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CABLE LONGSIGHT, N. Y.
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CABLE LONGSIGHT WASHINGTON

April 23, 1971

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG
SIMON H. RIFKIND
HOWARD A. SEITZ
ADRIAN W. DEWIND
RAMSEY CLARK
MORRIS B. ABRAM
MORDECAI ROCHLIN
PAUL J. NEWLON
JOSEPH S. ISEMAN
JAMES B. LEWIS
THEODORE C. SORENSEN
MARTIN KLEINBARD
RICHARD H. PAUL
NORMAN ZELENKO
JOHN E. MASSENGALE
JAY H. TOPKIS
EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN
ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.
JOHN C. TAYLOR, JR.
BERNARD H. GREENE
ERNEST RUBENSTEIN
ALLAN B. ECKER
STUART ROBINOWITZ
JAMES L. PURCELL
ARTHUR KALISH
DAVID T. WASHBURN
BERNARD FINKELSTEIN
ARTHUR L. LIMAN
RICHARD R. DAVIDSON
SEYMOUR HERTZ
WALTER F. LEINHARDT
GERALD D. STERN
ANTHONY B. KUKLIN
MARTIN LONDON
DAVID C. BRODHEAD
PETER R. HAJE
LEONARD V. QUIGLEY
ALLAN E. LUMSTEIN
NEALE M. ALBERT
JAY GREENFIELD
KEVIN J. O'BRIEN
ALFRED D. YOUNGWOOD
DONALD F. MOORE

Mr. David Ginsburg
Ginsburg, Feldman and Bress
1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear David:

During my recent visit to Washington you in-
dicated an interest in the lecture I prepared for delivery
at Chatham House during my recent visit to London. It
is enclosed. Since the Chatham House procedure is similar
to that of the Council on Foreign Relations, I did not
deliver the text verbatim but followed it very closely.

AJG:jm

THE CONTEXT OF PEACE EFFORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg

Former United States Representative to the United Nations

It is a natural temptation for one who, as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, for three years played a key role in the debates and negotiations involving conflict and peace in the Middle East to offer his personal blueprint of how peace can best be achieved.

I do not propose to yield to this temptation. It is one thing to express concern about the situation in the Middle East and to voice the fervent hope that a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states will be achieved - better sooner than later. It is quite another thing to profess a monopoly on the prescription which thus far has eluded Israel, the Arab states, Ambassador Jarring and governments, including my own and Great Britain, in attaining a peace agreement.

Accordingly, in lieu of a blueprint, I wish to offer some general observations about the road to peace in the Middle East. Most of these relate to expressions emanating from my own country. I have noted some similar attitudes from Great Britain.

Perhaps the best way to start is to recall the principle that guided my government, and others at the UN during the long period of debate and negotiations following the six-day war and culminating in the unanimous adoption of the critically important Resolution 242 by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. This is what I said at the time, not once but repeatedly: "To return to the situation as it was on June 4, 1967 is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities".

I believe that this principle was accurate then. I believe it is accurate now. And, as an American, I express the fervent hope and expectation that our respective governments will remain faithful to this principle, derived as it is from the history of the last two decades.

- 2 -

I think it is appropriate to recall also what my government,
immediately after the June war, said about the nature of a peace
settlement in the Middle East: In the words of President Johnson,
"But who will make this peace where all others have failed for
20 years or more? Clearly the parties to the conflict must be
the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is they who must
make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible
for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason
together". I am not aware that the British Government in any way
disagreed with or dissociated itself from this formulation when
made.

Again, I believe that this insight was right then. I believe it
is right now. As an American I again express the fervent hope and
expectation that our governments will remain faithful to this insight.

Finally, we might also recall another principle agreed upon by
our governments, namely that others can and should help, but their
contribution should be "to promote agreement and assist efforts to
achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement". That is the exact
language of Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967; it is also Ambassador
Jarring's mandate, and is also binding on both our governments which
were principal architects of that resolution.

In light of these principles, the concept recently bruited about
in the Four-Power discussions in New York and elsewhere of a
Big-Four Power UN peacekeeping force, including American and
Soviet "fighting forces" is, in my opinion, a non-starter, completely
lacking in substance and fraught with the most dangerous possible
consequences. It is true that this proposal has been somewhat blunted
in the last fortnight by a welcome declaration of Secretary of State
Rogers that my government would not support such a proposal unless
both Israel and the UAR agreed. Perhaps this moots the proposition
since it is inconceivable to me that Israel would or should accept it,
in light of the tragic experience of 1967. But whether Israel accepted

- 3 -

basic ground that participation by the Soviet Union and the United
States in particular, or the big powers in general, through contingents
of fighting military forces under a UN peacekeeping umbrella would
be contrary to America's interests, Britain's interests and the interests
of world peace.

I think it therefore essential that those governments and statesmen
seeking to help the parties resolve this dispute, as well as responsible
commentators, should recall the history and language of Resolution 242,
since all seem to agree that this resolution is the key to a peace agreement
between the parties. If the dramatic events preceding and occurring
during the six-day war of early June, 1967, have dimmed in public
recollection, this is doubly the case with respect to Resolution 242.
Just last week, for example, the New York Times reported a meeting
between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Rogers, following
which the Soviet Ambassador told newsmen that it is up to Israel, if
peace is to be achieved, to accept the November 22, 1967 resolution and
implement it. The Soviet Ambassador seems to have a lapse of memory.
Israel has accepted the resolution. The important thing to recall, however,
is that the Security Council, when it adopted the Resolution, did not
adopt the Soviet version of it, and with good reason. Moreover, the
resolution is not self implementing but depends ultimately upon agreement
of the parties.

Resolution 242 was not adopted in a vacuum. It was the product
of months of debate and negotiation at the United Nations extending from
May 1967 before the war actually broke out, until November 22 of the
same year, the date of its adoption.

In May of 1967 the late President Nasser of the UAR moved sub-
stantial Egyptian forces into the Sinai, ejected the UN peacekeeping
forces, reoccupied the strategic and previously demilitarised Sharm-el-
Sheik and proclaimed a blockade of the Straits of Tiran.

- 4 -

These were ominous measures. Israel, which under American pressure had withdrawn its forces from Sinai and Sharm-el-Sheik in 1957, had consistently affirmed that a blockade of its ships and cargoes seeking to pass through the Straits of Tiran would be a causus bellum. Moreover, faced with divisional forces of well armed UAR troops on its borders and increasingly provocative statements by Nasser and other Arab leaders, Israel had little choice but to order mobilization of its largely civilian army.

It was justified concern which, therefore, prompted the Western powers, including our two countries, to take the initiative in convoking the Security Council in an attempt to avert a conflict by restoring the situation.

These attempts in the Security Council and through private diplomatic channels failed because of Arab objections supported by the Soviet Union. Apparently, whatever the reason, both were ready to risk war rather than reestablish the conditions which had previously prevailed in the area.

It was only on the second day of the war, after it became publicly apparent to all that Israel for all practical purposes had already won the war, that agreement was reached in the Security Council on a simple resolution calling for a ceasefire.

The ceasefire resolutions which were ultimately adopted during the tense days of the war differed dramatically, however, from previous resolutions of the Council in the Israeli-Arab wars of the preceding nineteen years. In the earlier resolutions, the call for a ceasefire was usually accompanied by a demand for a withdrawal of troops to the positions held before the conflicts erupted. In June of 1967, however, no withdrawal provisions were incorporated as part of the ceasefire resolutions. This was not by accident but rather as a result of the reaction by a majority of the Security Council to what had occurred.

- 5 -

As the debates revealed, the Council was unwilling to vote forthwith withdrawal of Israeli forces because of the conviction of a substantial number of the members of the Council that to return to the situation as it was before the June 1967 war would not be a prescription for peace but a formula for renewed hostilities. Proof that this was so is provided by the action of the Council with respect to a resolution pressed at the time by the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative offered a specific resolution not only reaffirming the Council's call for a ceasefire, but additionally, condemning Israel as the aggressor and demanding a withdrawal of its forces to the positions held on June 5, 1967 before the conflict erupted. But this resolution of the Soviet Union, although put to a vote, did not command the support of the requisite nine members of the Security Council.

The unwillingness to support the Soviet resolution for a withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967, was based upon the conviction of a substantial number of the Security Council members that the withdrawal of Israeli troops should this time be in the context of a just and lasting peace settlement putting an end to the state of belligerency which had prevailed for two decades resulting from the Arab States unwillingness to acknowledge and respect Israel's sovereignty and right to live.

The Soviet Union did not allow the matter to rest with its defeat in the Security Council. It called for a special session of the General Assembly which convened on June 17, 1967. It is important to recall that the General Assembly also refused to adopt by the requisite 2/3 majority a resolution offered by Yugoslavia and several other members and supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab states, differing somewhat in tone but not in substance from the prior Soviet resolution.

With the adjournment of the Special Session of the General Assembly in September 1967, the matter once again reverted to the Security Council and again became the subject of further public debate as well as intensive private negotiations. These finally culminated in the November 22 resolution.

- 4 -

The ceasefire resolutions which were ultimately adopted during the tense days of the war differed dramatically, however, from previous resolutions of the Council in the Israeli-Arab wars of the preceding nineteen years. In the earlier resolutions, the call for a ceasefire was usually accompanied by a demand for a withdrawal of troops to the positions held before the conflicts erupted. In June of 1967, however, no withdrawal provisions were incorporated as part of the ceasefire resolutions. This was not by accident but rather as a result of the reaction by a majority of the Security Council to what had occurred,

- 5 -

The Soviet Union did not allow the matter to rest with its defeat in the Security Council. It called for a special session of the General Assembly which convened on June 17, 1967. It is important to recall that the General Assembly also refused to adopt by the requisite ¾ majority a resolution offered by Yugoslavia and several other members and supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab states, differing somewhat in tone but not in substance from the prior Soviet resolution.

The resolution offered by the British Representative, my distinguished friend, Lord Caradon, stemmed in substantial degree from the General Assembly resolution of the Latin Americans and a United States resolution offered to the resumed Security Council meeting.

The unanimous support for this resolution was the product in considerable measure of intensive diplomatic activity by the United States and Great Britain both at the United Nations and in foreign capitals throughout the world. This is not to say that the various Latin American countries, India and others were not actively engaged in the negotiations and diplomatic activity, but it cannot be gainsaid that the United States together with Great Britain took the lead in the adoption of the November 22 resolution. Impartial observers reported at the time that the United States' role was the primary one. As its representative, I now confirm the validity of this observation.

It should be noted that before the vote on the November 22 resolution, the Soviet Union offered a draft resolution again calling for withdrawal of Israeli troops to the June 5 lines. It did not, however, press this resolution to a vote. Then, and only then, was the stage set for the adoption of the November 22 resolution.

It is to the text of the resolution that I now turn, since it is the text of the resolution, illuminated by its legislative history, which expressed the will of the Security Council.

It is of great significance in interpreting the resolution that it does not specifically require Israel to withdraw to the June 5, 1967 lines. Rather, it enunciates as a principle "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict". The word "all" does not precede "territories" in this formulation or principle. Nor does the article "the" precede "territories" in the English text which was the negotiated document. This was not accidental but was the product of negotiated design.

Coupled and linked with the withdrawal provision is the enunciation of the deeply-held conviction by many UN members: the time had come for the termination by the Arab states of all claims of a state of belligerency

its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.
In this linkage, the Security Council realistically acknowledged that
the Arab states could not be left free to assert the rights of war,
as they had been doing, while Israel was being called upon to abide
by the rules of peace. While the resolution speaks in terms of respect
for the sovereignty of all states in the area, it is obvious that its
main thrust is to obtain acknowledgment of Israel's sovereignty,
something the Arab states have been unwilling until now to do.

The resolution further affirmed the necessity for guaranteeing
freedom of navigation of international waterways in the area, of
achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem, and for guaranteeing
the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilit-
arized zones. In light of reports concerning the role of the Security
Council, and particularly its four leading permanent members, in
connection with the peace settlement, it is important to note that the
language of the resolution speaks in terms of guarantees rather than
imposition.

While the provisions relating to withdrawal, renunciation of
belligerency, freedom of navigation and settlement of the refugee
problem are numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 in the resolution, they are
all stated in terms of principles for a settlement. The really operative
part of the resolution is in paragraph 3 which requests the Secretary
General to designate a special representative to the Middle East to
establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to
promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted settlement.

It is this paragraph pursuant to which Ambassador Jarring was
designated to undertake his delicate mission. It is his mandate
and sets forth the ultimate object of the whole enterprise, namely, to
help bring about agreement between the parties to ensure a just and
lasting peace in the area. The concept of a just, agreed upon and
lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security is
emphasized and repeated throughout the resolution. It cannot be

Given this diplomatic history, it is appropriate for me to take note of some recent developments. President Sadat of the UAR has advised Ambassador Jarring that his government is willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel, although this offer is conditioned with reservations not embodied in the November 22 resolution. And Israel, of course, has long stated its fervent desire to conclude a peace treaty with the UAR. In this connection, I would like to emphasize the value of patience in the resolution of grave diplomatic dilemmas such as this. Patience and fortitude can bring their own rewards. In the years following the 1967 war many diplomats adhered to the view that the UAR would never agree to sign a peace agreement with Israel under any circumstances. Israel's insistence upon a peace agreement led to charges of unrealism and inflexibility on its part. But events and the recent offer of President Sadat have, at least to some extent, justified Israel's patient resolve on this point.

And not only has Israel proved to be right in this respect, but I have always believed that, given the opportunity through appropriate negotiations, Israel will effectively discredit the all-too-prevelant conception, held even among some friends, that Israel is inflexible and unwilling to display magnanimity for peace. The concessions to date made by Israel in the search for peace are too often overlooked.

Israel wanted to start with direct negotiations but agreed to begin with indirect negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

Israel wanted the Jarring talks to be held on the foreign minister's level, but agreed to begin on the ambassadorial level.

Israel wanted the discussions to be held close to the Middle East, but agreed to commence in New York.

Israel wanted a restoration of the agreed-upon ceasefire with an indefinite duration but agreed to resume negotiations through Ambassador Jarring with the ceasefire limited by a unilateral declaration of the UAR.

Israel wanted the removal of missiles and sites constructed in violation of the ceasefire understanding arranged by the United States, but agreed to proceed with the talks despite the Soviet and UAR breach of this understanding.

- 9 -

These are not insubstantial concessions. In my view, they reflect the fervent desire of the government and people of Israel for the long sought goal - a just and enduring peace in the area.

In light of these considerations, I welcome the assurances of my government that Israel will not be pressured in the search for a just and lasting peace which will serve the interests of Israel and its Arab neighbours. It is precisely such a peace that is mandated by Resolution 242.

The time has long passed when great powers can or should impose their views on small states. Greatness alone does not assure a monopoly on wisdom. Rather, all powers and people genuinely interested in a settlement in the Middle East should lend their influence for a negotiated peace treaty between the parties to the 1967 conflict. In this uncertain world, no one can guarantee that anything done today will endure forever. But I am strongly of the conviction that there is no other way to lasting peace in the Middle East than the way in which nations throughout history made peace which lasts - through negotiated agreements between the affected parties reflecting both magnanimity and a true and realistic recognition of the needs and interests of those directly concerned.

ends...

KISSINGER, HENRY A

CONSERVATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10027

February 19, 1969

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant to the
President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I have just come back from a State
Department tour of six weeks which
took me to Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Ceylon, and India.

Will you have any time in the latter
part of Wednesday, February 26, or
p.m. including lunch on the 27th, so
that I could communicate a few im-
pressions to you.

If there is any free time on your
schedule perhaps you would have your
secretary call mine at (212) UN 4-3270.

July 18 Backup

KISSINGER, HENRY

AMERICAN LEGION AUXILIARY

WASHINGTON OFFICE • 1608 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. - 20006
EXECUTIVE 3-4811

June 18, 1973

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The 27th Annual Session of Girls Nation, our youth citizenship training course in the processes of Federal Government, will be held at The American University from July 12 to 19, 1973.

During the latter half of that week, the girls will form, as an exercise in the Executive Branch of government, an administration in which there will be an office comparable to yours. It will be a personal challenge to the girls appointed to this position to learn as much about it as possible in the short time at our disposal. In that aim, I am hopeful that she may have an opportunity to visit your office.

The hour of 3:00 p.m., Wednesday, July 18 has been set aside for each of our young ladies to pay a call on her counterpart. Could you possibly receive your young protegee personally at that time? It would be meaningful for her to meet with you briefly, then perhaps you could assign a staff member to show her around your office and answer her questions. If you will not be free to receive her in person, could you please designate a representative to greet her on your behalf. (In that event, we would need the name and office of that person.)

Advance details for this part of our programming are being coordinated by Miss Joanna Adamus of this office (phone number 393-4811, Ext. 62). By Monday, July 16 (following the Girls Nation election on Sunday) she will be able to provide you with the name and background of your Girls Nation Counterpart.

We would be grateful for any aid you can give us in making this an exciting "living experience" in the processes of American Government.

MC/jma

RECEIVED
JUL 20 1973
CENTRAL FILES

NEWS RELEASE from

Etc

AMERICAN LEGION AUXILIARY

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
777 NORTH MERIDIAN STREET
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46204
TELEPHONE: 635-8411

WASHINGTON BRANCH
1608 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
TELEPHONE: 393-4811

FOR RELEASE: IMMEDIATE (for background information)

GIRLS STATE AND GIRLS NATION

Girls State, culminated by Girls Nation is the youth citizenship training program conducted annually by the American Legion Auxiliary to give high school juniors practical experience in the processes of government and thus a clear understanding of their approaching citizenship responsibilities.

GIRLS STATE SESSIONS, sponsored by 51 state and territorial Departments of the American Legion Auxiliary, are held each June or July in State capitals or on centrally located campuses in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. There, high school juniors chosen with the aid of their school principals for qualities of leadership set up their own miniature city, county and state government and learn to administer them according to the rules and procedures set by actual state and local law. They learn by "doing" it.

From Girls State, two Senators are selected to represent their constituents at GIRLS NATION, sponsored in the Nation's Capital in July by the National Organization of the American Legion Auxiliary.

The 27th Annual GIRL NATION will be held at American University, July 12 to July 19, 1973.

GIRLS NATION in its first three days, will organize political parties, the "Nationalists" and the "Federalists" (with the aid of practical advice from representatives of both the Democratic and Republican National Committees), hold national conventions for the nomination of candidates, climax campaigns with a "national election" and install the winners in office.

From this point on, Girls Nation moves in a dual role: As a Senate, which meets to enact legislation, and also as a government administration, complete with elected and appointed officials. Girls Nation will then visit the White House and learn first-hand how the federal government functions through briefing sessions on Capitol Hill and at various Government Departments, including those of State and Defense.

Next fall, when the girls return to high school as seniors, they will report to their classmates (as well as to local civic, church and fraternal clubs) on what they have experienced and learned as delegates to GIRLS STATE and to GIRLS NATION. By summer's end, the American Legion Auxiliary thus will have added 19,000 to 457,000 girls so far trained as knowledgeable and experienced citizens through this program.

GENERAL

FEB-11-71 KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /g

FEB 4 1971

Dear Sister:

I share your indignation about the quip in Time Magazine and am in
complete sympathy with the views expressed in your letter of January
26, 1971.

I was mortified when I learned that such a remark had been attributed to me. As sometimes occurs in dealings with the press the comment was taken totally out of context and therefore appears doubly insensitive and disrespectful. I immediately called the author of the article. I thought you might be interested in his apology, a copy of which is attached. The magazine offered to make amends for its impropriety in a subsequent issue but advised that this would only draw more attention to the unfortunate quote. I reluctantly agreed that the best course was to drop any further public reference to the matter. I also asked the magazine to forward any critical letters to me so that I could personally write to the authors. Unfortunately, the magazine feels such a procedure would involve a violation of privacy. They have, however, agreed to indicate my regret to those who were so justifiably offended by the quotation.

In order to convey my personal embarrassment and chagrin over this
matter to those of the Catholic faith, I immediately called Cardinals
Deardon and Cooke. They also felt it was best to draw as little atten-
tion to it as possible.

I want to reassure you of my deep respect for those women through the
ages who have had the faith, grace, strength and inspiration to devote
their lives to a higher calling, and of my special admiration for those
devout members of the Catholic faith who have dedicated themselves to
service of the church.

Diane Giunta, SND
Convent of the Sisters of Notre Dame
Tyngsboro, Massachusetts
01984