members may move to the left or to the right. This would strengthen both the Labour party and the Liberal party; and might eventually lead to the emergence of a strong Labour party, a strong Liberal party, a small centre party, a small party to the left of the Labour party, and a small party to the right of the Liberal party. The majority of the Dutch would welcome such a rationalisation of the political structure.

## Brandt, Brezhnev and Barzel

The disarray in the ranks of the west German Christian Democrats is an unhealthy development, not merely for Germany itself but for western Europe as a whole. Although, in a sense, the absence of an effective right-wing opposition may make it easier for Herr Brandt to negotiate with Mr Brezhnev this weekend (the Soviet leader is due to arrive in Bonn on 18 May, for four days), there is a danger that the Russians will be over-confident; and, in particular, that they will try to do a little arm-twisting over the question of west Berlin. This would infuriate people like Herr Strauss, leader of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (the sister-party of the CDU), but there is not much he can do about it.

Herr Barzel, the too obviously ambitious politician who came within an ace of overthrowing Brandt and becoming west German chancellor exactly a year ago, is now without any discernible political future. Having resigned from the party's parliamentary leadership, it is virtually certain that he will have to relinquish the national chairmanship of the party. Herr Strauss made ominous noises earlier this year about taking the CSU members out of the alliance with the CDU and setting up shop on his own. This would be all that was needed to complete the mess west German conservatism is in.

Although Barzel's resignation came as a shock, even to the rebels in his party, internal plotting to get rid of him began immediately after the party's defeat in the general election in November. One slightly encouraging development is that the party congress will be brought forward from the autumn, to resolve the leadership crisis before the summer. Herr Kohl, the premier of the Rhineland-Palatinate state, has already announced that he will fight Barzel for the party chairmanship.

At the root of the conflict within the party lies Barzel's desire to steer it on to more 'progressive' lines in order to appeal to younger voters. After the party's electoral defeat he appointed a number of commissions to re-shape policy on important social questions: educational reform, land reform, 'co-determination' in industry, tax reform and re-distribution of wealth. Herr Katzer, leader of the progressive left wing of the party, was chosen to co-ordinate the commissions' activities; this has rankled with the right-wing.

## The Soviet Visit

While the Christian Democrats are trying to sort out their affairs, Mr Brezhnev will be attempting to inaugurate a new era of profitable relations with the most powerful country in western Europe. In a curious way, the east-west tug of war for the soul of Germany that followed the second world war has turned into a contest for the pockets of Germany. Two weeks ago, in Washington, Herr Brandt heard a plea from Mr Nixon for greater west German financial sacrifices to support the dollar and defray the cost of keeping American troops in Europe. The previous week, in Belgrade, Herr Brandt promised President Tito large easy-term capital loans to help to develop

4

Jugoslavia's industry. Poland is expecting similar large injections of German capital.

The Russians are looking to west Germany for more big credit deals, on the lines of the Siberian gas scheme (whereby plants in the Ruhr supply the pipeline, financed by government-guaranteed bank loans, and the Russians will repay in the form of natural gas at reduced prices).

On the eve of the Brezhnev visit, Russia requires west German aid more than ever, because it has had to use up much of its hard currency reserves in purchasing western wheat. The ruling coalition in Bonn, probably more than any other government in western Europe, seems ready to co-operate.

On the face of it, if the Russians want west German economic assistance so badly, they are not in a strong position to push for the loosening of west Berlin's ties with west Germany. But the signs are that this is what Mr Brezhnev will try to do – although it may be no more than a probing exercise on his part. Maybe Herr Brandt will stand his ground. But the situation would be more propitious if Brandt had a vigilant, effectual and credible right-wing opposition to contend with. And, just at the wrong moment, he does not.

## Qaddafi angers the Africans

After its diplomatic successes in Africa last year, Libya may now have gone too far in its campaign for African support. First reactions to President Qaddafi's message to all African heads of state have been negative.

[His ultimatum, dated 30 April, demanded that member states of the Organisation of African Unity 'define their attitudes to the zionist enemy so as to harmonise them with those of the Libyan Arab Republic' before this year's OAU summit, which is scheduled to start in Addis Ababa on 24 May. The council of ministers' meeting, which starts this Thursday, may find itself preoccupied with the Libyan challenge instead of debating more important issues on the agenda, such as the impending negotiations between African countries and the European Economic Community.]

- In the view of many African (as well as western) leaders, Qaddafi's message was ill-conceived, both in content and in tone. Its first mistake was to assert that Libya is 'the major source of supply of arms, money and men to all African liberation movements'. This is patently untrue, as is the claim that Libya 'is the only state that has called for the overthrow of the two racist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa'. African diplomats describe such a display of ignorance as 'embarrassing'.

The suggestion that the nationalist guerrillas depend on Libya's largesse is also resented, with the result that anti-Libyan stories have rapidly gained circulation. The experience of a group of African refugees from Portuguese-ruled areas, who had been granted Libyan scholarships but recently applied to be transferred to some other country, is widely cited; in Libya, instead of being allowed to study their own subject (biology), they were taught nothing but Arabic and the Koran.

More significantly, Qaddafi is held responsible for the failure of the Eritrean Liberation Front to maintain the momentum of the offensive launched in late 1970. Qaddafi's insistence that the front should be essentially an Islamic movement deprived it of the support of Ethiopian students and other Christian opponents of the Addis Ababa regime. The Eritrean Liberation Front split into Christian and Moslem wings and no longer has a unified command.

5

Qaddafi based his ultimatum on the argument that Ethiopia harbours the 'zionist enemy', and threatened not to attend the summit unless the Ethiopians broke their Israeli links. But it is widely believed that his threat not to take part in the summit had less to do with zionism than with his need for an excuse to stay away from it: for **King Hassan** of Morocco, the current OAU chairman, is bound to attend the Addis Ababa meeting, and Libyan-Moroccan relations have remained bad over the past year, largely because of Qaddafi's verbal support for coup attempts in Morocco.

At last year's summit in Rabat a strong resolution condemning Israel was unanimously passed, and there was no reason to believe that this year's meeting would not also come out solidly in favour of the Arab cause. Now this seems much less certain. For instance, **President Ahidjo** of Cameroun - whose government has consistently supported the Arabs - pointed out last week that the Palestinian people would gain nothing from the attempt to provoke a 'useless crisis' within the OAU. The immediate effect would be to compromise the international support which the Egyptians in particular have enjoyed. Ahidjo went on to describe Qaddafi's demand that the OAU headquarters be moved to Cairo as 'pointless'.

Even **President Sadat** is said to have been embarrassed by the Libyan move, and is reported to have reassured **Emperor Haile Selassie** privately when the Ethiopian leader spent a few days in Cairo on his way to Washington (where he has just had talks with Mr Nixon). Sadat, however, can hardly come out publicly against Qaddafi, and a number of other African presidents with pronounced anti-zionist views are in the same dilemma.

For example, the Somali government - which is playing an important peacekeeping role between Tanzania and Uganda - finds itself in an awkward position. While not wishing for any upheaval in the OAU, Somalia has a militantly Moslem regime, and has territorial claims against Ethiopia which are popular with its people. Libya's allegations of 'zionist imperialism' have been echoed too often in Somalia to be disavowed publicly at an OAU summit.

Significantly, the only official support for Libya so far has come from Uganda. **President Amin** cabled Qaddafi that his challenge 'shows the great love, interest and concern that you have for the entire continent'. But Amin wants Kampala rather than Cairo to be the headquarters (or alternative headquarters) of the OAU, 'because of our geographical position'. (Amin still intends to go to the Addis Ababa meeting.)

The most likely outcome of the whole affair will be a massive expression of support for Emperor Haile Selassie, and a widespread commitment to Addis Ababa as the most suitable site for the OAU, now and in the future. This may affect **General Mobutu's** plans for OAU leadership: Zaire still harbours the ambition of becoming permanent host to the OAU, or at least to some of its most important institutions (see *FOREIGN REPORT* of 2 May). Since Mobutu himself is on excellent terms with Israel, he can scarcely support Libya's attempt to dislodge the organisation from Ethiopia.

Another possible result of Qaddafi's attack on Haile Selassie may be to instal the emperor as the chairman of the OAU for 1973-74. Although this would be his second term - he was its first chairman in 1963 - he might be re-elected to demonstrate African support for him, and to celebrate the organisation's 10th anniversary in proper fashion.

But many African diplomats argue that a younger and more active chairman is needed; and the name of **General Gowon** of Nigeria is being canvassed. It may be significant that Gowon has finally accepted the invitation to pay a state visit to Britain,

6

despite the fact that there has been no obvious improvement in British-Nigerian relations. If he were to be elected chairman of the OAU, his visit to London in June would provide him with a useful opportunity to project African opinion on Britain's African policies.

## The new Soviet economic structure

The changes in the structure of Soviet industry, announced early last month and referred to in FOREIGN REPORT on 4 April, have been widely misinterpreted in some circles in the west. It is tempting to see these innovations as a reversion to – or extension of – the reform programme of the mid-1960s.

That programme, it is worth recalling, had contradictory aspects. One school of thought – later condemned as revisionist – envisaged the partial introduction of market economy principles with a view to achieving American efficiency levels. The other school of thought – that of the leninists – aimed at making the traditional centralised planning model more efficient; the leninists were prepared to resort to profit concepts, provided the traditional ideological framework remained untouched. Their concept of centralised efficiency involved the reintroduction of the ministerial system of industrial management, which had been abolished by Khrushchev in 1957. As things turned out, the leninists won.

Under the new structure, announced last month, the ministries and government departments concerned with the economy must present to the council of ministers what are called 'general schemes for the management of the industrial branches for which they are responsible'. These schemes will be based upon a 'two-tier', or 'three-tier', management structure (although the enabling decree does provide, in exceptional instances, for a 'four-tier' structure).

Under the two-tier system industrial enterprises and production associations will be directly subordinated to the ministries concerned. Under the three-tier system, a new body called the 'industrial association' is created; it will stand between the ministry at the top and the production associations and enterprises at the bottom.

The production association is not as new a concept as it has been made out to be; it is little more than a merger of similar enterprises. The aim is to simplify the management structure at the production level and provide a framework to facilitate the introduction of new techniques.

What the new 'industrial association' does is to introduce into the Soviet economy, in camouflaged form, the elements of the American giant corporation. The industrial association is defined as 'a single production-economic complex which incorporates enterprises, scientific-research institutes, design and project organisations and other technological units. ... It bears responsibility for satisfying the needs of the national economy in the production lines concerned, for the technical level of production, for the scheduled commissioning of production capacity, for the fulfilment of the state plan and for meeting budgetary obligations'.

There is debate amongst Sovietologists about what all this means, in brass tacks. But, on the face of it, the creation of the industrial associations will result in the abolition of the old ministerial departments, which up to now have been responsible for running the existing production associations and enterprises. The aim is greater cost-effectiveness; the old ministerial departments were financed from the state budget

7

and their costs were not linked to the efficiency of the production units which they controlled. By contrast, the new industrial associations will function (theoretically) on the basis of accountability; they must cover their costs and show a profit. But, in the ultimate analysis, the operations of the industrial associations will be subordinated to the plans laid down by the state planning committee.

Behind this complex economic structure is one stark reality: the need to force the pace of scientific and technological progress, within the leninist ideological framework. It is hoped, for example, that by including scientific and technical research within the industrial associations (manifestly on the lines of the huge American corporations) considerable advances will be achieved.

The trouble is that the principles of the American corporation cannot be forced into the leninist straitjacket. The big corporations in the west are not static entities; they rise and fall in response to market forces and innovatory impulses – which western societies foster but which are still almost totally absent in Russia.

© WORLD COPYRIGHT RESERVED 1973 THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD.
'FOREIGN REPORT' IS SUPPLIED ON THE CONDITION THAT IT IS REGARDED AS CONFIDENTIAL BY THE RECIPIENT.
IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY THE CONTENTS BE REPRODUCED WHOLE OR IN PART.

PRINTED BY WATERLOW LONDON, FOR THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER LTD, LONDON SW1A 1HG

II. 14 May 73

YUGOSLAVIA

I 1

INDIRA GANDHI TO PAY OFFICIAL FRIENDLY VISIT 15-17 JUNE

Belgrade TANJUG in English 1328 GMT 11 May 73 L

[Text] Belgrade, May 11 (TANJUG) At the invitation of the president of the Federal Executive Council of Yugoslavia, Dzemal Bijedic, the prime minister of the Republic of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi, will pay an official and friendly visit to Yugoslavia, from June 15 to 17 this year and will have talks on the questions of the mutual interest of the two countries.

During the visit President Tito will receive Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and will have talks with her.

BEIGRADE RADIO SPECULATES ON KISSINGER VISIT TO LONDON

Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 10 May 73 A

[Text] Here is a special report of TANJUG correspondent Mladen Gavrilovic from London on the visit of U.S. emissary Henry Kissinger to Britain:

The talks between Foreign Minister Douglas-Home and U.S. emissary Henry Kissinger, who arrived on 24-hour visit to Britain yesterday, concluded in the Foreign Office a few moments ago. Kissinger arrived in London en route from Moscow to Washington. In the Foreign Office it is said that this is not an official visit to Britain, although the U.S. emissary was received at Number 10 Downing Street by Prime Minister Heath, who entertained him at a dinner which, it is assumed, passed in talks on current problems of East-West relations.

Official circles in London view Kissinger's visit as confirmation of a new U.S. orientation toward the policy of partnership with its European allies. This is, in fact, a qualitative change in the U.S. umbrella policy, whose evolution means the acceptance of the nine European countries as equal partners in the dialog between East and West. For this reason, Kissinger's 24-hour stay in London is understood as an extraordinary gesture of the Anglo-American alliance.

Thanks to Kissinger's visit, in 10 days time, when he will come face to face with President Pompidou in the Elysee Palace in Paris, Prime Minister Heath will be able to inform his host in detail on Washington's views on the future relations in Europe, particularly between East and West. This will certainly be welcome to Pompidou, who after meeting Heath will meet U.S. President Nixon in Reykjavik, Iceland. In the meantime, Chancellor Brandt, the third partner of Heath and Pompidou in the EEC, will welcome Leonid Brezhnev in Bonn. This, according to London's assessment, the nine European countries will experience their qualitative inclusion in the world political scene as an important negotiating partner of the big powers. Essentially, London rejects the existence of two superpowers in the world, claiming that the contemporary development of international relations has already proved that the epoch in which the United States and the USSR had a dominant influence on world political trends has been surpassed.

MINIC TO VISIT CHILE, PERU FOR COOPERATION TALKS

Departure Statement

Belgrade TANJUG in English 1628 GMT 12 May 73 L

[Text] Belgrade, May 12 (TANJUG)--Yugoslav Vice-Premier and Foreign Secretary Milos Minic this afternoon left Belgrade on a visit to Chile and Peru. The Vice-Premier and head of Yugoslav diplomacy in this way returns the visits which at one time were Chilean Foreign

II. 14 May 73

I 2

YUGOSLAVIA

Minister Clodomiro Almeyda and Peruvian Foreign Minister Mercado Jarrin, who in the meantime took over the post of the Peruvian foreign minister, paid to Yugoslavia. The head of the administration in the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat, Mirko Kreacic, left together with Secretary Minic.

Before leaving Belgrade, Milos Minic told TANJUG that there were mutual readiness and interest in the promotion of bilateral cooperation between Yugoslavia on the one side and Chile and Peru on the other. He underlined that these two friendly nations enjoy great sympathies of the Yugoslav public.

"I wish to express particular satisfaction that I have an opportunity to return visits to these friendly countries. With Chile and Peru we have a high level of cooperation in all the spheres. This visit fits in the already established practice of the exchange of opinions between representatives of our countries.

It will be an opportunity to exchange opinions on the current international questions, on which we have close or identical views, then on the position and problems of the developing countries, and possibilities for the further promotion of bilateral cooperation in all the spheres, for which there are mutual readiness and interest. I hope that we will have an opportunity to get acquainted more closely with the current processes of the internal development of Chile and Peru, particularly because in their efforts for the general progress and development, these two countries enjoy great sympathies of the Yugoslav public.

Milos Minic further stated that he and his hosts will discuss in particular the activity and role of the nonaligned countries in the present international situation and preparations for the forthcoming top-level conference of the non-aligned in Algeria in September.

Yugoslavia's relations with Chile and Peru, and with other Latin American countries, are developing with growing intensity, Minic stressed. He particularly underlined the useful and active cooperation which Yugoslavia is maintaining with these countries within the United Nations organization and other international bodies and forums. In all these organizations we are working jointly on settling important international problems and we are fighting for peace, independence, security and democratization of economic and political relations in the world, Milos Minic concluded.

Milos Minic was seen off at the airport by Assistant Foreign Secretary Ilija Topalovski and other representatives of the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat and representatives of the embassies of Peru and Chile.

Arrival in Chile

Belgrade TANJUG in English 2045 GMT 13 May 73 L

[Text] Santiago, May 13 (TANJUG)--Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milos Minic arrived in Santiago this afternoon on an official four-day visit to Chile, on the invitation of President Allende's government.

On arrival, Minic was given a cordial welcome at the Santiago airport. Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Clodomiro Almeyda welcomed his guest.

III. 17 May 73 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

AAA 1

VIETNAM DEVELOPMENTS

KISSINGER TRAVELS TO PARIS FOR TALKS WITH LE DUC THO

Washington Departure

Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT 16 May 73 L

[Text] Washington May 16 TASS--Henry Kissinger, assistant to the U.S. President for national security matters, emlahed for Paris today to hold talks with the representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Le Duc Tho.

Paris Arrival

Moscow TASS in English 2359 GMT 16 May 73 L

[Text] Paris May 17 TASS--The assistant to the United States President for national security matters Henry Kissinger has arrived in Paris. The first meeting between member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party, representative of the DRV Government Le Duc Tho and the assistant to the United States President for national security matters Henry Kissinger will be held in a Paris suburb today. They will study questions related to the fulfillment of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

Talks Begin

Moscow TASS in English 1010 GMT 17 May 73 L

[Text] Paris May 17 TASS--Talks have opened in the Paris suburb of Saint-Nom-La-Breteche between member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party, representative of the DRV Government Le Duc Tho and U.S. Presidential Adviser on National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger. The aim of the talks is the examination of the questions related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

PROXMIRE NAMES FIRMS MAKING EXORBITANT PROFITS FROM WAR

Moscow TASS in English 0954 GMT 16 May 73 L

[Text] Washington May 16 TASS--The companies of the military-industrial complex of the United States turned the aggression in Vietnam into a source of getting super-profits. Chairman of the Joint Economic Commission of the Congress, Senator William Proxmire published a list of over a hundred firms, which received, according to him, exorbitant profits, filling in the Pentagon's orders intended for the war in Vietnam. These companies profits frequently ran into tens or hundreds per cent of the capital invested. Thus, the National Union Electric Corporation in 1967, 1968 and 1969 got respectively 74, 72 and 91 per cent of profits, filling in orders for the U.S. aggression in Indo-China.

W. Proxmire pointed out that the companies which received exorbitant profits were mainly engaged in the production of bombs, explosives, ammunition and other armaments for the war in Vietnam. But the list, published by the senator, omits the biggest corporations of the military-industrial complex, which, as practice has it in the United States, have a possibility of "writing off" superprofits in some branches to make up for "losses" in other branches. In absolute figures they "earned" on the war in Vietnam dozens of million dollars.

III. 17 May 73

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A1

GENERAL

WORLD REACTION TO NEW ATLANTIC CHARTER EXAMINED

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 2, Signed to Press 3 May 73, p 7 L

[Article by Ye. Makarov: "An Atlantic Dialog"]

[Text] The "new Atlantic charter" proposed by the United States in the speech by President Nixon's national security adviser Kissinger reflects Washington's intention to formulate a new policy toward Europe in the circumstances of the tremendous changes taking place both in the world and in Europe.

Kissinger's statement in fact acknowledges that the previous policy pursued by the United States and its NATO partners in Europe was hopeless. The detente process initiated by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries has led to the creation of a new political climate in Europe, and the United States recognizes this fact.

Attempts to find a way to resolve the increasing U.S.-West European trade, economic, and political contradictions, achieve an increase the West European countries' fundamental contribution to NATO, and--as is clear from Kissinger's statement--maintain the strong position of U.S. capital in Europe are some of the important elements of the proposed "new Atlantic charter."

This "detailed statement on U.S. policy for world consumption," as American commentator Reston termed the U.S. presidential assistant's speech, have elicited a widespread response. Citing the reaction to Kissinger's speech in various European countries, the New York TIMES reported that many people welcome Washington's "new approach." At the same time, the "concern" displayed by the United States about an independent Common Market policy and the thesis of a "more equitable" distribution of arms expenditure being sponsored by Washington is causing growing anxiety.

Kissinger's speech was received in different ways in different countries. The British Foreign Office described the speech as "important." According to Belgium's LE SOIR, among others, the United States' "new ideas" have been greeted with great satisfaction in London. People there are hastening to welcome "the concept of a united Europe" with U.S. participation in the hope that, as some commentators stress, in this Europe Britain, taking advantage of its "special relationship" with Washington, will play the chief role after the United States.

On the other hand, according to the press, Paris is displaying its "traditional skepticism" about the far-reaching U.S. plans. LE FIGARO, for example, said that Paris has always been highly suspicious of an alliance in which the proportional weight of the main partner is too great. Judging by press statements, Paris sees in the U.S. actions an intention, using the military and diplomatic superiority it enjoys on the continent, to make Europe pay for the implementation of its own trade and financial demands. As a result, according to LE COMBAT, "Europe and America have diametrically opposed positions on economic issues, and manifestations of impatience and hostility can be observed within the Atlantic community."

A West German Government spokesman has stated that Bonn is attentively studying the ideas spelled out by Kissinger before making an assessment. But the FRG Government spokesman's statement did not mention the main proposal in Kissinger's speech--the adoption of a "new Atlantic charter."

PRESIDENT LINKED
TO TAPS ON AIDES

Nixon Said to Have Backed
Action in '69 in Effort to
Plug Security Leaks

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 15—
President Nixon personally
authorized the wiretapping of
more than a dozen of his sub-
ordinates on the National Se-
curity Council and in the Pen-
tagon beginning in 1969, relia-
ble sources said today.

The sources said the wire-
tapping had been undertaken
in response to a dispatch by
William Beecher published in
The New York Times on May 9,
1969, which reported for the
first time that B-52 bombers
were striking targets inside
Cambodia.

A White House spokesman
confirmed the report of Presi-
dential authorization tonight.
"It was a national security mat-
ter," the spokesman said. "The
procedure was approved by the
President and authorized in in-

Continued on Page 27, Column 2

President Linked to Taps on His Aides

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

dividual cases by the Attorney
General in coordination with
the director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation."

Well-informed Government
officials defended the Presi-
dent's authorization as neces-
sary, in view of what they
termed a serious security
breach. Mr. Beecher's dispatch
told how the bombing was
being conducted without any
public protest from Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, who was

Mr. Beecher's article was the
first to indicate that the Nixon
Administration was expanding
the Vietnam war.

"The President's motives
were honorable," one official
said. "This had to be stopped
and it [the wiretapping] turned
out to be for the protection of
the innocent." He was refer-
ring, he said, to the fact that
most of those whose phones
were wiretapped were found to
not have violated security.

Another Government official
aware of the wiretapping noted
that it had been legal and add-
ed: "Hell, yes, I was aware that
it was going on. To have done
less would have been the high-
est order of irresponsibility."

Other Government sources
contended that at least three
White House and Pentagon of-
ficials whose phones were
monitored turned out to be—
as one put it—"blabbermouths"
and were eventually eased out
of their positions.

3 Aides Were Tapped

Specific approval for the op-
eration, which involved the
tapping of home and office tele-
phones, was granted by the late
J. Edgar Hoover, director of
the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and John N. Mitchell,
then the Attorney General.

Special F.B.I. reports of the
overhead telephone conversa-
tion were provided to Dr. Hen-
ry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's
National Security Adviser, and
then Col. Alexander M. Haig
Jr., one Mr. Kissinger's key
deputies who is now a four-
star general and is serving as
the temporary White House
chief of staff.

Among those tapped, sources
said, were three aides to Mr.
Kissinger—Daniel I. Davidson,
who left the Government later
in 1969; Anthony Lake, who
quit over the Cambodian in-

vasion in May, 1970; and Winston Lord, who will be leaving this week.

Mr. Lake and Mr. Lord served
as special assistants to Mr.
Kissinger and participated in
many secret peace talks with
Le Duc Tho, the chief North
Vietnamese negotiator, and
other North Vietnamese offi-
cials prior to the peace agree-
ment that was reached early
this year.

William D. Ruckelshaus, the
acting director of the F.B.I.,
told a news conference yester-
day that records of 17 wiretaps
placed on 13 Government offi-
cials and four newsmen had
been found in a safe belonging
to John D. Ehrlichman, the
President's former chief assist-
ant for domestic affairs. Mr.
Ruckelshaus identified one of
those overhead as Dr. Morton
Halperin, who joined Mr. Kis-
singer's staff in 1969.

Meeting Described

Sources in the executive
branch said that the wiretap
logs had been sent routinely to
Mr. Kissinger's office until May,
1970. At that time, one official
said, there was a meeting be-
tween President Nixon, Mr.
Hoover and H. R. Haldeman,
the former White House chief
of staff, "to discuss these taps."

"They agreed to continue
them," the official added, "but
they also decided to have all
of the mail [the logs and other
products of the wiretaps] go to
Haldeman." The wiretap pro-
gram itself was ended in Feb-
ruary, 1971, other officials said.

"We found out what we
wanted to find out," one source
said. "We found the people who
were the weak links." He de-
scribed the taps as being very
productive. "They were a couple
of guys who could have been
prosecuted," he added, "but we
just let them go out of the
Government."

Mr. Lake, reached on vaca-
tion in Edgartown, Mass., said
he was "disgusted" to hear
that his phone had been tapped
while working for the Govern-
ment. "It's an invasion of
privacy," he said. "I can't think
of any grounds for them to
have done that."

Mr. Lord, reached in the
White House, said he had only
learned from Mr. Kissinger a
few minutes prior to the call
that his phone had been tapped.
He had no comment.

Mr. Davidson could not be
immediately reached.

Mr. Halperin acknowledged
in a telephone interview that
he had been told by Mr. Kis-
singer that his security clear-
ance had been protested by the
Central Intelligence Agency
and the F.B.I. The agencies
complained that he had neg-
lected to mention a trip to the
Soviet Union while filling out
a form. "As I told him [Mr.
Kissinger] many times," Mr.
Halperin said, "I had reported
that trip three times previously
and four times afterward."

Mr. Halperin quoted Mr. Kis-
singer as telling him at one
point that he had been "ad-
vised not to hire any of the
people" he hired.

Complaints Noted

After The Times dispatch on
the Cambodia bombing was
published, Mr. Halperin noted,
he was told that three top
Government officials — Secre-
tary of State William P. Rog-
ers, then Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird and Mr. Mitch-
ell—complained to the Presi-
den that he was the source for
the article.

"Kissinger told me I was
under suspicion for that," Mr.
Halperin said. "I interpreted
that at the time as meaning
that they were mad at the leak
because they were trying to
keep from the American pub-
lic that, while the Administra-
tion was claiming it was with-
drawing, in fact it was esca-
lating the war."

"Of course I told him I was
not [the source]," Mr. Helperin
said, "and of course he can
find out if he wants to be-
cause Beecher is now a Penta-
gon official." Mr. Beecher left
The Times last month to be-
come a deputy assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for public af-
fairs.

Mr. Halperin, who is asso-
ciated with the Brookings In-
stitution in Washington, said
that despite the suspicion and
the wiretapping, he remained
on the National Security Coun-
cil until September, 1969, when
—despite urgings from Mr.
Kissinger—he resigned.

Mr. Halperin said he con-
tinued to serve as a consultant
to Mr. Kissinger until the
spring of 1970, when he re-
signed in protest over the
American and South Vietna-
mese invasion of Cambodia.

NYT
5/16/73

5/16/73

THE WASHINGTON POST, W

Joseph Alsop

# The ‘Zavidovo Message’

The more you learn about it, the more Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's recent Russian trip seems to have a currently important message. The message is that key foreign leaders like the Soviet general secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, have concluded that President Nixon is going to survive the Watergate horror. Hence they still see the President as the man to do business with, come hell or high water.

As Dr. Kissinger himself has often emphasized in the past, any honor paid to him as the President's emissary is obviously an honor intended for the President. Furthermore, the Soviets have never distinguished any other Western leader, at any rate since President Roosevelt's day, as President Nixon has now been indirectly distinguished through Kissinger.

In these Byzantine matters, there are always two tests to apply to any visitor's reception in the Soviet Union. The first test is the amount of time personally given to the visitor by the current Soviet boss. The second test is the degree of intimacy in which the visitor is received.

On the basis of the first test, the Kissinger visit was extremely notable. Despite all the responsibilities his power entails, Leonid Brezhnev gave the better part of four entire days to the man from the White House.

Since Winston Churchill in wartime, no foreign leader visiting the U.S. has ever had anything like this amount of an American President's time. Yet the astonishing amount of time Brezhnev chose to devote to talks with Kissinger, was only the first part of the

message from the Soviet Union. The second part may be called the message of Zavidovo.

Except perhaps by means of a U-2 or a reconnaissance satellite, Zavidovo has never before been seen by any spokesman of a major Western power. Before Dr. Kissinger, no one from any country not belonging to the Soviet empire has ever been invited to go to Zavidovo in fact, with the sole exceptions of the presidents of Finland and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia.

The place is the nearest equivalent of the President's retreat at Camp David; but it belongs, at least theoretically, to all the members of the Soviet Politburo. Basically, it is an immense hunting lodge, situated in deep forest at some distance from Moscow. But as a hunting lodge, it is a significantly expensive product of Soviet society.

It has external dependencies, such as a large artificial lake, on which Brezhnev likes to drive an immensely fast speedboat. But Zavidovo's core is a wide area of forest entirely surrounded by a strong wall, which keeps the wild boar and other game where they are wanted, and also, presumably keeps out undesirable intruders.

The accommodations comprise a lodge with separate suites for ordinary members of the Politburo; a species of chalet for the special use of Brezhnev, the first among equals; and a guesthouse, which was allotted to Dr. Kissinger. Brezhnev's chalet was where the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks mainly took place. But one day at Zavidovo, General Secretary Brezhnev also

took Dr. Kissinger out boar-hunting—although the President's foreign affairs adviser might be described as a non-practicing sportsman.

The boar-hunting was done without undue exertion, from a blind at the feeding place of the wild boars; but it reportedly required non-sportsman Kissinger to don a special, quasimilitary uniform. The Tsars also used to honor important visitors by inviting them to go boar-hunting. Altogether, this part of Dr. Kissinger's visit offers what Sen. Arthur Vandenberg used to call "a vivid contemplation."

No word of the substance of the long discussions at Zavidovo has as yet seeped out. Yet the main result is known, of course. Brezhnev will soon be coming to this country, to have equally long discussions with President Nixon. It is likely that other highly significant Soviet leaders will follow Brezhnev.

Hence this part of the signal is clear. Brezhnev not only expects to go on doing business with President Nixon. He is also eager enough to do business with the President in the most favorable atmosphere. He has therefore gone far, far out of his way to lavish unprecedented attentions on the President's special adviser.

If the Soviets had paid comparable attentions to an emissary of the British prime minister or the French president, the result would have been a kind of delirium in the British or French press and television. In some ways, we are a very odd country.

© 1973, Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON STAR & NEWS

16 May 1973 (17)

EDITORIALS

Kissinger In Paris

The forthcoming talks in Paris between presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of Hanoi's politburo will provide the first serious test of the extent to which the administration's foreign policy may have been impaired by the results of the Watergate scandal.

The administration, naturally enough, has been denying any ill effects. According to Kissinger, he noticed "no impact of Watergate on our foreign policy" in the course of his recent talks with British and Soviet leaders. The British and Russians, of course, have reasons of their own for hoping that the administration continues to function effectively in the area of foreign affairs. The North Vietnamese, on the contrary, have in the past been quick to exploit any weakness that they perceive in the American negotiating position.

Under the best of conditions, they could be expected to take a hard line in the coming talks. Kissinger's objective is to try to salvage something of the agreement on Indochina reached with Tho last January, calling for a cease-fire throughout the area and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and Cambodia. Giv-

en the lack of compliance with the terms of this agreement by all parties to the conflict so far, the chances of success were never brilliant.

Kissinger now is under a substantial additional handicap. The Watergate affair has shaken the confidence of the administration to its foundation. And partly as a result, the House of Representatives for the first time is in rebellion against the President's Indo-China policies, having voted to withhold funds for the continued bombing of insurgents in Cambodia. Kissinger himself admits the weakness of his position by wondering aloud "whether it is possible to maintain an agreement without either sanctions or incentives."

Certainly, it is worth the try. For all the evidence of continuing North Vietnamese belligerency, the hope remains that they are, in fact, anxious for a respite in the endless fighting. They would also be quite mistaken to overestimate the disarray in Washington when it comes to the bombing in Cambodia or other retaliatory action the administration might take. Kissinger still has cards to play and he can be expected to play them with all of his usual competence and skill.

BALTIMORE SUN 17 May 1973

Skylab Imperiled

The United States space program, after its brilliant performance during the Apollo moon voyages, is now confronted by its first major back. Even if astronauts can throw a thermal blanket around the sizzling exterior of Skylab I or deploy its jammed solar energy wing, the full promise of the $2.6 billion mission will not be realized. None of the three Skylab teams is likely to be able to spend enough time in space to thoroughly test the effects of prolonged weightlessness of the human body. And in addition to losing this information, which is essential to extensive space travel in the future, the 270 scientific experiments aboard the Skylab are in peril.

This is an extraordinary disappointment not only for gung-ho space enthusiasts but for earth-oriented citizens who were favorably impressed with the objectives, if not the expense, of the Skylab mission. Unlike the Apollo moon shots, which were engineering spectacular to avert the Soviet "firsts" at the late 1950's, Skylab was more scientific than political. Many of the complicated instruments

jammed inside the 80-ton, 118-foot cylinder were designed to survey the earth's natural resources, monitor weather, examine crops at three distinct stages of the growing process, correct mapping and perform other tasks of value to the human environment.

We hope that through astute improvisation much of the Skylab I mission can be salvaged. Yet if it has to be scrubbed, then NASA should be encouraged to go ahead with backup plans to send a second space laboratory into earth orbit next year. This would require an added expenditure of $200 million at a time of budgetary stress. But in view of the fact that more than 10 times this amount has already been invested in the Skylab concept, it seems to us that a Skylab II venture would be in order. NASA could find the money if it is prepared to cut back or postpone other activities, including the controversial $14 billion space shuttle program beginning in 1978. While space shuttles can operate independently, they will approach their full potential only when they can rendezvous with orbital space stations or laboratories.

ATLANTA JOURNAL

11 May 1973

(17)

Callaway
Confirmed

THE EASE WITH which Howard

"Boo" Callaway of Georgia was confirmed by the U.S. Senate to be secretary of the Army is indicative of the high bipartisan regard in which he is held.

The Senate Armed Services Committee vote recommending his confirmation was unanimous. The Senate vote itself produced no opposition.

It is a pity that more of President Nixon's nominees do not merit the same sort of approval.

"Boo" Callaway goes to Washington at a time when the administration is facing a credibility problem. There is an erosion of public faith in the ability of the administration to effectively govern.

Moreover, the new Army secretary has a very real challenge within his own area of responsibility. He must preside over an all-volunteer Army and it is an Army that is simply not getting the number of recruits that it needs.

The problem Mr. Callaway will face is whether to lower the qualifications, either de jure or de facto, or press forward with renewed energy and imagination to persuade the nation's youth that the Army is an acceptable life.

Lowering qualifications is a dangerous business at best.

But the inescapable fact is that a sufficient number of volunteers must be found or the Army will fall flat on its face — and the nation with it.

So "Boo" Callaway has his work cut out for him. It is a challenge which can earn him national stature if he can bring it off.

Georgia Republican Bob Shaw predicted recently that Mr. Callaway's performance as Army secretary would open higher political opportunities. If he can perform the complex feat of resolving the Army's problems, we don't doubt Mr. Shaw's prediction one bit.

"Boo" Callaway will bring rectitude to Washington, a virtue which is in short supply there and sorely needed. He will be an asset to the administration.

We extended congratulations to him when President Nixon nominated him for the post. We renew those congratulations with his confirmation by the Senate.

NEW YORK POST 16 May 1973 (17)

Arms and Mankind

In some countries—including this one—there are many eager fans for horse racing. In others, the passionate preoccupation is car racing. Still further on, there are countless devotees of boat, foot and ski races. Internationally speaking, however, the whole world's favorite sport unquestionably continues to be arms racing.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has published its latest yearbook and it makes heavy,

rather than light, reading. Among the array of statistics supporting the Institute's conclusion that "the militarization of the world continues unabated" is the report that in the last three years alone the total global expenditure on armaments of all kinds was approximately $190 billion—one hundred ninety thousand million dollars.

What about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks? The answer is that the costs of long delay and limited restraints have escalated; since a year

ago, the U. S. has deployed about 1060 more nuclear warheads on various launchers—the warhead total now tops 7040—and the Soviets have added an estimated 90 warheads, for a total of 2260. Smaller states, meanwhile, have been piling up their "conventional" arsenals to record levels every year.

The subject would be worth some concentrated discussion at the impending U. S.-Soviet summit. In fact, Messrs. Nixon and Brezhnev may have no more critical business to confront.

1-E

NEW YORK TIMES 17 May 1973

Untimely Visit...

A visit to this country by Leonid I. Brezhnev has been a strong probability since President Nixon's own visit to the Soviet Union a year ago. But the timing of the Soviet leader's trip next month for eight days of talks in Washington and San Clemente is decidedly inopportune. It would be in the country's best interest to postpone these talks until late fall or next year.

Such a postponement would indicate no break with the diplomatic policy which Mr. Nixon has been pursuing with the Soviet Union and which these talks were intended to advance. There is broad bipartisan support for a further arms control agreement, increased trade, and improved understanding on other issues.

But it is a harsh fact of life that President Nixon is now passing through a crisis of confidence in his Administration. If this were a parliamentary country, the crisis might be quickly resolved by a vote in parliament or a snap election. But under the American form of government, no swift resolution is possible. Mr. Nixon has the problem of working his way through the Watergate scandals in all their complex ramifications and, if he can, gradually restoring the public's confidence and the

Administration's shattered equilibrium. Time is the first essential required in this delicate political undertaking.

It would be different if the Brezhnev visit were to be wholly ceremonial or if the Soviet leader represented a government with which the United States had easy and cordial relationships. But despite the developing détente, the Soviet Union is still this country's principal adversary in many areas of the world and Mr. Brezhnev has a well-earned reputation as a hard bargainer.

It is not in the interest of the United States or its allies for an American President to enter into substantive negotiations with his chief diplomatic rival when a domestic political storm puts the President at a serious disadvantage. Mr. Brezhnev is fully briefed on. Watergate. He may well be tempted to raise his diplomatic price on various issues in the confident belief that Mr. Nixon, at this particular time, needs visible proof of progress toward world peace so urgently that he would be prepared to pay the higher price.

The Soviet-American détente is likely to continue because it is in the best interests of both nations. It would enhance, not retard, that improvement in relations if the leaders of the two nations met under more relaxed circumstances when neither is at a serious disadvantage.

LOS ANGELES TIMES 16 May 1973 (17)

Kissinger and the Cause of Peace

Henry A. Kissinger will go into the talks with Le Duc Tho in Paris deprived of some of the weapons of persuasion that he might have liked to use in bolstering the Vietnam cease-fire. The North Vietnamese have now witnessed the first defeat for bombing funds in the House of Representatives, and they know that Congress will almost certainly impose tighter restrictions on the President in the next fortnight.

This is as it should be. The limitations on the President's war-making powers, particularly his powers to make war in Southeast Asia, are overdue. If Kissinger can accomplish nothing without the threat of more and more American bombing, he should have stayed home. For it can only mean that he has failed to learn a fundamental lesson of this war—that it is an Indochinese affair that can only be worsened by the interference of outsiders.

At the same time, the importance of Kissinger's mission in diplomatic terms must not be underestimated. The cease-fire agreement that he negotiated in January is of supreme importance to the future of Indochina. It offers the best way to substitute political competition for the endless struggle of the last 30 years. It provides a means for construction and reconstruction and an end to destruction. It recognizes the interests of most if not all of the varied interests of those perplexing nations and divisions of nations.

The best possible thing for all concerned would be to make the cease-fire work as it was intended to work.

As delegates to the Paris conference on Indochina acknowledged, however, this is up to the people

of Indochina. They are the beneficiaries of a cease-fire. It is they who have so much to lose if the cheating continues. Their suffering will only be made worse if outsiders continue to intervene.

That is the sum of the practical aspects. For the United States, the matter cannot be left at that. For this nation cannot help but weigh the overall strategic aspects, and cannot avoid the legal aspects. From a strategic point of view, it seems to us, never has it been more apparent that there is no, absolutely no, American national interest in pursuing this war, in dropping one more bomb. From a legal point of view, the arguments are overwhelming: There is no sanction for what Mr. Nixon has been doing. But it is also evident that he remains as determined as ever to do what he sees fit, regardless of public opinion—now 2 to 1 against the bombing—and regardless of what Congress does.

Yet even his departing secretary of defense, Elliot L. Richardson, has acknowledged that the executive cannot ignore Congress. And that makes so important, so useful, the action being taken on Capitol Hill. The vote of the House of Representatives last week to bar the transfer of funds to finance the bombing will certainly be seconded this week in the Senate. And there is now a good possibility that there will be approval by Congress of the amendment, offered by Sens. Frank Church and Clifford P. Case, requiring specific congressional authority for any expenditures on American military activity in Indochina.

Indochina is not, and never has been, an appropriate target for American bombs. This makes the more important Kissinger's powers of peaceful persuasion on his mission to Paris.

2-E

TUALITÉ INTERNATIONALE

3

LE FIGARO

16 MAI 73

ÉTATS-UNIS

HENRY KISSINGER DIRECTEMENT IMPLIQUÉ
DANS UNE AFFAIRE DE TABLES D'ÉCOUTE

PAR LE DIRECTEUR INTÉRIMAIRE DU F.B.I.

New York, 14 mai. (De notre envoyé spécial permanent.)

L'E lavage de linge sale déclenché par l'affaire du Watergate s'est éiéndu aujourd'hui à la famille « extérieure » de M. Richard Nixon, celle qui s'occupe de sa politique étrangère, alors que le scandale était limité jusque-là à l'état-major personnel du président et à ses conseillers de politique intérieure.

Dans une conférence de presse plutôt exceptionnelle dans les habitudes des services fédéraux de sécurité, M. William Ruckelshaus, directeur intérimaire du F.B.I., n'a pas confirmé seulement le fait — évélé depuis plusieurs jours par la presse — que les téléphones d'un certain nombre de hauts personnages gouvernements aux (treize), et de plusieurs journalistes (quatre) avaient été branchés de 1969 à 1971 sur les tables d'écoute. Il a ajouté que ces décisions avaient été prises par M. Edgar Hoover à la suite « de conversations générales » avec M. Henry Kissinger, c'est-à-dire alors que celui-ci était pleinement au courant, sinon avec son accord formel.

Ce n'est pas la première fois que le nom du conseiller spécial de politique étrangère de M. Nixon est prononcé dans l'af-

faire. Il l'avait déjà été à propos de M. David Young dont le nom avait été cité dans l'affaire du Watergate qui, avant de passer au service de M. John Erhlichman à la Maison-Blanche, avait été placé

De notre envoyé spécial
permanent :
Léo SAUVAGE

sous les ordres de M. Henry Kissinger au Conseil national de sécurité. Cela n'engageait en rien, toutefois, la responsabilité personnelle de M. Kissinger.

Une autre précision de M. Ruckelshaus — qui vient des services de « l'Environnement », et a été appelé au F.B.I. parce qu'il appartient aux rares fonctionnaires nixoniens dont l'intégrité n'a jamais été mise en discussion — en dit long sur les mœurs étrangers qui règnent à Washington. Si les dossiers des écoutes téléphoniques ont été transférés à la Maison-Blanche, a déclaré en effet M. Ruckelshaus, c'est que l'on craignait de voir le fameux M. Hoover aujourd'hui décédé en faire usage un jour contre la Maison-Blanche.

Le coffre-fort de M. Ehrlichman

M. Sullivan, l'adjoint de M. Hoover, qui a organisé le transfert, n'ignorait donc pas le caractère illégal de ces dossiers, ni certaienement M. Erhlichman qui les a accusé et les a conservés dans son coffre-fort, ni sans doute, et c'est

là la seule nouveauté, M. Kissinger qui était au courant de leur établissement en premier lieu.

Enfin une information du « Time » s'est glissée, peut-être involontairement, parmi les révélations et les confirmations du

directeur intérimaire du FBI. Les comptes rendus d'écoutes ayant trait à l'affaire Ellsberg, a-t-il dit, n'ont pu être transmis à temps au juge Byrne à Los Angeles puisqu'ils n'ont été découvertes que vendredi à dix-huit heures dans le coffre-fort de M. Erhlichman à la Maison-Blanche. C'était donc trop tard pour accéder à la demande du juge qui, comme on le sait, a prononcé un non-lieu définitif en faveur de Daniel Ellsberg et de son co-accusé Anthony Russo.

Le coup de théâtre, qui ne semble pas avoir frappé tout de suite les journalistes présents, réside dans l'aveu que le coffre-fort de M. John Erhlichman n'a été ouvert que le vendredi 11 mai à 10 h. Le conseiller de M. Nixon a été mis en cause depuis longtemps, en tout cas à partir de sa démission, acceptée avec émotion par le président, le 30 avril. Pourquoi avoir attendu le 11 mai avant d'ouvrir le coffre de M. Erh-

lichman ? Avait-on perdu le nu-
méro de la combinaison ?

A tout cela un journal californien vient d'ajouter son grain de sel particulier, qu'il convient naturellement de n'accueillir, pour l'instant, qu'avec la plus grande réserve : l'enquête en cours sur les opérations financières de Me Herbert Kalmbach, l'avocat personnel de M. Nixon, suggère, selon le journal « Register » de Santa Ana, que le reliquat des fonds électoraux du parti républicain en 1968 a servi à l'achat de la résidence présidentielle de San Clemente.

La dernière plaisanterie qui circule à Los Angeles a trait à « l'état-major prussien » qui entourait M. Nixon à la Maison-Blanche et que l'affaire Watergate a liquidé. Le président, se raconte-t-on, va s'entourer désormais de Japonais : leur équipement électronique est meilleur et eux, au moins, savent faire hara-ki-i...

Léo Sauvage.

THE WASHINGTON POST

B 4

Thursday, May 17, 1973

VIP

50
Years
And
150
Friends

By Maxine Cheshire

When 150 friends of foreign affairs adviser Henry Kissinger got engraved invitations to a party in his honor in New York, there was speculation that he might be getting ready to announce his engagement to frequent companion Nancy Maginnes.

But the host, Harvard professor Guido Goldman, insists that the black-tie dinner is simply to celebrate Kissinger's birthday. He will be 50 on Sunday, May 27.

Goldman's party will be on Saturday night, May 26, at the Colony Club. Because the location is one of Manhattan's best-known women's clubs, the invitations caused some kidding. One wag suggested that with Kissinger's reputation as a ladies' man, all the guests were probably going to be female.

Goldman isn't saying who is invited. There will be no press coverage, although some of Kissinger's friends in the media were invited on an off-the-record basis.

Goldman, a professor of government at Harvard, is one of Kissinger's closest friends. When Kissinger is in New York, he uses an apartment Goldman keeps there.

Potpourri

During the five years he worked in the White House, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman was seldom seen in public. This past weekend, a former administration associate was surprised to see a smiling Haldeman with his wife and a group of neighborhood children buying balloons from a vendor on a Georgetown street corner . . . "Impeachment," a newly published scholarly treatise by Harvard professor Raoul Berger, would be an unlikely bestseller in ordinary times. But the Sidney Kramer bookstore here has sold out its first order, and a lawyer who called early this week was told he would be number 27 on the waiting list.

© 1973. The Washington Post/Chicago Tribune-New York News Syndicate, Inc.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, May 17, 1973

B3

The national hearing eventually assumes finality, whether it is a Boston Welch, a feisty Jimmy Hoffa, aomer Capehart.”

## *At the Cast*

And down home
but never quite
conceal a super-
mind, a strong
considerable
questions some-
ne and he some-
ts to mumble a
be running this

Howard Baker (Ranking Republican committee, he'll foil. A bright he is making his the party after clarity as "Ev Dirk-law." He's been the administra-Watergate, but is a list and has ambi-ous sharp questions

it's worth, he will be highly
visible and vocal.

Today's key witness: James W. McCord Jr. The convicted Watergate conspirator who blew the whistle. He could provide more headlines this very afternoon.

TV viewers will also see
some familiar network
faces. Frank Reynolds will
be ABC's anchorman, while
Sam Donaldson will be
there in the hall, asking the
tough questions.

CBS will have two anchor-
men, Nelson Benton and
George Herman. Dan
Schorr, a positive bulldog,
will be handling the hall-
way and he knows a good

James McCord:
“Key Witness.”

Kissinger and Tho Talk Five Hours

By ANDREW BOROWIEC
Star-News Staff Writer

PARIS — Henry A. Kissinger and North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho held a long meeting today on how to prevent total collapse of the Vietnam peace agreement.

The meeting in suburban St. Nom la Breteche opened a new round of talks between the United States and North Vietnam. The talks were decided upon when it became fairly clear that the Jan. 27 agreement was crumbling.

Despite smiles and handshakes at the start of the session, a heavy atmosphere of charges and counter-charges dominated the talks. Neither side made an official comment.

The secret talks lasted more than five hours. Officials said both sides agreed to meet again tomorrow in a Communist-owned villa in the Paris suburb of Gif-sur-Yvette.

No official statement was issued on today's sessions, but in reply to a reporter's question Kissinger said the talks had been "okay."

AT THE SAME TIME, representatives of the Saigon government and of its Viet Cong adversary held another fruitless session aimed at bringing the two sides together for future political cooperation. As the previous 10 such sessions, today's meeting ended in a deadlock.

The Viet Cong repre-

sentative rejected South Vietnam's proposal to create four work groups. The envoy, Nguyen Van Hieu, in sharp language attacked what he described as American bombing of Viet Cong-controlled towns.

The United States, he said. "Does not want an effective cease-fire."

South Vietnamese representative Nguyen Luu Vien again proposed secret meetings to break the impasse. His proposal was rejected. The two sides separated until May 22.

The new Kissinger-Tho negotiations come against a background of charges of truce violations by both sides and the continuing fighting in Laos, Cambodia and parts of South Vietnam. They follow a breakdown of the talks between the United States and North Vietnam on

post-war aid and a U.S. halt in the mine-sweeping operations in North Vietnamese waters.

KISSINGER, arriving last night, told newsmen that his task is to "strengthen the peace in Indochina" and achieve a "speedy normalization of relations between the United States and North Vietnam."

"If our colleagues from North Vietnam approach these meetings with the same attitude, I am confident we will make major progress toward this objective," Kissinger said.

Tho reached Paris on Monday via Peking, warning that the new negotiations will be suspended if the United States continues bombing raids against Viet Cong-held areas in South Vietnam.

THE WARNING gives the veteran Communist negotiator an opportunity to walk out if he feels the negotiations are not pro-

gressing according to his wishes.

On the other hand, Kissinger's hands are considerably tied by the growing opposition in Congress against the continuing American involvement in Indochina. On Tuesday the Senate Appropriations Committee voted against continuing appropriations for military operations in Laos and Cambodia. Last week, the House went on record against continuation of the U.S. military involvement by voting to cut off funds for the bombing of Cambodia.

Thus the American negotiator can hardly approach the talks from a position of strength.

The basic issue is that the Jan. 27 peace agreement has not brought real peace either to Vietnam or the other countries of former French Indochina.

KISSINGER'S task is to try to salvage what can be salvaged. And the atmosphere preceding the talks

is not encouraging.

The United States has considerably changed its stand on the problem. Earlier this month, President Nixon warned bluntly that he would resume the bombing of North Vietnam if the Communist violations continue. Last week, Secretary of State William Rogers conceded that

"there are violations on both sides" and that he feels the North Vietnamese "fundamentally want the agreement to work.

The American hope is that an offer of large-scale economic aid for North Vietnam can prove a satisfactory inducement for a compromise.

HENRY KISSINGER

By JAMES DOYLE
and MARTHA ANGLE

Star-News Staff Writers

The office manager for the Committee for the Re-Election of the President told the Senate Watergate Committee today that on the day of the burglary at Democratic headquarters he took home a file which he now suspects contained "things which have no place in a political campaign."

The file was referred to by committee vice chairman Howard P. Baker, R-Tenn., in a line of questioning, as possibly the "Project Gemstone" file which is said to have outlined the campaign of bugging, sabotage and disruption which became known as the Watergate scandal.

But Robert C. Odle, 28, bespectacled, polite and professing great difficulty "in remembering the chronology of events," said he never looked in the file, never asked why he was directed to remove it, and returned it unopened two days later to deputy campaign director Jeb Stuart Magruder.

Odle said that when he reported to work on Saturday, June 17, 1972, around 9 a.m. he was informed by a press officer that there had been a burglary at Democratic National headquarters in the Watergate office building.

After that conversation, Odle told the committee, "I came away with the suspicion" that his director of security, James W. McCord, was involved in the burglary and was in jail.

Subsequently, Odle testified, he directed G. Gordon Liddy, since convicted as a Watergate burglar, to the largest paper shredder at campaign headquarters a few hours after the burglary. He then watched Liddy take a foot-high stack of papers to the shredder. But Odle said, he never inquired about the destruction of documents because such an action was not an unusual occurrence at the offices of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President.

He said that at one point during the day he received a telephone call from the wife of James W. McCord, the campaign committee's security chief who was arrested inside Democratic headquarters. She told him, "Jim has been involved in a project which has failed. He is in jail." Odle said he did not ask here what the project was or if his security officer

bunny.

In the circumstances. It is not even though refin-
country are turning it
els. Thing is, demand
distancing refinery
the oil supplies.

big reasons for the
demand:
the road. New-car sales
ons.

cars have conveni-
guzzle gasoline. Any
vice is a drain on your
rough the air condi-
test appetite.

reduces mileage. This equipment
alone accounts for much of the
increase in gasoline consumption.

So gasoline is in short supply. If
every motorist uses a bit less fuel,
though, we should get through the
coming months without real hardship.
Good driving habits will be a big help.
That's where you come in.

Meantime, we'll be refining gasoline
at top capacity; adding to our refining
capabilities where we can; exploring
for new petroleum reserves; increas-
ing our crude oil imports.

We'll do our part. You do yours, won't
we?