NEW YORK TIMES

10 FEBRUARY 72

# Mr. Nixon's State of the World

The report to the Congress on President Nixon's foreign policy is described by Henry Kissinger, its chief author, as "a framework for a debate on foreign policy in this country." And, he adds, "we would welcome a debate." The challenge is unlikely to be ignored. But it confronts the Democrats with serious difficulties. In what is essentially a campaign document for the 1972 Presidential election, Mr. Nixon can be seen between the lines relishing the extent to which he has stolen the opposition's shirt.

Seldom in Western politics since Disraeli's Reform Bill of 1867—when Lord Derby boasted, "We've dished the Whigs"—has a national leader so completely turned his back on a lifetime of beliefs to adopt those of his political opponents. Mr. Nixon's objective is clear. The Democrats, he said a few weeks ago, can try to make an issue of the economy or the problems of the cities or of youth, "but we have the peace issue—that is our greatest strength."

As proof that President Nixon can bring the nation "a generation of peace," the so-called State of the World message catalogues with recognizable campaign hyperbole a three-year record of initiatives, progress and "breakthroughs" in foreign policy. Switches in policy are described as needed to meet changes in the world, as they surely were.

Two pictures to come—Mr. Nixon with Mao and with Brezhnev—will say more to many voters than the 100,000 words in yesterday's report. They will signal that the cold war has given way to a truce and parleys. But analysis of Mr. Nixon's report shows that the world is more complicated and his policies less clear than this would indicate.

Whatever happens in Peking, President Nixon's reversal of two decades of American policy toward China is a historic event. A dialogue has replaced belligerency on both sides.

WASHINGTON POST

9 JANUAR 1972

Summitry (I)

Among all the superlatives that might be applied to Mr. Nixon's forthcoming "summit" meetings in Peking and Moscow (and more than a few already have been applied by the President) surely the safest is that no comparable diplomatic initiatives in history have been the subject of as much advance build-up and ballyhoo. For that reason among others, this might be a good time to look back over the record of summitry during the cold war years in search of some sounder perspective on what may lie ahead.

The process could be said to have begun in 1953:

Stalin had just died and Winston Churchill, urging that East-West conflicts be addressed in "a conference on the highest level," said: "If there is not at the summit of nations the will to win the greatest prize and greatest honor offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility will fall upon those who now possess the power to decide. At the worst, the participants in the meeting could have established more intimate contacts, and at best we might have a generation of peace (sic)."

Departing for Geneva in 1955, President Eisenhower sounded precisely Churchill's note: "For the first time, a President goes to engage in a conference with the heads of other governments in order to prevent wars . . . if we change the spirit in which these conferences are conducted we will have taken the greatest step toward peace, toward future prosperity and tranquility that has ever been taken in the history of mankind." He returned to Washington more soberly, saying, "Just what will be the result of this conference, of course, no one knows but the coming months will tell much." Indeed they did. There followed the Hungarian Revolution and Suez invasion of 1956: Berlin exploded in 1958. Of Ike's Geneva topics—Germany; East Europe, "international communism," arms control, East-West contacts—only the last bore fruit in his presidency.

It was, then, a chastened Eisenhower who invited Nikita Khrushchev to visit this country in 1959 "to give him the opportunity to see . . . America" and to exchange political views in the hope that "serious exploratory efforts may reveal new opportunities for practical progress toward removal of some of the causes of world tensions." Following their discussions at Camp David, the two leaders reported only that they had agreed to reopen talks on Berlin (which remained under Soviet ultimatum) and to increase cultural exchanges. At his next press conference a reporter asked if he and Khrushchev had melted some of the East-West ice and he replied: "the most that could be done here . . . is a beginning."

Nonetheless, the next May found him in Paris for a Big Four summit "of historic importance . . . The issues that divide the free world from the Soviet bloc are grave and not subject to easy solution. But if goodwill exists on both sides, at least a beginning can be made." This was not to be. The U-2 incident collapsed the summit before it opened, leaving Soviet-American relations worse off. "We did hope to make some progress," Mr. Eisenhower explained, but "we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about." "An extraordinary personality" to Ike the previous September, Khrushchev now became to him a "despot."

John Kennedy, about to meet Khrushchev in

Vienna in 1961, said carefully that his purpose was "to permit me to make a more precise judgment on those matters which involve the interests of the United States." Back home, he insisted that the meeting had not been "a full-fledged summit meeting with a fixed agenda and a large corps of advisers, where negotiations are attempted," but an "informal exchange." It had been "a very sober two days . . . at least the chances of a dangerous misjudgment on either side should now be less . . . We have wholly different views of right and wrong, of what is an internal affair and what is aggression . . . the question was whether these two systems can ever hope to live in peace . . ." There followed the Berlin Wall and a major Berlin crisis, the Soviet termination of the moratorium on atmospheric nuclear testing; deterioration in Vietnam (despite a treaty "neutralizing" Laos), and the Cuban missile crisis.

Lyndon Johnson's summit with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, N.J., in June, 1967, was announced only the night before, with no statement of his own by the President. "When nations have deeply different positions, as we do on these issues [ABM, Mideast, Vietnam]," he reported afterwards, "they do not come to agreement merely by improving their understanding of each other's views. But such improvement helps . . . We must all remember that there have been many meetings before . . ." Mr. Johnson was about to announce his own trip to Moscow, in order to open the SALT talks, when, in mid-1968 the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia. He stayed home. SALT was delayed a year.

The record of eight Soviet-American summits planned over a span of nearly 20 years, then, shows that: two produced good atmospherics for a short while (Spirit of Geneva 1955, Spirit of Camp David 1959); none produced agreements or significant progress towards agreements (except in cultural exchanges; at least two were followed by unusually bad patches in East-West affairs (1955, 1961); and two were aborted (1960, 1968). Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who had the benefit of Mr. Eisenhower's experience, avoided his extravagant rhetoric but were not compensated by the Kremlin for their restraint. One is struck by the fact that of the few significant measurable improvements in East-West relations over two decades—such as the Austrian peace treaty, the partial test ban and the Berlin agreement—all have come from the ongoing process of diplomacy, none from the stir of a summit.

In our judgment, only one summit comes close to meriting judgment as a moderate success: Glassboro 1967. No great expectations were gotten up for it, sober and substantial communication seems to have gone on at the table, and its results apparently did not unhinge either side, although Lyndon Johnson was left with a further taste of summitry, which taste turned sour indeed. We are baffled if not dismayed that Mr. Nixon should feel otherwise. He said to CBS last Sunday: "... the Glassboro summit was a failure. When summits are not well planned, when they have for their purpose just cosmetics, they raise hopes and then there is a great thud when they fall down." This judgment, and the reading of history, implicit in it, raise trouble some questions about the President's approach to summits of his own—questions which will be the subject of a second editorial.

3-E

WASHINGTON
10 JANUARY
Summit

In his second press conference in office, President Nixon (speaking of the Kremlin) endorsed—unexceptionably—"a well-prepared summit meeting, where we have on the table the various differences that we have on which we can perhaps make progress." It was only "instant summitry"—an evident reference to the quickly arranged Johnson-Kosygin summit at Glassboro in 1967—that he opposed. But later, his own forthcoming summits in Peking and Moscow were arranged, and Mr. Nixon began speaking regularly of his desire to bring a "generation of peace," the phrase which Winston Churchill had introduced into the vocabulary of summitry back in 1953. By this January 2 Mr. Nixon was saying to CBS: "Summits which are held for the sake of having summits are a very bad idea, but when you are dealing with governments which have basically one-man rule . . . then for the major decisions summitry sometimes becomes a necessity." (Italics added.)

In fact, evidently anticipating charges of returning from Peking with no important agreements in hand, Mr. Nixon has already undertaken to trim some of his rhetoric and to describe that trip in terms that will help keep a credibility gap from opening. The fact of the trip ("the greatest surprise in history") he has exploited widely—we wonder if any other President would do otherwise. But he told Time its benefits might not bearent for "5, 10 or 15 years," adding in his CBS interview that its major purpose was to set up "that long dialogue which may avert what would otherwise be an inevitable clash." We entirely agree that the setting up of a dialogue with Peking is essential, and fully deserving of a Presidential launching. Our questions go to the way it is being done.

The other day we expressed our suspicion that Mr. Nixon's tilt toward Pakistan, otherwise hard to fathom, was owed at least in part to his wish to bolster his image in Peking as a firm, tough operator in Asia. Dan Rather of CBS raised a further point, asking Mr. Nixon if, by going to Peking (and Moscow) in an election year, he might be under such pressure for an electoral coup that he would lose "bargaining advantage." The President assured his audience that this would not be the case, insisting that "the wrong kind of agreement" with Peking (or Moscow) "would not be worth making." But the denial does not finish off the doubt.

NEW YORK TIMES

16 JANUARY 1972 (17)

Arms Talks:

Under the
Deadline of
The Visit
To Moscow

VIENNA—"We don't want a dancing congress," Soviet and American arms negotiators told their Austrian hosts in an effort to avoid the lavish ceremony and festive socializing that accompanied the historic Congress of Vienna in 1815. However historic their own efforts to put a ceiling on the nuclear arms race, the men from Moscow and Washington wanted to be left alone to labor in secret.

Through 27 months of talks here and in Helsinki, the arms race has maintained its momentum and the negotiators have maintained an almost monastic silence. But President Nixon's visit to Moscow next May impose a deadline for reaching some workable agreement. To miss that deadline, some diplomats fear, would risk the collapse of the entire effort.

Despite the curtain of secrecy shrouding the talks, unofficial reports indicate progress in some aspects of the negotiations. And from these reports, it was possible last week to get a fair picture of where the talks stand.

The essentials of the strategic tug-of-war have been apparent from the start of the negotiations in November, 1969. The Soviets entered the talks in an effort to head off large-scale deployment of an American antimissile defense (ABM) system while trying to achieve a parity in offensive arsenals, especially the giant SS-9 Intercontinental rockets (ICBMs). These are capable of carrying 25-negaton warheads.

Both nations were impelled to negotiate with a common objective: holding their massive nuclear arsenals at levels where neither side could feel confident of launching a surprise attack that would destroy the other's capability to strike back. Thus, the nuclear balance of terror—and nuclear deterrence—would be stabilized.

But while the negotiators have carefully threaded their way through the labyrinth of technical complexities, both sides have greatly improved their arsenals.

When the talks began, the Americans had 1,054 land-based ICBM's, 656 more on submarines, 100 strategic bombers and no ABM system. The Soviets had about 1,100 land-based ICBM's, 100 to 200 sea-based missiles, about 200 strategic bombers and 64 launchers in the ABM system defending Moscow and European Russia.

Today, the American offensive arsenal remains the same size, but is qualitatively more menacing. Multiple warheads are being mounted on half of the ICBM's and on three-fourths of the nuclear submarine. Moreover, ABM's are under construction around three American ICBM sites.

The size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal has been sharply expanded to include more than 1,500 ICBM's and nearly 500 missiles based on operational submarines, plus another 200 slated to go on submarines now under construction. Some Washington officials believe that the Soviets also have started using multiple warheads on ICBM's.

Against this backdrop, the arms negotiators are reportedly making some headway toward a ceiling on ABM's and another ceiling on ICBM's and strategic bombers. But they are miles apart on what to do about undersea missiles, currently the most rapidly developing sector of the arms race, and they have given up on trying to limit such qualitative improvements as multiple warheads.

The Russians have proposed limiting both sides to 100 ABM launchers; this would be enough to insure that some retaliatory ICBM's would survive a surprise attack but not enough to provide complete protection. Partly because the Soviets have more ICBM's, the Americans want more ABM's.—200

to Russia's 100. Soviet negotiators are said to have hinted recently that they may compromise later and give Washington a slight edge.

Another reported development would favor a freeze, at the present over-all levels, of ICBM's and bombers, although the Russians have yet to respond to American demands for a sub-quota of roughly 300 SS-9's. Washington officials have long felt that the Soviets understood this was an essential ingredient of any agreement and eventually will acquiesce on this point.

More worrisome to some Americans is the deadlock on limiting undersea arsenals. A few months ago, the Soviets reportedly refused to discuss an American-proposed freeze on "blue water missiles." More recently, they have said that this freeze can be discussed only on the condition that the United States will also discuss limiting its nuclear-armed jets based in Western Europe, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. But the Americans declined,

their prestige investment in the arms talks has been so great that each side would be hurt by a failure to reach some agreement in time for President Nixon's visit to Moscow.

Earlier this month, a Hungarian magazine quoted Soviet officials as saying they expected an accord in time, adding the comment that signing a treaty in Moscow would "be a sensation in the best sense of the word." American officials, knowing the election-year benefits for Mr. Nixon, clearly share the expectation. But they are uncertain about how much will be included, especially on offensive limitations.

So far, no major element of a treaty has been agreed upon. Major decisions at the highest political levels are needed to resolve the most important issues—the deadlock on undersea missiles, the sub-quota on SS-9's or the numbers of ABM launchers. Such decisions are unlikely until after Mr. Nixon returns from his trip to Communist China next month and both sides have had time to digest that venture.

One knowledgeable diplomat predicts that the bargaining on any strategic-arms limitation treaty will go "right down to the wire" before the President's journey to Moscow.

—HEDRICK SMITH

NEW YORK TIMES - 24 JANUARY 1972

# Nixon's SALT Choice

By ROBERT KLEIMAN

President Nixon's latest effort to slow the nuclear weapons race by stepping it up, this time with a new submarine missile system, poses a familiar danger. Experience shows that "bargaining chips" of this kind, instead of being bargained away, tend to pile up and even complicate negotiations. Since the start of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in 1969, each side has added a hydrogen warhead a day to its arsenal, a total of 800.

Mr. Nixon's budget request for $900 million to speed development of an underwater long-range missile system (ULMS) may be designed to pressure Moscow into negotiating a mutual cutoff in missile submarine construction, as proposed by Washington. But insistence on a submarine freeze while the Soviet Union is lagging behind might simply hold back the first-stage SALT agreement that now is within reach on other, more vital matters—without halting Russia's submarine buildup.

Some agreed language already has been drafted for a treaty limiting defensive antiballistic missile (ABM) systems—the key to curbing the missile race. A moratorium on further deployment of offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), including the giant SS-9's, also appears feasible. Important new Soviet proposals were made last month, and the Vienna talks have been marking time ever since, pending White House decisions. Why the delay?

On the ABM issue, Moscow's new proposals appear to have brought agreement within reach on the critical matter of radars, their nature, number and location, something the Soviet Union originally was reluctant to dis-

cuss at all. Russia also has advanced several counterproposals in recent months to meet Washington's insistence on 200 ABM launchers to protect two Minuteman ICBM sites, while limiting the Soviet Union to protection of Moscow with 100 anti-missiles.

Currently, the Soviet Union has formally proposed to defend Moscow and one of its ICBM fields with 100 launchers each, using the American argument that stable deterrence is benefited by defense of ICBM's, so why does Washington object? Once everything else is settled, the U.S.S.R. hints, it will not insist on precise parity in ABM launchers anyway.

It is a major irony that American arms control proposals should encourage the Kremlin to deploy more numerous and more modern ABM's than the 64 obsolete antimissiles the Soviet Union was content to retain in the Moscow area. A zero-ABM accord, earlier suggested by both sides but pursued by neither, would serve both superpowers and world peace far more.

Short of that, the lower the ABM level, the less the incentive on both sides to expand MIRV multiple warheads and other offensive missiles. The traditional offense-defense race in weaponry would be interrupted. The way would be open later for a second-stage SALT agreement to curb MIRV and wind down the offensive missile race on the basis of parity.

Theoretically, parity at sea could be assured by an early cutoff date on submarine construction. Without counting obsolete three-missile diesel subs, the number of sixteen-missile nuclear submarines now deployed by Russia or under construction totals about 41, equal to the American Polaris-Poseidon fleet. But America's British and French allies are deploying

eight Polaris-type subs. And inconvenience, more difficult geography, shorter missile-range and much less submarine "loiter time" near target disadvantage the Russians.

Robert Kleiman is a member of the editorial board of The Times.

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE 30 January 1972

# Soviet, U. S. Arms Talks Not So Secret

VIENNA, Jan. 29 (UPD) — The most secret talks in the history of Soviet-American relations are not quite so secret as they used to be.

Public diplomacy is being brought to bear on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The talks are expected to come up with an agreement soon. The public diplomacy involving a diplomat's occasional whisper, a leaked news story, an editorial in a Communist newspaper—is an attempt to influence the timing and content of that agreement.

## Agree to Privacy

It was not supposed to be that way. When the talks began in late 1969, both sides agreed to hold the talks in strict privacy, with no announcement to the press or public of what was going on.

Official briefings after the twice-weekly meetings are still highly discreet and nobody involved in the talks will say anything on the record.

But American diplomats who once said almost flatly that Washington wanted a treaty by the time President Nixon goes to Moscow in May, now deny that there is any deadline at all.

The Russians on the other hand, are in a visible hurry.

Soviet diplomats are spreading the word that Nixon is deliberately stalling on a treaty until after his trip to Peking in February.

## Cite Embarrassment

The Soviet line is that Nixon would be embarrassed to meet the Chinese, who often complain about Soviet-American "collusion," just after negotiating a major treaty with Moscow.

The Americans on the other hand, say they are not stalling but "there is so much work to be done" that it will be impossible to complete a treaty before Nixon goes to Peking.

Recent newspaper stories from Washington based on U. S. government sources have laid out the same timetable and have even hinted that Nixon may end up negotiating a treaty himself in Moscow in May.

Neither side wants such delicate negotiations to take place in the harried atmosphere at the summit and the Russians—using the Hungarian press as a mouthpiece—have said as much.

Hungarian magazine, Magyar Orszag, reported from Moscow that while there is "certainly no enthusiasm" there over Nixon's Moscow visit, he "is not expected to come or depart empty-handed. An agreement can be expected on the limitation of strategic armaments."

## See Sensation

If an agreement is signed there, it said, "That will be a sensation in the best sense of the word." If not, the Russians will see the visit as just "a station in Nixon's election campaign."

As diplomats here explain it the Soviets would like a treaty now, before Nixon's Peking trip. They are worried about improving Chinese-American relations. Hence the pressure is on Moscow now to make concessions.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 9 FEBRUARY 1972

# Toward a useful defense debate

By Robert R. Bowie

The large military budget, the prospect of a SALT agreement, and the election assurance that defense issues will be debated vigorously in the coming months. Judging by the past, however, the debate is as likely to confuse as to clarify the problems. To avoid that, it is essential to disentangle the various issues and ask how they relate to each other.

The problems arise both from the massive Soviet military build-up in recent years and from the impact of dynamic weapons technology. Since 1967, the U.S.S.R. has multiplied its strategic nuclear missiles fourfold, so that it now exceeds the United States in total numbers, with 50 percent more land-based ICBMs (of which 300 are far larger than ours) and about two-thirds as many sub-based missiles. The Soviets continue to dig large missile silos and to add about 100 sub-based missiles each year. Meanwhile, the U.S., without increasing total missile, has been installing smaller, multiple warheads on each one. Both sides are improving missile accuracy and have started ABM systems. The U.S.S.R. has also been rapidly expanding its naval forces and conventional mobility.

How do these changes affect deterrence, influence and leverage, and arms control?

First, does Soviet nuclear "parity" or possible "superiority" erode the deterrent against starting or threatening nuclear war? The answer is surely no. The deterrent rests on the ability to retaliate with unacceptable damage, even after a first strike by an adversary. That capacity will continue even though land-based missiles become increasingly vulnerable, and the attacker's "superiority" grows.

Even if no land-based ICBMs survived (most unlikely), the secure sub-based missiles could destroy the fabric of the attacker's society. Indeed, any rational leader, whatever his ideology or ambitions, would probably be deterred by far less: such as the risk to a dozen major cities, which could be devastated by 2 or 3 percent of existing missiles arsenals. Some have suggested that great "superiority" might tempt the holder to make a first-strike against opposing missiles, counting on inhibiting retaliation by the remaining threat to the victim's cities; but such a scenario would be far too risky to be taken seriously in real life. On this analysis, building large-scale ABMs to protect the obsolescing Minuteman would be wasteful, whereas improving the submarine missile forces by extending their range could be sensible insurance.

Does this analysis indicate that the U.S. need keep only a minimum secure nuclear deterrent, no matter how much the Soviets expand theirs? In military terms alone, the answer might be yes. But that is not the whole story: international politics include more than merely war-gaming. The question is: Would disparity — or Soviet "superiority" — even though not usable — affect their conduct or their influence? The truth is, no one can know for certain. Many experts believe the Soviet build-up dates from the Cuba crisis — when the Soviet leaders apparently felt that U.S. superiority gave it an advantage in pressuring them. On the other hand, a good case can be made that other factors — sea power, location, etc. — were actually decisive, since a nuclear exchange would probably have been suicidal even then for the U.S. as well as the U.S.S.R.

If the Soviets think otherwise, however that could be a critical — and dangerous. They might conclude that with "superiority" grows. Even if no land-based they could push us harder in a crisis, out undue risks, which could create an explosive confrontation. Or they may believe that nuclear "superiority" will enable them to intervene safely with conventional naval or air forces, or to pursue gunboat diplomacy. Finally, other nations, in judging the relative power and leverage of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., may well give weight to the comparative nuclear power, even though not expecting it to be used.

The Soviet view on these matters — which may vary among its leaders — will be critical for arms control negotiations. If the Soviet leaders believe that "superiority" in nuclear weapons can be useful for political leverage or influence, they are not likely to agree to restrict such weapons, unless, like ABMs, they would not serve this purpose. If they have concluded, however, that such weapons merely cancel each other out and that "superiority" offers no real political advantage, they should logically want to slow down and even reverse the arms build-up as a wasteful diversion of resources from other needs. Even with this shared aim, the difficulties of actual limitations are staggering: the necessity to equate different strategic systems and weapons, the dynamism of military technology, the Soviet resistance to inspection, the lack of means to check on qualitative changes in weapons, etc. — these would make for slow progress.

But the essential foundation for any control must be a shared conviction that these weapons cannot be converted into political influence or leverage. Whether that exists only time will tell.

Dr. Bowie is director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 MARCH 1972

# Journey to Moscow

The official announcement that President Nixon will visit Moscow in May ends speculation that the Moscow visit might be aborted either because of Soviet suspicions born of the Nixon trip to Peking or the complications attendant on ratification of West Germany's treaties with Moscow and Warsaw.

Whatever the timing of events has done to put Mr. Nixon's Moscow trip in the shade of his Peking experience, the journey to Moscow will be no less historic. No American President has ever been there during his tenure in office; and, in substantive terms, the immediate fruits of the Kremlin negotiations are likely to be greater than those in Peking. At a minimum some agreement limiting strategic weapons is likely to be signed in Moscow; there is also reasonable possibility of progress on other matters, notably trade and cultural exchange.

In a formal sense, the Nixon visit will be a return of the journey which Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev made in September 1959 as President Eisenhower's guest. The Soviet leader traveled widely through the United States, visiting Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines and New York City, among other cities. He was given abundant opportunity to get his ideas across to the American people, including a formal address carried live via television and radio. It will be interesting to see whether now, more than a decade later, President Nixon will have similar opportunities to communicate with the Soviet people.

NEW YORK TIMES 20 MARCH 1972

# The Soviet Union's Increasing Interest

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

ROXBURY, Conn.—In the age of the missile and the nuclear warhead, the Indian Ocean, the world's third largest, represents a vast launching pad for missile-firing submarines.

It is as close or closer to many Russian missile-launchers and industrial centers as the Mediterranean—and less well defended. From south of India across the Himalayas vast stretches of Soviet Siberia and Red China lie within range of sea-based missile attack.

Small wonder that the Indian Ocean—already a theater of global struggle for raw materials and a vital international maritime route—has new-found importance.

So far, the opaque sea water has given the submarine relative invulnerability, and the Indian Ocean has not been vital to U.S. nuclear deterrence. But the vast Soviet expansion program in land-based ICBM's and ABM's, in air defense, in submarine and naval construction and in anti-submarine warfare continues despite the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. If the talks should restrict offensive missiles, and if technological developments should lead to breakthroughs in submarine tracking, the Indian Ocean — with its 28,350,000 square miles of blue water in which to get lost—becomes increasingly important in the "balance of terror."

Major political changes have also altered fundamentally the stability and the power balance in the Indian Ocean area. In place of the colonial empires of yesterday a large number of independent states now border that ocean, which is the vital route for transit of Middle East and Persian Gulf oil to Japan.

Russia has clearly indicated by trade, fishing fleets, intensified oceanographic research, a naval presence, footholds around the Indian Ocean littoral and political and economic aid an increasing interest in the area.

This interest may not fully represent a long-term Grand Design pointed toward the replacement of British power and an ultimate primacy, but the actions taken by Moscow fall into a clear pattern.

In the West, Soviet interest centers upon the Arab-Israeli conflict and maintenance of Soviet positions in Arab lands, and slow penetration of Middle East oil lands.

Opening of the Suez Canal and consolidation of dominant Russian positions at its northern entrance and in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden are obvious

objectives. In Iran, now linked by a gas pipeline to the U.S.S.R., Afghanistan and Pakistan north-south land communications between Russia and the Indian Ocean littoral nations have been tremendously improved. North of Afghanistan, close to Sinkiang and bordering disputed Kashmir, the U.S.S.R. can now support some 22 divisions, intelligence officers estimate, as compared to five or six in 1951.

Eastward there appears to be one primary Soviet motivation—to checkmate Red China; a secondary one to assume dominant power in the area once held by Britain.

Peking must be preoccupied primarily with her land frontiers with the Soviet Union where she faces more than a million Russian troops. But she is competing ideologically everywhere with Russia and has great ideological and political influence in West Bengal — particularly in Calcutta. China's small navy (except for submarines) is chiefly coastal and none can be spared for the Indian Ocean. But she is increasing her trade with African states, is helping to support a small guerrilla war in Oman, supplies left-wing fedayeen movements against Israel, has established a major foothold in Tanzania, is building a railroad from Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam, supports anti-Indian Naga and Mizo tribesmen in Assam and Communist guerrillas in Burma and maintains in Tibet and along the crest of the Himalayas sufficient strength to tie down about ten Indian divisions.

More important are reports, as yet unconfirmed, that Chinese in Dar-es-Salaam are preparing instrumentation to monitor test ICBM's to be launched in China and to overfly the Indian subcontinent to impact point in the Indian Ocean.

To the United States, the winding down of the Vietnam war, the continued turbulence of southeast Asia, the uncertain future of Singapore, for decades the pivot of British power in the Far East, the slow emergence of Indonesia, the prospects of a mercurial Africa, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the increasing importance of raw materials and the vital prize of Middle Eastern oil (particularly to our Allies), and the complete change in the power balance in the Indian subcontinent pose both threat and challenge.

Hanson W. Baldwin, now retired, was formerly military affairs specialist for The Times. This is the first of three articles.

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NEW YORK TIMES 21 MARCH 1972

Nervousness in Moscow

Soviet Communist party chief Leonid L. Brezhnev confirmed yesterday foreign suspicions that the Kremlin is far from fully satisfied with some major recent developments in the international arena. He betrayed a certain nervousness, particularly over the uncertain fate of the Bonn-Moscow treaty now being debated in West Germany and also over possibility that secret agreements may have been concluded during President Nixon's visit to China.

His assertion that, in deciding on whether to ratify the treaty, West Germany is making "a choice between a policy of peace and a policy of war" is so patently a threat that it may boomerang and actually strengthen those who oppose ratification. And Mr. Brezhnev did not conceal his unhappiness in revealing that the Chinese People's Republic has offered at most to develop relations of peaceful coexistence with Moscow, rather than the more intimate relations the Kremlin believes appropriate among Socialist nations.

In his comments on President Nixon's scheduled May visit to Moscow, Mr. Brezhnev assumed an extremely cautious—but not negative—tone. He took particular care to reassure Moscow's allies that any improvement in Soviet-American relations would not be at the expense of any third parties. Yet the North Vietnamese, for example, must have apprehensions of the same kind they made little effort to mask during Mr. Nixon's visit to China.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of the Brezhnev speech—more for what it left unsaid than for what it did say—was his discussion of the Middle East situation. Here Mr. Brezhnev's concern was indicated by the lengths to which he went to overstate the warmth of Arab-Soviet relations, including the assertion, "It can be said with certainty that our relations with the Arab friends have never been so profound and all round as now."

All this turns a blind eye and deaf ear to the virulent anti-Communism in Libya, the open anti-Sovietism in the Sudan and the xenophobic hostility widespread in Egypt. It also takes no account of the general Arab suspicions about what may be hidden behind the increased flow of Soviet Jews allowed to migrate to Israel and behind the resumption of unofficial Soviet-Israeli contacts.

On balance, much of Mr. Brezhnev's address had a defensive tone, responding in words and overtones to criticisms among the Kremlin élite and to misgivings among the Soviet people, misgivings that remain real and understandable for all that they are allowed no public forum.

NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE

3 APRIL 1972 (28 MAR)

DIPLOMACY:

Preparing for Moscow

To the casual observer, Richard Nixon's mission to Moscow in May will probably seem an instant replay of his recent trip to China. The duration will be about the same—seven days; the President will again mix sightseeing with diplomacy and, just as the Chinese invited the Nixons to see "The Red Detachment of Women," the Soviets are almost certain to host Pat and Dick at the Bolshoi Ballet. On top of all that, the ceremonies and the rubbernecking will surely appear in living color on TV screens around the world. Yet the similarities will be largely on the surface. For in both the style of the pre-summit spadework now under way and in its potential for concrete results, Mr. Nixon's forthcoming journey to Moscow is a far different kind of venture than was the China trip.

Perhaps the most obvious difference is the open air of confidence in Washington concerning the Moscow trip. "This time," explains one insider, "it's not like going to the moon." Indeed, while Mr. Nixon and National Security adviser Henry Kissinger had to play much of the China planning by ear, this time the White House is officially leaving most of the arrangements to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Martin Hillenbrand. As if to point up the new division of labor, Kissinger took off for a vacation in Acapulco last week while State Department officials were busily sketching the outline of the Moscow communique.

**Package:** More important than the personnel involved, however, is the nature of the Moscow agenda. In contrast to the symbolic drama offered by the Peking venture, Mr. Nixon's Soviet trip holds out the hope for a number of substantive agreements. What the U.S. wants most is an agreement to limit the production and

deployment of nuclear weapons. Several roadblocks remain, but given the reopening of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki this week and Mr. Nixon's public optimism about a SALT accord, most people expect the two sides to hammer out at least a minimal "Phase I" package suitable for signing in Moscow.

Responding to Mr. Nixon's well-known penchant for linking progress in one foreign-policy area with progress in another, the Soviets may well give ground on SALT in order to facilitate a trade agreement with the U.S. Lagging far behind the West in technology, the Soviets are eager for such sophisticated American products as computers and advanced machine tools. And they seem ready to bargain. Last week, in fact, the Soviets agreed to meet with U.S. officials next month to reopen the long-dormant negotiations on Moscow's World War II Lend-Lease debts (NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28). If those talks and subsequent trade discussions bear fruit, U.S. officials expect a flood of bilateral agreements in other areas such as space cooperation and scientific and cultural exchanges.

**Upbeat:** In addition to these motivations, both Richard Nixon and Soviet party boss Leonid Brezhnev have a strong political interest in seeing the talks turn out well. The Nixon visit seems likely to strengthen Brezhnev's carefully cultivated reputation at home as a "man of peace." Similarly, the trip offers Mr. Nixon a chance to flood the news media with reports of his diplomatic successes while his Democratic Presidential opponents will be slugging it out in the Oregon and California primary campaigns.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ascribe the mutual interest in the summit to purely domestic political motives. Both President Nixon and Brezhnev seem committed to the improvement of relations between their countries. To underscore that point, Brezhnev himself sounded an upbeat theme about the Nixon visit in a major foreign policy speech last week in Moscow. The Nixon Admin-

10-F

istration, for its part, responded with a remarkably reserved assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities by the Pentagon's usually hawkish research director, John S. Foster Jr. That, in turn, we lowed by Mr. Nixon's own declaration his press conference last week that "the prospects for success at this summit are very good."

True, neither side is likely to alter its fundamental policies concerning such crucial problem areas as China, the Middle East, Vietnam and Europe. But in terms of bilateral relations, the chances for agreements in several key areas are good. Beyond that, if the trade and SALT accords prove to be of major consequence, the Moscow summit could well mark the beginning of what both sides have promised their people for more than a decade: an era of genuinely peaceful coexistence. If that happens, Richard Nixon's seven days in Moscow could turn out to be a week that really changed the world.

100

HOUSE ACTION

233

Armed Services Committee

On May 26, 1971, the House Armed Services Committee reported the FY 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Bill at an authorization level of $21,875,212,000, an amount almost $2 billion more than the FY 1970 authorization bill. One of the largest items in the bill was a $1.08 billion authorization for continued development and procurement of the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. And not included in this authorization bill were additional costs carried in the Military Construction Authorization Bill which together brought the Administration request for the ABM to $1.4 billion for FY 1972.

(NOTE: As in 1970, the House would split authorizations for the ABM system between the military procurement and military construction authorization bills. The Senate, on the other hand, would again consider all ABM funding in the procurement bill. This is subsequently resolved in conference committee.)

Significant Committee action on major weapons systems included:

PROCUREMENT

The committee authorized $13,911,900,000 for the procurement of missiles, aircraft and other weapons during fiscal 1972. This was $32-million less than the Administration requested, but $2.3-billion more than was appropriated in fiscal 1971.

Aircraft

The committee authorized $6,532,500,000 for the procurement of aircraft in all four branches of the military. This was $167-million more than the Administration requested and $946-million more than was appropriated in fiscal 1971.

C-5A. For continued procurement of the giant C-5A jet transport, the committee authorized $357-million for fiscal 1972, the amount requested by the Administration. Costs on the aircraft contract have increased more than $1-billion and its capabilities have been criticized by Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.) and Rep. William S. Moorhead (D Pa.). The committee report stated the aircraft had "met or exceeded" all specifications required by the Air Force.

B-1 Bomber. The supersonic, long-range B-1 bomber, which has been chosen by the Air Force to replace the B-52 bomber, received authorizations from the committee for $370-million for fiscal 1972. In an effort to cut escalating costs on the program, the Air Force cut the number of flight-test aircraft from five to three in February, but subsequent criticism and evaluation of the project by the General Accounting Office and Sen. Proxmire and Rep. John F. Seiberling (D Ohio) indicated that costs would still exceed original estimates. For 1971, the committee provided authorizations of $100-million for the bomber.

The committee withheld funds for the Army's Cheyenne helicopter pending a Pentagon study of similar programs in the Air Force and Marines and provided $112-million (a total of $402-million) in authorization above the amount requested by the Pentagon for procurement of the F-111 jet fight-bomber. An authorization

of $806-million was provided for the continued procurement of the Navy's F-14 aircraft and its companion air-to-surface Phoenix missile system. The committee report cited rumors of financial difficulties which could result in cost overruns on the program, but stated no communications had been received from the F-14's manufacturer so funding would be provided on the basis of original estimates.

Missiles

The committee approved a total of $3,645,300,000 for the procurement of missiles. This was $126-million less than requested by the Administration, but $366-million more than the amount appropriated for fiscal 1971.

MIRV. The committee recommended authorization of $489-million for the continued (fourth year) procurement of the Air Force Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a triple warhead (MIRV) configuration. Included in the authorization was continued procurement of Minuteman II ICBMs with single warheads.

ABM. Authorization of $1,084,000,000 was provided for continued procurement of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system. Money included in the authorization was for advanced engineering studies of two locations under consideration as a fourth ABM site. Although only one site would eventually be chosen, the committee report stated the excess expenditures were needed to "provide the President the maximum flexibility in regard to SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) while having the standby authority to provide defense that may eventually be required." To eliminate the ABM system, the report stated, would be to "seriously weaken the President's hand in the negotiations (SALT)."

The committee report mentioned specific authorizations of $112-million for the Lance surface-to-surface ballistic missile; $86.8-million for the Maverick air-to-surface missile; and $61.6-million for the Navy's Sparrow air-to-air missile.

284

## Naval Vessels

The committee authorized $3,328,900,000 for the procurement of naval vessels which was the amount requested by the Administration and was $863-million greater than the $2,465,400,000 appropriated in fiscal 1971.

Although the committee report discussed at length the Soviet submarine threat, no figures were provided for either procurement or research and development of U.S. submarine programs.

The only program in the Naval vessels category for which authorization figures were provided was for nuclear-power frigates. $14.6-million was earmarked for the continued development of the nuclear-power guided-missile frigates DLGN-41 and 42—programs the Navy wanted to drop. Another $194.6-million was authorized for the continued development and procurement of several other frigates.

## Naval Torpedoes

For the first time, the Armed Services Committee was required to authorize funds for Naval torpedoes (PL 91-441). The committee authorized $193.5-million, $12-million less than the $205.5-million requested by the Administration, for Naval torpedoes and support systems.

The controversial Mark-48 torpedo, which has jumped in program costs from $714-million to $2.6-billion in seven years, was the only torpedo program discussed in the committee report. No specifics for annual authorizations were provided and the report said only that a "significant number of Mark-48 torpedoes" would be provided by the funding.

## Other Weapons

The committee provided authorization of $176,400,000 for the procurement of tracked vehicles. This amount compares with the $235,500,000 requested by the Pentagon and the $244,900,000 appropriated for fiscal 1971.

In the miscellaneous category titled "other weapons," $35.3-million was requested and the same amount authorized by the committee. This compares with the $69,189,000 authorized for the same purpose for fiscal 1971.

Southeast Asia. The committee authorized an amount "not to exceed $2,500,000,000" for the support of allied forces in Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. The same ceiling was authorized for fiscal 1971. According to the committee report, support costs were $2-billion in fiscal 1970, $2.25-billion in fiscal 1971 and were estimated at $2.3-billion for fiscal 1972.

**Additional Views.** Supplemental views from committee members who voted for the bill, but who were not satisfied with certain sections, were published by Robert L. Leggett (D Calif.), Robert T. Stafford (R Vt.) and Les Aspin (D Wis.).

Leggett and Stafford expressed concern at the $800-million increase in the research and development portion of the bill. Aspin proposed imposing a spending ceiling on procurement and research not to exceed the fiscal 1971 budget appropriations.

**Minority Views.** Nedzi and Whalen, two of the four who voted against the committee's bill, said they would offer an amendment on the floor to cut funds for military operations in Southeast Asia effective Jan. 1, 1972.

Harrington filed a separate minority statement: "I think we do ourselves, the armed forces and our country a disservice. Instead of open discussion leading to broad, national understanding of military needs, we have held secret talks which inevitably build resentment. Instead of an exchange of views drawing the country to a consensus on defense priorities, we have acted as the military's Capitol Hill lobby incurring as we sit the distrust and the dismay of so much of our citizenry who cannot, at least through our deliberations, come to a sharing of this committee's views."

Pike, the fourth committee member to oppose the bill, expressed his dismay at the soaring defense costs in the joint statement signed by all four dissenting committee members.

285

## Floor Action

On June 17, 1971, the House passed the FY 1972 Military Procurement Authorization Bill authorizing $21,069,112,000. The vote was 332-58. Most of the three-day debate on the bill focused on the Indochina War with nine of the 21 amendments considered designed in some way to restrict U.S. activities there. Other amendments sought to reduce funding for U.S. troops in Europe, the ABM, MIRV, C-5A and the B-1 bomber programs.

## Debate on Amendments

**Indochina War Amendments.** The Nedzi-Whalen amendment was brought to the floor June 17 and was the first of five amendments dealing with the Indochina war. Four modifying and substitute proposals to the Nedzi-Whalen amendment were also considered. The various modifications contained both stronger and more conciliatory language than the Nedzi-Whalen amendment, but the changes in language in either direction drew less support than the original proposal.

"We are all acquainted with the House rule of germaness," Nedzi said. "All efforts to strengthen the amendment resulted in frustration by the rules of the House. Yet we considered it essential that the people of the United States be provided an opportunity to express their concerns over the war through their elected Representatives. This accounts for the narrowness of the amendment and its vulnerability to the charge that it is a do-nothing amendment."

Hebert produced a letter dated June 15 from Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird opposing the amendment. In the letter, Laird said the proposal's basic intent was to "dictate a formal and fixed timetable for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. (military) from Indochina."

"After hearing the letter of the Secretary of Defense," Nedzi told the House: "I did not recognize my own amendment. Could the chairman (Hebert) enlighten us as to where in my amendment there is any dictation of a formal and fixed timetable for complete withdrawal?" Nedzi's time expired after asking the question and no answer was given during the afternoon.

Leslie C. Arends (R Ill.), ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee, said he was never "more concerned or more disturbed about a false issue that has been raised than at this particular time. It is a cruel hoax to try to lead the American people to believe that if a date is fixed then everything will be over....The way to get out of Vietnam is to do what the President of the United States is recommending today...that we give him the tools with which to work and with which to negotiate."

House Speaker Carl Albert (D Okla.), who normally does not participate in debates before the House, said: "I do not believe we should undertake by legislative fiat to settle the war at a time certain to tie the hands of the President in any way."

In all of the above statements opposing the amendment, there was criticism of setting a fixed date for withdrawal. No such withdrawal date was mentioned in the Nedzi-Whalen amendment or in any other of the proposals considered by the House as amendments to the defense procurement authorization bill.

Other separate amendments dealing with the Indochina war included:

* Paul Findley (R Ill.) proposal which gave no date for withdrawal but stated that no funds authorized by the bill could be used to support U.S. military activities in Indochina. Rejected by voice vote.

* Herman Badillo (D N.Y.) proposal that sought to cut off funds for all activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and any group acting in behalf of the CIA which was conducting military operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos or Thailand. Rejected by standing vote, 46-172.

* Michael Harrington (D Mass.) proposal that sought to remove from the bill the $2.5-billion authorization for support of local and free-world forces in Indochina. Rejected by standing vote, 29-128.

* Claude Pepper (D Fla.) proposal which provided a June 1, 1972, cutoff date for funds in the bill to be used in Indochina and which provided a cancellation clause if all U.S. POWs had not been released 60 days prior to June 1. Rejected by recorded teller vote, 147-237. The 90-vote margin on the Pepper amendment was the closest of any of the votes on Indochina.

**Missile Programs.** Two attempts were made to limit spending on missile programs. Robert I. Leggett (D Calif.) June 16 sponsored an amendment which sought to cut $102-million from the $1.1-billion authorized for continued procurement of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) program.

Leggett told the House: "Safeguard is not only a misuse of money and dangerous because it stimulates the arms race; it is doubly dangerous because it in effect weakens our defense....So the national interest really calls on us to drop the Safeguard program altogether. But I am not proposing anything that radical this year. I am just proposing that we freeze it at two sites while we give our SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiators a chance to work."

The Leggett amendment was rejected June 16 by a 129-267 recorded teller vote. Two amendments offered by Leggett to the fiscal 1971 procurement bill were rejected in April 1970 by 85-131 and 86-128 teller votes.

Donald M. Fraser (D Minn.) proposed June 17 that funds for the MIRV missile system, which were being used to convert nuclear submarines to the Poseidon multi-warhead missile configuration, be held in an escrow account until the President reported to Congress that the SALT negotiations would provide no chance for an arms-limitation settlement. The MIRV system was an offensive missile program whereas the ABM was defensive.

"The President announced just a few weeks ago," Fraser said, "that we are going to get an agreement with the Soviet Union to limit ABM systems....If the President's prediction proves to be true, then clearly we do not need

the multiple-warhead (MIRV) program and any money spent between now and then will be wasted money that could be used for other purposes and needs here in the United States."

Chet Holifield (D Calif.) opposed the Fraser amendment: "I cannot understand this kind of logic where you tie your hands against a weapon which is designed to protect the United States while the adversary is continuing to make those weapons. It is incomprehensible to me."

The Fraser amendment was rejected June 17 by voice vote.

### Aircraft Programs.
After Chairman Hebert successfully guided his amendment to cut $806.1-million for the F-14 jet fighter program from the bill, two other proposals that sought to reduce aircraft authorizations were offered.

Otis G. Pike (D N.Y.) sponsored an amendment which sought to cut $357.2-million and which would have stopped the continued production of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.'s C-5A jet cargo aircraft.

"I do not think," Pike told the House, "that this aircraft, which is a classic example of failure of both cost and performance, is worth what we are paying for it."

Durward G. Hall (R Mo.), however, said the amendment was a "classic example of cutting off our nose to spite our face." Hall said: "We will achieve nothing on the debate on this bill by pointing out deficiencies of the C-5A. It is the best transport aircraft available in the world today."

It is needed. It is badly needed." Pike's amendment was rejected by a 41-132 standing vote. Amendments to the fiscal 1971 bill to restrict or cut C-5A funds were rejected by a 21-58 standing vote and 48-90 teller vote respectively.

Pike offered a second amendment dealing with aircraft in which he sought to cut funds for continued research and development of the B-1 long-range bomber. His proposal would have removed $370.2-million earmarked for the B-1 program. Leggett offered a conciliatory modification to the Pike proposal by requesting a cut of only $170-million. The modification was rejected by voice vote.

"Here we go again," Pike said in support of his amendment, "starting out a new strategic system—a new manned bomber in an age in which I believe manned bombers are obsolete....It (the B-1 program) is in this bill and it is in the Defense Department budget as a sort of memoir to those of the Strategic Air Command who have not really accepted the coming of the missile age."

Hebert opposed the amendment: "I tell the members of this committee that there is not a more important vote than the one we are going to cast, to cast a vote in favor of the B-1, in favor of its advancement as quickly as possible."

The Pike amendment was rejected by a 97-307 recorded teller vote.

## Amendments Accepted

June 16—F. Edward Hebert (D La.)—Delete $806.1-million from aircraft funding earmarked for continued procurement of the F-14 fighter plane. Voice vote.

June 17—O.C. Fisher (D Texas)—Provide that no funds authorized by the bill for research projects could be used at any university or college if the institution maintained a policy of barring military recruiting agents from the campus, unless the Secretary of Defense requested such funding; provided that 60 days after enactment of the bill, the Secretary would provide a list of institutions which barred military recruiters. Voice.

## Amendments Rejected

✓ June 16—Robert L. Leggett (D Calif.)—Provide that no funds could be expended for Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) sites beyond those located at Grand Forks, N.D., and Malmstrom, Mont., thus providing a $102-million reduction, to $999,100,000 from $1,101,100,000, in total ABM funds in the bill. Recorded teller, 129-267.

Otis G. Pike (D N.Y.)—Cut from aircraft procurement funds $357.2-million, to $2,744,800,000 from $3,102,000,000, which was to be used for continued production of the C-5A jet cargo aircraft. Standing vote, 41-132.

✓ Leggett—Modification to Pike amendment (below)—Cut research and development authorization for the Air Force for continued R&D on the B-1 long-range bomber by $170-million, to $2,859,844,000 from $3,030,144,000. Voice.

✓ Pike—Cut from research and development authorization for the Air Force $370.2-million, to $2,659,844,000 from $3,030,144,000, earmarked for continued R&D of the B-1 long-range bomber. Recorded teller, 97-307.

Robert T. Stafford (R Vt.)—Modification to Pike amendment (below)—Provide a maximum authorization of $7,456,680,000 for R&D (instead of $7,963,312,000)—a 5-percent increase over fiscal 1971 appropriation. Standing, 67-111; recorded teller, 135-258.

Pike—Provide that the total amount recommended for research and development ($7,963,312,000) by committee bill be limited to $7,109,200,000—the same amount appropriated for fiscal 1971. Voice.

✓ Les Aspin (D Wis.)—Provide that total funds authorized by the committee for procurement and for research and development ($21,875,212,000) not exceed the amount authorized for fiscal year 1971 by PL 91-441 ($19,929,089,000). Recorded teller, 118-278.

Lucien N. Nedzi (D Mich.)—Provide that any member of the reserves or the National Guard could avoid going to summer camp if the period for such military training fell within 120 days of his release from the armed services (committee version provided this privilege only to persons who had served one or more years of active duty). Voice.

✓ June 17—Nedzi and Charles W. Whalen Jr. (R Ohio)—Provide that no funds authorized in the bill could be expended after Dec. 31, 1971, to support military operations in or over South and North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; if the President determined that the amendment would not permit the safe withdrawal of U.S. forces and ensure the return of U.S. POWs, he could come to Congress and recommend legislation setting another date; the amendment was not to be construed as affecting the constitutional powers of the President or his powers to provide asylum and protection of South Vietnamese endangered by a withdrawal or military and economic assistance to Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam; the amendment was not to be construed as limiting funds needed to ensure the return of POWs or to prohibit the assignment of customary military personnel to diplomatic missions in South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. Recorded teller, 158-254.

Howard W. Robison (R N.Y.)—Modification to the Nedzi-Whalen amendment (above)—Provide an April 30, 1972, cutoff date for funds authorized for use in Indochina; provided that the amendment would become void if a cease-fire was not declared and if all U.S. POWs were not released by April 30, 1972. Voice.

286

287

## Amendments Rejected, Continued

Stewart B. McKinney (R Conn.)—Modification to the Nedzi-Whalen amendment (above)—Delete section of the amendment declaring that the President, if he determined the provisions were too restrictive, could come to Congress and request a later cutoff date for funds; substitute new language declaring that if an agreement for a cease-fire and return of POWs was not reached by Dec. 1, 1971, the amendment would become void. Voice.

Patsy T. Mink (D Hawaii)—Substitute for the Nedzi-Whalen amendment (above)—Provide that no funds authorized in the bill be expended for military operations in South and North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos after Dec. 31, 1971. Recorded teller, 97-327.

Joseph M. McDade (R Pa.)—Modification to the Mink substitute (above)—Provide additional language stipulating that all U.S. POWs must be released not less than four months prior to any cutoff of funds and that the North Vietnamese must not interfere with the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops or the amendment would become void. Standing, 37-146.

Paul Findley (R Ill.)—Provide that none of the funds authorized in the bill could be used to support action by U.S. combat forces in Vietnam except to ensure a safe withdrawal of all such forces by the earliest possible date (effective upon enactment); provided that the amendment would not be construed to limit the power of the President to secure the release of U.S. POWs or to grant asylum to South Vietnamese endangered by the withdrawal. Voice.

Herman Badillo (D N.Y.)—Provide that no funds authorized in the bill could be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or by any person or agency acting in behalf of the CIA to organize, conduct or supervise

any military or paramilitary operation of any kind in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos or Thailand. Standing, 46-172.

Donald M. Fraser (D Minn.)—Provide that the Secretary of the Treasury place in a separate account all past and future funds appropriated for production and deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and all unused funds appropriated for conversion of nuclear-powered submarines to Poseidon missile ships, and that no further amounts be obligated or expended until the President reported to Congress that the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) did not reach an agreement which would enable the United States to cease further production of the missile system. Standing, 32-146.

Leggett—Provide that no funds authorized by the bill could be used to procure equipment to support U.S. forces in excess of 270,000 men in Europe after Jan. 1, 1972, but that the President could exceed the limit if he provided Congress with detailed reasons for such exception. Voice.

Michael Harrington (D Mass.)—Provide that the $2.5-billion authorized in the bill for support of free-world forces in Indochina be deleted. Standing, 29-128.

Claude Pepper (D Fla.)—Provide that no funds authorized in the bill could be used after June 1, 1972, to support U.S. armed forces in or over Indochina; nothing in the amendment was to be construed to limit the authority of the President to provide asylum to South Vietnamese endangered by U.S. withdrawal, to provide for safe withdrawal, to provide assistance to nations of Indochina in amounts approved by Congress; provided that the amendment would become void if 60 days prior to June 1, 1972, all U.S. POWs had not been released by North Vietnam. Recorded teller, 147-237.

## SENATE ACTION

### Armed Services Committee

On September 7, 1971, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported its own substitute version of the FY 1972 Military Procurement Authorization bill authorizing $21,018,482,000. Normally the Senate would consider and act upon a House-intiated version of such bills.

In making its report, the Committee commented at length on the massive cost problems being confronted in the maintenance of an adequate defense.

* "It is striking that fighter aircraft now being developed for procurement in the mid-1970's will cost five to six times more than comparable aircraft at the beginning of the 1960's. The cost of tanks is increasing over fourfold during the 1965-1975 decade. A burst of .50 caliber machine gun fire ... costs about $20; we are now developing tactical air-to-air munitions costing several thousand dollars per round.

288

...present trends, if continued, make it un-
likely that this level of funding will be ade-
quate in the near future for the development and
procurement of sufficient weapons to equip our
forces.

The report, in conclusion, cited three major factors in the rising cost of maintaining an adequate defense -- manpower cost growth, inadequate contributions of the NATO allies and "above all, the high cost and low effectiveness of new weapons systems".

Senate Committee action on major weapons systems included:

**C-5A Aircraft.** In 1965, the Air Force estimated that a fleet of 120 C-5A jet cargo planes would cost a total of $3.4-billion. By June 30, 1971, program costs for 81 C-5A aircraft were put at more than $4.5-billion.

The Pentagon requested $472,200,000 in continuing authorizations for the C-5A program in fiscal 1972 and the Armed Services Committee then reduced the authorization by $75,800,000 to $396,400,000. The committee recommended restrictions that "the funding authorized in this fiscal year will be used only for the C-5A program and not diverted or intermingled by any means to other uses or other programs...." There had been accusations by Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.) that the financially troubled Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the C-5A manufacturer, was using its government contract funding to bail out a commercial project.

**F-111 Aircraft.** For the continued research, development and procurement of the controversial F-111 aircraft, the committee authorized $185,700,000 for fiscal 1972, the full amount requested by the Administration. To arrive at the total, the Pentagon juggled accounts in three other programs, reducing them by $183,800,000 and adding the authorization to the F-111 program. Like the House committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee refused to allow the Pentagon to phase out production of the aircraft at 70 planes, but added $112-million to the original request for 12 additional planes.

**F-14 Navy Fighter.** The Pentagon signed a contract with Grumman Aerospace Corporation in 1969 with various options which could provide as many as 772 F-14 jet fighters in subsequent years. The Defense Department announced in mid-1971 that it anticipated that 313 aircraft would be purchased during the next five years at a cost of approximately $16.7-million per plane.

The Armed Services Committee approved an authori-
zation of $1,029,600,000 for the purchase of 48 F-14
aircraft and continued research and development. The
Administration request was $1,034,000,000.

**B-1 Bomber.** Designed as the aircraft to replace the B-52 bomber, the B-1 long-range bomber was described in the committee report as having "a larger payload capacity, a better capability to penetrate at lower altitudes, a quicker reaction launch and the characteristics necessary to operate from austere dispersed bases." The B-1 program, which was still in the research and development stage, was authorized $75-million in fiscal 1971 by Congress.

For fiscal 1972, the Senate committee recommended an authorization of $370,300,000 for the continued research and development of the aircraft, the same amount requested by the Pentagon.

Total program estimates were $9.4-billion in 1971.
The Pentagon reported in June that program costs
would probably be $11.1-billion. The B-1 was scheduled
to go into production in fiscal 1975.

**Other Planes.** The Army, Marine Corps and Air Force were developing different aircraft for the same mission—close air support of ground troops. A Pentagon study of the Army's Cheyenne helicopter and the Marine Corps' Harrier and the Air Force's A-X fixed wing planes indicated that they all had "unique capabilities" and that it was too early to tell which—if any—should be phased out because of needless duplication.

The committee recommended a $47-million authori-
zation for the Air Force A-X research and development
program—the same as the Administration's request.
The A-X was described as a "twin turbofan-powered,
fixed-wing aircraft..." designed for "carrying large bomb
loads and for efficient cruising and long loiter times on
station near the battle zone."

The Marine Corps' Harrier program was authorized $126-million for the procurement of 30 of the planes in Great Britain and for the eventual shifting of the manufacturing sites to the United States. Thirty Harriers were approved for production in fiscal 1971, which would bring to 60 the total by the end of fiscal 1972. The committee's recommendation was more than the amount requested by the Administration.

The Cheyenne helicopter, which has been in develop-
ment since 1966, was authorized no new funds in fiscal
1972. However, the committee did authorize the juggling
of accounts on programs with excess funds to provide the
Cheyenne project with $103-million needed to complete
its development stage. Of the $103-million, $35.8-million
was to be used to pay outstanding debts accrued by Lock-
heed to secondary subcontractors on the Cheyenne pro-
gram.

**Safeguard.** The antiballistic defensive missile system (ABM) is being deployed under the name of Safeguard. The mission of the Safeguard system is to provide protection for a number of offensive missile sites.

The committee cited a growing Soviet threat in of-
fensive missile launchers—1,100 in mid-1970 and 1,440 in
mid-1971—as reason for recommending $1,106,200,000 in
Safeguard authorizations for fiscal 1972. The Army had
requested $1,392,000,000 for fiscal 1971.

289

The committee sharply limited where and how the Safeguard funds could be used. Two of the four sites currently under consideration were provided funds for full deployment—Grand Forks, N.D., and Great Falls, Mont. Two other sites—Sedalia, Mo., and Cheyenne, Wyo.—were provided funds for advanced preparations only. An optional site around Washington, D.C., was all but cancelled with the committee allowing only superficial study of the location.

Total program costs were estimated at $6.5-billion during fiscal 1971 and at $7.1-billion at the beginning of fiscal 1972. At the end of fiscal 1971, $3.7-billion had been authorized for the Safeguard ABM system.

When the Senate Armed Services Committee reported the military construction authorization bill (HR 9844), funds for the construction of the facilities at Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) sites were deleted from the bill. The construction items were deferred until the procurement authorization bill (HR 8687) was considered. The House Armed Services Committee split the Safeguard authorization and the Senate committee dealt with the entire ABM package at one time. Therefore, HR 8687 as reported from the Senate committee included ABM construction items amounting to $109,070,000 which were not included in the House-passed version of the bill.

**SCAD.** The Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) missile system received an authorization of $10-million from the Senate committee, the same as the Administration request. "While funds for SCAD were first provided in fiscal year 1969," the committee report stated, "no substantial progress has yet been made in initiating the development of this missile system which is urgently needed to improve the penetration capability and lethality of our strategic bomber force."

**Shipbuilding.** The Navy's shipbuilding program request for fiscal 1972 was the largest since World War II. Nineteen new ships and nine ship conversions were requested by the Pentagon. The committee approved 15 new ships and the nine requested conversions and authorized $3,010,600,000 in appropriations. The Administration requested $3,327,900,000.

"At the end of fiscal year 1971, the Navy will have approximately 700 ships and submarines in the active fleet, a reduction of about 50 below the 1970 level and about 200 below the 1961 level," the report said. "The committee is vitally concerned over the fact that some of our surface ships, excluding the attack carrier, do not carry offensive systems with necessary range to effectively combat the Soviet surface-to-surface missile ships."

## Floor Action

Following almost a month of debate, the Senate on October 6, 1971 passed the FY 1972 Military Procurement Authorization Bill authorizing $21,412,082,000 an amount approximately $343 million more than the House-approved bill. Included in the bill, however, was $381 million in additional funding requested by the Administration for military pay increases. This request was not considered in the House or in the Senate Committee. The final vote on the bill was 82-4. Twenty-seven amendments were considered of which nine were accepted.

## Debate on Amendments

**B-1 Bomber.** George McGovern (D S.D.) offered an amendment to reduce fiscal 1972 funding for the B-1 long-range bomber program by $250,300,000 to $20,000,000 from $370,300,000. The amendment would also have earmarked $1-million for research on alternatives to the B-1 program and another $10-million for modification of the B-52 bomber—the Air Force's existing strategic bomber which the B-1 would replace.

During the Sept. 22 debate on the amendment, McGovern charged that the Air Force wanted the B-1 for two reasons: "To enhance the excitement for strategic bomber pilots and (for) the glamour of Air Force recruiting programs." McGovern said that final costs on the program could reach $47-billion because the Air Force would have to develop a supersonic tanker to refuel the B-1.

McGovern was opposed on the floor by Thomas J. McIntyre (D N.H.), chairman of the Armed Services ad hoc subcommittee on research and development. "We must ensure to the fullest extent possible," McIntyre said, "that there is never any question as to the ability of our forces to survive a surprise attack and still respond with devastating effectiveness."

The McGovern amendment was rejected Sept. 22 by voice vote.

**Project Sanguine.** The Navy, in an effort to develop new ways of communicating with submerged submarines around the world, previously had proposed the development of a low-frequency transmitter system. As envisioned by Navy planners, the Project Sanguine system would involve burying six feet below the ground 1,000 miles of cable in a grid pattern. The area to be covered by the giant grid would total about 6,400 square miles and would be located in northern Wisconsin.

Gaylord Nelson (D Wis.) offered an amendment which would have withheld all of Project Sanguine's $5,557,000 authorization for fiscal 1972 except $450,000 for studying the ecological effects of the program. The purpose of the amendment was to withhold expenditure of funds until the Navy filed an environmental impact statement, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act, and until the entire project was subjected to a feasibility review by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.

Nelson said that not only had the Navy failed to file an impact statement, but that "there is a serious question whether the technology proposed by the Navy for communicating via Project Sanguine will even work."

McIntyre said the Nelson amendment had "implications which are so far reaching that it could undermine and obstruct the orderly presentation of most of the program." McIntyre asserted that the two scientific

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academies—private, non-profit organizations—should not be given "the unique responsibility for determining the technical feasibility of a Department of Defense program. This is interference of the highest order."

The amendment to withhold funds from Project Sanguine was rejected Sept. 22 by a 35-45 roll-call vote.

A second amendment dealing with Project Sanguine was brought to the floor by Nelson Sept. 29. In it, Nelson requested that the $5,557,000 authorization in fiscal 1972 research funds on the project be reduced to $3,492,000. The amendment stipulated that of the $3,492,000, a total of $450,000 would be used for environmental studies and for research to determine the biological and ecological effects of the program.

Nelson explained that Project Sanguine included two experimental parts—the grid pattern communications system buried six feet below the ground and a deep drilling project where cables were to be sunk thousands of feet into the ground. Nelson said the Navy had hand delivered a letter to his office Sept. 10 informing him that the deep drilling portion of the program had been abandoned. The Navy then took the $2,065,000, which was to be used for the deep drilling experiment, and transferred the money to grid pattern research and development.

"In effect, the Navy has substantially increased the research and development effort for the shallow Sanguine system without bothering to present Congress with any justification whatsoever for it," Nelson said.

Urging rejection of the Nelson amendment, Lloyd Bentsen (D Texas) said: "I think the Navy is actually to be commended as to its sensitivity to the problem, as to its willingness to adapt to a better approach, to try to resolve the problem with an expansion of its alternative effort on the shallow system.... Are we going to force the Navy or the Defense Department into a straitjacket?"

The second Nelson amendment was adopted Sept. 29 by a 44-42 roll-call vote.

### Chrome Debate—Part I. About 60 percent of the chromium ore imported into the United States in fiscal 1971 came from the Soviet Union. Before the United States joined the United Nations' embargo against Rhodesia in 1966, about 30 percent of the chromium imported by the United States was provided from the rich mines of Rhodesia, another 30 percent came from the Soviet Union. The UN trade embargo was imposed as a reaction to the decision of the white supremacist government of Rhodesia to declare its independence from the British Commonwealth.

A provision of HR 8687, called section 503, stated that the President could not regulate the amount of goods imported from any non-Communist country if the United States was importing the same material from a Communist country. The provision would require the United States to break its agreement with the United Nations to adhere to the trade embargo of Rhodesia in order to decrease the quantity of chromium ore imported from the Soviet Union.

Senators Gale W. McGee (D Wyo.) and Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.) offered an amendment which sought to remove this section from the bill. "The language of section 503," said McGee, "is specifically designed to have the United States unilaterally break the United Nations'

embargo against Rhodesia and to import chrome ore from that area."

Harry F. Byrd Jr. (Ind. Va.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, did not agree with McGee's interpretation of section 503. "Its purpose is simply to end the dependence of the United States upon the Soviet Union for chrome ore—a material vital to the defense of this nation," Byrd said.

The amendment to delete section 503 was rejected Sept. 23 by a roll-call vote of 36-46.

### Chrome Debate—Part II. Defeat of the McGee-Brooke amendment did not close debate on section 503 and its international implications. J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a similar amendment Sept. 27 which added to section 503 the stipulation that the President could ignore the clause if he determined contrary action to be in the national interest or if treaty obligations otherwise required.

The Foreign Relations Committee had held hearings on the chromium situation, had considered a proposal sponsored by Byrd (Va.) identical to section 503 and had rejected the measure, he said. The Armed Services Committee heard Byrd's proposal and adopted it unanimously as section 503 of the defense procurement bill.

Fulbright said the Armed Services Committee had "exhibited this irresistible power to dominate the Senate by rejecting the McGee amendment.... It does not come as any news that the Armed Services Committee is a very powerful and distinguished committee and is under the bureaucratic influence of the Pentagon when it comes to voting on the floor of the Senate."

Fulbright added that the primary thrust of section 503 was "to undermine the United Nations and say with respect to the embargo that the United Nations voted to support, that the United States unilaterally would no longer abide by the embargo authorized by the United Nations Charter."

Although Fulbright's amendment was initially adopted by a 45-43 roll-call vote Sept. 30, a series of routine motions which followed the initial victory tied up the amendment in procedural knots. Fulbright refused to take a roll-call vote on the amendment because many of his supporters had already left the Senate floor. Byrd and Stennis demanded a final roll call but the Senate adjourned Sept. 30 without a final decision on the Fulbright amendment.

### $60-billion Budget. George McGovern (D S.D.) offered an amendment which requested two things: first, an alternate defense budget for fiscal 1973 based on a $60-billion spending ceiling; second, a report recommending congressional action aimed at stimulating conversion planning by the defense industry.

William Proxmire (D Wis.) supported the McGovern amendment, saying it would "simply require the administration to tell us for the 1974 budget...what would happen, what their priorities would be and how they would be able to meet a $60 billion ceiling. It would not bind the Administration to that ceiling in any way, shape or form."

Arguing against the McGovern proposal, McIntyre said: "That is no need for such dramatic and ill considered action with respect to the defense budget." Strom Thurmond (R S.C.) said: "That such a proposal would even be made in the Congress will certainly send shock waves

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## Debate on Amendments, Senate Floor, Continued

through our defense establishment and the confidence of our free world allies."

The McGovern amendment was rejected Sept. 23 by a 26-58 roll-call vote.

**MIRV System.** An amendment to restrict the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) missile system, an offensive weapon system estimated to cost a total of $12.9-billion, was offered by Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.). It sought to hold fiscal 1972 funds earmarked for MIRV in escrow. Under Humphrey's proposal, these funds could not be spent unless the President and Congress jointly determined that the Soviet Union was testing and deploying a MIRV system or an ABM system which posed a threat to the United States.

"This amendment," Humphrey said, "merely places Congress on record in favor of success in the SALT (strategic arms limitation) talks. The amendment says that if those talks do not succeed, and if the Soviet Union continues to test, if they act in a recalcitrant manner, we are not going to stand idly by. The amendment has both the carrot and the stick."

Stennis told the Senate that the Humphrey amendment "would unilaterally degrade the strategic capability of the United States to an intolerable degree."

The Humphrey amendment was rejected Sept. 24, with barely a quorum voting, by a 12-39 roll-call vote.

**Five-year Projection.** An amendment requesting long-range budget projections for defense procurement was offered by Nelson Sept. 28. The proposal requested that five-year projections for such procurement be made by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees based on current foreign policies and world conditions. The amendment requested the committees to use the Pentagon's five-year budget projections as one of its resource materials.

"Time has already robbed the Congress of much of its flexibility to make major decisions on the level of defense spending in fiscal 1972." Nelson told the Senate. "Meanwhile, the Administration is already far along in planning the fiscal 1973 defense budget and it has been making the basic decisions on that budget without any significant congressional guidance."

Stennis called the proposal a "waste of time" and said the five-year projection "would be almost a worthless sheet of paper and I am afraid that it would be highly confusing."

McIntyre also opposed the amendment: "The defense budget is the antithesis of cause and effect. The variables in this constantly changing world are so numerous, so diverse and so unpredictable that it never ceases to amaze me how even a single thread can be woven through the fabric of the annual defense budget."

Nelson, stating that the Pentagon made five-year budget projections, asked: Why not Congress? "They (Pentagon) do not find it an impossible task to prepare a five year defense budget and then the next year project it five years ahead again...recognizing that circumstances change and that they have to modify the projection each year."

The five-year budget projection amendment was rejected Sept. 28 by a 28-54 roll-call vote.

**Production Base Switch.** Included in the Armed Services Committee report was an explanation of the

authorization for the Navy's Harrier aircraft. The bill included $102.3-million for procurement of 30 aircraft during fiscal 1972 plus $23.7-million for switching production of the aircraft from Great Britain to the United States. The U.S. company which was awarded the Harrier contract was McDonnell Douglas Corp. of St. Louis, Mo. The Pentagon estimated that to switch the production base from Great Britain to the United States would add approximately $113,800,000 to the ultimate cost of 114 aircraft.

William B. Saxbe (R Ohio), a member of the Armed Services Committee, offered an amendment to delete the $23.7-million authorized for the transfer of production to the United States and thereby save $113,800,000 in conversion funds.

"I realize," Saxbe said, "that St. Louis, like many other areas, needs economic relief and probably employment, but I suggest that this is a poor way to do it."

Both of Missouri's Democratic Senators opposed the Saxbe amendment—Stuart Symington and Thomas F. Eagleton. Symington was a member of the Armed Services subcommittee which analyzed development of the Harrier aircraft.

Three factors were cited by Symington as necessitating the switch in the production base of the aircraft to the United States: to alleviate unemployment in the United States, end U.S. dependence on a foreign source of supply for the Harrier and establish a technological base for further development and possible later additional production of the aircraft.

Saxbe replied to each argument: "It is not the purpose of the defense budget to regulate the national economy.... There is no real likelihood that the British source of supply would be cut off." Saxbe said that although production of the airframe was to be transferred to the United States "at present no American company has expressed interest in domestic production of the Harrier's engine."

The Saxbe amendment was rejected Sept. 28 on a tie vote, 40-40. Under Senate rules, a tie vote defeats an amendment.

Most of the support for the amendment came from Republicans, while Democrats, particularly northern Democrats who had offered most of the proposals to cut funds from the procurement bill, voted overwhelmingly against it. R 28-9; D 12-31 (ND 10-19; SD 2-12).

**F-14 Fighter.** William Proxmire (D Wis.) offered an amendment which sought to cut all fiscal 1972 funds ($801,600,000) from the Navy's F-14 jet fighter project, thus canceling the program.

Proxmire told the Senate: "A threshold consideration—and that only—is the cost of the plane. Everybody knows that its estimated unit cost has increased from $11.5-million to $16.7-million since the beginning of the year.... The 10-year cost for a 300-aircraft program will likely be $15 billion.... Grumman (Aerospace Corp.) is facing a projected loss of $367-million today for a 300-aircraft program because during the final months of contract negotiations for a 463-aircraft program it reduced its bid by $474-million in order to land the contract."

"But one cannot cancel a program every time the cost goes up or it turns out that a buy-in has occurred."

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Proxmire continued. "But we do not need the F-14 and we do have a suitable alternative."

John G. Tower (R Texas) countered: "All the evidence available points to the fact that the F-14 is the best aircraft we can provide the Navy with in time to provide the kind of military capability we require.... Failure to deploy the F-14 could be tragically shortsighted in the short run if the United States naval forces were found wanting when they were required; and in the long run (it) would be much more costly in an economic sense if we were required to initiate a crash program to modernize the Navy's aircraft under the pressure of a political crisis."

The amendment to abolish the F-14 program was rejected Sept. 29 by a 28-61 roll-call vote.

### ABM Debate.
Unlike the debate in the three previous years, the Senate's consideration of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in 1971 was neither heated nor prolonged. Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), a member of the Armed Services Committee, offered an amendment aimed at stopping further deployment of the ABM system. The Hughes amendment sought to delete $639,000,000 from the bill earmarked for deployment while allowing $427,000,000 to remain in the bill for research, development, evaluation and testing of the system.

Hughes argued that not only was the $9.5-billion estimate of total costs out of line with economic reality, but also that too many skeptical voices had been heard in the Pentagon concerning the effectiveness of the ABM system.

Stuart Symington (D Mo.) called the ABM system "a tragic and additional unnecessary waste of the taxpayers' money...authorizing continuation of a system which now even many within the Defense Department privately admit is a poor allocation of resources if we really need to protect ourselves."

Characteristic of debate over the ABM was the position taken by John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.), a long-time opponent of the ABM system. He said that for the first time in three years he would not support efforts to delete funds from the ABM. "It is my firm belief," he said, "that an agreement on ABM at a very low level of deployment and an agreement completely consistent with U.S. security is attainable before the end of this calendar year" at the SALT (strategic arms limitation) talks. Cooper said he would not support the Hughes amendment because the proposal sought to remove a valuable bargaining chip from the President in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

During the 1971 debate, Hughes introduced an identical amendment which had been rejected by a 33-62 roll-call vote. The Hughes amendment offered as part of the fiscal 1972 bill was rejected Sept. 29 by a 21-64 roll-call vote. Eight Senators who supported the 1970 amendment were not present for the Sept. 29 vote. Another five Senators who supported the 1970 amendment reversed their positions on the 1971 vote. Those who switched their votes from opposition to support of the ABM authorization were: Frank Church (D Idaho), Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.), Clifford P. Case (R N.J.), William B. Saxbe (R Ohio) and Cooper.

### Main Battle Tank.
In 1963, the United States entered into an agreement with West Germany for development of a new tank—the Main Battle Tank (MBT-70). Because of escalating costs and slow technical progress, the United States in 1970 dropped out of the joint venture and assumed full responsibility for developing a tank similar to the MBT-70, the XMS03. The cost of the joint program was estimated at $138-million. The current Pentagon estimate for the entire program was about $500-million.

The Administration requested $86.6-million in fiscal 1972 for the XM803 program. The House authorized $27.5-million and the Senate Armed Services Committee requested $62.8-million.

Thomas F. Eagleton (D Mo.) offered an amendment which sought to reduce the amount authorized by the committee to $27.5-million from $62.8-million. Eagleton was asked during debate why his amendment didn't delete all funds requested for the tank. "All the money that has been spent on the MBT-70 has not, in my judgment, been a total loss. We have gained some knowledge and technological sophistication which can be applied as a base to upgrade" other U.S. tanks, Eagleton said.

"A primary element in this changed battlefield environment," Eagleton continued, "is the simple fact that tank designers can no longer keep pace with advances in anti-tank weaponry. Tanks now have more armor, more speed, lower profiles, improved suspension systems and better fire control and yet they are more vulnerable to cheap, mobile and highly accurate anti-tank weapons than ever before."

Strom Thurmond (R S.C.) argued that the foot soldier needed the tank. "The Department of Defense said he (foot soldier) needs this tank. I do not believe that the Senate is going to deny our ground forces, who are going to have to fight to save this country and fight to defend freedom, a modern tank such as we need."

The Eagleton amendment was rejected Sept. 30 by a 42-51 roll-call vote.

### Vietnam Withdrawal.
For the second time in four months, the Senate Sept. 30 voted to declare as U.S. policy the intention to withdraw all U.S. troops from Indochina. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) again sponsored the amendment; it called for a total withdrawal within six months of enactment pending the release of U.S. prisoners of war. With the exception of the six-month withdrawal deadline, Mansfield's amendment was identical to one adopted June 22 as part of the draft extension bill (HR 6531—PL 92-129). That amendment was weakened in a House-Senate conference, however, and the final version signed by the President contained no withdrawal deadlines.

On the Sept. 30 vote by which the second Mansfield amendment was adopted 57-38, four fewer votes were cast for the proposal compared to the June 22 vote. The June vote (61-38) was supported by 45 Democrats and opposed by 10. The Sept. 30 measure was supported by 42 Democrats and opposed by 11. Republicans split 16-28 on the June vote and 15-27 on Sept. 30.

Three Senators switched positions to vote against the amendment Sept. 30—Howard H. Baker Jr. (R Tenn.), Ted

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Stevens (R Alaska) and Herman E. Talmadge (D Ga.). However, Norris Cotton (R N.H.) switched his position and voted for the amendment as did newly appointed Sen. Robert T. Stafford (R Vt.), although his predecessor, Winston L. Prouty (R Vt. 1959-71), had voted against the amendment in June.

Three other Senators who voted for the amendment in June were absent Sept. 30—Charles H. Percy (R Ill.), Daniel K. Inouye (D Hawaii) and Joseph M. Montoya (D N.M.).

Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R Pa.) gave two reasons for opposing the Mansfield amendment: "We are interested in preserving the structure of a state as a state with democratic principles. We are even more interested in preserving the security of our men and their lives as they withdraw."

John G. Tower (R Texas) said: "However lamentable a right-wing dictatorship may be, and I have no brief for a right-wing dictatorship, I do not know of any right-wing dictatorship in the world that tries to export a brand of politics to some other country. The fact is that communists do and there is a vast international conspiracy to overturn governments of non-communist countries throughout the world."

J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.) told Tower: "The staging next Sunday (Oct. 3) of a rigged, one-man election to ratify the rule of the incumbent military dictator cannot be blamed on the Nixon Administration which made desperate efforts to create the appearance of a genuine contest. Nonetheless, it should lay to rest once and for all the ludicrous fiction that this war has anything to do with giving the South Vietnamese people the right to determine their own future."

**Military Pay Raise.** In order for President Nixon to dislodge the conference agreement on the military draft extension bill from the Senate, he gave assurances to Gordon Allott (R Colo.) that the White House would support an amendment to the defense procurement bill requesting $381,100,000 in wage increases for the armed forces in addition to the $2.4-billion pay hike scheduled to go into effect at the end of the wage-price freeze Nov. 13.

"This amendment has the full and reiterated support of the President of the United States," Allott told the Senate when he introduced the $381.1-million pay increase proposal.

Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine), ranking minority member on the Armed Services Committee, said: "I cannot believe that the President really deep down in his heart favors the Allott amendment but, rather, to use his own words, considers it to be 'political profiteering' because it clearly runs counter, and very seriously so, to his economic policy of greater austerity.... Perhaps he (Nixon) does now officially support the Allott amendment after his original opposition to it--his support being the price paid to get the draft extension bill finally passed."

The Allott proposal added pay increases to only lower-ranking and short-term military personnel. Average compensation for an E-1 (private) as of Jan. 1, 1971, was $3,165 annually. Under the provisions of the draft law (PL 92-129) the average pay was increased to $4,872 effective Nov. 13. The Allott amendment would increase the private's annual pay to $5,150. Further up the enlisted man's pay scale (E-6 through E-9), however, the Allott amendment would provide no increases. The three lowest grades of officers also would receive salary hikes from the Allott amendment.

The $381,100,000 pay increase amendment was adopted Oct. 4 by a 65-4 roll-call vote. Voting against the bill were Senators Smith, Edward M. Kennedy (D Mass.), J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.) and Ted Stevens (R Alaska).

**Laos Spending Ceiling.** Stuart Symington (I Mo.) offered an amendment to impose a $250-million ceiling on U.S. direct or indirect economic and military support of Laos. The proposal excluded from the ceiling expenditures accrued through U.S. air operations over Laos.

In the final version of the amendment, the President was required to report four times annually on expenditures in Laos. The Pentagon had privately estimated that costs for Laotian operations would not exceed $350-million in fiscal 1972.

"It is now clear," Symington said, "that for years the Congress has been appropriating money in the blind to finance this Laotian war."

Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.) opposed the amendment saying that Laos would fall to Red China along with the rest of Southeast Asia. "If we allow this to happen," Goldwater explained, "I think we can very safely foresee the beginning of another world war because Red China, with domination over Asia, will then be a serious threat to Russia on Russia's southern border. We, by that time, would have vacated the world leadership spot.... The world leadership would start us on another war. And the conflict would start between Red China...and the Soviet Union."

Stennis, floor manager of the bill, originally opposed the amendment, but after Symington agreed to raise the ceiling on expenditures to $350-million (instead of $200-million), Stennis agreed to support the proposal.

The Symington amendment was then adopted Oct. 4 by a 67-11 roll-call vote.

**STOL Program.** An amendment offered by Goldwater, a member of the Armed Services Committee, would authorize the Air Force to reprogram $14,500,000 already appropriated in prior years to purchase 30 armed short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft.

"What the Air Force wants," Goldwater said, "is to buy cheap, off-the-shelf aircraft and test these aircraft to see if they can be used in a limited interdiction role in South Vietnam." Goldwater explained that the aircraft had been produced in Switzerland first, then by two companies in the United States. "It's not a new plane," he said.

After further discussion, the amendment was adopted Oct. 4 by voice vote.

**Alternatives to B-1 Bomber.** William Proxmire (D Wis.), an outspoken critic of the B-1 bomber program, offered an amendment authorizing $500,000 to conduct a feasibility study to see whether or not the B-52 could meet specifications of the B-1 program and $1-million to study the possibility of adapting any existing airframe to the missile launching specifications of the B-1 program.

Proxmire explained that his amendment was "a hedge against the large number of uncertainties facing the B-1 program." If something should go wrong with the B-1, if the aircraft should not meet specifications or if it should cost too much, the Air Force would have some alternatives upon which to rely, Proxmire said.

Goldwater opposed the amendment: "I think the idea of re-engining the B-52 has a lot of sex appeal. A lot of people think of the B-52, as they should, as one of the

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Stop the Bombing. Mike Gravel (D Alaska) offered an amendment calling for a prohibition on future funds to be expended in bombing actions on Cambodia, Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam. The amendment, which would have cut off funds as soon as the bill became law, provided that the President could use air warfare only when it involved protecting the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina.

"The amendment I offer is quite straightforward," Gravel said. "Let us stop the bombing, not just partially over North Vietnam, but in all Indochina—except for those strikes inside South Vietnam demonstrably related to the security of our withdrawing troops. Is it really the desire of the Senate to continue to send out those planes?"

"We do not like to have to do those things," explained Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, "but the situation over there demands it or they (communists) will march right on through Laos and absorb those people there." Stennis said that Laos ran 1,000 miles from its northern to southern borders and had a population of 2.8 million people. "Yet they have all that borderline, all that terrain, all that area to protect. Of course they cannot protect themselves."

Later in the debate, Strom Thurmond (R S.C.) said: "This amendment would seriously damage U.S. efforts to impede communism in Indochina until our allies there are able to handle the job alone."

Gravel said: "I do not understand it, in the face of... the intelligence accounts reported in the Pentagon papers that the bombing is totally ineffective militarily and has no effect at all. If we are really trying to get out of this war...why do we have to bomb a thousand miles away (in Laos)?"

Stennis replied: "This is part of the war, even though it is in the process of being wound down.... It is because of supplies. I think that perhaps they (United States Air Force) have an occasional raid in North Vietnam. As long as we are over there, already engaged in battle, it is pretty obvious that it is likely to happen."

Gravel said: "I do hope the Senator from Mississippi does not mean to leave the impression that we are only bombing there slightly."

Stennis: "The Senator means North Vietnam?"

Gravel: "Yes. I think the record shows that every four days we have been striking North Vietnam. And the record shows that under this Administration we have doubled the amount of bombing in the little country of Laos."

Stennis: "I do not apologize for any new raids. There are facts that they are based upon. However, if the Senator will get the North Vietnamese out of there and no longer let them be a menace to our boys and our departure ... I would be willing to join him in his amendment."

The amendment to stop the bombing in Indochina was rejected Oct. 5 by a 19-64 roll-call vote.

Delayed Chrome Clause. Bill Brock (R Tenn.) offered an amendment which sought to delay implementation of section 503 of the bill until Jan. 1, 1972. Section 503 required the President to import chromium ore from Rhodesia, in violation of a 1966 United Nations embargo, if any ore was imported from a communist country.

The Brock amendment was adopted Oct. 6 by voice vote.

Earlier on Oct. 6, the Senate rejected a related amendment offered by J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.) which sought to amend section 503 by allowing the President to have discretionary authority over importation of chromium ore from Rhodesia. Final consideration of the Fulbright amendment had been delayed by parliamentary snags. The amendment was tentatively passed by the Senate Sept. 27 by a 45-43 roll-call vote, but instead of immediately adopting a motion to prevent reconsideration of the proposal, which is usually a routine procedure on all amendments, the motion was rejected. 36-40 after several of the amendment's supporters had already left the chamber. A subsequent vote of 39-38 brought the amendment back before the Senate for reconsideration. Fulbright delayed a final vote and it was postponed to Oct. 6 when it was rejected without debate by a 38-44 roll-call vote.

Full Weapons Report. John C. Stennis (D Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, offered an amendment to HR 8687 which sought to require in-depth cost estimates, delivery-date and operational testing and evaluation of every weapon system paid for through congressional appropriation. The Stennis amendment also required that 30 to 60 days before awarding a contract or exercising an option on a contract, the Defense Secretary would submit to Congress a similar evaluation of the weapon system.

This was the only amendment which Stennis offered, and he was the only Senator who spoke for or against the proposal before it was adopted Oct. 6 by voice vote.

Upgrade Offensive Missiles. On the day before final passage of HR 8687, James I. Buckley (Cons.-R N.Y.) Oct. 5 offered three amendments dealing with requests for more funds for research on upgrading the United States' offensive supply of missiles.

Buckley said his three-part package was necessary because of two recent developments. "The first of these developments," Buckley said, "has to do with the dramatic expansion in the numbers and lifting capacities of the Soviet Union's intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)." He said the second development was "the seemingly authoritative report that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) now in progress will seek to limit the quantity, but not the quality, of our land-based nuclear missiles."

The first amendment requested $5-million for research and development to enable the United States to rapidly upgrade its Minuteman (ICBM) force. By fiscal 1974, Buckley explained, "we will be in a position to expand the projected deliverability of Minuteman warheads from 2,100 to 3,000 without any increase in the number of missiles deployed."

"At the present time," Buckley continued, "our Minuteman force is composed of 500 Minuteman I's and 500 Minuteman II's—both types having only single warheads. Since June of 1970 we have been replacing the older Minuteman I missile with the more modern Minuteman III multiple-warhead missile (MIRV). By the time the current modernization program is completed, the force will consist of 550 Minuteman III's each having the capacity to launch three warheads, and 450 Minuteman II's each with single warheads. The aggregate number will remain unchanged at 1,000—the same number de-

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ployed in 1966—but the warhead capacity of this force will have been increased from 1,000 to 2,100."

Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), who previously had offered an amendment to delete funds for further expansion of the antiballistic missile (ABM) system, joined with Chairman Stennis, who had earlier opposed the Hughes amendment, in opposing the Buckley proposals.

Buckley's first amendment requesting $50-million for upgrading research for the Minuteman program was rejected Oct. 5 by a 17-66 roll-call vote.

His second amendment would authorize $12-million for research to increase the kill probability of the Minuteman III by about 40 percent. Although the amendment was voted on separately and rejected by voice vote Oct. 5, Buckley presented his second and third amendments as companion measures.

The third Buckley amendment called for an additional $25-million which, he said, in three years would provide the United States with the ability to improve the kill probability of the Poseidon missile (launched from submarines) by about 500 percent.

Stennis replied: "I know we can argue on and on, ad infinitum, about research money. I just decline to go further on that. But I repeat that here is the position of the President of the United States. Here is his responsibility. The SALT talks are in progress. There are some signs of developments that are desirable. Certainly the last thing we want to do is to have a recorded Senate vote on this subject that could be used in any way to cause concern, alarm or distrust of our good faith...."

The third Buckley amendment was rejected Oct. 5 by a 12-68 roll-call vote.

## Summary of Action on Major Amendments

**Amendments Accepted.** Sept. 30—Gaylord Nelson (D Wis.) Reduce the fiscal 1972 authorization for Project Sanguine to $3,992,000 from $5,557,000 and earmark $10,000 of the remaining authorization for environmental compatibility projects and $300,000 for biological and ecological effects research: none of the funds authorized for Project Sanguine could be used for research and development of a deep underground communications system. Roll-call vote, 44-42.

Sept. 30—Mike Mansfield (D Mont.)—Declare as United States policy that all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Indochina and military operations terminated not later than six months from enactment of the bill, subject to the release of all American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam and its allies; urged the President to negotiate for an immediate cease-fire and for the phased withdrawal of troops in exchange for the phased release of prisoners within the six-month deadline. Roll call, 57-38.

Oct. 4—Gordon Allott (R Colo.)—Provide $381,100,000 in military pay increases for fiscal 1972 in addition to the $2.4-billion in increased benefits approved in the draft extension bill (PL 92-129). Roll call, 65-4.

Stuart Symington (D Mo.)—Establish a $350-million annual ceiling on expenditures directly and indirectly for military and economic aid to Laos, but excluding all expenditures for air support from the ceiling; require the President to report quarterly on all expenditures on Laos. Roll call, 67-11.

Barry Goldwater (R Ariz.)— Authorize $14,500,000 for the purchase of 30 short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft for experimental use in Vietnam. Voice.

Oct. 6—Charles McC. Mathias (R Md) —Substitute for Moss (D Utah) amendment—Provide salary increases for federal employees on Jan. 1, 1972, which were not to be greater than salary increases granted to the private sector of the economy after termination of the Administration's wage-price freeze Nov. 13. Roll call, 60-27.

Bill Brock (R Tenn.)—Delay to Jan. 1, 1972, enactment of section 503 of the Senate committee's version of the bill stipulating that if the United States imported chromium ore from a communist country, it must also import the same material from all free world sources willing to trade, including Rhodesia (the United States joined a United Nations embargo against Rhodesia in 1966 which adoption of section 503 would violate). Voice.

John V. Tunney (D Calif.)—Bar use of funds for all aircraft flights at Los Alamitos, Calif., Naval Air Station until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense submitted a report to Congress explaining and determining the best use of the air station. Voice.

John C. Stennis (D Miss.)—Require the Department of Defense to submit to the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate in-depth reports on the annual budget of each weapon system for which funds were requested in the bill; to be included in the reports were the planned procurement schedule of the system, estimated costs, the results of operational testing and evaluations and summary of costs already expended, problems encountered in the program and the original procurement schedule; required that similar reports be filed 30 to 60 days prior to the awarding of any contract, or option in a contract, on any weapon system. Voice.

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Action on Amendments, Continued

Amendments Rejected. Sept. 22—George McGovern (D S.D.)—Reduce to $31-million from $370-million the authorization for continued research and development on the Air Force B-1 long-range bomber program. Voice.

Gaylord Nelson (D Wis.)—Bar use of all but $450,000 of the committee-recommended amount of $5,577,000 in fiscal 1972 for the Navy's submarine communications system called Project Sanguine, proposed to be constructed in northern Wisconsin, until the Navy submitted an impact statement of the project's effects on the environment. Roll call, 35-45.

Sept. 23—Gale W. McGee (D Wyo.)—Delete from the committee version section 503 which removed trade restrictions on imports of Rhodesian chromium ore, thus violating a 1966 United Nations embargo against Rhodesia. Roll call, 36-46. (See related Brock amendment, above. Fulbright amendment, below.)

McGovern—Require an alternate defense budget for fiscal 1973 with a $60-billion ceiling to be submitted along with the regular defense budget request; require accompanying report on recommendations for congressional action to stimulate defense conversion planning by major defense contractors. Roll call, 26-58.

Sept. 24—Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.)—Require that authorized fiscal 1972 funds for the multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) program be placed in a special Treasury Department account to be used only when the President and Congress jointly determined that Soviet developments in the MIRV or ABM field necessitated further U.S. testing and deployment or until an agreement was reached at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Roll call, 12-39. (Story, Weekly

Sept. 28—Nelson—Require a full study by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees by the Department of Defense on projected five-year budget requests. Roll call, 28-54.

William B. Saxbe—Delete the $23.7-million of the $126-million authorization for the Harrier close-air-support-of-ground-troops aircraft to be used for the conversion of the production base to the United States from Great Britain. Roll call, 40-40.

Sept. 29—William Proxmire (D Wis.)—Delete the entire $801,600,000 for continued research and development of the Navy's F-14 aircraft except where the funds would be used to terminate contract agreements. Roll call, 28-61.

Harold E. Hughes—Delete $639-million from the committee-recommended $1.066-million authorization for the ABM, thus allowing continued research and development on, but not deployment of, the missiles. Roll call, 21-64.

Sept. 30—Thomas F. Eagleton (D Mo.)—Delete $27.5-million of the $62.8-million authorization for continued research and development of the Main Battle Tank (XM-803). Roll call, 42-51.

Oct. 4—Proxmire— Authorize an additional $1.5-million for studies to determine alternatives to the B-1 bomber program. Voice.

Proxmire— Authorize an additional $25-million authorization for a feasibility study of a light fighter prototype for the Navy as possible alternate aircraft for the proposed F-14. Voice.

Oct. 5—Mike Gravel (D Alaska)—Prohibit future funds from being spent on U.S. bombing operations over Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam except where the raids were for the direct protection of U.S. troops withdrawing from Vietnam. Roll call, 19-64.

James L. Buckley (Cons.-R N.Y.) Authorize $5-million to conduct preliminary studies toward modernization of the Minuteman III missile program. Roll call, 17-66.

Buckley— Authorize $12-million for research and development of programs designed to improve accuracy of the Minuteman III missile system. Voice.

Buckley— Authorize $25-million for research and development programs designed to improve the accuracy and kill ratio of Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Roll call, 12-68.

Oct. 6—Joseph Montoya (D N.M.)—Bar use of funds for U.S. assistance to South Vietnam unless the South Vietnamese government held a presidential election with more than one candidate participating prior to Feb. 3, 1972. Roll call, 25-60.

J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.)—Give the President discretionary authority to abide by or to break the 1966 United Nations embargo against Rhodesia on the matter of importing Rhodesian chromium ore. Roll call, 38-44. (Ten-tatively adopted Sept. 30, 45-43; subsequent motion confirming the initial vote was defeated, 36-40; motion to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was first adopted was then approved, 39-38.)

CONFERENCE ACTION

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On October 19, 1971, during the routine procedure of appointing House conferees to the House-Senate conference on the military procurement bill, anti-war House members attempted to get an up-or-down House vote on the Mansfield end-the-war amendment included in the Senate bill. According to House custom, the Minority Leader's designee is permitted to offer a motion to instruct conferees on bills going to conference. Rep. Whalen, as he did when the draft extension bill went to conference over a similar Mansfield amendment, intended to offer a motion instructing conferees to accept the Mansfield amendment. Conferees would be bound by the result of a vote on this motion. Instead, however, Congressman Arends was permitted to offer the instructing motion. His motion instructed conferees to reject all non-germane Senate amendments. These would include the Mansfield amendment, the military pay raise, the Rhodesian chrome ban repeal, and the Laotian aid limit.

In subsequent votes, the House first moved to end debate on the Arends motion by a vote of 215-193. It then rejected the motion by a vote of 192-216, thus leaving the conferees free to negotiate with Senate conferees as they saw fit. Prevention of a straight up-or-down vote on the Mansfield measure was considered a victory for the Administration.

On November 5, 1971, the House and Senate conferees filed their Conference Report on the FY72 Military Procurement Authorization Bill. As agreed to, the conference bill authorized a total of $21.3 billion. (Major provisions are outlined below.)

The Conference Report went to the House floor on November 10 where a controversy again arose over parliamentary procedures to handle the three remaining non-germane Senate-approved amendments: the Mansfield amendment, the $350 million ceiling on aid to Laos, and the so-called Byrd amendment repealing the ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome. The military pay-raise provision had been deleted in conference.

Several members wanted separate up-or-down votes on these three amendments under a procedure whereby if any of the provisions were thus rejected, only that portion of the bill would return to conference and the remainder could be voted upon separately and passed. It was ruled, however, that if any part of the Conference Report was rejected, the entire bill would return to conference. The effect of this ruling was to deter those opposed to one or all of the three amendments but in favor of the bill's passage as a whole from demanding separate votes. In the end, a separate vote was demanded only with respect to the Rhodesian chrome provision. The amendment prevailed by a vote of 251-100.

The Conference Report was subsequently adopted by the House by voice vote. In the Senate, the Conference Report went to the floor on November 11, 1971 where it was adopted by a vote of 65-19. Prior to adoption, Senator Allott was critical of the conferees' decision to drop the military pay raise amendment.

A summary of conference action on major provisions follows:

**Mansfield Amendment.** As passed by the Senate, an amendment sponsored by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) declared it the policy of the United States that a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina would be completed not later than six months after enactment. The withdrawal clause hinged on the phased release of U.S. prisoners of war by North Vietnam and its allies.

Conferees removed from the Senate-passed amendment the six-month withdrawal deadline, replacing it with the language "at a date certain." House conferees tried to make the amendment a sense of Congress pro-

posal instead of a declared policy statement, but the Senate language prevailed. House conferees added language to the provision, however, requiring that all Americans missing in action who had been held or were known to be held by North Vietnam or its allies had to be accounted for by those governments before the policy statement would take effect.

Sen. Margaret Chase Smith (R Maine) and Rep. Leslie C. Arends (R Ill.), both members of the conference committee, emphasized in the conference report their strenuous opposition to the inclusion of any part of the Mansfield amendment.

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**Military Pay Increases.** As passed by the Senate, HR 8687 included an amendment authorizing $381,100,000 for military pay increases, with the increases weighted toward enlisted men and low-ranking officers. The amendment, sponsored by Gordon Allott (R Colo.), was supported by the President as part of an earlier agreement with Allott to gain passage of the draft extension bill (HR 6531-PL 92-129) when a coalition of Senators threatened to reject the conference report on HR 6531.

House conferees cited a Defense Department position paper on the Allott amendment which said that while the Pentagon did "concur in the additional increases proposed to be provided in Mr. Allott's amendment," it "believed that the pay provisions in the conference report on HR 8687 (the procurement bill) met the tests of equity and competitiveness."

The $381,100,000 pay increase amendment was deleted.

**Laos Expense Ceiling.** As passed by the Senate, the bill contained an amendment adopted on the floor placing a $350-million ceiling on U.S. expenditures in Laos. The ceiling did not include U.S. expenditures from its air actions over Laos.

House conferees "intend that the $350-million limitation should include all assistance-related activities in Laos," the conference report stated. "However, the conferees wish to make it understood that it is not the intent to place a ceiling on, or reduce, funds available for vital non-assistance-related activities in programs which must be carried on...." Therefore, the Senate-passed $350-million ceiling on Laos expenditures was included in the conference version along with the House conferees' interpretation of the meaning of the amendment.

**Contract Schedule Reports.** As passed by the Senate, HR 8687 contained an amendment sponsored by John C. Stennis (D Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, requiring the Pentagon to submit annual reports on the development, testing and procurement schedules of all weapons systems authorized in the procurement bill. The amendment also stipulated that prior to awarding procurement contracts for major weapons systems, a supplemental report to both Armed Services Committees would be required on the weapon being considered. The House bill had no similar provision.

"It has become increasingly apparent that weapons systems have entered volume production before adequate development and testing has been completed. In effect, the military departments were gambling that major problems would not be encountered and that any design changes required after completion of testing would be of a relatively minor nature. Such has not been the case," the conferees stated.

Despite the strong language of the conference report, however, House conferees insisted that the contract reports not be required where the Defense Secretary determined that such a report would adversely affect the selection process or the "vital security interest of the U.S."

With the House stipulations, the amendment was approved by conferees.

**C-5A Aircraft.** Although the House did not reduce the Administration's $472,200,000 budget estimate for continuing the procurement of the C-5A jet cargo, the Senate Armed Services Committee cut the request to $396,400,000. The House agreed to the Senate reduction.

The Senate had also included language in their version which continued restrictions, which had been included in the fiscal 1971 bill, prohibiting the use of C-5A funds by the aircraft's manufacturer, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, for any purpose other than the C-5A program. The language was also included in the conference version.

**Nuclear-Powered Frigate.** Although the Defense Department had not requested it, both Senate and House Armed Services Committees authorized $14,600,000 for advanced procurement of a nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate as an escort ship for one of the three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The Navy had testified that the frigate was needed despite its omission in the fiscal 1972 Defense Department's budget.

**Chromium Imports.** Written into the Senate-passed version of the bill was a provision prohibiting the President from adhering to a trading ban, involving strategic materials, on a free-world nation when the United States was importing the same strategic materials from a communist nation. The provision had the effect of forcing the United States to violate a United Nations embargo against the white supremacist government of Rhodesia, a major chromium ore producer, because the United States had been importing chromium from the Soviet Union since early in 1967.

The United Nations Security Council voted Dec. 16, 1966, to impose the embargo against Rhodesia, and President Johnson Jan. 5, 1967, issued an executive order implementing the embargo. Since the issuance of the executive order, 21 complaints of violation of the embargo had been made, all by Great Britain, involving transactions by France, Japan, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, West Germany and the United States.

Chromium ore—a strategic material essential to the production of steel—imported to the United States had come predominantly from the Soviet Union (60 percent) since 1967. "As the dominant world supplier of chrome," the conference report stated, "the Russians have driven the price from a pre-sanction level of about $25 per ton up to the present level of $72 per ton."

The conference committee concluded: "Continued observance of the UN-imposed embargo against the importation of chrome ore from Rhodesia adversely affects the national interests of the United States." The Senate-passed provision was agreed to.

**Safeguard ABM.** The Senate-passed bill contained a $1,106,200,000 authorization for continued procurement, research, development and construction of the Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system. The House-passed version authorized $1,267,600,000 for the program—the same amount requested by the Administration.

Because of construction delays in the system, however, House conferees agreed that the full Administration request was not necessary. The conference agreement contained $1,106,200,000—the same amount passed by the Senate.

Also at issue during the conference was Senate-passed language restricting deployment of missiles and radar to two of the proposed Safeguard ABM sites—Grand Forks, N.D., and Great Falls, Mont. The Senate bill further authorized advanced preparation of ABM sites at Sedalia, Mo., and Cheyenne, Wyo., but not deployment of missiles and radar.

The House version provided for full deployment at all four of the proposed sites and for advanced deployment at a possible fifth ABM site located in the Washington, D.C., area.

The conferees agreed to the restrictions provided in the Senate-passed version.

**Project Sanguine.** As passed by the Senate, the bill authorized $3,492,000 in funds for continued research and development of Project Sanguine—the Navy's proposed low-frequency submarine communications system requiring a grid pattern of cables to be buried in an area of northern Wisconsin covering 6,100 square miles. Of the amount authorized by the Senate, $150,000 was earmarked for environmental compatibility studies.

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and $300,000 for biological and ecological effects research. The House had authorized an amount that was about $2-million greater than the Senate version and had earmarked funds for environmental research.

Conferees restored $1-million of the $2-million cut by the Senate, making a total of $4,492,000 available for the project. The earmarked funds for environmental research were kept in the bill.

**Special Projects Group.** The Senate had reduced a $34-million Pentagon request for the Defense Special Projects Group to $3-million. The Special Projects Group was formed to develop a sensor system to be used in the Vietnam war in Southeast Asia.

"The conferees agree," the report stated, "that there is little or no justification to continue the Defense Special Projects Group." Conferees, however, restored $8,300,000 for a total authorization of $11,300,000.

**Prototype Program.** After both the House and the Senate had completed action on HR 8687 and it had been sent to a House-Senate conference, the Department of Defense requested an additional $67,500,000 authorization to initiate an advanced prototype program—a procedure for acquiring prototypes of weapons systems before taking any further procurement steps.

"While in agreement with the objectives of this program, the conferees reduced the request by half because a) the lateness of appropriations will reduce the period of time for which funds are required... b) Congress did not have time to review the individual projects in sufficient detail to establish either the validity or urgency of all the requirements," the conference report stated. Thus conferees authorized $34-million for the prototype program.

**STOL Aircraft.** An amendment of the Senate-passed bill called for an authorization of $14,500,000 (out of prior-year funding) for the purchase of 30 short take-off and landing (STOL) aircraft. House conferees accepted the amendment.

**Harrier Aircraft.** As passed by the House, HR 8687 authorized $102,300,000 for procurement of 30 Harrier aircraft for the Marine Corps. The Senate added to the House-passed figure $23,700,000 to be used for switching the production base of the aircraft from Great Britain to the United States. The additional $23,700,000 was deleted from the bill, leaving the authorization at $102,300,000—the amount passed by the House.

**F-11 Fighter.** As passed by the Senate, HR 8687 contained an $801,600,000 authorization for procurement of not less than 48 F-11 aircraft. The House had repealed the authorization from the bill pending a Pentagon study of F-11 cost overruns. Conferees agreed to authorize the full Administration request of $801,600,000.

**Minuteman.** As passed by the Senate, the bill authorized $1,771,900,000 for continued procurement of Minuteman (offensive) missiles. The House version authorized $1,841,400,000. Conferees reached a compromise figure of $1,788,900,000 for the Minuteman program. ✓

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL, FY 1972

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

<table><tr><td>November 11, 1971</td><td>House Appropriations Committee reports the FY 72 Appropriations Bill recommending a funding level of $71,048,013,000.</td></tr><tr><td>November 17, 1971</td><td>House passes the DOD Appropriations Bill at the Committee recommended level. The vote was 352-51.</td></tr><tr><td>November 18, 1971</td><td>Senate Appropriations Committee reports the FY72 DOD Appropriations Bill recommending a funding level of $70,242,513,000.</td></tr><tr><td>November 23, 1971</td><td>Senate passes the DOD Appropriations Bill with a funding level of $70,849,113,000. The vote was 80-5.</td></tr><tr><td>December 15, 1971</td><td>Senate adopts Conference Report by voice vote. House adopts Conference Report. The vote was 292-39.</td></tr><tr><td>December 1971</td><td>The President signs the bill.</td></tr></table>

MAJOR PROVISIONS

As enacted, the FY 1972 Defense Appropriations Bill appropriated a total of $70,518,463,000 - some $3 billion less than the Administration's request. In spite of this reduction, however, this was the second largest defense appropriation measure in U.S. history, surpassed only by the FY 1969 bill.

The largest cuts effected by the Congress were the deletion of $500 million in weapon sale credits to Israel (because a similar provision was already contained in another bill) and reduction of $250 million for intelligence spending.

The tables below show a comparison of House and Senate approved funding levels and a comparison of Administration requests and final appropriation levels:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>House Version</th><th>Senate Version<br>(thousands)</th><th>Conference Version</th><th>Administration Request</th><th>Approved by Congress</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Military personnel</td><td>$21,021,974</td><td>$21,032,274</td><td>$21,024,574</td><td>$21,291,969,000</td><td>$21,024,574,000</td></tr><tr><td>Retired military personnel</td><td>3,777,134</td><td>3,777,134</td><td>3,777,134</td><td>3,777,134,000</td><td>3,777,134,000</td></tr><tr><td>Operation and maintenance</td><td>20,435,481</td><td>20,212,481</td><td>20,299,231</td><td>20,647,834,000</td><td>20,299,231,000</td></tr><tr><td>Procurement</td><td>18,185,292</td><td>17,688,992</td><td>17,776,892</td><td>19,681,660,000</td><td>17,776,892,000</td></tr><tr><td>Research and development</td><td>7,511,762</td><td>7,516,662</td><td>7,519,062</td><td>7,949,362,000</td><td>7,519,062,000</td></tr><tr><td>Special foreign currency program</td><td>12,000</td><td>12,000</td><td>12,000</td><td>12,300,000</td><td>12,000,000</td></tr><tr><td>Aircraft, weapons for Israel</td><td>0</td><td>500,000</td><td>0</td><td>183,570,000</td><td>109,570,000</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>$71,048,013</td><td>$70,849,113</td><td>$70,518,463</td><td>$73,543,829,000</td><td>$70,518,463,000</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6">Breakdown by services:</td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>$20,455,796</td><td>$20,152,030</td><td>$20,211,446</td><td>$21,429,762,000</td><td>$20,211,446,000</td></tr><tr><td> Navy</td><td>22,629,095</td><td>22,390,519</td><td>22,470,795</td><td>23,354,333,000</td><td>22,470,795,000</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>22,366,770</td><td>22,207,812</td><td>22,244,570</td><td>23,053,940,000</td><td>22,244,570,000</td></tr><tr><td>Defense Agencies</td><td>1,819,218</td><td>1,821,618</td><td>1,814,518</td><td>1,928,660,000</td><td>1,814,518,000</td></tr><tr><td>Retired military personnel</td><td>3,777,134</td><td>3,777,134</td><td>3,777,134</td><td>3,777,134,000</td><td>3,777,134,000</td></tr><tr><td>Aircraft, weapons for Israel</td><td>0</td><td>500,000</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>$71,048,013</td><td>$70,849,113</td><td>$70,518,463</td><td>$73,543,829,000</td><td>$70,518,463,000</td></tr></tbody></table>

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HOUSE ACTION

Appropriations Committee

On November 11, 1971, the House Appropriations Committee reported a defense
bill recommending an appropriation level of $71.05 billion for FY 1972. The
bill reflected reductions of approximately $2.5 billion from the Administra-
tion's requests, more than half of which came in the procurement area.

Significant action taken by the Committee included a reduction of some $181 million in overall intelligence funding. This cut, which was spread among intelligence activities by the services as well as CIA, DIA and NSA, was made in response to the view that intelligence operations had grown "beyond the actual needs" of the Defense department and lacked effective coordination.

The committee also deleted funding authorized for the continued development of the main battle tank program, replacing it with a $20 million appropriation for the development of two prototypes for a new conventional tank. In addition, despite adamant support by the two Armed Services Committees, the Appropriations Committee deleted the $14.6 million authorized for the development of a fourth nuclear-powered missile launching frigate. This had been opposed by the Administration.

In its report, the Committee was also sharply critical of a so-called "officer
boom" as a result of which the large number of officers in the services were
no longer proportional to the number of men they commanded. It directed a
Defense Secretary review of the proliferation of officers of high rank to be
submitted to Congress during FY73 budget hearings.

Moreover, the Committee expressed strong criticism of the lack of action in
developing a standard prototype development program - whereby competing com-
panies would make prototypes of aircraft and weapons desired and would compete
with these models for both maximum capability and lowest price. The committee
report commented:

In too many instances the military services declared
that the new weapons were needed at a certain date to
meet a predicted enemy threat The fact that the threat
either didn't materialize at the time indicated or per-
haps never materialized, or that the fact that some
weapons systems were so changed in performance from the
original concept by the time they were in production...
hasn't deterred the continuation of this procedure....
It is hoped that prototypes..will be successful enough
to discourage the use of these alarmist tactics which
have no place in a very protracted situation such as the
one we have found ourselves since the advent of the Cold
War.

303

A summary of action on other major defense programs follows:

**Safeguard ABM** The Committee recommended an appropriation of $1.189 million for the continued procurement, construction, research and development of the Safeguard system compared to an Administration request of $1.268. Of this, approximately $104.4 million was for construction which had been included in the military construction appropriation bill but later dropped because authorizing legislation had not yet cleared Congress.

**F-14 Aircraft** In its report, the Committee was highly critical of this program chronicling the cost overruns, production slippages, design faults and the Navy's attempts to cover up problems involved. While it went on to say that it seriously considered halting further production of the aircraft and returning it to research and development status, the Committee nevertheless recommended full-funding of the program and appropriated the $801.6 million already authorized.

**LANCE Missile** The Committee recommended a $76.3 million appropriation for continued procurement. The Pentagon had also requested $2.9 million for development of non-nuclear LANCE missiles, however this portion of the request was denied.

**Ship-building** $3.017 million was recommended for the purchase of 16 new ships and various service craft, plus nine ship modifications. Of this $890 million was approved for six new nuclear attack submarines (SSN-688). This sum was $22.5 million above the Administration's request and included funds for a sixth submarine not requested by the pentagon.

**Additional Views** One Republican and 13 Democrats filed an additional statement pledging support of an end-the-war amendment which would set June 1, 1972 as a cutoff date for the use of funds contained in the bill for U.S. military operations in Indochina. The joint statement commented:

> No one can change the tragic events which have passed before us... In Congress, however, we do have the power and the duty to shape our future destiny in Southeast Asia. It is our intention to see that power exercised...
> 
> ..The executive branch refused to establish a termination date for getting our military forces out of Indochina.
> 
> With this refusal, Congress continues to stand as the court of last resort for the American people on this issue.

Congressmen Clarence Long (D-Md.) and Sidney Yates (D-Ill.) also filed separate views critical of the F-14 program. They requested a GAO evaluation of the program prior to the FY 73 authorization and appropriation process.

### Floor Action

On November 17, 1971, the House passed the FY72 DOD Appropriations Bill at the Committee-recommended level of $71 billion. The vote was 352-51. Six amendments were offered and all were rejected.

Debate on the bill ranged from the magnitude of the Soviet Union's alleged missile threat to the size of the United States nuclear submarine fleet. However, the most controversial aspects of the debate centered on American Indochina policy and an amendment offered by Rep. Boland to "end-the-war". This

304

amendment, which was the House-version of the so-called Mansfield amendment which had been attached the FY72 procurement authorization bill in modified form, called for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Indochina subject to the release of all U.S. prisoners and an accounting of those missing in action. It set a June 1, 1972 deadline for the cutoff of funds contained in the defense bill.

Supporters of the amendment maintained that a majority of the American people were opposed to continuation of the war. Since an end to the war was the responsibility of Congress as well as a the President, the Congress should vote to get American troops out. A stand by the Congress on the issue was particularly critical since the President intended to maintain a residual force in Indochina indefinitely which would merely prolong the war and continue to endanger American lives. In addition, it was argued that the only way to secure the release of American POW's was to set a date for withdrawal.

Opponents of the measure argued that it would tie the hands of the President in seeking a negotiated settlement of the war and, since the President was already ending American involvement in Indochina, the amendment was superfluous. They also maintained that there was no evidence that the North Vietnamese would release American POW's if, in fact, a withdrawal date were set and that the United States could not abandon the South Vietnamese until they were able to stand by themselves.

The Boland amendment was ultimately rejected by a vote of 163-238. This was subsequently followed by an amendment offered by Rep. Jacobs (D-Ind.) to set a November 7, 1972 cutoff date. He defended this measure as a means to make sure the war was ended by election day. It was defeated 52-161.

Other amendments considered and defeated included:

- A Rep. Bingham (D-N.Y.) amendment to delete the full $801.6 million appropriation for the continued development and procurement of the F-14 aircraft. Support of the amendment was based on the substantial cost overruns and dubious cost-effectiveness of the aircraft. The vote was 76-311.

- Rep. Moorhead (D-Pa.) amendment to set aside $10 million of the F-14's funding for the development of two prototypes which might serve as alternatives for the F-14. In support of the measure, Rep. Moorhead stated this would not:

> stop the F-14 but it questions the advisability of proceeding much further with the acquisition...I am not an aerospace engineer nor a cost accountant but I have a keen sense of smell. The F-14 has a C-5A odor - the smell of cost overruns and performance underruns.

The amendment was defeated by voice vote.

- Rep. Yates (D-Ill.) amendment to limit to 60 days the President's emergency power to call to active duty military personnel in excess of the Congressionally imposed ceiling. The President would have the 60 days to either justify the

305

troop call-up or reduce the armed forces back below the ceiling. Supporters of the amendment maintained that it would prevent future erosions of Congressional power and evasions of congressional policy. The rejecting vote was 183-210.

--Riegle (R-Mich.) amendment to cut by 5 percent the estimated expenditures of the Defense Department for FY 1972. The vote was 74-307.

--Rep. Aspin (D-Wis.) amendment to limit FY 72 appropriations to the total amount appropriated in FY 71, including supplementals. This would amount to $69.5 billion. In support of his amendment, Aspin offered four reasons for the increases in the FY72 defense budget: too many generals not doing enough, cost overruns in weapons programs, too much overhead (unnecessary bases and unneeded civilian personnel) and too much "gold plating". Aspin continued:

> It seems to me with the budgets getting higher and the amount of money we are getting for the budgets less, it is appropriate for this Congress and its members to express their unhappiness with the situation. This amendment does not tell the Pentagon what to cut or where to cut or how to cut, but it does put the House on record as being opposed to buying less defense and spending more for it.

The amendment was rejected 114-278.

## SENATE ACTION

### Appropriations Committee

On November 18, 1971, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported the defense bill recommending an appropriation level of $70,242,513,000 for FY 1972. This was $805.5 million less than the House-passed amount.

A summary of significant committee action on major weapons programs follows:

**Safeguard ABM** The committee recommended an appropriation of $1,191.6 million for the continued development and deployment of the ABM. In accordance with the procurement authorization bill, full deployment of radar and missiles was limited to two of the four authorized ABM sites.

**Cheyenne Helicopter** The Committee deleted the $13.2 million requested for advanced engineering in preparation for production of the helicopter. Of the $61.3 million requested for continued R&D, the Committee appropriated $44.3 million which included $35 million to pay for cost overruns at Lockheed.

**Main Battle Tank** The authorization bill had reduced the budget request of $86.6 million for development and procurement to $62.8 million. The House-passed appropriation bill had deleted all funds for continuation of the MBT program replacing it with funding for two prototype tanks. The Senate Committee recommended an appropriation of $50 million to be used for whatever new tank program the Defense Department wished to pursue.

306

**Lance Missile.** The committee recommended $108,500,000 for procurement and development of the Army's Lance missile—a surface-to-surface ballistic missile for support of ground troops. Of that total, $29,400,000 was for continued research and development of the system.

**TOW Anti-Tank Missile.** The committee recommended $63,700,000 for the Army's TOW anti-tank missile—a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile system with a maximum range of 3,000 meters.

**F-14 Aircraft.** The committee recommended $1,029,800,000 for the Navy's F-14 (A and B model) aircraft. Of this amount, $600,800,000 was for procurement of 48 F-14A aircraft; $128-million for continued development of the F-14A; and $100,200,000 for the development of the F-14B.

The F-14 was expected to replace the F-4 as the Navy's carrier-launched aircraft during the 1973-1980 period.

**Harrier Aircraft.** The Marine Corps' Harrier aircraft programs. Of this amount, $349,200,000 was for cost overruns on the program, bringing the total of cost AV-8A Harrier, which was being produced by Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Ltd., Great Britain, had four engines fixed for verticle takeoff that rotated for horizontal cruising.

**Anti-Submarine Aircraft.** The committee recommended $579,900,000 for continued development and procurement of the Navy's carrier-based S-3A anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. Of this amount, $322-million was for the procurement of the first 13 aircraft.

**ULMS.** The committee recommended $103-million for continued research and development of the undersea long-range missile system (ULMS). "The objective of this effort is to develop a new long-range submarine-launched missile and a newly designed submarine with characteristics and equipment permitting operations in vast ocean areas which will minimize chances of detection," the report stated.

**Attack Submarines.** The committee recommended $881-million to continue procurement of SSN Class 688 nuclear attack submarines. The program was first funded in fiscal 1970 and included procurement of six submarines.

**Destroyers.** The committee recommended $599,200,000 for seven new Spruance class destroyers. The current program called for 30 of these destroyers; nine had been funded through fiscal 1972.

**Guided Missile Frigate.** The committee recommended $194,600,000 for continued construction of a third nuclear-powered guided missile frigate (DIAGN-38). A fourth frigate, which was recommended by both Armed Services Committees but not by the Pentagon, was not funded by the committee, thus deleting $14,600,000 from the bill.

**Poseidon Conversion.** The committee recommended $1,010,000,000 for the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. The funds were for conversion of Minuteman I missiles to the Minuteman II and III—both of which had multiple nuclear warheads which were independently targetable.

**F-111 Aircraft.** The committee recommended $485,700,000 for procurement of the F-111 and FB-111 aircraft programs. Of this amount, $349,200,000 was for cost overruns on the program, bringing the total of cost overruns on the F-14 program to $975,500,000. "The committee does not expect to consider any future requests for funds for these overtarget costs and unfunded deficiencies," the committee report stated.

**International Fighter.** The committee recommended $128,400,000 for development and procurement of 21 F-5E international fighter aircraft. The aircraft "will provide the free world forces in Southeast Asia an increased air-to-air self-defense capability," according to the report. "This aircraft is being developed and produced for transfer to the free world forces and there are no plans to have this aircraft in the U.S. Air Force's inventory." The aircraft was "designed for uncomplicated flying and maintenance."

**C-5A Transport.** The committee recommended $321,500,000 for continued procurement and development of the C-5A jet transport program. Of the amount recommended, $299,100,000 was to pay for cost overruns in funding the first 76 C-5As. The Air Force planned to buy 81. (C-5A developments, Weekly Report p. 2148)

**B-1 Bomber.** The committee recommended $370,300,000 for continued research and development of the Air-Force's B-1 bomber. The estimate of total costs for the completed research and development portion of the program was $2,628,300,000.

**F-15 Aircraft.** The committee recommended $414,500,000 for continued development and research of the Air Force's F-15 jet fighter. Through the end of fiscal 1971, the program had cost $252,600,000 and was estimated to cost when finished (including 20 aircraft) $1,721,100,000.

**Minuteman Missile.** The committee recommended $1,010,000,000 for the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. The funds were for conversion of Minuteman I missiles to the Minuteman II and III—both of which had multiple nuclear warheads which were independently targetable.

307

Floor Action

On November 23, 1971, the Senate passed the FY 72 DOD Appropriations Bill appropriating a total of $70,849,113,000. This was approximately $600 million more than the Committee-recommended amount as a result of amendments adding $500 million in credits for Israel and about $100 million in additional research funds. The final vote on the bill was 80-5. Of eight amendments considered, six were adopted and two rejected.

Debate on the bill focused primarily on two amendments of a controversial nature. One was an amendment offered by Senator Jackson to add the $500 million in credits for Israel, $250 million of which was for purchases of F-4 Phanton jets. Chairman Ellender and Senator Bellmon opposed the amendment which was widely supported and passed easily with a vote of 82-14.

The other amendment subject to considerable debate was one offered by the Appropriations Committee to impose a 250,000 limit on the number of U.S. troops which could be stationed in Europe. Funding for any personnel in excess of this ceiling would be cut off June 15, 1972. Majority Leader Mansfield, who on May 19, 1971 had lost in a bid to reduce U.S. troops in Europe to 150,000, strongly supported the amendment:

> As for mutual, balanced force reductions, we negotiate and we talk and we thrash over these problems. We do not decide. We do not act. I wait now for it to be revealed right on this floor today that indeed, once again, we are on the brink of a decision that will accomplish mutual force reductions ...

He went on to argue that it was time for our NATO allies to assume a greater role in defending themselves. Opponents of the Committee amendment argued that any withdrawal on the part of the U.S. would substantially weaken - both politically and militarily - the position of America's European allies. They also maintained that ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on mutual troop reductions would be useless if the United States acted unilaterally.

The amendment was rejected by a vote of 39-54.

Amendments accepted included:

- Jackson (D-Wash.) amendment to add $500 million in credits to Israel.

- Dominick (R-Colo.) amendment to restore $12.3 million for the Navy's hydrofoil R&D program. The vote was 59-30.

- McIntyre (D-N.H.) amendment to restore $93.7 million in R&D funds which had been cut by the committee without specification as to what programs were to be reduced. The vote was 53-33.

- Brooke amendment to restore $600,000 in food research funds.

308

Amendments rejected included:

- The Committee amendment to reduce troops stationed in Europe.

- Symington amendment to establish a $4 billion ceiling on expenditures by the CIA, NSA, DIA and intelligence activities of the services. The vote was 31-56.

This amendment sparked considerable controversy over the secrecy surrounding the annual appropriations for DOD's intelligence network. In offering the amendment Senator Symington stated he was denied information on the intelligence budget by the Appropriations Committee staff and that his amendment was designed to find out how much the intelligence community spent and how it was being used. The amendment also sparked an exchange between Senators Ellender and Fulbright on U.S. clandestine activities in Laos.

## CIA Oversight by Senate

The following exchange was excerpted from the Nov. 23 Senate debate over a floor amendment to place a $4-billion annual ceiling on U.S. intelligence activities.

Allen J. Ellender (D La.), chairman of the Appropriations Committee and head of its five-man Intelligence Operations Subcommittee, discussed his knowledge of CIA-run operations in Laos with J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.) and Alan Cranston (I Calif.). (CIA oversight fact sheet, Weekly Report p. 1810)

Fulbright: "Would the Senator (Ellender) say that before the creation of the army in Laos they (the CIA) came before the committee and the committee knew of it and approved it?"

Ellender: "Probably so."

Fulbright: "Did the Senator approve it?"

Ellender: "It was not—I did not know anything about it."

Fulbright: "So the whole idea of Congress declaring war is really circumvented by such a procedure, is it not?"

Ellender: "Well, Mr. President, I wish to say that—"

Fulbright: "Is it not?"

Ellender: "No, I do not think so."

Fulbright: "Well, if you can create an army and support it through the CIA, without anyone knowing about it, I do not know why it is not..."

Ellender: "I wish to say that I do not know. I never asked, to begin with, whether or not there were any funds to carry on the war in this sum the CIA asked for. It never dawned on me to ask about it. I did see it publicized in the newspaper some time ago."

Cranston: "...the chairman stated that he never would have thought of even asking about CIA funds being used to conduct the war in Laos...I would like to ask the Senator if, since then, he has inquired and now knows whether that is being done?"

Ellender: "I have not inquired."

Cranston: "You do not know, in fact?"

Ellender: "No."

Cranston: "As you are one of the five men privy to this information, in fact you are the number-one man of the five men who would know, then who would know what happened to this money? The fact is, not even the five men know the facts in the situation."

Ellender: "Probably not."

369

CONFERENCE ACTION

On December 14, 1971, House and Senate conferees filed their Conference Report on the FY 1972 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill. As agreed to, the bill appropriated a total of $70.5 billion --a sum less than either the House or Senate-approved bills.

The Conference Report went to the floor in both the House and the Senate on December 15. In the House, the bill was adopted by a vote of 292-39 and in the Senate, it was approved by voice vote.

Significant action taken by conferees included:

**Israeli Weapons** Conferees deleted $500 million in weapon sale credits to Israel which had been adopted by an amendment to the Senate bill. House conferees refused to accept this amendment because a similar provision had been adopted in a continuing resolution on foreign aid which had been adopted by both the House and Senate.

**Main Battle Tank** The Senate version had provided $50 million for general tank development programs. The House bill provided $20 million for the intitiation of two tank prototypes to be considered as substitutes for the MBT-70, a program the House version terminated. Conferees agreed to appropriate $40 million for a tank prototype program and terminated the MBT-70 development program.

**Hydrofoils** The House bill provided $15.4 million for Naval hydrofoil research. The Senate bill contained an amendment to increase this to $27.7 million. The Conferees agreed to a compromise level of $21.7 million.

**Intelligence Cut** The House version reduced appropriations for the Intelligence community by $181 million. Neither the Senate report or bill mentioned any specific reduction in intelligence funding. The conference version of the bill, however, reduced intelligence spending by $250 million.

In Committee - 12

DEFENSE POSTURE: POLICY OF 'REALISTIC DETERRENCE'

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird delivered the annual defense posture statement to a closed meeting of the House Armed Services Committee March 9. A 191-page version of the report, entitled "Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," was issued the same day.

Throughout the report, Laird stressed that "realistic
deterrence" was a new strategy for the United States.
"Past policy focused on containment and accommodation.
The new strategy emphasizes measured, meaningful in-
volvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of
strength," the report stated. The strategy employed by
the Eisenhower Administration was described as "strate-
gic superiority" and by the Kennedy and Johnson Ad-
ministrations as "assured destruction" with a "flexible
response" capacity.

The basis of realistic deterrence as described in
Laird's report was an emphasis on a strong technological
base (continued and expanded weapons development), a
reduced active troop strength in the United States with
a sharpening of reserve force capabilities and a greater
reliance on what Laird called the total force concept
(requiring allied countries to assume a greater share of
the burden in defending themselves).

"We do not intend to be the policemen of the world," Laird said, but "when required and appropriate" the United States would provide logistical, sea and air support to its allies. And, "in some special cases, it could include ground combat support as well," he said.

Laird indicated for the first time that if "a large
land war...should occur in Asia, we would be prepared to
mobilize...a portion of those forces based in the United
States and earmarked for NATO, if required and feasible."
He said that non-NATO forces would be used first, how-
ever, in the event of a major Asian conflict.

**Weapons.** Laird said that if it becomes necessary
in the future to mobilize the manpower and production
potential of this country, it can be accomplished "in a
relatively short period of time." But, he said, "Everyone
must understand that we cannot similarly improve over-
night our technological base." During the next five years,
Laird said, "we must increase our technological effort."

"Whatever the outcome of the SALT talks," he said, the United States must continue its research and development of strategic weapons. Laird announced that the Pentagon had taken steps toward deployment of a fourth antiballistic missile (ABM) site at either Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, or in Washington, D.C. In 1970, Congress appropriated funds for engineering surveys and initial construction of the Warren site, but Laird's announcement of the Washington, D.C., site was the first official Pentagon statement on the subject. There was no direct statement in Laird's report about what type of ABM defense system the fourth site would be (anti-Soviet or anti-Chinese).

He said that additional ABM sites were necessary be-
cause "we continue to believe that an effective defense
of our population against major Soviet attack is not now
feasible. Thus, we must continue to rely on our strategic
offensive forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on our
cities."

Of the seven retaliatory weapons systems mentioned
in the report, five were scheduled for increased funding

in fiscal 1972 (increase of $713-million). Included in this
category were such systems as the Poseidon missiles, the
undersea long range missile system (ULMS), the B-1
bomber and the SRAM and Minutemen missile systems.

In discussing the Soviet threat to the United States,
Laird said that Russian construction on new intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) sites had "slowed
during the past year" and that other Soviet missile pro-
grams appeared "to have leveled off at the present
time." Laird said that Communist China may have con-
ducted its first test of an ICBM at something less than
full range capabilities.

"The implications of these trends are still not clear,"
he said. "We are pursuing moderate programs preserving
our flexibility with regard to both SALT and the threat,
and keeping our options open for the future."

**Troop Strengths.** In the Asian theater, Laird said the United States would continue to withdraw troops, but he offered no specifics. He said the Pentagon planned to turn over all ground combat duties to the South Vietnamese by this summer, but did not mention specific target dates for South Vietnamese takeovers of air and logistics support. Laird gave no indication that current U.S. troop levels in Europe would be altered.

In 1971, draft calls will be reduced below the 1970 level of 163,500 men, Laird said. (Calls for the first four months of 1971 were 17,000 per month or an extrapolated total by the end of the year of 204,000 men.) He said the military fully supports President Nixon's July 1, 1973, target date for a zero draft but cautioned that Selective Service registrations of eligible males must not be discontinued even after draft calls have been eliminated.

**Total Force.** In considering the defense needs of the free world, Laird said the United States must provide the bulk of nuclear deterrence potential and that the United States must be willing to supply sophisticated equipment support that other countries cannot afford.

"However, in planning our forces, we must consider
the capabilities of our friends and allies to share the
burden of defense at sea, as well as on land and in the
air." Laird said that U.S. allies could provide naval
support by supplying escort ships and air support with
light aircraft that could be utilized on anti-submarine
or reconnaissance missions.

"The better equipped our friends and allies are to
provide for their own security, the more firm will be our
own security," Laird said. "Because some of our NATO
allies—for example, Greece and Turkey—do not have and
cannot afford needed modern equipment, it is in our in-
terest to help them modernize their forces and to rely on
them to man and operate those forces."

**Pentagon Reorganization.** A new philosophy and
several organizational changes in the Defense Depart-
ment were included in Laird's report. "Participatory
decision-making" and management that emphasizes
"individual responsibility and action" was the new
philosophical approach to Laird's plan for running the
Defense Department.

Laird said that he would request congressional
approval for the creation of a second Deputy Defense
Secretary position. David Packard is the only person
currently serving in the position.

PAGE 564 - March 12, 1971

COPYRIGHT 1971 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.
Reproduction prohibited in whole or in part except by editorial clients

CQ Executive Branch

311

# EUROPEAN TROOP CUT: MASSIVE WHITE HOUSE LOBBY EFFORT

The Nixon Administration, backed by two former Presidents and 24 high-ranking government officials from the last four Administrations, mounted a one-week campaign to defeat Senate proposals aimed at reducing U.S. troop strength in Europe.

The strongest of the proposals, which received the brunt of White House pressure, was introduced as an amendment to the draft extension bill (HR 6531) by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.). The amendment sought to reduce by 50 percent U.S. troop strength in Europe by the end of the year. Five other proposals were considered with the Mansfield amendment May 19. (Floor story p. 1101)

Although the Administration had expressed optimism that the Mansfield amendment would be defeated, there was less confidence that the five substitutes and perfecting amendments also offered would be turned down.

The White House had predicted that "anything with a date on it" would be defeated.

Included on the list of those publicly supporting the Administration's effort to defeat the Mansfield amendment were two Democratic former Presidents—Lyndon B. Johnson and Harry S Truman—and two dozen high-ranking officials from past Administrations, most of whom were Democrats.

Two former Secretaries of State—Dean Rusk, who served under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and Dean Acheson, who served in the Truman Administration—were on the list. Acheson, who was one of the first former Administration officials to throw the weight of his name behind Mr. Nixon's lobbying effort, was assigned May 13 to the job of collecting signatures of support for the President's position.

The Mansfield proposal was introduced May 11 in the Senate as an amendment to the draft extension bill (HR 6531). Although Mansfield had warned that he would offer such an amendment before May 11, the White House apparently was caught off guard. During the Majority Leader's introductory remarks May 11, he offered to come to a vote on the amendment immediately.

## Groundwork for Pressure

The morning of May 12, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, met to discuss plans for defeating the amendment with the two ranking Republicans in the Senate—Minority Leader Hugh Scott (Pa.) and Minority Whip Robert P. Griffin (Mich.).

Later the same day in the Senate, Scott conferred with John C. Stennis (D Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee and floor manager of the draft extension bill. With Mansfield's consent, the final vote on the troop cut amendment was delayed for one week (to May 19). Mansfield refused to withdraw his amendment or to replace it with a sense-of-the-Congress resolution which would not have been binding. Such proposals were

included by other Senators in their substitutes for the Mansfield amendment. (Box p. 1102)

Throughout the day, statements condemning Mansfield's resolution were issued from the White House and the State Department.

By May 13, the White House had developed a hard line on the Mansfield amendment. No amendments and no resolutions dealing in any way with U.S. foreign policy and U.S. NATO commitments would be acceptable to the President, said White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler. Scott told reporters that he was "as sure as a man can be" that the President would veto the draft bill if it required a cutback of U.S. troops stationed in Europe.

At the White House the President convened the first of several strategy sessions. Included in the meeting were Acheson; Cyrus T. Vance, former Deputy Defense Secretary; George Ball, former Under Secretary of State; and Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces, and Robert Ellsworth (R Kan. 1961-67), U.S. ambassador to NATO, both of whom had arrived that morning from Europe. Acheson was given the job of rounding up support from other officials of past Administrations. Ball assisted Acheson while working as a lobbyist on select members of the Senate. Secretary of State William P. Rogers also was meeting with a number of Senators individually.

**New Optimism.** Although the White House had expressed concern initially that the Mansfield amendment would pass in the Senate, by May 16 two spokesmen for the President appeared on national television with a revised assessment of the proposal's chances for survival.

Rogers, on NBC's "Meet the Press," told the interviewers, "I don't think the Mansfield amendment is ever going to become law.... Why should we in the United States reduce (our troops) unilaterally and thereby kiss goodbye to any chance that we might have to negotiate successfully to reduce the Soviet presence...."

Clark MacGregor, counselor to the President for congressional liaison, appeared the same day on CBS television's "Face the Nation," "We have no doubt but what we will win the vote on Wednesday (May 19)," MacGregor said.

The increasing optimism expressed by the two Administration spokesmen was in part a result of the May 15 announcement from Key Biscayne, Fla., the President's southern retreat.

Through Ziegler, the President announced early in the day that his opposition to Mansfield's amendment was supported by 24 high-ranking officials of past Administrations.

The list included Acheson and Rusk; three former Defense Secretaries, Robert Lovett, Neil McElroy and Thomas Gates; former Under Secretaries of State James Webb, Robert Murphy, Livingston Merchant, C. Douglas

May 21, 1971—PAGE 1095

Executive Branch - 2

Dillon, Ball and Nicholas Katzenbach; former Deputy Defense Secretaries Vance and Roswell Gilpatric; former supreme allied commanders in Europe Matthew Ridgway, Alfred Greunther, Lauris Norstad and Lyman Lemnitzer; former NATO ambassadors Charles Spofford, W. Randolph Burgess, Thomas Finletter and Harlan Cleveland, and former military governors or high commissioners for Germany Lucius Clay, John McCloy and James Conant.

Later on May 15, former Presidents Johnson and Truman issued statements of opposition to Mansfield's proposal. Johnson, who was succeeded as majority leader of the Senate by Mansfield, said the amendment "would endanger what we have achieved in the past and shatter our hopes for the future."

According to Ziegler, only two of the persons who were asked to support the President's position declined to do so. They were Clark M. Clifford, Defense Secretary under Johnson, and James Douglas, Truman's Deputy Defense Secretary.

Former Defense Secretary Robert P. McNamara, who served during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, was included on the list with a footnote by his name which read: "Former Secretary McNamara declines to comment because of his position as head of an international institution (World Bank). He does not want this abstention to be interpreted as non-support of the statement (Nixon's position)."

Mansfield, who remained unyielding to requests for a compromise, was asked to comment on the President's array of supporters. "It looks to me like the resurrection of the Old Guard," he said. "It took me back 20 or 25 years (to the time when the NATO treaty was written)."

**Soviet Initiative.** Adding strength to the Administration's campaign to kill the Mansfield amendment was a timely offer from the Soviet Union to discuss multilateral withdrawals from Europe. In a May 14 speech in Tiflis, the capital of Soviet Georgia, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Soviet Communist party leader, repeated an offer he had made March 30 to discuss mutual troop withdrawals along with disarmament negotiations for central Europe.

Although the March 30 offer had stirred little attention in the White House, Brezhnev's May 14 announcement immediately was picked up by the White House, hailed as an initiative for multilateral withdrawals and used as ammunition by the President against the Mansfield amendment. Why should the United States make a unilateral withdrawal when the Soviets have offered us the chance to negotiate a multilateral settlement, asked Administration spokesmen following the Brezhnev offer.

The Soviet position was further clarified May 17 after a meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S. ambassador to Moscow Jacob Beam. In the meeting, Gromyko agreed that both national and foreign forces should be included in consideration of mutual troop cuts.

**Balance-of-Payments.** Two days before the Senate vote on the Mansfield amendment, the Department of Commerce announced a $2.2-billion increase in the quarterly assessment of the balance-of-payments deficit. During the last quarter of 1970 the deficit was $3.3-billion, and for the first three months of 1971 it jumped to a record $5.5-billion.

One of Mansfield's strongest arguments for cutting the number of U.S. troops in Europe was the payments deficit. Even those who opposed the Mansfield amendment admitted that something must be done to reduce the outpouring of currency.

## NOSE-COUNTING ON THE SST

Only a few hours before the Senate voted on the supersonic transport (SST) May 19, the White House had conceded defeat. The Administration's hopes, according to Presidential Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, had been based on the argument that the cost of restarting the project would be less than those for canceling it. (Floor story, p. 1099)

But, he added, those hopes had disappeared when the Boeing Company, prime contractor for the plane, had refused to renegotiate contracts at previous levels.

Counting the noses of Senators for and against the SST for the second time in two months, President Nixon's counsel for congressional relations, Clark MacGregor, told Congressional Quarterly May 17 he thought the Administration had a 50-50 chance to resurrect the project.

The House had revived the SST on May 12 when it voted 201-197 to provide $85.3-million in fiscal 1971 appropriations for continued development of the program. (Week-by-Report p. 1066)

Throughout the following week, House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (Mich.), one of the leaders of the pro-SST campaign, maintained that the White House played only a secondary role in the House reversal and that the move had been initiated and carried through by House members of both parties themselves.

MacGregor told Congressional Quarterly: "We sought to assist them in their efforts, but this was largely a bipartisan effort originating with members of the House and carried forward by them. We assisted somewhat at their request in seeking to enlist the help of George Meany (president of the AFL-CIO) and others who are prestigious heads of outstanding and large organizations to gain their help in persuading congressmen to support the (SST.)"

Meany met with President Nixon at the White House a few days before the May 12 vote and, according to one House member, ordered his AFL-CIO lobbyists to push for resurrection of the plane.

Regardless of the degree of White House involvement, most of the key switches from the March vote came from Republicans, 17 of whom either switched their votes from opposition to support of the program, voted "present" or remained absent from the House floor during the voting.

**One-Vote Margin.** After the Administration's defeat in the March vote on the SST, MacGregor attributed the rejection to the 1970 elections. "A number of holdover members of the House who were re-elected in November pledged during the course of their campaigns after repeated questioning at public gatherings to change their votes from an affirmative vote which they had cast in the past on the SST to a negative vote." he said.

MacGregor added that in the March vote "we actually had four Republican House members who would have changed their vote had their vote change been determinative of the result." The vote margin on one of those votes had only been nine, he said, so "we came within one vote of carrying it in the House of Representatives."

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and 1973 to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

The sums would complete a total additional U.S. contribution of $1-billion pledged to the bank's Fund for Special Operations in April 1970. The fund makes loans on easier terms (lower interest rates, longer maturities, repayment in local currencies) than other loans by the bank. The "soft" loans are for social and economic purposes such as agriculture, education, housing and health. The House approved the entire contribution in a bill (HR 18306—PL 91-599) in 1970, but the Senate deleted all but the first $100-million installment. (1970 *Almanac* p. 907)

### Testimony June 4

**Charls A. Walker, Under Secretary of the Treasury:**

The Administration is committed to a greater reliance on multinational development institutions for implementation of its foreign aid policies. In the last 10 years, multilateral assistance in Latin America has tripled, reaching $1.5-billion in 1970, while U.S. bilateral aid programs in the area have remained relatively constant. A similar change has occurred in other areas.

The increase in the fund's resources is intended to enable it to maintain the lending level appropriate to the needs and absorptive capacity of Latin America. The U.S. contribution is essential. The lack of approval in 1970 is already affecting the bank. In economic, social and political terms, failure to fully replenish the fund "would have a profound impact." The U.S. contribution is vital to maintenance of adequate external financing to support Latin America's own efforts to progress. The impact on the U.S. budget will be delayed, since the contribution will be made in the form of letters of credit and the loans will be drawn down only as needs require. ✓

## NATIONAL PRIORITIES

The Joint Economic Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government held hearings June 1, 2 and 4 on the economics of national priorities.

**Background.** The hearings stemmed from Congressional criticism of Administration claims that in the budgets for fiscal years 1971 and 1972 the priorities prevailing for 20 years previously were reversed and more money was budgeted for meeting human needs than for national defense. The Joint Economic Committee, in its report on the 1971 Economic Report of the President, sent to Congress on Jan. 29, rejected the claims.

*References. Fiscal 1972 budget, Weekly Report p. 207, 287; text of budget message, p. 271; 1971 budget, 1970 *Almanac* p. 1110; Joint Economic Committee report on President's economic report, Weekly Report p. 750.*

### Testimony June 1

**Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.), chairman of both the committee and the subcommittee, in an opening statement:**

"The alleged shift in national priorities that is supposed to have occurred over the past two years is largely a fantasy.... We had an $80-billion defense budget two years ago, and the Administration is requesting another $80-billion defense budget. Even taking inflation into account, an $80-billion defense budget does not signify a meaningful change in national priorities. We simply cannot have a peacetime economy with a wartime defense budget."

**Charles L. Schultze, senior fellow of the Brookings Institution and former director (1965-67) of the Bureau of the Budget (now Office of Management and Budget), led a panel of his co-authors of a Brookings study, *Setting

National Priorities: The 1972 Budget, consisting of Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin and Nancy H. Teeters:

The President's budget describes only one set of alternatives—those the President is recommending. To make intelligent choices, Congress needs to review a wider spectrum of alternatives. The Brookings study sought to identify the major choices the President recommended, describe alternatives, analyze consequences and identify criteria for making choices.

The President's 1972 budget is neutral in its economic impact. A large part of the expenditure increase reflects built-in escalation: rising wages and prices, increased numbers of beneficiaries of social security and welfare and rising workloads. Income maintenance programs have become the largest single element of federal spending.

### June 2

**James M. Gavin, chairman of the board, Arthur D. Little Inc.; former Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (retired), and Ambassador to France (1961-62):**

It is past time that, having established national goals, the nation develop a strategy to attain them: improve the domestic condition, support a viable and dynamic economy and invest in the future with research and development. "We should provide adequate, and no more, tactical weapons systems.... From a strictly military point of view, it has been nonsense to spend billions and billions per year, pursuing illusive tactical goals that would never be realized, while our strategic posture steadily deteriorated....

"Further tactical commitments, whether they be in Southeast Asia or in Europe, that are supported at the expense of any aspect of our strategy should be questioned, for they may be, even in a military sense, greatly in error.... Our society is a microcosm of the world society, and it is time that we get on with dealing with its problems in a realistic way, based on priorities that will serve our national goals."

**Robert S. Benson, director, national priorities project, the Urban Coalition:**

The Urban Coalition's alternative to the federal budget, *Counterbudget*, was published in February. Its main purpose was to determine how resources would have to be reallocated for a frontal attack on the nation's most urgent problems. How national security requirements are defined and determined goes to the heart of the problem.

### June 4

**Ralph Nader, Center for the Study of Responsive Law:**

Little thought has been given to measuring "the distortions, wastes and economic depreciations of the citizen's dollar in the marketplace and the direct and indirect transfer of the citizen's taxes into private corporate coffers." Six discernible "subeconomies of consumer-taxpayer exploitation," with examples, are:

* Involuntary—fragile, useless automobile bumpers which generate about $2-billion in involuntary and preventable expenditures annually.

* Transfer—epidemic pilerage (such as on shipping docks), the cost of which is transferred to consumers.

* Controlled market—price-fixing, other antitrust violations and "merchandising gimmickry," which avoid or distort value competition.

* Corporate socialism—tax advantages of corporations and wealthy persons.

* Compulsory consumption—environmental pollution and safety hazards with clear economic costs.

* Expendable—refusal of banks and insurance companies to lend money or sell insurance on ghetto and other central-city property.

The ability of any of these subeconomies to support industry, create jobs and generate income "cannot in any way justify them in any scale of national priorities." They are not socially desirable or responsible and are often illegal. ✓

June 11, 1971—PAGE 1279

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DEFENSE: U.S. NEEDS VIS-A-VIS RUSSIA AND CHINA

The Joint Economic Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government held hearings Aug. 9, 10 and 11 on the priority of defense needs in the federal budget.

Testimony Aug. 9

Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.), chairman, in an opening statement questioned the size of the defense budget:

"In view of the new overtures made to the Chinese by President Nixon, the question we must face is what level of military spending do we need to protect our national security? Unless the relative economic and military strengths of the Chinese and Russians have greatly increased over the last two years, the Administration's request for an $80-billion military budget in fiscal year 1972 appears wholly inconsistent with either the real threat posed by Russia and China or the new relationships proposed by the President...The subcommittee is especially interested in the issue of whether there has indeed been any major shift in priorities within the United States." (The President in his budgets for fiscal years 1971 and 1972 claimed a shift in priorities from military to civilian programs in government spending.)

W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for political affairs (1963-65) and chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks in 1968, testified to the breakdown in monolithic Communism:

"The monolithic structure of international Communism has been shattered not only by the rupture between Peking and Moscow but by Tito and by the increasing independence of Communist parties in different countries. It is noteworthy that both the Italian and French Communist parties criticized the Soviet Union for its invasion of Czechoslovakia."

John P. Hardt, Research Analysis Corporation, said Russia may be turning toward domestic economic problems:

There is some evidence that Soviet leaders will decide or have already decided to return to the priority for modernizing their economy which prevailed under Khrushchev before the Cuban missile crisis. The potentiality and rationale for change may have been greatly enhanced, but the likelihood or evidence of change is not yet persuasive. Economic problems are apparently not sufficient to bring about a reordering of priorities in the economic system. But a similar combination of economic and political circumstances may be present, and change is more possible now.

Abram Bergson, Harvard University, warned against large military cuts:

Opinions have been voiced that U.S. military expenditures are inordinately large and should be cut, perhaps more than would result directly from withdrawal from Vietnam. "I for one find little support" for this view. Debate has resolved around the advisability of a unilateral cut. There is little disagreement on the merit of defense limitations the United States and the Soviet Union might initiate by agreement.

Wassily Leontief, Harvard University, said the time is ripe for cuts in the military budget:

Assuming that Russian military policies aim toward overall equality with the United States rather than superiority, it is reasonable to conclude that a gradual bilateral reduc-

tion in arms expenditures would be desirable from the Soviet point of view. "Should this country embark on a program of gradual but steady reduction of its military expenditures, the Soviets can be expected to follow suit. On the other hand, if we proceed to yield to the insatiable demands of our military, the Russians will also follow suit. Let us not doubt their capability to do so."

Aug. 10

Richard T. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs, said Russia stands to gain more than the United States from disarmament:

Even if U.S. and Soviet expenditures for defense should be identical proportions of gross national product (total economic output), the expenditure would be more of a nuisance for the Soviet Union, with less than half the American national income, than for the United States. "Conversely, it is true that the gain from disarmament would be greater in the less affluent country than in the one that is better off."

George W. Rathjens, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, discussed U.S. and Soviet military strength:

"I am concerned that Defense Department presentations may have conveyed an impression that our situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is worse than it is, and that we can estimate the level of Soviet expenditures for military R and D (research and development) and the relationship between (expenditures and output with considerably more precision than I think possible."

Jerome Alan Cohen, Harvard Law School, said the Administrations fails to understand the leaders of Communist China:

"President Nixon's professed belief that the United States will be able to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China while retaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) may well represent the most recent example of persistent American failure to understand the outlook, experience and determination of China's Communist leaders....American policymakers should adopt a more realistic and less fearful assessment of China's capabilities and intentions. Mao's China has not been expansionist in the conventional border-crossing sense. its success in subverting other countries has been limited and its nuclear weapons are unlikely to pose a serious threat....The United States has frequently violated international law in its relations with China." It will be important to determine whether recent actions of the Administration represent a temporary gesture or a new policy of dealing with China on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect.

Aug. 11

John K. Fairbank, Harvard University, discussed ways of staying out of an Asian war:

"The intellectual resources needed for warfare are rather small compared to the intellectual resources needed for avoiding warfare and maintaining peace. Today we know enough to fight in East Asia. The question is whether we know enough to save ourselves from further fighting in the future. The Chinese are never going to threaten us in this country. The problem is how to stay in contact with East Asian peoples on their home ground. For this the requirements are less military than diplomatic, less material than psychological-intellectual."

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Fact Sheet

ANNUAL ABM DEBATE DISARMED BY SALT ACCORD PROSPECTS

Although the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system continues as an ongoing weapon system, it was sidetracked as a controversial issue in the Senate this year with only one-third of the network paid for.

One overriding factor caused the anti-ABM forces in the Senate to wither in strength and fade in interest—word from one of their leaders that, in his studied opinion, U.S. and Soviet negotiators at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were near agreement on the ABM.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.), who for years led opposition to the ABM program, told the Senate Sept. 29 that a successful SALT settlement depended on the politicians, not the negotiators. Cooper felt an ac- cord was so close that he reversed his position in one last effort to give the President an unhindered chance to reach agreement with the Soviets, using the ongoing ABM program as a bargaining chip.

SALT negotiators were scheduled to convene the sixth round of talks Nov. 15 in Vienna with both the President and Cooper hinting that some kind of agreement was possible by the end of the calendar year.

Despite the low level of activity by the ABM opposition in 1971, a Congressional Quarterly survey showed that a strong sentiment against the program remained an important consideration in the 1971 debate, although it was not held to be the most important factor.

A strong opposition movement to ABM funding would not be likely during consideration of the upcoming defense appropriations bill, the survey showed, but if some type of agreement was not reached at the SALT negotiations by the spring of 1972, the President would probably face a revitalized opposition movement as well as a full-scale resurrection of the arms race.

The day the Senate voted on an amendment to stop deployment of the Safeguard system, some of the program's former foes—such as George McGovern (D S.D.), Alan Cranston (D Calif.), Birch Bayh (D Ind.), Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.), Fred R. Harris (D Okla.), Joseph M. Montoya (D N.M.), and Daniel K. Inouye (D Hawaii)—stayed away. Some who had for years opposed or were expected to vote against the program were voting for it—names like Cooper, Frank Church (D Idaho), Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.), Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.).

A survey of lobbyists, key Senate staff members and the records of the 1971 ABM debate showed that while the primary factor in defusing the anti-ABM movement may have been the expectation of a SALT agreement, many other influences played a role in thwarting the movement. They were:

* Action by the Senate Armed Services Committee restricting deployment to two of the four proposed ABM sites which cut $161-million from the Administration's $1.268-billion Safeguard ABM request.

* The reversal by Cooper to temporarily support the ABM and thus indirectly pressure the Administration to reach a SALT settlement.

* Poor organization by Senators normally opposed to the ABM authorization. One anti-ABM lobbyist, said: "Liberals have this natural tendency not to agree to focus on a limited number of issues. They come running into the Senate with 50 different amendments and, my God, who's going to listen to them?"

* Lobbyists were not active, partially, they said. because their function had been to educate and because there were few new technological or scientific aspects that had not already been explored previously. They also said the disorganized anti-ABM forces in the Senate had not kept lobbyists informed of upcoming crucial votes.

* The bill containing the ABM authorization (HR 8687) came to the Senate floor after nearly four months of Senate debate on the military draft extension bill (HR 6531—PL 92-129). The Senate by then was tired of long debates, especially on military matters.

* There was the feeling that any Senate-passed provisions would be watered down or knocked out in the Senate-House conference committee. (The bill subsequently went to the conference and House conferees agreed to the ABM cuts made by the Senate Armed Services Committee.)

**References.** 1971 ABM debate, Weekly Report p. 2096, 2051, 1365; SALT background, p. 1155 and 1970 Almanac, p. 383; ABM debates in previous years, 1970 Almanac, p. 394-98; 1969 Almanac, p. 257, 269-73; 1968 Almanac, p. 412; Editorial Research Reports, Nuclear Balance of Terror, July 1, 1970, Vol. II, p. 485.

Cooper's Key Role

Sen. Cooper first offered an amendment to halt deployment of the ABM system April 18, 1968. His proposal was rejected by a 28-31 roll-call vote after an afternoon of floor debate.

Cooper joined with Philip A. Hart (D Mich.) the following year to offer an amendment to the defense procurement authorization bill to cut all funds for Safeguard procurement. After more than one month of debate, the Senate Aug. 6, 1969, by a 50-50 vote rejected a substitute amendment similar to the Cooper Hart proposal and then by a 49-51 margin rejected the original amendment.

The ABM battle in 1970 again centered around a version of the Hart-Cooper amendment to the procurement bill restricting ABM authorization to just two sites instead of the four requested by the Administration. After eight days of debate, the amendment was rejected Aug. 12, 1970, by a 47-52 roll-call vote.

Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), who had offered an amendment in 1970 aimed at halting all deployment of ABMs, sponsored the only anti-ABM proposal during consideration of the 1971 defense procurement authorization

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bill (HR 8687). The Hughes amendment was debated for 90 minutes Sept. 29 and was rejected by a 21-64 roll-call vote, the worst defeat for such an amendment in four years.

**Position Switch.** It was during debate on the Hughes amendment that Cooper told the Senate he had changed his mind on how best to restrain future enlargement of the Safeguard ABM network.

"I have not changed my views about the inadequacies of the Safeguard ABM system," Cooper told the Senate Sept. 29. "But for the present—and this is the core of my statement—the adequacy or the inadequacy of the ABM system is not the issue before us... It is my firm belief that an agreement on ABM is attainable before the end of this calendar year. I strongly believe that the SALT talks are the most important diplomatic negotiations that have been undertaken since the nuclear age began... I believe it best that we do not alter the basis upon which negotiations are taking place."

Cooper placed great hope in the outcome of SALT but warned that if an agreement had not been reached when the Senate considered the 1972 defense authorization bill, he would oppose further funds for the Safeguard system.

Stuart Symington (D Mo.) commented on Cooper's switch: "I do regret that he (Cooper) believes it essential to authorize this additional billion dollars for a worthless system, apparently as a necessity for reaching such an agreement (at SALT). To me this is a tragic and additional unnecessary waste of the taxpayer's money."

One lobbyist told Congressional Quarterly that Cooper had been given a "horse and pony show over in Helsinki... he was sold a bill of goods."

William G. Miller, aide to Cooper who has for four years been involved in the fight to reduce the ABM program, said that Cooper's decision was reached "not simply in Helsinki." Miller explained: "We had discussions before we left with people in the White House, the State Department and with the Soviets. We've been studying this for years."

"There is a distinction between what the negotiators can accomplish and what the political leaders will decide to do," Miller told Congressional Quarterly. He said that when he visited Helsinki with Cooper in August 1971 to talk with U.S. negotiators, "they had reached a position where an agreement was possible. After this point it becomes a political question," Miller said. "The timing on a thing like this is up to the politicians."

"The SALT talks are at a position now that if an agreement on defensive weapons can be attained," Cooper said. "an agreement on offensive missiles can take place. The negotiating team at Helsinki...has brought the negotiations with the Soviet Union to this point. What remains is for the two governments to take action on the possibility which lies before them."

**Bargaining Chip.** According to Miller, the only viable argument left for continuing the Safeguard program, was its possible value to U.S. SALT negotiators. This had for several years been referred to as the "bargaining chip" argument, and, during the 1970 and 1971 ABM discussion, it was a primary defense of the program.

Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), a long-time supporter of the Safeguard program, illustrated the bargaining chip argument in the Sept. 29 debate: "I believe it is clear

## Background On Safeguard

ABM stands for a family of anti-ballistic missiles designed to destroy incoming enemy missiles in flight.

By linking anti-ballistic missiles to an early-warning radar and guidance system, the Pentagon created an ABM system known as Safeguard. Within the Safeguard system are two types of ABMs—short- and long-range intercepters.

The Spartan missile was designed to destroy incoming enemy warheads at about 100 miles above the earth with bursts of X-rays from a five megaton atomic blast in the vacuum of space. The Atomic Energy Commission conducted an experimental five-megaton test blast Nov. 6, 1971, at the Alaskan island of Amchitka. The test was believed to be for the Spartan warhead and sparked a heated controversy.

The Sprint missile was designed to intercept enemy missiles that the Spartan failed to destroy. The Sprint is a short-range missile with an estimated attack range of about 35 miles. The Sprint bursts from its launch pad at speeds unmatched by any other U.S. missile.

One related research program costing $25-million in fiscal 1971 and $65-million in fiscal 1972 was named Hardsite. According to a Pentagon spokesman, Hardsite would provide greater "close-in protection by deployment of more Sprint missiles and more accurate close-range radar systems."

**Site System.** Defense planners in the Johnson Administration called their ABM program the Sentinel system and Congress was told that major cities would be protected by the 17-site system.

President Nixon changed the name to Safeguard in 1969 and said it would stress regional protection with a 12-site system. Although this plan has not been abandoned altogether, Congress has authorized funds for just four sites to protect offensive missile launch locations, not cities and not regions.

Of the four approved sites, two have been given the go-ahead by Congress for full deployment of the radar systems and missiles—Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D., and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. The other two sites—Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., and Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.—have been cleared by Congress for advanced preparation. Development of a possible fifth site, protecting Washington, D.C., was postponed by Congress. The Pentagon estimated that the first Safeguard site, Grand Forks, would be operational by early 1973.

**Funding.** Cost estimates for the four-site Safeguard program jumped from a fiscal 1971 estimate of $6.5-billion to a fiscal 1972 estimate of $7.1-billion. Congress authorized $1.1-billion in continuing appropriations for fiscal 1972.

Although Congress had authorized appropriations for Safeguard totaling $3.7-billion through fiscal 1971, the Pentagon had actually spent just $2.5-billion by Sept. 31, 1971.

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that, since the beginning of the talks (SALT), the Soviets' desire to limit the U.S. ABM system has been at the core of the Soviet interest in the over-all negotiations. This desire is the only effective leverage available to us in attempting to obtain limitations on ongoing Soviet programs.... Every vote in the Senate, at this point in time, to stop the American ABM program unilaterally makes it more difficult for the United States to persuade the Soviets to limit offensive systems as well as defensive."

Hughes tried, with little success, to discredit the bargaining chip defense of the ABM system. "A year ago it was argued that ABM deployment would constitute an effective bargaining chip for these talks. There is no more reason to accept this as a valid approach today than there was a year ago... I deeply believe that our rejection of the ABM would strengthen, rather than weaken, our negotiating position in the SALT talks."

"The technological questions have been answered," Miller said. "Safeguard will never be built. Technology ceased to be the issue even last year, and it is now entirely to support the negotiators."

## Defusing the Movement

In the four years that budget-cutting amendments to weapons bills have attacked the ABM on the Senate floor, the White House forces have always defeated the anti-ABM contingent. The score on these floor fights would seem to indicate that the plans of the Pentagon have been overwhelmingly endorsed by Congress.

"In the long run, the ABM has been defeated," said Jeremy J. Stone, director of the American Federation of Scientists. "Each year the rationale has changed for keeping this program alive and each year the size of the program itself has been reduced."

Stone said that the ABM was not a major issue in the Senate in 1971 because the Senate Armed Services Committee pre-empted the anti-ABM forces by restricting deployment to just two of the four sites. "We never win a floor fight—the White House and Pentagon have tremendous power and resources—but we nudge them year after year."

Tom Halstead, a former lobbyist against the ABM and currently legislative assistant to Sen. Cranston, said that Cooper's switch may have affected some votes on the Hughes amendment, "but the Armed Services Committee was much more important in defusing interest."

"The committee acted more carefully this year," Halstead said, "so there was less justification to go after it."

"The Cooper-Hart forces got 50 votes in 1969," Halstead said, "and only 47 in 1970. It would have been a psychological mistake to march up the hill again because they would have gotten even less support."

**The Lobbyists.** The Council for a Livable World and the American Federation of Scientists were two of the most active anti-ABM lobby groups in recent years. Both claimed their goal was to educate the public and members of Congress about the ABM system. Spokesmen from both groups said they had not been as active in 1971 as in past years on the ABM issue for several reasons: little interest in Congress, few new scientific arguments and the feeling that the ABM had already been defeated in the long run.

Halstead, who for several years served as director of the Council for a Livable World, said that the Council was "not an arm-twisting, nose-tweaking organization. We were concerned with the educational aspects of the ABM...bringing in experts from outside the government to testify on the program. This year there was little need for that."

Peter Ognibene, the new director of the Council for a Livable World, told Congressional Quarterly that Senate leadership was dispirited. "There was the feeling among some members that irrespective of what the Senate did in the way of amendments, they would all be watered down or knocked out when the bill went to conference."

The American Federation of Scientists, a lobby group responsible for bringing many non-government experts before the Armed Services Committees, was not active this year either.

Stone said that the $1.1-billion Safeguard authorization for fiscal 1972 (bringing to $1.8-billion the total authorization) was not a major concern of the group. "We aren't so worried about a $4-billion boondoggle. Those are all over the Hill. We were worried that this program was going to turn into a boondoggle of immense proportions." Stone referred to the $20-billion to $60-billion cost estimates for the Sentinel ABM program promoted during the Johnson Administration. (Box, p. 2338)

## Outlook

Two strains of thought prevail concerning what would happen if an agreement has not been reached by SALT negotiators when the fiscal 1973 weapons bills reach the Senate in 1972. First, some participants say that a massive campaign against the ABM system would be mounted in the Senate and carried to the public. Still others have said that with no agreement the United States will require the ABM more than ever.

Sen. Cooper said he would again oppose Safeguard if no agreement was reached at SALT by the time Congress considered the 1973 defense bills. "Safeguard as now planned remains a system inadequate to the task of defending the Minuteman missile force against any significant threat," Cooper said. "There are many signs that the Pentagon is moving in the direction of developing a more effective missile site anti-ballistic missile system called Hardsite which, in the event that it becomes necessary in the future to deploy an ABM. could provide a more adequate defense. (Hardsite, box p. 2338)

The Council for a Livable World, said its director, Ognibene, will actively support candidates siding with the council's policy of trying to "defuse the potential for nuclear conflict and to introduce some sanity into the arms race."

Halstead said that although funds for the ABM program would be included in the upcoming defense appropriations bill, the weapon system would not be a major issue until the next defense procurement authorization bill was considered in 1972. He also said, "You can bet we'll have something from SALT before the '72 elections."

"What will happen if nothing comes out of SALT?" Miller said. "If SALT fails then the attempt at parity has failed, and we are doomed to the mad arms race all over again."

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# WEAPONS ACQUISITION: HOW FAULTY IS CURRENT SYSTEM?

The Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings Dec. 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9 on the weapons acquisition process, how the military goes about buying weapons.

The hearings, according to John C. Stennis (D Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, were designed to explore the methods used in contracting for research and development of weapons and the methods employed in purchasing a tested weapon system. Stennis explained that the testimony was to be used to educate staff members on the committee, the press and the public on the problems of weapons acquisition and possibilities for change.

The final day of hearings, Dec. 9, was closed to the public and the press. Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, Naval Ships Systems Command, testified.

During the four days of hearings which were open to the public, the committee heard testimony from two weapons designers, three "think tank" specialists, one economics professor, the Defense Department's director of research and development and the chairman of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

With the exception of John S. Foster, director of defense research and engineering, all the witnesses were critical of the way the acquisition process was being handled.

The witnesses criticized:

* Congress for interfering too much with the acquisition process, causing people who should be building weapons to spend too much time justifying the project.

* Congress for long delays in financing programs, caused by busy legislative calendars and long debates over defense bills.

* Manufacturers for being blindly optimistic on cost estimates when bidding for weapons contracts.

* Manufacturers for devoting their resources to winning defense contracts, not producing the weapons.

* The Defense Department for ignoring the prototype development phase of research on weapons.

* The Defense Department for writing specifications on weapons which ignore costs, existing technological systems and timetables for production.

**References.** Defense Appropriations bill, Weekly Report p. 2497, 2437; Defense Procurement Authorization bill, p. 2376.

## Testimony Dec. 3

John C. Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, explained why he was holding the hearings:

"If the weapons we develop are so costly that we cannot afford enough of them and if they are so technically complex that they are unreliable and difficult to maintain, we have done the nation a disservice by developing and procuring them.... I am a lawyer by training and, quite frankly, the discussion of weapon systems in the Congress has seemed to me

## Cost Overruns

One of the primary reasons Sen. John C. Stennis (D Miss.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, called for hearings on weapons acquisition was that weapons systems have been costing more.

Some of the classic examples:

**F-111.** Original estimates for the program included the purchase of 1,700 aircraft at $3.4-million per plane. The current total order of 418 aircraft cost approximately $15-million per plane. By reducing the number of planes purchased by 1,282 aircraft, the Air Force was able to keep the cost overrun to about $1-billion. (Weekly Report p. 2499)

**C-5A.** Except for the blimp, the Air Force has never purchased a larger flying machine than the C-5A Galaxy, a jet cargo aircraft. Original estimates for the program included the purchase of 120 aircraft at $28.4-million per plane ($3.4-billion program cost). Most recent estimates of program costs were $4.8-billion; the total order was reduced to 81 aircraft at a cost of about $59-million per plane. Cost overruns were kept below $2-billion by reducing the number of aircraft purchased by the Air Force. (Weekly Report p. 2499; fact sheet, p. 431, 1124)

**F-14.** Congress appropriated more than $1-billion for fiscal 1972 for the F-14 program. Original estimates for the 710 aircraft order were for $8.3-million per plane or about $6-billion. Current estimates were $12.5-million which would cost $8.9-billion if the full 710 plane order were filled. (Weekly Report p. 2499, 2050)

**B-1.** Although the B-1 bomber was only in its third year of research and development, cost problems caused the manufacturer—North American Rockwell Corporation—to reduce the number of test planes from five to three. The B-1, scheduled successor of the B-52 bomber, has been funded through mid-1972 at a cost of $689-million. Full research and development of the aircraft was estimated at $2.6-billion and full production has been estimated at $20-billion to $40-billion.

**Cheyenne Helicopter.** The Army's close air support Cheyenne helicopter, which has not yet gone into production, was funded for $35-million in cost overruns to be paid during fiscal 1972. For more than a year, the Defense Secretary has been studying the Army's Cheyenne helicopter and the Air Force's A-X close air support aircraft to see if one of the systems could be dropped thus eliminating costly duplication for similar missions. No decision had been reached when Congress acted on the Defense Appropriations bill (HR 11731). (Weekly Report p. 2497)

Dec. 18, 1971—PAGE 2615

In Committee - 2

319

to be sadly deficient in its understanding of process and procedures....

"I hope that in these brief initial hearings we will be able to begin to understand some of the underlying problems of the weapon systems acquisition process: how the system functions, why individuals and institutions within it behave as they do, what their real incentives are, what sort of reforms in the process will give us a better product.

"We're getting into something I've been wanting to get into for a long time...down to the fundamentals, get the problem described...get it on the record for staff analysis as well as the press."

Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, chairman of the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1969-1970) and chairman of the board of directors, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company:

"One of the most urgent needs for improvement for the entire weapons systems acquisition process is more effective operational test and evaluation.... Operational testing is done to determine, to the extent possible, whether such systems and materiel can meet operational requirements. It must provide advance knowledge as to what their capabilities and limitations will be when they are subjected to the stresses of the environment for which they were designed (usually combat)... Funding throughout the Department of Defense has been and continues to be inadequate to support most necessary operational testing.... In fact, there is no agency that can even identify the funds that are being spent on operational testing.

"Evaluation type functions, including test and evaluation, should not be within the control of either those charged with the responsibility for acquiring weapons systems nor of those charged with the responsibility for using the weapon system as an end product. Dominance of the evaluation function by either the producer or the user has a strong tendency to weight any evaluation."

The services spend so much time "building up a file to defend the program (a weapon system) that they don't build the plane." Too many people in Congress are looking into the Pentagon's business. Committee inquiry, which is valuable in itself, should be limited to perhaps two or four committees. A completely new set of procurement regulations is needed. "They're so bogged down in paper work over there (Pentagon) they can't do the job they're supposed to do." Merely improving procedures has not and will not work as a solution to the problem. Rather, a systematic change in the acquisition process is called for.

Dr. John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering for the Department of Defense:

"From the outset, this Administration has been concerned about cost growth of weapon systems, the lack of authority and stature of program managers and shortfalls in performance or delay in some important systems. Since taking office, Secretaries Laird and Packard have placed heavy emphasis on improving procedures in these areas."

The "most important single element for ensuring the proper execution of programs is the selection of qualified program managers." Six months ago, only 12 flag officers were assigned as program managers; now, 20 of the 82 managers are of flag rank. A school- the Defense Systems Management School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia is handling an increasing number of officers to participate in the weapons acquisition process.

The new position of Deputy Director of Defense test and evaluation was created to provide "over-all supervision of test and evaluation that heretofore had been lacking.

"The services have changed their organizations to ensure that a command independent of the developer participates in all operational testing and evaluation. This command renders a separate report, through a strong service local point, to the chief of the service to assist him with his later decisions."

Dec. 6

J. A. Stockfish, member of the Rand Corporation, specializing in weapons acquisition:

"Since it is the military user who must assume the ultimate responsibility for commanding military operations in the field and in conducting war, it is their preferences that should dominate the decision-making process.... Since World War II the technicians have been making the decisions.... High technical precision has been equated with good weaponry. This is not true."

Stuart Symington (D Mo.), a member of the committee:

Why is the United States not getting more for the billions it spent on research and development?

Stockfish:

"A large part is all too frequently caused by overspecifying the system. The user is often as much at fault because he also insists on these specifications."

The committee should give the military an incentive to do more testing by placing greater budget restraints on the Pentagon. "Whenever you encounter assertions that this is the most cost-effective system...find out whether the model or theory was based on sufficient or valid testing.... Has the model been validated by some independent testing?

"I would not be too disturbed at a three-fold cost overrun if the system was good," but all too frequently the system overruns do not result in solid weapon systems.

Dr. F. M. Scherer, professor of economics at the University of Michigan, defense consultant and author:

The insecurity of defense contractors has been "a major source of incentive breakdowns and disfunctional behavior. Today, with the weapons industry in its worst state of disarray since the late 1940s, the problem is even more critical. One simply cannot expect weapons suppliers to devote their top resources to anything but winning new orders when their very survival depends upon such orders. One cannot expect them to estimate costs and technical risks accurately when optimistic estimates enhance the prospect of capturing a new program assignment. One cannot expect them to refrain from hoarding personnel under whatever contractual blanket they can find when long-run organizational viability demands that they keep the team together."

"Contractors must somehow be induced to maximize output given their limited resources, not to maximize the quantity of resources they can spread over a restricted array of programs."

"It must be made crystal clear through word and deed that organizations which consistently do a good job will be allowed to grow while those which repeatedly fail will find their support progressively withdrawn. This is admittedly a radical proposal. But I am convinced that unless we move in that direction, channeling the insecurity of national security contractors in constructive rather than counter-productive directions, we are not likely to eliminate the intolerable inefficiency and waste presently pervading the weapons acquisition process."

Dec. 7

Robert Perry, director of system acquisition studies and specialist on European aircraft acquisition, Rand Corporation:

"An analysis of programs of the 1950s and the 1960s has disclosed that in terms of schedules, cost and weapons performance which vary from those specified at program inception, the prediction and control of system acquisition programs in general did not significantly improve.... In the 1960s typical major programs in all three services continued to exhibit an average cost growth of about 40 percent after corrections for inflation and changes in quantity of items purchased; schedule slippages of about 15 percent; and weapon system performance that characteristically deviated by 30 or 10 percent from original specifications.

PAGE 206 DEC. 1974

U.S. DEPARTMENT TO THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERS

329

In Committee - 3

"It appears that changes to system specifications imposed after programs had begun accounted for about half of cost growth... Engineering difficulties encountered in the course of development accounted for at least an additional one third; and native (inherent) imprecision of cost estimating processes was responsible for the residual 15 to 20 percent.

"Separate the development phase of weapon system acquisition from the subsequent production phase, both sequentially and contractually...conduct the initial research and development for a new weapon in a highly austere manner, concentrating first on demonstrating system performance and deferring more expensive tasks of detailed production design and reliability demonstration until both the technical and the requirement uncertainties have been very substantially reduced."

Arthur J. Alexander, specialist on Soviet aircraft acquisition, Rand Corporation, described the Soviet Union's process:

"The competitive system of design and the importance attached to production have promoted a philosophy based on simplicity, commonality and inheritance. Simplicity implies an unadorned product which performs only what is required: commonality means the use of standardized parts and assemblies as well as the sharing of design features among different aircraft; design inheritance is an intergenerational concept which favors modification rather than introduction of entirely new products.

"In technically, Soviet aircraft production is similar to the way the American industry operated before the government began to participate heavily in project management... Planning and profit motivation seem to have discovered one path to the solution of technical problems."

Dec. 8

Dr. William B. McLean, technical director of the Naval Undersea Center (projects designer), San Diego, Calif.:

"Based on some 30 years experience with military procurement, I believe the weapon systems acquisition process is now dangerously inadequate because...the need for development prototypes to demonstrate technical feasibility before the writing of military requirements has been ignored; the total acquisition process rewards the design of complex and expensive systems and penalizes work of simpler and, therefore, less expensive ones; the budgetary process has become a ritual with no content, which is occupying more than 50 percent of the productive time of our best technical people at the laboratory level and the full time of large numbers of technical people in Washington."

The development and testing of prototype weapons prior to procurement and prior to the writing of detailed specifications for performance is essential to lowering the cost of weapons development. "Requirements (for what a weapon should be able to do) written before the demonstration of a developmental prototype are worse than useless, because they have the effect of interfering with and even excluding, technically possible means of approach."

Dr. Pierre M. Sprey, systems manager of Enviro Control Inc. (water pollution devices); former systems analyst at the Pentagon, developing paper studies of light-weight fighters; consultant to Dr. Wayne Smith of Henry Kissinger's White House foreign policy staff:

"The weapons cost explosion has reached the stage where national defense is being severely impaired. Furthermore, I believe that the issues involved are so pervasive and fundamental that we cannot continue to treat this problem on a technical case-by-case basis; instead the issue must be raised to the level of national policy."

The military is requesting such complex weaponry that the development stages are taking years longer, the final product

is produced in smaller numbers to cover cost overruns, the weapon produced is more likely to suffer mechanical breakdown than more austere versions of the same weapon. The military would get more weapons, better service at less money if the services were forced to write specifications which took into account existing technology and severe cost restraints.

## HIGHER EDUCATION

The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee Dec. 3 ordered reported with amendments S 659, an omnibus education aid bill.

As ordered reported, S 659 included the provisions of several related measures approved earlier by the Senate:

* The Education Amendments of 1971 (S.659) as approved by the Senate Aug. 6 authorizing $19-billion in federal aid to post-secondary education in fiscal years 1972-1975. (Weekly Report p. 1845)

* The Indian Education Act of 1971 (S 2482) as approved by the Senate Oct. 8. (Weekly Report p. 2147)

* An emergency desegregation aid measure (S 1557) approved by the Senate April 26, authorizing $1.5-billion in fiscal 1972-1973 to assist school districts in eliminating minority-group isolation. (Weekly Report p. 964)

In addition the bill as ordered reported contained the provisions of the bill (S 390) to provide for a foreign service scholarship program. This bill had been reported favorably by the committee May 12 but unfavorably by the Foreign Relations Committee June 21. (Weekly Report p. 1483)

The bill contained language barring the use of federal funds solely to achieve racial balance in schools.

The busing issue, injected into the higher education aid measure during consideration by the House, which added anti-busing amendments to the education bill and then added the desegregation assistance package, was the major factor delaying Senate action to send the bill to conference with the bill the House passed Nov. 4.

Several southern Senators had proposed anti-busing amendments which they wished the Senate to add to its version of the education bill before sending it to conference. In order to avoid extended debate on this issue which might delay adjournment, Senate leadership decided not to consider the measure again until it convened in January. (Weekly Report p. 2386, 2399) ✓

## ORGANIZED CRIME

The House Select Committee on Crime held hearings Dec. 7-9 on the influence of organized crime on the banking, insurance and securities industries.

Reference. Senate hearings on organized crime and the securities industry, Weekly Report p. 1729.

### Testimony Dec. 7

Claude Pepper (D Fla.), committee chairman:

"The evidence uncovered thus far shows that important racketeers have combined with lawyers and accountants in developing schemes which have defrauded the general public as well as companies in the banking, securities and insurance industries of hundreds of millions of dollars each year."

Lawrence R. Tapper, Deputy Attorney General, California, discussed action by the State Board of Accountancy to lift the certified public accountant's license

Dec. 18, 1971-PAGE 2617

OCT 13 1971
N.Y.T.

Nixon's Second Summit

The announcement by President Nixon yesterday that he will visit Moscow next May for intensive negotiations on a broad range of issues indicates that he has won the gamble he took last summer when he disclosed his planned visit to Peking. That step raised the risk of an angry reaction by Moscow to what it might interpret as a Chinese-American coalition directed against the Soviet Union. However, the U.S.S.R. has been playing it cool, as witness the recent four-power agreement on Berlin, the indications of progress at the Helsinki SALT negotiations and now Moscow's receptivity to Mr. Nixon's projected trip.

At his news conference yesterday, the President insisted there was no relationship between his Peking and Moscow journeys. The diplomatic reasons for such a denial are evident, but the intimate tie between the two meetings can hardly be doubted. Mr. Brezhnev scored a domestic political coup with his announcement that Mr. Nixon will be coming to Russia. Implicitly, that news suggested to Soviet citizens that their fears of a Chinese-American anti-Soviet alliance have been proved groundless, no doubt as a result of skillful Soviet diplomacy.

That Mao and his colleagues will be equally happy about this latest turn of events would seem improbable. However, the fact that the President will be in Moscow after he visits Peking may conceivably increase Chinese interest in making concrete progress toward normalizing Sino-American relations. It is perhaps not entirely accidental that the Moscow trip has been announced shortly before Dr. Kissinger's scheduled second flight to China.

The numerous Democrats who would like to run against Mr. Nixon in November 1972 will undoubtedly see the President's trips as purely political ploys designed to get him re-elected. Presumably not even Mr. Nixon would deny that thoughts of political advantage in 1972 do occasionally enter his mind. Nevertheless it would be wrong to look at the two rounds of summit diplomatic meetings now scheduled for the next seven months from purely parochial, partisan points of view.

What has happened is that new possibilities have been raised for a substantial improvement in United States relations with the other two great world military powers, the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union. There is no guarantee, unfortunately, that these possibilities will be realized. But, as he journeys to Peking and Moscow in the cause of world peace and international security, Mr. Nixon will need the support of all Americans regardless of party and irrespective of differences on domestic issues.

WASHINGTON POST - 17 OCTOBER 1971

319

# Timing of Moscow Trip
# Worries Defense Experts

By Michael Gettler

A number of experienced U.S. defense experts, already openly troubled over the continuing buildup of nuclear weaponry in Russia, are also expressing some concern privately about timing of President Nixon's trip to Moscow next May.

Though the President's surprise announcement last week—almost eight months before the actual visit to Moscow — apparently was viewed by the White House as necessary to balance the forthcoming trip to China, officials in several agencies say they are concerned about its potential impact on the forthcoming round of the Staategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).

These officials fear that the early announcement may induce the Russians to drag their feet at SALT and wait until next May—rather than early in 1972—for an initial agreement to try to limit the arms race.

Some officials feel that although an agreement in May, just six months before the presidential election, would no doubt be helpful to Mr. Nixon, the move also would expose the President to the possibility of a very tough final stand by the Soviets on unsettled issues.

"You just can't keep talking about a generation of peace, about the era of negotiations, as the President has, then go to Moscow and not come back with agreement," as one high-level defense official puts it.

Last May, when the leaders of both countries announced that they would try to break the deadlock over nuclear arms limitations, it was stated that they would try and reach an initial agreement by the end of this year.

Sources close to the talks, however, say that even before the president announced his intended visit to Moscow, it did not appear that an initial agreement could be reached before January or February, 1972.

With a Nixon visit now set for May, some of these officials believe the incentive is further diminished for the Soviet leaders to commit themselves well before then on a number of remaining dispites.

What these officials are saying in private was expressed publicly on Friday by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), a not yet announced presidential hopeful. Jackson told newsmen that the timing of the President's announcement, in his view, had given the So-

viets "a powerful weapon" to extract further concessions from the United States at SALT. "The question is how much we're going to give up and give in for international cosmetics," he said.

Jackson takes a tough stand on a strong defense posture and is generally considered the only Democratic contender who could challenge the President on this issue. But some analysts feel that the longer a SALT agreement is delayed, the more vulnerable the President gets to a Soviet squeeze, and the harder time he may have selling a resultant agreement to some of his own constituency and to Congress, where there is still a sizeable reservoir of mistrust for the Russians.

On the other hand, a number of officials high up in government confess to a feeling of not having all of the facts on the real state of relations between the two superpowers.

Pentagon Insiders say that the number of people who knew about the Moscow trip well in advance of the announcement may not extend very far — if at all — beyond the President and his chief national security adviser, Dr. Henry M. Kissinger. Similarly, informed sources suggest that the agreement last May concerning SALT may also have been unknown even to the Secretaries of State and Defense until not long before the public was informed.

Linked to new concern about when a SALT agreement is reached is heightened concern about what will be included in an initial agreement.

Some weapons experts and Kremlinologists believe that once the Soviets achieve their principal objective at SALT — the halting of the U.S. Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system — they will lose incentive to negotiate limitations on other types of offensive weapons, such as missile-firing submarines, which may not be included in an initial agreement.

Thus, some officials believe that the United States should press hard and fast for a sublimitation to be included in an initial agreement along with ABMs and ICBMs. Again, they reason that if an initial agreement is delayed until next May, the President could conceivably be pressured into giving up subs for a later time that some strategists believe may never come.

### Agree With Laird

Though most government planners concede that the nu-

clear arsenals on both sides are now so stuffed with land and sea-based missiles that some imbalance doesn't really make much military difference, they tend to go along with Defense Secretary Laird's recent assertion that a SALT agreement freezing the United States into a permanent numerical inferiority in both missile categories could create political problems at home.

The United States is already outnumbered in land-based ICBMs by about 1550 to 1054, and the Soviets are expected at least to match the U.S. fleet of 41 Polaris-style submarines in 1973.

The submarine issue is particularly hard for the U.S. to handle at SALT. For one thing, these weapons are less worrisome than the bigger and more accurate land-based ICBMs. For another, the main U.S. objective at SALT has been to put a limit on the number of huge SS-9 missiles, the only weapon that might eventually be made accurate enough to threaten U.S. missiles buried in underground silos in a surprise attack. Most officials believe this SS-9 limit

can be achieved as part of an initial agreement which also limits the rival ABM systems.

In recent months, however, the United States has detected evidence that the Soviets are greatly expanding their submarine construction facilities. This has raised the prospect that the United States will be outnumbered in both land- and sea-based missiles in the future and it has brought about the new pressure to include subs in the agreement.

Intelligence sources say that at this point there is only the outline of a new sub-building facility at Severodvinsk, with construction at the "concrete pouring stage." And, they say, there is "a real likelihood" that the facility may be intended all or in part to remodel existing Russian Yankee-class missile subs to carry the longer-range Safwy missile that has just been flight-tested.

This might mean the Soviets would use the yard to modernize their fleet, not necessarily expand it.

Intelligence analysts, however, take no comfort in this, since it could also be used several years from now, when it it completed, to double the current eight-subs-per year production capability of the huge Severodvinsk yard.

One official says that even if the U.S. wanted to put a new missile submarine into construction, it would be 1975 before the keel could be laid because the existing U.S. yards are tied up with converting Polaris submarines to carry the Poseidon missile and with other work.

Concern about the Soviet land-based ICBM force still centers around what kind of missile the Russians intended to put into the roughly 90 new silos they have under construction, and whether they intended to keep digging more holes.

None of the silos are finished and no new ICBM has yet been tested. Some new flight tests are expected within the next month or two.

The Soviets appear to be putting about five new SS-type silos in each of the six existing SS-9 bases. This could send the total number of these missiles in service to well over 300, but officials remain optimistic about putting a lid on this weapon. The other holes appear to be for the more numerous but far less powerful SS-11 or a modification of it.

There have also been a few extremely large new excavations spotted, but intelligence sources say the idea that these are command posts and not missile silos "does have some appeal."

NEW YORK TIMES

17 OCT 71 (18)

Doing Business With Brezhnev

Apart from the 1972 election, the critical factor behind President Nixon's historic decision to be the first American President to visit Moscow, as well as Peking, appears to be a feeling that he can do business with Brezhnev. This feeling evidently is based primarily on the recent Berlin agreement and on exchanges in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). It reflects a sea change in atmosphere in less than a year.

Last fall—and as recently as the beginning of this year, when the President's last "State of the World" message was published—Mr. Nixon sensed malevolent intentions in Moscow toward the United States. There had been a series of confrontations with the Soviet Union over the Middle East, starting with massive missile cheating at Suez and ending with the abortive movement of Syrian tanks, with Soviet encouragement, into beleaguered Jordan. Soviet missile submarines were calling at Cuban ports. And the SALT talks were bogged down. But the Soviet conflict with China had eased off a bit and Moscow was negotiating with West Germany for a provisional settlement in Central Europe based on the territorial status quo.

The Soviet strategy, Mr. Nixon felt, was to try to divide the NATO alliance by seeking détente with West Europe, semi-détente with China and confrontation with the United States.

The turning point came in May with sudden progress in negotiations with the Soviet Union of special interest to the United States both on Europe and on strategic weapons. In the SALT talks, a summit accord was reached to seek a pact limiting defensive antiballistic missile (ABM) systems by the end of the year, together with a freeze of certain offensive delivery systems pending negotiation of a comprehensive agreement.

On the basis of this and other SALT contacts, Mr. Nixon evidently is convinced, as he said last week, that Moscow and Washington "can both agree that neither major power can get a decisive advantage over the other, an advantage which would enable it to launch a preemptive strike which might enable it to engage in international blackmail." As a result, he added, "there is no alternative to negotiation at this point."

In Europe in May there were breakthroughs both on Berlin and in regard to arms control in the heart of the Continent. In the four-power Berlin talks, the Soviet Union for the first time indicated that it would accept responsibility for "unimpeded" access to West Berlin, 110 miles within East Germany. And, at about the same time, Soviet Communist party leader Brezhnev announced that Moscow was prepared to open negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on force reductions in Central Europe.

These breakthroughs were confirmed by conclusion of the Berlin agreement last summer and, in a broader philosophical sense, by the tone of the sixteen hours of conversations between Mr. Brezhnev and West German Chancellor Brandt in the Crimea last month. These first extensive foreign policy discussions in private by the Soviet leader since his emergence as top man in the Kremlin hierarchy revealed a new approach reassuring to Washington.

The Brandt-Brezhnev talks indicated that Mr. Brezhnev now accepts the fact that West Germany acts in close concert with its strongest ally, the United States, and that Bonn does not speak alone but as a member of two alliances, NATO and the European Economic Community. Specifically, the Soviet leader recognizes that a European security conference can be held only with American participation and that fundamental questions of security, such as reciprocal force reductions in Europe, must be negotiated with NATO, not its individual members.

What is implied in Mr. Brandt's report is that the Soviet Union may have shelved its old effort to divide the West and would now be content to stabilize the status quo in Europe. The implication is that the past Soviet policy of "differentiated détente," seeking to relax tension with West Europe but not with the United States, has given way to efforts at a broader accommodation with the West as a whole.

None of this means that the millennium has arrived. Mr. Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed just the other day that Soviet-American differences "are still very deep." But the plan for a Nixon-Brezhnev summit appears to reflect a conviction on both sides that either any longer can gain a "decisive advantage" over the other by the maneuvers of power politics or an unrestricted arms race. It appears to reflect a desire to seek a mutual accommodation of interests. Success will not be easy. But the effort in itself could cushion the continuing conflict and provide some security to this endangered world.

320

NEW YORK TIMES 26 OCT 1971

Laird vs. Nixon

Secretary Laird's alarmist reports on the Soviet strategic missile buildup at sea and on land contrasts curiously with President Nixon's optimism about stabilization of the nuclear arms race.

In announcing his plan for the visit to Moscow by an American President, Mr. Nixon said the other day that the projected Soviet-American summit meeting reflected a conclusion by "both of us" that "neither major power can get a decisive advantage over the other ... which might enable it to engage in international blackmail."

Mr. Laird, however, in announcing that the Soviet Union would match America's 41 Polaris submarines by 1973, said: "I believe we would be placed at a very great political disadvantage if the Soviet Union were able to ring the United States with a vastly superior Polaris-type fleet off all our coasts and outdistance us by a large number of missiles."

What are the facts? The facts are that 100 American nuclear warheads delivered on target can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. Beyond 400 delivered warheads, which would knock Russia out of the twentieth century—inflicting 100 million Soviet fatalities and destroying three-fourths of Soviet industry—no useful increment of damage can be obtained by an increase in the numbers of attacking hydrogen bombs. The United States now has more than 5,000 separately targetable strategic warheads and is racing toward a force of more than 8,000 such hydrogen warheads. The chosen instrument of American nuclear escalation is the MIRV multiple warhead, already installed in the first four of 31 projected Poseidon submarines, and in 150 or more Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

MIRV was designed to penetrate a heavy Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. No such system is being built. The Soviet Union has offered to freeze its small, obsolete Moscow ABM system at approximately present levels as part of the pending first-stage strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement. An ABM agreement is virtually certain by early next year, before Mr. Nixon's Moscow trip, limiting ABMs to very low levels. The tremendous expansion of American offensive delivery vehicles now under way will be overkill then and, in fact, has been nothing but overkill for a long time. The four American Poseidon submarines already operational can fire many more warheads than the 25 Polaris-type submarines the Soviet Union now has at sea.

The Soviet Union is equally guilty of building overkill. Its chosen instrument is the force of huge SS-9 ICBMs, expansion of which might one day threaten the American Minuteman force. The rate of expansion of this force has dropped from 55 a year to about 40 a year. But some 30 "big holes" have been started since January—not 90, as some reports suggest. Two thirds of the "new holes" are for much smaller missiles, indicating that further expansion is taking the form of an improved silo or missile or both.

The Soviet Union has indicated a willingness to freeze further expansion of this and other land-based missiles in a first-stage SALT agreement. But it wants to hold out for a second-stage agreement a freeze on ballistic missile submarines, which the United States insists must be incorporated in the agreement now under discussion.

The American proposal would freeze the Soviet Union

into a position of numerical inferiority in warheads, pending Soviet MIRV development, which evidently is lagging. The Soviet Union evidently wants to be free to press ahead with submarine deployment, in addition, as a "bar-gaining chip" in the second-stage negotiation, just as the United States is pressing ahead with Safeguard and MIRV now.

Mr. Nixon sees that none of this is of major significance in the strategic balance. A few extra missiles or submarines on one side or the other can make no difference when both already have many thousands more warheads than they need to deter attack. But Mr. Laird insists that the United States, which has enjoyed vast nuclear superiority for a quarter-century, will not permit the Soviet Union to exceed parity, meaningless as that would be.

Politically, Mr. Laird may be right—and Moscow would do well to pay heed to the consequences of pressing forward with futile and expensive further deployment of nuclear missiles at a time when a SALT agreement is within reach. But Mr. Laird could make a major contribution himself by curbing America's chosen instruments of missile expansion, MIRV and Safeguard, as the Senate long has urged.

325

326

Joseph Alsop

BALTIMORE SUN 27 OCTOBER 1971

Will Russia use its new power?

Washington.

A single question is truly
haunting at the close of a long
and arduous journey to the
Middle East and Asia. The
question is whether the Soviet
Union is still likely to respond
to changes in the balance of
power in the old way, like one
of Pavlov's dogs salivating
when the bell was rung.

It is a key question—in fact,
the single key question of the
moment—simply because the
Russians are making such
enormous efforts to tilt the
world balance of power in
their favor. These efforts are
being made in every area, no-
tably including conventional
naval power. But the simplest
measure is the Soviet effort in
the area of nuclear-strategic
power.

The chief scientist of the
Pentagon, Dr. John S. Foster.
has been under bitter attack.
Dr. Jeremy Stone and a good
many other misguided Ameri-
can scientists have formed a
powerful lobby primarily
aimed, so far as one can see,
to subordinating American
strategic policy to Soviet stra-
 tegic policy.

Of this dubious scientific
lobby, Dr. Foster has been a
prime target—as a dreadful
pessimist, as an advocate of
"the worst case," as an habit-
ual exaggerator of this coun-
try's perils.

It is interesting, then, that
Dr. Foster has now been
proved dead wrong on the op-
timistic side. Last January,
when the Russians renewed
active development of their
giant counter-force weapons,
the SS-9's, and other intercon-
tinental missiles, Dr. Foster
rather confidently predicted
that the maximum number of
missiles to be deployed this
year might reach 35.

By September, however, the
last American reconnaissance
satellite had found more than
95 new silos, dug to receive
new missiles. These silos are
divided into about 60 for ad-
vanced-model SS-11's (like our
Minuteman, but more power-
ful): about 30 advanced-model

SS-9's (capable of taking out
more targets than the early
model), and 6 or 7 outsize
silos probably due to take a
super-brute missile of an en-
tirely new type.

Perhaps more ominously,
testing of the advanced-model
SS-9's and SS-11's, though not
of the super-brutes, began a
few weeks ago. One of the
more curious features of this
year's silo-digging program—
in fact pointing to a crash pro-
gram—was the Soviet failure
to pre-test the new missiles
that will go into the new silos.
But that is ended now.

Both the advanced-model
SS-9 and the advanced-model
SS-11 have been recently test-
ed inside the Soviet Union and
at relatively short range.

Only long-range tests will
show with certainty what the
detailed characteristics of
these new missiles may be.
But the initial results are dis-
turbing, to say the least. Ma-
jor improvements are indicat-
ed, with five huge warheads
on the new SS-9, for instance.

In addition, there are two
other quite novel elements in
the pattern.

First, new naval construc-
tion and launching facilities
indicate one of the two possi-
bilities. Either the Russians
mean to have more of their
Yankee-class nuclear submar-
ines by 1973-1974 than we have
Polaris-Poseidon submarines.
Or they mean to have large
numbers of very fast attack
submarines intended to check-
mate our submarines of the
Polaris-Poseidon class.

Secondly, the Russians ran
a major series of exercises
this summer in the interesting
field of satellite-neutralization
and/or satellite destruction
The least informed person
knows that 95 per cent of
America's information about
Soviet weapons development
and military deployment is
owed to the U.S. reconnais-
sance satellites.

Neutralizing or destroying
those satellites will be the ex-
act equivalent of blinding this
country in a crisis. It is impor-
tant, then, that the recent ex-
ercise, which were elaborate

and ambitious, have proved
that the Russians now have
this capability of blinding us.

The weapon used was a
non-nuclear missile with pow-
erful apparatus for correcting
its course in flight, and for
target seeking at the climax.
When "fixed" on its victim-
satellite, it appears to do its
job by ejecting large numbers
of high velocity pellets of
some sort.

If the U.S. is one day blind-
ed in this manner, one can
already foretell the response
of Dr. Jeremy Stone and

many another high-level
American thinkers.

To the returning traveler,
all this gives food for thought
for two rather simple reasons.
In the Middle East, in China,
and one or two other places
around the world, there are
situations that must greatly
tempt the Russians if they feel
ready to be brutal.

And whenever the Russians
have thought they were acting
within a favorable balance of
power, they have always end-
ed by seeking their national
aims with considerable brutal-
ity. This is the Pavlov aspect.
It makes an interesting calcu-
lation.

327

NEW REPUBLIC 30 OCTOBER 1971

Shocks and
Shivers

Alarms over Russian weaponry are again being rung in Washington: inspired stories describing "agitated pacings" of the Pentagon's research chief as he speaks of enemy breakthroughs, military briefings of defense industrialists, and finally, new revelations by Secretary Laird of Soviet missile deployments. Very scary stuff, but not new. There were official warnings last spring, at the start of congressional hearings on the defense budget, of horrendous Soviet developments, such as the construction of large holes for a mammoth new missile. (Later, and less noisily, the Pentagon acknowledged that much of the new construction was for smaller, existing Russian ICBMs.) In recent days "seniors analysts" have alerted us to the feverish construction of Soviet ICBM launchers, about 90 this year. This is significantly fewer, however, than the 160 a year observed in 1969, a rate of increase, Pentagon officials said at the time, which if continued would threaten our Minuteman deterrent force in 1975. Once again, we are asked to be startled by disclosures of large holes in the ground, and once again no evidence is supplied of any new Soviet missile having been tested. If a new Soviet missile is in the works, its development is lagging long behind earlier US estimates. The probability was and is that these large holes are hardened Soviet silos to protect against a possible US strike.

Secretary of Defense Laird appears particularly anxious about accelerated Russian missile submarine construction, raising the possibility that the Soviets might reach numerical equality with the US in 1973. And if they do? Right we to shake in our boots at that prospect, when the Pentagon has always said that submarine missiles are the "foundation of a deterrent force? Indeed, Mr. Laird was at a loss when asked by newsmen why US submarines ringing the USSR mean no harm indeed are desirable, while Soviet subs off our shores present an unacceptable threat. That question is repugnant to those who believe that what America does is right and necessary because America does it, and wrong for others because they do not share our good intentions. But that general principle needn't be arrested. The practical facts are that Soviet subs and missiles are inferior to those of the US, and that by 1973 the US will have a submarine fleet with long-range Poseidon missiles capable of raining on Russia three or four thousand nuclear warheads each with a yield several

times that of the Hiroshima bomb. It is hallucinatory to imagine that if the Russians build 41 subs - the number in our Polaris fleet - they will have achieved even parity.

Of course, the Soviets are arming; so are we, each side knowing that no amount of arms will ever put either in a position where it could risk initiating nuclear war. The US is already increasing the number of its strategic warheads from about 2000 in 1970 to more than 7000 by 1975. Moreover, our missiles will be equipped with MIRVs - that is, many warheads, each capable of hitting an individual target. We are building a new intercontinental bomber, the B-1, whereas the Soviets have restricted their efforts to a shorter-range aircraft. Both sides are building ABMs.

Arms control, not pandemonium from the Pentagon, is the only hope of breaking this spending spiral. But the lobby for arms limitation is puny, the lobby for arms unlimited is powerful. Nearly two years have passed since formal talks began, four years since they were first proposed. Under the philosophy that all weapons programs must be pushed in order to provide bargaining chips for the negotiators, both sides have vastly increased their forces during this period, so that any halt will be at a higher level than if restraint had been exercised earlier. The Russians have boosted the number of their launchers by nearly 100 percent since 1968; the US has tested, and is well along in the deployment of two MIRV systems, nearly doubling the number of our warheads in that time. Fortunately, the Russians have not yet begun testing a MIRV system, and it is MIRVs, not the number of launchers, that are the real threat in the long run to our land-based deterrent. Yet there is no serious discussion at SALT of limiting MIRVs.

What prompts the present shocks and shivers in the Pentagon? The congressional budget cycle is about over for this year. Is it to lay the groundwork for the next defense budget submission, which must now be in preparation? As the expenditures for Vietnam wind down, the Pentagon faces increasing competition for federal funds. The large federal deficits can only be reduced by cuts in defense funding. Or is the present campaign calculated to impede agreement at SALT? It has been reported that when the US negotiating team returned to Helsinki in July, it was seeking a freeze on Soviet submarine construction in addition to one on the large SS-9 ICBMs, asking in effect for a halt to all Russian deployments, while allowing the US to replace Polaris missiles with the much larger MIRVed Poseidons and our Minuteman II ICBMs with MIRVed Minuteman IIs. Mr Laird "will oppose any national-security program which would place us in an inferior position," forcing the President to "crawl to a negotiating table." Who wouldn't oppose that? What we want to know is whether the current propaganda on the Soviet submarine buildup is a Pentagon attempt to tie the US needlessly to a nonnegotiable position.