4

missiles and tactical weapons into the NATO defenses on the Europ-
ean continent, the trend toward the extension of the atomic cap-
ability to other western powers beside the U.S. and the U.K., and,
particularly, the organization and training of the West German
armed forces in a manner which practically implies their use and
possession of atomic weapons at a later date, all operate to heighten
greatly Soviet nervousness about the unresolved German problem,
and complicate the solution of that problem. If, therefore, means
could be found to alter this trend to western policy, or at least
to hold out the possibility of such alteration as a part of a suit-
able settlement of the German question and the problem of European
security, it would in my opinion have a useful political effect.

C. <u>Soviet Intentions</u>

1. The concept of Soviet intentions which is common in this
country and which underlies much of our public discussion appears
to assume that what we are faced with in Moscow is not only a single
mind, but also a mind already made up, committed, and not importantly
to be influenced by what we may or may not do. I disagree with this
view. I believe that Soviet policy is the product not of any single
mind, but of many; that these are not always in agreement and that
Soviet policy often represents a compromise between them; that Soviet
intentions change as the world situation develops; and that our own
actions and attitudes are an important determinant of them.

2. With these reservations I can say that I do not believe
that the Soviet leaders want another major war, or that they would
be likely to inaugurate one by surprise attack just because they

5

felt that they had a temporary advantage in long-range striking power. There is only one contingency in which I believe that they would consider such an attack; and that is if a situation were to arise which caused them to feel that major war between themselves and the United States was both inevitable and imminent. In this case we should expect them to take any and all measures that might seem suitable to them, including the exploitation of the element of surprise, in order to reduce to a minimum the dangers which such a major war could involve for them. I think, therefore, that it ought to be a constant aim of our statesmanship to see that no such situation develops.

3. It is my belief that the Soviet government regretted the introduction of atomic armaments into the world balance of power and was, until recently at least, sincere in the desire to see them abolished and eliminated from national armaments, although unwilling to provide adequate facilities for inspection. As Soviet military plans and dispositions become, under present conditions, increasingly centered around atomic weapons, rigidities will also be created on the Soviet side which will be adverse to any elimination of these weapons from national arsenals; and this has no doubt already happened to some extent.

Nevertheless, it is my belief that the Soviet government would still prefer, on balance, to see these weapons eliminated from the scene. The cost of their cultivation represents a heavier burden on the Soviet economy than is commonly supposed in this country; and the Soviet leaders would see no reason to be inordinately discouraged about their prospects for successful competition,

6

political and military, even in a world which would not include
atomic armaments.

4. In any negotiations looking to the elimination of atomic weapons, the Soviet leaders would not be likely to grant us inspection facilities that would give us complete protection against clandestine violations of the agreement on their side. On the other hand, I do not feel that this means that there might not be agreements on this subject that would be profitable and acceptable to both parties. In the long run, the reliability of agreements on the control of armaments will always depend primarily on the political and psychological climate in which they operate; and the best security we can have against violation will be not the inspection provisions themselves, which can never be wholly foolproof, but the absence of incentive to violation.

5. The first and immediate concern of the Soviet government with respect to Germany is to bring about an alteration, in their favor, of the situation of Berlin. The Soviet leaders feel that the present situation there has become a serious obstacle to the consolidation of their political position in Eastern Europe, and in some ways a threat to their political security. They consider that they have it in their power to make the Western position in that city an awkward one if the Western powers decline to agree to a new status of Berlin which would render the city less of a thorn in the communist side. I do not think the Soviet leaders want war over Berlin; but they are prepared in this instance, for reasons not fully apparent, to play particularly close to the edge;

7

they have committed themselves extensively; and it would not be
wise for the Western governments to take the matter too lightly.

6. With regard to more long-term problem of Germany in gen-
eral, the main Soviet concern is to assure:

a. That the eastern zone is not swallowed up by the German
Federal Republic in so drastic and violent a way as to con-
stitute a major blow to communist and Soviet prestige; that
in any possible German settlement the East German communist
leaders should have a voice; and that if possible some of the
social and economic changes introduced by the communists in
East Berlin should be retained in any such settlement;

b. That atomic armaments should not be introduced into the
defenses of Western Germany; and

c. That the armed forces of Western Germany, or of a poss-
ible united Germany, should not be allied with, and should not
constitute an extension of, the armed forces of the United
States.

* * * *

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

24 August 1965

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I returned to this country yesterday and have just seen your note of
August 9.

I am deeply appreciative of these kind and generous words, for there is
no critic whose opinion I value more highly.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Harvard University Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

signed in his absence.
Dicated by Mr. Klaander;
Henry A. Klaander

With kind regards.

in Cambridge starting early in July.
some weeks ago soon. I will be back
I hope we can repeat the lunch of
me.

much your letter of June 6th meant to
want to drop you a note to tell you how
I am leaving for Europe but I did

Dear Geordie:

Princeton, New Jersey 08540
The Institute for Advanced Study
The Honorsble George Kennan

June 13, 1966