- 2 -

to Maj. Whitside who, with his command, was halted further
down the valley. Going my way to the extreme advance Guard

I arrived forward to when Captain Maylan, whose trap was advance
I there learned that a considerable number of Indians had
Guard, had fallen while I had been at the mission. He reported to me
been observed in its front and reported by the non-com off.
that has advanced had developed a force of about 50 Indians.

in charge of the "point". The forward movement was ordered

and very soon a skirmish from long range x commenced and one
immediately y was preferred that the Indians

soldier was wounded. Seeing the Indians proposed to be op-

intended to oppose my progress and supposing that the main camp of the
hostiles was in that direction I concluded it best to make
this reconnaissance in as great force as practicable, and
Maj. Henry with his battalion being under my command I at once
sent him word by courier to join me, and sent the second dis-
patch to General Brooke. The

It seems to me that the only natural inference when
can be drawn from this report is that Maj. H. was sent for
as a last resort, as an absolute necessity for the salva-
tion of my command, and after it had gotten into an irre-
medible predicament, and that his timely arrival was all that

-3-

saved it.

I wish to call attention to the fact that Col. H. was sent for not after I had gotten into a fight but just as soon as I discovered that I was to meet with any resistance at all, and for the reasons stated above. To the other statements and testimony herewith tending to the above inference I desire to reply categorically as follows.

On page 5 in the record of Maj. H's testimony is found the following. "I found part of his troops in a pocket, and I told me he could not withdraw them" This statement I never made as here given. When Maj. H. arrived on the field he was reported to me at all but that of his troops in position. I ordered him my adjutant to move out of his troops into another position, then went back and asked me if there was any other position in last position indicated in map. remaining then on my line relocated Caprons battery and gave directions for it's fire. A short time later I found that there was no battery left, and that the troops had withdrawn. I then went and hunted up Maj. Henry and by the time I found them any difficulty in withdrawing the troops had disappeared and it only remained to call an accomplished fact. Then the troops he referred to had practically withdrawn. Can-

-' 4 -

had ch
sequently before I ever had an opportunity to make this re-
that I could not withdraw my troops

mark to Maj. Henry the troops had already been withdrawn,
and if Maj. Henry had not arrived when he did, Maj. Henry would have
to stop his troops and taken his own time to get them across the river.

In the conversation I had with him, I may have
made use of the wind pocket, but I in the connection given by him, for
I could not withdraw those troops until I got others in position.

but as it was then, I utilized it.

Page 5. On my way out I met several couriers urging haste"

I did send several messengers for Maj. H. as it seemed to me
there had been more than ample time for him to have arrived
since I sent my first message. The very broken character
of the country was such that more troops were desirable
to cover it in the best manner and as far out on the flanks
as seemed wise. The tenor of my conversation with Lieut.
Dreoton before sending him back was that if Maj. H. was
coming at all he must come soon or he would get there too late
to be of any use at all, that I did not have enough troops
of him then, or not at all.

-5-

As previously remarked there never was a time when my entire command could not have been withdrawn by use of its own Troops alone. It would however have taken a little longer time and thereby possibly have subjected it to greater loss. This I certainly had no intention of doing unless absolutely necessary.

Pages 5 and 6. "Lieut. Preston 9th Cav. met me about three miles out and presenting Col. F's comlements urged me to

"hurry up, or we will be cleaned out".

This does not agree with St Paul's testimony, This skillful combination of language and quotation marks and I certainly have no recollection of sending creates the inference that such was the language of the any such message,

message sent by me. This may have been an opinion hazarded by Lieut. Preston but the message I directed him to give is accurately stated in his testimony page 9.

Page 5 "I deployed two troops, "I" and "K" 9th Cav. on the heights to the right with one Hotchkiss gun on a knoll and two troops "D" and "F" 9th Cav. were deployed on the left"

-'6-

The effacement of everybody not connected with the 9th Cav. from participation in this manoeuvre could not be more complete if it were intentional. The language does not say that Maj. Henry voluntarily made the deployment of all these troops uninstructed and unsolicited but such is the natural inference and the one drawn by the Inspector, for on page 17 he says "It appears that skirmishers were not thrown out to take position of the bluffs on the right and left of the valley, until Maj. Henry arrived with his command and DEPLOYED IT as shown on map enclosed." (see statements of Maj. McCormick and Maj. McWhitney)

The Two troops "I" and "K" 9th Cav. were deployed on the right (by Maj. H. in a position where I had told Lieut. Preston I wanted some troops and in one which Maj. W. would, under my instructions, have assumed with a part of this battalion Maj. F. been a few moments later.

Those on the left were deployed by my orders as follows: I sent my adjutant, Lieut. McCormick to Maj. H. with orders to:

-7-

directing that the designate two troops to go in on the left.

The troops of Capts Steadman and Loud were designated by Maj.

H. Seeing Lieut. Guilfoyle near by I asked if he was not the Adj. of the 9th Cav. battalion and receiving an affirmative reply I requested him to accompany Lieut. McCormick to whom I told explained where the Troops were to be deployed and given their detailed instructions as to what they were to do.

Page 6 "I also met some led horses of the 7th Cav. going to the rear near the mission and Lieut. Robinson, 7th Cav. trying to stop them.

The horse holders were directed to retire across the bridge. This they did, but, mistaking their instructions, instead of stopping there, they continued on down the road. Lieut. Robinson, the Adj. of that bat. happening that they had gone quite a distance too far to observe them after they had gone, reported the fact to me, and I ordered him to go and bring them

- 8 -

back. His horse was completely played out and it was some
little time before he overtook them, but having done so he
brought them back in good order.

and as accurate a statement as probably could be made from his
standing and with his knowledge. The use of one word I
am inclined to think injudicious and I am apt to create an er-
roneous impression. He states that Capts. Loud and Steadman
"CHARGED" the bridge on the left. Capt. Steadman told Capt.
Edgerly of my regiment that he did not see a hostile Indian
that would hardly indicate the necessity for
a charge, in the mean proper use of his term.

day, He further says "The enlisted men of the 7th
Cav. I think were unnerved by the slaughter of the day
before"

It is probably quite true that the fighting
condition of the men was not what it had been on the previous
day but I observed no indications of a lack of nerve nor
that the slaughter of the day before had any
的影响 on their condition. This I think was

-9-

solely due to fatigue and hunger. We made a <u>night</u>
march on Dec. 28th to reach the Wounded Knee camp. A light
breakfast was had the next morning and that was the last

meal my men got until after the fight near the Mission was over.

Except breakfast on the morning of 30th fighting, Neither dinner nor supper was practicable on the 29th.

Machin[ability] having commenced the ration day until 10:30 a.m. going before breakfast on the morning of the 30th to the relief

Early on the Morning of 30th we were hostil[ably] called to the relief
of the 9th Cav. wagon train, <u>which</u> had hardly returned before

leaving <u>which</u> could be immediately <u>for the Mission.</u> This unexpected

robbed both officers and <u>men</u> of breakfast.

Taking into consideration the character of work they had
been doing and the little food they had <u>their</u> condition
<u>cannot</u> be a matter of surprise.

The opinions of the Rev. Father Jutz, the Rev. Mr. Cook and
the two Shangraus <u>as to</u> the number of Indians engaged <u>in</u>

this
that only
1 my command

- 10 -

in the fight are evidently influenced by what they heard from
Indians and possibly the same Indians. Their testimony
seems to agree in several points with that of Little Horse.
None of them were in positions to see for themselves how
many Indians were concerned near the end of the fight, for
kxxxXXxxEXxxEXxxEXxxEX for I am informed that they went to the
rear early in the action. The number of Indians engaged
when the fight began was probably not more than they state.
The following is the estimate of the number of Indians en-
as made by every commander of an independent organization
in my command that day.

The leaving off the body of the enlisted man that was killed
was something that I was not aware of at the time at all as
it was not then reported to me.

I enclose the report of Capt. W.S. Edgerly concerning this
matter. The statement in the inspectors report that only
70 bucks had actually surrounded a part of my command

- 11 -

and the further conclusion that my command stood in danger of serious results from this number of Indians (a part of whom were supposed to be armed with clubs) need no comment from me.

Substantially the same statements and conclusions had been heralded by the public press a day or so after the fight coupled with the further statement, as is the Inspectors, that had it not been for the timely arrival of the 9th Cav. these serious results would have ensued. These publications caused Maj. Henry to write me the following note.

I received this note to-day.

I gave Maj. H. and the 9th Cav. all, the credit, and many of my officers think more than was their due, in the following to ready to Maj. H's note.

It would appear from the Inspectors report that the evidence of Maj. H. and Lt. Preston concerning the number of Indians engaged was not desirable and not as good as that of a few non-combitants who witnessed the fight from afar since the numbers are stated from the "best" authorities.

Memorandum reply to report rendered by Col. E.M. Heyl

on Mission Fight.

000

On the morning of Dec. 20th, in accordance with instructions as stated by General Brooke, I marched with my command towards smoke observed in the direction of Drexel Mission. On arrival these two columns of smoke were observed to be further down the valley, but after an interview with Father Jutz, I concluded to return to Pine Ridge, and wrote the note to General Brooke, which he states was received about 12 O'clock. I also arranged with Father Jutz to return with me to the Agency so that he could personally report to General Brooke what had taken place during the preceding night.

A short time after this despatch was sent "Little Fat" reported that he had heard "heavy guns down the valley" in the direction I knew Sanfords command to be. Tho' I doubted the reliability of this information, the same that was soon reported to General Brooke, [see his statement in Col. Heyl's report] and which was afterwards ascertained to be incorrect, I feared it might be possible and then determined to make, before returning, an armed reconnaissance in that direction towards the burning buildings down the valley.

Sending for Lieut. Preston, I ordered him to report to Maj. Whitside who, with his command, was halted further down the valley. I then rode forward to where Capt. Moylan, whose troop was advance guard, had halted while I had been at the Mission. He reported to me that his advance scouts had developed a force of about fifty Indians. The forward movement was ordered and very soon a skirmish from long range commenced and one soldier was rounded. It was self evident that the Indians intended to oppose my progress and supporting that

ing that the main camp of the hostiles was in that direction I concluded it
best to make this reconnaissance in as great force as possible, and Major Henry,
with his battalion, being under my command, I at once sent him word to join me,
and sent the second despatch to General Brooke.

The natural inference from Colonel Heyl's report is that Major H. was
sent for as a last resort, as an absolute necessity for the salvation of my
command, and after it had gotten into an irredeemable predicament, and that
his timely arrival was all that saved it.

I wish to call attention to the fact that Col. Henry was sent for, not
after I had gotten into a fight but just as soon as I discovered that I was
to meet with any resistance at all and for the reasons stated above.

To the other statements and testimony herewith, tending to the above in-
ference, I desire to reply categorically as follows:

On the page 5, of the record, in Major Henry's testimony, is found the
following: "I found a part of his troops in a pocket, and he told me he
could not withdraw then". This statement I never made as here given. When
Major H. arrived on the field, he did not report to me, but placed one of his
troops in position on the right as indicated on the map. Another was retain-
ed near the Hotchkiss gun, and the other two were disposed of under my orders,
as set forth in the following statement:

[ Note: Here followed a written statement made by Lieut. McCormick,
the Adjutant of the Regiment, setting forth in detail the orders I had given
him and the circumstances attendant upon the disposition of these troops.]

I then went back and re-located Caprons battery in last position in-
dicated on map, and gave directions for it's fire. A short time after this

I found Major Henry near his Hotchkiss gun and by that time any difficulty in withdrawing the Troops had disappeared, and it could have been called an accomplished fact, consequently before I had ever had an opportunity to make this remark to Maj. Henry "that I could not withdraw my troops", they had already been withdrawn, and if Major Henry had not arrived just when he did Major Whitside would, with his three troops, have occupied the ground he took with his force.

[see report of Major Whitside herewith].

In the conversation I then had with him I may have made use of the word "pocket", but not in the connection given by him, for there never was a time when all my troops could not have been withdrawn without the assistance of the 6th Cavalry, but as it was there I utilized it.

Page 5. "On my way out I met several couriers urging haste". I did send several messengers to Major Henry, urging haste as it seemed to me there had been more than an ample time for him to have arrived since I sent my first message. The very broken character of the country was such that more troops were desirable to cover it in the best manner and as far out on the flanks as seemed wise. The tenor of my conversation with Lieut. Preston, before sending him back was that if Major Henry was coming at all he must come soon or get there too late to be of any use, that I had need of him then or not at all.

As previously remarked, there never was a time when my entire command could not have been withdrawn by use of it's own troops alone. It would, however, have taken a little longer time and thereby possibly have subjected it to greater loss. This I certainly had no intention of doing, unless absolutely necessary,

Pages 5 and 6. "Lieut. Preston 6th Cavalry, met me about three

miles out and presenting Col. F's compliments, urged me to "hurry up, or we
will be cleaned out".

This does not agree with Lieut. Prestons testimony and I certainly have
no recollection of sending any such message.

Page 5 I deployed two troops, "I" and "K", 6th Cavalry, on the heights to the right with one Hotchkiss Gun on a Knoll, and two troops "D", and "F", 6th Cavalry, were deployed on the left". The effacement of every body not connected with the 6th Cavalry from participation in this manoeuvre could not be more complete if it were intentional. The language does not say that Major Henry, voluntarily made the deployment of all these troops uninstructed but such is the natural inference and the one drawn by the Inspector for he says on page 17 "It appears that skirmishers were not thrown out to take position of the bluffs". A session on the right and left of the King's valley until Major Henry arrived with his command and DEPLOYED it as shown on map enclosed". See statement of Lieut. McCornick and Major Whitside.

Page 6. "I also met some led horses of the 7th Cavalry going to the rear near the Mission and Lieut. Robinson, 7th Cav. trying to stop them."

The horse holders were directed to retire across the bridge. This
they did, but, mistaking their instructions, instead of stopping there they con-
tinued on down the road. Lieut. Robinson, the Adjutant of that Battalion,
happening to observe that they had gone too far, reported the fact to me and I
ordered him to go and bring them back. His horse was completely played out
and it was some little time before he overtook them, but, having done so, he
brought them back in good order.

On page 17 of the Inspectors report, he says, "The position selected by Colonel Forsyth on the slope by the shack beyond the bridge was not a judicious one". The Inspector is here referring to a position occupied by only one troop, "F", that of Captain Varnum. Major Whitside had been ordered, as stated in his report, to withdraw three troops of his Battalion from the 1st to the 2nd position. About the same time Capt. Varnum, commanding the other troop "E", of this battalion was ordered to fall back near the bridge and cover the withdrawal of the rest of the battalion across it. Capt. Varnum withdrew to the position mentioned above and indicated on the map in blue and marked E."

This position was not selected by me but by Captain Varnum. It was not selected from which to carry on the fight but temporarily taken to cover the withdrawal of the other troops as has been stated.

Although not the most suitable from which to fight a battle, it was the best obtainable to carry out the purpose it was taken for.

This "E" Troop in its position also constituted the Troops which have so often been spoken of as being in a pocket. It held this position only long enough for the others to withdraw and then retired itself, having had at that place [in the so-called pocket] not a man killed nor one wounded.

Lieut Prestons testimony is straight forward, ingenuous and definite. The use of one word I am inclined to think injudicious and apt to create an erroneous impression. He states that Captains Loud and Steadman "charged" the ridge on the left. These Captains did deploy their troops and advance towards these bluffs by my orders as previously explained, but Captain Steadman told Captain Edgerly of my regiment, that he did not see a hostile Indian that day.

This would hardly indicate that he had made any charge at all, in the proper sense of that term.

He, Lieut. Preston, further says, "the enlisted men of the 7th Cavalry, I think, were unnerved by the slaughter of the day before."

It is probably quite true that the fighting condition of the men was not what it had been on the previous day but I observed no indications of a lack of nerve nor do I believe that the fight of the day before had anything to do with their then condition. This I think was solely due to fatigue and hunger. We made a night march on Dec. 28th, to reach the Wounded Knee camp. A light breakfast was had the next morning and that was the last regular meal my men got until after the fight near the Mission on the next day was over, except breakfast on the morning of the 20th. Neither dinner nor supper was practicable on the 28th, fighting, caring for the Wounded and marching back to the Agency having consumed the entire day until 10.30 P.M. Early on the morning of Dec. 30th we were hastily called to the relief of the 6th Cavalry wagon train and had hardly returned before leaving for the Mission. This second unexpected order robbed many officers of breakfast.

Taking into consideration the character of the work they had been performing and the little food they had had their condition cannot be a matter of surprise.

The opinions of the Rev. Father Jutz, the Rev. Mr. Cook and of the two Shangraus as to the number of Indians engaged in the fight are evidently influenced by what they heard from Indians and possibly from the same Indian. Their testimony seems to agree in several points exactly with that of Little Horse, none of them being in a position to see for themselves how many Indians

were engaged near the end of the fight for I am reliably informed that they went to the rear early in the action. The number of Indians engaged when the fight began was probably not more than they have stated. The following is an estimate of the number of Indians engaged as made by the commander of every independent organization in my command that day.

[here followed report referred to].

The leaving of the body of the enlisted man that was killed was some-
thing that I was not aware of at the time at all as it was not reported to
me until afterwards. I enclose the report of Capt. W.S. Edgerly, the troop
commander of said man, as to this matter,

The statement in the Inspectors report that only 70 bucks had surrounded a part of my command and the further conclusion that my command stood in danger of serious results from this number of Indians [a part of whom were supposed to be armed with clubs] needs no comment from me.

Substantially the same statements had been heralded by the public
press several days after the fight, coupled with the statement XXX, as is the
Inspectors, that had it not been for the timely arrival of the 8th Cavalry,
these serious results would have ensued. These publications caused Major
Henry to write me the following note.

HENRY'S note here followed.

In the following reply to that note I gave Major Henry and the 8th Cavalry
all the credit, and many of my officers think more than was, due then.

Here followed Reply.

In his report the Inspector says, the probable number of Indians engaged

is stated "according to the best authority". Since he failed to solicit upon this point, the views of Lieut. Preston, who was engaged at the front in this fight, it would appear that the opinion of this gallant young officer was not considered as good as these of non-combitants and deserting scouts who witnessed the fray from afer, and of an Indian interested in exaggerating the prowess of his brothers.