Telcon
David Rockefeller

May 1, 1973; 10:08

K: ...or to call him, even if they can't get through because...

R: Well, I'm having dinner with him tonight, you know, with him, and I'm assuming you'll be there too.

K: Oh, yes.

R: Would it be better to call rather than try to say anything there?

K: I think it would be better to have a record.-- to call, yeah.

R: Well.

K: And if you could get some of your friends either to call or...

R: Well, why don't I see what happens. I'll try, myself.

K: Good. There's a sense of great loneliness. You won't get through, but I think he needs all the moral bucking-up he can get now.

R: If I don't reach him by phone, I'll try writing a letter.

K: Just a little hand-written note, or a typed note, you know, just so that...I think it's really important now.

R: Yeah. Well, I agree and maybe the situation has already changed to a point where it might be possible. So let's try.

K: Well, it would be very nice, David.

R: Right. Thank you. I appreciate the guidance.

K: And, I'll see you tonight.

R: I'll see you tonight. Thank you.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

Dated NARA Dated 6/2/04

TELCONE

Amb. Robert Murphy/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. - 5/1/73

K: Hello.

M: Oh, Henry. Bob.

K: Bob.

M: Listen Henry, I'm sorry to break in on you. I just want to ask you a question about that Bilderberg meeting. I'm so pleased that you have decided not to go under the circumstances. The question is, Henry, do you think, first of all, that the American delegation should refrain from attending. I'm talking quite impersonally because I had to decline and was not intending to go and I've always had a doubt about the selection of this place under the circumstances. But in the light of their attitude I don't think that our American group should attend. I was talking with the fellows this morning and they thought your judgement on this might be very useful if you could comment on it - just between us.

K: Let me put it on a - I would not object if this were the result.

M: Good, good, good.

K: And I think from a foreign policy point of view it could only do good.

M: Yes, and then

K: On the other hand if you did go we'd understand.

M: Oh, sure, yeh, yeh. Now there hasn't really been time for a good consideration - what I'm working on at the moment - Bill is calling them over there in Holland - is to see whether the whole thing can't be cancelled out for the moment, postponed or transferred to another place. The trouble is the meeting is scheduled for the 10th of May and the time's so short, but that's what I'd really like to see done. Don't you think that would be the best solution?

K: That would be by far the best solution.

M: Then it wouldn't put the onus on the American end of it.

K: And then I'd make a major effort to come.

M: Oh, good. Fine. That'd be great. Wonderful. Aren't they sons-of-bitches though, really you know.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

Dated NARA Ref. 6/20/73

Telcon
Ernst Van der Beugel
May 1, 1973; 12:44 p.m.

K: Hello.

B: Hello, Henry.

K: Ernst. How are you?

B: I called you to console you. I have just heard the news from Joe
and I think the only thing we can do is call the whole thing off.

K: Well, that's up to you.

B: Yes, that's good. I mean I think there is no other alternative.
I think that the moment that the Swedish Government says that one of
our participants, Mr. Hicks or anybody, is not welcome, it's the moment
to call it off.

K: Well, you know, I can't...

B: ...precise words.

K: The words I have you are a direct quote from what he said. I just
paraphrased them, but exactly what he said.

B: Well, I didn't receive it. I just talked to Joe. Could you repeat it?

K: All right, let me get it. Can you hold on a minute.

B: Yes, I'll hold on.

K: Hello.

B: Yes.

K: Well. Hold on. I'll read to you the correct quote.

B: Yes.

K: The Foreign Minister Wickham said that he wondered about the utility
of Dr. Kissinger coming to Sweden at this time. And that's a direct quote.
Mr. Wallenberg is not the only Swede who will be at Bilderburg. The Swedish
Government also plays a role. The Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance
and the Ministry of Industry will be there. I don't see how his coming here

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated MAR 03 1973

would be a good thing. It would just force us into a stance of disagreement
and make matters worse.

B: Yes.

K: And then our man said that I didn't want to make any public appearances
nor make any official official appointments, and that I did not want to discuss
US-Swedish relations on behalf of the government.

B: Yes.

K: And Wickham said that maybe it is just our bad luck that Bilderburg
happened to be in Sweden this year.

B: Yes. Well, that does it, in my opinion. And the bastards knew this
for six months, and my strong feeling is that this feeling of the Prince
too that under those circumstances we cannot go to Sweden and we must
call it off. And what remains is a matter of publicity.

K: Yeah.

B: It shouldn't have ever happened, of course, and I think it is absolutely intolerable, and I don't see us meet in Sweden if one of our guests has got this treatment. So I think the only way is to call it off. The only question I would like to ask you - if what I think is absolutely improbable because we have still a week's time - if we are able to organize it in some other place then you must go out of your way to come.

K: I would make a very major effort then to come.

B: Yes, yes. But I think this is absolutely intolerable, and the only thing which is rather difficult is to plead in such a way and to make the publicity in such a way that we don't kill Bilderburg, you know.

K: Yes, well that you must avoid at all costs.

B: Yes.

K: And I don't ask that you cancel the meeting.

B: Of course not, Henry. Of course not. You have not asked a thing. You
have only said that under those circumstances you don't come.

K: That's right.

B: And I think for us this is absolutely the limit which is intolerable.
Quite apart...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/04

-4-

K: Well, considering the fact that they're receiving Kosygin officially it's...

B: Yes. That's quite the point. This is a private conference.

K: Exactly.

B: And we have, and the Prince has invited you. And the Prince cannot hold the conference quite apart from the political point of view. But the Prince cannot hold a conference in which one of the people he has invited is not welcomed by a government who has nothing to do with it.

K: Yeah.

B: And I have played with the thought that I think it is too risky to say that the Swedish visitors are not welcome.

K: No, I think... I don't think... I shouldn't go to Sweden under any conditions now.

B: Under any conditions.

K: Because they will have demonstrations and it's just not gonna be worth it.

B: No, no. That is the only point which it leaves is to try to get it in another place, but as you will understand that with this kind of organization that is 99 percent impossible because we have just a week to organize it. And you've got to find a place, an exclusive place. So that is practically out. So we will postpone the conference and do it in another place - probably in the fall. And then there's the matter of publicity, and there of course Joe and George Ball will be in close contact with you.

K: All right. I would like a minimum of fuss about me, but...

B: Oh, we will make a minimum of fuss anyhow. But after all, when you call it off you've got to say something - if it will be only to report the incident.

K: Yeah.

B: You know Ohlsmach Volenbach, he still doesn't know. I will inform him. He will do his utmost to change the situation, but this other point, I mean the only thing which could change it would be withdrawal and in a policy that I don't see them doing that.

-5-

K: No, and even then I won't come.

B: No.

K: At least that would preserve your position.

B: Yes. That would preserve our position.

K: Yes.

B: That would preserve our position.

K: That's right.

B: Then they must make 180° turn, and I don't see them do that.

K: I don't believe it.

B: No. All right, this is all very sad. I have the feeling that I lost a relative.

K: (laughs)

B: But we'll overcome it.

K: Well, Ernst, you wrote me a letter about meeting in New York for dinner one evening.

B: Yeah.

K: I think it was the 22nd.

B: Yeah, right.

K: I think I will be able to do that.

B: Fine, because I think it is important.

K: But I'd like to see you first.

B: Yes, of course, of course. But this business is still very disgraceful.

K: Yes, but still it would help me if I had half an hour with you to understand it.

DECEMBER

Authority ED 12958

DATE 12/2/97

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated 6/2/04

B: Then I'll let them know that in principle it is all right..

K: Yes.

B: All right.

K: I might, if I get absolutely stuck here, can you come to Washington?

B: Well I could, but I don't think that he could. He's an old man.

K: Well, I will do my very best to come up.

B: All right. Have matters cleared up a little, or not, since yesterday?

K: Well, I think it depends how much more stuff is going to come out now.

B: Yeah.

K: You know, I'm totally in the dark about what went on.

B: Yeah, yeah, fortunately.

K: So I have no way of knowing what else there is. If nothing more comes out then I think we'll be all right.

B: Yeah _________

K: Yeah.

B: When are you going to Moscow?

K: On Thursday night.

B: Thursday night. Joe will be in contact with you about this.

K: Okay.

B: All right. Give my love to Nancy.

K: Thank you.

B: All right.

K: I'll see you on the 22nd.

B: I'll see you on the 22nd.

K: Goodbye.

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:45 p.m., May 1, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Yes, hello, Henry.

K: On that Article IV, we can accept -- Where the hell is it? (looking for paper) I'll find it any hour now.

D: (laughter) I hope everything is all right fourth paragraph.

K: Well, the one we're talking about.

D: Yes, I know. We have too many paragraphs probably.

K: Oh, here we are. Types of strategic offensive arms is all right.

D: Uh-huh. Instead of nuclear deliveries?

K: Yeah.

D: Yeah. What about simultaneous?

K: Now, the simultaneously -- I don't think you have read the sentence carefully. What it says is: To resolve the question of those other delivery systems which one might consider a strategic set or these other types of strategic offensive arms, they agree that neither side will circumvent a permanent agreement through systems not limited. That makes it simultaneous.

D
D: But it is not quite clear really. Because if I look about your dynamics of your thought, previous one was concentrate. Now you really just say that they will agree to establish. But does it mean, as you imply, that they should be simultaneously?

K: Simultaneously there will be no circumvention, yes.

D: Yes, you mean to discuss them or to resolve them and they will discuss the results simultaneously. Not first one and the second one. This is not interpretation?

K: My interpretation is that this makes it simultaneous.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012058
By: N.W. Stockton
Date: 05-Mar-73

Ambassador Dobrynin - 4:45 p.m, May 1, 1973

2

D: Simultaneously?

K: Yes. Simultaneous through the device of an non-circumvention clause.

D: Yes, I understand. But without the instruction who is first, who is second.

K: That's right.

D: But does it mean that you will insist on the first one? Because up till now you were always insisting on a first one, so?

K: Well, this is a slight change in our position.

D: Huh?

K: This is an improvement in our position.

D: So result is just leaving it open, so to speak? But you are not insisting anymore to be the first?

K: That's right.

D: Am I correct if I explain to Gromyko this way?

K: That is correct.

D: Yes. Then there is no specific emphasis because before it was.

K: Right. But by means of the circumvention clause.

D: Well, this means by means that this will be discussed too. By means of circumstance, I agree with you. But still when you discuss by means, you discuss what the means are really too. So all the problems about the second part of the phrase --

K: Well, we are willing to accept the phrase as it is.

D: Yeah.

K: Minus -- And substitute "types of strategic offensive arms" for other nuclear delivery systems."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MW Pata De: 05/04/73

Ambassador Dobrynin - 4:45 p.m., May 1, 1973

3

D: Yes. And at same time with understanding that we discuss the [central?] and other questions. This would be -- Well, more or less simultaneously but not prejudged already now. The [central?] should be a first one?

K: Well, prejudged to the degree that ............ an understanding or an agreement that there will be no circumvention. Not an agreement that we will actually go into them in detail.

D: No, I understand. But through the principles of simultaneous discussion really because it should be. I understand the principles of circumvention is clear. But now the question is how they going then? .................... the situation will be ............, what they going to do?

K: What they will do?

D: Yes. Because your delegation which will then discuss all this [equitable?] limitations a little later on. And ________ will say: Now, let's discuss it. Just to give them a chance to -- I don't know -- ....... of procedures that will not force them to discuss. Because up till now -- I read very carefully all the statements made by Johnson. He is just saying: Look here, we are not going to discuss anything until we have agreement on this one. Later on I prepared to discuss. This was his position. That's why I just asking you the question because Gromyko will ask me. Does it look bad putting it this way or not?

K: No, we are willing to put into the agreement something that says it cannot be circumvented through other means.

D: Yeah, I understand. What does it mean?

K: What it means is --

D: In concrete, because when they will discuss equitable -- Or, you mean you just want to have this in the principle to persuade without [presenting?] anything?

K: We'd like to have it as a principle.

D: Yeah, as a principle. But when we will discuss, it's open in what way and how they will discuss.

K: That's right.

4

D: And it's not necessary that the first one should be discussed first?

K: We don't want to say necessarily that we will discuss a particular weapon -- say in Europe:

D: No, I understand. It should be included too in all the discussion, I mean, but what will be the first; what will be second, if it is not decided right now?

K: We're willing to accept a non-circumvention principle.

D: Non-conventional?

K: It's non-circumventional.

D: Oh, yes, yes; understand. I understand, this point I mean. But the question is what the discussion will be. I don't want you to give me right now an answer but I would like to have a --

K: Well, I will be prepared when I come to Moscow.

D: To explain this?

K: Yes.

D: In this language.

K: In two languages, English and German.

D: (laughter) All right. I think better not the second one.

K: Would you tell -- You will make sure that Gromyko knows that I now consider him almost at my level.

D: Yes, I am going to tell him.

K: Okay.

D: All right, Henry. Until I see you in Moscow.

K: Have a good trip.

D: Thank you very much. And have you a good trip. See you later.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCONE

4:45 p. m., May 1, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Yes, hello, Henry.

K: Yeah.

D

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 1258

PAPERS
NARRATED BY

2

D: Simultaneously?

K: That's right.

D: But does it mean that you will insist on the first one? Because up till now you were always insisting on a first on, so?

D: Huh?

K: That's right.

K: That is correct.

D: Yeah.

DELEGATED
Authority E012958

PUBLISHED
NARRATED BY

3

K: What they will do?

D: Yes. Because your delegation which will then discuss all this [equitable?] limitations a little later on. And ............ will say: Now, let's discuss it. Just to give them a chance to -- I don't know - ....... of procedures that will not force them to discuss. Because up till now -- I read very carefully all the statements made by Johnson. He is just saying: Look here, we are not going to discuss anything until we have agreement on this one. Later on I prepared to discuss. This was his position. That's why I just asking you the question because Gromyko will ask me. Does it look bad putting it this way or not?

K: What it means is --

K: That's right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/84

4

K: We don't want to say necessarily that we will discuss a particular weapon -- say in Europe.

D: Non-conventional?

K: It's non-circumventional.

D: To explain this?

K: Yes.

D: In this language.

K: Okay.

K: Have a good trip.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12958

Dated: NARA Dye 6/2/73

TELCONE
Larry Eagleburger/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., May 1, 1973

E: Henry, look, I just wanted to let you know -- I know this has been a rough weekend and if there's anything I can do before I get broken out of this fly-sided fruit factory to help, just let me know, huh?

K: Now, you're being considered for Secretary. Do you really want to leave?

E: (laughter) Thank you, I don't want it. (laughter) No, I'm serious' Henry, I know it hasn't been an easy weekend and I just wanted to let you know if there's anything I can do to help --

K: No, you're a good friend. No, it has in fact been a rough week and rather shattering to see all these things happen.

E: I know. It can't be easy at all but it there's anything I can do, just let me know.

K: I appreciate it.

E: And if you can pop me out of here, I'd appreciate that.

K: Well, you're supposed to be out on the 8th.

E: Okay.

K: I'm going to get you out of there, believe me.

E: Okay.

K: Good.

E: But if you need anything, let me know, Henry.

K: Thank you.

E: Okay.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCOM
Secretary George Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

Approx. 6:00 p.m., May 1, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry. I'm tied up until 6:30 so I guess we won be able to make it today. But I still --

K: How about first thing in the morning?

S: How early can you be here?

K: 8:00. I can aim for 7:45.

S: Could you? Well, all right, let me try to see you then? But what is your reaction now to what -- Were you aware of what was going to be said at that meeting?

K: No, I thought it was appalling. I thought the whole tone was appalling. What did you think?

S: I had exactly the same feeling.

K: He isn't talking to me, I don't know what he's trying to do.

S: Well, apparently we're to have a system with Cole or Ash more or less in charge.

K: Well, that's unacceptable.

S: That's what I would get out of that.

K: Well, that's totally unacceptable.

S: It seems to me you and I are sort of here on the basis that we have something to say about the substance but that isn't regarded as very important right now.

K: No.

S: I was very discouraged by the meeting.

K: I thought it was awful. I thought it was ungenerous, irrelevant -- In fact, even these FBI fellows -- Let's be honest, if there was an ethical problem, it was having FBI fellows in the office of your closest associate, whether they stood out in the hall or sat in his office is a presentational question.

DELEGATED
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Secy Shultz - Approx. 6:00 pm, May 1, 1973

2

S: Well, yeah, there is a matter of decorum there. And also what was the FBI trying to prove? Are they up to some sort of --

K: No, no; I don't object to -- You know, that there shouldn't be FBI men in the halls of the White House. But it isn't an ethical, that's an cosmetic question. The ethical question is whether you have lost so much confidence in your closest associates that you feel that they must have their files secured by the FBI.

S: Well, that was an aspect of the meeting but that was not the aspect that --

K: No, no, the aspect that bothered me was the Ken Cole/Roy Ash aspect. And the otherwise business as usual aspect. And keep things away from me.

S: Well, we had the same reaction as before. Well, let us talk about it tomorrow morning.

K: Good. I'll be here no later -- 8:00 is safe. 7:45, I'll try.

S: Yeah. I have an 8:30 meeting with the President and we're sort of getting prepared for it in this economic stabilization area and I have a regular 8:00 meeting but I'll duck out of it as soon as you're --

S: And I'll be there earlier so I'll notify your office and have them tell me as soon as you get in.

K: Good.

S: Okay.

K: See you in the morning.

wgh

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority E012958

D#H NARA Dkt 6/2/73

TELCONE

President/Kissinger

6:45 p.m. - 5/1/73

K: Mr. President.

P: Dave Packard's coming in to see me at 9 o'clock Thursday morning. I've decided that he is the best available man if we can clear up the stock thing so I thought you should know.

K: Right.

P: I know you think highly of him and you know what I mean.

K: I think he's a very decent man.

P: Well, the main thing you got to have a man that doesn't have to find his way to the men's room, Henry, and between you and him, you know, and that other fellow over there, I mean you work well with him.

K: He's a little bit more on the liberal line but he's an honorable, decent man.

P: I know, I know. The other guys are of the conservative line.

K: Yeh, he's the best you can get.

P: So you see - he's no more liberal than Eliot.

K: No, he's better than Eliot.

P: (Laugs) That's what I mean.

K: Because he's not so ambitious.

P: Exactly. Exactly. He isn't going to be wanting to make peace for the sake of peace.

K: Absolutely.

P: I thought you should know we've got it all set and I've got him.

K: Well, I think that's the best solution.

P: I got him coming in and anything you want me to say about Brandt tonight except that he's a wonderful guy and the greatest leader for peace there is.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

Dated NARA DRE 6/2/73

2

K: I wouldn't do that.

P: (Laughs) I don't intend to. I'm going to say quite personal things.

K: And I'd again hit some of the themes you hit this morning, Mr. President.
You know about the need to stay firm in the West.

P: Oh, good, good, good. I thought it was well to hit those with him, you know, if that's your friend Bahr - I was really

K: No, that son-of-a-bitch is going to leak it straight to the Soviets which is fine.

P: Does that bother you?

K: No, that strengthens our negotiating position.

P: Yeh, because it lets us - I didn't say anything nasty about the Soviets.

K: Oh no, oh no.

P: I said they are tough and strong and by golly, we've got to be tough and strong.

K: Oh no, I thought it was well done.

P: But Brandt was better this morning than he's usually been, I thought.

K: Yeh, he was very confident - much better, much livelier.

P: Now you keep your morale up.

K: Mr. President, my morale is fine.

P: Right. It's all going to come out.

K: I'm absolutely confident of this.

P: That's right, that's right.

K: Now we have one problem, Mr. President, on the SALT negotiations.
I don't want to plague you with all the details, but if we're going to make
some progress I have to submit privately a paper to Dobrynin tomorrow.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

DRAFT NARA Doc 6/204

TELCONE

Prof. Doty/Kissinger

8:30 a.m. - 5/2/73

K: Hello.

D: Henry.

K: Paul.

D: So, two thoughts. One, your loyal servants have a short document, only 3 pages which we'd like to get to you before you go.

K: Oh yeh, where is it?

D: And it's here. There isn't time to mail it; I think I'll send it with my secretary or my daughter.

K: Good, and we'll pay the transportation.

D: OK, and if we could arrange to leave it at the gate or bring it in.

K: Bring it in.

D: So it doesn't get lost in the mailroom.

K: No, no bring it in.

D: Just one thing now about the other point. If you would feel inclined and the opportunity arose, I think it might be good in the long run to mention Millienchakov (sp.?) and that other group to Brezhnev in an encouraging way. It doesn't make much difference now but it could keep it going.

K: I will definitely do that. And that will be easy to do.

D: I thought that would be the easiest way to do it.

K: No, there will be many social occasions and I may even ask to have him at some dinner or something.

D: I see. Oh, that's very nice. Very good.

K: Which would even be easier to show my...

D: We're sort of negotiating on whether to come in June or July but as I say I don't think it's very important.

DELEGATED

Authority E.O. 12958

Dated NARA Dkt. 6/2/73

2

K: Now what in summary is the view of the *paper* you are sending.

D: Well, it's just contrasting our reworking of the views of the partial versus the total. I know the total seems out, but the more you look at it the more attractive it ought to be to them. It isn't anything new but I think at least you should have a look at the--

K: Yeah. It's not a question of convincing--

D: No, but in the arguments that one might choose. But it also some of the things we did on the partial.

K: Okay.

D: I guess you could just be the courier for me at the and they could bring it in, huh.

K: Good, excellent.

D: Okay, awfully nice.

K: Thank you Paul, bye.

D: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

Dated NARA Doc 6/2/87

TelCon
Sec. Richardson/Mr. Kissinger

10:39 am, May 2, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Elliot, how are you.

R: Fine. Just a very quick, McClellan called me a little while ago and he's also very concerned about this transfer authority problem. I understood President ______________ did have a chance to speak to Mainhein yesterday, and I just wanted to ask you if you get an opportunity, it would be very helpful if the President could speak to McClellan too.

K: All right.

R: McClellan wants to be helpful, wants to be convinced, he's asked me to give him a letter requesting the opportunity to appear. I am sending him that letter. There is a meeting of the Democratic Policy Committee this afternoon. I think what McClellan is going to do is to use whatever ammunition we can give him, ______________ Policy Committee that I have requested the opportunity to appear with Moorer, and please hold off. He may still lose. In any event I think that if he felt that he had a call from the President, especially knowing that the President--I said __--he muttered about__--

K: I will see what I can do. I guess a call--obviously a call from me wouldn't be as good as a call from the President, but would it help if I can't get the President to--

R: Yes, it would if you can get the--

K: Yeah, if I can't get the President to do it before 4:00, I shall.

R: Okay. Thanks.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E0-2958

Dated NARA Doc 6704

TelCon
Joe Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

12:12 pm, May 2, 1973

J: ...................that is a flop.

K: Oh, God.

J: Has the Swedes gotten in touch with you?

K: The Swedes? No.

J: Oh, really. Well, a perfectly fascinating thing happened. Ernst called Vollenberg this morning early, after we talked over here about your letter as you know cause Bob Murphy called you.

K: Yes, I know about that.

J: And Vollenberg said I want you to talk to the Prime Minister, so Ernst had a telephone conversation with the Prime Minister the sum of which was in fact the Charge had misunderstood the thrust of what had been said by the Foreign Minister whether it was a language problem or--

K: That's impossible.

J: Well, this is what was said. Now let me just finish. I'll come back to the subject of what the Prime Minister said which could have been, you know, the Prime Minister may have decided to give a different answer after discovering what our attitude was, and you know what our attitude was. Because you've talked I know to both Bob and to--

K: Yeah, well I only knew Bob's attitude. I know Ernst, I don't know what formally was decided.

J: Well, there were various people having different attitudes, but Ernst and mine were the same, so was some others, and it may have been that this caused the change, but in any case Ernst was told that it was a misunderstanding, told furthermore that half an hour before Palmy and Ernst talked the Secretary General of the Foreign office had called the Charge in and repeated to him what Palmy had said or saying to him what Palmy had said to him, and also was sending a message to the Swedish ?, whatever he is in Washington, asking them to get in direct touch with you. You would be welcome at the meeting, they'd be keen to have you.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/73

2

J: And the only thing I think they were a little bit worried when you said you worked (weren't?) plus talk Swedish/American relations, they said that we hope if he comes he won't come so that he can't say anything or even shake hands with us. This is in the message of which you should then from me. I will see that you get it if you'd like to have it.

K: I haven't received it yet. I will probably not come after all of this.

K: Well, we would all certainly welcome you, I want you to know that but I just wanted to tell you that we were distressed at the news and although others were prepared to go ahead I think the majority of the Europeans certainly some of the Americans were determined to make it clear that we felt this was a private meeting. And this may have been responsible for a shift in position in Stockholm. I hope you can reconsider if, after they talked to you, because I know I speak for the Prince and I speak for all the members of the American Jew in the very strong hope, and Ernst has sort of spoken for himself, in the very strong hope that you can come.

K: Well let me look at the Swedish message.

J: Right.

K: Good, Joe.

J: I can send you -- I had a gal listen in on Ernst conversation with me a couple of hours ago, and I can send you a copy at once of that message. I don't know if it would be any help if I were to go down to the U.S. Mission and ask them to put it on the machine or not.

K: If you want to.

J: Maybe he could talk to you tomorrow, that'd be enough, would it.

K: Well you know it's not a matter of life and death to me.

J: Oh, I know it's not a matter of life and death to you. It

K: If I could have it today because I'm leaving for Moscow tomorrow.

J: Okay, well I'll get hold of somebody at the Mission and get the message taken down and put on the--then maybe you'll get it this afternoon, and presumably you will hear from the Swedes one way or another.

K: That's right. I haven't heard from them yet.

J: Right. Well, I'm sorry for the trouble, I'm sorry that it happened this way, and I certain hope that you can manage to change your mind and everybody would like to have you there.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

Dated NARA Ref. 6/20/74

K: Well I appreciate that very much, Joe.

J: I don't think you really realize how much it means to the Europeans.

K: That's why I had really arranged my Moscow trip so that it could coincide with this--

J: I realize this. Well, I hope you can reconsider after you have seen the message.

K: Okay.

J: My message is obviously not official, but presumably their official message will come through, and we were assured that one is coming through.

K: Well I'll take a look at it when it comes and I will be in touch with you.

J: Righto, thanks Henry.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
P#44 NARA Dkt: 6/2/09

TelCon
Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Hello, good morning.

K: How are you.

M: Fine thank you. Just to check with you about the stop-over, because I guess you leave very soon as though we have no special way to communicate.

K: Oh, no, you can communicate with us. What I would like to do is to meet with the Foreign Minister on the 16th of May.

M: This is understood. So there is no change.

K: No, I will come back here and then I'll go over again.

M: Oh, yes.

K: I'll come back here on the 10th and I would like to see the Foreign Minister on the 16th, if that's still convenient.

M: Okay, but maybe if you prefer under these circumstances another date, you know it's possible maybe to arrange it.

K: Oh, you mean do it straight on the way back from Moscow.

M: I don't know, but I can ask.

K: Well, can I wait to see how it is in relation with that Vietnamese meeting.

M: For the time being we maintain the date of the 16th is absolute.

K: Any time, morning or afternoon whichever you prefer.

M: There's no problem. So we stay like that unless I hear different from you.

K: Exactly.

M: Okay. Bye.

K: Good, bye.

DELEGATED

Authority E.O. 1298

Dated: May 2, 1973

TelCon
Prof. Henry Rosovsky/Mr. Kissinger

2:37 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Henry

K: Yes, Henry, how are you.

R: How are you.

K: Okay.

R: Listen, a couple of things, one is I wanted to tell you that as of July 1 I will be replacing John Dunlop.

K: Congratulations.

R: as Dean of the Faculty, and

K: Isn't that a masterful appointment.

R: Well, at least you know, I don't bother with the condolences but the congratulations--

K: Condolences are in order for you, but contratulations to Harvard.

R: Anyway I will do my best, and one of the --

K: It's one of the brightest things that I've heard Harvard do, you're not the normal candidate.

R: You are very kind.

K: No, I mean it.

R: I guess they couldn't find anybody else. But I wanted to tell you that I hope this maintains communications between us and that you know sometime you and I might discuss whether you had any interest at all in your eventual returning here, and under what circumstances.

K: Well, aren't you nice.

R: Well I mean that very sincerely.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/73
Title K.H.

2

K: Well let me in that connection, you know Brook called me months ago and said if I ever had the request he would entertain it.

R: Right.

K: Well, I'll never do that, I mean Harvard has make a suggestion to me.

R: I understand that, and I just want to tell you that I certainly will keep that in mind and as far as I'm concerned, you know, you would be an adornment here, and I would certainly work very hard for your return. I think the only thing that might help the process is some knowledge of when, what your own plans are.

K: Right.

R: Well, But that, you know, you have many friends. But you should also understand that, that you have a great many friends here.

K: Oh, I understand that. Well Henry, leaving aside my own situation which is marginal, I think it is a really superb appointment.

R: Well I thank --

K: I think it is a really superb appointment. Unusually intelligent. You don't maneuver, you don't politic, and you're not the normal type, I just don't know why they did it.

R: Well I don't know (laughter) I'm the last person--

K: You are qualified, what's wrong with it.

R: Henry, two other matters I wanted to discuss with you. I don't know if you are aware of the fact that I am Chairman of the Commission of International Affairs of the American Jewish Congress.

K: No.

R: And I know that you have met recently with the Jewish leaderships and one thing that you probably do know or should know is that Congress in fact has taken the position that is--backs the Administration most strongly. We have, that is Arthur Hertsberg is the Rabbi ahead of it, and we have tried very hard to get the Jewish community to modify its stand on the Jackson amendment.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated 6/2/04
Page 1 of 2

3

K: It's suicidal.

R: Well y; ou have no argument with me and I have strongly backed Hertsberg against a tremendous amount of flack by the organized Jews because you know we have been called quizzlings and all the rest of it. I think that you should know that, that they certainly are force within the Jewish community on a non-political basis recognize that the President has done very well by Israel and by Jews--Soviet Jews, and we are fighting this battle very hard. Now, the specific point I wanted to ask you is I understand that taking a list to Russia.

K: Yeah.

R: And I wanted to make sure--I realize obviously that you are not going to walk out with 40 activists, but I think the attempt is well worth it and anything you can get obviously would make the life of people here who are fighting this issue much easier. You understand yourself. I wanted to make sure that one name was on it. A ______ gist by the name of Vitoli Reubens.

K: All right.

R: He probably is on your list, but if you could just jot that down.

K: All right.

R: Vitali Rubin. In any event I don't need to give you instructions on how to handle these issues because I know that you are well aware of the problem. Now the other thing is I wanted to ask you a question. Who handles the Middle East sort of in your shop. It's possible that we would like to invite that person to talk to our Commission on International Affairs, if he has the time.

K: Saunders.

R: Who.

K: Hal Saunders. XXX

R: You think I can just call him?

K: Absolutely.

R: I will call him and tell him that when our commission is meeting and so forth and that we would very much welcome a presentation from your office, because I think that again is ammunition for us.

K: And when I come back why don't you get in touch with me. Do you ever come to Washington.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958
Date: 6/2/79
DAN: NARA ID: 6704

TelCon
Cong. Ford/Mr. Kissinger

4:35 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello.

F: Hi, Henry, Jerry Ford.

K: How are you Jerry.

F: I'm fine, how are you.

K: Okay.

F: I'm calling on a somewhat unusual matter but I suspect you have an interest in it and may have some influence, and if I might I'd like to speak up on behalf of General J. C. Myer of SAC as the next head of the Air Force.

K: Jerry, Elliot made a recommendation on somebody else actually, but I'm going to hold it until we have a new Secretary.

F: Okay. I've known J. C. Myers for 24 years, I know his career, I know him personally, and there are darn few military men that I know what has as broad a view and as much practical, operational, past experience as he.

K: Good.

F: And I just want to get a good plug in for a guy that I think deserves the job.

K: I appreciate that very much.

F: Is there anything I can do down there to help the situation otherwise.

K: Just give us your continued staunch support.

F: Well we've been working on this matter involving that appropriation. I think we are going to get it through the committee all right. We will have a tough time on the floor I'm afraid.

K: Well, it would be terribly helpful.

F: Well we are working on it.

K: Thank you Jerry. All the best to you.

F: Thank you, same to you. Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012858
DATE 6/2/73
PAP MARA DUE 6/2/73

TelCon
Amb. Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

4:58 pm, May 2, 1973

KJ Hello.

C: Henry.

K: Rollie, two things, one--we will send over to you how we have
redrafted those principles.

C: Oh, fine.

K: And you will see that we have dropped the non-transfer thing completely.

C: Well I was fully confident.

K: And we have put it in the circumvention clause.

C: I see, fine.

K: Context, and all your other points are taken care of.

C: Thank you very much indeed.

K: Now, what I would like however, is to make sure that your Embassy
people don't run all over town talking about this.

C: Oh, God no.

K: Because Wilberforce has been talking freely around my staff about it.

C: To Odeen.

K: That's all right, as long as you make sure he doesn't talk to anyone
else.

C: He has strict instructions to talk to no one other than Odeen. Actually
I told him not to talk to Odeen about it.

K: Well I have no objection because Odeen knows everything.

C: Yes, I certainly will.

K: Good, but you can tell your people--well you will see when I send this to you.

C: Okay, Henry. Fine.

K: And you can also tell Brimelow that we have--on the other thing taken care
of all of his points.

C: Oh, good. That's on what we call "hullabaloo"

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958
DATE NARA Dkt 6/2/73

TELCONE

Sam Spiegel/Mr. Kissinger

5:42 p. m., May 2, 1973

K: Hello, how are you?

S: I'm very well. How are you?

K: Okay.

S: I may come over the weekend to Washington but you will be --

K: No, I will be in Moscow unfortunately.

S: Yes. I wanted to say please try and find some time this summer to
come to. come on the boat.

K: I can certainly use it.

S: I can imagine. I have been watching it all from a [different ?] perspective
than most people because I spent some time in Europe and some time
here and flying back and forth one gets an orbital perspective.

K: (laughs) It's a hectic period.

S: Yeah. Now you must be really exhausted. Is there any hope for you to
get some time off?

K: Well, maybe in July.

S: Well, all of July is at your disposal. All you have to do is just whistle.

K: Well, you're terrific! Let me call you and, in turn, you let me know
when you come to Washington.

S: Yes. Well, I'm going to make a picture in this country at the end of this
year but I am preparing it out of Europe because of all kinds of -- it's
just more pleasant to work out of Europe, (laughter) to be quite honest,
on writing and preparing.

K: Oh, yeah.

S: You'll be back from Moscow --

K: I'll be back next Thursday.

S: Next Thursday. I'll still be in this country. I'm not going to London
until about the 20th or so.

CLASSIFIED

DELEGATED
Authority: EO 12958
Dated: NARADATE 6/2/73

Sam Spiegel/Mr. Kissinger

5:42 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Well, why don't you call me --

S: I'll call you after you return from Moscow.

K: Good. Excellent!

S: And please you try to figure out in your own mind when would be a nice
time and then we would invite the people you would like to have.

K: Good. Wonderful.

S: And we'll make it really nice and pleasant.

K: I'm certain you will.

S: And above all, we'll sail into places where people will only be able
to reach you in emergencies.

K: That would be ideal.

S: Inaccessability, it's one of the great virtues of sailing.

K: We'll talk after I get back.

S: I'll call you as soon as you get back.

K: Thank you.

S: And have a safe and good trip.

K: Thank you.

S: Aurevoir.

K: Goodbye.

wgh

DELEGATED
Authority E012958
DATE MAY 26 1973

TELCORN

Joe Califano/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. You were pretty prophetic, weren't you?

C: In what way?

K: Remember when I ran into you in the street and you said you were going to get well on the Watergate case. And I said isn't that dead? And you explained to me that judges read newspapers.

C: (laughter) Yeah. It's very sad though.

K: Well, it's now getting to beyond -- I don't really want to talk about it until it's run its course. But it's really now reaching a point where one has to ask one's self what good is achieved?

C: Yeah. Well, the problem is, I mean, the thing that's killing -- and it's going to keep it going for a year in my judgment -- is the monumental nature of the cover-up by whomever; by whomever.

K: Yeah.

C: And the other thing, I'll tell you, you know people don't think through the fallout. You know that the Democratic Left -- the crazies, if you will -- are going to think they were cheated and they're not going to realize -- this would be against human nature and their human nature, particularly to think that they would have lost anyway.

K: No, it's a problem for you too. Because what seemed to be settled at the last election within the Democratic Party.

C: Wide open again, Henry.

K: Can open up again.

C: It will, it will. I mean, if you just psychologically put yourself in the position of George McGovern as he wins in South Dakota and now he's been given what to run on in South Dakota -- I told you how corrupt it was back there.

K: Yeah

DECEMBER
Authority E01298
DATE NARA Dkt 6/204

["Joe Califano/Mr. Kissinger", "5:55 p. m., May 2, 1973", "C: He's bound to feel that every mistake that was made in his campaign was in some way attributable to some kind of sabotage.", "K: Yeah. Oh, no question.", "C: And he should go again. I mean, I can see --", "K: Well, if not he, at least somebody like he.", "C: Sure, sure.", "K: And now it's a national disaster.", "C: And it's interminal in so many respects. I mean, the terminal trials -- they can't possibly come until the fall and then they'll run their course and Ervin will run his course. It will go along --", "K: And everybody in town is going to leak like crazy.", "C: You know, I must say -- I mean, whatever one wants to say about the *Post*, I happen to know for a fact that in the last two weeks they have been enormously careful.", "K: Oh, no, I have --", "C: . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Joe Califano/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 pm, May 2, 1973

C: I'd hate to have this happen in the context of the campuses we had in the last year of Johnson's Administration. Or after Cambodia. Henry, I didn't call about this.

K: I'm sure.

C: I am representing three major architectural firms - Warnke & Davis Associates, and Max Urban who is head of the American Institute of Architects and I'm representing him as of about two days ago but for the last two years they've been negotiating privately and in my judgment quite naively but incredibly effectively with the Russians.

K: On what?

C: The Russians have asked them -- I shouldn't say "asked", I should say talked to them about designing a city of about 40 to 50 thousand people to be built as -- in effect, a suburb of one of the major Russian cities, most likely Moscow but it's not settled.

K: But who's going to pay for it?

C: They are going to pay for it. They, the Russians, are going to pay for it.

K: Oh, really?

C: I have known this for some time because a friend of mine is one of the architects. Lou Davis who also did the Japanese Fair and is doing the Boston Common and a lot of those things. I called them to get me an awful lot of detail and stuff on what they've done and they want me to go over to Russia with them and plan to go over there with them in the next month or so and try and lock up some kind of -- [write an] agreement. But what I'm calling you about is (1) I realize you're going there very soon.

K: Tomorrow.

C: (laughs) Tomorrow. And I don't know whether this -- part of this at least shouldn't be put in other channels. I know nothing about dealing with the Russians, Henry, but I --

K: Whom are you dealing with?

C: Well, I forget the names -- I don't have the names of the people -- I should goddammit have them and have them for you. I just don't have them. I mean, they're dealing with key members of the Supreme Soviet

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated 6/2/73
PAP

Joe Califano/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 pm, May 2, 1973

C: (cont'd) and the guy who's in charge of --

K: Do you want to send it over to me and I'll let you know whether I think
you're in the right channels?

C: Sure.

K: If that's your question.

C: That's my question. And the other thing is whether or not it shouldn't
get more involved with U.S. Government channels or maybe that's a
hindrance, I don't know.

K: Well, why don't you let me look at it and I'll give you an opinion.

C: Okay. And you're leaving tomorrow.

K: I'm leaving tomorrow evening. But this doesn't depend -- you know, this
isn't something I'd be taking up with Brezhnev.

C: Oh, I realize that.

K: So if you let me know -- You know, if you can't do it by tomorrow evening,
let me take a look at it when I get back and I'll talk to Dobrynin.

C: All right, fine.

K: Good.

C: Thank you very much.

K: Joe, nice to talk to you.

C: Bye.

wgh

TelCon

Danny Kaye/Mr. Kissinger

6:45 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello.

DK: Henry.

K: Danny, how are you.

DK I called you and you were on your way to New York the other day.
Did you get my message.

K: No, I didn't.

DK Well, anyway I think it was on Saturday, or Friday I guess. They
said you were on your way to New York. The reason I called I had
been making something at home and I mentioned it to somebody, I
said I wish Henry were here because this dish he would really like.
I made up a whole new dish, you know, a Northern dish.

K: Oh, really.

DK Yeah.

K: It's really great to talk to you. I called you the day after that great
dinner of yours, but you weren't in.

DK I'm sorry.

K: I had a really marvelous time there.

DK I'm glad you came that night, and I'm glad you were so relaxed and
it's nice to get away from everyday business you know. It was lovely,
I enjoyed very much having you there.

K: When are you going to come east.

DK I was supposed to go to Israel next week but I don't think I'll be able to.
I've got to go up north now, we have some things with our stations up
there. So I will probably be -- at the end of May I will probably be in
New York and then I'll come down to Washington. I've got to do a thing
on June 3rd, so I'll either come down the day before or I'll stay there
a day or two later, or something. Are you going to be in town then.

K: Definitely. If you let me know, give me a week's warning, we'll have
dinner, and if you want me to, I'll get a few people together.

DK Well I don't know, I'd just as soon we went out and, if you want to have
a couple of folks, that's fine, I'd like to make it informal or whatever.

DELEGATE
Authority E.O. 1298
Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/73

2

K: We'll make it informal, and we'll just have it either just you and me, or if Sylvia is with you--

DK: I don't whether she'll be in New York or not. I think she'll be going home by then.

K: You know I saw her last week.

DK: Yeah, my secretary just called me to tell me that.

K: It was great to see her.

DK: Yeah. How are you feeling otherwise.

K: Well, it's a mess.

DK: (laughter) Well it ain't nothing to what it's going to be, so just hold on to your hat.

K: Exactly.

DK: Anyway, just take care of your health and you'll be in good shape, and I just wanted to tell you how we were thinking about you here. I was just making a whole new Thimmish. The next time you come, I'm going to make you some Italian food.

K: Terrific. Oh, that Chinese food was so great, I--

DK: I'll tell you what, the next time you come, if you want I'll make you six or eight other dishes.

K: That'd be marvelous.

DK: Of course. We can do anything you like.

K: Good. Well I hope to see you soon.

DK: Okay Henry, take care.

K: And you let me know when you come here.

DK: I will, I'll probably call you from New York.

K: Good, okay.

DK: Bye

K: Bye.

TelCon
Pierre Salinger/Mr. Kissinger

6:55 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello

S: How are you.

K: Okay.

S: Are you leaving tomorrow night.

K: Yes, I'm off to Moscow.

S: What about our interview.

K: Well, I'd like to have this turmoil subside. I'm just don't have the peace of mind to do it.

S: I'm not trying to argue with you about it, because you have to make your own mind up, but it just seems to me at the moment with the European press leaning heavily on it, the Watergate, that it wouldn't be a bad time to get into other things.

K: Well, I can't possibly do it until I'm back from Moscow.

S: I know that. When are you going to be back.

K: About the 10th, but then I may have to go to Paris to see the Vietnamese.

S: Can we do it in Paris.

K: Why don't you check with me about the 11th or 12th.

S: Because the best thing of all would be if you are in Paris we would-- maybe the Board of Editors would do it.

K: Well, let me see.

S: You know, with LaValle and people like that.

K: Well, let's see about it. Why don't you check with me about the 11 or 12.

S: I'll do that. Bon voyage.

K: Thank you, bye.

CLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT
Authority E.O. 12958

Dated: May 2, 1973
From: Pierre Salinger
To: Authority E.O. 12958

TelCon

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 pm, May 2, 1973

K: Hello

F: Good evening Henry.

K: Yes, Peter.

G: There has been a series of rumors about Mills' position on MFN. I got to him this evening and he is lopling a little bit. And he's waffled because he got put up in front a lot of Jewish leaders yesterday in a meeting with Jackson apparently and others. And he said that his position hasn't changed, that he was for the Jackson /Zanuk/Mills amendment which is that there should be no NFM as long as there is a tax. So, that's going ;out, and Jackson is misinterpreting that as saying that he has gone back to his original position. That's not correct. Mills' position is that as long as there is an education tax there should be no MFN. That, however, the statement that the Soviets made satisfy him as long as it is in existence and on the basis of that, he would grant MFN. However, he doesn't like the way we have suggested it in our bill. What he is going to suggest is that there be conditions to the MFN extension, that those conditions be that there be no education tax, and that if such education tax is subsequently imposed that the MFN will be revoked. Now, I got him at home tonight to try to straighten this thing out. He said I don't know the ;kind of language we used, but that's the idea I have in mind. I didn't say we would accept it. The problem with it is, it leaves it to us. He says that constitutionally he doesn't like to have this kind of an agreement subject to an Congressional veto. That's why he prefers this formulation. But in any event, when you are over there if these reports come out, you can assume that that Mill's position and remains Mills' position, to the contrary, regardless of what Jackson and Ribikoff might say. Mills said he heard from a fellow by the name of Seeger, who I think is a Newsweek correspondant, xxx in Moscow, and on the basis of his correspondence with Seeger he thinks it would be extremely helpful if there could be yet another forthcoming action on the part of the Soviets at about the time that Brezhnev starts here. And he suggested, presumably based on what he heard from Seeger, that this fellow Pannov, a dancer, and his wife who have become a cause celeb, he says among the Jewish community, be released. Pannov apparently--

K: Yeah, I know who he is.

F: Okay. I told Mills I would get that suggestion to you, so I've done it.

K: Good.

F: I will keep you -- if there are any major changes in the MFN thing, I'll let you know. I think you should assume, unless we tell you differently,

CLASSIFIED
Authority: E0-1298
Dated: MAR 03 1973

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:25 am, May 3, 1973

P: ...... and I don't have in mind a long period, you know, 'cause
I'll do some thinking, I might have somebody in a week.

K: Well, I think Mr. President

P: I'll get somebody trained too.

K: I think the major thing now is to get -- to do what eases your
immediate position.

P: Yes, it's mainly, you see, Henry, to handle the domestic things, I
mean, like Cole and Agnew are fighting now about who's going to--
you know what I mean, Agnew's trying to step into things. Well
Agnew can't--we just can't allow that to happen.

K: Oh, no. We shouldn't show any weakness. The first guy who sticks
his head above the parapet has to be--

P: The point is, Al will do that; now the main point is I want to assure you
that on the international thing, you and I are going to handle it. I've
just got to get somebody that can--it's a curious thing--that can handle
that so that you and I can do the other, see.

K: Right. Now, Mr. President, I'm sure these things will all work out
in practice and--

P: What did you tell Al.

K: Well, I told Al that I thought there was a national need. He knows how
I feel about some of the other--

P: Tell me this, how could, how physically to you work out such a thing.
I just--

K: I think you have to be careful not to ruin his military career.

P: Yes, I just asked him for--

K: So he should leave at some terminal date, and just request the Secretary
of Defense not to vacate his job, that he remains Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army on temporary duty for 30 days.

P: Yeah, well, why I just say for thirty days. Will you, or should I tell
him to work up the piece of paper that I send the Secretary of Defense.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: I think it'd be better if he did it.

P: He'll know how to--

K: He'll know the language.

P: Good deal, Henry. Well, that's awfully cooperative of you, and I appreciate you being such a good team player.

K: Well, I think we have a national problem right now.

P: Oh, hell, we'll get over it.

K: We can take up the other matters later.

P: Yessir. But Bruce was very good, we had a very good talk with him, and he's just thrilled to death.

K: He's a fine man. I'm sorry I couldn't come in but

P: One thing I told him and I want to pass it on to you that I said that normally on your visit, he said about the report you'd make after your trip to Moscow, suggest you'll be coming to Peking. I said normally you always met alone, but I said in his case I'm sure that you would probably want him.

K: Absolutely, no question.

P: I said you understand though, this cannot go through the channels, He said oh, I know the State Dept., he said the last three weeks proves it leaks like a sieve. He said I'm never going to use that channel.

K: David is going to be a marvelous man.

P: You see what I meant, I have assured him that when you went over you wouldn't be seeing people along. You'd always want him along anyway.

K: I wanted him along. No problem.

P: Good deal.

K: Right, Mr. President.

DELEGATED
Authority EO 12858
Dkt 01-2077
NARA No. 61274

TelCon

Yuri Babenko//Mr. Kissinger

10:35 am, May 3, 1973

K: Hello.

B: Henry, good morning.

K: How are you.

B: Thanks for calling back. I got a message for you from Gromyko. He would like to inform you that there is a possibility, just to inform you for your planning in Moscow, that there is a possibility that the talks will be outside of the city. I presume at Mr. Brezhnev's country estate. And that's about 100 kilometers from Moscow, 60 miles.

K: All right.

B: And in this case, the contact with your plane there will be helicopter service arranged.

K: Oh, excellent.

B: And in this country estate, besides the premises for yourself there will be three apartments for some of the people whom you would like to take with you there. Three two-room apartments, that is, one bedroom apartments. And Gromyko says maybe the rest you'll choose to leave in Moscow and take them when you need them by helicopters.

K: Okay. Does that mean I can take three or six people?

B: That means you have three apartments. You can take how many people you want, but he says there will be possibility for only three apartments.

K: How many guests beds.

B: Well, he doesn't mention this. I don't know.

K: He can put beds in the rooms.

B: Oh, they can put additional beds I think.

K: So I can take as many as six people.

B: Yeah.

K: Good. Thank you.

B: If there is anything else I'll call you, if not have a nice trip. Bye.

CLASSIFIED
Authority: E012958
Dated: MAR 24 1973

TelCon
John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

11:46 am, May 3, 1973

K: Hello.

O: John Osborne. Two brief questions. One, would you be going to Moscow if the Paris meeting is held up.

K: Yes.

O: You would.

K: But I have no reason at this moment to believe it will be held up

O: Oh, you mean for mid-May.

K: Yes.

O: Oh, well you know, the published accounts in Paris reports that it has been held up, according to Thach and S ____.

K: Oh, you know, according to what Thach says it is not now scheduled. Which is probably technically true since we have not agreed on a text and on the absolutely precise date, although we have agreed--you know it's one of these tezaritic statements which could mean that they are postponing it, and which might merely mean that they are being their usual silly selves.

O: Did you feel the manner of their announcement mixing on the record and background screwed it up temporarily.

K: Yes.'

O: On the record, what would you have said on the record this morning had you been asked whether the Watergate affair were impairing the ability of you and other U.S. negotiators to negotiate.

K: I would not answer. But this is not on the record.

O: No. I was asking what you would have said had the question been asked.

K: As of now I see no impairment but I think whatever the effect is will take some weeks until foreign governments--

O: Right.

K: Certainly the reception that we are informed we'll have with the Soviet Union would indicate that it's very warm.

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O: KXX Very interesting. Thank you, and I certainly wish you luck.

K: Between you and me I think they would be bothered by any moral scruples with respect to the--

O: But there'd be a question of--

K: There are two questions--for your own, you know, unattributable basis, unattributable even Administration--

O: Right.

K: There are two questions foreign governments must ask, one is the ability by which we can carry out whatever commitments we make. We agree we can give domestic support for carrying out commitments. The second, freedom in penalizing countries that challenge us.

O: Right.

K: Those are the two questions that will decide to what degree of foreign policy is effected, plus the intangibles of whatever moral leadership is.

O: Right. Well I wish you good fortune.

K: I tell you this now, really, to be written under your own--

O: Oh, yes, absolutely no attribution, I guarantee it.

K: Right.

O: Right.

K: Thank you John.

O: Bye.

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TELCONE

Dave Packard/Kissinger

12:05 p.m. - 5/3/73

K: Hello.

P: Dave Packard, Henry.

K: Dave, how are you? Where are you?

P: I'm over at the Pentagon.

K: I see. Taking over?

P: (Laughs) Not yet. Just telling them how to run it, that's all.

K: OK. Dave, the President wanted me to call you and add whatever weight I had with you to his and to tell you that it's really very important if we can do anything on this financial thing. If you think my talking to Stennis would do any good or anything like that.

P: Well, I'm having lunch with Stennis and I know him well enough that we can talk about this all right. I appreciate very much your call and I understand the

K: Well, you know how I feel about you Dave, so it

P: Well, I'm not sure how you feel about me, but I'll take my chances with you.

K: You know I've always thought you were a great man.

P: We were always able to get along and if I come back I'm sure we would

K: You're a man of great integrity and really the country needs it now.

P: You're very nice to say that.

K: And so far as I can do anything from this office to make your life easier.

P: Look if I come back here I don't expect my life to be easy.

K: You know it's a great national crisis right now and we'll all have to pull it through.

DELEGATED
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TELCONE

Scotty Reston/Mr. Kissinger

3:20 p.m. 5/3/73

HK: Scotty, how are you.

SR: Henry, I'm trying to get off on another subject and I'm just wondering how you are looking at this coming trip--what is the real purpose in your mind. I don't want to quote you in that.

HK: Well the real --I'm assuming you are doing this on the basis that you are writing the article. The purpose is to go over the summit agenda and to see whether we can make some advances on SALT and a few of the other outstanding bilateral issues.

SR: Hm huh.

HK: And also whether we can chart in our relationships a sort of future analysis to what we publicly proposed with respect to Europe.

SR: Hm huh.

HK: It isn't good for heads of government to get together unless they have a pretty good idea of what's going to come out.

SR: Yeh, also I got the impression that they are arguing here the point that President Nixon put on a big television show and had many things to announce at the end of his meeting at the Kremlin and they are hoping the same thing will be true here.

HK: That is correct.

SR: When you talk about an agenda, what are some of the things--

HK: Well we'll discuss the Arms control issues between us. And may take a look at some of the principles whether--that were established last year--whether they are capable of elaborating --perhaps some talk just to get their ideas on MBFR and then probably some of the bilateral issues like transportation agreements, nuclear energy exchange. I mean that won't be a bloody negotiation, it'll just be a setting out of some goals which we will then turn over to experts after I return. And then we always have a tour d'horizon at these meetings.

SR: Then what about the East European Security Conference?

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Page 2

HK: That of course also. See we are now at a stage--last year we cleared away a lot of the underbrush and made some turning--some significant turning points. Now we can look say 3 or 4 years ahead to the end of this Administration and plan our course accordingly. When we can in we were still in a confrontation posture into well into 1971. It wasn't until the second half of 71 that things began to turn.

SR: Hm huh. On the European idea--Year of Europe--how does that fit into the Soviet thing.

HK: We have to be able to live in a world in which relaxation of tension and strengthening of Atlantic ties are going on simultaneously. And one reason why the political side of the Atlantic relationship become somuch more important is because if we succeed in what we are trying to do with the Soviet Uni on, it must lessen the perception of a imminent military attack. And we are trying in our relations with the Soviets to move more into a relationship where security is-- depends at least in part on the lowering of tensions, on legal guarantees and not simply on confronting each other on military strength. We still need it but it shouldn't be the predominant feature.

SR: Yeh. What about most favored nation.

HK: I think that is essential. And that I was asked this morning when I briefed on the foreign policy report --see the trouble with the congressional debate on MFN is that they take that out of the whole context of relation and then ask whether we are getting enough for it. But MFN has to be seen in the whole context of the relationship in which they have already done quite a bit.

SR: What about the--are we making progress at all in the exit permits.

HK: To all practical purposes cancelled them--they have given us a communication --given the President two communications in which they explain they would not enforce it, but they set no time limit. And that the only duties that they would collect are the normal ones which were in effect prior to the imposition of the exit tax.

SR: But that still doesn't satisfy our dinner companion last night.

HK: Well it doesn't satisfy him because he is making the outrageous proposition that they have to lower all bars to XXXX emigration, for everybody. Which would mean that the Baltic States, the Ukranians, that they would have to change their whole system. And we can't even make such a proposition, because if we did that all the hard liners in the Kremlin who have been saying if you tie yourself to the West, it will lead to a massive interference in your domestic affairs. Now I hope that Jackson will agree to some sort of compromise before his

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amendment runs it course.

SR: He's not likely to do that because he is obviously playing politics with it although in the long run I think it is very bad politics.

HK: No Soviet leader could possible accept this and I think his supporters have to ask themselves whether they want to take the responsibility for what will happen if MFN fails.

SR: When you were leaving last night you made a point on the other question on the tragedy of having--it--tried very hard to develop Presidential authority and then what had happened--or is that a bad ask subject to discuss?

HK: Certainly it's an awful subject to discuss in relation to me. It would be a disaster.

SR: I just wanted to understand your thought on the point.

HK: My thought --is you know you obviously don't write --if you could avoid discussing it at a time when they will think I will talk to you if you write the other subject--the problem is that we have tried very hard to -- that much of the motivation for going as we did in Vietnam was to maintain some respect for authority in this country so even opponents could feel that we got out because we wanted to get out not because we were driven out by a complete collapse. Of course now many other things have happened.

SR: Mmm--you are not worried, are you, that the current thing is really going to interfere seriously with your negotiations?

HK: No, not yet.

SR: I don't think so.

HK: No but I didn't say it in that connection--

SR: No, I understand.

HK: No, in foreign policy I can literally--I can see no sign of it at all.

SR: When are you off?

HK: At midnight tonight.

SR: Ah huh. And what about Le Duc Tho?

HK: That is for your information but you can't give that date--it seems to be set for the 17th.

Page 4

SR: Huh hm. And what do you expect to do there--get back to what you thought your understanding was.

HK: Well we won't get to it in every detail because the SVN aren't keeping everything either. But get back to enough of a modus vivendi to permit some peaceful evolution to continue.

SR: Hm huh. Henry, have a good trip and I'll see you when you get back.

HK: Happy to.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
P# # NARA DR: 6/2/09

TELCONE

Sec. Clements/Kissinger

5:24 p.m. - 5/3/73

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry. It's Bill Clements.

K: Oh, they told me Packard was calling.

C: Oh no, I don't think so, Henry. He was in my office earlier and I don't think he did use the phone but he called Bill Rogers, he didn't call you.

K: Right, OK.

C: Well, Henry, you want to talk a minute.

K: Yeh, but I'm practically leaving. No, I'll be glad to talk. Did I call you?

C: I called you.

K: OK. Fine.

C: The girl might have thought it was Packard calling instead of me, I don't know.

K: (Laugs) OK.

C: Henry, on Larry Eagleberger, I would like very much for Larry to go to the Turkey meeting with Hale.

K: No, I just can't do anymore. I am shorthanded over here in an unbelievable way. The whole load has fallen on me and I just must get my people aboard now.

C: We're only talking about a week.

K: I know but it's - what is the date?

C: Henry, I don't have that date right in front of me. They're scheduled to go on the 13th, I think.

K: But you see the trouble is if I don't start getting people working over here it will never end and right now I am overworked as it is. Every goddamn thing is falling on me.

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Dated NARRATOR: 6/2/94

2

C: (Laughs) Henry, you're not overworked, you're getting fat on it.

K: That is true, I'm getting fat.

C: Look, Henry, I know you're overworked and so am I, but I've got a problem over here and it's a serious one and I don't want to drop any stitches in Turkey. And I think Bob Hill really needs the guy.

K: I need him too.

C: Hell, you know better than I what's going to go on in Turkey. If you make the final decision, which you are, that "No, he's got to come over here and do whatever work you want him to do. . .

K: Can you tell me the exact dates?

C: He would have to leave here on the 12th and he would be gone for about 5 days. So he'd be gone from the 12th to the 17th.

K: OK. I'll get word to you first thing in the morning.

C: OK, Henry, have a nice trip.

K: Thank you, Bill. I won't give away too many of your land-based missiles.

DECLASSIFIED
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D#1 NARA Doc 6/2/01

TELCONE

Walter Stoessel/Mr. Kissinger

5:38 pm, May 3, 1973

K: Hi, Walt.

S: Hello, Henry.

K: What did you want to talk to me about?

S: Henry, you asked me to come to see you.

K: Oh.

S: That's what I was calling about.

K: Right. Well, I wanted to find out what the four issues are that the Germans have said we shouldn't give away in the Security Conference.

S: Henry, I don't know on the four. They were strongest with us on the --

K: On the inviability --

S: Inviability.

K: Yeah.

S: We've sent a memo over on this. You'll be getting it. The Secretary asked us to do this. They made quite a presentation at the Secretary's lunch and I gather Bahr talked with you also.

K: Yeah, but only on the inviability issue.

S: Yeah. I don't know what the others are. You heard there were four.

K: Well, that's what Scheel said to me.

S: Yeah. Can I check on that?

K: Yeah.

S: Okay.

K: And on MBFR, there isn't a hell of a lot to do.

S: No, no; I think we're okay. And actually, I think on this inviability thing, we should be all right. They just asked for our support and so on and made their points and I think this should work out. And we've heard now that the Soviets are prepared to accept the 5th version, which looks okay.

DECEMBER 9, 1973

Authority E.O.12858
DATE NAGLYPH<0>DR 6/2/73

Walter Stoessel - 5:38 pm, May 3, 1973

2

K: Right.

S: Henry, can I ask you about the Atlantic Charter?

K: Yeah.

S: Is there any changes in signals on this?

K: Absolutely not.

S: Because we've had some noises from the Germans - Well, maybe there was some pulling back and we're not supposed to draft it and --

K: Absolutely not. We don't use the words "Atlantic Charter" necessarily.

S: Right. But a declaration or --

K: We want to have a Declaration that could be signed on the occasion of the President's trip to Europe.

S: Right.

K: Also, the President has sort of agreed with Brandt, though that was not reflected, that there would be a summit meeting of NATO Ministers -- of NATO heads of government at the NATO Council when he's in Europe.

S: Uh-huh.

K: That should be the big forum; not the Community.

S: Yeah.

K: And please keep that in mind. I know that your people think the opposite.

S: Yeah, because we heard some rumors about a summit in Paris or some place not in Brussels.

K: No; it's a NATO meeting.

S: Yeah. Focus on the Alliance, huh?

K: Yeah.

S: Okay.

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Authority EO 12958

Dated NARA ID 6/2/73

TELCONE

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

6:03 pm, May 3, 1973

K: Joe, you wanted to see me before I left.

S: Well, only -- I was just wondering whether there was anything you needed for Moscow at all?

K: Well, anything that you think might come up.

S: Well, the only thing I wanted to say to you is that if they make a huge plug on the Arab side, I would just stay with the line that you've been staying with, namely, that if we're going to do any good, there's got to be a negotiating process started. I think you're on the right gammit as long as you stick with that.

K: I don't intend to get into the Middle East.

S: Well, they might raise it because they might feel as if they've got to show the Arabs that they're nudging you every time they get an opportunity on this.

K: I've got your paper over here, haven't I?

S: Oh, that's that one that I sent way a couple weeks ago?

K: Yeah.

S: Yeah, that's the two-track thing.

K: Yeah. Can I just operate from the assumption that that -- You know, I'm not going to propose it but just keep it in my mind.

S: Well, keep it in your mind. I think that two-track affair is the way to proceed. And the way to do it, Henry, if you feel it out, we really need to put it to the Israelis. Because the paper as you will look at it if you get an opportunity to look at it carefully, you will see that you really have to do a little selling on the Israeli side in the first instance.

K: A little is no expression.

S: And so I think what you can discuss generally is the -- Well, am I to assume from what you're saying that you may have a session with that other fellow on this trip?

K: No, not on this trip. If I have a session with the other fellow, it would be ten days later.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01298
D# 14 MAR 1973

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Vorontsov

5/3/73 6:20 p. m.

HK: Hello?

V: Hello, Henry--it looks like --it's Vorontsov again--that I'm going to see you anyhow this evening. I just received a message to the President from General-Secretary Brezhnev in reply to the President's message on the 1st.

HK: Oh.

V: It's a short one, but I would like to deliver it before you go. Before you depart.

HK: Good.

V: When are you--when would it be possible for me to see you and to come?

HK: Oh, let's say at 7:15

V: 7:15 is fine.

HK: Good. See you then. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012055
By: WW. CAPTAIN J. O'BRIEN

D file

TELCON

Bruce Kehrli/Mr. Kissinger

5/3/73 7:15 p.m.

HK: Look, I just found out that you held up a paper for a month on Mexico that I have been working on and that you restaffed something that we have already staffed--that's totally unacceptable to us.

BK: OMB had some--

HK: I don't give a damn--you have no business--

BK: ---been trying to reach you for a month now on it.

HK: Look you have no right to go to OMB with my papers. I take full responsibility for my own staffing papers and I am just going to take them indirectly to the President from now on.

BK: Well I am sorry about the delay but they have been trying to get back to you for a month now.

HK: They are trying to get back to me because you gave them my paper.

BK: Well

HK: My memos to the President--if I start showing them to the interested agencies I am dead

BK: I know but in terms of the WH staff we are trying to give the President an objective viewpoint.

HK: The President can get any objective viewpoint he wants as long as I have the responsibility for this goddamn action if you go to the other agencies, they will then make up another story in order to win their case and it'll never end. I had promised the Mexican an answer by the time their President came back. Well I am just going to take it directly to the President.

BK: Okay, I think Roy Ash was wanting to meet with you on it.

HK: I have my own things to do, I won't be back for a week and there are number of other reasons which would have made it important for us to be able to do this and it was a goddamn accurate account of what -- you know whatever the case they will be overruled, since they don't want to do what the Brownell report says and for political reasons we have to overrule them -- it doesn't make a goddamn bit of different what gimmick they have.

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Page 2

HK: Either way they are going to get overruled.

BK: The staffing system is set up just to give the people on the WH staff and that includes Roy Ash--a shot at the memos--we do the same thing for you Dr. Kissinger and when it--someone else tries to put something in without your viewpoint.

HK: Their viewpoint was reflected in this memo--it is an old story that if you get their viewpoint with a recommendation of getting them overruled that they will then answer my recommendation and then come in with another viewpoint and on this basis the process will be endless--their viewpoint isn't all that tough that I could have misunderstood it. They just don't want to do it.

BK: No, your papers come back directly to you and there is no change for appeal on that basis.

HK: The point is you gave them a paper in which I had summed up their viewpoint and recommended that it be overruled. On that basis then they naturally modify their point of view in order to take care of my recommendation.

BK: They have been trying to reach you for a month to resolve the thing.

HK: Well ah--

BK: And we would do the same for you--

HK: It isn't my goddamn viewpoint--I think I am qualified to make an objective assessment of the Mexican situation than you are.

BK: I have no vested interest in it--all I want to do is make sure the President gets all the viewpoints that he needs to make the decision and that's my responsibility--not to put my viewpoint in it at all.

HK: The fact is that it is totally unacceptable to me that a memo with my recommendation goes back to anybody else. After I have been charged with collecting the various points of view which I did as fairly as I could.

BK: I do the same thing for you--if someone else--

HK: I don't give a damn what you do for me Mr. Kehrli because you are going to be told how to do it next week and then you are just going to do it and I just cannot accept it. We have had a major foreign policy problem--we promise something and its being held up a month for without any notification to me. I am not a contestant with OMB on this and there is no possible way I could have misunderstood the OMB position which was summed up in there--no possible way--they wanted to get a second shot at it after their first one was recommended to be overruled.

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HK : This isn't a complicated issue--if it were, I would grant that perhaps we misunderstood them. This is a very simple issue in which OMB doesn't want to spend the money, and it is now 500 reasons why it shouldn't spend the money--there is only one issue--whether this thing is going to be settled by 1978 or whether we are going to have a confrontation with the Mexicans in the year or two--and whether they spend 80M dollars 40 M or 50M is a subsidiary issue. I have no--I don't even understand the technical issues--I have no knowledge and no interest in it. But we bought Mexican President's silence on this trip which he took by promising him to move on the ______ issue as soon as he came back.

So it is really totally irrelevant what OMB thinks which is a pure fiscal matter. No matter what they come up with cannot be satisfactory. And what they did was to take my recommendation and are trying to argue with it--that's what they want to do. Their original position was not to do it. And to push it into the 1980s. Believe it is unacceptable to the Mexicans because this President is committed to this--their Mexican President who has only one term to conclude it in his term. That is the issue. So the figures are irrelevant--if it isn't settled by 76 we are going to have a major confrontation. Now it doesn't have to be completed by 76 but the final thing has to be done well in train by 76 which is the fiscal jist of the Brownell report recommendation and my support for it. And therefore the OMB is turning it into a bureaucratic contest misses the entire point--I guarantee you the President will approve it on any variation of the OMB scheme. But I'll get Scowcroft to move on it tomorrow.

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P. O. BOX 647

TELCONE

Amb. Dinitz (Israel)/Mr. Kissinger

755 pm, May 3, 1973

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Dr. Kissinger.

K: While I'm gone, General Scowcroft will be in touch with you and he knows
all our conversations and you can treat with complete confidence.

D: Yeah, fine.

K: And he will pass on to you any intelligence information we get on that
subject you discussed.

D: Fine.

K: In the meantime, could you give us your intelligence assessment of what
the Syrians are up to in Lebanon?

D: Yes, I've already requested this a few hours earlier because I had a call
from State that they were concerned on the deteriorating situation. I
expect to get a cable within the next half an hour. Shall I call the General
about it too?

K: Yes, please.

D: Yeah, I will do this. I think within the next hour I should have some
information.

K: Right.

D: So I will have our people talk to State but I will also call the General.

K: Right. Good.

D: Okay. Thank you very much and have a nice trip.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh.

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Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/73

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Marvin Kalb

5/3/73 8:27 p.m.

HK: Marvin, I just wanted to tell you I appreciated your asking me that question.

MK: Yes, sir, and I want you to know that was the most--I don't know--I kept looking at you and being pained throughout that whole damn thing but I was under instruction and I hope

HK: Being pained that you had to ask it?

MK: Yes, I was pained that I had to

HK: Well I was actually glad you did.

MK: Oh, good because my feeling was inside that I couldn't bother you with that but

HK: Well I knew you didn't do it happily but

MK: You could see that on my face, I think.

HK: No, no you didn't have your old fervor and I just as soon since it had been mentioned in this highly misleading context--

MK: You notice that the--as I said, I was under the instructions to do so.

HK: I don't know whether anyone used this.

MK: Nobody used it. Because your explanation -- well, number one nobody used it but as far as CBS reasoning was concerned your explanation was so acceptable that there was not reason to make something out of nothing. And this was the time -- see what's happened is that everybody is now looking obviously and they had an assumption based on what I had told and based on our last conversation that there was no reason to look in that wing of the WH.

HK: That is absolutely correct.

MK: Right. So when this story appeared in the paper this morning, they said ah, he said--and then I said, I said and I still believe and they said well you damn well better ask that question then which was the reason for it.

HK: You know--I hope no other question has to be raised, but there is no possible way that any of these operations --

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MK: That you would be involved in that stuff-

HK: involved--knowledgeable of any of that--

MK: Listen, when do you take off?

HK: In about 3 hours.

MK: Mama mia--you going straight through?

HK: I'm going straight through and then I'm going out to Brezhnev's country house.

MK: Oh really? Is that the one you went out that Wednesday night?

HK: No. This is further out--this is 70 miles from Moscow.

MK: My God. Henry, I'll tell you something for an old communist leader, that guy has more homes than Rockefeller.

HK: (laughing) I tell you, if you want to live in style, you better be a communist leader.

MK: When are you coming back?

HK: Thursday night.

MK: You making any other stops?

HK: I'm stopping in London just for a roundup with Burke Trent

MK: I see. Does Heath come here as part of this Western--

HK: No, Well Heath was here and we really discussed the main elements of my speech with Heath before -- back then.

MK: I see. That's wonderful. I wish you a very, very good trip.

HK: You seem to have a wild party going on.

MK: Well it's not all that wild--it's a farewell for Bob McClosky--

HK: Right--well I wish him well.

MK: Good--wish you were here.

HK: I wish I could be.

MK: Right. Bye.

TELCOM

Fred Brisson/Mr. Kissinger

8:32 p. m. 5/3/73

HK: Freddy, how are you?

FB: Fine--we had expected to see you at the State dinner, but we never got there.

HK: Oh what a pity.

FB: The one for Willy Brandt, you know?

HK: Yes, what happened.

FB: Well the production people--the writers and directors and all of that. In connection with the spectacular came out here and had to work here for four days and to put the thing together and they've started rehearsals now.

HK: What spectacular is that? Oh--the "Woman of the year" thing?

FB: Yes. And I'm just checking with you to see if you'll be with us now on the 14th--I see in the papers where you are supposed to be off today.

HK: Yes, but there is a prettygood chance that I'll be here.

FB: Oh that's great--I'll tell you Mamie is going to join us that night--you got my letter didn't you?

HK: Yes, who is?

FB: So Henry you can bring as many girls as you want because I assure you the ones I got are a little bit over the hill.

HK: I was just going to say this doesn't sound like a great attraction to me.

FB: No no, but we have to stay within the framework of the show.

HK: Is that after the show?

FB: No no, I'll tell you what it is Henry. We are meeting in the atrium where we are having cocktails and--for instance, Kay Graham will be there, Rose Kennedy all those--Strause and Shirley Chisholm and so forth. And we're having cocktails and dinner and then the rest of the people--and entertainers that are on the show--they'll be there too. And we will have dinner and Javits and Mamie, the Harrimans--no, no they aren't coming to the dinner--they're coming to the show; but we will have a table of about 14. And then we have dinner there about 730 and

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Authority: E.O. 12958

Dated: NARA Dated: 6/2/94

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at about 9:30 we go over to the Eisenhower theater where they do a warmup
before the actual television show and the show starts at 10:00 and then the
reception is at 11:00 in the atrium afterwards.

HK: Right, well I will do my best to be there.

FB: I'll be in Washington starting next Thursday and I'll give a call to your office
--we'll be at the Madison

HK: No, Thursday, I won't be there--I'll be back Thursday night.
So call me Friday.

XB: Call me Friday

FB: I'll call you Friday, Henry. We miss seeing you but we see your pictures
in the paper.

HK: The Domestic side of the House is getting all the publicity these days.

FB: I should say so. It was a pretty good dinner the other night, I hope

HK: It was very nice.

FB: Looking forward to seeing and so is Rosalyn--hope you can make.

HK: I'll do my best.

FB: Don't forget to make a date.

HK: Oh I'll make a date--don't worry about that.

FB: The Bradens are having a dinner on the 16th--are you going there by any
chance?

HK: I don't think they've asked me yet.
But I'm sure they will-- No on the 16th, I may be in Paris again.

FB: I'll check with you on Friday.

HK: Thank you. Give my best to Ros.

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority E012858