Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
11/15/72; 9:06 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: Did you get the letter down there?

K: Yes, I got it last night. I thought it was tremendously improved.

P: I thought we ought to put a few subtleties in there.

K: It has already in fact been delivered.

P: I put in tough -- but I also put in some soft -- see you in San Clemente.

K: I got it about 5:30 and got it off at 6:30 and it already has been delivered. That goddamn Thieu -- he's going through his stalling act. Thieu wouldn't receive Bunker for 24 hours and now he asks for another 24 hours to study the letter. He just won't meet. We have to go ahead on Monday -- if we don't get his reply, without him.

P: I don't see -- maybe -- I don't see how he can continue KIX to stall. What in the hell is he going to do? The way that letter is written -- it's put in a context that we have to go another way if he doesn't go.

K: I think we should get the best agreement we can next week and if he doesn't accept it, KIX go bilaterally with North Vietnam.

P: We don't want to do that because in effect it will -- they will say, "hell you could have done that all along." Although, we will do it!

K: The only thing -- I don't know if we can make the Laotian and Cambodian -- make them stick. Thieu -- he can't be mad to drive it to that point -- he just wants to hold to the last possible moment.

P: We just don't have any real communication between him and Bunker. Bunker used to go and talk with him.

K: Yes, as long as we did what he wanted.

P: Abrams is not there and he apparently doesn't talk to Weyand.

K: It is premature to draw any conclusions.

P: I suppose -- I was looking over his letter to us -- it's just another song and dance.

11/15/72; 9:06 a.m.

K: We have given him 15 changes which we are willing to press for and that's what they are now discussing. It is not unreasonable for him to study that. What is unreasonable is when Bunker wants to see him that he can't get an appointment.

P: He asked to deliver the letter and got put off?

K: No, he asked to deliver the changes and was put off and then when he had your letter he got in. He didn't even know the letter was coming when he gave him the appointment. He almost always keeps Bunker waiting for 24 hours when he wants an appointment.

P: We are going along on our course of action and we are asking him to come along.'

K: We may have the North Vietnamese in a very tough frame of mind. We have no reason to believe that they will take all these changes. How many they take still remains to be seen. But I think at this moment they are less of a problem than Thieu.

P: Right. Okay, Henry.

K: I will come up on Friday next week morning, Mr. President.

TELECON

David Rockefeller

11/15/72 9:25 a.m.

R: You're nice to call back. I know what pressures you're under and I do congratulate you again on what you're doing. I think it's unbelievable. You really are. But Henry, I understand from Gerry Smith that he talked with you about his having accepted __________ he now says that he had understood the __________ was assured. I don't think I ever said that but I did say that it looks as though the Ford Foundation was very interested which indeed they were. But I must say, and I'm seeing Mac on Friday morning early, but I understand that Mac is not too happy about the choice of Gerry over the choice of Mac's __________ in Europe and that this may be causing him to reconsider whether it's worth doing. Well I must admit that I'm not absolutely thrilled myself but unfortunately haven't been able to come up with any better possibilities which is the problem. Do you still feel it's worth going ahead.

K: Well I think it's worth doing. My honest opinion is that Konstamm is terribly along the track that may not be the wave of the future.

R: Yeah, well I'm afraid of that. This is the Europeans' choice but of course it's the choice of five individuals and it may well be that the primary group of Europeans will pick someone else.

K: And you know I personally like Gerry but he's not Bill Scranton.

R: No he isn't or Doug Dillon.

K: Or Doug Dillon. He doesn't have the prestige . . .

R: I fully agree. If we could find better ones I would jump at it but I just haven't been able to think of anybody, have you?

K: No and I think it's worth doing. I'm strongly for it. Maybe I'll give Mac a call.

R: Well, if you have time, I must say, I think it would be a great help to my efforts when I see him Friday. Because I think that he is wavering. Now I do think there's one other thought that's been made and that is that one might have a sort of steering committee of two members, two people from each country, who would be on tap to advise the Chairman and you might get on the steering committee people such as Doug Dillon and Bill Scranton who would have more stature and that this would sort of build up the total image a little bit more . . .

K: What bothers me frankly is that it's a little convention . . . well, Konstamm is totally conventional but Gerry is pretty conventional too.

DREASSIFIED
Autograph: E.R.2.958-1
Dated: 10/04

R: Well, I agree. But I mean maybe we could . . .

K: But I don't know anybody better and if the choice is between not doing it and doing it with Gerry I'd rather see it done.

R: Yeah and maybe we could bolster it with others who would be less so but wouldn't be able to give as much time.

K: Yes.

R: So this is the thing we were thinking of.

K: Right, well let me talk to Mac before Friday.

R: Well that would be absolutely marvelous if you can.

K: No, I will do that.

R: All right, well I wish you every success.

K: Well you've been a good friend David and I appreciate your . . .

R: And I think the elections were encouraging. I just hope that our worries expressed before are not coming true. Unfortunately there have been more and more rumors.

K: In what area?

R: Of who's going to go into State.

K: Oh, no, I don't believe/ it.

R: I certainly hope not.

K: At any rate if that's what happens I'll be available for your projects.

R: You've got it. But I hope for the Country's sake you don't.

K: I appreciate that very much.

R: All right Henry, good luck and I'll see you.

K: Thank you David. Bye.

DRL ASSIGNED 07/26/88

TELCONE

Ambassador Cromer/Kissinger

12 Noon - 11/15/72

K: Hello.

C: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Fine, how are you?

C: Look, I'm sorry to burden you with this, I know you've got many
other things.

K: Not at all.

C: It's only this: That it was well known in the British press that the
Prime Minister had an idea of coming to visit the President some-
time this year and that it would be arranged after the election. Now
some partisan person has put down a PQ in the House of Commons
asking whether anything has been arranged. The impression at the
moment is to say nothing has at present been arranged, which is true.

K: Our problem - I was going to call you - is this: Until we get this
Vietnam thing on a definite course.

C: Well that I can understand.

K: We can't fix a precise date, but we can give you the assurance that
the Prime Minister is the first foreign leader that the President will
see.

C: That's very nice.

K: And very soon. We may still be able to make it on the 19th.

C: I see - that is still a possibility?

K: That's right.

C: Yeh. Fine. That's fair enough. I couldn't ask for more than that
and let's leave it like that for the moment and you let me know when
you can.

CLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Secretary Peterson/Kissinger

12:47 p.m. - 11/15/72

K: Hello.

P: Hi, Henry.

K: Pete, how are you?

P: How are you?

K: I'm fine.

P: Say I just thought I'd give you the report if you haven't got it. Our friend, Rollie, called me about an hour ago to tell me that he had it on extremely high authority that your mutual friend and mine either has been or will be made a firm offer in the foreign policy arena and that there was a report that he's going up to Maryland tomorrow and he said he's extremely confident of what he's saying.

K: Yeh.

P: And that our other friend is saying you know all about international and all this orchestration about international economics and so forth that I told you about that you see in the paper today and that, you know, goes back to the interview with Stu Alsop. It's a buildup to get him the position out of this, I feel too. I don't know if you heard this but Rollie seems to be speaking with great conviction.

K: I know he's going up. All I can say, I've been told exactly the opposite and other names have been mentioned to me. I would have to say that if this were to come to pass, the deception would have been so massive that, aside from the basic problem, I would no longer be able to stay. You know, I would in any event not stay because on my judgment that is an incompatible relationship.

P: Sure.

K: But if this were to be done, I would - bad judgment would be compounded by massive deception. And in that case my decision would be made for me.

P: Yeh. Well, what does he say the reason is for the visit up there tomorrow

DREASSIFIED

2

K: Oh, to discuss his political future. But I have been assured by him, by Haldeman that they're not planning any Cabinet thing for him, but you know, it will strain them not to tell the truth but I think they could manage it.

P: Um-hmm. OK, I don't know who Rollie was talking to except the other day it sounded to me...

K: It sounds like he was talking to the appointee.

P: Um-hmm. Yeh. And he was also talking to somebody close to Mitchell the other day. I asked him where he got that information and he said somebody very close to Mitchell.

K: This whole period is so degrading for everybody.

P: Yes, I know it is.

K: And it is so unworthy that

P: What is your best assessment of what they're going to do? Leave the current guy in or not? You don't think that's very likely?

K: Well, they gave me a name, I don't want to discuss it on the telephone. And he won't set the world on fire, that's for sure. And that was given to me as the reason why they want him.

P: Um-hmmm.

It would be a clear indication there would be a change.

K: Yeh. But has anybody talked to you?

P: Oh, hell no.

K: I mean not even to ask your opinion? I mean about your area?

P: Oh, no they haven't talked to me.

K: You have not heard a word since election?

P: Not a single word. No. What would they talk to me about?

DAILY NEWSPAPER

August 12, 1965 -

Best COPYDATE: 9/10/65

3

K: Well, I tell you it's amazing. Do you want to have breakfast one morning this week?

P: Sure. Tomorrow I can.

K: No, I've got one tomorrow. How about Saturday?

P: Saturday'll be great.

K: OK.

P: Have you had any indication as to whether my status is one of exiting or staying or

K: I tell you, I'll talk to you on Saturday about what I know about what is going on. It's worthy of what has preceded it. I don't know. I honestly don't know.

P: Well, you know the reason the appointing may be the story as an interesting hypothesis is that both this fellow - you know Rollie - and our friend Joe, the two Joes, got enormously seduced by the prospective appointee and you would have thought that he was one of the major peacemakers of the Western World by the time he worked them over. That's a fascinating thought. It's quite possible that Rollie's getting it directly from him.

K: Well, I know that during the campaign he put out a lot of stuff that he would take this only if I left and I traced two of them down and it came from George Christian who was after all working as his press secretary. And he has been giving me a working over with the President anyway. But that's standard. You know, that's his method of operation.

P: Right.

K: But I frankly, Pete, I am really very relaxed. Not only am I relaxed, I'm not even sure that I'm not hoping for selfish reasons it comes out that way because I just have the old stomach for another four years of this.

P: Yeh, well you keep accusing me of too much integrity at the substantive level which is what I'm concerned about - something we vaguely refer to as the national interest. I find that prospect so unbelievable given all the effort that's gone into building bridges around the world.

K: Oh, it's a disaster.

P: It's just unbelievable and I guess it's that problem that just absolutely baffles me given this other fellows obvious hostility toward everybody.

4

K: He's a total lightweight.

P: You mean on the substance?

K: Oh yeh. I mean what the hell did he bring to the Treasury and what did he leave there?

P: That's right.

K: Leaving aside all the fact that every personal relationship within the Administration was exacerbated by him.

P: But I can understand psychic ambivalence and personal ambivalence of all kinds but the part that worries me the most, Henry, is how can this alternative be seriously considered given all of the other moves that you guys have done over the last two or three years.

K: But I'm not sure it is being seriously considered.

P: Yeh. What would the talk about political future include - that would be a fascinating - because I think this spot unlike most of my associates, I think this spot fills his political objectives pretty well. It would give him a dimension that he's seriously lacking; it differentiates him from Spiro and he can change his party affiliation fairly soon and given his enormous talents, you know, in presentation, I could see a lot worse things could happen to him from his standpoint, Henry, than this. And I know that isn't conventional wisdom but

K: All he needs is a foreign policy.

P: What?

K: How is he going to conduct foreign policy?

P: Well, that's not the kind of thought that would occur to him. . . . . . there's no problem with that is there? From his vantage point he has a foreign policy and it's brilliant and it's bold and all the rest of us don't know what we're doing. That'd be the last thought that would occur to him that he couldn't do it. But don't you think it would move him from the domestic riverboat gambler, oilman image to the larger stage. OK, let's talk about it Saturday. How do you want to do this?

K: I'll be glad to come over - about 8 or 8:30?

P: 8:30 - all right. Great.

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

3:13 p.m. - 11/15/72

K: Hello.

MK: Henry.

K: Marvin, you didn't get your daily briefing.

MK: I know that. Listen, I'm very anxious to cover the rest of this whole
negotiation and I would like some sense of your honest appraisal really
as to what sense there is - I mean I'd love to be able to go and cover
the rest of this - does it make any sense to you?

K: I don't think so. I don't propose to say anything to the press while
I'm there.

MK: Right.

K: Or to have any briefings.

MK: Right. So we'd be in a posture, really, of seeing you go in and out
of the place and that would be it.

K: I don't even know whether you'll see me go in and out of the place.

MK: Oh, I see. So if anyone were to go over there we really would not
be in a position to learn anything.

K: That would be right. We would follow our previous procedure.

MK: What's that?

K: If previous procedures are followed, that would be right.

MK: Well OK, I'll have to find out. The office is very anxious for me to go
and I'd love to be there if we come in for a landing on this but

K: Well, as I said, we won't sign anything there.

MK: Oh, I know. I know. You still got the Saigon route to go.

K: That's right.

B-04 11/15/72
Dated: 11/15/72
DR. ASSISTED
Autograph 12/2/72-

TELCONE

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

3:19, Nov. 15, 1972

K: Hello.

F: Henry, Pete, how are you?

K: Fine.

F: Three quick things--One, do you know whether the President for
Rogers told Brandt that we wanted some kind of an institutionalized
mechanism for U.S. discussions for the common market.

K: No. Brandt has raised it every time he saw the President and
the President may not have said no, but he never really said yes.

F: Right. We've been ducking on that.

K: I'm not ducking, I'm being non-committal.

F: Right. On that one, I was talking here to a fellow by the name of
Davignon who is Under Secretary---

K: I know who he is.

F: He runs that political committee. A very interesting fellow and
he's just left, and when you have the time with regard to the---I'd
like to discuss it with you.

K: Right.

F: Secondly, this D. C. study. We have suggested some terms of
reference to Hal Sonnenfeldt and he's working on it. Sonnenfeldt
suggested that we let the State Department go ahead with their
D. C. /U.S. Economic Study, now I'm bringing in this other one
later. Two problems with that, one, ECUS economic study stinks
and secondly, it's meaningless if it's not postured in the context of
the overall political relationships. I personally think, even if it
means we are going to have to wait, we ought to do them together,
but I would hope that you would be able to come up with the plans
of reference for that study, as soon as possible.

K: We were planning to do it this week.

F: Great, wonderful, well that sounds being the case, I'm doubly
convinced we shouldn't split it into two very different studies, and
at different parts of the same study we should make sure that the
economic part is subject to the political conclusions.

BOSTON
BRIDGE
BUILDING
1972

EUGENE
BASS
FIELD

2

F:(contd)

Third, do you agree--

K: I agree with you.

F: Good. Third, we have asked for some comments from Sonnenfeldt on a hardy perennial which has been around practically since I've been here and that is, what should our response be to the EC-Spain and EC-Israel agreements, association agreements between the countries and the community. We think we ought to move. I understand that Helmut is not sure that we ought to be active on that--

K: I have to take a look at it.

F: Would you do that?

K: I'll try.

F: Cause this is an endless problem and all we do is let these violations of what we think our rights are go on and on without ever bringing it to a head.

K: Right.

F: It's got to go to the President. There's a strong difference of opinion between the current Treasury and State, I must admit I'm on the Treasury side, and I think we ought to bring it to a head as soon as possible.

K: Right.

F: Good, thank you.

K: Right, bye.

F: Bye.

TelCon

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

4:50, Nov. 15, 1972

..................

K: I never said it I didn't even know the movie was being made--

Z: So, I can say to her categorically you never said and you didn't know anything about the movie even until you read it in her column.

K: Exactly.

Z: Is that true? Cause she said she's going back and check all her sources--

K: But, she can check her sources, I didn't even know a movie was being made on this subject.

Z: You mean you didn't know anything about a cocktail party being held, to be shown during--

K: Absolutely not.

Z: Well, she can go back and check her sources and then she will have to say her sources lied, right?

K: It is a flat lie. I been misrepresented--

Z: Well, you never at any time said to anyone even *ak* in a kidding or a social setting about you would be willing to go or appear before you know, attend a cocktail or anything like that.

K: Absolutely not. And I'd never do it. But I never said it either.

Z: Okay. The first you knew about this is--

K: The first that I knew a movie was being made of the Exorcist was when I read her column.

Z: Then the first you knew about *at* party--

K: The first I knew about a party was in her column. I've never discussed a movie, a party, a film part.

Z: Of any film at any time with anyone.

DROPPED

AUG. 27 72 - 856 - 10/01/72
BY JOSEPH M. BANGOR - 10/01/72

TELCONE

Higby/Mr. Kissinger/Halderman

5:04, Nov. 15, 1972

K: Hello.

H: Yes, sir.

K: The avidity I have to go through to get people is really moving me.
Could you get your boss to call at some point?

H: Right, he just walked in, just one second.

K: I'm trying to come up, Bob, on Friday morning which I understood
the President wants. Is that still on?

that's

H: I don't know, the last I heard but I think he's talked to you since I've
talked to him, hasn't him he.

K: He talked to me at nine o'clock this morning.

H: Okay, well I have not talked to him today about any plans as far as
your coming or the announcements or anything like that, so--the
conversation I had was yesterday. He has not raised the subject
at all with me today, so I have no idea what his plan is.

K:

K: Can you let me know tomorrow sometime. Are you coming down or
are you staying up.

H: I was going to try and come down but I don't know whether I will now
or not, it's so late.

K: Yeah.

H: And, How did you leave it with him?

K: He said I should either come Thursdaynight or Friday morning,
and I said I'll come Friday morning, and he said work it out with
Haldeman.

H: How clever of you.

K: And, well, also I have out of town friends.

H: Right. How is she?

K: No, it's unfortunately a man.

H: Henry, you're slipping.

2

K: Definitely something.

H: Okay. You want to come up Friday morning?

K: I think it would be useful if I came up just to get a picture of going over the negotiations.

H: Yeah.

K: I think, incidentally, I may have already told you, but I think it is a mistake to make a big circus of it up there.

H: Nobody is making a big circus of it.

K: Yeah, well my concern is not to get trapped in a situation where the President is perceived at the moment an agreement.

H: What?

K: Where the President is perceived by the North Vietnamese as having Nailed himself into a great need for an agreement. So whichever works out in a low key way, I favor, whether that is Europe I adjudge denying.

H: Okay.

K: I'm just afraid if the whole press corps gets taken up there---

H: Nope, that isn't the thought, Henry. There was never any thought of bringing the whole press corps up here. There is a press pool that stays up here all the time the President is here.

K: Right, well if that can be worked---

H: We put out the announcements from here on anything that happens here.

K: Right, well that's--about that I have no judgment. You know, you have a better judgment of what would be a big story anyway.

H: Right. That would be the logical way to do it.

K: Oh, I think the logical way to do it would be with at least wounded feelings getting the fact that all the senior journalists are calling all the time about it. Ypir people ought to step out at the regular briefing, read the announcement, answer one or two questions, he can say I'm up with the President now going over the negotiations with him and getting his detailed instructions.

H: Uh huh. Okay.

3

K: I had at first thought I would do something but it's wrong, I'm not doing it.

H: I see. Okay, Henry, and that would be Friday morning.

K: It must be Friday at 11:00.

H: Announcement Friday at 11:00.

K: That's when they are going to release it.

H: Okay, you ought to meet the President at 10:00 then, shouldn't you.

K: That's right. Well, of course, we assume that he's being fully informed, I mean, the assumption is not that I bring him the news--

H: I understand that.

K: I'm in Camp David when the announcement is made. I can be there at 10:00.

H: 10:30 you want to make it?

K: 10:30 is fine.

H: You are always late, so we ought to set it at 10:00, then you'll be here at 10:30.

K: Oh, I can make it. Make it 10:30, that's safe, I have a breakfast.

H: Okay.

K: And, then we can go over this.

H: Okay.

K: One other thought I had, I thought--put a great deal of thought to that Richardson thing. I don't know how locked it is.

H: Nothing is locked.

K: But it's something on which I'd like to offer a few things for consideration. Probably not on the telephone.

H: Okay.

DALLAS, Texas

August 12, 1958

BOSMA DATED 8/10/58

4

K: More in terms of the people he'll be bringing with him.

H: Okay.

K: I prefer to wait with it 'til Friday.

H: Okay, well nothing's going to be locked on that, before then anyway.
So there is no danger.

K: Okay, fine.

H: All a matter of sorting them out at this point.

K: No, no, I'll talk to you; and there was one other subject I want to
talk to you about but not on the telephone.

H: Okay.

K: For your information, the bureaucracy is really churning in a frenzy
about what's going to happen to them. You, no doubt, are aware of
that.

H: Is that good or bad?

K: Well, up to a point it's good, but beyond a certain point you may get
some disloyalty and some screaming.

H: A point in time?

K: Some point in time, yes.

H: Where do you see that point being?

K: Well, I think if it goes much beyond Thanksgiving, you are going to
have trouble. The only other thing I would ask personally, I'm not
going to be surprised with anything with respect to Connally without
being told first.

H: No, sir.

K: Okay.

H: Cause that one is totally up in the air, the President is
meeting with him tomorrow. Until he talks to him and finds out what--
where the ground lies from his viewpoint, we have no indications now
of anything. The intention from here is nothing.

K: Right, well that's my impression.

※

5

H: There's the possibility of that changing.

K: I beg your pardon!

H: There's the possibility, obviously, of that changing if he raises something.

K: Right.

H: I think the odds are---

K: I should get the warning before it gets public.

H: Oh, sure. Good Lord, yes.

K: Because you know my view on this thing.

H: Yep. I don't think there's much likely you'll have any problem there.

K: Because he's been putting it out here--

H: What?

K: Well, that's he's been offered firmly the other position--the State position.

H: You mean that's spread around a while--

K: Yes, but it's being reiterated now to so many people.

H: Really?

K: Yeah.

H: I think that's the same story, just bouncing. Cause he's in Jamaica, he hasn't been putting it out.

K: Well, no, he wouldn't do it personally anyway. But, that is a different matter, whether it should be done or not. We said two aspects--one that it should be done, the other is how to handle, you know, the thing framework if it is done.

H: Yep.

K: And, in that case--

H: That's one I wouldn't waste much time worrying about. I don't think it's a contingency with which we will have to deal.

CLASSIFIED

August 12 1955

BOSTON
STAR-DAILY NEWSPAPER

DRL ASSIGNED

Authored FEB 21 1958

B-8F MAT Dated: 01/10/58

K: Right. Well, I'll talk to you on Friday morning about one aspect of the Richardson situation which is handable but which I think you should be aware of.

H: Okay.

K: And I'll plan then to be there at 10:30.

H: Good.

K: Good.

H: See you then.

K: Right. Is the President reachable now. We have to issue instructions for the SALT delegation which is leaving Friday. Is it your sense that he wants to read those in detail or can we issue them from here in his name?

H: There's no feeling on that, Henry, I don't know.

K: Why don't I talk to him?

H: I think you probably should.

K: Right.

H: He should be reachable now, do you want me to switch you?

K: Can you?

H: Yeah. Hang on.

(Ring)--H: Can you switch Dr. Kissinger to the President, please?

Operator: Yes I will. (pause) Just a minute, sir. (long pause) Mr. Campbell would like a word with you.

C: He's in the pool right now, he said he would call you back in about three quarters of an hour.

K: That's fine.

C: All right, sir.

TELCONE

The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., November 15, 1972

K: Mr. President

P: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I'm sorry to bother you.

P: That's all right, I was in the pool when you called.

K: Oh, no, no; that's all right. There's no hurry about it.

P: Fine, I'm all out now.

K: Right. Two things. One is they have formed a working group in
Vietnam now and the next stage --

P: It wasn't as bad as you thought then, huh?

K: Well, no, it was --

P: Just irritating.

K: Yeah. But that's his usual procedure --

P: But that's a good sign isn't it?

K: That is a good sign.

P: Good, good, good.

K: And the second thing is we have a SALT Delegation leaving on Friday and we've been having meetings all week.

P: You think maybe I should meet with them?

K: Well, that is one possibility. We have now told them that it isn't likely to happen because you were in Camp David.

P: Yeah.

K: I was wondering how you wanted to handle the instructions?

P: The point is are we leaving Gerry Smith in charge?

K: No, Gerry Smith has resigned effective January 1st. He's in charge for this one session. This session, however, is purely exploratory. we are not making any proposals.

DRL ASSIGNED

Autograph E012958-

RJ Rees Maw Dated 01/10/72

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., November 15, 1972

- 2 -

P: Well, I think maybe I should sit in on it then. I really think I should.
It's on Friday, huh?

K: No, on Friday they are leaving.

P: Yeah. Well, when would they -- You see, I have Connally tomorrow.
When are you coming? Could they come in --

K: I was coming Friday morning. We could hold them an extra day.

P: What I meant is couldn't we meet on Friday morning?

K: Sure, we could meet Friday morning or Friday afternoon.

P: Or Thursday afternoon or whatever -- what do you think? What time,
you just name it.

K: Well, at this point they don't -- all the issues are really -- there's no
disagreement --

P: No meeting is necessary, huh?

K: I don't really think it's necessary, Mr. President, because there's
substantial agreement already.

P: Yeah. All right, let's not go through the rigmarole, cause I really got
these other things to work on that are important and I don't want my --

K: Well, I could send up the instructions -- I could send them up for you
on the telephone.

P: Great, great. Well, you'll be here anyway.

K: Right.

P: Oh, you mean we've got to hand them to them before they leave?

K: No, we can wire them to them. I think it's better that I bring them up
to you.

P: You bring them up. I'll tell you what -- put that out as a story, you
brought the instructions up and I issued them and you brought them
back and wired them, how does that sound?

DR. AGNES F. EAGLE

Autograph EFL2958

Date: 11/1/72

*

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., November 15, 1972

K: Right. I think that's best.

P: Let's kill two birds with one stone.

K: Good.

P: Good.

K: And I'll also bring up the negotiating position that we've worked out.

P: Oh, yeah, sure.

K: But that won't take too much time.

P: I know there's nothing we can do on that except just work on it.
But at the present time you anticipate going on Monday now and --

K: No, I'm leaving on Sunday, Mr. President.

P: But I mean starting the meeting Monday and lasting three days to four days.

K: Three to four days.

P: Maybe. And then come back here for a week, right.

K: That's right.

P: Uh-huh.

K: And we may -- you may decide to send Haig to Vietnam with a text depending on what their reaction is to our suggestions.

P: You mean, the suggestions we've already made?

K: That's right. If they accept the procedure that we sent them and that you -- are reflected in your letter.

P: I must say the letter -- as I reflect on it -- is while it had some grace notes is damn tough.

K: Oh, it's extremely tough.

P: And don't you think it had to be?

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., November 15, 1972

- 4 -

K: It couldn't be anything else.

P: Yeah, because after all, we've been around the track on this. And dammit, they've just got to understand that we're backing up everything - I think he may have the impression unless he hears it directly from me that whether it's you or Haig that you know --

K: There's no question about it.

P: Do you think that's it?

K: No question about it.

P: Will he have any doubt after this letter now?

K: It's almost impossible to imagine.

P: (laughter) I know. But I think it's going to work out. Strangely enough, I'm more optimistic -- You know, I've never been optimistic but I have a feeling that maybe it's going to work out this time.

K: Well, I think --

P: Mainly because he has no choice.

K: He has no choice. It depends now how tough the North Vietnamese are going to play it.

P: Well, so they play it tough. Then we settle on that basis and Thieu goes along. They'll have to make some changes; the North Vietnamese -

K: No question.

P: We just say to them: All right, we can't go back empty handed, and then you get all that you can.

K: Well, with your approval, Mr. President, I think I ought to play it very tough at the meeting --

P: With the North Vietnamese; oh, God, yes.

K: And rather have the meeting end without an agreement and if we want to cave, we can always ask for another meeting and cave there.

DRIASSIFIED

Autograph E012958-1
Dated Nov 15 1972

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:46 p.m., November 15, 1972

- 5 -

P: Another meeting when?

K: I mean, supposing they absolutely refuse to yield. I think I should then say I'm going back to talk to you.

P: Right.

K: Rather than saying -- And say we just can't agree.

P: That's right.

K: Rather than for me to yield at the end and accept the old draft.

P: Oh, no, no; I agree with that. I meant, they've got to make some concessions and that's to be expected. And as a matter of fact, I think that I should give you a letter which you can read to them at this thing where I say that we've got to have these and that's that.

K: Right. I'll draft one and bring it up.

P: I mean, that's a minimum that we've got to have -- you know, something like that so -- leave enough gobbledygook in that they can . . . evasive but most of these idiots have got to be reasonable now, Henry, dammit. We're the only reasonable party and we're the ones that have got to bring this war to a responsible end.

K: We've wound up in the curious position of mediating between the two Vietnamese parties.

P: Yeah.

K: Because they're both a little bit crazy.

P: Right. And yet we know we've got a good deal for the South and everybody else in the world knows it -- you know, like de Borschgrave and all those guys.

K: No question about it.

P: He wrote me a very nice note after the election. I just dictated a reply to him.

K: He's a good man.

DPR-AGHEDU

- 6 -

P: Oh, he's one of the few friends we've got in the press.

K: And at some point when you give an interview --

P: Incidentally, I will. But he said that he had discussed an idea with you and I told him in my letter that I would look forward to discuss with you. I don't know what it is.

K: Well, it's the idea of your giving an interview to him because he feels it would strengthen his hand with all these Doves on Newsweek.

P: Oh, we might try that. We might try that. At a certain time I will but not --

K: That's right. I mean, this is not the time but --

P: And it might also needle Time.

K: Exactly.

P: On the other hand, we don't want to help the Post. Well, anyway, we'll see. Well, anyway, we'll then expect you Friday morning, right?

K: Right. About 10:30.

P: Good.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Okay, bye.

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