This is not the place for an analysis of arms control
theory which included many valuable and indispensable
insights. However, arms control, to be effective, requires
an unusually delicate understanding of the elements of
strategy. Nations had often suffered catastrophe in the
past even when they fancied themselves superior; negotiating
equality with an adversary calls for an unprecedentedly
sophisticated analysis. The measurement of equality has
been maddeningly complicated by the novelty of the weapons,
by the asymmetry in the design of the weapons systems of the
two sides, in their geostrategic positions and in the
unpredictability of technological developments. Thus even
were the Soviets ready for a serious effort, negotiations
would be difficult because the weapons of the two sides are
designed by different criteria and serve different strategic
ends.

Since its early days, arms control theory has developed a life of its own. It used to be argued that arms negotiations should be an essential complement to broader strategic and foreign policies. Today the tail comes close to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric arms control schemes become an end in themselves thereby eliminating any relationship to defense strategy.

The issue of NATO modernization illustrates the point.

Before the INF agreement modernizing the Lance weapons stationed in the Federal Republic was considered an internal NATO matter not subject to international discussion. The INF agreement has turned it into an East-West issue.

Modernization is opposed by the Soviets with the argument that it violates the non-circumvention clause of the INF agreement. And it is opposed by significant segments of German political opinion because it allegedly singles out the Federal Republic for nuclear risk. The so-called

"compromises"--linking modernization to some new arms control measure--nevertheless accept the principle of denuclearization of the Federal Republic; the controversy concerns the price.

All this repeats the INF experience. None of the schemes account for the fact that the Soviet Union as a nation state will retain the capacity for nuclear threats while NATO as an alliance in need of 16 sovereign decisions gradually loses that capacity as nuclear weapons are being delegitimized while the conventional inferiority remains. Even assuming full compliance with foreseeable agreements the Soviet Union will always retain categories of weapons on that part of its national territory outside the agreement from which it can launch a threat to Europe. But the removal of categories of weapons in NATO denuclearizes nations--not parts of a national territory. Hence it throws an increasing burden of decision on the United States and

elaborates different perspectives between the US and Europe
and between the nuclear and non-nuclear countries within
Europe.

This is all the more worrisome because NATO depends on
nuclear weapons more than the Soviet Union. Finally, large
reductions in START work against the discriminating use of
nuclear weapons and hence underline the declining
credibility of the threat of general nuclear war at a time
when the INF negotiations force ever greater reliance on a
nuclear strategy founded on weapons based in the United
States or at sea. In short, arms control policy and
alliance strategy must be brought into harmony lest they
paralyze each other. Or else arms control becomes a device
by which the Soviet Union gains a veto over Western defense
policy without meaningful reciprocity.

c. A Larger Role for Europe.

In the early days of NATO the United States had first
an atomic monopoly and later a huge nuclear superiority
coupled with economic predominance. It was inevitable in
these circumstances that the Alliance structure came to be
dominated by America. But since then Europe has recovered
economically and restored some of its military strength.
Britain and France have developed nuclear forces of their
own. In the process, existing arrangements have become
unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all
major issues--when that country chooses weapons and decides
deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets
the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework
for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains
for a serious European effort to redefine the requirements
of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint
efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs.

Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or incur the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be corrected by "consultation," however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

Moreover, military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the senior partner wherever doing so is safe, especially with

regard to some Third World issues, the Middle East and
certain aspects of East-West relations.

For all these reasons the United States has a positive
interest in encouraging the evolution of a more autonomous
European voice in security matters. During the entire
postwar period it has been an axiom of American policy that
for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a
strong, United Europe was an essential component of the
Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle,
insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas
except security. With respect to defense, the US has been
indifferent at best--at least since the failure of the
European Defense Community in 1954--to any sort of
Europeanization. Many seem to fear that a militarily
unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic
relations and thus weaken the common security.

The opposite is almost certainly the case. In the
economic field, integration was bound to lead to
transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination.
What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its
external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the
field of defense, by contrast, increased European
responsibility and unity would almost certainly promote
closer cooperation with the US. A Europe analyzing its
security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to
find association with the US essential. Unity in defense
matters would also enable the Federal Republic to escape the
fear of isolation and enable the Atlanticists to resist
nationalist tendencies.

Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome
the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every
European nation to stretch already inadequate defense
efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example,

there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO,
different types of artillery and different standards for
calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major
conflict, it would be a herculean task to keep this
hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic
Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and
coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about
traditional "burden sharing", paying more for the existing
effort. I have in mind something more structural--a more
rational balance of responsibilities. The present
allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to
reflect naturally about either security or political
objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative
in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel
the whole enterprise or antagonize the United States. There
is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will

not be better off with American support. This is why, if
the British and French can agree on coordinating their
nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an
important first step toward a greater European role in the
joint nuclear defense. Above all the United States should
make clear that European union on defense matters will be
viewed as strengthening not weakening Atlantic ties.

East-West Relations.

Too many in the West seek to escape their dilemmas by taking refuge in the personality of Gorbachev. Without entering into the debate as to the long range purposes of the Soviet leader, the democracies cannot make themselves dependent on a single personality, especially as every Soviet leader except Lenin has been disavowed by his successor.

CYJ

Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking. But is it wise to treat his person as the deus ex machina to solve all the West's dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free countries? Do these attitudes do justice to the actual choices facing the Soviet leadership? It is easy to forget that Gorbachev has emerged at the top of what must be the toughest competition in the world--one in which losers are rarely heard from again. He has never wavered from basic communist doctrine. And how could he, never having held any position other than as a member of the communist hierarchy?

Reality no doubt imposes at least a respite on Soviet foreign adventurism, perhaps even an end to it no matter who governs in Moscow. But Gorbachev, as any prudent leader, is unlikely to court unnecessary domestic problems. He will not volunteer changes in political and strategic

arrangements that powerful factions within his bureaucracy
would find unpalatable. Obviously, he will push those
programs most advantageous to his own country.

More fundamental issues must be addressed. What
exactly is it that the West wants the Soviet Union to stop
doing? What is the American and Western notion of
cooperative conduct? In the contemporary situation is
glasnost or human rights progress enough, or are other
changes necessary? Can four centuries of Russian
expansionism be due to personalities, or do they reflect
more permanent geopolitical and strategic elements? The
absence of criteria causes domestic disputes to fester. The
reluctance to endow peaceful coexistence with political
content produces an overemphasis on numerical nostrums and
threatens to open up a gap between strategy and arms-control
policy in which each checkmates the other.

I do not know how Gorbachev would react if presented
with a comprehensive program that would reduce nuclear and
conventional weapons simultaneously. Or how he would
respond to a serious attempt to discuss the US-Soviet role
in the world a decade or so ahead of us. I am convinced
that he has the intelligence and imagination to make a
significant and constructive response. And if he refused,
we would at least understand the nature of the challenge
better than we do now.

Conflicts Outside the NATO Area.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a response
to the fear of Soviet aggression against Europe. At that
time, 40 years ago, the United States had a huge nuclear
superiority and was dominant economically, while Europe was
only beginning its recovery from the war. Conflicts outside

Europe were produced by the process of decolonization; the
Soviet role in them was relatively minor. The United
States, reluctant to be involved in colonial wars, insisted
that the obligations of the Atlantic Treaty did not extend
outside of Europe.

Since then, conditions have changed dramatically.
Europe has recovered its economic dynamism and is moving,
although fitfully, toward political unity. The fear of
Soviet invasion has diminished. American nuclear
superiority has been replaced by rough parity with the
Soviet Union, and European allies increasingly question the
credibility of the nuclear deterrent.

But on the issue of relationships towards third area
conflicts the early problem remains almost unchanged,
although the two sides of the Atlantic have exchanged their
roles. Now it is Europe that insists that the treaty's
obligations do not extend to the developing world. And it

is Europe that feels free to dissociate itself from US
actions where indigenous upheavals and Soviet efforts to
outflank the alliance produce contemporary crises.

That process of dissociation has been accelerating for
at least 15 years. During the 1973 Israel-Arab War, Britain
and West Germany refused to grant the US permission to use
American bases for reconnaissance--or blocked American arms
shipments to the Middle East from their territories. Allied
governments almost unanimously opposed American policy
toward Iran during the hostage crisis, on Central America
and Grenada. To be sure, cooperation in the Persian Gulf
has been much better. But as Europe develops its own
autonomy explicit arrangements for third area conflicts and
tolerable dissociation become more important. The Alliance
will be weakened if interests considered vital by one
partner are consistently neglected by the other.

Conclusion

This is a vast agenda. And it cannot possibly be accomplished except in a bipartisan setting. The national security interest of the United States does not change every four or eight years. That possibility makes us a factor of instability. Weapons decisions, arms control strategy and serious diplomacy have a lead time longer than the term of office of a single Presidency. There will always be disagreements over tactics; but the fundamental issues must be settled. It should be the highest priority of a new Administration and of both sides of the Congress.

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to take this opportunity to sketch briefly
the main tasks facing the Atlantic Alliance.

Any discussion of the state of NATO must begin with the
recognition that it represents one of the great success
stories of the post-war period. For <u>MORE THAN</u> 40 years Europe has
known no wars--the longest period of peace <u>since the</u>
creation of the modern state system. While it is never
possible to prove conclusively why something has not
happened, the Western democracies have every reason to take
pride in their collective achievement.

Success breeds two contradictory dangers however: on
the one hand complacency and on the other a temptation to
tinker that takes the achievement for granted and seeks to
combine it with basically irreconcilable objectives.

The Atlantic Alliance faces both dangers: complacency in the reluctance to come to grips with the major political and technological changes that have occurred; tinkering in the restless quest for negotiating formulae heavily influenced by domestic considerations that will in the long run undermine the cohesiveness of the Western democracies.

Part of the cause for this state of affairs lies in the failure to resolve contradictions that have beset the alliance since its early days. These contradictions were tolerable so long as the democracies possessed a vast military superiority. But the growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides and the resulting nuclear balance requires that they be dealt with if the achievements of the last generation are not to be jeopardized.

NATO Strategy

the practicalities of nuclear deterrence. Indeed they
constantly affirm the unthinkability of nuclear war while
basing their security policy on its deterrent effect.

The need to build up NATO's conventional capability has
been passionately affirmed for a long time; for an equal
period the ~~target~~ goal has proved elusive. This is partly
because our European allies have less confidence in
conventional defense than some American systems analysts.
History teaches them that deterrence with conventional
weapons is a chancy enterprise. Europeans have seen wars
break out (for hundreds of years) between armies that were
thought to be evenly matched. (Even at the outset of World
War II the French army was considered to be--and in fact
was--superior in numbers and equipment to the German army.)
In conventional war, leadership, concentration of force, and
tactics, play a role which make systems analysis
calculations a hazardous guide. It can be no accident that

all wars in the postwar period have broken out where there
were no American forces and no nuclear weapons.

NATO has never solved its perennial problem: the
proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the
appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons albeit
as a last resort. The doctrine of flexible response was to
answer these issues. But NATO is still some distance from a
conventional capability that could sustain itself for even
the thirty days envisaged in some scenarios. And the
elaboration of a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons
runs into two obstacles: Some anti-nuclear groups
paradoxically insisted that nuclear war must necessarily be
all-out extermination of civilians lest governments be
tempted into nuclear adventures. Some of our allies start
at the opposite end of the political spectrum but reach the
same conclusion: that anything less than the threat of
all-out war would weaken deterrence.

For the Soviets would have to calculate that the United
States would use its missiles before they were overrun.
Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they
used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would
trigger a counterblow on Soviet territory. Were the war
confined to Europe this would inflict an unacceptable level
of damage on the Soviet Union. But the Soviets would escape
this challenge only by initiating general nuclear war
against US territory--a decision out of proportion to any
likely objective. Hence the defense of Europe and the US
were "coupled."

INF in short was a reassurance for defense minded
Europeans that America would use its nuclear capability on
behalf of Europe's survival. But the defense-oriented
leaders in Europe faced bitter opposition. In the end the
INF missiles were introduced only after riots and
demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquility of many

II

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countries for months. It is impossible to understand the psychological impact of the INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed.

The NATO challenge can thus be summed up as follows:

- The INF agreement and the pressures it generates against the remaining nuclear systems places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea.

- In the process, many Europeans are convinced a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic may be "decoupled."

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-- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced. The threat that generated NATO in the first place remains intact.

-- The modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons must be seen in this context. The Atlanticists in the Federal Republic have been traumatized by the removal of intermediate range weapons. They fear another change in American position. The critics of US policy feel confirmed in their view. Both now tend to unite against a scheme that can be represented as making Germany a nuclear battlefield. Sentiment is therefore being generated for the removal of these missiles--the third zero option. And modernization of short-range weapons is likely to face the same domestic opposition as the intermediate range weapons a decade ago.

On the other hand, the denuclearization of the Federal Republic--the nearly inevitable consequence of the third zero option--would create profound splits in the Alliance.

13

CYD

A nuclear free zone logically implies the adoption of a "no first use" concept, because otherwise the zone would still be under nuclear threat from weapons outside. And once the alliance has proclaimed that it would not use nuclear weapons first, it is committed to accepting defeat with conventional weapons rather than escalating to nuclear war. Once the principle of defeat is accepted the neutralization of Central Europe, the goal of Soviet policy for 40 years, will be nearly complete. The nuclear armed members of NATO would be asked to assume risks on behalf of the Federal Republic which that country is not prepared to run for itself--an impossible state of affairs.

## The Future of the Atlantic Alliance

A single statement can do no more than outline directions. A complete policy must emerge out of a detailed

debate within the United States as well as within the Alliance. But restoration of the unity of the Atlantic Alliance must be a prime objective; without it a continuation of current East-West negotiations will lead to the unravelling of all that has been achieved by forty years of bipartisan foreign policy.

a. A Coherent NATO Strategy

The ambiguities that have beset NATO for forty years--some of which have been outlined above--must be overcome. On the part of the United States it requires an end to the rhetoric that America's goal in East-West negotiation is the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such a goal is neither possible nor desirable and Western leaders do their publics a disservice if they shrink from avowing this truth. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons

15

EYJ

have been produced by the superpowers; hundreds by
medium-sized countries; dozens by recent entrants into the
nuclear club. No scheme of disarmament could account for
all these weapons. Nations would insist on residual forces
to protect themselves against cheating, or against the fact
that the factories that produced the weapons would remain,
or, should by some improbable chance these too be destroyed,
against the knowledge in the minds of men from which these
factories and weapons sprang in the first place. Mankind
cannot unlearn the secret of the atom. For the immediate
future--even assuming forseeable reductions--that level will
be quite high; the real issue before us will be the nature
of deterrence, and its components.

At the same time our European allies have an obligation
to face strategic and technological realities. Too many of
them create the impression that deterrence can be separated
from defense and that it depends entirely on the vastness of

the threat. But deterrence is in fact the product of the threat and credibility. If credibility is zero even the most devastating threat will amount to nothing. Europe has a right to insist that the United States use all the means necessary to stop Soviet aggression. It can have no interest in a strategy that has the end of all civilized life as its inevitable corollary. The elaboration of other options is in the interest of both sides of the Atlantic.

It is therefore urgent to end the demoralizing debate over which side of the Atlantic is seeking to escape what risks and responsibilities. The goal must be an effective defense at tolerable cost. The deterrent threat cannot be separated from what the Alliance is prepared to implement without opening a psychological gap which sooner or later will tempt aggressive conduct.

### b. Arms Control Policy

CYD

The idea of arms control is novel, if not revolutionary. Developed in its present form in the 1950's arms control strove explicitly for stability by reducing the incentive for surprise attack not through arms but through agreement. The historically extraordinary notion emerged that a country's vulnerability was a strategic asset; with the civil populations of both sides at risk--so the argument ran--neither side would dare to launch its weapons. Arms control theory contributed--in the West--to an aversion to defensive weapons; it also caused every offensive system to be subjected to extended scrutiny lest it somehow "destabilize" the military equation. Never before in history had military policy been judged by such criteria; the Soviets for their part have shown no such inhibitions in their unilateral weapons decisions.

19

CYS

to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric arms an end in themselves thereby eliminating control schemes become their own purpose and defeat any relationship to defense strategy.

Before the INF agreement modernizing the Lance weapons stationed in the Federal Republic was considered an internal NATO matter not subject to international discussion. The INF agreement has turned it into an East-West issue. It is opposed by the Soviets with the argument that it violates the non-circumvention clause of the INF agreement. And it is opposed by significant segments of German political opinion because it allegedly singles out the Federal Republic for nuclear risk. The so-called "compromises"--linking modernization to some new arms control measure--nevertheless accept the principle of denuclearization of the Federal Republic; the controversy concerns the price. It repeats the INF experience. None of

20

CYJ

the schemes account for the fact that the Soviet Union as a
nation state will retain the capacity for nuclear threats
while NATO as an alliance in need of 16 sovereign decisions
gradually loses that capacity as nuclear weapons are being
while the conventional inferiority remains,
delegitimized. Even assuming full compliance with
foreseeable agreements the Soviet Union will always retain
categories of weapons on some part of its national territory
outside the agreement from which it can launch a threat to
Europe. But the removal of categories of weapons in NATO
denuclearizes nations--not parts of a national territory.
Hence it throws an increasing burden of decision on the
United States and elaborates different perspectives between
the US and Europe and between the nuclear and non-nuclear
countries within Europe.

### c. A Larger Role for Europe.

Britain and France have developed nuclear forces of their own. In the process, existing arrangements have become unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues--when that country chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World--little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs.

23

cyc

Moreover, military dependence on another nation has a
cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from
wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under
conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt,
self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the
united states
wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some
Third World issues, and certain aspects of East-West
relations. For all these reasons the United States has a
positive interest in encouraging the evolution of a more
autonomous European voice in security matters.

component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that
principle, insofar as it depended on American actions, in
all areas except security. With respect to defense, the US
has been indifferent at best--at least since the failure of
the European Defense Community in 1954--to any sort of
Europeanization. Many seem to fear that a militarily
unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic
relations or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken
the common security.

The opposite is almost certainly the case. In the
economic field, integration was bound to lead to
transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination.
What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its
external barriers are higher than its internal ones. If
the field of defense, by contrast, increased European
responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation
with the US. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a

26

CYD

East-West Relations.

Too many in the West seek to escape their dilemmas by taking refuge in the personality of Gorbachev. Without entering into the debate as to the long range purposes of the Soviet leader, the democracies cannot make themselves dependent on a single personality, especially as every Soviet leader except Lenin has been disavowed by his successor. Gorbachev's personality is no doubt striking.

But is it wise to treat his person as the deus ex machina to solve all the West's dilemmas--a communist leader who will bring peace and tranquility without any real effort on the part of the free countries? Do these attitudes do justice to the actual choices facing the Soviet leadership? It is easy to forget that he has emerged at the top of what must be toughest competition in the world--one in which losers are rarely heard from again. He has never wavered from

Even assuming Gorbachev's intentions are conciliatory,
he can be expected to go only so far by himself. Reality no
doubt imposes at least a respite on Soviet foreign
adventurism, perhaps even an end to it no matter who governs
in Moscow. But Gorbachev, as any prudent leader, is
unlikely to court unnecessary domestic problems. He will
not volunteer changes in political and strategic
arrangements that powerful factions within his bureaucracy
would find unpalatable. Obviously, he will push those
programs most advantageous to his own country.

31

CYJ

But on the issue of relationships towards Third area
conflicts the early problem remains almost unchanged,
although the two sides of the Atlantic have exchanged their
roles. Now it is Europe that insists that the treaty's
obligations do not extend to the developing world. And it
is Europe that feels free to dissociate itself from US
actions where indigenous upheavals and Soviet efforts to
outflank the alliance produce contemporary crises.

That process of dissociation has been accelerating for
at least 15 years. During the 1973 Israel-Arab War, Britain
and West Germany refused to grant the US permission to use
American bases for reconnaissance-or blocked American arms

32

CYJ

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman,

Any discussion of the state of NATO must begin with the
recognition that it represents one of the great success
stories of the post-war period. For forty years Europe has
known no wars--the longest period of peace since the
creation of the modern state system. While it is never
possible to prove conclusively why something has not
happened, the Western democracies have every reason to take
pride in their collective achievement.

NATO Strategy

3

CYJ

The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation. The strategy then was to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. From the perspective of massive retaliation this deployment had a political, not a military rationale. On the one hand NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-nuclear means. On the other hand NATO sought for political reassurance: it wanted to make sure America was organically committed to nuclear retaliation even in the face of conventional aggression. Both European and American conventional forces were conceived as a trip wire for an American nuclear riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts but a substantial non-nuclear

establishment was created nevertheless to give credibility
to the nuclear threat.

This situation became precarious when the growth of
Soviet strategic forces altered the credibility of the
nuclear threat. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially
unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its
conventional defenses but not as fast as the Soviets; hence
it has not closed the gap in such forces. As the current
NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five
American divisions that have remained in Europe, the
alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet
ground attack for more than a few weeks at most.

Ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our
allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to
provide an alternative to nuclear weapons; the United States
would surely not reintroduce the draft, yet much of public
opinion and many leaders shy away from even thinking about

The need to build up NATO's conventional capability has
been passionately affirmed for a long time; for an equal
period the target has proved elusive. This is partly
because our European allies have less confidence in
conventional defense than some American systems analysts.
History teaches them that deterrence with conventional
weapons is a chancy enterprise. Europeans have seen wars
break out for hundreds of years between armies that were
thought to be evenly matched. (Even at the outset of World
War II the French army was considered to be--and in fact
was--superior in numbers and equipment to the German army.)
In conventional war, leadership, concentration of force, and
tactics, play a role which make systems analysis
calculations a hazardous guide. It can be no accident that

NATO has never solved its perennial problem: the
proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the
appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons albeit
as a last resort. The doctrine of flexible response was to
answer these issues. But NATO is still some distance from a
conventional capability that could sustain itself for even
the thirty days envisaged in some scenarios. And the
elaboration of a doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons
runs into two obstacles: Some anti-nuclear gruops
paradoxically insisted that nuclear war must necessarily be
all-out extermination of civilians lest governments be
tempted into nuclear adventures. Some of our allies start
at the opposite end of the political spectrum but reach the
same conclusion: that anything less than the threat of
all-out war would weaken deterrence.

However, statesmanship and morality both demand that so long as nuclear weapons exist governments seek ways to limit their use and to terminate any war before it turns into a world holocaust. In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, it is reckless to teach that any nuclear incident must automatically escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst happens--for whatever reason--governments have an obligation to humanity and to history to limit the consequences. Only nihilists or abstract ideologues can shirk that duty.

A resolution of the problem is inhibited because in nearly every country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has broken down. As a result, national security policy is too often overwhelmed by domestic politics. The result has been an unworthy debate in which the recent American proposals on modernization are presented by critics as a means of shifting the risks of destruction to Europe. But the Alliance cannot possibly base itself on such

considerations. It is essential to develop a strategy that distributes risks equitably but effectiveness must be the ultimate outcome. This is why the issue of modernization should be geared to a careful examination of NATO strategy and arms control policy. Otherwise the Alliance will be left with a precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of flexible response which, however, now--unlike when it was first developed--has to be applied under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism, a subtle Soviet strategy to separate the US and Europe especially in the nuclear field, and continued inadequacies in conventional forces.

INF

Divisive trends have been magnified by the INF agreement. This is not the occasion to analyze the merits

of what will soon be an accomplished fact. If the Senate
were to refuse ratification, domestic pressures in all
European countries would force the withdrawal of these
missiles in any event. The current choice is between
unilateral withdrawal or the quid pro quo envisaged in the
agreement.

To understand the impact of this state of affairs some
discussion of the background of INF is important. The
formal justification for INF as a counterbalance to the
Soviet SS-20's was always a mistake. The INF weapons were
never aimed at the SS-20's. Their ultimate justification
was to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking
the strategic defense of Europe with that of the United
States. With intermediate range American weapons in Europe
the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any
nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would
trigger an American counterblow from European installations.

For the Soviets would have to calculate that the United
States would use its missiles before they were overrun.
Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they
used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would
trigger a counterblow on Soviet territory. Were the war
confined to Europe this would inflict an unacceptable level
of damage on the Soviet Union. But the Soviets would escape
this challenge only by initiating general nuclear wars
against US territory--a decision out of proportion to any
likely objective. Hence the defense of Europe and the US
were "coupled."

-- The INF agreement and the pressures it generates
against the remaining nuclear systems places the predominant
burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United
States or at sea.

-- In the process, many Europeans are convinced a gap
is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union
to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In
technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the
Atlantic may be "decoupled."

CJD

debate within the United States as well as within the
Alliance. But restoration of the unity of the Atlantic
Alliance must be a prime objective; without it a
continuation of current East-West negotiations will lead to
the unravelling of all that has been achieved by foty years
of bipartisan foreign policy.

a. A Coherent NATO Strategy

b. Arms Control Policy

insights. However, arms control, to be effective, requires an unusually delicate understanding of the elements of strategy. Nations had often suffered catastrophe in the past even when they fancied themselves superior; negotiating equality with an adversary calls for an unprecedentedly sophisticated analysis. The measurement of equality has been maddeningly complicated by the novelty of the weapons, by the asymmetry in the design of the weapons system of the two sides and in their geostrategic positions. Thus even were the Soviets ready for a serious study, negotiations would be difficult because the weapons of the two sides are designed by different criteria and serve different strategic ends.

to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoteric, arms
control schemes become their own purpose and defeat any
relationship to defense strategy.

The issue of NATO modernization illustrates the point.
Before the INF agreement modernizing the Lance weapons
stationed in the Federal Republic was considered an internal
NATO matter not subject to international discussion. The
INF agreement has turned it into an East-West issue. It is
opposed by the Soviets with the argument that it violates
the non-circumvention clause of the INF agreement. And it
is opposed by significant segments of German political
opinion because it allegedly singles out the Federal
Republic for nuclear risk. The so-called
"compromises"--linking modernization to some new arms
control measure--nevertheless accept the principle of
denuclearization of the Federal Republic; the controversy
concerns the price. It repeats the INF experience. None of

the schemes account for the fact that the Soviet Union as a
nation state will retain the capacity for nuclear threats
while NATO as an alliance in need of 16 sovereign decisions
gradually loses that capacity as nuclear weapons are being
delegitimized. Even assuming full compliance with
foreseeable agreements the Soviet Union will always retain
categories of weapons on some part of its national territory
outside the agreement from which it can launch a threat to
Europe. But the removal of categories of weapons in NATO
denuclearizes nations--not parts of a national territory.
Hence it throws an increasing burden of decision on the
United States and elaborates different perspectives between
the US and Europe and between the nuclear and non-nuclear
countries within Europe.

Moreover, military dependence on another nation has a
cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from
wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under
conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt,
self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the
US wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some
Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West
relations. For all these reasons the United States has a
positive interest in encouraging the evolution of a more
autonomous European voice in security matters.

[Y]

The opposite is almost certainly the case. In the
economic field, integration was bound to lead to
transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination.
What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its
external barriers are higher than its internal ones. ILn
the field of defense, by contrast, increased European
responsibility and unity would promote closer coopeation
with the US. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a

traditional "burden sharing", paying more for the existing
effort. I have in mind something more structural--a more
rational balance of respnosibilities. The present
allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to
reflect naturally about either security or political
objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative
in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel
the whole enterprise or antagonize the United States. There
is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will
not be better off with American support. This is why, if
the British and French can agree on coordinating their
nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an
important first step toward a greater European role in the
joint nuclear defense. Above all the United States should
make clear that European union on defense matters will be
viewed as strengthening not weakening Atlantic ties.

East-West Relations.