Receptionist's Note: the person listed is the one who is responsible for this meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

Mr. Kissinger

12:10 p.m., May 11, 1972

By: K.L.V. NAFU Date: 5/12/04

K: Demi

B: Henry, hi, it's been a long time.

K: It certainly has.

B: Let me be very brief because I know how busy you are. I've been asked to call you by 8 presidents of Ivy League institutions to see whether there would be any possibility in connection with our meeting in Washington next Wednesday to possibly get a very brief appointment with the President. I know how difficult that is and I can see all the reasons but I felt I ought to.

K: Well, particularly in the light of some of the public statements.

B: Well, I'm aware of that and I'm aware of the irritations they must have caused but I guess we had some feeling that perhaps we might be able to communicate in a little more understandable way the nature of our concerns.

K: Well, you know, the concern here was it was hard to see how one could not even mention the North Vietnamese attacks.

B: Yeah. But I think -- my point is that problem -- that statement was put together by conference call and I'm not sure that I wouldn't agree with you, Henry, that if I had been able to sit down and work on it, I would've put that in.

K: It would certainly have helped its impact. But I will recommend it to the President and we will see then. You know, if he can't do it, I would certainly be happy to do it.

B: Well, that would be --

K: Although I don't know whether you would -- it's clearly not an adequate substitute but at any rate I want to offer my willingness to do it.

B: Henry, that would be marvelous. We will be in Washington all day. One or two people do have to get back in the afternoon but obviously if the afternoon were the only appropriate time, you know, the great majority of us would still be there.

K: You mean, for the President?

Re: what if the president called in a favor to a friend, but the president said no?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

Ir. Kissinger

2:10 p.m., May 11, 1972

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/13/04

J: For the President or for you.

K: Right.

B: Morning obviously would be more preferable but anytime all day would be --

K: Could I give you a time for me and I have to check the President whether he can do it and when.

B: I think that would be marvelous if my secretary could call your secretary in the afternoon. Would that be enough time?

K: No, no; that would be fine. And we will give you a definite time then.

B: Thank you so much, Henry.

K: And I will certainly see you and I will do my best for the President to see you if only briefly.

B: Oh, you're very kind.

K: Now, I don't care whether it's made public whether I see you or not. I would propose -- I personally have no great need to do it. We can just say you came in and I saw you and say nothing else. But it's up to you.

B: Henry, I have a -- myself, I do not want to posture -- at least, speaking for myself, I do not want to posture getting any publicity so I can't speak for the others but --

K: My recommendation, Derta, is that we say you came in. You know, again, your public view is known and I'm not saying this to keep citizens from coming in and you can, of course, say anything you want on your own.

B: Sure.

K: I think we could talk more humanly and perhaps more understandably to each other if we didn't have to worry that the remarks would be repeated.

B: Henry, that certainly is the way I feel and if the rest of the group doesn't feel that way --

K: Well, I will see you anyway.

The President's Office of the Vice President
for Academic Affairs

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L.V.

NASA Date: 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger

2:10 p.m., May 11, 1972

Because I want to communicate. I don't want to strike public poses or placate students or anything of that kind. I'm totally in agreement with you.

I feel very strongly, Derek, that whatever happens now and since, after all, this Administration may stay in office.

Yes.

It's essential that your main academic people remain in some sort of touch with us.

Yes.

And I would certainly do anything I can to maintain that contact.

Yes.

Or if we could have a really serious discussion, I'll be as frank with you as I possibly can be.

Sure.

You can all announce you were here.

Yes.

And, of course, you are in no sense inhibited to make an independent statement afterwards of whatever you feel. The only thing I don't want to have is to be rebutted in anything I may have said.

I personally feel exactly that way. If I detect any sentiments to the contrary in the group, I will let you know and you can make any arrangements including declining meeting --

No, I'll meet you then anyway but --

Not in any --

I'll meet you anyway. I just want to know the ground rules, Derek.

Sure. I will make sure that those are understood and communicated to you and I very much hope that they are the ones that you suggest.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E102568
By CHNARA Date StatoL

TELCON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

5:00 p.m., May 11, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol.

D: First of all, thank you very much for very nice photo.

K: They really came out very well, didn't they?

D: I really like them. It's a very nice background and of course (action pictures) are rather nice.

K: I really think they are some of the best pictures that he has taken.

D: I agree with you completely. You didn't send me at least your signature just for my own but next time. You needn't write an inscription but simply --

K: No, no; I will do it on Monday when we meet. Will you bring one of them along and I will -- or bring all of them along.

D: Okay.

K: All I wanted to do is really minor is to officially confirm on behalf of the President what I told you about our actions.

D: Oh, I see. Fine. The three bodies you mentioned.

K: Yeah, the three points.

D: Three points. And really during this meeting if --

K: I will give you on Monday certain limitations we will observe during the meeting.

D: Well, this is a point too.

K: We are working those out and the only reason I didn't give them to you today --

D: I understand. But as a hint I --

K: But you can tell your leaders that on Monday I will inform you of certain limitations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FOLIO
By CHNARA Date StLOT

TELCONE

5:00 p.m., May 11, 1972

2

D: It's not only on this sheet but --

K: No, no; I understand. I understand fully and that is our intention.

D: Okay. And then I look in the communique, you mentioned about invitation to leaders who I interpret as the three top men in my government. I mean, for them.

K: Yes, but --

D: You say there is a limitation. I am just reading from your text. You said about --

K: Yes. You can interpret it but it doesn't -- Let me put it this way, Anatol, we are happy to have it interpreted this way but if Mr. Brezhnev would prefer to come alone --

D: No, no; I understand. Two other men are mentioned too.

K: You can put it in whichever way you think it would be best received.

D: Okay.

K: We will be delighted to receive all three of them.

D: Okay.

K: But if the other solution is better, that's also fine.

D: Okay. So unless there is something else, until Monday then.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Right.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

HONOLULU, FEBRUARY 14, 1969
BY PRESIDENT
RECEIVED

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

President/Kissinger

8:40 a.m. - 5/12/72

By: KVL WASH. D.C. 5/12/74

K: Hello.

P: You're going to do the Republican senators?

K: Yes, but I've just been told that they couldn't work out enough of a group so apparently it's been cancelled.

P: Oh, I see. What was the matter - they didn't want to come or it's Friday?

K: I guess it's Friday, Mr. President.

P: That's my guess.

K: I had it on my calendar for a...

P: That's all right. You'll see them another time.

K: But I'm going to see Howard K. Smith. I have him on the list today.

P: Fine.

K: Oh, on the military situation, the attack on An Loc is again very massive. They put in 8,000 rounds of artillery yesterday which was about 600 to 700 tons. We put all our B-52 strikes in there but they've just completed so we don't have a report how effective they were. But apparently they weren't effective enough to stop the artillery. But the casualties have to be very heavy. The VC claims they have taken half of An Loc. We called out there and MACV claims they haven't; MACV has often been right where our military has been wrong.

P: That's right.

K: But I am having them check it right this minute. I haven't got the report back. And in the rest of the area it's quiet. The attack on Kontum hasn't developed yet. There are ______ ahead which is about 25 miles northwest of Kontum which has been under attack for four days and where they broke off the contact - the other side broke off the contact so we went out and found over 300 bodies that had been killed by air strikes. At this rate of casualties it's just hard to see how they can keep it up. It's also interesting that the

U.S. Air Force
U.S. Navy
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Army
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Navy
U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Army

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLW
NASA Date: 5/12/04

K: (con't) attack on Kontum hasn't come yet and now we are getting into the rainy season up there - another two weeks. It is hard to see how even if they do attack Kontum they can do anything with it.

P: What about Hue?

K: In the Hue area there isn't much going on. They are still pushing supplies. The bombing up north apparently is going very well. They've got these new bombs with PB type guidance and they knocked down another two stands on that big bridge across the Red River and they claimed to have knocked out two bridges that go off into China further up and they are thereby trapping the rolling stock in between. They hit the Haiphong POL last night. There's no damage report yet, but they're staying well clear of the ports.

P: That's all done.

K: That's all done. . . . by positive orders by just telling them what they could hit.

P: That's the way to do it. Actually that's what we ought to be hitting now anyway.

K: That's right. There's no sense hitting ports in any event - no ships are moving out and in. China has issued a statement now which is milder than the Soviet statement and which . . . . . . . rear area of course . . . . we bombed that . . . . be a very great comfort. I mean that's what they always say - they escalate their statement.

P: Right.

K: Nothing from the Soviets, but one doesn't expect anything. What's so revolting is if the Soviets don't cancel the summit it won't be the fault of our commentators.

P: Is that right?

K: Oh, God, they're all drooling on saying there is no proof yet that the summit will go on, that the Soviets are just in a holding pattern and in effect almost challenging the Soviets to do something.

P: Hoping that they will, aren't they?

K: Of course.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

3

By: KVL, NASA, Date: 5/13/04

P: Well, you know what matters is first that they do the commentaries and set it up and we're prepared for it. If they don't they're going to look pretty bad, aren't they?

K: Exactly.

P: Isn't that what matters?

K: I think it's slightly better than 50-50 now that they won't.

P: Yes.

K: And in fact with every passing day it's more probable that they won't.

P: Well, we have to remember that it poses awfully serious problems for them to cancel it at this point.

K: Not just immediate problems, but also long-term problems. If they cancel this it will take them 18 months under the best conditions to get back to this position.

P: With us?

K: With us, yes.

P: If they cancel this they're gambling on somebody else winning the election. And that's a helluva tough gamble right now because they know that we're going to put it to them. If they cancel, then they know we are then going to play it much harder militarily with the Vietnamese too.

K: Right. I don't believe they'll cancel, Mr. President, for the reasons I gave you yesterday. If they were going to cancel this was the week to do it. There's almost no percentage in it for them to cancel it next week.

P: How did that picture with that Minister confuse the TV...

K: That also... that he and you discussed the pronunciation of the word friendship.

P: Yes.

K: And they all said that of course no Soviet Minister would do this unless he was under instructions and there they are right.

Re: should the US enter into a mutual defense treaty?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

4

By: KVL NASA Date: 5/13/04

P: But the commentaries are really having a time, aren't they?

K: Oh, God, aren't they. They're dying.

P: They're trying to knock it down. Well, so much for that.

K: That will make it look better next week, if it works out.

P: Right and if it doesn't we're prepared. You know what I mean.

K: Right. You made this decision with the high probability that it would be cancelled.

P: 80%.

K: That's right. I'd put it even higher - I thought it'd be 90.

P: We didn't give it any more than that.

K: No.

P: But in any event the important thing now is to keep that on our heart line and just remember reassure people around here about this. One thing Henry you've got to pound in is that we have a lot of support for this. That's the thing the TV people and so forth have got to. . . I've got to give Haldeman a call on that. but

K: Absolutely - they are absolutely embittered when you talk to rational people you find an enormous amount of support. They're all proud of what you've done. It's best you know when you go into the Georgetown salon, but if they weren't against this they'd be against something else.

P: Listen, next October I don't care if we pull this off and have the summit with the Soviets or anything else, they are going to be violently against us. They are a breed.

K: Exactly.

P: Another thing they realize that if we win they're going to be wiped out - totally wiped out.

K: That's another thing.

Re: [insert telephone number]

is the best way to get around the world.

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

5

P: Don't you think they feel that?

K: Deep down they know it. That's why now Joe Kraft is on a new kick. He says in effect that we are selling out in Vietnam.

P: Oh no. How?

K: Well, that our peace terms were in effect a bugout and if we did want to do that why didn't we do it earlier.

P: Oh my God, isn't that amazing!

K: SO . . . . beating us over the head.

P: We offered it in May of course, but nevertheless.

K: Of course we offered it in May last year. It's a lousy wicket. But they are positioning themselves for the fact that it might work.

P: Well, that's their problem. Just take a very hard and confident with these people and that's the only thing to do. I certainly feel that on the Soviet thing - I've been reflecting on it some - I'm not all that hot for it because I really feel that if they go the other way our options aren't that bad either.

K: I was going to say it's a mixed bag to go around with all these toasts to Soviet-American friendship.

P: That's right. That's right. And after all we've been talking about the Communist army, do you know what I mean?

K: Exactly.

P: Well, anyway you and I know there are reasons why it's the better bag in a sense, but on the other hand it's a mixed bag from the standpoint of what we've been doing here. And if the Soviets cancel we will turn on them hard too. Don't you agree?

K: Absolutely. Totally.

P: If we turn on them hard and then turn on them as/supporter aggressors that use the god damn tough [MSS] language with them.

K: Absolutely and we have that well positioned if we want to do it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Follett
By: CHNARA Date: April

TELECON

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol.

D: What was the result of yesterday's game?

K: Oh, New York lost 3-0.

D: Were you there?

K: Yeah, I went there.

D: So you didn't really support them very much. I watched you on the television.

K: Was I on television?

D: Of course, you were. And you were sitting rather passively without running out and so on. Usually, the fans jump out and show their emotions. But even on the game, you don't want to show any emotions.

K: Well, not at the game -- afterwards.

D: Well, I think during the game radio fans show their emotions.

K: Well, I really didn't have a team; I was vaguely for New York but not wildly so.

D: Oh, if was vaguely, then I understand. So you were just looking for the winner.

K: Besides, my team was losing, so there wasn't much occasion to show emotion.

D: So, you are looking for winners is my impression.

K: Yeah, well, it's always better to win than to lose.

D: Yes, exactly. Well, Henry, I received this telegram from Moscow. Very shortly we will give you some drafts of papers, so to speak, on certain question of Summit.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By CHINA DATE Statement

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

- 2 -

K: Like what?

D: I don't have it here yet. I would like you to know today or Saturday; otherwise, you will go somewhere very far.

K: Are they substantive or technical?

D: No, I think they are on substance.

K: On substance.

D: It says here in the telegram to tell you that what we will send draft on certain questions or problems. Problems which are really on agenda.

K: Oh, I see, okay. Good.

D: This is the point. The only thing I would like you to know -- one additional point, we would like and expect that you will not really use it as a publicity stunt. Just in a serious way for preparation for the Summit.

K: Use what as a publicity stunt.

D: Well, the very fact that I will give you some drafts and so on.

K: Yeah, but, Anatoliy, I have never discussed anything you discuss with me.

D: No, no, no -- I know but this really is from Moscow. It does not come from me. You understand what I mean.

K: You can be absolutely sure, Anatol, I don't think anybody even knows...

D: You see, this was sent straight to me. I do understand that, but...

K: I have told nobody that we have had a response from Brezhnev.

D: I think that this is a point.

K: Because I then have to explain, if there is a response, whether ... that it isn't strong or it is strong.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2588
By L.B. MARRA Date 05/12/72

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

D: Sometimes the White House has __________

K: But, Anatol, in our relationship I have never made the slightest leak.

D: Agreed. This is really what I am telling because they sent it to me from Moscow.

K: You tell your people in Moscow that anything that comes through your channel we need no special admonition on. We have never ... there will never be the slightest hint that something is coming. In fact, no one even knows what I get or that I get anything.

D: I understand. But I am telling you what they asked me to tell. I don't need any specific assurances but they asked me to do so. They want me to do it, so I'm telling you.

K: All right. You give them the assurance, but you tell them it was an unnecessary admonition.

D: No, no. I did what I was told, but they would like me just to mention that this is coming; it's not yet come here, but I want you to know before hand. They don't say anything about the document itself, on this they absolutely do not worry, but the general effect ...

K: Look how we handled the SALT announcement. You would have thought there was practically nothing going on.

D: Henry, I repeat it's not --

K: All right, I understand. At any rate, neither the fact of the communication nor the contents will be revealed to anybody except the President.

D: Yes, this is it ... the effect of the communication not the substance because on this they are sure from Moscow definitely.

K: Yeah, but they can also be sure about the facts.

D: Okay. I will mention ...... I have your assurances. I do not need myself but --

K: You give them immediate assurances and tell them that no communication through your channel is ever revealed to anybody.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012587
By: CNARA Date 05/01/87

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

D: Okay, Henry. Will you be tomorrow or day after tomorrow just for me where I could reach you?

K: I'll be here in Washington.

D: In Washington. You won't go anywhere?

K: No.

D: Through your telephone.

K: But you can reach me through my telephone anyway even if I were away but I will be here.

D: Within the Washington area.

K: In Washington itself.

D: Itself, fine.

K: But that message will come today, won't it?

D: Maybe today, maybe tomorrow. They didn't say -- they used a Russian word which could be translated either today or tomorrow.

K: Right.

D: This is so confusing .... it could be today or tomorrow.

K: Yeah. And what it is is concerning some substantive or other aspects of the summit?

D: Yes. This is only on our drafts on certain problems . . . summit.

K: Oh, fine, good.

D: You understand that your message in general. (laughter)

K: Oh, Anatol, I'm not totally stupid.

D: No, you are not. This is a well-known fact not only to me it was long ago known but I speak about the general public.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101258-
By CNAR Date 5/1/68

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

- 5 -

K: Two other things, Anatol, the first is we are -- this is a minor thing -- you remember we talked about press announcements of the various agreements?

D: Yes.

K: I gave you that schedule yesterday.

D: Yes. I already sent it to Moscow.

K: No, no; fine. I just want you to know what I forgot to tell you yesterday. We agreed to joint briefings.

D: Oh, to the joint briefings. Yes, I will put this on.

K: So that we could do it jointly and the way we do it, except for the very important ones, --

D: Yes.

K: Ziegler would brief on our side and whoever on your side --

D: I don't know yet.

K: But at any rate, the way we should do that, Anatol, is for you and me to get together.

D: Okay.

K: And we will then agree. Ziegler will say exactly what we tell him.

D: Okay, I understand.

K: So you and I can work it out and there will be no problem.

D: Okay.

K: On SALT and on the final principles, I would do the briefing.

D: Okay. I think it is most important.

K: Those two, on the principles and on the communique and on SALT, I will do the briefing.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: CHARA Date: Stator

TELCORN

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

D: So I will say either Ziegler or you on most important items.

K: Right. And in any event, if it's Ziegler, you and I will work out ahead of time what he will say. He never deviates from it.

D: Okay.

K: Now one more thing, Anatol, on this. We are thinking now very seriously of a public statement on Monday.

D: On What?

K: On the German thing.

D: Oh, I think it's --

K: That will have the maximum effect.

D: Oh, I think it's very ____. Could I send this or are you just thinking? Better not to make disappointment. Sorry I really ask you blunt question. If you are really so, I will send them but if you change your mind --

K: Let me say, you know, if there is no, which I don't anticipate, no stop aggravation of this situation.

D: Oh, I don't think -- I think for our part could say this, whether you do or not. Don't you think so?

K: What?

D: About whether it will be an aggravation or not.

K: What do you mean we can say?

D: No, I think we could judge -- I think you and me could fairly say whether there would be aggravation or will not be before Monday.

K: Yeah. My impression is there will not be.

D: You mean about [Israel] and Bonn?

K: No, no; I mean in the overall world situation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Foi28F
By: CNARA Date: 6/1/87

TELCOM

11:15 a.m., May 12, 1972

D: Oh, well, this is what I think is my impression. ... So if your impression is the same, so I think we are on the same ground.

K: Right. So I just wanted to tell you that. In that framework I think you are pretty safe in assuming it.

D: Yeah. It would be White House statement?

K: A White House statement.

D: A special statement?

K: Well, we've planned it in answer to a question.

D: Okay, an answer to a question.

K: And I will work that out and give it to you Monday morning.

D: Okay. I think it's fair enough and good enough.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, I'll be in touch with you. Please don't go too far.

K: No, I'll be here.

D: (laughter)

K: Anatol, how can you and I be separated?

D: No, no, no. This is my impression too; it's unbelievable.

K: You and I, when this thing is over, we are going to have one purely social evening with not one word of business.

D: Okay, I'll get prepared.

K: We have earned it.

D: You see, only one of your respectable newspaper men after you -- when you come back here. You remember on this ________ when we worked together. After this, on those ________.

K: Oh, yes.