What Kissinger Said

To the Editor:

We, the chairman and former chairmen of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, were present at the Jan. 31 breakfast meeting of Jewish leaders with Henry Kissinger, in which he was invited to present his views and answer questions on matters of concern to our community. Our recollection of that discussion is that Dr. Kissinger expressed the following views, among others:

* Although Israel's handling of the Arab demonstrations left much to be desired, the foreign press and media opinion unfortunately exaggerated Israel's alleged excesses.

* It would be unfair and unwise for the American Jewish community to waiver in its fundamental support of Israel.

* Israel would be at a disadvantage in an international conference as proposed because process would overcome substance, and in the absence of adequate time to prepare, Israel would be overwhelmed by other participants and world opinion to its unfair detriment.

* Therefore, during 1988, Israel and the United States should come to an agreement on an approach, and Israel should unilaterally propose to initiate bilateral negotiations for autonomy and withdrawal from part of the occupied territories.

Dr. Kissinger did not advise that Israel should bar the press from the occupied territories. He suggested that while that might have been desirable at the outset, it would be inadvisable now. We have no recollection that he advocated the use of brutality in putting down the riots; indeed, he was critical of excessive force, while strongly advocating that the uprisings should be put down as promptly as possible.

MORRIS B. ABRAM

KENNETH J. BIALKIN, JACOB STEIN
(Rabbi) ALEXANDER M. SCHINDLER

(Rabbi) ISRAEL MILLER
New York, March 7, 1988

JUN. 27 '88 11:20 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

8 pages attached

June 27, 1988

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary
RE: Further on Your March Breakfast with Jewish Leaders

A recent edition of the *American-Arab Affairs* quarterly just crossed my desk and I noted it carried your name on the cover.

The famous 'record' of your breakfast in March is listed under "Documenta-
tion" in the table of contents. The actual memo - cited as a reprint
from the Saudi Gazette - is carried in full at the back of the edition.

All pages attached. Just thought you might want to see.

JUN.27 '88 11:21 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.03

$5.50

American-
Arab
Affairs

SPRING 1988

NUMBER 24

### LEBANON: Views of Statesmen

The Agenda Ahead

The Indivisibility of Peace

Amine Gemayel

Ghassan Tuéni

### LEBANON: Analysis/Commentary

#### MESA Symposium: Lebanon's Dilemma

Civil War in Perspective

Entrapment and Escalation of Violence

Social Dynamics of Internal War

Waiting for the Nadir

Confronting Political Realities

The Vatican and the Lebanon War

Leila Fawaz

Samir Khalaf

Salim Nasr

A. R. Norton

Ghassane Salame

George E. Irani

Revolt in Occupied Palestine

Zionism, Freedom of Information and the Law

Israel, South Africa and the U.S.

Congress and Saudi Arms Sales

INTERVIEW: Counsellor, China's U.N. Delegation

INTERVIEW: Foreign Minister of Tunisia

Muhammad Hallaj

S. V. and W. T. Mallison

Souad Dajani

A. Craig Murphy

Wang Xue Xian

Mahmoud Mestiri

### BOOK REVIEWS

DOCUMENTATION: Amnesty Report; Kissinger advice; Shifter testimony

### SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published by the AMERICAN-ARAB AFFAIRS COUNCIL

JUN. 27 '88 11:22 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.04

American-Arab Affairs

ANNE JOYCE
Editor
Director of Publications

JOHN A. SANDWICK
Associate Editor
Director of Advertising

PEGGY NALLE
Copy Editor

CARLA BROEDEL
JOYCE BOUVIER
Production Assistants

TINA M. PEEL
Circulation Manager

RENEE SCAIFE
Subscriptions & Fulfillment

American-Arab Affairs (ISSN 00731-6763) is published quarterly by the American-Arab Affairs Council to provide a forum for viewpoints on recent developments that affect U.S.-Arab relations. The material published in the journal does not necessarily express the views of the American-Arab Affairs Council or the members of its National Advisory Committee.

Articles and book reviews will be considered by the editors, who assume no responsibility for them.

American-Arab Affairs is indexed by PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service), Index Islamicus, Quarterly Strategic Bibliography, Book Review Index, ABC POL SCI, Bowker International Series Database, The Middle East: Abstracts and Index, Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory, BREF (Book Review Editor's File), University Microfilms International, IBD: The International Business Database, ISI (Institute for Scientific Information), Political Science Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, and Recently Published Articles—American Historical Association.

Annual subscription rate in the United States, $25.00; elsewhere: $42.00 (postage and handling included). Back issue price: $6.00. Checks must be drawn on U.S. banks. Send subscription payments to: Circulation Department, American-Arab Affairs, 1730 M St., NW, Suite 512, Washington, D.C. 20036 (tel: 202-296-6767; telex: 440506-AMARA-UI). Bound volumes available from William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1285 Main St., Buffalo, NY 14209 (tel: 1-800-828-7571).

Color and black-and-white advertisements are accepted. For rates and supplemental information, please contact the Director of Advertising.

American-Arab Affairs Council

The American-Arab Affairs Council is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization whose purpose is to contribute to an understanding of current issues in U.S.-Arab affairs. The Council publishes American-Arab Affairs, special reports and books, and sponsors conferences and seminars that provide scholarly discussion of contemporary events relevant to both the United States and the Arab world. These activities are guided by a Board of Directors with the assistance of a National Advisory Committee composed of distinguished individuals knowledgeable in the many aspects of U.S.-Arab relations.

A

Annual
Outside U

☐ Payment

☐ Send to:
Postage &

Postage &

Inter

Send to:
Gulf C
Moder-
Inserde,
paperb-
side U
$37.45
Order
of pay:

Enclos

JUN. 27 '88 11:23 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.05

3

## LEBANON: Opinions of Statesmen

<table><tr><td>The Agenda Ahead</td><td>Amine Gemayel</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>The Indivisibility of Peace</td><td>Ghassan Tuéni</td><td>6</td></tr></table>

## LEBANON: Analysis and Commentary

### A Middle East Studies Association Symposium on Lebanon's Dilemma:

<table><tr><td>Civil War in Historical Perspective</td><td>Leila Fawaz</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Entrapment and Escalation of Violence</td><td>Samir Khalaf</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>The Social Dynamics of an Internal War</td><td>Salim Nasr</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Waiting for the Nadir</td><td>A. R. Norton</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>Confronting Political Realities</td><td>Ghassane Salame</td><td>25</td></tr></table>

### Diplomats in a Quandary:

<table><tr><td>The Vatican and the Lebanon</td><td>George E. Irani</td><td>29</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Revolt in Occupied Palestine</td><td>Muhammad Hallaj</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>Zionism, Freedom of Information, and the Law</td><td>Sally V. and W. Thomas Mallison</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>Israel and South Africa: The U.S. Connection</td><td>Souad Dajani</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>Congressional Opposition to Saudi Arms Sales</td><td>A. Craig Murphy</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>INTERVIEW: Counsellor, China's U.N. Delegation</td><td>Wang Xue Xian</td><td>113</td></tr><tr><td>INTERVIEW: Tunisia's Foreign Minister</td><td>Mahmoud Mestiri</td><td>119</td></tr></table>

## BOOK REVIEWS

<table><tr><td>Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, reviewed by Weston F. Cook, Jr.</td><td>123</td></tr><tr><td>Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon, reviewed by Tod Robberson</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td>Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East: The Role of the Holy See in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1962-1984, reviewed by Marston Speight</td><td>128</td></tr><tr><td>Ellis, The Vatican, Islam, and the Middle East, reviewed by Charles A. Kimball</td><td>129</td></tr><tr><td>Ghabra, Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival, reviewed by Laurie Brand</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank, reviewed by Antony T. Sullivan</td><td>133</td></tr><tr><td>Kahane, Uncomfortable Questions for Comfortable Jews, Kotler, Heil Kahane, and Mergui and Simonnot, Israel's Ayatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in Israel, reviewed by David Wemple</td><td>135</td></tr><tr><td>Flapan, The Birth of Israel, reviewed by Mark Gaffney</td><td>137</td></tr><tr><td>Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1984-87: Strategic Implications and Policy Options, reviewed by Gary Sick</td><td>139</td></tr></table>

JUN. 27 '88 11:24 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.06

DOCUMENTATION

<table><tbody><tr><td>I. Text of Shultz Peace Plan</td><td>142</td></tr><tr><td>11. Letter of support to Secretary Schultz from 30 U.S. Senators</td><td>143</td></tr><tr><td>III. Text of U.S. Justice Department Statement on Closing the PLO Observer Mission at the United Nations</td><td>144</td></tr><tr><td>IV. Congressional Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy on assistance to the Middle East and North Africa</td><td>144</td></tr><tr><td>V. Communique from the United National Leadership for the Uprising [in the Occupied Territories]</td><td>150</td></tr><tr><td>VI. Amnesty International Report on Human Rights Violations in Israel and the Occupied Territories</td><td>151</td></tr><tr><td>VII. Congressional Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard Shifter on the Uprising in the Occupied Territories</td><td>156</td></tr><tr><td>VIII. Henry Kissinger's Secret Advice to Israel regarding containment of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories</td><td>158</td></tr><tr><td>IX. Declaration of the 7th of November 1987 (Tunisia)</td><td>161</td></tr><tr><td>SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY</td><td>163</td></tr></tbody></table>

© 1988 THE AMERICAN ARAB-AFFAIRS COUNCIL. PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.

EDITO

The success of the West Bank gain has been brutalizing and waited steadily for despair, gathering disposal: resources finally to be lost.

With loss of Shehadeh of spoken to the anticipated that for the Israeli its effort to

Palestinians maimed, jailed, than ever. While up the teen-ager Everyone is against the

In the United fear which the television news commentary producers fateful 1948 detail, provided East politics grievances-through a total

Telling the event. For Palestinian policy. Until this was told lands have

In addition, condemned of Khalil al for Israel (April 16), agent rath

["JUN. 27 '88 11:25 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC", "P.07", "AMERICAN-ARAB AFFAIRS", "training IDF personnel in tactics appropriate to controlling and dispersing violent civilian demonstrations. However, we need to keep in mind that many of the soldiers serving in the Occupied Territories are reservists, who serve a short tour of duty and then get replaced by other reservists, who will also have to be retrained.", "As for equipment, it is our understanding that Israel has made a significant effort to provide the IDF with hardware that is appropriate to its present mission of riot control in the Occupied Territories. This includes water cannons, and rubber bullets as substitutes for live rounds, as well as teargas masks, dispensers and similar items which will allow for a more measured response to situations that are not inherently or imminently life-threatening. The Israeli government has also begun to acquire additional protective gear, which might enable IDF personnel to avoid some of the situations where the individual soldier feels he has no choice but to protect his life at the expense of the life of a demonstrator engaged in acts of violence.", "In this context I need to note that questions have also been raised as to whether the likelihood of the need to resort to lethal force would be reduced if Israel were to stop sending out small patrols, which can easily be surrounded by a large number of civilians, and perhaps engage in more limited patrolling, but do it with larger contingents. A small patrol, two or three men, often including inexperienced reservists, can find itself easily surrounded and unable to extricate itself in any manner other than by firing live ammunition. We have conveyed our concerns in this regard to the Israeli government, although we in the field of human rights must concede that we are not in a position to expound upon the \"proper\" or \"ideal\" military or police tactics required to quell a disturbance.", "In determining our own role in dealing with the issues which I have here discussed, we need to keep in mind that Israel is a democracy in which all aspects of governmental affairs, including the behavior of troops in the Occupied Territories, are subject to close public scrutiny. The incidents to which I have referred are matters of extensive public debate in Israel and have resulted in a great many expressions of anguish and condemnation. Where inexcusable transgressions have occurred, it is the general public that will insist on proper punishment. To the extent to which this self-correcting mechanism may, however, not be working as well as it should, we shall continue to apply ourselves to effect the results which I have here identified.", "Having spoken of Israel as a democracy, I need to add, of course, that the residents of the Occupied Territories are not participants in that democracy nor does they have democratic institutions of their own. Their concerns have to be understood, and resolved, through peaceful negotiation. That is, of course, the underlying problem with which we are dealing. For the root of the difficulties which we face in this situation does not lie in the area of human rights. The underlying problem is the state of war which has existed in this area for close to forty years, which has caused the shedding of blood across the decades, and which continues to have this sad result. That is, of course, why we are seeking to find the path to a peaceful solution to this conflict.", "VIII. KISSINGER'S SECRET \"AMERICAN\" ADVICE TO ISRAEL", "The following letter was published in the *Saudi Gazette* of March 19, 1988. It was apparently written on the letterhead of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 425 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10022, dated February 3, 1988, and was marked \"CONFIDENTIAL.\"", "Re:", "Dear Kaye,", "I am so sorry to hear that you are having trouble finding a job as a civilian. I have been a reservist for two years now and I feel that I have not been able to find a job that suits me. I have been working as a patrol officer in the military for the past two years, but I want to try something new. I have been a reservist for two years now and I feel that I have not been able to find a job that suits me. I have been a reserv

JUN. 27 '88 11:27 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

DOCUMENTATION

Re: Breakfast Meeting with Dr. Henry Kissinger

Dear Friend:

I attended a private "off-the-record" breakfast meeting with Henry Kissinger early this week to discuss the current situation in the Mid-east and I believe you will find of interest the following report on the discussion that took place.

In sum, as I will amplify below, Dr. Kissinger conveyed three major points, as follows:

1. Now is not the time for Jewish community leaders to publicly attack Israel or its policies with respect to the Palestinians.

2. Israel should bar the media from entry into the territories involved in the present demonstrations, accept the short-term criticism of the world press for such conduct, and put down the insurrection as quickly as possible—overwhelmingly, brutally and rapidly;

3. The proposed international peace conference, as presently conceived by Foreign Minister Peres, may lead to a "disaster" for Israel.

I now will elucidate somewhat on the development by Dr. Kissinger of these points.

He started out by making it clear that he wants to be perceived by the public as an American leader and not as a representative of the Jewish community, but that we should realize that he would never participate in anything that would negatively affect the security of Israel.

The real "tragedy" facing Israel is obvious: it cannot give up all of the territories and end up like Czechoslovakia at the beginning of World War II, yet it cannot maintain dominion over all of the Arabs that are located in the territories.

Focusing on the situation in the last few weeks in Israel, Kissinger appropriately noted that Israel's public relations were horrible. In his opinion, it made two major mistakes. First, it did not throw all of the media out of the relevant territories. Second, it announced that it would "beat" the participants in the violence (and not shoot them). Israel may have felt that that approach was more humanitarian, but they overlooked the fact that when you "beat" someone it means you already have control of that person and can no longer claim self-defence.

Kissinger repeatedly emphasized that, under no circumstances, should Israel make any concessions during the present insurrection. If one learns anything from the history of revolutions, such as the Russian or French Revolution it is that concessions during an insurrection merely accelerate the revolution rather than hastening its end. Therefore, what is critical at this time is to put down the insurrection as quickly as possible. It was at that point that Kissinger added that he "really thinks that Jewish leaders should not yell at Israel now and make them even more paranoic. We must close ranks and not let the enemy utilise quotations from Jewish leaders as evidence to support their position about Israel in general."

Kissinger then turned to the international peace conference which has been proposed by Foreign Minister (Shimon) Peres. He said that he was fully apprised of all the procedural conditions that Peres has placed on the conference and the respective roles of the parties involved, but he still feels Peres overlooked one major problem. What is going to happen during the second week of the conference? All the deals that Peres has made with the various prospective participants in the conference reflect, in his opinion, naivete and read a bit childish.

After all is said and done, Israel does not have a government at present that could formulate a substantive policy for the proposed conference and, on the other side of the

civilian
ing in the
laced by

effort to
control in
tutes for
ow for a
hatening.
ich might
feels he
gaged in

ther the
to stop
civilians,
A small
self easily
ammuni-
ough we
upon the

ised, we
l affairs,
the public
le debate in
. Where
n proper
c, not be
its which

dents of
ey have
tsolved,
h we are
the area
this area
des, and
find the

parently
tue, New

CJ

159

JUN. 27 '88 11:28 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.09

AMERICAN-ARAB AFFAIRS

coin. there is no Arab leader that is able to make peace right now. Israel must always be
aware of the fact that the American government is not against the return by Israel to the
1967 borders (except for, possibly, Jerusalem). In his opinion, the State Department has
never given up on the Rogers Plan.

Kissinger recently had a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy in which the latter explained to him in excruciating detail all the procedural protections for the beginning of the conference. He noted, however, that no one was focusing on what happens in the course of the conference itself. He feels that if the United States and Israel do not have any prearranged agreement as to what positions will be taken at the conference itself, it may lead to a disaster. It is totally naive to believe that the five permanent members of the United Nations will come to the conference and be prevented from taking substantive positions. For example, assuming that after the opening there will be subcommittees for bilateral negotiations, there is no question that they will come to an immediate deadlock. What happens then? According to the Peres formula, Israel will have the right to say that nobody could talk from that point on. That simply cannot be done. For that matter, the idea of Israel just walking out of the conference and meeting . . . the whole thing is ridiculous.

Kissinger noted that other than Israel, there is no state attending the conference that does not favor return by Israel to the 1967 borders and, in his opinion, Israel could not survive that type of withdrawal.

In general, Kissinger feels that the issue of a peace treaty is overblown. It is not the be all and end all of peace in the Mid-east. Mutual recognition did not stop Iran and Iraq from its [sic] war; nor has it stopped India and Pakistan from continuing to fight with each other.

Focusing on the conference itself, Kissinger said that there is no question in his mind that China will adamantly support an "extreme" Arab position. This is necessary to outdo the Russian "romancing" of the Arabs. Syria, in his opinion, must also take a radical position on the Palestinian claims, so that it will not end up being isolated on the Golan Heights issue. Israel on the other hand, can never give up the Golan. He recalls having a discussion with the Russian ambassador in which the latter delineated to Kissinger the distinction between bilateral issues which will be dealt with at the international peace conference directly between Israel and the individual Arab nation involved and multilateral issues which will be dealt with by all of the participants at the international conference. The Russian ambassador then went on to offer examples of multilateral issues. He said that, of course, Jerusalem is a multilateral issue. In addition, the establishment of borders for Israel is also a multilateral issue—especially since they will eventually be guaranteed by the international community.

Returning to the current situation in Israel, he repeated his prior point that the insurrection must be quelled immediately, and the first step should be to throw out television, à la South Africa. To be sure, there will be international criticism of the step, but it will dissipate in short order. As he put it "there are no awards for losing with moderation."

He feels that international guarantees are not worth a damn. They can only be used to stop Israel from appropriately defending itself from "terrorist" activities. they are no help against "guerrilla" infiltration.

In terms of an ultimate solution to the issue, Kissinger feels that Israel should negotiate with America and work out a unified position. if at all possible. and then unilaterally announce that it was prepared to transfer control of Gaza to Jordan—not Egypt; he does not

want Egy
PLO to ta

As note
from the
announcer
Samaria"
there and

The ann
convened
(Signed)

Julius Ber

IX. DECL

The follow-
presidency

I. Zine E
In the Na
Fellow C
The enor
Republic, a
developmer
him and pu
loyalty and
and the gov

Confront
of his docto
to assume h

In assum
of our belo
hatred and r

The inde
homeland a
homeland, it
citizens.

Fellow cit.
its elements
in conformi
prerogatives
respectful of

It has bec
of President-
will of the p
political life

160

JUN. 27 '88 11:30 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 10

DOCUMENTATION

want Egyptian troops on Israel's borders. Moreover, he feels that Egypt would allow the PLO to take over the Gaza.

As noted above, he does not believe that Israel should retain all the territory that it took from the 1967 war. Consequently, at the same time Israel is making its unilateral announcement on Gaza, Israel should announce the specific territories within "Judea or Samaria" that it is willing to relinquish, provided that there be no military forces situated there and that there be no PLO controlled government in that area.

The announcement would then conclude with an offer to have an international conference convened for purpose of implementing the proposal.

(Signed)

Julius Berman

## IX. DECLARATION OF THE 7th OF NOVEMBER 1987

The following is the official statement of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on his accession to the presidency of Tunisia, November 7, 1987.

I, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Prime Minister of the Republic of Tunisia, issue the following:

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful,

Fellow Citizens:

The enormous sacrifices made by the leader, Habib Bourguiba, first President of the Republic, along with a number of brave men, for the liberation of Tunisia and its development, are immeasurable. For this reason, we have felt affection and esteem towards him and pursued our endeavors for many years, under his leadership, with confidence, loyalty and self-denial, at all levels, both within the ranks of our national and popular army and the government.

Confronted with his senility and his worsening state of health and based upon the report of his doctors on this matter, national duty compels us to declare him absolutely incapable to assume his duties as President of the Republic.

In assuming our responsibilities, we rely on the contributions of the sons and daughters of our beloved homeland, in a climate of confidence, security and serenity, which excludes hatred and rancor.

The independence of our country and its territorial integrity, the invulnerability of our homeland and the progress of our people, are the concern of all Tunisians. Love of the homeland, its safeguarding, and contributions towards its progress are the sacred duty of all citizens.

Fellow citizens, our people has attained a level of responsibility and maturity enabling all its elements and components to contribute constructively to the management of its affairs in conformity with the republican principle, allowing institutions to exercise their full prerogatives and ensuring the conditions for the installation of a responsible democracy respectful of popular sovereignty as enunciated in the Constitution.

It has become imperative today to revise the Constitution. In this era, neither the status of President-for-Life nor the automatic succession of the Head of State, which ignores the will of the people, can be tolerated. Our people deserve an institutionalized and evolved political life based on multipartyism and diversity of grassroots organizations.

161

March 7, 1988

The Editor
The New York Times
229 W. 43rd Street
New York, New York 10036

Dear Sir:

The undersigned current and former Chairmen of The Con-
ference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations were
present at the meeting of Jewish leaders with Dr. Henry Kissinger
on January 31, 1988. Dr. Kissinger was invited to present his
views and answer questions regarding matters of concern to our
community. Our recollection of that discussion is that Dr.
Kissinger expressed the following views, among others, (a) al-
though Israel's handling of the Arab demonstrations left much to
be desired, the foreign press and media opinion unfortunately
exaggerated Israel's alleged excesses (b) It would be unfair and
unwise for the American Jewish Community to waiver in its funda-
mental support of Israel (c) Israel would be at a disadvantage in
an International conference as proposed because process would
overcome substance, and in the absence of adequate time to pre-
pare, Israel would be overwhelmed by other participants and world
opinion to its unfair detriment (d) therefore, during 1988 Israel
and the U.S. should come to agreement on an approach, and Israel
should unilaterally propose to initiate bilateral negotiations for
autonomy and withdrawal from a portion of the occupied territo-
ries.

Dr. Kissinger did not advise that Israel should bar the press from the occupied territories. He did suggest that while that might have been desirable at the very outset, under current conditions it would be inadvisable. We have no recollection that he advocated any use of brutality in putting down the riots; indeed he was critical of excessive force while strongly advocating that the uprisings should be put down as promptly as possible.

On the Right -- Wm. F. Buckley Jr.

Henry Kissinger on Brutality

I have for many years profited from Rusher's Laws (William A. Rusher, publisher of National Review). My favorite is the Law of Rusher's Gap, best divulged by illustration. You wish to redo your office and the estimate for doing so is eight thousand dollars. Ah, but you are a wise old bird, you have been around; **you** know the cost will actually be closer to eleven thousand dollars. Rusher's Gap is the difference between eleven thousand dollars and the price it finally comes in at. Another of Rusher's Laws is: If you get word that your best friend has been spotted naked in Times Square carrying a placard denouncing you, doubt the messenger, not your friend.

Accordingly, my reaction on seeing the story that Henry Kissinger at a private breakfast with Jewish leaders recommended "brutality" as a means of confronting the Palestinian dissidents. Mr. Kissinger chooses his words with some care, and he knows the difference between, e.g., brutality and resolution. To exhibit resolution may require force. And force can be viewed, especially depending on the perspective, as brutal. The treatment of our northern prisoners at Andersonville during the Civil War was brutal whether viewed by Union or Confederate eyes. Our conquest of Okinawa was brutal in part: so was the resistance. To use the word brutal to describe recommended policy serves no interest.

Not that of the policy being recommended, not the reputation of
the person using that word. It came therefore as no surprise when
the chairmen, current and past, of the Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations published, on March 11 in the New
York Times, an account of what Henry Kissinger said to them at the
infamous breakfast meeting. Their letter ended, "We have no
recollection that [Dr. Kissinger] advocated the use of brutality
in putting down the riots; indeed, he was critical of excessive
force, while strongly advocating that the uprisings should be put
down as promptly as <u>M</u> possible. "

Our feet are, then, planted squarely again on the ground,
and the Henry Kissinger whose most scattered views have been
excogitated and studied for twenty years is dismissed from the
ranks of the sadists, where he would properly belong if he
recommended brutality. But he did, in the language of the Jewish
leaders, recommend "putting down" the riots as promptly as
possible, and this recommendation deserves more serious thought
than it has been given.

Those who have read Mr. Kissinger's books or studied his
thought know that a principle he has from time to time reaffirmed
holds that a state in trouble ought not to choose the moment of
that trouble to exercise leniency. This was the calamitous mistake
of the Shah of Iran. At a moment of maximum weakness, he released
thousands of political prisoners, ~~and invited the Ayatollah~~.
~~Khomeini back to Iran from France.~~ He might as well have signed
an instrument of abdication at that moment. Chiang Kai-shek in
1948 and 1949 elected the moment to exercise maximum

2

latitudinarianism with the Communist insurgents, and he paid for
this the loss of China.

Now this is not to take the position that all weak regimes
are right and that therefore they ought to buttress themselves.
At this moment the regime of General Noriega in Panama is weak and
we pray it will be weaker tomorrow, and gone the day after. But
clinical advice to weak regimes does not alter, depending on
whether they are virtuous or iniquitous. A doctor will give the
same medical advice to a sick devil as to a sick saint.

As to Kissinger's positions on Israel, they are widely
advertised. He believes that Israel cannot hope to continue to
dominate all of the West Bank and all of Gaza against the
sentiment of the overwhelming majority of those who live there.
He believes that the intensity of the press coverage of the riots
of the past two months have imposed on Israel pressures extrinsic
to those it should legitimately feel. Israel **should** be
pressured to initiate an accommodation with the Palestinians. But
Israel should not be pressured to do so with reference to a
timetable that issues out of camera-shots of Israeli soldiers
beating rockthrowing Palestinians.

He opposes the grand schemes for international conferences
for the best of reasons: He has lived through such conferences,
and one barely escapes with one's skin. What is needed is an
Israel initiative, backed by the United States: modest, but
palpable; generous, but shrewd. It ought not to be saying to the
Palestinians, in effect: "You have forced this from us by your
insurrectionary behavior in the conquered territories. Such
behavior we can cope with, using, as required, the same force used

3

APR.04 '88 09:54 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

2 JEWISH WORLD-MARCH 11-17, 1988

MAK w

P.01

Senate letter leaves pro-Israel

By LARRY COHLER

WASHINGTON—It was about 7 p.m. on March 2 when Tom Dine walked into the office of Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and faced the new congressional reality created by three months of rioting and repression on the West Bank and Gaza.

Levin, one of Israel's strongest supporters in Congress, had a letter to show Dine, who is head of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). While he was interested in Dine's comments, Levin did not seek his approval. The letter, to Secretary of State George Shultz, was going forward regardless.

With that resolve, soon backed by the signatures of 29 other senators—including many longtime friends of Israel—Levin signaled a turning point in relations between Congress and the pro-Israel lobby. The letter assured Shultz of the senators' support for his Mideast peace initiative and scored Arab obstructionism that threatened it. But it also singled out Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir for criticism, expressing “dismay” at his categorical rejection of the “land-for-peace” principle upon which Shultz's effort is based.

The Big Picture

What startled many Capitol Hill observers was not only the criticism of Israel by some of its staunchest congressional friends but the process by which it took place: Unlike almost all previous cases of congressional initiatives affecting Israel, Levin made his decision and worked up the letter with no prior consultation with AIPAC, long regarded as the most effective lobby on Capitol Hill.

In fact, the letter was wholly Levin's initiative and composed by the senator and his aide on Mideast affairs, M.J. Rosenberg, a former editor of Near East Report, the AIPAC-linked biweekly newsletter. Dine did make some suggestions

that Wednesday evening, but Levin rejected the most important one.

According to sources familiar with the letter's creation, Dine argued vigorously for deleting the criticism of Shamir for rejecting the "land-for-peace" formulation. Shultz himself had dropped the term after Shamir's rebuff, Dine pointed out, falling back instead on advocacy of "242 and 338" to say the same thing. This referred to the two UN resolutions that call on Israel to withdraw from territories won during the Six Day War in exchange for recognition and peace from the Arab world. But many regard those resolutions as ambiguous, given assertions by Israeli leaders opposed to territorial compromise that Israel met these requirements when it yielded the Sinai to Egypt.

Levin insisted on the original wording's clarity. The senator also kept in the reference to "violence and counter-violence," which indicts Israel equally with the Arabs.

In a separate encounter with Oded Eran, the Israeli Embassy's chief political officer, and Neville Lamdan, its congressional liaison, Levin rejected similar objections.

But beyond the letter's contents, as one prominent Jewish leader stressed, was the issue of the Israel lobby's lack of effectiveness: "To lose control over this was just unprecedented."

A Capitol Hill staffer with a strong pro-Israel background went further, declaring that when it came to Mideast issues, "the PAC system and the stranglehold of AIPAC and the PACs over Congress could be dead and buried now...It changes the rules completely. No longer will anyone say that being critical of Likud or Yitzhak Shamir is anti-Israel."

Perhaps. But the staffer's insistence on anonymity indicated that the lobby's influence hadn't com-

pletely vanished. At the very least, however, the senators' letter was one more indication that room for debate and criticism has opened up. With Israel's own government divided between Likud leader Shamir and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of the Labor Party, AIPAC and the PACs can hardly enforce an orthodoxy Israel itself cannot achieve as Shultz moves his plan ineluctably forward.

Snubbing the PACS

Hyman Bookbinder, special representative of the American Jewish Committee, pointed especially to the significance of the decision by Sens. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) and Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) to sign the letter. Both face grueling challenges in their upcoming re-election campaigns and are depending heavily on the support of pro-Israel PACs and activists to succeed. In making their decisions, neither consulted with AIPAC or the PACs.

"What the senators said...reflects the majority's feeling in the Senate and among American Jews," he said.

Indeed, the pattern was repeated many times over as Levin took the letter around personally to his colleagues on the Senate floor during votes that brought them together on Thursday and Friday. This was another departure from convention that signaled the letter's importance; generally such initiatives are sent around to the offices of other senators under the cover of a "dear colleague" letter from the sponsoring senator, with an invitation to sign on. The senators and their staffs then carefully deliberate and decide whether they want to lend their support.

Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.) was the first colleague Levin approached on Thursday morning and the first senator to join in, becom-

MAR.25 '88 13:33 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.02

JOHN MCLAUGHLIN: ONE ON ONE
WITH GUEST, DR. HENRY KISSINGER
FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

RECORDED THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1988
TO BE AIRED THE WEEKEND OF MARCH 12-13, 1988

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Rioting in Israel's West Bank and Gaza Strip continued into its fourth month this week, with no end in sight. Nine American hostages remain in captivity in Lebanon. The war between Iran and Iraq continues to rage. Will the tortured Middle East ever have peace? This foreign policy expert will speak to that.

Born: Bonn, Germany; emigrated to US in 1938 at age 15; naturalized, 1943; 64 years of age. Wife: Nancy, 13 years; son and daughter from a previous marriage. US Army, staff sergeant, counter-intelligence corps, three years. Harvard University, BA, summa cum laude; MA and Ph.D., History. Harvard University, Departments of Government and the Center for International Affairs, faculty member, 18 years. Kennedy Administration, National Security Council, consultant to, two years. Johnson Administration, Department of State, consultant to, four years. Nixon and Ford Administrations, National Security Council, seven years; Secretary of State, four years. Numerous decorations, including Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1977; Nobel Peace Prize, 1973. Kissinger & Associates, Inc., a consulting firm, chairman, six years and currently, Henry Alfred Kissinger, it's One on One.

Dr. Kissinger, were you pleased with your biography that you just saw?

DR. KISSINGER: That was fine. It was --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You can use that, if you want, if you decide to run for President.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, first you have to make the (inaudible) state of the union to make me a native-born American.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Or we could change the Constitution of the United States.

DR. KISSINGER: Or change the Constitution.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Would you recommend that we amend the Constitution to permit you to run for President?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I'm tempted by that thought.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: (Laugs.)

DR. KISSINGER: It'd be a noisy campaign, I'll tell you that.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Would it? Because of what you would say?

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400

MAR.25 '88 13:34 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.03

[L]

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

-2-

HENRY KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER: Because of my nature.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I hope we can hear some of that noise here today. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir comes to the United States shortly, and he will talk to George Shultz about the Mideast peace proposal of Mr. Shultz, the centerpiece of which is an international conference involving the Soviet Union and Israel and the United States, and representatives presumably from the Palestinian people. Do you think that Mr. Shamir will consent to the peace proposal?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I'd separate peace proposal and peace conference. I would be surprised if he accepted it in an unqualified way.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that the fact that he's willing to go with earlier elections is signalling some softening of his position? Because the earlier elections presumably would be a referendum --

DR. KISSINGER: I think --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- on the peace conference.

DR. KISSINGER: Two things. First, I think there should be elections in Israel. It's desirable. You have a prime minister and a foreign minister who are cutting each other up and not (?) using the United States. Each side is trying to line up the United States and other foreign countries in their support. It's an intolerable situation. So the earlier they have an election and get unified, the more important it is. Secondly, I would separate the notion of a peace conference from the notion of peace. Those two are not necessarily related.

I have consistently, over the years, had the gravest doubts about an international peace conference that includes the members of the Security Council, four or five Arab countries, Israel, and of course the United States, as a member of the Security Council. The only country that can really deliver is the United States. And I hate to see us in the position when, unless we know ahead of time what the parties are going to say, where everybody beats on the United States. We are isolated, in the end (?) get accused by Israel of betraying it, and by the Arabs of being Israel's lawyers, and having the Soviet Union take a free ride. They have no responsibility. They can make any proposal they want.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Are you opposed to an international conference, then?

DR. KISSINGER: I would prefer for the United States to handle it directly. Everything that has worked in the Middle East -- in the Nixon Administration, in the Ford Administration and in the Carter Administration -- was handled under American auspices.

MAR.25 '88 13:36

P.04

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88
HENRY KISSINGER

-3-

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Then you would prefer to see Shultz go a different route.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I'd prefer Shultz to do it alone.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, that seems to yield nothing. And Jordan -- Jordan's Hussein says he wants an international conference. He needs it for cover.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
COPYRIGHT (C) 1988, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

MAR.25 '88 13:36 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.05

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

HENRY KISSINGER

2-1

(DE)

DR. KISSINGER: For cover of what?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, he needs it, apparently, to provide him with the --

DR. KISSINGER: But let's be realistic. Let's be serious about this. What is said is that there be an international conference which meets once after which Jordan and Israel and Syria and Israel go off and settle things. In the whole history of Arab-Israeli relations, the Arabs and Israelis have never settled anything bilaterally, so it is guaranteed that they will deadlock and then come back to the conference. At the conference we have, then -- everybody going to the conference will already be committed before the conference, with the exception of the United States, to the '67 borders of Israel. I think those will guarantee the destruction of Israel. Between Haifa and Tel Aviv a distance of 50 miles. The -- that border establishes a corridor that is, at most, nine miles wide. On the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the border was about 100 yards from the road. That is an impossible situation. Israel cannot (stay away of this?). It must give up some territory.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Gaza?

DR. KISSINGER: It certainly must give up Gaza. And it certainly must give up a heavily populated part of the West Bank. On the other hand, the Arabs cannot get the '67 borders. I think that principle ought to be established before we ever go into a conference, otherwise they're going to get beaten to death.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Gaza is a coastal strip. It's tiny. It's 28 miles long. It's six miles wide. It fronts the Mediterranean. So you would see that going to the Arabs?

DR. KISSINGER: To Jordan. I'd give it to Jordan.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: To Jordan?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: All right. And you'd give part of the West Bank to Jordan?

DR. KISSINGER: At least for an interim period, yes.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that idea would go anywhere?

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3-1

MAR.25 '88 13:37 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.06

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

3-1

(DE)

HENRY KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER: Look, a lot depends on how ideas are presented. If you throw them all out for general discussion, nobody has any reason not to insist on their maximum demands, including the Israelis, who will insist on holding all of the West Bank. If we were to say we, the Americans, are the only ones that can really deliver anything, it is our view that you have to balance on the West Bank self-determination against security.

It's a problem, you know, historically very similar, funnily (?) enough, to the Czech crisis of '88. From the point of view of self-determination, the Germans were right. The territories were populated by Germans. From the point of view of survivability of Czechoslovakia, the Czechs were right, because once they gave up those territories, they became, in effect, defenseless.

So it's more or less true of the West Bank. The West Bank, at its deepest point, is 30 miles wide. We're not talking about a huge territory here. So if it's possible to balance the Arab right to self-determination, self-respect, against the Israeli concern for security, Israel has to give up some territory and many of the populated areas; the Arab countries have to understand that they must recognize some defensible borders for Israel.

Now, if we say it's either that or nothing, then everybody has an alibi. If it's thrown open to a sort of general debate, it will go on forever.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Dr. Kissinger, we'll be right back.

(Commercial Break.)

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4-1

MAR.25 '88 13:38 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.07

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

4-1

(AP)

HENRY KISSINGER

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Dr. Kissinger, do you believe that the current conflict in Israel is qualitatively different than anything that has gone before.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, because it is different, in the sense that Israel is in occupation of a territory where the population is conducting an uprising, that has not happened before.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: So, it's a national uprising -- using the word, national, loosely -- it's a national uprising, it's also, it's indigenous, and it's propelled by youth for the first time. In fact, the youth has caught the PLO leadership, it appears, off guard. Correct?

DR. KISSINGER: Certainly it is, everybody seems to agree, including the Israelis, that it is largely indigenous.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Largely indigenous, so therefore, the Israelis are probably going to have to give up some land for peace?

DR. KISSINGER: That -- by that, there is no question in my mind, but --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Have you told them that?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I haven't told them directly because I am not in touch with the Israeli government. I've written it.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Can you clear up something, and tell us why you cause so much commotion? About six weeks ago, you were at a breakfast and a memorandum of that breakfast says that you made the following point, quote, "Israel should bar the media from entering into the territories involved in the present demonstrations, accept the short-term criticism of the world press for such conduct and put down the insurrection as quickly as possible, overwhelmingly, brutally and rapidly -- just a moment -- the insurrection must be quailed immediately and the first step should be to throw out television, a la South Africa. Did you say it?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Did you say anything like it?

DR. KISSINGER: I said nothing -- I said nothing like it, and this was a memorandum written by one person who was putting -- I'm sure the letter -- whom I don't even know --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Julius Berman, the former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Org -- he sounds like a very distinguished chap.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4-2

MAR.25 '88 13:40 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.08

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

4-2

( )

HENRY KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER: But, since then five equally distinguished chaps who were all presidents of Jewish organizations have written a letter to the New York Times which published the original memorandum which the New York Times has not yet seen fit to publish which states what—

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What you said?

DR. KISSINGER: What is my recollection of what was said.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Was Laurence Tisch there?

DR. KISSINGER: I won't go into who was there. It was — we're talking here about a breakfast which was done at their invitation, in which there was a general discussion. The major theme of the discussion was to tell these leaders (1) that there was no sense second guessing the day to day incidents on the West Bank, because nobody knew enough about that. That they should put their weight on

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

P.09

[LC]

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

S-1

(LB)

HENRY KISSINGER

helping establish a negotiating position for the diplomacy that was inevitable in which Israel would agree unilaterally to give up Gaza and a major part of the West Bank. This was before the Shultz initiative, and I was urging them to get Israel to offer to give up territory. That was the major part of the ---

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Who were "they?" Prominent American Jews?

DR. KISSINGER: These were prominent American Jews who had invited me. I didn't ---

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Are you displeased with the present attitude of American Jewry towards what's going on -- by the conduct of the Israeli government and the management of these demonstrations?

DR. KISSINGER: No. That wasn't the point of that meeting. My advice to them was that they could be most influential in dealing with middle- and long-range things. As far as the press was concerned, I really think one ought to read that letter, if the New York Times ever considers to publish it.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You want to say categorically that you did not say "bar the television cameras?"

DR. KISSINGER: I could tell you exactly what happened. Somebody complained about the parameters of television coverage. I said -- this was in a private conversation on the way out. I said that television is inherently unfair in these things because it can only cover the action. It cannot cover the provocation and it cannot cover the context. Maybe it would have been best to exclude the press at the beginning, like America did in Grenada. But this is water over the dam now, and there's no sense in arguing about it.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: This is what you said then?

DR. KISSINGER: That is what I said then. This was about a thirty-second conversation in a three-hour meeting, and I think this whole reporting has been grotesque.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You said nothing about putting down the insurrection brutally?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I said that, under the pressure of insurrection, it is very difficult to make concessions. But I also said that, during this year, I thought they should put their influence, use their influence for Israel to indicate which territories it was willing to give up and to indicate, in principle, agreement to the concept of territory-for-peace. In fact, I even said they didn't have to insist on peace, that they should simply give up territories in return for security arrangements.

MAR.25 '88 13:42 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

[L]

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

6-1

(MW)

HENRY KISSINGER

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Dr. Kissinger, you signed a Memorandum in 1975 -- September the 20th between the government of Israel and the United States. It was signed in Geneva, wasn't it?

DR. KISSINGER: It was probably signed in Jerusalem.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It says:

> The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

First question: Does that leave any room for maneuver for the United States with the PLO?

DR. KISSINGER: I'm sort of tired of people who take a memorandum that was never ratified by the Congress and 13 years ago and deal with it as if it were one of the Ten Commandments.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You wish to abjure this memorandum?

DR. KISSINGER: No, not at all. But I told the Administration that -- and several administrations that if they want to -- to put forward a different position on their merits, I'm not going to do it because --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But --

DR. KISSINGER: But wait a minute. Let's see what this Memorandum says. All the PLO has to do to be eligible for conversation with the United States under the provisions of this Memorandum is recognize the state of Israel and recognize the peace process by which the negotiations are taking place. It is not an excessive demand. It is an absurdity --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Okay, now --

DR. KISSINGER: -- to say that they should be talked to while their program is to destroy an American ally and when they don't accept the Security Council's resolutions.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: In 1982, I interviewed Arafat in Beirut, and Arafat told me that he has done this -- that he has done it equivalently, and he has done with sufficient explicitness to satisfy anybody -- that is, accepted 242 and 338.

MAR.25 '88 13:43 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

[L]

P.12

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

6-2

(MW)

HENRY KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER: Well, if that is true, it has escaped me. But if it is true, all he has to do is say it and then this provision no longer applies.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Here -- here's the problem. Shultz goes over there and he talks to, I guess, Hussein on his trip. He talks to Mubarak. He talks to Assad. They didn't start this violence. It was started by the Palestinians. He ought to be talking to the Palestinians. I don't think he is talking to the Palestinians --

DR. KISSINGER: No, he's not talking --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- because all of the Palestinians you know and I know recognize the PLO as their legitimate spokesman and collective leadership.

DR. KISSINGER: He offered to speak to Palestinians in Jerusalem in the Arab part of Jerusalem where no American secretary of state has ever gone. All the PLO has to do according to this provision is to recognize the existence of the state of Israel and to recognize the Security Council resolutions on the basis

CONTINUED ON 7-1

MAR.25 '88 13:44 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.13

[LC]

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

HENRY KISSINGER

7-1

(MG)

of which all other Arab states are participating in the
negotiations.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yeah, but --

DR. KISSINGER: Why should that -- why is that such an
incredible demand?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, assuming -- notwithstanding what I said about Arafat -- that that cannot come about. This is providing a fire wall against which no one appears to be able to move, because even if you found leadership on the West Bank among the Palestinians, they would not emerge as --

DR. KISSINGER: I know, but --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- true leaders without the legitimacy of the PLO recognition.

DR. KISSINGER: But with all due respect, the fire wall is not created by what was said here. It is not an unreasonable proposition for the United States to say they will not talk to a country or to a group that has, as its basic program, the destruction of its ally, with whom it's supposed to be negotiating. All we are asking for is that the PLO recognize the existence of the state of Israel -- they don't have to accept particular frontiers -- the existence of the state of Israel and the relevant Security Council resolutions, on the basis of which everybody else, including the Soviet Union --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And you don't believe that they have yet done
that.

DR. KISSINGER: No. And if they want to do it, why don't they say it explicitly. Then this thing becomes irrelevant.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Let me ask you a couple of questions about a different scene (?), and that's Panama. You saw, at the top of the biography, your picture with Omar Torrijos. I didn't realize that you were a close friend of Omar Torrijos.

DR. KISSINGER: I wasn't a close friend of Omar Torrijos. I met him once, when I was down there to sign the principles which were the basis for the Panama Canal negotiations.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Did you know -- did you know that he was a
drug trafficker?

DR. KISSINGER: I met him once, for one specific purpose.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: His brother --

DR. KISSINGER: And it might have been --

MAR.25 '88 13:45 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.14

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

7-2

HENRY KISSINGER

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: His brother Moises (?) --

DR. KISSINGER: I did not know he was a drug trafficker.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: His brother Moises was --

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know whether he was one --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- indicted by a grand jury in New York on a sealed indictment for drug trafficking. And then it was revealed to the Justice Department --

DR. KISSINGER: I met --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- that Omar Torrijos was drug trafficking, too.

DR. KISSINGER: This picture was from 1974. I don't think that was true then.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I think it was. And Noriega was his head of the CIA down there.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, this might -- all I've been saying is, this picture, which my office gave you --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You can't shed any light on the Panama situation?

DR. KISSINGER: No, because my only relation to it was when I went down there for three hours to sign the basic principles which initiated the Panama Canal negotiation.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: All right, we will relieve you of this line of questioning, but we'll be right back.

(Commercial announcements.)

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Dr. Kissinger, which presidential candidate is best equipped to handle the foreign policy of the United States, as president -- Bush, Dole, Robertson, Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore?

DR. KISSINGER: I will support the Republican candidate, because I think they stand for a more responsible foreign policy.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: How would you grade Ronald Reagan's administration's foreign policy, on a scale of A to D, A being the kind of grades you got when you were at Harvard, and D being those --

DR. KISSINGER: I give them very high marks in the first six years, and I'm very disappointed by the last two years.

MAR.25 '88 13:46 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.15

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

7-3

HENRY KISSINGER

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Why?

DR. KISSINGER: Because I think he is undoing a lot of what he achieved in East-West --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You're not referring to Iran-contra.

DR. KISSINGER: No, Iran-contra, that was a sort of mistake --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: An aberration.

DR. KISSINGER: -- that anyone can make. You know, it was a grievous mistake.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What were you referring to, the INF Treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: The whole -- the conduct of negotiations with the Soviets, including the INF Treaty.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Thanks for being my guest on One on One, Dr. Kissinger.

END OF REGULAR SEGMENT

*** PBS SEGMENT FOLLOWS ON PAGE 8-1 ***

MAR.25 '88 13:47 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

[L]

P.16

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

HENRY KISSINGER

8-1

(NG)

********PBS SEGMENT********

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Dr. Kissinger, on the subject of the rising now going on in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Soviets have repelled this by force, 30, at least are dead. But this is a real problem in the Soviet Union. You've got 100 nationalities and ethnic groups, they've got problems in the Baltic area --

DR. KISSINGER: And soon over half of the population will be non-Russian.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Non-Russian?

DR. KISSINGER: Non-Russian by the year 2000.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You've got problems, insurrections, or uprisings in Estonia, Latvia. Do you think this is the biggest problem the Soviet Union is now facing?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the Soviet Union has a whole series of problems, all related to the same thing, namely that they have to give up the centrally run economy in order to keep from becoming an underdeveloped country. But the minute they start decentralizing they run into all these nationalist tendencies, autonomous tendencies, and in the whole history of the Russian state there has never been a decentralized administration.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that these uprisings are due to perestroika or glasnost? Or do you think that they were there anyway?

DR. KISSINGER: They were there anyway, but I think the new conditions have made them easier, and because Gorbachev trouble(?).

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Is there any reason to believe that these riots have been instigated by Gorbachev's foes who are opposed to perestroika and glasnost?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think so. That would be much too dangerous.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that Gorbachev is hurt by these uprisings?

DR. KISSINGER: Definitely.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You do?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that in this critical June planum(sp?), this meeting that's taking place in the Soviet Union,

MAR.25 '88 13:48 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.17

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

8-2

( )

HENRY KISSINGER

that this will be advanced as a reason for arguing that glasnost has gone too fast -- too fast and too far?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think sooner or later it will be used against him. But I would also warn against putting that much emphasis on the personality of Gorbachev. Our problem is not glasnost. Our problem is Soviet foreign policy. And we shouldn't get so obsessed with Soviet internal developments.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Which Soviet foreign policy?

DR. KISSINGER: What America needs from the Soviet Union is restrained international conduct. What they do at home is interesting, may have some effect on it, but we -- it is not our major concern.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You don't see restraint being exercised by the Soviet Union, or reform? For example, the withdrawal of troops scheduled for -- from Afghanistan?

DR. KISSINGER: If they withdraw troops from Afghanistan, and if, within a measurable time the communist government in Kabul collapses, then, indeed, that will be a major event.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You know that George Shultz, in supporting an international peace conference in the Middle East, at which the USSR will be present, is an implicit, even explicit quasi-blessing of Gorbachev.

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You don't think so?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It helps Gorbachev, does it not?

DR. KISSINGER: It may or it may not.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It would help him internally.

DR. KISSINGER: But that's not the problem. I am -- I have always thought

CONTINUED ON 9-1

MAR.25 '88 13:49 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.18

[L]

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

9-1

(DE)

HENRY KISSINGER

that we were better off pursuing our policy in the Middle East unilaterally because the Soviet Union can make no contribution to it unless we know in advance that they will ask the same sacrifice of their friends in the Arab world that we will be asked to demand of our friends in Israel.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I understand that. But I have a proposition. The proposition is that this administration, Ronald Reagan and George Shultz principally, are dedicated now to helpy Gorby make it, to helping Gorby survive. One way --

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not sure that that is correct, but if it were, I don't agree with that.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Okay. The one way is that, if there is an international peace conference in the Middle East regarding the Middle East of which the USSR is present, that can only help him. Furthermore, the President went to Brussels. He went to Brussels to reassure our allies at the summit that the INF was in their interests and to get their cooperation. That also helps to relieve the anxieties of the hawks in the Soviet Union who fear that the NATO allies will re-arm their short- and mid-term -- mid-range weaponry because the INF Treaty is now secure. Those hawks were opposed to excluding the nuclear weapons from -- to excluding from the treaty the nuclear weapons of Great Britain and France. So to quiet them down, Reagan goes over there. Here also --

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- in an attempt to help Gorby.

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't believe that is fair to the President.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Is the central proposition that I have stated true?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I don't think he quieted down the Europeans. I think that there was a sort of a tacit nonagression pact. The Europeans want the President to go out with dignity. He didn't make any demands on them. They didn't make any demands on him. So it was a good exercise in --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You're the father of detente, right? That was Detente I. We now have Detente II. Can it be argued that Detente II is more "detentish" than Detente I? We've got five seconds.

DR. KISSINGER: It's more psychiatrically inclined. President Nixon and I were more -- (end of audio feed)

***** END OF PBS SEGMENT *****

END OF TRANSCRIPT

COPYRIGHT (C) 1988 FEDERAL INFORMATION SERVICE CORPORATION

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Julius Eerman, the former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Org -- he sounds like a very distinguished chap.

DR. KISSINGER: But, since then five equally distinguished chaps who were all presidents of Jewish organizations have written a letter to the New York Times which published the original memorandum which the New York Times has not yet seen fit to publish which states what--

DR. KISSINGER: I won't go into who was there. It was -- we're talking here about a breakfast which was done at their invitation, in which there was a general discussion. The major theme of the discussion was to tell these leaders (1) that there was no sense second guessing the day to day incidents on the West Bank, because nobody knew enough about that. That they should put their weight on

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

P.09

ONE ON ONE-03/10/88

HENRY KISSINGER

5-1

(LB)

DR. KISSINGER: No. That wasn't the point of that meeting. My advice to them was that they could be most influential in dealing with middle- and long-range things. As far as the press was concerned, I really think one ought to read that letter, if the New York Times even considers to publish it.

APR. 04 '88 09:54 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.01

By LARRY COHLER

The Big Picture

But beyond the letter's contents, as one prominent Jewish leader stressed, was the issue of the Israeli lobby's lack of effectiveness: "To lose control over this was just unprecedented."

Snubbing the PACS

Hyman Bookbinder, special representative of the American Jewish Committee, pointed especially to the significance of the decision by Sens. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) and Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) to sign the letter. Both face grueling challenges in their upcom-ing re-election campaigns and are depending heavily on the support of pro-Israel PACs and activists to succeed. In making their decisions, neither consulted with AIPAC or the PACs.