CHAIRMAN
DR HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB. HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN LLOYD BENTSEN
REP WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN DANIEL K. INOUYE
REP JACK F. KEMP
AMB JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR WINSTON LORD
SEN CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP JAMES C. WRIGHT

Tentative Agenda

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>9:30 - 10:45 a.m.</td><td><u>Legal Reform</u><br>Mr. James H. Michel<br>Deputy Assistant Secretary of State<br>for Inter-American Affairs<br>Dr. Seymour Rubin<br>Executive Director, American Society<br>of International Law</td></tr><tr><td>10:45 - 11:45 a.m.</td><td><u>Population</u><br>The Futures Group:<br>Mr. Phillip Claxton<br>Mr. Harry Cross<br>Mr. John Stover</td></tr><tr><td>11:45 - 12:30 p.m.</td><td><u>Private Investment</u><br>Mr. Marshall Mays<br>Former President of OPIC</td></tr><tr><td>12:30 p.m.</td><td><u>SANDWICHES SERVED</u></td></tr><tr><td>12:40 - 1:40 p.m.</td><td><u>League of United Latin American Citizens</u><br>Mr. Mario Obledo<br>National President<br>Mr. Arnoldo Torres<br>National Executive Director<br>Ambassador Abelardo Valdez<br>Task Force on Central America</td></tr></tbody></table>

2201 C STREET NW, ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520, TEL: (202) 632-7804

SUITE 500
1800 M STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

October 26, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America
2201 C Street, N.W., Room 1004
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Because of the enormous importance of the study undertaken by you and your colleagues, I want to accept your invitation to send you a letter outlining some of my views on the problems you will be considering. If appropriate, I would appreciate your providing a copy of this letter to the other members of the Commission.

Our relationship with Central America hungers for a long view -- for an analysis that is detached from daily crises and current controversies, and thus is free to examine the underlying issues and interests.

One of the most serious handicaps to our foreign policy is the tendency for each new Administration, of whatever party, to regard continuity almost as a calamity -- with the result that it vigorously seeks to separate itself from its predecessor in nearly all areas of policy. This tendency toward fits and starts needlessly fosters an unsteady approach. In the process it comforts our adversaries and confuses our friends.

The Commission has an opportunity to break this dreary cycle, and to begin building a broadly-based consensus on the nature of our interests in Central America and how we can best pursue them over the long term.

If the Commission takes a detached and objective long view -- if it pursues the right questions -- you will reach some surprising conclusions and will challenge the current conventional wisdom of all of us.

I.

As a general framework for considering the challenge of Central America, I would recommend several fundamental propositions.

#2 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

First, although the issues are controversial -- or more precisely *because* they are controversial -- it is useful to begin by identifying certain elements of what I believe should be the common ground on the relationship between U.S. interests and Soviet ambitions in the area.

The United States has important interests in this region. They are so deep and pervasive that we cannot hope to distance ourselves or remain aloof.

- We have significant security concerns. Sea lines of communication transit the region through the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico. A hostile military buildup in the area, because of proximity, could be a direct threat to us.

- We have extensive economic ties in the region. The countries there are important both as markets and as a source of supply.

- [ ] And we have special human concerns. Many of our citizens share a heritage with Latin America. That, and our physical and traditional closeness, mean that we feel with special intensity the suffering felt by the people of Central America when their rights are abused and their needs are left unfilled.

Beyond our interests in Central America is the reality that the Soviet Union is opportunistic in this region, as it is elsewhere. The Soviets support instability, turmoil, and revolution, which inflict human suffering and risk wider conflicts. So their ambitions are at odds with our interests.

Because these basic tenets are widely accepted, it is not useful to consider whether some are more and some are less alert to the danger of Soviet inroads in our hemisphere, or whether some are more and some are less in opposition to those trends. The reality is that, whether or not the Soviet Union is the proximate cause of violence and revolution, it is certainly a major complicating factor. What we must do is devise a policy that will protect and advance our interests in spite of that reality.

#3 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

Second, as another fundamental reality, we must recognize that the turmoil in Central America has an enormous economic component -- indeed, economics is probably the most critical factor. That means we must be prepared to invest considerable sums in the region, in ways that are designed to improve the economic prospects of the poor and to broaden the economic base of poor countries -- or else we must lower our sights dramatically, to suit a modest commitment. Rather than bemoaning the expenses of economic assistance, we should remember that military commitments usually are both more expensive and less promising. The need for such military commitments regularly stems from stinginess in economic support.

Third, we must persuade ourselves, and others, that while countries are important, no set of rulers is indispensable. Our interests and those of the rulers we help do not always coincide, and we must keep our interests central to our policy. It is not in our interest to be perpetually engaged in military causes that are not winnable because effective indigenous leadership does not exist and cannot be created.

Fourth, I recommend great caution in elevating local or civil conflicts into global symbols. While recognizing that the Soviets are ambitious and opportunistic, we should not give them more credit than they deserve, nor ascribe to them more effectiveness than they have. When we define what is essentially a civil war as a cosmic confrontation between East and West, one of the consequences is that we eliminate much of our leverage with the government we are trying to support, for it becomes convinced that we cannot afford to let it fall no matter what. That may lead to a situation in which our assistance is no longer buying time for reform, but is accepted by the ruling group as an alternative to reform. Perhaps that is our dilemma in El Salvador.

Fifth, we should have sufficient confidence in our system and our own values to maintain correct, affirmative relations with a diversity of governments, regardless of their internal ideology. It may turn out that our relations with revolutionary countries are often adversarial. We should have no illusions. But neither should we have a rigid posture. It is not in our interest to drive any country either into a dependency upon the Soviet Union or more deeply into the Soviet fold.

#4 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

Sixth, we should emphasize an active, creative diplomacy. In a troubled and important region, it is not enough for us simply to make speeches or declare policies and then wait until others come around to our view. That, as we have seen, can be a formula for isolation, irrelevance, and impotence. Rather, we need an aggressive diplomacy -- one that is principled, but that is also untiring in the search for solutions.

Seventh, human rights, broadly defined, must be at the core of our policy. Human rights -- including political, personal, and economic rights -- are much more than nice sentiments; they are powerful instruments. We pay an unacceptable price, morally and pragmatically, when we are seen as condoning death squads. In the long term, human rights are the only means that can hope to defeat the revolutionaries now bent on imposing and propagating Marxism in Central America, quite simply because they represent better, more appealing, and more effective ideas than Marxism offers.

## II.

Within this broad framework there are a number of specific subjects or issues areas that I believe a comprehensive study would be well-advised to address in detail, as a means of determining how we can most effectively pursue our interests in this region. Let me list them by topic.

(1) **Security aims.** We need to identify our minimum indispensable security objectives in Central America. We have military bases in the region. Some will believe that our security will be enhanced if we acquire more than those we presently have. Or perhaps it will be sufficient simply if we ensure that outside powers do not develop military bases from which they can threaten us. On the other hand, we probably cannot hope to exclude the Soviet Union's growing contacts in aid, trade, and diplomacy, so we must find ways to respond to any political influence those ties bring along. Perhaps the most difficult dilemma is to decide whether we can tolerate the presence of a Marxist government in Central America, or must we subject any such government to unremitting pressure.

#5 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

(2) **Military Prospects.** In our national experience, military solutions sometimes have been chosen not because they showed promise, but simply because the means were at hand. But because the costs are high and the consequences of failure so severe, we need to take a realistic look at the chances that military steps will succeed in Central America. For example, we should be able to identify and measure specific criteria that will make military assistance effective in some circumstances and ineffective, or even counterproductive, in others. Perhaps the Commission can propose preconditions that would make such aid more effective. You might also determine whether there are fundamental differences, in both law and practicality, between supporting the defense of a sitting government, as in El Salvador, and supporting efforts, as in Nicaragua, to overthrow one. Other related questions include the means of avoiding an arms race among the impoverished countries in the region if we do supply arms aid, and the question whether and when a direct U.S. military intervention can be a viable option.

(3) **Clandestine Operations.** We have had newspaper stories almost daily on the debate over whether we should provide "covert" assistance to the anti-Sandinista "contras" operating out of Honduras and Costa Rica. Clandestine aid is no secret, of course, from the recipients, nor, probably, is it altogether unknown to the targets. Where our secret hand is revealed, as it has been in Nicaragua, it often tends to insure that our cause will fail. So it is pertinent to ask whether and under what circumstances we should try, as an open society, to compete with the Soviets by attempting to conduct sustained political or military activities on a clandestine basis in Central America.

(4) **Economic Concerns.** It is necessary to consider the full range of our economic relationships with Central American countries, to evaluate their net effect. For example, it is quite possible that our posture on such matters as sugar prices, the terms of lending by the World Bank and the IMF,

#6 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

and trade preferences, may be working in contradic-
tion to our political objectives in the region.
Or the traditional austerity measures we support
for the sake of economic viability may sow the
seeds of revolution, for the heaviest burdens usually
fall on the poor.

(5) **Central America in a Global Context.** By virtue of its proximity and our historical connection, some would argue that the region is so extraordinarily important to us, in comparison to Asia and Africa, that it should receive special attention in our aid and concessional trade programs. Others contend that we should deal with Central and South American countries on the same basis as we relate to other similarly situated countries around the world, in order to help dispel the impression of paternalism that had infected earlier Hemispheric approaches.

(6) **Peaceful Reform.** Given the nature of revolutionary ferment in this region, we are forced to consider whether peaceful change can hope to keep pace with rising expectations, or whether violent revolution is destined to be the order of the future. It is difficult, to be sure, but still not unreasonable, to expect progressive and constructive reform by governments that are already facing armed guerilla attacks, for such reform is the best way to compete effectively for popular loyalty. Our best opportunities lie not in sterile arguments over whether or not revolution is exportable, but in encouraging democratic economic, social and political progress. It may be contended that Nicaragua is infecting El Salvador, or that El Salvador may, in turn, infect, Mexico. But regardless of the ambitions of outsiders, the disease will not take hold unless indigenous conditions make the target countries hospitable to revolution.

(7) **Relations with Revolutionary Governments.** We have seen that revolutionary governments in the region sometimes seek security through alliance with or reliance upon the Soviet Union, both directly and through Cuba. But is it inevitable that new governments will perceive the United States as a threat,

#7 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

justifying them in looking to the Soviets for support? The irony associated with this question is the fact that on the record, the Soviet Union is not an appealing ally. The United States, objectively, is more aligned than the Soviet Union with the aspirations of revolutionary movements that proclaim the objectives of serving economic justice, national independence, and basic human needs. An equally pressing question is how to deal with governments that are hostile to the United States not because of outside stimulation but stemming from indigenous sources.

(8) **Negotiating Flexibility.** Perhaps, in the interest of long-term stability and peace, we need to be more open and flexible in the search for diplomatic solutions to Central American conflicts. To take a specific case in point, I am not so sure that negotiated power sharing -- which might also be seen as forcing the opposition to take some of the responsibility for the way things are going -- is always repugnant, especially if it is a step toward truly fair and open general elections.

(9) **The Role of our Allies.** Reality -- including their own growing ties in the region -- suggests that we must work with our allies toward a common position on Central American issues, lest we be isolated and ineffectual. It troubles me that we are so often at odds with them -- that our posture seems to be that events in this Hemisphere are none of their concern. In addition, we must, of course, coordinate and reconcile our policy with the views and roles of other governments in the region, including such friends as Mexico, Brazil, and the other countries that serve with Mexico in the Contadora group.

(10) **The U.S. Presence in the Region.** We have gone through a variety of postures in Central and South America, from a "Good Neighbor" to an "Alliance for Progress," and now there is talk of a new "Marshall Plan" there. So it is important to consider how we want to be perceived now in the region, and how we can adjust our conduct to support

#8 - Dr. Henry Kissinger - 10/26/83

that perception. In my view we want to be seen as
respecting the people and nations of Central America.
We want to be recognized not as noticing the region
only when the pressure of injustice boils over and
the problem becomes a military one, but as pressing
constantly toward justice, even when conditions
are calm. We must have the discipline to align
ourselves, even when it is painful to do so, with
popular aspirations and democratic ideals. We
want to be respected, not simply feared.

I hope these will be among the subjects the Commis-
sion will cover when it issues its report early next year.
If your report takes a new and critical look at each of these
issues, then I feel it will certainly make a fundamental
contribution to the formulation of American policy at a crucial
time for a critical region.

With personal regards,

1

GOOD MORNING, MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BI-PARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA. IT IS INDEED AN HONOR TO COME BEFORE SUCH A DISTINGUISHED BODY TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS ON U. S.-CENTRAL AMERICAN RELATIONS. I AM ARNOLDO S. TORRES, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR THE LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC), THIS COUNTRY'S OLDEST AND LARGEST HISPANIC ORGANIZATION WITH OVER 110,000 MEMBERS IN 43 STATES. LULAC NATIONAL PRESIDENT MR. MARIO G. OBLEDO WAS UNABLE TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON FOR TODAY'S SESSION BUT I BRING HIS GREETINGS. IN ADDITION, MR. OBLEDO WANTED ME TO CONVEY HIS VIEWS OF THE IMPORTANCE THIS COMMISSION CAN HAVE ON THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICA AND HEMISPHERIC SECURITY. ALSO, AMBASSADOR ABELARDO VALDEZ, FORMER CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WITH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS PREPARED TO JOIN US TODAY BUT WAS CALLED AWAY ON OTHER BUSINESS. AMBASSADOR VALDEZ HAS SERVED AS ADVISOR TO THE LEAGUE ON U. S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS.

THIS TESTIMONY IS PRIMARILY A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE GROWING CONCERNS HISPANIC-AMERICANS HAVE REGARDING U. S. CENERAL AMERICAN RELATIONS. PORTIONS OF THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION APPEARED IN AN EDITORIAL IN U. S. A. TODAY JULY 25, 1983.

HISPANIC-AMERICANS HAVE A GROWING CONCERN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS EVER-VOLATILE REGION. MANY OF US ARE FINDING THAT THE CULTURAL INSENSITIVITY AND IGNORANCE WHICH IS PREVALENT IN U. S.-LATIN AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE INSENSITIVITY AND MISUNDERSTANDING OF HISPANIC-AMERICANS ARE INTERRELATED. OUR CONTINUED REFERENCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA AS "OUR BACKYARD" IS INDICATIVE OF OUR PATERNALISTIC

2

AND CRISIS-ORIENTED MENTALITY. WE HAVE A HISTORY OF NEGLECT AND DISREGARD FOR CENTRAL AMERICA AND THAT NEGLECT CANNOT BE RECTIFIED SIMPLY BY DEFENSIVE RESPONSES TO CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION OR BY THROWING MONEY INTO WARS. IT IS THIS NEGLECT AND DISREGARD THAT HAS HELPED CREATE THE DESPERATE NEED FOR CHANGE.

THIS MENTALITY IS ALSO REFLECTED IN U. S. AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK'S SUGGESTION THAT DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON THE SCALE OF THE MARSHALL PLAN OUGHT TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN ORDER TO THWART SOVIET-BACKED "SUBVERSION" IN CENTRAL AMERICA. SUCH A PLAN ONLY CONSIDERS THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA IN A SOVIET-U. S. CONTEST AND NOT IN THE CONTEST OF FOREIGN AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES. IT IS INDEED UNFORTUNATE THAT AN "EXPERT" ON LATIN AMERICA SHOULD THINK OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE, EDUCATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE ONLY IN TERMS OF A RESPONSE TO CUBAN LITERACY PROGRAMS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND OTHER PROGRAMS PROVIDED TO OUR SOUTHERN FRIENDS BY THE SOVIET UNION.

AS THE DAYS PASS, THE INEVITABLE TRAJECTORY OF OUR PRESENT CENTRAL AMERICA POSTURE BECOMES EVEN MORE EVIDENT AND EVER MORE FOREBODING. THE ADMINISTRATION SEEKS A MILITARY SOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA WHICH WILL HAVE HISPANIC-AMERICANS FIGHTING IN DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBERS AGAINST OUR FELLOW LATIN BROTHERS. HISPANIC-AMERICANS WILL BE THE FIRST ON THE FRON LINE CARRYING OUT THIS UNREALISTIC AND MISTAKEN POLICY AND WE WILL BE THE TARGETS OF THE FRUSTRATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AS SEEN IN THE CALLOUS REFERENCE OF "FLEET PEOPLE." IN VIEW OF THE PARANOIA AND TREATMENT OF THE UNDOCUMENTED WORKER, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT UNDER WAR CONDITIONS WE COULD HEAR THE EXTREMIST CALLS OF THE FAR RIGHT FOR THE

[10]

3

ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNMENT CAMPS FOR "LATIN COMMUNISTS." LULAC DOES NOT VIEW THIS MATTER AS A LIBERAL VERSUS CONSERVATIVE ISSUE BUT RATHER AS A DISASTROUS POLICY WHICH HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN WRONG AND IS NOW THREATENING TO CAUSE EVEN MORE IRREPARABLE HARM. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED AND WE HOPE IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO ALTER OUR COURSE NOW. WE HISPANICS ARE BECOMING MUCH MORE INVOLVED IN THIS DEBATE AND MANY OF US ARE COMMITTED TO PROVIDING OUR DIRECT MILITARY PARTICIPATION.

IT IS THE SHARED OBLIGATION OF THE DECISION MAKERS IN CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION TO SEE THAT INTERNATIONAL AND OUR OWN LAWS ARE OBEYED, THAT PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE WITH OUR NEIGHBORS IS SOUGHT AND MAINTAINED, AND THAT THE LIVES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS ARE PROTECTED. AS THOSE OBLIGATIONS ARE INCREASINGLY VIOLATED AND AS THE NUMBER OF DEATHS OF AMERICANS IN CENTRAL AMERICA INCREASES, WE MUST ASK, WHO IN CONGRESS OR IN THE ADMINISTRATION WISHES TO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILING TO MEET THEIR SHARED OBLIGATIONS? THAT FAILURE MEANS FURTHER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT: THE FINGER BEING POINTED WILL BE THAT OF WAR.

UNDER MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, A FOREIGN POLICY WHICH HAS BROUGHT THE LOSS OF OVER 45,000 LIVES, COUNTLESS HUMAN SUFFERING AND THE EVER GROWING HUMAN TRAGEDY WOULD HAVE WARRANTED MAJOR CHANGES.

UNFORTUNATELY, NONE APPEAR FORTHCOMING. IS IT UN-AMERICAN OR UNFAIR TO QUESTION OR CRITICIZE THE INSANITY OF SUCH A POLICY? I CERTAINLY HOPE NOT.

4

THE ABOVE CONCERNS HAVE RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION AND APPEAR TO BE GROWING IN THEIR ACCEPTANCE BY HISPANICS AND MANY OTHERS. CONTRARY TO THE CONTENTIONS MADE THAT THE STRUGGLES IN CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICA ARE AS A RESULT OF THE LARGER CONFLICT BETWEEN EAST-WEST INTEREST, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE INSTABILITY HAS AS ITS ROOTS UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN ALL FACETS OF LIFE. PERHAPS THE PERUVIAN AUTHOR MARIO VARGAS LLOSA SAID IT BEST IN HIS ARTICLE "INQUEST IN THE ANDES" NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE JULY 31, 1933, IN WHICH HE DESCRIBES THE REASONS BEHIND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY. HE WRITES: "PERHAPS THIS STORY HELPS TO CLARIFY THE REASON FOR THE MIND-SHATTERING VIOLENCE THAT CHARACTERIZES GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA. THESE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS ARE NOT "PEASANT MOVEMENTS." THEY ARE BORN IN THE CITIES, AMONG INTELLECTUALS AND MIDDLE-CLASS MILITANTS WHO, WITH THEIR DOGMATISM AND THEIR RHETORIC, ARE OFTEN AS FOREIGN AND INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO THE PEASANT MASSES AS SENDERO LUMINOSO IS TO THE MEN AND WOMEN OF UCHURACCAY. THE OUTRAGES COMMITTED BY THOSE OTHER STRANGERS -- THE GOVERNMENT FORCES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY - TEND TO WIN PEASANT SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS.

PUT SIMPLY, THE PEASANTS ARE COERCED BY THOSE WHO THINK THEY ARE THE MASTERS OF HISTORY AND ABSOLUTE TRUTH. THE FACT IS THAT THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GUERRILLAS AND THE ARMED FORCES IS REALLY A SETTLING OF ACCOUNTS BETWEEN PRIVILEGED SECTORS OF SOCIETY, AND THE PEASANT MASTERS ARE USED CYNICALLY AND BRUTALLY BY THOSE WHO SAY THEY WANT TO "LIBERATE" THEM. THE PEASANTS ALWAYS SUFFER THE GREATEST NUMBER OF VICTIMS: AT LEAST 750 OF THEM HAVE BEEN KILLED IN PERU SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1933.

5

THE STORY OF THE EIGHT JOURNALISTS REVELAS HOW VULNERABLE DEMOCRACY IS IN LATIN AMERICA AND HOW EASILY IT DIES UNDER MILITARY OR MARXIST-LENINIST DICTATORSHIP. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR PEOPLE TO DEFEND A FREE PRESS, ELECTIONS AND REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WHEN THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT ALLOW THEM TO UNDERSTAND MUCH LESS TO BENEFIT FROM, THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY. DEMOCRACY WILL NEVER BE STRONG IN OUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS LONG AS IT IS THE PRIVILEGE OF ONE SECTOR OF SOCIETY AND AN INCOMPREHENSIBLE ABSTRACTION FOR ALL THE OTHERS. THE DOUBLE THREAT -- THE MODEL OF GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN CHILE AND THE MODEL OF FIDEL CASTRO IN CUBA -- WILL CONTINUE TO HAUNT DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS PEOPLE IN OUR COUNTRIES KILL FOR THE REASONS THAT THE PEASANTS OF UCHURACCAY KILLED."

THIS OBSERVATION IS PERHAPS THE MOST ELOQUENT AND ACCURATE IN DESCRIBING THE CONTINUED STRUGGLES IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE. THEY SHOULD SERVE TO PUT TO REST THE SIMPLISTIC AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CONTENTION THAT COMMUNISM IS UNDER EVERY ROCK AND AT THE ROOT OF ALL INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA. IT IS SAD TO SAY THAT DESPITE SUCH ACCURATE DESCRIPTIONS THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS VIRTUALLY IGNORED THE UNDERLYING REASONS FOR THESE CONTINUED STRUGGLES. AS HISPANICS WHO HAVE HAD TO UNDERGO THE SAME TRIBULATIONS IN SEEKING EQUITY IN THIS COUNTRY, IT IS SAFE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT BY HISPANIC-AMERICANS WILL CONTINUE GROWING AS THE INJUSTICES FACING LATIN AMERICANS CONTINUE TO PARALLEL THOSE OF OURS HERE IN THIS COUNTRY.

THANK YOU.

ON BEHALF OF LULAC, THIS COUNTRY'S OLDEST AND LARGEST HISPANIC ORGANIZATION WITH OVER 100,000 MEMBERS IN 44 STATES, AND AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF A COMMUNITY VERY CONCERNED ABOUT OUR COUNTRY'S ROLE IN THE VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION IN THE COUNTRIES OF FELLOW HISPANICS, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE CHAIRMAN AND SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF FOR HAVING ALLOWED US TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS ON THE MATTER OF PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION FOR U.S. AID TO EL SALVADOR.

THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EL SALVADOR AND THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE WAR FOR MANY REASONS. DUE TO OUR BACKGROUND, WE ARE MORE SENSITIVE TO AND HAVE A GREATER DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SITUATION THAN MANY AMERICANS. MOREOVER, WE FIND THE CULTURAL INSENSITIVITY AND IGNORANCE WHICH IS PREVALENT IN U.S./LATIN AMERICAN POLICY AND THE INSENSITIVITY TOWARDS AND MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY IN THIS COUNTRY VERY MUCH INTERRELATED. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS ATTITUDE WHICH CONCERNS US IS THE RECENT SUGGESTION BY THE U.S. DELEGATE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, THAT DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ON THE SCALE OF THE MARSHALL PLAN OUGHT TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN ORDER TO THWART SOVIET-BACKED "SUBVERSION" IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SUCH A PLAN ONLY CONSIDERS THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA IN A SOVIET/U.S. CONTEXT AND NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES. IT IS INDEED UNFORTUNATE THAT MS. KIRKPATRICK SHOULD THINK OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE, AND EDUCATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL ASSISTANCE ONLY IN TERMS OF A RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN LITERACY PROGRAMS AND THE FELLOWSHIPS AND OTHER PROGRAMS PROVIDED TO LATIN AMERICA BY THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE A HISTORY OF NEGLECT AND DISREGARD FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THAT NEGLECT CANNOT BE RECTIFIED SIMPLY BY DEFENSIVE RESPONSES TO CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION OR BY THROWING MONEY INTO PROGRAMS OR INTO WARS.

ANOTHER STARK EXAMPLE OF CULTURAL INSENSITIVITY AND IGNORANCE TOWARDS HISPANICS ARE THE RECENT STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND VICE PRESIDENT BUSH REGARDING

THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA. ON FEBRUARY 28 OF THIS YEAR SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ ATTACKED "CHURCHMEN WHO WANT TO SEE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN EL SALVADOR IMPROVED." SHORTLY AFTERWARD, ON THE EVE OF POPE JOHN PAUL II'S VISIT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, VICE PRESIDENT BUSH SUGGESTED THAT CATHOLIC CLERGYMEN ARE SUPPORTING MARXIST REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA. IT IS INCONCEIVABLE TO US, NOT ONLY AS A LARGELY CATHOLIC COMMUNITY BUT AS PEOPLE, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD HAVE THE ARROGANCE TO BELITTLE THE CHARITABLE AND OFTEN DANGEROUS AND THANKLESS WORK OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE POPE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN EL SALVADOR HAS BEEN TO DEFEND HUMAN LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY, BOTH OF WHICH ARE VERY THREATENED. THE CHURCH HAS RECOGNIZED THAT THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE MORE THAN PAWS IN POWER STRUGGLES AND POLITICAL RIVALRIES: THEY ARE HUMAN BEINGS WHO WANT AND DESERVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE AND WORK IN PEACE UNDER A GOVERNMENT THAT WILL PROTECT THOSE RIGHTS. THESE ARE THINGS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PERPETRATORS OF THE BLOODSHED AND REPRESSION IN CENTRAL AMERICA HAVE YET TO DEFEND OR TO RECOGNIZE. WE SHOULD HAVE HOPED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S. WOULD NOT SEEK TO DEFAME THE POPE'S SEARCH FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT RATHER WOULD SUPPORT AND OFFER EVERY ASSISTANCE TO IT.

ATTITUDES AND POLICIES SUCH AS THESE, WHICH DEMONSTRATE TERRIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING OF LATIN AMERICA, VERY MUCH OFFEND AND AFFECT HISPANICS IN THIS COUNTRY AS WELL. PRESENT U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EL SALVADOR ALSO IMPACTS OUR COMMUNITY BY BRINGING WITH IT NEW HISPANIC REFUGEES TO OUR BORDER; REFUGEES WHO ARE UNFORTUNATELY NOT OFFICIALLY WELCOMED OR EVEN RECOGNIZED AS POLITICAL REFUGEES. THERE ARE OVER 500,000 UNDOCUMENTED SALVADORAN REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES. IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ALONE THERE ARE SOME 65,000 TO 80,000, WITH MORE COMING EVERY DAY.

A PRIVATE, INDEPENDENT STUDY PREPARED BY COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL (CTI) TO IDENTIFY THE POTENTIAL MARKET FOR A SPANISH-SPEAKING RADIO STATION IN THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA CONCLUDES BY STATING:

THE IMMIGRATION FROM LATIN AMERICA TO WASHINGTON, D.C. WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNREST IN THESE COUNTRIES, AS IS THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR AND CUBA. SHOULD THE POLITICAL UNREST SUBSIDE, WE CAN ASSUME AN ANNUAL HISPANIC GROWTH RATE OF 6.81%. SHOULD THE POLITICAL UNREST CONTINUE, THE HISPANIC POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF 195,671 BY 1985 AND 240,293 BY 1990 (IN WASHINGTON, D.C.) COULD BE CONSIDERED CONSERVATIVE.

BETWEEN 1970 AND 1980 THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY OF THIS COUNTRY GREW BY 61%, IN PART DUE TO MAJOR MOVEMENTS TO THE U.S. OF PEOPLE FROM CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, FROM MARCH 1979 TO MARCH 1981. THE NUMBER OF CENTRAL OR SOUTH AMERICANS IN THE U.S. INCREASED FROM 840,000 TO 1,022,000, THUS BECOMING THE FASTEST GROWING HISPANIC GROUP OF PEOPLE. THIS BECOMES A CYCLICAL PROBLEM. OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR IN EL SALVADOR PUSHES REFUGEES TO OUR BORDER, WHICH IN TURN HELPS CREATE THE CLIMATE FOR DEFENSIVE, PROTECTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICY AND CONDEMNS SALVADORAN REFUGEES TO A LIFE OF FEAR. OVER 6,000 SALVADORANS HAVE BEEN DEPORTED BACK TO THE WAR IN THEIR COUNTRY, WHICH DEFENSE MINISTER GUILLERMO JOSE GARCIA HAS SAID IS BEING FOUGHT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THAT OF EL SALVADOR. INNOCENT SALVADORANS ARE BEING DENIED THE SHELTER OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARE BEING SENT BACK TO THE INESCAPABLE VIOLENCE OF A U.S. SUPPORTED WAR. IN VIEW OF THIS PROBLEM, LULAC HAS SUPPORTED AND URGES YOU TO SUPPORT AN INITIATIVE TO GRANT SALVADORANS EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE UNTIL THE UNREST IN EL SALVADOR SUBSIDES.

EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE IS THE ONLY HUMANE POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO EMPLOY WITH REGARDS TO SALVADORAN REFUGEES, BUT IT DOES NOT ADDRESS THE LARGER PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM OF SALVADORAN REFUGEES WILL ONLY BE ADDRESSED WHEN THERE IS A POLITICAL OUTLET FOR THE TENSION IN EL SALVADOR, AND A DEESCALATION OF THE MILITARY APPROACH TO THAT TENSION.

ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE A MILITARY EXPERT TO KNOW THAT THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THIS WAR. ITS ROOTS ARE HISTORICAL AND INCLUDE 30,000 VICTIMS KILLED IN A CIVILIAN UPRISE IN 1932. IF THERE WERE TO BE A TEMPORARY MILITARY VICTORY ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH AT PRESENT LOOKS UNLIKELY, THE WAR WOULD BEGIN AGAIN SHORTLY. THIRTY THOUSAND DEATHS IN 1932 DID NOT STOP THE UNREST IN EL SALVADOR AND FORTY THOUSAND IN THE 1980S HAS NOT AND WILL NOT. IF THERE WERE TO BE A MILITARY VICTORY BY THE LEFT, WHICH PRESENTLY APPEARS LESS UNLIKELY, HOW LONG WOULD IT BE BEFORE WE STARTED READING IN NEWSWEEK ABOUT COVERT OPERATIONS DIRECTED AT EL SALVADOR? THE FURTHER WE BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS WAR AND THE MORE INTRANSIENT WE BECOME IN OUR STANCE, THE FURTHER WE WILL DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION, THE HARDER WE WILL ALLOW OURSELVES TO FALL, AND THE CLOSER WE COME TO THE FEARED "VIETNAMIZATION" OF EL SALVADOR AND PERHAPS OF CENTRAL AMERICA. ALREADY ONE AMERICAN SOLDIER HAS BEEN WOUNDED, THREE AMERICAN ADVISORS HAVE BEEN SENT HOME FOR HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN TACTICAL MISSIONS, A37 DRAGONFLY JETS PROVIDED BY THE U.S. HAVE REPORTEDLY BOMBED OR ROCKETED AN

AREA WHERE 258 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN IS ASKING
FOR ALMOST SIX TIMES THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY AID CONGRESS HAS APPROPRIATED
TO EL SALVADOR FOR THIS YEAR OR, HE THREATENS, HE WILL SEND MORE AMERICAN
PERSONNEL TO EL SALVADOR AND WILL PERHAPS ALLOW THAT PERSONNEL TO WORK
MORE CLOSELY WITH THE SALVADORAN TROOPS.

IT IS SOMEWHAT REASSURING TO KNOW THAT THERE ARE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
WHO RECOGNIZE THE DANGEROUS DIRECTION IN WHICH WE ARE MOVING WITH REGARDS
TO EL SALVADOR. WE APPRECIATE SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE'S RECENT COMMENT
THAT "ONE CANNOT EASILY FORGET VIETNAM, ESPECIALLY IF YOU HAD TO LIVE
THROUGH THAT EXPERIENCE, REALIZING THAT YOUR DECISIONS WOULD AFFECT THE
LIVES OF MANY YOUNG PEOPLE." WE ASK, THOUGH, THAT IT ALSO BE RECOGNIZED
THAT YOUR DECISIONS AS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ALSO AFFECT THE LIVES OF TENS
OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT SALVADORANS. IN REVIEWING THE $144 MILLION WE
HAVE GIVEN TO EL SALVADOR IN MILITARY AID IN THE LAST TWO AND ONE HALF
YEARS AND THE ESTIMATED 40,000 DEATHS IN THAT TIME PERIOD, WE SEE A RATIO
OF ABOUT 278 DEATHS FOR EVERY MILLION DOLLARS SPENT. IN A SENSE THEN,
PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PRESENTLY REQUESTING THE RESOURCES TO PROVIDE FOR
SOME 31,000 MORE DEATHS, FOR NOW.

THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVEN ITSELF "STRONG" ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE
SEEMINGLY ENDLESS REQUESTS FOR OUR TAXDOLLARS TO LET THE SALVADORAN
MILITARY PROTECT WHAT SOME VIEW AS OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. WE HAVE
PROVEN OURSELVES "STRONG" ENOUGH TO WATCH AS TENS OF THOUSANDS OF
INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE KILLED AND MAIMED AND TORTURED IN THE NAME OF
ANTI-COMMUNISM AND OUR SELF-DEFENSE. WE ARE PRESENTLY PROVING
OURSELVES "STRONG" ENOUGH TO ENTERTAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF ALLOWING
OUR TAX-PROVIDED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION AND TRAINING TO BE USED IN THE
KILLING OF TENS OF THOUSANDS MORE, YET WE REFUSE TO ALLOW OR ENCOURAGE
THE DISPUTING PARTIES TO SIT DOWN AND TALK. WE HAVE IMPOSED THE KINDS
OF REFORMS AND ELECTIONS WHICH WE AS AMERICANS SEE AS POSITIVE, BUT
THEY HAVE NOT WORKED: THE WAR CONTINUES. WHY SHOULD THE DISPUTING
PARTIES NOT SIT DOWN AND DECIDE WHAT REFORMS AND ELECTIONS THEY VIEW
AS NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE. DO THEY NOT KNOW BETTER THAN WE WHAT
REFORMS WILL ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS FACING EL SALVADOR? HOW CAN WE BE
SO FEARLESS AND INDIFFERENT IN PROVIDING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION AND SO
FEARFUL AND ADAMANT IN THE FACE OF DIALOGUE? NOW IS THE TIME FOR SUCH
DIALOGUE. IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT SALVADORAN LIVES AND
OUR TAXDOLLARS ARE BEING WASTED ON A WAR THAT HAS NO END. THE FRENTE
FARABUNDO MARTI PARA LA LIBERACION NACIONAL (FMLN) AND THE FRENTE
DEMOCRATICO REVOLUCIONARIO (FDR) DELIVERED A PROPOSAL TO INITIATE
DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO PRESIDENT MAGANA ON OCTOBER 5, 1982
AND EXPRESSED THAT WILLINGNESS IN A LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN ON

ON DECEMBER 27, 1981. THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIALOGUE IS PRESENT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF IT OFFERING A SOLUTION OR A STABILIZING INFLUENCE TO THE SITUATION IS GREATER THAN THAT POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR ALL OF THE MILITARY AID THE UNITED STATES CAN AFFORD OR IMAGINE.

WE BELIEVE THAT MILITARY AID SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN TO EL SALVADOR, AND THAT THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS HAS BECOME OBSOLETE THROUGH MISUSE. WE BELIEVE THAT PRESENTLY THE REFORMS WHICH ARE PART OF THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS ARE BEING USED MORE TO APPEASE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND AS A POLITICAL TACTIC FOR SECURING MORE AID FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR THAN FOR INTEGRATING THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR INTO A POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM WHICH WILL MEET THEIR NEEDS. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS CREATED THE NEED FOR A NEW CERTIFICATION PROCESS WITH HIS RECENT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR. CONGRESS MUST REASSESS U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR AND DECIDE THE DIRECTION OF FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS EL SALVADOR. WE URGE YOU TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DEESCALATE THE TRAGIC AND TIRESOME WAR IN EL SALVADOR BY CONDITIONING FUTURE AID TO EL SALVADOR TO THE REALIZATION OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE DISPUTING FORCES. THROUGH SUCH A DIALOGUE THE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE OPPOSITION FULL PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS CAN BE NEGOTIATED. ELECTIONS WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE THE FDR/FMLN WILL NOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OR REALITIES FACING EL SALVADOR TODAY. THE PROBLEM OF A PLURALISTIC, REPRESENTATIVE ELECTION BECAME MORE IMMEDIATE AND MORE DIFFICULT WHEN PRESIDENT MAGANA ANNOUNCED, WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S ENCOURAGEMENT, THAT THE NEXT ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD IN DECEMBER OF THIS YEAR RATHER THAN NEXT MARCH AS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED. IN VIEW OF THIS TIGHT TIME FRAME, LULAC RECOMMENDS THAT A NINETY DAY SUSPENSION OF MILITARY ARMS AND AMMUNITION SHIPMENTS BE IMPOSED AT THE NEAREST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH WOULD BE OVERSEEN BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND DURING WHICH TIME A DIALOGUE WOULD BE INITIATED.

LULAC FINDS UNACCEPTABLE REPORTS OF OVER ONE BILLION DOLLARS LEAVING IN CAPITAL FLIGHT IN TWO YEARS AND OF U.S. TAX DOLLARS BEING USED TO REPLACE THE MONEY LEAVING EL SALVADOR IN UNPAID DIVIDEND, AND MOST RECENTLY, OF SOME 25 MILLION DOLLARS ALLOCATED TO THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM BEING UNACCOUNTABLE. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) AUDIT THE USE OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC AID BEFORE ANY FUTURE AID BE GIVEN. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT OUR ECONOMIC EFFORTS IN THE SHORT RUN BE DIRECTED TO HUMANITARIAN AID FOR REFUGEES AND PEOPLE DISLOCATED DUE TO THE WAR, RATHER THAN THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH IS UNDER ATTACK BY THE GUERRILLAS. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS APPEARED IN A WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE OF MARCH 17, 1983, WHICH SAYS:

6

ASKED HOW LONG THE (CLARENCE E. LONG SCHOOL, BEING
BUILT AS A PART OF THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (AID) PROGRAM IN BERLIN) WOULD STAND,...
THE CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISOR SMILED AND SAID 'OH,
UNTIL THE 'MUCHACHOS' (GUERRILLAS) COME AND BLOW
IT UP.

ONLY WHEN THE SITUATION IS SOMEWHAT STABILIZED CAN AID FOR THE INFRASTRUCTURE
OF THE COUNTRY BE USED EFFECTIVELY. THE TAX DOLLARS WASTED IN THIS ENDLESS
WAR, ABUSED BY SALVADORAN OFFICIALS, AND USED UNWISELY IN REBUILDING AN
INFRASTRUCTURE UNDER ATTACK ARE ESPECIALLY HARD TO JUSTIFY IN VIEW OF THE
ECONOMIC SITUATION WE ARE FACING TODAY. OUR INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR
INCREASES OUR DEFICIT, PLACES FURTHER DEBT ON EL SALVADOR AND IS PAID
WITH OUR TAXES. WE CAN ILL AFFORD THIS UNPRODUCTIVE BURDEN IN VIEW OF
THE PRESENT RECESSION AND THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM WHICH ARE
REQUIRING SACRIFICES FROM SO MANY AMERICANS, BUT ESPECIALLY FROM HISPANIC
AMERICANS.

THE WAR IN EL SALVADOR IS NOT ONLY COSTING US TAX DOLLARS, WE ARE ALSO PAYING ITS PRICE BY COMPROMISING OUR VALUES AND BY ISOLATING OURSELVES FROM OUR ALLIES. THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AMERICAN EMBASSY, AND ADMINISTRATION ARE PLACED IN THE SCHIZOPHRENIC POSITION OF HAVING TO DEFEND THOSE WHO DISREGARD AMERICAN VALUES AND AMERICAN LIFE RATHER THAN DEFEND AMERICAN VALUES AND AMERICAN LIFE. THE NEW YORK TIMES OF MARCH 9, 1982 STATES THAT "THE FAMILY OF A YOUNG AMERICAN (MICHAEL KLINE) KILLED BY SALVADORAN SOLDIERS CHARGES THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD DELAYED INVESTIGATING THE DEATH TO PROTECT ITS CONTENTION THAT EL SALVADOR IS MAKING PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. IT GOES ON TO QUOTE MARK ROSENBAUM, WHO IS REPRESENTING THE KLINE FAMILY, AS HAVING SAID "THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS TREATING THIS CASE AS IF IT WERE CLOSED BECAUSE THE TRUTH ENTIRELY UNDERMINES THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION. A WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE OF JANUARY 19, 1983 DISCUSSES THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ORIGINAL COVERUP OF THE MURDERS OF THE AMERICAN CHURCHWOMEN KILLED IN EL SALVADOR AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THOSE INDICTED FOR THE MURDERS BEING UNDER ORDER BY SUPERIORS TO COMMIT THE CRIME. IT STATES "U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE SAID PRIVATELY THAT THEY HAVE NEITHER CONCRETE LEADS NOR THE DESIRE TO PURSUE SUCH ISSUES." ON OCTOBER 29, 1982, WHEN OUR AMBASSADOR TO EL SALVADOR, DEANE HINTON, STATED TO THE AMERICAN AND SALVADORAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE THAT IF THE AMERICAN VALUES OF HUMAN RIGHTS WERE NOT RESPECTED, AMERICAN AID MIGHT BE WITHHELD, HIS COMMENTS WERE IMMEDIATELY DOWNPLAYED AND LATER CONTRADICTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH CERTIFIED THAT THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENTAL REGIME OF EL SALVADOR WAS WORTHY OF OUR AID DESPITE TREMENDOUS EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

7

THE MAJOR CONTENTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY IN EL SALVADOR IS THAT WE MUST CONTAIN THE SPREAD OF SOVIET, MARXIST-LENINIST INFLUENCE AND DETER THE MULTIPLICATION OF OTHER CUBAS AND NICARAGUAS IN THE REGION NO MATTER WHAT THE COST AND NO MATTER WHO WE MUST BEFRIEND IN ORDER TO DO SO. THEY DO NOT SEEM TO REALIZE THAT THE MORE INFLEXIBLE AND SINGLE-MINDED OUR STANCE THE MORE LIKELY AND HARDER WE ARE ALLOWING OURSELVES TO FALL. ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT JUSTIFICATIONS FOR OUR INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVAODR IS THAT WE MUST COUNTERBALANCE THE AID BEING PROVIDED TO THE GUERRILLAS BY NICARAGUA, AND THEREFORE, INDIRECTLY BY THE SOVIET UNION. A WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE OF FEBRUARY 21, 1983 REFUTES THAT CONTENTION. IT QUOTES A U.S. OFFICIAL AS HAVING SAID "IT IS VERY POSSIBLE NICARAGUA IS NOT FEEDING ANYTHING BUT PEANUTS INTO EL SALVADOR," AND AN INFORMED MILITARY OFFICER AS HAVING SAID "I NEVER THOUGHT NICARAGUAN ARMS SUPPLIES ARE CRITICAL." ANOTHER WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE, FROM MARCH 15, 1983, CREDITS DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY FRED C. IKLE WITH HAVING SAID THAT THE SANDINISTAS HAVE RECEIVED 1.6 BILLION DOLLARS IN NON-SOVIET AID, OVER TWICE THE 440 MILLION DOLLARS THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIETS. THE DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY ALSO SAID THAT OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES "EITHER WANT TO REMAIN QUITE IGNORANT ABOUT WHAT REALLY GOES ON AND PERMIT THEMSELVES TO BE DECEIVED BY TOTALITARIAN PROPAGANDA OR SOME MAY BE OUTRIGHT MISCHIEVOUS." WHETHER THEY ARE MISCHIEVOUS OR WE ARE SINGLE-MINDED, WE ARE ISOLATING OURSELVES FROM OUR ALLIES. THIS DISCORD CAN ALSO BE WITNESSED THROUGH REPORTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND BY THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES WHICH CONTRADICT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S assertion that there have been IMPROVEMENTS WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, AND THROUGH APPEALS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE WAR GIVEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS, THE MEXICAN, COSTA RICAN AND VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENTS, POPE JOHN PAUL II, THE LATE ARCHBISHOP ROMERO AND THE PRESENT ARCHBISHOP RIVERA Y DAMAS OF EL SALVADOR.

IN CONCLUSION, LULAC CONTENDS THAT THE CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THAT WAR ARE AT A DECIDING STAGE, AND THAT THE FURTHER MILITARIZATION OF THE SITUATION, RATHER THAN DETERING THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER CUBA OR NICARAGUA, WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THAT POSSIBILITY. WHILE THE POSSIBLE ESCALATION OF THE WAR IS IMMINENT, THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A POLITICAL FORUM TO VENT AND RESOLVE THE TENSION IN EL SALVADOR IS JUST AS PRESENT IF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE WILLING TO DEFEND THAT ALTERNATIVE. THE BLAME FOR OUR INVOLVEMENT IN EL SALVADOR CAN NO LONGER BY PLACED SOLELY ON THE ADMINISTRATION. CONGRESS MUST TAKE A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE ON THIS VITAL ISSUE. IT MUST BE CONGRESS, BECAUSE IT WILL NOT BE THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE A MORE POLITICALLY INTELLIGENT, PRACTICAL, HUMANE AND RATIONAL SOLUTION TO THE CIVIL STRIFE IN EL SALVADOR.

8

LULAC'S RECOMMENDATIONS ARE:

* THAT REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID BE FIRMLY OPPOSED,

* THAT A NINETY DAY SUSPENSION OF MILITARY ARMS AND AMMUNITION SHIPMENTS BE IMPOSED AND OVERSEEN BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, DURING WHICH TIME A DIALOGUE BE INITIATED,

* THAT THERE BE AN AUDIT OF ECONOMIC AID TO EL SALVADOR BEFORE FURTHER ECONOMIC AID BE GIVEN,

* THAT ECONOMIC AID TARGET THE MEDICAL, NUTRITIONAL AND HOUSING NEEDS OF ALL REFUGEES IN EL SALVADOR, AND

* THAT SALVADORAN REFUGEES IN THE U.S. BE GRANTED EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE UNTIL THE WAR IN THEIR COUNTRY SUBSIDES.

CONGRESS' STANCE ON THIS ISSUE WILL DECIDE THE USE OF MILLIONS OF U.S. TAXDOLLARS AND OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA. IT WILL ALSO INFLUENCE THE STABILIZATION OR FURTHER DESTABILIZATION OF OUR NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND OUR RELATIONS WITH U.S. POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA AND TOWARDS HISPANICS IN GENERAL. MOST IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, IT WILL GREATLY IMPACT THE LIVES AND FUTURES OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE, WHO, IF PRESENT POLICY IS CONTINUED, MAY INCLUDE MORE AMERICANS THAN THOSE ALREADY KILLED IN EL SALVADOR.

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DÍAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN LLOYD BENTSEN
REP WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN DANIEL K. INOUYE
REP JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR WINSTON LORD
SEN CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP JAMES C. WRIGHT

November 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Commissioners and Counsellors

FROM: Harry Shlaudeman, Executive Director

SUBJECT: Controversy about Roberto D'Aubuisson's Testimony

On October 21, a telegram was sent to Dr. Kissinger from Major Roberto D'Aubuisson (Attachment No. 1) in which D'Aubuisson challenged the report on his testimony, before the Commission October 12, that appeared in the October 18 Washington Post (Attachment No. 3) alleging that the El Salvadoran Armed Forces were behind the death squads. He implied that Dr. Kissinger ought to make a clarification to that effect.

The telegram was prompted by an inquiry directed to D'Aubuisson from the Minister of Defense to whom D'Aubuisson sent a reply (Attachment No. 2) enclosing a copy of his telex to Dr. Kissinger.

When apprised of the messages in the Far East, Dr. Kissinger did not indicate that he wished to reply directly to D'Aubuisson. He authorized the release of the text of the message, which was subsequently released separately by the Ministry of Defense in El Salvador.

Attachments:

As stated

2201 C STREET NW., ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520. TEL: (202) 632-7804

ATTACHMENT NO. 1

Dr. Henry Kissinger
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
Washington, D.C.

With all due respect to you and the members of your Commission, we, the delegates of ARENA who attended the private meeting held with you on October 12 at the Hotel Presidente of San Salvador, have learned about a report published in the Washington Post, bylined by reporter Edward Cody, wherein it is stated that the undersigned asserted that our armed forces is the organizer of extreme right groups. In consideration of your international prestige and the great responsibility that you personally share as the head of that Commission I feel it is my duty to clarify the misinterpretation. If any member of your Commission made that kind of statement he made it in a totally distorted manner, and it will be you who will have to explain the factual distortion in order to ensure the seriousness and impartiality of your important mission and of your responsibility for formulating a policy is appropriate to the realities and the needs of my homeland, El Salvador, and of Central America.

Con el debido respeto que usted y los miembros de esa comisión se merecen, nos hemos
enterado los delegados de Arena que estuvimos con ustedes en la audiencia privada
en el Hotel Presidente de San Salvador el día 12 de octubre, de una noticia aparecida
en el Washington Post y responsabilizada por el periodista Edward Cody, en la cual
dicen que el suscrito afirmó que nuestra fuerza armada es la organizadora de grupos
ultra derechistas. Dado su prestigio internacional y la gran responsabilidad que
sobre su persona recae como dirigente de esa comisión, creo es mi deber aclarar
la errónea interpretación, y si algún miembro de esa comisión dió dichas declaraciones
las ha dado totalmente tergiversadas por lo que será usted quien tendrá que explicar
esta distorción de la realidad, para garantizar la seriedad e imparcialidad de la
importante misión y responsabilidad que Ud. tiene, para que se pueda estrucutar una
política congruente con las realidades y necesidades de mi patria El Salvador y
Centroamérica.

Afectuosamente

Roberto D'Aubuisson Arieta

ATTACHMENT NO. 2

October 21, 1983

Minister of Defense and Public Safety
General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova

Dear Mr. Minister:

Regarding your Note #6419 dated October 19, 1983, I communicate to you the following: that the article published in the Washington Post bylined by reporter Edward Cody is totally incorrect since the said reporter was not present at the Kissinger Committee meeting nor does he mention what member of that Commission made those statements. For that reason it is quite possible that he may have completely distorted the statements expressed before the said Commission. I appreciate your note and I reiterate that, first of all, I am a military man and secondarily a politician. Among the principles sustained by the political party I represent there is one that literally says: the Salvadoran Armed Forces are acknowledged as the only armed branch of the people and as such it deserves the complete support and recognition in the fulfillment of their constitutional duty. These principles are not only written down in documents, but on the occasions that we have made them public we have reiterated our support of our Armed Forces, and at no time will the writer of this note, or our party, be the ones to discredit this noble armed institution of El Salvador. Likewise, I would like to bring to your knowledge that on this very date I have sent a telex to Dr. Henry Kissinger in order to ratify, I repeat, ratify, what has been stated in this note, I repeat, in this note. I am communicating this to you requesting at the same time that you bring it to the knowledge of the armed institution that you represent.

Roberto D'Aubuisson
President of Constituent
Assembly

October 21, 1983

Sr. Ministro de Defensa y de Seguridad Pública
General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova

Sr. Ministro:

En relación a su Nota No. 6419 de fecha 19 de Octubre del corriente año comunitario que la publicación aparecida en el Washington Post y responsabilizada por el periodista Edward Cody es totalmente incorrecta puesto que dicho periodista no participó en la Comisión Kissinger ni menciona que miembro de esa Comisión aportó esas declaraciones por lo que es factible que haya tergiversado totalmente los conceptos que al respecto plantea ante la mencionada Comisión. Agradezco su nota y reitérole que primero soy militar y luego político así como también dentro de los principios que sustentamos en el partido que represento está el que literalmente dice: se reconoce a la fuerza armada salvadoreña como único brazo armado del pueblo y como tal merece total apoyo y reconocimiento en el cumplimiento de sus deberes constitucionales, principios que no solo están escritos en los documentos sinó que en las veces que hemos salido al público reiteramos el apoyo a nuestra fuerza armada y en ningún momento será el subscrito o nuestro partido quienes desprestigiaremos a la noble institución armada salvadoreña. Asimismo hago de su conocimiento en esta misma fecha he enviado un telex al Sr. Dr. Henry Kissinger para que se ratifique, repito ratifique lo expresado en esta nota, repito en esta nota, lo que comuníco a Ud. solicitándole al mismo tiempo que por su medio sea del conocimiento a la institución armada que Ud. representa.

Education


*22. Primary Age Children and Enrollments - Honduras

III. EFFORTS TO REDUCE BIRTHS

*23. Effects of Delay in Starting a Program to Reduce Fertility

*24. Family Planning - Requirements for Smaller Family Size

*25. Family Planning Costs to Attain a 3-Child Family Average in 20 Years

LEWIS M. ROBERTS

November 1983

Some Facts and Reflection on Central America
that Bear on the Process of Refining
Present United States International Policies in that Region

Gentlemen, the tremendously important and extremely complex task of your Commission to advise the President and other leaders of our government on the refinement of the U.S. foreign policies vis-a-vis Central America would be much simpler if this region were a geopolitical entity. Central America is a geographic term used to designate a narrow strip of land extending from the southern boundary of Mexico to the northern frontier of Colombia. It has only slight significance in the geopolitical sense. Its total area of 207,000 square miles is slightly less than that of Texas and about 20 percent larger than California. There are geographic similarities that extend throughout the region such as topography, rainfall, temperature patterns, etc., which are basically responsible for the six countries in the region producing a similar list of agricultural commodities. All of the six countries share a common language and a basic cultural and religious background. Agriculture and forestry provide the fundamental economic base for all of them and will continue to do so for many years to come. The percentage of the labor force engaged in agriculture ranges from a low of 36 percent in Costa Rica to a high of 61 percent in Honduras. All of the six countries are underdeveloped. The average annual per capita income ranges from a high of about $1700 in Costa Rica and Panama to a low of about $560 in Honduras. In all of the countries, with perhaps Costa Rica being an exception, marked disparity characterizes the distribution of the national incomes with a large share going to a small wealthy class and a small percentage going to the large mass of very poor people. In general, the governments are not very responsive to the needs of the citizens, and basic services such as education and training at all levels, health and

1) Costa Rica has traditionally had a democratic form of government that has been much more responsive to the aspirations and needs of its people.

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agricultural research and extension are inadequate. These similarities, and others that could be mentioned, do not, however, signify that the Central American region is a geopolitical entity. Each of the six countries has its own identity and character that are quite distinct from the others. Disharmony characterizes, in general, the relationships between these countries almost from the time they became sovereign countries; and this condition continues now.

The total population of the region as of mid-1982, according to the Population Reference Bureau, was approximately 24 million. For comparison purposes, the 1980 census showed Texas to have about 14 million and California, 24 million.

When I began visiting the six countries of Central America in the late 1940s, the total population of the region was around 9 million. During that time there was little evidence of serious social strife and political unrest. The oligarch-military-church combination had little difficulty in running the governments of five of the six countries in the region because there was enough food and other basic necessities available to the general populace to keep it largely passive. This has changed dramatically in a span of only about 30 years; and of the many factors that have contributed to the present state of ferment and instability in Central America, none ranks higher in basic importance than the fact that the population of the region has increased about 2½ fold in only three decades. While some progress has been made in the past couple of decades to reduce the population growth rates in all of the six countries, this gives scant hope for the future of this region unless this progress can be greatly accelerated in the very near future. At the present population growth rate, the total population of the region will be doubled to about 48 million in less than thirty years. The implication this has on the formulation of updated and projected U.S. foreign policy guidelines for Central America is self-evident.

Guatemala, with about 20 percent of the total land area and approximately 1/3 of the population of the entire region, probably has the greatest potential for development of any of the Central American countries, although to date this has been only partially achieved. In its development

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process from its very beginning, Guatemala has had a massive racial or ethnic problem to deal with. Twenty years ago, more than 50 percent of its total population were of pure Indian blood of Mayan descent. The remainder were comprised of mainly caucasians and mestizos (a cross between white and Indian). The latter, plus a small percentage of Indians who have exchanged their Indian dress and culture for Western culture, are called Ladinos. Still today, the percentage of pure Indians in the total population is estimated to be about 50 percent. No other country in Central America has this problem to any significant degree. It has had a major impact on the formation of the nation's character and on the country's development efforts. The Indians have always been at the bottom of the social and economic scale, and they are growing increasingly restless with their lot in the national context. This presents an explosive situation which the political leaders must face up to right away if the danger of an eruption in the not-to-long distant future is to be defused. To accomplish this, major changes will be required in the government's philosophy, strategy and tactics for dealing with this Indian problem and large investments in programs that will effectively raise the economic and social level of this large sector of the population, and the many other poor people in the society. Military force alone is not the real answer to this problem, but there seems to be a good likelihood that it will be used increasingly to try to control the situation if it worsens - which is entirely possible.

El Salvador presents by far the most difficult long-term problem to deal with of all the countries in Central America. It has approximately 5 million people in its area of 8,260 square miles, or a density of population of about 600 per square mile. This is about ten times the population density in the U.S.A. We think we have more than enough problems to deal with here in our country in trying to meld together a humane society of 226 million, and I wonder if we would not consider this problem intractable if we had to deal with a total population of 2.2 billion. There is no doubt in my mind that it is in the best interest of our country to continue giving strong support to the present government of El Salvador, which was elected by a substantial majority in an open election, in its present conflict with

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rebel forces, short of committing U.S. military forces to armed combat in that country. Victory by the government should not be measured by the in-flexible demands of the relatively small faction of extreme right-wingers in El Salvador who are unwilling to settle for less than total extermination, or at least total domination, of the rebels. The victory that should be sought by the government, and with the sympathetic understanding and col-laboration from other countries in the region together with our own, should be peace with justice and compassion. Once this goal is reached, and it should be attainable, then the opportunities will open up for the people of El Salvador, with wise leadership from their government, to begin rebuild-ing their economy and their society on a more solid and equitable founda-tion than they have had heretofore. This will be a long, arduous task that basically has to be accomplished by the Salvadorians, but they will simply never be able to get this done on their own. They will have to have large amount of both economic and technical assistance and, especially the first, will be available to them mainly from the U.S.A. if it is willing to provide the necessary support. It would surely be in the best interest of the U.S.A. to do this if the Salvadorians demonstrate that they are seriously commit-ted to accomplishing the political, social and economic reforms that have long been needed.

Honduras is perhaps the least developed of the Central American countries. It has the lowest annual average per capita income ($560) of all the countries in the region. This need not be so because Honduras does have a lot of good land resources appropriate for various sorts of agricultural and livestock production and for timber. It has a variety of climates rang-ing from the hot-wet to hot-arid, along with cool to cold in the mountains. Some of the good land resources are intensively used (for example export banana production on the Atlantic coast) but much of its land is underuti-lized or scarcely used at all. In a way, Honduras is fortunate to be among the few underpopulated countries left. On the other hand, this presents some serious problems and anxieties. The soccer match war with El Salvador several years ago was basically a demographic war. Now the Hondurans are nervous about their ability to fend off encroachments of their neighbors to the south.

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These external defense problems are real and bothersome to be
sure, but the basic problem in Honduras is one of development almost across
the entire gamut and a more equitable distribution of the fruits of that
development among the entire populace. This entails improvement of the
whole range of government organizations and services in the basic fields
such as health, education, research, extension, finances, etc. If the
Honduras really commit themselves to bringing about the basic changes that
are necessary for economic and social development, the U.S.A. should, I
believe, go all out with them to achieve these goals; and if this were done,
it should be possible to achieve solid results and improvement within a
decade or two.

My comments with respect to Nicaragua will be very brief. I do
not feel that I can contribute significantly to the vast state of confusion
about the present situation in that country as a consequence of the con-
stant deluge of conflicting reports and opinions that we receive daily from
television and our other news media. I do know that Nicaragua has sub-
stantial agricultural production potential which is somewhat comparable to
that of Honduras. During the 43-year tenure of the Somoza dynasty, the re-
cord of achievement to develop this potential and to use the fruits of such
achievements to benefit broadly the populace of Nicaragua is dismal. This
is so despite the fact that the U.S.A. has been consistently generous over
the years with its economic assistance, much of which was siphoned from
the government's coffers for personal use by Somoza and his friends.

Costa Rica has a long tradition of a democracy, and it provides
a good example of how a democratic form of government in the Central Amer-
ican setting can be made to function effectively for the good of its con-
stituency. Although Costa Rica is only approximately one-third the size
of Nicaragua, it has about the same number of people (2 million+). Its
average annual per capita income is approximately $1,700, which is about
2½ times that in Nicaragua. Measured by almost any index that reflects
level of development, Costa Rica ranks at the top of the Central American
countries. If all the other countries in Central America had handled their
political, economic and social problems in the past as well as Costa Rica

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has, it is highly unlikely that the present radical movement in the region would have made significant headway. This little jewel of democracy is now in the toughest bind it has ever experienced. For various reasons, including the current world recession over which it has no control, Costa Rica has high unemployment and government services have had to be curtailed, etc., causing a sharp rise in social and political unrest. Outside radical forces, especially from Nicaragua, are doing all they can to further the destabilization process. Costa Ricans are naturally quite nervous because of these recent developments, to the point of even seriously considering establishing military forces to protect their security. It would be a real pity if such a step had to be taken. Perhaps there is no feasible way that the U.S.A. could assure Costa Rica's security from outside forces even if Costa Rica requested such assistance in lieu of its having to create its own military forces. If there are any possibilities along this line, they should be seriously considered. The U.S.A. should at least make certain that Costa Rica is not allowed to go down the drain because of a lack of economic or any other sort of aid, including military support, if requested, that may be required to assure its survival and further development as a democratic and free enterprise country.

Panama, because it is situated astride the Canal and close to Cuba, is going to require much careful attention and deft handling of the delicate relationships between it and the U.S.A. in order to strengthen the bonds of mutual understanding and friendship between the two countries. Its smallness (28,575 square miles) and scant population (about 2 million) belie its present significance and certainly its future significance. Its annual per capita income has now reached $1,700, which is about the same as that of Costa Rica and well above that of the next highest in the region, Guatemala at $1,100. Panama has already started up the road of development that could lead it to become one of the premier banking, shipping and trading centers of the world, a la Singapore style. The Canal treaty is certainly a big boost to Panama, as it carries forward along this pathway to a much higher level of affluence which should make possible vast improvements in the economic and social conditions of the people. Agriculture will continue to be vital to the country's economic and social development; and

[L.C]

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great emphasis should be given to its improvement, especially over the
next couple of decades while Panama is building its strength as an im-
portant international finance, trading, and shipping center.

If this scenario unfolds and I believe the odds are favorable
that it will Panama will very likely evolve to a position of becoming a
strong supporter of the capitalistic free enterprise system. It would
surely be in the best interest of the U.S.A. to do all that it can to
support Panama in its efforts if it does demonstrate that it is serious
in its intent to evolve along these lines.

Many people in our country wonder why the vast efforts over the
past thirty years or so by the international assistance agencies, the
national assistance agencies, such as US/AID, and private foundations have
not been more effective in helping to bring about more rapid development
in Central America and other underdeveloped countries. This is a valid
question and one which is very pertinent to the task of this Commission.
I shall hold my comments on this topic until we get into our discussion
period.

I shall now terminate my introductory remarks so that we can
have as much time as possible for the discussion period which should be
the most productive part of our meeting here today.