We thought we hadn't missed a spot.
Then we spotted Ipanema.

We had been to Acapulco before the Jet Set found it. We had been to St. Tropez and St. Thomas. What we needed was a new playground.

Happily for us, a playboy acquaintance put his finger right on it. "Ipanema," he said, with the accent on the *lp*.

"It's the latest find in smart resorts— and not many people have found it."

That did it. Not long afterward, we were on a Pan Am Jet headed for Brazil—and Ipanema.

Ipanema is a strip of land that looks on the Atlantic from the southern edge of Rio. It's a little bit of the Riviera with a dash of Jamaica thrown in. There are several miles of white sand, with dozens of choice restaurants, cafés and a race track nearby.

Best of all, Ipanema is right in Rio, probably the world's most beautiful city from the air. The perfect harbor is surrounded by purple mountains and street after street of white-and-pastel houses marching from the water's edge straight up the mountainsides.

When you come down to earth, there are miles of mosaic walks, fabulous restaurants, night clubs that go till dawn, shops that give Fifth Avenue a run for its money, plus music everywhere.

You really ought to fly down there and see it all. South America is a giant among continents, yet so easy to get around. Fly Pan Am to Rio, for instance, and take advantage of no-extra-fare stopovers in oil-rich Caracas, Belém (on the Amazon), and Brasilia, the world's newest city. From Rio, you can fly Pan Am south to Buenos Aires. And, from there, fly Panagra west to Santiago, then north to Lima, the "City of Kings," then on to unspoiled Ecuador.

From there, Panagra will take you to a tame place called home.

A word from two airlines: Nobody knows South America like Pan Am-Panagra. This is the only airline system that can fly you completely 'round the continent. Fast Jets, frequent flights, a wealth of experience, plus the utmost in passenger comfort. You can see both coasts for the price of one on a round-trip ticket to Buenos Aires. See the East Coast with Pan Am, the West Coast with Panagra. Go one way, return the other. You can do it for less than you've ever dreamed. For instance, the new 30-day Jet economy excursion fare 'round the continent is just $550 from New York, $520 from Miami, $674 from Los Angeles.

PANAGRA • PAN AM

PAN AMERICAN-GRACE AIRWAYS PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS

ANNOUNCING SR's THIRTEENTH ANNUAL

WORLD TRAVEL PHOTO CONTEST

TWO GRAND PRIZES

*A Trip to London for color winner:*

*A Trip to Hawaii for black-and-white winner:*

PLUS 18 ADDITIONAL CASH PRIZES

Award-winning photographs will again be featured in Saturday Review's annual World Travel Calendar issue. This issue, appearing January 1, 1966, will report forthcoming events of major importance to tourists during the coming year in fifty countries.

The Calendar issue will be fully illustrated by the World Travel Awards photographs. One of the prize winners will be reproduced on the cover of the January 1st issue.

The winning pictures will be chosen by the following judges, all distinguished in the field of photography:

**Norris Harkness**—Past President, Photographic Society of America, syndicated columnist on photography.

**Ivan Dmitri**—Leading color and magazine photographer, Director, *Photography in the Fine Arts.*

**Leopold Godowsky**—Co-inventor of Kodachrome.

**Margaret R. Weiss**—Photography Editor, *Saturday Review*

The important thing is to read the complete rules below, and start sending in your entries now.

Deadline for entries is October 15, 1965.

*Saturday Review*

380 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

Should the Grand Prize winners prefer some other trip than the ones outlined above, the equivalent for one or two persons can be arranged on request.

### Contest Rules

1. The contest is strictly for amateur photographers. Anyone is eligible except employees of *SATURDAY REVIEW* and the *McCALL CORP.*, members of their families, and individuals who personally, or any members of whose families, are engaged in the manufacture, sale, commercial finishing, or professional use of photographic goods.

2. Pictures must have been taken after July 1, 1964, during a trip away from home for either holiday or business purposes.

3. **Black-and-white photographs**

a. Prints must be submitted in glossy prints 8 x 10 unmounted.

b. On the back of the photograph must appear: name and address of photographer; make of camera and film used in taking the picture; date and place it was used.

c. Developing and printing may be done by a photo-finisher or the entrant. No composite pictures such as multiple printing or montages are eligible. No art-work or retouching on prints or negatives from which they are made is permitted.

d. No negatives should be submitted.

e. **NO BLACK AND WHITE PRINTS WILL BE RETURNED.**

4. **Color photographs**

a. Color pictures may be submitted as either slides or prints. Do not send slides and prints of the same picture.

b. Transparencies must be originals and must be mounted in cardboard only.

c. Color prints must be 8 x 8 or 8 x 10, unmounted.

d. Stereos are eligible. Only one transparency need be sent.

e. The same data must be given as specified above for black-and-white prints and must be written on the mount of each transparency or on the back of each print.

f. Transparencies and color prints will be returned to entrant only if accompanied by return postage; a minimum of 10 cents.

5. **SATURDAY REVIEW** assumes no responsibility for negatives, prints or color transparencies, but reserves the right to publish within its own pages as part of the Awards competition any pictures submitted, whether winners or not.

6. To enter the contest, mail no more than two black-and-white pictures, and/or two color pictures to this magazine's WORLD TRAVEL PHOTOGRAPHY CONTEST DEPARTMENT. All entries must be postmarked no later than October 15, 1965, to be eligible for judging. **IMPORTANT: NO MORE THAN FOUR PICTURES, TWO IN EACH CATEGORY, CAN BE SUBMITTED BY ANY ONE ENTRANT.**

7. Pictures will be judged on photographic quality and originality in choice and treatment of subject. The decision of the judges will be final.

8. Before receiving a final prize, the entrant must sign a statement that his picture, or any closely similar picture of the same subject or situation, has not been and will not be entered by him in any photographic contest other than the one conducted by this magazine without permission of *SATURDAY REVIEW*, and has not been and will not be offered for publication in any manner prior to January 1, 1966. Winning pictures become the property of *SATURDAY REVIEW*.

*Saturday Review*

July 24, 1965

Cover photo by Louis Goldman, Rapho-Guillumette

SR: Ideas

21. The U.N.: The Next Twenty Years -A Special Section with articles by Arthur Larson, U Thant, Richard C. Hottelet, Andrew W. Cordier, Paul G. Hoffman, Leslie Paffrath, Carlos P. Romulo, and Clark M. Eichelberger

36. Context for Peace: An Editorial

SR: Books

39. Literary Horizons, by Granville Hicks

39. Index of books reviewed

SR: Departments

6. Phoenix Nest, by Martin Levin

8. Trade Winds, by John G. Fuller

10. State of Affairs, by Henry Brandon

14. Top of My Head, by Goodman Ace

16. Manner of Speaking, by John Ciardi

38. Letters to the Editor

40. Literary Crypt

50. TV and Radio: Robert Lewis Shayon reviews *South African Essay*

51. SR Goes to the Movies: Hollis Alpert reviews *The Sandpiper*

52. As Others See Us, by James F. Fixx

54. Literary I.Q.

66. Kingsley Double-Crostic No. 1633

Saturday Review published weekly by Saturday Review, Inc., 380 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y. 10017. Chairman of the Board, J. R. Cominsky; President, Norman Cousin; Vice President and Treasurer, Nathan Cohn; Vice President and Secretary, W. D. Patterson; Advertising Director, Robert A. Burghardt; Manager of Advertising Sales, Harry T. Morris; Circulation Director, R. F. Goodman; Circulation Consultant, Bert Garmise; Assistant to the Publisher, Marion Urmay; Advertising Promotion Manager, William Donald Garson. Subscription $8 a year. Member Audit Bureau of Circulations Vol. XLVIII, No. 30, July 24, 1965. Second-class postage paid at New York, N. Y. and at additional mailing offices. Indexed in the "Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature." © 1965 by Saturday Review, Inc. All rights reserved under the Berne and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. Reproduction in whole or in part of any article, without permission is prohibited. Printed in the United States of America. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a properly addressed envelope bearing sufficient postage. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions, undelivered copies, and other addresses to Subscription Department, SATURDAY REVIEW, 380 Madison Ave., New York, N. Y. 10017.

BRANCH ADVERTISING OFFICES: Midwest Office: Raymond W. Welch, Jr., Mgr., 919 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, 11, Illinois; West Coast Offices: Fletcher S. Udall & Company, 1221 Hearst Building, San Francisco 3, California, and 422 South Western Avenue, Los Angeles 5, California; Bruce E. Miller, New Center Building, Detroit, Michigan 48202; Southeast Office: Ray Rickles & Co., Box 2008, Miami Beach 40, Florida. Printed by the McCall Corporation, Dayton, Ohio.

4

SR/July 24, 1965

# OUTSTANDING SUMMER READING
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JUST FOR SELF-APPRAISAL: CHECK THE BOOKS YOU HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO "GET AROUND TO" THROUGH OVERBUSYNESS

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THE DOWN
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206. JOUR-
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JOHN XXIII.
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431. THE
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THIRD REICH by
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234. THE OXFORD HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
by SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON
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198. FU-
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BERLIN by LEN
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199. DON'T
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184. THE
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148. THE
ITALIANS
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106. REMINIS-
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127. THE
MAN by
IRVING WALLACE
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THE EXPERIMENTAL MEMBERSHIP suggested here will not only prove, by your own actual experience, how effectually membership in the Book-of-the-Month Club can keep you from missing, through overbusyness, books you fully intend to read; it will also demonstrate another important advantage enjoyed by members: Book-Dividends. Through this unique profit-sharing system members can regularly receive valuable library volumes—at a small fraction of their price—simply by buying books they would buy anyway.

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5-55

Keeping Peace Among Allies

The Troubled Partnership: A Re-
appraisal of the Western Alliance,
by Henry A. Kissinger (McGraw-
Hill-Council on Foreign Relations
266 pp. $5.95), discusses the prob-
lems and the fundamental differen-
ces of opinion that have developed
concerning the future of NATO. The
Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.,
was Secretary for Air in the Atlee
government at the time the Atlantic
Alliance was established.

By ARTHUR HENDERSON

THE COMPLEX and critical prob-
lems disturbing the Atlantic Alliance
must cause serious concern to all who
regard it as an essential bastion of peace
and freedom in Europe. There can be
no doubt that the Alliance has become,
in the words of Henry Kissinger's title,
a troubled partnership. The fact is that
fundamental differences of opinion have
developed concerning its whole future.

The Atlantic Alliance is perhaps the
most powerful collective defense asso-
ciation ever known in peacetime. It grew
out of and expanded the concept of a
defense alliance within the framework
of the United Nations Charter which the
late Ernest Bevin, then British Foreign
Secretary, put forward in 1948, when he
proposed a formula for Western union
embracing not only defense, but also
technical, cultural, and social coopera-
tion.

The Communist coup in Czechoslo-
vakia and the Berlin blockade, as Dr.
Kissinger points out, caused a turning
point in Western policy, and it served
to produce the decisive participation of
the United States in what emerged as
NATO in 1949. Thus the United States
became directly involved in maintaining
the security of free Europe against any
further Soviet expansion. That was a de-
velopment of momentous significance.

NATO prevented war in Europe
throughout the subsequent years, con-
tributed to the development of the poli-
cy of peaceful coexistence, and enabled
practical steps to be taken in the direc-
tion of European unity.

But, as Dr. Kissinger makes abun-
dantly clear, there have been adverse
results as well. There have been "increas-
ingly sharp disputes among the Allies."
Unity within the Atlantic Alliance has
been seriously strained. Problems that

may be structural in origin have
emerged as policy issues. "Thus . . . with-
in the Atlantic Alliance disagreements
about the future organization of NATO
and the relative roles of its members
have multiplied. The chief protagonists
have been the United States and
France." The author summarizes the di-
vergent American and French attitudes
in concise terms: "Now debating the
wisdom of negotiating with the Soviets,
now contesting the role of nuclear weap-
ons, always disputing the future organ-
ization of Europe and the structure of
the Alliance, the two countries have
sometimes acted as if each has a psy-
chological need to use the other as a foil.
Each side has developed elaborate
theories concerning the evil designs of
its opponent."

The reader will discover that in dis-
cussing these disagreements the author
presents the French position as fully and
fairly as the American. What is disquiet-
ing is that there should be such deep
policy divisions within the Alliance, and
that on some issues United States and
French views diverge so as to hold out
little hope for harmony.

To take only one important point:
Both the United States and France sup-
port the idea of European unity. But

while the United States urges an "in-
tegrated" Europe in which the role of
nation states would be diminished, Pres-
ident de Gaulle argues that unity de-
pends on "the vitality of the traditional
European States." He envisages a con-
federation of states rather than a supra-
national institution.

It is clear that the conflicting atti-
tudes of the United States and France
on this and other issues lie at the heart
of many of the tensions that impair the
present well-being and the future pros-
pects of the Atlantic Alliance.

The author also shows that Britain
has not escaped General de Gaulle's
displeasure. He resented the Nassau
Agreement, and he dislikes the "special
relationship" that Britain is supposed to
enjoy with the United States. The term
was first used by the late Sir Winston
Churchill in the House of Commons on
November 7, 1945, when he referred to
"... our special relationship with the
United States and Canada about the
atomic bomb." The connotation of this
term has been misconstrued to imply
that there is some kind of preferential
relationship between Britain and the
United States. Such is not the case. If
"special relationship" is intended to
mean that we speak the same language
and have the same cultures, antecedents,
it of course is true; but it is a myth that
Britain enjoys a "prefereial relation-
ship" with the U.S. at the expense of
other NATO partners.

Two informative chapters deal with
"The Nature of the Strategic Debate"
and "The Issue of Nuclear Control," on
which agreement has not yet been found

"Sorry, Captain, no room at your table again."

SR/July 24, 1965

41

possible. Here it is vital that there
should be unity of viewpoint and polit-
cal aim. The alternative to real and
effective interdependence is, obviously,
the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
and the "road towards nuclear prolifer-
ation has no logical ending."

It is relevant to mention here the view
expressed by the British Prime Minister
at the NATO ministerial meeting in
London in May 1965:

The sheer facts of thermonuclear weap-
onry, to say nothing of the hard lessons
of economics, mean that outside the
two major nations, the USA and the
USSR, there cannot be a genuinely in-
dependent nuclear power capable of
sustaining thermonuclear war or of pro-
viding a globally credible nuclear
deterrent.

The effects of modern nuclear war-
fare, no less than the realization that
isolation is impossible even for the
most powerful, mean that no nation,
however great, can think in terms of
going it alone, without allies and with-
out regard to world opinion.

It is, of course, a fact that the United
States is the leader of the partnership.
But if there is to be a real interdepend-
ence Alliance, then it is surely right that
the non-nuclear countries should have
their say in the formulation and control
of policies which will affect all the na-
tions in the Alliance.

In a chapter dealing with East-West
relations the author puts forward an in-
teresting suggestion regarding the prob-
lem of the reunification of Germany,
about which there are differing views
within the Alliance. In brief, it is that
for a period of fifteen years "the territory
now called the German Democratic Re-
public [that is, East Germany] would
have a status similar to that of present-
day Austria." This proposal would mean
that "a loose confederation could be
established between the two German
States, but East Germany would be in-
dependent, neutral, and demilitarized."
Kissinger elaborates on this idea, but is
cautious about its practical value, for
his conclusion is that "it is improbable
that any negotiating formula will ad-
vance German unity. Even the most
reasonable program is likely to be rejec-
ted by the East. The long-term hope for
German unity therefore resides in the
unity of Europe."

This conclusion seems to me to be
sound if by "the unity of Europe" the
author means that the solution of some
of the political and security problems
in Europe dividing East and West.

Dr. Kissinger's book makes a timely
appearance. During the coming weeks
and months some of the disagreements
and problems he discusses will have to
be solved by the NATO governments
if new life and strength are to be in-
jected into the troubled partnership.

Breaking a Common Bond of Poverty

*Unfinished Revolution: America
and the Third World, by C. L.
Sulzberger (Atheneum. 304 pp.
$5.95), concerns the quest of under-
developed nations for economic betterment and national and human
dignity. A. A. Castagno is professor
of government and director-designate
of the African Studies Center at Bos-
ton University.*

By A. A. CASTAGNO

IN ONE of his classic works, *The Stakes of Diplomacy* (1915), Walter Lippmann stated that the overwhelming problem of diplomacy is the weak state. Other authorities on world politics have insisted that the rampant nationalism and the proliferation of "small states" which followed from the Versailles Treaty were a contributing factor to World War II. Today the prophets of nineteenth-century nationalism still haunt world politics, for we have failed, as Alfred Cobban once noted (*National Self-Determination*, 1944), to adapt self-determination and modern nationalism to contemporary conditions of technology and world politics.

This is a main theme of C. L. Sulz-
berger's most recent book. It is a fasci-
nating work that seeks to launch untried
solutions for the problems that have
been pounding that vast area—Latin
America, the Middle East, Africa, and
Asia—whose only common bond is pov-
erty, an inferiority complex, and frus-
trated nationalism.

For Sulzberger, the unfinished revolu-
tion (the quest for economic betterment
and national and human dignity) is three-
pronged. The "revolution of self-determi-
nation" he sees as having been instigated
by Woodrow Wilson, and given modern
form by the decolonization process. The
"revolution of Communism," shaped by
Lenin and reshaped by Mao Tse-tung
and Tito, provides organizational weap-
ons for the nationalist movements. The
"revolution of technical means," influ-
enced first by Marconi and now by the
transistors, provides even the most re-
mote nomad with the ideology of revolt
from the status quo. All three are ana-
lyzed in the context of the East-West
struggle for the minds of men in the
Third World.

Any such sweeping endeavor is wide
open to criticisms. Area specialists par-
ticularly will find gaps here and there;

some Africanists, for example, will not
appreciate the short shrift given to the
explosive problems of race relations in
the southern tier of African states. Others
will criticize the pessimistic pronounce-
ments on African unity, economic devel-
opment, and nation building. Both the
realist and the idealist schools of inter-
national politics will look askance at
some of the assumptions on international
politics. Historians will grieve that Sulz-
berger has given Wilson such a decisive
role in the formation of new states. And
economists might find that the author
has oversimplified the problems in inter-
national economics.

But once the reservations have been
properly reported and the few factual
slips recorded, the fact remains, at least
to this reviewer, that this is one of the
most perceptive, the most provocative,
and the most thoughtful books to come
out on such a complex subject. The
reader may not agree with all the author
says, but he will be compelled to think
in new terms.

FOREIGN-POLICY makers, however,
will feel a sense of frustration with the
book. While agreeing with much of what
Sulzberger prescribes, they will wonder
how, given the role of public opinion and
Congress in foreign policy, they are to
implement his recommendations. There
is no doubt that we should push reform
in Latin America; but, specifically, how,
amidst all the obstacles? We can agree
that commodity prices for Latin Ameri-
can goods should be stabilized and our
quotas reduced or eliminated; but will
the variety of economic pressure groups
in the United States be persuaded to
follow the "national interest"? We can
also agree that our racial attitudes at
home have adversely affected our image
abroad, to the advantage of Communist
Chinese racist propaganda; but, after
using the power of law, how do we
change the souls and minds of men?
Even if we were to agree that de Gaulle
is emerging as a model for the leaders
of new nations—quite a controversial
point, this—and that he is one of the
great leaders of the twentieth century,
will American nationalism permit an ob-
jective appraisal of the orientation of a
French nationalist? It is true that "no
amount of foreign aid can substitute for
lack of domestic effort," but how can we
devise means to assure optimum use of
foreign assistance by recipient nations?

There are a number of major points of
disagreement which this reviewer har-

42

SR/July 24, 1965

man, his food and his health, and speculates about fungi in outer space. The historical, scientific, and technical aspects are combined in a manner that will inform and engross the general reader. A book of wonders, written with wit—a winner! See Lj, May 15, p.2275.

KISSINGER, Henry A. *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*. (Atlantic Policy Studies). footnotes. index. 266pp. 65-17493. McGraw. $5.95 YA

This provocative study is essential reading for the student of current history. See Lj, May 1, p.2146.

LASCH, Christopher. *The New Radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The Intellectual As a Social Type*. footnotes. index. 349pp. 65-11126. Knopf. $6.95 YA

These biographical sketches of reformers and radicals from Jane Addams to Norman Mailer serve as portraits of the intellectual as a social type. Outstanding chapters are those on Lincoln Steffens and the *New Republic*. Will find a place and an audience in schools where ideas and dissent count. See Lj, May 15, p.2258.

LEWIS, Howard R. *With Every Breath You Take: The Poisons of Air Pollution, How They Are Injuring Our Health, and What We Must Do about Them*. photog. appendix. index. notes. 322pp. 64-23821. Crown. $5. (W) YA

Substantiated by documentation from the U. S. Public Health Service, the premise set forth here is that industrial exhaust poses a threat equal to, if not exceeding, radioactive fallout. Should prove useful in high school collections. See Lj, Apr. 15, p.1920.

LEWIS, Richard S. *A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure*. maps. drawings. photog. index. 300pp. 65-13204. Viking. $7.95 (W) YA

This account of the intensive scientific study by the recent IGY Antarctic exploration group details the political history and cooperative efforts of various countries in their attempt to learn together the secrets of this isolated icy world. Natural as well as geological data accompanied by many photographs make this book a valuable resource in a high school library.

MANVELL, R. & FRAENKEL, H. *Himmler*. ills. bibliog. notes. 285pp. 64-18020. Putnam. $5.95 YA

More informative as a study of the Third Reich, its leaders, their activities, philosophies, and rivalries, than as a biography, this companion volume to *Doctor Goebbels and Goering* has the authors' trademarks of research and readability. The development of the S.S. and also the obsessive and indecisive character of Himmler, his influence on Hitler, his intrigues against and suspicions of other Nazis, such as Heydrich and those with military-social background, are told without embellishment. Interested students will find this a graphic account of an evil time and of the forces and personalities that created it.

MASEFIELD, John. *Old Raiger and Other Vers*. 73pp. 65-12905. Macmillan. $3.95 YA

This collection of 12 poems, all new, by England's poet laureate, illustrate Masefield's talent for the "tale in verse" which has characterized much of his writings. His ability to work in allegory without being hampered by the mechanics of verse make this a useful introduction to poetry for young people.

MELLERS, Wilfrid. *Music in a New Found Land: Themes and Developments in the History of American Music*. appendix. bibliog. discog. indexes. music examps. 544pp. 64-17706. Knopf. $6.95 YA

The idea that the characteristics and qualities of American life can be seen in and understood through its music is well presented in this examination of art music, pop, and jazz from colonial times to the present. Mellers' insights into and conclusions about the interrelationships of our music, especially jazz, and our culture are knowledgeable, if debatable. His analyses of specific composers, works and musical trends are informative and, being subjective, arguable. More erudite, though less readable than Chase's *America's Music* or Howard's *Our American Music*, this is highly recommended for schools with good music programs and serious music students. See Lj, Nov. 1, 1964, p.4360.

THE NEW YORK "TIMES" STAFF. *Road to the White House*; ed. by Harold Faber. photog. tabs. index. 305pp. 65-20111. McGraw. $6.95 YA

The story of the 1964 presidential campaign and election as written at the time by reporters and columnists. Good for detailed material on history in the making and study of our political system. See Lj, Jun. 1, p.2565.

ORR, Robert. *The Animal Kingdom*. b.-&w. diags. & photog. index. 380pp. 64-17929. Macmillan. $9.95 (W) YA

This book is a necessary source book for the up-to-date scientific library. Covers animal life from the simplest single-celled organisms to the highly complex multicellular creatures. Good reference for introductory zoology. See Lj, Jun. 1, p.2569.

POOLE, Lynn & Gray. *Scientists Who Work With Cameras*. (Makers of Our Mod. World Bks.). photog. index. 176pp. 65-14117. Dodd. $3.50 (W) YA

This describes in vivid and dramatic form the techniques and challenges of photography as a means of scientific investigation. Successive chapters tell of particular scientists and their work, from Professor Alexopoulos' motion picture investigation of the growth of slime molds to Dr. Whipple's camera-telescope study of meteors. Highly recommended. Looks younger than most adult books.

RIVLIN, Harry N., FRASER, Dorothy M., & STERN, Milton R., editors. *The First Years in College: Preparing Students for a Successful College Career*. appendix. 605pp. 65-21215. Little. $8.95. (W) YA

This book endeavors to indicate what college

3140

LIBRARY JOURNAL

REVIEW OF KISSINGER'S _THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP:_
_A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE_

Bernard Brodie*

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-APPRAISAL
OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Henry A. Kissinger

McGraw-Hill, 1965, $5.95

This is Henry Kissinger's best book thus far. It is an exceedingly good one. Certainly it is the best book I know of on the subject of its title, and the only American book of recent years that I would put on a par with some of the best work of France's Raymond Aron, and that is high praise indeed.

In format it does not bear too conspicuously the trappings of formal scholarship, but is rather a work of contemporary reportage. However, it is reporting on the very highest level. Kissinger's quotations and footnotes

Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

This paper was prepared for publication in _The Reporter_, September 1965.

-2-

are more concerned with what statesmen have said and done
than what colleagues in his profession have concluded
(though the latter are not altogether neglected), but this
could after all reflect mostly the originality and
incisiveness of his own thoughts as contrasted with the
lack of these qualities among most others in his field.

In what field? Is it international politics or is it
strategy? Kissinger is one of the few writers presently
on the scene in international politics who can effectively
straddle both. In a review-article written nearly two
years ago in the *Times* (London) Literary Supplement, the
then *Times* reporter on defense affairs (Alun Gwynne Jones,
now Lord Chalfont, Labour Minister for Disarmament)
ruminated on the representatives of that amazing new breed
of American civilian strategists who seemed to be develop-
ing the new and significant ideas in the field of modern
military strategy, and who were obviously influencing --
and in some instances guiding -- official American strategy.
The author made an interesting distinction between strategy
as a form of conceptual analysis, which he considered
"reasonably easy to define," and that which he considered
to be represented by Kissinger, who was one of two he
singled out as placing the emphasis on the *political*
elements of strategy.¹ It struck me at the time that
Chalfont was putting the approach to strategy via politics
on a somewhat lower level of value, as though it detracted
from the development of what ought to be a *science* of

¹The other person happened to be myself, which I may
perhaps be pardoned for mentioning on the ground that it
exposes to the reader where my bias may lie.

-3-

strategy. If that was really his feeling, I might say that it would not have been shared by Clausewitz, whose most enduring contribution to strategic thinking has certainly been his insistence on the dominance of the political aim and indeed of political control in the determination of all important strategic issues. The fact that most military people after his time, including those who professed to be guided by him, were of a different opinion is not remarkable. It argues only that they had never studied Clausewitz. And who has?

What we have learned today, twenty years after the advent of the nuclear bomb, is that politics is as never before the basic stuff of strategy, especially nuclear and even more clearly "pre-nuclear" strategy. It presents us, either in reality or in our minds, with all our dares and dare-nots -- with the whys and wheres and hows. Or as Kissinger himself puts it in this book: "In the past the major problem for strategists was to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary period the problem more frequently is how to make the available power relevant to objectives likely to be in dispute."

The new science of cost-effectiveness analysis, which results mostly from a wedding of technology with economics, may tell us that a certain type of nuclear weapon would provide a much more economical way of destroying a bridge in Northern Vietnam than would use of conventional or "iron" bombs -- as well as many other things not nearly so obvious -- but it is the political considerations that hold us to the iron bombs and that indeed call into challenge the advisability of the whole operation. Comparable

-4-

examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but it is
surely clear that there is no need for them.

It is mostly for these reasons, no doubt, that there
is less space and consideration given in this book to
purely strategic considerations than in some of Kissinger's
earlier works -- certainly far less than in the one that
made him famous.² Anyway, Part Three of the book, which
comprises only three chapters, is assigned to "the
strategic issues," and of these only Chapter Four, called
"The Nature of the Strategic Debate" (the title recalls
Aron's recent *The Great Debate*) really has much to do with
the strictly military side of the problem. It is an
excellent chapter, and it is sufficient.

The book is about the Atlantic Alliance, or NATO,
and what troubles this "troubled partnership" are for the
most part not questions of strategy at all, though many
of them can hide too easily behind the pretense of being
so. Incidentally, of those same three chapters supposed
to be on strategic issues, Chapter Five deals with the
proposed multilateral force (MLF), which is from beginning
to end a political and not a strategic issue. I should
add that Kissinger's chapter on the MLF is in my opinion
far and away the best summary and statement of the com-
plicated issues in this fantastic story that I have yet
read. In view of the large volume of literature that this
particular debate has churned up, this too is saying a
great deal.

²Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper & Bros.,
1957.

-5-

Of the total of eight chapters in the book, there is
only one concerning which I feel any substantial reserva-
tions. This is Chapter Two, which is on the subject of
Franco-American relations, particularly with respect to
President de Gaulle's role in them. I have considerable
sympathy with most of Kissinger's views and insights even
in this chapter, finding myself much oftener in agreement
than not, but his apologia for De Gaulle does seem to me
to go a bit too far. Kissinger might have a point in his
insistence that De Gaulle's attacks on the United States
are more motivated by his interest in bucking up French
morale after the long years of defeat than by other con-
siderations, but we have plenty of evidence (underlined
by the work of Nathan Leites and others) that the French
population, as distinct from a very few nationalist
personages within it, are not only in no need of such
bucking up but really do not respond to it. They are
interested in other things, mostly their prosperity; and
while it no doubt gives most of them more pleasure than
pain to see their president periodically kicking Uncle Sam,
there are plenty of reservations in France even about that.
Raymond Cartier in a recent article in *Paris-Match*, refers
to what he calls Kissinger's "psychoanalytic" defense of
the General, but he seems to be shaking his head sadly in
disagreement.

On the subject of the problems of Germany, however,
and of the other members of the Alliance, and especially
of their dissatisfaction with the Alliance as it now
stands, Kissinger is superb. No doubt something is owing
to his background, which assists him in achieving appro-
priate intellectual detachment and also makes him entirely

-6-

at home in the German tongue. With these goes a reputation
in Europe, especially as one closest to the highest councils
of the United States and yet detached from and critical of
their views, that undoubtedly gives him access under con-
ditions of relative candor to all the important personages
of Europe.

Others, however, may enjoy a comparable access and even
linguistic skill, but few others have the remaining necessary
equipment. There is simply no substitute for insight, per-
ception, sensitivity, and what simply has to be called a
"political sense." These Kissinger has in abundance, and
in this field the combination is rare. It is really hard
to understand why they should be so rare. So many articu-
late people study international politics; so few of them
grasp so well its essence -- especially where issues of
military significance are involved. The latter is indeed
a most complicating factor, and Kissinger no doubt owes
something to pure luck that he happened at the beginning
of his academic career to turn his attention seriously and
deeply to military problems. With his knowledge of military
affairs goes, however, an even rarer thing, a sense for the
implications of power -- its potentialities and its limita-
tions. He can speak of military force and its use without
inducing a reviewer to remark, as one British reviewer once
did in reviewing, on the whole favorably, Herman Kahn's
Thinking about the Unthinkable: "One sometimes wonders what
has happened to Mr. Kahn's sense of anguish."

The number of quotable passages in this book is legion.
I refrain from quoting more of them for several reasons, but
mostly because the choice among them would be too difficult
and their insertion would add considerably to the bulk of

-7-

this review. Anyway, let the reader of this review read
the book for himself. It will be worth his while. ³

Finally I should like to say that in this book
Kissinger has achieved a clarity and a terseness of style
that he has not possessed in the past. He has always been
capable now and then of turning a very good phrase, but
with it went a lot of plain turgid writing. The latter
he has now sloughed off, and he emerges as no mean stylist,
certainly as one of the most readable as well as insightful
of the American commentators on the international scene.

³However, I may perhaps be excused for quoting only the following, because it reflects Kissinger's talent for observation and for getting around. It is not the kind of insight one picks up merely in reading:

> Faced with a ravaged Europe, the United States came to deal with its Allies paternalistically. This has involved a certain self-righteousness and impatience with criticism. American policymakers often act as if disagreement with their views is due to ignorance which must be overcome by extensive briefings and insistent reiteration. They are less inclined to inquire whether there may be some merit in an opposing view than in overwhelming it with floods of emissaries, official and semi-official. As a result, the United States and Europe have too often conducted their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured in America.

August 3, 1965

Miss Sylvia Baruch
The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Dear Miss Baruch:

Thank you for your letter of
July 19th.

How thoughtful of you to send
me copies of some reviews. I also
appreciated your sending me an advance
copy of the Saturday Review.

Kind regards.

Henry A. Klausinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

copy of the Saturday Review.
appreciated your sending me an advance
me copies of some reviews. I also
How thoughtful of you to send

July 19th.

Thank you for your letter of

Dear Miss Barnuch:

New York, New York 10031
28 East 68th Street
The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
Miss Sylvia Barnuch

August 3, 1962

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following current books and pamphlets are all closely related to the questions covered in "American White Paper." Why not make a selection from this list to review before the program.

General Background

**The Might of Nations.** By John G. Stoessinger. 444 pp. Random House. $6.75. 1965. New edition of prize-winning introduction to study of international relations. Notes such developments as Sino-Soviet split, liquidation of colonies in Africa, recent negotiations on disarmament and control of nuclear weapons, UN financial crisis, trends in regional organization in Europe, Africa, Latin America. Case study approach. Includes new case study on Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

**Politics Among Nations.** By Hans J. Morghenthau. 570 pp. Alfred K. Knopf, New York $10.00. 1960. Basic text expressing "realist" theory on international politics. Discussion in depth on struggle for power, elements and limitations of national power, balance of power. Examination of peace in mid-20th Century: peace through limitation, transformation, accommodation.

**Making Foreign Policy in a Nuclear Age** (2 pamphlets). 1. Government and Public Opinion. 2. Challenges to U.S. Foreign Policy. Headline Series by FPA Staff. Norman Jacobs, Editor; each, approx. 60 pages. Foreign Policy Association, Inc. 75¢ each. June & August 1965. How effectively does our foreign policy making process enable the U.S. to cope with the global challenges confronting it in this "nuclear age? What are its strengths and weaknesses? How can the effectiveness of the process be increased? The answers.

**Great Decisions 1965. Foreign Policy Association, Inc.** 95 pp. $2.00. Details background, indicators' major issues in following foreign policy areas: Red China, Germany, Trade, Food and Dollars, South Africa, Eastern Europe, The UN at

Twenty, Vietnam, The Population Boom.

**Great Decisions 1964. Foreign Policy Association, Inc.** 95 pp. $2.00. Covers following: World Communism Today, France and the West, Egypt and the Middle East, Disarmament, Castro's Cuba, Indonesia, Foreign Aid, Ideological War, fare.

**Part 1: Confrontation with the Soviet Union.** The Theory and Practice of Communism. By R. N. Carew Hunt. 292 pp. Penguin Paperback. $1.25. 1964. (Hardcover $5.00) Concise, critical study of Marxism and its interpretation in practice, with discussion of institutions and events which have helped shape map of contemporary world, the Communist League, First and Second International, Russian Revolution. plus developments inside and outside Russia between time of Lenin and Khrushchev.

**From Lenin to Khrushchev. The History of World Communism.** By Hugh Seton-Watson. 408 pp. Praeger Paperback. $2.25 1963. Focuses on pattern of Communist behavior and application of Communist strategy and tactics under diverse social, economic, intellectual conditions. Probes factors leading to successes and reverses of Communist revolutionary technique. Standard work in the field of international affairs.

**The New Europe Today—and Tomorrow.** By George Lichtheim. 219 pp. Praeger Paperback. $2.25. 1964. Acquaintants non-specialist reader with some arguments underlying current debate over Western Europe's future role within emerging Atlantic Community by drawing upon recent studies of European Common Market and rather problematic future of Britain as member both of Commonwealth and new Western European grouping.

**The Troubled Partnership. A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance.** By Henry A. Kissinger. 251 pp. McGraw-Hill. $5.95. 1965. Scholarly, informed, incisive examination and discussion of difficulties of alliance concerning strategy for defending Western Europe, control of nuclear weapons, German problem, European unity, etc. First of 12-volume series known as "The Atlantic

Policy Studies," an inquiry into future of Atlantic Community in political, economic and military terms.

**Alternative to Partition.** By Zbigniew Brzezinski. 175 pp. McGraw-Hill. $5.95. 1965. Prepared for Atlantic Studies Program of the Council on Foreign Relations. Scholarly approach to central theme: America becoming irrelevant to a divided but secure Western Europe, which is in turn faced by increasingly independent Eastern Europe. Proposes specific policy recommendations: strengthen, broaden process of European reunification, including promotion of multilateral ties between the West and East; reduction of Russia's and East Europe's fears of Germany; cultural and social contacts designed to erode narrow ideological perspectives of the ruling Communist elites; an eventual East-West economic development plan.

**The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age.** By Hedley Bull. 212 pp. Praeger Paperback. $1.95. When first published in 1961, the author defined nature of disarmament and arms control, assessed their feasibility or desirability. In this second edition there is a lengthy introduction tracing developments of the past four years, analyzing implications of expanded and still expanding "Nuclear Club." New appendix examines problem of sanctions as a means of enforcing the arms-control agreements.

II. Profile of the Emerging World

**From Empire to Nation.** By Rupert Emerson. 419 pp. Beacon Press Paperback. $2.45. 1963. Excellent introduction for general reader to problems involved in rise of the new nation states, in the break-up of empires. Discusses overseas expansion of Europe, its aftermath, the nature of the new nationalism which is now coming to flower in almost every corner of the earth. Brief section on Communist imperialism.

**The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic Development in our Time.** By Robert L. Heilbroner. 183 pp. Harper & Row. $4.00 (Paperback, 95¢). 1963. Lucid,

9 August 1965

Henry A. Kissinger

McGraw-Hill, 1965, $5.95*

This, I believe, is Henry Kissinger's best book thus
far. Against the chance that this be considered back-handed
praise, let me add at once that I think that it is an
exceedingly good book. It is certainly the best book I know
of on the subject of its title, and the only American book
of recent years that I would put on a par with some of the
best work of France's Raymond Aron, and that is high praise
indeed.

It resembles Aron's work in more ways than one. In
format it *does not* bear too conspicuously the trappings of formal
scholarship, but is rather a work of contemporary reportage.
But it is reporting on the very highest level. Kissinger's
footnotes are more concerned with what statesmen have said
and done than what colleagues in his profession have concluded
(though the latter are not altogether lacking), but this could

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. This review-article is to be published in *The Reporter*.

This review-article is to be published in *The Reporter*.
Policy of any of its governments or private research abomaora.
views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or
author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the
*

(though the latter are not altogether lacking), but this could
and done than what colleagues in his profession have concluded
and footnotes are more concerned with what statesmen have said
But it is reporting on the very highest level. *His* quotations
scholarship, but is rather a work of contemporary reportage.
format it doesn't seem too copiously the trappings of formal
It resembles Aron's work in more ways than one. In
indeed.

best work of France's Raymond Aron, and that is high praise
of recent years that I would but on a bar with some of the
of on the subject of its title, and the only American book
exceedingly good book. It is certainly the best book I know
braise, let me add at once that I think that it is an
far. Against the chance that this be considered back-handed
This, I believe, is Henry Kieainger's best book thus

McGraw-Hill, 1962, $2.92
Henry A. Kieainger

ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-APPROVAL OF THE

9 August 1962

-2-

after all -- and in my opinion does -- reflect mostly the
originality and incisiveness of his own thoughts as contrasted
with the lack of these qualities among most others in his
field.

In what field? Is it international politics or is it
strategy? Kissinger is one of the few writers presently on
the scene in international politics who can effectively be
to
both. In a review-article written nearly two years ago in
the *Times* (London) Literary Supplement, the then *Times* reporter
on defense affairs (Alun Gwynne Jones, now Lord Chalfont,
Labour Minister for Disarmament) the author ruminated on
the qualities of the representatives of that amazing new breed
of American civilian strategists who seemed to be developing
the new and significant ideas in the field of modern military
strategy, and who were obviously influencing -- and in some
instances guiding -- military strategy. The author made an
interesting distinction between strategy as a form of conceptual
analysis, which he considered "reasonably easy to define," and
what he considered to be represented by Kissinger, who was one
of two he singled out as placing the emphasis on the political
elements of strategy.¹ It struck me at the time that Chalfont

¹The other happened to be myself, which I may perhaps be
pardoned for mentioning on the ground that it exposes to the
reader where my bias may be.

reader where my pize may pe.
bargained for mentioning on the ground that it exposes to the
The other happened to be mieelf, which I may perhaps pe
I

elements of strategy.¹ It struck me at the time that Chalfout
of two he singled out as placing the embattles on the political
what he considered to be represented by Kieasinger, who was one
analysis, which he considered "reasonably easy to define," and
interesting distinction between strategy as a form of conceptual
instances bridging American strategy. The author made an
strategy, and who were obviously influencing -- and in some
the new and significant ideas in the field of modern military
of American civilian strategists who seemed to be developing
the qualities of the representatives of that amazing new breed
Lapour Minister for Disarmament) the author ruminated on
on defense affairs (Vinn Gwynne Jones, now Lord Chalfout,
the *Times* (London) Literary Supplement, the then *Times* reporter
poit). In a review-article written nearly two years ago in
the scene in international politics who can effectively deal with
strategy? Kieasinger is one of the few writers presently on
In what field? Is it international politics or is it
field.

with the lack of these qualities among most others in his
originality and incaliveneese of his own thoughts as contrasted
after all -- and in my opinion does -- reflect mostly the

-3-

-3-

was putting the approach to strategy via politics on a slightly
lower level of value, as though it detracted from the develop-
ment of what ought to be a _science_ of strategy. If that was
really his feeling, I might say that it would not have been
shared by Clausewitz, whose most enduring contribution to
strategic thinking has certainly been his insistence on the
dominance of the political aim and indeed of political control
in the determination of all important strategic issues. The
fact that most military people after his time, including those
who professed to be guided by him, were of a different opinion
is not remarkable. It argues only that they had never studied
Clausewitz. And who has?

power relevant to objectives likely to be in dispute."
period the problem more frequently is how to make the available
strategists was to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary
but it in this book: "In the past the major problem for
with the why and where and how. Or as Klaarner himself
reality or in our minds, with all our dotes and dare-note --
clearly "pre-nuclear" strategy. It presents us either in
basic stuff of strategy, especially nuclear and even more
of the nuclear bomb, is that politics is as never before the
What we have learned today, twenty years after the advent
Clausewitz. And who has?

is not remarkable. It argues only that they were never studied
who professed to be guided by him, were of a different opinion
fact that most military people after his time, including those
in the determination of all important strategic issues. The
dominance of the political aim and indeed of political control
strategic thinking has certainly been his insistence on the
shared by Clausewitz, whose most enduring contribution to
really his feeling. I might say that it would not have been
ment of what ought to be a science of strategy. If that was
lower level of value, as though it detracted from the develop-

-3-

-4-

The new science of cost-effectiveness analysis, which results mostly from a wedding of technology with economics, may tell us that a certain type of nuclear weapon would provide a much more economical way of destroying a bridge in Northern Vietnam than would use of conventional or "iron" bombs -- as well as many things not nearly so obvious -- but it is the political considerations that hold us to the iron bombs and that indeed call into challenge the advisability of the whole operation. Comparable examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but it is surely obvious that there is no need for them.

It is mostly for these reasons, no doubt, that there is less space and consideration given in this book to purely strategic considerations than in some earlier of Kissinger's works, e.g., *The Intelligence Problem* -- certainly far less than in the one that made him famous.² Perhaps another reason is that there have not been any really new ideas in strategy over at least the last two years. Anyway, Part Three of the book, which comprises only three chapters, is assigned to "the strategic issues," and of these only Chapter Four, called "The Nature

1923.

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harber & Broe.⁵

issues," and of these only Chapter Four, called "The Nature
comprises only three chapters, is assigned to "the strategic
the last two years. Anyway, Part Three of the book, which
have not been any really new ideas in strategy over at least
that made him famous.⁶ Perhaps another reason is that there
works ~~which~~ is certainly far less than in the one
strategic considerations than in some earlier of Klaasen's,
less space and consideration given in this book to purely

It is mostly for these reasons, no doubt, that there is
put it is surely obvious that there is no need for them.

operation. Comparable examples could be multiplied indefinitely,
that indeed call into challenge the advisability of the whole
political considerations that hold us to the iron pompe and
well as many things not nearly so obvious -- put it is the
Vietnam than would use of conventional or "iron" pompe -- as
much more economical way of destroying a bridge in Northern
tell us that a certain type of nuclear weapon would provide a
results mostly from a wedding of technology with economics, may
The new science of cost-effectiveness analysis, which

-4-

-5-

of the Strategic Debate" (the title itself recalls Aron's
recent *Le Grand Débat*, translated as *The Great Debate*) really
has ~~very~~ much at all to do with the strictly military side of
the problem. It is an excellent chapter, and it is sufficient.

The book is about the Atlantic Alliance, or NATO, and
what troubles this "troubled partnership" are basically
not questions of strategy at all, though many of them can
hide too easily behind the pretense of being so. Incidentally,
of those same three chapters supposed to be on strategic
issues, Chapter Five deals with the proposed multilateral
force (MLF), which is from beginning to end a political and
not a strategic issue. I should add that Kissinger's chapter
on the MLF is in my opinion far and away the best summary
and statement of the complicated issues in this fantastic
story that I have yet read. In view of the large volume of
literature that this particular debate has churned up, this
too is saying a great deal.

Of the total of eight chapters in the book, there is
only one concerning which I feel any substantial reservations.
This is Chapter Two, which is on the subject of Franco-American
relations, particularly with respect to President de Gaulle's
role in them. I have considerable sympathy with most of

role in them. I have considerable sympathy with most of
relations, particularly with respect to President de Gaulle's
This is Chapter Two, which is on the subject of Franco-American
only one concerning which I feel any substantial reservations.
Of the total of eight chapters in the book, there is
too is saying a great deal.

literature that this particular debate has churned up, this
story that I have yet read. In view of the large volume of
and statement of the complicated issues in this fantastic
on the MEF is in my opinion far and away the best summary
not a strategic issue. I should add that Kieisinger's chapter
force (MLE), which is from beginning to end a political and
issues. Chapter five deals with the proposed multilateral
of those same three chapters subsumed to be on strategic
hide too easily behind the pretense of being so. Incidentally,
not questions of strategy at all, though many of them can
what troubles this "troubled partnership" are basically

The book is about the Atlantic Alliance, or NATO, and
the problem. It is an excellent chapter, and it is sufficient.
has been much at all to do with the strictly military side of
recent Le Grand Départ, translated as *The Great Debate*) really
of the Strategic Debate" (the title itself recalls Aron's

-2-

-6-

Kissinger's views and insights even in this chapter, finding
myself much oftener in agreement than not, but his apologia
for de Gaulle does seem to me to go a bit too far. Kissinger
might have a point in his insistence that de Gaulle's attacks
on the United States are more motivated by his interest in
bucking up French morale after the long years of defeat than
by other considerations, but we have plenty of evidence (as
underlined by the researches of Nathan Leites and others) that
the French population, as distinct from a very few nationalist
personages, are not only in no need of such bucking up but
really do not respond to it. They are interested in other
things, mostly their prosperity; and while it no doubt gives
most of them more pleasure than pain to see their president
periodically kicking Uncle Sam, there are plenty of reservations
in France even about that. In a recent issue of *Paris-Match*,
curiously enough, Raymond Cartier refers to what he calls
Kissinger's "psychoanalytic" defense of the General, but he
seems to be shaking his head sadly in disagreement.

On the subject of the German problem, however, and of
the other members of the Alliance, and especially of their
dissatisfaction with the Alliance as it now stands, Kissinger
is superb. No doubt something is owing to his background,

is anerp. No doubt something is owing to his packround,
disaastasaction on the Alliance as it now stands, Klaasing
the other members of the Alliance, and especially of their
On the subject of the German problem, however, and of
seems to be shaking his head adily in disagreement.
Klaasing's "psychoanalystic" defense of the General, but he
curiously enough, Raymond Cartier refers to what he calls
in France even about that. In a recent issue of Paris-Match,
periodically kicking Uncle Sam, there are plenty of reservations
most of them more pleasure than pain to see their president
things, mostly their prosperity; and while it no doubt gives
really do not respond to it. They are interested in other
persoages, are not only in no need of such pucking up but
the French population, as distinct from a very few nationalist
underlined by the researches of Nathan Leites and others) that
by other considerations, but we have plenty of evidence (as
pucking up French morale after the long years of defeat than
on the United States are more motivated by his interest in
might have a point in his inattention that de Gaulle's attacks
for de Gaulle does seem to me to go a long way too far. Klaasing
myself much ottener in agreement than not, put his apologia
Klaisinger's views and insights even in this chapter, finding

-c-

-7-

which in the first place assists him in achieving appropriate
intellectual detachment and also makes him entirely at home
in the German tongue. With these goes a reputation in
Europe, especially as one closest to the highest councils
of the United States and yet detached from and critical of
their views, that undoubtedly gives him access under conditions
of candor to all the important personages of Europe.

Others, however, may enjoy a comparable access and even
linguistic skill, but few others have the remaining necessary
equipment. There is simply no substitute for insight,
perception, sensitivity, and what simply has to be called
a "political sense." These Kissinger has in abundance, and
in this field the combination is rare. It is really hard to
understand why they should be so rare. So many articulate
people study international politics; so few of them grasp
so well its essence -- especially where issues of military
significance are involved. The latter is indeed a most
complicating factor, and Kissinger no doubt owes something to
pure luck that he happened at the beginning of his academic
career to turn his attention seriously and deeply to military
problems. With his knowledge of military affairs goes,
however, an even rarer thing, a sense for the realities of

however, an even rarer thing, a sense for the realities of
problems. With his knowledge of military affairs goes,
career to turn his attention seriously and deeply to military
pure luck that he happened at the beginning of his academic
complicating factor, and Klaasinger no doubt owes something to
significance are involved. The latter is indeed a most
so well its essence -- especially where issues of military
people study international politics; so few of them grasp
understand why they should be so rare. So many articulate
in this field the combination is rare. It is really hard to
a "political sense." These Klaasinger has in spudence, and
perception, sensitivity, and what simply has to be called
equipment. There is simply no substitute for insight,
linguistic skill, put few others have the remaining necessary
Others, however, may enjoy a comparable access and even
of candor to all the important beraonges of Europe.
their views, that undoubtedly gives him access under conditions
of the United States and yet detached from and critical of
Europe, especially as one closest to the highest councils
in the German tongue. With these goes a reputation in
intellectual detachment and also makes him entirely at home
which in the first place assists him in achieving appropriate

-1-

-8-

power -- its potentialities and its limitations. He can speak of military force and its use without inducing a reviewer to remark, as one British reviewer once did in reviewing, on the whole favorably, Herman Kahn's *Thinking about the Unthinkable*: "One sometimes wonders what has happened to Mr. Kahn's sense of anguish."

The number of quotable passages in this book is legion. I refrain from quoting more of them for several reasons, but mostly because the choice among them would be too difficult and their insertion would add considerably to the bulk of this review. Anyway, let the reader of this review read the book for himself. It will be worth his while.³

³ However, I may perhaps be excused for quoting only the following, because it reflects Kissinger's talent for observation and for getting around. It is not the kind of insight one picks up merely in reading:

> United States-European relationships took on their present cast during this period. "Faced with a ravaged Europe, the United States came to deal with its Allies paternalistically. This has involved a certain self-righteousness and impatience with criticism. American policymakers often act as if disagreement with their views is due to ignorance which must be overcome by extensive briefings and insistent reiteration. They are less inclined to inquire whether there may be some merit in an opposing view than in overwhelming it with floods of emissaries, official and semi-official. As a result, the United States and Europe have too often conducted their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured in America."

of a blueprint manufactured in America."
conducted their dialogue over the technical implementation
result, the United States and Europe have too often
floods of emissaries, official and semi-official. As a
merit in an obboating view than in overwhelming it with
are less inclined to indulge whether there may be some
by extensive briefings and insatent reiteration. They
their views is due to ignorance which must be overcome
American policymakers often act as it disagreement with
certain self-righteousness andimbalance with criticism.
its Villes baternistically. This has involved a
ravaged Europe, the United States came to deal with
their present seat during this period. "Faced with
United States-European relationship took on
insight one picks up merely in reading:

insight one picks up merely in reading:
operation and for getting around. It is not the kind of
following, because it reflects Klaasinger's talent for

However, I may perhaps be excused for quoting out of

for himself. It will be worth his while.³
review.
Umway, let the reader of this review read the book
and their insertion would add considerably to the bulk of this
mostly because the choice among them would be too difficult
I refrain from quoting more of them for several reasons, put
The number of quotable passages in this book is legion.

Mr. Kahn's sense of anguish.

Unthinkable: "One sometimes wonders what has happened to
on the whole favorably, Herman Kahn's *Thinking about the
to remark, as one British reviewer once did in reviewing,
of military force and its use without inducing a reviewer
power -- its potentialities and limitations. He can ask

-8-

-9-

Finally I should like to say that in this book Kissinger
has achieved a clarity and a terseness of style that he has not
possessed in the past. He has always been capable of turning
a very good phrase now and then, but with it went a lot of
plain turgid writing. The latter he has now sloughed off,
and he emerges as no mean stylist, certainly as one of the
most readable as well as insightful of the American commentators
on the international scene.

on the international scene.

most readable as well as insightful of the American commentators
and he emerges as no mean stylist, certainly as one of the
plain turgid writing. The latter he has now aloughed off,
a very good phrase now and then, but with it went a lot of
boastfully in the past. He has always been capable of turning
has achieved a clarity and a terseness of style that he has not
Finally I should like to say that in this book Klaasger
-0-

9 August 1965

Henry A. Kissinger

McGraw-Hill, 1965, $5.95*

It resembles Aron's work in more ways than one. In
format it bears not too conspicuously the trappings of formal
scholarship, but is rather a work of contemporary reportage.
But it is reporting on the very highest level. Kissinger's
and footnotes are more concerned with what statesmen have said
and done than what colleagues in his profession have concluded
(though the latter are not altogether lacking), but this could

*Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. This review-article is to be published in The Reporter.

-2-

In what field? Is it international politics or is it
strategy? Kissinger is one of the few writers presently on
the scene in international politics who can effectively <u>straddle</u> both.
In a review-article written nearly two years ago in
the <u>Times</u> (London) Literary Supplement, the then <u>Times</u> reporter
on defense affairs (Alun Gwynne Jones, now Lord Chalfont,
Labour Minister for Disarmament) the author ruminated on
the qualities of the representatives of that amazing new breed
of American civilian strategists who seemed to be developing
the new and significant ideas in the field of modern military
strategy, and who were obviously influencing -- and in some
instances guiding <u>American military strategy</u>. The author made an
interesting distinction between strategy as a form of conceptual
analysis, which he considered "reasonably easy to define," and
what he considered to be represented by Kissinger, who was one
of two he singled out as placing the emphasis on the <u>political</u>
elements of strategy.¹ It struck me at the time that Chalfont

-3-

was putting the approach to strategy via politics on a slightly
lower level of value, as though it detracted from the develop-
ment of what ought to be a _science_ of strategy. If that was
really his feeling, I might say that it would not have been
shared by Clausewitz, whose most enduring contribution to
strategic thinking has certainly been his insistence on the
dominance of the political aim and indeed of political control
in the determination of all important strategic issues. The
fact that most military people after his time, including those
who professed to be guided by him, were of a different opinion
is not remarkable. It argues only that they _have_ never studied
Clausewitz. And who has?

-4-

It is mostly for these reasons, no doubt, that there is less space and consideration given in this book to purely strategic considerations than in some earlier of Kissinger's works that I have read -- certainly far less than in the one that made him famous.² Perhaps another reason is that there have not been any really new ideas in strategy over at least the last two years. Anyway, Part Three of the book, which comprises only three chapters, is assigned to "the strategic issues," and of these only Chapter Four, called "The Nature

-5-

-6-

Kissinger's views and insights even in this chapter, finding
myself much oftener in agreement than not, but his apologia
for de Gaulle does seem to me to go a little too far. Kissinger
might have a point in his insistence that de Gaulle's attacks
on the United States are more motivated by his interest in
bucking up French morale after the long years of defeat than
by other considerations, but we have plenty of evidence (as
underlined by the researches of Nathan Leites and others) that
the French population, as distinct from a very few nationalist
personages, are not only in no need of such bucking up but
really do not respond to it. They are interested in other
things, mostly their prosperity; and while it no doubt gives
most of them more pleasure than pain to see their president
periodically kicking Uncle Sam, there are plenty of reservations
in France even about that. In a recent issue of *Paris-Match*,
curiously enough, Raymond Cartier refers to what he calls
Kissinger's "psychoanalytic" defense of the General, but he
seems to be shaking his head sadly in disagreement.

-7-

-8-

> United States-European relationships took on their present east during this period. "Faced with a ravaged Europe, the United States came to deal with its Allies paternalistically. This has involved a certain self-righteousness and impatience with criticism. American policymakers often act as if disagreement with their views is due to ignorance which must be overcome by extensive briefings and insistent reiteration. They are less inclined to inquire whether there may be some merit in an opposing view than in overwhelming it with floods of emissaries, official and semi-official. As a result, the United States and Europe have too often conducted their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured in America."

-9-

The Weekly
Kaleidoscope

About Germany's
Leather Goods —
and Offenbach

The "Town of Leather"—this is the name Germans give to Offenbach, a neighbouring town of Frankfurt, situated on the river Main in the Federal Republic of Germany.

This year, from August 28 to September 2, Offenbach will again be the centre of interest concerning leather goods. During this period Offenbach's international leather-goods exhibition will be held.

That Offenbach is the centre of the German leather-goods industry is proven by the fact that in the town itself and in the vicinity of Offenbach 650 of Germany's 1,000 leather-goods factories are situated. In these 650 factories, about 17,000 people are employed and some 3,000 to 4,000 part-time craftsmen supplement the full-time workers.

Goods made of leather last year were exported from Germany in particular to Switzerland, the best customer of the German leather-goods producers, and to the U.S.A., Sweden, Holland, Belgium and France.

At Offenbach, one can see leather goods that are not for sale. A museum there displays man's handicraft with leather through the ages. The complete

With the goddess of justice looking on: A week of celebration began in Bremen's town hall on August 10 in honour of the 1,000th anniversary of the day in 965 when the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire granted Bremen the privilege of holding its own public market. Thus the community that only a few centuries later became a Free City of the Hanseatic League was launched on its long and flourishing career as a major centre of trade

collection is open to the public, and is displayed in 23 modern exhibition halls.

A few of the articles to be seen are ancient instruments made of leather, such as the leather bag used for carrying medicine by a doctor of prehistoric times and a pair of children's shoes from ancient Egypt.

Another valuable object is a green attaché-case, adorned with gold print, which belonged to Napoleon I of France. Made in 1810, it has the words "Napoleon et Roi" hand-painted on the case.

All told there are 4,861 exhibits displayed in the leather museum. The shoe collection is by far the greatest among the collections of tapestries, furniture, cases and trunks, weapons, clothes, saddles and bridles and handbags made from leather.

The shoe display shows mostly worn shoes, spanning times from sandals worn before the Christian era to modern boots used for skiing and mountain climbing.

Other exciting exhibits are collections of shadow figures from China, Siam, India, Java, Bali, Egypt and Turkey, which can be seen in various diaramas. One presses a button to illuminate the scenes.

Some 30,000 people visit the Offenbach leather museum annually. Another attraction of Offenbach is its excellent training installations for the leather trade. Regrettably there is no great demand for this trade among the younger generation. Where there were once 200 apprentices, there are only 60 now.

This is a disturbing factor for the leather industry as a largely handicrafts trade. For there are still spheres where machines cannot replace human beings.

Smoother sailing — for motorists: This new bridge across the Rhine at Koblenz links up the city with the autobahns, the Federal Republic's network of long-distance highways

6

THE BULLETIN, AUGUST 17, 1965

[il]

The RAND Corporation

1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA 90406

13 August 1965

L-16862

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

The other day I sent you a copy of the review of your book that I had just sent off to Max Ascoli. As is always the case with me, a fresh look a few days later prompts me to do some self-editing, and this was no exception.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of an edited version I sent off to Max yesterday, to replace the original one. Inasmuch as I sent it off special delivery, my guess is that he received it Friday (i.e., today), which should be in plenty of time for his next issue, which I understand will not be until September anyway. Of course, there is no telling what Max's own editors will do but in my letter I hinted that I expected his editors to minimize their intervention.

As you will see from the copy, practically all of my changes take the form of a deletion of words, which almost invariably results in improvement. Actually in bulk the changes are quite small.

With best regards,

BB:pd

Enclosure:

Book Review of *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*

Enclosure to L-16862,
dated 13 August 1965

29 August 1965

This I believe, is Henry Kissinger's best book thus far. Against the chance that this be considered back-handed praise, let us add at once that I think that it is an exceedingly good book. [It is certainly] the best book I know of on the subject of its title, and the only American book of recent years that I would put on a par with some of the best work of France's Raymond Aron, and that is high praise indeed.

It resembles Aron's work in more ways than one. # In format it bears not too conspicuously the trappings of formal scholarship, but is rather a work of contemporary reportage. However, it is reporting on the very highest level. Kissinger's and footnotes are more concerned with what statesmen have said and done than what colleagues in his profession have concluded (though the latter are not altogether lacking), but this could

after all --- and in my opinion does --- reflect mostly the
originality and incisiveness of his own thoughts as contrasted
with the lack of these qualities among most others in his
field.

In what field? Is it international politics or is it
strategy? Kissinger is one of the few writers presently on
the scene in international politics who can effectively straddle
both. In a review-article written nearly two years ago in
the *Times* (London) Literary Supplement, the then *Times* reporter
on defense affairs (Alun Gwynne Jones, now Lord Chalfont,
Labour Minister for Disarmament) ruminated on
---the qualities--- of the representatives of that amazing new breed
of American civilian strategists who seemed to be developing
the new and significant ideas in the field of modern military
strategy, and who were obviously influencing -- and in some
instances guiding -- American strategy. The author made an
interesting distinction between strategy as a form of conceptual
analysis, which he considered "reasonably easy to define," and
that which he considered to be represented by Kissinger, who was one
of two he singled out as placing the emphasis on the political
elements of strategy.¹ It struck me at the time that Chalfont

¹ The other happened to be myself, which I may perhaps be
pardoned for mentioning on the ground that it exposes to the
reader where my bias may lie.

was putting the approach to strategy via politics on a somewhat
lower level of value, as though it detracted from the develop-
ment of what ought to be a _science_ of strategy. If that was
really his feeling, I might say that it would not have been
shared by Clausewitz, whose most enduring contribution to
strategic thinking has certainly been his insistence on the
dominance of the political aim and indeed of political control
in the determination of all important strategic issues. The
fact that most military people after his time, including those
who professed to be guided by him, were of a different opinion
is not remarkable. It argues only that they had never studied
Clausewitz. And who has?

-4-

The new science of cost-effectiveness analysis, which
results mostly from a wedding of technology with economics, may
tell us that a certain type of nuclear weapon would provide a
much more economical way of destroying a bridge in Northern
Vietnam than would use of conventional or "iron" bombs -- as
well as many other things not nearly so obvious -- but it is the
political considerations that hold us to the iron bombs and
that indeed call into challenge the advisability of the whole
operation. Comparable examples could be multiplied indefinitely,
but it is surely clear that there is no need for them.

It is mostly for these reasons, no doubt, that there is
less space and consideration given in this book to purely
strategic considerations than in some [earlier] of Kissinger's
works -- certainly far less than in the one
that made him famous.² Perhaps another reason is that there
have not been any really new ideas in strategy over at least
the last two years. Anyway, Part Three of the book, which
comprises only three chapters, is assigned to "the strategic
issues," and of these only Chapter Four, called "The Nature