# 1. FOREIGN POLICY GENERAL: VOLUME I

## Table of Contents

<table><thead><tr><th>Title</th><th>Date</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2"><strong>POSITION PAPERS</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1. Fulbright Attack on Administration<br>Foreign Policy....................</td><td>3/31/64</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"><strong>BACKGROUND PAPERS</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1. Status of the Cold War (Kinter)........</td><td>12/17/59</td></tr><tr><td>2. U.S. Information Policy (Kraeine)....</td><td>12/23/59</td></tr><tr><td>3. Education for Democracy...............</td><td>2/8/61</td></tr><tr><td>4. After Cuba...........................</td><td>12/14/62</td></tr><tr><td>5. After Cuba - Draft 2...................</td><td>2/14/63</td></tr><tr><td>6. Barry Goldwater: Life Article........</td><td>1/27/64</td></tr></tbody></table>

March 31, 1964

QUESTION:

What is your reaction to Senator Fulbright's recent attack on
the Administration's foreign policy?

FACTS:

1. In a speech before the Senate on March 25, Senator Fulbright -- the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- urged the United States to adapt itself to a complex and changing world, to shed old moralistic myths "in the face of new realities" and to dare to think "unthinkable things." He called for a bold approach in re-evaluating old ideas and commitments. The Senator outlined 4 specific areas where myths were impeding U.S. foreign policy:

- **The Soviet Union and The Communist Bloc:** the "myth" that the Communist bloc is "a monolith composed of governments which are not really governments at all but organized conspiracies...determined to destroy the free world." He said that considerable diversity had developed among the Communist nations and that this trend should be encouraged by the West, primarily through trade agreements.

- **Cuba:** the "myth" that Cuban communism, on the one hand, is a grave danger, and on the other is a "transitory menace" that can be eliminated by trade boycotts and other economic and diplomatic pressures. Fulbright described the current economic boycott of Cuba as a "failure." He said Cuba was a "nuisance" but not a threat, and that it was not an "insuperable obstacle" to important U.S. objectives in the hemisphere. He suggested that U.S. trade with Cuba might help weaken its ties with Moscow.

- **Communist China:** the "myth that Chinese Communist hostility toward the United States is necessarily a permanent state of affairs and that normal relations between the U.S. and Peking and Taiwan and that mainland China might be drawn into "existing East-West agreements in such fields as disarmament, trade, and educational exchange."

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2. Senator Fulbright supported the main lines of current policy in *Vietnam*. He specifically rejected neutralization on grounds that it would lead to a Communist takeover. He attacked De Gaulle for confusing the situation in Vietnam by advocating a policy of neutralization.

*Panama:* the "myth" that there is "something morally sacred" about the 1903 treaty on the Panama Canal. Fulbright said it was preposterous to regard U.S. honor and prestige at stake in a controversy with a small, weak nation such as Panama, and he saw no reason why the U.S. should balk at renegotiating the 1903 treaty.

Senator Fulbright's remarks have been highly controversial. Many feel that they may have triggered a comprehensive re-examination of United States foreign policy and a great debate over that policy.

## RECOMMENDED POSITION:

1. Fulbright is correct when he says that U.S. foreign policy must be re-examined but the conclusions which should be reached are opposite from Fulbright's. For example:

a. Rather than embracing the Communists, we should recognize clearly that Communism is not "losing" anywhere in the world. In any re-examination we must realize that Communism has often changed its tone but not its goals.

b. While U.S. policy toward Cuba could be called a failure, the reason is a lack of determination and definition in the policy by the Administration.

c. Rather than defame De Gaulle, we should understand that this Administration set a precedent for independent action when it negotiated with the Soviets over Berlin and the Test Ban Treaty without adequately consulting our continental allies.

2. The Fulbright speech is particularly distressing because it comes at a time when Administration spokesmen have been making many statements which may have the same effect. They all may undermine the confidence our allies have in us -- and they all may embolden our enemies by convincing them that we lack the power or the will to shape events. Other examples include:

a. Senator Mansfield's proposal for the neutralization of Vietnam.

b. Mc George Bundy's statement (in the current *Foreign Affairs*) that the Cuban missile crisis "came out better than President Kennedy or any of his associates had expected." This statement must make our allies wonder what else we would have been willing to concede, and it may entice our enemies to be more adamant in the next crisis.

c. President Johnson and Ambassador Stevenson have both recently said that war is horrible and that general war is impossible. While nuclear weapons inspire all sensible men with restraint, we must appreciate that only our power and will can protect freedom -- our capacity to deter and our willingness to defend. We must not give the Communists any reason to doubt that either exists.

J. L. Goldthwait

9 February 1961

# EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

## I. Educational Exchange

The two most evident facts about the development of educational exchange since World War II are (1) that the extent of educational exchange has increased many times over and that an enormous effort has been put forward in the last fifteen years, and (2) that the needs of the underdeveloped countries are so staggering that what we have done is a pathetically inadequate response to them. The swift political developments of the 1950's have brought self-government to a large part of Africa and Asia where there has been little previous development of either the knowledge or the discipline required for a nation to govern itself. And the problem, in itself more than formidable, has been accentuated by the involvement of the new nations in the East-West conflict. It is not necessarily the goal of American policy to align these nations with the West, but unless we can assist them to achieve an internal stability sufficient to guarantee their neutrality, we may well witness their movement into the Communist sphere of influence.

The primary needs of the underdeveloped nations are for (1) a small but sufficient number of well-trained statesmen, (2) a far larger body of trained administrators, and (3) many trained technicians and persons to work as their subordinates.

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The Belgians in the Congo have been accused of having failed to educate the Congolese to take over their own government. In fact, there were less than a score of college-trained men among the Congolese who were able to take over the government of the country upon the assumption of independence of a country of 14 million people. Behind this deplorable situation, however, one must acknowledge that the Belgian shortcomings were due to both miscalculation and misunderstanding and were not as cynical an evidence of colonial "imperialism" as has been charged.

The Belgian miscalculation was in estimating how soon the Congo would be independent, and this miscalculation was not particular to the Belgians; in fact, the African territories have achieved independence at an astonishing rate. Very few persons with a lifetime of experience in colonial administration would have anticipated the events of 1959-60.

The Belgian misunderstanding is a common misunderstanding, and one which even now we still hold. Up until World War II it had been a common concept in colonial administration that education in an underdeveloped territory must start at the bottom with the extension of primary education and then secondary and advanced education to all the population, or at least to as many of them as were able to take advantage of the opportunity. In other words, education was conceived as an attempt to duplicate educational systems in the developed countries.

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During and after World War II, however, the British and French made a new and revolutionary discovery. Education begins at the top and not at the bottom, or to state it less dogmatically, there are two needs in education, one that the system be built from the bottom and the other that it be built from the top. Of the two, in a world where political events are moving as rapidly as they are, first priority must be given to education from the top. Since the Africans refuse to accept the argument that economically and socially they are not ready for well-balanced, stable self-government and since they demand self-government in any case, the burden of the responsibility for the welfare of these new states must rest on the shoulders of the very few adequately prepared leaders.

This is not a safe concept, and there is certainly opportunity for the new states under this system to degenerate quickly into narrow oligarchies or dictatorial systems. However, at the moment it is the only concept with which we can work and anticipate any success. It is no longer practical to argue that education must be adequate for all the people of the underdeveloped territory. Certainly this is the ultimate aim, but in the meantime we must concentrate on the training of the leaders, administrators, and, to the extent possible, technicians.

Most African states spend a larger share of their governmental income on education than we do in the U. S. However, the inadequacy of these efforts may be illustrated by figures. For example, in Zanzibar there are 65,000 children of primary school age, of

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whom only 20,000 go to school at all. When these children are of age to begin secondary school, there are only 1,000 in school; only 60 are able to finish the last two years of the six-year secondary school course. Are we to concentrate on the 45,000 illiterate children, or the 60 who may be potential leaders? Neither can be totally neglected, but of the two, the first priority must go to the 60 who may be called on to provide leadership for their country in a world in political turmoil.

The major contribution that the U. S. can make is in the education of approximately 100,000 African leaders in all needed callings, public and private.

Of first importance are contributions to university education, both in the territories concerned and through our programs of bringing foreign students to the U. S. Our contributions to university education in the underdeveloped countries must include providing funds for buildings and equipment, loaning staff to teach and to train teachers, and giving guidance in educational planning. Immediately following assistance to university-type training in priority should come assistance to teacher-training and technical training institutions. Next in importance is assistance to secondary educational institutions, in order that the institutions of higher education will receive an adequate flow of well-prepared students. The greatest assistance the U. S. can provide to secondary education in the underdeveloped areas is to send teachers, but one must hastily qualify this statement by saying that those whom we send must be

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adequately trained. It is not enough for great-hearted Americans
to go to the underdeveloped areas to teach. This sense of well-
meaning service must be accompanied by careful selection of persons
best suited to make their teaching experience a success. Persons
who do not know the language of the country to which they go, who
are otherwise unqualified to teach what the Africans must learn, or
who are unable to handle successfully the experience of teaching in
an underdeveloped country might do a greater service to the cause
of the underdeveloped countries by remaining in the U. S.

In addition we must handle our programs of educational exchange
in such a way that the most generous contribution possible is made
to the education of students from the underdeveloped countries.
This may well involve bringing more foreign students to the U. S.
to study, but of equal importance is the qualitative value of the
experience these students gain in the U. S.

Finally, the extent to which we are able to be of assistance
to the underdeveloped countries in meeting their problems depends
on our own ability to frame a coordinated program which makes the
maximum use of our limited means of providing assistance. At present
there are many different programs in operation. The Department of
State, the ICA, the universities acting both independently and under
ICA contract, and the foundations all are providing educational
assistance. The problem is how to see that the activities of the
different segments of a pluralistic system are best combined to
achieve the first priority objectives of the underdeveloped areas.

[LCS]

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## Congress and educational programs

The problems of educational exchange and of ICA-financed programs are vastly complicated by the U. S. system of year to year appropriations by Congress.

Educational programs can only be productive of results over fairly long periods of time, yet appropriations for them are made annually, and staff is often recruited for only two-year periods.

Future legislation providing funds for university activities should authorize arrangements flexible enough and of sufficient duration so that the universities which undertake the activities can function effectively.

## U. S. Government organization for educational exchange

Separate programs of educational exchange are administered by the Department of State and the International Cooperation Administration, as well as the Department of Defense and the Office of Education in HEW. The major programs of interest to the training of leaders in the underdeveloped countries are the programs of the Department of State, the ICA, and the ICA university contracts.

Each of these government agencies administers its educational exchange program in pursuit of its own specific objectives. The Department of State is interested in educational exchange as it increases international understanding through the educational experiences of the exchanges. The ICA objectives are less academically oriented; the ICA is interested primarily in training badly needed

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technicians for service in the underdeveloped territories. The ICA negotiates contracts with universities to provide specific services to aid in the economic social development of underdeveloped areas. The Department of Defense program is primarily concerned with the training of foreign military personnel in its own schools, while the activities of the Office of Education are mainly directed toward improving the education of Americans and assisting the universities in developing greater specialization for our own use in areas vital to foreign policy.

Federal government programs involving universities have been called "limited, sporadic, uncoordinated and ill-supported." (Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs.) In attempting to achieve more order, however, in a situation which must be better coordinated to be effective, one immediately encounters a paradoxical situation. On the one hand it would seem that there must be more planning to see that the various programs complement each other, do not overlap, and are directed toward the areas where the need is greatest. On the other hand the universities are the primary medium through which exchange programs are conducted, and one immediately encounters the argument that the university cannot "sell" the point of view of the American government and that it can only be effective if it is being true to itself and its tradition of academic freedom.

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There is no immediate and clear-cut answer to this problem, but it would seem that an answer must be found. The task in which we must assist is huge, and the necessity of our achieving a maximum degree of success is sharpened by international political tensions. It may be possible to achieve better coordination and direction of our educational exchange programs without compromising the principle of academic freedom. However, if it is not possible, or if we do not succeed in putting forth a better over-all effort, we may have to consider which is the more important issue, the retention of full freedoms of the pluralistic approach or the achievement of our objectives.

Various suggestions have been made by different committees as to how to introduce more planning and coordination into the present mixture of programs of Government agencies and their dealings with the universities. The Sprague report (Report of the President's Committee on Information activities abroad) suggests that the universities themselves might bring into existence a permanent council to deal with fundamental problems of government-university relationships. It also suggests the establishment of a quasi-independent Foundation for International Educational Development to link together government, university and foundation efforts in assisting foreign educational development. The Morrill report (Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs) suggests the creation of a wholly private organization whose primary concern would be the programs and purposes of the universities in

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world affairs. The organization would seek to supplement and facilitate the planning and work of the universities. It would be a source of independent and authoritative advice to the government, but it would not be the channel for major support funds to universities, or an intermediary between them and government or other institutions in contract or grant negotiations.

On the government side, coordination measures have been suggested in various reports. The Morrill report speaks of the necessity of focusing the attention of the government agencies concerned on the more effective use of university resources in program planning and implementation and on the provision of government support to build university competence in world affairs. To do this the Morrill report suggests that in the State Department the prestige and functions of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for the Coordination of International Educational and Cultural Relations should be enhanced, that the prestige, authority and competence of the Office of Education in supporting American higher education in world affairs might be upgraded, or that the President might designate the field of higher education and world affairs as an area of special concern for one of his assistants and as an area requiring special coordination among the Cabinet officers concerned. The Morrill report also emphasizes the importance of upgrading educational competence at all levels in the federal government.

The Sprague committee, without designating any particular agency, feels that it would be desirable that the role of a single

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agency of the government should be clarified and strengthened in
order that it might deal with the universities on over-all and long-
range policy questions which arise from the tasks being undertaken
by the different governmental agencies working abroad.

The proposals of both the Morrill committee and the Sprague
committee do not seem clear-cut, nor does it seem that they would
necessarily accomplish their ends. What seems to be most lacking
is a clear sense of purpose and a realization on the part of the
federal government of just what it is we are trying to do and what
we are not trying to do. There is also a need for a more serious
consideration on the part of the government of the importance of
education as an integral and important part of our overseas foreign
aid programs. Without this sense of purpose and of the importance
of the mission to be accomplished, no amount of administrative
machinery will be of value in making our programs more effective.

There already exists in the Department of State a Special As-
sistant to the Secretary for the Coordination of International Edu-
cational and Cultural Relations. It may be possible to make this
position more effective in overall coordination of educational
programs. It would also seem advisable that the person occupying
this position should not also be responsible for the administration
of the Department of State's own program of educational and cultural
affairs. He would then be more free to concentrate on coordination
activities. (I would also suggest simplifying his title.)

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The main area for coordination of educational exchange activi-
ties is in coordinating the programs of ICA and the Department of
State. In fiscal year 1960 ICA spent some $20 million on university
overseas contracts and an additional $10 million on training indi-
vidual participants from overseas in American universities. The
State Department spent over $15 million on exchanges of students
and scholars. Generally speaking the State Department concern is
more with education in the traditional academic sense, while
the ICA functions in the educational field to provide technicians to
aid in economic development. However, in actual fact the persons
brought here under the Department of State programs come with the
sanction of their governments, and such sanction often is accorded
on the basis of what the government considers to be its needs.
Moreover, the ICA programs have in recent years shown more and more
of a tendency to place students in regular academic institutions
rather than in special training courses. It would seem, therefore,
that the ICA and the Department of State programs are moving closer
together and that, therefore, greater care should be taken to pre-
vent their overlapping.

One further question is raised by the comments of individual
members attached to the report of the Sprague committee. Gordon
Gray and Livingston Merchant question whether the creation of a
new quasi-independent Foundation for International Educational
Development is a practical suggestion. They view the coordination
of U. S. educational programs as of secondary importance to the

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coordination of all types of aid for each country. Their view is
that it is more important that all the different types of aid that
the U. S. gives, for example, to Vietnam, should be coordinated into
a program which is satisfactory for Vietnam, rather than that we
should coordinate educational aid to Vietnam with the educational
aid we extend to other countries in Southeast Asia and throughout
the world. It is questionable whether these two points of view are
mutually exclusive. Certainly the overall needs of each country
should be considered, but the functional approach makes possible
aid on a regional basis and the development of regional training
centers which might not be envisaged under separate country programs.

U. S. Government exchange programs have also been criticized
as being shaped by our reactions to the world situation and the
Communist threat, rather than proceeding from the long-range needs
of the countries concerned.

In 1959-60 some 2,600 foreign students were brought to the
U. S. under Department of State grants; of these over 1,300, or
more than half, came from Far Eastern countries, while only slightly
over 200 came from African countries. The figures for the training
of ICA foreign nationals in the U. S. and third countries show a
similar discrepancy. Of the over 9,000 ICA participants trained
in the U. S. on third countries in 1959-60, more than 3,200 came from Far
Eastern countries (and this figure does not include those from
India or Pakistan), while only slightly over 700 came from African
countries. Even making allowances for factors which might explain

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the discrepancy, such as the greater movement of African students
to European countries for education, it is still difficult to ac-
count for the differences in the figures. It must be questioned
whether our educational exchange programs have been designed to take
into account the vast needs of the new African nations.

Education abroad

A major part of the U. S. effort should be concentrated on the
development of educational facilities abroad. There are certain
undeniable benefits to be achieved in bringing foreign students to
the U. S., but our ultimate goal should be to assist the new nations
to develop their own educational facilities, particularly for under-
graduate study.

The Sprague report states that we should move with conviction
in giving a new accent to our assistance to foreign education, and
that our conviction should be made concrete in the form of a decla-
ration of policy in support of long-term assistance to foreign
educational development by either the President or by Congress.

The report suggests the initiation or the continuation of the
following measures:

1. Assistance in building and equipping model schools,
   laboratories and libraries;

2. The creation of new regional institutions and training centers in public administration, agricultural technology and the management of enterprises;

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3. The development of large mobile training centers to provide basic skills in health, agriculture and mechanical trades to thousands of trainees at a time;

4. Experiments in the use of television to spread literacy and teach basic skills on a large scale;

5. The contribution of funds for "opportunity scholarships" to enable talented young people from all social classes to acquire an education in their own country;

6. A major program for teacher training and the establishment of teacher training institutes;

7. A program of training and orientation for young Americans who would spend a period abroad performing basic tasks such as teaching in elementary schools, working in the civil service, and acting as staff assistants in village development programs.

Many of these suggestions are incorporated in existing ICA and State Department programs, as well as in the proposals for a Youth Corps. However, the Sprague report feels that an adequate program in this field will call for a far more substantial financial commitment than the funds which are currently available.

The new ICA $20 million program for technical assistance to Africa is a move in the right direction. A large portion of this money is to be spent for education, and in addition to the new and

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greater financial commitment, the program allows for our assuming
a portion of the capital expenditure on buildings and equipment,
which is a necessary part of the development of educational facil-
ities within the underdeveloped areas.

ICA university contracts

The ICA university contracts are an important and valuable tool in promoting educational development, particularly in the training of technical personnel.

Two questions have been raised regarding the participation of the universities in the work of the ICA. The first is whether or not the universities should be taking on these contracts at all, whether or not it is the responsibility of the universities to help the government get its business done. This question can be answered with relative ease. The responsibilities of the university are not limited to the state or the nation in which they are located; they are defined by academic tradition. "The fate of free institutions and free societies in the world at large is a matter of grave and immediate interest to the universities. Our system permits them to act in support of that interest. It would be a tragic mistake to suppose that only the federal government could contribute to such national goals, that only public institutions could concern themselves with such public purposes."
(Annual Report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1959-60, p. 21)

The other question raised regarding the participation of universities in overseas contract work is not so easily answered.

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The question is whether or not the university may destroy its
usefulness by trying to do too many things on too many fronts.
However, others argue that if the universities do not undertake
overseas assignments, the government will have to create new
institutions to perform these functions. "This is not an attractive
possibility."

The argument has other facets. Some persons who agree
that the universities cannot stay aloof from the issues of the day,
think that the universities' contributions should be limited to
teaching and research. In contrast, there is the view strongly
held by the land grant institutions that the university is a service
agency committed to contribute to society not only by teaching and
research but also by the performance of many practical tasks
involving a high level of expertise. The land grant institutions
have functioned in this way at home and see no objection to extending
the principle into the international sphere.

There is no bitter conflict between these views, although
there is a genuine difference of opinion. However, there is no
reason why we should have to choose one view or the other. Each
institution can act in its own tradition and still contribute to
the international good.

There is a problem and it will be an increasing problem
regarding the competition between domestic and foreign needs for

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the same university facilities. Should foreign students be brought to the U.S. and should U.S. universities commit their resources to overseas assignments when they may thereby reduce the educational opportunities for U.S. citizens. Ultimately, with the provision of adequate educational facilities in the underdeveloped countries this problem will diminish, but for a certain period of time it is very real. The answer is neither a simple yes or no. Each case will have to be judged on its merit.

The Morrill report has various suggestions to increase the effectiveness of the university contracts:

1. The universities are sometimes called upon to provide contract services which are not entirely appropriate to the university purposes. ICA and the universities are both more conscious of the universities' limitations than they were in the past, but there is still a temptation to look on the university as an "intellectual cafeteria."

2. The university does not always take the ICA contract seriously enough in deciding to accept it or in organizing to carry it out. A university which accepts a contract must mobilize its resources to carry it out.

3. The university is not always selected with sufficient care. ICA should consider whether the university has the strength to undertake the assignment, and the contract should be drafted to take advantage of the university's particular strengths.

[L]

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4. The university is not ordinarily brought into negotiations until after the crucial preliminary discussions with the host country. University officials should be consulted at the outset of negotiations.

5. The scope of the contract is usually too narrow. ICA might reasonably be expected to bear at least part of the cost of research and collection of teaching materials on the subject matter of the project so that overseas experience can be cumulated and transmitted to others. The scholar, on the other hand, must adjust himself to the ICA objective of institution-building, which may mean that he spends less time teaching and more time planning and advising than he would do at home. Contracts should be further simplified in order to give the university freedom to achieve those objectives which are common to its own and the ICA program.

6. Multi-year contracts are necessary, but no contract can take the place of a climate of continuing mutual confidence and expectation of continuing relations. Both the Executive Branch and Congress should announce and accept the proposition that educational development in countries seeking our help is a continuing U.S. responsibility and that the universities are indispensable in carrying it out.

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The foreign student in the U.S.

In 1959-60 more than 48,000 foreign students came to the U.S. Approximately 20 to 25% of these students came here either under State Department grants or under the sponsorship of the ICA.

Educational exchange under these programs has two objectives, the furthering of international understanding through cultural contact, and the training of badly needed leaders, administrators and technical personnel for the underdeveloped areas.

The furthering of international understanding through such exchange is a legitimate aim, but it is a secondary objective and one which can best be achieved through indirect means. The primary objective of educational exchange is the provision of a satisfactory educational experience for the exchangee. If this objective is achieved the furthering of international understanding may very well follow.

In making the development of a favorable attitude toward the U.S. the objective of educational exchange we are adopting a natural but a somewhat unrealistic point of view. We run the risk of overemphasizing the importance of the exchangees' attitude to the U.S. A large proportion of the foreign students who come to the U.S. do come to like the U.S. and Americans and to understand far more of our cultural heritage than they understood before.

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But they cannot be expected to abandon their own cultural patterns
and to accept everything in the U.S. as the ultimate of perfection
in the evolution of human society. Blind acceptance of us should
not be our goal. If what they learn in the U.S. is to be adapted
for use in their own countries and to make their lives there richer,
the students must remain culturally integrated with their own
countries, not ours. The intellectual and emotional expatriate has
little influence among his fellow countrymen. (IIE, The Goals of
Student Exchange).

Foreign students who come to the U.S. do not always have a
satisfactory experience, and a good many return to their own
countries feeling bitter about their experience or having simply
reinforced some of the negative opinions they held about the U.S.
before they came here. Our educational exchange programs should
give far greater attention than they have to seeing that the number
of students who return with such an experience is kept at the
minimum.

There are a number of grave personal and social problems
which are inherent in the exchange process, particularly at the
undergraduate level. The foreign student coming to the U.S. has
left the personal and social environment to which he is accustomed
and is very likely to experience a diminished sense of personal
worth as a result. Not only is he being exposed to the ordinary

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challenges that any student faces in the process of higher education,
but he is meeting these challenges in surroundings and among people
totally unfamiliar to him. In addition he finds that all the
routine matters of social living are interpreted differently.
For example, he will find that although American students are often
critical of the U.S., if he makes similar critical remarks they
will be resented. Our handling of the exchange student might
forewarn him of many of these things or might assist him to
handle them with a minimum of strain, but we must acknowledge that
the chance of strain is there and will not be met adequately unless
the student is more mature than many who come here.

In addition, one of the greatest problems faced in bringing
African or Asian students to the U.S. is that of racial discrimination.
Discrimination is almost inevitably bound to occur at some point,
and this provides one of the strongest arguments for our attempting
to concentrate our energies on building up the educational
institutions in the underdeveloped areas themselves. We can attempt
to deal with the problem by trying to send non-white students to
those parts of the country where they are least likely to encounter
difficulties. We can also arrange to have them placed in a social
setting in which they can count on being accepted as normal
participants in community life. But in spite of all the care that
is taken we must still expect that the path will not always be

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smooth for the foreign student, and we should therefore exercise
greater care than we have in selecting those who can benefit to
the maximum from the experience.

In bringing students here there are a number of things we can
do which should help to decrease the number who go home embittered
by their experience.

1. No agency or institution should send foreign students to the U.S. without careful planning, and without a careful weighing of the difficulties as well as the advantages inherent in exchange.
We should not try simply to bring *more* students to the U.S., in spite of the vast educational needs of the underdeveloped areas.
Our first objective should be to do a better job with those who come.

2. Students who come here should be carefully selected at their point of origin in order to weed out those who are incompetent or unprepared for the experience in other ways. Those students who come on Government grants are more carefully screened than those who do not. Even then, government screening processes are not completely adequate and they can be so cumbersome as to be ineffectual. (For example, the IIE, which is charged with screening Fulbright and Smith-Mundt scholars, is itself not able to evaluate a student's credentials. Such evaluation must be done by the Office of Education in Washington and takes up to six months.)

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For those students who do not come on government grants there
is virtually nothing more than a "mail-order" device by which their
enrollment in a U.S. academic institution is accomplished. A
personal interview and personal appraisal of each candidate would be
desirable, and might be arranged through the establishment of a
traveling selection panel abroad. Each member of the panel would
be available at stated times in foreign cities. All the colleges
that admit foreign students might find it paid them in the long run
to set up, staff and finance such a service. It might be done
through one of their many professional associations.

3. Foreign students should be intelligently advised, so that they end up in the right institution and with a program that fills their needs. However, we must be realistic regarding the degree to which a student can transfer what he learns here to his home country, in particular the extent to which he can take back with him an understanding of the meaning of democracy. In the first place most American students are not entirely clear as to the meaning of democracy and what it stands for. And in the second place, even if the foreign student does gain new insights, the extent to which he can transfer what he has learned to his home country depends on local conditions of literacy, customs and traditions. There are two hazards for the foreign student who returns to his country: (1) what he has learned may make him feel out of place in his own country

25.

and he may find himself lost between two cultures and belonging to
neither; and (2) he may not be able to find useful employment when
he returns home.

All these considerations should be taken into account in
advising the foreign student regarding coming to the U.S. and the
institution to which he should go.

4. Foreign students should be given a more adequate preparation for American university life. It has been suggested that they should arrive here at least six weeks before the beginning of the academic year, and that they should participate in orientation sessions which would prepare them for some of the realities of American life before they plunge into their academic programs. The universities admitting foreign students could establish a number of regional orientation sessions to which all the colleges and universities within a given area could send their foreign students for orientation. Ideally there should be orientation sessions on each campus, but the regional solution might be more practical.

5. When the foreign student has arrived at an American university or college he should be given help in adjusting to his new environment. Foreign student advisers exist on many campuses, but they are often overworked and cannot possibly do all that they might wish. The universities should provide a full-time, full-fledged office which will serve the variety of needs of the foreign students. Such an operation involves extra planning, staff and money. American

26.

professors often feel that the foreign student who cannot manage
without special assistance should not be here at all, but in all
fairness to the student he should be given certain types of
assistance in matters where he is at a definite disadvantage in
comparison with his American companions; the student's educational
and social problems should both be given consideration. At the same
time the student should not be given special assistance and special
courses to the extent that he is separated from the academic
community to which he has come. The advice and assistance given
him should be directed toward making him better able to participate
in university life.

6. Students should not be brought here if the program they undertake is likely to serve only as a device for imparting foreign talent into the U.S. The talent of these students is needed in their own countries, and the shortage of sufficient educational facilities makes it of prime importance that the talents of those who have the opportunity of an overseas education should not be lost for their own country.

7. In this connection the foreign nations which send students here should work out effective means of using the talents of these individuals when they return.

14 December 1962

J. L. Goldthwait

AFTER CUBA

TRENDS OF JFK FOREIGN POLICY AND REPUBLICAN
OPPORTUNITIES, 1963-4

There has been considerable discussion lately of the likelihood of a major Soviet peace offensive, which is expected to set the tone of East-West relations in the coming months. U.S. and British analysts have reportedly detected signs of such a development. Whether it will be a change of atmosphere only, or whether it will create a climate in which agreement can be reached on some of the principal issues dividing East and West - Berlin, a nuclear test ban, etc. - is still not clear. The situation is further complicated by what may be a growing tendency on the part of Communist China to pursue in the Far East a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union.

The belief in the possibility of a Soviet peace offensive is based primarily on an assessment of the Kennedy handling of the Cuban crisis as having caused a major turning point in East-West relations. There is no doubt that the President, in his handling of the Cuban crisis, showed a surer hand and a greater willingness than ever before to display firmness on an issue vital to our security. However, the question arises whether the U.S. performance on Cuban will cause the Soviets to moderate their foreign policy throughout the world for any considerable length of time. And if they do so, will such moderation be dependent upon further U.S. action to back up the posture we have assumed in the Cuban situation?

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Finally, if further U.S. action is needed in order to demonstrate a continuing firmness in handling foreign and defense matters, will the President be (1) able and (2) disposed to act in the manner indicated?

The points at which JFK might be vulnerable to Republican criticism over the next two years can only be estimated by attempting to assess whether or not the Cuban situation will materially alter the past Kennedy performance in foreign policy, and if so in what way. The following paper suggests some possible implications of the Cuban affair, both military and political, and then outlines some of the principal areas in which JFK might be vulnerable to attack.

-3-

# 1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

## A. The Military Balance

In the first direct confrontation of U.S.-Soviet strategic power, the Soviets found it expedient to back down. "For this crisis, at least, the credibility of our deterrent was greater than theirs." (HAK, Reporter, 11/22/62.) In the future, however, it is by no means assured that the credibility of our deterrent will continue to remain greater than that of the Soviet Union. A different situation may apply in the future as we approach a nuclear stalemate, in which each side will be in a position to inflict unacceptable damage upon the other.

1. One must assume that Khrushchev's retreat was dictated primarily by the fact that the Soviet Union does not now possess the second strike capacity that the U.S. has. When faced with the U.S. determination, as phrased in JFK's statement of October 22nd, that any attack on the U.S. from Cuban-based missiles would be answered by U.S. retaliation against the Soviet Union itself, Khrushchev had virtually no choice but to back down.

- The lack of a Soviet second-strike capacity is also attested to by published accounts of intelligence estimates. The Institute of Strategic Studies in London, stated that, as of the end of October, 1962, the Western allies had 450-500 intercontinental missiles, as against about 75 Soviet missiles, although the Soviet missiles carried a larger warhead.

- 4 -

- In medium-range missiles, the Institute stated, the Soviets led with about 700 missiles, as against about 250 for the West. (NYT, 11/9/50)

2. Khrushchev's decision to back down may also have been dictated by the militarily unfavorable aspects of the Soviet bases in Cuba: the remoteness of the missile bases from the Soviet Union, the difficulty of coordinating action from them, and, on the other hand, their proximity to the U.S., and the fact that such proximity gave the U.S. a flexibility in handling the situation which the Soviets did not have. The advantage to the Soviets of being able to bring to bear against the U.S. their numerical superiority in medium range missiles (a superiority they do not possess in intercontinental missiles), was offset by the difficulties of command and control so far from the Soviet Union.

3. In the future, we can hardly count on the same set of circumstances persisting which on this occasion favored the U.S.

a. The Soviets will undoubtedly develop a second-strike capacity as rapidly as they can. The only limitation on such action will be the capacity of the Soviet economy to bear the cost.

- If the number of Soviet ICBM's is actually as small as it appears to be, the Soviets must have made a major miscalculation. However, having made the mistake, one can hardly expect them to do other than to repair it and to build a strategic force with a second-strike

- 6 -

- An American public rapidly galvanized to action by the existence of a Communist military base 90 miles from our shores, is far less sensitive to Communist expansion in areas such as Southeast Asia.

- It is more difficult for the U.S. to deploy military forces to these areas, and, conversely, easier for the Soviets.

- In the conflict in the Far East we are far less expert than our adversaries in conducting irregular warfare and handling the oblique form in which the Communist challenge presents itself.

(2) Berlin will remain a potential tender-box, even if the Communists decide to relax their pressures there temporarily. Our position there is exposed; it is particularly susceptible to gradual erosion, and the Soviets can increase tensions there at will and with a far greater variety of possible actions than is available to the West in response.

- What has happened in Berlin in the last year and a half illustrates the way in which Communist maneuvering can gradually bring about an erosion of our position, almost imperceptible but in the long run substantial. We talked originally of German reunification, but this claim has now publicly been almost

- 8 -

## B. Political implications of the Cuban crisis

The results of the Cuban crisis should not be overestimated as a major Western victory or a turning point in the Cold War.

### 1. Soviet goals

There may well be changes in the way in which the Soviets pursue the Cold War, but past situations provide ample proof that the Soviets are fully capable of substantial tactical maneuvers without changing their ultimate goals.

- The previous switch from hard line Stalinism to the soft line approach pursued after 1956 did not represent so much a change in Communist objectives as a realization that the soft line approach might be more effective in attaining those objectives. The Korean War had mobilized Western military forces to block Communist expansion, but the Communist economic offensive, which followed the trade and aid programs and support of internal subversion in the uncommitted countries represented a far more difficult problem for the West to meet effectively and with unity.

### 2. Negotiations.

There has been considerable talk recently of the possibility of a relaxation of tensions following upon the Soviet decision to withdraw in Cuba. The Soviets are reported to believe that we are close to agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty and that we are

- 9 -

that with a spirit of "reasonable compromise" on both sides, progress can be made in the fields of general and complete disarmament, relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and the question of atom-free zones in Europe, Latin America and Africa. (NYT, 11/26/62)

- On both Berlin and the test ban treaty, the Soviet proposal of progress through "reasonable compromise" on both sides, holds out little hope of settlement. The U.S. has watered down the Western position to try to meet Soviet demands almost to the limits of tolerable concession. The next move, it is felt, is up to the Soviets: they must recognize the right of Western troops to remain in Berlin and have access to it; on the test ban treaty they must accept at least minimal international inspection on Soviet territory to ensure compliance.

- However, the Soviets do not seem disposed, with the reopening of the test ban negotiations in Geneva, to relax their adamant refusal to accept the "adequate" controls asked by the West to ensure compliance with such a treaty. In particular they have consistently blocked Western attempts to establish an effective system of on-site inspections.

- Most of the other proposals, e.g. atom-free zones in Europe, have already been advanced by the Soviet Union in a form the West considered unacceptable; an atom-free zone in Central Europe would mean the dismantling of major portions of the Western alliance and is violently opposed by our West German

- 10 -
allies, whose position we support.

3. **Cuba.** Because of their limited military usefulness at the time, the Soviet missiles in Cuba were more important politically and psychologically than as a decisive factor altering the power balance. Even though the missiles have been withdrawn the breach-ing of the Western Hemisphere system by a Communist bloc state remains to the advantage of the Soviets.

- "Soviet foreign policy makers consciously set for themselves maximum and minimum as well as long-range and immediate objectives. In the Cuban case, they decided that it would be better to save Castro as a minimum, thereby retaining the long-range Communist significance of Cuba as the revolutionary out-post in Latin America." (Brzezinski, WP, 11/4/62)

4. **Latin America.** Although one of the most dramatic effects of the Cuban crisis was the show of Latin American unity in backing the U.S. position on Cuba, the real test for the Latin American countries will be their positive action to meet the long-range economic and social problems which threaten their stability.

Since Castro's coming to power, the Cuban revolution has held great appeal in many of the Latin American countries. Political action in these countries has been dominated by parties of either the far left or far right, with virtually no strong center parties. For those elements of the population who were dissatisfied with their economic lot under the status quo, virtually their only means of expressing such dissatisfaction has been through political

- 12 -

may be considerably diminished.

6. **The Underdeveloped Areas.** The political results of the Cuban crisis in the rest of the underdeveloped world are even less certain than in Latin America.

a. In the Far East Communist Chinese expansionism appears to be increasing.

(1) The attack on India, which for some time assumed the proportions of a full-scale war, is not likely to end soon in a peaceful solution.

- The Chinese cease-fire proposals represent a strategic gain for the Chinese if they are implemented; the Indians have rejected them for this reason.

- The border war has also stirred up the dispute between Pakistan and India.

- It has lessened Pakistan's alignment with the West.

(2) It is virtually impossible to estimate the effects of the Sino-Soviet rift and the emergence of more than one center of power in the Communist bloc. However, there is little evidence to date that would indicate any lessening of Chinese aggressiveness to coincide with the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba.

(3) The situation in Laos is deteriorating. Souvanna Phouma has recently threatened to resign, and the "neutral and independent Laos" we sought to create is almost certain to come under eventual Communist domination.

- 13 -

(4) Although the war against the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam has been stepped up, it appears unlikely that it can be won at our present level of commitment.

b. In other uncommitted areas the lessons to be learned from the recent Soviet and Chinese actions do not appear to be as clear to the nonaligned countries as we had hoped.

- The Chinese Communists, in basing their cease-fire proposals on a plan offered by Sekou Toure of Guinea, have drawn closer to their side many of the uncommitted nations who might otherwise be inclined to reconsider the wisdom of the pro-Communist orientation of their nonalignment.

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# KENNEDY FOREIGN POLICY AND FUTURE REPUBLICAN CRITICISMS

## A. The lack of a clear sense of purpose

Probably the strongest criticism that can be levelled against the Kennedy administration on the basis of its first two years in office is its lack of a clear and strong sense of purpose, which then given direction to the individual moves the Administration makes in the situations it confronts. The Kennedy approach has made a virtue of open-mindedness in seeking solutions to the point that it no longer acts from any strong convictions. The antithesis of the Dulles foreign policy, it has bent too far over backward in the other direction. Even the most recent change in policy in handling the Cuban situation, if it is extended as a policy of firmness into other areas, has been arrived at by trial and error. There is far more emphasis than there should be not on what is right but on what will work. This lack of conviction has not only produced inconsistencies in our policy, but it has confused and disillusioned our allies, and encouraged Communist aggressiveness and intransigence.

### 1. The Far East

In the Far East we have given no clear commitment that we would oppose Communist expansion by whatever means necessary.

- This has been evident in the contradiction between the policies we pursued in Laos and in Vietnam. In Laos the Administration has sought to promote a neutralist regime, in which the Communists will almost surely gain eventual dominance, while in South Vietnam we are committed to defeating the Communist

- 15 -

guerrillas. Our treatment of the situation in Laos has complicated the military situation with which we have to deal in Vietnam, and has undermined Vietnamese confidence in our commitment there.

- In addition we have been reluctant to commit to Vietnam sufficient military force to defeat the Communist guerrilla movement.

- We now face a similar problem on the Indian frontier; it remains to be seen whether our military assistance there will be any more effective than it has been in Vietnam, but the Chinese venture on the Indian border was certainly not discouraged by the U.S. performance in either Laos or, to a lesser extent, Vietnam.

- In addition, the way in which we promoted a settlement of the Western New Guinea issue, amounting as it did to a yielding to the Soviet-supported invasion by Indonesia, has added yet another item to the list of indications to the Soviets that Communist expansion in certain areas may well go unopposed.

A month and a half after the Cuban crisis there is little evidence of any substantial policy change by the Communists which would alter the impact of the Administration's record in the Far East.

2. **Western Europe.** The same air of improvisation has hung over our relations with Western Europe. NATO is torn by inter-allied disputes on matters of both defense and political policy, In

[Lc]

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part these may be attributed to the growing strength of our
Atlantic partners and their desire to play a more equal part in
the alliance than they have in the past. But some of the diffi-
culties must also be ascribed to U.S. ineptitude in the handling
of our allies, and to our failure to provide the kind of leader-
ship the alliance needs in achieving a unified policy.

a. **Strategic forces.** The question of the command and control of NATO's strategic deterrent, hitherto exercised only by the U.S., is becoming a major issue dividing the alliance. The Cuban crisis has vastly aggravated this issue.

- Europeans were generally shocked that in the first great crisis which might have involved an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons they were not consulted. Some have stated that the American nuclear monopoly, combined with the rule of non-consultation, reduces the European states to the condition of American protectorates.

- There has been a growingly insistent demand for a multi-lateral deterrent force under NATO.

- However, previous plans for NATO multilateral force have begged down over the inability to agree upon a method of controlling the weapons which would at the same time safeguard the interest of each of the NATO nations and make it possible to fire the weapons as rapidly as a crisis might demand. This problem has been summed up in the phrase "fifteen fingers on the trigger." The Kennedy

- 17 -

administration has, somewhat unenthusiastically, renewed
the offer made to the Europeans under the Eisenhower
administration to supply a limited number of Polaris
submarines for a NATO deterrent force. However, the
JFK administration has made its offer conditional upon
European agreement on a workable control system, and the
Administration has not taken any responsibility in
developing such a control system but has dumped it into
the lap of its allies.

- Many Europeans who were most strongly shocked over U.S. unilateral action on Cuba have also been shrewd enough to see that "the fearful Cuban risks would have been fearfully multiplied by consultation of our allies." (Also, WP, 12/12/62).

If the Cuban crisis has aggravated the European demand for
congrol over the weapons on which their security depends, it
has also pointed up the problems presented in bringing such
a force into being, and the extent to which the danger would
be increased by any solution which was not adequate. The
Kennedy administration continues to point out to its allies
their ultimate dependence on the U.S. for an effective stra-
 tegic deterrent force. In military and financial terms the
administration is undoubtedly correct in this judgment, but
we are seeking to impose on our allies a solution which is
politically impossible for them to accept.

- 18 -

b. **Local defense.** NATO has yet to arrive at a policy for the local defense of Western Europe which is agreed upon and practicable. The issue has not yet been faced of how to respond to a full-scale conventional attack; in addition, overall NATO strategy must be redesigned in order to retain the option as to whether or not nuclear weapons are brought into use, and, if they are used, to make it possible to conduct discriminating tactical nuclear operations at the outset of hostilities. Each of the three services in the U.S. has addressed the problems of the use of tactical nuclear weapons differently, and there are wide divergencies between our views and those of our allies.

c. **Political unity.** Our own refusal to face the issue of the defense of Europe in realistic terms is one of the most serious causes of the deep political divisions which keep recurring within the Western alliance.

The NATO Council meeting in Paris, December 13-15, holds out little hope of solving these problems. The Kennedy administration seems no more disposed than it has been in the past to deal with the problem of Western European defense in a way which is either adequate to meet the military threat should it be revived, or satisfactory to the legitimate national interests, military and political, of our allies. The missions of Rusk to Paris and McNamara to London before the

Administration's

NA

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NATO meeting serve as one more instance of the administration's practice over the past two years of having to send high level diplomats abroad periodically in order to calm the uproar we have created in the alliance.

### 3. The Underdeveloped Areas

#### a. Economic policy

The lack of clear long-range objectives against which to measure present performance is most evident in programs which are by their very nature long-range projects. The foreign aid program is a particular example. The Kennedy administration started off with good intentions but too little firmness of purpose. The administrative machinery was revamped, but not enough. It was decided to make the switch from development grants to development loans, which were to be the underpinning for long-term economic development in the underdeveloped areas. Much was said about necessary economic reforms in the countries aided. What has resulted has been sadly disappointing, even if one takes into account the fact that the program has not been under way long enough to render a final judgment on it. Certain things have been particularly lacking.

- There has been no clear sorting out of objectives with a priority assigned to each. Behind this there must be the realization that the funds are not available to do all that ideally would be done; without a scale of

- 20 -

priorities, it is not possible to tell what must be done first. The decision has not been made whether to concentrate our major efforts on a few countries where success is most likely, with relatively minor efforts more-at in other areas, or whether to scatter our efforts more at random.

- There seems to have been little understanding of the highly important role that private investment must play in the economic development of underdeveloped areas, and of the necessity for adopting ourselves and urging strongly upon the countries we aid measures which encourage private investment, both domestic and foreign. For example, in many of the Latin American countries a large part of the good which might come out of our foreign aid program is offset by the flight of local capital abroad.

- Our attitude towards the various military coup d'etats in Latin America over the past year has been so vacillating that it has done little to contribute to political stability. The economic program of the Alliance is dependent upon political stability, and we do little to contribute to such stability by recognizing immediately one military junta which overthrows a democratic government and delaying our recognition of the next.

- Some of the groups whose support is most needed have been antagonized by the Alliance. Businessmen have considered it a socialistic threat, while the working people find

[L.C.]

- 21 -

that inadequate measures to curb inflation result in a serious cut in their living standards.

- The administration of the foreign aid program has not improved in spite of the setting up of AID. Funds for the Latin American economic and social development Alliance for Progress are supplied by five different Government agencies.

- The effect of the new approach of the Alliance and its emphasis on self-help has been largely obscured by the large proportion of Alliance funds which have been disbursed as emergency funds to tottering Latin governments, rather than being spent in the promotion of the long-range economic and social projects envisaged in the Alliance Charter.

- The basic thinking behind our foreign aid program is now being questioned. If the program continues in its present inadequate manner it is likely to lose both its support in the U.S., which is necessary for its financial survival, and the support of those countries it seeks to serve. There is an urgent need for a dramatic breakthrough in a few countries, if only to encourage both the givers and the recipients of the aid program. To date the Administration has shown little sense of the urgency of the situation. It did not put up very strong battle against Congressional opposition on the foreign aid appropriation this fall, and, having announced the Decade of Development in the fall

[ec]

- 22 -

of 1961, it seems more ready to coast on its past accomplishments than to apply the enormous effort needed to cope with the real and knotty problems besetting the foreign aid progfam.

## b. Political policy

Too often in the past we have allowed ourselves to become so identified with the governing group or party in the country to which we have given aid that we have lost sight of the purpose for which the aid is given, the long-term interests of the people of the country. Our primary goal should be the welfare of the people, and it should be made abundantly clear to the government to whom we give support and to its people that we do so in order to contribute to the general welfare of the country and not to consolidate the position of some privileged or special interest group.

- Had we acted out of this type of conviction in Laos, our switch from support of the Boun Oum government to Souvanna Phouma would not have appeared as capricious and as ruthless as it did.

- In South Vietnam we must make clear to Diem that, once the guerrillas are defeated, our support of his government will be dependent on the extent to which he adopts measures which secure for the government the commitment of its people.

- 24 -

B. <u>Concessions in negotiations</u>

One of the results of the Kennedy administration's lack of a clear
sense of purpose, has been that in negotiating with the Soviets,
repeated concessions have been made in our position. In an attempt
to find solutions acceptable to the Soviets, we have come up with so
many different negotiating proposals, each one giving a little more
ground to the Soviet position than the last, that we have encouraged
the Soviets to take a more intransigent position. There can be little
point, in their view, to accepting a proposal we put forth at one
time if they know that six months or a year later they will have a
better proposal before them.

1. Nuclear testing

The willingness of the Kennedy administration to make concessions
which move toward the Soviet position is most evident in the
attempts to achieve a test ban treaty.

a. This progressive weakening of our proposals has now gone so
far that it seems to involve a high risk of endangering our
national security. In the

In the last year we have moved steadily toward the Soviet
position of:

- <u>Number and staffing of inspection stations.</u> Early in the
Kennedy Administration the number of internationally
staffed inspection stations the U.S. demanded in the
Soviet Union was reduced from 21 to 19. At present, even

- 25 -

[Lc]

the number 19 is considered to be negotiable and the U.S. is reported to be considering a substantial reduction. In addition, in the summer of 1962 the President indicated that we were prepared to accept "national," (i.e. Soviet-manned in the USSR) inspection stations under some form of international inspection, instead of our previous firm demand for internationally staffed inspection stations.

- **Number of Inspections.** The Eisenhower Administration's last position on this subject was to offer the USSR the choice of two formulas for inspection of a percentage of seismic events above a certain "threshold"; both would have resulted in about 20 inspections a year on Soviet territory. (This would have meant the inspection of approximately one in every five unidentified events, provided there was no muffling). Easily in the Kennedy Administration a third alternative for a "sliding scale" was offered, which would have resulted in 12-20 inspections a year, depending on the number of unidentified seismic events. At present it is known that the Kennedy Administration is now willing to reduce the number of on-site inspections it is requesting even further.

- **Staffing of Inspection Teams.** The Eisenhower administration's position on this matter was that teams inspecting the USSR should be composed of nationals from the U.S.-U.K. (and vice versa). The Kennedy Administration

- 26 -

modified this in 1961 to provide, in the case of the USSR,
for a team composed of 50% US-UK nationals and 50%
"neutrals." The most recent Kennedy proposal states only
that a team cannot have nationals from the country which
is being inspected. In other words, in the USSR a team
could be composed entirely of "neutrals," therefore giving
the unaligned members of the commission substantially more
power.

- **Composition of the Control Commission.** This offers another example of the Kennedy Administration's willingness to give increasing power to the neutrals. Under the Eisenhower Administration the final proposal made by the U.S. was for a commission composed of 3 Western states, 2 Communist states and 2 neutrals. Under the Kennedy Administration this proposal was compromised to accept the Soviet demand for East-West parity; the Commission was to consist of 4 Communist states, 4 Western states, and 3 neutrals. The most recent Kennedy proposal provides for a commission of 15: 4 Communist states, 4 Western states, and 7 neutrals.

- **Elimination of the Threshold.** Originally the U.S., under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, had asked for a treaty banning all tests except those below a certain threshold, (approx. 19 kilotons) which were considered so difficult to detect as to make it impracticable to try to do so. On these smaller underground tests under the

- 27 -

Eisenhower Administration, the U.S. proposed a moratorium
of 27 months. The Soviets in 1961 asked an extension of
the moratorium to 4 years, and in early 1962 asked that
the threshold be eliminated altogether. The U.S. has con-
ceded in both instances: In 1961 the 27 month period was
extended to 36 months; in early 1962 the Administration
agreed to the Soviet demand that the threshold be eliminated.
This was later justified by "advances in detection."

- Voting on budget of Control Commission. Under the Eisenhower administration the U.S. had maintained that voting on the budget of the Control Commission should be a two-thirds majority. The Kennedy administration has agreed to Soviet demands for a veto on the total budget. In effect, the Soviets have thus been given a veto over the activities of the Commission through control of its funds. Soviet denial of funds to the U.N. in the Congo dispute provides sample evidence of their willingness to use this type of veto.

b. It has also been a chafacteristic of the negotiating proposals advanced under the Kennedy administration that concessions have been advanced without obtaining any concessions from the Soviets in return. The result has been a growing Soviet intransigence in the negotiations, and many concessions they had made in the past have now been withdrawn.

c. Although improved methods of detection have been advanced as the basis for the U.S. concessions, this does not take account

[L.C]

[L]

Draft II

14 February 1963

J.L. Goldthwait

AFTER CUBA

There has been considerable discussion in the aftermath
of the Cuban crisis of the likelihood of a major Soviet peace
offensive, which is expected to set the tone of East-West relations
in the coming months. U.S. and British analysts have reportedly
detected signs of such a development. Whether it will be a change
of atmosphere only, or whether it will create a climate in which
agreement can be reached on some of the principal issues dividing
East and West - Berlin, a nuclear test ban, etc. - is still not
clear. The situation is further complicated by what may be a growing
tendency on the part of Communist China to pursue in the Far East
a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union.

- 35 -

- Some of the groups whose support is most needed have been antagonized by the Alliance. Businessmen have considered it a socialistic threat, while the working people find that inadequate measures to curb inflation result in a serious cut in their living standards.

- The administration of the foreign aid program has not improved in spite of the setting up of AID. For example, funds for the Latin American economic and social development are supplied by five different Government agencies.

- The effect of the new approach of the Alliance and its emphasis on self-help has been largely obscured by the large proportion of Alliance funds which have been dispursed as emergency funds to tottering Latin governments, rather than being spent in the promotion of the long-range economic and social projects envisaged in the Alliance Charter.

The basic thinking behind our foreign aid program is now being questioned. If the program continues in its present inadequate manner it is likely to lose both its support in the U. S., which is necessary for its financial survival, and the support of the countries it seeks to serve. There is an urgent need

for a dramatic breakthrough in a few countries, if only to
encourage both the givers and the recipients of the aid
program. To date the Administration has shown little sense
of the urgency of the situation. It did not put up a very
strong battle against Congressional opposition on the foreign
aid appropriation last fall, and, having announced the Decade
of Development in the fall of 1961, it seems more ready to
coast on its past accomplishments than to apply the enormous
effort needed to cope with the real and knotty problems
besetting the foreign aid program.

NOTE: This situation may be altered with the appointment of the Presidential committee to study the foreign aid program under Gen. Clay. But Gen. Clay's committee has only a very limited time in which to make its survey.

- 37 -

## 1. Nuclear testing

In the last year we have moved steadily toward the Soviet position:

- **Control posts.** Under the Eisenhower administration the U. S. had insisted that monitoring of possible underground tests be carried out by internationally manned control posts. The U. S. demanded 21 such posts on Soviet territory. Early in the Kennedy administration this demand was reduced to 19, and in the summer of 1962 the Kennedy administration abandoned

- 38 -

the idea of internationally manned control posts entirely in favor of national means of detection together with a very limited number of unmanned seismographic stations on Soviet territory. In current negotiations the Soviets are discussing only three unmanned seismic stations, and the U. S. does not appear to oppose this figure. The manned stations seem to have been given up entirely by the U. S.

- **Number of On-Site Inspections.** The Eisenhower Administration's last position on this subject was to offer the USSR the choice of two formulas for inspection of a percentage of seismic events above a certain "threshold"; both would have resulted in about 20 inspections a year on Soviet territory.

  (This would have meant the inspection of approximately one in every five unidentified events, provided there was no muffling). Early in the Kennedy Administration a third alternative for a "sliding scale" was offered, which would have resulted in 12-20 inspections a year, depending on the number of unidentified seismic events.

- 39 -

At present it is known that the Kennedy Administration
has reduced the number of on-site inspections it is
requesting to 8-10 a year; and is reported to be
considering even further reductions.

- **Staffing of Inspection Teams.** The Eisenhower administration's position on this matter was that teams inspecting the USSR should be composed of nationals from the U. S. - U. K. (and vice versa). The Kennedy Administration modified this in 1961 to provide, in the case of the USSR, for a team composed of 50% US-UK nationals and 50% "neutrals." The most recent Kennedy proposal states only that a team cannot have nationals from the country which is being inspected. In other words, in the USSR a team could be composed entirely of "neutrals," thereby giving the unaligned members of the commission substantially more power.

- **Composition of the Control Commission.** This offers another example of the Kennedy Administration's willingness to give increasing power to the neutrals. Under the Eisenhower Administration the final proposals

[10]

- 40 -

made by the U. S. was for a commission composed
of 3 Western states, 2 Communist states and 2 neutrals.
Early in the Kennedy Administration this proposal
was compromised to accept the Soviet demand for
East-West parity; the Commission was to consist of
4 Communist states, 4 Western states, and 3 neutrals.
The most recent Kennedy proposal provides for a
commission of 15: 4 Communist states, 4 Western
states, and 7 neutrals.

- **Elimination of the Threshold.** Originally the U. S., under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, had asked for a treaty banning all tests except those below a certain threshold, (approx. 19 kilotons) which were considered to be so difficult to detect as to make it impracticable to try to do so. On these smaller underground tests under the Eisenhower Administration, the U. S. proposed a moratorium of 27 months. The Soviets in 1961 asked an extension of the moratorium to 4 years, and in early 1962 asked that the threshold be eliminated altogether. The U. S. has conceded in both instances: In 1961 the 27 month period was extended to 36 months; in early 1962 the Administration

- **Voting on budget of Control Commission.** Under the Eisenhower administration the U. S. had maintained that voting on the budget of the Control Commission should be by a two-thirds majority. The Kennedy administration has agreed to Soviet demands for a veto on the total budget. In effect, the Soviets have thus been given a veto over the activities of the Commission through control of its funds. Soviet denial of funds to the U.N. in the Congo dispute provides ample evidence of their willingness to use this type of veto.

b. It has also been a characteristic of the negotiating proposals advanced under the Kennedy administration that concessions have been advanced without obtaining any concessions from the Soviets in return. The result has been a growing Soviet intransigence in the negotiations, and many concessions

- 42 -

they had made in the past have now been withdrawn.
At present the Soviets are calling on the U. S.
to make "reasonable compromises" when the compromises
they have offered in return have been no more than
a reversion to positions they took earlier and then
withdrew.

c. Although improved methods of detection have been advanced as the basis for the U. S. concessions, this does not take account of the fact that certain processes of muffling or decoupling of underground explosions add new possibilities for evasion of a treaty which we have not yet been able to take into account in our negotiating position.

- 43 -

## 2. Berlin and Germany

One of the most serious concessions made by the Kennedy administration has been its constant giving of ground on the issue of German reunification. By not openly advocating reunification the Administration has seemed to accept the indefinite continuation of the division of Germany. In doing so, it has seriously strained our relations with the West Germans, for no West German government can simply write off sixteen million East Germans and still expect to retain the confidence of its people.

In our negotiations on Berlin itself, although we have not made any concessions on what we consider to be our "basic rights," we have presented a number of negotiating proposals, each one of which has given a little more ground. The result has been that our "basic rights" have been pared to the core. Not all of our proposals have actually been advanced in conversations with the Soviets, e.g. the "package plan" of April 1962, but the publicity given this plan when it was presented to the Allies was a clear

bien when it was presented to the Villes was a clear
bien" of April 1932, put the publicly given this
conversations with the Soviet, e.g., the "backstage
of our proposals have actually been advanced in
"parte rights" have been based to the core. Not all
a little make a ground. The result has been that our
of negotiating proposals, each one of which has given
to be our "parte rights," we have presented a number
we have not made any concessions on what we consider
In our negotiations on Berlin itself, although
confidence of its people.

million East Germans and still expect to retain the
West German Government can simply write off fifteen
attrained our relations with the West Germans, for no
division of Germany. In doing so, it has seriously
seemed to accept the indefinite continuation of the
advocating remitification the Administration has
on the issue of German remitification. By not openly
administration has been its constant giving of ground
One of the most serious concessions made by the Kennedy

S. Berlin and Germany

- 43 -

- 44 -

indication to the Soviets of the trend of our thinking
and the areas in which they might expect to gain
concessions.

3. Laos

Our policy on Laos has likewise been marked by a
series of concessions for which we gained nothing
in return. After having supported General Phoumi
Nosavan, the head of the legitimate government in
Laos, we changed our policy in May 1961 to seek a
"neutral and independent" Laos, in which Gen. Phoumi
would be joined by both "neutralist" and pro-Communist
Pathet Lao forces. We were pushed into this unwise
course by the fact that we had agreed in principle
in March 1961 to a cease-fire. While U.S. military
intervention was thus thwarted, the Communists used
the time before the cease-fire was actually implemented
in May to extend their control to approximately
three-fourths of the country, including the vital
corridor adjacent to South Vietnam which has since
served as a supply line for Communist troops and
supply movements into that country.

substantive movements into that country.
erved as a supply line for Communist troops and
corridor adjacent to South Vietnam which has since
crossed-borders of the country, including the vital
in May to extend their control to approximately
the time before the cease-fire was actually implemented
intervention was thus thwarted, the Communists used
in March 1967 to a cease-fire. While U.S. military
course by the last day that we had agreed in principle
brought Macsao forces. We were bused into the area until
would be joined by both "neutralizers" and pro-Communist
"neutralizers and independent" Macs, in which Gen. Pomni
Pacsa, we change our policy in May 1967 to seek a
Noisavan, the head of the legitimate government in
in return. After paving supported General Pomni
series of concessions, for which we gained nothing
Our policy on Pacsa has falttered been marked by a

3. Macs

concessions.

and the areas in which they might expect to gain
indication to the Soviets of the trend of our thinking

- 44 -

- 45 -

When the cease-fire was finally effected, the Communists, from their position of strength were abashed to force us into seating the pro-Communist Laotian prince at the conference table, a move we had violently opposed earlier.

The final arrangement to which we agreed on Laos leaves the Communists as the dominant force in a three-party coalition. The key ministries of Defense and Interior we were forced to cede to the neutralists, and the Communists have shown progressively greater strength in the government. The machinery established to supervise the carrying out of the agreement has not proved adequate to ensure that Communist forces from outside Laos are withdrawn from the territory. There is considerable evidence pointing to the fact that the agreement is not being adhered to, but our position is now so limited by the terms of the agreement that there is very little that we can do to ascertain whether it is being carried out, or to enforce compliance if it is not.

- 46 -

C. Half-measures

Up until the recent Cuban affair, the Kennedy administration's action in most areas has been characterized by half-measures inadequate to fulfill their purpose.

- The most glaring example was the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, 1961, when the denial of air cover to the operation was the chief factor in its failure.

- Our present military effort in South Vietnam is inadequate and half-hearted. The Kennedy administration has not yet shown itself disposed to commit sufficient military strength to the operation to defeat the Communist guerrillas. At present, our policy appears to be limited to containing them.

- In Laos as well our policy has been half-hearted, even though the Kennedy administration inherited a situation which was fraught with difficulties. From March 1961 until the signing of the Geneva agreement in July 1962, U.S. policy was so weak that we suffered a series of setbacks, including the extension of Communist control to three-quarters of the country, the yielding to Communist or pro-Communist neutralist forces of key posts in the new governments, and the

- 47 -

withdrawal of Western forces without sufficient guarantees to ensure that Communist forces from North Vietnam were also withdrawn and that the armies of the three Laotian groups were integrated.

- In Berlin during the last year the Western response to Soviet and East German harassment and provocation has tended to be too little and too late, until Western rights in the city have been pared down to the hard core of what we consider as our "basic rights." Moreover, these rights are now reduced to the extent that they now are applied only to the Western sector of the city.

It is in this area of half-measures that it is most difficult to predict what will be the future Kennedy performance. In the Cuban affair the President showed a great deal more sureness of hand than he had previously shown in applying measures appropriate and sufficient to bring about the objectives desired. It is possible that the Administration may have learned a lesson from this affair which they will be able to apply to other situations

- 2 -

on Cuba will cause the Soviets to moderate their foreign policy
throughout the world for any considerable length of time. And if
they do so, will such moderation be dependent upon further U.S.
action to back up the posture we have assumed in the Cuban situation?
Finally, if further U.S. action is needed in order to demonstrate
a continuing firmness in handling foreign and defense matters, will
the President be (1) able and (2) disposed to act in the manner
indicated? The present status of the Cuban situation and the
Administration's handling of the Soviet build-up there may provide
an answer to these questions.

The points at which JFK might be vulnerable to Republican
criticism over the next two years can be estimated to a large extent
by attempting to assess whether or not the Cuban situation will
materially alter the past Kennedy performance in foreign policy,
and if so in what way. The following paper suggests some possible
implications of the Cuban affair, both military and political, and
then outlines some of the principal areas in which JFK might be
vulnerable to attack.

# I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUBAN CRISIS

## A. The Military Balance

[L.C]

- 3 -

This crisis, at least, the credibility of our deterrent was greater than theirs." (HAK, Reporter, 11/22/62.) In the future, however, it is by no means assured that the credibility of our deterrent will continue to remain greater than that of the Soviet Union. A different situation may apply in the future as we approach a nuclear statement, in which each side will be in a position to inflict unacceptable damage upon the other.

1. One must assume that Khrushchev's retreat was dictated primarily by the fact that the Soviet Union does not now possess the second-strike capacity that the U.S. has. When faced with the U.S. determination, as expressed by JFK in his statement of October 22nd, that any attack on the U.S. from Cuban-based missiles would be answered by U.S. retaliation against the Soviet Union itself, Khrushchev had virtually no choice but to back down.

- The U.S. is reported to have at present about 200 land-based intercontinental missiles which are operational, and 9 Polaris submarines, each carrying 16 missiles, with a

- 4 -

tenth soon to be available. There are thus about 350 U.S. missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. In addition the U.S. has a strategic bombing force vastly superior to that of the Soviet Union; 1200 bombers, including 630 B-52's, 90 B-58's, and the rest B-47's reactivated during the 1961 Berlin crisis. Half of the bomber force is on 15-minute ground alert.

- The Soviets are reported to have about 75-100 intercontinental missiles in place, but not all are believed to be fully operational. They may have 20-35 missile submarines equipped with two or three short-range missiles apiece. (Baldwin, NYT, 1/10/63)

- Thus the U.S. has at present at least double the Soviet number of missiles (although the Soviet missiles carry a larger warhead), and to the U.S. side of the equation must be added our vast superiority in bombers.

2. Khrushchev's decision to back down may also have been dictated by the militarily unfavorable aspects of the Soviet bases in Cuba; the remoteness of the missile bases from the Soviet Union, the difficulty of coordinating action from them, and, on the other hand, their proximity to the U.S., and the fact

- 5 -

[LC]

3. In the future, we cannot inevitably count that the same set of circumstances will favor the U.S.

- If the number of Soviet ICBM's is actually as small as it appears to be, the Soviets must have made a major miscalculation. However, having made the mistake, one can hardly expect them to do other than to repair it and to build a strategic force with a second-strike capacity. The only question is how long it will take them to do this.

them to do this.

capacity. The only question is how long it will take
it and to build a strategic force with a second-strike
one can hardly expect them to do other than to repair
major mobilization. However, having made the mistake,
as it appears to be, the Soviets must have made a

- If the number of Soviet ICMs is actually as small
  to bear the cost.

such action will be the capacity of the Soviet economy
capacity as rapidly as they can. The only limitation on
a. The Soviets will undoubtedly develop a second-strike
of circumstances will favor the U.S.

3. In the future, we cannot inevitably count that the same set
control so far from the Soviet Union.

(a superiority they do not possess in intercontinental
U.S. their numerical superiority in medium range missiles
to the Soviets of being able to bring to bear against the
the situation which the Soviets did not have. The advantage
that such proximity gave the U.S. a flexibility in landing

- 2 -

[10]

- 7 -

- It is more difficult for the U.S. to deploy military forces to these areas, and, conversely, easier for the Soviets or Chinese Communists.

(2) <u>Berlin</u> will remain a potential tinger-box, even if the Communists decide to relax their pressures there temporarily. Our position there is exposed; it is particularly susceptible to gradual erosion, and the Soviets can increase tensions there at will and with a far greater variety of possible actions than is available to the West in response.

- 8 -

- What has happened in Berlin in the last year and a half illustrates the way in which Communist maneuvering can gradually bring about an **erosion of our position**, almost imperceptible but in the long run substantial. We talked originally of German reunification, but this claim has now publicly been almost completely abandoned in favor of maintaining our "basic rights" in Berlin: freedom of access, freedom to continue to station troops there, and freedom of the West Berliners. And even these rights have been pared down by the Soviet "salami tactics."

- We have been extraordinarily **unsuccessful in achieving any agreed-upon Allied policy on defending Berlin**, and the policy we have agreed upon has not been implemented realistically. The NATO conventional forces have never been brought up to agreed-upon strengths, primarily because the agreed-upon strengths did not make much sense in terms of military strategy. In addition, no policy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons has been agreed upon and taken into account in the training, equipment and deployment of the NATO forces.

- 9 -

4. In the more distant future, as the Soviet Union develops its second-strike capacity and as both East and West move towards more invulnerable strategic weapons systems, the opposing retaliatory forces will tend mutually to deter all-out war. However, limited wars are more likely to occur, not only as the sole means available to pursue the tensions of the Cold War in military terms, but also because the threat of all-out war will be almost useless as a factor in deterring limited aggression.

1. Soviet Goals

- 10 -

those objectives. The Korean War had mobilized Western
military forces to block Communist expansion, but the
Communist economic offensive, which followed, the trade
and aid programs and support of internal subversion in
the uncommitted countries, represented a far more difficult
problem for the West to meet effectively and with unity.

2. Negotiations.

There has been considerable talk recently of the possibility
of a relaxation of tensions following upon the Soviet decision
to withdraw in Cuba. The Soviets have stated that we are close
to agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty and that with a
spirit of "reasonable compromise" on both sides, progress can
be made in the fields of general and complete disarmament,
relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and the
question of atom-free zones in Europe, Latin America and Africa.
(NYT, 11/26/62).

a. On both Berlin and the test ban treaty, there are very
few compromises the U.S. can make without seriously
endangering its security. In the past, the U.S. has
watered down the Western position to try to meet Soviet
demands beyond the limits of tolerable concession. The
Soviet proposal for a spirit of "reasonable compromise"

[L.C]

- 11 -

has become a means of forcing us to dilute our
position further.

- On Berlin, the next move is up to the Soviets: they must recognize the right of Western troops to remain in the city and to have access to it. No amount of "reasonable compromise" can alter this Western position.

- On the test ban treaty, the present basis of negotiation, far from being a "reasonable compromise", may lead to our signing a treaty seriously jeopardizing our security. The Soviets, on the other hand, have exploited to the full the propaganda value of their "concessions" on the test ban treaty. In reality their "concessions" are no more than a return to a position they accepted a year ago and later withdrew, but the U.S., is being maneuvered into the position of having either to accept a treaty which is woefully inadequate for the proper protection of our interests, or to be held responsible for rejecting it.

b. Most of the other proposals on which the Soviets reportedly feel an agreement can be reached, e.g. atom-free zones in Europe, have been advanced before by the Soviet Union

- 12 -

in a form the West considered unacceptable; an atom-free
zone in Central Europe would mean the dismantling of
major portions of the Western alliance and is violently
opposed by our West German allies, whose position we
support. At this point the West appears to be so
mesmerized by talk of a relaxation of tensions, that we
see evidence of such a relaxation in negotiating proposals
which do not differ materially from those in the past
found unacceptable by us.

3. **Cuba.** Because of their limited military usefulness at the time, the Soviet missiles in Cuba were more important politically and psychologically than as a decisive factor altering the power balance. Even though the missiles have been withdrawn, the breaching of the Western Hemisphere system by a Communist bloc state remains to the advantage of the Soviets.

- "Soviet foreign policy makers consciously set for themselves maximum and minimum as well as long-range and immediate objectives. In the Cuban case, they decided that it would be better to save Castro as a minimum, thereby retaining the long-range Communist significance of Cuba as the revolutionary outpost in Latin America." (Brzezinski, WP, 11/4/62)

- 13 -

4. Latin America. Although one of the most dramatic effects of the Cuban crisis was the show of Latin American unity in backing the U.S. position on Cuba, the real test for the Latin American countries will be their positive action to meet the long-range economic and social problems which threaten their stability.

Since Castro's coming to power, the Cuban revolution has held great appeal in many of the Latin American countries. Political action in these countries has been dominated by parties of either the far left or far right, with virtually no strong center parties. For those elements of the population who were dissatisfied with their economic lot under the status quo, virtually their only means of expressing such dissatisfaction has been through political parties whose leaders have been dominated by Marxist or pro-Castro thinking.

With the Soviet attempt to put offensive missiles into Cuba, there has been a significant change in Latin American thinking, a realization of the threat to their security by a Soviet-supported power in the Hemisphere. Latin American unity in the face of this threat is important, but it will not solve the basic Latin American problems, which are

- 14 -

[10]

economic and social, rather than political. The key question for the Latin American states is whether they can bring about the social and economic change needed in an evolutionary manner which preserves freedom, rather than in a Castro-type Communist-dominated system.

5. The North Atlantic Community, which has been sorely divided and mistrustful of U.S. policy, showed a gratifying unity in backing the U.S. position on Cuba, as striking as the unity in Latin America. However, our European allies really had no choice but to support the policy the U.S. developed by its unilateral actions. Moreover, in the weeks following the Cuban crisis, the Western alliance has fallen into deeper trouble than at any time during the past two years.

- The Kennedy administration's unilateral decision on Skybolt caused the British government to consider an "agonizing reappraisal" of the alliance. The Nassau agreement, which sought to alleviate these difficulties is fraught with ambiguities which contain the seeds of future dissension with our British ally and with any other member of the proposed multilateral nuclear force. Moreover, the Nassau agreement has been rejected completely by the French, and

agreement has been rejected completely by the French, and
proposed multilateral nuclear force. Moreover, the Nassau
with our British ally and with any other member of the
ambiguities which contain the seeds of future disintegration
sought to alleviate these difficulties with great effort with
reassurance of the alliance. The Nassau agreement, which
caused the British Government to consider an "aggravating

- The Kennedy administration's unilateral declaration on Skypolt
trouble than at any time during the past two years.

Cuba erases the Western alliance has fallen into deeper
unilateral actions. Moreover, in the weeks following the
choice put to support the policy the U.S. developed by its
in Latin America. However, our European allies really had no
packing the U.S. position on Cuba, as striking as the unity
and material of U.S. policy, showed a gratifying unity in
the North Atlantic Community, which has been sorely divided
Communist-dominated system.

manner which preserves freedom, rather than in a Castro-like
the social and economic change needed in an evolutionarily
for the Latin American states is whether they can bring about
economic and social, rather than political. The key question

- 14 -

[f]

- 15 -

this action, coupled with the French veto of British
membership in the Common Market, has created an
atmosphere of mutual recrimination in the Alliance.

- In addition, the U.S. is at present experiencing difficulties
  in negotiating with the Common Market over the continued
  entry into Europe of our large agricultural exports.

- With the French veto of British entry into the Common Market, the thrust of one of the major portions of the new trade legislation passed last year with be considerably diminished.

6. The Underdeveloped Areas. The political results of the Cuban crisis in the rest of the underdeveloped world are even less certain than in Latin America.

- The Chinese cease-fire and "withdrawal" represents
  a strategic gain for the Chinese if the proposals
  are fully implemented.

are fully implemented.

a. a strategic gain for the Chinese if the proposals

- The Chinese case-fire and withdrawal" represents
  seen in a peaceful solution.

(1) The attack on India, which for some time assumed the
be increasing.

a. In the Far East Communist Chinese expansionism appears to
  certain than in Latin America.

c. The Underdeveloped Areas. The political results of the Cplex
diminished.

new trade legislation based last year will be considerably
 Market, the thrust of one of the major portions of the

- With the French veto of British entry into the Common
  entry into Europe of our large agricultural experts.

- In addition, the U.S. is at present experiencing difficulties
atmosphere of mutual recrimination in the Alliance.

membership in the Common Market, has created an
this action, complied with the French veto of British

- 12 -

[Lc]

- 16 -

- It has loosened Pakistan's alignment with the West.

(3) The situation in Laos is deteriorating. In November, Souvanna Phouma threatened to resign, and the "neutral and independent Laos" we sought to create is almost certain to come under eventual Communist domination.

b. In other uncommitted areas the lessons to be learned from the recent Soviet and Chinese aggressive actions do not appear to be as clear to the nonaligned countries as we had hpped.

- 17 -

- In addition the recent Soviet actions on the nuclear test ban negotiations seem to be aimed primarily at securing the support of the neutrals. The Soviets may very well succeed in this aim.

## II. A Balance Sheet on the Results of the Cuban Crisis

### A. Net losses

1. The Cuban crisis did not remove the Cuban problem. At best, it only returned it to the status quo ante. At worst, by being forced to accept an agreement with no inspection rights to see that it is observed, we may be faced with a new and perhaps more dangerous crisis in the time ahead.

a. The Western Hemisphere system is still breached by the presence of a Soviet-controlled state.

b. Castro is actually stronger than he was a year ago.
There are still at least 17,000 Soviet troops in Cuba.
This is a very substantial increase over the number
that were there last July.

- 18 -

c. There are reports that the missile sites are not being dismantled, and, because we did not insist on on-site inspection, we have no guarantee that all the missiles were removed and that no others have replaced them. Despite Defense Secretary McNamara's assurances on this score, CIA Director John McConne has indicated that only on-site inspection could make our information on this issue completely certain.

2. The U.S. has been forced into a position where we have practically guaranteed Castro against invasion. Premier Khrushchev, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, December 12, 1962, staked his political reputation on the statement that "the U.S. gave before the world a public statement not to attack the Cuban Republic and to restrain their allies from doing so." (WP, 12/16/62)

- Although Khrushchev misrepresented the facts, the U.S. is still left with far less freedom of action to handle the Cuban situation as we see fit in the future.

3. The Administration is now hindered in pressing for the removal of Soviet arms and men from Cuba by its own stand on the removal of "offensive" weapons. The category was

- 19 -

meaningless in the first place, since most weapons can
only be classified as "offensive" or "defensive"
according to the intent of their users. However, having
made this distinction originally, we are now unable to
drop it, in spite of the fact that weapons of a "defensive"
nature, if concentrated in Cuba in sufficient numbers,
may very well become "offensive".

4. The U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons if necessary to protect our vital interests in Cuba has caused a major crisis in our relations with our NATO allies.

a. The persistent undercurrent of European demands for independent control over the nuclear weapons on which their security depends has mounted to an uproar.

- For the first time the Europeans realized that the alliance cut both ways: if the U.S. was obligated to defend Europe, they also were obligated to defend the U.S. What was self-evident and acceptable when it was remote became deeply shocking to our allies when they realized that they might be involved in a nuclear war over an issue such as Cuba on which our views differ substantially from theirs.

- 20 -

- The realization which followed was that the vital interests of one state are not necessarily those of another state. This situation is magnified in the age of nuclear weapons. The risks of nuclear war are so great that a state which does not consider itself directly concerned is extremely reluctant to run them.

b. The U.S. action to obtain removal of the Cuban missiles has also added weight to the French arguments in favor of developing their own independent nuclear striking force, and has detracted considerably from the Administration's argument that such forces are useless, wasteful and dangerous. If a small striking force were indeed of so little consequence, why did the U.S. run the risk of a major nuclear exchange in order to secure the removal of forty-odd Soviet missiles in Cuba? If the missiles were such a threat to the U.S., then the same military value might be assigned to the French striking force.

c. The fact that the U.S. took its decision on the Cuban question unilaterally and informed its allies of its decisions afterwards, has served to strengthen the hand of those Europeans who argue that Europe must

- 21 -

possess the strength of independent nuclear power
in order to achieve a genuine partnership with the
U.S.

B. Net gains

1. The Cuban crisis has removed many of the doubts that existed about our capacity for decisive action. To those who felt that JFK suffered from a kind of paralysis of the will as regards being willing to use our nuclear forces if necessary, he has demonstrated that in certain situations their doubts were not well founded.

2. We have also "shaken the myth that in every crisis the Soviets are willing to run greater risks than we are."
(HAK, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1963, p. 284).

3. In the eyes of the world, the value of the Soviet nuclear guarantee to a distant country has been reduced. (Lippman, HT, 11/6/62). The Soviets were clearly not willing to bring on a full-scale nuclear war for their satellite, Cuba. (Note: The value of this argument, however, is somewhat mitigated by the fact that Cuban situation took place in a particular set of circumstances which might not be duplicated elsewhere, and which might not continue to prevail).

- 22 -

4. Our European and our Latin American allies rallied strongly to our cause at the height of the Cuban crisis. In the case of the European countries the value of the momentary rallying to our support has been diluted by the deep divisions in the alliance that have since shown themselves. However, in the case of the Latin American countries, it appears that there has been a genuine change of heart in some instances. Castro could hardly have dealt Fidelism in the other Latin American countries a greater blow than he did when the Latin American countries found themselves within striking distance of Soviet missiles.

### III. KENNEDY FOREIGN POLICY AND FUTURE REPUBLICAN CRITICISMS

#### A. The lack of a clear sense of purpose

Probably the strongest criticism that can be levelled against the Kennedy administration on the basis of its first two years in office is its lack of a clear and strong sense of purpose, which then gives direction to the individual moves the Administration makes in the situations it confronts. The Kennedy approach has made a virtue of open-mindedness in seeking solutions to the point that it no longer sets from any strong convictions. The antithesis of the Dulles foreign policy, it has bent too far over backward in the other

- 23 -

direction. Even the most recent change in policy in handling
the Cuban situation, if it is extended into other areas,
has been arrived at by trial and error. There is far more
emphasis than there should be not on what is right but on
what will work. This lack of conviction has not only produced
inconsistencies in our policy, but it has confused and
disillusioned our allies, and encouraged Communist aggressiveness
and intransigence.

The result of this lack of conviction is perhaps most
dramatically illustrated if we ask ourselves what made the
Soviets believe that they could put missiles into Cuba in
the first place. Since they obviously would not have adopted
a policy which they felt could not succeed, or would run them
the major risks it did, they must have felt that they could
get away with it: either (1) the U.S. would not consider its
vital interests sufficiently affected to run the risks we
did, or (2) we would not be able to apply our power and could
be forced to accept a face-saving formula as we have in the
past. Our past performance, from Suez to Lebanon, and from
Laos to the Berlin wall, has served to give the Soviets this
impression.

- 24 -

1. Western Europe. An air of improvisation has hung over our relations with Western Europe. NATO is torn by inter-allied disputes on matters of both defense and political policy. In part these may be attributed to the growing strength of our Atlantic partners and their desire to play a more equal part in the alliance than they have in the past. But some of the difficulties must also be ascribed to U.S. ineptitude in the handling of our allies.

Underlying virtually all the discontent of our European allies has been the refusal of Washington to admit that the most practical technical solution to the strategic defense of the North Atlantic area raises political difficulties almost impossible for the Europeans to surmount; politically, the Europeans cannot tolerate U.S. insistence on control of strategic weapons. Britain, with a long-term sense of community of values with the U.S., has nevertheless found it extremely difficult to accept the fact that ultimately its defense must depend upon U.S. strategic power. France, faced with the same problem, has completely refused to make the decision

- 25 -

Britain made so reluctantly, and has persevered in her
attempt to build a strategic nuclear force, despite
all American attempts to discourage it.

We have tended to treat General De Gaulle's action
as that of a recalcitrant old man who is unrealistically
trying to restore France to its former position of glory.
In doing so we have ignored two arguments in favor of
national deterrent forces which have a compelling force
for the French:

- For those who have doubts about the American nuclear
guarantee of Europe, "a small strike force in the hands
of a threatened state is worth more than a large
strike force in the hands of a supposedly protective
ally."

- Behind this is another deeper reason undoubtedly
motivating General De Gaulle: "that a state ceases
to exist as a state to the extent that it is deprived
of the means of self-defense." (Raymond Aron, Atlantic,
August, 1962).

It does little good for the U.S. to point out to the French
that these arguments have involved them in an endeavour
which is wasteful, technically unsound, and, in our
opinion, downright dangerous. Our constant reiteration

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of these opinions has only made the French more
determined to pursue the course we oppose. It is a major
failure of the Kennedy administration that it has not
been able to perceive that NATO's problems are political,
rather than military, and that they must be dealt with
in political terms.

In the North Atlantic Community the Administration
has pursued simultaneously two contradictory policies.

- As holder of the strategic power on which the security of the NATO nations depends, we have demanded a voice commensurate with our power, without realizing that this points out the unequal character of the NATO partnership. For example, we have insisted upon a veto over the use of nuclear weapons, without taking into account the extent to which our insistence on this veto means to our partners that they are not our equals.

- On the other hand, the Administration has made interdependence among the allies a cornerstone of our policy and has emphasized that "we regard the new Europe as a welcome partner, not a rival." (JFK, State of the Union Message, 1/14/62).

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To pursue both these policies simultaneously takes a greater adroitness than even the Kennedy administration possesses. France's wrath in barring Britain from the Common Market was directed as much at the U.S. as at Britain, and the new Administration policy of "getting tough" with recalcitrant allies, and of trying to isolate General De Gaulle by encouraging other Common Market members to break away from him may only undermine the Common Market, one of the great diplomatic achievements of the post-war era, without the creation of anything positive to take its place.

It is a major problem of U.S. policy to help to foster the growing integration of Europe in economic, political and defense terms in such a way that the Europeans themselves can accept it. In working toward such a goal we may have to set aside temporarily our longer range goal, unity in the whole North Atlantic Community. For example, we may have to accept a European multilateral strategic force under NATO and integrate it with our strategic forces before we can achieve a NATO force.

In the meantime we must recognize that we now have very little control over the De Gaulle policies. Rather

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than railing at our ally, in a dispute in which French
criticism of our policies is intensified by our apparently
self-righteous attitude, we would do better to seek out
schemes in which we have a common interest in cooperation.
Our present policy is only serving to make the French
President more stubborn in holding to his views. It would
perhaps be more worthwhile to attempt to divert him.

a. **NATO's strategic forces.** Specifically, the major question dividing the alliance has become the command and control of NATO's strategic deterrent, hitherto exercised by the U.S. The Cuban crisis has vastly aggravated this issue, and the Nassau agreement, which proposed a NATO multilateral force, raises as many questions as it solves.

- Europeans were generally shocked that, in the first great crisis which might have involved an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons, they were not consulted. Some have stated that the American nuclear monopoly, combined with the rule of non-consultation, reduces the European states to the condition of American protectorates.

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- As a result, there has been a growingly insistent demand by the Europeans for independent control of the nuclear weapons on which their security depends.

- However, many Europeans who were most strongly shocked over U.S. unilateral action on Cuba have also been shrewd enough to see that "the fearful Cuban risks would have been fearfully multiplied by consultation of our allies." (Alsop, WP, 12/12/62).

- The shock to the Europeans of the Cuban crisis was magnified by the U.S.'s unilateral decision to cancel the *Skybolt* program, upon which the British independent deterrent force of the late '60's as well as Britain's pride and prestige depended. To the Europeans the Skybolt incident provided substance for their long-held fears that the U.S., when faced with a difficult choice, could not be trusted to treat its North Atlantic partners as equals.

- The solution to the Skybolt affair, the *Nassau agreement*, poses as many new questions as it answers. In particular, although it states that the future British Polaris force will be assigned to NATO, it is eloquently silent on the key questions of the

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command and control of the multilateral NATO force.
In the past all previous plans for such a NATO force
have bogged down over the impossibility of agreeing
upon a method of controlling the weapons which would
safeguard the interest of each of the NATO nations
yet make it possible to fire the weapons as rapidly
as a crisis might demand.

If the Cuban crisis has aggravated the European demand for control over the weapons on which their security depends, it has also pointed up the problems presented in bringing a multilateral force into being, and the extent to which the danger would be increased by any solution which was not adequate.

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Each of the three services in the U. S. has addressed
the problem of the use of tactical nuclear weapons
differently, and there are wide divergencies between
our views and those of our allies.

The NATO Council meeting in Paris, December 13-15, 1962,
did little to solve these problems. Subsequent allied
consultations have produced at best agreements which do
not deal with the real problem, which is political, at its
source. Instead technical gimmicks have been substituted
for policy. The Kennedy administration seems no more
disposed than it has been in the past to deal with the
problem of Western European defense in a way which is
either adequate to meet the military threat should it be
revived, or satisfactory to the legitimate national
interests, military and political, of our allies.

## 2. The Far East

- This has been evident in the contradiction between
the policies we have pursued in Laos and in Vietnam.
In Laos the Administration has sought to promote a

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neutralist regime, in which the Communists will almost
surely gain eventual dominance, while in South Vietnam
we are committed to defeating the Communist guerrillas.
Our treatment of the situation in Laos has complicated
the military situation with which we have to deal in
Vietnam, and has undermined Vietnamese confidence in our
commitment there.

- The way in which we promoted a settlement of the Western
New Guinea issue, amounting as it did to yielding before
the Soviet-supported invasions by Indonesia, has added yet
another item to the list of indications to the Soviets that
Communist expansion in certain areas may well go unopposed.
Almost four months after the Cuban crisis there is little
evidence of any substantial policy change by the Communists
which would alter the impact of the Administration's record in
the Far East. In fact the Communist Chinese may well be able
to consolidate their position in India, and the Indonesians seem
ready to repeat their New Guinea venture in Brunei and perhaps
the rest of British Borneo.

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3. The Underdeveloped Areas

The lack of clear objectives against which to measure
present performance is most evident in programs which are
by their very nature long-range projects. The foreign aid
program is a particular example. The Kennedy administration
started off with good intentions but too little firmness of
purpose. The administrative machinery was revamped, but not
enough. It was decided to make the switch from development
grants to development loans, which were to be the underpinning
for long-term economic development in the underdeveloped areas.
Much was said about necessary economic reforms in the countries
aided. What has resulted has been sadly disappointing, even
if one takes into account the fact that the program has not
been under way long enough to render a final judgment on it.
Certain things have been particularly lacking.

- There has been no clear sorting out of objectives with a
priority assigned to each. Behind this there must be
the realization that the funds are not available to do
all that ideally should be done; without a scale of
priorities, it is not possible to tell what must be done
first. The decision has not been made whether to concentrate

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our major efforts on a few countries where success is
most likely, with relatively minor efforts in other areas,
or whether to scatter our efforts more at random.

- There seems to have been little understanding of the highly important role that private investment must play in the economic development of underdeveloped areas, and of the necessity for adopting ourselves and urging strongly upon the countries we aid measures which encourage private investment, both domestic and foreign, for example, in many of the Latin American countries a large part of the good which might come out of our foreign aid program is offset by the flight of local capital abroad.

- Our attitude towards the various military coup d'états in Latin America over the past year has been so vacillating that it has done little to contribute to political stability. The economic program of the Alliance is dependent upon political stability, and we do little to contribute to such stability by recognizing immediately one military junta which overthrows a democratic government and delaying our recognition of the next.

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[10]

in the future. However, the Cuban situation was unique
and may not be a sure indication of the future trend of
Administration policies.

## Conclusion

The most difficult issues confronting the Kennedy
administration in the next two years will be the achieve-
ment of unity with our allies and the cooperation of
other countries in the free world in supplying visual
proof that democratic forces are capable of providing
an adequate response to the problems we face. In both
these areas the Administrations foreign policy is in
serious trouble. It is far more difficult to achieve
unity in developing positive programs than in meeting
a threat to our security, such as the Cuban situation
represented. The Kennedy performance in the past two
years has not been outstanding, and the future does not
promise any strong reversal of this trend.

years has not been outstanding, and the future does not
represent it. The Kennedy performance in the past two
a threat to our security, such as the Cuban situation
unity in developing positive programs than in meeting
serious troubles. It is far more difficult to achieve
these areas the Administrations foreign policy is in
an adequate reason to the problems we face. In both
proof that democratic forces are capable of providing
other countries in the free world in supplying visual
ment of unity with our allies and the cooperation of
administration in the next two years will be the achieve-
ment of Kennedy's most difficult issues confronting the Kennedy
<u>Conclusion</u>

Administration policies
and may not be a sure indication of the future trend of
in the future. However, the Cuban situation was unique

- 48 -

[no]