PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with General Paul Stehlin,
Chief of the French Air Force - January 13, 1963

From: Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting took place at Stehlin's country home. It was arranged privately.

General Stehlin opened the conversation by saying that he had never been more depressed by the political situation. He had always believed in a united Europe. He was born an Alsatian. His grandfather had been a French non-commissioned officer who had then spent all his life as a German citizen because Alsace-Lorraine had changed ownership. He had decided to join the French army in 1920 because he thought that never again should Alsace-Lorraine be separated from France. And he had always known that a larger frame than the national one was necessary. He had been a European federalist even while doing intelligence work in Nazi Germany.

Then the war had ended. From 1948 onward his hopes seemed to be fulfilled. Until early in 1962 progress was slow but steady. The Six were very close to a political treaty. Then the prospect of British entry was used as a pretext to postpone a final decision. Now Europe was as divided as ever; it was becoming Balkanized.

I asked him what the reason was. He said of course the immediate reason is De Gaulle: his pride, his mysticism, his arrogance. De Gaulle would be extremely tough at the press conference the next day. But the more he has thought about it the more he has come to the conclusion that the historic reason is the behavior of the Anglo-Saxons, particularly the U.S. We have never really been content to see a politically strong Europe as distinct from an economically powerful one. We have always talked of Atlantic partnership as if any assertion of political will in Europe would be inconsistent with such a notion.

The result is that in most European countries those opposed to political integration--some sincere and some with arrière pensées--have been able to pose the

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political alternative as a choice between the U.S. and Europe. Political integration has been stopped in the name of Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle has frightened the Americans who live in the present and cannot understand that historic forces are more powerful than any personality, however great. The Americans have antagonized De Gaulle by constantly talking about the good faith of their leaders which is not the issue, and by insisting on legal commitments instead of deepening moral bonds.

Now it is nearly too late. In Germany, only one man understands what is at stake: Adenauer. But he is too old and practically isolated. Why did he come to France on January 21st? Whom does he represent? Schroeder tells everyone how much he disagrees with the old man. Erhard is a political idiot. The Socialists are romantics. The Italians are congenital neutralists. Great Britain is morally bankrupt.

The Nassau agreements are an expression of this spirit. For two years we had been saying publicly that the French nuclear force was "inimical," "useless," and "dangerous." Then as a by-product of humiliating Britain, we suddenly offered France a missile which, to say the least, was not immediately relevant. Before we even had the French answer we began to organize a multilateral force composed of yet other European countries. Why the hurry? Why must France always speak to an Anglo-Saxon blueprint?

Britain by its action at Nassau had done more to undermine Europe than De Gaulle with all his lofty arrogance. If Britain had been serious about Europe, Macmillan would have discussed the Nassau proposition with France before accepting it. He also had an opportunity to discuss the problem at Rambouillet before Nassau. But Britain was so eager for the semblance of a special relationship with the U.S. that it ignored the fact that it also is a European power.

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Admittedly De Gaulle had often used language which gave the impression that he wanted to play a lone hand. But why did we have to be so impressed by his sacral language? Did we really believe that France could ever be strong enough to do without us? We were Balkanizing Europe to prevent an illusory danger.

The Balkanization of Europe applied not only to nuclear matters but to the whole field of military technology. For example, if we really were serious about partnership, why did we force Germany to buy F-104's when the Mirage III was a much better plane for European conditions. I asked why the Germans would buy the American model if this was true. Stehlin replied that Germany was interested in acquiring the most advanced technology to increase her relative weight in Europe. But the most advanced technology did not necessarily mean the most effective weapon for European purposes. Thus we were Balkanizing Europe, not necessarily deliberately but because of our very strength and our singlemindedness on technical matters.

I asked Stehlin why he had said that our fear of France's separatist tendencies were groundless. Stehlin replied that he attended all the meetings of the French equivalent of our National Security Council. He could assure me that at those meetings De Gaulle always insisted on two points: that France had to have the means for her own defense and that alliances were essential for her security.

I asked why, if this was true, De Gaulle pursued the policy he did. Stehlin replied that we had to understand the character and personality of De Gaulle. His experience in Britain during the war had seared him deeply. He could not bear anything that looked like dictation. This is why he was so hostile to the Nassau accord. This is why he would never ask for anything, no matter how badly he needed it. Indeed, he might construe his need as a form of dictation and would be unyielding in proportion as he was weak. We would find De Gaulle much more ready to cooperate once the French nuclear force actually existed.

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Nor should we consider his peremptory manner as directed against us or treat it as his normal pattern of action. For example, at Cabinet meetings De Gaulle was very commanding, brooking no discussion. But when Stehlin saw him privately--which was at least once every two weeks--the reverse was true. De Gaulle then would listen eagerly--often for hours--and no subject was forbidden. In a personal situation, De Gaulle was an enormously patient listener. But he never gave any indication of his decision until it had been made. Then he would announce it and no further discussion was permitted. Stehlin was certain that no minister had seen what De Gaulle was going to say the next day at the press conference.

This personality, and his experience in the war, shaped De Gaulle's policy. For example, Stehlin was aware of the criticism that France had not supplied the agreed number of divisions to NATO and that even those assigned to NATO were deployed close to the French border. The reason was De Gaulle's conviction that the present NATO planning and its concentration on conventional defense was dangerous. De Gaulle was convinced that in case of conventional war in Europe many of the national contingents would surrender or disintegrate as in 1940. Then everything would depend on whether France had any resources of her own left. Only that way could an unconditional surrender be avoided.

I said that if everyone else had been defeated three divisions would not save France. Stehlin replied, of course, it was pathetic. But it had also an element of greatness and responsibility. A leader is not excused from doing the best he can just because his resources are inadequate.

Another example of De Gaulle's attitude was his stance towards nuclear weapons. De Gaulle was convinced, Stehlin said, that any substantial attack on Europe required the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the outset. At the same time he did not believe we would use them; indeed, that we intended to withdraw them. Thus

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he saw no sense in a French conventional commitment to a forward strategy. It would only place French forces in a hopeless position.

I said that if this was De Gaulle's concern, why did he not articulate it. Stehlin replied that was because France had no hope of getting tactical nuclear weapons before 1970. To ask for them now would only emphasize U.S. hegemony.

Actually a principal reason for France's nuclear program was to prevent tactical nuclear operations from devastating French territory. The issue as Stehlin saw it was not whether the United States would fail to respond to Soviet aggression. This he agreed was highly likely. However, in the conduct of tactical operations the U.S. might well have a different view than France of what would be an appropriate response. The U.S. might consider it had done its duty by resisting and by gaining ultimate victory. France had a stake in how the war was conducted and to prevent a devastation of its soil.

Stehlin did not wish to insist on these arguments. He did want to stress, however, that we were approaching Franco-American relations the wrong way. It was senseless to offer a particular weapons system and then argue its merits. The real challenge was to agree on a strategic concept. Instead of offering technical solutions or of arguing about such phrases as indivisibility and independence, why not ask De Gaulle to state exactly how he visualized a joint defense. It was pointless to argue about phrases like multilateral, etc. in the abstract. Why not see what concretely De Gaulle has in mind?

We would find De Gaulle much more tractable if we did not ask him to give up his sacramental language. For example, France was supposed to be standing aloof from airdefense. And formally this was true. However, Stehlin had made informal arrangements which effectively tied France into the NATO airdefense system. Moreover, De Gaulle was fully aware of this arrangement and had approved it. Similar arrangements would be acceptable, provided only that France retained the right and

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the possibility to use its nuclear forces in an emergency. He did not believe that De Gaulle was convinced of the sincerity of the Nassau provision in this respect.

Then there was the problem of the multilateral, multinational force offered simultaneously. What did this mean? How could it work? It seemed to be another example of the United States insistence on the dominant voice. I said this was quite incorrect. I had the impression that Washington would consider a formula by which the multilateral NATO force could be used whenever the European members unanimously requested it. Stehlin said that we would always be able to count on Italy or Belgium to prevent unanimity. And in any event, since we controlled the warheads, we were really only talking of a moral commitment. France had learned that when national survival is involved, the pressures of the moment might over ride all other considerations.

I asked about the offer of Polaris to France. Stehlin replied that aside from the objectionable circumstances in which the offer was made, he had the most serious question about the utility of the Polaris system for France. Polaris was a rich man's weapon. It required elaborate communications. To be truly invulnerable it had to exist in adequate numbers. France would be able to afford only three or four submarines. At least one would always have to be serviced. It should not be too difficult to track the remainder and to sink them without the French government even knowing what had happened.

I said that invulnerability was always relative. Was not the French Mirage force even more exposed? Stehlin said that this was not the case. France had developed a system of dispersal by which only one plane would be on an airfield, using all civilian and military airfields in France. To destroy the French retaliatory force, the Soviets would have to attack every city in France, and this seemed too risky a course.

somehow too study a course.

resistless force, the Invaders would have to attack every city in France, and this
field, using all available and military article in France. To destroy the France
had developed a system ofдаряелйй which only one plane would be on an alt-
ernate force even more эмблема? Stalpein said that this was not the case. France

I said that invulnerability was simple relative. We not the France
France Government even knowing that had happened.

Special and do so difficult to track the resistance and to track them without the
force or form of resistance. At least one would have to be served. It
would be hard to exist in adequate numbers. France would be able to offer only
a ray man's weapon. It required elaborate communications. To be truly invi-
itable question about the utility of the Polaris shown for France. France was
from the objectionable circumstances in which the other was made, he put the most
I asked about the other of Polaris to France. Stalpein replied that each
the all other considerations.

that even national survival is involved, the presence of the moment might even-
markable, we were really only telling of a moral commitment. France had formed
itself or Belgium to prevent annihilation. And in any event, since we controlled the
entirely reduced it. Stalpein said that we would have to count on
whichever the multilateral NATO force could be used whenever the European forces
were incorrect. I put the impression that Washington would consider a formula in
example of the United States itself to be the dominant voice. I said this was
satisfactorily. What did this mean? How could it work? It seemed to me an-
contrary to Belgium to prevent annihilation. And in any event, since we controlled the
entirely reduced it. Stalpein said that we would have to count on
whichever the multilateral NATO force could be used whenever the European forces
were incorrect. I put the impression that Washington would consider a formula in
example of the United States itself to be the dominant voice. I said this was
satisfactorily. What did this mean? How could it work? It seemed to me an-
contrary to Belgium to prevent annihilation. And in any event, since we controlled the
entirely reduced it. Stalpein said that we would have to count on

Then there was the problem of the multilateral force offered
by France was confirmed of the simplicity of the system proposed in this ressort.

The besiness to use its nuclear force in an emergency. He did not believe this

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I said that even assuming relative invulnerability, what about the ability of the Mirage force to penetrate. Stehlin replied that of course this was a problem which had been given highest priority study. His conclusion was that at least 60% of the force would reach its targets. The acquisition of refueling techniques and the assistance of the U.S. had been invaluable in this respect. It enabled the French force to enter the USSR from many directions. He said he was not impressed by theoretical calculations of the efficacy of Soviet airdefense. The parade ground was different from the confusion of combat. I said this might work both ways. He smiled and said this was true. He still believed that the Mirage force would serve France's purposes until missiles became available in 1969 or 1970.

Stehlin then said that all this technical discussion was really beside the point. The real problem was that the France-American discussion had become a dialogue of the deaf. Both sides were shouting and neither side heard what the other was saying. It was necessary to talk about fundamentals before discussing technical problems. But then how was that possible when one partner did not have a sense of history and the other was a prisoner of his memories?

sense of history and the other was a braver of his memories!

believe him. But then now was that best time when one barrier did not pave a
way ahead. It was necessary to talk about fundamentals before discussing tech-
nology of the deal. Both ideas were outstanding and neither side heard what the other
point. The real problem was that the France-American discussion had become a dis-
credit to the cause. He said that all this technical discussion was really pesky the
France, a burden on military action because available in 1929 or 1930.

enlisted and said this was true. He still preferred that the Mirage force would serve
was different from the calculation of combat. I said this right work both ways. He
put theoretical calculations of the efficiency of Soviet aircraft. The basic idea was
Mirage force to enter the U.S.S. from many directions. He said he was not impressed
and the statement of the U.S. had been unavailable in this regard. It implied the
60% of the force would reach its targets. The calculation of retreating ennemy
had which had been given highest priority study. His conclusion was that at least
of the Mirage force to benefit. Steppin relied that of course this was a bit-
I said that even assuming relative invulnerability, what about the apathy

TERRAIN AND CONSIDERATION