II - Report

August 15,1957

IX - 4

attempt to prevent war through retaliatory power. Either of these methods is highly useful and desirable as long as it succeeds. But suppose it does not? In both cases, exclusive concern with the avoidance of war poses a fearful alternative: total war as the only alternative to total peace.

Since all-out war could start not only by surprise attack but also by the spreading of a small war, it would seem wise for the U.S. to include on the agenda of disarmament negotiations constructive proposals to mitigate the horrors of war. Despite the poor record of the human race in this regard a program to mitigate the horros of war could be used to clarify the intentions of the opposing sides and thus might help prevent the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation.

Even a unilateral U.S. declaration would accomplish a great deal because it would provide a strong incentive to the other side to consider the same ground rules. As long as both major powers possess nuclear weapons, it is possible -- indeed likely -- that even a limited war involving them will include the use of nuclear weapons. Under present conditions, the sudden employment of nuclear weapons would have devastating effects on world opinion and might unnecessarily unleash an all-out war. It is therefore imperative to establish in advance as much as possible the psychological and political framework of such a conflict.

Such a course would also enable us to make a distinction between disagreement proposals and communist ban-the-bomb propaganda. We would leave no doubt that aggression by the communist blod would be resisted with

II - Report

August 15, 1957

VIII - 6

provisions stand in the way of fully effective cooperation between American
scientists and those of our NATO partners. Thus in their atomic research our
European allies are forced to go over ground already covered by the U.S. and
we are placed into the paradoxical position of withholding from our allies in-
formation which Soviet science already possesses.

Yet re-equipping NATO forces will not of itself solve the problems of
NATO. It must be accompanied by a reconsideration of NATO's strategic doc-
trine. NATO strategy must decide whether the alliance is a device to unleash
U.S. and British strategic airpower or whether it seeks to stop an attack within
Europe should it take place. It is the judgment of this report that with
proper weapons and doctrine and a willingness to maintain sufficient forces a
significant local defense of Europe is possible. The known capability that any
Soviet attack will meet effective resistance is the most effective deterrent to
aggression. To achieve it, however, we must be ready to share our atomic
know-how and our allies must stop pretending that they can reduce defense ex-
penditures without imperiling their as well as our joint security. The problem
of NATO is even more a question of will as of power.