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in Egypt because it involved no assumption of substantive risk. It would never have entered Egypt had not both parties to the dispute accepted it and had not both parties sought a device to liquidate military operations. The United Nations force did not cause the cessation of the attack; rather it ratified a decision already made. [It does not] for this reason offer a particularly hopeful model for what will be the real security problem of our period: the growing Soviet power coupled with a refusal to yield to anything except superior force.

The argument that a supra-national authority can resolve tensions which have proved intractable in direct negotiations, and that it can be entrusted with the exclusive custody of weapons capable of encompassing the destruction of humanity, reflects two related notions: that aggression is by its nature unambiguous and that weakness somehow guarantees responsibility and perhaps even superior morality. But in the nuclear age recognizing aggression has proved as complicated as resisting it. "ere a supra-national Disarmament Executive charged with enforcing the peace, to come it is predictable that its major problem would be to define a meaningful concept of aggression.

Moreover, it would be difficult to find Powers clearly recognized as neutral to act as custodians of the thermo-nuclear stockpile or with sufficient technical competence to administer it were they so recognized. [N nor is it clear why a monopoly of power in the hands of states dependent for their equipment, their training and their facilities on the two super-Powers

* The very quality which would make Powers acceptable as members of a Disarmament Authority - their neutrality - will reduce their willingness to remit risk to the real security problem, which is a dispute between the United States and the U.S.S.R. they may take the power to impose on their will or the will of a

for nuclear war they will develop many of the characteristics
of the strategic striking forces. They will be highly mobile and capable
of striking across considerable distances from their base areas.
With the proper doctrine and equipment, they should require a
minimum build-up to go into action. Thus in a limited war it
is doubtful whether an inspection system would supply substantial
additional warning.

This is not to say that inspections systems are without
any utility. The very agreement to them may serve as a symbol
of peaceful intentions. But peaceful intentions could be con-
veyed as well in other ways, particularly through the settlement
of some of the disputes which have divided the Soviet bloc from
the Free World. Conversely, in the present climate of distrust,
an inspection system might do little more than add another ele-
ment of contention. Indeed, Unless designed with extraordinary
care, a system of inspection may well make a tense situation even
more explosive. In view of the complexity of the strategy for
all-out war, The value of an inspection system depends not only
on the collection, but also on the interpretation of facts. For-
rect interpretation is all the more important because the only
meaningful reaction to the violation of an agreement is to launch
an immediate retaliatory strike, because Negotiations and protests could
not begin to be effective before the enemy force has reached its
targets. It is therefore vital that an inspection system re-
duce rather than add to the danger of an all-out war produced
by a misunderstanding of the opponents' intentions. But the

This is not to say that inspections systems are not without value. The very agreement to them may serve as a symbol of peaceful intentions. But peaceful intentions could be conveyed as well in other ways, particularly through the settlement of some of the disputes which have divided the Soviet bloc from the Free World. Conversely, in the present climate of distrust, an inspection system might do little more than add another element of contention. Indeed, unless designed with extraordinary care, a system of inspection may well make a tense situation even more explosive. In view of the complexity of the strategy for all-out war, the value of an inspection system depends not only on the collection, but also on the interpretation of facts. Correct interpretation is all the more important because the only meaningful reaction to the violation of an agreement is to launch an immediate retaliatory strike. Negotiations and protests could not begin to be effective before the enemy force has reached its targets. It is therefore vital that an inspection system reduce rather than add to the danger of an all-out war produced by a misunderstanding of the opponents' intentions. But the

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information produced by any inspection system so far advanced is
of necessity fragmentary. And inspection is likely to run into
most difficulties and evasions when it is most needed, when inter-
national tensions are at their height. To launch an all-out on the
basis of inevitably fragmentary and contradictory information, is
psychologically difficult but the knowledge that it is the sanction
for seeming violations may well add to the tenseness of relationships.
Instead of increasing the danger of all-out war, inspection
systems may make a showdown produced by a misunderstanding of the
opponent's intentions more likely.

It is the technical complexity of inspection and its
futility in the present climate of distrust which caused some
thoughtful individuals, appalled at the prospect of nuclear war,
to advocate an international Disarmament Authority as the only
solution. It is argued that as long as both sides possess thermo-
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them a vicious spiral of
constantly growing insecurity is inevitable. The only solution
is the surrender of all strategic weapons to a world authority which
would be the sole agency to possess heavy armaments and the means
for delivering them. The Disarmament Executive should be composed
of minor Powers which are not part of the East-West struggle.

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out war capacity would be so formidable and the benefits relatively so trivial that an inspection system may actually have pernicious consequences. It may give a misleading impression of security and therefore tempt us into relaxing our preparedness. More likely, given the prevailing distrust it will induce both sides to place their striking forces into an even greater state of readiness in order to compensate by the demonstration of its power for the loss of secrecy. Nor would inspection materially reduce the chances of local aggression. The Soviets would find it difficult even under present condition to stage a significant build-up in any threatened area without it becoming known. To overemphasize the role of inspection as a bar to local war is to underrate the intelligence information already available. There is no major area in which the Soviets could launch a major blow without our learning of the build-up. Yet it is not knowledge of an impending attack which deters or defeats it but the known capability and the willingness to resist. In the face of the strategy of ambiguity employed by the Kremlin, knowledge of troop concentrations has in the past not always given a clear indication of Soviet intentions, a difficulty compounded by the reluctance of the non-Soviet world of coming to grips with the dangers facing it. Thus during the week while Soviet troops were pouring into Hungary there was a great deal of speculation in the West that these movements were in fact a prelude to a Soviet withdrawal in order to save face or to guard the Soviet lines of communication. Moreover, as the armies of the major powers are being reorganized