Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KHC

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

6:15 pm 1/23/70

Z: State has screwed the Biafran thing.

K: Why

Z: Thank God we did what we did. Relief coordination in Nigeria said we had not requested. I didd and said we had sent in XXXXXXXX. Kennedy is talking about the Western report.

K: /?/? ? ? ?

Z: State admits to have underestimated the whole thing. Thank God.

Secretary Rogers called and I don't know why. He said something about 7.5 billion think on press operation (?) . ShouldI the State Dept. go ahead for Sunday? I checked with some guys on your staff and they said OK

K: When he calls tell him the President siad to tell deal with me

Z: OK if you want me to

K: Unless its public relations

Z: I figured if I got back to him that we are giving 7.5 billion to be matched. It wasn't big enough to call the press in so I told him to go ahead.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Fulbright/Kissinger

7:27 pm

1/23/70

F: I want to congratulate you on your statement yesterday

K: I was pleased with it. The President wrote it

F: You helped a little, didn't you? I was following up on our talk before Christmas. For a drink sometime. The 8th or 9th or 10th? Anytime not agreeable? Can you tell me know?

K: What time of day?

F: About 5

K: 6

F: Whatever you say

K: 5:30 or 6:00. I have trouble getting away. the 8th, 9th or 10th would be fine. The 8th is a Sunday. Who about the 9th or 10th. That week I am free every day.

F: Can I call in the morning?

K: Yes and we will settle it then

F: The 9th I know I have another dinner

K: After that? the 11th

F: The 11th is OK

K: We will make it tentative and you will call.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

President/Kissinger

7:30 pm 1/23/70

P: Who are you with tonight?

K: The Nieman Fellows. 40 of them. Kraslow and that. On a background basis. I thought I could make some of the points we mentioned this afternoon.

P: The Nieman Fellows are people who become editors, etc.

K: These are already

P: My view in talking to them is to talk about the process.

K: I thought I would

P: I just read the NYT and I must say that it went pretty well

K: About the speech? The account on the editorial page?

P: Reston said it was a great speach. Do you know him? I don't

K: Yes, quite well and that's outstanding and I was just talking to Fulbright and he said he had nothing to criticize.

P: I had in mind two things. The Neiman thing you are doing the right thing. Say: I am taking into account what hours the man takes and for days he read and read in a broad field. History, philosophy. Then I had you buzz in to give you an idea of what I was doing. They are all great writers and they should know I know the agony of writing.

K: I found that giving them a little feel for the WH. The staff thinks it natural of course but outsiders find it outstanding.

P: On Reston -- I though you might give him a ring. I read your thing and wanted you to know who it came about. Then show him the files. And the other fellow.

K: I may ask him in to lunch.

P: Don't be too obvious, I agree. So you can chat about the details. Stay away from programs. The main thing is the spirit of the thing.

K: I think also that philosophical bent. You cannot have written what you did without reflection.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/84

TELCORN

Congressman Passman/Kissinger

1/23/70

7:30 pm

P: Fulbright had no idea of letting an authorization bill get through this late in the legislation. I moved it on by the House, thru the committees and the Senate took it up, passed it, went to conference, reached an agreement, the House approved it. Went to the Senate. Fulbright realized he had gone to sleep at the switch -- they tabled the bill. We are going to have to move on the authorization bill or move on the House bill. I went out through the roof for the President. Do you understand what I am talking about?

K: Yes, I know what you are talking about. I know what you have done, and so does the President. He appreciates all that you are doing.

P: Here is what I am confronted with. 10 separate votes on aid to China. Last motion was defeated almost 2 to 1. I realize these people are stubborn on the other side. They hope to continue this program under a continuing obligation. For me to be able to cooperate with the Administration I will have to ------ and capitulate. Anywhere I have advocated jets there has been a lot of crap in the papers about it. If your people will give me a nod you are going to give the Republic of China $35 million I will go over the committee, have a secret meeting with Senator McGee. I will come to conference next Tuesday morning. We will dispose of this bill. If the Administration asks me for anything in the way of economic assistance. If I don't reach an agreement the HEW bill comes down, we will go into a conference the whole thing is opened up and I don't know where we go. If we raise China, I don't do the other (then we are in trouble). You had good legislative assistance, the Congress voted $54.5 million for China but I am willing to ------ off. What I want is a silent nod. Now I need some help on this because I realize what I am going to go up against back in conference. I shouldn't be expected to make all the concessions. Rivers, Sykes, Ford went with me. I have given you a rambling story but I want to protect the Administration. Make a commitment for $35 million, I am not asking them to tell me what they are going to do with it, use it for maintenance, ------, and I will go into conference and I promise I will bring the bill out intact.

Send somebody down to talk to me.

K: When?

DIV LIB

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

CONFIDENTIAL

January 23, 1970

6641

DRAFT MESSAGE

I am aware of your deep concern that Israel may become increasingly isolated. This need not be true as far as the United States is concerned unless Israel desires it.

The United States stands by its friends. Israel is one of its friends.

The United States is deeply engaged in trying to help the people of the Near East find peace. In this effort, we are consulting fully with all those most concerned.

The United States believes that peace can only be based on agreement between the parties and that agreement can only be achieved through negotiations between them.

The United States does not intend to negotiate the terms of peace or to impose the terms of peace. We believe a durable peace agreement is one that is not one-sided and is one that all sides have a vested interest in maintaining.

We are convinced that the prospects for peace are enhanced as the governments in the area are confident that their borders and their people are secure.

The United States would prefer restraint in the shipment of arms to this area. But we maintain careful watch on the balance of forces in the area. We are prepared to provide military equipment to support

CONFIDENTIAL

.DIY LIB

By: KHC NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

the efforts of friendly governments to provide for the defense and
safety of their people.

The United States has as its objective helping the people of the
Near East build a peaceful and productive future. I believe that all
Americans can unite for that goal.

CONFIDENTIAL