-26-

So our journey must start from where we are now.

This is a time of lessened tension, of greater equilibrium, of
diffused power. But if the world is better than our earlier
fears, it still falls far short of our hopes. To deal with the
present does not mean that we are content with it.

The most striking feature of the contemporary
period -- the feature that gives complexity as well as hope --
is the radical transformation in the nature of power.

Throughout history power has generally been homogeneous.

Military, economic and political potential were closely related.

To be powerful a nation had to be strong in all categories. Today
the vocabulary of strength is more complex. Military muscle
does not guarantee political influence. Economic giants can

-27-

be militarily weak, and military strength may not be able
to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political
influence even when they have neither military nor economic
strength.

It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power,
for there are several which have to be related to each other.
In the military sphere, there are two super powers. In
economic terms, there are at least five major groupings.
Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged;
some 80 new nations have come into being since the end of
World War II and regional groups are assuming ever
increasing importance.

Above all, whatever the measure of power, its
political utility has changed. Throughout history increases in

-28-

military power -- however slight -- could be turned into
specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals
of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage
is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is
reached, additional increments of power do not translate into
usable political strength; and attempts to achieve tactical
gains can lead to cataclysm.

This environment both puts a premium on stability
and makes it difficult to maintain. Today's striving for
equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power
of previous periods. The very notion of "operating" a
classical balance of power disintegrates when the change
required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be
achieved by limited means.

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More specifically, there is no parallel with the
nineteenth century. Then, the principal countries shared
essentially similar concepts of legitimacy and accepted the
basic structure of the existing international order. Small
adjustments in strength were significant. The "balance"
operated in a relatively confined geographic area. None of
these factors obtain today.

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a
simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly
shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous
centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time.
In an age of ideological schism the distinction between friends
and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals as
well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength

-30-

of our friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with our
opponents.

When we refer to five or six or seven major centers
of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded
but that a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were
only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new
centers of power has meant greater freedom of action and
greater importance for all other nations.

In this setting, our immediate aim has been to
build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of
sparing mankind the scourges of war. An interdependent
world community cannot tolerate either big power confrontations
or recurrent regional crises.

-31-

But peace must be more than the absence of conflict.

We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human
aspirations, not as an end in itself. We have learned much
about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots.

We have begun to accommodate our differences, but we have
not affirmed our commonality. We may have improved the
mastery of equilibrium, but we have not yet attained justice.

In the encyclical for which this conference is named,
Pope John sketched a greater vision. He foresaw "that no
political community is able to pursue its own interests and
develop itself in isolation" for "there is a growing awareness
of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The opportunities of mankind now transcend nationalism,

- 32 -

and can only be dealt with by nations acting in concert:

-- For the first time in generations mankind is
in a position to shape a new and peaceful
international order. But do we have the
imagination and determination to carry
forward this still fragile task of creation?

-- For the first time in history we may have the
technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs.
The imperatives of the modern world respect
no national borders and must inevitably open
all societies to the world around them. But
do we have the political will to join together
to accomplish this great end?

- 33 -

If this vision is to be realized, America's active
involvement is inescapable. History will judge us by our deeds,
not by our good intentions.

But it cannot be the work of any one country. And it
cannot be the undertaking of any one Administration or one
branch of government or one party. To build truly is to chart
a course that will be carried on by future leaders because it
has the enduring support of the American people.

So let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us
restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and
the executive, between the government and the press, between
the people and their public servants. Let us learn once again
to debate our methods and not our motives, to focus on our

- 34 -

destiny and not on our divisions. Let us all contribute our
different views and perspectives but let us, once again, see
ourselves as engaged in a common enterprise. If we are to
shape a world community we must first restore community
at home.

With Americans working together, America can
work with others toward man's eternal goal of a Pacem in
Terris — peace abroad, peace at home and peace within
ourselves.

October 9

Tuesday morning
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING:
Norton Ginsburg

The national interests of the United States

An independent view

Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Barnet

The opening addresses are intended to set forth the current range of agreement and disagreement among those officially charged with responsibility for creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy. These addresses are intended to be representative of more detached views among the experts who operate in the academic/intellectual community.

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: Frances FitzGerald, Leslie Gelb, Stanley Karnow, Hans Morgenthau, Harvey Wheeler, George F. Will

Tuesday afternoon
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING:
Fred Warner Neal

Relations with allies *Paul Warnke*

Relations with adversaries *Marshall Shulman*

Relations with less-developed countries *Theodore M. Hesburgh*

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: Herschelle Challenor, Jerome Cohen, John Paton Davies, Morton Halperin, David Horowitz, Ronald Steel

Tuesday evening
8:00 to 10:00

PRESIDING:
* Stanley R. Resor

The national interest and military power

*Clark Clifford*

What kind of military establishment is required to maintain
national security in the new global setting?

Deterrence by means of mass destruction

*Herbert York*

The limitations of arms control, the possibilities of disarmament,
and prospectively, possible new developments in armament.

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: Gloria Emerson, William Foster, Admiral Gene La Rocque, Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner, Albert Wohlstetter

III

IV

V

VI

(LC)

October 10

VII

Trade and economic competition

Peter G. Peterson

The possible replacement of questions of security by economics as the primary factor in international relations; credits and currency; the multinational corporation.

Wednesday morning
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING:
To be announced

VIII

Development

Kenneth Thompson

Can we transfer resources and technology from developed to developing countries on terms acceptable to both?

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: Frank Church, Richard N. Cooper, Neil Jacoby, Abraham Ribicoff, Walter Surrey, Paul Sweezy

IX

The emergence of transnational issues

The scientific/technological challenge
to traditional concepts of sovereignty *Alexander King*

The necessity of common or shared resources,
including science and technology *Gerard Piel*

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: George Brown, Jr., Harrison Brown, Seyom Brown, Jonas Salk, Louis Sohn, John Wilkinson

Wednesday afternoon
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING:
Lord Ritchie-Calder

X

The imperatives of institution-building

Philip Jessup

The basic questions of sovereignty, nationalism, interdependence, and the role of law raised by sovereign nations.

Wednesday evening
8:00 to 11:00

PRESIDING:
Bradford Morse

XI

The United Nations and alternative formulations

Richard Gardner

Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest groupings to deal with peace-keeping, and the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Richard Falk, Pauline Frederick, Edward M. Korry, Sol Linowitz, Charles Yost

* Invitation under consideration

(c)

October 11

XII

Thursday morning

9:30 to 12:30

The requirements of democratic foreign policy

PRESIDING:

Checks and balances: Executive vs. Congress

Rexford G. Tugwell

Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

Divided powers as stultification of policy-making vs. lack of accountability as a force toward authoritarianism.

PRESIDING:

Checks and balances: The partisan role

Harry S. Ashmore

Hubert H. Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern,

Edmund S. Muskie, Nelson Rockefeller, George Wallace

Political parties as the focus of interest-centered and ideological pressures on the allocation of priorities. Can politics stop at the water's edge?

If possible, is bi-partisan foreign policy desirable? Are there proper limits to the adversary process in a political campaign?

Thursday afternoon

2:00 to 5:00

XIII

PRESIDING:

Power, self-interest and social pretense—
The establishment and foreign policy

John Cogley

J. Kenneth Galbraith

Can a self-governing people tolerate a closed elitist foreign policy process?

Can international relations be based on open covenants, openly arrived at?

Is there a practical balance?

The relationship of government and media

James C. Thomson

Secrecy, deception, and manipulation of public opinion.

The First Amendment issue.

Critique

PANEL MEMBERS: Alfred Balk, Thomas E. Cronin, David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke, Peter Lisagor, George Reedy

Conclusion:

Robert M. Hutchins

No. 24

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY

MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1973

8:30 p.m.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

Aspects of the National Interest

Preface: The Middle East

One of my themes tonight -- unexpectedly more topical than I had expected -- is the need of a world rule of law, in the words of the United Nations Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

Regardless of the outcome of the current fighting in Sinai and the Golan Heights, Arabs and Israelis alike are catching a glimpse of their destiny in a world without law. It is a destiny of recurrent war, unending tensions, fear and hate, and a crushing burden of arms. For the fourth time in a generation these otherwise gifted peoples have failed of the promise of their own ancient civilizations and plunged into futile hostilities. The failure, however, like the danger, is not theirs alone but that of the entire civilized world, which solemnly committed itself at San Francisco in 1945 "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind..."

It is possible, though hardly likely, that the Arabs and Israelis are content to continue the struggle, each in vain hope of some ultimate victory. I cannot believe that really is their wish because of the enormous costs to themselves and the bleakness of the future which continuing struggle will bring. The Arab states, including those which are now conservative, are likely to be radicalized as their grievances fester. Israel, already a garrison state, faces the prospect of mounting terrorism and recurrent war, of a national existence with no semblance of security. However confident they may be of their own military prowess, the Israelis can hardly relish this prospect.

But even if the combatants can accept the prospect of unending struggle, the outside world cannot. As long as there is danger of other nations being drawn in -- and that danger is constant -- the world cannot stand aside. Like the Balkans in 1914, the Middle East has become the potential flash point of world conflict. In addition, there is the energy problem. Call it what you like -- blackmail or ordinary business -- the Arab Middle East possesses at least 300 billion of the 500 billion barrels of proven world oil reserves. With no spare productive capacity of its own, the United States -- like other industrial nations -- is increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil, and consequently in need of good relations with the producing countries. These countries, it is well to remember, have no direct quarrel with the United States and have never done anything to harm the United States. Our dependence on their oil is a matter of national interest, no more so perhaps than our emotional bond to Israel, but surely no less so either. These are matters which affect all nations, and because they go beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict itself, the outside world has the right and responsibility to participate in the making of a settlement.

The first requirement is an immediate cease-fire -- not a delayed cease-fire which might allow one side or the other to impose "new facts," but an immediate cease-fire ordered by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with its authority,

-1A-

under Chapter VII of the Charter, to "decide what measures shall be taken" to restore peace. Beyond a cease-fire the Security Council ought now, without delay and with full support from the United States, to implement its resolution of November 22, 1967, by persuasion if possible, by enforcement if necessary, in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Charter. That resolution officially supported by the United States through the Rogers plan of 1969, calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories, but also provides for Israel's survival and security by requiring the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area."

Given a will to settle, reasonable variations on the Security Council resolution of November 1967 might be worked out to bolster Israel's security. The Rogers Plan allows of "insubstantial alterations" of territory for the sake of mutual security, and these could include the retention by Israel of some part of the Golan Heights from which the Syrians before 1967 fired down upon civilian communities. In addition, arrangements might be made for the phased restoration of Sinai by Egypt along with a general acknowledgment of Egypt's sovereignty over the region. Israel's right of free access through the Gulf of Aqaba might be secured by the stationing at Sharm el Sheikh of an international force, removable only by the consent of all parties, or alternately by an Israeli leasehold comparable to the special French presence in the German Saar after the First World War.

Jerusalem, because of its profound importance to three great religions, can and should be made an international city. Its sacredness to Jews is well-known, but its equal importance to Muslims has not been fully appreciated in the West. It may be recalled that in 1967, by a vote of 99 to 0 in which the United States abstained, the United Nations General Assembly condemned Israel's unilateral annexation of the city. Its status now cannot be accepted as "non-negotiable."

All these arrangements could be guaranteed by a binding arrangements, duly ratified, between Israel, the Arab states and the United Nations. In addition -- as I have suggested on several previous occasions -- a United Nations guarantee could be supplemented by an identical bilateral treaty between Israel and the United States -- not an executive agreement but a treaty consented to by the Senate -- under which the United States would guarantee the territory and independence of Israel within its adjusted borders. This supplementary, bilateral arrangement with Israel would obligate the United States to use force if necessary, in accordance with its constitutional processes, to assist Israel against any violation of its borders which it could not repel itself, but the agreement would also obligate Israel, firmly and unequivocally, never to violate those borders herself.

The conflict in the Middle East is testimony to the bankruptcy of traditional power politics. Had the nations met their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter in 1948 or 1956 or 1967, any or all of these three wars could have been avoided. Now, once again, tragedy brings opportunity. As will be shown in the remarks which follow, I am less than confident of the rational and humane conduct of human affairs. But neither have I given up on that possibility. I perceive in the Middle East a unique opportunity to make the United Nations work as it was intended to work, and by doing so, not only to resolve the conflict between Arabs and Israelis, but also to create a most valuable precedent for the future.

-1B-

# I. Concepts of Policy

Perhaps in the abstract sense there is an objective category which can be called the "national interest." Human affairs, however, are not conducted in the abstract, and as one moves from the theoretical to the operational, objectivity diminishes and sentiment rises; ideas give way to ideology, principle to personality, reason to rationalization. As formulated by men of power, the national interest is a subjective and even capricious potpourri, with ingredients of strategic advantage, economic aspiration, national pride, group emotion, and the personal vanity of the leaders themselves. This is not to suggest that the concept of "national interest" is false but that it is elusive and far from self-evident, and when statesmen invoke it, they raise more questions than they answer.

There have been in recent American usage at least three separate conceptions of national interest; the ideological, exemplified by the anti-Communist crusade of the cold war; the geopolitical, which treats international relations as an endless struggle for power as an end in itself; and the legal-institutional, an approach which holds that international affairs, like domestic affairs, must be brought under the regulation of law, an approach which gave rise under American leadership to the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. Depending upon which approach you embrace, or deplore, your conception of the national interest will vary from, or conflict with, another. My own preference -- bias if you like -- is toward the legal-institutional. The preference of the Nixon Administration, as I perceive it, is strongly geo-political. Though divergent in concept, these approaches often overlap in practice; I find myself, for instance, in agreement with the Soviet Union, but in disagreement on certain underlying concepts of what the national interest is and what it is not.

It is not my intention here to offer a definitive catalogue of the national interests of the United States but rather to comment on certain aspects of the national interest which I believe to be illustrative of its basic character. I shall not comment tonight on the emergence of China as a leading and accepted nation, except to take note of the extraordinary experiment in social cooperation within China which may well prove exemplary for much of the third world, and also to express hope that China will play a leading and responsible role in strengthening the United Nations. Nor do I comment here on the seemingly intractable problems of poverty and population growth in the third world. In all of these the United States has major national interests, but I confine myself here to a discussion of basic concepts of national interest, of the fragile and threatened détente with the Soviet Union, of the need to restore economic health at home, and the continuing significance of the all-but-forgotten promise of the United Nations. Though by no means definitive, these areas seem to me to be both topical and illustrative of the kinds of national policy which are consistent with our national tradition, congenial to our national character, and best conceived, overall, to advance the security and welfare of the American people.

Administration on the wisdom of détente with the

-2-

It has ceased to be useful, if ever it was, to deal with foreign policy as a category distinct from domestic policy. Neither can be rationally conceived or successfully executed except as aspects of national policy. I am thinking not of the policy maker's natural preference for strong domestic support of his foreign policy, but of the more fundamental need of a foreign policy which advances the well-being of our people, does not drain resources unduly, and is compatible with the national character. In the course of history nations have been defeated by foreign enemies at least as often because of internal weaknesses of their societies as because of insufficient armaments. But I would go even beyond the fact of demonstrable interaction between foreign and domestic problems to suggest that a well-conceived foreign policy is not only related to but necessarily subordinate to domestic needs and aspirations. In a report of a few years ago the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that "Foreign policy is not an end in itself. We do not have a foreign policy because it is interesting or fun, or because it satisfies some basic human need; we conduct foreign policy for a purpose external to itself, the purpose of securing democratic values in our own country."¹ To put the matter simply: our national interest has to do with the kind of society we live in, and only incidentally with the kinds of society other people live in.

It is mistaken to conceive of foreign policy as an adventure, even an idealistic adventure. Echoing General de Gaulle's mystical conception of France's role, Secretary Kissinger has suggested twice recently that "America was not true to itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself" -- a "spiritual" meaning, he went on to explain.² Dr. Kissinger also endorsed Theodore Roosevelt's entreaty that we "dare mighty things" and "win glorious triumphs." That invocation, the Secretary said, "epitomizes the essence and strength of this nation." I do not know exactly what "mighty things" to be dared the Secretary of State has in mind, but I must say that I find the notion disturbing. It is my impression that Theodore Roosevelt was an impetuous and enthusiastic chauvinist with imperialistic tendencies. There may have been a kind of romantic idealism in his outlook, but it is the wrong kind of idealism, dangerous and obsolete in this nuclear age.

Foreign policy is not an adventure, and our statesmen are not cavaliers but public servants. It is not daring but competence and prudence that are required of them. When they forget that, and take flight with their own soaring rhetoric, they get into trouble, and drag the rest of us with them. I do not agree with Dr. Kissinger that our American experience necessarily has "universal meaning," or that America requires a meaning beyond itself. There is meaning beyond itself. There is meaning enough in being ourselves, a meaning by no means yet fulfilled, and in letting others find their own meanings.

The primacy of domestic policy has nothing to do with "isolationism" -- a concept which has become functionally irrelevant as well as rhetorically polemical. The charge of "neo-isolationism" is an invention of people who confuse internationalism with an intrusive American interventionism, with a quasi-imperialism. Those of us who are called "neo-isolationists" are, I believe, the opposite: internationalists

1 "National Commitments," Report prepared for Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office), April 16, 1969, p. 9.

2 Confirmation Hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 7, 1973; International Platform Assoc., Aug. 2, 1973.

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(LO)

In the classical sense of that term, in the sense in which it was brought into American usage by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. We believe in international cooperation through international institutions. We would like to try to keep the peace through the United Nations, and we would like to try to assist the poor countries through such institutions as the World Bank. We do not think the United Nations is a failure; we think it has never been tried.

The merit of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy is that it is rooted in a coherent view of the world; the principal failing of the Nixon-Kissinger policy is the particular worldview in which it is rooted. The power politics approach is an improvement on the ideological crusade of the cold war, and the Administration deserves credit for the openings to China and Russia which have alleviated the cold war. But the balance-of-power approach, on which our new relationships with China and Russia are based, is justly criticized as cold and amoral, oriented to process rather than purpose, as if the "game" of nations were nothing but a game, conducted for the sake of the game, not for winning *something* but just for the sake of winning, for being "Number One." But the ultimate failing of supposedly hard-headed, realistic power politics is that, always in the long-run and often in the short-run as well, the approach turns out to be neither hard-headed nor realistic as a means of keeping the peace. However successful the balance-of-power has been in keeping the peace over certain periods of time, it has always broken down in the end, culminating as in 1914 in general war.

There are many reasons for the inherent instability of power politics. One is the failure to take account of the internal life of nations. In the eighteenth century the kings of Europe were able to alter and adjust the balance-of-power through shifting alliances; even in 1939 the Hitler-Stalin pact shattered the last remaining fragment of European stability. For the most part, however, modern nations gain and lose strength, and with it the ability to upset the international equilibrium, as the result of internal developments. Germany upset the European balance in the late nineteenth century primarily because her economy and industry grew much faster than those of her neighbors, enabling Germany to become militarily preponderant. More recently, France has reclaimed a leading role in Europe despite the loss of empire, more accurately perhaps *because* of it; the stability of the Fifth Republic and the rapid growth of the French economy since the Algerian war have given France a new weight in international affairs. Conversely, and more pertinently, we have seen the influence and reputation of the United States in world affairs diminished by political scandal and economic dislocations, the latter largely the result of extravagant military spending. Confrontations, summits, alliances and spheres-of-influence are surely factors in a nation's position in the world, but they are no longer the major factors; the major factors are internal.

A skillful diplomacy can of course take account of domestic developments, but here we are thrown back upon the cleverness of statesmen -- a commodity hardly to be relied upon. And that indeed is the root weakness of the game of nations: it is a despotism without laws, as stable or shaky, just or unjust, as the men momentarily at the top of the heap. In international relations as within our own country stability requires institutions; it requires a system that *ordinary* men can run and incompetent men cannot ruin. Guarantee if you can that the game will be played by a Bismarck or Talleyrand, by a Kissinger or Le Duc Tho, and perhaps I will withdraw my objections. But as long as luminaries give way to lesser lights -- and they always do -- the objection stands. As Henry Kissinger wrote

-4-

of Prince Bismarck, "In the hands of others lacking his subtle touch, his methods led to the collapse of the nineteenth century state system. The nemesis of power is that, except in the hands of a master, reliance on it is more likely to produce a contest of arms than of self-restraint."³

That brings me to the rub of both my concurrence with, and dissent from, the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. I concur, strongly, in the efforts toward a "structure of peace," but I am concerned with the flimsiness of the structure. It is makeshift and fragile, too dependent on agility and cleverness, too delicate to work for dull leaders or withstand incompetent ones. I remain, therefore, a Wilsonian, a seeker still of a world system of laws rather than of men, a believer still in the one great new idea of this century in the field of international relations, the idea of an international organization with permanent processes for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

## II. The Structure of Détente

Reluctant though we may be to relate foreign policy to our domestic affairs, we seem all too willing at times to apply our foreign policy to other people's domestic affairs. The Jackson amendment to the trade bill pending in Congress would deny most-favored-nation trade treatment to the Soviet Union -- which is to say discriminate against its trade -- unless the Soviet Union eliminates restrictions on emigration by its citizens. On September 17 the Senate, on the initiative of Senator Mondale, adopted a resolution, without referral to a committee and with minimum discussion, asking the President to press the Soviet Government to stop oppressing dissidents and permit its citizens freedom of expression and emigration. Under the Mondale resolution the President is called upon to negotiate nothing less than a revamping of the Soviet system, and the dismantling of a police state apparatus going back half a century under the Communists and a thousand years before that under the tsars. It is a worthy sentiment but a tall order.

Nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries is one of the cardinal rules of international law and relations, and it is codified in the United Nations Charter. The essential purpose of the rule of nonintervention is to prevent larger countries from bullying smaller ones, and to prevent quarrels arising from gratuitous meddling. There are times when nonintervention seems harsh and immoral, as when an oppressive government is left free to mistreat its own people. At times an exception may be warranted, as when a society disintegrates into barbarism, or when an internal issue becomes a threat to international peace, as that is defined in the United Nations Charter. Much more often than not, however, nonintervention is more likely to advance justice than to detract from it. As we Americans discovered in Vietnam, outsiders are selcom wise enough, just enough, or disinterested enough to advance the morality or welfare of a society not their own. The Russian people have lived under dictatorship throughout their history; it is not for us, at this late date, to try to change that by external pressure, especially at a time when there is a better chance than ever to build a cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Why indeed should we cooperate with the Soviet Union, a country whose social system is inimical to our own? The answer is simplicity itself: we have to get along with the Russians

³ Quoted by James Chace in *A World Elsewhere: The New American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973)

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because, in matters of world peace, we cannot get along without them. The threat of nuclear destruction has become a commonplace, so much so that we tend to dismiss it. But the fact remains that the leaders of the two nations have the means at their disposal at any time to destroy each other's cities and much or most of each other's populations, and there is nothing -- *nothing* -- either side could do to prevent it. American pioneer families helped each other to build cabins and clear the land because the job was too big to do alone -- cooperation was a matter of survival. Similarly, the Bedouin Arabs have an ancient etiquette of hospitality -- a traveller across the desert cannot be refused food and water, because the host knows that he too may someday journey across the desert. Here too it is a matter of survival -- not of affection or friendship or religion or ideology. That is the sum and substance of it: in matters of war and peace Russians and Americans are wanderers in the same desert, and in that desert it is not ideology that counts but food and water -- the "food and water" of trade, arms control, political cooperation and cultural exchange.

For this essential reason I cannot concur in the appeal of Mr. Sakharov, the Soviet physicist, who says that there can be no détente without democracy, or the novelist Solzhenytzin, who says that "mankind's sole salvation lies in everyone making everything his business." This asks too much of human nature, assuming that involvement will always be benign rather than aggressive, moral rather than predatory. Were everyone to make everything his business, the result would be war not peace, imperialism not democracy. Men have capricious notions of what is and is not their business; that is why it is usually better for them to mind their own. I do believe that the world can be made better, and that man is capable of aiding its betterment, but I am equally a believer in selectivity of means. Important as it is to know what we hope to achieve, it is equally important to know what we are incapable of achieving; which is to say that humane aspiration must be tempered by realism.

Selectivity is inevitable in politics, even on the part of those who would base détente upon sweeping standards of morality. Why indeed are we distressed by the denial of civil rights in the Soviet Union, when we have amicable relations with a large number of non-Communist dictatorships? Why do we suddenly require measures of democracy in the Soviet Union as the price of our trade? In Chile a freely elected but Marxist government has been overthrown by a book-burning military dictatorship; will we require a return to democracy before resuming trade and investment? If we wish to apply pressure for democracy and human rights, would it not make sense to start with Chile, Brazil or Greece, all of whom are vulnerable to American pressures, none of whom are essential partners for the maintenance of world peace? Why start with the Soviet Union, a superpower which can, if it must, live without our trade and investment, and the one country whose cooperation is absolutely essential for building a structure of peace?

The adoption of the Jackson amendment requiring continued discrimination against Soviet trade may not in itself destroy the détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, but it may well derail it. We may recall that in 1960 the U-2 affair shattered the Eisenhower-Khrushchev "spirit of Camp David," and that the Cuban missile crisis precipitated a renewal of the arms race. Khrushchev went on to conclude the partial nuclear test ban treaty with President Kennedy, but his position at home had been irreparably weakened by his failures in attempting to get along with the Americans, and he was displaced in 1964.

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(10)

General Secretary Brezhnev has now reiterated Khrushchev's request for businesslike dealings with the United States. In Moscow last year significant agreements were reached in the field of arms control -- especially the ABM treaty -- and for cooperation in such fields as space, science and health. Now the Russians are interested primarily in trade and investment, and without being gullible or naive, surely we owe it to ourselves to give openminded consideration to Mr. Brezhnev's assurance to members of Congress: "We came here to consolidate good things, not to quarrel." If Mr. Brezhnev, like Khrushchev, fails in his détente policy because of American pressures on emigration and the treatment of Soviet intellectuals, it is possible that Brezhnev, like Khrushchev, will be discredited at home and displaced by hard-nosed successors who will have little interest in trade, arms control or détente with the United States, or in freedom of thought or emigration for Soviet citizens.

The Soviet Government, it is true, has already yielded a great deal under our pressure: emigration to Israel, which was kept to only 1,000 three years ago, is now being permitted at a rate of over 30,000 a year. But we should not conclude that the Russians will continue indefinitely to yield to American pressure. The adoption of the Jackson amendment might induce the Russians to remove remaining restraints, or it might anger them into clamping the controls back on. If ever there is to be an authentic liberalization in the Soviet Union, it will come about as a result of internal pressures from increasingly assertive professional, managerial and intellectual classes within the Soviet Union.

Like the tsars before them, the Soviet leaders greatly fear Western political ideas, which they consider a threat to their rule. It is understandable, though not admirable, that they should tighten internal controls at the same time that they are seeking closer political and economic ties with the West. They fear our subversion, just as we once feared theirs; specifically they fear that we will try to bring our political ideas into their country along with the trade and investment which they desire. The Jackson amendment reinforces these fears and, in so doing, threatens the political and economic cooperation which both sides need and desire.

I would judge that the most we can do to advance the cause of liberties within the Soviet Union is to help create an international atmosphere of security and cordiality, an atmosphere calculated to diminish rather than aggravate neurotic fears of Western ideas on the part of the Soviet leaders. In practice this would mean a continuation of measures of détente already begun, in trade, investment, cultural exchange, and above all arms control.

While recognizing the futility of war, the superpowers refuse to recognize the resulting futility of their arms race. Instead of pursuing the logic of the ABM treaty and proceeding energetically with the SALT talks, they prepare for future agreements by feverishly accumulating "bargaining chips," which is to say, by arming to the teeth. To cite one recent example: on September 27 the Senate by a narrow margin voted $1.6 billion to allow the Administration to accelerate the development of a new ballistic missile submarine called Trident. Each single Trident submarine will cost an estimated $1.3 billion, and that does not allow for the Pentagon's inevitable cost-overruns. The decision to accelerate the Trident program was made in the wake of last year's interim agreement so as to give the United States additional "bargaining chips" in the negotiations for a permanent treaty, and despite the fact that our Polaris and Poseidon submarines are virtually invulnerable to attack and

-7-

likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. As Charles Yost has written, "When Congress votes funds for a submarine it votes not for one but for two, an American and a Soviet."⁴ Progress toward arms control -- the most important single area of Soviet-American détente -- is thus negated by the self-defeating theory of "bargaining chips." If we are to have the "structure of peace" of which President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger speak, it is essential that we terminate this irrational, ruinously costly practice of accelerating the arms race while trying to restrict it.

Until and unless China joins the other great powers in their ill-considered arms race, her significance will consist primarily in the challenge of her society. Visitors to China -- experts and amateurs alike -- report on the orderliness, purposefulness, cleanliness, and cooperativeness of Chinese society. Perhaps, to some degree, they have been misled by guided tours; perhaps their reports reflect something of the old condescending sentimentalism of Americans toward China. The evidence suggests, however, that there is more to the modern Chinese experiment. The evidence suggests that this largest of human communities and oldest of civilizations has moved far to bring health, education, social cohesion and a sense of purpose into the lives of a long divided, poverty-stricken and demoralized population.

The world significance of the Chinese experiment is its potential impact on the third world. China alone of the great powers has a claim to membership in the third world. As an economically less developed nation itself, China has the potentiality of serving as a model for Asian, African, and Latin American nations to whom the experience of economically developed nations like the Soviet Union and the United States may seem irrelevant. It seems possible, therefore, that neither of the missile-wielding superpowers will prevail in the competition for influence in the third world but that the role of an exemplar will fall to China as one of their own. It is in this respect -- not as a "power" but as a society -- that China commands a position of primacy in our foreign policy and in our national interest, warranting our attention, our friendly interest and our best efforts toward understanding. Dr. Kissinger commented after his visit to China in early 1972, "These people have a sense of purpose. If there is communication, it will be a great challenge to our whole society."

### III. The Domestic Side

If détente with the Soviet Union and with China represents the first foreign requirement in the national interest, the first requirement on the domestic side is the restoration of a healthy national economy. The two, as we have seen, are inseparable: extravagant military expenditures strain our economy, and the weakened economy in turn detracts from our foreign policy. The essential corrective is a more restrained American role in world affairs, a reduction in status, so to speak, from "Number One" to something like "first among equals."

On August 15, 1971, the day President Nixon imposed emergency controls on the economy, the United States passed through a symbolic watershed in its foreign policy. Prior to that date we had felt ourselves able to shape our foreign policy solely in terms of what we needed and wished to accomplish in the world. Since that time we have been compelled -- or should have been compelled -- to recognize that our resources are limited and that we must base our policy decisions not only on what we wish to do but also on what we can afford.

⁴ Yost, Charles, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 101.

-8-

Some cogent statistics illustrate the change. In 1950 the United States produced half of the world's total output of goods and services; by 1970 our share had dropped to 30 percent. In 1950 we produced almost half of the world's steel; today we produce about one-fifth. In 1950 the United States held half of the world's monetary reserves; today we hold less than one-tenth.

The significance of these developments, by no means yet fully appreciated, is that the United States can no longer afford, and no longer can fairly be expected, to sustain the military and political supervision of world affairs which it has exercised for three decades. The role of global colossus came to us by default after World War II when every other major industrial nation in the world was economically devastated. We thereupon undertook extraordinary global -- and even extra-global -- enterprises, including the Marshall Plan, the rearmament of ourselves and our allies, worldwide military and economic aid programs, two long and costly wars, the extravagantly expensive arms race with the Soviet Union, and a superheated race to the moon.

Only recently, with our national economy beginning to crack under the strain, have we been constrained to recognize the necessity of bringing our military and political activities back into harmony with their economic base. For this purpose economic controls are only temporary expedients. They are no substitute for the fiscal and monetary reforms which are essential to curb inflation, stem the dollar outflow, and restore confidence at home and abroad in the American economy and its managers. However many "phases" of control and de-control are superimposed on our national economy, a stable equilibrium can be restored only through some combination of increased revenues and reduced expenditures.

The most promising field by far for reducing expenditures without risk to our national security is in the development of unessential new weapons systems. The Brookings Institution economist Edward R. Fried suggests that savings of $10 billion could be made without appreciably altering current military capabilities by major economies in the use of manpower and by slowing down the developments of such weapons systems as the Trident ballistic missile submarine and the B-1 supersonic bomber, the one designed to supplant the still-functional Polaris, the other to supplant the still quite adequate B-52 bomber.⁵ There are, in addition, numerous aid projects, troop deployments, and other foreign operations which, though individually modest in cost, are quite costly in the aggregate and of dubious relevance, in any case, to the national interest.

In practice if not in their declarations, Congress and the Nixon Administration reject the concept of interacting foreign and domestic policies. Congress pays eloquent tribute to the need of economy but votes just about everything the Administration requests for arms procurement; the Senate declined last week to cut even $500 million from a whopping $20.9 billion arms procurement bill. The Nixon Administration, for its part, pursues détente with the Soviet Union, but at the same time pursues an arms policy which goes against détente and which strains our national economy. The defense budget for the fiscal year 1974 is still based on outdated cold war assumptions and on the equally outdated assumption of unlimited American resources to prosecute it. Conceived as it seems in

⁵ Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, July 31, 1973.

-11-

conduct their relations with each other. There is nothing
in the human environment, as Adlai Stevenson once reminded us,
to prevent us from bringing about such fundamental change.
The obstacles are within us, in the workings of the human mind.
But just as it is the source of so many of our troubles, the
inventive mind of man is sometimes capable of breaking
through barriers of prejudice and ancient attitude. In the
field of international affairs, I believe, such a breakthrough
was achieved with the formation, first of Covenant of the League
of Nations, then of the United Nations Charter. The next break-
through, urgently awaited, is to make the conception work.

October 8, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

SUBJECT: Pacem in Terris III

Sir:

1. <u>Time and Place.</u>

Sheraton-Park Hotel, 8:15 p.m.

You should eat dinner before you go. Dinner for the attendees will have been served earlier. Upon arriving, proceed to the Potomac Room where the other speakers (Fulbright, Hutchins and Willens, Chairman of the Convocation Committee) will gather. At 8:35 Hutchins will introduce you and they are expecting you to speak for twenty to thirty minutes. Senator Fulbright will speak immediately afterward for about the same amount of time. The convocation should conclude by 10:00 p. m.

2. <u>Attendees.</u>

About 1500 guests are expected.

3. <u>Press Coverage.</u>

Public Broadcasting is planning to video-tape the program for airing at 9:00 p. m.

Richard Campbell

"SOMETHING IS BEGINNING..."

The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has convened *Pacem in Terris III* for the same reason that it called together *Pacem in Terris I* and *II*: the Center, like everybody else, wants peace; the Center believes that peace is not likely to come by neglecting it—accidental peace, or peace as a by-product of anything but policies directed toward it seems improbable. The best efforts to formulate a foreign policy for the United States in the light of the most serious reflection and discussion are called for if this country is to be the force for peace we all hope it will become.

Cliches and slogans will not do. They are poor substitutes for thought. Demands of American leaders that this country remain the most powerful in the world have no more rational content than Winston Churchill's announcement that he did not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British empire.

In fact the state of the world, of which science and technology are the distinguishing characteristics, and the hydrogen bomb, satellites, and multi-national corporations the symbols, puts in question the definition of power by which we have lived and the future of the nation-state to which that power has been attributed. Meanwhile, we have international and transnational issues without international or transnational institutions adequate to cope with them. We must still speak of foreign policy even though we know that, science and technology being what they are, domestic and foreign policy are now inseparable.

The events of recent years make it clear that something is ending. But if something is ending, there must be a new beginning. The object of *Pacem in Terris III* is to consider, in a non-partisan way, what that beginning might be and what it ought to be. What can and should the United States do now to bring peace to a world that will have either peace or catastrophe?

The purpose of the Center is to clarify the basic issues and widen the circles of discussion about them. The program of this convocation is designed to bring home to every American the question of what his country ought to do about the basic issue of life and death.

Robert M. Hutchins

CHAIRMAN

October 8

Robert M. Hutchins
CONVOCATION
CHAIRMAN

Harry S. Ashmore
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

Fred Warner Neal,
Sander Vanocur
CONSULTANTS

PACEM IN TERRIS

A NATIONAL CONVOCATION TO CONSIDER NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

III

Monday evening
8:00 to 10:30

Opening remarks

Harold Willens

A new global setting

Robert M. Hutchins

I

PRESIDING:
Robert M. Hutchins

The view of the Administration

Henry A. Kissinger

A Congressional view

J. William Fulbright

II

October 9 (L)

III

An independent view

Stanley Hoffmann, Richard J. Barnet, Robert W. Tucker

Critique: Norton Ginsburg, CHAIRMAN Frances FitzGerald, Leslie H. Gelb, Stanley Karnow, Hans J. Morgenthau, Harvey Wheeler, George F. Will

Tuesday morning
9:30 to 12:30

PRESIDING:
Morris L. Levinson

IV

Critique: Fred Warner Neal, CHAIRMAN Herschelle Challenor, Jerome Alan Cohen, John Paton Davies, Morton H. Halperin, David Horowitz, Ronald Steel

PRESIDING:
Arnold M. Grant

V

Clark Clifford

Deterrence through the threat of mutual assured destruction

Herbert York

Critique: Albert Wohlstetter, CHAIRMAN Gloria Emerson, William Foster, Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, Jeremy Stone, Admiral Stansfield Turner

Tuesday evening
8:00 to 10:30

PRESIDING:
James H. Douglas

VI

October 10

(LC)

VII

Peter G. Peterson

PRESIDING:

Charles H. Dyson

Development

Kenneth W. Thompson

Critique: James P. Grant, CHAIRMAN Frank Church, Richard N. Cooper, Neil Jacoby, Abraham Ribicoff, Walter Sterling Surrey, Paul M. Sweezy

VIII

Wednesday Afternoon
1:45

The special case of Japan Edwin O. Reischauer

PRESIDING: Seniel Ostrow

Wednesday afternoon
2:15 to 5:00

PRESIDING:

Edward Lamb

The scientific/technological challenge Alexander King

The necessity of common or shared resources,
including science and technology Gerard Piel

Critique: Lord Ritchie-Calder, CHAIRMAN George Brown, Jr., Harrison Brown, Seyom Brown, Jonas Salk, Louis Sohn, John Wilkinson

Wednesday evening
8:00 to 10:30

Philip C. Jessup

PRESIDING:

Frances McAllister

Richard N. Gardner

Charter revision and/or the creation of new regional or interest
groupings; the increasing demands upon the specialized agencies.

Critique: Bradford Morse, CHAIRMAN Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Richard A. Falk, Pauline Frederick, Sol M. Linowitz, Charles W. Yost

IX

X

XI

October 11 (L)

XII

Sam J. Ervin, Jr.

Comment: Rexford G. Tugwell

Hubert H. Humphrey, Henry M. Jackson, Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern, Edmund S. Muskie, Nelson Rockefeller, George Wallace

Political parties as the focus of interest-centered and ideological pressures. Can politics stop at the water's edge? Is bi-partisan foreign policy desirable? Are there proper limits to the political adversary process?

PRESIDING:
J. R. Parten

XIII

John Kenneth Galbraith

James C. Thomson, Jr.

Critique: John Cogley, CHAIRMAN Alfred Balk, Thomas E. Cronin, David Halberstam, Richard Holbrooke, Peter Lisagor, George E. Reedy

Conclusion:

Robert M. Hutchins

Thursday afternoon
2:00 to 5:00

PRESIDING:
Eleanor B. Stevenson

SPEAKERS AND PARTICIPANTS

**Harry S. Ashmore**
President and Senior Fellow of the Center;
Pulitzer Prize-winning author and editor

**Alfred Balk**
Editor, *Columbia Journalism Review*;
Lecturer, Graduate School of Journalism,
Columbia University

**Richard J. Barnet**
Co-founder and Co-director, Institute for Policy Studies;
former official, U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency; former Consultant, Department of Defense

**Elisabeth Mann Borgese**
Senior Fellow of the Center;
served with the Committee to Frame a World
Constitution as editor of *Common Cause*

**George Brown, Jr.**
Member, U.S. House of Representatives, California

**Harrison Scott Brown**
Professor of Geochemistry, Science, and Government,
California Institute of Technology;
former Assistant Professor, Institute for Nuclear Studies

**Seyom Brown**
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution;
Adjunct Professor, Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies

**Herschelle Challenor**
Congressional Fellow, American Political
Science Association; Professor of Political Science,
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

**Frank Church**
United States Senator from Idaho;
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations; Chairman, Senate Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere Affairs

**Clark Clifford**
former Secretary of Defense;
Special Counsel to President Truman

**John Cogley**
Senior Fellow of the Center; editor, *The Center Magazine*;
former religious news Editor, *New York Times*

**Jerome Alan Cohen**
Director, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School;
Chairman, Subcommittee on Chinese Law,
American Council of Learned Societies

**Richard N. Cooper**
Provost, Yale University;
former Consultant to the National Security Council;
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for International Monetary Affairs

**Thomas E. Cronin**
Visiting Fellow of the Center;
former Research Political Scientist,
the Brookings Institution and White House Fellow

**John Paton Davies**
Retired Foreign Service Officer; former member,
China Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

**James H. Douglas**
attorney, Chicago, Illinois;
former Deputy Secretary of Defense;
Member of the Center Board

**Charles H. Dyson**
Chairman, Dyson-Kissner Corporation;
Representative U.S. Treasury,
Bretton Woods Monetary Conference;
Board Member, Businessmen's Educational Fund

**Gloria Emerson**
Fellow, Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University;
Foreign Correspondent, *New York Times*

**Sam J. Ervin, Jr.**
United States Senator from North Carolina; Chairman
Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights, Revision and
Codification of the Laws, and Separations of Powers

**Richard A. Falk**
Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice,
Princeton University; Faculty Associate,
Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School
of Public and International Affairs

**Frances FitzGerald**
author, *Fire in the Lake*; recipient, National Book
Award, Overseas Press Club Award

**William Foster**
former Director, United States Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency;
former Deputy Secretary of Defense

**Pauline Frederick**
United Nations correspondent for N.B.C. News;
recipient, Peabody Award

**J. William Fulbright**
United States Senator from Arkansas;
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**John Kenneth Galbraith**
Professor of Economics, Harvard University;
former United States Ambassador to India

**Richard N. Gardner**
Professor of Law and International Organization,
Columbia University; member, Board of Trustees,
United Nations Institute for Training and Research;
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

**Leslie H. Gelb**
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution;
Visiting Professor, Georgetown University;
former Director, Policy Planning Staff,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

**Norton Ginsburg**
Dean and Senior Fellow of the Center;
past president, Association of American Geographers;
former Associate Dean of the College and of the Division
of Social Sciences, University of Chicago

**Arnold M. Grant**
attorney, New York, New York;
Trustee, Syracuse University and St. John's College;
Member of the Center Board

**James P. Grant**
President, Overseas Development Council;
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State;
former Director, AID, Turkey and South Vietnam

**David Halberstam**
Pulitzer Prize winner for international reporting;
former Foreign Correspondent, New York *Times*

**Morton H. Halperin**
Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution;
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

**The Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C.**
President, University of Notre Dame;
Chairman, Overseas Development Council;
former Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

**Stanley Hoffmann**
Professor of Government, Harvard University;
former Fellow, Center for Advanced Study of
Behavioral Sciences

**Richard Holbrooke**
Managing Editor, *Foreign Policy*

**David Horowitz**
Editorial writer, *Ramparts* magazine

**Hubert H. Humphrey**
United States Senator from Minnesota;
former Vice-President of the United States

**Robert M. Hutchins**
Chairman of Fellows, and Chairman of the Center Board;
former President, University of Chicago

**Henry M. Jackson**
United State Senator from Washington;
member Armed Services Committee

**Neil Jacoby**
Associate of the Center;
former Dean and presently Professor of Business
Economics and Policy, Graduate School of Management,
University of California at Los Angeles;
former Economic Adviser to President Eisenhower

**Philip C. Jessup**
former Judge, International Court of Justice; former
Professor of International Law, Columbia University

**Stanley Karnow**
Contributing Editor, *The New Republic*;
former Foreign Correspondent, Washington *Post*

(LE)

### Alexander King

Associate of the Center;
Director-General of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris

### Henry A. Kissinger

Secretary of State;
Special Advisor to President Nixon for National
Security Affairs; former Professor of International
Affairs and Government, Harvard University

### Edward M. Korry

former United States Ambassador to Ethiopia and Chile;
former UPI foreign correspondent and European editor,
Cowles Publications

### Edward Lamb

Chairman, Lamb Enterprises, Toledo, Ohio;
Member of the Center Board

### Gene R. La Rocque

Director, Center for Defense Information;
Rear Admiral (Ret.), United States Navy

### Morris L. Levinson

President, Associated Products, New York, New York;
Member of the Center Board

### Sol M. Linowitz

Chairman, National Urban Coalition; Chairman, National
Council of the Foreign Policy Association; former United
States Ambassador to the Organization of American States

### Peter Irvin Lisagor

Chief, Washington, D.C. bureau, Chicago *Daily News*

### Frances McAllister

Flagstaff, Arizona;
Trustee, Blaisdell Institute at Claremont;
Member of the Center Board

### Eugene J. McCarthy

Editorial consultant, Simon and Schuster, Inc.;
former United States Senator from Minnesota

### George McGovern

United States Senator from South Dakota;
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on
Nutrition and Human Needs;
Democratic Presidential Nominee, 1972

### Hans J. Morgenthau

Leonard Davis Distinguished Professor of Political
Science, City University of New York

### F. Bradford Morse

United Nations Under-Secretary for Political and
General Assembly Affairs; former Member,
U.S. House of Representatives, Massachusetts

### Edmund S. Muskie

United States Senator from Maine;
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control,
International Law, and Organization

### Fred Warner Neal

Associate of the Center;
Professor of International Relations, Claremont Graduate
School and University Center, Claremont, California

### Seniel Ostrow

President, Sealy Mattress Co., Los Angeles, California;
Member of the Center Board

### J. R. Parten

Vice-Chairman of the Center Board;
independent oil producer and rancher, Houston, Texas

### Peter G. Peterson

Vice-Chairman, Lehman Brothers;
U.S. Chairman, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission;
former Secretary of Commerce

### Gerard Piel

President and Publisher, *Scientific American*; recipient,
UNESCO Kalinga Prize and the George K. Polk Award

### Bernard Rapoport

President, American Income Life Insurance Co.,
Waco, Texas; Member of the Center Board

### George E. Reedy

Dean and Nieman Professor, College of Journalism,
Marquette University; former White House Press Secretary

### Edwin O. Reischauer

Professor of International Relations, Harvard University;
former United States Ambassador to Japan

### Abraham Ribicoff

United States Senator from Connecticut;
former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare;
Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on International Trade

### Lord Ritchie-Calder

Senior Fellow of the Center;
former professor of International Relations,
University of Edinburgh;
Member United Nations Scientific Missions

**Nelson Rockefeller**
Governor of New York;
former Assistant Secretary of State

**Jonas Salk**
Director, Institute for Biological Studies;
Adjunct Professor in the Health Sciences,
University of California at San Diego

**Marshall Shulman**
Director, Russian Institute, Columbia University;
former Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

**Louis Sohn**
Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard University;
former Consultant, Department of State

**Ronald Steel**
former United States Foreign Service Officer;
Visiting Lecturer, Yale University

**Eleanor B. Stevenson**
Captivia, Florida;
former Board Member, International Red Cross;
Member of the Center Board

**Jeremy J. Stone**
Director, Federation of American Scientists;
former Consultant, RAND Corporation

**Walter Sterling Surrey**
Adjunct Professor, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University; former Acting Chairman,
National Conference on International Economic and
Social Development

**Paul M. Sweezy**
former Visiting Professor of Economics, Yale University;
Editor, *Monthly Review*

**Kenneth W. Thompson**
Vice-President, Rockefeller Foundation;
member, editorial board, *Worldview*

**James Claude Thomson, Jr.**
Curator, Nieman Fellowships for Journalism;
former Associate, East Asian Research Institute and
Lecturer on History, Harvard University

**Rexford G. Tugwell**
Senior Fellow of the Center;
member of President Roosevelt's "brains trust";
former Governor of Puerto Rico

**Robert W. Tucker**
Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University;
author of *A New Isolationism*

**Stansfield Turner**
Vice Admiral, United States Navy;
President, Naval War College;
former Director, Systems Analysis Division,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

**Sander Vanocur**
former correspondent, NBC and PBS;
Director, Communications Project, Duke University

**George C. Wallace**
Governor of Alabama

**Paul C. Warnke**
Chairman, Board of Visitors, Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service; former Assistant Secretary for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

**Harvey Wheeler**
Senior Fellow of the Center;
author; former faculty member of
Harvard, Johns Hopkins,
Washington and Lee Universities

**John Wilkinson**
Senior Fellow of the Center;
former faculty member of the Universities
of Pennsylvania, Chicago, California, Munich and Vienna

**George F. Will**
Chief, Washington, D.C. Bureau, *National Review*

**Harold Willens**
Chairman, Factory Equipment Corp., Los Angeles,
California; Chairman, Businessmen's Educational Fund;
Member of the Center Board

**Albert Wohlstetter**
Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago

**Herbert York**
Professor of Physics, University of California at San Diego;
Science Advisor to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy;
former Director of Defense, Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense

**Charles W. Yost**
Lecturer on Foreign Policy,
School of International Affairs, Columbia University;
President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations;
former United States Ambassador to the United Nations

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

**Board of Directors:** Robert M. Hutchins, *Chairman*; J. R. Parten, *Vice-Chairman*;
Ralph E. Ablon, Joseph Antonow, Harry S. Ashmore, Blair Clark, Ramsey Clark, Patrick F. Crowley,
Fagan Dickson, James H. Douglas, Jr., James C. Downs, Jr., Joseph W. Drown, Arnold M. Grant,
Vesta Hutchins, Francis J. Lally, Edward Lamb, Eulah C. Laucks, W. Price Laughlin, Morris L. Levinson,
J. Howard Marshall, Frances McAllister, Steward Mott, Paul Newman, Seniel Ostrow, Bernard Rapoport,
Eleanor B. Stevenson, Bernard Weissbourd, Harold Willens

**Senior Fellows**

Robert M. Hutchins, *Chairman*, Norton Ginsburg, *Dean of Academic Program*, Harry S. Ashmore,
Elisabeth Mann Borgese, John Cogley, Alexander Comfort, Lord Ritchie-Calder, Rexford Tugwell,
Harvey Wheeler, John Wilkinson; *Secretary to the Senior Fellows*, Gary M. Cadenhead

**Visiting Fellows**

Rick J. Carlson, Thomas E. Cronin, Wendell Mordy, Joseph J. Schwab

**Associates**

Richard Bellman, Silviu Brucan, Paul Ehrlich, Mircea Eliade, Neil H. Jacoby, Bertrand de Jouvenel,
Alexander King, Alva Myrdal (*in residence*), Gunnar Myrdal (*in residence*), Fred Warner Neal,
Raúl Prebisch, Karl H. Pribram, Robert Rosen, Nathan Rotenstreich, Adam Schaff,
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Herbert F. York

**Consultants to the Center**

Chief S. O. Adebo, Hugh Downs, Clifton Fadiman, Robert Gordis, N. N. Inozemtsev, Clark Kerr,
Joseph P. Lyford, Milton Mayer, Isidor I. Rabi, George N. Shuster, Sander Vanocur

**Officers and Staff**

Harry S. Ashmore, *President*; Frank K. Kelly, *Vice-President and Director of Continuing Education*;
Gary M. Cadenhead, *Secretary-Treasurer*; Wilda Osborn, *Assistant Secretary*;
Elsa Rylander, *Assistant Treasurer*; Peter Tagger, *Director of Promotion, Membership, and Development*;
**THE CENTER MAGAZINE:** John Cogley, *Editor*, Donald McDonald, *Executive Editor*;
**CENTER REPORT:** Mary Kersey Harvey, *Editor*; Books and Audio Tapes: Barnard Norris, *Editorial Director*;
Patricia Douglas, *Audio Tape Coördinator*; William M. Dodd, *Special Projects Coördinator*,
William R. Bidner, *Director, Western States Office*

2056 Eucalyptus Hill Road, Santa Barbara, California 93108 Mail Address: P.O. Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California 93103

The
Center
for the Study of Democratic Institutions / The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

December 5, 1973

The Sloan Kettering Cancer Foundation
410 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021

Gentlemen:

Enclosed you will find our check in the amount of $2000.00 as a contribution to your work on behalf of Dr. Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State.

The Secretary recently participated in one of our conferences and, in declining the customary honararium, asked that it be contributed to your foundation instead.

I assume you will acknowledge to the Secretary directly.

PT:db
encls.

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