Sonnenfeldt

General Comment.

I miss in this speech a clearer definition of what our inter-
national goals are. There is mention of "design" "progress" "respon-
sibility", etc; there is a discussion (p 33 et seq) of the coming
agenda. But the broad terms are not refined and the agenda is not
put into a context. My feeling is we need a page or so that says
that we are trying to help shape a world in which power (meaning
the gorwing power of the USSR and later on of China) is balanced
so that it will be exercised with restraint; that our alliances
are intended to protect our security in the face of the power of
others but also to help balance those others (since we cannot expect
to do so alone in all respects). We have an interest in strength,
stability and material well-being in other parts of the world both
because these things fullfill people's aspirations and because
wihtout them the areas affected become arenas for power competition
that affects our own security. Something like that: we have to show
that we have a concept of an international system pertinent to the
next 25 years.

Second, I miss, as I do in most of our speeches, a clearer
relationship to the American experience. I don't think general
references to the American tradition are enough; and references only
to experience in the 20s and 30s don't give enough historical
depth, especially in a bicentennial setting. The debate-- unresolved --
about America's role in the world goes back at least to 1900, as
do the paradoxes referred to in the speech. The fact is that the
35-40 years since the quarantine speech are abnormal years in
American history. Our involvements, commitments and definitions of
interests all run against the sweep of American history. They
were accomplished by an unusual political coalition which submerged
the basic debate, which has now re-emerged: is it right and proper
for a country that began as a safe haven from the world to play
an "imperial" role?

Third, for a speech to the ASNE, I miss any explicit effort to
deal with the problem of the press. If we need consensus and comity
don't we also have to include the press. And is not the special
problem that under our system the press cannot be enlisted in a
consensus by government but by its own impulses and discipline. Must
the press always and only be "anti-government"? Given what the
speech rightly says about our being a single actor in international
affairs -- since that is how others see us -- can public debate
on international affairs be conducted on the same groundrules as
debate on domestic affairs? Are the standards of the First Amendment --
whereby the effects of press irresponsibility are outweighed by
the values of freedom -- equally applicable to foreign affairs?

4/13/75

Draft IV

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER
TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS

WASHINGTON, D. C. - April 17, 1975

America is being tested.

We meet at a moment of severe trial.

Our response as a people will shape the kind of
world we leave to our children.

A nation faced with setbacks has a number of
choices.

It can paint apocalyptic visions and sink into
gloomy resignation.

It can wallow in recrimination, looking for scape-
goats rather than lessons.

It can try to ignore or sugar-coat its difficulties
and fatuously proceed as if nothing had really changed.

Or it can examine its situation dispassionately,
draw appropriate conclusions, and chart its future with
realism and hope. Only in this manner can it turn
difficulty into opportunity.

- 2 -

A week ago President Ford chose this latter course.

He called upon Congress and the American people to turn
this moment of malaise into a demonstration of spirit --
to prove once again our resilience and our vision, and
to put these into the service of building a better world.

Let me state succinctly at the outset the burden

of my message:

-- The United States has suffered setbacks
and faces serious problems in foreign policy.

-- It is idle and dangerous to ignore this reality.

-- For all of the post-war period our struggle has
been the main factor in preserving the peace;
our leadership has been essential to promote progress.

-- If either falters our security and our prosperity
will be in great danger.

-- At this moment other nations are watching closely
our reaction to crisis; they will base their
policies on their judgments of our reliability
and resolve.

- 3 -

-- The President and the Administration are
determined to meet this challenge and confident
of doing so.

-- We have strong assets -- a sound design for
our international role, major achievements in
recent years, a powerful country and the
enormous capacities of this nation.

-- Our deepest problem is not abroad but the
erosion of our domestic foundation through years
of turmoil and bitterness.

-- So our essential challenge is to restore unity
and confidence and authority at home.

-- If we do not, we will see a period of great
upheaval and danger. If we do, we have the
opportunity for great creativity and accomplishment.

- 4 -

The International Context

The way to overcome our present trial is first
to recognize that they exist.

We should not despair over our current difficulties,
but neither should we gloss them over. We must face up
to the basic reality that events in Indochina, in
Portugal and the Middle East have had a serious impact.

A great nation undertook a major enterprise for
almost fifteen years. We invested enormous prestige;
tens of thousands died and many more were wounded,
imprisioned and lost; we spent over 150 billion dollars;
and our domestic fabric was severely torn.

This is not to say that it was all in vain or
without redemption for the sacrifices made. But when
such an effort nears failure, when a great nation
debates its exit as we are doing, it is an event of
profound significance. We cannot dismiss the ramifications
for our posture in the world.

- 5 -

Every day reports are coming in from our embassies all over the world, relaying disquieted questions from our friends abroad. What do events in Indochina and elsewhere signify for the America's competence -- constancy -- credibility -- coherence? How will Americans react at a time of travail? What are the implications for America's policies?

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing to serious consequences makes for a self-fulfilling prophecy; that if we would only keep silent, there would be no problem. To say that those who predict consequences are responsible for them shuts off rational debate -- and in our present situation will make the consequences inevitable. Such an attitude ignores the elementary fact that other nations judge us by our actions, not our rhetoric. It implies that we can manufacture credibility. It suggests that we can

- 5 -

- 6 -

achieve our aims through proclamations rather than
exertion.

To offer bromides to the American people now would
only compound our problems. Precisely because -- for
whatever reason -- we have drawn down our credits of
steadiness and coherence we must now shed illusions.
Precisely because we have used up some fat in our
resources and our reputation we must fac facts as they
are.

This is not to state an extreme domino theory,
with adversaries inexorably extending their reach and
friend after friend mechanically toppling over. This
simplistic version discredits the more real -- if
gradual and preventable -- dangers that arise when a
great power's resolve and reliability or even internal
stability are called into question. Those who gear
their policies to ours -- either to rely on our

- 7 -

fidelity, or to hinder our purposes -- are making
crucial decisions of their own which affect their
course of action and their domestic stability.

This is a fact, not a theory. It does not spring
from our rhetoric. Nor will it go away because we
choose to ignore it. Nothing will disquiet other
nations more than a pretense of business as usual.

## Indochina

Let us start with the current headlines.

The President fully understood the national mood
when he requested military as well as humanitarian assistance
for South Vietnam. He knows the American people are under-
standably tired of a conflict that has already cost us
so much.

But a President is responsible not only to the
mood of the moment but to the judgment of history.
It is the President's responsibility to tell the people

- 8 -

what he believes is right, not what is necessarily
popular.

We are concerned about what we think of ourselves
not just at a moment of passion and confusion but in
the decades ahead. When we look back on this period
will we understand why at the time of their greatest
need we failed to help people with food and ammunition
who relied on us and who are now the victims of cruel
aggression?

We believe this assistance is the minimum America
can do in present circumstances. And we believe that,
whatever the outcome, the fact that American leaders
requested it is also of fundamental importance -- in
the eyes of America, the world and history.

The Administration has made its case. We will abide
by the verdict -- without recrimination or vindictiveness.

- 9 -

It is vital that all Americans do so. For one of
the greatest casualties of Vietnam has been the
civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years
debate has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the
issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have
been called into question. Not only policy but character
has been attacked. What began as overwhelming national
consensus progressively deteriorated into vicious,
poisonous contention. And disturbing traces remain.
As fateful events in Indochina once more dominate the
news, dormant passions threaten once more to erupt.

This type of debate must be put behind us. Civil
discourse is a two-way street: leaders in Government
and others allied with them have at times abused their
position and demonstrated excesses of conduct and words.
But equally foreign policy in a democracy cannot be
conducted when leaders are continuously vilified, when

- 10 -

trust is systematically undermined, when all symbols
of authority are continuously derided. In the end
the whole nation suffers.

It is time for restraint and compassion. The
time has come to concern ourselves not with who has
been responsible for our experience in Indochina but
who -- and how -- we will be responsible for our
foreign policy *after* Indochina.

This country can -- and this country will -- shape
its destiny. This country can and will play a major
role in world affairs. We have the basic resources
to continue to be the major force for stability and
humaneness in the world. This Administration is
determined to turn our difficulties into the beginning
of a new period of creativity.

The Over All Design.

As we look toward the future we start with a sound
structure in our foreign policy -- if we can sustain it

-11-

here at home. And we have the raw materials for continued
progress -- if we exhibit purpose and resolve.

It should not be forgotten that the central thrust
of our foreign policy has been to adjust our conceptions,
our methods, and our commitments to the conditions of
a new era -- including an American already fatigued by
Indochina.

We were convinced that a continuing, strong American
role was indispensable to global stability and progress.
But we knew as well that this required tailoring our role
to new realities abroad and a new mood at home.

The postwar order of international relations ended
with the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the
passage of that era, but the cumulative change by the end
of the 1960's was profound-- both in the condition of
the world and the attitude of the American people. We

- 12 -

needed fresh concepts and policies to help shape a
new design:

-- Our allies in Europe and Japan had regained their economic vitality, social cohesion and political self-assurance. We needed to forge with them more balanced and dynamic coalitions.

-- The Communist world, which we had perceived as a monolithic bloc, had fractured into competing centers of power and doctrine. New relationships based on restraint and negotiation became more promising.

-- A rough balance in strategic weaponry had developed, changing both defense doctrines and the context of diplomacy. Arms control and strong defense were inseparable elements of our national security.

-- Across the globe nations were gaining identity and self-confidence. They were able to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and well-being.

- 13 -

But they needed our steady assistance to make the transition.

These policies were designed to elicit from the American people and Congress -- weary from two decades of global enterprise and domestic turmoil -- support for the continuing world responsibility of the United States without which the peace of the world and our own security cannot be maintained.

It is worth recalling how far we have come.

Our major alliances with the Atlantic world and Japan remain firm anchors of security and prosperity. They are now a solid basis for close cooperation on a range of unprecedented new problems.

We have launched a hopeful new dialogue with Latin America and moved toward resolving long-standing issues.

We have taken historic steps to stabilize and improve our relations with our major Communist adversaries.

- 14 -

We have reduced tensions, deepened dialogue, and pro-
duced some major agreements.

We have begun to bring under control the race in
strategic armaments which threatens a global catastrophe.

Ours has been a key role of leadership in helping
to ease long-standing political conflicts such as Berlin
and the Middle East.

Ad we have taken the major initiatives to mobilize
an international response to new global challenges such
as energy, food, and the vast reaches of the oceans.

In all these areas the American role has been
crucial. The design still stands, our responsibilities
remain. But we must now pursue them in more sober circum-
stances.

We will meet these challenges. We will dispel any
doubts. But we can only do so as a united people.

What is being tested is the mettle of our people and
our institutions. Setbacks are bound to occur in a

- 15 -

world which no nation alone can dominate or control.

We must face one overwhelming fact: most of our
travails are of our own making. They can be traced
not so much to the actions of foreigners as to the
slackening of our own unity and self-confidence after
a convulsive decade. But this very fact gives us
reason for hope. If the causes are within ourselves,
then so are the remedies.

## The Domestic Dimension

The American people expect their government to
conduct foreign policy effectively, to achieve national
goals. For this, government needs boldness, direction,
nuance. It must have a sense of the future that
cannot be proved when it is developed; a sense of
proportion that depends on intangibles. And thus foreign
policy requires above all a sense of partnership and

- 16 -

confidence between the public and the government and
between the Executive and the Legislative.

We must fact the fact that our deepest problem is
a crisis of confidence -- the causes of which are
deep-seated. Some afflict democracies everywhere;
some are unique to America's tradition and recent
history.

We face the problem of modern government, besieged
by social, economic, and political challenges that cut
across national boundaries and lie at the margin of
governments' ability to control. The process by which
political leaders reach office too often does not
prepare them for the scope of the challenges with
which they must grapple. Management of bureaucracy
consumes their energies and turns issues of public
policy into issues of institutional bargaining. Instant

- 17 -

communications force the pace of events and expectations.

Issues are so complex that a premium is placed on a
simplification that approaches demagoguery. Persuasion --
the essential method of democracy -- becomes extraordinarily
difficult in an era that is without simplicity and
without certainty.

The result is a disaffection that simultaneously
debunks government and drains it of the very public
confidence that it requires if it is to act, in a
democracy. In this country we have witnessed the de-
struction of three Presidents in succession; in many
democratic countries we see an almost inexorable ebbing
of confidence in whatever government is in office.
Just when our need for creative leadership is greatest,
the conditions for it are most undermined.

We face as well the problem of a new generation.
The gulf between their historical experience and ours

- 18 -

is enormous. They have been traumatized by Vietnam
as we were by Munich. They derive no lesson from the
tragedies of the previous era and no inspiration from
the great postwar period of American

- 19 -

achievement in foreign affairs. They find little meaning or
incentive for loyalty in an impersonal, technological, bureau-
cratized, materialistic society. To satisfy their frustration,
only iconoclasm is offered. The alienation of the young is a
powerful factor for the demoralization of any society.

This has been compounded by the decline, if not the
demoralization of what has been called "the Establishment."
Following the Second World War, a broad spectrum of
civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen,
clergy, the media, Congressional and national leaders of
both parties -- led American public opinion in a new inter-
nationalist consensus. Taught by the very experience of the
Second World War, the nation understood that we best secured
our domestic tranquility by enlightened participation, indeed
leadership, in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies

- 20 -

was not a price to be paid but a service to be rendered to
international stability and therefore to our self-interest.

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina, only?
leadership opinion turned sharply against many of the inter-
nationalist premises of the postwar period. For years now
we have had drummed into us the view that conflicts are
stimulated by American military equipment given in support
of friends that injustices are perpetuated by American action
or inaction, that suffering is only prolonged by American
steadfastness to allies, that defense spending is a waste, that
American intelligence activities are immoral, that the con-
fidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the American
public, that flexibility is cynical and amoral -- and that
tranquility is somehow to be purchased by America's abandon-
ment of its causes and its friends.

- 21 -

These themes strike a responsive chord in a disillusioned public. And they are all the more persuasive at a time of serious unemployment and inflation at home. But they are indiscriminate and they are dangerously irrelevant in a period of evident and complex dangers abroad.

All of this has produced the complex problem of executive-legislative relations in a new period. In every country, the modern state seems frustratingly remote from the human beings whose lives it affects; in every country, it is challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Accommodation of special groups -- the essence of problem-solving on domestic issues -- robs foreign policy of consistency and focus, which are the essence of national action abroad. Issues become difficult for

- 22 -

legislative oversight to encompass, as they become either more
broad or more technical -- precisely as they become more
important. Governments must make decisions before all
facts are clear, or else they abdicate control over events. Yet
predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided are
never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus have a field-
day and when they become endemic in executive-legislative
relations, reasoned debate is replaced by a series of
confrontations on peripheral issues.

These problems are the malaise of all democratic
societies. In America, it has its own dimension.

We cannot afford domestic disarray perhaps tolerable in
other societies -- because of the global consequences that
inescapably flow from our national policy. For Americans, the
adjustment to a more complex world is inevitably difficult.

- 23 -

We are a people accustomed to triumph, to unlimited horizons.

Our earlier experience taught us that exertions had a terminal
point, that striving was rewarded. We had a soaring idealism,
a faith in law-- rarely tempered by the experience of tragedy
or knowledge of the contingent quality of human ends. We took
our power for granted and attributed our successes to virtue.

We disparaged means. Thus in our foreign involvement we have
oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, between crusading
and retreats into self-doubt.

We are a self-centered nation. In periods of success, we
project ourselves. In periods of difficulty, we attack ourselves.

Let us remember that America's commitment to involvement
in the world has always been problematical. The roots of
isolationism, nourished by geography and history, go deep in

- 24 -

the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in
foreign conflicts, the deep-seated aversion to "power politics"
and balances of power, the notion that weapons are themselves
the causes of conflict, the conception that humanitarian
assistance and participation in the economic order are an
adequate substitute for political engagement -- all these were
familiar characteristics of the American isolationsim of the
'20's and '30's.

And so America today is a paradox. In the nation with
the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in
the world, in the nation that is perhaps the most secure in the
world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals
of civil liberty and pluralist democracy -- we find a deep and
chronic self-doubt. There is a danger of forgetting the lessons
painfully learned at great cost in our own lifetime.

- 25 -

The result is a nation at the height of its powers that
needs to recover its faith in itself.

Will the American people now support a responsible and
active American foreign policy? They can and they will -- if
their leaders, in government and outside of government, give
them a sense that they have something to be proud of and some-
thing important to accomplish.

There is a great reservoir of faith around the world in
this country's values and strength. Equally, there is a great
reservoir of confidence within America in the contribution this
country can and must make to a better world.

This Administration dedicates itself to working in partner-
ship with Congress in a new spirit of commitment to international
affairs in our nation.

- 26 -

Where Do We Go From Here?

Let us learn the right lessons from our present situation.

We no longer have the margin of safety we once had for
disarray or abdication or short-sightedness in the conduct of
foreign policy. In the era of American predominance,
America's simple preferences held great sway. We could over-
whelm our problems with our resources. We had less need to
resort to the traditional style of nations conducting foreign policy
with more modest means -- subtlety, maneuver, patience,
flexibility. Now we must have these qualities -- but in a democracy
they place a very high premium on public understanding and public
confidence.

In the era of our predominance, our constancy was not in
question; now it is. We are still the largest single factor in

- 27 -

international affairs -- but we are one nation among many.

The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our
perseverance, our creativity, and our perceived reliability.

We can no longer afford isolationism in the guise of moralism
-- either in overinvolvement in the affairs of others or in
abject renunciation of our great responsibilities.

We will have to work harder to earn trust and confidence
and we shall.

We must stop the pretense that we can choose between
morality and pragmatism. American cannot be true to itself
unless it stands for humane values and unless it upholds the
dignity of the individual. But to stand for our values we must
be secure. The deepest problem of foreign policy to strike
a balance between these requirements. In 1941 Churchill supported
the Soviet Union whose values he abhored and had fought all his

- 28 -

life against the Nazi invasion. He thought the survival of the
West required it. Similarly we may have to cooperate at times
with governments with whose practices we do not fully agree.

We must recognize that we must maintain both our
security and our values. We must have the wisdom to recognize
that we can achieve neither without the other and neither of them
absolutely. The American people must never forget that our
strength gives force to our principles and hope to all those who
seek safety and peace.

Let us understand the nature of our obligations. Our
most serious commitments arise out of our actions as a nation
over a period of time, not from legal documents even less
from "secret" commitments never invoked seriously by anybody.

Diplomacy ostensibly has an element of confidentiality, to force it
entirely into the open is to destroy all serious exchange, to turn this

- 29 -

into secret commitments is to destroy deliberately the basis of
public confidence. But the Congress and the public must know
and will continue to be fully informed of these exchanges imply-
ing national actions.

We shall in the future carefully scrutinize new commitments.

But we shall scrupulously honor those we make. Let no nation
ever believe again that it can tear up a solemn treaty with the
United States with impunity.

There will be no vacuum of leadership. Our friends will
find our resolve tempered by experience and our adversaries
will find us determined to uphold our principles.

We shall continue our policy of seeking to ease tensions.

But we shall insist on strict reciprocity. We shall not forget
who supported the aims which were used to tear up the Paris
accords. Continuation of such actions will risk all that has been

- 30 -

achieved in the policy of detente.

At this moment, a great responsibility rests upon all

of us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative branches

is the only possible basis for national action. In every country,

their cooperation is a complex problem. It is compounded in

this country by the separation of powers and by the weakening

of traditional patterns of authority within the Congress, occurring

at the same time as the weakening of the authority of the

executive branch.

Let there be no mistake about it: in this country, the
decade-long struggle over alleged executive dominance in
foreign affairs is over. It is last year's issue. The assertion
of Congressional authority is with us; it is the dominant fact

- 31 -

of national politics today -- unchallenged by the Executive Branch.

The question now is whether Congress will block the diplomacy
of the Executive Branch while unable to formulate or carry out
a clear national policy of its own, or whether both branches
will, with some humility, recognize that a spirit of cooperation is
a grave necessity for this nation at this moment in our history.

The Executive Branch will do its part to consult and to
work in partnership. But cooperation must be a two-way street.

Just as the Executive has an obligation to reexamine its
policies, so the Congress should reconsider these 
which have produced our paralysis with respect to events in
Portugal, our loss of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and
have set back our relations with the USSR. The problems we face
are national problems, not those of one Administration. Foreign
policy must have continuity; if it becomes partisan the very

- 32 -

alteration in office of our national parties becomes an element
of instability. If we now exacerbate foreign policy issues by
struggles between us, they will only be inherited by the next
Administration, but under worse conditions.

At home, the American people yearn for an end to the
divisiveness and bitterness of the past decade. They will
look to those leaders who offer them a positive vision of
what America can do, at home and abroad. The American
people believe their government is their own, not the enemy.
They have a President worthy of elementary trust.

When other countries look to the United States, they
see one nation. When they look to Washington they see one
government. They judge us as a unit -- not as a series of
unrelated actions or essentially uncoordinated branches.

- 33 -

When they measure our continuity, our will, our purpose, our
ability to follow through on what we promise, their index is
our performance and not our debates. The country cannot
afford partisan warfare at this moment in our history.

## The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever
complained of a want of opportunity." Neither does a great
nation.

Our resources are vast, our leadership essential, our
opportunities unprecedented and insistent:

> -- The United States provides the core of the great alliances -- with the industrial democracies of the West, with Japan and the other nations of Asia, and with Latin America. These alliances are the anchor of our security, the foundation for détente, and the expression of shared values

- 34 -

and purposes. They require our strength and our stamina.

They will be strengthened.

-- United States' strength is indispensable to the process of reducing conflict and tension in the world. With the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China we are seeking reliable long-term relationships founded on mutual restraint and more positive cooperation. But their relationships with us rest heavily on their estimates of our power and influence on the international scene. Only with a strong national defense can we balance potential adversaries, buttress alliances and thus nourish the processes of detente.

-- The United States is the only country that has the confidence of both sides in many regional conflicts. We have made striking progress in helping the parties of the Middle East move toward peace. The United States is determined to maintain

- 35 -

this momentum on whatever course is most promising. Let
no nation believe that we can be pushed into compromising
vital interests by pressure. But equally let no country gear
its policy to maintaining a stalemate which we believe dangerous
to world peace and contrary to the American national interest.

The United States is by far the world's largest producer
and supplier of food. With foresight and commitment, we can
help the world close the ominous gap between population growth
and food production. We have a moral obligation to do so. And
we have a political interest in tracing a constructive pattern
for other producers of other resources in an interdependent
world.

-- The United States is central to any solution of the
energy problem. We consume one-third of the world's energy,

- 36 -

we are a major producer, and our technology and leadership
are vital. Together with other consumers we have made major
progress on many fronts. Without our own major efforts on
conservation and energy development, however, there is no
hope of success for our collective efforts.

-- The United States has the world's most dynamic economy and the most advanced technology. We must apply these assets to the emerging agenda: reforming the international economy; ensuring that the oceans become areas of cooperation rather than conflict; harnessing technology to the service of mankind while protecting the environment; and reconciling the interests of developed and developing nations with humanity and realism.

These challenges in the coming decades will dwarf today's
disputes. If we act purposefully the events of today can be
seen as the shedding of old illusions to free us for our real

- 37 -

challenges.

An incipient world order is taking form around us. Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role.

But we and our friends must come to terms with ourselves.

We must understand our own interests and act purposefully.

If not, the field will lie open to others -- others not necessarily friendly to us. The result could be a reshaping of the world which takes little account of our values and our interests, and produces great dangers of war.

It is time for America to act without guilt and without self-doubt. It is time for America's leaders, in and out of government, to say what they are for, not what they are against. In the words of Longfellow, it is time to "look not mournfully into the past. Wisely improve the present. Go forth to meet the shadowy future without fear, and with a manly

- 38 -

heart."

In an era of turbulence, uncertainty and conflict, the world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and a vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized for generations man's conquest over nature, so too has America -- with its banner of progress and freedom -- symbolized man's mastery over his own future.

For the better part of two centuries our forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively weak country, met adversity with intense courage and creativity. And in the course of their struggle they built the freest, richest and most powerful nation the world has ever known. As we, their heirs, take America into its third century, as we take up the agenda of the modern world, we are determined to recover the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our history.

- 2 -

of my message:

-- For all of the post-war period our *struggle* has
been the main factor in preserving the peace;
our leadership has been essential *in* progress.

- 7 -

Insult for p. 10

Indochina

- 10 -

The Over All Design.