30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

ROOM 5600

(212) 649-5600

APR 23 1999

April 20, 1999

Dear Henry:

Your handwritten note, accompanying a beautifully inscribed silver cream pitcher meant a great deal to me. Our lives have, indeed, been closely intertwined for a very long time, and my admiration and affection for you have only grown as the years have gone by.

In the world of today, you truly occupy a unique position in terms of your understanding of the world's interconnectedness. If we lived in a more perfect world, you would undoubtedly be a super Minister of Foreign Affairs for all nations! Regrettably, though, even our own President doesn't have the sense to call on you nearly enough, but, happily, there is a constant stream of high ranking officials passing through New York who do seek your thoughts and advice.

For me, having you as a friend is something I cherish.
With great affection,

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Twenty-sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

ROOM 5600

(212) 649-5600

JUL 12 1999

July 2, 1999

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter telling me about your plans to honor Henry Kissinger with an endowed chair at the Library of Congress.

I had forgotten that the Library is the custodian of his papers, and I must say I cannot think of a more fitting tribute to Henry than establishing a Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library with its vast resources and wealth of research materials. It sounds as if you are structuring the Chair, and the programs that will be part of it, in a very unique and interesting way.

Given my deep admiration and respect for Henry and our friendship over the years, I am very glad to support your efforts with a one-time gift of $250,000, to be made over two years. Accordingly, enclosed please find a check for $125,000, made payable to the Library of Congress.

With best wishes to you for success in this very worthwhile undertaking,

Dr. James H. Billington
The Librarian of Congress
101 Independence Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20540-1000

cc: Dr. Henry Kissinger

Franklin & Eleanor

ROOSEVELT
INSTITUTE

711 Fifth Avenue, Suite 900

New York, New York 10022

Phone 212-339-2579 • Fax 212-832-1175

MAY 0 4 1999

May 3, 1999

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry:

The Congress has appropriated funds to build an Orientation Conference Center as part of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library site at Hyde Park, New York. As the private sector foundation supporting the Library, the Institute has undertaken the obligation to raise the matching funds on which the Congressional appropriation is conditioned. We are in the process of organizing that campaign. We hope also to be able to restructure the Library to allow temporary exhibit space and to renovate the museum's permanent exhibit to engage audiences of the next generation. It would have great meaning for our effort if you would agree to be a member of its Honorary Committee. Former Presidents Ford, Reagan and Bush have agreed to serve with President Clinton as chairs of the Committee. Lady Bird Johnson, Margaret Truman Daniel, David and Julie Eisenhower, and Caroline Kennedy will be co-chairs.

This designation, of course, will not require your time or personal participation. We will be pleased to keep your office posted on our progress. We do not anticipate any general appeal. Our plan is to approach approximately 500 individuals outside of our own Board of Directors. Over 14 million visitors have come to the Roosevelt Library and Museum. Presidential libraries have great meaning, not only to scholars but to the general public. They are classrooms of American democracy. Your honorary participation on our Committee of fifty distinguished Americans would speak that message to our friends regarding our effort.

Thank you for considering this request. I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

William J. vanden Heuvel
President

Irene Roosevelt Atken

Joe Louis Barrow, Jr.

Anne K. Bingsman

June Bingham Binge

Dan S. Boyd

John Brademas

Daniel B. Brewster, Jr.

Douglas Brinkley

Charles F. Brower IV

Roosece C. Brown, Jr.

Lawrence H. Budner

Chao-Chi Chu

F. Forrester Church

Sandra W. Cuneo

Margaret Truman Daniel

Evan A. Davis

William J. Dean

Noel deCordova, Jr.

Elinor Kerney Farquhar

Toni Fay

Justin N. Feldman

Eileen Finletter

Frederick P. Furth

John Kenneth Gaither

Richard N. Gardner

John J. Gartland, Jr.

Robert F. Garie

David Ginsburg

Doris Kearns Goodwin

Theodore L. Gross

George Morris Gurley

Dona Cooper Hamilton

Kitty Carlile Hart

Carla D. Hayden

Scott Hinch

John H. Hobbs

Janet Howard

Nancy Roosevelt Ireland

Barbara Loomis Jackson

Mary Draper Janney

Philip W. Johnston

Harry Kahn

James Kahn

Henry L. Kimelman

George L. Knox

Peter Kovler

Cynthia C. Lazara

Orin Lehman

Carol R. Lubin

Jay Mazur

William J. McDonough

Donald F. McHenry

Cynthia Ann McKinney

George J. Mitchell

Zachary P. Morfogen

Henry Morgenthau III

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Dennis J. Murray

Richard Ravitch

Donald H. Rivkin

James Roosevelt, Jr.

Laura D. Roosevelt

Michael A. Rotherberg

Paul S. Sarbanes

Stephen C. Schlesinger

Jerome Shestack

Florence P. Shientag

Robert M. Shrum

Kathleen M. Sloane

Stephen Stamas

Ted Van Dyk

Katrina vanden Heuvel

Geoffrey C. Ward

Susan Ware

Jack H. Watson, Jr.

Frank A. Weil

Directors

John F. Sears
Executive Director

Trude W. Lash
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Co-Chair

Schuyler G. Chapin
Chair, Executive Committee

Robert L. Beir

Fredrica S. Goodman

Louis Harris

Raymond A. Lamontagne

Anne Roosevelt

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.
Vice President

Nicholas L. Ludington
Secretary

Rivington R. Winant
Treasurer

MAY-19-1999 14:25

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Alexander Rose
Editorial Board
*National Post*
CANADA
Tel: (416) 383 2394
Fax: (416) 383 2439
Email: arose@nationalpost.com

MAY 19 1999

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Thank you so much for granting me yesterday's interview. I've transcribed the tape, and have sent it to you, as requested. We're hoping to run it on Saturday in either the Review or Op-Ed section, probably *verbatim* in Q&A form.

Once again, many thanks for your time. I hope to hear from your office in the near future if you wish to make any amendments to the transcript.

MAY-19-1999 14:25

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Henry A. Kissinger Interview Transcript, 18 May 1999, 2:30pm, Toronto

Transcribed by Alexander Rose. 2300 words.

Introductory: Reference to the recent publication of *Years of Renewal*.

Rose: You were one of those in charge of extricating the U.S. from Indochina: American troops flowed in for many years, but little thought was given to how to get them out if the necessity arose. Is there a historical parallel with what appears to be an absence of an "exit strategy" in Kosovo? Has President Clinton given much thought about what to do if the Kosovo problem is solved by way of a partition, or even independence, but a chain of Balkan ethnic wars breaks out as a result of a perhaps faulty peace?

HAK: I think there is a certain parallel in the failure to think through the implications before one went in [to Kosovo]. But when the Nixon Administration came in the Nixon Administration hadn't put the troops in - we had to get them out after somebody else put them in - and I think Vietnam was a much more difficult problem because we actually had casualties and were involved in a bitter conflict.

Rose: So, is Mr. Clinton's successor going to be left holding the Balkan bag?

Kissinger: It depends. I think Kosovo will be settled within the next month - at least the first round. Clinton's successor will find American troops in Kosovo, and there's no exit strategy at all. That is why I was against it to begin with.

Rose: Why was there no exit strategy from the beginning? Mr. Clinton seems to do this quite often - he gets involved in things without first thinking them through and leaves a trail of destruction behind for someone else to clean up. Is this something to do with this relatively recent morality-based foreign policy?

Kissinger: I think Clinton and some of the left-wing governments in Europe seem to think that a moral affirmation is in itself a foreign policy, and they don't seem to be comfortable with the proposition that once you've declared a foreign policy you need the means to implement it through a series of stages.

Rose: You spoke of the first round, or stage, of a peace with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What kind of peace is there going to be in Kosovo: will there be a partition, with a Serb north, which would include the cherished battlefield [Kosovo Polje, 1389] near Pristina and the shrines (and the natural resources), and an ethnic Albanian south? Or should NATO be fighting for a wholly independent Kosovo under ethnic Albanian rule?

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Kissinger: I think the outcome cannot be clear-cut because we have already agreed to Serb sovereignty (over Kosovo), [but] the KLA will surely continue to fight for independence. They will not accept an outcome short of independence.

Rose: So, we're stuck between a rock and a hard place. Hasn't the KLA, however, been wiped out in recent weeks?

Kissinger: I think the KLA has undoubtedly suffered very major losses, but over a period of months and years, it will re-constitute itself. And after all, the Serbs have been severely weakened, too.

Rose: We've always said that Kosovo is an autonomous province of Serbia, but if we continue to say that President Milosevic has sovereignty over Kosovo, then why should the Kosovar Albanians make peace in the first place? They're never going to trust him again, are they?

Kissinger: No, I believe there are several inconsistencies with calling Milosevic a war criminal and then negotiating with him. There is the inconsistency with declaring Serb sovereignty and seeking to reconcile that with KLA insistence on independence, and therefore the outcome will be messy.

Rose: We have a lot of the world to cover. Kosovo, tragic though it may be, is pretty small beer compared to the long-term implications of Sino-U.S. relations, of which you were the prime architect in the early 1970s. Over the last few years - and especially in the past couple of months partly owing to Los Alamos nuclear secrets and campaign financing - there has been a marked increase in anti-China rhetoric. Some commentators even seem to be wishing that China takes the place of the old Soviet Union ...

Kissinger: Well, yes, there are some people who are trying to put China in the place vacated by the Soviet Union.

Rose: They want someone to fight against?

Kissinger: Yes, but I don't know what victory would look like. And how do we know we've won?

Rose: But on China, you seem to be in an ever-diminishing minority, fired upon by both the left and the right on moral issues, free speech, human rights, trade and so on.

Kissinger: My concern is that before you take on the most populous nation in the world, which is also culturally radiating into Asia, with some 60 million overseas Chinese, you have to know what the issue is and what you are trying to achieve. If we try to build China into a Soviet-style confrontation, we first of all misunderstand the problem because

[relations with]

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the Soviet Union could be contained only by organising a group of very weak nations, but China already faces some very substantial nations, very substantial nations, so it isn't as if China can by itself ride roughshod over the others. Secondly, how can you define victory in this context? I don't consider the present Chinese government a classic Communist government, and I also believe that a Taiwan-type government would be also extremely nationalistic as a means of unifying [China]. So that difference is not worth fighting a war over.

Rose: Are there any issues worth fighting a war over with China?

Kissinger: Well, if China attempted hegemony over all of Asia, or if China attacked Japan, but those are improbable circumstances and there would be others [in Asia] who would resist before we would have to resist, with us.

Rose: Nevertheless, Canada's foreign affairs minister, Lloyd Axworthy, advocates what he calls "human security", [ADDED FOR EXPLANATION: which seems to place the defence of human rights above conventional geopolitics and appraisal of the national interest]. Do you think this is worthwhile?

Kissinger: I can understand the objective of human security, and I can understand moral persuasion, and even economic pressure, but to use military means except in really extreme cases - such as genuine genocide - would seem to me in time to defeat itself because the point will be reached when the countries will do nothing. People say Kosovo is a precedent: I think Kosovo above all will have the result that NATO will never engage in a similar operation again.

Rose: Should not NATO therefore withdraw from the Balkans, at least to preserve its unity? There is some talk that the bombing is splitting NATO. Do you see a future for NATO?

Kissinger: I am a strong advocate of NATO, but I believe this war will have the inevitable result of leading to a re-examination of NATO because it was an out-of-area conflict initiated by us.

Rose: How would NATO be re-examined?

Kissinger: Well, certainly the Europeans keep talking about a greater [defence] identity, but it's not yet clear whether they are willing to put up the resources.

Rose: They say NATO may be expanding in central and eastern Europe, on top of the three new members [Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary] admitted a month or two ago. Expansion, however, has always made the Russians jumpy, or is it that just rhetoric?

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Kissinger: The fact that NATO was used for a war beyond its borders initiated within weeks of [Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary] coming in is going to make it much more difficult to admit new members.

Rose: Is this partly to do with the Russian situation? It seems to me that under the leadership of the former foreign minister and then Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, the Russians began to resurrect a more muscular foreign policy in places like the Balkans and the Middle East.

Kissinger: Well, they don't have much muscle, but they have good diplomatic skills. The new prime minister [Stepashin] has no experience in diplomacy; he comes from the KGB. But I think a somewhat muscular foreign policy is imposed on the Russian leaders by their population - if they were perceived to be helping NATO, or acting as agents of NATO, they'd be in serious trouble.

Rose: Now that Mr. Primakov, who seemed to be the main instigator behind this policy, is gone, do you see more trouble brewing in the Middle East, especially as regards Iraq, which may be appearing on our radar again very soon?

Kissinger: I think there has been a disproportionate allocation of our military efforts when we bomb Iraq, which threatens our national security, for three days [in Operation Desert Fox], and Serbia for a few months. So, our military forces have been bent out of shape by this Yugoslav enterprise. But I don't think the Russians are ready to be actively muscular - they can do what Primakov did: stake their prestige, but I don't think they can implement it.

Rose: There has been a great deal of discussion about U.S. policy as a whole towards Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. Some people say that U.S. has been overly focused on getting rid of just one man - Saddam Hussein - when it should be trying to destroy the entire regime [i.e., those institutions and organisations, such as the secret police and the Republican Guards, which keep Saddam in power]. This latter course, however, might entail some form of covert operation, or co-operation with dissident groups, such as the Iraqi National Congress.

Kissinger: We need, above all, a coherent policy which is going to stick together for some period of time in Iraq. There are people who believe that guerrilla action will overthrow Saddam, but I think that can happen only if it is understood that we will back the guerrillas if they get into trouble, and I don't think we're in a position to give such a commitment until Kosovo is finished.

Rose: It is, however, a State Department mantra that Iraq can't be cut up into three pieces based on religious or tribal lines, with the Shi'ites in the south, the Kurds in the north, and the Sunnis in the centre. Therefore, the regime has to be kept in place in order to keep the

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country together. But do you think the time has come to start thinking about splintering Iraq into three? After all, like a lot of African countries, aren't its borders an artificial creation?

Kissinger: The trouble with that is that Iraq is potentially the most important counterweight to Iran, and then you get a Kurdish problem with Turkey also, and perhaps with Iran.

Rose: While we're in the Middle East, regarding Turkey, is there something brewing in Cyprus with Greece?

Kissinger: At the end of the day, I don't think they'll go to war. Between Greece and Turkey, I think there will be a state of continuing tension, but I don't think they'll go to war.

Rose: Will Turkey become a member of the European Union? Greece appears to have torpedoed its chances for the foreseeable future.

Kissinger: It will not become a member of the EU because Greece will block it, and Germany will probably block it. But I think the Turks must be given some other political outlet than just membership of NATO.

Rose: What role do you see for Canada within NATO, NAFTA, and Atlanticism in general?

[a motorcycle roared by at this point, making part of the following paragraph unclear. Is this an accurate rendering?]

Kissinger: It depends what the evolution of Europe is. I would like to see something in which NAFTA and a free trade area including Britain and the European Union can create some structure of essentially free-market economies and democracies of which Canada would be a natural partner. That's what I would like to see. It's certainly not going to happen very easily because if Europe engages in any attempt to redefine its relative position with America it could open up a can of worms.

Rose: But once the EU unites politically and economically, leaving Britain out on a limb - to go in, or go out, or stay in-between, as at present ...

Kissinger: In order to stay in-between, there has to be some alternative structure, which could include the EU, but which transcends the EU.

Rose: Such as a renamed and enlarged NAFTA, with Britain being mothered into membership by Canada?

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Kissinger: That's more or less it. I would only qualify it slightly by saying that membership should be open. American should not be conceived as trying to sabotage the EU. Also, we should not push the EU [into unification]. If the EU cannot come together on its own, then we have no reason to accelerate it. So, therefore, the alternative structure should be made available, but should not become an issue of American prestige.

Rose: Are you bullish about the EU's prospects? Can you see, as some predict, the EU descending into war in, say, thirty years, or is that scenario an impossibility nowadays?

Kissinger: War within the EU?

Rose: Perhaps not a war, but a series of spats and splits.

Kissinger: Breaking up into a war I think is very, very unlikely.

Rose: But do you think the EU is going to be a successful experiment - politically, economically and militarily?

Kissinger: Militarily, they would have to spend a lot more money. Politically, this is not a period of heroic statesmanship, so I find it very hard to say who will bring it together.

Rose: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

TOTAL P.08

07/29/99 THU 00:33 FAX

002

FYI: The Washington Post

July 25, 1999

... And a Captive Treaty

THE CLINTON administration has cranked up a necessary campaign to liberate the nuclear test ban treaty from the parliamentary grip of the same Sen. Jesse Helms who has endorsed Richard Holbrooke's U.N. nomination. The senator is holding the treaty hostage to a personal agenda: to move the United States immediately rather than at the administration's more measured pace to national missile defense and to spike the Kyoto global warming treaty. In hijacking the test ban, he is unswayed by the argument that in fairness the Senate deserves an opportunity to debate and judge the treaty on its merits. One wonders why his colleagues, of whatever party or test ban persuasion, let him go on.

To be sure, the test ban is not without controversy. Some people accept the Clinton view that the ban would help curb the creating and expanding of nuclear forces by others—a goal of the utmost consequence to American security. Others see it as a potential threat to a viable long-term American nuclear posture as current weapons age. "However," says a leading specialist, Leon Sloss, "all but the most

extreme fringes [of those holding the latter view] accept the [test ban] as a 'done deal.' " It has been debated internationally for 40 years. The treaty itself has chalked up 152 signatures and 41 ratifications so far.

Perhaps the single most telling judgment of the test ban came in the last of seven hearings Sen. Helms chaired this year on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, his vehicle for advancing missile defense. His star witness on May 26, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, gave his latest views—positive—on missile defense. Sen. Bill Frist then asked him about the test ban. Noting the "constraints" it would place, he said: "I think we have an arms control objective, and must have, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And anything that makes it more difficult to develop more nuclear weapons, I would, in principle, favor."

The test ban makes it more difficult to develop more nuclear weapons. In short, you can have your test ban and your missile defense, too. Missile defense is moving along. Free the test ban treaty.

07/29/99 THU 00:34 FAX

003

Senator Frist: Although we do not want to focus on any one area, but with regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, could you just share your thoughts whether it has any value today in our overall defense strategy either on its own or as part of a larger package of arms control agreements?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have not really studied this in detail. I think we have an arms control objective and must have to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and anything that makes it more difficult to develop more nuclear weapons I would in principle favor. But then one has to weigh this against the constraints it places on us. But the prevention or the slowing down of nonproliferation is an arms control objective to which we should pay a great deal of attention.

Senator Hagel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in your opinion where does the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty fit into all this?

Dr. Kissinger: I really am not adequately prepared on all the nuances of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I am not ducking it. I will be glad to come back. I have not addressed that issue.

In my day it was always believed that you could not go below a certain threshold with safety. And all the analysis that I was familiar with when I was conducting these negotiations was the belief that you needed to test below - first, that you could not detect below a certain threshold, and secondly, that you needed it for the confidence in your own weapons. But this is the knowledge that I have not updated.

Senator Hagel: Thank you.

The Governor of Puerto Rico

SEP 14 1999

September 9, 1999

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Ph.D.
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Doctor Kissinger:

I am writing to follow up on our brief conversation at The White House during the Presidential Medal of Freedom presentation ceremony that was conducted on August 11.

As I indicated when we spoke, I am delighted that you plan to be in Puerto Rico later this year.

By this means, I invite you -- and Mrs. Kissinger too, of course, if she will be accompanying you - to visit La Fortaleza. My wife Maga and I would be honored to have the pleasure of your company, either on December 2 or whenever your busy schedule permits.

Looking forward to hearing from you in the near future, I extend cordial greetings and very best wishes.

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

1. The logic of the so-called Oslo Agreements (the September 1993 initial agreement and the September 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza) was that an interim period during which the Palestinians would acquire a significant measure of self-rule, and renounce and control violence against Israel, and Israel would redeploy its forces to specified military locations, would build confidence, setting the stage for a permanent status agreement. (The September 1995 agreement provided for the interim period to extend until May 1999).

2. Yassir Arafat's goal was focused from the start: the creation of an internationally recognized, independent, sovereign state in as much of the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem as possible.

3. The Rabin and Peres Governments understood Arafat to have developed an expectation that the Palestinian State, incorporating between 75 and 90 percent of the West Bank, would come into existence in May of 1999. They made little or no effort to disabuse him of this notion. It may be that they saw no point in joining the issue while interim Palestinian self-rule arrangements were being put in place, or that they believed that the public mood in Israel would be more favorable to territorial concessions at the conclusion of the interim period, or that they anticipated that Arafat would show greater flexibility on territorial issues as the prospects for consensual establishment of a Palestinian State became greater, or some combination of these considerations. (All that can safely be said about their intentions is that they were prepared for some 50% of the West Bank to be entrusted to substantial Palestinian self-rule by the conclusion of the required three redeployments, prior to an agreement on final status).

4. Netanyahu's electoral defeat of Peres was a rather decisive vote of no confidence by Israel's Jewish voters in Peres' ability to manage negotiations with the Palestinians. A series of terrorist bombings seemed to expose Peres' exuberant rhetoric of a New Middle East as naive. For his part, Netanyahu exercised care to argue that he would continue the peace process, providing more sober leadership and bringing better results.

5. Whether for tactical reasons or, as some would argue out of ideological opposition to territorial concessions in the West Bank, Netanyahu set out to lower Palestinian expectations. In this, he proved very - perhaps overly - effective. Suspicions about his ideological commitments and the fact that his coalition relied upon parties for whom ceding territory would be heretical, generated widespread doubts, including among the American and European governments, as to whether Netanyahu was prepared to pursue a negotiated settlement to the Palestinian conflict in good faith.

6. No doubt in part due to the resulting pressures, in January 1997 Israel's new Government entered into the Hebron Agreement, agreeing to withdraw from almost all of the West Bank city to which the Jewish people have the strongest historical and religious ties. In a pattern which would come to typify Netanyahu's stewardship, Israeli flexibility came so late, and so seemingly unwillingly, as to earn Israel and him less credit than they deserved.

7. In the months following the Hebron Agreement, direct negotiations between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority broke down entirely. Israel found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically. In reaction, Israel took the initiative in trying to bring the United States into the process to a greater degree than had been thought wise by the Rabin or Peres Governments.

8. Netanyahu may have believed that his close relations with the Republican Congress, particularly with Speaker Gingrich, President Clinton's political difficulties, and the midterm Congressional elections would restrain the Administration from exercising pressure on Israel. For months Dennis Ross forcefully argued the need for the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel to deal with one another directly. Secretary Albright apparently endorsed a more active American role, one which however produced a May ultimatum to Israel. (Although at the time, the official U.S. explanations were that no ultimatum had been delivered, in the background briefings following the Wye Agreement, senior Administration officials pointed to what they labeled the ultimatum delivered in May as a decisive turning point).

9. Arafat's principal obligations under the Oslo Agreements and the Hebron Agreement relate to the renunciation of the use of terrorism and acts of violence. Apart from the general obligation to assure compliance with these principles in areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority, the agreements included explicit provisions restricting the size of the Palestinian police force, limiting weapons, providing for the transfer to Israel of individuals suspected of terrorism, curbing incitement against Israel in the press and requiring that the Palestinian Covenant be formerly amended to render inoperative those articles denying Israel's right to exist. The Palestinian Authority can of course muster technical arguments on its compliance record. It is however safe to say that Arafat can hardly labor under the illusion that any Government in Israel would have found the Palestinian Authority's compliance other than sorely lacking.

10. Within Israel's intelligence communities there are differing interpretations of Arafat's behavior. The more generous view asserts that Arafat will not take on Hamas - as would be necessary to fully satisfy Israeli conceptions of what it required to contain terrorism and thereby honor the letter and spirit of the agreements - for so long as he does not believe that he can convincingly hold out to his people the prospect of the imminent establishment of a Palestinian State. Until then, the specter of armed attacks on Israelis, albeit in part by groups that represent a threat to his authority, provides useful leverage. The more skeptical assessments are that Arafat is at best ambivalent about, and at worst uncommitted to, a peaceful resolution of the conflict on terms acceptable to Israel.

11. There is however a consensus that while maintaining a threat of Palestinian armed insurrection, Arafat would prefer to avoid terrorism in the run up to May 1999. His calculation is that he will thereby gain overwhelming international recognition for a Palestinian State - the American position being most important. Some elements within Hamas accept his logic.

12. Even as Arafat has concentrated on positioning himself for the endgame on final status, Netanyahu has been continually mired in the tactical. This is partly a

product of the robustness of Israeli democracy and his unwieldy coalition. But it
is also a function of his leadership style which does not devote much effort to
building informed consensus. Only after a near revolt by his own ministers, who
found it unsettling to be asked to approve redeployments without any sense of
how they might fit into a larger strategy, did Netanyahu permit Government
discussion of final status issues.

13. Netanyahu's eventual efforts to shift the focus of the peace process from interim redeployments to permanent status negotiations were received suspiciously by the Palestinians and by most American and European officials. The distrust and doubt as to his motives are not easily overcome. The Israeli political culture of leaks has not helped.

14. Israel has serious, broad and understandable security concerns, which it will want to see addressed in permanent status arrangements. Netanyahu could have used the period since the Hebron Agreement of January 1997, to define and underscore these concerns, communicating Israel's desire for peace while demonstrating the need to test Palestinian intentions. In practice, he has failed to deliver either message effectively.

15. The recent Wye Agreement obviously moved toward putting the peace process back on track. But the negotiations also served to expose how problematic the positions have become. A skeptic could raise doubts as to whether at Wye Israel made a deal with the Palestinians. Both the Palestinians and the Israelis were negotiating at least as much with the Americans as with one another, a point borne out by the fact that key undertakings were set out in sideletters to and from the United States.

16. The level of distrust is high. Israel's distrust of the Palestinian Authority impels it to insist on detailed and explicit Palestinian undertakings and to insist on rigid compliance. Palestinian distrust of Israel's intentions makes them more reluctant to implement undertakings in ways which they find politically difficult. There is little sense of mutual commitment to outcomes, or even to a process of reaching stable outcomes, such as would give greater cause for optimism. The United States has increasingly stepped into this breach, adjudicating arguments over compliance. In light of the unavoidable and probably necessary ambiguities in some undertakings (which recall were in many cases addressed to the U.S.) and the American tendency to seek the middle, Israel is unlikely to be entirely pleased with the results.

17. In his own approach Netanyahu has had disappointing, if understandable, difficulty finding a focus, bouncing from Israel's relationship with the U.S., to suspicion of the Palestinian Authority, to the need to sustain his coalition, to preparing for elections - not even getting to final status. The tones of his communications are therefore often contradictory, mostly serving to further undermine his credibility, domestically and abroad.

18. The contours of a possible deal on final status are increasingly evident. An overwhelming majority of the Israeli public would support them, although over the vocal objections of a sizeable minority of Netanyahu's voters. However,

moving from the status quo to an agreement on final status requires good will, trust, leadership, and the ability for each side to appreciate the substantive and political constraints on the other. On the Israeli side, it requires a clear-headed definition of interests which seems to have been hitherto lacking, or has not even been shared by the Prime Minister with his own ministers.

19. May 4, 1999 presents a particular challenge as that is the date on which Arafat contends that he will be free to declare a Palestinian State. It is already clear that it will not be possible to reach agreement on all details of permanent status by that date. The best hope is that it will be possible to agree on a declaration of principals to guide completion of an agreement, and to extend the deadline. The Palestinians are however unlikely to agree to an extension unless Israel explicitly indicates its readiness to accept the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, albeit a demilitarized state.

20. What would be best for Israel under the current circumstances would be a national unity government. The differences between Netanyahu and Ehud Barak, the head of the Labor Party, concerning the outlines of a final status agreement would not appear to be significant. Implementation of an agreement will be a wrenching experience for Israeli society. A national unity government would permit action by near consensus. Unfortunately, if understandably, the Labor Party - with the exception of Shimon Peres - has placed political gain above substantive results.

## Additional Notes

21. One ongoing source of unease and at times exasperation for Israeli officials in dealing with Palestinian officials, especially in the presence of Americans or Europeans, is the attitude of 'equivalence' which they sense. The Israelis are exceedingly sensitive to the fact that essentially each of the Palestinians with whom they deal has enriched himself by virtue of his position. Often the sole explanation for the emphases the Palestinians bring to bear relates to their parochial business interests.

22. The approaching era is one which brings with it considerable uncertainty and danger for Israel. Enemies at a greater distance are poised to develop weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver them. The collapse of the Soviet Union has created a buyers market for those intent on mischief. It would be too facile to argue - as has Secretary Albright on occasion - that under these circumstances Israel should not fuss over the details of agreements with the Palestinians because maintaining the strategic relationship with the U.S. is Israel's overriding interest. But it is certainly desirable for Israel's leaders to take a broad view of national interest.

23. Within the Palestinian Authority one senses an increasing understanding for the importance of relations with Israel for Palestinian economic growth. The preoccupation with autonomy and independence which characterized initial attitudes, has in many cases softened. On a 'cultural' level, the period since 1967 has seen considerable interaction between Palestinians and Israelis; there is not as great a gulf to be overcome as for example between Jordanians and Israelis. Starts

in cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians have been made across a broad range of pursuits and fields. To its credit, the Netanyahu Government has taken significant steps to ease commerce between the Palestinian territories and Israel.

24. Since the 1978 Camp David Accord, Israel and Egypt have been at peace. However, relations have remained cool. Only in the field of agriculture has there been significant cooperation.

25. For Jordan, the benefits of the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty have been disappointing. The King and Crown Prince remain openly and firmly committed to the course of peace but the academic, scientific and professional communities are hesitant about, or opposed to, cooperation with their Israeli colleagues.

26. There is precedent for turning attention to the Syrian track when the Palestinian track bogs down. However, Syria's continuing apparent insistence that negotiations may only resume once Israel agrees to withdraw to the pre-1967 lines is a non-starter.

27. In confronting, among others, the challenge of regional water scarcity, there is a compelling case for cooperation. Political considerations on the part of the leaders of Israel's neighbors (with the partial exception of King Hussein and Crown Prince Hassan) and the lack of adequate international finance have inhibited the development and implementation of projects of great potential benefit for the peoples of the region.

HAK:

Bill Vanden Heuvel invites you to join the Honorary Committee for the Franklyn & Eleal-or-e Roosevelt Institute at the FDR Presidential Library at Hyde Park.

They have an impressive list of Chairmen & Co-Chairmen!

Agree ____ ✓ Decline with thanks ____

ssm

MAY-06-1999 17:07

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.02

MAY 06 1999

May 4, 1999

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger and Associates
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, NY 10152

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I spoke with Lea Rabin earlier this week and she shared with me the wonderful news that you have agreed to serve as our chair for the New York Philharmonic performance of the Rabin requiem at Lincoln Center on July 15th. I cannot tell you how meaningful it was to her and to us, and I am looking forward to working with you in the coming months.

At this time, we are planning for a 6:30 p.m. reception at Lincoln Center preceding the 8:00 p.m. performance in Avery Fisher Hall. We have reserved 200 seats for the performance itself and have the option to purchase another 500 tickets if we so choose. We plan on making the reception an intimate affair with the Rabin Family, our key supporters and those who made contributions in support of the event itself. Within this scenario, we would love to have you and Mrs. Rabin make some remarks during the reception before we move into Avery Fisher Hall for the performance.

We have arranged for Event Associates, an event planning firm in New York, to coordinate the entire evening and plan to work with them raise funds both through ticket sales and underwriting contributions. I would like to arrange a time to speak with you to further outline the evening's program. I would specifically like to discuss how you prefer to take part in chairing this event and whether there are any particular individuals with whom you would like to be collaborating either as a co-chair or within the context of a host committee.

I will be in touch with your office to follow up and to determine how you would like to move forward. In the meantime, thank you again for your commitment to chair this event and for your ongoing support of the Rabin Family and the American Friends of the Rabin Center.

Cc: Mrs. Lea Rabin

The Honorable James A. Kissinger

Steven Bogenler

Eme Brandman

Shoshana Conti

The Honorable Warren A. Christopher

Lester Cown

Isaac Fuchs

William H. Meyman

Jonathan Raby

The Honorable Henry Kissinger

Aron Mielson

Ruth Popkin

Ambassador Isidor Rubinstein

Edward Sonders

Professor Angela Shapero

Gil Shiva

The Honorable George I. Shultz

James Tonsuzaos

Michael Zellmerer

The American Friends of the Yitzhak Rabin Center

729 15th Street, N.W., Third Floor • Washington, DC 20005
Tel: 202.737.5877 • fax: 202.737.6061

TOTAL P.02

The Enigma of the Two Chavez

Gabriel Garcia Márquez

Special for El Universal

Carlos Andrés Pérez stepped off the plane that had brought him from Davos, Switzerland, that evening and was surprise to see General Fernando Ochoa Antich, his Defense Minister, on the platform. "What is it?" he asked, mystified. The minister reassured him with such reliable explanations that the President didn't go to the Miraflores Palace but to the presidential residence, La Casona. He was just falling asleep when the same Defense Minister woke him with a telephone call informing him of a military uprising in Maracay. He had barely entered Miraflores when the first cracks of artillery fire broke out. It was February 4, 1992. Colonelel Hugo Chávez Frías, with his sacramental cult of historical dates, commanded the assault from his improvised command post in the Planicie Historical Museum. The President understood then, that his only recourse lay in popular support, and he headed for the Venevisión studios to speak to the country. Hours later the military coup had failed. Chávez gave himself up, on the condition that he too might be allowed to address the people on television. The young colonel, with his paratrooper's beret and his admirable ease of expression, assumed the responsibility for the movement. His speech, though, was a political success. He served two years in jail, until he was granted amnesty by President Rafael Caldera. However, many followers--and not a few enemies--have felt that the speech given in the moment of defeat was the first in an electoral campaign that was to take him to the presidency of the Republic less than nine years later.

President Hugo Chávez Frías told me this story on the plane of the Venezuelan Armed Forces that was taking us from Havana to Caracas two weeks ago, less than a fortnight before his inauguration as constitutional president of Venezuela, elected by popular vote. We had met three days earlier in Havana, during his talks with presidents Castro and Pastrana, and the first thing that impressed me was the power of his body of reinforced concrete. He had the immediate cordiality and the native grace of a pure Venezuelan. We tried to meet again but were unable to--for which were both to blame--so we flew to Caracas together to talk about his life and miracles on the plane.

It was a good experience for a resting journalist. As the story of his life unfolded, I discovered a personality in no way consistent with the image of a despot formed in our minds via the press. It was a different Chávez. Which of the two was real?

The tough argument against him during the campaign had been his recent past as a conspirator, involved in a coup. But Venezuela has digested more than a few throughout its history--starting with Rómulo Betancourt, rightly or wrongly remembered as the father of Venezuelan democracy, who overthrew Isaías Medina Angarita, a former democratic military man trying to purge his country from thirty-six years of Juan Vicente Gómez. His successor, the novelist Rómulo Gallegos, was deposed by General Marcos Pérez Jiménez who was to hold full power and keep it for nearly eleven years. He, in turn, was toppled by a whole generation of young democrats who inaugurated the country's longest period of elected presidents.

The February coup seems to be the only thing that has ever backfired on Colonelel Hugo Chávez

Frías. But he views it on the positive side as a providential setback. It's his way of understanding the good luck, or the intelligence, or the intuition, or the astuteness, or whatever the magic breath is that has guided his actions since he first came into the world in Sabaneta, state of Barinas on July 28, 1954 under the sign of power: Leo. Chávez, a Catholic believer, attributes the blessings of his fortune to the scapulary, over a hundred years old, that he has worn since childhood, inherited from a maternal great grandfather, Colonel Pedro Pérez Delgado, who is one of his guardian heroes. His parents managed barely to survive on their salaries as primary school teachers, and since the age of nine he had to help out by selling sweets and fruits from a handcart. Sometimes he would ride a donkey to visit his maternal grandmother in Los Rastrojos, a neighboring village that seemed to them a city because it had a small electric plant with two hours of light in the evening, and a midwife who attended his birth and that of his four siblings. His mother wanted him to be a priest, but he got no further than altar boy and rang the bells so pleasingly that everyone recognized him by the peal. "That's Hugo who's playing," they would say. Among his mother's books he found a providential encyclopedia and was instantly captivated by the first chapter: How to Triumph in Life.

It was actually a recipe book of options and he tried almost every one of them. As a painter astounded by pictures of the works of Michelangelo and David, he won first prize in a regional art show at age twelve. As a musician he became indispensable at birthday parties and serenades with his mastery of the *cuatro* and his good singing voice. As a baseball player he turned out a first-rate catcher. The military option wasn't on the list, nor had it occurred to him of his own accord, until someone told him that the best way to get into the big leagues was to enroll in the Barinas military academy. It must have been another of the scapulary's miracles because that day marked the beginning of the Andrés Bello plan allowing graduates from military schools to rise to the highest academic level.

He studied political science, history and Marxism to Leninism. He was completely taken with the study of the life and works of Simón Bolívar, his number one Leo, whose proclamations he learned by heart. But his first conscious conflict with real politics was the death of Allende in September 1973. Chávez couldn't understand. Why, if the Chileans elected Allende, is the Chilean military going to overthrow him? Shortly afterwards, the captain of his company assigned him to keep an eye on a son of José Vicente Rangel, thought to be a Communist. "Strange how the world turns," says Chávez in a burst of laughter. "His father is now my minister of foreign affairs!" Even more ironically, at graduation he received the sabre from the very president he would try to overthrow twenty years later: Carlos Andrés Pérez.

"Furthermore," I said, "you were on the verge of killing him." "Not at all," protested Chávez. "The idea was to set up a Constitutional Assembly and go back to our quarters." I realized from the first that he was a natural story-teller. A genuine product of the Venezuelan popular culture which is creative and festive. His wonderful sense of handling time and memory has in it something of the supernatural that enables him to recite from memory poems of Neruda, Whitman and entire pages of Rómulo Gallegos.

He was still very young when he discovered, by chance, that his great grandfather was not a consummate assassin, as his mother said, but a legendary warrior of the times of Juan Vicente Gómez. Chávez was so enthused that he decided to write a book to purify his record. He searched through historical archives and military libraries, and crossed the region town by town with a historian's backpack to reconstruct the itineraries of his great-grandfather from the testimony of

those who survived him. From then on he incorporated him into the altar of his heroes and began wearing the protective scapulary that had been his.

On one of those days he crossed the border without realizing it, over the Arauca bridge, and the Colombian captain who searched his backpack found material evidence to accuse him of espionage: he was carrying a photograph camera, a tape recorder, secret papers, photos of the region, a military map with graphs and two regulation pistols. His identity documents, as befits a spy, could easily be false. The argument lasted several hours in an office where the only picture was one of Bolívar on horseback. "I was almost exhausted," Chávez told me: "The more I explained the less he understood." Until the saving statement came to his mind: "See, Sir, the things that happen in this life: a short century ago we were one and the same army, and that person who is watching us from the picture was your chief and ours. How could I be a spy?" The captain was moved. He began speaking eloquently of La Gran Colombia and the two ended up that night drinking beer from both countries in a saloon in Arauca. The next morning, sharing a headache, the captain returned Chávez's historic belongings and saw him off with a bear hug in the middle of the international bridge.

"That was when I got the concrete idea that something was wrong in Venezuela," says Chávez. He had been appointed in the east as commander of a detachment of thirteen soldiers and some communications equipment to wipe out the last guerrilla strongholds. One night of pouring rain, an intelligence colonel came seeking shelter in the camp with a band of soldiers and some alleged guerrillas they had just captured, looking greenish and down to the bones. Around ten o'clock at night, when Chávez was just dropping off to sleep, he heard wrenching screams from the room next door. The soldiers were beating the captives with baseball bats wrapped in rags so they wouldn't leave any marks, Chávez told me. Outraged, he demanded that the colonel deliver up the prisoners to him or get out, as he could not allow anyone to be tortured in his commando. "The next day I was threatened with court martial for disobedience," Chávez said, "but they just kept me under observation for a time."

A few days later he had another experience that outdid the others. He was buying meat for his troops when a military helicopter landed in the patio of the barracks with a load of soldiers who had been badly hurt in a guerrilla ambush. Chávez lifted up in his arms a soldier with several bullet wounds in his body. "Don't let me die, Lieutenant," he said, terrified. Chávez managed only to put him in a car. Seven more died. That night in his hammock, unable to sleep, Chávez asked himself, "What am I here for? On one side, peasants in military dress were torturing guerrilla peasants, and on the other side guerrilla peasants were killing peasants dressed in green. At this point, with the war already over, it made no sense to fire a shot against anybody. And," he concluded on the plane carrying us to Caracas, "that's when I fell into my first existential conflict."

The next day woke up convinced that his fate was to found a movement. And he did just that, at age twenty-three, with an obvious name: Bolivarian Army of the Venezuelan People. Founding members: five soldiers and himself, with his rank of second lieutenant. "What was the purpose?" I asked. Very simple, he said, "the purpose was to prepare just in case something happened." A year later, as a paratrooper and officer in an armored battalion in Maracay, he began to conspire on a large scale. But he made it clear to me that he used the word conspiracy only the figurative sense of summoning wills together to a common task. That was the situation on December 17, 1982 when an unexpected event occurred—one that Chávez considers pivotal in his life. By now he was a

captain in the second regiment of paratroopers and aide to the intelligence officer. When he least expected it, the commander of the regiment, Angel Manrique, commissioned him to give a speech in front of two hundred men, among them officers and troops. At one o'clock p.m. the battalion was gathered on the soccer field and he was introduced by the master of ceremonies. "Where's your speech?" asked the commander of the regiment seeing him go up to the rostrum with no paper in his hand. "I don't have it written down," said Chávez. And he began to improvise.

It was a brief speech, its inspiration drawn from Bolívar and Martí but with a personal component regarding the situation of oppression and injustice in Latin America two hundred years after its independence. The officers--those who were his and those who weren't--listened impassively. Among them were captains Felipe Acosta Carle and Jesús Urdaneta Hernández, sympathizers of his movement. A very upset commander of the garrison received him with un upbraiding in everyone's hearing.

"Chávez, you seem like a politician."

"I understand," replied Chávez.

Felipe Acosta, who was two meters tall and couldn't be subdued by ten contenders, stood in front of the commander and said, "You're wrong, Sir. Chávez is no politician. He is a captain for today, and when you hear what he said in his speech you'll pee in your pants." Then Colonel Manrique made the troops stand at attention and said, "I want you to know that what Captain Chávez said was authorized by me. I gave him the order to give that speech, and everything he said, though he didn't have it written down, he had told me yesterday." He paused for effect, and closed with a peremptory order: "No one else is to hear about it!"

When the event was over, Chávez trotted down to the Samán de Güere, ten kilometers away, with captains Felipe Acosta and Jesús Urdaneta, and there they repeated the solemn oath spoken by Simón Bolívar on the Aventine Hill. "I made a change at the end, of course," said Chávez. Instead of: "when we have broken the chains that oppress us by the will of the Spanish power," they said, "until we have broken the chains that oppress us and oppress the people by the will of the powerful."

From then on, all officers joining the secret movement had to take that oath. The last time was during the electoral campaign in front of a hundred thousand people. For years they held larger and larger clandestine congresses with military representatives from all over the country. "For two days we would hold meetings in hiding places, studying the situation of the country, doing analyses, making contacts with friendly civilian groups. In ten years," Chávez said, "we managed to hold five congresses without getting caught."

At this point in the conversation, the President laughed knowingly, and revealed with a shrewd smile: "Well, we've always said there were three of us to begin with. But now we can state that there was actually a fourth man, whose identity we always kept secret in order to protect him, as he wasn't discovered on February 4 and remained active in the Army and attained the rank of colonel. But it's now 1999 and we can reveal that the fourth man is with us here on this plane." He pointed an index finger at the fourth man seated at a distance, and said, "Colonel Badull!"

According to Commander Chávez's view of his own life, the climaxing event was the Caracazo, the

popular uprising that devastated Caracas. He used to repeat, "Napoleon said that a battle is decided in one second of inspiration of the strategist." Based on that thought, Chávez developed three concepts: One, the historical hour. The other, the strategic minute. And lastly, the tactical second. "We were concerned because we didn't want to leave the Army," Chávez said. "We had formed a movement, but we didn't clearly know what for." But the tremendous drama is that what was going to happen, happened, and they weren't ready for it. "In other words," concluded Chávez, "the strategic minute caught us by surprise."

He was referring, of course, to the rioting of February 27, 1989: the Caracazo. He himself was one of the most surprised. Carlos Andrés Pérez had just assumed the presidency with a heavy vote and it was inconceivable that something so serious could happen within 20 days. "I was going to school for a graduate program on the evening of the twenty-seventh, and I go into Fort Tiuna looking for a friend to give me some gasoline so I could get home," Chávez told me minutes before landing in Caracas. "Then I see them bringing out the troops and I ask a colonel, "Where are all those soldiers going?" Because they were bringing out the ones from Logistics who aren't trained for combat, much less urban combat. They were recruits frightened by the very rifles they were carrying. So I ask the colonel, 'Where is that bunch of people going?' And the Colonel says, 'To the street, to the street. That's the order they gave--you have to put a stop to that any way you can, so here we go.' 'My God, what order did they give?' 'Well, Chávez,' the Colonel answers, 'the order is to put a stop to that any way you can.' And I say, 'But Colonel, imagine what can happen.' And he says, 'Well Chávez, it's an order and nothing can be done about it. Let God's will be done.'"

Chávez says he had a high fever from a bout of German measles, and when he turned his car on, he saw a poor soldier running with his helmet fallen off, his rifle hanging and the ammunition scattered all over. "So I stop and call him," said Chávez. "And he gets in all nervous, sweating, an 18-year old kid. And I ask him, 'Aha, where are you running to like that?' 'No,' he said, 'what happened is the squad left me behind and there goes my lieutenant in the truck. Take me, Major, take me.' And I catch up to the truck and I ask the guy who is taking them, 'Where are you going?' And he says, 'I don't know a thing. Who can know, just imagine.'" Chávez sucks in his breath and almost yells, drowning in the anxiety of that terrible night, "You know, you send the soldiers out to the street scared, with a rifle and five hundred cartridges, and they'll use them all. They were raking the streets with bullets, they raked the hills, the low-income neighborhoods. It was a disaster!'" And it was: thousands of them, and among them Felipe Acosta. "And my instinct tells me they had him killed," says Chávez. "It was the minute we were waiting for, to take action." No sooner said than done: From that moment on, they began to hatch the coup that would fail three years later.

The plane landed in Caracas at three o'clock in the morning. Outside the window I could see the marsh of lights of that unforgettable city where I spent three years, crucial for Venezuela and crucial in my life also. The President said goodbye with his Caribbean bear hug and an implicit invitation: "I'll see you here on February 2." As he went off into the distance escorted by his military men with their insignias and his friends from the early times, I was shaken by the inspiration that I had just traveled and talked enjoyably with two opposite men. One who was offered the opportunity, by his abiding fortune, to save his country. And the other, an illusionist who could go down in history as just another despot.

Copyright G.G.M/Cambio. Reproduction in whole or in part prohibited.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 27, 1999

To Whom It May Concern:

I have known Beatrice Rangel for some twenty years, first as an advisor to then-Foreign Minister Consalvi of Venezuela and later as an advisor on economic and national security policies to then-Senator Carlos Andres Perez. When Perez became President of Venezuela he brought Ms. Rangel with him, first to be his Deputy Chief of Staff and later his Chief of Staff. From the beginning, Ms. Rangel impressed me as someone with uncommon ability and potential.

When Ms. Rangel left public service in 1993, she relocated to New York to join the Cisneros Group of Companies, a multi-billion-dollar international conglomerate. There she worked directly under the Chairman and CEO to design and implement its international strategy. We have continued to maintain regular exchanges on matters pertaining to Venezuela and Latin America. Her analyses of strategic issues have always been reasoned, accurate and helpful, contributing greatly to my knowledge of the region.

Ms. Rangel has told me she is now eager to pursue new professional challenges in the area of private equity investment in Latin America. I do not hesitate to recommend her with enthusiasm for a senior management position in this or a related field. Her extensive knowledge of Latin America and her personal acquaintance with its leading decision-makers both in government and the private sector; her superb analytical and negotiating skills; her extensive background in political and economic policy and her proven management ability insure that she would be a very valuable asset.

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7910

MAR. 11. 1999 6:02PM

CORPORATE STRATEGIES

NO. 724 P. 1/2

MAR 15 1999

Beatrice E. Rangel
300 East 75th Street
New York, NY 10021

March 11, 1999

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
between 51st, & 52nd Street
New York, NY 10022

Via Facsimile
(212) -759-0041

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Over the course of the years, you and I have had the opportunity to establish a positive professional relationship, and have also managed to build a solid friendship.

Up until now, my professional career has involved working in both the government and the public sector. This experience has afforded me the opportunity to represent my country in numerous ways, and has also provided me with the chance, as a Latin American, to participate in delicate and successful negotiations affecting the region.

Proceeding my work experience with the government, I explored my interest in the private sector and was fortunate enough to participate in an industry that is continuously evolving, one in which my government experience has played a crucial part in the negotiation processes I have been involved in thus far. Telecommunications, media and entertainment are dynamic industries that I have thoroughly enjoyed working in; particularly during this period of convergence and integration.

MAR.11.1999 6:03PM

CORPORATE STRATEGIES

NO. 724 P. 2/2

I believe I have reached a point, however, where I would like to explore new professional challenges. Hence, considering the strong and respectful relationship that we share, I wonder if you would be kind enough to write a letter of recommendation on my behalf, so that I could accompany such a distinguished opinion in my dossier.

I would very much appreciate if you would take a moment of your valuable time to compose a brief, written evaluation of myself that should specify how long we have known each other; my most impressive talents and abilities; and whether you would recommend me for a top managerial position.

Any other remarks you might consider appropriate would also be welcome.

Please call me if you have any questions.

With gratitude and thanks,

Beatrice E. Rangel

New York, May 24, 1999

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Fl.
New York, NY 10022

MAY 24 1999

My Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was utterly surprised to learn that you have been distinguished with the "Emma Lazarus, Statue of Liberty Award" on History, as I have always considered you to be "the best part of the History of the twentieth century".

The distinction bestowed by the American Jewish Historical Society was thus not highly over due but a means to place on the record what the world has awarded to you for the last forty years.

Nevertheless, all of us who are grateful to you for having brought stability and security to a rapidly evolving international system, rejoiced last Tuesday at the honoring ceremony to the greatest living statesman.

Please accept these flowers that you need not water and will not compete with those that embellish your gardens at Kent.

Warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Kissinger

SENT BY:

4-14-99 ; 17:13 ;

READER'S DIGEST→

12127590042:# 1/ 1

Reader's
Digest

READER'S DIGEST
1730 RHODE ISLAND AVE., NW
SUITE 406
WASHINGTON, DC 20036

FAX

<table><tr><td rowspan="2">TO:</td><td>NAME</td><td>Dr. Henry Kissinger</td><td>FAX # 212-759-0042</td></tr><tr><td>LOCATION</td><td>Kissinger and Associates</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Cc:</td><td>NAME</td><td>John Mitchell, Senior Research Editor</td><td>FAX 202-466-2566</td></tr><tr><td>FR:</td><td>PHONE</td><td>202-223-3682</td><td></td></tr></table>

NUMBER OF PAGES
(including cover) 1

DATE: 4/14/99

Dr. Kissinger:

An author for Reader's Digest has written an article on National Missile Defense which quotes you and I would like to verify that you are quoted accurately. The article discusses the view of the Clinton Administration that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability. The author then cites your opinion that this position is no longer wise and quotes you as: "The ABM treaty was barely plausible when the Soviet-Union existed. Now it makes no sense in a multi-polar world of proliferating missile states."

It is my understanding that this quote was from your address at the recent Heritage Foundation conference on missile defense. Is this quote accurate and in context?
Also, our author identifies you as the chief architect of the ABM treaty. Is that accurate?

Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter. I can be reached either by phone at 202-223-3682 or by fax at 202-466-2566.

Jacob Reingold ran an institution which did enormous good for older people at a precarious stage of their lives. He was compassionate, warm and caring. My mother's last years were made better because of his help to her as an outpatient. And I have lost a valued friend.

Jacob Reingold - *Draft*

Jacob Reingold was at the forefront of providing compassionate care for the elderly.

Through his efforts, many elderly people were able to live, or, as in the case of my mother, receive periodic supportive services, in a warm and caring environment. The Riverdale setting was as homelike as possible and provided a broad range of assistance to meet the changing needs of its clients. Jacob Reingold set the standard for residences for the elderly which will serve as an inspiration for the future.

Jacob Reingold was an compassionate person while she did enormous good to older people at a precocious stage of their lives. He was compassionate, warm & caring. My mother's last years were made better because of his help & love as an on-site caregiver. And I love her & a valued friend.

[Y]

DATE 10/22/99 CORR. FILE Reston, James "Scotty"

ACTION: LPB ARB MKD SSM

FG (TC) JI

SUBJ. FILE ____________

CROSS REF. ____________

COMMENTS:

After receiving e-mail request from Newsweek, I contacted HAK in Seoul and faxed the info. to him. He said he tried once to reach Evan Thomas, couldn't get him, and then never tried again.

DC OFFICE:

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED ✓

HISTORY

# The Burdens of an Insider

## James Reston's papers reveal the world of access journalism

BY EVAN THOMAS AND
LUCY SHACKELFORD

JAMES (SCOTTY) RESTON, The New York Times's top Washington reporter from the 1940s through the '70s, personified a certain kind of journalist. He was a true insider, the sort of figure who referred to Washington as "this town" and picked up story tips in the lobby of the Metropolitan Club. To an older generation of newsmen he was a role model, but after Watergate made Washington journalism more adversarial, he was regarded by some as a tool of the establishment. Late in his life (Reston died in 1995 at 86), he knew that his reputation was tarnished. In 1980 he wrote his fellow Timesman Tom Wicker that he was "bother[ed]" by "the suggestion that I have been allowed upstairs because I would peddle whatever garbage the great men wanted to put on my conveyer belt ... It's true that I have used the column as a vehicle for interviews with every big shot I could find anywhere in the world, but there has never been any personal relationship in any of this."

But like many Washington reporters, Reston was willing to

at least feign friendship. A transcript of a private phone call between Reston and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in March 1975 shows Kissinger beseeching the veteran columnist: "I talk to you now as a friend. They [the Israelis] have been playing with our chips in a rather reckless way." The secretary asks, "Scotty, what else can we do? ... If you were secretary of state or the president, what is the U.S. position?" Reston deflects Kissinger's attempts to co-opt him by replying "I don't know" or "it's a nightmare"—but plays along with the clubby confidences. Kissinger ends the conversation, "Oh well, then let's have a drink on Wednesday or Thursday. But this conversation really ... don't ascribe anything to me."

Reston's private papers, which will be opened to the public next week by the Uni-

versity of Illinois, are full of such tidbits. They are a rare and complete record of the old Washington game of access journalism. At one point Reston records in his diary that Kissinger has told him the conditions under which the United States might normalize relations with Cuba. Kissinger "authorized me," Reston writes, "to repeat them to [Fidel] Castro if I saw him." Ambassador Reston? At the same time, Reston's private correspondence and diaries offer insights into a man of considerable dignity who resisted blatant attempts at manipulation and who wrestled with the difficult question of when to publish government secrets.

His worst mistake was the Bay of Pigs. At his recommendation, the Times watered down a story in April 1961 that the CIA was

about to stage an invasion of Cuba by an exile army. When the invasion was a disaster, even President Kennedy regretted that the Times had not more forcefully blown the whistle. A patriot, Reston agonized over the duties of a journalist during the cold war. "We are obviously in a period when it is not always easy to be a good newspaperman and a good citizen," he wrote his editor, Turner Catledge, in 1953. "Therefore, some information will have to be withheld."

Reston was without question right to sit on his biggest scoop: that America had discovered nuclear missiles in Cuba and planned to blockade the island. At JFK's personal request, Reston held off for 48 hours, until the president had a chance to address the nation and the world. And unlike some of his rival pundits, Reston, his papers show, resisted the CIA's attempts during the 1950s to use his column to plant disinformation. Similarly, when President Lyndon Johnson summoned Reston to the Oval Office in 1964 and started dishing dirt about Barry Goldwater (right out of Goldwater's FBI file), Reston refused to be used as a conduit for scandal and sensation. That same year, declining to examine in print various conspiracy theories about JFK's assassination, he explained to a friend, "This is a question of manners, rather than journalism." After checking with his

friend Chief Justice Earl Warren, he wanted to wait for the official investigation into Kennedy's death.

Today's reporters would scoff at such deference to authority. But they could use a dose of Reston's reasoned sensitivity. After Republican leader Sen. Robert Taft visits his home one evening in 1947, Reston laments in his diary that journalists have become "caricaturists." Taft is generally described as "stuffy, cheerless, and calculating," but Reston finds him "friendly, open-minded, and almost boyishly happy." The moral, Reston writes, is "gather your own information about people as much as you can; test every popular conception; and don't be in a hurry about people." In the age of the round-the-clock news cycle, still good advice. ■

NEW YORK TIMES FROM UNIV. OF ILLINOIS ARCHIVES

Wrestling with the question of what to publish: With LBJ

> "We are in a period when it is not always easy to be a good newspaperman and a good citizen."

—JAMES RESTON

44 NEWSWEEK NOVEMBER 1, 1999