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CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized
only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the
exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under
any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or
in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be
taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to
third parties prior to publication.

HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, May 12, 1991

(c) 1991, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Paavo
Keisalo, foreign news editor of Suomen Kuvalahti, in Helsinki,
Finland.

QUESTION: Is the Soviet Union now a credible international trade partner?

ANSWER: To defuse international tensions, it is in principle desirable for the United States and the Soviet Union to attempt to cooperate. But as a practical matter, there are severe limitations to cooperation in trade until the Soviet Union's internal situation is clarified. Few governments have enough resources to make a significant contribution, and the private sector will not invest heavily in the Soviet Union as long as there is great domestic uncertainty. That is a fundamental fact. Certainly, the Soviet Union has to understand that repression in the Baltic states will severely jeopardize any hope for economic and political cooperation with the West. The Western countries have never accepted the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, and they cannot change their position now.

Q: Gorbachev and nine Soviet republics have reached an understanding on how to proceed, but the Baltic states were not among them. Could this mean that he is resigning himself to their leaving the federation?

A: Speaking as a student of history, I would say that it would be better for the Soviet Union to let go of those republics that can only be kept within the Soviet Union by force. As for the remaining republics, the Soviet Union will be better off if the new Confederation confines itself to those republics cohesive enough to defend themselves but not so centralized that they threaten all their neighbors, which is precisely what Russia has been doing for most of its history. While the source of much Russian tragedy has been the result of foreign invasions, much has also derived from overextension into foreign adventures. Given modern technology, territory is not as important as it used to be, so the Soviet Union will no longer need extensive buffer zones. And it still has the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world, making it unlikely that any country will invade the Soviet Union in the face of such an arsenal.

Not only that, there is no longer a single country along the
Soviet border in a position to invade the Soviet Union. So, for all
these reasons, I think restructuring the country would signal a
positive evolution. But it is also essentially out of the hands of
outside forces:

Q: The U.N. cooperation in the Persian Gulf was made possible by

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the charter's clauses on collective security. Is this something
that can be repeated in future cases of aggression?

A: I would not say no, but we cannot count on it because the Gulf situation involved a very special set of circumstances: preoccupied with its own domestic problems, the Soviet Union simply could not add to them another foreign adventure; China was eager to ease the isolation in which it found itself as a result of the uprisings in Beijing; France was concerned about maintaining an American presence in Europe in face of Germany's possible resurgence, and Britain supported us for what one might call collective security reasons.

All of this was further helped along by the fact that Saddam Hussein turned out to be a man of exceptional brutality and limited intelligence. By announcing that none of the borders in the Middle East was valid, he managed to unite all the Middle East countries against him. And by never offering any basis for compromise, he made it easy to build up forces over a long period of time and to keep the alliance together.

I was convinced, incorrectly, until the very end that at some point Saddam would offer to withdraw from Kuwait if we withdrew from Saudi Arabia and put Kuwait under some kind of U.N. administration. If that had happened, he would have scored a very big victory. The 500,000 American troops to protect Saudi Arabia against Iraq would have implicitly asserted the military superiority of Iraq over its neighbors.

But we will not often have such a brutal or limited opponent. And we surely will not often find such an international constellation. I would argue that one can explain what happened in the case of the Gulf as much by an accumulation of national interests as by a doctrine of collective security.

Q: In Europe, and especially in the European Community, new debate has begun on the need to create what they call European defense identity. Do you consider this desirable? And if so, in what framework should it be done?

A: First, I consider it inevitable. It is not possible to have a European political identity without, sooner or later, developing a military identity. Second, with the withdrawal of Soviet forces to the Soviet border, and maybe even beyond the current border, there will not be the same sense of urgency with respect to a Soviet surprise attack, especially by land.

So, a structure which is geared to a rapid response will in any case no longer be necessary to that extent. And if indeed the Europeans achieve the political unity to which they aspire, it is only natural that they will develop a certain military component.

The question is, in what framework? Now it will have to have some sort of framework appropriate to the United States remaining in Europe. The United States should remain in Europe for the following reasons. First, because the remaining Soviet threat is mainly nuclear and only the United States can adequately defend Europe with nuclear weapons. Second, if Europe tries to build up a nuclear capability equivalent to the Soviet Union's, it would have to involve the Germans. And this would almost surely become a source of friction. Third, only America can provide the kind of

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political balance within Europe to alleviate French and possibly even British worries about the possible resurgence of Germany. Nor would this be undesirable from Germany's perspective, for it would keep it from its historic temptation to become isolated from the rest of Europe.

What is therefore required is a structure in which the American role is reduced, but not to the point where Americans become a kind of auxiliary force on which Europeans may call when they wish; and certainly not to the point where Americans do not have a major voice in final decisions.

I do not agree with those who say that we have to keep the existing structure in order to achieve these goals because I think the existing structure will become increasingly untenable in the 1990s. I suppose one could create a Western European defense structure within the Western European Union on the basis of some kind of joint arrangement and joint command structure that includes the United States; the Europeans would command the immediate ready forces, especially those that may be needed for crises among the nationalities and in ethnic conflicts. As a part of this structure, the Americans would have the decisive voice in controlling the nuclear forces. Certainly the right structure could be worked out once the Europeans and the Americans understand just what they want.

Q: Would NATO still be there.?

A: Yes, but its components would alter.

Q: Is there a realistic basis for a hoping for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

A: If you look at the 3,000-year history of the Middle East, you find very few problems that were ever solved permanently. But I think we can alleviate some of the problems, and that alleviation could become an ongoing process. And I think that over time we can also improve the situation. But it is just not realistic to set goals in which we say we are working toward final solutions after which all problems will disappear. That is not only not possible, it is a guarantee for failure.

Q: You negotiated an agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1973 and 1974.

A: It was because we were not aiming for a single, definitive solution that it became possible eventually to produce one between Egypt and Israel. That was easier than negotiating between Syria and Israel, and much easier than between the Palestinians and Israel.

I think that one inevitable step in this process of alleviation will be for Israel to give up Gaza and part of the West Bank.

Q: To the Palestinians.

A: First, they should give it up to Jordan or a group of Arab states. It will not be easy to put the two states into a territory where the distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea is only about 50 kilometers. In addition, it would leave in Galilee and elsewhere almost as many Arabs under Israeli control as there are on the West Bank. So a phased approach will be necessary to see what the practical consequences would be, though I do not believe Israel can stay put.

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Q: It has been suggested that the Palestinians should be given Jordan.

A: I think it should work the other way. I think Jordan should be given part of Palestine. The idea that we would overthrow a friendly Arab government and put it into the hands of Palestinians who have not asked for it just so we can have a neat solution is imprudent.

Q: It has been said that normally an arms control agreement is reached only when economic and technological reasons so dictate, that an agreement just records what in any case would be done. Most countries in Europe seem to have gone further in arms reductions in fact than in agreement. Is arms control still needed?

A: As you know, I was against the INF agreement. What we did was to take out weapons which we now need, and to leave weapons in Germany which we do not need. But that is water over the dam. As to whether it is needed, certainly not the arms control of the 1960s and 1970s. The idea that we should start a process of armaments when we cannot ease political tension as a way of building confidence is no longer valid.

We need to rethink arms control. In conventional arms control, I really do not see much of a future because distance and budgetary pressures are producing more or less what an arms control agreement would have produced. As for strategic weapons, I see a certain utility in an agreement that would permit the Soviets to dismantle their strategic weapons outside the Russian Republic, thereby avoiding the danger of leaving strategic weapons in the hands of states that could become independent. Beyond that, I think also that the unilateral building programs on both sides will tend toward stability.

On the whole, I would favor START's completion, but after that we all ought to take a thoughtful look at where we are going.

Q: So the debate between United States and Soviet Union on conventional forces and possible violations by the Soviets of this agreement is not substantive?

A: I am more bothered by the 10,000-plus tanks the Soviets have moved beyond the Urals -- which is perfectly legal but violates the spirit of the agreement -- than I am by their putting three army divisions into their navy. Those divisions are not going to make a difference, but the 10,000 to 20,000 tanks could make a big difference someday. The case of the three divisions is outrageous. It is the sort of tendency Soviets are prone to and which gains them next to nothing while making people lose confidence in them.

Q: Speaking of the Soviet military, is there any possibility of the military's taking power there?

A: In Russian history, the military has never taken power. What could happen, however, is that some political aspirant enlists military support the way Khrushchev did in 1957. That is entirely conceivable. In any event, the influence of the military in the power struggle going on now is definitely on the rise. I think the Soviet military feels deeply humiliated by what is happening to their armed forces in Europe. They obviously feel that concessions were made for which there was no reciprocity.

Q: You have said that in the future there will be new centers of

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power in the world.

A: Yes. Not that we should create them, for they are creating themselves. It is something we have to live with. Now that is not a big problem for Finland, but it is a big problem for the United States. By the way, I am a great admirer of Finland. Really, I am. I think what you people have done is truly admirable. And you've done it with great dignity.

Q: Well, yes. For us the big problem is the smaller Baltic states. But Japan does not seem very willing to take a responsible role in becoming a new center of power.

A: Japan, in my view, is pursuing a carefully thought-through strategy. It will play a larger role, in its own good time, on its own terms, and not on behalf of American objectives. For instance, it saw no reason to perform any military functions in the Gulf. But I think it is building up its armed forces very systematically. It already has the third largest military budget in the world. By the end of the 1990s, Japan will be in the same position Germany was in 1934, having the capacity to expand its armed forces rapidly and whenever it chooses. Japan did not survive for 2,000 years as an independent nation by being somebody else's protectorate. So I assume in the 21st Century Japan will play a major role in the political and military fields. Whether we will always like what it does will be a different matter.

Q: Is the same true for Germany?

A: No, I think less so for Germany. Germany has learned altogether different lessons from its experiences in the two world wars. Though Germany will also be more assertive, it will be so much more in the economic field.

Q: Would these new centers of power call for changes in the United Nations structure?

A: Actually, I believe the Security Council should be reconstituted. Germany, Japan and perhaps India should become permanent members. And the rules should be changed so that three-quarters constitute a majority.

1

5/2/91 ATTENTION DON MICHEL - KISSINGER INTERVIEW

Q: Is the Soviet Union ---

A: To defuse international tensions, it is in principle desirable for the United States and the Soviet Union to attempt to cooperate. But as a practical matter, there are severe limitations to cooperation in trade until the Soviet Union's internal situation is clarified. Few governments have enough resources to make a significant contribution, and the private sector will not invest heavily in the Soviet Union as long as there is great domestic uncertainty. That is a fundamental fact. Certainly, the Soviet Union has to understand that repression in the Baltic States will severely jeopardize any hope for economic and political cooperation with the West. The Western countries have never accepted the incorporation of

2

the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, and they cannot
change their position now.

Q: Gorbachev and nine Soviet republics---

Not only that, there is no longer a single country
along the Soviet border in a position to invade the Soviet
Union. So, for all these reasons, I think restructuring the
country would signal a positive evolution. But it is also
essentially out of the hands of outside forces.

Q: The UN cooperation in the Persian Gulf was made--

4

presence in Europe in face of Germany's possible resur-
gence; and Britain supported us for what one might call
collective security reasons.

All of this was further helped along by the fact that
Saddam Hussein turned out to be a man of exceptional
brutality and limited intelligence. By announcing that none
of the borders in the Middle east was valid, he managed to
unite all the Middle East countries against him. And by
never offering any basis for compromise, he made it easy to
build up forces over a long period of time and to keep the
alliance together.

I was convinced, incorrectly, until the very end that
at some point Saddam would offer to withdraw from Kuwait if
we withdrew from Saudi Arabia and put Kuwait under some
kind of UN administration. If that had happened, he would
have scored a very big victory. The 500,000 American troops
to protect Saudi Arabia against Iraq would have implicitly

5

Q: In Europe, and especially in the European Community-

A: First, I consider it inevitable. It is not possible to have a European political identity without, sooner or later, developing a military identity. Secondly, with the withdrawal of Soviet forces to the Soviet border, and maybe even beyond the current border, there will not be the same sense of urgency with respect to a Soviet surprise attack, especially by land.

6

The question is, in what framework? Now it will have
to have some sort of framework appropriate to the United
States remaining in Europe. The United States should remain
in Europe for the following reasons. First, because the
remaining Soviet threat is mainly nuclear and only the
United States can adequately defend Europe with nuclear
weapons. Secondly, if Europe tries to build up a nuclear
capability equivalent to the Soviet Union's, it would have
to involve the Germans. And this would almost surely become
a source of friction. Third, only America can provide the
kind of political balance within Europe to alleviate French
and possibly even British worries about the possible

7

resurgence of Germany. Nor would this be undesirable from
Germany's perspective for it would keep it from its
historic temptation to become isolated from the rest of
Europe.

I do not agree with those who say that we have to keep
the existing structure in order to achieve these goals
because I think the existing structure will become increas-
ingly untenable in the 1990's. I suppose one could create
a Western European defense structure within the Western
European Union on the basis of some kind of joint arrange-
ment and joint command structure that includes the United

8

Q: Would NATO still be there?

A: Yes, but its components would be different.

Q: Is there a realistic basis for a hoping for___

9

Q: You negotiated an agreement between ---

A: It was because we were not aiming for a single,
definitive, solution that it became possible eventually to
produce one between Egypt and Israel. That was easier than
negotiating between Syria and Israel, and much easier than
between the Palestinians and Israel.

Q: To the Palestinians.

10

Q: It has been suggested that the ---

A: I think it should work the other way. I think
Jordan should be given part of the Palestine. The idea that
we would overthrow a friendly Arab government and put it
into the hands of Palestinians who have not asked for it
just so we can have a neat solution is imprudent.

Q: It has been said that normally an arms control--

A: As you know, I was against the INF agreement. What
we did was to take out weapons which we now need, and to
leave weapons in Germany, which we do not need. But that is
water over the dam. As to whether it is needed, certainly
not the arms control of the 1960's and 1970's. The idea
that we should start a process of armaments when we cannot

11

Q: So the debate between United States and--

12

A: I am more bothered by the 10,000 plus tanks the Soviets have moved beyond the Urals - which is perfectly legal but violates the spirit of the agreement - than I am by their putting three Army divisions into their Navy. Those divisions are not going to make a difference, but the 10,000 to 20,000 tanks could make a big difference someday. The case of the three divisions is outrageous. It is the sort of tendency Soviets are prone to and which gains them next to nothing while making people lose confidence in them.

Q: Speaking of the Soviet military, is--

13

Q: You have said that in the future there will---

14

objectives. For instance, it saw no reason to perform any
military functions in the Gulf. But I think it is building
up its armed forces very systematically. It already has the
third largest military budget in the world. By the end of
the 1990's, Japan will be in the same position Germany was
in 1934, having the capacity to expand its armed forces
rapidly and whenever it chooses. Japan did not survive for
2,000 years as an independent nation by being somebody
else's protectorate. So I assume in the 21st century Japan
will play a major role in the political and military
fields. Whether we will always like what it does will be a
different matter.

15

A: Actually, I believe the Security Council should be reconstituted. Germany, Japan, and perhaps India should become permanent members. And the rules should be changed so that three quarters constitute a majority.

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where
not be easy to put two states into a territory in which the
distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea is only
about 50 kilometers. Not only that, you would be putting two
states with the full attributes of sovereignty into a situation
~~territory~~ and then leaving it in the Galilee and elsewhere almost
as many Arabs under Israeli control as there are on the West
Bank. So a phased approach is necessary to see what the
practical consequences would be, though I do not believe Israel
can stay put.

A: I think it should work the other way. I think Jordan
should be given part of ~~Palestine.~~ The idea that we would
overthrow a friendly Arab government and put it into the hands
of Palestinians who haven't asked for it just so that we can
have a neat solution is imprudent.

Q: It has been said that normally an arms control agreement
is reached only when economic and technological reasons so
dictate, that an agreement just records what in any case would
be done. Most countries in Europe seem to have gone further in
arms reductions in fact than in agreement. Is arms control
still needed?...

A: As you know, I was against the INF agreement. And what we did was to take out weapons which we now need, and we left weapons in Germany which we don't need, but that's water over the dam.

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for don

BURBY

Q: Is the Soviet Union now a credible international trade partner?

A: In principal it is desirable for the United States and the Soviet Union to attempt to cooperate, to defuse international tensions.

But as a practical matter I think there are severe limitations to cooperation in trade until the Soviet Union's internal situation is clarified. Few governments have enough resources to make a significant contribution and the private sector will not invest heavily in the Soviet Union as long as there is great domestic uncertainty. That is a fundamental fact. Certainly the Soviet Union has to understand that repression in the Baltic States will severely jeopardize any hope for economic and political cooperation with the West. And without repression, the Baltic States will soon be out from under Soviet domination. The Western countries have never accepted the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. And they surely cannot change their position now.

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understanding on how to proceed but the Baltic states were not among them. Could this mean that he is resigning himself to their leaving the federation?

A: Speaking as both a professor and student of foreign policy, I would say that it would be better for the Soviet Union to let go those republics that can be kept within the Soviet Union only by force. As for the remaining republics, the Soviet Union will be better off if a new confederation includes only republics that are cohesive enough to defend themselves but not so centralized that they threaten all their neighbors, which has been what Russia has done throughout most of its history. Some of the sources of Russian tragedy have been foreign invasions, but some have also resulted from overextension in foreign adventures. With modern technology, territory is not as important as it used to be because the Soviet Union no longer needs extensive buffer areas. It still has the second largest nuclear arsenal and no country will invade the Soviet Union in the face of such an arsenal.

Not only that, there is no longer a country on the Soviet border in a position to invade the Soviet Union. So for all of these reasons I think restructuring the country would be a positive evolution. But it's really substantially out of the hands of outside forces.

Q: The U.N. cooperation in the Persian Gulf was made possible by the Charter's clauses on collective security. Is this something that can be repeated in future cases of

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aggression?

A: I won't say no, but we cannot count on it.

This was a very special set of circumstances. The Soviet Union was preoccupied with its domestic problems and could not add to them a foreign adventure. China was eager to ease the isolation in which it found itself as a result of the uprisings in Beijing. France was concerned about maintaining an American interest and presence in Europe in face of the resurgence of Germany. Britain supported us for what you would call collective security reasons.

And all of this was helped along by the fact that Saddam Hussein turned out to be a man of exceptional brutality and limited intelligence, as demonstrated by his challenging every border in the Middle East when he annexed Kuwait. By announcing that none of the borders were valid, he united all the Middle East countries against him. And by never offering any basis for compromise, he made it easy to build up forces over a long period of time and keep the alliance together.

I was convinced quite wrongly until the end that at some point Saddam would offer to withdraw from Kuwait if we would withdraw from Saudi Arabia. If that had happened he would have scored a very big victory, in the following sense. It would undoubtedly have put Kuwait under some kind of U.N. administration. That would have made it very difficult to keep the alliance together. But the victory would have come from our putting 500,000 American troops in place to protect Saudi Arabia against Iraq, an act that without battle would have

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implicitly defined the military superiority of Iraq over its
neighbors.

So we will not always have such a brutal and limited
opponent. We will not always find this constellation
internationally, and I would argue that one can explain what
happened as much by a collection of national interests as by a
doctrine of collective security.

A: First, I consider it inevitable. It's not possible to
have a European political identity without sooner or later
developing a military identity. Secondly, with the withdrawal
of Soviet forces to the Soviet border and maybe even beyond
the current border, if some of Soviet neighbors become
independent, there is not the same sense of urgency with
respect to a Soviet surprise attack, especially by land.

So a structure which is geared to a rapid response will in
any case no longer be necessary. And if indeed the Europeans
achieve the political unity to which they aspire, it is only
natural that they develop some military component.

Now, in what framework? It will have to have a framework
within which the United States has a reason to remain in
Europe. The United States has to remain in Europe. One,
because the major Soviet threat will be nuclear, and only the
United States can defend Europe adequately with nuclear

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weapons. Next, because if Europe attempted to build up a
nuclear power equivalent to the Soviet Union, the task would
have to involve the Germans. And this would almost surely be a
source of friction. Secondly, Americans are needed to provide
some kind of political balance within Europe in order to
alleviate French and maybe British worries about the
resurgence of Germany. In fact, that also is desirable from
the German point of view so that they don't get isolated from
Europe again.

It therefore requires a structure in which the American
role is reduced but not to the point that Americans become an
auxiliary force that the Europeans can call upon as they wish,
not to the point at which the Americans do not have a major
voice in the final decision.

I don't agree with those who say we have to keep the
existing structure in order to achieve this. I think the
existing structure will become increasingly illogical through
the 1990s. But I also don't agree with those who seem to say,
let's make the Americans a totally subsidiary force. So I
suppose one could create a Western European defense structure
within the Western European Union, some kind of joint
arrangement with a joint command that includes the United
States, and one in which the Europeans could command the
immediate ready forces, especially those that may be needed
for crises of nationalities and ethnic conflicts. As part of
this, the Americans would have a major voice in control over
the nuclear forces. But the right structure can be worked out

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once Europeans and Americans understand just what we want.

Q: Is there a realistic basis for a hoping for a solution to the the Arab/Israeli conflict?

A: If you look at the 3,000-year history of the Middle East you find very few problems that are permanently solved. I think we can alleviate some problems and that alleviation can become a constant process of alleviation. But it is not realistic to set a goal in which we say we are working now towards a solution, after which all problems have disappeared. That is not possible. In fact that's a guaranteed non-starter. But I also think we can improve the situation.

Q: You negotiated an agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1973 and 1974 ...

A: I did not aim for a final solution, and for that reason it was possible to produce a solution eventually between Egypt and Israel. But that was easier than negotiating between Syria and Israel and much easier than between the Palestinians and Israel.

Q: To the Palestinians.

A: I think first they should give it up to the Arabs, and then let the procedure evolve. Maybe to Jordan as a first step. Maybe to a trusteeship of Arab countries. And it will

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not be easy to put two states into a territory in which the
distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea is
about 50 kilometers. Not only that, you would be putting two
states with the full attributes of sovereignty into such a
territory and then leaving in the Galilee and elsewhere almost
as many Arabs under Israeli control as there are on the West
Bank. So a phased approach is necessary to see what the
practical consequences will be, but I do not believe Israel
can stay put.

A: I think it should work the other way. I think Jordan
should be given part of Palestine. The idea that we would
overthrow a friendly Arab government and put it into the hands
of Palestinians who haven't asked for it just so that we can
have a neat solution is imprudent.

A: As you know I was against the INF agreement. And what we
did was to take out weapons which we now need and we left
weapons in Germany which we don't need, but that's water over
the dam.

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of the 1960s and 1970s. The idea that when we can't ease
political tension we should start a process on armaments and
in this way build confidence is no longer valid.

We need to rethink arms control. In conventional arms
control, I really don't see much of a future because budgetary
pressures and distance are producing more or less what an arms
control agreement would produce. In strategic weapons, I see a
certain utility in an agreement that permits the Soviets to
dismantle the strategic weapons they have outside the Russian
Republic and thereby avoid the danger of having strategic
weapons in the hands of states that may become independent.
Beyond that I also think that the unilateral building programs
on both sides will tend toward stability.

On the whole, I would favor START being completed but after
that we all ought to take a thoughtful look at where we're
going.

A: I'm more bothered by the 10,000 plus tanks the Soviets
have moved beyond the Urals, which is quiet legal, than I am
by their putting three Army divisions into their Navy. Those
divisions are not going to make a difference, but those 10,000
to 20,000 tanks someday could make a big difference. The case
of the three divisions is outrageous, and it's the sort of
stupidity the Soviets tend to display that gains them next to
nothing but makes makes people lose confidence in them.

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A: In Russian history the military, as military, has never taken power. What could happen, though, is that some political aspirant could enlist military supportas Khruschev did in 1957against people who were trying to overthrow him. That is conceivable. And in any event the military influence and the power struggle now going on is clearly increasing. I think the Soviet military feels deeply humiliated by what is happening to their armed forces in Europe. And they obviously feel that concessions were made for which there was no reciprocity.

-0-

(I'm a great admirer of (Finland?). I really am. I think what you people have done is truly admirable. And you've done it with great dignity. So I'm glad to have the chance to XXXX Finish. You can use this if you want to.)

-0-

Q: You have said that in the future there will be new
centers of power in the world.

A: Yes. Not that we should create them, but they are
creating themselves. It is something that we have to live
with. Now, that is not a big problem for Finland, but it's a
big problem for the United States.

A: Can I say a sentence that you will not use?

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Q: Yes.

A: We will all regret the day that we urged the Japanese to play a major military role.

To answer your question directly, though, Japan in my view is pursuing a very thoughtful strategy. It will play a larger role in its own time, on its own schedule and not for American objectives. It saw no reason to perform a military function in the Gulf. But I think it is building up its armed forces very systematically. It already has the third largest military budget in the world. By the end of the 1990s Japan will be in the same position as Germany was in 1934 where it can very rapidly expand its armed forces whenever it wants to. And Japan did not survive for 2,000 years as an independent nation by being somebody else's protector. So I assume in the 21st Century Japan will play a major role in the political and military field. Whether we will always like what they do is a different matter.

A: No I think less so for Germany. I think Germany has learned different lessons from its experiences in the two world wars. But Germany will also be more assertive, but it will be more in the economic field.

A: I actually believe that the Security Council should be reconstituted. Germany and Japan, and perhaps India, should become permanent members. And the rules should be changed so