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1 United States is unwilling to stand behind and stand with the
2 men and women who serve their country in combat.

3 Dr. Kissinger: I think that is the crucial lesson of the
4 war. We should not fight a war we are not prepared to win; we
5 should not fight a war unless the Congress assumes
6 responsibility for it together with the executive branch.

7 Chairman Kerry: Mr. Secretary, thank you. I was just
8 reading that debate, and I think that is a really interesting
9 and I think it is a very important point that Senator Brown
10 has made, and worthy of the committee factoring in here. It
11 underscores to me some of the questions that I was raising
12 earlier, and I want to come back a little bit to them and
13 truly hope that we can settle on an understanding here of what
14 may have occurred.

15 As I read the debate, and I was just reading the debate
16 on the particular resolution, all of the talk in the debate is
17 about MIA's. It is all about an accountability for MIA's.

18 What I was raising with you earlier, and what strikes me
19 in this -- and I want to go through a little bit of a sort of
20 sequence to give you an indication and see if you do not agree
21 with me that there is not something in the public perception
22 that happened that may have also shifted our thoughts about
23 this issue.

24 I have tried to draw -- and also let me say to Senator
25 Brown, I think I said at the outset of this hearing, I think

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enhanced query -- and I only say query -- if there had been

something more forthcoming about the beliefs and doubts which

we are now hearing expressed by these higher officials 20

years later. If more people, in a sense, had been debating a

name rather than an abstraction, query -- and I only say

query -- whether that would have made a difference or not. I

do not have the answer to that, and maybe you do not either,

but I think it is a question one has to ask.

There is another document here that is sort of a key
document, but I cannot ask you about it now because we did
promise Senator Kohl if he came back from presiding he could

have a turn.

Dr. Kissinger: And you understand, I really cannot stay
more than 15 minutes longer.

Chairman Kerry: It is Senator Kohl's time and we will

try to fit in what we can. Maybe we could have it on the

record.

Senator Kohl: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
get right to my questions, Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger, we all know what you said about your state
of knowledge with regard to the POW issue in 1973 -- can you

hear me?

Dr. Kissinger: Not very well.

Chairman Kerry: Pull it a little closer.

Senator Kohl: Dr. Kissinger.

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1 commission.

2 Vice Chairman Smith: Right. Well, the key is they are
3 saying that we agreed to it and then pulled away from it.

4 Dr. Kissinger: They knew that all of this was <u>it's</u>
5 <u>called</u> an ad referendum -- that this <u>was</u> something that they were
6 doing to discuss, <u>but</u> then, at a minimum, before we agreed to
7 it, we would have to submit it to the Congress. And there
8 were endless discussions about this.

9 Vice Chairman Smith: Well, the key here is that I still
10 believe that one of the real problems that we face is the
11 result of -- the reason why we are still having problems is I
12 believe the Vietnamese correctly or incorrectly concluded that
13 economic aid was tied directly to the POW issue, even thought
14 that may not have been the intention of the administration. I
15 think that is what they thought.

16 Dr. Kissinger: If General Walters is a good interpreter,
17 they could not have had that view.

18 Vice Chairman Smith: Well, the point is in March and
19 April -- the 28th of March, 25th of March, was when we
20 implemented the final phase of the agreement regarding
21 prisoners, and we had this first meeting on the 15th and this
22 list of things was drafted, that is all. The point I am just
23 trying to make is that we got down to some pretty specific
24 items regarding economic aid. But if you say -- did you say
25 we did or did not agree to it? I did not hear what you said.

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1. be different than looking at it in the contemporary manner.

2. But looking at it today, I do not see any difference between

3. what we were doing before the agreement was implemented and

4. after the agreement was implemented regarding the information

5. we were collecting on Laos. I do not see any demarcation

6. line.

7. Now, let me just quickly reference that. On March 21st,
8. we told the Vietnamese in writing, quote, the withdrawal of
9. U.S. forces will be completed in accordance with the terms of
10. the agreement and coincident with the release of all -- I
11. repeat, all U.S. POW's held throughout Indochina. Withdrawal
12. of U.S. forces will commence after the U.S. has been provided
13. a complete list of all U.S. POW's, including those held by the
14. Pathet Lao, as well as the date, time, and place of release.

15. We already had February 1st lists, which we knew of.

16. Thus, we did not stick to the terms of the March 21st letter
17. because on March 21st we told the Vietnamese we are not going
18. to withdraw until we get a list of all the POW's in Laos.

19. That is what we told them. But we did. And that is my point.

20. What happened, what was different in that week that led the
21. administration to go ahead and implement the agreements and to
22. accept that last -- the last POW's from Vietnam?

23. Dr. Kissinger: Not -- not --

24. Vice Chairman Smith: You mentioned the Congress -- let
25. me have one more point and then I will take your answer.

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1 not going to characterize it. I assume it has something to do

2 with a negotiating strategy, but read on its own without

3 explanation, it might be subject to other interpretation. I

4 wanted to ask you if you want to put it on the record today.

5 Do you have that one there?

6 Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

7 Chairman Kerry: Do I need to read any of it, or do you

8 want to explain it?

9 Dr. Kissinger: No, I know what it says. This was a

10 discussion with President Thieu in August 1972.

11 Chairman Kerry: The document will be put into the

12 record.

13 Dr. Kissinger: You know, in a way, it's not I don't

14 know whether it's very fair to throw this document out when

15 you know I have to leave.

16 Chairman Kerry: I am happy to have you file a written

17 response and we will not make it public until you do.

18 Dr. Kissinger: Well, but --

19 Chairman Kerry: We will not make it public until you do.

20 There is no trapping here, Mr. Secretary. There are a lot of

21 questions, and if I had wanted to make this a big issue I

22 obviously could have read it myself and made something of it.

23 It will not be made public and we will solicit your written

24 explanation.

25 Dr. Kissinger: No, I will answer it now, because it can

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