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Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we have to have I have known
Chancellor Kohl for 30 years, and there is absolutely no
doubt that he belongs to the most pro-American wing of the
Christian Democratic Party, which in turn has been most
consistently supportive of the United States, and we have to
ask ourselves what brought him to the point where he is today.

By instinct, he would want to be supportive. It reflects
domestic pressures that have been accentuated by recent
events.

Senator McCain: Thank you very much, Doctor.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman [presiding]: Thank you, Senator McCain.

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I believe next is Senator Glenn.

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Senator Glenn: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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There are some benefits to a filibuster also in that last
night I had a chance to read its statement in its entirety
and reread parts of it. So some good comes out of a
filibuster, and I thought that was one of the more thoughtful
statements on this whole process that I had seen.

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Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

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Senator Glenn: I want to compliment you on that, and I
mean that in all sincerity.

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Your position on INF is basically problems, you might not
have gone that way, but you think it would be a mistake not
to go -- we would do more damage by going back than we would

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ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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Senator Glenn: On page 7 of your testimony you said that since its early days, arms control theory has developed a life of its own. It used to be argued that arms negotiations should be an essential complement to broader strategic and foreign policies. Today the tail comes close to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric arms control schemes become an end in themselves, thereby eliminating any relationship to defense strategy.

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Well, I could not agree with you more on that, and I am nervous also about us rushing into the new START thing prematurely when we know that in INF they were writing some of the fine print on the airplane coming across the ocean to meet with the President, and I am concerned that we may be considering that INF sets a basis that we now can use in future arms control negotiations, and I doubt that very much. I think that future arms control is going to have to get into more of some of the things you talk about here, verification, conventional balances. At some point along the way we have to start considering bringing other nuclear powers into the equation, somewhere. We may be a ways from that now.

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And also, somewhere I do not think we are going to feel very safe, even if we had complete arms control a la

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Reykjavik, with them sitting with 12,000 removed warheads on
the shelf and us over here with the same thing and not get
back to our traditional American emphasis on control of
fissile material, which we had for some 40 years.

Now, that leaves us with where do we go from here with
regard to START, and my question would be do you have a
series of things you have thought out or proposed as
guidelines for START that would fit within a strategic
framework?

I am looking at INF as sort of a given, it is going to go
through, there will be some debates and so on.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Senator Glenn: But the important thing now to me is
let's make sure that as we move on to START, that we set a
pattern that is going to go for the future.

Could you set us down some guidelines for START?

Dr. Kissinger: Senator, I have agreed with you on
INF. The only reason I keep reiterating it, it is really
two-fold, one, to show the Europeans that some people in the
United States understand the problem that has been raised,
and secondly, to alert us to the problems that need to be
dealt with here, and not to consider INF as the end of a
process.

Now, with respect to START, I belong to the group that I must tell you that I am extremely uneasy about that negotiation.

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know that one can only say a 50 percent reduction is a great
thing, and that is true. If you accept the premise that any
elimination of nuclear weapons is in itself desirable, then
you can say getting rid of two categories of weapons is good,
and then you can say a 50 percent reduction is good.

But if you look at it at the other end and ask yourself
where is our security situation, in what way is our security
situation improved after the 50 percent reduction, if you put
these numbers into ratios of warheads and so forth, then I
come to the following concerns.

One, the ratio of warheads, even if the Soviet heavy
missiles are cut by 50 percent, the number of our missiles is
cut by more because we have more MIRVed missiles. So I think
most calculations show that the ratio of warheads that the
Soviets have available to target at our remaining missiles
goes from about three-to-one to about 4.5 to 4.8-to-one. So
I do not see the benefit that we have achieved in strategic
stability.

Secondly, the number of our submarines is cut to 17 or 18
from whatever it is today, but the number of Soviet
antisubmarine forces is not affected because they are not
part of the agreement. The number of our airplanes are cut,
but the Soviet air defenses are not affected by the
agreement. So air defenses are not limited, submarine
defenses are not limited, but antimissile defenses are

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limited, or are attempted to be limited.

It is a sort of a one-sided equation, and I would really
plead for putting arms control reflection not into the
framework of a numbers game of how many warheads we have
reduced, but where we will be after they are reduced.

Then for every gain in stability, you pay a price
someplace else. I find it hard to visualize how we can
continue to say that we will be forever ready to treat an
attack on Munich like an attack on Chicago when the numbers
of warheads and the comparative counts raise the question of
what are you going to attack when you do use nuclear weapons,
and what risks do you run to the security of your own forces?

And that gets to your most important question of what do I think would be the right proposal. Of course, one of the difficulties when you are outside the government and do not have big staffs is that if you as an individual are asked to come up with an alternative proposal, it may not be all that persuasive, but if you do not like my ideas, that does not mean that 15,000 people in the State Department and 20,000 in the Defense Department could not come up with a better idea than I can come up with by myself.

I state that as a theoretical possibility, so do not hold
me to it too strictly.

[Laughter.]

Dr. Kissinger: Now, I was tempted, and I think I still

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would be tempted to a view that if we could go to mobile, ~~our~~ both sides could go to mobile, single-warhead, land-based missiles, that the danger of surprise attack would be substantially reduced. Other problems would arise, namely, how are you going to use your strategic weapons in defense of allies. But that problem exists now because we have no clearcut military mission of a counterforce nature for our strategic forces now.

So I would tend to, I would welcome an attempt to base the land-based forces of both sides on single-warhead missiles that could be permitted to be mobile, and I would not then worry so much about numbers. I mean, the numbers should be equal, but I would then not see any great magic in whether the number is at one level than another. This is one thought I had. But that is, of course, not a complete answer to your question.

I also, I certainly favor the idea that the Chairman put forward as an interim measure on the Strategic Defense Initiative for the protection, for ballistic missile defense of some missile sites.

Senator Glenn: Thank you very much. My time is up.

Just one comment. You stated that the INF magnifies divisive trends.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Senator Glenn: I would think that you would see START as

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even more of a magnification.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you see, the trouble is with all of
these proposals, in each country there is such a large
constituency of people who are yearning for agreement and who
see in every agreement a beginning of a change of Soviet
attitude, and who tend to treat foreign policy
psychiatrically, so that it eases tensions and therefore it
improves the situation.

I think the first reaction to a 50 percent cut will be
one of great euphoria and great relief. But when you begin
thinking about it and you begin to ask yourself what will be
the security situation afterwards, that is when questions
arise. And we are drifting into a situation where we have
hooked ourselves, the whole West has hooked itself to a
slogan that has become sacrosanct, so that
anything you reduce is desirable.

Secondly, on-site inspection, so if we are given the
right to some on-site inspection, you then do not have to
analyze anymore what machinery you need, how much are you
permitted to inspect. Some of these inspection procedures I
would be interested to get an intelligence estimate of what
percentage the on-site inspection provisions of the INF
agreement add to what we could have found by national means.

I would be amazed if it is very significant.

I am not against it, and I am not so worried about

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1. violations on INF because I do not see the purpose they would serve. But I do warn against the ritualization of arms control in which certain things become sloganized, and we really ought to ask ourselves what exactly is it we are achieving. And what exactly is it that that on-site inspection does.

7. And when I read about hundreds of inspectors, I ask myself, who are they going to report to and who is going to read all of this stuff, and how do you get it to any decision?

10. I am not questioning it. I am just saying it is more you cannot just throw the word on-site inspection around and think that in itself is a breakthrough.

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The Chairman: Senator Cohen?

Senator Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, I commend you for the windburn which has colored your complexion.

You mentioned in response to Senator McCain that Chancellor Kohl is one of the most pro-American people that we could hope to have in West Germany. That may be the case. But all of us who attended a conference recently, the *Veracruz Conference*, were struck by the anomaly of having Mr. Braga sit next to Egon Barr and Mr. Vogel and link hands metaphorically.

And so I would not want to put too much stake in the fact that Chancellor Kohl, while he may be pro-American, nonetheless may be under similar pressure from his own right.

Dr. Kissinger: This is exactly the point that I have been trying to make. When Chancellor Kohl came back from Washington, he was congratulated by Egon Barr for the delay he achieved in facing the modernization issue.

Dr. Kissinger, *whom I have also known for 30 years*, I was getting some award in Germany last May, came to see me and pleaded with me to use whatever influence he had a totally wrong impression of my influence, to abort the agreement.

And now he has joined we are seeing an alliance now between some of the right-wing people and some of the

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neutralist people, which is extremely worrisome. And he cannot count on the traditional, the Adenauer wing being fragmenting.

And that is one of the most worrisome things, that if you look at German history you will find that in German history, of the modern state system, there has never been an alliance between Germany and any Western country.

There has been occasional friendship with Russia. But never with a Western country, because France was the eternal enemy, hereditary enemy. Adenauer was the first German who tied Germany to the West. And that is what is now in mind. And that is why we should be so worried. And that is why we are absolutely right. We contributed to this state of affairs.

Senator Cohen: Dr. Kissinger, I used the phrase Genscherism, and that was the equivalent of using the phrase secular humanism in the face of Pat Robertson's delegates, it got quite a reaction at that time.

But also said something to the effect that the West Germans were forming a parade and they were about to march down through a nuclear-free corridor right into the Neville Chamberlain square. And that also produced a rather remarkable reaction among the delegates who were there.

But frankly, I think that some of this language has to be used to shake somebody to their senses, because the dynamic has been set in motion now. Not only the double zero but the