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doing international business in England, Germany, and the other affected nations. Every three months 8 to 10 billion American dollars in short-term notes flowed from Arabic sources to Europe, and these monies were immediately converted into international long-term loans. These were the causes of the international "debt crisis" of the developing nations in the 1980s.

At the time I had not anticipated the debt crisis in this way; two other matters worried me. First, I was concerned with the solvency and ability to make payments of those banks that were dealing in currencies other than their own and thus were neither subject to supervision nor, in case of emergency, entitled to support by their own national central banks. I thought a banking crisis was not out of the question—not, as it turned out, mistakenly. Second, I was afraid that none of the oil-importing nations could in the end avoid a crisis in the balance of payments and as a consequence a deflationary crisis with massive effects on employment.

I drastically expressed these worries in a public address in Rhineland-Palatinate: We were entering on demanding times, I said, and would have to be prepared for severe restrictions. Alluding to Churchill's famous wartime speech, I spoke of sweat and tears. This reference offended Chancellor Brandt, who insisted that the economic boom must not be attacked. I acquiesced, but on November 5, 1973, I wrote a concerned private letter to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In it I suggested that a private conference of diplomats, oil specialists, and currency experts in the important industrial nations be held in order to develop a joint policy for the Western governments. It was essential, I wrote, to exchange views and experiences in order to arrive at mutual cooperation and a common policy toward the OPEC nations.

At first my suggestion did not fall on fertile soil with Kissinger because in November 1973 friction between Washington and Bonn had developed. These tensions were fed by the media. Without Germany's knowledge, the United States government had put together ocean transports bound for Israel from its military arsenals in Bremerhaven, thus turning the Federal Republic into a source of military reinforcements in the Yom Kippur War. Willy Brandt was fully justified in taking offense. It was not until February 1974 that the Washington energy conference grew out of my suggestion. Henry Kissinger discussed it in detail in his memoirs.

French President Georges Pompidou did not send his finance minister, Giscard, as I had hoped, but instead dispatched his foreign secretary, Michel Jobert, and heated controversies arose between him and

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found guilty. In order to avoid further shock and internal division of
the nation after Vietnam and Watergate, Ford pardoned his predecessor
after a few weeks. This, too, was in accordance with the Constitution,
but once again was highly unusual—and almost beyond the comprehen-
sion of Europeans, since European constitutions do not recognize such
a procedure (that is, a pardon *before* the legal verdict). When I learned
of Gerald Ford's decision, I said to my colleagues, "Ford is one hell of
a brave man."

Since Nixon was now out of the picture, some of the media pounced
on Ford. In the two and a half years of his term he was treated pretty
unfairly by the media in his country and especially by American televi-
sion. This predominantly negative attitude was initially transmitted to
Europe. But during the great Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe in Helsinki in late July 1975 and during the first economic
summit in Rambouillet in November 1975, European statesmen
learned to appreciate Gerald Ford as a reliable partner in foreign affairs;
they also trusted him on a personal and human level—despite unavoida-
ble conflicts of interest and differences of opinion.

The Soviet leadership under Leonid Brezhnev, who probably did not
fully understand the domestic significance of the Watergate affair, was
reassured by the fact that Henry Kissinger was once again nominated
as secretary of state; under Ford there seemed to be no danger of any
fundamental change in the United States' international aims and meth-
ods. Even before Helsinki, the meeting between Ford and Brezhnev in
Vladivostok in December 1974 probably swept away any doubts that
might have remained.

I myself met and spent time with Ford eight times in extended
conversations or negotiations during his brief period in office. Our first
meeting, in Washington in the late autumn of 1974, was basically
devoted to becoming acquainted. Beginning in May 1975, we met three
times at short intervals—first in late May in Brussels on the occasion of
a large NATO meeting, eight weeks later in Bonn during Ford's visit
to the Federal Republic, and again a few days later in Helsinki.

During his visit to Bonn at the latest I developed a great personal
confidence in the new president. That feeling has never been disap-
pointed; nor did Gerald Ford ever take me by surprise, perhaps by
making unilateral decisions, arrived at without consultation. On the
contrary, he continued Nixon's foreign policy in almost every respect;
during his presidency the United States—from Bonn's point of view—
became an increasingly reliable and dependable partner and NATO
leader.

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So NATO's dual "grand strategy," as it had been formulated jointly in late 1967, remained in force: both joint security *against* the Soviet Union through joint defense capability and cooperation *with* the Soviet Union, especially in the area of arms limitation by treaty through SALT and MBFR. Of course Europe understood that, beyond these decisions, the United States had to respect its own interests along with overall Western interests in those regions that transcended the geographically definable territory of NATO; this situation was not a new reality.

In 1975 one of our trivial differences of opinion was the question of the attitude to take toward Portugal and Spain. On May 29, 1975, a discussion took place in Brussels between Ford and Kissinger on one side and myself on the other. The following dialogue ensued:

**SCHMIDT:** Could you possibly be somewhat more reserved in your address to the NATO Council in regard to Spain than your draft provides?

**FORD:** Do you want me to leave Spain out altogether?

**SCHMIDT:** No, but perhaps the whole passage referring to Spain could be reformulated somewhat. To us in Europe the whole Spanish problem looks a little different than it does to the United States, for whom Spain is primarily a strategic factor. The Franco era is obviously coming to an end [Francisco Franco died on November 24, 1975]. It is still not clear who will take the helm. We should be encouraging those we hope will govern after Franco. That means we must deal not only with those who are in power now.

**FORD:** We are now negotiating a treaty for a military base, and we assign a high priority to it. Should these negotiations fail, the alliance would suffer appreciable disadvantages. So we have to walk a tightrope.

**SCHMIDT:** Yes, certainly. But so that you can be sure of your bases and your special strategic ties with Spain beyond today, you should talk about it with tomorrow's rulers as well. What is also at stake is the United States' standing in Europe. No one should be able to say of the United States that it was supporting the wrong regime.

**KISSINGER:** We in America apply the same theories to Spain that you Europeans apply to Portugal: We are unwilling to support any movements that cannot be controlled. . . . The latest development in Portugal shifted the weight in favor of the communist-leaning officers.

**SCHMIDT:** It's too early to form a final judgment about the outcome of that business. Portugal is going through an economic decline, it is facing a desperate situation in that area. Even Mario Soares, whom I

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believe to be a courageous man, is unlikely to be able to deal with it [in 1974, after his return to Portugal, Soares first became foreign minister; he ruled the country from July 1976 to 1978]. Though the communists are well organized, when it comes to finances they are entirely dependent on Soviet aid. I do not believe the Soviet Union is prepared to supply economic help to Portugal in the grand style for long.

**KISSINGER:** The public confrontations between the communists and the socialists have one advantage, at least—the idea of a popular front can't arise.

**FORD:** What can the United States now contribute that would be useful to what happens next?

**SCHMIDT:** Prevent the Soviet Union's open intervention in Portugal. To be sure, so far Moscow has been rather cautious; it prefers to send Romania or East Germany to do its dirty work.

**KISSINGER:** That's right. But even a Romanian or Yugoslav sort of communism would have dangerous effects on NATO.

**FORD:** How would the Europeans react if the Azores seceded from Portugal and declared their independence?

**SCHMIDT:** The Eastern European propaganda machines would present it as the result of American interference. Western Europe, however, would accept a separation of the Azores if the situation in Lisbon becomes untenable. But today that is not the case. Therefore at present a declaration of independence on the part of the Azores would not be justified in the eyes of Western Europe.

I was expressing the opinion of most of my European colleagues. We thought the chances were particularly good for a shift to democracy in Spain—and we supported all democratic parties and labor unions to the best of our ability. Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, the opposition leader (later prime minister) Felipe González, and especially King Juan Carlos played their parts to perfection. Today little is left of Francoism; in the meantime Spain has joined both NATO and the European Community.

The situation was somewhat different in Portugal, because that country had been a member of NATO from the outset. But since the end of António Salazar's dictatorship and most recently under Marcello Caetano, the Portuguese revolution had drifted far into communism domestically. Some of the military personnel who appeared for Portugal in the governing bodies of the alliance and of NATO expressed astoundingly naive views, some of them vulgarizations of Marxism. This was true as well and especially for Vasco Dos Santos Gonçalves, the head

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of government, and Costa Gomes, the head of state. I could therefore
easily understand why Ford and Kissinger were turning a cold shoulder
to the Lisbon regime. But even in the case of Portugal we still hoped
for a turn to democracy, even though we could not overlook the East
bloc attempts to underpin the communist element in the government,
which was strong to begin with. Portugal too has since become a
member of the European Community, after the dilettantish, semicom-
munist regime was abolished in 1976 by President Mario Soares.
Granted, changes in Portugal's domestic policies have not so far made
as firm an impression as Spain's.

In both cases Bonn gambled on positive changes and tried to contrib-
ute to that end, while Washington was skeptical. But influenced by
Europe, Ford and Kissinger in fact chose not to draw the consequences
that seemed to them obvious. Until then, events on the Iberian penin-
sula had confirmed the European assessment of the situation. For simi-
lar reasons it later seemed to me correct to oppose the forces in Europe
that seemed to want to escort Turkey out of NATO when Turkey
returned to a military regime. I was just as determined when I countered
the American wish to force Andreas Papandreou's Greece out of NATO
in view of measures he took that appeared destructive and provocative.

Of course the problems of the Iberian peninsula were not the most
important topics of discussion between the Ford administration and the
West German government. I focus on them here only because—with
one exception, to which I will return—there was no serious difference
of opinion between Washington and Bonn. Much more important in
our consultations were questions related to SALT I and MBFR, and
then of course the 1975 Helsinki Accord; the structural crisis in the
world economy, especially oil and energy questions; the currency prob-
lem; and the Middle East and China—and finally, the purely bilateral
topic of the German military payments to the United States, which I
wanted to end once and for all.

As far as MBFR was concerned, Ford wanted to see rapid progress
that he could show off at home. He hoped that before the actual
presidential election campaign began, he would be able to withdraw
some of the American troops from Europe in the train of a reduction
agreement; he would be able to present this withdrawal as a success to
the Congress in Washington. He had the impression that both the
Soviets and the West were playing too many tactical and arithmetical
tricks during the negotiations.

Ford wanted to move the matter forward, and this wish coincided
with my views. As early as the late 1950s and then again ten years later

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as defense minister, I had advocated the establishment of a troop balance in Europe; I had expended a considerable sum of spoken and written words on this effort—without results. I therefore found Ford's attitude all the more gratifying. But the two of us did not have enough influence to propel the sluggish and pedantic MBFR negotiations in Vienna forward.

Nor did our opinions on SALT II differ. In November 1974 Ford and Kissinger had met with Brezhnev and Gromyko in Vladivostok. Obviously they had come very close to complete agreement on SALT II. Two obstacles remained, however. One had to do with internal American politics—the upcoming election in 1976, since what could have been achieved would presumably be attacked by both sides: both by certain Democrats, who would have found the agreement not far-reaching enough and by the right-wing Republicans, headed by California Governor Ronald Reagan, who would have denounced the agreement as harmful to the United States—these were the same people who, for ideological reasons, were suspicious of Kissinger's policy of balance and therefore were condemning it. Ford therefore wanted to wait to conclude SALT II until after the presidential primaries in the summer, and possibly until after the presidential election in November. So he took his time.

On the other hand, he also needed time to overcome the other obstacles: the Backfire bomber, on which the Soviets had just begun production, and the intermediate-range SS-20 missiles. In a private conversation in May 1975 Ford and I spoke very candidly about these new difficulties.

I could certainly understand why Ford was concerned with these domestic considerations, and his calculations did not annoy me. I counted on the probability of his reelection, and I never doubted that during his second term he would bring about the SALT II agreement, which was very important to Germany. As far as the Backfire bomber and, even more, the SS-20 missiles were concerned, Germany, of course, had an urgent interest in including them in the bilateral balance at which SALT II aimed. Since the Cuban missile crisis, the superiority of Soviet nuclear intermediate-range missiles in Europe had seemed to me to pose a danger, and while I was defense minister I had discussed the subject repeatedly with Melvin Laird. I was therefore glad that Gerald Ford not only understood this concern but also shared it. He specifically promised that the SS-20s and Backfires would be included in SALT II. At the time we did not put our understanding on the record. Given our personal confidential relationship, there seemed no

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necessity to write it down—and besides, we were not at all eager to rouse any sleeping dogs.

In May 1975 the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had not been entirely planned. In fact, it occurred in late July. There were no differences worth mentioning between Washington and Bonn concerning the contents of what was to become the Final Act and the section that dealt with the declaration of principle concerning the preservation of human rights in Europe, as well as the other political questions to be discussed in Helsinki.

President Ford's two-day state visit to Bonn at the end of July 1975—that is, just before the Helsinki Conference—therefore turned into a brilliant success for both sides. Ford's statements on Berlin and the overall defense of Europe, which he made in a small Hessian town before troops of both nations, allowed no doubt whatever of America's constancy. What we said jointly about Helsinki and the CSCE Final Act proved to everyone that in Germany the opposition of the CDU-CSU was totally isolated when it rejected the Helsinki Final Act as inadequate. But even leaving this aspect aside, we made great strides forward.

Like almost every eminent guest of state, Ford stayed at Gymnich Castle near the federal capital. The official talks were held in the Schaumburg Palace in Bonn, which had served as Konrad Adenauer's residence while he was chancellor (the move to the new chancellery had not taken place until three years later). On the wall of my office was a good and impressively lifelike portrait of August Bebel, painted in the last year of his life, that had been a gift to me from Alfred Nau. A conversation about the great Social Democratic leader, the history of the German labor movement, and the growth of the German Social Democratic party revealed, to my surprise, that the United States secretary of state was extremely knowledgeable; the American president, for his part, had a detailed idea of Bebel's great opponent, Bismarck. In the case of Kissinger, who was among the intellectual elite of the East Coast, and who in addition had been born in Germany, a knowledge of German history might have been assumed. But it seemed to me unusual in someone like Jerry Ford. I did not find a comparable familiarity with the history of my country in either of his successors.

Over dinner the conversation turned to German expressionist painting, and particularly to Emil Nolde. Hitler had ostracized almost all expressionists, had removed their paintings from the museums, and had had them destroyed or dumped them at auctions abroad. Several expressionists had not been allowed to exhibit, while others were forbidden to paint altogether. Influenced by the art classes in the Lichtwark school

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in Hamburg, I had been a fan of German expressionism since I was a boy, and my enthusiasm had grown over the years. In 1937, when I was eighteen, the exhibition "Degenerate Art" organized by Hitler convinced me completely of the degeneracy of National Socialism. As chancellor I used every opportunity to help the expressionists to find their well-deserved breakthrough into the awareness of both Germans and foreigners; compared to the French *faures*, they still played only a subordinate role in the world. That was also the reason I had furnished the new chancellery with expressionist works of art, which always caused comments from foreign visitors.

This was true of Ford and *Kissinger* as well. We talked about Nolde's undervaluation in the American art market. *Kissinger* suggested a group exhibit in the United States to give the American public its first thorough overview of German expressionism. Such an exhibition was in fact mounted at the Guggenheim Museum in 1981; by now, as the guest book shows, many Americans have also made the pilgrimage to the Nolde Foundation in Seebüll, a few kilometers south of the German-Danish border.

President Walter Scheel invited Ford and Kissinger for a boat trip on the Rhine, together with prominent European guests and a large contingent of American journalists. It was a beautiful summer night. Thousands of people crowded the landing stages, and the wine queen of Linz offered the Fords a goblet of good wine. Later there was the dark outline of the Siebengebirge, hundreds of lights on the Rhine, talk about all sorts of things, including Adenauer ("Over there, in the dark, is Rhöndorf; that's where he had his house. That is why Bonn was made the capital"). Betty Ford had just undergone an operation for cancer and still felt weak; she really needed rest. But out in public she played her part magnificently, and everywhere people applauded her with all their hearts.

Our guests seemed happy: Everything taken together resembled the image of Germany the German immigrants had brought with them to America in the late nineteenth century. It was a picture of Germany our guests had preserved—in spite of Hitler and Auschwitz. Of course the Hofbräuhaus, the Nibelungs, sauerkraut, and "old Heidelberg" would have fit the picture just as easily. And a year later, on the occasion of the Bicentennial of the United States, when I invited Jerry Ford to a reception on board our training ship *Gorch Fock*, the sailing vessel dressed overall with flying pennants also fit the romantic image of Germany held by many Americans.

Nevertheless, neither Ford nor Kissinger was so naive as to think that

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the obvious liking of their German hosts or the tipsy Rhine journey was a full characterization of the German Federal Republic, its problems, its fears, and its hopes. Both were realists: the president as a result of the experiences of a long political career as a congressman, during which he had had to campaign to get reelected every two years—when he had had to take other people’s concerns seriously. And the *American secretary of state*, only yesterday a Harvard professor, who knew more about modern German history than many German participants on the midnight cruise.

Both realized that the permanent division of the German nation must present a grave problem to all Germans; they knew that the division had caused not only visible wounds but also internal ones. And they recognized our hopes for healing. In these matters Ford was neither callous—he did not say, “You Germans will just have to accept the situation”—nor did he arouse illusionary expectations. After this trip *Time* magazine wrote, “No country in Europe is more pleased with Ford than West Germany. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt . . . found Ford well briefed, informed, serious. . . . What [the West Germans] treasure more than anything, however, is the sense of stability and calm they perceive in the Ford administration.” This assessment was correct on every count.

Only a few days after Ford's visit to Germany we met again in Helsinki. Two things stood out during the days in Finland: the matter-of-factness with which the United States appeared as a European power and was accepted as such, and Gerald Ford's reserve and natural dignity. Even more important was the relative ease with which Gerald Ford, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Harold Wilson, and I arrived at arrangements for an international economic conference of the heads of government of the major industrial democracies. The idea had originally come up in a conversation between Giscard and myself. We had been thinking about a kind of continuation of the old Library Group on a higher level. But at first Washington had hesitated; its relationship with Paris had been marked by caution, at times even traces of mistrust, since the de Gaulie era. In Bonn, Ford and I worked out a joint concept, and in the meantime a good personal relationship between Ford and Giscard had also developed. On a bright summer afternoon, sitting around a garden table in Helsinki, therefore, we made plans for the first summit; so as to keep it from falling into the hands of the bureaucrats, we agreed to have all preparations made by people we would personally charge with the task. We also quickly agreed on the necessity of Japan's participation; I especially welcomed this move because it would keep Germany

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the Forces Agreement and the supplementary agreement thereto,
are the responsibility of the stationing power.

The stationing of an additional American brigade in Schwanewede
near Bremen thus furnished the occasion for a one-time final payment;
since it was small, it did not affect the economy, and it allowed the
Americans to save face. The plan to shift this brigade from the United
States to northern Germany was primarily attributable to the two defen-
sense ministers, Georg Leber and James Schlesinger. Clearly in this
case Schlesinger did not enjoy Ford's approval from the outset, and the
president must have felt somewhat pressured. In fact, I repeatedly
thought I sensed that Ford was displeased with Schlesinger; in Novem-
ber 1975 he replaced him with Donald Rumsfeld.

Ford and his advisers—Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld, and Brent Scowcroft (who had succeeded Kissinger as national security adviser in November 1975, allowing the latter to concentrate entirely on the State Department)—had proved to be open-minded partners in ending the currency offset. Precisely because they did not boast of America's leadership role, it was easy for us to acknowledge the extensive leadership the United States in fact exerted. Concerning all essential questions of world politics—whether China or the Middle East, the overall Western strategy toward the Soviet Union or the position each of us should take in the international economic structural crisis—we either agreed in the first place or at least were able to work out a sufficient consensus. This was true of the relationship of Washington and the governments of the European partner states in general; it was especially true of German-American relations.

One difference of opinion occurred in November 1975 because of
New York City's financial crisis. This American metropolis, a center of
private financial trading and the world's stock markets, is also a con-
glomerate of industry, trade, business, and services and a cultural center
of American civilization—and it is frequently on the edge of being
ungovernable. Extreme wealth and widespread poverty, even flagrant
misery, live cheek by jowl in the city. Whenever I looked at New York's
problems, the concerns of European mayors seemed to me compara-
tively slight.

I admired all the men, from Fiorello La Guardia to Edward Koch,
who managed to administer such a city halfway decently and success-
fully. By comparison, the administration of Hamburg, my hometown,
is a piece of cake. The economic crisis that manifested itself in increasing
unemployment beginning in 1974 brought considerable financial dif-

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ficulties to almost all the great cities of the world; everywhere expenditures for social welfare grew rapidly, while tax revenues did not. But New York City found itself in an unusually severe budget crisis.

I could only speculate how far New York had previously lived beyond its means. But in the summer and autumn of 1975 rumors made the rounds concerning its supposedly imminent inability to pay its bills, and I was disquieted by the open controversy about the necessity of financial aid from the federal government, which was allegedly refused. New York's financial collapse could easily become a model for other cities that found themselves deep in debt—and not only American cities. A collapse of the interest rate of municipal bond issues could spill over onto Europe and other parts of the world, especially as it would originate in one of the world's financial centers; after all, almost every metropolis everywhere had been living beyond its means.

The city, its political representatives, the governor of the state of New York, and the Democratic opposition in Congress put the Republican president under pressure, especially because New York State was also affected. Ford too feared a precedent, though with different implications—that is, a number of other cities might come forward to raise claims of their own if New York were to be given federal help. He therefore made it a condition that the city, ignoring the countless pressure groups, must first of all impose budget cuts and thus create the conditions for permanent financial recovery. This suggestion corresponded in principle to my own way of thinking. Nevertheless, I was convinced that the city must not be allowed to fall into a situation where it was unable to pay its bills.

In early October 1975, on my way to Washington, I was asked at a press conference in New York what I thought. I made the mistake of responding to the questions. The New York media interpreted my answers as critical of the president's position. Two days later, when I met with Gerald Ford, my conscience troubled me; whatever I had said on the subject, I should not have allowed myself to be drawn into a public discussion of my host country's domestic problems in the first place. With a short reply the president courteously passed over the matter but carefully listened to my view of the matter. A few days later he arrived at an agreement with New York City.

When Ford won the primary contests over Ronald Reagan by a hairs breadth, I was glad; I did not know Reagan, and I valued Ford highly. In November 1976, when he lost the election to Jimmy Carter, who to me was another unknown quantity, I was concerned. Ford and I had worked very closely together, as had our foreign ministers,

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Genscher and Kissinger. Our collaboration had gone far beyond the area of the alliance and the overall strategy toward Moscow. We held the same views on the future role of the People's Republic of China, on the important role of Anwar Sadat and on the Middle East in general, on the role of OPEC, on the situation of the developing nations and the possibilities of providing them with the help they needed, on the economic crisis—and we had helped each other in all these areas. I was deeply grateful to the departing president of the world power that was the United States. In a long letter of farewell of November 23, 1976, I wrote:

> Among all other things you restored the integrity of the presidency and the White House and thereby trust and confidence of hundreds of millions of people—Americans and foreigners—to the United States. . . . I feel that no other German chancellor ever felt so free, on such friendly terms and so reliably rooted in a sense of friendship with an American president as I have felt with you during your presidency. . . . When I myself and the coalition parties supporting my Government in the Federal Republic of Germany won the federal elections in October by the skin of our teeth, we probably just had that bit more luck than you. Quite certainly, one of the causes for our success in the elections was that German voters were conscious of the excellent relations existing between the United States and my country, for which you deserve much of the credit.

> I am sure I have not always been an easy partner for you—but how could it have been otherwise when every head of government has to represent and protect what he believes to be the interests of his own country. This indeed makes mutual confidence all the more precious. . . .

Of course, my wife and I also thanked Betty Ford, whom we had come to value greatly. In my letter to the president I expressly mentioned the great help given us by Henry Kissinger and Ford's secretary of the Treasury, William Simon. In closing I stressed the role played by our superb personal relationship.

Gerald Ford thanked me warmly for my letter, and we promised each other that we would continue to cultivate our personal friendship. In fact, to my great satisfaction and enrichment, this close friendship has continued to this day.

My farewell letter to Kissinger and his reply were of a similar nature. When Kissinger handed his office over to his successor, Cyrus Vance,

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we had known each other for almost two decades. I had first met Henry Kissinger in the mid-1950s, when he had won international recognition with an intelligent book about nuclear warfare. I had not been at all in agreement with the thesis of the book, but I owed many interesting ideas to it. In 1960, when in a book of my own I set out to develop alternative ideas by summarizing the British and American literature on military strategy, which was as yet almost unknown in the Federal Republic of Germany, and comparing them to the position dictated by West German interests, Kissinger helped me in various ways. The same was true in later years, when he had long since become security adviser and later secretary of state. I believe that now and then I was of some help to him as well.

Conceptually as well as operationally Kissinger always saw the overall strategy of his nation as a unified whole. His basic moral values were typically American, but he was much too rational to use America's power as a policeman for moral uplift, as many Americans tend to do when it comes to international policies. Kissinger was a strategist of the West-East balance—advocating neither the striving for superiority that was later so noisily propagated by the right wing of the Republican Party under Reagan nor yielding to the Soviet expansionist drive or Soviet armament ambition, as he was sometimes accused of doing. While he was chancellor, Willy Brandt had had occasional problems with Kissinger, who in the early stages mistrusted the motives behind the German Ostpolitik. I, too, had my differences of opinion with him now and then, but far more often I agreed with him. At that time, most of all, there was an extraordinary degree of mutual trust. To this day, more than a decade later, nothing has changed.

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Jimmy Carter did, and presumably the inspiration for this and similar concoctions came from his staff.

In any case, I received an astonishing letter from Carter, dated June 12, which Washington immediately leaked to the press. In the first sentence the president referred to "conflicting press reports." Some of them "incorrectly have claimed that you have proposed an East-West freeze on TNF deployments, and others imply that you called on the Soviets to cease further TNF deployments for a fixed period of time. In view of your upcoming trip to Moscow, I thought it would be appropriate if I took the immediate opportunity to state once more our views on this matter." Carter explained that the United States would not agree to any proposal that provided any freeze, moratorium, or renunciation of further deployment of new or additional intermediate-range missiles, not even for a limited time. He knew, the American president went on, that I continued to support the TNF resolution emphatically. He himself supported an immediate and unconditional start to exploring limits on intermediate-range missiles; he would urge the Soviets to halt the deployment of their SS-20s; but he would not accept a freeze until 1983, even if this were binding on the Soviet Union alone; the United States would continue its swift deployment of intermediate-range missiles. In view of the fact that the texts of my speeches had been officially transmitted to the White House, the letter seemed odd, since it was based entirely on news reports. The real source of Carter's anger was my impending meeting with Brezhnev.

The release of the letter to the Washington press was pure spite. To all appearances someone was eager to vent his spleen—someone who had never been able to decide whether the Germans or the Russians were the archenemy of the Polish people, from whom he was deracified. For me the crucial point of the letter was the one-sided emphasis it placed on the deployment of Western intermediate-range missiles; by contrast the letter lacked all mention of the arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union decided on by the alliance, of which, under the TNF resolution, there were still three and a half years left. Until this time the Soviets had refused such negotiations; now it seemed to my colleagues and myself that at heart Brzezinski was happy with the situation and that Carter cared only about showing the American public that he was being firm in dealing with Moscow but that he really had no interest in the success of my mission to Moscow.

Four days later I answered Carter's letter tersely and without addressing the substance in detail. I suggested we talk in Venice, and this talk took place five days later, on June 21. Before our encounter an interview

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with Henry Kissinger appeared in the *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, in which he said about me, “I have great confidence in Schmidt as a man and as a political leader.” I admit that reading this made me all the happier because at the same time Dr. Kohl and Dr. Zimmermann, the leaders of the opposition, were unconditionally taking Carter's side in the Bundestag.

For the American president the atmosphere of the impending meeting of the seven grew worse because in the meantime he had called the June 13 Mideast resolution of the nine heads of government of the European Community—which had coincidentally been concluded in Venice—a “blow against Camp David.” On the other hand, Cyrus Vance, once again a private citizen, speaking at Harvard warned his fellow citizens against the belief that they and only they could direct the world in its course. He added, “We Americans cannot allow ourselves to become prisoners of our emotions.”

The city of Venice showed off its full splendor under gleaming skies. All international conferences are held on the island of San Giorgio Maggiore. The former Benedictine monastery, which is more like a palazzo, has been renovated into a conference center. Even the motorboat approaching diagonally through the Grand Canal offers a breathtaking view of the monastery chapel; on the ride back the main island, with the Doges' Palace and the campanile of San Marco, as well as the facades of the palazzi along the shore, dominate the view. It would take a heart of stone not to be overwhelmed anew each time at the beauty of this wonder of the world. This time, too, as I was on my way to my discussion with Jimmy Carter, my spirits soared.

I felt wonderful politically as well. I knew that the other European leaders, Giscard foremost among them, would support me. But most especially I had understood that for domestic reasons Carter was at present much more dependent on my good behavior than I was on his. For his prestige at home and in the world had suffered; mine had not. I was not interested in challenging Carter; rather, I wanted to settle our dispute. I wanted to have free rein for my trip to Moscow, and I wanted to be sure for the rest of 1980 that the White House would not continue to hamper me unfairly. I wanted to maintain the logic and reliability of my line. What was most important to me was insisting on American-Soviet negotiations to limit the Eurostrategic intermediate-range missiles. With this idea in mind I set out one beautiful afternoon, accompanied by Foreign Minister Genscher and my foreign policy adviser, Ambassador Berndt von Staden, to visit the American president,

220

Domestic Reasons for
the United States' Lack
of International
Continuity

WHEN President Carter took office, he made it clear to America's allies, who had loyally cooperated with the Ford administration, that much of what they had supported in international affairs had unfortunately been a mistake; he would begin an entirely new policy in many areas and expected our cooperation. When President Reagan followed him into office four years later, this drama was repeated in reverse. According to traditional European concepts, the international policy of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era might have been called a centrist policy; Carter initiated a 90-degree turn to the left, and Reagan continued with a 180-degree turn to the right.

Both changes had multiple causes, but they were rooted almost entirely in American domestic affairs, in their structures and structural changes, in the partisan power struggle, in the attitudes and trends among the citizenry and the political class. Of course the mind sets and prejudices of the two new presidents, both of whom arrived in Washington with little experience in foreign affairs, played an important role. Both brought with them to the White House their own people (among them very few women), who had stood by them during their time as governor and subsequently during their years of running for office. These aides and advisers always had a great deal of experience in domes-

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responsibly on the international level. It was precisely for this reason that they could preserve the continuity of United States foreign policy through changing administrations—at least until the domestic split during the Vietnam War.

A German politician who came to New York and was invited to meet with the council felt this to be a great honor; furthermore, he found it a good opportunity quickly and fairly effortlessly to take his bearings concerning the American government's position on the situation in the Mideast, its relations with the Soviet Union or Berlin, what its intentions were or what its intentions were likely to be in the near future.

Of course within this establishment various currents, even controversies, were evident. But here the visitor was dealing with people who really knew the countries and problems they talked about; they had sufficient money, time, and opportunity for travel; they spoke or understood at least one foreign language. They were at home in the world, and it was profitable to talk with them. Robert Roosa, George Ball, and later Peter Peterson and Felix Rohatyn are council members I hold in fond memory.

The foreign policy elite, which had very silent but effective ways of seeing to its own succession, was thus largely a matter of the East Coast. Of course some of the top people from Harvard and MIT in Cambridge were among them, as were some from the Ivy League universities of Yale, Princeton, and Columbia. From the 1960s I recall with pleasure Professors Robert Bowie, William Kaufman, Klaus Knorr, Marshall Shulman, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and many others. Of course this clublike, loose mesh of people also included some outstanding business leaders who were both talented and unassuming but had no direct social ties; among them were the successive heads of the AFL-CIO, George Meany and Lane Kirkland.

Any European in the 1950s and 1960s who needed information on the United States' current thinking on foreign affairs needed only a few days and a couple of conversations with members of this group. It was not necessary to travel to the United States every year if now and again he would attend some of the private international conferences; I gratefully recall the yearly so-called Bilderberg Conferences that Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands organized and ran, and the yearly meetings of the London Institute for Strategic Studies under the leadership of Alistair Buchan. Some of the United States senators active in foreign affairs—such as Jacob Javits, Charles Mathias, Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson, and Charles (“Chuck”) Percy—always participated in these two- to three-day international conferences. Conversations with Dean Ache-

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[LC]

John McCloy advised me that I should be firm in countering the anti-American and neutralist statements of some politicians, which had lately been heard in Germany; at the same time he reaffirmed his long and unshakable ties to Germany. Henry Kissinger went furthest in agreeing with the Reagan administration. He warned against underestimating American isolationism, which might join forces with American anticommunism in case of serious disappointment with Europe. He left open the question of whether economic measures against Poland would be effective, and he pretended that he lacked the expertise to answer the question. Gerald Ford replied that there were only two effective instruments of economic pressure: a grain embargo on the Soviet Union and a credit embargo on Poland. Both of these could be effective only if all the Western nations were truly united in participating, but the American administration itself was not even considering these measures. George Shultz agreed that these measures would, in fact, be effective only if the West took part in them as a unit, but such unity, he said, was a long way from reality. Lane Kirkland thought that compared with the public utterances, the measures taken by the Reagan administration were too weak. Senator Joseph Biden criticized the lack of sufficient consultation with the Europeans; the American sanctions had taken them by surprise, and, he claimed, the Senate had been misled when told that the Europeans had been consulted (which was probably true).

I myself could keep it brief that night. I pointed out that my speech to the Bundestag of December 18, the January 4, 1982, resolution of the European Community foreign ministers, and the joint statement President Reagan and I had released to the press shortly before this dinner had all said the same thing.

The detailed official communiqué was published the following day, January 6. With some satisfaction I pointed to our consistency and regretted the misleading reports in the American media. Consistency in foreign policy toward the Soviet Union was a precondition of the reliability of this policy; it was necessary, I said, if we wanted to be understood in Moscow. None of those present disagreed.

On the whole, that night I was conscious of a friendly affection. The fact that Betty Ford and Obie Shultz had come from the West and that Nancy Kissinger, the almost ninety-year-old John McCloy, and David Rockefeller from New York, as well as my old friends Melvin and Barbara Laird, Lane Kirkland and his wife, and Paul Nitze (at the time chief INF negotiator in Geneva) were there I understood to be gestures of great devotion. I was happy that not only my wife was included in these friendships but also my daughter Susanne, who for professional

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erative economic leadership were fruitless. Viewed in hindsight and in connection with the collapse of the general strategy of the West after 1976, this negative outcome was just about inevitable. Henry Kissinger, who had long since returned to private life, was the only one of the statesmanlike thinkers in the United States who recognized the necessity of economic leadership of the Western world. Had George Shultz been named not secretary of state but United States "economic czar" in 1982, this efficient, rich, and powerful country might have been in a position to continue its great tradition of world economic leadership, which had begun with the ideas of IMF, the World Bank, the Marshall Plan, and the trade-political GATT "Kennedy round."

But Carter and Reagan acted without much concern for their economic partners, keeping an eye only on what they assumed to be America's economic interests. Their temporary economic successes blinded them to the fact that the huge aggregate of the American economy and the overriding dollar currency were having powerful effects on the world economy. They were conscious of their claim to supremacy, but they recognized the responsibility that followed from it only in their own short-term self-interest and only from case to case.

The United States has not yet understood that a purely national economic strategy is an anachronism in today's interdependent world economy. Just as in the areas of foreign policy and security strategy the United States cannot prevail in any corner of the world and certainly not against the Soviet Union without the cooperation of its partners, it must also cooperate with its partners for its own economic welfare.

Unfortunately at present the overall American strategy is being limited more and more to military armament and deployment. If Washington were to take its bearings from the fact that the seven participating states of the annual world economic summit taken together produce far more than half the total gross national product of the world, an overall strategy could be developed that would also include a joint economic policy for the common good and in order to ensure mutual trust between the industrial democracies, as well as for economic development help and in order to clean up squalid areas in the Third World that might otherwise fall under the grip of communist ideology and Soviet influence.

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cially as he controlled an immeasurably greater military potential than his predecessor.

When Deng finished, I replied that neither he nor Mao had to make us aware of such misgivings about the Soviet Union; Germans had not forgotten that it was the Soviet Union that had divided our country. Nevertheless, we were not afraid of an attack; NATO was standing in readiness to defend Europe, and its capability was impressive. After all, the Soviet Union knew what Mao had stated only yesterday: In the end it was seldom the aggressor who came away victorious, usually it was the defender.

We were unable to persuade each other of our assessments of the Soviet expansionistic drive, and neither of us tried very hard. Deng said the Chinese did not believe in maintaining an arms balance for one, two, or three decades. Through the nuclear test ban treaty in 1963, SALT in 1972, and Vladivostok in 1974 (Ford's meeting with Brezhnev to make detailed preparations for SALT II) Moscow had erased the United States' advantage; in some areas the Soviet Union was already superior. Only a few days earlier, Deng and Mao had said the same thing to Henry Kissinger, at that time secretary of state in the Ford administration. The arms race would continue, and there would not be balance. As Mao had emphatically said the previous day, whether war broke out in ten years or in thirty, the Soviet Union would always be the cause of the war.

Deng never deviated from Mao's line. What was interesting, however, was a passage on the kind of warfare to be expected. A war with conventional weapons, he said, was much more probable than the exchange of nuclear blows. This was the outcome, on the one hand, of the two superpowers' nuclear stalemate but more especially of the aims of the coming war: occupation of territory, dominion over peoples, and acquisition of raw materials. None of these could be reconciled with nuclear destruction. West Germany's conventional forces were therefore especially important.

In Deng's view of the situation the Soviet Pacific fleet apparently played a major part. He pointed out that it was already three times the strength of the United States Seventh Fleet. On the other hand, the political situation in Asia had developed along lines favorable to the United States since that nation had abandoned Vietnam. Japan, however, was still subject to Soviet pressure.

Deng talked in great detail about the Soviet threat to China. He had no fear of a direct Soviet attack on China, since the Soviets could occupy at most the large cities, not the entire huge country. No Russian

[LC]

301

MEN AND POWERS

would make Hitler's mistake. Instead, Moscow was trying to achieve political control over China. As early as 1958 the Kremlin had wanted to bring China's coastline under its control with the proposal of a joint Soviet-Chinese fleet; such a shared enterprise would also have meant that Soviet bases would be established on Chinese soil. Since that time relations between Moscow and Beijing had grown very much worse, partly because of the ideological confrontations that had broken out.

In any attempt to imagine theoretically possible operational objectives for the Soviet Union, the first one that came to mind was Manchuria, followed by northeast China, eventually Beijing itself, perhaps even the entire territory to the Yangtse River. The Soviet fighting forces along the border could be employed not only against China, of course, but also against Japan and other East Asian nations. Were they not also a threat to the American bases in East and Southeast Asia? And the Russian missiles were threatening the United States itself.

Without growing excited, quite without polemic, speaking matter-of-factly, Deng noted, "But China is not afraid of the Soviet Union. Our country is prepared. And after all, a million Soviet soldiers along a seven-thousand-kilometer border are not very many; to make an attack on China, the Soviet Union would have to bring at least two million more from the western part of the nation. Such a war would certainly last twenty years or more. We are not afraid."

When I asked him whether he thought a Soviet nuclear attack on China was likely, Deng answered very calmly, "That would not change anything important. China would survive even that."

As my visit continued, however, I could feel that many Chinese were seriously concerned about the possibility of nuclear war.

Toward the end of our talk Deng came back to the subject of the United States. He spoke once more about the excessive extent of its protection obligations. Then he addressed Washington's relations with Europe. Were we really sure, he wanted to know, that the United States would actually defend Europe? Even when it was a matter of "only" Yugoslavia or Scandinavia? It was, after all, conceivable that the Americans would behave as the British had done in 1940 at Dunkirk and leave their allies to their own devices.

Deng told me he had said the same thing to Kissinger; the secretary of state had replied that the United States' behavior would essentially depend on the Europeans' actions. Apparently that remark had made sense to Deng. There would have to be a stable partnership between Europe and the United States, he went on; that was why China had no objection to the presence of American fighting forces in Europe. But

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China had some doubts about America's "policy of appeasement"; the example of the Helsinki Conference was very troubling. In any case, Western Europe would have to be prepared to defend itself if need be. And that was why Europe must unify politically.

I was relatively cool in my reply; I said that the unification of Europe was something Bonn had demanded and promoted at a time when Beijing, along with Moscow, had still strongly opposed it. But as far as a European defense capability was concerned, we Germans were making a military contribution to it that was highly valued, and not only by our friends. I added that because of its decades of experience with the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership probably understood Moscow better than I did; but it was also important for them to know more about Europe, and therefore I would like to invite him to pay us a visit. However, I continued, Beijing should also cultivate closer contact with the United States. Gerald Ford and **Henry Kissinger** were strong and dependable men, and they could take criticism well.

Suddenly, almost without preamble and very tersely, Deng said, "We support the reunification of Germany." China, he went on, viewed the division of Germany from the point of view of the experiences of the divided countries in its own hemisphere; the desire for the reunification of Germany went along with the desire for the reunification of Vietnam, of Korea, and of China with Taiwan. All these problems of reunification could not be solved in five or ten years, but perhaps they would require less than a century. This perspective seemed realistic to me, and of course I liked Deng's initial sentence. I thanked him cordially for his unequivocal words.

Deng's remarks on the world economic situation were both extremely ideological and strikingly vague. In general he limited himself to the rhetorical reasons for the necessity of a "new world economic order" that was on the agenda of all the developing nations at the time. In the economic area Deng was merely a listener; what he had to say did not go beyond broad slogans. Even a decade later, when China became committed to domestic economic reform and to opening up to the international economy, his knowledge of economic conditions was obviously still very general, in no way comparable to his acuity on strategic questions.

Counting all the banquets, during which we could also talk at length, Deng and I exchanged views in a very personal way for eight or ten hours. I gained the impression that he, too, found this time very well spent.

To summarize my impressions of that visit, it seems to me that Mao's

TRANSLATION - jw

March 16, 1990

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I have just spoken with Dr. Mark Wössner with whom you shared a flight to New York. He mentioned you talked about Spiegel's position on the discussion regarding German reunification and about Rudolf Augstein's comments. Dr. Wössner undoubtedly pointed out that Augstein supported German reunification very early on and very consistently. Owing to your many international commitments, perhaps you did not follow the entire commentary. I am therefore at Dr. Wössner's request sending you a record of the overall comments. Issues from July 3rd, July 17th and September 18th, 1989 are particularly indicative of Spiegel's course.

I hope you enjoy your reading.

FOUR STAR BOND
SOUTHWORTH CO. U. S. A.
25% COTTON FIBER

TRANSLATION - jw

20 August 1990

Dear Prof. Kissinger:

What you published in the August 19th WELT AM SONNTAG could not have been better formulated. Yet I'm afraid it's almost too late. Through the deployment of the Americans, English, Germans, etc. to important strategic points, a new situation would be created which the US Administration obviously didn't take into account. To the Arabs, we are the unbelievers--that is, if need be, these men can be sacrificed without a second thought. Hitler thought the same way. He had no religious affiliation. President Bush faces difficult but avoidable decisions for us should he not want to risk his international image.

My wife and I wish to leave Germany in the next two weeks and stay in Vancouver for awhile. Perhaps there will be an opportunity to meet you there sometime.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 27, 1990

Any recollection of my years in Washington is the more deeply enriched as time passes by the association I had during that period with Felix Schnyder. It is fitting on this occasion of his 80th Birthday that my brother, Walter, should be here to convey my felicitations to this great gentleman and scholar. In his years in office as the Swiss Ambassador to the United States, Felix represented his country with a grace, elegance and intellect that won highest regard from all who knew him.

It was surely my privilege to be among them. Most importantly, I appreciated in Felix his capacity for true friendship, which I witnessed first-hand in his close personal acquaintances with Walter Stoessel and my own brother, Walter, whom Felix assisted through a particularly difficult time of his life.

Is it not therefore the finest testament to that friendship that he should be surrounded by so many who have known and loved him through eight decades.

Happy Birthday, Felix.

To be read to Mr. Felix Schnyder
On the Occasion of his Birthday

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

TRANSLATION - jw

22 December 1989

Dear Professor:

For Christmas and the New Year, I send best regards and all
good wishes.

I am taking this opportunity to send you a few more photos
taken during your visit in Stuttgart.

Keeping in mind your words of June 22nd, I am viewing the
change in the East critically and judging it with caution.

Enc

HENRY A. KISSINGER

July 10, 1990

Dear Prince von Schwatzenberg:

On behalf of my wife and myself I want
to thank you very much for extraordinary
courtesies which you showed us during our
visit to Prague. We both remember with
special fondness the marvelous dinner which
you so kindly hosted for us (though I still
object to being fed so much and so well
during my brief visit to Prague!)

I particularly valued the opportunity to
exchange views with you again on the evolving
European security situation and hope that we
can stay in touch on these matters in the
months ahead. Please let me know if your
travels bring you to the United States, so
that we can have an opportunity to repay your
hospitality here. I would be happy to get
you together with some interesting people in
either New York or Washington if your
schedule permits it.

Thank you again for all of your
hospitality.

Prince Karel von Schwatzenberg
Kancelar Presidenta Republiky
Hrad Prague
Czechoslovakia

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
TELEFAX (212) 759-0042

TRANSLATION - jw

8 January 1990

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has kindly agreed to give a lecture covering several aspects of European monetary policy on Thursday, March 1st, 11:00am, at my offices in Karlsruhe.

I'm very honored by his acceptance and pleased to be able to bring together with Mr. Schmidt a group of bankers, university professors and insurers associated with my company.

For this special occasion, I am giving a dinner in honor of Helmut Schmidt for a small group of guests on the night before, Wednesday, February 28th, at 7:30 at my home in Karlsruhe, Märchenring 50. I would be greatly pleased if you could manage to attend this dinner. I know that Helmut Schmidt would be delighted, as well as Christine Esswein.

Should you also be able to attend the lecture the following day, I would be doubly pleased.

Hoping for a positive reply,

NOTE ATTACHED FROM Christine Esswein:

Christine Esswein reinforces the words of Robert Schwebler and would greatly enjoy seeing you again on Märchenring.

[L]

Prof. Dr. ROBERT SCHWEBLER
VORSITZENDER DES VORSTANDES
DER
KARLSRUHER LEBENSVERSICHERUNG AG

7500 KARLSRUHE 1 8. Januar 1990
FRIEDRICH-SCHOLL-PLATZ
RUF (0721) 1392200

The Honorable Professor
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Suite 1021
1800 K.Street, N.W.

USA Washington D.C. 20006

JAN 17 1990

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Kissinger!

Herr Bundeskanzler a. D. Helmut Schmidt hat mir freundlicherweise die Zusage gegeben, am Donnerstag, dem 1. März 1990, in Karlsruhe in den Räumen meiner Gesellschaft einen um 11.00 Uhr beginnenden Vortrag zu halten, der einige Aspekte europäischer Währungspolitik behandeln wird.

Diese Zusage ehrt mich sehr, und ich freue mich, an diesem Tage einen Kreis von Bankiers, Hochschulprofessoren und Versicherern, die meiner Gesellschaft verbunden sind, mit Herrn Schmidt zusammenbringen zu können.

Aus diesem besonderen Anlaß gebe ich zu Ehren von Helmut Schmidt am Vorabend, Mittwoch, dem 28. Februar 1990, in meiner Wohnung in Karlsruhe, Märchenring 50, um 19.30 Uhr ein Abendessen für einen kleinen Kreis von Gästen. Ich würde mich aufrichtig freuen, wenn Sie es einrichten könnten, an der Abendveranstaltung teilzunehmen. Ich weiß, daß Helmut Schmidt diese Freude mit mir teilen würde, das gleiche gilt für Christine Esswein.

Sollten Sie es ermöglichen können, auch die Vortragsveranstaltung am darauffolgenden Tag zu besuchen, wäre das für mich eine doppelte Freude.

Ich hoffe auf eine zusagende Antwort und bin

mit freundlichen Grüßen

Ihr