IN0413 henry

DEPT.

only the most churlish or fanatical would refuse to join the almost palpable hope expressed at that historic ceremony, not only on the expectation of miracles usually suffer shipwreck. In the years ahead, the idyll on the White House lawn can only be fulfilled if all the parties concerned apply its spirit to resolving the nagging questions which remain. For example, What exactly was being recognized by each party? Was it preface (however unavoidable) to invest Arafat with the aura of a head of state three years after his support of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, and on the basis of 'granting' Israel a status that is the automatic prerogative of nearly every other nation? Was the euphoria in which we all shared a spur to the process? Or will it prove an obstacle if it leads to disillusionment after the nearly inevitable deadlocks appear?<-

Whether the agreement leads to greater flexibility or greater tension will depend in part on the United States. Until now, every Arab-Israeli agreement has been brokered by the United States, and many of the for-

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[21]

[X]

1993-09-17 15:17 63-96 S #15

EXPI: HOTEL RITZ

[Y]

INO413 henry

DEPT.

mulae leading to solutions were designed in
Washington. Yet when America has
assumed responsibility for breaking all
deadlocks, it is perversely encourages
them. After the signing ceremony, one of
the PLO negotiators said to me that the
PLO had learned that American pressure
on Israel usually backfired and that a settle-
ment could be sold best to the Palestinians
if it was freely negotiated. <—

[15]

On this occasion, the United States al-
lowed just that-staying on the sidelines,
uninvolved and an crucial juncture unin-
formed. And even now, America is not
needed on a daily basis, hard as this may be
for some our more missionary experts to
accept. But what America should do-and
is the only country in a position to accom-
plish-is to get the confidence of both
sides to enable them to move forward.
America alone has the ability to some up
with concepts for reconciling the clashing
notions of sovereignty, and perhaps even to
create areas of mixed sovereignty. It should
hold the line against outside intervention,
and make clear to traditional friends, espe-

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1993-09-17 15:17 63-96 S #14

EXPL HOTEL RITZ

[Y]

IN0413 henry

DEPT.

centru
ally to Israel, that the peace process only-
strengthens America's commitment to
the future, + to traditional advancem. to p5.
the moderation is the only road to peace.

(adversaries)

p5

What America must not do is to offer its
military forces as the deus ex machina for
solving every security issue. Nothing would
more undermine the willingness of the
American people to support the peace pro-
cess than a permanent stationing of U.S.
combat troops, especially in the heavily
populated territories on the West Bank,
where they could easily repeat the experi-
ences of Beirut. Instead, America should
focus on these principal tasks:.

5 p.
p5a1 #5

7 am w/ ch
(5 paragraphs)

to p12 ->

k

p12

It should
#1) It must really support for the economic
development of the autonomous area. Most
of these funds should come from the Arab
world. <-

[11]

#2) It should use its influence with other
Arab countries to move rapidly to deal with
Israel and to play a moderating role with
the Palestinians. At a minimum, the Arab
boycott of Israel should be lifted. <-

[4]

#3) It should be available at times of dead-

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[5]

EXP. HOTEL RITZ

1993-09-17 15:16 63-96 S #13

["IN0413 henry", "DEPT.", "himself will be unable to endow this transit-\ntion with the nearly mystical significance\ngiven to it by many Israelis. Any political\nleader must rely on his constituency. And in\nthe past, the PLO has been an umbrella\norganization including terrorists, rejection-\nists, and radicals, many of whom have been\nunlikely to ever be converted to views con-\ntrary to those of a lifetime. Even granting\nArafat's unreserved commitment to peace,\nthe pressures he faces will make him an\nincreasingly complicated partner. If he pur-\nsues a PLO or radical consensus, he will be\nforced to be ambiguous; if he goes beyond\nhis constituency, he may be removed or\nbecome irrelevant.<-", "[18]", "When the Palestinians recognized Israel,\ndid they mean that they have become genu-\ninely reconciled to its existence? Or was it\nwith the same attitude that France re-\nnounced Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in\n1871, as a stage in a continuing struggle? I\nasked this question of a PLO representative\nafter the signing ceremony. He answered:\n\"I consider myself as coming from Jaffa. My", {"bbox": [722, 1268, 834, 1289], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))", "CYJ", "1993-09-17 15:14 63-96 S #10", "HOTEL RITZ EXI:"]

["[Y]", "IN0413 henry", "DEPT.", "children, who have never lived in Palestine,\nwill also tell you they are from Jaffa. At the\nsame time, he was voluble-and I believe\nsincere-in protesting his yearning for\npeace.", "[14]", "The follow-on negotiations must strive to\nremove this ambivalence. They must make\nclear that there is a point beyond which\nIsrael should not be asked to make concessions,\nand that Israel's international support\nhas been enhanced by the risks it is\ntaking for peace. They must also demonstrate\nthat the Palestinians that their dignity\nis an essential aspect of a final settlement.\nthe major tasks will be to help the Palestinians\nand Israelis to learn to live side by side.", "[11]", "It will be painful for each side to accept\nthe consequences of its own decisions. After\nthe elections in the occupied territories,\nin nine months time, the Israeli recognition\nof the Palestinian entity will be irrevocable,\nas will the withdrawal of Israeli troops.\nIsraeli politicians who speak blithely of abrogating\nthe agreement or of reoccupying\nvacated areas are deluding themselves. The", {"bbox": [722, 1225, 836, 1249], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))", "1995-07-17 15:15 9-6-99 5", "HOTEL HUIT"]