YALE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

AUGENE V. ROSTOW

September 8, 1975

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach
Berliner Allee 33
4 Dusseldorf
Federal Republic of West Germany

Dear Kurt,

I am immensely grateful for your letter of August 27 about the
Iceland-German-European Community controversy. It must have crossed
my answer of September 4 to your preliminary letter on the subject.

Let me start with the premise of your letter, and the position
of the German government, which I thoroughly understand, namely,
that the negotiations are and should be governed by the Protocol
No. 6 of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Community and
Iceland.

Juridically, of course, you are correct. But there are times
when it may be wise to waive one's juridical rights in order to
achieve higher political and security goals.

For example, in the Middle East, the Security Council Resolutions gave us, and Israel, and the world community at large the absolute right to insist that there be no Israeli withdrawals at all until the parties, through direct negotiations, reach an agreement of peace. Rightly or wrongly, we decided that it was impolitic to ask Sadat to comply with the Resolutions. Instead, we negotiated for him two "military disengagement" agreements which returned territory to Egypt without peace. As you know, I have expressed reservations about the wisdom of our course. But, perhaps correctly, we reached the conclusion that it would be in the larger interest to follow the path we have followed--to separate Egypt from the Soviet Union and from the other Arab states, prevent a war, and another oil embargo, and maintain the momentum of negotiations.

The position of Germany and of the Community in relation to Iceland is analogous, I suggest. Would it contribute to our common ends to waive the provision of the Protocol, in effect, and negotiate with the Icelanders without that pressure? They do have a strong Communist party, which can and does readily exploit the "blackmail" issue. The

continued.....

Dr.Dr.h.c. Kurt Birrenbach

September 8, 1975

Page Two

Soviets are buying fish which can't be sold in Europe. The whole country
is extremely sensitive to the fishing problem. Our friends in Iceland
assure me, and I have no doubt assure your Ambassador, that negotiations
will proceed much more easily for them once the guillotine is removed.
I fully appreciate the stickiness of the negotiating process. All negotiations about fish seem to have that quality. But the political reality
within Iceland is palpable. And the present government, after all, won
a political victory last year which is the inspiration of the Portugese,
the Maltese, and others who have to contend, in the trenches, with
native Communist parties strongly supported by the Soviets.

With warm regards,

Yours cordially,

EVR/dm

Dictated but not read.

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

September 24, 1975

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry,

I enclose a copy of my answer to Dr. Karl Mommer's letter of August 22, which I sent you some time ago.

With cordial regards,

EVR/dm
Enc.

Atlantic Treaty Association
Association du Traité Atlantique

Chairman/Président: Eugene V. ROSTOW

Secretary General/Secrétaire Général: Jean de MADRE

185 rue de la Pompe, 75116 Paris

Tél. 553-15-08

September 24, 1975

Dr. Karl Mommer
53 Bonn-Bad Godesberg
Rotdornweg 6
Federal Republic of West Germany

My dear colleague and friend,

I was flattered by your faith in my command of the beautiful German language, but for safety I had your interesting and important letter translated! I know your English is much better than my German.

I believe that the sympathetic attitude of the German government towards this vexing and difficult controversy is fully appreciated--surely by my government, and I think by the Icelandic government as well. What is difficult for all of us outside Iceland to grasp--surely I did not fully understand the problem until I had been there a while, despite our baptism two years ago in Brussels--is the intensity of the Communist effort within Iceland, and the skill with which they exploit the fisheries issue.

To me, the peace to start is the question raised by paragraph 4 of your letter. Surely Germany has clear legal rights under the agreements. And surely international relations should in general be based on respect for legal rights. Pacta sunt servanda. If you recall my speech at the Hague a year ago, you will realize how strongly I subscribe to that view.

But every rule has exceptions. There are times when it may be wise to waive one's legal rights. We have just witnessed an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The agreement was based on a waiver by Israel (and the United States) of their legal rights under two Security Council Resolutions, those of 1967 and of 1973. Under those Resolutions, Israel was not required to withdraw one inch from the Sinai until Egypt made a binding, public, agreement of peace.

The United States decided to move on another track. It may have been right or wrong. (I criticized the policy in private and then in public). But we did what we did. Chancellor Schmidt publicly urged Israel to go along--to be more "flexible." I hope he was right.

continued...

Association Atlantique Belge, Bruxelles • Atlantic Council of Canada, Toronto • Atlantsammenslutningen, Kobenhavn • Association Française pour la Communauté Atlantique.
Paris • Deutsche Atlantische Gesellschaft, Bonn • Heilenic Atlantic Treaty Association, Athens • Samtok um Vestraena Samvinnu, Reykjavick • Comitato Italiano Atlantico, Roma • Comité Atlantique du Luxembourg, Luxembourg • Maltese Atlantic Association, Valetta • Atlantic Commission, 's Gravinhag • Den Norske Atlanterhavs Komité, Oslo • Comité Português do Atlántico, Lisboa • Türk Atlantik Antlaşması Dernegi, Ankara • British Atlantic Committee, London • Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington •

Dr. Karl Mommer

September 24, 1975

Page Two

It seems to me that the case for waiving one's legal rights in behalf of Iceland, an ally struggling with a difficult political problem, is far stronger than the case for Israel and the United States making a comparable concession to Egypt (which has been the aggressor in the Middle East over and over again) and the Soviet Union.

We are now in the ridiculous position in the Iceland-German-European community dispute we have achieved with our embargo of arms shipments to Turkey. Both we and the Turks say we will never yield to a Diktat. The trouble with "Diktats" is that they become cumulative; they escalate; and they defeat themselves.

Our friends and colleagues in Iceland, and their friends in the government, assure me that if the Protocol could be waived, the negotiations would go swimmingly, and a fair compromise would be reached. They say that they cannot move politically under present circumstances.

One thing I am sure of. The future law of the sea will be determined in the multilateral conference, and not by bilateral precedents. I learned in 1966-1969 that the bilateral precedents were worthless, because Peru, Ecuador and Canada would not go to the I.C.J.; Peru and Ecuador would not reach agreements; and we could not use force.

Looking forward to seeing you soon, and with most cordial regards,

EVR/dm

October 3, 1975

Dr. Karl Mommer
Rotdornweg 6
53 Bonn-Bad Godesberg
Federal Republic of West Germany

Dear Karl,

I have a promising signal to report to you. I had two telephone
calls yesterday from our friend and colleague Heimir Hanneson,
who was so helpful at our 1973 meeting in Brussels, and after
it, in getting the Icelandic-British cod-war settled.

He called once before he saw Johannson, and once afterwards.
Johannson, you may recall, is the sagacious and moderate
former Prime Minister - an excellent and powerful man, who
is now acting Foreign Minister. This is in itself excellent
news, since the nominal Foreign Minister is very much to the
left, and weak to boot.

The Icelanders are extremely pleased with the atmosphere and
implications of their recent meetings with German diplomats
in New York. They said they found a new and most welcome
spirit, which they attribute, with immense appreciation, to
your conversations and other efforts in Germany.

They are eager to move forward on the basis of what they felt
at New York, to take advantage of the opportunity you have
helped to create, and thus curb and defeat the Communist
politicians in their own country, and resolve a dispute of
great and growing danger to the alliance.

Our friend reports, especially after his talk with the Acting
Foreign Minister, that if Germany and the Community can bring
themselves to abolish the two pressure points - the veto on
Iceland's association with the Community, and the German
landing ban on Icelandic fishing vessels - seemingly on a
unilateral basis, "a most favorable atmosphere for negotiation"
will be created. They will be most forthcoming, they say,
even on the sensitive problem of German fishing in the zone
between 50 and 200 miles at sea. And Johannson adds that he
"would not exclude" the possibility of his going to Brussels
or Bonn, or both, if invited, to finalize the agreement.

- 2 -

[N]

They see the problem as exactly comparable to that presented
in the cod-war two years ago, or in the Turkish-American
imbroglio. In 1973, the British withdrew their ships,
unilaterally, after receiving assurances like those I report
to you today - then a fair compromise was reached, and the
war was ended.

No one likes to negotiate under threat. Small countries are
naturally most sensitive to such pressures, which highlight
their weakness. I am writing you the day after our House of
Representatives voted to end the arms embargo for Turkey -
an end for which our Atlantic Council has been working ever
since I returned from Europe in July, and indeed before that.

I hope and pray that Germany will be able to make the gesture
the finest political group in Iceland thinks it needs in order
to consolidate its 1974 victory over the Communists, and to
help restore allied solidarity in a most sensitive and important
place.

My government is very pleased to have this news, and will do
what it can. But you know how slow and unpredictable our
bureaucracy sometimes is. It would be infinitely better,
for many reasons, if the leadership and initiative at this
point were entirely German.

I share the grateful enthusiasm the Icelanders feel toward
you for what you have done already, and I am confident you
will be able to persuade your government to take the next
step for which you have prepared the way so well.

With warm regards.

Yours cordially,

October 3, 1975

Dr. L. C. Kurt Birrenbach
Berliner Allee, 33
4 Dusseldorf
Federal Republic of West Germany

Dear Kurt,

I have a promising signal to report to you on the Icelandic
fishing dispute. Yesterday I had two telephone calls from
Iceland, from one of the key leaders of the Atlantic Council
there, the man who helped immeasurably in solving the dispute
with Great Britain two years ago.

With warm regards.

Yours cordially,

October 14, 1975

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

PERSONAL

Dear Henry,

I was surprised by the comment at the foot of your letter of September 28. Before writing the article, I checked with Scotty about the views he attributed to you on the "statesmen" of the thirties. He confirmed the accuracy of his story, and indeed said that he nearly lost his back teeth when he heard you say it. Obviously, the Reston column is important in revealing an aspect of your thought-- important in itself, and important to the possibility of a genuine national debate about the ends and means of American foreign policy. I put my reaction to Scotty's report in the form of questions, not conclusions about your conception of your job, for the reason brought out by your response. We cannot have a serious debate if you say that those who disagree with your evaluation of Soviet policy are "against detente," or advocate policies which would lead to war, or if your critics say that you are an "appeaser."

For the rest, so far as you are concerned, my article rested on what you yourself had told me, or (about our Portuguese policy) on several reliable first-hand European and American officials, who all said exactly the same thing about your views.

I suggest that the way forward requires two steps.

You and I should have dinner alone at your convenience before too long in order to thrash out our differences. I have full confidence that our relation will make that exercise productive, and I hope we can do it reasonably soon. I offer you the hospitality of 208 St. Ronan Street as a quiet setting for our conversation. I am confident that such a meeting would make us both feel better, but it has no national importance.

My second suggestion, therefore, is that you soon make a speech in which you put the comment you made to Scotty behind you. It may well have been a casual remark, meaning nothing. It may have been a flash of light illuminating your inner mind. The constructive way to overcome the shock waves generated by Scotty's story (and my correspondence confirms that they are real) is an affirmative statement of

continued....

# The Foreign Policy "Debate"

Etc.

By EUGENE V. ROSTOW

Since 1973, when his plans for Indochina began to go wrong, our Secretary of State has been calling for a bipartisan foreign policy and a national debate that might develop it. But Mr. Kissinger's speeches and other statements frustrate the possibility of serious debate. It is difficult to convince public opinion that fresh policies are needed while a popular and plausible Secretary of State tells us that all is well.

Mr. Kissinger's Minneapolis speech of July 15 is altogether typical. "Detente" is his magic word, his Excalibur. He is for "detente," which he treats as a reality, not as the lodestar of American foreign policy since World War II. And he implies, none too gently, that those who disagree with him are against "detente." "What is the alternative that they propose?" he asks. "What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the Cold War? Does detente encourage repression—or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Can we ask our people to support confrontation unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored?"

In the last few years, these familiar rhetorical questions have been answered by a number of conscientious critics—Senator Jackson, George Meany, Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Albert Wohlstetter, George Ball, Thomas Hughes and the Foreign Policy Task Force of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. They have dealt with the broad framework of Mr. Kissinger's strategy; with his diplomatic and political style; and with his handling of specific problems like the nuclear arms negotiations, Indochina, the Middle East, Cyprus, Portugal and our relations with Europe and Japan.

Mr. Kissinger's critics have indeed proposed alternatives and asked for change in many "precise" policies." The Secretary has never answered them, save in the derisory manner of his Minneapolis speech.

The over-arching point on which all Mr. Kissinger's critics agree is that both the Nixon and the Ford administrations have sought political gains at home by claiming too much for the policy they call "detente." Mr. Kissinger refers to his critics as "critics of detente." But no sane person is against detente. What the critics say, echoing the words of the great Russian prophets of freedom, is that true detente has not been achieved, and that the pseudo-detente Brezhnev and Kissinger are talking about is a political sham. There has been no improvement in our relations with the Soviet Union, no change in the policies of that nation, and no relaxation of tensions, save in the travels of ballet companies and the spectacular performance of the Soviet and American astronauts. We

have lived through circuses before, however, and through periods when we were told that "the Spirit of Camp David" prevailed.

The heart of the matter is that we are in "a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger," to use Mr. Kissinger's phrase. We are living through "constant crises" far more threatening to the vital interests of the United States than those of the Truman period. Certainly the American people should not be asked to support what the Secretary calls "confrontation" unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored. But why does the Secretary refuse to explain to the American people that the Soviets have broken their agreements with us about Indochina, the Middle East and strategic arms; that is, that the supposed alternatives have been explored, and explored again, and shown to be a myth?

## The Thought of Chairman Mao

Despite the inherent strength of our position, based on the tensions of the Soviet-Chinese-American triangle, the fact is that American policy has not been realized. China turned to the United States in 1971 and 1972 in order to deter what it perceives to be a mortal Soviet threat. As Mao Tse-tung once remarked to a European visitor, "What is detente? I am detente. I keep a million Soviet troops immobilized in Siberia. If Chinese policy were different they would swarm over Europe."

But the immense advantages to us and our allies in China's rapprochement with the United States are being frittered away. The Chinese have complained lately about America's "strategic passivity." They are right. The salami is being sliced more and more frequently, and we pretend that nothing is happening.

In the Far East, the Soviet Union simply double-crossed us. In March, 1973, they promised to see to it that the North Vietnamese got out of Laos and Cambodia, and left South Vietnam to the South Vietnamese. This was the agreed predicate for our withdrawal from South Vietnam.

During the spring and summer of 1973, however, with Mr. Nixon on the spit of Watergate, the Soviets decided that they could ignore their promises with impunity. They backed the North Vietnamese offensive which finally crushed South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We did not evenbleat.

The pattern of Soviet policy in the Middle East has been, and remains exactly the

> Why does the Secretary refuse to explain to the American people that the Soviets have broken their agreements with us in Indochina, the Middle East and strategic arms?

same. In May, 1972, concerned about China's move for American protection, the Soviets publicly promised President Nixon they would fully support Ambassador Jarring's efforts to achieve peace between Israel and its neighbors in accordance with the mandate of the Security Council. Instead—starting a month before Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, 1972, according to President Sadat—they helped to plan, prepare, equip, incite and support the Arab aggression of October, 1973.

In Portugal, the Soviets are violating the most fundamental rule of the Cold War—that of mutual respect for each side's sphere of influence. We do not intervene in the internal affairs or the civil wars of Poland, East Germany, Hungary or Czechoslovakia. There can be no hope for detente unless the Soviets respect that primitive rule with equal discipline, above all for members of NATO and other American allies.

Both the Middle Eastern crisis and the Soviet bid for control in Portugal are situations of conflict which the Soviet Union is seeking to exploit as steps in its abiding strategy for enveloping Western Europe and mastering it.

Privately, Mr. Kissinger concedes that President Nixon claimed too much for "detente." But he and President Ford continue to make exactly the same claims Mr. Nixon made. Inspired stories suggest that Mr. Kissinger talks of "detente" so much only to disarm the American and European doves, silence The New York Times and leave the administration free to face down the Soviets when necessary. The idea is worthy of the Watergate team. The fact is that the Nixon and Ford administrations have by no means faced down all the Soviet threats they have had to meet.

On the contrary, they have yielded to Soviet blackmail and silently acquiesced in Soviet betrayals—in the strategic arms negotiations, in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East—hoping for the best and endlessly repeating their litany of "detente." If the Portuguese people and their political parties rid that NATO ally of the threat of Communist takeover, it will be a splendid victory in which our policy played no significant part. For many months, Mr. Kissinger is reliably reported to have been willing to write off Portugal altogether.

This quintessential flaw in Mr. Kissinger's view of his task is documented by James Reston in the Aug. 31 issue of The New York Times. His penetrating article illuminates an aspect of Mr. Kissinger's makeup about which observers have been increasingly concerned during the last few years.

Mr. Reston reports that Mr. Kissinger's strategy in the Middle East is to avoid "confrontation" with the Soviet Union and to avoid another Middle Eastern war. To achieve that end, he has sought and obtained an agreement between Israel and Egypt which, he explains, settles nothing, but buys time.

No one can quarrel with Mr. Kissinger's desire to prevent another Arab-Israeli war, which might bring Soviet threats to intervene militarily, like those which were made —in each case after the event—in 1956, 1967 and 1973. Nor can one object, in principle, to "buying time," at least if one plans to use the time to good advantage.

It is absurd, however, for Mr. Kissinger to answer those who disagree with his Middle Eastern policy by claiming that the policies they propose would lead to war. It is hardly self-evident after what happened in 1973 that the Arabs are straining at the leash for war. In any event, whether war occurs depends in considerable part on the strength or weakness of American policy.

But the Secretary's interview with James Reston goes beyond the issue of the Middle Eastern conflict. Churchill never tired of arguing that wise, firm and conciliatory diplomacy could have prevented both world wars. This is the thesis Mr. Kissinger challenges.

In order to obtain his second "military

disengagement" agreement between Israel and Egypt, Mr. Kissinger abandoned the Security Council Resolutions of 1967 and 1973 and forced Israel to abandon them, too. Two years ago, the Secretary rightly thought those resolutions were indispensable instruments for the protection of American and Allied interests in the Middle East, and in world politics. Their key provision, based on 27 years of tragic experience, is that Israel need not withdraw from any of the occupied territories until the parties themselves negotiate agreements of peace. In making peace, the parties would establish the "secure and recognized" boundaries to which Israel would withdraw, pursuant to an agreed timetable.

## Obliging President Sadat

Mr. Kissinger has now accepted the view that it is too much to ask President Sadat to negotiate directly with Israel and actually to make peace. He has therefore undertaken to oblige President Sadat by returning some of the Sinai to Egypt without firm and binding agreement to make peace, exactly as John Foster Dulles did in 1957 in order to oblige President Nasser. Mr. Kissinger defends the concession he has forced Israel to make as a practical compromise, intended to help avoid war, another oil embargo and perhaps a Soviet military move in the Middle East. One can only hope that Mr. Kissinger's confidence in the good intentions of President Sadat and his successors turns out to be better founded than Mr. Dulles' confidence in those of Mr. Nasser.

Mr. Reston summarizes Mr. Kissinger's case. "His argument," Mr. Reston says, "is fairly clear. In the period between the two World Wars, the statesmen of the major powers—if that is the right word for them—were much more heroic and determined to insist on their rights and principles, and as a result of their tactics peace lasted only 20 years, before the Second World War almost destroyed Western civilization."

Mr. Kissinger must be the first qualified academic who has described the European prime ministers, foreign ministers and diplomats of the period between the wars as heroic men, determined to insist on their countries' rights and principles to the point of war. Whom does Mr. Kissinger include in his list of misguided heroes? Sir John Simon? Pierre Laval? Sir Samuel Hoare? Chamberlain? Halifax? Flandin? Baldwin? Sir Neville Henderson? Churchill was in the wilderness during the critical years of this period, and Eden soon joined him there.

It is hard to recall an "heroic" statesman of the inter-war period who insisted on his country's "rights and principles," or an episode which fits the pattern Mr. Kissinger describes. For example, it is sensible to contend that Britain and France might well have prevented the war altogether if they had insisted on their rights, principles and interests, and refused to allow Hitler to remilitarize the Rhineland in 1936. It is difficult to imagine that Hitler could have moved in the east if this had been the case. Britain and France had a

perfect right to keep the Rhineland demilitarized under the treaties. But they didn't.

How would Mr. Kissinger have handled the Rhineland crisis? By avoiding confrontation and buying time? Would he dissent from Churchill's view that World War II could have been prevented if the ninnies and boobies who held high office during the '30s had seriously resisted aggression in Austria, Spain, Manchuria, Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia, before the momentum for aggression had become uncontrollable? Would Kissinger have advised Britain to fight on after the fall of France in 1940? One wonders.

## Mr. Kissinger's Model

It is breathtaking to realize, on the authority of an eminent and scrupulous journalist, that Mr. Kissinger identifies himself with Hoare, Laval and Chamberlain, and not with Churchill and Eden, among the men of the '30s. Mr. Kissinger often invokes Dean Acheson as a model. But Mr. Acheson's policy was dominated, from Berlin to Korea, by the conviction that only a firm Allied policy of insisting on their rights and security interests could build a foundation for better relations with the Soviet Union, based on mutual and reciprocal respect for the rules of the United Nations Charter.

Raymond Aron once remarked that the Cold War is due to "a dialectic of history more potent than anything willed by diplomats." George Kennan made the same point in his comment that "it is an insult to the serious men who direct the Communist movements of the world to suppose that they can be deflected from their cause by diplomatic niceties." Of course we should be fair, polite and imaginative in conducting our diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. That is the only way we can be true to ourselves. But it is a profound error to suppose that unrequited concessions, or silence about the reality of Soviet policy, could induce the leaders of the Soviet Union to accept the rules of international law as the basis for their own behavior.

Mr. Reston is Sterling Professor of Law at Yale and chairman of the Foreign Policy Task Force of the coalition for a Democratic Majority.

[ICC]

[LC]

The Certitudes of Interdependence
closing remarks
by
Eugene V. Rostow
President of the Atlantic Treaty Association
at its Twenty-First Annual Assembly
Paris, October 24, 1975

It has been a singular pleasure and privilege for the Atlantic Treaty Association that our debate throughout this Assembly was based upon Professor Raymond Aron's brilliant paper, "The Ambiguities of Interdependence." Professor Aron is of course an intellectual whose scholarship and probity are respected throughout the world. He represents not only the tradition of reason, but the tradition of reason disciplined by a firm and courageous allegiance to the values of our liberal civilization. Neither intellectual fashion nor political resistance have ever caused him to hesitate in expressing the conclusions to which his mind, and his faith, have led his pen.

Professor Aron's paper has dominated our discussion. It has been an exercise which demonstrated that a searching analysis at the highest intellectual level is not only useful, but sport as well. We enjoyed his paradoxes and his ironies, which helped to reveal the ambiguities and pomposities of life for what they are. They helped us to confront his thesis in all its rigor.

Now, four days later, after many hours of talk, and as many more spent in drafting and debating our Final Resolution, we must ask ourselves, "Where have we been?"

Professor Aron's argument, we have discovered, is not exactly what it seemed at first reading.

2.

[LC]

Professor Aron started with the arresting proposition, altogether correct, that the fact of interdependence does not create a feeling of solidarity, still less a will for collective action. Many inferred from what he wrote, and said, that he was justifying this paradox, not describing or explaining it. Now we all realize, I believe, that Professor Aron's preoccupation was not to devise a program, but to delineate a state of mind.

It is human, and natural, he pointed out, for men to yearn for the restoration of the autonomy of the nations to which they belong. The strength of their feeling of allegiance to the national idea is one of the essences of history which we must accept. It is a reality which cannot be changed easily, or quickly. Perhaps it cannot be changed at all, during the forseeable future, even by the historical development of interdependence, which seems to command international solidarity.

The first of the historical forces pressing for Western solidarity, Professor Aron contends, is the nature of Soviet policy, backed by the massive growth of Soviet military power. The Soviet threat to the security of Europe and the United States, Professor Aron points out, has increased in recent years, and is increasing still. If one looks only at the balance of forces, he says, it is obvious. If one looks beyond force levels to the configurations of world politics, the combined threat of Soviet policy to the west--the threat of political intimidation based on military power; the exploitation of social unrest; and the influence within our society of Western Communist parties and other groups,--is like the danger we faced in 1949, if not worse.

3.

[LC]

True, Professor Aron doubts whether the Soviets would actually invade Western Europe across the central front in Germany, although he would be the first to add that such an invasion is a tactic both implicit and explicit in Soviet military doctrine, should the opportunity arise. But a direct invasion of Europe is not the only tactic the Soviets can employ to bring Western Europe under Soviet control. The Soviets need not accept the risks of such an invasion, if they can reach their overriding strategic goal--that of controlling Western Europe--by enveloping Europe from the South or the North, or both:--for example, by reaching a position of dominance in the Middle East and North Africa, and gaining power in a number of European countries which now have strong Communist parties.

In explaining the decline in Western solidarity, Professor Aron puts primary emphasis on the fact that public opinion does not now perceive the direct threat of a Soviet invasion, and finds the Soviet campaign of encirclement hard to identify, or to believe in. True, the people of the West perceive the reality of Soviet policy in moments of crisis--when, for example, Soviet policy produces explosions like those of the successive Soviet-backed attacks on Israel. Public opinion can hardly be blamed for failing to understand that the goal of Soviet policy in the Middle East and North Africa is Europe itself, so long as our political leaders fail to portray the significance of events to their own people in this perspective, and indeed go further, in proclaiming the achievement of "detente" with the Soviet Union, and an end of the "Cold War."

4.

Whatever the causes of this condition may be, Professor Aron is surely right in pointing out that fear has diminished in influence as the cement of the Alliance. The decline in fear, he says, seems to justify each country in going its own way, despite the fact of our interdependence, and despite the universal desire to maintain the Alliance as a precaution--a kind of insurance policy, in case the optimistic appraisals of Soviet policy turn out to be wrong.

The pattern of Western response, Professor Aron points out, is similar in the sphere of economics. Concerted action, he says, is a patent necessity on the main economic problems we face, and face together, as participants in an integrated world economy. But he doubts whether it will occur, even though every nation has an equal stake, or should be able to recognize one, in the effective functioning of a system capable of producing results as remarkable as those achieved during the Bretton Woods period which ended so brutally in August, 1971.

Why should the phenomenon Professor Aron describes have occurred? Must we treat it as something from the realm of the absurd, an episode of mass hysteria like the Dance of Death? Or are there roots to be identified, political, social, or psychological causes whose elucidation might permit us to build more rational policies, and persuade men to accept them?

The problem, I believe, is somewhat different in the realms of security and of economics, although the state of mind of the west is generically the same with regard to both. In both realms, too, there is another irony, another paradox. Our basic position is strong, stronger probably than ever before.

5.

[LC]

In the field of security, the strength of our position is symbolized by China's rapprochement with the United States. The logic of the nuclear weapon, and the pressures of Soviet policy, have forced China to realize that its security requires a relationship of close association with the United States, and with Europe and Japan. The lesson of these events is equally clear for Europe, for Japan, and for many other nations throughout the world.

On the foundation of these facts, it should be possible to achieve a stable system of peace, if our diplomacy is conducted with reasonable skill, energy, and confidence.

Similarly, our position is also strong in the field of economics, despite the folly of our own policies in recent years, and the catastrophic increase in the price of oil. Collectively, the western nations and Japan possess a monopoly far more important than the monopoly position of the OPEC nations with respect to oil: the monopoly, that is, of the entrepreneurship, capital, and skill which the developing world must use if it is to achieve the economic progress its people so desperately want. It is today more apparent than ever before that the world economy is profoundly integrated as a single system, which can be managed only by the collective efforts of the industrialized nations in the first instance, and notably by the close cooperation of Western Europe, North America, and Japan.

Despite these developments, however, we do not feel strong and confident. On the contrary, we feel weak, beset, confused, hesitant, and even besieged.

6.

[LC]

On problems of security, both history and technology are factors which tempt the Atlantic nations to avoid solidarity.

Some in Europe argue that if, in the nature of the nuclear weapon, the United States has to be the ultimate guarantor of security anyway, why should the European nations take risky and expensive positions, and affront large sections of their public opinion, which prefers to believe that Soviet policy is one of wronged and defensive innocence, after all? In America, the obverse of the argument has some support. If the United States is necessarily the ultimate guarantor of European, Japanese, and Chinese security, because of unclear logic, these men contend, why should the United States engage in the tiresome exercise of Alliance solidarity, with all that it entails?

Under these circumstances, the record of responsible solidarity achieved by the Western nations through the North Atlantic Alliance during the last twenty-six years is a remarkable achievement. The Alliance forces exist. They are strong, well-trained, and well-led. They have somehow been maintained, despite the fluctuations of western opinion.

This judgment requires an important qualification. The Alliance has never consistently achieved solidarity with regard to events outside Europe which directly affect the security of Europe. Europe suffers from a certain myopia on the subject of the outer world. While the Alliance achieved something close to a concerted position with regard to the diplomacy of the Middle Eastern War of 1967, this was hardly the case in 1948, 1956, or 1970-73. There is

7.

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a strong European reaction to the present threat of a Communist
take-over in Portugal, or in Spain, but not to the steady process
of Soviet penetration in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Lebanon, Egypt,
or the Middle East generally.

I believe that the European myopia about events outside the area
defined in the North Atlantic Treaty stems from an important aspect
of the historical experience of Europe since 1945--the liquidation
of Empire, and the withdrawal of Europe to Europe itself. Europe's
retreat from Empire has been an immense and a traumatic process,
which has deeply affected the European outlook. Thus far, it has
been translated into a more and more insistent refusal to take
responsibility for European security even on the flanks of the
continent, and on its vital sea-lanes.

It is this feature of European security policy, I believe,
more than any other, which led Solzhenitzyn recently to conclude
that the Third World War is over; that Europe is on the verge of
falling under Soviet control; and that we are in the opening phases
of the Fourth World War, that for the United States itself.

Is Solzhenitzyn's harsh verdict justified? The next few years
will reveal the truth. There will certainly be more explosions caused
by Soviet policy, and the growing military forces behind it. If we
look at the curve of crises over the last quarter century, starting
with the threats to Turkey and Greece, and the blockade of Berlin in
the late 'forties, we note that each crisis was worse and more power-
ful than its predecessors. We should remark on the way in which
these events are reflected in the speeches of our leaders. For the

8.

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last few months, Mr. Kissinger has been stressing a theme which did not appear in his earlier statements. If war comes, he has said repeatedly, our people must be convinced that everything possible has been done to avoid it.

The economic factors leading to the paralysis of effective solidarity among the industrialized nations are somewhat different from those affecting Alliance solidarity on security matters, but just as difficult to overcome. In this realm, the stakes are obvious. Inflation and unemployment are visible, unpopular, and profoundly unjust. The root of our troubles on the economic side of our interdependence is not the obscurity of the threat, or psychological resistance to recognizing it, but the absence of agreement on the right remedy.

It is not, I stress, the absence of an adequate analysis of our difficulties, and of an appropriate prescription for them. I believe that such an analysis exists. But it is drowned in a Babel of conflicting and not very convincing voices.

I would remind you that there never is a consensus among economists, any more than there is or should be consensus among lawyers, historians, or practitioners of any other learned calling. During the Great Depression of the Thirties, Keynes was part of a small minority among the economists, in advocating policies he had developed from the ideas of a number of his predecessors.

It is true, no doubt, that the evolution of the economy has gone beyond the reach of conventional wisdom. We have passed the limits of our intellectual capital, and do require a fresh and

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creative input, comparable to the work of Keynes and his followers a generation ago. One can only sympathize with the poor politicians, whose paralysis during the last few years has been the genuine response of biological organisms under severe stress. But we must remind them, also, that the task of practical men is to choose among the prescriptions of the experts--to decide which of the experts makes sense.

This altogether normal task for politicians has never been more difficult. It is always rare to find leaders who are willing to lead. Under present day circumstances, outsiders must admit that the choices open to our political leaders are hardly simple, or obvious. The agenda of politics recalls the comment of Camus that in the human condition there is fundamental absurdity as well as implacable grandeur, and that these two qualities naturally appear together.

We need the analysis of our intellectuals--first rate analysis translated into policy. Beyond analysis, we must achieve a renewal of political will.

I have no doubt about the will of our people, as distinguished from that of our leaders. We need only contemplate the inspiring events in Portugal to realize how powerful the will of our people is. After nearly two generations of dictatorship, the people of Portugal are saying, day after day, that they do not want to exchange one dictatorship for another. The communists are making a fierce attempt to seize control in that tortured country. But they have not yet prevailed.

10.

In this strange period, there are patterns of nearly instinctive
and inarticulate reaction beneath the ritual content of our political
vocabularies. For example, we are meeting here in Paris, hardly
an event without meaning against the background of recent history.
And there is, throughout Europe, a powerful response to what is
happening, and what is threatened, in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and
Greece.

The management of interdependence is an inexorable task. Both
in the field of security and of economics, it demands a large
measure of solidarity. After all, the field of security is not
military alone, but largely political. In our unstable world, where
the contending forces struggle in circumstances of more and more
visible violence and anarchy, political policies must often be
backed by the implicit presence of effective and credible military
power.

Thus far, on the ultimate issues, both Europe and the United
States have hesitated to accept the full burden of solidarity, in a
situation which was stable enough to give us the luxury of pausing
until 1971 in the realm of economics, and until October, 1973, in
the realm of politico-military or military-political affairs. The
premise on which our posture of hesitation depended is rapidly
disappearing.

In the light of that fact, I shall conclude by attempting to
answer the question Professor Aron puts on page 9 of his paper:
"To what extent can a European interest, as distinct from an American
or an Atlantic interest, be discerned?"

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11.

I should answer his fundamental question categorically. Both the economic and the security interests of Europe and America are identical. In the realm of security, they are Atlantic interests. In the realm of economics, they are interests we share with Japan and the other industrialized nations who are members of O.E.C.D., and, more broadly, with all the nations which depend upon and participate in the integrated world economy built around the strength of the Atlantic nations and Japan.

In both realms, effective policy requires solidarity--partnership--
effectively organized in accordance with the principles of responsible
democracy.

The time available for decision is short. The tide is favorable.
To recall Shakespeare's admonition, we must take it at flood. If we
hesitate much longer, the tide will surely ebb.

EUGENE V. ROSTOW

November 20, 1975

Dear Henry,

I enclose for your information the Final Resolution adopted at the annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Paris last month, together with Raymond Aron's paper, which was the principal basis for our debates, and my closing remarks.

EVR/dm
Encs.

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

185 rue de la Pompe, 75116 Paris Tél. 553.28.80

Chairman: Eugene V. Rostow — Secretary General: Jean de Madre

XX1st Annual Assembly, Paris, 20-24 October 1975

FINAL RESOLUTION

1. The Twenty-First Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association was held in Paris on October 20-24, 1975.

2. The theme of the Assembly was "Interdependence within the Atlantic Alliance." The interdependence of the members of the Alliance in the realms of security and economics is a fact. It becomes deeper and more irreversible with every passing year. But interdependence does not always lead to solidarity. As certain key issues can be handled only by methods of organized cooperation, the principal work of the Assembly was to identify those areas of Allied concern which require concerted policies.

3. The Assembly expressed the conviction that while the interdependence of nations in many contexts is a global phenomenon, with commitments and interests pulling the Allies in different directions, it is essential that the processes of interdependence enhance rather than diminish or endanger the solidarity of the Allies on those matters of central importance.

4. While real detente should continue to be a major goal of Allied policies, satisfactory conditions of detente with the Soviet Union have not yet been achieved.

5. The utmost vigilance should be exercised by the government to see that the Helsinki agreement is carried out especially with regard to the protection of human rights. The Assembly also resolved that the Association should support non-governmental projects to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki agreement.

6. Although the Soviet threat to the Alliance has increased, the perception of it in Western opinion has diminished. Special efforts are therefore required by our governments and citizen groups to inform public opinion on the basis of an enlarged dialogue, especially with younger people. This remains the main function of the Atlantic Treaty Association and of its member organizations.

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7. The military problem within the Alliance is to meet the world wide challenge arising from the rapid growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces in every category. Deterrence, based on a stable balance of forces, must be maintained at the conventional as well as the nuclear level, so that the political choices available to the Alliance are not unduly circumscribed.

8. The Assembly strongly recommended a greater harmonization of tactical doctrine and procedures and the standardization of weapons and equipment within NATO as essential both for military and economic reasons. In this context, in order to promote more effective European participation in defense production, and North American procurement in Europe, the Assembly recommended the establishment of suitable combined machinery which, in cooperation with the North American defense industry, could serve the Atlantic defense market.

9. In the political area, the Assembly stressed the vital role of the Alliance in maintaining Allied solidarity by helping to mediate and reconcile differences among Allies on the basis of equal respect for their interests. To that end, it recommended that all disputes among Allies, including those affecting sea beds and air space, should be resolved as early as possible by negotiation in order to prevent confrontations damaging Allied unity. The Assembly welcomed the recent action of the United States with regard to the arms embargo against Turkey and expressed the hope that the embargo would be soon entirely removed in the best interests of the Alliance.

10. The Assembly also expressed its concern over the course of events in Portugal, and urged support of Portugal's progress toward pluralist democracy.

11. The Assembly concluded that the interdependence of Western economies had reached a point where the sustained coordination of national policies on credit, budgets, currency and capital movements had become a prime necessity. It therefore recommended coordinated action on these matters, and on energy and raw materials problems, as well as the strengthening to that end of intergovernmental arrangements and institutions among the Western and other interested nations, including in particular the members of the O.E.C.D.

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12. The Assembly urged the member countries of the Alliance to recognize that internal subversion initiated or exploited by the Soviets constitutes an increasingly dangerous arm of Soviet policy. The utmost attention should be given to such activities, as well as to those affecting the discipline and morale of the armed forces.

13. The future of the Alliance depends upon the maintenance of its political and moral cohesion, transcending regional and national differences or economic frictions. To assure this goal, in view of the growing pressures of Soviet policy, every effort should be made to enhance and improve the processes of Allied political consultation, and to ensure the utmost unity in the military sphere. On this foundation, the Allies, and the Alliance, will prevail in the ideological struggle of our time.

## SUPPORTING ANALYSIS

### POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE ALLIANCE

1. The Assembly reaffirmed its judgment that while real detente should continue to be the goal of allied policies, satisfactory conditions of detente with the Soviet Union have not been achieved.

2. The Assembly noted the political and psychological phenomenon that, while the Soviet threat has increased, the perception of it in Western public opinion has diminished. Indeed, in 1975 the cumulative effect of: a) the increase of Soviet military intimidation; b) social unrest heightened by economic circumstances; and c) the danger deriving from the ideological and subversive influence of the Western communist parties, present a continued challenge of the utmost gravity.

3. In view of the fact that the primary mission of the Atlantic Treaty Association is to inform public opinion about the vital role of the Alliance in the defense of freedom, the Assembly notes that:

a) While the fundamental position of the Alliance in world politics and in the world economy remains strong, special efforts are required by our governments and by citizen

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groups throughout the Alliance to inform public opinion
about the nature of Soviet policy, the comparative
level of military forces, and the ambiguities of detente.
The prevalence in Western opinion of the illusion that
detente has been achieved encourages the growth of
laxity and of rivalries among the Allies, and persuades
wishful thinkers that defense is a waste of money.

b) In developing responsible public opinion, the essential source of policy in a democracy, it was recognized that particular care should be taken to enlarge the dialogue about the mission of the Alliance within our community, especially with younger people and educators.

4. The Assembly examined with care the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference and noted that, despite imperfections, it contained expressions of Western principles and policies. The Assembly recognized that so far only the West has given significant signs of implementing those policies. The Assembly urged that, in the future development of East-West relationships, the utmost vigilance be exercised to make sure that the principles of the Helsinki accord, and especially those relating to human rights, be fully carried out. The free flow of objective information, for example, through Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and other wireless media should be encouraged. The Assembly also recommended that the Atlantic Treaty Association and its member bodies, in cooperation with other interested groups, undertake to keep these problems under constant review.

5. The Assembly recognizes that, while bilateral dealings between members of the Alliance and the Soviet Union are normal methods of diplomacy, both in general or as responses to particular problems, adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty continues to be the corner-stone of the foreign policy of all the members of the Alliance. The indispensable corollary of bilateral relations between member countries and the Soviet Union is scrupulously to maintain and develop the practice of regular consultations within the North Atlantic Council on matters of interest to the Alliance.

6. Note was also taken of the relationship between the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. It was recognized that favorable developments had marked the cooperation among the Community, the Eurogroup, and the North American allies. Reference was made to the useful work

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by the Committee of Political Directors of the Community.
The Assembly welcomed its accomplishments, and anticipated
that the program of the Committee will continue to be
carried on in harmony with the purposes and procedures of
the Alliance, with the work of the Eurogroup, and with the
policies of the U.S. and Canada.

7. With regard to the position of France as a member of the Alliance, but not a participant in its integrated command, the Assembly took note of the fact that the arrangements established between France and the NATO Command in various sectors are proceeding in a useful way and with mutual satisfaction.

8. The Assembly stressed that all disputes among Allies, including those affecting sea beds and air space should be solved by negotiations as early as possible in a spirit of mutual trust and respect for the interests of the Alliance, in order to prevent serious conflicts and damaging confrontations. In this context, the Assembly welcomed the action taken by the United States with regard to the arms embargo against Turkey and stressed the hope that the embargo will soon be totally removed in the best interests of the Alliance.

9. The Assembly expressed its deep concern about the course of events in Portugal during the recent months. It was recognized that it is in the common interest of the Alliance and of the Allied people of Portugal that Portugal's progress toward pluralistic democracy be supported by the governments, and by non-governmental groups in all Allied countries. The Assembly recognized the special difficulties created for Portugal by the emergence of Angola as a nation in three weeks' time and recommended international assistance, including an acceleration of the evacuation air lift, if required, which might help Portugal in solving the human and economic problems that this event entails.

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY MATTERS

10. The Assembly noted that the interdependence of Western economies and those of other industrialized nations, including Japan, has reached a point where the coordination of policies on credit, budgets, currency, and movements of capital has quite clearly become a prime necessity. On the other hand, as the phenomenon of interdependence does not prevent

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differences between nations even if they are a part of an
alliance, the Assembly recommended that all efforts be pursued
to minimize difficulties among them, so that, at a time of
economic uncertainty, they might not jeopardize the very
foundation of the Alliance. In particular, the Assembly sug-
gested strengthening cooperative efforts in certain major
economic fields of key importance.

11. These major problem areas, as perceived by the Assembly, are: The control of inflation and unemployment; the international monetary system; a program to deal with raw materials, especially those concerning energy and foodstuffs; and the further liberalization of international trade.

12. The Assembly noted that there is no consensus on the causes of the dual inflation-recession crisis, but that there is little doubt that inflation, unemployment, the monetary system, and coordination of economic policies are interlinked, and require study and agreement in an international framework. The Assembly believes that members of the Alliance should continue to work towards these ends with the IMF, the O.E.D.C. and other appropriate international agencies; and that inter-governmental arrangements pertaining to those organizations should be strengthened. The Assembly welcomes initiatives under the aegis of the O.E.C.D. to explore the energy problem in a setting wider than the regular membership of that organization so as to include representation of interests other than those of industrial countries. The problem of the supply of other raw materials, especially over the long term, also call for a frank discussion between consumers and producers.

13. Finally, the Assembly recognized that what is needed today is not only strengthened intergovernmental institutions to meet the new and difficult problems we face, but also the political will to achieve agreement. Hope was expressed that the forthcoming summit meeting of Heads of States and other regular international gatherings will help generate the political will necessary to achieve progress in the field of economics through the competent international organizations.

MILITARY PROBLEMS

14. The issue facing the Alliance is to meet the challenge arising from the steady growth of Soviet forces, as shown by the following developments:

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a) The continuing build-up of Soviet forces in and near Europe, and especially those opposite Central Europe, where in fact the Soviets now have nearly a three to one advantage over NATO forces in main battle tanks. It is evident that Soviet ground forces are much larger than could be needed for defense, and that priority has been given by the Soviet Union to techniques and weapons which can only have an offensive use.

b) The recent major expansion of Soviet naval forces. The Soviet navy has in fact been developing the capability not only to threaten the sea lanes on which NATO defense depends, but also to intervene in local conflicts on a world wide basis. Moreover, Soviet political and military pressures, particularly in the Mediterranean and southern Europe fronts, have increased markedly in the recent years.

c) The notable expansion and improvement of Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear forces, and of land-based, air-based, and sea-based delivery systems, which will soon be an overall match to those of the United States in number and sophistication, if present trends continue.

15. The Assembly has therefore examined the requirements that this situation entails, and noted the following:

a) Of fundamental importance to the military strength of NATO is the continued cohesion of the member nations, their internal socio-political strength, their manifest will to defend themselves, and the discipline and morale of their forces. All steps taken, be it the introduction of a new weapon system, of a new military doctrine, of a new political initiative, should be judged by their effect on the cohesion of the Alliance.

b) In the strategic sphere, it is essential that the United States maintain the deterrent power of its second strike capability in a situation of changing technology where the number of Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is growing rapidly.

c) Deterrence must be maintained at the conventional as well as the nuclear level. The defense capacity of conventional NATO forces needs to be improved so as to avoid a situation

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which might tempt a potential aggressor to test the will of the NATO authorities. In particular the strength of NATO ground forces should be increased by enhancing the ability of member nations rapidly to mobilize larger reserves; the potential mobility and flexibility of the air forces in any part of Western Europe should be exploited; and the coordination and standardization of naval forces to enable them to protect vital sea lanes should be increased.

d) Recent events have confirmed that threats may develop to the security of the Alliance arising outside the North Atlantic Treaty area: of special concern are the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, and most obviously, at present, the Middle East. The Assembly reiterates its recommendation of 1974 that interested members of the Alliance should undertake whenever necessary appropriate consultations as envisaged by the Harmel Resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1967.

e) At a time when economic difficulties and demands for higher living standards place heavy burdens on national treasuries there is a particular need to be as efficient as possible in the use of the resources available for defense; defense priorities need therefore to be ascertained with the utmost clarity.

f) In spite of the progress in joint procurement already achieved, there is room for further improvement through the joint planning of new weapons systems from the time an operational requirement is ascertained to their subsequent production through Allied cooperation. This practice will permit member nations to share in advanced technology. It would also help to reduce the risk of arbitrary disruption in the supply of weapons to any member nation.

g) Greater harmonization of tactical doctrine and procedure and the standardization of weapons and equipment are essential both for military effectiveness and for economy. Standardization will require balanced two-way trade between North America and Europe. In order for this trade to be most equitable in volume and in degree of technological sophistication, the trading partners should be of nearly equal size. As the individual nation-states of Europe are too small for compatible military trade with the United States, the twelve armed nations of NATO Europe should establish suitable combined machinery, and restructure

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their defense industries to serve an Atlantic defense market, efficiently and effectively. A longer range objective would be the establishment of a North Atlantic Common Defense Market which would complement and make viable these necessary institutional and structural changes within Europe.

16. While the responsibility for protecting North Sea oil from sabotage and terrorism rests at the moment with national forces, NATO can play an important back-up role in providing a surveillance and communications system available to national policing forces, and in coordinating search and rescue operations.

17. The Assembly urged the member countries of the Alliance to recognize that internal subversion initiated or exploited by the Soviets constitutes an increasingly dangerous arm of Soviet policy. The utmost attention should be given to such activities, as well as to those affecting the discipline and morale of the armed forces.

***

The Assembly was opened by Professor Georges Portmann, President of the French Atlantic Association, and the first guest speaker was Mr. Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council. Professor Raymond Aron (France) then presented his Politic/Economic Report on "The Ambiguities of Interdependence." During the Plenary Session on military affairs, addresses were given by Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and by General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The Military Report on "The Defense of Europe within the Framework of Atlantic Cooperation" was presented by General Ernst Ferber, former Commander in Chief Allied Forces Central Europe. The Rapporteurs of the Political, Economic and Military Committees were: Mr. Mouriau de Meulenacker (Belgium), Mr. Hans Daniels (Germany) and Mr. David MacEachron (U.S.A.). The General Rapporteur was Ambassador Egidio Ortona (Italy). A meeting of the A.T.A. Information Working Group also took place during the Assembly.

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

185 rue de la Pompe, 75116 Paris Tel. 553.28.80

THE AMBIGUITIES OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Political-Economic Report

presented by Mr. RAYMOND ARON, Professor at the Collège
de France, member of the Academy of Moral and Political Science

Since the A.T.A. has chosen interdependence as the theme of its 1975 Congress in France, the moment is perhaps opportune for me to preface this report with a definition of the term, at the risk of appearing pedantic.

The word *interdependence* indicates or describes a situation of fact: what happens in country A affects country B, and vice versa. In this sense, the countries of the Atlantic Alliance may be called interdependent. But this state of interdependence does not result in the creation of a feeling of solidarity, still less a will for collective action.

In the economic sphere, interdependence multiplies the number of occasions for rivalry or conflict. True, on the global, or macroeconomic level, each member of the Alliance has a stake in the prosperity of the others. Today, all of them are hoping for the recovery of the American and German economies. But interdependence manifests itself in other ways. When one country wins a highly profitable contract, another fails to get it. On the microeconomic level, what is beneficial to the one often appears, with justification, unfavourable to the other. In a period of recession, such as that through which the western economy is passing, business concerns and nations alike are tempted to resort to practices which do not fully conform to the rules of good conduct, in order to increase their share of exports, to grab an order, or reduce their imports.

Nor is interdependence of itself sufficient to create awareness of solidarity on the political level. Outside of the interest in collective security which it shares with its allies, each country of the Alliance preserves its own interest, its desire for autonomy, and may on occasion violently oppose another member of the Alliance on a question vital for itself but which may appear secondary to others.

The first question to which I would like to reply would be formulated in the following terms : to what extent have the feeling of solidarity and the will for joint action been strengthened by the interdependence which the events of the last two years have confirmed ?

[L.C]

(All countries are affected by the increase in oil prices and the recession). My reply to this question will unfortunately be somewhat negative. The decline in morale of the Alliance over the past years, which the rapporteurs of previous Congresses have noted, does not to me appear to have abated.

At the risk of dwelling on familiar facts, I would like first of all to seek the causes of this decline.

# I - A weakening of solidarity

The Atlantic Alliance was concluded in 1949 in a cold war climate, at a time when Western Europeans were becoming aware of the dangerous position in which they were condemned to live because of the presence of the Russian Army in the heart of the former Reich and the sovietisation of Eastern Europe. The following year, the Korean campaign gave rise to the setting up of NATO. In other words, the Alliance constituted a response to a perceived threat, to a situation felt to be precarious.

If one were to confine oneself to strictly objective considerations such as the balance of forces, one would conclude that the peril has increased rather than diminished. The virtual, if not the actual, economic and military superiority of the United States was incomparably greater twenty-five years ago than it is today. Deterrence through the threatened use of nuclear weapons was, in theory at any rate, more effective so long as the territory of the United States remained safe from reprisals. The imbalance of forces in the Alliance's central sector, at the expense of the West, is more accentuated today than ten years ago. The massive expansion of the Soviet fleet bears witness to the world ambitions of the men conducting the business of the vast empire known as the Soviet Union.

The threat is patent in other contexts besides that of comparative forces. Twenty-five years ago, the memories of a still recent war, polemical violence, the face which Stalinism presented to the outside world, and the behaviour of Western Communist parties created a feeling of anguish which held the Alliance together. Today, Western peoples have become accustomed to coexistence; although the regime has remained in essence unchanged, the Soviet Union of Leonid Brezhnev has adopted a more normal, conservative and reassuring appearance. People in the West have gradually come to believe, probably with justification, that the leaders of the Soviet empire are disinclined for military adventures and that, while they might not hesitate to restore discipline by force in their areas of influence, they do not propose to despatch armoured divisions towards the Atlantic.

Complex and heterogeneous as it is, the Atlantic Alliance needs something tougher in the way of ciment than merely subscribing to common values. The fear which once cimented the Alliance has dimmed or receded and, despite the reality of interdependence, despite the will to maintain the Alliance as a precautionary measure, each member goes his own way.

There are other contributory causes of this weakening of solidarity. Summit diplomacy as practised by the Nixon-Kissinger team and as still practised today, although with reservations, by the Ford-Kissinger team, can only strengthen the tendency to disintegration. To a certain extent, summit diplomacy is a logical response to the

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interests first; national passions take precedence over the leaders'
desire for a compromise; the United States no longer have the same
ability to influence their allies; the Secretary of State was more
familiar with his file on SALT than with that on Cyprus; Congress
opposes the decisions of the President. Neither Greece nor Turkey has
changed sides, but both countries have accepted the deterioration of
the military situation in the Mediterranean. Governments perhaps feel
regret, but their peoples direct their passions either against the ally
they hold responsible for their misfortunes, or against their tradi-
tional enemy.

This analysis would be only half complete if I said nothing
about *detente* itself. The Atlantic Treaty Association has in years gone
by always pronounced itself in favour of detente. It will not change
its attitude this year. But it seems to me important to show up the
ambiguities of the notion of detente. The official doctrine in the
Soviet Union consists in proclaiming peaceful coexistence among States
and simultaneously the rejection of peaceful coexistence among ideologies.
According to the doctrinal interpretation, detente represents a mode or
method, or a phase of the continuing struggle between classes and social
regimes (each of the latter being taken to represent one class, prole-
tariat or bourgeoisie). Must we regard this doctrinal interpretation as
concealing or camouflaging an underlying conservatism? Or, does
diplomatic language, on the contrary, conceal or camouflage the same
old ambitions? The USSR's arms policy weighs, it seems to me, on the
side of the second theory or, at least, forces us to regard it as just
as *likely* as the first.

But in democracies, people always lean towards the theory which
comes closest to meeting their wishes. In a totalitarian regime, nothing
is easier than to combine detente with an enormous spending budget. In
our own countries, such a combination meets with resistance from public
opinion. Once the fear of invasion disappears, military expenditures are
considered pointless. It is hard to put across the idea that force
relationships have a continuing influence on relations between States
and that the relative weakness of the Western powers would expose them
to manoeuvres of intimidation, or even subversion.

It therefore appears to me important, even though intellectually
unfashionable, to recall that the division of Europe into two zones,
the one composed of open societies and democratic regimes, the other
of ideocratic regimes, prolongs indefinitely a historical conflict which
in no way implies a war, in the conventional sense of the word, but
which imposes vigilance and moral resistance. The Soviets and the
Communist parties denounce free regimes. We should not be afraid to join
issue with them by responding and, above all today when the recession
is enough to shake the confidence of the faint-hearted, indefatigably
pleading the cause of liberal civilization.

## II - The economic problems

In his report last year, Pierre Uri stressed the uncertainties
of the economic situation. A year later, these uncertainties are still
with us.

In certain respects, things have gone better than expected. Some
fears have proved exaggerated. The oil-exporting countries have spent
their increased earnings faster than was expected; the recycling
operation has so far taken place without imperilling the banking system;

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exporters and consumers of oil have had a better understanding both of
what divides them and of their interdependence. The OPEC countries can
spend the tens of billions of dollars of their receipts only in the
Western countries. The latter have, as a result of the recession,
restored the balance of their foreign trade, and in some cases even
their balance of payments. The adaptability of free economies has once
again been demonstrated.

Having said this, it must be recognized that none of the fundamental problems set out in the reports of previous years has yet begun to be resolved. Even in this recessive phase, inflation rates remain high, around 10% in France, much higher in Italy and Britain. The price of oil has been stabilised in nominal terms; in real value and in relation to world inflation, it has dropped. The OPEC countries will perhaps increase the nominal price, and the consumer countries will for the moment have no means of opposing their cartel action. The oil prices which are accelerating the development of a few exporting countries are deteriorating the situation in those third world countries which do not possess oil. Unless the rich countries, that is those who own a lot of oil and are sparsely populated, hand over a substantial proportion of their additional income to the victims (that is India, Bangladesh, Pakistan) the oil cartel will have created new inequalities and injustices without bringing us nearer to the objective to which all lay claim.

It has become fashionable to speak of problems becoming world-wide, and this illustrates an incontestable fact: the interdependence formula is not applicable only to countries within the Atlantic Alliance; it is in some respects applicable to all the countries of the world. In matters of the environment, of the layer of ozone which protects the earth's atmosphere, humanity is one; the decisions reached by the oil exporters affect humanity as a whole; the Western recession hits jute exporters on the other side of the world. But to an even greater extent than inside the Atlantic Alliance, interdependence does not imply moral solidarity; it sets interests in opposition to one another more often than it makes them coincide.

A certain consensus has emerged among economists concerning the probability that the exceptionally rapid expansion of the years 1948-1974 will be followed by a different phase lasting several years. Whether they like it or not, those who conduct the West's economies will have to combat inflation and refrain from sacrificing their currency to their growth rate. If we are to beat the recession, business must regain its profit-earning capacity, which has been seriously impaired during recent years, particularly since 1965 when American inflation began to weigh upon the already inflationary tendencies of European economies. Concern for the environment will at the same time give rise to modifications in the production apparatus; the need to export more to pay for the increased cost of energy will bring about further modifications in the production apparatus. Collective impoverishment resulting from the rise in oil prices is causing, and will continue to cause, bitter struggles over the distribution of national revenues and the sharing-out of sacrifices.

> No-one has an overall plan or blue-print. Each perceives some of the causes of the dual inflation-recession crisis, but there is no consensus on the relative importance of the different causes. The majority of British and American economists approve of the floating exchange-rate system, and do not attribute any major responsibility to the international monetary system. Many continental economists, the French above all, view the matter differently. To many people, fluctuations in the value of the dollar, which is still the key currency, appear both excessive and disturbing.

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[L.C]

lines of communication. How should one today present the case of France which, if only by reason of its geopolitical situation, occupies a central position in the Alliance while only half belonging to it, or at any rate, belonging differently from its partners of the European Community ?

The decision to withdraw from the integrated command was taken by General de Gaulle ; it has become and remains an integral element in the gaullist heritage, the body of ideas and practices which the UDR (Union for the Defence of the Republic) considers inviolable. Before the President of the Republic could take the risk of rejecting this dogma and before the UDR could tolerate his rejection of it, events which cannot at this time be imagined would have to take place.

The Communist Party is carrying on a campaign against what it claims is France's returning to NATO. (In the current argument, most commentators and politicians omit to distinguish between NATO and its integrated command). The accusation is in fact -fortunately or unfortunately- unfounded.

To begin with, the French military staff never broke off relations with NATO. France takes part in the radar alert system, the Eurocam tactical communications system, and in certain manoeuvres, and uses NATO's pipelines. Moreover, the new French President is temperamentally disinclined to dramatize disagreements as General de Gaulle used to enjoy doing. A situation looks entirely different as presented by Valery Giscard d'Estaing than when subjected to the epic and grandiose rhetoric of the first President of the Fifth French Republic. But, important as they are, degrees of difference in style do not alter the essential facts.

Those facts can be summed up in one question : to what extent is France readying her defences in a strictly national framework, or is she integrating it in the NATO framework ? Although a categorical reply one way or the other remains impossible, official statements and concrete measures tend to substantiate the first hypothesis. French troops are still in Germany, but they would not in the event of conflict be under NATO command and no-one can tell with certainty whether or when they would occupy a sector of the front. The ambiguity of the French doctrine was made blindingly obvious by the affair of the "Pluton" tactical atomic weapons, whose range is no more than 150 kilometers. The Bonn government was understandably disturbed ; if these missiles are to serve uniquely to defend French territory, they can only reach targets situated on German territory.

So far as I can judge, the French Government has chosen neither one of the two doctrines open to it : either participation in the common European and Atlantic defences ; or else the guarantee, however illusory, of the inviolability of its national territory by means of nuclear weapons, even in the event that enemy troops reach France's frontiers. As a member of the Alliance, the French Government is to a certain extent involved in the common defence ; as a country which has left the integrated command, France conserves its freedom of decision until the last moment. To the extent that the threat comes from the East, France finds herself, perhaps for the first time in her history, behind the front line. Rightly or wrongly, she is able to delay her decision. It goes without saying that this is irritating for her allies, and I doubt that the situation can be altered in a hurry.

The largest party in the government coalition, the UDR, would certainly not agree to an official return to the integrated command. French diplomatic spokesmen refer to the independence of our defences and policy. This kind of talk would have been possible without leaving the integrated command. It would no longer be so once Paris went back on a

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