WASHINGTON POST 22 October 1971 P3

231

# House-Senate Conferees
Agree on Defense Money

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

House-Senate conferees on the Defense Procurement authorization bill have reached agreement on a $21.3 billion money total—including $1.1 billion for a Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile system with deployment limited to two existing sites, and $801.6 million for 48 Navy F-14 fighters.

But Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.), in announcing the money figure yesterday, said all of the tough legislative provisions of the bill were still unsettled.

These include Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield's end-the-war-in-six-months amendment, a $350 million limit on aid outlays for Laos, Sen. Harry Byrd Jr.'s amendment to shatter the UN embargo against imports of Rhodesian chrome. Sen. Gordon Allott's amendment raising military pay at the lower levels another $381 million a year, and Sen. Charles McC Mathias' amendment allowing federal civilian pay raises.

The final money figures, while achieving savings of about $907 million from the administration request, "will not impair the bone and muscle of our defenses," Stennis said.

He said it was his impression that the administration is willing to accept the provisions limiting Safeguard deployment to two existing sites —Grand Forks, N.D., and Malmstrom, Mont.—with only site preparation allowed at two other sites, and all work barred on a possible fifth site at Washington, D.C.

The House had authorized a general go-ahead on all five sites as the administration sought, but the restrictive Senate provision was adopted in conference. Stennis' committee had recommended the slowup because of a "slippage" in construction schedules, but this action averted a major floor fight against system expansion. Many senators believe an ABM-limitation agreement is imminent in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The go-ahead on the much-criticized F-14 came when the House conferees accepted the Senate dollar figure. The House had lopped out all $801.6 million for procurement, to await the results of a Defense Department decision on whether the new Grumman plane would be worth going ahead with in view of cost increases. Once the department made that decision, House acceptance of the Senate figure was considered certain.

Stennis said the conference, which took place Wednesday, also:

* Approved a Senate figure of $374 million for the Lockheed C-5A military transport, thus accepting a Senate cut of $72 million, but left unresolved certain Senate-added restrictive language. In a speech prepared for delivery last night, William Proxmare (D-Wis.), leader of Senate critics of the plane, said "not even one more C-5A aircraft" should be built in view of huge cost overruns, unused cargo capacity in the Air Force in other planes, poor performance and recent instances of engines falling off, landing gear collapse, and the grounding of the plane due to wing cracks, bad electronic equipment and other malfunctions.

* Restored $40.8 million for procurement of 12 Lockheed C-130E Air Force tactical transport planes the Senate had voted to kill out of the House bill.

* Approved the House's $95.2 million for procurement of the Marine Corps' Harrier V/STOL interceptor in British, throwing out $24 million the Senate had added to switch production to the United States.

* Approved the Senate's $62.8 million for production of six prototypes of the Main Battle Tank, rejecting a House cut.

* Approved the House's $56.5 million for replenishment oiler vessel and the Senate's $22.5 million addition for an added nuclear submarine.

* Approved House language requiring that contracts for the DLGN-41 nuclear frigate be entered into immediately, unless the President declares it not in the national interest.

* Approved language by Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) barring research and development on a "deep underground" system for the Navy's Sanguine underground communications project in Wisconsin.

232

STON GLOEE 7 NOVEMBER 1971 (9)

ABM critics' arguments called 'often misleading'

By Victor K. McElheny
Globe Staff

A congratulatory letter from the White House went Oct. 13 to a little-known scientific society which recently blasted the conduct of prominent disarmament specialists during the 1969 debate over starting the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.

The attack by the Operations Research Society of America (ORSA) on such figures as Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, new president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and MIT political scientist Dr. George Rathjens, is bound to be a factor in the Washington debates over whether the US is responding adequately to a Soviet missile buildup.

The targets of the ORSA attack think the publicity being given the attack is part of a well-orchestrated attempt to discredit their congressional testimony, which has been influential in holding down spending on new weapons.

ORSA's blast against ABM opponents, none of them members of the society, was in a study, issued Sept. 30, accusing them of misleading statements and of not living up to the rules of the field of operations research.

Wiesner, Rathjens and a third MIT colleague, physics Prof. Steven Weinberg, refused to take part in the study when it began late in 1969. The three said the study was too narrow and presumed that the ABM debate could have an iron-clad "right answer." they also said: "Even the Spanish Inquisition reserved the charge of heresy for those who had been baptized."

ORSA's action has caused violent controversy, still unresolved, in the society, which just held its annual meeting at Anaheim, Calif. There are rumors the society is considering launching a similar study of opponents of the supersonic transport.

The White House letter to Robert Machol, ORSA president, of Northwestern University was from press counsel. Donald Rumsfeld, formerly an Illinois state senator, and

member of the House space committee who now is executive director of the White House Cost-of-Living Council.

Rumsfeld's letter to a fellow Illinoisan praised the society's study and expressed regret that it had not received more publicity.

"All in all, I would say that you and the society have performed a magnificent service," Rumsfeld wrote. "There is no question but that, in the future, when 'experts' present themselves before congressional committees as professionals arguing for or against a given course of action, they will be considerably more careful about the quality of professionalism of their remarks and argument."

Rumsfeld said he had talked about the report with President Nixon and heard Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, chief of Naval Operations, praise the study.

"While not page one headlines," Rumsfeld wrote, the report "has been widely covered in the daily newspapers." Actually, story made page one of the Globe and the Washington Post. "I am a bit disappointed that the weekly magazines have not yet touched on it. Possibly some follow-up work might be helpful there."

The 135-page ORSA study's leading conclusion was as follows:

"The evidence strongly supports the disturbing conclusion that when prominent experts outside the Administration supported their opinions on Safeguard deployment with arguments or results of an operations research nature, these analyses were often inappropriate, misleading or factually in error."

Wiesner, Rathjens and Weinberg replied that they saw "no reason to change our views regarding the essential absurdity of the enterprise."

ORSA's six-member study group, the three said, "failed to recognize... that the assumptions made by the opponents were quite as reasonable as those made by the Administration."

in hindsight more so ... the committee seems to have been remarkably un-critical of Administration assumptions."

They added: "We do not claim infallibility. We made mistakes, ... but we believe not serious ones.... We devoted our efforts to the issues of fundamental concern. We believe the Administration spokesmen, and to an even greater degree Mr. Albert Wohlstetter and the ORSA committee, avoided many of these issues, preferring to dwell on minutiae."

The MIT group accused ORSA of "becoming an instrument on one side of a political debate," and added that they "find it hard to believe that any professional group in this country is in greater need of scrutiny and reform." They dismissed the report as "a very ugly incident—we hope not the harbinger of a trend."

With barbed exchanges like these, a little-noticed dispute two years ago between academic experts on armaments blew up into a widely publicized dispute over the objectivity of leading US proponents of disarmament.

The incident could be important not only in the continuing tug-of-war over the proper response to a massive Soviet arms buildup also in the expected battle next summer over ratifying whatever arms-limitation agreement President Nixon signs during his Moscow visit next May.

On one side in the dispute is Dr. Albert Wohlstetter of the University of Chicago, author of a book called "The Delicate Balance of Terror," who believes the United States may be losing its ability to respond crushingly to a Soviet surprise attack.

At the Air Force-supported Rand Corp. "think tank" in the 1950s Wohlstetter worked out the Air Force plan for concentrating its B52 strategic bombers in the United States.

On the other side are such prominent figures in the disarmament movement as Drs. George Rathjens and Jerome B. Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who were and are opposed to building any antiballistics missile (ABM) system.

Wiesner, who became president of MIT July 1, was President Kennedy's science adviser in 1961-63 and helped steer the 1963 atomic test ban treaty to US Senate ratification. As staff director of the US delegation to a 1958 Geneva conference on surprise attacks, Wiesner removed Wohlstetter as head of a technical panel.

Charges by Wohlstetter of misleading statements by Wiesner, Rathjens and others during the 1969 debate over approving the Nixon Administration's Safeguard ABM plan led to the ORSA study.

The study ruled in Wohlstetter's favor on virtually every point.:

The report was widely distributed to the press. It set off immediate fireworks within the 8000-member organization. Prof. Philip Morse of MIT, the society's first president, was one of several who accused ORSA of seeming to line up completely with the Pentagon and arms manufacturers in general and the ABM in particular. Five of 12 ORSA council members objected to the handling of the study.

Some observers thought the wide publicity for what had been billed as a technical study of professional ethics was political.

Lending fuel to the fire, according to some, was the influence ABM opponents have had in limiting the Safeguard system to just two of a planned 12 installations, and in forcing the Nixon Administration to defend those two as just a "bargaining chip" in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) which began late in 1969.

The opponents of big new US weapons systems work closely together to study and rebut continuing Defense Department arguments for additional armaments. They testify frequently before Congress and recently formed an arms-control association, a sort of coalition against the arms race.

The arms-control proponents have hit particularly hard at frequent assertions by Dr. John Foster, the Defense Department's director of research, that the Soviet Union is outspending the United States in military research and development — $10 billion versus $7 billion — and soon will "catch up" with the United States.

The rebuttal to this, summed up by Rathjens, is: "It doesn't matter what goes in, it's what comes out." The disarmament backers argue that the United States leads the Russians in the quality of all major strategic weapons and is maintaining its "parity" with the Russians by a rapid buildup in accurate multiple warheads on both land-based and submarine-based missiles.

The arms-control lobby has many backers in Congress, but continuing efforts to cut back funds for such weapons as a swinging Navy fighter and a new strategic Air Force bomber were beaten this year.

This fall, many Pentagon spokesmen have been citing new "spy satellite" information about unusually wide concrete missile silos being dug into Soviet soil.

Some experts argue that the Russians are simply building silos for existing missile types with thicker concrete shields. Others argue, however, that the Soviets are building huge new rockets with super-accurate warheads capable of wiping out the land-

based missile fleet in a single surprise attack.

Still being held back by top Pentagon officials are two major US weapons systems — the B1 strategic bomber for the Air Force, to replace the B52, and a new generation of bigger, faster, quieter submarines carrying longer-range multiple-warhead missiles.

Both weapons systems are estimated to cost tens of billions of dollars. If the strategic arms talks stretch out too long, pressure to go ahead on the expensive armaments will become heavy.

Creating pressures the other way, however, are mounting costs built into big domestic social programs, and President Nixon's apparent desire to strengthen his 1972 re-election bid with some sort of arms-control agreement.

With background like this in mind, some observers were quick to say that the judgment of the men who conducted the ORSA study was colored by loyalties to the depressed defense and aerospace industries.

233

WASHINGTON POST 4 NOVEMBER 1971 PAGE 10

234

# Navy's Chafee Sees Approval Of First Billion-Dollar Carrier

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Navy's first billion-dollar ship, a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, has sailed smoothly through budget challenges so far and is well on its way to becoming a reality, Navy Secretary John H. Chafee said yesterday.

He said in an interview that he did not blame Congress for refusing to finance the new Cimitz class carrier in the

past because the Nixon administration itself showed uncertainty on whether it should be built.

But this time, Chafee said, the Navy and its civilian bosses are united on the need to put a big chunk of money for the carrier in the fiscal 1973 budget now in preparation—with about $300 million expected to be put in that budget.

Without counting the cost of the airplanes that will go aboard it, the latest estimate for the new attack carrier

designated CVA-70—is $951 million. The airplanes would put the price well above $1 billion. Inflation and rising costs have pushed the price of the CVA-70 well above the cost of its sister carrier, the Eisenhower, which is expected to cost $616 million.

Chafee conceded that $1 billion is a staggering amount of money to pay for any single weapon complex. But he argued that the aircraft carrier has already proved itself a vital projection of national power in the past and will become even more important as foreign land bases for American forces decline in the era of America's low military profile in the world.

Without going into whether the Navy needs 15 attack aircraft carriers for the indefinite future, Chafee said the obvious problem right now is that the carrier fleet is old and must be modernized.

"I think the President was greatly impressed with what carriers could do in the Mediterranean." Chafee said in referring to the political leverage they provided during the Middle East crisis last fall. "Everybody who was associated with the flap thought it was pretty nice to have a few carriers around."

 Pressed on the question of two many carriers he thinks the Navy should keep on the line. Chafee said "there is nothing magic" about the number 15 but said he did not want to get in an argument now over the future force structure. He said critics often fail to realize that the number of carriers "is dictated" by world commitments.

Keeping two carriers in reserve for every one out on the line is the way to make sure men on the ships are rotated home regularly. Without this system, Chafee said, it would be difficult to keep anyone in the Navy. In a war, he said, a greater proportion of the total carrier force would be kept at sea.

It is still too early to tell whether President Nixon and his budget advisers will go along with the Pentagon on the new crarier. But Senate critics plan to challenge the carrier again arguing that it is

too much money for a ship that could be disabled by a ship-to-ship missile in a conventional war or an H-bomb in a nuclide war.

The Senate opponents of the aircraft carrier—the heart of the surface navy—have held up the CVA-70 two years as it is. The upshot of a 1969 amendment sponsored by Sens. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) and Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.), was a congressional study of the need for aircraft carriers.

That joint Senate and House Armed Services Committee study recommended that additional carriers be built but did not set a maximum number. However, the Nixon administration was conducting a carrier study of its own in 1970 so Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) of the Senate committee refused to approve the Navy's request for CVA-70 money until the administration's assessment was completed.

This year, the Navy's ambitions for the new carrier were thwarted again. The Senate refused to authorize the reprogramming of funds for the CVA-70 until another study—this one by the Pentagon—was completed.

"We did not get the carrier last year," Chafee said, "because there was too much ambivalence in the department and the rest of the government on it. The Senate quite rightly does not want to go out and use all its energy fighting for a carrier that the government will build if some study shows that we need it."

WASHINGTON POST

8 NOVEMBER 1971 P-3

# $7 Billion Overrun Rise In Year on Arms Charged

United Press International

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) charged yesterday that 45 major military weapons systems will cost the government $66.2 billion more than original estimates, indicating that the cost overrun problem is getting worse.

The new figures, supplied by Congress' General Accounting Office, compare with $28.2 billion in excessive costs for the same programs a year ago.

"Thus in one year, the overruns themselves have increased by $7 billion, or 25 per cent," Proxmire said in a statement.

The latest figures show ably no letup in the spiral-costs of weapons systems.

The problem of cost overruns appears to be growing worse."

Proxmire said analysis of the figures showed that $15.5 billion of the overruns involve nine weapons systems—the B1 bomber, the F111 fighter, the Minuteman II missile, the Minuteman III, the Safeguard antiballistic system, the SAM-D missile, the MBT-70 main battle tank, the M-60 tank and the TOW missile program.

Proxmire also charged that "there are a number of serious problems in other weapons whose dimensions are still hidden by statistical gimmicks, and the fact that it is too early to evaluate the results of actual production."

"This is especially true for Navy weapons systems," he said.

235

WALL STREET JOURNAL

3 NOVEMBER 1971 P-4

MONDAY MORNING, 8 NOVEMBER 1971

# Navy Moves Ahead With Escort Ship Plans Despite a Go-Slow Signal From Congress

By RICHARD J. LEVINE

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Despite a clear go-slow signal from Congress, the Navy is moving ahead rapidly with plans to build a new $2.5 billion class of escort ships.

The class is known as the Patrol Frigate, or PF, and the Navy would like to build 50 of the 3,400-ton warships at $50 million apiece.

Efforts to launch the PF provide an interesting glimpse at the tactics used by the military services to promote big weapons programs. They also demonstrate the difficulty Congress has in keeping track of the $76 billion defense budget.

Today, ship designers and builders interested in the PF are scheduled to attend a "classified industry briefing" on details of the program at the Navy's Ship Systems Command here.

Indications are the Navy is planning to ask industry before the end of the year to submit proposals for design work on the PF. Though turned down once, the Navy also is preparing to ask Congress to "reprogram," or switch, $10 million to the PF from other Navy projects once Congress finishes work on the defense money bill for the year that started July 1.

All this activity comes as a surprise on Capitol Hill as it involves a program that has never been approved by Congress. Indeed, the Navy appears to be doing just what it was told not to do, violating the spirit if not the letter of a legislative decision earlier this year.

All the Navy's planned activity would appear to signal "a form of a start (on the PF), however nominal," says a congressional expert on defense matters.

## Committee Refuses

Last summer, the Navy asked the Senate

Armed Services Committee for permission to switch $51.6 million into the PF program through a budget amendment. But the committee refused, expressing concern that approval of the money—for initiating design work and procurement of long-lead items—would, in effect, commit the Congress to a big, expensive program without a thorough examination.

At a brief hearing on July 14, Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr. (D., Va.) lectured Adm. Ralph Cousins, Vice Chief of Naval Operations: "I am sympathetic with your view but as a businessman and as a legislator I have some hesitancy in approving something that was brought in at the last minute. ... Before the Congress goes into a new program, it ought to have a lot more facts than are available here."

And in denying the Navy request for the $51.6 million the committee said that, while it was "generally sympathetic" with the PF concept, "additional review is required prior to commitment to a program of this size." The panel promised further hearings on the PF program as well as the overall status of naval forces.

Navy men contend the current PF approach is entirely above board, noting that the Senate panel rejected the money request "without prejudice" and arguing that there is a critical need for the ships. Industry officials attending today's meeting will be advised of the cloudy funding situation, a Navy spokesman says.

On Capitol Hill where it was believed the PF program was bottled up for at least a year, defense experts agree the Navy, in a strict sense, hasn't done anything illegal. At this point "there is nothing we can do," says a Senate source. "We're kind of stymied."

## "Build Contract Pressure"

What seemed perfectly clear to congressional staffers is that the Navy is, in the words of one, attempting to "get a show going and

build contract pressure" for the PF program. "It's a form of leaning against Congress," says another. "It's part of the Navy's lobbying. Zumwalt is an activist," he adds, referring to Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations.

Industry pressure undoubtedly could help speed the program—especially since the PF work promises to be spread around. Current plans call for selection of two contractors for design work, with one of these companies also responsible for building the first vessel. The 50 ships would be built at three separate yards.

Maneuvers involving the PF also show that the "reprogramming process is a jungle," says a defense analyst. Late requests to switch funds from one program to another make it more difficult for Congress to control the procurement process and at the same time make it easier for the military services to shape programs to their liking.

The Navy says it was impossible to include the PF in its original budget request submitted last January because work hadn't yet been completed on the ship's basic outlines.

While it's considered likely the PF will eventually win congressional approval, some Senators have questioned the need for more escort ships. They're concerned about the apparent inconsistency in building more ships for convoy duty at a time when Defense Secretary Melvin Laird is calling for U.S. allies to assume a larger ocean-escort role.

In March, Mr. Laird told Congress: "It is one of our goals for the 1970s that our Atlantic and Pacific allies should provide a major contribution in protecting the convoys that in war would be carrying material for their sustenance."

As the Navy sees it, the Patrol Frigate—heavily armed with guns, torpedoes, surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles—would be a relatively inexpensive ship for protecting military and merchant convoys as well as amphibious forces and supply ships. It isn't designed to operate with high-speed aircraft carrier task forces.

WASHINGTON POST 8 NOVEMBER 1971

of Future or Another F-111?

236

# F-14: $4 Billion Test for Navy

By Michael. Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

CALVERTON, N.Y.—In 41 years of building airplanes, 19,000 Navy fighter planes have rolled off the production lines at Grumman Aerospace Corp. Thousands of flights tests have been made from the company's sprawling airfield here and from another airstrip not far away at Bethpage, the company's headquarters on Long Island.

But nothing that has taken off from either field in the past will match the importance for Grumman and the Navy of a new series of flight tests scheduled to get under way here Nov. 30 and continue, periodically, for at least a year.

On that date, a Navy test pilot is slated to strap himself into the cockpit of a new Grumman-built F-14 jet fighter and begin putting this costly and controversial warplane through its paces.

The F-14 already has a load of 70 times, but that is just about 10 per cent of the planned testing and there have always been Grumman test pilots at the controls. Now it is the Navy's turn to see if the F-14 and its complex load of missiles, radars and guns work as advertised.

A successful F-14 means big business—at least $4 billion and possibly a lot more—for Grumman and scores of other companies at a time of sagging fortunes for the defense industry as a whole. Yet, at $16.7 million apiece, the plane is one of the most expensive weapons to come along in recent years and it has been thought in aeronautical circles that a Defense congressional approval from Congress for its future will not be assured.

During the time the Navy tests

and the Navy's service will

be one of the most successful

of the Navy's all-out stages of development.

The Navy has just released its latest

plan for the F-14, as will be the latest update of the aircraft.

The Navy has also released

its latest update and

its latest aircraft car-

ing. The Navy has also released

its latest aircraft and

its latest aircraft car-

its latest aircraft and

its latest aircraft car-

cent of the F-111 (TFX) fiscal of the early 1960s by putting a costly and complicated warplane into production before it was adequately tested and before being certain that it could carry out its mission.

By late next year, Grumman will know whether its hard-earned reputation as a builder of quality airplanes can survive the F-14. Although 50 per cent of the plane is built by others—including the jet engines and missile armament, both of which are crucial to the plane's success—"It will be our name that's on the rudimentary pedals," says Grumman F-14 project manager Peter E. Oram.

The Pentagon will know if another huge aerospace company is heading for the same kind of financial disaster that brought Lockheed to the brink of bankruptcy this year and forced the government overtly into the business of balling it out. Grumman has said that it cannot profitably continue indefinitely to build the F-14 at the price it agreed to when it won the long-term contract in January, 1969.

By the time these flight test are over, some 30,000 to 40,000 employees at plants here and in Connecticut and Florida, where the engines are built, and in California, where the F-14's Phoenix missile and electronics are built, will also learn whether they will join the swollen ranks of unemployed defense and aerospace workers.

Besides everything else riding on these tests, the results should show something about the quality of criticism being voiced on Capitol Hill and the quality of top-level Pentagon decision-making.

The timing of the Navy tests is also crucial. Despite an intensive attack on the plane by some legislators, a move to knock out $806 million from this year's defense budget for 48 more F-14s was easily defeated, 61 to 28, on Sept. 30.

Of all the forthcoming tests, the most critical are expected to take place next summer. If they are delayed for any reason, the Congress next tail may again be confronted with a vote on spending another billion dollars for the next batch of 48

in force, although there would still be no conclusive flight test results.

At this point, Congress has approved funds for 76 F-14s, including 12 test models, 26 production models approved last year (some of which are also needed for Navy flight trails) and the 48 approved this year.

Actually, the final acceptance tests for the F-14 will not come until December, 1972, after the next round of contract signing. But the Navy and the Pentagon both expect to have the F-14's performance pegged before then.

Although the Navy's top brass is publicly on record in the support of the F-14 even at this stage, defense experts in and out of the Pentagon agree that the Navy flight evaluations are tough and "run by a pretty hard-nosed, bunch," making it difficult for the Navy to go on buying a lemon if that is what the flight tests show.

At Grumman, last month's vote to keep F-14 production going has —at least temporarily—eased a good deal of the tension among workers and management alike. Interviews with several top officials reveal a clear sense of optimism that the F-14 will airplane.

But there is also an obvious sense of bitterness here over what officials feel has been unfair treatment of their company and their product by some in Congress, the Pentagon and the press.

Now, ironically, the firm finds its technical reputation being challenged by some critics on the F-14, the plane that was supposed to overcome all the flaws of the F-111. The firm also finds itself bickering with its old friends in the Navy and Pentagon over the cost of the plane at a time when defense business is shrinking.

"There has been a lot of distortion by pseudo-analysts and by the press," claims Loys M. (Butch) Satterfield, assistant to Grumman president Lew Evans.

Satterfield's biggest gripes are directed at Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), the F-14's most persistent and effective congressional critic. "Our biggest complaint," says Satterfield, is that Proxmire "doesn't verify his information before he puts it out."

Satterfield also charges that F-14 critics have used the current price of a single F-4 Phantom fighter, more than 4,000 of which have been built, to compare with the F-14's of which only 213 are thus far planned.

Among other things, Proxmire and Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) claim that with a relatively minor modification, the Phantom, the Navy's current front-line fighter, could be made to out-perform the initial version of the F-14, at far less cost.

The Navy and Grumman claim that under no circumstances is this true, and they cite Navy studies which report that the F-14 can climb, accelerate and roll at least 20 per cent better than the modified Phantom, with a 40 per cent advantage in turning radius, all critical maneuvers in a dogfight.

Proxmire and Symington, on the other hand, claim knowledge of studies to support their contentions. These are believed to have been made, in Proxmire's case, within the Air Force—which is building its own new fighter (the F-15), and in Symington's, within McDonnell Douglas Corp., the Missouri-based manufacurer of both the Phantom and the F-15.

This war of paper studies may reflect both real concern over the best approach to building new fighters and some partisan views on what parts of the country should get slices of the shrinking defense pie. It also reflects, in part, the output of what Pentagon insiders say is an anti-F-14 "underground" composed of a small but experienced group of aircraft designers and fighter pilots who oppose the Navy approach.

One technical critic willing to make his views public is Duane Yorke, the president of Dynamics Research Associates, a small consulting firm about eight miles from Bethpage.

Yorke is an aeronautical engineer from MIT who spent 14 years with Grumman through 1967.

Yorke estimates that the F-14 will be better than the F-111, but he lines up on the side of those who say that a modified F-4 Phantom could outperform the new Grumman plane.

The primary motivation behind the F-14 design,

Yorke claims, is "inter-serv-
ice bureaucratic rivalry"
and, he adds, the Defense
Department is "withholding
all adverse data and re
ports" on the design.

At Grumman, however, of-
ficials hotly dispute this,
claiming that the lessons
learned from the F-111 have
been out to good use, pre-
cisely to avoid the flaws
that plagued the earlier
plane. There ar major con-
ceptual differences in the
design of the two planes and
in the wing structures.
Grumman says the F-14 is
getting more structural test-
ing on the ground earlier in
its development than any
other plane in history.

In June, 1970, an F-14
wing box cracked short of
its design goal during a
stress test at Grumman, and
last December an F-14
crashed on its second test
flight. The mishaps were
early and stinging for Grum-
man, but the causes report-
edly have been fixed. Prog-
ress since then has been
solid and steady, according
to the top officials here.

But Grumman and Penta-
gon officials concede that at
this point only about 10 per
sent of the total planned
testing is completed.

It was the crash last De-
cember that set the flight
testing program back six
months and, in turn, set-up
the TFX-style situation the
Navy now faces wherein
production has been author-
ized before much of the
flight evaluations are fin-
ished.

Before the latest contract
was signed last month for 48
more planes, Grumman
tried to persuade the Penta-
gon to buy only 21 F-14s in
this budget. This would
keep production rates low,
about one a month, into late
1972, when the final accept-
ance tests are scheduled,
rather than four per month

with the 48-plane purchase.
Grumman argued that while
this would indeed break the
contract and provoke accu-
sations that the company is
being "balled out," it would
also help avoid the TFX-
style trap in case more trou-
ble developed and also allow
more time to introduce the
advanced "B" version of the
F-14 with more powerful en-
gines.

Grumman says it was only
thinking of the Navy, but in
the Defense Department
there was little sympathy
for Grumman's view. Not
only would the bail-out
charge have been raised, of-
ficials say, but Congress
might have killed the pro-
ject altogether under those
conditions.

Furthermore, one official
says, Grumman's price for
21 planes "was a large frac-
tion" of the price for 48.

The Pentagon's attitude is to hold the company's "feet to the fire." Defense officials say that neither they nor the Navy is convinced that Grumman will lose money on the F-14, although they admit there is that possibility.

It was a Grumman fore-
cast last year, projecting a
possible cost increase of $1
billion to $2 billion for the
F-14 fleet that sent the Pen-
tagon into a panic.

Subsequently, the plan to
build 722 planes was re-
duced to a currently
planned 313, a move which
helped push the price per
plane to $16.7 million (in-
cluding research and devel-
opment costs), making the
F-14 the world's most expen-
sive fighter.

The disclosures came as a
number of influential legis-
lators were beginning to
worry openly about whether
U.S. weapons were becom-
ing so costly that the coun-
try might not be able to af-
ford to buy enough planes,
tanks and ships to fight fu-
ture battles.

What went wrong, Grum-
man says, is that in 1968 no-
body could have predicted a
doubling of the inflationary
trend coupled with the bot-
tom falling out of the space,
defense and executive air-
liner field all at once.

While men were walking
on the moon, NASA can-
celed the remainder of
Grumman's LM program. In
1969, aerospace accounted
for half of the firm's billion
dollars insales. Now it is
the F-14 that accounts for 40-
per cent of Grumman's busi-
ness.

From 38,000 people in
1968, Grumman is now down
to about 22,000. The 2300 en-
gineers that were on the F-
14 project at one time have
been cut to 700. The Penta-
gon says its wants Grum-
man to "skinny down" even
more. But Grumman main-
tains that its efforts to cut
costs have been substantial
and are overshadowed by
events out of its control.

The company says its busi-
ness is down 28 percent and
that it has cut employment
by 38 per cent. Grumman
says that it has stayed within
its contract cost for the F-14's
development phase.

"We'll come out with a
slight profit or loss on the
development work." says
Vice President Mike Pele-
bach, "and that's okay. Our
problem is in production.
We just don't see the couple
of bucks there, and that's
the hang-up."

Precisely how much
Grumman will lose is not
yet clear, say corporate offi-
cials. Nevertheless, the firm
insists that it will "not be-
come another Lockheed."

Privately, officials here
say they will not allow the
Pentagon to force the com-
pany to accept any more F-
14 contracts under which
they stand to lose "tens of
millions of dollars" in years
ahead.

Grumman officials convey
a cautious feeling that the
worst of the F-14 battles
may be behind them. While
they once told the Navy
they could not afford to ac-
cept this year's contract,
they decided to do so and to
treat what loss they see as
an "investment." (Even if a
loss on the F-14 is recorded
this year, the company ex-
pects to show a corporate
profit.)

With 48 more planes in
the works, and if the flight
test; go well, the implication
is that Grumman will be in
a strong position with the
Pentagon next year around
contract time.

Officials here believe the
Navy still will wind up buy-
ing more than 700 of these
planes as long as it succeeds
in maintaining the level of
its carrier fleet. They say
they also have had "very
preliminary" discussions
with Germany, Japan, Brit-
they also have had "very

At the Pentagon, however,
officials say the Defense De-
partment holds some high
cards, too. "We won the last
game didn't we," says one
foolish referring to Grum-
man's reluctant acceptance
of the October contract.

Without the F-14 contract,
one top official say he does
not see how Grumman's
management could survive
the next stockholders' meet-
ing.

What's the alternative if
Grumman is indeed faced
with a continuing large loss
"We still hope to work out a
permanent resolution with
the government" say Grum-
man's Satterfield.

A high-level Pentagon of-
ficial lists three alterna-
tives: "Bail them out: go to
a carrier-based version of
the Air Force F-15, which
Deputy Secretary of De-
fense) Packard has ordered
the Navy to keep looking at;
or, there is always the im-
proved F-4 Phantom."

The F-14 and a healthy
Grumman, however, is still
the first choice.

237

AVIATION WEEK 15 NOVEMBER 1971 (16)

239

# Conferees Clear $21.3-Billion Defense Bill

By Donald C. Winston

Washington—Senate-House conferees agreed on a $21.3-billion Fiscal 1972 defense procurement authorization bill last week, in a move which clarified congressional intent on the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, supervision of Lockheed Aircraft Co. handling of the C-5A contract, research and development procurement policy and other points of disagreement between the houses.

Earlier, conferees had reached decisions on major hardware procurement (AWAST Nov. 1, p. 17). Final approval of the authorization bill had been delayed because of differences over policy language.

Final agreement on the authorization cleared the way for the House Appropriations Committee to report a $25.7-billion bill funding the Fiscal 1972 defense procurement program, including research. The money bill is larger than the authorization because it funds ongoing programs that do not require annual authorization. Indications are that the money bill will move through Congress with relative dispatch, with the leadership anxious to have all major legislation complete by recess early in December.

The final authorization is $871.5 million less than the original Defense Dept. request last January. Congressional cutbacks in the shipbuilding request and in research, development, test and engineering accounted for the bulk of the reduction. Major hardware procurement items were, for the most part, left intact.

On Safeguard, conferees approved the Senate restriction on deployment to two sites, with advance preparation only at two others and no authorization for a start on a site near Washington, D.C. But in their report of the action, conferees declared that the controlling factor is not a desire to limit Safeguard deployment as much as a recognition that the program has slipped, and as a consequence further deployment authorization would be premature.

As finally approved, full authorization was continued for deployment at Grand Forks AFB, N.D., and Malmstrom AFB, Mont. Advance preparation only was approved for Whiteman AFB, Mo., and Warren AFB, Wyo.

Final approved figure for Safeguard research, development, test and engineering was $357.6 million, or $52.4 million less than the original Army request of $410 million. In addition, $109.6 million has been approved for Safeguard construction; this was $74 million less than the original request.

Senate restrictions on Lockheed accounting procedures regarding cost overrun authorizations for the C-5A ego aircraft were reluctantly accepted by House conferees, who receded only after prolonged argument.

The restrictions preclude Lockheed from including bid and proposal costs, independent research and development costs, and the cost of other similar unsponsored technical effort among those items recoverable under the C-5A program. Also prohibited are deprecation and amortization costs on property, plant or equipment.

Reps. Leslie C. Aren is (R.-Ill.), Charles Gubser (R.-Calif.) and Bob Wilson (R.-Calif.) refused to accept the agreement of their eight House colleagues on the conference committee, and registered a formal dissent. They termed the Senate language "restrictive and harsh," claiming that Congress had already taken a hard hit on Lockheed's fixed loss

on the program to be $200 million.

"To restrict the traditional right of recovering depreciation, bid and proposal and independent research and development costs is to add upwards of an additional $20 million in fixed loss." they complained, characterizing the Senate move as legislative amendment of a contract on an ex post facto basis.

Conferees also approved a Senate restriction on expenditure of research, development, test and engineering money, requiring that from Fiscal 1972 onward all such appropriated funds be available for obligation no longer than two years. Senate sources said that the intent of the amendment was to give Congress additional control over research spending by the Defense Dept.

Other points of agreement reached by conferees included:

* Decision to abolish the Defense Special Projects Group, an organization created by former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara to devise technological means of fighting the Indo-china war. The group is best known for its development of the "McNamara Line," an automated string of sensors across Vietnam which prevented people from crossing without detection but which failed to stop guerrilla action by the civilian population already living across the line. Sensor technology responsibility was returned to the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

* Setting of $34 million, rather than the requested $67.5 million, for Defense Dept. prototype program implementation. Conferees agreed on a program which included $12 million for the Army: $10 million for Navy and $12 million for Air Force.

* Amendment of a Senate-sponsored clause in the bill requiring annual reports by the defense secretary on development schedules, procurement schedules and operational testing and evaluation for weapons systems for which procurement funds are being requested. House conferees accepted the provision after it was amended to give the defense secretary power to withhold the information in instances where disclosure might affect source selection. The same power was granted where security is involved

CHICAGO TRIBUNE - 17 NOVEMBER 1971 P-3

# House Debates Air Force
# Bid to Buy 12 More F-111s

240

BY PHILIP WARDEN

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 —
House debate of a $71 billion
defense appropriation bill dis-
closed today that the Air Force
would buy 12 more of the con-
troversial F-111 airplanes.

These are the planes the
Johnson administration or-
dered from a Texas manufac-
turer. So many crashed in
combat in Viet Nam they were
grounded. They proved too
heavy for Navy aircraft car-
riers.

Mahon Urges Buying

Rep. George Mahon [D., Tex.], chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, acknowledged under questioning by Rep. H. R. Gross [R., Ia.] that he recommended $112 million for the 12 additional planes, plus $183 million extra to cover the estimated cost overrun. Mahon said each plane would cost $16 million. Gross said the original price of the plane was $4 million.

"The only thing not explained is the difference in cost between an F-111 which will fly, and the F-111 which won't fly," said Rep. Frank Thompson [D., N. J.].

Passage of the long-overdue
Defense Department money bill
went over until later this
week.

Senate, House Disagree

The Senate and House found
themselves disagreeing over
emergency financing for de-
fense, poverty, foreign aid. and
the city government of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.

The legally penniless pro-
grams were kept in limbo to-
night when the House rejected
a Senate continuing resolution
for them and insisted on a
House-Senate compromise con-
ference.

House lenders tried to accept
the Senate resolution to extend
temporary spending authority
until Dec. 1 to put the pro-
grams legally back into busi-
ness immediately. But required
unanimous consent. and two
House members refused.

The House finally decided by
voice vote to send the Senate
Dec. 1 date into a House-Senate
conference with the original
House resolution to continue
the program, until the end of
this year's session of Congress.

The Senate approved a reso-
lution to allow the Defense De-
partment, the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity, and the
District of Columbia to contin-
ue operating until Dec. 1 at
last year's appropriations lev-
els.

It ordered a ceiling on for-
eign aid spending. At the sug-
gestion of Sen. Allen J. Ellen-
der [D., La.], Appropriations
Committee chairman, foreign
aid will operate to Dec. 1 un-
der an annual appropriations
ceiling of $2,681,745,000, instead
of the $3,396,516,000 level at
which it has operated since
July 1 of this year.

The financing authority for
all four major agencies ex-
pired yesterday. They had
been operating under a contin-
uing resolution since July 1 be-
cause bills appropriating funds
for their 1972 operations had
not been completed by Con-
gress.

Altho the approval of contin-
uing resolutions usually is a
routine affair in the Congress,
the squabble over foreign aid
created a roadblock this year.
Ellender has been an inveter-
ate foe of foreign aid spending.
This year he had the support
of Sen. Mike Mansfield [D.,
Mont.], the majority leader,
and other Senate doves who
lost their fight to get Senate
approval of Viet Nam War
amendments into the aid bill.

In the House, three amend-
ments were proposed to the de-
fense money bill.

Rep. Edward Boland [D.,
Mass.] proposed to require an
end of the war by June 30,
1972, provided the prisoners of
war were returned. The
amendment was opposed by
Speaker Carl Albert [D.,
Okla.].

An amendment proposed by
Rep. Leslie Aspin [D., Wis.]
sought to hold defense spend-
ing to last year's level. This
would be a reduction of ap-
proximately 2 per cent.

On the Operations Research Committee Report
and the ABM Debate

WASH: POST
17 NOV 1971

242

Joseph Alsop's column of November 8 for the most part accurately reflects the findings and tone of the recent critique by the Operations Research Society of America of the role of myself and others in the ABM debate. What Mr. Alsop failed to appreciate or convey to his readers was the fact that the ORSA report is a technically incompetent critique—based on bizarre procedural arrangements, selective use of evidence, and remarkably uncritical acceptance of administration assumptions. many of which had little or no foundation in fact.

This is not the place to discuss all of the deficiencies of the ORSA report—we have done that in some detail elsewhere—but lest readers be misled by Mr. Alsop's column it is perhaps useful to comment on two issues in the ABM debate: the possible vulnerability of the U.S. Minuteman force to a Soviet SS-9 "first strike" in the mid-70's, and whether the Safeguard ABM deployment would make a significant difference in Minuteman survivability.

Although the second question was really what the ABM debate was all about, ORSA focused its attention almost exclusively on the first, a hardly surprising fact since Albert Wohlstetter who instigated the inquiry, and whose lead it slavishly followed, had largely avoided commenting on Safeguard's utility in both his testimony and his specification of changes.

As regards Minuteman vulnerability, I would point out that estimates necessarily had to be based on interpretation of intelligence information and technical judgment of what the situation would be six years later. Various participants in the debate made quite different judgments, and such differences, not mathematical manipulation which was essentially trivial, nor the application of esoteric operations research techniques, accounted for my estimating that 25 per cent of the Minuteman force would survive while Mr. Wohlstetter and Defense De-

partment spokesmen stated 5 per cent. I leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusion as to whose judgments were more reasonable pointing out that I would now revise my estimates of Minuteman survivability upward as it now seems even less likely than it did two years ago that the U.S. SR. could fully equip its SS-9 force with highly effective multiple independently targetable recenty vehicles (MIRVs) by the mid-70's. Reports such as those by Michael Getler of a recent DOD/CIA sponsored study by TRW (The Washington Post, June 17), General Ryan's March 9 testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, and Secretary Packard's remarks of October 21 lead me to believe that the administration too might now estimate very substantial survivability.

The administration seems also to have largely come around to the views of its opponents with regard to the question of Safeguard effectiveness. Thus, it is now recognized, even in the Defense Department, that the missile site radar is the Achilles' heel of Safeguard, and there are serious efforts under way to design a dedicated hard-site defense employing less expensive radars as many of us recommended. And it is now considered, as we had suggested, that Safeguard as originally planned will be an inadequate defense if a build-up in Soviet missile capabilities continues, whereas originally it was argued that it was needed in case of such a build-up.

Mr. Alsop points out that we admitted mistakes. A single example will perhaps put that admission in perspective. I had argued that Messrs. Laird, John Foster and Wohlstetter had made unrealistic assumption in imputing to the Soviet Union the capability, in executing an attack against us, of compensating for all their missile failures by replacing the failures with other warheads aimed at the same targets. In fact, Mr. Wohlstetter had, unlike Messrs. Laird and Foster, apparently assumed that 15 per cent of the failures could not be so replaced. I was in error and was criticized by ORSA for the mistake. It is to be noted that neither Mr. Wohlstetter nor the Defense spokesmen offered any analysis to support their contention that such tactics were feasible. Yet, the ORSA committee did not criticize this omission. Rather, it attempted the back-up analysis for them, in so doing finding it necessary to use assumptions about Soviet MIRV technology totally at variance with observations!

Finally, Mr. Alsop alleges that I charged Howard Berger, one of the ORSA committee, with harboring personal animus against me; that Dr. Berger has claimed I was guilty of prevarication in making such a charge; and that there is solid evidence to that effect. I made no such charge and challenge Mr. Alsop and Dr. Berger to produce evidence that I did, much less evidence that I lied in making it! What I and my colleagues did suggest was that since Dr. Berger had previously been relieved by me of a position of responsibility, he should have been disqualified either by himself or by ORSA from participating in the inquiry. In suggesting this, we were not charging animus on his part, but rather lack of sensitivity and appreciation of reasonable professional and ethical norms by him and ORSA, a charge which the style of the ORSA inquiry fully substantiates.

As has been the case with so many of his columns, Mr. Alsop has again regrettably elected to accept uncritically those arguments consistent with his deep-seated biases rather than to attempt to understand and elucidate the issues involved in a complex question—in this case, those relating to the Safeguard deployment question.

G. W. RATHJENS.

WASHINGTON POST - 19 NOVEMBER 1971 P-1

# Senate Panel Votes To Cut GIs in Europe

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Appropriations Committee voted 14 to 13 yesterday, to bring home about 60,000 of the 310,000 American troops stationed in Western Europe by June 15.

A campaign was immediately launched by the Nixon administration to try to repeat its victory over Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield's drive last May to cut U.S. forces there by 50 per cent. That produced a massive White House lobbying effort which defeated Mansfield's bolder slash by a 61-to-31 Senate floor vote.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers charged yesterday that the new Mansfield amendment, if passed, would "undermine" negotiations now in prospect for mutual East-West troop reductions in Europe.

Rogers said that "any unilateral reduction forced on us by Congress at this time would destroy possibilities for these negotiations and, as a consequence, remove from the realm of the practical any mutual reductions."

The Senate committee's action came without public forewarning. But the Nixon administration learned Wednesday that the Senate's Defense Appropriations Subcommittee voted in secret to add the new Mansfield amendment to a $70.2 billion defense spending bill, and it attempted to over turn the vote when the full committee acted yesterday.

Laird, in a two-page letter rushed to senators, labeled the new Mansfield amendment "reckless" and "dangerous," and said it "would undermine chances for the success of mutual and enhanced force reduction negotiations" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Rogers joined yesterday in calling the amendment "most harmful," coming "at a moment when President Nixon is trying very far-reaching initiatives to reduce tensions" and negotiating "reciprocal" troop reductions.

Committee Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) dismissed the claims yesterday as "hogwash."

Ellender said, "We simply do not need 300,000 American troops there any more" and "our allies must take on a larger share of the defense burden in Europe."

He said he has been "advocating this for 20 years" and "all that talk about how it would hurt our cause and hurt us in dealing with the Russians—all that is so much hogwash to me."

The $70.2 billion defense bill approved by the full committee yesterday was $805.5 million less than the House approved and $3.3 billion less than the administration requested. It includes a $68.4 million cut in spending for military intelligence, and reduced funds for the A-7D fighter, submarines and defense research.

By a 14-to-10 vote, the Senate committee rejected an attempt to withhold all Indo-china war funds except those required to withdraw U.S. forces, conditional on the release of U.S. prisoners of war. Despite the defeat, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said he was encouraged by the prospects for winning the amendment on the Senate floor.

The Mansfield troop cut amendment states that "after June 15, 1972, no part of the funds appropriated in this act shall be used for support of United States military personnel (in Europe) in excess of 250,000." Laird said this would mean a reduction of "more than 60,000 men."

Ellender said he was mystified about how Laird learned Wednesday about the subcommittee vote to support the amendment, which Ellender said was 9 to 7. Ellender said it was Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and an Appropriations Committee member, who moved to strike the Mansfield amendment when the full committee met, losing by one vote.

Since the defeat last May of the earlier Mansfield amendment, the Nixon administration has been anxious to display some progress toward arranging East-West troop cut talks, to fend off pressure in Congress for unilateral U.S. troop reductions.

The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization in October designated former NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio to take soundings in Moscow to prepare for negotiations. The hope was that Brosio could do so by Nov. 15, and report back to the annual NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels on Dec. 8-10.

State Department spokesmen Charles W. Bray said the United States is "confident that Mr. Brosio will be going to Moscow" in time to report to the December meeting in Brussels. Bray later said "we have no commitment" from the Soviet Union, but reiterated assurance that the Brosio mission will take place in time.

Reporting on Rogers' opposition to the latest Mansfield amendment, Bray said, "The administration's view is that the way you engage people in serious negotiations is not to throw in your high card before you come to the table."

Mansfield, however, reiterated last night his disbelief in waiting for "mutual" force reductions with the Communists of Europe.

244

B-1 CONCEPT PUSSED

DENVER POST 1ST NOVEMBER 1971 (34)

246

# Congressional Mood Key to Bomber's Future

By DAN PARTNER

Denver Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Calif.—Carefully guarded in a hangar adjacent to Los Angeles International Airport is a full-scale, $3.3 million model of the world's most complex aircraft.

It's the B-1 bomber, an advanced weapons system designed to fly more than twice the speed of sound at above 50,000 feet and at 650 miles per hour at 150 feet, through any adverse weather and invisible to enemy radar beams.

## WOOD, PLASTICS

The sleek, white, mockup—a heavily blended aerodynamic structure resembling a king-size fighter plane—is made of wood and plastics. Some day it may be converted into aluminum, titanium and steel as a part of the U.S. deterrent force to reduce the B52 bombers.

The mockup could be the part of the controversial program and join the XB70 and other antiques at the Air Force Museum at Dayton, Ohio.

Whether the B-1 will ever join the Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC) as part of the Defense Department's triad concept of deterrent weapons depends on the mood of Congress when the next increment of the $11.1 billion program comes to a showdown vote next month.

A manned bomber is imperative. According to the administration, to maintain an effective mix of land and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and aircraft.

## B-1 OBJECTIVE

The B-1 objective, says the Air Force, is to develop and acquire for the post-1975 time period a fast reaction, intercontinental-range, survivable bomber capable of penetrating sophisticated enemy defenses for precision delivery of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, in general and limited war developments.

Proponents of the B-1 insist that without the B-1 to replace the aging B52s, U.S. defenses will suffer a serious and perhaps fatal imbalance in the

1980-1990 time period.

Opponents of the manned bomber concept, who have yet to launch a serious campaign to kill the project, are expected to maintain that the bomber has a questionable strategic value and that the program isn't worth the $11.1 billion.

## U. S. CUTBACK

While the Soviet Union reportedly is building a new supersonic bomber, the Backfire, and is maintaining its fleet of older heavy aircraft, anti-bomber advocates in the United States note a continuing cutback in the Air Force's defenses against a manned bomber attack.

Reduction of the Aerospace Defense Command's capability to detect, intercept and destroy manned bombers could indicate that U.S. planners don't believe the Russians give aircraft equal priority with land-based and submarine-launched missiles.

The U.S. Air Force maintains that bombers provide a flexible system not possible in an all-missile configuration, which would allow the enemy to focus his attack against a single defense. It is pointed out that bombers can be recalled up to the point of releasing their weapons over the target.

## BEGAN IN 1965

Development of the B-1 began in 1965 with the Air Force's Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) study. In June of last year, contracts totaling $2.6 billion were awarded to North American Rockwell and General Electric for research, development and test phases of the airframe and engines.

If this validation program proves successful—and Congress continues to supply the funds—the full-scale development phase will produce the first plane for testing in early 1974. Cost of a 241-plane fleet of B-1s is estimated at $8.5 billion.

North American Rockwell says the per-plane cost will be approximately $35 million. Opponents of the program insist the price tag will be closer to $50 million each.

## EQUIPMENT

Whatever the cost, the new

bomber will be a marvelous package of space age systems never before assembled in a single unit. The equipment list including low-light television infrared instruments and radar, is of the proven off-the-shelf variety.

Only item pushing the state of the art is the detachable crew compartment, which would be separated from the airframe in event of an emergency. The design calls for a rocket engine to blast the compartment away from the airframe.

Another engine, attached to the capsule, and stabilization fins will stabilize the compartment until three 60-foot-diameter chutes deploy to allow a soft landing.

The B-1 will have a gross takeoff weight of from 350,000 to 400,000 pounds and be capable of operating on 4,000-foot runways. This will allow the Strategic Air Command to disperse the B-1 fleet in a system of mini-bases located in the northern tier of Midwestern states, hopefully out of range of submarine-launched missiles.

## DIMENSIONS

The plane is 150 feet long, 34 feet high and the third-generation swing-wing system varies the span from 137 feet when forward to 78 feet when swept back for supersonic flight.

Four F-101 engines, each with 30,000-pound thrust, are twin-mounted under the wing. The power plants provide supersonic speed without use of afterburners, which add 50 per cent more thrust, according to Rick Cotton. North American Rockwell's B-1 development manager. If jet fuel isn't available, the engines will operate on regular automobile gasoline.

The four-man crew includes the pilot, copilot and two avionics systems operators. One operator handles the offensive systems and the other operates the electronic counter measures console and other defensive systems. Crewmen will enjoy the luxury of a flush toilet and two bunks.

## SPECIFICATIONS

The B-1, says Cotton, will be built to specifications allowing growth through the year 2000.

The airframe will have a 50,000 hour lifetime and there's a capacity for 10,500 pounds of avionics, about twice the weight of the avionics in the first operational aircraft.

The plane's key capability will be to fly at almost the speed of sound at tree-top altitude, beneath enemy radar, and carrying twice the weapons load of the B52.

North American Rockwell has developed a unique low altitude ride control system that will eliminate the extreme buffeting of the crewmen by air turbulence.

## 'EXCITER VANES'

The system is a derivation of two "exciter vanes" that were mounted on the XB70 research aircraft during a program to study effects of air turbulence on large aircraft traveling at high subsonic speeds at low altitude.

Because mission success depends largely on the crew's ability to perform, it is necessary to eliminate turbulence that reduces human effectiveness because of discomfort and the inability to monitor instruments, according to N. D. Showalter, B-1 operational suitability manager at North America Rockwell.

Another B-1 innovation is the multiplexing system that allows one wire to carry as many as 30 differ electrical functions.

## WIRING REDUCED

"Thirty two miles of wiring has been eliminated by the system," Cotton said.

He said the B-1 can be launched in less than half the time of the B-52. This would make the time from engine start to takeoff about five minutes. The designed launch time is one of the many classified performance items.

The B-1 program, Cotton says, is on schedule and operating under estimated costs.

"It's an extremely well-managed program, with the Air Force's 'over-the-shoulder' observation resulting in quick decisions," Cotton said.

WASHINGTON POST

24 November 1971 P1

247

# Senate Rejects GI Cut

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate passed a $70.8 billion defense money bill last night, after turning back a move to slash the U.S. contingent to NATO and adding $500 million in military credits for Israel.

The NATO cutback, sponsored by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.), was defeated by a 54-to-39 vote. It would have forced a reduction in U.S. European forces to 250,000 by next June 15. At present, the United States has 310,000 men in Europe.

The $500 million in credits for Israel was added by an 82 to 14 vote, despite strong objections from Appropriations Chairman Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) and Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) who said $385 million for Israel was already being provided in the foreign aid bill.

Withdrawal of a key GOP sponsor caused the collapse of a move to offer an end-the-war amendment. The anti-war bloc thus lost what may be its, last opportunity this session to respond to President Nixon's recent dismissal of end-the-war language in the earlier defense procurement bill.

The bill, on which the final vote was 80 to 5. now goes to conference with the House, which voted $71 billion in defense funds. The administration had requested $73.5 billion.

Defeat of the Mansfield amendment came after Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.) read to the Senate a letter dated Monday from President Nixon announcing that he met NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio, as a representative of the Atlantic alliance, will be received in Moscow next week to begin discussions on basic issues in mutual balanced force reductions" that could result in troop reductions in Europe by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Stennis said that he, like Mansfield, favors some reduction of U.S. burdens for the defense of Europe, but "as long as the President is trying, I'm willing to wait a few more days, a few more months."

The President's letter called the "substantial unilateral reduction" required by the Mansfield amendment "a great mistake." It said it would weaken NATO, while corroding the U.S. bargaining position in various negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet agreement to receive Brosio, which had been in some doubt, also represented the second time this year that Moscow has given a signal which, intentionally or not, helped the administration defeat Mansfield.

In May, Soviet Party leader Leonid Brezhnev made a speech calling on Washington to explore the ground for troop cuts. This supplied the administration with the argument that it was no time to cut U.S. forces unilaterally, just as the Russians were offering to do it through negotiations.

Sponsored by Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), the arms-for-Israel amendment specified that half the available $500 million should go for the purchase by Israel of 50 Phantom jets that Israel is seeking. The State Department has not yet approved the sale of the jets to Israel, on grounds that it might evaluate the Middle East arms race and retard chances for a negotiated settlement here.

One purpose of the Jackson amendment was to exert more pressure on Secretary of State William P. Rogers to approve the Israeli request.

At the White House, presidential press secretary Ronald Ziegler said the administration did not oppose the Israeli arms amendment. Asked whether the funds would be used, he responded, "That would depend entirely on our assessment... of the situation in the Middle East."

It is determined that additional equipment is necessary to preserve the arms balance. Ziegler said, "these funds are available to meet that objective."

Although beaten, the Mansfield NATO-cutback proposal was not votes this time than the amendment offered by Rep. Don May 19 and de

Mansfield, later, asked up seven senators who were absent or opposed him on the earlier vote. They are Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.M.), Alan Bible (D-Nev.), Lee MeCalf (D-Mont.), Thomas J. McIntyre (D-N.H.), Joseph M. Mentoya (D-N.H.), Jennings Randolph (D-W.Va.), and Robert Stafford (R-Vt.). However, four former supporters missed the vote yesterday—Frank Church (D-Idaho), Vance Harke (D-Ind.), George S. McGovern (D-S.D.) and William B. Saxbe (R-Ohio).

Mansfield told the Senate that his design, in seeking to cut NATO forces, was not to cripple or end the North Atlantic alliance, but simply to effect a "nominal troop cut in Europe" and let U.S. allies take over more of the burden. This would help shrink the over-extended U.S. military contingents around the world, he said, while cutting U.S. costs and balance-of-payments deficits at a time of economic crisis.

Stennis led the attack on Mansfield's plan, as he had six months ago. He said a unilateral reduction, achieved by legislative fiat, would shake the whole alliance. "save very little money," and undermine the President's efforts at a balanced, negotiated mutual force reduction.

"We are currently in the final stages of talks to establish improved arrangements for the sharing of the defense burden in Europe, including an agreement with West Germany to offset nearly $2 billion of United States costs, and the second phase of the European defense improvement program, to be finalized at the NATO meeting beginning Dec. 8," wrote the President.

"In the area of East-West relations, we expect that Mr. Brosio will be received in Moscow next week to begin discussions on basic issues in mutual balanced force reductions. At the same time, the Berlin negotiations have entered the final and most difficult stage. As you know, we are also making significant progress in the SALT talks," continued Mr. Nixon.

All four Virginia and Maryland senators opposed the Mansfield amendment yesterday, and backed the Jackson move to provide military credits to Israel.

Another major vote had been expected yesterday on an amendment drafted by

Church, John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Clifford P. Case (R-N.Y.) to cut off funds for U.S. military operations in Vietnam, except for withdrawal costs once prisoner-release had been agreed on.

However, arrangements to propose the amendment fell through when Cooper decided against being a co-sponsor. Cooper reportedly felt there was difficulty in offering an amendment that would be eligible under the rules for consideration on an appropriate

bill and that would focus adequately on what he regards as the central issue—a residual U.S. force in Vietnam. He also reportedly felt that the time is simply not ripe for a new fight over an end-the-war measure.

Just before passage, the Senate stripped from the bill a provision that would have allowed the Defense Department to hire commercial air cargo services only if the C-141s and C-34s in the department's Military Airlift Command were fully in use. The committee had inserted this restriction in order to avert "under-utilization" of the controversial C-34. The provision, which could have deprived commercial carriers of up to $168 million slated to be spent for commercial air cargo charges, was stripped from the bill on the insistence of Howard W. Cannon (D-Nev.)

America's B1 Bomber Must
Battle Budget First

FEBRUARY 13, 1971, STAR 13 (24)

In a cavernous hangar bay on the west side of the Los Angeles International Airport sits an airplane model. The model is as big as the Boeing 767. Costing $3.3 million, the model represents what the U.S. Air Force calls this nation's answer to the growing strategic threat of the Soviet Union, especially in the field of intercontinental, manned bombers. Critics of the program say the model represents another example of a costly government arms program, unneeded, untried and unrealistic. This is the B1.

By James J. Fisher
The Star's Aviation Editor
and Joe Lastelic
Of The Star's Washington Bureau

Los Angeles—The profile of the 1,400 mile-an-hour B1 strategic bomber is definitely low.

Low because the airplane itself hugs the ground, looking more like a fighter than a bomber. Bombers traditionally have been huge, ponderous machines, full of fuel and armaments. The B1 looks like a sleek version of the F106 interceptor.

Low because the Air Force and its two major subcontractors, North American Rockwell (airframe) and General Electric (engines), know that critics inside and outside Congress are going to push for cancellation of the 2.6-billion-dollar development program.

And low because the Air Force and contractors alike feel they have a winner in the B1, a top design with first-rate engines, a plane capable of delivering twice the load of the aging B52, and one that can counter the Russian design, code-named Backfire.

Prototypes of Backfire are known to be flying and Western intelligence sources say that the aircraft could be operational within two to two and one-half years. It has the basic configuration of the B1. It's range would allow it to strike targets east of the Mississippi without refueling.

The first flight of the B1 prototypes, said Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson. B1 project director, would probably come in April, 1974, if current schedules are kept.

General Nelson emphasized that the $2.6 billion the government is spending on the B1 program is for development only. That money will produce three flight test aircraft and one aircraft for use in static tests to see how the airframe reacts to stress. No production decision has been made, Nelson said.

Obviously the Air Force wants this program. Projections for production of 240 of the B1 estimate the cost at $25 million a plane, $15 million more than a commercial 747; $3 million less than the controversial Lockheed C5A.

Yet the Air Force and the depressed aerospace industry have learned lessons, bitter ones at that, but valuable in the anti-defense climate of today. Those lessons include:

* A return to prototypes. In the early 1950s Convair and Boeing built full-scale prototypes of new strategic bombers—Convair with the YB60; Boeing with the XB52. Boeing won. With the ar-

rival of Robert S. McNamara, former secretary of defense, in Washington in 1961, paper studies were substituted for hardware. Thus paperwork became the end, not the aircraft. The F111 and C5A programs are two examples.

* Disclosure. When asked about the cost of the B1 model General Nelson snapped right back. "3.3 million and this

is as much a tool as any jig or lathe." Five years ago the comment would have probably been no comment.

"We aren't going to talk about range (6,000 miles plus), altitude (70,000 feet plus), avionics, electronic countermeasures, or stuff that 99 per cent of Americans know that must be kept secret," said one Air Force officer. "But we are going to talk to the public about how this plane can protect him. That's first. We are going to talk about the Russian threat. And we are going to talk about price."

That point was emphasized when the bomb bays of the B1 were opened and newsmen got their first look at an impressive array of armament, conventional, nuclear, and defensive. Some of the older Air Force officers were clearly shocked by the doors opening but one officer said:

"The Russians can know within 10 per cent of what we've got inside. So can we."

Disclosure also means emphasizing that only prototypes will be built, not squadrons. When the supersonic transport went down the drain in the Congress last year, most persons thought a vote against the SST was against a giant fleet of the airplanes. Actually Boeing was building only two prototypes but somehow never managed to make that clear to the nation.

General Nelson said he believes support from the public and Congress is growing for the B1. That support is coming, observers say, from backers who want a strong deterrent in the post-Vietnam world, plus a bargaining tool in the current Strategic Arms Limitations Talks now under way in Vienna. The B1 would reaffirm America's commitment to the triple threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and long range bombers. The Soviet Union has the same commitment.

"It's like poker," said one industry spokesman. "You better have a good hand but not out of a deck that's so worn that the cards are dog-eared."

And dog-cared is probably an apt word for America's B52 striking force today. Maintenance is becoming heavier on the aircraft every year, with some of them almost 17 years old.

The B52, with many configurations for bombing conventionally, would take millions to convert it into a viable force. Wings would have to be rebuilt: structures repaired, and huge outlays for new engines and avionics would be required

248

Even then, Nelson said, the B52 would have no growth capability compared to the B1, nor would it have the range, low level bombing or defensive armament capability.

"It would be a patch job, all right," he said.

The cost of refurbishing the B52 fleet would be almost as expensive as developing the B1, a plane whose life is expected to be stretched into the mid-1990s.

As for the bomber version of the F111, the FB111, Nelson said it is "an interim airplane. If simply hasn't got the range or payload ability to do the job."

In an earlier interview, Dr. Robert C. Seamans, secretary of the Air Force, said an aircraft like the B1, capable of high subsonic speeds at low altitudes and supersonic speeds at high altitudes, is one answer to the antiballistic missile. A pilot can change course, speed and altitude, he said. A missile can't.

Seamans added that the Russians now have a two-to-one superiority over the United States in land and sea-based missile payloads, and that payload superiority is increasing. Although the United States has more heavy bombers (B52s), the Soviet Union has more total heavy and medium bombers since the retirement of the U.S. B58 and limited purchases by the Air Force of the FB111.

IN WASHINGTON the defense appropriations bill passed by the House yesterday includes $370,300,000 more for the B1 program for research, development, test and evaluation. So far $319 million has been spent on the B1 program.

Its predecessor was the B70 which was abandoned after $1,468,100,000 was spent on it. The state of the art of anti-aircraft missile warfare passed the B70 while it was under development and that is a concern that the Air Force and Congress have in common about the B1. The emphasis is to produce a system that defeats the capability of the Soviets to come up with more sophisticated threats of the future.

Having been burned on the B70 program, Congress is watching the B1 closely. The development cost now is estimated at $2.6 billion, and purchase of an unspecified number of aircraft (probably 240) at $8.5 billion, for a combined program cost of $11.1 billion.

At the congressional hearing on the B1 program, Rep. Joseph Addabbo (D-N.Y.) asked Lt. Gen. Otto J. Glaser, deputy chief of staff for research and development for the Air Force, "Is the Air Force putting all of its eggs in the B1 basket?"

"I believe what we have done is to make a very conscious decision that, of all the choices available to us, the B1 appears to be the optimum way to go," Glaser replied, adding the B1 is one of the most thoroughly studied aircraft ever proposed. The general said flexibility and versatility have been designed into the B1 to cope with a changing threat, whereas the B70 was limited to high altitude operation.

The questioning continues in and out of the Pentagon on the need for bombers. The Nixon administration is convinced of the need for a mixed force of bombers and land-based missiles. The arguments go like this:

* Bombers provide insurance against failures in the missile system, can be used in areas where the air defenses are less formidable than those in the Soviet Union, and can be used in non-nuclear wars.

* When the B1s go into service the B52s will be 18 to 22 years old and therefore there is a need to replace them.

* Work is necessary now because it takes 8 to 10 years to build new intercontinental bombers.

The first flight of the B1 is scheduled for April 1974, to be followed by a year of tests before the production decision. If all goes well the first bomber could be delivered to the Air Force in October 1977.

The B1 is smaller than the B52 which it will eventually replace. It is in the 360,000 pound weight class compared with 488,000 pounds for the largest models of the B52 and about 123,000 pounds for the FB111 fighter bomber. It will carry a crew of four compared with six in the B52 and two in the FB111. The B1's primary mission would be to deliver nuclear warheads over long distances against both military and urban-industrial targets. It could be configured to lay mines, bomb land forces in the field or attack selected military targets.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), long interested in airplanes and defense strategy, does not oppose funds for research and building of the prototypes, but he wants to study the results before committing himself in favor of B1 production.

The committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law made a study of the B1 and concluded there is no need for a new medium bomber. The thought was that there is a need for a manned bomber in the deterrent strategy and that the B52 should be used, possibly after being improved with new engines.

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) is pressing for further studies on bombers, but his staff says he has no intention now of trying to knock out funds for the B1. Production is another matter. Proxmire is worried about the cost. He says that given the experience of other recent aircraft the B1 costs can be expected to far exceed the estimates of the Defense Department. So the expected battle in Congress is yet to come, in a year or two.

249

251

CHICAGO TRIBUNE - 6 DECEMBER 1971 P-14

# Defense Budget Cuts Debated

BY STEPHEN CREWS

The proposed $80 billion defense budget for the coming fiscal year looms as a burden which every taxpayer would rather do without.

While that much was agreed upon Friday and Saturday at a conference of experts at the University of Chicago, the means of achieving meaningful cuts while maintaining security proved to be a more controversial question.

Exchange Verbal Salvos

Thirty-five participants at a seminar on "The Military-Industrial Complex and Arms Control," exchanged verbal salvos on defense for 16 hours. At the end a broad range of perspectives on the American security structure had been given. The Center for Policy Study at the university, the seminar sponsor, said these will be compiled into a book and used as the subject of a WTTW-TV program.

Among the most spited discussions was one started by the introduction of a paper authored by Seymour Melman, a professor at Columbia University and a member of the New York Historical Society.

In the paper, Melman drew a picture of a fortress America with minimal military manpower and a deterrent force limited to nuclear-equipped submarines as an alternative to the current defense strategy with its $70 billion price tag and bases in more than 30 foreign countries.

Frees $50 Billion

Melman said such a reduction, accomplished unilaterally, but in phases, would free at least $50 billion to provide for the well-being of the nation's citizens—as important a component of overall security, he said, as protecting the society from external threats.

The present defense budget, he said, has focused technology on nonproductive goods and has created the nation's economic problems.

The plan Melman offered called for a military force of 100,000 men, almost all to be stationed in the United States;

a fleet of 41 Polaris submarines; and a Navy and Air Force with a capability limited to defending the nation's shores.

Melman said this would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from aggression and also would create "pressure within the Soviet state" to make similar cuts in defense spending.

Attacked by General

First to attack the Melman proposal was Air Force Gen. Robert Richardson III (ret.), who formerly took part in American Strategic defense planning.

Richardson accused Melman of putting the cart before the horse by attempting to use a change in American policy as the means to changing the realities of the world.

"The driving force is the threat," he said, adding that defense budgets recede as the threat lessens, and not vice versa.

"We do have a cost problem in defense," Richardson said. "but what is the alternative?" He said the only real one, and the one Melman, in effect, was suggesting was a reduction in commitments.

Open to Aggression

The Melman plan, by limiting reaction forces to the nuclear bomb, would leave the West open to "nibbling aggression." Richardson said. The soviets would be able to make a series of small, independent advances, knowing that the United States would be hesitant to respond.

Maxwell Singer, president of the Hudson Institute, a New York "think tank" which does research for the Defense Department, challenged Melman's plan as being one which would prevent the United States from being able to win a war or

defend itself against a nuclear "first strike" by the soviets.

Relative Success Better

"After all," he said, "a war might happen, and it is better to be relatively successful than relatively unsuccessful."

Singer said he believed the maintenance of a conventional warfare capability is sadly necessary.

"We have a moral commitment to avoid the use of nuclear weapons even if it is more expensive," he said.

Norman Gelfand, an associate professor of the University of Chicago physics department, said the position taken by Melman would result in the step-by-step conquest of the world by the Russians, and the eventual economic isolation of the United States.

Challenges Polaris Plan

A final attack on the plan was made by Morton Kaplan, a political science professor at the University of Chicago, who challenged the idea of depending entirely on the Polaris submarine as an attack deterrent.

"The Navy seems to feel the Polaris is invulnerable," Kaplan said, "but that requires the assumption that the Russians are not more ingenious than us." He said that if a war were found to neutralize the Polaris threat the United States would be left defenseless.

A Frustrating Task

An aide to Henry Kissinger, who asked that his name not be used, described arms cut negotiations as a frustrating task.

The problem, he said, is in maintaining the military balance while cutting existing forces. It is a balance, he said, which is seen by each side in a different way.

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WASHINGTON POST - 9 DECEMBER 1971 P-32

# Pentagon Rewards Costly Weapons
## At Expense of Simplicity, Hill Told

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Claiming that "the really brilliant advances in weapons come from simplification" and not from making military hardware ever more complex, a former Pentagon official warned a Senate committee yesterday that the "weapons cost explosion has reached the stage where national defense is being severely impaired."

At the same session, the Senate Armed Services Committee heard the man responsible for developing one of the simplest, cheapest and best weapons ever built—the Navy's Sidewinder missile—say that the current system for developing new weapons "rewards the design of complex and expensive systems and penalizes work on simpler and therefore less expensive ones."

The military budget process, said the Navy's Dr. William B. McLean, now "ends up being a problem of guessing what will sell rather than what is really needed or can be produced."

The former official, Pierre Sprey, who spent four years as a weapons analyst in the Office of Systems Analysis, said the fascination with sophisticated weapons technology since World War II has greatly increased the "career possibilities and influence of both civilian and military technology advocates." That influence remains relatively unchecked by "counter-advocacy and by critical and realistic testing," he added.

Sprey, who left the Pentagon in 1970, is a strong advocate of more austere weapons

of all types so the United States would not be outnumbered in future battles.

But he, along with a small group of Air Force fighter experts, has pressed hard for the United States to build a lightweight, low-cost fighter stripped of everything not essential for its primary role of knocking down enemy planes under the most likely combat conditions during daylight and at subsonic speeds.

Pressing his case in 1968 while still in the Pentagon, Sprey wrote studies which irritated some higher-ups by showing, according to his calculations, that such a plane could out fight not only Soviet Migs, but the U.S. F-4 Phantom as well, and would be a lot cheaper than the Air Force's new F-15 and Navy F-14.

Although the Senate committee's special hearings are intended to help solve the problem of ballooning weapons cost and complexity, Sprey's testimony yesterday appeared to ruffle at least two committee members.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who has been sharply critical of Pentagon buying policies and has praised most of the critics who have come before the committee, said he disagreed with some of Sprey's comments and questioned Sprey mostly about his background. Both the F-15 and the Phantom are built in St. Louis.

Sen. Howard Cannon (D-Nev.), a strong advocate of tactical air power, said he disagreed with "a lot" of what Sprey said, and read aloud me-

moranda written by civilian Navy officials working on the new F-14 fighter which criticized Sprey's earlier studies.

Sprey said he knew about those memos but the actual technical critiques had never been shown to him for rebuttal.

Since the F-14 and F-15 programs have begun, the Pentagon has decided to undertake an experimental lightweight fighter project, with strong support by Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard.

### Goldwater Support

Sprey drew support from Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) who said "part of our trouble lies in some of our career civilian and military who can't see anything good in a new idea."

Sprey said that the best "Mig-killer" today is the French Mirage III, which has virtually none of the sophisticated electronics going into new U.S. fighters. Nor does the Mig carry such equipment, he said.

Sprey charged that the price the military is paying for radars, radios and navigational equipment was hundreds of time higher than the price commercial airliners pay and that the commercial equipment was far more reliable, another point on which he received strong backing from Goldwater.

Sprey claimed that high air-craft costs were hurting training because commanders were afraid to let pilots fly under full combat maneuvering stress for fear of losing expensive planes. Also, missiles cost too much to be fired enough in training, he said.

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon's effort to convince the Soviet Union that continued expansion of their nuclear arsenal will be by counter moves in this country is expected to result in a Defense Department request of about $81.5 billion for the next fiscal year, according to informed defense officials.

Barring any last-minute changes by the White House, the new military budget for fiscal 1973, which goes to Congress next month, is expected to be $2 billion to $3 billion higher than this year's.

Contained in that new budget are several items intended to offset the buildup of Soviet land and submarine-based missile forces. These include a speedup in the rate at which U.S. Minutemen and Po- seinid ICBMs are being converted to carry multiple warheads, a speedup in the development of a new submarine-missile combination known as ULMS, the B-1 bomber, and another sizeable increase in the Navy's fleet modernization.

Meanwhile, in a related development, there is some evidence—though far from conclusive at this time — that the steady expansion of the large, new Soviet ICBM silo construction program may be slowing down.

While work continues in the Soviet Union on roughly 90 of these new underground silos, authoritative government sources say that few if any additional ones have been spotted since about September.

Officials note that Russian missile programs frequently have been marked by pauses of several months, only to start up again later. They also say that it is possible that some additional silos may have been started that have not been detected by U.S. reconnaissance satellites.

The construction of these large missile silos, first spotted early this year, has been a major source of concern to U.S. defense planners. The size of the holes being dug indicated that at least some of could house missiles larger than the mammoth SS-9. The Soviet Union already has about 290.

Initially, about 10 of the new holes were spotted and reported publicly in this country in March. As U.S satellites expanded their coverage of the Soviet land mass and as

more Soviet construction work got started, the number of new silos detected climbed to about 40 last spring and then to about 80 early in August. Since shortly after that, however, officials say there has been little if any change.

At the Pentagon, officials say that even if the Soviet ICBM program is leveling off there is still considerable cause for concern about the roughly 90 new silos under construction now. This number of new missiles by itself, it is said, calls for some form of U.S. response.

The new Pentagon budget will go to Capitol Hill next month at a time when the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitations talks have reached a crucial stage in Vienna.

Until this latest round of the talks began last month, virtually all discussion has centered around the defensive ABM systems that each nation is building.

Now, the United States is attempting to focus the talks primarily on some limitations of offensive weapons, both land- and sea-based. The United States is pressing hard for a limit on the SS-9 type missile with a specific cutoff date beyond which no more of these large new silos will be started or perhaps finished. The United States also is attempting to limit Soviet missile-firing submarine production, which is expected to outstrip the United States, in 1973.

In recent days, both Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and Defense Department spokesmen have been signaling the Soviet Union that the Pentagon would recommend a speed-up in several strategic programs in this year's budget as a response to Russian moves. And last week, the Pentagon also announced that the U.S. Safeguard ABM had been successfully tested against a U.S. Polaris missile carrying multiple warheads. The Safeguard is the weapon the Soviets seem most interested in halt- ing.

Defense officials say, however, that the final decisions on these matters still rest with the White House, and that a presidential decision to forego some of the weapons speed-ups might bring the final budget down by about $1 billion.

As it now stands, the Pentagon's proposed new budget involves about $81.5 billion in authorizations for next year, but the actual amount to be spent is said to be about $79

billion to $80 billion.

Thus, if a SALT agreement is made this spring, as a number of officials hope, it is conceivable that some of the projects set in motion by the new budget might be altered before large sums are spent.

This year's fiscal 1972 defense budget called for authorizations of just over $79 billion and actual outlays of about $76 billion to $77 billion. However, the final defense bill, reflecting both cuts by Congress and additions for higher military pay, has not yet emerged from Capitol Hill.

The planned new defense budget is also far above the spending level of roughly $77 billion strongly recommended by the President's Office of Management and Budget several months ago.

Officials say that some of the new Soviet silos under construction are very close to completion. At this point however, no new missiles have been installed, nor has the United States yet spotted the

long awaited flight testing of whatever it is that the Russians intend to put in those holes.

Most officials expect that the Russians soon will test an improved version of their SS-9 missile, probably with a more accurate system of multiple warheads aboard, as well as an improved version of the smaller SS-11 ICBM, of which the Soviets have more than 900.

Of the roughly 90 new silos being worked on, about 30 are said to be situated at six bases where the SS-9 missiles are located, and the rest at bases normally associated with the smaller SS-11.

Because of its large size, the SS-9 might eventually be fitted with at least three and maybe many more warheads. They might eventually be made accurate enough to pose a threat to U.S. Minuteman missiles. This fear has been a driving factor in several U.S. defense programs.

253

WASHINGTON POST - 12 DECEMBER 1971 P-1(13)

# New Military Budget May Rise $2 Billion

NEW YORK TIMES 16 December 1971 P40

Defense Budget of $70.5-Billion Is Voted

256

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 — An adjournment-minded Congress approved today a $70.5-billion appropriations bill for the Defense Department but remained snagged on funds for the foreign aid program.

In an attempt to break the impasse, the House passed a stopgap resolution that would permit economic and military assistance spending to continue at an annual rate of $2.6-billion until March 15. But in the other chamber, the resolution faced delaying tactics by a handful of Senators resentful over the way the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee had been bypassed by the House on foreign aid legislation.

The defense measure — the last major appropriations bill to be cleared by Congress for a fiscal year that began nearly six months ago — provides about $3-billion less than requested by the Administration for the armed services.

## Up From Last Year

The Congressional reduction in the defense budget went somewhat deeper than had been expected by the Pentagon, but not as deep as had been hoped and planned by the Senate Democratic leadership, which had been looking to heavy cuts in defense appropriations to offset Congressional increases in domestic programs.

At the same time, the defense bill provides $1-billion more than last year's appropriations bill, reversing a three-year trend of steadily decreasing defense budgets.

As it sought to clear the way for adjournment, Congress also approved a $932-million appropriation for the District of Columbia and sent to the White House legislation extending unemployment compensation by 13 weeks in states with high unemployment.

With all the necessary appropriations bills out of the way, the only obstacle standing in the way of adjournment was foreign aid.

On this issue, a tug of war was developing between the House, and in particular its Appropriations Committee, and a group of Senate activists who have been seeking to assert the Senate's role in the formulation of foreign policy.

To the vast majority of the House, these Senate activists, such as the majority leader, Mike Mansfield, and J. W. Fulbright, were being arbitrary and capricious in blocking the ending of the first session of the first session of the 92d Congress. Holding court in the Speaker's lobby, Lewis Desch-

ler, the House Parliamentarian and a powerful figure in the House, commented to a group of members standing around him: "One guy over there [he was referring to Senator Fulbright] is trying to blackjack the House."

But to the small group of about a half-dozen led by Senators Fulbright and William Proxmire of Wisconsin, the issue was the upholding of the right of the Senate and its legislative committees to impose policy restrictions on the executive branch.

In the foreign aid authorization bill, the Senate, on the recommendation of the Foreign Relations Committee, incorporated various policy restrictions on the executive branch. But the authorization bill became deadlocked in a conference committee when the House conferees refused to permit a House vote on a Mansfield amendment stalling the policy of total troop withdrawal from Indocina in six months, contingent only upon the release of prisoners of war.

In the absence of an authorization bill, the Senate leadership has refused to consider a foreign aid appreciation bill passed by the House. With the concurrence of the Administration, the House Appropriations Committee in the closing days of the session came forward with a so-called continuing resolution, temporarily extending the foreign aid program in the absence of authorizing legislation or an appropriations bill.

For the Administration, the continuing resolution would provide more money for the foreign aid program than it probably would have received through an appropriations bill. Perhaps just as importantly, the Administration would be able to bypass all the policy restrictions approved by the

## Fulbright's View

To Senator Fulbright, the House-approved continuing resolution also was reminiscent of what he describes as the "annual ritual" to end the Congressional session with an attempt by the House to "ram an objectionable foreign aid package down the throat of the Senate."

Last year, for example, the House sought in the closing days to provide $200-million in military credits to foreign countries that had not been authorized in separate legislation. The year before, the House sought to provide $54-million for jet fighters for the Chinese Nationalist Government.

WASHINGTON POST

14 DEC 1971 Pg4

Scott Lauds
Military
Cutbacks

Associated Press

Senate Republican Leader Hugh Scott said yesterday the Nixon administration is spending more on domestic than military programs and has paved the way for a new era "in which the United States no longer plays the role of warrior."

In his annual minority leader's report to the Senate, the Pennsylvania said defense spending is at the lowest percentage of the budget in more than 20 years while domestic expenditures are at a record high.

This year, he said, troop strength in Southeast Asia stands at 172,000 while expenditures for the conflict total $8 billion.

At the beginning of the Nixon administration in 1969, spending to support the nation's allies in Southeast Asia stood at $30 billion annually with more than 543,000 troops stationed there, Scott said.

Scott said there now exists a real hope for an end to the wars between the United States and the Soviet Union through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and said the President has set a course for the nation to be "a mediator on the world's stage."

* Predicted "across-the-board" troop reductions are on the horizon in Europe. He did not elaborate.

* Urged strict neutrality of all nations in the Indochina war and said the conflict could more readily be contained if arms shipments by Russia and China were cut off. "Both Russia and China have shown a determination to use the strategy of this war for their own advancement," Scott said.

* Described as "presidential seniors" those Democrats seeking their party's nomination and accused them of injuring American attempts to stay neutral in the war.

* Lamented hope for a peaceful solution to continuing the war.

BALTIMORE NEWS-AMERICAN 19 DECEMBER 1971 (21)

# 'Fat Albert' Is Sick

"I think the C5 is the greatest airplane ever built."

—Chairman Daniel J. Haughton, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

"It's jinxed. It'll never work right."

—Chairman F. Edward Hebert, House Armed Services Committee.

By PATRICK J. SLYAN
News America:

Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Fat Albert is sick, fragile and will require a mother's love for what promises to be an all too short lifetime.

Fat Albert is the Air Force nickname for the Lockheed C5 Galaxy jet, a cargo plane conceived in hyperbole and produced in the face of withering criticism about its soaring cost.

During more than three years of attacks spearheaded by Scn. William Proxmire, D-Wlis., Lockheed, the Air Force and members of the congressional armed services committee have defended the plane as its price tag went from $28 million to $61 million per plane. Supporters of the C5 program, conceding it was costing more than expected, promised that the plane would usher in a new era in airlift for the Military, Air Command (MAC).

Officially, the "A" has been dropped from the designation, because no "B" model is now expected to be built.

BUT TODAY after more than a year of MAC experience with the C5, even the plane's staunchest supporters have begun to sour. Air Force optimism about the C5 has been replaced with hostility, bitterness and frustration.

There are problems today with the plane's landing gear and electronic systems that will take at least two years to repair if the C5 is to be an effective tool for President Nixon's plan to maintain world peace.

But there are problems in the Inherent design of the C5 for which there is no certain solution. And, these design deficiencies have resulted in a much narrower role for the plane for far less than the lifetime originally anticipated by the Air Force.

What went wrong?

SOME OF the answers were found in interviews with Lockheed engineers at Marietta, Ga., where the plane is being made; in Dayton, Ohio, where an Air Force general is attempting to control the program, and in the Pentagon where top defense officials are grim.

"I'd call it engineering negligence," said Robert C. Scamans Jr., the secretary of the Air Force.

"Lockheed did a lousy job, but so did the Air Force," said Raymond L. Bisplinghoff, the scientist the Air Force hired to find out what was wrong.

"You just get tired of it and you want to say, 'A pox on it.'" said Robert D. Ormsby, the Lockheed engineer who built

In the hot seat.

"Frankly, I don't like this Job," said Brig. Gen. Warner Newby, the Air Force officer charged with sorting out C5 problems.

In conception, the C5 fulfilled an abiding passion of Robert S. McNamara. Above all, it would be "cost-effective." As Secretary of Defense, McNamara on Oct. 1, 1955 selected Lockheed to build the world's largest airplane under a unique contract.

Called total package procurement, the contract gave Lockheed responsibility for everything — the plane, engines, electronics, tires, lightbulbs and performance.

FOR 120 PLANES, the contract would have provided Lockheed and its subcontractors $3.4 billion. Today, the General Accounting Office says the Air Force will get only 81 planes and these for a total of at least $5 billion.

But as McNamara saw it, the C5's beauty was in saving costs. One C5 would carry more than three C141's, then the biggest Air Force cargo jet—also made by Lockheed.

In 1955, McNamara predicted the military program would result in a commercial counterpart providing transcontinental trips for less than $100 per passenger.

But most important, the C5 would be a rugged assault plane, able to ferry heavy equipment of an army division to some world troublespot and land near the front lines on a strip of grass.

Building a plane as large as the C5 was considered well within the state-of-the-art of aeronautical engineering. McNamara, the Air Force, Lockheed and other competitors for the C5 contract agreed the plane could be built with proven, established technology.

LOCKHEED engineers essentially were confronted with the problem that confronted the Wright brothers: make a plane strong enough to carry a payload but light enough to fly.

It's the basic problem with almost any airplane," said Bisplinghoff, former dean of engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is now deputy director of the National Science Foundation.

"When you're building a plane, the engineers are always struggling to control the weight of the plane so it can have good performance-speed and range. But you've got to have enough strength in the design so you don't have a catastrophic failure and the same old smart and

crashes."

257

During competition for the Air Force C5 contract, Lockheed proposed a plane that would carry a 160,000-pound payload for 2,500 nautical miles.

After looking over proposals by Lockheed, Boeing and Douglas, the Air Force decided it wanted a bigger airplane — one able to carry a 265,000-pound payload over 2,700 nautical miles. Lockheed agreed to do the job with a plane with a basic weight of 712,000 pounds instead of the initial version of 69,000 pounds.

Lockheed conducted limited wind tunnel testing on the bigger plane and spotted some "minor" difficulties. Nevertheless, it ordered its subcontractors to start building parts for production of the C5 in December, 1965, only two months after the contract had been awarded.

UTMOST SPEED in production was necessary, Lockheed believed, even though preliminary testing of the plane was not underway. The Air Force contract imposed penalties — up to $11 million — if Lockheed failed to meet delivery deadlines.

The quicker the production, the Air Force believed, the cheaper the total cost.

The nightmare for Lockheed engineers started in 1966, when more detailed wind tunnel tests were "full of surprises." The tests showed eight major design changes were required, changes in everything from nose to tail, from top to bottom.

Subcontractors were thrown into turmoil. They were told to junk work they had done and start building new designs.

Even with the new designs, there were serious problems. Too much drag from the bulky wing design was sure to degrade the C5's ability to operate from short, unprepared battlefield airstrips. The plane was too heavy.

BOEING HAD encountered the same problems. When it lost out on the C5 competition, Boeing modified its plans and came up with the 747 commercial passenger plane. When Boeing reached the overweight problem, its single most important solution was to require it subcontractor to build more powerful engines.

"Lockheed could have done the same thing," said Gen. Newby in hindsight. "The Air Force told them to go ahead and get bigger engines — but that Lockheed was responsible and

increase for the engines.

"But they didn't do it that way."

Ormsby, vice president c: engineering at Marietta, has a different version. Ormsby said the Air Force would simply not relax the requirements for C5 performance, particularly the rough field performance.

The C5 wings are not swept back to the degree seen on most commercial jetliners. This limited sweep design provides more lift when the C5 is attempting to get airborne from a short runway. Using 10,000-foot runways, swept-wing commercial jets have ample time to build sufficient speed to become airborne.

Ormsby said Lockheed's solution to the weight problem was to emphasize a high-stress design. "If I had to go off to a desert island and build a wing, I'd do it with a high stress design."

BASICALLY, the high-stress approach is to design the wing understrength and then repair as it fails. "This way, you get maximum strength with repairs and minimum weight," Ormsby said.

Bisplinghoff agrees.

"It is an old philosophy," Bisplinghoff said. "You go ahead and design understrength. But the important thing is, you find your failures in a test model and then correct them before you go into production. But Lockheed started production without testing.

"They did it the Insane way at Lockheed. Insane."

Lockheed began carving 4,500 pounds of metal out of the C5 wing. More accurately, removing weight from wing parts scattered around in bits and pieces.

Exotic techniques were employed. For example, some wing sections were bathed in chemicals to eat away the exact amount of unwanted metal. Besides chemical milling of parts already produced, lighter titanium and beryllium alloys were employed.

WHEN THE weight reduction effort started in 1967, Lockheed continued production without waiting for best results of the high-stress design.

"That's what I call engineering negligence," fumes Seamans, the Air Force civilian chief who has a distinguished engineering background.

"Lockheed didn't test when they knew they were putting the plane right on the knife's edge."

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NEW REPUBLIC

25 DEC 71 (22)

C-5A, Go Away

259

What can you do about an airplane that develops wing cracks, loses engines and runs $2 billion over its promised cost? You can study it. That's what the Air Force intends to do with its C-5A transport plane for the next 12 months, at a public expenditure of $3.5 million. The Pentagon announced in late November that it had decided to set 130 specialists to work on an enormous review, headed by an Air Force technical adviser and by F. A. Cleveland, former chief engineer of the Lockheed plant in Marietta, Ga., where the planes are built. If the C-5A had just begun to show problems, or if it had never been reviewed before, the project might seem routine. But this plane has experienced many failures and studies in the past, and none of them has produced a significant change.

The C-5A is the world's biggest airplane and the Air Force's biggest headache since the F-111, the one that occasionally lost wings in mid-flight. Unlike that plane, the C-5A is not a classified project. It was designed to carry oversize cargo and fly on "tactical missions" - if necessary, to land at night in a rough field. Yet it is one of the most studied machines the Pentagon has produced in recent years.

Even before the Pentagon had agreed to sign on Lockheed for the $3.4 billion job, it bought expensive research called "contract definition" to find out whether the builder would have to invent any "new science" to construct the plane. In signing the contract in October 1965, the Air Force undertook a new system known as "concurrency production," which would allow Lockheed to run planes off the assembly line before tests were completed. The Air Force would follow closely behind each stage of production and testing, with options to cancel later segments of the contract if Lockheed weren't meeting standards.

Cost experts in the Pentagon soon realized there would be large overexpenditures for the C-5A, and at least one of them, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, suspected that in cutting corners, Lockheed had "flimsied up the airplane." Fitzgerald testified to this effect, before a congressional committee in 1968, stirring up bad publicity for the entire project. About a year later he was fired. In the meantime, the Air Force launched a full review of the C-5A directed by Assistant-Secretary of the Air Force Philip Whittaker. After three months of study, the experts concluded in July 1969 that although there had been 46 design changes, "none of these changes has degraded the mission performance.... It looks as though we'll have a good aircraft."

The optimism of the "Whittaker Report" was not borne out by later testing, however, and once again in February 1970, the Air Force commissioned a study of the C-5A. This one, headed by MIT professor Raymond Bisplinghoff, would last for five months and assemble reports from independent researchers, Air Force inspectors and representatives of all the major aerospace corporations. They concluded in June that the C-5A had "slight deficiencies of range" and minor problems with landing gear and avionics (flight instruments). The wings, which had been so troublesome in tests, might require "further engineering changes... to correct deficiencies not yet located." That was all. They couldn't offer any stronger judgment until tests had run further. Two days later another wing cracked in the laboratory.

The latest major report appeared in March of this year when the Government Accounting Office released information it dug up for Sen. William Proxmire (D. Wis.). Based on an examination of the first 15 planes turned over to the Air Force, the GAO concluded that major deficiencies in landing gear, wings and avionics meant that "the C-5A cannot perform its tasks as it is, hiding the cost of necessary repairs in a less controversial section of the budget."

Unless these were corrected, the plane would have to serve merely as a cargo transport-and a risky one at that. More wing cracks have appeared in ground testing since then, and in September an engine flew away from the wing of an airplane preparing for take-off. For a while, the entire fleet was grounded to check for cracks in engine pylons, which had not been a problem before. Almost all the planes are now back in operation.

The Air Force has committed itself to buying 81 of these C-5As under a new contract that absolves Lockheed of the cost of refitting them if they fail to meet standards. Lockheed, which is about two years behind schedule and charging $2 billion more than originally promised, has finished 47 planes and is working on the 70th. When the new study comes out in 1973, production should be over. What will the Air Force then do with this $3.5 million piece of research? Well, it could use it to start over from the beginning, asking Congress for the hundreds of millions it would cost to reinforce the planes and bring them up to standards. More likely the report will follow its predecessors into the files, and the Air Force will make do with the C-5A as it is, hiding the cost of necessary repairs in a less controversial section of the budget.

WALL STREET JOURNAL - 27 DECEMBER 1971

261

# Less for More? Some Strategists
Fret Over Complexity of Weapons

ROBERT KEATLEY and RICHARD J. LEVINE
*Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL*

WASHINGTON — When North Korean gunboats seized the USS Pueblo back in 1968 and war fears were high, the U.S. had only a handful of combat jets assigned to South Korea—not enough to deter possible attack across the 38th parallel. But the Air Force scrambled around and rushed 100 modern planes to friendly South Korean airstrips within three days.

"That show of strength must have made a lasting impression on the North Koreans," claims a State Department official. It may even partially explain why Korean Communists have since dropped some former belligerence and are holding low-level political talks with the Seoul government.

But what if something similar should occur a few years hence? It's possible the Air Force would respond by sending in fancy F15 fighters, perhaps the world's best combat planes. But it's also possible the U.S. could scrape up only a half-dozen or so of the planes from other commitments. Would such a tiny force, despite its high quality, cool hostilities—or would it encourage escalation?

## Not Entirely Hypothetical

A growing band of foreign policy planners here don't find such questions entirely hypothetical, and they don't like the answers they fear will prove correct. For when they look over the Pentagon's multibillion-dollar spend-plans, they conclude the generals and ads are buying weapons that are too costly, complex—and, most importantly, too few in numbers to meet some legitimate U.S. security needs in the years just ahead.

"We're pricing ourselves out of our strategies," fears one specialist with long Pentagon and White House experience. "We could wind up having an Army with one tank, a Navy with one ship and an Air Force with one plane."

A few months ago a worried Senate Armed Services Committee, hardly a critic of the Pentagon in the past, painted this alarming picture:

"Fighter aircraft now being developed for procurement in the mid-1970s will cost five to six times more comparable aircraft at the beginning of the 1960s. The cost of tanks is increasing over fourfold during the 1965-75 decade. ... The (electronics) package in some types of new military aircraft will alone weigh two or more tons and cost several million dollars; at over $1,000 per pound this is about twice as costly as gold."

Such elaborate weapons programs as these raise complex and serious policy issues that range far beyond the Pentagon. Critics argue that Defense Department leaders cling to some dated strategic concepts and to excessive weapons sophistication at a time when Congress (properly, they believe) forces the military to buy less each year. The result, as they see it, could be extremely high quality but quite small conventional forces, unable to compete with American political commitments abroad credible to either friend or foe. This and mean serious, and unnecessary, foreign policy problems ahead.

## Worriers in Many Departments

Such worriers are scattered throughout the government, though they are a distinct minority of those directly involved in procuring today's arms. Some are White House staffers or senior State Department officials. A few can be found on Capitol Hill, and some are even in the Pentagon itself. Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, the pro-

said to share such concerns.

This isn't the old civilian-versus-military squabble about high cost overruns and alleged bad management of weapons programs. Neither is it a pitch for bigger defense budgets. Rather, the critics are arguing for revising priorities within present dollar limits—something many military men (who like fancier weapons) are reluctant to do. It also concerns strategic concepts—by demanding a recognition that brushfire wars (which Vietnam once was) are unfortunately the wave of the future and that the U.S. must be ready to deal with them, like it or not. A replay of World War II, this time against the Soviets, is considered the least likely of all grim possibilities, though that's the war the military seems most ready to fight.

Much of this concern involves applying the so-called Nixon doctrine in future years. Under this broad policy, the U.S. has promised to give limited help to certain foreign friends and allies if they're threatened by war, provided they also work hard to help themselves. This assistance can range from sending arms to providing air and naval combat support, though it rules out using ground troops as in Vietnam. Israel or South Korea, among others, might make strong appeals for such support someday, many officials believe.

## Phantoms vs. Oxcarts

In the worst cases, the U.S. would need "pertinent and effective" weaponry, officials stress. Yet, critics contend, the Pentagon is overstressing the need to meet an alleged Soviet military threat in Europe by acquiring $15 million fighter planes, complicated tanks and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers with long-range fighter-bombers that aren't well-suited to small wars. "In Vietnam, the Air Force was using $4 million Phantoms (F-4 jets) to knock out oxcarts," complains one official. "That was not only too expensive—they also weren't any good at it."

As they look ahead, critics and defenders of Pentagon procurement policies agree on one point: The traditional corrective to shrinking forces—more money—simply isn't going to be available in the near future. Mainly because of widespread public and congressional disenchantment with the military, stemming from the Vietnam experience, Pentagon budgets are almost certain to remain on a tight leash. Even the most hawkish generals concede Defense Department budge: officials will be doing well to hold on to a fixed percentage (around 7%) of a rising gross national product.

Aggravating the situation is the sharp increase in military manpower costs due to inflation and the continuing campaign to produce all-volunteer armed forces. The cost of paying, feeding, clothing and housing GIs and Pentagon civilians today consumes about 52% of the $76 billion defense budget, and by the middle of the decade it's expected to absorb around 65%. The Army figures the average cost of a "man-year" has climbed to about $8,600 from $4,400 in 1965.

This means the amount available for weapons is decreasing, even as the cost of these weapons is mounting dramatically.

Inflation—the rising cost of labor and materials going into weapons—has, of course, contributed significantly to the overall weapons' price problem; Pentagon officials attribute about 25% of the price increase in new weapons to inflation's impact. And they readily concede that technical problems and poorly written

But by far the largest factor is the growing complexity and sophistication of the weapons themselves.

Consider, for example, the Army's new transport helicopter, now on the drawing boards. Excluding research and development, it will cost $800,000 to $900,000 compared with $270,000 for the present Huey chopper, the workhorse and symbol of the Vietnam war. The new helicopters will be bigger and stronger (able to haul 11 combat-equipped infantrymen plus the crew rather than six or seven) as well as faster and less vulnerable to ground fire. But—mainly because of the higher price tag—the Army will also end up buying far fewer.

The impact of all these factors—tight budgets, rising personnel costs, higher weapons prices—on the size of U.S. military forces is clear. Today there are 2.6 million men and women in uniform, down from a 1968 Vietnam-war peak of 3.5 million, and the number is scheduled to decline to 2.5 million by mid-1972.

## Like Cutting the Corps

The Army has taken the brunt of the reductions; it has shrunk to 13 divisions and 940,000 men from a Vietnam high of 19-2-3 divisions and 1.6 million men. ("We've cut the equivalent of a full Marine Corps every year for the past three years," says a senior Army general.) The Navy's fleet numbers 656 ships, compared with a Vietnam high of 932 in 1968.

Again, it should be stressed that the critics aren't arguing for more money, though many officers are; they're concerned instead with making better use of the smaller sums, and forces, available. They want to stave off unwanted foreign policy problems in the years just ahead, however much this may ruffle some preconceived security notions at the Pentagon.

They start with one unfashionable premise. that the U.S. is and will remain a nation with numerous foreign commitments. Despite much talk about paring down American involvement overseas, they argue that political, economic and military needs will keep the U.S. concerned about affairs throughout the world. It's not that they want it that way; they simply figure it's unavoidable.

For example, a State Department tally sheet shows the U.S. has bilateral relations with 155 other countries or political entities and has in force some 370 assorted treaties and agreements on 82 subjects. These range from a cultural exchange pact with Rumania to an extradition treaty with New Zealand to the NATO military alliance. A few may be canceled, or expire, but analysts don't foresee substantial whittling away of these obligations.

## Credible Threats

Meeting some obligations means credible military forces must be available, the critics contend, or political problems can result.

Consider Europe. Administration strategists reject the notion that the U.S. can safely draw down NATO forces substantially without a similar reduction by the Soviet Union. They don't expect a Russian invasion if the Americans send their divisions home, but they do envision political-and economic losses. A skittish Europe, afraid Washington is welshing on past promises, could easily turn inward. Reducing the NATO contingent would also remove a major Moscow incentive to negotiate a mutual force reduction and other East-West matters.

Then there is the Mideast. The U.S. has ties to Israel that would be politically difficult to evade if the worst comes someday, and the critics say having mobile conventional forces available is one way to help delay any final Arab-Israeli showdown. For example, they point out that President Nixon's highly credible threat to send air support to Jordan last year, when Syria tried to invade, prevented a bigger war and preserved a fragile stability. To keep things together in the future, they insist, the

MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

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## CONSIDERATION...Continued

area, such as air-to-ground munitions or space communications. We first describe what we want to be able to do within these functional areas, look at what we already have, and then identify what needs to be done.

Sometimes we may find that, rather than needing anything new, we need less of what we already have, because individual services may have developed duplicate capabilities simply because they were unaware, by circumstances or ignorance, of the full capabilities of another service's system.

In other cases, this broad functional approach will permit us really to zero in on the actual type of capability needed. We want to keep programs in advanced development longer, until we are sure we know what we are doing. We want to put more reliance on hardware and less on paper studies in advanced development.

Q: Much has been said and written about prototyping, usually referred to as "fly before you buy." How does this technique fit into the scheme of things?

Mr. Packard: We are placing new emphasis on a special kind of prototype. During the current fiscal year we want to establish a modest program of experimental prototypes. The common example that is frequently mentioned for this type of development is that of a lightweight fighter.

While this may be a good example of prototyping, it by no means describes the scope of what we have in mind. Experimental prototypes are equally applicable for rifles, electronic countermeasure equipment, radios, hydrofoils, and many other items in component and system development.

When we talk of experimental prototypes we are not referring to prototypes such as those for the AX or the B-1 aircraft. In these two cases we have confidence that these weapon systems can be developed, and we have specific force structure objectives in mind. This will not be true for most of the experimental ones where there will be more technical uncertainty about the development. Frequently we will not have specific force structure objectives in mind, only generalized concepts.

Experimental prototypes should not be confused with preproduction prototypes—that is, production late in the engineering-development cycle when we have a good idea about the actual configuration for production. Experimental prototypes precede—are not part of—engineering development.

Finally, experimental prototyping normally will not be the basis for system procurement. We are all aware of the sole-source difficulties that would occur if we were not so.

Q: On what basis will experimental prototyping be conducted?

Mr. Foster: The program that we

are now considering for our experimental prototyping was developed based upon criteria that are a good indication of the types of things that we would consider for such projects. These projects should have one or more of the following characteristics:

1. Support or satisfy an anticipated future military need.

2. Significantly reduce uncertainties (technological, operational performance, costs, scheduling) in possible future developments.

3. Provide novel and feasible operational/technological options.

4. Offer the possibility of appreciably lower cost alternatives or techniques than those currently available or programmed.

5. Have a reasonable (not "assured") chance of success.

6. Have relatively low cost with respect to potential total program cost.

Q: How is experimental prototyping expected to affect industry and the Department of Defense?

Mr. Packard: For industry, I believe this program will provide another incentive to develop systems and technology which might make a major contribution to our defense posture. This type of development should permit us to look at substantially more pieces of hardware and different types of hardware. It will give us a better understanding of the capabilities of technology and provide a better basis for making decisions on our major programs by providing a means of exploring additional technological options. Finally, it will better permit us to retain and improve the competence of design and engineering teams.

Q: In major procurement programs which are in trouble, it is generally known that the problem develops from a common fault—production had been started before engineering development was finished. What is being done to solve this problem?

Mr. Packard: Several important policies and procedures have been established to help avoid the disastrous results of concurrency.

First, we will not use total package procurement contracts on major programs. Secondly, in general, major development contracts will be the cost-incentive type and will require close working relationships between service managers and industry managers. Thirdly, fixed-price production contracts will be negotiated on major programs after the development has proceeded far enough that we know what we are to produce—and we know it will work the way we want it to work.

Q: Dr. Foster, research and development plays an extremely important part in the making of sound decisions on successful defense systems acquisition programs.—What has been done

to improve the efficacy of research and development efforts?

Dr. Foster: Our R&D efforts must have an output that is measured in terms of the quality of our new military products, their capabilities against an ever more capable threat, their cost to produce, and their reliability in the field. With these objectives in mind, the following changes and improvements have been made.

Development concept papers, together with area and technology coordinating papers, are being used to package our plans in a way that clearly establishes our rationale, any current deficiencies, and the programs with which we are moving forward.

Authority is being delegated to departmental program managers over short command chains.

With the deemphasis of total-package procurement, the measurable milestones, rather than calendar dates, are being emphasized as decision points.

Unnecessary and cumbersome paper work is being discouraged.

There is increased emphasis on realistic testing, early and continually, in on-going programs.

We are carefully observing the broad policy guidelines set down by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in his July 13, 1971, directive on Defense Systems Acquisition (DOD Directive 5000.1).

Q: What does the future hold for augmenting and expanding the effort to improve research and development programs?

Dr. Foster: We are seeking new initiatives for our R&D program. About thirty new-initiative programs have been incorporated in the fiscal 1972 budget plan, and more are expected to be developed in the months ahead for the fiscal 1973 budget.

Some of the most important initiatives are, in fact, elegant modifications to already fielded hardware: the slatted wing on the F-4 is a significant example of a large pay-off for a relatively modest investment.

We are now trying to put ourselves into such a position that in the future we really will have choices. We can't afford to remain locked into a situation in which our only choices—that is, alternative ways of meeting accepted military needs—are not only few in number but expensive.

Toward this end result, we desire to emphasize the use of prototypes. The objective is to create a set of demonstrated, advanced-technology options from which we can select programs to go into engineering development, or to remain in advanced development, or to stop. We need experimental and prototype hardware to serve as a factual basis for our studies.

We are going to make step-by-step

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# DEFENSE SYSTEMS

## OPERATION...Continued

Based on the development status and demonstration of hardware, not just on paper analyses and unrealistic requirements for initial operational capability.

We are making every effort to ensure that the weapon system is tested and evaluated in as realistic a manner as possible, with emphasis on two-sided engagements wherever practical.

We are absolutely serious about stopping some programs. Obviously, if we are going to start more work and subject the resulting hardware to stringent tests, some programs will fall. Those that have solid foundations, that perform effectively and meet timely needs, will go ahead to full development or production.

We are absolutely serious about trading off performance, cost, and reliability as we move through weapons-acquisition process. This means that we aren't through with trade-offs when we start to bend metal. In this way, we will create for ourselves a situation in which we can realistically estimate and predict—and adjust, if necessary—development and production costs and schedules.

We are committed to preserving our technological base and to maintaining an aggressive program in the forefront of such areas as materials, structures, aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, and electronics. We are now conducting a major review in each critical area.

We will continue to explore the unknowns in research and turn them into useful knowledge that can be exploited in advanced and engineering development. Industrial and Government laboratories must maintain a high level of expertise and continuity in research and design.

We are committed nationally to preserving this reservoir of talent, keeping teams at work building and testing advanced hardware, so that the resource will always be available.

Viewpoint of DOD in the field of R&D, especially as it applies to the process of weapon systems acquisition. has been described. It is also shown at the R&D system from the technical side, what does it mean?

Hostler: It is important for industry to continue making recommendations, either in the form of new ideas or as plain, old-fashioned notes.

Industry could be searching hard for types of people—the excellent engineer or architect and the tough, closed manager.

An industry must orient its independent programs toward acquiring

demonstrable hardware instead of publishing brochures.

Under on-going contracts, industry might do two things—(1) hold to the policy of scrutinizing your work for "frilly," nice-to-have features and removing them from the designs; and (2) point out to us practical, logical trade-offs that can reduce costs or improve reliability significantly, with minor impact on performance.

Q: Secretary Shillito, how does this new policy for defense systems acquisition affect contracts?

Mr. Shillito: The new acquisition policy is oriented toward caution and the elimination of procedural rigidity in structuring contracts for our new programs. The new philosophy does not emphasize a single procurement approach. Several important steps have been taken to provide a sounder basis for contracting.

The overemphasis on planning and programming to the exclusion of hardware development and testing, particularly in the critical high-risk components and subsystems, has been corrected by emphasizing the need to demonstrate the solution to technical problems progressively as the development proceeds.

Development milestones have been set up in weapon-system contracts. Concurrency has been reduced by separating the contract for development from the contract for production. Increased emphasis has been placed on the use of prototypes before undertaking full-scale development.

In highly complex weapon systems, dual development or prototype contracting offers numerous advantages. Competition is maintained until advance development is substantially completed.

Under prototype development, we will be able to evaluate hardware rather than paper promises in choosing a contractor, and we will have confidence that a proposed system will meet its performance objectives before substantial production commitments are made.

Q: What problems are foreseen in competitive prototype development?

Mr. Shillito: Implementing our desire for competitive prototype development gives us a number of problems. Certain systems are just too costly to accommodate parallel development.

Dual development also takes longer to accomplish. In cases where dual development of the total system is impractical, we feel sure that some advantages can be gained by parallel development of the critical subsystems. I believe that we can go much further

in applying this approach to various lower level (subcontract and sub-contract) high-risk areas.

Prototype development will not solve all the problems of weapon system development, but it will reduce some of the risk.

Q: What contract methodology is envisioned in the prototype development phase of system acquisition?

Mr. Shillito: The whole idea is to set the stage for more flexibility in effecting trade-offs among performance, schedule, and cost throughout the development phase. The contract methodology by which this is to be achieved is through the use of cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts which are tailored specifically to the risk inherent in each program.

Since total package procurement has been eliminated, including the use of production options in development contracts, the risk to the contractor has been reduced significantly.

Costs are to be controlled by continuous trade-off analyses and program adjustments where necessary, duly reflected in changes to the contract.

Q: What steps are indicated to help solve some of the problems in DOD procurement, production, and logistics?

Mr. Shillito: Many of our procurement, production, and logistics problems are the kind of barnacles that any large organization accumulates over the years. It seems to me that we can rid ourselves of these impediments by doing five things:

First, we can set clear, unequivocal policies that stop short of dotting every i and crossing every t for the men who must make the operational decisions. We are doing that.

Secondly, we can rid Defense organizations of staffs remote from actual operations whose reviews and commentaries contribute to the problem rather than to the solution. We are doing that.

Thirdly, we can select the best possible managers on their records—and then keep them on the job longer. We are doing that.

Fourthly, we can let the managers who are selected know what is expected of them—we can pinpoint their responsibilities. We are doing that.

Finally, we can give those managers the authority they need to meet all their responsibilities. We are doing that, too.

Under the new directive, I look forward to more emphasis on producibility and supportability of a system earlier in the cycle, with attendant significant over-all reductions in the cost of ownership.

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Aero-System Services, OX 52884

THE B-1 BOMBER by BERKELEY RICE

277

The Very Model
of a Modern Major Misconception
SATURDAY REVIEW 11 DECEMBER 1971 (9)

With relatively little attention from the press and even less from the public, Congress has approved a fiscal year 1972 Defense Department budget of roughly $75-billion, give or take a few billion. Included in this total is about $21-billion for research, development, and procurement of a variety of military hardware. Buried in all these figures is the comparatively trifling sum of $370-million to start development engineering on the B-1, the Air Force's new manned strategic bomber. Trifling or not, this early funding represents only the tip of an iceberg. The entire B-1 program may end up costing anywhere from $10- to $50-billion, depending on who's doing the estimating.

Practical men, Congressional opponents of proposed weapon systems generally argue in terms of cost-effectiveness and strategic capability, both grounds on which one can mount an impressive case against the B-1. In Congress, unfortunately, these are the only arguments with which one can realistically hope to gather significant opposition to, any expenditures for military hardware.

The most important argument against the B-1, however, and one rarely cited by its opponents on Capitol Hill (because it would alienate the votes of fiscal but patriotic conservatives) is that building nuclear bombers of any kind is an enterprise of insanity. Insane because it represents an outrageously expensive escalation of the arms race, and insane because it brings us no closer to the illusory goal of military supremacy.

Arguments over the B-1's cost, effectiveness, and strategic value are like arguments over "clean" versus "dirty" bombs—logical, relevant, and interesting, but nevertheless mad. Mad or not, these constitute the grounds on which Congress debated the B-1, and are arguments that the government should at least consider.

Unlike the opposition to the ABM in 1969, or the SST last spring, citizen groups have not rallied to lobby on Capitol Hill against the B-1. Unlike Lockheed's disastrously expensive C-5A cargo plane, the B-1 has not yet achieved a cost overrun large enough to create a public scandal (although it does show considerable promise of doing so). All the letters received by every Congressman this year—for and against the B-1—would easily fit in a single mail sack. Obviously, the public neither knows nor cares much about the B-1.

On the basis of the Congressional debate on the B-1, few Congressmen do either. Representing a group of scientists and representatives known as the Sciences of Congress for Peace and Law, Senator George McGovern (D-N.D.) and Representative John Sciberling (D-O) prepared a detailed report opposing the B-1 on several grounds that should at least have

resulted in some intelligent debate. Much of what debate did occur, however, ran along the lines of the argument by Representative Robert Price (R-Tex.): "Inasmuch as we are still facing the threat of nuclear holocaust, and since we still face an implacable enemy in communism, the B-1 program must continue at full speed."

On June 16, the House devoted less than an hour to its debate on the B-1. An amendment by Representative Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) that would have cut off funds for the bomber was crushed 307 to 97. On September 22, with only half a dozen members on the floor, the Senate quickly rejected a similar amendment by voice vote. Commenting on these votes, Representative Pike later observed, "People are just not yet aware of the B-1. The trouble is, by the time they are, it may be too late to do much about it. They're still afraid of tampering with anything labeled 'national defense.'"

Along with defense strategy, patriotism, and ignorance, there is another reason why the B-1's flight through Congress drew so little flak. The politically powerful aerospace industry has been taking a beating in recent years, with the defeat of the SST, the financial troubles of Lockheed, and the general slump of the airlines. The B-1's prime contractor, North American Rockwell, had dropped from a peak work force of 97,000 men down to 50,000 at the time it received the prototype contract in June 1970. Over the next few years, it expects to hire about 15,000 additional employees, many of them aerospace engineers who have been out of work for months. If the B-1 program were terminated, many of these men would find themselves floundering again on the already depressed job market. Since North American, like Lockheed, is based in President Nixon's own Southern California, cancellation of the B-1 program could damage his chances in next year's election.

Despite the B-1's economic and political importance to Southern California, its economic and strategic impact on the rest of the country deserves far more critical examination than it has yet received in Congress or the press. Knowledgeable critics have questioned the wisdom of the B-1 program on several grounds:

* The B-1 promises to become the most expensive weapon system in military history, as well as one of the most worthless.

* The Air Force may not need the B-1 at all. Critics claim it offers only marginal advantages over the existing fleet of strategic bombers.

* By the time the B-1 becomes operational, around 1980, it may well be obsolete.

* By going ahead with a new strategic nuclear bomber, the United States will be giving costly and dangerous impetus

to the arms race with the Soviet Union at the very time the two countries are supposedly trying to agree on a limitation of nuclear weapons.

For those unaccustomed to the ethereal realms of military finance, discussion of the cost of the B-1 program can be difficult. How does one talk meaningfully about billions of dollars to the average citizen, whose

## NON-VITAL STATISTICS

The B-1, also known as Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), is a four-engine, swing-wing, nuclear-armed bomber with the following specifications (proposed or estimated):

### Wing span:

Forward: 137 ft.

Swept: 78 ft.

Length: 143 ft.

Speed capability: 1,300 to 1,400 mph

Gross weight: 350,000 to 450,000 lbs.

Bomb load: 50,000 to 120,000 lbs.

Maximum range: 6,000 miles
unrefueled or 3,000 miles round-trip

largest personal financial concern is the mortgage on his house? Even on Capitol Hill, where millions tend to get tossed around with careless precision (at Congressional committee hearings one hears such phrases as "in the neighborhood of $100-million"), the B-1 program represents a considerable amount of money. For those who care about our national priorities, the $370-million just voted by Congress for engineering development alone on the B-1 is far more than the federal government will spend this year for all urban transit programs. The $500-million in B-1 funding planned for next year's Pentagon budget will exceed the entire budget of the State Department. Even if one accepts the Pentagon's current estimate for the B-1 program—and almost no one in the aerospace industry does—each of the 240 bombers will cost four times as much as the annual budget of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. For those who believe money talks, such a comparison says a great deal about this country's commitment to limiting the arms race.

To those Congressmen who worried about the excessive cost of the B-1 program, the Pentagon and its supporters on Capitol Hill argued that the current contract covers only the construction and testing of a few prototypes, at a cost of a mere $2.6-billion. The Pentagon insists it will carefully examine the results of this test program, in 1974, before deciding to go into production in 1975. The trouble with this argument is that the investment of $2.6-billion in public funds (compared to "only" a few hundred million dollars spent on the SST before its termination) will constitute a persuasive reason to go ahead

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