Pol Potrno in the weeks before the German attack on the U.S.A. to scheme an
form of atomic bombardment. One need only study the subject effort of the
war. But both history and Soviet theory would seem to indicate that this is a
conceivable, and that any attempt to print it should not feed to all-out
troops or even where Soviet influence has been growing, as in Hungary, at
impression that any withdrawal from any territory once occupied by Soviet
the Soviets have efficiently sought to paralyze opposition by giving the
likely to arise everything to scheme a positive plan. To be sure,
their nationalist survival is not directly affected. They are even less
which would risk everything to prevent someense transformations as part as
Soviet and Chinese theory leave little doubt that these are not regimes
in diagnosis, we may actually be safe to use Soviet theory to our advantage.
economic and military premises are related to the objective
that we succeed in seeing policy as an entity in which political, bay-
sections both in our diplomacy and in our military policy. To the extent
Everything degenerates therefore on our affinity to finance our
international problems.

overcome until their opponents are forced to confront that they were really
empirical. History demonstrates that revolutionary powers have never been
in action because it will back into the hands of the Soviet stratum of
pioneers. We must understand that the dust will for certainly can only paralyze
and first in the reflection among states, which may flex a greater role than
that they are no longer flexible; any more than briefly military solutions
chology of its opponents as carefully as they studied one; we must learn
of it becomes too great. The United States must therefore study the bat-
combustion and rigidity if the gap between reality and the expectation
which gives flexibility and daring to Soviet moves in a vacuum, may produce

AII-11-25

VIII-53

accommodation to realize that, when confronted with an unfavorable relation of forces, the Communist regimes would not hesitate to apply Lenin's dictum: One step backward, two steps forward. And Mao has repeatedly labelled the refusal to yield when confronted with superior force as "desperadoism." The strategy of limited war described in previous chapters therefore emerges as the best strategy for countering Soviet pressures both in terms of our self-interest and in terms of its impact on Soviet behavior.

Most of the discussion in this chapter has been in terms of a Soviet doctrine developed before the first explosion of the atomic bomb. Has nuclear power then brought about a change in Soviet theory? It has been remarkable how little Soviet doctrine has been affected by the horror of modern weapons and this has been an element both of strength and of weakness. Of strength, because during the period of our atomic monoply it enabled the Soviets to create a psychological framework which surrounded nuclear weapons with a special horror thereby increasing our inhibitions against using them, And of potential weakness because it may make more difficult the integration of nuclear weapons into an effective Soviet strategy or because it may cause the Soviets to under-estimate the horror of nuclear war. The struggle to maintain doctrinal purity may give a clue then to how difficult it will be for the Soviets to give up their vision as "reality" and also to their efforts to come to grips with the dilemmas of the nuclear age.

["The basic idea of the nuclear strategy of the Soviet Union is to give them a clear vision as a result of which they will be able to maintain their access to the resources they need. This can be done by maintaining a strong military presence in the area. This can be done by maintaining a