EX - 33

issues actually in dispute, an attempt is made to find intermediary appli-
cations for the new technology to bring power into harmony with the objectives
for which to contend.

Once the strategic implications of nuclear technology became a fit
subject for discussion in Soviet military journals, the reaction of the
Soviet military, as distinguished from the political leadership, was not
basically different from that of their colleagues in the West. The Soviet
officers simply went through the process about five years after their Western
counterparts in each phase, almost precisely reflecting the time-lag in the
FOR this reason,
development of nuclear technology. Moreover, Soviet military doctrine seems
to have gone only through the first two of the three phases. It has inte-
grated nuclear weapons into its strategic thought; but, after the initial
period of denying that nuclear weapons had brought about a fundamental change
in strategy or tactics, most Soviet discussions have concerned the problems
of all-out war. There has been practically no published discussion of the
military problem of limited war. This is in some respects inconsistent with
the Soviet political strategy of the indirect approach which refuses to risk
everything in a final showdown unless the relation of forces is overwhelmingly
in its favor. In so far as published discussion reflects the actual state
of Soviet military thinking -- and on the basis of the eminence of some
of the authors it probably does -- this gap may offer an element of vulner-
ability and of danger: of vulnerability because it may indicate Soviet diffi-
culties in mastering the strategy and tactics of limited nuclear war and of
danger because it may induce the Soviets to treat the explosion of any
nuclear weapon anywhere as the prelude to all-out war. Unless the Soviets
develop a more balanced approach or unless we succeed in conveying one to
them, 39) an all-out war may therefore be brought on by the failure of one
or both contenders to consider alternatives.

39. See below, chapter X.

X' - 34
EX-

The first phase of the reorganization of Soviet military thought and of the Soviet military establishment started early in 1945. For the first time the Kremlin permitted public discussion of the characteristics of atomic weapons and their potential destructive power. In this manner, the Soviet public in 1945 received the same information which the Western public had learned in 1945 concerning the means by which atomic energy is released, the power of the explosion, the impact on objects in the vicinity of the explosion. 40) An atomic explosion was compared with a volcanic eruption; the mechanism of the atomic and hydrogen bombs was described in the same popular language which had characterized Western articles on this subject a decade previously. Very little was said of the hydrogen bomb; the explosion most frequently mentioned was of the type which had destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 41)

Concurrently with the dissemination of basic data on nuclear matters, military journals began discussing the conduct of military operations under atomic attack, another subject which had hitherto been prohibited and which presumably had not been taken up in detail in the training of troops. 42)

40. **Krasnaya Zvezda**, Spring 1954.

41. The dissemination of information was furthered by the publication of a number of books and pamphlets for popular consumption. Among them were *Atomic Energy and Its Use* by S. Petrovich and D. Didov (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1954); *Atomic Energy and Its Utilization* (I.K. Naumenko, DOSAFF Publishing House, Moscow, 1954); *The Atom and Atomic Energy* by V. A. Mezentsev (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1954). The fact that so many of these books were published either by the military publishing house or by the civil defense organization (DOSAFF) indicates that the regime was slowly dropping the myth that in the U.S.S.R. atomic energy was being used only for peaceful purposes. This was indicated too by a review of a number of these books (appearing in *Novy Mir*, April 1955) which dealt solely with the military aspects of atomic energy, even though the books themselves considered both the military and civil applications.

42. **Krasnaya Zvezda**, January 27, 1955; **Sovietski Flot**, January 5, 1955; **Krasnaya Zvezda**, January 30, 1955; **Krasnaya Zvezda**, February 1, 1955; **Komsomolskaya Pravda**, June 7, 1955. These had such titles as "Radiation Checks and Activities of Troops in a Contaminated Area in Winter," "The protection of Troops against an Atomic Attack," "The Effects of an Atomic Explosion on Populated Areas."

["Atomic Explosion on Prolonged Volumes.", "\"The protection of Troops against Atomic Attack,\" \"The Effectiveness of the Checks and Verifications of Troops in a Conquered Area in Winter.\"", "Konstantinowky Prungs, June 1, 1922. These had been issued to the Air Force on the 1st of December.", "Krasnyev Vlasov, January 30, 1922; Krasnyev Vlasov, December 1, 1922; Krasnyev Vlasov, January 5, 1922; Krasnyev Vlasov, January 2, 1922;", "75.", "pocks themselves configured to fire and claim publications, which are printed solely for the military audience. The audience is provided with the latest news and other information which is of direct interest to the military. The

X' - 35

Most of the articles were extremely factual and dry accounts of means by
which troops could protect themselves against the effects of atomic explosions.
All the authors emphasized that nuclear explosions need not disrupt the normal
functions of an enemy. The major concern seemed to be to integrate atomic
weapons into existing doctrine without modifying any of its basic character-
istics. To be sure, the articles proved that the Soviets had carefully
studied Western military writings on atomic warfare. The official of the
Red Army, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) in a review of a book of Colonel C.
Reinhardt and Lt. Colonel William Kintner <sup>43)</sup> stressed that the book con-
tained "data and arguments which deserve careful attention." <sup>44)</sup> The book
had advocated abandoning the old concept of large mass armies and stressed the
importance of flexible, highly maneuverable units, with a large measure of
initiative on the part of local commanders <sup>44</sup> proposals which were the exact
opposite of prevailing Soviet doctrine. Nebertheless, the main thrust of this
first phase of Soviet military thought seemed to be to validate the tradi-
tional reliance on land warfare: "Soviet military art" wrote a Soviet officer
in an army journal "assumes that the new means of combat, not only do not
reduce, but on the contrary, enhance the part played by the foot-solder and
raises his role to a new level." <sup>45)</sup>

As nuclear technology became more diffused, however, and better understood, the temptations of emphasizing its retaliatory aspect proved irresistible. The West had relied too much on its own nuclear offensive power not to encourage the Soviets to seek to neutralize its opponent's primary weapon by stressing the Soviet capability of retaliation. To apply "massive

43. George C. Reinhardt and William R. Kintner. *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*, Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1953.

44. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 19, 1955.

45. Colonel F. Gavrikov. *Sovietskaya Armia*, July 1, 1954.

IX - 36

became
retaliation" in reverse was therefore an excellent tool of Soviet political
warfare, the best means of paralyzing the opponent through "atomic blackmail."
At the same time, it may represent the real conviction of military leaders
newly come into possession of a fearful weapon and carried away by its
destructive implications. Starting in 1955 the Soviet leadership unleashed
an ever-mounting series of threats of all-out war against its opponents,
differing only in its ponderous Marxist jargon from the most extreme formu-
lation of air strategy in the West. A Soviet radio commentator noted (January
31, 1955) that "according to the most optimistic estimates, . . . it would take
only a few hydrogen bombs to ensure the destruction of Britain's principal
industrial centers and fewer still would be needed to paralyze the vital
centers of France, Belgium and Holland." 46)
Major General Isayev wrote
on March 5, 1955: "Under modern conditions, the United States' ruling circles
have no grounds for the hope . . . that U.S. territory would remain outside mili-
tary retaliation. And as regards the production of hydrogen weapons, the
Soviet Union is well ahead of the United States." 47)
And Mikoyan in his
speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 said: "Future war will be character-
ized by the mass use of the air force, rocket weapons and various means of
mass killings such as atomic, thermo-nuclear, bacteriological and chemical
weapons . . . Nor will the American imperialists be able to hide from these bombs;
they will not be able to hide their factories." 48)

IX-36

In fact, one of the chief concerns of Soviet propaganda has been
to prevent the United States from increasing its freedom of action by a
doctrine of limited nuclear war. Soviet propaganda both domestic and
foreign has therefore endlessly repeated

46.

47.

48. Current Digest,

XIX - 36

[y]

became
retaliation" in reverse was therefore an excellent tool of Soviet political
warfare, the best means of paralyzing the opponent through "atomic blackmail."
At the same time, it may represent the real conviction of military leaders
newly come into possession of a fearful weapon and carried away by its
destructive implications. Starting in 1955 the Soviet leadership unleashed
an ever-mounting series of threats of all-out war against its opponents,
therefore
differing only in its ponderous Marxist jargon from the most extreme formu-
lation of air strategy in the West. A Soviet radio commentator noted (January
31, 1955) that "according to the most optimistic estimates, . . . it would take
only a few hydrogen bombs to ensure the destruction of Britain's principal
industrial centers and fewer still would be needed to paralyze the vital
centers of France, Belgium and Holland." 46)
Major General Isayev wrote
on March 5, 1955: "Under modern conditions, the United States' ruling circles
have no grounds for the hope . . . that U.S. territory would remain outside mili-
tary retaliation. And as regards the production of hydrogen weapons, the
Soviet Union is well ahead of the United States." 47)
And Mikoyan in his
speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 said: "Future war will be character-
ized by the mass use of the air force, rocket weapons and various means of
mass killings such as atomic, thermo-nuclear, bacteriological and chemical
weapons. . . Nor will the American imperialists be able to hide from these bombs;
they will not be able to hide their factories." 48)

In fact, one of the chief concerns of Soviet propaganda seemed to be that
the United States might seek to escape Soviet retaliatory power by a doctrine
of limited nuclear war or, which amounts to the same thing, that the West
might regain freedom of action by seeking to develop doctrine for the less
than all-out application for nuclear weapons. Soviet propaganda both domestic
and foreign has therefore engaged in an incessant repetition of a basic theme:

46.

47.

48. *Current Digest,*

IX - 37

that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war, that any employment of
nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out war. Marshall Zhukov chose
the 20th Party Congress as the forum for warning the West that it could not
escape the consequences of Soviet "massive retaliation": "Recently utterances
of political and military figures in the United States reflect with increased
frequency the idea that U.S. strategy should be based on the utilization of
atomic weapons for operations on battlefields and fronts. In view of the
geographical distance of America these gentlemen attach weight to the fact
that atomic weapons would first be used on European territory, naturally as far
from U.S. industrial centers as possible...However things would not work out
as the crafty strategists planned. Today it is impossible to fight wars and
avoid counterblows..." 49)

IX - 37

But if war depended so importantly on retaliatory power what then had
become of the "constantly operating factors?" What of the vastness of Soviet
territory as a protection, what of the superior morale conferred by a superior
social structure as a guarantee of victory? It was becoming increasingly
clear that the "constantly operating factors" with their reliance on long
term trends implicit in the doctrine of the "constantly operating factors"
might inhibit initiative and produce overconfidence. Such an attitude
might have been acceptable when the U.S.S.R.

49. *Current Digest*, op. cit., p.

IX - 37

But if war depended so importantly on retaliatory power what then had
become of the "constantly operating factors?" What of the vastness of Soviet
territory as a protection, what of the superior morale conferred by a superior
social structure as a guarantee of victory? It was becoming increasingly
clear that the "constantly operating factors" with their reliance on long-term
trends, centralized control and unwieldy mass armies hardly fitted the condi-
tions of nuclear war with its emphasis on quick movement and sudden thrusts.
The rejection of the factor of surprise, the insistence on the inherent in-
feriority of Western military science implicit in the doctrine of the "con-
stantly operating factors" might inhibit initiative which is of crucial
importance in a nuclear war and lead to an underestimation of Western ac-
complishments. Such an attitude might have been acceptable when the U.S.S.R.

49. *Current Digest*, *op. cit.*, p.

40. Current Digest, ob. cit., p. 10.

complishments, such an attitude might have been acceptable when the U.S.B.R. importance in a nuclear war and led to an underestimation of Western security operating factors" might impede initiative which is of crucial importance to Western military science implicit in the doctrine of the "constituency operating factors" with their reformation in a long-term social structure as a guarantee of victory. It was becoming increasingly territory as a protection, what of the匯ator more secure configuration, whether become of the "constantly operating factors?" What of the assumption of Soviet but it was debased so importantly on retaliatory power, what was said about the atomic weapons..."

Today it is impossible to suppose and from U.S. industrial centers as possible...However things would not work out that atomic weapons would that be used on European territory, naturally for geographical distance of America these gentlemen attach weight to the fact that nuclear weapons for operations on battlefields and fronts. In view of the frequency the ideas that U.S. strategy should be based on the utilization of political and military figures in the United States reflect with increased escape the consequences of Soviet "massive retaliation": "Recently, uncertainties the Soviet Party Congress as the form for warning the West that it could not nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to off-out war." Marshalluskov opine that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war, that any employment of

IX - 31

above all had above all to guard against any admission of weakness; it was not equal to the opportunities and the perils of the age of nuclear plenty. As a result, the "constantly operating factors" have been slowly reinterpreted in two senses: in the direction of a greater recognition of the achievements of Western military science and in the direction of ever-increasing emphasis on the role in war of surprise. The movement was launched by Marshal Sokolovsky, then Soviet Chief of Staff, when he demanded on February 23, 1955 that there be more "creative research and bold study of the most pressing problems of military science." Such a study should take into account above all the increased significance of the surprise factor in view of the existence of a weapon with enormous destructive power" and that it should include "the latest achievement not only in our country, but also abroad." 50)

The most elaborate of the new studies called for by Marshal Sokolovsky came from Marshal of Tanks Romirov, one of the most original Soviet military thinkers.⁵¹) Writing in Red Star, he stated that the "possibility of surprise aggression has increased, not diminished in recent years." Whereas in the past the Soviet Union had nothing to fear from surprise attacks, "it must be frankly admitted that because of the power of atomic and hydrogen weapons, a surprise attack could become a deciding condition for success not only in the initial phases of a war, but even in its final outcome...We cannot regard these events passively; we must not lull our military cadres with outdated theories; we must reveal the increasing danger of surprise attack and likewise improve the military preparedness of our Army, Navy and Air Force."

At the same time, Marshal Romirov attacked two traditional Soviet dogmas which had almost become shibboleths: the reliance on the "constantly

50.

51. Marshal P. Romirov. "For Working Out the Problems of Soviet Military Science Creatively," Krasnaya Zvezda, March 24, 1955.

["Science and Society, 1920, \"The War Correspondent,\" by Walter S. McEwan, 1920.\n21. \"Militia,\" by John R. Stedman, \"The War Correspondent,\" 1920.", "20.", "disease which had spread because of the "coronavirus\nepidemic which had spread during the influenza pandemic.\nAt the same time, the military authorities in the capital issued\nbatteries to improve the military effectiveness of the forces and\ntheories; we must never forget the increasing danger of surprise attacks and the like; these events balefully: we must not fail our military duties with our forces; the initial phase of a war, but even in the later stages... We cannot regard a surprise attack could become a deciding condition for success not only in the military sense, but also in the political sense; we must never forget the increasing danger of surprise attacks and the like; these events balefully; we must not fail our military duties with our forces; the initial phase of a war, but even in the later stages... We cannot regard a surprise attack could become a deciding condition for success not only in the military sense, but also in the political sense; we must never forget the increasing danger of surprise attacks and the like; these events balefully; we must not fail our military duties with our forces; the initial phase of a war, but even in the later stages... We cannot regard", "the most elaborate of the new studies offered for the military. Scientifically come\nfattest achievement not only in our country, but also abroad.\" (20)", "war with enormous destructive power, and that it should include \"the\nincreased significance of the umbrella factor in view of the existence of a\nmilitary science.\" Each a study should take into account also \"the\nmore \"creative research and poor study of the most misleading problems of\nSoviet Chief of Staff\" when he demanded on February 8, 1932 that there be\non the basis of umbrella: The movement was launched by General Sokolov,\nof Western military science and in the direction of ever-increasing umbrella\nin two senses: in the direction of a greater recognition of the achievements\nresult; the \"consistently operating factors\" have been already reinterpreted\nto the umbrella and the basis of the age of un集体brink. We a\nhad spaces for, to guard against any deviation of work; else we not equal", "IX - 38"]

IX - 39

operating factors" and the doctrine drawn from the experience of World War II, that the vastness of Soviet territory conferred immunity from attack. He criticized the military theory which had excited the "constantly operating factors" as purely theoretical considering all the complications that may occur in practice." To be sure, capitalist countries were inferior in the "constantly operating factors," but it was self-delusion to deny that they were not improving their armaments and the morale of their soldiers. Moreover, under conditions of atomic warfare, it was possible for a short war--traditionally favored by a country inferior in social structure and morale--to be more decisive than in the past. As for the importance of space, Romirov was ambivalent. He admitted that the vast expanse of Russia offered advantages over some capitalist countries with smaller territories and a higher density of population. But he insisted that the Soviet Union could no longer permit a repetition of the last war when the major battles were fought on Russian soil and he called for a re-examination of the whole problem of space in Soviet strategy. 52)

It was an inevitable step from emphasizing the importance of surprise and the rejection of defensive war to a doctrine which stressed the importance of transferring operations into enemy territory. This was nothing new in Soviet military thought, for Soviet strategic doctrine, and for that matter political doctrine too, has always exhibited a striking preference for the offensive. Lenin had advised that "it is necessary to strive for daily successes, even if small...in order to retain the moral ascendancy." And Stalin had warned against "a dangerous error called 'loss of tempo...'" 53 It was not until 1942 that the defensive was admitted to be "a normal form of combat" and even then the Field Regulations continued to insist that

52. Similar, and perhaps even more explicit arguments, were used by Lt. General C. Shatilov, "An Important and Noble Theme, "Literary Gazette, May 28, 1955.

53. Both titles in Garthoff, op. cit., p. 139. Lenin, Sochinenia v.2 (1929) p.320; Stalin, Sochinenia, v.6 (1947) p. 159, both quoted in Garthoff, cited p. 139-

["23.", "Best states in Germany, p. 111, p. 112.", "Apr. 28, 1945.", "General, \"Stratification,\" \"An Introduction to Modern Terms,\" \"Fundamental Concepts,\" \"Stratification,\" and \"Stratification in Modern Terms,\" were used in 1945.", "of combat,\" and even then the field relationships considered to exist that\nIt was not until 1945 that the derivative was substituted for the \"basic form\nof combat\" used against \"a dangerous enemy\" (see of tempo...\n\"The derivative, even if small...in order to retain the mental secondness.\" And\noffensive. Then put obtained that \"if it is necessary to strive for daily\npolitical doctrine too,\" he states expedited a striking principle for the\nSoviet military thoughts, for Soviet strategic doctrine, and for this matter\nor formulating operations into enemy territory. This was nothing new in\nand the rejection of derivative war to a doctrine which stressed the importance\nof space in Soviet strategy.\n(25)", "Compared on German soil and he carried for a re-examination of the whole problem\nno further benefit a re-examination of the fact was when the motor vehicles were\nhigher benefit of nomination. But he indicated that the Soviet Union could\nenjoy some advantage with smaller territories and a\nwas imminent. He asserted that the best expense of terminals offered ab-\nbe more decisive gain in the race. As for the importance of these, nomination\ndoes not favor it a community inferior in social structure and morale...to\nunder conditions of atomic war, it was possible for a strong war--staff-\nwere not improving their commerce and the morale of their soldiers. Moreover,\n\"Community operating factors,\" put it was self-contraction to deny that they\noccur in practice.\" To be sure, capitalist countries were inferior in the\n"tagline,\" as purely theoretical considering all the considerations that must\nbe considered a military theory which has excluded the \"community operating\nfactors\" the vastness of Soviet territory combined in itself from attack. He\noperating factors\" and the doctrine drawn from the experience of World War II.", "IX - 30"]

IX - 40

"offensive combat is the fundamental aspect of combat actions by the Red Army."⁵⁵) The new emphasis on seeking to conduct operations outside the territory of metropolitan Russia can therefore hardly be considered a doc-
trinal innovation although it was sharpened by references to the require-
ments of nuclear warfare. An article in _Red Star_ insisted that the Soviet
Armed Forces would be able to deliver an annihilating blow even in a war
fought with atomic and hydrogen weapons. In case of war, Soviet strategy
should seek to transfer military operations into enemy territory in order
as much as possible such a course would else
to spare the Soviet population and to increase the inhibitions of the enemy
who would presumably be more reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in friendly
than in hostile territory. Because of the fact that Soviet forces would
probably have to fight in enemy countries, particular attention should be
paid to their moral quality.⁵⁶) And Marshal Vasilevsky wrote in _Izvestia_:
"In view of the speed of jet-propelled aviation and the existence of wea-
pons of great destructive power, the significance of the factor of weapons of
great destructive power, the significance of the factor of suddenness has
greatly increased...Should a war be unleashed, [the Soviet Union] is ready
to anticipate a surprise attack and to strike before the aggressor can take
advantage of his own preparations for the initial blow."⁵⁷) [Emphasis
added]

Thus Soviet military thought in less than two years had come almost
full cycle. From minimizing the role of nuclear weapons, it had come to
consider them an essential, if not the primary weapon; from deprecating the
role of surprise, it had elevated it almost to a "constantly operating

55. Ibid., p. 67. Boer and Ustarov, Pekhody, v. 1 (1942-1945), p. 8 quoted in Garber, cited, p. 67.
56. Kashirin, P. colonel. "The Importance of Moral Strength of the Army in Contemporary War," May 28, 1955. See also "The Soviet General Staff Takes Stock, - Changes in Soviet Military Doctrine," The World Today, Vol. II, 1955, p. 492ff.

57. *Izvestia*, May 8, 1955.

EX - 41

factors" And it had grown to accept strategic bombing and the possibility of a devastating, short war--all notions that had heretofore been derided or rejected. What then does the new emphasis of the Soviets on nuclear weapons tell us about Soviet strategic thought and what consequences flow from it for the United State?

One of the reasons for the insistance on the new-found retaliatory power is undoubtedly a feeling of exhilaration at having traversed the abyss and emerged unscathed. The Soviet leadership must remember the American atomic monopoly with a feeling of profound humiliation because it must have known, whatever it pretended to the outside world, that it was *subject* to a perhaps catastrophic blow without being able to offer a similar threat in return. And the fact that Soviet doctrine declared our intentions as inherently hostile must have added to Soviet uneasiness. To be sure, the Soviets managed to hide their concern by an iron-nerved tour de force. But the incessant, almost gloating references to the horror that they can now inflict on the United States may reveal an effort to "get even" retroactively for years *what must have seemed* of living on the brink of catastrophe. Orator after orator on the occasion of the 20th Party Congress in 1956 insisted that with the development of hydrogen weapons, it was "no longer" possible to defeat the U.S.S.R. -- a remarkable admission in view of the fact that any reference to the possibility of defeat would have been treated as a treasonable utterance during out atomic monopoly and an indication, perhaps, that the Soviet leadership had a better awareness of the real relationship of forces than its opponents.

Another factor is the usefulness of the present Soviet position for paralyzing the will to resist of its opponents. The more terrible Soviet propaganda can paint the consequences of another war, the more reluctant its opponents will be to resort to it and the impact of Soviet atomic

IX - 42

blackmail has proved none the less effective for their being accomplished in the guise of peace offensives. In fact, it was not until the Soviet nuclear stockpile began to grow, that the Soviet Union derived full benefit from its tenacious campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons. For with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile, the preconceptions created by Peace Councils, "ban the bomb" propaganda and Soviet invocations of the horrors of nuclear war began to serve a dual purpose: the same arguments that had hitherto enjoined self-restraint on the West could not be used to appeal to its fear; the Free World which had been asked to recoil before the devastation it could inflict in a nuclear war could now be made to shrink before the devastation it might suffer. Since 1954 Soviet propaganda has been above all concerned lest we escape our difficulties by a doctrine to mitigate the consequences of nuclear war. Since 1954 Soviet pronouncements have been as insistent that any resort to nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to all-out war as they had been during our atomic monopoly that nuclear weapons were horrible and ineffectual.

Since the Soviet leaders can have few doubts about the consequences of all-out thermo-nuclear war, this may indicate a realization that the greatest vulnerability of the Soviet armed forces is in the area of limited nuclear war. Just as during our atomic monopoly the Kremlin obscured its weakness by a show of bravado, it may now be seeking to inhibit our most effective strategy by declaring it impossible. Or else the repeated rejection of the possibility of limited nuclear war may reflect a certain

limited nuclear war may reflect a certain
declaring it impossible. Or else the rebuffed reflection of the feasibility of
of pravda, it may now be seeking to vindicate our most effective argument, i.e.
that as long as atomic monopoly the Kremlin opined its weakness is a show
uniqueness of the Soviet armed forces if in the area of limited nuclear war.
of all-out thermo-nuclear war, this may indicate a realization that the greatest
since the Soviet leaders can have ten command about the consequences

our atomic monopoly that nuclear weapons were horrible and intellectual.
to nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to all-out war as they had been during
war. Since ILYT Soviet pronouncements have been as insatiate that and recent
encroach our billions of a doctrine to mitigate the consequences of nuclear
warer. Since ILYT Soviet probands has been so far concerned least we
in a nuclear war could now be made to shrink before the devastation it might
wield which had been asked to recoil before the devastation it could multific
self-restraint on the West could not be need so abysmal to its least the free
people to serve a dual purpose: the same arguments that had filtered out of
the pomp probands and Soviet invocations of the horrors of nuclear war
Soviet nuclear stockpile, the consequences created by Peace Connolly, "pen
tenacrine campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons". For with the growth of the
stockpile begun to grow, that the Soviet Union derived until benefit from its
the rise of peace alternatives. In fact, it was not until the Soviet nuclear
blackmail has proved none the less effective for their point accomplished in

H3 - 75

-43

backwardness in Soviet military doctrine. The reliance on the threat of all-out war may indicate that Soviet military thought is still intoxicated with the destructive potential of the new weapons. Some Soviet military literature, although it refers to widely dispersed formations and measures to avoid the contaminating effects of radiation, gives the impression that the Soviet Union may have succumbed to the temptation of adding nuclear weapons to the existing arsenal as a more efficient explosive without the fundamental alteration of tactics which nuclear war requires.

tremendous effect upon the enemy which, without the
weapone to the extirpating effect as a more efficient explosive without the
detoxify the Soviet Union may have accompanied to the extirpation of adding敵
to whom avoid the contaminating effects of radiation, gives the impression
literature, sufficiently wide to widely diatherized formations and measures
with the destructive potential of the new weapons. Some Soviet military
all-out war may indicate that Soviet military thought is still uninfected
pathobacteremia in Soviet military doctrine. The reliance on the threat of

No P

But the use of nuclear weapons simply as a form of artillery, the attempt to maintain a stabilized front and similar tactics derived from the experience of World War II would be both ineffective and extremely costly.

Of course, we cannot gear our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inadequacy. Inevitably the Soviet Armed Forces will realize that nuclear war requires a new order of tactics. Nevertheless, whatever its theoretical insights, the Red Army will be at a decided disadvantage in adapting to the new conditions of warfare. Limited nuclear war, as we have seen, requires decentralized command, because it can only be conducted by relatively small, self-contained units. But Soviet military doctrine prides itself on its centralized control. In World War II, Soviet commanders were permitted only the barest minimum of initiative; their primary task was implementing plans which prescribed not only the general objective---as in American field orders---but the detailed methods for attaining it. Soviet military literature, in fact, prides itself on the "single, monolithic strategic design" of the Soviet High Command. "The deployment of troops," wrote a high-ranking Soviet officer, "can be successfully completed only when a rigid centralized plan ... has been prepared." In World War II, the Soviet insistence on rigid centralization made for great flexibility at the top, but extraordinary rigidity at the lower echelons. And this theory of command has been embodied also in the field regulations of 1946.

Again, in a limited nuclear war initiative is of cardinal importance, because the fluidity of operations makes it impossible to predict all

58. Zlobin, Voennaia Mysl', No. 5 (1945), quoted in Garthoff, cited, p. 212.

IX - 45

contingencies in advance. Soviet military doctrine, however, while paying lip-service to initiative in theory, discourages it in practice. Soviet doctrine distinguishes between two kinds of leadership: the first, inspiring, initiating and directing; the other, implementing and directing according to plan. The former is the task of the Politburo and the High Command, the latter the duty of all other subordinate commanders. Thus the task of subordinate commanders has in practice been limited to what the Soviet Field Regulations describe as "making precise plans of a higher command." Leadership, to be sure, is considered a "constantly operating factor," but it has been defined in terms of "organizing ability" with respect to the orders of higher headquarters.⁵⁹)

As a result, the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II, while often displaying great flexibility strategically, have run to stereotype tactically. Field Regulations prescribe the exact location of company commanders in the rear of his troops; field orders determine not only the direction of the attack, but the precise form it was to take. The sphere of initiative of division commanders could not have been more restricted. "Important decisions," wrote a Soviet war correspondent "that cannot be put off a moment (Emphasis added) must be made by the divisional commander himself."⁶⁰) German accounts commented on the rigidity of Soviet tactics. Divisions were prohibited from crossing the individual boundaries and carried out this order even if it meant the destruction of a neighboring unit before their eyes. Regiments advanced on prescribed lines even into their own artillery fire. To deviate from orders was a court-martial offense if it did not succeed. To carry out even suicidal orders did not involve any stigma. "American lieutenants" wrote General Bradley "were delegated greater authority on the Elbe than were Russian division commanders."⁶¹)

59. Garthoff cited, p. 199.

60. Vassili Grossman, *The Years of War* (Moscow, 1946), p. 418, quoted in Garthoff, cited p. 211.

61. Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Holt and Co., 1951), p. 551.

EX - 45

contingencies in advance. Soviet military doctrine, however, while paying lip-service to initiative in theory, discourages it in practice. Soviet doctrine distinguishes between two kinds of leadership: the first, inspiring, initiating and directing; the other, implementing and directing according to plan. The former is the task of the Politburo and the High Command, the latter the duty of all other subordinate commanders. Thus the task of subordinate commanders has in practice been limited to what the Soviet Field Regulations describe as "making precise plans of a higher command." Leadership, to be sure, is considered a "constantly operating factor," but it has been defined in terms of "organizing ability" with respect to the orders of higher headquarters. 59)

As a result, the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II, while often displaying great flexibility strategically, have run to stereotype tactically. Field Regulations prescribe the exact location of company commanders in the rear of his troops; field orders determine not only the direction of the attack, but the precise form it was to take. The sphere of initiative of division commanders could not have been more restricted. "Important decisions," wrote a Soviet war correspondent "that cannot be put off a moment (Emphasis added) must be made by the divisional commander himself."60) German accounts commented on the rigidity of Soviet tactics. Divisions were prohibited from crossing the individual boundaries and carried out this order even if it meant the destruction of a neighboring unit before their eyes. Regiments advanced on prescribed lines even into their own artillery fire. To deviate from orders was a court-martial offense if it did not succeed. To carry out even suicidal orders did not involve any stigma. "American lieutenants" wrote General Bradley "were delegated greater authority on the Elbe than were Russian division commanders."61)

59. Garthoff, op. cit., p. 199.

60. Ibid., p. 211.

61. Omar N. Bradley. A Soldier's Story. New York: , 1951, p. 551.

b. 227

Ott. Gen. F. Bredy. V. Schier. S. Grom. New York.

CO. 1919, B. SL.

20. Germany, ob. cit., b. 100.

103th.

on the Epe than were German division commanders." (G).

"American prisoners," wrote General Bredy, "were defeated Greater Germany not once, but twice." To carry out even stronger orders they did not involve any risks.

Test fire. To devise from orders was a court-martial offence if it did

their own. Orders advanced on prescribed lines even into their own territory. Regiments advanced on prescribed lines even into their own territory. Orders were prompted from crossing the independent pontificates and carried himself." (G).

Germans accounted for the rigidity of Soviet tactics. "A moment (Embrace added) must be made by the divisional commander."

"Important decisions," wrote a Soviet war correspondent, "first cannot be put of initiative of division commanders, but not have been more restricted, the direction of the attack, put the precise form it was to take." The aspect company commanders in the rear of his troops! Trench orders determine not only the strategy of tactics. Field Regulations prescribe the exact location of II, while often displaying great flexibility strategyarily, leave the order to

as a result, the operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in World War II, higher headquarters.

been defined in terms of "organizing sparsity," with respect to the order of attack, to be sure, is considered a "constantly operating factor," but it has Regulations describe as "making precise plans of a higher command." Leeper originate commanders has in practice been limited to what the Soviet High Command the order of staff other subordinate commanders. Time the task of en- dicting and directing; the other, implementing and directing according to doctrine distinguishes between two kinds of feeders: the first, inabling, and the second, disallowing it in practice. Soviet contingencies in advance.

IX - 42

46

It would therefore seem to the United States' advantage to adopt a strategy which places a premium on initiative and decentralized control. The more decisions Societ commanders can be forced to improvise, the less they will be able to profit from their military tradition. The best means of taking advantage of the lack of initiative of subordinate Soviet commanders is by means of fluid operations; the best strategy for exploiting the rigidity of the Soviet command structure is that of limited nuclear war. An all-out thermo-nuclear war can be carried out according to a centralized plan with target systems, flight plans and attack patterns carefully prepared in advance; this is indeed the only possible way of conducting such a war. A limited conventional war permits the massing of troops which can obscure the rigidity of the command structure. In limited nuclear war, on the other hand, strategy depends on daring and leadership of a higher order — qualities in which both by tradition and training our armed forces are likely to excel those of the U.S.S.R.

Nor will the Soviet High Command be able to escape its dilemma by an act of will. It is one thing to be theoretically aware of the importance of leadership, initiative and decentralized command; it is quite another to bring these qualities about. It has often been noted that the mere possession of a navy does not guarantee success in sea-battles. In the absence of the "feel" for naval warfare produced by a long tradition, even a substantial navy may be doomed to sterility as Germany experienced in World War I and Japan in World War II. The Soviet leaders may have less difficulty in creating the equipment for limited nuclear war than in adapting the psychology of their personnel to its requirements. For nothing in Soviet society encourages initiative, or produces self-reliant action spontaneously.

action abnormally.

For noting in Soviet society encourages initiative, or produces self-reliant
unherent war plan in adapting the bayonet of their personnel to its requirements.

Soviet leaders may have less difficulty in creating the equipment for limited
to stellify as Germany experienced in World War I and then in World War II. The
naval warship produced by a long tradition, even a substantial navy may be deemed
does not guarantee its success in sea-patients. In the span of the "leaf" for
dушifies spout. It has often been noted that the mere possession of a navy
ship, initiative and decentralized command; it is quite another to bring these
out, will. It is one thing to be theoretically aware of the importance of leader-
ship will the Soviet High Command people to achieve its dilemma by an act

U.3.2.R.

both by tradition and training our armed forces are likely to excel those of the
thing depends on daring and leadership of a higher order —ушities in which
of the command armament. In limited nuclear war, on the other hand, an arly-
coumental war benefits the meaning of troops which can opacure the rigidity
this is indeed the only possible way of conducting such a campaign. A limited
target system, tight plans and attack patterns carefully prepared in advance;
thermo-nuclear war can be carried out according to a centralized plan with
of the Soviet command armament is that of limited nuclear war. An all-out
is by means of fluid operations; the best strategy for exploiting the rigidity
taking advantage of the lack of initiative of subordinate Soviet commanders
will be made able to benefit from their military tradition. The best means of
more decisions Soviet commanders can be forced to improvise, the less fully
strategically which places a premium on initiative and decentralized control. The
If would therefore seem to the United States, advantage to adopt a

correct when it insisted on the interrelationship of all aspects of national
life. It was right in claiming that a society is capable of only a limited
mode of action which expresses itself in political doctrine, in economic
planning and in military strategy. But this very insight may now define
Soviet weakness. The mass armies, the reliance on a centralized plan, the
rigidity of the command structure were in effect an adaptation to military
problems of the method of operation of Soviet society in general. In
developing its strategic doctrine, the Soviet leadership did what came
"naturally." It was successful in World War II because this mode of action
was well suited to the existing technology and the particular conditions of
all-out conventional war.

But, as has so often happened before, the very qualities which led
to success given one set of conditions may become an element of weakness
given another. Even assuming the maximum degree of insight on the part of
Soviet leadership, it will not be easy for it to develop the qualities in
the subordinate commanders that will be at a premium in a limited nuclear
war. Self-reliance cannot be improvised. It exists in the American officer
corps because it is drawn from a society in which self-reliance and individual
initiative have traditionally been encouraged. By the same token, these
qualities will be difficult to find in the Soviet Armed Forces because
nowhere in Soviet society can models for them be found. Where everything
is done according to plan there may be a tendency to reduce even initiative
to stereotype. In short, the Soviets may be able to train units for limited
nuclear war; but the mode of operation for such a conflict would not come
"naturally" because the Soviets would possess no instinct for this kind of
operation. Both Russian history and Soviet dogmatism would indicate that the
Soviet Armed Forces will be more at home with mass attacks than with sharp

Soviet Armed Forces will be more at home with mass attacks than with annihilation. Both Russian history and Soviet government would indicate that the "militarism" because the Soviets would possess no instrument for this kind of nuclear war; put the mode of operations the American conflict would not come to stereo type. In short, the Soviets may be able to train units for limited war, accounting to them only be a tendency to reduce even initiative nowhere in Soviet society can models for them be found. Where everything quantities will be difficult to find in the Soviet Armed Forces because initiative have traditionally been encouraged. By the same token, these commands because it is drawn from a society in which self-reliance and individualism. Self-reliance cannot be improved. It exists in the American officer the appropriate commander which will be at a premium in a limited enemy. Soviet leadership, it will not be easy for it to desist from the difficulties in given another. Even assuming the maximum degree of insight on the part of to success given one set of conditions which become an element of weakness. But, as has so often happened before, the very difficulties which led out-of-conventional war.

was well suited to the existing technology and the particular conditions of "militarism." It was successful in World War II because this mode of action developing its strategic doctrine, the Soviet leadership did what came problems of the method of operation of Soviet society in general. In quality of the command structure were in effect an substitution to military Soviet weakness. The mass armies, the reliance on a centralized plan, the breaching and in military strategy. But this very insight may now define mode of action which expresses itself in policies of strategy, if economic life. It was right in claiming that a society to be strong a limited correct when it initiated an intervention which of all aspects of national

TK - 43

IX - 48

individual clashes, more with carefully planned campaigns than with deliberately flexible operations. The history of Russian and Soviet naval warfare — and naval warfare offers the closest analogy to the tactics of limited nuclear war—demonstrates the extraordinary difficulty of adapting the Russian human material to operations different from the massive defense of the "motherland." To be sure, the Soviet troops could learn the strategy of limited nuclear war just as Americans could master the principles of mass infantry Red Army attacks. But they will probably not be any more at ease with the new tactics than ruthless utilization of its manpower. Americans would be in the kind of sluggish match at which the Red Army excelled in World War II. A limited nuclear war does not guarantee success by itself; but it would use the sociological, technological and psychological advantages of the United States to best effect.

A familiar argument is certain to recur at this point: if limited nuclear war is to our advantage, it must be to the Soviet disadvantage and the Soviet leadership would therefore adopt a strategy either of conventional or of all-out war. As the strategy of conventional war, it is clear that the Soviet leaders cannot force us into it by their choice, only through our inhibitions or through our failure to create the psychological framework for our most effective strategy. As for the option of all-out war, it cannot be repeated often enough that the fact that the Soviet cannot profit from limited war does not mean that they can profit from all-out war. The penalties of all-out war are so evident that they leave hardly any room for miscalculation. If we behave effectively, we should be able to make it clear to even the most fanatic opponent that all-out war would be tantamount to national suicide. Thus one of the more hopeful aspects of the present situation may be that a gap may have been created between Soviet political and strategic doctrine; between the political preference for the

IX - 49

indirect approach, the constant pressure, the exploitation of the psychol-
ogical weak point of the opponent and the strategic options open for achiev-
ing the political goal. Whether the gap is exploited, indeed, whether it
comes into being, depends importantly on our own strategic doctrine:
whether we can break away from our own preconceptions and whether we are
ready to face the prospects and opportunities of limited war.

Nevertheless, it would be risky to rely too much on the self-
evidence of the horrors of nuclear war. The doctrine of the greater in-
vulnerability of the Soviet state, if repeated often enough, may induce its
proponents to miscalculate either our capabilities or our determination. The
persistence of traditional doctrine may make it difficult for the Soviet
leadership to adjust to the new modes of warfare. Obsolescent tactics may
then bring on a holocaust despite Soviet intentions. Finally, the theory
of the need for constant activism may mislead the Soviet leadership about
its strategic opportunities or the kind of resistance it might face. It
therefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey its correct options
to the other side; in some respects to make up for any lack of imagination
on the part of the Soviet leadership by conveying to them our understanding
of the nature and the limits of nuclear war. To be sure, such a program will
not deter an opponent determined on a final showdown. No diplomatic program
can be a substitute for an adequate retaliatory power. But to the extent
that a war may become all-out because of miscalculation of our intentions
or because of a misunderstanding of the nature of nuclear warfare, it should
be the task of our diplomacy to bring about a better comprehension of the
range of strategic options of the nuclear period. This is all the more
important because whatever the advantages of limited nuclear war, it will

["Important consequences of the development of limited nuclear war, it will result in the development of the nuclear weapons. This will lead to the development of a better comprehension of the nature of a number of the consequences of nuclear war, it should be the task of our diplomacy to bring about a better comprehension of the nature of nuclear weapons. To do this, and a program which will not deter an opponent determined on a further showdown. No diplomatic program of the nature and the limits of nuclear war. To do this, and a program which will not deter an opponent determined on a further showdown. No diplomatic program of the nature and the limits

not be possible to improvise it under the pressure of events. In seeking to avoid the horrors of all-out war by outlining an alternative; in developing a concept of limitation that combines firmness with moderation, diplomacy can once more establish a relationship with force even in the nuclear age.

can once more establish a relationship with force even in the ancient age.

If a concept of situation that comprises stimulus with motivation, motivation, and

is to develop the powers of all-out war, continuing as effective; in develop-

not be possible to improve it under the pressure of events. In seeking

FX - 20