IV-2

of Adenauer, so this argument runs, will prove more flexible in the conduct of diplomacy, while De Gaulle's heirs will either stop the French nuclear program or turn it into an appendage of ours. The entry of Britain into the Common Market will give us a voice in European councils which is in

danger now of being submerged by the sentimental predilections of two figures

who are lonely in their own countries and who have made no provisions to

perpetuate their policies. With the assistance of Great Britain we can rally the smaller European nations and Italy into a bloc to prevent the Franco-German axis from dominating Europe and turning the emerging unity into a Third Force. The new Trade Bill will enable us to forge links for the Atlantic area similar to such institutions as the Coal and Steel Community which ushered in the Common Market.

These arguments have plausibility. It is to be questioned, however, whether they represent the most creative act of statesmanship of which we are capable. Waiting for the disappearance of two great leaders may make us the prisoner of events in a rapidly changing world. It may cause us to miss the many opportunities for constructive action available at a moment when old-patterns are disappearing and the new await the courage of an act of creation. It is not self-evident that the succession in Germany

essential that we distinguish between the tactically convenient and the long-term strategy. Many of those in Europe who support our stand against de Gaulle's defense policies are more inclined towards Third Force positions than he is: they see in aborting the nuclear program a convenient opportunity to attack the very concept of joint defense. It would be extremely dangerous to forget that the American nuclear umbrella now sometimes ruthlessly exploited by France to gain a reputation for toughness can be equally well invoked-- and in the long run more inimically-- to conduct policies amounting to neutralism. Many of the parties now most critical of their countries' relations to Washington urged precisely such a course less than three years ago.

Nor should we assume that developments in Europe are necessarily in the direction of greater political cohesion or that economic ties inevitably produce political strength. A post-Adenauer Germany may lack its far-sighted dedication to a greater community. A post-de Gaulle France may be rent by internal schisms. An Italy dominated by the "opening to the Left" may seek to substitute manipulativeness for statesmanship. The Iberian peninsula could, after the death of its aged dictators, descend into chaos. Not all of these events are within our control. But the shock of all of them could be mitigated by a stronger Atlantic Community.

The role of Great Britain in Europe thus becomes crucial.

international affairs. It is the result of the resignation
that the great power status <u>so tenaciously</u> sought in the entire
post-war period can now be achieved only through the closest assoc-
iations <u>with the Continent. Nothing so pedantic</u> as acting as
our spokesman in Europe can <u>justify Britain's present course.</u> The
contrary is likely to be the case. Britain is <u>more likely to
become the spokesman of Europe with us.</u> But to do this effectively
<u>a similar act</u> in <u>Great Britain</u> will have to adopt <u>much of France's program</u>,
ameliorating it with its own subtle <u>style.</u> <u>It would not lack</u>
<u>Irony if one result of Britain's entry into the Common Market were</u>
<u>that Europe would henceforth conduct its Gaulle's policies with</u>
<u>British methods.</u>

This is not undesirable in itself. A real partnership can
only gain xxxxxxxx from the strength of the partners. It does
imply, however, that if we want to shape events we <u>must do so soon</u>-
<u>and that we cannot rely on time to do our work for us.</u>

Similar considerations apply also to the view that the new
<u>Trade Bill</u> passed by Congress will be a means <u>to transcend</u> many
of the difficulties described in this article. A new era of
<u>Atlantic economic relationships</u> <u>could build structures for an</u>
eventual Atlantic partnership similar to those which preceded the
foundation of the European Community. However, the two situations
are not necessarily comparable. In 1947, Europe's economy <u>started</u>-
<u>from scratch.</u> Shattered by the war, <u>A</u> consolidation of its units
across national boundaries promised benefits to everyone. It is

and

far from clear that a growing dynamic European economic group will see matters in the same light. The Trade Bill did not receive the notice in Europe that it has in the United States. Across the Atlantic it has been treated less as the inauguration of a new era than as a commercial transaction whose benefits will have to await detailed negotiations.

But it is really likely that Great Britain is making the sacrifices inherent in joining the Common Market only to submerge these benefits by drastic tariff reductions in favor of the U.S.?

It is probable that the Common Market having abolished its internal tariffs, will need to lower its external walls. Though this may be the ultimate outcome, we would do well to prepare ourselves for some hard bargaining. It is quite possible that economic integration will follow and not precede Atlantic partnership.

In short,

we cannot wait either for the political succession in Germany and France or Britain's entry into the Common Market or the impact of the Trade Bill to begin constructing the political structure of the Atlantic partnership. Invocations to unity are no longer enough. The nature of the partnership will have to be defined. Confidence has to be built not only in our tactical skill but in our long-term purposes.

With respect

to the Federal Republic we must continue the process which appears to have already started of establishing the proper priorities. Ingenuity in finding formulae in access

expressions of narrow nationalism. Unless we behave extremely unwisely, it should always be possible to have the advantages of the greater community exceed those of the lesser ones. This requires however an attitude in which we show less concern about the assertions of independence which are inseparable from sectional self-confidence. It is much the better course to focus energies on goals to achieve rather than conjectural dangers to avoid.

It may be time to consider more seriously the proposals for some form of Western General Staff put forth in various forms by such figures as Dean Acheson, a Lord Avern and even President de Gaulle in his scheme for a Directorate. Whether this is institutionalized in the governmental level or whether it is started as a semi-official body of senior and respected citizens, there is an urgent need to develop common policies and even more importantly common views of the future. The Atlantic Community requires urgently some vision of its future in order to submerge the tactical into larger purposes.

It may be argued that the model of the Common Market demonstrates the preferability of moving step by step without abstract discussion about ultimate ends. However, the lessons of history cannot be applied mechanically. There is a method appropriate to each level. In the late Forties, it was a major spiritual act to be willing to confront the technical tasks of reconstruction. In the Sixties

II-5

In Germany, not all of the advocates of initiatives in foreign policy have in mind measures which would necessarily strengthen the Atlantic partnership. Finally, it may turn out to be a shortsighted conception to assume that a Europe in which Great Britain plays a leading pole will be easier to deal with or that it will conduct policies much different from the Europe of the Six. Time, in short, is not necessarily on our side.

IV: The Issue of Nuclear Weapons: U.S. French Relationship

The issue of negotiations would by itself have been serious enough. It has been compounded by the dispute concerning strategy and nuclear weapons. The strategic issues in a period of rapid technological change are, of course, extremely complex. Yet not the least difficulty has been our tendency to regard what is essentially a political and psychological problem as primarily technical. Every NATO meeting has witnessed declarations of formal unity. The speeches of Secretary McNamara in particular have almost universally been hailed as brilliant and fully persuasive. Yet equally, predictably has been followed by periods of intense disquiet. It soon has become apparent that the persuasiveness of the American position was confined to the strictly technical realm. The unanimity was revealed as dictated at least in part by the reluctance to bring uneasiness into the open.

When Secretary McNamara was reported to have used essentially the same arguments in his speech at Ann Arbor on June 16, 1962, as he had used at Athens the real nature of the European disquiet became apparent.

Freed of the restraints imposed by formal ministerial meetings, the

III-4

been persistent demands for initiatives and migration demand for German "initiatives" has been persistent--though it has

rarely been specified what these initiatives consist of. (An initiative cannot be specified by another party)

On the German side, the expressions of disquiet have been no less numberous. The suspicion has been frequently expressed that the United States would sooner or later confront Germany with a fait accompli. Inspired stories have doubted the validity of our nuclear guarantee. Time and again the Chancellor has rejected the hints for German "initiatives" often in extremely abrupt form.

Part of the difficulty resides in the way the issue has been stated. Too often the issue has been posed between the so-called "flexible" approach seeing to ameliorate the position of Berlin as against the rigid policy in favor of perpetuating the status quo. However, we owe it to ourselves to pose the issues correctly. It is hardly plausible that Khrushchev started the Berlin crisis and has brought the world to the brink of war to improve the West's position. The difference is between those who believe that the position of Berlin is in fact susceptible to improvement and those who would hold that the existence

III-5

of Berlin is so precarious that any change is likely to undermine its viability. The former has generally been the position of the United States. The latter has been the view of France--and almost certainly be of the government of the Federal Republic. Indeed there would/no point in the French position unless it were the conviction that any settlement on Berlin along the lines discussed during the past year would sooner or later alienate Germany from the West.

The difference between our Continental critics and the United States has been in assessing the relative priorities involved in the German problem. There are three interrelated issues: the position of Berlin; the unification of Germany and the future political role of the Federal Republic. Our pragmatic and "realistic" approach has tended to cause us to write off the issue of German unification as hopelsss and non-negotiable. We have therefore concentrated on discussing modalities of access rights and various security arrangements for Central Europe. Confronted by a French veto on negotiation s we have called the conversations with the Soviets "exploratory talk."

In this manner, we have combined the disadvantage of every

III-6

course of action. By assuming the brunt of the conversations with
the Soviets we facilitated De Gaulle's self-assigned role as protector
of the political interests of the Federal Republic. The method of
"exploratory talks" moreover, was tailor-made for Soviet fishing
expeditions. Our proposals would not commit the West. But they
established the terms for which we presumably were prepared to
settle and they, therefore, defined for the Soviets the minimum
conditions on which they could count. Every U.S. proposal was in
effect "banked" by the Soviets and became the starting point for the
next round of talks. Had Soviet policy been more flexible and exploited
this state of affairs more skillfully, the disarray of the West might
have been even greater.

Moreover, the ground covered by the negotiations turned to the
tonvensations almost entirely into a probing operation as to what
Western concessions were acceptable to the Soviets while still being
tolerable for the West. For on ? issue of Berlin the margin
of safety is so narrow that significant changes are not easy to
conceive. Berlin, an enclave in Communist territory with a wall on

III-7

one side and a barbed wire fence on three others, is living pre-
cariously enough in its present status. It would not take much for
the population to panic and thus settle the Berlin issue by mass
emigration. Finally, the Soviets have gradually whittled away at
Western . . . by unilateral action. For example, many of the con-
cessions offered the Soviets at the Geneva Foreign Minister's Conference
of 1959 have become irrelevant.

Of course, any proposal to ameliorate the situation in Berlin
would be desirable. The difficulty is that none have so far been
advanced--either by the Germans, who prefer the status quo, or by
us.

The United States proposal leaked to the press last April provided for an International Access Authority on which East Germany, East Berlin and West Berlin would be represented together with other Western and Eastern neutral power powers. Three major nations, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, would have the decisive vote. Even assuming of course that the Western powers would remain united on every veto, this would represent a short of responsibility for access from the three major Western countries to three neutrals, two of them living in the shadow of Soviet power. Though there may be some advantage in removing the constant threat of immediate interruption of access, the people of Berlin are not likely to believe that their security has been enhanced by substituting the judgment of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland for the responsibility now exercised by Great Britain, the United States and France.

At the same time, the issue which is of the greatest long-term significance in the Federal Republic was not included in the negotiations: the reunification of Germany. Many thoughtful people have argued that no one really wants German unification. The East German puppet state is an accomplished fact. "Realism" would dictate

an adjustment to the inevitable. Moreover, the Federal Republic is the stronger of the two German states. Promoting contacts between it and the East German puppet state is the surest way of bringing about a united Germany.

It is not easy to follow how many of the same people who hold that the Congo can never be stabilized until Katanga is integrated with it can be of the view that a strong and prosperous Federal Republic can simply accept the permanent subjugation of 17 million Germans by Communist guns? Every German party and every political leader in the Federal Republic has felt impelled to avow the goal of reunification. No German political leader, however moderate, can accept the division of Germany as permanent. An alliance which demanded such a price would in German eyes soon lose a great Para? deal of its luster. The deterioration of the position in this respect has been striking. At the Foreign Minister's Conference of 1959 the Western proposal for a Berlin settlement was still tied to the issue of unification--although even then the Western package did not remain such for very long. In recent diplomatic encounters, the issue has not even been raised.

The tactic abandonment of a Western advocacy of German
unity represents a serious mortgage on the future. For if ṙ a German
government should show flexibility it will not be for the price of
access to Berlin. Rather the goal will be progress towards uni-
fication or at least amelioration of conditions in Eastern Germany.
To the degree that the West can be maneuvered into the position where
it seems to have lost interest in the issue of German unity, German
political leaders will be obliged to take a more active part. The
Soviet Union will thereby be given an opportunity to seek to split the
West by appealing to the Federal Republic with the prospect of
unification and to its allies on the basis of their fear of Germany.

The argument that the West can discharge its obligation
by encouraging the Federal Republic to deal directly on this issue
with the East German regime is faulty. It is often alleged that
the superior strength and domestic cohesion of Western Germany would
give it the upper hand in any such contacts. But as long as twenty
three Soviet divisions are stationed in Eastern Germany, the lack of
popular support for the East German regime is irrelevant. It will
the
simply use the fact of ṙ contacts to enhance its position while

continuing obdurate in substance.

The chief reason why many in the Federal Republic have
not pressed more directly for initiatives on the German question is their
fear that these would be used only as a means to obtain German concessions
on access to Berlin which would remain after the issue of unification
was dropped. However, if we may have pressed too hard to achieve
a modification of the German position on the issue of Berlin, we
neglected the opportunity of defining a Western position on the German
question. This would have been all the more important to reduce the
pressures of nascent nationalism and to induce the Federal Republic
to face the implications of the future when its basic orientation is
still staunchly pro-West. As long as future German policy remains a
vague aspiration--and one in which the West can be represent as
uninterested--the danger exists that at some future time less responsible
German leaders will define their own program. Finally, there are some
problems which can be faced only within the context of an all-German
policy. For example, a proposal about the Oder-Neisse line would be
probably politically impossible in the Federal Republic if related only
to the Berlin issue. It would be unavoidable if a scheme on the German

worse from being offered?

We must keep in mind that there is a problem of succession
in Germany—though it is not always the one being stressed. The usual
argument is that such strains as exist between Bonn and Washington are
due to the rigidities of an old man. The leaning towards France by
Germany is ascribed to the sentiments of a single individual. Once the
Chancellor passes from the scene, it is thought by many, *dixi* irritations
will disappear.

However, this is a profound misreading of the German
situation. The building of the wall and the indecisive Allied reaction
shock
has given a shock to the German body politic which has not yet crystallized
into a clear tendency but whose reality we can ignore only at our peril.

The legacy of Adenauer of a firm pro-Western orientation is not yet
shaken. But it would be short-sighted to assume that German political
leaders will necessarily interpret flexibility identically with us. Or
that a "flexible" Federal Republic exploiting its central *x*position or
simply substituting political juggling for a clear policy would be an un-
mixed blessing to the West.

We do have a stake that Adenauer's successors remain com-

III-15

mitted to the main lines of his policy. Close ties to the West should al-
ways remain preferable to German leaders † than ‡ alternative courses.

The Federal Republic has to find within the framework of Atlantic
relationships a substitute for its thwarted national aspirations. The
corollary is that it must always be demonstrated that these aspirations
are thwarted not by the Atlantic partnership but by Soviet intransi-
gence. Not everybody who supports particular U.S. initiatives is nec-
exxarily committed to these principles. On the contrary, some of the
loudest critics of Adenauer's attitude towards Washington are doing so
to discredit these principles. We must align the short-term objectives
with the long-term objectives. This can only be done by separating tac-
tical expedients to get through a particular crisis with the long-term
measures which alone can give these policies meaning. The West needs a
more concrete notion of the Atlantic community than phrases of Atlantic
partnership. For only such a context permits the best energies of all
countries to be focussed in the essential vision of the future.

The-issue-of-negotiations-would-by-itself-have-been-

II-6

It may therefore be appropriate to examine in turn the issues arising
from the variouspositions of our allies: the issue of Berlin and
German unification; the political aspect of nuclear questions; some
issues raised by Britain's entry into Europe (Common Market.)

III. Berlin and United States-German Relations.

The Berlin problem has festered since November 27, 1958 when Premier
Khrushchev first demanded the transformation of Berlin into a "free
city." Since then deadlines have come and gone and the world has
seemed more than once on the brink of war. Para.?
The issue of Berlin has
been shrewdly chosen by Premier Khrushchev. Its geographic location
in the middle of Communist controlled territory makes it a convenient
fulcrum for forcing diplomatic confrontations on an issue where the
local balance seems to tip heavily against the West. Berlin, moreover,
touches a raw nerve in West German politics, symbolizing the receding
hopes of German reunification. It has proved to have a maximum potential
for disrupting the Alliance. Four years after the first Soviet threat

The United States and Europe

With the passage of the Trade Bill, there is once more much talk of the "great design" of the Atlantic Community. The President, in his major address of July 9, 1962 (has)called for a partnership between the United States and Europe. Others have used the simile of a "dumbbell" to describe two strong entities united by a common purpose.

There is no doubt that the emergence of Europe as a great and self-confident center of power is in the long historical view the most hopeful aspect of *dom temporary* affairs. The prospects (thus) opened up for a dynamic and expanding free world system are limited only by our *according to whom?*

vision and energy. (Yet the vistas of the future must not obscure the *must not be obscured* if the difficulty to be encountered in the road ahead. The actuality of *the rhet. describing it.* Atlantic partnership will not be as simple to achieve as is its rhetoric.)

We will need to It will not be achieved by incantation. (It will require us) to overcome many obstacles, not the least of which *ix* are the habits of Americans thought developed during the period of United States predominance in Atlantic affairs. (The future of the Atlantic Community is not foreordained.) It will depend on the generosity with which *the* are willing to partners *wkk* understand the shift in relative power represented by

-2-

the emergence of a self-donfident, dynamic Europe.

promise

It is ironical that at the moment of its greatest opportunity,
the Atlantic group of nations should be rent by disputes which, what-
ever their significance, in the long run threaten the attainment of larger
ends. Rarely has distrust and lack of understanding been so marked in
Allied councils. While some of the disagreements reflect inevitable
adjustments to new situations and (thus) have been exploited for nationalist
or domestic ends, the fact remains that neither on Berlin, nor on disarmament,
nor on nuclear matters, does there exist an allied consensus.

Furthermore, the discord has affected not only the immediate matters
at issue, but has been treated--sometimes ruthlessly--as a symbol of
impossibility?

the inadequacy of Atlantic relationships altogether. It therefore
becomes important to inquire where our relations with Europe stand
at this particular point (in history) and the directions that are open
to us.

II

There are four major components in our relationship with Europe:

our relationship with Great Britain, based on long historical ties
and expressed in special arrangements on nuclear matters; our relations
with France, strained by French efforts to assert the leadership of
Continental Europe and an independent voice in nuclear affairs; our
relations with the Federal Republic, torn between its Atlantic ties
and the inevitable urge towards reunification and under pressure
in Berlin; the claims of the smaller countries, partly fearful of
Franco-German hegemony, but also eager to play on the European stage
the role denied to them within the confines of their geographic

borders. It is not easy. To reconcile these divergent strains, is not easy. But the assertion that a difficult course exists is not in itself a policy.

Furthermore, it is nothing more difficult in policy-making than to distinguish the essential from the peripheral. Frequently what most occupies attention concerns symptoms, not causes. The difference between success and failure resides in the ability to understand the deeper forces and its corollary:

the ability to establish
the establishment of proper priorities.

II-2

(4)

The root cause of many of our difficulties with our European allies

has been our confusion of symptoms and causes, and our tendency to

push simultaneously many incompatible policies. We have pursued

which

negotiations on Berlin/have been treated with extraordinary suspicion

by the ally most concerned: the Federal Republic. It might have been

possible to pursue such policies if the Federal Republic had been

confronted by a united front of all of its allies--though even then

to do so

Another example so

it would not have been without its risks. However, our nuclear policy

towards France has, according to the President's Special Assistant

for National Seucirty Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, impaired our lines

of communication with France. This reinforced a trend which was

implicit in President De Gaulle's conception of Europe in any case--

towards a Franco-German bloc on the Continent asserting European

identify if necessary against the United States. The uneasiness

caused in Europe by the conflicting versions of our NATO policy could

be exploited by purposeful men as one more demonstration of U.S. re-

assessment of its European commitment. U.S. policy in colonial areas,

II-3

especially New Guinea and to a lesser extent the Congo, disillusioned
*the Netherlands* (notably the Netherlands) and reduced
some of the smaller countries, and the enthusiasm with which these had given priority to Atlantic over
European relationships.

It must be granted that in many (of the policies) prudence was on the
side of the course we were urging. Many of the European criticisms
derived from short-sighted, or selfish motives. (Often the course
we urged was wiser than that of our critics.) The fact remains that
by pushing simultaneously so many policies which were for various
reasons objectionable to different governments, we have detracted
energies from the task of constructing an Atlantic partnership and
focussed it on negative, often sterile, debates whose outcome in the
long run may well be foreordained.

Another irritant has been the tendency to believe that
the resistance we have met on the Continent has been above all
due to the obstinacy, rigidity, or misplaced notions of grandeur
of two old men whose successors would conduct more accommodating
*Great Britain's*
policies. And the entry of *Great Britain* into the Common Market
also
has been expected to inject an element of moderation into European
politics. These convictions have produced a tendency to encourage,

II-4

deliberately or not, opposition to existing regimes--if only by
causing us to adopt dilatory measures in the expectation of future
change (modification).

As a result, many of those who now must avidly support the United
States position, particularly on the Continent, have also in the past
been most vocal opponents of the Western alliance. This has
led to the ironical situation that in the Federal Republic
an
where
Chancellor Adenauer, whose opponents used to call him "Chancellor
of the Allies," now finds himself under attack for jeopardizing

At the same time
Bonn's relationship with Washington. WHXX in France many of those
now
who started the French nuclear program see in it a useful focus for
a attacks on President De Gaulle (what does this mean?
stemming largely from different reasons.)

This has produced the optical illusion that those who oppose the
current policies of their countries would necessarily conduct
affairs in the future more in accordance with our wishes. But this
is largely an illusion. Once in office, the policies of many of
President De Gaulle's opponents would not on nuclear matters differ
so much from his substantive views--though they would of course
conduct it with a different style.

Find intermediate ways of applying power. See pages
Horse-and-buggy analogy
Take in idea: "Police action vs. volunteers. - role of U.S. in Korea?

Flankless line

Fluidity - Mobility

Naval Warfare

For an airplane age separate organization - in missi
Find may be made may missi
Find may & indeterminate response to missi
Not kept limited by agreement but by self-interest. -- Also by power and in
horror of all-out war. - This & privacy must be all - out war.
and this condition of privacy + need of policy.

Not kept limited by agreement but by self-interest. -- Also by power and in
horror of all-out war. - This & privacy must be all - out war.
and this condition of policy + need of policy.

Will national accept defeat rather than expand now?
Tend to understate response.
Cannot be certain
Have missiles affected the situation?

Tend to understate response.

Cannot be certain

A great deal of misunderstanding

New Statesman: "The Gaither report has revealed that irrespective of any effort which America may now make the Soviet preponderance in advanced weapons has now reached such an absolute stage that America's national survival will depend -- until 1961 at least--on Russian benevolence

Shows how demoralizing threat of all-out war is.

Result is that allies feel fighting war for "others."

Real implication: <u>Not</u> decisive in all-out war, if we behave properly.

In fact makes allies dispensable in all-out war.

Raises threshold of provocation

Why missiles?

To resist missiles.

But however strong, power will be useless if our military organization
cannot bring it to bear on issues.

And if political leadership cannot define issues for itself
& contend
Requirements

Good organization and doctrine frees energies for really marginal case.

Uses resources efficiently