# The Growing Risks of Fighting in the Dark

## The mismatch between man and high-tech arms

BY JOHN BARRY

It can be argued that the USS Vincennes had no choice but to fire the missiles that destroyed Iran Air Flight 655 and all of those on board. But if the disaster in the Persian Gulf last week was caused by a failure of military technology, as it now seems, the tragedy poses a dilemma for every country that seeks to maintain an effective national defense. The Vincennes and its captain were trapped in an arms race that dates back at least to World War II—an arms race that has created ever more sophisticated weaponry in an effort to make long-range warfare both possible and effective. The superpowers' nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles are only the most notorious products of that arms race—for, in fact, advanced military technology is spreading to every part of the globe.

The upward spiral of technology has now led to an imbalance between the ability to kill at long range and the ability to see who is being killed. There is a simple reason for this. The speed, range and accuracy of modern weaponry mean that there is no time

left for the attacker to verify his target. The Air Force, to cite just one example, is now trying to develop a computerized flight helmet that will in effect put combat pilots inside a black box. Instead of using their eyes to find their targets, fighter jocks of the future will watch radar and infrared signals projected on the inside of the helmet visor. Like most such gadgets, the sensor-packed helmets are made necessary by the increasing speed and range of the opposition's weaponry. But technology is forcing man out of the loop.

The U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf has been both victim and culprit in this mismatch between the technologies of death and of discrimination. The Iraqi pilot who sent two Exocets plunging into the USS Stark almost certainly did not want to hit an American vessel. He saw a large blip on his radar screen and fired on sensor informa-

tion: to have flown closer to his target, seeking to check its nationality, would have meant risking his own life. In precisely the same way, the captain of the USS Vincennes could not wait to identify the incoming aircraft visually, because his vessel then would have been within the range of a hostile aircraft's missiles. The Airbus was shot down at nine miles away,

when it was still invisible in the haze.

Military men do not enjoy killing women and children, and they are more aware than anyone of this mismatch between discrimination and death. As a result, they have arranged rules to minimize the risk to non-combatants. But the rules depend for their effectiveness on the tacit collaboration of all parties to a conflict—depend, that is, on the one sensor who is now out of the technological loop, man.

In the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy has tried to construct a three-layer system of long-range discrimination. Radar is the first layer. IFF transponders, radar-activated signaling devices that establish an

aircraft's identity, are the second. The third layer is voice communication. The significant point is that two of those verification systems, voice communication and the IFF system, depend upon cooperation between the potential killer and the potential victim. (Though IFF transponders are automatic, an aircraft pilot can turn his transponder off—which means that the system is essentially collaborative.) Without that cooperation, the attempt to discriminate

fails, as it did last week over the Strait of Hormuz.

A logical solution might be to develop ways of discriminating that do not depend upon cooperation—the automatic sensors of the Strategic Defense Initiative, for example. SDI will consist of systems able to identify incoming Soviet ICBM's and automatically trigger a defense. Critics charge that this is dangerous because there is no

man in the loop. But it is impossible to develop a system to send all the sensor data to a human being who could make the judgment that a Soviet first strike was in fact under way, for there is no time.

**Back to binoculars:** The tragedy in the gulf poses precisely the same question. Theoretically, the Navy could put ships without radar into the gulf—ships, in other words, whose captains would have to rely upon binoculars. They certainly wouldn't shoot down an Airbus at long range. The snag is that those vessels would be defenseless against the first aircraft-launched Exocet.

Those who claim that the United States has been buying the wrong sort of military technology may claim that the destruction of Flight 655 proves them right. In one unarguable sense, they are. The technology was “wrong” in that it did not discriminate between an Airbus and an F-14. Where the critics of technology go wrong is in their proposed remedy—cheaper, less sophisticated technology. In fact, what is needed is more sophisticated technology. We can't avoid technological problems by retreating, for technological change is here to stay. If our new weapons prove to be imperfect, we can only improve them.

If there is a technological lesson from the Persian Gulf this week, it is that to avoid similar disasters we need to redress the imbalance between killing technology and sensor technology. The worst response—one that would surely cost the lives of many American servicemen in the long run—would be to abandon modern technology as too costly or inefficient or dangerous. The other lesson of the week's events, however, is this: no matter how powerful the new technology may be, it is man who creates human conflict. And it is man, in the end, who must take responsibility for the power that technology unleashes.

AFSC—IDI

**Combat in a black box:** *Computerized pilot's helmet*

LC

NEWSWEEK: JULY 18, 1988 27

# Iran: 'We Do Not Take Revenge'

## Rafsanjani wants to build bridges to the West

DAVID MILLS—PICTURE GROUP

More weary than enraged? Teheran protest last week

The grief was real, but the crowds were small—at least by Iranian standards. Only 10,000 mourners turned out last week for the funeral of 76 victims of Flight 655. Men chanted, women keened; the crowd shook fists in orchestrated anger. Absent, however, was the passion that brought millions of Iranians to the streets in the early days of the Islamic revolution: after eight years of inconclusive war with Iraq, the mourners seemed more weary than enraged. Iran is in the midst of “a political, social and economic crisis,” said a Western diplomat in Teheran. “Things have changed since last year.”

One notable change was in Teheran's tone of voice last week. Who would have expected so mild a response to the killing of 290 civilians? After the Ayatollah Khomeini's inevitable call for “full-fledged war against America,” the new military com-

mander in chief of Iran, Parliament Speaker Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, forswore immediate retaliation. “The United States is trying to push us to commit a crime,” he said at the Friday Sabbath service that often establishes the current Iranian line. “Wise people understand why we do not take revenge.”

For Rafsanjani, the incident could not have come at a more delicate time. Only hours earlier he had called for “a new foreign policy” of improved relations with the West. Describing his initiative as an attempt to strengthen Iran militarily, Rafsanjani argued that Teheran had unnecessarily alienated the Western powers and pushed them toward support for Iraq. Khomeini quickly acquiesced: when his designated successor, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, called for revenge against “America’s material, political, economic and military interests,” Khomeini replied that Montazeri “should spend [his] time in building a world of virtue by supporting” Rafsanjani. It was still possible that Shiite Muslim extremists loyal to the ayatollah could take independent action—against the American hostages in Lebanon, for example—but for the moment, Rafsanjani seemed in control.

As some sources reconstruct it, Iranian policy began shifting last May, in response

to losses in the war with Iraq. Since its abortive 1987 drive to take the important Iraqi city of Basra, Iran has suffered a nearly unbroken string of political and military defeats. Its use of mines against gulf shipping lanes prompted the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution negating Iranian territorial gains. Last April Iraq recaptured the strategic Fao Peninsula. Then, in retaliation for another mining attack, the U.S. Navy wiped out 20 percent of Iran's naval forces in less than 24 hours. Iraq followed with offensives in May

and June that drove back Iranian forces along much of the front.

When Iran launched missiles at Baghdad, Iraq unleashed more than

150 missiles against Teheran and other Iranian cities. While tactically insignificant, these attacks devastated civilian morale. “Most people, at least once or twice, were close to the missiles,” said a Western diplomat in Teheran. “It broke people.” Meanwhile, Iraqi attacks on Iranian shipping in the gulf have starved Iran of the oil revenues it needs to keep on fighting.

Shortages are common, and most Iranians are hard pressed to explain why the war goes on.

No one was more aware of those setbacks than Rafsanjani. “Since mid-May, he has used his military overlord’s position to impose a virtual state of emergency on Iranian policymaking,” said a European diplomat who has served at length in Teheran. “Anyone opposing him is told that it’s all in the name of the war effort. In Iran, there is no more potent argument.” Asserting his new authority, Rafsanjani announced that he was combining the regular Army and the militant, political Revolutionary Guards into a single command. In a tacit admission of his nation’s war fatigue, he also announced plans to draft more soldiers and to extend the length of military service past the current 28 months. According to some foreign diplomats in Teheran, Iran’s offensive ability has been

badly hurt by a lack of fresh volunteers.

Under Rafsanjani's authority, Iranian diplomats have started rebuilding bridges to the West. Iran renewed diplomatic ties with France in June; it was making overtures to Britain and Canada—and according to Secretary of State George Shultz, it was even hinting at a willingness to open a dialogue with Washington. In his speech before the Airbus downing, Rafsanjani implied that Iran was willing to consider negotiations to end the war if the United Nations would brand Iraq the aggressor. While Westerners may doubt his sincerity, Rafsanjani's purpose is clear: new economic links to the West and an end to the pro-Iraqi tilt of many noncombatant nations.

**'Moral high ground'**: According to some Iran-watchers, the Airbus tragedy may actually strengthen his hand. Members of the Rafsanjani faction “probably think they’ve won some moral high ground as a result of this,” says British Foreign Office spokesman Christopher Meyer, “and they will be very careful not to waste it.” That stance corresponds to the Shiite religious view that martyrdom has its rewards. No one can know how long Rafsanjani will be able to resist the more militant tendencies of the Islamic revolution, particularly if Khomeini is dying, as many observers suspect. For now, however, the West may have a window of opportunity. Despite the Airbus tragedy, Iran desperately needs to improve relations with the outside world.

HARRY ANDERSON with CHRISTOPHER DICKEY in Teheran, THEODORE STANGER in Rome, RUTH MARSHALL in Paris and bureau reports

28 NEWSWEEK: JULY 18, 1988

# A Letter From Iran Air 659

## Are Americans callous about Iranian lives?

BY CHRISTOPHER DICKEY

Iran Air 659 from Teheran to Dubai took off a little before 3 Saturday afternoon, not quite a week since the downing of Iran Air 655. The passengers aboard the packed jumbo jet were much the same kind of people. There were lots of women, dozens of kids running down the aisles and giggling in the corridor by the bathroom. Why was the flight full? Because life in Iran is hard. Sitting next to me was a former teacher at an American school in Isfahan. Before the revolution he taught foreign students, mainly Americans, about contemporary Iranian culture ("I used to tell them religion was really very central"). Then the Islamic revolution came and he was out of a job. "I don't really do anything," he said. "I am retired." He has accumulated enough foreign exchange to come to Dubai—an ancient Mideast trading city—to buy a television set, a vacuum cleaner, maybe a VCR. Back in Iran, he will sell them. At black-market rates, you can make a living that way.

Many of the crew wore black ribbons. "Our best friends died, you know," one said. "It is very bad." A rough-hewn Iranian peasant with little experience of flying sat near the window. When we were over land once more he started smiling. He looked at me and groped for the English word: "Finish," he said. We were no longer in danger. He made a shooting motion skyward and frowned. Then he laid his head on a hand, to show he could relax now.

**Ask 'them'**: Throughout three previous days in Teheran itself, Iranians treated me and other American reporters with unflagging courtesy. At the public funeral for 76 of the victims, I encountered no personal hostility, even amid the ritualistic shouts of "Death to America." People asked me, "Why?" Again and again they said, "The American people are not our enemies," even though they suspected Washington was lying about how it happened. Said the schoolteacher on my plane: "When I heard the Americans shot down the Airbus I couldn't believe it. I thought at first that something was wrong with the Iranians."

All the anti-American slogans, the jingles that bored kids sing to themselves almost unconsciously, are so familiar

they are mere background to daily life in Teheran. Iranians are becoming cynical about their own leaders. Hostage-taking, the terrorism in Beirut are done by "them." Iranians, at least of the English-speaking class, rarely seem to talk about their clerical leadership as "the government" or even the more pejorative "regime." It's "them." And "they" did these things. Even the head of the Air Force, Brig. Gen. Mansour Satary, when asked why the war drags on, said reporters would have to ask "them."

This in no way absolves Iran for past atrocities like the hostage seizures. But how would an American crowd have reacted to an Iranian reporter in its midst after nearly 300 U.S. civilians, more than 60 of them children, had been blown out of the air by an Iranian warship. Would Americans differentiate between that Iranian and his government? Not likely.

And that's really the point. When the mullahs call the United States "the Great Satan" their people are likely to react with skepticism or indifference. A large part of the American public, however, seems perfectly willing to believe in the satanism of Iranians. Just before I went to Iran on Tuesday I was called by a radio talk show from the States that wanted to know if there was anything to the idea that the Iranians set up the whole thing,

then dumped all those naked corpses of women and children in the water.

I even caught myself asking if it might be true. Then I saw the bodies—and I've seen a lot of bodies. I talked to the people in Bandar Abbas and Teheran. Satary, who received training in America, wondered if Americans thought Iranian lives were perhaps less important than other lives.

**Durable demons:** None of this is meant as criticism of Capt. Will Rogers or his crew. Rogers's statement that he would have to live with this for the rest of his life was one of the few made by an American official that seemed genuinely felt. And it was clear that even Satary did not think the United States actually intended to shoot down an unarmed civilian aircraft. He just said they didn't care enough to be careful enough not to do it.

The administration needs a more critical look, I think. It's not pushing a point too much to say that demonization has been a Reagan rhetorical trademark: remember the "evil empire"? The Soviet demons seem to have shed their horns, but the mullahs have remained reliably sinister. Only, we don't say "the mullahs." We say "the Iranians."

The bereaved steward on my flight from Teheran wanted to know how I felt about what had happened. I said it was awful, then turned the question around. What did he think happened? "I don't know," he said. "It was a mistake, an American mistake and an Iranian mistake." It was his friends who died, yet he saw gross errors on both sides. Why is it so hard for Americans to do the same?

GREG ENGLISH—AP

'Our best friends died': Wreckage of downed airliner displayed in Bandar Abbas

NEWSWEEK: JULY 18, 1988 29

SPECIAL REPORT

# Time to Talk With Iran

BY HENRY KISSINGER

Occasionally an unexpected catastrophe provides an opportunity for reassessing a course in which all participants, like actors in a Greek tragedy, seem bent on fulfilling a destiny no longer in their control. The tragic shootdown of the Iranian civilian airliner by the American Navy may be the occasion for all the parties involved in the gulf war to pause and to reclaim control over their destinies.

The basic facts require no discussion. Even the fanatics in Teheran must know that the United States had no conceivable rational motive for such an act. No doubt the U.S. military authorities will review the relevant rules of engagement in an effort to minimize the possibility of a recurrence. But above all, the accident should provide an occasion for all sides to review how they wound up in a situation where such an incident could happen in the first place.

Fundamentally, there are few nations in the world with less reason to quarrel and more compatible interests than Iran and the United States. Though the shah came to symbolize the friendship between the two countries in the 1970s, those interests did not depend on him. They reflected political and strategic realities that continue today. This unfortunate accident may provide the occasion to reopen a dialogue with Teheran. As part of the process, the United States could agree to pay compensation to the families of the airline victims—but put the money in escrow until there is a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and American hostages in Lebanon are released.

America has three basic objectives in the gulf:

* To ensure freedom of navigation. At least half of the oil reserves of the world are located in the countries bordering the gulf. An interruption of shipping in the area would threaten the industrial democracies with a recurrence of the oil shock of the '70s, which produced inflation, recession and mounting unemployment.

* To prevent Soviet domination of the area. At least since the time of Peter the Great, controlling the gulf has been a major goal of Russian policy. In the 19th century, but for British intervention, Iran would have been incorporated into the Russian empire, just as the neighboring Central Asian principalities were conquered by the czars. In 1946, but for American intervention, Iran's northwestern province of Azerbaijan would have been seized by the commissars as a first step toward dismembering Iran, which has a frontier of some 1,500 miles with the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan was another stage in fulfilling this centuries-old Russian

ambition. And the current withdrawal almost surely means not that the goal has been abandoned, but that it will be pursued by more indirect means.

* To preserve the territorial integrity of friendly states and encourage their progress. Two radical threats exist in the gulf: secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. Iraq has a history of supporting terrorism and bringing pressure on nearby moderate states. Fundamentalist Iran has sought to overthrow all moderate regimes and to humble Iraq, which attacked it in 1980. A victory for either side would undermine the security of friendly gulf countries and jeopardize the prosperity of the industrial democracies. So long as Iran seemed to be winning the war, it was necessary for the United States to tilt toward Iraq. But in the end America can have no conceivable interest in the victory of either side.

To what extent are these objectives served by the American commitment in the gulf?

In 1987, when the United States first started escorting Kuwaiti tankers, I expressed grave reservations. It seemed to me then that the stated goal—freedom of navigation—hardly reflected our real purposes. Iran has no interest in closing the gulf, because it uses that waterway to export its oil. Iraq did have such an interest, because it wanted to deprive Iran of its principal source of hard-currency earnings. In fact, statistics show that through 1987 the majority of attacks on shipping in the gulf came from Iraq; Iranian attacks on shipping generally were in retaliation. Nor was the escorting of Kuwaiti ships representing less than 2 percent of the total traffic through the Strait of Hormuz relevant to the problem of free navigation. It is only in the last three

months that the United States has offered assistance to all neutral shipping.

Despite these inconsistencies, the deployment wound up serving American long-term interests. Teheran—and friendly moderate governments—interpreted the scale of our deployment as a prelude to more sweeping designs, perhaps even to an assault on Iran. This induced extraordinary (and heretofore uncharacteristic) circumspection on the part of Iran, reducing fundamentalist pressures. Friendly moderate governments have recovered from the shock of U.S. arms sales to Iran: witness Saudi Arabia's break of diplomatic relations with Iran. It no longer seems possible for Iran to win the land war; a stalemate in the fighting appears to have developed. There are even indications that Iran is reconsidering its policies. The second man in Iran, Parliament Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has stated that Iran has needlessly antagonized neutral countries with its revolutionary fervor. And

LEDRU-SYGMA

Parading a hostage: U.S. Embassy ordeal, 1979

## Iranians have suffered tragically. Americans have been bestially abused.

30

NEWSWEEK: JULY 18, 1988

SPECIAL REPORT

Teheran has opened dialogues with Great Britain and France.

These successes would have suggested a reassessment, even had the civilian airliner not been shot down. At the same time, the accident makes it necessary to demonstrate that new initiatives represent not a loss of nerve but a long-range policy.

America has no reason to create the impression that it is irrevo-
cably hostile to Iran, even less that it is committed to the victory of
Iraq. On the contrary, America has a positive interest in the
territorial integrity and economic development of Iran, provided
that its rulers do not make trouble outside their national borders.
What brought American naval forces to the gulf was the expansion-
ist policy of Iranian fundamentalism. What makes a dialogue
between America and Iran so difficult is Iranian support for some of
the most obnoxious forms of terrorism and the cynical manipula-
tion of American hostages.

The rulers in Teheran must sooner or later see the folly of a policy that challenges the most distant superpower—and thereby weakens them against a giant neighbor with historically demonstrated ambitions to dismember Iran and dominate the gulf. Nor can they doubt as to the basic readiness of the Reagan administration to improve relations. Fanaticism may blind the Iranians to the motive. They took the arms-for-hostages fiasco as a sign of weakness. They may worry as well about their domestic cohesion if they deal with what the mullahs choose to call “the Great Satan.”

Although the United States can do nothing to change the in-

grained attitudes in Teheran, it
could use the disaster in the gulf
to give Teheran another oppor-
tunity for a businesslike dia-
logue. This should take place in
three stages: a settlement of the
airliner issue; a de facto cease-
fire in the Iran-Iraq war; the
beginning of a more fundamen-
tal dialogue.

With respect to the airliner, the Reagan administration has already expressed its regret at the loss of life. To go further and apologize would imply an admission of deliberate wrongdoing that might become a pretext for new acts of terrorism. There has been too much self-flagellation on that score.

Moral concern is not demon-
strated by abjectness. But it
could be expressed in the follow-
ing additional steps:

* Agreeing to allow an inter-
national investigation of the
incident.

■ Offering to pay compensation to the families of victims.

However, the United States cannot be asked to finance the war against Iraq or to pay a substantial sum of hard currency to a country whose disciples are still holding American hostages. Innocent Iranian families have suffered tragically. But innocent American families have been suffering for years while their loved ones have been bestially abused, and at least two have been murdered. Congress should therefore be asked to vote appropriate compensation, but to place the part of it that will go to Iranian nationals in escrow until there is a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and American hostages have been released from Lebanon. To prevent the compensation issue from turning into a new form of blackmail, the amount should be proposed by internationally recognized experts based on established criteria, such as the lifetime earning capacities of the victims.

America would thus formally agree to specific compensation for

innocent Iranians. Iran would demonstrate its readiness to end
the suffering of innocent Americans and victims of the Iran-Iraq
war. The rulers of Iran will only increase their long-term dilem-
mas if they use a tragic accident as an excuse for a new wave of
terror. Such actions would surely produce retaliation. Hostages
are no longer a bargaining chip but an obstacle to an improve-
ment of relations that in the end is at least as much in Iran's
interest as in America's.

From that basis, America should undertake major efforts to
bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict. Now that Iraq's
armies have reconquered practically all the territory occupied by
Iran, that goal becomes more realistic. In order to avoid endless
negotiations between the parties about the modalities of a cease-
fire, the United States could make the following five-step
proposal:

■ Iran and Iraq would both unilaterally declare an end to all offensive operations beyond their national frontiers.

■ Iran and Iraq would agree to end attacks on shipping.

■ The secretary-general of the United Nations would create a
commission to investigate the causes of the war—thus meeting a
key Iranian demand.

■ As soon as each side has declared its willingness to stop offensive military operations—or even if Iran does so alone—the United States would stop escorting shipping in the gulf.

■ As the cease-fire takes hold, the United States would reduce

its naval presence in the gulf
to the levels existing before
the escorting of neutral ship-
ping began.

Once that context is estab-
lished, the United States should
be prepared to initiate confiden-
tial discussions aimed at a per-
manent improvement of U.S.-
Iranian relations. The mistake
of the last initiative toward Iran
was to seek to move immediate-
ly to the solution of concrete
problems. Because those prob-
lems involved profound Ameri-
can anxieties, the mullahs were
tempted to engage in blackmail.

In fact, the situation has some
analogies to the early stages of
U.S.-Chinese relations. In that
case, two ideologically hostile
countries began a dialogue
based on the premise of congru-
ent geopolitical interests. Each
side presented its view of the
international situation and ex-
plained where it met and where

it differed from the other's. Similarly, in a dialogue with Iran, it
would be futile for either side to pretend to approve of the other's
values. It is possible, however, that over time a common interest in
stability in the gulf can emerge. The United States can do no more
than present as thoughtfully as it is able why this is so. As in the
secret negotiations with China, this process would be best conduct-
ed by a small group on a highly confidential basis, to avoid raising
unnecessary expectations and having to make jarring public
explanations.

The United States has achieved its basic objectives in the gulf. The choice is now Iran's. Is it prepared to face reality and act on the basis of national interest? Or will it continue to pursue essentially revolutionary aims? If it chooses the former, it should find a fair and open-minded partner in the United States. If Teheran chooses the latter, the United States has no option but to stay the course and defend its vital interests and those of its friends.

KOL AL ARAB—SYGMA

Radical versus radical: *An Iranian casualty near Fao*

America can have no
conceivable interest in a
victory by either side

NEWSWEEK : JULY 18, 1988

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

# Meese's Long Goodbye

## His resignation helps Bush, but a prosecutor's report details ethical lapses

© ROBERT HOLMGREN

A player in most of the questionable incidents: *Attorney Wallach*

Early last Tuesday, Attorney General Edwin Meese III got a chance to play his favorite role as the nation's top cop when he presided over a raid on a California marijuana patch. But that was nothing compared with his bravura performance later that day at a hastily convened press conference in Sacramento. Declaring that he had been "completely vindicated" by independent prosecutor James McKay's 14-month investigation into his ethical conduct, Meese said he would leave the Justice Department by the beginning of August. It was a definition of "vindication" missing from standard dictionaries. Just hours before the attorney general made his announcement, McKay filed an

830-page report detailing Meese's improprieties in office.

A controversial figure since he followed Ronald Reagan from California eight years ago, Meese has calmly shaken off allegations of wrongdoing time and again. Though few in the administration besides the president wanted him around, most despaired of his volunteering to step down before the election. But with the "sleaze factor" emerging as a key Democratic issue, Meese had become a political liability for the Republicans. For the Bush campaign, the resignation couldn't have been more welcome. In a terse statement, the vice president said simply: "Ed did the right thing and I wish him well."

**'Everything wrong'**: McKay found insufficient evidence for indicting the attorney general on any federal criminal charges. Nevertheless, law-enforcement sources say that the report, which has been placed under court seal until later this month, concluded the attorney general was at best insensitive to the appearance of impropriety. Other prosecutors hinted that, faced with the same evidence, they might have indicted him. As one government official puts it: "The word at Justice is that the report says Meese did everything wrong except commit a crime." By resigning before its contents are made public, "he can claim vindication without having to react

to any of the items that may be in the report," says Terry Eastland, who was fired as Justice spokesman in May. With the attorney general's office in disarray and only six months left, the administration scurried to find a successor who could be confirmed quickly—and end the Reagan era at Justice on a dignified note. At the weekend, former Pennsylvania governor Dick Thornburgh headed the short list.

"No Problems Ed"—as Washington

pundits call the ever-upbeat Meese—finally realized he had a problem after a series of springtime setbacks. In late March, Arnold I. Burns, the No. 2 man at Justice, and William F. Weld, head of its criminal division, quit because they felt Meese had compromised the department's credibility. That same week, McKay announced that he would not recommend an indictment against Meese but indicated that his upcoming report would raise questions about the attorney general's ethical conduct. A month later, the Senate subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management found that, as counselor to Reagan, Meese had violated White House policy

when he intervened to win a defense contract for the scandal-ridden Wedtech Corp. His firing of Eastland, a popular conservative, alienated supporters on the far right.

Reagan repeatedly dismissed the charges against Meese as largely partisan smears. Though he reluctantly agreed with principal advisers—most notably his wife, Nancy—that Meese was a political handicap, he refused to try to force him out. But while Reagan was away at the Moscow summit, Bush told Meese that he should resign for the good of the party. Given the attorney general's stubbornness, few administration insiders expected him to oblige. He "was ready to fight the world on this report," says a former Justice official. "He

had been under attack for so long, he could not think rationally."

**Narrow window:** In fact, despite his public determination to stay on, Meese notified Reagan several months ago of his plans to resign before the term was up. Last month Meese began plotting his strategy with a small group of trusted advisers, including Justice aide William Bradford Reynolds and veteran Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin. "Not one of the group was telling

WALLY MCNAMEE-NEWSWEEK

Reagan loyalist: With James Baker, Michael Deaver

32 NEWSWEEK: JULY 18, 1988

KISSIN
VER # 01

DEPT.

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PG:

LGERST

HJ: Y 00311 LINES(INCL.HEAD)
ISSUE: ; 88B
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Occasionally an unexpected catastrophe provides an opportunity for reassessing a course in which all participants, like actors in a Greek tragedy, seem bent on fulfilling a destiny no longer in their control. The tragic shootdown of the Iranian civilian airliner by the American Navy may be the occasion for all the parties involved in the Gulf war to pause and to reclaim control over their destinies.

The basic facts require no discussion. It was an unintended accident. Even the fundamentals in Teheran must know that the United States had no conceivable rational motive for such an act. No doubt the U.S. military authorities will review the relevant rules of engagement to minimize the risk of a recurrence. But above all, the accident should provide an occasion for all sides to review how they wound up in a situation where such an incident could happen in the first place.

[10]

[12]
(( (MORE) ) )

cYJ

KISSIN

DEPT.

PAGE-2

□Fundamentally, there are few nations in the world with less reason to quarrel and more compatible interests than Iran and the United States. Though the Shah came to symbolize the friendship between the two countries in the 1970s, those interests did not depend on him. They reflected political and strategic realities. Now the United States should agree to pay compensation to the families of the airline tragedy victims and reopen a dialogue with Teheran—the indemnity to be put in escrow until there is a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war and American hostages in Lebanon are released.+

[14]

□America has three basic objectives in the Gulf:+

[2]

■ To ensure freedom of navigation: At least half of the oil reserves of the world are located in the countries bordering the Gulf. An interruption of shipping in the area would threaten the industrial democracies with a recurrence of the oil shock crisis of the '70s, which produced inflation, recession and mounting unemployment and— in some countries—domestic instability.+

[9]

(((MORE))))

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "area: For centuries controlling the Gulf has\nbeen to goal of Russian policy. The ambi-\ntion is in fact stated in the testament of\nPeter the Great. In the 19th century, but\nfor British intervention, Iran would have\nbeen incorporated into the Russian Em-\npire, just as the neighboring Central Asian\nprincipalities were conquered by the Tsars.\nIn 1946, but for American intervention,\nIran's northwestern province of Azerbai-\njan would have been seized by the commis-\nsars as a first step toward dismembering\nIran, which has a front of some 1500\nmiles with the Soviet Union. The invasion\nof Afghanistan was another stage in fulfill-\ning this centuries-old Russian ambition.\nAnd the current withdrawal almost surely\nmeans not that the goal has been aban-\ndoned, but that it will be pursued by more\nindirect means.→", "To preserve the territorial integrity of\nfriendly states and encourage their pro-\ngress: The United States, together with\nother industrial democracies, has an inter-\nest in preventing radical domination of the\nGulf states. Two threats exist: secular Iraq\nand fundamentalist Iran. Iraq has a history", "[2]", {"bbox": [749, 1408, 882, 1432], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "of supporting terrorism and bringing pres-\nsure on nearby moderate states. Funda-\nmentalist Iran has sought to overthrow all\nmoderate regimes and to humble Iraq,\nwhich attacked it in 1980. A victory for\neither side would undermine the security\nof moderate Gulf countries and jeopardize\nthe prosperity of the industrial democra-\ncies. Until recent weeks, so long as Iran\nseemed to be winning the war, it was under-\nstandable that the United States tilted to-\nwards Iraq. But it is important to under-\nstand that America can have no\nconceivable interest in the victory of either\nside. +", "□ To what extent are these objectives\nserved by the American commitment in\nthe Gulf? +", "□ In 1987, when the United States first\nstarted escorting Kuwaiti tankers, I ex-\npressed grave reservations. It seemed to me\nthen that the stated goal-freedom of navi-\ngation-hardly reflected our real pur-\nposes. Iran has no interest in closing the\nGulf, because it uses that waterway to ex-\nport its oil. Iraq did have such an interest,", "[22]", "[3]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "because it wanted to deprive Iran of its\nprincipal source of hard currency earnings.\nIn fact, statistics show that through 1987\nthe majority of attacks on shipping in the\nGulf came from Iraq; Iranian attacks on\nshipping generally were in retaliation.\nThus, our actions were not consistent with\nour justification for them-a potential\ncause for domestic discord when the going\ngot tough. Nor was the escorting of Kuwaiti\nships representing less than 2% of the total\ntraffic through the Strait of Hormuz rele-\nvant to the problem of free navigation. It is\nonly in the last three months that the Unit-\ned States has offered assistance to all neu-\ntral shipping.→", "Despite these surface inconsistencies,\nthe deployment did have significant bene-\nfits. Teheran-and even friendly moderate\n^ governments-interpreted the scale of our\ndeployment as a prelude to more sweeping\ndesigns, perhaps even to an assault on Iran.\nThis induced extraordinary (and hereto-\nfore uncharacteristic) circumspection\non the part of Iran. Thus, whatever the justifi-\ncation, the deployment of naval forces in\nthe Gulf has in the end served long-range", "[24]", (((MORE)))))"]

["CJD", "KISSIN", "DEPT.", "American objectives. Radical pressures-\nat least those emanating from Iran-have\nbeen reduced. Friendly moderate govern-\nments have recovered from the shock of\narms sales to Iran: witness Saudi Arabia's\nbreak of diplomatic relations with Iran. It\nno longer seems possible for Iran to win the\nland war; a stalemate in the fighting ap-\npears to have developed. There are even\nindications that Iran is reconsidering it\npolicies towards Western Europe and even\nsome of its neighbors, if not yet towards the\nUnited States. The second man in Iran,\nSpeaker Rafsanjani, has stated that Iran\nhas needlessly antagonized ~~neutral countries~~ by its revolutionary fervor. And a dialogue has been opened with Great Britain and France.+", "□ These successes would have suggested a reassessment, even had the civilian airliner never been shot down. At the same time, the accident makes it necessary to demonstrate that new initiatives do not represent a loss of nerve but a long-range policy.+", "□ America has no reason to create the impression that it is irrevocably hostile to", "[29]", "[6]", {"bbox": [750, 1377, 883, 1401], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "PAGE-7", "Iran, even less that it is committed to the\nvictory of Iraq. On the contrary, America\nhas a positive interest in the territorial\nintegrity and economic development of\nIran, provided that its rulers do not make\ntrouble outside their national borders.\nWhat brought American naval forces to\nthe Gulf was the expansionist policy of Ira-\nnian fundamentalism. What makes a dia-\nlogue between America and Iran so diffi-\ncult is Iranian support for some of the most\nfor some of the most obnoxious forms of\nterrorism and the cynical playing with\nAmerican hostages. +", "The rulers in Teheran must sooner or\nlater see the folly of a policy that challenges\nthe most distant superpower-and thereby\nweakens them against a giant neighbor\nwith historically-demonstrated ambitions\nto dismember Iran and to dominate the\nGulf. Nor can they be so blind as not to see\nthe basic readiness of the Reagan Adminis-\ntration to improve relations. Fanaticism\nmay blind them as to the motive. They\nmistake the arms-for-hostages fiasco as a\nsign of weakness. They may worry as well\nabout their domestic cohesion if the deal", "[16]", (((MORE)))))"]

["EYD", "KISSIN", "DEPT.", "PAGE-8", "with what the mullahs choose to call ``the\nGreat Satan.''", "Although the United States can do nothing to change the ingrained attitudes in Teheran, it could use the disaster in the Gulf however to give Teheran another opportunity for a business-like dialogue. This should take place in three stages: a settlement of the airliner issue; a de facto ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war; the beginning of a more fundamental dialogue.", "With respect to the airliner, the Reagan\nAdministration has already expressed its\nregret at the loss of life. To go further and to\napologize would imply an admission of de-\nliberate wrongdoing that might be used as\na pretext of new acts of terrorism by Iran.\nThere has been too much self-flagellation\non that score. American moral superiority\nis not demonstrated by abjectness.", "America could demonstate its moral con-\nvictions by taking the following additional\nsteps:", "An agreement to allow an internation-\nal investigation of the incident.", {"bbox": [748, 1399, 881, 1424], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))", "[15]", "[9]", "[9]", "[3]", "[2]"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "PAGE-9", "An offer to pay compensation to the families of victims.", "[2]", "However, the United States cannot be asked to finance the war against Iraq, or to pay a substantial sum of hard currency to a country whose disciples are still holding American hostages. Innocent Iranian families have suffered tragically. But innocent American families have been suffering for years while their loved ones have been bestially abused. Congress should therefore be asked to vote an appropriate compensation, but to place the part of it that will go to Iranian nationals in escrow until there is a ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war and American hostages have been released from Lebanon. America, by formally agreeing to specific compensation through its constitutional processes, would demonstrate its concern for the suffering of innocent Iranians. Iran, by meeting the reasonable conditions of the escrow, would show its readiness to end the suffering of innocent Americans and of the victims of the Iran-Iraq war. The rulers of Iran must understand that they will only increase their long-term dilemmas if they use a tragic", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "accident as an excuse for a new wave of\nterror, which would surely invite a new\nround of retaliation. Hostages are no long-\ner a bargaining chip but an obstacle to\nimproving relations that in the end is at\nleast as much in Iran's interest as in\nAmerica's/+", "[32]", "From that basis, America should under-\ntake major efforts to bring about an end to\nthe Iran-Iraq conflict. Now that Iraq's ar-\nmies have reconquered practically all the\nterritory occupied by Iran, that goal be-\ncomes more realistic. In order to avoid end-\nless negotiations between the parties about\nthe modalities of a ceasefire, the United\nStates could make the following five-step\nproposal:+", "[10]", "Iran and Iraq would each unilaterally\ndeclare an end to all offensive operations\nbeyond their national frontiers.+", "[3]", "Iran and Iraq would agree to end at-\ntacks on shipping.+", "[2]", "The Secretary General of the United\nNations would create a commission to in-\nvestigate the causes of the war-thus meet-", {"bbox": [747, 1374, 879, 1398], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "PAGE-11", "ing a key Iranian demand. +", "■ As soon as each side has declared its willingness to stop offensive military operations-or even if Iran does so alone-the United States would stop escorting shipping in the Gulf. +", "[4]", "■ As the ceasefire takes hold, the United States would reduce its naval presence in the Gulf to levels and locations occupied before the escorting of neutral shipping began. +", "[5]", "Once that context has been established, the United States should be prepared to initiate confidential discussions aimed at a permanent improvement of U.S.-Iranian relations. The mistake of the last initiative towards Iran was to seek to move immediately to the solution of concrete problems which, because they involved profound human American anxieties, tempted the mul lahs into blackmail. In fact, the situation has some analogies to the early stages of U.S.-Chinese relations. Then, two ideologically hostile countries began a dialogue based on the premise that they might have congruent geopolitical interests. The early", "[5]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISSIN", "DEPT.", "talks avoided all divisive issues. Each side\npresented its view of the international situ-\nation and explained to the other where\nthose views met and where they differed.\nSimilarly, in a dialogue with Iran, it would\nbe futile to pretend that either side ap-\nproves the values of the other. It is possible,\nhowever, that over time a common interest\nin stability in the Gulf can emerge. The\nUnited States can do no more than to pre-\nsent as thoughtfully as it is able why this is\nso-a process which is best conducted by a\nsmall group on a highly confidential basis,\nto avoid raising unnecessary expectations\nand having to make perhaps jarring public\nexplanations.→", "[31]", "The United States has achieved its basic\nobjectives in the Gulf. The key choice is now\nIran's. Is it prepared to face reality and act\non the basis of national interest? Or will it\ncontinue to pursue essentially revolution-\nary aims? If it chooses the former, it should\nfind a fair and open-minded partner in the\nUnited States. If Teheran chooses the lat-\nter, the United States has no choice but to\ncontinue to defend its vital interests and\nthose of its friends.→", "[11]", {"bbox": [749, 1425, 882, 1449], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE))))"]

July 6, 1988

Draft #2

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

Occasionally some unexpected catastrophe provides an opportunity for a reassessment of a course in which all participants, like actors in a Greek tragedy, seem bent on fulfilling a destiny no longer in their control. The tragedy of the shootdown of the Iranian civilian airliner by the American Navy may be the occasion for all the parties involved in the Gulf war to pause and to reclaim control over their destinies.

The basic facts require no detailed discussion. In the close confines of the Persian/Arabian Gulf a Navy commander seeking to protect his crew and his ship, conscious of the cashiering of another commander who waited too long, fired his missiles at the outer limit of a five-minute warning period available to him and destroyed a civilian airliner with a large loss of innocent life. It was an unintended accident. Even the fanatics in Teheran must know that the United States had no

2

conceivable rational motive for such an act. No doubt the
US military authorities will review the relevant rules of
engagement to minimize the risk of a recurrence. Outsiders
~~do not possess enough information to comment on that technical~~
~~above all~~
subject: But the accident should provide an occasion for all
sides to review how they wound up in a situation where such
an incident could happen in the first place.

For fundamentally there are few nations in the world with
less reason to quarrel and more compatible interests than Iran
and the United States. Though the Shah came to symbolize
The decade-long friendship between the
in the 1970s, those interests did not depend on him
two countries though symbolized by the Shah was independent of
~~They~~
his person. It reflected political and strategic realities--at
Now the United States should pay an indemnity to the families,
least so long as Iran pursued a national policy of preserving
of the airline tragedy victims and reappearing a dialogue with
its independence and territorial integrity. expansionist
Tehran, or its rulers will abandon their policy of ~~US To ensure~~
III
America has three basic objectives in the Gulf: freedom
of navigations to prevent Soviet or radical domination of the
area to preserve the territorial integrity and encourage their
progress of friendly states.

The indemnity will be paid in cash, until there is a careful plan
the Iran / Iraq war + American廊tages for胜利
are released

3

At least half of the oil reserves of the world are located in the countries bordering the Gulf. An interruption of shipping and turmoil in the area would threaten the industrial democracies with a recurrence of the crisis which produced inflation, recession and mounting unemployment and -- in some countries -- domestic instability.

To prevent ... : Controlling the oil reserves of the Gulf has been the goal of the ambition is in fact stated in the testament of Russian policy. But for British intervention Iran would in the 19th century have been incorporated into the Russian Empire, just like the neighboring Central Asian principalities which were conquered by the Tsars. But for American intervention in 1946 Iran's northwestern province of Azerbaijan would have been seized by the commissars as the first step in a new attempt to dismember Iran. The invasion of Afghanistan was another stage in fulfilling a Russian ambition already expressed in the testament of Peter the Great. And the withdrawal from it means almost surely not that the goal has been abandoned but that it will be pursued by more indirect means.

4

The United States, together with other industrial democracies, has an interest in preventing radical domination of the Gulf states. Two threats [present themselves]: secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. Iraq has a history of supporting terrorism and bringing pressure on nearby moderate states. Fundamentalist Iran has sought to overthrow all moderate regimes and to humble Iran, which attacked it in 1980. A [victory for either side] would undermine the interests of all moderate Gulf countries, [while the prospect of] industrial democracies. Until recent weeks [only] Iran seemed [to be] capable of winning the war. And it was [therefore] understandable that the United States tilted towards Iraq. But it is important to understand that America can have no conceivable interest in the victory of either side.

To what extent are these objectives served by the American commitment in the Gulf?

In 1987 when the United States first started escorting Kuwaiti tankers I expressed grave reservations. It seemed to

5

me then that the stated goal--freedom of navigation--had little
reflected not real relevance to our real purposes. Iran has no interest in
closing the Gulf because it uses that waterway to export its
oil. Iraq cut off from the sea did have such an interest in
because it wanted its principal order to deprive Iran of the source of its hard currency earnings. In fact statistics show that through 1987 the majority of attacks on shipping in the Gulf came from Iraq, and that Iranian attacks on shipping generally have been purpose of retaliation. Thus our actions were not consistent with our justification for them--a potential source of domestic discord when the going got tough.

Nor was the escorting of Kuwaiti ships representing
less than 2% of the total traffic through the Strait of
Hormuz relevant to the problem of free navigation. It is
only in the last three months that the United States has
offered assistance to all neutral shipping.

Despite these surface inconsistencies, there have been some significant corollary benefits. Iran--and perhaps even friendly moderate

9

An offer to pay an indemnity to the families of
victims.

However, the United States cannot be asked to finance the war against Iraq or to pay what will amount to a substantial sum of hard currency to a country whose disciples are still holding American hostages. Innocent Iranian families have tragically suffered this week. But innocent American families have been suffering for years while their loved ones have been bestially abused. The Congress should therefore be asked to vote an appropriate indemnity but to place the part of it applicable to Iranian nationals in escrow until there is a ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war and American hostages in Lebanon have been released. The rulers of Iran must understand that the Hostages are no longer a bargaining chip but an obstacle to an improvement of relations that in the end is as much in Iran's interest as in America's. end has to be as much in Iran's interest as in America's.

10

From that basis America should undertake major efforts to bring about a dialogue with Iran and an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict. Now that Iraq's armies have reconquered practically all the territory occupied by Iran, it becomes more realistic. In order to avoid endless negotiations between the parties, [insert diagram] about the modalities of a ceasefire, the United States could make the following proposal:

a. Iran and Iraq would each unilaterally declare an end to all offensive operations beyond their national frontiers.

b. Iran and Iraq would agree to end attacks on shipping.

c. The Secretary General of the United Nations would create a commission to investigate the causes of the war--thus meeting a key Iranian demand.

d. As soon as each side has declared its willingness to stop offensive military operations--or even if Iran does so alone--the United States would stop escorting shipping in the Gulf.

11

As the ceasefire takes hold the United States would reduce its naval presence in the Gulf to levels and accepted locations of before the escorting of neutral shipping began.

In that context the United States should be prepared to initiate confidential discussions looking towards a permanent improvement of US-Iranian relations.

The United States has achieved its basic objectives in the Gulf. The key choice is now Iran's: whether it is prepared to face reality and act on the basis of national will it continue to pursue essentially imperialist aims. If it chooses the former it should find a fair and open-minded partner in the United States. If the latter, the United States has no choice except to continue to defend its vital interests and close all its friends.

July 6, 1988

Draft #2

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

2

conceivable rational motive for such an act. No doubt the
US military authorities will review the relevant rules of
engagement to minimize the risk of a recurrence. Outsiders
do not possess enough information to comment on that technical
subject. But the accident should provide an occasion for all
sides to review how they wound up in a situation where such
an incident could happen in the first place.

For fundamentally there are few nations in the world with
less reason to quarrel and more compatible interests than Iran
and the United States. The decade-long friendship between the
two countries though symbolized by the Shah was independent of
his person. It reflected political and strategic realities--at
least so long as Iran pursued a national policy of preserving
its independence and territorial integrity.

America has three basic objectives in the Gulf: freedom
of navigation; to prevent Soviet or radical domination of the
area; to preserve the territorial integrity and encourage the
progress of friendly states.

3

At least half of the oil reserves of the world are located in the countries bordering the Gulf. An interruption of shipping and turmoil in the area would threaten the industrial democracies with a recurrence of the crisis which produced inflation, recession and mounting unemployment and domestic instability.

To dominate the Gulf has for centuries been the goal of Russian policy. But for British intervention Iran would in the 19th century have been incorporated into the Russian Empire just like the neighboring Central Asian principalities which were conquered by the Tsars. But for American intervention in 1946 Iran's northwestern province of Azerbaijan would have been seized by the commissars as the first step in a new attempt to dismember Iran. The invasion of Afghanistan was another stage in fulfilling a Russian ambition already expressed in the testament of Peter the Great. And the withdrawal from it means almost surely not that the goal has been abandoned but that it will be pursued by more indirect means.

The United States together with other industrial democracies has an interest in preventing radical domination of the Gulf states. Two threats present themselves: secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. Iraq has a history of supporting terrorism and bringing pressure on nearby moderate states. Fundamentalist Iran has sought to overthrow all moderate regimes and to humble Iran which attacked it in 1980. A victory for either side would undermine the interests of all industrial democracies. Until recent weeks only Iran seemed capable of winning the war. And it was therefore understandable that the United States tilted towards Iraq. But it is important to understand that America can have no conceivable interest in the victory of either side.

5

me then that the stated goal--freedom of navigation--had little
relevance to our real purposes. Iran has no interest in
closing the Gulf because it uses that waterway to export its
oil. Iraq cut off from the sea did have such an interest in
order to deprive Iran of the source of its hard currency
earnings. In fact statistics show that through 1987 the
majority of attacks on shipping in the Gulf came from Iraq
and that Iranian attacks on shipping generally have the purpose
of retaliation. Thus our actions were not consistent with our
justification of them--a potential source for domestic discord
when the going got tough.

Nor was the escorting of Kuwaiti ships representing
less than 2% of the total traffic through the Strait of
Hormuz relevant to the problem of free navigation. It is
only in the last three months that the United States has
offered assistance to <u>all</u> neutral shipping.

However these surface inconsistencies have had some
corollary benefits. Iran--and perhaps even friendly moderate

6

governments--observing the incommensurability between the
scale of our deployment and the nature of its justification
assumed it was a pretext for more sweeping designs perhaps
even an assault on Iran. This has induced extraordinary and
heretofore uncharacteristic circumspection on the Iranian side.

Thus whatever the justification the deployment of naval forces
in the Gulf has in the end long-range American objectives.

Radical pressures--at least those emanating from Iran--have
been reduced. Friendly moderate governments have regained
confidence--witness Saudi Arabia's break of diplomatic relations
with Iran. It no longer seems possible for Iran to win the
land war; a stalemate in the fighting appears to have developed.

There are even indications that Iran is reconsidering its
policies if not yet towards the United States then towards
Western Europe and even some of its neighbors.

These successes would have indicated a reassessment
even had the civilian airliner never been shot down. Indeed
the accident over the Gulf may impose an interval lest it

7

appear that America lost its nerve in the face of the attacks
of a nation that has systematically sought to humiliate it for
over a decade and played with innocent American lives.

In the long run, America has no reason to create the
impression that hostility to Iran is a congenital attribute of its
foreign policy. On the contrary America has a positive interest in
the territorial integrity and economic prosperity of Iran
provided that country stays within its national borders.
What brought American naval forces to the Gulf has been the
expansionist policy of Iranian fundamentalism. What makes a
dialogue between America and Iran so difficult is Iranian
support for some of the most obnoxious forms of terrorism.

The rulers in Teheran must sooner or later see the folly
of a policy that challenges the most distant superpower thereby
weakening itself against a giant neighbor with historically
demonstrated ambitions to dismember Iran along a frontier of
some 1500 miles. Nor can they be so blind as not to see the
basic readiness of the Reagan Administration to improve

8

relations. Fanaticism may blind them as to the motive; they mistake
the arms for hostage fiasco as a sign of weakness; they may worry
as well about their domestic cohesion if they deal with
what the mullahs choose to call the Great Satan.

The United States can do nothing to change the ingrained
attitudes in Teheran. It could use the disaster in the Gulf
however to give Teheran another opportunity for a business-like
dialogue. This should take place in two stages: a settlement
of the airliner issue followed by a more fundamental dialogue.

With respect to the airliner the Reagan Administration
has shown a generous and open attitude. It has already expressed
its regret at the loss of life. An apology would be inappropriate
because it would involve an admission of a deliberate wrong.
There has been too much self-flagellation on that score by
personalities appearing on the media. American moral superiority
is not demonstrated by abjectness. It could supplement it with
the following steps:

a. An invitation to an international investigation of
the incident.

b. An offer to pay an indemnity to the families of
victims.

At the same time the United States cannot be asked to
finance the war against Iraq or to pay what will amount to a
substantial sum of hard currency to a country whose disciples
have held American hostages often for years. Innocent Iranian
families have tragically suffered this week. But innocent
American families have been suffering for years while their
loved ones have been bestially abused. The Congress should
therefore be asked to vote an appropriate indemnity but to place
the part of it applicable to Iranian nationals in escrow until
there is a ceasefire in the Iran/Iraq war and American hostages
in Lebanon have been released. The rulers of Iran must
understand that the hostages are no longer a bargaining chip
but an obstacle to an improvement of relations that in the
end has to be as much in Iran's interest as in America's.

10

Iran/Iraq conflict. Now that Iraq's armies have reconquered
practically all the territory occupied by Iran it becomes
more realistic. In order to avoid endless negotiations
about the modalities of a ceasefire the United States could
make the following proposal:

11

e. As the ceasefire takes hold the United States would reduce its naval presence in the Gulf to levels and locations of before the escorting of neutral shipping began.

The United States has achieved its basic objectives in the Gulf. The key choice is now Iran's: whether it is prepared to face reality and act on the basis of national interest or to pursue essentially imperialist aims. If it chooses the former it should find a fair and open-minded partner in the United States. If the latter, the United States has no choice except to continue to defend its vital interests.

July 6, 1988

Draft #1

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

2

To dominate the Gulf has for centuries been the goal of Russian Soviet policy. But for British intervention Iran would in the 19th century have been incorporated into the Russian Empire just like the neighboring Central Asian principalities which were conquered by the Tsars. But for American intervention in 1946 Iran's northwestern province of Azerbaijan would have been seized by the commissars as the first step in a new attempt to dismember Iran. The invasion of Afghanistan was another stage in fulfilling a Russian ambition already expressed in the testament of Peter the Great. And the withdrawal from it means almost surely not that the goal has been abandoned but that it will be pursued by more indirect means.

CJA

5

But whatever the justification there was a deeper reason

for the commitment of American naval power in the area, it
was contained in a declaration and
supported the other objectives outlined above and especially,

the confidence of friendly moderate regimes after
to restore the bizarre episode of selling arms to Iran at a time when

Iraq was reeling from repeated Iranian offensives.

And the deployment of naval forces brilliantly served long-range American objectives. Radical pressures--at least those emanating from Iran--have been reduced. Friendly moderate governments have regained confidence--witness Saudi Arabia's break of diplomatic relations with Iran. It no longer seems possible for Iran to win the land war; a stalemate in the fighting appears to have developed. There are even indications that Iran is reconsidering its policies if not yet towards the United States then towards Western Europe and even some of its neighbors.

Thus the success of American policy would have indicated a reassessment in the light of the changed circumstances it has brought about even had the civilian airliner never been shot down. Indeed the accident over the Gulf may impose an interval lest it appear that America lost its nerve in the face of the attacks of a nation that has systematically sought to humiliate it for over a decade and played with innocent American lives.

7

The rulers in Teheran must sooner or later see the folly
of a policy that challenges the most distant superpower thereby
weakening itself against a giant neighbor with historically
demonstrated ambitions to dismember Iran along a frontier of
some 1500 miles. Nor can they be so blind as not to see the
basic readiness of the Reagan Administration to improve
relations. Fanaticism may blind them as to the motive; they mistake
the arms for hostage fiasco as a sign of weakness; they may worry

8

There has been too much self-flagellation on that score by
personalities appearing on the media. American moral superiority
is not demonstrated by abjectness. It could supplement it with
the following steps:

cyj

9

From that basis America should undertake major efforts
to bring about a dialogue with Iran and an end to the
Iran/Iraq conflict. Now that Iraq's armies have reconquered
practically all the territory occupied by Iran it becomes
more realistic. In order to avoid endless negotiations
about the modalities of a ceasefire the United States could
make the following proposal:

11

July 5, 1988

Draft #1

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

The just concluded Communist Party conference in Moscow
following so close on the heels of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit
symbolizes the end of the postwar period in international
relations. These twin developments--the unexpected radicalism
of Gorbachev's domestic changes and the redefinition of American
conservative doctrine by the most conservative American
President--have capped the upheaval of postwar international
relations.

--Whatever Gorbachev's intentions he has started a process
within the Soviet Union and even more in the satellite orbit
whose consequences not even he can foretell.

--Whatever Reagan's convictions he has contributed to
conditions which will bring about major changes in Atlantic
relations within the next decade.

--These twin events make the future of Europe--East and
West--a central political and not simply an arms control problem.

--As the US-Soviet ideological rivalry diminishes traditional geopolitical factors will become more prominent. The decline of Communist ideology--real or imagined--will require increasing attention to historic Russian expansionism.

--This will occur while Japan, China and India will become increasingly important factors.

--Too it will change the character of so-called regional conflicts especially in Africa and Central America.

--In these circumstances exclusive concerns with arms control is a diversion from the dominant trends of our period.

--To deal with such a world the United States must reassess its traditional approach to international affairs focused on intentions rather than capabilities and historically uncomfortable with maintaining a balance of power. It has an opportunity to do so in the electoral campaign about to start and in the formation of the new Administration.

The Nature of the Challenge

Public discussion in most of the democracies and the statements of almost all leaders paint an idyllic picture of the world ahead of us. In it Gorbachev emerges as a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika in this view emerge as the solutions of all international problems. Communism loses its appeal globally together with its dynamism. The Soviet Union becomes a consumer society. Its leadership concentrates on domestic affairs. The democracies have an obligation to "help" Gorbachev achieve these goals. As Communism wanes, the world will become more peaceful.

To be sure this idyll is punctuated by frequent protestations of wariness as to Soviet intentions. President Reagan never tires of repeating the alleged Soviet proverb: "Trust but verify." But this is *ritual*. The dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the democracies and the Soviet

4

Union and even of personal friendship between Western leaders
and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev's success in freeing the Soviet Union from
the isolation and stagnation of 1985 when he took office is
an astonishing tour de force. President Reagan seems to
believe that he enjoys a personal friendship with Gorbachev,
that Gorbachev virtually alone is responsible for the domestic
changes apparently taking place in the Soviet Union, and that
these factors combined are sufficient to produce a new era in
East-West relations. And he is not alone among Western leaders
in holding these views.

Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True,
major, perhaps historic, changes are under way in the Soviet
Union, but it defies all reason to believe that a man who has
never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party would
abandon the Marxist belief in the predominance of objective
factors in favor of a "subjective" affection for an American

5

leader of a different generation whose formative experience
was in a profession quite distant from politics. No Soviet
leader would dare go to the Politburo with the proposition that
his personal ties to an American president could justify changes
in Soviet policy.

For all his panache and intelligence, Gorbachev like most
statesmen, is to some degree a product of circumstance. He
seeks--with courage and imagination--to change the Soviet domestic
structure to overcome the stagnation of the late Brezhnev era.
It is not a commitment to peace in the abstract but a more
competitive Soviet Union, though he undoubtedly needs a period
of peace to achieve his domestic goals. Another Soviet leader
would in all likelihood feel compelled to pursue similar policies,
if with less verve and psychological skill. After all the
present phase of Soviet policy was inaugurated when Gromyko--
attacked at the party conference as a relic of the Brezhnev era--
during the leadership of the decrepit Chernenko, who has become
a non-person, called on President Reagan in 1984.

The emphasis on personalities trivializes the past
because it creates the impression that Cold War tensions
were caused by idiosyncracies rather than by specific actions
and fundamental differences. And it mortgages the future by
turning foreign policy into a version of psychiatry. In the
long run in all democracies this strengthens the neutralist
and radical elements who have claimed all along that tensions
have been unnecessary and that the risks of the Cold War were
frivolous.

The exaltation of the personal relation of the two leaders
creates two traps. If tensions increase in the next presidential
term only six months away the democracies will once again be
torn between those who blame tensions on the failures of
leadership and those who maintain that the Soviet leopard never
changes its spots. And should Gorbachev leave office for
essentially internal reasons a wave of despondency and self-
flagellation will sweep over the democracies that will no doubt

7

accuse themselves of not having made enough concessions. A
policy based on personalities is inherently precarious however.

The often repeated phrase that we should help Gorbachev
is devoid of meaning unless help is properly defined. Does
it imply that we should make agreements that we would not
make on their merits? Does it mean that we must accept
the Soviet definition of the issues? Should we side with
Gorbachev in his internal disputes? Or do we help him most
by putting forward a reasonable concept of a more peaceful world
that takes account of changing realities?

In the end it is geography, geopolitics and history which
define the limits within which personality and ideology operate.
Even should Communist ideology decline there would still remain
historic Russia as a great power whose objectives Gorbachev
would have to determine in the light of its experience. And
for four hundred years it has been a major challenge for world
peace how to establish a relationship between that giant state
of eleven time zones and its smaller neighbors. Often invaded

8

Russian frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably outward.

The issue of whether Soviet expansionism has been the result of Communist ideology or of Russian historical expansionism has been debated for as long as the existence of the Communist state.

During World War II it was an article of faith that Stalin had defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution and hence would pursue Russian national objectives rather than expansion after the war.

In fact the assessment turned out to be correct. Stalin did pursue Russia's traditional goals; his distinguishing feature was that he pursued them all simultaneously. The program Molotov submitted to Hitler in November 1940 and which Stalin not unexpectedly pursued after Hitler was defeated could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination of the Balkans and of the Straits; a major role in Poland, and Soviet predominance over Iran. Soviet policy did not reach all these objectives but it was not through lack of trying. It was the stuff of the Cold War.

9

The role of ideology has been threefold: it gave Soviet leaders an inner assurance that their Tsarist predecessors occasionally lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters in many countries and in the end it tempted them into distant enterprises such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an abandonment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the pursuit of traditional Russian objectives.

Western leaders are practicing escapism if they believe the decline in Communist ideology ends their foreign policy problems. It opens up opportunities, but also new challenges which America in particular has never had to face.

## The New Soviet Challenge

Revolutionaries rarely foresee all the consequences of their actions. They attack the existing structure by forming

10

a coalition of all resentments. But having undermined it they
wind up having to reestablish discipline among their followers.
This is why revolutions usually consume their own children.

Gorbachev's situation is crucial. His power base is the
Communist Party, an avowedly revolutionary organization; his
sole official position is that of General Secretary of that
party. He has repeatedly and passionately avowed his
commitment to one-party rule. At the same time he recognizes
that his reforms can only be achieved by overturning the
encrusted bureaucracy of the party he is leading and which
supplies his power base. Every new General Secretary has
faced the problem that the system that claims to represent
scientific materialism and the advance forces of history is
in fact run more like a feudal medieval state on the basis of
personal relationships. That is why every new General Secretary
has begun his reign with a purge often lasting five years or
longer and ended it in stagnation as his colleagues aged with
him and began to maneuver for survival in the succession.

11

What is novel in Gorbachev's approach is not the purge
which is clearly under way with the traditional public humiliation
of the victims who have often served the Communist Party for
decades. It is his obvious conviction that his goals cannot
be achieved by the traditional methods of taking over the
Communist Party. His solution is a structure so complex
that at least on paper the governmental and the party
bureaucracies balance each other out enabling Gorbachev to
play the various bureaucracies off against each other.

Only at the apex are the bureaucracies joined. The new
office of President for the first time since Stalin combines
party and governmental power. When fully elaborated it
will lend itself to authoritarian control more easily than to
checks and balances for in the end it is likely that when the
purge is completed party rule will return. Thus a contradiction
is built into the system. One-party rule is to be sustained
by free discussion. Like many reformers Gorbachev may believe
that all reasonable people will come to similar conclusions.

12

Like many revolutionaries he will be disappointed in that
expectation. Will he then decide to destroy his critics, now
his supporters?

I do not pretend to know Gorbachev's ultimate intentions;
it is possible that neither does he. I believe in any event
that American policymakers should focus on Soviet foreign
policy rather than the current obsession with Soviet domestic
trends. These are relevant to foreign policy primarily because
they make it likely that the process started by Gorbachev will
take years of turmoil and uncertainty before it settles down.
The established bureaucracies will not yield easily to a crushing
of their power and their privileges. In an empire of many
peoples, decentralization is bound to run into the nationality
question. There is no entrepreneurial tradition left. The
secret police and the military--two of the most potent bureau-
cracies--have not yet been heard from.

It is possible that this turmoil will usher in a period
of peace. It is equally possible that in the end the regime

13

will appeal to the historic unifying element of at least the
Russian part of the population--its profound nationalism.
The manifestations of that process are the challenges to
our foreign policy.

Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove even more
unsettling in the countries of Eastern Europe. A Soviet
citizen may still take patriotic pride in the victory
in World War II, the industrialization of the Soviet Union and
its achievement of high status in international affairs even
after hearing that every leader since Lenin was responsible
either for a cult of personality, adventurism or stagnation.
No such comfort is available to the East Europeans. Their
ruling parties were imposed by the Soviet Union which now
advertises publicly the corruption and inefficiency of its
system. The Gorbachev reforms are thus bound to increase the
challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling groups in Eastern
Europe. These will not be able to operate the subtle balancing
act between government and party envisaged by Gorbachev for the

14

Soviet Union. It is no wonder that some of the East European
Communist parties--in East Germany explicitly and to a lesser
extent in Czechoslovakia--are dissociating openly from
the Soviet pattern. And the Polish Communist Party is in
trouble even without changes in the Kremlin.

Gorbachev may therefore well be ushering in a period of
turmoil in Eastern Europe. In the face of upheaval Soviet
leaders may feel compelled to intervene to prevent the
restiveness from spreading into the Soviet Union. In this
connection it is significant that Gorbachev in his interview
with the *Washington Post* claimed that the West fomented the
Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czech spring of 1968; in
other words challenges to Communist preeminence are ascribed
to foreign intervention by definition, hence a Soviet military
reaction is justified. And if the Soviets should intervene--
even as an act of desperation--the present euphoric mood in the
West will switch to intransigence repeating--with even wider
swings--the postwar cycle between excesses of conciliation and
excesses of belligerence.

15

Global Impact of Recent Events

The foundations of postwar policy are shifting as well
in Europe and in Asia. Unlike his predecessor who seemed
above all concerned with safeguarding the status quo in Europe
Gorbachev seems intent on a deliberate strategy to undermine
the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Soviet theoretical
journals justify peace not so much for its own sake as to
deprive US policy of its rationale. Soviet policymakers
understand very well that the various nuclear arms control
agreements either concluded or in the process of negotiation
must undermine the existing NATO strategy. How often can the
phrase "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"
be repeated in US-Soviet communiqués before the nuclear deterrent
loses all credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons
are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes
unfeasible? And in the existing climate of relaxation of
tensions it is naive to believe in any substantial conventional

16

rearmament; in fact NATO will be fortunate if it can maintain
its present level of conventional forces. Step-by-patient-step
the Soviets are elaborating a claim to a veto over NATO defense
policy to a point where the modernization of weapons introduced
ten years ago without controversy or even comment is threatening
to blow up into a major East-West issue.

As a result traditional pro-American groups especially
in the Federal Republic of Germany are becoming demoralized.
Neutralist elements who in the entire postwar period have
argued either that tensions were artificial or that there
existed some deus ex machina to overcome them feel vindicated.
All this leads to a renewed focus on East-West relations
especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1982
the distinguished historian Gordon Craig in a prescient
lecture on the ambivalent German relationship to the West
warned that historically Germany's ties had been in Central
Europe or the East and that excessive importunities by the
Western allies or even excessive dependence on them might produce

17

"gusts of nostalgia" for a more autonomous past. That is
now happening.

I do not expect anything so dramatic as leaving NATO or
overt neutralism. But it is likely that efforts to augment
or to modernize NATO forces will meet increasing resistance
and even European integration will become controversial when
it reaches the point of a greater European military cooperation.
Then we may well witness a repetition of the debate of the
Fifties whether prospects for German unity are being sacrificed
on the altar of Western ties.

These tendencies though not caused by the Soviets are
surely being exploited by them with a daring inconceivable in
the Brezhnev period. By cooperating in building Gorbachev into
a folk hero too many of the leaders of the democracies are
tempting Soviet initiatives more conducive to undermining the
Alliance then contributing to stability. It is no accident that
European public opinion polls give Gorbachev not President Reagan

tYJ

18

credit for the easing of tension. Meanwhile Soviet emissaries are crisscrossing Europe preaching the virtues of what they call the House of Europe--a structure from the Urals to the Atlantic whose practical consequence is the expulsion of the United States from the Continent and to make European security depend on Moscow.

All this is no doubt disconcerting to the Western Alliance. And in all likelihood Gorbachev presents his foreign policy to his colleagues in the Politburo as one of his great achievements. But it remains to be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as farsighted as it is daring. As the Federal Republic and to a lesser extent the other European countries increase their activities and investments in Eastern Europe the centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet empire will be accelerated--especially if there is not some political understanding of how this process might evolve. After all the most logical and historically most valid arrangement for a House of Europe would return the

19

countries of Eastern Europe to their traditional European relationships. Thus the focal point of diplomacy will increasingly be on the evolution of Europe's future and it may well require more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than by Washington.

The impact of the emerging patterns of international affairs will be of profound importance for Asia as well.

Gorbachev has made essentially the same appeal in Asia as in Europe: a suggestion that the pursuit of national interests makes the United States dispensable and some vague Asian security system to parallel the House of Europe. But the impact has been less sweeping. The countries of Asia have not felt so dependent on the United States nor as afraid of the Soviet Union. Hence in Asia there is not the emotional absorption with Gorbachev's personality as in the Western democracy.

The Asian nations have gone to school in the European power politics of the age of colonialism and have grafted onto it

20

their own unsentimental national experiences. They do not look for a transcendent end of international tensions. They will try to assess the trade-off between a decline in Soviet ideological dynamism and its increase in real power if perestroika succeeds. They will seek to evaluate whether American actions reflect a long-range strategy, a decline in American strength or domestic incoherence. They will be preoccupied in a manner no longer conceivable in Europe by their relations with each other. Hence the ups and downs of US-Soviet relations concern them more from a geopolitical than from a tactical perspective.

At least since the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 China has feared the application to it of the Brezhnev doctrine by which Moscow asserted its right to maintain doctrinal orthodoxy in the Communist world. This fear is undoubtedly eased by recent developments in the Soviet Union. With Moscow imitating many of China's economic reforms the Soviet incentive to impose

21

ideological conformity on China has surely diminished.

On the other hand the growth of Chinese power could--at least in Chinese eyes--create a Soviet temptation to set back Chinese economic development. But pressure on China would weaken the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States. Thus the careful calculators in Beijing will lower their estimate of the dangers of a direct quest for hegemony by the Soviet Union and will feel less inclined to gear their foreign policy to preventing it. Moreover they will take care not to be isolated by a US-Soviet rapprochement.

The likely outcome is a steady improvement in Sino-Soviet relations--especially as the Soviets meet Chinese conditions, above all Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. At the same time Chinese planners are not sentimental. They will not forget that no rapprochement with Moscow can change the 3,000-mile length of the Sino-Soviet frontier. They will try to prevent improvement of relations with the Soviet Union from leading to

22

an estrangement with the United States which China will continue to require as counterweight to hegemonial aspirations in Asia. And in that respect China's long-term fear concerns Japan nearly as much as the USSR. Nor can China be interested in weakening Europe lest the Soviet Union shift the center of gravity of its pressures towards the East.

The real challenge in Sino-US relations is whether the United States will be able to grasp Beijing's complex and power-oriented diplomacy. Ideologists frustrated by the waning of the Cold War under the aegis of a conservative president may be tempted to turn on China. Liberals may resist the policy of equilibrium implicit in making China's territorial integrity a major American interest. The Chinese may compound these tendencies by misunderstanding American psychology or domestic politics.

Japan, already an economic superpower, is on the way to becoming a major political and even military force. Though less

23

than 2% of the Gross National Product Japan's military budget
is already the third largest in the world. Japan is not
likely to be much influenced by the domestic changes in the
Soviet Union. Its policy towards Moscow has always been more
influenced by national aspirations especially its claim to two
northern islands and by concern over Soviet military power in
the Far East than by an ideological threat to which Japan feels
itself largely immune. As its own military power grows and
America emphasizes non-nuclear defense the price Japan is
prepared to pay for American military protection is bound to
decline. And the economic rivalry between the two allies is
likely to increase. At the same time Southeast Asia will grow
in strength and India will play an increasing role. All this
will require a reassessment of the heretofore largely bipolar
orientation of US foreign policy.

What Does This Mean for US Foreign Policy?

Comparable analyses could be made for other parts of the
world but they would go beyond the scope of an article. Enough

24

has been said to make clear that the evolution in Moscow,
the change in weapons technology, the emergence of new power
centers and the relative decline in American economic
predominance have combined to hasten the end of the world as
it existed in the forty years since the end of the second
World War. This is often identified with a decline of American
power. In fact absolute American power has grown in the past
forty years and is increasing still. But in a world of 160
sovereign nations no country should carry the psychological
burden of being principally responsible for the security and
progress of every area. The emergence of a multipolar world
does not diminish America's importance but it requires it to
change the thrust of its involvement at least in some areas
from a principal actor to a crucial supporting role. Unfortunately
nearly two decades of domestic controversy threaten to deprive
us of a coherent intellectual apparatus to deal with the new
challenge.

25

The tendency to deal with the Soviet challenge
psychiatrically by an assessment of the motives of Soviet
leaders leaves us at the mercy of Soviet internal developments
over which we have no control. The rejection of geopolitical
considerations--indeed of real problems--the balance of power
threatens us with irrelevance with respect to the rest of the
world. If our resources are shrinking, ideology is declining
and new power centers are emerging the logical conclusion is
that we can no longer do everything simultaneously. It follows
that peace presupposes a balance of power--a concept which
Americans of all persuasions have historically resisted.

It is part of America's historic legacy that we have
considered our situation as unique or special, that we believed
in final solutions to all problems, in a world without any
inherent conflict and or where conflicts reflect a struggle
between good and evil. None of these assumptions apply to a
world regulated in part by considerations of balance of power.

26

America's role is no longer unique in the sense that we
can afford to wait for an actual assault on the equilibrium
because by then it is usually too late to act. A balance of
power world focuses on capabilities as much as intentions.
It deals with nuances rather than absolutes; it assesses power
relationships as much as moral preferences. It knows few
final solutions and it presupposes consistency of policy based
on a long-term understanding of historical trends.

These are not staples of current American thought which
tends to be divided between opposing camps that seek to base
peace on the strenuous moral improvement of America and others
that see foreign policy as a permanent struggle between good
and evil. Both are modern versions of historic US isolationism.
The former abdicates pending the moral regeneration of America,
the latter does so in the name of the moral failings of mankind.

A mature American foreign policy must recognize that we
are involved in the world as a matter of naked survival not as a

27

favor to ourselves, even less to foreign nations. Preserving
the balance of power is essential for our security; it
requires us to distinguish three types of situations: (1) where
the superpowers are directly involved; (2) where the superpowers
are indirectly involved such as in Asia or the Persian Gulf;
(3) where the security interests of the superpowers are not
homogeneous, such as for example in Central America.

The first situation of direct involvement of the nuclear
superpowers applies primarily to Europe. But analysis of it
is nearly obscured by a preoccupation with arms control. If
wars are caused not by geopolitical causes then their origin
must be evil men or the accumulation of arms. We take care of
the former by the exaltation of Gorbachev and of the latter by
abstruse agreements increasingly divorced from strategic reality.

I have on many occasions expressed my technical concerns
about agreements in the process of being negotiated. But many
of these concerns could be met if a major bipartisan effort were

28

under way to develop a coherent strategic doctrine on which
a post-arms control world is to be based. All experts agree
that a reduction of present forces by 50% increases their
vulnerability. It can be argued that this is not significant;
it cannot be maintained that it is a contribution to stability.
There is wide consensus, too, that this increase in vulnerability
could be avoided by measures such as mobile missiles or fewer
missiles on each submarine. Paul Nitze, the distinguished
principal advisor to our arms control negotiators, has pointed
out that nothing in the pending agreement prohibits such measures.

But they have not been taken or even outlined. Therefore
proceeding with these negotiations must raise doubts about
the validity of US strategy and guarantees a bitter ratification
battle. Why not use the interval of our electoral period to
put forward a concept of modernized strategic forces that could
then become a basis for arms control talks? What would be more
elevating to the democratic process than a reasoned dialogue of
the strategic choices before us?

29

A concept of modernization of strategic forces in the context of arms control negotiations must be related to the conventional balance. After all it was the Soviet conventional threat which triggered the nuclear build-up in the first place. There is much idle talk about achieving a conventional balance through either build-up or through negotiations. But first there is no consensus about what constitutes an adequate balance and then there is no possibility in any NATO country of substantial build-up in the era of euphoria about relaxation of tensions. As for conventional arms control domestic politics predominates over strategic thought. If we are not careful we will slide into the same trap as on INF, that the Soviets accept proposals made by the West largely for internal reasons which do not in fact add to its security and may undermine its political cohesion.

The next President is likely to face early on some unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, perhaps

30

Czechoslovakia, or even a token withdrawal from Eastern
Germany. What will the West's response be then? How will
it affect nuclear modernization in the Federal Republic in
the light of the statement by the Federal government that
modernization would not take place if there were progress towards
conventional arms control? What will be the defense strategy
of NATO after nuclear weapons have been stigmatized and
conventional weapons frozen or reduced in a strategically
irrelevant manner. Historically conventional deterrence has
never worked. What then is the Western concept of conventional
arms control?

That question is almost impossible to answer in the absence
of some understanding about the future of Europe. As I have
indicated above Soviet policy can embarrass the Atlantic
Alliance but the long-range dilemma is on the Soviet side. To
weaken NATO Moscow must pursue a policy of moderation both
internationally and domestically. But such a policy encourages

31

autonomy in Eastern Europe and tempts Western Europe and especially the Federal Republic into seeking to dissociate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union by economic and even political penetration. If that occurs in a vacuum the danger of brutal Soviet intervention is real, perhaps even of a demonstration of Western impotence such as a new crisis over Berlin.

Has the time not come to begin sensitive discreet discussions about the future of Europe? Historically and logically the European House of which Soviet emissaries speak cannot include parts of the Soviet Union because territorially the larger part of the Soviet Union is in Asia. A European House with a European dimension would extend from the Soviet-Polish frontier to the Atlantic.

A thoughtful exploration of this concept would point out to Soviet leaders that by identifying their security with the forcible maintenance of regimes considered alien by their publics

32

they have made their entire policy dependent on the capacity
to repress periodic upheavals putting Soviet long-range
policy at the mercy of unforeseeable events. Has the time
come to separate the nature of the regimes from the security
of the Soviet Union? Are not in the long run arrangements in
Finland more conducive to Soviet security than those of Eastern
Europe? Is it possible to devise security arrangements for
Eastern Europe that meet Soviet security concerns even very
widely defined? Is it possible to start the process in one
country with total Soviet withdrawal and guarantees against
reintervention provided no military changes took place? In
the context of such a House of Europe it would be possible
to devise a security system from the Urals to the Atlantic
of drastic reductions of all outside forces that might in fact
usher in a period of unprecedented security.

This is not a negotiation that lends itself to the formal
diplomacy conducted by coveys of diplomats and tacticians

33

characteristic of arms control negotiations. It requires
above all a strategy worked out with some care and closely
coordinated with our allies. It would be most effective
in the context of rapid progress towards West European
integration in which case Europe should play a principal
exploratory role in the sensitive, confidential talks without
which the concept is doomed.

The problem of the balance of power in Asia is less direct.
There has been no direct confrontation between the US and the
Soviet Union. Except for Korea no American troops are in
a front line. In the '90s there will exist in fact two
balances of power: between China, Japan, the Soviet Union
in Northeast Asia and between Japan, India and to some extent
the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia with the United States--if
it can ever develop a national strategy--having an opportunity
for a balancing role.

The American role with respect to these two balances will
be very similar to that of Britain with respect to the European

34

continent: we are the balancer of the equilibrium. An Asia
under hostile domination is against US interests whatever our
legal obligations. This after all was the proximate cause of
US involvement in the second World War. The US must play the
role of the balancer supporting the weaker against the stronger
and the potential victim against the potential aggressor. Such
a policy has to be carried out in the face of the almost certain
loss or at least degradation of our Philippine bases over the
next decade and the need to restructure both forces and
command arrangements in Korea in the same period. This
requires subtle judgments and a consistency yet to be acquired
by American foreign policy.

With respect to the third category of issues where US
and Soviet issues are neither directly nor significantly
involved a new kind of dialogue is needed. In the '70s there
was an attempt to discuss rules of conduct for the superpowers
which was much derided by those who prefer slogans to strategy.

35

Of course no agreement is self-enforcing; without America's
willingness to sustain its commitments they are bound to be
stillborn. Nevertheless some discussion of who may do what
where and when at a minimum reduces the risk of misunderstanding
in a crisis. Failing such an understanding it will have to be
brought about in the crucible of crises.

Conclusion

rhetoric raises two causes for concern: the increasing
emphasis on the personal relationship of the two leaders and
the implication in the final communique and other statements
that the conclusion of a START agreement reducing forces by
50% during what remains of the Reagan administration is
possible and desireable.

President Reagan seems to believe that he enjoys a
personal friendship with Gorbachev, that Gorbachev virtually
alone is responsible for the domestic changes apparently
taking place in the Soviet Union, and that these factors
combined are sufficient to produce a new era in East-West
relations. Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious.

True, changes are under way in the Soviet Union, but it
defies all reason to believe that a man who has never held
any post outside the Soviet Communist Party would abandon
the Marxist belief in the predominance of objective factors