2/26/64

GOVERNMENT #130

Henry A. Kissinger

Today we will start a series of case histories in International Affairs starting in the 19th century and working up into the contemporary period. The point of which (what have we got here). The point is not to make historians out of you and I must say that, whatever this course has succeeded in doing I am sure that this is always been proved on final examinations. We have not made historians out of you. The point is to try to show some similarities and differences and some of the considerations that had to go into the making of policies at different times in terms of the problems that we face. Today, I will first make some observations about the general problems that have to be met and then begin the discussion of the peace settlements of the early 19th century. Then I will go on from there.

All of policy-making involves as I pointed out before the interaction of the policy-maker and his advice, involves an element purpose and an element of objective condition. No statesman can invent a policy just because it appears . This is a perogative that only the Crimson has. The margin for creativity is in part determined by the conditions which he faces. perform Now there are four essential patterns that any statesman has to understand. The first is that he has to understand what kind of an environment he is in. What kind of society confronts, what the relation of forces is, what the historical tendencies are. In this task which in retrospect may appear as objective as scientific. He faces the dilemma that, as I pointed out in my first lecture, he has to make a about likely developments. No one can tell today what the trend of history will be. Historical conjectures are being against each other. It is easy for us to say that as history evolves states

will become more and more democratic. It is just as easy to say for the
Soviets that as history continues they will become more and more Communistic.
No one can prove today what it means what the likely trend is. No one knows
at any given period what the actual relationship of forces is and the
superior statesmen are those whose
are better than those of their
colleagues in other countries. If policy could be made with the certainty
of mathematics IBM machines could conduct it. If policy were a purely scientific
process then each statesmen will come to the same conclusion. Then you would
have at worse the theoretical confrontations of Chinese strategy and you would
never have actual confrontation. However, our policy is not that objective
and therefore the first requirement is to make an assessment of the relative
relation of forces, the historical trends, and the general conditions which
of survival in a given environment. Second condition that each has to be
met is to devise a means for obtaining whatever is objective has been set.

This requires an answer to two questions: The first question is What knowledge is relevant? Is it historical knowledge? Is it analytical knowledge? Is empirical knowledge? In much of our debates with Europeans today, for example, one of the difficulties is that we are really talking about a different realm of discourse. Our people have great faith in analytical knowledge. We believe that theories once developed are likely to be universally valid and that they are not likely to be psychological obstacles to anything we consider desirable.

The Europeans are more weighted down with historical tradition. In the Fall
for example, there were in *Time* Magazine and in a number of other journals
articles which described a certain set of French maneuvers and with the
sensitivity for which *Time* is noted they ridicule the scenario in which both
armies were advancing on the French quarters, all of France's allies had fallen

apart and France alone confronted the hostile invasion. And *Time Magazine* pointed out that at that point France would have only four divisions to act and 50 atom bombs and that this was not as many as 100 Russian divisions that would be marching on the French border. It was gratefully noted in France heretofore sufficiently studied.

But, the issue the problem that France faces is this. The scenario is in a little ridiculous. On the other hand, it happens to correspond to the French drama of both 1914 and 1940. Both times foreign armies attacked. In 1916 in particular all allies did in fact collapse. Except Great Britain, and Great Britain did not make the only effective fighting force therefore available for the defensive. I think Britain *KING* was right but this was no consultation to France. *KING* To France the trauma of 1940 happens to be more significant than the that is carried out at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica. And to prove to them that only the complicated theories that we have devised which treat a collection of some foreign states as if it were a unit and as if no difference with the nationalistics could arise will never be psychologically meaningful to the Europeans. This doesn't mean they are right. It means that the relevant facts to them are different to us. And any policy that doesn't *KING* answer their particular trauma is not likely to be a very persuasive policy. Again, I am not going to argue now *KING* we will get into that in April. Perception is more correct in the contemporary situation.

I am simply trying to point out that *KING* in devising the means for carrying out these objectives has first of all to find out what knowledge is relevant to it. And there are certain realities that cannot be *KING*.

encountered by computers and that may be all the more powerful perhaps
with a certain irrational element. And secondly, of course, in devising
the means there has to be some relationship not only the psychological
reality but to specifically again anyone who thinks that this is a simple
matter should see the different interpretations that exist. That in each
government in the contemporary <u>...</u> period or in any historical period
about what the most effective policy might be. It isn't the case, either
historically as we will see or
that it simply isn't the case
that there is only one policy that magically commences us to all interested
parties. The third task the statesman has is to get the achievement of
other powers to whatever policy he has devised. And there again there is
a certain incommensurability between a nation's domestic experience
and its international experience. Domestically, the policy once it is
adopted becomes lost. This is <u>...</u> what makes domestic policy. Domestically
a nation <u>...</u> justifies itself by a standard objective. But internationally
what is defined as justice domestically becomes a subject for negotiation.
As a result, one of the striking facts is that in the folklore of any nation
no nation think of themselves as soluable, well-meaning, unsophisticated
being taken in by the sharp authority. It is always the foreigner
who is immoral. And it is always one's own country that is conducting its
policy on a high moral plane. Only you and I know that this applies to only
one country. But there is this problem in finding the support of other countries
and the <u>...</u> for that is diplomacy in which a statesman has to attempt to balance
risks and opportunities in such a way that it seems more attractive to the other
countries to pursue the line that he considers most advantageous than on the
other <u>...</u>.

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negotiations
As I pointed out before I do not believe that international settlements are
conducted from on the basis of pure reason. There is today no purely reasonable
solution of the Kashmir dispute, of the Cyprus issue. The problem almost
invariably is not simply to find a negotiating point; the problem is rather
first to arrange p the pressures, which may include moral pressures, in such
a way that there is a desire for a negotiation formula, and only if such a desire
exists can one then get a settlement. And finally, a statesmen has to get domestic
agreement for this policy and this again involves two aspects.

He has to get the agreement first of his bureaucracy and, under contemporary
conditions, the agreement of his people. If you look at history, on e of the
arguments whenever we get into trouble, one reads in the newspapers
that
that if one recently gets into trouble it is the experts have been sufficiently
listened to. If somebody has, for example, taken foreign policy away from the
State Department, now this maybe true; on the other hand if you look at foreign
policy historically you will find that the real great things in history have
very rarely been done by professional diplomats. Almost all great statesmen have
been opposed by the experts in their foreign office. And the reason for that
is one to which I alluded before. An expert is a man who is at the highest highest
level what is commonly understood. And w one does not become an expert by breaking
new grounds. The great changes in history have occured, have been carried on by
people who have had a vision of the future which was not acceptable to everybody.
The great men, of or the great statesmen in history, have known before their
that
visions became common experience/ The trouble is the experts, or perhaps the
people at large, know only when it is too late to act that by the time events
have overtaken the possibility of effectiveness. Bureaucracy generally operates
by a standard of average performance. They are more conscious of risks than they
are of opportunities. No one has ever been fired from the government department
for not having foreseen a great opportunity for the very simple reason that no one

for not having foreseen a great opportunity for the very simple reason that no one
are of opportunities. No one has ever been fired from the Government department
by a standard of average performance. They are more conscious of risks than they
have overtaken the feasibility of effectiveness. Bureaucracy generally operates
people at large, know only when it is too late to act that by the time events
visions became common experience. The trouble is the experts, or perhaps the
that
The great men, etc. or the great statesmen in history, have known before their
people who have had a vision of the future which was not acceptable to everybody.
new ground. The great changes in history have occurred, have been carried on by
level what is commonly understood. And we do not become an expert by breaking
is one to which I alluded before. An expert is a man who is at the highest
been opposed by the experts in their foreign office. And the reason for that
very rarely been done by professional diplomats. Almost all great statesmen have
policy historically you will find that the real great things in history have
State Department, now this maybe true; on the other hand if you look at foreign
listened to. If somebody has, for example, taken foreign policy away from the
that it one recently gets into trouble it is the experts have been sufficiently
arguments whenever we get into such a trouble, one reads in the newspapers
conditions, the agreement of his people. If you look at history, on e of the
he has to get the agreement first of his bureaucracy and, under contemporary
agreement for this policy and this again involves two aspects.
exists can one then get a settlement. And finally, a statesman has to get domestic
a way that there is a desire for a negotiation formula, and only if such a desire
first to arrange a peace the peace, which may include moral peace, in such
invariably is not simply to find a negotiating point; the problem is rather
solution of the Kashmir dispute, of the Cyprus issue. The problem almost
conducted them on the basis of pure reason. There is today no purely reasonable
As I pointed out before I do not believe that international agreements are
negotiations

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can ever prove that a great opportunity has existed. Many people have been fired for not having foreseen risks. And the tendency of a bureaucracy almost inevitably to predict almost every conceivable horrible thing that might happen if only to protect themselves. On the other hand, we shall see next week, the statesman faces a dilemma. As I have said, bureaucracy is run by a standard of average performance and great things often have to be done against bureaucracies not with bureaucracies. On the other hand, whatever is done, has to be within a framework that can, within a finite time, be assimilated into a standard of average performance. If a policy is conducted in such a way that it requires a great man in every generation, the country that is attempting to do this is embarking on a tour de force beyond its resources. There is no historical record of great men succeeding each other in an unbroken line. In fact, great men have a tendency to blight their successors and to prevent other great men from emerging. So the problem of the statesmen is to be able to break out of the mold that is bureaucracies in a way which in imprisonment but not so far that an orderly procedure becomes totally impossible.

Germany, after Bismarck, was saddled with a legacy which no German chancellor could possibly possibly carry out. France after de Gaulle may face precisely the same dilemma.

The second aspect of contemporary policy, in addition to getting the agreement of the bureaucracy, is the to get agreement of whatever body legitimizes the government which is usually, in the modern period, some sort of popular support. This form of popular support, incidentally, is also true in totalitarian states, though Even the king, by divine right, in the 18th century may made no effort to get the approval of their people because the legitimacy of their rule did not depend on popular support, modern dictators go to enormous lengths through a combination of propaganda and oppression to gain popular support and to some limited extent where

of brogues and oppression to gain popular support, and to some limited extent where
on popular support, modern dictators go to enormous lengths through a combination
the approval of their people because the legitimacy of their rule did not debase
Even the king, by divine right, in the 18th century may made no effort to get
though
This form of popular support, incidentally, is also true in totalitarian states.
Government which is usually, in the modern period, some sort of popular support.
of the bureaucracy, is able to get agreement of whatever body legitimises the

The second aspect of contemporary policy, in addition to getting the agreement
same dilemma.

couldarisefly loosely carry out. France after de Gaulle may face precisely the
germany, after Bismarck, was added with a legacy which no German chancellor
procedure becomes totally impossible.

that is bureaucracies in a way we appropriation but not so far that an orderly
emerging. So the problem of the statesmen is to be able to break out of the mold
a tendency to plight their successors and to prevent other so great men from
of great men succeeding each other in an unbroken line. In fact, great men have
embarking on a tour de force beyond its reasons. There is no historical record
great men in every generation, the country that is attempting to do this is
average performance. If a policy is conducted in such a way that it requires a
a framework that can, within a finite time, be assimilated into a standard of
not with bureaucracies. On the other hand, whatever is done, has to be within
of average performance and great things often have to be done against bureaucracies
the statesman faces a dilemma. As I have said, bureaucracy is run by a standard
if only to protect themselves. On the other hand, we shall see next week,
inevitably to predict almost every conceivable horrible thing that might happen
fired for not having foreseen risks. And the tendency of a bureaucracy almost
can ever prove that a great opportunity has existed. Many people have been

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they cannot structure popular support through propaganda and repression may be even be
responsible. Now the requirement of popular support contrary to what was expected
by the democrat and liberal thinkers of the 18th and 19th century has not necessarily
made for a more peaceful policy. On the contrary, it has led to an oversimplification
of foreign policy issues, it has led to a very great amount of demegacy demagogy
foreign policy because every political leader wants to prove that he has a simple
answer and the total answer which to existing problems. It has limited freedom
of maneuver of the statesmen and not necessarily for the advantage of a peaceful,
and certainly not for the advantage of a long-range, policy. The peace settlement
which was made in 1815 for example on which we will speak this time or next time
could not have been made, for better or for worse, under contemporary conditions.
Now these are the requirements of the statesmen.

Now let me make a few observations about the international system in which
and
he has to p operate, &c.- About the conditions which limite the- his scope and which
affect his policy. Many of them I have talked about before so I will summarize them
rather rapidly.

Among the factors to consider in determining the objective environement
are three: 1) One is what are the units that are in potential conflict. Are they
fudal states, national states, trans national states ? What is the notion of
sovereignty that attaches to any particular to what particular unit does the
notion of soverignty attach? Great upoa upheavals in histtrey history have occured
and-thereon- when there have been changes in the notions of sovereignty. There have
been changes from the city-state to the feudal state to the national state to states
which went beyond the nation.

The Second question that the statesman has to be able to answer is what
the units, however they are defined, are able to do to each other in terms
of technology, strategy etc.

The third question is what the w units want to do one to another? And this

The third question is what the we units want to do one to another? And this
of technology, strategy etc.

The second question that the statesman has to be able to answer is what
which went beyond the nation.

been changes from the city-state to the feudal state to the national state to states
and-thereby- when there have been changes in the notions of sovereignty. There have
notion of sovereignty attach? Great whee upheavals in Feudal history have occured
sovereignty that attaches to any particular to what particular unit does the
fiefal states, national states, trans national states? What is the notion of
are three: 1) One is what are the units that are in potential conflict. Are they
Among the factors to consider in determining the objective environment
rather rapidly.

aft his policy. Many of them I have talked about before so I will summarize them
he has to be operated about the conditions which limite his scope and which
and
Now let me make a few observations about the international system in which
Now these are the requirements of the statesmen.

could not have been made, for better or for worse, under contemporary conditions,
which was made in 1812 for example on which we will speak this time or next time
and certainly not for the advantage of a long-range policy. The peace settlement
of maneuver of the statesmen and not necessarily for the advantage of a peaceful,
answer and the total answer which to existing problems. It has limited freedom
foreign policy because every political leader wants to prove that he has a simple
of foreign policy issues, it has led to a very great amount of negatively demagogu
made for a more peaceful policy. On the contrary, it has led to an overaimplification
by the democrat and liberal thinkers of the 18th and 19th century has not necessarily
reasonable. Now the requirement of popular support contrary to what was expected
they cannot structure popular support through brooks and repression may be even be

(A)

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depends on its domestic policy. You have a stable world in which is the number of states in it is multiple because the greater the number of states, particularly if they have comparable domestic structures, the more combinations are possible. This is not true in the present period because there are only two major states and then a few secondary states and then a host of smaller ones that have, whose shift of sides weally doesn't make any difference and moreover which had a high incentive which I pointed out not to shift sides because their bargaining position depends precisely on being able to find some position between the two contenders. The world is stable also if there is a relatively stable technology, that is if there is a similar outlook by political leaders, no-stable technology and if there is limited domestic claims, that is if there is a similar outlook by political leaders about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. And it has proved helpful in the past if there was a frontier that permitted compensation. It was not helpful to the people living on the frontier but it proved helpful to the people running the international system. In the 19th century European could be defeat compensated to some extent by colonial expansion. And it was a deliberate policy of Bismarck after France had been defeated in 1871 to encourage France into colonial expansion partly because he wanted France to find an outlet for its national pride in areas other than in Europe and partly because he was hoping to employ France against Britain and to divert France's energy from Germany.

In a stable system, the main goal is to prevent a single actor from upsetting the equilibrium. The maintenance of the international system becomes more important than a the achievement of any particular goal within it. Adjustements are possible but they of occur within the framework of the existing structure rather than in an attempt to overthrow it. Again, periodically, there have been periods of stability which contributed some exhibited some or all of these features and they have been succeeded by periods of instability. Sometimes these periods of instability came about by accident. The European Civil War

these periods of inaptability came about by accident. The European Civil War
these features and they have been succeeded by periods of inaptability. Sometimes
have been periods of inaptility which were also some or all of
structure rather than in an attempt to overthrow it. Again, periodically, there
Adjustments are possible but they do occur within the framework of the existing
more important aspects than a the achievement of any particular goal within it.
achieving the equilibrium. The maintenance of the international system becomes
In a stable system, the main goal is to prevent a single actor from
to employ France against Britain and to divert France's energy from Germany.
its national pride in areas other than in Europe and partly because he was hoping
into colonial expansion partly because he wanted France to find an outlet for
policy of Biarmay after France had been defeated in 1871 to encourage France
defeat compensated to some extent by colonial expansion. And it was a deliberate
could be
to the people running the international system. In the 16th century Europe
it was not helpful to the people living on the frontier but it proved helpful
it has proved helpful in the past if there was a frontier that permitted compensation.
political leaders about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy. And
there is limited domestic claims, that is if there is a similar outlook by
it there is a similar outlook by political leaders, no--stable technology and it
The world is stable also if there is a relatively stable technology, that is
depends precisely on being able to find some position between the two contenders,
incentive which I pointed out not to shift sides because their pertaining position
shift of sides weakly doesn't make any difference and moreover which had a high
and then a few secondary states and then a host of smaller ones that have, whose
This is not true in the present period because there are only two major states
if they have comparable domestic structures, the more combinations are possible.
of states in it is multiple because the greater the number of states, particularly
depends on its domestic policy. You have a stable world if there is the number

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for example, which started in 1914, came at the end of a period of faith in
uninterrupted progress. None of the statesmen who went to war in August 1914
in Europe had any intention of overthrowing the European system. No one believed
that it was possible that a war like World War I could ever occur and the reason
they went to war so joyously was precisely because they thought it would be
a very quick war leading to some very marginal adjustments. The enormity of the
war efforts were added only as the casualties mounted but there had to be some
connection between the suffering and the waring. The overthrow of the international
equilibrium that existed throughout most of the 19th century came about as an
accident through incompetence, through lack of foresight, through lack of any
appreciation of technology or any relationship between the masses of manpower
which were being mobilized and the objectives which were initially being sought.
Initially the objectives which were being sought were, it would be very difficult
to state them. And on other occasions, the equilibrium had been overthrown as the
result of deliberate policy. Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini of Communist policy is
that
deliberately aimed at upsetting the international system the exists. The reason for
this can be irrepresible ambition of an individual. I think this would be the case
of Napoleon or Hitler. The reason could be also be ideological conviction.
I think this would be the case with the French Revolution and with the Communist
system. Or it can be objective factors working out of any ones control. When the frontiers
end, all the competitiveness of the units comprising the international system had to
be carried out within the international system. When there is an increase of state
control more resources become available for the conduct of foreign policy. When states
are consolidated the number of factors in the conduct of foreign policy diminish.
Now these are the major factors of the environment and the major considerations of
the statesmen.

And I would like to turn now to begin a consideration of the historical period
which will concern us for the next few lectures. The making of the peace settlement

which will concern us for the next few lectures. The making of the peace settlement
And I would like to turn now to begin a consideration of the historical period
the statements.

Now these are the major factors of the environment and the major considerations of
are consolidated the number of factors in the conduct of foreign policy diminu-
control more resources become available for the conduct of foreign policy. When states
be carried out within the international system. When there is an increase of state
end, all the competitiveness of the units comprising the international system had to
system. Or it can be objective factors were out of any once control. When the frontiers
I think this would be the case with the French Revolution and with the Communist
of Napoleon or Hitler. The reason could be states- also be ideological conviction.
this can be irrepressible ambition of an individual. I think this would be the case
deliberately aimed at upsetting the international system she exists. The reason for
that
we result of deliberate policy. Napoleon, Hitler, was much of Communist policy is
to state them. And on other occasions, the equilibrium had been overthrown as the
Initially the objectives which were being sought were, it would be very difficult
which were being mobilized and the objectives which were initially being sought.
appreciation of technology or any relationship between the masses of manpower
accident through incompetence, through lack of foresight, through lack of any
equilibrium that existed throughout most of the 19th century came about as an
connection between the suffering and the waring. The overthrow of the international
war efforts were added only as the casualties mounted pws there had to be some
because
a very quick war leading to some very marginal adjustments. The enormity of the
they went to war so joyously was precisely because they thought it would be
that it was possible that a war like World War I could ever occur and the reason
in Europe had any intention of overthrowing the European system. No one believed
uninterrupted progress. None of the statements who went to war in August 1914
for example, which started in 1914, came at the end of a period of faith in

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in 1815 as which I think illustrates some of these observations. In the 18th
century Europe was composed of a some 50 sovereign states, the majority of them
being located in Germany and Italy which at that time were not considered nations
but geographic entities comprising a number of different sovereign states. It
would not have occurred to anybody in the 18th century for example that all people
speaking the German language should have the same nation and even less all people
having the ... It was certainly conceivable, indeed it happened all the
time, that German states would make alliances against other German states or with
Russia. The governments were in the hands of kings who ruled by divine right. They
had absolute power in a certain sense but they had no right to conscript their
subjects, to levy tax-income taxes or to devote a very great percentage of
international resources to the national effort. War were carried out by mercenaries
and since mercenaries not easy to come by casualties were very low. Every general
had a high incentive to conserve his human resources. The war of peoples was
not imagined at the time. As a result, even though wars occurred they were very
limited wars. Adjustments did take place but they did not affect the basic
relatively
equilibrium of Europe. It was, in short a relative stable period. All of this was
ended by the French Revolution.

In the 18th century no state made universal, ideological claim. No state
insisted that its domestic structure had any particular validity outside of its
own borders. After the French Revolution as Burke said, considerations were
introduced into the concerns of all countries which did not arise from their locality
or their national circumstances.

in short, was the French Revolution
brought about first a domestic upheaval in France and in the domestic upheaval
made it possible to increase the governmental controls over the population because
now policy was justified not by the divine right of kings but by popular legitimacy.
And thirdly the French form of government was declared not to be something which was
peculiarly applicable to France but something which was universally valid. This