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weak. The act of faith assumes that a strong Soviet Union will abandon both three indigent years of expansionist Russian foreign policy and seventy years of Soviet policy based on the correlation of forces.

that is, a tall order. Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense as a static condition of good will--which he must be remembered to have developed after World War I--the criteria on the basis of which he is to determine it are far from clear. There is little in the history of either tsars or commissars to supply him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by Communist ideology or Russian history expansionism has been debated ever since the existence of the Communist state. During World War II (which was thefurthest the Germans could have been comforted from the general conviction that Stalin had defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution and hence would pursue Russian national objectives rather than expansion after the war), the question of

B

Communist after the war.

and hence would be a Russian nationalistic agenda rather than

that Stalin defeated Trotzky on the issue of world revolution

MOSCOW, May 11, 1945

The Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the Red Army occupation of Moscow.

departed ever since the existence of the Communist state. During
Communist idealogy or Russian history expropriation has been
introduced.

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by
supply him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

There is little in the history of either state or nation to
on the part of which he is so determined it are far from clear.

which the West only developed after World War I--the criteria
that must be remembered.

Peace in the Western sense as a static condition of good will--

What is a fair order? Even weresovsky committed to
correction of forces.

foreign policy and several states of Soviet policy based on the
anti-communist政策 of the Soviet Union.

Weak. The sort of faith shown that a strong Soviet Union

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and they proved to be very
In fact, Stalin did pursue Russia's traditional goals:
Clash not in the sense they had meant
this distinguishing feature was that he pursued them all
@multicCountry! In all cases who illusinates the democracies,
Stalin After the war returned to the program Molotov submitted
to Hitler in November 1940 as the price for Soviet support.

It could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination
of the Balkans and of the Straits; a major voice in
domination of Poland; and
Soviet hegemony
over Iran. Soviet policy did not reach all
these objectives but it was not through lack of trying.

The role of ideology has been threefold: it gave Soviet
leaders an inner assurance that their tsarist predecessors
sometimes lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of
in the event of
supporters and it tempted them into distant enterprises such
as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional
Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline
of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a
willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an

["willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an\nof ideological sin is thus most likely to be reflected in a\nRussian enfler might have given a lower priority. The decline\nas Andorra, Cipa, Nicosia and Inochina to which traditional\nembassaries and its ambassaded them into distant enterprises each\nsometimes faked; it ambushed them with a sledge carpe ut\nleaders an inner assurance that their carried br Great Powers\nThe role of ideology has been fulfilled: it gave Soviet\ncases objectives but it was not through lack of trying.", "Soviet propaganda over Iran. Soviet policy did not reach all\nof the Balkans and of the Baltics: dissemination of Poland; and\n~~a major military~~ in\nIt could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination\nto Hitler in November 1940 as the brice for Soviet an dport.\n~~Soviet~~ after the war returned to the program Molotov annexed\n~~the territories~~. Illusions 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Indochina a moral nightmare will present itself. For by
far the largest and best organised military force of the anti-
Vietnamese resistance is the unspeakable Khmer Rouge that killed
two million of its own population in the three yeras it governed
Cambodia from 1975-78. The trauma of America's Indochina
involvement has prevented American military assistance to the
anti-Khmer Rouge resistance forces. It is naive to appeal to

China--the principal sponsor of the anti-Vietnamese resistance--
China has already shown its good will by giving some
arms to Prince Siphanaketh, the King of Lao P.D.R., to rein in their clients. Beijing cannot create a balance of
forces in a vacuum. And America must learn that the view that
negotiations do not have a momentum of their own is illusory.
Negotiations can ratify an equilibrium; they cannot create it.

Ironically the only hope for an equilibrium in Cambodia
is to use the Cambodian army trained by the Vietnamese as a
counterweight to the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese army leaves.

This is not an uplifting prospect. But foreign policy in the
world is being imposed on ourselves. We must deal with the material at hand; and the Khmer Rouge are

AUG. 26 '88 17:07 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.02

August 26, 1988

Draft #1

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

It is the essence of a revolutionary period that a gap develops between expectation and reality. We are witnessing the end of the post-war structure of international relations--a process requiring a more complex diplomacy than anything with which we are familiar and requiring strenuous efforts. But public discussion in the democracies celebrates peace as if it were a static condition in which the need for effort evaporates and the world lives with a consciousness of harmony.

In the idyllic picture of the world ahead of us painted by almost all the leaders of the democracies Gorbachev is turned into a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are treated as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society with its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs. Therefore the

AUG. 26 '88 17:08 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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2

democracies are said to have an obligation to "help" Gorbachev achieve these goals.

To be sure this idyll is punctuated by frequent protestations of wariness as to Soviet intentions. But this is ritual. The dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the democracies and the Soviet Union and even of personal friendship between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev.

No doubt progress has been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But it is important to remember that a new era rarely comes into being smoothly. The new international order which is emerging brings with it a host of new challenges. The way the democracies respond to them will determine whether there will be tranquility or turmoil:

> --Whatever Gorbachev's intentions he has started a process within the Soviet Union and even more in Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell.

P.04

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--Whatever the convictions of the leaders of democracies they have contributed to a view of the USSR which within the next decade will bring about major changes in Atlantic relations.

--These twin events make the future of Europe--East and West--a central political and not simply an arms control problem.

--As the US-Soviet ideological rivalry diminishes traditional geopolitical factors will become more prominent. The decline of Communist ideology--real or imagined--will require increasing attention to historic Russian expansionism.

--This will occur while Japan, China and India will grow in strength and become increasingly important in international affairs.

--The regional conflicts which are being settled--Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern Africa--result in part from the changed priorities of the US and the USSR. And each of the so-called settlements creates a dynamism of its own and therefore the need for a new approach to the issues and interests at stake.

AUG. 26 '88 17:09 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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--In these circumstances exclusive concern with arms control is a diversion from the dominant trends of the new period.

--To deal with such a world the United States must reassess its historic approach to international affairs with its emphasis on intentions rather than capabilities and its reluctance to be involved with maintaining a balance of power.

## The Impact of Mikhail Gorbachev

The most immediate issue is whether the democracies are wise in putting so much reliance on a single personality in the Soviet leadership. Indeed whether it is "helpful" to Gorbachev--to use a fashionable phrase--for them to do so.

To be sure Gorbachev's success in overcoming the Soviet Union's isolation and stagnation of 1985 when he took office is an astonishing tour de force. Many Western leaders, President Reagan included, seem to believe that their personal relationship with Gorbachev eases diplomatic negotiations, that Gorbachev

AUG. 26 '88 17:10 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

5

virtually alone is responsible for the domestic changes
apparently taking place in the Soviet Union, and that these
changes in turn will bring about a new era of peace.

Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True,
major, perhaps historic, changes are under way in the Soviet
Union, but it defies all reason to believe that a man who has
never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party and who
was in the Politburo during the Brezhnev era would abandon the
Marxist belief in the predominance of objective factors in favor
of a "subjective" affection for a democratic leader. No member
of the Politburo, much less its General Secretary, would dare
approach his colleagues with the proposition that his personal
ties to an American president could justify changes in Soviet
policy.

For all his panache and intelligence, Gorbachev like most
statesmen, is to some degree a product of circumstance. He
seeks--with courage and imagination--to overcome the stagnation

AUG.26 '88 17:11 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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6

of the late Brezhnev era. It is not a commitment to peace
in the abstract but to a more competitive Soviet Union, though
he undoubtedly needs a period of relative calm to achieve his
domestic goals. Another Soviet leader would in all likelihood
feel compelled to pursue similar policies, if with less verve
and psychological skill. After all the present phase of Soviet
policy was inaugurated when Gromyko--attacked at the party
conference as a relic of the Brezhnev era--during the leadership
of the decrepit Chernenko, who has become a non-person, called
on President Reagan in 1984. No one can know--including Gorbachev
himself--what he will do if he should success in his goal of
infusing the Soviet economy with dynamism and Soviet society with
higher morale.

The euphoria in the democracies must therefore be based
either on a paradox or an act of faith. The paradox is that
those who believe most ardently in Gorbachev must assume that he
cannot succeed; hence that the Soviet Union will remain permanently

AUG. 26 '88 17:12 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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7

weak. The act of faith assumes that a strong Soviet Union
will abandon both three hundred years of expansionist Russian
foreign policy and seventy years of Soviet policy based on the
correlation of forces.

That is a tall order. Even were Gorbachev committed to
peace in the Western sense as a static condition of good will--
which the West only developed after World War I--the criteria
on the basis of which he is to determine it are far from clear.
There is little in the history of either tsars or commissars to
supply him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by
Communist ideology or Russian history expansionism has been
debated ever since the existence of the Communist state. During
World War II <u>[noun needed]</u> drew comfort from the general conviction
that Stalin had defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution
and hence would pursue Russian national objectives rather than
expansion after the war.

AUG. 26 '88 17:13 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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8

In fact Stalin did pursue Russia's traditional goals; his distinguishing feature was that he pursued them all simultaneously. Whatever the illusions of the democracies Stalin after the war returned to the program Molotov submitted to Hitler in November 1940 as the price for Soviet support.

It could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination of the Balkans and of the Straits; domination of Poland; and Soviet predominance over Iran. Soviet policy did not reach all these objectives but it was not through lack of trying.

The role of ideology has been threefold: it gave Soviet leaders an inner assurance that their tsarist predecessors sometimes lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters and it tempted them into distant enterprises such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an

AUG. 26 '88 17:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 10

abandonment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the
pursuit of traditional Russian objectives.

In the end geography, geopolitics and history define the
limits within which personality and ideology operate. Even
should Communist ideology decline there would still remain
historic Russia as a great power whose objectives Gorbachev
would have to determine in the light of its experience. And
for four hundred years it has been a major challenge for world
peace how to establish a relationship between that giant state
of eleven time zones and its smaller neighbors. Often breached
by invaders Russian frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably
outward.

The reliance on one Soviet leader creates three dangers:
Since every new Soviet leader has disavowed his predecessor,
such a course is inherently precarious. Second by creating the
impression that tensions were caused by idiosyncracies it strengthens
the neutralist elements who have claimed all along that the risks

P. 11

10

of the Cold War were frivolous and unnecessary. If tensions
increase the democracies will once again be torn between those
who blame tensions on the failures of leadership and those who
maintain that the Soviet leopard never changes its spots.
Third should Gorbachev leave office for essentially internal
reasons a wave of despondency and self-flagellation will sweep
over the democracies that will no doubt accuse themselves of not
having made enough concessions.

The often repeated phrase that we should help Gorbachev is
devoid of meaning unless help is properly defined. Does it
imply that we should make agreements that we would not make on
their merits? Does it mean that we must accept the Soviet
definition of the issues? Should we side with Gorbachev in his
internal disputes? Or do we help him most by putting forward a
reasonable concept of a more peaceful world that takes account
of changing realities and that he can submit to his colleagues?

AUG. 26 '88 17:15 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 12

11

I believe the latter is the only responsible course.

It is to render no service to Gorbachev--whatever his motives--
to ascribe to him Western liberal values. Nothing could undermine
him more rapidly with his colleagues. For the struggle in Moscow
is not over democracy, even less about peace in the Western sense.

It is primarily over the creation of a modern state that overcomes
the feudal baronies which are the practical result of a centrally
planned Marxist economy. It is thus akin to the struggles by
which the modern state emerged in Europe in the 17th century at
the end of the feudal period. That did not lead to democracy
in France nor to a restrained foreign policy anywhere. In
England it ushered in two centuries of colonial expansion. In
France it led to a century and a half of seeking to dominate
Europe.

To be sure there were then no nuclear weapons commanding
coexistence. But the opportunity presented by the Soviet need
for a respite must not be wasted by wallowing in psychiatric

AUG. 26 '88 17:16 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.13

12

assessments of Soviet leaders or in escaping every dilemma
by making the most favorable assumptions about the future.

In the new era that is emerging coexistence requires a
careful assessment of the legitimate interests of both sides
and a serious effort to determine whether and how they can be
reconciled. This is all the more important because the
diplomatic results of recent years create their own dynamism
and because the growing power of some countries increasingly
affects the global equilibrium. And the United States has little
precedent in its history for dealing with such a fluid international
environment.

Three sets of issues will shape the new era whatever one
thinks of Gorbachev's motivations:

- The nature of Third World conflicts now that the nuclear
superpowers seem to be disengaging in certain key areas.

- The political impact of the successful arms control
negotiations especially in Europe.

AUG. 26 '88 17:17 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 14

13

—The relationship of countries like Japan, China and India (and later Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico) to the international equilibrium.

Third World Issues

Major progress has been made on so-called regional issues during the course of this year. The Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has indicated that it would leave Cambodia by 1989; there is an agreement in principle for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

All this indicates at a minimum that the Soviet Union has found itself overextended in theaters with the exception of Afghanistan far from areas traditionally identified with Soviet national security. But foreign policy knows no plateaus; each advance creates a new set of challenges.

This is a particular problem for the United States which tends to treat foreign policy as a series of discrete problems

AUG. 26 '88 17:18 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 15

14

capable of final resolution. But this legacy of America's
geographic isolation which permitted the United States to
choose its involvements is not the way foreign policy has been
conducted by nations with narrower margins of survival and less
of a geographic buffer from world affairs. It is surely not the
way the Soviet Union looks at foreign policy. For the Soviet
Union--as its tsarist predecessors--is playing chess not poker.
Each move is part of a design. And it is patient and persistent.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has been too widely
celebrated as analogous to the American experience in Vietnam.
But the analogy is misleading. In Vietnam the United States not
only withdrew but abdicated. That cannot/ be the Soviet attitude
with respect to a country on the Soviet border. The Soviet Union
has surely abdicated an interest in Afghanistan which it has
asserted for a century and a half under tsars and Communists.
It will seek to assert it by different more indirect methods.
There are three possible outcomes after the Soviet troops withdraw:

AUG. 26 '88 17:19 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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(a) the emergence of a government of national reconciliation whose writ runs throughout the country; (b) the maintenance of the Communist regime in the cities because the mujahedeen while controlling the countryside cannot take fortified towns;

(c) the collapse of the Communist regime leading to civil war between pro-Pakistani, pro-Iranian, pro-Soviet, fundamentalist and secular factions.

The first outcome is extremely unlikely having never occurred in Afghan history. The other two will involve some kind of civil war. If the Communist regime maintains itself in the principal towns, the Soviets will have achieved their strategic objective: Afghanistan would be a forward base towards the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. Maintaining the resistance even in the countryside will grow increasingly difficult. The Communist government is internationally recognized; for example, the United States still maintains an embassy in Kabul. It will shed the stigma of Soviet occupation. The agreement leading to Soviet

P.17

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withdrawal has the Communist regime and Pakistan as the only parties and it prohibits Pakistan from supplying arms. To be sure the United States has declared that it will continue to equip the resistance; but this is a unilateral statement not self-evidently compatible with the terms of the agreement. As time goes by Soviet pressure on Pakistan already strong is certain to mount. And the death of President Zia will undoubtedly introduce an element of uncertainty about Pakistani policy.

But if the Communist regime in Kabul collapses a civil war among the many factions is almost certain. Pro-Iranian, pro-Pakistani, pro-Soviet, secular and fundamentalist factions will contest for preeminence in a manner reminiscent of Lebanon. If that happens the Soviet Union might well play the role of Syria in Lebanon as the ultimate arbiter of the conflict. In that case public support for the resistance in the United States is likely to diminish; indeed a definition of what is a legitimate resistance will almost surely become controversial. And the

AUG. 26 '88 17:20 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 18

17

perceived interests of Pakistan and the United States may
well diverge. Indeed America's Pakistan policy itself may
become an issue.

In other words, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan ushers
in a new and complicated diplomacy in which it becomes important
to prevent the implementation by the Soviet Union of Lenin's
dictum: one step backwards, two steps forward. This requires
a careful definition of (1) American interests in that country
(2) US relations in the Indian subcontinent (3) American attitudes
towards the Afghan resistance (4) long-term American attitude
towards Pakistan. There is no scope in this article to answer
these issues. It is enough to stress that the '90s are apt to
be more dangerous than even the preceding decade.

The situation in Cambodia is comparably complex. Of course
Vietnam has made a specialty of offering withdrawals that never
take place. But if for the first time in thirty years Hanoi
should keep its promise to withdraw from a neighboring nation in

AUG. 26 '88 17:21 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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Indochina a moral nightmare will present itself. For by
far the largest and best organized military force of the anti-
Vietnamese resistance is the unspeakable Khmer Rouge that killed
two million of its own population in the three yeras it governed
Cambodia from 1975-78. The trauma of America's Indochina
involvement has prevented American military assistance to the
anti-Khmer Rouge resistance forces. It is naive to appeal to
China--the principal sponsor of the anti-Vietnamese resistance--
to rein in their clients. Beijing cannot create a balance of
forces in a vacuum. And America must learn that the view that
negotiations do not have a momentum of their own is illusion.
Negotiations can ratify an equilibrium; they cannot create it.

Ironically the only hope for an equilibrium in Cambodia
is to use the Cambodian army trained by the Vietnamese as a
counterweight to the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese army leaves.
This is not an uplifting prospect. But foreign policy in the
end must deal with the material at hand; if the Khmer Rouge are

AUG. 26 '88 17:22 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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19

to be opposed there must be some local force to do so. If
the democracies cannot or will not support for example the
armed forces of Prince Sihanouk they will have to rely on a
morally less attractive alternative. What they must not do is
posture or ask Beijing to do their work for them.

Similar analyses could be made for Southern Africa or
Central America. But this would go beyond the scope of this
article. For present purposes it is enough to stress that
none of the solutions to regional conflicts worked out in recent
months are conclusive. In Afghanistan we can lose our strategic
position and in Cambodia our moral position. These regional
issues impose on the United States an unprecedented analysis of
its interests, its resources and its long-term strategy. And
failing that these regions will erupt again in a much more
insidious way than previously.

8/29
SSM- For your
files. 2nd part
of Draft #1.
Jody

## The New Phase of East-West Relations

As Third World problems move from military confrontation to
the diplomatic arena, Europe and Asia have suddenly become focal

20

points of East-West relationships. And especially in Europe
appearances are deceptive. A seeming calm could be the
prelude to a major crisis--unless the current preoccupation
with arms control is accompanied by a serious effort to master
and shape foreseeable political conflicts.

Unlike his predecessor who seemed above all concerned with
safeguarding the status quo in Europe Gorbachev seems to have
chosen to undermine the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Soviet
theoretical journals justify peace not so much for its own sake
as to deprive US policy of the fear with which it rallied its
allies to the common defense. Soviet emissaries taking the cue
from their General Secretary are promoting a so-called European
House from the Urals to the Atlantic which is supposed to achieve
European security and prevent European civilization from being
overwhelmed by American materialism. Its practical consequence
is to diminish American influence in Europe if not to expel us
from it. And that slogan is gaining in appeal especially in the
Federal Republic of Germany.

21

In that context the significance of arms control negotiations
is political. Soviet policymakers understand very well that the
various nuclear arms control agreements either concluded or in
the process of negotiation must undermine the existing NATO
strategy which is based on nuclear weapons. How often can the
phrase "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"
be repeated in US-Soviet communiqués before the nuclear deterrent
loses its credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons
are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes
unfeasible? And which Western statesman is prepared to initiate
an all-out nuclear war? In the existing climate of relaxation
of tensions it is escapist to believe that conventional rearmament
can serve as a substitute; NATO will be fortunate if it can
maintain its present level of conventional forces. Step-by-
patient-step the Soviets are elaborating a claim to a veto over
NATO defense policy. A point has been reached where the moderniza-
tion of short-range weapons introduced into Europe ten years ago

22

without controversy or even comment is on the verge of turning
into another bitter struggle.

As a result traditional pro-American groups, especially
in the Federal Republic of Germany, are gradually shifting their
emphasis to relations with the Soviet Union. More and more
political leaders visit Moscow as a prelude to elections rather
than Washington. Neutralist elements who in the entire postwar
period have argued either that tensions were artificial or that
there existed some deus ex machina to overcome them feel
vindicated. In 1982 the distinguished American historian Gordon
Craig in a prescient lecture on the ambivalent German relationship
to the West warned that historically Germany's ties had been in
Central Europe or the East and that excessive pressures by the
Western allies might produce "gusts of nostalgia" for a more
autonomous past. I believe that is now happening.

I do not expect anything remotely so dramatic as leaving
NATO or overt neutralism. But it is likely that efforts to

23

augment or to modernize NATO forces or to strengthen NATO
cohesion will meet increasing resistance. Even European
integration in the military field will become controversial.
We may then well witness a repetition of the debate of the
Fifties whether prospects for German unity are being sacrificed
on the altar of Western ties.

Conventional wisdom argues that the Soviets will become so
dependent on Western Europe economically as to preclude a return
to Cold War tensions. But dependence is double-edged. It is
equally possible--and perhaps more likely--that some Western
leaders will become so dependent psychologically and domestically
on good relations with Moscow that they will not run any risk
of the Kremlin's displeasure thereby giving the Soviets a veto
over a wide range of their policies.

These trends are being exploited by the Soviets with a
daring inconceivable in the Brezhnev period. But it remains to
be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as farsighted as it is

24

daring. For one thing the Soviet Union is operating from a
position of domestic weakness.

Revolutionaries rarely foresee all the consequences of
their actions. They attack the existing structure by forming
a coalition of all resentments. But having undermined it they
wind up having to reestablish discipline among their followers.
This is why revolutions usually consume their own children.

Gorbachev's situation illustrates this observation. Until
he also becomes President as he has proposed his sole official
position is that of General Secretary of the Communist Party.
He has repeatedly and passionately avowed his commitment to
one-party rule. At the same time he seems to recognize that his
reforms can only be achieved by overturning the encrusted party
bureaucracy which supplies his power base. Because the Soviet
system by the account of its own leaders at the party conference
is run like a feudal state on the basis of personal relationships
every new General Secretary has begun his reign with a purge.

25

What is novel in Gorbachev's approach is not the purge
which is clearly under way with the traditional public humiliation
of the victims but his obvious conviction that his goals cannot
be achieved by the traditional method of taking over the Communist
Party. His solution is a complicated structure in which the
governmental and the party bureaucracies balance each other out.
They are joined only at the apex in the new office of the
President with unprecedented powers. When fully elaborated this
structure will lend itself to authoritarian control especially
after the purge is completed. At this point glasnost is a means
to bring pressure on the party bureaucracy not a permanent form
of government. Like many reformers Gorbachev may believe that
all reasonable people will come to similar conclusions; like
many revolutionaries he will be disappointed in that expectation.
Will he then attempt to destroy his critics, now his supporters?

As de Gaulle said over two decades ago: "During my lifetime
Communist ideology has been personified by many people. Each

26

of these leaders in his turn condemns, excommunicates,
crushes and at times kills the others. In any event he fights
firmly against the personality cult of the others."

It is impossible to predict at this point whether Gorbachev
will prove an exception. What is certain is that the process
started by Gorbachev will produce a substantial period of turmoil
and uncertainty. The established bureaucracies will not give
up their power and their privileges easily. In an empire of many
peoples, decentralization is bound to run into the nationality
question. There is no entrepreneurial tradition. The secret
police and the military--two of the most potent bureaucracies--
have not yet been heard from.

It is possible that this turmoil will lead to a more restrained
foreign policy--though as I explained above surely not automatically.
It is equally possible that in the end the regime will appeal
to the nationalism that has historically unified at least the
Russian part of the population.

27

Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove even more unsettling in the countries of Eastern Europe. Even after hearing that every leader since Lenin was responsible either for a cult of personality, adventurism or stagnation a Soviet citizen can still take patriotic pride in the victory in World War II, the industrialization of the Soviet Union and its achievement of high status in international affairs. No such comfort is available to the East Europeans. Their ruling parties were imposed by a country which now advertises publicly the corruption and inefficiency of its system. The Gorbachev reforms are thus bound to increase the challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling groups in Eastern Europe. These will not be able to operate the subtle balancing act between government and party envisaged by Gorbachev for the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that some of the East European Communist parties--in East Germany explicitly and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia--are dissociating openly from the Soviet pattern. When the East

28

German Communist organ announces that the German Democratic Republic never having followed the Soviet pattern in the first place need not adapt it to the party conference it is proclaiming at a minimum a doctrine of national Communism. And in most countries of Eastern Europe nationalism is not friendly to Russia. The Polish Communist Party, of course, is in trouble even without changes in the Kremlin.

Gorbachev may therefore well be ushering in a period of turmoil in Eastern Europe. Faced by spreading upheaval Soviet leaders may feel compelled to intervene. In this connection it is significant that Gorbachev in his interview with the _Washington Post_ claimed that the West fomented the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czech spring of 1968; in other words challenges to Communist preeminence are ascribed to foreign intervention by definition. And if the Soviets should intervene--even as an act of desperation--the present euphoric mood in the West will switch

29

to hysteria repeating--with even wider swings--the postwar
cycle between excesses of conciliation and excesses of belligerence.

It may thus happen that the new Soviet policy has created
a Frankenstein. As the Federal Republic and to a lesser extent
the other countries of West Europe increase their activities
and investments in Eastern Europe the centrifugal tendencies in
the Soviet empire will be accelerated--especially if there is
not some political understanding of how this process might evolve.
In short Soviet policy whether by design or inadvertence is
returning the focal point of diplomacy to Europe. This may
well require more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than by
Washington.

Soviet policy can embarrass the Atlantic Alliance but the
long-range dilemma is on the Soviet side. To weaken NATO Moscow
must pursue a policy of moderation both internationally and
domestically. But such a policy encourages autonomy in Eastern
Europe and tempts Western Europe and especially the Federal

30

Republic into seeking to dissociate Eastern Europe from the
Soviet Union by economic and even political penetration. Then
we might see a reemergence of the competition between Teuton
and Slav that produced one world war or a partition of Eastern
Europe into spheres of influence which led to another. Either
contingency is certain to lead to a traumatic crisis. If that
occurs in a vacuum the danger of brutal Soviet intervention is
real, perhaps designed to demonstrate Western impotence in shaping
the future of Eastern Europe. A new crisis over Berlin may seem
farfetched today but is conceivable in that context.

When the major foreign policy problems are political arms
control negotiations cannot continue to bear the principal burden
of East-West relations. They are too esoteric; they turn political
leaders into ratifiers of agreements among technicians. It is
time to face the fact that no agreement so far negotiated--
including those in which I participated--has made a strategic
difference. Indeed they are justified domestically on precisely

31

the grounds that they leave the military situation unchanged.

They are a response to domestic pressures; they are valued for their political symbolism as a step towards an undefined peace.

But the symbolism in fact accelerates the potential crisis described here by encouraging centrifugal tendencies in both East and West without creating a political framework for dealing with them. Has the time come to begin sensitive discreet discussions about the political future of Europe? Historically and logically the European House of which Soviet emissaries speak cannot include parts of the Soviet Union because territorially the larger part of the Soviet Union is in Asia. A true European House would extend from the Soviet-Polish frontier to the Atlantic.

A thoughtful exploration of this concept would point out to Soviet leaders that by identifying their security with the forcible maintenance of regimes considered alien by their publics they have made their entire policy dependent on the capacity to repress periodic upheavals putting Soviet long-range policy at

32

the mercy of unforeseeable events. Has the time come to
separate the nature of the regimes from the security of the
Soviet Union? Are not in the long run arrangements in Finland
more conducive to Soviet security than those of Eastern Europe?

Is it possible to devise security arrangements for Eastern Europe
that meet Soviet-security concerns even very widely defined while
permitting a political evolution compatible with popular aspirations?

In the context of such a House of Europe it would be possible to
conceive a security system involving drastic reductions of all
outside forces—including those of the US—that might in fact
revolutionize present concepts of security.

This is not a negotiation that lends itself to the formal
diplomacy conducted by coveys of diplomats and tacticians
characteristic of arms control negotiations. It requires above
all a strategy worked out with some care and closely coordinated
with our allies. It would be most effective in the context of
rapid progress towards West European integration in which case

33

Europe should play a major exploratory role in the sensitive,
confidential talks without which the concept is doomed.

## Asian Perspectives

The emerging multipolar world will produce major changes
in Asia as well; indeed Asia will be one of its principal
components. Gorbachev has made essentially the same appeal in
Asia as in Europe: a suggestion that the United States has
become dispensable and a proposal for some vague Asian security
system to parallel the House of Europe. But the impact has been
different.

The Asian nations have gone to school in the European power
politics of the age of colonialism and have grafted onto it their
own unsentimental national experiences. They do not look for a
transcendent end of international tensions. They will try to
assess the trade-off between a decline in Soviet ideological
dynamism and its increase in real power if perestroika succeeds.

34

They will seek to evaluate whether American actions reflect
a long-range strategy, a decline in American strength or domestic
incoherence. They will be preoccupied in a manner no longer
conceivable in Europe by their relations with each other. Hence
the ups and downs of US-Soviet relations concern them more from
a geopolitical than from a tactical perspective. Not having felt
so dependent on the United States nor as afraid of the Soviet
Union there is not in Asia the emotional absorption with Gorbachev's
personality as in the Western democracies.

At least since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 China
has feared the application to it of the Brezhnev doctrine by
which Moscow asserted its right to maintain doctrinal orthodoxy
in the Communist world. That fear has undoubtedly been eased
by recent developments in the Soviet Union. With Moscow imitating
many of China's economic reforms the Soviet incentive to impose
ideological conformity on China has surely diminished. On the
other hand the growth of Chinese power could--at least in Chinese

35

eyes--create a Soviet temptation to set back Chinese modernization.

But that temptation finds a limit in the Soviet need to maintain its standing elsewhere. Too overt pressure on China would weaken the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States.

Thus the careful calculators in Beijing will lower their estimate of the dangers of a direct quest for hegemony by the Soviet Union and will feel less inclined to gear their foreign policy to preventing it.

Moreover they will take care not to be isolated by a US-Soviet rapprochement. They will not want to be the last to man the forts of the Cold War.

The likely outcome is a steady improvement in Sino-Soviet relations--especially as the Soviets meet Chinese conditions, above all Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. At the same time Chinese planners are not sentimental. They will keep in mind that rapprochement with Moscow cannot shorten the 3,000 miles of the Sino-Soviet frontier. They know that professions of good

36

will can be reversed. They will try to improve relations
with the Soviet Union without weakening their ties to the
United States which China will continue to require as counter-
weight to any hegemonial aspirations in Asia. And in that
respect China's long-term fear concerns Japan nearly as much as
the USSR. China will continue to be interested in a vital and
independent Europe lest the Soviet Union shift the center of
gravity of its pressures towards the East.

The real challenge in Sino-US relations is whether the
United States will be able to grasp Beijing's complex and power-
oriented diplomacy. Ideologists frustrated by the waning of the
Cold War under the aegis of a conservative president may be tempted
to turn on China. Liberals may resist the reliance on balance of
power which is implicit in making China's territorial integrity
a major American interest. The Chinese may compound these
tendencies by misunderstanding American psychology or domestic
politics.

37

Japan, already an economic superpower, is on the way to becoming a major political and even military force. Though less than 2% of the Gross National Product Japan's military budget is already the third largest in the world. Japan is not likely to be basically influenced by the domestic changes in the Soviet Union. Its policy towards Moscow has always been shaped less by an ideological threat to which Japan feels itself largely immune than by national aspirations especially its claim to the northern islands and by concern over Soviet military power in the Far East. As its own military power grows and America emphasizes non-nuclear defense the price Japan is prepared to pay for American military protection is bound to decline. And the economic rivalry between the two allies is likely to increase.

At the same time India will grow in strength and play an increasing international role. Its policies can be deduced from Britain's east of Suez in the 19th century which were essentially shaped by the Viceroy's office in New Delhi. India's modern

38

leaders are likely to have the same conception of security as
their colonial predecessors. This is why they have insisted on
all the boundaries established during British rule. They will
seek to be the strongest power in the subcontinent and will
attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian
Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Thus whatever the day-to-day
initiations between New Delhi and Washington, its own geopolitical
interests will impel India over the next decade to assume some of
the security functions now exercised by Washington in those areas.

Thus the balance of power in Asia involves the United States
less directly than in Europe. In Europe for the foreseeable
future, the United States must be part of the balance. In Asia,
Korea excepted, no American troops are in the front line. In the
'90s there will exist in fact two balances of power in Asia:
between China, Japan, the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia and
between Japan, India and to some extent the Soviet Union in
Southeast Asia. The American role with respect to these two

39

balances should be similar to that of Britain with respect to
the European continent: we are the balancer of the equilibrium.
Whatever our legal obligations an Asia under hostile domination
is as much against US interests as an enslaved Europe. This
after all was the proximate cause of US involvement in the
second World War. As a balancer the US must support the weaker
against the stronger and the potential victim against the potential
aggressor. Such a policy has to be carried out in the face of
the almost certain degradation of our Philippine bases over the
next decade and the need to restructure both forces and command
arrangements in Korea in the same period. This requires a sense
of national strategy yet to be acquired by American foreign policy.

## Conclusion

The basic US foreign policy problem is conceptual. The
evolution in Moscow, the change in weapons technology and the
emergence of new power centers have combined to hasten the end of

40

the world as it existed in the forty years since the end of
the second World War. This is often identified with a decline
of American power. In fact absolute American power has grown
in the past forty years and is increasing still. But the
strength of other nations has increased even more rapidly partly
because as a result of the devastation of the second World War
they started from a smaller base.

The emergence of a multipolar world does not diminish
America's importance but requires us to change our involvement
from a principal actor to a supporting role at least in some areas.
If our relative power is shrinking, if ideology is declining and
if new power centers are emerging it is clear that we can no
longer do everything simultaneously. It follows that peace
presupposes a balance of power--a concept which Americans of all
persuasions have historically resisted.

It is part of America's historic legacy that we have
considered our situation as unique and immune to the experiences

41

of less fortunate nations. But the basic change in international
relations is that our situation is no longer unique. Modern
technology stakes American survival as of all other nations.
A collapse of the equilibrium would threaten American institutions
together with those of our allies. We can no longer afford to
wait for an actual assault on the equilibrium because by then it
is usually too late. A balance of power world cannot afford
obsession with psychiatric analyses of the leaders of adversaries.
It must focus on capabilities as much as intentions. It has to
deal with nuances rather than absolutes; it assesses power
relationships as much as moral preferences. It knows few final
solutions for every apparent solution creates a new equilibrium
that must be managed. It requires consistency of policy based
on a national consensus regarding historical and geopolitical
trends.

The second requirement is to build arms control negotiations
into a concept of national strategy. Driven in all democracies

42

by domestic politics, conducted by experts who have studied
the issues for as many years as the political leaders have hours
to deal with them they threaten to slip out of control of any
long-range policy. For example all experts agree that a reduction
of present strategic forces by 50% increases the vulnerability of
America's strategic deterrent. There is wide consensus, too,
that this increase in vulnerability could be avoided by measures
such as mobile missiles or fewer missiles on each submarine or
strategic defense. But these measures have not been taken or
even publicly outlined and they are being opposed by one of the
candidates.

Modernization of the strategic forces is therefore a
prerequisite to arms control negotiations and it must be related
as well to a sustainable concept of conventional defense. It is
highly probable that the next President will face early on a
renewal of the Gorbachev tactic of accepting some Western proposals
made for domestic considerations and insufficiently worked out in

43

strategic or political terms. This could involve some reduction
of Soviet forces in Hungary, perhaps Czechoslovakia, or even
from Eastern Germany. What should the West's response be then?
How will it affect nuclear modernization in the Federal Republic
in the light of the statement by the Federal government that
modernization would not take place if there were progress towards
conventional arms control? What will be the defense strategy
of NATO after nuclear weapons have been stigmatized and conventional
weapons frozen or reduced in a strategically irrelevant manner?
Historically conventional deterrence has never worked. What then
is the Western concept of conventional arms control?

Arms control negotiations are an integral part of Western
diplomacy. They will turn into a trap, however, if they are not
enclosed in a concept of defense on one side and a vision of a
political future on the other.

This requires a new look at the organization by which
national security policy is developed in the United States. The

44

emphasis is on adversary procedures between increasingly autonomous departments that specialize in solving day-to-day operational problems. There is in practice no focal point for long-range strategy especially since the decline in the role of the National Security Council staff and its diversion into the very short-term operational management that it should seek to overcome. It has been fashionable to deprecate the role of the national security advisor. But without some focal point in the White House to make sure that the options are sorted out, a new President will be swamped by pet projects without the means of evaluating them. And the great departments must take a look at their own structure to make sure that strategy is not overwhelmed by tactics.

Any catalogue of contemporary problems is bound to look formidable especially at the onset of a period of dramatic change. But it is important to maintain perspective. The problems outlined here are almost without exception susceptible to policy

45

adaptations; those of the Communist world are structural--a
much more difficult challenge.

The United States and its friends are thus in the unusual
position of being able to shape their own future.