August 27, 1962

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of August tenth.

I am grateful to have your thoughts on the scientific
basis of our new proposals. As you will see from the full text
of my statements (enclosed), the scientific basis was not my
only, or even my primary, concern. The questions I raised on
Page 3 seem to me to go beyond the problem of detection. They
are similar to your own concerns about the danger of secret
Soviet preparations, expressed on "Meet the Press" on February
ninth of this year.

Also, I have serious reservations about our
diplomatic tactics, particularly in the light of the abrupt
Soviet abrogation of the moratorium. It seems to me that,
far from making agreement easier, these methods reward Soviet
intransigence and are likely to produce an ever stiffer Soviet
attitude.

It will of course always be a pleasure to see you.
Though the next months promise to be hectic, I am sure we will
be able to find a mutually convenient time.

With best wishes,

The Honorable William C. Foster
Office of the Director
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Washington, D. C.
United States Air Force Control and Disarmament Agency
Office of the Director
The Honorsble William C. Foster

W\NAR

With best wishes,

be able to find a mutually convenient time.
Though the next months promise to be pleasant, I am sure we will
It will of course always be a pleasure to see you.

attitude.
intransigence and are likely to produce an ever stiffer Soviet
far from making agreement easier, these methods reward Soviet
Soviet approximation of the moratorium. It seems to me that,
diplomatic tactics, particularly in the light of the spruot
Also, I have serious reservations about our

ninth of this year.
Soviet preparations, expressed on "Meet the Press" on February
are similar to your own concerns about the danger of secret
Page 3 seem to me to go beyond the problem of detection. They
only, or even my primary, concern. The questions I raised on
of my statements (enclosed), the scientific basis was not my
basis of our new proposals. As you will see from the full text
I am grateful to have your thoughts on the scientific

Dear Bill:

August 27, 1965

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
ALEX INKELAS
HENRY A. KUSSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38
MASSACHUSETTS

August 22, 1962

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Nelson:

I am enclosing three versions of a reply to Foster.

My strong recommendation is to adopt Version B. I think if you engage in an extensive discussion of the test ban issue, you should do so publically and not in a private letter. If you do the latter, you will merely enable the Administration to prepare a reply and to organize its counterattack. It would also enable them, it seems to me, to keep you talking about the test ban throughout your campaign.

If you wished to, you could use Version A, but that seems to me a bit abrupt.

I have prepared Version C at length even though I hope you will not use it. I think it should be considered a nucleus of a statement should the President attack you in a press conference or on one of his visits to New York State.

My recommendation would be that the only member of the Administration to whom you should respond is the President. If he attacks you, I would recommend that you take the line that they are trying to shut off public debate on an issue which affects the life and death of this country. You might then emphasize their own statements, as in Version C, and point out that the public information available at the time you made your statement led to quite different conclusions from those implied in the Administration plan.

I would recommend that you go easy on the scientific data, since the Administration no doubt will be able to mobilize any number of Nobel Prize winners. Instead, I would concentrate on the political implications, on the problem of preparation for breaking a test ban (which I think is insoluble) and on the inconsistencies in Administration thinking.

These considerations also make it appear unwise for you to answer

VERSION A
(Second Choice)

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of August 10th.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

(General Chorus)

AERIAL V

Dear Bill:

I am grateful to have your thoughts on the scientific basis of your book for your thoughtful letter of August 10th.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Bill

VERSION B
(First Choice)

Dear Bill:

I am grateful to have your thoughts on the scientific basis of
our new proposals. As you will see from the full text of my statements
(enclosed), the scientific basis was not my only, or even my primary,
concern. The questions I raised on Page 3 seem to me to go beyond the
problem of detection. They are similar to your own concerns about the
danger of secret Soviet preparations, expressed on 'Meet the Press' on
February 9th of this year.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely yours,

Best wishes.

nicely convenient time.

most appropriate to be perfect. I am sure we will be able to find a
It will of course also be a pleasure to see you. Though the
attitude.

Soviet intelligence and are likely to produce an ever better Soviet
It seems to me that, at least from making agreement earlier, these methods seem
to be particularly in the light of the drubbing Soviet propagation of the materialism.

Also, I have serious reservations about our diplomatic relations.

Recently I had a talk with you.

Danger of secret Soviet brokering, expressed or 'Meet the Press,' on
problems of detection. They are similar to how our concerns about the
concern. The questions I raised on page 3 seem to me so to be pertinent to
(especially), the scientific news are not so only, or even my primary,
our new broadeads. We have to see from the full extent of my statements
I am grateful to have your thoughts on the scientific news et
Thank you for your thoughtful letter of August 10th.

Dear Bill:

(Attest Chieko)
ABSTRACT B

VERSION C

Dear Bill:

I appreciated your thoughtful letter of August 10th.

It seems to me that three kinds of issues are raised by our
recent proposals: (A) the detectability of secret testing; (B) the
detectability of secret preparations; (C) the political wisdom of making
our proposals at this time.

(A) As for the detectability of secret testing, the public
record at the time I made my statement gave me cause for considerable
uneasiness. On March 4th of this year, you said on "Meet the Press"
that "we are not willing to depend on national systems." You added,
"I think, if anything, in the view of our experience, it would be in
the national interest to perhaps increase, rather than decrease, the
amount of inspection." (above the twelve required in our April, 1961
proposal)

By July, we had agreed to national inspection systems and we
have, as you indicated in your letter, revised downward the number of
inspections considered adequate to police the test ban. I find this all
the more puzzling because in your appearance on "Meet the Press" in March
you indicated that experience with our underground testing indicated, if
anything, a need for an upward revision of our inspection quota:

Mr. Foster: "At the time the April treaty was proposed we had
no concept of the magnitude of the series of tests which could be pre-
pared in secret, as demonstrated by the recent series that the Soviets ran.
Therefore, we must modify the treaty to take cognizance of that experience
and the modifications are designed toward that end."

Interviewer: "You cannot say whether the adjustment will be downward or upward, that is, whether the inspection will be greater or less?"

Mr. Foster: "No I cannot, although on balance, if anything, I would think they might be upward."

In the light of these statements, the new United States proposals which were introduced in July without public discussion of the facts or issues involved were bound to produce uneasiness. What experience did we acquire in underground testing between March and July to permit such a drastic change of view? Why did the underground tests *before* March lead to such different conclusions from those afterwards? Does this not indicate that there was relatively little time to study and assess whatever new data may have been developed? Why did the proposals have to be introduced so urgently?

I was glad to receive the scientific data on which the new proposals were based. This, of course, was not available to the public at the time our new proposals were made. Even now, many questions remain. For example, how can we be so sure about the incidence of earthquakes in a territory as vast as the USSR? Does this not represent an extrapolation of data acquired in the United States between March 4th (the date of your appearance on 'Meet the Press') and June? Have we fully explored the problem of decoupling and its effects on the problem of detection?

I confess I have serious questions also about the proposals of April, 1961. They were based on the assumption of 125 annual shallow earthquakes equivalent in size to 19 kiloton explosions (of which 100 would be unidentified) and 590 unidentified earthquakes equivalent to a 2 kiloton explosion in tuff. Thus, we were asking for 20 free inspections to deal with 690

unidentified events, or about 2.8% of all unidentified events. If we assume
that there was to be a threshold of inspection, it would mean that we asked
to inspect 15 to 20% of the unidentified earthquakes similar to nuclear
explosions of 19 kilotons, and none for the 590 unidentified events with
characteristics similar to explosions of two kilotons. (This leaves aside
the problem of decoupling.)

If the new proposals do not weaken but maintain this ratio, I would still
be uneasy. If improvements in detection lead to a corresponding reduction in
on-site inspections, the reliability of the system can never improve.

Moreover, I notice that your letter refers to atomic explosions in vol-
canic tuff. However, the Department of Defense release of July 7th, 1962 points
out that alluvial soil dampens the signals "by as much as ten times over that
expected from that in volcanic tuff." What would the figures you gave be
for tests in alluvium? There was no mention in your letter of testing in
outer space nor what findings, if any, were made about decoupling in our
recent tests. Did we in fact attempt any experiments to test this theory?

Then there is the problem of national (i.e. Soviet) manning of control
posts in Soviet territory. While I can understand how improvements in detec-
tion techniques might permit a reduction of the number of seismic stations, it
is not clear to me why they should enable us to agree to national manning?
Why should it be safe to have the data on Soviet territory collected by
Soviet citizens? It seems to me this issue is essential regardless of the
sensitivity of the instruments.

Finally, I notice in the statement of the Department of Defense of July
7th, 1962--the only official information available at the time of my state-
ment--that the new methods of detection, while holding out greater hope for
distinguishing earthquakes from underground blasts, also complicate the

problem of fixing the precise location of unidentified events. This suggests
that the area available for on-site inspections may have to be increased,
though our proposals seem to make no reference to it. In any case, it
makes adequate on-site inspection more difficult. And if it is true, as
Ambassador Dean has pointed out, that the next breakthrough is likely to
be pure fusion weapons, we would not be able to identify underground blasts
by looking for radioactive samples. The public has not learned of the
answers to any of these problems.

(B) The problem of secret preparation for a new test series concerns me even more than secret testing. To repeat the queries from my statement: What guarantees do we have that the treaty we are now proposing will not result in the Soviet's breaking it as they abrogated the moratorium? What is to prevent the Soviets from using a treaty as they used the moratorium, to prepare a new series? What safeguards do we propose to prevent secret preparations for such contingencies?

These concerns parallel those expressed by you in a letter to the
*Washington Post* of February 9, 1962 to the effect that:

"Unless there is an effective treaty banning all tests and offering safeguards against secret preparations of tests, the Russians could again surprise the West with a problem of experiments that might well tip the balance of nuclear power in their favor."

The President, in his press conference of February 7, 1962, expressed
himself similarly:

"We must have methods of inspection and control which could protect us against a repetition of prolonged secret preparations for sudden series of major tests."

I agree with the fears expressed both by the President and by you. I
do not know of any provisions in our new proposal to guard against these
dangers. If there are any, they have not been made public.

(C) A few words about the political framework in which our offer was
made. Ambassador Stevenson on August 9th made the statement that "the
proposals we are making go a long way towards meeting the Russians." This
supports my own statement that "we have been moving steadily towards the
Soviet position."

Of course, it is helpful to see the other side's point of view. How-
ever, one has to consider also the general context. It does not seem to
me an adequate *quid pro quo* that, in return for substantial changes in our
position, we ask no more from the Soviets than that they agree to a provision
they had already accepted in 1958 and withdrawn in 1961.

It is my contention that our present diplomatic tactics--and not only
on nuclear testing--reward Soviet intransigence. Consider the situation
from the point of view of the Soviet leadership. They have consistently
insisted on very small number of inspection posts on their territory,
although they had once accepted nineteen such posts manned internationally.
They have attempted to reduce the number of on-site inspections--although
until 1961 they accepted both the principle of on-site inspection and
three "free" (i.e. veto-proof) inspections of suspicious events. In the
past year they have withdrawn their previous agreement to internationally
manned inspection posts. They have rejected on-site inspections. They
broke the moratorium on tests. Yet at the end of this period, they have
received an insistent American plea for a ban containing provisions even
more favorable to their view. We have given up the principle of inter-
national staffing of control posts. We have reduced the number of these posts

by more than half. We have made our offer conditional on Soviet acceptance of a proviso which was basic to the negotiations from 1958 to 1961.

Why should the Soviet leaders not believe that if they hold out another year, they will elicit proposals even closer to their views? Is there any incentive for them to behave responsibly and lawfully when even after their unilateral, brutal abrogation of the moratorium, we came up with proposals so much closer to the Soviets' original position? This was all the more outrageous as it occurred only three weeks after Mr. Khrushchev had solemnly assured the then Chief of our Disarmament Administration, Mr. John McCloy, that he would never do so. My concern is that such tactics not only make agreement unlikely; they seem to me to reward the most brutal Soviet behavior.

I have serious doubts that this kind of diplomacy furthers the prospect of peace. It tempts Soviet irresponsibility. It confuses world opinion. The pressures on us by the neutrals have not lessened as a result of these tactics. Since we have come up with two "final" proposals in the space of one year, they too have every reason to believe that further U.S. concessions are likely. In the long run, I believe that our propaganda victories will prove hollow. Far from encouraging a meaningful agreement, our tactics may have the opposite effect: of turning one of the most pressing problems before mankind--that of disarmament--into an extension of Soviet political warfare.

Best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

December 28, 1962

Dear Nelson:

I do not think it is
worthwhile to debate with a person like
Dr. Pilisuk. I am familiar with the group
he represents and my knowledge of them
reinforces this belief.

Kind regards.

DRAFT REPLY TO DR. MARC BILISUK

December 28, 1983

Thank you for your letter of December

Dear Dr. Billenk:

Ann Arbor, Michigan
The University of Michigan
Department of Psychiatry
Dr. Marc Billenk

Sincerely yours,

to get into fund-raising activities.

I do not think the Governor ought
from Charles J. Kersten of Milwaukee.

I am returning the correspondence

From: Henry A. Klaarner
To: Diane Van Wies

January 21, 1963

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Kersten: (Check whether Governor calls him by first name)

Thank you for your letter of December 21. I appreciated
your thoughtfulness in sending me the paper from the Slavic
Institute of Marquette University. It seems that the
Institute is doing very good work.

As for its financial problems, I am not sure that I can
do much better than to suggest the obvious sources, such as
the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations.

With kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

As for its financial problems, I am not sure that I can
With kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

January 24, 1963

To: Diane Van Wie

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I am returning the correspondence
with Channing Liem. Although I was not
asked to suggest a reply, in my view it
might be a good idea to send a little
note, and I am attaching a draft.

To: Diane Van Wie

From: Henry V. Klaasen

January 24, 1963

might be a good idea to send a little
asked to suggest a reply, in my view it
with Channing Litem. Although I was not
I am returning the correspondence

(typed from handwritten letter)

335 McClellan Ave.
Mr. Vernon, NY

January 29, 1963

Gov. Nelson Rockefeller
Governor's Mansion
Albany, NY

Dear Gov. Rockefeller:

No matter how deeply you have dug your hole, for
protection, you, your children, grandchildren, brothers,
friends, constituents and fellow humans will all be dead
and buried. This will happen if we cannot as Mr. James Wadsworth
puts it, 'stop playground tactics' with the world. If the US
and the USSR fail to reach a test ban agreement and eventually,
complete disarmament, the world will end in a nightmare of hell.

How can you put your political future about the lives of
our children? Every American - Republican or Democrat should
give President Kennedy support in his decision to halt nuclear
tests during negotiations of test-ban treaty. Surely an atmosphere
wherein testing is suspended can only improve any incentive for
agreement on the part of both countries.

Mr. Rockefeller we are so well stocked with nuclear
weapons that this old world could be destroyed forty times over.
When do we stop?

TYPED FROM HANDWRITTEN COPY

January 29, 1963

Governor Nelson D. Rockefeller
Albany, New York

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

As a resident and voter of New York State, I want to assure
you that, in criticizing the President's decision to suspend
underground nuclear tests during the test-ban talks, you were most
definitely not speaking for me.

I find the progress being made in these talks one of the most
encouraging developments of recent months. No matter what one
thinks of the Russians, there is no denying that, in agreeing to
even a small number of on-site inspections, they have come at least
half way in meeting our demands. Suspending our tests is a
gentlemanly gesture, underlining our sincerity in trying to reach
an agreement, and indicating appreciation of Russian efforts to
achieve a compromise.

You say we cannot trust the Russians. Many Russians feel this
way about us. We must learn to live with all sorts of people we
distrust and disapprove of, some of whom distrust us or each other.
We must learn this if we are not to blow each other up. An
adequately inspected test-ban agreement would be an important first
step toward a world in which we would not blow each other up -- and
temporary suspension of U. S. underground tests, being a useful step
toward a test-ban agreement, deserves the support of all Americans,
regardless of political party.

Mrs. George V. H. Moseley, III
2703 Yates Avenue
Bronx 69, New York

Box 199
Aspen, Colo.

January 30, 1963

Governor Nelson Rockefeller
State Capitol
Albany, N.Y.

Original to NAR
Info Photo to Monow

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

Your name has been in the news again: you are against concluding a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms now offered us of three inspections a year. I feel sure that you take this stand out of concern for American XXXXX security: I cannot believe that you would take such a stand on such a vital issue simply to advance your own political career. If I am right in this belief, I hope you will take the time to read and think over the enclosed letter to Mr. McNamara.

Believe me, Governor Rockefeller, I have done my homework. I have been studying disarmament, military strategy, and both Soviet and American foreign policy for some years. I do not believe in either appeasement or unilateral disarmament, but I would like to see the human race survive, and I see a test ban agreement as a very realistic first step which can be undertaken at no great danger to the United States. An ever accelerating and long continued arms race, on the other hand, entails not merely the risk, but the ultimate certainty of mutual extermination.

Box 199
Aspen, Colorado

January 28, 1963

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. McNamara:

The so-called "counterforce" strategy recently adopted by the United States is, you have said, aimed at military objectives and designed to spare civilians. I must question that statement on a number of grounds.

Implicit in a "counterforce" strategy is the necessity to first: if it were reserved for retaliation, there would no longer be any important military objectives (missiles and aircraft) in place. If we launch a first strike against the Soviet Union, that will try to retaliate, and has made it quite clear that its deterrence is aimed at our cities. Even if military installations were aimed at, this would make little practical difference because in any country these are located so close to population centers that the effect would be the same. And once our cities are destroyed, are going to spare theirs? I would, indeed, wish it so, but it seems unlikely.

The real thought behind our "counterforce" strategy is that we could launch such a massive surprise attack against the U.S.S.R. that they would be virtually unable to retali ate at all. Leaving aside the moral considerations (although they are worth pondering), I think that from a military standpoint this is a preposterous risk to take. A single bomb, nowadays, can destroy not merely cities but whole states and poison the earth for centuries so that it will be unfit for habitation. In this age of hydrogen bombs, rockets, chemical and bacteriological warfare, and with the cobalt bomb on the way, even a few weapons arriving on target can utterly destroy this continent. Civil defense has become an illusion: the few people who might survive underground would emerge into a devastated and deadly environment which could not support human life.

Moreover, when the U.S.S.R. sees the U.S. making preparations for a "counterforce" first strike, they will not sit idle waiting for this to happen. Their answer will be to build their own "counterforce" and the arms race will be off on another spiral. As for sparing civilians, I would like to quote from James E. King, Jr. of the Institute for Defense Analyses:

"There is no dispute that nuclear weapons can be designed both more and less powerful than any in being whether they are "needed" is another matter. In one circumstance they might be a major effort to develop counterforce weapons systems capable of penetrating the security of opposing missile systems and thus restoring the first-

Would you have us believe, Mr. McCamara, that blasts sufficient
to destroy hardened missiles in unknown locations would spare civilians?

Is it not rather clear that there can be no security in a continued
arms race? Military technology is rapidly approaching its practical
limit and logical conclusion: the creation of the Doomsday Machine.
Paradoxically, then, your duty as Secretary of Defense must be to
protect the national security in the only way still possible: by
finding a way to end the arms race.

Surely a xxx nuclear test ban treaty is an urgent first step.
After all, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. now have little to gain
from further testing: failure to reach an agreement will benefit
mainly China, Germany, France, and other nations anxious to develop
their own nuclear weapons. Violations of a nuclear test ban are
relatively easy to detect, and it is unlikely that, having entered
into such an agreement, and allowing "black boxes" and even a few
inspections on its territory, the U.S.S.R. would want to risk
breaking it.

The second, and far more difficult step, is to bring about
some sort of arms control agreement between ourselves and the
Soviet Union, xxx Without going into the complexities of how
this can be done, I would simply like to say that there must be
a genuine wish to achieve such agreement by both sides, and the
agreement must be fair to both. In the past we have not offered
proposals that met these conditions.

In the long run, the only sure security for the human race
will be a disarmed world with some sort of international peace
keeping force. This is not yet in sight, but our hope must be
that we can stabilize the balance of power for a number of years
xxx so that in time social and political institutions will
have a chance to catch up with the technological developments of
our time. If we can gain this time, I am sure the West can hold
its own against the Communist block. If not, there will not be
enough left of either side to be worth worrying about.

Please regard this as an "open" letter: I shall send copies
to the President and others who might be interested.

In looking back over this letter, I find that I have written
about our "counterforce" strategy as though we really intended
someday to use it for a first strike. Perhaps you will say that
this is not really our intention, and I would welcome this assurance.
But, looking at it from the Soviet standpoint, actions speak louder
than words - (indeed their has been some talk of "preventive" and
"pre-emptive" war ) and if the Soviet Union had been first to
launch plans for a "counterforce", what do you think would be the
American reaction?

Original to NPTK
Info Photo to Menev

190 Stoker Avenue
Freeport, New York

February 1, 1963

Dear Mr. Rockefeller :

I could scarcely believe my eyes when I read your statement protesting the cessation of nuclear testing. I can assure you that to the women in this State, nothing could be more shocking than your avowed desire to see the continuation of these dangerous tests.

We women are well aware that each nuclear test further effects the health of our children, and the health of those as yet unborn. Need I remind you that luekemia, a radiation-affected disease has increased 85% during the testing period; that the rate of dead births and deformed infants has shown great increase in areas in which heavy radiation is found.

Now, to ask a mother to sacrifice the health and possibly the life of her child for any cause is unrealistic, to say the least. But to ask her to do so for a self-defeating cause is patently ridiculous. We are in possession of more and more effective weaponry each year; yet we are not more secure in our aspirations for peace.

No sane person can honestly believe that disarmament is the only practical method of achieving peace. However good for business nuclear weapon manufacture may be, it is not good for people -- and people are the concern of wives and mothers like myself.

I beg you to reconsider your ill-advised stand.

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
Albany,
New York

TYPED FROM HANDWRITTEN COPY

Feb. 5, 1963

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

In past months I have been saying that if the 1964 presidential
campaign were a Kennedy-Rockefeller contest, it was conceivable that
I might vote for Rockefeller despite the fact that I voted for Kennedy
in 1960.

However, your apparent opposition to a nuclear test ban has
made me change my mind. I am constantly amazed at the willingness
of politician to risk a nuclear war, but their unwillingness to risk
the possibility that some Piloton explosions by the Soviet Union
might go undetected. The latter risk seems much preferable,
particularly in view of the fact that there are enough megaton bombs
around to <u>overkill</u> every man, woman, and child on this earth--10 tons
of TNT, equivalent, according to Sulzberger of the N. Y. Times, for
every person--the fear of a few more bombs in an already established
arsenal, is ridiculous.

The many times I voted for Democrats, my decision was based
upon the fact that their Republican opponents seemed less able to
cope with modern day problems. I had thought you to be an exception.
However, in dealing with the greatest problem to beset mankind, that
of controlling nuclear weapons, you have shown that you adhere to
the kind of thinking suitable to the pre-atomic era. For reasons
cited above the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which is already
beginning to take place, and a future in which nation after nation
pours atomic poison into the atmosphere, are far riskier than the
possibility of undetected underground Piloton explosions. Time is

getting short in which to control nuclear weapons. Once nuclear
arsenals are the property of many nations it will be merely a matter
of time before the world takes the nuclear plunge to its own
destruction.

It is regrettable that so many Republicans seem unable to face
up to the realities of the problem.

ADDRESS ON ENVELOPE:

Litman
7434 Cord Ave.
Pico Rivera,
Calif.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK

360 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

February 1, 1963

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

With reference to our brief chat during
the dinner the other night about your Cuban
speech and as requested here is the January 1963
issue of "Navy" in which the lead article is
that seven page operational report entitled "The
Navy and Cuba". It begins on page 5 and you
will note that part of it is in diary form.

Although I have not read it closely
and consequently cannot comment any further on
the subject matter I do hope you will find it
both interesting and helpful.

With warm regards.

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
The Governor of the State of New York
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

OL UNIT

Form No. 175

NAVY

THE MAGAZINE OF SEA POWER

VOL. 6, NO. 1

JANUARY, 1963

The Civilian VOICE of the Navy

Official Publication of THE NAVY LEAGUE of the UNITED STATES

The Civilian ARM of the Navy

## Features

<table><tr><td>Editorial</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>The Navy and Cuba: Operational Report<br>By JACK KESTNER</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Deterrent Strategy and the Oceanic Community<br>By GEORGE E. LOWE</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Automation at Sea<br>By CAPTAIN E. B. PERRY, USN (Ret.)</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Symbolizing Unity of the Americas<br>By ENSIGN CLAUDE E. ERBSEN, USNR</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Communist Squadron in London's River<br>By DESMOND WETTERN</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Sea Treasures in Bottles<br>By RAYMOND SCHUESSLER</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>A Bit About a Buddha<br>By HAROLD HELFER</td><td>35</td></tr></table>

## Advertisers

<table><tr><td>American Telephone & Telegraph Co.</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Cervecería Corona, Inc.</td><td>C-2</td></tr><tr><td>Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Puerto Rico, Inc.</td><td>C-2</td></tr><tr><td>McDonnell Aircraft</td><td>C-4</td></tr></table>

## NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

Founded 1902

THE MILLS BUILDING, WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

National President ROBERT CROWN

### NATIONAL VICE PRESIDENTS

<table><tr><td>ROBERT H. BARNUM</td><td>DONALD M. MACKIE</td><td>JOHN A. SUTRO</td></tr><tr><td>FRANCIS B. CROCCO</td><td>JACK R. MCKENZIE</td><td>W. PAUL THAYER</td></tr><tr><td>MORGAN L. FITCH, JR.</td><td>ASA E. PHILLIPS, JR.</td><td>HAROLD E. WIRTH</td></tr><tr><td>National Treasurer</td><td>GEORGE O. SCHWEINHAUT</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>National Assistant Treasurer</td><td>JACK WILD</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>National Judge Advocate</td><td>J. PAULL MARSHALL</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>National Deputy Judge Advocate</td><td>WEAVER W. DUNNAN</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>National Deputy Judge Advocate</td><td>WILLIAM BLUM, JR.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Executive Assistant to the National President<br>(Executive Director)</td><td>RICHARD A. HARRISON</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Executive Secretary</td><td>EVELYN M. COLLINS</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Executive Assistant to the National President</td><td>GEORGE C. GILMAN</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Executive Assistant to the National President (NAVY)</td><td>L. EDGAR PRINA</td><td></td></tr></table>

### NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

<table><tr><td>FRANK GARD JAMESON<br>(Chairman)</td><td>LOUIS E. DENFELD</td><td>MRS. JOY HANCOCK OFSTIE</td></tr><tr><td>E. ROBERT ANDERSON</td><td>F. KENNETH EASTER</td><td>ROBERT PRODDOW, JR.</td></tr><tr><td>ROBERT B. ANDERSON</td><td>W. M. FECHTELER</td><td>THEODORE ROOSEVELT, III</td></tr><tr><td>JOHN J. BERGEN</td><td>WILLIAM B. FRANKE</td><td>JAMES M. ROSS</td></tr><tr><td>CHAUNCEY B. BORLAND</td><td>GEORGE S. HALAS</td><td>RUDOLPH A. SCHOENECKER</td></tr><tr><td>BARRY BRANNEN</td><td>FRANK A. HECHT</td><td>IRVING SEAMAN</td></tr><tr><td>ARLEIGH A. BURKE</td><td>EDWARD C. HOLDEN, JR.</td><td>REGINALD SINCLAIRE</td></tr><tr><td>ROBERT B. CARNEY</td><td>PETER D. JOERS</td><td>C. HORTON SMITH</td></tr><tr><td>J. J. CLARK</td><td>DAN A. KIMBALL</td><td>CARL G. STOCKHOLM</td></tr><tr><td>JOHN B. CONNALLY</td><td>JOHN S. LEAHY, JR.</td><td>JOHN L. SULLIVAN</td></tr><tr><td>JOHN L. CONNER</td><td>JOHN MARSHALL</td><td>CHARLES S. THOMAS</td></tr><tr><td>JAMES P. CROWDER</td><td>JOHN J. MULVANY</td><td>GEORGE WINGFIELD, JR.</td></tr></table>

Matter printed herein does not necessarily represent the opinion of the publishers.

## Departments

<table><tr><td>President's Message</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>61st National Convention</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Navy Day 1962</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Portrait—<br>VADM Alfred G. Ward, USN</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Council of the Month</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>Membership</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>With the Marines</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>Youth Program</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>News of Councils</td><td>43</td></tr></table>

### NAVY—The Magazine of Sea Power

Second-Class postage paid at Washington, D. C. Published monthly by the Navy League of the United States, The Mills Building, Washington, D. C. This magazine is classified by the Librav of Congress call number: VA-49-N28.

© Navy League of the United States, 1962

Reprinting by permission

Editorial, Subscription and Advertising Correspondence to Navy League of the U.S., Mills Building, Washington 6, D. C. Telephone, D1strict 7-3320. Publication Office, 2380 Champlain Street, N.W., Washington 9, D. C.

Annual Membership includes one year's subscription.

Subscription $2.50 per year.

Single copies 25c.

The Navy League is an independent, civilian organization. Statements contained herein have no official sanction or approval by the Navy Department.

Editor L. EDGAR PRINA
Advertising & Bus. Mgr. R. A. HARRISON
Art Director THOMAS B. MURPHY

Eastern Advertising Representative,

WALTER J. MASTERSON, JR.
Box 298, Yonkers 1, N. Y.
Yonkers 5-9793

### NATIONAL PUBLICATIONS COMMITTEE

<table><tr><td>Donald M. Mackie</td><td>E. Robert Anderson</td></tr><tr><td>Chairman</td><td>Thomas Sprague</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>W. Paul Thayer</td></tr></table>

## THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

THE front cover of this issue of "Navy-The Magazine of Sea Power" contains the text of a Resolution adopted by your Executive Committee at its last meeting—one of the most cogent resolutions we have ever put on paper.

We hope that all who see it will ponder it carefully, weigh its obvious conclusion and lend his voice toward implementing it in whatsoever way he is able.

The Cold War has gone to sea. The Cold War is now a wet war.

Lebanon and the Formosa Strait were examples, but Cuba is less than 100 miles from the Florida coast. The United States Navy's quarantine or selective blockade of offensive weapons to Castro's Communist controlled island should convince skeptics of the importance of control of the seas in times of strife. The Navy League has always contended that

sea power, nurtured and kept modern, is vital to our nation's security. It was thus in 1902, before air power and the atomic age. It is today, and so long as three-quarters of the earth's surface is wet, it will be in the future. Nothing has better underscored the validity of the Navy League's 60-plus-year-old thesis than the recent Cuban crisis. Without a shot having to be fired, our Naval strength successfully carried out our National policy.

A recent development to which we must also turn out attention is Red China's activity on the Indian border. Many military observers and global strategists believe it is obvious that the Peking regime is pointed toward the Indian Ocean . . . that great basin which today is a relative vacuum of Free World sea power without the erstwhile great British Fleet. More American Men of War could be put to good use there.

But back to Cuba, close to home; think if you will of the alternatives which might have been available to our President had the United States no Navy, or a weak one . . . submission or nuclear war . . . sea power in its practical application permitted resolving of the Cuban crisis without result to either extreme. We believe that an increasingly strong, versatile and mobile sea-going force will become more and more important as the Free World faces up to its problems and responsibilities. We believe that the Navy League's primary job in educating the American people of the importance of our maritime power is succinctly expressed by the Resolution on this issue's cover.

ROBERT CROWN, National President
Navy League of the United States

## Statement of Policy

* We of the Navy League of the United States stand for a strong America—a nation morally, economically and internally strong.

* We believe that the security of our nation and of the people of the world demands a well-balanced integrated, mobile American defense team, of which a strong Navy, including the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation, is an indispensable part.

* We support all the Armed Services to the end that each may make maximum contribution to the national security.

* We know that in a free nation an informed public is indispensable to national security, and therefore, we will strive to keep the nation alert to dangers which threaten—both from without and within.

* We favor appropriations for each of the Armed Services, adequate for national security, economically administered.

* We oppose any usurpation of the Congress' constitutional authority over the Armed Services.

* We urge that our country maintain world leadership in scientific research and development. We support industrial preparedness—planning and production.

* We support efforts of our government to achieve worldwide peace through international cooperation.

* We advocate a foreign policy which will avoid wars—if possible; if not, win them!

* We pledge our loyalty and allegiance to the government and to the flag of the United States, and will work for the furtherance of the principles stated herein.

2

# THE NAVY AND CUBA
## OPERATIONAL REPORT

Here's the Story of How Admiral Dennison and
His Subordinate Commands Quarantined Castro

By JACK KESTNER

Reporter, The Virginian-Pilot,
Norfolk, Va.

MRS. J. HOGE TYLER III simply couldn't understand it. Her barbeque for Tidewater's senior military officers would start in another 15 minutes, and two admirals and a Marine Corps general had just called to say they couldn't make it. At this rate, there wouldn't be any men there at all. What was going on?

What was going on that sparkling clear Oct. 20, 1962 was that Norfolk, Va., had suddenly become the staging area for the first military-political maneuver of its kind in Naval history—a selective blockade.

The admiral destined to become the on-site commander of this blockade was one of those who had phoned his regrets to Mrs. Tyler.

### Change of Command

Two hours earlier, at 10 a.m., Vice Adm. Alfred G. Ward had stood on the fantail of the sleek cruiser USS NEWPORT NEWS

and relieved Vice Adm. John McN. Taylor as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and Commander, Striking Fleet, Atlantic.

Later, he was to tell a reporter who had attended the ceremony:

"So help me, at the time I didn't have the faintest idea of what was coming up. Oh, I knew that things were getting warm down there, but the idea we were about to take immediate action . . . I just didn't know."

Admiral Ward's first inkling that something was in the wind occurred shortly after 11 a.m. during the customary post-change of command reception. He noticed that his chief of staff was discreetly, but firmly hurrying guests through their punch and cookies.

A few minutes later, while the last pair of spike heels was clicking down the ship's cleated brow, "Corky" Ward sat at his glass-topped desk pouring over a sheaf of messages. All were top priority

and top secret. When he was through reading, he sat quietly for a moment, then picked up the telephone at his elbow.

### Meanwhile, a Mile Away

A long mile away in a high-ceilinged, thick-carpeted office a commanding voice answered.

"Admiral Dennison."

"I've been reading some traffic," Admiral Ward said. "I wonder if I can come over for a fill-in?"

"You not only can, I want you here," came the reply.

As he took off his sword and medals and changed to work blues, he mused wryly that this was probably the first time an admiral had taken over a fleet only to be tossed, without time even for guests to depart, into what looked like an action situation.

For Admiral Robert L. Dennison, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and U.S. Atlantic Fleet, his introduction to the crisis had occurred four

5

ADM R. L. DENNISON, USN
Under JCS Orders

RADM ROBERT J. STROH, USN
Car. Div. 6 Skipper

RADM J. A. TYREE, JR., USN
U.S. Latin Force Chief

RADM JOHN T. HAYWARD, USN
Flag Aboard "Big E"

RADM DENYS KNOLL, USN
Logistics Chief

days before on Tuesday, October 16. He had just finished breakfast with his wife at stately Missouri House on "Admirals' Row" when a telephone rang in his upstairs study.

## The Telephone Trio

In the pleasant, book-lined room overlooking a garden in the rear, there were three telephones. One was local, another a "hot" line to the Chief of Naval Operations, the third a "hot" line to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was the third phone that was ringing.

The conversation was brief. There was urgent business in Washington. Could he come? Yes.

At approximately the same time, in a bedroom in the White House, President Kennedy was handed a thick stack of photos. He, too, was being introduced to one of the deadliest threats the country had ever known.

Admiral Dennison returned from his Washington trip to mull over contingency plans. On Thursday, October 18, he again flew to a JCS meeting in Washington.

On that same day the nuclear-powered attack carrier, USS ENTERPRISE, back only six days from a four-month deployment in the Mediterranean, left Norfolk in such a rush that she was still taking her air group aboard as she "turned the corner" at Cape Henry.

## The "Cover" Stories

When a reporter asked Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force headquarters why ENTERPRISE had taken off in a cloud of spray, he was told that she had put to sea to (1) practice engineering exercises, and (2) evade Hurricane Ella.

"Engineering exercises!" the reporter snorted. "A week after she gets back from the Med? And Ella turned east at noon today. You really want me to believe that?"

"Absolutely," was the cordial reply.

This was the pattern for all queries in the days to come. There were no leaks (at least not until the eve of the President's speech) simply because there were only a few at the very highest level who were aware of what was going on. As a result, the Cuban operation became the best kept military secret of modern times.

In Norfolk, only Admiral Dennison had the complete picture. And he had a ready-made cover story going for him in the Caribbean.

## The Amphib Exercise

For on the same fateful Tuesday that proof of Russian perfidy had been handed President Kennedy, 10 Amphibious Force ships steamed out of Norfolk for Camp Lejeune, N. C., where they picked up a Marine brigade and headed for Vieques Island off the eastern tip of Puerto Rico.

Weeks before, an amphibious exercise entitled "Phibriglex 62" had been scheduled for 8 a.m., October 23—only 12 hours, as it turned out, after the President delivered his "quarantine" speech.

Also scheduled for the exercise were the attack carrier, USS INDEPENDENCE, the ASW carrier, USS RANDOLPH, destroyers, submarines, and replenishment ships.

Had it not been for the fortuitous timing of Phibriglex, the sudden departure of so many ships would quite likely have resulted in public

lished speculation of a seriously handicapping nature. It was a big break for Admiral Dennison.

## The Chronology, with Details

Here is how the events of the next critical days unfolded:

**FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19.** High above the chill waters of the North Atlantic, Vice Admiral E. B. (Whitey) Taylor, Commander, Atlantic Fleet Antisubmarine Warfare Force, was winging his way toward Weymouth (Mass.) Naval Air Station. With him was Rear Admiral G. P. Koch, Commander, Fleet Air Wings Atlantic. The two had just paid routine calls on Argentia and Halifax, and were returning to Norfolk via Weymouth.

Suddenly, an urgent message arrived for Admiral Taylor. He was to direct patrol planes at Lajos in the Azores to seek out a Russian sub tender believed to be heading south. Also, he was to deploy Patrol Squadron 56 from Norfolk to Guantanamo Bay.

As a subordinate command of the Atlantic Fleet ASW Force, Fleet Air Wings Atlantic was charged not only with its normal ASW mission, but also with shipping surveillance. And on surveillance rested, to a very large degree, the effectiveness of the entire "quarantine."

## They Kept 'Em Flying

To locate and track all Cuba-bound freighters and, later, to locate and photograph outbound vessels carrying missiles and IL-28 bombers required more than 10,000 hours in the air. Fleet Air Wings was given a capable assist in this by SAC tankers and bomb-

6

VADM JOHN MCN. TAYLOR, USN
Unified Staff Officer

VADM ALFRED G. WARD, USN
Quarantine Commander

VADM HORACIO RIVERO, USN
Had the Amphibios

RADM E. J. O'DONNELL, USN
Guantanamo Skipper

LGEN R. B. LUCKEY, USMC
FMF LANT Boss

ers based in Bermuda and the Azores. Also, by carrier-based aircraft who racked up another 10,000 hours.

As soon as Admiral Taylor stepped off the plane he was given an urgent message to call Norfolk. The conversation was short. He and Admiral Koch walked directly back into their plane. Some three hours later they were in their respective "war rooms."

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20. When Admiral Ward joined Admiral Dennison at his Atlantic Command headquarters, he found him studying a huge chart of the Caribbean. With CINCLANT was his deputy, Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, and his assistant chief of staff, Rear Admiral J. W. Leverton Jr.

Someone had taken a pair of dividers and, with the eastern tip of Cuba as the center, struck an arc to the north and east.

## Lining Up the Blockade

The eastern tip of the line ended at a point 120 miles north of St. Thomas, while the western ended

500 miles east of Cape Canaveral.

It was only a thin line in black pencil on a chart that could be purchased for $1.20 from the U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office. But it was a mark that would find its way into the history books.

The radius of the arc was 500 miles, its length 600. Its choice reflected both military and political thinking.

Militarily, it lay beyond the operating range of Mig fighters based in Cuba. Politically, its distance from Cuban ports would give Washington time to decide whether or not a particular ship should be boarded and searched.

During the remainder of that sun-drenched afternoon, Admirals Dennison and Ward pondered the disposition of blockading forces. When they had finished, there were 12 dots in red pencil along its broad curve. The distance between them was 60 miles.

## Destroyer Assignments

Four days later the dots would be occupied by (reading from the

western end of the line) the destroyers USS J. R. PIERCE, USS LEARY, USS DEWEY, USS STEINAKER, USS WITEK, USS MACDONOUGH, USS GEARING, USS LOWE, USS BIGELOW, USS McCAFFERY, USS F. ROYAL, and USS SELLERS.

Inside the western end of the line was another dot that would be the site of the cruiser USS CANBERRA and her destroyers, USS SOLEY and USS BORIE. Farther down the line was a dot that marked the future station of the 2nd Fleet flag ship, the cruiser-command ship, USS NEWPORT NEWS, with the destroyers, USS LAWRENCE and USS KEITH.

Discussion of the blockade was interrupted occasionally by phone calls, messages and brief conferences by Admiral Dennison with his top military commanders. Among these was Lt. Gen. Robert B. Luckey, Commander Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.

Gen. Luckey had attended the change of command ceremony and was changing clothes for Mrs.

Tense moments face Admiral Dennison and his aide, Captain Harry C. Allendorfer, USN. Working around the clock, Admiral Dennison and his staff were kept current on pertinent information at the Command Post at the Atlantic Command's Operations Control Center.

Telephones and other communications facilities permitted Admiral Dennison to be in immediate contact with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all of his unified forces during the Cuban crisis.

7

A low level photograph taken on October 23 of San Cristobal MRBM site reveals extensive vehicle trackage, an additional missile shelter tent, and camouflage netting over ten trucks at two separate locations.

A Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile range base in Cuba. Photo by U.S. reconnaissance plane.

Tyler's barbecue when a call from Admiral Dennison brought him to Atlantic Command headquarters. He was told that the JCS had approved sending a battalion of Marines to GTMO from Camp Pendleton, Cal. The General returned to his office to work with his staff on operational plans.

## The Flight to Washington

At 6:10 p.m., Admiral Dennison left Norfolk for Washington. With him in his plane were Admiral Ward and Lt. Gen. Louis W. Truman, Deputy Commander, U. S. Continental Army Command, who had been serving on the Atlantic Command staff as a planner and who would now form the nucleus of a Joint Staff.

Attending the meeting in Washington that night were the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral George W. Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, who served as executive agent for the JCS in the upcoming military operation), the Dennison party, Gen. Walter C. Sweeney, Commander, Tactical Air Force, and half a dozen joint staff members of two-star rank or above.

Using the chart, Admiral Dennison outlined the proposed mechanics of the blockade. The ground rules of engagement were discussed, as were the availability and disposition of forces.

## The Mood of Dennison

While there, a preliminary draft of the President's speech was

passed around. It was indicated that the speech would be delivered Monday night, with implementation of the blockade occurring at 10 a.m. Wednesday.

Enroute back to Norfolk shortly before 11 p.m., the mood of Admiral Dennison and his commanders was serious but calm. They knew what they had to do.

Sandwiches were served. Admiral Ward wolfed his down. He suddenly realized that it was the first food he'd had since breakfast that morning.

**SUNDAY, OCTOBER 21.** Early in the day, Rear Admiral John W. Ailes III, commander of Charleston-based Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 6, flew into Norfolk and spent the day at CINCLANT headquarters. He was to be designated surface group commander of the quarantine forces. By that evening, a draft of the operational order had been prepared.

At 9 a.m., Admiral Ward met with Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen Jr., commander of the Norfolk-based Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 4, and told him to "get your boys ready to go as unobtrusively as possible."

Other forces were moving in the same manner. Submarines at the Destroyer-Submarine Piers began slipping out one by one. Overseas in Holy Loch, Scotland, the tender USS PROTEUS was preparing to steal quietly out to sea. Pre-determined targets in Russia were already zeroed in by Polaris missiles.

Vice Admiral E. G. Grenfell, Commander Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force, said later:

## Reporters Get Inquisitive

"I would think that Mr. Khrushchev was aware that our Polarises were ready, and that this had something to do with his decision

Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic and U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and his Chief of Staff for Contingency Operations, Lieutenant General Louis W. Truman, USA, survey activity on "Suicide Hill", at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Naval Base, during an inspection tour at the height of the Cuban crisis.

8

to walk the cat back in Cuba.”

Five Amphibious Force ships of Phibron 6 left Norfolk that Sunday. They had arrived only the day before from a six-month deployment in the Mediterranean.

At the Atlantic Command public information office, the tempo of incoming calls was stepping up by the hour.

At mid-afternoon, 25 miles southeast of San Salvador in the Bahama Island chain, the tropical blue water below was broken by a broad white wake. At the head of the wake rode the nuclear-powered ENTERPRISE, her two plane guard destroyers striving to keep astern. She was ready to fight. Both of her red "angel" helicopters were airborne and in position.

The tempo of activity at Atlantic Command headquarters mounted throughout the day. On a wartime footing for the first time since Korea, the joint staff was shifting into high gear.

## He Has the Wrong Dope

A mid-west military reporter wrote following the crisis that the various Armed Forces went into the Cuban crisis lacking a proper unified command.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

As stated by Vice Admiral Beakley: "We quickly realized that there'd have to be a tremendous buildup to fulfill the broad requirements of a fully unified command."

The initial step in this occurred almost simultaneously with the recognition of the Russian threat in Cuba. The "U. S. Army Forces, Atlantic" was created, and Gen. Herbert B. Powell, Commander of the U.S. Continental Army Command, arrived at Command headquarters as its component commander. Gen. Sweeney, TAC commander, followed soon as component commander of the comparable "U. S. Air Forces, Atlantic."

Geography lent itself to this arrangement, since Powell's headquarters at Fort Monroe on Old Point Comfort was only a five-minute helicopter ride from the CINCLANT compound. TAC headquarters at Langley AFB lay a scant six miles beyond Monroe.

Lieutenant General Robert B. Luckey, USMC, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and General Truman talk with Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, USN, Deputy Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, in the Atlantic Command Operations Control Center at Norfolk. Members of the unified Atlantic Command, these three top ranking officers formulated operational plans that ultimately led to the back-down of the Russian effort to move offensive missiles and aircraft into Cuba.

A U. S. Marine debarks from the MATS jetliner that carried the Marine detachment to Guantanamo Bay.

Marines attend Catholic Mass in the field at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Conducting the service is Father Ferdinand E. Slejzer, a Navy Lieutenant serving with the Marines.

Above: Marines await briefing at the Naval Air Station at Guantanamo Bay.

Below: Brigadier General W. R. Collins, USMC, commander of Marine ground forces at Guantanamo, briefs airlifted troops.