DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

John D. Rockefeller III
4/1/71 ca. 11:00 a.m.

R: Is it an awful moment to have a word with you?

K: Not at all.

R: I'm distressed on this Vietnam thing. It seems to me it brushes off our final hope -- it seems to me we are committed to withdrawal and are not proving that the other side has the strength to stand.

K: But that's not true. Really, with all respect, that isn't the conclusion we are reaching. We have spent a whole week in very careful analysis and this isn't the conclusion one should draw. We cannot afford to be kidding ourselves, and wouldn't delude you. We may be wrong, but this is our best judgment.

R: What I was wondering was in looking ahead -- we have got to get out.

K: I agree with that.

R: The question of getting a base of support within the government . . .

K: You mean in South Vietnam?

R: Yes, to give it more viability within the South Vietnamese picture. I was proceeding on a premise which you say is wrong, but I wondered if we could hope that the present government will command the respect of the people of the country if we pull back.

K: That is a very important point.

R: Somehow I feel time is awfully short here, but if my premise is wrong . . .

K: I don't want to give you a flip answer. Would you like to come down for lunch next week?

R: I do come down occasionally. I will be there the week after next.

K: Let's do it then. I would like to give you first our best judgment of the military situation and then the political situation and get the best judgment you have as a senior citizen.

R: I have been there so many times . . .

K: I know your long-standing concern with the area. How about having lunch?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

John D. Rockefeller III
4/1/71 ca. 11:00 am

R: That's really terrific.

K: I would like to do it.

R: Let's plan on it. Let me have my office git in touch with yours.
The stakes are high here, was you know much better than I. It would be
tragic if we guessed wrong, not only for Vietnam but for the whole area.

K: And our domestic stability as a people.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Bill Timmons

4/1/71 11:40 a.m.

K: You people are beginning to try my patience. Every day I get some other hot shot resolution which I am told may be acceptable. No resolution is acceptable -- no resolution of any kind. Here I've got this O'Konski resolution.

T: That's terrible.

K: It's impossible, totally unacceptable. It's worse than a time-certain one. There are other issues in Vietnam than the release of the prisoners. It is not the only issue. At this time we stand on the October 7 statement. And if our people hold tight we may be able to make a negotiation.

T: This Matsunaga thing -- it won't be an isolated resolution.

K: I don't think they will pass it.

T: I don't either.

K: I don't think they will take the responsibility for losing the war. Take the line the President took with Boggs and Albert, that he will go after the Congress if they take the responsibility.

T: They are looking for something supportive.

K: Have them say the October 7 announcement and the withdrawal proposal. But not what we've got here.

T: No, that's terrible!

K: My memorandum says that MacGregor doesn't see that as a problem.

T: I have here: "In support of national objectives . . . the 92nd Congress places full support in the initiatives of the President which may be pertinent to these goals."

K: That will never get passed.

TX: Probably not, but it's something to offer as a substitute which is supportive of the President.

K: You do that and then someone offers something else and you have a negotiation with yourself.

T: We won't offer this unless we are stuck with a complete withdrawal statement

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Bill Timmons

4/1/71 11:40 a.m.

K: Let them pass it if they will, and then we'll murder them. You can't placate these people. If we can't carry our policy through the country then we can't. But if we start __________ no one will know what we stood for.

T: Then you want to try to fight the Matsunaga resolution and if it wins let it ride.

K: We always tell one more thing and then everyone will be satisfied. Every time we do it it gets us two to three months at the most. The time-certain argument is frivolous; it ruins any negotiating position we have left. If the Congress wants to take that responsibility, let them take it. We are in the best negotiating position we have had and now everything is being done that can be to undercut us. The time-certain argument is undercutting. It may not do any damage with Hanoi, but it won't do any good.

T: I think we can crack this thing.

K: If the Republicans rush in with an alternative every time, no one will ever know where we stood. I believe very strongly that we have to fight it.

T: We are going to but/ if we lose/ it may help to have a fall-back position.

K: Just say to them you now have the responsibility of having undercut the President, and all of the sacrifices that have been made. Tell Gerry Ford to make the speech the President made the other morning at the breakfast.

TK: Okay, we'll fight it.

K: Try Bill, really.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Clark MacGregor

April 1, 1971 11:50 a.m.

jlj

K: I just talked to Bill Timmons and

M: Yes I know. I don't think the O'Konski language is good.

K: You do not see the resolution as a problem. I have a note here which says that you . . .

M: Someone is editorializing. I had to dictate my message to Larry Higby and apparently he editorialized on my comments. What I said was that we should consider that this may present us a manner of getting the House on record.

K: It is my strong recommendation is get these guys out on a limb. I have talked with the President several times and we should fight them.

M: It gives us a negative triumph. But that is not bad.

K: Perhaps we can get a positive one later with this statement coming up.

M: We have the vehicles to do it.

K: Have you noticed that we have a Vietnamese cook at Camp David. Does that give you a hint?

M: Plenty of nuc mam. Yes, that gives me a hint. I wonder if the cherry blossoms will be out. I will be happy to go ahead and fight this thing and get a negative triumph. We can get a positive one later on. I wanted to say to you as long as I have you on the line - I am reflecting changing mood on the Hill with these comments. I hope the April 7 statement is different in degree and different in kind.

K: What do you mean?

M: I will send you a memo.

K: What do you mean kind?

M: It should not be like his others saying that so many troops will be out 6 months hence. It should be different than just number and date.

K: Those people that want us to set a specific date. . .

M: I didn't say set a specific date.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: We have an LDX in the situation room. Could you get it down there and have it sent to me pretty quickly.

M: Fine.

K: Contact Jon Howe in my office. He can handle that. In fact I will get him in touch with you. Clark, from our point of view we have as good a chance as we have never had and it is painful to have to stop XXX because of domestic reasons.

M: Nobody is proposing that. This memo will not be complete but more illustrations of what we could do.

K: Illustrative of your ideas is fine.

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

April 1, 1971 12:38 p.m.

jlj

NARA, Date 5/26

M: The President called me and asked me to call Ft. Benning and revoke the order restricting Calley to the stockade and hold him confined in quarters as before. I have talked to the Secretary of the Army - Resor - who is calling Ft. Benning and giving this order. . . . word to go to the people about this and I understand he is going to make a statement in three or five minutes. I am sure that the President is getting all kinds of legal advise but I would like to say the less said about that the better. This is my personal view that I am just telling you. If he says anything you cannot tell what the legal bastards will say.

K: I will tell you Tom, if I took all the PR people and gave them to you we could have another SOXXAY raid into Laos with them and we would not miss them here. I will do my best to get your views to him and turn this off.

M: The less he says about it the better. People may accuse him of XOXXAY condoning such acts.

K: That is my view.

M: I just do not want anyone criticizing him.

K: I understand the spirit of your proposal.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird
4/1/71 1:15 p.m.

L: I talked with Tom -- he got a call from the President. He got in touch with Resor because he is the one who has to do it. Everything has been carried out, but Tom would appreciate it and I would too if Ron would work with Henken on it.

K: Ron is supposed to call Tom.

L: Yes but Tom would appreciate it if he worked with Henken on it -- he is not interested in getting any more involved.

K: Okay, I will get Ziegler together with Henken.

L: Everything has been carried out by Tom. But this is not in his line of authority. He called Stan and he got in touch with the convening authority. But I think it is not the right thing to do. I talked on the Hill today with Rogers, Hugh Scott, and Mansfield and came back with this action involved, and if the President wants to get involved fine.

K: But do you think it is right?

L: I think it is the right thing/ to do but it's wrong for him to do it. He thinks it's a political plus. It is at present maybe, but 30 days from now it won't be. Sometimes they don't take a look at the 30-day route. He should have talked with Mttchell about this -- John would have told him not to do it.

K: I know. It's too far down the track now; I can't call the President off, but I'll get Ziegler to get with Henken.

L: Okay, and just have them say the President has directed the convening authority. That helps me and Resor. We were working out a long-range game plan on it

K: Pardon me, Mel. The President is calling.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
(taking the call for the President)

April 1, 1971 1:30 p.m.

jlj

K: The President asked me to see if there was anything that I could help you with. He is in a meeting right now.

L: Tom just called me back here and I think I should talk to the President. He said that a statement was going to be made and Ron insisting in talking to him and say that the President had directed Admiral Moorer to order this. Legally wrong because he is not in the chain of command according to the NSC Act. He should say that he directed the proper authorities to do this.

K: I told Ron that if he was going to make any kind of detailed statement that he should check with Henkin if he makes any extended statement.

L: I talked to John Mitchell and John thought this might happen. He is taping the David Frost show at the present and is in NY. He will not be back until 8:30. I am sure the President's legal advisor would say that this should not be done. I think the action is just fine but do not get Moorer involved in it. He cannot exercise any military command. It ends up what actually goes out would be from Secretary of the Army. Let's not get into that. Do you see how it is absolutely important?

K: I will talk to Ziegler.

L: Tom does not have any authority to make this order.

K: I will call Ziegler right now.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

April 1, 1971 1:34 p.m.

jlj.

K: Laird called the President and did not get him and talked to me. He says you cannot say that we ordered Moorer. We should say that ordering the convening authority.

Z: What should I say?

K: We ordered the convening authority.

Z: I am going to be asked who he talked to. I will say that he talked to Admiral Moorer this morning. That the order has been directed to the convening authority at Ft. Benning. That's ______ isn't it.

K: You told me. It has been directed to the convening authority.

Z: Here I go.

K: Good luck.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/J. Edgar Hoover

April 1, 1971 2 p.m.

jlj

K: I was just talking to the President about that matter we talked about this morning.

H: One before the arrest?

K: Yes. He does not want anything done for 6 weeks or so. However, nothing should impede your collecting of evidence. But you should come back to us and remind us. Another thing, you remember you talked to me about Bunker stopped the presence of your people in Saigon. When Haig went out there we said we would straighten it out for you. While he was out there he had some conversations and everyone thought the FBI might be helpful.

H: Thank you very much Dr.

K: If there is any problem you come to us and we will try to work it out.

H: Thank you Dr.

K: We will write this to suit whatever you think you are going to have to have.

H: I will write you a memorandum. We could not get along with Bunker without you stepping in.

K: Well we have solved the reporting problem.

H: Thank you Dr.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
9:52 a.m. 4/2/71

K: I just found out that a NSSM went to State on Law of the Seas that wasn't discussed with Ted Eliot. I am having it pulled back. Keepin in line of understanding. It was done at the insistence of Defense. We will call Ted Eliot and if there's a disagreement we will discuss it. That way, no formal procedure and we can see where we are.

R: I am meeting with an advisory panel. We haven't disagreed with defense.

K: Pakkard has a strong view but it should be handled by State. We will work it out. This was following things in the old pattern and I expect to work it out the new way.

R: It's a hell of a can of worms on the Calley thing. I think it would be a catastrophe to work percipitatively. Did you hear the juror?

K: The fellow that said they tried to find extenuating circumstances. He was terrific.

R: He had tears in his eyes. They asked what would happen if the President upset the verdict. He said that they did what was required under the system. It was an unpleasant duty. He said, "on reduction of sentence, I have no views but the whole system of law and order is involved." This juror said when he started his sympathy was with Calley. He said, "we listened to the evidence."

K: If we put out a statement of compassion I can see it running side by side with pictures of the women and children.

R: He can do it in a thoughtful way. The jurors were acting for him as Commande in Chief.

K: I am uneasy about it. The peace groups that are quiet will come out with a bang. It comes out Calley is a peacenik and if we set him free he will run around the country attacking us.

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

TELCON
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger
10:04 a.m. 4/2/71

K: On that Thai cable and the Jordanian thing, we should be willing to go along on the Jordanian thing.

J: Did you get the revised text?

K: We made suggestions.

J: There should be a revised text. Instead of using '71 money we would use '72 money.

K: That makes it easier.

J: You should have some revised language on that.

K: I will check and clear it today.

J: '72 exactly, money.

K: Their disposition is to go along and you have will have clearance by the end of the day. On the Thai business, my people claim they did work with you people on working level on a better basis then what's worked out. If we could have a meeting within a couple of weeks of coming back like we did a few months ago it might be better. But I would rather have a mediocre package then no package. Do you think we can do that?

K: Holding up what we want to do. We have been so much time already. PL 480 took so much time.

K: And you check with your people on working group? Wayne Smith handling it on my side. But I don't know who in your shop.

J: Part of the hold up was DOD and ourselves. Packard and I worked it out.

K: The objection is that these people claim and I haven't studied it -- what they did was develop like Cambodia, various packages, which are analytically valid but most of course it has to relate to what's done. We don't want them to have to wait another 6 months. If your judgement were that we could at an SRG meeting agree on one of the other packages and it were better it would only delay two weeks but if it would trigger a delay then I want to go with what we have. Let me check on who are people are dealing with.

J: I will run it down and call you back.

K: If you do that then I will make a decision.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Howard Stein/Kissinger

11:59 a.m.

4/2/71

S: Do you have a minute or two?

K: Sure.

S: This is probably not very helpful but I wanted to convey this onto you. We understand the Administration is trying to find wind down. Trying very ______ on part of consumers to understand what's happening. We took a poll of share holders of 400,000 (?) . We can see basis of pessimism and feeling. Great uncertainty because the don't understand what the Administration is doing. If they could in a clear way it would effect them as consumers.

K: How can we do that?

S: In Korean War if you look at the Dow-Jones, the market was flat. When you went into the armistice in '53-'54 the market went up 105%. Each time you have had international things. In the '60 period you had Berlin wall, Bay of Pigs, and ______ and the market remained flat. Peacetime economy it went up 85%. In '65 when VN excalated the corporate ______ went flat. It's below '55-'56 which was not a flat period. The market has begun to move up and there's an understanding of winding down. If they understand what's happening the Dow-Jones will sell between ? ? ? ? and corporate profits went up ______. Therefore, I think that all that's really necessary and needed here is one of 32 million who own shares to know what effect it would have on the market and what effect the market would have on corporate profits and what effect on ? ? ?. If the desire is to wind down the war then more k should be given to the people.

K: Like what.

S: I have to leave that to you. I realize the situation is terribly complicated.

K: Our problem is -- we have no problem demonstrating -- or perhaps we do. We should be able to demonstrate we are winding down and we want to keep ambiguity too for negotiations. You think this would have an electric effect on share holders?

S: During all past periods there's an expansion of multiple that takes place and when that happens people say I can sell stock and therefore build. There's not as many problems working out an economy in different environmental conditions. No witness willingness to work out a higher price. They only do it when they are sure it's ______ and can identify it.

K: Let me ask you -- there can't be more than 500 people in the country who can effect it in terms of what investments figures. So if the top 500 got information it would change their planes and effect their decisions?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Howard Stein/Kissinger

11:59 a. m.

4/2/71

-2-

S: Unless the market goes up there's no currency and they are less interested in borrowing because it adds debt to debt. So a higher multiple market will ? ? ? ? ?

K: Think about what to do. I will too. Coming to Washington?

S: You have so much --

K: I don't see unusual people that often. If I ask for it you are not bothering me.

S: OK, fine.

K: I will really give this every thought I am capable of and talk with the President about it.

S: I am not the one to carry this message because I am in another camp.

K: But a community of interest on this one that isn't partisan.

S: I have feelings about the war and how we should do it as I'm sure you have. No advantage to me but Administration if it's in for consideration. I see the degree of pessimism in the consumers and they will not be turned on by easy money. They need to feel troubles are behind us. They are not sophisticated. ? ? ? ? ? Sp it tends to confuse them. So a definitive statement would put us in a different ball game.

K: OK. Thanks for calling.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Lloyd Shearer/Kissinger

12:18 p.m. 4/2/71

S: How's it look over the weekend?

K: Going back Monday.

S: Going to be up here?

K: I'm not sure. If I am, it will be in and out and don't want pictures taken then. We could do it here Monday morning.

S: My home phone is GR 2-1011. Maybe sometime over the weekend you will be up here and we can do it in 10 mins.

K: You don't want to come down here?

S: I don't mind but if you are up here it would only take 10 mins. Any chance you will be here?

K: I might be up Sunday.

S: That would be fine. We are on Sunset Blvd and you would probably be close.

K: Beverley Hills. I will call if I am in L.A.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird

4/2/71 ca. 1:30 p.m.

L: I guess you weren't able to help on that thing?

K: No, have instruction that they should work it out on a mutually
satisfactory basis.

L: They have already leaked the "Dear Mel" letter to the Washington
Post.

K: Those sons of bitches.

L: That abortion thing was handled by the Assistant Secretary for Health.

K: I was told 15 minutes ago that it was between Friedheim and Buchanan.

L: They leaked the whole thing. They said I put up a fight with the
President, which I didn't. They are not going to gain politically with the
Catholics by doing this. I am getting sick and tired of taking this heat.

K: ________ talked to the President; we talked to Buchanan and I
was certain it was worked out.

L: They got work Caldwell was told; they read it to Friedheim. The
story will show there's a dispute between me and the President on abortion.
But this was with some doctor on the Medical Review Board. This is going
on too much. I've been taking the heat on the Hill, now the heat on this . . .
I will have to start operating like Bill. He said he won't put up with that,
and he just won't cooperate. Maybe I ought to operate that way.

K: I don't know what he is talking about, but don't you do that.

L: These guys ________ me up like this -- it's crazy.

K: I'll protect you when I know what's happening. I don't know what the
hell is happening. But I will get back to you.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Under Secretary Johnson
4/2/71 1:50 p.m.

K: On that Thai cable, we'd better go ahead with it. Whatever considerations the ______ have, we'll put it in a long-term framework.

J: Wilson just came back from a meeting with Wayne Smith on this and was talking to me.

K: Well, you can consider this a formal clearance.

J: Okay, Henry, we'll get it off.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger
4:50 p.m. 4/2/71

K: I am sorry I couldn't get back to you earlier. I was with the President the whole time. I know I have a memo here from Buchanan that says there's a memo from Freidheim on Defense. So here's the game plan. So we thought you were aboard.

L: They took the "dear Mel" letter and gave it to Clawson in the Post.

K: I couldn't be sorrier.

L: In addition they gave him another internal working paper. He said it was OK to announce it. But I wasn't aware of this. I didn't told Murphy that letter would never go anywhere. It was damaging to the President. I did what the President wants but that letter will cause him problems.

K: They mislead us and I couldn't be sorrier.

L: It doesn't pay to play on this team.

K: It does and will. I am sorry.

L: I know the deal. You know Brent ____?

K: National Review.

L: It's a deal they helped to engineer. You have to be careful about those things.

K: You are arguing with the wrong guy. I'm with you.

L: I am going to have to say I will not do anything unless it comes through your office. McNamara put out that order in '66.

K: If I heard sooner I would have protected you. Every interest in building you up. There's never been a crisis where you haven't been taking the heat with us.

L: I have been up on the Hill all week on the draft.

K: I was raising hell with the President and said it wasn't fair.

L: Not fair to put out letters unless they tell me. I am not blaming you. But I can't operate out of the dark.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELECON
Amb. Bush
4/2/71 a.m.

B: Yesterday, I had lunch with Beebe (?) and all the editors of News-week. The subject of Laos came up and they were very closed-minded about it. I was thinking of our conversation on the helicopter losses and I thought you told me that we have more helicopter losses in Cambodia than in Laos, Is that correct?

K: I think so. Though this may have changed in the last week of the Laos operation.

B: That was my feeling, but I didn't have numbers on it.

K: I can get that number for you.

B: Could you? That would be very useful. I would like to go back to them. They are so closed-minded and I think if we have some decent numbers that aren't classified with me to call this fellow back. And another figure you had was that during the Laos operation the losses had only exceeded 10 percent of the normal operating losses beforehand. I think I've got these figures -- that's not important. This meeting was all off the record. But I would like to be able to call them back with this other.

K: I will get you these figures.

B: I'm sorry to bother you.

K: You never do.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mike Wallace

4/3/71 11:10 a.m.

W: Tongiht I leave for Israel where in the next two or three days I am
going to interview Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan. I thought, had you the least
disposition, you might tell me what strategically would be interesting.
Obviously the Suez Canal, and they are pushing very hard on Sharm Al Shaik.
But is there anything you can tell me that would be particularly interesting to
know?

K: Get them to go on record with their intentions regarding the frontiers.
Are there any '67 frontiers that they will be willing to go back to? Or any
part of it? I think I know the answer, but it wouldn't hurt to get it out in the
open.

W: Okay. Anything else?

K: I think it's an interesting idea to get them on TV.

W: And they, as much as we, have been interested in doing this. My
hunch is they have some points they want to make. We never before have
had this kind of . . . We were going to get only Dayan and she wanted
to go on.

K: Isn't that interesting?

W: How important is a Guantanamo arrangement to Sharm Al Shaik?

K: What do you mean?

W: If they are willing to go for an arrangement whereby they remained
enclaved, leasing or paying or something of that sort.

K: It would be interesting to have their views. I don't think the Arabs
will like it and if you have no possession, what you will or will not take depends
on the other guy.

W: On the '67 frontiers, you think you know the answer?

K: They haven't said so formally, but I am suspecting that I know pretty
well. That's the big dispute between them, and some people in the State Depart-
ment, and to what degree should they go back to the frontiers of '67.

W: All right.

K: And most of the rest of the stuff has been in the press.

W: That's what seems to me. I am sure they are sensitive to
the fact they are losing support in the U.S. Of all people, the *Times* is putting

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mike Wallace

4/3/71 11:10 a.m.

page 2

more pressure on them than in the past. The Saturday Review leads with
an article by Ben Gurion saying give everything back except Golan and

K: Of course, they say people always believe a peace is achieved by
making a treaty . . .

W: But what I find difficult to understand is, so it's a few miles here and
there. Really, what the hell difference does it make?

K: They have a tough problem that way. They can't afford to lose on
one battle when they have no cushion. I am not saying I disagree, just that I
understand the problem.

W: I see.

K: Have a good trip. I hope to see you. Will I?

W: When I come down, some time soon.

Telecon (Tape)

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

April 3, 1971

K: Hello, Mel.

L: How are you?

K: Okay; how are you?

L: Very good. Say, did you get that memorandum all right.

K: I did. Thank you, and the President has got it and is studying it.

L: Very good. Now, I kind of held that in line with what I thought you were working on.

K: That's right.

L: And didn't go overboard at all on it.

K: Well, it's more than the military want, of course.

L: Well, yeah, but the military... hell, they would want to bring it down to about 8,000, but they've always been about 20%... Their recommendation has been 20% below the President's always. So it's about the same as you would expect. So I don't think we are too far off.

K: Well the President has got it right in front of him now.

L: Do you need any more material?

K: No, I think, Mel, that this gives us... Frankly, I don't know what he is going to pick and whether he is coming in on which of these three choices. But... or what length of time.

L: The situation is such that he's got to at least go 12,500, and he could go a little more if he really wants to, Henry.

K: Yeah, well that's what your recommendation is.

L: Yeah; well, I can see we could even go up to 15,000 if he really feels he has to.

K: Well, I don't think that that's his mood. But I'll tell him that.

L: If he really feels he has to, I can give him one that's a little more than that but I just didn't think I'd put it in there because I thought these were, you know, reasonable things. But if he wants one worked out for a little more, I'll work one out for him.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Autumn
By. NARA Date 6/1/04

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird (Tape)

April 3, 1971

- 2 -

K: Well, I think we better not, Mel, for the time-being. If we need it, I know we can get it and I'll ask for it.

L: Yeah. I thought that would be a better way to handle it.

K: I think that's the more... that's the fairer way of handling it, and there's less danger of anything leaking and so forth. Not that this will leak either.

L: There's one thing, Henry. I wonder if you or the President -- now that he's in this -- shouldn't read the Pearce Commission Report which I've put a clamp of secrecy on.

K: Oh, yes.

L: Because sooner or later, that thing will... you know, we are keeping it now classified on the basis that it would prejudice... might prejudice the judicial process. Now there are some people who have read it and I think you should know that.

K: Like who?

L: Eddie Hébert.

K: Yeah.

L: He read it, and Stennis has read parts of it. The parts on the sex offenses, sodomy and rape. I wouldn't let them use those in the prosecution, but they are in that report.

K: Well, let me check with Ehrlichman what he thinks we should do on that. I know somebody at the White House ought to read it.

L: Somebody ought to read that God-damned report, Henry. But I don't want to get that thing so circulated. We've got to handle it very carefully because I'm going to try to keep that bottled up for another 12 months. There'll be a great demand to make that public. You know, McCrade(?) who is Rockefeller's counsel is going to take the President on on this thing.

K: But he's no longer Rockefeller's counsel. Is he still?

L: Yeah.

K: But why the hell should he do it?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/71

April 3, 1971

- 3 -

L: Well, he was the Counsel for the Pearce Commission.

K: Let me talk to Rockefeller and see whether I can get him shut up a bit.
What do you think?

L: I think he's been talking a little bit to much, I think, to some of our friends on the New York Times and some other places; and I just hate to have this whole damn thing surfaced because... you know, these guys all think the President is going too far in this thing.

K: Well, so far, he's just on the line, I think. If he had gone one step further he'd be dead.

L: Well, if Ehrlichman wouldn't have had that backgrounder, we'd have been a lot better off and if they'd have gone just with the statement, because Latimer now is going to use that backgrounder.

K: On what grounds?

L: On the grounds that the President is going to use some unfortunate thing in non-legal review and so forth, and so on. We've got to be damn careful about this, Henry. You know, I'm not an old woman about it, or anything...

K: No, I was on your side with it. I didn't think it was a good idea for us to get into it if we could avoid it.

L: I thought we could have handled a lot of these things quietly, but you know, sometimes these things make a plus for 24 hours, but you've got to be damned careful, Henry.

K: Well, Mel, let me...

L: You know, I'm worried about this more than anybody else, and I just think we've got to be very careful.

K: Well, let me see what I can do about... what I can find out about getting somebody to look at this report. I've... I frankly don't want to do it myself.
I don't want to get into that review process.

L: I think it's better if you don't, but somebody ought to. I don't even think Bill should read it. Bill thought maybe he should read it.

K: Who, Rogers?

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Authority:
By: NARA Date 6/10/71

April 3, 1971

L: Yeah, and I said, "Bill, you shouldn't read it."

K: No; Bill ought to stay out of it, too. It's a loser.

L: But I think some body should read it so that they know what... and we can keep... you know, the press is after it. We will not give it to them. I'll just stand firm on that.

K: Okay, Mel. Good.

L: Are there any other problems.

K: No; none that I.. Will you keep an eye on whether there are any significant North Vietnamese offensives that we may be hit with in the next week or so so that the President doesn't say anything that will get us into trouble?

L: Yeah. Well, they are being very quiet right now.

K: That's what it looks like. What are our casualties going to be this week?

L: Well, they'll be about 83.

K: That's including those 33?

L: We don't have all of them in there, but we have about half of them in.

K: Yeah. But they should start dropping now, shouldn't they?

L: Well, I hope so. The only trouble is we've got about... we've got those missing in Laos that we haven't gotten fully reported yet because we haven't gotten their bodies.

K: Yeah, yeah.

L: If you'll look on your report this morning, you'll see that we have the number that is still our missing, and those... most of those will be dead.

K: Okay, Mel. Those are the only things we've got now.

L: Okay. That report on the casualties won't come out until Thursday morning.

K: Right.

L: Okay, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

M01 E0 12958
Autborit

By NARA Date 6/1/04

April 3, 1971

K: I will keep you posted.

L: You think the material on the report is all you need -- the report I sent out to you? You don't need anymore today?

K: I don't think so, Mel. I think that really... It's a first-class piece of work -- very, very thoughtful.

L: Well, if you need some more material or anything, let me know.

K: I don't think so, Mel. I'll let you know just as soon as I know anymore. He is secluded and working away.

L: Very good.

K: Thank you, Mel. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

MD E0 12958

By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Brought in 4/4/71

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Let me cover a couple of things. First, I just talked to Buchanan and my main concern now is to get some more thoughts on the concluding part on which, you know, you sent a memorandum in. We've got really three different ideas here, all of which may or may not be worthwhile. You know, Safire had his... Buchanan's got some ideas; you've got some; and I have some, too. Buchanan pulled some of them together. So I've asked him to come over as soon as he's in the office. Why didn't he just sit down and talk with you about it and have you just look over... First of all, we have perhaps our major problem... Let me put it this way. The major problem is to get it tight -- get it down so that it isn't too long. At the present time, it'll run... It's got to be no more than 4 or 5 minutes of that concluding part, you see, or otherwise you lose them, if you just go on and on and on.

K: Right. Absolutely.

P: So, I am taking... On the other part of it, I'm getting it honed down now -- the first part. It's moving along all right. But this part is actually the most important and the most difficult, so Buchanan as you will note in the stuff that he pulled together, he's got much of the material you suggested, and he's got a little of the Safire, some of my own... I put in some, for example, about the American soldier. That's the way to handle the Calley thing -- not that we are talking about Calley, but you've got to say something about the 2-1/2 million Americans...

K: Absolutely.

P: That we can be proud of them. But it's too long at this point. But what I would like for you to do is just sit down and look at it as editor and then put him back to the drawing board to... you know, stuff that should be in and out and how we can tighten it. I would say I wouldn't expect anything for about three hours so if that sounds all right to you, we'll do it. That's where I really need the help is on the conclusion.

K: Is he coming over to my... Well, I'll get in touch with him, Mr. President.

P: I don't know where he is actually. I just talked to him on the phone. I think he's still at his apartment.

K: Well, I'll find him.

DECLASSIFIED
Author MD E0 12958
By NARA Date 6/1/71

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)

- 2 -

P: He'll be at the office.

K: I'll be over there.

P: He'll either come to your house or there. It doesn't make any difference. You can work any place.

K: Right.

P: Fine; fine. There are a couple of other things I want to ask about. What is -- with regard to that... I notice in the Los Angeles Times that village they tore up... Foize had a pretty good piece on that, didn't he, about where did you see it -- on the atrocity...

K: I haven't seen it yet, Mr. President.

P: That was a pretty bad thing, wasn't it?

K: Yes. They killed about 100 people... You mean the North Vietnamese attack on that village.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. But that was their atrocity.

K: That was absolutely... And it's typical.

P: It's typical. Hell, it's... at least somebody -- I don't know whether the television ever used it -- the difficulty is... I may get this in some place that the difficulty is that in this war we always see what we have done. We never see what they have done.

K: Exactly.

P: Well, anyway, it's a tough one. Now, the second thing is...

K: And there's one other big difference. For them terror has been... I don't know whether you would want to say that because this isn't a speech... but it is a fact that for them, terror has been a regular part of the strategy. In our case, it has been an aberration when it's happened.

P: Exactly. Oh, I know. It's so hard to get into that I'm afraid we can't... I'll do that with the editors. You know what you come down to. They would be giving Calley a medal. We give him a trial.

K: That's right.

DECLASSIFIED
Autumn 1971
By NARA Date 6/1/71

- 3 -

P: That's [inaura] the difference between the two. Let me ask you one other thing. What is the... I noticed here that one wire report or something out about the North Vietnamese attacking in some area... What I'm just thinking is that is there something going on right now that may hit before we go on on Wednesday?

K: Well, of course, they know your date, and they can always attack something. There's no major campaign going on. They attacked a fire base in the highlands last week, and overran part of it and then either were driven off or left while...

P: That actually was what this story is about.

K: But they had very heavy casualties.

P: That's right. In fact, they said 1500 casualties and only 2 Americans were killed in the whole damn thing.

K: That's right. Well, the Americans concern 700 casualties, but nevertheless. I mean 700 North Vietnamese. Still they took very heavy casualties.

spasm

P: I really think your judgment with regard to the [inaura] theory is right. As a matter of fact, Henry, when you look back on what they were doing in Cambodia. Those were little spasms when they started to cut roads and raise hell.

K: That's right.

P: You know, after the sanctuary operation, they were rushing in. They didn't have a hell of a lot of staying power. They couldn't stay any place they went.

K: That's exactly right. And here, where they think they have the psychological momentum...

P: You see, my point is that I don't want to be... just have lack of credibility when I speak fairly confidently.

K: Well, I think you are quite safe, Mr. President. I have been telling all the newsmen and television guys. We cannot prevent... we cannot predict whether they'll do a high point now and then, or a series of high points, and they have always the choice between putting more into a high point and then having less protracted war. But we are talking about an average rate and on that I know you are going to stand...

P: Right. I'm confident about it, as you know, but what I'm concerned about, Henry, is only that the TV the night you go on -- or at any extent... Well, anyway, understand I'm just...

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F-O 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/07/88

- 4 -

K: Right. No, I don't think... Well, it's just hard to say whether they are going to make a big attack the night you go on.

P: No, no, no. It isn't that. I meant whether there is any big attack they can sustain. It doesn't look like that.

K: No, it doesn't...

P: If we had had something, then I would want to hedge pretty strongly in the speech.

K: It doesn't look that way now, but we will watch that very carefully.

P: But as far as... You see, I haven't been reading the reports this week. As far as that's concerned, the level of activity apparently has not been too...

K: It's been actually dropping except for this attack on the firebase. It's been dropping in the Lam Son area.

P: Right. And the ARVN apparently is doing a little attacking of its own.

K: That's right. The ARVN, of course, except for the units that were in Lam Son, is unaffected by this. And we have a long cable in from Bunker about all the psychological measures they are taking.

P: What's he say?

K: They are having rallies all over the country. The TV is playing it in a certain way, and they have a sense, he claims, of great accomplishment. And it's interesting that the opposition parties -- the Buddhists have just passed a resolution supporting their armed forces and taking pride in the cross-border operations.

P: You know, it's a funny thing about patriotism. Even South Vietnamese sometimes don't like to see their boys lose. And if we get a little of that going there, Henry, we've got a lot going with us, haven't we?

K: That's absolutely right. And I think that's involved in this country, too.

P: We hope so, yeah. The one point I think... If I could just say -- I didn't mention this to Buchanan -- but when you are talking to him... I feel that the important thing here is not just to make this blood, sweat and tears. You understand

DECLASSIFIED
MVO EO 12958
Autonumber
By NARA Date 6/1/04

["The President/Mr. Kissinger\nBrought in 4/4/71 (Tape)", "- 5 -", "I think that people have had so much of that, you know. You've got to grin and bear it.", "K: No, they've got to have some hope, too.", "P: There's got to be... It must have lift, and we've got to speak with confidence and so forth and therefore the negatives with regard to 'well, even though this means a defeat... I mean I'm inclined to think that we ought to in terms of tone, it should be more one of 'well, we are coming to the end. Confident. You know what I mean. Just... They've just got to be reassured. The American people right now, you know, are in sort of a psychological depression and the reason they are in that depression, Henry, is this God-damned television.", "K: That's right.", "P: It's just been pounding them night after night. It is just shameful. Look what it does to people. No wonder it depresses them. So what we have to do is to cheer them up a little. I have rewritten the beginning in a very... I mean... you don't have to look at any of that. I don't want anybody to waste any time on the meat and potatoes -- I'll take care of that, until I get it done in the way I want to say it, and then it's the conclusion where we need some good extra thinking. But the beginning, rather than just starting out, you know, 'well, I'm going to announce... I'm announcing tonight...' I'm going to start right out probably in something like this. \"Over the past several weeks, you have heard a number of discouraging reports on TV, radio and in your newspapers on the situation in Southeast Asia. I think the time has come for me, as President and as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, to put these reports in perspective -- to lay out all the pertinent facts before you -- and to let you judge for yourself as to the success of our policy. I'm glad to be able to begin my report with some good news. On May 1st..." You see what I mean. Start right out that way. You don't just start out and say, well, in the old way 'I'm announcing tonight a new withdrawal.' I think the people -- you disarm them immediately by saying 'look, you've been hearing a lot of stuff, but now I just want to tell you, tain't all that bad'. See.", "K: And I would put in... I would perhaps go a little further and not just say, \"It's not that bad.\" I'd say, \"In fact, (something like) we believe that the events this year have been a plus\" or something like this.", "P: I've got that in later.", "K: \"And as a result, we can increase...\" to show some relationship between what has happened.", "DECLASSIFIED\nMJD 12958\nAuthority\nBy NARA Date 6/10/71"]

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)

- 6 -

P: Oh, that's all in. It's not the first paragraph. Then I go into the open item after I get through with Laos. I just make (train going by -- unintelligible) And it's because of that... because of Cambodia, etc., that we are able to do what we are doing. Oh, well, don't worry. That's all in there because it's true.

K: Right.

P: Don't even think about that part of it. Just think about the last part. In other words, the concluding thoughts and think in terms of the stuff you prepared which you will note a lot of it is in what Buchanan's put together. He just sort of... and it was my suggestion... scissors and paste. He put in your stuff, some that he had, a little of Safire's, an idea that I had on the armed forces, but it runs twice as long as it should, and also it doesn't have any structure. But you sit down and talk and put him back and see what he can come up with. In the meantime, I'll probably end up writing most of it myself, but...

K: But it may be a help.

P: It's always a help to get some phrases and some ideas as to what should be left in and what should be left out.

K: Well, I'll call him this minute.

P: No, no, no. There's no hurry. He'll be ready and you can have at it. Be sure to sit outside today. That's the place to work.

K: Well, I've got a great porch so I'll probably sit there.

P: I have the general feeling that what we are really at at this time with the doves running off... you know, the Calley thing, of course, got some of the hawks even saying let's get the hell out... is that it's like always -- the last of a war. As I've often said, the darkest month of the Civil War was August of 1964, and the brightest was September. So what the hell. But nevertheless, this isn't that kind of war. But the point is that at this time the country is in sort of that kind of a funk, and this isn't going to pull them out of it. All it is going to do is to sort of say, well, we'll just give them a little more chance. That's about all we are doing, see.

K: Well, but that may be all that is needed.

P: Maybe. And, also, it could be that the over-reaction of the doves and of the media and so forth may now be compensated for. If the reactions you are getting from some of your press guys are at all reflectors in what they do or write, they'll begin to compensate a bit, you know. They don't like to be out

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Brought in 4/4/71 (Tape)

- 7 -

just being completely wrong. Correct?

K: Absolutely. And they have this uneasy feeling that there's something
going on in the country. This I think is excellent...

P: You really feel that, do you?

K: Oh, yes.

P: Of course, some of them are trying to interpret that as being really
just war weariness.

K: Well, but it's ...

P: But they don't really believe that.

K: They know it's the war weariness of the hawks who'd really like to win.

P: Yeah. And that worries them, huh?

K: And that worries them.

P: I know you said it worried Hubbard. Is there anybody else that it
worries?

K: Well, all the newsmen I saw Friday afternoon, for example. Deacon(?)
for example.

P: The St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

K: The TV guys yesterday. And I have found... I haven't seen today's
papers yet, but the play of the news is no longer quite as negative in a subtle
way.

P: Isn't it, really?

K: No, no. They are beginning now to report some of the achievements on
Laos and the hysterical/gloating tone is out of it to a considerable extent.

P: The gloating over the defeat.

K: Over what they considered the defeat.

P: Huh -- really?

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Autonomous

By: NARA Date 6/10/71

K: Yes.

P: Well, you watch it. I'm deliberately isolating myself from those day-to-day reports because I must -- if I get involved in that, I will not do the thing effectively. I think it's very important for me to be absolutely above it, detached from it, and just plow right ahead.

K: I think that's right.

P: These damn reports... That's the purpose of those really. As much as anything else those guys are trying to get me.

K: Well, that's the...

P: Wouldn't it really kill them if they knew I don't read them.

K: It already kills them that you are so serene. Everyone keeps asking me...

P: Really?

K: About 80% come in and say, "Now tell me the truth. Is the President really so calm? or is he nervous?" I said I've never seen him waver in any of these periods.

P: That burns them up, doesn't it?

K: You know, they are used to Johnson rooting around and beating his breast.

P: I saw Kennedy the day after the Bay of Pigs and, boy, I tell you. If ever I had seen a guy who had lost his cool, that was one.

K: Oh, God, yes.

P: And that was, of course, crap. Nothing to that.

K: Well, that was a one-shot operation.

P: Well, it was easy to handle, too.

K: From which it was easy to recover.

P: Just announce going to the moon. That's all. Well, anyway, if the serenity bugs them, they'll get bugged with that because we've just got to plow right ahead on that score. Well, we've done that all along, of course. I think

DECLASSIFIED

MJD FEO 12958
Authorily

By NARA Date 6/9/74

- 9 -

that bugged them in the November 3rd period and in the Cambodia period, too.

K: It bugged them, for example... Now, this is sort of taken for granted...

P: There isn't one student of a Harvard professor that could stand up to me for five minutes in a debate.

K: That's what they don't like about you.

P: There's not one of them that could stand up for one of those press conferences without a note. 'Cause they don't teach that anymore.

K: Exactly. And also the way you have everything organized. You know when you can say to Howard K. Smith, "The following are the three points -- 1, 2, 3 in grammatical sentences."

P: That's right. There's not one of their students who could do that. And none of them could.

K: Well, none of them could because they don't teach them anymore to be that disciplined in their thinking.

P: The other thing, though... The point I didn't make to Bob is the difference of the press with Johnson than with me is that they were willing to tear Johnson to shreds but a little leery for a reason because they knew the alternative. Johnson was not necessarily one of theirs, but Nixon... or a Republican. But now, you see, they are willing to tear me to shreds without (unintelligible) is that they know that the alternative to me is one of theirs, see. Therefore, that's why they are going all out for... Haldeman didn't understand that -- the fact that.

K: Well, and what they do to you that they didn't do to Johnson is this constant nagging away at every little thing on top of the big things [Tape ran out]

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F-O 12958
Author's
By NARA Date 6/10/71

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Lloyd Shearer/Kissinger

9:32 a.m.

4/5/71

S: Suppose we run a two-shot of you and Marlo Thomas.

K: Suppose what?

S: Suppose we run a two-shot of you and Marlo Thomas. Would that outrage you?

K: I was just along at a dinner. You mean yesterday?

S: Yeah.

K: I would just as soon be alone.

S: OK. What's your schedule?

K: I am going back at noon.

S: You will be out again? I will be out in two months. I may be in Palm Springs for a vacation and if you wanted to come down there for a picture --

K: I will be out in two months. I may be in Palm Springs for a vacation and if you wanted to come down there for a picture --

S: It will be hot and melt the film but maybe we could. It's 110 degrees.

K: In April?

S: You will be in an airconditioned house and a swimming pool and it's very dry. I ran into a guy at Sen. McGovern's lunch who said he went to school with you in Lausanne. Did you come from Mainz and go to sch-ol in Switz?

K: Neither. The next time I am out I will let you know.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/John Scalli

7:35 p.m., April 5, 1971

S: What the fuck do we do?

K: Jesus, the language you use and you are supposed to be taking a
responsible position.

S: Yeah. Need a quick argument for McGovern on how we keep
substituting Asian bodies for American bodies.

K: That's a goddamn outrage! Just 3 years ago, he said just the
opposite.

S: It is mirrored throughout the country now and something has to be
done to make it without picking a fight. I would like to discuss it
with you. As far as my stay here, I will take it nice and easy.

K: That's what I would do. Don't know exactly what he is going to say.

S: I will stay in touch and I will do a proforma for the broadcast......

K: That isn't bad.

S: I look forward to seeing you but I will be back Wednesday night
before the speech if there is anything I want to say or you want to
say.

K: Okay, John.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/John Scalli

7:35 p.m., April 5, 1971

S: You're back.

K: That's right, John. Are you bothered yet by ______?

S: The announcement is going to be Friday. I am here for two days of speeches at St. Petersburg Junior College -- I will walk the very narrow line. I talked to General Haig and reassured him that I will not let the President's speech out of the bag.

K: That's not why I am calling, I am returning your call.

S: I just wanted to check one point on which I will undoubtedly get a lot of questions. Can you tell me just how successful was Laos -- I mean I have the fact sheet --

K: Look, I had my people out in San Clemente and I went around the room trying to do an analysis and asked for their reactions on are we better off, worse off, if we had it to do over again, would we do the same thing? Everyone of them said we are better off and would do it again. Some of them had had reservations before the start. I don't think it was the knockout it should have been or could have been but if you add the supplies used up, the supplies that were captured, destroyed in bombing. An analysis that maintained the protracted warfare and pushed back a general offensive into next year.

S: At the same time the reaction at home has been like a small tet.

K: How would they have been if it had hit us in the summer -- suppose it had gotten to ______ or (DaNang)?

S: You lost Stu Alsop you know.

K: Yes.

S: And I think you are going to lose a lot of the others. It disturbs me and I hope the President's speech has something more in it besides rate of withdrawal. There has got to be something more or the critics will step up the attack. We are at a very critical period in terms of domestic support. I don't know what the President has in mind but on a very narrow ______.

K: That's probably true.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Len Garment

8:10 p.m., April 5, 1971

K: I wanted to tell you that both the President and I, although it wasn't directed at me, greatly appreciate that memo on the speech. It shows you are a great man because your instincts went the other way.

G: It really came out of the ______ on the Federal City Center. Have you seen it?

K: No.

G: I'll send you a copy.

K: Would you? I completely agree with you, there is no chance playing the Dove line, he will just placate from one to the other.

G: These are torturous times, it is an agony that we all suffer in Vietnam -- no self-righteousness, no self-pity.

K: Right, right.

G: I will send you this other thing ______ of our policy is basically sound. That's very gracious of you to call me.

K: I will talk to you about our other problem after the speech. I have talked to Schreiber.

G: Argov called and made a date with me, I think it will be day after tomorrow but I will come in to see you before I talk to him.

K: If you could do it Thursday after the speech.

G: All right, I'll put him off till Thursday.

K: Good, put him off till Thursday.

TELCONE (TAPE)

Pat Buchanan/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

K: Pat.

B: Yeah.

K: The President asked me to check with you what you thought of the
new draft.

B: Geez, I just took it back to my office and locked it up.

K: You haven't read it yet?

B: No.

K: Okay. He just wants to make damn sure you don't show it to anyone
also.

B: Oh, don't worry about that. I locked it up myself.

K: Okay, fine.

B: Okay.

K: Good.

B: Don't worry.

K: No, no, but that isn't the main thing; he wanted to get your quick
reaction.

B: Okay, well, tell him I haven't read it yet. I'll come in early and
do the news summary and give it a reading and get it over to him.

K: Right. Now, remember, Pat, at this stage of the game confidence
is more important than perfection.

B: Okay, fine, okay.

K: You know, if you have a violent objection, you should make it.

B: You mean to the speech.

K: Yeah but I mean, the main thing he's got to get now is confidence.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD EO 12958

By NARA Date 6/9/71

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

K: Mr. President

P: Yeah.

K: I've just talked to Pat and he actually hasn't read it yet, he locked it up in his safe and he was at home.

P: Oh, yeah -- fine, well, that's okay.

K: But I'm positive what he will think.

P: Okay. __________ a chance to change __________

K: Right.

P: Pretty hard to tell __________.

K: Well, I think that's right.

P: Cause I don't want it to get around and have the staff start nitpicking me.

K: They all want you to score a homerun by giving in to what they think are the pressures and I don't think it can be done that way. I think if we get ahead of the game, then we can play the peace situation.

P: Well, there's no homerun to be scored because there's not -- really nothing more that we can do.

K: No. Anything more we do, we might just as well leave.

P: __________ as much as the traffic can bear.

K: And more.

P: A little more.

K: A little more.

P: __________ probably as much as we can possibly __________

I will just play it pretty cool and sort of nonchalantly.

DECLASSIFIED
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Page 2

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: ________________

K: Oh, no; no, no.

P: ________________

K: No, and I'll go the way you suggested. I'll just give them the impression that you might be leaning their way.

P: Well, not too much.

K: No.

P: Not leaning their way.

K: Oh, but I mean that you were listening to it.

P: That I had listened to everything, that I've got to make my decision they have been hearing from all the fellows here, of course, that have been bombarded by ________________ They are both fine newsmen, of course, but their story on Calley -- aren't we to blame, you know. Good, God, I mean -- this business of aren't we to blame ________________ shouldn't Americans consider ________________ responsible for these atrocities ________________.

K: It's a rough mood.

P: It's rough, yeah. Also it was kind of rough if you remember when we went into Cambodia and it's rough -- it's tougher now, a year later, but all right.

K: On the other hand one knows what is right and --

P: That's what we are doing and I'm not going allow ________________ people running people and so forth and force them to do something ________________ force them to believe ________________ pitiful -- you know, it makes ________________ Look kids, we're sorry for all this -- you know, I mean

K: Yes.

MJD F.O. 2958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCORN (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Hello, Henry. Well, since you've gotten back have you been
infected yet with the Washington virus?

K: Not yet, Mr. President. I think we are on the right course. I have
read the speech over and I think it is very strong now.

P: It's a pretty good speech, I think.

K: I think it's an excellent speech.

P: It's got a lot of ... Let me just say that I think it's important.
I told Rose to tell Buchanan and you the same thing - both you and
Buchanan say you don't know what the hell's going to be in it.

K: Right. Well, I haven't even shown it to Haig.

P: It's very important that you do that for the reason that I might
change it. And second, I think it's just as well to know that ...
because I know that we get the usual staff jitters and from the Congress
saying to do this and that.

K: Yes.

P: But I understand all this. They are all wobbling around and hell,
I'm just not going to let them think they affected me one way or the other.

K: Absolutely, Mr. President.

P: I know -- the point is the fellows all think they can tell me things
I don't know but I'm aware of those things, I know them more deeply than
they do.

K: Well, John Scali called this evening and he had a number of hot ideas
but you know that is a centrum of all the people who just leave the news field.

P: Um-humm.

K: They want to do it the other way -- in the traditional way.

P: What is his idea?

K: Well, he doesn't have a concrete idea, he just wants some sort of
smashing announcement that would defuse everything.

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Authentic

By NARA Date 6/16/71

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

Page 2

P: Now, what the hell would we do; you mean like announce we are going to get out tomorrow or ...

K: Well, he doesn't have -- he admits he doesn't know what it is.

P: Can't be done.

K: And it can't be done. I think --

P: November 3 just ____________ respect just like that. November 3 because basically I mean -- we will listen to him later but the point is at this point we can not just do something that you know isn't going to wash.

K: I talked to Garment and he said he's become totally convinced that if we appeal to the Doves, we will be destroyed.

P: How?

K: And he said he read the World Report, he had to give a speech at the Federal City Club, he thinks your foreign policy holds together and its got a good philosophical foundation and we should fight for it.

P: Yeah.

K: And that coming from him since his instincts are the other way is particularly interesting I think.

P: Well, we're not going to go -- we'll play, once we get something to play with, Henry...... Dobrynin or anything like that, we'll let go of John Scalli, and by God we will broker the hell out of them.

K: Oh, yeah, but then we do it to destroy the Doves.

P: But not for the purpose of catering to them, cause I mean you can confuse them. Bull will not work.

K: I agree completely.

P: I know, for example, I mean John ______ you know has raised the credibility problem ____________. He was doing it you know just to ____________. Well, John, I said -- and he wasn't trying to advocate a change but he said there is a problem. Hell, I know, there is a problem but it's not what we've done, it's what they have created.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Automatic
By NARA Date 6/1/71

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p. m., April 5, 1971

K: That's right.

P: I mean what the hell have we done? The only stupid thing we've actually done -- look at Laos. The only stupid thing -- that goddamn blackout which I didn't order.

K: On the contrary which we thought would end within 24 hours. If it had ended within 24 hours, no one would have paid any attention to it. No, Abrams in this whole operation has been a disaster. He's got great credit but he has not been good on this.

P: Well, anyway the point is that having happened -- while it is true, if you read the polls and everything else, there is a credibility about us and I believe there is a lack of confidence in the conduct of the war and so forth but that is no reason to cave and just state it out there the best we can and hope for the best.

K: It is the only --

P: If we start simpering around and catering to these bastards, hell, they will just eat us alive. Garment sees that doesn't he?

K: Absolutely. In fact, he came to this conclusion entirely by himself and as you can imagine against his first instincts.

P: Well, when you are talking tomorrow to the staff or some of the seniors, I wouldn't take alarm where you're concerned but you occur to be a little Dovish and say, gee whiz -- you know, I; oh, I don't know what he's going to do -- I mean he's done what he's done, he did before, he's thinking about it himself and he's going to make his own decision and I can't predict as always.

K: All right, absolutely.

P: I'd just keep guessing and if they wail and go around; say, now look, wail all you want but he's the guy that's going to do this and that I've considered all the reviews and all the rest -- I mean Shultz, Ehrlichman, McGregor, Rumsfeld, Finch and all the rest of them, they don't know a goddamn thing about this.

K: Exactly.

P: Or what it's about.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By ____ NARA Date 6/4/71

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

K: And they don't know what we will be hit with if this whole thing comes apart.

P: They don't know a thing about foreign policy; they are only concerned about peace at any price, really. Cause they see -- all they are concerned about is revenue sharing, the environment and all that crap which doesn't amount to anything.

K: They want to take off the immediate pressure, this is their overriding concern.

P: ____________ immediate pressure.

K: And that I don't believe can be done. I mean it can't be done their way because once you accept the premises of McGovern, you are fighting on his ground and it wouldn't be in character.

P: Oh, that's right.

K: There is one thing, Mr. President, there are two sentences we ought to add because there is the cynical comment that Doves are now making, especially McGovern, that we are substituting Asian for American casualties and increasing the bombing. We can do it in two sentences -- One, where you speak about reduction in American deaths, you can say and South Vietnamese casualties have also dropped by I think 50%, I'll get you the exact figures.

P: And why don't we say that our -- then put in and we've reduced our bombing by so much.

K: And the bombing within South Vietnam has been reduced by 90%, Mr. President.

P: Well, rather than getting into too many figures, just say that we have reduced our bombing by 30% or something like that. You know, whateve the figure is for Southeast Asia -- I don't have to get into set wording, South Vietnam, Laos --

K: But the significance of the 90% is that in the populated areas our bombing has decreased by 90%. The area we are now bombing is the unpopulated area.

P: I know that but I don't have time to explain --

K: No, I'll get you the right figures.

MAY 12 95
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/97

TELCONE (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

P: All we need is just get some figure that makes the point. We can
at least try to get that across.

K: Right. So two sentences is what I would recommend in that place.

P: And also the South Vietnamese casualties.

K: The South Vietnamese casualties, I'm getting the exact figure.

P: Even with Laos?

K: Even with Laos.

P: We can say that even with the heavy casualties they took in Laos.

K: Right.

P: Oh, of course, these goddamn Doves think just one thing. They eat
you alive, they take one thing and then go after another one and hell,
I've determined to just see it through and the hell with them.

K: It's the only --

P: If it fails, it fails.

K: Well, it's a heroic posture, Mr. President.

P: Well, hell, believe it or not, there is no other course for the country.
These people -- I mean, that's why our domestic side while I'm
interested in their views, why they're irrelevant, they don't know what
the hell they are talking about.

K: That's right.

P: I mean, on the other hand, I must say that they are so terribly obsessed
with listening to television, reading all of our critics -- the New York
Times, the Washington Post and of course, I must the Alsop piece
probably disturbs them but they read all that and they say, well now
just a minute, is this true; have we overstated anything, haven't we
really kept our promises, you see that's the point.

K: That's right.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 2958
Authority
By - NARA Date 6/16/71

TELCOM (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m., April 5, 1971

P: I constantly get back to the fact that I don't think our own people know enough how to defend us.

K: That's right, that's right. They are astonished by some of these things or by what we have accomplished. I mean, we've kept our promises,

P: we will have taken out several hundred thousand, 2/3 of our forces.

P: They get the impression -- they read the critics and they get the impression that dammit we are lying, that we are covering up, that there are more losses ______ and so forth and goddammit, we've told the truth about everything.

K: Incidentally, we have a very . . . . . . .

[End of tape]

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F-O 12958

Authority

By ____ NARA Date 6/4/1971

TELECON (Tape)

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

April 5, 1971

H: [Beginning of tape] ... that rises out of a memo from Garment on a broad-based thing of what the President's long-range issues are for 1972 and all this stuff. Len made the point in it that there's a... Let me read you a little bit of this. "There's a contradiction between a sustained effort to make the President popular and the President's determination to do what he believes he must do in very tough times. In short, it is hard for popular government to be 'popular' and an all-things-to-all-men strategy blurs and distracts from the President's specific strengths and weak points achievements." And he's got some backup on that.

K: I agree with that.

H: I know you do. Then in another section, he says "If the principles that I believe in were applied to next week's Vietnam statement, it would mean that he would not cater to the withdrawal syndrome by increasing the rate of withdrawal. If there's a strategic reason or justification for doing so, fine. If not, he shouldn't. It is out of character for him to do so. It will seem reactive and defensive and, in the long run, will hurt rather than help. He would not say his course is the unpopular one and that he, in fact, has an option that would be popular. By his lights, he really doesn't have such an option, and it rings false to say so. He would, however, be very clear about what he is doing and his determination to continue to adhere to his stated withdrawal program. He would discuss in general and compassionate terms the conflict between the number of things people want and what, in fact, realistically be done in a given period of time, and how fully he appreciates the sense of frustration. All of this would be brief and factual. There should not be any expectation that people can be persuaded to be cheered or convinced by statistics or by reasoned argument. There should be conveyed an underlying sense of a willingness to let the political chips fall where they may."

K: I agree with him.

H: "In all of this, I am not stating any absolutes; I am trying to say that the architecture of the President's personality and policies should not be concealed by odds and ends, by an excessive effort to be what he isn't, doesn't want to be, and in so far as I am concerned, shouldn't try to be." Now, in the context of that, the President raises the question of whether maybe we shouldn't leave the withdrawal rate at 12,500.

K: No, I think he can go to what he is planning. It is less than almost everyone is speculating on, so it doesn't look that he is pandering to anyone.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/1/04

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

April 5, 1971 (Tape)

On the basis of his best analysis... but he should not make a big deal of the rate. He should just matter-of-factly say, "I have made my studies and I have come to this conclusion. But I do feel very strongly that we have to change the architecture of the speech.

H: That's what he is doing.

K: I know. I gave him some pages today for which I hold no brief which in effect... you know, he'll make his announcement and all that, but instead of going through the litany again of what he found and where we are which he can do in three or four minutes. He should positively make clear why it is that, however close... that we are close to the goal, but still have to take the slightly harder route rather than the softer one. And challenge the people and say, "I know am asking a difficult thing, but I know the American people have never failed us," or something like that.

H: Now that's the sense of what Garment is saying.

K: That's right.

H: Yeah.

K: But I don't think he needs to go back down.

H: Okay. My argument... He raises in the context of the Garment thing was that what he is doing is perfectly consistent with Garment because Garment says if there is a strategic reason or justification for increasing the rate, fine. There is a reason for increasing the rate a little bit, which is the success of Laos.

K: Look, Bob...

H: I think he's got to do it in order to prove the success of Laos.

K: Our analysis indicates that if our analysis is worth anything that they can't launch a big attack before next February. By next February, we would have taken out the number we are talking about now anyhow even at the other rate. So, all we are doing is capitalizing a bit on Laos.

H: And we should because the people need to be reassured that there was some validity to Laos.

K: Look, so there's the difference between what we are doing and what we're doing is one month. Exactly, it's a one month.

DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By NARA Date 6/10/71

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

April 5, 1971 (?Tape)

- 3 -

H: Because it's a question of whether you withdraw 100,000 by December 1st or by December 31st.

K: Exactly. And you and I know that anybody... you promise to withdraw by December 31st will be out by December 15th. So I think this is the least we can do -- I think it's a responsible figure. It's also the most that Thieu can stand, incidentally. I think if he announced a bigger figure, Saigon could collapse which is what the hot-shots don't recognize.

H: Some of them would just as soon he would.

K: Well, I mean our guys.

H: Yeah.

K: Our opponents certainly would. But I think if he makes a fighting speech if then he is driven out, at least no one will ever doubt where he stood, and when the bad effects become evident next year, he can run against those who forced him out. While if he is, in effect, saying 'I agree with all of you; I just don't have the nerve to go quite as fast as you want to.' So I agree with Garment.

H: Okay.

K: But I would stick at my rate.

H: He got caught up for, for, you know, just thinking, 'I wonder if we should just leave the rate right where it is, and let them screw you. This is where it's going to be.'

K: I think we can afford this increase.

H: Well, it's a small increase, but it's symbolically significant because it confirms that our program is working.

K: Exactly.

H: And that you do need to do.

K: Exactly. I think we can...

H: And you are not making any sacrifice to do it.

K: Well, you are taking a risk. But we've taken...

H: But it's the same risk... You take the same risk if you waited one month longer.

DECLASSIFIED
MILITARY
AUTHORITY
By NARA Date 6/4/04

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/9/04

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

April 5, 1971 (Tape)

- 4 -

K: That's right. And if he'd take... Well, that's assuming if its a straight line, of course -- what he could do is announce a year's thing and take out less by January 1st.

H: Well, that's not what he was talking about, though. What he was saying was to change it... to leave it at 100,000 but say by the end of the year.

K: Oh, no; that's ridiculous.

H: That doesn't accomplish a thing.

K: That is senseless. I think he should change the architecture of the speech and go through the litany of what was achieved which I gave him as the only text, and compress that and use something like the arguments that I handed him today.

H: He read this and then he called you. He was going to have you come in and read it. And they said no, I'm not going to do that anyway. We should leave it right where it is and he dropped it. And then he just called a minute ago and said to try to reach you over the weekend and ask you what you thought about it.

K: Where the hell does he think I am?

H: I don't know. He knew you had left.

K: I left the office, but he knows I'm at home, doesn't he?

H: I don't know.

K: Well, do you want to make sure he knows I'm in San Clemente.

H: He's off with Bebe now.

K: Okay.

H: Let's leave him lay.

K: Is he going up to Los Angeles tonight?

H: I don't think so. I hope not.

K: Okay, fine. Well, I think he's doing exactly the right thing.

H: Right. Okay. Good.

TELCOM (TAPE)

President Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

April 5, 1971

K: Mr. President, we just came back from San Clemente. The President wanted me to call you before he gave his speech on Wednesday to tell you that no matter what you read in the newspaper and that's just for your information, he has no intention of stampeding out of Vietnam and of throwing away of what so many brave men have suffered for and he thought you should particularly know that.

J: Well, I'm glad to hear it.

K: And that no matter what the pressures are on us, we will keep up some withdrawals but it won't be what the newspapers keep saying.

J: Well, it's good, Henry, glad to hear it. What speech -- giving one tonight?

K: Wednesday night. I'll call you on Wednesday, he's still playing with some of the figures and we're still talking to Thieu about it but it's going to be within the range of things we've done before.

J: Well, don't worry about me, just go on and do what you think you ought to do and I'll be for it. I hope you come down to the Library opening.

K: Definitely, Mr. President.

J: I sure do -- I particularly want you to be here.

K: Well, Mr. President, I wouldn't miss it. I've already -- we're coming down with two airplanes as a matter of fact but I have already asked the President to put me on the list and he's agreed.

J: I don't want you to get out of the government any sooner than you have to but when you do, I want you to come down here and teach our people some of the things you know at the school of public affairs.

K: Well, you're very generous, Mr. President.

J: No, I'm not generous, I just want to do something for my people.

K: Mr. President, there was one other matter that the President wanted me to raise with you. Hal Boggs made a very sharp attack on Hoover today apparently, I haven't seen it myself. And he wondered whether anything could be done to quiet him down a little bit.

MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/9/04
DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE (TAPE)

April 5, 1971

J: I hope so, I'm surprised -- I talked to him yesterday, he didn't say a word about it.

K: Cause he's actually a great patriot but he sometimes gets a little enthusiastic.

J: Well, liberal pressures I guess. That damn school of yours -- yall close Harvard for a while, we'd get along better.

K: Oh --- God, I mean -- (laughter) I'm getting some of what you people were exposed to for 4 years now. They are suddenly discovering villainess in my character that were well hidden for many years.

J: Tell the President I will do anything in the world that I can because I think he's been a good public servant and I'll do everything I can -- I don't know but I called Hale -- had a long talk with him yesterday and I'm surprised.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will be calling you on Wednesday.

J: Thank you. Don't take any of your time on me because you've already got me.

K: Well, no, but you --

J: Very thankful that you are in the Government.

K: Well, you are very generous, Mr. President, and it's a privilege to be working with you even if it's infrequent.

J: I appreciate all the President's trying to do and you are not going to have any problem out of me.

K: We know that, we are calling you out of respect for what you've done.

J: Well, thank you, Henry.

K: Right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Authorized
By ____ NARA Date 6/9/04