PRESS STATEMENT FOR GENERAL RELEASE

(Issued by the Continuing Committee of the Pugwash Conferences on
Science and World Affairs)

8 Asmara Road, London N. W. 2 England

11th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

Dubrovnik, 20-25 September 1963

Attachments: Message from President Kennedy
List of Participants

The 11th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs was held in Dubrovnik from 20-25 September 1963. These conferences bring together distinguished scientists from East and West for frank and informal discussions on important problems of common interest; particularly those related to the threat of nuclear war, the problem of achieving general and complete disarmament, and ways of ensuring the widespread application of science for peaceful purposes.

The Dubrovnik Conference was organized by the Continuing Committee of the Pugwash Conferences, of which the Secretary-General is Professor Joseph Rotblat of London, together with a Yugoslav Organizing Committee under the chairmanship of Professor Ivan Supek. The Conference was sponsored by the Council of Yugoslav Academies. Among the 64 participants from 24 countries there were 13 from the USA, 11 from the USSR, and 7 from the UK. In addition, there were 14 observers.

The main theme of the Conference was "Current Problems of Disarmament and World Security," and five Working Groups were formed to consider the following topics:

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1. Problems of General Disarmament.

2. Consequences of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.

3. Denuclearised zones, especially in Central Europe and the Balkans.

4. Role of Non-Aligned Nations in Disarmament and World Security.

5. The Partial Test-ban, the Problems of Detection, and the Next Steps.

The timing of the meeting, following so closely on the successful negotiation of a Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, was fortunate, and the friendly, co-operative and hopeful atmosphere of the discussions was immediately apparent to the participants. The reports of the Working Groups were substantial and showed that much progress had been made in reaching a common understanding on important practical issues, in giving consideration to clarifying different points of view, and in raising novel suggestions which can be studied and given further consideration at subsequent conferences.

## Prevention of Surprise Attack

In Working Group 1, two important proposals were made relating to the prevention of surprise attack in Central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact countries face each other. It is essential that both sides should assure themselves against surprise attack since this would make possible a mutual reduction of conventional defence forces, and eventually of nuclear forces also. It could thus greatly help in the creation of atom-free zones in Central Europe.

Firstly, it was suggested that rapid agreement might be obtained for establishing control posts at major transportation centres within agreed areas of Central Europe. These posts would give warning of any surprise attack which required the massing and transport of large numbers of conventional arms and forces. The control posts would be equipped with all necessary facilities for access and communication.

Secondly, it was suggested that military officers from each side should be stationed and should reside with the troops of the other side within the agreed areas. These officers would have adequate means of communication with their own governments. It was suggested that the details should be worked out by military experts of the countries concerned.

## Minimum Deterrent Force

The Group also discussed as a first step in disarmament the destruction of all nuclear delivery vehicles whatsoever, except for the creation of a minimum deterrent, or "umbrella," force which would be sufficient to deter, but not sufficient to allow an aggressor to wage a major thermonuclear war. It was thought that a very substantial number of vehicles could be eliminated in less than a year.

The Group agreed that during the period of disarmament, world security would have to be guaranteed by the umbrella forces of the USA and USSR alone. Most participants thought, however, that the adoption of a substantial measure of nuclear disarmament by these two major powers might be sufficient to persuade the other nuclear powers to forego their nuclear forces altogether, and so make it very difficult for any further country to enter the nuclear arms race.

## Control and Inspection

The Group agreed that control and inspection of the process of disarmament should be effected by a permanent International Disarmament Organisation enjoying all necessary privileges and powers. They state that the possibility that any power could cheat by evading inspection has been grossly exaggerated, but that the inspection system has not only to maintain security and prevent cheating, but also to alleviate the fears that cheating might occur. Since no inspection system can be perfect, greater efforts might profitably be made to devise machinery to deal openly with the doubts and fears which must inevitably arise from time to time. Inspection would also be eased if short-range tactical weapons could be drawn back from an atom-free zone between East and West.

## Limiting the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

In Working Group 2 several valuable contributions were made. First, that since the development of nuclear reactors in many countries might lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons, control of fissile materials should be made more effective, and the major powers should transfer their fissile materials through the International Atomic Energy Agency rather than, as is often now the case, through bilateral agreements; and that the IAEA should assume full control of such transfers.

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Further, to avoid the waste of manpower and resources by many small nations which would follow from the development of their own nuclear technology, international centres for peaceful nuclear technology, especially power-production, should be set up and should be organised along the lines of the present successful international centres for pure research. In such centres, all nations would be able to contribute and gain experience and skills on a common, open basis. The second contribution was an appraisal of the argument sometimes used to justify atomic bomb construction--that important scientific and technical forces are thus created for the strengthening of the industrial and economic capacity of a country. It was concluded that further bomb-production in our present circumstances, would be a grossly inefficient way of securing such technical and scientific advantages. They can be obtained much more economically by other methods.

As further steps for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the Group recommended that the security of countries which forego the construction of nuclear weapons should be guaranteed by the strengthening of the system of collective security, and that the Great Powers should accept a special responsibility for this within the framework of the UN. Such countries should also be supported by making available to them the scientific and technical knowledge which they might have gained from the production of nuclear weapons. The Group also agreed that some form of sanctions should be established against any power which undertakes the testing or production of atomic weapons, after a complete test-ban has been signed and a substantial measure of disarmament achieved.

## Atom-free Zones

In Working Group 3 there was a fruitful discussion about atom-free zones, and two specific recommendations were made. The first, to all Governments directly concerned in Central Europe, suggested that they should enter into negotiations leading to the lessening of tensions in the area and to the establishment of denuclearized Central Europe. The second proposed that the Governments of the Balkans, Africa and Latin America should conclude a treaty banning nuclear weapons from that part of the world and conforming to the U. N. Charter, with arrangements for international inspection.

Non-Aligned Nations
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Working Group 4 stressed the contribution which could be made by non-aligned nations by their renunciation of nuclear weapons, and by establishing atom-free zones as a contribution toward complete disarmament. The Group also suggested that the non-aligned nations, either individually or collectively, should set up institutes or groups for the study of the military, strategic and technological problems met in disarmament. Such institutes should maintain close contact with the various disarmament officials of individual states, and with the UN and its special agencies. Such action could allow the creation, in good time, of a competent body of personnel for the support of an International Disarmament Organisation.

Extending the Test-Ban
--------------------

Working Group 5 stressed the importance of early progress toward general disarmament in order that the international confidence generated by the Moscow Conference may be maintained. Even steps with no great military significance should be sympathetically considered since they may help in improving the political climate. The Group suggested that scientists should take every opportunity to influence public opinion so that the Test-ban Treaty shall be adhered to by all nations (including France and the People's Republic of China). It expressed the opinion that any further tests in the atmosphere, water, or outer space would not only increase radioactive fallout, but could also contribute to the breakdown of the Test-ban Treaty and to a further escalatory series of atomic tests.

To assist in extending the test-ban to include underground tests, the Group suggested that not only should the work of individual states on underground explosion and earthquake detection be continued and intensified; but also that international collaboration in this field should be established. A co-ordinated seismological programme, with full interchange of records of explosions and earthquakes, should be begun by the USA, USSR and UK, with other nations contributing later. Improved methods of detection would diminish the ambiguities in the interpretation of the seismic records and increase the precision with which the origins of such events can be established. In addition, an international seismological station, manned by specialists from different countries, could be established in a politically suitable and seismologically quiet area. Another recommended step which would have the effect of increasing international confidence was that a ban on orbiting nuclear weapons should be negotiated between the major powers.

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A.

PRESIDENT REQUESTS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE READ
TO CONFERENCE AT ITS OPENING:

"ONCE AGAIN I EXTEND MY WARM GREETINGS TO THE CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. YOU HAVE CONCERNED YOURSELVES WITH THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. IN THE WORLD OF THE INTERCONTINENTAL MISILE AND THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD, THESE PROBLEMS DEMAND THE ATTENTION AND DISCUSSION OF THE BEST MINDS IN ALL COUNTRIES.

SIGNIFICANT ADVANCES HAVE BEEN MADE SINCE YOUR LAST MEETING. WE NOW HAVE A RAPID AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MY COUNTRY AND THE SOVIET UNION AND, MORE IMPORTANT, WE HAVE SIGNED A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY WHICH WILL BRING ABOUT A CESSATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTING IN THE ATMOSPHERE, UNDER WATER, AND IN OUTER SPACE. ALTHOUGH THESE INITIAL STEPS ARE LIMITED, THEIR ACHIEVEMENT ENCOURAGES US TO LOOK FORWARD TO MORE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. IN YOUR CONFERENCE YOU WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITH EACH OTHER AND TO EXPLORE VARIOUS AVENUES FOR FURTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND OTHER MEANS OF REDUCING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THESE PROBLEMS ARE NOT SIMPLE, BUT PERSONALLY I HAVE THE FULLEST CONFIDENCE THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN FINDING NEW SOLUTIONS. PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD WANT TO LIVE IN PEACE, AND DEMISING A SYSTEM TO SECURE THIS GOAL IS A MAJOR CONCERN OF MY GOVERNMENT. MANY OF OUR BEST MINDS ARE ENGAGED WITH THIS PROBLEM, WORKING ON ALL LEVELS, TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC. YOUR UNOFFICIAL DELIBERATIONS WILL BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY BY THEM AS WELL AS BY MYSELF.

THE BROADER AND BETTER INFORMED IS PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES, AND THE MORE EVERY GOVERNMENT SHOWS ITS CONCERN WITH AND RESPONSE TO SUCH PUBLIC DISCUSSION, THE GREATER THE PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER AND BOLD STEPS IN DISARMAMENT THAT WILL ALLOW US SIGNIFICANTLY TO REDUCE THE DANGERS AND BURDENS OF THE ARMS RACE."

JOHN F. KENNEDY

FINAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE

A. PARTICIPANTS

Australia

Dr. J. W. Burton

Austria

Prof. H. Thirring

Brazil

Dr. W. Kerr

Bulgaria

Acad. G. Nadjakov

Canada

Dr. N. Z. Alcock

Czechoslovakia

Acad. V. Knapp

Denmark

Prof. O. M. Kofoed-Hansen

France

Father P. Dubarle

Dr. H. Marcovich

Mr. J. Moch

Prof. F. Perrin

German Democratic Republic

Prof. H. Barwich

Prof. G. Rienäcker

German Federal Republic

Mr. H. Afheldt

Prof. H. Rumpf

Ghana

Mr. D. K. Abbiw-Jackson

Greece

Dr. B. Dimissianos

Hungary

Prof. R. Bognar

India

Prof. M. G. K. Menon

Italy

Prof. A. A. Buzzati-Traverso

Netherlands

Prof. H. A. Tolhoek

Poland

Prof. L. Infeld

Prof. K. D. Lapter

Rumania

Acad. D. Dumitrescu

Sweden

Prof. A. Engström

Switzerland

Prof. K. P. Meyer

United Kingdom

Prof. P. M. S. Blackett

Sir John Cockeroft

Prof. B. H. Flowers

Rt. Hon. P. J. Noel-Baker

Sir Nevill Mott

Prof. C. F. Powell

Prof. J. Rotblat

United States

Prof. H. Brown

Prof. P. Doty

Prof. B. T. Feld

Prof. R. Fisher

Prof. D. A. Glaser

Prof. H. B. Glass

Dr. F. A. Long

Prof. M. Meselson

Prof. I. I. Rabi

Prof. E. Rabinowitch

Prof. A. Rich

Prof. M. Shulman

Prof. L. Szilard

U. S. S. R.

Acad. L. A. Artsimovitch

Acad. A. A. Arzumanjan

Acad. A. A. Blagonravov

Acad. N. N. Bogolubov

Prof. V. M. Khvostov

Acad. V. A. Kirillin

Mr. V. P. Pavlichenko

Prof. N. A. Talensky

USSR (continued)

Acad. A. N. Tupolev

Acad. A. P. Vinogradov

Prof. B. M. Yul

Yugoslavia

Acad. M. Bartós

Dr. D. Kanazir

Acad. A. Kuhelj

Leo Mates

I. Supek

B. OBSERVERS

Czechoslovakia

Mr. T. Nemec

Denmark

O. Maale

France

P. Genevey

German Democratic Republic

Dr. P. Hess

German Federal Republic

Prof. G. Burkhardt

Dr. E. Heimendahl

United Kingdom

B. T. Price

United States

Mrs. Ruth Adams

Prof. H. Kissinger

Mr. D. Lang

Yugoslavia

Prof. A. Moljk

UNESCO

Mr. W. A. Mills

Prof. Hla Tla

W. H. O.

Mr. M. Kaplan

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XI. (Adm) 10

## Members of the Conference

### France

Father P. Dubarle

35, Rue de la Glacieve, Paris 13

Dr. H. Marcovich

Institut Pasteur, 26 Rue d'Um, Paris ve

Mr. J. Moch

45 Allée de la Brêt, La Celle St.Cloud, Seine et Oise, France

Prof. F. Perrin

Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique, 69 Rue de Varenne,
B.P. 307, Paris 7

### German Democratic Republic

Prof. H. Barwich

Ulica Sovjetskaja 2/1. Dubha, USSR

Prof. G. Rienäcker

Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin W 8,
Otto Nuschke Str. 22/23

### German Federal Republic

Mr. H. Arfeldt

Hamburg - Blankenese, Strandweg 57

Prof. H. Rumpf

Karlsruhe, Hansjackobstr. 12

### Ghana

Mr. D.K. Abbiw-Jackson

38, Alexandra Park Road, London N. 10, England

### Greece

Dr. B. Dimissianos

23 Voucourestiou, Athens T. 134

### Hungary

Prof. R. Bogár

L. Kossuth University Debrecen

### India

Prof. M.G.K. Menon

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Colaba, Bombay 5

### Italy

Prof. A.A. Buzzati-Traverso

Caselca Postale 104, Napoli

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XI. (Adm) 10

## Members of the Conference

### Netherlands

Prof. H.A. Tolhoek
Physical Laboratory, Westersingel 34, Groningen
Dr. P. Valkenburgh
13 Droppings Veld, Groningen

### Poland

Prof. L. Infeld
Warsaw, Hoza 69

Prof. K.D. Lapter
Warsaw 12, Sandomierska 12 m 11

### Rumania

Acad. D. Dumitrescu
Bucharest, Strada Gaimatei Nr. 18, Raionul T. Vladimirescu

### Sweden

Prof. A. Engström
Karolinska Institutet, Stockholm

### Switzerland

Prof. K.P. Meyer
Institut für Angewandte Physik, Bern, Sidlerstrasse 5

### United Kingdom

Prof. P.M.S. Blackett
Imperial College, London S.W. 1

Sir John Cockcroft
Churchill College, Cambridge

Prof. B.H. Flowers
Dept. of Physics, The University, Manchester 13

Rt. Hon. P.J. Noel-Baker
16, South Eaton Place, London S.W.1

Sir Nevill Mott
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge

Prof. C.F. Powell
University of Bristol, Bristol

Prof. J. Rotblat
St. Bartholomew's Medical College, Charterhouse Square,
London E.C. 1

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XI. (Adm) 10

## Members of the Conference

### United States

Prof. H. Brown

California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California

Prof. P. Doty

Dept. of Chemistry, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Prof. B.T. Feld

Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Mass.

Prof. R. Fisher

Harvard Law School, Cambridge 38, Mass.

Prof. D.A. Glaser

Physics Dept., University of California, Berkeley 4, Cal.

Prof. H.B. Glass

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Maryland

Dr. F.A. Long

Cornell University, Dept. of Chemistry, Ithaca, N.Y.

Prof. M. Meselson

Prof. I.I. Rabi

Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.

Prof. E. Rabinowitch

University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.

Prof. A. Rich

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.

Prof. M. Shulman

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford 55, Mass.

Prof. L. Szilard

The Research Institutes, The Univ. of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.

### U.S.S.R.

Acad. L.A. Artsimovitch

Moscow, Leninsky Prospect 14

Acad. A.A. Arzumanjan

Moscow, Leninsky Prospect 13/6

Acad. A.A. Blagonravov

Moscow, Leninsky Prospect 14

Acad. N.N. Bogolubov

Moscow, Academy of Sciences

Prof. V.M. Khvostov

Moscow, Academy of Sciences

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XI. (Adm) 10

## Members of the Conference

Acad. V.A. Kirillin
Moscow, Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospect 13

Mr. V.P. Pavlichenko
Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Leninsky Prospect 14

Prof. N.A. Talensky
Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. A.N. Tupolev
Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospect, Moscow

Acad. A.P. Vinogradov
Moscow, Nab. Gorkogo 4/22 Kv. 10

Prof.B.M. Vul
Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospect 53, Physical Institute

## Yugoslavia

Acad. M. Bartoš
Belgrade, Palmotićeva 14

Dr. D. Kanazir
Belgrade, Gospodar Jevremova 14

Acad. A. Kuhelj
Ljubljana, Lepipot 11

Leo Mates
Politics and Economy, Belgrade, Makedonska 25

I. Supek
Zagreb, University of Zagreb, Marulićev Trg 19

## B. OBSERVERS

### Czechoslovakia

Mr. T. Nemec
Parizska 11, Praha 1

### Denmark

O. Maaløe
Copenhagen, Ahlmanns Alle 38, Hellerup

### France

P. Genvey
Sceaux, Seine, 2 Allée Bernadotte

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XI. (Adm) 10

## Members of the Conference

Dr. P. Hess

Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin, Berlin W 8

Otto Nuschke Str. 22/23

### German Federal Republic

Prof. G. Burkhardt

Hannover, Tizianstr. 5

Dr. E. Heimendahl

Bremen, Oberkenlander Str. 23

### United Kingdom

B.T. Price

Seers Bough, Wilton Lane, Jordans, Beaconsfield, Bucks

### United States

Mrs. Ruth Adams

Chicago 37, Illinois, 935 East 60th St.

Prof. H. Kissinger

Cambridge Mass., 6 Divinity Ave.

Mr. D. Lang

New York 36, N.Y., 25 West 43rd St.

### Yugoslavia

Prof. A. Moljk

Ljubljana, Janova 40

### UNESCO

Mr. W. A. Mills

Paris 7e, Place de Fontenoy, France

Prof. Eta Tha

Paris 7e, Place de Dontenoy, France

### W.H.O.

Mr. M. Kaplan

Geneva, World Health Organization, Switzerland

XI.WG. 1

Report of Working Group 1

PROBLEMS OF GENERAL DISARMAMENT

The Working Group affirmed its belief that the ultimate goal of disarmament, a goal to be reached within the shortest time compatible with world security, is general and complete disarmament. Nevertheless, it recognized that mutual mistrust was still at a high level, and it therefore considered that a number of preliminary steps might be taken which, by tending to create greater confidence, would ease the introduction of a comprehensive treaty. This was the general framework of our discussions regarding the abolition of delivery systems, the problems of inspection and control during the first stage, and the question of surprise attack.

A. Abolition of Delivery Systems

It is widely agreed that the first stage in disarmament should be achieved through the abolition of all nuclear delivery systems except for the creation of a minimum deterrent, or "umbrella" force under adequate control. This minimum level should be sufficient to deter, but not sufficient to enable an aggressor to wage a major war; and it was recognized that this minimum deterrent might need to be retained by the two major powers in order to maintain security beyond the end of the first stage.

We agreed that the examination of disarmament problems in the first stage is of exceptional importance and that this examination would be carried out within the framework of a single Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.

It was also suggested that a very substantial immediate reduction in nuclear delivery systems was essential, coupled with a halt in further production and the conversion of the fissile material so released to peaceful purposes. It was thought that this reduction, if agreed to, could be achieved in less than a year. If such a first step could be achieved, it was thought that a further reduction to minimum deterrent level could take place quite quickly. This suggestion was not generally agreed to, however.

Working Group 1

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XI. WG. 1

Opinions varied on what form the minimum deterrent should take as well as on its size. One proposal called for a force consisting only of long-range rockets with warheads of limited and agreed yield. At the opposite extreme was a proposal that in addition to a force of essentially invul-nerable long-range missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles should also be included.

We agreed that during the period of disarmament, world security would have to be guaranteed by the umbrella forces of the USA and the USSR alone. Most participants further believed that the adoption of a substantial measure of nuclear disarmament by the two major powers should be sufficient to persuade the UK and France to forego their respective nuclear forces altogether. This in itself would be a major contribution to world security since it would make it very difficult for any further country to enter the nuclear arms race.

We considered briefly the role of the so-called tactical nuclear weapons by which we meant weapons of short range and low yield to be deployed on the battlefield. It was generally agreed that they would play no part in the minimum deterrent force, from which it followed that they should be abolished in the first stage, or perhaps as a preliminary measure drawn from the East-West borders beyond an adequately controlled atom-free zone.

Finally, we discussed briefly the reduction in conventional forces over and above those required to maintain national security. The USA and the USSR have already agreed to a rough parity, and although there are problems in equating different kinds of forces, the remaining difficulties did not seem insuperable. However, it was stressed that no substantial reductions in the armed forces of the two major nuclear powers could reasonably be expected until other major powers, at present non-nuclear, were induced to disarm too.

## B. Inspection and Control in the First Stage

We consider that the function of control and inspection should be implemented from the beginning of disarmament by a permanent International Disarmament Organization invested with privileges and immunities necessary for efficient fulfillment of the functions assigned to it. It was generally acknowledged that the Organization would contain inspecting personnel selected on an international basis and enjoying all necessary privileges and immunities, and would have access to all reasonable information and facilities they required to verify the processes of destruction of delivery vehicles. In particular, they would be empowered to employ appropriate procedures for checking factories which seemed to them to warrant suspicion.

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Working Group 1

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XI.WG. 1

In the view of many of us, the International Disarmament Organization would have, in addition to its task of verification and inspection of the process of disarmament, the important duty of exercising control over the umbrella force. Several agents of the I.D.O. would, in this view, be attached to each unit of this force and would inspect it continuously.

We agreed unanimously that the problem of a power cheating and trying to retain or to build up a clandestine nuclear force has been grossly exaggerated, and we felt that the inspection system had not only to maintain security and prevent cheating, but also to alleviate present fears, resulting from mutual mistrust, that cheating might occur. Since no inspection system can be 100% effective, and so can never completely eliminate the possibility of non-compliance with the disarmament agreement, greater efforts might more profitably be made to devise machinery to deal with fears and doubts of non-compliance which must inevitably be expected to arise from time to time.

We were also briefly informed of a scheme of inspection by graduated access whereby there would exist only a low level of inspection and verification until the first stage of disarmament was well under way. The paper¹ on which this proposal was based was too closely reasoned for more than a superficial discussion, but many believed that it deserved further study.

Finally, it seemed clear that the problem of inspection and control in the earliest stages of disarmament could be eased if the so-called tactical weapons of short-range could be drawn back from an atom-free zone between East and West.

## C. Surprise Attack

Some proposals were presented during the work of our group which we believe merit the approval of the Conference as a whole. Our group unanimously stressed the importance of an agreement, to be achieved as rapidly as possible, for the establishment of control posts at major rail centers, highway junctions, airports and harbours, in an agreed region in which the NATO and Warsaw powers are confronting each other.

The purpose of the control posts would be to provide information necessary to warn of surprise attack requiring the massing and transport of large numbers of conventional arms and forces. It was generally agreed that the

1) Leonard S. Rodberg: Journal of Arms Control, Vol. 1, No 2, April 1963.

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Working Group 1

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XI. WG. 1

control post personnel should have appropriate status and skills and must be given the types of access and communication facilities necessary to perform their assigned task.

The boundaries of the region to be controlled would be sufficiently far back from the present lines of confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw powers so as to reduce any element of surprise from an attack launched from outside the controlled area.

We believe to be most valuable a further proposal, which goes beyond that of the control posts, that military officers from each side be stationed with the troops on the other side in the agreed areas. These officers would reside with the staffs of the forces to which they were assigned and would be assured adequate means of communication. The group fully agrees to this in principle, and suggests that detailed arrangements and limitations should be worked out by military experts of the countries concerned.

XI.WG.2

Final Report of Working Group 2

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In the present situation, where a partial test ban has been concluded, giving hope of early concrete steps towards disarmament, the extension of the number of states equipped with nuclear weapons would represent a serious retrograde step. It would greatly complicate the international situation and tend to undermine the recent growth in international confidence; it would increase world tension, add to the burden of armaments, and make war more probable.

The need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms is urgent, for every extension produces pressures in neighbouring countries for a similar capability. The problem of disarmament is already grave and any extension of the arms race multiplies the complications and difficulties.

The spread of nuclear weapons can come about by a state producing them independently with its own resources, or through their supply by other states. In the second case, the form of the proliferation may be widely different, ranging from the acquirement of an independent nuclear capability, to such devices as the multilateral nuclear force. In the transfer of nuclear weapons, there may be several forms and degrees of control exercised by a supplying state.

There are a number of areas where the spread of nuclear weapons would raise problems of particular urgency.

a) Europe.

In the tense and heavily armed region of Central Europe, an increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons would produce a situation of the utmost gravity. In particular, the acquirement of such weapons by Germany could be a potent cause of war. We believe that such a development ought to be firmly resisted by the maintenance of existing treaties or by ensuring that this principle is preserved in future agreements. The establishment of a multilateral force could itself lead to a proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we view it with anxiety since it could facilitate the acquirement of a nuclear capability by West Germany.

Working Group 2

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XI.WG.2

France's decision to develop thermo-nuclear weapons and not to adhere to the Moscow test-ban agreement makes it more difficult for the world to move towards a reduction of armaments. Among other reasons advanced to justify these decisions are considerations of fundamental scientific progress and industrial development. We believe it is possible to find much more effective methods, other than that provided by bomb production, for the development of such science and technologies and we set out our reasons for this view in the attached paper.

b) Eastern Asia.

The production of nuclear weapons by the People's Republic of China would be likely to stimulate several neighbouring states, at present without such weapons, such as Japan, India and Australia, to attempt to secure them. In the absence of our Chinese colleagues which we greatly regret, we have not attempted an analysis of the consequences of such a development. We urge the Continuing Committee to express to our Chinese colleagues the earnest hope that they will be strongly represented at the next Pugwash Conference at Udaipur.

We feel that the isolation of China from the community of nations is a factor which may contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; that this isolation of China is neither in her own interest nor in that of the world community. We therefore urge that China should take her place in the United Nations as soon as possible.

c) The Middle East

The politically explosive situation in the Middle East, particularly in the Arab-Israeli area, gives rise to a serious danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It could be prevented by an agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons or missiles to the area or to assist in their local production. Immediate action, based on the co-operation of the great powers with the states in this area, could, we believe, forestall a potentially very dangerous situation.

In order that the spread of nuclear weapons may be prevented, we believe that the following measures are necessary:

(i) The test ban should be made complete.

(ii) Substantial steps towards comprehensive disarmament. It will be difficult for the great powers to

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Working Group 2

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XI.WG.2

persuade others to forego nuclear weapons, if they
themselves have not reduced their own armaments.

(iii) Concrete steps to ensure the security of those states which forego the construction of nuclear weapons. Such steps include:

1. the guarantee of their security through the strengthening of the system of collective security. The great powers should accept a special responsibility within the framework of the United Nations for the security of those nations which have willingly foregone nuclear weapons.

2. making available the scientific and technical knowledge, which may be a by-product of the production of nuclear weapons, and which can be applied to peaceful industrial processes.

d) An agreement not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states should be negotiated. In this respect, atom-free zones would be a most important factor against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

e) In view of the over-riding importance of preserving world peace, some form of sanctions should be established against any power which undertakes the testing or production of atomic weapons, after a complete testban has been signed and a substantial measure of disarmament achieved.

The working group recommends to the conference that it should publicly ask our scientific colleagues in those states which have not yet adhered to the Moscow test ban treaty, to urge their peoples and governments that they should do so in the earliest future.

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XI.WG.2

Working Group 2

APPENDIX 1

INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
FOR THE PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The development of nuclear technology represents an investment expensive both in money and in trained manpower. Further, the development of centres of nuclear technology all over the world could be the basis of a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A. The working group therefore notes with warm approval the recent agreement for the extension of the supervisory responsibilities of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency over any fissionable materials which it has made available. It believes that this supervisory function should be strengthened. It suggests that the major powers should channel their transfer of fissionable materials through the Agency; and that IAEA should assume full control over the use of all fissionable materials transferred through its agency.

B. The working group also considers that it would be of great value to set up appropriate international centers. These could be under the International Atomic Energy Agency or could be bodies specially created, Such a center could carry out research and development in the field of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, particularly that of power production. They could be organized in a manner similar to that of the established international centers for high energy physics. They could include, for example, reactors of various designs, and equipment for isotope production.

Centers of nuclear technology of this type would enable all nations to contribute and benefit on a common, open basis in the development of this important but expensive area. They would remove the need for each state to set up equivalent facilities of its own. If the need for the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes arises, however, they should only be conducted by international collaboration under the auspices and control of UNO.

APPENDIX 2

BY-PRODUCTS OF ATOMIC BOMB DEVELOPMENT

Development of an atomic bomb is not an effective way for a country to improve its scientific, technical and industrial strength. Direct government support of research in science and industrial technique is a much cheaper and more efficient method for economic and industrial development which has great educational and other advantages.

# I. APPLICATIONS OF ATOMIC EXPLOSIVES

## A) Applications of Atomic Explosions in Scientific Research

There are several fields of science in which atomic explosives may be useful. These include studies of the propagation of seismic waves and the geological structure of the earth, properties of extraterrestrial radiation belts, experiments in nuclear physics, particularly using neutrons, and studies of high temperature and high pressure phenomena.

## B) Industrial Applications of Atomic Explosives

It has been suggested that atomic explosions may be useful in converting coal into oil underground, in constructing canals and harbours, and for some other earth-moving projects.

None of these projects requires a costly independent redevelopment of atomic bombs since existing bombs are adequate and can presumably be made available for worthwhile applications, under suitable international arrangement and safeguards.

Very few new scientific results were obtained in the development of military atomic explosives that were not already learned in the development of nuclear reactors. Those few results are already publicly available and scientists do not expect that new independent bomb projects are likely to contribute much to science, especially on bomb projects being carried out by small countries already burdened by the great cost of developing the bomb for military uses. It is, therefore, very difficult to justify undertaking to produce atomic bombs because of the hope that scientific or technical discoveries might be made.

XI.WG.3

Report of Working Group 3

DENUCLEARIZED ZONES, ESPECIALLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE
AND THE BALKANS

INTRODUCTION

A denuclearized zone is understood to be a
clearly defined area where

(i) existing nuclear weapons and medium and long-range missiles for their delivery have been removed; and

(ii) no production, acquisition, stockpiling and testing of nuclear weapons takes place.

Denuclearization may be reached either in one stage or by a series of stages, agreed upon by the states of the zone and by nuclear powers, especially those which are allies of one or more states in the denuclearized zone.

The creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world would be useful in promoting peaceful relations for the following reasons:

(i) it would help to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and consequently the danger of nuclear war;

(ii) it would relieve international tensions, and help to build a climate of opinion that would facilitate general and complete disarmament; and

(iii) it would provide experience in matters of inspection that would be exceedingly useful in later steps toward general and complete disarmament.

The formation of denuclearized zones constitutes a limited step toward general and complete disarmament. Perhaps such zones cannot even be maintained indefinitely if no further steps toward general and complete disarmament are taken.

Working Group 3

XI.WG.3

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The usefulness of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world varies with the regions. In some parts of the world, where there is no great tension, the advantage lies in a contribution to improvement of the psychological climate favouring disarmament. In other parts of the world where strong political tensions exist and where nuclear weapons are already located, the advantage would be greatest and a considerable détente could be expected. We believe that the formation of various denuclearized zones of the former sort would help to create an improved atmosphere of mutual trust; and that preliminary steps toward formation of those of the second type can now be made, unilaterally or multilaterally, that would lessen the engagement of the major nuclear powers and diminish the probability of escalation to nuclear war.

## A DENUCLEARIZED ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE

### 1. Avoidance of Unilateral Advantage

Any treaty for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe should satisfy the requirement that no appreciable one-sided military advantage would result for either bloc (NATO or Warsaw Pact).

This condition can be satisfied for the Central European Zone (containing the German Federal Republic, German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, together with whatever adjoining states might adhere) provided the following points are contained in the treaty:

i) The adhering countries will not be obliged to abandon their present military alliances (NATO or Warsaw Pact);

ii) The existing line dividing the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries of the zone, including free access to West Berlin, will be guaranteed against change by force through pledges of the countries of the proposed zone, the present nuclear powers, and the United Nations;

iii) The conventional armed forces of the nations of the zone will be reduced by the treaty to an agreed level;

iv) The denuclearization treaty will contain clauses to permit a further reduction of conventional forces.

It is to be hoped that conventional forces of the present nuclear powers situated in the zone will by mutual

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XI.WG.3

A denuclearized zone in the Balkans was given special consideration. It was defined as including Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, European Turkey and Yugoslavia. To the establishment of such a denuclearized zone the West would probably raise no objections, since MRBM's have been withdrawn from Greece and Turkey.

Difficulties may be anticipated, because of the attitudes of the governments of Albania, Greece, and Turkey. If, however, the proposal meets the support of the governments of the USA and USSR, these problems might be solved.

We have considered the declarations of governments in Africa and Latin America that they would not acquire nuclear weapons. Such declarations should be unified through treaty, conforming to the U.N. Chapter, and agreement should entail a certain international inspection. We propose that the Eleventh Pugwash Conference should appeal to the governments of Africa and Latin America to conclude such a treaty. Reduction of conventional armaments should also be considered.

## RELATION TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

We do not consider the formation of denuclearized zones as a final goal, but as a step towards general and complete disarmament. However wide the extent throughout the world of denuclearized zones involving non-nuclear powers, there remains the vital problem of disarmament within the territories of the present nuclear powers.

An extension of the concept of denuclearized zones to embrace biological and chemical weapons would be highly desirable, though it entails serious problems of inspection. Reduction of conventional armaments must also be effected. Yet the formation of various denuclearized zones, which can be achieved more quickly and more certainly, would promote general disarmament by creating a greatly improved atmosphere of mutual trust.

This must be one of our first steps toward peace.

## RESOLUTIONS

(1) The Eleventh Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs urges all Governments directly concerned with the situation in Central Europe to enter into negotiations leading to the lessening of tensions in this area and to the establishment of a denuclearized Central Europe.

XI. WG. 4

Report of Working Group 4

ROLE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT AND WORLD SECURITY

The activities of the non-aligned nations in connection with disarmament are well known, and most of their governments are continually watchful of opportunities to assist in reducing world tensions. Additional steps will be determined by the course of events, and therefore any significant contributions in the future will depend on developments and opportunities arising in a fast-changing world, and in particular on developments in the attitudes of major powers on specific questions relevant to the advancement of general disarmament. The contributions that the non-aligned nations will be able to make will also depend on increased technical knowledge necessary to enable them to carry out the responsibilities that might contront them in a disarming or in a disarmed world.

In this perspective the following viewpoints emerged:

1. A great number of scientists from non-aligned nations should be invited to participate in Pugwash discussions. The group was aware of attempts which had been made by the Continuing Committee to accomplish this, and recommends that each of the non-aligned nations be acquainted with the nature and objectives of the Pugwash Movement, and the desirability of providing foreign exchange and in other ways facilitating attendance by scientists invited to conferences by the Continuing Committee of Pugwash.

2. The non-aligned and other nations that have not already done so are urged to sign the agreement for the partial test ban, to affirm their support for a com-

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XI. WG. 4

prehensive test ban, to affirm their opposition to the
spread of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass
destruction, and to affirm their determination never to
possess them.

3. The non-aligned nations could assist in bringing about a complete test ban by establishing their own appropriate seismographic stations, manned by their own technical personnel.

4. Nuclear free zones were not within the scope of inquiry of Group Four; however, the Group wishes to record its view that the establishment of nuclear free zones in regions containing non-aligned nations would be a substantial step toward complete disarmament and deserves intensive study, and even the calling of special regional Pugwash conferences. Scientists from these regions might be asked to take the initiative in the convening of such conferences.

5. It is recognized that the problems of disarmament have become increasingly complex. It is recommended that the non-aligned nations, individually or jointly, set up groups or institutes to study the military-strategic-technological problems of disarmament. Furthermore it is recommended that such institutes specifically undertake studies and training programs in the fields of international inspection and control. For these purposes, such non-aligned study groups or institutes should be in close touch with the various national disarmament officials, and with the United Nations and its specialized agencies, so that studies undertaken may be both realistic and useful to the negotiating officials of the various countries concerned.

The Group recommends to the Continuing Committee that it canvass members of the Pugwash Movement and inform governments wishing to establish or to develop such institutes of scientists able to assist.

The Group recommends that means of increasing the technical and scientific knowledge required for successful disarmament negotiations, be an item on the agenda of the next Pugwash Conference, and that scientists from non-aligned nations be asked in advance to consider the matter.

6. The developing countries have a special interest in the economic aspects of disarmament. At the Ninth Pugwash Conference it was recommended that each country analyse in detail the consequences of disarmament to its own economy.

The Group is not aware of any widespread response to this recommendation, and therefore wishes to

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XI. WG. 4

stress the importance of such studies, and requests the
distribution of the results of any national studies.

7. These specific courses which non-aligned nations might pursue could separately and in the aggregate, in certain circumstances, tip the balance in favour of disarmament or reduced tensions; however, a major contribution non-aligned nations can make is in being non-aligned, extending areas outside the scope of alliances, and creating not another economic or political group, but an international relationship resting upon mutual respect for sovereign integrity and upon regional and functional co-operation.

8. The nuclear nations have each affirmed the principle that there should be no interference in the affairs of other nations, and each is aware of the reduction of tensions which to a certain extent results from progressively extending areas of non-alignment. The Group believes that major powers would be pursuing their own interests, and the interests of world peace, if they did nothing which prevented the desire of national independence being expressed in policies of non-alignment.

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XI.WG.5

measures which actually address themselves to the central problems of disarmament and the establishment of a stable peace.

## The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The attitude of the Governments of France and the People's Republic of China, refusing to sign the Treaty banning nuclear tests, is in sharp contrast with the tendency towards an improvement in international relations manifested at the present time. We believe all scientists and their institutions should avail themselves of all the opportunities (especially press, radio, and television) to influence public opinion, so that the Governments of France and the People's Republic of China might reconsider their attitude.

We believe that further agreements in the field of disarmament may lead to a detente in Europe, and that under these conditions it may become easier for France to reconsider her decision and join the other nations in adhering to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The resulting worldwide decrease in tension may also have favourable impact on the decision of the People's Republic of China.

Any further atomic explosions in the atmosphere, water or in outer space should be severely condemned as an act directed against the interests of all mankind. The danger resulting from such an atomic explosion is not limited to an increase in the quantity of radioactive fallout. Such an explosion could lead to a breakdown of the Treaty agreement which we have now attained and may mean the beginning of a new series of atomic tests.

## A Joint Study in Seismology

Working Group 5 was unanimous in believing that the Test Ban Treaty should be extended as soon as possible to ban all underground nuclear explosions.

To help the negotiations to this end, we believe that work on the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes should be continued and intensified and that international collaboration in that field should be increased.

We recommend that a coordinated program of seismological study should be undertaken from the US, UK and USSR, in the first instance, directed towards improving the de-

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XI. WG. 5

tection and identification of underground explosions and earthquakes by long-range seismological stations and possibly by unmanned seismological stations. Arrangements should be made for interchange of records of explosions and earthquakes and the nations involved should consider the possibility of joint operation of a seismological station incorporating the most advanced techniques and situated in a politically suitable and seismologically quiet area. It would be highly desirable if other nations would also join in this co-operative project.

## A Ban on Orbiting Nuclear Weapons

Among steps which require a minimum of negotiation, and which may help to slow down the arms race, the group recommended a declaration by the heads of state of the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations that they will not place nuclear weapons in orbiting satellites. Such weapons would greatly increase the atmosphere of fear in the world, even though they have no great military value. A declaration of this type would be in the spirit of the Test Ban Treaty, and would be a demonstration to people of all countries that the nuclear powers are determined to take effective steps to slow down the arms race.

## Scientific Co-operation

Among developments which could significantly improve the climate of international relations, and thus facilitate progress towards disarmament, the group laid particular weight on growing international cooperation in pure and applied science, and the freeing of the exchange of scientists from the present burden of restrictive regulations.

The group welcomes the statements in the speech of President Kennedy to the United Nations, on September 21, which represented a renewed demonstration of increasing importance attached by political leadership to constructive international cooperation in science.

The group noted with satisfaction that many of the currently discussed plans for international scientific co-operation dealt with matters first suggested or emphasized in the Seventh Pugwash Conference at Stowe, Vermont, in September 1961. This includes the already agreed upon as well as the newly proposed forms of cooperation in space, plans for a world medical and biological research centre, broadening of the US - USSR exchange of scientists, coordination of efforts to penetrate the earth's crust as well as some other programs. The group hopes that other proposals

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XI. WG. 5

included in the report of the Stowe Conference, will also gain the attention of several governments. It believes that the Pugwash movement should follow its successful initiative in this field in designing its future program of conference and study groups.

The forthcoming conference in Udaipur, India, in particular, could provide an appropriate setting for the discussion of possible forms of East-West cooperation in certain aspects of technical, medical and scientific assistance to the development of new nations.

## Control of the Distribution of Fissile Materials

Since the first step has now been taken to limit the development of nuclear weapons, the role played by the production and distribution of fissile isotopes from which these weapons are made deserves serious examination.

The problem of possible diversion of fissile isotopes from power reactors to weapons use is rapidly assuming a new magnitude. Production of fissile material in nuclear power technology now surpasses that for weapons use. Thus the essential material base for nuclear bomb production is arising at many points throughout the world. The safeguards devised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would provide an objective check on the possible diversion of fissile material for weapons use. However, the use of this procedure has been by-passed or not applied in the setting up of almost all reactors. This is due to the preference of the countries involved for bilateral arrangements; and with these have come great variations in safeguard procedures.

With the rapid growth of nuclear power reactors, little time is left to establish a pattern of responsible use that would provide protection to all countries against the diversion of plutonium to nuclear weapons. We therefore recommend that the Governments concerned undertake to replace the bilateral agreements now existing with safeguards administered by IAEA and that future reactors and their associated plutonium separation plants be subjected to similar procedures.

This turn of events would bring to the IAEA the role originally envisaged for it and would greatly strengthen this essential agency.

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XI. WG. 5

# A Security Guarantee Against the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and its hoped-for extension to include underground tests may lead us into a period in which many nations will have renounced the manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons. This will be a highly desirable development as the nuclear powers attempt to achieve substantial disarmament. In this period, therefore, states should be given an incentive to renounce nuclear weapons of their own by being assured of protection against nuclear threats and nuclear aggression by others.

* We have discussed means of providing such security. We have agreed upon some general features which this security guarantee must possess. It must enjoy the support of the major nuclear powers and they must act in concert but it should be accomplished through the United Nations. It must be convincing both to the protected states and to the would-be users of nuclear weapons. It must be desired by the protected states as well as the world community in general.

Although we agree on these points, we realize that the detailed arrangement necessary to achieve their realization is a subject of considerable complexity and we have not attempted to produce a detailed proposal.

PRESS STATEMENT FOR GENERAL RELEASE (NO EMBARGO)

The Dubrovnik Conference was organized by the Continuing Committee of the Pugwash Conferences, of which the Secretary-General is Professor Joseph Rotblat of London, together with a Yugoslav Organising Committee under the chairmanship of Professor Ivan Supek. The Conference was sponsored by the Council of Yugoslav Academies. Among the 64 participants from 24 countries there were 13 from the USA, 11 from the USSR, and 7 from the UK. In addition there were 14 observers.

The main theme of the Conference was "Current Problems of Disarmament and World Security", and five Working Groups were formed to consider the following topics: -

The timing of the meeting, following so closely on the successful negotiation of a Nuclear Test-ban Treaty, was fortunate, and the friendly, co-operative and hopeful atmosphere of the discussions was immediately apparent to the participants. The reports of the Working Groups were substantial and showed that much progress had been made in reaching a common understanding on important practical issues in giving consideration to clarifying different points of view, and in raising novel

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## Minimum Deterrent Force

The Group also discussed as a first step in disarmament the destruction of all nuclear delivery vehicles whatsoever, except for the creation of a minimum deterrent, or "umbrella", force which would be sufficient to deter, but not sufficient to allow an aggressor to wage a major thermonuclear war. It was thought that a very substantial number of vehicles could be eliminated in less than a year.

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Control and Inspection

The Group agreed that control and inspection of
the process of disarmament should be effected by a per-
manent International Disarmament Organization enjoying all
necessary privileges and powers. They state that the pos-
sibility that any power could cheat by evading inspection
has been grossly exaggerated, but that the inspection
system has not only to maintain security and prevent cheat-
ing, but also has to alleviate the fears that cheating might
occur. Since no inspection system can be perfect, greater
efforts might profitably be made to devise machinery to
deal openly with the doubts and fears which must inevitably
arise from time to time. Inspection would also be eased
if short-range tactical weapons could be drawn back from
an atom-free zone between East and West.

In Working Group 2 several valuable contributions
were made. First, that since the development of nuclear
reactors in many countries might lead to a proliferation
of nuclear weapons, control of fissile materials should be
made more effective, and the major powers should transfer
their fissile materials through the International Atomic
Energy Agency rather than, as is often now the case, through
bilateral agreements; and that the IAEA should assume full
control of such transfers. Further, to avoid the waste of
manpower and resources by many small nations which would
follow from the development of their own nuclear technology,
international centres for peaceful nuclear technology,
especially power-production, should be set up and should
be organised along the lines of the present successful
international centres for pure research. In such centres,
all nations would be able to contribute and gain experience
and skills on a common, open basis. The second contribution
was an appraisal of the argument sometimes used to justify
atomic bomb construction - that important scientific and
technical forces are thus created for the strengthening
of the industrial and economic capacity of a country. It
was concluded that further bomb-production in our present
circumstances, would be a grossly inefficient way of
securing such technical and scientific advantages. They
can be obtained much more economically by other methods.

COPY of a letter from Dr. Paul Doty to Academician Arzumanyan
dated September 23, 1963.

Dubrovnik

September 23, 1963

Dear Academician Arzumanyan,

We are glad to accept your suggestion of postponing our
first meeting until January. It will give both of our groups
more time to prepare and make use of the interchange that we
have had at this meeting. We would like to suggest that the
meeting begin on January 5 in Cambridge and follow the Sche-
dule that had been planned, that is, a two week meeting followed
by a visit to Washington or elsewhere. This would still leave
time to reach New Delhi for those going to the Pugwash meeting.

You will recall that we had agreed in the London and Moscow
discussions that the study should revolve about a core of natu-
ral scientists and that they should constitute at least half of
the groups. Your list of participants indicates that you wish
to depart from this. After discussing the matter again with my
colleagues we find no reason to depart from the original agree-
ment. It seems to us still best to begin our work with strong
emphasis on disarmament problems with a heavy technical compon-
ent so that political differences will not arise before we have
reached a degree of understanding that will enable us to cope
with them. In addition, it gives our effort the advantage of
building on the close acquaintance that natural scientists have
as a result of common interests in purely scientific areas.

Therefore we hope that with the extra time available before
January you will be able to adjust the composition of your group
by enlargement or otherwise, so that it will be consistent with
our original agreement. Otherwise it would seem to us that a
central feature of our plan would have been lost at the outset.

With the extra time available we hope that both sides will
be able to prepare some papers for discussion and perhaps choose
articles such as the one by Buchan, if that suits, for a seminar-
type discussion. We will have some further details of our plans
ready when you and Kirillin attend the Centennial Celebration in
Washington next month.

Letter from Dr. Doty to Arzumanyan

September 23, 1963

Page two

I enclose a little book that may be of interest profession-
ally. It was all that I could find in the haste of leaving. I
shall be leaving early Wednesday morning. Shulman will be here
another day if you wish to discuss these matters further.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Committee on International Studies of Arms Control

Notes on the Meetings of September 14, 15 in Washington D. C.

Present on Saturday, September 14:

Doty

Brennan

Frisch

Kissinger

Shulman

Sohn

Cavers

Rostov

Fletcher

Dickey

Brown

Higonnet

Ambassador Thompson and Adrian Fischer were present by invitation during part of the meeting.

Present on Sunday, September 15, 1963:

Doty

Brennan

Frisch

Shulman

Sohn

Cavers

Fletcher

Dickey

Rabi

Long

Brown

Higonnet

Messrs. John Mc Naughton and George Rathjens were present by invitation during part of the meeting.

There appeared to be a consensus on the following:

I. Agenda and procedure for the meeting with the Soviets.

A. Although a wider framework of discussion would be desirable, the agenda proposed to Arzumanyan (with possible modifications of detail--See G. Below) will serve if the Soviets prefer to proceed on that basis. The functional approach which would begin by identifying common hazards could be used as a framework for our presentations.

B. Important matters such as the generalities of the inspection problem can be raised collaterally in discussion of the items to be submitted under #1 (Measures to relieve international tension).

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or in discussion of other numbered items. Proposals for a separable first stage would be discussed under #2 (GCD etc.).

C. There was general agreement on the desirability of discussing the domestic implications in the US and the Soviet Union of such measures as the partial test ban. This would afford an opportunity to explain what we think the testimony in Congress means and to give the Soviets a sense of the apprehensions that are part of the political life of this country.

D. There was wide agreement that a seminar type of discussion on the broader implications of the present strategic balance would be fruitful. Buchan's *Encounter* articles might be a good basis for such discussion, it being understood that the US participants do not necessarily subscribe to all of Buchan's views.

E. To keep the agenda manageable, we should propose that each side submit only one topic under #1 (Measures to relieve international tension). Ours would be in the political-social field and would probably be concerned with the development of a common approach to the problems of peace keeping and settlement of disputes in areas where there is recognition by both sides of common hazards. As a practical matter, this probably would be limited to non-great power disputes.

F. There was apparent agreement that the first session with the Soviets should be kept relatively informal, that meetings should perhaps be scheduled only in the mornings, and that there should be maximum opportunity for private, personal conversation between members of the two sides.

G. There was an evident consensus on the desirability of rephrasing the formulation of certain items in the agenda proposed to Arzumanyan. The agenda would thus read as follows:

1. Measures to relieve international tension: with each side proposing one item in the military-technical or one in the political-social area.

2. General and complete disarmament: with special emphasis on how the process of achieving it will be affected by the non-adherence of some nations.

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3. & 4. Two or more of the following:

a. Prohibition of nuclear weapons in orbit.

b. The relation of antiballistic missiles to the disarmament process.

c. The danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

d. Cessation of production of nuclear material and/or delivery vehicle production and related problems of verification.

II. Substantive preparation on the US side.

A. It was agreed that a background paper would be needed for discussion of the item: "Relation of antiballistic missiles to the disarmament process." Fletcher was urged to be prepared to undertake the preparation of such a paper in the event that the Soviets agreed to discuss the item. The paper would be based on public materials and would include an analysis of the bearing of AICBM on the stability of a minimum deterrent.

B. Mrs. Lall will be asked to continue to work on her paper on proliferation, eliminating the general sections of the first draft and focusing more sharply on the essentials of the problem of proliferation.

III. Participants other than the US and USSR.

A. The concept of "national delegations" should be avoided. The tradition of the type of meeting we contemplate has not been sufficiently established to bear the weight of national delegations without compromising the open character of the discussions. The emphasis should be on the quality of the individual participant and what he has to contribute. Although a restricted bilateral conference of intellectuals is in important respects objectionable, our meetings must be kept small. There is no perfect solution, but the best course will be to start on a bilateral basis and then explore the possibility of inviting others as individuals, not as national representatives.

B. The possibility of establishing corresponding discussion groups with the British and Western Europeans might also be worth exploring. In the case of France, the approach might be through the French Academy. Such discussion might be tied to the US-USSR study group or be independent of it.

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## IV. U. S. Participants

The slate of US participants for any particular meeting should be kept flexible until the agenda is known. Doty should review the situation and invite the participants who seem to him most suitable in the light of the topics to be discussed.

## DISCUSSION

In general this appears to be a favorable time to initiate the kind of dialogue that we contemplate. There are pressures-- economic and political, domestic and foreign (China)--on the USSR to improve relations with the West. Our problem is to make the Soviets understand that improvement requires agreement on substantive measures and not merely symbolic steps toward détente. We must try to direct their attention to the real causes of tension, not the symptoms. An obvious difficulty is that in the Soviet view instability is a condition which they can exploit, to advantage. On the other hand, they rightly fear escalation, and Cuba has reinforced this fear. We must recognise that this process of learning must be part of their self-education. Cuba, de-Stalinization, China and Western resistance to pressure on Berlin have become part of their own experience. We must seek a way to cast what we have to say to them in this framework of self-education. Western polemics will not be persuasive.

Our approach should be in the perspective of what might be possible in a period of years. This will involve talking about matters that politically are not now negotiable. One preliminary problem is to "plug into" a projection of future possibilities which is responsible and realistic in terms of the facts of US politics.

What is the best way to lead into a discussion with the Soviets of procedure for settlement of disputes and peace-keeping and the strengthening of international institutions? It was recalled that at the Hanover Conference, individual Soviet participants had shown great enthusiasm for Grenville Clark's presentation, but their formal position was that, before such proposals could be seriously discussed, the world must pass through a period when national societies achieve independence and speak for themselves. Much has happened since then and many new states have appeared on the world stage. A way to begin might be to ask the Soviets whether they think the situation has sufficiently matured to permit such discussions.

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Against this, it was suggested that we should avoid issues
with a heavy ideological component, which would only make it dif-
ficult for the Soviets to get down to cases. Long range propo-
sals for world order will conflict with basic Soviet concepts and
provoke an ideological reaction. Likewise, such questions as
whether this is an age of diminishing colonialism will be seized
by the Soviets to press us on Angola, South Africa etc. On the
other hand, it may be possible to talk profitably with them about
peace-keeping mechanisms that might be used to damp down the inter-
mediate range of conflicts not directly involving the great powers
or their chief allies. A way to initiate such a discussion would
be to point to the hazards of escalation then to move to the ques-
tion of what mechanisms (UN or other) might be used to prevent es-
calation. A relevant point would be the need for financial support
of UN peace-keeping operations. This could be presented to the
Soviets as the sort of substantive measure which is required if
there is to be a real reduction of tension.

Another approach would be to propose a series of case studies
of areas of tension such as the Middle East and India-Pakistan. It
was suggested that we should divide peace-keeping into its various
components. There is the ultimate question of establishing an in-
ternational force. This is the most difficult, and discussion of
it with the Soviets at this stage would be fruitless. Discussion
of intermediate dispute settling would be more feasible. In this
area there are many problems involving the danger of escalation,
and it should be possible to discuss some of them on the basis of
common interests. We could then explore whether UN or some other
machinery could be made effective. If we get the stock reply
that the machinery already exists in the Security Council, we
might raise the question of abandoning the veto on questions con-
sidered under Chapter VI of the Charter (Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes).

It was suggested that US-Soviet tensions are the important
thing and that it would be a mistake to adopt an approach which
would exclude them. A better way would be to list the kinds of
conflicts that one can conceive of and then to talk about the
kinds of machinery or procedures that might be effective in dealing
with them. A basic question would be: Are there any disputes
with respect to the settlement of which new institutional arrange-
ments can be developed?

It was urged that our discussions should not be confined
to the development of new mechanisms and formal institutional
arrangements. We are dealing with a range of problems in the

Minutes

Page five

solution of which custom may be more important than positive
law. We must not overlook what can be done unilaterally and the
ways in which the unilateral measures of both sides can interact
over a period of time to create a set of customary procedures
stronger and more effective than untested formal enactments.
(It was pointed out that discussion of the broad question of
custom versus positive law might also raise ideological issues
that are better avoided.)

The following formulation was suggested as a possible approach and was discussed at length:

1. "Fishing rights in troubled waters."

2. Political disputes between new states and their impact on relations between the great powers.

3. Development of a common approach to the settlement of international disputes.

a. Categories of such disputes (it being important to distinguish between disputes directly involving the great powers and lesser disputes where there might be a common interest in avoiding such involvement).

b. Means of settling them.

4. Removal of the veto in the Security Council with respect to disputes involving states other than the great powers and their allies.

5. Measures to be taken by the US and the Soviet Union to prevent escalation of disputes between other nations into conflicts between the two of them.

Discussion of Proliferation

Discussion of proliferation proceeded from the assumption
that here the US and USSR clearly have a common interest. China
and France are the problem for the 1960's; other nations may enter
the picture in the 1970's. There was lengthy discussion of the
problems of inspection in this context. Can inspection work?
Where and under what circumstances will it be needed? What should
be the composition of the inspectorate? A distinction was drawn
between areas where joint US and Soviet participation would be

[L]

Minutes

Page six

necessary and those where it would be unnecessary and perhaps even undesirable. In certain regions, an agreement not to admit or produce nuclear weapons could provide for inspection by the nations of the region themselves. A more important requirement might be the establishment of a regional consensus, a political and psychological climate that would render the introduction of nuclear weapons pointless and even inexpedient. The possibilities and some of the problems of nuclear free zones in Latin America, Africa and the Middle and Far East were canvassed. The point was emphasized that Nuclear Free Zones are more feasible in areas where questions of the balance of power are not involved and where the more difficult problems of inspection do not arise.

It was recalled that history offers little grounds for confidence in the efficacy of inspection. The build-up of German force in the post-Versailles period and North Korean deployment in violation of the Korean Armistice agreement were cited. Against this, it was argued that the problem in these instances was not one of determining the facts. The world knew what was going on. What was lacking was the will to do something about it.

A major portion of the discussion of proliferation centered on the possibility of developing a system of incentives and controls in the framework of the IAEA. Here we might work with the Soviets to build on what we have. The chances of political acceptance would thus be maximized. There were recent signs of potentially important modifications in the Soviet position on inspection of facilities. There was of course a long way between this and agreement to destroy facilities used in violation of agreements. Moreover, bi-lateral arrangements for the transfer of nuclear materials were numerous and were beyond the reach of the agency. There were also problems of the composition and quality of the IAEA inspectorate. Despite these considerations, it was felt that the coming general meeting of the IAEA in Vienna would bear watching for new possibilities of a break through.

## Weapons Reduction

There was discussion of the possibilities of weapons reduction (either by destruction or transfer to peaceful purposes) and cutoffs in production of weapons material and/or delivery vehicles. The first raised problems of inspection and verification in their most difficult form. Reasonably adequate monitoring of a production cutoff, on the other hand, was technically feasible. Inspection of a limited number of main industrial complexes and transportation arteries would do the job. Quite apart from the question

[Lc]

## Minutes

Page seven

of inspection, however, a cutoff would be politically difficult if not impossible for the US in the present climate. On the other hand, it was not inconceivable that economic pressures and other factors would cause the Soviets to move unilaterally toward a cutoff of production of nuclear weapons materials (and this would have an impact on the political climate in the US). Through re-fabrication of existing weapons, it would continue to be possible to exploit technological advances in weaponry. The Soviet military would probably offer strong objections to a cutoff in delivery vehicle production.

**Budgetary controls** of a production cutoff were discussed. There was skepticism of their effectiveness as a check on Soviet performance. Without inspection, they would be meaningless. It was pointed out that the technical possibilities of detecting false returns in records inspection have not been fully investigated and may be quite high. An important feature of such controls is that they would involve contact with only a relatively limited number of Soviet officials of a type that the Soviet government might not be unwilling to expose to foreign influence.

## Germany

There was some discussion of **Germany** as the key political issue between the US and USSR. If this could be settled, other things would fall into line. Without a settlement here, we live in the presence of great risks. An uprising in East Germany, which could occur at any time, would bring the world face-to-face with catastrophe. It could not be sealed off as the Hungarian uprising was. What might be done now? The possibilities are extremely limited. An important obstacle even to modest first steps is the character of the East German regime. It would be useful to press the Soviets on this, as well as in access to Berlin. There is, finally, the obvious relation of the German situation to the question of observation posts, which are not negotiable on the basis of limiting them to Germany.

## Weapons in Orbit

There was recurring discussion of the question of nuclear weapons in orbit. It was felt that this was an area where early agreement would be feasible.

Benjamin H. Brown

KUPOVINA stranih sredstava plaćanja HR № 428565

Podnosilac
K. A. Sin

Zemlja

pasoš br.

<table><thead><tr><th>Vrsta valute</th><th>Iznos u valuti</th><th>Služb. tečaj<br/>+ %</th><th>Dinara</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>$</td><td>20</td><td>750</td><td>15.000</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>podaci o čeku — kred. pismu</td><td></td><td></td><td>15.000</td></tr><tr><td>broj</td><td>izdavalac</td><td>% prov.</td><td>300</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>14.700</td></tr></tbody></table>

Čuvati obračun kao dokaz pro-
daje i za slučaj eventualnog
retransfera.

Keep this document as a proof
of the effected sale and for
the purpose of a possible
retransfer.

Conservez ce decompte comme
pièce justificative de la vente
effectuée et au cas d'un re-
transfert eventuel.

Diese Abrechnung ist als Be-
weis der erfolgten Einwechs-
lung und zwecks eventueller
Rücküberweisung aufzubewa-
hren.

1

KORISNIKU

Obr. 1434-a Izd. NB (1846)

18. 9. 63

(mjesto i datum)

PODREŽEN PODREŽEN

(Stambil mjerenja i potpis)

3 DUBROVNIK 3

KUPOVINA stranih sredstava plaćanja HR № 428583

KORISNIKU

Obr. 1484-a Izd. NB (1846)

Podnosilac
zemlja
.................................................... pasoš br. ....................................................

<table><thead><tr><th>Vrsta valute</th><th>Iznos u valuti</th><th>Služb. tečaj<br>+</th><th>Služb. tečaj<br>%</th><th>Dinara</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>$</td><td>20</td><td>700</td><td></td><td>15000</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">podaci o čeku — kred. pismu</td><td></td><td>15000</td></tr><tr><td>broj</td><td>izdavalac</td><td></td><td>% prov.</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>14.850</td></tr></tbody></table>

(mjesto i datum)

(Stavljen mjenjica i potpis)

XI. (Adm.). 2

Dubrovnik, 20 - 25 September 1963

CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN DUBROVNIK

VENUE

The meetings will be held in the Umjetnicka Galerija in Dubrovnik.
The secretariat, which will be located at the same address, will be open from
10th September.

Telegraphic address: Pugwash, Umjetnicka Galerija, Dubrovnik

All participants will be accommodated at the Neptun Hotel about two miles
outside Dubrovnik. Coaches will be available to convey participants from the hotel
to the Galerija and back.

TRAVEL

There are direct flights to Dubrovnik from many European cities, and it should
be possible to arrive at or leave Dubrovnik for most destinations on any day of the week.
All participants will be met at point of arrival if information is provided in time.

The local travel agent is Mr. Branko Begovic of the Atlas Travel Agency,
Dubrovnik, who will also deal with hotel arrangements.

Mr. David Formosa (Express Travel and Transport Co., 89/91 Newgate Street, London, E. C. 1), who helped with the travelling arrangements at the London Conference, is willing to give similar help for Dubrovnik.

CLIMATE

It is usually warm and dry in Dubrovnik at that time of year, and light summer clothes are recommended. There are good swimming facilities at the hotel.

CURRENCY

The present rate of exchange is about $1 to 750 dinares (or £1 to 2100 dinares).
There are no restrictions on the import or export of foreign currency, and it is
easy to exchange these into dinares in Dubrovnik.

LOCAL ORGANIZATION

The chairman of the Yugoslav organizing committee is Professor Ivan Supek,
Sveuciliste-Universitas, Institut teorijske fizike, Marulicev trg 19, Zagreb, Yugoslavia.

The Conference administration will be handled by Dr. Marcel Lazanski and
Dr. Vladimir Knapp at the Institut Ruder Boskovic, Bijenicka 54, Zagreb, Yugoslavia.

Telegraphic address: INSTRUBO

After 10th September they will be at the Umjetnicka Galerija as above.

XL. (Adm.). 1

"CURRENT PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT AND WORLD SECURITY"

Preliminary Programme

<table><tr><td>Friday, 20th September</td><td>Formal opening and two plenary sessions</td></tr><tr><td>Saturday, 21st September</td><td>Meetings of working groups</td></tr><tr><td>Sunday, 22nd September</td><td>Plenary session in the morning</td></tr><tr><td>Monday, 23rd September and<br/>Tuesday, 24th September</td><td>Meetings of working groups</td></tr><tr><td>Wednesday, 25th September</td><td>Plenary sessions and close of Conference</td></tr></table>

It is hoped to hold the sessions in the mornings and early evenings, leaving the afternoons free.

Working Groups

(a) Abolition of Delivery Systems

(b) Inspection and Control in the First Stage of Disarmament

3. Atom-free Zones, especially in Central Europe and the Balkans

4. Role of Non-aligned Nations in Disarmament and World Security

5. The Test-ban and the Problem of Detection

PARTICIPANTS IN THE DUBROVNIK CONFERENCE

<table><thead><tr><th>Country</th><th>Participants</th><th>Observers</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Australia</td><td>Dr. J. W. Burton</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Austria</td><td>Prof. Hans Thirring</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Brazil</td><td>Dr. Warwick E. Kerr</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Bulgaria</td><td>Acad. G. Nadjakov</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Canada</td><td>Dr. Norman Alcock</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Czechoslovakia</td><td>Prof. V. Knapp<br>Acad. Ivan Malek</td><td>Mr. Theodor Nemec</td></tr><tr><td>Denmark</td><td>Prof. O. Kofoed-Hansen</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>Father Dubarle<br>Mr. Jules Moch<br>Prof. Francis Perrin<br>Dr. H. Marcovich</td><td>General Pierre Genevey</td></tr><tr><td>Ghana</td><td>Prof. R. P. Baffour</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>East Germany</td><td>Prof. M. Steenbeck<br>Prof. H. Barwich</td><td>Dr. Peter Hess</td></tr><tr><td>West Germany</td><td>Prof. H. Rumpf<br>Mr. H. Afheldt</td><td>Dr. phil. Eckart Heimendahl</td></tr><tr><td>Hungary</td><td>Prof. Rezso Bognar</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>India</td><td>Prof. V. Sarabhai<br>Prof. H. J. Bhabha</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>Prof. Edoardo Amaldi<br>Prof. Buzzati-Traverso</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>Prof. B.V.A. Roling<br>Prof. H. A. Tolhoek<br>Dr. P. Valkenburgh</td><td>Mr. F. J. Terwisscha<br>Van Schetinga</td></tr><tr><td>Norway</td><td>Dr. H. Wergeland</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Poland</td><td>Prof. L. Infeld<br>Prof. K. Lapter</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Rumania</td><td>Acad. H. Hulubei ?</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>Prof. Arne Engstroem</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Switzerland</td><td>Prof. Ruzicka</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Eleventh Pl. COSW Conference
Informal Working Paper

August 19, 1963

Roger Fisher,
Harvard Law School

SOME NON-INSPECTION ASPECTS OF CONTROL
In the First Stage of Disarmament

A great deal of attention has been given to the possible secret violation of a disarmament agreement and the inspection necessary to assure countries that no such violation is taking place. Perhaps more important is the problem of the non-secret conduct that is thought by someone to be a violation. A number of considerations suggest that it is a mistake to separate the compliance problem from the dispute-settling problem and that a critical aspect of control, at least during the early stages of disarmament if not later, is a means of obtaining authoritative interpretations and applications of the agreed rules.

Three different situations can be identified. One is the case of the secret violation, known and believed by the government officials engaged in it to be contrary to a disarmament treaty. It is possible that motivated by some view of national interest responsible officials of a country might undertake deliberate, concealed action contrary to a disarmament agreement. And even if such conduct would never in fact occur, there would always be those who would fear that it might be taking place. The problem of reducing the likelihood of such secret violations and of responding to any if they should be uncovered is not dealt with here.

A second situation is that of the open repudiation or termination of all or part of a disarmament agreement. Governments have repudiated treaties in the past and may do so in the future.

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The problem of lessening the likelihood of such an occurrence and of what to do should it occur is also not the question here being considered.

The third situation, to which this brief paper is directed, is that of governmental conduct which is plausibly justified by the officials of one country as being permitted under the treaty but which is regarded by some people as being contrary to the treaty — at least as they believe it ought to be interpreted. A hypothetical case may illustrate the problem.

A treaty prohibits the manufacture of any new bomber aircraft but permits, as it presumably would, the continued manufacture of cargo planes. An aircraft plant develops a new cargo plane with doors that open at the bottom in order to accommodate large, box-like units into which the cargo is pre-packed. The plane, we will assume, has other features which would make it adaptable or convertible to use as a bomber such as, for example, long range, high speed, and the ability to drop the cargo while in flight in the event of emergency. A government might well decide that such a plane was permitted by the treaty and order it as being useful for cargo-carrying purposes. There is a natural tendency to construe rules favorably to ourselves. And no matter how explicitly a treaty spelled out the definition of bomber aircraft there would be border-line cases — if not the one suggested, then another — where honest men could reach different conclusions. What means of control should there be to cause "compliance" in such a case?

Preliminary consideration of this problem suggests the following points.

- 3 -

## Use of national courts.

In working out compliance procedures it would seem wise to make extensive use of the national courts of the various countries to regulate conduct within their territories. These courts already enforce a number of rules of law against their own nationals, including officials of their own government, and there seems little reason why they should not be called upon to assume at least a portion of the task of enforcing arms limitation provisions.

Certainly in small cases and perhaps in important ones the national courts could be/to interpret fairly a disarmament treaty or other applicable rule. Judges trained in the law tend to appreciate long-range considerations. They would also recognize that an unduly liberal interpretation would weaken the agreement and reduce the restraint required not only from their own country but from other countries as well.

Any problem of enforcing by force the judgment of a court would appear to be far easier if the judgment were one of a national court. One possibility would be to have an international commission or court charged with interpreting the treaty, leaving to national courts the problem of enforcing the decision should any official be reluctant to respect it. Alternatively, the national courts might be used in the first instance. A country might agree to provide that any person believing that conduct was being undertaken which was contrary to a disarmament agreement could begin a proceeding in its courts to seek an order calling for the cessation of such conduct.

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There is the possibility that the courts of one nation would reach an interpretation of a treaty contrary to the interpretation placed upon it by the courts of another. This problem already exists in the case of all treaties among those countries which have not accepted compulsory arbitration or the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as to such disputes. Ideally, perhaps, all countries should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or some special tribunal. Failing that, however, national enforcement would not be meaningless, any more than the provision of the United States Constitution that treaties are the supreme law of the land is meaningless.

### Civil remedies, not criminal.

Where the obligation is clear and important, and certainly if a specific judicial decree has removed all legitimate doubt, punishment for contempt should apparently be available, at least as a last resort. It should also, apparently, be available for offenses analogous to embassiesent and bribery. On the other hand, punishment would seem unwise for such conduct as producing a cargo plane that looked too much like a prohibited bomber.

The punishment of government officials, at least, of high officials, is likely to be difficult to bring about. The fear of punishment for conduct whose legality is in doubt may deter competent people from accepting public office or may adversely affect governmental decisions. If the consequence of a decision that particular conduct is prohibited is to send to prison an official who thought that he was doing his duty, courts may be reluctant to construe rules as strictly as would be best for the future.

- 5 -

Small decisions, not large ones.

The basic means of causing respect for the decisions of a
court will be the enlightened self-interest of those concerned.
For this self-interest properly to affect the government
which loses a case, the harm that comes from yielding to a
decision ought to be clearly and markedly less than the harm
that might come from defying it, involving a risk of upsetting
the whole disarmament program. The narrower the immediate
decision the less painful it will be to yield to it, and the
more likely it becomes that defiance would have worse consequences.

Negative injunctions.

The wisest procedure would seem to be one in which the question
is raised as to whether certain conduct should be barred in the
future. The decision of a court should be in the form of what
American lawyers would call a cease-and-desist order. Compliance
will be facilitated if the decision identifies what is not to be
done, rather than ordering affirmative action. Where evidence and
facts are disputed a court can readily say, "Whatever you may or
may not have done in the past, don't do such-and-such in the
future." Many excuses may be advanced as to why affirmative action
was not taken. Active defiance is much more difficult to justify.

Personal and specific directives.

The decision will have a greater chance of being respected if
it is directed to one or more designated individuals, rather than
to a government as such. The more explicit and specific the
decision is, the greater the chance that the named individuals will
go along with it.

-/-/-/-/--

THE SAFEGUARDS ROLE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

by
John A. Eali

There have been few scientific discoveries which have had such profound political and military consequences as nuclear fission. The control of atomic energy became an international problem, and the solution of this problem became an urgent postwar task. From June 1946, with the introduction of the Baruch Plan in the United Nations, to August 1963, with the signing of a partial nuclear test ban, statesmen have dealt with various aspects of establishing international responsibility and control of atomic energy.

The purpose of this article is not to tell the story of 17 years' search for security on the broad front of atomic disarmament, but to review the more limited question of controlling uranium, plutonium and associated facilities intended for peaceful purposes through one of the newest of international organs, the International Atomic Energy Agency. As in the case of the test ban agreement of August 1963, the controls established by the International Agency are only a partial solution to a larger problem. Small steps, however, may be the necessary first steps to carry us forward in our search for mutual security.

Ten years passed between the first United Nations discussion of atomic energy and the agreement of 81 States in 1956 to establish a world-wide international organization charged with the responsibility of controlling certain nuclear materials to prevent their use for military purposes. But, even when the Statute of the Atomic Energy Agency came into force in July 1957, it contained only an outline of safeguard provisions which would enable the Agency to exercise the important control functions. In the six years that have passed since then, the Agency's safeguards have been developed on the basis of the statutory provisions into a system with certain detailed regulations. While this development might appear slow, it has been achieved in a sensitive field of international relations, that of international controls over national activities.

In the summer of 1963, three significant developments have occurred which suggest even more progress. These developments are: the extension of the Agency's safeguards system (which had been limited to reactors of less than 100 thermal MW) to reactors of unlimited size, the approval of the agreement whereby the Agency is to assume the safeguards functions now exercised by the United States in Japan and, finally, the agreement in principle between the Governments of India and of the United States for the eventual transfer to the Agency of the safeguards responsibilities for the planned large 380 MW (Tarapur) reactor.

The development and present status of the Agency's safeguards deserve particular attention since these are the first control activities of this type exercised by any world-wide international organization. In particular, except in the case of some regional organizations with relatively homogeneous membership, the I.A.E.A. is the first international organization which has the right to perform inspections in its member States and is actually carrying out such inspections.

## THE SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS IN THE AGENCY'S STATUTE

### Negotiation of the Statute

The direct impetus for the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency came from President Eisenhower's address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953.

President Eisenhower's proposal came at a moment when the United Nations disarmament discussions had reached an impasse. The proposals were deliberately developed as a modest and different step which might help the DISARMAMENT impasse. In addition to implying the necessity for establishing a safeguards system in order to make certain that the assistance granted by the Agency to its member States would be used only for peaceful purposes, there were also two related items which important disarmament implications: One was that the negotiation of the Statute of the Agency and the operation of the Agency would

be carried out by the General Assembly, this motion was supported unanimously by the atomic power - United States, United Kingdom, France and Canada. The motion was also passed by three abstentions and one abstention.

[Lc]

"Open up new channels for peaceful discussions, and attitude at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved.... if the world is to shake off the internment imposed by fear, and is to make positive progress towards peace, another was that the proposed organization should receive substantial contributions of uranium and fissionable materials which it would store for its own peaceful purposes and thereby also reduce the military stockpiles of the contributing States. While this objective, that of transferring stockpiles of nuclear materials from national to international control, was incorporated without substantial controversy into Article IX of the Agency's Statute, no steps have been taken towards its realization.² On the other hand, while the safeguards control system was incorporated into the Statute only after extensive controversy, the actual implementation of safeguards has proceeded since the establishment of the Agency.

From 1954 to 1956 negotiations concerning the development of the Agency Statute proceeded first with bilateral exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union and continued through discussions at the Ninth and Tenth Sessions of the General Assembly, then discussed an eight-State and later a twelve-State working group. The negotiations culminated in October 1956 in the International Conference at United Nations Headquarters at which 81 States unanimously approved the Statute. The issue of safeguards was one of the most important and most troublesome problems during the entire negotiations.

The controversy in establishing a statutory safeguards system focussed primarily on two points; one was procedural while the other was substantive. The procedural question was: should the safeguards

²/ The proposal that the atomic powers transfer quantities of weapon-grade uranium for peaceful purposes has been recently introduced in the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. In April 1963, the United States proposed that both the United States and the Soviet Union transfer at least 50,000 kgs. On 14 August 1963, the United States reiterated the early proposal, but suggested that the United States transfer 60,000 kgs and the Soviet Union 40,000 kgs. All transfers of fissionable materials between States would be for peaceful purposes. A system of safeguards to ensure that material transferred between States did not find its way into weapons would be worked out in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (USIS Release of 16 August 1963).

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[lc]

provision in the Statute be general or specific? Some Governments argued that it would be sufficient to state that the Agency would establish a system of safeguards to assure that its assistance was not being diverted for military purposes. On the other hand, those States in favor of a strong system felt that the provisions in the Statute should be detailed enough so that only implementing regulations would be necessary to place them into effect. The compromise reached resulted in the inclusion in the Statute of broad principles as well as certain detailed provisions, but provided that their application to specific projects would be determined by the Board of Governors on the basis of the nature of the projects concerned; thus all States requesting assistance from the Agency were forewarned that they would be subject to safeguard requirements of certain types, though their exact scope was yet to be determined.

The substantive question was: to what extent would the proposed safeguards system affect the sovereignty and economy of the receiving States? This controversy centered around the formulation of Article XII.A.5 of the statute, which provides that excess special fissionable material³ above that to be used immediately for certain specified purposes, is to be deposited with the Agency. The question was: to whom should such valuable material belong while deposited, and under what conditions might it be released? The compromise provides that while the Agency may require the deposit of such materials, they are to be "returned promptly" to the State concerned if required for one of the permissible peaceful uses.

A related point was the charge that the safeguards system would result in a continuing control by the atomically-developed States (i.e. those who could build up nuclear industries without external assistance) over the less-developed States who would have to request assistance and would therefore be subjected to continuing safeguards by the Agency on what was expected to become a vital factor in their industrial and economic development. It was clear from the beginning that the "nuclear powers" would not permit safeguards on their own nuclear industries, except possibly within the framework of a

¹) U.S. atomic energy can be used directly in nuclear weapons

- 5 -

[10]

general disarmament arrangement; on the other hand, the United States and others stated that they would not be prepared to give substantial nuclear assistance to any State if there was a possibility that it would be used for military purposes. On this point there was a limited compromise which introduced into the Statute a provision allowing (but not requiring) any member State to invite the Agency to exercise safeguards over any of its activities in the field of atomic energy.

## Safeguards Provisions of the Statute

The Statute establishes a number of different types of safeguards responsibilities for the Agency. In the first place it is responsible, as set forth and detailed in articles III.B.2, IV.H and VII.B of the Statute, for safeguarding its own activities and any materials and facilities under its control. In the second place it has the responsibility of exercising safeguards in its member States under any of the following conditions:

(a) If it establishes a "project" in a member State to which it grants assistance at the request of the State concerned,⁴ the agreement pursuant to which such assistance is granted must specify which of the several safeguards procedures of the Agency are relevant to the project.

(b) If the State concerned has received assistance on a bilateral or multilateral basis and both the assisted and the assisting States agree that the related safeguards should be exercised by the Agency,⁵ this provision means in effect that it does not matter whether a State is assisted directly by the Agency (which in general can itself only obtain the assistance it is rendering from one of its member States) or if the assistance comes from a member State agreeable to permitting the Agency to exercise safeguards in its stead.

(c) At the request of a State itself with respect to any of its atomic activities,⁶

4. See Articles III, A.5, XI.F.4, XII.A and C of the Statute.

5. See Articles III.A.5 and XII.A and C of the Statute.

6. See Article III.A.5 of the Statute.

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The methods by which the Agency is to exercise its safeguards responsibilities in member States are set forth in general terms in Article XII.A. of its Statute. The structure of these provisions is quite similar to the safeguards provisions in United States bilateral agreements concerning the "civil uses" of atomic energy. This is no coincidence, but results from the fact that the U.S. bilateral assistance program, as well as the foundation of the Agency were derived at the same time from the "Atoms for Peace" Program initiated by President Eisenhower. Specific enabling provisions were incorporated in the 1954 revision of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. These safeguards provisions of the Statute are very similar to those set forth in the Security Control Convention of the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D. — formerly O.E.C.).⁷, and are not dissimilar to those of the Euratom Treaty⁸. These treaties were concluded after the Agency's Statute had been completed and were, therefore, influenced by it — to some extent deliberately, since it was clearly desirable that various international safeguards systems should be compatible to the greatest extent possible.

In brief, five types of control activities are foreseen in Article XII.A. of the Statute:

(1) the right of the Agency to review the design of facilities to be safeguarded in order to assure itself that they will not by themselves further a military purpose, and that they will lend themselves to the exercise of safeguards (e.g. that they will contain sufficient reliable measuring instruments to permit a determination of what is happening within the closed part of a reactor or reproducing plant);

(2) the obligation of the State concerned to maintain and to make available to the Agency operating and accounting records on safeguarded nuclear activities;

(3) the obligation of the State to make progress reports on such activities;

1/ For the text of the Convention see IAEA publication, Legal Series No.1, Multilateral Agreements (1960), page 187

8/ Chapter VII ("Safety Control"); for the text see id., p. 79, at pp. 109-112.

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(4) the right of the Agency to approve the means for the chemical processing of irradiated materials and, as indicated above, to require the deposit of any excess special fissionable materials produced which are not immediately required for other peaceful projects to be carried out under Agency safeguards; and

(5) the right of the Agency to send into the State inspectors who are to "have access at all times to all places and data and to any person ... as necessary to account for source and special fissionable material supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose ...".

In addition, Articles XII.A.7 and XII.C of the Statute provide for the sanctions that the Board of Governors of the Agency may impose on States violating their obligations, either by committing military diversion or by preventing the effective exercise of safeguards; these sanctions include withdrawal of assistance provided either by the Agency or by any of its members (which might have a crippling effect on a nuclear industry based on imported nuclear materials), reports to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations for appropriate action by these organs, and recommendations that the State be suspended from the rights and privileges of membership in the Agency.

With respect to the financing of the Agency's safeguards system, the general rule established by Article XIV.B.1(b) of the Statute is that these expenses are to be a common charge on all the members, divided in accordance with the scale of charges for the general administrative expenses of the Agency (a scale to be based on that used by the United Nations in connection with its regular budget). The reason for this provision is that it was considered that safeguards are exercised for the common benefit of all countries of the world and not for the special benefit of the safeguarded State - which, if it were to be charged for the safeguards to be exercised within it, might in the first place become reluctant to approach the Agency for assistance and in the second might be suspected of influencing the exercise of safeguards through its financial control.

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However, Article XIV.C of the Statute does foresee that, when bilateral or multilateral safeguards are transferred to the Agency, the arrangement might provide for the Agency to be reimbursed by the States concerned for some of the expenses incurred.

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROCEDURES

As indicated above, in drafting the Agency's Statute, it had been decided that although certain detailed safeguards provisions should be included, these provisions would require further elaboration before they could be applied to particular projects. After the Agency started its operations, the question arose whether the statutory provisions were sufficiently specific so that they could be applied directly in formulating projects and safeguards agreements with member States, or whether a detailed general system should be established on the basis of which such agreements would be formulated. (In general, those States favoring strong safeguards favored the formulation of such a general system which would be used as a guideline in negotiating particular agreements; other States favored an ad hoc approach, which would have required negotiating each such agreement separately on the basis of the statutory provisions).

The Board of Governors of the Agency decided that an attempt should be made to formulate a general system, and the Secretariat prepared a preliminary draft during the Spring of 1959. In June and September 1959 the Board adopted guidelines for formulating the general system and instructed the Secretariat to revise its draft to incorporate those principles. The Secretariat's new draft was considered by the Board of Governors during its meeting of January 1960, at which time a Special Working Group of Expert Representatives from seven members of the Board (Brazil; Czechoslovakia; France; India; the U.S.S.R.; the United Kingdom; and the United States) was established to review the Secretariat's draft. These technical experts met under the chairmanship of Dr. Gunnar Randers of Norway, and prepared a somewhat simplified draft which was considered by the Board in April 1960 and provisionally approved by

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it, but also submitted it to the General Conference of the Agency "for consideration and appropriate action". The General Conference in September 1960 debated the provisionally approved safeguards system at considerable length and finally decided to "take note" of the Board's proposals and invited the Board, before giving effect to the document, to take into account as appropriate the views expressed in the General Conference debate. The Board undertook to review the system in the light of this debate at its meetings in January 1961, and on 31 January it approved the Agency's safeguards system². The General Conference had also requested the Board to report to it at its sixth session on the results of a general review of the system to be performed after two years of operation. However, before the sixth session of the General Conference the Board decided that the experience in applying the system up to that time did not yet warrant a general review, and so reported to the General Conference - which did not comment on the matter.

In February 1961, the Board decided that the safeguards system, which by its terms had been limited to reactors of under 100 thermal MW, should be extended to reactors of larger size. For this purpose it commissioned the Secretariat to formulate appropriate proposals and it reconstituted the earlier Expert Group (with the same membership) to review these proposals. At its meetings in June 1961 the Board considered the report of this Group, and provisionally adopted the recommended provisions. At the same time it decided that, in the light of certain questions that had arisen about the desirability of applying Agency safeguards to specialized equipment it would undertake the postponed general review of the safeguards system during 1964.

2/ Set forth in IAEA document INFC/10/26.

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THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

The Agency's "safeguards system" consists essentially of three types of provisions: statements as to the purpose and scope of the system, definitions, and general principles; specific provisions as to the circumstances in which Agency safeguards are to be applied; and specific provisions as to how they are to be applied. Of these the second and third provisions should be examined.

When are Safeguards Applied?

The provisions detailing the circumstances under which Agency safeguards are to be applied form what is probably the most difficult and controversial part of the safeguards document, since the guidance given by the Statute on these points is extremely slight. Separate provisions cover nuclear materials, nuclear facilities (such as reactors and reprocessing plants), and specialised equipment and non-nuclear materials. For each, it is specified under what circumstances safeguards will be "attached" and/or "applied". The term "application of safeguards" merely means the carrying out of the application provisions (i.e. approval of design, records, reports and inspections). The term "attached" means those items to which safeguards are not only applied but which cause safeguards to be attached or applied to other items associated with them; e.g., any special fissionable material produced in or by the use of nuclear material to which safeguards are attached will also have safeguards attached to it; any reactor using nuclear material to which safeguards are attached will have safeguards applied to it during such use.

With respect to nuclear materials, there are provisions for attaching safeguards to materials supplied by the Agency and also to those produced in or by the use of attached material or in attached reactors. Safeguards are applied to all materials to which safeguards are attached, and also to other

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nuclear materials while they are intermixed with attached
materials and to nuclear materials voluntarily submitted to
safeguards. With respect to attachment, certain minimal
quantities of nuclear materials can be exempted in each State
(these exemption limits range from 200 grs of plutonium to
20 tons of thorium or depleted uranium); however, in establish-
ing such exemptions, account is taken not only of the material
supplied by the Agency but also of all other nuclear materials
in the State which are subject to any form of international
safeguards or safeguards commitments of which the Agency has
official notice. In addition, the attachment of safeguards
can be suspended as to nuclear materials, either if the amount
suspended does not exceed certain minimal quantities or if
equivalent nuclear materials are substituted for them; the
primary purpose of the suspension provision is to permit the
transfer of materials for reprocessing to other States to
which Agency safeguards do not apply, but under conditions
which will make certain that the total amount of unsafeguarded
material in the world is not significantly increased by such
a transaction.

While the original safeguards document avoided dealing
with the complicated issue of "pursuing" (with safeguards)
second and subsequent generations of special fissionable mat-
erials derived from Agency sources, the provisionally approved
provisions concerning large reactors provide for the attach-
ment of safeguards regardless of "generations" if produced in
a safeguarded large reactor.

Safeguards are attached to facilities if such facilities
are supplied by the Agency or "substantially assisted" by it.
Safeguards are also applied to facilities voluntarily submitted
to safeguards. Small reactors with a thermal capacity of less
than 3 MW may be exempted after an inspection, but the total
capacity exempted in any State may not exceed 6 MW. It is
specially provided that no Agency safeguards will be attached
to mines, mining equipment or ore processing plants.

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With respect to "specialized equipment" and "non-nuclear materials", it is merely provided that safeguards will be attached and applied to them, and will also be applied to facilities incorporating them. No definition of such equipment or materials has yet been approved, so that the Board of Governors must either decide in each individual case that certain equipment or materials fall in this category, or at some future time designate certain specified items as falling under these provisions.

## How are Safeguards Applied?

Part V of the safeguards system contains the detailed procedures for implementing the program set forth in the Statutes: the approval of designs, the keeping of records, the making of reports, and the performance of inspections. With respect to both records and reports, it is provided in general terms what such documents should contain. The particular systems for keeping the records and making the reports for any facility under safeguards must be agreed to between the Agency and the State concerned. Detailed provisions also indicate under what conditions special reports have to be submitted to the Agency: e.g., within 48 hours after the occurrence of an unusual incident involving actual or potential loss of materials to which Agency safeguards are applied, or after the discovery of such a loss; on the other hand, a State has to submit a special report to the Agency at least two weeks before any major transfers of safeguarded materials or a significant change in the planned programme of a safeguarded facility.

The right and ability to perform inspections is the crucial aspect of any safeguards system. Without this right no control system can be effective, for if there is no way of proving the accuracy of the designs submitted for approval of the data given in the operating and accounting reports, there is no way of being certain that diversion for military purposes is not in fact occurring. On the other hand, the performance by an international organization of inspections within the territory of a sovereign member State is surrounded with considerable political, legal and practical difficulties.

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The Agency inspection procedures are in the Statute¹¹/ in three documents approved by the Board of Governors and in certain decisions of the Board. The document incorporating the safeguards system, which was discussed above, sets forth the conditions under which inspections of particular projects are to take place. In general, all projects are subject to regular inspections, unless, on the basis of the minimal quantity of nuclear materials in the State or associated with the project, only "nominal safeguards" (no routine inspections, only one routine report annually) are applied. Other provisions indicate the maximum frequency with which routine inspections may be performed of any reactor: the present system itself establishes a linear rule calling for one inspection per 5 kg of annual usage or maximum potential production of plutonium (or other "equivalent" fissionable materials), up to a maximum of six annual inspections; the provisionally approved system for larger reactors extends this formula to up to twelve inspections and provides that if the plutonium capacity is in excess of 60 kg per year the Agency's inspectors may "have access to the facility at all times". Other provisions of the safeguards documents set forth the factors that are to be considered in setting the actual inspection frequency, and provide that it shall be kept to a minimum.

In this connection it should be noted that while the maximum annual frequency of routine inspections is determined in each case on the basis of the formula in the safeguards document and is generally specified in the safeguards agreement with the State concerned, the actual scheduling of inspections within that maximum number depends upon the discretion of the Director General. Finally, the safeguards document indicates the conditions under which "special inspections" may be performed - in effect whenever a "special report" indicates the necessity for such an inspection.

¹¹/ See Articles XII, A.6 and XII, B.

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## Who Inspects?

The Board of Governors has approved a document setting forth the principal provisions applying to Agency inspectors. This document in the first place indicates how inspectors are to be designated to a State: first the Director General informs the Government of the name, nationality, rank and qualifications of the official he is proposing to designate as an inspector for that State; the Government may request consultations and has 30 days within which to indicate whether it will accept such designation. If it objects, the Director General must propose alternative designations; however, if the repeated refusal of a State to accept designations may impede the inspections provided for in a safeguards agreement, the Director General may refer such refusals to the Board. Once an Agency official has been accepted and designated as inspector he must be granted the necessary visas promptly.

The other parts of the inspectors document deal with the arrangements for visits of Agency inspectors (required period of notice, supply of equipment and transportation, etc.) and their rights of access, for particular types of facilities and specified types of inspections.

In approving the inspectors document the Board also decided that it would reserve the right to approve all appointments to the Division of Inspection, and in practice even all ad hoc designations of Agency officials to act as inspectors have been submitted to it.12/ Thus, in order to send a new Agency official as an inspector to a given State, the following steps have to be performed:

(a) The Board has to approve his appointment to the Division of Inspection or his ad hoc use as an Agency inspector.

12/ As of June, 1963, the Board has approved ad hoc designation of ten specialists to compose the inspection staff. These specialists are from the following countries: Yugoslavia, Argentina, Pakistan, U.S.A., Hungary, U.K., Burma, U.S.S.R., Sweden and Mexico. The Director of the Safeguard Division, the policy division, is from Yugoslavia, Dragoslav Pepević.

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(b) The Director General has to inform the State concerned of the proposed designation, and if it is accepted, to designate the inspector.

(c) The Director General has to select the official, from among all those designated for the State, to perform the particular inspection, and must give the State the required notice of his arrival.

The privileges and immunities of Agency inspectors are mentioned briefly in the last part of the inspectors document and also form the subject of several provisions in the Agency's general Agreement on Privileges and Immunities¹³. In particular Sections 18(b) and 23 of that Agreement provide that Agency inspectors, while performing this function, shall have in addition to the normal functional immunities of Agency officials, practically full diplomatic immunities preventing their arrest under any condition and forbidding any seizure of their baggage or any interference with their communications or papers and documents. Since most Member States of the Agency have not yet ratified this Agreement, its provisions are generally incorporated by reference into particular safeguards agreements.

## THE OPERATING EXPERIENCE

Up to now the Agency has included safeguards provisions in seven agreements approved by the Board. However, as indicated below, in several cases the safeguards have not yet been implemented because the items concerned have not yet been delivered or put into operation.

### Japan

The first Agency-assisted national project (called "Agency projects" in the Statute) was the 10 MW³ JER-1 research reactor in Japan for which the Agency supplied (from Canada) three of the six tons of natural uranium required for the first fuel load. The safeguards arrangements were made in 1959, two years before the safeguards system was adopted. For several years the reports required by these arrangements were made, but before the reactor

13/ 8th fourth in JICA document INFCRC/9/Rev.1.

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became critical the Board decided that, on the basis of the
newly adopted system, the three tons of natural uranium sup-
plied should be exempted and, therefore, no further safeguards
were to be applied to the reactor.

## Norway

In connection with the joint research project in reactor
physics conducted with the research reactor NORA by the Insti-
tutt for Atomenergi of Norway and the Agency, the Norwegian
Government requested the Agency to obtain for it the lease from
the United States of approximately 1600 kgs of uranium oxide en-
riched to 3% in U-235. The project agreement for that arrange-
ment provides for the approval of the design of the facility,
the keeping of records, the submission of two routine operating
and accounting reports annually, and the making of a maximum
of one routine inspection per year. The reactor itself was,
because of its low power, exempted from the attachment of safe-
guards after the first inspection. This would have eliminated
the need for safeguards procedures altogether, were it not for
the fact that the reactor contains a quantity of Agency-supplied
uranium in excess of the exemption limit. Because of this, the
keeping of records and the submission of two routine operating
and accounting reports annually is required and the Agency may
make one safeguards inspection annually so long as Agency sup-
plied material remains in the reactor.

## Finland

The Agency assisted Finland in obtaining a 100 KW TRIGA
Mark II reactor and the fuel therefor from the United States.
Here again the reactor itself is exempted from attachment of
safeguards because of its low power, but because it contains
Agency supplied uranium, safeguards are applied. In this case
a smaller quantity of material is involved (13 kgs uranium en-
riched to 20% in U-235) and only nominal safeguards are there-
fore necessary. These require the keeping of records and the
submission of one annual operating and accounting report but no

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routine inspections are called for. These requirements would
cease upon the removal of Agency-supplied material.

Yugoslavia

Similar arrangements were made with Yugoslavia for the
supply and for the safeguarding of a TRIGA Mark II reactor to
be obtained from the United States. In addition an agreement
was negotiated with Yugoslavia and approved by the Board for
the supply of the 15 watt AGN reactors, subject to nominal
safeguards.

Pakistan

The Agency has made arrangements for the supply to Pak-
istan of a 5 MW AMF reactor and the fuel therefor (5775 grs
of 90% enriched uranium, plus 112 grs of plutonium for a neutron
source). The relevant project agreement provides for the sub-
mission of two operating and accounting reports annually and for
the performance of a maximum of two routine inspections a year.
This reactor is subject to safeguard since its capacity is above
the three MW limit.

The Congo

In 1958 the United States delivered a 50 KW TRIGA Mark I
reactor and the necessary fuel to Belgium for the establishment
of a reactor at Leopoldville. After the <u>Congo</u> obtained its in-
dependence in 1960, no immediate transfer of title to the Congo
could be arranged, since no bilateral agreement had been conclud-
ed between the Congo and the United States. To rectify this sit-
uation, the United States, Belgium and the Congo agreed that
title to the reactor and the fuel should be transferred from Bel-
gium through the Agency to the Congo, as an Agency project. This
has been done, and the safeguards provided for by the project ag-
reement are being implemented. Only nominal safeguards were
called for in view of the small quantity of fuel involved (10 kgs
of uranium enriched to approximately 20% in U-235). As in the
case of Finland and Yugoslavia the reactor is subject to exemption

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from the attachment of safeguards as soon as an initial inspection has been performed. Recently the Board approved the conversion of the reactor to a MARK II model (with a 250 KW capacity), using additional equipment to be supplied as a gift by the United States. This conversion, however, will not require any change in the safeguards provisions.

The Agency has recently supplied minor quantities of nuclear materials to a number of member States, ranging from microgram quantities of U-235 to 5 or more grams of plutonium, or to 80 grams of plutonium in a plutonium-beryllium source. In each case it has been possible either to exempt the material since the total quantity of material supplied to that State was below the minimum limits, or to cover such materials by the safeguards for an existing larger project, or to suspend safeguards on the material on the ground of its nominal quantity.

## Safeguarding Projects Not Assisted By the Agency

The Statute provides that the Agency might assume bilateral or multilateral safeguards being exercised in a member State by another State or States. Even before the adoption of the safeguards system the Japanese Government indicated that it hoped to have the safeguards provided for in its bilateral agreements with Canada and the United States transferred to the Agency. These States agreed in principle to such a transfer and addressed joint letters, together with the Japanese Government, to the Agency to request the formulation of the required agreements. Later the Japanese Government made similar arrangements with the Australian and South African Governments. During the spring of 1963, the Japanese and U.S. Governments and the Agency negotiated the first safeguards transfer agreement, which was approved by the Board of Governors in June. The Agency will assume the safeguards now being exercised by the United States in Japan with respect to over half-a-dozen reactors and types of nuclear materials that had been (or will be) supplied by the United States to Japan or that have been (or will be) produced in Japan by their use. In addition, the Agency will safeguard in the United States any special fissionable material produced in Japan under Agency safeguards and returned to the United States pursuant to the bilateral agreement.

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At the time that the General Conference was considering the proposed safeguards system, the United States indicated that it was prepared to submit four of its reactors to Agency safeguards on an experimental basis in order to permit the testing and development of the system. The agreement entered into force on 1 June 1962 for a two-year period with respect to three of the reactors and for one year with respect to the fourth. Pursuant to that agreement the Agency has already performed three inspections in the United States, in the course of which it gained a great deal of experience with the problems involved in safeguarding larger reactor facilities.¹⁴¹ Further information and experience was gained in the negotiation of the agreement itself and in the evaluation of the reports that have been submitted on a periodic basis on the four reactors.

### India
The Tarapur Power Reactor - In June, 1963, it was announced by representatives of the United States and Indian Governments that arrangements had been negotiated for United States support of a large 380 MW nuclear power reactor to be located at Tarapur, India. This arrangement was in the form of a United States bilateral agreement of co-operation. The bilateral provides that the United States and India agree, that the Agency will be requested to enter into trilateral arrangements for the implementation of safeguard provisions in the bilateral agreement. It would appear that at a subsequent stage the Agency would assume important safeguard responsibilities on the largest atomic power plant in that part of the world.

## CONCLUSION

The Agency safeguards system is moving from the realm of the theoretical and is becoming an accepted and workable operating system. Safeguards agreements have been concluded with seven Member States and several further agreements are under consideration or being negotiated. Though the initial projects involved reactors

¹⁴¹ The reactors involved were the 40 MW Argonne Experimental Building Water Reactor - later on converted into a 100 MW design; the 45 MW Piusa Organic Moderated Reactor; the 20 MW Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor; and the 3 MW Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor.

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of minimal capacity and minor quantities of fuel, some of the
recent arrangements involve facilities with serious military
capabilities. All this has been accomplished by the use of a
number of original political and legal devices, but always with
full respect for the sovereign rights of member States, which
in each case had freely entered into arrangements providing
for the exercise by the Agency of the safeguards functions re-
quired by its Statute in connection with the activity concerned.
The recent action in the Board of Governors in June 1963 to ex-
tend the safeguard system to large power reactors ... with the
affirmative support of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. ... suggests
that the Agency's objective to develop a partial control of the
atom reactor on solid and determined political support.

The Agency's control system has been applied to small fac-
ilities in the past, but the recent actions at the I.A.E.A. Head-
quarters in Vienna make it possible for the Agency to exercise
more substantial safeguard responsibilities in the future. The
agreement that the Agency's safeguards procedure should be expand-
ed to apply to large power reactors, the assumption of the Japan-
ese - United States bilateral safeguards responsibilities by the
Agency, and the agreement that the Agency should ultimately assume
the safeguard responsibility of the Indian Tarapur Reactor, all
mark steps forward. The atomic safeguard actions in Vienna and
the atomic test ban agreement in Moscow are significant and are
clearly related. Progress has been made in 1963 on the 17-year
search for international limitation of the dangers of atomic
energy.