["H. M. S. T. B. C. S. C. S. C. S. C. S. C. S. C. S. C. S. C. S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/13/04

TelCon:12:05-9/2/72

Mr. Kissinger/
The President

K: Mr. President.

P: Oh Henry, I was thinking - you know Fisher will be coming in having won that chess thing sometime. And I want you to see if we can get the other fella to come to.

K: Spassky.

P: Yes, you know what I mean.

K: Right.

P: They have had a long match, etc.

K: No, we better not Mr. President because Spassky is thinking of defecting and we better stay away

P: Oh, is he.

K: Yes.

P: OK. Thanks.

OCLASSI-HLD

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

NAFTA Date 5/12/04

H. Kissinger, Mr. Henry, and Mr. Ziegler

TelCon:12:35-9/2/72

Mr. Kissinger
Ron Ziegler

K: Hello.

Z: Hi Henry.

K: How did it go today.

Z: Good. I just followed the line.

K: OK. Is there a lot of excitement about it?

Z: No, I didn't detect that. But I certainly did from the question Pierpoint asked detect the direction of going in referring to the fact that previously when prisoners were released they were put back into the service, you know. And I said I didn't think that occurred in this Administration because none were released. Were they?

K: No.

Z: And I said it would be appropriate for me to make any further comment at this stage. You know, I just stayed away from that. You see what I mean.

K: They probably stay in the service. They can if they want to.

Z: Yes, but the point I made. I said the North Vietnamese have stated an intent and it wouldn't be appropriate for me to say anything beyond that.

K: I think that is fine. Did you get the Middle East question.

Z: Yes. I don't know if it took on them, but I will hit them again tomorrow.

K: Good.

Z: We will see how it plays.

K: OK, fine. Because the trouble is the Israelis are asking us to do something on the God damn immigration from Israel.

Z: Yes.

K: And that is what I am trying desperately to avoid.

The Times (London) daily newspaper
of the United States of America
PRESIDENT'S CHAT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L. W. (NAHA, Date: 5/13/04)

TELCON

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

9/5/72 6:15 p.m.

SJ: How are you?

HK: Okay, how are you?

SJ: Listen, I just wanted to touch base with you in view of this situation in Munich. Just you know, find out if anything at all that you had in mind--

HK: I don't know whether it carried it in the East--we made a statement at 7:30 this morning California time expressing the President's outrage.

SJ: Right. And he, I gather, has done a great since. Talked to Golda Meir and so forth.

HK: That's right. And we are also in diplomatic contact with a number of governments that we believe have influence with Arabs and I will be talking to Dobrynin in a little while.

SJL: Very good. Well, it suddenly one of the most harrowing things that have ever happened.

HK: I just had a press report that these Arabs are at the airport in Munich and that there is some shooting going on.

SJ: Shooting Henry? Good god.

HK: I can't imagine that the Germans would let them take the Israelis out of Germany, can you?

SJ: Apparently some helicopters transported them--

HK: Yeh, but that may be just to get them to the airport.

SJ: Well, god knows what's up, but I just wanted to touch base with you because of the seriousness of it.

HK: You can be sure that--it is one thing when major foreign policy considerations are involved, but this is an outrage.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

Re: Is it possible to get a telephone call from Moscow to Israel?

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Page 2

SJ: Terrible. Henry, I hope to get together with you sometime when you have a minute. I know you've come back--

HK: You know I've got back and you know that I'm going off to Russia-- that was announced this morning.

SJ: Oh you are. When do you leave?

HK: Probably on Friday.

SJ: Well, suddenly you have more than enough to--

HK: I'll see you as soon as I get back.

SJ: How long will you be?

HK: I'll be three days in Russia. I'll be back by the end of next week.

SJ: Very good. I'll look forward to seeing you.

Like the Israeli

no--

It may be just to get them to the airport.

I know what's up, but I just wanted to touch base with you because of the seriousness of it.

I know that--it is one thing when major foreign policy decisions are involved, but this is an outrage.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01250
By CHYARA Date 05Mar02

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:20 p.m. - 9/5/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, have I interrupted a chess game?

D: Almost. Henry, what about your - because I have a telegram about this - those navigators about the plane. Where you be-in Washington and you have to pick up our navigators for plane - or you will still be in Munich?

K: I will probably be in Munich but we can pick him up in Frankfort. I will leave a day later. I won't go to the Olympic games under these conditions.

D: I understand.

K: But what I will do is to offer to go through Munich for one morning.

D: What's really your suggestion - to go to Frankfort or Munich?

K: Either way.

D: It doesn't matter.

K: It doesn't make any difference.

D: It will be on Sunday or on Saturday?

K: Well I will arrive in Munich Saturday night and I will go on in the late afternoon.

D: In the late afternoon on Sunday?

K: Right.

D: OK, I will then send a message about the navigator. And as for Lynn he decided he will go with you.

K: Yes, he will go with me.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By CHINA MARA Date 05/01/68

D: Next question - on Maritime agreement, have you checked that thing out?

K: Yes, I have checked. On the bunkering you were right; there is a regulation that prohibits bunkering. Now our people tell me that your people told them that they would _________ to not pay hard currency for bunkering; that they would be content to bunker in Cuba.

D: Yeh. Did they - did they tell them?

K: That's what my people tell me your people said. My people say that your people said that they can do their bunkering in Cuba. On the other hand, at the same time in order to move this forward I am prepared to make an understanding with you that if that bunkering problem is an issue we will review it within six months and we cannot change that regulation during this election period.

D: Oh, I understand. It could be a subject for discussion then later on.

K: That's right.

D: OK. As for cargo - how it stands?

K: The cargo stands as I told you yesterday.

D: As it stands it's all right but . . . .

K: Right. But since half of your plane is carried that way. . . . . I think that we can manage.

D: It's half but there is another half.

K: Yeh, but you only get a third anyway.

D: What you mean third?

K: I mean a third of the grain - only a third is carried on Soviet ships.

D: Yes, one of those Soviet, one is yours and the ________.

K: Right. Anatol, we are calling for your information, we are calling the grain companies and tell them to expedite grain on third country ships. You know the problem you mentioned to me yesterday?

2

*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folaase

By CNARA Date 05/20/55

D: Yes, I think that is important. And you mentioned yesterday about September 18th. as the deadline for signing.

K: No, not as a deadline for signing. We recommend that you send a group over here. I am told there are a number of minor problems that should be dealt with.

D: But this concerns the Maritime agreement?

K: Yes.

D: Oh I see. It's not the trade agreement.

K: No, but there are two things. You can bring a group over here - if we settle things next week which I am confident we will.

D: Yes, my impression is also.

K: Then . . .

D: Then why would we have to send the group here though if everything is settled in Moscow?

K: To work out the language.

D: Even the language. . . . . . . . . because the text of the agreement is already the same.

K: Well if you think it will be effectively settled then what we should do is call a meeting of the Commission and get it signed in early October.

D: You mean on Maritime?

K: No, no - on Maritime?

D: No, I speak now on Maritime. . . . . . around 18th, yes?

K: Yes.

D: And there is no need really for anyone, if it is agreed, there is no need to send any group of people here.

K: No if it's all agreed then there's no need.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2358
By CNARA Date StLOT

D: Now you are speaking about trade agreement?

K: Right.

D: This I understand - you proposed they come around 6th of October and they will just look at the ______ and sign it.

K: That's right.

D: Yeh, that's clear.

K: You might want to send a drafting group here before then but that's not a major thing.

D: I understand. That's all right. In that . . . . . . of the tentative agreement you gave me there is two attached memorandums that you didn't give me. One is attached memorandum on Export-Import Bank.

K: Yes, I will send it over to you.

D: And the second is attached memorandum of the draft of the tax treaty.

K: The treaty I gave you I thought.

D: No, tax, tax, on taxation.

K: Oh, tax treaty. I'll send it over. I have it here.

D: It was mentioned but you don't have it here.

K: Yes, I just wanted to see whether you were alert and actually read these things.

D: I see. I tell you Henry I thought we were friends and now you are just trying to . . .

K: Listen you forced me into a long meeting with the President this morning.

D: Why?

K: Because I had to discuss your various problems.

D: I think it's only natural for you to come and be a real responsible representative of the President as everybody expects in Moscow.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By: CNARA Date: 04/26/87

K: So I'll send you over the tax text.

D: Could you send it right now?

K: I'll send it within the next five minutes. As soon as I get off the telephone.

D: Yeh.

K: Now on the Export-Import that is just to tell you what the procedures are. I really didn't give it to you because I thought I had given you so many documents and if necessary I would bring it with me. But you will not let me give anything new to your Chairman.

D: On what issue?

K: Tax and . . . Now I have talked to the President and he confirms what I said to you yesterday on that understanding on the nuclear business. That is to say when we talk with you in this channel we are always serious.

D: Yeh, I understand.

K: And I will hand you tomorrow a piece of paper that indicates some of our concerns. It doesn't give you any language.

D: No, I understand - just an idea of course.

K: Right. And also I will give you tomorrow a sheet of paper which indicates various approaches to the SALT thing.

D: Fair enough. And about security arrangements on the . . .

K: That I may not get finished. If I don't have it finished I will have it for you very shortly afterwards.

D: OK.

K: But you can be sure that before Gromyko gets here I will get it to Vorontsov. Well, if we don't have it then we'll wait for Gromyko to come.

D: On the . . .

K: On the security zones.

5

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E102358
By CHNARA Date 05/01/58

6

D: But you will be in a position to give some ideas.

K: Yes.

D: And what about. . .

K: I have checked again. If there weren't any peace proposals made they have been lying to us.

D: Yeh, I understand.

K: You know they wouldn't do that.

D: I hope not. Henry, what about this Leningrad Consulate.

K: Now on the Leningrad Consulate - it really will be bureaucratically very tough for me to get it done. For me to open it. But I can certainly make an agreement with you while I'm there if I get some sort of assurances that within a month or three weeks, say by October 1st or October 10th just to make sure, we can get it opened and we would even send somebody over there to open it if that means something to you.

D: I understand.

K: So and really we're not trying to hold you up.

D: No, I understand.

K: If Brezhnev just says one sentence to me saying I attach importance to it so that I have an excuse for doing something. You see what I mean?

D: Yeh, I understand.

K: And says "on the quilting we promise you July 1st or whatever"

D: Yes, . . . . . . we settle . . . .

K: Yeh, we won't hold you to two weeks. And then the other two points on lend lease just make some proposal to me and we'll get it done. Then as soon as I come back we will instruct the State Department to work out all the arrangements and it will be done quickly and we will have it opened by the middle of October. If you'd like McComber to come there to open it . . .

D: I really understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsinger
By: CHNARA Date: 06/21/85

K: We want to settle it and we're not trying to hold you up. And the thing to do would be for me to visit the Consulate while I'm there.

D: Yeh. You would just visit them as a procedure, so to speak.

K: Yeh and that would give me an excuse to go if Brezhnev would mention two sentences to me.

D: I understand. OK. Have you had a chance to look about our embassy's building?

K: No, but I will do it before tomorrow night.

D: Good.

K: You want four more meetings is that it?

D: Four more meetings.

K: What are you going to install - listening equipment in my office?

D: . . . . . . . . . . it will be a rather poor listening device.

K: OK.

D: So tomorrow at 3 or 5 which do you prefer?

K: Six.

D: Six at your office. OK. Bye.

7

The Official Report of the Executive Committee of the Internationaleron
Munich's Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KHL V NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Dobrynia/Kleisinger
11:20 p.m. - 9/5/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatsui, have I interrupted a chess game?

K: I will probably be in Munich but we can pick him up in Frankfurt. I will leave a day later. I won't go to the Olympic games under these conditions.

D: I understand.

D: What's really your suggestion - to go to Frankfurt or Munich?

K: Either way?

D: It doesn't matter.

K: Right.

K: Yes, he will go with me.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy
in the light of the new system of
Magna Carta

OCLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/13/04

2

K: Yes, I have checked. On the bunkering you were right; there is a regulation that prohibits bunkering. Now our people tell me that your people told them that they would ______ to not pay hard currency for bunkering; that they would be content to be bunker in Cuba.

D: Yeah. Did they - did they tell them?

K: That's right.

D: As it stands it's all right but . . . . .

K: Right. But since half your plane is carried that way. . . . . I think that we can manage.

K: Yeah, but you only get a third anyway.

D: What you mean third?

D: Yes, one of these Soviet, one is yours and the ______.

The Times, Sunday版, 周五出版
With the exception of
Maritime Sun?

By KHLW NARA Date 5/12/04

3

D: Yes, I think that is important. And you mentioned yesterday about September 18th, as the deadline for signing.

K: Yes.

K: No, but there are two things. You can bring a group over here - if we settle things out next week which I am confident we will.

K: Then...

K: To work out the language.

D: Even the language. . . . . . . . . . because the text of the agreement is already the same.

D: You mean on Maritime?

K: No, no - on Maritime?

D: No, I speak now on Maritime . . . . . around 18th, yes?

K: Yes.

The State of the Union Address
by the President of the United States

By: KSL NASA Date: 5/12/04

K: Right.

K: That's right.

D: Yeah, that's clear.

D: No, tax, tax, on taxation.

K: Yes, I just wanted to see whether you were alert and actually read those things.

D: I see. I tell you Henry I thought we were friends and now you are just trying to ...

D: Why?

Номер телеграммы
of the series of
MOSCOWandum

By: KML NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

5

D: Yeah.

K: Now on the Export-Import that is just to tell you what the procedures are. I really didn't give it to you because I thought I had given you so many documents and if necessary I would bring it with me. But you will not let me give anything now to your Chairman.

D: On what issue?

K: Tax and... Now I have talked to the President and he confirms what I said to you yesterday on that understanding on the nuclear business. That is to say when we talk with you in this channel we are always serious.

D: Yeah, I understand.

D: Ok. Fair enough. And about security arrangements on the ...

D: OK.

D: On the...

K: On the security zones.

Невеста ТамARA
of the House of cards at
Moscow State

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

6
By: KMLV NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Yes.

D: And what about. . .

D: Yeh, I understand.

K: Now on the Leningrad Consulate - it really will be bureaucratically very tough for me to get it done. For me to open it. But I can certainly make an agreement with you while I'm there if I get some sort of assurances that within a month or three weeks, say by October 1st or October 16th just to make sure, we can get it opened and we would even send somebody over there to open it if that means something to you.

D: I understand.

D: No, I understand.

D: Yeh, I understand.

K: Yeh, we won't hold you to two weeks. And then the other two points on land lease just make some proposal to me and we'll get it done. Then as soon as I come back we will instruct the State Department to work out all the arrangements and it will be done quickly and we will have it opened by the middle of October. If you'd like McComber to come there to open it . . .

M: I really understand.

["Номерrell 11-111111-1111\nof the Series 1111 of\nMilitary Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6", "By: KML V. NAFI, Date: 5/12/04", "7", "K: We want to settle it and we're not trying to hold you up. And the thing to do would be for me to visit the Consulate while I'm there.", "D: Yeah. You would just visit them as a procedure, so to speak.", "K: Yeah and that would give me an excuse to go if Breshnov would mention two sentences to me.", "D: I understand. OK. Have you had a chance to look about our embassy's building?", "K: No, but I will do it before tomorrow night.", "D: Good.", "K: You want four more meetings is that it?", "D: Four more meetings.", "K: What are you going to install - listening equipment in my office?", "D: . . . . . . . . . .

["A letter from the president of the\nUnited States, the prime minister of\nAdmiralty Board.", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6", "By: K.L. V. NAFI, Date: 5/12/04", "", "TELCOM", "Amb. Rabin/Kissinger", "11:07 a.m. - 9/6/72", "K: Hello.", "R: Hello.", "K: Mr. Ambassador.", "R: Good morning, how are you?", "K: OK. Well you know I want to express my own personal feelings on...", "R: I understand.", "K: On - I don't know whether Haig has explained to you what these fellows want to do.", "R: I understand.", "K: Their conviction is that you are now convinced that there must be a settlement.", "R: Strangely enough I just told it to Haig that it seems that those who carried out the action in Munich succeeded beyond their expectations.", "K: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

["OCLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6", "H. E. B. H. K. B. H. B. H. B. H. B. H. B. H. B. H. B. H

Hochschule für Technik
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Advisory Staff

By: K.L.V. NAFU Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 6, 1972

JK: I was surprised to read you are going to Munich. Is that sudden?

HK: Well, I'm going to Moscow.

JK: Yeah, I knew that but I guess I thought I had asked you about going to Munich. I had heard that and you said no.

HK: When my Moscow trip got set, I picked up that invitation to go to the Olympic Games and to stop -- and since the whole German government was there, I thought it was a good chance to talk to them before going.

JK: I see. And you're going through with that now?

HK: Well, my present plan is to not go to the Olympic Games but just to see the leaders and cut out a day of the visit, just make it an overnight rest stop and then before I go on to Moscow in the morning see Brandt and Bahr.

JK: Yeah.

HK: That's not yet definite. I don't believe that I will go to the Olympic Games. Don't you think? I think it would be in bad taste.

JK: Yeah, I tend to think so. You know, I think one ought to behave the way one would have behaved anyhow but that's the right thing to do. You know, this isn't ______ but it looks to me as sort of an episodic thing from which one can draw no useful generalizations.

HK: Oh, no, you can't draw generalization. The question here is a question of personal taste.

JK: Yeah, well, I think so.

HK: And it's not a question of principle or of high policy.

JK: Yeah.

HK: My original intention was to get there Friday night and see these people in a leisurely way and go Saturday afternoon to the Games.

JK: I tend to think you are right.

By: K.L. V. NASA Date: 5/13/94

TELCOM

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 6, 1972

HK: And my present thought is to arrive Saturday night, see these people on a more hectic schedule, then go on Sunday afternoon to Moscow.

JK: The stories about the Moscow trip indicated you would be talking Vietnam. Is that a deliberate -- that's the story you're putting out?

HK: What do you mean, that's the story we're putting out. We said we discuss every topic that was also covered at the summit and then somebody said Vietnam and we said yes.

JK: I see. Well, that's exactly what I mean. Is it going to be the main thrust?

HK: I wouldn't think so but it's obviously going to be a topic.

JK: Did you see a story in the Times today about some visitors who came back from North Vietnam --

HK: Those that claim there will be a settlement by --

JK: Yeah.

HK: Well, you know, you get everything these days.

JK: You know what that's about. Who these visitors are?

HK: No.

JK: I have had the impression that you are backgrounding along the lines that the settlement is likely.

HK: No, I don't think you'll find anyplace --

JK: You've never told me that but --

HK: Look, I've talked more to you about Vietnam than to anybody. I mean, by that you can judge how much backgrounding I have done. The trouble is this is so complex now as you I think appreciate better than almost anybody that to say a settlement is likely would be totally irresponsible.

JK: Yeah.

November 13, 1973
At 11:40 a.m. Central time
Revised 11/13/73

OCLASSIHLD
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

TELCORN
Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 6, 1972

NARA, Date 5/12/04

HK: And I haven't said this. Nor have I implied. Nor have I talked to anyone about it.

JK: Yeah. Well, the Pham Dam Dong statement certainly seems to me to show how really unreliable -- how really counterproductive it is to say anything along those lines.

HK: You mean, his remarks about the Paris meeting?

JK: Yeah.

HK: Oh, yes. That's really why -- what we cannot prevent is all the people who know nothing speculating.

JK: Including the whole State Department. What about -- I had assumed that trade would be a very important item on the agenda, is that right?

HK: In Moscow?

JK: Yeah.

HK: That is correct.

JK: Yeah, I see. Are you going to have some time between now and then?

HK: I doubt it. Maybe Friday.

JK: Shall I call Dick and try to -- because I'm dousing it and I would like to see you if you do have some time.

HK: All right, call Dick.

JK: Okay.

HK: But I don't remember that I've talked to any reporter about Vietnam in the last -- for example, Joe Alsop had a column which was based

JK: That had a direct quote from you, Henry.

HK: Which he got from a Senator, not from me.

JK: Really? Because, you know, I did not think that it was a comment that didn't look even like a very bright comment that --

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 6, 1972

HK: He got that from a Senator, not from me.

JK: You mean you didn't say it?

HK: Well, when that meeting happened, it happened shortly after my first meeting with Le Duc Tho in July.

JK: I see, I see.

HK: And at that time there were some anti-war resolutions up. And I cannot -- I don't want to say I didn't say it. If I did say it, it was in a much bigger context and directly related to these resolutions.

JK: I see, I see. At least, if he read it, they had a choice between either being serious or else wanting to re-elect President Nixon. Whether there is certainly a third alternative which is that they are just popping off the Russians with the Chinese.

HK: That's right. There's a fourth alternative, that they can't decide.

JK: Yeah.

HK: You know, and that they don't have an absolutely ironclad strategy. Why do we have to assume that we are the only confused government.

JK: (laughter) Well, I would agree. I would agree with that. You know I've been puzzled as to why the bombing has been stepped up. It seems to me the intensity is clearly going up.

HK: I don't think that is true.

JK: And I don't understand the military logic of it.

HK: I don't think it's been stepped up. In fact, the weather has been so bad that I'm sure the average -- I think the average is probably below what it was in May and June but what may happen is when they get a clear day is to have -- they may on any one day have higher sorties.

JK: I see, I see.

HK: I'm sure that the total effort is less than it was in May and June.

JK: I see. But I mean, you know, the raid on Hanoi/Haiphong I guess it was on one of the last days of August they said was the biggest raid in four and one half years.

Receptionist's file, the office
of the Vice President
At&T Systems

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLV NARA Date: 5/13/04

TELCON

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 6, 1972

HK: Yeah, which I doubt was true anyway. One of the problems is that these public relations officers of the Services have different motives.

JK: I see.

HK: I looked into that at the time and I was told that that was nonsense. At any rate it isn't a policy -- I think if you look at the weekly totals you will find it's probably below.

JK: I see. You feel you've got good control over the raids. There was a time when you felt the Air Force was not operating.

HK: Well, good control with our military is a strong statement. I think we have good negative control in the sense -- I'm not sure we can always get them to hit what should be hit but I think we can keep them from -- I know we can keep them from hitting things they shouldn't hit.

JK: Yeah, yeah. All right. Okay, I'll call Dick. Thank you very, very, much.

HK: Right.

JK: Take care.

The Vice President of the Republic
and the Vice President of the
Executive Seal

TELCOM
The Vice President/Mr. Kissinger
11:50 a.m., September 16, 1972

By: K.L. V. NARA, Date: 5/13/04

VP: Henry.

HK: Yes, Mr. Vice President, how are you?

VP: I'm fine. I had an interesting piece of information. I don't know whether it really is going to be of any assistance to you but at the Southern Governors Conference yesterday in confidence from a source I can't reveal except to say a very high source, word was passed to me that McGovern is getting ready to send a very visible emissary to Israel. It's a medal over there in the same way that --

HK: I think he's already sent him.

VP: Has he? Who was he?

HK: Chayes (?)

VP: No, no -- this is somebody else.

HK: Really?

VP: Apparently somebody else and they wouldn't tell me who it was except that it was not Chayes. It is somebody very highly visible.

HK: I think it's a ploy. That guy has done nothing that isn't toyerty.

VP: Let me pass on to you the source who asks not to be identified -- so you will know.

HK: Right.

VP: Please don't --

HK: You can count on it.

VP: It's Governor Mandel, who was asked to accompany.

HK: Did he tell you whom he is sending?

VP: Huh?

HK: Probably sending Ribicoff --

HONDA HONDA HONDA
of the Jewish People of
Israel Staff

By: K.L. W. NARA, Date: 5/13/94

TELCOM
The Vice President/Mr. Kissinger
11:50 a.m., September 6, 1972

VP: Yeah, that's right. And I'm not sure Ribicoff is going but Mandel refused to go, said he didn't think it was constructive and he would not participate.

HK: Is Mandel Jewish?

VP: Yeah.

HK: What a <u>devious</u> maneuver. That guy really --

VP:q He's something else, isn't he?

HK: You know, if we did a tenth -- if you said a hundredth of what this man is saying, you'd have the editorialists frothing at the mouth about this.

VP: No doubt about it.

HK: That campaign devisiness --

VP: Well, I just thought you might want to be made aware of that.

HK: Well, I appreciate it very much.

VP: It was given to me in confidence and I don't want to -- but I think it's important enough that you should be aware of it.

HK: Well, I am seeing the Israeli Ambassador on this current business tomorrow and I'm going to raise hell -- I won't mention this -- I'll just tell him better not horse around with McGovern too much.

VP: Okay.

HK: But I don't think they will because they count the aircraft carriers.

VP: Yeah. But it just shows that he will go to any limits, any limits.

HK: You know, for a man to say he would padlock every base in Asia --

VP: Isn't that ridiculous.

HK: Which means Korea, Japan -- it would mean the end of our China policy because the only interest we have for the Chinese is our strength. It is unbelievable.

A report on the proceedings
of the meeting of the Board of
Administrative Staff?

By: KMLW NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

- 3 -

TELCOM

11:50 a.m., September 6, 1972

VP: It's not that he does it, it's the way that he's getting away from the kind of editorial comments you would expect to result.

HK: Oh, if Goldwater had said this, you would have had outraged editorials on this. They

VP: Sure.

HK: And the way he talks about Lon Nol -- when have we had a Presidential candidate who made betrayal of our allies the key plank as his policy.

VP: Exactly, exactly. And we'll have no diplomatic credibility anywhere in the world. And this is the most serious interjection of politics into foreign policy in the history of our country.

HK: Well, if he wins the election on the day afterwards, we'd be through in South Asia. They wouldn't wait till the Inauguration. In this respect, he's right.

VP: Yeah. Well, I don't know how we're going to handle him but I think he's handling himself pretty well from what I hear around.

HK: McGovern?

VP: Yeah. I think the people are just -- he's making such an ass of himself.

HK: Oh, he's finished.

VP: There's little that we need to say.

HK: You don't think that there's untapped resources there that we don't see?

VP: No, I don't. I don't. I think the reaction I've had as I've moved around from people -- and Democrats -- particularly these Democratic governors -- they are desperately embarrassed by this man.

HK: Yeah, yeah. Okay, Mr. Vice President. I appreciate that information very much and any time that you want, I'll drop over and let you know where we stand.

VP: Yes, I'd like to do that. I just got back in the office. Maybe tomorrow or the next day if we can.

HK: Good. Bye.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

Receptionist's Office
Attn. Henry Kissinger
Academic Secretary

By: KHLV NAFU Date: 5/13/94

TELCOM

Jerome Weisner/Kissinger

September 6, 1972 - 12:00 noon

K: Hello.

W: Henry

K: Jerry, how are you?

W: Hear you're going to Moscow.

K: That's right.

W: Give my friends a hello.

K: I shall certainly do that.

W: Listen, I'm calling to tell you about something which I responded to in the negative, but having done it I realized I probably should have talked to you about it beforehand. I had a phone call from a fellow. I'm not in my office so I can't remember his name now. At Cornell. Asking me whether I would accept an invitation to Hanoi.

K: Yeah.

W: As part of an academic group and my response was no; that I thought that I was in too vulnerable a position.

K: I think that was the right decision.

W: That it could embarrass both the Administration and MIT. Then it occurred to me having slept on it, that I should have asked you whether there was anything that could serve your purpose by my going before I said no.

K: Well, had you gone I would have, you know, told you some things you should say to them but I think on balance it's better that you don't.

W: No, I wouldn't do this kind of thing unless I felt that there was something you wanted done.

K: Well, they know what's needed now.

H. W. World History
In the Days of Abraham
Advanced Study

By: KWL NAFI Date: 5/12/04

- 2 -

W: It's just conceivable that somebody who is ostensibly regarded as a liberal Democrat could repeat what you said.

K: That's true. Well, I wouldn't be outraged if you went.

W: Well, at this stage I've turned it off. If they come back to me. They were going to see if they could get some other people. I doubt whether they will get any responsible university presidents to go.

K: Yeah.

W: Without at least your tacit blessing. I certainly wouldn't do it unless I felt I was doing some good.

K: Well, I would certainly not attack you if you went.

W: Right.

K: You would not get criticized.

W: So I--

K: Unless you started doing what Ramsay Clark did.

W: Well, that was crazy. You know, I would feel even stronger then unless you felt that there was something I could do that you couldn't do. I'm not proposing there is.

K: No, no, I understand.

W: I'm saying why should I do it.

K: Right.

W: An academic with a liberal Democratic background might reinforce something and I probably have thrown away the chance to do it anyway but I--

K: I think on balance we're better off not having anyone carry any more messages.

W: Right.

K: You come down here still sometimes?

OCLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sept. 3.6

H. E. B. T. of the Air Force
and Mr. J. W. of the Navy
Advisory Board on

By: K.L. W. NASA, Date: 5/12/04

W: Oh, I still try to get down for the PESAC meetings. I've missed the last two or three.

K: Do let me know even if I'm---

W: You and I almost intersected in Paris this summer. I got there the day after you'd been there. In fact I went to see Dick Watson I was going to look for you and discovered you'd been there the day before. I hate to bother you.

K: No, no, but I'd love to see you. I'm unbelievably busy but as long as you understand if I tell you if I'm busy. Give me a chance of making an appointment anyway.

W: Yeah, I understand completely. Well, I'll call.

K: Good.

W: How long are you going to be away?

K: Just a week.

W: If there are times when my perspective can help you with either the Russians or the Chinese or anyone I'm glad to be used is the way to put it.

K: Good.

W: You know in the interest of things I think we both believe in.

K: Well, I'm delighted to hear that and secondly I'd like to talk to you you know if we win the election. We have to get a better relationship between the academe and the Administration.

W: Yeah.

K: We have to.

W: I think we have to. You know there was a very unfortunate thing happened at the beginning. You know when Frank Long had not rejected that sort of ________. Remember I talked to you when the President made what we all thought was a mistake and he corrected himself. If Frank had been willing to accept that I think things might have been different.

Husqville 31311, France
Date: 11/10/1981
Time: 11:00:00
Admiralty Report

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NAFU, Date: 5/13/04

- 4 -

K: That's right. As you know so much of SALT grew out of what we did at MIT and Harvard ten years ago--twelve years ago.

W: I think that's right. My only fear is that we don't move fast enough and technology still outruns---

K: But what we have to get is the input of people, you know, whom we don't have to look at as I mean I don't do it anyway but as really potentially out to destroy the Administration. If the President wins-----

W: I don't know if anybody believes it but I tried my damnest to be very careful and very quiet.

K: No, no I believe it, I know it.

W: I don't know what the President believes. But aside from the ABM issue which I was involved in before this Administration came into office I have not -----

K: No, no I recognize that Jerry. That is a topic I really do want to talk to you about during October sometime.

W: I think on the ABM issue we did you a favor. That's another matter.

K: Well, you know, cooperation doesn't mean you have to agree with everything policy.

W: No, I think it would be a mistake you know to hold back on differences of opinion.

K: Absolutely.

W: It would certainly not serve the country or the President.

K: No, and we don't need that or want it.

W: OK, sir.

K: Good, Jerry, we'll be in touch.

W: Listen, can I ask you one last thing?

K: Yes.

НомерLEXИУМЕЙ
НомерLEXИУМЕЙ
№ 100110

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L. NARA Date: 5/12/04

W: I'm about to join Derek Bock and some others in an open letter attacking the [that's putting me midly] the Russian ransom business and I suspect it will affect my relations with the Soviets in the Academy some but I don't see how in good conscience I cannot do it. Do you?

K: NO. They take it very bitterly, you know that.

W: I'm going to write a private letter to [Keldez?] saying that in doing this I understood I run the danger of jeopardizing my relations but I feel that this is not only vital to the world but to them that they no do these things and see what happens.

K: Yes.

W: OK, sir.

K: Good, Jerry.

W: Bye-bye.

K: Bye

OCLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sept. 3.6

November 6, 1972

Re: Henry's trip to Hawaii

Re: Kissinger's call

By: KMLW NASA, Date: 5/13/72

TELCORN

Taft Schrieber/Kissinger

September 6, 1972 -- 12:35 p.m.

K: Hello

S: How are you, Henry?

K: How are you?

S: Very good. I hope you had a nice trip to Hawaii.

K: Well, Hawaii was pretty hot.

S: Pretty hot, huh

K: That party you put together turned out very good.

S: We enjoyed it very much. There were a lot of people you couldn't
make it. They were out of town. But, god, it was nice. It was
so beautifully handled by the White House crowd and I think the
President really enjoyed it.

K: Yes.

S: He loved it and the press on it is not to be believed. We're getting
press clippings on it that gee.

K: It's unbelievable.

S: They say we had more turn out than the Academy Awards and
stuff like that.

K: I've seen it. It's amazing.

S: I'll tell you why I called you, Henry. A very close friend of mine
is Dr. Corday, he's a former president of the American College
of Cardiology and he's a very eminent man. He's coming home
from Washington meetings. He's on the Presidential Advisory
Council and apparently he's talked to Irving Lazar just shooting
the breeze. I guess he knows Irving because Corday has some
of Irving's clients and Lazar that "you were probably not going
to be in Government much longer after the------"

K: Oh, he's out of his mind.

S: Oh, I know that. "------much after the elections and that he's
made a fabulous book deal for you." Now I know Lazar very

The Telephone Book of America
Telephone Numbers and Names of Public Figures

OECCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L. V. NARIA, Date: 5/12/04

- 2 -

well and he's a very, very egotistical little maniac and I was ---

K: Lazar has no authority to make any deals for me.

S: I know that, wait a minute. I didn't call for that reason. I know that. You're saying that is right. But, I think Al Haig ought to call the guy and tell him that I had called you and made this report that Dr. Corday had heard this conversation and if he's going to say anything to others and there is no--that he's embarrassing you. He's really putting something or allowing things to be spread that would endager or embarrass you and that he's got to stop this. Now, in other words, if I call him.

K: No, I or Haig will call him.

S: I think ______ Corday started to mention it to several people here at a dinner party and I said no wait a minute, please don't repeat this story it is untrue. Irving Lazar is a total, absolute liar. I was incensed.

K: Irving Lazar has been making propositions like this for two years to me

S: I know that. But he's such a terrible man that he's liable-- in other words you can never tell if Evans and Novak picked this up they can make a very nasty story out of it. You follow?

K: Yes.

S: And I don't think your friends should permit that. I would have called him before but he might feel that I'm sticking my nose in something I shouldn't.

K: I'll call him. Thank you, Taft. You've been a good friend as always.

S: I hear you're going away. I hope you get a little rest on this trip.

K: In Russia?

S: Listen, I saw that little acrobat. I'll tell you what you tell that you'll bring her over and I think she'll be one of the greatest draws in the world. Did you see her on television?

K: OK.

Номер диспансерной линии
от 18.04.1978 г. № 10101
Администрация

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

- 3 -

S: Did you see this little girl?

K: No, I didn't, I can't see them all.

S: No, no this one is only about 14 years old. She was so graceful I think the Russians in public relations did more good for themselves with this little girl. Nobody would every have thought that these people had such rythmn and beauty. You know.

K: I didn't see her.

S: Well, anyway, have a great trip, and I'll talk to you soon.

K: Right.

S: Bye.

K: Bye.

President, House, Senate, and Executive Councils of the United States of America

TELCOM

Secretary Shultz/Kissinger

September 6, 1972 - 2:20 p.m.

S: Hello.

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

S: Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

S: You're off again.

K: You notice the deference with which you're being treated.

S: I'm overwhelmed.

K: The Secretary of State told the President this morning that you were not to make any profound pronouncements at the meetings.

S: Well, I think he's mistaken. That's what I'd like to talk to you about.

K: I lean towards your view.

S: I wonder if I could come over and tell you the nature of what we might propose and then sort of look at the pros and cons of doing it.

K: I think we need a roadmap of where we are trying to go. We don't have to get there.

S: Well, we have a roadmap.

K: We have to have a sense of direction.

S: Well, I have

K: People have to know what it is we want to accomplish. You want to come around three?

S: You couldn't do it right now if I came over there? I have a meeting starting at three.

K: How about 2:30? Can you come at 2:30?

S: I'll come.

Re: [list of people] in the document
Attn: [list of people] to whom [list of people] was told

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: KWL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Sec. Rogers/Kissinger
2:42 p.m. - 9/6/72

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Yes, Bill.

R: I noticed we got a telegram from Kennedy in NATO saying that our allies are somewhat concerned about the Ziegler briefing saying that you are going to talk about European Security Conference.

K: He didn't say that. I looked at the text; we're not going to talk about the European Security Conference. There's no way it could be discussed.

R: What did he mean by European security? Just general?

K: Well he said all the topics that were covered at the summit but in a general way be covered.

R: But he also mentioned European security.

K: I thought all he said was European problems.

R: No, he said European security.

K: Well at any rate it will not be discussed.

R: What about Mutual Balanced Force Reductions?

K: Unless they raise it we're in no position to discuss it. We've just had an exchange there.

is

R: Well what I would like to just say/that it's not going to be discussed and if you could just - if the subject comes up - say we're not ready to discuss it yet, that would make it easier because then we could just tell our NATO allies that these subjects were not going to be discussed. On SALT we could say that we're going to continue to have the briefings that we've had in the past so that if you talked about SALT we could just say well anything that's discussed about SALT you'll be briefed on by Gerry Smith just the way you have been in the past.

By: KMLW NASA Date: 5/12/04

2

K: Well, if they mentioned - if they had another thought for example about this approach and raised that issue with us that we've already approached them on, there will be no discussion on the substance on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. That you can certainly tell them. We don't have a position.

R: And on the Conference on European Security we just say we're not prepared to discuss it yet, are we?

K: That's right.

R: Even if they raised it?

K: You mean the substance?

R: Yeh.

K: I don't - we don't have a substantive position.

R: No, but what they're worried about in NATO is that you'll - it's not so much who raises it as whether you'll talk about it or not. If we're in a position to tell them that this is a subject that you're not going to talk about then we wouldn't.

K: Hold on a second the President is calling.

(Kissinger takes the President's call.)

K: Hello. Well, why don't you send a cable over that you want to send and let me see what it says. If I have any concerns with it I'll tell you.

R: OK. I think it is important to do that because they were upset the last time on it. They claimed that you'd said that we negotiated a communique for three or four months and so they felt that we had sort of misled them. When I told them we hadn't agreed on anything yet.

K: My briefings were on the public record and I never said three or four months.

R: Well whatever it was. All I'm saying is that they were concerned. They had a couple of meetings and talked about it and so forth and I sent them a telegram saying there was nothing for them to worry about. I just want to reassure them that's all.

September 12, 1968, the eve
of the Summer Games in mono
Advisory Board

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NARA Date: 5/12/68

3

K: Well, let me see the cable and I'll . . .

R: When are you going to leave?

K: Probably now not until Saturday morning because I don't see that I should attend any of the Olympic events.

R: I don't see why you'd want to now.

K: No I won't.

R: And I think on the German government thing it's going to be very tough now. The feeling against them is so strong.

K: Yeh, but on the other hand to cancel them would be a slap in their face.

R: Yeh I think that's right except I suppose you could do it . . before you were doing it as I understand it on the ground that you were going to the Olympics.

K: That's right.

R: If you're not going to the Olympics you might be able to do it on the way back. Are you going to stop in England now?

K: Yes.

R: What's that about?

K: It's about nothing except I didn't want to fly into Paris and have 300 newsmen following us and so I wanted to go to England as a stop from which to go to Paris. And then go over to Paris for that other thing the next morning.

R: Well and I suppose you could do that now in Germany. You could stop in Germany on the way back instead of London. Well, it's up to you but I would think it would present quite a problem in Germany at the moment. OK, well you're not going to leave until Saturday then.

K: Right.

R: OK. Thank you.

Hanoi, 12 June 1976

Re: Kissinger's comments on the situation

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sept. 3.6

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
2:45 p.m. - 9/6/72

By: K.L. NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, isn't my recollection correct that on some occasions past the North Vietnamese have supported these guerillas in their statements?

K: Uhhh.

P: Let me suggest this and get your research people on it. It would be very useful if we could know whether that's the case. You see what I mean?

K: Yeh.

P: The North Vietnamese support or I think they did in one case - if they didn't it's fine. It's just a little research thing.

K: I'll get it looked at Mr. President.

P: It's just something that we can do for a columnist to pick up and write.

K: I'll get it looked at.

P: All right. Fine.

["H. E. T. U. S. A. T. C. O. L. E. L. O. P. H. S. A. S. U. S. A. W. A. S. E. W. A. S. E. W. A. S. E. W. A. S. E

H. M. S. B. C. S. C. U.

A. M. S. U. S. A.

By: K.L.V. NAFU Date: 5/12/04

2

K: You can say - well, what we are doing, we've talked in a low key way to Dobrynin. Next week we'll call him into the State Department. If the Jewish community doesn't mind after I've been in the Soviet Union and have done-some national business, so we'll do it on Wednesday on Thursday next week. Don't tell them that.

G: No, I won't tell them anything.

K: But next Thursday we'll call them in.

G: And defer any meetings between any of our people and the Jewish groups until after Wednesday.

K: That's right. After Wednesday you'll be able to say that the issue has been raised both with Dobrynin and with the Minister.

G: I think between now and November a certain amount of theater is needed to keep the lid on. That's basically what seems to come through to me. After that I just don't know; there are various people that are talking about forming committees to raise the money and doing a variety of things.

K: They ought to remember what this Administration has done. . .

G: Yes, all of that can be pointed out but nevertheless here they are and subject to presses of this sort and I'm simply asking.

K: No, no, you've been great on it.

G: Well, I'm doing a job and all I want to know is how to handle it.

K: Our game plan is that we cannot possibly make a formal protest while I'm on the way to Russia.

G: Right. I understand that.

But even Stanton and the USIA Advisory Council are casting around for ways to be helpful on this and I think a certain amount of guidance is needed so that it doesn't get out of control.

K: Good.

G: So then that's basically it. After the trip this could spawn everything for the next week or ten days and after that something will happen.

K: Yes, it won't be dramatic but something will be done.

G: OK, have a good trip.

December 1, 1968
is the last day of life of
MOSCOW SUSS?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sect. 3.6

By: K.V. NASA Date: 5/12/64

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Kissinger
5:07 p.m. - 9/6/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, why does it take you so long to come to the telephone?

D: (Laughter) Well, it takes time for me to come to this telephone.

K: I see. I've got to see your office or is that the office you're using?

D: I have it in the office and in my bedroom.

K: I see. Oh, the bedroom is what I've seen.

D: Yes, you know all the secrets are here in the bedroom. What else you could claim really.

K: I tell you I don't know.

D: What you don't know - you've been here definitely. I think not once but three times.

K: You've read a lot of my books; I've never seen one of yours.

D: Oh, if you'd really like to in Moscow I'll show you some of them.

K: Sometime if they ever get published I would like to read your analysis of the American scene. I'll bet they're outstanding.

D: Well, I don't know but usually what I discuss with you you know my points of view. You could guess it really. Well I could make some different words but basically I think you could guess what I think.

K: No question. Anatol a minor point if you're sending a cable. I want you to know we will be prepared to announce the subsidies for the American ships within a day or two of my return from Moscow.

D: You mean on grain?

K: Yes.

D: Within one or two days?

Incorporated by its registered agent
to the order of the Bank of
Memphis, Tenn.

OECIASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML V NASA, Date: 5/12/04

2

K: Right. So the week after my return we will announce the grain subsidy.

D: This is for your trip.

K: For my trip. You're just looking around for ways to ease the congestion that you're talking about.

D: Yes.

K: So within the next ten days we will make an announcement of subsidies for the American ships.

D: Henry, while I am dealing with you, you mention Breshnev asked you for two months. . . .

K: Two months for what?

D: For the resignation of Thieu. You said one month and you said "no, you said two months." You remember?

K: Yeah.

D: Now I notice you easily and very flexibly switch to one or two days after your return. Then two weeks and then ten days.

K: No, no, ten days from now - two days after my return.

D: Oh, I see ten days from your return.

K: No, no, I will return on the 15th and we will announce it the 18th or 19th.

D: Oh, I see.

K: I meant 10 days from today.

D: Yes I understand. All right.

K: In other words no later than a week from next Tuesday.

The New York Times

By: K.L.V. NAFIA, Date: 5/12/04

9

D: Yes I understand because otherwise ?

K: No, no, no later than a week from next Tuesday we will announce it.

D: And meanwhile . . . . . . involve with third countries.

K: Yes, . . . . . put maximum pressure on them.

D: Yes, I think it's very helpful.

K: We will do that for the next ten days and then functionally within two days of our return or say the 18th or 19th we will announce the subsidies for American ships.

D: OK.

K: And then within a week after that if we can sign the Maritime Agreement then we've got it all.

D: I think it looks like we are approaching something.

K: Well, when you and I work together things usually happen.

D: I think so too. Henry, about tomorrow - I receive a telegram now and they ask if it's possible for me to arrive on Friday evening.

K: Do you want to come earlier?

D: Well, even 5:30 would be fine.

K: Let's make it 5.

D: Five. Could you make it?

K: Yeah, I'll switch whatever I have.

D: Then I will leave tomorrow in the evening around 8:30 from Dulles airport.

K: OK, let's make it at 5.

D: OK. Because I couldn't get everything in the telegram and Breshnev wants me to explain what the position on the . . . .

Member of the staff
of the State Department
of the Republic of
Mongolia

By: KMLV NARA Date: 5/12/94

4

K: Oh you two are going to be so lined up against me.

D: Oh no.

K: It's going to be. . . The trouble is everytime you have negotiated with us we have brought at least one weak member of our team. In our case when I face you, Grumyko and Breshkov plus that little devil Kerniyko who's probably going to hang around.

M: Yeah, well, he is very good in being precise in all those things and he is very good. . . . . . we can rely on him that all the commands and points will be in the proper places.

K: Is it going to make you unsufferable if I tell you that I look forward to my visit.

D: No, I think it will be a pleasant visit and interesting discussions.

K: Yes, I think we will have some interesting discussions.

D: This is my estimate because they ask me in Moscow before when I was there and I make it my long prediction that on some major points we will make a good movement forward and even we will close some issues. And now after talking with you my impression of that is correct.

K: Oh, absolutely. That's the attitude with which I'm coming.

D: So tomorrow I would like to talk to you about SALT. . .

K: I will give you something on SALT. I will give you something on that nuclear thing. It's just general but it expresses the President's concern and his attitude.

D: Yes, I understand. And if you could __________?

K: Now what I would like to do is also we should get somebody on a brief communique after my visit of what was discussed and the progress that was made.

D: OK. If you could give me a draft tomorrow it would be fine.

K: Well, I'll try.

The Official Journal of the United Nations
of the United States of America

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Flanigan/Kissinger

5:33 p.m. - 9/6/72

K: Hello.

F: Hello Henry.

K: Peter, how are you?

F: Fine. Do you feel that all the economic parts of the puzzle are put together for Moscow or do you think we ought to get together with Pete and discuss what you're going to say hopefully on lend-lease.

K: Have you been working with him on the packages?

F: I've been working with him up to the Convention and was away from the time of the beginning of the Convention up til now. I talked to him at the end of the Convention on it. I understand that you and Pete are together and you and he are satisfied with what's happening.

K: That's right and so is the President. But certainly neither the President nor I have any competence in this.

F: Well I know nothing about it. I have a meeting with him tomorrow so I think I ought to get myself completely aware of where you are, don't you think?

K: By all means.

F: I will do that. When are you leaving?

K: I am leaving on Saturday. I was going to leave on Friday and go for a day to the Olympics but I think it'd be bad taste for me now, don't you?

F: Yes I do. It'd be wrong.

K: Well I'm going to Munich but I will not attend the Olympics. Or is that wrong politically?

F: Yeh, I think that's kind of tough, don't you?

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/13/04

K: What, not go to the Olympics?

F: No, no, well I don't know how you'd go to Munich and not go to the Olympics or not be to some extent involved in them.

K: Well I was going there for my meetings with Brandt and others.

F: Then obviously.

K: And I thought if I cancelled it, since the meetings with Brandt, Scheel and Bahr have already been announced.

F: It looks like you're blaming them.

K: It looks as if I'm blaming them. And by not going to the games themselves I'm showing enough displeasure.

F: Yeh, I think you're arriving and carrying out your meetings make sense. I have one or two other things I'd like to talk to you about if you have any time between now and your departure. I'll get myself up-to-date on this.

K: If you want to drop down for a few minutes at six.

F: Six o'clock.

K: Today is really better because tomorrow and Friday I'll just be going crazy.

F: I'll be there at six.

K: OK. Good.

December 16, 1976, 11:00 a.m.
Re: Meeting with M.D. and Macs
Subject: RE:

By: K.L. V. NASA, Date: 5/12/76

TELCOM

Don Kendall/Kissinger

6:10 p.m. - 9/6/72

K: Hello.

DK: Hello Handsome.

K: I thought I'd help you out in China by going to the Soviet Union.

DK: Well but you're too early. You're too early, but I think it's a good idea.

K: Oh, I'll keep them generally stirred up.

DK: Henry, two things. Number 1 we talked about a possible weekend in October. I am flexible on any weekend in October with the exception of the weekend of the 21st - I've got the Business Council. All the others are totally flexible.

K: Can I get in touch with you after I return from Moscow.

DK: Yup. Because I know you can't make a commitment on it now but that's the only date that I've got anything and I'm going to try and maintain that flexibility. The other thing is do you think that you'll see Kosygin in Moscow?

K: I'll certainly see Brezhnev.

DK: If you could find out for me when they're going to announce - I tried to get Offshimov (sp. ?). Offshimov is sick - you know Patolichev was sick as hell - in fact he passed out at the airport when Peterson left as you probably know and was there sick for quite awhile and Offshimov couldn't give me the answer until Patolichev got back and now Offshimov is out sick. With that hot weather they've had I guess it's - but I can't find out when they're going to announce our deal and if you could somehow in a conversation ask them when they're going to announce this I would really appreciate it.

K: All right.

DK: Because we've got people we want to send in there. The engineers to get it going. We're going to miss next summer if they don't do something soon and I don't know why in the hell they're holding it up and I'm also concerned that maybe something's gone wrong. I don't think it has but. . .

November 13, 1968, the date here
influenza暴发,在 Munich举行
Advisory Board Meeting.

By: KML V. NASA Date 5/12/64

2

K: No, Dobrynin spoke to me as if it was set.

DK: Well that's what everybody tells me but I'm still nervous until I know it is set. As far as I know Kosygin and everybody's approved it but. .

K: Let me see whether I can find an occasion to raise it.

DK: I would appreciate it if you could without causing you any embarrassment.

K: OK. Good.

DK: Greatly appreciate it and hope you have a good trip.

K: Thank you Don.

DK: I gather you're going to stop in Munich on the way back.

K: No, I'm going to stop in Munich on the way over.

DK: Oh, I thought you were going to take some. .

K: No, I was going to stop in Munich and attend the Olympic games for a day plus see some German leaders. Now under the present circumstances I don't really think I ought to attend the games.

DK: God, that's terrible isn't it?

K: But on the other hand I don't want to cancel the meetings with the Germans so it looks like a total reprove.

DK: That's right. It's not the German's fault - it's the one thing I was upset about last night when on television they started talking about "well, this is Germany all over again." Christ, this is not the German's fault.

K: It's absolutely not the German's fault. So what I'm doing is to cut out the day I was going to watch the games and go for the day I was going to meet the leaders. You know going to the games would be bad taste, but seeing the leaders they deserve.

DK: Well I certainly hope you have a good trip and good luck and anything you can find out for me I will greatly appreciate.

K: Yes, thank you.

H. W. S. MCKINLEY
UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
BY ORDER OF THE
GOVERNMENT

By: KWL NAFU Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

President/Kissinger

9/6/72 - 7:31 p.m.

K: Hello.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, we're going to have a showing of "Crusade in Europe".
Of course you and everybody's probably seen.

K: No, I haven't.

P: It's in the White House Theater in about 15 minutes. You might
like to see part of it - you know it's Eisenhower and it's a marvelous
thing. And if you could go, your staff, Haig and the rest - anybody
that wants to come. You know there's 30 or 40 seats.

K: Well, aren't you nice, Mr. President.

P: You're probably going to dinner.

K: No, I was going . . .

P: If you would tell Haig because you know it'd be an nice thing since
he just made General if he'd - he's probably seen it but - and also
I'm not inviting anybody else but everybody on the NSC staff. You
know the whole group.

K: Well that's terribly generous of you.

P: Just tell them that anybody' that's free is invited over and that -
what time you got now?

K: 7:30.

P: It'll be 7:45 - 'Crusade in Europe'and they can come as the guests
and I'll be there. They can stay as long as they want. They can
stay 45 minutes or an hour of it - it's a very long show.

K: I would have loved to do it but I'm going over to Joe Alsop's and
he said he invited some people who needed to get the word.

December 13, 1968
the Newsweek Staff
of the Newsweek Staff

By: K.L. V. NAFIA, Date: 5/13/64

2

P: Good. Good.

K: In fact that's why I decided not to go to New York tonight.

P: Incidentally I wish you would give him a little of that ____ thing... the parts that *Newsweek* didn't cover. Could you . . . . that to him?

K: Well that's what I thought I would do.

P: If they look - well just say "We've got the verbatim on this, Joe, and you ought to really write it."

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Have a good time but will you tell Haig that anyone on the NSC staff including secretaries are invited in 15 minutes and have them do it.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Rogers called me about what he had done and I called the Bergers and apparently everything is.

K: I think we have handled it . . .

P: Apparently McGovern requested this - I indicated I knew nothing about it and

K: He was requested to go to the funeral.

P: That's right.

K: And he was turned down.

P: Rogers told me that McGovern had requested for somebody else on his staff or somebody like that but whatever it was I said that's interesting and so forth. So that's the way it stands. In the meantime what I am planning to do, for your private information, at 11:00 tomorrow I'll step across the street to the little church and spend five, ten minutes and then come back - on my own.

K: That, Mr. President, is.

P: It isn't on the schedule, nothing else. But you see that's the way we do it in our church. We're all a little different.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 32938, Sec. 3-6

The following information will be used in this conversation.
Please read all material in its entirety.

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/64

TELECON
Admiral Moorer
9/7/72 8:30 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Good morning Henry.

K: Tom, you told me you were going to let me know about the air policy last, a week ago.

M: I told you as soon as you got back, yeah. How about this afternoon after the Verification Panel.

K: I won't be able to do it then unless it ends at 4:30. I have a meeting at 5:00.

M: Well, I think that you notice they've been putting more up there and Gayler and the two people primarily involved in the war, I'm sending them . . . they're going to Saigon and I've talked to Warren too about coordinating the whole thing including Gayler's problem and I think that by and large it's going to be all right. They've allocated now 48 attack sorties up to that northwest corner. As you may have noted they've been going up there every chance they got ______. And I thought it would be a good idea if they all sat down together and worked this out. Now I've talked to Warren about it too and he understands what the problem is I think. And I feel it's by and large they've got the thing under the best control and the best application that could be made Henry.

K: Okay, fine. Well, maybe if the meeting ends early this afternoon we can talk for 15 minutes.

M: All right. I wanted to report to you while I've got you a couple of other things. I just talked to Warren a minute ago. He had just at my request gone up to Military Region 1 to see Phong and he took ______ who's the number two man, the ex-Marine Commandant and very close to ______ and Thieu with him. And he says the situation around Hue is ______, that he's real pleased with that. They pushed out even further and captured more supplies and they're up further north now and beginning to ______. The airborne is going to move against the right, that is the southern, point of the enemy and the Marines are going to move forward. As you know, we're conducting an amphibious ______ and he seems to think that the situation up there is pretty good. He said he was pleased with it. I had asked him to look into the Marine casualties; he said the Marines have been losing a net of about 60 a day. In other words, about a 100 total but 40 of the previously wounded returning. So a net of about 60. He says as far as leadership's concerned though, fortunately they haven't lost anyone in the company battalion regi-mental category of officers. The officers have all been battalion commanders. He said that they just had an intercept that the 325th Division commander had

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12939, Sect. 3.6

It is requested that the open line be
continued for 1 mile ofambulacral
Morphacae said?

Moorer, 9/7/72, 8:30 a.m.

By: K.M. W. NASA Date: 5/13/74

been fired, North Vietnamese that is, for failure to carry out his orders and
that again on balance he thought that Tong was optimistic. Tong feels that
he's got about 2 more months and that the other side's got about one month so
far as the weather's concerned. He makes this differentiation because of the
fact that he has hard service roads and some fuel (?) mobility and so forth
that the other side doesn't have. But on balance he said that he thought that
things were going pretty well up there. He made a ______ about this little
town south of Que Son.

K: Yeah, I'll be asked about that by the President.

M: All right, he said that that is certainly in terms of scope very small compared to Que Son and they'll take that back, I mean the South Vietnamese will take it back right away. He said that this is part of the overall program they're trying to put forward now affecting some of these district towns like Que San and this one Hai Phuc or whatever it is and then the one down, you know, west of Pleiku, San An. And he said that they've had the intelligence that the North Vietnamese are trying to ______ a few of these district towns. But this one out in Military Region 1 he says that should not be a major problem like Que San which has been cleared up and that they will recapture it.

K: Yes.

M: So, that's about the gist of it. I had a long talk with all the people in the war that are involved in this overall area. But I made them set up a very close means of marking the targets by categories, that is POL, railroads, and so on so that they can lay out a weekly plan and follow up on it and so on. Course they've been doing that but I think I've tightened it up some and I think that Gayler going out there with all the people involved and so on, they know what you want and it's just a matter of, of course you would expect MACV to be more concerned about the area immediately around them. That's a problem we've had from the outset. But I think that Warren is much more, you know, he's sensible than Abrams. And actually they put in just as much last night as the weather would permit. And I've got them going around the clock, 24 hours a day up there. If you look at the schedule, if you plotted against the 24 hours, which I do, put a bar against every hour of night and day you can see that we are keeping them stirred up continuously.

K: Right, right. Okay, good Tom.

M: Righto. Bye.

["H. J. S. M. H. J. S. M. H. J. S. M. H

The president of the open is to
speak one or two sentences
Pursuant to that?

TELECON
Senator Fulbright
9/7/72 10:10 a.m.

K: Mr. Chairman.

F: Good morning.

K: How are you?

F: Pretty well, how are you doing?

K: Okay, how's Mrs. Fulbright.

F: Well she's showing improvement but still being very quiet.

K: Well Mr. Chairman, the reason I called you was because I was going to go off tomorrow on this trip but because of this Olympic & tragedy I'm going to go a day later, and I was just wondering whether by any chance you were free for lunch. We haven't had a chance to round things up. I have nothing urgent and I just thought that with all the things that have happened since our last lunch...

F: Today?

K: Tomorrow.

F: Tomorrow. Let's see, that's Friday?

K: Yeah, if it doesn't work we can do it after I come back.

F: I'm free on lunch; it's just I don't think we're going to have any votes or anything like that, you know, it's the usual thing. But I think it's all right. I think we could do it anyway. You want to do it up here?

K: Well, I'll have it wherever you say.

F: Is that agreeable to you. The only reason is that it makes it much easier in case there's some ______. I think probably they won't have any.

K: Well could we do it then... could we do it privately?

F: Yeah.

K: Or did you want it in the Senate restaurant, what did you...?

F: No, I thought we'd have it in that room.

K: Oh sure. Of course, I'll be happy to do it.

Request for Proposal to the Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Fulbright, 9/7/72, 10:10 a.m.

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/13/74

F: No, I don't think we ought to have it in the . . .

K: No, I'll tell you because then some people start yelling . . .

F: No, where we had it before.

K: Oh, that would be great.

F: Does that suit you?

K: That suits me if you serve me a little less than last time. I'm trying to be on a diet.

F: Okay, what do you want. A bmx fruit salad or what? Just tell me what you want.

K: Oh, just something light.

F: I want something you like.

K: I'll get my girl to call your girl.

F: Okay, okay. You know what they have up there. They have fruit salads and they have soups and, you don't have to have a steak. I just thought you always had a steak down there.

K: No, no, the last time they served me a big meal. I was very flattered. No, I can have a small steak for example, but nothing else.

F: I see, you don't want it put before you because you can't resist temptation.

K: I have no willpower whatsoever.

F: You have to avoid it, not resist it. I'm the same way.

K: Once it's before me . . . You know, when you're brought up in a German family where you've got to clean your plate or you get it for breakfast . . .

F: Exactly what I was brought up in.

K: But I meant it as a compliment, not as a criticism.

F: Oh well it's exactly the way I was brought up; I was told to eat everything on my plate.

K: What room number was that? I'll get my girl to . .

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

Fulbright, 9/7/72, 10:10 a.m.

F: 201.

K: I'll be there at 1:00; is that convenient?

F: Arrive here at 1:00? Yeah.

K: Good. Be nice to see you again.

F: And you have your girl. . . If you want anything special, you don't want anything to drink, you don't drink any drinks at lunch, do you?

K: No, I won't have anything to drink.

F: Well, that's good. And I'm awful sorry your trip was delayed. That was a terrible business.

K: Well, I was going to see some of the German leaders and spend one afternoon at the Olympic Games, but I don't think under present circumstances I should go to the Games.

F: You know, by the way, we're still struggling over the Interim Agreement. Are you still devoted to the Jackson Amendment. Couldn't you live without it? You don't think it would be a tragedy if it were changed or cut out do you?

K: Well, frankly what I want at this stage is to get the bloody thing ratified.

F: Well, that's what I mean.

K: And what I would think is if we everybody's face could be saved to let it pass and then have it taken out in the conference, that might be the most statesmanlike solution. We won't fall on our sword on it at the conference.

F: And you won't complain bitterly will you. . . If we have a vote first of the week won't you just sort of let nature take it's course.

K: I'll be in Moscow; I can't complain.

F: Good.

K: What I would like really. . . You know, Gromyko is coming over by the end of the month and we would like it if we could go and have some ratification by then.

F: Well, it's not me that's standing in the way.

K: Yeah, I know.

Fulbright, 9/7/72, 10:10 a.m.

By: KHLW NAVA Date: 5/12/04

F: I'm not going to belabor you with it, that's our problem.

K: I really feel now Mr. Chairman that we all know what everybody wants in this and how it's going to come out. If we could just get the bloody thing voted in some form I think it will emerge in a satisfactory

F: _________'s the one holding it up. I'm ready to vote today, tomorrow. . .
We're going to have one vote today at 12:00 and I'm ready to vote all the way
down, but I'm not ready to allow him to tie it up in knots with his unanimous
consent agreement. That's against the rules of the Senate. He's the one
holding it up. So put the pressure on him. Tell him to go on and vote.

K: See you at 1:00 tomorrow.

F: All right.

K: Bye.

The president has the power to issue orders, make decisions, and appoint people.

TELECON
Senator Mansfield
9/7/77 10:17 a.m.

By: K.L.Y. NASA Date: 5/13/04

M: Hello.

K: Hello Senator.

M: Yes Henry, how are you?

K: I'm okay.

M: Good.

K: I have finally had a reply from the Chinese. Let me read it to you and this has to be on a very personal level because we used a very personal channel. And then on top of it they made it in the form of a personal discussion with me by the Prime Minister. Their point is, first of all of their high regard for you. Up to now they said they had done all the contacts with our legislators on a bipartisan basis and "would it not affect your bipartisan relationship . . ." I'm quoting now, it's a personal letter, "if Mansfield comes alone for a visit." Secondly, they are concerned that you might have some intentions vis-a-vis Sihanouk. Now, and then they say if I can answer those questions, let me read you the last letter. "Please tell us explicitly and in the candor with which we have always dealt with each other whether there is any other intention in Mansfield's proposed visit." Now, you know, that I can easily handle, that last part, because you know I can make clear that as far as we are concerned you embody a bipartisan figure. On China policy we don't consider you a partisan figure.

I don't suppose there's any way of going with a Republican without destroying your real intentions.

M: Well we could if that would help.

K: I think that would solve it myself. I think with

M: Now about Sihanouk . . .

K: I think about Sihanouk we ought to say that they should establish the ground rules.

Mexican, you're not going to see Sihanouk, are you?

M: That's right.

K: I mean you're not going to see Sihanouk, are you?

M: No.

Mansfield, 9/7/72, 10:17 a.m.

p. 2

K: I know you'd be happy to see him.

M: No, but if it's suggested that I pay a courtesy call, what do you do?

K: Well they say you gave a speech recently about Sihanouk which puzzled them. I frankly don't remember what that...

M: Oh yes. I suggested that it might be a good idea to consider the possibility of Sihanouk getting back into Cambodia on an interim basis. But I didn't expect much to come of it because that country is far from stabilized, Henry, and I don't know who else can do anything at the appropriate time to bring about stability.

K: Uh-huh. They may have thought that we were sending you as an emissary to Sihanouk to bring that about.

M: Oh no, no, no, no, no, no, no. I would discuss no policy with Sihanouk. If I see him, I would hope not to see him but then sometimes events develop whereby it's unavoidable.

K: I think, you know, if we can... Uh, I have a chance tomorrow evening to talk to them. If you wanted to give some thought on in what way, I mean supposing you went with a Republican from the Foreign Relations Committee. So that you're not going as Majority Leader but as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

M: Fine.

K: I don't know what Republican you'd go with.

M: Well there are lots of good ones there.

K: I mean, Aiken, I don't know whether he'd be interested. I know he's a good friend of yours.

M: Well, he'd be a good one but I worry about George's...

K: Health.

M: Age and health. But there's a fellow like Cooper who would fit in.

K: Right.

M: And I don't know whether Hugh wants to go again or not.

K: From our point of view there is no requirement. In fact It's just... I think that what they want to avoid... My impression is, reading between the lines, that they want to have a basis to reject individual Americans who

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

Reclassified after it was opened
by the State Department
Academic Staff

By: KJLW NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Mansfield, 9/7/72, 10:17 a.m.

p. 3

might want to use them as a platform for politics.

M: Oh I see, well I can understand that.

K: You know and that doesn't have to apply . . . that obviously doesn't apply to you, but if they make a rule that no diggle political figure ever comes then they have solved that problem.

M: That's true, that's true. Well okay Henry. Let me think about it and I'll give you a call, either later & today or tomorrow morning.

K: Good, and on Sihanouk I think I can handle that because what I would tell them is first, what you said did not reflect necessarily our policy.

M: No.

K: Secondly, that you would not go there to convince Sihanouk of anything.

M: Absolutely.

K: And if you did see him, which you didn't insist on, you would promise not to make any specific proposal to him.

M: I couldn't; I'm not in a position to and if I were I wouldn't because I would be in a foreign country. And I have to watch my pees and cues very carefully and if it was unavoidable to see him it would be on the basis of a courtesy call.

K: Right, but that you would not be offended if things worked out that his schedule precluded his seeing you, but in a way that's easiest for them to handle.

M: Not in the least.

K: Okay, well that makes it clear.

M: Okay Henry.

K: Well if you could call me or I'll call you, whichever you prefer.

M: I'll give you a call.

K: Good thank you Senator.

M: Okay, Henry.

K: Bye.

M: Bye.

H. J. F. Kissinger
Receptionist

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1293, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW
NASHA Data: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Hal Sonnenfeld/Mr. Kissinger

12:30 p.m., September 7, 1972

K: Where do we stand on the subsidies?

S: I got to talking to E yesterday; just told him to wait until we come back.

K: Yeah, but is it then done?

S: Then all we have to do is for you to say so and then we move.

K: And then it will be done within a day.

S: No, no; then we start the procedure which takes approximately 3 to 3 and 1/2 weeks because it has to be announced in the Federal Register and it just takes that long to go through the machinery under the law.

K: We announce that we are giving subsidies?

S: That's right. That we will be giving subsidies.

K: But that we can announce within several days?

S: We can announce it if you're content that Flanigan is happy --

K: But is Flanigan happy?

S: The last time -- and that's what I told you yesterday -- the last time. . . . to the public announcement, I will be glad to ask him if he has any objection not to our doing it.

K: My question is can we announce publicly within 3 or 4 days of my return that we are finding them eligible for subsidies?

S: There is no obstacle to it whatsoever except to ask Flanigan and Weinberger whether they have any problem. They had no problem of substance before.

K: Well, can you get that cleared up now so that I'm committed when I'm there?

S: Yeah.

K: Good.

TELECON
Secretary Peterson
9/7/72 6:22 p.m.

K: Hello.

P: Henry, just a quickie.

K: Yes Pete.

P: You ________ from three different sources that there's a strong movement on the Hill to ________ the Soviet Jewry issue with anything that has anything to do with the Soviet Union.

K: But that won't be effective until after the election.

P: Well there's strong pressure in this one group that I met with that's been confirmed since then to submit MFN legislation, but to tie the issue to that and then to use the submission of the bill to get extremely vocal about it. Javits and a number of others are very active on it.

K: Yeah, but they'll subside after the election.

P: Yeah, now I don't know how much it hurts you, however, to do it prior to the election because that's what they're going to do. Okay, I just wanted you to know about it.

K: No, I didn't know about it; it will hurt me but . . . It will hurt but what can we do. There's no sense; you can't make a deal with Javits on things like this. Don't you think?

P: Well you know him much better than I do. I don't know what he'd . . . he's got great respect for you. I don't know. I'll tell you what I can do if we can get helpful. I can find out who the Senators and Congressman are beside him and if in your absence you want anybody to try to pacify them so they don't get out on the floor and create problems for you while you're over there, that might help. Or I can drop it, whatever you wish.

K: No, if you could find out in a way that doesn't draw too much attention to it that would be very helpful.

P: All right, you'll get it in the morning.

K: Good Pete, and you're holding the other thing till Thursday.

P: I'm expecting to hear from you Wednesday night. I'll be all prepared.

K: Good. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L. W. NASA Date: 5/12/72

["DECLASSIFIED", "Authority E012587\nBy CHNARA Date Stetov", "TELECON", "Ambassador Dobrynin", "9/7/72 6:37 p.m.", "K: You know that fellow that I mentioned to you?", "D: Yeah.", "K: His name is, I'll spell it: MXXEX N-E-R-Z-L-Y-KXX A-K-O-V.", "D: Oh Nerzlyakov.", "K: Yes and his first name is Mikhail.", "D: Oh Michael.", "K: Yes, Michael.", "D: Michael M Nerzlyakov. Probably, I don't know him but it sounds . . .", "K: Yes. Antwerp (?)", "D: Antwerp, yes?", "K: And you know, there's no insane urgency about this. You don't have to\nspend time tonight on it and nothing . . .", "D: Let us say a week is all right.", "K: Wait until you get back; it can be left till you get back and there's nothing\nto be concerned about until then.", "D: Yes, so within a week time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom

By: CNARA Date: Stetson

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:37 p.m., September 7, 1972

- 2 -

D: But you said that the West Coast -- is it only cash or no basis? I keep on trying to understand.

K: Only cash.

D: Only cash?

K: Only cash.

D: So cash is prohibited for one -- two places and allowed for another two places?

K: Exactly.

D: Yes, just to make sure.

K: Only one place, the West Coast.

D: No, the West Coast and the Lakes.

K: Yes, yes.

D: So it is two places. Two places it is okay and two it is prohibited for the time being, yes?

K: Right. But no grain.

D: Huh?

K: I would not load grain in the Great Lakes.

D: But it says there..

K: That is sloppy --

D: But it is written there.

K: Well, let me just check on that immediately.

D: ... it is not but West Coast and Great Lakes. One question I had really was whether it is on a cash basis or --

K: Well, this is after the agreement is signed; they could call on the Great Lakes.

TELECON
Secretary Peterson

9/7/72 6:42 p.m.

Re: possible Taino ship in the area
Is this true? If so, what is the reason for this? Please explain please?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KM L
N/A: Date: 5/12/04

K: Pete, Sonnenfeldt sent me a talking paper on shipping for Dobrynin which may have completely confused the issue. It said that Soviet ships carrying only cash cargoes would not for the time being request entry into East Coast and Gulf ports, but they could call at West Coast and Great Lake ports.

P: Not all Great Lakes, only the ones that they have been previously calling on. Now wait a minute, you mean before we sign the agreement?

K: No, after.

P: Oh after Henry. We think we could do it in the Great Lakes because of the distance from the Cuba problem you know. I mean the distance from Cuba. You know if we have to pick some areas we think those are less sensitive. You better have somebody check out the Gulf Port area. I would have thought that might be a little hotter down there.

K: No, no. Gulf is no good on this memo.

P: Is no good.

K: No.

P: Only Great Lakes?

K: And West Coast.

P: Yeah, West Coast they're doing anyway.

K: And West Coast they can call on now?

P: West Coast we said they could do now if they didn't go wild on it so it calls a lot of attention to it. [lost in change of tapes]
and they have gone there in the past.

K: So I can confirm this that they can go to the West Coast now.

TELCORN

6:46 p.m., September 7, 1972

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012562
By L.B. MARRA Date 9-1-72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, here is the situation. West Coast you can call on now if you
go easy.

D: Oh, yeah, I understand. This is a rather limited amount, yes.

K: Great Lakes you can call after the agreement is signed. Say after
October 1st. And East Coast and Gulf after say November 15th.

D: East Coast and Gulf, okay.

K: Right.

D: I think it is clear enough. Okay. Thank you very much. Bye.

Husqville, France, open 24
The Sieur de la Fere du Riboulet
Nouvelle Caledonie

TELCOM

6:46 p.m., September 7, 1972

By: K.M. W. NASA Date: 5/12/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatoli, here is the situation. West Coast you can call on now if you go easy.

K: Great Lakes you can call after the agreement is signed. Say after October 1st. And East Coast and Gulf after say November 16th.

D: East Coast and Gulf, okay.

K: Right.

Re: [subject to change]
Re: [Subject to change]
Re: [Subject to change]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM

Ambassador Morizet/Mr. Kissinger

6:50 p.m., September 7, 1972

K: Mr. Ambassador.

M: Yes, good evening.

K: How are you? I just wanted to straighten out one thing if it needs straightening out. On this subject that my associate discussed with you yesterday.

M: Yes.

K: We may sometimes be given to somewhat more pretentious expression than I would and I just wanted to make clear this is not anything we expect to lead anywhere.

M: Yes, of course.

K: It is simply to inform you of a proposal that was made to us and how we proposed to handle it a conciliatory way.

M: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

K: So it is not -- so you should not expect that this will -- we will not raise it. I'm certain it will be raised by them.

M: Yes, yes, yes.

K: And then we will raise all the objections which we gave you.

M: Yes, yes.

K: And then the next move is up to them. Even the next move will not lead to anything.

M: Yes, okay.

K: Okay.

M: And it's been quite right.

K: Okay, fine.

M: I hope to see you when you come back.

K: Absolutely, goodbye.

M: Bye.

By: KML
NAFIA Date: 5/12/04

Re: a phone call with a president of a
university in a residential
樓層graduate?

By: KHLW NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Kissinger

September 7, 1972 - 7:09 p.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Henry?

K: Yes.

Z: I'm saying this matter was dropped in July and that I don't think it was even brought to the attention of the President because you simply dropped it. Is that all right?

K: It was never an active matter, Ron. I don't know why it's so hard to say that. You can't drop something that's never active.

Z: Never an active matter.

K: It was a proposal which was rejected.

Z: That's the point. But was it ever brought to the President's attention?

K: No, because we rejected it.

Z: All right.

K: And---

Z: But we talked, we talked---I made the point clear to Rosenbaum that of course this afternoon we're trying to find out what's going on here. There were discussions between the White House and State Department. I think we should say that, don't you?

K: Well, we wanted to find out how he got the passport.

Z: Sure.

K: As far as we were concerned. I didn't talk to any of them after June. They talked to Taub and Hoffa to tell them both we were opposed to it.

Z: Right. In July?

K: No later than the middle of July.

*

- 2 -

Z: But you told them in June that we were opposed to it.

K: I told them to begin with that we were opposed to it but then they called back.

Z: You told them again we were.

K: I never talked to him again. Then he called back with this black-mailing proposition that if I didn't deal with him he would reveal that I had missed an opportunity to ________.

Z: You met with him in San Clemente in June, right?

K: That's right, but not knowing what he wanted.

Z: I made that point. OK, fine.

K: Good.

*

TELCONE

Foreign Minister Rabasa of Mexico/Kissinger

September 7, 1972 -- 7:12 p.m.

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, how are you?

R: This is Emilio Rabasa from Mexico.

K: I know, Mr. Foreign Minister. I just give you your title first.

R: Henry, you've been making a lot of traveling lately, no?

K: A lot of traveling. Lots of traveling.

R: Henry, what have you thought about what we talked the last time?

K: Well, the basic proposition is all right but there's that one problem which we discussed.

R: The side problem, no?

K: The what?

R: The side problem.

K: That's right.

R: The island.

K: Exactly.

R: Well, we're going to think it over. But in principle you're in accordance with our idea.

K: Yes, but

R: No?

K: The idea is good but we'd prefer it after the election simply because the schedule wouldn't permit it before.

R: You want the meeting or the announcement after.

*

- 2 -

K: The meeting certainly and perhaps the announcement, too.

R: All right. We'll think over what this lateral problem we can
do about it. I'll keep in touch with you.

K: Good. Emilio, I was sorry I couldn't make our last appointment.

R: No, I understand. You are a citizen of the world, you have to
make a lot of travels. I understand perfectly well, Henry.

K: I hope to see you when you next come up here.

R: Fine. Then I'll tell my President that in principle you are in
accordance. That this should be done after elections.

K: Right.

R: And that we'll get in touch with you before we make any kind of
announcement.

K: That's right. That would be helpful.

R: That's how you like it, no?

K: That's how I would like it, yes.

R: OK, Henry. Have a fine time and don't work too much.

K: Thank you, Emilio, you're a good friend.

R: Bye.

K: Bye.

Stewart Alsop/Kissinger
Re: the State of Russian Political Science?

By: K.M. W. NASHA Data: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Stewart Alsop/Kissinger

September 7, 1972 -- 7:48 p.m.

K: Stew?

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Stew, I had an answer to that question I asked our Russian friends.

A: Yes.

K: They would like me to bring a medical record along.

A: When do you leave, Henry.

K: I'm leaving Saturday morning.

A: Saturday morning, that gives us tomorrow.

K: Yes and that's why I'm so urgently asking you. They'd like you to know what type it is and the best of your knowledge of your doctor's knowledge; what treatment you've had and then they will tell me whether there is anything additional they can do. But it will be handled by their Minister of Health personally.

A: That's wonderful of you, Henry. I must say I really do appreciate that. I'm having a transfusion tomorrow and my doctor John Glick will be with me all morning.

K: You know, it doesn't have to be in excruciating detail just enough; well of course as much detail as possible.

A: I'm sure that John will do that with pleasure.

K: Right.

A: I really do appreciate it and I'll---

K: Not at all. He wasn't sure whether they were, in fact, treating it yet or whether they were still researching but he said it would go immediately to their Minister and that by the time I left they'd give me an answer. It might be that you'd have to go over there.

A: Well, anything is worth a wack, what?

*

- 2 -

K: Well, that's what I think.

A: Yes. I really do appreciate that and I will get on it right away.

K: Good, Stew, and by the end of the day tomorrow you will let me have it.

A: I will do that.

A: When do you get back or you don't know?

K: I'm going---I know but I may not tell you but it will be 14th or 15th.

A: And again thanks.

K: Not at all, Stew.

The following is a true report of
what may be said in a commercial
publicity ad?

By: KML
NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCORN

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 7, 1972

S: Henry.

K: That's it, you got the name right.

S: Good grief. Doctor, sir, I know you've had a really busy day but we're going to do a story about Al Haig and I'd just like to --

K: Well, he could never have achieved what he did without me.

S: (laughter) Okay. That's for sure, huh?

K: No, he's a great man.

S: A lot of people are saying, you know, does this mean Kissinger is apparatus is just being dissolved and that he is going to go next year. I tell them no but maybe I'm wrong.

K: Look, I have heard more stupid things. Some people are saying that this means that I'm not going next year because Haig was clearly going to be my successor. Now people are saying it means that I'm being dismantled and it therefore proves that I'm going to go. The fact of the matter is Haig is nearly replaceable. On the other hand if I kept him here much longer his military career would have been finished. Here was a great opportunity for him so with bleeding heart, enormous reluctance -- Let me say that I was not uninstrumental in getting him placed there so it isn't that he was taken away from me kicking and screaming. Nothing would have been easier for me -- It wouldn't have happened without me. And so it's the one clearly unselfish act of my Administration.

S: (laughter)

K: These are not to be quoted.

S: Okay. You know I always clean you up, Henry.

K: Well, certainly don't say my Administration.

S: Tell me, on Vietnam did he work closely with Abrams before. In other words when Abrams would report to the President, did he do that through Haig, through the NSC.

K: Well, Haig did not have a special channel. I mean, everything came through my office.

The President's Office of the Vice President
for Academic Affairs

*

TELCOM

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 7, 1972

By: K.L. V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

- 2 -

S: Right.

K: And the reports went in on the way but of course as a former military man I would take him particularly seriously.

S: Yeah. But I mean, does he have a pretty good working relationship with Abrams? Did Abrams ask for him or was Abrams consulted or how did it all work? I mean, so that I could say on my own.

K: You can say Abrams agreed.

S: Uh-huh. What about those other 240 generals? (laughter)

K: Those what?

S: Those other 240 generals that he jumped over?

K: Well, if they don't kill him before he gets sworn in, they have no choice.

S: Yeah, yeah, yeah. When are you going to name a replacement?

K: Well, he's going to stay until about November 1st.

S: I see.

K: And I will name a permanent replacement after my own decisions are clearer.

S: I see.

K: But I'm talking to people now.

S: I see, I see. Did Al talk to you about the possibility of me joining you on this trip of yours this weekend?

K: Yeah. Well, actually on the PR side, that is a decision that has to be made by Ziegler. Now, as I understand -- between us -- I mentioned it to Dobrynin and he tells me you don't have a bureau there. Is that right?

S: We have a bureau -- Of course we have a bureau.

K: Weren't you evicted from it?

S: No, no; that's not right. We have a guy there. I don't understand that at all.

TELCON

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 7, 1972

- 3 -

K: Well, his view was that if you had a bureau there, there would be no trouble.

S: Well, we have a bureau.

K: Is it Newsweek that got thrown out?

S: I don't know. I mean, I don't understand that. That's very strange behavior from him.

K: No, he wasn't uncooperative. Let me say this, if you go on your own, what would it involve?

S: Well, I mean, the idea would be -- well, what's happened is this. In the past people have gone with Connally and they haven't flown on the same plane with him but you know they've been in the same town and he's seen them at some point along the trip. And I just don't know how you are going to operate but it would seem --

K: Well, I've never done it before but -- would you quote me or would you just need it for background?

S: Well, you know, it's obvious that I could do it on background, I would think but you know -- I mean, let's be realistic. It would be done on background but it would also be obvious that I'm there and you're there. You know if I write something --

K: You know my point is that if you're in the posture of having gone alone -- If Ziegler tells you to go, I have no problem at all.

S: He said to talk to you.

K: If you go on your own, and if I don't officially know you are there until you get there and then you call the Embassy, I will see you once while I'm there.

S: Yeah, I see.

K: But how much that gets you I don't really know.

S: I don't know. The problem is I've also got to get a Russian visa quickly.

*

TELCONE

- 4 -

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 7, 1972

K: Yeah.

S: Let me make a quick call to our people tomorrow.

K: But it would have to be a gentlemen's agreement between you and me that you went entirely on your own and took your own chances.

S: Right, of course.

K: And that I then took pity on you.

S: Right, right.

K: But I might be willing to call Vorontsov -- Dobrynin has left tonight.

S: All right, okay.

K: And see whether they would expedite a visa for you.

S: Okay. That would be helpful, that would be helpful. I'll make some calls and I'll get back to --

K: I don't know whether it's really worth your while.

S: That's what I really want to discuss. I think it's a problem. Maybe it would be better to see you when you come back. But on the other hand, frankly, I think you know it's going to be a hell of a lot of interest in what you're doing. I think we are getting into the height of the campaign and I think it is important for us to show what you're doing and to kind of get away from the secrecy of this kind of a mission as much as you can under the circumstances.

K: Well, you couldn't be present at the meeting.

S: No, that's for sure.

K: I mean, I'm not sure they will have photographers even there. I guess they will have one picture.

S: Yeah. What about this situation in Germany? You going to be in Munich on Saturday and Sunday?

K: No, just on Sunday.

TELCONE

- 5 -

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 7, 1972

S: Just on Sunday. And then you fly to Moscow on Monday?

K: Right. And I'm not going to attend the Olympic Games. I am going to Munich to see -- the whole German government is there, and I'm going to see Brandt, Bahr and Scheel and Barzel and Strauss of the opposition and then I go straight on to Moscow.

S: I see.

K: Where I will be Sunday night. In effect, one night rest stop in Munich.

S: I see, I see. Does it look like you'll come back next week?

K: Oh, yeah, I'll be back by the end of the week.

S: I see because there was some question about that.

K: I don't know how long it takes from Ulan Bator but --

S: Yeah, I was going to say (laughter) -- Paris or Ulan Bator, huh?

K: Yeah.

S: Okay. In planning this I don't want to put you on the spot but --

K: No, I'll be back -- well, this trip is announced from the 10th to the 13th so you can assume I'll be back by Thursday or Friday at the very latest. You know, to give a little cushion.

S: Yeah, okay. Great, great. Thanks a lot, Henry.

K: Right.

S: Henry, I'll just use a quote here that he's -- that Kissinger described Haig as nearly indispensable or something like that.

K: Oh, yes.

S: Is there anything else you want to say on the record about him?

K: He is one of the outstanding military men that I have met with a broad view of political -- with a great awareness of political problems.

S: Yeah, good.

*

TELCONE

Ambassador Watson/Mr. Kissinger

9:17 p.m., September 7, 1972

- 2 -

K: I'm not at all a good friend. I'm selfish. I'm hoping you will ask
me to stop off at your residence --

W: Oh, for God's sakes! That goes without --

K: Not overnight, just in the interval between my meeting and going to
see Pompidou which will be at 5:30.

W: Wonderful. Now, when would you get there?

K: I won't get there until the morning.

W: Uh-huh.

K: So I can't stay with you but if you could arrange your day without
telling anybody so that you would be available say from 4:30 on in
your residence.

W: I'll be available all day my friend.

K: And then we'll go together to Pompidou.

W: That's great, that's terrific. You going to be on your way back or on
your way --

K: Yeah, I'll leave right afterwards unless my other meeting should be
prolonged.

W: Uh-huh.

K: In that case I would stay with you.

W: Well, just remember the door's open.

K: So, Dick, I just want you to know this.

W: I appreciate your calling me.

K: And I repeat nobody here knows anything about it except the President
of course and Haig so don't mention anything to your people there until
the announcement is made on the -- not on the 12th --

W: Well, I'm leaving here Sunday night, the 11th.

TELCORN

9:17 p.m., September 7, 1972

- 3 -

K: Well, no, the announcement will be made on the 13th, not on the 12th. It will be made on Tuesday.

W: Who are you going to use to replace Al?

K: No, it will be the 13th. My staff tells me it will be the 12th, it will be the 13th.

W: All right. I heard on the radio about Al Haig's appointment.

K: Yeah. I don't know how to replace Haig.

W: No, that's going to be a tough one.

K: It's going to be next to impossible.

W: You ought to get Dick Walters.

K: Oh, Jesus! No, he's too active.

W: Call me, Dick. (laughter) No, that's good for Al though; he deserves it.

K: Right.

W: All right, Henry.

K: Good, Dick, I'll see you then a week from tomorrow.

W: But let me know where I can pick you up and all that stuff.

K: No, no; I will get to your place.

W: All right.

K: You can take me to the airport.

W: Wonderful. And does George know you're going to come?

K: Oh, yes, that's all set.

W: So if I need any coordination, I can talk to him.

H. Hyland and Mr. Kissinger
the basis of a mutual
CONFIDENTIAL

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/13/94

TELCON

Bill Hyland/Mr. Kissinger

10:07 p.m., September 7, 1972

K: Bill, your boss managed to leave the country without leaving any Basic Documents with us that we know whether they are authentic on the trade business. Are you checked in on that?

H: Not too much but he left me a hell of a lot of stuff.

K: Well, he left me a hell of a lot of stuff too without the benefit of telling me what it was!

H: Yeah. I'll try and straighten it out.

K: I'll tell you we are going to have an authentic book or Sonnenfeldt is staying in Munich.

H: Yeah.

K: And if that means he's got to work tomorrow by long distance phone, that's his problem.

H: Yeah. Why don't I take what you have and compare it with what he left behind. I think everything that we have is authentic --

K: Look, I handed over a set of documents to the Russians. Now, I think that it is obvious that I cannot be in the position of their raising a question about a document which I don't have with me.

H: Yeah. We've got a copy of all of those.

K: Will you put together a book the very first thing in the morning tomorrow.

H: Yeah. But are there other things besides that one big package that we need?

K: Like what?

H: Well, were there other papers on shipping?

K: Well, there's a maritime agreement in there.

H: Well, we've got that but I mean, there's a single piece of paper that I stuck in that book.

K: Yeah, well, that I want along too.

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/13/94

- 2 -

TELCON
Bill Hyland/Mr. Kissing er
10:07 p.m., September 7, 1972

H: Yeah, we've got that.

K: And I handed that over to them.

H: Yeah, and we've got a copy of that in your book with that -- the other book -- the CSCE. You see, there's some stuff under the tab on economics in that Basic Book.

K: Well, I recognize that Sonnenfeldt wants to make me completely dependent on him but I am a lousey subject for that. Let me have the Basic Book please. I've never yet gone into a negotiation where I didn't dominate the subject.

H: Well, we'll put it all together for you in the morning then first thing. You do have a folder, is that right?

K: Yeah, but that's all crap. I need one big folder on economics thing.

H: Okay, okay.

K: I mean, I have to be at least up with the documents that I handed them.

H: Yeah. Well, we've got all of those.

K: Then I need that one-pager on shipping. I don't know what else I handed them today on economic matters, I don't think anything.

H: There was Principles, was the first document.

K: Which principles?

H: It's called, "Principles of Economic Relations", or something like that. It has different sections.

K: That's the Trade Agreement.

H: Yeah. That's on top.

K: Well, you put it together. I can't discuss it on the telephone.

H: I'll put it all together.

K: Yeah, principles, that is the first thing I handed over. Quite right.