The Gospel, A Study of The Epistle To The Romans

Study 1

THE POWER OF GOD

Romans 1

Epistles all commence with the sender identifying himself and sending a greeting. It is
in the opening verse of this epistle that Paul states his two great themes.

1. What two great themes are identified by Paul in the opening verse of this epistle? (Rom. 1:1, see vs. 3 also)

2. How does Romans 1:5-6 show that the Gospel was not to be restricted to Jews only?

In the opening four verses, the apostle references each member of the Trinity playing a
role in the outworking of the Gospel. The Gospel is *God the Father's* message. The
Gospel is about *Jesus Christ*. The Gospel is declared by the power of *the Holy Spirit*.

3. What does Romans 1:8 tell us about the witness of the church in Rome?

4. Why did Paul want to visit the church at Rome and what might this tell us about the role of ‘ministers’? (Rom. 1:11, 15)

5. In what way is the Gospel "the power of God"? (Rom. 1:16)

3

Paul cites Habakkuk 2:4 in Romans 1:17 and shows that the Old Testament prophesied about the coming of the Gospel. "Righteousness" is a key word in this epistle. It means "innocence" and "right standing before God". It is related to another word: *justified* (Rom. 3:28). While we each stand before God as guilty and despicable sinners deserving the wrath of God, Christ has offered His life as our Substitute and has atoned for our sins. In the language of a court-room, we have now been declared "innocent" (not because we are, but because Christ, the truly innocent One, has borne our eternal penalty).

6. Paul tells the Roman believers that *all* people intuitively acknowledge that there is a God (Rom. 1:19). But in order to justify their rebellion toward God, they have to do something. According to Romans 1:18, what is it that they unrighteously do?

7. Even people with no religious background are born with an intuitive knowledge that there is a God. In addition to this, according to Romans 1:20, how *else* can they know that there is a God?

Today we tend to associate our *minds* with our *thinking* and our *hearts* with our *feeling*.
But the Bible seems to identify our *thoughts* as coming from our *hearts*.

8. According Romans 1:21, what does a refusal to honour or thank God do to a person's thinking (and heart)?

What does God's judgment look like? When does God judge people? You would be forgiven for thinking that God's judgment looks like *punishment* and not *self-gratification*. You would also be forgiven for thinking that God punishes people when they embrace a lifestyle of gross sin. But Romans 1:24-25 challenges these assumptions.

9. Consider what happens when God "gives people up" to fulfil the passions of their debased minds as described in Romans 1:26-32. Why does verse 32 sound a stern warning to us today?

4

It would be wrong of us to become judgmental of others whom we felt the closing section of Romans 1 describes. We should instead be moved with compassion for these people to accept the Gospel instead. This is clearly the heart of the apostle who authored this epistle.

10. Describe in your own words what stood out to you the most in Romans 1 -

11. What is your prayer for your life based on what you've gained from Romans 1?

12. Who can you share with this week, what you have now just learned?

13. In which part of this study did you sense God was speaking to you?

14. Write out your prayerful response to God -

Amen.

5

2.
The President

Feb. 13, 1974

30

K: ON the Embargo, Mr. President, I am confident that it will be lifted
in a week.

N: Sounds that way from the thing I saw last night and this morning that you sent over here.

K: They are having a summit meet of Faisal, Boumedienne and Sadat today and tomorrow.

N: Incidentally, I got your message late last night about the conference and I think that is just the way to handle the French -- isolate them. They don't want to be isolated. The interesting thing is though that all the other countries would be willing, you know, to go along. The Europeans were supposed to have unanimous vote you remember. That is why I made the little crack that I made at the end of the dinner because our friend the Canadian had told me that we have to be unanimous. I said well you aren't going to do anything then. He was not mean about it.

K: Last week, Mr. President, the Community took a decision and today they have split apart on it eight to one. It is a lesson to everybody.

N: There is no confrontation with the Arabs, is there?

K: Absolutely none.

N: Make that point very clear will you in your -- when are you going to brief?

K: About 3:00.

N: Make it very clear that you and I have chatted, etc and that the President particularly pointed out that this was not by way of confrontation with the oil producing nations. On the contrary it is in their interests to have first a market they can count on and at a price that is reasonable -- whatever you want to say. And that we all want to do that. We look forward to working with them in the same cooperative spirit that we worked here and we look forward to working with them in their economic development -- apart from oil. All that old jazz.

K: We meet again at 12:30 and we are down to a very few minor paragraphs.

TELCON

P. 3
The President

Feb. 13, 1974

N: You might tell the conferees you have talked to me and I was very pleased with the results. Tell them this -- you might say that the President said -- I did not include this in my toast -- you can say in these days of summitry there is the tendency often to credit -- for the attention to go and the credit or discredit to go only to the heads of government or heads of state because we meet in various things, but that I have always said that the real credit goes to the ministers and that I consider the foreign ministers, the economic ministers, ministers of finance, etc and their colleagues that they are basically the artisans -- the peacemakers -- the peacebuilders -- without them there could be no success between meetings of heads of government and state and I particularly appreciate the hard work that they have gone to do to produce. Anything like -- something like that might be helpful.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will say this. And I am planning to come down to Key Biscayne on Friday night.

N: Only if you feel it will help you.

K: I would like to do it.

N: That will give you two days to do down there.

K: Goodbye, Mr. President.

END

TELCORN

The President - Secretary Kissinger

February 14, 1974

6:15 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: I just called to congratulate you. We got the cable on the plane and I showed it to George, he's off to the West Coast, and Ziegler was there and everybody thought it was terrific, it was really great.

K: Well, we got 98% of what we wanted.

isolated

N: As a matter of fact we come around some...

Totally,

K: In addition to the communique, the fact of the matter is that it taught an important lesson to the European community.

N: The point is the European Community, instead of having that silly unanimity rule, learned they can't gang up against us and we can use it now, we can use it on trade, security, with everything else.

K: Exactly.

N: Its an historic breaktrough, people will see it later, Henry, and by God it was a hell of a thing.

K: Your speech on Monday night was terribly important.

N: It was a shot across the bow but nobody could really be mad at me.

Well, everyone got the point including Reston and

K: You made the connection between the economic and the military...

N: That right.. you can't separate the two.

K: Well, it really turned into a major success. I gave a press conference this afternoon.....

N: Oh, how did it go, Henry?

K: Very, very good. You know they usually needle me and try to show.....

N: And they've been writing what a disaster the conference was going to be, and was, and then all of a sudden they have to write, I mean it must have, how were they, were they sheepish

The President
page two

33

K: Oh, yah, they said how did you do it, what happened, are there any secret concessions you had to make. I said look how could you, there were 13 people there how could you make with 130 people in the room. And everyone, lot of questions about the isolation of France so I was very generous to the French and said of course they are old friends.

N: We understood, we said we needed them all, we understood that they'd all had reasons for going into business for themselves, but after all they had to realize, but...I think the line that its good short term politics but disastrous long term statesmanship. That's the thing we've got to keep hammering.

K: It taught us an important lesson if we really throw our weight around we can have our way. Another thing. We had a message from the Saudis, saying its 95% certain that they're going to get the embargo, that the embargo will be lifted. They're already in Algiers.

N: As of when, Henry?

K: I would guess by the end of next week.

N: Not this week huh?

K: Well I think the decision will be taken this week but we won't be able to talk about it because it will have to be ratified next week.

N: Yes, but the Saudis are totally positive?

K: But, oh yes, but the press is so much against it now, I means its talking it down so much that whether it happens this week or next week it will be a huge success.

N: Well, the main point is I got Simon at the fore and I really nailed him to the cross, I said now Bill I don't know what's going to happen I think we may get it sometime, I said first, OK there's going to be no rationing, second, I said I want those service stations filled up so we don't have those damn lines. Two or three weeks after it is lifted, he said, I will givethem 100% of their requirement. He's got oil running out of the ears.

K: That's going to, I think the embargo will be lifted within the next 2 weeks at the latest.

N: Then I could have a press conference right afterwards.

K: Exactly, also, if you plan a press conference, Mr. President for

The President
page three

week of the 25th, that would turn out very good because we would be able
to announce the resumption of relations with Egypt.

N: Yes, yes. a couple of brief things I mentioned to Al. First I talked to Finch about Japan, he doesn't want to be an ambassador anyplace so he's out, which is fine because he'd be a fine ambassador but we need him here. Second, I think that Hodgeson would be ahell of a good man if he'd take it, he was an excellent Secretary of Labor, and

K: No, no, I think its a good idea.

N: He's a businessman, and also he's totally our man, you know what I mean. Now, the other one is that I would like to do, don't know if he will take it but I want to offer it. I think we ought to offer London to Dave Packard. If Packard would take it you know maybe that would be....

K: Oh, that would be great.

N: Wouldn't that be superb.

K: That would be a great appointment.

N: And then you see as a senior ambassador over there, even more
than Walter, he could help Straus-Hupe in NATO he could help with
the European Community, he understands so much, and of course if
would be great for the British.

K: I'm seeing him tonight at the Business Council should I run it past him.

N: Absolutely, I told Al, I said to be sure, as far as I'm concerned I'd like to have it offered to him. Tell you what you do, if you see him tell him the President has been trying to reach him or something like that and I want him to know I wanted him to do it.

K: Oh, yes I'll put it entirely

N: You could say that I called and that we, I think its such a terribly
important post, He wouldn't have to go until first of May. Walter wants
to stay through April, I think. And look, its the Court of St. James,
Dave has got money running out of his ears, his wife's a big socialite,
they've got a magnificent Embassy. He'd be one of the stars in the
diadem, wouldn't he.

K: He would be terrii.

N: Why don't you tell him that, will you. Another thing I mentioned

35

The President
page four

I really would like to give John Cooper something, I don't know what, but...

K: I agree, I've been looking for something.

N: How about Egypt?

K: No, Mr. President we have to have a professional in Egypt, because that's too hairy. The guy we've got there is the best man to send.

N: Well maybe we elevate him. You see John and his wife are great people and.

K: He couldn't handle Sadat. I'd rather give him East Germany.

N: East Germany? Are we going to recognize those bastards.

K: He's a great German Lover and, oh yah, everyone else has already

N: When do we do it.

K: Well, whenever the West Germans have completed it. We'll be the last ones to do it.

N: Fine. All right. I would like for you to give him a call as I mentioned it to him at Alice Longworth's party last night and I said John I want you to do something ...consider it...tell him this is an historic first and we want the best we can have and would he take East Germany. That would be a terrific thing, it would be a great signal to all of our list. John Cooper's loyal and will do what he's told.

K: Oh, yah. and it's not all that complicated business.

N: Well if you'd give John Cooper a call and say I talk to you about it and say we talked about a post, East Germany will be open and would he be willing we want to hold it open to him.

K: Excellent.

N: I'll have Hodgeson, I want to do that one myself, he's done some wonderful things lately for us on the labor front, voluntarily, he's working for Lockheed you know. If he would take it that would give us a damn good man in Japan. Former Secretary of Labor, former senior Vice President of Lockheed, you know, he's a real pro. how's that sound to you.

N: It sounds excellent, outstanding.

36

President
page five

N: Fine. You tell Dave Packard we want him to the Court of St. James, second I think old John Cooper would love it, Lorraine would love it love to be offered it anyway.

K: I'll call them tonight or tomorrow morning.

N: No hurry, you know what I mean, just so you do it, because I told him I was thinking of something. When do you go to the Business Council right now.

K: in about half an hour.

N: I told you to cut down your schedule, why the hell do you go over there?

K: I thought it would do the Administration some good.

N: Everything is helpful, but you know we don't want you falling apart.

Now I told the fellow when I got my physical out there today that ...that guy that a masseur. He said he'd only done you once, and I said every time you want it. so tonight he'll be there if you want him. If you don't want him.

K: I've already arranged it Mr. President.

N: Does it help you?

K: I love it.

N: All right, fine, but you have got to be available for it. He comes in around 10 o'clock. Now look, he does Sgt. and chicken cols, why can't they do our Secretary of State.

K: It's terribly thoughtful Mr. President.

N: When do we see you then, Saturday?

K: Friday night.

N: OK All right Henry, it was a great day wasn't it.

K: It turned out magnificently, its almost the communique we had submitted ourselves, almost word for word, it took about three days

President
Page six

of maneuvering, but we managed it. but your speech was, that really
convinced them that we meant business.

N: Is that what they told you.

K: Oh, yes.

N: You see I was very subtle, as we said on the phone, I didn't
hit them with a sledge hammer, but I got the point.

K: What was even more important is that a number of them came
up to me without any prompting on my part and said they wanted to
tell me that they would report to their governments that you were in
marvelous shape, you know,

N: Oh, that I looked good.

K: Yes, that you looked good, you acted

N: I did it all without a note as you know, the fact I did it without
a note I think impressed them.

K: Your whole demeanor your confident manner, your delivery,

N: Yes, they had to be convinced of that.

K: and the subtlety.

N: Good, take care of yourself, give my best to the Business Council
and tell them By God, they have got to...take them onto the high road
Henry, tell them we mustn't think of these miserable, parochial things,
we got to think the peace of the world is in our hands, you know, and
all of history will judge us for how we act in these next two or three
years, you know that right/ What are we going to do, screw around with
politics or are we going to do the big things? That's what this is all
about, you know it and I know it.

K: Exactly.

N: OK, enjoy your rubdown.

TELCORN

The President/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Feb. 18, 1974

10:00 a.m.

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to bring you up to date on where the
matter stands with these foreign ministers.

N: Right.

K: I followed the strategy which you and I discussed the other day which
amazed them because they had come here to haggle to see what we would
pay for the embargo. Now I have the strong impression that they are
going to lift it anyway and therefore I think you should see them.

N: Well, I told Haig if that is what you wanted to do we will do it.

K: But I think you should be very aloof and not offer anything to them.
We've offered them everything there is to offer now and I don't think they
need any additional reassurances and they are not really looking for that now.

N: What are they looking for then?

K: Well, I think they want to deliver to you the message they've got which
is a little bit ambiguous but which I think, in practice -- I've told them
that we can't accept any conditions. They were going to link it to Syrian
disengagement. I said that under those conditions you can't meet them so
they are now going to take that linkage out and they are just going to state
it as a series of three unlinked propositions; that they have agreed to
the principle of lifting the embargo, that they want progress on Syrian
disengagement, they want me to come to the Middle East but they don't
make those three things conditional on each other. Absolutely.

N: As far as the thing is concerned we will meet with them and talk to
them a little.

K: I thought if you wanted to you could step out with them and say you are
sending me back out to the Middle East.

N: Or we could say it while we are in the room. We will feel something
out on that.

K: That is what they want and that is what they want to have announced
anyway. It doesn't make any difference who does it. It just one way of
emerging with something and then if they do lift the embargo it would be
linked back to this meeting. They say any discussion of lifting will

2.
The President
Mon., Feb. 18, 10:00 a.m.

them. They are going to try to have a meeting of the oil ministers within
two weeks.

N: That is two weeks later than they are supposed to already.

K: That's right.

N: I wonder then if they say no discussion of the embargo if it is really
worth having them and the fact that you are going to the Middle East is not
going to -- you know -- we have been around that track before, Henry
and it hasn't helped on the embargo. You see, my only interest is the
embargo. That's the only thing the country is interested in. They don't
give a damn what happens to Syria. That is our problem. I think we
should see them but I don't know that we want to build up the fact that you
are going out there if it cannot be in anyway linked to the embargo --
you see the problem we've got there.

K: Well, it can't be linked to the embargo, Mr. President, and I think
the more we build up the embargo the less we are going to get it. The
most effective thing I have found with them is when I told them Saturday
night that we don't want to discuss it anymore.

N: Well, that may be effective in terms of their thinking. They want to
have their cake and eating it too.

K: No, no. It was effective in getting it lifted.

N: I hope so. I think we will get out the announcement.

K: It doesn't have to be done then, Mr. President. I just thought--

N: It ought to be done right there. They will leak it out anyway right away.

K: If it happens within two weeks as they say it will then even though you can't announce it tomorrow it will be linked back to that meeting.

N: At least it will show some action. O.K., Henry, that is what we will
do -- meet them about 11:00.

K: Right. Eleven o'clock and if I may I could come in half an hour before.

3.
The President
Mon, Feb. 18, 10:00

N: Sure, sure. Let Steve know when you want to come and I will keep it open. Good. Hope you are not wearing yourself out again.

K: You know these characters all wanted individual meetings rather than a joint meeting and I've got them again today.

N: Gosh. Try to get that rubdown artist over there. I have ordered him out there.

K: Fine.

END

TELECON

The President/Sec. Kissinger

March 6, 1974

3:27 pm

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi Henry. Anything on the foreign policy front you want me to try to get out on board today. I don't think I'll be asked anything.

K: On the oil embargo, the way it stand now, just to let you know -- I wouldn't go beyond what we discussed yesterday. The Libyans don't want to hold it in Tripoli so Sadat has asked us to come to Cairo. Which at least gives us a fixed location. We have had a cable from the Saudis saying that the King after the meeting I had with him has now definitely decided to lift it, but even that I wouldn't bet my bottom dollar on given their volatility. But this time it comes from the Foreign Minister which is higher than we have ever had it. We made a statement yesterday that we hadn't been consulted on that European thing.

N: Right,

K: And I think you should just stick with that because that is true. Should I say

N: I think so. That's what we take a dim view of it or not.

K: I think what you said yesterday...

N: Well, we might say that they are obviously looking to their interests and we will of course look to ours.

K: Something like that. That would be fine. But otherwise, -- I am just leafing through my cables to see whether there is anything else that is likely to come up. On the European thing, they are obviously looking to their own interests; we have offered cooperative arrangements and it is up to them which way they want to go. If they look to their interests exclusively, then we'll look to ours. I would leave open the possibility of the cooperative.

N: Ok.

K: There is nothing else you don't know.

N: The meeting is tentatively scheduled for the tenth, is that right?

K: It is tentatively scheduled now for the 11th but again I would not tie yourself to it because so many things can happen. I would just say

The President

March 6, 1974

that there is a meeting; it is their decision to make but we of course
have indicated our view. Something like that.

N: As for as the Syrian thing is concerned we will simply say that it is
a difficult problem that will be discussed further when the Syrians and
Israelis come to Washington.

K: Yes, but you could say, Mr. President, that the United States will
exert all its influence to bring about a just disengagement scheme
between Syria and Israel. It would be well received in Syria.

N: Right.

K: And the Syrians have been actually in their public statements very
restrained.

N: Alright. Fine Henry that is good. If you think of anything give me a
call.

K: Right, Mr. President. All the best.

END.

TELCORN
The President
Secretary Kissinger
9:40 a.m. March 11, 1974

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to bring you briefly up to date where we stand, on that oil embargo, because there have been so many stories around; most newspapers say this means the end of it. This is not true. We have now heard not only from the Egyptians, but also from the Algerians. I have had a message from Boumedienne which says he will definitely support lifting the embargo. And with that in the fold, I think it is going to work.

N: Yeh, I understand. Well the newspaper stories, they don't know what the hell is going on.

K: They don't know what is going on, but on television and so forth, they keep saying this is an indefinite postponement. For once now I believe it is going to work.

N: Yeh. What is the date set for--

K: Wednesday--in Tripoli, Mr. President

N: What does that mean indefinite. Why would they interpret it to mean indefinite

K Well they figure there will be another delay or no agreement.
they

N: That is the way/were going to have it too. But anyway what we can say about it are the results, but

K: At any rate, I thought you might like to--

N: Having heard from both the Egyptians and Algerians -- but at least the Egyptians said they were going to have the meeting for that purpose didn't they?

K: That's right, but for this purpose, Mr. President the Algerians are worth more to us than the Egyptians--because the Algerian oil minister is the head of that group, and secondly, the Algerians are known to be close to the Syrians and thirdly, they are radicals.

N: Of course. And they have indicated they are going to move to support it, are they?

44

Page 2

K: That is right. We got a message this morning. That is what I thought you might like to know.

N: That they would support the lifting ?

K: That is right.

N: The Algerian Foreign Minister, Hm huh. Well we will wait until tomorrow. Okay. Nothing else to do.

K: No. There has been a report that Tito has died, but it is unconfirmed.

N: Hm huh. That will start a little action, won't it?

K: That might well start a civil war there

N: Think so?

K: Could happen, yes.

N: Yeh. The only thing is they have to have arms. Well I guess---

K: Well, they've got arms between themselves.

N: They just divide them all up huh?

K: Yeh.

N: Army, Navy, Air Force. Well anyway

K: Be mostly Slovaks against the Serbs

N: Right. Right. Well we will keep our fingers crossed --the embargo--I think maybe it is going to come off this time.

K: This is the closest we have come to anyway--

N: We have information that maybe the TV people don't have for once, okay?

K: Right, Mr. President. I'm impounding all these cables.

N: Sure, sure. Good idea, good idea.

K: Good.

TELECON

The President/ Sec. Kissinger

March 13, 1974

4:30 pm

K: Mr. President,

N: Any report from our Arab friends?

K: I haven't had any report yet, no Mr. President.

N: I see it is 4:30, well they never get through til late.

K: No, they're probably in the middle of a great

N: Pow wow.

K: Pow wow.

N: Right, but we think they are meeting.

K: Yes, well we know they are all in town. They were supposed to meet this morning and then it was put off til after lunch so they didn't start until about, oh, here that would make it about...

N: Well, they are still at it. Fine, fine. Good, nothing else of interest?

K: No, I testified before the Armed Services Committee this morning but that's a friendly group.

N: Yes.

K: The Senate Armed Services Committee.

N: Right, right. I spoke to the British Ambassador and he said he wanted to assure me that Harold Wilson felt that the British/American relationship was the cornerstone of their foreign policy.

K: Well, that is very helpful to us

chat

N: And that he is very anxious to ... and I of course told him I would see him. I couldn't while I was there but I am going to invite him in next week and have a little chat with him before he goes back.

K: That would be very very useful.

N: And I'll give him a good going over.

-2-

K: Good, that would be very useful.

N: Harold is going to want to have some foreign policy -- some little things for his bonnet and he just may start swinging a little weight around.

K: Absolutely, Mr. President. I think that's the way to play it.

N: Right, right.

K: I'll call you as soon as I hear. We must hear within the next little while.

N: We may not, we'll see. Of course, I know you'll call. That's fine, don't worry about it -- we'll see what happens.

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: Ok, what did the Armes Services Committee ask you about.

K: Oh, they asked about SALT and the Middle East, Diego Garcia, Vietnam appropriations. Harold Hughes who was there made some positive noises.

N: Good, well he is leaving the Senate and he can afford to be positive now can't he.

K: Exactly.

N: Alright, thank you.

Conversation ended -- then the President called back.

N: I thought you would be interested -- the new Australian Prime Minister bent my ear a bit by saying that his Prime Minister wanted me to know that he felt the American/PRC/Soviet relationship was the key to any possibility of survival to them or for the world and he wanted to be supported totally.

K: That is why it is essential to maintain it no matter what the newspapers here say. But that is very helpful considering the origin.

N: Yes, people were all talking up

K: That's very good. Thank you Mr. 'President.

N: Bye.

TELECON

Vice President Ford/Secretary Kissinger

March 14, 1974

5:48 PM

F: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President.

F: How are you, Henry?

K: OK. I just called you because I've been harrassed by both the President and the press all day long about what I may or may not have said to you.

F: When?

K: About the embargo. You know you said this morning you had heard from me that it was being lifted. All I want you to know if I had said to the press all day long what they asked me, then all I know about the embargo is what I read on the press tickers because we haven't had any official word. And that I must have given you the general sense of an expectation.

F: I guess that's right, but then I read the paper this morning and I was on that 7:30 TV program, Henry.

K: No, I just want you to know that I didn't mean to pull away from you.

F: Right.

K: But I had no choice because then to say that we haven't had any official word because if I said anything else Faisal would hit the ceiling.

F: Right, I understand. As I recall what I said, I said apparently it had been lifted and that a final notification would probably come in several days on Sunday and then they asked me, did I have any previous notice and I said well I fuzzed it a bit, forgotten exactly what I said and then - did I say I talked with you last night about it?

K: Well, that's what the news ticker brought, but you might well have - actually I don't remember that we talked about it.

F: I don't think so either and my best recollection is, Henry I didn't say I talked to you about it last night.

K: Well to tell you the truth, all I saw was the news ticker and they may well have run together two separate statements.

F: And put it on the basis that you and I were together last night.

48

Ford - page 2

K: Well they didn't say I said it last night. They said you said - I said it would be lifted which I probably did say to you at some point.

F: That's right, but I suppose they made it more emphatic as a result of our being together last night.

K: Look, my concern now is not with what you said but so that when you see news reports that I said I had not given the clear impression that I didn't pull away from you.

F: Don't worry about that, Henry. I understand fully and you don't even have to call about those things.

K: I am determined to maintain some friendships in this town.

F: Well, it will be forever.

K: I know that.

F: OK, you're damn nice to call.

K: Thank you.

F: Don't worry about those little things, I understand what the damn press does.

K: Right.

F: Keep going.

K: Thank you.

F: Alright, Henry.

K: Bye.

F: Thanks for calling.

END

ELECON

The President/Sec. Kissinger

March 15, 1974

11:00

K: Mr. President

N: Henry, it is quite important, tell me in just a moment because I have some people waiting for me and I have to leave, but what should I say, as I will be asked about this embargo because of the Ford statement, your statement and then of course the leak out of Sadat about 2 months etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. What is your suggestion?

K: My suggestion is that the reports we have is that we have had no official report.

N: I know, I know, that is a duck you can take -- it is one I can't take. I can say simply that I am not going to comment on this because we have had no reports -- which of course isn't true, alright second point.

K: No, it isn't untrue, because we haven't had an official report, but you could say our impression is that they have decided to lift the embargo.

N: I should say that, that they have decided and then when they lift it for two months...suppose Henry, the more likely question will be, of course, is suppose, Mr. President, the report is true that they lift the embargo but only for two months with a condition -- what is your reaction. What do you say to that.

K: We have made a strong complaint to the Egyptians about this.

N: Privately, what do I say publicly, that's what I am asking.

K: I would say lifting it for two months really doesn't solve the basis problem very substantially. Or I would say this, they we move at the pace which is best suited to bring about a settlement regardless of the embargo and if they think they can affect us by it, that is not the right way of doing it. And I would handle it that way.

N: Ok.

K: But frankly....

N: We are not going to look at a gift horse in the mouth, we're going to take the two months at least and it will be awful hard for them to impose it again.

-3-

50

K: Yes, he must have it by now.

N: Nothing..

K: Nothing in the paper -- that won't leak on their side.

N: Well, I'll cover that in answer to a question I think I am not going to make a big thing by announcing it.

K: No, I wouldn't do it.

N: I'll get a question on it so I'll low-key it.

K: Right, I would low-key it and keep it in that general framework.

N: Yes, not get into a position of announcing it in a big way -- well, we have cancelled our trip to Europe -- we have never had a trip to Europe.

K: Exactly, I wouldn't put it on the basis of cancel, I would just say...

N: We'll just say that we will take it when the situation is ready

K: And when the Declarations are ready.

N: They are not ready yet. The one on NATO is going along satisfactorily the one on the other is unsatisfactory because they have, the nine have taken a position at times that seems to be opposed to that of the United States. We, of course, do not.. it is a consultative process, you know what I mean.

K: Exactly, exactly the line and until we have that worked out there is nothing to sign.

N: And I am going to say too that this is all part of the same situation. The Europeans cannot expect cooperation on the security front where the American role is indispensable to their survival and confrontation with and at times even hostility on the economic front.

K: And political front. That I think would be excellent. And I think they are beginning to cave. We had word today that Brandt has given orders that there has to be full consultation with us no matter what the Nine do.

N: Right, right, Ok, Henry, I'll hit them even harder than you did --for the ladies.

K: Ok, all the best END

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

March 15, 1974

4:14 PM

K: Brent, would you get a message to the President's plane to tell him I thought his performance was absolutely spectacular.

S: Yes.

K: I really think he was good.

S: I think he was good too. Is he in the air now?

K: Yes. He was a little rough on the Europeans then I would have liked him to be.

S: Well, that's alright.

K: But I tell you, we're winning. Have you seen the cables?

S: No, I haven't.

K: The Germans have now proposed to setting up a consultative group.

S: That follows Scheel's comments, never again would we go without consulting. That's good.

K: I tell you before the Europeans tackle us again they're going to think three times.

S: Your Congressional wives speech is going to turn into a great coo.

K: And they're all going to run to Jobert now and tell him, now shut up.

S: That's right.

K: You've now got the Americans so inflamed.

S: That's right. No question about it. I think it's just great. I think it's alright for the President to be a little tougher than you.

K: It's good for me, I don't know whether it's good - no but any sign of strength is good.

S: I agree, I certainly agree. I'll get word to him right away.

K: Yes, good. Thank you.

S: Right.

TELCON

The President/Sec. Kissinger

March 18, 1974

1:10 p.m.

K: Mr. President. We have just had a flash news ticker item that the embargo has been lifted. We have not had it confirmed yet.

N: That's good.

K: Apparently, without conditions. We will say nothing here.

N: You keep the lid on totally. If and when anything is said I will say it in Houston. Gives me a day to think about it. tomorrow

K: The news will come out today.

to

N: I don't care about the news coming out but I mean as/what it means to us; what we now do, rationing and that crap.

K: We will say nothing here. I thought you might like to hear it.

N: Good. Great.

K: Right Mr. President.

END

TELECON

President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

March 18, 1974

6:28 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Hello, Henry.

K: We finally got the official text. What happened is basically it is lifted unconditionally by the majority. With the previsal that they would discuss it again on June 1. Which doesn't mean it goes back on June 1, it just means they will discuss it again on June 1.

N: Right.

K: The Algerians may say they agree to lift it only until June 1, so they make it conditional.

N: We don't care, we don't get any from them anyway.

K: That's right. I got a message from Sadat and he said he will help me get the thing concluded by the end of April, which is also my plan. The Syrian disengagement, so then there won't be any problem, anyway.

N: Well, of course, there must follow not only the disengagement, as you know, but....

K: Mr. President, with all respect, we don't have to linger to any permanent settlement at this point. The major thing we need now is the disengagement. If we talk too much about permanent settlement, when I was there the last time I talked to Sadat, he isn't ready to discuss that. That will get us back into Geneva. We should be very careful in making promises on that.

N: This is one thing we're going to do though, Henry. That's understand that. There is going to be a permanent settlement.

K: Of course, Mr. President. If we get into a forum where all of these issues get discussed together, we'll get killed.

N: I agree, but we don't want to leave any illusions here with our friends here that this is it, you know, and the Israelis think that they can just dig in and this is it.

K: No, no...

N: Because then this same thing will come up to haunt us next Fall.

K: No, the strategy that I see now, but which we shouldn't announce publicly, is that after the Syrian disengagement we should get a settlement between

Nixon - page 2

54

Egypt and Israel and then we've broken the back of it. Then we can work on....

N: I agree. Palestine and Jerusalem last.

K: It's one step at a time. That's our advantage over the Russians. The Russians are trying.....

N: What about the note to Brezhnev, did we decide?

K: That's coming - that should be waiting for you.

N: It's still a good idea.

K: It's an excellent idea, Mr. President. I made just general review by you of the issues for the summit.

N: Good. And you have incidentally made it clear to everybody in the Department that there is to be no comment on this thing.

K: Absolutely.

N: And Simon should just really be ...

K: Haig and I called Simon.

N: Don't say a word, I'll say something tomorrow night. I must say it categorically but I won't go too far. I can't do it in a half-assed way. You see what I mean.

K: We both called Simon, Mr. President.

N: We'll the advantage out of this and if later on it would be a disadvantage we'll take it. It's fine. It's good news. Good news to get it done this far.

K: On the other one, I - there's no question that after the Syrian disengagement we have to go to a permanent settlement.

N: Yes. Looking at the trip thing now, that's the other thing I want to raise with you.

K: My recommendation would be for you - the Egyptians are recommending that around May 20 would be best for them. We can announce it early in April. We can have a few others ahead of the Egyptians. I would recommend that you start in Egypt.

N: Put Egypt first.

Nixon - page 3

K: Yes. Because you'd get a tremendous reception. He could smooth the way for you and go to Morocco last. That way you'll have two tremendous receptions. You could go to Morocco first.

N: Morocco will be good. It should be Egypt first, they're the hard one.

K: If you go to Egypt first, you'll get a tremendous reception. You'll get a good one in Sudan and Saudi Arabia. You'll get a great one in Amman. What you get in Damascus, only the devil knows.

N: That's right.

K: Then Israel you'll get a good reception.

N: Maybe.

K: No, you'll get an excellent reception.

N: The point that I make is that - I might be asked about that - I doubt it, but if I am, I'll say we have a number of invitations we have under consideration.

K: And now that the embargo lifted, we can explore them more fully.

N: We're looking at them, right. On the European thing, you want to stay about where we are.

K: Mr. President, it is going so well, the French Ambassador today made a public statement praising you, but you should stay tough. We've put the steam in the kettle and we're going to get everything. I think you should say you've made your comments. The Atlantic relationship is of course, the corner stone and now it is up to the Europeans. We have for a year expressed our views and when the Europeans have reacted, we will meet them more than halfway. If they ask you about a trip to Europe I think you should say let's wait how the discussions go. They will be on their knees begging you to come before too much time is over and when you come now you'll come as the strong man.

N: What I was going to ask though was on the trip to Europe, we put in terms that having laid down what we did, can we say the matters are now under discussion.

K: On the trip to Europe...

N: No, no, not the trip. The matters of issue.

K: The issues are now being under discussion.

51

TELCORN

The President/Sec. Kissinger

9:14 a.m., April 12, 1974

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: How are our Algerian friends?

K: I thought that was a spectacular day yesterday, Mr. President.

N: They are a little bit, shall we say provencial but...

K: But they are very influential in the Arab world.

N: Very influential and they are just like the Chinese. Puritanical as hell. You notice they smoke but they didn't drink.

K: Yes. Boumediene said to me on the way out, he said just tell your President that whatever his contemporaries are doing to him, history within one mandate (meaning one term of office) will record him as one of the greatest peace makers in history.

N: That's nice of him.

K: You made a tremendous impact on him.

N: We had a good talk. I thought that in the evening what he wanted to do was make a little speech. That is why I let him do it. That let everybody hear it and then keep it a little light. I think sometimes these guys are so humorless.

K: On the other hand, the human touch for them is enormously important. I had mentioned to them in the afternoon your plans of going to the Middle East.

N: They hit me with it.

K: I told them you had no specific plan to go to Algeria but then I am glad they did hit you with it. I think myself now the way this present schedule is, we may have to lean on the Israelis a little bit. If we can get the disengagement done in the first few days of May then -- I think very much you ought to go in the last week of May or first week in June.

2.
The President

April 12

N: Depending of course upon this House thing. We have to see what is happening there. If They've left us off the hook by that time or got us on, we've got to do one or the other.

K: Do you think they can do it that fast.

N: I don't know. I haven't the slightest idea. They probably want to drag it on. I don't know. Doesn't make any difference.

K: I think in any event, when the disengagement with Syria is done -- which I hope to be able to know in two at most three weeks then the trip by you to the Middle East would be an enormous event. And one that is...

N: Before Russia.

K: I think it must be before Russia; and it would be politically of the first magnitude in the Middle East. I have been talking to the Egyptian Foreign Minister and he says they need it. They just don't want it, they need it as a symbol of their new orientation. Conceivably we could do it after Russia: but if you do it before Russia, the Russians would be extremely miffed.

N: I know, but they would get over it.

K: My own guess, Mr. President, is...

N: They travel in the Middle East. Why can't we?

K: Exactly. My guess is that around May 25th would be a good time.

N: Let me think of it in terms of planning. Henry, with regard to Gromyko, we see him at 11:00. I have just gone around the track with Podgornyy, and there is not much. How long do we have to take with this fellow again?

K: I guess an hour and a half or hour and fifteen minutes. I've got the Egyptian For. Min. here in my office. I am in the back office. I will come over about 10:30 if you agree.

N: I am pretty tight this morning. Come over about 20 minutes till, will you?

K: O.K. The major problem is he will want to go over all the bilaterals. That's easy. The major thing he will hit you with is Soviet participation in the Middle East.

3.
The President

April 12

N: Right. I know that. Podgornyy hit me with it too and I said you would consult etc.

K: You can't go much beyond that.

N: I know that. I told him there were some places we have influence and some places you have.

K: The Egyptians are violently opposed to it. The Syrians are opposed to it. And the Israelis are opposed to it. It is the one thing they have all agreed on.

N: What do you say to him then.

K: I think we should say after the Syrian disengagement we are prepared to go back to Geneva and to agree that everything is done through Geneva.

N: You noticed how Boumediene picked up immediately on my line that look you're not going to have a permanent settlement with a lot of governments sitting around in Geneva. I said you have got to have some private talks between things. He said that is the practical way it is done. I said of course we have this public forum. He got the point, didn't he.

K: Mr. President, I know these Arabs.

N: You have spent more time with them than anybody else.

K: This was a spectacular success yesterday. I told you what the For. Min. said to me after the morning. In the afternoon, and after the evening, first Boumediene said to me on the way out, then Boutiflika took me aside.

N: Who is Boutiflika.

K: The For. Min. He said we've got to get the President to Algeria. He said get disengagement done fast so that we can do it.

N: Good.

K: It is not only to have a junket, Mr. President. It will be/political event in the Middle East of the first magnitude.

N: Of course it is. And We've done it. I'll see you then about 20 mins. to 11:00. Make it a quarter till. You and I know this subject so well I will do a dance around the son of a gun.

K: We don't have to talk about it.

TELCON

The President/Kissinger

9:20 a.m. - 4/15/74

K: Mr. President. I missed you last night.

P: I only called to wish you a Happy Easter.

K: Thank you. I am in New York today to speak to the UN. It is not going to shake the world.

P: We seem to have a little problem on the Lebanon border but that was inevitable.

K: Both sides are guilty there. I had a good talk with the Chinese last night. You know the highest ranking official ever was here. They fully reaffirmed our policy and he went on and on about your visit. And he strongly reaffirmed the course that was outlined.

P: Did they give you any indication of the problems?

K: I have the feeling Chou is on the way out. They didn't mention him once during the evening. And every time I brought him up they changed the conversation to Mao. Now as I think back, I had over three hours with Mao and Chou didn't say a word.

P: Mao (?) has killed off his people like Stalin.

K: That's right. That's the second man he's killed off. To be number 2 man is suicide. That conversation with me was his way of putting his own stamp on the thing so that they could get rid of Chou without hurting the relationship with the US.

P: Why do you think they want to get rid of him?

K: Domestic politics. I think it's a tragedy. I think it's a clash between Chou and Madame Mao. This guy yesterday talked as if he were in charge. He didn't say he was in charge but talked with great assurance.

P: We didn't meet him?

K: No, he was purged in the Cultural Revolution and just rehabilitated after you were there.

TELCORN

The President/Sec. Kissinger

April 16, 1974

3:00 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: How did your speech go over.

K: I think it went over very well.

N: Good, good.

K: I said some pretty tough things about forming cartels of producers and they did not go up the wall. On the whole, the reaction, actually, was better than even the NY Times reported because it just breaks their heart to say anything positive. I quoted some things that you said in 69 when you appeared before the UN about the need to dedicate ourselves to deeds and not just to retoric.

N: I guess we are going to have the For. Ministers dinner tomorrow night

K: That's right, Mr. President.

N: 8:00., Blk. Tie.

K: No. They were told not to bring blk. tie so they aren't ready for it.

N: We still make it 8:00.

K: 8:00 will be fine.

N: And women are coming.

K: Yes.

N: That's good. That will be good because Mrs. Nixon just having taken this trip, she ought to be there.

K: I think it would be essential for her to be there.

N: I just plan to speak briefly.

K: If you want me to, I will send over a few suggestions, but you usually do these things so well.

President - p. 2

N: Yes. We will just make it a warm, sympathetic kind of a thing.

K: That's right. The major point with them is to give them the sense
that they've moved to the center of our attention, historic relationships.

N: Right. I had told Al to have the people prepare me a thousand words.
Maybe I will just read it, or I don't know. Do you think I should do that
or do you want me to just wing it.

K: Why don't we draft something and let you see it and then you can decide.

You could certainly read it.

N: If we read it, we could make copies and pass it around so they wouldn't
have to translate it.

K: I think there would be a lot of advantages.

N: Would they have a response?

K: I suggested that one of them respond. And they will let me know
tomorrow morning.

N: It won't be Sevilla Sacasa will it.

K: Oh, no. God no. It will be a Foreign Minister -- maybe the Brazilian,
maybe the Argentinian.

N: There response should also be in the same way. They should read it.
What I am thinking of is so it won't be a long dreary time in translating
and everything. Maybe we could just have a thousand words written
that I could read and I would ad lib a couple of things at the end and that's
that. And then hand it out to them. I don't know. That's a possibility. You
see if talk and translate and they talk and translate we are looking at about
an hour and a half at least. While they like speeches, we don't like them that
well.

K: Yes.

N: Basically, what you want more is just a friendly gesture don't you.

K: What is most important is the warm gesture. Another thing we could
do. I don't know how the room will be set up -- whether it will be round
tables or a long table. Because if it were round tables one could have

The President, p. 3

an interpreter at each table.

N: It sort of has a bad feeling when you hear that mumbling all the time.

K: Yes. That is true.

N: I don't like that but we could still use round tables. I think the round tables make it more...

K: It is a more intimate evening.

N: Also we avoid then the protocol.

K: Exactly.

N: I will determine on the reading tomorrow.

K: We will have something for you tomorrow morning.

N: That's good. I had a little call from Mansfield reporting on his dinner with the Chinese. He says the Chinese are very supportive and friendly about the President and about you etc.

K: Oh, they are all out.

N: And they asked about his coming there and he said well, tell me. They said go see Wong Chen. I said, fine Mike, go see Wong Chen, we are all for it.

K: Absolutely.

N: I think it is an indication that they want to warm things up a bit.

K: No question.

N: Another thing that is probably true too is that every time we sort of start to make a move towards our Soviet friends, they sort of move a little towards us.

K: Exactly. That's what these idiots can't understand. That our China policy--
what our critics don't understand our China policy absolutely depends on our
Russian poli...
The reverse would also be true. If we moved away from the
Russians, then the Chinese then would be free.

The President, p. 4

N: Well, we are coming along and just remember if we have been able to take the heat of this last year and accomplish what we have we sure as the dickens are going to be able to take it a little while longer.

K: Mr. President, I believe that the public opinion is on the verge of turning if we can just -- if there were just one unambiguous event like a House vote in your favor or something like this.

N: It is hard to get those people to ever come to a point because of politics, but we will see. We have some things that maybe will be interesting next week. The main this is that is very interesting both in terms of our foreign policy and even in my travels in Ohio and Michigan there is an undercurrent of support there that is just ready to break loose. What do you think?

K: That is my absolute conviction -- that is my firm conviction.

N: In foreign policy it never has left us.

K: In foreign policy the liberals are sort of trying to create the impression now that there is something wrong with our foreign policy. Our foreign policy is in great shape. What can they point to.

N: That is one of the reasons that the trip was hard for them to swallow.

K: Exactly. And why the summit is hard for them to swallow. If they were sure it would be a failure, they would want you to go. It's because they know damn well it will be a success. That it's a guaranteed success that they don't want you to go. And they can piss on SALT, we will have enough other agreements. The average person doesn't know what SALT stands for.

N: And on SALT WE WILL/HAVE SOMETHING.

K: We will certainly have something in the field of arsm.

N: And that's all you need.

K: Something on the ABM...

N: Everything has to be step-by-step.

K: Exa ctly.

N: Fine Henry. See you tomorrow.

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: Bye.

K: Bye.

April 17, 1974

8:28 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Yes, hi.

K: I'm sorry to disturb you. We have one matter with this Latin American meeting and the one that's happening at the OAS. As you know, there are a number of American subsidiaries in Argentina and the Argentines has passed a law according to which if they don't sell to Cuba they're going to be nationalized.

N: I see.

K: And you had already approved in February that under those conditions we can make a special exception and we can't really take the position that American companies in Argentina cannot obey Argentine law. If you had approved that and I held up the implementation of it because the Brazilian government at that time was changing and they had some doubts about it, now the Brazilian Government has come to us and have indicated that they favor our going ahead and if we could go ahead within the next day on this then Argentina would not introduce a resolution in Atlanta which would have the effect of lifting the sanctions altogether throughout the Western Hemisphere.

N: It's a dead loser as far as anything here is concerned to indicate any backing down in regard to ____ it will raise a hell of a storm.

K: Well, we're not backing down with Cuba. The position we're taking -- we're not lifting any.....

N: Well just don't make any announcement on it, just do it.

K: OK.

N: Just do it very very very quietly. Don't make a big thing out of it.

K: No, we wouldn't announce at it, we'd just let the Argentines do it in a low key way.

N: Alright, fine. OK, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

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70

President/Kissinger

N: You're leaving Sunday?

K: I'm leaving Sunday, Mr. President.

N: God bless you and good luck.

K: Well

N: Hope it works out and in meantime. If I do take a trip, I think the sooner the quicker.

K: I agree.

N: What do you think about 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 or what?

K: I would say any time from the 25th on.

N: It will be the 25th, OK.

K: And I'll set it while I am out there. As soon as

N: Get indications from everybody.

K: That's right. And as soon and then we can announce it within a few days of my return.

N: The quicker the better that we can announce it too, Henry.

K: Right Mr. President.

N: All right. Fine. You feeling all right?

K: I am feeling fine. I am having a press conference in about 20 minutes.

N: Oh, fine, fine.

K: But it is mostly about foreign aid

N: Give'em my love. And incidentally be sure you hit the fact. Let's talk w very candidly, the investment in Egypt and the investment in Viet Nam and the investment in peace that's all.

K: Exactly.

N: Peace that is all we are talking about. It is no give away, it is no donor thing or anything like that. It isn't something to get us involved, it is a way to keep out of war in the ME. To keep

TELECON

The President/Secretary Kissinger

June 2, 1974

12:10 P.M.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President

P: I just called to see if you got a good night's sleep.

K: I'm catching up, but it is beginning to be noticeable.

P: Everything seems to be on course at the moment.

K: Yes we have had answers from all of the countries and the schedule is now all set for you.

P: Al is working on it with the advance men now. And so that is good.

K: Right.

P: The countries seemed to be pleased about we're going.

K: Oh, most eager.

P: I think we will even get a good reception in Jerusalem. Don't you?

K: I think you will get a very good reception in Jerusalem. They know what is good for them.

.....

K: But it will add two days to your trip. If you want to go to Algiers

P: I think it is important that we not do Algiers now having seen him here. I would say to him however what I would like to do is to get a message to Algeria/Morocco. Morocco is coming here, ... is coming here. It is best for later time to avoid travel to the North African countries. I want to be fair to them. I think it is important in announcing this that our Ambassadors be informed. That the President has in mind a later time in year. How does that sound to you.

K: Good.

P: And I think we could do it. I mean after the Russian trip some time bounce through those countries.

K: What is your thought, Mr. President, about stopping in Europe?

-2-

73

P: Well, you mean after Russia or the Middle East.

K: No, no, not after the Middle East. Either before or after Russia.

P: After Russia or before?

K: We will have NATO declaration which will be ready to sign and if you were going to stop we could arrange some kind of summit meeting in which it gets signed.

P: Well, would your point be that we do that before we go Moscow or after?

K: I frankly would have a slight preference before.

P: That sorta cuts down our preparation plan. But that is OK. Could we do it in Brussels or London?

K: No, it would have to be in Brussels.

P: Yea.

K: This doesn't preclude your stopping in London on the way back.

P: Yea.

P: I am thinking of stopping in London or France. You know what I mean. But we could do with France, we should give Giscard D Estaing an early start at a point you know before the next one.

K: Yea.

P: But I don't know. Provided it was just a pure business meeting, I don't want to stop and have two or three days horsing around with those people.

K: No, no it would only take about day or day and a half. Either on the way to or on the way back.

P: On the way to, I just don't know. I just wonder if things we have to talk to the Russians about that we just aren't going to want to answer a lot of questions. You know or discuss.

K: On the other hand afterwards you have to explained *with* what you did.

P: Well they have to be briefed.

-2-

P: What is the effect on the Russians if we stop before the meeting?

K: Well, they won't be crazy about it either before or afterward.

P: I understand.

K: I don't think it makes a lot of difference whether it is before or afterward.

P: My own inclination is that if we do it at all and coming back from Russia we could come back with only a rest stop and then back. Because I think we want the Russian thing to be over-ride.

K: That would be my view. That is why I am slightly in favor of doing it on the way over. On the other hand signing the declaration can be a fairly solid solemn ceremony. And it is a good document.

P: But not thinking, Henry, in terms of a day or day and a half or anything like that.

K: You know, you don't need a rest stop on the way back from Russia. It is only a 10 hour flight.

P: That's true.

P: Although I may want to say something when I get off the plane. I don't know. On, now it doesn't make any difference. Do you think maybe we could stop in London on the way back?

K: The trouble is you stop in one capital and not in the others.

P: But I mean not stop in the capital now, is there some base in Northern Scotland or something like that.

K: Oh yea, but you would still have to see Wilson.

P: Yea, but that is still a problem, stop there the others are angry. So Iceland is out. You can't think of any other place that we could stop. I kinda like the idea of just stopping and getting some sleep even for six hours and getting on the plane and coming home.

K: Europe is only three hours from Russia.

-3-

15

K: That is the problem and you still have 7 1/2 hours to go there.

P: And it is out of the way if you stop in the Azores unless we you were at the South of Russia. Suppose you were down at the Black Sea, Henry, is there any place we could stop at on the way back. Could we stop at that delightful place in Morocco not in Rabat or Casablanca.

K: You mean Malicas(sp?) for example oh sure you can do that.

XXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

P: And then go on.
That is a long flight.

K: An hour more or maybe an hour and a half.

P: Stopping on the way over for the NATO thing is not bothering me.
I think it is all right.

P: Tomorrow you will sit down and have a talk with Dobrynin.

K: Naturally.

P: And you will have in mind not only this but be sure to put front and center that it is on the European conferences as a trade off on the MBFR thing. Will you do that?

K: Absolutely.

P: Now, when do you want me to step in with you. You remember the meeting we had with them three months ago and you said well we got the right thing on the road again. Well, I am ready to go at any time. I'll look ... in the eye and even see...

K: Well, Mr. President, let's just see what the issues are. It is a little premature Mr. President. First we will have to see what the Russians are willing to accept.

P: Yea. All was even saying that their defense department was even raising hell about the underground nuclear test. That is so ridiculous I don't know.

K: They are abotaging everything right now.

P: Well they are trying to, but they are not going to. You know what I mean. They have tried to before.

June 6, 1974

4:40 PM

N: I just thought you'd be pleased to know I got Ron and the boys working on the schedule. Ron told me he thought your news conference played very well. He said the only thing he was mad about was the way they asked you all these questions about wire tapping. Let me say, don't ever be worried about that and frankly if they ever hit me with wire x-tap tapping I'm going to say you're God-damned and some of you are going to be wire taped, you ought to be. You know? It's disgusting.

K: The disgusting thing is I didn't want to both you with it before. The whole world applauds what is being done. These SOB's turn it in as if I'd been engaged in a criminal activity.

N: But wire tapping, Henry, all the wire taping we did was totally against legal, you know would understand that. Every damn one was approved either by Mitchell or Hoover. Everyone. Some of them turned up some very important evidence, as you well know.

K: That is right.

N: And also there was three times as much under Bobby Kennedy as there was from us.

K: Well, I didn't want to go into that.

N: I understand, but nevertheless, we don't need to be apologetic about it. Answer

K: Well, I just refused to answer any questions.

N: Right. That's good. Anyway, you did fine, don't worry. OK.

K: Right.

END

TELECON
Ronald Reagan Secretary Kissinger

June 7, 1974

3:30 PM

R: Congratulations.

K: Thank you Ron. How nice to hear from you.

R: Well, I wanted to do if for a long time. What kind of breakfast cereal do you eat?

K: Why?

R: That sounds like a back-breaking schedule that is just inhuman.

K: That's true.

R: That must have been really something.

K: Oh, it was exhausting.

R: Well, it was a very wonderful thing, I can tell you that. And I also had to call to ask you about something. I've put it off calling knowing you must when you come home of literally have to go into a de-compression chamber. But I had a call from a prominent gentleman out here with Pacific lighting - a Jack Miller. And they're deeply involved with Indonesia. When I was there when that natural gas thing was signed in Jakarta on that last trip and he wanted to know if I could call and ask if he could call your office and if he could make an appointment. It has to do with our country and natural gas and Indonesia. I did gather when I was out there at the signing where the Japanese got the...

K: Yes.

R: The American businessmen who were there expressed to me that with some of our agencies in Washington, part of our problems were excessive red tape. Now I don't know whether that's what he wants to talk about.

K: I don't question that.

R: But I don't know whether that's what he wants to talk about or not, but would it be alright if I told Jack Miller it would be alright that he could call in regard to see you?

K: I can't do it before the middle of July. I'm going off with the President tomorrow.

Reagan - page 2

R: Oh, well I'll tell him that sometime after the Middle of July.

K: Right.

R: If your secretary will just remember the name Jack Miller.

K: Right.

R: Alright, but....

K: How are things going with you?

R: Well, fine, I think. Same old battle out here.

K: I can't imagine.

R: But we were all thrilled by that, Henry, that was a very wonderful thing.

K: Well, you're a good friend. Let me know when you come east.

R: I sure will. Hell of a way to treat a new bride.

K: That is the truth.

R: OK, well Nancy gives you her best.

K: Thank you, give her my best regards.

R: I sure will. Alright.

K: Bye.

END

-2-

K: I'll raise that, but I don't think they will ever accept that.

P: I agree, they won't, but I think it is a nice jex gesture to raise it in quiet polite, sorta in low key subtle way.

K: I think if you see the Ambassador you ought to do it.

P: Fine. I'll put that on the talking points.

K: No I think that would ....

P: ... for the Ambassador

K: After the Mid-East trip. And you know Mr. President we have arranged for the signing of the NATO declaration in Brussels on your way to Moscow.

P: Provided that it will be ready.

K: It will be ready. We will complete it in Ottawa and we will initial it in Ottawa which just means it is completed and then it will be signed in Brussels and we have already got Schmidt and Wilson agreeing to come there. Which means that most of the heads of governments will come. Giscard can't come right now. But he will probably send his Prime Minister.

P: Well, the others are Prime Ministers so what the heck. It is perfectly all right.

K: That's right.

P: The Italians would come in a minute.

K: Of course, and this is not, Mr. President, I would not take this as a hostile move from Giscard.

P: No, no. I just wonder if it is too hostile to the Russians.

K: No.

P: Well they know the darn thing has been on the platter for a long time.

K: No, no., this is not a hostile thing. And it ain't actually says friendly things about detente and the declaration. It is better that way Mr. President than do it on the way back.

-3-

81

P: If we do M____ on the way back which I prefer much to Stalingrad. I don't want to go to Stalingrad for a number of reasons, but basically if we get M____ we could fly directly from M-____ back I think.

K: The way we are doing it Mr. President, unless you want x to change it we can do it either way. We thought we would do M____ on the way back from the Kremmer to Moscow and then fly back from Moscow which you can also do directly. M____ is only a 100 miles closer and probably ... no at all ____ closer.

P: Either one. Fine.

K: I think it is better to depart from Moscow.

P: I agree.

K: Because then they will all come to the airport.

P: We can maybe have some final communique signed.

K: That is the point Mr. President, we could issue the communique the morning of ____ your departure this way and then M____ wouldn't be a let down.

P: Right. I get it. Sounds better.

Everything else all right. Fine. ____ How are you feeling?

K: I feel fine.

P: Getting a little rest?

K: A little bit.

P: Not much. I understand you are going k over to see the German Foreign Minister in Austria.

K: Well, I am going over to Germany to see him. He has been wanting to see me. I canceled a meeting with him three times and now he proposed this one.

P: Yes, I understand.

K: And since Schmidt is going to come to Brussels and he'll do us more good in Brussels.

P: That's fine. OK

K: Right Mr. President

TELECON

June 21, 1974

8:13 PM

N: Hello?

K: Mr. President.

N: I understand you did very well before the committee. Hugh Scott was pleased at least.

K: Yes and he was very supportive.

N: Well, I called him beforehand and told him, look here we want you to tell a few of these people to stand up and he said he would. He did, did he?

K: Absolutely. And he asked a very helpful question. He said is everything already negotiated so that he's just going there to sign? Or is there a lot left to negotiate. I said, I wish there were a little less left to negotiate, because in most of the areas there are very big problems remaining. I went through it with him. And then Fulbright stepped out and said he fully supports you.

N: Good. And you were able to before and after to get the nuclear power plant thing.

K: That's right. I don't know whether they showed it on television but I.....

N: But I know Ron -- I think they must have because he said you got out in time to be on if they were going to use it. I'm competent they must have used it.

K: Good.

N: Anyway, that's one out of the way.

K: I think we're going to have a very successful trip.

N: Well, the way it will work out is that, work out a communique that handles MERVE thing the way that you suggested. I think it's just about in the _______. And that leaves something left to be done.

K: That's right. I think that's just as well.

N: Yes. And find the areas of agreement on the other two items.

K: Exactly.

The President - page 2

83

N: Which are not insignificant, let's face it.

K: Well exactly, Mr. President, if we got a breakthrough on SALT which will get negotiated later on, that's not bad.

N: That's right. But I mean having the threshhold of the ABM thing, is an accomplishment of itself.

K: Of course. I don't find much nitpicking about the trip anymore.

N: Scott said the committee was pretty well set, they didn't badger you with other strenuous matters.

K: No, I don't think this was the time to do it.

N: Good. The Committee was, in other words, pretty supportive all the way around, then.

K: The Committee was very good. It was a very good session.

N: That's good.

K: And it was all on the summit, a little bit on NATO and Fulbright, when he came out, made a very strong statement, the press tells me that others as they were coming out made good statements.

N: Well, we have to understand this little flap on the nuclear thing -- they have to find something to pick on so they -- and people just -- it's such a the trouble is such a darn mistake. mystery, you know, we have to remember Eisenhower talked about atoms for peace; way back there we were going to share it with the world and gave the same speech, and Kennedy was for it. That's what this is all about. How do you do it otherwise? Isn't that what it's about.

K: Exactly. It's the only way you can control relations in this period.

N: How about our Israeli friends. Are they still bombing?

K: No, they stopped it. We made a sharp protest and they sent us a message this afternoon -- this evening. In fact, Dinitz was just in here to tell me they had stopped it.

N: That's good. It should, in their own interest. We're not asking them to do something harmful for them. We're asking because if they go too far, we'll get one hell of a reaction here. People now are on the mountain top; they want a peaceful settlement in the east.

K: No question about it. I think they're coming on very strong.

TELECON

Mr. Schecter/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

10:40 am

S: Hugh must have known you were trying to get me, he wouldn't let me get off the phone.

K: What does he want, to prove that the President is getting ready to fire me.

S: No, he said that diplomatic relations between the White House and the State Department were superb.

K: That's true.

K: I return his calls the same day now.

S: (Laughter) Well, you sound in pretty good shape. The reason I called is we are trying to do a piece about -- a sort of positioning things for your appearance.

K: My appearance won't be until the 23rd now.

S: I see. Are you pretty sanguine about how things..

K: Oh yes. Now that I have seen all the documents which I never had before. I think they more than support my case.

S: When you say all the documents, you mean the FBI stuff.

K: Yes, you see all I had seen is a 29 page summary. Now I have seen the documents on which the -- on what basis are we talking?

S: The usual.

K: No, I just don't think I ought to characterize my testimony before I give it, but I really...

S: Let me -- well, I can say on my own that you are confident.

K: Very very confident. And, in fact I don't think there is a problem.

S: What about this so-called difference about the fact that Hoover says in the memos, which I gather were drafted by Sullivan but signed by Hoover, saying that you were the initiator.

-2-

85

K: I think that will all come out very clearly. The initiator of what, individual taps?

S: Yes.

K: It is a pure question of terminology. And I think I am going not to get into it. What I am going to do is to describe it. I really think it is a pure question of terminology. That the substance is as I described it.

S: Right, right. What about the thing on terminating the taps.

K: McCloskey now says, that he having reviewed the records -- if anything I overstated my role.

S: (Laughter) Well, it won't be the first time.

K: Listen, you bastard, you'll never get in here again. Look, everyone agrees that after May 1970, I didn't see any of these reports anymore. So what possible basis did I have for terminating it.

S: Yes,

K: Secondly, the records will show that a number of people that were tapped, I never got any reports on so I just couldn't have been the guy terminating them.

S: Right, well, who was responsible for that in the White House at that point.

K: You know I'll have to wait with my statement. But I don't know the answers to all of the questions.

S: Ok, it's just sort of speaking personally, I think that is one of the questions that should be answered in this whole thing because that is one of the questions that has been raised on this. The memo says, the FBI memo says, that on three separate occasions they asked for the taps to be terminated.

K: I frankly don't believe that.

S: Well, ... there may have been a little bureaucratic ass covering there, but you know, you're aware of what the problem is. The problem is that you then take a quantum jump from not terminating the taps to the idea that the information wasn't, didn't generate National Security information but was used for domestic political purposes, namely the fact that

S: Halperin and Lake were working for Muskie.

K: Loo,k at the time Halperin and Lake were working for Muskie, I wasn't getting any reports any more.

S: Ok.

K: So even if that were true, I wo uldn't have known about it.

S: Now, what about the plumbers business and Wellender. Do you see that as a problem.

K: It is a harder problem to prove because I didn't do anything, so I have no records whatsoever to fall back on.

S: Yes.

K: I do not see it as a problem, no. I did not know about the Plumbers.
I don't know how often I have to say that.

S: Now, for example, in your testimony, you have mentioned on two or three occasions people came to you for historical documents which you r efused, but you also said that you didn't understand that that was an organized group.

K: No, no no. Nobody of the Plumbers ever came to me.

S: I see. I see.

K: That didn't come from the Plumbers.

S: Where did that come from, Colson?

K I think once it came from Colson and once it came from Erlichman.
But that never came from any body from the Plumbers.

S: I see. Ok. Well, I get the feeling that resignation is fading into the background here, would that be correct.

K: It depends what decision the Committee makes.

S: Yes, but I sense that frankly, the worst that Erlichman and Colson have to offer seems to have just kind of floated away with the tide.

K: They don't have anything to offer.

S: That's right.

TELECON

Bernard Kalb/Secretary Kissinger

July 12, 1974

12.20 PM

HAK: How are you?

K: Fine. Thank you very much, sir. I just wanted a moment if I could, I was going to try actually to stop by for a second before leaving for San Clemente to drop off a bound copy of the book, which we just have received.

HAK: Oh, terrific.

K: But Dr. Kissinger, my office called to ask me to look into the story in the Wall Street Journal which I assume you may have seen this morning.

HAK: No.

K: It's on the front page on the top, Nixon and Kissinger head toward a falling out.

HAK: Oh, baloney.

K: And he says the President fails to aid the Secretary of State on the wire tapping controversy; Kissinger would like a White House statement that he's telling the truth.

HAK: That's also nonsense.

K: All of that?

HAK: Yes. I'm certain the President will say what needs to be said before that is over and it's just not true.

K: Can I use some of this of what you're saying, nonsense of this whole report? I mean would it be alright if I were to quote you on this? Or just take it on background and so forth.

HAK: Take it on background. But you can make it very strong.

K: The whole story?

HAK: Yes. I mean, for example, somebody read me a part of it this morning. For example, he fails to inform me of a Japanese trip. He failed to inform me of a trip he isn't taking.

K: I see.

HAK: That was with respect to the story that he was going to Japan in

Kalb - page 2

August. The fact that a trip was being planned for 1974, I of course knew,
because I had it in the communique when Tanaka was here.

K: Absolutely. Well, one of the things that when we were listening to the Salzburg news conferences, there was some speculation that maybe some of that might have been that the President might step forth and in effect reiterate the May 22 that he personally authorized the entire wiretap program.

HAK: I've expected that will be done before it's over. There is no dispute between the President and me and I'm sure the White House will confirm this.

K: They have. They told me that this morning.

HAK: There's not the slightest problem and I don't know how these stories get started.

K: So in effect, you're really guiding me away from that whole story and knock it down as best I can.

HAK: That is really -- and I'm not doing it to be cute. There just isn't anything to it.

K: Alright, I'll get down and I'll try to stop by Dr. Kissinger and drop of a copy of the book on the floor before we take off.

HAK: Good.

K: I'm most grateful for your help on this thing and to welcome back after a very very difficult job on this last round.

HAK: Thank you.

K: I hope you loved the soccer match.

HAK: I liked it very much.

K: OK, many thanks.

HAK: Bye.

END

MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

CLASSIFIED ITEM(S) REMOVED

The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they
contain security classified information:

**Collection:** Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part III

**Box Number:** 210

**Folder Number:** 1

Item(s) and Security Classification:

TELECON - President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger, July 17, 1974, 4:30 PM 2pp

TELECON

July 18, 1974

2:48 PM

K: Mr. President.

H: Hello, Henry. Just checking in. So you did decide on Sisco.

K: Yes. That was your instinct too, wasn't it.

N: I just sort of felt that.

K: I thought you were right.

N: You can control him.

K: It's better to have somebody who knows the subject. We're having trouble here with some of my guys who are leaking, and I'm going to take care of them next week after this is over. The New York Times is coming after us.

N: About Makarios?

K: Yes. Some of the members of the House are starting to leak rumble.

N: We'll try not to commit ourselves here. I'll leave it up to you.

K: I just wanted you to know. I'll take it from here.

N: OK. We just won't try to avoid Cyprus.

TELECON

July 30, 1974

3:10 pm

K: Mr. President,

N: Hi Henry.

K: I wanted to tell you the Greeks and Turks have just signed an agreement to set up security zones and for your information we broke the back of it. They were deadlocked last night and ready to pack up and go home at 9:30 and we came up with a compromise we were able to sell to the Turks and the British.

N: Good job.

K: It was your fortitude that did it.

N: Are you going to be here with Simon. I have him at 3:15.

K: I have Allon, the Israeli Foreign Minister here.

N: No stay there. I'll have..

K: Scowcroft?

N: Yes. I'll have him.

K: I thought it was going to be this morning.

N: It was, I slipped it. I slept in this morning. We were up late last night. That California time change.

K: It is the second night that hits you.

N: Yes, well I feel great now...

K: You can count on me.

B: The whole point is it has to go to the Senate and we just have to beat it.

K: It is an awful experience.

TELECON

The President - page 2.

N: We are not going to wring our hands about it.

K: Well, it is a terrible thing to watch and heart-breaking.

N: Well, don't break your heart over it.

K: You don't have to worry about anything from me except for
support.

N: I know that Henry -- and congratulations.

END

TELECON

General Haig/The Secretary

August 3, 1974

9:55 a.m.

K: Al, I have a substantive problem if you can focus your mind on it. It has to do with Arms for Israel. There is a huge shopping list here. I would like Allon to go back with just enough so he got something but not enough to make any difference. I talked to Schlesinger. We could give him 200 tanks, Redeyes and Cobras and that would leave the whole huge shopping list in abeyance. Can I do that without asking the President?

H: What is your timing Henry?

K: Monday morning. Explain to him this is the absolute minimum of their package.

H: Let me do it first and see if he can focus on a report from you.

K: This is about 1/100's of their list. This is not anything that will make any difference in the military balance.

H: Well, the Redeyes will cause some stir probably when it gets out only because of the character of the weapon.

K: Well, the cobra will cause more stir because they will use that against the terrorists.

H: We have to keep this damn thing together.

K: They have seven items listed which we are got giving them. Then they have... it is a list of 20 pages of things that they want that they are not getting, except the tanks.

H. Right. OK. I think that's very durable. Let me run it by him. I think we can do it very quickly. If not, I will come back to you and you can tell him.

K: OK Thanks very much.

END.

August 5, 1974

3:22 PM

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President. How are you?

F: I'm fine, how are you?

K: I'm getting along.

F: I guess we all are.

K: You're in a very difficult position and doing it with great nobility. Mr. Vice President, I was wondering, I thought that meeting with those congressmen went rather well.

F: I thought it was great. I saw half of them and they thought it was very terrific.

K: Anytime you want to arrange a meeting with any max a group like this, just go ahead and do it.

F: I'll have Jack Marsh check with I. Lynwood for a time that is open on your schedule.

K: I thought it was a very good group.

F: They are and all they wanted was an opportunity to hear it first hand.

K: I think they are entitled to have a sense that the government knows what it's doing and give them a chance to ask questions.

F: They used to give us trouble -- trouble stemming from non-information and I'm confident they will be on their side.

K: I'll be very pleased to do it.

F: Maybe we can do it every couple of weeks or so.

K: Excellent.

F: I'll have Jack Marsh get in touch with Lynwood.

K: Maybe we can schedule it for a day that you will be in town. OK. Give me a list of who you think should be invited.

F: OK.

END

TELECON

Rita Hauser/Secretary Kissinger

August 6, 1974

6:15 PM

(Missed first part)

H: He told me the good news. I'm very pleased.

K: It was a good report.

H: It was __I think it will be fine, it's a footnote in this mess. How x was the President today?

K: He was alright.

H: Was he rational? There is now an enormous vote against him in the House.

K: It's pretty rough.

H: He's pleaded guilty and thrown himself on the __. I hear Goldwater is angry. I don't nix know who's going to rise up and defend him.

K: You mean during the trial?

H: Where is he going to get anyone to rise up in his defense. If he __he will be convicted and will go to jail.

K: If he resigns?

H: It gets close __nix__ willing to give him some sort of immunity.

K: It's unbelievable.

H: I think the whole thing is dreadful. Ford will take over and the end of our friend Nelson.

K: Unless he's made Vice President.

H: Jerry won't pick him. He's too big and powerful.

K: I think Nelson could do him a lot of good.

H: I would be astonished if he could. You're going to hang on?

K: Assuming there's a change quickly, I'll of course stay on to see what the shape of the new administration will be. I have an obligation now. I can't play around.

Hauser - page 2

107

H: You can stick it out.

K: I think I can give it six months and see where we stand. I don't think anyone knows what sort of President Ford would make, including Ford.

H: You can be sure Mel Laird will be front and center.

K: Is that good or bad.

H: For you?

K: I get along with Mel.

H: He's a smart fellow and knows how to ____. He's got a hell of a problem in the economic picture. He has to bring in some real power. It's a very unhappy situation. I certainly hope you stay with it as long as you can.

K: That's all I can do. It's a disheavling period and in a funny way. Some awful mistakes were made by the President but he's doesn't deserve this.

H: ____ to see it to the end.

K: Ziegler is a great political expert.

H: Yes. (laughter)

K: I wonder where Ziegler is going to decide...

H: I talked to him and said he should resign.

K: That the President should quit?

H: Yes. He said basically it's the President's decision to make. On the Latin American think job...on the economic and business issue. There's a big fight between the _____. When do you want all this stuff?

K: As soon as possible.

H: We had planned to finish it at the end of September.

K: That's fine. Maybe I could meet with the Committee.

H: When?

K: Why don't you wait until the president hasyteria is over and try me in the next week or so.

H: Great. OK. Any Henry.

I want to see you soon. Let me know when you're in town.

108

Hauser - page 3

H: Well, I know your program is always hectic.

K: Well, today especially.

H: Does he talk to you at all about this?

K: No. He sometimes tells me of a decision he's made.

H: Do you think it has any impact on foreign policy.

K: Not on any particularly country.

H: What happens to a country like Egypt?

K: Brezhnev will be in trouble.

H: OK. Be a good guy Henry and let's talk soon.

K: OK.

END

TELECON
Rita Hauser/The Secretary

August 7, 1974

7:19 p.m.

H: It is hard to get you. I called to tell you a friend of mine, who is a very old and good friend, advises me has was consulted by Mel Laird yesterday on two areas of interest to both of us. Mel is being considered as an advisor to Ford so that he won't be a threat to Jerry in 1976. My friend said that Mel discussed with him at some length whether he, my friend, could live basically with you as Secretary limelighting my friend. I say my friend because I am professionally obligated not to tell you. H has been living in a very strange circumstance. I just don't think there is any problem in effect, which is what I told him. I thought it was very interesting that Mel was seeking advice on this.

K: Not every advice Mel seeks is ______.

H: Jerry preside over....Cabinet and WH and presumably at such time as Haig goes, Laird will come in and take over the WH. Rose Woods called me today in a terrible funk and said the President wanted my advice. I said it breaks my heart to say this, but I told her I thought he should resign and do it soon. She said he has made no decision. But Mel has certainly moved in and is getting off the shots. ______ would like to see Nelson as V.P.....does Nelson want it?

K: I have no way of knowing. Mel is Mel and we will just have to see.

H: I have no doubt, Henry, that he told you all along he would be a big wheel and he is the man who made Ford what he is. The best thing is for you to just do your business.

K: I get along with Mel and you never know what the WH will be like.

H: There is nothing else that can be done.

K: That is exactly my view.

H: ______ and let me know what you think.

K: I appreciate it very much Rita. Let me know when you come down here.

2.

H: I hope it works out for Nelson. I think it is his time in history. He will do no good to stay out. He can't make a run at an incumbent President. But Nelson may be carefully assessing Ford. I don't think he has ______. If Ford presides over a very serious reassessing, it is not going to be a ______.

K: I cannot take it on. Assuming there is a big reassessing then the Republican nomination is not good having.

H: You never know what the Democrats will nominate. I'll let you know if I hear more.

K: Thank you.

H: Goodbye.

END.

TELECON

August 8, 1974

11:25 AM

Mood

K: Brent, is everything still on schedule as far as you know?

S: Yes, and I've reconfirmed it. That's going on right now. About the meeting announcement this afternoon, they said no problem, but they would rather wait until this meeting is over to make sure. They're going to call me after the meeting is over.

K: I'm going to be over there at 3:00.

S: Right.

K: At the EOB office?

S: Right.

K: OK. On drafting those letters, I think we ought to draft them over here.

S: I don't have any problems with that.

K: Clift isn't in the same class as Sonnenfeldt.

S: That doesn't give me any problem.

K: Fine. As soon as I get my guys working there's a possibility that it will leak out so I want to make sure the other meeting is on.

S: I'll call you after the meeting.

K: Not my meeting with him.

S: No.

K: When are they going to announce the Presidential speech?

S: My understanding is noon.

K: Good. Will you let me know as soon as it's been announced.

S: Right.

K: OK.

TELCORN

The Vice President/Sec. Kissinger

August 8, 1974, 12:30 p.m.

F: Good morning.

K: Mr. Vice President.

F: How are you Henry.

K: Fine.

F: I just finished talking with the President and he gave me his decision and we spent about an hour and twenty minutes over there. During the course of the conversation he indicated that you were the only one in the Cabinet whom with whom he had shared his decision.

K: That is right.

F: I would hope we could get together sometime this afternoon at your convenience. I have no plans other than to start getting ready.

K: Would 3:00 suit you Mr. Vice President?

F: That would be fine, Henry. I would appreciate it very much and whatever your schedule is -- mine is totally flexible.

K: After the President talked to me yesterday I prepared some tentative suggestions for your consideration. Might I bring those along?

F: Absolutely.

K: They are things that need to be done in the next two days.

F: I will be delighted to see you and bring anything along that you want, Henry.

K: Right. One other technical thing. Can we say to the press that I am coming over to see you or had you rather announce that. It is not particularly necessary. We can just avoid it all together.

F: I see no reason why you can't say that you are coming over to see me. I see no harm in that.

The Republicans have it, but no one of the Republicans, of course, will leak it. The trouble is that the Republicans, like conservatives generally, are responsible and play with Marquis of Queensberry rules, whereas the liberals go just the other way.

The irony of this whole situation is that we are being accused of playing a foul game during the election and so forth, whereas what we have done as compared with previous administrations is hardly worth mentioning, but with the double standard that exists in the media, anything that comes out that hurts the conservatives, and particularly the President, gets enormous play—anything that comes out against one of the Democrats gets a one-day play and then is dropped.

I think one thing that seems to disturb our opponents in the media, in the Congress, and in partisan circles the most is that I have hung on. As I look back over the year, I don't know quite how I have done it. I have had times of considerable discouragement although I have pretty generally been able to cover it so people are unable to see it.

I remember, looking clear back, in May 1973 I think it was, while we were in the swimming pool in Florida, and David was sitting in the Jacuzzi, and he said that he had been thinking about all these things and he felt that all that was necessary was for me to "persevere," as he put it. And that is, of course, about all we've been doing—persevering.

Looking back over the year and just highlighting the events, the mistakes are quite apparent. First, the April 30 speech. Possibly the decision on Haldeman-Ehrlichman was right, although I am not absolutely sure that it was under the circumstances now.

But going on from there, certainly the first major mistake was the appointment of Richardson as Attorney General. Richardson's weakness, which came to light during the Cox firing, should have been apparent.

Then, of course, came the bombshell of the tapes. This occurred, unfortunately, while I was out at the hospital, and I remember when Haig came in and told me about it and we discussed it. Later Agnew came in and said, maybe you ought to destroy them. Frankly, we thought about it. We should have done it, because none had been subpoenaed at that time. But here Garment, I think primarily, stepped in with the idea that it would be a destruction of evidence or what have you. But all the sorrow and difficulties we have had about the eighteen minutes and the so-called two missing tapes, and, of course, then the tapes themselves and the Supreme Court case would have been

1004

avoided had we just bitten the bullet then. But having failed to do so we went on down the line.

The Agnew resignation was necessary although every serious blow, because while some thought that his stepping aside would take some of the pressure off the effort to get the President, all it did was to open the way to put pressure on the President to resign as well. This is something we have to realize: that any accommodation with opponents in this kind of a fight does not satisfy—it only brings on demands for more.

Of course, the Cox firing probably was the right thing to do even with all the pain and suffering that it caused because, according to Buzhardt and others, Cox was ready to indict the President at that time and that could have been at a time that it could have had a fatal effect with the House, even though our public standing then was probably somewhat higher than it is now.

I think what has irritated me the most has been the handling of my personal finances. We have an excellent case, but we simply couldn't get a proper hearing on it.

On May 20, 1974, the district court hearing Jaworski's suit for the sixty-four new tapes ruled in his favor. I decided to appeal the decision. Jaworski immediately moved to bypass the court of appeals, requesting that the Supreme Court take the case directly. On May 31 the Supreme Court agreed to Jaworski's unusual request. This meant that a final decision could come in as little as a month.

By the end of May Kissinger had spent thirty-two days traveling back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus in the long and often frustrating attempt to achieve a disengagement between Syrian and Israeli troops. The Egyptian-Israeli disengagement had been easier because Sadat had adopted the attitude that if the major issues could be resolved, the minor ones could be settled at the ongoing Geneva Conference. But the hatred between the Syrians and the Israelis went too deep for them to be able to think this way.

Kissinger was at his finest in these sessions, probing like a surgeon to concern that separated the two parties, indefatigably seeking the areas of mutual interest that would make an accord possible.

But on May 16 Scowcroft brought Haig a message from Kissinger that he was coming back; he had done the superhuman and it still was not enough. I sent back a firm message of encouragement directing that

Nixon on his Mid East Trip

100

he gave it one more try. I knew he was exhausted, but he was too close to a settlement to let the momentum slacken.

On May 22 I wrote Mrs. Meir to "urge that you and your Cabinet make a supreme effort to seek a compromise which would permit an agreement on the disengagement of forces on the Golan Heights and enable us to move another step away from strife and bloodshed."

On May 29 the prize was won. The impossible had been achieved. Both Israel and Syria accepted the terms, and the disengagement agreement was signed on May 31.

The next step in the American effort had to be an attempt to consolidate the new trust and extend the new dialogue. It was important to move fast while the momentum was still fresh. Plans were therefore activated for a series of major summits in the Mideast. I decided to make personal visits to Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to help firm up the gains we had made and to lay the groundwork for more progress in the future.

While Kissinger was forging the Syrian-Israeli disengagement, the House Judiciary Committee turned to the topics of wiretaps and the Plumbers. Kissinger had already testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about both subjects, but now the House Judiciary Committee had been given the materials on the case and was treating them with characteristic irresponsibility. The committee began a systematic series of leaks implying that there were discrepancies in Kissinger's statements. Several Foreign Relations Committee members reaffirmed their belief in Kissinger's veracity, but the press would not let up. Early in his first press conference after his shuttle tour de force the questions took an ugly and accusatory turn. He was asked about reports that he had given false testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee and whether he had obtained a lawyer because of the prospect of perjury. His jaw angrily set, Kissinger fired back, "I do not conduct my office as a conspiracy."

This sudden attack on his character and truthfulness, added to the strains of a month of tense shuttling between Israel and Syria, set Kissinger's nerves on edge. He kept his composure during the press conference, but afterward he was shaken and disillusioned. As he analyzed the situation, he was the major symbol of the positive foreign policy accomplishments of the Nixon administration; even while the full-scale attempt to impeach me was under way, he had had the effrontery to show the nation and the world that the United States under my leadership was still able to command respect in the world and achieve significant results despite the drag of Watergate. I agreed with this analysis completely: the voracious forces of the opposition could not allow that to continue.

1006

## THE MIDEAST TRIP

Shortly before leaving for the Mideast on June 19, I dictated two notes about the way the domestic situation had developed.

### Diary

As the week ends and as the trip begins, there seems to be a feeling that the momentum is changing somewhat, although we have felt this before and have been disappointed.

One thought that has occurred to me, which I developed at Camp David as I took a walk down the nature trail on a very muddy path, is that from now until approximately the first of August when the Supreme Court will rule, the thing to do is to just treat every day as basically the last one and not to be constantly concerned about what may happen in the future. I have tried to do this over the past year and a half, but it has been very difficult at times because we seem always to be fighting the battle or trying to deal with some new development.

But all in all, looking back over this last fifteen or sixteen months, to me the great tragedy is that it seems to be a year and a half almost that is lost. We have accomplished some good things but I have had to spend an inordinate amount of my time thinking about this problem, and, of course, emotionally it has taken a great deal out of me. We certainly have made our mistakes but perhaps the year has taught us all somewhat more compassion and understanding, although I must say that it has also brought clearly to light the unbelievable battle in which we are engaged and how high the stakes are and how bitter and fatalical the opposition is. We simply have to stick it out.

On June 5 I held a meeting for some of the leaders of the American Jewish community. I was disturbed by what I considered to be the shortsighted outlook.

### Diary

I pointed out that hardware alone to Israel was a policy that made sense maybe five years ago but did not make sense today, and that they had to have in mind that each new war would be more and more costly because their neighbors would learn to fight, and there were more of them. And that second, looking into the future, someone would have to hold the ring against the Russians, as we did with the alert in 1973.

I made it very clear there is going to be no blank check in our conversations with the Israelis although, of course, I expressed

10

sympathy for their military needs and, of course, enormous respec for their bravery, etc.

As a matter of fact, whether Israel can survive over a long period of time with a hundred million Arabs around them I think is really questionable. The only long-term hope lies in reaching some kind of settlement now while they can operate from a position of strength, and while we are having such apparent success in weaning the Arabs away from the Soviets and into more responsible paths.

On June 9 we had a lively family dinner. Afterward, while the girls and their husbands went downstairs to watch a movie and Pat went upstairs to finish her packing, I went to the Lincoln Sitting Room and dictated a note describing the problems and opportunities I saw in the historic trip we were to begin the next morning.

### Diary

I don't know whether I got across adequately the point that not just this trip when it is concluded, or the two and a half years remaining when it is concluded, will mean that we have secured our goal of a lasting peace. It is going to require tending thereafter by strong Presidents for the balance of this century. And who knows what can happen thereafter.

All I must do is to do everything possible to see that we leave a structure on which future Presidents can build—a structure based on military strength, diplomatic sophistication, intelligence, and, of course, a strong strain of idealism which will lead to progress despite some rough waters through which we will have to pass toward our goal of a permanent peace in that area.

As I complete this day, June 9, I begin this trip recognizing the profound importance it will have for the future as far as the Mideast is concerned, and as far as the American position in the world.

I was fully aware that the success or failure of this trip might make the decisive difference in my being able to continue to exercise presidential leadership abroad and at home despite the merciless onslaught of the Watergate attacks.

### Diary

The irony of it all is that, as I told Ziegler, the press—or at least most of the press—will be more obsessed with what happens with the minuscule problems involved in Watergate than they are with the momentous stakes that are involved in what I will be doing and saying in the Mideast.

This is probably a turning point in terms of the whole so-

called Watergate issue, but also a turning point in the history of presidency itself is concerned. I am going to devote myself over to this next ten days to doing everything possible to restore some respect for the office as well as for the man.

During the flight to our first stopover, Salzburg, Austria, Haig me that Kissinger was upset about an editorial in that morning's *Times* that accused him of having disassembled in his Senate to York *Times* that he held the key to holding a press conference in Salzburg in order to answer this charge of a goddamn thing.

“A *Times* editorial isn’t a charge, Al,” I said. “It’s nothing more than a *Times* editorial, and that doesn’t mean a goddamn thing. If he holds a press conference, he’ll only play into their hands by giving the Watergate lead for their first story from this trip.” I said that if Kissinger felt he had to have a press conference, he should at least not be fensive but approach the question positively on the ground that the wiretaps were legitimate and necessary.

But Kissinger was in no mood to take this advice. He called a conference and opened it with a long and emotional statement. He went through the details of his testimony on the wiretaps, he introduced an aggrieved personal note. “I have been generally identified, or, I have been alleged that I am supposed to be interested primarily in the basis of power,” he said. “I would rather like to think that when the record is written, one may remember that perhaps some lives were saved and perhaps some mothers can rest more at ease, but I leave that to history. What I will not leave to history is a discussion of my public honor.”

The real bombshell came during the question period that followed, in reply to a question, he said, “I do not believe that it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States under these circumstances when the character and credibility of the Secretary of State is at issue. And if it is not cleared up, I will resign.”

I issued a public statement expressing my understanding of Kissinger's desire to defend himself against malicious leaks, adding that Americans would recognize, as I did, that his honor needed no def-

### Diary

All in all, what really concerns me about this attack on Kissinger is the total irresponsibility of the *Times* and Washington Post and all of our opponents at a time we are traveling abroad to tell him on this flimsy issue. The mistake that he made, of course, was to hypothesize with the threat to resign, which, among other things, is an empty cannon.

The first reaction to Kissinger's threat to resign was a resound-

1008

rus of support for him. Within a few days, however, even a few of his
reporters were calling his Salzburg performance a tantrum, with a
small band of critics was claiming that it had been a calculated ma-
never to distract attention from the charges against him. But in the end
his threat to resign had the effect he desired and put his critics on the
defensive. Later, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reconsidered
his testimony and announced that he was still in good standing with
them. This, at last, seemed to put the matter to rest.

We stayed overnight in Salzburg in order to get used to the time change.

Diary

I felt good this morning except for the fact that my left leg is
having exactly the same symptoms it had when I was in Hawaii
and had what was diagnosed as a blood clot. I am having Lukash
come over and take a look at it since he was the one who meas-
ured it before.

It is much larger than the right leg and it really makes me quite
lame. I, of course, will not allow them to do anything which will
disrupt the trip at this point.

I was suffering from phlebitis, an inflammation of a vein. After Lukash examined the leg he told me that the danger of phlebitis is that a blood clot might form and break loose into the bloodstream; if it reached the lungs, it could cause a fatal embolism. Fortunately, he seemed to think that the swelling in my leg was in fact the aftermath of the inflammation and that the greatest danger had already passed. He told me to wrap the leg in hot towels at least four times a day and to stay off it as much as possible.

Later I called Haig in and showed him my swollen leg. I told him that I wanted the few people who knew about it to keep it absolutely secret.

We landed in Cairo on June 12 in the hot afternoon sun. President Sadat and his wife were waiting at the airport, and I was immediately impressed by both of them. Sadat is a handsome man, somewhat taller than I had expected from his pictures. In the car he turned to me and said with intense feeling, "This is a great day for Egypt."

As soon as we started on the road to Cairo, I got the first taste of what was perhaps the most tumultuous welcome any American president has ever received anywhere in the world. For mile after mile along both sides of the road people were packed a hundred deep. In Cairo itself the streets and large squares were overflowing. Conservative estimates put the crowd at over a million.

But even more impressive than the sheer number was the obvious
cerity of the crowd's emotion. Sadat seemed to sense what I was th
ing, because he leaned over and shouted in my car so that I could
him. "This is a real welcome from the heart," he said. "These people
here because they want to be here. You can bring people out, but
can't make them smile." We passed under large arches that had
built across the streets, decorated with huge pictures of Sadat and
proclaiming us "Great Men Dedicated to Peace and Progress."
noise was overwhelming as a million people yelled "Nik-son, Nik
Nik-son!" at the top of their lungs.

When the motorcade finally reached the palace where we would
staying, Sadat suggested that we delay our first meeting for an ho
two. I thought he was simply being polite because of the exerti
standing up and waving for almost an hour under the blazing sun.
later during the visit did Mrs. Sadat tell me that he took a nap even
ternoon. He had suffered two mild heart attacks as recently as 1970
as a result took extremely cautious care of himself. I later made a
note: "The thing that I am really concerned about is what would ha
if he were to pass from the scene."

In our conversations Sadat showed great subtlety and sophistici
He did not press me privately about U.S.-Israeli ties, although pu
he made a strong appeal for the return of the occupied territorio
rights of the Palestinians, and the status of Jerusalem. Describ
dealings with the Soviets, he said that he had asked them for mi
help before the October war, and they had not come through. Wit
prising candor he said, "We just gave up on them."

The crowds got bigger each day we were in Egypt. They jamme
entire route on our three-hour train ride from Cairo to Alexa
as Sadat and I stood waving from an open coach. It was hot and
and the swelling in my leg grew painful from standing so long.
realized that Sadat felt it was important for as many people as po
to see us together. It was a way of confirming the new Egyptian-
can relationship.

One of the pool of reporters aboard the train asked Sadat ab
principal contribution the United States could make for con
peace in the Middle East. In his reply he referred to some of the
made signs we had seen along the route: "It is to keep the moment
the whole thing going on, and I must say you have read what my
wrote. They wrote, 'We Trust Nixon.' ... President Nixon never
word and didn't fulfill it. He has fulfilled every word he gave. So
momentum continues, I think we can achieve peace."

I made a diary note about these phenomenal crowds: "I think t
mates that approximately six and a half to seven million people t

1010

12

saw in Egypt is an honest one. It is in that kind of ball park at an
Ottomans. I wonder whether they came out simply because they think
were bringing a bag full of money to deal with their problems. Certainly
something of that enters into it. I think more than that was what Sadat
told me: that they really feel very strongly a feeling of affection for the
Americans. Part of that, of course, is their irritation with the Russians."
**Egypt is the key to the Arab world,** and thanks to Sadat and the
Egyptian people, the trip got off to an excellent start. Our objectives
were to provide support to Egypt in pursuing its moderate course and to
encourage and strengthen Sadat in his roles as leader of his country and
as a constructive and essential influence for any future Middle East ne-
gotiations. At the conclusion of the visit, we issued a statement of prin-
ciples of relations and cooperation between Egypt and the United States
that set forth the basis for working together for peace in the Middle East
and new plans for economic cooperation. We also agreed to negotiate an
agreement under which we would sell non-military nuclear reactors and
fuel to Egypt for the production of electrical power.

When we landed in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, the temperature was above
100 degrees. Even so, King Faisal was at the airport waiting to greet us.
He looked much older than his admitted sixty-seven—according to our
intelligence reports, seventy-two—years.

Faisal saw Zionist and Communist conspiracies everywhere around him. He even put forward what must be the ultimate conspiratorialist notion: that the Zionists were behind the Palestinian terrorists. Despite this obsession, however, and thanks to his intelligence and the experience of many years in power, Faisal was one of the wisest leaders in the entire region.

Saudi Arabia was not directly involved in the Middle East peace nego-
tiations, but Faisal's stature in the Arab world and the substantial finan-
cial support he provided to Syria and Egypt gave him a vital role in main-
taining the momentum toward peace. I was also able to discuss with him
the serious global impact of the high oil prices caused by the recent Arab
oil embargo and to encourage his moves to moderate oil prices.

I was as surprised as the reporters who clustered around us when Fai-
sal said at the departure ceremonies, "Anybody who stands against you,
Mr. President, in the United States of America or outside the United
States of America, or stands against us, your friends in this part of the
world, obviously has one aim in mind, namely, that of causing the splin-
tering of the world, the wrong polarization of the world, the bringing
about of mischief, which would not be conducive to tranquillity and
peace in the world. Therefore, we beseech Almighty God to lend His
help to us and to you so that we both can go hand in hand, shoulder to

shoulder in pursuance of the noble aims that we both share, namely,
those of peace, justice, and prosperity in the world.

My visit to ~~Syria~~ Mideast trip. Syria had been one of the most radically pro-Soviet, and Israeli, and anti-American of the Arab nations.

The problems that my visit presented to President Asad were summation up in the story he told me about his eight-year-old son. The boy had watched our airport arrival ceremonies on television, and when Asad returned home that night, he went up to his father and asked, "Wasrani, Nixon, the same one you have been telling us for years is an enemy of man who is completely in control of the Zionists and our enemies? How could you welcome him and shake his hand?" Asad smiled at me and said, "That is the question all my people will ask, and that is why we have to move at a very measured pace as we develop our relations in the future. After all, for years my people have been taught to hate the Americans; and in recent years they have been taught particularly to hate the Nixon who represents the capitalists who have always supported the Israelis. The same Nixon who saved Israel in 1973!"

The agreement to disengage forces in the Golan Heights had been
achievement of substantial proportions, and my visit was an opportu-
to encourage, support, and nurture the new Syrian-American relati-
ship that Kissinger had begun. I was convinced that Asad would con-
tinue to play the hardest of hard lines in public, but in private he would
follow the Arab proverb that he told me during one of our meeting
"When a blind man can see with one eye it is better than not being a
to see at all." I was very impressed with President Asad.

Diary

As far as Asad was concerned he exceeded my expectations on
the conversations I had had with Henry. He was, as Henry had
said, a tough negotiator, but he has a great deal of mystique, tre-
mendous stamina, and a lot of charm. He laughs easily, and I
see he will be a dynamic leader if he can just maintain his
judgment. In our last conversation he came down very very hard
against any separate peace. But on the other hand, he seemed to
be quite reasonable with regard to the various regional ap-
proaches we were making. All in all he is a man of real sub-
stance, and at his age—forty-four—if he can avoid somebody
shooting him or overthrowing him, he will be a leader to be reck-
oned with in this part of the world.

Pat noted that he had a flat head in the back which she said

1012

was probably because he hadn't been turned when he was a boy. What he reminded me of, curiously enough, was that he had a forehead like Pat Buchanan's, and my guess is he has the same kind of brain and drive and single-mindedness that Pat has. The man really has elements of genius, without any question.

In the Syrian capital of Damascus, the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world, American flags were flying for the first time in seven years. Everywhere we went large and friendly crowds turned out to welcome us, despite the fact that our movements and itineraries were given no publicity by the Syrian authorities. I viewed this as a measure of the people's strong desire for friendship with America, for an alternative to the Soviets, and for peace. I noted in my diary, "These people want to be friendly with the U.S. and it runs right down to the rank and file and it goes to the fact that they know the Russians. The Americans, of course, may be in that category soon if we are unable to produce on the peace initiatives that we have begun."

In his toast at the state dinner in my honor President Asad said, "Let us open a new page and begin a new phase in the relations between our two countries." For a President of Syria, this was a dramatic statement. At the conclusion of my visit we announced the resumption of diplomatic relations between our two countries, and I stated our willingness to resume educational and cultural exchanges and to cooperate in Syrian economic growth.

When I said goodbye to Asad at the airport, he kissed me on both cheeks—the highest compliment that can be paid a visitor and an extraordinarily important gesture for the man who, until a few months earlier, had been the leading anti-American firebrand of the Arab world.

I later reflected on this breakthrough in our relations with Syria.

*Diary*

All in all, Syria is by far the most difficult country we have in terms of working out some kind of positive continuing relationship. On the other hand, they desperately want to have another string in their bow. They want us in there, probably to play us against the Russians, and that's why on the way back I said that we must explore every possible way to make some moves toward the Syrians in the economic area.

My receptions in Egypt and Syria and my conversations with Sadat and Asad confirmed the tremendous potential of the new role of the United States as a force for peace in the Arab world. If we could provide the lead, these two pragmatic and patriotic men were willing to seek a

compromise settlement with Israel as a prerequisite for turning their attention to the development of their own country was also encouraging to see the extent to which the Soviets had aliased their former clients; it was particularly interesting to discover that this was not just case at the leadership level. As was frequently the case, Manolo, who was traveling with me, was an excellent source of information and insights.

*Diary*

Manolo gave some interesting sidelights about the trip when we asked him about which country he liked the best. He said that he liked Egypt the best because the Egyptians were so friendly. He said that they all said they were glad to see the Americans come in and the Russians leave. It reminded me of my first conversation with Sadat, where he said that in six months America had gained more in Egyptian popular support than the Russians had been able to gain in twenty years.

Manolo said that the Egyptians told him over and over again that the Russians were grim and mean; they lived apart and did not treat the people kindly. He ran into the same thing in Syria where one of the people working in the kitchen told him that the Americans were smiling and the Russians were always grim. think one thing we have going for us in this part of the world and I trust in other parts of the world, is the fact that, with all our faults, and with the exception of some arrogant American particularly in the foreign service and some business types, most Americans basically like other people. Putting it another way, they want to be liked, and so they go overboard in trying to win other people. The Russians, with their inferiority complex and their single-minded communist determination, are a very different breed. They don't let their good qualities show through except when they are dealing with what they consider to be a solute equals.

I recalled a conversation I had had with Sadat in which I had told that I thought that the real problem between China and Russia, deep down, the Chinese consider themselves superior and civilized than the Russians. Sadat had smiled and said, "You that's exactly the same way we feel: we Egyptians are more civil than the Russians."

Our reception in Israel, although warm by ordinary standards, was the most restrained of the trip. This was partly because of Israeli political problems. Golda Meir had resigned just two months earlier and

1014

Rabin had taken over as Prime Minister, heading up a fragile coalition. Given the unpopularity of my Mideast policy in many quarters in Israel, Rabin was understandably unwilling to be more than correct in the treatment he accorded me but he was also bluntly anxious to know how much more aid he could depend on from us.

The primary purpose of my meetings with Rabin and his top Cabinet officials was to make it clear to them that while we would not waver in our total support for Israel's security, we would insist on their playing a sincere and serious part in maintaining the momentum of the peace negotiations that we had begun with Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and had now confirmed with my trip. In addition to a thorough discussion of the economic and military needs of Israel and a review of further steps that might be taken toward peace, we proposed in a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit that we negotiate an agreement on non-military nuclear reactors and fuel supply similar to the one we had concluded with President Sadat.

At the state dinner at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament building, I said that I would exercise the presidential prerogative of breaking precedent: although Golda Meir was no longer Prime Minister, I wanted to propose a special toast to her before the traditional toast to the head of state. I said that of all the world leaders I had met none had greater courage, intelligence, stamina, determination, or dedication to their country than Golda Meir. She was sitting nearby at the head table, and I could see how flustered and flattered she was. I continued, "I thought that I, having worked with her, having become her friend, and she has been my friend, that I might have the honor and the privilege to ask you to join me in a toast to the former Prime Minister. Prime Minister Golda Meir. To Golda."

Typically eloquent even when taken by surprise, she made a brief reply. "As President Nixon says, Presidents can do almost anything, and President Nixon has done many things that nobody would have thought of doing. All I can say, Mr. President, as friends and as an Israeli citizen to a great American President, thank you."

In my formal toast I talked frankly about the task confronting the new Prime Minister and the Knesset:

> There are two courses that are open to them. The one is an easy one, an easy one particularly politically, I suppose, and that is the status quo. Don't move, because any movement has risks in it, and therefore resist those initiatives that may be undertaken, that might lead to a negotiation which would perhaps contribute to a permanent, just, and durable peace.

> But there is another way. The other, I believe, is the right way. It is the way of statesmanship, not the way of the politician alone. It is a way that does not risk your country's security. That must never be done. But it is a way that recognizes that continuous war in this area is not a solution for Is-

> rael's survival and, above all, it is not right that every possible avenue to be explored to avoid it in the interest of the future of those children we say by the hundreds and thousands on the streets of Jerusalem today.

Our last stop in the Middle East was in Jordan, where I was once again impressed by the charm and intelligence of King Hussein. He and I spent over two hours in a private discussion of his unique role in assisting the settlement of conflicts. He had long been a staunch and loyal friend of the United States, sometimes to his considerable peril, and he affirmed that he would continue to do his part on behalf of restraint and moderation on the long road that lay ahead.

In his toast at the state dinner he gave for us, Hussein generously summed up the meaning of my trip as he saw it: "Mr. President, we joined with you in all the hopes and expectations you must have for this memorable 'Journey for Peace' that you are undertaking, and we in the Arab world are grateful that you have made it," he said. "Although you know better than anyone else perhaps that a journey for peace seems to have no ending, your coming to us at this time has been perfectly timed to preserve the momentum that American initiative had begun under your inspired and inspiring leadership."

I concluded my toast that night by saying: "I do not tell you what this journey will end. I cannot tell you when it will end. The important thing is that it has begun."

There was a large crowd waiting on the South Lawn of the White House to welcome Pat and me. Jerry Ford led the official delegation. He said, "Mr. President, about ten days ago, I here with many others to wish you Godspeed. Our prayers were with you at that time, and I think it might be appropriate now to quote from a biblical injunction: 'Blessed is the peacemaker.'"

During the next few days, even while preparing for Soviet Summit I briefed congressional leaders on the opportunity we had to exert leadership for peace in the Middle East, and I reflected on the Mideast in the practical perspective of the domestic reaction to it.

### Diary

We must have gotten some lift from the trip, although seems almost impossible to break through in the polls. Of course this is not surprising after the terrible banging we are taking. I pointed out to Ziegler, when he was telling me about the five minutes that we had to get started, six minutes that we were getting on each network while we were away, I said, 'Compare that with the eight or ten minutes they have been hearing on Watergate for over a year!' We can

1016

complain too much about the coverage in the Mideast. It was
good. It is very hard to knock the trip. And I think it had an
impact. How great and how lasting only time will tell.

The most important thing, of course, is to keep working to
make sure the trip bears the fruits of peace—or at least of prog-
ress. Sadat constantly emphasized the point that it was unnat-
ural for the Egyptians and the Americans to be enemies, and
natural for us to be friends. It was this theme that we heard in
Saudi Arabia and also in Syria and Jordan: natural and unnat-
ural, normal and abnormal, etc. This to me is the most signifi-
cant benefit from the presidential trip as distinguished from all
the negotiations. The Arabs really want to be friends of the
Americans, and now it's up to us to be their friends and also to
prove that friendship with America is worthwhile.

With the congressional leaders I stepped out a little bit ahead of Henry in indicating that we would make Israel strong enough that they would not fear to negotiate, but not so strong that they felt they had no need to negotiate. I would add to that, Israel should also be strong enough so that their neighbors would not be tempted to attack them, and would have an incentive to negotiate.

One thing the Mideast trip did was to put the whole Water-
gate business into perspective—to make us realize that all the ter-
rible battering we have taken is really pygmy-sized when com-
pared to what we have done and what we can do in the future not
only for peace in the world but, indirectly, to effect the well-being
of people everywhere. This, I suppose, is what we must always
keep front and center regardless of what happens in the future.

On June 13, while I was in Egypt, Fred Buzhardt had suffered a heart
attack. Once I was assured that he was going to pull through, I tried to
assess the impact his illness would have on our legal situation. This was
a particularly busy and important period because we had briefs to file
and oral arguments to prepare for the tapes case before the Supreme
Court. We also had to prepare for the pretrial hearings in the Watergate
cover-up case on defense motions for documents, and to respond to
demands for documents from the district court that was hearing the Ells-
berg break-in case. There were several other lesser legal battles also
being waged. We were trying to assert a claim of executive privilege in a
suit brought by Common Cause; and we were getting ready to file an ap-
peal on Sirica's decision to release a section of the September 15, 1972,
tape that he himself had earlier judged did not relate to Watergate—one
in which I had talked about IRS information on our opponents. And as

1018

if these were not enough, the Ervin Committee was still demanding
more information, Kissinger was returning to testify on the
retaps be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Judiciary
Committee was continuing its rapacious demands for more tapes. Buz-
hardt's enforced absence would be a serious blow.

There was at least one relatively bright spot: there were reports of
behind-the-scenes problems at the House Judiciary Committee. The
leaks from both members and staff had become so frequent that
Democrats as well as Republicans were expressing their disapproval. An
anonymous committee member was quoted in the Washington *Post*, "I
think we are a little embarrassed by what we have done."

On June 21, two days after my return from the Mideast, the House
Judiciary Committee finished hearing all the evidence on all the charges
against me; it ran over 7,000 pages and ultimately filled thirty-eight
large printed volumes. The quantity of the evidence was overwhelming,
but its quality was weak; most of it had little or no direct bearing on my
own actions.

There were also other optimistic signs. Washington columnists noted
that John Rhodes, for the first time in weeks, was beginning to emerge
as a leader in my behalf. The House pro-impeachment Democrats were
now reported to be pushing hard for an early House floor vote because
they felt the committee's slow pace had let the momentum slip. The
Washington *Post* ran a front-page story that the committee had begun
to polarize.

On June 22 I telephoned Louisiana Democrat Joe Waggonner. A vet-
eran of seven terms in the House, Waggonner headed an informal group
that sometimes numbered as many as a hundred House Democrats,
mainly Southerners, who had often given me support on key issues. He
had been a great source of strength to me throughout the whole Water-
gate period; hardly a week went by that he did not call to reassure me of
his continued support. But he was always totally realistic, and he never
tried to encourage me falsely. Now he was saying that he had seventy
anti-impeachment votes in his group that he thought were pretty solid.
The only thing that might change them, he said, would be if for any rea-
son I were held in contempt of the Supreme Court. Other than that he
did not think there was any chance for an impeachment. He ended this
conversation, as he did every one I ever remember having with him, by
saying, "God bless you."

I calculated that if Waggonner had 70 Democratic votes, we would
need only 150 Republicans to make a majority against impeachment.
That was not an unrealistic goal. On June 22 and 23 I reflected on the
tentative new sources of support showing up in Congress, and even in the
House Judiciary Committee itself.

1019

Diary

Thank God some of our Republicans on the committee led Charles Wiggins [of California], are standing up. This may be the new factor that could change this situation—change it, that is, with the one caveat—that what happens in the Supreme Court is going to put us to a real test.

I still hope and feel, however, that there would be a fairly good chance this time that the Court, as it looks down to the future of this country and the future of the presidency and for that matter the future of the Court itself, will not want to set such a devastating precedent. But the Court all lives in Washington, are affected by the Washington stories, and the poison they see in the Washington *Post* must really really seep in. It's very difficult for people to read it every day and not be affected by it.

In thinking today, after my call with Joe Waggonner, when he said that unless there was contempt of the Supreme Court we would win the impeachment, I realized that we really are looking at about thirty days in which the climactic decision with regard to whether we are able to stay in office or whether we will have to, in effect, refuse to comply with what might be an order of the Court which would violate the constitutional precepts which I have laid forward, will have to be made. What I have to do in these next thirty days is to live every one of them up to the hilt and not be concerned about what happens in between. We just have to be sure that we do everything we can to be worthy of whatever responsibilities we have.

The more I think about this whole impeachment process the more I remember what Ayub Khan said: "Trust is like a thin thread. Once you break it, it is almost impossible to put it together again." This is why as time has gone on, when we add up the Dean week which was just a year ago—and the tape issue—and then Agnew—and then following that up with the two-tapes business—the tax business—and all of the other assaults—the Rebozo thing—the eighteen minutes—it's just miraculous that we are still in the game at all.

We can only thank God for the strength of the family, as I have often said—of some of our close friends, and the iron will of Haig, who I think is the strongest man in the whole group—supported, of course, by Ziegler, Buchanan, and others.

I had a very good talk with Bob Haldeman. He is really a tower of strength. I told him that I knew he must be worried about what was going to happen in September and what he must be going through, and that I felt for him very, very deeply, just as I felt for John Ehrlichman and John Mitchell. He said, well,

he just lived day by day and didn't think about the outcome in the end.

When I think, incidentally, of my feeling of depression last night I suppose that something might happen in the future with regard to the Court that would end in eventual impeachment, I thought of all of the others who must be going through much worse—sleepless nights and so forth—people who don't have strong physical or emotional faculties as I have. It's really remarkable that we have so many among our own group who have stood up under a terrible battering, and have taken the worst shots that they could get and have still survived.

I talked to Henry. He seemed to think the mood, as he puts it, had changed. Of course, he has said this before. And, Henry, of course, always puts in the caveat, "unless something big develops."

I also talked to Al Haig. He says he really feels better than he has for a year.

As I analyze things on this rather rainy Sunday, June 23, I must say that we are probably, as Al says, stronger than we were a couple of months ago, and we shall now see what happens as we go to the Soviet Union, come back, and as the tension then focuses as it will almost totally on the whole impeachment process. At least the Mideast trip tended to break the momentum and to focus attention on other subjects. Al feels that the press wants to do that—that they are rather tired of the other subject. I trust he's right, although I think that we will find that many of our opponents will not play that game because they desire to get us out.

My family and I tried to make the time we spent together as happy and carefree as possible. I worried about the girls constantly. They were having to fight my battles day in and day out. Their concern was about my thoughtfulness. I was a source of great comfort to me. Julie would leave her copy of the New English edition of the New Testament on the bedstand, opened to some consoling passage. And Tricia would come and sit with me while I read or worked, in a quiet tribute of love and support.

I was in the Mideast on Father's Day, but there was a telegram from the girls: "Dear Daddy, Happy Father's Day. We are so proud of you and love you very much. Julie and Tricia." My sons-in-law will send me a telegram: "Mr. President, A triumphant Father's Day admiration and love. Ed and David."

Because of the demands of Ed's job, he and Tricia stayed in

1020

You did not make many official appearances. It became a favorite insatiable gossip columnists to fabricate rumors of a "rift between me and Ed, or even between Tricia and Ed. It finally reached the point that Tricia was forced to issue a statement denying that her marriage was about to break up. In fact, she and Ed seemed to grow stronger and draw closer the more they were forced to endure. In March, without informing me beforehand, they jointly wrote a courageous and eloquent magazine article in my defense.

Julie and David were directly in the blast of the hurricane for the entire final year of my presidency. Living in Washington ensured that they could never escape from the ceaseless media scrutiny or from the stifling atmosphere of the threatened impeachment. Both Julie and David were sturdy young people, but after more than 160 public appearances, many of them searing Watergate sessions, they would have had to be unintelligent and insensitive not to feel the effect. In February 1974 David wrote to me about it:

> Julie has undoubtedly mentioned my low spirits this past week. In a nutshell, nothing in my life prepared me for the thunder clap of criminal charges pressed against people I know and respect and essentially on grounds growing out of dedication to your case....

> I never accepted that life could be so unfair and it's unquestionably just the beginning. I spent the better part of this week wrestling with my feelings on the situation. I hope I haven't been misunderstood. Last night I discovered an appropriate thought, "There is no despair so absolute as that which comes with the first moment of our first great sorrow when we have not yet known what it is to have suffered and be healed, to have despaired and recovered hope." The quote was from George Eliot, of course. I wondered when it was you experienced your "despair so absolute"—14 years ago, 1 year ago—ours may have been last week. But the point of the passage and of your experience is hope. Under these circumstances hope means determination. We are happy with any part of redeeming the work you have done for America and we aren't alone either, come what may.

It hurt me to see Julie daily grow quieter and more inward. But the only time I recall that she ever let me know of her despair was when we went to Camp David after the release of the Blue Book transcripts. "Everything is so dreary," she said quietly. By the next day she had bounced back, and within a week she and David decided to hold a press conference in response to the storm of criticism of the transcripts and the calls for my resignation that were now coming from friends and enemies alike.

At one point during their press conference a reporter for CBS began talking about the "sins of the fathers" being visited on their children. His implication was that their spontaneous decision to hold the press

conference was part of a calculated move to shield me from reporting Julie's eyes flashed, but the steel in her character helped her repress the emotion as she said:

> I am going to try to control myself in answering the question, because really does wound me.... I am here because Helen Smith had fifty-five calls from the media.... Now if the media had a hang-up, an obsession about religion and feels they must be reassured by members of the family, I feel a daughter it is my obligation to come out here.

> I have seen what my father has gone through, and I am so proud of him that I would never be afraid to come out here and talk to any members of his press about resignation or anything else, even though it goes against grain because I know he does not want me out here because he does not want anyone to construe that I am trying to answer questions for him. I am trying to answer questions for him. I am just trying to pray for enough courage to meet his courage.

Pat was, as always, the strongest of all. She worked to keep our spirits high when we were together as a family, while she showed the world beneath the woman who was loved universally for her warmth, her elegance, and her genius for personal understanding, there was a strength of character unmatched, I believe, in the history of American politics.

She was, as Jerry Ford proclaimed her, "First Lady of the World" and on March 11 she made what was to be the last of her trips as representative abroad. This time she visited Brazil and Venezuela where she captivated everyone who saw her. Yet on the plane back porters immediately started pressing her about Watergate, wanting to know just how much pain she had suffered in the last year, just how it had been for her. "I really don't wish to speak of it. It's just a personal thing," she said. "Why bring that into the trip?" She repeated what she had said before: that she loved me and knew that I was an honor dedicated person.

She worked hard to be an example of dignity under attack. And they would not let up.

## SUMMIT III

In January 1974, the Soviets had agreed to announce the decision of the American Summit III, scheduled to be held in Moscow in the summer. I evaluate this decision either as an act of faith on their part that I was going to prevail over impeachment, or as an indication of their interest in détente continue regardless of who was President.

What was probably the most crucial and hardest fought battle of the Summit III took place not in Moscow but in Washington, where the activities of the anti-détente forces reached almost fever pitch just as

1022

[244] Aug. 8

Public Papers of the Presidents

released a transcript of their news briefing on
the meeting on the same day. The briefing is

printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents (vol. 10, p. 1010).

245 Remarks on Departure From the White House.

August 9, 1974

Members of the Cabinet, members of the
White House Staff, all of our friends here:

I think the record should show that
this is one of those spontaneous things that
we always arrange whenever the President
comes in to speak, and it will be so re-
ported in the press, and we don't mind,
because they have to call it as they see it.

But on our part, believe me, it is
spontaneous.

You are here to say goodbye to us, and
we don't have a good word for it in Eng-
lish—the best is *au revoir*. We will see you
again.

I just met with the members of the
White House staff, you know, those who
serve here in the White House day in and
day out, and I asked them to do what I
ask all of you to do to the extent that you
can and, of course, are requested to do so:
to serve our next President as you have
served me and previous Presidents—be-
cause many of you have been here for
many years—with devotion and dedica-
tion, because this office, great as it is, can
only be as great as the men and women
who work for and with the President.

This house, for example—I was think-
ing of it as we walked down this hall, and
I was comparing it to some of the great
houses of the world that I have been in.
This isn't the biggest house. Many, and
most, in even smaller countries, are much
bigger. This isn't the finest house. Many
in Europe, particularly, and in China,
Asia, have paintings of great, great value,
things that we just don't have here and,

probably, will never have until we are
1,000 years old or older.

But this is the best house. It is the best
house, because it has something far more
important than numbers of people who
serve, far more important than numbers
of rooms or how big it is, far more impor-
tant than numbers of magnificent pieces
of art.

This house has a great heart, and that
heart comes from those who serve. I was
rather sorry they didn't come down. We
said goodbye to them upstairs. But they
are really great. And I recall after so many
times I have made speeches, and some of
them pretty tough, yet, I always come
back, or after a hard day—and my days
usually have run rather long—I would
always get a lift from them, because I
might be a little down but they always
smiled.

And so it is with you. I look around
here, and I see so many on this staff that,
you know, I should have been by your of-
fices and shaken hands, and I would love
to have talked to you and found out how
to run the world—everybody wants to tell
the President what to do, and boy, he
needs to be told many times—but I just
haven't had the time. But I want you to
know that each and every one of you, I
know, is indispensable to this Govern-
ment.

I am proud of this Cabinet. I am proud
of all the members who have served in
our Cabinet. I am proud of our sub-
Cabinet. I am proud of our White House

630

Richard Nixon, 1974

Aug. 9 [245]

Staff. As I pointed out last night, sure, we have done some things wrong in this Administration, and the top man always takes the responsibility, and I have never ducked it. But I want to say one thing: We can be proud of it—5½ years. No man or no woman came into this Administration and left it with more of this world's goods than when he came in. No man or no woman ever profited at the public expense or the public till. That tells something about you.

Mistakes, yes. But for personal gain, never. You did what you believed in. Sometimes right, sometimes wrong. And I only wish that I were a wealthy man—at the present time, I have got to find a way to pay my taxes—[laughter]—and if I were, I would like to recompense you for the sacrifices that all of you have made to serve in government.

But you are getting something in government—and I want you to tell this to your children, and I hope the Nation's children will hear it, too—something in government service that is far more important than money. It is a cause bigger than yourself. It is the cause of making this the greatest nation in the world, the leader of the world, because without our leadership, the world will know nothing but war, possibly starvation or worse, in the years ahead. With our leadership it will know peace, it will know plenty.

We have been generous, and we will be more generous in the future as we are able to. But most important, we must be strong here, strong in our hearts, strong in our souls, strong in our belief, and strong in our willingness to sacrifice, as you have been willing to sacrifice, in a pecuniary way, to serve in government.

There is something else I would like for you to tell your young people. You know, people often come in and say,

"What will I tell my kids?" They look at government and say, sort of a rugged life, and they see the mistakes that are made. They get the impression that everybody is here for the purpose of feathering his nest. That is why I made this earlier point—not in this Administration, not one single man or woman.

And I say to them, there are many fine careers. This country needs good farmers, good businessmen, good plumbers, good carpenters.

I remember my old man. I think that they would have called him sort of a little man, common man. He didn't consider himself that way. You know what he was? He was a streetcar motorman first, and then he was a farmer, and then he had a lemon ranch. It was the poorest lemon ranch in California, I can assure you. He sold it before they found oil on it. [Laughter] And then he was a grocer. But he was a great man, because he did his job, and every job counts up to the hilt, regardless of what happens.

Nobody will ever write a book, probably, about my mother. Well, I guess all of you would say this about your mother—my mother was a saint. And I think of her, two boys dying of tuberculosis, nursing four others in order that she could take care of my older brother for 3 years in Arizona, and seeing each of them die, and when they died, it was like one of her own.

Yes, she will have no books written about her. But she was a saint.

Now, however, we look to the future. I had a little quote in the speech last night from T.R. As you know, I kind of like to read books. I am not educated, but I do read books—[laughter]—and the T.R. quote was a pretty good one.

Here is another one I found as I was

n of Presi-
o).

til we are

is the best
far more
people who
n numbers
more impor-
cent pieces

t, and that
erve. I was
down. We
s. But they
ter so many
nd some of
ways come
nd play
— would
because I
they always

ook around
is staff that,
by your of-
would love
nd out how
wants to tell
and boy, he
—but I just
want you to
ne of you, I
his Govern-

I am proud
e served in
of our sub-
White House

631

[245] Aug. 9

reading, my last night in the White House,
and this quote is about a young man. He
was a young lawyer in New York. He had
married a beautiful girl, and they had a
lovely daughter, and then suddenly she
died, and this is what he wrote. This was
in his diary.

He said, "She was beautiful in face and
form and lovelier still in spirit. As a flower
she grew and as a fair young flower she
died. Her life had been always in the sun-
shine. There had never come to her a
single great sorrow. None ever knew her
who did not love and revere her for her
bright and sunny temper and her saintly
unselfishness. Fair, pure and joyous as a
maiden, loving, tender and happy as a
young wife. When she had just become a
mother, when her life seemed to be just
begun and when the years seemed so
bright before her, then by a strange and
terrible fate death came to her. And when
my heart's dearest died, the light went
from my life forever."

That was T.R. in his twenties. He
thought the light had gone from his life
forever—but he went on. And he not only
became President but, as an ex-President,
he served his country, always in the arena,
tempestuous, strong, sometimes wrong,
sometimes right, but he was a man.

And as I leave, let me say, that is an
example I think all of us should remem-
ber. We think sometimes when things
happen that don't go the right way; we
think that when you don't pass the bar
exam the first time—I happened to, but
I was just lucky; I mean, my writing was
so poor the bar examiner said, "We have
just got to let the guy through." We think
that when someone dear to us dies, we
think that when we lose an election, we
think that when we suffer a defeat that

all is ended. We think, as T.R. said, that
the light had left his life forever.

Not true. It is only a beginning, always.
The young must know it; the old must
know it. It must always sustain us, be-
cause the greatness comes not when things
go always good for you, but the greatness
comes and you are really tested, when
you take some knocks, some disappoint-
ments, when sadness comes, because only
if you have been in the deepest valley can
you ever know how magnificent it is to
be on the highest mountain.

And so I say to you on this occasion, as
we leave, we leave proud of the people
who have stood by us and worked for us
and served this country.

We want you to be proud of what you
have done. We want you to continue to
serve in government, if that is your wish.
Always give your best, never get dis-
couraged, never be petty; always remem-
ber, others may hate you, but those who
hate you don't win unless you hate them,
and then you destroy yourself.

And so, we leave with high hopes, in
good spirit, and with deep humility, and
with very much gratefulness in our hearts.
I can only say to each and every one of
you, we come from many faiths, we pray
perhaps to different gods—but really the
same God in a sense—but I want to say
for each and every one of you, not only
will we always remember you, not only
will we always be grateful to you but
always you will be in our hearts and you
will be in our prayers.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:36 a.m. in the East Room at the White House. His remarks were broadcast live on nationwide radio and television.

Following his remarks, the President and

632

28

A TIME TO HEAL

President wants to see you," Haig said. "I think you know what he's going to say."

Ten minutes later, I entered the White House. I stopped at Haig's office first. His eyes told me all I needed to know. I walked into the Oval Office alone.

Nixon was sitting behind his desk, but he stood up as soon as I entered the room. We shook hands; he said, "Sit down," and I took the chair to his right. The President leaned back in his chair with his hands clasped together in his lap. His face was solemn. He had been under tremendous strain; he was still very tense, but in control. Speaking slowly and deliberately, he came right to the point. "I have made the decision to resign," he said. "It's in the best interest of the country. I won't go into the details pro and con. I have made my decision." He paused for a moment, then added, "Jerry, I know you'll do a good job."

"Mr. President," I replied, "you know that I'm saddened by this circumstance. I would have wanted it to be otherwise, but I am ready to do the job and think I'm fully qualified to do it."

"I know you are too."

Once he'd said that, he relaxed and our conversation became much more informal and as pleasant as it could be under the circumstances. Now that he had relinquished the burdens of the world, he was offering an old friend the best advice he had for the days ahead. We talked about the timing of the transition and the way it would be accomplished. Nixon would announce his resignation on TV that night. It would be effective at noon the next day. On Friday morning he wanted to say goodbye to his loyal aides and their families in the East Room. He hoped I would understand his desire to do that. He would write a letter of resignation to Henry Kissinger. When Kissinger received it, Nixon would no longer be President. He would be on his way to San Clemente as a private citizen. Then I could take the oath of office.

He talked pragmatically about the problems I would face in both foreign and domestic affairs. He mentioned the need to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as his hope that I could reach agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations. Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviets' top man, was bright and tough,

UNCERTAIN DAYS

29

Nixon said, but he could also be flexible. He hoped I would continue a strong policy in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and he emphasized the role that Kissinger could play. "Henry is a genius," Nixon said, "but you don't have to accept everything he recommends. He can be invaluable, and he'll be very loyal, but you can't let him have a totally free hand."

Turning to domestic affairs, he noted that the economy was suffering. Inflation was horrendous, and there were some ominous signs of a general economic slowdown in the months ahead. He stressed the need to hold the lid on federal spending and said he hoped that I would work closely with Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur F. Burns. His own decision to impose wage and price controls in 1971, the President went on, had been more harmful than helpful, and he hoped that I wouldn't try to impose them. I told him that he didn't have to worry about that. I'd lived through wage and price controls during the Korean War and again in 1971, and I was convinced they didn't work.

He showed no vindictiveness toward anyone, no bitterness toward people he'd criticized in my presence before. He made no comments about the press and didn't even mention the name "Watergate." That was something he wanted to put out of his mind.

Then we talked about who my Vice President would be. He suggested that Nelson A. Rockefeller, the four-term governor of New York, would be a wise selection. He didn't identify anyone else by name. "There are a number of good people," he said. "It's your choice. I won't be talking to you again, but you'll want somebody who will add stature to the Administration, somebody who will generate national as well as international confidence."

I had heard rumors that the discussions among members of the Nixon family about resignation had been volatile, but in our meeting the President never brought it up. He had made his decision. It was over, as far as he was concerned, and his only interest now was to foster a smooth, orderly transition. After seventy minutes we had touched every base, and it was time for me to leave. As we walked toward the doors, Nixon put his arm around me. "Here's an old friend who's made a major decision changing both our lives," I said to myself. "Now he's wishing me the best not only for myself but for

30

A TIME TO HEAL

the country." I couldn't be very eloquent because my emotions were
too strong. There was a choking in my throat.

"Well," I said, "I'll see you tomorrow. Give Pat and the family my best." Even those low-key words didn't come out easily.

"You and Betty will enjoy living in the mansion," the President replied. "We'll see you tomorrow."

We shook hands again, and I walked the forty yards to the limousine waiting in the driveway. I never once looked back. Nor did I glance at the Secret Service agents accompanying me because I was afraid my feelings might show. I stared ahead at the car, and I wanted the agents to open the door as soon as possible so I could climb inside. I needed to be alone.

But that, I knew, would be impossible, for there were still too many things to do. As soon as I returned to the EOB, I telephoned Kissinger. I thought it urgent to tell him right away how I felt about him. "Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with you."

"There will be no problem," he replied in his deep, accented voice. "Sir, it is my job to get along with you and not yours to get along with me."

"We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's worked out well, so let's keep it that way."

Hartmann, Buchen and Marsh came into my office with lists of other decisions that still had to be made: the selection of a site for the swearing in, the choice of a person to administer the oath, the compilation of a guest list for the ceremony, the naming of a new press secretary and final approval of the speech I'd have to give.

Traditionally, I knew, most Presidents were sworn in on the steps of the Capitol. As a former Congressman, I would have preferred the Capitol myself, yet I realized there simply was no time to arrange the site. Besides, that would have lent a festive air to the occasion, and the country was hardly in a festive mood. The East Room of the White House, I thought, would be far more subdued and appropriate.

"Whom do you want to swear you in?" Hartmann asked.

UNCERTAIN DAYS

31

It was important to demonstrate that the three branches of our government were acting in unison, so I suggested Chief Justice Warren Burger, then attending a conference at The Hague in the Netherlands. Marsh telephoned him and, minutes later, signaled me that he was on the line. "Mr. Chief Justice," I said, "I guess you've heard the news. I hate to interrupt your trip, but I would like it very much if you could be here for the swearing in."

The Chief Justice broke in quickly. "Oh, I've got to be there. I want to be there," he said.

"It's going to be difficult," I explained, "because it's now evening your time, and the ceremony is at noon tomorrow. But we can get you an Air Force plane."

I asked Marsh to get on the extension and work out the details. Jack would have a long night ahead of him, I knew, because I'd also asked him to be responsible for inviting 275 guests and making sure that the list met all the protocol requirements. (One person I really wanted to attend was John McCormack, former Democratic Speaker of the House, who now lived in Boston. I offered to send a plane to pick him up, and even though he hated to fly, he agreed to come.)

The next item on the agenda was my new press secretary. Buchen recommended Jerald terHorst, the Washington bureau chief of the Detroit News. I'd known Jerry since 1948, when he had covered my first Congressional campaign. I had always been impressed by his sense of fairness and integrity, and over the years we'd become personal friends as well. The moment I heard he might be available, I told Phil to call and offer him the job. TerHorst said he wanted to talk to his wife and his editors. He called back soon and accepted.

It was amazing how all the small details were falling into place. Next I called Senate Minority Leader Scott. "As you know, Hugh, things have come to pass," I said. "Our relationship has been excellent, and I expect it to continue as it has between friends. Accessibility and openness will be the hallmarks of my Administration. There will be no filtering of leadership views through others. No, sir."

At two forty-five that afternoon, I placed a call to Thomas P. ("Tip") O'Neill, Democratic Majority Leader of the House. We had played together in a golf tournament near Worcester, Massachusetts, eight days before. *Newsweek* had run a photograph of the two of us strolling down a fairway with our arms around each other, and we

32

A TIME TO HEAL

opened by discussing that. "Well, we sure had a helluva time that day," the two of us agreed. Then we got down to business. Nixon was submitting his letter of resignation to Kissinger at 10 A.M. It would be effective at noon, and I wanted Tip to be at the swearing in.

"Are wives invited, Jerry?" Tip asked. "The reason I'm asking is that I've already told Millie to pack and get down here."

"Wives were not invited," I said, "but they are now."

"Now, Jerry," Tip went on, "I've got a statement prepared, and I want to read it to you." He paused, then began again: "While we are close personal friends and I have great respect for his honesty, integrity and ability, our political philosophies are diametrically opposed. I wish him every success in bringing our politically torn country together. He can expect cooperation from Congress, and I trust he will cooperate with Congress and the rest of America in the days ahead."

"That's fine, Tip," I said. "And I want to say that I'll be relying on you for your advice and assistance."

"I can tell you one thing, Jerry," he went on. "Don't think of a Democrat for Vice President. This country doesn't work that way."

"Thanks for the advice," I said.

For a moment neither of us spoke. Then he sighed. "Christ, Jerry, isn't this a wonderful country? Here we can talk like this and you and I can be friends, and eighteen months from now I'll be going around the country kicking your ass in."

That, I thought, was one hell of a way to speak to the next President of the United States. But it was vintage O'Neill, and it contained a large measure of truth. We were close personal friends. But we were also fierce political enemies, and I knew that he'd be doing what he promised to do in less than eighteen months. That, after all, was the essence of democracy.

Since Wednesday morning when he'd brought in the first draft of my acceptance speech, Hartmann had gone over it several times. I'd told him that I'd wanted it to be short and dignified and to have a healing theme. And I'd insisted that he say something thoughtful about Nixon and his family. Bob had an uncanny ability to craft a sentence or a phrase so that it expressed my sentiments, and now, as I read over his polished draft, I saw that he'd succeeded again.

Because I tend to be low-key, people have the impression that I'm

unemotional. I do care very deeply about my family, close personal friends and intimate experiences I've shared with others, and I have a hard time with my voice. Tears well up in my eyes very easily. I don't hide it very well. I don't apologize for it, but a lot of people who know me casually probably have no idea of this. I knew that when I gave the acceptance speech, I couldn't afford to break down. I wanted to appear confident, to give the public the assurance that I was in charge and could do the job, so I decided to rehearse the speech again that night, with Betty as my judge.

Later that afternoon, I had a lengthy meeting with Henry Kissinger. Both of us were aware that some of our country's adversaries might misinterpret the transition as a time of chaos in America and might decide to probe militarily where we seemed vulnerable. It was essential, we agreed, that a message go out to all governments warning that such probes would be resisted by force, that although the country was switching Presidents, its foreign policy remained the same. Just to make sure that everyone got the word, he urged me to let him arrange meetings, after the swearing in, with ambassadors from all over the globe.

Quickly, I agreed.

Then our discussion touched on the world's trouble spots. Although the Communists had signed the Paris peace accords in 1973, they were still causing trouble in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The situation in both countries looked worrisome indeed. The Middle East remained a tenderbox. The Yom Kippur War had ended ten months before, but new hostilities could break out at any time. We would have to watch the area carefully. The one bright spot I remember in our session that day was the possible chance to reach agreement with the Soviets during strategic arms limitation talks. Nixon and Brezhnev had agreed to meet later in the fall. Kissinger asked me if I wanted him to push ahead with those plans.

"Yes, of course," I replied. Anything that would bring the arms race under control would be a plus for the entire world.

Mike, our oldest son, and his wife, Gayle, were due in from Massachusetts, but they hadn't arrived by the time I returned to our Alexandria home at eight twenty-five. Nor had Jack, our middle son, flying in from Yellowstone National Park. Susan and Steve were

UNCERTAIN DAYS

33

130-C

34

A TIME TO HEAL

home; they had just finished dinner, and as we sat in the family
room, they seemed unusually reserved. Although they didn't know
the Nixons well at all, they were saddened by what was taking place
and somewhat awe-stricken by the changes that were about to occur
in all our lives.

Nixon was due to appear on TV at nine o'clock. As I waited for his speech to begin, I couldn't help but reflect on my long association with him. My political career had coincided roughly with his. His had begun two years earlier, in 1946, when he had answered an ad placed by Republicans in his California Congressional District who were seeking an opponent for an entrenched liberal Democrat. He volunteered and won as an idealistic believer in the American economic and political system. My own began in 1948 with a similar dedication to the American way and U.S. leadership abroad. In January 1949, after I had been sworn in as a member of the House, Nixon was one of the first colleagues I met. Over the next twenty-five years, our political paths crossed many times, and our friendship grew. His career was always more visible, more dramatic than mine, but that was fine with me.

In writing about a friend, one likes to consider the mutual bonds
and good qualities on which the friendship is based. One of our strong-
est ties was the fact that we came from Middle America (economical-
ly if not geographically), and from families that had suffered much
during the Depression years. We respected each other because each
of us knew that the other had come up the hard way. Both of us were
lawyers; both had served as naval officers during World War II. We
had similar interests aside from politics: football, baseball and other
sports. Each of us had a wonderful wife and fine children. We under-
stood each other's ambitions in politics—his to become President of
the United States, mine to be elected Speaker of the House. And all
the while, our friendship was strengthened by our mutual adherence
to the same basic policies, both at home and abroad.

Nixon had a brilliant mind, a great sensitivity to the public's politi-
cal mood and a unique ability to analyze foreign policy issues and act
decisively on them. Big decisions were his strength, and his batting
average was excellent. But he abhorred details, and rather enjoyed

pushing them off on subordinates. And that, it seemed to me, was one
of the several reasons he had come to this point of having to resign.

With all his experience in giving speeches and press conferences,
one might have assumed that he was an extrovert. In fact, the oppo-
site was true. He was very shy, a loner in many respects, and he
seemed to prefer dealing with paper work to dealing with people.
His oratorical capabilities were the result of his recognition that in or-
der to succeed in politics, he had to be able to speak convincingly be-
fore large audiences. His fierce determination and able mind pro-
pelled him toward the highest office in the land.

Most of us have hidden flaws or personality quirks that seldom
come to the surface. We control them successfully and resist their ex-
ploitation by those around us. In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A
terribly proud man, he detested weakness in other people. I'd often
heard him speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was weak. Report-
ers, he sensed, were his adversaries. He knew they didn't like him,
and he responded with reciprocal disdain.) He was very bitter about
members of Congress who wanted to cut and run from our obliga-
tions in South Vietnam, and he detested those lawmakers who were
trying to hamstring his efforts to settle the war from a position of
strength. He felt that ever since the days of House Speakers Sam Ray-
burn and John McCormack and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson, the Democratic leadership of the Congress had been erod-
ing. Because it had become increasingly weak, it was deserving of his
contempt. That attitude was reflected in his selection of Bob Halde-
man and John Ehrlichman as the White House aides through whom
he wanted to deal with the Hill.

It was reflected, too, in his explanations of Watergate. His pride
and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability to tell
the difference between right and wrong. What some journalists
called the "dark side" of his personality had prevailed over his judg-
ment, which was normally sound. And once the course had been set,
there was no turning back.

As I sat in our family room, I wondered whether he had known in
advance about the break-in at the Watergate. I couldn't really be-

UNCERTAIN DAYS

35

TELCON

Secretary Kissinger
Hugh Sidey

8/9/74 8:08 p.m.

132

Mood.

K: Hi, Hugh, how are you

S: Pretty good, how are you doing?

K:

S: Survive all of this?

K: Yeh, fairly.

S: Henry, is there any chance to come around/you at all--to get a little fill in on some of the events to the extent that you can that have happened. Or is that impossible.

K: When do you have to do it?

S: By tomorrow afternoon or evening.

K: Look, try coming over to my state department office at 8:30 tomorrow morning. I can't promise you it will actually work out, then.

S: I see.

K: Can you do that?

S: Sure, I can do that, that'd be fine if we could--where is that 7th floor?

K: Yeh.

S: Does that make sense--you know we've got gaps in the story and we've got--

K: I don't know how much I'd be prepared to say, but I might steer you away from things that are wrong.

S: Yeh, I would appreciate it, you know and after all we are not living under the heavy hand any more--I know Jerry Ford and its' prett, open Administration, or hopefully it will be.

K: No, the problem really is--what happened to President Nixon is a human tragedy.

S: Well, maybe you can tell me some of that.

Page 2

K: You know, I want to --I don't want to go into too much of it--and when I say tragedy, it doesn't mean that it wasn't undeserved.

S: Yeh, I realize that.

K: It was like one of those Greek things where a man is told his fate is ______ and fulfills it anyway, knowing exactly what is going to happen to him.

imagine

S: No, I can imagine the whole physical strain and emotional problems of the week and all and I understand that. But I would, if you had time, just like to run through the chronology and just ______ you were involved ______ in and see if it is correct and if there is anything we should know that we don't.

K: Okay, well come by at 8:30 -- I may have to shift it to 10:30 at the WH but you will understand that.

S: Okay, Henry.

K: Bye.

TELECON

Arthur Burns/Secretary Kissinger

August 10, 1974

2:33 PM

(Missed first part)

K: Just about the most heartbreaking thing I've been involved in.

B: Was it difficult?

K: Well, it was inordinately painful.

B: I know, but did he understand?

K: Yes and no. He understood the arithmetic in the Congress and he understood what would happen if he fought to the bitter end and I think __energy in the committee.

B: I thought until the end that he might keep on fighting __fortunately, that didn't happen.

K: That was awful.

B: I feel terrible about his family.

K: I spent three hours with him Wednesday night and it just about tore me up.

B: How was in family?

K: They weren't supportive. They wanted him to keep fighting. I would stake my life that he must have authorized clemency. We know Haldemen. He __by showing his manhood to the President.

B: That one was enough. Every friend he had on the judiciary committee switched immediately.

K: But I'm saying, what would have happened if he went on.

B: Some of the Committee people want this to continue.

K: But that can't be permitted. Enough is enough.

B: Exactly. We need to forget and I don't want to her the word Watergate.

136

Burns - page 2

K: I don't want to see a former President of the U.S. in jail or in court.
He wasn't a bad President.

B: The idea of equality is ridiculous after all, Nixon has been punished
more than Colson who gets a year.

K: No comparison.

B: He had the most severe punishment.

K: A man who spends his whole life getting to where he was.

B: And the only President to leave the office in disgrace. To want blood
after that is inhuman.

K: I'd go public if it happened.

B: You take the present x tapes, to whom do they belong, to Nixon?

K: I agree with you. OK. Let's get together soon.

B: Yes, I want very much to, there's no much to talk about and we have
new opportunities.

K: Exactly.

B: And this opportunity will be lost unless we move energetically with the
next few weeks.

K: Right. Let's talk about it soon.

B: Alright.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

TELCON

The President/Sec. Kissinger

August 10, 1974

3:40 p.m.

F: Yes, Henry.

K: Mr. President, sorry to bother you.

F: That's all right.

K: We are having some developments on Cyprus. Until I know how you want to work, I thought I should check with you on some of these actions. You know the Greeks and Turks are meeting under the British Chairmanship in Geneva and we have an Assistant Secretary there to be generally helpful.

F: Sisco?

K: No. Art Hartman. The British minister represents a government that will have to stand firm on this issue so they are looking for a quick success and they are a bit like a bull in a china shop. Callaghan is not too experienced. The Turks want a quick result leading to partition of the Island into Greek and Turkish parts with sort of a general federal government which would however be very weak. They have about 15 percent of the island and want 30 percent. They might try to grab it. I have talked to the Prime Minister of Turkey. He was a student of mine and I have told him that we could not -- really in the first 48 hours of your term of office -- be very relaxed about unilateral military action.

F: We sure cannot.

K: If that happens we might have to disassociate from the which we have tried to avoid. Out of danger in Turkey and why we must maneuver carefully. They might turn very nationalistic and the Russians have been trying to exploit that but we cannot let them act unilaterally. I am writing a letter to Ecevit. He has promised to hold off for 24 hours. I am writing to Ecevit on my behalf outling where I see the negotiations stand. The Turks propose two areas -- one Turkish & one Greek. I think the Greeks we can push into a position where they would be willing to accept two or three autonomous Turkish areas but not one contiguous area. That would avoid a population transfer.

F: Right.

K: This would give us an opportunity to stall military actions long enough to get it working on the foreign minister level to see if we can get a compromise.

BRIEF HONEYMOON

183

before January 31,
country and agree to
inally, they'd have to

nishment once they
agreed to spend two
had once belonged.
clemency discharge,
benefits. The details of
wanted me to give
atives, who demanded
r, and I was hopeful
ner Senator Charles
art in processing the
eceive.

d for all, the sort of
flourished during the
oth tradition and ex-
ial in the tax returns.
I don't think my
order I placed severe
mber 20, in a memo
talked about the need
tion government bu-
t to it that the merit
the personnel laws
d out,” I said. “Ap-
nust not be made on

ent was to ban any
ther in the Oval Of-
that anyone on my
son's knowledge or
everyone knew my
I asked senior aides
to the White House
—we didn't want a

lot of fanfare or publicity—but the word got around and caused an
improvement in the atmosphere.

On the foreign policy front, one of my chief concerns was the situ-
ation in the Middle East. On September 10, Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and his wife arrived in Washington. I had known Ra-
bin when he was Israel's ambassador to the U.S. A dour, very serious
man who dressed conservatively and spoke in a soft, almost inaudible
voice, he was nonetheless a tough negotiator. But toughness, I was
convinced, was not the only ingredient needed to resolve the Middle
East impasse. Flexibility—on both sides—was essential as well, and I
wasn't sure how flexible Rabin could be. “We have taken risks for
peace,” he said, but he didn't spell out what those risks had been, and
in toasting me at a state dinner on September 12, he indicated that he
wasn't going to make concessions readily. Unfortunately, at the end
of our two days of talks, we hadn't made much progress toward solv-
ing the issues that still divided us, and I asked Kissinger to plan an
October trip to the Middle East to see what he could do.

The long-standing conflict in that part of the world was also on the
mind of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko when he came to
Washington for two days of talks on September 20. Even before I be-
came President, Kissinger had achieved significant success in easing
the Soviets out of the Middle East. I thought they didn't want a bona
fide settlement there and that their only aim was to promote instabil-
ity, so I wanted to keep them out. Gromyko, of course, complained
about this. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., he said, were cochairmen of the
dormant Geneva Conference on the Middle East. Our two countries
should work together in the interests of all parties. But Kissinger and
I decided that we could accomplish more unilaterally by working
with Israel and each of its Arab neighbors. Whenever Gromyko asked
us about our plans, we would be as vague as possible. “We will keep
you informed,” we'd say. That made him very upset.

I had better luck with Gromyko in discussing bilateral relations. I
told him I thought Congress would listen to reason and strike out irk-
some amendments to the Trade Reform bill and the Export-Import
Bank bill. This was reassuring. Then we talked about SALT. Nixon
and Kissinger had been to Moscow that summer and had made mini-
mal progress in their talks with Soviet leaders. But now Gromyko

506 *Nixon: A Life*

139

demise may well have been listened to by Ford's unthreatening personality and his easy acceptability to Congress. He came to believe that 'the coalescence of forces' against him eventually included a significant number of Republicans in the House and Senate who thought 'they could get along better with Ford than with me'.⁹⁵ This retrospective view may well be right, but at the time quite different calculations prevailed. Ford was perceived both by Nixon and by many of his fellow Congressmen as decent but dumb. He would be loyal, useful in coralling Republican votes against an impeachment resolution, but his peers did not regard him as a potential President. He was another 'insurance policy', or so Nixon told Chuck Colson.⁹⁶

Unfortunately for the President, there was no insurance policy that would take care of the Special Prosecutor. Nixon saw Cox as a 'partisan viper we had planted in our bosom'.⁹⁷ On 12 October he discovered that the viper's sting could be deadly. That was the day when the Court of Appeals handed down a 5-2 judgement that the President must obey Cox's subpoena to hand over nine of the White House tapes related to Watergate. The decision presented Nixon with another dilemma. If he released the tapes he would be breaching the important principle that a President's private conversations must be protected by executive privilege. Yet disobedience of the court order was unthinkable, for it would make the President a lawbreaker. The only escape routes from the dilemma were either to seek a compromise, or to dismiss Cox.

The story of the plan that became known as 'The Stennis Compromise' will forever baffle historians because the conflicts of evidence about who agreed to what; who misinformed whom; and who broke their word are so confusing and contradictory. The essence of the plan was that the President would preserve the constitutional principle of executive privilege by providing summaries of the nine tapes required under Cox's subpoena. Once the nine summaries had been delivered, there would be no further attempts by the Special Prosecutor to obtain additional tapes of presidential conversations. The summaries would be verified for accuracy by Senator John Stennis of Mississippi. As the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, a former judge, and a senior Democrat, Stennis was respected in all political quarters for his integrity and impartiality. His imprimatur of authenticity should make each summary an acceptable substitute for the tape itself - or so the White House hoped.

The week in which the Stennis compromise was floated coincided with the fiercest days of fighting in the Middle East war. It was one of the most momentous dramas in Nixon's career as an international statesman, and he rose to the occasion magnificently. Not only did he save Israel from annihilation, he also put forward, in a far-sighted letter to Brezhnev, the concept of the two superpowers co-operating to impose a joint US-Soviet peace settlement on the Middle East. Had Nixon been strong enough at home to see this intuitive through to a successful conclusion, it might well have been his crowning glory as a peacemaker.

With the pressure of great events occupying his time on the international

ber 7

September 8

Gerald R. Ford, 1974

[60]

Russian and the cosmonauts have learned to speak some English, so you can either talk to them in Russian or English, either way you want. [Laughter]

Thank you very much, and we look forward to having a bite to eat.

NOTE: The President spoke at 3:35 p.m. at the Northern Virginia Police Academy.

60

## Remarks on Signing a Proclamation Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon. September 8, 1974

Ladies and gentlemen:

I have come to a decision which I felt I should tell you and all of my fellow American citizens, as soon as I was certain in my own mind and in my own conscience that it is the right thing to do.

I have learned already in this office that the difficult decisions always come to this desk. I must admit that many of them do not look at all the same as the hypothetical questions that I have answered freely and perhaps too fast on previous occasions.

My customary policy is to try and get all the facts and to consider the opinions of my countrymen and to take counsel with my most valued friends. But these seldom agree, and in the end, the decision is mine. To procrastinate, to agonize, and to wait for a more favorable turn of events that may never come or more compelling external pressures that may as well be wrong as right, is itself a decision of sorts and a weak and potentially dangerous course for a President to follow.

I have promised to uphold the Constitution, to do what is right as God gives me to see the right, and to do the very best that I can for America.

I have asked your help and your prayers, not only when I became President but many times since. The Constitution is the supreme law of our land and it governs our actions as citizens. Only the laws of God, which govern our consciences, are superior to it.

As we are a nation under God, so I am sworn to uphold our laws with the help of God. And I have sought such guidance and searched my own conscience with special diligence to determine the right thing for me to do with respect to my predecessor in this place, Richard Nixon, and his loyal wife and family.

Theirs is an American tragedy in which we all have played a part. It could go on and on and on, or someone must write the end to it. I have concluded that only I can do that, and if I can, I must.

101

[60]

September 8

141.

There are no historic or legal precedents to which I can turn in this matter, none that precisely fit the circumstances of a private citizen who has resigned the Presidency of the United States. But it is common knowledge that serious allegations and accusations hang like a sword over our former President's head, threatening his health as he tries to reshape his life, a great part of which was spent in the service of this country and by the mandate of its people.

After years of bitter controversy and divisive national debate, I have been advised, and I am compelled to conclude that many months and perhaps more years will have to pass before Richard Nixon could obtain a fair trial by jury in any jurisdiction of the United States under governing decisions of the Supreme Court.

I deeply believe in equal justice for all Americans, whatever their station or former station. The law, whether human or divine, is no respecter of persons; but the law is a respecter of reality.

The facts, as I see them, are that a former President of the United States, instead of enjoying equal treatment with any other citizen accused of violating the law, would be cruelly and excessively penalized either in preserving the presumption of his innocence or in obtaining a speedy determination of his guilt in order to repay a legal debt to society.

During this long period of delay and potential litigation, ugly passions would again be aroused. And our people would again be polarized in their opinions. And the credibility of our free institutions of government would again be challenged at home and abroad.

In the end, the courts might well hold that Richard Nixon had been denied due process, and the verdict of history would even more be inconclusive with respect to those charges arising out of the period of his Presidency, of which I am presently aware.

But it is not the ultimate fate of Richard Nixon that most concerns me, though surely it deeply troubles every decent and every compassionate person. My concern is the immediate future of this great country.

In this, I dare not depend upon my personal sympathy as a long-time friend of the former President, nor my professional judgment as a lawyer, and I do not.

As President, my primary concern must always be the greatest good of all the people of the United States whose servant I am. As a man, my first consideration is to be true to my own convictions and my own conscience.

My conscience tells me clearly and certainly that I cannot prolong the bad dreams that continue to reopen a chapter that is closed. My conscience tells me that only I, as President, have the constitutional power to firmly shut and seal this

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book. My conscience tells me it is my duty, not merely to proclaim domestic tranquillity but to use every means that I have to insure it.

I do believe that the buck stops here, that I cannot rely upon public opinion polls to tell me what is right.

I do believe that right makes might and that if I am wrong, 10 angels swearing I was right would make no difference.

I do believe, with all my heart and mind and spirit, that I, not as President but as a humble servant of God, will receive justice without mercy if I fail to show mercy.

Finally, I feel that Richard Nixon and his loved ones have suffered enough and will continue to suffer, no matter what I do, no matter what we, as a great and good nation, can do together to make his goal of peace come true.

[At this point, the President began reading from the proclamation granting the pardon.]

"Now, therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, pursuant to the pardon power conferred upon me by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, have granted and by these presents do grant a full, free, and absolute pardon unto Richard Nixon for all offenses against the United States which he, Richard Nixon, has committed or may have committed or taken part in during the period from July (January) 20, 1969 through August 9, 1974."

[The President signed the proclamation and then resumed reading.]

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this eighth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and ninety-ninth."

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:05 a.m. in the Oval Office at the White House, where he signed Proclamation 4311 granting the pardon.

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## Proclamation 4311, Granting Pardon to Richard Nixon.

September 8, 1974

By the President of the United States of America a Proclamation

Richard Nixon became the thirty-seventh President of the United States on January 20, 1969 and was reelected in 1972 for a second term by the electors of forty-nine of the fifty states. His term in office continued until his resignation on August 9, 1974.

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policy moves he initiated as President. Until 1970, he had maintained a hard line against the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The clipping file will contain accounts of the famous "kitchen debate" with Nikita Khrushchev and the many speeches he made chastising Mao Tse-tung. But those clips will be footnotes in the pages of history. The headlines will record his grand strategy to move from the Cold War to a policy of détente with the Soviets. That policy was best exemplified by the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement of 1972, the joint space effort and the numerous cultural and technical exchanges between the two countries. Historians will wonder how this Cold Warrior of the 1950s and 1960s could move so successfully to a policy of accord with the Soviets. The consensus will be that Nixon saw the big picture.

Our new ties with the Soviets were possible, I believed, only because the Soviet leaders were becoming concerned about developments within the People's Republic of China. Both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were making increasingly antagonistic speeches toward the Kremlin. Nixon sensed that the Chinese leaders feared and distrusted the Soviets. Their long-standing border dispute was a festering sore. Mao had never forgiven the Soviets for mistreating him in the 1950s, and he was concerned about Soviet intentions in the Pacific. Skillfully, Nixon moved to take advantage of the split.

The result was a recognition in world capitals that the United States was once again the master of the international scene. American involvement in Vietnam had undercut our worldwide leadership role and many old friends and neutrals were moving away from us. After the overtures to Moscow and Peking, U.S. prestige began to rise again. Nixon's initiatives defused the trend against us and created a new foundation for peace.

And now with Nixon gone, nations around the world wondered whether I would keep that foundation strong. The prevailing wisdom in Washington at that time was that I knew very little about foreign policy. Like so much of the wisdom in the capital, it was totally inaccurate. Since 1953, as a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee—and later as a member of the subcommittee that had a watchdog responsibility for the CIA—I'd had ample opportunity to listen to Administration experts testify about all aspects

of our relationships with other countries. In addition, from 1956 through 1964 I had served on the Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee. I had questioned Secretaries of Defense and State and directors of the CIA. I'd traveled to Europe and Southeast Asia, and I was confident that I knew as much about foreign policy as any member of Congress. And for the past eight months, I'd had the benefit of weekly briefings from Henry Kissinger or his deputy, Brent Scowcroft.

It would be hard for me to overstate the admiration and affection I had for Henry. Our relationship began on solid, unshakable ground and grew even better with the passage of time. He had gone through hell during the final days of the Nixon Administration and he had agreed to stay on only because I said I needed him. People who don't know Kissinger view him as solemn, gruff and pedantic. The truth is that he has an engaging sense of humor. Sure, he had an ego—most people who achieve international stature do—and it's also true that he had a penchant for secrecy. But that, I felt, was a necessary ingredient of successful diplomacy, and of Kissinger's success there could be no doubt. Our personalities meshed. I respected his expertise in foreign policy and he respected my judgment in domestic politics. He was a total pragmatist who thought in terms of power and national interest instead of ideology. He had a global view of international relationships and tried to rearrange them in a way that would be beneficial to the United States. I think we worked together as well as any President and Secretary of State have worked throughout our history.

The Nixon resignation, of course, had been just as profound a shock internationally as it had been in the United States. Henry impressed upon me how essential it was that I become identified in the minds of the diplomatic corps as someone knowledgeable about and involved with the conduct of American foreign policy. Thus, on my first day as President, I met with some sixty envoys from nations all over the world—some privately, such as representatives of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Israel, several of the Arab nations and South Vietnam. Others—the envoys from our NATO allies—we received as a group.

In the Oval Office that evening, I conferred with the members of

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FORD MEMOIR

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the transition team who had been devising ways to facilitate the change in Administrations. Able, hard-driving Don Rumsfeld was the coordinator of the team's efforts and, in my opinion, he was a perfect choice. I'd been disappointed when he'd left the Congress in 1969 to run the Office of Economic Opportunity for Richard Nixon, though I felt confident that if anyone could take that mess and straighten it out, Rumsfeld was the man. In 1971, when Nixon adopted wage and price controls, he named Rumsfeld to administer them. Don had achieved great success in everything he'd done, and so I wasn't surprised when he left Washington in 1973 to become Ambassador to NATO. Both of us had athletic backgrounds—his was in wrestling— and both of us were straightforward. Above all, he was a superior administrator and a demon when it came to working long hours, organizing an office and making sure that everything functioned efficiently. The fact that he was in the Nixon White House from the earliest days and didn't get involved in Watergate said much about his personal integrity. He wouldn't tolerate political shenanigans and the men around Nixon knew he wouldn't, so to protect themselves, they kept him out of the loop.

The transition team member responsible for liaison with the federal agencies and departments was Rogers Morton, the Secretary of Interior. I had been in the House with his brother, Thruston, so when Rog came to Congress as the Representative from the Eastern Shore of Maryland, we became friends right away. We shared the same philosophy and political beliefs. He was a hulking bear of a man, six feet eight, but he was also one of the gentlest people I have ever known. No one ever got mad at him. Most important, both Don and Rog had no qualms about telling me when I was wrong.

The third member of the team—responsible for personnel—was Bill Scranton. He and I had overlapped at Yale. I'd gotten to know him better when he served in the House, and I'd been saddened by his decision—after one splendid term as his state's governor—to retire from politics. But our relationship was such that I knew I could count on him to help when I needed him. Jack Marsh was the fourth and final member of the group, and as a former Congressman, the obvious choice to handle my liaison with Capitol Hill.

During that initial meeting, the transition team sought and re-

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ceived my agreement on four general operating principles. They wanted to organize the Ford White House to give me control over the major functions of my office and to make sure that key people had ample access to me. Secondly, they wanted to guarantee that the organization reflected my personal style by assuring openness and the free movement of people and ideas. A third goal was to reduce the overall size of the White House staff. Finally, they wanted to make the structure as flexible as possible.

Rumsfeld and the others were acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the role they played. They didn't want the transition team to "take over" the government, and Don said it should go out of business within thirty days. If it didn't, chaos could ensue. People anxious to appeal decisions that the Nixon Administration had made would turn to the transition team, and there was a possibility that we'd wind up with two "White House staffs" and two Administrations. "So let us get in and help out," Don said, "and let's understand that, barring some major catastrophe, we'll be out of here in a month." (The group did its job in less than two weeks.)

On Saturday, my second day as President, I convened the Cabinet. Nixon had always behaved rather formally with his Cabinet, seldom shaking hands or engaging in banter; he got down to business very quickly. It's pretty hard to change your style at the age of sixty-one, and I had no intentions of changing mine. I strode into the room, shook hands all around and asked the Cabinet members to take their seats. I told them that I didn't want—indeed, that I wouldn't accept—any resignations. The country needed stability and continuity. I urged the Secretaries to be more "affirmative" in their relations with the press, and I also asked them to "come and see me with your problems. I think we have a fine team here," I concluded, "and I'm looking forward to working with each and every one of you."

What I wanted in my Cabinet were strong managers who would control the career bureaucrats and not become their captives; people who knew how to build support in the Congress and the media. I would leave the details of administration to them and concentrate on determining national priorities and directions myself. I wanted men and women who would give me unvarnished truth, then lay out the options for decisions that I would have to make. If several of them

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disagreed with each other before the decision was made, well, that was all to the good. I'd be the beneficiary of their arguments.

And as I glanced around the room during that first Cabinet meeting, I had to admit that Nixon—whatever his shortcomings—had recruited a Cabinet of fine quality. Kissinger was superb as Secretary of State. As Secretary of the Treasury, Bill Simon stood for a fiscal responsibility that I thought was mandatory for the Cabinet. I liked his drive, his obvious intelligence and his desire to work with others. As Secretary of HUD, Jim Lynn was excellent. So was Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz. Former Ohio Senator William Saxbe was Attorney General. Some members of my staff found him garrulous, and he tended to shoot from the hip, but his independence made him credible, and I was delighted when he agreed to stay. As for Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, I respected his intellect, but I wasn't sure how effective he would be in dealing with the Congress. People on Capitol Hill often found him patronizing or arrogant. Some of the other Cabinet members—Casper Weinberger at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and Claude Brinegar at the Department of Transportation, for example—were exhausted by the turmoil of the Nixon years and really wanted to leave. In the spirit of unity, they, too, agreed to stay.

In the Nixon years, the Cabinet departments and agencies had lost power and influence to such White House appendages as the Domestic Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council on International Economic Policy. That tended to destroy one of the foundations of our form of government. A Watergate was made possible by a strong chief of staff and ambitious White House aides who were more powerful than members of the Cabinet but who had little or no practical political experience or judgment. I wanted to reverse the trend and restore authority to my Cabinet. White House aides with authority are necessary, but I didn't think they had the right to browbeat the departments and agencies. Nor did they have the right to make policy decisions. I decided to give my Cabinet members a lot more control.

To a large degree, any Administration's success depends on the ability of the President to work harmoniously with his Cabinet, and from the beginning I imposed a set of rules for myself in order to do

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just that. They were: (1) have no special confidants within the Cabinet; (2) listen, don't confide; (3) don't get involved in any jurisdictional rivalries; (4) have confidants outside the Cabinet from whom advice can be solicited; (5) don't get mired down in detail—handle the broad policy decisions and leave management and program implementation to the department heads; (6) move aggressively on all fronts toward resolution and decision; (7) look at all proposals as if you're going to have to be the advocate who sells them to the public at large; and (8) finally, encourage dissent before a final decision is made.

People probably expected me to move cautiously, even tentatively, in picking up the reins, but it was important to set an activist pace from the start. There had been a hiatus in the capital for the past few months; the government seemed to be standing still. Nixon hadn't talked to reporters; he hadn't dealt with the Congress; he hadn't reached out to the people of the country. I had to do all three. My actions had already signaled to the press that my Administration would be very different from his. Soon it would be time for me to address a joint session of Congress, and over that first weekend I worked with Hartmann and Milton Friedman on the text of my speech.

Shortly after eight-thirty on Monday evening, August 12, Betty and I drove from our home in Alexandria—we weren't set to move into the White House until the following week—to the Capitol. Kenneth R. Harding, the Sergeant at Arms of the House, and George M. White, the Architect of the Capitol, met us at a side door on the House side of the building. While aides led Betty to the family gallery in the House chamber, Harding and White escorted me toward the Speaker's office on the second floor. The corridors were packed with Congressional employees whom I'd known for years. They were smiling and clapping. The members of the Cabinet were gathered in the Speaker's office, waiting for me to arrive. So were the House and Senate leadership, and I shook hands warmly with each of them. These were my friends. They were cordial in their welcome. Everyone was patting me on the back.

"Mr. President," boomed the voice of William M. ("Fishbait") Miller, the crusty old doorkeeper of the House, "line up. We've got to move." Speaker Albert and Senate President Pro-tem James Eastland

ing there was no way he was going to lose in '64. That was
strictly a sympathy vote, and our party was so fractured that we
probably would have lost anyway. [Republican candidate
Barry] Goldwater was a disaster, but I remember [Herbert]
Hoover told me in '64 that with Goldwater, who was very
weak, it might serve us well to get the party's extremism out of
its system. Maybe he was right.

"But when it came to winning, Johnson stopped at nothing. He had guts, but not enough to run again in '68. He left me a mess, but at least he fought the goddamned North Vietnamese. A lesser president may have packed it in.

"He did civil rights, which was his one big achievement. But his expansion of the welfare state in this country was unforgivable. All of that crap about the Great Society was just an excuse to pour money into all the programs and the new ones he created to satisfy his liberal supporters. Don't get me wrong; Johnson was a true-believing liberal. But much of what he did he did for purely political reasons. Johnson was a totally political animal. He told me once, 'People don't support you because they like you. You can count on a person's support only when you can do something for him or to him.' He lived by that rule.

"After he left office, he was bitter, cynical, and hard. As I've said, it's difficult not to be, but Johnson was so sensitive about how he would be portrayed historically that he was just totally shattered when he left. Johnson was not a good man, but he made decisions from his gut, and he tried."

Nixon leaned back in his chair. "There," he said to me,
"that's your political lesson for the day."

His thoughts about his more recent contemporaries were less
historical judgments than personal opinions. Since Ford's,
Carter's, and Reagan's presidencies came after his own, he cri-
tiqued them through a finer lens and with less generosity, par-
ticularly based upon how they treated him as a former
president. Nixon's own policies and achievements would sur-
vive or fall depending upon what these men did in the office.
His frustrations with being out of power, and with having to

watch his successors act in ways he would not have consumed
him. His assessments of these men reflected this oppor-
ment, agitation, and anger and reinforced his own notion that
he had been a superior president.

"Poor [Gerald] Ford," he said on July 8, 1992, after a phone conversation with his successor. "You won't even believe why he called me. He was concerned about some presidential photos and about having me sign them. Imagine! He calls me for *that*! Of course he's busy making speeches for big money, like the rest of them." He paused, settling on a point he wanted to emphasize. "You know, I have never taken a dime for a speech since 1952. Of course no one gives me credit for that. Ford was really the first to take money. Roosevelt and Kennedy died; Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and I never did. But since Ford, they are out there accumulating a fortune by selling the office—or their experiences in the office, anyway. I know it's tempting, but it's just not right. Besides, when Ford talks, does anyone pay any attention?"

"Well, sir, he did assume the office in a very difficult way and
had no choice but to be a steward of existing policies," I said,
trying to get a more sympathetic view from him.

"True," he replied. "I don't mean to be so down on him. He was put in a hell of a position. He didn't even want to be president, never mind getting it *that* way. And of course the press and everybody else was going to be rough on him because he was my choice." He hesitated. "No, I feel for the guy. It's not fair to judge him by the same standards. But you know, to see him out there now using the office just doesn't sit well with me."

His disappointment in Ford intensified when he learned that
Ford would be attending former secretary of state Henry
Kissinger's seventieth birthday party in mid-1993. On April 27,
a disgusted Nixon said, "*[Washington Post* board chairman
Katharine] Graham will be there. Imagine the nerve of him to
 invite me too! I will *not* sit in a room with her. Why should
I? I'm a pretty forgiving person, but not when it comes to
that crowd. Luckily, I can't go anyway because I need to go to
[international-affairs expert] Dimitri [Simes]'s wedding on the

Monica Crowley: Nixon off the RECORD (New York: Random House, 1996).

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because it was for Henry, but when he said Graham would be there—well, forget it! And look at Ford—what is he thinking about, going to the goddamned thing?

Fortunately for Ford, he was in the presidency for only a limited time, which spared him the full Nixon wrath. Jimmy Carter, however, who won campaigning on the “integrity” he implied Nixon lacked, was an easy and extensive target.

"I can't believe Carter didn't show up at our library opening," he said on July 23, 1990. The Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace in Yorba Linda, California, had been dedicated four days earlier, with former presidents Ford and Reagan and President Bush in attendance. Carter, however, pleading scheduling conflicts, did not attend. Nixon was angry. "Is that the pettiest damn thing you ever heard of?"

I had been working for him for only three weeks and did not know him very well, but I felt compelled to ask, "Sir, have you ever been to his library?"

He looked at me, shocked by the question. "Well, no. But that's not right either."

Carter was in the unenviable position of being not just the first full-term president to succeed Nixon but the first Democrat as well. Nixon resented, though understood, the political advantage Carter enjoyed in 1976 by virtue of Nixon's downfall. By showcasing his own moral integrity, Carter had called attention to Nixon's storied moral deficit. With Nixon's tactics discredited as Machiavellian evil, Carter had positioned himself as an idealist who would restore America's virtue and save it from the debris of the Nixon presidency.

"Carter is one of those types who tries to be morally superior but does such small, petty things that it becomes almost hypocritical," he said on April 1, 1992. Carter had been a guest of President Bush's at the White House that morning, prompting Nixon's comments.

"They weren't discussing the Russians, were they?" he asked me.

"Not from what the news reports indicate," I answered.

20

"Good," he replied, then paused. "Why does Bush invite Carter there? He's a true partisan. He's not there to win Bush." He paused again. "Here is Carter, holier than thou with that toothy grin, but he turns around to slam anyone he passes judgment on, including me. So much for generosity. Look, I understand that he had to do it in '76 and even '80, though to a lesser extent. But to continue to beat the horse after all this time is too much."

In early October 1992, Nixon was concerned that Carter intended to visit Russia when he planned to be there. Several months before, Nixon had taken the lead on the issue of aiding Russia to help solidify the democratic and free-market gains made since the collapse of communism there in 1991. Because of his constant and public prodding, the Bush administration moved forward with an aid program, for which Nixon got the credit. He was protective of the issue and resented Carter's infringement.

"I see that Carter may be there when we are there," he said on October 3. "He's probably going over to build outhouses in Central Asia." He stopped, reconsidered his attitude, and subtracted the sarcasm. "No, that's overdoing it. Look, although I have problems with Carter personally and politically, he has done some very decent things as a former president. While Ford is playing golf, which he should do if that's his idea of retirement, Carter is out there banging nails into houses for the poor. At least Carter puts his money where his mouth is. He practices what he preaches, and for that I give him credit. Basically, he is a decent guy; he was just wrong for the presidency."

"Do you think he was too honest to make an effective president?" I asked.

He smiled. "That's a very interesting question. No, I don't know. I think he was too trusting and too naïve, particularly when it came to the Russians."

✓ Carter's involvement in international affairs irritated Nixon immensely. He considered Carter a disruptive intrusion upon other countries' political processes and upon our own in his role as a freelancing and unofficial secretary of state.

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