[Y]

V - 6

desired
their partners' desire for harmony to impose a given course. But if this
happens too frequently, the result is that a dangerous build-up of frustration ⑴
which cannot be smothered indefinitely by
occurs side by side with declarations of friendship. This has been happening in
the Atlantic Alliance.

⑴

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective
when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of conception or of
assessment. It works best in *implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it.
Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the
primary objectives of the Alliance.

instinct,
... implementing a

⑵

In assessing the prospects, it is important to distinguish two types of
consultation: (a) functional consultation which concerns the implementation
of an agreed objective and (b) political consultation which concerns the defini-
tion of the objective or the reconciliation of conflicting interests.

The rationalistic bent of American policy-making and the dominant position while we have enjoyed in the Alliance causes many of our proposals for strengthening NATO to amount to a form of functional consultation. The thrust of these proposals make our Dominance psychologically une acceptable, and try to create a structure which makes it physically impossible for any ally (except

⑶

[Y]

V - 10

American policy has been characterized by a profound ambivalence with
respect to this problem. In the field of strategy we have insisted on a unitary
system of command and control. With respect to East-West relations, the pre-
dominant tendency has been to deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union. For
example, American disarmament schemes have typically been discussed with our NATO
allies only when they were on the verge of being [formally submitted]. Finally,
the United States has enunciated a "grand design" of Atlantic partnership in
which the United States and Europe are to share equally in the burdens of world
responsibility.

This mixture of approaches is self-defeating. The emphasis placed on a
unitary strategic system for the Alliance has reversed the proper priorities. The
real challenge to the consultative process is less in the field of strategy than
in diplomacy. The ability to fight a centrally controlled general war is useful;
but the ability to devise common policies in the face of a whole spectrum of
eventualities is much more important. Most of our allies are less concerned
with nuclear operations than with their influence on diplomacy in peace time or
more permanent [immediate] action during periods of crisis. They consider joint planning the conduct of day-to-day
diplomacy;

[Y]

V - b - 12

But is it really true that adequate resources always produce
a willingness to assume global responsibilities? The American national
experience would seem to contradict this. Through the greatest part of
its history, the United States possessed the resources but not the
inclination to play a global role. Conversely, many European states
maintained overseas interests when their resources were much smaller
than they are today.

For many European countries, the process of decolonization following
two World Wars has been traumatic. These countries have been transformed
from world powers into purely European states. Having shed their
overseas interests, they no longer consider that their security is
directly affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather
than run the risk of nuclear destruction for a conjectural danger, they
prefer to wait until the actual danger materializes. In other words, they
treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United
States treated Europe's quarrels until 1941. Not so committed to the notion
of ideological conflict as the United States, they are more likely to seek
a measure of protection in equilibrium. To many of them, Communist China

v - b - 18

the structure advocated by de Gaulle turned out to be best suited for
flexible Atlantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes
blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum which
cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any structure that reflects the desires of Europeans, it is not easy to discover the specifically American or Atlantic interest behind our passionate commitment to the "twin pillar" concept of Atlantic partnership, as the only possible form of cooperation and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is it really possible or useful to group the countries of Europe on all issues? Is each always inherently closer to its European neighbor than to the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility? The more rigid the structure within Europe, the more complicated will be the problem of American influence.

V - b - 23

to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist world, schisms
are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more
fortunate. Their evolution has been richer; they have forged unity by
drawing strength from diversity. Free from the shackles of a doctrine
of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great
service by demonstrating that if history has a meaning it is up to us
to give it that meaning.