JACQUELINE SIMON

988 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

212-744-2480

JUL 9 - 1988

June 29th, 1988

Dear Henry:

Both *Politique Internationale* and I congratulate you for your really fine piece in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Just recently, I discussed with Peter Grose, at some length, the possibility of our two magazines agreeing on one piece we would believe significant enough to be published simultaneously.

I think surely, had we talked about that idea sooner, we might have wanted to speak to you about your essay with Cy Vance.

I am mainly in accord with you, and certainly a higher
level of maturity in considering foreign policy would
be helpful and welcome. Bipartisan policy doesn't seem
to me as likely in fact as it is logical in theory.

I hope one day we can talk about how it can become the
informed reality we need in our country.

This said, I realize that soon it will be ten years that
I have worked for PI, and the magazine is now institutionalized
and no longer as challenging for me. I work only because of
the challenge and the puzzle, as you know. I'm taking the
liberty of enclosing a fairly unadorned CV, with the idea
that you may, in conversation, hear of an organization or
magazine that would profit from the varied skills that are
mine.

While there's no urgency about a change for me, it seems
advisable to move on, eventually, and to find a new challenge
I can meet. I feel sure you understand.

POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE 11 RUE DU BOIS DE BOULOGNE 75116 PARIS, FRANCE TEL. 500-15-26

JACQUELINE SIMON

212-744-9400

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

1988

EDUCATION

Ph.D. 1977 New York University (Political Science)
Dissertation: Structuralism as a Paradigm to
Understand the Evolution of Politics (with
case studies).

M.A. 1972 New York University (Political Science)

B.A., Phi Beta Kappa, Cum Laude

Early Education: Paris and New York

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

U.S. Bureau Chief, Associate Editor, POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE
(a French Quarterly on foreign affairs), 1978----

Contributing Editor, Harper's Magazine, 1984----

Political Analyst and Interviewee, French Canadian Radio-
Television, 1984-1986

Commentator, Antenne 2, French Television, 1985-1987
Europe #1 (Radio), 1986-1987

Senior Research Associate: Institute of French Studies at
New York University, 1979----

Center Associate: Institute for the Media on War and
Peace, 1985----

Assistant Professor, Political Science, New York University,
1982, 1983 (Adjunct, Comparative Politics)

Assistant Professor, Political Science, Southampton College,
1977, 1978, 1979 (Adjunct, Political Philosophy, French Politics)

Conferences, lectures, papers, academic colloquia, seminars, etc.
/details on request)

[L]

Jacqueline Simon

Page 2

PUBLICATIONS (COLLECTIVE VOLUMES and ARTICLES)

"La Carte Chinoise," and "Le Renouveau Americain?" in APRES LA DETENTE, edited by Patrick Wajsman (Pluriel, Hachette, 1982)

"Qui Encercle Qui?, Pekin-Moscou: la reconciliation?" in LA NOUVELLE ASIE, edited by Francois Joyaux and Patrick Wajsman (Pluriel, Hachette, 1984)

"Et Si les Etats-Unis devenaient Cartésiens?" in La Résistance Nouvelle, April, 1982 (a monthly review)

Since 1979, an on-going series of conversations-in-depth with leading political and intellectual figures in the U.S., in every issue of POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE, including George Ball, Richard Nixon, Helmut Schmidt, Walter Laqueur, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Robert W. Tucker, Stanley Hoffmann, A. Doak Barnett, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Oscar Arias, among others.

"A Qui Profite la Carte Chinoise?" in L'Evenement, April, 1981 (a weekly Belgian review).

DRIFT, DESTINY and TRUTH: an essay in book form on the direction of U.S. foreign policy since World War II, and alternatives to the moment when drift moves beyond choice to become destiny. (1989.90)

"Nuclear Macho: the abuses of power: in Vogue, November, 1986

"Talking to Flora Lewis", a profile and book review, in Vogue, November 1987

*********************

Board of Directors: Fresh Air Fund

Married, two children, (Husband, Pierre Simon, President, Multiparts corp. NYC)

Transcription of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's lecture on "The World in Perspective: Lessons of the 20th Century for the Next"

Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva - June 7, 1999

Introduction by Prof. Curt Gasteyger, Director of the PSIS:

I don't want to name all the very distinguished guests, but just one who happens to be with us (and delighted about it), Dr. Carl Bild, a special envoi of the UN Secretary-General for the Balkans. We are delighted to have you with us, Carl.

Tomorrow afternoon from 3 to 5, the second part of our anniversary programme will take place at the Aula of the university. Three outstanding experts: Dr. Walther Stützle (Secretary of State for Defence) from Bonn, academician Andrey Kokoshin and Professor David Calleo will present their views on, and expectations for, security in the next century. Everybody is cordially invited to this, I am sure, very interesting event.

And now allow me, Ladies and Gentlemen, a brief public relations exercise for both our Programme and obviously for our speaker today. One reason for celebration has to do with the fact that, as you probably know from the invitation, the PSIS is 20 years old, or young. By a strange accident of history, these 20 years are divided into two equal parts. The first decade covered the last years of the Cold War with its fears of nuclear war, its reality of wars by proxy, and its hope for disarmament and arms control. The second decade, as the Cold War had ended, was marked by an almost exuberant hope for a new world of peace and cooperation only to be followed by the saddened recognition that neither of them could be easily achieved. Seventy-two days of

bombing to end, we hope, a conflict in a small place in the
Balkans and the first armed conflict between two nuclear powers
(India and Pakistan) bear witness to this. These two contrasting
decades deeply marked the activities of our Programme. This is
true for its teaching as part of the Graduate Institute (the HEI)
as it is for the various training programmes, its numerous
international seminars, les Conférences de Genève, its research
and its several dozens of publications. An overview of all these
activities is in a limited number available on request. We hope
that in this way PSIS could contribute, and will do so in the
future, to first, the reputation of the Institute, and second, if
I may say so, to that of Geneva and Switzerland, as ideal
platforms for teaching, training and negotiations on the central
issues of peace and security. Hence, our fervent hope that both
the Swiss Confederation and the Canton de Genève will be
foresighted and generous enough to support these important
activities also in the future and, if I may say so, in their own
interest.

I cannot end this overview without expressing my, our,
sincere thanks to those who have lent their support and
encouragement in these 20 years. Above all, to the Graduate
Institute, to the Swiss Confederation, the Canton of Geneva and,
occasionally even, the City of Geneva, to various foundations,
the Ford Foundation in particular. Our sincere thanks also go to
the many sponsors, individuals and firms and, why not, to the
hoped-for sponsors, the majority of which are located in Geneva.

2

I owe sincere thanks to the members of the staff and the dozen
assistants whose support and help were crucial. The latter
assistants have just come out with an excellent collection of
essays, "Security in the Globalized World: Risks and
Opportunities". It can be ordered on the forms outside, but
please, those who have already been curious enough to take some
of the copies (we have only five), would they be kind enough to
let us have them again.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to two ladies. First, to
my wife Doris, whose unflinching support and encouragement,
discretion and charm has been the indispensable and often needed
ingredient to keep me and the Programme going. Then, to my
secretary Mme Marianne Bruder, who for almost 20 years has been
the most loyal and indispensable pillar (the roue and the pole)
(?) of all our activities. Both ladies have with infinite
tolerance and grace accepted my occasional short temper in the
interests of long-term objectives.

And now let me turn at long last to our guest of honour, Dr.
Henry A. Kissinger. It is only a slight exaggeration when I say,
Dr. Kissinger, that it took us the better part of the second PSIS
decade to persuade you, to lure you, to Geneva and, happily
enough, to persuade you to give now what has become the
Anniversary Keynote Address.

I have long pondered the question of how to introduce
somebody with the stature of Dr. Kissinger, incarnating such a
unique combination of outstanding statesman and as, in such cases

3

almost inevitably, not uncontroversial, reputed scholar,
strategic thinker and wonderful writer. Much of all this is
reflected in his writings, beginning with "A World Restored:
Information of the Holy Lands", his doctoral thesis, and ending
with the three volumes of his memoirs, "The White House Years",
"Years of Upheaval" and, just out (a little propaganda of public
relations doesn't do any harm), "The Years of Renewal". Not to
forget, "Diplomacy." Instead of an inevitably longish discourse,
let me therefore, Ladies and Gentlemen, introduce him as a very
personal note. It is prompted by a moving post-script in Dr.
Kissinger's third and last volume of memoirs dealing in a very
fair and impressive way with the Ford administration and its many
(?) accompt (?). Then at the very end, and seemingly totally
unconnected with the preceding thousands of pages, comes a letter
which Dr. Kissinger's father wrote to his two sons before an
operation which he feared he would not survive. And yet this
letter is both a testament and a testimony of what life, our
life, is, or should be, all about. The letter ends with a
father's advice, and I quote: "Always keep in mind that we find
real satisfaction only in what we are doing for others." Dr.
Kissinger, you certainly have lived up to your father's advice.
All of us are deeply grateful for your having done so and you are
doing us today one more great service by giving us such needed
guidance on the basis of your unique experiences in this century
on what we should keep in mind when facing the next. Moving as we
are from years of upheaval to hopefully again years of renewal

4

and, who knows, eventually again to a world restored. Dr.
Kissinger, Henry, the floor is yours.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger:

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Curt and I have been working together in various conferences
and panels for longer than either of us wants to admit, and I
have always benefited from his views and admired his efforts. So,
in spite of a long negotiation, it was always clear that I would
come, and I am delighted to be able to be here.

Curt chose the title for my lecture. He thought that I
should review some of the evolution of international relations in
the 20th century and the lessons to be learned from it. That
would take me the better part of the evening, however, so let me
instead make a brief summary of some of the changes taking place
in the 20th century and then concentrate briefly on the present,
especially on the challenge that America faces in this period.

I noticed our Ambassador sitting in the front row, glowering
at me, and I want to make clear that I am speaking for myself,
and that he speaks for the US Government. I often agree with our
government and believe that foreign policy must be non-partisan.
But if I should deviate from established orthodoxy, please
remember that he represents it and that I'm just an itinerant
professor.

The 20th century has seen enormous conceptual changes in the

5

conduct of foreign policy. It began with the conviction that war
was unlikely since civilized nations would not fight with each
other. There was at that time a global economy, in the sense that
it involved all independent nations. Most thoughtful people did
not believe the general prospects would be risked in a general
conflagration. At the same time, an armaments race was going on
because all the nations believed in the balance of power.

Strangely enough, in light of what happened, none of the nations
felt that their own survival was threatened by the domestic
institutions of other nations. So there was a widely accepted
concept of legitimacy. It was the high point of the doctrine of
sovereignty of the nation-state, a doctrine at which people now
look somewhat askance. But we should remember that the notion of
sovereignty began to flower in response to the Thirty Years War
when over 30 per cent of the population of Central Europe was
wiped out in ideological conflicts which recognized no borders.
And it set some limits on the exercise of state power.

Then came World War I which broke the back of the self-
confidence of the 19th century. It happened in large part because
the statesmen of the period did not understand the technology
that they had created and because they created methods of
mobilization which, once underway, could not be arrested and
generated their own momentum. None of the statesmen who went to
war in August 1914 would have made that decision had they known
what the world would look like in 1980. All of them believed that
the war would be over by the winter. And as the war went on, they

6

had to adjust their abhorrence of the suffering they had
inflicted on each other to keep pace with the escalating anguish
so that, by 1918, the balance of power was destroyed. The
legitimacy of the system was destroyed as well because Russia,
which had been a key element of the pre-war international order,
now had a regime ideologically hostile to the existing system and
hoping to profit from its conflicts and Germany fell outside the
system because of the Treaty of Versailles.

Ironically, the appearance of America introduced a totally
new element into international politics. All the European states
had had powerful neighbours. All of them knew through long
historical experience that there were no final solutions to
foreign policy problems. All of them had relied on equilibrium
and the relative benefits of stability. And then appeared
America, populated by a people who had turned its back on Europe,
an almost entirely immigrant population that had never known a
powerful neighbour, never engaged in a prolonged foreign war; a
nation that believed, correctly, that the secret to its success
were the democratic institutions it had brought to the new world.
It was this Wilsonianism that identified then, and does to this
day, the ideal peace to be achieved via the spread of American
values.

Thus much of the American domestic debate on foreign policy
has been between these schools of thought: one that believes that
foreign policy is a sub-division of psychiatry; one that believes
that relations between nations are like relations between people;

and another that holds that foreign policy is a sub-division of
theology in which foreign policy represents a contest between
good and evil.

These tendencies permeate the American debate. This is why
we turned World War I - and every war in which we have engaged -
into a personal conflict between ourselves and the leader of the
enemy nation. And that is why we came up with the doctrine of
self-determination as the key to international settlement in
Europe. Now, as we see today in the Balkans and as we learned
then in Central Europe, ethnic boundaries are extraordinarily
difficult to draw in regions across which conquerors have marched
for millennia and in which the people have been mixed up. It is
that much harder to bring into these regions some concept of
equilibrium, so that at the end of World War I the strange
situation developed whereby the victorious allies, trying to
limit the power of Germany, actually left Germany geo-politically
stronger than it had been before World War I: before World War I
there had been five major powers in Europe; at the end of World
War I, there were two or three and Germany was surrounded by weak
nations emerging on the basis of the concept of self-
determination. As soon as Germany broke the disarmament
provisions of the Treaty of Versailles - which sooner or later
had to happen as it happened after every war (like France did
after the Napoleonic wars) - it was bound to emerge as the
dominant nation in Eastern Europe.

After World War II, Europe lost its previous central

position and the Cold War began in which two extra European powers were the chief contestants and in which the European notion of equilibrium, which depended on a plethora of medium-sized states, did not apply. Moreover, nuclear weapons had modified the traditional power equation and created risks out of all proportion to the conceivable objectives. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, nations could go to war because they might think that the consequences of defeat would be worse than the consequences of war. With nuclear weapons, the consequences of a war became worse than any other conceivable outcome, meaning that a kind of pacifism was built into the prevailing strategies. It emerged in the principle of deterrence, around which highly esoteric theories were developed that nobody had ever tested and that depended entirely on never having to be tested. For this, there was no previous experience. As a former professor, I found myself personally in the position of knowing what the probable casualties would be, but of nevertheless going through the conduct of crisis in which the threat of nuclear war was not negligible. This was, in the long run, bound to prove to be an unsustainable situation.

On the other hand, the Cold War coincided with some of the things Americans do extremely well. In America there is no experience with, and really no understanding of, the concept of the balance of power. But there is historical experience with resisting attempts to achieve world domination. There is as well experience with overcoming domestic recession by the mobilization

of resources. Now the Cold War, especially at its beginning,
suited the American experience very well. We could apply to it
the theories of the anti-Hitler coalition, of dealing with the
Soviet Union as the incarnation of evil (in President Reagan's
phrase, "the evil power") and we could deal with European
recovery by analogy to the New Deal of the United States, through
which President Roosevelt restored confidence and hope. And those
were our two great efforts that stabilized Europe.

When I was a young professor, I met President Truman and
asked him what he thought he had done of which he was most proud.
He replied: "I am most proud of the fact that, after totally
defeating our enemies, we brought them back to the community of
nations as equals. And I would like to think only Americans would
have done that." It was a noble thought, and in that sense the
Fifties and Sixties were the high point of America's involvement
in world affairs. Then came Viet Nam. Viet Nam started, in my
view, with the best of motives. It was an attempt to apply in
Asia the lessons that had been learned in Europe. It was based on
the proposition that, if one could stop communism in Asia, the
nations there would recover just as the European nations had; and
that their democratic processes would create such a difference
between communism and democracy that, sooner or later, as Kennan
had predicted, communism itself would be under siege.

But it didn't turn out that way because the nations we were
defending were not nations. Because in Europe there existed a
civil service and the nations had a historic reality. In Viet

10

Nam, there had never been a South Vietnamese nation, and the
attempt to create one had to be made in the middle of a civil
war. These democratic criteria had to be applied while guerrilla
troops and terrorists were killing the best of the people. (They
left the worst alone because the latter would help do their work
for them.)

And then came a break in American thinking because American
idealism turned on itself. The late Sixties and Seventies were
dominated by a debate in the course of which the argument emerged
- not that we had overextended ourselves but that there was
something rotten in American thinking itself and that our anguish
in Vietnam was a kind of punishment for our moral inadequacy. It
was therefore not desirable that we should make the best deal
possible but that we should lose, because that was the only way
to purify ourselves.

When I went to universities in those days and said that we
wanted an honourable peace, I was hooted down by those whose
notion of honour was exactly the opposite of ours. They thought
that honour depended on never being tempted to get into such
situations again. None of the disputes of the Sixties and
Seventies can be understood without first understanding how
American idealism turned on itself.

Then, after a period of humiliation, came other assertions
of American idealism, in the Reagan period and the neo-
conservative incarnations. And, again, it took on a Wilsonian
form. The neo-conservatives in America insist that our real

11

mission is not to defend either the balance of power or our
allies, but to spread democracy. But "how?" In the Seventies, it
was said that we needed to use moral pressure. In the Eighties,
it was said we should use economic sanctions. And now it is being
argued that we should use military force and that the traditional
principles of the national interest are not the decisive ones. It
is convictions like these that lead to many of the challenges
that America faces today and that make our domestic debate so
extraordinarily difficult.

I belong to a minority that believes that crusades have
caused far more deaths than they have cabinet wars. And I think
in this period one has to be able to explain to the mothers why,
if their children are placed at risk, it should matter. I
therefore have more sympathy for policies that are geared to a
broad conception of the national interest.

That is really in many ways the fundamental debate that is
going on in America. We see it over such issues as Kosovo, which
is a tiny country, not even a country, in a tiny corner of the
Balkans. And we see it in the debates about China going on in the
United States. There is one group of people in America that would
like to put China into the category of the Soviet Union and carry
out with respect to China policies analogous to the policies that
helped win the Cold War. But with respect to both Kosovo and
China, we face big cultural problems. With respect to Kosovo,
Americans think of multi-ethnicity as the natural form of co-
existence, because in America everybody was a refugee at one

12

point or another and the melting pot has become an expression of
the national genius. But in Central Europe and in the Balkans,
the ethnic groups have been over-run, time and again. The weak
have been killed and the conciliatory have emigrated, and their
identity has become equated in almost every instance to a
religion invariably synonymous with their group. If one looks at
the history of the Balkans, one finds that these ethnic groups
have often lived together provided there was an outside conqueror
or dictator on top of them. But as soon as the question became
democratic, namely, "who should govern whom?", a blood bath
developed. So the very effort to find a definitive solution
sometimes becomes the guarantee of an extremely bitter conflict.
This is a cultural problem in the Balkans and I would be amazed
if, once the smoke clears in Kosovo, many Serbs are left there.

In China, we are dealing with a society with a 5,000-year
history. They think they managed quite well without significant
advice from the United States, so they don't take it as self-
evident that we have a superior knowledge of what their internal
organization should be. Moreover, the historical experience of
the Chinese has always been the difficulty of reconciling the
vast numbers of their population with central control. They are,
therefore, much more conscious of the anticipated tendencies in
their society than appear in these monolithic pictures that are
sometimes drawn of them in the West.

American diplomats and leaders tend to personalize their
relationships with their opposite numbers and insist that good

13

personal relations are a major contribution to diplomatic
progress. But the Chinese, having survived thousands of years of
turmoil, seek to ground their relations in objective conditions
and are not amused - or even understand - arguments in which we
claim we are converting them to our point of view. They think
they are responsible for their point of view and that we are
responsible for our point of view. The art of diplomacy is to
reconcile carefully thought-out interests. What has complicated
our relationship with the Chinese is that it has often run afoul
over questions of style as much as it has over questions of
substance.

For the United States - and for all of us - this is now a
very new kind of world. Communications are instantaneous.
Economics are global. Politics are national and motivations are
often ethnic. How to reconcile the technological world and the
economic world with the emotional and political world is one of
the overwhelming tasks of our period. And it is compounded by the
fact that, if one looks around this world, one finds at least
three, possibly four, kinds of world orders existing side by
side. In the relations of the Atlantic world and probably even
much, if not most, of the Latin American, the Wilsonian
principles of self-determination and democracy actually have
great relevance. Wars between these nations are almost
unthinkable and the qualities that have represented the genius of
the post-World War II economic reconstruction have a great scope.

But in Asia, there is a world that is most similar to the

19th century Europe. Four or five significant countries look at each other as potential rivals and think of their relationships as partly strategic. There, some idea of equilibrium is an absolute essential of any diplomacy. None of them want to hear that we are doing them great favours. They are much more reassured if we tell them our self-interest drives us in this or that direction and that we hope we can reconcile it with theirs. Therefore, I belong to the school of thought that considers good relations between China and the United States important because, without it, we will find ourselves in the middle of every Asian conflict - the more exacerbated by tensions if they are perceived to be unnecessary.

Then there is the Middle East, or the Islamic world, and the Gulf, where the deepest conflict is between fundamentalism and secularism and which, in that respect, is more like Europe of the 17th century. My point is that all of us have to conduct policies in all of these areas simultaneously, and for this we need different modes of thought. However, this is happening at a period when the human consciousness is changing in a way that has not happened since the collapse of the mediaeval period. Up to the end of the mediaeval period, knowledge was acquired via memory, which meant that one needed texts that everybody could agree on and that emphasized religion and epic poetry. The advent of books secularized the world. It broadened knowledge and it was believed at the time that it was the widest available knowledge. But the fact is that books, especially with our present

15

knowledge, are difficult to read and one has to imprint them on
one's mind because one can't go back to every book one has ever
read. So one has to form concepts that relate things to each
other and this becomes a device for looking at the future -
which, for statesman, is the most complex assignment. We now live
in a world in which knowledge is at one's fingertips and with a
range that was inconceivable previously. But it is also so easy
to acquire that there is no obligation really to learn it. One
only has to grasp it for a moment since one can always go back to
it. So we find ourselves faced by the strange phenomenon that our
knowledge has broadened while our perspective has shrunk.

The great statesmen of history have been distinguished by
having had a view of the future and having had the courage to
walk there. Bismarck, who was considered an ultimate realist,
once said that the best a statesman can do is to listen to the
footsteps of God, get a hold of the hem of His cloak and walk
with Him a few steps of the way. I don't know any modern
statesman who could formulate such a thought, and it shows,
incidentally, that, without moral convictions, you cannot be a
realist because the realistic world offers narrow alternatives;
and morality consists of having the strength to choose among very
tight alternatives.

Modern statesmen live in a condition of congenital
insecurity. They can never know how good they are until they have
seen it depicted on the evening news, and they live for the sake
of sound bites. When I started in politics as an advisor, people

16

asked me what to think. These days they ask what to say. This
represents the deepest challenge of foreign policy for us in
America, and also in Europe. In every country now, foreign policy
is becoming more and more an aspect of domestic politics. We hear
talk these days of a new kind of war, the humanitarian war -
never mind that we have already gone through all this in Europe
in the sense that we have exhausted the ideological war. And the
wars of the righteous are much more destructive. Besides which,
they always leave us with the question of who defines
righteousness.

I have no great conclusions, though I have talked about
America's dilemmas. And I must say that, of all the people I have
encountered, I know none that are more genuinely idealistic or
more genuinely eager to contribute than the American people.
Still, this is not something that happens automatically. I have a
Chinese friend from Singapore who claims that there exists the
following Chinese proverb (I say "claims" because I don't think
there are as many Chinese proverbs as they lay upon us, and that
they sometimes simply make them up): "When there is turmoil under
the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big
problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there
is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to smaller
problems, and smaller problems should not obsess us."

I think that is the real challenge of our period,
everywhere: whether we can distinguish the little from the big
problems, and whether we can reduce big problems to little

17