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Interdepartmental Course on Counterinsurgency
Foreign Service Institute
26 September 1962

LESSONS LEARNED

THE PHILIPPINES: 1946 - 1953

By

Edward G. Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

I.

A Communist insurgency, like a civil war, can seem to be a most intimate, family matter for a nation. As in other family quarrels, the outsider -- even a well-meaning friend of the family -- had better stay out of it, unless he can move in to help with great skill and understanding.

This "family quarrel" aspect, of a Communist insurgency in a foreign country, poses the thorniest challenge ever faced by free Americans. We cannot look on, aloof, while a people are enslaved or murdered, and still have our own freedom bright and clear. Yet, if we move in on a foreign people to help them, and see this only as a pragmatic exercise, equating full bellies with man's liberty, or compromise our principles in the name of expediency, or let the egos of some turn Americans into big frogs in little ponds, then we can stifle that very, precious spark of true national life we seek to help protect and guide towards strength.

The Communists' task is the easier one of tearing down, of employing fear, so that they can impose their will on the weak. Our task is the harder one of building up, of employing wisdom, so that we can be brothers to a world family of free people.

During the long campaign against the Huks in the Philippines, we found a way as a nation to give true help to the Filipinos. Among the 22 million people living on the seven thousand islands which are the Philippines, there were Filipinos who had the courage to stand up -- to pledge their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor -- to the cause of man's liberty. As we recognized these Filipinos and concentrated on helping them grow strong, within the spirit of our own heritage, we then found the vital, determining basis upon which the victory was constructed.

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It wasn't the number of dead Huks. It wasn't even money or
hardware. It was the ever increasing number of Filipinos dedicated
to making their democracy live.

There were Americans who believed in these dedicated Filipinos
and acted upon that belief. As they did, such Americans were accepted
as brothers, not outsiders.

II.

As I noted, the Huk rebellion was a long one. Its genesis was back
in the 1920's. Its postlude is still in the air.

The so-called "armed struggle"... the open attempt to overthrow
the Constitutional Government of the Philippines by armed force...
lasted from 1946 until 1953, or about 8 years. It reached a peak in
mid-1950, when the Communists had some 15,000 organized guerrillas
in the field, and about a million supporters and sympathizers in the
population. Against them were the Philippine Armed Forces, which
totalled about 50,000.

The Communist strategy was run by a Politburo, composed mostly
of Filipino intellectuals. Politically, the insurgency was shaped to
appear as a fight between landless peasants and wealthy landlords.
The landlords, of course, were seen as being helped by the Yankee
"imperialists," who supplied weapons to the Filipino "lackeys" in
uniform who did the bidding of a government controlled by landlords.
The 1949 Philippine Presidential campaign, with its bitter charges of
ballot box stuffing and intimidation of voters by the incumbent Adminis-
tration, led the Politburo to broaden its political attack. The Filipino
masses were told they were being cheated out of their franchise, the
Constitution had turned out to be merely a scrap of paper, so the
masses could only have their own government if they imposed their
will by force. Thus, the slogans of the Huks: "Bullets Not Ballots"
and "Land for the Landless."

The military arm, the Huk guerrilla force, was organized in
squadrons and led by a Supremo, Luis Taruc. The military, including
the Supremo, was under the tight control of the Politburo. Political
indoctrination was carried on at schools hidden in the jungles and
hills, the so-called "Stalin Universities," in troop units by political
commissars, and through the use of "Self Criticism." This continual
political indoctrination, coupled with "iron discipline," turned a
movement which had started out with an old-time Robin Hood and
Agrarian Socialist flavor into a tough, ruthless force that had hope
and intent -- by mid-1950 -- of winning the Philippines by 1952.

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Against these Communist forces was a government much like our own, with Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches. Initially, the responsibility for coping with the Huk rebellion was largely left up to the Secretary of the Interior, whose militant arm was the national police force, the Philippine Constabulary. Local control of the Constabulary was mostly the political prerogative of the Governor of the Province where the troops were assigned. All too often, the provincial capitol, the governor's residence, and the property of the governor's major political supporters could be recognized by the number of Constabulary troops mounting guard there. The Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force, under the Secretary of National Defense, and assisted by MDAP and the U.S. military advisors of JUSMAG, devoted almost full-time in readying themselves to resist an invasion by external forces, and paid scant attention to the internal threat of the Huk rebellion.

In 1950, this was changed. The Armed Forces were reorganized, to include the Constabulary as part of the military establishment under the Secretary of National Defense. Defense took over the main responsibility of the fight against the Huks. The Constabulary force of company-size units was replaced by battalion combat teams. A former guerrilla leader, Ramon Magsaysay, gave up his seat in the House of Representatives to become Secretary of National Defense. He brought with him a deep understanding of guerrilla life from personal experience, an impatience with the status quo, and a devotion to the principles of democracy.

Little more than a year later, in November 1951, the Huks had lost the initiative and were on the run. In that period, the Armed Forces had become the protectors of the people and had started restoring the people's faith in the Constitution, in the Electoral Code, in the real meaning of democracy. The critical changes took place in fourteen action-filled months. What happened in those months holds many a lesson for those whose freedom is threatened, and for Americans in a position to help. I will sketch in some of the events and lessons for you.

### III.

The first lesson is rather basic: there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge. Let me illustrate.

In 1950, when I returned to the Philippines, for duty with JUSMAG, I did what any of you would have done -- I made myself as current on the situation as I could, by reading reports and having talks with

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officials "in the know." I did this, both in Washington and Manila. From this quick study, the Huks and the Filipinos among whom the Huks were based emerged in a conventional two-dimensional picture. It had no depth -- yet it was the best there was, for decision-making, in both Washington and Manila.

The "Makabulos Massacre" had just happened. The reports and the Manila press said that there was a strong tide of popular revulsion against the Huks for the wanton savagery of the massacre. The story of the Huk action seemed proof enough that decent Filipinos would be revolted. The Huks had attacked the small station hospital at Makabulos, killed the staff of administrators, doctors, and nurses, and the patients, including helpless ones in bed. Ammunition was precious, so bolos and bayonets had been used. It was butchery.

Shortly after arrival in the Philippines, I visited Makabulos, which is on the outskirts of Tarlac town. My old friends in Tarlac explained their feelings. Yes, they regretted the killing, but this was war. The soldiers had been on the government side, not the people's. Their most vivid memory was of how polite and thoughtful the Huk guerrillas had been! The Huks had started filtering into town in the early afternoon. Some had even gone to the movies to await H-hour. Then, at first dark, the Huks had quietly taken over the streets, asking the people to please remain indoors so they wouldn't get hurt when the government troops started firing. They explained that they were going to destroy the military fort on the outskirts of town, to demonstrate how strong the people's army was becoming. The words of these armed Huks, many of them relatives of local folks, are what the people remembered -- not the words of politicos or editorial writers or officials in the safe remote-ness of Manila.

The conclusion was a stark one. The Philippine government had lost the people, at least in Tarlac. Rapid visits elsewhere confirmed this same finding, in other towns, other provinces. Later, captured documents gave even further proof of how much had been lost. Yet, only exceptional individuals in the Philippine government, among the U.S. officials in the Philippines, seemed to have any inkling of the real truth in the provinces.

One of the exceptions was Magsaysay, who had just become Secretary of National Defense. As a friend from my past service in the Philippines, I was assigned as liaison with him for JUSMAG and we shared much of the next 18 months together. Let me sketch in a few scenes from that time, to let you glimpse some of the depth factors that went into the decisions.

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There were the charcoal cooking fires, in the nipa huts up in the provinces, where the meals for farmers' families were being prepared. Magsaysay would wander away from where the troops were deployed, to the neighboring huts and their cooking fires. Invited in, he would ask question after question, about the family, the crops, their income, the debts to money lenders. It would wind up with him peering into the pot on the fire, to see what they had for dinner. A deep anger would take him as he saw the scanty food, the poverty. Then, his eyes would moisten, sadden -- an arm go around shoulders in mute reassurance -- and he would leave.

There was the day in Aglao, his home barrio, just after a Huk raid, as he looked at the bodies of women and children he had known -- murdered to intimidate him into resigning as Secretary. It was the first time that the real savagery of the Huk guerrillas came home to him, and gave his later compassion for prisoners a poignant humanity that was deeply, movingly, real.

There were his constant surprise visits to the troops. The soles of shoes worn through on boots, a medium tank breaking down in combat due to faulty spark plugs (with the Secretary, under fire, trying to fix it), officers at their CP's sleeping off a night of poker or mah-jongg. First-hand evidence of any army not on its toes -- and quickly followed by actions to remedy. As he went from the combat areas to his office, to Cabinet meetings, to Congressional hearings, to staff councils, he commenced to think and speak and decide with more sureness, with the authority of someone who knows whereof he speaks, of someone who has been there.

## IV.

Another lesson from those days is that some of the most significant help came, not from the U.S., but when Filipinos started helping themselves. I will mention just two examples.

The first was the so-called Peace Fund. About a million dollars worth of pesos were raised by a fund-collecting drive, much as in a Community Chest or United Givers Fund drive, under the chairmanship of Vice President Lopez. These became Magsaysay's contingency or confidential funds -- used for rewards for actions against Huk leaders, for purchasing firearms in the provinces to prevent them falling into the hands of the Huks, and for operational intelligence. These Peace Funds put a weapon of great practicality into the hands of a man who knew how to use it well.

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The second example was a series of informal war councils, in which the real *do-ers* among the Philippine military participated. By "do-ers," I mean combat commanders of all ranks and some staff officers, men who had been in the thick of the fight, men of imagination and energy, men who wanted to win and who were not content to merely go through the motions just because the book said so. We, as American advisors, only used our "good offices" as interested friends to bring these men together in an informal atmosphere, provided plenty of coffee -- and then let them alone to do a "re-think" on their campaign. These sessions sparked many of the ideas which were later developed into the winning tactics which became famous. Magsaysay attended many of these sessions, as did some civilians who wanted to help -- such as leaders of the Philippine Veterans Legion and the Jaycees. It was a bit rough on some of the lieutenants and junior captains who would jeep in from combat for the sessions, but they spoke up and were listened to in this atmosphere. I commend this method as a prized way of getting ideas on how to win.

## V.

Another lesson from those days also is a rather basic one: since the objective in a counterinsurgency is to win over the people to our side, the political-psychological appeal is a most vital element in winning. In this, the old truism that "actions speak louder than words" must be heeded.

When Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense in September 1950, he recognized the need for psychological action by appointing an assistant, Colonel Mike Barbero, for psychological warfare. Later, Barbero was succeeded by Major Joe Crisol. The function was given the name of "Civil Affairs," and "Civil Affairs Officers" were put in the chain of command down to include the battalion combat teams. They handled psychological warfare, troop information, and relations between the military and the people. However, psychological operations were stressed as a command function, and the whole Philippine Armed Forces adopted them as a weapon in this combat.

Let me list some of the actions that "spoke louder than words":

- When Huk prisoners were taken to the compound for interrogation and processing, the Army would notify the closest relatives, suggesting a visit. If the family was poor, as was often the case, bus fare would be provided and rice and other help given to the family. This was the first step towards the policy which became known later as offering the Huk enemy either "all-out friendship or all-out force."

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- Huk prisoners who sincerely desired to "turn over a new leaf" were given the opportunity, through EDCOR - a project run by Defense. This started originally as a carpenter shop, where selected prisoners were set up in business to make barracks furniture, which was purchased by Defense. Later, farm projects were started in Mindanao where Army veterans and Huk prisoners pioneered new farm communities, clearing out the virgin jungle to get the land. The former Huks earned title to their own land, through their labor. This was a powerful action to counter the Communist cry of "land for the landless." The word-of-mouth "bamboo telegraph" not only carried word of this up into the Huk camps in the hills, but also all over Asia. The British in Malaya told me that people being relocated there asked for electric lights in the new villages, because they had heard there were electric lights at EDCOR. The Burmese Army set up similar farm communities for their Communist guerrilla prisoners. I ran into word of EDCOR, time after time, out in the boondocks of Asia. It was a smash hit!

- As a means of bringing the people and the Armed Forces closer together, arrangements were made so that anyone who wanted to could send a telegram to the Secretary of National Defense for 10-centavos. Information about the Huk enemy, misbehavior of the military, exemplary actions noted by civilians, gripes, praise, and suggestions all came flooding in as hundreds of telegrams daily. A staff section in the Secretary's office was established to handle these. Each telegram was checked out quickly for accuracy, and was acted upon. The people started feeling that the military was really their own.

- In an insurgency, where the guerrillas hide in among the people, there are often casualties of civilians caught in the cross-fire between troops and guerrillas. Prior to 1950 in the Philippines, these civilian casualties were mostly left to shift for themselves. Under Magsaysay, who believed that the military must act as the brothers and protectors of the people, these civilian casualties were given the same prompt treatment as military casualties -- at military aid stations, in military hospitals. The people started feeling that the Army really *cared*. And, you know, the Army found that it really did care. As its heart grew -- so did its will, to win.

- Most of the Communist Huk recruits came from families of tenant farmers. To these families, the government had seemed something pretty remote, usually an entity wanting tax money or sending in soldiers who always were ready to shoot. When they had an argument with the landlord, the case would be settled in an Agrarian Court -- with a government judge presiding, with lawyers representing the landlord, and with the tenant farmer pleading his own case, usually to his loss. As a means to end this inequity, Magsaysay asked for volunteers among the Judge Advocate lawyers, and sent them to the provinces -- out of uniform -- to act as attorneys for deserving tenant farmers in the Agrarian Courts, gratis.

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- As noted earlier, the Communist Politburo had made effective use of charges of fraud in the 1949 Philippine Presidential Election; the publicity gave vitality to the Huk slogan of "Bullets Not Ballots" as the means the people should use in changing their government. Thus, when the next national election, of November 1951, for certain Senate and House seats, for Provincial Governors, came around, the Armed Forces were asked by the Commission on Elections to help make the provisions of the enlightened Philippine Electoral Code come true. The Armed Forces, using ROTC students mostly, but backing them with troops when necessary, protected the right of free speech for candidates, policed the polling booths to ensure secret balloting, kept the political goons from intimidating the electorate, and helped supervise an honest count. This public service by the Armed Forces quite openly gave the government back to the people, and earned their full trust. The Huk Supremo, Luis Taruc, later said ... after he came in and surrendered ... that this electoral service by the Armed Forces broke the back of the Huk rebellion. Since the troops represented the government, and the government belonged to the people, the Communist Huks suddenly found the entire nation against them.

VI.

There is room for one more lesson, suggested by the 1951 Philippine election. This lesson might be expressed as: Americans, when we are true to our heritage, have a real duty to speak up for our belief in liberty.

In the Philippine Election of 1951, the United States officially reiterated its dedication to the sanctity of a free election. This was done both in Washington and in Manila. These strong statements, timed just before the November elections in the Philippines and noting the guarantees to the electorate in the Philippine Constitution and Electoral Code, did much to hearten those fighting to maintain their freedom. As a final touch, the U.S. Ambassador, Myron Cowen, talked openly and staunchly on the subject at a mass meeting of Filipino voters right in the heart of the Communist dominated province of Pampanga. He received standing cheers.

Later, in the 1953 Philippine Presidential campaign, another U.S. Administration and another U.S. Ambassador, Raymond Spruance, came out just as strongly for the same political principles. These statements were warmly welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people.

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VIII.

In the days to come, in other critical areas of insurgency, you
will be facing problems which will be pressing for solution. Perhaps
then, some of these lessons from the Philippines will come to mind
and will suggest actions to fit your own needs. I hope so.

At such a time, also, I hope you realize that we Americans
aren't sitting up in the grandstand, in choice seats on the 50-yard
line. We are right down there on the playing field as far as the
rest of the world is concerned. The stakes are for a people's
freedom. Those are big stakes, worthy of the biggest and best
we have and do as a people, as a nation.

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