Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Max Fisher

12/13/69 9:20 a.m.

F said he had called K enough; K said he had tried to return F's call the other day, and had asked Len Garment to call him.

F said this situation--the understanding was if there's going to be a shift in policy toward the Middle East I was to be kept informed. F said he is in an embarrassing position with all these big meetings in New York. K said what big meetings. F said the United Jewish Appeal and the KDC (?). F has been the principle speaker. K said what secret meetings. F said no secret meetings. F said I didn't say secret meetings. K said then what meetings. F said here in New York. K said by whom? F said maybe I'd better start all over again. F said there are meetings of Jewish communities. . . . K said oh, I understand. F said. . . . greeted warmly here by a feeling of a major shift in policy on the Middle East. F said my understanding was if there was a change I should be kept informed. F said if I have leadership role in Jewish community, I should be told. F said has there been a shift in policy? K said Joe Sisco was supposed to give you a full briefing. K said Len Garment called Sisco at our request and Sisco said he would give you a full briefing. F said I haven't had it. K said you check with Len; I thought the matter was under control. F said if I'm going to be effective, I should know where we stand. F said if I am to speak out, I have to know where we stand. F said if there's been a shift, and they don't want me to know about it, I should know that too. K said there's been no shift. K said I was very busy or I'd have briefed you myself, but Sisco said he would do it.

F said and then I was told there was going to be a speech by Rogers. F said on top of it to have Humphrey speak and blast the Middle East statement--he made quite a speech. F said he was quite a man to be opposite to, but that's not the point. F said Joe Sisco. . . . I didn't have information; I just got a copy of the speech now. F said there was a telegram sent by the P for him to read and it was greeted *unk* in a way F didn't like. F said he called Joe on Wednesday, but he was out of town and nobody knew where to reach him and nobody knew where he was. F said the meetings are going on through the weekend. F said it's very unfortunate; I don't know what this is all about. K said right; out position is taken along the lines of the Security Council position that's been agreed to--no major shift. F said is definition of borders a shift in policy? K said on Egyptian side--similar to what the P said at the UN to which Eban agreed. K said but that the P said already in September. F said maybe it's the tone; I don't know, there has been a breakdown in communications, I am not satisfied yet. K said why don't you talk to Joe Sisco?

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Max Fisher

12/13/69 9:20 a.m.

page 2

K said if then you are not satisfied, come in and see me. F said all right. K said you talk with Sisco. F said all right, Joes' back in town.

F said I don't bother you--the only time I call you is when I think it important that we converse. K said he told Garment to call you and he said he did; he said he call Sisco, and Sisco was eager to talk to you. K said I thought it was under control. F said my effectiveness is not good unless I know what's going on. K said well that's in our own selfish interest, the White House's.

F said David Rockefeller talked with him; he was in for an hour and a half. F said he wants to be the great diplomat now. K said they all do. F said he said he saw the P. K said we hear a lot of people; that doesn't mean anything.

F said I will call Sisco. F said I'm not going to bother you except in a case of real importance. F said I just want to be kept informed. F said there are going to be some real problems I visualize. K said good. F said he will be in town next week. K said right, bye.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo. 5/13/64

Telecon
Bill Sullivan

12/13/69 12:15 p.m.

S said the Australian minister gave a suggestion. K said right, he brought me a copy. K said he thought this was something S should handle, at least in this instance. S said he reports you indicated it him you thought the reaction would be positive. K said I thought we should consult. S said he wanted to touch base with K on this. K said he hasn't had a chance to give it to the P yet. S said we might consider the problem of other countries as well, give evidence on the US-Australian one. S said we have been faced with the problem of consultation with the remainder. S said the remainder is reduced by the Philippine presence. S said at the next SEATO meeting we would have a contributing meeting. S said it would be embarrassing if the host were no longer a top contributor. S said we could meet Australia publicly and others by having private session with the Australians somewhere along the line, January, February have another session involving the other four. It would give the appearance of not being totally special with Australia. K said we will have more talks with them? S said right, staged in such a way that none come to the table except in the presence of the others and it will appear spontaneous. K said sounds good to me. S said there's the problem of getting all the foreign ministers together; it might be good to have it here rather than have a foreign minister exercise. K said sounds good to me; I would support that and I would prepare the P accordingly. K said he was sure the Secretary of State would support it.

S was wondering about plans in Paris for the holidays; both Christmas and new Years fall on Thrusdays. S said he received a paper from Al Haig advising looking toward reducing the frequency of plenary sessions. S Said he didn't know what the P meant. K said he didn't either; he just send K a note. K said we might just skip the Christmas meeting and have one on the next Wednesday. S said they might have one on the 20th rather that the 25th and skip the next and go on to ____________. S said it might be a liaison footwork to begin Tuesday of next week. S said K had asked for a paper on this by the 17th, but he'll get it done today and get the secretary to take a look at it. K said good, I'll get a reply by the end of the day on Monday.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Rabin

12/13/69 12:55 p.m.

Foreign

R said he understood a meeting has been arranged between K and the
PKMX Minister. K said breakfast on Tuesday. R said fine. K said
I am delighted to see him. R said he was glad. K said he doesn't
see so many intelligent Foreign Ministers. R said at least we have
one. K said true; are you coming along? R said I believe I will come
along. K said I'm delighted. K said he may have one of my staff
people present, does R mind? R said not at all. K said probably
Saunders. R said fine. R said he believes the main issue will be the
last speech and its significance. K said he may want to talk for 10
minutes alone with the Foreign Minister; give him some information
on the P's thinking.

By: KML NARA, Dalo 5/13/69

Telecon
The President

12/13/69 12:59 p.m.

K said I wanted to call you; there isn't really a great deal, just two things. The soviets have now made the proposals to the Germans and they're tough as hell. P said he was just reading them; P said it doesn't surprise him. K said now the Germans get themselves sucked into Berlin negotiations: on the one hand they are committed to it, and on the other they can't get anywhere. P said the point is we really have to get it through our stupid heads that we are not dealing here with people to whom a smile or a handshake makes any difference; these are sons of bitches. K said that's right; the Germans will be drawn into a position in which they are forced to doncuct a nationalist policy and they didn't do it before they were divided. P said forced to? ... turn to the right you mean? K said the Germans have a long tradition of national Bolshevism--a combination of nationalism and leftism. They are going to be drawn more to look at it from a national point of view. They have been given a set of insoluble positions. K said he saw David Bruce last night; Bruce is concerned--he likes Brandt; K does too--he is afraid the Germans are going the way of the __________. P said any time a country goes to the left, unless it goes to the communist left, it disintegrages. This drives our liberal friends up the wall. P said softness in any problem means softness in others and then a frenetic reaction to an extreme situation which tears people apart. K said that's the problem. P said the Russians have asked for formal recognition; once they are established they will be . . .

K said the other problem he wanted to mention is that there's been an unbelievable amount of leaking from State on the Chinese meeting; they gave a full debriefing to the Japanese and the Japanese are leaking it now. The Japanese are asking whether they can release it to the press; we'll reject that. P said they debriefed the substance of the conversation? K said yes. P said what the hell for? K said it's a combination of two things: the Sovietologists are eager to make sure the Russians don't get sore at us; so far according to the leak from State, we are reassured by the Russian reaction. The second problem is they then send it out as a normal cable of information to the key posts. They wanted to tell the Japanese; we said no. K said the problem is with so many people knowing about it, somebody's going to leak it. K said I don't know how the Chinese will react. P said this was deliberate on the part of State so that China will get mad and start talking. P said these talks with the Chinese, and with the soviets, ought to be handled on a confidential basis--that's what they agreed to in the tlaks. K said we set it up so carefully, and over such a long period of time and if they think we're only trying to get propaganda they'll have to hit us back. K said he would handle it with the Executive

*as a part of reassuring the Russians.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
The President
12/13/69 12:59 p. m.

page 2

Secretariat at State; K doesn't think Bill had anything to do with it. P said Stessle (?) said it was fine to let out the background, but not the content. K said as long as you agree that we should tell State, we can get it under control. P said play it low-key; we must get it started and keep continuing because of the natural suspiciousness of the Chinese. P said it's essential at this point not to have these debriefings. P said this is an order: there is to be no debriefing to any Soviets, just as we are not to inform the Chinese of what the Soviets talked about. P said we ever gotten the 2 million, 5 hundred thousand words. K said they are being cut down, and they are complaining. P said why are they complaining. K said they feel they are missing some of the reporting; some of the posts are complaining. K said it's better to have a requirement that forces people to sort out the out the essential from the non-essential things. P said yes, and send the rest in in a book at the end of the year. K said or x letters. P said or letters, but to put on wires this monstrous stuff is ridiculous. K said he is going to tell them to put on a higher classification too; they just made it secret. P said we'll kill this child before it's born. K said right; I don't care about these talks; we don't have anything to talk about anyway. P said we all know that, but the Russians aren't going to believe we didn't have anything, and the Chinese will believe we are playing them off against the Russians. K said they might think we are in cahoots to embarrass them with other communists.

P said what's this Greece stuff. K said that's European; the Scandinavians did it on doctrinaire grounds. P said kick the Scandinavians in their asses. P said they agreed to sending arms to Greece? K said no, but it isn't blocked either, that's up to executive discretion. K said Goodell is holding up Tasca now. P said on what grounds? How can he? K said he did it by getting Javits to block it. They've held him up on grounds that the Council of Europe decision might be affected. K said that's ridiculous; we're going to get him next week. K said he recommends the P see him briefly before he goes. P said I'm not only going to see him; I'm going to publicize it--get a picture taken. P said the Scandinavians don't amount to a thing; for them to point the finger at the Greeks is ridiculous--why not at the Italian government? K said or at least the Eastern Europeans. P said what about Tito? P said it doesn't go with Greece; I think the people are sick of this afk crap, don't you. K said the reaction of the last 6 weeks is making that clear.

P asked K if he would develop 3 or 4 lines on the POW thing for Monday night. P said just a note of concern, but this issue should be separated out from others. P said after seeing the wives and mothers on Friday,

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

Telecon
The President

12/13/69 12:59 p.m.

page 3

he doesn't want to just ignore the issue. K said he would have one wait-
ing for P. P said do you think it's a good idea? K said it's a good idea
if you don't hit it too hard. P said let's just not overlook it.

P said he had an idea about Lodge--since his relations with Martin are
good, why couldn't he stay at the embassy. He, as ambassador, could
host it. P said he's one of the rare cases of an ambassador who plays
the line exactly. K said yes, he's our man. K said David Bruce indicat-
edd that he is being bored with retirement and would be interested in an
ambassadorship. K said he might be possible for the negotiations. P
said that's what I was thinking; he will do what we want. K said yes, he's
an honorable man. P said what happens is we talk to these people, and
Pete clears them, and then Bill clears them; this makes them State's men.
P said he's going to talk to them first. K said excellent; we'd have dies in
Saigon if we hadn't had a direct channel to Bunker. P said I think we
should ask Bunker to stay for 6 more months. P said Bunker leans a
little too much in favor of Thieu, but we need that; anybody who said 'the
hell with Thieu'... K said it would be a catastrophe. P said the idea
of Bruce appeals to him, but not now. K said no, he wants to go on a
trip.

K said that message K discussed with P shows it's getting to them. NYT
said something about not having someone there. If it's a come-on, its a
sign that they feel the need for it. P said we might replace Berger just
to show some change there. K said Berger is tough, but doesn't have
subtlety. P said no. K said who then. Habib, but we promised him an
ambassadorship. K said but this certainly ranks as an ambassadorship.
P said let's think about him. K said he's a little . . . P said peacenik?
K said yes. P said he's been sitting over there.

P said on the NYT thing, that's anticipated, don't you agree? K said yes.
K said Xuan Thuy has been away; I am getting a lot of calls from there;
they say he is rallying. P said our friends at the Times don't know what to
bitch about. P said but State will get antsy as a result

*

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon

The President

12/13/69 1:28 p.m.

P said one other point--the UPI story on the Vietnam talks--this had to come from State. [P read an excerpt from a newspaper article.] P said somebody is really putting that out. K said it's total transparent nonsense; very cheap prppaganda.

P said when are you going to have the backgrounder? P said he would like to see one on Vietnam and one on general things. K said on Monday and he would make sure Ron plants a few questions on negotiations. P said right, make sure of that.

P said this idea of not replacing Lodge, we can't let them make a capital case out of that; let's let them worry about it. K said you think I should have a backgrounder after you are on TV? P said why not before? P said if they did it at 4:00, they couldn't run it until you've been on. K said right; go on at 4:00; tell them what you're going to say. P said we'd really dominate the news that way, really get in and knock some of this crap down.

P said on the atrocity thing, I think it's quieted down. K said definitely. P said this is something.

Percy

P said [PICKS] suggests that no national incident since the death of Martin Luther King has such a strong response, and [RECOV] knows who these people are [the Black Panthers]--they're not kids. K said they are telling the Algerians how they plan to overthrow the government. P said he talked with Percy about Johnson's son-in-law thing. Johnson was mad: there's a difference between it's being brought up as a family thing and as a press release. P said the guy who made the charge is a peacenik. P said Johnson was really outgaged about the whole thing. P said Butterfied sat on his ass and didn't get anything donw. Who made the attack; what actually happened. If Johnson knew these things, I should have. P said can you find out.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

12/13/69 2:07 p.m.

P said he talked to Garment; it's a touchy thing to handle. P said tell him I had you call him. P said it would be unfortunate if we were to say anything or imply a private understanding contrary to Rogers' speech. P said we don't want her to say anything. K said he fully understood. P said what little time we bought for the summit with the speech will be lost. P said he wishes we could postpone it. K said it doesn't hurt us if she attacks the speech as long as she doesn't refer to the other thing. P said some interest would be served by expressing some disappointment in Rogers' speech. K said yes. P said in terms of Arab summit for her to indicate that--indicate their hard line. But say the P's private reassurances remain firm--no change. P said it's just a damn charade we're playing. P said we don't want her to indicate everything is just fine; tell her I think it helpful to indicate disappointment with Rogers' speech. P said it gives us a bargaining position with the Arabs. Just be sure the private reassurances remain firm. K said they are all stirred up; Max Fisher called this morning and said we are undersutting the Jewish position. K said he send him to State to talk with Sisco. P said he's not going to hold hands with any Jewish leaders; State got it's way in the NSC meeting. K said we should let them go two more rounde, but then you will have to make fundemental decisions, Mr. P. P said there's no reason for us to take the heat off this; let them explain this. K said that's right. K said Javits has been screaming too. P said let him scream at Rogers. K said he tome him. P said what did he say? K said he said he's going to do it.

P said you know this is the Moratorium day, and there were just 12 at American University. K said he didn't see that; isn't that something. P said those kids are not dumb; they can read the polls and they know their parents don't approve. K said and they respect success; they want something to succeed, something they can admire and emulate; they are looking for fathers, something to look up to. They are rootless; that is their basic problem. P said but they had an issue to bring to this Moratorium--My Lai. P said but they didn't do a damn thing. How do you explain that; it's very interesting. K said you have rallied a majority of people; Johnson didn't have this; he was caught between the healthy majority and the unappeasable doves. P said in the press conference, on the question of a confrontatin: P said he would like to be looked at as a P who took a stand. P said you just don't tell people what they want to hear each time; that's where the press is wrong; they think the only way to success is to say yea each time. K said they want a leader who has a grasp of things; your press conference was successful because you can tie things together. K said one-sentence answers makes them feel you are on top of things, and the November 3 speech gave them the same feeling--you explained it. K said in a revolutionary period, the worst thing is to give

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

12/13/69 2:07 p.m.
page 2

in to every manifestation of dissatisfaction. K; said every time we have
made concessions, we have been asked for me. K said we can go back
to Paris any time we want without loss of face. K said we can use Janu-
ary or February to get something else started. K said of course we will
have a set-back, they will probably launch an offensive in February or
March, the rate of infiltration indicates that. P said it will take 30
days to know that; the rate of infiltration may be to replace losses. P
said I just wonder what the hell they're up to. P said the ______ of
the Joint Chiefs--I don't like that. K said that's partly Laird's fault--
they sent the memo to him over two weeks ago; Laird just got it over
here yesterday. K said the normal thing is for the P to call them and
to talk to them. K said he would have a word with Wheeler. P said
say we are keenly aware, but are boxed in. Also way we are going to give
until April 15, and then give a hard look. K said we can tell them that;
we can tell them to stay at top ceilings (that will ease their minds); K
said he would like to work out through Haig that Wheeler will give us cop-
ies of memos addressed to P. P said we should bring him in on these
discussions. K said I wouldn't do it now; you get Vietnam under control
first.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Laird

12/15/69 9:16 a.m.

L: I am having a little problem--the Laos part of the appropriations bill is coming up on the floor of the Senate today.

K: Yes.

L: I am concerned, although this is a joint Defense and State problem.

K: The Laos thing?

L: Yes--it looks like the Cooper amendment may pass today. It's really a tough amendment on that bill. It limits maneuverability and air force sorties. I am going to lobby against that. But I can't get him not to introduce it. That would be the best thing. But I thought I should alert you to it. I don't think the P could get Cooper not to offer it.

K: Cooper goes deaf when we talk to him.

L: He hears pretty well.

K: Yes, I never noticed any trouble hearing when we say something he likes.

L: I've alerted Bryce, but I thought you should be told.

K: But will we get our friends' funds limited?

L: We'll have to knock it out in the Senate-House conference if they adopt it. We've got to do some fancy bookkeeping; they're still trying to shut us off in Laos as fast as they can.

K: Do you think we are going to lose the ABM appropriation?

L: If the members aren't there we could lose today, but it would be put back in conference. In our statements we can include estimations of the infiltration rate. Each month it is delayed, the charges go up. Hatfield estimated the costs in the end of January--150 million dollars attributed to an increase of inflation in construction. This bill depends on whether our friends are there. Bryce doesn't want to get it publicized; that kind of question wouldn't do the country any good. We're going to win it in conference, and publicity wouldn't do the country any good.

By: KMH NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Laird

12/15/69 9:16 a.m.

L: We can certainly lick it in conference.

K: Yes, but the conference might not come until January; that
delays it 3 months and gives bad publicity on limits.

K: Yes, yes, yes, yes, but we almost need it for the SALT talks.

L: Yes, we've got nothing else to offer; might proceed along
that line with the bipartisan leadership. We are following Bunker flying
Barry Goldwater over this morning.

K: He wants to see me this morning, not about this, just what
he found. I've got more people coming in hear telling me how to win the
war.

L: That's good Henry.

K: But you're the one who's going to win this war.

L: Everybody thinks we're going to win every battle.

K: That's why the P wants to go slow in January and February
and make the big one in March or April.

L: Tell them they can slip all questions over here. You tell them
my press briefing is at 11:30 tomorrow morning.

K: We will tell them all details will be handled at Defense when we
release it. I will send you the backgrounder, but it won't go into details. The
one thing I will stay away from is figures on combat and combat support.

L: You don't want to get into percentages of combat and combat
support. In phase two, I'd like to refer to them as security forces.

K: right

L: They won't have combat responsibility, but security responsibility.

K: Right. I've had word from Bunker that he's had contact from
those characters.

L: Maybe Berger will have to meet with Ky once a week; he is
the only one who can screw things up enough.

K: Right.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

12/15/69 9:20 a.m.

K said, I wanted to call you about the draft of tonight's statement.
The President is working on it himself, but I thought I would give you
a working draft - that is the only piece of paper I have got.

R said, why don't you just send it over. I assume it will be only
a 5-minute talk. K said, if he follows this working draft he isn't
going to say anything except about the troop replacement and the
fact that it is going pretty well. Rogers said, is he going to say
anything about infiltration? K said, he is going to say infiltration
has picked up - we don't know whether it is to replace losses or
prepare for an offensive, but we are going to watch and will take
actions to protect ourselves. R said, I never have seen anything
as confusing as the statements on infiltration figures. K said,
this is one of the things Richardson and I are going to do in this
study group -- is to study figures.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Ambassador Bogdan
12/15/69 9:40 a.m.

B: Could I see you today some time?

K: Sure.

B: Everything I think is all right according to schedule.

K: Do you need to?

B. It's not necessary.

K: My only question to you is will I have to shift appointments?
What is your schedule tomorrow?

B: It stands as it was outlined when we spoke last. In the morning
he wants to see you.

K: This is our brief visit or our regular talk?

B: Our brief preliminary visit, 30 or 45 minutes. Then he has
an appointment with Mr. Hillenbrand. Wednesday afternoon is free.

K: We have our regular talk on Wednesday? Why not have a
lengthy session tomorrow?

B: At your convenience. Tomorrow morning we are completely
free.

K: Why doesn't he come by at 10:00 at the same place.

B: At the library

K: Yes, the diplomatic entrance. I will set aside an hour or an
hour and a half for it and then I will also save time on Wednesday afternoon
for that should it be necessary.

B: Fine, at 10:00 we will be there. He will be accompanied by
myself and Mr. __________, the interpreter.

K: You will attend the meeting?

B: Yes.

K: Fine, we will see you then.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Bogdan

12/15/69 9:40 a.m.

B: Is everything under control?

K: I can't say everything is under control or they will take my job away.

B: We'll give you some things that will held you keep your job.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Schultz
12/15/69 10:41 a.m.

S said he was calling to see if there had been any word on the oil problem. K said he doesn't see how he can make a national security objection, and that is the only thing I am competent to make. S said okay thank you very much. K said right; you have your own problem with Defense and the JCS which I understand you are dealing with. S said yes; Defense is on board; they talk like they're not, but they are. S said is it okay for me to say you have no objection on a national security basis? K said yes, with Presidential perspective. S said okay thank you.

By: KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
12/15/69 11:00 a.m.

K: You're avoiding me; I need a backgrounder to speak about the deteriorating State/White House relations.

R: When have I avoided you?

K: I've called you 3 times this morning.

R: I'm sorry.

K: The P wants to announce he's giving Habib the personal rank of ambassador and he doesn't want any discussion.

R: We'll all be delighted. The only one who's going to be against it will be Fulbright and he's against personal ranks.

K: Will you secure that with your assistants?

R: Yes

K: I've sent over a draft of what the P's saying. He isn't saying a lot.

R: He doesn't have to.

K: Okay.

R: The meeting on South Africa . . .

K: The way I recommend is we do this if you haven't used up your credit. I introduce the general problems, and you give the operational problems.

R: I think my credit is strained enough.

K: You recovered beautifully.

R: I don't know if I did with Rogers.

K: Elliot, you will have the satisfaction before three months are up of having been one State Department official who was right.

R: In the meantime the difference between roles I may have held in committees but where it's within __________ jurisdiction. I think it would be better if Newsome did it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Richardson

12/15/69 11:00 a.m.

page 2

K: I just think your African bureau has its own ways so strongly and the P gets so restive when he's being steam-rolled, that it doesn't do any good. Let me look the papers over. I understand your problem and can see why you shouldn't do it.

R: I have interest.

K: I have ideas I mentioned to Cargo about how we might handle NSC paper from now on which would give you more satisfactory role and better handling of the papers. We should handle more on the model of the NATO paper. The things we've done best, verification, special studies, DPRC, are things tailored specially to the problem.

R: I look forward to talking with you about that. Anything else?

K: No. See you Thursday. And really, you were in a very tough spot. I should have intercepted it.

[Had to answer IO.]

K: He won't say that 3 months from now. There are only two choices: get out of negotiations or impose.

R: That's right.

K: In the meantime, it's just as well if Dave does it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Schultz

12/15/69 11:00 a.m.

K: I wanted to make clear what I am agreeing to. The way to put it is I'm making a judgment on the basis of figures in your report. I cannot go behind the figures. If the figures are . . . for example, somebody's said a million and a half barrels a day from Canada which hasn't been found yet. I am sure there's no answer to that one, but I can't get into that argument. If your figures are correct, then I perceive no national security objection. That's all I am qualified to say.

S: We spot-lighted one box in Table K--a one-year interruption cutting off all continental in-flows. The Canadian assumption is important for that box. To the left one column, saying we can expect the same flows from Latin America, you don't need the Canadian assumption.

K: I understand this; I just want to make sure you are . . .

S: I understand. I agree that this particular objection only goes to one column.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon
Habib
12/15/69 11:12 a.m.

K: What did you screw up today?

H: Nothing, why?

K: I just thought I'd get you on the defensive. The P is going to
announce this evening that he's giving you the personal rank of ambassador.

H: Oh Judas.

K: What do you mean you bastard, you son of a bitch?

H: I see your fine hand in this /

K: You are the meanest man in the whole foreign service.

H: That's why we get along so well.

K: He always wanted to do it; it's the right decision.

H: Personally it's just a sign of his confidence; I'll not let him
down.

K: It's the personnel action that's given me the greatest pleasure
since I've been in office.

H: That's really something. More than I expected. Please tell
him I'll never let him down.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/64

Telecon
Richardson
12/15/69
11:50 a.m.

K: The P has approved that proposal on China policy: foreign assistance control; restrictions on US participation in trade and modification of non-commercial purchases. Now how do we implement it?

R: Changes in the Federal Register--same way as last time. Nothing has been done on drafting any regulations.

K: Will you do that?

R: Yes.

K: How long?

R: A week or so.

K: Let's try to get it done by early next week. But can we stop that infernal leaking on China? I thought and the P thought more strongly that the Warsaw thing was very poorly handled. We spend weeks pains-takingly trying to setting it up and then it was buckshotted to all the embassies. If they believe us they think we are saps, and if they don't believe, they'll think we are not, and are taking them. You might look at this fax traffic. Did you see the instructions the P asked me to send over? They came on Saturday to Ted Eliot. No criticism of you--you weren't here. But whatever influence you can exercise. We'd like to do it mysteriously. The less we give them that they can reject, the less they can feel we are using them. There isn't all that much to negotiate about. We have to improve the atmosphere and give them the feeling we are talking. We must avoid propositions they have to turn down. We prefer these talks to be informal.

R: As far as we can forsee. If they were to reverse their position we wouldn't know what to do.

K: Exactly.

R: It rather worries the Russians though.

K: And it should.

R: Dobrynin has brought it up the last couple of times I've seen him.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon
The President
12/15/69 3:15 p.m.

K: I have only three minor nit-picks: On page 2, partly stylistic, the second paragraph, that begins with "as." I would simply say "I have indicated . . ." On the next page "it is most important to get independent judgment . . ." I don't think you need the word possible (?).

P: That's right.

K: It's a petty point.

P: The paragraph before that I say I believe it is essential. I think it would be better to say it is particularly essential. See what I mean?

K: I would say I believe it is essential even when we don't talk about the life of American men.

P: Essential any time.

K: It looks as if otherwise it isn't essential.

P: A P can't check with John Doe when he decided how many bills he's going to veto that day.

K: The only other question is whether you would consider dropping that sentence at the top of page 10.

P: Yea.

K: I think particularly . . .

P: Don't you think particularly does it? Could say in making decisions I believe it is essential . . . uh, this is particularly true, vital when these decisions affect the lives of American men.

K: I think the other one is clearer.

P: I believe it is essential for a P . .

K: It's important to state it as a clear proposition.

P: " . . . what he wants to hear but what he ought to hear. This is particularly true . . ." I believe a P should listen . . . I believe this is particularly essential . .

K: Excellent.

P: When the lives . . .

*

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

page 2

K: of American men are involved.

P: or when these decisions involve the lives. Do you think that's better?

K: Yes, "when these decisions involve American lives."

P: "The lives of American men." All right?

K: Excellent.

P: It is most impostant. . . The point made in the ____ paragraph might be dropped, but it involves Johnson. That's a good line to leave in. A person who has independent judgment may still tell you what you want to hear. How about this, say: "This is particularly essential" after the two paragraphs? Better?

K: Right. I agree.

P: I velieve a P should listen int only to those who tell him what he wants to hear, but what he needs to hear. . . . This is particularly important when the lives of American men are involved. It fits better at the end of the whole thing.

K: Yes, it's better that's.

K: Yes. Yes, it's more logical. Now the only other point I have . . .

P: page 10?

K: Yes.

P: Just a minute.

K: I just wondered whether you would consider dropping the last sentence and end on up-beat note of previous one. I can see the point of keeping it in--I don't feel strongly about it. Because it tells them something to do.

P: Or we could say . . . I don't think we can drop it with "I know there's nothing more." Got to say "I pledge" or something . . . I don't know.

K: I would leave it. It gives them something to do. It makes them feel they are participating.

P: Or . . .

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

12/15/69 3:15 p.m.

R: It will irritate some of the peaceniks. The Christmas thing you suggested is very good.

R: I had lunch with the group. We didn't discuss Vietnam till the last minutes. I made a comparison with the Kennedy period and Sidey said that's true. I mentioned the Nixon Doctrine, the Latin America speech, Okinawa. . . And in Vietnam they feel you've gotten ahead of the game. They don't even harrass me any more.

P: And we had to stop Hedley Donovan from writing a bug-out piece.

K: Yes. I had to plead. They don't even question me any more.

P: The Nixon doctrine, Okinawa, China and you can throw in Bucharest, the Soviet Union, SALT--we've accomplished something there. And the same leadership in Europe.

K: I said those lads have known and trusted you for a long time. I said wouldn't you have to say we're heading into a successful period of foreign policy? For Donovan I was working to a hostile audience. This time it was quite the opposite. It never was ecstatic, as it would have been for Kennedy.

P: I have a sneaky feeling it just might work and the massive response against the demonstrations, for Agnew, for patriotism.

K: The mentioned the enormous support the P has. Time isn't nagging any more.

P: She was wrong on the word count; I was right. It's one third as long as the other speech. Should be about 11 minutes.

K: Fine. Five would have been too short.

P: 10 or 11--can't really report in less than 10.

K: No, it would look superficial. The casualties were 85.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

The President

6:28 p.m., December 15, 1969

Mr. Kissinger called the President to congratulate him on his speech. He told the President it was the best talk he had ever heard him give -- it had been tremendously effective. The President said, 'even better than November 3?' K said in terms of pure delivery, the November 3 speech was not as good. In terms of the whole context, he had not been so assertive on November 3; it would not have been right for that speech. This statement was assertive -- the Commander-in-Chief stating where he is and where he is going. On November 3, he had been stating the case and appealing to the human being. K then said that some of the press people who came to his backgrounder said it was getting easy. There was no mood of tension -- it had been very positive. It hadn't been so hard for K. The President asked, 'on the delivery, what did K like -- the assertiveness?' K said it was a strong speech, strongly delivered, like his press conference last Monday. It wasn't aggressive, but it was the Commander-in-Chief talking. K said some of his staff members, who are tough critics, had listened with him; and they couldn't have been more delighted. It was a very effective delivery. But it won't get a response. The President agreed -- no more than the other troop withdrawal announcements. K said it will do one thing the others didn't. The others ushered in a period of controversy. The first one had ended with a press conference on Clifford; the last one was the beginning of the Moratorium outcry. The President said this one was important because it was a report to the people -- the people like to be let in on. K said this is the first time the President is withdrawing when he is not under pressure. The President mentioned that Manolo had liked the statement about Sir Robert Thompson. K said the press had liked that; they had asked a lot of questions; such as, "Does the President go along with everything Thompson said [apparently, he said yesterday in Britain that a large force has to be kept there after victory]." K said no, the primary purpose was to make an analysis. The President was looking for someone to make such an analysis. The President asked K if he had indicated that he had a long talk with Sir Robert both before and after he went to Vietnam.

The President said he had added the part about listening to the people because it seemed to him that method, while it will have no Republican impact, it will have a reassurance for the people. He asked K if he got that across in his backgrounder. K said he had said it was one of the qualifications. We had looked for someone who didn't owe us anything. K said one can sense when you talk to the press. On November 3, it was an emotional experience -- they were outraged. Every question was

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

hostile. K had taken a friend in who said he was amazed that K had
kept calm. Today was a piece of cake. All of the questions elicited
information -- none questioned the good faith of the Administration.
P said maybe he had given them too much. K said the television
commentators had spent two to three minutes giving very factual
statements; they made all the points the President had wanted to
have made. Abel had said it was a good Christmas present to the
American people. Their one worry is an increase in infiltration.
In the last speech, they began by saying 'now there will be riots in
the streets.' K said he knows Abel hates it; so does Reynolds. CBS
had a very factual summary.

P asked how K felt about the time. K said if it had been shorter, it
would have been wrong. P had a lot in the speech -- it covered a lot
of ground. P said he had covered as much as many would cover in
30 minutes. He said our speeches should always be tight with no
wasted phrases and flights into rhetoric. P said he was glad we put
in the Christmas thing and asked K how it came across. K said P
had paused before that statement; he had looked directly at the camera;
it came across very well. K said his staff had thought, from the point
of delivery, it had been the most effective speech they had heard the
President give since he took office. K said he thought it was the speech
of a very strong man.

P said Bill Martin told him today 11 members of his Board thought the most effective thing was the press conference last week which indicated to P this isn't just the young. The older people need leadership in the world today. They need to hear what is going on.

P said he was glad he left in the risk business. He had delivered it
very low-key, and it got home. K said the newsmen can't imagine what
we have in mind. They were asking questions all around it but they
were afraid to ask 'the' question. K said we are making the November 1
threat look better and better. Hanoi is interpreting everything for
setting up escalation. He doesn't think they are worried about Viet-
namization. Vietnamization can work if they keep their combat down.
Hanoi feels P is trying to force them into a position so they will hold
still for Vietnamization, or that he is setting up an alibi for escalation.
P said he was glad we left it tough. The way it is done with balance
between the two risks reads pretty well.

K mentioned that Bogdan was coming in to see him on Tuesday; however, he could something only Romanian in mind. One thing he might want could be a visit by Ceaucescu to the U.S., and that might not be a bad ploy. P agreed. K said particularly if we can make him pay something

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

for it -- such as communication to Peking. P asked what time, and when K said 10:00, P said as a courtesy he might shake his hand. He saw the Davis Cup Team. K could say the President wants to say hello. We have to keep that channel open.

P, back to the speech, asked K if he agreed it was right thing to rewrite his speeches in his own idiom. K said it was essential that he do it. It makes it the President's and genuine. It made the November 3 speech and it made this speech. K said it would be interesting to see the reaction. They will probably fulminate a little bit in Hanoi. K agreed with the President that it had been excellent to put the Habib item in the speech. P said he has never been an Ambassador, and that is going to annoy Hanoi. K agreed -- even more than keeping him at the lower level status. K said Habib is the most experienced Vietnamese expert we could possibly send there. Hanoi can't say the President is downgrading it.

K mentioned that we are going to announce the Chinese decision P made; it will be put in the Federal Register. We may tell the Romanian -- but K wants to see what he brings first.

lds

By: KHLW NARA, Dale S/12/64

Telecon
Laird
7:15 p.m.,
Monday, 15 Dec 69

L said that he thought the President's speech went very well.
K said, he screwed up that one clause of yours but you can straighten
it out. The point was he did not quite get the difference.

L said, this is all right. I'll straighten it out tomorrow. Things
went well in the Senate today. The ABM was 45 to 36.

K said, Accepted? L, yes. K: Why do we have a Leadership
meeting on it tomorrow? L: They defeated that amendment all
right. On the Laos amendment they went farther than the President
will like. They have a prohibition in the bill to prohibit new funds
to support combat troops in Thailand or Laos, but we can live with
that. But they don't have anything to do with air support and so
forth, but we can live with that. I think that it went along all
right.

K: I just had a call from Frank Mankiewicz. He said, you are
screwing us up completely; we will launch an attack on you.

L: We have got to prepare people; there will be a couple of defeats,
but we will make this all right.

K: I am beginning to get more optimistic; I was the most pessimistic
one, but I am beginning to think it will work.

L: I think there is a problem in Australia. He is raising a little
hell today. He said he may start some troop withdrawals. They
have got a great deal at stake on this, more than we have and they
don't have a hell of a lot in it. I thought I would call the President
before the Leadership thing tomorrow and congratulate him on the
speech.

K: I think that would be a very good thing to do.

L: Yes.

By: KHC NARA, Dale S/13/64

TELECON

Mary McGrory

7:35 p.m., December 15, 1969

Miss McGrory said she was currently involved with the Black Panthers. She asked K if he had gotten the special delivery letter she had mailed to him last night to the White House. It had her address but not her name on it. It had said if the 19th were the only possible time, they would do it. K asked her if she had all her peacenik friends lined up. He said he could do it on Friday. However, he said he would confirm to her on Tuesday by noon. M said her friends are waiting for word from her. They have said they could do it up through Monday. K said he does want to see them; M said she was delighted that he will. K said he assumes there will be no publicity on either side. M said none from her, and they have a constituency which would be just as alarmed if it were made public. K said on his part, it would help -- it would show open-mindedness. M said some people in the Administration would think K were being corrupted and led astray.

K said he appreciated M's patience. M said she understood -- his time isn't his own. They discussed the Newsweek article.

M said she could expect to hear from K tomorrow noon without fail. She gathers the weekend is completely out for him. K if it would be better for her, he could do it Sunday night. M said if it fit into his plans, K said he would check it out and get back to her by noon, Tuesday.

lds

*

TELECON

Secretary Laird

7:40 p.m., December 15, 1969

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/69

K said the President didn't quite get the difference on the subject K and L had discussed, and K had not wanted to harrass. L said that was all right; they would hit it tomorrow, and he would straighten them out. L said he thought the President's statement went extremely well. He said things went well on the Hill today also -- the ABM was accepted 45 to 36. On the Laos Amendment, they went farther than the President would like. There is a prohibition in the bill against the use of any of these funds to support combat ground forces in Thailand or Laos, but L said they could live with it. L said they didn't have anything to do with air support, so we are all right on that.

K told L he did the backgrounding on the President's statement today. H said he was beginning to be more optimistic -- he is beginning to think it will work.

L said he thinks there is a problem in Australia. Gorton is raising hell today; he came out and said he may start troop withdrawals. K said that was to be expected. L said they have a greater stake in this than we have.

L said he thought, before the Leadership Meeting tomorrow, he would call the President and congratulate him on his statement. K said he thought that would be very nice.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Bryce Harlow

7:45 p.m., December 15, 1969

H said they had a victory on the Hill today. K said that is what Laird just told him. Therefore, his talking paper preparation was for nothing. K said in view of the ABM vote, he thinks we should stay away from ABM -- why run the risk of having these guys run off their mouths. K suggested that he stay off Safeguard and scare their pants off on the Soviet missile developments and also give them a run-down on SALT. He asked H if these were all Republicans; H said yes. Some of the attendees were Brooke, Saxbe and Schweiker. H said he had just talked to the President; we can't cancel the breakfast at this late date.

K suggested that he (1) give them a rather cold analysis of what the Soviets are doing in the strategic field and (2) then brief on SALT talks without making any claims about how they are related (the Members can relate them in their own tortured little minds). H said he needed K's background paper. K said he would cut off the last two pages of what he originally had planned to send up; K said he didn't think the President should make his presentation now. The President should talk for 5 minutes -- 'I have you together to give you a little briefing on SALT and the strategic trends.' K said he is worried if you mention ABM to these characters, and they will argue with you. If you are in an area they don't understand; i. e., Soviet strategic business, it will scare them. It will show the White House is really interested; then they will believe us later on the ABM. H suggested that K send his portion directly to the Residence tonight.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

TELECON

The President

7:58 p.m., December 15, 1969

The President said K should call Bryce and congratulate him. K said Laird had told him about the ABM and he had called Bryce. P told K to hold Wednesday morning for breakfast with him, Harlow, and Mansfield. P had called Mansfield since he voted for ABM. He invited him to breakfast -- he will discuss China since Mansfield is very interested in that. He also told Mansfield we are having interesting talks with the Romanians.

P said on ABM we are getting votes from people we never expected. This announcement helped tonight. Harlow told him these people are reading the polls. K said it is obvious they must be. These are people who bitterly fought it four months ago. P said we have to keep this negotiating position.

K said, concerning the Leadership Meeting tomorrow, his recommendation is not to defend Safeguard. P said he was going to let that go. He said he wanted K to give his pitch about what we have done. K wondered about giving a combination briefing on SALT and the strategic threat. P said he was not sure the strategic threat is necessary now -- he would like to talk about Okinawa, germ warfare, the Nixon Doctrine, etc. He wants to give them something affirmative. He said he did not require any talking points from K.

K said Laird said he was going to call the President. P said he had. K said L thought the statement was very strong, very effective. The President said he told Laird in his press conference on Tuesday to say the President had asked him to go to Vietnam again in February (he hasn't been since last February) to give us a run-down on the threat. P had told L we have to lay the foundation in the event they step up things, so we would be ready to move. P said L was going to play the game, and P thought having him go out there in February is a good idea.

K said he was thinking maybe we should send Haig and Lynn who has been doing the Vietnam studies -- Haig to review the military situation and Lynn to review the other. P said terrific -- have them in his office tomorrow or the next day, or maybe when he is in California. And K said we will send them off in January. When we have the momentum, we have to keep it going; keep the momentum with us.

K said he had talked with Frank Mankiewicz. Everyone is going crazy. There is no possibility of their launching an attack. Mankiewicz had told K 'whether one likes the President or not, and M doesn't, the President is doing superbly -- he is moving out instead of in.' There is nothing left to argue about.

lds

*

TELECON

Joe Sisco

9:22 p.m., December 15, 1969

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/69

K asked S why he didn't stop annoying the Israelis. S said he had goofed last week -- he told Max Fisher when he should have sent him the draft speech ahead of time. S had told Fisher he would take full responsibility and he would report to K on it.

K said he had had to put Eban off. S said Eban was seeing the Secretary 3:30-5:30 on Tuesday and asked when K would see him now. K said probably Wednesday morning unless he could see him at 11:30 a.m on Tuesday. S said they can be reminded that if they want the US to play a singular role on the Jordan/Israel aspect, we ought to tell them we would be willing to play that role. S said he flew to London where he met with the Jordanians (he sent this to K tonight). Hussein has said his private assistant and Meir's private assistant could meet in the same room with Sisco. S said we can provide them with this. K said that is almost direct negotiation. S said he didn't know whether they are ready at this stage of the game to be specific.

S said he has been taking this line: look, we are not convinced any more than you that Nasser wants peace, but you fellows have succeeded in appearing like a warmonger rather than a peacemaker. S said he thought K's pros and cons at the NSC meeting were terrific. K said he thought it clarified a lot of things. S said K had brought it to the fire for the first time and made them look at the other end of the tunnel. K asked S what he thought personally. S said he thought if we are able to use basically that line in the Jordanian paper, we should take that position. S thinks it will come out that we will not achieve a four-power consensus on that basis. We will be urged to go a step farther, but we have to get guts on that and tell Charlie he cannot move one inch beyond this. We are not going to achieve a consensus. It clears our skirts -- it will not get us a settlement, but we have adopted a reasnable position. K asked with whom it clears our skirts if both the Israelis and Araba get made with us. S referenced the Secretary's speech -- we have threatened the moderates. K said he would have to say he agrees. Moscow wouldn't say we were splitting them if we weren't. S said they don't know how to handle the October 28 formulation. Intelligence indicates we have given heart to the Moroccans, the Saudi Arabians and even the Jordians. We are strengthening the moderates a little bit. This trend may not be reversable in the long run. K said the radical trend -- maybe at this stage of the conquest... S said we should try this out. K said that's direct contact through you.

lds

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
12/16/69 12:30 p.m.

K: Sorry I couldn't call you back earlier. I had meetings . . .

L: It wasn't important. I just wanted you to know that I was going to talk about the trip to Vietnam.

K: The P talked to me about it already. Is it the end of February?

L: No the early part, just about at Tet.

K: Great.

L: About the day Tet's over.

K: About the tenth.

L: Right.

K: I don't know when Bill is planning to go to Africa. But there's no reason why both of you can't be out of the country at the same time.

L: The sooner we go the better, for planning purposes. Tet is 5th, 6th and 7th.

K: And you will get there on the 7th?

L: Right and General Wheeler will go with me.

K: Excellent idea.

L: We've got to shut ACDA people up on the toxin thing. They are saying we don't consider toxins as chemicals. Everyone agrees they are chemicals. We aren't manufacturing them and we haven't manufactured them, but I don't want to come out and announce that.

K: Could you send over anything they have said and Il will slap them down.

L: The article in the Times came from them. We don't want to give away our negotiating position in advance. Even U Thant said toxins are chemicals. And when the U. N. is saying that and a 14-nation team is saying it, I don't know why we should take another position.

K: I'll get that article and take action.

L: I called just to keep in touch.

K: You've been terrific and everybody here appreciates it.

By KHC NARA, Dalo. S/12/04

Telecon
Director Mayo
12/16/69 12:50 p.m.

M: The P has come down so hard on me on the stockpile thing. I think you and I had better put our heads together.

K: I don't think he understands it.

M: I came back with 5 to 7 hundred million. And he ordered me to put 3 billion dollars ... get rid of 3 billion dollars on stockpile in the budget. It's the firmest he's ever been with me.

K: I've send him a memo, which he apparently hasn't read yet.

M: He told me he wants to sell half; I came back with 7 hundred and he books like I'm disobeying orders. I can't tell him 3 billion is important because he ordered me to do it.

K: Yes, but I can.

M: Why don't you take it up with him. You could probably do something through Futures (?). We haven't time for a big study; I've got to have a digit in the budget and mighty soon. The P said 'tin! I don't care what happens to Bolivia.' Well, he really does.

K: Let me see where all of this stands.

M: And come back as soon as you can. I'm getting nervous about some people who heard him say that who are going to say that 'the P directed you Bob,' and they're going to spend that much somewhere else.

K: One of the arts of a Presidential assistant is to know when an order is an order.

M: I've had orders to cut 25%, and haven't done it.

K: I've done the same.

M: That's why we are Presidential assistants and somebody who takes him more literally isn't. But now I'm hung up on it.

K: I'll check.

M: Maybe it would be better to lie low on it for awhile, Thursday or Friday.

K: I won't do it till after I've talked with you again.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Robert C. Tyson, Chairman Finance Committee
U. S. Steel, New York

16 Dec 69, 4:45 PM

T said, Mr. Kissinger, I am back again. The situation is as I have expressed it. This coke problem is a real tight serious one. We have been talking to the Roumanians and we have not made any concrete offers yet, but we did promise to get them an answer by Thursday, when I understand, the head of the mission is returning to Roumania.

K said, Right. T: However, we are going to expedite our look at this time and do the best we can and I will have something to tell you prior to your meeting tomorrow, if that is satisfactory.

K: That will be most satisfactory.

T: I will call you; I can't say what time because I will be traveling but I will be in touch with you before your meeting at 2:30 if that is satisfactory.

K: Will you talk to General Haig, my deputy, if I am not available?

T: Yes. What time will you be back?

K: Between 12:00 and 1:00.

T: That is probably the time I will be gone.

K: From 12:00 on you can assume that I will be in my office.

T: As soon as I am able to run this thing down I will be in touch with you.

K: OK.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Robert C. Tyson
12/16/69 4:45 p.m.

K: The P asked me to call you about a problem which appears as a commercial one, but in which we have some political interests. For reasons of our own, we are trying to be helpful to the Romanians when we can. They are being squeezed by the Russians in getting coke for their steel furnaces. They are trying to get ______ tone next year and ______ in the next quarter. I understand it is a commercial action. They have approached you and a number of others. I am seeing him tomorrow. We are trying to get some things from him and it would help if I could show that we are able to do some things for him.

T: Let me look into it. Coke is short at this time in this country in the U.S. I don't know what the situation is, but I will look into it immediately and try to get back to you today.

K: I am seeing him again at 2:30 tomorrow.

T: Let me see what I can find out and get a feel of it and I will get back to you.

K: We appreciate it very much.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Alastair Buchan
12/16/69 6:10 p.m.

K: I'm sorry it didn't work out today.

B: I was giving evidence to the McCloy Committee today. Did they make sense with the P?

K: Reasonable/

B: How's life treating you?

K: Okay. I hope you'll remember me at Oxford when they run me out of here.

B: I think you have things under control.

K: On Vietnam we are ahead for the first time.

B: And SALT?

K: And SALT . . . The Middle East is the only one that's not under firm control.

B: And there's noghing immediate brewing in Europe.

K: I think that's right. What is your impression?

B: I was here 6 weeks ago. I saw the P the day after the speech. I have a feeling that Vietnam is much more under control. The press was very angry at Agnew's attack, but it has taken it to heart.

K: That's my impression. Have you started your new duties.

B: Yes, in a planning capacity. It's a challenging sort of job.

K: Yes.

B: I am up-dating it in many ways. Seminars rather than lectures and a new set of faces.

K: How long will you be there, two years?

B: Yes.

K: And then you go to Oxford?

B: Yes.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Buchan
12/16/69 6:10 p. m.

K: It should be a good interlude.

B: And you will be going back to Harvard after yours?

K: I'll be ripe for academia--I don't know about Harvard.

B: Well your friends on the other side wish you well.

K: My British friends have been a great source of support for me. You will be coming over?

B: Not very often.

K: We must get you over in the spring. Just consider yourself invited. I'm terrible about remembering this sort of thing; will you drop me a note around March or April?

B: Yes.

K: Happy holidays.

B: The same to you and I'll see you in the spring.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
George Champion
12/17/69 12:20 p.m.

C: I mentioned to the P a fact that at the Blue Ribbon Defense meeting they showed at the last meeting a Russian official picture of their armaments. It's shown in Russia and they charge admission; it's also shown in Japan. It has not been released for showing here. It's a fascinating story of what the Russians are doing. It was narrated to us by Captain Murphey of the Navy; he was able to explain what types of tanks and missiles: types of rockets, anti-sub ships, the whole gamut. It was extremely interesting and informative program for Americans who think Russia isn't doing anything in armaments. The P said he'd like to see it and asked me to give you a ring.

K: Where can I get it, from the Fitz-Hugh panel?

C: The Fitz-Hugh Panel doesn't have it; it was shown by the Navy. Why don't you call Fitz-Hugh or Fred Bussard (?).

K: I'll set that up within the next couple of weeks. The P had mentioned this to me and I was just waiting for your call. Thank you for calling.

By: KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/17/69 12:30 p.m.

R: I read over the intelligence report to the P this morning on infiltration.

K: I called it to his attention already.

R: For 20 weeks there's been no influx.

K: I told him you must have read the report before I did--you must have been referring to it at breakfast. So don't disturb your credit with the P now.

R: I mention it because I think you've got to be careful when we talk to Mansfield not to confuse him. I don't think we confused him too badly this morning.

K: You put a strong corrective on it. I got from what you said that there hadn't been any recent infiltration.

R: I didn't want to take Mel on, but I wanted to indicate skepticism. I think the meeting went well.

K: I think it went well, and we were all a team. What he said about you with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was very complimentary.

R: He said some very complimentary things about me the other day. I'll send over Mansfield's remarks. That's quite a spectrum of remarks from Mansfield to Goldwater. He said State may not be completely cleaned out, but it certainly has changed.

K: I think the mood has changed and if they don't put a lot more people into the pipeline, it's going to change next year. I've been telling the P the present rate is consistent with replacing losses. They would have to keep up at November's rate before you could say they are building up for an offensive.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Tyson

12/17/69 12:50 p.m.

T: I have been able to do a little checking. I'll tell you what we are pre-pared to tell these people. We can commit ourselves to 30 thousand tons promptly. That's about half of what they were talking about for the first quarter. The situation is extremely tight. We are doing our own operating planning on a month to month basis. We can't say beyond the first quarter. But we have it in our hands, and if there's anything we can do, we will.

K: Excellent. The fact that I can produce anything on 24 hours notice will be helpful. Let me say it today and you can say it any time from tomorrow on.

T: We have a meeting tomorrow. We can tell them then?

K: Unless you hear from me to the contrary. Who are you seeing, a trade fellow?

T: Yes. I can tell him tomorrow?

K: Unless my fellow gets obnoxious this afternoon in which case I'll call you.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon

David Rockefeller

12/17/69 4:45 p.m.

R: I wanted to call you and tell you how pleased I was with Rogers' speech.

K: Well you have had a little to do with it.

R: In any case, I thought it was very good. What kind of reaction have you gotten?

K: Well, the Israelis are not in complete accord with us.

R: That's the best thing that could happen. Have you had any indirect reaction from the Israelis?

K: Yes, some of the moderates are pleased, and the Lebanese and

K: Another matter--we have had private talks with the Romanians. They are trying to get credit. I understand they've had talks with various banks. There are some things that we want them to do for us.

R: I think we are probably closer than other banks, and I'll find out.

K: I've also talked with the Bank of America. I guess I could talk with Peters (?) about it.

R: I'll check and let you know.

K: Wonderful.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

12/17/69 4:50 p.m.

S: The Secretary asked me to call you on that document.

K: Why isn't he talking to me any more.

S: He said he talked to you today.

K: He did.

S: It's a hand-in-glove relationship/

K: We are going to kill the Foreign Service once we get 100 % together.
About the Jordan plan?

S: Yes, the Secretary made 2 or 3 tiny changes at my suggestion.
They tighten it up. They pertain to conditionality. They will make it
more favorable to the Israelis. It takes into account some of the comments
from Eban. Charlie would like to put it down before the summit. What more
would you like from me; what more can I do? Tell Charlie he is authorized
to go ahead?

K: Because the P is going to take the heat, and I think he is . . .

S: Oh yes . . .

K: I want to give him a chance to say no. I am in favor and I think
he will go along. But I want to make sure. What are the three changes;
anything I should know about?

S: Let me call them to Hal. He will put them in front of you.

He'll have them to you in half an hour.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
12/17/69; 6:40 p.m.

K said Mr. President I wanted to mention two things. One, State Department is again suggesting that they surface the Jordan package tomorrow at the four-power talks. P asked before the 20th? K said if they are ever going to do it they should do it tomorrow. Admittedly, it is going to raise hell with the Israelis. P said you put Cellar(?) over there and that is right -- I am inclined to let it surface. P said give private reassurance to Mrs. Meir and let it go. P said let State see if they can field it. They are not going to send anyone over here to see me. P said State is going to answer all the questions. P said let's get that word around.

K said the second thing I wanted to mention is my conversation with the Romanian. K said Romanian transmitted what P said to Chinese and North Vietnamese. The Chinese were interested in normal relations with the West and us but nothing specific. K said on Vietnam the Romanian said he transmitted exactly what the P said to the North Vietnamese and then the Romanian just stated NVN's normal conditions that we had to withdraw all our forces, coalition government in the South, etc. K said I just told him what your position was based on your speeches. K said I don't think we should send a message with him. K said I told the Romanian the next move would be up the NVN. K said the only hopeful thing he can see is that the Romanian might want to be able to report back that we are in fact firm and that there has not been any change. But, K said that's reaching for things. P said I don't know why he came. K said and he had to come this week. K said I am sending you my notes on the meeting just so you have something. K said I will send them over in just a few minutes. P said it looks to me he must have come for reasons of just to create an impression that they are talking to us. P said they have their problems, too and I think we should just stick to what we say. K said I think we should stick where we are now. P said Chinese think we are making that move (?) K said we will worry them both. K said I found that Elliot Richardson was slobbering over Dobrynin and let a few things out. P said oh, he just had a few drinks and . . . K said the lucky thing is they won't believe them. P said my view is that I wouldn't tell them anything. P said if I were the State Department I would just let them guess. P said we have to have our own private contacts on these -- we can't count on State. P said anything we do important has to be done privately. K agreed. K said I think you should see him (Romanian?) P said I don't think I will spend much time with him. K said you might again -- stick where we are now. P said we want to be friendly with regard to the Romanians as such.

P said the African thing produced what we expected it. K said I thought you handled it with great delicacy. P said Helms(?) took a strong position.

By KHC NARA, Dale S/12/04

TELECON
Mr. Kissinger
Joe Sisco
12/17/69; 8:55 p. m.

K said the President said go ahead but don't come to him again with any modifications. S said I don't blame him. Thank you very much. K said I have not seen the changes. S said I sent them to Hal Saunders 15 minutes after I talked to you. K said I did it on the basis of your word. K said I will look at them tomorrow.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

12/18/69 10:26 a.m

S: I just talked with Hal Saunders about the Moroccan cabel about personal protection. The King asked if we could provide protection for while he is here.

K: I haven't seen it, but I'll look at it. Do you have any thoughts about what should be done to it?

S: No, I just want to see that something is done with it.

K: I will focus on it right away. I have a strong feeling we've got to do something to reverse this cycle.

S: My own personal judgment is that we are making it worse rather than better. If we were willing, we could do something.

K: I doubt if we will get to that point.

S: I think we've bought some time.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/18/69 2:36 p.m.

K: I just wanted to give you a brief rundown--I gave a longer one to Elliot--on the talks with Macovescu. I'm damned if I know what he wanted. He said he had a letter from Koschesdo to the P. All he raised was the European Science Conference as a way to fight off the Breshnev Doctrine. He told me he knows that the Chinese wanted to better relations between us. I had asked him if he had any special information; he said they interpreted the Chinese silences. They said if we would ... the war could be settled. That was big news! What he wanted over here I can't imagine. I am sending a memcon to you, but wanted you to know what went on.

R: I made a speech to the foreign service organizations. In it I said we in State have let our responsibilities erode a bit. I thought it up to us that we assert some of them. The question about the NSC and you came up; I said I was not referring to NSC, but to Defense and CIA. I thought it partly our fault if our position has eroded. Our people have been damoralized and it's partly their own fault. It isn't a question of blame of Defense and CIA--it's just a fact of life.

K: There may be a story on it, but it won't make any difference to me. I saw what you said on TV, and I appreciated that.

R: I want to get our young people especially steamed up. The fact that CIA has taken over the role of State. Yesterday's report on politics and economic activities in other countries.

K: That's right and I'm uneasy about their marching armies around.

R: Right. Some time I'd like to talk on some briefings -- CIA and our people--discuss the political situation. There's no reason why Dick should brief the President on that.

K: You mention it at NSC.

R: Yes.

K: No problem there.

R: Like the Armin Meyer--meeting on Japan--divide the work load.

K: The way the P's mind works, these meetings are very useful.

R: They're very useful to everyone.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
12/18/69 4:50 p.m.

K: I read about you all the time.

L: You're the only guy I know who talks to Kraft.

K: I haven't seen him in 6 weeks. Actually I thought it was a plus.

L: It's wrong. I'm calling about the budget thing. I talked to Mayo today. Schlesinger and he got 16 imms they want me to look over in the 71 budget. I think I should avoid it.

K: Right. We've got a meeting on Saturday morning.

L: You told me over two weeks ago . . . hexagon is his big one.

K: Everyone I've talked to wants Hexagon, don't you?

L: Sure--I don't think we should __________ it up again. We've affected one million jobs. I shouldn't talk with Mayo.

K: I agree; I'll back you up.

L: We've got military civilian personnel we're laying off. We're going to have an effect. We're going down next year another 4.5 billion.

K: I'll tell the P I'm behind you. I will tell him we have to get back down there. He doesn't like Schlesinger anyway.

L: I think he read the story this morning and believed it.

K: If that committee serves only one function it's to help you, not Mayo. I think of myself as your ally.

L: I was afraid you weren't cranked in on this.

K: I wasn't.

L: Rogers must have read the story and gotten carried away by it.

K: The P was amused by it; he didn't pay any attention to it. He thought it was a plus. It will give you some attention for what you've been doing.

L: I don't need that mind of attention.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/18/69 6:00 p.m.

R: On the tanks to Pakistan thing, I have reservations about it. We should talk about it before the President makes a decision. Russia has sold them 200 tanks.

K: But the problem is when the P was there he practically __________ this. He said we probably not able to sell our own, but would move the Turkish tanks deal.

R: It may stimulate the Indians to recognize North Vitenam which would be a shame. It might stimulate others to do the same. Also the Paks have sent 600 men to Jordan. That's going to cause trouble soon.

K: Has it surfaced yet?

R: Not really.

K: The best way to handle it is if you send over a memo with these objections. I will recommend a review of the situation. My own feeling is he's half committed to it. But the last consideration of the 600 Pakistanis entering the Middle East could be used as an excuse possibly.

R: I'll also send over a memo about the consultations on the Warsaw talks.

K: Elliot showed me that. I said I'd show it to the President.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Marshall Green
12/18/69 6:10 p.m.

G: About China; the memo we sent over to you from Alex Johnson about gestures to President Chaing Kai Shek. We were interested in 1 or 2 things we might do for him. We have suggestions. I wasn't sure on the origina. It occurs to me that present moves may make him hit the skylights. The first step is for the VP to inform the Jemo (?) of our decision to continue support for the Vanguard program of technical assistance in Africa. We've got it worked out with so they will come through with the 10 million dollars. Out in two weeks.

K: Is that time enough?

G: That's the question. The memo from the Secretary to the VP it occurred to me we ought to get the White House to clear. Is it all right with you?

K: I'm sure the P will approve.

G: When the VP goes out inform him?

K: Unless you think earlier.

G: Another thing; helping them with aircraft control and viewing systems. Also Nike Hercules. The latter of which the Jemo will find more satisfactory. He's not interested in Vanguard. Others in his government are and we are too. We haven't had time to staff proposals with DOD. You said it might help.

G: It might look like if we do it soon if he becomes mad enough we do things. But it might help. You said 1 or 2 things we want to talk to you about. We think you will find them acceptable. We could have these available to offset his mood. I don't think Vanguard will offset it, to any extent. The other two would. We might want to move tomorrow to get military clearance for support.

K: If you need help from me, why don't you invoke me?

G: All right. I understand the China story has leaked somehow. It may be in the papers tomorrow.

K: That would pre-empt us by only 24 hours.

G: I don't know how it happened. I just learned about it.

By: KM U NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon
Green
12/18/69 6:10 p.m.

K: Thank you. I would push ahead on the military items.

G: And I will have a memo from the Secretary to the P recommending
that he direct the VP to do this.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ehrlichman

12/18/69 7:13 p.m.

E: You're going to be getting an invitation from Dellenbach to go to Williamsburg for the weekend.

K: This weekend?

E: No, leater. Here's the background: w at we hve here is a 30-odd year old fellow who has lots of money. He has a lot of friends who are members of Xerox.

K: Maybe they would hire me.

E: That's what I was thinking--it's better then Arizona State. He's got 8 or 9 friends who would like to sit around and talk about affairs of the country. I think it would be interesting, a weekend with a stimulating bunch of guys.

K: I would be happy to do that if you think I should.

E: I think so. It would be in Williamsburg; we could flip down.

K: I think it would be fun.