MAR.03 '88 11:42 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

There is No Alternative Strategy
by

Eugene V. Rostow*

A Paper Prepared for Discussion at
a CATO® Institute Conference,

"Collective Security or Strategic Independence?
Alternative Strategies for the Future."

Washington, D.C.

December 2-3, 1987

For more than forty years, the necessity to limit Soviet expansion has imposed immense costs on the United States and many other nations--costs measured in blood as well as in treasure. The sponsors of this Conference are quite right in suggesting that the American people and the other Western peoples are tired of the burden. In 1947, we were assured by the theorist of the Truman Doctrine, George Kennan, that ten or fifteen years of containment would mellow Soviet foreign policy, and then all would be well. Alas, there has been no mellowing. The pressures of Soviet expansion are worse than ever. It is altogether natural, therefore, that some Americans are restless and irritable. There are few open advocates of appeasement and surrender. But many are casting about for easier and cheaper ways to protect our independence than those we and our allies have developed since the time of Truman and Acheson.

*Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University, and formerly Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (1966-69) and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981-83).

(1966-68) and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981-83).
Defense University, and formerly Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
*Distinguished Visiting Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National

have developed since the time of Truman and Adenauer.
easier and cheaper ways to protect our independence than those we and our allies
open advocates of appeasement and surrender. But many are casting about for
natural, therefore, that some Americans are restless and irritable. There are few
mellowing. The treasures of Soviet expansion are gone than ever. It is altogether
Soviet foreign policy, and then all would be well. Also, there has been no
Doctrine. George Kennan, that ten or fifteen years of containment would mellow
tired of the burden. In 1947, we were assured by the theorist of the Truman
right in suggesting that the American people and the other Western peoples are
measured in blood as well as in treasurē. The sponsors of this Conference are quite
imposed immense costs on the United States and many other nations--costs
For more than forty years, the necessity to limit Soviet expansion has

Washington, D.C.

December 2-3, 1981

Alternative Strategies for the Future."
"Collective Security or Strategic Independence?

a CATO Institute Conference,
A Paper Prepared for Discussion at
Englewood V. Rostow*

by
There is No Alternative Strategy

MAR. 03 '88 11:45 KISSIMMER REASSOCIATES, INC., DC

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MAR.03 '88 11:43 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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My role here is that of the Commendatore in Don Giovanni, or Banquo's
Ghost, or perhaps the little boy in Hans Christian Andersen's story--the little boy
who pointed out that the Emperor was naked. The question we are invited to
address is "Collective Security or Strategic Independence? Alternative Strategies
for the Future." Much as I sympathize with the mood of frustration which lies
behind the question, my answer is that there are no alternative strategies for the
future. We must pursue, reform, and improve the strategy of collective security
we have been building for the last forty years, or perish. Strategic independence
for the United States is a chimera. Dean Rusk once remarked that no country has
less sovereignty than the United States. Like everything that wise and staunch
man says, his comment confronts reality. The United States shares the fate of
every other country in history. To recall the warning of the greatest of our
diplomatic historians, Samuel Flagg Bemis, the United States must adapt its
security policies to the changing patterns of the world balance of power or "sink
amid the strife of nations."

It is conceivable that Gorbachev has seen a blinding light over the domes of
St. Basil's Cathedral, and that his domestic policies of "openness" and
"restructuring" will lead to genuine peace between the Soviet Union and the other
nations of the world. That is a consummation devoutly to be desired. We should of
course explore such possibilities and encourage their fruition. But there has been
no sign as yet of change in Soviet foreign policy in any of the areas of current
friction, in the arms control talks, or in Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union has
not even withdrawn from Afghanistan, to say nothing of the Caribbean, the
Western Hemisphere, or Eastern Europe. In the Middle East, Soviet policy has not

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Western Hemisphere, or Eastern Europe. In the Middle East, Soviet policy has not
not even withdrawn from Afghanistan, to say nothing of the Caribbean, the
triumph, in the arms control talks, or in Soviet propaganda. The Soviet Union has
no sign as yet of change in Soviet foreign policy in any of the areas of current
course explore such possibilities and encourage their triumph. But there has been
nations of the world. That is a consummation devoutly to be desired. We should of
"restructuring" will lead to genuine peace between the Soviet Union and the other
St. Basil's Cathedral, and that his domestic policies of "openness" and
It is conceivable that Gorbachev has seen a declining light over the domes of
amid the strike of nations."

security policies to the changing patterns of the world balance of power or "sink
diplomatic historians, Samuel Flagg Bemis, the United States must adapt its
every other country in history. To recall the warning of the greatest of our
man says his comment confronts reality. The United States shares the fate of
less sovereignty than the United States. Like everything that wise and astute
for the United States is a chimera. Dean Rusk once remarked that no country has
we have been building for the last forty years, or perhaps, strategic independence
future. We must purue, reform, and improve the strategy of collective security
behind the question, my answer is that there are no alternative strategies for the
address is "Collective Security or Strategic Independencies? Alternative Strategies
who pointed out that the Emperor was naked. The question we are invited to
Ghost, or perhaps the little boy in Hans Christian Andersen's story--the little boy
My role here is that of the Commendatore in Don Giovanni, or Baudela

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MAR.03 '88 11:44 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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been worse for twenty years, and there are disturbing reports of considerable
Soviet support for the insurrection against Mrs. Aquino in the Philippines.
Gorbachev is more agile and ingenious than his predecessors. His tactics are
dazzling, but Soviet goals are unchanged. In the nuclear arms control talks,
Gorbachev is bidding with new boldness to neutralize Western Europe and achieve
decisive superiority in nuclear weapons. A change will come some day, no doubt,
but Western policy cannot rest on the assumption that it has already taken place.
We should recall that in his day Khruschev, like Gorbachev, aroused high hopes in
the West. He denounced some of the crimes of Stalin and allowed Solzhenitsyn and
other free spirits to be published. Then, however, he gave us the Cuban Missile
Crisis. As Lyndon Johnson once said, "In dealing with the Russians, always have
your right hand out and your left hand up."

The American system of collective security is not perfect, of course. It needs
to be modernized and supplemented by a policy of more active defense, going
beyond its original function of pure containment. That is the thrust of the Reagan
Doctrine. Since 1972, we have foolishly allowed the Soviet-American nuclear
balance to deteriorate, raising the specter of Western paralysis in the face of
Soviet nuclear superiority. Clearly, the nuclear balance must be restored and
stabilized. This can be done easily by an American build-up, by arms control
agreements, by a combination of the two, as the Soviets may prefer. Unless that
step is taken, the United States will be unable to have a security policy at all, even
for the territory of the United States itself. In the future as in the past, moreover,
the American policy of collective security will be conducted erratically, sometimes
spasmodically, with varying degrees of intelligence, foresight, skill, and luck.

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subamodically, with varying degrees of intelligence, foresight, skill, and luck.

the American policy of collective security will be conducted strategically, sometimes for the territory of the United States itself. In the future as in the past, moreover, step is taken, the United States will be unable to have a security policy at all, even agreements, by a combination of the two, as the Soviets may prefer. Unless that stabilized. This can be done easily by an American build-up, by arms control

balance to deteriorate, raising the specter of Western catastrophe in the face of

beyond its original function of pure containment. That is the thrust of the Reagan
to be modernized and supplemented by a policy of more active defense, going

Crisis. As Lyndon Johnson once said, "In dealing with the Russians, always have
other free spirits to be published. Then, however, he gave us the Cuban Missile
the West. He denounced some of the crimes of Stalin and allowed Bolshenitsyn and
We should recall that in his day Khrushchev, like Gorbachev, showed high hopes in
but Western policy cannot rest on the assumption that it has already taken place.
decisive superiority in nuclear weapons. A change will come some day, no doubt,
Gorbachev is bidding with new boldness to neutralize Western Europe and achieve
dazzling, but Soviet goals are unchanged. In the nuclear arms control talks,
Gorbachev is more agile and ingenious than his predecessors. His tactics are
Soviet support for the insurrection against Mrs. Adkins in the Philippines,
been worse for twenty years, and there are disturbing reports of considerable

MAR.03 '88 11:45 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.04

My point is different. Our policy of collective security cannot be replaced by a policy of hunkering down behind the Conestoga wagons or by one of global or regional unilateralism. Such proposals--and there are many of them these days--defy the geography and arithmetic of power. More particularly, they defy the inexorable logic of the nuclear weapon and other modern high technology weapons.

Now, having stated my thesis, let me attempt to defend it.

I.

The first step in that effort, obviously, is to define the national security interests of the United States.

The principal driving force behind the behavior of states in world politics is the set of impulses summed up in the words, "the balance of power." They represent the oldest, most familiar, and most important idea in the theory and practice of international relations. The instinct behind the concept is simplicity itself: never allow an adversary or potential adversary to become too strong, if you can possibly help it. The corollary of the precept is equally simple: if you cannot help it, know your place, pull your forelock, and behave accordingly.

Over and over again in history, the emergence and rise to power of a predatory state has led those threatened by its ambition to regroup: to form alliances and other combinations, often with former enemies, in order to check and if necessary defeat the would-be conqueror. The last forty years vividly demonstrate that the conditioned

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would-be competitor. The last forty years vividly demonstrate that the conditioned
combinations, often with former enemies, in order to check and if necessary defeat the
state has led those threatened by its ambition to regroup: to form alliances and other
Over and over again in history, the emergence and rise to power of a predator

can possibly help it. The corollary of the precedent is equally simple: if you cannot
itself never allow an adversary or potential adversary to become too strong, if you
practice of international relations. The internet behind the concept is simplicity
represent the oldest, most familiar, and most important ideas in the theory and
the set of impulses summed up in the words, "the balance of power." They

The principal driving force behind the behavior of states in world politics is
interests of the United States.

I.

inexorable logic of the nuclear weapon and other modern high technology weapons,
dety the geography and arithmetic of power. More partially, they defy the
regional unilaterallism. Such proposals--and there are many of them these days--
bolicy of humbling down behind the Conestoga wagons or by one of global or
My point is different. Our policy of collective security cannot be replaced by a

MAR. 03 '08 11:42 K1221HGR H220CIATE2 M4EH.DC

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MAR.03 '88 11:46 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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reflexes of the balance of power concept are alive and well. Thucydides would have found the pattern of history since 1945 altogether familiar.

For reasons nearly beyond understanding, "the balance of power" is a pejorative phrase in the American language. Our constitutional order at home is perhaps the supreme example on earth of the balance of power principle at work. But we prefer to talk about foreign policy in a vocabulary dominated by the rhetoric of liberty and human rights. On the other hand, we have always conducted our foreign affairs as committed practitioners of the balance of power. Although the thought was rarely articulated, we fought in both World Wars in order to keep Germany from conquering Russia, and therefore dominating the entire Eurasian land mass. We knew in our bones that a state which controlled such an enormous aggregation of power would be too strong to be resisted. And we have taken the lead in the formation and maintenance of NATO in order to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering Germany and Western Europe. The same kind of reasoning explains the Korean War, the war in Indo-China, and the Shanghai Communique issued by China and the United States in 1972. In that communique, the two nations agreed on only one point, but the point was crucial. Both states announced their opposition to any hegemonic power in Asia. Japan publicly declared its acceptance of the policy at a later date. The American people know without being told why we are helping China against Soviet pressure, just as they understood in 1941 why we made common cause with Stalin against Hitler,

No one has stated the maxim more colorfully than Jefferson, commenting on Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. He wrote:

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Napoleonic's invasion of Russia in 1813. He wrote

understood in 1941: why we made common cause with Stalin against Hitler, without being told why we are helping China against Soviet pressure, just as they declared its acceptance of the policy at a later date. The American people know states announced their opposition to any hegemonic power in Asia. Japan publicly communique, the two nations agreed on only one point, but the point was crucial. Both and the Shanghai Communique issued by China and the United States in 1937. In that Europe. The same kind of reasoning explains the Korean War, the war in Indo-China, NATO in order to prevent the Soviet Union from conducting Germany and Western strong to be resisted. And we have taken the lead in the formation and maintenance of that a state which controlled such an enormous aggregation of power would be too weak to resist. And therefore dominating the entire Eurasian land mass. We knew in our bones articulated, we fought in both World Wars in order to keep Germany from conquering committed practitioners of the balance of power. Although the thought was rarely human rights. On the other hand, we have always conducted our foreign affairs as talk about foreign policy in a vocabulary dominated by the rhetoric of liberty and supremacy example on earth of the balance of power principle at work. But we prefer to phase in the American language. Our constitutional order at home is perhaps the

found the pattern of history since 1945 altogether familiar.
reflexes of the balance of power concept are alive and well. Thucydides would have

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"Surely none of us wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia, and thus lay at his feet the whole continent of Europe. This done, England would be but a breakfast... [P]ut all Europe into his hands, and he might spare such a force to be sent in British ships, as I would as leave not have to encounter... No. It cannot be to our interest that all Europe should be reduced to a single monarchy."

For more than a century, the American people were screened from this fundamental truth. The Americans of the Revolutionary period knew it well. Their minds were concentrated by the imminent prospect of disaster. Their leaders succeeded by skillfully exploiting the dynamics of the European balance of power in order to win the war and then to consolidate the peace and the early expansion of the nation. But in the period of relative peace between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War, Americans had free security as the wards of the Concert of Europe, protected by the British fleet. After 1919, we refused to notice that the Concert of Europe had lost the capacity to manage the world balance of power. Indeed, it took another war to make us realize that we could no longer rely on Britain and France to defend our security, and that we had to take part in the process ourselves. Now, with the emergence of nuclear bipolarity, we have discovered that there is no escape from the necessity of American leadership in the quest for a balance of power and a reasonably stable system of world public order based on it.

What is implied by the concept of the balance of power for American policy in the closing years of the twentieth century? The problem of achieving a balance of power today is exactly what it was in the world of Thucydides or the Roman Emperors, or in the worlds of Philip II and the first Queen Elizabeth, Louis XIV, Napoleon, or Germany in the first half of this century. But the task is different.

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Napoleon, or Germany in the first half of this century. But the task is different.
Emperors, or in the world of Philip II and the first Queen Elizabeth, Louis XIV,
of power today is exactly what it was in the world of Thucydides or the Roman
in the closing years of the twentieth century. The problem of achieving a balance
What is implied by the concept of the balance of power for American policy

order based on it.

In the quest for a balance of power and a reasonably stable system of world public
have discovered that there is no escape from the necessity of American leadership
part in the process ourselves. Now, with the emergence of nuclear bipolarity, we
longer rely on Britain and France to defend our security, and that we had to take
balance of power. Indeed, it took another war to make us realize that we could no
notice that the Concert of Europe had lost the capacity to manage the world
Concert of Europe, protected by the British fleet. After 1919, we refused to
Wars and the First World War. Americans had free security as the wards of the
the nation. But in the period of relative peace between the end of the Napoleonic
order to win the war and then to consolidate the peace and the early expansion of
 succeeded by skillfully exploiting the dynamics of the European balance of power in
minds were concentrated by the imminent prospect of disaster. Their leaders
fundamental truth. The Americans of the Revolutionary period knew it well. Their
For more than a century, the American people were screened from this
monarchy."

cannot be so our interest that all Europe should be reduced to a single
be sent in British ships, as I would as leave not have to encounter... No. If
breakfast... (Plus all Europe into his hands, and he might spare such a force to
test the whole continent of Europe. This done, England would be put a
"Entirely none of us wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia, and thus lay at his

MAR. 03 '88 11:47 KRABBER ASSOCIATES, MWH, DC

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MAR.03 '88 11:48 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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The political universe is entirely different, the distribution of power is different, and the technology of war is different.

Following Mackinder's classic analysis, the United States should be viewed as a small island off the coast of the vastly larger land area, population, and economic potential of the Eurasian land mass. The disproportion is even greater if one adds Africa and its resources to the scale, as one must. Any state which succeeded where Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler failed--succeeded, that is, in controlling the whole of Europe and Russia--would automatically control the Middle East and Africa. The relative power and potential power of Eurasia is far greater than it was in 1914. The Soviet Union, India, and Japan are modern industrial countries and China is moving towards that status with intelligence and determination.

Jefferson's comment about Napoleon's breakfast is more compelling now than when it was made.

It follows that the United States does not have and cannot achieve the capacity to defend its security single handed. Our population is a small and declining fraction of world population, and our gross national product is now down to 22% of world production. That fraction, too, is falling. Geographically, our posture would be hopeless without Great Britain, Japan, and the other island states as allies, as well as coastal states like France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, China, and Germany, at a minimum. Our security problem is like that of Great Britain during the four centuries between the two Queens Elizabeth. Britain was always smaller and weaker than her principal adversaries, the predator states who sought the mastery of Europe in turn. But during that period, Britain skillfully deployed its

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mastery of Europe in turn. But during that period, Britain skillfully deployed its
and weaker than her principal adversaries, the predator states who sought the
the four centuries between the two Queens Elizabeth. Britain was always smaller
to 22% of world production. That fraction, too, is falling. Geographically, our
declining fraction of world population, and our gross national product is now down
capacity to defend its security single handed. Our population is a small and
It follows that the United States does not have and cannot achieve the

it was made.
J Jefferson's comment about Napoleon's breakfast is more compelling now than when
and China is moving towards that status with intelligence and determination.
was in 1814. The Soviet Union, India, and Japan are modern industrial countries
Asia. The relative power and potential power of Eurasia is far greater than it
the whole of Europe and Russia---would automatically control the Middle East and
where Napoleon, the Kaiser, and Hitler failed---succeeded, that is, in controlling
Africa and its resources to the scale, as one must. Any state which succeeded
potential of the Eurasian land mass. The disproportion is even greater if one adds
a small island off the coast of the vastly larger land area, population, and economic
Following Mackinder's classic analysis, the United States should be viewed as
and the technology of war is different.
The political universe is entirely different, the distribution of power is different.

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diplomacy, its armed forces, and its money to prevent Spain, France, and Germany
from becoming too strong.

In the political universe of the late twentieth century, we must do likewise,
that is, we must lead coalitions and alliances to counter and if necessary to defeat
the Soviet bid for dominion. The NATO Allies, Japan, and China in combination
have more than enough power and potential power to prevent the Soviet Union
from gaining control of Western Europe, and thus of China and Japan as well. To
assure the political independence and territorial integrity of those key countries
has therefore been the first strategic goal of American foreign policy since the end
of the Second World War. For as far ahead as we can see, this will necessarily
remain the case. For cognate reasons, the first strategic goal of the Soviet Union
has been and remains to break the ties between the United States and its allies in
the Atlantic and the Pacific Basins, so that it can add those territories to its
empire, and reduce the United States to impotence.

In the long run, the United States and China are the most dangerous obstacles
to the Soviet strategy. At this stage of China's development, Soviet strategic
planners could reasonably conclude that if they succeed in neutralizing the United
States, Europe, China, and Japan would come to heel automatically. If the Soviet
Union gains control of the 300 million people of Western Europe, and of its skills,
capital, productive capacity, and geographical position, China, Japan, and a great
many other countries around the world would conclude that the balance of power
had turned irreversibly against the United States. They would also conclude that
the United States had lost its mind. As a consequence, they would make the best

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the United States had lost its mind. As a consequence, they would make the best
had turned irreversibly against the United States. They would also conclude that
many other countries around the world would conclude that the balance of power
capital, productive capacity, and geographical position, China, Japan, and a great
Union gains control of the 300 million people of Western Europe, and of its skills,
States, Europe, China, and Japan would come to deal automatically, if the Soviet
planners could reasonably conclude that if they succeed in neutralizing the United
to the Soviet strategy. At this stage of China's development, Soviet strategic

the Atlantic and the Pacific Basins, so that it can add those territories to its
has been and remains to break the ties between the United States and its allies in
remain the case. For cogmate reasons, the first strategic goal of the Soviet Union
of the Second World War. For as far ahead as we can see, this will necessarily
has therefore been the first strategic goal of American foreign policy since the end
assure the political independence and territorial integrity of those key countries
from gaining control of Western Europe, and thus of China and Japan as well. To
have more than enough power and potential power to prevent the Soviet Union
the Soviet Union did for dominion. The NATO Alliance, Japan, and China in combination
that is, we must lead coalitions and alliances to counter and if necessary to deter
In the political universe of the late twentieth century, we must do likewise,

from becoming too strong.

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MAR.03 '88 11:50 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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possible accommodation the Soviet Union would allow them, and the United States
would be left helpless and isolated and impotent, too weak to protect its territorial
integrity and political independence, but too strong to be ignored by the Soviet
Union and allowed to remain neutral indefinitely.

Soviet hegemony in Asia would have precisely the same consequences for
Europe and the United States. The Western-oriented nations would face the
nightmare described by Thucydides in the debate between the general of an
invading Athenian military force and the leaders of Melos, a Spartan colony which
sought to remain neutral. The Melians pleaded for mercy in the name of justice.
The Athenian replied:

"You know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by
practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to
compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the
weak accept what they have to accept."

We discovered soon after World War II that safeguarding the independence of the
key states required us also to protect their approaches. The world is round, and nations
can be invested. In the hands of the Soviet Union, South Korea and Taiwan would
threaten both Japan and China; Europe can be outflanked from the North and from the
Mediterranean, the United States from Central America and the Caribbean. For the
United States and the West generally, access to critical raw materials is a matter of
the highest urgency, and the list of such raw materials is getting longer. In fact, no
area of the world can be excluded <u>a priori</u> from the purview of our security concerns,
because nearly all could become significant in the context of Soviet programs of
expansion.

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expansion.

Because nearly all could become significant in the context of Soviet programs of
area of the world can be excluded a priori from the purview of our security concerns,
the highest priority, and the list of such raw materials is getting longer. In fact, no
United States and the West generally, access to critical raw materials is a matter of
Mediterranean, the United States from Central America and the Caribbean. For the
threaten both Japan and China; Europe can be outflanked from the North and from the
can be invested. In the hands of the Soviet Union, South Korea and Taiwan would
key states required us also to protect their approaches. The world is round, and nations
We discovered soon after World War II that safeguarding the independence of the
weak accept what they have to accept."

You know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by
the Pelican and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the
practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to
The Athenians replied:
sought to remain neutral. The Melians pleaded for mercy in the name of justice.
invading Athenian military force and the leaders of Melos, a Spartan colony which
nightmare described by Thucydides in the debate between the general of an
Europe and the United States. The Western-oriented nations would face the
Soviet hegemony in Asia would have precisely the same consequences for
Union and allowed to remain neutral indefinitely.

Integrity and political independence, but too strong to be ignored by the Soviet
would be left helpless and isolated and impotent, too weak to protect its territorial
possible accommodation the Soviet Union would allow them, and the United States

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MAR.03 '88 11:51 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.10

While analysts differ, it is my view that Soviet strategy is one of America first. As I read the tea leaves, the Soviet Union has been and is moving in the first instance against the United States rather than against China. It is seeking to accomplish that end by separating Western Europe from the United States while building up flanking positions of strength in the Caribbean and Central America. This is the objective served by its conventional and nuclear forces, its Middle Eastern and African policy, and its arms control diplomacy. Above all, this hypothesis explains the Soviet enthusiasm for the zero-zero INF agreement, which it regards as a key weapon to denuclearize and neutralize Western Europe.

II.

The second step of my task today is to address the arguments of those who say they fully understand the supreme national interest of the United States in keeping Western Europe, Japan, China and other key countries out of Soviet control, but argue that the United States could safeguard that interest more cheaply and more surely by withdrawing its troops and fleets from Europe and other forward positions, abrogating the security arrangements we made during the administrations of Truman and Eisenhower, and conducting our affairs from the United States. Some of this persuasion think our treaty commitments should continue; all members of the group would end our forward deployments. With or without treaties, they would have us protect our stake in the balance of power by judicious intervention ad hoc, as circumstances required. I shall call supporters of this position "global unilateralists," for convenience.

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this position "global unilaterals" for convenience.

Judicious intervention ad hoc, as circumstances required, I shall call upon all
continuing all members of the group would end out forward deployments. With or
United States. Some of this persuasion think our treaty commitments should
administrations of Truman and Eisenhower, and conducting our affairs from the
other forward positions, apropping the security arrangements we made during the
cheaply and more surely by withdrawing its troops and fleets from Europe and
control, but argue that the United States could safeguard that interest more
keeping Western Europe, Japan, China and other key countries out of Soviet
say they fully understand the supreme national interest of the United States in
the second step of my task today is to address the arguments of those who

II.

weapon to denationalise and neutralise Western Europe.

Soviet enthusiasm for the zero-zero INP agreement, which it regards as a key
policy, and its arms control diplomacy. Above all, this hypothesis explains the
served by its conventional and nuclear forces, its Middle Eastern and African
positions of strength in the Caribbean and Central America. This is the objective
and by separating Western Europe from the United States while building up planning
against the United States rather than against China. It is seeking to accomplish that
As I read the tea leaves, the Soviet Union has been and is moving in the first instance
While analystsitter, it is my view that Soviet strategy is one of America first.

MAR. 03 '88 11:21 KLAASNER ASSOCIATES, MARCH, DC

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MAR.03 '88 11:52 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.11

The global unilateralists are the only group proposing alternative strategies worth discussing. The others ignore the problem of the balance of power altogether, and imagine that the United States could be secure within its own territory, or in a hospitable Western Hemisphere, or in a world where the United States remained allied to Western Europe, or Western Europe plus Japan, and allowed the Soviet Union to dominate the rest. They are the Pied Pipers of the foreign policy debate and their arguments do not merit attention.

The position of the global unilateralists suffers from four fatal weaknesses, in my view. First and primarily, it rests on an inadequate appreciation of the nuclear weapon in general, the mutation nuclear arms have brought about in world affairs, and the nature of Soviet nuclear policy. Secondly, it assumes that in the modern world the United States would have the luxury of waiting for two or three years (or two or three months) before making up its mind that a war somewhere really did affect its security. Third, it ignores the immense geo-political consequences of our worst post-war mistake, our failure to insist on the fulfillment of the Soviet promise at Yalta and Potsdam to allow free elections in Eastern Europe. And finally, it assumes that a policy of abrogating our security arrangements with Canada, Western Europe, Japan, China, Korea, the Philippines, Israel, Pakistan, Thailand, and a number of other countries would save us money and improve the character of our European allies and Japan, whom the global unilateralists excoriate mercilessly--and quite unjustly--as spongers and appeasers whose influence the Soviet leadership exploits to disarm and emasculate the United States.

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United States.

Abbe書 whose influence the Soviet leadership exploits to搞軍和發動戰的
the global unilaterialists exults in militarily--and quite unjustly--its abnegation and
would save us money and improve the character of our European allies and Japan, whom
Korea, the Philippines, Israel, Pakistan, Thailand, and a number of other countries
abrogating our security arrangements with Canada, Western Europe, Japan, China,
allow free elections in Eastern Europe. And finally, it assumes that a policy of
our failure to insist on the fulfillment of the Soviet promise at Yalta and Potsdam to
Thind, it ignores the immense geo-political consequences of our worst post-war mistake,
United States would have the luxury of waiting for two or three years for two or three
nature of Soviet nuclear policy. Secondly, it assumes that in the modern world the
in general, the mutation nuclear arms have brought about in world affairs, and the
view, first and primarily, it rests on an inadequate appreciation of the nuclear weapon
The position of the global unilaterialists mutters from four fatal weaknesses, in my
and their arguments do not merit attention.

Union to dominate the rest. They are the Red Pioneers of the foreign policy debates
silled to Western Europe, or Western Europe plus Japan, and allowed the Soviet
unbearable Western Hemisphere, on a world where the United States remained
imagine that the United States could be secure within its own territory, or in a
discussing. The others ignore the problem of the balance of power altogether, and
The global unilaterialists are the only group proposing alternative strategies worth

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I shall start with the unilateralists' fourth point. Emotionally if not analytically, it is the heart of their case.

Like everybody else, the global unilateralists are frustrated and enraged by the apparently endless character of the Cold War. They discharge their feelings by blaming our friends and associates rather than ourselves and our enemies. It is safer thus, and less dangerous. Every alliance in history has suffered from this disease. Who can forget the slogans of enemy propaganda that England would fight to the last Frenchman and America to the last Russian? The global unilateralists believe, as Angelo Codevilla put it recently, "that if our European and Japanese allies were put on notice that they would bear the primary and final responsibility for their own safety, they would be better able to help themselves and more disposed to help us. Without the psychological and financial burdens of present arrangements, we too would be better able to take care of ourselves and to help our allies in time of real need. This argument," Codevilla adds, "may be mistaken, but it deserves serious consideration."* I fully agree that the argument Codevilla summarizes deserves serious consideration. And I believe it is profoundly mistaken, as he suspects.

The central feature of every article the unilateralists write is the angry charge that our European NATO allies are not paying their fair share of the costs of our common defense. To make their point, those articles tell us that we spend a larger share of our G.N.P. on defense than the allies do. Such charges prove nothing. We spend more than half our military budget on the pay of troops and pensions; our allies,

*Angelo Codevilla, *American Soldiers in Europe: Hostages to Fortune*, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Summer 1987, 89, 92.

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Summer 1987, 88-93.
*Angelo Codevill, *American Soldiers in Europe: Hostages to Hostage*.

abundant more than half our military budget on the pay of troops and pensional our allies, share of our G.N.P. on defense than the allies do. Such charges prove nothing. We common defenses. To make their point, those articles tell us that we spend a larger that our European NATO allies are not paying their fair share of the costs of our The central feature of every article the unilaterals write is the angry charge

profoundly mistaken, as he aspects.

argument Codevill summarizes deserts serious consideration. And I believe it is "may be mistaken, but it deserves serious consideration."* I fully agree that the of ourselves and to help our allies in time of real need. This argument," Codevill adds, and financial burdens of present arrangements, we too would be better able to take care better able to help themselves and more disposed to help us. Without the bayonets would bear the primary and final responsibility for their own safety, they would be but it recently," that it our European and Japanese allies were but on notice that they and America to the last Russians? The global unilaterals believe, as Angelo Codevill toket the signs of enemy propaganda that England would fight to the last Frenchman less dangerous. Every alliance in history has suffered from this disease. Who can our friends and associates rather than ourselves and our enemies. It is safer thus, and abémently endless character of the Cold War. They discharge their feelings by blaming like everybody else, the global unilaterals are frustrated and enraged by the is the heart of their case.

I shall start with the unilaterals' fourth point. Emotionally it not analytically, it

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most of whom have conscription, spend far less. Our military procurement is notoriously expensive, as compared to everyone else's. And we have the nuclear burden, and the cost of defending our interests outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. It is far more significant that the bulk of the troops, planes, tanks, and even ships of the NATO forces are supplied by our allies, not by the United States. In most important categories, that fraction is well over 80%.

But waving the bloody shirt about "burden sharing" is not the most important weakness in the unilateralist case. The fatal flaw in global unilateralism is revealed in the vocabulary Codevilla uses. Two words run through Codevilla's sentences--"them" and "us." He talks about the allies helping "themselves" and helping "us." Those two words are evidence of an unresolved contradiction that runs through the entire literature. The global unilateralists have not really accepted the fact that for United States security policy since 1945 the distinction between "us" and "them" does not exist. When we defend key components of the world balance of power we are not defending "them" but "ourselves." Part of the unilateralist mind is still in the nineteenth century, when the world political system was managed by the Concert of Europe, and the United States for the most part could ignore the problem of its security. The sad fact is that most of the unilateralists give only lip service to the proposition that the balance of power must be the first objective of American foreign policy. None of them has really confronted the fact that the United States cannot achieve that goal alone.

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contrasted the fact that the United States cannot achieve that goal alone. must be the first objective of American foreign policy. None of them has really unilaterallats give only lip service to the proposition that the balance of power could ignore the problem of its security. The said fact is that most of the was managed by the Concert of Europe, and the United States for the most part unilaterallat mind is still in the nineteenth century, when the world political system world balance of power we are not defending "them" but "ourselves." Part of the between "us" and "them" does not exist. When we defend key components of the accepted the fact that for United States security policy since 1945 the distinction runs through the entire literature. The global unilaterallats have not really helping "us." Those two words are evidence of an unresolved contradiction that sentences--"them" and "us." He talks about the allies helping "themselves" and revealed in the vocabulary Codeville uses. Two words run through Codeville's weakness in the unilateralist case. The fatal flaw in global unilateralism is

important categories, that friction is well over 80%, ships of the NATO forces are supplied by our allies, not by the United States. In most Treaty. It is far more significant that the bulk of the troops, planes, tanks, and even and the cost of defending our interests outside the area covered by the North Atlantic notoriously expensive, as compared to everyone else. And we have the nuclear burden, most of whom have conscription, spend far less. Our military procurement is

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It is revealing that the unilateralists never attack Canada for spending less of its national income for defense than the United States, although it would not be difficult to do so. The unilateralists know that we must defend Canada against the Soviet Union in order to defend the United States, however little Canada spends for her own forces. The strategic relationship between Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States in exactly the same as our strategic relationship with Canada or Mexico. The burden sharing argument of the unilateralists is not only wrong. It is irrelevant. Of course fair burden sharing among the allies is to be encouraged, but not by making threats we cannot afford to carry out.

The global unilateralists make another untenable charge against our European allies: that most of them are timid and parochial appeasers whose influence in our affairs prevents us from pursuing a vigorous and effective policy of power politics all over the world. The absurdity of the charge underlines its importance. No one can seriously contend that the United States lacks a large and influential army of entirely native isolationists, illusionists, wishful thinkers, Soviet apologists, appeasers, and assorted doves. It is an insult to them and to the strong Congressional groups which represent them to suggest that they are the puppets of the German Foreign Minister, the United States Foreign Service, or any other popular devils or bugaboos. The slogan "No more Vietnams" is made in America, and it is powerful political medicine. The American people have never achieved an agreed vocabulary for thinking about foreign affairs, and we are still talking and writing about national security policy in terms which would have made Theodore Roosevelt blush. But even so astute and experienced a student as Angelo Codevilla

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Roosevelt blush. But even so astute and experienced a student as Angelo Codevills
writing about national security policy in terms which would have made Theodore
agreed vocabulary for thinking about foreign affairs, and we are still talking and
and it is powerful political medicine. The American people have never achieved an
popular devil or pugnacious. The slogan "No more Vietnam" is made in America.
the German Foreign Minister, the United States Foreign Service, or any other
Congressional Groups which represent them to suggest that they are the pUbIUS of
abbessers, and assorted doves. It is an insult to them and to the strong
entirely native isolationists, illusionists, wishful thinkers, Soviet apologist.
can seriously contend that the United States lacks a large and influential army of
all over the world. The absurdity of the charge underlines its importance. No one
affairs prevents us from putting a vigorous and effective policy of power politics
affairs that most of them are timid and parochial abbessers whose influence in our
The global unilaterals make another untenable charge against our European

but not by making threats we cannot afford to carry our.
is irrelevant. Of course fair burden sharing among the allies is to be encouraged,
or Mexico. The burden sharing argument of the unilaterals is not only wrong. It
and the United States in exactly the same as our strategic relationship with Canada
her own forces. The strategic relationship between Western Europe, Japan, China,
Soviet Union in order to defend the United States, however little Canada spends for
difficult to do so. The unilaterals know that we must defend Canada against the
its national income for defense than the United States, although it would not be
It is revealing that the unilaterals never attack Canada for spending less of

MAR. 03 '08 11:22 K122INKER 82 Associate, NABH DC

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can say that "the U.S. Government, for NATO's sake, has again and again
weakened itself militarily, pulled its punches in the Nicaragua of this world, and,
worst of all, confused its own policy making." Europe should not be made the
scapegoat for our own mistakes. Our errors in Nicaragua, Lebanon, and many other
scenes of recent trouble have been serious and entirely our own.

The model Codevilla and the unilateralists have in mind for United States
strategic policy is that of General de Gaulle, under whom France withdrew from
NATO's integrated command while remaining a signatory of the North Atlantic
Treaty. In that period and since, France has rebuilt its military forces, including a
small modern nuclear force, and pursued a vigorous and seemingly independent
foreign policy.

De Gaulle's example confirms my view of the matter, however, not that of
the global unilateralists. De Gaulle's policy was one of political theatre, designed
to help restore the national pride of France after defeat and occupation during the
Second World War and the painful process of decolonization in Asia and Africa
after the war. No one knew better than de Gaulle that his policy was not in any
sense one of accepting "primary and final responsibility" for the safety of France.
In de Gaulle's time and now, "the primary and final responsibility" for the safety of
France is borne both by France and by France's allies, emphatically including the
United States and its nuclear arsenal. France can eat its Gaullist cake and have
the protection of NATO as well because of its geographical position. It is to the
west of Germany and the main bulk of the NATO integrated command. The
excellent French troops in Germany work in close and harmonious touch with those

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excellent French troops in Germany work in close and harmonious touch with those
west of Germany and the main bulk of the NATO integrated command. The
the protection of NATO as well because of its geographical position. It is to the
United States and its nuclear arsenal, France can eat its Canaanist cake and have
France is borne both by France and by France's allies, emphatically including the
in de Gaulle's time and now, "the primary and final responsibility," for the safety of
sense one of accepting "primary and final responsibility," for the safety of France.
after the war. No one knew better than de Gaulle that his policy was not in any
Second World War and the painful process of decolonization in Asia and Africa
to help restore the national pride of France after defeat and occupation during the
the global unilaterals. De Gaulle's policy was one of political theatre, designed
De Gaulle's example confirms my view of the matter, however, not that of
foreign policy.

small modern nuclear force, and burled a vigorous and seemingly independent
Treaty. In that period and since, France has rebuilt its military forces, including a
NATO's integrated command while remaining a signatory of the North Atlantic
strategic policy is that of General de Gaulle, under whom France withdrew from
The model Codeville and the unilaterals have in mind for United States
scenes of recent trouble have been serious and entirely our own.

scafeboat for our own mistakes. Our errors in Nicaragua, Lebanon, and many other
worst of all, confused its own policy making." Europe should not be made the
weakened itself militarily, pulled its punches in the Nicaragua of this world, and,
can say that "the U.S. Government, for NATO's sake, has again and again

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of France's allies. If the United States should ever be so misguided as to follow de Gaulle's example and withdraw from NATO's integrated command, our security position would not be comparable in any way to that of France today. An American policy of Gaullism would automatically terminate our security arrangements with our European and Asian Allies. Then we should realize that the only super-power behind the United States is the Soviet Union.

"Ah," the unilateralists say, "you forget that France has its own nuclear force de frappe." But the French and British nuclear forces, separately or together, cannot be regarded as a strategic deterrent in relation to the Soviet Union. A Soviet diplomat once commented that from the Soviet point of view, the French and British nuclear forces "are not worth a sand box exercise." In the military sense, that is unquestionably true. Without the full nuclear support of the United States, France and Britain cannot plausibly threaten the Soviet Union with a force which is and will inevitably remain minute in comparison with the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union is too far ahead and its building program has too much momentum to allow Britain and France to contemplate catching up. And, if the United States withdrew from Europe the Soviet Union would never allow France and Great Britain to undertake such an effort. The Soviet reaction would be even more violent and predictable if Germany or Japan sought to become nuclear.

The British and French nuclear forces have a well understood function under circumstances of extreme tension if the United States should happen to have a weak and indecisive President: to start a war the United States would have to finish. It is not an idea we enjoy. But no American, looking back at our record since World War II, can dismiss the policy as irrational.

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The British and French nuclear forces have a well understood function under
the circumstances of extreme tension if the United States should happen to have a
weak and indecisive President to start a war the United States would have to
finish. It is not an idea we enjoy. But no American, looking back at our record

more violent and predictable if Germany or Japan sought to become nuclear.
and Great Britain to undertake such an effort. The Soviet reaction would be even
United States withdraw from Europe the Soviet Union would never allow France
momentum to allow Britain and France to contemplate catching up. And, if the
ennemy. The Soviet Union is too far ahead and its building program has too much
which is and will inevitably remain minute in comparison with the Soviet nuclear
States, France and Britain cannot plausibly threaten the Soviet Union with a force
sense, that is unquestionably true. Without the full nuclear support of the United
and British nuclear forces "are not worth a sand box exercise." In the military
Soviet diplomat once commented that from the Soviet point of view, the French
cannot be regarded as a strategic deterrent in relation to the Soviet Union. A
de trappe." But the French and British nuclear forces, separately or together,
"And," the unilaterals say, "you forget that France has its own nuclear force

only super-power behind the United States is the Soviet Union.
arrangements with our European and Asian allies. Then we should realize that the
American policy of Gaulism would automatically terminate our security
position would not be comparable in any way to that of France today. An
Gaulis's example and withdraw from NATO's integrated command, our security
of France's allies. If the United States should ever be so misguided as to follow de

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There is thus no way in which Japan, China, Western Europe or any other
country or group of countries can meet the challenge of "primary and final
responsibility" for their own safety against the credible menace of a Soviet threat.
The Gaullist metaphor of the global unilateralists rests on illusion about the
nuclear dimension of the security problem.

As Edward Luttwak* remarks

"the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons overshoots by far the culminating point of military utility... [I]t is no longer possible to slight the destructive consequences of any nuclear attack, as the consequences of anticipated cavalry incursions, sieges, or even conventional bombing raids could always be minimized in the past by animal optimism, and by the perceptual asymmetry between war gains vividly imagined and war losses dimly feared. It is the definitive, indeed measurable, character of nuclear destruction rather than the possible but uncertain magnitude of its scope that inhibits the resort to nuclear war. This quality of scientific predictability has altered the millennial terms of comparison between the worth of war aims and their cost. In the presence of nuclear weapons, the perceptual balance that was once achieved only in the midst of war, when its costs were experienced in the flesh, is now in effect before war begins." Luttwak concludes, "even powers amply supplied with nuclear weapons may yet fight 'conventionally' or employ only a few of the smallest weapons as gestures of token effect."

Luttwak's analysis does not suggest that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to war or politics. While the risk of nuclear war, at least among the major industrial countries, is minimal, uncertainty persists. No one can say there is **no** risk of nuclear war, even between the major powers, since these weapons are controlled by human beings or their computers. For countries governed by irrational leaders, of course, the probabilities are different. Therefore the fear of nuclear war, however remote, is and will remain a powerful political force.

* *STRATEGY, THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE* (1987) pp. 60-61.

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STRATEGY, THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE (1981) pp. 80-81.

conceal, the prophecies are different. Therefore the fear of nuclear war, however human beings or their computers. For countries governed by irrational leaders, of nuclear war, even between the major powers, since these weapons are controlled by countries, is minimal, uncertainty predominates. No one can say there is no risk of war or politics. While the risk of nuclear war, at least among the major industrial Luftwak's analysis does not attest that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to token effect."

"even powers imply subbed with nuclear weapons may not fight experienced in the clean, is now in effect before war begins." Luftwak that was once achieved only in the midst of war, when its costs were and their cost. In the presence of nuclear weapons, the perceptual balance altered the millennial terms of comparison between the worth of war aims inhibits the resort to nuclear war. This quality of scientific predictability has destruction rather than the possible but uncertain magnitude of its scope that dimly feared. It is the definitive, indeed measurable, character of nuclear perceptual asymmetry between war gains vividly imagined and war losses could always be minimized in the past by animal optimism, and by the anticipated cavity incursions, sieges, or even conventional bombing raids destructive consequences of any nuclear attack, as the consequence of culminating point of military utility... [it] is no longer possible to slight the "the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons overshoots by far the

As Edward Luftwak, remarks

The Gaullist metaphor of the global unilaterals rests on illusion about the
responsibility" for their own safety against the credible menace of a Soviet threat.
country or group of countries can meet the challenge of "primary and final

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Both the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals exist therefore not primarily as military instruments to be used in war, but as sources of political influence designed to deter. To deter what? It is generally assumed that Soviet and American policies are the same in this respect. But they are not. There is a fundamental difference between the Soviet and American concepts of deterrence. The United States builds its weapons in order to deter Soviet conventional or nuclear attacks or threats against the vital interests of the United States. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, regards its nuclear weapons as the ultimate sanction behind its program of expansion. The Soviet nuclear force is configured to deter any resistance to Soviet expansion, and above all to persuade the United States to remain neutral in the event of Soviet threats or attacks against third countries or against the United States itself. In short the Soviet Union seeks to use its nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression, while United States nuclear doctrine treats our forces as a defensive shield against aggression.

The global unilateralists tell us that the threat of American nuclear retaliation even against Soviet moves against our most vital interests has lost all credibility. They argue that the Soviet leaders "know" we would never use nuclear weapons and face a nuclear reply from the larger, more modern, and more sophisticated Soviet nuclear arsenal. Therefore, they urge us to pull back from forward deployments and reduce our forces.

It is hard to imagine a more dramatic demonstration of the political effect of military power. It is breath-taking to find the global unilateralists, many of whom

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military power. It is prehensile to find the global unilaterals, many of whom
It is hard to imagine a more dramatic demonstration of the political effect of

sophisticated Soviet nuclear arsenals. Therefore, they urge us to build back from
-weapons and take a nuclear reply from the larger, more modern, and more
credibility. They argue that the Soviet leaders "know" we would never use nuclear
retaliation even against Soviet moves against our most vital interests has lost all
The global unilaterals tell us that the threat of American nuclear

goodline treats our forces as a defensive shield against aggression.
its nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression, while United States nuclear
countries or against the United States itself. In short the Soviet Union seeks to use
States to remain neutral in the event of Soviet threats or attacks against third
deter any resistance to Soviet expansion, and above all to persuade the United
sanction behind its program of expansion. The Soviet nuclear force is committed to
Soviet Union, on the other hand, regards its nuclear weapons as the ultimate
nuclear attacks or threats against the vital interests of the United States. The
The United States builds its weapons in order to deter Soviet conventional or
fundamental difference between the Soviet and American concepts of deterrence.
American policies are the same in this respect. But they are not. There is a
-deigned to deter. To deter what? It is generally assumed that Soviet and
as military instruments to be used in war, but as sources of political influence
Both the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals exist therefore not primarily

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are intellectuals of impeccable anti-communist credentials, enthusiastically
following the Soviet line, but that is what they are doing. They propose precisely
the policy the Soviet Union has been trying for a generation to induce the West to
adopt. We should recognize and accept the correlation of forces, the Soviets say,
and duly pay tribute to our suzerain, like every other subject people in history.

Such defeatism is premature. The threat of nuclear retaliation still restrains
the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior, even in recent years, belies the unilateralist
hypothesis. The Soviets are pursuing an enveloping strategy in the Third World
precisely because they do not dare to threaten the great centers of Western power
directly. The strength of the West is more than sufficient to maintain and fortify
both our nuclear and our conventional strength, and that fact is clearly still a
restraint on Soviet adventurism.

Henry Kissinger was quite right to say that "no great power commits suicide for an ally." No power, great or small, willingly commits suicide at all. So long as we retain a credible nuclear retaliatory capacity, the issue will not arise. And no American President ought to be put into the position of having to choose between capitulation and the use of the nuclear weapon. That is why the Soviet-American nuclear equation is so important.

If we allow the Soviet Union to achieve crushing nuclear superiority, of
course, we shall have no choice but to accept defeat without war. Under such

19

["19", "course, we shall have no choice but to accept defeat without war. Under such\nIf we allow the Soviet Union to achieve crushing nuclear superiority, of", "nuclear education is so important.\n\nAmerican President ought to be put into the position of having to choose between we retain a credible nuclear retaliatory capacity, the issue will not arise. And no for an ally.\" No power, great or small, willingly commits suicide at all. So long as Henry Kissinger was quite right to say that \"no great power commits suicide", "restraint on Soviet adventurism,\nboth our nuclear and our conventional strength, and that fact is clearly still a\ndirectly. The strength of the West is more than sufficient to maintain and fortify\nprecisely because they do not dare to threaten the great centers of Western power\nnuclei. The Soviets are pursuing an enveloping strategy in the Third World\nthe Soviet Union. Soviet behavior, even in recent years, belies the unilateralist\nSuch defeatism is premature. The threat of nuclear retaliation still restrains", "and duly pay tribute to our sustainability, like every other subject people in history.\nWe should recognise and accept the correlation of forces, the Soviets say,\nthe policy the Soviet Union has been trying for a generation to induce the West to\nfollowing the Soviet line, but that is what they are doing. They propose precisely\nare intellectuals of impeccable anti-communist credentials, autonomously", "MAR.03 .88 15:00 K122119R 820CCIR1E2.1.001.1.002.1.003.1.004.1.005.1.006.1.007.1.008.1.009.1.010.1.011.1.012.1.013.1.014.1.015.1.016.1.017.1.018.1.019.1.020.1.021.1.022.1.023.1.024.1.025.1.026.1.027.1.028.1.029.1.030.1.031.1.032.1.033.1.034.1.035.1.036.1.037.1.038.1.039.1.040.1.041.1.042.1.043.1.044.1.045.1.046.1.047.1.048.1.049.1.050.1.051.1.052.1.053.1.054.1.055.1.056.1.057.1.058.1.059.1.060.1.061.1.062.1.063.1.064.1.065.1.066.1.067.1.068.1.069.1.070.1.071.1.072.1.073.1.074.1.075.1.076.1.077.1.078.1.079.1.080.1.081.1.082.1.083.1.084.1.085.1.086.1.087.1.088.1.089.1.090.1.091.1.092.1.093.1.094.1.095.1.096.1.097.1.098.1.099.1.100.1.101.1.102.1.103.1.104.1.105.1.106.1.107.1.108.1.109.1.110.1.111.1.112.1.113.1.114.1.115.1.116.1.117.1.118.1.119.1.120.1.121.1.122.1.123.1.124.1.125.1.126.1.127.1.128.1.129.1.130.1.131.1.132.1.133.1.134.1.135.1.136.1.137.1.138.1.139.1.140.1.141.1.142.1.143.1.144.1.145.1.146.1.147.1.148.1.149.1.150.1.151.1.152.1.153.1.154.1.155.1.156.1.157.1.158.1.159.1.160.1.161.1.162.1.163.1.164.1.165.1.166.1.167.1.168.1.169.1.170.1.171.1.172.1.173.1.174.1.175.1.176.1.177.1.178.1.179.1.180.1.181.1.182.1.183.1.184.1.185.1.186.1.187.1.188.1.189.1.190.1.191.1.192.1.193.1.194.1.195.1.196.1.197.1.198.1.199.1.200.1.201.1.202.1.203.1.204.1.205.1.206.1.207.1.208.1.209.1.210.1.211.1.212.1.213.1.214.1.215.1.216.1.217.1.218.1.219.1.220.1.221.1.222.1.223.1.224.1.225.1.226.1.227.1.228.1.229.1.230.1.231.1.232.1.233.1.234.1.235.1.236.1.237.1.238.1.239.1.240.1.241.1.242.1.243.1.244.1.245.1.246.1.247.1.248.1.249.1.250.1.251.1.252.1.253.1.254.1.255.1.256.1.257.1.258.1.259.1.260.1.261.1.262.1.263.1.264.1.265.1.266.1.267.1.268.1.269.1.270.1.271.1.272.1.273.1.274.1.275.1.276.1.277.1.278.1.279.1.280.1.281.1.282.1.283.1.284.1.285.1.286.1.287.1.288.1.289.1.290.1.291.1.292.1.293.1.294.1.295.1.296.1.297.1.298.1.299.1.300.1.301.1.302.1.303.1.304.1.305.1.306.1.307.1.308.1.309.1.310.1.311.1.312.1.313.1.314.1.315.1.316.1.317.1.318.1.319.1.320.1.321.1.322.1.323.1.324.1.325.1.326.1.327.1.328.1.329.1.330.1.331.1.332.1.333.1.334.1.335.1.336.1.337.1.338.1.339.1.340.1.341.1.342.1.343.1.344.1.345.1.346.1.347.1.348.1.349.1.350.1.351.1.352.1.353.1.354.1.355.1.356.1.357.1.358.1.359.1.360.1.361.1.362.1.363.1.364.1.365.1.366.1.367.1.368.1.369.1.370.1.371.1.372.1.373.1.374.1.375.1.376.1.377.1.378.1.379.1.380.1.381.1.382.1.383.1.384.1.385.1.386.1.387.1.388.1.389.1.390.1.391.1.392.1.393.1.394.1.395.1.396.1.397.1.398.1.399.1.400.1.401.1.402.1.403.1.404.1.405.1.406.1.407.1.408.1.409.1.410.1.411.1.412.1.413.1.414.1.415.1.416.1.417.1.418.1.419.1.420.1.421.1.422.1.423.1.424.1.425.1.426.1.427.1.428.1.429.1.430.1.431.1.432.1.433.1.434.1.435.1.436.1.437.1.438.1.439.1.440.1.441.1.442.1.443.1.444.1.445.1.446.1.447.1.448.1.449.1.450.1.451.1.452.1.453.1.454.1.455.1.456.1.457.1.458.1.459.1.460.1.461.1.462.1.463.1.464.1.465.1.466.1.467.1.468.1.469.1.470.1.471.1.472.1.473.1.474.1.475.1.476.1.477.1.478.1.479.1.480.1.481.1.482.1.483.1.484.1.485.1.486.1.487.1.488.1.489.1.490.1.491.1.492.1.493.1.494.1.495.1.496.1.497.1.498.1.499.1.500.1.501.1.502.1.503.1.504.1.505.1.506.1.507.1.508.1.509.1.510.1.511.1.512.1.513.1.514.1.515.1.516.1.517.1.518.1.519.1.520.1.521.1.522.1.523.1.524.1.525.1.526.1.527.1.528.1.529.1.530.1.531.1.532.1.533.1.534.1.535.1.536.1.537.1.538.1.539.1.540.1.541.1.542.1.543.1.544.1.545.1.546.1.547.1.548.1.549.1.550.1.551.1.552.1.553.1.554.1.555.1.556.1.557.1.558.1.559.1.560.1.561.1.562.1.563.1.564.1.565.1.566.1.567.1.568.1.569.1.570.1.571.1.572.1.573.1.574.1.575.1.576.1.577.1.578.1.579.1.580.1.581.1.582.1.583.1.584.1.585.1.586.1.587.1.588.1.589.1.590.1.591.1.592.1.593.1.594.1.595.1.596.1.597.1.598.1.599.1.600.1.601.1.602.1.603.1.604.1.605.1.606.1.607.1.608.1.609.1.610.1.611.1.612.1.613.1.614.1.615.1.616.1.617.1.618.1.619.1.620.1.621.1.622.1.623.1.624.1.625.1.626.1.627.1.628.1.629.1.630.1.631.1.632.1.633.1.634.1.635.1.636.1.637.1.638.1.639.1.640.1.641.1.642.1.643.1.644.1.645.1.646.1.647.1.648.1.649.1.650.1.651.1.652.1.653.1.654.1.655.1.656.1.657.1.658.1.659.1.660.1.661.1.662.1.663.1.664.1.665.1.666.1.667.1.668.1.669.1.670.1.671.1.672.1.673.1.674.1.675.1.676.1.677.1.678.1.679.1.680.1.681.1.682.1.683.1.684.1.685.1.686.1.687.1.688.1.689.1.690.1.691.1.692.1.693.1.694.1.695.1.696.1.697.1.698.1.699.1.700.1.701.1.702.1.703.1.704.1.705.1.706.1.707.1.708.1.709.1.710.1.711.1.712.1.713.1.714.1.715.1.716.1.717.1.718.1.719.1.720.1.721.1.722.1.723.1.724.1.725.1.726.1.727.1.728.1.729.1.730.1.731.1.732.1.733.1.734.1.735.1.736.1.737.1.738.1.739.1.740.1.741.1.742.1.743.1.744.1.745.1.746.1.747.1.748.1.749.1.750.1.751.1.752.1.753.1.754.1.755.1.756.1.757.1.758.1.759.1.760.1.761.1.762.1.763.1.764.1.765.1.766.1.767.1.768.1.769.1.770.1.771.1.772.1.773.1.774.1.775.1.776.1.777.1.778.1.779.1.780.1.781.1.782.1.783.1.784.1.785.1.786.1.787.1.788.1.789.1.790.1.791.1.792.1.793.1.794.1.795.1.796.1.797.1.798.1.799.1.800.1.801.1.802.1.803.1.804.1.805.1.806.1.807.1.808.1.809.1.810.1.811.1.812.1.813.1.814.1.815.1.816.1.817.1.818.1.819.1.820.1.821.1.822.1.823.1.824.1.825.1.826.1.827.1.828.1.829.1.830.1.831.1.832.1.833.1.834.1.835.1.836.1.837.1.838.1.839.1.840.1.841.1.842.1.843.1.844.1.845.1.846.1.847.1.848.1.849.1.850.1.851.1.852.1.853.1.854.1.855.1.856.1.857.1.858.1.859.1.860.1.861.1.862.1.863.1.864.1.865.1.866.1.867.1.868.1.869.1.870.1.871.1

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circumstances, the Soviet Union would be able decisively to exploit the political effects of what Luttwak calls "the perceptual balance" between the putative gains and costs of war.

This is one of the many reasons why the counsel of those who advocate pulling our troops and fleets out of forward positions in Europe and Asia is so dangerous. Their emphasis on the money to be saved by such a course raises serious question about whether they are "global unilateralists" in fact, or old fashioned isolationists in a new costume. Both our allies and our adversary know that under the circumstances of modern war, forces which would take months or years to assemble, train, mobilize, equip and transport, have no military significance, especially as a deterrent. If the unilateralists were serious about maintaining the balance of power, their policy would cost us more money, not less. It would require more forces and more transport to deter the Soviet Union from Kansas and Texas than from forward bases in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. And such methods are inherently less credible and reliable than the present system, for all its faults. Forward deployment is the only rational policy for a strategy of deterrence. Our formidable armored divisions are more useful either as a deterrent or as a fighting force in Germany than in the United States. Moreover, they cost less to maintain abroad than at home, because many facilities are supplied by our allies.

The prospective zero-zero INF agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, reinforced by the American performance at Reykjavik, has stirred powerful tides of anxiety, neutralism, and nationalism in Europe, in China, and in

20

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powerful ties of anxiety, neutrality, and nationalism in Europe, in China, and in United States, reinforced by the American performance at Reykjavik, has stirred the prospective zero-zero INF agreement between the Soviet Union and the

subplied by our allies.
they cost less to maintain abroad than at home, because many facilities are
deterrent or as a fighting force in Germany than in the United States. Moreover,
deterrence. Our formidable armored divisions are more useful either as a
for all its tariffs. Forward deployment is the only rational policy for a strategy of
And such methods are inherently less credible and reliable than the present system.
Kansas and Texas than from forward bases in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
It would require more forces and more transport to deter the Soviet Union from
maintaining the balance of power, their policy would cost us more money, not less.
significance, especially as a deterrent. If the unilaterals were serious about
years to assemble, train, mobilize, equip and transport, have no military
that under the circumstances of modern war, forces which would take months or
tasked off isolationists in a new costume. Both our allies and our adversary know
serious question about whether they are "global unilaterals" in fact, or old
dangerous. Their embassies on the money to be saved by such a course raises
busting our troops and fleets out of forward positions in Europe and Asia is so
This is one of the many reasons why the counsel of those who advocates
and costs of war.

and costs of war.
effects of what Luttwak calls "the perceptual balance" between the putative gains
circumstances, the Soviet Union would be able decisively to exploit the political

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Japan. Against that background, an American policy of withdrawal and demobilization would be perceived everywhere as one of retreat to isolation and neutrality. The American nuclear guaranty would lose credibility; Western Europe, Japan, China, and many other countries would move towards neutrality, at a minimum, or move towards Gaullism and militarism; and the United States would be truly isolated and at the mercy of events.

Even a hint or expectation of an American withdrawal from forward positions in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East would have another consequence: it would necessarily trigger the rapid spread of nuclear weapons and the breakdown of the regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1967. The influence of that Treaty has not been negligible. There are many fewer nuclear powers today than most observers thought likely twenty years ago, when the Treaty was signed. And the Treaty is supported by powerful political instincts throughout the world. Adopting the unilaterists' policy would release a political fire storm far more serious than the controversy over the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. But if the United States reduced its forces abroad, many countries which now rely on the nuclear power of the United States would feel driven to become nuclear powers themselves. I know of no government and no responsible political party in any allied country which would favor such a development. In my experience, the feeling against nuclear proliferation is stronger in Germany and in Japan than in any other nations. The nuclearization of those two countries would arouse fears and passions both among the German and Japanese peoples and elsewhere. The world political system would become far more volatile and unpredictable. And the Soviet Union would have a

21

31

Soviet Union would have a
world political system would become far more volatile and unpredictable. And the
and passions both among the German and Japanese peoples and elsewhere. The
any other nations. The nuclearization of those two countries would arouse fears
feeling against nuclear proliferation is stronger in Germany and in Japan than in
slied country which would favor such a development. In my experience, the
themselves. I know of no Government and no responsible political party in any
power of the United States would feel driven to become nuclear powers
States reduced its forces abroad, many countries which now rely on the nuclear
the unilaterals' policy would release a political fire storm far more serious than
Treaty is supported by powerful political instruments throughout the world. Adopting
observers thought likely twenty years ago, when the Treaty was signed. And the
not been negligible. There are many fewer nuclear powers today than most
regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1985. The influence of that Treaty has
necessarily triggered the rapid spread of nuclear weapons and the breakdown of the
in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East would have another consequence: it would

be truly isolated and at the mercy of events.
minimum, or move towards Gaullism and militarism; and the United States would
Japan, China, and many other countries would move towards neutrality, at a
neutrality. The American nuclear guaranty would lose credibility; Western Europe,
demobilization would be perceived everywhere as one of retreat to isolation and
Japan. Against that background, an American policy of withdrawal and

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plausible excuse for attacking Germany and Japan under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that nothing in the Charter "shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy "of any signatory of the Charter," taken or authorized as a result of that war by the government having responsibility for such action.

With a sublime indifference to history and political feeling, the global unilateralists are not only willing but eager to take this step, which is necessarily a central feature of their policy. That it would be imprudent is obvious. It would in fact be far worse than imprudent. Coupled with a zero-option INF Treaty and an American withdrawal of conventional forces from Europe and the Far East, it would risk global war under circumstances that could neither be predicted nor controlled.

There is no conceivable reason to run such a risk. The far-ranging American impulse to retreat, caused in large part by the fear of nuclear war, has an ironic dimension. As an isolated "neutral" state, we should have to maintain at least as large a nuclear arsenal as we do now. The unstated assumption behind the arguments of the global unilateralists is that while we may not have enough nuclear weapons to protect Europe, China, or Japan, we surely have enough to protect our own territory. Their assumption is wrong. The retaliatory nuclear force required to keep the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, China, or Japan is mathematically the same as that required to prevent attacks on the United States itself. The force required for nuclear deterrence is determined by the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, not by the particular target chosen for a Soviet attack.

This is one of the

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33

This is one of the forces of the Soviet Union, not by the particular target chosen for a Soviet attack. It is the force required for nuclear deterrence is determined by the nuclear mathematically the same as that required to prevent attacks on the United States to keep the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, China, or Japan is own territory. Their assumption is wrong. The retaliatory nuclear force required weapons to protect Europe, China, or Japan, we surely have enough to protect our arguments of the Global unilaterals is that while we may not have enough nuclear large a nuclear arsenal as we do now. The unanticipated assumption behind the dimension. As an isolated "neutral" state, we should have to maintain at least as immense to retreat, caused in large part by the fear of nuclear war, has an incentive there is no conceivable reason to run such a risk. The far-ranging American

controlled.

would risk global war under circumstances that could neither be predicted nor American withdrawal of conventional forces from Europe and the Far East, it fact be far worse than imprudent. Coupled with a zero-obligation UN Treaty and an central feature of their policy. That it would be imprudent is obvious. It would in unilaterals are not only willing but eager to take this step, which is necessarily a With a sublime inditference to history and political feeling, the Global

that was by the government having responsibility for such action.

been an enemy, "of any alignment of the Charter," taken or authorised as a result of preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has Nations Charter, which provides that nothing in the Charter "shall invalidate or blamable excuse for attacking Germany and Japan under Article 101 of the United

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most important lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Because we had full
nuclear retaliatory capability then, the Soviet Union could not have opposed an
American invasion of Cuba, and therefore withdrew its missiles in the face of
American preparations for an invasion. If the nuclear balance were unfavorable to
the United States, could we oppose a Soviet landing in Florida?

The global unilateralists have one more arrow in their quiver: S.D.I. They
write as if S.D.I. were a magic solution for all our ills. The problem of missile
defenses is important and urgent, but missile defense systems are not and can
never be an alternative strategy for protecting the security of the United States,
for making offensive nuclear weapons obsolete, or for eliminating the need to
maintain the balance of power. Even a perfect S.D.I. astrodome could not make a
policy of neutrality safe for the United States standing alone. And there are no
present prospects for a perfect astrodome.

The Soviet Union has been testing and developing anti-missile defenses since
1948. The Soviet program has been carried forward steadily and on a large scale.
The Soviet scientists and engineers have made impressive progress, and are far
ahead of the United States, which greatly reduced its efforts in the field after the
A.B.M. Treaty was ratified in 1972. Indeed, the Soviet Union has recently
modernized the A.B.M system around Moscow, the only functioning A.B.M. system
in the world, and tested anti-satellite weapons, laser weapons, and other defensive
systems based on novel technologies. One of its major objectives in the SALT I
negotiations in 1972 was to stop American research and development in this field.
All the portents indicate that a major Soviet goal in the present nuclear arms
negotiations is to derail the American and allied S.D.I. effort, thus preserving the

23

23

negotiations is to detail the American and allied S.D.I. effort, thus preserving the
All the portents indicate that a major Soviet goal in the present nuclear arms
negotiations in 1975 was to stop American research and development in this field.
systems based on novel technologies. One of its major objectives in the SALT I
in the world, and tested anti-satellite weapons, laser weapons, and other defensive
modernized the A.B.M. system around Moscow, the only functioning A.B.M. system
A.B.M. Treaty was ratified in 1973. Indeed, the Soviet Union has recently
ahead of the United States, which greatly reduced its efforts in the field after the
The Soviet scientists and engineers have made impressive progress, and are far
 ahead of the United States, has been carried forward steadily and on a large scale.
The Soviet Union has been testing and developing anti-missile defenses since

present prospects for a perfect astrodome.
policy of neutrality safe for the United States standing alone. And there are no
maintain the balance of power. Even a perfect S.D.I. astrodome could not make a
for making offensive nuclear weapons obsolete, or for eliminating the need to
never be an alternative strategy for protecting the security of the United States,
defenses is important and urgent, but missile defense systems are not and can
write as if S.D.I. were a magic solution for all our problems. The problem of missile
The global unilaterals have one more arrow in their quiver: S.D.I. They

the United States, could we oppose a Soviet landing in Florida?
American preparations for an invasion. If the nuclear balance were unfavorable to
American invasion of Cuba, and therefore withdrew its missiles in the face of
nuclear retaliatory capability then, the Soviet Union could not have opposed an
most important lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Because we had full

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Soviet Union's virtual monopoly in defensive systems.

Missile defenses should be viewed as an integral part of the Soviet-American
nuclear equation. If both sides had equal offensive systems, but one had a
moderately effective system of defense against ballistic missiles, the side having
defenses would have what amounts to a first strike capacity. The other side would
know it, and would therefore yield without actually fighting. In the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962, the Soviet leaders retreated because our overwhelming nuclear
retaliatory capacity at the time made it impossible for them to threaten to use
their nuclear weapons. Equally, and for the same reason, our nuclear power made
it possible for us to invade Cuba effectively with conventional forces. When
President Kennedy demonstrated his willingness to invade Cuba with conventional
forces, the Soviets drew back.

The United States has no choice but to go forward with the S.D.I. program. It
cannot leave the field entirely to the Soviet Union, and it must act soon or fall so
far behind as to be in a position of hopeless weakness. A reasonably effective
American S.D.I. program should help restore the credibility of the American
retaliatory deterrent against Soviet aggressive moves in third countries, or against
the territories or armed forces of the United States.

On the other hand, there can be no stability in the nuclear environment unless
the Soviet Union and the United States reach agreement on all three phases of the

24

On the other hand, there can be no stability in the nuclear environment unless
the territories or armed forces of the United States.

retaliatory deterrent against Soviet aggressive moves in third countries, or against
American S.D.I. program should help restore the credibility of the American
tar behind us to be in a position of hopeless weakness. A reasonably effective
cannot leave the field entirely to the Soviet Union, and it must act soon or fall so
The United States has no choice but to go forward with the S.D.I. program. It

President Kennedy demonstrated his willingness to invade Cuba with conventional
it possible for us to invade Cuba effectively with conventional forces. When
their nuclear weapons. Equally, and for the same reason, our nuclear power, made
tet shadow capacity at the time made it impossible for them to threaten to use
Crisis of 1962, the Soviet leaders retreated because our overwhelming nuclear
know it, and would therefore yield without actually fighting. In the Cuban Missile
defenses would have what amounts to a first strike capacity. The other side would
moderately effective system of defense against ballistic missiles, the side having
nuclear equation. It both sides had equal offensive systems, but one had a
Missile defenses should be viewed as an integral part of the Soviet-American

MAR. 03 . BB 15:02 K122INGR #2 Associate. WHAH. DC

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MAR.03 '88 12:06 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

nuclear equation--intermediate range and intercontinental offensive weapons and defensive systems as well. With the advance of technology, the A.B.M. Treaty is becoming obsolete. There can be no progress towards nuclear calm unless the Soviet Union accepts the principle of deterrence as the United States defines it, and gives up its frantic drive for nuclear superiority. Even a nuclear agreement based on the American view of deterrence would be worthless if it were regarded as a license for Soviet expansion accomplished by the aggressive use of conventional weapons, proxy wars, guerrillas, and subversion.

The strong regional combinations we have helped organize since 1947 to thwart the Soviet bid for mastery thus have a powerful internal coherence. There is no escape from their logic. Only the United States can frustrate the formidable nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union, so the United States is an indispensable member of each combination. And only by maintaining its nuclear quaranty for its allies and other vital interests can the United States sustain the balance of power on which its own primitive safety depends.

Inability and other vital interests can the United States sustain the balance of power
member of each combination. And only by maintaining its nuclear quantity for its
nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union, so the United States is an indispensable
is no escape from their logic. Only the United States can frustrate the formidable
thwart the Soviet bid for mastery thus have a powerful internal coherence. There
The strong regional combinations we have helped organize since 1947 to
conventional weapons, proxy wars, guerrillas, and annexions,
as a license for Soviet expansion accomplished by the aggressive use of
based on the American view of deterrence would be worthless if it were regarded
and gives up its tragic drive for nuclear superiority. Even a nuclear agreement
Soviet Union accepts the principle of deterrence as the United States defines it,
becoming obsolete. There can be no progress towards nuclear calm unless the
defensive systems as well. With the advance of technology, the A.B.M. Treaty is
nuclear equation--intermediate range and intercontinental offensive weapons and

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25

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III.

The angry, passionate argument for a policy of global internationalism thus vanishes upon examination, destroyed by its contradictions.

It professes to be based on a full acceptance of the view that the most vital security interest of the United States is to keep Western Europe, Japan, China, Canada, South Korea, and certain other countries out of Soviet hands. But its advocates are willing to withdraw American forces from forward bases <u>and to demobilize them</u>; only by demobilizing those forces could we hope to save the $100 billion or more the unilateralists claim we spend in the defense of Europe, and correspondingly large sums we spend for forward deployments elsewhere.

The argument that the economic troubles of the United States are caused by the level of our defense expenditures, especially in Europe, is without substance. Our military budget absorbs 5% or 6% of our G.N.P., a level far below war time mobilization levels, and comfortably within the capacity of our expanding economy. According to the best estimates available to me, the Soviet Union is now spending nearly 20% of a smaller G.N.P. on its military budget. That figure is rising towards 25%. The United States, like other advanced industrial countries, must adjust its output patterns in accordance with the principle of comparative advantage. The inefficiency of our adjustment process is not caused by military spending, but by a low level of savings, poor business management, inadequate entrepreneurship, an appalling performance by the government in the field of fiscal

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entrepreneurship, an appealing performance by the government in the field of fiscal
abending, but by a low level of savings, poor business management, inadequate
advantage. The inefficiency of our adjustment process is not caused by military
must adjust its output patterns in accordance with the principle of comparative
rising towards 25%. The United States, like other advanced industrial countries,
abending nearly 50% of a smaller G.N.P. on its military budget. That figure is
economy. According to the best estimates available to me, the Soviet Union is now
mobilitation levels, and comfortably within the capacity of our expanding
Our military budget absorbs 3% or 8% of our G.N.P., a level far below war time
the level of our defense expenditures, especially in Europe, is without substance.
The argument that the economic troubles of the United States are caused by
correspondingly large annua we spend for forward deployments elsewhere.
pillion or more the unilaterals claim we spend in the defense of Europe, and
demobilize them; only by demobilising those forces could we hope to save the 2100
advocates are willing to withdraw American forces from forward bases and to
Canada, South Korea, and certain other countries out of Soviet hands. But its
security interest of the United States is to keep Western Europe, Japan, China,
if it professes to be based on a full acceptance of the view that the most vital
vanishes upon examination, destroyed by its contradictions.
The angry, passionate argument for a policy of global internationalism thus
III.

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policy, and a deteriorating educational establishment. The policy proposals of the global unilateralists could make no contribution towards restoring the American balance of payments and the international competitiveness of the American economy in general.

Codevilla calls the unilateralists' withdrawal proposal a bet. It is a bet the United States cannot win. The unilateralists believe that if we undertake to withdraw from Europe and other forward bases, Europe, Japan, China, and other countries under our protection will replace American conventional and nuclear forces with conventional and nuclear forces of their own, so that deterrence will be maintained at least at its present level, and American forces could be demobilized or used unilaterally in dealing with Third World hostilities. It would of course be easy for Europe or Japan to replace American conventional forces. But there is no conceivable way in which Japan or Western Europe could replace the American nuclear forces, because the Soviet Union is so far ahead of Britain and France, and is most unlikely to allow Britain and France, and especially West Germany and Japan, to become formidable nuclear powers if the United States withdrew its forces and signalled a retreat to neutrality. Without nuclear forces capable of offsetting and neutralizing the Soviet nuclear arsenal, neither our erstwhile allies nor the United States itself could use conventional forces against those of the Soviet Union. Under those circumstances, resistance being manifestly impossible, it would not occur.

If our Allies fail to meet the challenge of duplicating the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the global unilateralists would have the United States wash its hands of their defense and allow them to be drawn into the Soviet sphere as unworthy partners who deserve the fate of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Finland.

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partners who deserve the fate of Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Finland. Their defense and allow them to be drawn into the Soviet sphere as unworthy allies, the global unilaterals would have the United States wash its hands of it. Our Allies fail to meet the challenge of duplicating the Soviet nuclear

it would not occur.
Soviet Union. Under those circumstances, resistance being manifestly impossible, not the United States itself could use conventional forces against those of the offsetting and neutralizing the Soviet nuclear arsenals, neither our eratwhile allies forces and signalled a retreat to neutrality. Without nuclear forces capable of Japan, to become formidable nuclear powers if the United States withdrew its is most unlikely to allow Britain and France, and especially West Germany and nuclear forces, because the Soviet Union is so far ahead of Britain and France, and conceivable way in which Japan or Western Europe could replace the American easy for Europe or Japan to replace American conventional forces. But there is no or used unilaterally in dealing with Third World hostilities. It would of course be maintained at least at its present level, and American forces could be demobilized forces with conventional and nuclear forces of their own, so that deterrence will be countries under our protection will replace American conventional and nuclear withdraw from Europe and other forward bases, Europe, Japan, China, and other United States cannot win. The unilaterals believe that if we undertake to Codeville calls the unilaterals' withdrawal proposal a pet. It is a pet the economy in general.

balance of payments and the international competitiveness of the American Global unilaterals could make no contribution towards restoring the American policy, and a deteriorating educational establishment. The policy proposals of the

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MAR.03 '88 12:08 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

This is the step the United States should never take. If the unilateralists really accepted the balance of power principle, they could never propose so dangerous a bet.

Nor do the global unilateralists explain why, even if their dreams came true, it would be preferable from the point of view of American security to have the countries of the free world fragmented into a series of separate nuclear regional combinations rather than linked with each other in a more and more coordinated community based ultimately on American nuclear power. It would seem obvious in the light of historical experience that since the United States would inevitably be drawn into the general convulsions of the world state system, as was the case during the Napoleonic Wars and both World Wars, it would be infinitely better that we participate fully and actively in the preliminary diplomacy of such convulsions rather than delegate the task entirely to our allies. It would seem equally apparent, at a time when country after country throughout the world is moving massively away from socialism towards capitalism, that it would make no sense to dissolve the pluralist Western community based on the power of the capitalist state system.

Both the World Wars of this century could have been prevented by wise and vigorous diplomacy backed by adequate force. Those wars did catastrophic damage to the fabric of civilization. Beyond even the deaths and injuries of service men and civilians and the destruction of cities and towns, millions of refugees were forced to wander the earth; Fascism and Communism emerged from the ruins; and totalitarian government challenged the concept of social order governed by just

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totalitarian government challenged the concept of social order governed by just
forced to wander the earth. Fascism and Communism emerged from the ruin and
and civilians and the destruction of cities and towns, millions of refugees were
to the fabric of civilization. Beyond even the deaths and injuries of service men
vigorous diplomacy backed by adequate force. Those wars did catastrophic damage
Both the World Wars of this century could have been prevented by wise and

disolate the pluralist Western community based on the power of the capitalist state
massively away from socialism towards capitalism, that it would make no sense to
apparent, at a time when country after country throughout the world is moving
rather than delegate the task entirely to our allies. It would seem equally
we participate fully and actively in the preliminary diplomacy of such convulsions
during the Napoleonic Wars and both World Wars, it would be infinitely better that
drawn into the general convulsions of the world state system, as was the case
the light of historical experience that since the United States would inevitably be
community based ultimately on American nuclear power. It would seem obvious in
combinations rather than linked with each other in a more and more coordinated
countries of the free world fragmented into a series of separate nuclear regional
it would be preferable from the point of view of American security to have the
Nor do the global unilaterals explain why, even if their dreams came true,

per.

accepted the balance of power principle, they could never propose so dangerous a
This is the step the United States should never take. If the unilaterals really

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law. This century has known barbarism without precedent in human history. Confronting the terrible risks of general war in a nuclear environment, the policy of the United States, its allies, and their associates in security arrangements around the world should be to improve and strengthen their programs of collective security, not dismantle them, thus precipitating a cycle of retreat before the menace of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. A policy of *sauve qui peut* and the devil take the hindmost can only result in general war or general surrender without war. In a nuclear environment, aggressive war itself must be the enemy.

The program of the global unilateralists is fuelled by two emotions wise policy must overcome:--anger and fear amounting to panic. The anger is an unworthy and unjustified rage against our friends. That feeling is in fact a displacement of the anger we feel against the Soviet Union, whose policy of expansion has cost us so much since 1945. It is dangerous to express such anger against the Soviet Union, so we discharge it against our allies. The fear is our reaction to the reality of the Soviet Union's growing advantage in nuclear weapons. The purpose of the Soviet arsenal is to persuade the United States to withdraw its forces from forward deployments and become neutral. That, in fact, is the policy the global unilateralists are recommending. It would be suicidal to accept the policy and unnecessary even to consider it. It is easily within our power to strengthen our own nuclear forces and the conventional forces of the Western alliances so as to make our policies of collective security as credible as they were before Vietnam and the other disastrous events of the 'Seventies. But unless we restore the Soviet-American nuclear balance, we shall be unable to protect either the balance of power or the liberty of the United States itself.

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American nuclear balance, we shall be unable to protect either the balance of
other dangerous events of the 'Seventies'. But unless we restore the Soviet-
our policies of collective security as credible as they were before Vietnam and the
nuclear forces and the conventional forces of the Western alliances so as to make
unnecessarily even to consider it. It is easily within our power to strengthen our own
unilaterals are recommending it would be suicidal to accept the policy and
deployments and become neutral. That, in fact, is the policy the global
arsenal is to peruse the United States to withdraw its forces from forward
Soviet Union's growing advantage in nuclear weapons. The purpose of the Soviet
we discharge it against our allies. The fear is our reaction to the reality of the
much since 1947. It is dangerous to express such anger against the Soviet Union, so
anger we feel against the Soviet Union, whose policy of expansion has cost us so
unattacked rage against our friends. That feeling is in fact a displacement of the
must overcome--anger and fear amounting to hate. The anger is an unworthy and
The program of the global unilaterals is fuelled by two emotions wise policy
nuclear environment, aggressive war itself must be the enemy.
the hindmost can only result in general war or general surrender without war. In a
manner of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. A policy of 'assemble unit pent' and the devil take
security, not dismantle them, thus precipitating a cycle of retreat before the
around the world should be to improve and strengthen their programs of collective
of the United States, its allies, and their associates in security arrangements
Contesting the terrible risks of general war in a nuclear environment, the policy
law. This century has known barbarism without precedent in human history.

MAR.03 .68 15:09 KIEEBSKER ASSOCIATES, INC. DC

P:53

CZARIST FOREIGN POLICY

Shortly before Michael Romanov became the first Tsar of his
line in 1613, the boyars of Moscow circulated a letter to
various towns of Muscovy, saying that "Enemies are pillagая
the state of Muscovy on every side; the neighboring sovereigns
put us to shame and reproach."

This simple statement defined the geopolitics of early
Russian foreign policy: to defend the new state against foreign
encroachments from every side. In the last years of Ivan the
Terrible, the Tartars burned Moscow; the Swedes occupied the
shores of the Baltic, as well as Finland and Karelia; the Poles
held the Western Ukraine; the Tartars and Turks occupied much
of Southern Russia; and a number of tribes held Central Asia.

Muscovy was thus virtually encircled to use Stalin's
phrase. Only in the east, was there a relatively open
frontier. The roads led to western China, where some natural
obstacles were encountered (the Pamir mountains), but also to
the maritime provinces which were almost completely open to
occupation and settlement. This would put Russia on the flank
of Manchuria.

Much of the territory surrounding Moscow had been claimed
by ancient Russia before the Time of Troubles in the 16th
century, but had been wrested away. The offensive aim of
Russian foreign policy was therefore to recover the lands that
Muscovy considered rightfully to belong to Russia, and as an
additional incentive, to unite the Slavic peoples into one
state. In practice this meant expanding toward the natural
boundaries, the Baltic, the Black sea, and the Caucusus. This
effort inevitably led to almost endless wars with Sweden and
Turkey, and campaigns in Persia. But in the West there was no
clear boundary, at least not until the Vistula. And this meant
that Russian expansion had to be at Poland's expense. The
determinination to dominate Poland however, would sooner or
later bring Russia into confrontation with Prussia and the
Hapsburg empire. Rather than fight both powers, the Russian
leaders wisely decided to make an alliance with these two
monarchies, and this was to become a permanent feature of
Russian policy until the late 1880s.

As a consequence of this defensive-offensive expansion,
Russia was almost always at war. Peter the Great was at war for
all but one of this thirty-five years as Czar. These wars would
have been fatal if waged against all three neighbors, Poland,
Sweden and Turkey. Consequently, choices had to be made. And
the priority went to defeating the main threat from Sweden,
while neutralizing the threat from Poland, and even seeking a
temporary alliance. Even with this policy of discrete

priorities in the 17th century, there were increasing strains on the Russian state. The great Russian historian Kluychevsky made a profound observation that could be extended to characterize much of Russian and Soviet history:

"these wars, defensive in their origin, imperceptably and unintentionally on the part of the Muscovite "politicians" became wars of aggression-- a direct continuation of the unifying policy of the old (pre- Roman) dynasty, a struggle for Russian territory that had never been extended to the Muscovite state. "

This process meant a heavy reliance on military forces and a growing conviction that the only permanent solutions were those achieved not by diplomacy but by military forces. Gradually the small guards units gave way to large standing armies, eventually with Russian officers. Peter's field army was about 35-40,000; but by the end of his reign the Russian army was 200,000. A century later it was almost one million. Moreover, the army was not, as in Western Europe, heavily dependent on the aristocracy. The officers were, to be sure, from the largest families, but the army was a factor apart from the nobility. Consequently it came to have distinct political power--occasionally intervening in high politics, putting Peter on the throne and later doing the same for Catherine II, and Alexander I. And it came to have a voice in foreign policy. Indeed, it was foreign policy that led the military to overthrow Catherine's son, Paul I, in favor of Alexander.

An additional consequence of expansion for Russian policy was that the military effort drained resources and treasure; so that an expansion of the economy was necessary if the military-political strategy was to continue. Thus expansion brought new opportunities for enlarging trade and Western contacts, and these in turn spurred the push outward. This applied to all regions. In the Far East, especially, the lure of riches created an incentive for expeditions, and then small settlements, which then had to be protected, and the process was renewed. Then diplomacy would be called on to consolidate these gains in new treaties.

Finally to administer the growing territory required bureaucracy. The old oprichniki, or Tsar's household, gave way to new administrative institutions. Indeed, the very process of expansion was accompanied by a system of fortified links that became administrative centers spreading in concentric circles.

Nevertheless, Russia (Moscovy) also showed itself capable of strategic maneuvers, and diplomacy. The Tsar Alexei's minister Nashchokin in the 1660s said that

"Affaris of state should be pondered upon by specially chosen men of blameless character, with the object of expanding

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the state in every direction, and this is the business of the Department of Foreign Affairs."

Naschchokin developed in the 1600s a calculated strategy. He conceded that the Ukriane could not yet be redeemed from Poland, and he even toyed with conceding all of the Ukraine to Poland in return for an alliance (vetoed by the Tsar). But Nashchokin was determined to keep Poland quiet while Russia dealt with Turkey and Sweden. This policy was codified in the peace treaty of Andrusovo with Poland. Even when there was one of the infinite clashes between the Poles and Cossacks, Nashchokin deliberately refused to aid the Cossacks, on the grounds that it would violate his treaty. He even hinted at a union with Poland, the price being the return of Kiev to Moscow. Nashchokin's calculation was that trade was vital to the Russian state; that the natural outlet was the Baltic (mainly through Livonia (modern Latvia), and this meant coming to grips with the problem of Sweden. As a protestant power dominating the Baltic coast, Sweden constituted a permanent threat; it had to be driven back or defeated if Muscovy was to expand. Russia's ability to do so alone was doubtful; hence the need for alliance even with old enemies. This anticipated the policy of Peter.

Two other aspects of the foundations of Russian policy must be mentioned.

First is the messianic character that occasionally asserted itself, either as pan-Slavism, or as a mystical religious sense of mission (i.e., the idea that Moscow was a second Rome). This in turn gave rise to a long disputes among intellectuals over whether Russia should turn West or turn inward. On the whole the Westerners prevailed. But these two issues were blurred: thus the panslavs tended to reject western influence, but they advocated an aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans to fullfill Russia's mission. Those who rejected accepted western influence also favored an aggressive policy in the East and in Central Asia. Usually there was compromise in which claims to protect orthodox or broker Slavs were cynically exploited by Tsars as opportunities to gain in power and influence for Russia.

How Russian policy was presented and interpreted, however, came to be a factor in itself. Russia came to be regarded as a belligerent, ruthless, expansionist power, to be feared and contained. This was especially true in England, and British efforts to block Russian gains in the near east became a nearly permanent feature of European politics. Because Russian policy was so often clothed in expansive rhetoric, Russia's opponents came to see in Russia not simply another great power but an ideological opponent.

A distinctive factor was the Eurasian character of Russia. Catherine in one of her early Nakazams to the boyars said simply

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that "Russia is a European state." But in fact the east had an
attraction, especially in the latter 19th century. And many
argued that this was Russia's destiny -- to guard Europe
against the hordes of Asia (the Kaisier William II always used
this argument with his cousin, Tsar Nicholas II).

There was no clear dividing line between European and
Asiatic Russia. Indeed, the distinction was largely invented
by Western geographers and writers. The Urals were never much
of an impediment to movement; one could travel south of the
Urals along the Chinese border and go all the way to the
Pacific. This route was the open plain once used by the Mongol
invaders, but later it was a road for Russian colonists moving
east. Since much of the East was sparely populated because of
the terrain and the climate, Moscow's foothold in the east was
tenuous and vulnerable. Until the late 18th century, however,
there was no competition from other powers. Since the Chinese
were used to coping subtly with various foreign invaders there
were few direct clashes between the small bands of Russians
and the Chinese, until much later in the 19th century. Russia
established itself as an Asiatic power with little effort.
Later, these gains would compound Russia's strategic situation
as Japan rose to power and the other European powers in the
scramble for the virtual partition of China into spheres of
influence.

This meant that Russia came to face a threat on two fronts, and at great distances. Britain could be threatened in India, of course, and later all of the powers had colonial possessions that drew them into various conflicts. But Russia, as Germany, could be threatened directly by, say Japan and Germany. This situation had the effect of reinforcing the inclination to strong military forces and preemptive diplomacy. In the period before World War I, the two fronts also made Russia something of an erratic factor, shifting to the East in the war with Japan, and then back to the West in an effort to recoup with disastrous results. After 1890, Russia, and then the Soviet Union could never pursue a policy without calculating its effects in Europe and the Far East.

*****

By the end of the reign of Peter I, (1725) Russia had
emerged as a Great Power. As a result of Peter's long but
successful defense against Charles XII, and his victory at
Poltava, Russia defeated Sweden and assumed the role of the
strongest "northern" power (Russia was always in the Northern
Department of the British Foreign Office). Peter had followed
the previous policy of neutralizing Poland. But first he had
turned south against the Turks, only to be badly defeated.
Then he launched the Great Northern War against Sweden, and was
defeated badly by an inferior forces at the battle of Narva.

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This was a shock and accelerated the reform of the army, especially European-style training, and reequipment. (When Charles was finally defeated, Peter remarked to captured Swedish officers, 'We owe it all to you'). Because Charles dallied in Saxony, Peter gained time after the defeat at Narva, and when Charles resumed his offensive, he found a better opponent; so much so that in the early fighting the Russians held their own and even won small engagements. Thus it was that Charles, cut off from his supplies, harassed by weather and a the vicissitudes of a long campaign over several years, was finly defated in 1709.

The war did not end for a few years, but at the Peace of Nystad (1721), Russia regained the Baltic. It had been an achievement of Peter's, achieved without significant allies through superior military force, and skillfull strategy--lessons that would reverberate through subsequent Russian history.

Judgments about Peter vary. One assessment by the British historian, Michael Florinsky, is that:

> "the wars that filled the reign of Peter were largely of his own making....they were embarked upon without any realization of what they actually meant, and without any definite and clear object in view."

It may be noteworthy, that after a period of sharper Russian criticism in the 18th and early 19th century, the reputation of Peter revived, and under the Communists, he has been lionized for his foreign policy in defeating the Swedes and the Turks, creating a more modern army and for creating a navy. Stalin encouraged a favorable historical interpretation of Peter, especially in the 1940s: he made Russia a major power and "laid the foundations of Russian military art".

Russian success in Peter's era was part of a larger European process; while Peter was fighting the Northern War, the other European were fighting the last of the wars of Louis XIV. Blenhheim and Poltava were contemporary battles. As a result the constellation of European power was fundamentally altered.

Great Britain and Russia emerged as two powers on the outer circle of the European complex. Both were positioned to play similar roles, to influence the shifting tides of politics on the continent. But there were significant differences: Britain played a role in balancing power; British policy was avowedly to prevent the domination on the continent by one single power. This gave Britain heavy responsibility, but also a great deal of freedom of action. Russia's role, however, came to be fixed