With HAK revisions - 4/4/05

- Es gilt das gesprochene

Wort -

Rede anlässlich des Symposiums

„Helmut Kohl: Ein Leben für Deutschland und Europa“

12. April 2005

von Henry A. Kissinger

1. In den dreißig Jahren, in welchen ich nun das Privileg habe Helmut Kohl zu kennen und zu begleiten, hat er Unglaubliches erreicht: Er hat er sein Land durch die Untiefen des Kalten Krieges gesteuert - hin zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Er hat die Bundesrepublik mit Europa wirtschaftlich und politisch geeint und zugleich immer an der Stärkung der transatlantischen Beziehungen gearbeitet. Die Freundschaft zu Frankreich und die Partnerschaft mit Amerika waren die Kernelemente einer Politik, die das Vertrauen der Verbündeten genoss und zugleich den langfristigen Interessen der deutschen Bürger diente. Loyalität gehörte stets zu den herausragenden Eigenschaften Helmut Kohls. Ebenso seine Gelassenheit: Auch in stürmischen Zeiten blieb er ruhig und überlegt und demonstrierte durch seine Haltung, dass Charakter und Glaube sich durchsetzen - auch über die schwierigsten Umstände hinweg.

2. Ich wurde gebeten heute zur Ehrung von Helmut Kohl einen amerikanischen Blick auf sein Lebenswerk zu werfen. Das ist ohne Frage eine große Ehre. Ich spreche zu Ihnen als Amerikaner - auch wenn Deutschland **natürlich** nie ein fremdes Land für mich **war** **sein kann**. Ich teile meine Kindheit und Jahrzehnte der Nachkriegsgeschichte mit diesem Land. Und ich bin stolz darauf, dass Helmut Kohl seit nunmehr drei Jahrzehnten mein Freund ist. Aber natürlich kann die amerikanische Perspektive nur einen Teil der historischen Leistung Helmut Kohls abbilden.

3. Die Freundschaft zwischen Amerika und Deutschland ist eine der großen politischen und moralischen Errungenschaften der Zeit nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ich sah Berlin zum ersten Mal im Sommer 1945. Wie die meisten deutschen Städte, so war auch diese Stadt vollkommen zerstört. Deutschland lag am Boden. Seine Bevölkerung dachte nur ans Überleben - das Land war politisch isoliert.

4. Die Nachkriegsgeneration in Deutschland verdient Respekt für ihre Hingabe und Opferbereitschaft, mit der sie das Land wieder

(ND)

aufgebaut hat. Sie verdient Respekt dafür, dass sie Deutschland in die Gemeinschaft freier Staaten zurückgeführt hat – und es heute dort Anerkennung als eines der wichtigsten Mitglieder findet. Als Deutschland 1871 geeint wurde, erklärte der britische Premier Benjamin Disraeli: „Das ist ein bedeutenderes Ereignis als die Französische Revolution.“ Er glaubte damals, dass die Kraft eines geeinten Deutschlands es erheblich erschweren würde, eine neue Machtbalance herzustellen. – *Die Verringerung der Staaten in Europa würde so Disarelis Überzeugung und die Diplomatie in ihren bisherigen Möglichkeiten – in ihrer Flexibilität – beschränken würde.*

5. Das nächste Jahrhundert bestätigte Disraeli's Weitsicht: Das europäische System der Diplomatie erwies sich als unfähig, ein Land von der Größe Deutschlands – noch dazu im Zentrum des Kontinents – einzubinden. Auf der anderen Seite war das deutsche System nicht immer in der Lage, Wettrüsten und ultimative Katastrophen zu verhindern.

6. 1949 traf Deutschland unter dem ersten Bundeskanzler der Nachkriegsära, dem *herausragenden großen* Konrad Adenauer, eine historische Entscheidung: Es schwor einer rein national ausgerichteten Politik ab, die Deutschlands zentrale geographische Lage und demographische Stärke in den Mittelpunkt stellen würde. Es definierte seine nationalen Ziele als Teil der europäischen Idee und der transatlantischen Partnerschaft. In schmerzhafter Entsagung ordnete Adenauer das Streben nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung den Zielen der europäischen Integration und der atlantischen Partnerschaft unter. Konfrontiert mit einer leidenschaftlichen Opposition, erklärte die Regierung Adenauer, dass die europäische Integration und die Partnerschaft mit Amerika Voraussetzung für die Wiedererlangung der eigenen deutschen Einheit seien. Diese Position wurde selbst beibehalten, als die Sowjets 1953 ein zweideutiges Angebot unterbreiteten. Darin boten sie Adenauer an, dass Deutschland die Einheit erringen könne, wenn es den Status der Neutralität einnehmen würde.

7. Zur gleichen Zeit unternahmen die USA eine grundsätzliche Neuausrichtung ihrer Außenpolitik. Noch 1944 erklärte Franklin D. Roosevelt gegenüber Winston Churchill, dass amerikanische Truppen nicht länger als zwei Jahre in Europa stationiert bleiben könnten. Unter der Präsidentschaft von Harry Truman überwand Amerika jedoch seine historische Isolation und fand zu einer Außenpolitik, die das eigene Schicksal mit dem Wiederaufbau Europas und der atlantischen Partnerschaft verband. Ebenso wie die Entscheidung Adenauers für die Westbindung, war auch die moralische Komponente in Trumans Entscheidung von größter Bedeutung. Ein Jahrzehnt später fragte ich Truman, was sein

größter Erfolg gewesen sei. Er antwortete: „Das wir nach dem überwältigenden Sieg unsere Gegner in die Gemeinschaft gleichberechtigter Staaten zurückgeführt haben.“

8. Der Marshall Plan und die Atlantische Allianz waren Ausdruck dieser Politik. Dieser Akt der Versöhnung wäre jedoch nicht möglich gewesen ohne das mutige Engagement für die Zukunft in Deutschland selbst. Nach den Auseinandersetzungen der 50er Jahre ist die europäische Einigung, fußend auf der Freundschaft mit Frankreich und der Partnerschaft mit Amerika, zu den Wegweisern deutscher Außenpolitik geworden. Nach einer Weile wurden sie akzeptiert von der Opposition und fortgesetzt durch zwei bemerkenswerte Kanzler der anderen großen Volkspartei, der SPD. Diese verfolgten eine aktive Politik der Versöhnung gegenüber dem Osten Europas und der Sowjetunion.

9. Als Helmut Kohl 1982 seine Kanzlerschaft antrat, war die Architektur der Nachkriegszeit vollendet. Was vor ihm lag war die Vollendung des Gebäudes der deutschen Einheit, der europäischen Integration und die Aussöhnung mit dem Osten – dies alles auf der Basis der Partnerschaft mit Amerika und auf der Grundlage der Westpolitik Adenauers. „We are not wanderers between worlds," he proclaimed at the beginning of 1983. "Our place is at the side of the Atlantic Community and our French friends." Doch bevor diese große Aufbauleistung in Angriff genommen werden konnte, musste eine andere schwierige Debatte über den Zweck der westlichen Allianz überwunden werden. Ausgelöst wurde diese durch die Stationierung amerikanischer Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa - davon der größte Teil auf deutschem Boden. Die strategischen Überlegungen, die zu dieser Entscheidung führten, wurden eingeholt von dramatischen Entwicklungen.

Aber an was wir heute immer wieder zurück denken sollten, ist der Grundton, der die Debatte über die Atlantische Allianz in den 50er Jahren bestimmte: Ist es möglich das Schicksal beider Seiten dies- und jenseits des Atlantiks getrennt zu betrachten? Kann jede Seite Sicherheit und Fortschritt erreichen, ohne den Ansatz einer gemeinsamen Sicherheitspolitik? In den 80er Jahren hat Helmut Kohl auf das gemeinsame Schicksal bestanden, indem er bereit war, gemeinsame Risiken einzugehen – auch gegen eine mächtige Opposition, und emotionsgeladene Demonstrationen, und sowjetische Drohungen. Helmut Kohls Leistung war es, gemeinsame Entscheidungen zu vertreten, die nicht der Taktik folgen, sondern auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Werte beruhen.

10. Alle großen Errungenschaften sind zunächst nur Ideen, bevor sie in die Realität umgesetzt werden. Ronald Reagan – der erste amerikanische Präsident, mit welchem Helmut Kohl als Kanzler

zusammengearbeitet hat - drückte Amerikas Dankbarkeit und die gemeinsame Vision wie folgt aus, als Helmut 1986 Washington besuchte:

„Der Weg von Kanzler Kohl ist gekennzeichnet vom Ideal der Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit...Heute stehen die Demokratien vor unglaublichen Herausforderungen. Aber wir bestehen, und am Ende wird der Friede siegen. Unser Sieg wird nicht erreicht werden durch das Überschreiten von Grenzen mit gut ausgerüsteten Armeen, natürlich auch nicht durch den Bau von Raketen und die Besetzung anderer Staaten. Unser Sieg wird kommen - vielleicht Schritt für Schritt - wenn Mauern fallen, Raketen abgerüstet werden und die Menschen frei sind...Die Freundschaft und Kameradschaft, die Helmut Kohl durch seinen Besuch ausdrückt, ist ein Zeugnis dafür, dass die Welt, die wir wünschen bereits gebaut wird."

11. So geschah es auch: Keine fünf Jahre nach diesem Treffen wurden die Waffen, die eine derartige Kontroverse in Europa ausgelöst hatten, abgerüstet. Und zwar nicht unilateral - wie viele Kritiker vorausgesagt vorgeschlagen hatten - sondern auf beiden Seiten des Eisernen Vorhangs. Begleitet wurde dies durch eine allgemeine Verbesserung des politischen Klimas und einen fruchtbaren Dialog zwischen den Partnern der atlantischen Allianz und den Ländern im Osten Europas sowie der sowjetischen Führung. A major step in this direction was the meeting of Kohl with Gorbachev in June 1989.

At that moment, the unification of Germany still seemed a distant dream, ritualistically invoked but not a subject of active diplomacy. Fifteen months later, it became a reality.

12. Zur Symbolik dieser Entwicklungen gehörte auch, dass sich Helmut Kohl zu einem Besuch in Warschau aufhielt, als die Berliner Mauer fiel. Dieses Ereignis traf gänzlich unerwartet ein und forderte alle Nationen in Europa heraus - Ost und West - die Vereinigten Staaten und die Sowjetunion. Heute haftet der raschen Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands der Atem des Unabwendbaren an. Die Wahrnehmung damals war jedoch eine andere - selbst innerhalb der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

13. Nicht wenige - auch in Deutschland - vertraten die Auffassung, dass es wünschenswert sei, auch nach dem Kollaps des Kommunismus zwei deutsche Staaten zu bewahren. Es gab einen Moment des Zögerns; Unsicherheit über die Einheit der NATO, Bedenken über die Reaktion der Sowjetunion machten sich breit. Dies alles wurde überwunden durch das Vertrauen der amerikanischen Führung in die Werte und die Zielsetzungen Helmut Kohls. Der Kanzler besuchte Camp David im Februar 1990 und

(Y)

überzeugte und bestärkte den amerikanischen Präsidenten George H.W. Bush davon, das der Moment für die deutsche Einheit gekommen sei. Selbst wenn zwei deutsche Staaten nur vorübergehend entstehen sollten, so würde dies die internationale Diplomatie in ihren Bemühungen, eine neue europäische und globale Weltordnung zu schaffen, **behindern sehr schwierig** machen.

14. Das Treffen in Camp David hatte unmittelbare historische Konsequenzen. Mit der Unterstützung Amerikas ließ Helmut Kohl durch seine Vision, seinen Mut und seine Hartnäckigkeit die Hoffnungen einer ganzen Generation wahr werden. Im Oktober 1990 konnte er nicht nur eine nationale Aufgabe erfolgreich abschließen, sondern auch Deutschlands Rolle in der NATO festigen. Er dehnte den Schirm der Allianz über Ost-Deutschland aus. Dies alles wäre nicht möglich gewesen – wie groß Amerikas Beitrag auch immer gewesen sein mag – wenn nicht Helmut – aufbauend auf den Errungenschaften seiner Vorgänger – die neue sowjetische Führung erfolgreich davon überzeugt hätte, dass ein geeintes Deutschland keine Gefahr für die Sicherheit Russlands darstellt. Im Gegenteil, würde dies doch Russland ermöglichen, in die internationale Gemeinschaft zurückzukehren.

15. Helmut besann sich auf das andere zentrale Element aus dem Erbe Adenauers: die Vollendung Europas, dessen Geschichte durch nationale Rivalitäten gekennzeichnet war. Das Ergebnis war der Vertrag von Maastricht, der die ökonomische Vision manifestierte und zum Prozess politischen Konsolidierung führte. 1997 wurde die atlantische Architektur dann auch auf die Staaten in Osteuropa ausgedehnt, die von der kommunistischen Herrschaft befreit wurden. 2004 sind zehn Staaten der Europäischen Union beigetreten. Amerika erkennt die große Friedensleitung des Projektes Europa an – diese Leistung, die ganz wesentlich durch Helmut Kohl gefördert wurde.
Da andere ohne Zweifel seine Verdienste für die Europäische Union ausführlicher hervorheben werden, möchte ich mich im Folgenden auf den amerikanischen Aspekt beschränken.

16. Es ist heute zu einem Gemeinplatz geworden, die Ursachen für eine Verschlechterung der Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den USA in der relativen Schwäche Europas zu suchen. **Daher würde auch eine starke Europäische Union, die sich im Aufwind befindet, die atlantische Partnerschaft unterstützen.** Dieses Argument wird jedoch nicht den Errungenschaften gerecht, die zwei Generationen von Politikern in Europa erzielt haben. In meinen Ausführungen zur gemeinsamen Geschichte möchte ich verdeutlichen, dass Europa eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt hat, nicht weil es Amerika unter Druck

(N)

setzte, sondern weil der Sinn für gemeinsame Werte, der Geist von Kameradschaft und das Empfinden für das gemeinsame Schicksal die Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Amerika immer durchdrungen haben. Keiner hat einen größeren Beitrag hierzu geleistet als Helmut Kohl. Man muss nur seinen Berichten über seine Jugend in der **deprimierenden schwierigen** Zeit nach dem Krieg folgen. Dabei spielt auch Amerika eine wichtige Rolle, und man begreift, dass für Helmut die transatlantischen Beziehungen nicht eine Frage von Gleichgewichtstaktik oder der Druckausübung waren. Vielmehr waren sie die Erfüllung einer inneren Notwendigkeit.

17. Das nun geeinte Europa wird auch für die atlantische Partnerschaft neue Möglichkeiten und Herausforderungen beinhalten. Nach Abschluss des Vertrages von Maastricht hat Amerika diese europäische Initiative begrüßt, weil es Helmut Kohl und seinen Kollegen vertraute. **Die Herausforderungen sind heute jedoch andere—auch aufgrund der Tatsache, dass wir eine erfolgreiche gemeinsame Politik auf der Grundlage gleichberechtigter Partnerschaft konzipiert haben. Diese moralische Haltung an die neuen Gegebenheiten anzupassen—darin besteht die große Herausforderung, die das Erbe Helmut Kohls heute an uns stellt.** New conditions exist. The previous period concentrated on security and European construction. Our time faces a more ambiguous security problem and the need for a new global order. The overriding challenge of our time is whether the moral attitude of the Kohl legacy can guide a united approach to these new challenges or whether the Atlantic world will relapse into the competitiveness that caused so many of the 20th century tragedies.

18. Ich zitierte zuvor Ronald Reagan, den ersten amerikanischen Präsidenten, mit welchem Kanzler Kohl zusammengearbeitet hat. Nun möchte ich enden, indem ich den letzten Präsidenten der USA, mit welchem Helmut Kohl in seiner Zeit als Kanzler zusammentraf, zitiere – Bill Clinton. Helmut wurde die höchste zivile Auszeichnung der USA, – the Medal of Freedom – verliehen – und ich darf hier anmerken, dass diese Medaille nur in ganz seltenen Fällen an Ausländer verliehen wird. Clinton sagte damals folgendes:

„Zukünftige Historiker werden sagen, dass das 21. Jahrhundert mit der Weitsicht von Helmut Kohl begann. Er entwickelte in den Monaten nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer eine Vision für die deutsche Einheit und für eine neue Partnerschaft zwischen dem Westen und einem demokratischen Russland. Er sah die Notwendigkeit, andere Staaten in die europäische Familie aufzunehmen. Er sah Deutschland in der Mitte, und nicht länger am

(N)

Rande, eines geeinten und demokratischen Europas – eines
Europa, in welchem Grenzen nicht länger Möglichkeiten
verschließen und in welchem Nationalbewusstsein als eine Quelle
von Stolz gesehen wird, und nicht als Ursache für Konflikte…Jeder,
der dieses Erbe Helmut Kohls annimmt, weiß, dass für das
Überleben des Friedens in Europa unsere Allianz der Demokratien
gefestigt sein muss – sie muss zusammenstehen gegen Diktatoren,
die menschliche Differenzen dazu nutzen, um ihre Macht
auszubauen…und wir müssen unserer Vision treu bleiben noch
lange nachdem wir unsere militärischen Ziele erreicht haben.”

19. Lieber Helmut, ich danke Dir für eine lange und erfüllende
Freundschaft - Amerika dankt Dir für Deinen Einsatz für Freiheit,
Frieden und Fortschritt. Was Du erreicht hast, wird uns dienen als
gemeinsames Gewissen und Dein Sinn für Gerechtigkeit wird uns
eine immerwährende Quelle der Inspiration sein.

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- Es gilt das gesprochene Wort -

12. April 2005

von Henry A. Kissinger

1. In den dreißig Jahren, in welchen ich nun das Privileg habe Helmut Kohl zu kennen und zu begleiten, hat er Unglaubliches erreicht: Er hat er sein Land durch die Untiefen des Kalten Krieges gesteuert - hin zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Er hat Europa wirtschaftlich und politisch geeint und zugleich immer an der Stärkung der transatlantischen Beziehungen gearbeitet. Die Freundschaft zu Frankreich und die Partnerschaft mit Amerika waren die Kernelemente einer Politik, die das Vertrauen der Verbündeten genoss und zugleich den langfristigen Interessen der deutschen Bürger diente.

2. Ich wurde gebeten heute zur Ehrung von Helmut Kohl einen amerikanischen Blick auf sein Lebenswerk zu werfen. Das ist ohne Frage eine große Ehre. Ich spreche zu Ihnen als Amerikaner - auch wenn Deutschland natürlich nie ein fremdes Land für mich war. Ich teile meine Kindheit und Jahrzehnte der Nachkriegsgeschichte mit diesem Land. Und ich bin stolz darauf, dass Helmut Kohl seit nunmehr drei Jahrzehnten mein Freund ist. Aber natürlich kann die amerikanische Perspektive nur einen Teil der historischen Leistung Helmut Kohls abbilden.

4. Die Nachkriegsgeneration in Deutschland verdient Respekt für ihre Hingabe und Opferbereitschaft, mit der sie das Land wieder aufgebaut hat. Sie verdient Respekt dafür, dass sie Deutschland in die Gemeinschaft freier Staaten zurückgeführt hat - und es heute

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und

dort Anerkennung als eines der wichtigsten Mitglieder findet. Als Deutschland 1871 geeint wurde, erklärte der britische Premier Benjamin Disraeli: „Das ist ein bedeutenderes Ereignis als die Französische Revolution.“ Er glaubte damals, dass die Kraft eines geeinten Deutschlands es erheblich erschweren würde, eine neue Machtbalance herzustellen. Die Verringerung der Staaten in Europa würde - so Disraeli überzeugung - die Diplomatie in ihren bisherigen Möglichkeiten - in ihrer Flexibilität - beschränken.

7

5. Das nächste Jahrhundert bestätigte Disraeli's Weitsicht: Das europäische System der Diplomatie erwies sich als unfähig, ein Land von der Größe Deutschlands - noch dazu im Zentrum des Kontinents - einzubinden. Auf der anderen Seite war das deutsche System nicht immer in der Lage, Wettrüsten und ultimative Katastrophen zu verhindern.

6. 1949 traf Deutschland unter dem ersten Bundeskanzler der Nachkriegsära, dem herausragenden Konrad Adenauer, eine historische Entscheidung: Es schwör einer rein national ausgerichteten Politik ab, die Deutschlands zentrale geographische Lage und demographische Stärke in den Mittelpunkt stellen würde. Es definierte seine nationalen Ziele als Teil der europäischen Idee und der transatlantischen Partnerschaft. In schmerzhafter Entsgagung ordnete Adenauer das Streben nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung den Zielen der europäischen Integration und der atlantischen Partnerschaft unter. Konfrontiert mit einer leidenschaftlichen Opposition, erklärte die Regierung Adenauer, dass die europäische Integration und die Partnerschaft mit Amerika Voraussetzung für die Wiedererlangung der eigenen deutschen Einheit seien. Diese Position wurde selbst beibehalten, als die Sowjets 1953 ein zweideutiges Angebot unterbreiteten. Darin boten sie Adenauer an, dass Deutschland die Einheit erringen könne, wenn es den Status der Neutralität einnehmen würde.

1 gessen

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P.2

8. Der Marshall Plan und die Atlantische Allianz waren Ausdruck dieser Politik. Dieser Akt der Versöhnung wäre jedoch nicht möglich gewesen ohne das mutige Engagement für die Zukunft in Deutschland selbst. Nach den Auseinandersetzungen der 50er Jahre ist die europäische Einigung, fußend auf der Freundschaft mit Frankreich und der Partnerschaft mit Amerika, zu den Wegweisern deutscher Außenpolitik geworden. Nach einer Weile wurden sie akzeptiert von der Opposition und fortgesetzt durch zwei bemerkenswerte Kanzler der anderen großen Volkspartei, Diese verfolgten eine aktive Politik gegenüber dem Osten Europas und der Sowjetunion.

9. Als Helmut Kohl 1982 seine Kanzlerschaft antrat, war die Architektur der Nachkriegszeit vollendet. Was vor ihm lag war die Vollendung des Gebäudes der deutschen Einheit, der europäischen Integration und die Aussöhnung mit dem Osten – dies alles auf der Basis der Partnerschaft mit Amerika und auf der Grundlage der Westpolitik. Adenauers, Doch bevor diese große Aufbauleistung in Angriff genommen werden konnte, musste eine andere schwierige Debatte über den Zweck der westlichen Allianz überwunden werden. Ausgelöst wurde diese durch die Stationierung amerikanischer Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa – davon der größte Teil auf deutschem Boden. Die strategischen Überlegungen, die zu dieser Entscheidung führten, wurden eingeholt von dramatischen Entwicklungen.

Aber an was wir heute immer wieder zurück denken sollten, ist der Grundton, der die Debatte über die Atlantische Allianz in den 50er Jahren bestimmte: Ist es möglich das Schicksal beider Seiten dies- und jenseits des Atlantiks getrennt zu betrachten? Kann jede Seite Sicherheit und Fortschritt erreichen, ohne den Ansatz einer gemeinsamen Sicherheitspolitik? In den 80er Jahren hat Helmut Kohl auf das gemeinsame Schicksal bestanden, indem er bereit war, gemeinsame Risiken einzugehen – auch gegen eine mächtige Opposition und emotionsgeladene Demonstrationen, Helmut Kohls Leistung war es, gemeinsame Entscheidungen zu vertreten, die nicht der Taktik folgen, sondern auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Werte beruhen.

10. Alle großen Errungenschaften sind zunächst nur Ideen, bevor sie in die Realität umgesetzt werden. Ronald Reagan – der erste amerikanische Präsident, mit welchem Helmut Kohl als Kanzler zusammengearbeitet hat – drückte Amerikas Dankbarkeit und die gemeinsame Vision wie folgt aus, als Helmut 1986 Washington besuchte:

> „Der Weg von Kanzler Kohl ist gekennzeichnet vom Ideal der Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit...Heute stehen die Demokratien vor“

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P.3

11. So geschah es auch: Keine fünf Jahre nach diesem Treffen wurden die Waffen, die eine derartige Kontroverse in Europa ausgelöst hatten, abgerüstet. Und zwar nicht unilateral - wie viele Kritiker vorausgesagt hatten - sondern auf beiden Seiten des Eisernen Vorhangs. Begleitet wurde dies durch eine allgemeine Verbesserung des politischen Klimas und einen fruchtbaren Dialog zwischen den Partnern der atlantischen Allianz und den Ländern im Osten Europas sowie der sowjetischen Führung.

13. Nicht wenige - auch in Deutschland - vertraten die Auffassung, dass es wünschenswert sei, auch nach dem Kollaps des Kommunismus zwei deutsche Staaten zu bewahren. Es gab einen Moment des Zögerns; Unsicherheit über die Einheit der NATO, Bedenken über die Reaktion der Sowjetunion machten sich breit. Dies alles wurde überwunden durch das Vertrauen der amerikanischen Führung in die Werte und die Zielsetzungen Helmut Kohls. Der Kanzler besuchte Camp David im Februar 1990 und überzeugte und bestärkte den amerikanischen Präsidenten George H.W. Bush davon, dass der Moment für die deutsche Einheit gekommen sei. Selbst wenn zwei deutsche Staaten nur vorübergehend entstehen sollten, so würde dies die internationale Diplomatie in ihren Bemühungen, eine neue europäische und globale Weltordnung zu schaffen, behindern.

erfüllen.

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abschließen, sondern auch Deutschlands Rolle in der NATO festigen. Er dehnte den Schirm der Allianz über Ost-Deutschland aus. Dies alles wäre nicht möglich gewesen - wie groß Amerikas Beitrag auch immer gewesen sein mag - wenn nicht Helmut - aufbauend auf den Errungenschaften seiner Vorgänger - die neue sowjetische Führung erfolgreich davon überzeugt hätte, dass ein geeintes Deutschland keine Gefahr für die Sicherheit Russlands darstellt. Im Gegenteil, würde dies doch Russland ermöglichen, in die internationale Gemeinschaft zurückzukehren.

16. Es ist heute zu einem Gemeinplatz geworden, die Ursachen für eine Verschlechterung der Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den USA in der relativen Schwäche Europas zu suchen. Daher würde auch eine starke Europäische Union, die sich im Aufwind befindet, die atlantische Partnerschaft unterstützen. Dieses Argument wird jedoch nicht den Errungenschaften gerecht, die zwei Generationen von Politikern in Europa erzielt haben. In meinen Ausführungen zur gemeinsamen Geschichte möchte ich verdeutlichen, dass Europa eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt hat, nicht weil es Amerika unter Druck setzte, sondern weil der Sinn für gemeinsame Werte, der Geist von Kameradschaft und das Empfinden für das gemeinsame Schicksal die Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Amerika immer durchdrungen haben. Keiner hat einen größeren Beitrag hierzu geleistet als Helmut Kohl. Man muss nur seinen Berichten über seine Jugend in der deprimierenden Zeit nach dem Krieg folgen. Dabei spielt auch Amerika eine wichtige Rolle, und man begreift, dass für Helmut die transatlantischen Beziehungen nicht eine Frage von Gleichgewichtstaktik oder der Druckausübung waren. Vielmehr waren sie die Erfüllung einer inneren Notwendigkeit.

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17. Das nun geeinte Europa wird auch für die atlantische Partnerschaft neue Möglichkeiten und Herausforderungen beinhalten. Nach Abschluss des Vertrages von Maastricht hat Amerika diese europäische Initiative begrüßt, weil es Helmut Kohl und seinen Kollegen vertraute. Die Herausforderungen sind heute jedoch andere, auch aufgrund der Tatsache, dass wir eine erfolgreiche gemeinsame Politik auf der Grundlage dieser gleichen, gleichberechtigten Partnerschaft konzipiert haben. Diese moralische Haltung am die neuen Gegebenheiten anzupassen - darin besteht die große Herausforderung, die das Erbe Helmut Kohls heute an uns stellt.

18. Ich zitierte zuvor Ronald Reagan, den ersten amerikanischen Präsidenten, mit welchem Kanzler Kohl zusammengearbeitet hat. Nun möchte ich enden, indem ich den letzten Präsidenten der USA, mit welchem Helmut Kohl in seiner Zeit als Kanzler zusammentraf, zitiere - Bill Clinton. Helmut wurde die höchste zivile Auszeichnung der USA, - the Medal of Freedom - verliehen - und ich darf hier anmerken, dass diese Medaille nur in ganz seltenen Fällen an Ausländer verliehen wird. Clinton sagte damals folgendes:

> „Zukünftige Historiker werden sagen, dass das 21. Jahrhundert mit der Weitsicht von Helmut Kohl begann. Er entwickelte in den Monaten nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer eine Vision für die deutsche Einheit und für eine neue Partnerschaft zwischen dem Westen und einem demokratischen Russland. Er sah die Notwendigkeit, andere Staaten in die europäische Familie aufzunehmen. Er sah Deutschland in der Mitte, und nicht länger am Rande, eines geeinten und demokratischen Europas - eines Europa, in welchem Grenzen nicht länger Möglichkeiten verschließen und in welchem Nationalbewusstsein als eine Quelle von Stolz gesehen wird, und nicht als Ursache für Konflikte...Jeder, der dieses Erbe Helmut Kohls annimmt, weiß, dass für das Überleben des Friedens in Europa unsere Allianz der Demokratien gefestigt sein muss - sie muss zusammenstehen gegen Diktatoren, die menschliche Differenzen dazu nutzen, um ihre Macht auszubauen...und wir müssen unserer Vision treu bleiben noch lange nachdem wir unsere militärischen Ziele erreicht haben.“

12. April 2005

von Henry A. Kissinger

1. In den dreißig Jahren, in welchen ich nun das Privileg habe, Helmut Kohl zu kennen und zu begleiten, hat er Unglaubliches erreicht: Er hat sein Land durch die Untiefen des Kalten Krieges gesteuert - hin zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Er hat Deutschland mit Europa wirtschaftlich und politisch geeint und zugleich immer an der Stärkung der transatlantischen Beziehungen gearbeitet. Die Freundschaft zu Frankreich und die Partnerschaft mit Amerika waren die Kernelemente einer Politik, die das Vertrauen der Verbündeten genoss und zugleich den langfristigen Interessen der deutschen Bürger diente.

2. Ich wurde gebeten, heute zur Ehrung von Helmut Kohl einen amerikanischen Blick auf sein Lebenswerk zu werfen. Das ist ohne Frage eine große Ehre. Ich spreche zu Ihnen als Amerikaner - auch

2

wenn Deutschland natürlich nie ein fremdes Land für mich gewesen
ist. Ich teile meine Kindheit und Jahrzehnte der
Nachkriegsgeschichte mit diesem Land. Und ich bin stolz darauf,
dass Helmut Kohl seit nunmehr drei Jahrzehnten mein Freund ist.
Aber natürlich kann die amerikanische Perspektive nur einen Teil
der historischen Leistung Helmut Kohls abbilden.

3. Die Freundschaft zwischen Amerika und Deutschland ist eine
der großen politischen und moralischen Errungenschaften der Zeit
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ich sah Berlin zum ersten Mal im
Sommer 1945. Wie die meisten deutschen Städte, so war auch
diese Stadt vollkommen zerstört. Deutschland lag am Boden. Seine
Bevölkerung dachte nur ans Überleben – das Land war politisch
isoliert.

4. Die Nachkriegsgeneration in Deutschland verdient Respekt
für ihre Hingabe und Opferbereitschaft, mit der sie das Land wieder
aufgebaut hat. Sie verdient Respekt dafür, dass sie Deutschland in
die Gemeinschaft freier Staaten zurückgeführt hat – und es heute
dort Anerkennung als eines der wichtigsten Mitglieder findet. Als
Deutschland 1871 geeint wurde, erklärte der britische Premier
Benjamin Disraeli: „Das ist ein bedeutenderes Ereignis als die
Französische Revolution.“ Er glaubte damals, dass die Kraft eines
geeinten Deutschlands es erheblich erschweren würde, eine neue

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Machtbalance herzustellen. Auch würde die Diplomatie in ihren bisherigen Möglichkeiten – ihrer Flexibilität – eingeschränkt.

6. 1949 traf Deutschland unter dem ersten Bundeskanzler der Nachkriegsära, dem großen Konrad Adenauer, eine historische Entscheidung: Es schwor einer rein national ausgerichteten Politik ab, die Deutschlands zentrale geographische Lage und demographische Stärke in den Mittelpunkt stellen würde. Es definierte seine nationalen Ziele als Teil der europäischen Idee und der transatlantischen Partnerschaft. In schmerzhafter Entsagung ordnete Adenauer das Streben nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung den Zielen der europäischen Integration und der atlantischen Partnerschaft unter. Konfrontiert mit einer leidenschaftlichen Opposition, erklärte die Regierung Adenauer, dass die europäische Integration und die Partnerschaft mit Amerika Voraussetzung für die Wiedererlangung der eigenen deutschen Einheit seien. Diese Position wurde selbst beibehalten, als die

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7. Zur gleichen Zeit unternahmen die USA eine grundsätzliche
Neuausrichtung ihrer Außenpolitik. Noch 1944 erklärte Franklin D.
Roosevelt gegenüber Winston Churchill, dass amerikanische
Truppen nicht länger als zwei Jahre in Europa stationiert bleiben
könnten. Unter der Präsidentschaft von Harry Truman überwand
Amerika jedoch seine historische Isolation und fand zu einer
Außenpolitik, die das eigene Schicksal mit dem Wiederaufbau
Europas und der atlantischen Partnerschaft verband. Ebenso wie
die Entscheidung Adenauers für die Westbindung, war auch die
moralische Komponente in Trumans Entscheidung von größter
Bedeutung. Ein Jahrzehnt später fragte ich Truman, was sein
größter Erfolg gewesen sei. Er antwortete: „Dass wir nach dem
überwältigenden Sieg unsere Gegner in die Gemeinschaft
gleichberechtigter Staaten zurückgeführt haben.“

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Frankreich und der Partnerschaft mit Amerika, zu den Wegweisern deutscher Außenpolitik geworden. Nach einer Weile wurden sie akzeptiert von der Opposition und fortgesetzt durch zwei bemerkenswerte Kanzler der anderen großen Volkspartei. Diese verfolgten eine aktive Politik gegenüber dem Osten Europas und der Sowjetunion.

9. Als Helmut Kohl 1982 seine Kanzlerschaft antrat, war die Architektur der Nachkriegszeit vollendet. Was vor ihm lag, war die Vollendung des Gebäudes der deutschen Einheit, der europäischen Integration und die Aussöhnung mit dem Osten – dies alles auf der Basis der Partnerschaft mit Amerika und auf der Grundlage der Westpolitik Adenauers.

Anfang 1983 erklärte Helmut Kohl: „Wir sind keine Wanderer zwischen den Welten – unser Platz ist an der Seite der atlantischen Gemeinschaft und unserer französischen Freunde.“

Doch bevor Helmut Kohl diese große Aufbauleistung in Angriff nehmen konnte, musste eine andere schwierige Debatte über den Zweck der westlichen Allianz überwunden werden. Ausgelöst wurde diese durch die Stationierung amerikanischer Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa - davon der größte Teil auf deutschem Boden. Die strategischen Überlegungen, die zu dieser Entscheidung führten, wurden eingeholt von dramatischen Entwicklungen.

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Aber an was wir heute immer wieder zurückdenken sollten, ist der Grundton, der die Debatte über die Atlantische Allianz in den 50er Jahren bestimmte: Ist es möglich, das Schicksal beider Seiten dies- und jenseits des Atlantiks getrennt zu betrachten? Kann jede Seite Sicherheit und Fortschritt erreichen, ohne den Ansatz einer gemeinsamen Sicherheitspolitik? In den 80er Jahren hat Helmut Kohl auf das gemeinsame Schicksal bestanden, indem er bereit war, gemeinsame Risiken einzugehen – auch gegen eine mächtige Opposition, emotionsgeladene Demonstrationen und Drohungen aus Moskau. Helmut Kohls Leistung war es, gemeinsame Entscheidungen zu vertreten, die nicht der Taktik folgen, sondern auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Werte beruhen.

> „Der Weg von Kanzler Kohl ist gekennzeichnet vom Ideal der Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit...Heute stehen die Demokratien vor unglaublichen Herausforderungen. Aber wir bestehen, und am Ende wird der Friede siegen. Unser Sieg wird nicht erreicht werden durch

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das Überschreiten von Grenzen mit gut ausgerüsteten Armeen,
natürlich auch nicht durch den Bau von Raketen und die Besetzung
anderer Staaten. Unser Sieg wird kommen – vielleicht Schritt für
Schritt – wenn Mauern fallen, Raketen abgerüstet werden und die
Menschen frei sind...Die Freundschaft und Kameradschaft, die
Helmut Kohl durch seinen Besuch ausdrückt, ist ein Zeugnis dafür,
dass die Welt, die wir wünschen, bereits gebaut wird."

11. So geschah es auch: Keine fünf Jahre nach diesem Treffen wurden die Waffen, die eine derartige Kontroverse in Europa ausgelöst hatten, abgerüstet. Und zwar nicht unilateral – wie viele Kritiker vorausgesagt hatten – sondern auf beiden Seiten des Eisernen Vorhangs. Begleitet wurde dies durch eine allgemeine Verbesserung des politischen Klimas und einen fruchtbaren Dialog zwischen den Partnern der atlantischen Allianz und den Ländern im Osten Europas sowie der sowjetischen Führung. Ein Meilenstein auf diesem Weg war das Treffen zwischen Kohl und Gorbatschow im Juni 1989. In diesem Moment erschien die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands noch als ein ferner Traum – sie war bereits angestoßen, aber noch nicht Gegenstand aktiver Diplomatie. Fünfzehn Monate später wurde die Einheit Realität.

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13. Nicht wenige - auch in Deutschland - vertraten die Auffassung, dass es wünschenswert sei, auch nach dem Kollaps des Kommunismus zwei deutsche Staaten zu bewahren. Es gab einen Moment des Zögerns; Unsicherheit über die Einheit der NATO, Bedenken über die Reaktion der Sowjetunion machten sich breit. Dies alles wurde überwunden durch das Vertrauen der amerikanischen Führung in die Werte und die Zielsetzungen Helmut Kohls. Der Kanzler besuchte Camp David im Februar 1990 und überzeugte und bestärkte den amerikanischen Präsidenten George H.W. Bush darin, dass der Moment für die deutsche Einheit gekommen sei. Das Übergangsszenario zweier deutscher Staaten liefe den Bemühungen der internationalen Diplomatie eine neue Weltordnung zu schaffen, entgegen.

9

15. Helmut besann sich auf das andere zentrale Element aus dem Erbe Adenauers: die Vollendung Europas, dessen Geschichte durch nationale Rivalitäten gekennzeichnet war. Das Ergebnis war der Vertrag von Maastricht, der die ökonomische Vision manifestierte und zum Prozess politischer Konsolidierung führte. 1997 wurde die atlantische Architektur dann auch auf die Staaten in Osteuropa ausgedehnt, die von der kommunistischen Herrschaft befreit wurden. 2004 sind zehn Staaten der Europäischen Union beigetreten. Amerika erkennt die große Friedensleistung des Projektes Europa an – diese Leistung, die ganz wesentlich durch Helmut Kohl gefördert wurde.

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16. Es ist heute zu einem Gemeinplatz geworden, die Ursachen für eine Verschlechterung der Beziehungen zwischen Europa und den USA in der relativen Schwäche Europas zu suchen. Dieses Argument wird jedoch nicht den Errungenschaften gerecht, die zwei Generationen von Politikern in Europa erzielt haben. In meinen Ausführungen zur gemeinsamen Geschichte möchte ich verdeutlichen, dass Europa eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt hat, nicht weil es Amerika unter Druck setzte, sondern weil der Sinn für gemeinsame Werte, der Geist von Kameradschaft und das Empfinden für das gemeinsame Schicksal die Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Amerika immer durchdrungen haben. Keiner hat einen größeren Beitrag hierzu geleistet als Helmut Kohl. Man muss nur seinen Berichten über seine Jugend in der deprimierenden Zeit nach dem Krieg folgen. Dabei spielt auch Amerika eine wichtige Rolle, und man begreift, dass für Helmut die transatlantischen Beziehungen nicht eine Frage von Gleichgewichtstaktik oder der Druckausübung waren. Vielmehr waren sie die Erfüllung einer inneren Notwendigkeit.

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17. Das nun geeinte Europa wird auch für die atlantische Partnerschaft neue Möglichkeiten und Herausforderungen beinhalten. Nach Abschluss des Vertrages von Maastricht hat Amerika diese europäische Initiative begrüßt, weil es Helmut Kohl und seinen Kollegen vertraute. In dieser Ära standen die Sicherheitspolitik und der Aufbau Europas im Mittelpunkt.

Heute stehen wir vor neuen Herausforderungen. Die sicherheitspolitischen Probleme des 21. Jahrhunderts sind weitaus komplexer und erfordern eine neue globale Weltordnung.

Wir stehen nun am Scheideweg: Entweder leiten wir aus dem moralischen Erbe Helmut Kohls eine neue gemeinsame transatlantische Politik ab. Oder es droht der Rückfall der atlantischen Welt in den alten Konkurrenzkampf, aus welchem die unzähligen Tragödien des 20. Jahrhunderts entstanden sind.

12

„Zukünftige Historiker werden sagen, dass das 21. Jahrhundert mit der Weitsicht von Helmut Kohl begann. Er entwickelte in den Monaten nach dem Fall der Berliner Mauer eine Vision für die deutsche Einheit und für eine neue Partnerschaft zwischen dem Westen und einem demokratischen Russland. Er sah die Notwendigkeit, andere Staaten in die europäische Familie aufzunehmen. Er sah Deutschland in der Mitte, und nicht länger am Rande, eines geeinten und demokratischen Europas – eines Europa, in welchem Grenzen nicht länger Möglichkeiten verschließen und in welchem Nationalbewusstsein als eine Quelle von Stolz gesehen wird, und nicht als Ursache für Konflikt. Jeder, der dieses Erbe Helmut Kohls annimmt, weiß, dass für das Überleben des Friedens in Europa unsere Allianz der Demokratien gefestigt sein muss – sie muss zusammenstehen gegen Diktatoren, die menschliche Differenzen dazu nutzen, um ihre Macht auszubauen...und wir müssen unserer Vision treu bleiben noch lange nachdem wir unsere militärischen Ziele erreicht haben."

19. Lieber Helmut, ich danke Dir für eine lange und erfüllende Freundschaft - Amerika dankt Dir für Deinen Einsatz für Freiheit, Frieden und Fortschritt. Was Du erreicht hast, wird uns dienen als gemeinsames Gewissen, und Dein Sinn für Gerechtigkeit wird uns eine immerwährende Quelle der Inspiration sein.

English final

CYJ

As prepared for delivery

"Helmut Kohl: A Life Devoted to Germany and Europe"

Speech for Symposium,
A Life Devoted to Germany and Europe"

April 12, 2005

by Henry A. Kissinger

In the thirty years that I have had the privilege of knowing and observing Helmut Kohl, he navigated his country through the shoals of the Cold War, towards national unification, towards European economic and political unity, all the while strengthening Atlantic relations. Friendship with France and partnership with America were the principal elements of a policy that maintained the trust of his allies and safeguarded the long-term interests of his people. Loyalty has been one of Helmut Kohl's extraordinary attributes. And serenity: Amidst the storms of crisis, he remained calm and confident, demonstrating by his bearing that character and faith would prevail over even the most tumultuous circumstances.

The organizers of this testimonial to the life of Helmut Kohl have asked me to provide an American perspective. It is a great honor. I speak as an American. Yet Germany is never really a foreign country to me. I share with it my childhood and decades of its postwar history. And I am proud of the fact that Helmut Kohl has been my friend for three decades. Of course, the American perspective, important as it is, represents only a part of Helmut Kohl's historic contribution.

The friendship between America and Germany is one of the great political and moral achievements of the period following the Second World War. I saw this city for the first time in the summer of 1945. Like most German cities, it was devastated. The German state had collapsed. The population was preoccupied with survival. Germany was political and morally isolated.

The German postwar generation deserves the respect of other democracies for the dedication with which it undertook the task of reconstruction and the sacrifice with which it brought about its return to the community of free nations as one of its indisputably principal members. When Germany was unified in 1871, the British Prime

As prepared for delivery

April 12, 2005

by Henry A. Kissinger

As prepared for delivery

Speech for Symposium,
"Helmut Kohl: A Life Devoted to Germany and Europe"

April 12, 2005

by Henry A. Kissinger

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Minister Benjamin Disraeli said, "This is a greater event than the French Revolution." He meant that the power of a unified Germany would make it very difficult to reestablish a new balance of power and that the reduction of the European system by so many heretofore independent states deprived diplomacy of some of its previous flexibility.

The next century demonstrated Disraeli's farsightedness. The European diplomatic system proved unequal to absorbing a country of Germany's magnitude in the center of the continent, and the German domestic structure did not always manage to muster the restraint necessary to prevent an arms race and ultimate catastrophe.

In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its great first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foresaw a purely national policy seeking to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated the immediate prospects of unification to the pursuit of European integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a precondition to its own national unification. This position was maintained even when the Soviets in 1953 ambiguously offered unification in return for German neutrality.

During the same period, America undertook a major transformation of its own historic foreign policy. As late as 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had told Winston Churchill that American forces could not remain in Europe for more than two years. Under the presidency of Harry Truman, America abandoned its historic isolation and adopted a policy that tied its destiny to the future of European recovery and Atlantic partnership. Like the Adenauer choice for Atlantic partnership, the moral component of Truman's choice was the most important. A decade later, I asked Truman what he considered his greatest achievement. He replied, "That after total victory in war, we brought back our adversaries to the community of nations as equals."

The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance were the expressions of this policy. Those acts of reconciliation would not have been possible without a courageous commitment to the future inside Germany. European unity based on friendship with France and

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partnership with America became the guideposts of German foreign policy for the decades after the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two significant chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's Westpolitik. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another critical debate about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the realm of shared embracing values.

All great accomplishments were an idea before they became a reality. President Ronald Reagan - the first American President with whom Helmut Kohl dealt as Chancellor - expressed America's gratitude and common vision, when Helmut visited Washington in 1986, in these words:

> "Chancellor Kohl charts his course guided by the ideals of liberty and justice. ...Today the democracies face challenges that, at times, seem overwhelming. Yet we persevere and, in the end, freedom will triumph. Our victory will not be realized in the crossing of borders by well-equipped armies, certainly not in the launching of missiles or the occupation of other countries. Our victory will come, perhaps little by little, as walls are torn down, missiles dismantled and as people are freed. ...The friendship

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and comradery of Chancellor Kohl's visit is testimony that the
world we seek is already being built."

So it turned out. Within less than five years of that meeting, the missiles that had generated such controversy were being dismantled not unilaterally – as critics had urged – but on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was accompanied by a general easing of tensions and a growing dialogue between the Atlantic partners and the counties of Eastern Europe under Soviet occupation and with the Soviet leadership.

It was symbolic of these trends that the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred while Helmut was on a visit to Warsaw. That event was unexpected when it occurred, but the necessary consequence of the previous policy challenged all the nations of Europe, East and West, and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union. Today the rapid unification of Germany has about it an air of inevitability. That was not the perception at the time, even within the Federal Republic.

Not a few – even in Germany – thought that it might be desirable to maintain two German states even after the collapse of communist rule. There was a moment of hesitation; uncertainty about the cohesion of NATO; concern about the reaction of the Soviet Union. It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp David in February 1990 and reinforced President George H.W. Bush's predisposition that this was the moment for unification; if two German states were to emerge, even on an apparently temporary basis, the modalities of their interaction would deflect international diplomacy from the overriding task of constructing a new European and world order.

The Camp David meeting had immediate and historic consequences. With the support of America, Helmut Kohl turned the hopes of a generation into reality by his vision, courage and tenacity. By October 1990, he had succeeded not only in the national task; he had maintained Germany's role in NATO and extended the Alliance umbrella over the part of Germany rejoining the national community. This would not have been possible, whatever America's encouragement, had not Helmut, building on the achievements of his predecessors, succeeded in convincing the new Soviet leadership that the emerging Germany would no longer be a threat to Russia's security; on the contrary, it would be an asset in enabling Russia to rejoin the international community.

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By 1997, the Atlantic architecture had been extended to the new states arising from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Helmut turned to the other key elements of the Adenauer legacy: to complete the building of a Europe which transcended historic national rivalries. The result was the Maastrich Treaty, which institutionalized a European economic vision and led to the current process of political consolidation. Others will no doubt speak about Helmut's role in the creation of the European Union. I will confine myself to the American aspect of it.

It has become conventional to argue that if relations between Europe and America have suffered, it is because of Europe's relative weakness. Therefore, the strong European Union now in the process of emerging will promote Atlantic partnership. This argument does not do justice to the achievements of two generations of Europe's leaders. In the journey through history that I have sketched, Europe played a major role not primarily because of its ability to pressure America, but, above all, because of the sense of community, the spirit of comradery and the sense of a common destiny that imbued relations between America and Europe. No one made a greater contribution to this atmosphere than Helmut Kohl. One needed only listen to his account of his youth in the depressed postwar period and the role America played in it to realize that, for Helmut, Atlantic relations were not a matter of equilibriating tactics or pressures. Rather, they were the fulfillment of an inner necessity.

The emergence of a united Europe will present new opportunities for Atlantic partnership, together with new challenges. In the aftermath of Maastrich, America welcomed the European initiative because of the confidence inspired by Helmut Kohl and his colleagues. The challenges have now changed largely due to the success of common policies, jointly conceived and carried out on the basis of equality. To adapt that moral disposition to new circumstances is the challenge that Helmut Kohl's legacy leaves for us.

I cited earlier remarks made by the first American President with whom Helmut dealt as Chancellor, Ronald Reagan. I conclude with comments by the last President during Kohl's chancellorship, Bill Clinton. They were made when conferring on Helmut the Medal of Freedom, America's highest civilian award, very rarely given to a foreigner:

> "Future historians will say Europe's 21st century began on [Helmut Kohl's] watch. In the months that followed the fall of

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the Berlin Wall, he conceived a generous vision for German unification, and for a new partnership between the West and a democratic Russia. ...He saw the need to embrace other nations into Europe's family, putting Germany in the center, not on the edge any longer, of a united, democratic Europe – a Europe where borders do not limit possibilities and where nationhood is a source of pride, not a crucible of conflict. ...Anyone who respects the legacy of Helmut Kohl knows that for peace to survive in Europe, our alliance of democracies must stand, and stand together, against dictators who exploit human differences to extend power. And we must stay true to our vision long after we achieve our military goals."

Dear Helmut, America thanks you for your contribution to freedom and peace and progress. Your achievement will serve as our conscience, and your legacy will be forever part of our inspiration.

As prepared for delivery

Organized by Konrad Adenauer
Foundation - at Deutsches Historisches
Museum, Berlin

# Speech for Symposium, "Helmut Kohl: A Life Devoted to Germany and Europe"

April 12, 2005

by Henry A. Kissinger

(4)

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In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its great first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foreswore a purely national policy seeking to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated the immediate prospects of unification to the pursuit of European integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a precondition to its own national unification. This position was maintained even when the Soviets in 1953 ambiguously offered unification in return for German neutrality.

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(ND)

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another critical debate about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the realm of shared embracing values.

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5

It has become conventional to argue that if relations between Europe and America have suffered, it is because of Europe's relative weakness. Therefore, the strong European Union now in the process of emerging will promote Atlantic partnership. This argument does not do justice to the achievements of two generations of Europe's leaders. In the journey through history that I have sketched, Europe played a major role not primarily because of its ability to pressure America, but, above all, because of the sense of community, the spirit of comradery and the sense of a common destiny that imbued relations between America and Europe. No one made a greater contribution to this atmosphere than Helmut Kohl. One needed only listen to his account of his youth in the depressed postwar period and the role America played in it to realize that, for Helmut, Atlantic relations were not a matter of equilibrating tactics or pressures. Rather, they were the fulfillment of an inner necessity.

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Submitted 3/23/05

As prepared for delivery

April 12, 2005

by Harry A. Kissinger

As prepared for delivery

Speech for Symposium,
Helmut Kohl: A Life Devoted to Germany and Europe"

April 12, 2005

by Henry A. Kissinger

As prepared for delivery

April 12, 2005

by Henry A. Kissinger

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Speech for Symposium,
"Helmut Kohl: A Life Devoted to Germany and Europe"
by Henry A. Kissinger

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3

LYD

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982, the archity of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another critical debate about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the realm of shared embracing values.

3

EYD

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1982, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another critical debate about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the realm of shared embracing values.

3

EJD

4

Not a few – even in Germany – thought that it might be desirable to maintain two German states even after the collapse of communist rule. There was a moment of hesitation; uncertainty about the cohesion of NATO; concern about the reaction of the Soviet Union. It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp David in January 1990 and reinforced President George H.W. Bush's predisposition that this was the moment for unification; if two German states were to emerge, even on an apparently temporary basis, the modalities of their interaction would deflect international diplomacy from the overriding task of constructing a new European and world order.

5

6

As prepared for delivery

2

3

EYD

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1981, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another critical debate about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the realm of shared embracing values.

4

LYJ

Not a few – even in Germany – thought that it might be desirable to maintain two German states even after the collapse of communist rule. There was a moment of hesitation; uncertainty about the cohesion of NATO; concern about the reaction of the Soviet Union. It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp David in January 1991 and reinforced President George H.W. Bush's predisposition that this was the moment for unification; if two German states were to emerge, even on an apparently temporary basis, the modalities of their interaction would deflect international diplomacy from the overriding task of constructing a new European and world order.

5

6

the Berlin Wall, he conceived a generous vision for German unification, and for a new partnership between the West and a democratic Russia. ...He saw the need to embrace other nations into Europe's family, putting Germany in the center, not on the edge any longer, of a united, democratic Europe - a Europe where borders do not limit possibilities and where nationhood is a source of pride, not a crucible of conflict. ...Anyone who respects the legacy of Helmut Kohl knows that for peace to survive in Europe, our alliance of democracies must stand, and stand together, against dictators who exploit human differences to extend power. And we must stay true to our vision long after we achieve our military goals."

2033 words

3/23/05-FINAL

Helmut Kohl Speech

2

3

[Y]

The German postwar generation deserves the respect of other democracies for the dedication with which it undertook the task of reconstruction and the sacrifice with which it brought about its return to the community of free nations as one of its indisputably principal members. When Germany was unified in 1871, the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli said, "This is a greater event than the French Revolution." He meant that the power of a unified Germany would make it very difficult to reestablish a new balance of power and that the reduction of the European system by so many heretofore independent states deprived diplomacy of some of its previous flexibility.

4

5

6

Germany. European unity based on friendship with France and partnership with America became the guideposts of German foreign policy for the decades after the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two significant chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

7

[Y]

8

whom Helmut Kohl dealt as Chancellor – expressed America’s
gratitude and common vision, when Helmut visited Washington in
1986, in these words:

"Chancellor Kohl charts his course guided by the ideals of liberty and justice. ...Today the democracies face challenges that, at times, seem overwhelming. Yet we persevere and, in the end, freedom will triumph. Our victory will not be realized in the crossing of borders by well-equipped armies, certainly not in the launching of missiles or the occupation of other countries. Our victory will come, perhaps little by little, as walls are torn down, missiles dismantled and as people are freed. ...The friendship and comradery of Chancellor Kohl's visit is testimony that the world we seek is already being built."

9

unilaterally - as critics had urged - but on both sides of the Iron
Curtain. This was accompanied by a general easing of tensions and a
growing dialogue between the Atlantic partners and the counties of
Eastern Europe under Soviet occupation and with the Soviet leadership.

Not a few - even in Germany - thought that it might be
desirable to maintain two German states even after the collapse of
communist rule. There was a moment of hesitation; uncertainty about
the cohesion of NATO; concern about the reaction of the Soviet Union.

10

LYJ

11

12

13

"Future historians will say Europe's 21st century began on
[Helmut Kohl's] watch. In the months that followed the fall of
the Berlin Wall, he conceived a generous vision for German

14

MAR-23-2005 10:50

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.01/01

2054 words

Helmut Kohl Speech

3/21/05-#2

With edits

additional edits

TOTAL P.01

MAR-23-2005 10:53

KAI DC

212 753 7248

2

The organizers of this celebration of the life of Helmut Kohl have asked me to provide an American perspective. It is a great honor. I speak as an American. Yet Germany is never really a foreign country to me. I share with it my childhood and decades of its postwar history. And I am proud of the fact that Helmut Kohl has been my friend for three decades. Of course, I am aware that the American perspective, important as it is, represents only a part of Helmut Kohl's historic achievement.

The friendship between America and Germany is one of the great achievements of the period following the Second World War. I saw this city for the first time in the summer of 1945. Like most German cities, it was devastated. The German state had collapsed. The population was preoccupied with survival. Germany was political and morally isolated.

2.d

Mar 23 05 10:43AM

MAR-23-2005 10:53

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.02/07

3

The German postwar generation deserves the respect of other democracies for the dedication with which it undertook the task of reconstruction and the sacrifice with which it brought about its return to the community of free nations as one of its indisputably principal members. When Germany was unified in 1871, the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli said, "This is a greater event than the French Revolution." He meant that the power of a unified Germany would make it very difficult to reestablish a new balance of power and that the reduction of the European system by so many heretofore Independent states deprived diplomacy of some of its previous flexibility.

The next century demonstrated the wisdom of that prediction.

E-9

Mar 23 05 10:43AM

MAR-23-2005 10:53

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.03/07

In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its great first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foreswore a purely seeking national policy designed to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated even to the immediate prospects of unification in pursuit of European integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a precondition to its own national unification. This position was maintained even when the Soviets in 1953 ambiguously offered unification in return for German neutrality.

P.4

Mar 23 1985 10:43a

MAR-23-2005 10:53

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.04/07

During the same period, America undertook a major transformation of its own historic foreign policy. As late as 1944, President Roosevelt had told Winston Churchill that American forces could not remain in Europe for more than two years. Under the presidency of Harry Truman, America abandoned its historic isolation and adopted a policy that tied its destiny to the future of European recovery and Atlantic partnership. Like the Adenauer choice for Atlantic partnership, the moral component of Truman's choice was the most important. A decade later, I asked Truman what he considered his greatest achievement. He replied, "That after total victory in war, we brought back our adversaries to the community of nations as equals."

The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance were the expressions of this unity. That act of reconciliation would not have been possible without a courageous commitment to the future of Germany.

g.d

Mar 23 05 10:43a

MAR-23-2005 10:54

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.05/07

6

principles of European unity based on friendship with France and partnership with America became the guideposts of German foreign policy for the decades after the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two signatories chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1981, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's will to live and with America. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another crisis about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision

p.6

Mar 23 05 10:43a

MAR-23-2005 10:54

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.06/07

7

have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this
decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy
us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the
Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies
of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or
progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the
consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s
insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to
accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful
opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was
to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the
 realm of embracing values.

 elected

All great accomplishments were an idea before they became a
- the first Pundit with whom Helmut
reality. President Reagan expressed America's gratitude and common
vision, when Helmut visited Washington in 1986, in these words:
as clinton
offered
opportunity

p.7

Mar 23 05 10:43a

MAR-23-2005 10:54

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.07/07

8

"Chancellor Kohl charts his course guided by the ideals of liberty and justice. ...Today the [western] democracies face challenges that, at times, seem overwhelming. Yet we persevere and, in the end, freedom will triumph. Our victory will not be realized in the crossing of borders by well-equipped armies, certainly not in the launching of missiles or the occupation of other countries.

So it turned out. Within less than five years of that meeting, the missiles that had generated such controversy were being dismantled not unilaterally - as critics had urged - but on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was accompanied by a general easing of tensions and a

TOTAL P.07?

MAR-23-2005 10:56

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.01/06

9

It was symbolic of these trends that the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred while Helmut was on a visit to Warsaw. That event was unexpected when it occurred, but the necessary consequence of the previous policy challenged all the nations of Europe, East and West, and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union. Today the rapid unification of Germany has about it an air of inevitability. That was not the perception at the time, even within the Federal Republic. It was

~~the years of generation~~

Helmut Kohl who turned possibility into reality by his vision, courage and tenacity.

6.p

Mar 23 05 10:43a

MAR-23-2005 10:56

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.02/06

10

It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in
the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp
David in January 1991 and reinforced President Bush's predisposition
that this was the moment for unification; if two German states were to
emerge, even on an apparently temporary basis, the modalities of their
interaction would deflect International diplomacy from the overriding
task of constructing a new European and world order.

The Camp David meeting had immediate and historic consequences. With the support of America, but crucially with his own energy and vision, Helmut Kohl completed the task of unification by

By 1994 he succeeded not only in the national task; he did so in a way that maintained Germany's role in NATO and extending the Alliance umbrella over the part of Germany rejoining the national community.

p.10

MAR 23 2005 10:54:42

MAR-23-2005 10:56

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.03/06

11

By 1997

Lad

[Note] the Atlantic architecture having been extended to the new
states arising from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Helmut turned to the other key elements of the Adenauer legacy: to complete the build a Europe which transcended historic national rivalries. The result was the Maastricht Treaty, which institutionalized a European economic vision and led to the current process of political consolidation. Others will no doubt speak about Helmut's role in the creation of the European Union. I will confine myself to the American aspect of it.

to argue
It has become apparent that relations between
a conventional phrase often invoked is that

[if]
Europe and America have suffered, occasionally because of Europe's
relative weakness, which is to be remedied by the strong European

p.11

Mar 23 05 10:44a

MAR-23-2005 10:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.04/06

12

The emergence of a united Europe will present new opportunities for Atlantic partnership, together with new challenges. In the aftermath of Maastricht, America welcomed the European initiative because of the

p-12

Mar 23 05 10:44a

MAR-23-2005 10:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.05/06

13

confidence inspired by Helmut Kohl and his colleagues. The challenges
have now changed largely due to the success of common policies, jointly
conceived and carried out on the basis of equality. To maintain that
*adopt*
*to be consistent with*
moral disposition is the challenge that Helmut Kohl's legacy leaves for
us. It is not too much to say that the success of the Atlantic partnership
depends on our mastery of the intangible.

p.13

Mar 23 05 10:44a

MAR-23-2005 10:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.06/06

14

TOTAL P.14

TOTAL P.06

2046 words

3/22/05-#3

Helmut Kohl Speech

2

3

[Y]

The next century demonstrated the wisdom of Disraeli's farsightedness. The European diplomatic system proved unequal to absorbing a country of Germany's magnitude in the center of the continent, and the German domestic structure did not always manage

4

In 1949, the Bundesrepublic, under its great first Chancellor,
Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foreswore a purely
national policy seeking to exploit Germany's central geographic
position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling
its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic
partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated the
immediate prospects of unification to the pursuit of European
integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate
opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would
seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a
precondition to its own national unification. This position was
maintained even when the Soviets in 1953 ambiguously offered
unification in return for German neutrality.

5

During the same period, America undertook a major transformation of its own historic foreign policy. As late as 1944, President [Franklin D.] Roosevelt had told Winston Churchill that American forces could not remain in Europe for more than two years. Under the presidency of Harry Truman, America abandoned its historic isolation and adopted a policy that tied its destiny to the future of European recovery and Atlantic partnership. Like the Adenauer choice for Atlantic partnership, the moral component of Truman's choice was the most important. A decade later, I asked Truman what he considered his greatest achievement. He replied, "That after total victory in war, we brought back our adversaries to the community of nations as equals."

6

EJ

7

All great accomplishments were an idea before they became a reality. President [Ronald] Reagan - the first American President with

8

9

LY

It was symbolic of these trends that the fall of the Berlin Wall
occurred while Helmut was on a visit to Warsaw. That event was
unexpected when it occurred, but the necessary consequence of the
previous policy challenged all the nations of Europe, East and West, and
the United States, as well as the Soviet Union. Today the rapid
unification of Germany has about it an air of inevitability. That was not
the perception at the time, even within the Federal Republic. Helmut
Kohl turned possibility into reality by his vision, courage and tenacity.

10

It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in
the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp
David in January 1991 and reinforced President [George H.W.] Bush's
predisposition that this was the moment for unification; if two German
states were to emerge, even on an apparently temporary basis, the
modalities of their interaction would deflect international diplomacy from
the overriding task of constructing a new European and world order.

The Camp David meeting had immediate and historic
consequences. By 1990, [with the support of America,] he had
succeeded not only in the national task; he had maintained Germany's
role in NATO and extended the Alliance umbrella over the part of
Germany rejoining the national community. This would not have been
possible, whatever America's encouragement, had not Helmut, building
on the achievements of his predecessors, succeeded in convincing the

11

By 1997, the Atlantic architecture had been extended to the new
states arising from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.
Helmut turned to the other key elements of the Adenauer legacy: to
build a Europe which transcended historic national rivalries. The result
was the Maastrich Treaty, which institutionalized a European economic
vision and led to the current process of political consolidation. Others
will no doubt speak about Helmut's role in the creation of the European
Union. I will confine myself to the American aspect of it.

A phrase has become conventional to the effect that [if] relations
between Europe and America have suffered, it is because of Europe's
relative weakness. Therefore, the strong European Union now in the
process of emerging will promote Atlantic partnership. This argument

12

13

have now changed largely due to the success of common policies, jointly
conceived and carried out on the basis of equality. To [WORD
MISSING?] that moral disposition to new circumstance[s] is the
challenge that Helmut Kohl's legacy leaves for us. It is not too much to
say that the success of the Atlantic partnership depends on our mastery
of the intangible.

14

2054 words

3/21/05-#2

With edits

Helmut Kohl Speech

2

LYJ

The organizers of this celebration of the life of Helmut Kohl have asked me to [provide] an American perspective. It is a great honor. I speak as an American. Yet Germany is never really a foreign country to me. I share with it my childhood and decades of its postwar history. And I am proud of the fact that Helmut Kohl has been my friend for three decades. Finally, I am aware that the American perspective, important as [it] is, represents only a part of Helmut Kohl's historic achievements.

The friendship between America and Germany is one of the great political and moral creations of the period following the Second World War. I saw this city for the first time in the summer of 1945. Like most German cities, it was devastated. The German state had collapsed. The population was preoccupied with survival. Germany was political and morally isolated.

3

SY

Disraeli's far-right views.

4

In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its great first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foreswore a purely seeking national policy designed to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated even to late the immediate prospects of unification in pursuit of European integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a precondition to its own national unification. This position was maintained even when the Soviets in 1953 ambiguously offered unification in return for German neutrality.

5

The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance were the expressions of this unity. That act of reconciliation would not have been possible without a courageous commitment to the future in Germany.

6

CYJ

principles of European unity based on friendship with France and partnership with America became the guideposts of German foreign policy for the decades after the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two significant chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1981, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership and a reaffirmation of Adenauer's Westpolitik. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another crisis about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision

7

SYJ

All great accomplishments were an idea before they became a
- the first President with whom Helmut
Kohl dealt in office
as Chancellor
vision, when Helmut visited Washington in 1986, in these words:

8

"Chancellor Kohl charts his course guided by the ideals of liberty and justice. ...Today the [Western] democracies face challenges that, at times, seem overwhelming. Yet we persevere and, in the end, freedom will triumph. Our victory will not be realized in the crossing of borders by well-equipped armies, certainly not in the launching of missiles or the occupation of other countries.

9

It was symbolic of these trends that the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred while Helmut was on a visit to Warsaw. That event was unexpected when it occurred, but the necessary consequence of the previous policy challenged all the nations of Europe, East and West, and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union. Today the rapid unification of Germany has about it an air of inevitability. That was not the perception at the time, even within the Federal Republic. It was Helmut Kohl who turned possibility into reality by his vision, courage and tenacity.

10

It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in
the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp
David in January 1991 and reinforced President Bush's predisposition
that this was the moment for unification; if two German states were to
emerge, even on an apparently temporary basis, the modalities of their
interaction would deflect international diplomacy from the overriding
task of constructing a new European and world order.

The Camp David meeting had immediate and historic
consequences. With the support of America, but crucially with his own
energy and vision, Helmut Kohl completed the task of unification by
[date if formal act] led
[1991]. He succeeded not only in the national task; he did so while
*By 1991* led
maintaining Germany's role in NATO and extending the Alliance
umbrella over the part of Germany rejoining the national community.

11

By 1997

Led

[With] the Atlantic architecture having been extended to the new
states arising from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe,✓
Helmut turned to the other key elements of the Adenauer legacy: to
build a Europe which transcended historic national rivalries. The result
was the Maastrich Treaty, which institutionalized a European economic
vision and led to the current process of political consolidation. Others
will no doubt speak about Helmut's role in the creation of the European
Union. I will confine myself to the American aspect of it.

Les beurre univокual & the effect

A conventional phrase often invoked is that relations between
Europe and America have suffered occasionally because of Europe's
relative weakness, which is to be remedied by the strong European

12

[Y]

Union now in the process of emerging. This argument does not do justice to the achievements of two generations of Europe's leaders. In the journey through history that I have sketched, Europe played a major role not primarily because of its strategic location, but, above all, because of the sense of community, the spirit of comradery and the sense of a common destiny that imbued its relations with America. No one made a greater contribution to this than Helmut Kohl. One needed only to listen to his account of his youth in the depressed postwar period and the role America played in it to realize that, for Helmut, Atlantic relations were not a matter of equilibriating tactics or pressures. Rather, they were the fulfillment of an inner necessity. And he was understood in America, whose leaders reciprocated his sentiments.

13

confidence inspired by Helmut Kohl and his colleagues. The challenges
have now changed largely due to the success of common policies, jointly
conceived and carried out on the basis of equality. To maintain that
*moral disposition is the challenge that Helmut Kohl's legacy leaves for* us. It is not too much to say that the success of the Atlantic partnership depends on our mastery of the intangible.

14

MAR-21-2005 17:11

KAI

Stape's comments

212 759 0042

P.04

With HAK edits

3/21/05-#2

2054 words

General comment: the sentiments in the speech are excellent and very appropriate to the occasion. I only have a few minor suggestions, as noted below.

## Helmut Kohl Speech

MAR-21-2005 17:11

KAI

212 759 0042

P.05

2
Stape's comments

The organizers of this celebration of the life of Helmut Kohl have asked me to [provide] an American perspective. It is a great honor. I speak as an American. Yet Germany is never really a foreign country to me. I share with it my childhood and decades of its postwar history. And I am proud of the fact that Helmut Kohl has been my friend for three decades. Finally, I am aware that the American perspective, important as [it] is, represents only a part of Helmut Kohl's historic achievement.

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

212 759 0042

P.06

3
Stape's comments

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

212 759 0042

P.07

4
Stape's comments

In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its great first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foreswore a purely national policy designed to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. [Comment: You expand on this point later. The question here is whether Germany in 1949 was in a position to exploit its central geographic position, given that the division of Europe was already well underway. The Cold War divide essentially removed central Europe as a geographically relevant entity, thus forcing the development of Europe into a completely different mode that persisted for forty years. The genius of Adenauer lay in recognizing that Germany's historic position as the dominant country in central Europe was not possible under the conditions that emerged in

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

212 759 0042

P.08

5
Stape's comments

the late 1940s. He opted instead for West European unity and
Atlantic partnership, as you note in your next sentence. My only
quibble here is that Germany in 1949 did not really have the
option of resuming its old role in central Europe. I also doubt
that the Soviet Union would have been prepared to treat
Germany like Austria and offer unity in exchange for neutrality,
despite their ambiguous hint in 1953.] It committed itself to
fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an
Atlantic partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated
any
even the immediate prospects of unification to the pursuit of European
integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate
opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would
seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a
precondition to its own national unification. This position was

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

212 759 0042

P.09

6
Stape's comments

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

212 759 0042

P. 10

7
Stape's comments

The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance were the expressions of this unity. That act of reconciliation would not have been possible without a courageous commitment to the future in Germany. The principles of European unity based on friendship with France and partnership with America became the guideposts of German foreign policy for the decades after the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1981, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another crisis about the purpose of the Alliance had to be

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

212 759 0042

P. 11

8
Stape's comments

surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on
German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision
have been overtaken by the drama of the evolution for which this
decision was, in fact, the starting point. But what needs to preoccupy
us still is the underlying issue which repeated the debate about the
Atlantic Alliance of the 1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies
of the two sides of the Atlantic? Can either side seek security or
progress by insisting on a special status that spares it the
consequences of a common security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s
insisted on the vindication of the common destiny by being prepared to
accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful
opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was
to raise common action beyond the reconciliation of tactics, into the
realms of embracing values.

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

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Stape's comments

All great accomplishments were an idea before they became a
reality. President Reagan expressed America's gratitude and common
vision, when Helmut visited Washington in 1986, in these words:

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KAI

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10
Stape's comments

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

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Stape's comments

It was overcome, above all, by the confidence America's leaders had in
the values and purposes of Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor visited Camp
David in January 1991 and reinforced President Bush's predisposition
that this was the moment for unification; if two German states were to

emerge, [Comment: two German states were already in
existence, under the vague German formula of one nation, two
states. The question was whether two German states would
remain in existence after the collapse of the wall. Most

Europeans, and especially the French, would have preferred that
outcome. Kohl recognized that the opportunity for unity was
either now or not for a long time, and he correctly opted for
now. Then-President Bush wisely supported him. However,
without the four-plus-two talks and the settlement of the border

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Stape's comments

issue with Poland, German unity could greatly complicated the
trend toward European unity and made the Maastrich Treaty
much more difficult to achieve. Kohl deserves enormous credit
for allaying these European fears and keeping the weight of a
united Germany behind the quest for unity.] even on an
apparently temporary basis, the modalities of their interaction would
deflect international diplomacy from the overriding task of constructing
a new European and world order.

The Camp David meeting had immediate and historic
consequences. With the support of America, but crucially with his own
energy and vision, Helmut Kohl completed the task of unification by
______. He succeeded not only in the national task; he did so while
maintaining Germany's role in NATO and extending the Alliance
umbrella over the part of Germany rejoining the national community.
This would not have been possible, whatever America's encouragement,

MAR-21-2005 17:12

KAI

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13
Stape's comments

[With] the Atlantic architecture having been extended to the new
states arising from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe,
Helmut turned to the other key elements of the Adenauer legacy: to
build a Europe which transcended historic national rivalries. The result
was the Maastrich Treaty, which institutionalized a European economic
vision and led to the current process of political consolidation. Others
will no doubt speak about Helmut's role in the creation of the European
Union. I will confine myself to the American aspect of it.

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KAI

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14
Stape's comments

relative weakness, which is to be remedied by the strong European
Union now in the process of emerging. This argument does not do
justice to the achievements of two generations of Europe's leaders. In
the journey through history that I have sketched, Europe played a
major role not primarily because of its strategic location, but, above all,
by the sense of community, the spirit of comradery and the sense of a
common destiny that imbued its relations with America. No one made a
greater contribution to this than Helmut Kohl. One needed only listen to
his account of his youth in the depressed postwar period and the role
America played [in] it to realize that, for Helmut, Atlantic relations were
not a matter of equilibriating tactics or pressures. Rather, they were
the fulfillment of an inner necessity. And he was as understood in
America, whose leaders reciprocated his sentiments. [Comment: this
sentence is not clear.]

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KAI

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15
Stape's comments

The emergence of a united Europe will present new opportunities for Atlantic partnership, together with new challenges. In the aftermath of Maastrich, America welcomed the European initiative because of the confidence inspired by Helmut Kohl and his colleagues. The challenges have now changed largely due to the success of common policies, jointly conceived and carried out on the basis of equality. To maintain that moral disposition is the challenge that Helmut Kohl's legacy leaves for us. It is not too much to say that the success of the Atlantic partnership depends on our mastery of the intangible.

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KAI

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Stape's comments

"Future historians will say Europe's 21st century began on [Helmut Kohl's] watch. In the months that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, he conceived a generous vision for German unification, and for a new partnership between the West and a democratic Russia. ...He saw the need to embrace other nations into Europe's family, putting Germany in the center, not on the edge any longer, of a united, democratic Europe - a Europe where borders do not limit possibilities and where nationhood is a source of pride, not a crucible of conflict. ...Anyone who respects the legacy of Helmut Kohl knows that for peace to survive in Europe, our alliance of democracies must stand, and stand together, against dictators who exploit human differences to extend power. And we must stay true to our vision long after we achieve our military goals."

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KAI

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Stape's comments

[Final comment: the quote by President Clinton is very apt.

However, quoting Clinton and not mentioning President Bush could be misread as implying more than you intend.

Unfortunately, President Bush's remarks during his February visit to Europe were not filled with historic phrases. However, in his exchange of toasts with Schroeder in Mainz, the President did say: "We can't have good, strong relations with Europe if we don't have good relations with Germany. This great nation is the heart of Europe." He offered a similar sentiment in his public comments with Schroeder at the Electoral Palace, when he said: "And in order for Europe to be a strong, viable partner, Germany must be strong and viable, as well. And in order for us to have

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Stape's comments

good relations with Europe, we must have good relations with
Germany." Perhaps some variation of these ideas could be
worked into your final point. One way would be to refer back to
your earlier citing of the imperfect argument that relations
between Europe and America have suffered occasionally because
of Europe's relative weakness.]

TOTAL P.21

2054 words

3/21/05-#2

Helmut Kohl Speech

2

3

4

In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its great first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, made a historic choice. It foreswore a purely national policy designed to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic partnership. In a painful renunciation, Adenauer subordinated even the immediate prospects of unification in pursuit of European integration and Atlantic partnership. In the face of passionate opposition, the Adenauer government proclaimed that Germany would seek unification with Europe and partnership with America as a precondition to its own national unification. This position was maintained even when the Soviets in 1953 ambiguously offered unification in return for German neutrality.

5

6

principles of European unity based on friendship with France and partnership with America became the guideposts of German foreign policy for the decades after the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1981, the architecture of the postwar period had been accomplished. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America. But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another crisis about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was triggered by the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic considerations that led to this decision

7

8

9

10

The Camp David meeting had immediate and historic
consequences. With the support of America, but crucially with his own
energy and vision, Helmut Kohl completed the task of unification by
______. He succeeded not only in the national task; he did so while
maintaining Germany's role in NATO and extending the Alliance
umbrella over the part of Germany rejoining the national community.
This would not have been possible, whatever America's encouragement,
had not Helmut, building on the achievements of his predecessors,

11

12

[Y]

Union now in the process of emerging. This argument does not do
justice to the achievements of two generations of Europe's leaders. In
the journey through history that I have sketched, Europe played a
major role not primarily because of its strategic location, but, above all,
by the sense of community, the spirit of comradery and the sense of a
common destiny that imbued its relations with America. No one made a
greater contribution to this than Helmut Kohl. One needed only listen to
his account of his youth in the depressed postwar period and the role
America played [in] it to realize that, for Helmut, Atlantic relations were
not a matter of equilibriating tactics or pressures. Rather, they were
the fulfillment of an inner necessity. And he was as understood in
America, whose leaders reciprocated his sentiments.

13

14

03/21/2005 08:01

NO. 004

002

Mar 19 05 02:12P

P. 1

1936 words

3/19/05

Helmut Kohl Speech

I have made a special trip from America to pay tribute to a great man. For the thirty years that I have had the privilege of knowing and observing Helmut, he navigated his country through the shoals of the Cold War, towards unification, into a European political construction, and political unity, all the while strengthening Atlantic relations. Friendship with France and partnership with America were the principal elements of a policy that maintained the trust of his allies and safeguarded the long-term interests of his people. I have had the honor of being able to count Helmut among my friends. Loyalty has been one of his extraordinary attributes. And serenity, amidst the storms of crisis, he remained calm and confident, demonstrating by his bearing that imagination and faith would prevail over even the most tumultuous circumstance[s].

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Mar 19 05 02:12P

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P. 2

I will confine these remarks to Germany's relationship with

I will confine these remarks to Germany's relationship with the two countries: one is the great power, Germany, and the other is the small power, America. The friendship between these two countries is one of the great political and moral achievements of the period that followed the Second World War. I saw this city for the first time in the summer of 1945. It was devastated like most German cities. The German state had collapsed. The population was preoccupied with survival. Germany was political and morally isolated.

The friendship between the two countries is one of the great political and moral achievements of the period that followed the Second World War. I saw this city for the first time in the summer of 1945. It was devastated like most German cities. The German state had collapsed. The population was preoccupied with survival. Germany was political and morally isolated.

The postwar generation deserves a tribute from other democracies for the courage with which they undertook the task of reconstruction and the sacrifice with which they worked at their return to the community of free nations as one of its indisputably principal members.

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005

Mar 19 05 02:12p

p.3

3

President Roosevelt had told Winston Churchill that American forces could not remain in Europe for more than two years. Under the presidency of Harry Truman, America abandoned its historic isolation and adopted a policy that tied its destiny to the future of European recovery and Atlantic partnership. Like the Konrad Adenauer decision for Atlantic partnership, the moral component of Truman's choice was the most important. A decade later, I asked Truman what he considered his greatest achievement. He replied, "That we achieved

total victory in war and then brought back our adversaries to the Atlantic community of nations as equals."

That act of reconciliation would not have been possible without a lie

courageous commitment to the future in Germany. When Germany

H2

S4et

t
p2

inadequate

03/21/2005 08:01

NO. 004 P. 4

Mar 19 05 02:12P

4

The European diplomatic system proved unequal to absorbing a
country of that magnitude in the center of the continent, and the
German domestic structure did not always manage to muster the
necessary restraint to prevent an arms race and ultimate catastrophe.

In 1949, the Bundesrepublik, under its first great Chancellor, Adenauer, made its historic choice. It foreswore a purely national policy designed to exploit Germany's central geographic position and demographic advantage. It committed itself to fulfilling its national aspirations as part of a European idea and an Atlantic partnership. In a heroic decision, Adenauer subordinated even the immediate prospects of unification in pursuit of what was then still a dream.

03/21/2005 08:01

NO. 004 D07

Mar 19 05 02:12p

p.5

asserted in the face of passionate opposition that Germany would

maintained even [with the advent] of the ambiguous Soviet offer in
1953—unification in return for neutrality.

These principles [of European unity based on friendship with France and partnership with America became the guiding principles of German foreign policy for the decades of the controversies of the 1950s. They were in time accepted by the opposition and supplemented by two chancellors of the other major party with an active policy towards Europe and the Soviet Union.

When Helmut Kohl became Chancellor in 1981, the architecture of the postwar period had been completed. What lay ahead was the completion of the edifice of German unification, European integration and Eastern reconciliation, all on the basis of partnership with America.

03/21/2005 08:01

Mar 19 05 02:13p

NO. 004

008

P. 6

6

But before the great acts of construction could be undertaken, another
crisis about the purpose of the Alliance had to be surmounted. It was
triggered by the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in
Europe, the majority of them on German soil. The strategic
considerations that led to this decision have been overtaken by the
drama
success of the evolution for which this decision was, in fact, the
starting point. But what needs to preoccupy us still is the underlying
issue which repeated the debate about the Atlantic Alliance of the
1950's: Is it possible to separate the destinies of the two sides of the
Atlantic? Can either side seek security or progress by insisting on a
special status that spaces it [within] the consequences of a common
security? Helmut Kohl in the 1980s insisted on the vindication of this
common destiny by being prepared to express it in a willingness to-
accept common risks and to sustain that decision against powerful
opposition and emotional demonstrations. Helmut's contribution was

03/21/2005 08:01

Mar 19 05 02:13p

NO. 004

009

All great accomplishments well onide -
A great and rare stability.

Before

President Reagan expressed our nation's gratitude, when Helmut

Amencés,

visited Washington in 1986, in those words:

> "Chancellor Kohl charts his course guided by the ideals of liberty and justice. ...Today the [Western] democracies face challenges that, at times, seem overwhelming. Yet we persevere and, in the end, freedom will triumph. Our victory will not be realized in the crossing of borders [by well-equipped armies], certainly not in the launching of missiles or the occupation of other countries. Our victory will come, perhaps little by little, as walls are torn down, missiles dismantled and [as] people are freed. ...The friendship and comradery of Chancellor Kohl's visit is testimony that the world we seek is already being built."

03/21/2005 08:01

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Mar 19 05 02:13P

p. 8

8

So it turned out. Within less than five years of that meeting, the missiles that had generated such controversy were being dismantled not - as enters last word - unilaterally, but on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This was accompanied by a general easing of tensions and a growing dialogue between the Atlantic partners and the counties of Eastern Europe under Soviet occupation and with the Soviet leadership.

It was symbolic of these trends that the fall of the Berlin Wall occurred while Helmut was on a visit to Warsaw. That event [was] unexpected when it occurred, but the necessary consequence of the previous policy challenged all the nations of Europe, East and West, and the United States, as well as the Soviet Union. Today the rapid unification of Germany has about it an air of inevitability. That was not the perception at the time, even within the Federal Republic. It was Helmut Kohl who turned possibility into reality by his vision, courage and tenacity. Not a few - even in Germany - thought that it might be

03/21/2005 08:01

Mar 19 05 02:13p

NO. 004

011

9

desirable to maintain two German states even after the collapse of
communist rule. ~~I participated in that debate in the United States.~~

reinforced 15 years

David and confirmed President Bush in his predisposition that this was
in January 1991

constructing a new world order.

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Mar 19 05 02:13p

NO.004 012

P.10

10

succeeded in convincing the new Soviet leadership that a new Germany

had arisen, which could no longer be a threat to Russia's security; on

international community.

situation of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Helmut

led to the process of consolidating its political cohesion. Others will no

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Mar 19 05 02:13p

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013

P. 11

11

doubt speak about Helmut's role in that task of creation. I will confine
myself to [the] American aspect of it.

A conventional phrase often invoked is that relations between
Europe and America have suffered occasionally because of Europe's
relative weakness, which is to be remedied by the strong European
Union now in the process of emerging. This argument does not do
justice to the achievements of two generations of Europe's leaders. In
the journey through history that I have sketched, Europe played a
major role not only because of its resources and strategic location, but,
above all, by the sense of community, the spirit of [comradery] and the
sense of a common destiny that assisted its leaders with America. No

one made a greater contribution to this than Helmut Kohl,

03/21/2005 08:01

Mar 19 05 02:13p

NO.004

Q14

12

confidence inspired by Helmut Kohl and his colleagues. The challenges
have now changed largely due to the success of common policies, jointly
conceived and carried out on the basis of equality. To maintain that
*discretion*
moral trend is the challenge that Helmut Kohl's legacy leaves for us. It
is not too much to say that the success of the Atlantic partnership
depends on our mastery of the intangible.

I cited earlier remarks made by the first (American) President
with whom Helmut dealt as Chancellor, Ronald Reagan. I conclude with
comments by the last President during Kohl's chancellorship, Bill
Clinton. They were made when conferring on Helmut the Medal of
Freedom, America's highest civilian award, very rarely given to a
foreigner:

"[Helmut Kohl] served as Chancellor for sixteen years. Future historians will say Europe's 21st century began on his watch. In the months that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, he conceived

03/21/2005 08:01

Mar 19 05 02:13p

NO.004

015

p.13

13

a generous vision for German unification, and for a new
partnership between the West and a democratic Russia. ...He saw
the need to embrace other nations into Europe's family, putting
Germany in the center, not on the edge any longer, of a
united, democratic Europe - a Europe where borders do not limit
possibilities and where nationhood is a source of pride, not a
crucible of conflict. ...Anyone who respects the legacy of Helmut
Kohl knows that for peace to survive in Europe, our alliance of
democracies must stand, and stand together, against dictators
who exploit human differences to extend power. And we must
stand together (stay true to our vision) long after we achieve our
military goals."

Thank you for your friendship while I was making myself
merry. And I'm grateful.