that I had been considered for a project that "has not yet materialized, that there was no assurance that "anything definite would happen in the near future"; and that, therefore, I should make an application for school at Ritchie.

This was the only information I ever obtained, officially, re a possibility of my transfer to OSS. The answer I had received seemed entirely plausible to me at the time and not particularly disappointing, because by then I had the unusual satisfaction of being used throughout the Division as a lecturer on enemy order of battle, general indoctrination, and current events. I felt accepted and useful and very happy about my success as a lecturer. Although everybody in G-2 knew of my German background and the fact that my family was "over there", the issue was no longer mentioned. I had acquired a certain leadership among my fellow EM and the officers who knew of my personal and educational background seemed particularly understanding and benevolent. I did not apply for transfer to Camp Ritchie, but stayed with the G-2 Section of the Division for the next two years through training, combat and occupation duty in Germany. It is noteworthy that, against army custom, I remained in the G-2 Section, where I had been an EM, even after I had won a battlefield commission.

## Epilogue

7) Regarding the OSS there was, however, an epilogue. Through my lectures in the Division I had become known to the Division Commander General Bolling. In April 1944, before I left on a second furlough to Washington, the General, who must have been aware that there had been a question of my possibly being used by OSS, directed me, without any further comment, to report, during my furlough, to a Mr. Cheston at OSS. I actually saw Mr. Cheston, who seemed to hold a rather high position in the organization. The conversation was very short, since I did not want to say anything which might result in my being transferred out of my unit. Mr. Cheston then passed me on to a Capt. Little who, after having consulted certain files, merely asked me as to the whereabouts of my wife and child and then informed me that I had at one time been considered for possible transfer to OSS, but that any such transfer was impossible by now, since all Ground Forces personnel, to which category I belonged, was "frozen". This, too, seemed quite plausible to me, and I never again had any contacts with OSS either directly or indirectly.

8) In May 1944, after my return to Camp Claiborne, I reported my conversations with Mr. Cheston and Capt. Little to Gen. Bolling who, in the meantime, had been on leave in Washington himself. The General, thereupon, uttered a short remark from which it seemed to result that he had learned in Washington that OSS had actually been reluctant to ask for my transfer. He did not elaborate, of course, but assured me, when I showed some bewilderment, in the most unequivocal terms that the information he had obtained was not of a nature to reflect on my personal reliability.

lii

- 3 -

LQJ

lity, that his confidence in me was entirely unchanged, and that no shadow had been cast on me. Since my entire remaining time in the Army - 4 years - was in fact spent with Intelligence, since in particular I was made, in Jan 1946, Chief of the Research Dept. of our Theater Command Intelligence School in Germany, which involved custody of all current and special G-2 and CIC reports issued by higher and medium level Hqs in Europe, since moreover I held the latter position for 22 months until my 3 year overseas tour of duty had come to an end, I can only assume that the General's remarks contained a statement of fact and were made not merely to allay my bewilderment. Gen. Bolling is at present Deputy Director of Intelligence in the Dept of the Army.

9) In March 1945, when I wrote a letter to the Commanding General of the Third Army (Gen. Patton) asking that I be informed of the fate of my family with which I had not been in contact for years, but which I believed to be in the part of Germany then held by the Third Army, Gen. Bolling indorsed that letter in the following terms:

"1) A thorough investigation was made concerning Kraemer before this Division departed from the US. (Sept 1944).

"2) He is a member of the G-2 Section of this division (84th Inf) and has proved his loyalty beyond question. He has performed in his assignment in an outstanding manner both in the training phase of the division as well as in combat.

"3) It is requested, therefore, that all possible protection be furnished to his family and that any information obtained concerning their welfare be communicated to Sgt. Kraemer."

10) In reference to the above remark that I was thoroughly investigated before the 84th Inf Div. departed for Europe in Sept 1944 the following might be mentioned:

When I was questioned by Post Intelligence Camp Ritchie, before I became a citizen and before I was assigned to the Interrogators course, I was informed that someone had reported from Camp Lee, my induction center, that I received letters from Germany and that I had declared myself unwilling to fight against Italy and Germany. At that time, when the facts were still ascertainable, it had been possible for me to show that I had received but one letter from Germany since Pearl Harbour, a letter smuggled out of Germany by a Swedish engineer, and that I had turned over this letter to a certain official in the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington, because it contained some information of interest to that Agency. I had also been able to prove that the person having reported the alleged remark had simply misunderstood a statement that I had already made in the official Army questionnaire, which I had to complete before I was accepted by the Army in spite of my alien enemy status. Since that questionnaire and the statement were part of my Army personnel file and since, obviously, Post Intelligence Ritchie

- 4 -

had been able to re-question the person who had reported my
alleged remark from Camp Lee, the matter could be clarified
at the time without difficulty, with the result that I actual-
ly was assigned a few days later to the course for German lan-
guage Interrogators.

11) Although the Camp Lee report was never mentioned later, I was nevertheless questioned by CIC Camp Claiborne, before the Division left for Europe, regarding my willingness to fight in Germany. I, then stated, in writing, that I knew better perhaps than most other men what dictatorship meant and why this war was being fought and that with my conservative and military (father an officer) background I would probably perform my duties at least as well as others. I do feel that I was later able to prove the sincerity of that statement in combat. It would seem, however, from General Bolling's indorsement to my letter to General Patton that there was also a thorough CIC investigation before it was actually decided that I could leave with the Division for Germany.

## Conclusions

I) It is possible that in the winter of 1943/44 the OSS, which may or may not actually have considered requesting my transfer to their organization, was reluctant to do so for reasons other than those officially communicated to me, which reasons were of an entirely plausible and harmless nature.

II) On the basis of my own long Intelligence experience I consider it not unlikely that in Jan 1944 they might have been indeed unwilling for security reasons, to use me in their organization.

1) I had been an alien enemy until less than 6 months ago.

2) My family (father, mother, wife and son) were in Germany.

3) My father, although an old man at the time and violently conservative and Anti-Nazi, had been a German officer.

4) I did not belong to the religion persecuted by the Nazis which made my case somewhat less clear than that of other German citizens who had recently come to this country.

5) I clearly held conservative and tradionalist views and expressed marked skepticism regarding the Eastern dictatorship, an attitude which, at that time, was sometimes considered as an indication of suspicious leanings.

6) Although I had left Germany at the age of 25, a few weeks after Hitler had come into power, my actual reliability from the US point of view as far as Germany was concerned had yet to be proven. Since it had not yet been proven at that time there was some reason to proceed with caution in regard to an individual whose entire family was still in Germany.

III) In the 6 years between 1943 and today certain facts have been added to the record.

I served in the US Army for altogether 5 years (May 1943 - Feb 1948) all of which, with the exception of the first few weeks, in Intelligence. Three of these 5 years were spent in Germany in Combat or on occupation duty. During the last 1½ years (July 1948 to present) I have held civilian position of Economic + Political Advisor in the Office Under Secretary of the Army. It so happened that in this position, again, I had to deal exclusively with German affairs. It must have become clear, in the meantime, whether apart from some understanding for and a deep interest in matters concerning Germany I have shown any personal love or hatred for that country impairing my reliability and usefulness from the US point of view.

- 6 -

When I became a civilian I remained in the MI active Reserve, where I lecture regularly to large groups on current events, especially German and Eastern problems. These lectures held in the Auditorium of the State Dept. have been attended by several hundred trained Intelligence men and must have supplied a rather clear picture of my attitude and convictions.

As regards my family the facts are as follows:

My **father** died several years before the end of the war.

My **mother**, a permanent resident of the U.K., where she has lived since 1947 with my only **brother** - I have no sisters - has already booked passage for the US and application for a preferential quota immigration visa has been made. My wife (Swedish subject) and our two small children came to this country with me when I returned from overseas duty. The required 2 years residence before naturalization will have elapsed on Oct. 20, 1949. Her naturalization will confer US citizenship on our **son** (British subject) and a **daughter** (stateless).

Adoléod Sept 1950

My mother came to the United States in March 1950, she immediately filed a Declaration of Intention and in June of this year received her "First Papers". My mother lives with me and my family at my Washington address, 4319 Eensenden St. N.W.

My wife, also living with me at the above address, became a US citizen on 8 Aug 1950.

Her naturalization conferred citizenship on our children, both under 16 years of age (sm 12½ year old, daughter 4 years old).

- 7 -

8 February 1950

Sir,

You very kindly permitted me to inform you of the answer I
would receive from CIA regarding the long pending question of my
possible employment with that agency. The answer has now arrived
in form of a letter, a copy of which you will find enclosed.

Although negative in substance the notification is very
friendly in form. I would consider it completely satisfactory,
if it were not for the fact that in 1943 the OSS, predecessor of
CIA, wrote me a somewhat similar letter, while at the same time
they informed my Division Commander that there were other reasons
why my employment with OSS seemed undesirable. I have always ful-
ly understood this decision by OSS, because, at that time, my en-
tire family lived in enemy territory and because my loyalty had
not yet been proven. Nevertheless, had I been, by chance, in a
division other than the 84th or had the division been commanded
by a different officer, the rejection by OSS would have been an
extremely serious matter for my entire future in the army and be-
yond. AS a matter of fact, this rejection by OSS in 1943 was du-
ly brought up again in 1949 when, in connection with my applica-
tion, the CIA checked old files.

There are indications that, as a result of the FBI full field
investigation undertaken in respect to all CIA candidates, the
CIA has no doubts about my loyalty. It may be that there was me-
rely a question in the mind of the top personalities at CIA as to
whether, as a matter of general policy, a naturalized citizen
should be given comparatively so high a position (GS14) in so sen-
sitive an agency. I would not in any way either directly or in-
directly argue the wisdom of this line of thinking. I am very
genuinely disturbed, however, by the thought that the negative
outcome of my dealings with CIA might follow me, henceforth, like
a shadow and prove a blemish on my record all the more difficult
to remove, because nobody would ever openly mention it.

Questionnaires for important jobs for which I might apply in
the future, will always contain the question: "Have you ever been
investigated before?" In supplying the information that I was in-
vestigated in connection with an application for employment with
CIA I would either have to disclose the unfavorable fact that,
subsequently, I was not accepted by CIA or else, if I were to omit
in my answer the reason for the investigation, it would arouse
suspicion that in 1949, while holding the position of political
adviser in the Office Under Secretary of the Army, I was suddenly
subjected to a full field investigation.

-I-

["- I -", "applied to a full time investigation.", "applier in the Office Under Secretary of the Army. I was engaged\nin a situation that in 1949, while holding the position of boffit\nin my answer, the reason for the investigation, if I were to omit\ninadequately, I was not accepted by OIV or else, if I were so out\nof OIV I would either leave to diaclose the multivendorie that must\ninvestigate before?\" In addition the information that I was in-\nthe name, will also contain the question: \"Have you ever been\n创造awares for important jobs for which I might add my\n\nTo remove, because nobody would ever operatively want you if\na person such as above a person on my record will the more sufficient\noutcome of my getting with OIV might follow me, because of the\nGenuinely statempe, however, that the thought that the negative\nguys are true, the reason of this fine of drinking. I am certain\nof this given combination so far as possible (0214) in so se-\naunder, as a matter of general benefit, a written statement of\nrefers to a question in the mind of the job bemanufactured at OIV as so\nOIV was no doubt about my knowledge. It was due that there was no\ninquiry into the matter to find out OIV candidate's, the\n\nThere are indications that, as a result of the BRI full time\n\nfor, the OIV checked off titles.\nI'll suggest mb again in 1949 when, in connection with ml abbi-\nlong. As a matter of fact, this rejection pl O22 in 1943 was un-\nforeverly a serious matter for my entire future in the Army and so\npl a different officer, the rejection pl O22 would have been an\nopposition other than the 8th or 13th the divisional peew commended\nnot let any person broken. Nevertheless, I feel, pl chance, in a\ntime I will flag in enemy territory, and because ml knowledge\nis the law of life, I feel I am, pl chance, in a\

Whether there is any way out of this dilemma I do not know.
The problem, certainly, is not an economic one. I feel more or
less confident that there will be other positions for me, even
should the Intelligence field, unfortunately, remain closed.
But I do not know, how I will ever be able to prove later that
my failure with CIA had no ominous implications.

Basically I disapprove of my turning to you with such a
personal problem, which is of no importance except to the indi-
vidual egotistically concerned. This explains why I waited two
weeks before transmitting the enclosed notification.

I am most sincerely thankful, however, that you gave me
permission to discuss my problem with you.

Gratefully yours

- II -

- II -

Gratefully yours

beseeching to grace me with your love.
I am most sincerely thankful, however, that you gave me
weeks before transmitting the enclosed message.

Argue et agotisatiel concerne. This explains why I waited two
hearts and a half problem, which is no inconsiderable except to the in-
ferior problem. I grasp the idea of my thinking to you with all a
whisper.

My life is with you always and no one can question it.

But I do not know, how I will ever be able to prove later that
strong the intelligence tied, unfortunately, remains intact.

These confident that there will be other opportunities for me, even
the problem, certainly, is not an economic one. I feel more or
whether there is any way out of this difficulty I do not know.

February 1951

FREEDOMIA

The preservation of the freedom, human rights, and civilization cherished by the Western World, particularly Western Europe and North America, is not and probably cannot be assured by international alliances and by international organizations. The United Nations Organization is inadequate as now constituted. Because of immediate threats posed by an aggregation which is directed from the Kremlin and the inadequacy of the UNO and of alliances of Western Nations to meet these threats, a federal government of a union of these Western nations is needed now. When the present paramount menace to freedom and western civilization is reduced to manageable proportions, such a federal government should be continued to provide for the common welfare and defense of its component nation communities. The non-Communist nations of Western Europe and North America should now relinquish some elements of their full sovereignty to the suggested federal government. This aggregation and federal union is hereinafter called Freedomia. The government envisaged is one, with its rights and activities limited to matters of common concern among its component communities, under which there will be effectively reserved for the respective jurisdictions of component nations and states matters which concern solely an individual component nation or state.

## Immediate Threats

The greatest immediate threat to individual freedom and to Western civilization is from the U.S.S.R. and its Satellites and associates. These include the Communist Party organizations which are guided from

the Kremlin but are located outside the U.S.S.R. and its Satellite countries. This aggregation which is led from the Kremlin is hereinafter called Sovietrani. The military might of this aggregation alone is sufficient to make an unreasonably dangerous risk of the continuance of independent direction and maintenance of separate national armed forces by each Western nation, such as France, Canada, or the United States. This military might of Sovietrani overshadows that of the Western countries, including North America, in terms of numbers of mobilized and trained fighting personnel, of artillery pieces, and of military aircraft, particularly aircraft in service. Its submarine fleet is at near parity or better in comparison with the combined undersea fleets of the Western nations. The U.S.S.R. is reported to have a number of atomic bombs in a stockpile which is growing. It is presumed that the capacity to produce atomic missiles in Sovietrani, particularly the U.S.S.R., is being enlarged under priority schedules.

Momentum is with Sovietrani. The aggressive endeavors of Sovietrani have a background of thirty-odd years of success beginning with the establishment of the U.S.S.R. by the Bolsheviks in 1917 (formally in 1923). By military occupation and by political and social subversion, especially during and after World War II, Sovietrani has been enlarged from the original U.S.S.R. and the then existing Communist Parties. Currently the additional increments include the remainder of Slavic Europe less Yugoslavia; major areas of Austria, Germany, and Finland; the remaining areas of Central and Eastern Asia less Japan, Formosa, and part of Korea; and additional strength of Communist Parties

- 2 -

by Sovietrani even though the latter establishes temporary control
over some additional manpower and land area. If the manpower of
Freedom is mobilized and trained in accordance with the available
assets of knowledge and material and spiritual resources, it should more
than match any deployment of the hordes of Sovietrani. Freedom's
manpower numbers, of course, would be considerable. The economic
resources of Freedom are overwhelmingly greater than those of
Sovietyrani. Only in raw material resources is there a semblance of
comparability. In capital accumulation, particularly in terms of material
devices and installations for performing work, the advantage of Freedom
is extreme. Freedom's assets of "know-how" and of processes of acquiring and effectively applying new knowledge greatly exceed those of
Sovietyrani. The political and spiritual background and present situation of Freedom--except possibly excessive fondness for complete sovereignty of component nations--provides inspiration, versatility, and
mobility highly favorable to effective application of material and human
resources. Freedom could function in accordance with the needs for
each separate endeavor with much less fear of deviation from fates of
central leadership than is the case of Sovietrani. Historical developments over the past two thousand years are sufficient to show the extent
of the great reservoir of leadership available to Freedom. Surely if
this leadership be unified, it can, with the resources potentially available to its direction, find ways and means of dealing with threats posed
by Sovietrani.

What to Do

The most probable reasons for the present aggressive efforts of

-4-

conditions exist now and will continue to persist, even though
Sovietyrani is defeated militarily, which are favorable to the exist-
ence and growth of organizations comparable to the present Communist
parties that are subservient to the Kremlin. Conditions favorable to
such developments must be continually kept under attack in order that
any such menace to the freedom and civilization of the Freedomia na-
tions does not remain or become great. The vast populations of China,
India, and elsewhere in Asia are in the process of dynamic economic,
social, and political changes. Change, of course, is not restricted
to these areas and exists to a high degree in the nations of Freedomia.
Industrial and scientific evolution is driving the world toward a type
of single community. Progress in transportation and communication has
been giving impetus to this trend over many years. Discovery and
application of means of producing atomic fission have unleashed forces
whose impacts as yet are imperfectly known. They were sufficient in
power, however, to lead the United States and Great Britain to propose
relinquishing aspects of their national sovereignty to a supra-
national body which would control and direct the fissioning of atomic
materials. These nations were ready to relinquish these aspects of
national sovereignty even though not more than two years earlier they
were insistent on the retention of the veto prerogative in the
Security Council of the United Nations. With an intensification of
the dynamic nature of human life, more powerful and effective political
and social instruments and organizations are needed. They are needed
to provide maximum assurance that past attainments of individual human
freedom and rights and of the civilization which characterizes Western

- 8 -

Europe and North America may be preserved. The establishment and support of the proposed Freedomia federal government would constitute one of the required developments.

The costs of establishing the proposed Freedomia government would include relinquishing some of the elements of complete sovereignty now enjoyed by the present Freedomia nations individually. Some particular groups in these nations as they are now constituted might lose considerably in terms of political and social status and economic advantage. It is not believed, however, that any of the nations as a whole would lose from the economic and social points of view, particularly over any extended period of time. The advantages of a large market, for example, are illustrated in the great single market that is provided by the United States for all of the people of its component states. In contrast, Western Europe provides comparatively restricted marketing opportunities because of its being fragmentized in many relatively small national markets. These restrictions on the size of the market in Western Europe limits the productivity of the population and its standard of living.

Great efforts have been made over the past 35 years to establish international organizations and methods of accomplishing objectives common to many nations. The League of Nations and the United Nations are the chief examples, but a more effective type of organization than these attempts is required to obtain the needed results. The proposed Freedomia federal government appears the logical next step in the evolutionary process toward a more desirable and perhaps inevitable kind of governmental organization which is needed to meet the

- 9 -

inclusion of more nations as practicable arrangements could be made and
to provide eventually a central federal government for the whole globe.

NOTE: No immediate radical change in the organizational character of
the United Nations Organization would be required by the establishment
of Freedomia. The votes of its component nations, of course, would be
cast as a bloc. Should the Freedomia federal government grow to serve
the entire globe, the functions of the UNO could be gradually transformed
and transferred.

NOTE: The Freedomia government suggested here would foster and encourage
within its component communities the fullest practicable operation of
democratic principles—the greatest degree of freedom of individual choice
among the people compatible with the general welfare and with the protection
of certain rights held to be inalienable from an individual person except
by due process of law. Accordingly, Freedomia would have as enemies and
dangers to its being and objectives governments which exist chiefly for
the benefit of those who govern, as well as organizations which exist
for the purpose of benefiting an elite group (the members of the organi-
zation and particularly its officials), at the expense of the general
public.

- 11 -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE NOMINEE

HEADQUARTERS, INSTALLATION OR ACTIVITY: Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, U. S. Army

NAME: Dr. F. G. A. Kraemer

AGE: 48

GRADE: GS-15

## 1. Present Assignment:

"Supervisory Foreign Affairs Officer". A senior advisor within the Army Staff on political, psychological, legal and sociological questions relating to presence of US forces abroad. Required: Most comprehensive knowledge of political science, international law and relations, and of actual developments in countries where US forces are, or may be, deployed. On basis of familiarity with pertinent intelligence and with US military and foreign policy objectives he advises on and recommends policies, plans and specific actions in the very extensive area of his concern.

## 2. Previous Related Experience:

a. Economic and Political Advisor (International) in Office Assistant Secretary of the Army (1943-50).

b. Expert on Non-Conventional Economic Warfare in National Security Resources Board (1950-51).

c. Indonesia/Thailand Desk Officer ECA-MSA-FOA (1951-53).

d. Chief, Research Department, European Command Intelligence School (1946-47).

e. Legal Adviser on staff of League of Nations' International Institute for Unification of Law" at Rome, Italy (1935-39).

## 3. Demonstrated Potential for Advancement:

Dr. Kraemer has performed exceptionally well in very varied assignments of considerable responsibility. Reached GS-15 grade after 5 years government service. His forcefulness, conscientiousness, extreme intelligence, superior ability to bring to a logical conclusion complex political, economic and legal problems have been attested to with telling persistence by his civilian and military superiors and earned him in this office a recommendation for Outstanding Performance Rating.

## 4. Capability of Adjusting Readily to a Variety of Substantive Fields and Ability to Master Complex Subject Matter:

Dr. Kraemer has proved himself in 4 separate fields: Political Science, Law, Economics, Languages. Trained to be a lawyer, he actually spent years in scholarly legal and political science research, writing

Studies in German, French and Italian; then he served with the Army, mainly in Intelligence assignments; finally he held positions not in one but in quite a number of government agencies. Because of his recognized competence and reputation his services, even where not in the field of his official responsibility, are continuously requested by other agencies. His excellent staff work is uniformly commended. Particularly notable: his contributions to development of the complex Contractual Agreements with Germany, and of the Presidential Directive for the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands; a 50 page staff study on Economic Warfare Measures in case of War in Europe; a comprehensive analysis of the new German Constitution for the US High Commissioner in Germany.

## 5. Demonstrated Teamwork Ability:

While serving with ECA/USA, Kraemer was selected to represent that agency permanently on SEAsia Panel of Psychological Strategy Board. While not a member of any formal panel in his present position, his tasks require closest day by day liaison and coordination with very numerous other agencies (particularly DCSOPS, OASA (CHA), OSD (ISA), Department of State). Highly articulate, of rare persuasive powers and yet congenial and sincere he has proved quite exceptionally successful in nearly always gaining his points and at the same time establishing good will for this office and for himself.

## G. Miscellaneous:

Kraemer holds two Dr. degrees: Dr. of Law, University of Frankfort (Germany), Dr. of Political Science, University of Rome (Italy). Studied (1926-31 and 1933-34) law, political science, economics at Swiss, UK, German, Italian Universities. Received two annual grants (1941-42) from American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia for his project of a Handbook on "Parliaments and Parliamentary Government in Europe (1814-1914)". Is much in demand as a dynamic lecturer and conductor of seminars. In first two months of 1957 he lectured to CIA personnel on "German Political Traditions" and "Problem of German Reunification", to Staff and Faculty of Signal School Fort Monmouth on "Current International Situation"; to Faculty and Students Navy Pre-Flight School Pensacola on "Soviet Political Strategy in Post-Stalin Area"; to DCSOPS Hub Des Det on "Recent Trends in France, Italy, and UK".

Lt Col, USAR with Mobilization Assignment in DCSOPS IPPD

Languages: Fluent German, Italian, French.

## 7. Basic Minimum Requirements:

Career appointment. Competitive status (substantially continuous creditable service from 4-23-51 to 10-30-55). TOP SECRET clearance. Dr. Kraemer desires to attend the Army National War College and will remain with DOD actively for at least three years after course completion, if selected.

Henry A. Kissinger
255 East Boylston Street
Watertown, Mass.

August 5, 1951

Lt. Col. William R. Kintner
800 N. Caroline Avenue S.E.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Kintner:

On the occasion of our recent conversation you indicated that
SECURITY
certain questions had been raised regarding the sincerity of Dr. F.C.A. Kraemer,
4319 Fessenden Street, Washington, D.C. You suggested that I might assist your
evaluation by describing my impression based on an acquaintance dating from
1944. I am only too happy to do so.

I do not mean, by this letter, to criticize your security procedures.
Having been connected with the Counter-Intelligence Corps, US Army for seven
years, with a present Mobilization Designation at the C.I.C CENTER, Fort
Holabird, Md., I am well aware of the complexity of your problem. I fully
understand the necessity of the most careful scrutiny, the impossibility of
taking any chances, the merit of erring on the side of severity.

If I write you in spite of this, it is because there does not exist
the slightest doubt in my mind regarding Dr. Kraemer's loyalty or integrity.
I do so, because the nature of Dr. Kraemer's background makes an analysis of
his motivation the key to a complete evaluation of his loyalty. Even the most
careful investigator, however, frequently finds difficulties in establishing
these psychological intangibles. My long acquaintance with Dr. Kraemer, which
enabled me to observe him at various stages of his career have permitted me to
form a rather complete picture of his character, his purposes and his abilities.

to form a manner complete picture of the character, his purposes and his utilities.
ensured we to operate him at various stages of his career have permitted me to
these behavioral influences. As long as correspondence with Dr. Kraemer, which
certainly investigator, however, frequently lingers difficulties in establishing
his motivation the key to a complete evaluation of his work. Even the most
I go so, becomes the nature of Dr. Kraemer's background makes an outline of
the earliest days in my mind regarding Dr. Kraemer's work or indirectly.
If I write him in some of his, it is because there goes not exist
taking such chances, the merit of earning on the side of several.

undertaking the necessary of the most careful scrutiny, the impossibility of
Hospice, etc. I am well aware of the complexity of his problem. I wish
years, with a present modification designation at the C.I.C. Center. Past
Having been connected with the Comer-Intelligence Corps, I had much for several
I do not want, by this letter, to elaborate his security procedures.
1944. I am only too glad to do so.

evaluation of describing his impression based on an acquaintance dating from
4213 Messrs. Street, Washington, D.C. You are pleased that I might feel free to
certain questions had been raised regarding the absence of Dr. E.C.R. Kraemer.

Dear Colleague Kühnen:

New York, D.C.
800 N. Caroline Avenue 2-82
Mr. Cef. William R. Kühnen

Volume 2, No. 1987

Waterford, N.Y.
222 East College Street
Henry V. Kiehne

-2-

I have known Dr. Kraemer since 1944 when we both served in the G-2 Section of the 84th Infantry Division. In 1946 I joined the faculty of the European Command Intelligence School where Dr. Kraemer headed the Research Department. Though I returned to the US in 1947 and have been connected with Harvard University both as student and instructor since that time, I have had frequent opportunity to observe Dr. Kraemer's career in Washington and to talk to him personally. In this whole period nothing ever came to my attention to cast any reflection on his loyalty to the US. I realize the difficulties presented to the investigator by the unusualness of Dr. Kraemer's personality and the complexity of his background. By the same token, these features prevent the application of the usual security criteria and put a premium on the proper understanding of Dr. Kraemer's motivation. In attempting this I have sought to consider what objections might have been raised to Dr. Kraemer from a security point of view. Only two could be brought up, to my knowledge, by casual acquaintances:

a. That Dr. Kraemer's German background together with certain events in his army career raise the presumption of continued loyalties to his native country.

b. That Dr. Kraemer's personality taken in conjunction with his background, brings into question his attachment to US principles of democracy.

I shall deal with these problems separately in the light of my personal observation of Dr. Kraemer's actions.

a. **Dr. Kraemer's Background and Possible Continued Attachment to his native Country:** The best procedure for dealing with this argument seems to consist of a description of Dr. Kraemer's actions during the period of our

consent of a description of Dr. Kraemer's actions during the period of em-
ployment contract. The past procedure for dealing with this matter seems to
be.

a. Dr. Kraemer's Background and Possible Continued Attachment to his
department operations of Dr. Kraemer's actions.

I will deal with these problems separately in the light of my
background, principles into question his attachment to US branches of commerce.
b. That Dr. Kraemer's personality shown in conjunction with his peo-
philiac commt.

in his and career relate the background of continued facilities to his
a. That Dr. Kraemer's German background together with certain events
so could be prominent, so to what knowledge, if any, can I conclude?

I might have been related to Dr. Kraemer whom a security point of view
motivation. In attempting this I have sought to consider what objections
critique and but a brevium on the broader understanding of Dr. Kraemer's
some token, these theories prevent the application of the same security
of Dr. Kraemer's personality and the complexity of his background. In the
I realize the difficulties presented to the investigator by the unusualness
ever come to my attention to meet his reflection on his behalf to the US.

Administration and to talk to him personally. In this whole period nothing
time. I have had regular opportunities to operate Dr. Kraemer's career in
connected with Harvard University both as student and instructor since the
Research Department. Though I returned to the US in 1947 and have been
of the European Command Intelligence School where Dr. Kraemer helped the
G-8 Section of the 84th Intelligence Division. In 1948 I joined the staff of
I have known Dr. Kraemer since 1944 when we both served in the

acquaintance. When I met Dr. Kraemer he was engaged in giving speeches to the personnel of the 84th Division as part of the Troop Information Program. His particular topic included the discussion of German problems. None of the speeches I heard over a period of 18 months contained any indication of pro-German tendencies. On the contrary, Dr. Kraemer's favorite thesis involved the insistence on the necessity of the war and the importance of tough and complete commitment. It must be emphasized that this insistence on discipline and on the need for awareness of the American mission in Europe continued throughout the period of occupation when the aftermath of the war saw a relaxation of the general effort. At a time when it became increasingly fashionable to consider Germany's superior technological achievement as the guarantee of pro-American sentiments, Dr. Kraemer tirelessly, both in the 84th Infantry Division and at the European Command Intelligence School, emphasized the importance of security consciousness and of a cautious, pragmatic approach to the German problem.

Dr. Kraemer, however, did not confine himself to the role of educator. When the 84th Infantry Division was slated to go to Europe, Dr. Kraemer successfully resisted efforts to keep him in the US. During combat, Dr. Kraemer frequently exposed himself to dangers beyond the call of his duties in the G-2 section. I am thinking particularly of a reconnaissance mission during the most fluid situation of the Battle of the Bulge and of his role in the capture of the city of Bielefeld for which he received a battlefield commission.

These exploits become all the more meaningful if it is realized that Dr. Kraemer's wife and son were at that time living in Germany. The consciousness of their peril weighed heavily on his mind, though it did not, to my

nose of his pair barb weighed heavily on his wing, though it did not, so much

Dr. Kraemer's wife and son were at that time living in Germany. The concierge-

These exploits became all the more meaningly to him, as it resulted that
character of the officer of Bielefeld for whom he received a patiiently commission.
the most lying situation of the Battle of the Ruhr end of the role in the
G-2 section. I am thinking particularly of a reconnaissance mission giving
thoroughly explicit himself to dunces behind the front of his duties in the
succession resented efforts to keep him in the US. During combat, Dr. Kraemer
when the 84th Infantry Division was led to Go to Ebro, Dr. Kraemer

Dr. Kraemer, however, did not continue himself to the role of colonel.
was of a castor, brusquely abhorred to the German troops.

Command Intelligence School, emphasized the importance of security, consciousness, therefore, put in the 84th Infantry Division and at the Ebroan
scientific achievement as the Guarantee of Pro-American interests. Dr.
a time when it became increasingly desirable to consider Germany's elaboration
when the alternative of the war saw a relaxation of the General effect. At
American mission in Brode continued throughout the period of accommodation
that this insistance on discipline and on the need for awareness of the
due importance of firm and complete commitment. It must be emphasized
special interest involved the instance on the necessity of the war and
injunction of pro-German agencies. On the contrary, Dr. Kraemer's
none of the above Iرد over a period of 10 months confined and
program. His behavior later also indicated the discussion of German troops.
to the personnel of the 84th Division as part of the Troop Information
conductance. When I met Dr. Kraemer he was engaged in giving above

-2-

-4-

observation, affect his actions. It may account however for certain episodes, which in his view might have needlessly jeopardized their safety. I consider it very likely that his reluctance to fight against Germany expressed on an unclassified Selective Service questionnaire stems from these motives. His subsequent military record would tend to support this conclusion. Dr. Kraemer's activities as Political Advisor to the Undersecretary of the Army and in the NSRB did not to my knowledge give any cause for doubting his attachment to the US. For these reasons I believe that Dr. Kraemer's security status is not jeopardized by his German background.

**b. Dr. Kraemer's Personality:** Dr. Kraemer is without doubt an unusual and extraordinary individual with many unorthodox characteristics. His manner of dress and speech, coupled with a dynamic and somewhat flamboyant personality make a dispassionate evaluation exceedingly difficult. I believe it quite possible that these traits may lead to an ambiguous interpretation by casual acquaintances. I consider them however, the characteristics of a rugged individualist, certain of his values and indifferent to the appreciation of the environment. Dr. Kraemer is, to be sure, a conservative. This is not a token of lack of appreciation of democratic principles, however. On the contrary, Dr. Kraemer's strong belief in the dignity of the individual, defended with great moral fervor, offers to my mind the best assurance of his attachment to US principles of democracy. Indeed, I believe it fair to state that Dr. Kraemer is a conservative just because he feels that the levelling tendencies of the age limit the possibility of individual responsibility. Moreover, from a security point of view I would consider Dr. Kraemer's

Moreover, from a security point of view I would consider Dr. Kraemer's
tenderness to the age limit the bostalgity of individual reasonableness.
that Dr. Kraemer is a conservative that because he tele that the levelling
attachment to US principles of democracy. Indeed, I believe it is right to state
deliberated with Great majority Labor offers to make the past issuance of his
On the contrary, Dr. Kraemer's strong belief in the dignity of the individual.
This is not a token of lack of appreciation of democratic principles, however.
pation of the environment. Dr. Kraemer is, to me, a conservative.
a robust individualist certain of his aims and indigent to the abstract
pluralist consensus. I consider them forever, the characteristics of
it quite desirable that these traits may lead to an unignificant interpretation
democratically make a dispassionate evaluation exceedingly difficult. I believe
manner of these and above, combined with a chance and somewhat random
and extraordinarily individualist with whom nothing characteristic. His

p. Dr. Kraemer's personality: Dr. Kraemer is without doubt an exceptional

not teetered by his German background.
the US. For these reasons I believe that Dr. Kraemer's security status is
in no way did not to my knowledge give any cause for suspecting his attachment to
activities as Political Advisor to the Undersecretary of the War and in the
immediate将来 would tend to arborize this conclusion. Dr. Kraemer's
unofficious subjective service questionnaire shows from these motives. His
it is very likely that his reference to light against Germany expressed on an
which in his view might have necessarily teetered his selection. I consider
observation, allows his reasons. It may account for certain episodes.

-4-

traditionalist tendencies and code of honor the best assurance for the
strictest adherence to the letter and spirit of his oath of allegiance.

I have confined myself in the previous paragraphs to dealing
with those aspects of Dr. Kraemer's make-up that might involve security
considerations. During my acquaintance with him I have not become aware
of any others. I should like to repeat that I have had no occasion to
doubt his loyalty or integrity. I know that my view is shared by many
responsible individuals who have had a chance to observe Dr. Kraemer
including Major General Alexander Bolling, A G of SG - 2 US Army.

I do not know whether a review of Dr. Kraemer's case will
prove possible. If it does, I hope that this letter will assist your
evaluation.

Henry V. Kieferling

Sincerely yours,

conclusion.

above before. It is done. I do hope that this letter will further hom

I do not know whether a review of Mr. Kieferling's case will
including Major General Vierlingen Belling, A O at 2 0 - S U2-Van.
reasonable individuals who have had a chance to operate Mr. Kieferling
give his truth or falsity. I know that Mr. Vierlingen is sure of his own
and others. I should like to repeat that I have had no occasion to
considerations. During my acquaintance with him I have not become aware
with these effects of Mr. Kieferling's make-up that might involve security
I have continued while in the previous correspondence to continue

arbitrator's attention and code of honor the best assurance to the
tradition of fidelity to the letter and spirit of the contract of affiance.

-P-

Lt. Col. William R. Kintner

20 November 1951 - 2

It requires no extended argument to show that the present situation
meets none of these conditions. The classic balance of power presupposed a
subtlety of conception and a determinacy of calculations to be applied on a
world-wide scale only with extreme difficulty. The second and third condition
could be better phrased by saying that before you can have a balance of power
there must be power to be balanced. The balancer must not himself be part of
the equilibrium, except to tip the scale. Above all, policy must be conceived
as a continuing process, with war as merely an instrument for the achievement
of determinate objectives. The balance of power is incompatible with the
assertion of absolute values. There is a beautiful quote by Churchill on this,
but I cannot lay my hands on it at the moment.

I quite agree with you that the balance of power is a doctrine of
self-limitation. Maybe Europe will recover its morale and provide an inde-
pendent force. Possibly the emergent East will provide another center of
power. If so, the United States should play in relation to Eurasia the tra-
ditional role of an island power towards a land-mass - to prevent the consoli-
dation of that continent under a single rule. At the moment the United States
is not a balancer but a direct contestant on a world-wide scale; and, moreover,
not by choice. The limitation of the balance of power was not achieved within
the concert of powers, but through the national strategy of a power which con-
trolled the balance. Moreover the balance of power did not prevent wars; it
only limited them by the consciousness that the balancer would never permit a
single power or group of powers to become so much stronger that a shift of
sides could not redress the balance. In relation to the U.S.S.R. we play the
role of a nation within the balance. Therefore any limitations must be self-
limitations, not even achieved by the classic balance of power and, indeed,
contradicting the reasons for its existence. It would be strain enough on
U.S. wisdom to be suddenly projected into Britain's traditional role. But a
more awful responsibility awaits us. The injection of an ideological element
into policy makes self-limitation an almost unattainable ideal. Policy begins
to be conceived as the means of an absolute attitude, not as the definition
of continuing relation. In the inevitable atmosphere of distrust each side
tends to play for absolute security, which means absolute insecurity (i.e.,
neutralization) of its opponent. This would be true even if only one side
were to introduce the ideological element.

I know there is a tendency to point to the religious toleration fol-
lowing the wars of the Reformation as a possible substitute for ideological
conflict. But surely the significant point is that this balance was achieved
only after a Thirty-Year's War.

But I do not think this period will follow the pattern of the 17th
century. I think we will find ourselves in the role of Rome after the Cartha-
ginian wars, and this is why I used the adjective "awful" to describe our
future. The contest with the Soviet Union is not the only national problem.

Washington, D. C.
800 North Carolina Avenue, S.E.
Lt. Col. William R. Kirtner

Henry V. Kirtner

Appropriation.

Any book addressing itself to these creations will be a major con-

solation requires a brooding doctrine. This is a real issue for long-range thinking, and it is
from within ourselves. This is a real issue for long-range thinking, and it is
Especially important from a long-range view is the fact that we may within a

Lt. Col. William R. Kirtner

20 November 1947 - 3

59 Frost Street
Cambridge 38, Mass.
20 November 1951

Dear Col. Kintner:

On the occasion of our recent conversation I promised to send you some memoranda about the need for an integrated psychological effort by the United States. The importance of the subject warrants a more substantial paper than the copies I am sending you. They were prepared for different, more limited purposes. The memorandum of March 4th states my views of some aspects of the basic problem fairly fully. The memorandum of August 7th may give you an idea of one specific effort at Harvard. I have included a copy of a memorandum on one of our participants to indicate some of the immediate possibilities. I feel very strongly, however, that one should not in the psychological field expect very rapid, concrete results. Our major emphasis should be on the creation of a psychological climate for the development of an integrated policy, not the development of short-run intelligence cells. I am very much convinced of the importance of a major psychological effort in the Far East. In the very near future I shall write a memorandum outlining a possible program for Japan. I hope it meets your requirements.

I found your notebook when I returned to the office on Sunday. For this reason the secretary did not see it. I destroyed it after receiving your note.

* * * * *

I had intended to include two papers I wrote last year on military strategy. Since I am in the process of writing a longer study on National Strategy for ORO, I should prefer to discuss this with you if you are interested. I should like to make a few observations in connection with the outline you showed me. In principle I agree with your goals for U.S. strategy. But politics, as Bismarck so well said, is "the art of the possible," and the realities of the present situation will prevent the achievement of the requisite equilibrium. A balance of power depends, in my opinion, on the following factors: (a) A geographically determinate area, (b) An equilibrium of strength within that area, (c) An outside balancer with a profound conception of national strategy and unencumbered by ideological considerations, (d) A large measure of agreement on basic values within that "concert of powers."

Washington, D.C.

December 9, 1951

To: Mr. Rentnik

From: Fritz G. A. Kraemer

Subject: U.S. psychological warfare campaign for political, economic, and military integration of German Federal Republic into Western Europe

**Basic Assumption:** Integration of the Federal Republic into a Western European Union, Federation or similar structure is an aim of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. overt and covert propaganda is faced with the double task of convincing a) the Germans and b) the other Western European nations, especially the French, that such integration is necessary and mutually advantageous to all parties concerned.

**Purpose of attached paper:** To outline the general theme and specific arguments that should be used in a United States psychological warfare campaign promoting the idea of a united Western Europe which includes the Bonn Republic.

The paper (Enclosure I) is concerned only with the substance of the campaign and not with the means, overt or covert, by which it might be carried out. I feel strongly, however, that "individual missionaries" of the type suggested in my memo to Senator Mundt (Enclosure II) would be particularly effective instruments of covert propaganda in Germany as well as in France.

[c]

## Outline

of General Theme and Specific Arguments
of Psychological Warfare Campaign for
Integration of Federal Republic into
Western Europe.

### I. How to present the case to the Germans

The integration of the Bonn Republic into a Western European Union or Federation should be presented to the Germans as a general idea, and not as a detailed plan. Once the idea as such has caught the fancy of large circles, or at least of certain particularly articulate groups, organizational details may be discussed, but first we must arouse the popular imagination and create a widespread conviction that Germany's amalgamation with the rest of Western Europe presents the only hope for a better future. Instead of merely explaining integration as a necessary and reasonable political structure it should be preached as a magic formula. The specific advantages resulting for Germany from the Schumann Plan, or the Pleven Plan are rather meaningless and uninspiring to most Germans who cannot understand the economic and legal complexities. And even the intellectual and political leaders will be inclined to be skeptical and unenthusiastic as long as the discussion remains limited to technicalities and partial solutions.

The chances of launching a crusade for new ideas are particularly favorable in present day Germany. All Germans, regardless of party affiliations and social status, agree that the nation in general and the younger generation in particular live in a vacuum. They exist on a day to day basis in an atmosphere of skepticism and emptiness. They remember the fall of the Kaiser's Empire, of the Weimar Republic and of the Nazi dictatorship all within one generation and the present regime, in spite of remarkable successes in the economic field and amazing progress in rebuilding and reorganizing a shattered country, is looked upon without enthusiasm and without real confidence or hope. The Germans like everybody else, and perhaps because of a certain innate romanticism even more than others, need inspiring goals and visions of a brighter and more secure future.

A return to any of the past political systems is not considered feasible or even desirable by any sizeable number of Germans. The very idea of a restoration of the monarchy appears ridiculous and the young people do not even seem to know that for more than a thousand years German political life was monarchical in structure. The Weimar Republic in retrospect seems well meaning at best, but dull and drab and utterly unbeloved. Nazism, in spite of the

success of neo-Nazi parties and although there is a distinct danger of a Nazi revival, if nothing else is injected into the German vacuum, is nevertheless thoroughly discredited, be it only because it ended in such catastrophic failure. Communism fortunately is the hope of only an extremely small minority and not the religion of any considerable group.

Virtually all Germans are agreed that there is an imperative need and a profound longing for some new ideas and ideals. The concept of a unified Western Europe, in view of the almost complete absence of any visionary schemes that might have even a ghost of a chance, is one of the very few and perhaps the only one in the Germany of today which holds a certain fascination for the young and which seems to contain a grain of hope from the point of view of the older generation. There were attempts by student groups a year or two ago to start something like a German youth movement for European unification. Such attempts are being continued, but clearly new sparks have to be emitted from somewhere to keep the fires burning and produce a real blaze. Much of the initial elan has been lost because of lack of direction and leadership, and enthusiasm has been whittled down by technical discussion of the pros and cons of the Schumann Plan and the European army scheme.

We must understand that in order to become a truly important force and political religion the idea of a united Western Europe needs symbols and slogans and at least a few fiery apostles. It might possibly be our task to design the symbols, to coin the slogans, and to first select and then aid the apostles. All overt and covert means at our disposal should be used to inject the European union idea incessantly into everyday German life. Since the general atmosphere is by no means unfavorable, it should not be too difficult to see to it that youth, church, and civic groups place the integration question on the agendas of their meetings. Nor does it seem impossible to induce daily papers, magazines, and the radio to dedicate space and time to a general discussion of the European Union idea. "Letters to the editor" and letters from the public to the boards of governors of the government radio stations might be used to keep the theme alive. Small teams of speakers could be organized to tour the country so that the problem will be ever-present in the minds of many. There should be parades of students demonstrating their faith in the European idea. Posters and symbols ought to appear on the bill boards of German cities and villages. But it is most important to keep in mind that the entire effort will have to be directed at making known the general concept. A beautifully logical exposition of details is by no means the aim of the suggested campaign. There must be created a general feeling that the movement for a European Union is a true wave of the future, and the new idea should be dangled before German eyes as a message of salvation rather than as a technical plan of organization.

In addition to the more emotional approach one can also,
however, adduce a number of specific arguments to convince and
persuade.

A. <u>German History</u>

The very history of Germany can be used most successfully to
demonstrate the inescapable development from small city states,
principalities and kingdoms to ever large political units. While
a comparison between the present situation in Europe and that of
the thirteen American colonies at the time of our war of independence
is not generally accepted as an argument for unification, every
German knows that the cherished independence of Bavaria, Prussia,
Saxony, Hamburg, and dozens of smaller states was finally merged
into the Unity of the German Reich to the advantage of all partici-
pants. It is also well known that a customs union preceded the
attainment of political unification and the creation of the Modern
German Empire by Bismarck is generally considered today not as
the work of a single man, but as a logical development from anti-
quated fragmentation to an inherently necessary consolidation.

It is true, of course, that, with the exception of large
Polish minorities in Prussia's eastern provinces, all inhabitants
of Bismarck's united Germany spoke one language and belonged to
one culture. The historical rivalry between the North and the
South had been extremely acute, however, and the differences
between Prussia and the Southern States were certainly no less
real and bitter, psychologically and politically, than those be-
tween France and Germany today. It is impossible to discuss
further details in this paper, but there can be no doubt that it
would be very easy to interpret German history as a particularly
convincing example of a definite general trend toward unification
of ever vaster territories.

B. <u>Geo-Politics</u>

Most Germans have in one way or another absorbed one of the
basic tenets of geopolitics known as the "Grossraum" (Large Space)
concept, predicated on the assumption that in our modern age
smaller countries have neither the means for, nor even a right to
a separate existence. According to this theory "large space"
today is an absolute prerequisite of real power and only the
political giants like the United States, the British Empire, or
the U.S.S.R. can hope to survive. Cherished in small circles even
before World War I this axiom was accepted by the entire nation
during World War II largely as a result of a popularization of
the teachings of General Haushofer.

It should be noted in parenthesis that Germans always seem
particularly happy to hear from non-Germans that at the end of

World War I the Allies committed a grave error when they split up the Austro-Hungarian monarchy which had united peoples of many tongues and races in the Danubian area as a rampart first against Turkish and later against Russian aggressiveness. Germans have frequently been told that President Wilson's idea of substituting for the Austro-Hungarian empire a number of small states (in the name of nationalism and self determination of all nations) was actually a step backward showing the naivete of our political concepts. Somehow it seems to satisfy German egotism and vanity to learn that in the ultimate analysis Wilson's principles were anachronistic and against the true trends of the time.

## C. The Russian Danger

Except for the very small number of Communists and fellow travelers there is hardly a Western German who does not consider the threat from the East as the most crucial problem of his country. In this respect there is no difference whatever between the conservative Chancellor Adenauer and the fiery head of the Socialist opposition Mr. Schumacher who remarked recently that should the Russians overrun Western Germany they would doubtless hang him at least ten minutes before Mr. Adenauer. The Germans disagree merely on the ways and means in which the danger from the East could or should be met.

It would be impossible to find a German today willing to maintain that the Federal Republic alone could resist a Russian onslaught or even Russian "peaceful" pressure. Flamboyant stories are sometimes told of lonely German regiments which allegedly stopped entire Russian divisions. Old soldiers, however, who participated in the eastern campaigns will be the first to admit that in view of Russian manpower resources there is just no hope whatsoever for a Germany fighting alone. In this connection one should refrain from making comparisons between the quality of Russian and German troops, and merely point to the unarguable and overwhelming Russian superiority in numbers.

While Germany clearly cannot hope to check the Soviets without the help of third powers, some Germans seem to feel that Germany and the United States and perhaps Great Britain, leaving out all other Western Europeans as "second rate", should unite in an alliance in which Germany would assume the leading role in Western Europe. It would be the task of our overt and covert propaganda to make it clear that for ideological as well as for practical reasons such a scheme is impossible. In accepting it we would encounter first the distrust and then the loss of the non-German Western Europeans who under such circumstances, fearing a revival of German domination, might even flirt, at least diplomatically, with the Russians. The idea must also be considered impossible from a purely technical point of view, since the ground

forces of the Anglosaxon powers are not sufficiently large
actually to defend the German area without the energetic and
wholehearted cooperation of the remainder of Western Europe,
particularly France. The United States cannot be expected to
be present on the Elbe in full strength as soon as the Russians
start moving. Seen from a military point of view combined European
ground forces are the only ones that could possibly prevent the
Soviets from overrunning Western Germany in the first onrush.

D. The American "Danger"

The Germans, like virtually all other Europeans, are experienc-
ing at present a period of marked anti-Americanism. Ironically
enough one of the reasons which would facilitate United States
propaganda for a united and therefore stronger Europe is the
feeling that such a united Europe would be able to show a greater
degree of independence in regard to the rich uncle across the
ocean. The more sophisticated Germans generally hold the conviction
that because of Western Europe's common culture Europeans, in spite
of all their historical and national differences, are much closer
to each other than to the more "naive" and "primitive" Americans.
The existence of strong cultural links between all Western
Europeans should be emphasized particularly by United States propa-
ganda aimed at high brow circles.

E. American Aid and American Power

Europeans often express some amazement at the fact that the
United States is pressing for a greater unification of Europe
although in the end the United States will find it more difficult
to impose its will on a unified Europe. Most Germans probably
feel that the majority of American statesmen and military experts
promote European unification mainly because they consider it an
urgent necessity of the day and because our policy is not suffi-
ciently far-sighted to think now of future disadvantages resulting
for the United States from such unification. The Germans stubbornly
believe that during the war we only saw the fascist but not the
communist danger, and they think that at this moment we only see
the communist danger, forgetting everything else. Other Germans
do admit that American idealism, or as they sometimes express it
"sentimentality" might be a contributing factor in our embracing
the pan-Europe ideal. It will not be too difficult to convince
a goodly number of Germans that idealism plays indeed a considerable
part in the formulation of our foreign policy. The older ones in
particular will find it relatively easy to believe that our
imagination has been caught by the Unified Europe idea in the same
way in which President Wilson became fascinated with his famous
visions of open diplomacy, League of Nations, self-determination
of all nations etc. It might as well be admitted, therefore, that
the short range approach and a certain messianic idealism play a
part in our enthusiasm for a Europe united.

Since Germans do also cling, however, to the old myth that in the ultimate analysis American policies are dictated by the calculating realism of the businessman, it will be very easy to explain to them that in the long run our "hard-headed" politicians, industrialists, and financiers will grant military and economic aid only to a "going concern." In other words, if Europe becomes stronger through unification, the very problem forever haunting Europeans today of whether Americans will stick with Europe will be brought much nearer to a solution. While many Europeans are afraid that the struggle against the East may be hopeless because the United States may refrain from appearing on the scene in time and in sufficient strength, many Americans feel that it would be useless to appear in time and in strength because Europe is hopelessly divided and incapable of action.

The arguments that European strength will make American aid more certain is of utmost importance. In spite of the fact that Germans, almost without exception, profess to have a rather low opinion of the quality of the American soldier, they are nevertheless naively convinced that the resources of this country are virtually unlimited. Many Germans will admit that even at the height of Hitler's successes they considered World War II lost when the power of the United States was finally mobilized against them as a result of Hitler's ill considered declaration of war. The German inclination to become part of a unified Western Europe will be enormously increased if it becomes clear that we do not lock upon unification as a device to reduce our own commitment in case of a Russian attack on Europe but that on the contrary we would be decidedly more willing to aid a Europe united than a Europe divided.

We must under all circumstances, however, refrain from threatening that in case of insufficient European cooperation we would withdraw from the European scene in disgust and revert to isolationism. Since the majority of Europeans fear this to be the case anyway, any such threat instead of spurring them into action would only confirm their suspicions and strengthen the position of the advocates of neutralism.

For similar reasons we must also continuously stress the theme of American power. Our sudden change from a demilitarization to a remilitarization policy in Germany and our sometimes almost hysterical eagerness to obtain German rearmament have created the impression in many Germans that we are weaker than we actually are and that we might need their military power more than they need ours. It should be made absolutely clear, therefore, although not in the form of open or veiled threats, that we can survive even without their aid while they cannot maintain themselves without ours. This line of

argument of course must not be exaggerated, and it should always
be admitted that the loss of Germany to the Russians would be a
very serious factor from the point of view of overall Western
strategy.

F. <u>German Rearmament</u>

Several months ago I prepared a memorandum on the rearment
problem as seen from the German point of view. The memorandum is
attached for reference (Enclosure III).

It will result from Enclosure III that in my opinion the German
resistance against rearment is motivated not by ideological and
political but almost exclusively by military considerations. The
Germans are unwilling to rearm because they feel that the military
situation is hopeless in view of the inferiority of Western ground
forces. As soon as we can convince the militarily experienced
Germans that there is a real chance that the territory of the Federal
Republic may be defended against a Soviet invasion they will rearm.

It would be a mistake to believe that German willingness to
rearm would be adversely influenced by the creation of a united
Western Europe and a European army. The natural aversion shown by
some professional military men against a non-national army will not,
in other words, prevent the Germans from taking up arms again
provided only that the sum total of Western ground forces will
appear sufficient for a defense at the Elbe instead of the Rhine.
It may even be predicted that certain groups, especially the
Socialist workers and many members of the younger generation, would
rather serve in a European than in a purely national army in which
of needs the officers and leaders of the Hitler period would finally
become all-powerful. It is suggested that public opinion polls and
similar methods be used to prove that this evaluation of the German
attitude is more than a psychological theory. I venture the opinion,
at any rate, that a unified Europe with a European army would not
make German rearment more difficult than it has been in the past.

G. <u>The German Role in a Unified Europe</u>

The Germans are fully aware of the fact that even without Eastern
Germany the Federal Republic would be, as far as population is con-
cerned, the largest member within the Western European community.
Considering themselves more hard working, better organizers, and
better soldiers than virtually anybody else, and proud of their
first class industrial production, Germans can very easily be in-
duced to believe that in a unified Europe, due to their industrious-
ness and discipline, they would play very soon a dominant role