Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

9:27 a.m. 6/29/71

K: I hope you are aware you are keeping me from making my will.

R: My favorite will starts out: "being of sound mind and body I spent it all."
On the press release so we don't resurrect on the secret mission, where it says
Dr. Kissinger will report to the President --

K: And the Secy. of State. Absolutely. That's important.

R: It's clearly a Presidential mission.

K: There's no question about it. It strengthens it and we should do it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerard Smith/Mr. Kissinger

10:05 a.m., June 29, 1971

S: Last Friday I sent to your people a draft treaty, after I talked to you. I find it hasn't been circulated to the agencies. Can't that be done?

K: Sure. By all means.

S: Time is so short, and they just seem to be sitting on it, I gather.

K: That is their specialty. Okay, Gerry.

lds

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM

Freeman Gosden

June 29, 1971, 12:30 pm

G: Hello Henry. How are you? Frank (Sinatra) called me yesterday and told me what was happening down there (in the Senate) and I think it is very nice. He is coming down today is he?

K: Yes Freeman, he is.

G: He has a suite at the Madison, doesn't he, in case he has some people down there? I am going to send him some flowers.

K: Do you want me to do it for you?

G: I was going to call a florist in Washington but if you would do it that would be great. Just have "from Jane and Freeman" put on the card and have the bill sent to me here. I hope the young girls enjoy the flowers. Send something around $25.00. I think sending them to the hotel would be better than just sending them where the party is.

K: Alright, I will take of it.

G: That would be great Henry. How are you?

K: Just fine - although my girls in the office probably would not say so.

G: I don't believe that.

mlh

By KCLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Alex Johnson/Kissinger

12:43 p. m.

6/29/71

K: Frement-Meurice raised the question of helicopters they want to sell to the Chinese.

J: I sawa letter.

K: I have a personal letter from Stxx Saintenay xxx raising the same issue. C
you give me some guidance?

J: I will check on it. The British are trying to sell the Trident.

K: This is helicopters.

J: It's all mixed together. I will call you back on it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Under Secretary Johnson

6/30 29/71 2:40 p.m.

J: I have tracked down what happened on these helicopters. On June 7 Schumann wrote to the Secretary about both the Caravels and the helicopter that was the first time we had ever heard of the helicopters. The Secretary wrote back on June 23 saying we were looking into it. These French helicopters are manufactured under a Secorsky (?) license. We are looking into and getting the extent of the licensing. I think it would be a tough case in the government. On Transport airplanes you have one kind of problem as far as military use is concerned. On helicopters you can't distinguish between transport and passenger helicopters.

K: Well, I will just write a bland reply saying that studies are going on and you will be hearing in due course from the Secretary. I have no interest in this.

J: Okay Henry.

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Attorney General/Kissinger
6:10 p. m. 6/29/71

AG: Did you have a good trip?

K: Yes. Some progress.

AG: Door still open?

K: Open more. We have a counter-proposal.

AG: Very interesting.

K: When you come over I will talk with you about it. What I want to talk about is that Max Fisher gave me a call in London. He is wild-eyed.

AG: I got a call from him from there.

K: He claims that Israelis know everything of the double talk Sisco had between Arabs and himself.

AG: I believe it.

K: At the NSC on Wed. morning, Rogers wants to infinite Faussi over here. I have stopped it for a week. If we don't give Faussi what he wants, we will have a blow-up and if we do? ? ? ? ?.

AGL: What does it have to do with the NSC?

K: The President is holding a restricted NSC on the M.E. following the meeting.

AG: Who's involved?

K: I will try to get you there. These guys are maniacs.

AG: I talked with Rogers but not with the President.

K: We screwed it up completely when we had a workable settlement along the Canal and both sides could live with it. In process of shooting around the M. Rogers and Sisco have built it into a variation of the Israeli proposals which do go far enough for the Israelis and too far for the Arabs. So now we are stuck.

AG: I think it's a good time to break it off.

I have a note -- Rabin seeing Rogers tomorrow to pre

By KML

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

AG/Kissinger

6:10 p.m. 6/28/71

-2-

AG: President doesn't know, does he? It should take some of his steam.

K: I don't think so. I haven't told the President because I hate to keep argu on abstruse points. I don't think ? ? ? ? ?

AG: State will only make everyone mad at us.

K: Russians are stronger in Egypt then when they started this process.

Ag: When will I see you?

K: Let's get in touch in the morning and try for during the day.

AG: Good. In the meantime, if it's still laid on for after the NSC on Wed., I will try to see the President before.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Joe Kraft

7:20 p.m., June 29, 1971

HAK: I'll see you in a little while, won't I?

K: Oh, yes.

HAK: I have read your dispatches -- your columns with great interest.

K: I had an interesting time in Cairo. A very curious thing happened which I would like to talk with you about.

HAK: You mean the Bergus papers

K: The Bergus papers.

HAK: You were kinder than they deserved.

K: Much kinder. But I wanted to be helpful.

HAK: Let me call you tomorrow. We will definitely get together at the end of the day. I'd love to hear your impressions. We will have a few words tonight and get together tomorrow. I have read your columns with great interest. You made a great contribution with that last one. It was a nasty story and if it had surfaced later, it would have been much worse.

K: Delighted that it turned out that way.

HAK: It was bound to surface and you did it in such a way that it was

K: Did he really do it?

HAK: Leaving the paper, he may have done. He couldn't have sucked all the ideas out of his fingers. What is the significance of leaving the paper and doing it all on his own?

K: They were really genuinely believe it came from ______. They showed me this article which they said parelleled. I said there was no parallel at all. He then drew me the line Bergus had drawn for him. He drew the line on a piece of paper.

HAK: We will talk briefly tonight and will get together briefly at the end of the day tomorrow.

K: Good.

By KCLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

1:23 p.m., June 30, 1971

L: Henry, there is a new development I thought you should be aware of. Ellsberg delivered to Mathias a whole package of papers. He didn't open them until Ellsberg went public.

K: What's in them?

L: Evidently someone in State passed them on -- there are no Defense papers, but there are NSC memos from 1969. I think someone from your staff should go over with our Legal Counsel and go over these papers. Fred Buzhardt will be getting in touch. I can't prove it, but it may have been someone in State.

K: Who?

L: A fellow named Cook who passed them to Ellsberg. Do you know him?

K: Yes, I know him. He worked on Richardson's staff.

L: Now Richardson has him in HEW. We tentatively kind of finger this guy, but we have to be careful. No Defense papers are evidently involved -- but some of your papers and some Rogers exchanges, that you had with Rogers.

K: I never have substantive exchanges with Rogers. I would have to see them. I might have answered on behalf of the President, but I have a firm policy not to debate with people.

L: Yes, but they are NSC papers. Your people should know what they are.

K: If he gave them to Mathias, he could have given it to 50 others. When did he do it?

L: Several weeks ago. He passed it to Mathias. I will have Fred Buzhardt call you. He is very knowledgeable. I want him to personally go over.

K: I may ask Haig to go.

L: Fred is our General Counsel here. Also, we have picked up all of McCloskey's(?) papers by devious means.

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissing

1:23 p.m., June 30, 1971

K: Do you have any idea what is in them.

L: No, but we will though. Another thing is there is a special MEET THE PRESS show going on tonight. I just think I should stay away from that. I feel it would be a loss for me.

K: On what subject?

L: On the question of Vietnam.

K: Who's on it?

L: They are trying to get State involved in it. I think I should stay away.

K: I haven't enough of a judgment on it.

L: Unless they feel someone from the Administration... I hate to get in the midst and I don't want to if I can avoid it.

K: Well, I certainly have no view one way or the other. Have any of our people asked you?

L: It may get up to you.

K: You won't get any pressure from me. Decide on the basis of your own situation.

L: With the Supreme Court decision coming out this afternoon, I do think we have to watch this. You know Cook?

K: I have met him. I don't think I would recognize him. I knew he had a dove's views. But I didn't think he would go to this point.

L: They tell me he is in HEW now. We have more investigating to do. This is a God-damned mess, isn't it, Henry?

K: It's a national disgrace. How can the country operate when they take it out of context. God knows what else was going on. This is the beginning. If this gets established...

L: If the court doesn't stay with us today, the lid is off. The SALT meeting is important [NSC meeting], but this thing is more important than anything in a long time.

By KCL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerry Warren

6/30/71 8:50 a.m.

K: When are you going to make the announcement?

W: 9:00 this morning.

K: About me?

W: Oh about you! I haven't talked to Bob about the timing yet
but he said Wednesday and today is Thursday, so...

K: No, today is Wednesday.

W: Oh it's still Wednesday, all right. What would you prefer?

K: I don't really care. I prefer morning, but I don't care
violently about it.

W: All right.

By KHC U

NARA, Dato.

TELCON
Stennis/Kissinger
10:11 a.m. 6/30/71

K: I just came from the President and he wanted to be sure there's no misunderstanding on our position. We don't want anything and damage to what we are doing and we can demonstrate that in reasonable time. There's an amendment that McGregor is bringing over which we don't want but I don't think we can live with but if there are significant changes then we will not want it. Then there will be no draft in the middle of the war. We can live with this draft but don't want it to be an administration amendment. But before there are changes if you could talk with me. It's a matter of importance. We are calling you as a friend and patriot.

S: I think it will be helpful but I don't know what's in your proposal.

K: Give us a little running room.

S: What do you mean by too long? We are ____ here and we have to present today. we have to start. We don't want it.

K: We would rather have no draft then the Mansfield amendment.

S: I don't blame you at all.

K: What we could probably settle for McGregor is bring bringing over.

S: Where is he coming to?

K: I don't know. He has instructions to get it to you.

S: OK. thank you for calling.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

G. Smith/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

6/30/71

S: Hal yesterday sent over to me the out going letter. I still haven't seen the incoming.

K: It's the same and then it will go to Gartoff.

S: No. I can read Russian and no one else will see it. Also can I see the letter with the interpretations?

K: I showed it to you.

S: Could I see it again?

K: Certainly.

S: Will you send it over or shall I read it in your office?

K: I will send it. It's the correct translation of their letter. They say the letter before it was sent.

S: So the situation from our point of view the letters are itendical.

K: We are bound by our letter. Dobrynin said it's a question -- the differ
are not very big and if it ever reaches these points we are in trouble.

S: I am trying to understand the facts. From our point of view we thought the letters were the same.

K: NO. We gave them the version of the letter we thought contained the st-
they
could live with. We went through it line by line.

S: The Language is difficult from the start.

K: Slightly.

S: If I could see the Russian it would help my understanding of what they are trying to do.

K: We are not bound by it.

S: But it will help me to negotiate this instead of being the dark.

K: They are trying to emphasize separate ABM agreement.

By KM U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Haldeman

6/30/71 12:10 p.m.

H: You rang.

K: No, I returned your call.

H: But my mine was returning yours. You came by at 10:34.

K: And now I don't know what the issue is. You've got a surly secretary there giving me hell every time I come in.

H: Good for her. Does she really give you hell?

K: Yes.

H: What does she do.

K: She snarls at me.

H: Good. Give me another five years and I'll really have these people shaped up in my image.

K: I found that Harriman conversation fascinating.

H: Really. What'd he say?

K: He said that if it means getting the President elected again, getting these negotiations going, he's for it. He said he is sick of McGovern. Of course that's a lot of nonsense, but I figure they're in trouble. I think we ought to hold firm on that ________ thing. . . . . . . . .

H: But Clark doesn't know that.

K: No, this is not critical; I'm just trying to tell you why a filibuster won't hurt us. We'll know by August 1 whether the Paris thing works. If it doesn't . . .

H: Then we unplug it anyway.

K: It won't hurt to have a scapegoat.

H: So you think the filibuster might be an asset to us.

K: A slight asset.

H: Well, all Clark is concerned about is that we were acting with the knowledge of what the consequences might be.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Haldeman

6/2 30/71 12:10 p.m. p. 2

K: My instinct tells me won't get a fillbuster. I have a feeling they are losing steam. I had some of the Washington newsmen at my dinner/ They said these papers didn't surprise them. There's nothing new in them.

H: Why didn't I get invited to your dinner?

K: That's a damn good question.

H: You don't want to mix with your less influential friends.

K: Don't be absurd. . . . . . On this filibuster, we can kill them. If we get two out of three we'll kill them.

H: Unless Bill and I figure out our plan to scuttle on it.

K: Once the trip announcement is out it may revive that first story. Another nasty thing. At Geneva yesterday we were in principle to the Soviet proposal for the five-power conference. This is one day after I told the Chinese we would say nothing about it yet.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Keating

12:30 p.m., June 30, 1971

Ki: Ken, I was calling you because I ran into Jha yesterday. He told me you had expressed extreme concern for my safety and others in State had also. As long as I am on a Presidential mission, we should work together on it.

Ke: I don't know about what others are saying at State, but I welcome your visit. I did express that the Indian Government had asked you to extend your stay a day or so to visit the camps in Calcutta. I expressed to him my concern over your personal safety in Calcutta.

K: Oh, was that it? He seemed to think you were worried about Delhi.

Ke: The police in Delhi are not excellent, but there is a better feeling there. I am not concerned about that.

K: Incidentally, since I am staying the guest house in Pakistan, I thought I should stay in India wherever they offer.

Ke: You should stay at the Presidential palace. It's not as nice as my residence, but I think you should stay there.

K: I was extremely uncomfortable there once.

Ke: They wouldn't understand it if you stayed in the government place in Pakistan and not in India.

K: That is what I thought. If you don't mind I will do it. Can I have some aides stay there with me?

Ke: I think so. They sent a cable -- I think Hal prepared it raising the point -- to have it arranged at Delhi how many can stay there at the palace. It may be all of them.

K: I know it's pretty hot and the air conditioning doesn't really work.

Ke: It was 106° the day I left.

K: But if I stay at the President's guest house in PAKISTAN, and not in India, it will be hell to pay. I look forward to seeing you a week from today.

Mr. Kissinger/Ambass

12:30 p.m., June 30, 1968

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Ke: I am leaving on Saturday to be sure to be there.

K: I will be there around 2:30 in the afternoon.

Ke: If Jha gave you any idea... As far as I am concerned, we welcome your trip.

K: Somebody told them I was responsible for the arms decision on Pakistan.

Ke: They certainly didn't get that from me.

K: I wasn't here when the decision was made. You heard the President. I wasn't even in the country when the decision was made.

Ke: Jha is going beyond anything I said. The only expression I made concerned your safety in Calcutta.

K: I look forward to seeing you. I will do my best to support what we are trying to do in the sub-continent.

Ke: I will be sure arrangements are set when I get there.

K: Thanks, Ken.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KLC U NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Packard/Mr. Kissinger

12:37 p.m., MM June 30, 1971

P: How are you? Did you survive the night?

K: I got home in the early hours, but it was a nice party.

P: I was pleased to see that the President approved the Latin American residual funding. I understand there is one issue about whether Nicaragua is included or not. Has State raised this with you?

K: What's your recommendation?

P: It should be included.

K: Certainly, it should be.

P: It's only $100,000.

K: Why shouldn't it be considered -- because it's a dictatorship?

We cannot possibly turn it off. Somoza was here...

P: The argument was not included in the MM original list.

We thought it should be. It's only $100,000.

K: If it comes to me, you can be sure it will be overruled.

P: Okay, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsinger
By: CHARA
Date: July 30, 1971

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin

6:35 p. m., July 30, 1971

K: Anatoliy, how are you. I have a number of items which I want to take up with you. (1) Our Ambassador deduced from his conversation with your Foreign Minister that your Foreign Minister was eager for a channel between the President and your Chairman Brezhnev. At any rate we don't want to use a channel through Beam, but through the established channel. He got the impression that Gromyko was hinting that Brezhnev wanted some indication from the President on policy views.

D: Brezhnev knows everything I am doing, so it's not quite clear.

K: Let me find it. I will read my cable to you since you read my cables anyway. [read Smith's cable].

D: It means that he mentioned in passing the importance of...

K: It seems significant that Brezhnev asked the President to be informed. I don't care much as long as you understand it.

D: I know perfectly well. It means simply they want to emphasize that Brezhnev is really the number one man from this point of view.

K: We wanted to say we will not reply in that channel. We are assuming you understand that what I say to you comes from the President and that any suggestions directly concerning the President are more efficient to discuss in your channel.

D: I am sure 100 per cent.

K: I am sure, too, but on the off-chance, we want you to understand.

D: It is my impression that, in passing, Gromyko wanted to emphasize it is a good idea that they communicate person to person.

K: If you think it's a good idea. We have no problem with writing a letter to Mr. Brezhnev on some occasion.

D: I think it's a good idea.

K: Do you?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: NARA Date: 6-30-71

6:35 p.m., July 30, 1971

D: Yes. In this context of what you read, I interpret the words of my Minister -- that he raised the question of a different channel, no. I am inclined to interpret it that he simply wants more personal basis between the two bosses. I know our point of view and personally that of Brezhnev and Gromyko. I have no doubts. There is no question on a new channel. We don't want to go through Beam. I am positive this is not the meaning.

K: If you think sometimes it is a good idea to send a letter, we will initiate something.

D: On this telegram, I am 100 per cent sure.

K: Anything I tell you comes from the President.

D: Sometimes person to person is not a bad idea. It is very clear that what you tell us is from the President. All answers you receive are directly from my President.

K: I understand perfectly.

D: My interpretation is he feels it is a good idea to have some human-being touch.

K: The second item -- Semenov and Smith had a meeting on July 29. Semenov said -- without being insistent -- that he understood the May 20th understanding to mean that there should be a separate ABM agreement worked out completely and only when that was worked out would they discuss offensive limitations. My understanding has been we would agree to discuss for several weeks the ABM limitations. Concurrently there should be some offensive discussions. This is the sort of issue that raises irritations. We have gone far to meet your point on this.

D: Our understanding is we should finish everything. If you put it this way. You didn't give consent to finish everything. No one was precise.

K: I am not insisting that it has to happen next week. They have been meeting for three weeks now.

D: The problem is psychological. It is much better to handle and easier from your side than from mine. I am receiving so many telegrams from Semenov. Each day I get two or three because they discuss several questions. [He listed several including accidental war.] You introduce a paper -- we introduce a paper. Reading them

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By NARA Date 07-07-91

6:35 pm., July 30, 1971

D: (Cont'd) occupies a lot of time. My personal feeling is they discuss so many issues simultaneously. Now on what specific dates we discuss this offensive weapons...

K: It doesn't sound like the sort of issue... I think it is the sort of issue you will have to solve. You know we won't agree to settle an ABM agreement first. But it can go on another week or two. We should settle it gracefully.

D: Sometimes there are things from our and your side. I am thinking aloud. Give them a chance and not time it to two to four weeks, but to concentrate on this particular issue. At least get half of it.

K: It is going to get completely studk if you take the position ABM must be completed.

D: But your man keeps pushing.

K: I told you he would introduce it, and he didn't push it as I told you he wouldn't.

D: But he does. They discuss lines in general or after at a cocktail party.

K: I told you this would happen because we have to do it from our point of view. In the plenary they have been discussing only ABM.

D: But in the plenary session there was your paper on offensive weapons.

K: But we dropped it.

D: Semenov sticks to the formal initiative.

K: My recommendation is since we have to settle it anyway, if we want an agreement, let's do it generously on both sides.

D: I think so.

K: I have no specific proposal. This can go on a week or two anyway.

6:35 p.m., July 30, 1971

D: Without an agreement on ABM, you won't accept anything?

K: I don't want to be in the position where one agreement is completed. But they can go a few more weeks on ABM. If we can have an understanding that after a few weeks, they will begin discussing offensive weapons.

D: It's a question of substantial things triggering it.

K: As long as we have it understood it will not be after the conclusion of an ABM agreement, but once we have decided some of the sites.

D: I am not in a position to say what is first or second. I will send to Moscow this notification. We should go through now agreement government to government. And there will be progress simultaneously. I will put it this way.

K: That's right. One other piece of information, strictly for your information. The British have told us they would slightly prefer to suspend Berlin negotiations for the month of August for a vacation. We have told them we want to continue and we believe they will accept our recommendation. Our position is we want to continue the talks.

D: I understand.

K: It is the White House position which will prevail. And I have communicated this to Bahr. I wanted you to know that. We are sticking to the schedule.

D: Thank you very much.

K: That last point treat with special confidence.

D: All right. Thank you.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
Secretary Connally

7:13 p.m., June 30, 1971

K: I am taking off tomorrow night but before I leave I wanted to talk with you about the IMF. There seems to be some sort of split on IMF and the World Bank. The President really as a matter of urgency wants to do whatever can be done. Sadat (?) who is a Deputy or something to Schweitzer (sp?) who is handling some of the standby money for Pakistan. Whatever you could possibly do to get this done.

C: It will be done.

K: I don't want to talk to him myself. I will talk to McNamara and tell him if he can't support it, to get out of the way.

C: Is he back of it?

K: He himself reasonably understands it. It is Cargill in the World Bank.

C: He is over in Europe raising hell.

K: He is very much influenced by McGeorge Bundy and the British. I will call McNamara tomorrow and tell him to keep his man as quiet as he can.

C: I will put every ounce of effort I possibly can on it. We have talked about it before but I will renew it tomorrow.

K: Whatever you can do will be greatly appreciated, John.

C: It will be done.

K: Thank you, John.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Joe Kraft

7:23 p.m., June 30, 1971

K: You had a bad day?

HAK: The worst. After a 3-hour SALT meeting, papers and every
other #*&@! thing, I haven't been out of the President's office.
I wanted to see if you could make a quick breakfast, about 8:00.

K: 8:00 would be perfect. At the White House?

HAK: If you don't mind.

K: No, that's fine.

HAK: Come to me at 8:00. I am going off tomorrow night but I wanted to talk with you before I take off.

K: I would very much like to do that. 8:00 at the White House.

HAK: If you don't mind.

K: Okay.

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird
6/30/71 11:33 p.m.

L: One or two things I didn't think we could talk about this afternoon. I've got this memo about things that it would be helpful for you to look at.

K: Can you get it over?

L: Yes, when are you leaving?

K: Tomorrow night.

L: I'll have it over. One thing: The President told me a couple of months ago that would have no objection if I tried to increase the number of military people in Cambodia by at least 50.

K: That's all right. No problem.

L: But I haven't gotten approval.

K: I will get it today.

L: Good. And if you could talk to Ladd. He's getting pressure to keep it low-profile.

K: Oh baloney.

L: He thinks he has gotten that from you.

K: We are not keeping anything low profile. It will be approved before I leave.

L: Will it?

K: It will be approved either today or tomorrow. That's an iron-clad commitment. It will be approved.