PAGE 8

VOICE OF THE FIRST U. S. ARMY

AUGUST 1, 1962

## Gen. Snyder Addresses G1 Conference

Governors Island—Brigadier General Howard Snyder, Chief of Staff, Headquarters, First US Army, addressed personnel staff officers from First Army major commands at a G1/S1 Conference held here on 20 July.

General Snyder emphasized "the

### Harvard Honors Army Major

West Point—Dual Recognition at Harvard University was won at graduation by Maj. Robert G. Gard Jr., formerly Assistant Professor for National Security Problems in the Department of Social Sciences at the USMA.

Besides receiving his Ph. D. in Political Economy and Government at Harvard's commencement exercises, Maj. Gard was awarded the coveted Sumner Prize given for outstanding scholarship at the Ph. D. level in the political science field.

Named for its donor, Senator Charles Sumner of the Harvard Class of 1830, the Sumner Prize is offered for the best dissertation on means for helping prevent war. Maj. Gard's doctoral dissertation analyzed a period in U. S. efforts to control nuclear weapons.

### SHEEPSKIN AWARD

Dean Don K. Price of Harvard's Graduate School of Public Administration presented the sheepskin and award to Maj. Gard.

A 1950 USMA graduate, Maj. Gard attended the Graduate School of Public Administration two years before teaching in the Social Sciences Department from 1957-60, and returned to Harvard afterward to complete his dissertation.

He is presently en route to a new assignment in Teheran, Iran, accompanied by his wife and three children.

need for improvement in personnel management and utilization in view of the growing austerity of personnel resources."

He stated "the objective of these conferences will be to improve the overall personnel posture of the command. A common understanding of our mutual personnel problems and an exchange of ideas on how to overcome them will be of great assistance in attaining this objective."

Colonel J. B. Wells, ACofS, G1, Headquarters, First US Army, following the welcoming address by the Chief of Staff, reviewed personnel operations over the past three years, provided guidelines for the conference, and outlined areas of importance for future consideration.

Colonel Wells concluded his remarks with his "personal thanks for the fine support rendered in the past and urged all toward greater achievement in the future."

During the afternoon a "Roundtable" discussion was held on major problem areas following which visits were made by conferees to "counterparts" in the Headquarters.

The next conference is tentatively scheduled for the month of November.

## Color Blindness No Bar in Army

Severe color blindness is no longer a bar to peacetime military duty, under the relaxation of Army Regulation 40-501, rejecting persons unable to distinguish bright red from bright gren.

Color blind personnel will be assigned to MOS's not requiring acute color vision, such as clerk typist, teletype operator or medical record clerk. About one per cent of the men tested for Army Active Duty reveal this severe color blindness.

Information Section

HQ. First United States Army

Governors Island

New York 4, New York

Postage and Fees Paid

Department of the Army

MR WALTER BARTON LEACH

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

CAMBRIDGE 38 MASS

## Capsule News -- First Army

The U.S. Air Force Bagpipe Band paid a recent visit to the Boston Army Base. Governors Island was host to the largest group of graduating dentists ever to be commissioned there—39. Fort Totten supply clerk Jesse "Jack" Frazier is looking for someone to write music to accompany his lyrics. He has been composing songs for the past six months. . . . Devens PFC Robert E. Curtiss received praise from several literary critics for his biographical publication depicting the life of an immoralist who later became a Saint. The book is entitled "And She Was Called Magdalen". . . . Camp Kilmer reports the new interstate highway of New Jersey's Route 78 is being renamed the "Lightning Division Memorial Highway" in honor of the 78th Division.

The new super-road will stretch from Newark to Phillipsburg. . . . Picatinny Arsenal has a "catch shell" program which provides for the recovery of projectiles after firing by catching them on a "sled" at super-sonic speeds. . . . Devens warns of human beings who go off sun-bathing half-crocked and come back half-baked. . . . Pay day is a good time to think of the Army Relief Fund. . . . "Noon meal" is an important time to Whitehall Street's PFC Francis White. That's the time he drew three prize winners in the recent Governors Island Art Contest. . . . When General MacArthur was about to pay his graduation day visit to the USMA, he was asked by an inquisitive hotel doorman, "Where are you bound for General?" "West Point," was the answer. "Beautiful place," said the doorman, "Ever been there before?" . . . Fort Dix was the subject of a 30-minute TV show on WRCV-TV, Philadelphia, "In Defense of Freedom". . . . Fort Hamilton is presenting a series of summer band concerts, every Thursday at 8 p.m. The programs will feature classical, jazz and light musical selections. . . . The 52d Artillery Brigade hosted a group of stock exchange brokers at a tour conducted at their base. . . . Fort Monmouth expectant parents are benefiting from a course given at the Patterson Army Hospital. . . . Fort Banks calls its fishing trips "fish-fry." . . . Fort Wadsworth "Harbor Watch" knows of a two-car family. Not unusual in the two-car situation of today except that this family owns two Packards of 1940 vintage. The "ancients" belong to Lt. Col. and Mrs. Thomas E. Haus. . . . Winner of a recent Fort Dix entertainment contest talked to himself. He is PFC Thomas E. Cascone, ventriloquist. . . . Army Mess Halls will play their part in observing United Nations Day, Oct. 24, by serving an international meal. . . . James Cagney, well known movie actor, narrated a DOD documentary film, "The Road to the Wall." The show traces communism from Karl Marx to the "Berlin Wall." . . . Sloane House YMCA is a stopping off point for servicemen touring N.Y.C. It is located at 356 West 34th Street.

Major General Willis S. Matthews, Deputy Commanding General, First U. S. Army and Brigadier General Howard Snyder, Chief of Staff, meet with two newly appointed civilian aides to the Secretary of the Army, and with Mr. Bryan Houston, former aide for the First Army area. (L to R) Dr. Reuben A. Holden, Secretary of Yale University, Civilian Aide, Secretary of the Army, State of Connecticut; General Snyder; former New Jersey Governor, Robert B. Meyner, Civilian Aide for New Jersey; General Matthews, and Mr. Houston. The meeting took place at Governors Island where Dr. Holden and Mr. Meyner were briefed by General Snyder on First U.S. Army activities.

AUGUST 1, 1962

VOICE OF THE FIRST U. S. ARMY

PAGE 7

## 50th Armored Leaves Drum; 42nd Arrives

**Camp Drum**—The 50th Armored Division, New Jersey completed its 15th consecutive field training cycle at this military installation last month.

The Division, commanded by Maj- or General Edward O. Wolf, was vis- ited by many notables from military and civilian life including: Governor Richard J. Hughes, New Jersey; Honorable Stephen R. Ailes, Under- secretary of the Army, General Her- bert B. Powell, Comanding General USCONARC, and Lt. General Gar- rison H. Davidson, Commanding General, First United States Army; Major General Donald W. McGowan, Chief, National Guard Bureau and Major General James F. Cantwell, Chief of Staff, New Jersey Depart- ment of Defense.

### "Rainbow" at Drum

Training now at this installation is the 42nd Infantry Division of the New York National Guard. This Division wears the "Rainbow" patch and is commanded by Major General Charles C. Nast.

Five major Infantry units and six Artillery battalions comprise the bulk of the 42nd Infantry Division's man- power.

## Ammo Cartons Bring Savings

**Pictinaky Arsenal**—The U. S. Army —and the taxpayers—will save al- most three quarters of a million dollars on its first order for 81,000,000 rounds of blank ammunition packed in cartons for the Army's new M-14 rifle.

In the future, soldiers in train- ing exercises will load their rifles from 20-round cartons instead of from five-round clips.

The metal clips were used to trans- fer ammunition to the 20 round mag- azines used with the M-14 rifle, now the basic weapon of the Army and Marines. By hand-loading ammuni- tion into the gun directly from small cartons, the metal clips can be elim- inated.

While this procedure is slower than clip-loading, the savings war- rant the change for training pur- poses. Metal clips, however, will continue to be used for combat.

The first order for 20-round car- tons, placed at the Lake City Ord- nance Plant, Indepedence, Mo., cost $58.47 per thousand rounds as com- pared with $67.55, thus saving $726,- 000.

The new ammunition loading pro- cedure for M-14 rifles was adopted through the efforts of Ellis W. Read, Chief of OSWAC's Small Arms Branch, and his assistant, Scott W. Spaulding.

The average exchange sales trans- action is only 73 cents.

## First Army Marks 44th Anniversary

(continued from page 1)

divisions, later to become an im- portant part of First Army, moved into the lines to help stem the enemy tide. Then, taking the initia- tive, they joined with the French in the great Aisne-Marne Offensive which regained the original Allied positions. With the enemy stymied, General Pershing moved ahead with his organizational plans.

On August 10, 1918, in a small French village, LaFerte-Journe, the First U. S. Army came into being. Its first operation was a concentrated attack against the deep salient the Germans held at St. Mihiel.

More than 550,000 Americans and 110,000 Frenchmen moved to both shoulders of the German positions. By nightfall, Sept. 13, the day after the attack began, most of the ob- jectives had been achieved.

The success of the American Army units first offensive was a great stimulant to Allied morale in facing the Germans.

The St. Mihiel battle was the pre- lude of the important Meuse-Argonne Offensive.

### MEUSE-ARGONNE

On Sept. 26, the Meuse-Argonne offensive was set in motion against one of the strongest portions of the German line. Heavy enemy re- forcements slowed the advance and not until two weeks later was the strong Argonne Forest elimi- nated as a defense bastion.

On October 16th, the First Army command was taken over by Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett.

By early November, the Ger- mans were in full retreat. On Nov- ember 11, 1918, an Armistice was signed. With it came the close of World War I. During the Meuse- Argonne Offensive, more than 1,- 000,000 Americans had seen action.

First Army was disbanded in the general demobilization of 1919 and not reactivated until 1933, when it was officially assigned the responsibility for the northeastern area of the United States, with headquarters at Governors Island.

In 1943, First Army HQ was mov- ed to England to begin intensive preparation for the "D-Day" inva- sion of Normandy. It was now under the command of General Omar N. Bradley.

Early on June 6, 1944 two Ameri- can airborne divisions were dropped in the rear of the German coastal defenses to prevent German rein- forcements from supporting the de- fending units on the beaches.

Later at 6:30 A.M. at Omaha and Utah Beaches the Infantry assault began. By nightfall the next day both landings had secured a firm foothold. Then the two forces were joined at Carentan on June 10. Three weeks later, the port of Cherbourg fell to First Army.

The fighting continued south through difficult hedgerows until the

Allies captured the strategically im- portant city of St. Lo.

General Courtney H. Hodges be- came First Army Commander on August 1, taking command as the Nazis launched their first large scale counteroffensive on the western front in the Mortain countryside.

First Army reacted quickly, send- ing heavy armor and infantry move- ments against the German flanks, bringing the drive to a standstill within two days.

The victory at Mortain set the stage for the encirclement and al- most complete destruction of the German Seventh Army.

The Americans then swung east and north to join British and Cana- dian forces. This maneuver re- duced the Falaise-Argentian pocket bottling up the German 7th Army.

By August 25, the fast moving First Army had driven the enemy out of Paris. On Sept. 2 the American troops crossed the Belgian border, breaching the Siegfried Line and cap- turing Aachen.

After fierce fighting the Germans were backed up to the Roer River.

The enemy wasn't finished how- ever, and in mid-December they started their "Ardennes Offensive".

It was here that First Army per- sonnel displayed their courage, fighting delaying actions at Bas- tone, Elsenborn Ridge, Malmedy and St. Vith and held firm on the northern shoulder of the penetra- tion until the German drive was spent.

By January 28, 1945, the Americans had reoccupied their original posi- tions.

One month later, First Army cross- ed the Roer River and drove the Germans back over the Rhineland Plain, capturing Cologne. The Luden- dorf Bridge was seized, and a bridgehead formed on the Eastern Bank of the Rhine.

The movement then swung north, with First Army joining the Ninth Army closing a huge pincer around the major portion of the German Fifth Panzer Army in the Ruhr Pocket.

Leaving two divisions to seal off enemy resistance in the Harz Mountains, First Army troops went on to take control of Leipzig and Halle.

On April 15, advance elements reached the Mulde River, which had been fixed as the forward limit of the American advance.

Ten days later a First Army patrol made the first physical contact with Soviet troops at Torgau, Germany.

Within a week after V-E Day First Army Headquarters commenced re- deployment to the Pacific. In early August an advance detachment set up a station in Manila to plan for the Japanese mainland invasion at Honshu.

Before the operation could begin, however, the war in the Pacific had come to an end.

Among First Army soldiers were such prominent personalities as (in WW I) Gen. John J. Pershing, Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett, Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall Jr., Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, Col. Billy Mitchell, Lt. Col. William (Wild Bill) Don- ovan, Maj. Charles W. Whittlesey, Maj. Eddie Rickenbacker, Capt. Harry Truman, and Sgt. Alvin York; and (in WW II) General Courtney Hodges, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Maj. Gen. Matthew Ridg- way, Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, and Maj. Gen. Anthony MacAuliffe.

**Governors Island** — The Army has announced that an immediate re- quirement exists for the procure- ment of approximately 1700 Com- pany Grade Officers and 1600 War- rant Officers to perform Active duty on a voluntary basis.

Although the principal procurement source for these programs as an- nounced in Department of Army circulars has been officers assigned to reserve component troop units and control groups, other eligible and qualified personnel may apply as provided in DA Circular 601-1, 15 May 1962, "Voluntary Active Duty for Warrant Officers" and DA Circu- lar 601-2, 10 May 1962, "Voluntary Active Duty for Commissioned Of- ficers."

Master Danny Bigelow, son of Staff Sergeant and Mrs. Arthur Bigelow at Fort Dix, N.J., receives his polio shot from Captain Anna Mae Stevens, Army Health Nurse Traine as Major Aloha B. Ham- merly, the Fort Dix Army Health Nurse, supervises. Captain Stev- ens is receiving her Army Health Nursing training at Fort Dix, the only First Army area military in- stallation where this training is available.

LAW SCHOOL
MEMORANDUM

FROM Leach
To Kissinger

If WE have feelings of frustration
about defense, what must the British
have? I suppose you've read this, but
it has interest.

Don't return.

By the way, I hope I have explained
to you that I tend to leave seminar
sessions early because it is physically
impossible for me to sit that long without
my left leg swelling up due to a
circulation deficiency which has to be
kept under control.

118

THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 13, 1962

# Steelmen Unstuck

The Trades Union Congress must follow up its victory for common sense in South Wales

THE dispute between two trade unions that, until Tuesday afternoon, was threatening to bring a large part of the British steel industry to a halt, has followed a too-familiar pattern. The intervention of the Trades Union Congress, leading to a truce and to agreement by both unions to submit to arbitration, could set a new and infinitely more sensible standard for the future. This time the squabble over who-does-what has been between the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers (83,030 members, several hundred in steelworks) and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (112,321 members): the bone of contention is the right to the job of lining with heat-resisting material the converters in which molten metal is transformed into steel. This has traditionally been done by ISTC members, but when the steel companies decided, instead of a lining of tar-like composition rammed into place, to use 90-lb prefabricated blocks of a similar substance, the AUBTW chose to claim that these blocks are bricks and should be laid by its own men.

In August the bricklayers stopped work at Corby in Northamptonshire, where the work has since been carried on by non-union volunteers from the company's staff; last week, having endangered the commissioning of the new integrated steelworks of Richard Thomas and Baldwins at Llanwern (and threatened other works on its way westwards) the dispute reached RTB's older plant at Ebbw Vale. There the management promptly (and not entirely convincingly) threatened to close the whole plant down—which would have meant catastrophe for the valley, 10,000 of whose men work there. Urged on by the local Member of Parliament, Mr Michael Foot himself, and by the local council, the TUC stepped in. After a 4½-hour meeting the bricklayers' union agreed to order its members back to work (many of them had been vocally reluctant to come out anyway in a strike that seemed to involve their union's prestige rather than their own jobs). The carve-up of work is still not resolved, but the AUBTW was persuaded to accept the verdict of an arbitrator —the ISTC having accepted arbitration from the start.

Of course there is more to this quarrel than meets the eye. The bricklayers fear that their jobs in the steelworks could fade away as new processes take the place of open-hearth operations: the open hearth, as big as a house, reconstructed every three months and built entirely of brick, has always been put up by craftsmen bricklayers. And the ISTC has for long been suspected by the craft unions whose members do specialist jobs in steel—electricians and engineers as well as building workers—of wanting to squeeze them out. The steelworkers' leader, Mr Harry Douglass, is a tough-minded right-winger who gets results for his members, in the form of high pay, sensible redundancy payments and so on, without too much truck with verbal militancy or formal delegate conferences; he does not lack critics to say that he is undemocratic, dictatorial and what you will (but not to his face). The latent conflict between the craft unions and Mr Douglass's quasi-industrial union has been simmering for a long time; just a year ago it came to the boil during another thoroughly avoidable strike, also of bricklayers, at Port Talbot, also in South Wales.

But whatever the underlying reasons for the obduracy of the bricklayers' union—and however much one may be surprised to find Mr Lowthian, the AUBTW's level-headed general secretary, mixed up in so stupid a business—there must be a warm welcome for the outcome. The great disappointment of this year's Trades Union Congress at Blackpool was the lack of a sense of urgency about union reform, even in the speeches of those who most clearly see the need for it. This week, however, Mr George Woodcock was faced with an inter-union dispute that clearly cried out for TUC intervention, and the publicity that the dispute got (and that union leaders and the local Labour council saw that it got) forced the building workers into a position where they had to accept arbitration, however poorly it may turn out for them. A couple of decisive TUC actions could do more to reinforce its prestige with its own constituents, and with the public, than any number of speeches.

## Key in the Door?

British defence policy has to be adapted to the needs of a new western alliance — and to the new British society

DEFENCE planning always looks a mess: if it looks even more of a mess this year, at the time when decisions on next year's estimates begin to loom large, this need not be an unmitigated disaster. Mr Thorneycroft has inherited the almost concurrent collapse of two policies: of Mr Sandys's strategic bias toward going-it-alone (the Blue Streak philosophy which still has its carry-over in the irrelevant claims of political independence for the V-bomber-Blue Steel-Skybolt force); and of Mr Watkinson's worthy but ill-

rewarded trust in the interdependence of the *Otan des patries* (from which the tactical missile, Blue Water, has been the chief, but not the only, sufferer). Now Mr Thorneycroft has got to pick up the pieces.

There are three jobs to be done. The first is to integrate the existing British forces into a more cohesive structure of western strategy. Primarily this means using the remaining bargaining power that the V-bomber force represents in allied councils to encourage the marriage of American and European

117

If Spain achieved all these things, it could lay much the same
foundation for an economic miracle as Germany, Japan and
Italy did in the early 1950s; most of the other pre-requisites
for such a big economic advance seem to be in place, including
even—and this is important for so Roman Catholic a country—
a fall in the birth rate compared with prewar days.

So far the signs of burgeoning reform in the last three years
are very hopeful. Questions (a) and (b) have already been
satisfactorily answered; the balance of payments is back in
surplus and price inflation has been largely checked. Ad-
mittedly, this has been achieved only at the expense of a
standstill in production from 1958 to late 1961, but the check
to production seems at last to have been permitted to impinge
most sharply on the most inefficient sectors. (That, indeed,
is largely why Spain has run into labour troubles in some
of its least efficient industries, troubles which have caught its
government politically on the hop.) Since late 1961, the
government has started to re-expend demand again. Most
important of all, during and since the "stabilisation period"
bureaucracy has begun to remove some of its most crippling
physical and other controls. The still too stately Spanish
equivalent of a dash for freedom is on; and last week saw
the publication of the document that might do most of all
to hurry the process up. It was in March of last year that
a team of seventeen experts from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, under the leadership of
Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees, arrived in Spain at the invitation of
the Spanish government. Their report, which has been in the
hands of General Franco's government for some time, has
now been published to the world.*

THE report is a fascinating document, not merely for the
future history of Spain, but in the history of the advice
given by international bodies of this kind as well. Unfortu-
nately, a large part of it is written in world bankers' English,
which is hardly a pellucid literary style. But the main recom-
mendation is clearly stated, again and again. "The principal
measure that the Government can take to establish an environ-
ment that is conducive to rapid industrial growth," declares
the mission, "is to remove the controls which continue to
hamper the free working of the economy." The mission runs
its eye over the history of Spain's internal investment controls,
of its allocation and rationing systems for industrial materials
and of its price controls; all of these controls have been con-
siderably whittled down in the last three years, but too many
(price controls, in particular) still exist. "We are per-
suaded," declares the mission flatly, "that general economic
conditions are now such that these controls can be removed."
The same medicine is recommended, although a bit more
guardedly and with some temporary exceptions, for import
controls and export controls. The mission then plunges into
a survey of the jungle of state subsidies which take the form
of special prices between state enterprises and concessionary
interest rates; always it recommends that these distortions
should be whittled down, and usually that they should be
virtually swept away.

This recipe of free market liberalism from the bank was
to be expected, although it is good news that the Spanish

government seems more than half-inclined to swallow it.
What was less certain was whether the mission would also
be progressive in its attitude towards the re-expansion of
demand. The answer comes out happily. "It is only by
a policy of stimulating the growth of the economy as a whole,"
declares the World Bank mission, "that a general solution can
be found to the problems caused by disequilibrium in employ-
ment, income and regional development." It is true that the
mission rears a bit awkwardly when it realises that this advice
might logically lead it into the still unspeakable sin (to world
bankers) of recommending that Spain develop on the basis
of unbalanced budgets. But it recovers its equilibrium admir-
ably. Spain, it thinks, should be able to plan its policies on
the basis of expecting "an annual growth rate of 5 per cent
per capita . . . over an extended period." "Taking the rate
of growth of national income proposed above and assuming
the same relation between the growth of income and of fiscal
receipts that has existed in the past," says the mission, "the
increase in public revenues that can be forecast would make
it possible . . . to carry out over the next five years . . . develop-
ment proposals. . . ."

In other words, by assuming that it will have an increase
in tax revenue as a result of assuming that it will have an
increase in national income, the Spanish government is told
to engage in the reflationary policies from which a more strictly
orthodox system of budget estimating would have held it back.
This system of reflating demand while pretending that it isn't
happening is the one that has worked so enormously
successfully in Japan and Germany and other expansionist
economies in the past ten years.

This article may have been too optimistic in its assumption
that the sauce that has proved so successful for other golden
goose may now be about to be applied equally successfully
to the Spanish gander; it is a bit odd to base optimism for
the future of the Spanish economy so largely on the fact that
the recent mismanagement of that economy has seemed to
be so unrepeatably ghastly. But, as the mission says, the
foundations for growth appear to be there; Spain already has
a wide range of industries, even such modern ones as con-
sumer durable industries, although necessarily most of them
are still working on a tiny scale. The dynamic could now
well be set alight by the opening up of the economy to freer
market forces, a process in which Spain's application to be
associated in some way with the European common market
could play a big subsidiary part. And if this happens none
should welcome it more than those who so rightly deplore
the unhealthy and undemocratic features of Spain's present
political system.

If Spain does now go forward economically into something
more like a west European standard of life, this will surely
bring new attitudes and new sorts of men into positions of
influence which will ensure that its governing classes cannot
go on looking backward politically for ever. There is, after
all, a proud past history on which this country can build.
"Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation
rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her
... locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty
youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday
beam. Methinks ..." Well, it is rather fun to find oneself
moved to quote Milton after reading a report from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

*"The Economic Development of Spain." International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 352 pages.

120

NOTES OF THE WEEK

ing a problem, but only after Mr Thorneycroft has got into Europe and can begin his second job of co-ordinating defence production can concrete decisions of this magnitude be risked. This reality should show up in next year's estimates.

The third job, of making the best of what exists, is one that occupies all defence ministers but is one which Mr Thorneycroft, arriving in office with the actual achievement of all-regular forces, should consider of exceptional importance. By ploughing the savings on Blue Water into conventional arms the minister has shown that he has grasped at least one of the glaring weaknesses in the British defence posture in Europe and outside it. But in the very success of the army's recruiting drive in the past year there lurk two dangers—which add up to a major opportunity. There is the danger that professional armies grow apart from the societies that produce them: this can be particularly serious in relation to the prestige, and the efficiency, of the technical and supply services on which modern forces are utterly dependent. There is the second danger that any upturn in the economy, and a belated increase in the civilian technical training facilities for school-leavers, may in the future deprive the services of the kind of recruit they most badly need.

*The Economist* has argued in the past that the services should be given funds specifically to turn themselves into model educators and employers of technical personnel; even

if they lose 80 per cent of their trainees to civilian employment after an initial period of service, this would still be all gain to the economy at large. This argument did not find favour with the Admiralty (which has had little or no recruiting problem, partly because it does provide good technical training and has given its technical grades, up to wardroom level, a proper status); nor did it find favour with the army which, desperately short as it was, could not afford to release skilled personnel as instructors and preferred to try to get half its tradesmen in from outside. The success of recruiting in making up sheer numbers may help to reduce some of the army's objections. For this is, in fact, the time for all the services to look ahead towards the type of educationally-superior entrant that they, like everyone else, will need in the later 1960s. It may be the last chance to capitalise on the failure of the educational system as a whole to cope with 16-year-olds of good potential.

The services ought to be expanding their own training facilities dramatically; they should be encouraged to play a part, with their own sandwich courses, in new technical colleges; and they could, by demonstrating the practicality of vocational training well above existing apprenticeship standards, become unexpected catalysts in overhauling ordinary industrial practice. The services have got to gear themselves to the new society in every way they can. This is one central role that Mr Thorneycroft, among his other preoccupations, should insist that they play.

## NOTES OF THE WEEK

### EUROPE

#### MacMarket

At last the Government's long-awaited campaign in favour of British membership of the common market has begun. Following up his firm speeches at the Commonwealth conference and on the television, the Prime Minister has now committed himself in print to wholehearted advocacy of British membership of the common market. His pamphlet "Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe," published by the Conservative Central Office on October 7th, wastes no words on the terms of an agreement or the possibility of failure to agree. The case for joining is put without qualification.

Conservative morale should be stiffened, too, by the loud support ministers have been giving to the Prime Minister. In the fortnight before the party conference Mr Thorneycroft, Mr Macleod and Mr Maudling all put the European case forcibly. Thus the rumour, sometimes heard in the constituencies, that Mr Macmillan is riding a private hobby-horse into Europe without cabinet support has been firmly squashed. Mr Maudling's voice should carry a special message for waverers. The man who had the misfortune to be

responsible for both the luckless free trade area and the European Free Trade Association has spoken with convincing moderation of the economic advantages of joining the common market.

The Prime Minister's own pamphlet covers ground familiar enough to readers of *The Economist*. It is wrong to suggest there is a choice between Europe and the Commonwealth, he stresses. Rather, if Britain is to serve the Commonwealth as it should, it must have a place in the new centre of power, Europe. The idea that sovereignty will be "sacrificed" is also false, he suggests, in an age when not even the giant powers, Russia and America, are fully independent in defence and foreign policy.

The Prime Minister's tract is not an inspired, crusading document. But its solid style and argument should be persuasive within his party. Perhaps the most intriguing passages are at the end, when the Prime Minister permits himself a flash of idealism:

> We want to see Britain . . . working towards the unity of the world which is the ultimate vision of mankind. The

European Community is a signpost to that future and we must play our part.

This follows a plea for speed in the Brussels negotiations. The Government has realised that uncertainty about the outcome of the negotiations has done as much damage in the country as the arguments of the anti-marketeers.

#### Waiting for France

Do the other Europeans share the British Government's wish for speed? There have been signs, since the Commonwealth conference and Mr Gaitskell's efforts at Brighton, that most of them do. Any doubts Mr Gaitskell may have sown about Britain's reliability as a future partner seem to be matched by a new awareness on the Continent of the Prime Minister's determination to get Britain into Europe, and by an enhanced sympathy with his difficulties. As Mr Heath learnt during his European milk round last month, five governments, at any rate, feel that from the community's point of view, as well as Britain's, the sooner uncertainties are resolved, the better.

But what of the sixth? The French have never shared their partners' anxiety for speed as far as getting the British in is concerned. M. Couve de Murville was in New York this week for the United Nations Assembly, and Mr Heath was not able to

Professors Louis Morton
Gene M. Lyons
Public Affairs Center
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire

Dear Lou and Gene,

Thank you for sending me your script on the
Defense Studies Program for your forthcoming book.

I have certain comments and corrections. I am
sure that you will want to send your mimeograph to Henry
Kissinger, so I am sending him a copy of this letter to
avoid duplication of comments.

My comments are keyed to the pages of your manu-
script.

Page 2, line 11. I do not think that the Ford
Foundation Grant was renewed after the original three
years. Other external financing has been obtained.

Page 2, last paragraph. The facts as to my
service with the Defense Studies Program are as
follows:

1954-55 - I gave the Seminar for the first time in addition to a full-course load at the Law School.

1955-56 - I was on leave from the Law School and gave full-time to the Seminar.

1956-58 - For these two years I was on a half-time basis with the Seminar, the other half of my time being devoted to the Law School. Since 1958, I have been full-time at the Law School and rather an appendage to the Seminar than a participant in it.

Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA, who was in 1954-56 Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Harvard and who is a leading military historian, was by far my most valued associate

ing methodically throughout, was by far my most valued associate
of Mifflin, Science and Science at Harvard and who is a fesd-
grove of Trevor H. Dubay, NEV, who was in 1924-25 Professor

than a barometer in it.

School and teacher an abridge to the Seminar
since 1928. I have been full-time at the law
with time pending devoted to the law School.

1929-28 - For these two years I was on a part-
and gave full-time to the Seminary.

1922-23 - I was on leave from the law School

law School.

time in addition to a full-course load at the
1924-25 - I gave the Seminar for the first

follows:

service with the Defense Studies Program and as
late S. Isad Barakabbu. The 140's as to my

years. Other external financing has been obtained.
Kegelung Grant was received after the original three
Bete S. fine ff. I do not think that the Lord

script.

My comments are related to the pages of your mem-

avoid qualification of comments.

Kieisinger, so I am sending him a copy of this letter to
sure that you will want to send your manuscript to Henry
I have certain comments and corrections. I am

Dear Ron and Gene,

Hanover, New Hampshire

Dartmouth College

Baptist University Center

Gene M. Phone

Professors Louis Morton

- 2 -

during the initial year of the course and took a leading part
in the Seminar as long as he remained at Harvard. Professor
Sutherland's middle initial is "E".

Page 3, first two lines. I would describe
Sutherland and Braucher "as professors at the Law School
with substantial military experience." As indicated in
the previous paragraph, it is inaccurate to put
Colonel Dupuy in the class of "also ran"; he was a key
factor in the building of the Seminar from the outset.

Page 7. The correct name of Ransom's book is "Central Intelligence and National Security." It would be nice of you to add to the periodicals in which we have published, the following:

JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE.

You might be interested to know that Ransom's book on
Central Intelligence has been translated into Japanese.

Page 8. The two courses given by Sam Huntington
and Ernie May were not part of the Defense Studies
Program.

Pages 9-10. It is usually true that between 75-125 students attend these Seminars even though there are only 50 members who are admitted to take the course for credit. Henry Kissinger can give you an accurate breakdown of the composition of the Seminar as it now is. I think he will find that it has changed somewhat from the composition which you describe.

Page 11. You might care to mention that a mid-year
examination is required. While this was Henry's idea
and he is best qualified to give his reasons, I believe
that the purpose was to impose heavy requirements (an
examination, a long paper, and the bi-weekly group meet-
ings in addition to the Seminar sessions) to be sure that
we really had highly motivated students.

Very sincerely,

W. Barton Leach
Story Professor of Law

WBL:has

Copy to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Cody to Dr. Henry V. Klaarfer.

MRT:Jaa

Stevy Professot of Pan
W. Burton Peab

Veny sncroely,

we really need highly motivated strains.
take in addition to the Semینr sessions) to be sure that
examination, a four paper, and the pre-weekly board meet-
that the board was to be done heavy requirements (an
and he is dead satisfied to give his reasons. I believe
examination is required. While this was Henry's idea
page 11. You might come to mention that a big-learn
combatiation which can happen.

thing he will bring that he can change somewhat from the
down of the combatiation of the Seminar as it was last. I
credit. Henry Klaarfer can give you an estimate pre-
only 20 members who are admitted to take the course for
admission at some Seminars even though they are
bates 9-10. If he really true that perhaps he-152
program.

and Henry Mah were not here of the Defense Strangers
page 8. The two courses given by Sam Huntington

Central Intelligence has been translated into Japanese.
You might be interested to know that Renam's book on

REAR MILITARY GENERAL'S

page 159, the following:

be nice to you to add to the biographies in which we
"Central Intelligence and National Security." It would
page 7. The correct name of Renam's book is

letter in the following of the Seminar from the outside.
Colonel Drabat in the class of "after run"; he was a key
theравens benеаing, if he is incorrect to say
with and after written experience." As indicated in
Sunderland and Brussels "a meeting at the Law School
page 3, that two times. I would agree to

Sunderland's middle initial is "N.".
in the Seminar as long as he received of Harvard. Professor
during the initial class of the course and took a leading part

- 5 -

Law School of Harvard University

Cambridge 38, Mass.

4 March 1963

Dear Henry,

I enclose a copy of THE AIRPOWER HISTORIAN for January. You will note that the lead article (Part I of two Parts, the second to appear in April) is one of the papers that was done for the Seminar last year by a law student. I suggest that if you should mention this to the Seminar, it would have a tendency to stimulate emulation.

It is of particular interest to me that this was a paper by a law student and not by one of the professional military men and that it is treated as authoritative on a military subject. You will note that an article by Major Alexander P. deSeversky is put in second place after our student (page 11).

WBL:has
enclosure

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director, Harvard Defense Studies Program
6 Divinity Avenue

Cambridge 38, Mass.

5 March 1963

MEMORANDUM TO PROFESSOR KISSINGER

Mr. Robert M. Gurfield, 526 Benine Road, Westbury, New York, was a student in the Seminar in 1961-62. He was at that time taking graduate work at MIT, having taken undergraduate work at Swarthmore, majoring in civil engineering.

He has recently been on a tour as an operations analyst for the Air Force (civilian) of 180 days in Viet Nam. He states that the discussions in the Seminar were invaluable to him. He calls attention to the fact that men in the Seminar who have a technical background -- mathematics and the physical sciences -- are especially qualified for this kind of work, and there are plenty of openings in Viet Nam. He found the experience rewarding and satisfying and would try to go back after completing his Master's Thesis at MIT.

The pay for this kind of work runs around $10,000-$12,000.

If any members of the Seminar are interested, they should get in touch with Major Eugene F. Calafato, Office of Operations Analysis, Department of the Air Force, Washington 25, D. C. (Room 5C259, The Pentagon).

Mr. Gurfield states that the technical background is required for bureaucratic reasons only, i.e. to satisfy the job description of an "Operations Analyst." The nature of the work that Mr. Gurfield was actually doing was irrelevant to technical qualifications.

Perhaps you might call attention briefly to this possibility of a job opening and publish this Memorandum on the bulletin board at Divinity Avenue.

W. BARTON LEACH

WBL:has

ARIZONA STATE
UNIVERSITY

TEMPE, ARIZONA

May 22, 1963

Professor W. Barton Leach
Harvard Law School
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Bart:

You will recall when you visited Boulder last September how impressed I was with your description of your Defense Policy Seminar. I even spoke of organizing such a Seminar at Colorado. Fortunately, the thought was only momentary for it would have duplicated what you have accomplished so well, under far more favorable situations, and what is being done elsewhere.

However, our discussions did indeed stimulate and tend to crystalize certain general ideas I had had for some time. These were clarified and developed further in several conferences at the AFA Convention at Las Vegas.

The result of all this is that we are establishing an Institute of Aerospace History and Policy at Colorado. I am enclosing a statement or prospectus of The Institute and shall indeed be happy to have your comment and opinion. This has now developed into a rather ambitious project and your observations will be important, especially for its general aspects.

The Institute has been approved by the University for its academic requirements. I have received a small, prestige-wise important, grant from the Link Foundation when I discussed it with Frank Sorenson at a meeting in Chicago last November. I presented the idea to the AFA Aerospace Education Council at a meeting at Keesler A. F. Base in January and it had a most favorable reception. The AFA group, especially Jack Loosebrock, have all been most helpful.

We have been teaching at Arizona State University during the second semester and have had an interesting time. Have met and had good talks with Tom R. Palfrey. He came here last year from Northwestern and says he has worked on several projects with you.

We leave here next week to return to Boulder by June 2. Hope you have time to write me there.

JGA/gs
Enclosure

[c]

# AN INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE HISTORY AND POLICY

## INTRODUCTION

The Space Revolution of today is rapidly being recognized as the most significant of all those great Revolutions of History which have affected the fate of man. Tremendous changes were wrought by these great historical forces---the Territorial Revolution of the 16th Century; the Scientific Revolution of the 13th and 17th Centuries; the Revolution of Religion in the 16th Century; and the Commercial, Social, and Industrial Revolutions of the 18th Century.

The vital transformations induced by each of these, in its own course and at its own time, have long been studied in the several disciplines of knowledge and especially in attitudes of individuals and of government and in relation to the physical realm of the earth's surface. Important as were all these revolutionary epochs of the historical past, there was, nevertheless, when viewed from modern concepts, one great limiting factor. This factor was that none of these was of immediate effect on the entire population of the whole world.

The Space Revolution of the mid-twentieth century is unique as its course and direction will be felt by every individual on each of the seven continents. Moreover, its effects will lie in an entirely new dimension--beyond the physical realm of man's existence and into the boundless areas of space itself. Two new terms are, even now, being applied to man and his activities: "on earth" and "in space."

This situation, resented by the Space Revolution, means that we have
now entered the Space Age. The threshold has now been crossed because what
was regarded only a short time ago as a fantastic and unprofitable adventure
has now become precise purposeful routine. Within a very few years a great
effort by government, involving the expenditure of vast amounts of money
and of ability, has created an awesome complex of men and the machinery
they operate. From Cape Canaveral with its instruments and computers,
these magic marvels and highly trained personnel stretch outward through
island outposts and tracking stations to encircle the earth.

We no longer have a choice because there is no stopping. Such a
condition is not new. Those early navigators of the fifteenth century,
sailing outward from Europe in flimsy and insecure wooden boats, presented
the world of their day with no choice either. After the voyages of Columbus
and da Gama, there was no stopping the oceans and the lands that lay beyond.
Only two years after da Gama's return to Portugal in 1498, a well planned and
well prepared expedition of fifteen ships sailed from Lisbon to follow the
path he had pioneered. The result was the discovery of Brazil and the
establishment of Portugal in India.

These explorations and discoveries of the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, with whatever rewards and knowledge they might bring,
were the monopoly of the crowns of Spain and Portugal. But the pace is faster
and the costs are greater. Over one hundred years elapsed, from the fantastic
adventures of Columbus and da Gama, before the first extensive private

company, the English East India Company, was established. But today a public corporation has already been organized to exploit the communications aspect of the Space Age.

The complexities of modern life require society to be greatly guided and modified by government which has become the largest single factor in the national economy. What impact this will have on society is quite uncertain. However, the tasks of both government and education will be greatly increased by the Space Age.

The educational requirements of the Space Age are quite staggering in their implications, challenges and opportunities. This situation is realized by only a few educators and their efforts, far-seeing as they may be, are, in relation to the vast need, somewhat insignificant and indeed quite isolated. There do exist a number of excellent workshops in Aerospace Education, with 2-3 week programs usually held in the Summer Sessions, and organized by forward-looking educators in our colleges and universities and supported by various State Departments of Education, the AFROTC, the CAP and others who realize the importance of aviation and aerospace affairs in our national future. Such workshops are directed basically towards teachers in the secondary schools who, quite frequently, do not receive proper credit and support from their own school systems.

In addition, there are certain specialized and advanced programs which are concerned in general with Aerospace affairs and which do have such validity. Such programs may be typified by the Defense Policy Seminar at Harvard University, inaugurated by Professor W. Barton Leach. One of its principal functions is to prepare individuals for positions in the Department of Defense. This seminar, with its valuable studies of National Security

policy, has been quite successful and programs along this general model have
been established at Ohio State University, George Washington University, the
University of Wisconsin and the University of California at Los Angeles.

In spite of the success and expansion of this program, as an attempt
to meet a specific need and with a definite objective, our leading educational
Institutions have not met the challenges of the Space Age. Indeed, their
accomplishments have been few in number and have resulted from the efforts
of a handful of far-sighted and dedicated individuals. On the other hand,
programs concerned with Aerospace affairs are maintained by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense and the
Air Force. These are all highly specialized organizations with definite
missions in national defense. They are established and are maintained for
government policy and as such demand a high degree of security classification.
These centers, because of their specific objectives, have no aspect of public
Information or education.

From this brief presentation of the implications of the Space Revolution
and of certain aspects of its educational requirements, it is apparent that a
need exists to tie our governmental agencies and educational institutions
together and to unite them in meeting the demands of the Space Age.

With this basic purpose and objective in mind it is proposed to establish
an Institute for Aerospace History and Policy which will be centered at the
University of Colorado. Although such an Institute as is now proposed would

be located at the University of Colorado, it would function in cooperation
with the U. S. A. F. Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force
Base and the U. S. Air Force Historical Division, Liaison Office, Headquarters,
U. S. A. F. It is expected that the Institute will develop and extend its
cooperation with other governmental agencies especially the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Related objectives require certain mutual relationships.

OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES

The objectives and purposes of an Institute of Aerospace History and Policy are many. To present them properly would involve a survey of the Space Revolution and especially of its tremendous impact on government and society.

An Institute of Aerospace History and Policy will bridge the gap between the purely scientific and technological aspects of the Space Age and the historical and philosophical bases of our system of government and society. No civilization can endure without an Ideological basis or unless it possesses certain well defined and well understood principles that give it meaning and impetus. An Institute, as here proposed, will provide the means whereby society might adjust to the great forces unleashed in the exploration of space. It will co-ordinate government and education in a united effort to meet the great challenges of the present day. The type of co-ordination here envisioned is of immediate concern because, for one thing, government is now regarded as the major factor in national economy.

The Institute will open up an entirely new career field. A great shortage exists of professionally trained personnel in the non-technical areas of aerospace affairs. This shortage is particularly apparent in institutions of higher education, in the armed services and in industry. A principal purpose of the Institute will be to meet this demand by offering professional training in this significant career field.

In recent years there has been some discussion, even controversy, concerning the relative positions of exact science and the more interpretative disciplines of knowledge. Studies have been developed which point to the conclusion that those trained in the broader fields, and history and literature may be so indicated, are more creative in this thinking than the physical scientists. Although the subject here raised is approached with trepidation and with a lightness of touch, it does appear to have some validity. A current study at Cambridge University, England, reaches the conclusion that "although there are individual exceptions, (the findings) do suggest that young physical scientists tend to be less intellectually flexible than young arts specialists."

It therefore appears that an Institute of Aerospace History and Policy, with its primary function directed towards the non-technical aspects of the significant area of aerospace affairs, has an importance in basic considerations of learning and knowledge. It can serve to relate more closely the vast new fields and studies opened by the Space Age.

# ORGANIZATION OF AN INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE HISTORY AND POLICY

## I. ADMINISTRATION

Council composed of ________ members.
Director.

## II. COURSES OF INSTRUCTION

At the present time the University of Colorado offers sufficient courses, in various fields, to satisfy academic requirements for the M. A. degree. A few such courses may be indicated:

* History of Science

* History of Flight and Exploration of Space

* General History of Astro-Geophysics

Although the Institute will originally offer the M. A. degree a full program leading to the Doctorate is envisioned.

## III. THE CERTIFICATE IN AEROSPACE HISTORY AND POLICY

A principal function of the proposed Institute will be in the granting of a Certificate. Such a Certificate will be in addition to the academic degree. However, it is envisioned that a Certificate could be granted to those who, for various reasons, may not desire the M. A. degree but do complete the program designed for the Certificate.

## IV. COOPERATING DEPARTMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS

Although the proposed Institute will center in the History Department, other departments and Divisions of the University will participate actively:

*Departments* of Political Science, Physics, Economics, and Astro-Geophysics.

*Divisions and affiliated areas:*

High Altitude Observatory; National Center for Atmospheric Research; Boulder departments of the National Bureau of Standards; Department of Aeronautical Engineering, College of Engineering; The School of Law.

[L]

THE GUIDED LEAK CONT'D
Exclusive data to Congressional favorites as
autine procedure.

A Nonpartisan News Service

Thus, the favored are assured of receiv-
ing word of contracts of interest to them be-
fore noon each day. This extra-special atten-
tion to party stalwarts is an extension of a
separate procedure that seeks to give poli-
ticians of both parties a smaller lead on con-
tract news. Each of the armed services has
a separate staff of Congressional Liaison of-
ficers that sees to it that all interested leg-
islators, Democrats and Republicans alike,
get about one hour's notice before public re-
lease of contract awards. The legislators are
notified at 3 p.m. each day, the press at 4
p.m. The Air Force delivers its information
by personal messenger to Congressional of-
fices; the Army and Navy use the telephone

for the most part.

Until recently, Congress witnessed the
spectacle of uniformed majors and colonels,
their watches synchronized, delivering can-
fidential contract memos with split-second
timing to avoid charges of leaking the
"leaks" to one legislator ahead of another.

But this got to be a bit too much, and
several Congressmen objected to the use of
high-ranking soldiers as messenger boys. So
the Pentagon adjusted its tactics, it now
uses enlisted men to carry contract news
unless a contract must be explained to a law-
maker. For these more delicate maneuvers,
officers are still preferred.

The rationale offered to justify the one-
hour news break for Congressmen is to en-
able them to intelligently answer press
queries on contracts awarded to companies
in their states. There's no mention of the
fact that, since the Pentagon awarded the

contracts, maybe its representatives should
be the ones to reply to questions. Nor is
the point made that Congressmen seldom are
given any more contract information than is
the press, so they can't add substance to a
news story anyway.

In the final analysis, then, the entire op-
eration—both the partisan and nonpartisan
phases—bols down to nothing more than po-
litical sleight-of-hand. And quite a few
Pentagon officials express the private (very
private) wish that the whole procedure be
abandoned once and for all. This view, not
surprisingly, is heard most frequently from
those officers who are required to spend hours
on the phone assuring non-favored Congress-
men that the military was not responsible
for contract leaks to their rivals. Sighs one
harried diplomat-officer: "I'd much rather
wrestle with the many complex problems of
guided missiles than of guided leaks."

INSCRIPTION...CONT'D

It is not possible to teach democracy
academically like a catchphrase. Peo-
ple must only be allowed to become
aware of its principles and how to
use them naturally. And had it not
been for U.S. help, this might not
have happened."

The Chancellor, already beyond
usual retirement limits when he
took power in 1949, gave his people
a new political philosophy, a decent
outlook, a strong economy and suf-
ficient sanity so that now, having
made some amends for past deviltry,
they can at least sleep at night.

Rigid Ideas

Adenauer retains certain right

Ideas. He feels that if de Gaulle
were not in France today all Eu-
rope would be Communist. But he
is convinced Khrushchev will never
make war because he doesn't intend
to risk Russia's economic progress or
gamble that China might gain at
Soviet expense. He says Khru-
shchev told him in 1955, "the
could not master the Red Chinese." Many
consider Adenauer's thoughts an-
tique and outmoded. He favors the
status quo and urges the ultimate
in caution. Even in his own land
time bypasses him.

Now he prepares to walk behind
the curtain, muttering warnings to
those who will pay heed. Evenings
his daughters and secretaries will
read him his favorite detective stor-

ies and he will proceed with the
tedious job of writing personal
memorials.

He has no notes but claims: "I
have much material and I know the
truth. I feared trying to express
judgments on events when I was
too close to them; this danger is
gone." Now I look forward to stress-
ing the truth for history.

"De Gaulle found it difficult to
write his own account. While he
was writing he wanted to return to
active politics and that made it
harder for him. I don't intend to go
back. Therefore I would like to do
a good job on my memoirs, a bal-
anced job. I fear some people may
not like me after I have written
them."

MISSILE/SPACE DAILY

14 October 1963

U.K. WON'T FISCAALLY BACK NATO SURFACE-POLARIS FLEET

The NATO proposal to form a mixed manned force of surface vessels armed with nuclear Polaris missiles is receiving a tenuous vote of approval from Great Britain, but the U.K. is still retaining the absolute right to avoid any participation in any force ultimately created.

Following a major schism in policy, over the proposed force, the Ministry of
Defense is now convinced that the mixed manned concept is a waste of time, money
and effort and from a military point of view, is utterly futile. Principal argument is
that Britain has already committed both jet bomber forces and nuclear subs to NATO
usage and a third U.K. expense for the surface fleet makes no sense, at least to the
Ministry.

U.K. Foreign Office, however, feels that it would be a political blunder for
Britain not to participate at least in the talks for such a force, and some sources say,
to lend member support, if not financial. Advantages, sources believe, would be
to give Britain a foot in the door on organization of the force, and enable it to watch
closely the political and militaristic aspirations of West Germany. The U.K. Foreign
Office is showing some growing concern for rapprochment between Bonn and Wash-
ington in recent months, and doesn't want West Germany to supersed e Britain as the
United States' best friend in Europe.

NATO
MIXED
MANNED
FORCE

MISSILE/SPACE DAILY

14 October 1963

NATO OBSERVERS NOW SAY that a 25-vessel nuclear surface fleet may become a reality. Agreement for the $2 billion program could well be signed at the NATO May 1964 meeting. Under the proposal, each ship would be equipped with eight Polaris missiles. Development would take up to 26 months, with an operational deployment of the fleet of at least four years away. Member NATO nations already in agreements Turkey, U.S., Netherlands, Italy, West Germany and Greece.

2-7

AIR FORCE Magazine, October 1983 (14)

Current News 10/14/63

[lc]

# COST/EFFECTIVENESS—
## Tool or Club?

> "Both the experienced military man and the operations analysts are important contributors to the decision-making process. However, I am disturbed because, now, in the Department of Defense, the operations analyst—properly concerned with 'cost/effectiveness'—seems to be working at the wrong echelon, above the professional military level rather than in an advisory capacity to the military who should thoroughly appreciate his assistance. Specialists cannot, without danger, extrapolate their judgments into fields in which they do not have expert knowledge. Unfortunately, today in the Pentagon an unhealthy imbalance has resulted because at times specialists are used as experts in areas outside their fields. This has resulted in a tendency to draw conclusions before all the evidence has been examined."

—Adm. George W. Anderson, USN (Ret.), before the National Press Club, September 4, 1963

By Claude Witze

SENIOR EDITOR, AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST

THERE is no military logistician or civilian fuel dealer who would suggest that the C-54 is a proper vehicle for hauling coal. Yet, in the Berlin Airlift, more than a million and a half tons of coal were hauled in airplanes, most of it in C-54s.

Economic nonsense? Yes, but it contributed to Communism's first great defeat in the cold war.

In the jargon of the systems analysts, moreover, the cost/effectiveness of the airlift was excellent. Cost/effectiveness is the accomplishment per dollar of cost, and it was high in this case despite the fact that no competent and sober man normally would pick an airplane for a job which properly belongs to a barge, truck, or train.

The cost/effectiveness of the C-54 in the Berlin Airlift was good because there were no alternatives. The need for effectiveness was so critical that the cost was not important. The barge, truck, and train were not priced out of the mission—they were eliminated by geographic, political, and military factors.

There are few, if any, military requirements where cost/effectiveness can be applied with such simple decisiveness as in the Berlin Airlift. There are few, if any, where there are no alternatives and the need is so compelling that cost can be ignored completely.

The application of cost/effectiveness to the mapping of military strategy, weaponry, budgeting, and procurement in the Defense Department is not new. But there is new emphasis on cost/effectiveness, and, for the first time, it is being used in the transmission of military requirements from the armed forces to the Pentagon civilian's retorts.

In the past, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have used cost/effectiveness as an in-house tool to help determine requirements. Now, when these requirements are passed up for departmental approval, they must be accompanied by cost/effectiveness studies for a number of—possibly four or five—alternate solutions. The result is that the services frequently have a system imposed on them that is not their own first choice.

The Air Force has felt the impact of this approach

more than the other services. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara is blunt about the reason. He says the requirement for strategic retaliatory forces, in sharp contrast to other military requirements, lends itself to what he calls "reasonably precise calculation."

Mr. McNamara has explained this to Congress in great detail. The strategic mission, most of which still is a responsibility of the Strategic Air Command, is to deter war by maintaining a capability to destroy an enemy's military power. This is a job that can be delineated with more ease than most missions of the armed forces because it can be measured, the Secretary says. The data needed, in his view, are precise and fairly easy to assemble.

First, he seeks the number, types, and locations of the potential targets. Then, how many weapons of what size are needed to put these targets out of business? The third step, Mr. McNamara says, is to find the best way to deliver these weapons, which means a choice between manned airplanes and a variety of missiles. To do this, he needs to know, for each system, the number and weight of warheads it can deliver, its ability to penetrate enemy defenses, its accuracy, and its cost/effectiveness. The latter he defines as "combat effectiveness per dollar of outlay."

The Secretary says there are other measurable factors, both of which must be ground into his calculations because the enemy might strike first and reduce our strategic force before it is used. These factors are concerned with the effectiveness of the enemy attack and the vulnerability of our own planes and missiles.

There is a format used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force for summarizing data they supply to the Secretary of Defense when he is to make a decision on weapon systems and forces. The first part of this presentation is a rundown on the possible alternatives. This includes the currently approved program, the revised program preferred by the Army, Navy, or Air Force, if they have a preference, the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a listing of other possible alternatives.

For each alternative there must be a forecast of the force structure. In testimony before the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees on the fiscal 1963 to 1967 defense program, Mr. McNamara cited an example. The air-weapon systems designated are hypothetical and so are the figures:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">Alternative 1</th></tr><tr><th></th><th colspan="6">Numbers of Aircraft at End of Fiscal Year</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>1961</th><th>1962</th><th>1963</th><th>1964</th><th>1965</th><th>1966</th><th>1967</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>F-18</td><td>800</td><td>747</td><td>658</td><td>493</td><td>325</td><td>275</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td>F-21</td><td>417</td><td>510</td><td>620</td><td>620</td><td>610</td><td>585</td><td>570</td></tr><tr><td>F-28</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>200</td><td>315</td><td>385</td><td>510</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td colspan="8">and similarly for each alternative.</td></tr></tfoot></table>

This must be followed, in the example above, by a breakdown of system costs, showing how much obli- gational authority will be needed each year—1961 through 1967—for each of the airplanes used in each alternative. These estimates must cover research and development, initial investment, and annual operating

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COST/EFFECTIVENESS...CONT'D

costs.

Then there must be an evaluation of effectiveness. For strategic systems this covers targets destroyed, with the losses broken down for the United States, its allies, and the enemy. There must be an estimate of the number of targets destroyed in each of six categories. A separate set of complete figures is required for each of the alternate force structures.

In the case of tactical air forces the data is about the same, except that performance for each alternative force structure is measured in terms of tons of bombs delivered, hours on station, and sorties flown.

Comments and recommendations are sought from the services, the JCS, the Comptroller, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and others. All of this is coldly factual and there are none of these facts that the Army, Navy, and Air Force have not been collecting and utilizing for years.

There is some irony in the genesis of Mr. McNamara's own proclivity for this approach and the expertise of his staff. The Secretary, who once was an officer in the wartime Army Air Forces, gained his foothold as a "whiz kid" through his masterful use of arithmetic and its practical application while in service with the Twentieth Air Force. His staff's expertise has come from the RAND Corporation, a creature of the Air Force that was set up to pioneer the systems-analysis procedure. With his background and proven talent in this area, it was natural for Mr. McNamara to look upon RAND as an attractive source of staff support.

There are some observers who feel this circumstance has its advantages, that USAF is lucky to have some of its concepts adopted by the Secretary of Defense. They point out that what USAF long has termed a "weapon system" is identical with what the Defense Department now calls a "program element." On the other hand, when USAF originated the idea and pioneered scientific methods of systems analysis these things were tools in the hands of soldiers with a firm and usually decisive voice in the selection of the tools of their trade. Now the soldier must list as many alternative tools as possible and wait upon a nonsayer for the selection. It is inevitable that the soldier, with the responsibility for fighting, will weigh values differently than his civilian peer. He has no argument with the Defense Department about the integration of cost/effectiveness as a factor. The conflict appears to be over the relative value to be given to cost and effectiveness.

The transposition of these approaches from USAF to DoD came about largely through the movement of people. Charles J. Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) came to the Pentagon from RAND, where he had worked on USAF problems and coauthored his definitive book on the subject, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*. Dr. Alain G. Enthoven, Mr. Hitch's deputy for systems analysis and the man who concentrates his talent on the selection of strategies and weapon systems, also is a RAND veteran.

In the preface to his book, Mr. Hitch says the greatest debt of the authors is to USAF and admits that much of it was written as part of a USAF-RAND project. The book has a long appendix entitled "The Simple Mathematics of Maximization." Author of the appendix is Dr. Enthoven.

With this background it is fully reasonable that the Air Force not only accepts the role of cost/effectiveness in the selection of weapons and strategy, but is its most devoted practitioner. On the other hand, it

is impossible to find a man working with cost/effectiveness in USAF who does not point to its limitations, as well as its advantages.

There is a tendency, they detect, to assume that any one of the possible alternatives can meet the requirement. This is the conflict behind the argument between manned aircraft and missiles. Mr. McNamara, having in front of him the alternative ways of delivering a warhead on a strategic target—the choice that he says lends itself to “reasonably precise calculation”—has picked the missile. The case for the missile is that it—particularly in the Minuteman—has high “combat effectiveness per dollar of outlay.” In the case of Polaris, which is much more expensive, the factor of presumed invulnerability appears to have outweighed the added cost. If cost/effectiveness were the only consideration, there would be no Polaris system today.

In this choice, however, the Defense Department is moving toward elimination of the manned bomber without considering whether such a system is a requirement in itself. Dr. Enthoven argues that in the choice of weapon systems, as opposed to the actual conduct of military operations, "one should not be 'offense minded' or 'defense minded,' 'air minded,' or 'for or against bombers,' or any other such approach." He charges that "some individuals are fighting for their favorite weapon system because it symbolizes a way of life."

It is possible here to help define the issue by pointing out that the missile has its best friends in the Air Force, friends who fought for its speedy development in the face of technological conservatism in another day. The disagreement is not between cost/effectiveness and the "bomber men." It is, more likely, between cost/effectiveness and the requirement for a mix of weapon systems to ensure flexibility. Target destruction is but one goal of a strategic air effort. There are other elements that go into the campaign, such as reconnaissance for the seeking out of mobile or unknown targets. Missiles cannot perform some of these missions.

There is no necessity to center the case on the bomber vs. missile matter. There are many other examples showing that the measures used in evaluating strategy and weapon systems cannot ignore complex and unmeasurable factors.

A classic example from World War II was that of the convoy losses suffered in crossing the Atlantic. Statistical studies showed that the number of vessels lost to the enemy remained about the same, no matter what the size of the convoy. The apparent solution was to increase the size of the convoy, thereby cutting the percentage of ships lost on each crossing.

But there were some things not ground into the statistical formula. There were delays forced by waiting for ships to be available and delays waiting for the cargo. The speed of the larger convoy was held to that of the slowest ship. At the end of the voyage there were delays resulting from the monstrous task of unloading a large convoy. The overall result was a cut in the amount of cargo delivered in any unit of time.

The experiment proved that the cost/effectiveness of a convoy operation must be measured by the amount of cargo delivered in a period of time, not by the percentage of the convoy that survives enemy attack.

This search for the real measure of effectiveness is just as pertinent in the choice of strategies and weapon systems. There was a time in World War II when the rate of attrition appeared to be critical, a

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COST/EFFECTIVENESS...CONT'D

fact that always will be in the memories of men with
experience in that war. Then there was emphasis on
the targets destroyed. The disputes over whether the
goal should be blanket devastation or selective de-
struction of vital German installations is one that
raged for many months as the Army Air Forces went
into action. Effectiveness was the issue, and the only
one.

Or, we can take a problem that is more current in
1963, that of the wartime capabilities of the Tactical
Air Command. The New Frontier has placed emphasis
on conventional-war possibilities. TAC now becomes
more proud of its flexibility, the wide part of the wea-
pons spectrum that it can accommodate. Nuclear
bombs or iron bombs can be delivered from the same
pylon, meeting the requirements from general war to
the localized and remote conflict. Yet, the attrition
rates in these two types of conflict would seem to dic-
tate two different force structures. Shall the number
of TAC delivery vehicles be dictated by the require-
ments of all-out general nuclear war or by the demand
of scattered uprisings fought with conventional wea-
pons?

There is another area of vital importance in making
these determinations. It is intelligence. This reporter
has found no record of any estimate on the cost/effec-
tiveness of the military intelligence effort. Yet what
comes out of intelligence could tell us where we
should spend money and where we are wasting it.
Jimmy, do little, once asked what he thought the
Pentagon should buy if it had an additional few bil-
lion dollars in the coffers, replied: "Intelligence" The
bearing of intelligence on strategy and the choice of
weapon systems was obvious to him and he knew that
more investment in the program would pay dividends.

If we know little about the cost/effectiveness of
our own intelligence effort, we know even less about
that of the Russians. We know that their intelligence
problem is far more simple than ours and that the
cost/effectiveness of their weapons must increase as
we narrow the range of options we have for fighting
a war. In this connection it is only necessary to recall
the testimony of Gen. Thomas D. White in his sup-
port of the B-70 bomber system when he was USAF
Chief of Staff. If we build the B-70, he said, it will be
expensive. But it will cost the Russians about four
times what it costs the United States. We did not
build the B-70, and Moscow never had to worry about
the cost/effectiveness of a defense against it.

There are a few current issues in which cost/effec-
tiveness studies are being pursued by the Defense De-
partment and the armed forces. One is our own de-
fense. Money can be invested in defense systems, such
as the much discussed and technologically complex
antimissile devices, such as Nike X. It can be spent on
a more elaborate system of shelters for civilians. A
third component is improved strategic systems and
swarming devices that would make them practical to
prevent attack. This may be the most complex cost/
effectiveness effort, as we are the most vital.

The Navy, at this writing, has been called upon to
study and retrain its requirement for aircraft car-
riers. While the Defense Department has not publicly
revealed the major issues, it is widely assumed that
the cost/effectiveness of the carrier is a matter that is
taking major attention. Like TAC, the Navy pre-

sumably is faced with the problem of multiple mis-
sions. The cost/effectiveness of the carrier in a nuclear
general war probably will be less attractive than
its cost/effectiveness as a mobile base for use in some
remote policing action or other conventional-type con-
flict.

The Navy's dilemma, in this case, recalls the story,
probably apocryphal, of the Secretary of the Army who
boasted of defeating the Secretary of the Navy in a
poker game. He said the evening was climaxed when
he "won a carrier," which brought a query from a near-
by Air Force officer: "Did you win cost or value?"

Air Force analysts currently are toiling over the
figures growing out of the Army's loudly proclaimed
need for more air support and air mobility. The Howze
Board, the group that produced an elaborate program
for expansion of Army aviation including a fixed-wing
transport system for use in the theater of operations,
is not credited with producing an adequate cost/effec-
tiveness study to go with it. The void will be filled by
USAF and when its examination of the Army require-
ment is handed on to the Defense Department it will
be supported by germane arithmetic.

Mr. Hitch, Defense Comptroller, wrote in his book
that "strategy and cost are as interdependent as the
front and rear sights of a rifle." He said nobody can
assign relative weights to the importance of the posi-
tions of the front and rear sights. In the same way,
as he views the problem, "one cannot economize ex-
cept in choosing strategies (or tactics or methods) to
achieve objectives. The job of economizing, which
some would delegate to budgeteers and comptrollers,
cannot be distinguished from the whole task of mak-
ing military decisions."

He is declaring here that cost/effectiveness argu-
ments really are arguments about strategy. Also, it
follows that if there is a conflict on strategy-or a dis-
agreement-either side can seek to prove its case with
cost/effectiveness arguments. If we revert to his illus-
trative front and rear sights on a rifle it becomes clear
that the proponents of two different strategies may be
aiming at two different targets.

Dr. Enthoven, an important aide to Mr. Hitch, has
said it is clear "that both the Secretary of Defense and
our senior military leaders are being forced by present
circumstances to place increasing reliance on [systems]
analysis rather than placing exclusive reliance on their
experience and judgment." This, he says, has become
controversial and is described as "downgrading of the
military."

Well, the military view probably should be ex-
pressed in more exact terms. It is that cost/effectiv-
ness is a good tool and one pioneered by men in uni-
form so far as military applications are concerned.
But it also is a tool with limitations which must be
recognized. These limitations sometimes lead people
with little military experience and judgment to sub-
stitute an inflated cost/effectiveness value for the
values they do not know and appreciate. Inflated cost/
effectiveness in other words can be made to fill a void
where more critical material is needed.

When the cold war made it impossible to move coal
into Berlin by barge, truck, or train, military men re-
sorted to the C-54. Cost was not a factor. Effective-
ness was 100 percent, which is what is needed in
war.-END

18-F

Cambridge 38, Mass.

PERSONAL

5 December 1963

Dear Henry,

I would appreciate it if you would write the usual letter to the Bursar -- or whatever the procedure is -- to provide the $500 contribution for Helen's salary for this half year.

I thought your wise-crack on Enthoven's phony
humility about "standing on the shoulders" was the best
in the whole history of the Seminar. It is very
fortunate that I did not stay after he finished his
opening remarks, because that pretty picture which he
painted is, to my certain knowledge, unrelated to the
realities. For example, he had the nerve to discuss
this "dialogue" with the Service Staffs (complete with
full presentation of facts and conclusions on paper
from OSD) in connection with the B-70. As you know,
(a) the decision on the B-70 was made on March 10, 1961
when the Administration had been in office only since
January 20, (b) I tried for one year and a half to find
out the basis for McNamara's adverse decision and never
yet have got it, nor has the Secretary of the Air Force,
nor the Chief of Staff, and (c) when Carl Kaysen was here
a couple of years ago he stated that the reasons for the
B-70 decision would not be disclosed "because that would
just start another hassle with LeMay." You may have
noticed some skeptical smiles among the audience in the
course of Enthoven's smooth presentation. Perhaps one
reason for this is that, at the session when Gilpatric
did not appear, I started off by giving the works to the
cost/effectiveness technique and to Enthoven by name.
It is not impossible that some of the students remembered
what I said in a forty-minute discourse. With great
restraint I mentioned the B-70 only in passing, and con-
centrated on the TFX.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Director
Harvard Defense Studies Program
6 Divinity Avenue

Cambridge 38, Mass.

15 April 1964

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Please note enclosed copy of a letter
from the University of Texas which was sent to
Professor Leach on March 20th. I sent a copy of
this to Professor Leach while on his trip. He
has written back to me that he is interested in
this matter and to send a copy of the letter to
you and to ask you to reply. He also mentioned
that he doesn't have anyone in mind to recommend
but maybe you would have.

Professor Leach, I am sure, would
appreciate receiving a copy of any letter that you
may write in reply.

hs
enclosure - copy. ltr. 3/20/64
WBL from H.Malcolm Macdonald

Cambridge 38, Mass.

8 June 1964

Dear Henry,

I want to express to you my admiration for the
work of the members of your staff (who often do not
identify themselves) in evaluating and commenting upon the
papers in the Defense Policy Seminar. In almost every
instance, I find myself in total agreement as far as the
law students are concerned, which is my area of responsibility.

I have one suggestion for administrative improvement. Many of these papers deserve to be published. Occasionally, I have taken the initiative in this matter where I was aware of the periodical which was the natural medium for publication -- for example, the long paper on the B-36 controversy which occupied two entire issues of THE AIRPOWER HISTORIAN. But my resources of knowledge in this area -- the periodicals dealing with history and political science -- are limited.

As a first step, I would suggest that someone
on your staff (perhaps Maury Feld) should compile a list of
the periodicals which might be interested in papers coming
out of this Seminar, together with a brief indication of the
fields of interest of each periodical. This would at least
permit a student who has the desire to get his paper pub-
lished, together with the drive to see it through, to write
to the proper people.

As a second step, if your staff resources permitted
it, individual letters drafted by your staff and signed by
you might go out recommending publication of a particular
paper or, at least, listing a few topics of papers and asking
whether the periodical is interested in looking at papers
on these topics which you consider publishable. I need not
add that a good record of publication would be a good thing
for the prestige of the Seminar and a useful talking point
in getting funds either within the University or from outside
sources.

As a third step, much more ambitious, I wonder whether
papers of similar quality are being produced at Wisconsin,
Ohio State, UCLA, Colorado, etc. I suspect that the answer is