47

triple zero that you have talked about.

And I do not know what it is going to take to shake that
momentum, because it has taken on a force of its own.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, a reliable American foreign policy
would help. And by reliable I mean what that does not change
*every four years*
*all the time*

Senator Cohen: Well, that would help. And by the same
token, I tried to take this into account.

The Germans were very concerned when President was first
elected. He was seen as being too warlike. Then they became
really alarmed in Reykjavik because he was seen as the
apostle of peace at that point, and that worried them too.

We have a problem with their reaction. They seem to coin
a new phrase every five or 10 years. Once it was
decoupling. We have heard that for about 10 years. Now it
is singularization, and now they are focusing upon that.

So they come up with a new phrase about every five years
in order to demonstrate their particular historical alarm.
So it is not just the United States, it is also a question of
Germany as well.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am not saying it is all our fault.
But I think we have to recognize that in Germany we have a
divided country with unnatural borders, a capital in a town
that has no historical relationship to being the capital.

And therefore rapid changes in American policy, no matter

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

48

how meritorious, are going to create disproportionate responses among a very insecure people that has a very own ~~maxx~~ complex history.

Senator Cohen: Let us face it. The zero-zero was not our proposal. That was Helmut Schmidt's proposal.

So it is not exactly something that has emanated from Ronald Reagan. They came from Helmut Schmidt, and they cannot lay the blame upon an American innovation that somehow has laid them naked to their enemies. This is something that they proposed back in 1980 or 1981.

I would also like to get your assessment on the, I think you mentioned this, about the French and the British perhaps combining their efforts to develop a standoff weapon. I am more concerned about the new proposal about Franco-German cooperation.

It sounds right on the surface. Dr. Schlesinger and others, I think Dr. Brown, as a matter of fact, perhaps suggested that we should embrace it at least calmly, if not enthusiastically.

But does that not also carry a consequence that the United States urges the Germans to start moving closer with the French and their defensive needs, that that will be used as a rationale to say, there they go again, they are decoupling.

Dr. Kissinger: We should not have to doubt, first

49

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

one has to recognize that the Germans suffer from congenital insecurity that cannot be removed by anything we do.

Partly of their geographic location and partly from the fact that a big part of their history has been blocked out, so that it is a more rootless society than many others. I do not think the United States should urge a Franco-German cooperation. I think it should be tolerant of it and supportive of it.

And the coupling between the two sides of the Atlantic has to emerge from the merits. And we cannot keep thinking up and there I agree with you completely, a gimmick every five years to meet a new slogan.

The big danger, in my view, in Germany is that feeling abandoned, rightly or wrongly, they will start pursuing nationalist policies in the guise of neutralization, of parallel policies between East and West Germany, and all other kinds of vague ideas.

And again, if you look at German history, if in the year 1900 anyone had predicted that within 10 years France, Britain, and Russia would be on the same side, it would have been considered crazy. It was the German inability to choose any given objectives. That done, Allied drive was here in objectives. That done, while Germanagy was to be established.

So Germany operating alone in the center of Europe will be a factor of great instability. And that is as much a criticism of them as a blame of ours.

50

1

2

3

Senator Cohen: If I could just pose one more question on the INF Treaty. You indicate that it is by the board now for all practical purposes.

4

5

6

7

But the fact is it also creates another problem for us on a strategic level, because the Soviets can now use SS-25s unlimited in production, and conceivably could use them in an INF mode or intermediate targeting mode.

8

9

10

Would that not call for at least some argument on behalf of having a reduction in strategic systems to minimize that problem? That would be one question.

11

12

13

14

And you also were part of that group on recommending discriminate deterrence, and part of that discriminate deterrence was having an ability to deploy strategic defenses.

15

16

17

18

19

20

The question I would have, if the Soviets were to deploy large-scale defenses, what would that do to the United States' credibility and its strategic retaliatory credibility, if they should move conventionally in Europe? What would large-scale defensive deployments on their part do to that credibility?

21

And you may take as long as you like to answer that.

22

23

24

Dr. Kissinger: One would have to assess how effective these defenses are supposed to be against what kind of American strategy.

25

Obviously, if the Soviets were to deploy large-scale

51

defenses, it would complicate the American, any American retaliation to an attack on Europe. But I think in part this is inherent in the current situation, because I find it difficult to visualize the precise purpose of an American attack. It is easy to say the United States must be prepared for an all-out blow if people who do not have to make the decisions. But then when you ask yourself, what is the man who walks into the President's office going to say to the President his targets are, and what risks is he running for what benefit?

And this is a question that is becoming increasingly difficult to answer, with or without defenses. Now, to me, to go back to what Senator Glenn mentioned, I would like to see a negotiated level of offense and a negotiated level of defense, and hopefully these two will be brought into a relationship with each other so that they produce the maximum degree of strategic stability.

Having said that, if you ask me what that level is that would, I could not give you a good answer.

Senator Cohen: Well, I think that the Chairman and others on this Committee have tried to argue that very point, trying to strike a balance between the acceleration of our offensive systems and matching that against the defensive.

Dr. Kissinger: I have not favored the version of SDI that states that its purpose is to eliminate nuclear weapons