7

security that can be satisfied only by the neutralization
of everybody else. We cannot accept a definition of
security for the Soviet Union which makes everybody else
absolutely insecure. Nobody has the right to march with
a hundred thousand men into a neighboring state that has
consistently pursued a policy parallel to that of the Soviet
Union, and in which no Western state ever attempted to
assert a significant political influence, just to fulfill
some theoretical concepts of security.

Nor is this an isolated act. Since 1975, at least,
we have seen a pincer movement with Soviet proxy forces
coming up through Africa from Angola, Ethiopia, into
South Yemen, threatening the oil-producing regions on
which the industrial democracies depend, from one direction.
And we see another pincer movement in the coup in Afghanistan
in April 1978 developing from the other direction, and now
completed with the occupation of Afghanistan. We have
seen networks of terrorist organizations, not directly
controlled from Moscow, but financed and trained in part from
Moscow, undermining the stability of many countries.

Nobody can avoid the responsibility for a rockslide
when he throws a rock down a stony hillside, just because
the rock that finally killed somebody is not the rock which
he threw. We have had Cuban soldiers in Africa and a

8

Soviet brigade in Cuba. So that Afghanistan is a
culmination of these events. And for this reason, I
want to state that even though I have not been noted in
the United States for unalloyed admiration of every
aspect of the foreign policy of our Administration, I
believe that their fundamental decision to make clear
that expansionism now must stop is correct. And those
who worry about whether America is going too far or whether
this or that move was tactically wise should ask themselves
what would they think if the United States had taken the
opposite course and had minimized what happened in
Afghanistan, and had accepted it.

So I believe, regardless of whether one agrees with
every tactical move, that the fundamental issue now is
to have this basic policy direction succeed. And those
who are worried should make their contribution in giving
content to what will be an enormously difficult task,
which I would be amazed if we in America had thought
through, where we need the wisdom of many of our friends
and where, as Ted Heath has said, a European view of the
situation could now be of great importance to us all.

What are the necessities that we face? The West has
neglected for too long its military strength. The Soviet
Union, since 1962, has increased its defense budget by

9

5%, in real terms, every year for nearly 20 years. I do not need to tell a group of this composition what compound interest at the rate of 5% a year will yield over such an extended period. For a variety of reasons that are not worth now debating, the United States has not equalled these expenditures, and Europe has done even less--not to speak of Japan.

There has been a reluctance to face the geopolitical facts of life, which are: that a statesman has the choice of acting early in the evolution of events; at that time, his knowledge will be very limited and he has to trust his judgment; or he can wait, until he knows for certain what is happening. Then he may pay a fearful price. In 1936, it would have been easy for the democracies to resist Hitler physically, but psychologically it was hard. Five years later, they all knew what the danger was. They paid for that psychological certainty with twenty million lives. In 1975, when Cuban troops first showed up in Angola, it was a qualitative change in the international situation. Some of us wanted to resist. We were prevented by our domestic structure from doing so. It would have been easy then--it is more difficult now. It is better now than it will be three years from now.

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So, there is no way around the necessity of building
up the overall military capacity of the United States,
and of its allies. And indeed, I think we will find
that, if we think through the problem, even the budget
now submitted will not make up for the neglect of the past
and that we will have to make even more sacrifices.
Secondly, we must create not only an overall strength
but a demonstrable local strength to resist in those
areas that we have defined as vital.

Some months ago, I gave a speech in Brussels, to
the effect that we must not act as if the fortunate
circumstance of an atomic monopoly permits us never to
adapt our strategy to the new circumstances. I said then,
and I repeat now, that an attack on demographic targets,
whose chief end is the destruction of populations, is
demoralizing for all decision-makers, either European
or American, who have no other choice. I repeat, however,
that this does not have to be our strategy, that the
defense of Europe and America must be linked, including
in the nuclear field, and that we then jointly must address
the question of other areas which are now the subject of debate.

Three require particular attention, and I will raise
questions with respect to them that we must all answer--not,
necessarily, that I know the answer: the Persian Gulf,

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Pakistan and China. It is imperative that we harmonize
our commitments and our capabilities. We cannot afford,
and we must not tempt, another American setback. Before
we engage ourselves, we must know what we are doing; and
once we have engaged ourselves, we must prevail, or the
impact will be catastrophic.

We have to decide, when we extend a guarantee to an area,
first what precisely the area is we are guaranteeing. I
am not saying we need to say all of this publicly, but we need
to say it to ourselves. I hear, often, that ambiguity is
a virtue--and it is, as long as the lower level of the
response encompassed in the ambiguity is unacceptable to
the aggressor. What is it we are defending, and what is it
we are defending it against? Military attack by the Soviet
Union? Proxy attack supported by the Soviet Union? Terrorist
attack? Internal upheaval? And how do we prepare to
achieve this objective for an extended period, which is what
strategy is all about?

It is not necessary for me, now, to give an answer to
these questions, except to say that we must answer them and
that, to the extent that we leave gaps in our thinking, we are
simply creating a new vulnerability. We must act decisively
and we must keep in mind that the curse of democracies in the
recent past, including the American democracy, has been the
belief that if something is done half-heartedly, or somehow

13

There is no way we will be able to implement any guarantees of any area we decide to defend without some visible presence of American forces and, preferably, of Western forces. Even if it is theoretically possible to move forces rapidly, it will not necessarily be credible to our opponents or to the countries concerned. So before we spread our commitments, let us make sure we are prepared to extend our capabilities. And let us not confuse plans with capabilities. The transport for the rapid deployment force will not exist before 1984 at the earliest. Secondly, in defending an area, we have to understand in the name of what we are defending it, and that has two components. One, what we tell our own people and, secondly, what the leaders we are protecting are telling their people.

We have suffered, in my view, from a rather simplified conception of human rights. We do not defend other countries as an award for good behavior. We are defending them because we discover a vital security interest of free peoples. But equally, we must have some concept of change, since history is not going to stop. What is the reform that can reasonably be asked? How can we support governments without challenging their fundamental structures and, therefore, making their defense meaningless to them--and yet have in mind some concept of adaptation to modernity? That, too, is a question we must answer. And in areas like the Persian Gulf, we must, over time, respond in some fashion to the political concerns that these nations have

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and to which they give high priority, even if it is
not a central issue in East-West relations, such as the
Arab-Israeli problem.

With respect to Pakistan, we must ask similar questions.
Pakistan faces three types of potential dangers: hot
pursuit from the Soviet Union, a Soviet attack or another
India-Pakistan war, or a combination of all three.

Pakistan has become additionally vulnerable because it
is simultaneously an ally of China and of the United
States. And therefore, the symbolic effect of its
disintegration on other countries would be very great.
But, conversely, we must have some idea of how we are
going to implement any guarantees and just what it is
we are guaranteeing--which of these dangers? I believe
that the question of hot pursuit is relatively easy.
The question of a full-scale Soviet attack cannot,
in my view, be dealt with in the near future without
some outside assistance. And that must be faced.

And the problem of India has the component that, for
India, the existence of a strong fundamentalist Islamic
state presents problems of its own internal cohesion and
may create its own incentives for war. On the other hand,
if India is worried about our policies, it must give some
assurances, other than rhetoric, that it will not act in
collusion with the Soviet Union and that it will not
cooperate in an attack on Pakistan. Here, a dialogue of
European nations, and of the United States, with all the
countries in that area, may be of great consequence.

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And, to some extent, a similar problem is faced of clarifying our purposes in our relations with China. It means, of course, to me personally a great deal to see the representatives of the People's Republic of China in this hall. I welcome the opportunity of Chinese participation in forums of this kind. There is no question that China is a major factor in international relations; but I have, with all my affection for China, never believed that China is a card that America can play.

I do not think China survived with the longest uninterrupted history of self-government by being another country's tool in its own rivalries with third powers.

I do not believe we should conduct our relations with China on the basis of the fluctuations of our relations with the Soviet Union. We should have a steady policy that looks to a long-time future and does not attempt to add to the annoyance factor in Moscow when something particular happens which we do not like. Beyond the question of the rearmament of China, which I feel strongly we must support, we will also have the question of what our attitude is towards the territorial integrity of China, should it become the subject of Soviet pressure. That is an infinitely more important question than what arms are sold, and at what rate, and by whom.

And as our commitments around the Soviet periphery multiply, the absence of statements about our intentions in particular areas becomes more noticeable. I am putting this forward as an issue that has to be discussed and thought about when we design a global strategy.

And even though it is not my special subject, I believe that recent events have given us a new opportunity towards the nonaligned. They have seen that communist advances led by Moscow are irreversible and may create an incentive and a justification for the Red Army--since the Soviet system operates under the peculiarity that the Red Army seems to be used only against Soviet allies. So that it becomes very dangerous to enter the Soviet orbit in any form. I think that the issue of how the resources of the North can be related to the needs of the South can perhaps, once again, be addressed in a new environment, free of the self-righteousness of some of the previous dialogue.

But I would like to say two more things: one about Europe and the United States and the other about relations with the Soviets. Since I have come here to Europe, I have heard a great deal about the question of whether detente is divisible; whether European and American interests remain identical; whether we can still cooperate. Let me give a few answers.

First, of course, our interests are not identical in every single respect, nor is it necessary for Europe to stand at

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[c]

attention every time we develop a new policy. But our fundamental interests in the world economy and in our mutual security are as congruent as it is possible for those of sovereign nations to be. And for this reason, I do not believe that what is called "detente" is divisible. I do not believe that Europe, in a period of danger, can adopt the posture that it will assume the monopoly of conciliation, while America bears the monopoly of defense. In these sense, detente is not divisible.

Europe has a vital interest that the policy that we are now adopting succeed; but it also has a vital interest in that the content of this policy make sense. And I have raised enough questions here, and some of you, some European leaders, will no doubt be able to think of many other questions that I haven't raised, in which Europe's contribution must be crucial. We need a common assessment of the situation. With a common assessment, we can have a division of labor: there are many areas of the world where Europe is now playing, or can play in the future, a role that would be difficult for the United States. But it is vital that we do this on the basis of similar interpretations of what we are up against and not suffer from what has been the bane of so much of the Atlantic debate--which is: when the United States negotiates with the Soviets, some accuse it of condominium; and when it resists the Soviets, it is accused of needless intransigence. Let us use this time, now, to develop a global strategy on a joint basis, with a division of labor where that is appropriate.

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Let me conclude with the Soviets. In this phase, we must
bring to a halt the Soviet geopolitical offensives that have
been under way at least since 1975. That must be stopped,
even in the Soviet interest. The American people are a
vital people. We will not be defeated without noticing it,
and, when we notice it, we will resist. The biggest danger
of all is a series of reciprocal miscalculations. So we
must stop the policy of pressure, of proxy forces, of
encouragement of terrorism; but we must also show a way
out, we must also give the Soviet Union an opportunity to
define a real coexistence.

The last period of what has been called detente was characterized
by Western euphoria and, to some extent, nonperformance of
what we said we would do. It was also characterized by massive
Soviet rearmament and a massive Soviet assault on the equilibrium.
In 1972 and 1973, the Administrations in which I served signed
some principles of coexistence with the Soviet Union--not
because we believed for one moment that a legal document
will restrain the Soviet Union--but because we wanted to
create a yardstick by which to measure compliance with
norms of international behavior.

What we now need, in this period when we are building up
strength and creating walls to expansionism, is to talk to
ourselves first as to what we understand by peaceful coexistence.
I do not believe that SALT II is worth reviving. It only has
three more years to run and weapons decisions take longer than
three years. I believe that the next time we talk about arms

control, we should negotiate on a ten- or fifteen-year basis,
including the European weapons, and do so without sentimentality
and without illusion. We should define for ourselves a
genuine code of conduct. And, in such a negotiation, we
must, of course, take seriously legitimate Soviet security
concerns. But we cannot define those, or let them define
them, as the right to move the Red Army into any territory
whose government displeases them.

So this is the agenda before us, in which there is a need
for Western strength and determination--but also a Western
sense of justice and a realistic conciliation. What is needed,
now, cannot be done half-heartedly or hesitantly, because
that will multiply our dangers. But it must also be done
carefully and reflectively. We ought to remember that we
have multiples of the gross national product of the Soviet
Union, multiples of the population, the more vital economic
and political systems; so that whatever shortcomings exist
are matters of will and leadership, and are not inherent
in the situation.

I would tell you that, at this moment of danger, I am actually
more optimistic than I have been in many years.

The American people have overcome the trauma of Vietnam; the
American government reflects the aspiration of our people.
Even though I am of the opposition party, I want you all to
understand that on the fundamental course, there is now for
the first time in many years a united America. So when I
raise these questions, we are in a position, for the first
time in many years,

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to give meaningful answers. But we cannot do it alone,
either physically or intellectually. I do not believe we have
thought everything through, nor could we have, after so
dramatic a change. But these problems can now be thought
through, and they must be thought through, lest we create the
opposite of what we seek to achieve. And so we live in
a moment of danger, which is also one of hope where we can
shape our own future and where, if we listen carefully,
we might be able to hear the footsteps of history.