SUNDAY HERALD ADVERTISER, JUNE 3, 1973

SECTION ONE

Editor's Report by W. R. Hearst, Jr.:

(Continued from Page One)

is deplorable is the general lack of regard for what
the administration has been trying to do.

Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger achieved a cease-
fire in a war three presidents considered justified.
So far as we were concerned, it was "peace with
honor" — and that's exactly what it would have been
if Communist aggression had stopped, even if only
temporarily.

When it did not, the question for this nation's
leadership became a moral quandary. Should we just
forget the whole mess? Or should we make some
final effort to get the kind of fair peace that was
promised in the accord of last January?

President Nixon chose the latter course. Thanks
almost entirely to the renewed bombing of Communist
positions in Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi finally agreed
to meet with Dr. Kissinger in Paris to shore up the
original truce agreement — and the payoff is im-
pending this week.

What the payoff in Paris will be remains to be
seen, and we can hope the Kissinger optimism turns
out to be justified. What is certain, in the meantime,

is that Congress couldn't have chosen a worse time
to press its anti-bombing legislation.

It could easily have waited a little longer. That
it did not is largely the result of concerted actions
by the same leftist-liberal forces which sought to have
this nation bug out of the war without ANY kind
of a peace agreement.

Thus it is not surprising that the Senate move
to cut off bombing funds was sponsored by Thomas
F. Eagleton, the hapless Missouri Democrat who was
briefly Sen. George McGovern's vice presidential
running mate on that party's national election ticket
last year.

And it is certainly not surprising at all that Sen.
McGovern, in voicing support for the Eagleton
measure, would pump his hand in vigorous con-
gratulations after coming up with this remark:

"We must stop trying to make Southeast Asia
safe for military dictatorships."

This is the kind of thinking you always get from
our McGoverns and their supporters. They literally
see nothing wrong with Communist dictatorship and
even fail to perceive it as such.

Did you ever hear any of them complaining about

Allende's high-handed decrees in Chile? Of course
not — he's a Marxist.

On the other hand they come up screaming mur-
der whenever an anti-Communist dictatorship is
mentioned. And especially one whose leader is or
ever was a military man.

CANADA'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW from the four-nation peace observation commission in Vietnam underscored and multiplied the difficulties inherent in Dr. Kissinger's quest for stricter adherence to the truce terms.

Canada told the truth. There is no real peace
to supervise in Indochina, so the selfishly practical
action is to get out. It would have been very easy
for the administration in Washington to have taken
the same attitude — if it had not felt a higher obliga-
tion.

That obligation has been to at least try to make
our former enemies stick by their word — to do
all that can possibly be done to stabilize an area
which has been torn by war for some 30 years.

Dr. Kissinger's trip to Paris this week may well
mark an end to that obligation.

Dr. Henry Kissinger's Quest

It is most improbable that he will return with
any guarantee of a fair and lasting peace from people
whose idea of peace is a regrouping for further con-
quest.

A "satisfactory" agreement, however, would be
a fresh promise by Hanoi to honor the truce pact
under conditions spelled out clearly for all the world
to see — and Dr. Kissinger may manage to get it de-
spite his handicaps.

This time, if or when the Communists fall again
to live up to their word, history must at least record
the sacrifice by the United States of the lives of
some 50,000 of its young men and the melting of
over 200,000 to the cause of freedom — but tragically,
alas, in vain.

Dr. P. D. White

Heart specialist Dr. Paul
Budley White, 86, remained in
our condition yesterday at
Massachusetts General Hos-
sil after suffering a "small
stroke," according to a hos-
spital spokesman.

Dr. White, who was Presi-

In Fair Condition

dest Euclerower's personal
physician, was admitted to the
hospital Wednesday night af-
ter complaining of weakness
in his left side.

A hospital spokesman said
Dr. White's facilities have not
been impaired, and that he
was "resting comfortably."

1

THE WASHINGTON POST

H2

Sunday, June 3, 1973

Kissinger Gets Strained Welcome

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

As if Henry Kissinger
didn't have enough troubles
at home lately, it seems that
for some days he was per-

sona non grata in Sweden.

The man who made secret
trips to China and who, be-
fore he entered the White
House, had the run of Euro-
pean capitals, was told his
presence was not particu-
larly desired at a recent con-
ference of politicians and
diplomats held in Saltsjoe-
baden, near Stockholm. In
earlier years Kissinger was
a much sought after star of
the discussions at the Bild-
erberg meetings.

A number of European
sources have confirmed that
word was sent to Kissinger
from Stockholm. The Swed-
ish Foreign Minister called
in the American charge d'af-
faires to say that in view of
the fact that Premier Olaf
Palme and other high Swed-
ish officials would be attend-
ing the conference, the pres-
idential adviser would not be
welcome.

When American repre-
sentatives of the Bilderberg
committee heard about this,
these sources said, they
were highly indignant. One

of the members is said to
have called Prince Bern-
hardt of the Netherlands,
founder of the yearly con-
ferences. Bernhardt, in turn,
called Palme, and told him
that in view of Sweden's at-
titude it might be better if
the conference were held
elsewhere.

Palme is said to have re-
plied that there must have
been some misunderstand-
ing and that he could not
imagine how that impres-
sion had been conveyed. The
prime minister called the
foreign minister who in turn
ordered the secretary gen-
eral of the foreign ministry
to make amends to the
American charge d'affaires,
Arthur J. Olsen. He said
there must have been some
mistake.

Now officials in Washing-
ton are explaining that what
the Swedish foreign minis-
ter meant in his original
communication was to con-
vey the message that if Kis-
singer were to come Swed-
ish officials would want to

meet with him as a U.S. offi-
cial.

Because of Sweden's out-
spoken attitude toward U.S.
participation in the war in
Southeast Asia, there has
been no ambassador in
Stockholm since August and
no Swedish ambassador in
Washington since Decem-
ber.

Conference sources con-
firm that there could have
been no misunderstanding
the original message. In any
case, by the time amends
were made, Kissinger had
already let it be known that
his attendance at the confer-
ence would not be
"appropriate at this time."
U.S. officials let it be known
that Kissinger's cancellation
could be seen as a rebuke to
Sweden for May Day state-
ments by the prime minister
and the foreign minister ac-
cusing the United States of
violating the Paris peace
agreements by bombing
"defenseless people" in
Cambodia.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1973

Associated Press

BACK FROM ICELAND: President Nixon debarking at Andrews Air Force Base, Md., Friday, on return from talks with President Pompidou. Following Mr. Nixon is Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential adviser.

W. Post
Sun, 6/3/73 the
World

Israel's ambassador to Washington called on White House national security adviser Henry Kissinger yesterday to express his country's "concern" about the possible sale of U.S. F-4 Phantom fighter bombers to Arab states.

Israeli sources insisted that this unusual action by Ambassador Simcha Dinitz did not constitute a protest against Washington's current negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for Phantoms.

The State Department announced Thursday American willingness to sell Saudi Arabia a "limited number" of Phantoms, which are also

the most advanced planes in the Israeli arsenal. Authoritative U.S. sources said that negotiations with the Kuwaitis are less advanced than with the Saudis.

Both sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict have regarded the Phantoms as the symbol of U.S. backing for Israel. Israeli sources said they were willing to accept the numerical inferiority against the Arab air forces as long as they had a superior excesive supplies of aircraft like the Phantom.

In Jerusalem, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban said his government would delay any decisions about shifting its policies until it

has received clarifications from Washington. U.S. and Israeli sources said that Kissinger would pass the Israeli ambassador's observations on to President Nixon and promised him a reply.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, June 3, 1973

A 21

nantoms

scores of "popular committees" have been formed to take over the running of a variety of organizations and schools.

Europe Meeting

HELSINKI — The European security conference will be held in Helsinki and Geneva, delegates of 34 nations decided here.

The preparatory talks for the main conference finally settled the location question, giving Finland the first and third stages and Switzerland the intermediate stage.

From staff reports and news dispatches

ABBA EBAN

... waiting for Henry

THE WASHINGTON POST

H2

Sunday, June 3, 1973

# Kissinger Gets Strained Welcome

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

sona non grata in Sweden.

A number of European
sources have confirmed that
word was sent to Kissinger
from Stockholm. The Swed-
ish Foreign Minister called
in the American charge d'af-
faires to say that in view of
the fact that Premier Olaf
Palme and other high Swed-
ish officials would be attend-
ing the conference, the pres-
idential adviser would not be
welcome,

The Washington Post

SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1973

# Guyana's 'Cooperatives'

By John Crocker
London Observer

GEORGETOWN, Guayana
—Prime Minister Forbes Linden Burnham's attempt to establish a “cooperative republic”—neither capitalist nor socialist—appears to be working, and diminishing the racial strife that once plagued the country.

The largest racial groups are East Indians (about 398,000), and blacks (about 238,000). There are some 40,000 American Indians, about 4,000 Europeans, and the rest are mixed. Burnham, a 50-year-old, London trained lawyer, is black.

A British colony since 1814, Guyana became an independent member of the Commonwealth seven years ago. The country with

NEWYORKMAGAZINE

JUNE 4, 1973

# How Kissinger Fooled Us All

By Nick Thimmesch

> "...Kissinger not only concurred in all of Nixon's decisions to use force in the past four years, he usually was the advocate..."

This time the enemy wasn't vanquished as the Germans and Japanese were in World War II. The generals didn't come home to ride in open cars, their brass shining in the sun while joyous multitudes roared. But the Vietnam war "ended" for us in January, 1973, and I wondered how that odd couple, President Richard M. Nixon and Henry Alfred Kissinger, finagled us out. How did they get by with "peace is at hand" and then "peace with honor"? How, side by side, did they wind up as Men of the Year?

But only three months later—while I still wondered—Nixon was nearly a fallen President, and Dr. Kissinger was caught in a net of evasive statements and lies about how he requested, and got, the F.B.I. to wiretap his own National Security Council staffers and newsmen in 1969. Both men were stuck to the tar-baby we now call "Watergate," a gener-ic term implying stealth, subterfuge, spying and even criminality. Where Nixon and Kissinger were seemingly excep-tions to the rule that all who touch Viet-nam would be fouled, even ruined, their good fortune crumbled in a place they never suspected—in the millstone of Old Watergate. These days Nixon can hardly boast of "peace with honor," and Kissinger faces a smiling, imper-turbable Le Duc Tho for what seems like the millionth time to straighten out the peace. When Kissinger left Wash-ington two weeks ago, he grumbled that Watergate hysteria had sapped confi-dence in the country, and besides, he couldn't threaten North Vietnam with bombing anymore. Congress, angered by Watergate, won't put up the money.

What I want to do here is relate what I learned about our Vietnam involvement in 1972, and also to sketch in Henry Kissinger's genius, partic-ularly his great skill in ambiguity. For several months I talked at length about the men' who made policy in 1972 or who were close to it: Dr. Kissinger

himself; General Alexander Haig Jr., Kissinger's able, strong and discreet deputy; Defense Secretary Melvin Laird; John Scali, now U.S. Am-bassador to the U.N.; the departed H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, Presidential shield extraordinaire; Charles Colson, also departed, but once the White House's "fixer" and "outside" man who had his hands in everything and owned the President's ear besides; a scattering of Russians; and military-political analysts at the Pentagon and on Kissinger's National Security staff.

Henry A. Kissinger is brilliant, tenacious, a remarkable repository of fact and historical understanding. He is also a man fearful of his liberal-academic peers; hence, in their presence, he often misleads these folk by uttering delicious obscurities in a charming Franconian accent. He has given the impression that he is the good guy struggling against Nixon for a more humane course, and wishful liberals were the easiest for Kissinger to fool. But Kissinger not only concurred in all of Nixon's decisions to use force in the past four years, he usually was the advocate.

Beyond that, Kissinger's ego is surely one of the largest ever to occupy the White House, and that takes in Lyndon Johnson and Teddy Roosevelt. Kissinger could restrain it in his immediate work with the President, but once the door was closed, his staffers often cringed and this jumbo ego swelled to magnifrence. Yet Kissinger had to be bucked up on occasion and lifted from dark funks in time of stress. Once on his feet, Kissinger stuck firm with his conviction that the United States must never cower, must act like a first-rate nation, and could not quit Vietnam. Thus, Kissinger's beliefs harmonized with those of Richard M. Nixon, a man he once disdained. The two men earnestly believed in consistency and the orderly process in conducting

foreign affairs, though both were wide-open pragmatists when it came to devising new policies.

It is a good dose of the salts for those who wallow in wishful thinking to realize that Kissinger was all business and all hawk when he was in that decision-making room with Nixon. Let scribes and pundits pen their foolishness about him—the real Henry, who suffered as a Jew in Nazi Germany and is not naïve about Communism, knows the potential for mischief and evil in the world and the need to punish it. Kissinger had an opportunity to show this quality to Nixon very early in his Administration.

On April 15, 1969, a lumbering, prop-driven U. S. Navy intelligence plane (EC-121) was shot down by North Korean Mig fighters, some 90 miles off the North Korean coast. Thirty-one U. S. Navy men aboard the unarmed plane were lost. The next day, the Government of North Vietnam congratulated its North Korean comrades for their "glorious achievement in shooting down with only one shot a marauding U. S. spy plane that intruded North Korean air space."

Hanoi lied about the facts, of course. and back in the United States there were angry reactions. Unlike the Pueblo spy-ship incident, where there was a question of position, the shooting down of the Navy plane, which was clearly within its authorized air space, was an outrage. The late Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, then chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, cried: "There can be only one answer for America: retaliation, retaliation, retaliation. If that means destroying a North Korean military base, then that is what the vast majority of American people expect."

Henry Kissinger agreed with Mendel Rivers's view, but within the sanctuary of the White House and not in the

WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

"I agree with the President. . . . It's almost irrelevant whether we like each other . . . like asking me whether I like my arm."

public print. In an April 15 session with the rather freshly anointed President, Richard M. Nixon, Kissinger strongly urged a retaliatory air strike at the North Korean airfield from which the Migs took off. Kissinger was joined in this recommendation by General Alexander Haig Jr., then Military Assistant to the White House, and soon to become Kissinger's deputy.

The Kissinger logic was that the U. S. had been tested too long by the Communist powers of Asia, that the stop-and-start, indecisive operations of the Vietnam war by the Johnson Administration had not only prolonged that bloody ordeal, but served to encourage the Communists to adventure as they pleased. A decisive strike now by the U. S. against the North Koreans would serve notice—not only to that Communist aggressor, but to our enemies in Hanoi and to the Chinese Communist Government—that there was a new Administration in Washington and that President Nixon meant business. Thus the atrocity, in effect, would be turned into another Gulf of Tonkin incident. North Vietnam could be bombed again and Haiphong Harbor mined for the first time. As one participant in those deliberations recalls, "There was something to starting the game all over."

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird

could follow the orderly process up to a point, but usually gave way to his political glands. He pleaded with Nixon against any retaliation. Laird said we were headed for big domestic and international trouble.

Nixon had to decide quickly. Naturally, he denounced the unprovoked attack; he declared that such intelligence flights would continue and ordered a 29-ship task force to show the flag in the Sea of Japan. A week later this force quietly faded away. To this day, however, Kissinger feels Nixon's decision not to react was a mistake. He and Haig feel Nixon would have established a reputation for reliability much more quickly had the President punished North Korea for its aggression.

Nearly three years later, in January, 1972, with Nixon readying his re-election campaign, Kissinger warned in White House councils of another Tet offensive, the kind which helped tumble Lyndon Johnson from the Presidency. Kissinger did not want to see any slippage in the gains of the past three years—the détente with Moscow and Peking, the stabilization of South Vietnam, the successful withdrawal of 450,000 U. S. troops, and the increasing possibility of a negotiated settlement under the terms Nixon had just offered Hanoi.

Then the Communist offensive came—not at Tet, as feared—but on Easter

weekend, April 2. North Vietnam's Commanding General Giap threw twelve of his thirteen combat divisions across the Demilitarized Zone into South Vietnam, overrunning several provincial capitals.

Again, the Administration's crisis options were listed by Kissinger. He saw that one of the possible consequences of a dramatic show of force would be the cancellation of the Moscow Summit scheduled for May 21. But, in the end, Kissinger recommended heavy penetration bombing of the North (suspended since October, 1968) and the bold, new action of mining Haiphong Harbor. In Texas, John Connally urged Nixon to let the Russians call the Moscow Summit off if they wanted to—a dare Kissinger also was willing to risk.

On May 8, Nixon phoned Kissinger at 1:15 p.m. to tell him he was going to confirm the decision at 2 p.m., but wanted Kissinger to come to his office at 1:30 p.m. to hear a dissenting view from Bob Haldeman. This surprised Kissinger, for Haldeman had never offered substantive views in Kissinger's area on any pending decision. When Kissinger got there, he heard Haldeman go through a carefully reasoned series of objections to the mining and bombing plans. Kissinger says Nixon then asked him what he

NEW YORK 49

> "... 'Day in and day out, Kissinger was the hawk-hell, yes, he's a hawk! But not in a knee-jerk way,' said a Presidential aide..."

thought of Haldeman's ideas. "I disagree completely," Kissinger replied, somewhat puzzled. "We must go ahead." Nixon smiled, and so did Haldeman, as Nixon explained that the conversation had been designed to test Kissinger one last time.

Nixon's audacious decision to use heavy force triggered a lot of criticism in the press, but little of it was directed at Kissinger. In fact, rumors were passed that Kissinger opposed the action because he felt it would blow the Moscow Summit out of the water. CBS State Department correspondent Marvin Kalb dramatically declared on the air that, "One casualty of the President's mining and blockade may well be his upcoming Summit to Moscow." Kalb based this on a strong impression he took away from Kissinger at a dinner Kalb had given for him on May 9.

But Max Frankel, then *New York Times* bureau chief, was at the same dinner, and wrote no such prediction. He had studied Kissinger and talked with him enough (they are both refugees from Nazi Germany) to understand his nuances. Months later, somewhat amused by the confusion of impressions at that dinner, Kissinger would only tell me that "Max Frankel is more subtle in his thinking."

Kissinger didn't have to join the Nixon Administration to learn the value of using force in crucial situations. It was the discreet use of force and a change in the policy-making process which Kissinger advocated in his writings in the fifties and sixties. He urged a change away from the situation-room "crisis" mentality of the men who planned and executed the Vietnam war. Kissinger believed in a staged withdrawal, a negotiated settlement, an avoidance of resolving Vietnam's internal political problems, but no quitting. "However we got into Vietnam," he wrote. "what-ever the judgment of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential for the peace of the world."

Nixon liked Kissinger's notion that national security should be conducted in an orderly way, German-style or Nixon-style. He also liked the idea of a negotiated settlement and "de-Americanizing" the war, as Mel Laird used to say. This idea wasn't new, but was lost in the flailing actions of the Johnson Administration in its last years. Laird urged Nixon to take Kissinger aboard because Laird knew him as a no-nonsense scholar who believed in

Laird also knew of the speeches Kissinger wrote for Rockefeller in the 1964 campaign, speeches which called for defeat of the Communists in Vietnam, for South Vietnamese troops' "hot pursuit" of Vietcong guerrillas into Cambodia, Laos or North Vietnam, and for strikes by South Vietnamese planes and pilots against Vietcong supply lines in Laos and in North Vietnam.

The liberal academics, seemingly unaware of his views, were horrified that Kissinger would now be in the service of their favorite ogre, and an ogre-elect at that. But then, they reasoned, good-guy Henry would be a restraining influence on hard-line Nixon.

In early 1969, Nixon had Kissinger methodically listing possible actions in Vietnam, the arguments for and against those actions, and finally presenting his own (Kissinger's) recommendations. I asked one of the President's top advisers why Kissinger had a reputation on the outside for urging softer courses on the President while those close to the decisions insist the opposite was true. He answered this way:

"More often than not, Henry was the leading advocate of the strong use of force in a situation. Day in and day out, Henry was the hawk-hell, yes, he's a hawk! But he never did it in a knee-jerk or reactive way. He didn't show his hawkishness in the machinery. He was measured, used calculation and care. He did it when he got inside in private with the President."

Kissinger says he absolutely never discusses publicly what he recommends to the President, but adds, "You can assume that if I could not support a major policy, I would resign." In their rage for order, Nixon and Kissinger found complete agreement, and when the final decision was made, they were in accord.

It was this way, of course, on the Cambodian invasion of 1970, and the Laotian incursion of 1971. But Kissinger opposed Mel Laird's argument that the South Vietnamese troops should handle their own show in Cambodia, that no American troops should be used. Nixon agreed with Kissinger's assessment, an act which later moved Laird to complain to a friend, "If Vietnamization finally works, Henry will say he was for it all along, and if it fails, Henry will say, 'I told you so.'" Kissinger's strong support of Nixon's decision to use American troops in Cambodia won him the total confidence of the President.

This confidence led Nixon to dis-

patch Kissinger on a secret visit to Peking on July 9, 1971, and on many other clandestine missions. And Nixon was content to let his own reputation develop as that of the hard-line President, the punisher of North Vietnamese aggression, while Kissinger was in the far different role of negotiator. As one Nixon intimate and friend of Kissinger's put it: "Americans tend to develop a negotiating hero. We think it is the negotiator-hero who suddenly broke through, when the situation is that the people you're dealing with have simply faced the realities of power."

The clock was running out on North Vietnam in 1972, an irony because Hanoi always felt that one of its great weapons was American impatience. Now the North Vietnamese forces suffered relentless bombing; the South Vietnamese Army had held; and the mining and bombing had dried up supplies.

As the McGovern campaign worsened, Kissinger showed advance polls by Louis Harris to the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris, making clear that Nixon would win by a landslide. Then on October 8, Le Duc Tho said the North Vietnamese Government would accept Thieu as leader of the Saigon Government and his party—the first time Hanoi made the concession. The North Vietnamese were now willing to have the cease-fire and political settlement of South Vietnam negotiated separately. And Hanoi would negotiate a withdrawal of forces from Laos and Cambodia. Thus the North Vietnamese were buying Nixon's cease-fire proposals. Well, thought Kissinger, this is it! He cabled the news to the President and excitement spread to Nixon's key men.

But Hanoi launched a war of nerves. On October 26 North Vietnam broke its word to keep the outlines of an agreement secret with a broadcast by Radio Hanoi disclosing in detail the draft agreement between Le Duc Tho and Kissinger. It was 2 a.m. on the 26th when Kissinger was awakened from sound sleep induced by the jet-lag fatigue of trips to Paris, Saigon and Cambodia. He was dismayed, and his first fear was that the whole agreement was lost. As his head cleared in the hours following, his pessimism ebbed some. Nixon and Haldeman spent the early morning hours talking to Kissinger. The President restated his conviction that the agreement should be signed only when the ambiguities were flushed out, and only after Thieu's reservations had been cleared up to Thieu's satisfaction.

"When this is all over, we will make judgments about who acted honorably in this period."

Kissinger was convinced that he could clear up the ambiguities in a few more days at the table, and gave lower priority to Thieu's concerns. Henry wanted that agreement so badly.

Presidential adviser Charles Colson, who was particularly close to Nixon at the time, recalls: "I think Henry was down at the time. He was feeling bitter that the North Vietnamese had gone public. He was afraid that this might mean we wouldn't get an agreement."

Hanoi's announcement had to be confirmed by a startled White House. Kissinger, rather than Candidate and President Nixon, would do it, to minimize the political aspect. Kissinger conferred for hours with Nixon and the President's men before meeting with the press in the White House briefing room at 11:35 a.m., October 26, 1972. The election was twelve days away.

Kissinger got to the point, the headline, in less than a moment. "We believe that peace is at hand. We believe that an agreement is within sight, based on the May 8 proposal of the President, and some adaptation of our January 25 proposal, which is just to all parties."

Haldeman says, "Henry did not come out that day and announce, like a headline, 'Peace Is With Us.' It was way down in his remarks. It wasn't *in* hand. It was *at* hand. There were things to be ironed out."

The Kissinger briefing of the press, and thus the nation, was methodical, but not as smooth as usual. The North Vietnamese had bought the essential Nixon proposal and wanted it wrapped up by October 31. Kissinger, speaking of the agreement, dodged on the date, saying, "We did, from time to time, give schedules by which they [the agreements] might be accomplished." It all seemed very clear, although Kissinger stated that the military aspect wouldn't be settled until certain "ambiguities" on the role and composition of the supervisory peace-keeping mission were resolved. The situation Henry Kissinger described on October 26, 1972, confirmed very much to what he had prescribed for the solution of the nagging Vietnam ordeal in his *Foreign Affairs* article four years before.

Colson looks back now and says:

"I think that in Kissinger's rhetoric on October 26, he went just a shade farther than I think the President would have gone had the President been saying it, and in fact, the first stories of the Nixon-Kissinger rift developed because the President, in his first public statements following the Kissinger briefing, was somewhat more restrained than Henry had been. . . . It is a question of emphasis and tone . . . actually the two men were saying the same thing."

While Nixon was musing and tempering Kissinger's discourse, Hanoi was angrily asserting that the agreement was ready, and that another meeting was not required. Kissinger, said the Hanoi spokesman in Paris, went over the agreement for twelve hours with Xuan Thuy, "page by page, line by line, and word by word." A newsman asked, "Was Kissinger then a liar?" "You can interpret the facts as you wish," replied the spokesman.

At this point, Kissinger had mixed feelings of fulfillment and exhaustion. He had logged 265,000 miles in Air Force jets in 1972. The final negotiating days ran to sixteen hours. His stolidity and iron ass were sorely tested. He was ripe for what then happened—the disastrous interview he granted Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci. The interview wound up as a lyric of "I's," with the impression that he, Kissinger, was more popular and famous than the President, and he, Kissinger, was the romantic boy who rode into town to bring peace to "the Americans."

The Fallaci interview caused an up roar in Washington, and Bob Haldeman recalls: "The President didn't talk to Henry about the Fallaci interview. The President wouldn't jump on his guy for something like that. He knows that the man feels badly enough about making such a mistake."

> "...Kissinger was discouraged and depressed. The people who knew him best, Nixon, Haldeman and Laird, tried to lift his spirits..."

Kissinger went back to his business after the election, and had a disappointing five-day session in Paris with Le Duc Tho in late November. Another meeting was scheduled for December 4, and Kissinger was confident he could settle the questions of the peace-keeping commission and North Vietnam's "right to intervene" (which Thieu was yelling bloody murder about) in a few days. It started well enough on December 4. In fact, Kissinger arranged for General Haig to return to Washington to ready himself for another trip to Saigon to let Thieu know what the agreement would mean. But Kissinger ran into the North Vietnamese wall—a familiar object to him after three years. The North Vietnamese presented seventeen new changes, mostly dealing in semantics. Demands multiplied. Thieu must go. A new argument over prisoners held in the South. The man who had announced "peace is at hand" was tired and depressed.

On December 5, Kissinger cabled President Nixon the discouraging recommendation that the negotiations be broken off. What's more, Kissinger recommended that the United States resume bombing North Vietnam, in full force. He also urged that the President take TV time to announce the action and explain that it was North Vietnam's intransigence which made it necessary.

The decision-making apparatus clicked quickly. The bombing would be resumed. This time Hanoi's innards would be hit with everything available, and North Vietnam's ability to function militarily would be destroyed.

Kissinger told me later that he was personally disappointed and at a low point over the negotiations. Kissinger was especially sensitive to criticism at this point, and suspected other White House staffers of planting stories that there was a rift between him and the President.

On Thursday, December 14, scarce-
ly back in Washington from Paris,
Kissinger had two calls placed to my
office when I was out. The calls sur-
prised me because Kissinger usually
doesn't look for journalists; it's the
other way around. We arranged to meet
on Friday. At that point, Washington
didn't know what was up with the ne-
gotiations, but sensed something had
gone wrong.

Having read and been impressed
with Fallaci's interview with Kissinger,
I decided to show a little humor, so
I bought a large sheriff's badge and
toiletries to give him when I

got to his office. But he no sooner had
ushered me in than it was clear there
would be no joshing. Kissinger had two
recent columns of mine before him,
sentences underlined the way a schol-
ar underlines. I was there to take my
discipline from him, the professor.

"I don't care who you talked to,"
Kissinger said, "... the President and I
are in complete agreement, we are in
immediate and constant contact. There
are absolutely no differences between
us."

He wondered, with an intent look on
his face, drawn with fatigue, to whom
I had been talking. I told him my
conclusions were based partly on de-
ductions and partly on conversations.
No, I had not been the beneficiary of
any "leaks." Then I asked him why
some writers were convinced there
was a difference in his views and the
President's. I read him this quote from
a column printed in *The Washington
Post*, November 25, 1972: "When Hen-
ry Kissinger came back from Paris to
say he had brought peace, Mr. Nixon
undercut him. Kissinger was forced to
change his tune and to say instead that
peace was 'at hand.'"

Kissinger said of this, "Whoever
wrote that is completely misinformed.
It is utter nonsense. That writer is
absolutely wrong." I told him that Tom
Braden, his social friend and a liberal
columnist, wrote it, and Kissinger re-
plied, "I don't care who wrote it, it's
wrong. I was not undercut by the Pres-
ident." Tom Braden later confirmed for
me that he had talked with Kissinger
several times in the period just before
he wrote the column.

Then Kissinger, quite generously, gave
me what amounted to an exclusive
story, one that lasted for twenty hours
anyway. He told me that the negotia-
tions had stalled, that one decision by
North Vietnam would have cinched
the settlement. The stuck issues were
the peace-keeping commissions and
North Vietnam's "right to intervene."
That was the exclusive. He then went
on to say he fully expected "to get
murdered in the press" for the break-
down, and "light at the end of the tun-
nel" statements would be received cyn-
ically. Hanoi was belligerent at the
bargaining, and a new offensive was
very possible.

"There will be an agreement, I as-
sure you of that. It must be settled.
But we will never make a decision that
will destroy the peace six months or
a year later."

Whatever it was about my column

that bothered him had now left his con-
sciousness, and he was cordial. Where-
upon I reached into my briefcase, took
out the large sheriff's badge and hand-
cuffs and said, "Dr. Kissinger, you have
described yourself as the cowboy who
makes peace. You underrate yourself.
You are the sheriff!" I gave him the
 badge and handcuffs, and he broke into
hearty laughter and thanked me.

The next day, Kissinger, before the
press, sounded tough when he said the
United States would not be blackmailed,
stampeded or charmed into an agree-
ment. With stories floating around that
he had been "charmed" with Le Duc
Tho, the pundits concluded that Nixon
made him use that term, but to this day
Kissinger insists it was his own choice.

He was discouraged and depressed.
With the Christmas season coming up,
and nearly four years of work on Viet-
nam behind him, the peace wasn't there
yet. The people who knew him best,
Nixon, Haldeman and Laird, tried to
lift his spirits.

And Kissinger had been seeing the
man who probably had done the most
to boost him from an unsure, greenhorn,
buck private from Washington Heights,
drilling in the muck of Louisiana in
1943, to a statesman whose brilliant
mind and talents would be realized. He
was seeing Dr. F. G. A. (Fritz) Kraemer,
a Prussian aristocrat, whose doctorates
were earned in political science and
law. When Hitler took power, Kraemer
was forced to flee Germany. After a
picaresque decade, he found himself as
an enlisted man in the United States
Army, wearing a monocle and looking
like a young Erich von Stroheim.

One of Kraemer's duties was to loc-
ture infantry recruits on the evils of
Nazism, which he did with gusto in a
harsh Prussian accent. Private Henry A.
Kissinger was so stimulated by a Krae-
mer tirade that he wrote him a fan
letter. Kraemer summoned him, learned
that Kissinger's ambition was to be a
bookkeeper, and ordered him to read
important books. He also got him a job
as an interpreter for the commanding
general.

The two transplanted Germans went
through the war together. Kissinger be-
coming a precocious administrator of
an occupied German district. With
Kraemer's urging, Kissinger went on to
Harvard, distinction in scholarship, and
eventually, great power. Kraemer went
to the Pentagon, where he still served
as a strategic analyst.

The man who survived in Kissinger's

> "... 'Henry does not come to me for advice,' Fritz Kraemer thundered at me one day in his office, 'he comes for absolution.'..."

life is Kraemer. "Henry does not come to me for advice," Kraemer thundered at me one day in his office, "he comes for absolution." Kissinger deals in subtleties; Kraemer sees demons and saviours.

On the evening of October 27, the day after Kissinger reluctantly announced "peace is at hand," he went to Kraemer's home. Kissinger lamented over how the North Vietnamese had broken their word on announcing the agreement. If the negotiations had only moved another inch, he could have gone to Hanoi and initialed the agreement. Kraemer admonished Kissinger, quoting Talleyrand's advice to a young diplomat: "Pas de zèle!" (Don't be too eager!)

The two men saw each other twice more before Christmas. At lunch, December 15, with Henry in the dumps over the stopped negotiations, Kraemer told him to feel no guilt, it was Hanoi which had sinned. Now you and Le Duc Tho can bargain realistically, he told Kissinger, because you have the measure of each other.

On December 16, Kissinger went on television to give his discouraging report on how negotiations had stalled. On December 18, awesome, full-scale bombing of North Vietnam was resumed. The weather was heavy, so the runs were operated with the all-weather B-52s, flying around the clock.

According to Colson, Nixon was resolute but concerned about losing B-52s, and Kissinger was also fretful. Colson said: "I talked to Kissinger a number of times during this period. His question to me was always, how much time do we have? He used me as his sounding board for what the domestic reaction would be. How much more time do we have? This was during the heat of the battle. I don't think he was ever quite so confident as the President."

By December 28, the North Vietnamese had had enough of the B-52s, and agreed to return to Paris on January 8 to wind up the peace settlement. Even in the worst of the bombing, Hanoi and Washington were in constant communication.

Kissinger was tanned and rested after a holiday in Palm Springs, California. The press was pessimistic as Kissinger flew to Paris. But Fritz Kraemer had been right. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would now be realistic because they had the measure of each other—through Hanoi's stubbornness and United States bombing. Le Duc Tho, the hard-bitten

revolutionary, knew Nixon meant business, and more bombs if there was no agreement this time.

It's not remarkable that in their five-day meeting, the agreement was reached. Kissinger had immediately sensed it was going to work. On January 9, one day after he resumed negotiations in Paris, Kissinger cabled the President that if the present mood holds, we can say your birthday [January 9] was the turning point in the final settlement.

Nixon announced the peace on national television on January 23, 1973. It was sparse, simplistic and unexciting, but it was peace. It was Kissinger's turn the next day. He went 100 minutes to Nixon's ten in a brilliant, masterful briefing of the press. Yet there was residual ambiguity, and eyebrows raised considerably when he said the "civil war" was "all about" who is the legitimate ruler of South Vietnam. Civil war? I thought Jack Kennedy sent the Green Berets over to stop naked Communist aggression and that Lyndon Johnson sent another 550,000 for the same purpose, and that the Nixon Administration went into Cambodia, Laos and Haiphong Harbor for the same reason. But Kissinger listed so many commissions, provisions, protocols and agreements that the mind boggled. At one point, talking on sovereignty, Kissinger said that was an issue "in which ambiguity has its merits."

Ambiguity again; Kissinger's marvelous skill for this had been inflicted on his Communist opposites, bureaucrats, White House staffers and scores of journalists. It also helped develop the talk of a "rift" between him and the President, especially in the November-December period. The New York Times's James Reston wrote of it December 30, proclaiming that Kissinger "undoubtedly opposes" the bombing of the North, and coming down nicely on Kissinger's side by stating that Kissinger is avoiding a break with the President. If there were a split, Reston wrote, Kissinger would be free to resign and write the whole story of the Paris talks, thus embarrassing Nixon.

Although Kissinger, in reality, had the absolute confidence of Nixon through the entire "rift" period, Kissinger betrayed some insecurity about it. The day after Nixon's re-election, Haldeman gathered top White House staff members and distributed brown Manila envelopes containing resignation forms —a procedure which became infamous. Kissinger opened his envelope and was puzzled. He later mentioned his puzzle-

ment in a conversation with Mel Laird, who laughed and told him: "Now, Henry, you're a Harvard professor. You should have inspected yours, then raised your hand, and when recognized, asked, 'If I fill it out nice, do I get an A for neatness?'"

What an unlikely pair, an odd couple. Kissinger, a German-born Jew, distinguished in academia, conservative in world diplomacy, but scornful of the sometimes chauvinistic conservatism of a Republican like Nixon, and disdainful, by his own admission, of Nixon for years. Nixon, Protestant, middle-American, resentful of the Eastern Establishment and academia that Kissinger thrived in, and long a foe of the Nelson Rockefeller powerhouse Kissinger worked for. But when they discovered each other, this odd couple realized they were a good intellectual and temperamental fit. Both are introverted, suspicious, secretive men who prefer to avoid Congress and the public. Both feel they have taken a lot of flak from the world, and are somewhat justified in that resentment. Both have a mania for order, an aversion to flamboyant decision-making, and a tragic, realistic vision of the world as a place where only a measure of order can be achieved, and then only through the exercise of diplomacy and power. The President was boss, but together they developed their roles—Nixon to exercise the will, and Kissinger to weave the subtleties of the negotiations.

Was there ever any authentic rift between Nixon and Kissinger? Answer: no. The rift was the wishful thinking of liberals and some journalists charmed and conned by Kissinger. Kissinger never lied to them. They wrote that he opposed bombing, invasions, and military actions, mostly because of the way he wiggled his eyebrows or offered generalities quickly converted to conclusions they wanted to believe because they hate Nixon so much.

Kissinger knows that I am not a liberal, but a centrist, so small need to charm me. In January, 1972, reflecting on earlier Administrations, he told me: "The worst kind of bastards in this town are those who hold high positions and then go out and say they really don't believe it [their policies]. If anyone would ever say I didn't believe in what Nixon is doing, I would publicly dispute him. I like the President. I agree with him. We've gone through all this for three years, like two men in a foxhole. I was up with him in his bed-

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“...‘You can make a few mistakes in this world,’ said Kissinger, ‘but only a few.’...”

room until 1 a.m. before he gave his last speech. It's almost irrelevant whether we like each other. It's like asking me whether I like my arm. We have no disagreement over anything central or basic. No disagreement over policy. We're too close for that.”

Kissinger is not squeamish about the application of force. I saw him in late February, 1973, after his thirteen-day trip through the Far East. He told how, when he arrived at Phuc Yen military airfield in Hanoi, he was greeted by Le Duc Tho, and Kissinger remarked that he didn't think his [Air Force] plane could land because of the damaged field. Le Duc Tho acknowledged that the airfield, pounded by B-52s, was in a "somewhat deteriorated condition." Kissinger said to me, "Somewhat deteriorated? You should have seen it. It looked like a lunar landscape."

Some of the President's men fret over Kissinger's seeming deception of liberals and activists who go away convinced that good-guy Kissinger is around to hold down that awful Nixon. To protect Kissinger on this score, Laird tried to coach him on one occasion after the settlement. "I called Henry before he went on the Today Show with Barbara Walters," Laird told me, "and I said, 'Henry, no matter what you do, mention the President by name. Mention him a few times, for God's sake.' "

When I saw Kissinger on March 9, 1973, he mentioned a 1970 episode when a delegation of Harvard colleagues talked threateningly to him during the uproar over Cambodia. Kissinger said he got the same kind of treatment during the Christmas bombing. "After all, I was with them for ten to fifteen years," he said, "so they come to me. But they are so righteous and arrogant. Where are the 'peace' people now in healing the country? What would have happened if McGovern had won? How would the P.O.W.s have felt if we bugged out? The United States had to leave with its self-respect. And liberal rhetoric! They complain about Agnew, but what they say about us is far worse than anything Agnew says about them. What they say about us implies that a maniac or madman is running the country. What utter nonsense."

In that last meeting with Kissinger, I asked about the situation of April 15, 1969, when the Navy plane was downed by the North Koreans, thus creating the first international crisis in the new Nixon Administration. Yes, Kissinger had favored a reactive air strike against

the Mig airfields to impress the enemy that Nixon would be reliable. Kissinger still feels the decision to go bland in that situation was a mistake.

"You can make a few mistakes in this world," he said, "but only a few." The orderly process dies hard.

The story would end here were it not for Watergate. The break-in and bugging of Democratic headquarters by hirelings of the Committee to Re-Elect the President had nothing to do with Kissinger. But he was snared in it.

In the Daniel Ellsberg trial it was revealed that Dr. Morton Halperin was wiretapped in 1969 and 1970 by the United States Government while Halperin served on Dr. Kissinger's staff. On May 12, 1973, during a press briefing, Kissinger was asked if he was aware of this wiretapping.

After professing annoyance with the question, Kissinger didactically explained that "my office has not handled or been aware of any activities that were conducted by other processes," meaning, presumably, wiretapping. These were the concerns of the C.I.A. and F.B.I., Kissinger stated, although he acknowledged receiving summaries from them on national security surveillance.

Newsmen were dismayed with Kissinger's equivocation. When I read the transcript, I was startled. It happened that I knew that Kissinger not only helped initiate the plan to wiretap Halperin, others on his staff, and four newsmen as well, but that Kissinger favored the action and helped supply names to the F.B.I. President Nixon approved the wiretaps. General Haig was aware of them. Attorney General John Mitchell ordered them on grounds of national security. And F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover, with whom Kissinger conferred, had them carried out, according to existing law.

This much I wrote in a column. In a way, I defended Kissinger by pointing out that 1969, when the taps were placed, was not a Watergate year, and that Kissinger had good reason to believe there were dangerous leaks of information from his staff which he felt duty-bound to stop. I also asked why Dr. Kissinger didn't have a general notion of what one of his staffers, David Young, was up to when he was on loan to John Ehrlichman. Young joined the White House "plumbers" group to plug leaks of confidential information, but wound up supervising the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office. I lectured that "specific denials were

“... Haig phoned, pleading that ‘for the country’s sake we must save Kissinger’...”

sorely needed at this point,” given the Watergate atmosphere.

Kissinger read the column and phoned me. He was furious. “Your column is an insult and an outrage,” he cried. “How could you do this to me?” He spoke of the “lynch mob” out to destroy the Government and him too. “If you people think that this Government can continue to operate under attack by innuendo, you are wrong,” he said, and vehemently denied knowing about the “plumbers,” the break-in, and Young’s activities.

“When this is all over,” Kissinger told me, “we will make judgments about who acted honorably in this period.” About the wiretapping, he would only say that the recent statement by Acting F.B.I. Director William Ruckelshaus covered the situation—the disclosure that the White House in 1969, requested and got seventeen legal wiretaps on N.S.C. staffers and newsmen and that Kissinger had conferred with Hoover on the matter.

A few minutes after Kissinger had blistered me, General Haig phoned. He was friendly, but displeased with the column, and pleaded that “for the sake of the country, we must save Henry Kissinger. He is thinking of quitting rather than being dragged through the slime.”

I learned that Kissinger and Haig spent the best part of two days on the phone with newsmen and editors to put the story in perspective. Kissinger blew up at Bob Woodward, the young Washington Post reporter whose reporting on Watergate won a Pulitzer, when Woodward phoned to ask if he had supplied the F.B.I. with names of those to be tapped. “I shouldn’t have to submit to a police investigation on this,” Kissinger shouted at Woodward. Kissinger also phoned Ben Bradlee, the Post’s editor, in an effort to get the story played down. Indeed, Kissinger was on the phone with a number of newsmen and columnists, including James Reston and Newsweek’s Henry Trewhitt. Somewhere in his conversation with Seymour Hersh, The New York Times’s crack investigator, Kissinger dropped in the fact that it was President Nixon who authorized the wiretapping. The next day a front-page story put the blame on Nixon.

Hersh subsequently dug around F.B.I. sources and discovered that Kissinger not only wanted the taps, but fingered his own staffers: Helmut Sonnenfeldt, like Kissinger a refugee from Nazi Germany; Winston Lord, Kissinger's

closest associate, who sat side by side with him at the Peking and Moscow meetings; Tony Lake, who left to join the Muskie campaign; Daniel I. Davidson; and Halperin, of course.

The newsmen who were tapped were Marvin Kalb of CBS; William Beecher and Hedrick Smith of The New York Times; and Henry Brandon of The Sunday Times of London. Some ironies here. Kalb had unusual access to Kissinger and frequently broadcast so-called inside information on American foreign policy. Brandon is a personal friend of Kissinger's, and now, in be-wildermen, says, “Henry used to tell me that I was the one correspondent in this town that he doesn't try to manipulate.” Beecher is now an official in the Pentagon where presumably he is loyalty itself.

Apologists for Kissinger claim he allowed the taps partly to clear people suspected by Haldeman and Ehrlichman of being unreliable. Those pained by Kissinger claim Henry, always suspicious, arranged for the taps to find out how loyal his associates and “friends” were to him, not to the country, and argue that the Greatest Leaker of Them All is Henry Alfred Kissinger himself. Many newsmen concur in this opinion.

Whatever Kissinger’s motives, the wiretapping was legal. In that uneasy period when the Nixon Administration was exploring new relationships with the Soviet Union and China, and also trying to extricate itself from Vietnam, there were serious security leaks, and Kissinger’s action was justified in principle. What is disappointing, however, is the way Kissinger came to evade and lie after the wiretapping story broke a few weeks ago. All he had to do, Watergate climate or no, was stand up and say: “Yes, I helped initiate these taps because national security was jeopardized. I do not apologize for this, and if you want to foolishly link it to Watergate, go ahead, but it was a separate, distinct legal action, and I am not ashamed of it.”

Kissinger was aggrieved and hurt when he spoke to me before leaving for Paris that week. His voice trembled: “How do I talk now with Le Duc Tho when the confidence in our Government is so shaken, and we can’t bomb anymore. What deterrent do we have now in the negotiations?”

Henry Kissinger, genius and apostle of force, is alive and well in Paris, negotiating with Le Duc Tho. Sooner or later, we'll hear about it.

THE WASHINGTON POST
H 2

Sunday, June 3, 1973

By Marilyn Berger

Washington Post Staff Writer

sona non grata in Sweden.

The man who made secret trips to China and who, before he entered the White House, had the run of European capitals, was told his presence was not particularly desired at a recent conference of politicians and diplomats held in Saltsjöbaden, near Stockholm. In earlier years Kissinger was a much sought after star of the discussions at the Bilderberg meetings.

A number of European sources have confirmed that word was sent to Kissinger from Stockholm. The Swedish Foreign Minister called in the American charge d'affaires to say that in view of the fact that Premier Olaf Palme and other high Swedish officials would be attending the conference, the presidential adviser would not be welcome.

When American representatives of the Bilderberg committee heard about this, these sources said, they were highly indignant. One

of the members is said to have called Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands, founder of the yearly conferences. Bernhardt, in turn, called Palme, and told him that in view of Sweden's attitude it might be better if the conference were held elsewhere.

Palme is said to have replied that there must have been some misunderstanding and that he could not imagine how that impression had been conveyed. The prime minister called the foreign minister who in turn ordered the secretary general of the foreign ministry to make amends to the American charge d'affaires, Arthur J. Olsen. He said there must have been some mistake.

Now officials in Washington are explaining that what the Swedish foreign minister meant in his original communication was to convey the message that if Kissinger were to come Swedish officials would want to

meet with him as a U.S. official.

Because of Sweden's outspoken attitude toward U.S. participation in the war in Southeast Asia, there has been no ambassador in Stockholm since August and no Swedish ambassador in Washington since December.

Conference sources confirm that there could have been no misunderstanding the original message. In any case, by the time amends were made, Kissinger had already let it be known that his attendance at the conference would not be "appropriate at this time." U.S. officials let it be known that Kissinger's cancellation could be seen as a rebuke to Sweden for May Day statements by the prime minister and the foreign minister accusing the United States of violating the Paris peace agreements by bombing "defenseless people" in Cambodia.

Potpourri

W. Post.

Tuesday, June 5, '73

Sen. Edward M. (Ted) Kennedy's sister and brother-in-law, Jean and Steve Smith, have rented a house in Bridgehampton for the month of August. Socialite Amanda Burden, Mrs. Smith's close friend, has taken the same house for the month of July... Foreign Affairs adviser Henry Kissinger took former Commerce Secretary Peter Peterson to dinner at the Rive Gauche one night last week and asked for a quiet table where they could "talk business" undisturbed. No one got close enough to overhear whether they were discussing Kissinger's leaving or Peterson's returning to the government. It's no secret that Kissinger wants his old friend to come back now that Peterson's enemies have themselves left the President's employ... There was no card to identify the sender of the arrangement of cornflowers and baby's breath on JFK's grave last Tuesday on the 56th anniversary of his birth. But the flowers came from Jacqueline Onassis, as they do every year, placed there before Arlington National Cemetery opens for the day.

© 1973 The Washington Post/Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc.

Kissinger Reaches Paris
For His Talks With Tho

PARIS, June 5 (AP)—Henry A. Kissinger arrived in Paris to-night for his latest round of talks with Le Duc Tho on how to make the Vietnam peace agreement work.

Mr. Kissinger was accompanied by the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, an addition to his usual Paris negotiating team.

Mr. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, and Mr. Tho, a member of the South Vietnamese Puerburo, conferred intensively for six days last month on how to end violations of the peace agreement they negotiated last winter.

NY Times

6/6/93

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6/5/73

# KISSINGER IS TAKING ZIEGLER TO PARLEY

### *NY Times*

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 4— Henry A. Kissinger will be accompanied by Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, when he flies to Paris tomorrow to resume talks Wednesday with Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief negotiator, on strengthening the Vietnam cease-fire agreement, the White House said today.

Mr. Ziegler's first direct involvement in the Vietnam negotiations, it came as a surprise to White House newsmen.

A White House official said President Nixon wanted Mr. Ziegler to have "a better substantive grasp" of the issues.

William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, has been in Paris in preliminary talks with Mr. Tho's deputy, Nguyen Co Thach. They meet today for five and a half hours.

In a report to Senator Robert C. Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, the Pentagon described several categories of non-combat deaths—in particular “gragging,” the assault on one serviceman by another, and accidental homicide, usually by discharge of weapons and called them “phonomena of the conflict in Southeast Asia.”

Such incidents “abated dramatically as the Vietnam troop withdrawal proceeded toward completion,” Lieut. Gen. Leo E. Benade, a deputy assistant secretary of defense for manpower, said in a letter.

## Volunteer Force Considered

General Benade expressed confidence that continuing efforts by the military departments to prevent accidents, suicides and homicides would further reduce the number of such deaths in the post-Vietnam period and that “the experiences of recent years will not have an adverse effect on the development of the all-volunteer force.”

As the morale and discipline,

Evening Star 6/6/73

# Kissinger, Tho
Both Optimistic
As Talks Reopen

PARIS (UPI) — Henry A. Kissinger and his Hanoi counterpart, Le Duc Tho, began a new and possibly final round of talks today on turning the Vietnam cease-fire into real peace.

Both were guardedly optimistic last night about the chance of success in the latest in their long series of meetings.

Kissinger said the talks, which resume a round with Tho that ended May 22, may result in agreement on ending the truce violations.

"If we continue the progress and the cooperative spirit that was shown last time, then the prospects are reasonably good that we might conclude in this round," he told newsmen on arrival.

"ON OUR SIDE, we shall certainly spare no effort to strengthen the peace in Indochina," he said.

"I have always been optimistic and I am still optimistic now," Tho said when asked about the chances of success. "But there are many difficulties ahead," he said.

The meeting today took place at an American-owned villa in suburban Gif sur Yvette.

Kissinger and Tho conferred for 30 hours between May 17 and 22 on conflicting charges that the two sides were violating the spirit and letter of Jan. 27 truce agreement signed in Paris.

AFTER THOSE TALKS, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan flew to Saigon to confer with President Nguyen Van Thieu. Sullivan returned to Paris last weekend, and since then has conducted about 13 hours of preliminary discussions with Tho's chief aide, Nguyen co thach.

(South Vietnamese sources said Thieu accepted the proposals in principle, but objected to some of the details, The Associated Press reported. These have been discussed in a series of preparatory meetings here since Sunday between U.S. and North Vietnamese officials.

(But North Vietnamese sources said the main issue in the preparatory talks was over the interpretation of Article 20 of the cease-fire agreement, which states that "foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities" in Laos and Cambodia, AP said.

(The United States has justified its continued bombing in Cambodia on grounds that the North Vietnamese are supporting closely the antigovernment insurgents who are nominally led by the exiled Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Hanoi has denied the charges.)

Kissinger said he would also meet with French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert to review decisions taken by President Nixon and President George Pompidou in their meeting in Iceland last week.

A 26

Thursday, June 7, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Kissinger and Tho Reopen Paris Talks

By Jonathan C. Randal

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS, June 6 — Presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger and Hanoi's Le Duc Tho resumed their secret talks today and agreed to meet again Thursday amid signs that they were nearing some kind of understanding designed to implement the Vietnam cease-fire.

The most hopeful indication was the presence of both delegations' official photographers and cameramen at the 5½-hour meeting held at the Communist villa at suburban Gif-sur-Yvette. In the past their presence at meetings has heralded imminent agreement.

Observers, however, remained skeptical about the effectiveness of any new agreement which may be announced, barring an unforeseen breakthrough.

As for other provisions of a new understanding, they are expected to deal with points supposedly covered in the Jan. 27 accords which ended American military involvement in Vietnam and brought the release of U.S. prisoners of war.

Additionally, the United States was expected to agree to resume demining of North Vietnamese harbors and the postwar aid talks with Hanoi which Washington broke off in April to protest alleged Communist cease-fire violations.

Moreover, judging from statements by the North Vietnamese, ousted Cambodian

head of state Norodom Sihanouk and other sources, a compromise settlement in Cambodia seemed still outside the grasp of Kissinger and Tho.

At best, observers suggested, the United States might offer to limit its bombing of Cambodia in return for North Vietnam's use of restraint with its Cambodian allies.

But even such an agreement would do little to settle the Cambodian political problem, which apparently turns on sorting out Chinese-Soviet differences concerning Sihanouk's future role.

As has again become standard in the Kissinger-Tho talks, members of both delegations shook hands and smiled broadly for the cameramen and photographers at the start and end of the session.

At the beginning of the meeting, Kissinger introduced Tho to Ronald Ziegler, presidential press spokesman who, the White House announced today, is to be given "increased responsibilities." However, the North Vietnamese have made clear they negotiate solely with Kissinger.

Ziegler has said nothing to the press since arriving here last night, although a routine announcement about the length of the meeting was made in his name by the U.S. embassy.

Thursday, June 7, 1973

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

An exiled artist goes home

Chagall visits Moscow
for Soviet exhibition

By Reuter

Moscow

Exiled modernist painter Marc Chagall set foot on his native Russian soil June 4 for the first time in more than 50 years, to be welcomed by a small but enthusiastic group of officials and admirers.

The 85-year-old artist arrived from Paris at the invitation of the Soviet Ministry of Culture to attend the first full-scale exhibition of his paintings since before the rule of Josef Stalin.

Born in the Byelorussian town of Vitebsk, Chagall, one of the pioneers of 20th century art, will also visit Leningrad and perhaps some other towns during his two week stay, Soviet officials said.

But he had asked not to visit Vitebsk itself, because he did not want to be "reminded of the past," they added.

Asked why he did not want to return to his birthplace, Chagall only smiled and pointed at his heart.

His memories of Vitebsk were a recurrent theme in his painting, even many years after he left the Soviet Union.

His works are like vividly colorful fantasies of a child. People and animals float heavenward in most of his paintings. Two enormous such murals are painted on the walls of New York's Metropolitan Opera House. His stained glass works are in the United Nations and in a hospital in Israel.

Chagall's paintings were banned here for many years but the exhibition, which opened here June 5 is said

to have several paintings and over 60 lithographs.

Since he left the Soviet Union in 1922, the painter has spent most of his life in France, but has also worked and lived in the United States.

In recent years, official Soviet attitudes have softened toward Chagall and other rebel Russian painters of his generation, Kandinsky, Malevich, and Falk.

The thaw that led to Chagall's invitation started in the 1960's when works by him were removed from Soviet vaults and sent to exhibitions abroad.

Plans to show his paintings in Moscow in 1966 were shelved, apparently because of conservative pressure, but a Chagall sketch was put on display in 1967.

Chagall's arrival has not been given any publicity here, but thousands of art-lovers are expected to have heard of the visit and will no doubt spend hours lining up to see the exhibition.

More cave drawings found

Monte Carlo

Explorers have discovered cave drawings which may be as old as 20,000 B.C. in a group of caves near the border between France and Italy, informed sources indicate here. They say the discovery has not been made public to avoid a rush of tourists who could damage the works before they could be protected.

OVER $150 MILLION
in Mortgage Loans

Mortgage loans funded by Loyola Federal during the past year exceeded $150 million. These funds helped to provide new home ownership for thousands of Maryland families... and in turn created jobs for thousands of people in the building and construction industry.

Cost of living—in U.S. and abroad

American families spend comparable share of income for food as those for

eat out in a restaurant for about 80 francs ($18.40).

tisticians, consumes about 24 percent of an autoworker's pay, while com-

★Kissinger-Tho accord expected

Continued from Page 1

But behind these details lies a
reality President Thieu till now has
strenuously resisted: the de facto
partitioning of South Vietnam into
zones controlled respectively by Sai-
gon and by the National Liberation
Front.

Neither Saigon nor the NLF accepts
a permanent division of South Viet-
nam, and the Jan. 27 peace agree-
ment provides for elections to reunify
South Vietnam. But, noted a Hanoi
official at a reception Tuesday, the
agreement "does not specify any
particular date for the elections."

Meanwhile, President Thieu des-
perately wants to avoid having tem-
porary truce lines solidified into rec-
ognized administrative zones of con-
trol unless, of course, he can get the
zones conceded to the NLF to an
absolute minimum. He apparently
has had to cede to some extent on this
issue.

The expected Kissinger-Tho agree-
ment will say nothing about partition-
ing South Vietnam, but if all the
cease-fire observance provisions it

includes are strictly applied, the de
facto effect will be just that.

American intelligence sources say
that Hanoi has completed what they
characterize as a "defensive buildup"
of arms, troops, and administrative
and technical cadres in South Viet-
nam. They call the buildup defensive
because they believe its purpose is to
help defend NLF areas, not to kick off
some vast new offensive.

Hanoi wins a point

North Vietnam has in effect told the
NLF, official American sources be-
lieve, that henceforth the emphasis
must be on peaceful reconstruction
rather than military struggle.

At the cost of some friction, Hanoi
seems to have won its point. A long
declaration by Nguyen Huu Tho,
chairman of the NLF and president of
the "Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment" it has set up, talks not only
of the need to "scrupulously observe
the Paris peace agreement" but also
to create industries, to respect pri-
vate property, to encourage Vietnam-
ese overseas to invest in South Viet-
nam.

The Provisional Government's min-
ister of state, Nguyen Van Hieu, was
asked at a reception he gave in Paris
Tuesday whether Mr. Tho's declara-
tion was intended to apply to South
Vietnam after it had been reunified as
a result of elections. "No, no," he
replied, "it is to come into effect
immediately."

If Saigon refused to admit the right
of the Provisional Government to
carry out its own policies in its own
administrative zones, he added, "we

shall have to struggle" to get this
right recognized.

Mediation doubtful

The new agreement will not extend
to Cambodia, a North Vietnamese
source indicated. Communist-sup-
ported Prince Sihanouk, now touring
African countries, has vehemently
rejected suggestions he treat with the
Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh,
and Washington is said to have
reluctantly concluded that the time is
not ripe for a mediation attempt.

The Communist side, noting con-
gressional opposition to further
American bombing of Cambodia,
may be hoping that Washington will
be forced to stop this bombing without
obtaining as a counterpart the with-
d withdrawal of North Vietnamese aid in
men and material to the Khmer
Rouge, Prince Sihanouk's guerrilla
supporters in Cambodia.

Meanwhile, both Moscow and China
have appointed ambassadors to the
Provisional Government, indicating
the PRG may be preparing to set
itself up as a visible administration
inside South Vietnam, once the new
Kissinger-Tho agreement comes into
effect.

As Hanoi and the Liberation Front never tire of pointing out, whatever claims Mr. Thieu may make to be the sole legal government of South Vietnam, the fact of the matter is that there exist in South Vietnam "two administrations, two armies, two zones of control."

When can these two be united? In
the works of one high-ranking Com-
munist, "We are patient men, and we
can afford to wait."

In addition, the governors passed seven resolutions giving a reduced New England Regional Commission what Gov. Francis W. Sargent (R) of Massachusetts, state co-chairman of the commission, called "a new direction."

In the absence of further federal funding for the commission, the action by the governors will provide $500,000 to fund for 18 months a private, nonprofit corporation with the governors as a board of directors.

## Modified role seen

The new entity, described as a "successor agency" to the regional

Governor Sargent also scored the lack of federal financial assistance to ease the economic impact of federal military shutdowns. He said only $1 million in federal funds — which he "first thought was for Massachusetts," but is actually for the entire country — is available.

In voting against the resolution, Governor Thomson said it would bring "into question the decision of the administration "on a matter concerning national security and the national economy."

Federal officials announced in May a nationwide shutdown of many military installations by July,

Solo round-the-world yachtsman Bill King sailed into this southern England port May 23 with tales of a mysterious sea creature.

The adventurer, who set off from Plymouth two years ago at the start of his 28,000-mile voyage, said there were two occasions when he thought his 42-foot yacht would not make it home from Australia.

The first was when he was rounding Cape Horn and traveling blind in a 50-knot gale; the second was off the Azores, in the Atlantic, when his junk-rigged vessel, Galway Blazer II, was knocked flat in a gale.

Commander King, who was greeted

# Portuguese parley asks recognition as unique culture

Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

Cambridge, Mass.

"The real coming together of the Portuguese people in the United States will begin after we have all gone home," said Ruben Cabral, a member of the steering committee which organized the first Congress of Portuguese in the United States.

The congress — held last weekend at Harvard University — was attended by some 200 delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey and California — the four states containing the most Portuguese.

Though it has been 150 years since the first Portuguese whalers arrived in New Bedford from the Azores, "Americans still tend to lump us together with other Southern European peoples as Spanish-surnamed Americans," complained a youth from Providence.

State Rep. Ronald A. Pina (D) of New Bedford, Mass., the keynote speaker, called for the establishment of a Massachusetts agency to aid immigrants.

ENJOY SUMMER MORE
IN SPORTSWEAR
FROM

SPECTRUM
Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

NICHOLAS von HOFFMAN
CBS RADIO NETWORK

JUNE 7, 1973

I'm Nicholas von Hoffman.

For four years Henry Kissinger has been the closest thing that the
liberal press could find to a White House good guy. It didn't take much for
that. Henry not only would see them, but go out to dinner with them and be
pleasant. From the rest of the White House they got kicks, cuffs and silence,
so the good Dr. K. was a hero.

Now the bouncing, cuddly, little beaver of American diplomacy, Nixon's
German gerbil, is in trouble with his liberal press buddies. Not only have they
found out that he's a telephone tapper like his boss, but he even put an
electronic insect on his best friend's phone -- and then lied about it.

Still, an enormous effort is being made to rescue our Henry. It's not
every man that has a four-star general calling up newspapermen and saying,
quotes, "for the sake of the country, we must save Henry Kissinger. He is
thinking of quitting rather than being dragged through the slime." Close
quotes. Those are the words that right wing columnist Nick Thimmesch says he
heard from the mouth of General Alexander Haig, the chief of Nixon's White House
staff, as well as the man who succeeded the disgraced H. R. (Bob) Haldeman.

So the last of Nixon's famous sauerkraut deputies is in trouble. But
even if a four-star general thinks otherwise, Henry's going will leave the
country intact. Indeed we may even be a little better for it.

Thimmesch, whose politics gives him access to White House people us
liberal journalists can't get near, says that Henry has been the superhawk of
this Administration. There can be no doubt -- since Dr. K. has virtually said
so in public -- that last year's bloody Christmas bombings can be laid in some
large part to the Don Juan of this Administration.

Ah, but Thimmesch says more. He says that Dr. K. is the one who egged
Nixon into all of his most violent performances -- the resumption of the bombing
earlier in 1972, Laos and Cambodia. In addition we have Kissinger's peace-is-at-
hand electioneering statement, and his crumbly peace agreement whereby the war
not only continues months later, but our part in it goes on, seemingly forever.

All of what Kissinger has come to stand for -- the rapprochement with
Russia and China -- has not curdled; nor is he responsible for the Cod War
between Iceland and England, but this is Nicholas von Hoffman with Spectrum
saying, nevertheless, go home to Harvard, Henry.

The diverse opinions expressed on SPECTRUM are those of the commentators themselves and should not be attributed to CBS or any of its affiliates
Produced under the supervision of CBS News, 524 West 57 Street, New York, New York 10019 (212) 765-4321

Kissinger and Tho Meet After a Delay of a Few Hours

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 7 — Henry A. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho continued their discussions today in a meeting that had been postponed for several hours at the American's request.

The postponement came after the Saigon Government announced that it would not sign any new agreement that two negotiators might produce.

The two men met in mid-afternoon in their continued effort to improve observance of the Cietnamese cease-fire, signed at the end of January. The session, held in a suburban villa in St. - Nom - la - Brtêche, lasted three and a half hours.

Asked why the meeting was suddenly delayed, Mr. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security, replied:

"There was no particular reason. We just needed more time to prepare something."

A similar question put to Nguyen Co Thach of North Vietnam brought no statement. He merely spread out both hands, palms upward. Mr. Thach is deputy to Mr. Tho, who is a member of Hanoi's Politburo.

As usual, there was no comment after the meeting from either the United States or Hanoi delegation about details or of any progress made.

The White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, who accompanied Mr. Kissinger to Paris to sit in on the negotiations, said only: "I cannot characterize the discussion except

to say that it will continue tomorrow." It is scheduled to begin at 3 P.M.

Mr. Kissinger is to see Foreign Minister Michel Jobert in the morning. He has said he

will review with Mr. Jobert "measures to implement the procedures and purposes" agreed on at last week's conference in Iceland between President Nixon and President Pompidou.

Communique Expected on Weekend

# Slight Gain Seen in Paris

By Jonathan C. Randal

PARIS, June 8—White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger and Hanoi's Le Duc Tho are expected to sign a joint communique Saturday or Sunday embodying modest progress toward implementing the much-violated January Vietnam cease-fire accord, informed sources said today.

No real progress on solving the Cambodian crisis will be included in the communique, barring unforeseen developments,

the sources said. Key provisions of an otherwise thin communique dealing with Vietnam involve both political and military concessions by Saigon, the sources said.

The communique calls for the formation within 45 days of the National Council of Reconciliation, which the original Jan. 27 agreement hoped would function within three months with Vietcong, Saigon and neutralist representatives.

But there will be no direct link in the communique between

the council's formation and a definite calendar for elections, the sources said. Instead the council will be empowered to decide on election procedures, a situation which Saigon has opposed in the past for fear that the Communists would drag negotiations out and turn the tripartite organization into a de facto coalition government.

Militarily, the communique is said to call for unit commanders to meet locally to resolve outstanding problems. Previously Saigon has insisted that such contacts take place at staff or divisional level to prevent the Vietcong from cashing in psychologically on such low-level fraternization between the two armies.

Other purely military problems dealt with in the communique, the sources said, were transit corridors between Saigon and Vietcong-controlled territory and the ports of entry for resupply of men and materiel.

No mention of stopping American bombing in Cambodia is included in the communique, which reiterates the earlier language on Cambodia included in the January agreement, and in the documents of the international conference held here at the end of February. The communique is said

See TALKS, A16, Col. 1

## Paris Burglars
### Toast Art Theft

PARIS, June 8 (UPI)—Champagne-drinking burglars drilled their way into a Left Bank art gallery Wednesday night and stole $1 million worth of original engravings and lithographs by Georges Braque, Marc Chagall, Joan Miro and Alexander Calder, police said yesterday.

Adrien Maeght, owner of the gallery, who estimated the loss, said that after rifling the gallery, the Burglars returned and drank Maeght's champagne, leaving two empty bottles behind.

## Apartment In the Midst Of Silver Spring's Prestige Garden Apartments

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THE ECONOMIST 9 June 1973 (12)

In the same boat

They are words to make you yawn, but then you would
be forgiven for thinking that everyone was asleep already.
Seven weeks after Mr Henry Kissinger invited western
Europe to say what sort of relationship it wanted with
the United States, the Europeans have not yet even be-
gun to collect their voice for an answer
and when President Pompidou and President Nixon tried
to decide at Reykjavik last week whether the next stage
in the proceedings should be a multilateral meeting or a
series of bilateral ones, they could not even agree after-
wards what they had decided. Those two somniferous
adjectives, multilateral and bilateral, and the paralysis
they have induced, lie at the heart of the problem facing
what is supposed to be the Year of Europe.

The American proposal is disarmingly simple. Mr Kissinger says that the countries on either side of the North Atlantic ought to be able to write down a list of general principles they all subscribe to. He is no longer saying that it should be called a new Atlantic charter, and he has not suggested what he thinks the list ought to contain, but he does insist that such a list exists: it is what makes the European community and the United States, among others, parts of a recognisable entity. No government in western Europe, not even France's, would for a moment want to contradict him. To do so would be to deny, what every major western politician, including General de Gaulle, has accepted since the original Atlantic charter was put together by Roosevelt and Churchill on a warship in mid-Atlantic, and mid-war, in August, 1941. When M. Pompidou said at Reykjavik that American troops were necessary for the defence of Europe, he was confirming what Mr Kissinger had been driving at: there still is an Atlantic world: Europe and America are not to be cut apart.

Kissinger at the sharp end

But if Mr Kissinger is right, it follows that the
countries which subscribe to this list of shared principles
ought to be able to meet together to discuss the things
they happen to disagree about. It need not be a meeting
of heads of government, and Mr Kissinger concedes that
the great men certainly should not be called together
until there is a reasonable chance that they can agree.
And no single negotiation, at any level, can deal with
everything at once, trade, money, defence, the lot. But
there ought to be some forum in which the members
of this collectivity can compare principles with
performance.

This is the American argument for a multilateral meet-
ing. It sounds straightforward enough ; everything that
has just been said is quite true. And yet it seems to
have got the Europeans tied in knots. There is first of
all the question of who should attend such a meeting.
It would have to include at least the whole of Nato, to
dcal with the d>fence issue, plus Ireland, which is a
member of the European community but not of Nato ;
the Brussels commission would want to be there to talk
about trade and money, and Switzerland probably ought
to be as well ; and if Switzerland were there it would
be nonsense not to invite Japan. It would have to be
a very large assembly, and at any such assembly two
things would immediately become apparent : that there
was no single voice speaking for the European community,
and that the United States was much the biggest and
most powerful country present.

The governments of the European community do not re-
lish either of those things, but their officials who deal with
the economic side of life are even more concerned about
the point France's new foreign minister has been hammer-
ing away at. If all the three subjects of defence, trade

and money can be discussed in a single multilateral
forum, M. Jobert says, the Americans will use the leverage
provided by those indispensable American troops defend-
ing Europe to make the Europeans give them the better
end of the deal on trade and money. That is the basis
of the French argument for limiting the next stage of
the proceedings to a series of bilateral meetings between
America and each of its main allies. It needs to be added
that, even if there were a wider meeting, M. Jobert's
own government prevents the European community from
attempting to argue on equal terms with the Americans,
by saying that the community's constitution does not
allow it to discuss politics and defence as a community.
When the community's foreign ministers discussed the
whole business at Luxemburg on Tuesday, for instance,
they were not even able to do so in their formal capacity
as the council of ministers, precisely because of French
legalism on this point. No wonder they got nowhere.

The decisions are coming up

These are all genuine problems ; but they do not justify
prolonging even longer the European silence about the
ideas Mr Kissinger put up on April 23rd. The silence, or
rather the confused mumbling, is not only too revealing
about the present condition of the European community.
It is also mumbling while issues burn, and the fire draws
closer.

The point is that all the specific issues the Atlantic
world is actually disagreeing about are coming up
for negotiation in one way or another pretty soon,
anyway. Quite apart from what has to be done about
the dollar, there is a longstanding negotiation about the
world's monetary system, the next formal stage of which
will be the International Monetary Fund meeting in
Nairobi in September. There is going to be a great big
worldwide palaver of a negotiation about trade, due to
start on September 12th. Quite soon the Americans will
once again be asking the European members of Nato to
pay more towards the cost of keeping American troops
in Europe. All these things are on the way, and each
of them will be discussed, quite rightly, in its own appro-
priate forum. The question is whether the countries
around the North Atlantic which say they have certain
things in common should sit down together at some level
or other—deputy foreign ministers is what Mr Kissinger
is suggesting at the moment—to cast a general eye over
the whole range of subjects.

The uncomfortable truth is that, when some Europeans
hesitate to accept this idea, the reasons that make them
hesitate are reflections of the reality of power in the
early 1970s. It is true that there is no single voice capable
of speaking for the European community, and there is
not going to be one within the period of the present
negotiations. It is true that, as a direct result of this,
in any international meeting except one with the Russians
the United States is the biggest voice around the table.
Above all, it is true that there is a difference between
two of the subjects now coming up for discussion, trade
and money, and the third, defence. In each of the first
two, there is a rough balance between the demands the
European community and the United States are making
of each other, and the concessions they might hope to
extract from one another. These are fully two-sided
subjects.

There is no such neat symmetry in the matter of
defence. The Americans have troops in Europe, which
Europe knows very well it needs; there are no European

CONTINUED PAGE 4-E

3-E

JUNE 9, 1973

9

rapid transit system within a year and a half, down-
zone undeveloped land so the city's population will
not exceed four million, put more patrolmen on the
street and appoint new faces to the city commissions.
But how well Bradley does seems less important at the
moment than the simple fact that eight years after the
Watts uprising, the voters of America's third largest
city, 85 percent of whom are white, are not afraid to
have a black mayor.

The Nixon Watch
Kissinger & Haig

This piece is about two men in the President's service, Henry Kissinger and General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., whom I have admired in the past without serious reservation. In my opinion, they continue to serve Mr. Nixon and through him the country in necessary and useful ways at a time when he and the country need all the help that's available. At the moment and specifically, they are doing what they appear to believe they honorably can do to help the President survive the Watergate scandals and, while doing this, diminish the stain from those scandals that inevitably touches them. The fact that it touches them is in itself evidence and a part of the encompassing Watergate tragedy. What follows is an effort to place their roles in a perspective that does them justice without minimizing the enormous offense against the public good and against decency in the public service that Watergate in its totality constitutes.

It must be said that the offense is compounded by
everyone, beginning with the President and including
Kissinger and Haig among others at the White House,
who in whatever ways and for whatever reasons tries
to obscure and narrow adequate understanding of
what the varied evils now labeled "Watergate" involve
and signify. That is precisely what the President,
Kissinger, Haig and the few other assistants who are
trusted and relied upon at the seat of the endangered
Nixon presidency are trying to do. No absolution for
that effort and the distortions of fact and understand-
ing that result from it is offered here. The sole points
to be made in behalf of the immediate subjects, Kiss-
singer and Haig, in their current roles as the Presi-
dent's defenders are that they and others in more or
less equivalent positions at the White House must do
what they are doing so long as they choose to serve a
President who clings to his office as Mr. Nixon is
clinging to his; and that, on the basis of the facts
known at this writing, they do not deserve the worst
of the hard time they are getting in much of the Water-
gate reporting and comment.

Because General Haig is the lesser known of the

two, we begin with him. He is a professional soldier
and he was an army colonel when, at age 44, he joined
Kissinger's National Security Council staff in 1969
after tours at the Defense Department and at West
Point. In four years the President promoted him to
brigadier and major general and, last January, jumped
him past the three-star grade of lieutenant general to
four-star rank and made him the army's vice chief of
staff. During the four years of Haig's NSC duty, the
last 30 months of it as Kissinger's only deputy assist-
ant for national security affairs, I never heard any-
thing but good about Haig from the harried assistants,
nearly all of them civilians, who labored under the
Kissinger lash and found in Colonel and General
Haig a capacity for calm and orderly performance
under pressure that Kissinger notoriously lacks. Mr.
Nixon evidently found a good deal more in Haig: he
alone among Kissinger's associates came to share the
President's confidence and to be consulted by him in
matters of high policy in anything like the degree that
Henry Kissinger shared it and was consulted.

In retrospect, however, one perceives qualities in
Haig that a former cadet who had some dealings
with him at West Point, where Haig was a regimental
commander and deputy commandant, describes in
admittedly hostile fashion in a recent issue of the
Village Voice. The sometime cadet is Lucien K. Trus-
cott IV, grandson of a famous World War II general and
son of a career army officer. Beneath Haig's "charisma
and leadership ability," Cadet Truscott detected "a
compulsive desire to keep everything within the regi-
ment," including rampant marijuana smoking and
honor code violations, and an absolute regard for
vested authority and sanctity of orders. Soon after
Haig was recalled from the Pentagon to replace dis-
carded H. R. Haldeman as the President's administra-
tive chief of staff at the White House, I heard stories
about him in his earlier NSC role that seem to reflect
some of the qualities noted by Truscott. At the time of
the Cambodia invasion in 1970, when several of Kiss-
singer's assistants quit, Haig in his rage and disgust
showed a dismaying inability to grasp or acknowledge
the possibility that good men might put principle
above orders and higher authority. The NSC resigna-
tions occurred for a variety of reasons, objection to
the Cambodia operation among them but not in most
instances the primary cause. Even so, they didn't justi-
fy the harsh and critical reaction from Haig that some
of the victims now recount. Truscott concludes in his
savage memoir that Haig as the President's White
House administrator is ideally suited to the obfusca-
tion and concealment of past wrongs that the job
requires and may be better at it than Bob Haldeman
was. To me, the chief significance of Haig's return to
the White House is its evidence of the President's
pathetic shortage of people whom he trusts and to
whom he can turn in a time of extreme need. Some-
thing is said about the President's plight when he has

10

THE NEW REPUBLIC

to deprive the army of its vice chief of staff and install
a four-star general in a job that a military man simply
shouldn't be doing. Still more is said when Mr. Nixon
has to look for excuses to keep General Haig in an
essentially political and civilian function for at least
a year because nobody else with his recognized skills
and reputation for integrity is known and available
to the President.

One of General Haig's recent duties has been to
urge upon certain reporters and commentators the
view that the domestic surveillance, wiretapping and
related measures that the President has confessed to
instituting in 1969 really have nothing to do with the
overall Watergate scandals in which these activities
have become enmeshed and should not only be dis-
tinguished from the Watergate evil but justified on
the ground that they were as necessary for "national
security" as Mr. Nixon said they were on May 22.
Columnist Joseph Kraft's assertion the other day that
Haig in the process "has been blackening reputations
and disclosing the contents of wiretaps-itself a viola-
tion of the law" was excessive and may have been
based upon misinformation. But General Haig's White
House assignment opens him to the charge and, at the
least, makes him by definition a participant in and
abettor of the President's transparent effort to cloak
himself and his stingily acknowledged responsibil-
ity for the Watergate climate in the camouflage of
national security.

Now for Henry Kissinger and his part in the same
endeavor. My sympathies are with Kissinger and not
with the whining complaint that the NSC assistants
whose home telephones were tapped in the course of
the aforementioned surveillance operations were out-
rageously imposed upon in violation of their civil and
personal rights. People who hold NSC and similar
staff jobs at the core of national security policy formu-
lation-and there are compelling considerations of
national security, despite the President's protective
abuse of them-waive normal rights to personal pri-
vacy. Competent professionals in such jobs under-
stand this and accept the occasional consequences.
The acknowledged tapping of four journalists' phones
that also occurred between 1969 and early 1971 is a
different affair, but there could be and perhaps were
justifying reasons for that as well. All of which is pre-
lude to my view that Henry Kissinger mishandled but
did not disqualify himself when the issue was raised
by disclosure of the taps on some of his assistants. He
dissimulated, he equivocated, he came mighty close
to lying as Joe Kraft asserted he did, before he finally
got around to saying publicly on May 28 that "my
office supplied [to the FBI] the names of some of the
individuals who had access to the information that
was being investigated" and adding: "I am responsi-
ble for what happens in my office and I won't give the
names of the people who did it." The man who did it
for Kissinger was Haig. Both of them were acting on

the President's authority and both of them, in the
sense already indicated, must share with him some of
the responsibility for the White House climate that
produced Watergate.

John Osborne

A Food Shortage Next Year?

The Grain Drain

An unexpected order went out on March 23 from the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to its field offices
directing a quick sale on a "highest bid" basis of grain
stored in government bins and warehouses. Few ele-
vator operators or farmers were in a position to take
advantage of the offer, however, and by March 26 the
field offices were told to report unsold amounts to the
Kansas City office. A crash drive to unload the re-
mainder on the big grain companies followed. Within
24 hours, most of some 25 to 26 million bushels of corn
in government storage had been sold, all but five or six
million of it to the large firms. Not all the details are
known, but officials of some of the firms have told
friends that USDA all but begged them to "take it off
our hands," apparently because the order to sell had
come directly from the White House. The big dealers
were able to dictate their own terms, such as no cash
down payments and free storage until grain could be
moved. Having insured themselves of free storage
with no initial cash investment, the big firms could
sell the grain on "futures contracts" at prices up to
50 cents per bushel above the purchase figure. This
means the sudden USDA sale could yield a $10 million
bonanza to the big companies. The biggest share,
perhaps half the total, will go to Continental Grain,
the firm that signed on former assistant secretary of
Agriculture Clarence Palmby after he helped negotiate
the Russian wheat deal last year.

The whole episode so enraged Sen. Harold E.
Hughes (D, Iowa) that he has asked the General
Accounting Office (GAO) for an investigation. Hughes
has accused USDA of selling with "unexplained haste
and under circumstances which would appear to favor
the big grain dealers." A preliminary report from
GAO is expected soon.

The timing of the sale was extraordinary. The corn
belt from Ohio across the Midwest into eastern Ne-
braska has suffered one of its wettest periods in his-
tory. Last fall heavy rains and early snows severely
hampered the 1972 harvest (there's still a lot of corn in
the field in Missouri and Iowa, most of it ruined).
Once the bulk of the crop was in, it needed to be dried
out. Fuel for the purpose was in short supply, so more
of the harvest was ruined. Fall plowing was out of the

HENRY 6-10

HAK, Scowcroft - L.L.D.

## WORLD HORIZONS FOR RELEASE SUNDAY JUNE 17 OR THEREAFTER--
(SOLO)

### EIGHT-YEAR-OLD KISSINGER BOOK REQUIRED READING IN EUROPE

BY RICHARD C. LONGWORTH

BRUSSELS (UPI) -- AN EIGHT-YEAR-OLD BOOK WHICH ATTRACTED ONLY MODEST ATTENTION WHEN IT WAS FIRST PUBLISHED HAS SUDDENLY BECOME REQUIRED READING IN THE CHANCELLERIES OF EUROPE.

THE AUTHOR WAS HENRY KISSINGER AND THE BOOK--THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE--IS THE ONLY ONE OF KISSINGER'S FIVE PUBLICATIONS TO DEAL SOLELY WITH EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

ACCORDINGLY, EUROPEANS ARE READING KISSINGER THE PROFESSOR, VINTAGE 1965, FOR THE LIGHT IT SHEDS ON THE CONCEPTS AND DESIGNS OF KISSINGER AND THE STATESMAN, 1973 MODEL--AND PARTICULARLY WHAT HE MEANS BY HIS PROPOSAL FOR A "NEW ATLANTIC CHARTER."

PART OF THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP IS EYE-POPPING. KISSINGER'S MAIN THEME IS THE NEED FOR "A POLITICAL BODY AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL FOR CONCERTING THE POLICIES OF THE NATIONS BORDERING THE NORTH ATLANTIC."

IN THE VERY LONG RUN, HE SAYS, "THE WEST REQUIRES A LARGER GOAL: THE CONSTITUTION OF AN ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH IN WHICH ALL THE PEOPLES BORDERING THE NORTH ATLANTIC CAN FULFILL THEIR ASPIRATIONS."

### "ATLANTIC CHARTER"

THIS GOES FAR BEYOND THE VAGUE AIMS PROPOSED IN KISSINGER'S "ATLANTIC CHARTER" SPEECH OF APRIL 23. IN THAT SPEECH, HE SAID THE ALLIES MUST "REINVIGORATE SHARED IDEALS AND COMMON PURPOSES" SO AS TO FIND A "NEW RELATIONSHIP."

KISSINGER CALLED FOR "UNIFYING FRAMEWORK...FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF DIVERSITY," BUT SAID THE "COMMON OBJECTIVES" SHOULD "BE PURSUED WITH CONSIDERABLE TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY."

THE SPEECH WAS NO MORE SPECIFIC THAN THAT. THIS IS WHY EUROPEAN LEADERS ARE RE-READING OLD COPIES OF THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP AND ARE WONDERING HOW CLOSELY KISSINGER STILL HEWS TO THE IDEAS HE OUTLINED THEN.

SOME PASSAGES OF THE BOOK CLEARLY FORESHADOW THE "CHARTER" SPEECH. FOR INSTANCE, HE WROTE THAT THE ALLIES INEVITABLY WILL HAVE DIFFERENT PRIORITIES AND THERE SHOULD BE "AN ALLIED STRUCTURE WHICH MAKES POSSIBLE A VARIETY OF COORDINATED APPROACHES ON SOME ISSUES" WHILE ALLOWING "A PERMISSIBLE RANGE OF DIVERGENCE."

BUT HE WENT ON TO STATE THAT "IF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS TO RETAIN ANY VITALITY, IT REQUIRES A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY...IN ITS ABSENCE, THE ATTEMPT TO DEVISE A COMMON MILITARY STRATEGY IS LIKELY TO PROVE FUTILE."

### NATO POLITICAL ARM

THE ONLY MODEL FOR COOPERATION WHICH HE SUGGESTED WAS A "POLITICAL BODY" CONNECTED WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) TO "FORMULATE COMMON ATLANTIC PURPOSES AND DEFINE THE LIMITS OF AUTONOMOUS ACTION WHERE INTERESTS DIVERGE. IT SHOULD GIVE POLITICAL GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS..."

THIS BODY OR "EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE" WOULD HAVE SIX MEMBERS, INCLUDING FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS--AMERICA, BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND WEST GERMANY--AND ONE MEMBER ELECTED BY THE SMALLER NATO NATIONS. A TWO-THIRDS VOTE WOULD BE BINDING, ALTHOUGH DISSENTING NATIONS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO APPEAL TO THE FULL NATO COUNCIL AND OTHER "ESCAPE CLAUSES."

ACCORDING TO THE BOOK, A CLOSER EUROPEAN UNITY WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE THROUGH A TIGHTER-KNIT SUBGROUP OF EUROPEAN NATO NATIONS.

THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP WAS WRITTEN AS THE BLOOM WAS BEGINNING TO FADE FROM THE U.S. "GRAND DESIGN" FOR A TIGHT PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE.

THE BOOK NOTED THAT, EVEN BACK IN 1965, EUROPEANS WERE CHALLENGING "NOT JUST THE TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF AMERICAN PLANS BUT THE VALIDITY OF AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS." THE RELATIVELY LIMP REACTION IN EUROPE TO THE "ATLANTIC CHARTER" PROPOSAL INDICATED THIS SITUATION HAS NOT CHANGED.

(ADVANCE WORLD HORIZONS FOR 6-17 RELEASE)

UPI 06-10 06:53 AED

Kathy

Whatever Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai may think of Watergate, the leaders of the People's Republic of China are not talking. No change is seen, however, in basic policy with the U.S.

David Bruce, special envoy to the People's Republic, may sound out Mao and Chou on visiting the United States. Henry Kissinger remains an important link between the two countries.

# Watergate: The View From China

by Lloyd Shearer

**W**hat effect has the infamous Watergate scandal had upon U.S.-Chinese relations?

What do Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the venerated leaders of the People's Republic of China, think of the Nixon Administration now?

No one knows, of course, because neither of these elder statesmen is speaking. But the day-to-day developments of the sordid, reputation-destroying mess have been reported here in the daily news bulletin, "News From Foreign Agencies and Press," distributed by the Hsinhua News Agency throughout China.

## The latest dirt

Moreover, anyone who has a short-wave radio receiver—and this includes every embassy, hotel, and almost every foreign journalist in Peking—tunes in the morning and nightly news, broadcast by the BBC (British Broadcasting Corp.) and the Voice of America specifically to obtain the latest Watergate dirt.

One result is that the Chinese currently refer to Watergate as the "Suei-men Scandal."

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, whose summit talks in the U.S. are slated June 18-26. China, of course, will be watching and hoping that he stumbles.

"Suei" means water in Chinese, and "men" means gate.

The Chinese are a traditionally polite and circumspect people. When PA-RADE asked many Chinese officials their personal opinions on Watergate, most of them smiled and replied gently with a variation of, "We do not concern ourselves with the internal affairs of other nations."

## Nixon's purge

One Peking source, however, when persistently pressed for his reaction, reluctantly explained his views. "Nixon has had to purge his politburo," he said, "of such men as Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and others. I gather these were not particularly popular or elected officials to begin with. In other governments these purges go on all the time, and we are accustomed to them. But for this to happen in the United States Government—it is to say the least, most unusual.

"I do not believe," he continued, "that Watergate will change the basic policy of friendship and amity our two nations have embarked upon. Even if a great calamity should befall the American President—perhaps even the de-

struction of his credibility—there is still Henry Kissinger to maintain the continuity of the relationship begun by our two countries in February, 1972. And even if Kissinger should depart, one must remember that nations are more enduring than the men who rule or represent them.

"Chairman Mao and Premier Chou did not enter into an agreement with Richard Nixon but with the United States of America. And that is why your special envoy, Mr. David Bruce, is here in Peking in charge of the U.S. liaison mission."

## Diversionary tactic?

On embassy row in the Chinese capital, rumors were generated that Bruce, the first U.S. diplomat of near-ambassadorial rank assigned to the People's Republic of China since the Communist takeover in 1949, would eventually sound out the Chinese on the possibility of Mao Tse-tung or Chou En-lai visiting the United States.

Such a move, one European diplomat pointed out, would serve as a diversionary tactic, would in effect change the focus of American interest from Watergate to foreign affairs.

Although the U.S.-China relationship has now reached the honeymoon stage, the Chinese are far too clever to let themselves be used so overtly. Peking is not about to help Richard Nixon remove his burned chestnuts from the fires of Watergate.

Peking is perfectly content to let its arch enemy, the Soviet Union, involve itself in that highly perilous mission. Let Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, visit the United States and tie his foreign policy to Richard Nixon. Let him make speeches in Washington about the dawning of a new era of peace. But not Chairman Mao or Premier Chou.

## Recall Khrushchev

Both of them well know what happened to another Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in 1959, when at the height of his popularity, he visited President Eisenhower and contributed to what was subsequently called "The Spirit of Camp David."

Gary Powers and the CIA-sponsored U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took care of Khrushchev's popularity with the Soviet military leaders. And he was reduced to a non-person.

Brezhnev, whose visit is due June 18-26, may prove far more adroit than Khrushchev in protecting his flanks, both on the Soviet home front and the Eastern European bloc. But in China the hope is widespread that he will fall flat on his face and somehow get splattered with the Watergate mud.

The shortwave radios in Peking are tuned in hopefully to the possible sound of such splatter.

4

PARADE • JUNE 10, 1973