January 15, 1960

Monsieur Raymond Aron
34 Quai de Passy
Paris, France

My dear Monsieur Aron:

I will be in Paris from Tuesday night, January 26th until Friday noon, January 29th, and I would like very much to see you if you are free during my visit. I will be occupied during all of the morning and through lunch on the 27th, but I am free most of the rest of the time, except for lunch on the 29th.

I will be staying at the Hotel Pont Royal, 7, rue Montalembert, and perhaps you could leave word for me there about when and where we could meet.

I am looking forward to seeing
you.

With kind regards.

Warm regards.

meeting.

but I did want you to know that this is a purely personal
with you, because they are coordinating all my appointments.
The Embassy will properly be getting in touch
leave for the airport.

on Wednesday morning or for lunch that day before I
there will be an opportunity for us to meet, perhaps
the 13th of May until Wednesday the 15th, and I hope
I am planning to be in Paris from Monday

Dear M. Aron:

Barrie, France
34 Quai de Paris
M. Raymond Aron

April 13, 1961

January 9, 1962

M. Raymond Aron
34, Quai de Passy
Paris, France

Dear Aron:

I am leaving for a fairly lengthy trip to Iran, Israel, India and Pakistan. On my way back, I am planning to stop over in Paris for a little more than a day, specifically, I am arriving on late Sunday afternoon, February 4th, and departing in the early afternoon of Tuesday, the 6th. I am probably going to be too tired to do anything on Sunday, but I would greatly appreciate an opportunity to see you the next day or perhaps Tuesday morning.

So much has happened since we last met, most of it bad, that I would greatly appreciate the benefit of your views on a number of problems that concern us all. There are also some matters connected with Harvard that I would like to discuss. Since time is so short, and also to avoid confusion, I have asked our mutual friend, General Gallois, to try to arrange my appointments and he will probably be calling you.

With kind regards as always.

P.S. I liked very much your open letter to Kennedy in September, though I know a few people who enjoyed it somewhat less, including the recipient.

July 6, 1962

Monsieur Raymond Aron
10 rue M. le Prince
Paris 6, France

Dear Raymond:

This is just a note upon my return
to Cambridge to thank you for sending your articles
from Le Figaro, which I read with interest, and also
to tell you how much I enjoyed seeing you in Paris.
I hope it will not be too long before we meet
again.

With kind regards.

MINISTÈRE
DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE

ÉCOLE PRATIQUE
DES HAUTES ÉTUDES

Sciences Économiques et Sociales

Centre de Sociologie Européenne

10, Rue Monsieur le Prince, 6e (MED. 17-52)

PARIS, le 14 novembre 19 62

Monsieur Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Diviniwy Avenue
CAMBRIDGE 38 (Mass.)

Cher Monsieur,

En réponse à votre lettre du 8 novembre, dont il vous remercie, Monsieur Aron me charge de vous faire savoir qu'il souhaiterait vous recevoir à déjeuner chez lui, si cela vous convenait, le vendredi 23 novembre. Si cela ne vous était pas possible, il s'arrangerait pour vous voir le 23 dans l'après-midi à son bureau.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

secrétaire de Mr. Aron
Isabelle Nico!

menta diangués.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'expression de mes aeti-

pour vous voir je 23 dans l'abréa-midi à 80 puresn.
du 23 novembre. Si cela ne vous était pas possible, il a'serrangersit
risit vonc recevoir à déjenner chez moi, si cela vonc convensit, je ven-
mercie, Monsieur Aron me charge de vonc iaire savoir du'il onbaito-
En réponds a votre lettre du 8 novembre, dont il vonc re-

Cher Monsieur,

CAMBRIDGE 38 (Maa.)
6 Divinity Avenue
Center for International
Affairs
Harvard University
Monaieur Henry A. Klaninger

PARIS, le 14 novembre 19 63

10° Rue Monsieur le Prince, 6e (MED. 17-21)

DES HAUTES ÉTUDES
ÉCOLE PRATIQUE

DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE
MINISTÈRE

January 30, 1963

My dear Raymond:

This is just a note to tell you what a pleasure it was to see you, and how much I enjoyed our conversation. Since then your predictions about France's attitude towards British entry have come tragically true and so have my predictions about our reaction. I am extremely depressed by the state of affairs. While De Gaulle's vision of a Europe based on Germany and France may not be realistic, I can not get very excited about a Europe based on Germany, Italy and Belgium either.

Have you been writing anything on this subject? If so, do send me a copy. I am nearly finished with your book and consider it a really remarkable work. When its English translation appears I will review it for the New York Times, if I can get adequate advance warning.

With warm regards.

PARIS, le 19 février 1963

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38 (Mass.)

Cher Ami,

Merci de votre lettre du 30 janvier. Je pense comme vous que si la responsabilité immédiate de la crise incombe au Général de Gaulle, le refus de nos amis de Washington de comprendre ses revendications atomiques est aussi pour quel- que chose dans le trouble actuel. J'ai écrit plusieurs arti- cles dans le Figaro sur tous ces sujets. The New *Republik* en a reproduit quelques-uns, mais avec des coupures qui en modi- fiaient quelquefois la signification.

I look forward to reading it with the greatest interest.

B.S. I have just received your book about atomic strategy.

Henry V. Kiebler

With warm regards.

I hope we will have a chance to talk soon.

of the offensive way in which he but his case.
arguments to the lengths that Gallipoli does--not to sheath
atomic matters. But I think it is disastrous to bush
not to be completely dependent on the United States in
Pierre Galliot. I have sympathies for European desires
the Anglo-American Press Club with our mutual friend,
As it turned out, I got into a violent debate at
to talk about.

before my departure. There would have been many things
all day at the WLU and, therefore, could not call you
reception of Carlo Schmidt. Unfortunately, I was engaged
I was glad to get alimbax of your wife at the

My dear Raymond:

Paris, France
34 Quai de Bessy
Monastur Raymond Vron

December 10, 1963

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

601P EST OCT 27 64 BB238
B NA387 NL PD TB NEW YORK NY 27

HENRY KISSINGER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY 125 LITTAUER CAMBRIDGE MASS
FOR "BOOK WEEK" COULD YOU REVIEW "THE GREAT DEBATE: THEORIES
OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY" BY RAYMOND ARON BEING PUBLISHED EARLY
JANUARY BY DOUBLEDAY? WE'D LIKE 1200-1500 WORDS BY DECEMBER
15. APPRECIATE YOUR ADVISING BY COLLECT WIRE OF CALLING NEW
YORK PE 6 4000. MANY THANKS

RICHARD KLUGER BOOK EDITOR NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message
unless its deferred char-
acter is indicated by the
proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International
Letter Telegram

123P EST DEC 02 64 BA 189

N ZGA008 DPR PD ZG NEW YORK NY 2 109P EST

HENRY A KISSINGER, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

6 DIVINITY AVE CAMBRIDGE MASS

WOULD YOU BE INTERESTED IN REVIEWING FOR US "THEORIES OF NUCLEAR
STRATEGY" BY RAYMOND ARON? DEADLINE IREFERABLY DECEMBER TWENTY
FIRST. PLEASE WIRE PRESS RATE COLLECT.

RACHELLE GIRSON SATURJAY REVIEW.

Henry A. Kissinger

Review of <u>the Great Debate</u> by Raymond Aron.

In the twenty years since man learned to harness the atom,
the nature of international affairs has changed fundamentally.
Throughout history war has been considered the last recourse of
sovereign states. It was always understood that if all else failed,
a country could vindicate its vital interests by force. Until the
weapons,
discovery of nuclear; it was possible to believe that the <u>immediate</u>
risks of war were smaller than the <u>ultimate</u> consequence of yielding.
But in the nuclear age any statesman contemplating recourse to arms
must realize that he is jeopardizing the lives of tens of millions
rather than thousands. The stakes are no longer marginal gains or
losses, but the survival of society itself.

This involves the basic paradox of the nuclear age. Power has
never been greater; it has also never been less useful. In the past,
the major problem for strategists was to assemble superior strength; in
the contemporary period the problem more frequently is how to discipline
the available power into some relationship to the objectives likely to be
in dispute. Yet no matter what spectrum of power may be available--no
matter how graduated the response--the fear of escalation is inescapable.
Though nuclear countries have an unprecedented capability to devastate
their opponents, the threats to use this capability have a decreasing
credibility. This is because the ability to destroy is not related to the

credibility. This is because the ability to destroy is not related to the
ttheir opponents, the threats to use this capability have a decreasing
Though nuclear countries have an unprecedented capability to deviate
matter how graduated the response--the fear of escalation is insupportable.
in debate. Yet no matter what spectrum of power may be available--no
the available power into some relationship to the objectives likely to be
the contemporarily period the problem more frequently is how to discipline
the major problem for strategists was to assemble superior strength; in
never been greater; it has also never been less useful. In the past,
This involves the basic paradox of the nuclear age. Power has
less so, but the survival of society itself.

rather than thousands. The stakes are no longer marginal gains or
must realize that he is jeopardizing the lives of tens of millions
But in the nuclear age any statesman contemplating recourse to some
risks of war were smaller than the ultimate consequence of yielding.
discovery of nuclear! it was possible to believe that the immediate
a country could indicate its vital interests by force. Until the
sovereign states. It was always understood that it all else failed.
Throughout history war has been considered the last recourse of
the nature of international affairs has changed fundamentally.

In the twenty years since man learned to harness the atom.

Review of the Great Debate by Raymond Vron.

Henry V. Kiebler

C43

H.A. Kissinger

page 2

ability to disarm. Hence, general war may simply guarantee self-destruction.

This "balance of terror" is considered by some a guarantee of stability and by others a nightmare. But whatever one's view about the feasibility of escaping these dangers through disarmament, while nuclear weapons continue to exist, peace depends on some degree of strategic stability and this presupposes meeting a number of technical conditions. A nuclear arsenal discourages attack only if an opponent cannot disarm it; if in fact the weapons are invulnerable. If this condition is not realized, nuclear weapons may tempt aggression rather than discourage it.

But what is invulnerability? Never before has so much depended on weapons so new, so untested, so "abstract." No previous military experience is relevant. The basic judgments as to the consequences of nuclear warfare are almost entirely theoretical.

Moreover, whatever the validity of the conclusions of one side, they must be concerted with those of the other. Failing this, war could break out through a misunderstanding. The primary purpose of modern weapons is deterrence: to prevent a particular course of action by a specific threat. But deterrence is as much a psychological as a military problem. It depends, above all, on the aggressor's assessment of risks. A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a "genuine" threat interpreted as a bluff.

of deterrence than a "genine" threat interpreted as a pink.

A threat meant as a pink put taken seriously was more useful for bazooes
problem. It debends, above all, on the aggrssor's assessment of risk.
abscic threat. But deterrence is as much a bafeoological as a military
woeses is deterrence: to prevent a particular course of action by a
break out through a misunderstanding. The primary burpooe of modes
they must be concerted with those of the other. Railing fire, was could
Moreover, whatever the validity of the conclusions of one side,
nuclear warlaste are almost entirely theoretical.

experience is relevant. The basic judgments as to the consequences of
on weapons so new, so untested, so "abstract." No previous military
But what is invulnerability? Never before has so much dependence
tan discourage is.

condition is not realized, nuclear weapons may tempt aggression rather
cannot claim it; it in fact the weapons are invulnerable. It this
conditions. A nuclear armswal discourage attack only if an opponent
strategic stability and this brevopooe meeting a number of technical
nuclear weapons continue to exist, because depends on some degree of
stability of escaping these dangers through disarmament, while
stability and by others a nightmare. But whatever one's view about the
This "balance of terror" is considered by some a guarantee of
tion.

apability to claim. Hence, General war may simply guarantee self-gestruc-
tion.

H.V. Klaasiger

page 3

H.A. Kissinger

Nothing is harder than to determine what facts are relevant to a judgment about matters of such gravity. Systems analysts have developed complicated and esoteric theories about the military interaction of various types of nuclear forces. Yet these theories somewhere must make contact with a political reality; in other words they must be plausible to overworked decision-makers. These in turn may not have as many hours for the consideration of a problem as the analyst has had years to study it. A doctrine which is too complicated for the political process will induce paralysis whatever its theoretical merit.

These problems real enough within each government become especially complicated in an alliance. For in a coalition of sovereign states divergences in history, geography and domestic structure can become decisive. A limited war fought in Europe has a different significance for our allies than it does for us. From the point of view of global strategy a Soviet advance of two hundred miles into Central Europe is not necessarily decisive; to the Federal Republic it would mean the end of its national existence. Rationalizing the over-all effect is not enough for our allies, if in the process they lose their sense of identity or believe that they jeopardize their existence.

This is why strategic debates inevitably involve political issues and why they have often been so frustrating. It has been difficult to establish an agreed universe of discourse. Military experts frequently

established an agreed universe of discourse. Military experts frequently and why they have often been so confusing. It has been difficult to believe that they jeopardize their existence.

for our allies, it in the process they lose their sense of identity or its national existence. Rationalizing the over-all effect is not enough necessarily decisive; to the Federal Republic it would mean the end of strategy a Soviet advance of two hundred miles into Central Europe is not for our allies than it does for us. From the point of view of global peace decisive. A limited war fought in Europe has a different significance states divergences in strategy, geography and domestic structure can especially complicate an alliance. For in a condition of sovereign

political process will induce barometers whatever its theoretical merit. But here to study it. A doctrine which is too complicated for the as many people for the consideration of a problem as the analyst has to be plausible to overworked decision-makers. These in turn may not have must make contact with a political reality; in other words they must action of various types of nuclear forces. Yet these theories somewhere developed complicated and esoteric theories about the military interest to a judgment about matters of such gravity. Systems analysts have nothing is harder than to determine what facts are relevant

H.V. Klemperer.

page 3

[4]

H.A. Kissinger

page 4

lack a sense of political realities. Students of politics often are
unaware of the strategic and technical context. Different countries
are above all conscious of their own national problems.

The strategic debate in the Atlantic Alliance has therefore often
the quality of what the French call a "dialogue among the deaf." For
years, it has been the great merit of Raymond Aron to illuminate the
discussion with his incisive and wise judgments. A philosopher of
distinction, a noted sociologist, a student of history, M. Aron combines
a knowledge of the relevant disciplines with a precise and discriminating
mind. As a European he is acutely aware of the concerns of his Continent;
but in contrast to many of his compatriots he knows America well. He
is therefore not given to seeing elaborately devious designs behind all
our moves. He has acted as an interpreter of American strategic thought
in France and of European political views in America.

"The Great Debate" splendidly continues this achievement. Its
special distinction is that though written for a French public, it is
equally relevant for Americans. Starting with a summary of the evolution
of American strategic thought, M. Aron moves to a discussion of the specific
problems before the Atlantic Alliance. He deals with the various schools
of thought with respect to the French independent deterrent and concludes
with his vistas for the future. M. Aron is impatient with doctrinaires
on either side of the Atlantic. He is sharply critical of the notions of

now either side of the Atlantic. He is apparently critical of the notions of
with his views for the future. M. Aron is impatient with doctrines
of thought with respect to the French independent determinant and concludes
problems before the Atlantic Alliance. He deals with the various schools
of American strategic thoughts, M. Aron moves to a discussion of the specific
especially relevant for Americans. Starting with a summary of the evolution
special distinction is then written for a French public, it is

"The Great Debate" identically continues this achievement. It is
in France and of European political views in America.

our moves. He has acted as an interpreter of American strategic thought
its therefore not given to seeing elaborately devised designs behind all
put in contrast to many of his competitors he knows America well. He
minds. As a European he is acutely aware of the concerns of his Contingent;
s a knowledge of the relevant disciplines with a precise and discriminating
distinction, a noted sociologist, a student of history, M. Aron combines
discussion with his initiative and wise judgments. A philosopher of
years, it has been the great merit of Raymond Aron to illuminate the
the quality of what the French call a "dialogue among the dead." For
the strategic debate in the Atlantic Alliance has therefore often
are above all conscious of their own national problems.

unaware of the strategic and technical context. Different countries
have a sense of political realities. Students of politics often are

H.V. Kießinger

page 4

H.A. Kissinger

some of his compatriots who argue that French nuclear power could
replace that of the United States. But he also takes to task his
friends on this side of the Atlantic for an exaggeratedly theoretical
approach to problems of strategy.

Above all, M. Aron transcends the controversies which form
the headlines of the day to distill the positive contribution of both
sides. However extreme some of its claims, France is not unreasonable
in trying to obtain some protection against the unforeseeable in a
century where no one could have predicted at the beginning of any
decade what the world would look like at its end. And the United States
while sometimes abstract and self-righteous has nevertheless been the
only country in the West which has taken defense seriously. Whatever
the final outcome of current debates within the Alliance, the intellectual
framework for the debate has largely been done on this side of the
Atlantic.

All these matters are treated with the sweep, the sense of
history and technical competence which has been characteristic of all
of M. Aron's work. Some of the material at the beginning of the book
is perhaps somewhat elementary. A few references in the book
presuppose knowledge of internal French affairs which the average
American reader may not have. Also M. Aron has not always been well
served by his interpreter who seems to lack familiarity with the common

convinced by his interpreter who seems to lack familiarity with the common American reader may not have. Also M. Aron has not always been well breviate knowledge of internal French elite which the average is perhaps somewhat elementary. A few references in the book of M. Aron's work. Some of the material at the beginning of the book history and technical competence which has been characteristic of all VII these matters are treated with the sweep, the sense of Atlantic.

framework for the debate has largely been done on this side of the
the final outcome of current debate within the Alliance, the intellectual
every country in the West which has taken defense seriously. Whatever
while sometimes abstract and self-righteous has nevertheless been the
decade when the world would look like at its end. And the United States
century where no one could have predicted at the beginning of any
in trying to obtain some protection against the unfavorable in a
sides. However extreme some of its claims, France is not unreasonable
the deadline of the day to settle the positive contribution of both
above all, M. Aron transmits the controversy which form
approach to problems of strategy.

friends on this side of the Atlantic for an exuberantly theoretical
replace that of the United States. But he also takes to task his
some of his competitors who argue that French nuclear power could

H.A. Kiefer

page 2

H.A. Kissinger

usage of terms. Thus "denuclearization" becomes "disatomization;" it
is jarring to read of "duelists" with respect to nuclear weapons.

These, however, are minor quibbles. M. Aron has made a very
useful contribution to the "great debate." If the diplomats learn
from his lucidity and understanding, Atlantic relationships may yet be
put on a new and more durable basis.

H.V. Kossinger

page 8

but on a new and more durable basis.
from the facility and understanding, Atlantic relationships may yet be
mutual contribution to the "great debate." If the diplomat learn
These, however, are minor dropples. Mr. Vron has made a very
to learning to read of "qualities" with respect to nuclear weapons.
usage of terms. True "denuclearization" becomes "dissolution;" it

10, Rue Monsieur-lé-Prince, 6e (MED. 17-52)

PARIS, le 16 Novembre 19 64

Monsieur Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts

Cher Ami,

Merci de votre lettre du 9 Novembre. Je suis ravi
que vous soyez chargé du compte rendu du "Grand Débat" dans la
New York Herald Tribune.

Je ne prends pas au tragique la crise actuelle. Elle
me paraît faire partie du rituel gaulliste.

Bien amicalement à vous,

Paris, I.A.C.

10, Rue Monsieur-le-Prince, 6e (MED. 17-52)

PARIS, le 8 Janvier 1965

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge
Massachusetts

Cher Ami,

Juste quelques mots pour vous remercier du compte rendu trop indulgent que vous avez fait du Grand Débat. Il est amusant de constater que les discussions stragétiques, après quelques mois d'apaisement, ont repris toute leur virulence. Il va de soi que les subtilités militaires comptent moins que les arrières pensées politiques.

Tous mes voeux pour vous et les vôtres, et
bien amicalement à vous,

Paris, I.A.C.

MINISTÈRE
DE L'ÉDUCATION NATIONALE
___
ÉCOLE PRATIQUE
DES HAUTES ÉTUDES

Sciences Économiques et Sociales
___
Centre de Sociologie Européenne

10, rue Monsieur-le-Prince, 6e (Méd. 17-52)
( et 63-71)

PARIS, le 8 février 19 67

FEB 1 3 1967

Mon cher ami,

Puis-je vous demander s'il vous serait possible de
m'envoyer un exemplaire de la revue Confluence, volume 5,
juillet 1956 ?

J'y ai publié un article sur la limitation de la guerre
à l'âge nucléaire que j'aimerais relire aujourd'hui après un
intervalle de plus de 10 ans.

Un analyste américain, ayant lu cet article, m'a
écrit et posé des questions auxquelles je voudrais répondre.

Bien amicalement vôtre,

Raymond ARON