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never establishing, /a sense of direction.
Foreign leaders /may/ not understand
this, but they would do themselves a favor
by waiting until Clinton has had time to
organize his administration and think
through what he wants to do.<-

*/paragraph deleted/<-

[22]

## Clinton would be wise to resist the pressures to /conduct/ personal diplomacy on the Presidential level, a tendency that in his case may be reinforced by his considerable capacity to charm. When heads of government start negotiating on details, there are two risks. One is a genuine misunderstanding, where each thinks he has convinced the other, and neither has. The other is that they may make their disagreements too clear, and thereby eliminate the possibility for compromise. For world leaders do not get to where they are without having highly developed egos, and they do not like to be perceived as backing down from well-publicized positions.<-

[1]

## The best role for /a president/ is to explain to foreign leaders what he is trying to

[16]

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IN0606 Kissinger

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do and to chart broad avenues for discussion. /deletion/Conventional wisdom /has it that/ if two sides disagree, a compromise should be sought somewhere in the middle.

But if the /other party/ knows that this is an operating principle, he will have every incentive to stake out an extreme position so that the compromise comes as close to his real position as possible. Then there is the belief that /the way to break a deadlock is to offer/ new proposals as a demonstration of America's flexibility. The practical result is often the deadlock one seeks to avoid-/deletion/. In my view, the best negotiating tactic is to stake out a moderate, reasonable position and then stick to it. Salami tactics of making little concessions at a time please the bureaucracy but confuse the /other party./<--

When I was in government, I generally tried to avoid situations where the president /deletion/ had to meet foreign leaders without knowing what the foreign leader was going to say ahead of time. And I used to make every effort to tell foreign leaders what the president /deletion/ would have

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to say to them. When heads of government meet, surprise should be reduced to a minimum and major emphasis should be placed on conceptual understanding. <-

All this will raise the inevitable issue of where the focus of decision-making should be. Clinton has said that he wants foreign policy made in the White House and implemented in the State Department. In my early years in the Nixon White House, this was certainly the opertaing style. But it was due to emergency circumstances not applicable to current events. The Vietnam negotiations, while exhausting, concerned a few relatively simple issues. The opening to China was spectacular but a single dramatic event. Economic issues were not yet as determining as they are /now. Today, the/ challenge is to devise a new concept of foreign policy and to implement it across the entire spectrum of our nation's /endeavours. / <-

Given this need, it would be a mistake for a president, particularly one with little international experience, to try to run the

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[18]

["JAN 22 '93 06:02PM 2123505146", "IN0606 Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "details of foreign policy out of the White\nHouse. The range and complexity of issues\nfacing the United States today are so great\nthat a Secretary of State needs to be in-\nvolved in the development of the concepts\nin order to convey the nuance of policy\ndecisions to the appartus that must imple-\nment it. The role of the National Security\nCouncil staff should be to frame the policy\noptions, but the Secretary of State must\nhave the major input.<-", "[14]", "## Organization should not be confused with stagnation. Some conflict of views within the new foreign policy team is certainly inevitable, and should not be discouraged by the president. It is much better for a head of state to have clear-cut alternatives presented to him then to get recommendations in the form of predigested compromises. For that usually has the effect of shifting the field of the bureacratic battle from phraseology to interpretation. The president may think that he has approved a pre-negotiated compromise, but each department interprets the decision in the way that suits it purposes.<-", "[15]", {"bbox": [724, 1357, 852, 1376], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

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Ironically, Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that most of our foreign problems had been solved, and that we could therefore focus on domestic restructuring, has come to office at a time of international turmoil, and perhaps crisis. But it is also a time that presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, yet he was responsible for (deletion) the architecture of a generation of American foreign policy. Clinton faces a similar challenge, though of course /under different circumstances./ If he can teach America to temper its twin impulses toward missionary zeal and isolationism, and /reconcile its/ values /with its interests/, he will have laid the groundwork for long-term progress toward peace. History will then little care how well he understood the world when he came to office.<-

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[22]

["IN0606", "DEPT.", "economically vital to many parts of the\nworld, whether or not Iran and Iraq are in\ndirect conflict. This requires the organiza-\ntion of some potential outside force to bal-\nance Iraq's continued ambitions and the\ngrowing strength of Iran. I agree with Clin-\nton that countries have to be judged by\ntheir actions. But Washington should not\nbecome so obsessed with technical compli-\ndance with the cease-fire provisions that it\nneglects the long term need for equilibri-\num. And I do not believe that we can any\nlonger hope to create that balance by con-\nciliating Iraq.<-", "Whatever others may say about the im-\nplications of Clinton's lack of military serv-\nice and his resistance to the Vietnam war,\nhe should not feel compelled to analyze\nthe situation in terms of whether he will look\ntough or not. He should assess it simply\nin the light of the objectives he is trying to\nachieve. Before he considers any form of\nmilitary action, he should define for him-\nself what he is trying to get the other side to\ndo, keeping in mind Bismarck's admoni-\ntion: ``Woe to the statesman whose argu-", (((MORE)))", "[18]"]

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Ironically, Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that most of our foreign problems had been solved, and that we could therefore focus on domestic restructuring, has come to office at a time of international turmoil, and perhaps crisis. But it is also a time that presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, yet he was responsible for some of America's most important postwar achievements. Clinton should be judged by how well he meets the challenges at hand. If he can teach America to temper its twin impulses toward missionary zeal and toward semi-isolationism, and lay the groundwork for a sustainable, long-term period of peace toward world order, his history will care little how well he understood the world when he came to office.<-

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its values & its needs will love land

IN0606
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BU: HJ: LINES(INCL.HEAI
PG: ISSUE: ; 93A
IN0606 -MWHITA-PVT
MWHITA ;01/21,14:59

By Henry A. Kissinger<--

11111111111111111111111111111111

[1]

When President Clinton spoke to The New York Times a week before his inauguration about how to deal with Saddam Hussein, he said that he was a Baptist, and he believed in the possibility of conversion. This comment was widely criticized as naive, and seen as evidence that the new president may not have the necessary diplomatic acumen to function effectively on the world state. But unsophisticated is may have sounded, Clinton's attitude was not very different from that of Franklin Roosevelt who, in the tenth year of his presidency, after Stalin has killed as many Russians as the Germans had, convinced himself that Stalin was reasonable, referred to him as Uncle Joe, and consented at Yalta to giving the Soviet de facto control over most

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["IN0606", "DEPT.", "PAGE-2", "[lc]", "of Eastern Europe.<-", "[19]", "Indeed, Clinton's remarks reflected two long traditions in American foreign policy—the enormous emphasis on good personal relations, and the belief that we can change our adversaries by the force of our example and good will. President Reagan, for example, began by talking about an evil empire, but later prided himself on having brought Gorbachev to a perception of Western values. At various stages of the post-war period, Soviet and other leaders have been described as having almost converted to the American point of view, that economic cooperation is more important than political gain. It is a fantasy often played out in American movies: a villain suddenly gets hit in the head or gets a disease and, from one day to the next, becomes benign.<-", "[18]", "Yet the real issue is not whether Clinton has the necessary wariness and self-discipline to conduct a successful foreign policy. He is president now, and much of what he may not know about the fine points of international diplomacy he will learn on the job.", (((MORE)))-"]

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The deeper problem confronting the new president is to understand the kind of world which America now finds itself in: a world which we cannot not dominate, but from which we cannot withdraw. It is a genuinely multipolar world, which requires some concept of a balance of power. Yet Clinton has assumed leadership of a country that has been traditonally hostile to that philosophy, and wedded to a belief in U.S. ``exceptionalism'' that leads either to messianic attempts to transform the world in America's image or to sullen retreats from it.<-

[20]

That conception of America's role must also take into account that each of the players in this multipolar game has unique tendencies based on history and circumstances. The penchant of American politicians has often been to treat all interlocutors alike, promoting American objectives as selfless and thus universally desirable. They have great trouble understanding that this makes foreign leaders nervous. For national interest can be calculated and relied upon; altruism can be capricious and

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PAGE-4

[c]

can change with the mood of the moment.<-

[13]

In few places is the need for this kind of objectivity—and appreciation of the requirements of equilibrium—more evident than in the Persian Gulf. It is a region menaced by two two aggressive powers, Iraq and Iran, each pursuing a different form of radicalism, both incompatible with the survival of the much smaller moderate regimes in the area. Every once in a while, these two regimes clash over the distribution of the spoils. The last time it happened, in the 1980s, America interpreted Iraq's resistance to Iran as having taught Saddam Hussein the advantages of moderation. Therefore, after the war, Washington continued to support Iraq and make possible its later aggressiveness. This was not because we were ``soft on Saddam'' in the abstract, but because we failed to view the situation in a geopolitical framework.<-

[20]

The challenge now is two-fold. First, it is to keep Iraq and Iran from starting to fight each other again, for that would benefit no one. Second, it is to protect a region that is

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["IN0606", "DEPT.", "PAGE-5", "economically vital to many parts of the\nworld, whether or not Iran and Iraq are in\ndirect conflict. This requires the organiza-\ntion of some potential outside force to bal-\nance Iraq's continued ambitions and the\ngrowing strength of Iran. I agree with Clin-\nton that countries have to be judged by\ntheir actions. But Washington should not\nbecome so obsessed with technical compli-\nance with the cease-fire provisions that it\nneglects the long-term need for equilibri-\num. And I do not believe that we can any\nlonger hope to create that balance by con-\nciliating Iraq.<-", "[18]", "Whatever others may say about the im-\nplications of Clinton's lack of military serv-\nice and his resistance to the Vietnam war,\nhe should not feel compelled to analyze\nthe situation in terms of whether he will look\ntough or not. He should assess it simply\nin the light of the objectives he is trying to\nachieve. Before he considers any form of\nmilitary action, he should define for him-\nself what he is trying to get the other side to\ndo, keeping in mind Bismarck's admoni-\ntion: ``Woe to the statesman whose argu-", (((MORE)))))"]

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PAGE-6

ments at the end of the war are not as
persuasive as they were at the beginning.''
In the case of Iraq, he does not have to prove
anything other than that he understands
the U.N. restrictions and will act to enforce
them.<-

[18]

The same problem of equilibrium pre-
sents itself in other parts of the world. In
the former Soviet Union, the issue is usual-
ly couched as though, if only democracy
and free enterprise were to come to Russia,
all problems would disappear. Yet if Russia
became stronger as a result of economic
reform, its relations with its neighbors
would become more complicated, not less.
The leadership groups that I know in Rus-
sia have not intention of accepting the dis-
integration of their influence over the old
empire. Sooner or later, the imperative of
market economics may also clash with the
imperative of democracy, giving rise to a
kind of pro-market authoritarian govern-
ment like that of Pinochet in Chile. The
Clinton administration would then have to
weigh the traditonal American impulse to
insist on democracy against both the dan-

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["IN0606", "DEPT.", "PAGE-7", "ger of conflict between the republics and\nthe political stability of Russia itself.<-", "[22]", "Other developments have helped create a\nsituation in which no one or two powers can\npredominate. Ironically, the Star II agree-\nment, by reducing the number of U.S. war-\nheads, brings countries like France and\nBritain and maybe China closer to a posi-\ntion of nuclear parity. Clinton is also right\nto stress the fact that the economic power of\nboth our friends and rivals must be taken\ninto greater account than ever before. And,\nas he pointed out in his inaugural addresss,\nthere are issues such as the environment,\npopulation and catastrophic diseases that\nrequire greater international consulta-\ntion. The emphasis on these new concerns\ncannot replace the traditional calculus of\ngeopolitics, but they have become another\nfactor to be taken into account.<-", "[18]", "Adjusting to these new realities has been\ncomplicated by the changing nature of di-\nplomacy. In the 19th century Europe, lead-\ners had more or less the same education,\nand understood intangibles in the same", {"bbox": [823, 1305, 955, 1327], "category": "Text", "text":>((MORE)))"]

["IN0606", "DEPT.", "way. Today, leaders emerge from such dif-\nferent backgrounds and political processes\nthat adjusting to eachother requires enor-\nmous effort. In previous centuries, slow\ncommunications also meant that diplo-\nmats had much greater latitude. The only\nway to instruct them was to send conceptu-\nal guidelines and leave them to determine\ntactics. For leaders of governments, this\nhad the great benefit of making them think\nthrough what they needed to say to make\nsure their position were correctly repre-\nsented. Today, negotiators often do not un-\nderstand the strategy behind their instruc-\ntions at all. They often get cables that\nsimply tell them what to say. The result can\nbe a certain sloppiness of thinking at home\nand a certain randomness in the conduct of\nthe negotiators.<--", "By the time these lines are being read,\nPresident Clinton will already have been\ninundated by daily cables that require an\nanswer, and by the pleadings of bureaucra-\ncies that will subtly try to push him in\ndifferent directions. Foreign leaders will\nattempt to descend on him, hoping to estab-", (((MORE))))", "[24]"]

IN0606

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lish a personal relationship or to extract
assurances or statements that they can use
to their advantage later on. To avoid being
engulfed, Clinton must decide philosophi-
cally what he is aiming at and resist the
pressure to get involved in the minutiae of
diplomacy. Recently, a European leader
asked me when he should come to Washing-
ton to meet the new president. I told him to
do himself a favor and wait until Clinton
has had time to think through what he
wants to do.<-

[19]

## Clinton would also be wise to resist the temptation to rely too heavily on personal diplomacy, a tendency that in his case may only be reinforced by his considerable capacity to charm. I believe, for example, that President Bush put too much emphasis on telephone with other world leaders (although luckily, he never found himself in a situation where he paid a price for it). When two heads of government start negotiating directly with each other on details, there are two risks. One is a genuine misunderstanding, where each thinks he has convinced the other, and neither has. The other-

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["IN0606", "DEPT.", "PAGE-10", "er is that they may make their\ndisagreements too clear, and thereby make\nit impossible to find room for compromise.\nFor world leaders do not get to where they\nare without having highly developed egos,\nand generally they do not like to back down\nfrom positions once they are taken. <—", "[21]", "What a president should do is to explain\nto foreign leaders what he is trying to do\nand to chart broad avenues of discussion.\nHe should state his country's point of view\nfirmly, but not personally discuss the poss-\nbilities for compromise, for that only en-\ncourages the other party to stake out an\nextreme position so that what he really\nwants will later seem like a concession.\nWhen I was in government, I generally\ntried to avoid situations where my presi-\ndents had to meet foreign leaders without\nknowing what the foreign leader was going\nto say ahead of time. And I used to make\nevery effort to tell foreign leaders what my\npresident would have to say to them, to\nminimize the danger of surprise, and to\nmaximize the opportunity for conceptual\nunderstanding. <—", "[19]", {"bbox": [836, 1347, 964, 1367], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

IN0606

DEPT.

In order to play this proper presidential
role, Clinton will have to rely on his foreign
policy apparatus to handle most of the de-
tails. And that will raise the inevitable
issue of where the focuse of decision-mak-
ing should be. Clinton has said that he
wants foreign policy made in the White
House and implemented in the State De-
partment. I am known as someone who, in
my years in the Nixon White House,
worked to limit the State Department's
role. But President Nixon had foreign poli-
cy his life study, and so had I. We were also
dealing with issues that, while huge, could
be reduced to relatively simple issues. For
example, one could open to China without
redesigning the whole concept of American
foreign policy. One could intervene at stra-
tegic moments in East-West negotiations,
but there was a certain momentum was
always in place. <—

Given the current climate in Washing-
ton, I believe it would be a mistake for a
president, particularly one with little in-
ternational experience, to try to run for-
eign policy completely out of the White

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[21]

["IN0606", "DEPT.", "PAGE-12", "House. The range and complexity of issues facing the United States today are so great that a Secretary of State needs to be involved in strategy in order to convey the nuance of policy decisions to the apparatus that must implement it. The role of the National Security Council staff should be to frame the policy options. And the new NSC advisor, Tony Lake, who worked on my staff in the Nixon White House, is precisely the right sort of highly talented analyst to perform that vital function.<-", "[17]", "That said, some conflict of views within the new foreign policy team is certainly inevitable, and should not be discouraged by the president. In fact, it's much better for a head of state to have clear-cut alternatives presented to him then to get recommendations in the form of predigested compromises. For that usually has the effect of transforming the field of the burecratic battle from phraseology to interpretation. The president may think that he has approved a pre-negotiated compromise, but each department interprets the decision in the way that suits it purposes.<-", "[14]", {"bbox": [835, 1347, 965, 1368], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

IN0606

DEPT.

Ironically, Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that most of our foreign problems had been solved, and that we could therefore focus on domestic restructuring, has come to office at a time of international turmoil, and perhaps crisis. But it is also a time that presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, yet he was responsible for some of America's most important postwar achievements. Clinton should be judged by how well he meets the challenges at hand. If he can teach America to temper its twin impulses toward missionary zeal and toward semi-isolationism, and lay the groundwork for a sustainable, long-term role in the new international order, history will care little how well he understood the world when he came to office.<-

(((END))))

[21]