FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 8, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON NATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION

THE OVAL OFFICE

9:00 P.M. EDT

Good evening. Five weeks ago, on Easter weekend, the Communist armies of North Vietnam launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam, an invasion that was made possible by tanks, artillery, and other advanced offensive weapons supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

The South Vietnamese have fought bravely to repel this brutal assault. Casualties on both sides have been very high. Most tragically, there have been over 20,000 civilian casualties, including women and children, in the cities which the North Vietnamese have shelled in wanton disregard of human life.

As I announced in my report to the Nation 12 days ago, the role of the United States in resisting this invasion has been limited to air and naval strikes on military targets in North and South Vietnam. As I also pointed out in that report, we have responded to North Vietnam's massive military offensive by undertaking wide-ranging new peace efforts aimed at ending the war through negotiation.

On April 20th, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Moscow for four days of meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. I instructed him to emphasize our desire for a rapid solution to the war and our willingness to look at all possible approaches. At that time, the Soviet leaders showed an interest in bringing the war to an end on a basis just to both sides. They urged resumption of negotiations in Paris, and they indicated they would use their constructive influence.

I authorized Dr. Kissinger to meet privately with the top North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, on Tuesday, May 2nd, in Paris. Ambassador Porter, as you know, resumed the public peace negotiations in Paris on April 27th and again on May 4th. At those meetings, both public and private, all we heard from the enemy was bombastic rhetoric and a re-playing of their demand for surrender. For example, at the May 2nd secret meeting, I authorized Dr. Kissinger to talk about every conceivable avenue toward peace. The North Vietnamese flatly refused to consider any of these approaches. They refused to offer any new approach of their own. Instead, they simply read verbatim their previous public demands.

Here is what over three years of public and private negotiations with Hanoi has come down to: The United States, with the full concurrence of our South Vietnamese allies, has offered the maximum of what any President of the United States could offer.

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We have offered a de-escalation of the fighting. We have offered a cease-fire with the deadline for withdrawal of all American forces. We have offered new elections which would be internationally supervised with the communists participating both in the supervisory body and in the elections themselves.

President Thieu has offered to resign one month before the elections. We have offered an exchange of prisoners of war in a ratio of 10 North Vietnamese prisoners for every one American prisoner that they release. And North Vietnam has met each of these offers with insolence and insult. They have flatly and arrogantly refused to negotiate an end to the war and bring peace. Their answer to every peace offer we have made has been to escalate the war.

In the two weeks alone since I offered to resume negotiations Hanoi has launched three new military offensives in South Vietnam. In those two weeks the risk that a communist government may be imposed on the 17 million people of South Vietnam has increased and the communist offensive has now reached the point that it gravely threatens the lives of 60,000 American troops who are still in Vietnam.

There are only two issues left for us in this war. First, in the face of a massive invasion do we stand by, jeopardize the lives of 60,000 Americans, and leave the South Vietnamese to a long night of terror? This will not happen. We shall do whatever is required to safeguard American lives and American honor.

Second, in the face of complete intransigence at the conference table do we join with our enemy to install a communist government in South Vietnam? This, too, will not happen. We will not cross the line from generosity to treachery.

We now have a clear, hard choice among three courses of action: Immediate withdrawal of all American forces, continued attempts at negotiation, or decisive military action to end the war.

I know that many Americans favor the first course of action, immediate withdrawal. They believe that the way to end the war is for the United States to get out and to remove the threat to our remaining forces by simply withdrawing them.

From a political standpoint, this would be a very easy choice for me to accept. After all, I did not send over one-half a million Americans to Vietnam. I have brought 500,000 men home from Vietnam since I took office. But, abandoning our commitment in Vietnam here and now would mean turning 17 million South Vietnamese over to communist tyranny and terror. It would mean leaving hundreds of American prisoners in communist hands with no bargaining leverage to get them released.

An American defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world, agression in which smaller nations armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighboring nations at will in the Mid-East, in Europe, and other areas. World peace would be in grave jeopardy.

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The second course of action is to keep on trying to negotiate a settlement. Now this is the course we have preferred from the beginning and we shall continue to pursue it. We want to negotiate, but we have made every reasonable offer and tried every possible path for ending this war at the conference table.

The problem is, as you all know, it takes two to negotiate and now, as throughout the past four years, the North Vietnamese arrogantly refuse to negotiate anything but an imposition, and ultimately that the United States impose a Communist regime on 17 million people in South Vietnam who do not want a Communist Government.

It is plain then that what appears to be a choice among three courses of action for the United States is really no choice at all. The killing in this tragic war must stop. By simply getting out, we would only worsen the bloodshed. By relying solely on negotiations, we would give an intransigent enemy the time he needs to press his aggression on the battlefield.

There is only one way to stop the killing. That is to keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam.

Throughout the war in Vietnam, the United States has exercised a degree of restraint unprecedented in the annals of war. That was our responsibility as a great nation, a nation which is interested -- and we can be proud of this as Americans -- as America has always been, in peace not conquest.

However, when the enemy abandons all restraint, throws its whole army into battle in the territory of its neighbor, refuses to negotiate, we simply face a new situation.

In these circumstances, with 60,000 Americans threatened, any President who failed to act decisively would have betrayed the trust of his country and betrayed the cause of world peace.

I therefore concluded Hanoi must be denied the weapons and supplies it needs to continue the aggression. In full coordination with the Republic of Vietnam I have ordered the following measures which are being implemented as I am speaking to you.

All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the international and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and all other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible. Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue.

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These actions are not directed against any other
nation. Countries with ships presently in North Vietnamese
ports have already been notified that their ships will have
three daylight periods to leave in safety. After that
time, the mines will become active and any ships attempting
to leave or enter these ports will do so at their own risk.

These actions I have ordered will cease when the
following conditions are met: First, all American prisoners
of war must be returned.

Second, there must be an internationally supervised
cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Once prisoners of war are released, once the inter-
nationally supervised cease-fire has begun, we will stop
all acts of force throughout Indochina, and at that time we
will proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces
from Vietnam within four months.

Now, these terms are generous terms. They are
terms which would not require surrender and humiliation on
the part of anybody. They would permit the United States
to withdraw with honor. They would end the killing. They
would bring our POWs home. They would allow negotiations
on a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves.
They would permit all the nations which have suffered in this
long war -- Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam --
to turn at last to the urgent works of healing and of peace.
They deserve immediate acceptance by North Vietnam.

It is appropriate to conclude my remarks tonight
with some comments directed individually to each of the major
parties involved in the continuing tragedy of the Vietnam War.
First, to the leaders of Hanoi, your people have already suf-
fered too much in your pursuit of conquest. Do not compound
their agony with continued arrogance; choose instead the path
of a peace that redeems your sacrifices, guarantees true inde-
pendence for your country and ushers in an era of reconcilia-
tion.

To the people of South Vietnam, you shall continue
to have our firm support in your resistance against aggres-
sion. It is your spirit that will determine the outcome of
the battle. It is your will that will shape the future of
your country.

To other nations, especially those which are allied
with North Vietnam, the actions I have announced tonight are
not directed against you. Their sole purpose is to protect
the lives of 60,000 Americans who would be gravely endangered
in the event the Communist offensive continues to roll
forward and to prevent the imposition of a Communist govern-
ment by brutal aggression upon 17 million people.

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I particularly direct my comments tonight to the
Soviet Union. We respect the Soviet Union as a great power.
We recognize the right of the Soviet Union to defend its
interests when they are threatened. The Soviet Union in turn
must recognize our right to defend our interests.

No Soviet soldiers are threatened in Vietnam. Sixty
thousand Americans are threatened. We expect you to help
your allies, and you cannot expect us to do other than to
continue to help our allies, but let us, and let all great
powers help our allies only for the purpose of their defense,
not for the purpose of launching invasions against their
neighbors.

Otherwise the cause of peace, the cause in which we
both have so great a stake, will be seriously jeopardized.

Our two nations have made significant progress in
our negotiations in recent months. We are near major agreement
on nuclear arms limitation, on trade, on a host of other issues.

Let us not slide back toward the dark shadows of a
previous age. We do not ask you to sacrifice your principles,
or your friends, but neither should you permit Hanoi's intransigence
to blot out the prospects we together have so patiently
prepared.

We, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are on
the threshold of a new relationship that can serve not only
the interests of our two countries, but the cause of world peace.
We are prepared to continue to build this relationship. The
responsibility is yours if we fail to do so.

And finally, may I say to the American people, I ask
you for the same strong support you have always given your
President in difficult moments. It is you most of all that
the world will be watching.

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I know how much you want to end this war. I know
how much you want to bring our men home and I think you know
from all that I have said and done these past three and one-
half years how much I, too, want to end the war to bring our
men home.

You want peace. I want peace. But, you also want
honor and not defeat. You want a genuine peace, not a peace
that is merely a prelude to another war.

At this moment, we must stand together in purpose
and resolve. As so often in the past, we Americans did not
choose to resort to war. It has been forced upon us by an
enemy that has shown utter contempt toward every overture
we have made for peace. And that is why, my fellow Americans,
tonight I ask for your support of this decision, a decision
which has only one purpose, not to expand the war, not to
escalate the war, but to end this war and to win the kind of
peace that will last.

With God's help, with your support, we will accomplish
that great goal.

Thank you and good night.

END

9:18 P.M. (EDT)

3279, as amended, be further amended to adjust imports consistent with this finding.

I agree with the findings and recommendations of the Director and deem it necessary and consistent with the security objectives of Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, to adjust the imports of petroleum and petroleum products, as hereinafter provided.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim that, effective as of this date, Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, is further amended as follows:

1. In subparagraph (2) of paragraph (a) of Section 1A, substitute "570,000" for "540,000."

2. In subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) of Section 2, substitute "1,165,000" for "965,000."

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eleventh day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-sixth.

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. Applauds U.N. Response to Challenge of Drug Abuse

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative George Bush in the Social Committee of the U.N. Economic and Social Council on May 15.

USUN press release 46 dated May 15

Last year I spoke to this Council on the scourge of drug abuse, which poses such a menace to individuals and to society as a whole. I deeply regret that a year later this evil has not receded but rather that we continue to face a long and painful period in the struggle to free mankind of the affliction of

drug abuse. I speak out of deep personal conviction in sharing the concern expressed by so many members of the United Nations that drug abuse be eradicated in all forms and in all places throughout the world.

But while we can take no comfort in the present situation, we can be greatly heartened and encouraged at the response of governments and the United Nations in recognizing its gravity and in undertaking new and hopeful forms of international cooperation.

It is now universally recognized that the menace of drug abuse transcends national boundaries and that no society is free of this present or potential threat.

Today the flow of drugs from country to country, continent to continent, is increasing in spite of new international efforts at controlling illicit traffic. We must have greater cooperation from all nations in dealing with every aspect of drug production, trade, and control. This has to be done on a worldwide basis, through increased international collaboration in evaluating problems, channeling information, training of specialists, as well as through greater mutual law enforcement efforts. My government believes that the U.N. should serve as the international focus for this cooperation and coordination.

My government has made extensive efforts over the past 12 months to cooperate closely with other nations in furthering drug abuse control as a priority objective of our foreign policy. President Nixon has said: ¹

No serious attack on our national drug problem can ignore the international implications of such an effort, nor can the domestic effort succeed without attacking the problem on an international plane.

We deeply appreciate the understanding and common concern expressed by so many countries in pressing the control of production and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. My government has been especially grateful for the close cooperation which we have received

¹ For President Nixon's message to the Congress on June 17, 1971, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1971, p. 58.

June 12, 1972

823

from our friends in Turkey, France, Thai-
land, Mexico, and Laos.

As the conscience of the world has been
aroused to combat drug addiction, the United
Nations has not been found wanting. We
applaud the United Nations for the steps
taken thus far. This past year has been a
significant one, perhaps even the turning
point in the effort to gain the upper hand.
As the International Narcotics Control
Board notes in its excellent report: ²

... the year 1971 will hold a special place, both by reason of the intense gravity of the problems and because of more concerted efforts by governments to deal with these problems.

There have been a number of noteworthy
developments in this field which demonstrate
the capacity of this body to respond when
faced with a humanitarian challenge. I would
note the following:

1. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs will be strengthened substantially as the result of the adoption of a protocol which assigns new responsibilities to the International Narcotics Control Board for attacking illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. The powers of the Board will be substantially increased to carry out this responsibility. My government expects to ratify the protocol shortly, and we hope that other governments will take similar action in order that the strengthened provisions will come into effect as soon as possible. The conclusion of this protocol in a spirit of common humanitarian concern and mutual cooperation has reflected great credit on the United Nations.

2. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs held its most important session beginning last September and approved an action program which should guide United Nations actions in meeting the drug abuse problem. We are convinced that the Commission will figure even more prominently in the worldwide attack on drug abuse and that it should be expanded to provide for participation by additional countries whose situation with respect to the illicit traffic makes their contribution important.

3. An important Committee on Illicit

Traffic in the Near and Middle East has
been established. My government endorses
the regional approach to drug abuse control,
and we hope that the committee will set a
pattern for similar regional cooperation in
other areas.

4. The International Narcotics Control Board has demonstrated a new sense of urgency in issuing a searching and frank report calling attention to steps which must be taken by countries to halt illicit production and traffic in dangerous drugs.

5. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control has been launched, and many countries, including some not directly affected, have made voluntary contributions. The Fund is now in a position to move with vigor in executing projects approved by the Commission in the action plan. The multipurpose project in Thailand represents a good beginning, and we hope that others will follow shortly. We trust that other governments will avail themselves of the resources and expertise of the Fund.

The United States will support a series of resolutions designed to strengthen and improve United Nations action in this field which will be presented to this session of the Council. I am confident that these proposals will be accorded serious and constructive consideration, and I hope that they will receive the support of all members. We will be commenting on these resolutions in detail as they are considered.

I appreciate this opportunity to reinforce
the concern of my government with the
serious social problems we face because of
drug abuse. We are making intensive efforts
to deal with this problem within our borders,
but international cooperation is essential for
the protection of all members. I believe that
we have made a good start through the
United Nations in facing this challenge, and
I hope that the momentum which has been
generated will grow so that we may note
substantial progress when we consider this
question again next year.

U.N. doc. E/INCB/13.

824

Department of State Bulletin

876

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, MAY 22, 1972

on Memorial Day, instead of during the customary forenoon period, on all buildings, grounds, and naval vessels of the Federal Government throughout the United States and all areas under its jurisdiction and control.

I also request the Governors of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the appropriate officials of all local units of government to direct that the flag be flown at half-staff on all public buildings during that entire day, and request the people of the United States to display the flag at half-staff from their homes for the same period.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of May, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-sixth.

RICHARD NIXON

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 2:01 p.m., May 19, 1972]

## United Nations Day, 1972

### Proclamation 4137. May 19, 1972

*By the President of the United States of America a Proclamation*

On October 24, 1972, people around the world will celebrate United Nations Day. It is fitting that people on all parts of our planet should join on this day in honoring an international organization dedicated to the ideals of peace and justice among all nations.

The United Nations has faced great obstacles as it has worked toward the achievement of these goals. Political differences among nations have hindered its progress. Decisions by some members have prevented the United Nations from acting to stop wars. The organization's financial difficulties are also well-known.

Not so well-known, however, are many of the constructive activities of the United Nations which have achieved impressive successes over the years. The United Nations has made significant contributions, for example, by facilitating international transportation and communication, preventing the spread of diseases, and setting standards for social and technical legislation in many countries.

In recent months and years, the United Nations has also helped to establish safeguards to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, helped to establish the rule of law in outer space and the oceans, provided technical assistance to the developing nations, promoted family planning, and worked to protect the environment. In addition, it has taken important steps to curb the traffic in addictive drugs, to protect diplomats from terrorism and travelers from hijackings, and to protect the rights of refugees and prisoners of war.

Any balance due of the performance of the United Nations must take these activities into account. They indicate that the United Nations and its affiliated agencies are working to build the foundations for a better world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Tuesday, October 24, 1972, as United Nations Day. I urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day with community programs which will promote understanding and support for the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

I have appointed Mr. Robert O. Anderson to be United States National Chairman for United Nations Day and, through him, I call upon State and local officials to encourage citizens' groups and agencies of communication—press, radio, television, and motion pictures—to engage in appropriate observances of United Nations Day in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

RICHARD NIXON

## The President's Trip to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland

*The President's Remarks to Members of the Press Planning to Accompany Him on the Trip.*

May 19, 1972

*Ladies and gentlemen:*

I understand that almost everybody here is going to leave with us tomorrow for the trip to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland and to the ones who are not going we are sorry you can't go on this trip and we will report to you when we come back.

I thought it might be useful to get a little background with regard to the trip and perhaps some information that would be helpful to you in covering it. This trip is one which has been in the process of planning going back perhaps over 3 years. You may recall the first time that I had a press conference in the East Room, I was asked about summitry.

At that point I expressed a very dim view of summitry unless it was well planned in advance. I said that because I have memories, as all of you have memories, of some of the summits of the past. I remember what terms were used by ladies and gentlemen of the press in describing it. There was the "Spirit of Vienna," the "Spirit of Geneva,"

877

and the "Spirit of Glassboro," and the Spirit of Camp David."

What they all added up to was cosmetics, a big feeling of hope in the world and in the United States in particular and then a letdown because there was all froth and very little substance.

This trip is one, and I do not want to overestimate what you may expect to have from it in the way of substance, but it is one primarily directed toward substance rather than toward cosmetics.

We are not taking the trip simply for the purpose of opening a new relationship, as was the case when we went to Peking. That, of course, was enormously important and it was important to go to Peking for that very purpose, if nothing else was served at all, and other things were served, we believe.

In this case, we have had relations with the Soviet Union for a number of years. There have been contacts at various levels, Cabinet levels with the Soviet Union and we have had meetings between the top Soviet leaders and top American leaders going back over a period of time through World War II and in the postwar period.

What has happened in the last 3½ years is that we have started a long process in several areas of trying to determine on both sides—it has been mutual on both sides—as to whether a meeting of the leaders at the summit would serve a useful purpose and that is why we did not make the decision, again, a mutual decision, that it would be useful to have such a meeting until just a few months ago.

You will recall that perhaps the single event which brought about the decision on the part of the Soviet leaders and our decision to go to the summit was the success of the understandings on Berlin. We thought if we had made progress in that very critical area for both of us that we should try with some hope of success to make progress in other areas that were also difficult.

Now, in coming to this meeting, I would suggest that it would not be useful to speculate as to what agreements or understandings will come out of it. I would touch on just the three subjects that have been very much written about in the press that will be on the agenda and three subjects, three areas, in which there is a possibility, not a certainty by any manner of means, but a possibility of agreement provided at the highest level we can break some bottlenecks which still exist.

One of course is arms limitation. Considerable progress has been made in this area. There are still some very difficult problems that remain unsolved. We will discuss them directly. I will discuss them directly with Mr. Brezhnev throughout the course of the visit and we hope that we may be able to reach agreement in this area.

However, on both sides we recognize that we have some difficult problems in which a decision at the top only can bring agreement. We are hopeful, but we do not want to leave the implication that it is certain that we can reach agreement.

The second area is the area of trade. You have all of course followed Secretary Butz' trip to the Soviet Union and Secretary Stans' and of course the trips that have been made by the Soviet Agricultural Minister and the Soviet Minister of Trade to the United States. They met with Mr. Peterson and Mr. Flanigan, and of course, I have had meetings with both of them.

In this area, I met with Congressional leaders discussing such matters as most favored nation and others, the matter of credits. I would say that the chances for some positive results are good, not certain, but certainly good.

You will be wanting to follow that very closely during the course of our visit there.

A third area that is worth your watching is the area of cooperation in space. In this respect, I was looking over the speech that I made to the Soviet people on television in 1959. I had forgotten I said it, as a matter of fact, and most things are well forgotten that you have said but, in any event, I said at that time—those 12 who are here who went to the Soviet Union on that trip will remember—I said let us go to the moon together.

I would not like to suggest and would not suggest that what we are going to discuss—let us go to the moon together, let us go to Mars together—but I do know that considerable progress has been made over the past several months with regard to cooperation in terms of the exploration of space. We are going to try to see a culmination of that progress in this area.

By mentioning these three, I do not mean that they are exclusive. I do mean that they are areas that perhaps offer considerable promise.

As far as other agenda items are concerned, both sides have submitted items for the agenda. The agenda is agreed. It will be primarily bilateral. I emphasize that all of the talks that we have will take place looking to the interests of each country, vis-a-vis the other, and not at the expense of or in derogation of any country's interest towards its allies or other countries in the world.

On the other hand, there will be discussions on the agenda for such items as Vietnam and other areas of the world where the United States and the Soviet Union do have sometimes conflicting interests.

I will not go beyond that in discussing those areas because only the results of our conversations will determine whether progress is possible. We are quite far apart, as you know, in several of those areas. I can only say that there will be an open, free, and frank discussion building upon discussions that we have had previously in these areas.

Now a word about the preparation. I mentioned the preparation and I do not want to indicate that it has all been done simply at the Presidential level. I have had, as you know, both by correspondence and through other contacts, a very great volume of exchange of views directly with Mr. Brezhnev. That exchange of views, I think, even though I met him only briefly in 1959, means that both he and I will start, at least, on a basis where we under-

878

stand what our differences are and therefore will be able to come to grips quickly with the problems that we, and perhaps only we, can solve at the highest level.

In addition to that, the State Department, of course, has had major responsibilities in certain areas, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Science Adviser, our NASA people, a number of others, all have been working toward the time when this meeting would take place.

Having in mind the fact that if we do not succeed—and we will not, of course—in reaching agreement in all the areas that will be discussed, we will at least continue the process of negotiation, so that following the summit, there may be not only dialogue, but possibly future agreements depending on what happens at the summit.

Now, with regard to your problems. I know that when you were in Peking it was rather difficult to cover. The reason was, of course, that we do not have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. We did not have, as we have in this instance, an on-going process of negotiation, various levels on which to build. And consequently, I know that from the standpoint of substance day by day until we finally got to the communiqué, that it was very difficult for members of the press to get the hard news, which I know you have to get and that you must get in order to justify your going so far. [Laughter]

In this instance I can inform you that there will be daily briefings. I can also say that in terms of substance, without indicating what will happen in the three areas that I mentioned, in the other areas, there will be two very substantive speeches made on my part.

The first night at the dinner in the Kremlin, Chairman Brezhnev, or Secretary Brezhnev, I should say, the General Secretary will make a substantive speech and I will respond to his substantive speech. That will be released in advance so that you will be able to write your stories and then enjoy your dinner.

The other will be on Sunday. On Sunday I will be speaking on the Soviet television and radio network to the Soviet people. This, of course, brings back memories of 1959. I shall never forget the long period that I worked with Ambassador Tommy Thompson, whom you all will remember, on that speech. He said a very interesting thing as I was working on it. He said, "You must think of the fact that what you say is to two audiences. The Soviet audience and the American audience. There are things you could say to the American audience that would not be helpful to the Soviet audience because they have not yet heard a top American official speak to them in this way."

And as we worked on that speech, cut this and added this, and so forth, he gave me one admonition. He said, "This is the first time that a top American official will ever have addressed the Soviet people on radio and television." He said, "Write the speech and make the speech in a way that it will not be the last time."

I think we accomplished that and in this instance the speech that I will make on substance on Sunday will be directed to the Soviet people, not with any naive attitude that we are going to convince them that all of our policies are right and that everything that they have heard about us is wrong, but simply to give them some observations about what we have found in the Soviet Union and to give them as well as we can a true and accurate picture of the United States, the American people, of the desire we have, a desire which is shared by the Russian people, a desire for peace in the world and better relations.

It will be, in other words, a speech directed to the Russian people rather than to the American people. I think, however, most of the American people would approve because this will be the first time the President of the United States has ever spoken to the Russian people by radio and television. I don't want it to be the last time.

As far as other activities are concerned, Mrs. Nixon, as was the case in Peking, will have a very intensive schedule and I am sure you will find it most interesting to follow her on days that we may be closeted in meetings. I would also suggest one other point, that there will be, in this instance, plenary sessions, probably two plenary sessions and then we will have parallel conversations.

My conversations will be with the General Secretary, Mr. Brezhnev, or with others that he may add from time to time from his own personal staff in addition to the plenary sessions. And Secretary Rogers will be meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. We will decide the work and in some instances, we, of course, will be discussing the same problems.

This way, with the amount of work that we do have, we feel we can cover a massive amount of material that is before us.

Eight days seems a long time and it will be a long time, I can assure you, from the standpoint of your own workload. But we could really take 8 days to consider even one of the subjects I mentioned, SALT, commercial relations, even space, and so we are cramming a great deal of work into a relatively brief period of time. We think that, however, can be quite useful.

In mentioning, incidentally, our visit to the Soviet Union, I want you all to not overlook the fact we are going to Iran. I know you will enjoy our visit there. I consider it very important to go to Iran to return a visit that the Shah made here, to show America's friendship and our close association with this strong friend of the United States in that part of the world.

We will be going to Austria, stopping there for tomorrow and Sunday and I look forward to going back there, having had the opportunity to see Austria in 1956 and being back on other occasions as well.

And then, of course, our trip will conclude with a trip to Poland.

I would advise in all of these areas, to the extent you can—as you will in the Soviet Union—I hope you can

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find time from your work for some sightseeing, because they are all great cities, extremely interesting, and I just wish I had the time to do a bit of sightseeing myself.

Now, one little personal note. On trips like this, virtually everybody who is going for the first time asks me, "Now, what would you advise that we see?"

Well, naturally you will want to see the Kremlin. You ought to see the University; you ought to see certainly one of the great industrial plants in Moscow, the magnificence of the gardens, and the former Czar's Palace in Leningrad, and so forth.

But one place that may not have occurred to you that I would urge, if you have the time, to get a real feel of the new Soviet Union and the old Russia, is to go to the marketplace. I have always gone there on all four of my trips. You will find the Russian people extremely friendly when they know you are from the United States, and extremely interested, asking many questions of our country, and you will get a flavor there you can't get in the government department store, which is also very much worth going to see, too.

I don't have stock in either one—neither do they. [Laughter] It is a different system.

Let me just close my remarks with one final thought. Everybody in this Government has worked extremely hard on this trip over the past months—some for years: the SALT delegation, our State Department people, the people in the other departments I have mentioned, the White House Staff, Dr. Kissinger, of course, has made an enormous contribution with the trip he has made to the Soviet Union, in talking to Mr. Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders. It is basically one where we are all going with one common purpose, and that is to attempt to establish a different relationship, one in which there will still be very significant differences—we must always remember this—and philosophy and approach and so forth, but one in which two great powers, each looking to its interest, decides that in certain areas we should work together rather than against each other.

I think that in terms of trying to give you the flavor of what to expect, I would not raise hopes too high, because there are some knotty problems left to be solved. What will determine whether they will be solved will be the attitude of the Soviet leaders and our attitude, as well.

I can say this: that from the correspondence I have had, and the contacts I have had directly with and from Mr. Brezhnev in the last few days, his attitude is positive.

Mr. Dobrynin came up to Camp David yesterday and brought me a personal message from Mr. Brezhnev, raising some questions that we had to discuss, but also indicating a positive attitude toward attempting to resolve some of these differences, so that when we do meet at the summit, it will not simply be one of those spirits that comes and goes, but there will really be some substance that remains, one which will mean that the American people and the Russian people will have a more friendly relationship

as people to people, despite differences in philosophy and government, and in which, perhaps—I would hope this beyond everything else—the cause of peace would be served.

Perhaps I can best describe it with a story that Mr. Brezhnev told Dr. Kissinger when he was there. Mr. Brezhnev was expressing his desire for making some progress in the summit—not just talking, not just agreeing to disagree, not just putting out the usual communiqué which papers over all differences—and he said it was important to take a step. He said, not just a little step, but a step that is significant in the relations between our two countries, because that will tell us where we are going.

And then he told what to Mr. Brezhnev is one of his favorite Russian stories. He said there was a tradesman from a town who was walking in the woods one day, and he came to a fork in the road. He saw the sign leading to a village, and decided to go towards that village. He saw a woodsman at the fork of the road, and he said, "How long will it take to reach the village?"

The woodsman said, "I don't know." The tradesman couldn't believe him. He thought he was being just totally obnoxious, because he knew he lived in this area; he knew he had to have been to the village.

So the tradesman started off down the road, and after he had walked a few steps, the woodsman said, "It will take you 15 minutes." He turned around, "Why didn't you tell me that in the first place?" He said, "I had to see how long your steps were."

So we are taking a step here. How long the steps will be, you ladies and gentlemen will have to evaluate. We hope that it can be a significant step. It will not end all differences, but it could mean certainly that the United States and the Soviet Union, building on this very careful structure that we have developed over the past, could have a constructive relationship in which both great nations will use their influence, not only between each other, but in other areas of the world where we have influence, to discourage aggression, and to encourage the forces of peace.

This is our goal. We trust and hope that it will be, too, the Soviet goal, because for these two great nations to come in conflict, either directly, or to be drawn into conflict because of disputes in other parts of the world where they are indirectly affected, is a threat to the peace of the world which none of us can certainly look forward to without very great concern.

So my remarks deliberately are not with the overblown rhetoric which you have properly criticized me in the past. [Laughter] This is a trip with very sober objectives. I intend to be very sober, but you don't have to be. [Laughter]

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release.

problems which will have to be discussed by
the leaders of the two nations. And in the
final analysis, if we work out successful
agreements they will be worked out by the
President of the United States and by the
Soviet leaders.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us about the
status of the lend-lease talks and whether a
failure to resolve that issue will hold up a
commercial agreement between the two coun-
tries?

Secretary Rogers: It is not clear as to the
last part of your question. We have made
some progress in that we are actively talking
about the settlement of the lend-lease debt.
But it is still in the early stages. We are not
sure, of course, what might result if the lend-
lease debt problem is not settled. That is the
reason that I say that although there have
been a lot of newspaper stories to the effect
that these agreements have pretty much been
completed, the fact is that the President and
the Soviet leaders are going to have a good
many things to talk about; and in the final
analysis, it will be up to the President and
those leaders to resolve these differences.

Policy on Middle East Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the Middle East be
on the agenda in Moscow, and if so, what
approach will the United States take toward
that subject in the discussions? What goals
can reasonably be achieved vis-a-vis the Mid-
dle East in this summit?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we don't have a
fixed agenda, so I don't want to start answer-
ing questions about what's going to be on the
agenda; but obviously the Middle East is a
subject that will be discussed. No doubt about
that.

I don't want to get into exactly what our
approach is going to be, but I can repeat
what our general policy has been toward the
Middle East. And I'll state it without any
particular effort to suggest the approach that
we're going to take with the Soviet Union.
We do not believe that a settlement between

Israel and Egypt—nor, for that matter, be-
tween Israel and Jordan, but in this case par-
ticularly between Israel and Egypt—can be
imposed by outside nations. We think that
the settlements have to be worked out among
the nations involved. On the other hand, we
think that it is vitally important for negotia-
tions to start, and we think that the frame-
work for a settlement is spelled out in Secu-
rity Council Resolution 242.² So, we are
prepared to discuss with any nation the
possibilities of getting negotiations started,
and that remains our policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Soviet Union
protest to the United States `the` reported
death of a Soviet seaman near Haiphong
harbor, and if so, what was our response?

Secretary Rogers: Well, Mr. Bray [Charles
W. Bray III, Director, Office of Press Rela-
tions] covered that matter yesterday, and I
really have nothing to add to what he said
yesterday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you a some-
what personal question? There have been, as
you may have noted, some Cabinet changes
lately. How do you feel? Are you planning to
sign on for another hitch?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I haven't really
given any thought to that. I think it's much
too early to think about the next Cabinet. I
think, though, that it's a compliment to the
administration that there's so much interest,
because it shows there's very little doubt
about the outcome. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, the North Vietnamese
have claimed that they cleared Haiphong
harbor of mines. What's your belief as to the
effectiveness of the mining operation?

Secretary Rogers: We think the mining
operation has been very effective. We think
that report is incorrect and false.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a lot of
representations from Jewish groups around

²For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

782

Department of State Bulletin

the United States to bring the question of
Soviet Jewry while the summit is going on.
Can you tell us whether the President will
discuss this with Soviet leaders or whether
you will with the Foreign Minister?

Secretary Rogers: Miss Berger [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post], I have had several meetings with Jewish leaders on the subject, and they know the concern the Government of the United States has about this problem. They've expressed appreciation for what we've done in the past, and they've also expressed appreciation and confidence in what we will do in the future. But I do not want to talk at this time about what we will take up specifically with the Soviet leaders.

## Reduction in U.S. and Egyptian Representation

Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent days Egypt has cut back the size of the mutual representation, the same representation that you and President Sadat enlarged just last May. Can you give us your comment on that and tell us what you think it means in terms of relations and whether it's related perhaps to the summit?

Secretary Rogers: We don't know for sure what it means, except that they want us to cut down our representation by about half and they will cut down their representation here by about the same amount. We have about a month to put that decision into effect.

We are inclined to think that we have enough matters of mutual interest and concern so that we'll be able to handle the business in about the same way we have in the past. We think communications will continue to be open, and we think our relations with Egypt will remain about the same as they have been.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports from China that recent visitors to Peking have been told by Chou En-lai that he feels the United States is not abiding by the Shang-hai communique. Do you feel that the administration's action in North Viet-Nam has in

some way jeopardising this fragile and new Sino-American relationship?

Secretary Rogers: No, I do not.

## Conditions for Ending Haiphong Harbor Mining

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some speculation about what the conditions would be for ending the mining of Haiphong harbor. There have been some stories that we have agreed to end it before the summit, perhaps at the end of the summit, during the summit. Are there any other conditions—for example, resumption of the Paris peace talks—except those conditions cited by the President, which were a cease-fire and return of American prisoners, under which we would end the mining of Haiphong?

Secretary Rogers: No, there is no such agreement. We haven't had any agreement of that kind at all.

Q. Would we be willing to end the mining of Haiphong before—

Secretary Rogers: No. The President stated the conditions on which we would be willing to end it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned also a full accounting of the Americans who are missing in North Viet-Nam. This is not a new condition, but I hadn't heard it expressed just that way before. Could you say what it is we would like them to do in that respect?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think it has always been included in the concept of return of prisoners of war. We want not only the return of prisoners of war, but we want assurance that there aren't any others that they have, and in order to do that they should account for all of those that they have and any who died in prison and so forth. So we want to be sure that the return of prisoners of war means that all of them are returned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I know you don't wish to talk about what's on the agenda at Moscow, but you did refer to the ratification of the Eastern treaties as paving the way for

June 5, 1972

783

WEEKLY PUBLICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, MAY 22, 1972

the exclusive use and benefit of the Tribe. Over the years, there have been continuing disputes regarding the true location of the reservation boundary.

In 1897, President Cleveland created by proclamation the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve in an area near the western boundary of the Yakima Reservation. In 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt extended the boundary of that Forest to include a tract of some 21,000 acres, then mistakenly thought to be public land. The tract is included within a larger area now called the Gifford Pinchot National Forest. In 1942, a portion of the tract was designated the Mount Adams Wild Area, and this portion has been administered since 1964 for the public benefit under the Wilderness Act.

In 1966, the Indian Claims Commission found that this tract had originally been intended for inclusion in the Yakima Reservation. However, the Commission does not have authority to return specific property to a claimant; it may only grant money damages. Accordingly, the Tribe sought Executive action for return of its land.

The Attorney General has at my request reviewed the specific history and background of this particular case, including the principles which govern the taking of land by the United States and the question of whether this particular land was so taken. In a recent opinion, the Attorney General has advised me that, in these exceptional and unique circumstances, the land was not taken by the United States within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and that possession of this particular tract can be restored to the Tribe by Executive action.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, particularly 16 U.S.C. 473, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. A portion of the eastern boundary of the Gifford Pinchot National Forest is modified as follows:

Beginning at the point on the main ridge of the Cascade Mountains, where the Yakima Indian Reservation boundary as located by the 1926 Pecore survey from Goat Butte intersects said main ridge; thence southwesterly along the main ridge of the Cascade Mountains to the summit or the pinnacle of Mount Adams, as shown on the diagram of the Rainier National Forest attached to the Presidential proclamation of October 23, 1911, 37 Stat. 1718; thence southerly along a divide between the watersheds of the Klickitat and White Salmon Rivers as shown on the 1932 Calvin Reconnaissance Survey Map (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, Docket No. 47, Indian Claims Commission) to its intersection with the north line of Section 34, Township 7 North, Range 11 East, Willamette Meridian.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Interior is directed to assume jurisdiction over the tract of land heretofore administered as a portion of the Gifford Pinchot National Forest and excluded from the Forest by Section 1 of this order, and to administer it for the use and benefit of the Yakima Tribe of Indians as a portion of the reservation created by the Treaty of 1855, 12 Stat. 951.

SEC. 3. Any prior order or proclamation relating to the tract of land affected by this order, to the extent inconsistent with this order, is hereby superseded.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House

May 20, 1972

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 11:10 a.m., May 22, 1972]

## THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO AUSTRIA, THE SOVIET UNION, IRAN, AND POLAND

The President's Remarks at the Departure Ceremony at Andrews Air Force Base, May 20, 1972

Mr. Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, Members of the Congress, and ladies and gentlemen:

We really do appreciate your coming to the airport today on this rainy day to wish us Godspeed on this trip. In just a few minutes we will be boarding the plane, the "Spirit of '76" on a trip that will take us first to Austria, then to the Soviet Union, then to Iran, and finally to Poland before returning here on the first of June.

I know as we visit these four countries that I can say to the people of all of these countries that I bring with me the best wishes, the friendship of all of the people of the United States to the people of these

882

countries use we Americans feel friendship for the Austrian people, for the Russian people, for the people of Iran, and for the Polish people.

As you know, the visit that we will be making to the Soviet Union is the first state visit that a President of the United States has ever made to that country. It is a visit that will be different from those that have occurred on previous occasions between American Presidents and the leaders of the Soviet Union. The others were important, but they did not deal primarily with substance. That is why we often hear them referred to as the "Spirit of Camp David," or the "Spirit of Vienna," or the "Spirit of Geneva," or the "Spirit of Glassboro."

In this case we are not going there simply for a better spirit, although that is important, and we think that may be one of the results of the trip. But we are going there for substance, very important substantive talks. We are not going there to make headlines today. We are going there in order to build what we hope will be a structure that can lead to better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and a better chance for peace tomorrow and in all the years ahead.

The negotiations will cover a wide range of subjects. Many of these areas are ones where we have not agreed in the past and where we will not find agreement in the period of discussions that we have on this occasion. But, on the other hand, we do expect to make some progress. And the progress that we make, we trust, will lay the foundation for more progress in the future in which two great peoples, the Russian people and the American people, can find a way despite philosophical differences that are very deep, despite competitive positions in the world that are quite different, can find ways to live in peace in the world and to use their great influence along with other nations to avoid those situations that lead to conflict any place in the world.

This is our goal and it is one that all of us will be working toward on this trip.

I simply want to say finally that we have been very touched that over the past week, as was the case before we took off for Peking a few months ago, we have received so many calls and letters and wires from people all over the country wishing us well. We thank you for wishing us well. We go there not in any personal sense, but we go there representing all the American people and the hopes and aspirations of all of our people, particularly the hopes of the children of America, those of generations to come, and we hope that we can conduct ourselves in a way that will be worthy of your hopes and worthy of your prayers for a better relation between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Russian people and the American people, between the people of all the countries that we will visit and the American people, and your hopes and prayers for what all people in the world want, a world of peace, a world of progress for all.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:10 a.m. at Andrews Air Force Base where he and Mrs. Nixon, with the official party, boarded the Spirit of '76 for the flight to Salzburg, Austria.

[lc]

Announcing the latest addition to the series of ...

Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States

RICHARD NIXON, 1970

The volume contains public messages and statements, verbatim transcripts of the President's news conferences, and other selected papers released by the White House from January 1 through December 31, 1970.

In the Foreword to the book President Nixon writes, "The story of the year, for me and for the administration team working with me, was above all a story of building for peace. Peace, we believe from the beginning, does not come to the passive; and so we pressed on through 1970 with a determination that the United States should act creatively, not merely react reflectively, on the world stage."

Among the items that are a part of the record for 1970 are addresses to the Nation on progress toward peace in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia; reports on the Cambodian sanctuary operation; speeches made by the President during his five-nation European tour; and the President's television interview on foreign policy with representatives of the three major networks.

The 1305-page clothbound volume, fully indexed, is available to the public at $15.75 per copy.

Similar volumes are available covering the administrations of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, and the first year of President Nixon.

All volumes in the "Public Papers" series are sold by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Distribution for official use is governed by the provisions of sections 32.15-32.19 of Title 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF

*Presidential Documents*

Published every Monday by the Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C. 20408, the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* contains statements, messages and other Presidential materials released by the White House during the preceding week.

The *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* is published pursuant to the authority contained in the Federal Register Act (49 Stat. 500, as amended; 44 U.S.C. Ch. 15), under regulations prescribed by the Administrative Committee of the Federal Register, approved by the President (30 F.R. 9573; 1 CFR Part 32).

Distribution is made only by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* will be furnished by mail to subscribers for $9.00 per year, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The charge for a single copy is 25 cents.

There are no restrictions on the republication of material appearing in the *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*.

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10 FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF KISSINGER BACKGROUNDER IN KIEV,
MAY 29.

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DNIEPRO HOTEL

10:50 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: DR. KISSINGER'S REMARKS WILL BE ON THE
RECORD. HE WILL GO DIRECTLY TO YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q ON THE TRADE MATTER, YOU REALLY EXPECTED BEFORE
YOU WENT TO GET A TRADE AGREEMENT, DID YOU NOT, REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER IT WAS LINKED WITH VIETNAM? YOU REALLY HAD HOPED TO GET

ANDERSON
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SONNENFELDT
V.I.G.
WALSH

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AN AGREEMENT. EVERYBODY SAID SO BEFORE YOU WENT. CAN YOU GIVE US
A LITTLE MORE BACKGROUND?

DR. KISSINGER: RON'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO SAY IT IS
OBVIOUS TO US YOU WERE NOT AT THE MORNING BRIEFING.

Q I READ IT WORD FOR WORD.

DR. KISSINGER: THE ORIGINAL OR THE TRANSLATION? (LAUGHTER)

WE NEVER EXPECTED TO GET A TRADE AGREEMENT HERE. WE
NEVER EVEN ATTEMPTED TO NEGOTIATE A TRADE AGREEMENT HERE. THE
TRADE ISSUE HAS SEVERAL COMPONENTS. THERE IS THE SALE OF GRAIN
ON A LONG-TERM BASIS. THERE IS THE MARITIME ISSUE. THERE IS THE
ISSUE OF CREDITS. THERE IS THE MATTER OF GRANTING THE MOST-FAVORED-
NATION STATUS TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND THERE IS LEND-LEASE. THERE
IS THE REPAYMENT OF LEND-LEASE DEBTS.

WE NEVER INTENDED TO WRAP ALL OF THESE UP INTO A TRADE
AGREEMENT. THEN THERE IS ANOTHER ISSUE, NAMELY, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NATURAL GAS RESOURCES IN SIBERIA, WHICH IS A VERY LARGE PROJECT
IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED, AND ABOUT WHICH IT HAS
BEEN TALKING TO VARIOUS AMERICAN PRIVATE CONCERNS.

WE NEVER EXPECTED OR EVER INTENDED TO WRAP ALL OF THESE
UP IN MOSCOW. WHAT WE EXPECTED TO DO IS TO SET UP THE ECONOMIC
COMMISSION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THEY COULD BE SYSTEMATICALLY
ADDRESSED, IN WHICH THE VARIOUS PARTS COULD BE RELATED TO EACH OTHER.
WE ALWAYS EXPECTED THAT WHEN SECRETARY PETERSON COMES OVER HERE
DURING THE COURSE OF THE SUMMER THAT THE MAJOR PROGRESS WOULD BE
MADE.

IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL PACKAGE, THERE WERE SOME PERI-
PHERAL ISSUES WHICH I POINTED OUT THIS MORNING IN WHICH WE THOUGHT
SOME PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, SUCH AS THE GRAIN DEAL AND THE MARI-
TIME ISSUE. THOSE ARE LINKED BECAUSE THE GRAIN DEAL DEPENDS IN
PART ON THE SOLUTION OF THE SHIPPING PROBLEM AND IN PART ON THE
NATURE OF THE CREDITS THAT CAN BE EXTENDED.

ON LEND-LEASE WE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS, AND WE
SETTLED, IN EFFECT, ALL ISSUES EXCEPT ONE. WE EXPECT TO MAKE
FURTHER PROGRESS ON THAT DURING THE NEXT MONTHS, AND WE EXPECT

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TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON THE TOTAL PACKAGE DURING THE COURSE
OF THE SUMMER. SO WE ARE SUBSTANTially ON SCHEDULE AND WE HAVE
DONE THE KEY PART OF IT, WHICH WAS TO SET UP THE ECONOMIC COM-
MISSION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHICH ALL THESE PARTS COULD BE
RELATED TO EACH OTHER.

Q WHAT DOES THE PRESIDENT PLAN TO DISCUSS WITH THE SHAH
OF IRAN? WHAT PROBLEMS DO WE HAVE WITH HIM, IF ANY?

Q THAT IS A QUICK SWITCH.

Q THE MAN IS SMART. HE CAN SWITCH.

DR. KISSINGER: RON GAVE ME INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEN CHANGED
HIS MIND. WILL YOU STAND IN FRONT OF ME SO I CAN SEE YOUR LIPS
MOVE? (LAUGHTER)

WE EXPECT TO HAVE A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION, PARTICULARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN SOUTH ASIA, SINCE IRAN IS REALLY A BRIDGE TO BOTH OF THESE COUNTRIES, AND NO DOUBT SOME OF THE ISSUES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WILL BE DISEDSED, INCLUDING SOME OF THE OIL PROBLEMS.

Q DR. KISSINGER, IN A RECENT INTERVIEW, SECRETARY OF
STATE ROGERS SAID ON PUBLIC TELEVISION, "SO AS EFFECTIVELY AS WE
CAN, WE ARE GOING TO ASSURE THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS TRIP THAT THE
NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA IS NOT AN ANTI-SOVIET MOVE." DID
THAT COME UP IN THE PRIVATE TALKS IN THAT WAY?

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DR KISSINGER: AS I SAID THIS MORNING, OUR BASIC POSITIO

TION WITH RESPECT TO BOTH OF THESE LARGE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IS THAT
WE WILL NOT DISCUSS ONE OF THEM IN THE CAPITAL OF THE OTHER. WE

RECOGNIZE THAT THEY HAVE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WITH EACH OTHER ON
A NUMBER OF ISSUES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PRIMARILY
ENGAGED, ONE OF THEM BEING THE BORDER DISPUTE, THE OTHER ONE
BEING AN IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF LENINIST
DOCTRINE WITH RESPECT TO WHICH OUR COMPETENCE IS NOT UNIVERSALLY
RECOGNIZED. (LAUGHTER)

SO, THEREFORE, WE DO NOT DISCUSS THE BILATERAL SINO-
SOVIET ISSUES IN THE RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR
BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE TALKS THAT OUR POLICY TOWARD THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC IS IN NO SENSE DIRECTED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION:
THAT WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN THREATENING LEGITIMATE SOVIET INTER-
ESTS, AND THAT WE ARE PURSUING OUR POLICY TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE BILATERAL ISSUES THAT EXIST BETWEEN
US. I THINK THAT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR.

Q HENRY, COULD YOU POSSIBLY GIVE US SOME ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION IN DETAIL, AND IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN DETAIL, IN

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GENERAL, OR THE ESSENCE OF THE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD WITH MR. BREZHNEV, COVERING THE EXTENT, THE NUMBER OF HOURS," AND WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW MANY HOURS AND HOW IT BROKE DOWN IN TIME. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IN PARTICULAR IS, WERE THEY HERE ESSENTIALLY REVIEWING THE POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORY OF U.S., SOVIET RELATIONS?

DR. KISSINGER: YOU MEAN ALL THE CONVERSATIONS PUT TOGETHER?

Q YES, OR WERE THEY CONCENTRATING ON IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS? WHAT CAN YOU TELL US IN TERMS OF THE SCOPE AND RANGE OF THE DISCUSSIONS?

DR. KISSINGER: THERE WERE SEVERAL TYPES OF MEETINGS WITH SOVIET LEADERS. THERE WERE THREE PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH MR. BREZHNEV THAT EXTENDED OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THEN THERE WAS AN EQUAL NUMBER OF MEETINGS AT WHICH BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN AND PODGORNY WERE PRESENT WITH THE PRESIDENT. THEN, OF COURSE, THERE WERE THREE PLENARY SESSIONS. YOU CAN CHECK THESE BECAUSE THEY WERE ANNOUNCED. I MAY BE OFF BY ONE ON EACH OF THESE.

TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, THERE WERE GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS. THERE WERE AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS THAT I REMEMBER IN WHICH THERE WAS A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION, OF THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS, BUT WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE FUTURE OF WHAT ROLE THESE COUNTRIES COULD PLAY TOWARD EACH OTHER FOR THE PRESERVATION OF WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY. FOR THE REST OF THE TIME, THERE WERE SPECIFIC TOPICS.

AS WE TOLD YOU, FOR EXAMPLE, ON TUESDAY BOTH THE AFTERNOON AND EVENING SESSION DEALT WITH SALT. THE EVENING ATSGHE DACHA WAS PRIMARILY DEVOTED TO VIETNAM. SOME OF THE TOPICS THAT WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SOVIET LEADERS WERE THEN FOLLOWED UP BY SECRETARY ROGERS OR MYSELF IN OTHER CONVERSATIONS. SECRETARY ROGERS HAD SEVERAL EXTENDED MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN. I HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS, FIRST ON SALT WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SMIRNOV AND LATER ON OTHER ISSUES WITH GROMYKO. THEREFORE, THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION, MURRAY, IS THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

["Department of State", "TELEGRAM", "UNCLASSIFIED", "PAGE 03 TEHRAN 03231 02 OF 08 301850Z", "THE TALKS WERE EXTENSIVE, THEY WERE VERY FRANK AND THEY COVERED\nBOTH THE GENERAL AND THE SPECIFIC.", "Q MAY I ASK WHY THERE WAS THIS JOINT DECLARATION\nAS A SEPARATE DOCUMENT, AND WHY IT WAS NOT SIMPLY INCLUDED IN THE\nCOMMUNIQUE, AND WHO IT WAS THAT INITIATED THAT IDEA?", "DR. KISSINGER: I COVERED PART OF THAT THIS MORNING, BUT\nLET ME ANSWER IT AGAIN. THE ORIGINAL IDEA WAS TO HAVE SOME GEN-\NERAL PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, JUST AS WE DID IN PEKING.\nTHEN IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT IF OUR RELATIONS MOVED FORWARD ON AS\nBROAD A FRONT AS THEY SEEMED TO BE MOVING, AND IF WE MADE ONE OR\nTWO REALLY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENTS, THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE APPRO-\nPRIATE IF WE MARKED WHAT AT LEAST WE INTENDED TO BE A DEPARTURE\nIN U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS BY SOMETHING OTHER THAN A SECTION OF A\nCOMMUNIQUE, BY A SOMEWHAT MORE FORMAL DECLARATION. WHEN THIS\nIDEA WAS FIRST ADVANCED, IT WAS NOTED AND PUT ASIDE IN ORDER TO\nSEE WHETHER OUR RELATIONS, IN FACT, JUSTIFIED ATTEMPTING TO EXPRESS\nSOME BASIC PRINCIPLES ON WHICH TO BASE RELATIONS, AND WHILE A GEN-\NERAL OUTLINE OF WHAT THESE PRINCIPLES MIGHT BE EXISTED, IT WAS LEFT\nOPEN WHETHER THEY WOULD BE FOLDED INTO THE COMMUNIQUE OR WHETHER\nTHEY WOULD BE MADE AS A SEPARATE DECLARATION.", "THEN THE SOVIET LEADERS AND THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT\nWE COULD RESPONSIBLY AND INDEED SHOULD RESPONSIBLY HAVE A SEPARATE", "DOCUMENT, GIVEN THE FACT THAT WE HAD MOVED FORWARD ON A BROAD FRONT,\nAND GIVEN ALSO THE FACT THAT IT WAS AT LEAST OUR INTENTION TO\nHOPE, OF COURSE, THE REALITY WILL NOT BELIEVE THIS TO MARK THE\nTRANSFORMATION FROM A PERIOD OF RATHER RIGID HOSTILITY TO ONE IN", "UNCLASSIFIED"]

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UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 8 TEHRAN 3231

WHICH, WITHOUT ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL
SYSTEMS, WE WOULD TRY TO BEHAVE WITH RESTRAINT AND WITH A
MAXIMUM OF CREATIVITY IN BRINGING ABOUT A GREATER DEGREE OF
STABILITY AND PEACE.

Q HOW MUCH DID YOU TALK ABOUT VIETNAM? HOW
EARLY DID IT COME
UP, AND WAS IT ALWAYS PRESENT, EVEN IF IT
WAS NOT DISCUSSED?

DR. KISSINGER: VIETNAM WAS DISCUSSED AT GREAT
LENGTH, AS WE TOLD YOU, ON WEDNESDAY NIGHT AT THE DACHA.
IT WAS DISCUSSED AGAIN AT A LOWER LEVEL BY FOREIGN MINISTER
GROMYKO AND MYSELF AT SOME LENGTH, AND THEN IT WAS DISCUSSED
AGAIN BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT. SO THERE
WERE EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS.

Q DID IT HANG IN THE AIR?

DR. KISSINGER: IT DID NOT HANG IN THE AIR IN
THAT SENSE. IN TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THESE DISCUSSIONS,
WHAT I THINK IS STRIKING ABOUT THEM IS THAT HERE ARE TWO
COUNTRIES THAT CONDUCT A GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY AND,

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THEREFORE, DO NOT HAVE TO PROVE TO THEMSELVES CONSTANTLY
THAT THEY ARE ENGAGED IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND THAT
PART OF THE WORLD, THAT THEY CAN TALK ABOUT PARTICULAR
PROBLEMS AND STILL BE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THERE
ARE OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD, ALL OF WHICH THEY HAVE
AN INTEREST IN AT SOME TIME, A MORE OR LESS EQUAL INTEREST.

SO IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO SAY THAT VIETNAM
WAS THE UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTION OF EVERY CONVERSATION.

Q WHAT ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, HENRY, HOW
DID THAT COME UP AND DO YOU HAVE A FEELING THAT THERE
WAS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION THAN PREVIOUSLY?

DR. KISSINGER: I THINK THE MIDDLE EAST WAS
FULLY DISCUSSED. I KNOW THE MIDDLE EAST WAS FULLY
DISCUSSED. THE DEGREE OF THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WAS
ACHIEVED WILL HAVE TO WAIT DEVELOPMENTS.

I WAS ASKED THIS MORNING ARE THERE SECRET
UNDERSTANDINGS: IS THIS OR THAT GOING TO HAPPEN, JUST
AS I WAS ASKED ON THE OCCASION OF MY VISIT HERE, "DID
YOU HAVE A SECRET DEAL WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS?" THIS
IS NOT THE WAY THESE THINGS HAPPEN.

WHEN TWO GREAT POWERS DEAL WITH EACH OTHER,
ONE OF THE BEST THINGS THEY CAN DO FOR EACH OTHER IS
TO MAKE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND EACH
OTHER'S POINT OF VIEW. WHAT ACTIONS THEY THEN TAKE,
BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING OF THAT
POINT OF VIEW, ONLY
THE FUTURE CAN TELL. THEREFORE, I DON'T WANT TO
SPECULATE.

Q DR. KISSINGER, CAN YOU TELL US, PLEASE,
SIR, CAN YOU EXPAND ON WHAT HAPPENED WITH THE MENTION OF
THE SOVIET-JEWISH PROBLEM, PLEASE, SIR, IN ANY WAY,
SHAPE OR FORM?

DR. KISSINGER: NO, I DON'T GO INTO THE
DETAILS OF ANY OF THESE THINGS EXCEPT TO REPEAT AGAIN
WHAT I SAID BEFORE: THIS IS A PARTICULARLY COMPLEX

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ISSUE TO RAISE IN A COUNTRY THAT IS BOUND TO CONSIDER
IT AN INTERNAL PROBLEM.

Q. DID YOU COME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD LIVE WITH THE MINING OF THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE HARBORS?

DR. KISSINGER: I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT I
DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ON WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL
DO ABOUT PARTICULAR AMERICAN ACTIONS. CERTAINLY A
FULL OPPORTUNITY EXISTED FOR THE EXPRESSION OF THESE
POINTS OF VIEW AND WE CERTAINLY MADE CLEAR WHY WE
HAVE TAKEN CERTAIN ACTIONS AND WHY WE BELIEVE WE HAVE
TO CONTINUE THEM.

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Q DR. KISSINGER, YOU SAID THERE IS ONE LEND-LEASE ISSUE THAT REMAINED UNSETTLED. DOES THAT ISSUE HAVE A DOLLAR SIGN IN FRONT OF IT AND, IF SO, CAN YOU GIVE US A ROUGH AMOUNT?

DR. KISSINGER: IF IT IS UNSETTLED, HOW CAN I GIVE YOU AN AMOUNT?

Q WHAT IS THE ISSUE?

DR. KISSINGER: ALL THE ISSUES OF LEND-LEASE CONCERN THE TERMS OF REPAYMENT. THIS IS ONE OF THEM. I DON'T THINK THE AMOUNT IS THE MOST UNSETTLED ISSUE.

Q THE PRESIDENT, BEFORE HE LEFT, CAUTIONED US ALL AGAINST OVERBLOWN EXPECTATIONS OUT OF THE SUMMIT. WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE IN A FEW WORDS WHAT YOU FEEL AND WHAT THE PRESIDENT FEELS CAME OUT OF THIS IN TERMS OF ITS SUCCESS IN MEETING THE MINIMAL EXPECTATIONS THAT YOU AND HE WENT WITH?

DR. KISSINGER: WHAT WE ATTEMPTED TO DO AT THE SUMMIT WAS TO BRING TOGETHER NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON A BROAD FRONT OVER A PERIOD OF A YEAR AND TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD BE FORMED INTO A PATTERN

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OF US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS RATHER THAN SIMPLY A SERIES
OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS.

SECONDLY, AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, WE ATTEMPTED
TO CONCLUDE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE WE DO BELIEVE
THAT TO PUT THE CENTRAL ARMAMENTS OF BOTH SIDES FOR
THE FIRST TIME UNDER AGREED RESTRAINT IS AN EVENT THAT
TRANSCENDS IN IMPORTANCE THE TECHNICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE INDIVIDUAL RESTRICTIONS THAT WERE PLACED ON
VARIOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS.

THIRDLY, WE WANTED TO SEE WHETHER, AS MAJOR POWERS,
WE COULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE LIVING IN
A PERIOD WHICH HAS SOME OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE SENSE THAT YOU ARE
GETTING MORE STATES THAT ARE BEING ACTIVE BUT WITH ONE
IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE: IN TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY THE
AIM WAS TO, THROUGH AN ACCUMULATION OF SMALL ADVANTAGES,
TO GAIN A QUALITATIVE EDGE OVER OTHER COUNTRIES. IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE, THE MOST DANGEROUS THING TO AIM FOR IS
A QUALITATIVE EDGE OVER YOUR MAJOR RIVALS.

THEREFORE, THE CONSTANT ATTEMPT TO ACCUMULATE
PETTY ADVANTAGES CREATES SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE OF
INSECURITY AND SUCH AN ENORMOUS DANGER THAT THE WORLD
MAY NOT BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH IT.

SO WHAT WE ATTEMPTED TO DO WAS TO SEE, THROUGH THE
SALT AGREEMENT AND THE OTHER AGREEMENTS, AND, ABOVE ALL,
THROUGH THE MANY COVERSATIONS ACROSS THE BRAOD SPECTRUM,
TO SEE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO EXPRESS THE POLICIES
OF THESE COUNTRIES THAT DO HAVE THIS GFT RESPONSIBILITY
IN SOME FORM THAT RECOGNIZES THESE REALITIES.

THIS IS WHY THESE PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE SOMETHING
MORE THAN JUST PLATITUDES. NOW, AGAIN, I MUST REPEAT:
WE ARE NOT NAIVE. IT IS PERFECTLY POSSIBLE THAT SIX
MONTHS FROM NOW IT WILL TURN OUT THAT WE ARE AGAIN
IN A PERIOD OF EXTEMEM HOSTILITY.

IF THAT HAS HAPPENED, BOTH COUNTRIES WILL HAVE
LOST AN OPPORTUNITY AND THE WORLD WILL HAVE LOST AN

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OPPORTUNITY. SO WE THINK THE ACHIEVEMENT IS THAT WE HAVE MADE THESE AGREEMENTS, THAT SALT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED AND THAT AT LEAST THERE HAS BEEN A RECOGNITION FOR THE FIRST TIME ON BOTH SIDES NOT JUST THAT THIS OR THAT PROBLEM HAS TO BE SOLVED, BUT MAYBE THAT AI EW STYLE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAS TO BE DEVELOPED.

HOW SUCCESSFUL WE WILL BE IN IMPLEMENTING THAT ONLY THE FUTURE WILL TELL.

Q AS WE SIT HERE IN KIEV TALKING ABOUT THIS, THE, YOU HAVE MET YOUR GOALS?

DR. KISSINGER: I THINK WE ESSENTIALLY MET THE GOALS WE SET FOR OURSELVES. YOU CAN STILL ARGUE WITH US -- UNUSUAL AS THAT WOULD BE FOR NEWSEEK -- THAT THE GOALS WERE NOT THE RIGHT ONES TO SET, BUT I HAVE TO SAY THAT WE MORE OR LESS MET THE GOALS WE SET FOR OURSELVES.

Q DR. KISSINGER, COULD YOU GIVE US A GENERAL IDEA OF THE SCHEDULE FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND MBFR AND IS '72 REALISTIC?

DR. KISSINGER: REALISTIC FOR WHAT?

Q THAT THE CONFERENCE CAN TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR.

DR. KISSINGER: REALISTIC WHAT?

Q THAT THE CONFERENCE CAN TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR?

DR. KISSINGER: OUR BELIEF IS THAT BOTH THESE CONFERENCES SHOULD BE VERY CAREFULLY PREPARED. WE ARE PROPARED TO ENGAGE IN PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND ON MBFR THIS YEAR. WE EXPECT THE MORE REALISTIC DATE FOR BOTH OF THEM, CERTAINLY FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, WILL BE NEXT YEAR. THAT IS, AT LEAST AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THE PLAN ON WHICH WE ARE OPERATING. MBFR, I POINTED OUT THIS MORNING, IS A SUBJECT OF ENORMOUS COMPLEXITY IN MANY WAYS. IT IS OF MUCH GREATER COMPLEXITY THAN SALT BECAUSE THE WEAPONS ARE SO DIFFERENT. THE REINFORCEMENT PROBLEM IS NEW AND YOU ARE DEALING WITH AN ALLIANCE. BUT WE HAVE DONE

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A LOT OF WORK ON IT AND WE WILL BE READY TO ENGAGE IN EXPLORATORY TALKS IN THE REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE.

Q HENRY, WAS THAT EXPLORATORY TALK ON THE SECURITY CONFERENCE OR ON MBFR?

DR. KISSINGER: BOTH

Q WHEN SYRIA GOT OUT OF HAND, WHEN WE GOT WORRIED ABOUT ACTIVITIES IN CURA, ACEN WE FELT WE HAD TO MINE -- WE HAVE HAD, AFTER ALL, A PATTERN OF QUICK CONSULTATION, AN EXPLANATION OF WHAT WE ARE DOING, IN SOME CASES BRINGING ABOUT A CHANGE. THE PRESIDENT COMPLIMENTED THE RUSSIAN LEADERS ON FINALLY TURNING TO RESTRAINT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU AND AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN IRONED OUT A REAFFIRMATION OF THE CUBAN AGREEMENT. THIS THING HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR SOMETIME. WHAT IS SO NEW ABOUT THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD GIVE US A DIFFERENT COURSE?

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FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS ASPIRATION.

Q DR. KISSINGER, AFTER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WAS SIGNED, MANY OF US WHO WERE TRUSTING AND NAIVE BELIEVED THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS WOULD GO DOWN. INSTEAD, THE RUSSIANS WENT WAY UP AND OURS WENT WAY UP. CAN YOU BELIEVE THAT OUR DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS WILL GO DOWN AND THERE WILL BE A SUBSTANTIAL REAPPROPRIATION OF RESOURCES, AND IF NOT, ISN'T ALL OF IT A WASTE?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. I BELIEVE IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES THE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS WILL GO DOWN SOMEWHAT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE MAJOR PROGRAMS IN THOSE FIELDS IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS ARE STILL GOING FORWARD AND IN WHICH AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED, BECAUSE IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROVE ANYTHING, IT IS THAT IT WAS OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO DISARM UNILATERALLY THAT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO GET THIS BILATERAL AGREEMENT.

A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES CAN BE A BYPRODUCT OF DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, BUT THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS AGREEMENT IS THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IT LEVELS OFF THE ARMS RACE: THAT IN SIGNIFICANT CATEGORIES ONE CAN AT LEAST SEE A CEILING FROM WHICH ONE CAN MOVE TO OTHER AREAS INSTEAD OF A CONSTANT MULTIPLICATION OF OTHER WEAPONS WHICH PRODUCE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS AND NEVER GIVE THE STATESMEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE.

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BASIC PRINCIPLES TO THE OTHER TWO?

DR. KISSINGER: FIRST OF ALL, IT MAKES SOME DIFFERENCE WHETHER THE TWO GREAT NUCLEAR POWERS, WHOSE RIVALRY HAS CHARACTERIZED THE POSTWAR PERIOD, SIGN SUCH A STATEMENT THAN IMPORTANCE, DO NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO AFFECT GLOBAL POLICY.

SECONDLY, IT IS NO DOUBT TRUE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ATTEMPTED, FOR A VARIETY OF PURPOSES, TO CODIFY ITS RELATIONSHIPS TO MANY COUNTRIES.

THIRDLY, THE IDEA THAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE EXPRESSED AT THE END OF THE VISIT WAS A JOINT ONE. AFTER ALL, WE HAD THEM IN OUR PEKING SUMMIT. THE IDEA TO MAKE THEM A SEPARATE DECLARATION WAS INITIALLY A SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH WE SHELVED PENDING AN EXAMINATION OF WHETHER WE COULD MAKE A REALLY MEANINGFUL STATEMENT.

NOW, AGAIN I WANT TO MAKE CLEAR: WE ARE NOT SAYING THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CAN BE A COOKBOOK TO WHICH YOU NEED MERELY REFER TO HAVE A GUIDE FOR FUTURE ACTION; NOR ARE WE SAYING THAT IT IS NOT PERFECTLY POSSIBLE THAT THESE PRINCIPLES CAN BE BROKEN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY; NOR AM I REJECTING THE POS SIBILITY AT ALL THAT THEY ARE INTENDED AS A TACTICAL DEVICE TO LULL CERTAIN PEOPLE. ALL OF THIS IS POSSIBLE.

IF ANY OF THESE EVENTS HAPPEN, PARTICULARLY THE LAST EVENT, THEN WE WILL ACT WITH, I BELIEVE, A FIRMNESS THAT WE HAVE SHOWN IN THE CRISIS TO WHICH MAX HAS REFERRED, AND IN THAT CASE I WOULD SAY A GREAT OPPORTUNITY HAS BEEN LOST AND THEN SOME OTHER LEADERS SOMEWHERE ALONG THE LINE WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS TO WHICH THESE PRINCIPLES ADDRESS THEMSELVES, NAMELY, THE PRBLEM OF HOW TO HAVE A PEACEFUL WORLD IN AN AGE IN WHICH A CATALYSM DEPENDS ON THE DECISIONS OF MEN.

SO WE HAVE LAID OUT A ROAD MAP. WILL WE FOLLOW THIS ROAD? I DON'T KNOW. IT IS AUTOMATIC? ABSOLUTELY NOT. BUT IT LAYS DOWN A GENERAL RULE OF CONDUCT WHICH, IF BOTH SIDES ACT

WITH WISDOM, THEY CAN, PERHAPS, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, MAKE A CONTRIBUTION. AT THIS POINT IT IS AN ASPIRATION. WE WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNED IT IF WE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WAS A CHANGE

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Q WHAT I WAS REALLY ASKING IS: HAVEN'T THESE PRINCIPLES REALLY ALREADY GOVERNED OUR CONDUCT IN MANY AREAS?

DR. KISSINGER: IT IS VERY RARE IN FOREIGN POLICY, MAX, THAT YOU CAN SAY -- AND WE WOULD NOT MAINTAIN -- THAT AS OF THIS DAY SOMETHING TOTALLY NEW, THAT HAS NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE, AROSE.

SOME OF THESE PRINCIPLES HAVE GOVERNED OUR CONDUCT, USUALLY EX POST FACTO AFTER A CRISIS, AND IT IS TRUE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE ON THE WHOLE REFRAINED FROM PUSHING CRISES TO THE EXTREME. THEY MAY HAVE GOVERNED OUR CONDUCT DURING CRISES.

WHAT WE ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO DO IS SEE WHETHER THEY GOVERN OUR CONDUCT TO PREVENT CRISES.

Q DR. KISSINGER, AS A RESULT OF THESE TALKS, IS ANY CHANGE IMMINENT IN OUR POLICY OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM AND KEEPING THE MINES ARMED.

DR. KISSINGER: THIS IS AN ESSENTIALLY TACTICAL QUESTION. WHAT WE WANT IN VIETNAM -- TO WHICH THE MATTERS TO WHICH YOU REFER ARE MEANS -- WHAT WE WANT IS A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION LEADING TO A RAPID END OF THE WAR AND, THEREFORE, THE END OF THE OPERATIONS TO WHICH YOU REFER.

IT HAS TO BE SEEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATION AND NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF ACTIONS TAKEN UNILATERALLY. WE DO NOT INTEND TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTIONS.

Q TO FOLLOW UP MAX'S QUESTIO, AFTER MR. BREZHNEV'S TRIP TO FRANCE, THERE WAS A STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES INVOLVING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION. FOLLOWING MR. PODGorny'S TRIP TO TURKEY, YOU ALSO HAD A SIMILAR STATEMENT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH FOLLOWS UP THE STATEMENTS OF BASIC PRINCIPLES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED TODAY.

WAS THAT A SOVIET INITIATIVE THAT FOLLOWS IN A PATTERN AND HOW DO YOU RELATE OUR STATEMENT OF

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DR. KISSINGER: WZPHAVE, IN THE PAST, DEALT WITH A
SERIES OF CRISES WHICH, WHEN CONCLUDED, WERE EXPRESSED IN
SOME STATEMENT RELEVANT TO THAT CRISIS. WE HAVE NOT IN THE
PAST ATTEMPTED TO LAY DOWN GENERAL RULES OF CONDUCT AHEAD
OF THE CRISIS BY WHICH THE BASIC RELATIONSHIPS OF THE
COUNTRIES COULD BE DEFINED.

IN FACT, YOU COULD ARGUE THAT MANY OF THE CRISES
THAT AROSE WERE CRISES INTO WHICH ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER
OR BOTH STUMBLED THROUGH A SERIES OF EVENTS IN WHICH THEY
HAD EITHER NOT BEEN IN SUFFICIENT CONTACT, MISCALCULATED
EACH OTHER'S REACTIONS, OR ATTEMPTED TO ACHIEVE SOME ADVANTAGE.

NO, AGAIN, MAX, NO ONE CAN BE SO NAIVE AS TO SAY THAT
IF THEY BUILT ANOTHER SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA, THAT THE MOST
TELLING ARGUMENT WILL BE THE THIRD PRINCIPLE OF THIS DECLARA-
TION. WHAT ONE WOULD HAVE TO HOPE IS THAT FOR BOTH SIDES, BEFORE
SUCH A STEP IS TAKEN THIS GIVES US A POSSIBILITY FOR AN
EXCHANGE AND POSSIBILITIES FOR RESTRAINT AND ARGUMENTS
FOR RESTRAINT WITHIN EACH GOVERNMENT THAT MIGHT NOT OTHERWISE
EXIST. SO, THIS IS TO ACT WITH FORESIGHT ON MATTERS THAT IN
THE PAST WE HAVE HAD TO SOLVE THROUGH CRISES.

UNCLASSIFIED

17

["Department of State", "TELEGRAM", "UNCLASSIFIED 235", "PAGE 01 TEHRAN 03231 06 OF 08 302038Z", "64\nACTION SS-14", "INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 NEA-10 INRE-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00\nUSIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01\nPRS-01 E-11 PM-06 NSC-10 ACDA-19 GAC-01 10-12 T-03\nRSR-01 /119 W", "119268", "O 301700Z MAY 72\nFM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8574\nINFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE\nAMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE", "UNCLAS SECTION 6 OF 8 TEHRAN 3231", "INCIDENTALLY, NO BODY WHO WAD REALLY ANALIZED THE", "ARMS RACE COULD ASSUME THAT THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY\nWOULD LEAD TO A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, BE-\nCAUSE IT AFFECTED OTHER COUNTRIES: IT DIDN'T REALLY AFFECT US.", "Q YOU KNOW, SENATOR JACKSON HAS SAID THAT THE\nRUSSIANS NOW HAVE A 50 MEGATON MISSILE, AND HE QUESTIONS\nWHETHER THE SALT AGREEMENT WILL REALLY GIVE US PROTECTION.\nCAN YOU TELL US, FIRST OF ALL, WHETHER HE IS CORRECT THAT\nTHEY HAVE THIS SUPER-MISSILE: AND SECONDLY, WHETHER THIS AGREE-\nMENT CUTS OFF THE SS-9S AT A SAFE LEVEL? WHAT DO YOU THINK?", "DR. KISSINGER: I WOULDN'T GO INTO A DISCUSSION OF\nTHE MEGATONNAGE OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET WEAPONS, BUT IT IS CLEAR\nTHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE WEAPONS OF SUBSTANTIAL EXPLOSIVE POWER\nAND THAT THEY ARE PROBABLY BUILDING SOME THAT ARE EVEN MORE\nPOWERFUL THAN THE ONES WE HAVE SEEN.", "I WOULD MAINTAIN THAT THE ARGUMENT YOU HAVE MEN-\NTIONED TO US CONFUSES TWO SEPARATE ISSUES: ONE, THE SIZE OF\nTHE EXPLOSIVE POWER ON WARHEADS OF EXISTING WEAPONS; AND TWO,\nTHE GROWTH OF THE ARSENAL OF THESE WEAPONS. THIS AGREEMENT", "UNCLASSIFIED"]

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DOES NOTHING ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE WARHEADS. THIS WILL HAVE
TO BE DONE, IT AT ALL, IN A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT. IT DOES DO
SOMETHING ABOUT THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS ON WHICH THESE WARHEADS
CAN BE BUILT.

THEREFORE, THE SS-9 IS FROZEN AT ITS CURRENT LEVEL
OF 309, BUT IN THIS CATEGORY NOTHING WILL PEVENT THE SOVIET
UNION FROM PUTTING LARGER WARHEADS ON THOSE WEAPONS THAT THEY
HAVE. THE ARGUMENT THAT SOME CRITICS ARE MAING, THAT
THEREFORE, THE AGREEMENT IS DANGEROUS, IS FALLACIOUS BECAUSE
WE WOULD FACE THE PROBLEM OF THESE LARGER WARHEADS, PLUS
ADDITIONAL MISSILES, WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT. THAT IS THE ARGU-
MENT.

WE ADMIT WE HAVE INSISTED AT A TIME WHEN MOST OF OUR
CRITICS WERE DENYING IT THAT -- AND WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID IT --
THE SS-9 IS A THREAT TO OUR RETALIATORY FORCE, AND IT REMAINS
A THREAT TO OUR RETALIATORY FORCE. WHAT THIS AGREEMENT DOES
IS TO FREEZE THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE
SIZE OF THE WARHEAD. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THERE WERE NO AGREE-
MENT, THERE WOULD BE MORE LAUNCHERS AND MORE WARHEADS, AND,
THEREFORE, WE HAVE REDUCED THE DANGER BY THE MARGIN OF THE NUM-
BER OF WEAPONS THAT WOULD BE BUILT WERE IT NOT FOR THIS AGREE-
MENT.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, ON THE VIETNAM ISSUE, DID EITHER
SIDE ADVANCE PROPOSALS WHICH THE OTHER SIDE INDICATED THAT IT
WOULD RESPOND TO AT A FUTURE TIME, OR IS THE DIALOGUE AT A
HIGH LEVEL ON THIS ISSUE SUSPENDED FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES?

DR. KISSINGER: I JUST DO NOT WANT TO GO INTO THE
DETAILS OF THE VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS BECAUSE I
DO NOT THINK IT WOULD SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE, EXCERT TO
SAY THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE VERY EXTENSIVE.

Q. MR. KISSINGER, YOU SAID EARLIER THAT THE MIDDLE
EAST ISSUE WAS FULLY DISCUSSED, BUT DID EITHER NATION OFFER
ANY CONTRIBUTION, TOWARD ACHIEVING SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS, TO
THE TALKS?

DR. KISSINGER: A GREAT DEAL DEPENDS HERE ON HOW
YOU WOULD DEFINE "TANGIBLE PROGRESS," BECAUSE ANYTHING THAT

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KEEPS THE SITUATION FROM BECOMING MORE INFLAMED IS AT LEAST A NEGATIVE SORT OF PROGRESS. THERE WAS A RATHER FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, WHICH I THINK CAN CONTRIBUTE TO AT LEAST THIS NEGATIVE PROGRESS I MENTIONED.

Q AT THE BOTTOM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE DE-GREE OF TRUST BETWEEN THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THEM. CAN YOU DWELL ON THE MEASURE OF TRUST THAT MAY HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SOVIET UNION?

DR. COSSINGER: IT DEPENDS ON WHAT YOU MEAN BY "TRUST". IF YOU MEAN BY THAT THAT THE LEADERS HAVE SUDDENLY GROWN EXTRA-ORDINARILY FOND OF EACH OTHER AND THAT THEY WILL DO FOR EACH OTHER THINGS JUST BECAUSE THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY ARE REGULAR FELLOW, THAT OBVIOUSLY CANNOT HAPPEN BETWEEN SERIOUS PEOPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, USUALLY THESE LEADERS DEAL WITH EACH OTHER THROUGH CABLES, AND WHAT IS FILTERED THROUGH THE MACHINERY TAKES ON AN INCREASINGLY ABSTRACT QUALITY AS IT TRAVELS TO THE HIGHER LEVEL.

NOW, I THINK THAT IN THE FUTURE WHEN A COMMUNICATION OF ONE TO THE OTHER ARRIVES, THEY WILL UNDERSTAND THE INTANGIBLES OF THE COMMUNICATION INFINITELY BETTER THAN THEY DID BEFORE BECAUSE THEY WILL BE ABLE TO REFER TO SOME VERY DETAILED AND CONCRETE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE. THE PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS APPROACHED THESE MEETINGS, IF YOU LOOK AT HIS PRESS COFERNECESAV FROM A TOTALLY UNSENTIMENTAL POINT OSSVIEW, AND HE HAS NOT HAD THE ILLUSION THAT HE COULD CHARM LEADERS, WHO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP ON THEIR BELIEF OF A SUPERIOR UNDERSTANDING OF OBJECTIVE FACTORS, BY HIS PERSONALITY.

SO IN THE SENSE THAT THERE IS NOW A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT BOTH SIDES ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT, IN THE SENSE THAT THEY WILL NOW AT LEAST HAVE THE RAW MATERIAL FROM WHICH THEY CAN ASSESS COMMUNICATIONS TO EACH OTHER IN TERMS OF THE MOTIVATIONS AND BASIC ATTITUDES, I THINK TRUST HAS DEVELOPED, BUT NOT TO THE POINT THAT IT COULD SURVIVE A MAJOR CHALLENGE THAT ONE SIDE WOULD PUT TO THE OTHER THAT AFFECTS ITS OWN ESTIMATE OF ITS VITAL INTERESTS. SO I WOULD PUT THE ANSWER WITHIN THAT LIMITATION.

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Q. DR. KISSINGER, ANOTHER ONE OF THE ARGUEMENTS THAT IS MADE WITH REGARD TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENT IS THAT IT MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF DIRECTING, OR REDIRECTING RATHER, THE ARMS CONSTRUCTION EFFORT. WHAT REASON IS THERE TO THINK THIS CAN BE CONTROLLED?

DR. KISSINGER: THIS ARGEEMENT, IF IT IS NOT FOLLOWED ON BY OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, WILL, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, PERMIT A QUALATATIVE RACE OR A RACE IN THE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH ARE NOT FROZEN BY THE AGREEMENT.

WE HAVE, IN THIS AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, COVERED A BROADER RANGE OF WEAPONS, BECAUSE THE DEFINITION OF LAND BASED INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES AND SEA BASED INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, IS RATHER SWEEPING, IF YOU READ IT.

I BELIEVE, AND WE BELIEVE, AND THE SOVIET LEADERS AGREE - IN FACT, WE HAVE EXPRESSED THIS IN OUR PUBLIC DECLARATION - THAT WE SHOULD START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DANGER TO WHICH YOU REFER. THE DANGER TO WHICH YOU REFER IS REAL; IT IS NOT IMMINENT, BUT OVER A PERIOD OF TIME IT WOULD DEFINITELY EXIST.

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Q. DR. KISSINGER, I BELIEVE SOMEWHERE IN THE COMMUNIQUE, IT SAID THAT THE TWO POWERS RECOGNIZE THE PRESENT BOUNDARIES IN EQUOPE. IN A SENSSAN DOES THAT MEAN THAT WE RECOGNIZE THEM AS THEY EXIST IN THE PERMANENT DIVISION OF GERMANY, AND DO WE, IN A SENSE, THEREFORE, RETURN TO THE OLD STYLE DIPLOMACY OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE?

DR. KISSINGER: IT SEEMS TO BE MY FATE TO HAVE TO ANSWER THE CHARGE OF OLD STYLE DIPLOMACY. WE USE THE PHRASE, RELATIONS SHOULD BE BASED -- I DON'T HAVE THE TEXT IN FRONT OF ME -- ON CERTAIN PRINCIPLES IN WHICH INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS WAS ONE OF THEM. WE DID NOT USE THE ADJECTIVE TO WHICH YOU REFERRED.

SECONDLY, THE PHRASE WE USED IS SOMEWHAT LESS STRONG THAN THE ONE THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS USED IN ITS TREATY WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT IS, OF COURSE, SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT FOR US TO BE MORE GERMAN THAN THE GERMANS ON THE ISSUE OF GERMAN UNIFICATION.

SO WHAT WE HAVE INTERPRETED THIS STATEMENT, THESE PRINCIPLES, TO MEAN, IS THAT WE DO NOT FAVOR THE USE OF FORCE IN CHANGING BOUNDARIES, AND THAT WE BELIEVE THE FOREIGN POLICY OUGHT TO BE CONDUCTED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, BUT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE NEGOTIATIONS.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, BECAUSE IF YOU LOOK AT IT, I THINK IT IS THE 11TH PRINCIPLE, YOU WILL SEE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE RENOUNCED ANY CLAIM TO SPECIAL SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, AN WE CONSIDER THAT ONE OF THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE.

Q. HENRY, AT THE RISK OF YOU NOT WANTING TO WRITE OUR STORIES FOR US, AS YOU HAVE SAID BEFORE, WOULD YOU ADMIT TO NAY DISAPPOINTMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THIS SUMMIT CONFERENCE? IS THERE NAYTHING THAT YOU CAME TO GET THAT YOU DIDN'T GET?

DR. KISSINGER: I THINK, YOU KNOW, IT IS A SORT

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OF SILLY ANSWER TO SAY THAT WE ACHIEVED ESSENTIALLY WHAT
WE CAME TO ACHIEVE, IN THAT THE AGENDA WE HAD SET OURSELVES,
AND THE POSSIBLE GOALS WERE MORE OR LESS REALIZED.

NOW I HAVE TO SAY RIGHT AWAY THAT SERIOUS PEOPLE
CAN GUARREL WITH THE GOALS. MAYBE WE DIDN'T SET THE
GOALS HIGH ENOUGH. I THINK I READ SOMEWHERE EARLY IN THE JOHN-
SON ADMINISTRATION, IF YOU DEFINE THE MIRACULOUS AS
THE ATTAINABLE, YOU CAN PERFORM MIRACLES EVERY DAY.

IT REALLY WOULD BE PSYCHOLOGICALLY BETTER IF I
TOLD YOU THERE WERE TWO THINGS THAT WE FAILED AT, AND
OF COURSE, PERHAPS, YOU KNOW, WE DIDN'T CONCLUDE THE
MARITIME AGREEMENT, THOUGH THE PROBLEM WAS MORE ON OUR
SIDE THAN ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

BUT I WOULD HAVE TO SAY, UNBEARABLE AS THAT
MAY MAKE US SOUND, THAT ESSENTIALLY WHAT WE HAD PLANNED
DO, WHAT WE HAD EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE, WAS MORE OR
LESS ACHIEVED, GIVE OR TAKE TEN PERCENT.

Q MAY I FOLLOW THAT UP AND SAY WAS THERE
ANY THING THAT WAS BROKEN THROUGH OR RESOLVED THERE,
OTHER THAN THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SUCH A HIGH LEVEL,
THAT YOU CAN POINT TO, THAT WAS NOT EXPECTED?

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AVIATION.

MURRAY MARDER ASKED HOW MANY HOURS THE LEADERS SPENT TOGETHER. IN FORMAL SESSIONS, THEY SPENT 20 HOURS AND 22 MINUTES TOGETHER; 16 OF THOSE HOURS WERE SPENT IN DIRECT CONVERSATION INVOLVING THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV, TOTALLING THE INFORMAL TIME TOGETHER WITH THE FORMAL SESSIONS -- BY INFORMAL TIME, I MEAN TIME TOGETHER IN THE AUTOMOBILES AND AT THE DINNERS, AND SO FORTH. -- THE PRESIDENT SPENT A TOTAL TIME WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS OF 41 HOURS AND 53 MINUTES; 20 HOURS AND 22 MINUTES IN FORMAL SESSIONS AND 21 HOURS AND 31 MINUTES IN INFORMAL SESSIONS. AND THEN, OF COURSE, YOU WOULD HAVE TO ADD TO THAT THE MANY HOURS EARLY IN THE MORNING AND SO FORTH THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD CONTACT AND THE AMBASSADORS' MEETINGS AND HENRY'S MEETINGS.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN.

END (AT 11:47 P.M.)

FARLAND

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I AM PURSUING AN EARLIER QUESTION. WE KNOW, OF COURSE, THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET JEWS IS AN INTERNAL PROBLEM. WE KNOW THAT, BUT YOU DID SAY IN SALZBURG THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING IT UP. AND MY QUESTION IS, DID HE FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING IT UP?

DR. KISSINGER: YES, HE MENTIONED THE PROBLEM.

Q A PROCEDURAL QUESTION. DOES THIS END THE PRESIDENT'S OVERSEAS TRAVEL THIS YEAR?

DR. KIDDSINGER: I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY OTHERS, BUT THEN MR. ZIEGLER HAS NOT BRIEFED ME ON THAT ISSUE.

Q MAY I QUICKLY FOLLOW UP THIS LAST QUESTION. YOU SAID HE BROUGHT UP THE JEWISH QUESTION. DID HE BRING IT UP WITH BREZHNEV?

DR. KISSINGER: I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO ANYTHING FURTHER ON THAT QUESTION. THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE AWARE OF OUR POSITION ON THE PROBLEM.

MR. ZIEGLER: WE HAVE ONE ANNOUNCEMENT TO MAKE. WE WILL HAVE THE SCHEDULE, WHICH WILL TAKE YOU THROUGH WARSAW, AVAILABLE IN ABOUT TEN MINUTES. THE BAGGAGE CALL IS ABOUT 8:30 IN THE MORNING.

THE PRESIDENT WILL LAY THE WREATH AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER AT 9:55 AND THE SCHEDULE WILL SHOW THE BUS DEPARTURES.

ONE FINAL THING. IN THE POOL REPORT THAT WAS PREPARED FROM THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT TODAY, THERE IS A LITTLE CONFUSION IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH. IT SAYS, "THE PILOT'S NAME IS" AND STATES THE NAME, AND THEN GOES ON TO STATE "HE IS THE BEST PILOT IN THE COUNTRY." I WAS MAKING REMARKS ABOUT REMARKS MADE TO ME OF THE MINISTER OF AVIATION, WHOSE NAME IS BUGAYEV, WHO IS THE MINISTER OF AVIATION. THE PILOT WHO FLEW THE PLANE IS A VERY GOOD PILOT, BUT THE REMARKS REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH REFERRED TO THE MINISTER OF

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BEST YOU CAN DO IS TO ACHIEVE WHAT YOU HAVE CHARTED, BUT
THAT YOU SHOULD NOT FACE ANY GREAT SURPRISES, AND I REALLY
WOULD SAY IT IS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF SUMMITRY, AT
LEAST OF ONE APPROACH TO SUMMIT MEETINGS, THAT WE
DON'T LOOK FOR THE UNEXPECTED.

WE THINK THAT THE LEADERS OUGHT TO KNOW
WHAT THE BASIC POSITION IS THEY ARE GOING TO FACE, ROUGHLY
WHAT THEY ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE, BECAUSE IT IS TOUGH ENOUGH
FOR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHO HAVE MYRIADS OF OTHER CONCERNS,
TO GEAR THEMSELVES TO EACH OTHER, WITHOUT BEING BURDENED
BY THE DANGER THAT THEY WILL SUDDENLY CONFRONT SOMETHING
THAT COULD BE VERY EMBARRASSING OR EXORDINARILY DIFFICULT.

Q DR. KISSINGER, I HAVE TWO BRIEF QUESTIONS.
YOU SPOKE OF TRUST, THE MEASURE OF TRUST.

DR. KISSINGER: AS I DEFINED IT IN RELATION TO PETER'S

Q YES. I WOULD LIKE TO RELATE THAT TO AN
EARLIER REMARK WHEN YOU SAID THERE WAS DISCUSSION,
WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR BOTH SIDES TO BRING A RAPID
END TO THE WAR. THE QUESTION IS: AS OF NOW, IS THERE
ANY MEASURE OF ENCOURAGEMENT OR OPTIMISM THAT WE ARE -- THAT
IS AN EMOTIONAL QUESTION. I REALIZE, BUT I ASK IT ANYWAY.
THAT IS MY FIRST QUESTION.

DR. KISSINGER: I APPLIED THE WORD TRUST TO THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET LEADERS. I APPLIED
"THE ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT A NEGOTIATION TOWARDS A
RAPID END OF THE WAR," TO OUR RELATIONS WITH HANOI.
SO WE ARE TALKING HERE ABOUT TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS.
ARE WE MORE OPTOMISTIC ABOUT A RAPID END OF THE WAR
AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS? I JUST DO NOT
WANT TO SPECIALIZE ABOUT WHAT THE IMPACT WILL BE, HOW
HANOI WILL INTERPRET THIS SITUATION. WHAT OTHER THINGS
MAY BE DONE BY US, BY HANOI AND OTHERS JUST HAS TO BE
SEEN AS ONE HAS SEEN SO MANY PREDICTIONS ON THE ISSUE
OF VIETNAM THAT WE WOULD REALLY NOW RATHER CONCENTRATE
ON THE RESULTS.

Q THE OTHER QUESTION IS A SEPARATE QUESTION.

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UNCLAS SECTION 8 OF 8 TEHRAN 3231

DR. KISSINGER: YOU SEE, THIS SUMMIT HAS BEEN REALLY
VERY PAINSTAKINGLY PREPARED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME,
AND ONE OF THE THINGS WE SAID TO EACH OTHER EARLY WAS,
DON'T LET US SURPRISE EACH OTHER AT THE SUMMIT, BECAUSE
WHEN HEADS OF STATE SUDDENLY PRESENT SOMETHING UNEXPECTED
TO THE OPPOSITE NUMBER, YOU CAN, OF COURSE, SAY MAYBE YOU
HAVE ACHIEVED SOMETHING SPECTACULAR, BUT MORE LIKELY YOU
WILL PRODUCE AN IMPASSE OR AN ATTITUDE OF, "GOOD GOD, WHAT
AM I DEALING WITH HERE?" BECAUSE EACH LEADER HAS HIS
OWN CONSTITUENCY AT HOME, HOWEVER YOU DEFINE IT, AND
THEREFORE, WE VERY PAINSTAKINGLY WORKED OUT THIS AGENDA
AHEAD OF TIME.

NOW THIS DOESN'T MEAN THAT THE RESULTS WERE
CLEAR AHEAD OF TIME, BUT THE POSSIBLE RESULTS WERE
UNDERSTOOD AND THEY DEPENDED, OF COURSE, ON THE
KIND OF CONVERSATIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD WITH THE
SOVIET LEADERS.

SO I SUPPOSE THE PRICE YOU PAY, IF IT IS A
PRICE -- WE DON'T BELIEVE IT IS A PRICE -- A CONSEQUENCE
OF A VERY CAREFULLY PREPARED SUMMIT, IS THAT IT TENDS
TO RUN ALONG THE COURSE THAT YOU HAVE CHARTED AND THAT THE

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UNCLAS TEL AVIV 3434

SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACK AT LYDDA

WE ARE URGENTLY SEEKING AUTHENTIC INFORMATION REGARDING
AMERICAN CITIZENS KILLED OR WOUNDED IN ATTACK AT LYDDA AIRPORT
AND WILL REPORT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BARBOUR

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WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, JUNE 5, 1972

943

MOSCOW: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS

Text of the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

May 29, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations
and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each other and to
place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat of war
and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in
the world and the strengthening of universal security and international
cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations and their
mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics, science
and culture, will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual
understanding and business-like cooperation, without in any way prejud-
dicing the interests of third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of the peoples of
both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

*First.* They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

*Second.* The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous ex-acerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining an. . . strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

*Third.* The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

*Fourth.* The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

944

*Fifth*. The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

*Sixth*. The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

*Seventh*. The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

*Eighth*. The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

*Ninth*. The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

*Tenth*. The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

*Eleventh*. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

*Twelfth*. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RICHARD NIXON

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, USSR)

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations
and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as
economics, science and culture, will meet these objectives
and contribute to better mutual understanding and business-like
cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of
third countries,

Have agreed as follows:

**First.** They will proceed from the common determination
that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting
their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.
Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA
and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development
of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty,
equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual
advantage.

**Second.** The USA and the USSR attach major importance
to preventing the development of situations capable of causing
a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they
will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise
restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to
negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions
and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a
spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

MORE

(OVER)

[L.C.]

are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

**Third.** The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

**Fourth.** The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

**Fifth.** The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

**Sixth.** The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

**Seventh.** The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

**Eighth.** The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth. The two sides reaffirm their intention to
deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage
fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values.
They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges
and tourism.

Tenth. The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure
that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned
fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built
on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent
character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields
where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint
bodies.

Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for
themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else
to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They
recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The Development of US-Soviet relations is not directed
against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this
document do not affect any obligations with respect to other
countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

For the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

RICHARD NIXON

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

[LC]

Excerpt from The President's Address to a Joint Session of the Congress at the Conclusion of His Trip to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, and Poland. June 1, 1972.

"Another area where we had very full, frank, and extensive discussions was the Middle East, I reiterated the American people's commitment to the survival of the state of Israel and to a settlement just to all the countries in the area. Both sides stated in the communique their intention to support the Jarring peace mission and other appropriate efforts to achieve this objective."

Congress
6/1/72

As far as the Vice President is concerned, my views with regard to his performance are the same that I reflected rather generously in my interview with Mr. Rather in January of this year. I think he has done a fine job as Vice President. I have very high confidence in him.

But the decision with regard to the Vice Presidency will not be announced until before the Republican Convention, in good time for them to make their own decision.

Mr. Horner.

QUESTION: Mr. President, what role do you foresee in the future months after he returns from his present trip and after the election, for John Connally?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Horner, first the reports we have had on Mr. Connally's trip have been excellent. I think his trip to Latin America -- and incidentally, also the trip that Dr. Arthur Burns made to Latin America -- came at a good time and allowed the Latin American heads of State to express their views just as vigorously as did President Echeverria when he was here in this country. That is what we want, candid, vigorous talk between the heads of State in the American Hemisphere.

The discussions he is presently having in Australia, in New Zealand, Southeast Asia, India, Pakistan and so forth and later in Iran I know will be helpful. When he returns he will not undertake a permanent government assignment, but he has agreed to undertake special government assignments at that time. I have one in mind, a very important one, but I cannot announce it at this time. I will announce it when he returns and when he reports to me in San Clemente.

Ms. Cornell. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: I said Ms.

QUESTION: Thank you.

Can you tell us what took you back to the Paris peace table and would you support a coalition government, the formation of a coalition government or would you discuss it in Paris?

THE PRESIDENT: It would not be useful to indicate the discussions that took place in various places with regard to returning to the Paris peace table.

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

AT 3:15 P.M. EDT

JULY 19, 1972

WEDNESDAY

MR. WARREN: I have a couple of announcements to make.

The schedule for tomorrow:

At 8:00, the President will have a breakfast
meeting with 13 Governors representing the National Governors
Conference who will be testifying tomorrow at 10 a.m.
before the Senate Finance Committee on general revenue
sharing. We will post the list of the 13 Governors who
will attend this breakfast. This will be held in the
State Dining Room.

Q Are they all Republicans?

MR. WARREN: No, it is a bipartisan group. The
Senate Finance Committee requested the National Governors
Conference to send representatives to the committee to
testify on general revenue sharing. The National
Governors Conference, including the current Chairman Marvin
Mandel, who will be here, named these representatives for
the National Governors Conference. We will post a list of
them.

Also you have one release. The President's
statement on the death of William T. Pecora. I think that
is self-explanatory.

We will post, after this session, a letter from
the President to the Chairman of the Board of the
Metropolitan Opera Association on the death of Goeran
Gentele, who was killed in Europe.

Also I would like to announce that the President
is today declaring a major disaster for the State of Ohio.
This request was made by Governor Gilligan who told the
Office of Emergency Preparedness that during the period
June 23rd to June 27th, high winds and rains associated
with Tropical Storm Agnes caused damage along the Ohio
River and on Lake Erie to about five counties. Governor
Gilligan advised the President that estimates of damaged
public and private property exceeded $3,400,000.

This is another disaster declaration as a result
of Tropical Storm Agnes. This means those in Ohio who were
victims of the tropical storm would have the benefit of the Agnew
Recovery Act, which is being debated in the Congress at
this time.

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MR. WARREN: I just have no comment on that whatsoever. But as I read the wire story, that was quite clear. I am not giving you a comment from the President on that yet. I want to make that clear. I don't have a reaction or a comment from the President on that action.

Q Does the President think everybody should vote?
(Laughter)

MR. WARREN: Yes, he does. As a matter of fact, he recently signed a proclamation on National Voter Registration Month, which is coming up.

Q If Henry comes back this afternoon or this evening and sees the President, is there some way you could let us know, like last time you called us when he was on the Sequoia.

MR. WARREN: Yes, I am sure we could let you know if such a thing happens.

Q Is there a White House view on the Soviet advisors leaving Egypt?

MR. WARREN: Well, we have no information or comment to provide you at this time on the reports out of Egypt. We are watching them closely, watching the developments closely, but we have no comment on those reports.

Q Is that the only thing on the schedule tomorrow, the breakfast?

MR. WARREN: The Governors' breakfast is the only thing I have at this time. If there are any additions, we will let you know.

Q Any word on the press conference?

MR. WARREN: No, no time or date set.

Q Did the President contact or was he contacted by George Meany?

MR. WARREN: I don't believe so, no.

That is it.

Q Is that it for the day?

MR. WARREN: That is it for the day.

I have two other postings.

We have an appointment of Leatrice E. Gochberg, New York, New York, to be a member of the President's Advisory Council on Management Improvement. She will succeed Allen W. Merrell.

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#1503

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:15 A.M. EDT

JULY 20, 1972

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As you know, the President met with 12 Governors this morning for breakfast for about an hour and a half. Governor Mandel and Governor Rockefeller and Governor Moore and the other Governors who attended the meeting were out here briefly before they left to speak before the Senate Finance Commission on behalf of revenue sharing legislation. They said this morning to the group that was assembled at that time, that they are continuing their all-out efforts to seek the passage of revenue sharing.

The President, this morning in the breakfast meeting, again stated his commitment to revenue sharing and the fact that it remains as strong today as it was in 1969 when we initially proposed the revenue sharing concept. The President made it clear that it was his view that revenue sharing should be passed by this session of Congress. It has been passed by the House, of course, and is now in the Senate committee.

He also expressed the view that it would be good to have the legislation considered by the Senate prior to the August 18th recess, prior to the Republican Convention.

The President pointed out again in his comments regarding revenue sharing that there is no question in his mind that the majority of the American people support revenue sharing, as was demonstrated by the vote in the House; that if the Senate has an opportunity to vote on revenue sharing, which we expect that they will, that it will pass overwhelmingly also in the Senate.

I just add those comments to what the Governors said this morning.

The schedule for tomorrow:

At 8:30 tomorrow morning, President Nixon will meet with the Republican Congressional leaders, and members of the Cabinet. This will be a breakfast meeting, which will be held in the State Dining Room. After that breakfast meeting, Senator Scott and Congressman Ford will appear here afterwards.

They will primarily be talking about budgetary matters.

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The News Court

#1503

MR. ZIEGLER: Bob, it applies to all transportation. It applies to railroads, airlines, bus transportation, highway transportation.

Q I think the difficulty I am having with the statement with regard to the $2-1/2 billion out of the busing bill, is, if I may say so, it seems like rather a mild reaction to a situation which, if I understand it correctly, is the virtual gutting of a major piece of White House legislation, to the effect that the removal of the money would remove the compensating factor for severe restriction to busing.

My question is, has the President contacted Congressman Quie, for instance? Has he expressed any special interest in what Congressman Quie is attempting to do, and the fact that Congressman Quie says he is doing it with the knowledge and suggesting the cooperation of this Administration?

MR. ZIEGLER: All I can tell you, Jim, is that I have stated our support of the legislation as we have submitted it. That is our position. That is what we are going to push for in terms of the pursuit of the busing moratorium. The legislation was designed by the Administration and presented in that form.

Q Would the President sign it without the money?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are not even close to that point. What we are trying to do is get the legislation moving. We are trying to get the busing moratorium legislation started through the legislative process. The only way you can get final passage is to get it rolling, and it is not at this point. I am sure there are a number of efforts that will be made and are being made in the Congress to get it moving. We think it is legislation that should be passed.

Q Ron, does the President believe chances in the Middle East for peace are any better because of the developments in the past few days in the UAR?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are following the developments there, as you would expect, closely, but I don't have an assessment to give you or specific comment to make on the situation.

Q Is there any chance of a public session with Dr. Kissinger?

MR. ZIEGLER: To discuss his talks in Paris?

Q Yes.

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't believe so. I responded to some questions on this matter yesterday, and I said that both sides agreed that the substance of the talks would not be made public. We will be as meticulous in following that procedure as we will be meticulous in carrying out every undertaking in relation to these talks.

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NEWS CONFERENCE

#1507

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:35 A.M. EDT

JULY 24, 1972

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You have had a report on the meeting with the President this morning. Jack Horner and Cliff Evans gave you a pool report on that.

We have only two announcements.

The President today is transmitting to the Senate for advice and consent 11 amendments to the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1960. The amendments were adopted by the Assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization in 1968 and 1969 in London. Three of the amendments adopted in 1968 by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, known as the IMCO, resulted from IMCO studies undertaken in 1967, following the foundering of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon. They are designed to help avoid the repetition of such disasters by requiring specified navigational equipment on board certain vessels, specifying operating conditions and requiring that ships carry up to date nautical publications.

The 1969 amendments are designed to upgrade requirements for shipboard fire fighting outfits, life buoys and life jackets, radio installations and navigational equipment.

I think the material that you have adds additional details to that.

The President today designated Gerard D. Reilly as Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for a term of four years, effective today. He succeeds Andrew M. Hood who has retired. We will provide a posting to you. The salary for the Chief Judge is $38,750.

Q He is already on the court.

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, he is already on the court, but he has been designated as Chief Judge.

Those are all of the announcements that we have with the exception of tomorrow's schedule.

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NewC

7/24/72

- 2 -

#1507

At 8:45 in the morning the President will meet with a group of Mayors representing the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors. These Mayors are scheduled to testify tomorrow before the Senate Finance Committee on revenue sharing.

You will recall that last Thursday the President met with several Governors before their testimony before the same committee.

We will post a list of the Mayors who will be here for the 8:45 meeting.

Then at 10:30 tomorrow morning, the President will meet with the Federal Property Review Board to hear a report of federal property made available to State and local governments for public use and the Legacy of Parks Program. Donald Rumsfeld, who is Chairman of the Property Review Board, will be here to brief members of the press after that meeting.

Those are all of the announcements that we have.

Q There is a story in a Beirut magazine saying that one of the factors in President Sadat's decision to ask Russian military advisers to leave Egypt was a conversation between the President and the Saudi Arabian Defense Minister last month. Is there any substance to that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I wouldn't have any comment on that. It is clearly a speculative story and it is based upon an unclear Middle East source. So I don't think anything would be served by my commenting on such a speculative story.

Q Would you deny it?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, I don't even want to get into denial or a type of response because it is clearly a speculative story. I have read the report of that particular meeting and I clearly will characterize it as an absolutely speculative story.

Q Well, if you have read the report, then you can either confirm or deny the validity of the report.

MR. ZIEGLER: I hate to do that when the source is unclear. I think I have made it quite clear to you already.

Q No, you haven't.

MR. ZIEGLER: It is speculative and without substance.

Q Ron, what about the briefing that Dr. Kissinger was going to give to Senator McGovern?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think they have been in touch. I don't know if a precise date has been set up yet, but they have been in touch and tentative arrangements, I understand, have been made.

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Q Senator McGovern has accepted the offer?

MR. ZIEGLER: It is available to him.

Q Is it tentatively this week?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know the date, but Henry told me they had been in touch, not directly, but they have been in touch to arrange for such a briefing. We will let you know when it is set.

Q Was Clark MacGregor speaking for the President when he rejected McGovern's idea for debates?

MR. ZIEGLER: He was presenting that view in an authoritative way, yes.

Q Leaving aside the story of the Beirut thing, did the President indicate in any way to the Saudi Arabian Defense Minister last month, that the Russian advisers were to leave Egypt and the United States would work especially hard to get the U.N. Security Council resolution into effect?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me go on <u>DEEP BACKGROUND</u> in response to your question. The subject was not discussed.

Q Did the President ask former Secretary Connally to head a Democrats for Nixon Campaign?

MR. ZIEGLER: Secretary Connally again was on one of the interview programs yesterday and he was responsive to a similar question and I think I would stand on his answer. Secretary Connally has already, as you know, made comments about his participation in the up-coming election and I would have nothing to add to that.

Q He is supposed to say something ---

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't have those details. That would have to come from Secretary Connally or Mr. MacGregor.

Q Can you tell us why the President has decided not to debate when he indicated in his June 22nd press conference that he might?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have no further comment on that beyond what Mr. MacGregor said yesterday.

Q You have said that Dr. Kissinger and Senator McGovern have been in touch, but not directly.

MR. ZIEGLER: I think a member of Dr. Kissinger's staff talked to a member of Senator McGovern's staff to make the arrangements.

Q Where is Dr. Kissinger? He is in Paris?

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ment Bank, the United Nations Develop-
ment Program, and the World Bank.

The 700-square-mile flooded area was first
hit June 25 by a typhoon and then by severe
rainstorms, which have destroyed most of
the crops in Luzon, a major agricultural
area, including the all-important rice crop,
apparently a total loss. Serious food short-
ages have resulted.

The U.S. Government, through AID, al-
ready is financing a U.S. naval air operation
which is distributing food, clothing, and
other emergency relief supplies to the flood
victims. Under the AID-financed operation,
the U.S.S. Tripoli, a helicopter carrier oper-
ating in the Lingayen Gulf, is airlifting sup-
plies to Luzon.

Also as part of the relief program, the U.S.
Navy is producing 10,000 nutri-buns a day
at the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay for
distribution to the flood victims. Nutri-buns
are high-protein biscuits made of enriched
and fortified wheat flour, vegetable oil, and
non-fat dry milk.

President Nixon Exchanges Greetings
With Prime Minister Meir of Israel

Following is the transcript of a telephone
conversation between President Nixon and
Prime Minister Golda Meir which was
broadcast live in Israel on July 26 during a
television program marking the inaugura-
tion of a communications satellite ground
station at Emeq Ha'ela.

White House press release dated July 26

The Prime Minister: Hello.

The President: Hello, Madam Prime Min-
ister.

The Prime Minister: Mr. President, sha-
lom.

The President: Thank you very much. I
want you to know that as I speak here
from the Oval Office, where you and I have
met so many times, that I extend the very
best wishes of all of the people of the
United States to all of the people of Israel.

I think this program, as I saw the coun-
tries you were talking to, instead of being
called "Around the World in 80 Days,"
could be called "Around the World in 60
Minutes."

The Prime Minister: That is right. Mr.
President, it is extremely kind of you to
take time off and speak to us. I can only
tell you that the best wishes of all the peo-
ple of Israel, appreciation, and all the
friendship that we can express goes out to
you and the people of the United States.

I remember the Oval Room very well,
always with a great feeling of satisfaction
and appreciation and joy and thankfulness
that you have always taken so much of your
time to listen to my long stories of troubles
and wishes and so on. But I must say I al-
ways came out with the right answers.

The President: Madam Prime Minister,
I want you to know that you, needless to
say, are always welcome here. I only regret
that while I have visited Israel on other oc-
casions I have never been able to do so as
President, but you can be sure that we will
continue to work together for what you are
interested in, what we are interested in, and
that is a just peace in the Mideast which
will protect the integrity of Israel, for
which your people have suffered so much
and sacrificed so much.

The Prime Minister: Thank you very,
very much. It is easier to face difficulties
when you speak as you do, and I know what
you have done, so thank you very much.
There is a large group here. They are all
smiling, and they are all happy to hear your
voice.

The President: I want to say just one last
thing. I think the fact that we do have this
new television communication will mean
that the programs that will be carried from
Israel to the United States, and from the
United States to Israel, will mean that more
of our people here will have an opportunity
not only to see Israel by television but per-
haps to go there as tourists and we hope
that more people from Israel can come here.
We hope that will be one of the dividends
of this new program.

210

Department of State Bulletin

The Prime Minister: Is a commercial
that will work both ways.

The President: That's right. That's right. I know that I have enjoyed my visits, and we want you and any of your friends to know they are always welcome here in our country.

The President: Thank you. We look forward to seeing you. Goodby.

The Prime Minister: Goodby.

## President Appoints John Connally to Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The President announced on August 3 (White House press release) the appointment of former Texas Governor John B. Connally as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The appointment was effective as of August 1. Governor Connally previously served on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from December 1, 1970, until his appointment as Secretary of the Treasury February 11, 1971. He served as Secretary of the Treasury until June 12, 1972. (For further biographic data, see White House press release dated August 3.)

The present Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was reconstituted and reorganized by President Nixon on March 20, 1969. It was originally established by President Eisenhower in 1956 as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities and was continued by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Composed of a nonpartisan group of distinguished private citizens, the Board performs a continuing review of all foreign intelligence and related activities conducted by

the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. It is responsible for advising the President on the overall national intelligence effort and for recommending to him appropriate measures to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence community.

The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is composed of 11 members, including Governor Connally, and is chaired by Adm. George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations and U.S. Ambassador to Portugal. The Executive Secretary of the Board is Gerard P. Burke.

In announcing the appointment of Governor Connally, the President noted the highly important role of intelligence in the overall national security of the United States and emphasized his reliance on the Board for nonpartisan objective appraisals of all the foreign intelligence activities of the government.

## Secretary Rogers Hails French Seizure of Heroin Laboratories

Following is a statement by Secretary Rogers, who is Chairman of President Nixon's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which was read to news correspondents on July 21 by Charles W. Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations.

The seizure yesterday of a third set of heroin-manufacturing equipment in France in less than a week represents an extraordinary achievement by French authorities and is a very substantial contribution to the effort to stop international narcotics trafficking. We are grateful to the French and to others who share with us an appreciation of the need for a united international effort to deal with what President Nixon has called "public enemy number one."

August 21, 1972

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#1510

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

JULY 26, 1972

AT 11:50 A.M. EDT

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President is placing a telephone
call to Prime Minister Meir of Israel. We announced that fact
yesterday. The phone call will mark the opening of the Israeli
earth station which will connect Israel with the Intelsat system
of satellite communications. The hook-up will improve the
quality and capacity of phone service and will also make possible
for the first time an exchange of live television programs.

I understand that the opening ceremonies which mark
the installation of this system are being televised live in
Israel, including the telephone conversation, but not from this
end. Shots of three astronauts from Houston will also be
on the program, and also a performance by Isaac Stern from the
Israeli Room at the Kennedy Center as a part of the program
opening this new communications system.

We will have a transcript of the conversation between the
President and the Prime Minister very shortly after the conversa-
tion concludes. Also, for the broadcast people, we will have
a tape made of that conversation and it will be available to you.

Q A two-way conversation tape?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. We will give you the exact times
of the phone call when it ends.

Q Are there any other countries involved in this?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. Prior to the telephone conversation
between the President and Prime Minister Meir there were
live segments beamed to Israel from Paris, Munich, and Vienna.
Also, I should add that FCC Chairman Burch is in Israel and
will be with Mrs. Meir when the President talks with her.
He also delivered a letter from the President to Mrs. Meir
expressing his best wishes and those of the American people
on the inauguration of the earth station. Xerox copies of
that letter are available for those interested.

The President today is announcing the appointment of
William S. Gilbert of Seattle, Washington, to be a member on
the part of the United States of America on the International
Pacific Halibut Commission. We will have the details on that
to give you. He replaces Haakon M. Selvar, who resigned on
the International Pacific Halibut Commission.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

News Conf.

UNCLASSIFIED 803

PAGE 01 STATE 137344

65
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 AF-10 IO-12 PM-06 NSC-10 CIAE-00
DODE-00 INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 USIA-12 PRS-01
/094 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:GNANDERSON:DD
7/28/72 EXT 22660

APPROVED BY NEA:EGY:GNANDERSON
NEA/P:JEAVES

S/PRS:CBRAY (INFO)
AF/P:GAFRIEDMAN (INFO)
IO/P:DTORREY (INFO)
EUR/P:ESAVAGE (INFO)

044206

P 282124Z JUL 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 137344

REF: CAIRO 2112

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT BRAY COMMENTS ON EGYPT AND ISRAEL AT NOON BRIEFING JULY 26.

BEGIN TEXT: Q. HAVE YOU ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN SHARE ON MOVEMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS OUT OF EGYPT AND WOULD YOU CARE TO REVIEW WHERE EFFORTS STAND ON RENEWING RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN CAIRO?

A. WITH RESPECT TO FIRST HALF OF YOUR QUESTION I'M STILL IN THAT SAME HOLDING PATTERN WITH RESPECT TO DETAILS OR COMMENT IN THIS MATTER. NOW, WITH RESPECT TO YOUR NEXT QUESTION, I WAS ASKED ESSENTIALLY THAT QUESTION HERE YES-TERDAY.

Q. WELL, THINK YOUR ANSWER WAS IN GENERAL TERMS AND CERTAINLY IT COULD BE INTERPRETED TO BE RESPONSIVE IN SOME

UNCLASSIFIED

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TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 137344

MEASURE: BUT I WONDER --

A. YES.

Q. -- IF THERE IS ANYTHING MORE SPECIFIC.

A. THERE IS NOT.

Q. O.K.

Q. DOES YOUR INABILITY TO COMMENT ON SITUATION ALSO APPLY TO MEIR STATEMENT OF WILLINGNESS TO SIT DOWN AND TALK WITH EGYPTIANS?

A. I THINK, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, YES.

Q. COULD WE GO BACK TO GEORGE SHERMAN'S QUESTION EARLIER IN THE WEEK: IS POSITION STILL AS STATED BY THE SECRETARY IN DECEMBER 1969 SO FAR AS OVERALL SETTLEMENT CONCERNED?

A. I'M GOING TO HAVE TO LUMP ALL THESE RELATED QUESTIONS UNDER SAME "NO COMMENT" RUBRIC, MARILYN, I'M SORRY.

Q. MRS. MEIR TODAY REPEATED ISRAELI WILLINGNESS GO INTO INTERIM SETTLEMENT. CAN YOU JUST BRING US UP TO DATE ON WHERE US EFFORTS IN THIS LIE AT THE MOMENT?

A. NOT FOR THE TIME BEING.

Q. DOES THE US SUPPORT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT?

A. LOOK, YOU KNOW, THIS IS FASCINATING LINE OF QUESTIONING, AND I WOULD PREFER TO BE IN A POSITION TO RESPOND, BUT I'M NOT. I HAVE YOUR QUESTIONS AND AN INCREASING LITANY THAT'S BUILDING UP, BUT I AM JUST NOT IN A POSITION TO RESPOND TO THIS KIND OF QUESTION.

Q. WELL, THE SECRETARY IS QUOTED AS HAVING SUGGESTED JUST THAT IN HIS STOP AT KUWAIT. HAS THAT POSITION CHANGED SINCE A WEEK AND A HALF AGO?

A. WE CAN FLOG THIS, MARILYN, BUT I'M --

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PAGE 03 STATE 137344

Q. I JUST WANT TO GET THE QUESTION STRAIGHT.

A. THERE HAS BEEN A PASSAGE OF TIME AND EVENTS, AND I'M
NOT AT THIS POINT IN A POSITION TO RESPOND TO THAT KIND OF
QUESTION.

Q. I JUST WANT PEOPLE TO KNOW THE QUESTION.

A. THANK YOU.

Q. IN OTHER WORDS, YOU ARE SAYING THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS
IN KUWAIT MAY NO LONGER APPLY TO SITUATION?

A. NO, GEORGE, I AM NOT. I AM SIMPLY DECLINING COMMENT
ON THIS WHOLE COMPLEX OF MATTERS. NO MORE AND NO LESS.

Q. CHARLIE, I'M AWARE OF YOUR PROBLEM AND I SYMPATHIZE.
IF YOU WOULD JUST EXPLAIN TO YOUR PRINCIPALS, WHO ARE PROB-
ABLY AWARE OF IT BUT POSSIBLY NOT AWARE OF THE DEEP PAIN,
WE'RE IN A POSITION WHERE EVENTS HAVE CAST SOME DOUBT ON
VALIDITY OF PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED AMERICAN POSITIONS FROM
THE SECRETARY'S 1969 STATEMENT AND ON UP. WHAT WE NEED,
IF IT'S IMPOSSIBLE TO ADDRESS THESE THINGS PRECISELY, IS
ANYTHING WE COULD GET, OR YOU COULD GET FOR US, TELLING US
WHICH OF PAST FORMAL AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS MAY STILL BE
TAKEN AS INDICATIVE OF AMERICAN POLICY AND WHICH CANNOT.

A. YES. I RECognize YOUR PROBLEM. I THINK YOU HAVE TO
ALLOW THE US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SATISFY ITSELF WITH
RESPECT TO THE FACTS, THE IMPLICATION OF FACTS, COME TO
JUDGMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS, AND LOOK TO THE FUTURE AT ITS
OWN PACE, IN LIGHT OF WHAT IT CONCEIVES TO BE AMERICAN
INTERESTS. AND THAT LEAVES YOU WITH SHORT-TERM PROBLEM IN
THE FOURTH ESTATE, AND I DO RECOGNIZE IT.

Q. IT ALSO LEAVES US WITH IMPRESSION THAT DEVELOPMENTS
ARE CAUSING SOUL-SEARCHING AND REASSESSMENT, AND POSSIBLY
SOME PAST POLICIES MAY CHANGE. THAT, OF COURSE, IS OF A
SPECULATIVE NATURE, BUT I THINK THE ADMINISTRATION MUST
REALIZE THAT TOO.

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PAGE 04 STATE 137344

Q. TO ADD TO THAT, IT SEEMS TO ME TOO THAT SADAT'S SPEECH RAISED AT LEAST ONE QUESTION OF REMOTE HISTORY GOING BACK FIVE YEARS, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PRESIDENT JOHNSON KNEW AND APPROVED IN ADVANCE OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK ON EGYPT. AND I DON'T SEE HOW SAYING YES OR NO TO THAT PERTAINS TO THE PARTICULAR SITUATION AT THE MOMENT REGARDING SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL.

A. THAT QUESTION IS PART OF THE LITANY THAT'S BUILDING UP, GEORGE.

Q. CHARLIE, WOULD IT BE FAIR TO CHARACTERIZE US POSITION ON THIS SITUATION AT THE MOMENT AS STU RELATED IT, THAT THERE IS LARGE ASSESSMENT AND SOUL-SEARCHING GOING ON, OR IS IT FAIR TO DESCRIBE IT AS AN IMMOBILIZATION, AS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY OTHERS?

A. (LAUGHING) ARE THOSE MY ONLY TWO CHOICES?

Q. HOW ABOUT DYNAMIC IMMOBILIZATION? (LAUGHTER)

A. AND RETROSPECTIVE AS WELL.

Q. IS THERE AN ANSWER?

A. WELL, LET ME TAKE SOME OF THE DRAMATIC EDGES OFF STU'S SPECULATION. OBVIOUSLY, WE ARE WATCHING THIS AND CONSIDERING IT, BUT IT IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE US TO EXPRESS ITSELF IN ANY JUDGMENTAL WAY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

Q. WHY, BECAUSE, IN FACT, YOU HAVE DONE IT.

A. THAT LEAVES YOU SOMEWHERE BETWEEN IMMOBILITY AND DRAMATIC SOUL-SEARCHING.

Q. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE WHOLE US IS IN A HOLDING PATTERN?

A. WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC COMMENTS? YES, I HOPE.

Q. CHARLIE, CAN YOU SAY WHY IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE

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PAGE 05 STATE 137344

USG NOW TO EXPRESS ITSELF ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES SINCE IT
HAS DONE SO MANY TIMES IN THE PAST?

A. THAT REPRESENTS OUR JUDGMENT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

Q. DOES THIS POINT, SOMEWHERE BETWEEN IMMOBILITY AND DRAMATIC SOUL-SEARCHING, AFFECT ONLY PUBLIC STATEMENTS? AND ARE THERE DIRECT CONTACTS IN --

A. YOU'RE NOT GOING TO HANG ME BY YOUR CHOICE OF ALTERNATIVES, ARE YOU?

Q. NO, I WANT TO KNOW IF THERE ARE ANY DIRECT CONTACTS-- IN THIS PERIOD OF TIME, ARE THERE DIRECT CONTACTS BEING MADE WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED TO DETERMINE WHERE TO GO NEXT AND TO GET THEIR VIEWS AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE MEANING OF WHAT IS HAPPENING.

A. NO COMMENT. END TEXT.

ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 26

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

3:02 P.M. EDT

July 27, 1972

Thursday

In The Oval Office
At The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENT: We will go ahead with some questions if you like.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have said that it is against U.S. policy to bomb the dikes and dams in North Vietnam. Yesterday, the State Department acknowledged there had been incidental and inadvertent damage from the bombing nearby.

My question is: Is it worth the risk of possible flooding and having world opinion turned against us as a result of bombing dams?

THE PRESIDENT: I think your question would be better answered by my discussing the policy toward bombing of civilian installations of North Vietnam generally, and then coming down to the specifics of your question, in giving a general answer.

Some of you who were in Texas with me will recall that that question was raised on the Connally Ranch, and it was raised, actually, by an advocate of bombing dikes as to why we did not bomb dikes. I said it had not been U.S. policy even before the bombing halt of 1968 to bomb the dikes; that it was not our policy now, and it would not be in the future, because it is the policy of the United States in all of its activities in North Vietnam to direct its attacks against military targets only.

This was the policy in the 60s and it is now the policy since we have had to resume the bombing for the reasons that I mentioned in my speech of May 8th.

With regard to the situation on the dikes, let us understand what we are confronted with here. This is approximately a 2,700-mile chain of installations, including perhaps a half-dozen major dams which are the heart of the system, and then peripheral areas getting down to mounds, which have, of course, the purpose of controlling the floodwaters in that particular area.

If it were the policy of the United States to bomb the dikes, we could take them out, the significant part of them out, in a week. We don't do so for the reasons that I have mentioned, because we are trying to avoid civilian casualties, not cause them.

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Page 10

QUESTION: What impact on the American policy in the Middle East is the withdrawal of Soviet personnel likely to have?

THE PRESIDENT: This question I noticed has been reflected on by some lower level officials in the Government, but not because Secretary Rogers and I have talked about this matter and Dr. Kissinger and I, not by us. For this reason, our goal, as you know, is a just settlement in the Middle East. The situation there is still one that is not clear and any comment upon it, first, might possibly be erroneous, and second, could very well be harmful to our goal of a just settlement.

So I am not trying to dodge your question, but I don't think it would be helpful to our goal of a just settlement in the Middle East. It might exacerbate the problem by trying to evaluate what happened between Sadat and the Soviet leaders.

QUESTION: On the subject of your selection of the Vice President, of your selection of Mr. Agnew, could you tell us if you considered anybody else for the job and who they were?

THE PRESIDENT: No. My thoughts with regard to Vice President Agnew were expressed at rather great length in this very room in an interview with one of the other networks. I think it was CBS.

On that occasion, I expressed my confidence in the Vice President. I wouldn't go over those matters that I covered at considerable length then now, except to say that I reaffirm that confidence as expressed then.

Under the circumstances, I believe that the choice I made four years ago is one that should now be reaffirmed by asking him to run for the office again.

Now, there has been speculation, I would hasten to say, about other people for the Vice Presidency. That is inevitable. The Vice President could get sick or the Vice President might decide not to run, all of these things. I don't think he is going to get sick. He is also in excellent health, better than I. He plays tennis. But, in any event, there has been a lot of speculation. Secretary Connally's name comes to mind.

I should point out that a really great injustice was done to Secretary Connally in the suggestion, I think, on one of the news reports to the effect that I gave Secretary Connally the bad news that he was not going to be the Vice Presidential candidate when I saw him Friday night.

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INR-06 NSAE-00 P-03 RSC-01 USIA-12 PRS-01 /083 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/GRK:GTCHURCHILL
7/28/72 X20930
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/TURRSDILLON
NEA/PR:EAVES
S/S-MR. MILLER

R 282305Z JUL 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

UNCLAS STATE 137609

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE - JULY 27

1. NEW YORK TIMES, JULY 28, CARRIES WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPT OF PRESIDENT'S JULY 27 NEWS CONFERENCE WHICH CONTAINED FOLLOWING REFERENCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY:

2. QUOTE. THE SECOND DECISION, WHICH I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT, WAS THE GREEK-TURKISH AID PROGRAM. THAT WAS A TOUGH ONE. IT SPLIT HIS PARTY. IT SPLIT IT INTO THE HENRY WALLACE WING AND HIS WING. BYRNES AND WALLACE, REMEMBER, HAD THEIR FIGHT. IT WAS A GOOD DECISION, AND I SUPPORTED IT IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

INCIDENTALLY, I STILL SUPPORT AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY. IT IS JUST AS NECESSARY TODAY AS IT WAS THEN, FOR MOST OF THE SAME REASONS, NOW PARTICULARLY ADDED BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT WITHOUT AID TO GREECE AND AID TO TURKEY YOU HAVE NO VIABLE POLICY TO SAVE ISRAEL. END QUOTE.

3. IFQUERIED ABOUT THE CONNECTION BETWEEN AID TO GREECE AND TURKEY AND OUR POLICY ON ISRAEL, SUGGEST YOU RESPOND

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

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[1c]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 147462

MR. ZIEGLER: HELEN, I HAVE NOT BEEN IN THE PAST, NOR AM I AT THIS TIME, PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WERE HELD IN THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY VERY THOROUGHLY REPORTED TO YOU IN BRIEFINGS THERE AND IN STATEMENTS THAT WE ISSUED. BEYOND THAT, I AM NOT PREPARED TO GIVE DETAILS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD.

Q. YOU SAID SEVERAL TIMES FOLLOWING THE CHINA VISIT THAT THERE WERE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS THAT WERE REACHED AND NOT ANNOUNCED. CAN YOU NOT MAKE THAT STATEMENT ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION?

MR. ZIEGLER: WELL, I THINK THE TERM "SECRET DEAL" --

Q. I WILL RETRACT THOSE WORDS. HOW ABOUT "PRIVATE"?

MR. ZIEGLER: THAT TERM WAS INJECTED BY THE QUESTIONER AND IT IS NOT ONE I WOULD ACCEPT.

Q. HOW ABOUT "PRIVATE AGREEMENTS"?

MR. ZIEGLER: I KNOW THE REPORT YOU ARE REFERRING TO THIS MORNING AND I THINK THE POINT IS THAT THE NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS COMING FROM THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE SIX MONTHS HAS BEEN ABOUT 15,000, SO THAT IS A RATE OF ABOUT 30,000 TO 35,000 THAT IS EXPECTED IN 1972. I BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT THAT REPORT RELATES TO.

OUR POSITION HAS LAWAYS BEEN, AND WE STATED IT PREVIOUSLY, THAT WE SUPPORT THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE SUPPORT THE RIGHT OF FREE IMMIGRATION FOR PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. SO I THINK THAT IS THE CONTEXT IN WHICH YOU SHOULD PUT THE REMARKS.

Q. BUT THAT IS NOT THE CONTEXT IN WHICH GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER PUT THE REMARKS. HE SAID THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND SOVIET OFFICIALS TO PERMIT IMMIGRATION AT THIS LEVEL.

MR. ZIEGLER: I AM JUST NOT PREPARED TO GET INTO ANY

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

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UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 147462

DETAILS. I THINK WE HAVE IMPLIED TO YOU BEFORE THAT
OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS A SUBJECT THAT WAS DISCUSSED.

Q. IS THE STORY NOW ON THE WIRES, QUOTING THE GOVERNOR AS SAYING HE WAS MISQUOTED, THAT THERE WAS NO DEAL -- HE MEANT TO SAY THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS -- MORE TRUE?

MR. ZIEGLER: THANK YOU FOR BRINGING THAT UP. APPARENTLY UPI HAD NOT SEEN THAT, AND NEITHER HAD I. (LAUGHTER)

WHAT I WAS TRYING TO DO WAS PUT THIS INTO CONTEXT.

Q. NOW MAYBE YOU WANT TO CHANGE YOUR WHOLE STATEMENT.

MR. ZIEGLER: NO, NOT AT ALL, BECAUSE I WAS TRYING TO PROVIDE YOU BASICALLY THE FACTS.

Q. I DIDN'T FEEL WE GOT THEM.

Q. WAS THAT AN ACCURATE CHARACTERIZATION, THAT IT WAS A "MEETING OF THE MINDS"?

MR. ZIEGLER: I AM NOT PREPARED TO GO BEYOND WHAT I SAID.

Q. YOU ARE IMPLYING THERE ARE SECRET AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

MR. ZIEGLER: YOU KEEP INJECTING THAT TERM, HELEN, AND I KEEP MOVING AWAY FROM ACCEPTING THAT TERM.

Q. YOU HAVE NOT DENIED IT.

MR. ZIEGLER: I WOULDN'T ACCEPT THAT TERM. IN RELATION TO THE FIGURES THAT HAVE BEEN REPORTED, I MADE THE POINT THAT ABOUT 15,000 HAVE EMIGRATED FROM THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE FIRST SIX MONTHS. IT IS RUNNING AT A RATE OF ABOUT 2,500 A MONTH, SO THAT IS ABOUT 35,000 THAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN 1972.

Q. I AM REFERRING TO OTHER MATTERS THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

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[1c]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 147462

BEEN DISCLOSED.

MR. ZIEGLER: WE WERE FORTHCOMING IN GIVING YOU A RUNDOWN
OF THE AGREEMENTS THAT WERE REACHED.

Q. WHEN YOU LEAVE GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER'S STATEMENT, AS AMENDED, ON THE RECORD AND YOU CALL OUR ATTENTION TO CERTAIN NUMBERS OF PERSONS REPUTED TO BE EMIGRATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION, YOU LEAVE IT UP TO US TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS, IN FACT, AN AGREEMENT THAT YOU WILL NOT DISCUSS. IS THAT NOT TRUE?

MR. ZIEGLER: I DON'T WANT TO LEAVE YOU WITH THE CONCLUSION OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS BEING REACHED. I THINK I MENTIONED TO YOU THAT THIS IS A MATTER THAT WAS TALKED ABOUT IN THE SOVIET UNION.

Q. WHEN YOU SAY THIS WAS A MATTER, WHAT WAS THE MATTER THAT WAS TALKED ABOUT: THE LEVEL OF JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION?

MR. ZIEGLER: I AM NOT PREPARED TO GET INTO THESE DETAILS.
THIS SUBJECT WAS ONE THAT WAS DISCUSSED.

G. WHAT SUBJECT?

MR. ZIEGLER: THE MATTER OF EMIGRATION, THE MATTER WHICH RELATES TO THE REPORT YOU ARE QUESTIONING ME ABOUT.

Q. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, DID THE SOVIETS TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT THEY INTENDED TO PERMIT ABOUT 35,000 PEOPLE THIS YEAR TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY?

MR. ZIEGLER: AS I SAID EARLIER, I AM NOT PREPARED TO GET INTO THOSE DETAILS. END QUOTE. ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

The Step-by-Step Approach to Peace in the Middle East

Address by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ¹

Mr. Plofsky [Ralph Plofsky, a past national commander, Jewish War Veterans] distinguished guests, and friends: First let me say thank you for your very generous introduction. I cannot help but recall the story of the man who fell off the 20th story of a building. After he passed the 10th floor, a friend stuck his head out of the window and shouted, "Joe, so far you are all right." There are times that in this job, which has been very challenging, I have felt a little bit like the fellow who fell off the 20th floor. But nevertheless it has been a labor of love, a labor of deep commitment to a political settlement which would result in a durable peace in the area.

There are three aspects of the Middle Eastern problem that help explain the continuing danger in the area.

There is the Arab-Israeli dispute, where the fundamental chasm is still deep, where mistrust between the parties remains.

There are the differences within the Arab world itself, the intra-Arab disputes that, in addition to the differences over the Arab-Israeli dispute, contribute to the present instability in the area. The objective of Arab unity still remains elusive.

And as if this were not enough, the fact that the Middle East is an area of potential conflict between the major powers helps to explain why it is high on the agenda of world trouble spots.

In my judgment, there is no satisfactory answer to the situation other than a stable and durable peace between the two sides—a peace agreement that will replace the 20 years of de facto cease-fire, a peace agreement in which each side undertakes obligations to the other, not a scotch-tape armistice arrangement, not undefined lines, but a peace agreement based on the fundamental philosophy of live-and-let-live.

As we look at the situation today, there are several positive elements.

The first is the cease-fire that has existed in the area well over two years. There are many things that can be said about the cease-fire, but I would single out one in particular: The people on both sides have experienced a period of over two years of reduced violence. This period, I hope, in time will help create a new atmosphere in the Middle East, a new atmosphere which has begun to emerge—not only an atmosphere of live-and-let-live but an atmosphere where there can be deep and meaningful coexistence; where people can move freely; and where each side can have confidence that agreements entered into will be kept because they will be agreements serving the interests of both.

The second positive element is that the balance in the area has been and will be maintained. I am convinced that for American diplomacy in the area to be effective it has to be based on the maintenance of the balance within the region, as it has been these past years, and the maintenance of the global balance. It must also continue to be bulwarked by a strong American presence in

¹ Made before the national convention of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. at Houston, Tex., on Aug. 19.

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Department of State Bulletin

the Mediterranean. Diplomacy must have teeth to be credible in the area.

A third element in the present situation has been the development of greater realism in the Arab world. I say this with some caution. Certainly the elements of violence in the Middle East are there. Certainly the people and the forces who see the military option as the answer still remain. But the forces of moderation are slowly getting the upper hand. The people in the area have an opportunity over the next three or four or five years to strengthen those voices of moderation; to move toward a peace shaped principally by the people and the countries of the area.

I am mindful of the fact that my words here tonight will be heard and scrutinized both in Cairo and in Tel Aviv. I hope you will bear this in mind. I have probably spoken to President Sadat for a longer period of time than any other official American since he has assumed the Presidency of his country. I want to say to this Jewish audience: I believe he wants a peaceful solution. I believe he has unleashed certain expectations in his country which the people of his country want satisfied. I believe he wants to satisfy those expectations, both in terms of peace and the welfare of his people. I believe that a part of the greater realism in the Arab world, regardless of the strident rhetoric we hear daily, is the appreciation that going to war would not solve anything. It would not solve anything for the people or the countries in the area, nor would it get at the key issues of a binding contractual peace agreement or resolving the territorial issues that divide the two sides.

What's our objective? It is a stable peace in the area. We have in the Security Council resolution of November 1967 the framework of a binding peace agreement.² But this Security Council resolution, important as it is, is no more than a bareboned framework. A basic assumption of that resolution was that there would be negotiations between the

two sides in order to arrive at an agreement. Such negotiations would seek to resolve the key questions of withdrawal, of territory, of borders, of the opening of the Suez Canal, the question of the right of each state in the area to exist, and the problem of refugees. It is, as I say, a bareboned outline. It can have no lasting meaning in terms of implementation unless the details are filled out and agreed to by both sides and unless the resolution, in fact, in detail, and in reality, leads to a binding peace agreement arrived at by the two sides, not imposed from the outside. We have influence that we can bring to bear on the situation, but no major power has the capacity to impose a solution.

Where do matters stand? At the May summit in Moscow, the Middle East was not a primary item, though it was discussed thoroughly and in detail. The communique endorsed a political solution based on the November 1967 resolution.³ We all know the 1967 resolution is interpreted differently in Israel and in the Arab world. The Egyptians have always insisted the resolution means total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before the June war of 1967. Israel has never agreed with this interpretation. The resolution does call for withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during the June war. But it also calls for secure and recognized boundaries. The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes the 1967 lines as the final lines. The assumption was that the final lines would have to be agreed between the two sides. I helped negotiate that resolution; and I am therefore fully familiar with its legislative history. The phrase "secure and recognized boundaries" is in the resolution, and it was adopted by a unanimous vote of the U.N. Security Council with each side applying its own interpretation in the explanations of vote. The Security Council did not endorse any specific lines as the final lines. This was and is a matter for the parties themselves to

² For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

³ For text of a joint communique issued at Moscow May 29 during President Nixon's visit, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 899.

September 25, 1972

351

decide in the context of real negotiations, whether under the aegis of Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] or under other auspices.

In addition to the endorsement of a political solution in the summit communique, an important set of principles was adopted:⁴ that each side should avoid confrontations over various trouble spots, that each ought to resort to peaceful means, that each should try to resist the temptation to derive unilateral benefit from one given trouble spot or another. There were no new departures. The communique tells the story: Neither major power wanted or wants to see the present situation break out again into hostilities between the two sides. Both sides remain committed to a political settlement based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

Since then there have been significant developments in Egypt. I am not in a position to say much about these developments. The events speak for themselves. This is an internal matter for the Egyptian people to decide. Moreover, not all of the facts are in; and before any firm judgments and conclusions can be drawn, we will want to be clear on what the situation is. That there has been a substantial reduction of the Soviet presence in Egypt has been confirmed. What it will mean in the future, what it will mean in terms of the "no war, no peace" situation in the area, what it will mean in terms of the possibilities of future negotiations, is difficult to predict at this point. At present the position on the substance of a settlement between the two sides remains unchanged.

There are diplomatic opportunities available. Ambassador Jarring has just concluded two weeks in New York. The United States has supported both the November 1967 resolution and Ambassador Jarring's mission. If Ambassador Jarring can break the impasse, it would be fine with us. But we have doubts on this score for one simple reason: Egypt says there must be total Israeli

withdrawal to the lines which existed before the June war; Israel is equally insistent that there must be substantial change in the lines. Because this difference is fundamental at this stage and not bridgeable in the near future, we continue to feel the more practical approach is the step-by-step approach.

You will recall that a year ago both President Sadat and Prime Minister Meir indicated a willingness to explore the possibilities of a so-called interim Suez Canal agreement. We, the United States, over the past year have tried to get these talks started, and we have not been successful. In October 1971 Egypt was favorable, Israel was not. Last February Israel took an affirmative decision to enter into so-called proximity talks under the aegis of the United States. The present Israeli position, in simple terms, is that it is willing to enter into these talks without conditions. The present Egyptian position is that before Egypt is willing to enter into such proximity talks it wants a prior commitment on the part of Israel to the memorandum submitted by Ambassador Jarring in February of 1971, which would amount to a prior commitment to withdraw to the line with Egypt that existed before the June war of 1967.

In the last few weeks the Prime Minister of Israel has stressed once again and reaffirmed the desire of Israel to enter into these talks. We noted in particular that in her most recent speech she placed a certain amount of stress on the fact that Israeli conceives of any interim Suez Canal agreement as temporary. A few days later Defense Minister Dayan placed similar emphasis on the desirability of such an interim agreement, indicating also some willingness to consider, in his words, "a line in the Sinai, temporary or permanent." The Israeli emphasis on the temporary nature of any interim Suez Canal agreement seems, in my judgment, to reflect a recognition on the part of Israel that one of the difficulties which Egypt has with the notion of an interim agreement is that it not become a new indefinite de facto status quo. Egypt is understandably concerned that any interim agreement

⁴For text of the basic principles of relations signed at Moscow May 29, see *ibid*., p. 898.

352

Department of State Bulletin

not become a final agreement with Israel re-
maining in occupation of territory.

I can recall, since this has already been in
the public domain, having visited Israel a
year ago in May and having had long discus-
sions with the Prime Minister. We discussed
this particular point of Arab concern—that
an interim agreement not be the final agree-
ment. I was authorized at that time by the
Government of Israel to communicate the
following to President Sadat: "First, that
Israel would be willing to withdraw in the
context of any interim agreement to what-
ever line is agreed to and that that line
would not be the final line. And secondly, I
was also authorized to communicate to Presi-
dent Sadat that Israel would be willing to
withdraw in the context of an overall peace
agreement to such other line that might be
agreed to in the context of those negotiations.
This is not news, because the Foreign Minis-
ter of Israel indicated what I just said in
these terms in his speech before the General
Assembly a year ago. But these two points,
in addition to the emphasis on the temporary
nature of any interim Suez Canal agreement,
are intended, I believe, to try to reassure
Egypt that an interim agreement, in fact,
would be considered by Israel as a partial
step—a partial step which would open the
resources of the Suez Canal to Egypt, since
Israel has never questioned the sovereignty
of Egypt over the Suez Canal; a step that
would mean an extended cease-fire, would
mean that the combatants in the area would
be separated, would offer new opportunities
for further efforts to achieve overall settle-
ment. In short, it would be an agreement in
the mutual interest of both sides because it
would be a practical and realistic test of
peace on the ground. It would give a prac-
tical meaning to signed pieces of paper.

Let me leave you with one concluding
thought. The "no war, no peace" situation
in the area gives continuing opportunity to
our adversary for penetration in the area,
regardless of the recent developments that
have occurred in Egypt. There is no satis-
factory alternative to the unstable "no war,
no peace" situation other than a stable peace

agreement. The key is negotiations. Unfortunately, the concept of negotiations does not have the same meaning in the Arab world as it does in the Western world. Negotiations are the key because the day is long gone when the Middle East can claim to be unique in this regard. There have been three wars in the last two decades in the Middle East. If North Korea can talk to South Korea and the East Germans can talk to the West Germans, if the Indians can talk to the Pakistanis in the aftermath of a war, just a few months after a war, if we can talk to Peking when there has been no dialogue for 20 years, if we can talk to the Viet Cong every day in Paris —then the force of the argument that the Middle East must remain a unique exception in this regard is weak and unrealistic. I do not mean that such negotiations need start face-to-face at the outset. But there is need for a negotiating process to begin; proximity talks on an interim Suez Canal agreement are still the most feasible approach. So I hope as we look ahead that opportunities in time will develop. I believe the minimal conditions exist in the area for such opportunities to evolve in time. We remain available to play a role in promoting an interim Suez Canal agreement. I hope I can get together again with this audience, a year, two, three years from now, and find in existence not only a cease-fire but a peace meeting the legitimate concerns of both sides. I am convinced this is a do-able proposition.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

Annual Report on Agricultural Export Activities
Carried Out Under Public Law 480 During Calendar Year 1971. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 92-318. June 29, 1972. 140 pp.

The Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomacy Enters the Nuclear Age. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Leneice N. Wu, Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. August 1972. 67 pp.

September 25, 1972

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1949, AND OVER THE YEARS MANY AMERICANS, BOTH IN OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, HAVE DERIVED MUCH SATISFACTION FROM THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THE DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS OF THE PEOPLE OF BANGLADESH. WE ARE PLEASED WITH THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN OUR COUNTRY AND BANGLADESH.

BANGLADESH HAS EMERGED FROM THE TRAGIC EVENTS OF LAST YEAR WITH ITS ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DISRUPTED AND DAMAGED. A MASSIVE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES WAS MOUNTED TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH IN PLEASURE IN THE FACT THAT, TO DATE, THE UNITED STATES HAD COMMITTED $286.4 MILLION TO THIS EFFORT.

MR. PRESIDENT, WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT PROGRESS WILL CONTINUE TOWARD THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NATIONS OF THE SUBCONTINENT. SUCH PROGRESS WE BELIEVE CAN BEST BE ADVANCED BY FULL AND SPEEDY IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION 307 ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST DECEMBER. IN PARTICULAR WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION REGARDING PRISONERS OF WAR SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

MR. PRESIDENT, IF I MAY COMMENT BRIEFLY ON THE VOTE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY THE DELEGATION OF SOMALIA. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE REALIZE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT IN VOTING FOR THIS AMENDMENT WHICH WAS NOT CARRIED, THE EFFECT OF THIS LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE BEEN DEBATABLE GIVEN THE RULING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER. BUT WE REGARDED THE RESOLUTION AS A RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL FOR ADMISSION OF BANGLADESH NONETHELESS. WE VOTED FOR THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT BECAUSE OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

THE PEOPLE OF THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT HAVE RICH AND ANCIENT CULTURES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED MUCH TO THE KNOWLEDGE AND ENRICHMENT OF MANKIND EVERYWHERE. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE SAME PEOPLESHAVE IN RECENT TIMES BEEN THE VICTIMS OF GREAT SUFFERING AND SORROW. IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS AMELIORATION OF THESE CONDITIONS CAN BE ADVANCED. FOR OUR PART WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION TO THIS END. UNQUOTE.

PHILLIPS

UNCLASSIFIED

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INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS USUN 2992

CORRECTED COPY PARA 5 FOLLOW LINE 6

SUBJ: STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER H. PHILLIPS,
DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON BANGLADESH.

FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT OF AMB. PHILLIPS

QTE

MR. PRESIDENT

MY DELEGATION REGRETS THAT THIS COUNCIL HAS BEEN UNABLE TO
AGREE ON A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE ADMISSION OF BANGLADESH TO THE
UNITED NATIONS. WE ALSO REGRET THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO AGREE
ON A FURTHER BUT LIMITED POSTPONEMENT WHICH MIGHT HAVE MADE
POSSIBLE A RESOLUTION OF THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE CON-
TRIBUTED TO THE IMPASSE WE FACE.

AS THE RECORD MAKES CLEAR, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED TO
SEE THE ENTRY INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
BANGLADESH. THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED BANGLADESH ON APRIL 4, 1972
AND ESTABLISHED FORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ON MAY 18TH. PREVIOUSLY
THE UNITED STATES HAD MAINTAINED AN OFFICIAL MISSION IN DACCA SINCE

UNCLASSIFIED

regarding Cuba, in which perhaps a quarter of
a million Cubans came to the United States?

A. Now look, I'm just sorting out your question. [Laughter.]

Insofar as the question of Soviet Jews, or
Jews in the Soviet Union, is concerned, we have
expressed our views to the Soviet Union on that
subject on occasions in the past.

I don't think that the question of the Berlin
agreement directly relates to the other question.

We would hope that there is more freedom of
emigration from the Soviet Union.

Now, as far as Cuba is concerned—what's the
question about Cuba again?

Q. I was wondering whether the understanding that we have with the Government of Cuba, with which we have no diplomatic relations, can be a model for an understanding with the Soviet Government.

A. I don't—I'm sorry, I honestly don't understand that question.

I don't think there is any relationship between the two. We have good relations with the Soviet Union. We don't have any relations with Cuba.

We regret very much that Cuba has taken
this action in stopping the refugees who want
to come to this country, and we have expressed
our attitude on it. Hopefully, we would hope
that Cuba might change its attitude on it.

Interim Settlement in the Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, I was wondering if you would give us an assessment of your views on the Middle East situation. Do you regard it as a completely deadlocked condition, especially as far as the interim settlement is concerned?

A. No, I don't at all. I think the interim settlement is still a matter that both sides have expressed an interest in. Both sides—when I say both sides, I am now speaking about Israel and Egypt—both sides have asked us to continue our efforts to bring about an interim settlement. We find that in certain respects there are parallel attitudes. And we are going to undertake a very active program of discussions between now and the first of the year to see if we can play a

useful role in bringing about an interim settlement. It hasn't been achieved yet, but we have no reason to be discouraged. In fact, we are quite encouraged by the fact that the cease-fire is still in effect. And the language that is used by the parties, although still sometimes a little strong, is much better than it was a year ago. In other words, the rhetoric has improved, and we are in contact with both Israel and Egypt on a fairly active basis. And I might say that I intend to speak further with Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.] in New York when he comes to the General Assembly about this subject.

President Nixon's Visit to Peking

Q. Almost everything that the American public knows about the President's trip to Communist China has been learned through interviews that the Chinese Premier has had with visiting newspapermen, journalists, and so on. Do you think that the administration's reticence on this trip, as important as it is, fulfills the requirements for a free and open society knowing what the objectives and aims of the President are on such an important matter?

A. Well, I think that we want—we in the
Government—want to make sure that the pub-
lic has the necessary amount of information
about the trip before the trip occurs. We have
read with interest, of course, the interviews with
the Premier of the People's Republic of China,
and to a large extent it is a restatement of previ-
ously stated positions. Now, I suppose we could
restate our positions on a daily basis. I am not
sure that that would be helpful. We have said
that we are not going to renege on any of our
commitments, we are going to be constant in our
efforts to carry out our treaty obligations. We
say that, as the President said and I restated a
few days ago, that we are not going to take this
trip and make any agreements at the expense of
our friends. We seek to have an improvement of
relations with the People's Republic of China.

The President feels, and has felt for a long
time, that it was a sensible position. They
represent one-quarter of the people in the

September 27, 1971

329

cannot have an investigation conducted in connection with any activities that it's been involved in, because it might reawaken these fears."

So in answer to your question, no, it's not an investigation of the State Department, I emphasize. This was an investigation—there were a couple of others, but they were all investigations of things that we thought could be violations of the law.

Secondly, we're going to make certain that people are not intimidated, that they have the same access to you and you to them that we've had in the past.

We take pride in the fact that, I think, this Department has a better record of making information available to the public about foreign affairs than any other foreign ministry in the world.

Now, when that happens, when you have that kind of availability of people in Government, then those people have to exercise considerable discretion to be sure that the law is not violated and to be sure that they don't do something or say something that causes us to have difficulty with other governments. And I don't believe this is going to be a problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it's still not clear to me why an outside agency, when you have your own security forces, has to be involved in this. Everything you've said—

A. Well, let me say this. In this case, when the story broke, there were investigations by other departments, by their own agencies; and our own agency investigated it. And then it was felt that there was a possibility of violation of law, and the FBI investigated it. That's what always happens.

In other words, that's not unusual. When there's a violation of law, the FBI is the investigative arm that investigates it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Thieu and you yourself both referred to the October 3 elections in Viet-Nam as a "referendum." Is it the opinion of this Government that such an election is in accordance with the South Vietnamese Constitution—that is to say, a referendum?

A. Well, I can't answer that question. I think

that's a question that will have to be directed to the South Vietnamese.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Canadian Government protested again yesterday against the forthcoming nuclear tests at Amchitka, calling it a "travesty of justice" and "Big Power bullying." Is there any response to this? Do you have any response to this protest? Do you think the test will go ahead?

A. Well, we haven't made a response to it. I'd rather not answer that. We just got it yesterday.

Q. There's a report from the Middle East today that the Israelis are going to pull back from whatever agreement they have made to the interim solution on the Suez unless they receive more warplanes from the United States to bolster their self-defense position. First of all, have we had any indication like that; and, second, what would your response be to such an answer?

A. Well, to answer your first question, we have not had any such communication from the Israeli Government. And, two, it would be an idle threat, because what they've done so far is not viable as far as an agreement is concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to the best of your knowledge, what happened to Donald Leahy and what now will occur with Mr. Erdos?

A. Well, we don't know. We've had problems of communication with Equatorial Guinea. I believe that Mr. Erdos and his family are on their way back to the United States now, and we'll have a better idea of what happened after that. As you know, there's some indication of mental instability; and I think, for that reason, I would prefer not to get involved in the details.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since there is a one-man presidential race in South Viet-Nam—which appears to be a contradiction of the American objective of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people—after the American disengagement, why should the United States continue providing large amounts of economic and military aid for South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, let's wait and see what happens in

September 27, 1971

331

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 5, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Francisco, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMAL REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
GOLDEN GATE PIER
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Gentlemen, I had the opportunity this morning before I left San Clemente to call Prime Minister Meir on the phone. I reached her just before we left. I talked with her for some eight minutes.

I expressed sympathy on behalf of all the American people for the victims of this murderous action in Munich. I also told her that she could expect total cooperation from the Government of the United States in any way that would be helpful in obtaining the release of the hostages being held there in Munich.

In addition to that, I raised with her the problem of what we could do in the future in this respect. I asked her whether or not Israeli intelligence had any information with regard to the possibility of this happening. They did not have any information.

Incidentally, Israeli intelligence, we have found, is among the best in the world. She said the reason was that while the Olympic Games were being held there in Munich, there just weren't any expectations that this kind of a group would be able to get in and engage in the kind of activity that they have engaged in. However, we are dealing here with international outlaws of the worst sort who will stoop to anything in order to accomplish their goals, and who are totally unpredictable.

Under the circumstances, I said to the Prime Minister, looking to the future, that we had to anticipate that Israeli citizens traveling abroad would be subject to such activities in the future. Naturally, we cannot do anything with regard to what happens in other countries, that is their responsibility primarily, except we can indicate our interest. But I said in the United States that we would try to do everything we could with regard to groups of Israeli citizens traveling in the United States to see that where there is any information at all with regard to a possible attempt of this sort, that adequate security measures are taken.

Finally, as you know, the games have been postponed until the hostages are released and the people who are guilty are apprehended, or those charged with guilt. There is very little words can say to indicate the concern we have for the families of the victims. But to have this happen in an international meeting with an unblemished record -- this being the 20th Olympics going back over 80 years -- an unblemished record of no incidents of this sort, this is indeed a great tragedy and I know the whole world shares the views that I expressed to Mrs. Meir.

MORE

QUESTION: Are you satisfied about the security of American athletes, particularly American Jewish athletes at the Olympic Games?

THE PRESIDENT: I am never satisfied with security when you see incidents like this, but I believe that we have adequate security measures, and, as I have indicated, or at least implied in my remarks here, since we are dealing with international outlaws who are unpredictable, we have to take extra security measures, extra security measures to protect those who might be the targets of this kind of activity in the future. That might include Americans of Israeli background, American citizens. It is more likely to be directed, however, against Israeli citizens, because what they want to do is get leverage with the Israeli Government with regard to people held by the Israeli Government. However, we are not taking any chances in doing everything we can to protect our own citizens.

END

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USMISSION USUN NY
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UNCLAS STATE 161467

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING IS PARTIAL
EXCERPT FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING
SEPTEMBER 5, 1972

QUOTE: MR. BRAY: YOU HAVE COPIES OF A STATEMENT BY SEC-
TARY ROGERS WHICH I MIGHT JUST READ INTO THE RECORD FOR THE
SAKE OF COMPLETENESS:

"I HAVE ASKED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO CONVEY TO THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OUR PROFOUND SORROW AND SENSE OF HORROR AT THE CALLOUS, OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK THIS MORNING ON THE ISRAELI ATHLETES IN THEIR QUARTERS IN OLYMPIC VILLAGE IN MUNICH."

"WE EXTEND OUR DEEPEST CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE ISRAELIS WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN THIS INCIDENT. WITH ALL NATIONS AND PEOPLE'S AROUND THE WORLD, WE FEVERENTLY HOPE THAT NO FURTHER INNOCENT LIVES WILL BE SACRIFICED. THIS ASSAULT ON THE ISRAELI OLYMPIC TEAM IS OFFENSIVE TO MEN AND WOMEN OF GOOD WILL EVERYWHERE FOR WHOM THE OLYMPIC GAMES ARE A SYMBOL OF MAN'S STRIVING FOR RECONCILIATION AND PEACE."

WOULD BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q. CHARLES, HAS THE STATE DEPARTMENT BEEN ASKED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO INTERCEDE IN THIS AFFAIR -- AND IF SO, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT IT?

A. WHEN THE SECRETARY TALKED TO AMBASSADOR RABIN IN MID-
MORNING, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED THAT THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MAKE SUCH EFFORTS AS WERE AVAILABLE TO IT, TO
EFFECT PRIME MINISTER MEIR'S REQUEST THAT THE GAMES BE
SUSPENDED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND OTHER OFFICIALS OF THIS DEPART-
MENT WITH CONTACTS IN THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE WERE
ATTEMPTING TO CONVEY THIS SUGGESTION TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE

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AMEMBASSY RABAT
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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ON THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE IN MUNICH WHEN WORD
CAME THAT THE COMMITTEE HAD SUSPENDED THE GAMES FOR 24
HOURS.

NOW BEYOND THAT, WE HAVE NOTED THAT CHANCELLOR BRANDT'S
APPEAL TO VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD TO USE
SUCH INFLUENCE AS THEY MAY HAVE TO SEEK THE RELEASE OF THE
ISRAELI ATHLETES.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTS THE
CHANCELLOR'S APPEAL. WE ARE CURRENTLY EXAMINING WITHIN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHETHER THERE ARE ANY INITIATIVES
WE CAN USEFULLY AND PROPERLY TAKE, MORE DIRECTLY, OURSELVES;
BUT I HAVE NO CONCLUSIONS TO OFFER YOU AT THIS TIME.

Q. WHAT DOES THIS INVOLVE -- WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THIS
CHARLES, WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT?

A. WELL, THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE, VERY DIRECTLY THIS
MORNING.

Q. DID HE TALK TO AMBASSADOR RABIN?

A. YES, HE CALLED AMBASSADOR RABIN WHO, I THINK, WAS ON
THE WEST COAST.

Q. WELL IS THAT TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO UNILATERAL
ACTION OF ANY KIND YET TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES?

A. NOT AS OF THE TIME I CAME OUT THIS MORNING.

Q. WOULD THESE INITIATIVES THAT YOU JUST SPOKE ABOUT, WOULD
THEY BE RELATED DIRECTLY TO THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN THE
SECURING OF RELEASE OF THE REMAINING ISRAELIS, OR WOULD
THIS BE IN OTHER AREAS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

A. WELL, THE URGENT SITUATION THAT IS BEFORE US AT THE
MOMENT, OBVIOUSLY IS THAT WHICH WE FIND IN THE OLYMPIC
VILLAGE RIGHT NOW, AND IT IS TO THAT, THAT OUR ATTENTION
IS MOST IMMEDIATELY DIRECTED.

BEYOND THAT, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO

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DEFINE THE KINDS OF INITIATIVES THAT WE MIGHT EVENTUALLY DISCOVER WERE IN OUR POWER TO TAKE, AT THIS MOMENT.

PERHAPS LATER IN THE AFTERNOON I WOULD HAVE MORE TO REPORT TO YOU.

THIS IS NOT THE FIRST INCIDENT IN WHICH THIS GROUP WHICH CALLS ITSELF THE "BLACK SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT" HAS BEEN INVOLVED. IT TOOK CREDIT AS YOU MAY RECALL, FOR THE ASSASSINATION OF WASFI TELL, THE JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN CAIRO, LAST NOVEMBER; AND FOR A SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO LONDON; AND MOST RECENTLY I THINK THE DEMOLITION, OR ATTEMPTED DEMOLITION OF SOME OIL TANKS IN TRIESTE.

IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN TOLERATE THIS DEEPLY NIHILISTIC AND TERRORISTIC CANCER IN ITS BODY, AND IT IS INCUMBENT ON THOSE WHO HAVE A STAKE, AS WE ALL DO, IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, THAT ACTIONS OF THIS KIND BE REPUDIATED WITH SUCH SUPPORT AS GROUPS OF THIS KIND MAY RECEIVE FROM WHATEVER SOURCE BE DRIED UP -- AND THAT THEY COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE WHAT THEY ARE AND ARE SEEN AS WHAT THEY ARE -- OUTLAWS, BRIGANDS, MURDERERS -- AND AN INTOLERABLE AFFRONT TO HUMAN SOCIETY.

Q. CHARLES, YOU SAID THAT YOU WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT THE CHANCELLOR'S APPEAL. WOULDN'T IT THEN BE LOGICAL THAT YOU FOLLOWED SUIT AND TURNED TO THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS THROUGH YOUR DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND DO THE SAME THAT BRANDT DID?

A. WELL, OBVIOUSLY THE FIRST STEP IN THAT PROCESS -- IF THERE IS TO BE A SECOND STEP -- I HAVE ALREADY TAKEN BY ENDORSING THE CHANCELLOR'S APPEAL HERE PUBLICLY. I WOULD FEEL A BIT MORE COMFORTABLE IN DEFINING FOR YOU FURTHER INITIATIVES ONCE WE HAVE GOT THEM DECIDED AND IN HAND AND IN TRAIN IF YOU WILL BEAR WITH ME.

Q. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT SEEMS, IF I UNDERSTAND IT CORRECTLY, TO FEEL THAT THE GAMES OUGHT TO BE SUSPENDED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THIS IS RESOLVED -- NOT ONLY FOR TWENTY.

FOUR HOURS. DO WE CONCUR IN THIS JUDGMENT OR IN THIS VIEW-POINT?

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A. YES, I THINK THAT IS FAIR. I WOULD HAZARD THE GUESS THAT THE OLYMPIC COMMITTEE SUSPENDED THE GAMES FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS IN THE HOPE THAT THIS TRAGIC MATTER WOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARED UP WITHIN THAT TIME PERIOD. BUT, YES, WE WOULD SUPPORT THE ISRAELI POSITION.

Q. FOR INDEFINITE SUSPENSION, IF THAT IS THE SITUATION.

A. WELL, LET'S DON'T CALL IT AN INDEFINITE SUSPENSION. LET'S CALL IT A SUSPENSION UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THIS MATTER IS IN HAND.

Q. CHARLIE, YOU TALK ABOUT POSSIBLE FURTHER INITIATIVES. BUT THERE IS SOME FEELING THAT THIS CANNOT GO ON FOR VERY LONG. HOW MUCH TIME DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE TO MAKE A MOVE WITH ITS NEW INITIATIVE?

A. VERY LITTLE.

Q. IS THERE ANY COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO STAYING ANY POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS?

A. NONE THAT I KNOW OF. I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT QUESTION HAS EVEN BEEN BROACHED, IN ISRAEL, IN THE COURSE OF THE CABINET COMMITTEE MEETING THIS MORNING. IT IS VERY HARD TO KNOW WHERE TO TURN WHEN YOU DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU.

Q. CHARLIE, ANY CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL?

A. NONE THAT I KNOW OF, NO. END QUOTE. ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

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#1545

MR. ZIEGLER: I would say there are many matters of
immediate and long-term interest that we are interested in
talking to the Soviet Union about, but this visit is a result
of previous discussions; in other words, it is not a meeting
that has come about just within the last week or so. It is
something that was discussed in the Soviet Union; that further
ongoing consultations would take place.

Q Was the holding of the meeting at this time
prompted by any recent developments?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would say that the holding of the
meeting at this time is based upon the fact that this was a date
that was convenient for both sides to continue the ongoing
consultations.

Q The opposition has been charging, and probably
will again, that these are timed for political reasons. What do
you say on that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would say in response to that that the
matters that are being dealt with in meetings such as this,
and I don't have to recap the subjects of interest between
the United States and the Soviet Union, are too important to
relate them to the election period or to domestic politics.
We are dealing, as was the case in the summit and is the case
in the ongoing consultations, with matters of utmost importance
to this country in terms of the conduct of our foreign affairs
and in terms of discussions that relate to easing of world
tensions, and hopefully moving toward a more peaceful world.

That is what this is about, what the previous con-
sultations were about, and what the consultations we are con-
tinuing with are about, so I would reject that charge.

I think most of you are aware, some of you may not be --
I am not announcing this; it was off the record, but it did
come up in the other session, so let me read from an AP wire lead
so you are aware of what I am going to refer to, because I was
asked about it in the other session.

"AP - Arab terrorists armed with submachine guns broke
into the Olympic Village today, killing two Israelis and
held 13 more Israelis hostage in their living quarters."

This relates to the athletes participating in the
Olympic Games. I was asked whether or not the President was
following that, and if we had a response to that particular
development in this situation.

I made the point that the President has been up
early this morning following the situation, and had received
direct reports on it from Dr. Kissinger and other members of
his staff. I talked to the President just before the session
earlier, and the President expressed a sense of deep outrage.
We deplore this development, and as the President said to me,
he does not see how the games can continue until this is re-
solved.

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#1545

So in relation to this particular development, the
President has been following it, and expressed a sense of deep
outrage, and made the point that he does not see how the
games can continue until this is resolved.

Q This isn't off the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: The only point off the record was my
reference to reading the wires. I wanted to call it to your
attention. The President's feeling about this is on the record.

Q I don't know if it makes any difference, but I have
just been told they suspended the games for 24 hours.

MR. ZIEGLER: The President's point was that he did not
see how the games could continue until this is resolved.

OFF THE RECORD again, apparently from what I gather,
they have 13 of the Israeli athletes held hostage and are
threatening to kill them on a periodic basis until there is
release of some of the people held by the Israelis. This
is OFF THE RECORD because they are the only details I have
at this time. My response is on the record.

Q It is probably a moot question, because it
might not happen, but is the President in effect saying
he would ask the American athletes not to participate
should they decide to go ahead with the games?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think Jack's statement there moots
that, and the other point is, we have to see how things develop.
I am saying that the President's observation is he didn't see
how the games could continue until this is resolved.

Q One UPI story said Mark Spitz is under guard
because he is Jewish. Is there a guard around the American
team now?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, Mark Spitz, as you know, is
Jewish. We are confident that the West German government is
taking the appropriate security measures, and we will be in
touch with them on this matter of security relating to not
only one individual, but to the whole situation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

(AT 8:07 A.M. PDT.)

#1545

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[L.C.]

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Public Statements
* Israel

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1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER MEIR:

2. "DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER: THE HEART OF AMERICA GOES OUT TO YOU, TO THE BEREAVED FAMILIES AND TO THE ISRAELI PEOPLE IN THE TRAGEDY THAT HAS STRUCK YOUR OLYMPIC ATHLETES. THIS TRAGIC AND SENSELESS ACT IS A PERVISION OF ALL THE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS OF MANKIND WHICH THE OLYMPIC GAMES SYMBOLIZE. IN A LARGER SENSE, IT IS A TRAGEDY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE'S AND NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE MOURN WITH YOU THE DEATHS OF YOUR INNOCENT AND BRAVE ATHLETES, AND WE SHARE WITH YOU THE DETERMINATION THAT THE SPIRIT OF BROTHERHOOD AND PEACE THEY REPRESENTED SHALL IN THE END PERSEVERE. SINCERELY, RICHARD NIXON."

3. WHITE HOUSE PLANS TO RELEASE FOREGOING WEDNESDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 6. ROGERS

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1546

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:03 A.M. EDT

WEDNESDAY

SEPTEMBER 6, 1972

MR. ZIEGLER: As I mentioned to several of you a little earlier, the President met this morning with Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers for about an hour and 15 minutes. They talked about the situation in Munich.

As we mentioned to the members of the press who were with us in San Clemente yesterday and then traveled back to Washington by way of San Francisco, the President followed the developments in Munich throughout the day yesterday. He talked to Prime Minister Golda Meir ✓ before leaving San Clemente.

Then, after returning to Washington, he consulted on the situation with Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger, after receiving the word of the tragic outcome of the situation.

Last night, shortly after eleven o'clock, President Nixon called Ambassador Rabin to express sympathy and concern regarding the tragic outcome of the situation in Munich relating to the Israeli Olympic athletes.

Also I should tell you, as I told a few others earlier, the State Department has had a task force in operation since early yesterday and throughout last night to be in consultation with Bonn and Tel Aviv to receive up-to-date information regarding the situation as it developed.

This morning's meeting with Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger was held primarily to review the circumstances and to discuss measures to be taken in connection with the tragedy. During the meeting and as a result of the meeting, the President asked Secretary Rogers to meet today with Ambassador Rabin to consult on the matter with him further and also asked that the Secretary of State consult with other governments on an urgent basis to determine what collective measures by the international community can be brought to bear on the problem of terrorism.

Also, following the meeting this morning with Secretary Rogers, a telegram was sent to the Prime Minister of Israel from the President. We have given you the text of that telegram.

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#1546

Further, during the meeting today, the President was brought up to date on specific steps taken involving increased security that appropriately should be taken at this time, increased security of Israeli citizens in the United States and also other appropriate security measures that should be taken as a result of this tragedy.

The President referred to this, as you recall, yesterday in his remarks in San Francisco. So that is what that particular comment relates to.

The President today, following the meeting with Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger, is meeting with other members of his staff, John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman and others, and will be spending the day in the office tending to staff matters and other administrative activities.

Tomorrow's schedule: At 8:00, the President will have a meeting with the Republican Leadership.

Tomorrow afternoon at 3:00, the President will receive diplomatic credentials from Ambassadors who have been designated to represent their countries in the United States, four Ambassadors. We will post the Ambassadors from whom the President will receive diplomatic credentials tomorrow.

You will receive a package of material in a moment that contains information on several announcements that we are making this morning. The President today is asking the Congress to consider a fiscal year 1973 budget amendment for the Department of HEW. This particular amendment does not involve any increase in budget outlays. It involves a transfer within the Cuban Refugee Program in HEW. The sum involved is $161 million. It would be transferred from the refugee assistance act to an account for transporting refugees from Cuba to the United States. That will be spelled out in detail in the material.

The President has accepted with deep regret the resignation of Robert Cahn and Gordon MacDonald as members of the Council on Environmental Quality. We will provide you information on that in the material that we will give you. Both Robert Cahn and Gordon MacDonald expressed earlier on that they intended to return to private life. This is a part of their long standing intentions, as the material we will give you will point out. Their letters of resignation were very warm and indicated, of course, no other reason than the fact that they had for some time intended to return to private life.

We do not have at this point the people who will replace Mr. Cahn and Mr. MacDonald on the Council on Environmental Quality, but we expect to have announcements on that very soon.

Those are all the announcements that we have here today. As I said, that material will be up to you very shortly. We will post here at 3:00 this afternoon.

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Q Is the President concerned about the safety of Jews in the United States, people of Jewish faith in the United States?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the President's remarks yesterday in San Francisco -- and we have copies available -- reflect the thrust of my remarks. I would just refer you to those.

Q Do you have any idea how many Israeli citizens there are in the United States? You know why I am asking. You said he was going to see that security was given them.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is why I referred you to the remarks yesterday. Obviously I am not prepared to get into the specifics of the security measures I am referring to. The President pointed out yesterday that additional cautions would be taken to determine where a possible threat might exist and take appropriate actions, security steps to prevent that if indications were that an incident would occur. That is the perspective you should put it into. It is carefully defined in the President's remarks of yesterday.

Q What happened to the Shultz meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President may meet with Secretary Shultz today, but that has not been determined at this point.

Q Is the President going to ask for an extra appropriation for extra security forces as a result of this added protection?

MR. ZIEGLER: Based on the information I have at this time, I don't think there will be a need for additional appropriations. I think funds available are adequate to cover any additional steps that will be taken.

Q Do you have a departure time for Dr. Kissinger?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. We will have that for you later in the week.

Q If the White House is not any more specific than you apparently intend to be as to who is going to be afforded protection in the United States, isn't that just a little unfair, let's say, to an Israeli touring group who might think they are being protected and then perhaps they are not? What is the criteria for protection?

MR. ZIEGLER: Jim, we run into a situation here when we are dealing with matters such as this when it is inappropriate to be more specific than I am. The President clearly defined his intent in his remarks yesterday. I would refer you to them.

A good portion of this relates to information and effectively pursuing information that would indicate possible activities such as we are talking about. But I cannot go beyond that.

Q Ron, you speak of protection for Israeli citizens. What about the possibility of retaliation? What about protection for Arab groups?

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MR. ZIEGLER: I have made the point that appropriate
steps are being taken in relation to this incident.

Q What is he seeing Shultz about?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know that he will see Secretary
Shultz today, but if he does it would be on fiscal and monetary
matters.

Q Why is it so up in the air?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, it is not a matter of being up
in the air. It is something that was not final on the President's
schedule. We will let you know if it does firm up.

Q Is the meeting with the Congressional leaders
a breakfast meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. It is a regular meeting in the
Cabinet Room.

Q Is the President going to the Israeli Embassy
today?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Is the game plan still to do occasional weekend
campaigning and stay in Washington during the week? And do you
have any weekend plans to announce?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there is nothing to announce on the
President's schedule beyond what I gave you. He will be in
Washington this week and next. The Congress is here and the
President will be here.

Q Will the President be in Washington this
weekend?

MR. ZIEGLER: He will be in the Washington area.

Q You are saying that he is not going to campaign
for the rest of this week and next week?

MR. ZIEGLER: He has no scheduled plans to make any
appearance outside of the White House.

Q Will the President have a special representative
at the memorial services tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, we will have representation there.
The plans have not been finalized yet. We will have to let you
know. There will be an appropriate representative from the
Embassy there.

Q Regarding an earlier answer of yours, will there
be any campaign appearances in the White House this week? (Laughter)

MR. ZIEGLER: No. The President will be attending to
business here, Don.

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Q Mr. Ziegler, in reviewing the circumstances of what happened in Munich, did the President and Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Rogers discuss any possible political repercussions of what happened? You recall that Chancellor Willy Brandt rather sharply criticized the lack of cooperation on the side of the Arabic states. There are feelings in Germany that this could at least have a negative impact on the normalization of relations between West Germany and the Arabs.

MR. ZIEGLER: I would not have a comment on that question.

END

(AT 11:23 A.M. EDT)

#1546

Department of State

Public Statement

TELEGRAM

9/6

UNCLASSIFIED 571

PAGE 01 STATE 163154

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

UNCLAS STATE 163154

INFORM CONSULS

1. FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS TO THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 6, 1972.

"MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I THANK YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF THIS CONFERENCE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY.

I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE WITH ME THE DEEP SENSE OF OUTRAGE AND GRIEF AT THE SENSELESS AND TRAGIC EVENTS WHICH HAVE SO MARRED THE OLYMPIC GAMES. THESE MURDERS BY EXTREMIST TERRORISTS ARE MORE THAN CRIMES AGAINST THE CITIZENS OF ONE COUNTRY. THE VERY SPIRIT WHICH THE OLYMPIC GAMES REPRESENT -- THE SPIRIT OF BROTHERHOOD AND OF FRIENDLY COMPETITION -- AMONG PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD. HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED BY THIS DEMENTED ACTION.

IN THIS TIME OF SORROW ALL MEN OF GOOD WILL MUST ASK

UNCLASSIFIED

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TELEGRAM

[lc]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 163154

WHAT CAN WE DO TO HELP ENSURE THAT SUCH CRIMES DO NOT CONTINUE? FOR SUCH CRIMES CERTAINLY THREATEN HOPES FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD. AT THIS CONFERENCE WE NEED TO REMEMBER THAT THE MUNICH ATTACKERS SOUGHT TO COMMANDeer, TO HIJACK, IF YOU WILL, AN AIRCRAFT TO MAKE THEIR ESCAPE. WE NEED TO REMEMBER THAT THREATS AND ACTS AGAINST INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL ARE ONE ASPECT -- BUT A VERY IMPORTANT ASPECT -- OF THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT THREATENS THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST TAKE FIRM AND PROMPT ACTION TO EFFECTIVELY PREVENT AIR PIRACY. IF WE CAN DO THIS WE WILL HAVE DENIED TO TERRORISTS AND WOULD-BE TERRORISTS ONE OF THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPONS AND WILL HAVE TAKEN A MAJOR STEP TO SUBDUING INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS AND TERRORISM.

WE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE ACTING IN THESE AREAS. THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST INFORMED ME THAT HE IS TODAY FORWARDING THE MONTREAL SABOTAGE CONVENTION TO THE SENATE WITH AN URGENT REQUEST THAT IT BE APPROVED FOR RATIFICATION. IN ADDITION, I AM URGENTLY APPEALING TO CONGRESS TO ACT PROMPTLY ON PENDING LEGISLATION TO STRENGTHEN OUR LAWS AGAINST HIJACKING EVEN FURTHER AND TO PROVIDE SEVERE PENALITIES FOR CRIMES AGAINST DIPLOMATS. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT, IF GOVERNMENTS FAIL TO ACT, THEN BY DEFAULT WE WILL ENCOURAGE THE VERY CRIMES THAT WE HAVE ASSEMBLED HERE TO PREVENT.

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRAVEL IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE WHICH IS INCREASINGLY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE. ONLY STRONG AND CONCERTED ACTION BY THE STATES OF THE WORLD WILL GUARANTEE THE CONTINUED SAFETY OF AIR TRAVELLERS. I URGE YOU TO BEAR THIS IN MIND IN YOUR DELIBERATIONS.

IT IS IMPERATIVE, I BELIEVE, THAT THIS CONFERENCE DRAFT A CONVENTION WHICH WILL PUT A STOP TO AIR PIRACY AND TERRORISM.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I THANK YOU, VERY MUCH, FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY, BRIEF OPPORTUNITY, TO APPEAR HERE TODAY TO EXPRESS THE VIEWS OF MY GOVERNMENT, THE HOPES OF MY GOVERNMENT, THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO STOP THESE ACTS OF PIRACY AND TERRORISM.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 163154

CERTAINLY, IN A WORLD THAT IS ADVANCED SO FAR IN SO MANY
OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY,
IT SEEMS ALMOST BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION THAT ACTION CAN'T BE
TAKEN TO STOP THESE ACTS AND I KNOW THAT YOU ARE LABORING HERE
TO ACHIEVE A RESULT WHICH WE ALL WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ACHIEVED.
BUT I AM FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE TO TAKE DECISIVE ACTION,
SEVERE ACTION IF YOU WILL, TO MAKE IT CLEAR THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
THAT CRIMINAL ACTS, CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST INNOCENT
PEOPLE CERTAINLY IS NOT AN ACCEPTABLE METHOD OF SOLVING
ANY OF THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS AND CERTAINLY IN THE FIELD
OF AIR TRAVEL WHERE ALL PERSONS IN THE WORLD ARE INVOLVED
WE MUST MAKE A START.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO
TAKE THE MOST FIRM, SEVERE ACTION THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY IS PREPARED TO JOIN IN. WE THINK IT'S ESSENTIAL NOW
TO ACT AND WE THINK THAT THESE TRAGIC EVENTS THAT OCCURRED IN
MUNICH UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY FOR ACTION NOW.

SO, I THANK YOU, VERY MUCH, FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY AND
I WISH YOU VERY WELL IN YOUR DELIBERATIONS.

THANK YOU."

2. TEXT ALSO BEING CARRIED ON USIS WIRELESS FILE

SEPTEMBER 7. ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 162451

AMCONSUL MUNICH

UNCLAS STATE 162451

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING IS PARTIAL
EXCERPT FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING
SEPTEMBER 6, 1972:

QUOTE: MR. BRAY: AS YOU KNOW, THE SECRETARY MET WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR SOME 75 MINUTES THIS MORNING, TO REVIEW YESTERDAY'S TRAGIC EVENTS, AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF CHARTING A COURSE WHICH WE HOPE CAN LEAD TO EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION AND EVENTUALLY, ACTION, WITH RESPECT TO THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

AND I SUPPOSE THE FIRST PUBLIC STEP IN THAT PROCESS WAS HIS
INTERVENTION AT THE ICAO MEETING THIS NOON.

HE WAS IN TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR RABIN THIS
MORNING WITH RESPECT BOTH TO YESTERDAY'S TRAGIC EVENTS AND
THIS PHASE OF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIONS INTO WHICH WE HOPE
TO MOVE; AND WILL BE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR RABIN IN HIS
OFFICE AT 5:00 P.M. THIS AFTERNOON.

OVERNIGHT, THAT IS, BEGINNING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND THEN
MORE INTENSIVELY, IN COOPERATION WITH A NUMBER OF AGENCIES,
WE ACTED TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO
A NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS. THE EXECUTIVE
PROTECTIVE SERVICE HAS STRENGTHENED ITS SECURITY PROCEDURES
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISRAELI, GERMAN, AND A NUMBER OF ARAB
MISSIONS IN WASHINGTON.

AMBASSADOR BUSH SOUGHT, AND HAS RECEIVED, THE WHOLEHEARTED
COOPERATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICY DEPARTMENT, FOR
WHICH WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL, AND THROUGH OUR OWN SECURITY
FIELD OFFICES, WE HAVE ELICITED THE COOPERATION OF POLICE
DEPARTMENTS IN VARIOUS CITIES -- WHICH I MIGHT JUST LIST
FOR YOU: LOS ANGELES, HOUSTON, ATLANTA, NEW ORLEANS,
PHILADELPHIA, SAN FRANCISCO, SEATTLE, BOSTON, CHICAGO,
DETROIT, ST. LOUIS, AND CLEVELAND.

NOW THESE MEASURES AFFECT PRIMARILY ISRAELI AND GERMAN
CONSULAR POSTS IN THESE CITIES. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THE ONLY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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AMEMBASSY BONN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 162451

ARAB CONSULAR ESTABLISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OUTSIDE
OF WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK, IS THE LEBANESE CONSULATE-
GENERAL, IN DETROIT.

Q. CHARLIE, COULD YOU VISUALIZE HOW THE CONSULTATIONS WILL PROCEED FOR THIS COLLECTIVE SYSTEM? ARE WE TALKING IN TERMS OF SOMETHING AT THE UN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, OR CAN YOU GUIDE US A LITTLE BIT ON WHAT THIS MEANS?

A. WELL, WATCH OUT. BE A BIT CAREFUL, TAD, IN INJECTING
PHRASES LIKE "COLLECTIVE SYSTEM" INTO THE VOCABULARY HERE
BECAUSE I'M NOT SURE IT'S REALLY DESCRIPTIVE OF EITHER THE
INTENT OR WHAT'S LIKELY TO BE THE END RESULT. AND IT'S
NOT SOMETHING I HAD REFERENCE TO IN MY OPENING REMARKS.

Q. THROUGH NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS?

A. YES.

Q. WOULD YOU DEFINE THAT THERE, PLEASE?

A. YES. WELL, OBVIOUSLY, I CANNOT EXCLUDE EVENTUAL
RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ANY MORE THAN I CAN --
FOR THE SAME, EQUALLY OBVIOUS REASONS -- EXCLUDE CON-
SULTATION WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

THE PROBLEM, CLEARLY, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IS TO ASCERTAIN -- AND HERE MANY BRAINS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE THAN A FEW -- WHAT STEPS THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS CAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND JOINTLY, TAKE TO -- HOW SHALL I PUT IT? -- TO PUT A REIN, A LEASH, ON ACTS OF TERRORISM OF THE KIND WE WITNESSED YESTERDAY AND HAVE WITNESSED IN RECENT YEARS WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT, PETROLEUM INSTALLATIONS -- AND SUBSEQUENT TO THAT ESSENTIALLY BRAIN-STORMING PHASE, TO DO WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PUT THESE IDEAS INTO CONCRETE, EFFECTIVE FORM.

NOW, I CAN'T STAND HERE AND PREDICT FOR YOU WHAT MAY COME
OUT OF THIS PROCESS: I DON'T THINK ANYONE HONESTLY COULD.
BUT IT REFLECTS THE DETERMINATION WHICH THE SECRETARY
EXPRESSED IN HIS EXTEMPORAENOUS REMARKS AT NOON AND WILL
INVOLVE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE DEPARTMENT'S

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 162451

INTELLECTUAL AND PRACTICAL EFFORTS IN COMING WEEKS, I THINK.

Q. CHARLES, CONRAD AHLERS, I THINK IT WAS, YESTERDAY HAD SOME FAIRLY SEVERE STATEMENTS OF DISAPPOINTMENT REGARDING THE CAIPO GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THIS THING. DO YOU SHARE HIS DISAPPOINTMENT? CAN YOU COMMENT ON WHAT YOU THINK THE ARAB GOVERNMENT'S REACTIONS WERE?

A. NO, I WILL NOT, FOR THE MAJOR REASON THAT WE WERE NOT PRIVY THROUGH THE COURSE OF THE DAY TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AS MAY HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE AND, THEREFORE, DON'T HAVE A DATA BASE ON WHICH TO COMMENT, KEN.

Q. DID WE CONTACT ANY ARAB GOVERNMENTS OURSELVES DIRECTLY AS PART OF OUR URGENT EFFORTS?

A. A NUMBER OF AMBASSADORS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ELSEWHERE WERE INSTRUCTED PRIVATELY TO ELICIT THE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS TO WHICH THEY WERE ACCREDITED FOR CHANCELLOR BRANDT'S APPEAL THAT THOSE STATES WHICH WERE IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THIS GANG OF TERRORISTS TO RELEASE THE HOSTAGES.

Q. CHARLIE, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TODAY CALLED UPON ALL NATIONS TO EXPEL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS FROM THEIR TERRITORY. DOES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THIS ISRAELI CALL?

A. WELL, I HAVE ALREADY ALLUDED TO OUR OWN VIEW THAT THE SOURCE OF SUPPORT OF WHATEVER KIND -- THEY COULD BE GEOGRAPHIC, FINANCIAL, POLITICAL -- OUGHT TO BE DRIED UP. AND I DON'T KNOW HOW I CAN MAKE OUR VIEW ANY CLEARER THAN THAT, GEORGE. I SAID THAT HERE YESTERDAY AS WELL. END QUOTE. ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

NEWS CONFERENCE

This Copy For

#1547

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:27 A.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 7, 1972

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: Only two items on the President's schedule remain unannounced: One, the fact that the President is now meeting with Secretary Shultz. The President asked him to come over this morning for a meeting. John Ehrlichman, on the President's staff, is sitting in on that meeting.

You know from the previously announced schedule that the President will meet with Dr. Burns and Secretary Shultz this afternoon at 3:30. That meeting is still on.

I do not believe we have announced the fact that today at 11:30 John Roosevelt and James Roosevelt will stop in to see the President. They will be accompanied by Governor John Connally. So that is added to the President's schedule. We will have a photo of that session.

Q What is the purpose of that? (Laughter)

Q Are they joining the Connally brigade?

MR. ZIEGLER: The purpose of that?

Q Yes. The purpose of the meeting.

MR. ZIEGLER: For a picture. (Laughter)

Q I believe that.

MR. ZIEGLER: In all seriousness, I think you will recall when we were in California, James Roosevelt, who is a Democrat, came out in support of the President. He is in town, so they are coming in for a courtesy call on the President.

I should add that James Roosevelt was very interested in the President's July 4th speech on the bicentennial and the concept of the Open House for America. He has some ideas about that, and about how he can participate in that particular effort as outlined by the President in his bicentennial speech, so he will be talking about that, also.

Q Is he going to get a job with the Bicentennial Commission? I think there has been a report to that effect.

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't think he is seeking a job, but he is particularly interested in that aspect of the bicentennial program as talked about by the President, and wants to talk about the way he can participate in that.

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You already know from the schedule that has been
posted that we have a 3:00 o'clock ceremony in which diplo-
matic credentials will be presented. We have already posted
the information about that ceremony and those Ambassadors who
will be presenting their credentials.

So to recap, 8:00 o'clock this morning was a leadership meeting with the Republican Congressional Leadership; 10:30 a meeting with Secretary Shultz; 11:30 the meeting with John and James Roosevelt and Governor Connally.

At 12:00 Noon there will be a photograph of the
meeting the President will have with representatives of the
International Conference of Police Associations. We announced
that yesterday.

At 3:00 o'clock today the presentation of diplomatic
credentials, and at 3:30 a meeting with Dr. Burns and George
Shultz.

In between all of this, the President has met with
Dr. Kissinger and also General Haig this morning, Bob Haldeman and
other members of the staff. He will be doing that this after-
noon, also.

The schedule for Friday:

At 10:30 tomorrow, the President will meet with the
Indonesian Minister of State, General Panggabean. He is a
guest in the United States of Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is Admiral Moorer's nearest counter-
part in the Indonesian structure. This will be a courtesy
call on the President. The President has not previously met
the General.

After that, the President will meet with drug abuse
law enforcement attorneys. There are about 30 to 40 young
Government attorneys who are in town for training and briefing
on the Administration's drug program, which was previously out-
lined to you. They will be accompanied here to the White House
by Myles Ambrose, head of the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforce-
ment.

The attorneys are from throughout the United States
and have come to Washington for briefings, as I mentioned
earlier, on the DALE program, Drug Abuse Law Enforcement. Myles
Ambrose and several of the attorneys will be here to discuss
their activities with you after that meeting.

Q What time is that meeting, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: It will be after the courtesy call
that will be paid by General Panggabean. I assume that will
be about 10:45.

Q Will we get a list of names and towns?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

The President today is announcing his intention to
nominate Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., for the rank of
General, full General, and to assign him as Vice Chief of
Staff, United States Army.

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General Haig is now, as all of you know, because I think you know Al Haig very well, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a position that he has held since June of 1970.

Prior to that, from January 1969 to June 1970, Major General Haig was Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

We will give you a release which gives you the biographical information on now Major General Haig. I believe that should give you detailed information about his background.

Q Do you have a successor for General Haig?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have no announcement at this time on a successor to General Haig as Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Q Will there be one?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Does Haig succeed Palmer?

MR. ZIEGLER: General Haig will succeed General Palmer, who is currently the Vice Chief of Staff.

Q Where will Palmer go?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have nothing to announce on his plans.

Q That is Bruce Palmer?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Do you know whether any Major General in recent history has jumped to full General without going through the rank of Lieutenant General?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not familiar with any recent move of that type, but I am sure this is not the first time. General Haig, as most of you know, is a highly qualified individual who is highly capable to assume this new capacity.

Q You say you are sure this is not the first time?

MR. ZIEGLER: It is my knowledge that this has happened previously. General Shoup did this, I understand. We can provide you with this material from DOD, but this has happened before.

Q What was General Haig's rank when he joined the White House staff?

MR. ZIEGLER: He was a full Colonel when he joined the White House staff.

Q I suppose a successor to General Haig will be another General; right?

MR. ZIEGLER: That has not been determined.

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Q Would we be correct in assuming that by jumping over all these other Generals for this appointment, that this means a tighter structure here between the White House and the Pentagon, and maybe more emphasis on national security?

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe what it means, and I do not want to expand upon this because I do not think I have to, many of you know General Haig and his capabilities. It means, one, General Haig is a highly qualified man. He is a young man who, it is felt, will do a very efficient and excellent job as Vice Chief of Staff. That is why he is being nominated for the position of General and being appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

It is based upon his qualifications. It does not suggest any different alignment for association in terms of the current structure between the White House and the Pentagon.

Q It will be effective when he is confirmed?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. I am not sure when it will be effective, but he will receive Senate confirmation for the full General grade.

Q When did he come to the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: General Haig came to the White House, as I mentioned earlier, in January of 1969.

Q What is his age?

MR. ZIEGLER: Al Haig is 47 years old.

Q When is General Abrams going to get confirmed?

MR. ZIEGLER: The confirmation of General Abrams is currently in the Senate Armed Service Committee. I do not know how they are proceeding.

Q Has he met with the President yet, General Abrams?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, he has not.

Q Does General Haig have to have confirmation also not only for full General, but does he have to have confirmation for the job?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Vice Chief is an appointive job. You receive Senate confirmation for the rank of General.

Q Does the Vice Chief have to be a full General?

MR. ZIEGLER: As a matter of practice, and that will be the case here.

Q Did Congressman Ford make the President's views crystal clear today on taxes?

MR. ZIEGLER: What do you mean?

Q Well, you heard them. How long is the commitment for?

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Q Do you plan any announcement out of that meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, we don't.

Q Yesterday Ambassador Rabin took a letter from Premier Golda Meir to the President and gave it to Secretary Rogers. Can you tell us what was in the letter?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Has the United States Government received a request from Israel to withdraw from the Olympic games?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, we did not.

Q Are you going to brief this afternoon?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will post at 3:00.

Q We have a story in Detroit that Jimmy Hoffa is on his way to North Vietnam to work for the release of prisoners. Is the White House aware of this? Did it help him get permission from the Parole Board to leave the country? Can you comment on it?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are aware of the story. We are aware of the intent. This is totally a private effort and a private matter on the part of Mr. Hoffa.

Q What about the parole? He has left the country while he is on parole.

MR. ZIEGLER: It is my understanding that this is a private matter between Mr. Hoffa and the Parole Board.

Q There are no private matters between them.

Q It is a Federal Parole Board.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is true, but it does not constitute any involvement between the Parole Board and the White House. I would suggest that you consult the Justice Department on questions about the Parole Board.

Q In view of the fact that the Justice Department had to get permission to let Mr. Hoffa out from the White House, I think it must have been handled by the White House.

MR. ZIEGLER: It was not.

Q There is a view at the White House on interference in a foreign government on the part of a private individual. You have stated it many times in terms of Ramsey Clark and Jane Fonda, et cetera. What is the position on Hoffa doing this?

MR. ZIEGLER: First of all, I don't have the specifics on what Mr. Hoffa intends to do. I think in relation to the question Bob Pierpoint asked about the granting of a visa to an individual in relation to a man who is on parole, that is something that the Justice Department should appropriately address. Beyond that, the only comment I can make from here is that there was no White House initiative involved in this, and secondly, it is a private matter.

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Q Wasn't the White House asked if this was okay, aside from initiative?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, we were not.

Q Does the President approve of American client states using State-owned broadcast facilities to editorialize against certain candidacies in the United States?

MR. ZIEGLER: I listened to your question on that subject earlier and I thought about it when I left here, thinking about the way I could answer it. I can't comprehend the point of your question. If you want to ask it a different way or something I will try. I have been thinking about it for the last 30 minutes and have not been able to comprehend it.

Q The Justice Department does not have authority over individuals on parole having contact with foreign governments. It may be the State Department. Why is it that the White House is dodging this question of individuals having business with foreign governments in Vietnam? They dodged it on Fonda and Ramsey Clark. Why don't they test the Logan Act? There is word going around the country that the White House is afraid to test the Logan Act because they are afraid it wouldn't hold up.

MR. ZIEGLER: I have nothing to say on that.

Q Will you get an expert to come out and discuss this because it has been the subject of repeated questions in our news of late.

Q Has the Administration counseled the Israelis not to take any punitive action as a result of the Olympics?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't feel that it would be appropriate for me to comment on that. We have had discussions with Ambassador Rabin. The President talked with Prime Minister Meir and expressed our sympathy and concern about the tragedy that occurred in Munich. Beyond that, I have nothing to say.

Q What is the reason for the delay in the appointment of Admiral Cousins as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know that there has been a delay.

Q You don't usually have four-star Admirals sitting around. He has had no duties for a week now.

MR. ZIEGLER: Perhaps he is tending to personal affiars or something anticipating a future assignment. I don't consider a week "sitting around".

Q One more question on taxes. From time to time you were saying you do not contemplate or plan any tax increases. You said "new" increases. Are there some old ones on the books that will come into effect in January? Why did you use the word "new"?

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MR. ZIEGLER: It must have been a slip of the
tongue. I didn't use the word for any significance.

Q Can you give us Dr. Kissinger's schedule? Has
it changed since the events in Germany?

MR. ZIEGLER: Les Janka says the departure may be
held up for a day. I thought he was leaving tomorrow.

Q Does he still plan to meet with the German
leaders?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. He still plans to meet with the
German leaders in Munich, as we previously announced. As to when
he will leave, I don't know yet.

Q The White House and this Government don't mind or
care if any individual goes and deals with the government in
North Vietnam; is that right?

MR. ZIEGLER: Sarah, I have nothing to say on this
beyond what we have said before.

Q Is that what you said?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have nothing further to say on that.

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Q On the SALT treaty this morning, Senator Mansfield said yesterday that the White House is contributing to the Senate delay in passing the SALT agreement because it is straddling on the Jackson amendment. Can you say what the White House position is on the Jackson amendment?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will say what I said a month or so ago, maybe earlier than that: that we favor the Jackson amendment. We have talked about the question of the interpretations of that amendment, which we have said we do not agree with. That is what Senator Scott said this morning. But we favor the Jackson amendment as written.

Q You favor the principle.

MR. ZIEGLER: We favor the amendment, as it is consistent with our policy.

Q But you don't agree with the Senator's definition?

MR. ZIEGLER: There are several interpretations as to what it means. We do not associate ourselves with that interpretation. As the Senator said this morning, there are different interpretations on this amendment, as there are on others. We favor the Jackson amendment, and, for that matter, the Mansfield amendment.

What we favor, as we said before, is the affirmative action on the part of the Senate in relation to the interim agreement.

Q When Pierre Salinger went to Paris and talked to the North Vietnamese negotiators there, you criticized this activity. When Ramsey Clark went to Hanoi, you criticized this activity also. Do you hold the same view about Mr. Hoffa's forthcoming trip to Hanoi?

MR. ZIEGLER: I really do not know what his plans are. That is the thrust of my answer. I understand that he has stated, the intent that he plans to travel, apparently to the Parole Board and has been granted a visa. Beyond that, I am not familiar with what his plans are, so I cannot make a comment.

Q Is the President interested in getting a report from Mr. Hoffa on his return?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know what he is going to do yet.

Q But the White House has never approved of private individuals, except for the Texas man, going to Hanoi to deal with the government on a private basis.

MR. ZIEGLER: The point I am making is that I am not familiar with Mr. Hoffa's plans. If and when we become more familiar with those, perhaps I can be more responsive to your question.

Q Has he been briefed by any Administration official prior to this?

MR. ZIEGLER: Not that I am aware of.

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Q Does the White House plan any statement on the future of the wage and price controls before the election?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, we do not.

Q Does the President agree with Senator McGovern placing the blame on Egypt and Lebanon for the Munich killings?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have no comment on that statement. We have offered our views on the subject.

Q The story in The Times today said President Thieu, in an order issued some time ago, has abolished the election of hamlet chiefs and village officials. Had the President known of this before today, and does he approve or disapprove of that action?

MR. ZIEGLER: We were not aware of the step taken by the other government before today. I would have no comment on an international matter such as that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on his visit with the German leaders and on his trip to Moscow, will he bring up in any way the atrocity in Munich in line with the President's suggestion to the State Department to get constructive ideas on how to prevent future atrocities?

MR. ZIEGLER: This is something that the Secretary of State is pursuing, as you know, on an immediate basis. Perhaps Dr. Kissinger will review with leaders that he meets the efforts that are being undertaken by the Secretary of State.

Q Is Dr. Kissinger's trip being delayed because of Munich, or any particular crisis?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am confident that it is strictly a scheduling matter. I did not mean to create confusion about that.

Q In line with Ted's question, I am wondering: Senator McGovern has characterized the South Vietnamese Government as a dictatorship. I am wondering how the White House views this. Is it a democracy or --

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not going to get into that type of thing. I have no comment on Senator McGovern's statement. We have pointed out our position. You know clearly there are differences in approach to that matter: between the opposition in the way the policy of this Government is moving to deal with the situation in South Vietnam.

Q Specifically, on Admiral Cousins, is the Administration having any difficulty in getting him cleared with our NATO allies?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not going to be more detailed about this, except to respond to you that your reference to a week is not a delay in my mind.

Q On Ted Knapp's question, you say "we". Do you mean the White House did not know that Thieu was going to do this in advance, or the Administration did not know?

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Department of State

Pb Statements [c]

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 163196

UNCLAS STATE 163196

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING IS PARTIAL
EXCERPT FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING
SEPTEMBER 7, 1972:

QUOTE: Q. CHARLIE, CAN YOU TAKE US BEYOND YESTERDAY ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIONS? HOW YOU SEE THIS WHOLE SUBJECT DEVELOPING AT THIS POINT.

A. WELL, AS YOU KNOW, WE WENT THROUGH AN EXTENSIVE SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS AND ALL OF THE REGIONAL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES IN THIS BUILDING YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. AND I THINK MORE ARE ON TAP FOR TODAY. THE COMMON THEME IN THESE DISCUSSIONS HAS BEEN AN INVITATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO COME FORWARD WITH IDEAS, ANY IDEAS, THEY MAY HAVE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM IN ALL OF ITS MANIFESTATIONS. I THINK YOU CAN ANTICIPATE THAT THIS IS GOING TO BE A VERY DIFFICULT PROCESS FOR ME TO REPORT TO YOU AND YOU TO REPORT TO YOUR READERS IN COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. IT DOESN'T LED ITSELF TO DAILY DEADLINES, IF I CAN PUT IT THAT WAY.

BEYOND THAT, SECRETARY ROGERS HAS ASKED DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON TO COORDINATE THIS PROCESS BOTH WITH THE DEPARTMENT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN MISSIONS, AND PARTICULARLY TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE. THE SECRETARY, I BELIEVE, WAS GOING TO THIS MEMORIAL SERVICE AT THE REFLECTING POOL THIS NOON. AND THAT'S ABOUT ALL I CAN GIVE YOU TODAY ON THE SUBJECT.

Q. COULD YOU TELL ME THIS, AS MATTERS NOW STAND, IS THE PIRACY CONVENTION DOWNSTAIRS FIRST PRIORITY IN THE LARGER EDIFICES THAT YOU ARE BUILDING OR TRYING TO BUILD?

A. SURE, WE ATTACH THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO IT. IT'S ONE CONCRETE THING ALREADY IN TRAIN TO WHICH THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS CAN GIVE THEIR SYMPATHETIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE.

Q. THERE HAS BEEN SOME FEELING, EDITORIAL AND OTHERWISE, THAT THE GAMES SHOULD HAVE BEEN CALLED OFF. COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE IS?

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

[L.C] Poly Statements

UNCLASSIFIED 668

PAGE 01 STATE 163196

61
ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-20 IO-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-06 H-02

USIA-12 /113 R

66636

DRAFTED BY NEA/P: JEAVES
9/7/72 EXT 20448
APPROVED BY NEA/P: JEAVES
AF/P:GAFRIEDMAN
IO/P:FBLACHLY
S/PRS:CBRAY (INFO)
EUR/P:ESAVAGE
NEA/EGY:MSTERNER

061756

R 072109Z SEP 72
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NY
USMISSION NATO

UNCLASSIFIED

44

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 163196

A. WELL, I DID THAT FOR SOME OF YOU LAST EVENING. AND JUST TO RESUME WHAT I SAID THEN AND HAVE SEEN REPORTED SINCE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE DECISION WHICH WAS REACHED YESTERDAY BY THE AMERICAN OLYMPIC COMMITTEE IN ITS ESSENTIALLY PRIVATE CAPACITY TO CONTINUE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE AMERICAN TEAM. AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT MORE ONE CAN ADD TO THAT.

Q. WELL, WHAT YOU MIGHT ADD IS WHAT THE ATTITUDE IS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

A. I DON'T KNOW THAT WE NEED TO EXPRESS AN ATTITUDE.

Q. WELL, YOU DON'T NEED TO: I WAS JUST ASKING IF YOU WISHED TO.

A. NO, I DON'T.

Q. CHARLES, DID THE GOVERNMENT CONTACT THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMITTEE TO ASK HIM TO SUPPORT THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE RESUMPTION OF THE GAMES AFTER THE EVENTS?

A. NO, WE WERE NOT ASKED TO.

Q. I WAS JUST GOING TO ASK WHETHER THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD FORMALLY ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE A POSITION EITHER ON WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN TEAM OR ON CANCELLATION OF THE GAMES.

A. NO, IT HAS NOT.

Q. IN THESE CONSULTATIONS THAT ARE BEING HELD ON THIS, ONE OF THE STRONG FEELINGS BEING EXPRESSED BY THE ISRAELIS IS THAT THESE TERRORIST GROUPS ARE RECEIVING LARGE SUMS OF MONEY FROM COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS RELATIONS. THE PRESIDENT THE OTHER DAY PRAISED ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE AS BEING AMONG THE BEST IN THE WORLD. SO PERHAPS WHAT THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE IS SAYING ABOUT THESE TERRORIST GROUPS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE SOME VALIDITY BY THIS GOVERNMENT. I WANTED TO CHECK WHAT, AS A FIRST STEP, THIS GOVERNMENT PLANS TO DO ON THAT SCORE, BECAUSE

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 163196

MONEY IS VERY IMPORTANT IN THEIR ACTIVITIES.

A. WELL, I DON'T KNOW THAT I WANT TO BE MORE SPECIFIC AT THIS POINT THAT I HAVE BEEN, AND I HAVE IN THE LAST TWO DAYS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT SUPPORT OF ANY KIND TO TERRORIST GROUPS COULD BE DRIED UP AT THE SOURCE. I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO A BLOW-BY-BLOW OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WE CONTEMPLATE IN THIS MATTER.

Q. SENATOR MCGOVERN MADE SPECIFIC CHARGES IN THIS SITUATION AGAINST TWO COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA. DOES THIS GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY IS THERE?

A. I WON'T COMMENT ON THAT. I HOPE, AS I SAID TO SOME OF YOUR COLLEAGUES LAST EVENING, TO THE EXTENT WE CAN WE CAN KEEP POLITICS OUT OF THIS ROOM FOR THE NEXT COMING WEEKS.

Q. THAT RESOLUTION THAT WAS PASSED UP ON THE HILL YESTERDAY, DO YOU HAVE A COMMENT ON THAT.

A. NOT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF IT. I DON'T KNOW THAT WE HAVE YET RECEIVED A TEXT HERE. CERTAINLY I HAVE NOT SEEN ONE. IT OBVIOUSLY REFLECTS THE ANGER AND SENSE OF REVULSION IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT SHARES.

Q. DOES IT SHARE IT TO THE EXTENT OF TAKING ACTION?

A. WELL, LET ME STAY AWAY FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF IT FOR THE TIME BEING. I HAVEN'T SEEN IT. I HAVE TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THAT WE HAD A LOT OF THINGS IN CONTEMPLATION, SOME UNDER WAY AT THE MOMENT. BUT I'M NOT SURE THAT I AM GOING TO GET INTO A PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THEM, AND I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME.

Q. AS THE RESOLUTION WAS INTRODUCED ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS BY THE TWO LEADERS IN THE SENATE AND PASSED WITHOUT OPPOSITION IN BOTH HOUSES, DO YOU KNOW DID THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT THAT RESOLUTION WHEN IT WAS INTRODUCED, DID THE LIAISON REPRESENTATIVE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXPRESS ANY VIEWPOINT ON THE LEGISLATION THAT WAS PENDING

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

[LC]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 163196

THERE YESTERDAY?

A. NO, I DON'T BELIEVE WE DID.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THE REPORTS OF AN ISRAELI APPARENTLY COUNTER-GUERRILLA RAID INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY?

A. I HAVE JUST SEEN THAT BEFORE I CAME OUT, AND THE DETAILS SEEM A LITTLE INFIRM, SO I'LL HOLD OFF ON THAT ONE.

Q. ON THAT MORE GENERAL SUBJECT, WHETHER THERE WAS AN ACTUAL INTRUSION OR NOT, HAVE YOU EXPRESSED TO THE ISRAELIS AT ANY POINT IN THESE CONSULTATIONS THE WISH OF THIS GOVERNMENT THAT THESE INTRUSIONS DON'T TAKE PLACE?

A. I DON'T BELIEVE THE SUBJECT HAS COME UP IN CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS HERE ON EITHER SIDE. THE WHOLE FOCUS OF OUR OWN ACTIVITIES IS, I HOPE, CLEARLY DIRECTED TO THE NEED TO TAKE POSITIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. END QUOTE. ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

Ambassador Bush's September 10
Security Council Statement

"Mr. President:

The Council is meeting today on a complaint by the Syrian Government. The Middle East has again been the scene of violence, as it has so often in the past. The Council is again seized of a problem with which it has repeatedly failed in the past to come to grips in an equitable way.

We should all recall that until a few days ago the world had again dared to hope because a climate of reasonableness and realism seemed to be developing in the area. There were grounds to hope that new opportunities for progress towards peace in the Middle East were opening up before us. Then came 'Munich' -- the senseless act of terrorism there which cast a pall over these hopes. Yet we are now meeting on a complaint by Syria -- a complaint that stands out for its unreality. It makes no reference to the tragic events at Munich. It gives no salve to the wounded conscience of an agonized world.

There is an obvious connection between the actions of which the Syrian Govern-
ment now complains and the tragic events which took place in Munich this
past Tuesday. Did the Syrian Government join in complaint or expressions
of outrage when terrorists invaded the Olympic Village, in violation not
only of law but of the spirit of Olympic brotherhood, and murdered innocent
athletes? Did we hear even a word of condemnation from the Government
of Syria for this despicable act? No, quite the contrary. The Syrian Govern-
ment continues to harbor and give aid and encouragement to terrorist organi-
zations which openly champion such acts.

And the Syrian Government is not alone in its encouragement of terrorism. Certain other governments in the area -- whether by word and deed, or by silent acquiescence and failure to disassociate themselves from the acts of a minority that preaches and practices lawlessness and violence -- cannot be absolved of responsibility for the cycle of violence and counterviolence which we have again witnessed this past week.

Mr. President, the ultimate root of the problem is, of course, the absence
of peace in the Middle East. My government has labored long and hard in

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this cause: in the effort to achieve a just and durable peace the United
States has been and will continue to be second to none.

We shall continue to work toward the goal of peace, but the absence of
peace cannot be exploited as a pretext for violence on any side. Those
who preach violence and employ it as a matter of policy always suffer
its consequences, for violence always begets violence. The crimes that
were carried out at Lod and Munich cannot but breed tragedy for their
perpetrators and for those who befriend them. States which harbor and
give succor to terrorists cannot then claim sanctuary for themselves.
The greatest tragedy of all is that when violence is employed, innocent
people, on all sides, are almost inevitably made to suffer. Slain olympic
athletes in Munich -- or heartbroken mothers searching for dead under
rubble in Rafid -- these are some of the immediate victims of terror.
But indeed the whole civilized world is the real victim of terror. Mr.
President, we deplore the loss of the lives on both sides.

Today the United States is engaged in a major effort along with other
members of the International Community, to make our airways, our
sports fields and our other gathering places safe from terrorism and
violence. A beginning has been made, in various international conventions
dealing with aircraft hijacking and related problems, to establish a strong
framework of law in these matters among the nations of our interdependent
world. Secretary Rogers has urged rapid and meaningful action in the
Sub-Committee of ICAO now meeting in Washington. He has urged rapid
action in ratifying existing conventions by governments that have not done so.
But recent events make clear that the problem is much broader and more
pernicious in nature. My government urges that the issue of terrorism in
all its aspects receive the highest priority when the General Assembly con-
venes later this month. The commendable initiative of the Secretary-General
in placing this question on the Assembly's agenda ensures that the world can
no longer close its eyes to this pressing matter.

Mr. President, the United States will continue to work for a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East. But one-sided resolutions of the type which this
Council has so frequently adopted in recent times, do not contribute to the

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goal for peace: Indeed, they create an atmosphere in no way conducive to peace by encouraging perpetrators and supporters of acts of terrorism to believe they can escape the world's censure.

Let us not put our heads in the sand and perpetrate the notion of 'unreality' that is often assigned to the United Nations.

Munich was so horrible, so vicious, so brutal, so detrimental in the world and to peace in the Middle East that we simply must not act as if it did not exist.

We believe each member of the Council, indeed of the entire International Community, should it unmistakably clear that acts of terror and violence practiced against innocent people as a matter of policy are unacceptable in a civilized world. Each of us has a responsibility to make clear that those who practice such acts, or aid and abet them in any way, are the ones deserving of censure and condemnation. Only then will be begun to eliminate this scourge from the earth, and with it the acts of counterviolence to which history inevitably proves it gives rise.

Mr. President, in closing, I would like to describe the kind of resolution which could be helpful in addressing itself to the thrust of our remarks here:

'The Security Council,

'Gravely concerned at the renewal of terrorist attacks on innocent persons.

'Deploring the loss of innocent lives on both sides and the outbreak of renewed violence in the Middle East.

'Convinced that acts of terrorism, and any encouragement and support for such acts, are totally unacceptable in a civilized society and are inimical to the maintenance of the ceasefire in the Middle East.

1. Condemns the senseless and unprovoked terrorist attack in Munich on September 5 by terrorists of the so-called Black September Organization which resulted in the loss of life of numerous innocent victims.

2. Calls upon those states harboring and supporting such terrorists and their activities to cease their encouragement and support of terrorists, and to take all necessary measures to bring about the immediate end of such senseless acts."