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slighted by Professor Rose. By the time Churchill had
returned to office, it was too late and Britain alone
was too weak to achieve his last great dream of
transcending the Cold War and shaping a new world
order, a task which had to wait for another
generation.

For readers interested in an account of what
Churchill did, Professor Rose's book offers a
workmanlike, if not very generous, account. For those
who are concerned with the import of Churchill's life,
one is tempted to invoke the judgment once made about
graduates of the French haute ecoles: "They know
everything. Unfortunately they don't know anything
else."

TOTAL P.11

1654 WORDS

KISSINGER _NY TIMES BOOK REVIEW_

5/28/95

Our age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. For the political leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to be superstars rather than heroes. The distinction is crucial. Superstars strive for approbation; heroes walk alone. Superstars crave consensus; heroes define themselves by the judgement of a future they see it as their task to bring about. Superstars seek success in a technique for eliciting support; heroes pursue success as the outgrowth of inner values.

The modern political leader rarely ventures into public comment without having tested his views on focus groups, if he does not derive them from a focus group. To a man like Churchill, the very concept of

[7]

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focus groups would be unimaginable.

Thus in the space of a generation, Churchill has been transformed from the mythical into the nearly incomprehensible. Twice in his career, he crossed to the other side in the House of Commons, in effect joining the opponents of his previous associates. Such an act is generally considered political suicide if undertaken once. Out of office for nearly a decade, he returned as the embodiment of British determination during his country's ultimate crisis. How is one to explain such a career? Deep conviction or unbridled ambition? Principle or opportunism? Our time leans to the second interpretation, all the more so as it has little understanding for the certitudes of the generation whose formative experience was prior to World War I.

[Y]

3

The Twentieth Century has dealt cruelly with these certitudes. Faith in uninterrupted progress and in the essentially benign operation of human intelligence was succeeded by two world wars, ruthless dictatorships, and ethnic exterminations. The consequence has been a growing proclamation of the relativity of all beliefs, and questions about the validity of Western civilization itself.

Few such doubts assailed the statesmen who grew up before World War I. To them, patriotism was not a blight but the condition of their creativity; the belief that their societies needed to be improved never reached the point of challenging basic values. It was no accident that, in the hour of their people's travail, these leaders provided a reservoir of statesmanship? that accomplished the recovery of

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Europe. For great tasks are rarely achieved by cynics.
All the key figures of European post-World War II
recovery were octogenarians who had been brought up
in the certitudes of the Edwardian Age: Churchill,
Adenauer, de Gasperi (sp?), de Gaulle.

Our age, embarrassed by such inward assurance,
is tempted to deconstruct the heroic element of
policy, to reduce successes to components, and to take
the clock apart to see what makes it tick. It has
become fashionable to debunk Churchill: John Charmly's
(sp?) biography goes so far as to imply that
Churchill's most singular achievement, holding Britain
together to fight alone against Nazi Germany, may well
have been contrary to Britain's long-term interest.

Professor Rose's biography, __________,¹

¹Please give name of the book.

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5

belongs to this genre. It is a point of view I do not share, and I state my bias early on in order to avoid what I have experienced often enough - having a reviewer's philosophical disagreement presented in the guise of objective truth.

Professor Rose has produced a comprehensive and readable biography which adequately sums up the key aspects of Churchill's life. What it lacks is any appreciation for the meaning of Churchill's purposes. Jean Monnet once said that all personalities of achievement are ambitious: but the key question is whether they are ambitious to be? or ambitious to do.

Professor Rose never addresses that question though he clearly leans to the first interpretation. Given his basically debunking premises, he does make a serious effort to be fair, presenting positive

[Y]

6

assessments together with significant criticisms. But
negative comments are generally given in much more
detail. Thus the reader is more likely to have fixed
in his mind the charge that Churchill abandoned two
fellow officers in escaping from a Boer prison than
the fact that he hid out near the prison to enable
them to join him (pp. 52-3). No seemingly fair
description of events can fail to pale after a comment
like this: "To the untrained public eye, and naturally
to that of his more jaundiced colleagues, his image
as an adventurer based on self-glorification was more
than confirmed by his flamboyant behavior. No doubt he
thrilled to the ride on a perilous merry-go-round,
believing that he would be able to descend gracefully
to general applause." (p. 135) Or: "No record of these
meetings exist. But Churchill found it difficult to

[Y]

7

keep his mouth shut at any gathering." (p. 153)

It is in fact nearly impossible to find unqualified appreciation for any of Churchill's actions. Thus his warnings about Nazi Germany are belittled on the ground that Churchill's early views on Hitler were less than clear-cut and that, by the time he had formulated them, they represented little more than an advanced version of the conventional wisdom. Even when Churchill rallied Britain to stand alone, he is treated to half-praises: "Churchill's natural inclination was to fight on to be acclaimed as an illustrious war leader." (p. 324) And Professor Rose denigrates even that ambition by dragging up this obscure Churchillian quote: Britain, Churchill allegedly said though it is not clear to whom, "had to hold on for another two or three months to demonstrate

8

[Y]

to the world that Germany had not beaten us." (p. 324)

From there, Professor Rose concentrates above all on Churchill's rear-guard action to preserve [British] influence disproportionate to its power, and [that], on the way, he was increasingly cold-shouldered by his stronger allies.

So it is almost inevitable that Rose's book concludes with the question of what Churchill's life actually accomplished. It cites as many doubts as it does contributions, and even questions whether the great months of the summer of 1940, when Churchill rallied Britain to stand alone, were an aberration when measured against the rest of Churchill's life. In the end, the cumulative impact of the book is as if an art critic, in analyzing a portrait, had dissected the adequate rendering of every limb but never got around

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9

to conveying the overall impact of the personality.

The ultimate test of statesmanship - and
Churchill was the quintessential British statesman of
his period - is a combination of insight and courage.
Insight leads to assessments which define a society's
freedom of action, while courage enables the statesman
to act on his convictions before they are generally
understood. Great statesmen operate on the outer
margin of their society's capabilities; weak statesmen
tend to be overwhelmed by events.

In my view, Churchill met both of these tests.
His judgments of the trends of history were uniformly
perceptive and often profound. Sometimes the practical
applications he drew from his insights were vitiated
by impetuosity; but equally frequently by bungled
execution for which he was not responsible. A product

CYJ

10

of the Edwardian Age, Churchill believed that peace required a balance of power and so long as Britain was strong enough to tip, or at least to maintain, the scales of that balance, his prescriptions were generally prescient.

Before the First World War, Churchill recognized that France was no longer capable of standing up to Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its historic isolation in favor of an alliance with France. In the 1920s, he wanted to add Germany to the balance of power by propitiating its resentments at the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930s, he recognized the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge; Professor Rose misses the point when he presents it as a largely technical debate about various levels of rearmament.

[Y]

11

In 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness to which Professor Rose ascribes it. Britain was certain to emerge from the war in a much diminished position. Its real choice was between the post-war hegemony of Germany or of the United States. Churchill chose the United States as the far more compatible partner. An element of Romanticism may well have been involved, as Professor Rose asserts. But the persistence with which Churchill pursued that course, the magnanimity with which he turned the other cheek to American rebuffs, reflected the knowledge - surely unwelcome - that Britain had lost the power to shape the world order. Henceforth, it needed to achieve its aims through persuasion. The "special relationship" with America was a practical conclusion and a major

12

achievement - unique among societies in which the
weaker partner held up its end by the merit of its
advice and the loyalty of its conduct.

To be sure, there are differentials of power not
to be overcome by consultation and diplomatic skill.
Churchill could not convince his American allies that
the political shape of the postwar world would be
importantly affected by the position of the armies
when the war ended. But he left a residue of trust and
a relationship solid enough to overcome differences in
perspective until the architecture of the Cold War
period was accomplished, with the two allies again in
substantial harmony. In the late 1940s, Churchill
greatly contributed to the intellectual structure of
the Cold War world by a series of speeches that were
as farsighted as any in the 1930s - though they are

[Y]

13

For readers interested in an account of what
Churchill did, Professor Rose's book offers a
workmanlike, if not very generous, account. For those
who are concerned with the import of Churchill's life,
one is tempted to invoke the judgement once made about
graduates of the French haute ecoles: "They know
everything. Unfortunately they don't know anything
else."

achievement.

That Gallipoli turned into a debacle is true enough: But Churchill's perception that a way needed to be found around the slaughter of trench warfare is not so seemingly fail to pale after a comment like this: of events can fail to pale after a comment like this:

"To the untrained public eye, and naturally to that of his more jaundiced colleagues, his image as an adventurer based on self-glorification was more than confirmed by his flamboyant behavior. No doubt he thrilled to the ride on a perilous merry-go-round, believing that he would be able to descend gracefully to ground level in this way.

Or: "No record of these meetings exist. But Churchill found it difficult to keep his mouth shut at any gathering." (p. 153)

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Professor Rose misses the point when he says it as a result of a debate about various levels of rearmament.

In 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness to which Professor Rose ascribes it. Britain was certain to emerge from the war in a much diminished position. Its real choice was between the post-war hegemony of Germany or of the United States. Churchill chose the United States as the far safer, better partner. An element of Romanticism may well have been involved, as Professor Rose asserts. But the persistence with which he pursued that course, the

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was accomplished with
period, when the views of the two allies were again in
substantially
in the late 1940s Churchill
harmony. He contributed importantly to the
the old one
intellectual structure of this world by a series of
speeches as Labour leader as any in the 1930s. though
they are slighted by Professor Rose. By the time
Churchill had returned to office, it was too late and
Britain alone was too weak to achieve his last great
dream of transcending the Cold War and shaping a new
world order, that task had to wait for another
generation.

For readers interested in an account of what
Churchill did, Professor Rose's book offers a
workmanlike, if not very generous, account. For
those who
are above all concerned with the meaning of
involve
Churchill's life, one is tempted to the judgement
once made about graduates of the French haute école.

1

1685 WORDS

KISSINGER *NY TIMES BOOK REVIEW* 5/27/95

Our age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. For the political leaders with whom we are familiar aspire to be superstars, not heroes. The distinction is crucial. The superstar strives for approbation; the hero walks alone. The superstar thrives on immediate consensus; the hero, while not rejecting it, defines himself by the judgement of a future which he is trying to bring about. To the superstar, success is a technique for eliciting support; to the hero, it is an achievement reflecting his internal values.

2

C Y J

group. To a man like Churchill, the very concept of
focus groups would be unimaginable.

Thus our period finds it difficult to come to
grips with a figure like Churchill. Here is a
political leader who, twice in his career, crossed to
the other side in the House of Commons, in effect
joining the opponents of his previous associates. Such
an act is generally considered political suicide if
undertaken once. How is one to explain two such
gestures? Deep conviction or unbridled ambition?
Principle or opportunism? One time leans to the second
interpretation, all the more so as it has few
categories for understanding the certitudes of the
generation whose formative experience was prior to
World War I.

[Y]

3

certitudes of the Nineteenth. A century of faith in
uninterrupted progress and in the essentially benign
operation of the human intelligence was succeeded by
two world wars, ethnic exterminations, a growing
assertion of the relativity of all beliefs, and indeed
questions about the validity of Western civilization.

Few such doubts assailed the statesmen who grew
up before World War I. To them, patriotism was not a
blight but the condition of their creativity; the
societies in which they lived were, of course,
believed to be capable of improvement - indeed, in
need of it. But none of the leaders questioned the
validity of what their societies stood for; their
basic values were accepted and taken as a guide to
political action. It is no accident that the key
figures of European post-World War II recovery were

[Y]

4

octogenarians who had been brought up in the
certitudes of the Edwardian Age: Churchill, Adenauer,
deG____, deGaulle.

Because our age is embarrassed by such inward
assurance, it is tempted to deconstruct the heroic
approach to policy, to divide up into segments, and to
take the clock apart to see what makes it tick. A
number of books have sought to demistify Churchill,
including John Charnly's? proposition that even
Churchill's most singular achievement, holding Britain
together in the fight against Nazi Germany, may well
have been contrary to Britain's long-term interest.

Norman Rose's biography is of this genre. It is
a point of view I do not share and I state my bias
early on in order to avoid what I have experienced
often enough - of presenting a philosophical

CYJ

5

disagreement as objective truth.

Norman Rose has produced a comprehensive and readable biography. It adequately sums up the key aspects of Churchill's life. Given its basically debunking premises, it makes a serious effort to be fair, presenting positive assessments together with significant criticisms. But it no accident that it winds up with the question of the ultimate significance of Churchill's life. It cites as many doubts as contributions and indeed raises the question whether the great months of the summer of 1940, when Churchill rallied Britain to stand alone, were an aberration ______ against the rest of Churchill's life. Though it does so affirmatively, it is in Churchill's words not any other witnesses. (?)

Since I do not agree with the generally sour tone

6

of Professor Rose's assessment, I am less than
satisfied with his book. No doubt, he would be able to
cite many positive assessments he makes. But these are
invariably buttressed by negative comments which are
generally given in much more detail. Thus a reader is
more likely to have fixed in his mind the charge that
Churchill abandoned two fellow officers in escaping
from a Boer prison than the fact that he hid out near
the prison to enable them to join him (pp. 52-3). In
describing Churchill's early successes in government,
the author quotes critics who thought they saw
Napoleonic or Caesaristic tendencies. These comments
would be more meaningful were there an explanation of
just why Churchill's early career was so spectacular.

Throughout the book, the criticisms are more
penetrating than the somewhat strained accounts of

[Y]

7

achievement.

That Gallipoli turned into a debacle is true enough. But Churchill's perception that a way needed to be found around the slaughter of trench warfare is inadequately recognized. No seemingly fair description of events can fail to pale after a comment like this: "To the untrained public eye, and naturally to that of his more jaundiced? colleagues, his image as an adventurer based on self-glorification was more than confirmed by his flamboyant behavior. No doubt he thrilled to the ride on a perilous merry-go-round, believing that he would be able to descend gracefully to general applause." (p. 135)

8

Thus it is nearly impossible to find any unqualified appreciation of any of Churchill's actions. Thus his warnings about Nazi Germany are belittled on the ground that Churchill's exact? views on Hitler were less than clear-cut and that, by the time he altered them, they represented a slightly more advanced version of conventional wisdom. Even the period of Churchill's career where he rallied Britain to stand alone is treated cursorily and with half-praise: "Churchill's natural inclination was to fight on to be acclaimed as an illustrious war leader." (p. 324) And Professor Rose denigrates even that ambition by dragging up an obscure quote according to which Britain "had to hold on for another two or three months to demonstrate to the world that Germany had not beaten us." (p. 324) From then on, the author

CYJ

[Y]

9

concentrates above all on Churchill's rear-guard action to preserve an influence disproportionate to its power, and on the way he was increasingly cold-shouldered by his stronger allies.

All of this is true enough. But in the end it is as if an art critic, in dissecting a painting, concentrated on the adequacy of the rendition of every portion of the anatomy, in the process obscuring the overall meaning of the personality. The ultimate test of statesmanship is a combination of insight and courage. The former results in assessments which give maximum scope to whatever freedom of action a society possesses; courage enables him to act on his convictions before they are generally understood. Great statesmen operate on the outer margin of their society's capabilities; weak statesmen tend to be

10

overwhelmed by events.

In my view, Churchill met both of these tests. His judgments of the trends of history were unfortunately perceptive and often profound. Sometimes the practical applications he drew from his insights were vitiated by impetuosity; but equally frequently by bungled execution for which he was not responsible. A product of the Edwardian Age, he believed that peace required a balance of power and so long as Britain was strong enough to tip, or at least to maintain, that equilibrium, his prescriptions were generally prescient.

Before the First World War, he recognized that France was no longer capable of standing up to Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its historic isolation in favor of an alliance with France. In the

[Y]

11

1920s, he wanted to add Germany to the balance of power by propitiating its resentments at the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930s, he recognized the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge and Professor Rose misses the point when he sees it as a debate about various levels of rearmament.

In 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness to which Professor Rose ascribes it. Britain was certain to emerge from the war in a much diminished position. Its real choice was between the post-war hegemony of Germany or of the United States. Churchill chose the United States as the far safer senior partner. An element of Romanticism may well have been involved, as Professor Rose asserts. But the persistence with which he pursued that course, the

12

magnanimity with which he turned the other cheek,
reflected the knowledge - surely unwelcome - that
Britain had lost the power and to insist that it
needed henceforth to achieve its aims through
persuasion. The "special relationship" was the result
- unique among societies in which the weaker partner
held up its end by the value of his advice and the
loyalty of his conduct.

To be sure, there are differentials of power not
to be overcome by amendment? and no amount of
consultation and diplomatic skill. Churchill could not
convince his American allies that the political shape
of the postwar world would be importantly affected by
the position of the armies when the war ended. But he
left a residue of trust and a relationship solid
enough to accomplish the architecture of the Cold War

13

period, when the views of the two allies were again in
harmony. He contributed importantly to the
intellectual structure of this world by a series of
speeches as farsighted as any in the 1930s - though
they are slighted by Professor Rose. By the time
Churchill had returned to office, it was too late and
Britain alone was too weak to achieve his last great
dream of transcending the Cold War and shaping a new
world order. That task had to wait for another
generation.

For readers interested in an account of what
Churchill did, Professor Rose's book offers a
workmanlike, if not very generous, account. Those who
are above all concerned with the meaning of
Churchill's life, one is tempted to __ the judgement
once made about graduates of the French haute __:

The New York Times
Book Review

229 WEST 43 STREET
NEW YORK, NY 10036-3959

To Our Reviewers:

If it is convenient for you, it would be a great help to us if
you would include a floppy disk containing an electronic copy of
your review along with your hard copy.

No matter what word processing program you use, all you need
to do is save a copy of your review as text or as an ASCII file.
You need not be concerned with the loss of formatting, as all
copy is reformatted here anyway.

On the disk's label please include your name and the name of
the book you are reviewing and its author.

Many of you now fax reviews to us. If it is also possible for
you to mail a floppy disk, please indicate that you will do so on
your fax.

Also, please remember to mail or fax the assignment/address
form that you received with your book or galley.

Thank you,

The Editors

THE FREE PRESS

Simon & Schuster Consumer Group
866 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022

March 1995

Dear Book Review Editor,

Due in part to the opening in Britain of the Winston Churchill archives, a series of revisionists have criticized Churchill's wartime strategy and his domestic politics, and they have even claimed that he could have avoided World War II and the decline of the British Empire. In **CHURCHILL: The Unruly Giant** (publication date: July 25, 1995), Norman Rose defends Churchill's greatness in spite of his flaws. The man that emerges from this book is an imperfect yet dominating myth-symbol of Britain's greatness, the unruly giant who stands as one of the great statesmen and world leaders of our century.

The book has received excellent reviews in the British press: *The Sunday Times* called it "a minor masterpiece. It is probably the best one-volume biography available." *The Daily Telegraph* called the book "the best to date. . . Although Rose does ample justice to his subject's manifest weaknesses, he never loses sight of Churchill's grandeur." **CHURCHILL** provides us with an important interpretation, with full archival support, of a great and perennially fascinating man.

Norman Rose teaches history at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and is also the author of the much-acclaimed *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography* (Viking, 1986) He will be a Visiting Professor at Stanford University during 1995.

I hope you'll be able to assign this fascinating title for review.

Best Wishes,

Christopher Marsden
Senior Publicist
(212) 702-4323