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# On Outer Space and International Politics

by

Karl W. Deutsch

Yale University

At the United Nation's Conference in the Spring of 1945, which adopted the United Nations Charter, the delegation of the United States included a number of officers who had been assigned a peculiar task. Their responsibility consisted in speculating what the national interest of the United States would be twenty-five years in the future, that is, about the year 1970; and they were to advise the leaders of the United States delegation accordingly, so that the presumed future interests of the United States could be taken into account in the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945. The group of State Department officers who were given this task, were the forerunners of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department; and their task was not an easy one. When students of politics and social science are asked in 1959 to speculate what the major problems and policy implications of the rapidly developing space technology will be twenty-five years hence, that is about the year 1984, the difficulties of their task seems even more formidable.

## Some Changes in Past 25-Year Periods

During each twenty-five year periods in the course of the last 100 years there has been at least one major change in international alignments, as well as at least one major change in the institutions and politics of one major power, and one major change in technology; and none of these changes would have been easy to predict on the basis of the facts known twenty-five years before its occurrence. In the free-trade atmosphere of 1859 it would have been extremely difficult to predict that world trade and world politics would have shifted by 1884 to policies of protectionism and empire building; nor would it have been easy to predict the emergence of a unified Germany as a main military power on the continent; nor the coming and resolution of the American Civil War and the policies of reunion thereafter, which left the United States domestically

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united and on the verge of becoming a major contender in the beginning race for world power. In the military and naval field, the strategic use of railroads, the complete victory of steam power at sea, and the coming of the ironclad warships had greatly changed the accepted practices of 1859; and the introduction of the electric telegraph, the telephone, and electric light, as well as the beginnings of the "penny press" were changing the style of culture.

In 1884, however, it would have been unusually difficult to forecast the world politics of 1909, when the old British-Russian rivalry, which had characterized the politics of 1859 and 1884, had given way to a British-French-Russian alliance, directed against Germany. Technology had been transformed by the wide introduction of electric power, the automobile, and the extended use of oil and oil products for purposes of energy, as well as by the beginnings of powered flight and wireless telegraph. The style of politics of 1909 showed the impact of several decades of compulsory mass education at the elementary level in most of the advanced countries. It was characterized by the rise of large labor movements, the acceptance of a considerable amount of social legislation, and the almost universal broadening of the franchise, either as an accomplished fact or as a major topic of political debate.

The world of seemingly stable monarchies and of broadening democratic and welfare legislation of 1909, however, would not have been a good place for predicting the desperately unstable world of 1934, characterized by the temporary disappearance and now the embittered return of Germany to the rank of great powers, as well as by the impact of an unprecedented economic depression.

The world of 1934 contained a major Communist power, the Soviet Union, whose existence had not been foreseen by anyone in 1909. It's political climate leaned toward revolutions and dictatorships and, with the conspicuous exception of the English-speaking countries, to a partial or complete retreat from democracy.

Its military technologies were characterized by the use of tanks, bombing airplanes,

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and its civilian technology and style of culture, as well as of politics, had
been profoundly affected by the universal spread of motion pictures and the radio.

The world of 1934, however, of which most members of university faculties
have had some personal experience, could not have foreseen easily the emergence
of the bi-polar world of 1959, divided by the bitter rivalry of two super-powers,
the United States and the U.S.S.R., nor could it have foreseen the emergence of
another major Communist power, the dictatorship of Communist China, and the
extension of Communist systems of government over one-third of mankind. Nor
could the world of 1934 have foreseen fully the changed technology of 1959:
the coming and the impact of nuclear energy and of its application to military
purposes, the coming of jet propulsion for airplanes, the large scale intro-
duction of rocketry, and man's reaching out to probing operations into outer
space and to the surface of the moon. The increases in human capabilities
production
for food and health through the progress of hybridization of seeds, the
introduction and development of antibiotics, the use of synthetic fibers, the
coming of television, the introduction of electronic computers and automation,
and the vast increase in the number and position of scientific personnel all
have once again transformed our style of culture.

## Some Expectable Technological Changes by 1984

Knowing the difficulty of predictions over twenty-five year periods
in the past, what can we try to guess in 1959 about the world of 1984?

If we assume that there will have been no total nuclear war in the
intervening period, then we may expect that the world of 1984 will have nuclear
power plants, techniques for applying nuclear energy for rocket propulsion, and,
in any case, very powerful and accurately guided rockets. It will have manned
space stations, as well as probably some manned stations on the moon, and it
will have seen the launching of several planetary probes toward our nearest
neighbors, Mars and Venus. Its technology will be characterized by a much higher
degree of automatic information-searching and processing, as well as by the

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in industry and transport, sensitive and versatile automatic control of all kinds of activities. With the partial introduction of automatic factories, a considerably higher proportion of the labor force in the most advanced countries will consist of personnel with scientific and engineering training. This world may have its eased food problem by developing a workable process of photosynthesis, as well as perhaps as by finding practicable techniques of plankton farming. It will need these techniques, since it will have, according to standard United Nations forecasts, between 4 and 5 million inhabitants. The world of 1984 may have a considerably increased capability for intellectual work, resulting partly from a broader recruitment for scientific work of persons of talent from hitherto partly untapped classes, regions, and races, and partly from improved methods of education and training, as well as perhaps from at present unsuspected advances in the fields of electroencephalography and psychopharmacology.

The most important changes in 1984, as against 1959, may, however, be the discovery and introduction of new forms of energy resulting from man's large scale entry into outer space. Once the observations and experiments of science are installed on a large scale and on a permanent or recurrent basis in the environment of outer space, it seems very likely that our knowledge of cosmic rays, magnetism, ionization, particle physics and other frontier areas of natural science will increase substantially, in some fields perhaps by a whole order of magnitude. It is impossible to say, of course, in which of all these fields the new sources of energy, and perhaps of new techniques of communication as well, will be found; but it seems not too hazardous to expect that some substantial advance of the sort should have been made by 1984, and even, that it should have been brought to substantial application. In this respect already, man's entry into outer space will have made the world of 1984 unlike all its predecessors in our survey. Outer space will have begun to transform human civilization on this planet, not because it will have become a major field of

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colonization or control, but because it will have become almost inevitably a
new and major source of knowledge.

The Actors of World Politics

Who will be the social and political actors - the human organizations -
to whom this knowledge will be imparted, and who will act on it? Almost
certainly they will be national states. More accurately, perhaps, the most
important among them will be intermediate in size between the national and
the continental scale. They will consist of more or less heterogeneous
populations, recruited around some national core and in process of relatively rap-
id acculturation toward a common "national" culture, somewhat similar to the
processes of integration and assimilation currently at work within such giant
states as the United States and the Soviet Union.

It seems almost certain that there will be at least three such states,
none of which will be able to swallow up its rivals. The three more or less
irreducible large states of 1984 might well be the United States, the Soviet
Union and mainland China. All of these will be likely to have by this time
nuclear and space capabilities, developed to the point where each of them will
be able to establish and maintain satellites around the earth and perhaps a
manned station on the moon. Other sovereign states with capabilities of this
order may include the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, and Italy, the
last three either separately or perhaps on some cooperative basis, and
even perhaps also some less populated but large and highly developed states
such as Canada and Australia. It may be most realistic, therefore, to expect
and
for 1984 a world of between 4 and 10 nuclear/space powers, divided into at
least two major coalitions, but in any case with significant differences cutting
across each coalition. Since every worldwide pattern of alliances since 1884
has undergone some drastic changes within a 25-year period, it seems only prudent
to expect that by 1984 the United States as well as the U.S.S.R. may have some
other terrestrial powers to worry about in addition to one another.

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Within each of these sovereign space powers of 1984, the strata of people who have to be taken into account in politics will have become broader than they are today. Their technical and scientific elites, though smaller than the politically relevant strata, will nevertheless also have substantially broadened.

At the same time the scope of politics will have increased. If in the non-Communist world of 1959, the government sectors took up approximately 30 to 35 per cent of the national income, in the world of 1984, the government sectors in the non-Communist countries may well take up between 45 and 55 per cent of the net national product. In the Communist countries the government sectors, of course, will be much larger.

Foreign trade in the non-Communist countries may represent a smaller proportion of national income than it does now, perhaps between 5 and 6 per cent in the United States. For middle sized space powers, the ratios of foreign trade to gross national product may be higher, but perhaps in each case between 5 and 10 percentage points below the corresponding levels of 1959. If so, then by 1984 the foreign trade ratios of the United Kingdom and Western Germany should be between thirty and thirty-five percent, and the corresponding proportion for France between roughly fifteen and twenty percent. If Western and Eastern Germany should have become reunited by that time, and perhaps once again merged with Austria, the foreign trade ratio of the resulting Greater Germany should be, of course, appreciably lower.

since 1913,

The relative decline of foreign mail, as compared to the volume of domestic mail, should be expected to continue. By 1984, foreign third-class mail received or sent in the United States should be not much more than one percent of domestic third-class mail; in Britain, France, and Western Germany, the corresponding percentage of foreign third-class mail should be about eight percent.

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In sum, while none of the non-Communist space powers of 1984 will be able to live in complete isolation from all other countries, their degree of national self相对, self-sufficiency should be appreciably higher than it is in 1959, and the influence of internationally oriented or internationally involved interest groups over their political decision making processes should be correspondingly somewhat weaker. While foreign political, economic, and military commitments may continue to take up a good deal of attention among the political elites of each of these powers, such commitments are likely to be made in fact increasingly on the basis of domestic pressures and considerations. Correspondingly, the content of the mass media of communication in the non-Communist powers is likely to be determined in 1984 even more than in 1959 by domestic agencies and interests, whether governmental agencies or private institutions, or some combination of the two. In any case, however, each space power will be somewhat more independent in the making of its own decisions from anything the other powers may do, and it will have correspondingly less influence over the decisions of the other powers. The international concert of 1984, therefore, may not only be no more harmonious than that of 1959, but it may be carried on under conditions of somewhat deteriorated sound conduction.

Similar trends would prevail within and among the Communist countries. There, too, broader strata of the population will have received secondary or university education and training, and will have to be taken into account in the making of political decisions. There, too, the shift from unskilled to skilled workmen as the majority of the labor force will tend to operate in the same direction; and the more rapid growth of domestic national incomes and domestic mail flows, relative to their foreign counterparts, should tend to make the political decision systems within each Communist country somewhat more responsive to domestic pressures and considerations, and somewhat less responsive to foreign ones.

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Even if these developments should not come to pass in the Communist countries, however, a similar, if smaller, effect would be produced if these countries should merely remain at the approximate level of domestic self-preoccupation and isolation at which they are in 1959, because the mere passage of another twenty-five years at the same level of relative insulation and national self-preoccupation at which these countries are today - and this would apply in particular to Russia and China - would further confirm and harden individual habits as well as social and political institutions to a degree that would make it increasingly difficult for each of these great powers to influence the actions of the other with any high degree of effectiveness. To some extent a similar trend may even prevail in the relations of these great powers to middle or smaller ones which are today still governed by regimes that seem to be far more willing to accept directions from Soviet Russian or Communist Chinese sources. Another twenty-five years of relatively low levels in intra-Soviet bloc trade, the interchange of travelers, personal contacts, and correspondence between the populations of these countries, may leave even the governments of such countries as Poland, Rumania, or Northern Vietnam, somewhat more estranged and more isolated from the central foci of the Communist world at Moscow, or Peking.

The main characteristics of the international system of 1984 may be expected to be, therefore, the institutions and practices of national sovereignty of the great powers and of reciprocity in their mutual relations. The specific sovereign and reciprocal policies chosen by the major space powers of 1984, however, will depend upon the general level of suspicion and rivalry prevailing among them.

## The Improbability of Space Monopoly

For the purposes of our exercise in speculation we may exclude here three possibilities as too unrealistic to deserve extended treatment. First of all, no single power or coalition of powers in 1984 will have the capability of

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complete interdiction and control over the space activities of its
rivals. At the present level of technology in the United States, the
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, and in the light of the probable
diffusion of such technological capabilities to other powers by 1984,
it seems extremely improbable that any one power, alone or with its
allies, will have the capability to "control" outer space in any way
comparable to that in which the British Navy may be said to have com-
trolled the seas in the nineteenth century.

## The Excluded Assumption of World War III

In the second place, there will have been no third world war -
that is no total nuclear war between 1959 and 1984. If there had been
such a war, no survivors of such a holocaust would be likely to possess
the civilization, organization, and resources requisite for space
capabilities. Rather, whatever survivors there might be left would
have to deal with problems of "broken-back" survival on this earth
instead of the conquest of inter-planetary space. At a considerably
later period in the history of the future, it might be conceivable
that manned stations on the moon, or on one or two planets, might
have been built up to the point where staffs could survive and pre-
serve the species even after the economic devastation or possibly the
radioactive contamination of the earth, but there seems to be no reason
at all to assume that mankind will be anywhere near this level of
capabilities by 1984. The only space issues of 1984 that could be
of interest to policy planners or students in 1959, therefore, are
those which are predicated upon the assumption of the survival upon
this planet of large organized governments with the high level of

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civilization predicated upon the assumption that total nuclear war
has been avoided.

## The Improbability of International Majority Rule

The third possibility that can be excluded as excessively impro-
bable is that of the universal acceptance of international majority
rule. No great power with nuclear and space capability is likely to
have accepted by 1984 the government or control of any international
body the decision of which it cannot expect to control itself.
Exceptions from this refusal might occur in areas of relatively triv-
ial importance, but not in regard to any subject matter of major
importance to the governments, the ruling elites, or the politically
relevant strata of the population of the space power concerned. Com-
munist powers will not submit to non-Communist majority rule; nor will
Western powers accept many decisions of a non-Western majority. Indeed,
even where differences in culture, race, and social institutions would
be moderate or absent, most of the large and powerful countries of 1984
would be unlikely to submit to the majority decisions of governments or
peoples outside their own boundaries.

## An International Climate of Rivalry, Anxiety and Caution

The states of 1984 will thus have avoided both Armageddon and
Utopia. They will cooperate with one another to a limited extent on
a world-wide basis through some organization similar to today's United
Nations, and perhaps linked with it through a continuity of name and
political tradition. They will each cooperate to a greater but still
limited extent with a smaller number of preferred partners, in the form
of alliances and perhaps even/coalitions. Between these alliances or

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coalitions, however, the main types of relationship will still be characterized by sovereignty and reciprocity; and two or more of the largest powers will consider each other as intense rivals, or even potential enemies.

Because of the greater destructive capabilities of the technology of 1984, each of these powers will be aware of a greater external threat than would have been the case in 1959. Since most of their policy formation and political decision making will be carried out, however, in response to domestic processes and pressures, and since politics in all major powers may have become still more responsive to centrally controlled mass media of communication, each of these powers will have become somewhat more impervious to general threats from abroad than they were in 1959. Their governments may have become more sensitive and perceptive, on the other hand, to specific threats from abroad and more nimble in responding or adjusting to them. This assumption follows from the one we made earlier, to the effect that these governments will have avoided running into a fatal head-on collision leading to nuclear war before 1984. Just as no one can drive several thousand miles through heavy traffic without possessing or acquiring some elements of driving skill, so any government surviving from 1959 to 1984 will have acquired a certain competence in the avoidance of extreme collisions. Its personnel will have become, therefore, more sensitive to some details and aspects of international relations, somewhat more tolerant in regard to others, and at the same time somewhat more expert in protecting the essential areas of national policy formation and decision making in such a way as to protect the basic integrity of the national political unit, its government and its culture.

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Within these very broad limits, the level of rivalry within the international system may vary from moderate to intense. This level of international rivalry, together with the capabilities of the competing states, will then determine the relative importance of the different issues that may arise in regard to international activities in outer space, and to the way in which government will respond to it.

## A List of Some Space Policy Problems

Before examining, however, our first "developmental construct" - to borrow an extremely useful concept of Harold Lasswell's - let us consider the range and urgency of space problems within the world of 1984.

For the sake of convenience, we may distinguish five groups of such problems:

1. problems of radioactive fallout or radiation, resulting from satellite or nuclear space activities;

2. problems of communication with the help of satellites;

3. problems of reconnaissance;

4. problems created by the passage or entry of space missiles;

5. problems arising from the occupation of space, or objects therein, through space stations, or through stations on the surface of the moon or some planet.

By 1984, problems from each of these groups are likely to be under active consideration.

## A First Developmental Construct: A World of Extreme Rivalry

In a world of extreme international rivalry, it is quite possible that unrestricted nuclear testing may have continued straight through the twenty-five year period from 1959 and 1984, with at most minor interruptions. As a result, fallout by 1984 may well have begun to have cumulative effects, observable in many countries, both in regard

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to genetic damage and in regard to the somewhat higher incidence of bone cancer and leukemia. Diplomatic and juridical positions would be frozen, with one group of powers insisting on majority-managed international inspection, and the other side stubbornly declining to submit to any such majority rule. Both sides, and perhaps several more or less uncommitted nuclear powers, would continue to test nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered rockets, both in their national air space and in the air space over the ocean, and in outer space, but sufficiently near to the surface of the earth for gravity to bring radioactive fission products back to the earth again with a delay of a few months or years. The growing biological danger and visible damage, resulting from such activities, would merely furnish each of the governments with material for ever more embittered reproaches of its rivals.

In the world of communications a similar situation might prevail. The rival powers of 1984 might be conducting an extreme mutual propaganda war against each other by means of radio broadcasts and the like, while countering the efforts of their rivals with indiscriminate jamming. Similar activities might extend to the systematic disruption of the electronic guidance of rockets, satellites and other space objects, as well perhaps as of aircraft of various types. The effectiveness of such jamming techniques might be greatly improved by this time through the introduction of special "jamming satellites", that is satellites circling the earth while being crammed full of equipment designed to broadcast jamming signals at selected spots and on selected frequencies. This would presuppose the capability to lift relatively large satellites into orbit around the earth, and to carry sufficient energy sources aloft with them to power their signals. None of these capabilities would seem

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to me to be inherently impossible for the world of 1984. Another
possible technique for the disruption of radio communications might
consist of the deliberate setting off of nuclear explosions high in
the ionosphere, so as to render it more permeable to radio signals,
disrupt their reflection back to earth, and otherwise change the
electric properties of the upper layers of the atmosphere, in a manner
designed to disrupt the radio traffic of other powers. The results
would be, of course, not only the destruction of the new science of
radio astronomy, but extreme general insecurity and inconvenience,
both in space and on the earth, in the radio, radar and TV communica-
tions of the rival powers, as well as in those of most other countries.
These inconveniences might well be accepted, however, by the govern-
ments of the major rival powers as part of the costs of the interna-
tional contest, and some relief might be obtained - albeit at consider-
able cost - by channeling some of the most important national terrestrial
communications through shielded cables, above or under ground.

For these two types of activities - contamination by fallout and
the disruption of radio communications - any distinction between air
space and outer space will be irrelevant. Radioactive particles could
sift to the ground from lower or higher layers of the atmosphere, as
well as from outer space itself, so long as they remained within the
area of preponderant gravitational attraction of the earth. Similarly,
radio communications might be just as effectively disrupted by events
set off in the upper atmosphere or in outer space, or by jamming activi-
ties from broadcasting stations on the ground.

The only added difficulty presented by man's entry into outer
space would be that of tracking down reliably the origin of the offending

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activity. While countries may easily threaten to retaliateto or in
fact retaliatelaunch of such as the production
of radioactive fallout or of disruptive radio signals that originate
from the ground or from the easily identifiable air space a short dist-
ance above the ground of some other country, it might be a very differ-
ent matter to identify even the origin of noxious fallout or disruptive
radio and radar signals coming from outer space. Indeed, even if the
satellites or rockets producing these effects could be tracked in space,
it might be extraordinarily difficult to track their origin, if they
were launched from the oceans, or the Arctic or Antarctic.

If such offending activities should occur in a world of frozen
rivalry between two unchanging blocs, each power would be automatically
inclined to blame its most prominent rival - a point made tellingly
already in 1946 by Bernard Brodie in his chapter in the book The
Absolute Weapon. This situation, of course, would furnish excellent
opportunities for third powers, or even for extremist non-governmental
groups, to create incidents and to embroil the larger powers with each
other.

In a world of intense great power rivalry, but of more rapidly
fluctuating coalitions, however, the incidence of mutual suspicion
might no longer be automatic. Each government might find it difficult
to choose between one of several possible offenders; and it might have
very little in the way of good evidence against any one of them. The
result might be a general state of exasperated and confused suspicion,
with no remedy in sight, except a concerted effort within each country
to perfect the national competence for identifying and tracking opera-
tions against objects and signals in the upper atmosphere as well as
outer space.

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The situation may be somewhat different in regards to overflights of the territory of a state by foreign rockets or space satellites, carrying electronic reconnaissance equipment, such as television cameras, and perhaps personnel, and possibly being used for the introduction of agents or objects into the territory of the overflown states. The assumption that manned satellites will be possible, and that the problems of reentry into the atmosphere, and of the use of auxilliary rockets, chemical or nuclear, for modifications of the flight path, will all have been solved, are not inconsistent with our earlier assumptions about the probable level of technology in 1984.

The military potential of overflights by satellites, large enough to serve as launching platforms for missiles, should not be underestimated. The simplest device of this kind might be an unmanned satellite weighing somewhere between one and two tons and constructed in such a manner as to contain two explosive charges. One of these would be in effect a nuclear warhead; the second would be either a chemical or nuclear rocket engine with adjustable exhausts for steering, or else a chemical or nuclear rocket charge so positioned as to impart to the warhead an acceleration downward, comparable in magnitude to the acceleration that lifted the satellite originally into orbit. Since the warhead itself would have to weigh less - a Hiroshima-sized nuclear warhead should not weigh much more than a hundred pounds, and it might well weigh less - the "straight downward" acceleration charge could be considerably smaller than the one used to lift the entire satellite in the first place. If the warhead could be shielded against the immediate effects of the "kick-down" explosion above it, it might then start to move towards the surface of the earth at a speed of 25,000 miles an hour,

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along a fairly steep path, and subject to further acceleration by the
force of gravitation. Since our exercise in speculation has presumed
the successful solution of the reentry problem into the atmosphere, in
the form of suitable shielding or cooling devices for bodies entering
it at high speeds, and since we have assumed that the development of
some form of nuclear propulsion for rockets will not be unlikely by 1984,
the development of such potential bombardment satellites to be set off
by electronic signals from the earth or from space, or by the failure of
such signals to continue (on the principle of the so-called "dead man's
switch") should be well within the technical possibilities for 1984.

If anything of the sort should come to pass, each major country might
be facing a situation of "vertical envelopment" by its rivals. Anywhere
between one hundred and say five hundred miles above, its skies might be
traversed by a succession of satellites operated by other powers. Since
the United States alone has sent up nine satellites, though of very limited
weight, within less than two years, it should be quite possible for any
major power in 1984 to send up several dozen satellites of this type and
keep them in orbit above other countries. These several dozen satellites -
and under the conditions of an international arms race they might well
become several hundred - might all weigh between one and two tons and
have bombardment capabilities; or else some of them might have these
weights and capabilities whilst others might only seem to have them, and
it might be up to the defense forces of each power on the ground to guess
which potential enemy satellites had what kinds of capabilities.

Perhaps it bears repeating that bombardment should be quite likely
to be feasible by 1984. All that is needed would be the capability of
lifting into orbit a two stage rocket, so designed as to impart a powerful
downward acceleration to its small last stage consisting of a nuclear

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warhead. Recent rates of progress in the miniaturization of computing and guidance equipment make it quite likely that by 1984 such two stage satellites would have all the accuracy necessary for military purposes. Improvements in interception techniques, though likely to occur, are unlikely to neutralize the potentialities of bombardment from outer space, or, more probably, from satellites in relatively close orbits around the earth. Once a large number of such satellites, or even manned space platforms have been put into orbit it seems quite unlikely that all of them could be neutralized at the moment of the outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, since satellites by 1984 might well be manned, or have some automatic capabilities for changing their orbits, they might not be easy to intercept, and they might all be, or seem to be, available for nearly simultaneous triggering at the instant of the outbreak of war.

The net psychological effect of such developments might be comparable to that of a condition of permanent naval or air demonstrations. Instead of "showing the flag" the great powers might "show the satellites" to each other's populations. Similar to the effects of the nuclear open air tests of the great powers in the mid 1950's, these exercises would produce very little change in the political behavior of the other countries, but they might contribute to a feeling of strength and virility on the part of each population who might be led by their national government to believe that their own satellites were vastly more numerous and powerful than those of all other powers. Beneath this surface attitude of imperturbability, of course, there might be a good deal of repressed fear which might introduce an additional element of hidden instability into the national decision-making systems, lessening significantly their capabilities to adjust to sudden shocks or strains. Unlike the potentially very real military capabilities of the bombardment satellites, the psychological effects of their

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demonstrative exhibition would make very little of a difference in military terms; but since it might serve to reassure national decision-makers who might order the demonstration to be made, the possible spread of such practices in a world of extreme rivalry cannot be excluded.

If in such an extreme arms race one country should choose to add bombardment satellites to its arsenal of weapons and its rivals should feel compelled to follow suit, the net result might be to slow space exploration rather than to speed it, since skilled manpower and resources would be diverted to military installations cruising in orbits close to earth, instead of remaining available for fundamental scientific exploration in larger space laboratories or far more frequent probings of deep space.

In regard to these possibilities of overflight, the distinction between "air space" and "outer space" may become relevant. While the exact delimitation between these two kinds of space is apt to be difficult and controversial, the basic operational distinction is simple.

Within the national air space of a state, analogous to its territory and its territorial waters, the burden of proof is upon the intruder. Agents of the national state will attempt to intercept, arrest, or destroy any intruder, up to the limits of their own capabilities. Ordinarily in such cases the agents of the national state are presumed to be in the right, not only by themselves and their countrymen, but by international law and opinion, while the intruder who ignores their orders to stop and surrender, is presumed to be in the wrong. Outside the national air space, analogous to conditions outside the national territory or the national territorial waters, anyone, personnel and installations of any country are presumed free to come and go, subject only at most to some internationally accepted rules of identification, and more universally, to the obligation to refrain from noxious or offending activities against national states.

Outside the national air space, the opposite presumption would apply. If an agent or installation outside the national territory, territorial waters, or air space is accused of carrying on noxious activities - such as originating noxious

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fumes, chemicals, chemical or radioactive contamination, etc., the burden of proof lies with the aggrieved party.

Practically all states thus recognize some sort of core area on the ground and perhaps on the sea, within which they will attempt to control all intruders, and another area, more distant from the focus of their interest, where they will attempt at most to control only such activities as they consider clearly and directly noxious to them. Some countries maintain a sharp and neat distinction between these two areas, and have obtained agreement on it with their neighbors. In other cases, however, there may be a kind of "grey" zone within which claims of several states may conflict, or where the practice even of one and the same government may be inconsistent, involving attempts only at controlling some activities, but not others, and throwing the burden of proof on some types of intruders, while according to others the presumption of innocent passage.

It seems obvious that on a small rotating planet no state could attempt to protect its national sovereignty vertically upward for an infinite distance from the earth's surface. At present, most countries have no capabilities for hitting or intercepting any object higher than, say, twenty or thirty miles above them, and the limits for reliable interception at present are much lower. By 1984, on the other hand, countries may be able to choose between attempting interception of threatening retaliation or reprisal for any intrusions into the air space up to the level of twenty miles - that is the altitude below which 99% of the atmosphere lies - or up to the level of sixty miles - below which lies all but one millionth of the earth's atmosphere - or up to the level of seventy five miles, at which meteors first appear and at which orbiting satellites are believed to expect the first major effect of atmospheric friction. Some powers with particularly strong capabilities, and perhaps anxieties as well, may of course attempt to put the limits of their national safety zones even farther out into space perhaps to the one hundred or two hundred or three hundred mile level. All this might be similar to the situation in regard to territorial waters which are put

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by some countries at three miles from the coast line, by other countries at twelve miles, while the United States in World War II at one time put the limits of its safety zone at seventy five miles out to sea and at other times extended them even farther out into the Atlantic.

None of this should obscure the basic distinction. At some low level, almost any government will be likely to object to unpermitted overflights, and at some very high level, or rather some very great distance from the earth, no government will effectively object to them. Between these two ill-defined limits, however, there is likely to lie a fertile field for bitter international disputes in 1984. In the probable event of the introduction of manned satellites, in particular, and even more in the case of manned satellites with bombardment capabilities, such incidents and quarrels may become fairly explosive. There will be charges and counter-charges about overflights and space intrusions, about the interception and destruction of presumed intruders, or even their "hot pursuit" into other parts of outer space or into the air space of other countries. In a world that has not yet gone to total war by 1984, however, such incidents will be tolerated by the great powers, and even more so by the small ones, with not much more than verbal protests and minor attempts at retaliation, much as were the similar disputes about overflights and the zealous shooting down of foreign airplanes that might have merely drifted off their courses in good faith, as occurred so often in the 1950's.

Even in this extremely divided and unstable world of extreme rivalry in 1984, however, the beginnings of a more stable and agreed-upon distinction between air space and outer space might evolve, in the form of a more-or-less general, though tacit, agreement derived from the vigor and intensity of national protests and attempts at interception. If a situation should

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propaganda. Attempts at putting any such steps toward "world government" or "enforceable world law" into practice would be fated either to collapse in the face of determined national resistance, or else to explode in war. No great power could be expected between 1959 and 1984 to concede to foreign threats or pressures its control over any significant part of its national self-system. Any such attempt, if seriously pressed, would be interpreted as a deadly threat to the integrity of the national decision system, and resisted to the utmost and at any risk, since giving in would be viewed as a crucial step to national capitulation. Any demands for a significant surrender of national sovereignty in these matters would be resisted particularly bitterly, if they should appear to be pressed by an unfriendly foreign power; and any foreign power would be likely to appear unfriendly, if it should be pressing such demands.

A possible way out of this dilemma, and an important area for research as well as eventually for experimentation, might consist in exploring the possibilities for establishing limitations of sovereignty, including mutual concessions of the right to overflights, inspection, and joint agencies operating by majority rule, among countries that had already come to consider each other as friends and allies on the basis of previous experience. A good research problem in regard to any proposal, for instance, for mutual inspection and surveillance between the United States and the Soviet Union, or for the joint inspection or operation of atomic energy facilities through a majority-ruled agency, as under the Baruch plan of 1947, would be to ask whether this plan could be put into practice between the United States and the United Kingdom, or between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, and perhaps some other countries. A related question would be to ask whether such a concession of reciprocal reductions of sovereignty and of joint majority-ruled agencies could be

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put into operation among the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community or whether it might prove acceptable between the West European Six and the United Kingdom, or between the West European Six and the United States. Generally speaking, the world of 1984 might well have discovered that any proposals for departing from policies of national sovereignty and reciprocity in the relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and perhaps a few of the other great rival powers, such as perhaps China, would have scant chances for success, if they had not been previously accepted and put into practice between the United States and its closest allies. In general, even a tense and suspicious world in 1984 might have accepted the principle, that no government of any great power urge with any credibility upon its main rivals the acceptance of any supra-national institution which it had not previously put into practice successfully and for a longer period of time in its relations with its friends.

In the absence of any such acquisition of substantially greater knowledge through research, and greater experience through practice, in regard to supra-national practices and institutions, the issue of national sovereignty will be likely to remain crucial in 1984, regardless of which power would happen to take which side of the controversy about it. Countries that believe themselves to have greater capabilities in space, or in the air, will be tempted, of course, to argue against sovereignty in favor of free overflights and the activities related to them. If their rival's capabilities should overtake their own, however, they would tend to reverse their position, albeit perhaps with a considerable time lag. Similarly, countries that expect to command a majority vote in some international body, would favor international majority rule in terms of a majority of governments, if not populations; and if their chances of controlling such a majority should diminish, their attitude to majority rule would probably shift.

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During much of the first decade after 1959, the United States may well continue to take the role of the critic of national sovereignty, the champion of free coastal navigation and free overflights, and of stringent international controls, managed by majority voting. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, it will be no longer certain that this would fit either our position or our mood, and by the 1980's we may well find ourselves defending the principles of sovereignty and reciprocity in the face of ample Soviet capabilities for overflying the United States, as well as of large and intractable non-Western majorities in the United Nations and other international bodies.

Regardless of these changes in the national positions of the largest powers, however, national sovereignty and reciprocity are apt to appeal to the populations and governments of most of the small and middle sized powers, and most of these powers will support these policies for most of the time, not only in words, but in their actual behavior. Great powers, trying to promote policies hostile to national sovereignty and reciprocity, will find themselves swimming, as it were, against the stream. Many of their successes will be precarious and ephemeral while many of their setbacks will threaten to be lasting. Nevertheless, each of the great powers will be able to afford a few setbacks of this kind, so long as it succeeds in avoiding excessive commitment to any policies opposed to national sovereignty, or to any deliberate attempts to depart from reciprocity of treatment in its dealings with other major powers.

The avoidance of excessive commitment is likely to be carried over into other areas of great power behavior, both as a matter of deliberate policy and, by 1984, of habitual skill. One aspect of such a policy of limiting national commitments might be a great increase in national efforts

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at the dispersal of essential national resources. Self-contained small colonies including nuclear power plants, electronic communication equipment, and a good deal of automatic machinery, are likely to be dispersed over a good part of the surface of the earth under the control of the great powers, as well as perhaps in the Arctic and Antarctic regions and for at least one or two colonies under the surface of the sea, perhaps on the continental shelves.

Against the possibility of an outbreak of war on the surface of the earth, each major power may be expected by 1984 to maintain a formidable "strike-second" capability, that is, the capability of inflicting intolerable damage upon any opponent even after having been hit itself in its major population areas and centers of production, or in the major part of its known military facilities and launching platforms. All great powers may be expected by 1984 to have developed such strike-second capabilities, and none is likely to depend, therefore, upon the minor and increasingly dubious advantages of first attack and of surprise.

While it seems very probable that each major power will have attained ample strike-second capabilities in regard to its installations on earth well before 1984, and that it well may have attained such capabilities in regard to relatively low flying satellites circling the earth within say 300 or 500 miles from its surface, it seems quite unlikely that any country will have attained strike-second capabilities in relation to any stations or installations on the surface of the moon or on any of the nearer planets. If there should be any installations either on the planets or on the moon, they are likely to be small and few in numbers. Surprise attacks might therefore yield limited advantages to aggressors in regard to raids in outer space and confined to targets in that area, somewhat as under conditions

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of 17th and 18th century warfare, both France and England were incapable of delivering "strike-first" knockout blows against each other, but were capable of carrying through successful surprise attacks against each other's installations in overseas theaters.

One possibility that cannot be entirely excluded, therefore, might be the conduct of some limited war operations among the great powers in outer space and particularly on the moon or on the nearer planets. On balance, nevertheless, any such development appears unlikely. Even if it should come to pass, on the analogy of terrestrial experience in the 17th and 18th centuries, it might be worth remembering that even in those centuries the period of limited raids among the colonists of the various European powers in America was followed by a period of consolidation of these colonists under one government in the case of the United States and eventual emancipation from the European mother countries which had earlier sent them to war against each other. Personnel on the space installations of different powers might find themselves under very similar conditions, contending against a very similar and very deadly environment; and their motivation for doing their level best to exterminate each other in outer space might well decline. If it should not decline, and each power could continue successfully to wipe out the other's personnel and installations on the moon or elsewhere in outer space, the recruitment of personnel for the continuation of such enterprises might gradually become somewhat difficult. Generally the reward of carrying on any such type of limited war in outer space against an adversary of presumably similar and nearly equal capabilities, are likely to be quite out of proportion to the costs and risks involved.

The more likely development, therefore, would seem to be that even intensely hostile great powers, through awareness of the devastating

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strike-second capabilities of their opponents as well as of their own, might learn to practice a surprising amount of forbearance both on earth and in space. They might resort to limited opposition to, or retaliation for, reconnaissance overflights, the planting of stations in rival territories, and even to raids in space, or to attacks with single missiles or small numbers of missiles on this planet. They might thus habituate themselves to consider as a serious attack nothing below the level of a fairly large scale nuclear salvo, whether launched from the earth or from outer space. They might thus treat the danger of their own and their enemies full capabilities being unleashed through an accident, the crime of some small group, or some malfunctioning of warning apparatus, as a greater danger than having to wait before using their strike-second capabilities to the full.

It is difficult to guess, whether this unwilling forbearance of the great powers in regard to the nuclear and space activities of their rivals will come to be extended to changes in the political alignments of some of the smaller countries on this planet. Every 25 year period during the past 100 years has seen drastic changes in the politics and institutions of several countries, and quite often corresponding changes in their international political alignments. It is possible that the great powers may come to tolerate some such domestic upsets, revolutions, or coups d'état even in the midst of a cold war, somewhat as Stalin's Russia tolerated the partial defection of Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948, or the change of the Iranian government from the pro-Russian neutrality under Mossadegh to the pro-Western course of its successors, or as the Western powers tolerated the shift of Mainland China from Nationalist to Communist rule, and later the shift of Northern Vietnam from French to Communist control. It is quite possible, however, that a different attitude may

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come to prevail, and that each major power may threaten the full use of
its weapons within what it may consider its own security zone, committing
its own conventional weapons, if this type of intervention should prove
sufficient, but reserving the right to commit nuclear weapons as well.
This kind of attitude was expressed rather freely by unofficial United
States commentators at the time of the Lebanese crisis in 1958, and
speculations in the press have again raised the possibility of the dispatch
of United States Marine battalions with nuclear capabilities into Laos
in connection with the crisis in that country in 1959. The Chinese Com-
munist intervention in North Korea in the fall of 1950, and the Russian
intervention in Hungary in 1956 might serve as further illustrations at
this point. That political upsets still occur in some of the peripheral
countries of the great power blocs, and that they will be accompanied by
attempts at shifting the political allegiance of some of these countries
from one bloc to the other, or from one bloc into some policy of neutral-
ity, seems fairly certain. Whether these attempted changes will be net
with tolerance or with repression cannot be foreseen, but it would seem
clear, from our assumption of the avoidance of World War III until at
least 1984, that both policies, toleration as well as intervention, would
be carried out by the great powers only within fairly narrow limits.

A major guide in their behavior might well again be reciprocity. The
great powers might tacitly agree to let some of the minor domestic revolu-
tions, civil wars, or defections of Communist or Western Satraps run their
course; or else they might tacitly agree to tolerate the intervention of
the other power within the zone of primary interest of the latter, limiting
their own reaction to verbal condemnation.

The same principle of reciprocity might then hold once again for the
problem of inspection in regard to nuclear aerial and space activities.

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Under conditions of extreme rivalry, no great power would be likely to tolerate foreign inspection personnel on its soil, or even in low overflights above it. Under these conditions, explicit or tacit agreements on limiting noxious air or space activities might be confined to arrangements that were "self-inspecting", such as an overt or tacit agreement to refrain from nuclear explosions within the atmosphere of the earth, or in outer space at such a short distance from the earth that significant amounts of the radioactive debris could be expected to fall back on this planet.

All these speculations about a world of intense great power rivalry in 1984 seem to carry an interesting implication: that these powers despite their rivalry would be under steady pressure toward developing more moderate styles and techniques of political and military action. The world of extreme rivalry in 1984, in short, would probably be under intense pressure to transform itself into a world of relatively greater international moderation. Whether this movement towards greater moderation should only be in its beginnings by 1984, or whether it would have been already well under way ever since the early 1960's, does not form any part of the topic of this paper. In any case, however, we shall now have to turn to a consideration of our second developmental construct: a world of more moderate great power rivalry in 1984.

## A World of Moderate Rivals

Under conditions of moderate rivalry, all space powers are likely to exercise some restraint in carrying out nuclear and space activities, and they are likely to have arrived at some tacit or explicit agreements on the indefinite suspension of all grossly contaminating activities of this kind in air space and in "fall-back" space. Similar explicit or

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tacit agreements are likely to have been reached on divisions of radio and radar frequencies, so as to permit the continuation of radio astronomy and of electronic communication and guidance in connection with space activities. The great powers may also have come to limit themselves to moderate efforts in the fields of radio propaganda and of jamming, with efforts at jamming perhaps confined to the more obvious propaganda broadcasts of rival powers.

Similar tacit or explicit agreements may come to hold in regard to overflights in "reconnaissance space". By "reconnaissance space" would be meant the volume of space within the distance at which optical or electronic reconnaissance would still yield relevant military information about objects and activities on the ground. The major space powers might come to adopt either a policy of refraining from such overflights, or some- what more likely, of tolerating them, and thus of submitting in effect to mutual long distance inspection. In this latter case a relatively open society, such as the United States might even be in a better position relative to its more secretive rivals, than it is now, or than it might be ten or twenty years from now, under conditions of an unlimited rocket race.

In any case, no sanctions other than those implicit in the resumption of an arms race with all its attendant painful domestic readjustments, are likely to be practicable, either now or in the 1980's. Images about a world government or a world police force, swiftly punishing violators condemned by the majority vote of some presumably impartial international court or administration, are unlikely to acquire much political reality during the next 25 years. Schemes for arms limitations will be arrived at by agreement, and enforced, if at all, by reciprocal self-interest and by fears of the responses of the other partners; during the quarter century

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under contemplation, no other forms of enforcement are likely to prove
practicable. Even such modest "early warning" systems of arms inspection,
however, might leave the great powers less insecure than they would be
under an unlimited nuclear and space weapons race.

What kinds of arms limitations might come to be agreed on by the
main powers, and policed by a mutual inspection system, capable of giving
all participants early warning of any large scale violations?

Possibilities of Arms Limitation and Inspection

One possible agreement might consist in limiting all major powers
and the lesser ones as well, to quotas of rockets suitable for the delivery
of nuclear weapons. These quotas would have to be kept well below the
saturation level for any large country. In other words, if a country
should decide to use some rockets in violation of the agreement and if it
should choose to equip them with warheads, the arms limitation agreement
might have seen to it that there might not be sufficient rockets available
for completely saturating any major country that might be chosen as a
victim of attack. In pursuit of the same goal, the agreement might well
specify that no nuclear warheads may be installed in rockets, that no
practice and training flights with nuclear weapons may be undertaken, and
that stockpiles of warheads might be limited to stringently inspected
quotas. An important part of any such agreement would consist in having
no nuclear warheads put into any objects put into outer space by any power.

Other parts of the agreement might specify that no organized target
files, guidance grades, and other paraphenalia for the effective direction
of nuclear bombardment would be maintained in any major power. Finally,
and perhaps most significantly, the participating countries would undertake
not to maintain any large organized military rocket forces or other military
forces above certain agreed on levels of capabilities.

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The overall result of such measures should be to leave no country with a capability of waging total war quickly after it had begun to violate the agreement, but to force any violating country to spend considerable time in acquiring the needed capabilities for large scale nuclear war, so as to give other countries ample warning time of the threat confronting them. Given such warning time, other countries would, of course, prepare for countermeasures of defense or retaliation against the violator; and after the arms race had been resumed by all the major powers, the world might be not much worse off than it is now or than it would be by 1984 if no scheme for arms limitation had been attempted.

Under the conditions just envisaged, much would depend upon the competence and effectiveness of the inspection system. If such a system should be enforced by 1984, it might well have developed from its beginnings as a system of inspection by professional staffs, recruited in considerable part from the military, police and intelligence forces of the participating powers. Inspection within each country might be carried out either by mixed teams, recruited in terms of parity between the home country and foreign countries, or in accordance with some other agreed-on formula for composition. An alternative would be reciprocal inspection under which, for instance, American teams would carry on in the main the inspection in Russia, and Russian teams in the main inspection in the United States. Compromises between reciprocity and mixed inspection teams might well develop.

The main object of inspection, in any case, would be the maintenance of mutual confidence so that no country would be tempted to return to the arms race. The sanction would be, of course, the loss of such confidence. A power dissatisfied with the results of the inspection system, or with

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what it might consider the imperfect degree of compliance of some other
country, would have a double problem. It would have to make credible
its own threat of withdrawing from the arms limitation agreement and of
resuming the arms race; and it would at the same time have to convince its
rivals that it had not merely seized on a pretext in order to take up a
course which it had desired in any case. The diplomatic problems thus
posed to any great power might be difficult, but they should certainly
not be insuperable. If the scheme should have succeeded for a number of
years, governments and peoples by 1984 might well have come to take it
seriously, as well as to take seriously the complaints or objections of
any nation suspicious of violations on the part of its rivals.

The technical capabilities of inspection teams might well be increased
by 1984 by further developments in such areas as reconnaissance satellites,
infra-red photography, the analysis of seismograph readings, and other
techniques of this kind. The greatest increase, however, in the capabilities
of inspection teams, or of an agreed on inspection authority of
the type of the United Nations (with powers limited to reporting and recommendations,
and with sanctions through threats of national returns to the
arms race limited to the major powers) would consist in a shift of emphasis
in regard to the activities inspected.

Possibilities of Inspecting the Social and
Communication Aspects of Armament

The concealment of hardware is a technical problem, and it may be
one that might actually have become somewhat easier by 1984, for instance
by means of putting some installations under the surface of the ocean on
the continental shelves, or putting them on space objects in orbit around
the earth. Detection, on the other hand, is also a technical process, and

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we have already suggested that its efficiency in at least some respects
is very likely to increase. The large-scale preparation of war, however,
is a social process and so would be its concealment. Neither of these
social processes will be particularly facilitated by technical developments.
Rather it should on the whole become easier, as time goes on, to detect
major changes in the activities and communications of a large community,
such as a modern industrial nation. In order to be successful, arms
inspections, therefore, will have to be an activity carried out by pro-
fessional teams but oriented in significant part to the monitoring of
human relations and social activities.

Clandestine preparations for large-scale war may well require major
preparations in the climate of opinion and legitimacy within the country
carrying on these violations of its arms limitation agreement. The pres-
ence or absence of such psychological preparation can be readily monitored
from the statistical analysis of the content of mass media of communi-
cation, as well as of the materials used in the institutions of indoc-
trination within each country, such as schools, armies, police forces,
national service organizations and the rest.

Content analysis of mass media might well center on three points.
The first of these would be the absence of excessive amounts of inflama-
tory material. This might involve an agreement of putting quotas on the
amount of space which the mass media in each country might devote to
particular controversies or disputes. This might relate in particular to
space on the front pages of newspapers, lead bulletins in broadcasts,
prime viewing time on television, and so on. The upshot of this might
be an agreement to maintain in all countries freedom to whisper, but not
freedom to shout. Each country, in other words, might well be limited to

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devoting not more than two per cent of its news space on any day and not more than one per cent of its news space during any week to controversies focussed on any one particular country, and these limitations might then hold for each particular newspaper or broadcasting station in the country. A consistent violation of these quotas, perhaps by hampering on one particular inflammatory incident or chain of incidents, or on a succession of different quarrels with the same country, could hardly fail to come to the attention of inspectors. If persisted in, this practice in itself would provide the early warning of an impending violation of the arms limitation agreement which the inspection system is designed to provide.

Corollaries of this inspection of mass media and of institutions of indoctrination might consist in an agreement to make it illegitimate to advocate violations of the agreement or to conceal them. Individuals might thus be taught by their own governments, acting in concert with their partners to the arms limitation agreement, that it were their duty to refrain from advocating violations, as well as their duty to denounce any violations of which they should acquire knowledge. A number of opinion polls held in different countries on this question of "inspection by the people" have disclosed among all audiences, including samples of members of the American Legion, a sufficiently high number of people who expressed their willingness to denounce publicly any violations even on the part of their own government, of which they should gain knowledge, to make it very unlikely that any large-scale violations could be carried on in secret for any longer time. Another corollary of the same type of agreement would be the passing of national legislation in all participant countries making it explicitly legitimate to disclose any relevant facts or doubts to inspectors. Suitable offices of such inspectors, perhaps under the United

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Nations, might well be maintained in most of the scientific and industrial centers of the participating countries.

Another corollary might be an agreement providing not only for the absence of objectionable material from the mass media of communication in the participating countries but also providing for the presence of material agreed on as helpful to their implementation. Such material, setting forth either the obligation to compliance, or the undesirability of violation, might well be carried in the national media of each country over the signature or with the picture of the leaders of the national government and in conjunction with the strongest symbols of political legitimacy accepted in that country. That is to say, the obligation to comply with inspection agreements might have to be publicized within the Soviet Union as a resolution of the Politburo, and embodied at a leading place in the May Day slogans and in all similar coronial settings; in England it might be made a part of the annual speech from the throne; in the United States it might be carried by presidential proclamation and congressional resolution.

An agreement to pass suitable national laws, implementing the illegality of concealment and the legitimacy of denunciation of all secret armaments, might be further supplemented by such ancient devices as that of having all judges, as well as all offices of the armed forces and police forces of the participating countries take a specific oath to uphold the arms limitation agreements.

None of all these and similar devices, singly or together, will insure complete compliance, but they might go very far indeed in facilitating timely leaks so as to permit the system to fulfill adequately its early warning function. By making it so extremely unlikely, furthermore, that any large-scale violation could be carried on in secrecy for any great

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length of time, these measures might very well discourage would-be
violators from attempting any such practices.

Mobility of Scientific Personnel as an
Aid to International Inspection

Another part of the arms limitation and inspection agreements might
provide for the mutual or international registration of all scientific
and technical personnel, such as perhaps all holders of the masters and
doctors degrees in the natural sciences and of corresponding degrees of
engineering. Professional inspectors might then be able to make sure,
at least in the case of samples, of the whereabouts and the accessibility
of scientific personnel. The agreement might then explicitly protect the
scientist's freedom to travel and to gossip - two propensities which have
long been the despair of security officers - and any attempt on the part
of any country to conceal the whereabouts of its scientists, to keep them
inaccessible to inspectors, or to interfere with their freedom of travel
and communication, might serve as prima facie evidence of bad faith in
the carrying out of the arms limitation agreement, and might hence pro-
vide another item of early warning. Incidentally, any power proposing
international guarantees for the freedom of scientists might make it hard
for its rivals to refuse to agree to them.

Other Control Techniques

Another method of inspection, already proposed by some Western
governments in the 1950's, might be the inspection of budgetary alloca-
tions. The national income of the United States and the USSR were already
sufficiently well known by 1959 to make it doubtful that the large percent-
ages devoted in each of these countries to national defense would have been
concealed for any great length of time. If the participating powers should

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agree to publicize their budgets and permit inspections in their budgets, in addition to agreeing to shorten gradually their work week and step up their spending on non-military uses, either in terms of consumer goods, or in productive or public service installations of various types, it might become very difficult indeed to mobilize, segregate and conceal the very large financial means and resources, as well as the large amounts of manpower and material, required for the preparation of total war.

All forms of inspection discussed thus far have been social, economic or psychological, rather than being oriented toward military hardware. All of them could be made even more effective by agreements for widespread personnel interchange, particularly in the scientific fields, and in the budgetary organizations, among the participating powers. Conventional ground inspection or air and ground inspections by military experts, on a reciprocal or international basis, would then supplement the measures just outlined.

## The Problems of Steps and of Spill-Over

Once in operation, the system would amount to the abolition of military secrecy in the participating countries. A complex, but not insoluble, problem would consist in finding an acceptable sequence of steps by which secrecy could be abolished in the participating countries at a time during which each of them still possessed the capability of utilizing the newly acquired knowledge of potential targets in the other countries for striking at one or more of its rivals. Agreements in regard to the content of mass media, the content of national indoctrination, and the general institutional apparatus of legitimacy and legality in all countries might well lend themselves to implementation in the early stages of such an agreement. Mutual sample tests of opinions and

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attitudes in the participating countries, as well as the compilation
of the personnel roster of scientists and technicians might then follow.
Budgetary controls might come still later; followed by controls of all
new installations and all new output. Putting the inspection system
into operation might then be completed finally by the disclosure of
the last remaining older launching facilities and weapons stockpiles.

Another problem might be that of containing the possible spill-over
effects of the abolition of military secrecy into a possible erosion of
other social, economic and political institutions in the participating
countries. This problem is likely to be minor in the case of the
Western democracies, but may well be serious for a dictatorship such
as the Soviet Union. If the system were worked in such a way as to
convince the Soviet government that they must either sacrifice their
type of dictatorship and substitute for it a Western-style private enter-
prise democracy with complete freedom of the press and freedom of private
interest organizations, they might very well prefer an arms race, somewhat
as the governing elites of some other countries might feel, if they should
come to believe that the inspection system were used as a lever to force
otherwise unacceptable social and political changes upon them. There
seems no reason to assume, however, that such difficulties will prove
insuperable. It should be possible for the participating powers to
develop an inspection system, and particularly an inspection staff, that
would concentrate on the business of inspecting and not attempt to reform
from the outside the societies which it would be trying to keep from
returning to an arms race.

## Some Possible Areas for Experimentation and Research

Even under the best conditions, however, schemes for agreed-on arms
limitation and inspection will require a good deal of experience, which
might best be acquired by carrying on some experiments among like-minded

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powers within the Western community of nations. This might hold in particular in regards to such matters as the content of mass media, the registration and interchange of scientific personnel, and the disclosure of budgetary data.

In regards to all these matters, more knowledge will be needed. From the perspective of 1959, five areas for desirable studies seem indicated as an aid for a better understanding of the problems of 1984:

1. A study of capabilities in fundamental science and in technological application and innovation, in regard to the probable rapid increase in scientific opportunities resulting from activities in outer space.

2. Problems of reciprocal or automatic inspection systems, as regards the technological aspects of such inspections.

3. Problems of social and political inspection, through such techniques as media surveys, monitoring of legitimacy and loyalty institutions and practices, and the allocation of economic resources to unconcealed locations and uses.

4. Scientific personnel registration, inspection, freedom of mobility, and interchange.

5. Experiments in regard to both supra-national and reciprocal experiments or arrangements in regard to arms limitations, as well as to the joint conduct of nuclear, scientific and space activities among like-minded countries within the Western bloc of nations, but including notably the United States. Studies as to the possible feasibility and the expectable problems, resulting from such arrangements between the United States and its closest allies, might go far to throw some light on the problems to be expected in the negotiation, as well as the putting into practice, of any agreements, however limited, with less like-minded powers.

The scientific and technological opportunities of 1984 will have

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demanded in all likelihood a substantial expansion of our capabilities in science and technology. The problem of coping with some of the political consequences of these changes may well require a substantial increase in our capabilities in the field of social science.

## Some Problems of United States Security Policy in 1984

Perhaps the most effective way of strengthening United States security in the space age might consist in amplifying the scientific and innovating capabilities of the United States by a very substantial margin – perhaps by a whole order of magnitude. This policy might be supplemented then by substantial improvements in early warning capabilities, and by deep shelter programs for substantial parts of the civilian population.

The increase in capabilities for scientific research and technical innovation, however, might well be decisive in the long run. The basic principle for such a policy of raising national capabilities might well be the notion that the learning capacity of a society is in some way proportional to that proportion of its resources that has remained available for a wide range of recommissions, such as might be suggested by future information as soon as it becomes available.

Possible steps toward accomplishing this increase in such capabilities might well form suitable topics for research. Such possible steps might include some of the following:

1. A substantial enlargement of the pool of trained scientific talent in the United States by means of broad practices of early talent identification and broad fundamental training. This would be a policy aiming at maintaining a relative abundance of high level technical talent, so as to permit the country to afford giving its young scientists several years of broad fundamental training before letting them commit themselves

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to specialized applications. It would thus be the opposite of recent
Soviet policies, which still appear to have been tailored to a situation
of a relative shortage of technicians and which seem to have emphasized
very early specialized training for relatively narrow applications.

2. A change in the cultural and educational climate of the United States, particularly in regard to private and public education on the primary and secondary school levels. The climate to aim at would be one stressing scientific and cultural achievement (rather than minimizing it as a departure from general equalitarianism) but at the same time a climate stressing the values of playfulness and curiosity and supporting the intellectual forays of the young with well founded expectations of early support and follow up.

3. A partial shift of material resources from relatively sterile military end products such as nuclear warheads, bombardment rockets, tanks, etc. to intermediate capital goods that can make a contribution to the growth of a society living in peace time and that are available for recommitment to a wide range of different needs. Intermediate capital goods of this type might include power stations, machine tools, communication and transport facilities, etc.

Among such intermediate capital goods available for wide ranges
of reallocation two categories should stand out:

4. A greatly enlarged scientific instrumentation industry capable of turning out a wide range of advanced scientific instruments at low cost to users. It might conceivably be worth while to shift some national sources both of capital and labor from such currently protected industries as the wrist watch industry to a program of federal support for reequipment of American universities, colleges, and secondary schools with a wide range of scientific and laboratory instruments, perhaps with the aid of an enlarged

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National Science Foundation. A bi-product of such a program would be an increase in the pool of manpower trained in the use of scientifically advanced instruments.

An even more important category of intermediate capital goods might be found in:

5. Greatly increased capability and installations for electronic computation. Such electronic computing equipment might be developed beyond the current profitable applications of engineering and commercial book-keeping and payrolls. In particular it might aim at developing a broader range of more flexible tools of thought including e.g. electronic desk computers for designing trend graphs and distribution graphs, fitting and testing them against any set of data put into a computer, and extrapolating them for possible trends or other regularities. Other intellectual tools might be abundant and inexpensive electronic indexing and searching equipment, and cheaper, smaller and less clumsy devices to take the place of current punched card techniques. The development of such devices would require the creation of large pools of very broadly trained programming personnel and of far broader and more readily accessible libraries of program routines.

The essential point of such a program would be a substantial increase in the intellectual capabilities of the United States through creating the conditions for attaining a new level of intellectual teamwork between human beings and man made computing, searching, and information processing devices. (It is perhaps not an accident that some of the early suggestions in the area were made in 1945 by Vannevar Bush who at the same time was very interested in the defense capabilities of the free world. (Cf. Bush's article, "That Men May Think," *Atlantic Monthly*, 176, July 1945, pp. 105-108, and his pamphlet, "Arms and Free Men", deriving from the same general period.