This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#872

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:10 P.M. EST

JANUARY 3, 1971

SATURDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me just attempt to go over what you have.

You have three statements. One of the statements is the signing statement on the Omnibus Crime Control Act for 1970. That is, of course, a major piece of legislation which a great deal of interest has been focused.

You also have a signing statement for S.1, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970. I think that is self-explanatory and it refers to certain guidelines which are contained in a memorandum which the President is sending to agency heads.

Then you have a statement which contains the words which were in a message to the Congress which was sent last night regarding H.R. 17809, which relates to the federal blue collar employees, and I believe the President's point of view is explained clearly.

Q That is a veto?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, it is a veto.

Q They are reading the message up there now?

MR. ZIEGLER: Right, they are reading the message on the Hill now.

In addition, you have a packet which contains 51 postings. Forty-nine of those postings refer to new information to you gentlemen, in other words, new action that the President is taking. Two of those postings refer to signing announcements which we made yesterday. Those are the signing of the Resolution which will convene the 92nd Congress at noon on January 21st. I believe that is in Tab 4.

And the other is a posting on H.R. 19436, which gives you information on the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970 which we announced also yesterday was signed.

So, in this packet you will find 51 postings. Two of those we announced yesterday, but simply the material is contained in this. Forty-nine of those are actions which we are announcing today.

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Q Is it the one before the President now?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, that is still before the
President. The final day for action on that is the fifth.

Q It is an authorization of how much?

Q It is an authorization of about $535 million.
The appropriation that follows it is $1 billion because
the Israel money is authorized somewhere else?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is right. Thank you.

Q Can you give us a ballpark figure of how
many bills are still awaiting action of the President?

Q Wouldn't there still be a fistful on the Hill
that hasn't arrived here yet?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, it is going to be difficult to do
because there are many on the Hill now that haven't been
enrolled. They have acted on them. They are on the way
down. We have some that the President has signed, many
in addition to this that he has signed that are going through
the procedures internally for us to get the material.

So, I don't know if we will be able to give you a
ballpark figure or not. The President signed 68 bills
on Thursday.

Q There were three foreign aid bills passed in
the last couple of weeks, a regular appropriation of $2.5
billion, which is one of those that you mentioned.

MR. ZIEGLER: Right, H.R. 17867.

Q A supplemental authorization which contains
the latest modification of the Cooper-Church language and
an appropriation of about $1 billion which depends upon that
authorization.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is right.

Q And the last two that I mentioned are still
before him?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is right. They are still before
him because the final day is not today for the action. I
think it is the fifth.

While they are trying to come up with that figure,
I don't think they will have much luck with that, the President,
as you know, is at Camp David today. He went up New Year's
Day. Much of the action which we are providing you with today
the President signed either during the day yesterday or
some of the material this morning. He was up this morning
taking action on a lot of this. John Ehrlichman is at Camp
David, as is Bob Haldeman, who are working with the President
on the flow of the material that is coming before him.

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#872

["A Conversation With the President—January 1971", "Following are excerpts from the transcript of an interview with President Nixon which was broadcast over television and radio on January 4. Interviewing the President were John Chancellor of NBC News, Nancy H. Dickerson of the Public Broadcasting Service, Eric Sevareid of CBS News, and Howard K. Smith of ABC News.", "White House press release dated January 4", "The President: Good evening, ladies and gen-
tlemen. I wish to welcome the distinguished\nmembers of our television panel to the White\nHouse library and also to welcome all of you\nwho are listening on television and on radio to\nthis conversation with the President.", "I was thinking when this program was an-\nnounced that I would have an opening statement\nas I had, you will recall, 6 months ago when we\nmet in California. But in view of the record of\nthe 91st Congress and some of the talk that\nwent on at the end, I thought that a filibuster\nwould not be appreciated. So we will go directly\nto your questions.", "Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, to be specific\nabout the last 2 years now, what do you now\nthink of as your primary achievement, specifi-\ncally, and what is your primary failure or\nmistake?", "The President: Mr. Sevareid, the primary achievement is, I think, in the field of foreign policy. We have not yet ended the war in Viet-Nam. I had hoped that we would have by this time. But we now see the end of Americans' combat role in Viet-Nam in sight—the fact, for example, that when we came in, American casualties in the last year of the previous administration were 14,500, the casualties this year", "are 4,200. That is still much too high. I will not\nbe satisfied until I do not have to write any\nletter at all to the next of kin of somebody\nkilled in Viet-Nam.", "But we are on the way out, and we are on the\nway out in a way that will bring a just peace,\nthe kind of a peace that will discourage that\nkind of aggression in the future and that will\nbuild, I hope, the foundation for a generation\nof peace. That is our major achievement in, I\nthink, the foreign policy field.", "Now, in the disappointment side, I think the\ngreatest disappointment legislatively was the\nfailure to get welfare reform. I believe this\nwould have done more than anything else to\ndeal with the problems of poverty in this coun-\ntry, the problems that many of our cities have\nand our States have, the problems of minority\ngroups who have particular difficulties, insofar\nas welfare is concerned.", "And then finally, if I could add one other—I\nwould not like to limit it to just one—I think the\ngreatest disappointment was in terms of the\ntragedies of Kent State, of Jackson State, and\nof the University of Wisconsin. It is true that\nover the past 2 years we have seen the war wind\ndown. We have seen our cities not as inflamed as\nthey were previously.", "We have seen the amount of violence going\ndown some, but during this administration to\nhave had three such tragedies as that left a very\ndeep impression upon me. And I trust that, as\nwe continue to have success in foreign policy,\nas we continue to solve the problems that people\nare interested in, that this kind of violence will\nbegin to recede even more.", "Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, if we could turn\nto some foreign problems for a while, for many", "January 25, 1971", "105"]

years the leaders of your party held the Demo-
cratic administrations to blame for the loss to
communism of East Europe and China. Do you
feel that what has happened in Chile now in
any way bears upon your responsibility?

New Government of Chile

The President: Well, what happened in Chile
is not something that we welcomed, although,
Mr. Sevareid, as you note, we were very careful
to point out that that was the decision of the
people of Chile and that therefore we accepted
that decision and that our programs with
Chile—we still recognize the Government, we
still have our People-to-People program, we
still have our Peace Corps programs; those pro-
grams would continue as long as Chile's foreign
policy was not antagonistic to our interests.

Now, as far as what happened in Chile is con-
cerned, we can only say that for the United
States to have intervened—intervened in a free
election and to have turned it around, I think,
would have had repercussions all over Latin
America that would have been far worse than
what has happened in Chile.

And I would say, finally, just as I told the
Chilean Ambassador when he paid his farewell
call on me, I told him to tell the new President
that as far as the United States was concerned
that we recognized the right of any country to
have internal policies and an internal govern-
ment different from what we might approve of.
What we were interested in was their policy
toward us in the foreign policy field.

So, I haven't given up on Chile or on the
Chilean people, and we are going to keep our
contact with them.

Protection of U.S. Forces in Viet-Nam

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, let me ask a
question about Viet-Nam, as though nobody was
going to ask you tonight.

The President: I didn't expect that.

Mr. Chancellor: Last month you sent a num-
ber of bombers into North Viet-Nam, and we
were told that they bombed missile sites and
antiaircraft installations because the North
Vietnamese had fired on an American recon-

naissance plane. But then a few days later, sir,
we learned that apparently that opportunity
was used to make very heavy bombing raids on
supply lines in the Mu Gia Pass and in the
passes from North Viet-Nam into Laos.

Now, I am confused because of all the talk
about the understandings with North Viet-Nam,
with the new criteria on the bombing you seem
to have put on, and the fact that what many
people got out of this one series of raids was
that we have quite enlarged the reasons for our
going north to bomb.

The President: Well, Mr. Chancellor, I have
no desire to resume the bombing of North Viet-
Nam. We do not want to go back to the bombing
of the strategic targets in North Viet-Nam, and
we do not want even to bomb military targets
unless it becomes necessary to do so—and this
is the key point—to protect American forces.

Now, with regard to the understanding, let us
see what it is. First, there was an understanding.
President Johnson said so; Dean Rusk said so;
Clark Clifford said so; Mr. [W. Averell] Har-
riman said so. There was an understanding that
after the bombing halt, that unarmed recon-
naissance planes could fly over North Viet-Nam
with impunity. We had to insist on that, be-
cause otherwise we would have no intelligence
with regard to what they were planning on an
attack.

So when they fire on those planes I have given
instructions that we will take out the SAM
[surface-to-air missile] site or whatever it is
that has fired upon them. We will continue to
do so; and if they say there is no understanding
in that respect, then there are no restraints what-
ever on us, and so we must have that in mind.

Now, the other understanding is one that I
have laid down. It is a new one. It is a new one
which goes along with our Vietnamization pro-
gram and our withdrawal program. I pointed
out a moment ago what has happened in Viet-
Nam, the fact that our casualties are a third
of what they were 2 years ago, the fact that we
have 265,000 out of Viet-Nam now, and that we
now can see the end of the American combat role
in Viet-Nam. We can see that coming.

We must realize, however, as Secretary
Rogers pointed out in his news conference at the

106

Department of State Bulletin

State Department a few days ago, that in May of this year most American combat forces, ground combat forces, will have been withdrawn from Viet-Nam. But there will still be 280,000 there left to withdraw.

Now, the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief, owes a responsibility to those men to see that they are not subjected to an overwhelming attack from the North. That is why we must continue reconnaissance, and that is why also if the enemy at a time we are trying to deescalate, at a time we are withdrawing, starts to build up its infiltration, starts moving troops and supplies through the Mu Gia Pass and the other passes, then I, as Commander in Chief, will have to order bombing strikes on those key areas.

That was one of the reasons for this strike, and it will be done again if they continue to threaten our remaining forces in Viet-Nam—but only on those military targets, and only if necessary.

*Mr. Chancellor: Does it bother you, sir, that this was not made as clear then as you have made it now?*

*The President:* Oh, it has been made clear only since we began our withdrawal program. You see, this is a new policy.

*Mr. Chancellor: Pardon me, sir. I meant in—just a month ago, in December, when the first announcement came out.¹*

*The President:* I made it clear not just a month ago, but in November—you may recall on November 3, when I made my speech on November 3, I warned the North Vietnamese then that if at a time we were withdrawing they stepped up their infiltration and threatened our remaining forces, that I would retaliate.²

I have said that on eight different occasions on national television and national radio. I have said it also in other messages to them that have gotten to them very loud and very clear. So there is no question about the understanding, and that was why we did this.

*Mr. Smith: Sir, you talked about the situation through May of '71. I hate to ask a hypothetical question, but people do ask them.*

*The President:* Everybody else does.

*Mr. Smith: And one of your own military advisers put it to me, not to get an answer from me, because I don't know, just to tell what was on his mind. Suppose, say, in 1972 our role is virtually eliminated, we are passive, we have few troops there, then the North Vietnamese attack and begin to come into control of the country. What is our policy then? Do we stand aside?*

*The President:* Well, Mr. Smith, our Vietnamization policy has been very carefully drawn up, and we are withdrawing in a measured way on the basis that the South Vietnamese will be able to defend themselves as we withdraw, and it is working. For example, did you realize that—I am sure you do because I think it was reported on your network—all of our naval forces now, combat forces, have been removed?

The South Vietnamese Navy has taken over. And so it will be in these other areas. When the time comes in 1972 that you speak of, it is possible, of course, that at that time North Vietnam might launch an attack, but I am convinced that at that time, based on the training program of the South Vietnamese, based on the watershed that occurred when they jelled and became a fighting, confident unit after the Cambodian intervention, I am convinced that they will be able to hold their own and defend themselves in 1972.

Now, that doesn't answer your hypothetical question, but I am simply not going to borrow trouble by saying that I expect them to fail. I don't think they will.

## Negotiations With the Soviet Union

*Mrs. Dickerson: Mr. President, I would like to ask you an overall question about our relations with the Communists. When you took office, you said this was going to be an era of negotiation, not confrontation. But in reality, haven't we returned to something of a cold war situation in regard to our relations with the Soviets? And how were our relations affected*

¹For President Nixon's news conference on Dec. 10, 1970, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1970, p. 769.

²For President Nixon's address to the Nation on Nov. 3, 1969, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1969, p. 437.

January 25, 1971

107

*by their duplicity during the Middle East crisis when they helped rebuild the missile sites?*

**The President:** Well, Mrs. Dickerson, when we talk about an era of negotiation rather than confrontation, we must remember that negotiation means exactly that. It means that you have two parties that have very great differences with regard to their vital interests and the negotiation process will sometimes be very, very extended. It does not mean that we are going to have—negotiation does not necessarily mean agreement.

Now, let's be quite specific. Mr. Kosygin [Alexsei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers] in his statement just a couple of days ago to the Japanese newspaperman, as you know, complained about our policy in Viet-Nam as he has previously; he complained about our policy in the Mideast.

We, of course, have been concerned about their movements in the Caribbean. We have been concerned by what you mentioned, their own activities in the Mideast, and of course, we have been concerned about their continuing harassment from time to time of the Berlin access routes.

Nevertheless, on the plus side, let's see what has happened. Over the past 2 years the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating. We have been negotiating, for example, on arms control. Those negotiations will begin again in Helsinki in March.³ I am optimistic that we will reach an agreement eventually. I do not suggest now that we are going to have a comprehensive agreement, because there is a basic disagreement with regard to what strategic weapons—what that definition is.

But we are now willing to move to a non-comprehensive agreement. We are going to be able to discuss that with the Soviet in the next round at Helsinki.

I am not predicting that we are going to have an agreement next month or 2 months from now or 3 months from now. But in terms of arms control, we have some overwhelming forces that are going to bring about an agreement even-

tually, and it is simply this: The Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in avoiding the escalating burden of arms—you know that they have even cut down on their SS-9 and big missile deployment lately and development—and, second, the Soviet Union and the United States have an overwhelming common interest in avoiding nuclear competition which could lead to nuclear destruction.

So, in this field, I think we are going to make some progress. In the Mideast it is true we are far apart, but we are having discussions. On Berlin we are far apart, but we are negotiating. And finally, with regard to the rhetoric—and the rhetoric in international affairs does make a difference—the rhetoric, while it has been firm, has generally been noninflammatory on our part and on theirs.

So, I am not without the confidence that I had at the beginning. I always realized that our differences were very great, that it was going to take time. But the United States and the Soviet Union owe it to their own people and the people of the world, as the superpowers, to negotiate rather than to confront.

**Mrs. Dickerson:** Mr. President, you always have put a certain value on personal diplomacy. Do you think this would be a good time for you personally to talk with some of the Russian leaders? Do you think it is a good time to have a summit, of sorts?

**The President:** Mrs. Dickerson, as you know, I have had conversations with the Russian leaders through the years and, of course, with Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin, a very skilled diplomat, here in Washington and with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] when he was here.

Now, as far as another meeting is concerned, a meeting at a higher level, that is a matter that has been speculated about. If it appears at some time that a meeting of that type would be what is needed to bring about the final summation in one of these areas, for example, the SALT talks or the Mideast or the rest, we will certainly have such a meeting.

But unless there is the chance for progress, a summit talk is not in their interest, and it is

³The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will resume in Vienna. [Footnote in White House press release.]

108

Department of State Bulletin

not in our interest, and not in the interest of
world peace. It creates a false sense of security.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, we have no
formal alliance with the State of Israel. But
isn't it really a fact that we are now so deeply
committed morally to the Israelis that if they
were in unmistakable danger of defeat wouldn't
we have to intervene?

Middle East Peace Talks

The President: Mr. Sevareid, to speculate on that question would not really be in the interests of peace in that area, as I see them at this point. Let's look how far we have come. We have had a cease-fire for 5 months, no killing, and for 3 or 4 years before that there were killings every day in that part of the world.

Second, as you know, the Israelis have gone
back to the Jarring talks and also the other side
will be there. That doesn't mean that the pros-
pect for an early agreement is very great. It
does mean, however, that there is some chance
that there will be discussion.

And, third, it seems to me that we must take
into account the fact that the people in that part
of the world, the people of Israel, the people in
the countries that are Israel's neighbors, that
they are overwhelmingly on the side of peace—
they want peace. Their leaders are going to have
to reflect it.

I think that we are at a critical time in the
Mideast, a critical time over the next few
months, when we may get these talks off dead
center, make some progress toward a live-and-
let-live attitude, not progress that is going to
bring a situation where the Israelis and their
neighbors are going to like each other—that
isn't ever going to hapepn, perhaps—but where
they will live with each other, where they won't
be fighting each other.

Now, to speculate about what is going to hap-
pen in the event that Israel is going to go down
the tube would only tend to inflame the situa-
tion with Israel's neighbors. And I won't do it.

Mr. Sevareid: Would it, Mr. President, calm
the situation and help the prospects for peace if

we did have some formal alliance with the State
of Israel?

The President: No, I don't believe so, because
I think that what we are doing for Israel is
so well known to them—and also incidentally it
is quite well known to their neighbors—that
it provides the balance that is needed.

We just provided a $500 million aid program
for Israel. I say "aid"—they are going to be
able to purchase weapons to that extent. We
have made it clear time and again that we would
help to maintain the balance of power in the
area, so that Israel would not be in a position
that its neighbors could overwhelm them with
their superior manpower or with the forces that
they got from the Soviet Union. But I do not
believe that a formal alliance would be—is
either necessary or would be in the interest of
peace in the area.

Mr. Smith: The kind of thing that bothers
me is the tendency toward adventurism in that
part of the world by the Russians. They are
manning the SAM sites, and last summer—it
wasn't widely publicized, but eight Israeli jets
were on patrol, they ran into eight Egyptian
MIG's, there was a fight, and over the radio
they heard they weren't Egyptians, they were
Russian-piloted MIG's. The score was four Rus-
sians shot down. But how frightfully danger-
ous that is. If the Russians had been tempted to
retaliate, then it could have become terribly
complicated.

The President: Mr. Smith, you will remem-
ber in the last 5 minutes of our conversation a
year ago, we didn't get to the Mideast till the
last 5 minutes,⁴ but I mentioned this very point,
that the key to peace in the Mideast is held by
several people: first, the parties involved, the
Israelis and their neighbors, primarily the
U.A.R. and Jordan; but second, the key to peace
is in the hands of the Soviet Union, the United
States, Great Britain, France—the four major
powers.

If the Soviet Union does not play a concilia-
tory peacemaking role, there is no chance for

⁴ For the transcript of an interview with President Nixon at Los Angeles, Calif., on July 1, 1970, see BULLETIN of July 27, 1970, p. 101.

January 25, 1971

109

peace in the Mideast, because if the Soviet Union continues to fuel the war arsenals of Israel's neighbors, Israel will have no choice but to come to the United States for us to maintain the balance to which Mr. Sevareid referred. And we will maintain that balance.

That is why it is important at this time that the Soviet Union and the United States as well as Britain and France all join together in a process of not having additional arms and additional activities go into that area, because that will only mean that it produces the possibility of a future confrontation.

This is the time to talk. Let me say one other thing with regard to the talk. I would hesitate to give advice to other nations as they enter such delicate talks, but I am sure of this: These talks will have no chance for success if they are done in a public forum. It is very important that it be done quietly, because every time an offer is made or a suggestion is made, it is talked about in the parliaments of one country or another, on the radio—you can forget it. So, if these talks can be quietly conducted, there is a chance for success, and in the end we want to remember that the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France must all be, and I think will be, in a position to guarantee whatever settlement is made through the United Nations.

Mr. Chancellor: Sir, can I take you to Cuba? Last October, just before we all left with you on your European trip, one of your aides here spoke about the potential of a grave threat in Cuba if the Russians introduced what apparently was a submarine missile base, a tender to serve nuclear submarines. Can you tell us what is going on there? Apparently there is a tender there. Will we react if the tender services a submarine in the harbor, or what happens? Can you tell us about that?

## Understanding With Soviets on Cuba

The President: Well, I can tell you everything that our intelligence tells us, and we think it is very good in that area, because, as you know, we have surveillance from the air, which in this case is foolproof, we believe.

First, let us look at what the understanding

is. President Kennedy worked out an understanding in 1962 that the Russians would not put any offensive missiles into Cuba. That understanding was expanded on October the 11th [13th] of this year by the Russians when they said that it would include a military base in Cuba and a military naval base. They, in effect, said that they would not put a military naval base into Cuba, on October the 11th [13th].

Now, in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding. That has not happened yet. We are watching the situation closely.

The Soviet Union is aware of the fact that we are watching it closely. We expect them to abide by the understanding. I believe they will.

Mr. Chancellor: Could we be close to a crisis, sir, if they begin doing that?

The President: I don't believe that they want a crisis in the Caribbean, and I don't believe that one is going to occur, particularly since the understanding has been so clearly laid out and has been so clearly relied on by us and as I stated here today.

## 98th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, head of the U.S. delegation, at the 98th plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on January 7.

Press release 6 dated January 7

Ladies and gentlemen: Serious negotiations call for willingness to discuss reasonable proposals without posing demands on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or as preconditions to discussion. Until now you have rejected this approach.

—On cease-fire, you have refused even to consider ending the fighting unless we first agree to your basic demands on troop withdrawals and political settlement. You have shown no interest in our offer of immediate discussion of a stand-

110

Department of State Bulletin

U.S. Continues Disaster Relief
to Pakistan

Statement by President Nixon ¹

The aftermath of the disaster that struck East Pakistan over a month ago continues to be a matter of deep concern. It was probably the worst natural disaster of this century, if not of recorded history, and the survivors still need help. As part of an international effort, this Government has contributed substantially to meeting initial emergency relief requirements. So far the United States has provided over $9 million in emergency relief assistance, including food, clothing, medical supplies, and associated transport and delivery services. U.S. helicopters in East Pakistan have airlifted over a million pounds of supplies directly to the disaster area.

Now that the immediate emergency requirements have been met, we are turning our full attention to sustaining the lives of the disaster victims and to aid them to once again lead productive lives.

Many of the survivors have lost virtually all of their possessions. Unless given the means to provide for themselves and to protect themselves they may yet perish. Hundreds of thousands of tons of food grains have also been lost, and unless there is substantial help from abroad there will be an even greater human tragedy in East Pakistan.

In response to appeals from the Government of Pakistan and the Secretary General of the United Nations, I am today announcing that the United States is increasing its grant of food grain to Pakistan to 200,000 metric tons as part of a major international effort. I hope that other countries, especially those in a position to provide rice, will join us in helping to feed the survivors until they are able to plant and harvest another crop.

Much more remains to be done, and we are committed to do what we can over the longer term to assist in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the devastated area. The Agency for

International Development, in its continuing work in Pakistan, will devote special attention in collaboration with the Government of Pakistan to meeting these longer term requirements. The U.S. voluntary agencies, who have already responded to the initial emergency needs, will also continue to serve long after the initial shock of the cyclones and floods has passed.

In this connection, I call the attention of all Americans to the campaign which the privately organized Pakistan Relief Committee of prominent Americans will be pressing to raise funds for use by the U.S. voluntary agencies operating in East Pakistan. If given the means, these organizations can help save the survivors by providing indispensable rehabilitation assistance in the form of such necessities as building materials to replace demolished homes and villages, seeds to grow new crops, farming tools for planting and harvesting, and cooking utensils.

Helping those in need is a deeply rooted American tradition, and I am sure that Americans will respond generously to the needs of the disaster-struck people of Pakistan.

Supplemental Assistance Bill
Signed Into Law

I heartily welcome the prompt and decisive action of the Congress in passing H.R. 19911. The additional foreign assistance funds which I requested only a little over a month ago are vital to the security of the United States and to the success of our foreign policy.² They are critical to the success of the Nixon doctrine and to our efforts to achieve a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

The funds made available by this bill represent major support by the United States for our

¹ Issued at Washington Jan. 4 (White House press release).

¹ Issued at San Clemente, Calif., on Jan. 6 (White House press release); as enacted, the bill is Public Law 91-652, approved Jan. 5.

² For President Nixon's message to Congress on Nov. 18, 1970, see BULLETIN of Dec. 7, 1970, p. 685.

138

Department of State Bulletin

friends and allies who are assuming greater
responsibility in the building of the peaceful
and stable world we all seek in the 1970's. They
enable us to provide the assistance required by
nations which, with our encouragement, are as-
assuming a greater burden for their own defense
and thereby enabling us to reduce our direct
overseas involvement.

I am particularly pleased by the consultation
and accommodation between Congress and the
administration demonstrated in the legislative
history of this bill. America's world leadership
depends upon our being able to put aside parti-
san differences when the national interest is
at stake and to band together to demonstrate
the unity of purpose so vital to the success of
our foreign policy. We have done so on this
legislation.

U.S. Regrets Canada's Extension
of High Seas Jurisdiction

U.S. Statement

Press release 357 dated December 18

Today [December 18], the Government of
Canada announced the establishment of fisheries
closing lines which purport to extend unilater-
ally Canadian jurisdiction over areas which are
traditionally regarded as the high seas. The
areas affected are: Strait of Belle Isle, Cabot
Strait, Bay of Fundy, Queen Charlotte Sound,
and Dixon Entrance.

The United States deeply regrets this action.
The United States regards this unilateral act as
totally without foundation in international law.
The United States firmly opposes such uni-
lateral extensions of jurisdiction and believes
that outstanding issues concerning the oceans
can only be resolved by effective international
action.

In this respect, on December 17 the United
Nations General Assembly approved by an over-
whelming majority a resolution which sched-
uled a Law of the Sea Conference for 1973
which will deal with a wide range of oceans
issues. Among the matters proposed for inter-
national action in the resolution are the question
of preferential fishing rights for coastal states,
conservation of living resources of the sea, and
the protection of the marine environment, in-
cluding the prevention of pollution. Canada,
together with the United States and a number
of other countries, was a co-sponsor of that
resolution. Moreover, Canada, perhaps more
than any other country, played a very impor-
tant lead role in achieving a commitment by the
international community to resolve these issues
multilaterally.

Therefore, the United States is deeply dis-
appointed and profoundly regrets that Canada
has chosen to assert a unilateral claim of juris-
diction over ocean space *only one day* after the
United Nations, with the approval of nearly all
member states, including Canada, determined
to resolve these problems regarding the law of
the sea by international action.

February 1, 1971

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NEWS CONFERENCE

#875

AT THE WHITE HOUSE
(San Clemente, California)

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:35 A.M. PST

JANUARY 6, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: In addition to the releases you have, we have quite a few postings this morning. We have additional copies of those which we will make available to you following the briefing.

The President was in the office this morning at about 8:30. Before going over to the office, he talked to George Shultz from his residence. Also, he has talked to the Attorney General this morning. After getting to the office he called Virginia Knaster, and complimented her on her press conference which she held yesterday.

Q Did he see reports of that press conference?

MR. ZIEGLER: He apparently read it in the news summary. He called her about it.

Q Does he plan to convert his next press conference to a similar format, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: He felt that she covered quite a few questions in the 35 minutes.

No, he wanted to talk to her about the content of it. If you haven't read the wire, you won't get the joke, Pierpoint.

He has also met this morning with John Ehrlichman and is now meeting with John Ehrlichman and Henry Kissinger. I think he plans to remain in the office through most of the day, as he said to the pool yesterday on Air Force One. He planned to be doing quite a bit of writing on the State of the Union Message while he is here.

The releases you have are as follows: The President has signed H. R. 1991, which is the authorization for the additional foreign assistance funds which the President requested in his message a little over a month ago. That message, as you will recall, asked for slightly over $1 billion for foreign assistance. That request contained a $500 million request for credit assistance for Israel, and funds which are contained in this particular authorization which amounts to $550 million, the one which he signed today.

The Israeli funds were authorized under the Defense Procurement Bill sometime ago.

Q This is not Israel?

MR. ZIEGLER: The one you have before you is the $550 million authorization for Cambodia, the Republic of

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Korea, Jordan, Lebanon and other areas, which we will have
for you in detail in the posting which we will provide to
you. It breaks down the $550 million. So that you are not
confused --

Q Did you say Lebanon?

MR. ZIEGLER: So that you are not confused, the
$500 million for credit to Israel was authorized under the
Defense Procurement Act earlier. The appropriation now
can be made following this authorization. The appropriation
bill has not been signed yet.

Q Is this the bill that contains the language
limiting U. S. troop activity in Southeast Asia?

MR. ZIEGLER: This particular authorization does
contain provisions regarding involvement in Cambodia, which
is totally consistent, as we have said before, with the
Administration's intent.

Q Thailand also, doesn't it?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, this relates to Cambodia.

Q Ron, what does it specifically limit?

MR. ZIEGLER: The bill contains three provisions
First, the bill provides that, and I am quoting now, "in
line with the expressed intention of the President," no
funds authorized under this, or any other act, may be used
to finance the introduction of U. S. ground combat troops
into Cambodia, or to provide U. S. military advisers.

It goes on to say that U. S. economic advisers
could continue to serve in Cambodia.

Second, the bill states that the assistance
provided to Cambodia under this or any other act shall not
be construed as a U. S. commitment to Cambodia for its
defense.

Q Is this something the President asked for,
too, that provision?

MR. ZIEGLER: There has been an extensive
legislative debate on this. We have said before that this
is not inconsistent with the President's plans or intentions
as relates to Cambodia.

Q What is the overall money total?

MR. ZIEGLER: $550 million, but not for
Cambodia. The dollars for Cambodia break down to $85 million
for additional military assistance and $70 million for
special economic assistance to Cambodia.

I should say that the President is gratified
that the Senate and the House, in relation to your question
on the language, rejected what was considered at one stage
of the debate to be dangerous, restrictive language in both
the Defense Bill and the Foreign Assistance Supplemental
Bill, and the extensive legislative history as the debate

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# U.S. Condemns Act of Vandalism Against Soviet Office

*Statement by Acting Secretary Irwin*¹

The United States Government categorically condemns the lawless and senseless act of vandalism that was perpetrated this morning against a building belonging to the Soviet Embassy. Violence and other actions which endanger innocent lives and damage private property can only sicken and dismay all law-abiding Americans. We are greatly relieved that there were no personal injuries and that property damage was apparently not great. Every effort is being made to apprehend those responsible for this criminal act.

The Executive Protective Service has taken further steps to tighten security precautions for all Soviet offices.

A State Department representative went immediately to the scene of the bombing, and the Department has been in close and continuing contact with officials of the Soviet Embassy, the EPS, and the Metropolitan Police concerning this deplorable incident.

## Officers of Overseas Private Investment Corporation Named

President Nixon announced on December 4 (White House press release) his intention to nominate officers of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The President nominated Bradford Mills as President of the Corporation and Herbert Salzman as Executive Vice President.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation is designed to mobilize new investments of U.S. private capital and skills in financially sound projects which contribute to economic and social progress in developing countries and which are welcomed by these countries as responsive to their special needs and requirements. In his foreign aid message to Congress on Sep-

tember 15, the President noted that he expected this institution to be an important component of the new U.S. foreign assistance program.¹ It was proposed by the President and authorized by Congress in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969. The legislation was based on recommendations of the congressionally chartered International Private Investment Advisory Council on Foreign Assistance (IPIAC).

In requesting the OPIC legislation last year, the President said:²

> We must enlist the energies of private enterprise, here and abroad, in the cause of economic development. We must do so by stimulating additional investment through businesslike channels, rather than offering ringing exhortations. ...

> The Overseas Private Investment Corporation will give new direction to U.S. private investment abroad. As such, it will provide new focus to our foreign assistance effort.

From the Agency for International Development, OPIC will take over and expand the existing programs of financial assistance and insurance to U.S. private investment, which provide important incentives for U.S. industry to participate in the development process. OPIC represents a new public-private joint venture, for the first time bringing U.S. international business experience and know-how into the direction and management of investment incentive programs. It will receive its policy direction from a mixed board of six private citizens and five U.S. Government officials, chaired by the Administrator of AID, John A. Hannah.

Mr. Mills is senior vice president and director of the New York Securities Company, an investment banking firm founded by Mr. Mills and several others in 1962 to provide a wide range of financial services to corporations. Mr. Mills served with the Economic Cooperation Administration in Paris from 1948-50 as Assistant to the Director of the Overseas Territories Division. As President of OPIC, Mr. Mills also will serve on its Board.

Mr. Salzman, formerly president of the Standard Bag Division of the Boise Cascade

¹For text of the message, see BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1970, p. 369.

²For President Nixon's message to the Congress on May 28, 1969, see BULLETIN of June 16, 1969, p. 515.

¹ Issued on Jan. 8 (press release 7).

112

Department of State Bulletin

Corporation, has had extensive experience in international business. He is now Assistant Administrator of AID for Private Resources. Mr. Salzman has been instrumental in the development of OPIC and has played a major role in the growth and success of AID's investment incentive programs during the past 4 years.

In addition to Dr. Hannah and Mr. Mills, the President has designated to serve as Government representatives on the OPIC Board of Directors Nathaniel Samuels, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Paul A. Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs; and Rocco Siciliano, Under Secretary of Commerce. These members serve at the pleasure of the President.

As private Directors, the President on December 4 submitted to the Senate the following nominations:³

### At-Large Directors

* **GUSTAV M. HAUSER** of New York, executive vice president of General Telephone and Electric International and a member of the IPIAC panel which studied the OPIC proposal. Nominated for a term of 3 years.

* **DANIEL M. PARKER** of Wisconsin, chairman of the Parker Pen Company and former chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers. Nominated for a term of 2 years.

* **CLIFFORD YEE** of Hawaii, executive vice president of Finance Factors, Inc. Nominated for a term of 1 year.

### Small Business Director

* **ROBERT F. BUCK** of Washington, senior vice president, National Bank of Commerce of Seattle. Nominated for a term of 1 year.

### Cooperative Director

* **ALLIE FELDER, JR.**, of North Carolina, executive vice president and director of international programs, Cooperative League Fund, and director of the outreach division of the Cooperative League of the United States of America. Nominated for a term of 2 years.

### Labor Director

* **JAMES A. SUFFRIDGE** of Virginia, a vice president and member of the executive council of the AFL-CIO, and international president emeritus of the Retail Clerks International Association. Nominated for a term of 3 years.

³ The Senate on Dec. 17 confirmed the nominations of the President and Executive Vice President of the Corporation and the six private Directors.

## International Financial Institutions
### Bill Signed Into Law

*Statement by President Nixon¹*

I am today [December 30] signing H.R. 18306—the international financial institutions bill—although it only partially meets my recommendations.

I welcome that part of the bill which approves the $1,540 million increase in the U.S. quota in the International Monetary Fund as part of a general increase in Fund quotas. This is a major step. The general quota increase will enable the Fund to meet its important responsibilities for providing adequate credit facilities to support expanding world trade and capital movements. Our own quota increase permits the United States to maintain its leadership role in the Fund and also takes the first step toward enabling us to enjoy the full benefits of the special drawing rights allocation to be made on January 1, 1971.

Similarly, I welcome the authorization for an increase in our World Bank capital subscription. The United States can now participate fully in making available to the Bank $2 billion of subscriptions from other countries in addition to our own increase of $246 million. The increase will maintain our relative voting position in the Bank. It will be of considerable help to the Bank in meeting its expanded program of assistance to the developing countries by expanding the base on which it can borrow in private capital markets around the world and by adding a substantial amount of paid-in capital immediately available to the Bank.

Unfortunately, the legislative situation did not permit action on my request for $100 million for the Special Funds of the Asian Development Bank. We must not allow further delay to be interpreted as lack of U.S. support for the Bank at a time when it is coming to play an essential role in encouraging peaceful development in Asia. This Bank, the result of

¹ Issued Dec. 31 (White House press release); as enacted, the bill is Public Law 91-599, 91st Cong., 2d sess.

January 25, 1971

113

an Asian initiative and managed primarily by Asians, is a major force for peaceful and cooperative development. Six countries have already contributed to the Special Funds in anticipation of a U.S. contribution. Failure to act early in the next session of the Congress would be a serious setback to the Bank's ability to obtain funds from other donors and build a strong, long-range concessional lending facility. Accordingly, I wish to stress that I will ask the 92d Congress to take prompt action to provide a United States contribution of $100 million to the Bank's Special Funds.

With respect to the Inter-American Development Bank, H.R. 18306 meets my request to provide an expansion of over $800 million in the U.S. subscription to the Bank's ordinary capital. This desirable step will greatly strengthen the Bank's capacity for conventional lending.

However, I regret that H.R. 18306 authorizes payment and appropriation of only $100 million for replenishment of the resources of the Bank's Fund for Special Operations, an amount representing the first portion of a planned $1 billion contribution over a 3-year period. The bill does authorize the U.S. Governor to vote in favor of a pending resolution of the Bank which templates that the full contribution will be available on schedule, and in accordance with this legislative action the U.S. Governor will cast his votes in favor of the resolution.

Further action by the Congress will be necessary to enable the United States to conclude the subscription procedure envisioned by the resolution, and I will urge the 92d Congress to take action to that end. Full U.S. implementation of this replenishment of the Fund for Special Operations will enable the Bank to continue and expand its role as the hemisphere's major instrument for promoting development financing.

As I indicated in my foreign aid reform message on September 15, international institutions can and should play a major role in the funding of development assistance.² I have therefore

proposed that the United States channel an increasing share of its development assistance through these institutions as rapidly as practicable. The institutions considered in H.R. 18306 are among the most important to this effort. I therefore welcome the authorizations contained in H.R. 18306 but regret its failure to fully meet my requests and urge that the 92d Congress take early action to do so.

## Report on Trade Agreements Program Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Nixon*

White House press release dated December 30

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to the requirements of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I transmit herewith the Fourteenth Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program.¹ This report covers the year 1969.

Stimulated by continued economic expansion, free-world trade in 1969 rose 14 percent to a new record of about $245 billion. In the United States, monetary and fiscal policies designed to restore stable and balanced growth of the economy were reflected in a slowdown of the increase in imports, while exports continued to rise at about the same rate as in 1968. As a result, the deterioration in the U.S. trade balance that had characterized performance during the previous four years was reversed.

During the period covered by this report, I forwarded to the Congress my proposals for new trade legislation. These proposals, together with others, are still under consideration. The decisions taken by the Congress will have an important bearing on our ability to advance our national interest, both in terms of sound growth of the domestic economy and further development of international cooperation so

¹ H. Doc. 91-433, 91st Cong., 2d sess.

² For text of the message, see BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1970, p. 369.

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#877

WITH RON ZIEGLER AND
JERRY WARREN

AT 12:01 P.M.

PST

JANUARY 8, 1971

FRIDAY

MR. WARREN: Ron will be here shortly, but I thought we would get started. We do apologize for the delay. Ron has been with the President most of the morning and he is now on his way back. He wanted me to give you some of the actions that have been taken today.

The President arrived at his office at about 8:15 this morning, and has been meeting with Ron, as I said, and John Ehrlichman. He has signed a number of bills which we will talk about now.

He has signed H. R. 13000, which is the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, which establishes permanent pay-setting procedures for adjusting the salaries of Federal white-collar civilian employees and, at the same time, military employees, who are tied to that scale by law.

He has also signed two Executive Orders which fix comparability. One of them affects 1,300,000 civilian employees. This Executive Order provides an increase averaging 5.96 percent.

The second Executive Order affects about 2,700,000 military and other uniformed personnel, and this Executive Order provides an increase in base pay only. Under the law, the military pay increases apply only to the base pay. So this increase is an average of 7.9 percent. It is kind of difficult for me to understand, but I will try to explain it. The 7.9 percent is on military base pay only. When you add all the other benefits that the military have, it would average out to the same as the 5.96 percent of civilian salary.

Q Jerry, how many civilians were involved?

MR. WARREN: About 1,300,000.

We will post some details on this bill.

Q And how many military?

MR. WARREN: 2,700,000, approximately. It is a total of 4 million.

Q Is there a total figure on the increase in pay cost?

MR. WARREN: Approximate figures. Estimated for fiscal '71 will be $1.1 billion and for fiscal '72 it is

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steps we took as to what effect it would have on cooling
the inflation and cooling the economy. So from that stand-
point, yes.

Q Did the President intervene in the
California welfare payments case?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, ma'am, he didn't.

Q Was he involved in that in any way, Ron,
in conversation or otherwise?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. That was a matter which was
left to HEW and that is the way the President prefers to
operate when he can on such matters.

Q Do you have any comments on either the
Soviet tender leaving the Cuban waters or the bombing
of the Soviet cultural center area in Washington?

MR. ZIEGLER: I can tell those of you who are
here what the State Department said this morning and what
we have done.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Davies
called the Soviet Embassy early this morning to express the
deep regrets of the U. S. Government for what he referred
to, and what we refer to, as a senseless act of violence
perpetrated against the Soviet Embassy Information Office
in Washington, and also Acting Secretary Irwin has issued
a statement at the Department of State today regarding that.

Q Who did Daviestalk to?

MR. ZIEGLER: He talked to Minister Counselor
Vorontsov.

Q Ron, the President is reported to have
telephoned Mayor Curran after his acquittal in San Diego,
expressing his pleasure at that acquittal. San Diego
television and one of the newspapers are reporting some
objection or criticism from the prosecutors who claim that
this will influence the case of the individuals on the same
charges who have not yet come to trial.

Has that been communicated to the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have no comment on that.
President Nixon called the Mayor and chatted with him
briefly but I have no comment.

Q Can I come back to my question on both parts?
Do you have any comment on the Soviet explosion in
Washington and; second, is there any comment on the
submarine tender situation?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will rest our U. S. comments
on what the Department of State has said and what the
Acting Secretary has said. That will be the comment from
the Government. We concur in that comment.

I should also add that I think the Executive
Protective Service has expanded the protection around the

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Soviet buildings for an indefinite period until it is felt that the possibility of such violence no longer exists.

Q Did the President order that?

MR. ZIEGLER: They took the action on their own. They have the responsibility.

Q Had they been guarding this cultural building?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, they have been carrying out protective responsibilities for that.

Q Ron, who is investigating that case? Is the FBI involved in the investigation?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't believe so, unless the Executive Protective Service would ask them for help.

Let me read you what Acting Secretary Irwin said: "The United States Government categorically condemns the lawless and senseless act of vandalism that was perpetrated this morning against a building belonging to the Soviet Embassy. Violence and irrational actions which endanger innocent lives or damage private property can only sicken and dismay all law-abiding Americans. We are greatly relieved that there were no personal injuries and that the damage was apparently not great. Every effort is being made to apprehend those responsible for this criminal act. The Executive Protective Service is taking further steps to tighten security precautions for all Soviet offices. A State Department representative went immediately to the scene of the bombing and the Department has been in close and continuing contact with the officials of the Soviet Embassy, the Executive Protective Service and the Metropolitan Police concerning this deplorable incident."

Q Now on the submarine tender, is there any comment?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Soviet submarine tender? The Defense Department this morning has given the position of the Soviet sub tender, frigate, oiler and tender all are out of the Caribbean. That is what the Defense Department made clear today.

I have no comments to make beyond what the President said in press conference on the matter, and what he said in the conversation.

For your BACKGROUND, I think you are aware that we were watching the situation very carefully. We were concerned about it. The President was interested in dealing with this matter in a way that would not precipitate a crisis. I think the President's remarks regarding the understanding are on the record and I have nothing to add to that.

Q Ron, do you know if that Defense Department announcement covers those barges that you supposedly could

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59

Depreciation reform is especially desirable today when we are requiring the diversion of significant amounts of business capital into the financing of pollution control facilities and away from those investments which would ordinarily go to increasing material productivity.

The specific administrative changes which I have approved are consistent with the recommendations of the President's Task Force on Business Taxation. I appointed this Task Force in September 1969 and asked the members to "concentrate on the role of business taxes in promoting growth, full employment, and a strong progressive economy." The Task Force included leading businessmen, lawyers and accountants, economists, a former U.S. Senator, and two former Secretaries of the Treasury.

A liberalization of depreciation allowances is essentially a change in the timing of a tax liability. The policy permits business firms to reduce tax payments now, when additional purchasing power is needed, and to make up these payments in later years.

Clearly, therefore, these steps toward meaningful depreciation reform are important for the present—in light of current economic conditions—and for the future—to maintain the growth which has made this Nation the strongest and most productive the world has ever known.

NOTE: The statement was released at San Clemente, Calif.

## American Jewish Leaders

*Exchange of Messages Between the President and Leaders of the Jewish Community.* January 11, 1971

All decent and law-abiding Americans share your outrage at recent criminal acts of violence against Soviet facilities in this country. You may be certain also that this Administration, reflecting the traditional liberties upon which this country was founded, joins with you in urging freedom of emigration as explicitly provided in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in its commitment to cultural and religious freedom at home and abroad.

But acts of violence and lawlessness such as those that have occurred in this country lately will not advance our common cause; they are, as you say, morally wrong and injure that very cause.

This Administration, in cooperation with local authorities, will use every means at its disposal to prevent such acts and to bring to justice those who perpetrate them.

RICHARD NIXON

Dear Mr. President:

We are outraged by the bomb explosion outside the Soviet cultural building in Washington. Such irresponsible and criminal actions must be stopped. While we are united in our conviction that those Jews in the Soviet Union, who wish to emigrate should be allowed to do so, and those who wish to remain should be permitted religious and cultural freedom, we are equally united in our abhorrence of these acts of violence. American Jews strongly condemn such criminal acts for they are morally wrong and injure the cause of Soviet Jews and undermine the cause of democracy in America.

NOTE: The texts of the messages were released at San Clemente, Calif.

The White House Press Office posted the names of 73 Jewish leaders from 34 cities who signed the telegram to the President.

## NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society

*Announcement of Designation of Russell E. Train as United States Representative to the Committee.*

January 13, 1971

The President has designated Russell E. Train, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, as the United States Representative to the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society of NATO.

The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was an initiative of the President at the 20th anniversary celebration of NATO in April 1969. The Committee constitutes an important element of the "third dimension" of the NATO Alliance in the field of peaceful co-operation on problems faced by technologically advanced countries.

The CCMS is now dealing with such matters as road safety, disaster assistance, air and water pollution, regional planning and the environment, job satisfaction in a technological era, and scientific knowledge and governmental decisionmaking. The Committee recently recommended a ban on intentional oil spills from ships by 1975 or at the latest, the end of the decade. It has also spearheaded a program developing prototype experimental safety vehicles which will have a significant impact on future highway injuries.

Train succeeds Dr. Daniel P. Moynihan, who served as U.S. Representative to the Committee during the first year of its activities. Dr. Moynihan will continue his association with this program as a consultant.

NOTE: The announcement was released at San Clemente, Calif.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#879

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:10 P.M. PST

JANUARY 12, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We have a series of bills which the President has signed, some 23 bills we are announcing today. The President signed these over the past few days.

The President is working today in his study at the Residence, and is continuing to work on the State of the Union Message, and also on his remarks which he will give at the University of Nebraska convocation this Thursday at 2:30, at the University of Nebraska Coliseum.

I think Jerry gave you the details on that particular stop yesterday. The President will stop in Lincoln, Nebraska, on his return to Washington.

I expect the President to spend the day at the Residence today and also tomorrow working on these matters.

The President has been in touch by phone today with a number of the staff members, both here in San Clemente and in Washington. Also, I think many of you may have noted on the wire that at 9:30 a.m. on Friday the President will dedicate the Dwight D. Eisenhower Center in Washington, D. C. Mrs. Eisenhower will also be there on the occasion of that ceremony.

I will go through very briefly with you the 23 bills just indicating for the record and for your information what each of the bills relate to.

Q Have you postings on all of these?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have postings on all of these which will contain the details and we have extra copies of the postings.

Q Is this the end of the bills?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, sir. It is just about the end.

The President has approved H. R. 19567, which extends until July 1, 1971, authority for active U. S. participation in the International Coffee Agreement of 1968.

The President has approved H. R. 15628, which authorizes appropriations for credit sales of Defense articles and services to foreign countries, and includes several general provisions relative to Foreign Military Assistance. This is the Foreign Military Sales Authorization

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H. R. 18693, which amends the Internal Revenue Code relating to the deduction and carryover period of losses resulting from the Cuban expropriation of property.

H. R. 19774, which provides relief to innocent spouses from tax liabilities and penalties attributable to income omitted from a joint return by the other spouse.

H. R. 19242, which makes two unrelated amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. H. R. 19242 requires capitalization for tax purposes of the costs of planting almond groves, and permits airline tickets and advertising to show separately the fare, the tax, and the total cost.

H. R. 19369, which reduces from 95 percent to 80 percent the amount of stock a parent corporation must own in a subsidiary corporation in order to claim an ordinary loss deduction if such stock becomes worthless.

H. R. 19562, which amends the Internal Revenue Code to permit tax-free statutory mergers when stock of a parent company is used in a merger between a controlled subsidiary of the parent and an unrelated corporation, and the latter survives.

H. R. 19627, which amends Section 1372 of the Internal Revenue Code to permit certain small business corporations to continue to elect to be taxed in a manner similar to partnerships.

H. R. 19790, which amends Section 1237 of the Internal Revenue Code relating to the income tax treatment of certain sales of real property by a corporation.

Finally, the President has approved H. R. 15728, which authorizes the President to extend existing loans of one submarine each to Greece and Pakistan and to enter upon new loans of two destroyer escorts to the Republic of Vietnam and two destroyers and two submarines to Turkey. These are not new loans; these relate to equipment already at hand. It simply extends the loan period.

Moving on to other announcements:

The President has appointed Arnold R. Weber, Associate Director of the Office of Budget and Management, to serve concurrently as Chairman of the Property Review Board. We will provide you with the background information on Mr. Weber.

We will post this afternoon at four o'clock and Jerry Warren will brief tomorrow. That will be at 11 o'clock.

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WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, JANUARY 18, 1971

[L.C]

Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

The President's Letter to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger on
Dr. Kissinger's Decision To Remain With the
Administration. January 16, 1971

Dear Henry:

Your decision to resign from the faculty of Harvard
University so that you can remain as a member of my
Administration is one that I know was very difficult for
you. The intensity of both your devotion to scholarship
and your affection for Harvard are well known to your
friends and associates. I want you to know that I greet
your decision with deep personal appreciation.

Frankly, I cannot imagine what the Government would
be like without you. Your wise counsel and strong support
over the past two years have meant a great deal to me.
During this time, our country has made great strides to-
ward achieving that just and lasting peace which has
always been our objective. The Nation's many accom-
plishments in the field of foreign policy during these past
two years have been due in no small measure to your
energy and to your vision.

I am grateful for what you have done and I am grateful
that you are staying.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

[Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, The White House, Washington]

Digest of Other
White House Announcements

Following is a list of items of general interest which were
announced to the press during the period covered by this
issue but which are not carried elsewhere in the issue.

January 7

The President today announced the reappointment
of John R. Bertrand and Joseph S. Sinclair as mem-
bers of the Board of Visitors of the United States Naval
Academy for terms expiring December 30, 1973.

The President today announced the appointment of
three persons to serve as members of the Board of Foreign
Scholarships for terms expiring September 22, 1973. They

are Lyle Morgan, dean of Stanford, Calif., James Hadley
Billington of Princeton, N.J., and John H. Carley of
New York, N.Y.

January 8

The President flew from the Western White House
to Santa Catalina Island, where he was greeted and ac-
companied on a tour of the Island by Mayor Harvey
Cowells.

January 12

The President has appointed Arnold R. Weber, Associ-
ate Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
to serve concurrently as Chairman of the Property Re-
view Board, succeeding Bryce N. Harlow.

The President has directed the Cabinet Committee on
Economic Policy to review the effect of steel price in-
creases, the import of foreign steel, and related problems,
and to report to the President promptly suggestions for
action.

January 13

The President visited Concordia Elementary School
in San Clemente, Calif., to meet with fourth and fifth-
grade students who had sent him cards for his birthday
January 9.

January 15

The President met, in separate meetings, with John
A. McKesson 3d, U.S. Ambassador to Gabon, Henry A.
Byroade, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, and Luther
I. Replogle, U.S. Ambassador to Iceland.

Officers of the Women's National Republican Club,
Inc., met with the President to present their 50th Anniv-
ersary Distinguished Political Service Award.

Printing industry representatives presented the Presi-
dent with the industry's 20th Annual Franklin Award for
Distinguished Service. The ceremony marked the 265th
anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin and the
start of International Printing Week 1971.

Mrs. Louise D. Perry of West Winfield, N.Y., called on
the President. Mrs. Perry, 79, had sent a Presidential Seal
in needlework as a birthday gift.

The President and Mrs. Nixon hosted a reception for
members of the Republican National Committee and
their wives or husbands.

Their Royal Highnesses Prince Juan Carlos of Spain
and Princess Sophia have accepted the President's invita-
tion to visit Washington on January 26 and 27. Following
their visit to Washington, they will visit other cities in the
United States.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#878

WITH RON ZIEGLER

MONDAY

JANUARY 11, 1971

1:18 PM PST

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the texts of messages which were exchanged by the President and the American Jewish leaders from around the country. We will post the names of the community leaders. There are some 50 of them from 27 major cities around the country. We will post those over on the bulletin board.

Q Have you extra copies?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will try and make them for you.

Q Are they organizational leaders?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, they are community leaders. We don't have organizations listed, but many, of course, are in Jewish organizations. However, they do not represent organizations. They are community leaders.

I would like to go through this briefly, these bills, and then we will post detailed information.

The President has approved H. R. 18582, which amends and extends through fiscal year 1973 the authorities contained in the Food Stamp Act of 1964. We will post the details on that.

I would like to remind you that since May 1969 the Administration has taken a number of actions in this area. For example, the number of counties which had neither food stamps nor commodity distribution programs has been reduced from 400 to 10. Also, increased participation in the program has increased from 3.2 million people to 9.3 million people.

Q Is that in food stamp alone, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. There is an additional 3.6 million participating in the commodity distribution program. This legislation, which the President has signed, permits a continuation of the program to provide food to more than 9.3 million needy Americans.

Q Isn't this the bill that contains the work

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Then the President has announced his intention
to make nominations of individuals to the grade of
General. We will post that.

Finally, the President has approved H. R. 19590,
the Defense Department Appropriations Act for fiscal year
1971.

This bill appropriates $66,595,937 for activities
of the Department of Defense, exclusive of the regular
military assistance, military construction, and Civil
Defense programs.

Those are all the announcements that we have.

The President has been in his office since
nine o'clock this morning.

As Mr. Walker told you, he talked to the Secretary
by phone.

He also talked with John Ehrlichman for quite
some time this morning regarding the State of the Union
Message and programs for 1971.

Looking outside, I think the President will be
working either in his office at the Western White House
or in his office-study at the residence throughout the
day.

There is no change in the information we have to
give you as to when the President may return. As I said,
it will be mid-week. I don't have a day to give you. We
will probably have an indication on that tomorrow.

Q More likely Wednesday, though?

MR. ZIEGLER: I just don't know yet.

Q Ron, what was the date on the letter to the
President in this exchange?

MR. ZIEGLER: This exchange took place over the
weekend. We received the letter from the Jewish community
leaders on the 10th.

Q It wasn't solicited, was it?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q It was in the form of a letter, not a tele-
gram?

MR. ZIEGLER: It was a telegram, yes, sir.

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Q Are they in convention somewhere or how
did the composition of this thing come about of the 27
organizations?

MR. ZIEGLER: Not 27 organizations. They are
from 27 cities.

Q Are they in convention somewhere?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I assume just by phone calls
and so forth amongst themselves. They have, as their letter
indicates, been concerned about developments occurring here
and in the Soviet Union and wanted to express themselves to
the President.

Q What was the President's reaction to the
vandalism against the automobiles belonging to correspondents
in Moscow?

MR. ZIEGLER: The State Department again, Stu,
has addressed that today and they have strongly protested
in Moscow today the acts of vandalism against the Americans.
Not only that incident but during the past weeks.

In the State Department statement today they
indicated we have asked for more protection from the Soviet
Government. The State Department statement on this matter
is reflective of the Administration's view.

Q Ron, did Mr. Walker fly all the way out here
just to talk to us?

MR. ZIEGLER: That was one of the reasons for being
here. It was not the only reason. I think he had other
business here.

Q I mean, he didn't see the President, though.
Did he talk to somebody else in the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: He has been here talking to me,
Ehrlichman and to the President by phone.

Q If the President was in his office, why didn't
he see Mr. Walker?

MR. ZIEGLER: It was a matter of time. By the
time Charls got here and we put this material together, and
for the time for him to drive down there, it couldn't be done.
He came in at the Newporter Inn and we were working on this
this morning.

Q Do we have any indication who was the
organizer of this letter or telegram from the Jewish leaders?
Who was the leading figure or organizer?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know here.

Q Do you have a date yet for the Budget Message?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, not yet.

We will post today at five o'clock. We don't expect
much in the posting. We will brief tomorrow here at 11 o'clock.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

PST)

Secretary Rogers Discusses Middle East and Southeast Asia
in Interview on CBS Morning News

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rogers on the Columbia Broad-
casting System's television program Morning
News on January 15. The interviewers were
Bernard Kalb, Marvin Kalb, and Nelson
Benton.

Press release 14 dated January 15

Bernard Kalb: Mr. Secretary, there's a report this morning from Israel of Israeli commandos striking into Lebanon, about 25 miles or so. Do you think this will affect Egypt's willingness to join in the Middle East peace talks?

Secretary Rogers: No, Mr. Kalb, I don't think that has any particular significance. There have been these attacks by guerrillas against Israel from time to time, and Israel naturally retaliates, but it doesn't affect the overall situation in any way, as I see it. The fact is that Egypt and Jordan and Israel have had a cease-fire now in effect for 5 months, and there has been no fighting among those three nations for 5 months.

Bernard Kalb: Mr. Secretary, before we go
on with the Middle East, there is a particular
development today—the Aswan High Dam has
been dedicated, and the Russians were there
today. The Americans might have been there
had not a predecessor of yours, John Foster
Dulles, turned down Egyptian appeals for
American aid to build that dam. To take a
retrospective look, Mr. Secretary, was that deci-
sion by Mr. Dulles a mistake?

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Kalb, one of the things that I've determined not to do is to criticize anyone who has been Secretary of State or make any judgments on decisions of previous Secretaries of State. It's an extremely difficult job,

as you know. I don't think anyone can answer
that question. As far as the United States is
concerned, we of course hope that the dam is
successful. We hope that the people in Egypt
will benefit as a result of the construction of
this dam.

Bernard Kalb: Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Un-
ion deceived the United States during the first
round of the standstill cease-fire on the Suez by
introducing missiles. The President has said
that there can be no peace unless the Soviet
Union plays a conciliatory peace role in the
Middle East. Why should you trust the Rus-
sians now, and what makes you think the
Russians will play a conciliatory role?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that it's misleading to talk about trust as such. There are situations in the world—and this may be one—where it's to everyone's advantage to have a peaceful settlement. Now, any peaceful settlement has to be based on the premise that there may be violations, there have to be provisions to be sure that the agreement is carried out, that there are guarantees, etc. So I don't think that we in the United States deal in these matters on the basis of trust, we deal on the basis that it's in everyone's interest to work out a peaceful settlement. Now, obviously, if there is a settlement, there'll have to be guarantees, there'll have to be peacekeeping arrangements made, and the parties have to be reasonably satisfied that the agreement will be kept.

Marvin Kalb: Mr. Secretary, on current prob-
lems, mainly the Jarring mission: How would
you rate the chances of its success?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it is very difficult to
rate it in terms of a mathematical equation.
The fact is that for the first time now since

February 1, 1971

133

[LC]

1967, there is some prospect that an agreement can be worked out. Granted, the prospect may be slight. But the fact remains that there has been a cease-fire for 5 months; for the first time the parties are talking on substantive matters; there seems to be a willingness—certainly in private discussions—to talk seriously about the problems that have involved this area for so long; so I think there is some prospect for success. As you know, Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] himself, I think, has indicated some encouragement as a result of his talks with the parties.

**Marvin Kalb:** He's expressed encouragement, as I understand it, after talking with the Israelis last weekend. Since that time, President Sadat of Egypt has made a number of statements which have depressed at least the reporters reading them. I was wondering whether they have depressed U.S. officials as well?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, we're certainly not encouraged by them. We would hope that the parties would not make statements of this kind. The fact is that you have to understand that when negotiations are being conducted the public statements do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the parties, for two reasons. One, they have an interest—the parties have an interest—in taking a strong position which may help them in the negotiation. They don't make concessions to begin with, so they take a very firm position to begin with. Secondly, they have political reasons at home sometimes for taking a strong public stand, because they have to get support for their efforts. So I'm not too discouraged by it. If you look back over the last year and see some of the things that have been said by the parties and then see where we stand today, you will see that a good many adjustments and concessions have been made.

**Bernard Kalb:** Mr. Secretary, is the United States prepared to send military forces into the Middle East to help insure and guarantee any peace formula that is arrived at?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I don't like to put it that way, because it conjures up all kinds of analogies. The fact is that the United States is prepared to play a role, a responsible role,

in peacekeeping in the area. And the United Kingdom, France, and Russia have also indicated a willingness to do that. Now, if it could be done, if peacekeeping forces could be established which would be acceptable to the parties—not as a substitute for an agreement but as a supplement—then it would be a very major step forward in the United Nations and a major step forward as far as peace in the world is concerned. Because when you look back at the United Nations, this was one of the concepts that it was felt provided great promise for the future, so we are willing to play a responsible role in the Middle East.

**Nelson Benton:** Mr. Secretary, earlier I think you had said that the United States Government had reached no conclusion on the advisability of perhaps participating in some sort of four-power peace force. Is what you're saying now, sir, reflecting perhaps a closer movement toward this kind of thing on the part of this country?

**Secretary Rogers:** I'm not sure that I ever said quite that. I've said from the beginning that we were willing to play a responsible role. Of course, we're not going to make a decision about that role until we know what we're talking about, but we have indicated a willingness to play that kind of a part in peacekeeping in the area, and we don't think this is a time to talk about it. We think it's very important that negotiations get started under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, and we don't want to do anything now that would disrupt that in any way. But we think that at the appropriate time we should talk about that in the four-power context and, as I said, not in any way to take the place of negotiations, because the negotiations have to be conducted between the parties, under Jarring's auspices. But we do think this is an important concept, and we're willing to play our role in that concept.

**Marvin Kalb:** Mr. Secretary, do you feel on the basis of what you know now that the Egyptians are accepting the Israeli proposals or principles that were put forth last weekend to Ambassador Jarring and are prepared to discuss them?

134

Department of State Bulletin

[L.C]

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I don't want to make any comment about that. I think answers to questions like that should be made by Ambassador Jarring. I think it's very important for the major powers, particularly the United States, to let him take the lead. This negotiation should be done quietly, and he should be the presiding officer. So I don't want to make any comment about that.

**Marvin Kalb:** Everybody seems to be talking. President Sadat was talking, Prime Minister Meir was talking, everyone is talking in the area, but the big powers are not talking. They seem to have more at stake.

**Secretary Rogers:** We're doing a great deal of talking. I spend a large part of my day talking on this subject, but we're not doing it publicly.

**Marvin Kalb:** Do you feel at this point that the Russians are prepared to be as responsible as you feel you are in this situation?

**Secretary Rogers:** Oh, I don't have any way of judging that. They have indicated some willingness to take part in guarantees, and we have to find out what they mean by that.

**Marvin Kalb:** Will they press the Egyptians at this point, as I assume the United States is using some of its leverage on Israel, to be conciliatory?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, we can't tell for sure. We can't tell for sure. There are indications that Egypt is serious about it, just as Israel is serious about it, and we think it may well be to everyone's interest to have a peace in the area. People talk about the Russians wanting to fish in troubled waters, but if the waters are too troubled you can't fish in them; you have a typhoon, you can't fish; and if there is a major blowup in the area it doesn't benefit anyone. I think the Russians may know that. But I want to say, Mr. Kalb, that the objective of the Government of the United States and the objective of President Nixon is to bring about peace in this generation, and the Middle East is one of the most dangerous areas in the world. And as a result of the initiative that President Nixon and this administration have taken, for

the first time there are some prospects of peace, and we're going to do everything we can to bring it about. It may not succeed. We recognize that it may explode. We hope not. We have reason to think it may not.

**Bernard Kalb:** Mr. Secretary, I'd like to turn this to Indochina, if I may. The latest military reports from Cambodia talk about a deteriorating situation. Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] has just paid a visit there, and there is speculation that the United States may engage in an airlift to ferry in South Vietnamese troops and ammunition. Could you tell us whether the United States will in fact do such a thing and whether because of the deteriorating situation you envisage any possibility of American ground troops returning to Cambodia?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I don't accept the proposition that the situation is deteriorating. It's a dangerous situation; it always has been. I think the Cambodian Government has done better than many people thought they would do. We think that there is a possibility that the enemy is building up for an offensive in March or April—something like that. In that sense we're concerned about the future. But I don't believe it's deteriorating. As a matter of fact, there are indications that the present actions are going quite well. Now, as far as our plans are concerned, we are not going to announce what our plans are going to be, what we're going to do. We have said, and I will repeat here today, that we are not going to use American ground forces in Cambodia. It is not necessary. The South Vietnamese are assisting the Cambodians and doing it quite effectively. So we are not going to use American ground forces in Cambodia.

**Marvin Kalb:** Mr. Secretary, if the issue in Cambodia is not deteriorating, why is it necessary for the South Vietnamese to rush their own forces into the area south of Phnom Penh, and why is it that all of the reports suggest that Phnom Penh has been almost totally encircled, that a great deal of the countryside in Cambodia is under Communist control? I don't understand your use of the term.

February 1, 1971

135

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that we have always expected that these things would happen, that attempts would be made, and as a matter of fact, we expected the North Vietnamese to attempt to reestablish the base areas in Cambodia. And what is happening is what we expected to happen, so in that sense, if you want to use the word, you can. But I don't use it in that sense. It's developing about the way we expected it would. Naturally, you're always concerned—if there is combat going on you want to do all you can to be victorious. Now the fact that the South Vietnamese are helping so effectively I think is an encouraging sign.

Marvin Kalb: Why is that?

Secretary Rogers: Well, because they have a million men, and if they cooperate as they are doing with Cambodia, it's a clear indication that the Nixon doctrine is working. The Nixon doctrine is that the Asians should carry the major share of the combat role and the United States should withdraw its troops. We're doing that. Now, here is a case where before Cambodia and South Viet-Nam didn't have even diplomatic relations, and now they are working together against the common enemy.

Bernard Kalb: Mr. Secretary, the President in his conversation the other night said that the war is beginning to end.¹ There are people who disagree with that. There is reference made to the fact that the B-52's are now bombing for the first time in the support of ground troops in Cambodia; the rate of infiltration by the enemy is higher. Where is the evidence that the war is beginning to end? End for us, or end for South Viet-Nam as well?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think probably the President's major emphasis was on the war ending for us, because our troops are being withdrawn, and as you noticed last week, our casualties were the lowest they've been in 5 years. The costs of the war have been reduced by half. When this administration took office the expenditure was $29 billion. As a result of President Nixon's decisions and policies, it's only half that now—$14½ billion. We are with-

drawing troops at a regular rate. So as far as the United States is concerned, we think the war is ending, and as far as the South Vietnamese are concerned, it's ending, too. There are very few combats—there is very low combat activity in South Viet-Nam.

Bernard Kalb: Mr. Secretary, if it is ending for us, as you put it, why does not the United States then accelerate the tempo of U.S. troop withdrawal from South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we want to do it in an orderly way, in a way that is effective, and I think we're doing it that way.

Marvin Kalb: Mr. Secretary, on Cambodia again: American air might is being employed in what seems to be a support combat way and it's not simply a matter of interdicting lines of supplies. Is that true?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it's true that we are supporting the efforts of the South Vietnamese in preventing the North Vietnamese from developing sanctuaries in Cambodia. But the objective is not to support the Government of Cambodia, it's to prevent the North Vietnamese from building up these base areas in Cambodia so they can attack our troops.

## 99th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, head of the U.S. delegation, at the 99th plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on January 14.

Press release 11 dated January 14

Ladies and gentlemen: These talks can progress only if both sides are willing to reach a negotiated settlement of this conflict. The United States and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam want such a settlement. The proposals we have put forward here are designed to achieve that goal. They have been placed before you without any preconditions to discussion of them and without any insistence that they must be the sole basis of negotiation.

It is obvious from your remarks this morn-

¹ For excerpts from an interview with President Nixon on Jan. 4, see BULLETIN of Jan. 25, 1971, p. 105.

136

Department of State Bulletin

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #883

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN, DEPUTY PRESS
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

11:08 A.M. EST

JANUARY 16, 1971

SATURDAY

MR. WARREN: Good morning.

I want to go through this rapidly as possible this
morning, for those of you who want to go over to the State
Department.

First, I should say that the President is at Camp
David and is working today on the State of the Union Message
and the programs for 1971 which will be submitted to the
Congress. We expect the President to return Sunday afternoon.

Also, I should remind you of the schedule for
Monday. At noon, the President will meet with the Construction
Industry Collective Bargaining Commission and other members
of labor and management involved in the construction industry.
And at 12:45, the President will meet with Secretary Laird.

You have the statement by the President and
a memorandum from the President to the Attorney General
concerning the National Commission on Reform of Federal Laws
Report, which was received by the White House on January
7, 1971. In it you will note that the President is
directing that the Attorney General establish a study group
within the Justice Department to look into the substantive
recommendations of the report of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, and also to look into
procedural questions raised by the Chief Justice in his
State of the Federal Judiciary Address to the American Bar
Association on August 10 of last year. I think those
are self-explanatory.

If you have any questions on those, or anything
else, I would like to take those now before we move to the
next piece of business. Are you clear on the Commission's
report, do you think, at this time?

Q Jerry, can you tell us what the Chief Justice
said on August 10?

MR. WARREN: I can tell you briefly. I can give you
the general theme of the Chief Justice's address, which was
that the Federal Judiciary system is inefficient because it
does not use advanced management and technology -- I am
paraphrasing now; I can't give you direct quotes -- to
expedite the processing of the increased volume and diversity
of cases that come before the Federal Judiciary, problems
with heavy case loads, generally in large cities, sharp
increases in criminal and automobile cases.

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As you know, the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, has been facing a
decision recently on whether or not to return to Harvard.
The President has indicated to Dr. Kissinger, on several
occasions, that he would like very much to have Dr. Kissinger
continue here in his post at the White House and in the
Administration.

Henry has retained his position on the faculty
of Harvard these past two years while on a leave of absence,
and now that that two-year period is coming to an end he faced
the decision, as you all know, of either returning to Harvard
or resigning his appointment there.

On Thursday before the President left San Clemente,
Dr. Kissinger informed the President that he had decided
to resign his position at Harvard in order to remain a
member of the Administration and that he had so informed
President Pusey.

The President has asked me to release his letter
to Henry Kissinger, which we are doing right now. The President
realizes this was a very difficult decision for Dr. Kissinger
to make. He knows that Harvard has been a large part of Dr.
Kissinger's life for more than 20 years and he knows that Harvard
is very close to Dr. Kissinger.

The President is extremely pleased that Henry
has made this decision and has expressed that sentiment
in the letter you are now receiving.

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The President recalled some of the things that he has said in early December of 1968 when he announced Dr. Kissinger's appointment. This announcement, as some of you recall, was made at the Hotel Pierre in New York. He said then that he wanted a man who could help set up a system which presented the President with a broad range of viewpoints and with the best ideas and the fullest range of choices.

He said then that he wanted a man who could dedicate himself to long-range thinking and planning and not just get bogged down in operational details.

He said then, I believe, that he did not want the United States Government just to react to events when they occur.

The President feels that he has such a system now and it is working very well. And the President regards Dr. Kissinger's efforts as a major contribution to the success we have had these last two years in meeting the President's objectives.

You have the letter. I had hoped to have Dr. Kissinger here to take your questions -- this should be OFF THE RECORD -- but it wasn't possible. So I apologize.

Q Has Dr. Kissinger told the President he is remaining on a month-to-month basis, or is he remaining until the end of this term, or what has he told the President?

MR. WARREN: He has told the President that he intends to remain to continue on in the post that he now holds. I don't believe he has put any time limit on it. I am quite sure he has not put any time limit on it.

Q Jerry, what specifically was Dr. Kissinger's position at Harvard?

MR. WARREN: He had a professorship in the Department of Government, and he was the Director of the Harvard International Seminar.

As I understand the Harvard arrangement, if he had chosen to go back, I don't think he would have necessarily gone back to the same chair or the same position. That would have been a matter that he would have worked out with Harvard.

Q But he loses his tenure as a result of this?

MR. WARREN: Yes, he does lose his tenure as a result of this action.

Q Do you know what date he had to make this decision by?

MR. WARREN: I think he had to make it early next month. Early in February, I believe, was the time limit.

Q Did President Pusey accept his resignation then?

MR. WARREN: Henry has been in touch with President Pusey and I don't know whether the actual acceptance has been submitted to Henry. But I am sure it will be.

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WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, JANUARY 25, 1971

79

Peter Peterson, the Chief Executive Officer and also the Chairman of the Board of Bell and Howell.

All of you who follow business affairs know of Mr. Peterson's rather remarkable record in that field. He is, as you can see, a very young man. He is a man that has been described by his colleagues in the business community as one of the ablest—and some have even used the term brilliant—chief executive officers of this generation.

We feel very fortunate that he would take this assignment. While his primary responsibilities at Bell and Howell have been domestic, he has had a great deal of experience in international affairs and we think that having him on the White House staff as an Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs will be a great asset to our staff.

If I could just spend one moment to use some examples as to why this kind of Council is needed, let me just tell you about my schedule for the last 4 days.

I was talking to the Secretary of State this morning and we reminisced, as we were talking about Mr. Peterson, about the fact that over the past 4 days either personally or by phone we have been discussing matters in the field of this Council which were of great concern to the Nation.

For example, you read of the oil crisis in the Mideast. You also read of the decision of the Tariff Commission, a split decision which now will have to come to the President with regard to a shoe import [quota] for shoes. And you, of course, have been following the situation with regard to possible British entry into the Common Market and what decisions that may require, what impact that may have on our policies.

In all of these areas we have direct examples of matters that cut across foreign policy and domestic policy which involved, in the one instance, the Department of Commerce and the Department of State, in another instance the Department of State and the Tariff Commission, in another instance the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture.

There has long been needed in the White House a direct adviser and Assistant to the President who can coordinate all of these activities.

Of course, the State Department has the primary responsibility. That's why the Secretary of State will be the Vice Chairman of this Council. I, of course, will serve as the Chairman of the Council, just as I serve as Chairman of the National Security Council and the Domestic Council.

And the Secretary of State will also, incidentally, be just as enthusiastic as I am about Mr. Peterson. Secretary Rogers was one of those who initially recommended that the Council be set up to bring these things together, and Mr. Peterson was not only my first choice but his first choice, and we are fortunate to get our first choice to serve as the man who will be the Executive Director of the Council and the Assistant to the President for International [Economic] Affairs.

I will not further detain you. Mr. Peterson will be glad to answer any questions you may have with regard to his

personal plans or his future activities on the Council. And George Shultz is here for the purpose of answering any questions you might want to ask for background on the Council and what particular areas that it will cover, because its scope is very broad, very broad in covering the whole area of international economic affairs. And Mr. Shultz, who has been consulted throughout on this matter, will be able to answer any questions in that respect.

I'll just say finally I think all of you who cover the White House will find that Mr. Peterson is a very great asset to our staff, one who will be accessible to you when it is proper for him to be so to discuss some of the matters in which you have interest and one who will bring some new ideas and, more important than that, some form, some central direction to a number of areas that have simply been handled on an ad hoc basis due to the fact that they cut across so many departments.

NOTE: The President spoke at 12:43 p.m. in the Briefing Room at the White House.

For an announcement and a memorandum concerning the Council, see the following two items.

## Council on International Economic Policy

*Announcement of Establishment of the Council and the Appointment of Peter G. Peterson as Executive Director of the Council and Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.*

January 19, 1971

The President today established the Council on International Economic Policy, and announced the appointment of Peter G. Peterson as Executive Director of the Council and Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. The Council includes as members the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor; the Director of OMB; Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Executive Director of the Domestic Council; and the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The President will be Chairman of the Council.

The Council is being formed to provide a clear, top-level focus on international economic issues and to achieve consistency between international and domestic economic policy. Peterson will be responsible for developing the agenda for the Council, and for assuring timely consideration of international economic policies.

Peterson, 46, is currently chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Bell and Howell Company. He joined the company in 1958 as executive vice president, became president in 1961, and chairman in 1968. He is a graduate of Northwestern University (1947, B.S., summa cum laude) and the University of Chicago (1951, M.B.A. with honors). Peterson is a director of the First

80

National Bank of Chicago and Illinois Bell Telephone Company, a trustee of the Brookings Institution, the University of Chicago, and National Educational Television.

In the Executive Office of the President, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget are involved in various aspects of foreign economic affairs. More than 60 other units and coordinating bodies throughout the executive branch have responsibility for certain limited portions of foreign economic affairs. Presently, no single high-level body holds the responsibility for the development of international economic policy and its relations to domestic economic policy. The Council will have this responsibility.

The Executive Director of the Council will report directly to the President, and will be responsible, in collaboration with the members of the Council, for development of the overall direction of the Council's work. Where the Council's responsibility overlaps with that of the National Security Council, as in the case of foreign aid, which has implications for both national security policy and economic policy, the Council on International Economic Policy will operate within the general framework of national security policy developed by the NSC.

Peterson presently resides with his wife, four sons, and a daughter in Winnetka, Ill. He was born in Kearney, Nebr.

NOTE: For the President's remarks announcing establishment of the Council, see the preceding item. For the President's memorandum establishing the Council, see the following item.

*The President's Memorandum Establishing the Council.*

January 19, 1971

### MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

THE CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL

THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

This memorandum establishes a Council on International Economic Policy. I will serve as Chairman with

the addresses as Directors. In my absence, the Secretary of State will chair meetings of the Council.

The purposes of the Council are these:

1. Achieve consistency between domestic and foreign economic policy.

2. Provide a clear top level focus for the full range of international economic policy issues; deal with international economic policies—including trade, investment, balance of payments, finance—as a coherent whole; and consider the international economic aspects of essentially foreign policy issues, such as foreign aid and defense, under the general policy guidance of the National Security Council.

3. Maintain close coordination with basic foreign policy objectives.

An Executive Director will be designated to help the Council in its operations. He will organize the general secretariat of the Council and be responsible for the staff work. He will have ready access to the President and will initiate projects and call upon staff resources from throughout the Government to augment his own small staff. In collaboration with the members of the Council or designated individuals at the senior political appointee level and pursuant to the directions of the President, his responsibilities will include:

- Develop the agenda and supporting materials for Council meetings and review all papers going to the Council.

- Help develop a sense of direction, strategy and relationship of the parts to the whole of this problem area.

- Establish a work program, including topics, timing and identification of individual assignments and set up task groups on special topics.

An Operations Group will be established, similar to the present Under Secretaries Group but replacing the work of that Group insofar as international economic policy is concerned. Its responsibilities will include:

- Follow up on decisions reached.

- Coordination of actions of the Government where that is necessary.

- Review of operating problems arising out of actions of other Governments or outstanding international economic developments.

The State Department will chair the Operations Group. Standing or special subcommittees may be added from time to time. To the extent practical the Council shall bring within its structure those existing committees or groups presently dealing within the scope of the Council's work as set forth above.

### RICHARD NIXON

NOTE: For the President's remarks and an announcement concerning the Council, see the two preceding items.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #884

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

11:30 A.M. EST

JANUARY 18, 1971

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: Ron is in a series of meetings this morning and has asked me to cover with you the material that we have.

You are aware, I think, of the schedule this morning. The President has been in a staff meeting and then he had a meeting beginning at 11:08 with Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, Director Helms, and Admiral Moorer. Dr. Kissinger is in that meeting, as is General Haig. I think there was a pool in with the photo session of that.

There will be a meeting with the construction industry representatives at noon.

Ron will be out here about 12:30 or 12:40 with a report on that meeting.

Q Which meeting?

MR. WARREN: The construction industry representatives meeting, which begins at noon.

Q Do you expect just Ron, or will there be people from the meeting?

MR. WARREN: I think there will be maybe one or two from the meeting and we probably will have film on that, by the way.

You have a release. The President today has announced the recess appointment of Thomas S. Kleppe to be Administrator of the Small Business Administration, to succeed Hilary J. Sandoval, Jr.

Q What does that job pay?

MR. WARREN: It pays $40,000.

Q Jerry, is it true that Secretary Stans has a lot to do with this agency and that he is the man who decides who heads it and who leaves it?

MR. WARREN: The head of this agency, Sarah, is nominated by the President and he serves at the pleasure of the President. Secretary Stans, in his role, does have a great deal of liaison with the Small Business Administration.

Q How about seeing Laird, will there be any chance of that?

MORE

#884

- 6 -

#884

Q Why do we send a high official of the State Department over to the Middle East to help some private oil firms negotiate on what they are going to pay to other countries for oil?

MR. WARREN: I think the State Department covered that in full, Sarah.

Q But, still, policy begins here, not over there. Why does Nixon send a man like that over there to do this? This is private enterprise. We don't send people out here to negotiate with other private people. Like Henry Ford selling some cars over to Europe. We don't send a State Department man over to negotiate the price of cars.

MR. WARREN: I am not sure that the State Department announced that he was going over to do that. The State Department did have a briefing on this on Saturday. I would have nothing to add to it.

Q There has been yet another cut in the prime rate. How does the White House feel about that?

MR. WARREN: Once again, the White House feels that this is welcome news. And we hope we will see stronger evidence after this that this easing in general credit conditions will also be felt in the mortgage industry.

Q Does the White House feel or does the White House think that interest rates are going to go back up in the spring, or do you think they are going to continue to go down?

MR. WARREN: I would have no prediction on that, Jim.

MORE

#884

Third Special Session of the OAS General Assembly
Adopts Measures on Kidnaping and Terrorism

The Third Special Session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States was held at Washington January 25-February 2. Following are statements by Secretary Rogers, head of the U.S. delegation,¹ together with the texts of a convention and a resolution approved by the Assembly on February 2.

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY ROGERS

Statement of January 27, 1970

I am pleased, Mr. President, to welcome back to the United States my distinguished colleagues from the American Republics. Only 7 months have passed since we were last here for the first meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States under its revised charter.

That inaugural Assembly launched the new stage of our Organization's history with a variety of expressions reflecting the hopeful and painful realities of our hemisphere today.

The present session is an outgrowth of a resolution adopted at the June meeting which charged the Inter-American Juridical Committee to draft instruments on "kidnapping, extortion, and assaults against persons, in cases in which these acts may have repercussions on international relations."

We have grown accustomed to special inter-American meetings that—in times of peace—

map programs for economic and social development and—in times of conflict—seek formulas to bring an end to the conflict. There is little precedent for the problem of terrorism confronting us at this session. Indeed, its most characteristic manifestation in this hemisphere—the kidnaping of foreign officials by private groups for ransom purposes—would seem to be a phenomenon new to the history of international relations. The fact that there have been 12 of these incidents in our hemisphere in the past 17 months makes it particularly appropriate that the OAS is the first international body taking legal action against them.

Last June, by unanimous vote in the General Assembly, we established the principle that acts of terrorism, irrespective of the pretext, constitute serious common crimes rather than political offenses. Now we are gathered here to give this principle practical effect in a convention, which I hope will also win the overwhelming endorsement of this Assembly.

Terrorism, as most of us know from our own national experience, springs from a complex of factors—social, psychological, and political. In time some of these factors, for example, poverty, ignorance, and discrimination, can be overcome by humane domestic policies and by the emphasis on social and economic development to which the inter-American system is dedicated. In seeking to eliminate the international manifestations of terrorism, we also have a responsibility to attack the basic ills of which terrorism is sometimes the outgrowth.

But to try to weigh the motives behind terrorist acts is not to excuse their commission. The methods to which terrorists have resorted show a cruel and callous disregard for human rights.

¹ For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 17 dated Jan. 20.

² Delivered before the Assembly by Under Secretary Irwin (press release 21).

³ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of July 27, 1970, p. 119.

228

Department of State Bulletin

They have no place in civilized societies. The United States pledges to join with you to combat these crimes through international cooperation.

At this meeting we are anxious to achieve a convention with strong enforcement provisions and real prospects for winning wide support not only in the OAS but elsewhere. Such a convention, I believe, would offer the greatest hope of becoming a truly effective deterrent.

With this objective in mind, my delegation is concerned about the legal and political difficulties which face us in trying to reach agreement on a general definition of terrorism.

In our deliberations we must be careful not to undermine the tradition of asylum which is such an important part of our hemisphere concept of political freedom. We must be mindful of the necessity of distinguishing between criminal acts and traditional political offenses. And we must take account of the limitations which many of our legal systems place on enforcement against acts lacking a clearly international character.

These difficulties surrounding the question of general terrorism are no excuse for inaction. We share the concerns of those who are anxious to find suitable arrangements to deal with terrorism in its many aspects, including of course the brutal crimes against local citizens and officials which have occurred in some of our countries. We would welcome separate measures on general terrorism.

In preparing a convention at this session, however, my delegation would prefer to focus first on a subject on which views are in complete accord—kidnaping and other terrorist acts against foreign officials. In June we condemned such acts as violations "not only of human rights but also of the norms that govern international relations." We all agree that, regardless of motive, they should be treated as common crimes, and not political offenses, for purposes of asylum and extradition.

A specific focus on such crimes would therefore hold the best prospect for a strong hemispheric consensus of the sort we achieved last June. Moreover, it would concentrate our attention

on the problem of most immediacy to the international community.

We would like to see this meeting approve a convention that clearly condemns crimes against government officials serving and visiting abroad. We believe it should apply not only to diplomatic and consular agents but to other government officials, to officials of international organizations, and to any foreign national in the case of a crime involving extortion of another government. The convention should establish effective enforcement procedures to bring the perpetrators of these crimes to judgment. In our view it should include, among other measures, the obligation to seek out of-fenders, to detain them, and to extradite or submit them for prosecution.

Moreover, we believe it important that the convention be open to accession by states outside the hemisphere, many of which are watching our efforts with particular interest. Representatives of West Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and Switzerland have already suffered at the hands of terrorists. And non-hemispheric countries are also potential places of refuge for terrorists.

Indeed, Mr. President, I would like to urge all of the delegates to this Assembly to keep in mind the international impact of the problem we are examining. All nations, regardless of ideology or political system, have a common interest in effective international measures to combat crimes against diplomats and other foreign officials.

The member states of the inter-American system have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to break new ground in working together for regional peace and in developing regional legal instruments.

This meeting gives us a unique opportunity to take an unprecedented legal step, and not only in our own interests but in the interests of the whole international community. A specific and forceful convention expressing a strong hemispheric consensus can become the basis for broad international legal action to combat crimes against officials abroad. The establishment of internationally accepted legal norms

February 22, 1971

229

can greatly enhance deterrence against would-be terrorists in our own hemisphere, and worldwide as well.

The challenge before us, then, is a major one. But I am convinced that, by concentrating on a subject on which we can make a significant international contribution, we can meet it in a way that does credit to the distinguished history of the Organization of American States.

## Statement of February 2⁴

On June 30, 1970, at the First Special Session of the OAS General Assembly, we unanimously condemned acts of terrorism, particularly kidnapping and extortion related to it. We established then that terrorist acts are common crimes rather than political offenses. Clearly, therefore, the perpetrators of such crimes are subject to extradition and are not eligible for asylum.

There is no dispute among the members of the inter-American community on this principle. However, considering the difficulty in framing an adequate general definition of terrorism, it is understandable that the majority of member states believe that we need to devote more time and thought to the complex question of definition.

However, in no sense does this belief imply that the member states are indifferent to the acts of terrorism that have afflicted a number of our Republics. On the contrary, the resolution adopted by the Assembly today reaffirms our purpose to continue work on general terrorism.

It is therefore a matter of great regret that six of our colleagues left yesterday's session over this issue. The preference of the majority for a more specific convention as a first step is in no way intended to slight their concerns, which we share. Rather, our intention has been to direct initial focus on the one class of crimes about which there is no problem of definition and on which a meaningful convention is immediately possible.

We hope that, despite the difficulties, all the

member states will subscribe to the convention before us and, building on that basis, will participate in the next steps to cope with the general problem of terrorism. We hope also that states outside the hemisphere will accede to this convention or, even if they do not, will recognize in their own practice the principles it articulates.

At this time, I would like to state for the record my delegation's understanding of certain provisions of this convention. Article 2 defines as common crimes of international significance certain acts against persons to whom the state has the duty to give special protection under international law. The discussions on that point before and during this special session of the General Assembly clearly reflect the general understanding that article 2 applies not only to diplomatic agents, consular officers, and members of their families, but also to other officials of foreign governments and officials of public international organizations. It has frequently been stated that the relevant provisions of the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, and the draft U.N. Convention on Visiting Missions, reflect existing principles of international law for purposes of article 2. The United States delegation shares that view.

Article 6 of the convention we adopt today states that none of the provisions of this convention shall be interpreted to impair the right of asylum. The United States Government recognizes certain rights relating to territorial asylum as established by the U.N. Protocol and Convention on Refugees. It is my delegation's opinion that article 6 is correct and that it reflects the purpose of this convention to distinguish between the traditional political offenses for which asylum exists and serious common crimes such as kidnapping, murder, and assaults upon persons entitled to special protection under international law. Thus the commitments made in this convention to deal with crimes violating the norms that govern international relations in no way impair the institution of asylum as it has been practiced in the Americas.

Finally, I would like to allude to a sensitive

⁴Delivered before the Assembly by Ambassador Joseph John Jova, U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States.

230

Department of State Bulletin

subject which is not dealt with in the conven-
tion. During these meetings, it was agreed not
to attempt to incorporate in an international
agreement any common position on how govern-
ments should deal with a threat of extortion
based upon the kidnapping of a foreign official.
It was the sense of the meeting that this deli-
cate decision should be left to the responsibility
of the states concerned and that no language
need be included in the agreement on that point.
The United States Government supports this
view.

TEXT OF CONVENTION ⁵

CONVENTION TO PREVENT AND PUNISH THE ACTS OF TERRORISM TAKING THE FORM OF CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND RELATED EXTORTION THAT ARE OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

WHEREAS :

The defense of freedom and justice and respect for the fundamental rights of the individual that are recognized by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are primary duties of states;

The General Assembly of the Organization, in Resolution 4, of June 30, 1970, strongly condemned acts of terrorism, especially the kidnapping of persons and extortion in connection with that crime, which it declared to be serious common crimes;

Criminal acts against persons entitled to special
protection under international law are occurring fre-
quently, and those acts are of international significance
because of the consequences that may flow from them
for relations among states;

It is advisable to adopt general standards that will
progressively develop international law as regards co-
operation in the prevention and punishment of such
acts; and

In the application of those standards the institution
of asylum should be maintained and, likewise the prin-
ciple of nonintervention should not be impaired,

THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERI-
CAN STATES HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING
ARTICLES:

Article 1

The contracting states undertake to cooperate among
themselves by taking all the measures that they may

⁵ OAS doc. AG/88 rev. 1; approved by the Assembly on Feb. 2 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 1, with 2 abstentions.

U.S. Regards OAS Convention
on Terrorism as First Step

Department Statement¹

The OAS General Assembly last night approved
a convention that condemns and classifies acts
of terrorism against foreign officials as common
crimes. This convention makes a major contribu-
tion to international law. It is the first time that
any international agreement has specified that
the murder or kidnapping of representatives of
states are not to be considered as political
offenses whose perpetrators are sheltered by
asylum. The convention is open to accession by
states outside the hemisphere, and it is our hope
that eventually all American states and many
others will accede to it or accept its principles
as international law. The general acceptance of
these principles by the international community,
we believe, could be a moral deterrent to this
class of crime.

We regret very much that six Republics in the
hemisphere left the meeting and were not on
hand to sign the final act. However, it should be
pointed out that they did not leave because they
object to the principle stated in the convention,
but because they believed additional matters
should have been covered by the same convention.
There is no difference between the 13 states that
signed and the six who were absent on the prop-
osition that crimes against foreign officials are
common crimes and not political offenses.

I should like to add, as the United States delege-
tated last night, that we are not indifferent
to other acts of terrorism that trouble some of
our Republics and that we regard this conven-
tion as a first step. It is our hope that the six
states will accede to this convention and, build-
ing on that basis, collaborate with the other
members of the OAS in the further development
of international law in this area.

¹ Read to news correspondents by Department
press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey on Feb. 3.

consider effective, under their own laws, and especially
those established in this convention, to prevent and
punish acts of terrorism, especially kidnapping, mur-
der, and other assaults against the life or physical
integrity of those persons to whom the state has the
duty according to international law to give special
protection, as well as extortion in connection with
those crimes.

Article 2

For the purposes of this convention, kidnapping,
murder, and other assaults against the life or personal
integrity of those persons to whom the state has the
duty to give special protection according to interna-
tional law, as well as extortion in connection with those
crimes, shall be considered common crimes of interna-
tional significance, regardless of motive.

February 22, 1971

231

Article 3

Persons who have been charged or convicted for any
of the crimes referred to in Article 2 of this Convention
shall be subject to extradition under the provisions of
the extradition treaties in force between the parties
or, in the case of states that do not make extradition
dependent on the existence of a treaty, in accordance
with their own laws.

In any case, it is the exclusive responsibility of the
state under whose jurisdiction or protection such
persons are located to determine the nature of the acts
and decide whether the standards of this convention
are applicable.

Article 4

Any person deprived of his freedom through the ap-
plication of this convention shall enjoy the legal guar-
antees of due process.

Article 5

When extradition requested for one of the crimes
specified in Article 2 is not in order because the person
sought is a national of the requested state, or because
of some other legal or constitutional impediment, that
state is obliged to submit the case to its competent
authorities for prosecution, as if the act had been
committed in its territory. The decision of these au-
thorities shall be communicated to the state that
requested extradition. In such proceedings, the obliga-
tion established in Article 4 shall be respected.

Article 6

None of the provisions of this convention shall be
interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum.

Article 7

The contracting states undertake to include the
crimes referred to in Article 2 of this convention among
the punishable acts giving rise to extradition in any
treaty on the subject to which they agree among them-
selves in the future. The contracting states that do
not subject extradition to the existence of a treaty with
the requesting state shall consider the crimes referred
to in Article 2 of this convention as crimes giving rise
to extradition, according to the conditions established
by the laws of the requested state.

Article 8

To cooperate in preventing and punishing the crimes
contemplated in Article 2 of this convention, the con-
tracting states accept the following obligations:

a. To take all measures within their power, and in
conformity with their own laws, to prevent and impede
the preparation in their respective territories of the
crimes mentioned in Article 2 that are to be carried
out in the territory of another contracting state.

b. To exchange information and consider effective
administrative measures for the purpose of protecting
the persons to whom Article 2 of this convention refers.

c. To guarantee to every person deprived of his
freedom through the application of this convention
every right to defend himself.

d. To endeavor to have the criminal acts contem-
plated in this convention included in their penal laws,
if not already so included.

e. To comply most expeditiously with the requests
for extradition concerning the criminal acts contem-
plated in this convention.

Article 9

This convention shall remain open for signature by
the member states of the Organization of American
States, as well as by any other state that is a member
of the United Nations or any of its specialized agen-
cies, or any state that is a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, or any other state that
may be invited by the General Assembly of the Orga-
nization of American States to sign it.

Article 10

This convention shall be ratified by the signatory
states in accordance with their respective constitu-
tional procedures.

Article 11

The original instrument of this convention, the Eng-
lish, French, Portuguese, and Spanish texts of which
are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Organization of American
States, which shall send certified copies to the signa-
tory governments for purposes of ratification. The in-
struments of ratification shall be deposited in the
General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States, which shall notify the signatory governments of
such deposit.

Article 12

This convention shall enter into force among the
states that ratify it when they deposit their respective
instruments of ratification.

Article 13

This convention shall remain in force indefinitely,
but any of the contracting states may denounce it. The
denunciation shall be transmitted to the General Sec-
retariat of the Organization of American States, which
shall notify the other contracting states thereof. One
year following the denunciation, the convention shall
cease to be in force for the denouncing state, but shall
continue to be in force for the other contracting states.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned plenipotentiaries, having presented their full powers, which have been found to be in due and proper form, sign this

232

Department of State Bulletin

convention on behalf of their respective governments,
at the city of Washington this second day of February
of the year one thousand nine hundred seventy-one.

STATEMENT OF PANAMA

The Delegation of Panama states for the record that
nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted to the
effect that the right of asylum implies the right to re-
quest asylum from the United States authorities in the
Panama Canal Zone, or that there is recognition of
the right of the United States to grant asylum or
political refuge in that part of the territory of the Re-
public of Panama that constitutes the Canal Zone.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>6</sup>

INSTRUCTION TO THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION TO STUDY MATTERS PERTAINING TO TERRORISM, ASSAULTS AGAINST PERSONS, AND EXTORTION RELATING TO THOSE CRIMES

WHEREAS:

The General Assembly, on June 30, 1970, in its first
special session, unanimously approved Resolution 4
which strongly condemned acts of terrorism, especially
the kidnapping of persons and extortion in connection
with that crime, as crimes against humanity, and de-
clared that such acts constitute serious common
crimes;

In the same resolution, the General Assembly
charged the Inter-American Juridical Committee with
preparing an opinion on the procedures and measures
necessary to make effective the purposes of the reso-
lution (paragraph 6), and with preparing one or more
draft inter-American instruments on kidnapping, ex-
tortion, and other assaults against persons in cases in
which these acts may have repercussions on interna-
tional relations (paragraph 7);

The Inter-American Juridical Committee, at the spe-
cial meeting held from August 31 to October 6, 1970,
prepared an opinion, a draft resolution and a draft
convention with an accompanying statement of rea-
sons, pursuant to the instructions given it by the Gen-
eral Assembly;

The Permanent Council, in referring to Article 3 of
the draft convention in its observations on the docu-
ments prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee, said: "... those delegations [noted] that the
Committee had made it clear in its opinion that con-
sideration had been given to the desirability of pre-
senting a single instrument—as was finally done—or
presenting two or more instruments which would give
separate treatment to the kidnapping of diplomats and

other officials, on the one hand, and to the kidnapping
of or other assaults against persons, on the other hand.
They added that the Committee had accordingly taken
care in its draft to see that the corresponding provi-
sions were presented separately, in different articles, in
case 'the General Assembly or specialized conference
... should decide to eliminate articles 3 and 4' of the
draft (see Statement of Reasons, paragraph 3, p. 23)"
(AG/doc. 71, p. 11);

The General Assembly, at its present special session,
has approved a "Convention to Prevent and Punish
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against
Persons and Related Extortion That are of Inter-
national Significance," which adopts standards on
terrorism, especially kidnapping, murder, and other
assaults against the life or physical integrity of those
persons to whom the state has the duty according to
international law to give special protection as well as
extortion in connection with those crimes.

The seriousness and complexity of the problem of
terrorism, as well as the intention of the member states
to continue studying the progressive legal regulation of
those aspects of the problem that have not been dealt
with in the convention, have been made manifest
through the deliberations of this special session of the
Assembly,

It is appropriate to reaffirm the principle that the
maintenance of order and internal security is the re-
sponsibility of each state, and likewise to reaffirm the
need for cooperation among the states for the purpose
of prevention and punishment of crimes of interna-
tional significance; and

It is appropriate to reaffirm the full force of the
institution of asylum and of the principles upon which
that institution is based,

THE THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,

RESOLVES:

1. To instruct the Permanent Council to study the matters pertaining to progressive international cooperation in the prevention and punishment of acts of terrorism, especially kidnapping and other assaults against persons, together with extortion relating to those crimes, that are of international significance, as regards those aspects that have not yet been covered by the Convention approved at this third special session of the General Assembly, nor by other treaties; to this end, it shall take into account the aims and purposes of Resolution 4 of June 30, 1970 of the General Assembly, the documents prepared by the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the observations presented by the Permanent Council to the Assembly, the drafts presented during this special session of the Assembly, the opinions stated during the session, and the observations made by the member states.

2. To request the Permanent Council of the Orga-

⁶ OAS doc. AG/90; approved by the Assembly on
Feb. 2 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions.

February 22, 1971

233

JANUARY 29, 1971

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

NO. 23

SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE, JANUARY 29, 1971

Following is the transcript of Secretary of State
William P. Rogers' News Conference, which is authorized
for direct quotation:

SECRETARY ROGERS: Ladies and Gentlemen, I thought if it was agreeable to you that we might start at least with the same format that we had at the last press conference and see how it works. I thought it worked reasonably well. I hope you did. There were some complaints about the fact that I seemed to call on the same people several times. I will try to avoid that today and see if I can be a little fairer.

First question?

Q Mr. Secretary, to what limits is the United
States prepared to go in fighting for the defense of
Cambodia?

A The United States is not fighting for the
defense of Cambodia. The United States is fighting to
protect the American forces in South Vie+-Nam. Now, in
that connection, we are prepared to use air power to the
fullest possible extent necessary to protect American
lives. And the principal objective of the United States
as far as Cambodia is concerned is to prevent the enemy
from re-establishing its base areas in Cambodia which it
can use against American forces.

PR 23

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Now, one of the reasons there is some confusion about this is obviously because we have that objective and Cambodia has an objective which is similar. We have a common enemy, common objectives. Then when we perform a military action such as the Route 4 action, we benefit both Cambodia and the United States. But our objective is to prevent the enemy from re-establishing the sanctuaries in Cambodia which they used for so long against American forces.

Q Mr. Secretary, does this in effect, though, extend U.S. air power, and certainly on occasion, as it has in the past, U.S. close support throughout Cambodia?

A The President has said repeatedly that he will use air power as he thinks necessary to protect American forces. Now, the principal use of that air power will be near the sanctuary areas, but there is no limit on it, and we don't see any reason why there should be any limit on the use of that air power. He intends to use the air power as he sees fit against enemy forces, against enemy supplies, against enemy communications, and to prevent the enemy from re-establishing those base areas.

Now, we don't have to wait in that connection. We

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PR 23

understandable interest in the fish, because it's a
very important part of their economy.

We have other problems in the world; and
if we accepted the 200-mile territorial jurisdiction
which they claim, it would be a very serious matter
for the United States in many parts of the world. So
we are going to see if we can work out some modus vivendi
which will eventually lead to a resolution of this
controversy. We are going to suggest that the matter
be referred to the International Court of Justice, and
we are going to propose a conference in the United
Nations dealing with the law of the sea to see if we
can work these things out by agreement. But it's quite
clear that if the nations in the world asserted a
territorial jurisdiction of 200 miles, it would create
havoc.

Q Mr. Secretary, could we change the
subject to the Middle East, please?

A Yes.

Q Could you tell us what your assessment
of the present situation is as it regards the end of the
cease-fire in February, and could you give us the basis

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for your assessment?

A Yes. We're encouraged by the developments
in recent weeks. We are convinced that the parties
may be on the verge of actually entering into serious
negotiations. By and large, the exchange of the
documents has been non-polemical and there is, I think,
a growing awareness of the serious need to resolve
this conflict by negotiations. Secondly, we think that
the controversy has gotten to the point now where a mere
exchange of papers is not the best way to proceed; and
we think that negotiations should now take part on a
more active basis, possibly over an extended period
of time, with oral exchanges in private sessions.

We are very much encouraged by the very
constructive attitude of Ambassador Jarring. He's
been working diligently, effectively, with the parties,
and by the action of the Secretary-General. We would
hope that their actions will result in an extension
of the cease-fire, because we think it's time now for the
parties to discuss these matters without any outside
interference, without any threat of deadlines, in a quiet

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atmosphere. So we are encouraged by what's
happened.

We do hope that the process will continue.
We are working quietly behind the scenes. We
think this is the time for quiet diplomacy and military
restraint.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to go back to --

A Excuse me. I'll come right to you. I
told this young lady I'd --

Q Could you tell us, with this dispute
with Ecuador, why the United States shipping vessels don't
get a permit with a product, to fish inside the 200 miles?

A Well, the reason for that is if we as
a Government acknowledged the right of another nation
to assert its territorial sovereignty 200 miles out
into the ocean, we'd be accepting that as a permissible
international law. We do not. We reject that. We don't
think that any nation has that authority, and that's
the reason we don't do it.

We'd like to work out, as I say, some modus
vivendi to resolve this dispute.

Chalmers -- sorry.

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Q Mr. Secretary, if we could return to the question that Marvin Kalb raised at the outset, what would be this government's view of any cross-border strikes by South Vietnamese troops into Southern Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail? And is any such activity anticipated in the near future?

A Well, as I said, I wouldn't want to answer a hypothetical question.

Let me say the answer to the first part of your question is: It would depend on the circumstances; it would depend on what the purposes were and all the other things that would be involved.

Q You would not rule it out?

A We do not rule out the use of air power to support Asians in any effort that they make to fight a common enemy. There is one enemy in Viet-Nam -- I mean one enemy in Indo-China. That's North Viet-Nam, and it is invading Laos, and Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam. And the Asians are fighting that common enemy, and we are going to provide whatever air power is necessary to protect our men while we are withdrawing from South Viet-Nam.

Q Mr. Secretary, with reference to your

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comment about your hope that the negotiations on the
Middle East may take a more active basis with oral
exchanges, are you envisioning direct face-to-face talks
between Israelis and their Arab neighbors in New York,
or somewhere else?

A. No, I am not talking about face-to-face;
I am talking about the talks under Ambassador Jarring's
auspices, but you don't have to have face-to-face
negotiations to be more active in your discussions.
I think discussions up to this point have consisted
largely of exchange of views on paper.

And although that is helpful to provide determined areas
of agreement, it is not very useful when it comes to
resolving the tough questions that remain.

Now the fact is that the exchange of documents
that have occurred recently under Ambassador Jarring's
auspices have provided areas of agreement. And we would
hope that the parties would use those areas of agreement
as a foundation upon which to discuss the areas of
disagreement that remain. And we think that the way
to discuss those areas of disagreement is to do it
actively and not be tied down to exchanging views on paper.

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Q Mr. Secretary, may I follow that up?

A No. Just a second.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I change the subject again?

A Yes.

Q There were 13 talks on Berlin since last March with the result of virtually nothing. Can you tell us what the chances are to reach agreement?

A No, I don't believe I can add much to what is common knowledge. As you can see, there has not been much progress and I was interested to see that Chancelor Brandt reaffirmed his position, which he has stated several times in the past, that there could be no ratification of the Treaty between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic until there was a satisfactory solution to the problem of Berlin. Recent harassments certainly are not conducive to a satisfactory solution. We would hope that those harassments will stop.

Marilyn.

Q Thank you.

When you speak of more active talks on the

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Middle East, would you see returning to a Rhodes'-type formula? And, if so, what is your definition of a Rhodes'-type negotiation?

A. No, we would not see a return to the Rhodes'-type formula. We would expect that the present Jarring-type formula would continue in existence. That is the essential part of our initiative. It has worked quite successfully so far, and we hope it will continue to. You have to keep in mind that we proposed that the parties stop fighting and start talking.

Now they have done both of those things, and our initiative provides how the procedures can be worked out. We are giving Ambassador Jarring the authority to work out the procedures -- times and places, and so forth, consistent with what he thinks will further the negotiations. We would hope that that process continues.

Q. Could you be more specific, sir, about the areas of agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis?

A. No, I don't want to go into all of them, but I can give you a couple of examples: A year ago, Israel resisted the use of the word "withdrawal." And the Arabs said, "Why doesn't Israel use the word 'withdrawal'?" They concluded from that Israel had no intention of

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withdrawing at all from any territory. So that was a
principal hurdle.

Israel said, "The Egyptians have no interest
and willingness to recognize us as a sovereign
nation because they will never say that they recognize
Israel's right to exist." They said, "Egypt will use
the words 'All the states in the area have a right to
exist but not Israel.'"

Well, as a result of the initiative that we have
taken, Israel used the word "withdrawal" to secure
and recognized boundaries as provided in the Security
Council Resolution. Egypt, on the other hand, indicated
a willingness to recognize the sovereign right of Israel
to exist as a nation.

Then, there are other areas of agreement. I
won't go into all of them. Those are two that are public
knowledge. But there are other areas where there is
substantial agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary --

A [Indicating another correspondent] Let
me get someone there.

Q Mr. Secretary, has the United States recently

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #920

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:52 A.M. EST

FEBRUARY 10, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President's schedule for today has been posted. There is one addition today. At noon today the President will meet with Secretary Richardson, Sidney Marland, who is Commissioner of Education at HEW, John Ehrlichman, and George Shultz. They will be discussing the education proposal which the President will submit to the Congress as a part of special revenue-sharing. That is an addition to the schedule. That meeting will take place at 12:00 noon.

We will make available here at the press office at 3 o'clock today the report on independent regulatory agencies which was compiled by the Ash Council. The report and a statement by the President concerning the report will be for release at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday. In other words, it is for p.m. papers on Thursday. It is a rather thick report, so you will want to take time to read it.

Q What is the reason for that odd 9:00 a.m. hour?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is P.M. release.

Q 6:30?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am sorry, the typewriter inverted the 6. (Laughter.)

Q Since that will take a lot of reading, could you make it available earlier than 3:00?

MR. ZIEGLER: We won't have them over here before then. So it will be available here at 3:00 and it will be for normal p.m. release on Thursday.

Q Briefing?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will not have a briefing on it, as such. We will have a fact sheet and a statement by the President. Also, Roger Cramton, the Chairman of the Administrative Conference, will be here to take questions on it which you may have, at the 4 o'clock briefing.

Q How about somebody from the Ash Council?

MR. ZIEGLER: No one was available.

Q Ash is in town himself making a speech at the Press Club.

MR. ZIEGLER: He was not available to do this.

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the ground into Laos during the past few days.

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't have the details of the Friedheim briefing this morning, but I am sure he addressed that from there. All I can tell you is that our policy is that there will be no U.S. ground combat forces, and there will be no advisers committed to Laos.

That is our policy. It will be followed. It is being followed. But in relation to that report from a soldier in the field, I think DOD would be the one who is checking into that and would answer that question.

But our policy is, and I can assure you that it is being followed, and will be followed, that there will be no U.S. ground forces or advisers involved in the Laotian operation.

Q Ron, you said in recent days that this government is keeping track of the Lockheed-Rolls Royce situation. Could you narrow that down a little bit and tell us what department or what agency, what person is maintaining this surveillance?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I am just not prepared to give any additional details to you on that.

Q Is there any view from the President on the developments in the Middle East? Is there anything you can tell us about his reaction?

MR. ZIEGLER: I really don't have a comment to give you on that. Of course, we obviously favor an extension and continuation of the ceasefire. But as Secretary Rogers has often said, and he said it very recently, this is a time that quiet diplomacy is the most effective diplomacy. So I will follow that guideline which he has set forth.

Q Do you not expect a news conference this week?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, we don't.

Q Do you expect any news down in Florida?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will have some announcements in Florida, John. But I don't expect anything out of the ordinary in terms of a big story or anything of that sort. At least I don't expect that at this time.

Q Ron, Vice President Ky in Saigon is being quoted as saying that the South Vietnamese might strike across the 17th Parallel at supply bases. Is this a trial balloon, is this something that has been proposed, or is this something that has been discussed in any shape or form with the U.S. Government?

MR. ZIEGLER: I just would have no comment on Vice President Ky's speech, which I believe he made yesterday. We have stated, I think quite clearly, the scope of our support of the ARVN operation and I believe President Thieu has made quite clear the scope of the ARVN operation

MORE #920

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #921

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

4:13 P.M. EST

FEBRUARY 10, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. WARREN: You have the report of the Ash Council. As Ron said this morning, we plan no briefing on that. I think the report itself is quite detailed.

You also have a statement by the President in which he calls for comments of vigorous public discussion on this issue of the independent regulatory agencies.

The President, as he says in his statement, has made no final decisions. He has asked the Ash Council staff to solicit comments from the broadest range of groups and individuals concerned and affected.

I have asked to come in this afternoon to take questions that they may be able to take or want to take, Mr. Roger Cramton, Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States. I have asked Mr. Cramton in because it is this Conference which pays special attention to the administrative procedures and legal procedures in this area. He would, of course, know the history of the agencies and some of the difficulties that they have been facing in recent years.

Also, Jim Finch, Deputy Director of the Ash Council staff, is here for any technical questions that anyone might have on the compiling of this report. So if there are any questions, we will be happy to take them now.

Q Jerry, I am not clear whether this is release for 9:00 or 6:30 a.m.

MR. WARREN: Thank you for asking, John. It is for release at 6:00 a.m. It is for p.m.s release tomorrow. The same typewriter that inverted Ron's 9 this morning inverted the 9 on these reports and releases you have. So it is for p.m. release on Thursday.

If we could move along. The schedule for tomorrow has been posted, I believe. If not, it will be shortly. The signing of the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds and sub-soil thereof, in other words, the Seabeds Treaty, will be at 9:30 a.m., as we have previously announced, at the State Department. That will be in the International Conference Room at the State Department. Secretary Rogers will be the signatory for the United States. The President will participate and make brief remarks.

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Q Jerry, who is it who calls from the White House to offices of Members of Congress and the Senate to invite them to these Democratic Congressional breakfasts?

MR. WARREN: I don't really know. I would assume it would be someone in Bill Timmon's office or Clark MagGregor's office.

Q Do you think you could find out for us why it was when they called to invite them to the breakfast this morning that they told at least five of them that it was for a breakfast which the President was giving in honor of Governor Connally and they did not tell them that it was a Democratic Congressional breakfast to hear the views of the Administration on its new proposals?

MR. WARREN: I will see if that is the case and see what I can tell you.

Q I would like to have the name of the person who did this.

MR. WARREN: I don't know that I would give you that. (Laughter) I think it was some of the secretaries.

Q Were they instructed by you people to do this?

MR. WARREN: No, not by me, Sarah. (Laughter)

Q Of course, you know I don't expect it to be. But this was a misapprehension that some of the Members came in for this and they didn't know it until they got here today. They were a little bit upset.

MR. WARREN: Ron announced yesterday morning that this breakfast was for the similar purpose that the Republican breakfasts were for.

Q I am well aware of that. That is why I am puzzled as to why at least five of them got called saying this was a breakfast in honor of Governor Connally.

MR. WARREN: Governor Connally was there.

Thank you, Sarah. I will look into that.

Q Is Secretary of State Rogers going to Florida with the President?

MR. WARREN: Yes.

Q Will he be working on the State of the World?

MR. WARREN: Yes, he will be.

Q Jerry, have you announced here -- you may have and I have missed it -- a policy we have as to what we do about our allies in case they are cut off from oil supplies?

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MR. WARREN: I don't know that that particular question has come up here.

Q It must have come up in the White House.

MR. WARREN: It might have come up at State. I don't know that it has come up here.

Q It is getting to be a pretty serious question.

MR. WARREN: The State Department, of course, is very interested in that question. But I would have nothing for you from here.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Jerry.

END (AT 4:41 P.M. EST)

Assistant Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on the
Columbia Broadcasting System's television and
radio program "Face the Nation" on Febru-
ary 14. The interviewers were George Herman
and Marvin Kalb of CBS News and Henry L.
Trewhitt of Newsweek magazine.

Mr. Herman: Secretary Sisco, reports from
Israel this morning say the Israelis consider
U.N. Ambassador Jarring's latest set of ques-
tions to be in fact a set of thinly disguised
substantive proposals. Do you agree with this
evaluation?

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Herman, Ambassador Jarring is mandated by the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, to promote an agreement between the two sides.¹ We feel he has a very broad mandate, and he is acting strictly in accord with that mandate.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Sisco, I take it that the answer was not exactly no. Is it yes—that these are in fact some kind of proposals that are being put to the Israelis and the Egyptians on the behalf of the U.N.?

Mr. Sisco: I'm not, of course, going to get into
the specifics of the discussions between the par-
ties under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. I will
say this—that Ambassador Jarring is now get-
ting at the very crucial questions that have long
divided the Arabs and the Israelis. We think
these talks have reached an important stage.
We think that there are difficult decisions to be
made for both sides, and we hope that both sides
will respond positively, because we think that
this is an important stage.

Mr. Trewhitt: Mr. Sisco, do you think it per-
haps possible that the Israelis are less opposed
to this kind of role for Mr. Jarring than they
were in the past? I seem to detect that sort of
note in Mrs. Meir's speech last week.

Mr. Sisco: Well, first of all, Henry, I would
recall that last June the Israelis accepted the
American initiative, and as part of that pro-
posal the Israelis as well as the U.A.R. and
Jordan committed themselves to abide by what-
ever procedures Ambassador Jarring decided
to pursue his mandate. And as I say, this, cou-
pled with the Security Council resolution, we
feel gives Ambassador Jarring very wide
latitude indeed.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Sisco, you said that he has this
wide latitude. Do you see Ambassador Jarring
as a mediator or as a negotiator?

Mr. Sisco: I think in the broadest sense his job
is, in the words of the resolution, to try to pro-
mote an agreement between the two parties. He
has explored various ideas over the months, and
these talks at this stage are reaching some of the
core questions. He is free under that resolution
to take as little and as much initiative as he
desires, and I think that one of the problems has
been that neither side has been willing really
to take the kind of decision and take the kind
of initiative which would give assurance to the
other. There are two principal concerns, Mar-
vin, as you know. The question of whether in
fact the Arabs want to make peace with Israel—
this has been a fundamental concern of the Is-
raelis. And in turn the Arabs have been con-
cerned with the whole question of withdrawal.
And I'm not revealing any secrets when I say
that these are the two key issues that are being
addressed at the present time.

Mr. Trewhitt: Would you pursue that, Mr.

¹ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

March 8, 1971

291

Secretary? One has the feeling that there has been considerable movement in the last year; yet it's terribly hard to pin down the specifics. Would you take a look at those core issues you mentioned and suggest to us what changes have occurred in the last few months?

Mr. Sisco: Well, yes. Before I do that, Henry, let me say this—that you mentioned, for example, that a year ago the situation was considerably different than it is today. For example, in looking back, the situation along the Egyptian-Israeli border, for example, there were incidents, exchanges of fire, a great deal of tension. The efforts of diplomacy were at an impasse. The situation in Jordan was quite shaky. The fedayeen were expressing themselves in very strong terms in favor of a forceful solution. Now, it was in these circumstances that Secretary Rogers, with the full backing of President Nixon, decided on the American initiative of last June. Now, that initiative was a very simple one, in order to get the parties to stop shooting and start talking. And we feel that as a result of President Nixon's initiative, the situation today affords an opportunity for both sides which did not exist a year ago. We are now in the seventh month of the cease-fire. Ambassador Jarring's efforts in the context of negotiations between the parties are focusing on the key issues.

The situation in Jordan, while we will see from time to time that incidents will occur, but the situation in Jordan is much better today than it was a year ago. And King Hussein has embarked upon a policy of reconciliation and reconstruction; and even in the fedayeen movement itself there are some very modest signs— and I don't want to overdramatize this—that at least some Palestinians are thinking about the notion of a political solution based on the idea of coexistence with Israel. So that the American initiative of last June, in our judgment, was the principal catalyst, and we think the situation is improved. There are many, many risks that are still there, but at least the minimal conditions are prevalent, in a nonshooting context, whereby Ambassador Jarring can pursue private diplomacy with the parties.

Mr. Kalb: Do you think the time is near when

Ambassador Jarring will be able to sit down with the Israelis and the Egyptians in one room and discuss these issues?

Mr. Sisco: In accepting the American initiative of last June, it was stated quite specifically that Ambassador Jarring would decide what procedures he would utilize. In my judgment, both parties are committed to abide by whatever procedures Ambassador Jarring decides to pursue and no procedure is barred, and I think this is a judgment which Ambassador Jarring will have to make, dependent upon the progress in the negotiations.

Mr. Kalb: Well, I mean do you think so, though?

Mr. Sisco: We definitely—

Mr. Kalb: What does the State Department think?

Mr. Sisco: We definitely feel that no procedure is barred. At the moment the discussions are indirect, under his auspices.

Mr. Herman: When Ambassador Jarring makes, in any form, under whatever procedure he wishes to, proposals to both sides, have these proposals been discussed with the Big Four, the Big Two, with the United States, specifically with your office?

Mr. Sisco: Ambassador Jarring is conducting the negotiations. Obviously he is in consultation with not only the major powers and the principal parties but a number of other U.N. members and the Secretary General himself.

Yes, he is consulted with, broadly across the board, but whatever ideas he's discussing are his own; he is the man who is conducting the negotiations.

Mr. Herman: If you do not approve of them, if you think there's something wrong, you are presumed free to tell him so. It's his discussion.

Mr. Sisco: We're not trying to second-guess the negotiations. Our objective is to give support to Ambassador Jarring's efforts. Our role is to encourage both sides to try to make the painful compromises that are going to be required in order to achieve a peace settlement. I've said on previous occasions that neither

292

Department of State Bulletin

side can expect to achieve their maximum positions. I believe that the talks have reached a stage where some of the painful decisions really have to be made. It is time for a decision.

**Mr. Herman:** Well, if you think that the American initiative of last June was the catalyst, is there a second-step catalyst in sight—for the United States to make some new move, some new helping hand that we should be contributing at this point or in the near future?

**Mr. Sisco:** No, the central process of negotiation is going on under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. We will help; we will try to encourage the parties; but the negotiations are in his hands.

**Mr. Trewhitt:** Mr. Sisco, did—isn't actually the United States, in an indirect sense, taking a form of initiative by agreeing in the Big Four discussions to discuss supplemental guarantees for whatever sort of peace might be reached in the Middle East?

**Mr. Sisco:** Yes, we have agreed to begin preliminary talks on the question of supplementary guarantees. However, let me make clear that the principal focus of the effort has to be the negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. The discussions of supplementary guarantees in the Four cannot be a substitute for negotiations. Guarantees cannot be a substitute for a peace agreement between the parties. The principal element of security for both sides must be a binding peace agreement.

**Mr. Kalb:** Mr. Sisco, Secretary Rogers stated—and I think I'm quoting you correctly—the parties themselves are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of security arrangements. Now, why are we the Big Four even getting into this kind of an operation?

**Mr. Sisco:** For this reason—first of all, because the Big Four have a direct interest in this matter, and in particular the United States. Here is a situation where there is very heavy Soviet involvement. We feel that the Middle East today is perhaps the most dangerous area in the world. Now, we feel quite strongly that the Four cannot substitute themselves for the

parties, that Big Four guarantees cannot be a substitute for the primary reliance of the parties upon themselves. But if a common understanding can be achieved on guarantees by the Four, it would add, as a minimum, an important psychological and political support of the agreement between the parties.

**Mr. Kalb:** Isn't "pressure" a better word than "support"? I mean, doesn't this—the Big Four stand there and negotiate this thing, and the little powers underneath with this above them I would imagine could feel only pressure, not support.

**Mr. Sisco:** On the contrary, the discussions as they relate to guarantees are very general at this stage. Moreover, before the Four could in any way come to any concrete judgments, it's going to be necessary to know just what is to be guaranteed, and that's another way of saying that in the first instance a peace agreement has to be negotiated by the parties themselves and the question of guarantees can only be supplementary and can only add in a marginal sort of way.

**Mr. Herman:** What's the climate? What's the status of the negotiations among the Big Four? Is there a climate that the Soviet Union, for example, would like to see total stability in the Middle East rather than the unbalanced situation which they've been apparently so fond of?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, first of all, I wouldn't say that there are negotiations going on between the Four. I think there are general discussions. Insofar as the Soviet attitude is concerned, I would say this. We feel that we and the Soviets have a common interest in avoiding a confrontation over this area. We have the impression that the Soviets would be as concerned as we would be in the event the Middle East were to break out into a broad hostility once again.

Where we have had reservations about the Soviet attitude is whether in fact they are willing to put their full weight behind a stable peace settlement. And in this connection, let me say this—that we feel that from the point of view of the United States there is only one real answer, a peace agreement that meets the legit-

March 8, 1971

293

imate concerns of both sides. And President Nixon has embarked upon a policy of active diplomacy simply because there is such an inherent and high degree of risk in this area. We would be remiss if we didn't pursue all avenues of diplomacy.

Mr. Trewhitt: Mr. Secretary, look at the other side of that coin for a second. You speak of American interests in the—and the common Soviet-American interest in avoiding confrontation. But do you believe that the Soviet Union has made a fundamental decision that they can preserve their interest in the Middle East during a situation of general stability between the Arabs and the Israelis?

Mr. Sisco: Henry, it's very difficult to say. What the Soviet Union has to weigh is what unilateral advantage it may feel it can derive from the turmoil against the risk that this situation could get out of control. And that is the crucial factor, insofar as we're concerned, as to what has to be weighed in a given instance in the Middle East.

We feel quite strongly that stability is required. We feel that the parties need to take risks for peace, and we think that these risks are in the mutual interest of not only the parties in the area but the major powers as well because a situation which is as unstable as the Middle East has been over the last 3 years, is one with—which is obviously rife with difficulty and very risky indeed.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Sisco, do you feel that Egypt at this point is a thoroughly sovereign state or in part a Soviet protectorate?

Mr. Sisco: Well, first of all, we're impressed with the fact that following the death of President Nasser, the new leadership was able to succeed into power without any instability having occurred in the country. Secondly, we're equally impressed that the new leadership promptly announced basically the continuation of the policy of trying to achieve a political solution pursuant to the U.N. Security Council's resolution of November 1967. We do feel that it is sovereign; we do feel that it is in a position to take the decisions in order to achieve a peace settlement.

Mr. Herman: The cease-fire, which has just

barely been agreed to, or at least that's the impression that was given, expires in 3 weeks—on March 7. One of the conditions is that there—at least as imposed by Cairo—that there be some signs of progress, of motion, by that time. Is 3 weeks enough time so that we will see some signs of motion, enough to please the Egyptians?

Mr. Sisco: Well, George, we regret the short deadline very much. We would have strongly preferred a longer extension. And as you say, this is the seventh month of the cease-fire that really began with the American initiative last June. Three weeks is a short time; we think these deadlines do not facilitate either agreement or facilitate negotiations. On the other hand, there is this time, and I think this is one of the reasons why Ambassador Jarring is pursuing the matter quite vigorously.

Mr. Herman: If you were a betting man, would you put some money down that there would be another extension, that there will be some progress?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I am always cautiously optimistic by nature—

Mr. Herman: I seem to have heard that word from the State Department before.

Mr. Sisco: Well, I borrowed it at the moment from U.N. Secretary General Thant. But you see, in this problem on the Middle East one has to take it on a day-by-day basis, and I can recall a year ago the expressions of doom and gloom. And here today I think there is—without again overdrawing it—an opportunity. There is an opportunity to make progress which may not be in existence 3 months from now, 6 months from now, a year from now. And I think that the question of building a peace in the Middle East is a step-by-step process, building block by building block.

Mr. Trewhitt: Mr. Secretary, the Israelis have pretty generally held out for the proposition that they would not take partial measures toward a settlement outside of a broad framework of settlement. Yet in the last week—the last couple of weeks—we've heard a great deal of discussion of details, of specifics. And now

294

Department of State Bulletin

we have this very, very specific matter of the
possibility of reopening the Suez Canal. Has
the thinking in Washington changed on that,
on that possibility of partial agreements leading
to a broader agreement?

Mr. Sisco: Well, first of all, let me say that
the—in our judgment—the statement made by
President Sadat last week, and the statement
made by Prime Minister Meir, leave the door
open. We don't feel that any doors have been
closed with respect to a proposal to open the
Suez Canal.

Our position has long been that the problem
of the Suez Canal was really one of the key
elements of an overall settlement. There is now
some indication on the part of both sides to
consider this matter as at least an initial step.
Our own feeling is this—that any step that the
two sides can agree to, that will help diminish
tension, any step that will be a step toward a
peaceful settlement, we would have a positive
attitude on such a step.

Mr. Kalb: Including a partial Israeli roll-
back from the Suez Canal?

Mr. Sisco: Well again, I'm not going to be
very specific, because actually what all of us
have to go on are largely the two public state-
ments that have been made by the leaders of
the U.A.R. and Israel.

Mr. Kalb: We assume that you're in pretty
close touch with the Egyptians and the Israelis,
much more than we are.

Mr. Sisco: Oh, I think that's a fair assumption, but I would merely add, Marvin, that we've not made any judgment with respect to the specifics. All that I'm saying is that this matter, as the Secretary said the other day, rests with the parties. And if the parties desire to explore this further, if they're able to achieve a common understanding, our attitude would be positive.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, included in your
area, apparently in the State Department's
definition of the Near East, is the country of
Greece. A number of my friends would like
very much to visit there but they don't want to
give any money to the military dictatorship.
When will they be able to go to Greece?

Mr. Sisco: Well, of course, they are free to
go to Greece at any time, but let me just say a
word about our policy on Greece. First of all,
candidly, we have been disappointed in the fact
that there hasn't been more progress toward the
establishment of parliamentary government.
On the other hand—

Mr. Herman: Are you surprised?

Mr. Sisco: —on the other hand, I think one
must bear in mind that Greece is a loyal NATO
ally. The Greek people have a tremendous af-
fection for America and the American people.
Greece is important to the United States as part
of the southern flank of NATO, and we have
really tried to pursue a two-pronged policy;
namely, to support the present leadership in-
sofar as its responsibilities are concerned within
the NATO framework, and we would hope that
more progress in the future can be made toward
the establishment of democratic institutions.

Mr. Kalb: Back on the Middle East, if I
might. Do you see a trip by Secretary Rogers
to that area coming up soon?

Mr. Sisco: There is no immediate trip planned, Marvin. I am sure, as the Secretary has said on several occasions, that if the time comes when such a trip would be useful, I'm sure that he would be quite disposed to go.

Mr. Kalb: I know that that has been said
before, but I was wondering if that, since you
feel that the time is so ripe for decisions,
whether the Secretary feels a trip on his part
there soon, say before March 7—

Mr. Sisco: No, I don't believe so; and as I
say, the principal focus of discussion is under
the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. The
United States is not running the negotiations—
Ambassador Jarring is.

Mr. Trewhitt: Mr. Secretary, would you ad-
dress yourself to the changing military situa-
tion, just briefly. Everyone, I think, assumes
that the situation is more stable than it was
just a few months ago. Do you think there is
a military standoff in the area?

Mr. Sisco: I believe that the situation, mili-
tarily speaking, is such that both sides do not

March 8, 1971

295

want to resume the fighting, and I think that
both sides do not want to resume the fighting
because there is a recognition that such a re-
sumption is 'very likely to be costly to both sides
and not be decisive, if it were to occur.

*Mr. Kalb: When you talk about the Middle East being the most dangerous part of the world, what do you have in mind—a war between Russia and the United States over this area?*

*Mr. Sisco:* I have in mind that there is a
large Soviet presence in the area.

*Mr. Kalb:* How large? Could you tell us that, too?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I again don't want to get into specifics, but I think you can assume that there is a very substantial Soviet presence in the U.A.R. and, by virtue of that presence, if there were an outbreak of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis again, that there is a greater—that there would be a greater risk of confrontation than in the past. We have vital interests in this area, political, economic, and strategic. So has the Soviet Union. And the object of diplomacy is to try to create conditions where the inherent risks of confrontation are diminished. I think I know a little bit about the feeling of the American people in this respect, and I think that the overriding objective is to try to help establish a peace, because confrontation and the possibility of confrontation is a serious risk if this can't be achieved.

*Mr. Herman:* As you know, Congress is chronically unhappy with the lack of consultation—their lack of consultation with the State Department over Southeast Asian affairs. How is consultation between your office and Congress on Middle Eastern affairs? Are they well informed of what you're doing in Israel and—

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, first let me say that I don't
accept the view that there hasn't been ample
consultation, both on the question of Indochina
and certainly on the Middle East as well. We

are in constant touch, and I might add that I
don't believe the Middle Eastern issue is a
partisan issue. I was struck with the fact that
Senator Muskie, just several weeks ago, vis-
ited the area and said quite clearly that he
thought that the policy of the Nixon adminis-
tration was sound. I was equally struck that
Senator Birch Bayh just returned from the
area and made a statement of a very similar
character. I think that there is a bipartisan ap-
proach to the Middle East because all Ameri-
cans want to avoid a war over this area. We are
anguishing in Viet-Nam; the President is en-
gaged, I think, on a very solid policy of dis-
engagement; he is trying to turn over the
responsibilities to the Vietnamese; and I think
that how that situation in Indochina comes out
is very relevant to the Middle East.

If we had adopted a cut-and-run policy in
Viet-Nam, one would have wondered as to what
the other side would have thought as to whether
we would have given the signal that we see what
our vital interests are and are ready to protect
those vital interests. So I think that there is a
direct relationship between the outcome in
Southeast Asia and the situation in the Middle
East, and I happen to think that the President
is on the right track.

*Mr. Herman:* We have about 30 seconds left. Do you think that continuing this policy of withdrawal from South Viet-Nam is going to be all right with the balance of factors that you have mentioned in the Middle East?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I think that the policy of disengagement—

*Mr. Herman:* We are withdrawing.

*Mr. Sisco:* Yes, we are, and I think that the American people are withholding final judgment, and I think that we will know in a year or a year and a half whether this is really successful or not.

*Mr. Herman:* Thank you very much, Mr. Sisco, for being with us here on "Face the Nation."

296

Department of State Bulletin

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#924

AT THE WHITE HOUSE
(Key Biscayne, Florida)

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:35 A.M. EST

FEBRUARY 15, 1971

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President is going to spend most of the day today working on his Foreign Policy Message with the Secretary of State and Henry Kissinger.

We are due to leave for return to Washington sometime this afternoon or early evening. We will post at three o'clock to give you the details of the President's activities today and also the departure time, but as I mentioned earlier, the President has been working this morning in his office, which most of you saw the other day at the photo session, on the final drafts of the Foreign Policy Message.

We have one announcement today: The President is announcing his intention to nominate Pinkney Calvin Walker to be a Member of the Federal Power Commission for the remainder of the term expiring June 22, 1972.

I believe that release is self-explanatory.

There is one correction in the release. Charles Walker, Under Secretary of the Treasury, who is the nominee's brother, is spelled wrong. Take the "e" out of Charles.

Mr. Walker will assume the term that Mr. Bagge held. Mr. Bagge was appointed to the Commission by President Johnson in May of 1965 and reappointed in September of 1967. Mr. Bagge is a Republican also.

We announced his resignation December 7, 1970, and then in Mr. Bagge's letter to the President, he indicated he was resigning to take on the Presidency of the National Coal Commission. So that left open this particular post and Mr. Walker is being appointed to it. The salary is $38,000 a year.

The schedule for tomorrow:

Tomorrow morning at 8 a.m., there will be a Cabinet meeting at the White House.

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Q Was the White House aware of it during his confirmation?

MR. ZIEGLER: Here we get into the type of question and answer thing that is really not appropriate. Mr. Stans and the Department of Commerce are taking questions on it, Bill, and I really have nothing to add. I don't have the details regarding this matter here and I am going to allow the Secretary to respond to questions on this, which he is doing and stating the situation.

Q Ron, is this accurate, the British journalist also said that President Nixon views South Vietnamese military operations in Laos and Cambodia as a test to determine the degree of further U.S. support for South Vietnam and the war.

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not prepared to comment on that particular interview. It has been reported and I have nothing to add to it.

Q You can't say whether it is accurate or not?

MR. ZIEGLER: I just have no comment on it or explanation on the interview to provide you.

Q Does the President intend to give one-to-one interviews with U.S. correspondents as well as foreign correspondents?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will see.

Q Ron, does the President plan to call for wage and price controls in the construction industry?

MR. ZIEGLER: The report of the committee which the President requested be set up at the time of his meeting with representatives of the construction industry and the construction unions is due, I believe, this week sometime. And before that report is presented to the President, I would prefer not to comment on it, but that report, I believe, is due this week.

Q Ron, is there any comment on the oil settlement in Iran?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are pleased that an agreement has been reached and hope it will bring new stability to the world petroleum market.

Q Does the President plan to communicate with or at all acknowledge the meeting of the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO in Miami Beach?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there is no plan for him to address that group.

Q Is he going to send them a letter or at all have any communication with them?

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#925

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

TUESDAY

FEBRUARY 16, 1971

AT 11:25 AM EST

MR. ZIEGLER: The Cabinet meeting this morning lasted from eight o'clock until ten o'clock. Two subjects were discussed: Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers gave a report on the ARVN operation into Laos. Secretary Laird pointed out to the Members of the Cabinet again the objectives of the operation by the ARVN, to disrupt the flow of supplies and staging areas which are being used to support enemy forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Secretary Laird indicated that the operation, Lam Son 719, has been going well. He indicated that there would no doubt be some tough days ahead but that it was going well and was successful up to this point. He felt it would continue to be successful.

The second part of the meeting was a discussion of the President's proposal for a National Health Strategy. The details of this particular piece of legislation are still being worked out and will be submitted to the Congress in the near future. We don't have a date set yet as to when that particular message will be sent to the Congress, but the second half of the Cabinet meeting this morning dealt with a discussion of that particular matter.

Those are all of the announcements that we have today.

The President participated in the Medal of Honor Ceremony this morning. I think we have given you material on that.

Q Where was that, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: In the Residence.

The President's schedule for tomorrow:

The President's schedule for tomorrow will be given to you at four o'clock. It should be firm by that time.

One future item relating to the President's schedule: King Hussan, of Morocco, has accepted President Nixon's invitation to pay a visit to Washington on April 22nd and 23rd. President Nixon last met with the King when he visited Morocco in June of 1967 as a private citizen.

You may recall that an earlier visit was contemplated. However, King Hussan had to postpone that for personal reasons

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until a mutually acceptable date was established. That date
is April 22nd and 23rd of this year.

Q Ron, you mentioned Secretary Rogers and then
left him dangling. Did he say anything at this meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, he did. I am sorry, I didn't
mean to leave that dangling.

Q You know who I mean, don't you? (laughter)

MR. ZIEGLER: The humor is coming from that side of
this room and not this side. I want the record to show that
(laughter)

Q It is a better variety.

MR. ZIEGLER: Could we provide Lisagor with a
microphone from now on? (laughter)

Q Did he speak to the group?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me answer your question if you are
finished answering it. (laughter)

Secretary Rogers did address himself to the ARVN
operation into Laos and also indicated that it was going well.
He indicated that, as President Thieu stated, it was limited
in time and scope, and referred again to the objective of
the operation, as Secretary Laird did. Beyond that there is
really nothing I can provide to you.

Q Did he go into the time or scope?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, he did not.

Q Were all the Cabinet Members there today?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, they were. Don Rumsfeld was
not there. He has Cabinet standing. I will get a list
for you, Sarah, and post that.

Q Would you expand on that reference to Mr. Laird
saying there are some tough days ahead? In what respect -- in
casualties, length of operation, or what?

MR. ZIEGLER: Secretary Laird has referred to that
publicly before. He has made the point --

Q That there are some tough days ahead. I don't
know what you mean by tough days.

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me explain. He was referring to
the fact that there would no doubt be enemy resistance perhaps
to a greater extent than the ARVN have experienced up to
this point as they move along with the operation. He has
said that before publicly.

Q Ron, there have been reports that the Health
Message might go up tomorrow.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is not the case, no, sir.

MORE #925

## President Nixon's News Conference of February 17

Following are excerpts from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the Oval Office at the White House on February 17.

The President: We will make this on the record today. . . . Any questions which you want to ask?

Q. Mr. President, the next logical step in Southeast Asia would seem to be South Vietnamese forces moving into the southern part of North Viet-Nam for the same reasons that they moved into the Laotian Panhandle. Would our policy rule out support for this type of move, air support for it?

The President: Well, I won't speculate on what South Viet-Nam may decide to do with regard to a possible incursion into North Viet-Nam in order to defend their national security. However, I will restate our policy. I stated that policy on November 3¹ and have restated it at least nine different times publicly since that time.

I stated then that at a time we are withdrawing our forces that if I found that the enemy was stepping up its activity through infiltration in a way that would threaten our remaining forces that I would take strong action to deal with the new situation.

On December 10, as you recall, I reiterated that statement and said that this action would include the use of airpower against the infiltration routes, military complex supply depots.²

That is our policy, the policy of the President

taking action if he finds that the North Vietnamese are undertaking actions which threaten our remaining forces in South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. President, under that guide, is there any limit to what we might do to protect our forces in South Viet-Nam?

The President: We have indicated several limits. For example, we are not going to use ground forces in Laos. We are not going to use advisers in Laos with the South Vietnamese forces. We are not going to use ground forces in Cambodia or advisers in Cambodia, as we have previously indicated, and we have no intention, of course, of using ground forces in North Viet-Nam. Those are limitations.

Q. I had reference to our use of airpower.

The President: I am not going to place any limitation upon the use of airpower except, of course, to rule out a rather ridiculous suggestion that is made from time to time—I think the latest by Hans Morgenthau—that our airpower might include the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

As you know, Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], this has been speculated on for a period of 5 years and I have said for a period of 5 years that this is not an area where the use of nuclear weapons, in any form, is either needed or would be wise.

As far as our airpower is concerned, it will be directed against—and I ought to be as precise as I was on December 10—against those military activities which I determine are directed against and thereby threaten our remaining forces in South Viet-Nam.

Q. Can you tell us, sir—the idea of an incursion into Laos has been under consideration in Saigon on the military level for some years—

¹ For President Nixon's address to the Nation on Nov. 3, 1969, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1969, p. 437.

² For excerpts from President Nixon's news conference on Dec. 10, 1970, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1970, p. 769.

March 8, 1971

281

South Viet-Nam will have to make decisions with regard to its ability to defend itself. I will only speak with regard to what the American action will be.

The American action will be, according to the guideline I laid down a moment ago, the use of airpower where I believe that North Viet-Nam's action may threaten our forces.

*Q. Mr. President, if the Laos operation goes according to your expectations and is as much a success as you hope, is it likely to be followed by any new diplomatic initiative in an effort to get the Paris talks going?*

*The President:* Well, Mr. Potter [Philip Potter, Baltimore Sun], the matter of diplomatic initiatives is something that we have been discussing constantly within the administration. As a matter of fact, I have been talking to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs], and others, both informally and in formal meetings.

I have nothing to report today, but I do want to say this—that we will continue to pursue the diplomacy for a primary reason, the primary reason being to negotiate some settlement of the POW issue.

As we have to realize that as far as a negotiation affecting a political settlement for South Viet-Nam is concerned, time is running out for the North Vietnamese if they expect to negotiate with the United States. Because as our forces come out of South Viet-Nam, it means that the responsibility for the negotiation increasingly then becomes that of South Viet-Nam.

But I can only say that, looking to the future, we constantly are reexamining the possibility of any diplomatic initiatives. However, I believe that what I stated in October is a very far-reaching, it is very comprehensive, it is a very fair proposal, and we stand on that at this time.

I do not want to suggest that there are any more concessions coming from our side to North Viet-Nam. We are not going to make any more concessions. The time is for them to negotiate on the principles that we have laid down.

*Q. Mr. President, may I ask a question, if I could get back to Viet-Nam for just one moment? There has been quite a bit of speculation about the possibility of the North Vietnamese coming down through the DMZ. Would this scrap any obligations that you may have under the bombing ban in the North, and would you be in a position then of having to retaliate for any crossing of the DMZ?*

*The President:* My action in case that happened—and I do not believe it will happen—but my action will be guided by the same principles that I have laid down before. I would use the power of the United States, and particularly its power in the air, to the extent that I consider it necessary to protect our remaining forces in South Viet-Nam.

We have a considerable number of forces, as you know, on the DMZ. The blocking forces along Route 9, before you get to the border of Laos, are primarily American. I will not allow those forces to be endangered by a massive North Vietnamese incursion, if one should be undertaken. I think the very fact that the North Vietnamese know that I intend to take strong action to deal with that incursion means that they are not going to take it. If they do, I can assure you that—I don't want to assure you, I simply want to have the record clear that I would not be bound, of course, by any so-called understandings, which they have already violated, at the time of the bombing halt.

## Situation in the Middle East

*Q. Could you take a couple of seconds on the Middle East, because it has not been brought up and I think it should be?*

*The President:* Sure.

*Q. Israel seems to be balking on the Jarring proposal. If they continue to balk, would you use your powers of persuasion to get them to accept something along that line?*

*The President:* I don't think it would be helpful, Mr. Warren [Lucian C. Warren, Buffalo Evening News], to speculate here that we would use powers of persuasion with Israel or, for that

March 8, 1971

285

matter, with Egypt or Jordan on the Middle
East.

Let me say this—that I have been encour-
aged, I am not overly optimistic and not Polly-
annaish, because this is a terribly difficult area
of the world, as I have pointed out in previous
press conferences, with hatreds that go back
over centuries and they are not going to be re-
moved very easily, the hatreds, maybe never.
But a live-and-let-live relationship may develop.
But I have been encouraged by the develop-
ments that have occurred so far.

Egypt has been more forthcoming than we
had expected, and I believe that Israel has been
somewhat more forthcoming. I have hopes that
when the present cease-fire expires that it will be
extended.

I will say that neither side will gain anything
by starting the fighting again. It is a war in
which either side will be a loser.

So as far as the Mideast is concerned—and I
answered it in more detail simply to give you
the tone of it—as far as the Mideast is con-
cerned, it is a difficult area. There are going to
be day-to-day blasts by one side or the other or
concessions by one side or the other before an
eventual settlement is reached.

But for the United States publicly to move
in and indicate what we think ought to be done
while these delicate negotiations go on would
not help.

Q. Could I clear up what I think is an impor-
tant point on Laos? You suggested that the
Saigon regime is making the decisions as to
what it will do in its own interest, particularly
in reference to crossing the DMZ.

Most Americans believe that the decision to go
into Laos was made in Washington and deci-
sions like crossing the DMZ would have
necessarily to be made here as well because
of the use of American airpower.

Could you straighten out for us where the
line is between the decisions that the Saigon
regime will make and that this Government will
make?

The President: Any decision, Mr. Lisagor,
that called for American participation would
have to be approved in Washington. The deci-
sion with regard to Laos was one that was
approved in Washington.

I approved the operation, and I approved the
decision to use American airpower. The opera-
tion itself was jointly developed—primarily by
the South Vietnamese but with, of course, very
close cooperation and consultation with General
Abrams and his staff.

But wherever American participation to any
extent is required, you can be sure that that
decision will be made here.

Now, when you put it in terms of what would
happen in the event the South Vietnamese went
into North Viet-Nam, I am not going to specu-
late on what they will or will not do. I will only
say that any American participation has to be
approved here.

If South Viet-Nam's decision with regard to
what they do would depend upon American
cooperation, then, of course, it could not be
undertaken without our approval.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

103d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, head of the U.S. delegation, at the 103d plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on February 18.

Press release 3S dated February 18

Ladies and gentlemen: You continue your at-
tempts to distort our actions and to conceal your
own in Laos and throughout the rest of Indo-
china. You appear to prefer to listen to your
own propaganda rather than to engage in seri-
ous discussion of the issues before us. In regard
specifically to events in Laos, last week I stated
my Government's position. In light of your re-
marks this morning, I will reiterate briefly to-
day a few main points:

—The limited operation undertaken in south-
ern Laos by Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces
with our assistance is not an enlargement of the
war. This area has long been involved in the war
as a result of the massive and illegal presence of
your forces and bases there.

—No American ground combat troops or ad-

286

Department of State Bulletin

This Copy For _________

NEWS CONFERENCE #928

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT; AND JERRY
WARREN, DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

AT 12:10 P.M. EST

FEBRUARY 18, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. WARREN: I don't have anything for you except
to tell you we will probably have a picture and then Ron
will be down shortly to give you a brief fill on the
meetings.

Q What is the picture on?

MR. WARREN: In the Cabinet Room.

Q Of what, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: Of the advisers and their meetings
and the President may go in there with Prime Minister
Colombo. I will take a pool in.

Q Is that all Ron is going to have, a report
on the meeting?

MR. WARREN: I think so. We have only one posting
this morning and I have one other piece of information to
give you. The schedule has been posted. The President
will give remarks at the opening of the Woodrow Wilson
Center for International Scholars at the original Smithsonian
Institution building. He will depart the White House at
5:25.

The pool should meet here at 5:10. The members
in the pool, the wires, AP, UPI photo, Reuters, CBS
correspondent, Time Magazine, Golden West Broadcasting,
Chicago Tribune, network reel and Cleve Ryan.

That is the old Smithsonian Institution building
and the event will be in the Great Hall, for those wishing
to go in advance to cover.

Q Will he have remarks?

MR. WARREN: He will have remarks.

Q Can you give us any guidance? Will they
be substantive remarks?

MR. WARREN: I really don't have any guidance for
you. Maybe Ron will later on when he comes down here. We
will post the pool members.

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We will post for you the representatives from the Italian Government. However, I will tell you that they included, in addition to the Foreign Minister, the Ambassador to the United States from Italy.

The President expressed to the Prime Minister, as he did in his welcoming remarks this morning, his pleasure at being able to continue their direct personal exchange on issues of mutual interest which they began at the time of the President's visit to Rome last fall.

The President, in recalling his visit to the Sixth Fleet, which was in September, assured Prime Minister Colombo of our continuing deep interest in the Mediterranean, expressing views similar to those that he expressed at the time of his visit to the Mediterranean area and discussed with the Prime Minister joint efforts together with other interested countries to protect Western interests in the Mediterranean area and also to continue to advance the Western interests in the Mediterranean area.

Among other topics discussed, the situation in the Middle East. On that note, President Nixon mentioned to Prime Minister Colombo that he had requested the Secretary of State. Secretary Rogers, to discuss the Middle East situation in further detail with him at a meeting tomorrow between the Secretary of State and Prime Minister Colombo.

They also talked about NATO matters and the President re-emphasized his view regarding NATO and the importance of a strong NATO alliance. They talked about current East-West relations with some emphasis on SALT. The SALT talks, as you know, will be reconvening in Vienna on March 15. They also talked in relation to European matters, about the European community.

As many of you know, Prime Minister Colombo has been one of the leaders of the development and unification of the European community.

In that context, they both, of course, expressed the importance of continuing to strengthen and unify the European community.

I think I would characterize the tone of the meeting as one which was very cordial. It was detailed in covering the items which I have referred to. And it was, as I said, very cordial and I think somewhat -- I say this in the positive context -- informal in terms of the two men being very free and comfortable in their discussions and the exchange of information between them.

Q Ron, were you sitting in on the meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. This is a report I got from the President.

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So to conclude the question, the subject of trade, I am sure, will be on the agenda while they are here.

Q Did Communist China come up, and if it did, do you know if the Italian Prime Minister shares the President's view that the incursion or invasion is not a threat to Communist China and should not so be regarded by Communist China?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would not attempt to express the view of another government. The President, of course, expressed his view yesterday. I can't confirm that in the context of their discussion on Southeast Asia that they talked about China.

Q Can you amplify the discussion on the western Mediterranean? You say here the President assured Colombo of our continued interests in the western Mediterranean and then something about lining up other allies in this area?

MR. ZIEGLER: I primarily am referring to strong NATO alliance and the role of Italy in maintenance of a strong NATO alliance, particularly as it relates to the southern rim of NATO, which is the Mediterranean area, the discussion would fall in that context.

Q Did the Prime Minister give the President his view of the progress in the Mideast discussions? Could you at least characterize the mood of that view?

MR. ZIEGLER: I can only convey to you the part that I was in, which was the second part in the Cabinet Room. And the President, at that time, basically re-emphasized the point he made to you gentlemen yesterday in the press conference.

So that was the thrust of the remarks which President Nixon made. I am sure that one of the reasons that the President wants the Secretary of State to discuss the Middle East in depth with Prime Minister Colombo when they meet tomorrow is the fact that, of course, Italy does have good relations with both Egypt and Israel and would welcome their assessment of the situation. But I am not prepared to state that to you.

Q Are you going to issue a communique?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there will be no communique.

Q Ron, on another matter, yesterday in Dallas Secretary Hardin expressed a hope for higher consumer food prices during 1971. He said, "But I hope the housewife can expect higher food prices this year."

Does that gibe with the President's wishes for the economy?

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#928

NEWS CONFERENCE

This Copy For

#934

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 4:50 P.M. EST

TUESDAY

FEBRUARY 23, 1971

MR. ZIEGLER: The President, as you know, went over to the Washington Hilton this afternoon to speak to the Governors who are involved there in conference.

The President talked to the Governors for about 15 minutes. Don Rumsfeld was there, together with others of us. I thought it might be helpful for him to come by and assist me in giving you a general rundown as to what the President covered with the Governors.

Mr. Rumsfeld has been working closely on the development of the legislative programs which the President has put forth. So I thought it would be helpful for him to be here.

The President began with the Governors in the session by indicating that he had requested to address them in executive session because he did not want to use the Governors' Conference forum as a forum to address the country. He wanted to use the opportunity he had on this occasion to talk directly and candidly with the Governors about the six-point program which he put forth in the State of the Union Message. And he did that.

I will let Don Rumsfeld give you an outline as to what he covered with the Governors and then we will be available for questions, if you have them.

Don?

MR. RUMSFELD: I think, as you indicated earlier the President spoke about 15 minutes. He pointed out to the Governors--as a matter of fact, Governor Hearnes in opening indicated that Chief Executives have a common bond -- and the President reflected on that and indicated that there were grave problems and that there was a need for levels of government to reform, not just at the Federal end, but all levels.

He indicated that he was taking the proposals that were put forward in the State of the Union to the nation, that he was planning to work with the Congress, was interested and aware that there were other ideas being put forward, but that he very specifically said that until he sees some proposal that is better than those that are put forward, he is going to stick to these and work for them.

He recognized and indicated to them that he recognized that some people are skeptical about some governmental units at the state and local level, and their ability to really do a perfect job in government, but indicated that in his judgment honesty and efficiency and idealism were not the monopoly

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Q: Do you have a schedule for tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. I have a couple of other announcements.

Some of you, I think, asked Jerry or someone what Bob Hope was doing on the White House grounds today. He is going to be entertaining this evening and will be participating in the Governors meeting. He is a guest at the White House for this evening's Governors dinner.

Q: Is he an overnight guest?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't believe so. We will check that.

Q: Is he rehearsing or something that he came early?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know. I was not over there.

The schedule for tomorrow:

At 12:15, there will be a White House briefing for members of the Federal Regional Councils and Chairmen of the Federal Executive Boards here at the White House. That will take place in the White House theatre.

I understand Mr. Shultz is going to conduct that briefing. We will get additional information on that and post that for you.

One additional thing regarding the President's Foreign Policy Message. You have noted from the material that we gave you that the message will be sent to Congress at 12:00 noon Thursday. Also on Thursday, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the President will make an address which will be available for live radio at 11:00 a.m., Eastern Standard Time. I understand that the four radio networks intend to carry this. This will be an address which will refer to the Foreign Policy Message, and the President, in that address, will speak to the Foreign Policy Message and its content.

Q: How long will it be?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know how long it will be, but it will be within a 30-minute time period, perhaps 25 minutes in length. I understand the four networks will carry this and many of the independent radio networks, also will carry that.

Q: From his office?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President plans now to make that address from his office.

We will have copies of that particular address available for you at about 10 o'clock, maybe a little earlier, but about 9:30 or 10 o'clock on Thursday which you will then be able to use in your initial reports on the Foreign Policy Message.

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