The ramifications of this week's affair are likely to reach a long way, but at this stage certain points stand out. Specifically:

(i) **The effect in the Middle East.** The question now is whether the Israelis will over-react. Meanwhile, the Arabs' cause has suffered enormous damage in the eyes of non-Arab opinion. This can be redeemed only by an unequivocal condemnation of the attack by leaders like President Sadat and President Qaddafi.

The majority of visitors to Munich, and the majority of west Germans, were exasperated first with the Africans for forcing a crisis over the participation of the Rhodesians. Now attention is turned to the Arabs (or, more accurately, a small group of Arab extremists). The countries of the third world naturally wanted to use the Olympics to display their sovereignty and their growing importance; they won a tactical political victory over the question of Rhodesia, but they have probably created a good deal of hostility for themselves in the past three weeks.

(ii) **The effect on the west Germans.** In terms of prestige the Black September coup has been a severe blow to the Brandt government. The pains the Germans went to in order to make the Olympics a success were extraordinary. Nearly 24,000 troops or para-military forces have been specially deployed to cope with the logistics; thousands of girls have been employed as hostesses and interpreters; and the courtesy and hospitality of the Bavarians have been overwhelming. On Monday night the unanimous opinion was that the whole affair was a spectacular success. Yet, somehow, on Tuesday morning, the Arab terrorists slipped over the fence. Then followed the bungling of the press relations and the ultimate tragedy—the failure of the west German marksmen to carry out their ambush effectively.

The whole affair is all the more extraordinary because it had been widely rumoured in Munich that the Arabs might attempt an attack; and the Israeli competitors were believed to be specially protected.

In fairness to the Germans, it must be stressed that the whole question of security presented gargantuan problems, which were compounded by the arrival of international statesmen. British officials were uneasy about the security arrangements for Mr Heath and the Americans were similarly anxious about Mr Kissinger's projected visit.

Until about a month or so ago, what the Bonn government feared most was trouble from the Baader-Meinhof gang, who carried out a series of terrorist acts in the spring. According to reliable western sources, the Baader-Meinhof group had plans to do something at the Olympics—but these plans were nipped in the bud by the west German security service, in collaboration with the Americans. There was a sense of relief that one serious threat to the games had been eliminated. But the question of providing adequate security for the Israelis proved insuperable.

How far Tuesday's tragedy will have political consequences within Germany is conjectural. The Christian Democrats may try to make political capital out of it, but by 3 December (the probable date of the election) the Olympics themselves may be forgotten. But for the moment the Brandt government has lost much of the kudos and reflected glory which the Olympics bestowed on it.

A few days ago, leading Social Democrats were saying that the effects of the 'Quick-Schiller affair', had already been expunged by the success of the Olympics; they can hardly claim that today.

(iii) **The effect on intra-German relations.** The Arab attack has also overshadowed the main political side-issue of the Olympics-participation of the east Germans. Probably nobody was more upset by the news than Herr Honecker, who

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- it was reported - was planning to visit Munich himself this week.

The Olympics have been a triumph for the east Germans, both athletically and politically. The apparent warmth with which they have been received by the west Germans has been remarkable; and relations between the east and west German competitors in the village have been cordial. But that is as far as the reconciliation goes. The 1,000-odd east German visitors who came to Munich by special train have refused to mix with the other spectators, and have lived en masse in a village on the Austrian border, under tight surveillance from their own security police.

There has been no attempt on their part to reciprocate the goodwill gestures shown by their hosts. The west Germans have cheered whenever an east German won, but the east Germans have seldom applauded a victorious west German. Several days of this kind of thing has made many west Germans feel that Ostpolitik is still very much a one-way affair.

Nevertheless, on balance, Herr Brandt is right in claiming that the warm reception given to the east Germans indicates that in principle Ostpolitik is accepted by most west Germans.

In the diplomatic in-fighting one or two points were, however, won by the west. For example, heavy pressure was exerted by the Russians to make Radio Free Europe, which is based in Munich, curtail its programmes for the duration of the games. This was stoutly resisted by the chiefs of RFE and its programmes are going out all over Europe, as scheduled.

**RHODESIA FOOTNOTE.**—The Rhodesian rumpus reverberates. Threats have been put out from Salisbury that the Smith government, possibly in conjunction with the Rhodesian Olympic Committee, may sue the International Olympic Committee to recoup the financial loss incurred in sending the Rhodesian team to Munich in good faith and bringing it back again. Whether this will be implemented remains to be seen; but lawyers in Rhodesia are examining the question.

## Bonn's deal with the Chinese

The Bonn government's overtures to China are being watched with considerable suspicion by the Russians. Herr Scheel, the foreign minister, has said he expects to visit China, probably in October, to formalise the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He has been described as 'behaving rather like a motorist trying to get into a one-way street from the wrong end under the eyes of the police'.

West Germany and Luxemburg are the only members of the Ten (the enlarged European Economic Community) that do not yet have diplomatic relations with Peking. Nevertheless, west Germany has become the leading trading partner of China among the western nations – and without even a trade treaty or indeed anything in writing.

With the establishment of formal relations trade will doubtless be stepped up – but that is not the main reason why Peking is wooing Herr Brandt. The Chinese reckon that the enlarged European community will be a counterweight in the west-to-the Soviet Union; and they see Germany as the economic leader of the community. In all this, Peking's thinking tallies with President Nixon's views on a new world power balance. But China's tactics do not fit in exactly with Herr Brandt's plans, particularly with regard to timing.

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Herr Brandt first wants to complete the process of normalising west Germany's relations with its east European neighbours; and above all to straighten out the tangled question of finding a modus vivendi with the east German regime. His hand was forced, however, by Chou En-lai's invitation earlier this summer to Herr Schröder, the chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee in Bonn, to spend 16 days in China as an official guest. Schröder, the Christian Democrats' shadow foreign minister, came back to Bonn gleefully waving an agreement that he had signed with the Chinese, to the effect that there were no obstacles in the way of establishing full diplomatic relations between west Germany and China.

The Brandt-Scheel coalition, limping towards premature elections which could well end its fragile tenure of power, therefore cannot afford, for internal political reasons, to wait any longer. Negotiations are being conducted in the closest secrecy through the Chinese embassy in Paris. Chou En-lai is reported to be so eager for a quick consummation of the deal that he has said there is no need for clauses or conditions. His attitude is very different from that of the Poles. (See article below.)

With China moving fast to put its relations with the United States, Japán and western Europe on a new and less unfriendly basis, the European security conference assumes increasing importance for the Russians. Security, in the Russians' eyes, means weakening western Europe's strategic cohesion, so that the Soviet Union has a quiet front in the west plus a freer hand to deal with China.

The Chinese, on the other hand, would not be displeased if western Europe became a counterweight to the Russians. In all the preliminary parleying about the security conference, the Chinese factor needs to be taken into account.

## New Polish pressures on Brandt

The west German government professes to be confident that relations with Poland will duly be normalised, in accordance with the recently ratified treaty. Nevertheless, the visit later this month of Mr Stefan Olszowski, the Polish foreign minister, is being viewed in Bonn with some apprehension. If Olszowski should decide to present new 'conditions', these could be politically embarrassing for Herr Brandt, even though in principle Ostpolitik is accepted by most west Germans.

The Poles have been under Soviet pressure to take a lower place in the queue, as it were, in their dealings with the Brandt government. At the conference of communist leaders in the Crimea at the end of July, Mr Gierek was told not to establish full diplomatic relations with west Germany until the Bonn government had first improved its relations with east Germany and Czechoslovakia.

From west Germany's standpoint the central question is the repatriation of the ethnic Germans in Poland. But this is a subject on which the Poles have been noticeably silent – even to the point of ignoring an official note from Herr Scheel, the west German foreign minister. More than 30,000 ethnic Germans have left Poland and resettled in west Germany since December, 1970, but there has been a sharp drop in the number of permits issued recently.

High among Mr Olszowski's priorities is the question of compensation for some 5,700 female victims of Nazi medical experiments in Ravensbrück concentration camp; the Poles are insisting that this must be settled before diplomatic relations can be established. Mr Jaroszewicz, the Polish prime minister, has also mentioned a broader range of compensation 'to victims of nazism'; some Bonn politicians see this as a

4

euphemism for extensive reparations claims, explicitly excluded by the Warsaw treaty.
It is also significant that Jaroszewicz recently cited relations with France as the

It is also significant that Jaroszewicz recently cited relations with France as the pattern for future co-operation with the west Germans. Trybuna Ludu, the main party paper in Poland, recently stressed the importance of co-operation with France, Scandinavia 'and other countries' - but did not mention west Germany.
The new Polish demands, when

The new Polish demands, when considered in conjunction with other communist tactics towards west Germany, suggest that there is a co-ordinated attempt to exert pressure on the Brandt government, particularly in any matters that might have a bearing on the projected European security conference. While busily looking for embassy premises near Bonn, the Poles are insisting that there is a world of difference between 'normalisation' and 'reconciliation' with the west Germans. Fearing that the Christian Democrats may be in office by the end of the year, the Poles are anxious to extract whatever concessions they can from Herr Brandt while he is still in office.

## Nixon's reassurances to Europe

The new defence budget that **President Nixon** will send to Congress in January will rule out any significant reductions in American military forces in Europe before mid-1974 at the earliest.
Officials in the defence department who have given

Officials in the defence department who have given reporters a general outline of this part of the budget - by law, the President is required to submit a final budget whether he is re-elected or not - say there is one important caveat on the question of American forces in Europe. The budget will make it clear that Mr Nixon reserves the right to change his decision, if agreement should be reached on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) by Nato and the Warsaw pact nations. But most observers believe that a meaningful deal on MBFR is still a long way off.
The issue of reducing the military commitment to

The issue of reducing the military commitment to Nato is increasingly becoming one of the foreign policy areas in which Mr Nixon believes he can draw a clear contrast between his position and that of **Senator McGovern**. Mr Nixon wants the election to offer Americans the clearest political choice in this century. Mr McGovern has proposed the unilateral withdrawal of 170,000 of the 305,000-man American garrison in Europe. He argues that the American forces can safely be cut by more than half 'because of the capability for rapid redeployment in the case of attack or ominous enemy buildup'.

A report just issued by a special congressional committee on Nato has estimated the cost of maintaining the American garrison to be about $4 billion a year. But it would cost almost twice that amount to withdraw around 170,000 troops from Europe and to acquire the transport planes and ships to send them back in an emergency. Mr Nixon is naturally making the most of the argument that Mr McGovern's proposals are undermining allied confidence in the United States. The whole question of America's commitment to Europe was one of the questions which Mr Kissinger hoped to discuss with Herr Brandt, at the end of this week, during his projected 'private' visit to Munich.
(See page 1.)

Politically, the stakes are high for Mr Nixon in all this. He is trying to convince middle-of-the-road Democrats and independent voters that Mr McGovern's foreign policy is dangerous. The Republican campaign managers reckon, however, that Mr Nixon will be doing well if 15 to 20 per cent of the Democratic voters switch their votes. The Republicans hope to offset this by winning 70 to 80 per cent of the independent vote.

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Peru sticks to the middle way

Despite its economic troubles, **General Juan Velasco's** military government in Peru feels confident that it can increasingly take political initiatives in Latin America. The Velasco regime has given the country reasonably stable administration for the past few years, even though it sometimes has to rely on the tough and well-armed Guardia Civil (as happened recently when disturbances broke out in the southern town of Puno, during a visit by the president's wife).

At the moment the ruling generals hope to obtain credits and investments from as many countries as possible - on the Peruvians' own terms. These are that foreign companies work as contractors and not as concessionaires, and that 51 per cent of the shares of any new private firm should be in Peruvian hands.

For business reasons Peru wants to avoid alignment with any great power, and is continuing to advertise its dissociation from the United States. Thus recognition of Cuba, which looked like a calculated snub to the United States, was quickly followed by a Peruvian offer to sell the Cubans an undisclosed number of 600-ton fishing boats. More recently £11m. worth of fish oil was sold to China. By such transactions the minister of fisheries, General Javier Tantaleán, keeps the coffers from being too seriously depleted by grandiose measures of social reform.

At the same time the apparent contradictions in Peru's policy are causing misgivings in other Latin American countries. The slogan 'neither capitalist nor communist' is beginning to look threadbare. More significant is the growing influence of Sinamos (the Movement for the Support of Social Mobilisation), which under **General Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa** has become the most powerful instrument of social change in the country. It is now involved in almost every aspect of national life, from the conduct of elections in the sugar co-operatives to provision of basic amenities in the shanty-towns.

General Rodriguez aims to gain general backing for his ambitious reform programme. With control of eight bureaus which until this year were directly responsible to the president, Sinamos is possibly the most powerful organisation in the country. Rodriguez is regarded as loyal to President Velasco; but his deputy, Carlos Delgado, is a former left-wing member of Apra (the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance). On his staff are other left-wingers such as Hugo Neira and Hector Bejar. It is even said that Hugo Blanco, who led the rebellion of landless peasants in La Convención in 1963, and who is now seeking re-admittance to Peru, will find a position in Sinamos if he returns. Because of its extensive organisation, its hostility to previous civilian regimes, and its intolerance of criticism or opposition, many people fear that Sinamos could become an instrument of repression.

Paradoxically, what may help Peru to keep on a middle course is the wide variety of personalities and ideas within the military coalition. This causes tensions, but also helps to provide a political balance. The prime minister, General Ernesto Montagne, periodically goes to the Walter Reed hospital in Maryland for medical check-ups, and some of his colleagues frequently tour eastern European countries.

The head of COAP (the special Advisory Council to the President), General José Graham Hurtado, is the leading ideologist in the armed forces, but the army's chief of staff (and the man in line to succeed the president), **General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin**, is the chief architect of Peru's non-aligned foreign policy - which was initiated while he was foreign minister. If and when President Velasco steps down, Mercado can

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be expected to follow a similar moderate line between the more conservative and the
more radical groups within the government.

The increasing privileges being enjoyed by the officer class and their wives are
tending to give the Peruvian 'revolutionary process' a bourgeois tinge. This may counter-
act the more demagogic propensities within Sinamos.

But in their bid to be the pace-setters in Latin American politics, particularly in
relation to the United States, the Peruvians continue to stir anxieties, not least in
Washington. The minister of fisheries was recently obliged to deny that the vast
fishing port complex at Paita could be used as a Soviet submarine base within missile
range of the Panama canal. The arrival in Lima of three New China News Agency
correspondents, previously expelled from Mexico for interfering in that country's
internal affairs, has not helped Peru's relations with its more nervous right-wing
neighbours.

But the Peruvians are alive to the leftist threat, and their intelligence agents, many of
them CIA trained, may prove a fairly effective counter to maoist or Soviet subversion.
Although relations between Peru and the United States have cooled since 1968, the
influence of the CIA is still significant.

Mounting tension in Madagascar

On 29 August Madagascar's new government imposed martial law and a state of siege. According to the official statement, the basic reason was economic: if Madagascar was to achieve economic recovery, a 'calm atmosphere' was needed.

This explanation caused some surprise. There had been no incidents for about a
month. However, since early August, large numbers of the security forces had been
seen in Tananarive day and night. On 1 September General Gabriel Ramanantsoa,
the new prime minister, announced that a referendum would be held on 8 October,
when the people would be asked to approve his plan to rule the island for five years with
his 'government of national unity'. This, he said, would provide time to transform the
economy and public life in accordance with the wishes of the population, and to
prepare a constitution - to be ratified by another referendum - that would meet the
island's economic, social and cultural needs. Instead of a parliament there would be a
'popular national development council', which would be representative of all aspects of
national life.

General Ramanantsoa's government came into being last May, apparently with
widespread acclaim, after a violent upheaval. During the four months of its existence it
has implemented a number of popular measures: for instance, it replaced the university's
French rector with a Malagasy one. (French domination of the island's academic and
cultural life was one of the main causes of the student demonstrations which sparked off
the May upheaval.) Since President Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party (PSD), which
had ruled until May, is unlikely to oppose the General's administration - Tsiranana
is still president, though now only a figurehead - and since the former opposition
parties have already promised Ramanantsoa their support, it is at first glance difficult
to see why it was necessary to impose martial law in preparation for the referendum.

However, the general's move may be explained by the activities of a new movement,
the KIM (the initials of the words Joint Action Committee in the Malagasy language).
This movement claims to represent the allied groups of students, workers, peasants

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and unemployed that brought down the Tsiranana government on 13 May. The strength of the KIM became evident soon after its formation when it stated its opposition to the PSD's plan to hold its party conference in the capital. The PSD reacted, rather surprisingly, by publicly admitting that it had cancelled its Tananarive meeting because of public opposition, and that its congress would take place elsewhere.

This week at least 10,000 KIM delegates from all parts of the island were due to assemble in Tananarive to discuss their political and economic programme; and their activities could interfere with the referendum plans. The subjects on the agenda of the KIM meeting include the framing of a new constitution, regardless of the government's plans; the revision of all the co-operation agreements with the French; the removal of foreign military bases (in particular the French naval base in Diégo-Suarez and the American satellite tracking station on the island); progressive removal of both national and foreign capitalism; and the establishment of a government 'which will work in the interests of the ordinary people, the workers and peasants'.

The KIM's apparent strength could become a significant factor in the strategy of the Indian Ocean. The undoubted decline in Madagascar's economy in recent months has been partly due to the withdrawal of the South African aid, trade and investment which had been welcomed by the Tsiranana regime. The extent to which the people of the island had resented these links with Pretoria was indicated in a recent statement by Ramanantsoa's foreign minister, who said on 1 September, while visiting Tanzania, that his government rejected any suggestion of 'dialogue' with South Africa.

But Ramanantsoa himself is in no way radical. He enjoys the confidence of the French, and he went out of his way, after gaining power, to emphasise that Madagascar appreciated the benefits it had derived from French aid and experience. In view of the conspicuous amount of military co-operation between France and South Africa it has been suggested that the new Madagascar government's international stance has been adopted in response to popular pressure. There is likewise reason to believe that Madagascar, which still recognises the Taiwan government, will soon enter into diplomatic relations with the Peking regime. This could be significant in view of western uneasiness about Chinese penetration of east Africa, through Tanzania.

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