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limitations should include the attempt to confine attacks to
military objectives. In the opinion of these thinkers, while this
strategy may be a possible one, it isn't desirable, since its
adoption is likely to undermine the balance of power and to
intensify the arms race.

The very great stability of the military balance at the
present time, it's said, rests upon the continued ability of each
of the great alliances to strike at the cities and population of
the other. While this capacity exists on both sides, the populations
of the great powers serve as hostages for the good behaviour of
their governments. But once this capacity is placed in doubt,
then the hostages will be set free, and the barrier is down in a
race for military ascendancy. Therefore, the path along which
both the West and the Soviet Union should move is that of maintaining
at all times the invulnerability of their own strategic weapons,
and at the same time refraining from any interference with the
invulnerability of their opponents' weapons. If, however, the
great powers are to proclaim that their prime objectives, in the
event of war, are military ones, they are abandoning a policy of
restraint in favour of one of provocation. The conclusion to which
we are led if we follow this line of reasoning is that, in the changed
conditions brought about by recent military technology, the principle
upon which military policy should be shaped is actually the reverse
of the traditional one. It is not the destruction of civilian
populations that must be proscribed, but the destruction of
military forces.

This third objection is a serious one, but I do not find
it entirely convincing. It is possible that the spread of ideas
like those of Mr. McNamara will stimulate military rivalry between
the great powers and further diminish the likelihood of agreements
about arms control. But the force of this argument has been
exaggerated; and there are countervailing considerations which
may be thought to over-ride it.

Ever since they first confronted one another as nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union have shown every sign of an intention, in the event of war, to seek out and destroy one another's strategic weapons, whatever other objectives they might attack as well. Indeed, given the overwhelming need, on every military ground, to do so, it seems unlikely that this will cease to be the case, whatever progress is made in the field of arms control. The novelty of Mr. McNamara's doctrine does not lie in the idea that military objectives will be attacked, but in the notion that civilian objectives, at least in the first instance, will not be attacked. His speech, therefore, does not alter the position of the United States with regard to the destruction of military targets. It rather superimposes upon that position an invitation to the Soviet Union to collaborate in the avoidance of destruction which is superfluous from the point of view of the rational conduct of the war.

Nor is it clear that the doctrine that cities and populations should in the first instance be spared must necessarily be connected with a massive build-up of armed forces designed to achieve victory in a strategic nuclear war. It has long been argued by certain military authorities, especially by spokesmen of the United States Air Force, that the United States should place itself in a position to disarm the Soviet Union by an attack on Soviet strategic nuclear forces that would actually or virtually eliminate them. Such a policy undoubtedly calls for an overwhelming superiority in quality and quantity of weapons systems; and whatever arguments may be urged in its favour, it is certainly intended to undermine the stability of the balance of power. But this strategy of a disarming attack is different from the doctrine of limitation in war I have been discussing, and isn't necessarily involved in it. Whereas the policy of acquiring a capacity to disarm the adversary is addressed simply to the Western powers, and is intended to provide

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them with a means of imposing outright defeat on the Soviet Union, the policy of restraint I have been discussing is addressed to both sides, and is intended to facilitate the moderation of the conflict in recognition of interests they have in common.

Mr. McNamara's pronouncements have in fact sometimes suggested that the United States is pursuing military superiority. But the case for attempting to confine strategic nuclear bombardment to military targets in the first instance does not appear in any way to depend on acceptance of that objective.

Moreover, even if we were driven to conclude that the attempt to plan the rational conduct of a strategic nuclear war was bound to stimulate the arms race, it would not follow that such an attempt should not be made. For if we should be concerned to avoid the dangers of modern war, we should also be concerned to take them into account. If the doctrines of Clausewitz and Grotius extend an invitation to resort to war, they also contain an appeal to limit it. And though we cannot apply them to strategic nuclear conflict without a certain anxiety, it is difficult to see that they have lost their relevance.

THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE
(UNIVERSITY OF LONDON)

TELEPHONE HOLBORN 7686

Houghton Street, Aldwych
London, W.C.2

20 March 1964

Henry A. Kissinger, Esq.,
Center of International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, 38, Mass., U.S.A.

Dear Henry,

Fellowship in Strategic Studies

Do you know of anyone who might be a
suitable candidate for the position described
in these enclosures ?

The closing date has been extended to
30 April.

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON S.W.1.

21 March, 1966

MAR 28 1966

HB/JEB

Dear Henry,

Anthony Hartley who is a leader writer in the "Economist" on defence and foreign policy questions will be passing through Princeton some time in April or May. He also contributes to "Encounter" and you may know his book "A State of England". He will be very interested to talk with you and I believe you would find it interesting to talk to him so I am letting you know in case he should get in touch with you.

I am coming to the United States myself on 21 March and expect to be in the Cambridge area early in the week of 28 March. I hope I may bump into you at some point then.

(Hedley Bull)

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Centre of International Affairs,
Harvard University,
6, de Vinity Ave.,
Cambridge 38,
Massachusetts,
U.S.A.

cc: L. Moore

Henry A. Kisaifer

Beat redge

I would appreciate anything you can do for me.

American Embassy, London.
England and can be reached c/o William Brubeck, Political Counselor,
to prosden himself with respect to European matters. He will be in
Mr. Moore is now attending a year at Harvard, and would like

he was actively involved in our Vietnam policy.
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In this capacity
with me while he was Special Assistant to William Bund, who is the
Moore, will be visiting London from November 10 to 15. He worked
A good friend of mine, a good man by the name of Jonathan

Dear Hedley:

London, S.W.1, England
Kind Charles Street
Room 518
Foreign Office
Research Unit
Arma Control and Disarmament
Mr. Hedley Bull

October 31, 1968

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

April 6, 1967

To: West European Faculty Seminar

From: Henry A. Kissinger

The next meeting of the Seminar will take place on
Wednesday, April 19, at the Harvard Faculty Club at 12:30.
Mr. Hedley Bull of the British Foreign Office will be the
guest speaker.

Would you call my secretary on extension 2125 to let us know
whether we can expect you?