steel Community as a quasi-sovereign entity -- which the United
States did and does when it accredits an Ambassador to that group.

* * *

Thus, there are

1. groupings between _nation-states_ as such, usually for a specific
purpose such as defense or military operation;

2. groupings of functions of various _nation-states_ for the purpose of
discharging particular economic functions (European Coal and Steel Community;
(Euratom);

3. like groupings of non-statist organization without benefit of (or
only limited benefit of) sovereign action -- the international corporation.
These last in volume, in control of assets, in the essentiality of their function
are not the least important of the three.

This brief introduction suggests some of the new conceptions offering
opportunity for modern statesmen, and indicates a range of new tools and
institutions with which they may work.

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II

Regional Groups for Defense

Geographic regional grouping of sovereign states is still the primary
and most familiar form of international cooperation. Analysis indicates, first,
that the controlling reason for their existence has been military and, second,
where there is a different reason (usually economic) the regional groupings
are smaller.

Under the charter of the United Nations, recognition is given by
Articles 51 and 52 to

"the inherent right of *** collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to obtain
international peace and security."

and to acceptance of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with

"such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that
such arrangements and agencies and their activities are consistent
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

The Security Council of the United Nations has as yet developed no
adequate, reliable method for maintaining international peace and security,
though it has worked out measures in certain cases. The field is therefore
clear for "grouping for collective self-defense." Under this legal sanction a
long series of such treaties have come into existence. Among them are:

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**In the Western Hemisphere:** The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro (international treaty of reciprocal assistance September 2, 1947) binding all of the American countries other than Canada to maintain peace within the American hemisphere for collective defense in the event of attack from outside. This is supplemented by joint Canadian-American defense understanding which substantially completes the Western Hemisphere defense group.

**In the North Atlantic area:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Washington, September 4, 1949), includes in a single group the United States and Canada in North America and Iceland and Great Britain in the Atlantic; Belgium, Denmark and France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Greece and Turkey in the European (and in the case of Turkey, part of the Asian) mainland.

In Europe also is a smaller group under the hegemony of the Soviet Union, the so-called Warsaw Pact which includes besides the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and East Germany.

**In the Near East:** Here there is a grouping with which also Great Britain is allied -- the so-called Bagdad Pact (the Treaty of Bagdad, November, 1955), consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, of which Great Britain is a member.

Overlapping this, **in the Near East** is the so-called "Arab League" (the Pact of the League of the Arab States, Cairo, 1945) consisting of Syria,

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Jordania, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Lebanon, Yemen, Libya and Sudan.

Its purpose is to maintain peace within its group and rather hazily to arrange for common defense in case of need.

**In the Far East:** Here there is the so-called "South East Asia Treaty Organization" consisting of United States, Great Britain, France, Philippine Republic, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Pakistan. Its primary purpose is common defense in the case of aggression from without.

Also in Asia must be reckoned the understanding between the Soviet Union and Communist China with which must be grouped as under special control North Korea and Viet-Minh in Indo-China.

The continent of Africa reflects chiefly groupings effected under the old imperial system. The United Kingdom has such a group (in which, as of now, the Union of South Africa *cannot* be reckoned a member); so have France, Belgium and Portugal.

Overlapping this formal grouping is the greatest single grouping, the British Commonwealth; though this is so loose that its organizing power and strength is anything but uniform throughout the group. For practical purposes, it can be assumed that Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will act together for common defense. Other members conceivably might do so, but there is no certainty of this.

The attached map indicates how large a part of the earth's surface is covered by these regional military groupings based on defense.

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III

Regional Groupings for Non-Military Ends

More remarkable is the modern trend toward evolution of regional
groupings not necessarily based or bound to common defense, but for the
purpose of integrating, in greater or less degree, the economic lives of the
members. More accurately, perhaps, the groupings recognize that a measure
of _de facto_ integration has factually taken place. These economic groups are
not geographically concurrent with the defense groups, though there is a
certain rough correspondence.

In this field perhaps lies the greatest possibility for immediate and
also long-range effective international action, yet a word of caution must be
inserted. Regional groups for common economic and political purposes,
spectacular as their growth has been, may well be, probably are, only a
phase. The deep currents noted in Chapter I steadily drive not only nation-
states but whole regions to expand their economic cooperative efforts. Prob-
ably the present regional groups are parts of a world community of nations
which, in distant future, may come into being.

These non-military groupings also cover most of the world, as shown
by the second attached map. They are:

**In the Western Hemisphere:** The Organization of American States
(Bogota, 1948). Its object is not only collective defense but also cooperation

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in strengthening the economic structure by collective effort, seeking to achieve "just and decent living conditions" for their entire populations, permitting general education. To effect this there is set up an economic and social council, a council of jurists and the cultural council.

Relatively little has been done to use the facilities thus outlined.

In practice, this group is supplemented by Canadian-American arrangements for cooperation in a number of respects notably development of water-power and economic resources afforded by the Great Lakes, the Niagara and the St. Lawrence Rivers.

**In Europe:** The "Benelux" group consisting of Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (set up at London, 1944), set up

"to create the economic union of Belgium-Luxembourg-and the Netherlands."

This is now overlapped by the larger "Convention for European Economic Cooperation" (OEEC) which includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Its declared purpose is that the constituted countries shall

"join together to make the fullest collective use of their individual capacities and potentialities *** expand their commerce" and otherwise work together for the economic welfare of the area. More recently, this OEEC group has expanded; there is currently before most of these

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countries a treaty designed to create a European common market. Separate treaties set up an European Payments Union, and so forth.

Closer political union is forecast by the so-called "Council of Europe" set up in London on May 5, 1949, designed to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of

"safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress."

The members are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Great Britain.

**In Communist Bloc countries:** These are the same as those constituting the Warsaw Pact. The extent of formal obligation to work together in economic matters is not known. In practice, the economies of the satellite or captive nations are integrated with the planning and economic life of the Soviet Union to a very large degree.

**In Asia:** Groupings for non-military purposes seem not to exist though Communist China undoubtedly integrates the economies of North Korea and Viet-Minh with her own in considerable measure.

(Colombo Group)

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**In the Middle East:** Effective groupings for economic purposes do not exist. In Africa there is only the remainder of the old imperial organization.

Finally, a new group at a different level is beginning to emerge based, chiefly, on the dim but passionate desire of the non-white races to strengthen and better their position. This is the so-called "Bandung Conference Group" composed of nations which attended a conference at Bandung three years ago. The list ranges widely through Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It remains to be seen whether sufficient community of interest, and sufficient possibility of common action, exists to make of this grouping a positive rather than a mere negative "anti-white" grouping. The attached map of its membership indicates possibilities of strength; the absence of common interest or objective offers doubt as to its future.

* * *

Plainly the struggle for grouping will continue. Given the breakup of the imperial systems, it can hardly be otherwise. Groupings for **defense** are likely to be affected powerfully by technical developments and weapons; they will survive or vanish depending in considerable measure on the capacity of any group to protect all of its member states. Greater grouping for **peacetime economic purposes** appears almost inevitable. Modern economics almost compel grouping, and compel an increasing degree of integration within the group. If this is not done through empire, it can only be done through

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organization of regional or world-wide communities. Evolution of these may
well be a large part of the history of the modern world.

Ability of the United States to assist and work with these groups may
also be determinative of her ability to work towards the ideal and, on the
whole, unchanging American objectives.

IV

The World Community

Inevitably certain objectives can only be reached, and even today
certain present interests can only be served by a functioning world community.

This had led the United States twice in the past four decades to cause
the organization of such a community; first, in the form of the League of
Nations at Versailles in 1919 (which the United States then refused to join)
and second, in the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. Such a commun-
ity (this is true of the United Nations today) is chiefly based, first, on ideal-
ism, that is, on an overwhelming passionate popular hope that it may be able
to prevent war and to achieve for its member peoples immunity from that par-
ticular form of disaster. This is, strictly, a hope; it cannot as yet be a
certainty. Second, on certain realist necessities, that is, on the fact that
certain technical operations can only be carried on effectively within a frame-
work of universal, or perhaps in fact, supranational, arrangements: radio

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communication; civil aviation; prevention of disease spread; possibly also control of atomic contamination.

Increasingly, other realist necessity for world-community organization is emerging. One of these is assurance of access to certain materials essential to the lives of a great many nations which do not possess them (for example, oil). World guarantee seems increasingly essential that certain basic transport facilities be maintained (essential waterways, peaceful seas). The combined drives of population, technology, and increased economic interdependence are almost certain to increase the limited list of operations which by their nature exact action from all or most of the world, and which are considered essential by all or most of the world.

Distinction between the idealist and the realist functions of the world community is essential. The idealist group can only be carried on by long, slow, evolving political processes which presumably will bring institutions into being and equip them with prestige and strength by which they command assent and acceptance for the arrangements they make. The realist group can be and in substantial measure have been embodied in specialised institutions (the World Health Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the Radio Communication conventions, and, though these last are at least partly still in the idealist field, the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International Labor Office).

In its idealized functions, peacekeeping, lifting the burden of poverty, requiring respectable human treatment of populations, and so forth, the United

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Nations can only act (when it can act at all) by bringing about assent of its member nations including the strongest of them to any given solution or course of action. There is clear disparity here between the present organization of the United Nations and its apparent constitution. Its Assembly acts by majority vote. But there is little if anything the United Nations can do if a major power (say, the United States or the Soviet Union, or, if it becomes a member, Communist China) refuses to act in accordance with that vote. The only effective means of compulsion thus far worked out is armed action with the risk of general war, a cure commonly worse than the disease. Further, when a small and impotent nation votes for or urges a course of conduct, it merely expresses an opinion; and that opinion is often dictated by purely domestic or local considerations. When larger nations vote, they assume responsibility and are expected to engage their economics or their armies to make the agreed course of policy effective. Thus there are, in effect, in the United Nations, two classes of votes: votes of opinion or points of view, and votes of "responsibility." Obviously the latter must be given only after far greater and more anxious consideration than required by the former.

In the idealistic field, the United Nations is therefore really a new form of carrying on those diplomatic functions formerly accomplished by the diplomacy of empires. The new form has some great advantages and certain great disadvantages. The outline of the world community is gradually growing; but it cannot (perhaps should not) as yet be effective save as diplomacy; its elevation into anything approaching a world government is very far away.

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Nevertheless the major function which the world hopes it will discharge -- that of keeping the peace -- can only be done through a world community. Greater danger is occasioned to every nation-state, to every people, and indeed to every individual, in case of war today than ever before. Whatever governments may do, or say, or think, there is steadily growing pressure on every government by every people demanding that questions shall be solved without recourse to atom-warfare. Because of this the present United Nations is likely to develop and grow in institutional prestige and, eventually, in power. Indeed if it does not, some other means of bringing about a world community will almost inevitably emerge in a relatively short space of time.

Increasingly the realist and the idealist currents tend to converge. Guided missiles and hydrogen bombs are merely a present illustration of the growing pressure. Regional groups are at present the current, most active, most evolving phase of the phenomenon of international institutions. They are likely to continue to develop until such time as a world community of nations is able effectively to discharge some of their functions. Even then, so large a content of required regional cooperation in problems that are not world-wide will exist as probably to guarantee their continued existence. But it is likely that they will in time cede certain functions to the specialized, and perhaps later to the generalized institutions, of the United Nations. There is no present fundamental conflict between the two; their ultimate relationship must, however, be a constant concern of American policy.

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V

Historically, the United States has an interesting record in dealing with new groups of states. In the nineteenth century it had taken the lead in forming the prototype of regional groupings, the Pan-American Union, and after World War II it systematically attempted to make the American community of nations a substitute for obsolete empire. At the close of World War II American initiative led to the world-wide community under the institutions of the United Nations; yet the preservation of regional groups, and the inclusion of Articles 51 and 52 in the United Nations charter to give them juristic base, was American work. The European Coal and Steel Community, the work of Jean Monnet, stemmed from three or four economic communities (the European Coal and Steel Committee, the short-lived European Inland Transport Committee) and one or two other similar plans worked out while the war was in progress. Vague frame for an European economic union was given during the Marshal Plan Administration through the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) though less comprehensive mechanisms, such as the European Payments Union had been generated earlier. At the same time American initiative led to the Bretton Woods agreements (world-wide) from which came the World Bank and the International Monetary Exchange Fund. Of interest is the fact that the United States in these initiatives thought of herself as primarily assisting others: she had not considered that they might be essential to her own purposes and her own development.

Now, as the deeper currents drive, and as the United States falls into natural place as one of the strong elements rather than the overwhelmingly

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dominant political economic force, the new groupings begin to assume import-
ance to the United States comparable to that which they hold towards other
component countries. Action in them becomes less a diplomatic synthesis
and more the expression of organic necessities for all concerned.

National interest, and idealist hopes, thus begin to converge. Plainly
these new institutions require not discursive but continuous and constant
attention, and now become a first concern of American policy-makers, whether
they are considering survival of the United States, or the achievement of
regional plans, or the ultimate creation of an enduring world of peace.

Elsewhere in this report more specific situations, regional and techni-
cal, are analyzed in considerable detail. But it seems wise to emphasize that
the problems fall into a great pattern; and that solutions and institutions
emerging also exhibit a design. Will we, nill we, the United States is influ-
enced both by the pattern of the problem and the solutions already designed
and later to be worked out. The unending grist of foreign developments is
more than a tale, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. The twentieth
century almost unwittingly is attempting to replace the imperial systems of
the nineteenth and seeking to do so on a higher basis than that of military
conquest or domination.