THE PERISCOPE

POLITICS AND THE POW'S

Political strategists in both parties, but especially the GOP, are eagerly scanning the returning POW's for potential candidates for 1974 or later. The returnees (who are mostly career military men) are "pretty attractive," says one Midwest state GOP chairman, "and they talk like Republicans." Democrats, less sanguine, still hope to score with some of the younger returnees.

THE MAN FOR PEKING?

What sort of man will President Nixon tap to head the new U.S. "liaison office" in Peking (page 17)? White House watchers think that Henry Kissinger's luncheon companion two days after his return from China provided some clues. He was David K.E. Bruce, a distinguished diplomat (Under Secretary of State, ambassador to France, Britain, Germany and the Paris peace talks) and, at least nominally, a Democrat who served JFK and LBJ as well as Mr. Nixon (perfect insulation from any hint of political preference). Age could also be an asset—at 75, Bruce would be dealing with contemporaries in China's top echelons.

TRAVEL PLANS FOR BONN'S DOLLARS

West Germany's mountainous dollar hoard may soon be moving back across the Atlantic. The Bonn government is looking over a plan to return some of these billions to the U.S. as direct investments. Under the scheme, the Bundesbank (Germany's central bank) would lend money at easy rates to Germans who wished to buy or build plants and businesses in the U.S. The plan, some German politicos think, would help with more than the dollar problem. Germany now has 2.5 million imported foreign workers, and, as one German asked, "Why not export the plants instead of importing more workers?"

HOMECOMING INSURANCE

As still one more measure to avoid having a returned POW say or do anything that could anger Hanoi and jeopardize prisoners still held in Indonesia, the Pentagon is considering keeping all men in the service, whether or not they are eligible for and want their discharges, until the last man is safely home.

THE KREMLIN'S CAREFUL SHOPPERS

With U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations running so smoothly, Washington was nonplused by the Kremlin's last-minute cancellation of a visit by American agricultural experts. The official excuse for the move

was a shift in Soviet agriculture ministers. The real reason, it's now thought, was to avoid revealing the full extent of the failure of Russia's winter-wheat crop—a key factor in any bargaining for more purchases of U.S. grain.

THE MAN AT THE HELM IN HANOI

Others may rate the spotlight, but the real power in Hanoi, U.S. intelligence analysts believe, is Le Duan, the veteran first secretary of North Vietnam's Communist Party. He managed, for instance, to keep clear of responsibility for the costly and largely futile offensive in the south last Easter and now supports the cease-fire. The experts also believe he is committed to using political tactics in South Vietnam, while concentrating on rebuilding the war-shattered north.

A MESSAGE FROM MANAGUA

A team of U.S. experts who studied Nicaragua's recent disastrous earthquake is putting together a report that will send tremors through many major U.S. cities. Much of the damage to Managua, Nicaragua's capital, they concluded, was due to a building code that was inadequate to start with and laxly enforced to boot. Most West Coast cities, the report will point out, lie in a zone of high earthquake risk—and have building codes as bad as Managua's.

WHEN A GUEST CAN DO NO WRONG

Peking is still smarting—but in silence—over the conduct of one recent VIP visitor, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre (the former Belgian Congo). The African ruler jarred the Chinese by arriving with an entourage of his Belgian advisers, complete with ladies and lapdogs. He angered them still more on leaving by stopping in India, China's main adversary in Asia, after his hosts had specifically asked him not to. The Chinese have stifled their indignation because Mobutu's visit ended Zaïre's relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government, eliminating one of Taiwan's last African footholds.

THE SHORT-LIVED GUN CRUSADE

The clamor for gun control that arose on Capitol Hill after last month's shooting of Sen. John Stennis is dying away as quickly as it came. Indiana's Sen. Birch Bayh, who got a tough gun-control bill through the Senate last year and watched it die in the House, says he won't even try again unless he has assurance of action in the House—which is only just getting around to setting up a subcommittee to handle such legislation.

Newsweek, March 5, 1973

15

FROM
D. C. ELLIOT

I am reminded of the remark once made by an old colleague of mine in India: "An error once perpetrated need not be perpetuated."

Neither to say, despite possibly different views. I sympathize with you in a different situation - a trying time.

Good luck to you - and all.

1

Telephone 1/27/70

Type of Request & Date

ELLIOTT

(Last name and pending date)

GENERAL

FEB-6

Name:

Prof. Elliott Wm. Y.

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /E

**Request:** Wld like Mr. Kissinger to focus on his paper as he is afraid that it will get lost and it is very impctant to him. He suggests that HAK speak with Bob Osgood about it as the Pro of. has discussed it in length with him andd feels he understands the whole thing. After HAK has made a decision, the prof. would like to come in a talk with him about what should be done next.

Numbers in rolodex

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

RECEIVED

JUL 8 1970

CENTRAL OFFICE

January 14, 1970

NOTE - for Dr. Kissinger

Attached are two enclosures to accompany
the draft letter to the Vice President which Dr.
Wm. Y. Elliott left with you today. He will pick
up the draft letter next week at your office, or,
if you prefer, it could be mailed to his Washington
address; The LaSalle Apartments - #930, 1028 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006.

Secretary

2nd Draft - 1/13/70

Dear Mr. Vice President:

The enclosure that I am sending you is a selection from the Task Force
Report of the Republican Strategy Committee of the Congress, the House particu-
larly, before the 1960 election, on "American Strategy and Strength," marked
as page 63 of that Record and submitted by me, as a member of Nixon's campaign
staff (with Arthur Burns, and Shipy, et al), to the Policy Committee of the
Task Force heretofore mentioned, inserted in the Congressional Record by the
Honorable Bob Wilson at that time (1960).

I hope that this may be of some interest and usefulness to you since it
clearly indicates, I hope, that the great need is to get the Vice President of
the United States committed to this much needed top level priority, interagency
program job as a part of his own education in basic national security policy's
program review. The Vice President stands next to the President and at any moment
may have to step into that role - as has been, alas, too often proved. Second,
it affords to the Security Council an extension of the Security Council's
machinery which, as a member of the Eisenhower Policy Planning Board, I don't
think the Operations Coordination Board, which I helped set up, ever fulfilled.
This is the right way to do it, as far as I am concerned.

I also send you, in addition, an enclosure for whatever use it may prove
to be to you, and at least worth your reading, a criticism of this made by one
of my own students who has just taken a PhD at American University. This young
man's name is Ronald Kirkullo, and I am just writing his name on the top of the
sheets which he had photostated out of his thesis to give to me, and I send them
along to you for what they are worth. I have made a few of my interpolations
(in brackets) in his text which more closely brings it into line with what I
actually recommended, as you will see if you read the Congressional Record's
boiled down version of my recommendations. I hope that these may be of some

- 2 -

service to you, and I would not, myself, want to raise this with the President
until I was certain that you would not object to having this kind of a sugges-
tion made. That is the real point of this letter from one you don't know, but
President Nixon does. In raising it with you at this time it leaves it up to
you to put a quietus on my suggestion to the President, which he did not object
to, and Eisenhower agreed to - but his mandate to John Eisenhower to work on it
was squelched in his last year of office by putting John Eisenhower (his son) back
into a routine Pentagon job, to which his father could not object without being
accused of nepotism.¹ General Andy Goodpastor was also on the launching team, I wasn't.

I may mention that I have served the present President, as I have served,
I hope, every President since Herbert Hoover at a high level, or often as some sort
of Special Consultant, with jobs that I took generally without having them appear
in the public eye. I did serve Eisenhower, for instance, on the Planning Board
of the National Security Council, and I was a Special Consultant to every Secre-
tary of State that came along after the resignation of Dean Acheson and a very
good friend and counsel or two of Dean Acheson's, for whom I have the highest
respect and hope that you will. The book, _On the Brink_, shows that it was my
advice to John F. Kennedy, one of my students, and I think next to Joe, his older
brother, the best of the Kennedy brothers, in my close experience of the oldest
three of them - Joe, Jack and Bob. I didn't know Edward - and I'm glad I didn't.

I had served John F. Kennedy in getting Dean Acheson and Bob Lovett to recom-
mend the one that I wanted to see Secretary of State, i.e., Dean Rusk, who was
the best of the available candidates in my view and in theirs.

This was a point of view shared by one or more of the other potential
candidates (certainly by Paul Nitze) who were mentioned in my letter to J.F.K.,
(my former student), but were not brought out by the two newspapermen who were

limiting the consultation on Rusk that I proposed, ~~not~~ to Acheson and Lovett
as the main people on whom the President depended. J.F.K. always admitted
that he never heard seriously of Dean Rusk before my letter came to him.

This is not by way of building up my reputation with you but to show you
that I am not without some background in this matter.

Enclosures:
as stated abv

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

63

voluntary' and always subject to change at
the individual's discretion. The mechanism
for assuring democratic control is the
market.

Neither the political process nor the mar-
ket work smoothly at all times; but we tend
to accept them in the spirit of Churchill's
celebrated comment, until anything better
turns up.

There is an essential difference between
the public and private sectors in one key
point.

In the public sector, when the political
process has made its decision, everyone in-
cluding a minority of as many as 49 percent
must accept the decision. If, through the
legislative process, we decide to have a $10
billion highway program, then everyone en-
joys that highway program, whether or not
20 percent of the taxpayers would have
gained greater satisfaction from an alternat-
tive use of that $10 billion, such as school
construction.

In the private sector, when the market
has made its decision, everyone exercises his
fairly free choice as to what kind of product
he buys, where, and when. If 51 percent
of the consumers want to buy a General
Motors car, this in no way requires the
other 49 percent to do so. They may splinter
their dollars among many other brands,
while some buy no car at all and others
buy two or three.

These examples may seem a trifle pat. But they do help to bring out a point which is too often overlooked. The political process as we practice (or at least preach) it and the market as it is (or should be) prevalent in most of the private sector—both are essentially democratic. But clearly the market provides a far better defense of individual rights, a safeguard against the tyranny of the majority, opportunity for the nonconformist. Of course, many expenditures most logically fall in the public sector for practical reasons. Our concern for freedom, however, ought to give us a constant bias in favor of the private sector as against the public sector, whenever hard choices must be made.

This kind of framework is helpful in re-
lating the needs of national security to the
underlying objective of maintaining, en-
hancing, and enriching individual freedom.

¹New York Times, Apr. 25, 1950.

²Task Force on National Security and
Peace, 1959.

³"Economics of National Security," 1954,
p. 21.

Ibid., p. 26.

⁴"Except under certain assumptions which
it is not reasonable to anticipate would be
borne out fully in the present situation.

⁵As stated, of course, this catch phrase
would be endorsed by nearly everyone.
Clearly, however, it misstates the alterna-
tives.

⁶An Interesting analysis recently by Boris
P. Pesek compared the relative impact of in-
flation and higher taxes on income distribu-
tion. Pesek found that, as a means of fi-
nancing increased Government spending, in-
flation was the most regressive of the alter-
natives. The most progressive method, of
course, was the income tax; next, a sales tax
with food exempt; next, a straight sales tax;
and finally inflation. This conclusion would
presumably lessen the political attractive-
ness of financing higher Government out-
lays for defense (or other) programs via defi-
cits and inflation. (See Pesek, "A Compar-
ison of the Distributional Effects of Inflation
and Taxation," American Economic Review,
March 1960.)

⁷"Washington Post and Times Herald," Apr. 3, 1960.

⁸One Senator, as recently as Sept. 5,
1959, was perfectly candid during debate on
the Senate floor. He stated: "The reason
why it will not be possible to • • • (cut).

the 27½ percent oil depletion allowance is
that there are not enough votes in the Sen-
ate to do it. It is just that simple." (CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD, Sept. 5, 1959, p. 16738,
temporary Record.)

¹⁰The House Ways and Means Committee,
in which all tax legislation must originate,
has underway a full-scale study of tax re-
form. It is widely hoped that this study will
ultimately produce the major overhaul of
the code which all observers agree, on prin-
ciple at least, is needed.

¹¹"National Security and the American
Economy in the 1960's," Jan. 30, 1960, p. 69.

¹²P. 27.

¹³See, for example, Kenyon Poole, "Public
Finance and Economic Welfare."

¹⁴Address before the Tax Foundation, Dec.
1, 1959.

¹⁵Address before the Electronic Industries
Association, March 15, 1960.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Eckstein includes a "very high" projection of $115 billion.

¹⁸Eckstein projects receipts, with present
tax rates, to a level of $104.6 billion in fiscal
year 1968.

¹⁹"Trends in Public Expenditures in the
Next Decade," April 1959.

²⁰Under exceptional circumstances, a re-
duction in disposable personal income which
resulted from a tax increase could be asso-
ciated with an absolute increase in consump-
tion expenditures. This would occur if the
tax increase was coincident with a bad infla-
tion scare, or with public anticipation of
controls and rationing. An international
crisis precipitating a boost in defense spend-
ing and therefore a tax increase could con-
celビ be tied to either or both of those
two effects. They, however, appear to be
remote from the present discussion.

²¹The adverse effect on growth referred to
here is entirely apart from possible effects
of a tax increase on incentives, a matter dis-
cussed later. The effect discussed here is
almost a technical function of a tax increase,
as opposed to the more intangible effects on
incentives.

²²February 1958.

²³This breakdown of gross national product is rather crude; for example, in terms of our analysis, it would be more appropriate for housing to appear as a consumption rather than investment expenditure. However, the general points stand.

²⁴It might be observed that 42 percent of our current gross national product might exceed the total Soviet gross national product, were safe, comparable measurements available.

²⁵"The Problem of National Security," July 1958, p. 2.

²⁶The value of industrial construction
actually declined after 1941, reaching a low
in 1943 and not regaining the 1941 level
until 1946.

²⁷During World War II, of course, educa-
tion was also set back. The gap in classroom
construction has still not been made up.

²⁸Op. cit., p. 4.

²⁹"Prosperity Without Inflation," p. 75.

Task Force Report: American Strategy
and Strength

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. BOB WILSON

OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, June 20, 1960

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Speaker, as part
of the "Task Force Studies on Amer-
ican Strategy and Strength," I place in

the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD study papers Nos. 15 and 13; "An
Extension of National Security Council
Machinery," by Dr. William Y. Elliott,
professor of government, Harvard Uni-
versity; and "The Economic Challenge of
the Soviet Union," by Dr. Don Paarlberg,
Special Assistant to the President for
Economic Affairs:

AN EXTENSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MACHINERY: THE CREATION OF A HIGH-LEVEL
CONTINUING ADVISORY BOARD TO REVIEW
NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS FOR POLICY
PRIORITY TREATMENT

(Summary of paper by William Y. Elliott,
professor of government, Harvard Uni-
versity)

The progress that has been made in the
National Security Council machinery is gen-
erally admitted, even by its critics. Yet,
many of the participants in NSC procedures
have recognized that in the absence of a
high-level reviewing staff to relate programs
of an interagency import to policies, and to
establish priorities for support and follow-
through, the Council machinery ground out
policies that were too much the product of
people who acted as the interested spokes-
men for agencies rather than as a unifying
policy staff for the President. The problem
of getting a high-level staff review always
presents, however, the danger of second
guessing the responsible high officials whom
the President alone controls. To substitute
the judgment of any staff for review of basic
national defense and foreign policies or
programs runs the risk of delaying or of
undoing costly programs before they can bear
fruit; or alternatively, of encouraging inac-
tion until the review group has given its
sanction. It is arguable that the only feasible
precariousness is by the Bureau of the
Budget plus congressional authorization;
and that these hurdles are hard enough to
operate under with efficiency and speed,
without adding another. Yet the fact re-
mains that the Bureau of the Budget and
the Appropriations Committees almost never
ask and never answer the basic positive ques-
tion: Are the programs in the national secur-
ity area which affect and depend on several
agencies getting the right priorities of at-
tention to see that they effectively carry out
the President's national security objectives
and policies?

The very substantial achievements for im-
proving the National Security Council
mechanism and procedures have introduced
occasional reviews by groups of outsiders.
This method of getting independent high
level advice to help the President, as sug-
gested in Eisenhower's first campaign, could
be improved by getting some continuity for
a single group, and by the selection of peo-
ple who were more nearly insiders in terms
of past experience. This would mean creat-
ing a regular program review board to ad-
vise, rather than a whole series of ad hoc
groups, like the Draper Committee. Many of
the same people appeared from committee
to committee; so that the experience was not
entirely wasted. But there was no con-
tinuity through a permanent staff such as
there would be in any kind of adaptation of
the wartime model of a continuing require-
ments committee for program review such
as we developed in the War Production
Board. Priorities set by the Board were
translated into allocations by the program
vice chairman after the hearings by this
requirements committee.

Furthermore, the very necessary effort to
see that the sum total of programs would
not be beyond the capacity of the country
to bear would seem, particularly in this era
of advanced costs because of the complexity
of technical improvements, to require even
closer attention to a discriminating treat-

555579-75905

J. CARLTON WARD, JR.

NORFOLK, CONNECTICUT 06058

December 31, 1969

Dr. William Y. Elliott
Hidden Valley Farm
Haywood, Va. 22722

Dear Bill:

I have received and digested your memorandum to mem-
bers of the Business Council. More on that later.

As you know, we have not attended the meetings of the Council as permitted for honorary members for some time. Without cluttering up this letter with all the reasons therefore, which in my case are many, I would like to get back to the subject of your memorandum.

I have maintained an interest in many phases of the
subject that you so fully covered and in particular, as you
would surmise, with the situation existing at my alma mater,
Cornell. Organization-wise I am a member of the Executive
Committee of a group under a foundation organized by one of
our alumni - the purposes of which are to point out and to
do something about the lack of a balanced education.

As you point out in your memorandum, college faculties
certainly in our leading institutions have been allowed to
go and have gone to an amazing extent into the liberal and
leftist movements and points of view. Also, as you are
aware, they fail to present through assigned reading, as
well as in their own lectures, the free enterprise and the
more constitutional points of view about which you are an
authority.

The above situation led to the circumstances surround-
ing the enforced resignation of Dr. Perkins as President of
Cornell and the substitution of a President, Dale Corson,
who is an outstanding physical scientist and with whom I
have worked intimately and for whom I have great respect.
This was not the case with Dr. Perkins who not only was an
extreme liberal, but who like so many liberals, became
unethical in forcing his policies willy nilly and with the
help of a similarly oriented chairman of the board upon
the rest of the University.

To make matters worse, all of his appointments as sen-
ior officers of the University were liberals like himself,
with the single exception of Dr. Corson who had been appoint-
ed Provost in the No. 2 spot and who is now the President.

- 2 -

As an example, Dr. Perkins acting on the turmoil started by the S.D.S. single-handedly and then with the liberal arts professors in the social sciences - which I call the social studies - forced through a narrow vote on the faculty to support the original effort of the S.D.S. in divesting the University of what was one of the top laboratories in the country, if not the world, doing a most efficient job for our government.

The Laboratory did 33% of classified work, approximately the same amount in unclassified work for the government, and the balance which was steadily growing as a percentage on technological projects concerning present day social problems.

Having been a founder of this Laboratory, I was naturally on the other side and managed with the help of the Attorney General of New York State to block the sale of the Laboratory to an upstart corporation, headquartered in Washington, known as EDP and which had on its board two former cabinet members of the Johnson administration.

As I saw this, it was not only an extreme effort to remove the University from national defense efforts, but in addition, it was a violation of the terms on which I raised the working capital for the Laboratory initially. And so, at the request of the Attorney General of New York, I submitted a memorandum which indicated that the University was violating an implied trust for which the working capital had been raised.

This proved effective so that the court granted a temporary injunction against the sale. Two of the University trustees are partners of two of the largest security underwriting investment banking firms in the U. S. They, with the Chairman of the Board who was the former financial head of the Eaton interests headquartered in Cleveland, had already announced the sale and had jammed it through the Board without revealing the necessary details.

It was interesting indeed that the EDP Corporation not only had no money, but had never made any money, and was only a year and a half old at the time the sales letter of intent had been issued. On the basis that one of the two security bankers, namely White, Weld & Co., submitted a letter that they believed the funds would be forthcoming. It was a partner of White, Weld who was one of the inner group of the Board of Trustees who engineered the sale to be and which was enjoined.

- 3 -

It seemed unbelievable to me that the two investment bankers who obviously were going to finance EDP using a "glamour" stock prospectus which would bring great profit to their respective organizations - I could not conceive how such a deal could be ethically put through, and particularly when the trustees as a whole were not given the full story.

At this point of time, I was Chairman of the powerful Engineering College Council on which was represented the senior officers of, among others, the following corporations: General Motors, General Electric, Dupont, Radio Corporation, Zerox, American Light & Power, Rochester Gas & Electric, Dow Chemical, IBM, a former Acting President of the University and Chairman of the Board of the Laboratories, the President of the Laboratories (a separate corporation), Dean of Engineering Emeritus, and the present Dean of Engineering. I have listed these gentlemen to show you why, in my estimation, this was one of the most unique and knowledgeable groups in the U.S., professionally competent to deal with the subject of the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories problem.

This group, at my request as Chairman, took time out of their busy lives to come to Ithaca, to consult with the committee chairmen of the faculty, the administration, and the Trustees set up to study this problem. These committees, as you would surmise, had very few members other than academicians, lawyers and administration representatives, nearly all of whom had never had any intimate relations with the 1,500 member personnel of the Laboratory. In addition, the Laboratory personnel had put together a powerful document as to why the Laboratory could not continue its function under a profit oriented enterprise, and especially the EDP of Washington.

Now comes a point of drama as far as I am concerned. After the Engineering Council had prepared its report and recommendations and we were in official meeting to approve the findings and send them to all trustees and the administration and the chairmen of the groups who had recommended the sale of the Laboratory to EDP, I was presented with a letter covering a formal announcement to the public that the sale had been consumated for $25,000,000., and that it was the unanimous action of all elements of the University community signed by President Perkins and the Chairman of the Board as a publicity release.

For a 'distinguished' educator and former head of the Carnegie Foundation for Education, namely Dr. Perkins, I

- 4 -

could not believe that such an event was possible. I for-
got to mention that, as his request President Perkins had
asked that we put his brother, Dr. Courtland Perkins, on
the Board of the Laboratory, and we did so with alacrity
for the Cornell President said he was an historian and not
knowledgeable in the laboratory field, but that his brother,
as head of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at Princeton, was
eminently qualified and would advise him.

When the Cornell President, as chairman of the Labora-
tory board, announced that he favored separation and sale
of the Laboratory by the University, he called upon each
member of the Laboratory's Board to state his views. Dr.
Courtland Perkins offered the comment that if this were to
be done, it would be a national disaster.

Subsequently, President Perkins denied his brother said
this when I quoted it to the then Chairman of the Board of
Trustees, and I was forced to go back to Dr. Courtland
Perkins to clear up this matter. Whereupon he wrote a
masterful letter to his brother which, in essence, clearly
indicated why he was against the separation and how Dr.
Perkins' so-called objections could be eliminated.

I hope I haven't bored you too much and I have left
out many of the events involved in this forceful attempt by
a dedicated liberal to dissociate a great university and its
laboratories in aiding in the defense of our country, which
of course, was the objective of the S.D.S. and completely
in line with his own personal views.

And now we come to the final denouement. The federal
judge who issued the temporary injunction insisted that the
issue was so substantive that there should be a full trial
which could lead to a permanent injunction if the events
supported the claims of the Attorney General of the State
of New York.

Here I appeared as a principal witness and my memorandum and evidence was supported by other authorities who had official knowledge of the acquisition of the Laboratory. The final briefs have been filed by the EDP lawyers, the University lawyers, against the injunction and the Attorney General's staff favoring it. The judge is to hand down the final decision in February. Q.E.D.

I have been at pains to present this story to you to
show the extent of the liberal forces within a great and
large University. Other events have forced the resignation

- 5 -

of Dr. Perkins, praise God, and it reminds me of your comment at the time Roger Blough, acting as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Business Council, at a meeting in the University Club in New York, insisted that every member present should speak on the following question: the question was - should the Business Advisory Council to the U. S. Department of Commerce free itself and become an independent Business Council?

I hope you recall your comment which I thought was most appropos at the time for under Kennedy as President of the United States, Harvard academicians had taken over so many policy roles in the government, and your final comment, for I believe you were the last to speak, was that you hoped God would deliver our government and Harvard University from its professors!

I have many times felt like making the same exhortation with reference to my own Alma Mater, giving you full credit as my inspiration.

Now, to another subject. The Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, personally picked by Dr. Perkins before he was forced to resign, hastily hired a so-called "Professor" Boorstein to give a course for credit on the Cuban and Latin American revolutions.

He did this on seemingly four days of administrative processing. Members of the Cuban student society wereaghast. Boorstein had been the economic head under Che Guevara for three years of the National Bank of Cuba - a wholly captive element of the Communist takeover. He is a fully admitted Marxist and his course, according to the Cuban students, is largely propaganda. His record of academic qualifications is unbelievably sketchy. The Cuban students demanded another course on Latin American revolutions to be given for credit by a fully accredited professor and offered a list of seven who were qualified, all of whom agreed to head up such a term course.

This whole matter became a "cause celebre" and finally forced the Dean of Liberal Arts, against his will and under his clandestine opposition, to set up such a course under a Dr. Aguilar who I believe is a professor in a school of international relations at Georgetown, or one of the Washington, D.C. colleges. Perhaps you know him well, and even he, while an anti-Marxist, is a socialist and could be classed a liberal.

- 6 -

My purpose in bringing up this incident is to show
that the College of Liberal Arts is so entrenched with
leftists that not one in the Departments of Economics,
Government, or History, would vote to allow Dr. Aguilay's
course, in spite of the evidence. Many of us have worked
on this issue and the result is that the course will be
given.

The two incidents I have outlined probably could be
matched many times over by your own vast knowledge in the
field of academia and I can only say, thank God for Bill
Elliott and what you are now endeavoring to accomplish.

On a more personal note, Laura and I have talked of
you and your family so many times and have wished that we
had opportunities, as in the past, for those fruitful and
pleasant contacts. I have to explain by saying that I am
truly retired, although still active in uranium mining in
Canada, the Defense Orientation Conference Association,
the National Planning Association, the current Cornell
Laboratory situation, Cornell University Council, and the
Engineering College Council, as well as some local organi-
zations.

Last year was an unfortunate one for us for I was in the
hospital three times - first with a heart attack, which my
wife blames on the Laboratory situation, although I do not;
and two operations. These have kept us here where we
moved a little over two years ago.

We live in the beautiful Berkshire Hill country in
Northwestern Connecticut and are surrounded by fields and
beautiful woods wherever we look and which, fortunately,
we control, so that the view in our time will not be
"improved" by real estate developments.

I am told we have fewer inhabitants here in Norfolk to-
day than we had during the Revolutionary War, and we hope
it stays that way in our life time. You probably recall
that I resigned as Chairman of the Advisory Board of the
Industrial College and was surprised to be honored with
the third Gold Medal issued for Distinguished Service
to National Defense. In the presentation I was told I
had lectured for twenty one years to the senior military
colleges, which was an all-time record and they caused my
portrait to be painted and hung in the lounge between those
of Eisenhower and Barney Baruch. This, you will detect,
is a most interesting association.

bring about the coordination of operations when other
agencies resist him.

Kintner's proposed Agency has too many conflicts
built into it to be able to effectively fulfill its wide-
ranging tasks without degenerating into a large unit
operating by the very compromises Kintner wishes to abolish.
Unless the Agency was composed of all staff men or all
agency representatives, and unless it could count on the
continuing support of the President, the Agency would
become a debating society within itself and an exposed and
vulnerable target within the Executive branch.

IV. ADVISORY REVIEW BOARD

Another approach for a White House level unit for
interdepartmental coordination of foreign policy has been
designed by Professor William Y. Elliott. The function of
this unit would be to review interdepartmental programs
to assure their conformity to established policies and, by
means of a comparative evaluation of programs, to establish
priorities among the programs to insure efficiency in all
invested resources. The Board would be chaired by the Vice
President and composed of approximately six individuals who
would have had high level responsibilities in several
agencies. The Board would meet on a part-time basis. Once

the Board had completed its review, the Bureau of the Budget would perform its own fiscal evaluation and carry out the follow-up function on the implementation of the programs to provide an objective evaluation of their impact. This review process by the Board and the Bureau of the Budget would provide the President with something other than parochially oriented recommendations and reports.¹⁰

A major strength of this proposed Board is that, being composed of the type of individuals contemplated, it is both high-level and authoritative. These individuals (of cabinet level, and above) could provide recommendations which could not be matched by either staff men brought into the Board from outside the government, or by agency representatives. These Board members would be competent both in the field under review and in the problems of administering an agency. The members, therefore, would be able to deal with agency heads in the latter's own frame of reference, they would not need an extensive initial process of education, and they would not be prone to produce "ivory tower" recommendations. But the willingness of this rare type of individual would probably be

¹⁰A summary of this proposal appears in *Ron*.
Bob Wilson, "Extension of Remarks," *Congressional Record*,
Appendix, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 922 F (June 20,
1960), pp. A5243-44.

in proportion to the influence of the Board on the setting
of priorities and the allocation of resources.

There are also other advantages in the high-level
nature and composition of this Board. First, since the
Board would be neither chaired by a representative from a
specific agency nor in any other way controlled by an agency,
there would be less chance that it would be used by an
agency for the latter's own ends. That is, one agency would
not be in a position to use the Board to keep a check on
other agencies, with the possibility of vetoing their
programs, while it diverted its own programs around the
Board to avoid subjecting them to the criticism of other
agencies. Second, the recommendations of the Board would
not appear to the smaller agencies as foreordained.

As a consequence of this non-identification of the
Board with a specific agency, however, it would come into
conflict with the most powerful agencies in foreign affairs.
When this situation occured -- as it undoubtedly would,
unless the Board was somehow "captured" by one or more of
the powerful agencies so their programs were rarely down-
graded -- the Board would have to be assured of strong
Presidential backing and support. This would be necessary
even though it was used by the President merely as an advisory
group to provide him with the data (information, analyses,
and alternatives) he needed to make decisions.

Another strength of the proposed Board is that it would meet on a part-time basis for periods of intensive work. This means that it would not be prone to "empire building" or to become another entrenched group of officials with its own interests and perspectives. The part-time nature of the Board might also be helpful in recruiting the type of individual needed to be a member. But these advantages could be lost if it consistently produced high-caliber recommendations. It would become the location of an ever increasing amount of work for the President, and might, therefore, become a full-time group and a new center for policy formulation.

A third strength of the proposed Board is that its setting of a system of priorities would be initially set apart from the budget process so that the latter process would work in support of programs best suited to achieve national goals. Thus programs would not be selected on the basis of their cost, but on the basis of their value to national goals and to the cost to those goals if they were not implemented.

Another strength of the proposed Board is that it would provide for the intimate education of the Vice President in the field of foreign affairs. For the reasons specified above ( pages ), and especially because he would lack the same type of view and understanding of the other

members, the Vice President should not be designated the
chairman. He could benefit from this process as merely
a member if the President wanted him on the Board.

Finally, the location of the follow-up function in
the Bureau of the Budget has two advantages. First, a
special and permanent staff for the Board would not have to
exist, and second, the follow-up function would be the
responsibility of officials who are experienced in that
type of activity.

This Board could make an important contribution to
the foreign policy of the United States, so long as it
remained small, competent, and restricted to major issues.
It would do away with the discontinuity resulting from the
utilization of various short-term groups such as the Draper
Committee. But the possibility remains that once a group
such as this one is established in the Executive Office of
the President on a continuing basis, it might become the
center of foreign policy formulation at the expense of the
State Department.

V. THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The functions of the Secretary of State depend upon
the wills of the President and his manner of operating.
The President may make the Secretary of State his chief
decision-maker in foreign affairs or a glorified clerk. His

EXECUTIVE

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

MAY 20 1970

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for your letter of May 12. I
appreciate your writing and am glad to hear
that my backgrounders are proving useful.

I will keep Dr. Grewe's suggestion in mind.
There are few things I would like better than
to come to Europe to renew old dialogues
with my friends there.

It's good to hear from you as always.

The Honorable Robert Ellsworth
United States Permanent Representative
on the North Atlantic Council
Brussels, Belgium

jlp:5/19/70

UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Brussels, Belgium

May 12, 1970

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

Your backgrounders have been providing me lately
with good source material in my contacts here --
with some moderately good effects, at least
locally.

Dr. Grewe, the German Ambassador here, just now
told me what a wonderful thing he thought it would
be if you could come to Europe one of these days
and let some of your old friends see you and have
the benefit of your current thinking. I told him I
would relay this on, which I am glad to do -- not
with the wish to add to your schedule, but with the
thought that, at some appropriate time, it might be
worth your keeping in mind.

That places an obligation on me to suggest an appro-
priate time, which I will do.

Of course if you yourself judge at any point that it
would be appropriate for you to be in Europe, your
presence would be most welcome.

Warm personal regards.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

AUG 4 1971

Dear Bob:

Many thanks for sending me the text of
the comments you delivered yesterday. I
was interested to see them and have passed
them along to my staff.

I hope being back in a law office is to your
liking. Stay in touch and let us get together
some time soone.

Honorable Robert Ellsworth
Lankler and Parker
Waterhouse
3526 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20007

jlp:8/3/71

RECEIVED
AUG 4 1971
CENTRAL FILES

REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT ELLSWORTH
(formerly U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council)
BEFORE THE
MID-WESTERN CONFERENCE OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS

WICHITA, KANSAS
7:30 P.M.

AUGUST 3, 1971

(The Mid-Western Conference comprises the states of Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

On May 19, 1971 the Senate rejected the Mansfield
Amendment (H.R. 6531) barring funds for use after December
31, 1971 for support of U. S. forces stationed in Europe
in excess of 150,000 men -- a 50% cut.

It is anticipated that this effort will be renewed

later this year.

The record of votes on the Mansfield Amendment is

as follows:

Alabama

Allen No
Sparkman No

Alaska

Gravel Yes
Stevens No

Arizona

Fannin No
Goldwater No

Arkansas

Fulbright Yes
McClellan Yes

[More background follows]

U. S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE WORLD OF THE 1970's

In speaking about U. S. national interests in the
world today, it is essential to start by recognizing -- as
President Nixon has said -- that no ground is more important
than the ground we stand on. The Nixon Doctrine proclaims
the intent to seek, by practical and honorable means,
substantial reductions in our foreign over-commitments. For
no problems are more pressing than our own problems:
feelings of racial injustice; poverty and unemployment;
alienation and drug addiction; inflation; and the balance
of payments. The anxieties, the problems, the fears we share
in 1971 are the most taxing we have ever known.

Even so, anxieties are not new to us. As General
Cumings said in *The Naked and the Dead*: "The natural role
of twentieth-century man is anxiety." For it is also true
that throughout the first half of the twentieth century our

2

civilization was deeply disturbed. We experienced the disintegration of our economic system, culminating -- so it seemed -- with the collapse of capitalism in the early 1930's. At the same time, we lived with the memory of one war and the threat of another.

After World War II, the anxieties of the West were reawakened by the sudden expansion of great Soviet military power into Central Europe; by the loss of mainland China to Communism; and by the Korean War.

The late 1950's seemed to be years of peace and prosperity; but from the middle 1960's to the present day, while our public and press attention largely has been focused on Vietnam, the Soviet Union has pursued a policy of rapid and thoroughgoing rearmament. Today it has attained rough parity with the United States in strategic nuclear forces. The Soviets' conventional (non-nuclear)

3

land, sea and air forces have been strengthened in Eastern
and Central Europe. Their military forces have been
extended to new areas such as Egypt, and have been increased
in such others as the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, and
Soviet Asia on the frontier with China. The Soviet Union
today has one of the most formidable military forces the
world has ever seen. Their international diplomacy is
skillful, assertive, and well managed.

Nowhere is the effect of all this more keenly felt
than in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
And nowhere in the world -- outside our own territory -- do
we, the United States, have deeper or more important national
interests in the 1970's.

This evening, therefore, let us concentrate our
attention on those aspects of our position in the outside
world that are crucial: our interests in the European area.

While many places in the world are important, our mutual relationships with Europe are so far-reaching, and so deeply rooted, as to be unique. Our mutual ethnic, historical, sentimental and political ties are stronger and more widespread; our mutual trade is incomparably greater; our mutual investments are far more substantial, varied, and technologically advanced; our mutual monetary interdependency is more fundamental; the mass tourist travel of our citizens is far heavier between Europe and the United States than between any other comparable areas of the earth. Quite apart from defense, security, and foreign policy, then, Western Europe and the United States constitute the largest and most intimate system of mutual interests in the world today.

Yet despite these evident American interests, we gave much higher priority in the late 1960's to other parts of the world, where our national interests were peripheral.

5

There were lapses in our practice of consulting with our NATO allies. We made ill-considered and poorly managed cuts in our conventional defense forces in Western Europe, in order to feed the Vietnam War, while stressing the rhetoric of conventional defense and leaving our great nuclear arsenal in Europe untouched. The basis of the world's confidence in our ability to appreciate and watch out for our own national interests was deeply shaken.

Today, things have changed. Today, we are withdrawing from the war in Vietnam as the South Vietnamese take over more and more responsibility for their own territory. Together with our allies, we are moving to correct the military imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Today, in full consultation with our allies, we are negotiating with the Soviet Union on subjects directly related to our essential national interests in our homeland and in Europe. Today, we are entering into a new political

6

relationship with the Peoples' Republic of China which could
help to improve the overall political and diplomatic atmosphere
in Europe, if we manage our diplomacy well. Today, our NATO
allies are with us: they trust us, and they have confidence
in us.

The most serious qualification on what I have said
would arise from the danger of enactment of the Mansfield
Amendment on NATO: the danger that Congress, responding to
the public's disappointment with our military involvement in
Vietnam, might impair the essential power of the Presidency
to handle our most important external national interests
and strategic relationships by forcing a radical reduction of
our forces in the European area. For example, the President
was able to avoid confrontation with the Soviets in the
Jordanian crisis of last September only by skillful use of
our political and military resources which were already on
the scene in the European area. But he had to act quickly,

7

in terms of hours and minutes. He could not have waited
on days of deliberation, or weeks of preparation and
deployment. It would be a very serious matter for Congress
to cripple the President's capacity to act, diplomatically
and otherwise, in the world of the 1970's. In order to
see why it is so serious, let us examine in detail some of
the complex and dangerous forces in our world today, which
the President of the United States is responsible for dealing
with.

First, let us turn to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks -- the SALT talks. The general outlines of today's
strategic nuclear balance between the two superpowers have
become well known: without entering into the questions of
definition and interpretations of intelligence which precise
figures would involve, I can say in general terms that the
Soviet Union and the United States are roughly in balance
in land-based ICBM strength; that the United States has over

8

twice as many SLBM launchers and three times as many long-range bombers as the Soviet Union; that the Soviets' strategic forces have greater throw-weight, although the United States has, overall, many more warheads capable of reaching Soviet territory than the Soviet Union has warheads capable of reaching the continental United States; and that in terms of independently targetable re-entry vehicles, the United States has a very large lead. Both parties are deploying defensive anti-missile missile systems. As for the balance of technological change, especially in the basic elements of modern weapons systems such as computers and solid state and micro electronics -- the crucial factor in determining accuracy of delivery -- the United States appears to have a large and growing advantage.

These weapons systems exist; they are growing; they are not going to be dis-invented. In addition to the two superpowers, strategic nuclear weapons systems are also in

9

the hands of France, Britain, and the Peoples' Republic of China. One of our basic human problems, as I see it, is to control these weapons. In the SALT negotiations now taking place in Helsinki, between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., both sides seek to control them by placing limitations on their further growth. This summer, both sides are proceeding on the basis of the agreement announced by President Nixon last May -- an agreement to the effect that limitations on _defensive_ weapons systems would be accompanied by certain limitations on _offensive_ weapons systems. I anticipate hard negotiations during the rest of the current Helsinki session; any agreement will require time, and mutual recognition of the national interests of both sides. However, the outlook is now brighter than it has been at any time since the beginning of the talks. Only the President can take the responsibility for guiding such negotiations safely and successfully.

10

As the negotiations continue, it is unquestionably correct to characterize the present strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers as a balance of 'sufficiency.' Each superpower has sufficient intercontinental nuclear weapons to be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the other superpower, even after having received an all-out first strike. This is a different situation from that which existed as recently as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The fact that the United States no longer has strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union has certain consequences:

> It means that either superpower has less incentive than ever before to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons. Neither can derive political or military advantages not available to the other through such threats. This condition of mutual stability, or stalemate, at the strategic nuclear level, means -- and this is most important -- that local

11

political and military balances have assumed greatly
heightened importance. Local tactical weaknesses are no
longer compensated by the strategic superiority of the
United States. The former American nuclear superiority no
longer shields us from the political effects of local,
conventional imbalances. Frankly, some of those Senators
who supported the Mansfield Amendment did not understand these
new conditions, brought about by the changes I have
described in the nuclear balance. That is why many of them
thought we could withdraw our conventional forces with
impunity.

In fact, the local European balance, between the
Warsaw Pact and NATO, has assumed great new importance for
world peace, and for stability, and for U. S. national interests
in Europe. The conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in
Europe as a whole is no longer compensated by overwhelming
United States nuclear superiority. Thus, the importance of

12

the United States (and its allies in NATO) basing our
European strategy on modern conventional defense capability,
plus renewed diplomatic strength and skill, has emerged
with unmistakable clarity. It was for this reason that one
of President Nixon's very first acts as President was to
visit Western Europe. The political and diplomatic effects
of that visit were impressive, successful, and will be long
remembered. Then, last December, the President affirmed to
the North Atlantic Council that United States participation
in the conventional defense of Western Europe will be
maintained and even improved, assuming a similar approach
by our European NATO allies. For their part, those allies
promptly affirmed a similar approach. I am in a position to
tell you that work has already begun on improving and
modernizing the defense of Western Europe, in accordance
with that uniquely candid exchange of mutual commitments
and acknowledgement of mutual responsibilities. Only the

13

President could have achieved that.

Within NATO itself, the European nations actually carry the greatest share of the conventional defense burden -- although, of course, the 300,000 Americans in the European area, and their equipment, play a key role. As members of NATO, and in the common strategic interest of all of us in the European area, our NATO allies contribute six times as many army divisions to the defense of Central Europe as does the United States, they spend twice as much money as the United States, and they maintain over four times as many tactical combat aircraft as the United States. Given the nature and extent of our own interests in Europe, we are fortunate to have such close and sturdy allies.

One important development that could directly affect U. S. force dispositions in Western Europe would be NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe as a whole. Together with our NATO

14

allies, we are now in direct contact with the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact to explore possible negotiations whose objective would be a more stable military balance in Europe as a whole, at lower levels of forces and costs. Only the President will be able to handle such complex and delicate negotiations.

United States forces stationed in the European area, including the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, while there primarily to support NATO, also have a highly significant strategic role in the Middle East. They provide an important underpinning to our political efforts aimed at creating and maintaining stability in the area. This, in turn, is the essential condition for getting the parties directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to move toward adjustment of their differences in a way that takes into account the legitimate aspirations and concerns of all governments and peoples of the area. Only the President --

15

with forces already deployed and stationed in the European
area -- can successfully manage that difficult task.

What, then, of the future of U. S. interests in
Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East? Should a
simple majority of the 535 Members of Congress take over
from the President his power to deploy our forces to meet
threats to our national interest and to fulfill our treaty
commitments? Is history ready to give Congress that
responsibility? Is Congress itself actually ready to assume
the responsibility for those decisions, and actions, which
today's world has placed upon the United States of America?

I am not addressing the broad question of working
out national priorities between competing demands of
different segments of American society. I am referring to
the on-going effort -- an effort which will probably be
renewed this fall -- by Senator Mansfield and others in
Congress to determine through legislation the timing and

16

location of deployment of U. S. forces in support of strategic
U. S. interests in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle
East. As a former Member of Congress, I can understand the
feelings of some of my former colleagues, but Congress is
simply not equipped to make decisions of that kind. Perhaps
they could develop means for more responsible participation in
such decisions, and I hope they will. I hope that the Congress
as a whole, when the question of Senator Mansfield's proposal
comes up again, will firmly reject that proposal. I hope each
of your Senators and Congressmen, even if tempted for other
reasons, will vote to reject it.

The United States, together with our allies, have
successfully prevented war in Europe for a quarter of a century.
We have successfully fulfilled our nation's commitment under
the North Atlantic Treaty -- a treaty which was fully considered,
fully debated, and fully approved by the United States Senate.
And of course, our forces in the European area play a clear

17

and present political role in support of U. S. strategic interests, and overall stability. Indeed, as long as the United States maintains a conventional defense capability of any size, and in the absence of settlement of the basic security issues in Europe, it will make eminent strategic sense to deploy a large part of that capability in the European area.

Beyond the Congress, the future of the U. S. interests in Europe will be both shaped and limited by trends I have already noted -- particularly by the build-up of Soviet military and naval power. Will that trend continue into the 1970's?

Much of the Western press has optimistically reported that the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party -- held in Moscow just last spring -- was a "consumer congress."

The hope has been expressed that the Soviet economy was being reoriented, to shift priorities away from military spending to spending for consumer goods. The sad fact is that this

18

is not the first time we have heard such hopes expressed.

Soviet leaders since the end of the Stalin era have at various times talked about improving the lot of the Soviet consumer -- and indeed, I myself have seen, during visits in the U.S.S.R. over recent years, that the Soviet citizen is better off materially than he was 10 years ago. These improvements, however, have never been at the expense of the Soviet military machine. We have only to look at the recent massive Soviet military build-up I have already described to see where priorities lie. In assessing the future, we should take note of this experience.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT talks) now taking place in Helsinki, together with possible Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are also key factors. If, as a result of those sets of negotiations, the Soviet Union were to agree to verifiable and comprehensive reductions in its military

19

power, that would be a very constructive development. If
they do not, then we will have to maintain and improve our
overall strength. Certainly no President of the United
States should be willing to accept limits on our national
interests in Europe, or in the Middle East, imposed by
Soviet military superiority.

Thirdly, the whole range of internal social problems
which beset all our nations will have some effect on the
future of U. S. interests in Europe. In the 1930's and
1940's we thought it would be difficult ever to liberate
ourselves from the fears, catastrophies, and anxieties of
the first half of the twentieth century. It has also proven
difficult to live in the freedom and prosperity of the
1950's and 1960's. In the face of rapid population growth,
tremendous affluence, massive migrations of people from
the countryside into the cities, ever changing and growing
patterns of industrialization, reduction in the strength

20

and value accorded the family and the community, loss of
authority in religious and civil life as well as within our
military forces -- in the face of all these changes, the
deepest values that have guided our civilization for a
thousand years are changing, and changing fast.

Nevertheless, the people of our nations still hunger
and thirst for peace, for justice, for order, and for purpose.
The responsibility for protecting our people in a world full
of self-centered and powerful nations falls not upon the
voting population, nor upon the press, radio and TV, nor
even upon our own military. It falls squarely upon our
political leaders. If our leaders follow the advice -- even
the aggressive demands -- of influential minorities or
elites, and lead us to failure, or defeat, or into a
holocaust, they will find that history will never forgive
them. What is more, they will find that even those whose
advice they have followed will not forgive them. That is

21

why no President of the United States can yield to Congress
his unique responsibilities, or his unique powers, in the
field of national security.

I continue to have faith and hope for the future:
first, that our national leaders will fulfill their heavy
responsibilities during the 1970's; and second, that the
United States and its allies will continue to do what is
necessary to maintain the peace and safety in which our
nations, and our people, can pursue their internal efforts
to correct economic injustice, social inequities and
spiritual malaise wherever they may be found. It is these
internal efforts to correct injustice, inequity, and
malaise -- by our own efforts, on our own responsibility --
for which we require the time and the safety provided by our
external security. The words of the great Russian poet,
Boris Pasternak, are just as meaningful for our societies
today as they were for the individuals for whom he wrote:

ROBERT ELLSWORTH
ONE ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020

GENERAL

SP4/

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

ND18/20165

KISSINGER, HENRY A./E*

July 28, 1972

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

Congratulations on your presentation at the dinner here in New York on Wednesday evening. I enjoyed it myself, and from comments I picked up afterward am confident that both the style and substance were highly effective.

I am not necessarily talking about political effectiveness in any partisan sense, but rather in the sense that you inspired confidence in places where there had been uneasiness before, and held out hope where there had been deep uncertainty. Given the overall composition of the group, that was an achievement of some significance.

With regard to Vietnam, your saying at the outset that it is virtually impossible to discuss Vietnam in this country in a rational way was, I think, a good thing to say. It was helpful in gaining acceptance and patience from many of those present who still are severely critical of our position in and handling of Vietnam.

Warm personal regards.

RECEIVED
AUG 4 1972

CENTRAL FILES

PAULUS ELM-SELIG

Paulus Elm-Selig's "blessing", as he often affectionately refers to it, is the inheritance of an unforgettable youthful environment and its' heartwarming influence, which he both vigorously and yet sentimentally projects with both heart and spirit into the present day world of entertainment.

Elm-Selig is dedicated to the continuity of a family tradition of musical life drawn from the days of his grandfather who played the early button-type zieh-harmonika in the many quaint Inns along the Danube river, and in general from a family tree generously studded through the years with violin and piano talent.

Directly associated with such an inspirational background, he spontaneously reflects, with ardent ability, unspoiled and unimpaired, song and Continental music which unfailingly captures the heart of audiences.

He received his exacting training and counsel from the late Professor Wilhelm Meyer from Bochum, Germany, Director of The Meyer Conservatory of Music, which developed him effortlessly into a well groomed dignified Continental entertainer.

With a large repertoire of memorized conservative American, Latin-American, French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Hungarian Gypsy music, he is refreshingly equipped to please the finer taste of stature and gracious dining, effective solo dance music, cocktail time, fashion show background, and fill-in during regular orchestra breaktime.

Paulus Elm-Selig is ideally suited to be your distinctive guide for a happy musical journey from the Rhein to the Danube, from New York to Milwaukee, and conveyed by a heartwarming bouquet of music which has long since been accurately labeled "Music with spirit, with a heart".

Paulus' versatility is embodied in his many variations of music, some tender and romantic and some vigorous and ebullient.

— Mimi MacDonald,
Managing Hostess,
Jug End, South Egremont, Mass.

You have within you the natural capability of expressing music with "heart-blood".

— The late
Professor Wilhelm Meyer,
The Meyer Conservatory of Music,
Bochum, Germany

He's good. Only "take one" necessary for his recording.

— Bob Arnold,
Recording Engineer,
Capitol Records, Inc.,
New York City

He plays wonderfully and emotionally from the heart.

— Mrs. Albert Spalding,
wife of the late Albert Spalding,
American Violin Virtuoso,
Great Barrington, Mass.

Your music recalls for me many happy memories. The spirit in your music is vitalizing.

— Gerhard Leuwerik,
former supervisory staff member,
Krupp Industries, Germany

You're a natural entertainer. You impart something of your very being.

— James J. Abernathy,
Assistant District Attorney,
Kingston, New York

As one man alone, it's amazing what he can do.

— Willy Sattelberg,
popular orchestra leader,
pre-WW II days,
Munich, Germany

You are a credit to the family. We are proud of you.

— Daniel L. Papp,
Paramount organ artisan,
Paramount Theater,
New York City

MOUNTAIN BRAUHAUS

"At 1275 feet in the land of Rip Van Winkel"

MEMBER:

CATSKILL
MOUNTAIN
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE

CAIRO
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE

GREENE
COUNTY
RESORT
ASSOCIATION

ROUND TOP
SKI RESORT
PROMOTIONAL
COMMITTEE

PAULUS and ROSA ELMSELIG

Winter Clove Road
ROUND TOP, NEW YORK, 12473

Area Code 518
622-9964 or 622-9684

5 January 1972

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
National Security Advisor
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Mr. Kissinger:

The writer is sensitively aware of the multi-
duties and administrative activities which demand
most of your time and attention, and yet he hopes he
may enjoy some measure of forbearance and preferred
contemplation.

Undoubtedly a gentleman in your position of
prestige faces the expectation of presenting an
occasional social-diplomatic function, be it formal
governmental or more of a personal nature. Related
thereto, entertainment may be a desirable party en-
hancement, and in this respect, your writer does most
sincerely suggest his engagement over other talent.

He is well endowed with unique Old World graciousness and romantic sentiment easily recognized through his "signature" melody, the lovely Viennese song "In einem kleinen Cafe in Hernals".

For a more fuller entertainment requirement,
the Edelweiss Duo dance music and songs, Paulus Elm-Selig
and colleague Michael Burns drummer examplar, provides
extraordinary support all in keeping with brochure
contents (enclosed).

The favour of your active consideration is
indeed most welcome.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen,

Featured on Radio Station WKNY, Kingston, New York

OFFICIAL, 9/17/70 jlp

Type of Request & Date

ELON

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Amos Elon, Editor of ARRITZ (sp?) in Israel

Request: Would like to see Mr. Kissinger on a subject which Joe Kraft has already raised with him. He has come over with Mrs. Meir, but for the purpose of seeing Mr. Kissinger. He will be here until noontime Tuesday but might be able to stay a little longer if Mr. Kissinger would be able to see him (his last appt. here is 3:00 Tuesday with Sisco).

He is staying at the Shoreham, 234-0700, Rm. F853--if he is not there a message should be left. (If he has not heard from us by mid-day Monday, he will be calling back)

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: 9/20- Repeated-

Additional Information:

RECEIVED

SEP 23 1970

CENTRAL FILES

Resolution: