DEAN ALFANGE
NINE EAST 40TH STREET
NEW YORK

Personal and
Confidential

March 23, 1964

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Executive Chamber
Albany, New York

Dear Nelson:

This letter supplements the memorandum on Cyprus I gave you in New Hampshire. Since this problem could lead to war, let alone the dissolution of NATO, a solution must be found.

Washington has shown neither resourcefulness nor initiative in exploring the available paths to a lasting solution. A Republican provocation is therefore in order.

I believe the solution lies in an exchange of populations; and the first step is to sound out the Greek and Turkish governments on the possibility of a settlement on this basis.

Exchanging populations is not a new idea among Greeks and Turks. In 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne, as I recall, approved the exchange of the Greek populations of Asia Minor and Turkish Thrace for the Turkish populations of Greek Macedonia and the Island of Crete. This turned out, in the long run, to be good for Greece.

Of course, the facts and circumstances here are not analogous. The major premise of the instant problem is that Cyprus historically is Greek, that more than 80% of its population is Greek, and that these people are entitled to self-determination. The real crux, in this context, is how to protect the rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriot minority.

Walter Lippmann and others have suggested the migration of the Turkish minority from the island to the Turkish mainland, subject to international guarantees of indemnity and assistance. This would be wonderful, if only Turkey would accept. I do not think the Turkish

government would ever agree to a unilateral concession of such magnitude. They will insist on a quid pro quo. And the quid I think they have in mind is the Greek population of Istanbul.

The Greeks of Istanbul (about 80,000) and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in that City are psychological thorns in their side. Their combined presence there symbolizes the Hellenic nationalist dream that one day the Byzantine Empire will be restored with Istanbul (Constantinople) its spiritual and political capital. That is why the Turks don't want them there. That is why the Greeks do. And that is why the Turks have been persecuting the Greeks of Istanbul, hoping to drive them out. These persecutions reached their peak in 1955 and nearly provoked war between Greece and Turkey.

Here then lies the basis of a feasible solution: the exchange of the Turkish Cypriot minority of about 100,000 with the Greek minority of approximately the same number in Istanbul and its Asiatic suburbs across the Bosporus. Turkey, I think, might readily agree. Greece might be induced to agree in the interest of peace and the probability of gaining dominion over Cyprus. The status of the Patriarchate need not be disturbed. It has the right, by treaty, to remain on Turkish soil.

I would think the Greeks of Istanbul should welcome the exchange despite the difficulties of adaptability from an urban to a more or less agrarian life. They live in daily fear of their lives. It is reasonable to assume they would prefer security and a modicum of opportunity to their present dangerous role as symbols of a romantic nationalism. The Turkish Cypriot minority should also welcome it to escape the pressures of the Greek majority and the constant risk of life. Their problems would be less onerous since they could be relocated to agricultural communities. For that matter, many of the Greeks of Istanbul with special skills could be advantageously settled on the Greek mainland. The

-2-

June Goldthwait

January 31, 1964

CYPRUS FACTS

1. The present unrest in Cyprus reflects an issue dating back many centuries. The basic problem is that the two communities on Cyprus, Greek and Turkish, are separated by both nationality and religion and are deeply hostile to each other.

— The problem is particularly difficult for the Turkish community, since they are outnumbered 4 to 1 by the Greek Cypriotes.

— The problem has been accentuated since Cyprus gained its independence from Britain in August 1960; there is no longer an outside arbiter to settle disputes.

2. In 1960 the Greek population in the newly independent Cyprus strongly supported a policy of union with Greece. This issue by now has been largely dropped except by extremists, but it has added to Turkish mistrust. The Turkish population feels that, if there is to be unification with any outside nation, it should be with Turkey.

3. Armed conflict broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes in December 1963. More than 200 lives were lost before Britain intervened with 2,500 troops to police an uneasy truce. Greece and Turkey have both threatened to intervene on opposite sides of the dispute, and there is danger of a Balkan War between them.

BETWEEN WAR BETWEEN THEM.

to intervene on opposite sides of the dispute, and there is danger of a
trials to police an unsteady times. Greece and Turkey have both threatened
1963. More than 500 thousands were loosed before Britain interested with S.200

3. Vainly conflict broke out between Greek and Turkish Charlesa in December, outside nation, if any, with Turkey.

The Turkish population feels that, if there is to be unification with and
united, grombed except by exarkona, but it has added to TurkishPOPULATION.
embarrassed a bit by union with Greece. This issue has been

5. In 1960 the Greek population in the newly independent Cyprus strongly
opposed eriper to settle diabetes.

bengence from Britain in August 1960; there is no longer an

-- The problem has been accentuated since Cyprus gained its independence fully are outnumbered 4 to 1 by the Greek Charlesa.

-- The problem is particularly difficult for the Turkish community,
since greatly restricted to each other.

Greek and Turkish, are separated by both nationality and religion and
centrally. The plastic problem is that the two communities on Cyprus,

1. The present unrest in Cyprus reflects an intense dating back need

CYPRESS REVISED

January 31, 1964

June Coldstream

[L.C.]

- 2 -

4. The parties concerned met in London in mid-January 1964 to negotiate a settlement. The Conference has been repeatedly on the verge of collapse.

5. The British, faced with other military commitments in the Far East and Africa, have proposed that the U.S. and other members of NATO send troops to Cyprus to help maintain order. It is likely that the U.S. will contribute troops to the proposed international peace-keeping force provided:

a. that the government of Cyprus give its approval (this is still a serious stumbling block);

b. that the treaty of guarantee under which Britain, Greece and Turkey have the right to intervene in Cyprus to maintain the status quo be suspended for three months;

c. that there be a time limit to the operation in order to avoid a protracted occupation,

d. that there be reasonable signs that a settlement of the communal strife is negotiable.

6. The governments of Greece and Turkey have given tentative approval to the international force, though the Turks have set conditions which are unlikely to be acceptable to the Greeks.

7. Britain has also gained tentative promises to furnish troops from Italy, France and West Germany.

8. Issue Between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes.

A. Independence for Cyprus was achieved only by drawing up a constitution which contained so many clauses to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriotes minority that effective government became impossible.

unfairly grant effective Government power impossibly.

V. Independence for Crete was proposed only in drawing up a constitution which contained so much clauses to protect the rights of the United States.

3. Issue Between Greece and Turkey Charles

and West Germany.

1. Britain has also been tentative broaches to turn into trouble from left. Hence to be tentative to the Greeks.

3. The Governments of Greece and Turkey have given tentative approval to the strike is negotiable.

5. That there be reasonable time that a settlement of the commitment brokened accommodation;

c. that there be a time limit to the operation in order to avoid a being the right to intervene in Crete to maintain the existing do.

b. that the force of Greece under British' Greece and Turkey serum annulling proof);

a. that the Government of Crete give its approval (this is still a contribute force to the proposed international balance-keeping force broached) to Crete to help maintain order. It is itself that the U.S. will

b. The British' signed with other sufficiently consistent in the Far East and settlement. The Conference has beenLABORATORY on the verge of collapse.

c. The battle concerned was in London in mid-October 1944 to negotiate a settlement.

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[n]

- 3 -

-- Turkish Cypriotes have the power of veto or a large number of extremely important sectors of government, e.g. foreign affairs, defense, security, taxation and other revenue measures.

-- Because they have felt their right to threaten, the Turks have used their veto right simply to obstruct the program of Archbishop Makarios, the Greek President. His reaction -- to put through programs without legislative sanction -- has only provoked more Turkish vetoes.

B. The Greek Cypriotes want constitutional revisions so that the normal processes of government are not paralyzed by Turkish intransigence. The Turkish Cypriotes want partition, or, at least a substantial exchange of population on Cyprus in order to move the most exposed islands of Greek or Turkish population to safer positions.

Turkishification to safer positions.

Denigration on Chrus in order to move the most exposed area of Greek or
Turkish Chrufoes must beition, on, at least a separate exchange of
processes of Government are not benefited by Turkish influence. The
D. The Greek Chrufoes want constitutional revisions so that the normal
Turkish veto.

has
programme without legislative sanction -- pas only provided non-
Mekranio, the Greek President. His reaction -- to but through
need their auto right straight to operator the program of Vrilapod
-- Because they have felt their rights to influence, the Turk have
defence, security, taxation and other revenue measures,
extr emely important sectors of Government, e.g. foreign affairs,

-- Turkish Chrufoes have the power of auto on a large number of

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January 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Telegram from the Council for Hellenic Affairs Urging U.S. Adoption of Policy Advocating Majority Rule in Cyprus.

I do not think you should get yourself involved in the Greek-
Turkish problem in Cyprus.

I think the best solution would be if the following letter
were sent over the signature of somebody else (perhaps Bill Ronan):

Governor Rockefeller has read with great
interest your telegram of January 14th. He appreciates
your bringing these thoughts to his attention.

hom, printing these thoughts to his attention.

interest from telegram of January 15th. He associates
Governor Rockefeller has read with great

were sent over the infrastructure of someplace else (Bergsve Bitt Rown):

Tendered by Pres. in Ohio.

opposition of Policy Advocating Majority Rate in Ohio.

SUBJECT: Telegram from the Committee for Senate Committee Under U.S.

FROM: Henry V. Krasinger.

TO: THE GOVERNOR

MEMORANDUM

January 5th, 1964

January 17, 1964

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

RE: Draft Response to Greek Group's wire to NAR urging US adopt policy of advocating majority rule on Cyprus.

1. I doubt if NAR should gratuitously get himself involved in this issue.

2. Draft reply to Council for Hellenic Affairs:

Thank you for your telegram of January 14th.

All peoples, the world over, earnestly pray for the restoration of peace and the success of democracy in Cyprus.

tjow et beace und the ancess et demoralch in Ohra.

VII beebes, the wurd ever, earneftly brak ter the resters-
Junk den ter hem fejekst et januari 14th.

S. Dratt reby te Cemoff ter Heffencf Vatina:

J. I qept it NAR spenj kruttently fer mineft involved in this <u>keane</u>.

et sprechst wertich ruse en Ohra.

RE: Dratt leabense fe Greek <u>~~</u> Greek's wire te NAR making US sadeb beffch</u>

FROM: DIB

TO: HVK

January 12, 1944

[f]

January 29, 1964

J. L. Goldthwait

CYPRUS

Summary

On January 26, 1964, the United States was asked by Britain if it would send American troops to Cyprus to help maintain order in the embattled republic.

The Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been a trouble spot almost constantly since it achieved independence from Britain in 1960. In December 1963, during Christmas week, the deep rivalries between the island's Greek and Turkish communities erupted in open warfare, which was brought under control only after Britain had intervened with 2,500 troops to separate the warring groups and police a cease-fire. At present British soldiers are holding positions and patrolling the roads to prevent another outbreak of violence.

Britain, however, finds herself sorely tried with the extent of her military commitments, which extend from Malaysia in the Far East to Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda in East Africa. Britain has asked the United States to send troops to Cyprus as part of a NATO international force under British command to help in maintaining order. Washington was believed at first to be cool to the proposal, but is now reported to be giving it greater consideration. Britain also has approached France, Italy and West Germany asking if they would join a selective force in Cyprus that would represent the North Atlantic alliance. Britain feels that she cannot carry her burden alone for long; she also feels that Cyprus is a problem for NATO, since warfare between the two Cypriote factions threatens to involve both Greece and Turkey, both NATO members.

* * * * *

Cyprus achieved independence from Britain in August 1960. Prior to the achievement of independence there had been severely strained relations between the Greek and Turkish elements of the island's population, the Turks being particularly concerned as to their future because they are outnumbered by the Greeks by four to one (450,000 Greeks to 100,000 Turks).

In order to protect the minority rights of the Turkish Cypriotes, an extremely intricate constitution was drawn up in 1960, which contained a series of formulas designed to protect Turkish rights.

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The constitution, however, was such that it could be made to work satisfactorily only if there were the greatest good will between Greeks and Turks. Instead there was the greatest mistrust between these groups, and the result was that the constitutional safeguards designed to protect the Turkish community have been used by the Turkish Cypriotes to cripple an administration which the Turks feel cannot be relied upon to defend their rights.

Tensions mounted between the two ethnic groups until in December 1963 armed conflict broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriotes, each group more or less backed by the military forces on the island stationed there by the mother countries of Greece and Turkey. The fighting resulted in between 200 and 300 persons killed before the British stepped in with their troops, separated the warring factions and negotiated an uneasy truce. It was agreed that a conference would be held in January 1964 in order to find a viable solution to the conflict.

The conference is currently being held in London. The prospects of its reaching a settlement formula acceptable to all are small, and the idea of a NATO force to preserve order is rejected by the Turkish Cypriotes. At present the future of the island republic is at best uncertain.

Meanwhile, Turkey has indicated that she will withdraw from the London conference. Both Greece and Turkey have informed the U.S. that they are prepared to use force if the situation continues to deteriorate and a Graeco-Turkish war is possible. Both Greece and Turkey are mobilizing armed forces. It is possible that the Greek Cypriotes have sought Soviet aid (NYT, 1/29/64).

* * * * *

Basic to today's difficulties in Cyprus are nationalistic and religious differences which have existed for many centuries. The islanders tend to view themselves as Greeks or Turks, rather than as Cypriotes. In addition to ethnic differences, the two groups are also separated by religious differences. The Greek Cypriotes are Christians, belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church. The Turkish Cypriotes are Moslems.

Moreover, the tensions between Greek and Turk on Cyprus have tended to be supported by the mother countries of Greece and Turkey, both of which are members of NATO. Such tensions have been considered to be extremely dangerous to the position of the alliance in this area.

The future of Cyprus is now dependent upon the solution of two problems. In the short run, the military problem must be met, and the opposing Greek and Turkish Cypriote factions must be

restrained from further violence. The solution to this problem may
well involve the sending of U.S. troops to Cyprus to join an inter-
national force, probably commanded by Britain, which will assure
the continued observance of the somewhat uneasy cease-fire. In the
long run a solution of the second problem is even more difficult
than the first. A constitution must be framed for Cyprus which at
one and the same time will grant the minority Turkish Cypriote com-
munity protection of its rights while making sure that it is still
possible for the normal processes of democratic government to con-
tinue.

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January 27, 1964

CYPRUS

I. History

The present unrest in Cyprus is rooted in a history of
competing national and religious groups.

The Turks occupied Cyprus in 1571 and ruled it, at times uneasily, until the era of British rule. The Turks ceded the administration of the island to Britain in 1878, and during World War I, the British annexed the island.

Under both Turkish and British rule it has been the Ortho-
dox Church which produced the "Greekness" of the Greek pop-
ulation. Thus it was no accident that when Makarios was elected
Archbishop and Ethnarch (leader of the people), he should have
emerged as political as well as religious leader of the Greek
Cypriote community.

The years before independence was gained in 1960 were mar-
red by Greek-Turkish violence, but, unlike most of the other
colonial territories which have gained independence, the vio-
lence was not unleashed to gain independence from Britain. In-
stead the Greek majority sought to bring about "enosis" or union
with Greece, even though Athens is some 500 miles away. The
Turkish population felt that if there was any change in the
island's status it should be united with Turkey, which is only
40 miles away. Both British and Turks strongly opposed any kind
of union with Greece. The British retain two military bases on
the island, and its position in relation to Egypt and the Middle
East (60 miles from Syria and 240 miles from Suez) makes it of
considerable strategic importance. (CSM, 1/6/64, NYT, 1/2/64).

- 5 -

II. The conditions of Cyprus's independence

Cyprus became an independent republic on August 16, 1960,
after a bitter and costly struggle led to the drafting of an
intricate constitutional formula devised to make the island
peaceful and independent. This formula represented a compré-
mise of the British desire to retain the island, the demand of
the Greek Cypriotes for "enosis" and the counterdemand of the
Turkish Cypriotes for partition of the island between its
ethnic groups.

A. <ins>Entrenched clauses in the Constitution</ins>

The Turkish community, only 13.6 percent of the island's
total population would agree to independence only after cer-
tain provisions had been entrenched in the Constitution
which in effect guaranteed its rights.

Under these provisions the Turkish community is promised

- the Vice-Presidency of the island;

- three of the 10 seats in the Cabinet;

- 15 of the 50 seats in the House of Representatives;

- 30 % of the places in the civil service;

- 40 % of the places in the Army;

In addition, both the President, (who is Greek) and the
Vice-President (who is Turkish), acting either jointly or
separately, have the power of veto over any decision of the
House of Representatives in the field of foreign affairs,
defense, and security.

- Any modification of the electoral law and the adopt-
  ion of any law imposing duties or taxes needs for
  passage not a simple majority in the House, but sep-
  arate simple majorities of the representatives elected
  by the Greek community and those elected by the Turk-
  ish community.

- Separate municipalities were to be created in the five
largest towns of the Republic by their Turkish inhab-
itants. This is perhaps the most sensitive issue in
the current dispute.

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(u)

### III. Greek and Turkish dissatisfaction with the Constitution

From the beginning the new constitution did not serve to dispose of the mistrust of Turks and Greeks for each other.

#### A. The Turkish position

To the Turkish community the willingness of the Greek majority to put through the proposals for the Turkish 30% representation in the civil service and for separate municipalities in the five largest towns became a touchstone for Greek Cypriote good faith.

When by 1961 these provisions had not been implemented (see below, the Greek position), the Turkish minority used its constitutional right to block financial legislation that year in the House of Representatives. The Turks vetoed Archbishop Makarios' income tax and customs legislation, and then, when the Archbishop sought to amend the constitution in order to delete sections which gave the Turks what he considered to be unworkable privileges, the Turks vetoed the constitutional changes.

Early in 1963, when the Greek Cabinet of ministers voted to replace the existing municipal councils in the five largest cities with Government appointed "improvement committees," the Turkish community reacted by proclaiming its own municipalities.

In December 1963, as the conflict between Greeks and Turks erupted in open fighting, the Turkish 40% of the country's army picked up their weapons and walked out of the barracks. The Turkish 40% of the police also took up position in the Turkish cause, and the Turkish civil servants stayed either at home or at their positions in the Turkish militia.

#### B. The Greek position

To the Greeks, the Turkish privileges, protected by entrenched clauses in the constitution, seemed to defy common sense.

- To get the prescribed proportions in the civil service, either competent Greek Cypriotes would have to be dismissed or unqualified Turkish Cypriotes recruited.

- To divide the island's five biggest towns into separate Greek and Turkish municipalities would mean partitioning what were already working entities.

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When the Turks vetoed the Archbishop's income tax and customs laws, taxes and customs duties were collected under presidential decree.

When this sort of thing evoked further Turkish vetoes, the Archbishop said he would not give the Turks the separate municipal administration the Constitution also promised.

Early in 1963, the seven Greek Cabinet Ministers sought to settle the dispute over municipal administrations by outvoting their three Turkish colleagues and deciding to abolish the already existing Greek-controlled municipal councils in the large cities; it was decided to replace them with Government-appointed "improvement committees."

## Greek proposals for Constitutional reform

In November, 1963, Archbishop Markarios proposed a series of constitutional amendments, all of which touched upon Turkish privileges. He called for:

- abolishing the president's and the vice-president's veto;

- abolishing the separate Greek and Turkish parliamentary majority for electing the speaker and his deputy and for voting on tax and other important bills;

- establishing joint justice for Greeks and Turks;

- integrating police and gendarmerie;

- abolishing the 70-30 and 60-40 ratios for civil-service employment and security forces;

- limiting the Cyprus armed forces in strength to meet the island's economic realities.

## C. Opposition by the Government of Turkey

The Archbishop submitted his proposals to Turkish Vice-President Kutchuk and wanted them treated as a strictly domestic affair. As a courtesy, he submitted copies of the proposals to the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Britain, the guarantors of the island's constitution. However, before Dr. Kutchuk could reply, the Turkish Government on December 16, 1963, informed the government of Cyprus that the suggested constitutional changes were unacceptable. At the same time there were charges from Turkey that the Greek majority in Cyprus was bent on exterminating the island's Turkish minority.

- 9 -

## IV. <u>Armed conflict</u>

Against this background armed conflict broke out on December 21, 1963. The Turkish garrisons, stationed on the island under provisions of the treaty guaranteeing the constitution, joined in the fighting. The Turkish force numbered approximately 600 out of the allowed force of 650. The Greek regular army force, which under the treaty could number 950 but was under strength, stayed dug in at strategic positions, but did not appear to join in the fighting.

### A. <u>British intervention</u>

Finally, Britain stepped in. With the consent of both Greece and Turkey, she took command of their forces in Cyprus. To help restore law and order, the British reinforced their own Cyprus garrison and there are now 2,500 British soldiers engaged in keeping apart the warring factions in addition to the 6,000 British troops regularly stationed there at British bases. The British established a truce zone on either side of the cease-fire line through the heart of Nicosia.

Britain also obtained agreement for the holding of a conference in London in mid-January, 1964, to consider the island's constitutional reform. (NYT, 12/26/63, 1/5/63, 1/18/64; CSM 12/31/63) (Although an emergency meeting of the U.S. Security Council had been convened December 27, 1963, the Council took no action and appeared to prefer leaving any action to the British.)

In spite of British military intervention, sporadic outbreaks of violence have continued. Between 200 and 300 people have been killed.

### B. <u>U. S. actions in the December crisis</u>

During the outbreak of violence in Cyprus, President Johnson, on December 26, 1963, sent messages to the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island offering to do everything possible to end the bloodshed. To preserve U. S. influence, he also refused to take sides in the dispute. The messages were delivered to Archbishop Makarios and Vice-President Kutchuk.

Simultaneously, President Johnson replied in a neutral spirit to a message from President Cemal Gursel of Turkey. The Turkish leader had urged Mr. Johnson to end the dalliance by

- 10 -

President Johnson expressed deep concern about the
"tragic events" and promised to do what he could to
support Britain, Greece and Turkey in the exercise of
their joint responsibility for peace on the island.

The Administration also supported the decision to
put Greek and Turkish forces in Cyprus under British
command and, presumably, through private contacts, sought
to keep Turkish planes and warships away from the is-
land (NYT 12/27/63).

C. Imports of Communist bloc arms

On January 10, 1964, Dr. Fazil Kitchuk, Cyprus's
Turkish Vice-President, charged that the Greek community
was receiving submachine guns, light armored cars and
tanks of Communist manufacture from the United Arab Re-
public. He charged that the Greek Cypriotes were plan-
ning to use the weapons for a "second onslaught" on the
Turkish Cypriotes.

The charges were labelled as "completely untrue and
totally fantastic" by a spokesman for Archbishop Mak-
arios. (NYT 1/11/64)

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V. The Communists

A. Communist dominated organizations

The solution to the Cyprus issues may be a long way off, but, in the meantime, the only group that stands to benefit from the present chaotic state is the Communists, even though they have played no active part in the fighting.

The biggest trade union, the Greek Cypriote Pancyprian Federation of Labor, the only "really good one", is controlled by the Communists, who candidly admit that 5,000 of their 40,000 members are behind them in their dues and therefore cannot be counted on for strong support. The union is affiliated with the Communist-run World Federation of Trade Unions. Not all of the union's members are Communists, but they respect and generally follow the political advice of the leaders.

The Communists also control the best youth clubs and women's clubs and the better of the two Boy Scout organizations.

B. The Communist Party

The Communist Party itself, has 10,000 members and is the best organized party on the island. It is called the Greek Cypriote Reform Party of the Working People, or AKEL.

C. Relationship of the Communists to Greek and Turkish Cypriots

Among the Turkish Cypriotes, there is practically no Communism, and this gives rise to another of the Turkish community's suspicions against the Greeks. The Turks are perturbed about the growth of Communism among their Greek compatriots and feel that Archbishop Makarios is their dupe.

Archbishop Makarios has hitherto kept the Communists quiet in the republic's national politics by giving them five of the 35 Greek Cypriote seats in the House of Representatives. As a result, they have refrained from attacking him personally. But what they would do if there were a prolonged breakdown of law and order or if the authority of the Archbishop were

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no longer there to restrain them is open to specu-
lation. If the center of Greek Cypriote power should
move away from the Archbishop, as is not impossible
at present (see below), it might lead to a moment of
opportunity for the Communists.

VI. Possible shifting of center of power in Cyprus

It has been reported from Cyprus that control of
the Greek side in Cyprus is passing from Archbishop Ma-
karios to an underground committee. None of the few who
know the names of the committee is willing to divulge
them, but it is speculated that they include:

- Polycarpos Yorgadjis, Minister of the Interior,
commander of Greek Cypriote forces in the Christmas
fighting;

- Frixos Petrides, head of a Greek gymnasium, chairman of the governors of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation and friend of Mr. Yorgadis from the time when the EOKA underground movement led the fight for independence. He offered his services "to help build up the defense of the State" and now has a desk in the Presidential Palace.

- Nicos Sampson, who is reported to have played an important part in some of the violence. He is an ex-EOKA leader and is far separated from Mr. Petrides and Mr. Yorgadjis. Sampson has recently visited Athens to meet with Gen. Grivas (see below).

- Gen. George Grivas, former Greek terrorist leader in the Cyprus forces which fought the British in the late 1950's. It is said of him that if he should choose to wreck the prospects of the London conference how being held, he would certainly do so. He is currently in Athens.

In mid-January, General Grivas sent invitations to
Greek Cypriote extremists to consult with him in Athens.
Although President Makarios warned General Grivas not to
meddle in the critical situation on Cyprus, a group of
more than 130 Greek Cypriotes flew to Athens on January
24th in answer to General Grivas' invitation. It was re-
ported that General Grivas called the group together
"because he feared that the failure of a conference in
London might lead to a resumption of communal violence."
(NYT, 1/25/64).

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## VII. The possibilities for solution of the present crisis

For the Western allies, a viable solution of the conflict -- possibly on a new treaty or constitutional basis -- is imperative. So long as the conflict remains unresolved, tension between Greece and Turkey will remain high. Since they are both NATO allies, the alliance's position in the eastern Mediterranean is greatly weakened by any difficulties (NYT, 1/5/64) Britain is currently asking the U.S. or the other NATO allies to send troops to Cyprus to relieve Britain of her substantial military commitment there. (NYT, 1/27/64)

Meanwhile Turkey has indicated that she will withdraw from the conference by January 30th. Both Greece and Turkey are stepping up their military readiness and the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war cannot be dismissed.

Archbishop Makarios has been charged by the Turkish Cypriot leader of secretly soliciting Soviet aid against a Turkish invasion. He has declined to comment on the allegation.

### A. The London Conference

The London Conference agreed upon at the time of British intervention opened formally on January 15th, 1964. The opening meeting was limited to an introductory speech by Duncan Sandys, the British Commonwealth Relations Secretary. Sandys emphasized the importance in reaching a peaceful solution, although he acknowledged the obstacles to the success of the conference. "The prospect of failure is too grim to contemplate. Somehow or other we have got to find a solution." He also warned that Britain was not prepared to assume greater responsibilities for keeping the peace if the conflict should again erupt into open warfare: "...if, for any reason, we were to lose the cooperation of the people, we would no longer be able to discharge this task" of holding the warring factions apart with British soldiers, "nor would we feel justified in exposing our men to the dangers involved." (NYT, 1/16/64)

Relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriote delegations were icily cool at the first meeting, and the conference has been several times on the verge of collapse. At present, the proposals being considered most seriously are those for U.S. or NATO intervention (see below). (NYT, 1/18/64)

### B. Request for U.S. or NATO intervention

Britain, at present faced with the possible collapse of the London conference, has sought to enlist the support of NATO members in helping to maintain order on the island.

1. The British have proposed that the U.S. and other members of NATO send troops to Cyprus to help maintain order.

Britain has argued that she cannot carry this burden alone

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(u)

for long. Her forces are stretched almost to the breaking point with new military commitments in Malaysia and in East Africa. She also feels that Cyprus, which has been independent from Britain for three and a half years, is a problem for the alliance in that war-fare between the two Cypriote communities threatens to draw Greece and Turkey, both NATO members, into the conflict.

2. This proposal was reportedly discussed with Attorney General Kennedy in his stop-over in London on return from his Malaysia mission. The Attorney General is reportedly in favor of American participation but made it clear in Britain that his terms of reference did not allow him to negotiate on this issue.

3. A British mission is currently in Washington consulting with various U.S. military and political leaders, including G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. The British military mission is led by Lieut. Gen. Geoffrey H. Baker, vice chief of the General Staff, the political mission by Sir Geoffrey Harrison, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4. It has been reported from London that the U.S. has indicated it would contribute troops to an international peace-keeping force for Cyprus if two conditions were met:

- That the Government of Cyprus give its approval, which it has not done.

- That the treaty of guarantee under which Britain, Greece, and Turkey have the right to intervene in Cyprus to maintain the status quo be suspended for three months.

5. Greece and Turkey have given their tentative approval to a combined force for Cyprus drawn from the NATO nations.

- The agreement of Greece and Turkey was made possible when Greece acceded to Turkey's demand that troops from both countries participate.

6. Turkey, however, has raised conditions for her acceptance of force that would be difficult for Archbishop Makarios to accept.

a.- The first condition is that Turkey be allowed to contribute as many troops as any of the other participating nations.

- Greece agrees in principle to Turkish military participation, but not beyond the 650 men she is allowed by treaty to keep in Cyprus. (The Greeks may keep 950 on Cyprus).

b.- The second and more difficult condition is that the international force have sufficient executive power to insure that approval of the Cyprus Government need not be sought

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(w)

to move freely about the island, to land aircraft and
bring in ships. Turkey, which previously had indicated
its intention to withdraw from the London conference
if agreement were not reached by January 30th, has agreed
to stay. "I am not withdrawing. We are going to work."
"We have just heard that the Americans have agreed to
participate. That is a good development."

7. Britain has gained *tentative promises from Italy, France and West Germany to furnish troops for the proposed NATO international force*.

8. The *Greek Cypriote President, Archbishop Makarios, reportedly has strong objections to the NATO force*. He has been trying to gather support among members of the *U.N. Security Council* for his proposal that it *take over all direction of any peace-keeping effort*.

9. No other party to the conference is eager to involve the Council in the dispute because of the opportunity it would offer the Soviet Union to inject its voice. (The Turkish Cypriotes have accused Makarios of having secretly solicited Soviet aid against a Turkish invasion. Makarios has declined to comment.) (NYT, 1/29/6

10. *General Lemnitzer*, supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe, *has recently held meetings in both Athens and Ankara with government and military officials*. He has indicated that the Greek and Turkish Governments hope to prevent war over Cyprus. The Greek Government, however, has announced that it is "considering with all possible coolness and seriousness all possible unpleasant eventualities and is taking all necessary measures in consultation with allied governments to face these eventualities."

-- The Government statement did confirm, however, that Greece would accept the establishment of a NATO, or non-NATO international peace-keeping force. (NYT, 1/30/64).

C. <u>U.N. participation in settlement of the dispute</u>

1. <u>U.N. observer</u>

On January 4, 1964, Britain asked the United Nations to provide an observer to supervise the cease-fire agreement between the Greek and Turkish factions in Cyprus. Two days later the Government of Cyprus informed the Secretary General of the U.N. that it had accepted in principle the stationing of an observer in Cyprus. The observer was to check on compliance with the cease-fire between the Greek and Turkish populations. Cyprus' acceptance was subject to agreement between Cyprus and other parties to the dispute on procedures the observer would follow. Following the precedent established for U.N. missions to New Guinea and Yemen, the expenses of the U.N. observer and staff are to be paid by the parties to the dispute. The observer, Prem Singh Gyani of India, arrived in Cyprus January 17th. (NYT, 1/7/64; 1/14/64; 1/18/64).

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## 2. U.N. police force

The possibility of the U.N.'s sending a police force to Cyprus, similar to those sent to the Middle East and the Congo, has been suggested, but such action is extremely unlikely. British forces are already doing this job alone. Britain has actively opposed such a course. The Greek Cypriotes would probably be happy to see a U.N. force in Cyprus, but the Turkish Cypriotes are so adamantly opposed that the presence of such a force could cause fighting to break out anew. The Turkish minority would view such a development as a means of getting the Turkish Army troops out of Cyprus. "If the Turkish Army leaves Cyprus, we are left at the mercy of the Greeks. We are outnumbered four to one." (NYT, 1/15/64)

## D. Other suggestions for solution

### 1. Partition

Vice-President Kutchuk, spokesman for the Turkish community, is in favor of partition of the island, and has suggested that the 35th parallel would be an "ideal line" along which partition could be carried out. In the meantime Dr. Kutchuk has declared that he is no longer vice-president because there is "no legal government." "We want to live separately and govern ourselves. We want security for our people." "This island is big enough for both communities." He has also promised a fight to the finish if the Greek Cypriotes refuse to discuss partition at the London conference. (HT, 1/11/64)

The Turkish Cypriotes may not ask for a partition of Cyprus at the London conference, but they reportedly intend to seek at least a major shift of the Greek and Turkish populations. They are insisting upon a real guarantee of their rights.

The Greek Cypriotes are violently opposed to the idea of partition and have announced that the London conference would come to "an abrupt end" if the issue is raised there. They are seeking independence unfettered by outside guarantees and rights of intervention. (NYT, 1/2/64; 1/7/64)

Archbishop Makarios has declared his intention to abrogate the treaties. (NYT, 1/2/64)

Most experts believe that the Turkish Cypriote idea of partition is a "policy of despair." They consider partition as all but unworkable, since Turkish quarters are found in all Cyprus cities and the populations are even intermingled in rural areas. It would be difficult for the sagging Cyprus economy to stand the upheaval in dividing the nation and the Turkish community would find itself faced with uninviting prospects for economic equality and material well-being. (WSJ, 1/8/64; Economist, 1/4/64)

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2. <u>"Invisible partition"</u>

One of the more constructive ideas which was circu-
lating among delegations to the London conference was an
"invisible partition" plan - division of the island on
functional rather than geographical lines. Under this
plan, Cyprus would become a federal state in which the
445,000 Greek-speaking Cypriotes would elect one provin-
cial legislature and the 105,000 Turkish Cypriotes would
control the other.

Each province would have its own Prime Minister, a
Cabinet, and civil service. But a federal government at
the center, elected directly or indirectly through the
provincial legislatures, would have overriding authority
in defense, foreign affairs, and other fields. Separate
police forces - if they were unarmed - might well remove
one of the principal causes of friction. (Manchester
Guardian, 1/16/64).

3. <ins>Exchanges of population</ins>

It has been suggested that, instead of partition,
Cyprus might well try an organized exchange of homes and
properties which would move the most exposed islands of
Greek or of Turkish families into neighborhoods of
their own people. That would lessen the opportunities
of paying off old scores, or the irritation of constant
contact with the other sort (Manchester Guardian 1/2/64).

4. Union with Greece and removal of Turkish Cypriotes to Thrace

Arnold Toynbee makes the following comments and sug-
gestions:

"In Cyprus it would be utopian to hope that the lion
and the lamb will lie down together, and that a little
child will lead them. The truth is that there are no ex-
Ottoman lambs; the ex-Ottoman peoples are all lions or
tigers.

"It looks then as if in Cyprus the price of political stabilization is going to be the segregation of intermingled nationalities that are irreconcilable. Since four-fifths of the Cypriotes are Greeks and would vote for political union with Greece if they were allowed a free choice, a solution on lines of nationality would require the waiving of the present constitutional ban on enosis (union with Greece) and this, in turn would involve the migration of the Turkish minority, considering what the present temper on both sides.

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VIII. The Prospects for the future

The great need for a solution to the problem does not make that solution any easier to achieve. It is now acknowledged that the original settlement of the question in 1960, although it was then probably the only settlement to which the parties would have agreed, nevertheless wrote into the Constitution several procedures which have proved completely unworkable. It has been said that "this most bizarre and complicated of constitutions needed more than the normal injection of tolerance, good will, common sense and mutual give-and-take to make it work. This is what the Cypriotes have not provided. The lack is the sadder since in some respects, especially in the economic sphere, Archbishop Makarios and his able ministerial team have made a promising start in governing the country.

"Among both Greek and Turkish Cypriotes there are moderates who do want to try to make the Zurich settlement work. In both communities there are extremists who want it to fail and who are prepared to resort to open violence. The Constitution's creaking performance so far has naturally played into the hands of extremists on both sides. From time to time Archbishop Makarios, pushed by his own frustration as well as by the political need not to lose contact with his extremists, has spoken openly of the need to revise the constitution. Although privately acknowledging that union with Greece is no longer possible, in public he has hinted obscurely, no doubt also for reasons of political expediency, that it remains the ultimate goal. The Turks have been confirmed in their belief that they must hang on to every comma of the Zurich settlement if they want to keep their privileged position intact. Thus the vicious circle has gone round.

"Part of the trouble with Cyprus has always been that Greek and Turk have regarded themselves too much as Greeks and Turks and hardly at all as Cypriotes. The Zurich settlement perpetuated their inclination to look over their shoulders at Athens or Ankara...During the three years of Cyprus's maimed independence, the Greeks appear to have been much less dependent on Athens than the Turks still are on Ankara. This is inevitable in view of the Turks fears of the Greeks and their numerical inferiority, but it will not make it easier for Ankara to disengage from Cyprus.

"Archbishop Makarios has also suggested that Cyprus should rely solely on a British guarantee. This is much more dubious. It is right that British troops and Mr. Duncan Sandys should go in to clear up the immediate mess. But it should be made absolutely clear to both sides in Cyprus

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that Britain cannot assume an indefinite responsibility for
holding them apart with British troops until they choose
make up their minds to settle down together. It would be
better, both for Cyprus and for Britain, that the lasting
<u>international responsibility for the island should be shared</u>
<u>more widely.</u> It will be a heavy enough responsibility....

"At this stage any proposals for getting the Cypriotes to settle down peaceably seem pretty unrealistic." The Greeks will probably insist on considerable pruning of the constitutional provisions that give the Turks their privileged position. "This will be hard for the Turks to accept - to put it mildly - especially if the Greeks also insist on cutting the special links between the Island and Athens and Ankara.....

"However desirable in the long run, the moment for ending
Cyprus's special relationship with Greece and Turkey will
have to be chosen with extreme care. So will the moment for
putting into force any agreed changes in the constitution.
It may be necessary to establish firmly in the island a
<u>United Nations or Commonwealth presence that will provide</u>
<u>the two communities with a life-line to the outside world;</u>
they need this to give them the self-confidence to settle
down together not as Greeks and Turks, or ex-British colon-
ials, but as plain Cypriotes. In the last resort it is up
to the Cypriotes themselves. If they will not make the ef-
fort, no one can make it for them." (Economist, 1.4.64)