BACKGROUND BRIEFING

## CONTENT OF THIS BRIEFING IS STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 P.M. EDT AUGUST 16, 1970. IT MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED.

## AT THE WHITE HOUSE (New Orleans, Louisiana)

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

AT 1:30 P.M. CDT

AUGUST 14, 1970

FRIDAY

MR. KLEIN: I would like to outline the ground rules which we will operate under today so that we can be clear.

We would like to have this in terms of a **BACKGROUNDER** so that we can have the maximum amount of candidness between those who will speak here and those who will answer questions, and yourselves. So we would like to treat it on a **BACKGROUND** basis.

In terms of the talk which the President will make to you at the start of the meeting, any reference you make to that we like to be on a third-person basis. So if you refer to that in anything you write subsequently, we would like to have you do it on the basis that it was learned or that the President is believed to think, that type of term, rather than to quote him directly in any way or to quote that this is what the President said even indirectly. We like to do that on a third-term basis.

In terms of Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Sisco, who will be here, we like to work with the **BACKGROUND** basis so that you can quote indirectly on any material they provide, but on the basis of quoting Administration officials.

So if you say that Dr. Kissinger said this, and he occasionally says something, it should be on the basis of an Administration official. The same would apply to Secretary Sisco.

We feel that to give the maximum amount of time and still keep current with whatever use you feel you would like to make of this, we would make this for Monday a.m. release. We will be making a transcript of the remarks of both Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Sisco, and also of the question-and-answer period. We will send that to you air-mail special delivery tomorrow to give you additional backup on that if it is in time to help you in that way.

The President was speaking at the signing of the Postal ceremony the other day -- which we regard as a great triumph -- and he looked over to "Red" Blount and said, "I sent 'Red' Blount a letter three days ago but he probably

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hasn't received it yet, so I better explain what I said."

I would have to say that in terms of what we will try to do in terms of the mailing of the transcript itself. So if you would like to make notes, fine.

Basically, we look at these briefings as ones which will help most in giving you some insight into the Administration thinking on foreign policy, ones which we hope will be helpful to you in formulating commentary or editorial policy so that you can look at it from the factual side as we see it and weigh it in with your own views as you go forward in deciding what things you will say of events ahead.

I might explain that this is the second of this type of briefing we have had. We had one recently at San Clemente, which was on a national basis, and we picked a number of newsmen and broadcasters at random from all sections of the country for that particular meeting. The response we had from that was one which was very encouraging to us and one which we felt made it worthwhile to do this again on a regional basis.

As you know, from what the President said as he arrived in front of the hotel, he feels very strongly that there is a great value in trying to get our officials and give himself the opportunity to get out of Washington and to have a give-and-take exchange with leaders in various parts of the country.

So starting with this particular briefing in New Orleans today, we are hopeful that we will also be able to have other ones regarding, say, Western editors and broadcasters, and we hope to have one for those in the East and Middle West at a later date.

We think it is good in two ways: One, it enables us to give the kind of background we think is helpful and; secondly, all of us are much interested in what your questions are because certainly it helps us, even when the President is not here, in reporting back to him in terms of what things are of most interest and what things are of a puzzling nature to you, or what things need further explanation.

We would like to leave this, as I said, on a very candid basis. In doing that, I would hope when we get to the question period you will feel very free to ask any question. Don't hold back on something because you think it might be of some embarrassment one way or the other.

I think in doing that we can have a better opportunity to go forward in the way which will be most productive for all. I might stop at this point and ask if any of you have any questions on the general ground rules we have laid forth.

Besides those of you who have been invited from the Southern States, and there are 11 Southern States represented, a pool from the White House Press Corps. The same transcript you receive will be given to those in that Press Corps.

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MR. KLEIN: I would like to go now to the program where we will hear directly from Secretary Sisco and Dr. Kissinger. When they have both had the opportunity to speak, we will have a good period of time for questions and we will be glad to have your questions on any subject at that point.

I might say also I recognize the room is warm, so if any of you feel you would like to have your coats off at any time during the afternoon session, I hope you will feel relaxed and free to do so.

Most of you, I think, are very familiar with the work which Dr. Kissinger is doing in this Administration as the Director of the National Security Council.

Dr. Kissinger has a long record of work in terms of being a consultant in government which basically goes back as far as 1950. His profession is that of a professor. Before coming with the President, he was the Director of the Center for International Relations at Harvard University. He has been Professor of Government there.

Basically, he has also been one of our Nation's top experts in the entire field of disarmament. Some of the work which was first done in a very pioneer way came from committees on which he served during the period between 1958 and 1961, and all through the time leading into the task he has now. He has been one of those who has kept most on top of it. He will be discussing another subject with you.

I might say in conclusion, that one of the things the President places great stress on is the ability of the staff to do a very thorough planning and a careful job of presenting a lot of options to him, presenting the reasons back and forth.

As you can gather from the President's remarks, and I think Dr. Kissinger will confirm this, one of the things which gives us the greatest hope in terms of the SALT talks is the fact that we have made the kind of careful study, made the kind of piece-by-piece study, so that if we have the opportunity to make gains for peace in this field, certainly we will know what the risks are, what the risks for peace are, what the opportunities are and be able to move in a quick and forthright way.

The same thing characterizes the other studies which have been done by the National Security Council so that it is a particular pleasure for me to introduce to you a colleague of mine on the President's staff who, I think, makes a great contribution to his country.

Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Herb Klein, gentlemen: I am always delighted when somebody refers favorably to anything that I might have done in my academic life because in some of my writings there is a tendency to confuse obscurity with profundity, which led a British reviewer to write, "I don't know if Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone finishing his book is a great reader."

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This experience of briefing people on foreign policy came to full flowering during the Cambodian episode when for about a month I was on the White House tour for visiting student groups as an example of the depths human depravity can reach.

I will talk to you for a bit about our general approach to foreign policy, and specifically also about the disarmament talks, relations with the Soviets and Vietnam, maybe a word about the Middle East. Then Secretary Sisco can talk to you in somewhat greater detail about the specifics of recent events in the Middle East.

Let me begin with a general statement first. I believe that when the history of American post-war foreign policy is written, it will turn out that the big turning point occurred not in 1961 when it was very eloquently announced, but in 1969, when no claims were made.

At the end of April of this year when the President spoke about Cambodia, many of my colleagues complained bitterly -- many of my ex-colleagues complained bitterly -- about the polarizing effect that his speech was supposed to have had with its emphasis on commitments to friends abroad and the desire to see to it that the self-determination of South Vietnam be preserved.

But if you read, for example, the Inaugural Address of President Kennedy, you will find such phrases -- I don't have the exact text here but I think this is reasonably accurate -- as: "We will pay any price, we will bear any burden, we will meet any hardship, we will fight any enemy, we will support any friend, to assure the survival of liberty."

I am not saying this as a criticism. It moved me, too, very much. I am citing it as an example of the enormous transfoxmation that has taken place in the situation in the world and in the situation in America since the early 60's.

The period of the 60's, in retrospect, will probably appear as the last flowering of that era of American foreign policy which we initiated in 1948, when we threw ourselves into international affairs with the same enthusiasm, impetuosity, and dedication with which we had built our country.

The belief was after our long history of isolation that any problem in the world that was not solved by America would probably not be solved at all. All over the world the United States found itself in the position of designing

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all the programs, selling them, executing them, running them. Part of this reflected the realities of the post-war situation.

Every major country in Europe, except Great Britain, had been defeated at one stage or another during the war.

Every country in Europe, with the exception of Great Britain, had been occupied at one stage or another during the war.

Every country in the world that had ever played a major role in foreign policy had been significantly smashed or reduced in influence, power and capacity to conduct foreign affairs, by the war. Economies were shattered. Civil government was very often threatened by domestic discord.

In these conditions, it was, in fact, true that if the United States did not play the major role, no one else possibly could.

Many of the transformations that I am talking about, therefore, are not criticisms of previous Administrations. They were made possible or, indeed, necessary, by the successes of previous policy and not always by the failures -- although some of them also reflect certain failure.

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A number of big changes have occurred. First, since 1948 over sixty new states have come into being. Since 1948 many of the traditional countries of Europe and Asia regained a great deal of their strength and vigor. Since 1948, the Communist world, which appeared monolithic, has appeared to have many profound divisions. And since 1948, and especially through the 1960's, we have had to learn that the United States cannot be in the position where other countries can pretend that their development is more important to us than it is to them, and that if their security is threatened, it is worse for us than it is for them. The United States cannot be in this position because to conduct foreign policy on this basis may be beyond our physical resources. It surely is beyond our psychological resources. No one can ask the U. S. Government to take the principal responsibility for every decision at every point in the world at every moment in time. It is not healthy for us and it is not healthy for other countries. It enables them to shift the burden of difficult decisions to the United States. It demoralizes their domestic situation. It exacerbates our domestic decisions when all the burdens have to be borne by the United States at every point throughout the world.

It was in this situation, in the fifth year of a war that seemed inconclusive, that this administration has come into office. It is in these conditions that we have tried to adjust the American foreign policy to realities of both our domestic and our foreign situation.

I read in the newspapers always very exciting accounts of the tremendous disputes that go on within the Administration, and who is up and who is down at any particular point, and who did or did not know about this or that decision. The basic charge that the President has given me and to his senior advisors is, first of all, to ask ourselves where we are going. The President, on the whole, is not interested in tactical questions. I remember four weeks after we came into office, if I can mention a personal vignette, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese started an offensive. The government was then still geared to the pace of the previous administration. A number of senior officials wanted to come over and assemble in the Situation Room so that the President could conduct that battle. I told them to wait a minute and let me find out what the President wanted to do. I asked the President whether he wanted to conduct these tactical operations from the White House. He said, "Is there any decision that I need to make?" I said no. He said, "Is there any decision that I can make now that would make any difference?" I said no. Then he said, "I don't want to see them. When there is a decision that I need to make, let me know. Let me know what my choices are."

He was absolutely right. There was nothing he could do at that point when the attack started that would not drive everybody crazy. The important concern that the President has put before us is to know where we are going, to put before him the fullest range of choices that he can develop; and then, of course, the final decision, which of the options he would choose, is up to him. He has steadfastly refused to leap on the basis of what seems temporarily fashionable.

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The danger of going into these negotiations precipitately was that we would spend two-thirds of the time negotiating with ourselves and one-third of the time negotiating with the Soviets. If you look at the history of the nuclear ban, for example, we spent five years on that subject. On the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which didn't even concern us, primarily, but other countries, we spent four years.

It would have been an easy matter to slap together a position and meet the Russians and put our position on the table. Then the Soviets would put their position on the table. There would have been a deadlock. We would have had to renegotiate our position within our bureaucracy. We would go back to the Russians.

This process could have been repeated indefinitely for five or six years. Instead, the President ordered the fullest study that has been made in or outside the government of just exactly what one would do if one wanted to limit any conceivable weapon system that has any conceivable application for strategic warfare.

We went through this weapon system by weapon system. We analyzed what our means of inspection were, what the dangers of violation were, what we would do if we spotted a violation, what the strategic significance would be if there was an agreement or if there were not an agreement.

In that process, incidentally, most of the usual bureaucratic disputes were avoided because we looked at it as an analytical problem and not as a bureaucratic problem.

Having made this survey, we were then in a position to put together four positions of various degrees of comprehensiveness, of which the President chose the two most comprehensive ones, which we put to the Soviets. The Soviets, as was predictable -- and this I am not saying critically, the issue is so complex -- had a slightly different view of the problem. But the work we had done enabled us to shift within a matter of three weeks from one position to another where previously this would have taken a year of internal fighting within our Administration.

Therefore, we are extremely optimistic about the progress in strategic arms talks. The Soviets have been constructive and without their cooperation it wouldn't have been possible. But I think it is fair to say that without the particular approach that the President insisted we introduce into the decision-making process, we could not have gotten to where we are today.

I will come back to that in a moment. I wanted to use it only as an illustration of the general approach.

Let me go back, then, and say that in the light of the philosophy I have described, and say what the guiding principle of the Administration is with respect to foreign policy.

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This was expressed by the President at Guam, and
has been popularly described as the Nixon Doctrine. It
states the following: One, of course, we will maintain
any commitments that the United States has. Two, that in
the case of a threat by a nuclear country against a non-nuclear
country, we feel that we have a special obligation since we
are the only major nuclear country in the free world. Three,
with respect to other threats, or with respect to other programs,
the initial and principal responsibility has to be borne
first by the country concerned and secondly by the region
concerned.

We will assist where our interests are involved and
where what we can do can make a difference. But we will not
be in a position where the principal programs or the principal
defense are borne in the first instance by the United States
if the countries concerned do not make the effort themselves.

This we view not as a way of withdrawing from the
world, but as a way of remaining related to the world in a
way that is historically, psychologically and domestically
bearable for us. It is a way of shifting to the other countries
what has to be the normal position of the primary burden of
their responsibilities, intellectually, physically, politically
and militarily.

Ennunciating a doctrine is a lot easier than
implementing it. Obviously, as one goes into a new phase, it
is only at universities that one has sharp dividing lines.
In reality, there are always vestiges of the old together with
the beginning of the new. Obviously, for example, when
you have 550,000 Americans engaged in combat, you cannot shift
to the Nixon Doctrine the day after you have announced it.
That will have to be obviously, in those areas, a gradual
progress.

So, I am describing a direction and not a cookbook,
a recipe, that can be applied literally to every situation
from one day to the next.

The reason why we believe that this Doctrine can,
should and will characterize American foreign policy in the
next decade is not only because of the developing strength
and self-confidence of other countries, but also because
of the different conditions that exist in the world compared
to the late 1940's.

In the late 1940's and the 50's, and, indeed, the
early 60's, one thought of Communism as a monolith, inherently
and eternally aggressive and run from a central core. No one
who has seen the Communist world operate would underrate the
aggressiveness of many of their leaders and many of their
countries. But there has been an important historical change
in a number of respects.

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One is that the Communist system simply isn't working very well domestically, and that the Communist Party really does not have a very meaningful domestic function any more.

This has good and bad consequences. It leads on the one hand to a certain bureaucraticization of life. On the other hand, it may give the Communist Parties a vested interest in foreign dangers. You don't need an ideological party to run a country. You don't need them to run an economy. So, they may have a vested interest always in being in a position of some tension in at least some part of the world.

The second important and perhaps decisive feature is the split between the Soviet Union and Communist China. According to Communist doctrine, the spread of Communism is to insure eternal peace. The fact of the matter is that the Red Army has been used four times since World War II, always against allies, only against allies.

The fact of the matter is that the deepest rivalries that exist in the world today are between Communist countries. First, the split that existed between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and now the enormous tension that exists between the Soviet Union and Communist China, which may be the deepest factor in Soviet foreign policy and for which they really have no mechanism of handling it. It would be bad enough as a problem among states, that is, if states of the size of Communist China and the Soviet Union were in conflict that would be serious enough, but when you add to it a quasi-religious struggle of who is going to define the true orthodoxy so that it has profound ideological, semi-religious overtones, it has many insoluble aspects. And if the Soviet Union is more conciliatory towards the West at the moment, the consciousness of what seems to them the impending danger from the East is one of the most crucial factors.

There are, therefore, openings in negotiations with the Soviet Union that simply did not exist even ten years ago, much less 20 years ago, produced by this new aspect of international relations. These are the basic realities with which we deal.

Let me now make a few remarks about some specifics in the conduct of foreign policy.

We have a difficult problem in the sense that when the President came into office he announced that it would be an era of negotiations, that he was aiming for an era of negotiation and not confrontation. Many Americans tend to believe that you fuel negotiations primarily by endless demonstrations of unilateral good will.

On the other hand, history tends to indicate that negotiations depend on an important extent, especially with Communist countries, on the balance of risks and opportunities that they perceive.

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Last year, when the President announced the ABM program, there were many who argued with us and said that if we developed the ABM, this would spark a new round of the arms race and it would forever doom the SALT negotiations.

The fact of the matter is, as the President pointed out, and as we can easily demonstrate, that without the ABM there probably wouldn't be any meaningful SALT negotiations. What possible incentive would the Soviets have? We have stopped developing offensive weapons. We have stopped building offensive weapons. Why should they make an agreement with us to stop doing something that we have already stopped doing and that they are continuing to do.

We didn't say that last year. At that time, we did it mostly on strategic claims, so I don't want to claim a foresight that we didn't insist on last year. Last year we did it because we were getting worried about the tremendous build up of the Soviet land based missile force.

As it turned out in the evolution of the negotiations, it is the ABM which is one of the main reasons why we can be so optimistic about the fact that we will get a fairly comprehensive agreement that we expect will include both offensive and defensive weapons within a reasonable time period, certainly a much shorter time period than was spent on any other set of negotiations.

The second area which I will not cover in detail, but which Joe Sisco will talk about is, of course, the Middle East.

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I don't want to repeat all the details which we can furnish you in writing. The major point I want to make is that this Administration is committed to ending the war, and it will end the war. But in order to end the war, it must carry out a number of steps which lend themselves to relatively easy attack. Obviously, at this stage of the war, there are no brilliant solutions available. The easy things have all been done. Therefore, anyone who takes the negative of any proposition can point out many weaknesses in any course that may be pursued.

Let me give you an example. One of our basic policies is the policy of Vietnamization, which is really an application of the Nixon Doctrine to South Vietnam, in which we want to put more and more responsibility on the South Vietnamese for their defense and for their political development.

There are many people who specialize in pointing out that this cannot possibly work, and others who say, "You mustn't have Vietnamization; you should have negotiation."

Let me say two things about it. First, if Vietnamization doesn't work, negotiation will not work either. Let me say flatly the whole thrust of our policy is to promote negotiation. We are convinced that the only quick way to end the war is through negotiation. The only reliable way of ending the war is through negotiation. No one familiar with the history of Vietnam can have any doubt that any program that depends entirely on local conditions has major problems connected with it.

But what we are saying is this: To the extent that the North Vietnamese look at the situation in South Vietnam and see that there develops there a structure that at least will give them a major problem after we withdraw, to that extent they will have an incentive to negotiate.

To the extent that the North Vietnamese looking at South Vietnam see a structure that is certain to collapse, to that same extent negotiations cannot work.

Therefore, there is no opposition between negotiation and Vietnamization. If Vietnamization works, negotiation may work --will work. If Vietnamization doesn't work, then both policies do not work.

Secondly, on the issue, there are many proposals, some of which have found their way into editorial pages, to the effect that we should put a deadline on our withdrawals. First of all, no one really knows whether we have an internal deadline or not. Secondly, whether we should announce a deadline raises a whole series of questions.

One reason we don't announce a deadline is because we want to beat any of the deadlines that I have seen written about. The reason we think we want to beat it is because we still have not given up on negotiations.

Once you have committed yourself irrevocably to getting out on a certain date, regardless of consequences, the other side has no conceivable interest left in negotiation.

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At that time, their only task is to hold on until that
deadline is reached.

We are reasonably optimistic, insofar as one
can be that in Vietnam, that Vietnamization is progressing
satisfactorily enough, in order to support negotiations.

We will have setbacks and there won't be an
uninterrupted progress. But the major trend we believe
will either lead to a situation in which the other side
may negotiate or to a situation in which we can withdraw
and leave the country in a position where it has at least
a chance to take care of itself.

Let me mention a few questions that are always
put to us. A friend of mine wrote a letter a few months
ago in which he said he wanted to put a few questions that
concerned thoughtful people. One of his questions was:
To what extent is your policy dictated by the Saigon
Government? Or, are you independent of the Saigon
Government?

I know the fashoinable thing, at least in my
former stamping grounds, would be to say we are completely
independent of the Saigon Government and we do exactly what
we believe. That would be a demagogic thing to say.

Obviously, when you fight in another country,
you are allied with that other country, and you are affected
by the actions of that country. Of course, we are
influenced by some of their views.

What we are trying to do, however, through the
process of Vietnamization, is to put them into a position,
and ourselves in a position, where we are less and less
dependent on their actions and they are less and less
dependent on our views. That is the purpose of
Vietnamization. We are not there yet, but we are trying
to be there.

Secondly, are we independent of Hanoi's action?

Of course we are not completely independent of
Hanoi's action. They, to some extent, influence us.

The third question is in negotiations, why don't
you propose -- and then you can have any list that human
ingenuity can devise.

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Let me make one observation about negotiations. First, there is a myth that negotiation with the North Vietnamese is like a detective story, in which they throw out their clues and we have to guess at the answer. Then if we don't get the answer correctly we are at fault for the failure of the negotiations.

I have been visited by more self-appointed peace emissaries who have picked out a phrase from some delegate in Paris that they thought was terribly significant, that we had been told about already, 50 times before.

The chief problem in negotiations is not lack of ingenuity on our part in coming up with a formula. The chief problem in negotiations is that we are confronting a country that has fought for 25 years with great courage, but whose very quality of courage may not make it capable of visualizing a compromise.

We have paid for the beginning of negotiations five different times. First we were told that if there were a bombing halt there would be substantive negotiations. Then we were told if we talked to the NLF there would be substantive negotiations; if we made a symbolic withdrawal of troops, if we announced the withdrawal of 100,000 troops, if we made the withdrawal of 100,000 troops, if we announced a new senior negotiator in Paris.

We have done every one of these things. There have not yet been substantive negotiations, and that for one simple reason. The last convinced us that in the world may be the North Vietnamese, and the sharing of political power is not the most obvious conclusion to which you are driven by the study of Leninism. Indeed, the opposite is true.

Secondly, Vietnamese, North or South, find it very difficult to visualize anything else but total victory. As soon as North Vietnam indicates that it is ready for serious negotiations, it will not be lack of ingenuity on our part that will start the negotiating process. Of this I can assure you flatly.

So, the missing ingredient at this moment is the beginning of a serious negotiation. But we haven't given up hope. You read in the paper yesterday that their senior negotiator is coming back to Paris. Whenever there has been a break in these Vietnam negotiations, it has come suddenly. I am not saying it is coming now, but whenever it will come, if it ever comes, it will be relatively sudden.

Let me make one final point: to sum up all these observations. We had some difficult months after the President's decision to go into Cambodia. We have been told on a number of occasions how desirable it would be if we yielded to the pressures of so many dedicated and concerned groups, and if we only stopped what is often called the polarization of our society.

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We have not done it, as the President said, because history tends to prove that the people do not forgive leaders who produce disasters, even if these disasters are following the recommendations made by the public. We believe that our obligation is to make a peace that will last; that a peace cannot last if in the process confidence in the United States is shaken.

Nor do we believe that the answer to our domestic difficulties is to yield to any group that smashes the china and then says, "Look what you have made me do."

We believe it is important that the way we end the war and the way we build the peace reflect the best judgment of the best thought that can be brought to bear on the problem.

In doing this, we believe, even though this wouldn't be recognized, that we may be the best protection of the very people who have been most vociferously protesting against us. If this country is taken over by a radical group, it will not be by upper middle class college kids. There will be a much more elemental group taking it over.

We cannot permit the political contests to be fought out by rival groups of demonstrators. We think this is terribly important, to conclude, because we are at a point where except for the war in Vietnam, there are possibilities of bringing about a more reliable peace in the world than we have known in the whole post-war period.

We are at a point where we can re-define the American position with respect to the world, where, for whatever reasons, it may be that even the Soviet Union has come to a realization of the limitations of both its physical strength and of the limits of its ideological fervor.

But none of these possibilities can be realized except by an American Government that is confident that it knows what it is doing, that can respond to its best judgment, and by an American public that has enough confidence in its leaders so that they are permitted the modicum of ambiguity that is sometimes inseparable from a situation in which you cannot, at the beginning of a process, know completely what all the consequences are.

The tragic aspect of policy-making is that when your scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which you can base this action is always at a minimum. When your knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has often disappeared. This is the problem that we face. This is why no society can operate without confidence. But the reason despite this turmoil is because in any new creation one is very conscious of the symptoms of the turmoil. One is very aware of the things that are being changed. It is always a painful process to see it come about. But we think there is a very good chance that by the end of this term we will have laid the foundations for a period to which many of those who were most worried a few months ago can not only reconcile themselves, but can support and in which the whole American public will feel that this was the beginning of an era of constructive peace.

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MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much, Henry.

I am sure all of you, having listened to Dr. Kissinger, understand why I feel it is a great thing that we have someone with the depth of his knowledge and the ability to analyze these problems, assisting the President, the Secretary of State, and others, on the great problems which are ones of war and peace in the world today.

I might mention also that Dr. Kissinger was mentioning the withdrawal deadlines, if you are looking at the Congress, which translates itself into the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, which will be coming up shortly.

We have with us today Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. He has been our principal U. S. negotiator in the Middle East with the Soviet Union and both sides, and has had a major role in the progress we have made where we now have a cease fire. He was appointed by President Nixon, and prior to that time he served under President Johnson as Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs. He, Dr. Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers have been working tirelessly in terms of trying to find a way to avoid the confrontation which has been mentioned in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, on the way down, Joe mentioned to me that this is the first day he has been away from his desk in seven weeks. As a matter of fact, I think this is a day off. I think by the time your questions are through, he may have changed his mind.

With that, I would like to present Secretary Sisco.

MR. SISCO: Thank you, Herb.

I think I can be very brief, ladies and gentlemen, and give all of you an opportunity to explore your areas of interest, both with Dr. Kissinger, as well as myself. I think both the President and Dr. Kissinger have taken a look at the Middle East in its broader context. I would merely say that, from where I sit, if one looks ahead over the next five or ten years, in my mind it is one of the most dangerous points where it can make the difference between war and peace.

We have a lot of interests in the area, political, economic, strategic, but in very simple terms, our overriding interest in the area is to try to create the kind of political settlement, the kind of stabilization, which would diminish the possibilities of a confrontation between us and the Soviet Union, and, therefore, diminish the risk of a possible direct involvement on the part of the United States.

We have an Arab-Israeli dispute in which both sides have positions that have hardened, where the suspicion is very deep. You have very serious differences between the Arabs themselves, so that alongside the Arab-Israeli dispute, you have intra-Arab disputes, where the moderates on the one hand are trying to maintain their own positions, are trying to move towards a political solution, and yet faced by Arab governments who see really force as the primary solution, and the Palestinian movement that has become a much more formidable political force in the area than it was two or three years ago.

Superimposed on the *rab-Israeli and on the intra-Arab disputes is the prospect of conflict between the United States

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The United States in particular, since we
negotiated both the cease-fire as well as the so-called
standstill arrangements, will be heavily and directly
involved in trying to help each side maintain the
elements of that agreement.

What has been most interesting about the recent
operation is this: Regardless of the fact that we do not
have diplomatic relations with the Egyptians, we do have very
good contact, both with the Israelis and the Egyptians,
and they expect that we will play the kind of middle-
man role that we have been playing in trying to help both
sides to maintain the fragile cease-fire.

You have seen, of course, a number of press
reports in the last two or three days, in which the
Israelis have put forward information to the effect that
they believe that there has been a movement forward of
certain of the SAM installations in the critical zone of
the Suez Canal.

The reason why this is important is this: From
the Israeli point of view, superiority of the air along
the Suez Canal is critical, and their concern is that
these SAM sites not be moved so close to the Canal where
there can be a serious challenge to their maneuverability
and freedom of action in the area. We are looking at this
information.

We, ourselves, have not made any judgment up to
now. We would expect to be in a position to make a judgment,
I would hope, within the next two or three days.

I think it is important to be able to maintain
this cease-fire simply because of the fact that the talks
between the parties, we hope, will begin very shortly.

The United Nations Representative, Ambassador
Jarring, has been discussing the matter with the parties
in New York, and he is trying to arrange for an agreement
on the time and place as well as the level of the talks.

It is obvious that there is an inherent relation-
ship between the maintenance of the cease-fire and progress
on the peace talks themselves.

One final observation. This, we believe, has
been a significant breakthrough. We believe that it is
a modest success which really provides the basis, if there
is will on both sides, for some progress for the first
time since the June War of 1967. But I think we have to
guard against any notion that the road is going to be easy,
and certainly we have to guard against any euphoria.

We had intimate knowledge as to what the views of
the respective parties are on the elements of a political
settlement. I can say to you that while, as a result of
the two- and the four-power talks over the last 17 months,
there has been some agreement achieved on a number of
common points, there are some very fundamental differences
that remain, not only between the major powers, but par-
ticularly between the parties themselves.

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The four-power talks and the two-power talks
were not intended to be a substitute for agreement between
the parties. They were intended to be an encouragement to
the parties, a guide to the parties. If we are going to
make any progress in the future, I think the one essential
that has to be met is that both sides have to view the
upcoming negotiations from the point of view of adopting
a position and a posture which is something less than
their maximum positions.

If, for example, one side continues to insist on
total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines, if it
continues to insist on a solution of the so-called refugee
problem without providing assurances to the other side that
it will not be expected to receive over one million refugees
and thereby alter fundamentally the Jewish character of
the State of Israel, there can't be any solution on that
basis.

And equally, if Israeli policy is based on
substantial acquisition of territory, then it is unlikely
that a political solution can be achieved. This is what
I mean when I say that as we look ahead over the coming
weeks and months, the job of the United States will be to
try to encourage both sides to move away from maximum
positions in order to try to achieve the kind of common
ground that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Thank you very much.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much, Joe. You have
been very clear and very concise, and I am certain you
have made very clear the arrangements that are being
made for the negotiations.

We would like to go directly to your questions.
I would like to ask you to direct to which person you would
like to put your question.

Q What is the Russian mood, Secretary Sisco,
in the Middle East? Why are their personnel there?

MR. SISCO: I will respond to that question.
I am not sure I am going to be able to answer it.

We are convinced that the Soviets don't want
a confrontation with the United States. We are equally
convinced that they don't want to see a general renewal
of hostilities between the Arabs and Israelis because it
will confront the Soviet Union with very difficult choices,
as it would confront the United States.

The big question mark with respect to the Soviet
Union is this, and here I build on what Henry Kissinger
said a moment ago about risks and opportunities in this
situation.

As long as the Middle East is in turmoil, the Soviet
Union is apt to derive unilateral political advantage in
the area. In other words, it can exploit the political

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turmoil that has existed over the past number of months
and years.

What the Soviets have to balance is whatever
advantage politically they may feel they have derived
over the past months and years against the risk that
this can get out of control and involve them directly in
a way in which we are convinced they do not want to
become more directly involved.

Why have they taken this step in the UAR?
I think at the outset it was not only responsive to the
deep penetration raids which I mentioned, which both
Moscow and Cairo found very embarrassing indeed, but
President Nasser and the Soviets have been close over
the years.

The Egyptians were hurting very badly from
these deep penetration raids, and Moscow, I think, was
under great pressure not only to be responsive in the
political sphere in supporting the political positions
of the UAR as they relate to the elements of a settle-
ment, but, likewise, they were under very grave pressure
to provide the Egyptians with the wherewithal in order
to stem the tide and to cut down the deep penetration
raids.

I think one can see the results. There have
not been any deep penetration raids since the SAM
installations have gone in. In that sense, we hope that
Nasser may feel that he is in a little stronger position
today to enter into serious negotiations than he might
have been some six months ago.

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MR. KLEIN: Thank you.

We will go right up here.

Q Mr. Sisco, you said that the cease fire is
fragile and the United States would be heavily involved in helping
both sides maintain that agreement. How heavily do you mean?
Are you implying the possibility of a peace-keeping force?

MR. SISCO: No, not at all. We actually negotiated
all of the details of the so-called cease-fire and standstill.
The understanding between the two parties is that not only will
they stop shooting, but, likewise, there is a specific
commitment on both sides that neither will use the limited cease-
fire to improve their relative military positions.

When I say that we will be involved, I mean we will
be largely the middleman as the receiver of the complaints.
Let me give you a concrete example. Last Sunday, the Egyptians
lodged a complaint against the Israelis through the United
States that they had seen 12 aircraft cross the Canal over the
city of Suez and that some ack-ack had presumably been fired.
They brought the complaint not to the United Nations Truce
Supervisory Organization that is on the ground, but rather
to the United States.

We, in turn, took it up with the Israelis. As it
turned out, three hours later the Egyptians realized they had
made a mistake. The mayor of the city of Suez announced
that it was an error and that was the end of this particular
violation.

As you know, the Israelis have lodged a complaint
as it relates to the alleged movement of certain SAM sites.
When I say the United States will be involved, I think it is
significant that both sides want to make their case in terms
of the cease-fire with the United States directly. I think it
is particularly significant on the Egyptian side since we
don't have diplomatic relations with the Egyptians.

Q I will direct my question to Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger, you made reference in your remarks
to the fact that the reasons for having the ABM are changed
somewhat this year from what they were last year. How
credible is the ABM as a bargaining chip in the SALT talks
in view of the fact that from the public standpoint, at any
rate, we don't know about the effectiveness of the ABM or
whether it can detect decoys or nuclear missiles aimed against
us, and so on.

Just how credible is this from the Russian standpoint?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me explain what I mean by
change. Last year when we made the initial decision to deploy
AMB, we did so primarily on the basis of an analysis of the
growth in the Soviets' large missile force, particularly the
SS-9 missile which has a very large warhead and which is also
developing multiple warheads now.

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The danger existed that our land based missiles might, in the 70's, become extremely vulnerable. We rested our public case on that proposition. When people asked us about the effect of that on SALT, our answer was that we did not think it would damage it. We didn't claim any positive results for it. That was our sincere conviction.

This year, the strategic reasons still exist. If the Soviet land based missile force were to continue to grow at the rate it has in recent years, the danger would, over a period of time, get very serious.

Actually, the President slightly understated the disparity that exists now. The Soviet Union has several hundred land based missiles more than we do. They are actually ahead in land based missiles by a not insubstantial margin, and they have the SS-9 for which we have no counterpart at all, with its tremendously large warhead.

The reason I said what I did was the development of the SALT negotiations themselves. It has become obvious during the course of the SALT negotiations that the one American development that the Soviets seem to be interested to stop, above all, was the ABM development. That is the area in which they have shown the greatest interest and the greatest flexibility.

Therefore, I am stating it simply as an empirical fact, one which we did not necessarily expect or predict, that rather than not do any damage it did some positive good, and this is a view that seems to be shared by all of our negotiators.

Now, the question is, will it really work. I have to tell you that when you hear opposing groups of scientists argue that case, you begin to worry about the perfect objectivity of the scientific community because both sides can make extraordinarily eloquent cases based on different assumptions. The fact of the matter, though, seems to be this to somebody looking at it from the outside.

The Soviet Union cannot possibly know how this system will work. One of the aspects of the defensive system is that the attacker cannot know how good the system is until he has tried it out, and he can't try it out without starting a general nuclear war.

So, from the point of view of deterrence, it can be quite effective.

Another thing that gives me reason to pause is that every scientist that I have talked to says that the Soviet system isn't much good and it is much worse than ours.

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Q May I direct this to Dr. Kissinger, please?

Our newspaper has been very sympathetic toward
the Administration on Vietnam, but there is one thing that
bugs me. After we withdraw our troops, assuming that Vietnami-
zation is successful, what do you think or what hard information
do you have to suggest that the Reds over there, North Vietnam,
China, so on, as they are now consolidating in Laos, will not
come right back in again? We won't go over there again, we
won't send 500,000 troops over there again. So if they
are in and smear the whole of South Vietnam again, we won't
do anything about it, and won't that look like an international
cop-out all through Asia? Have you anything on that, please?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no inherent reason. Of course,
if China comes in with a massive force, then we are in a new
situation. If China comes in with a massive force, it
won't be for South Vietnam; it will be for all of Southeast
Asia.

There is no point for China to come in in massive
force just to attack one country which is about 600 miles from
its frontier across difficult communication.

If China attacks all of Southeast Asia simultaneously,
then we face one of the situations of the Nixon Doctrine, namely
a nuclear country attacking non-nuclear countries. I don't
want to say flatly what we will do in these circumstances,
but that is a different case. Let's talk about the case of
North Vietnam.

I say there is no inherent reason -- except governmental morale, organization and political structure. After we have done everything we can to develop a governmental structure, after we have put them into the best possible shape that we can, and after we can tell ourselves in good conscience that we have done it in a way that is not a cop-out, if then, after five years, it turns out that they can't make it anyway, I think we are facing different consequences from the consequences of simply packing up and pulling out.

The evidence we have, which, I have to admit, is
always inconclusive in these circumstances, is this: Until
last year one would have to say that almost every program,
whatever their names were, pacification and so forth, they
have been very uncertain in their results. We have, as part
of the National Security Council, made a study of every single
province and the security situation in every single province,
on the theory that we cannot afford to kid ourselves, and
that we certainly cannot kid the North Vietnamese.

We had to know what the North Vietnamese were bound
to know, namely, what exactly the security situation is.

On the basis of that, we cannot maintain there is a
uniformly good security picture all over South Vietnam, but
there is a situation where in a considerable part of the
country it ought to be possible for the South Vietnamese
Army to resist the North Vietnamese Army and at the same time
maintain control over the population.

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In Cambodia, the South Vietnamese Army, to everybody's surprise, actually defeated the North Vietnamese Army whenever they fought against each other. So in a conventional war the South Vietnamese Army has now become quite good. How it will stand up in an indefinite period of this combination of guerrilla war and conventional war, in which the North Vietnamese specialize, whether it can develop enough of a governmental structure to maintain itself, that depends in part upon its own governmental morale.

But if the South Vietnamese develop and continue to develop the governmental vitality of which they are capable, then I think they have a reasonable chance. And if, in turn, Hanoi recognizes that it faces at least a protracted war, and at worse perhaps an indefinite and inconclusive one, then a situation may develop very similar to the Middle East, in which both parties decide that however much they may dislike each other, some sort of a modus vivendi has to be found. This is our best judgment of the situation as it stands today.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I think all of us would agree that the Nixon Doctrine is good and that it should be in effect all along, but that unfortunately it hasn't been.

In regard to that, you have stated that you still are hopeful of negotiations that will bring us a lasting peace, a lasting settlement, and yet you have said also that we have tried five times through conciliatory steps to win this negotiation, and that the North Vietnamese, because of the obstinacy and belief in the rightousness of their cause have refused to do anything and are still refusing to do anything.

The mood of the people in my area of Louisiana is not so much that we should end this war at all costs, but that we should end it honorably and not just write it off.

What we are anxious to know is this: If we continue to withdraw, are we, in effect, saying that we are writing off our investment of lives in Vietnam? What about the fate of the prisoners of war who, according to Victor Reisel, are now consigned to eating pumpkin stew and fish heads, 1500 of them?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me answer first, in part, and it is also relevent to the previous question -- part of my answer is also relevant to the previous question -- one of the results of the Cambodian operation has been that in III and IV Corps, that is, in the southern half of South Vietnam, the conventional war has, to all practical purposes, ended.

What is going on there now is a guerrilla war. The security situation in those two Corps areas is better than it has been at any time since 1964. The battles you read about in the newspapers are now in the northern part of South Vietnam, the areas that adjoin Laos, not in the ones that adjoin Cambodia.

This does not, of course, preclude their coming back over a period of time, although never again as easily as they did before, and never with the same security that

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