TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 am, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hebdo Henry, h;w are you.

K: Okay, how are you.

D: Thank you very much. When are we going to meet today?

K: Oh, you're missing me.

D: Of course I do. Don't you know.

K: How about 4:30.

D: 4:30, fine.

K: Right.

D: Okay. As for this--I was told by security you have done already.

K: On the street.

D: Yes. It's a very good idea.

K: Well, we are also blocking off the street in front of the Embassy.

D: During supper, I mean dinner.

K: During the whole time that Brezhnev is there.

D: Oh, during the whole time. Oh, really fine.

K: So there won't be any demonstrations in front of the Embassy.

D: I think this is a very good idea.

K: Of course, no Soviet personnel will be able to come in and out.

D: Well, I rather prefer they will be going. I will do it myself, it will be much more easier.

K: We'll send him food so when you run low let us know.

D: (laughter) I see. Well, thanks very much Henry for all the things, and Brezhnev sends you his best wishes. I talked with him and he asked me to tell you something. I have several things to inform you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 101, 2/21/73
By: W. M. Sargent

K: Good.

D: Okay.

K: Anatol, on the press at the airport, we can keep the television and the photographers away, but we have to let three reporters just be there so they can write they saw him arrive.

D: Henry!!

K: There will be no pictures. All it will say is he arrived and he went off to Camp David.

D: They will not ask him to make an interview.

K: No, no, they'll be in the hangar, they won't even get anywhere close to him.

D: All right. This is all right.

K: They won't get anywhere close to him.

D: That's all right.

K: We have to let AP, UPI and one other person just to say they saw him get off the plane.

D: Okay. This is no problem.

K: Well, you know American photographers. Now I cannot guarantee that they won't have somebody on the water tower or somewhere.

D: I understand. From this point of view I do not intend to make it really I know how Americans---

K: I can guarantee there will be no television. I can guarantee there will be no pictures unless they are taken with a telescopic---

D: I understand. It is no problem. Okay. It is quite all right. As you said, there is no problem, I agree with you.

K: Okay. I think I've taken care of all the other things. You think we'll have a civil air agreement on our side.

D: This is very good.

3

K: I talked to them this morning. I was told somebody called Pavlov is arriving without his dog.

D: (Laughter) Okay. All right Henry.

K: Well, I'll see you this afternoon, and I'll see you Sunday afternoon at Camp David. If for any reason you don't want that, we can avoid it.

D: On Sunday. I'm sure it's all right. There is no question about it.

K: For half an hour, it's just a courtesy call.

D: A courtesy call I don't know. It could come to proper now but maybe more, but how it will last I don't know.

K: It's entirely up to him. I'll be at his disposal.

D: I understand. Okay Henry, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By: MWBAPD
Date: 06/03/04

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 am, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Heppo Henry, how are you.

K: Okay, how are you.

K: Oh, you're missing me.

K: How about 4:30.

D: 4:30, fine.

K: Right.

K: On the street.

DCLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
D: NARA Dae 6/2/84

*

2

K: Good.

D: Okay.

D: Henry!!

D: That's all right.

D: Okay. This is no problem.

D: This is very good.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

DATE 6/2/07

D: On Sunday. I'm sure it's all right. There is no question about 8 t.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

D# NARA Dts 6/2/89

TelCon

Paul Keyes/Mr. Kissinger

9:47 am, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

PK: Hi, how are you.

K: Fine Paul. Paul I've just been told that we've got a patriotic group performing for Brezhnev.

PK: Yes.

K: Can somebody explain to me the reasoning by which we arrived at this conclusion.

PK: Well, when you say patriotic group, it's a group that has it's own television show every Monday night.

K: That's great, but I mean He's the General Secretary of the Communist Party, does he have to hear an American patriotic songs. How would we feel if the President had to listen to Communist songs in the Kremlin.

PK: Uh huh.

K: What if they played the Internationals for the President.

PK: Well, Henry, it's a very true comparison of like the international or our national anthem. They are doing a show business medley, they are doing a dixie land medley, and the patriotic thing is they close with a medley - it's Battle Hymn of the Republic, but it's not all America the Beautiful in any way.

K: But when you introduce them could we at least say this is a sort of a cross section of American folk songs.

PK: Yes, that is exactly the point.

K: And can you program the thing American Folk Songs or something like this, so that the guy doesn't look like an idiot back in Moscow.

PK: Uh hum. You want in the program "American Folk Songs".

K: That's right. Something like that.

PK: Sure.

K: Okay, thank you Paul.

PK: Right.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority ED 12958

Dated
NARRATED 6/20/73

*

TelCon
Gen. Haig/Mr. Kissinger (from Plane)

9:49 am, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

H: Henry. The fellow we were looking for, for that announcement Saturday, just gave me a no, no.

K: That's what I figured.

H: What a courageous fellow.

K: Well that's what I figured. I was certain--he's never yet brought himself to the point.

H: He just can't fight any bullets, obviously.

K: That's been my experience with him, over.

H: Right.

K: But I think he dodged the bullet, over.

H: Well I dotoo. I'm sure of that.

K: So, I think that was a lucky thing.

H: Yeah. What do you think about the other fellow, the scientist, which would be obviously controversial.

K: I think he's very imaginative in the area of research and having solutions, which is what we really need, he'd be very helpful.

H: Think we could survive the environmentalist problem, Over.

K: Well, it'd be a miserable battle, but I don't see what basis they have.

H: Well, that's one possibility. I'm going to try to get moving fast.

K: And the field in which he's good is certainly one of the alternative sources.

H: Right. Okay. Well, I covered the other thing with the boss that you were worried about. So everything is okay. He understood that completely.

K: Good, excellent. I'll see you tonight.

H: Okay, Henry. Bye. K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01298
D# NARA Dkt 6204

TELCORN

Joe Alsop/Kissinger

9:50 a.m. - 6/15/73

A: Henry, what is there new that one can say about the Brezhnev visit? I'll tell you a story about it. Margaret Chase, as you know, is staying with me. She tells me that BBC was agonized until Dean's appearance was put off because they didn't know whether to put Dean or Brezhnev on television. They would have appeared at the same moment. They were inclined to decide in favor of Dean.

K: (Laugs) You mean on Monday?

A: Yes.

K: Unbelieveable!

A: What is there additional to say about the Brezhnev visit?

K: You read the transcript of my press conference yesterday?

A: I haven't got to the transcript yet; I shall soon.

K: Which substantially covers it. You know in any other - you know as you said about the Zavidovo affair. In any other situation this would be considered one of the major events and you have brought about a situation without having sacrificed anything where Brezhnev will stand by the President more than American newspapers will is not a minor achievement.

A: (Laugs)

K: The objective thrust of our policy is what we discuss Sunday. I mean we're certainly not going to let the Chinese get away with pet projects. .. The Soviets get away with their pet project.

A: And, Henry, what about the Jackson Amendment? Do you think you've got that taped or not?

K: I think, yes.

A: What will it do? Become a <u>admonitory</u> instead of a mandatory?

K: It will either become <u>ad</u>itory or it will become a sort of a review function by the Congress.

A: And when is he going to announce that, you know?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 12958
P. #1 NARA Doc. 6/297

K: Jackson - certainly not during the trip.

A: No, I know that. He talked to __________, told me that he talked to him about it. He was in doubt about when you'd announce it. That is not now in your judgment an obstacle to the kind of agreement about trade which would really be the centerpiece of the whole thing.

K: I don't think trade will be the centerpiece. Joe, I've just been called to the President's office and he's leaving on a trip. I'll have to call you back later.

A: I have to go off and give blood so could you call me as soon as possible.

K: Yes, soon as I get out of the office, but I must run there now.

DELEGATEE

Authority EO/12958

DATE NARA DRE 6/2/04

TELCONE

Joe Alsop/Kissinger

10:04 a.m. - 6/15/73

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Joe.

A: What about the Jackson thing? Has there been any arrangement exchange between him and the White House on the subject?

K: Yes, I've been talking to him, but with not too much success up to now.

A: Then where do you get your confidences to overcome auditory or review?

K: Well, you know I have the impression that that's what he will finally be willing to agree to. I've mentioned it to him but he's never totally rejected it.

A: Dinitz told me straight out that ______________. And the question in mind was when.

K: I think that's reasonable.

A: (he mumbled something) __________ Well won't the trade thing really be the centerpiece of the whole business.

K: No.

A: What will, then.

K: Well, I can't really say more than I've said publicly yesterday. The __________ thing will be an important part but it will not be the centerpiece. Nothing in which I'm ever involved will ever have economics as the centerpiece.

A: I'm under a handicap because I didn't sleep all night and got up late, and going to the--what did you and your press conference make the centerpiece.

K: Why don't I send it over to you, at least the opening comments. I this basically the political relationships and the continuation on the course on which we are.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01285
Dated NARA Doc. 6/26/73

TelCon

B. Gwertzman/Kissinger

10:05 am, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Hi. Thank you for the plug yesterday.

K: (Laughter)

G:q My editor saw the --

K: It didn't excite them enough to make a news story out of it.

G: They said do an article on who saw Burnie ? yesterday.
I said that ________. You saw the article I did, didn't you.

K: You did an article on the answer to one question on Cambodia. It was a briefing on the summit.

G: We have an article on the summit. A whole big article. Not on the front page.

K: I couldn't find it.

G: Unless it's done -- it's on the page with your transcript. I believe it must be in there.

K: Not in my copy.

in any event

G: That's impossible. I'll blow up if that's the case./ I was calling on two things. One, Joe Alsop reference to the Laotian situation saying that NVN said they'd be drawing their troops out of Laos by July 1st.

K: Listen, I haven't even talked to Joe since I came back. Joe just called me up and asked me what I thought of his article, and I haven't read it yet.

G: I see. (looking at copy of paper) I don't see it in here--isn't that strange.

K: That's what I thought

G: That's terrible. I don't know how that happened. Oh, wait a second, page 4--it's all there.

K: Okay, I'll look for it.

2

G: Second is the -- in bureaucracy this concerns a minor point, but like when Brezhnev and Nixon meet would an American interpreter be present.

K: Listen, bureaucracy always has its--we will worry about that next week. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. We did all our negotiations last year with ______. I did all my negotiations with ______ in ______. And we have all these people present, not always but often who understand it well enough.

G: I think the--your concern was--the question really is who keeps the record of these things.

K: We always have a verbatim record, of our own.

G: Somebody's is always there when the President--did you ever find the President and Brezhnev just alone.

K: Well when that happens we get a record.

G: Okay.

K: There's no danger of there not being an adequate record.

G: Okay, it's one of these little - a Chip Bohlen syndrome.

K: What I read in Chip Bohlen's book that even when he kept a record there's a dispute afterwards who was there. Did you notice that.

G: Yeah, with the two interpreters.

K: We have verbatim records of every conversation that either I or the President has had with any foreign leader.

G: Okay, well that's what I wanted to check on. It's no great thing. Okay, I know that this may be an interesting trip.

K: I hope so. I think so.

G: The Russians are coming around saying why is there not more attention on the trip.

K: What do you say--you're so terrified that attention will be deflected from Watergate.

G: I say much as you are saying, you just have to accept the fact that we have such good relations now that people aren't fearful of your leader and accept him much the same way they accept a visit from most allied countries, that it's an accepted routine. As a result, Americans

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1298
Dated MAR 13 1979

3

for better or for worse tend to see Summits as sort of a circus and
the circus is predictable, it doesn't get the kind of big splash that it
does when it's unpredictable.

K: Well, if some of the best talent in the press weren't preoccupied with the domestic matters, we might get a little more.

G: Yeah, it's true. The Watergate still is--I think some of my colleagues wish they could get off of it.

K: Really, it's not turned into a monstrous disease. This is not for publication.

G: Of course.

K: You know, whether every last piece of dirt gets stuck up or not is-- on the one hand is the compulsion and the necessity to do it; on the other hand, the basic pattern is now obvious.

G: I suspect that after the next two weeks, this phase will end by July I think, and it will then recede. But that's still ahead of us.

K: Yeah. Well having survived the last 6 weeks, I think we can stagger through the next two.

G: Yes. I appreciated your remarks about your emotional stability in the Vietnamese--that quote of yours about that squabble over who would sign it was just a classic.

K: Well I tell you, it took us, it sounds funny, it took us a day to straighten it out and then another great theological dispute was in what order the paragraphs should appear.

G: Really! Whether they should be in chronological or

K: Well, each of the Vietnamese side wanted the political clauses to be in the order in which they presented their positions at ________ or wherever the God damned negotiations took place. Because in Vietnam whatever appears first also has priority.

G: Oh I see.

K: So we finally resolved that by have them appear in the order in which they were in the original agreement.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Doc. 6/2/94
Hl

4

G: But the question I have, if you don't do the negotiating, who will.

K: Nothing I look forward to more than a meeting between Mr. Duc from the Palace in Saigon and Duckie ??

G: Without any Americans. He's finally gotten to the point where US can finally say so long to these negotiations.

K: It would really take a lot to get me in again.

G: I can imagine. I'm sure Sullivan would love to get to Manila.

K: Yeah.

G: Is that really a problem. You refer to your essay on Leninism. When you have such a personal relationship in negotiations--

K: I think it is now within the limits permitted by the system certain amounts of confidence and at least comprehension. And I think frankly that Le Duc Tho probably has a hell of a time explaining in Hanoi some of the problems because after having met Pham Van Dong and the others, he seemed positively gentle to me. Those guys look like total extreme paranoids.

G: The Chinese, of course, comes out as wizards.

K: Well the Chinese are much more grand scale.

G: If you ever see the Chinese here again, wonder if you could give a little push to see the press here or something.

K: Well I see the Chinese a lot.

G: Okay, well we'll see Mr. Brezhnev tomorrow I guess. He's not going to say anything I take it.
be

K: No, it's going to very simple.

G: One more personal question--my wife's baby is imminent--will the commune be put out in Washington or just at San Clemente.

K: Almost certain in San Clemente. Well, simultaneously in Washington.

G: Will it be before Brezhnev leaves San Clemente.

K: Probably before Brezhnev leaves America.

G: So it will be in both San Clemente and Here on Monday.

K: But I doubt if you will understand it, without a briefing from me which will be in San Clemente.

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority ED 12958

Dated: NARA Dkt. 6/2/87

5

G: Uh huh. Okay.

K: It's a very complex subject about which you never saw. There's no reason for you to come out, there won't be any surprises.

G: Can you can imagine my

K: It will sum up what's gone on during the week. And there won't be anything.

G: SALT will speak for itself I take it.

K: And that will preceed the communique anyway.

G: I see. Will you make those kind of announcements here before you go to San Clemente.

K: There's a good chance.

G: Okay, much thanks.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO/2858

D/AH NARRATE 6/2/04

Telcon
Joe Sisco/Dr. Kissinger
June 15, 1973; 10:29 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Good morning, Henry.

K: How are you, Joe?

S: I'm fine. I think you came out very well in Paris. I hope everybody keeps his fingers crossed. It's a damned difficult exercise, wasn't it?

K: Well, you know, with the Congress cutting my balls out every day.

S: Yeah. Henry, to take just one minute of your time because you've got a lot of other worries. If you need anything over the course of the week on the Middle East, we've sent you a pretty good solid memo which I think covers everything.

K: Could you give me some language of what you would like in the communique?

S: Yes, it's already included. We wrote it in and it's there. It's quite good language. You'll be interested that the Security Council now has postponed any further consideration until mid-July which I think is probably a sign that maybe you'll have another meeting before then. This is probably the way they're thinking. In any event you've got the communique language.

K: You mean with Ismail?

S: Yeah, I think so. I mean, I think you'll probably hear from him again sometime.

K: I think those sons of bitches want a miracle, not a policy.

S: Oh, of course they do. And I don't know whether you read that telegram of Ismail's discussion with Gerry Green when he called Gerry Green to say goodbye to him. He took a hell of a tough line. Yeah, they want a miracle. That's exactly what they're after.

K: Of course, for some reason he doesn't like Gerry Green.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: E012958

Dated: NARA Dated: 6/2/94

-2-

S: Well, (laughs).

K: The one thing on which I'd agree with him.

S: I would agree with him. Look, Henry, I was at the credentials presentation.

K: Yes, the President told me.

S: And I told the President basically what I told you, that whatever...

K: The President seems to think that you indicated a preference for Moscow.

S: Well, yes, I said to him that, look, part of my reservation, you remember I said to you that personal business. You know what he told me on that. I said, you know, I had had some problems with one daughter and I had talked to the doctor and so on. He was very funny. He responded not like a president, but like a father of two daughters. He said, oh hell, you know they'll do better without you. In any event, he said I should get together with you after the summit, and talk about possible replacements and that kind of thing.

K: Well, I'll tell you, he told me this morning, he said, don't let anyone fill Moscow until you've talked to Sisco.

S: All right. Well that's why I called, so whenever you and I want to talk after the summit, why we can get together.

K: Absolutely. And at any rate you should know that he will not fill Moscow until we have had another talk with you.

S: Thanks a lot, Henry.

K: Good, Joe.

S: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

DECYDASSIFIED
Authority EO12858
Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/04

TELCONE
Mr. Kissinger/Paul Keyes

12:27 p.m. 6/15/73

PK: I wanted to reassure you about this--now let me tell you what the biography of the program says. It simply states Johnny Mann's professional career and then it announces the program of the songs representing the many geographic sections of the United States as well as different eras in history. The songs listed are these: A Dixieland Medley; A Neal Diamond Medley; America, There's So Much to Say; A Broadway Medley; and a Southern Medley. Now let me tell you what songs are involved--

HK: That's fine

PK: In the Dixieland, there is Alexander's Ragtime Bank, Bill Bailey Come Home, Back Home in Indiana; the Broadway medley has Hello Dolly, Cabaret, Never Fall in Love Again, Oklahoma, Sunrise Sunset and the Finale is Dixie and the Battle Hymn; now there is one song in the middle after we are into the program about 10 minutes and it is called America, there is so much to say--now let me tell you how I'll handle that. It is--the bottom line of the song is "Whoever you are, whatever you do, America is you--" It's about we got a great thing going here. So here's what I'm going to do to completely relieve you. When Johnny introduces that song, I will have him say how happy we are that Mr. Brezhnev is in our country and in the WH and as You love your country we love our country and here is a song we like to sing and you can sing America ______ and you would sing it yourself and I think

HK: That will help.

PK: I will take care of that.

HK: Very good.

PK: I don't want you to worry.

HK: Thank you Paul, you're a gentleman.

PK: Thank you sir.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority E012808
D# 114 NARA Doc 61704

TELCONE

Kirk Douglas/Mr. Kissinger

12:30 p.m. 6/15/73

HK: Kirk, how are you.

KD: Good, how are you?

HK: Okay.

KD: Tired?

HK: A little, no, I'm getting used to it, by now.

KD: That's good. You still coming out?

HK: I'm coming out on -- a week from today.

KD: Wonderful, because I was originally not going to be here but I will be so I'll look forward to seeing you.

HK: I'll be out there for about 2 weeks

KD: Wonderful--will you be able to take a little leave while you are out here?

HK: After Brezhnev has left, yes.

KD: Of course, all right, just wanted to check to make sure you are all right and to know we are thinking of you

HK: You're a good friend, now I finally got your letter.

KD: You did, really? You never got the original one?

HK: I don't remember of ever getting the original one. They are probably staffing it all over the White House now, maybe John Ehrlichman will reply to it.

KD: (laughs) Now listen you seem in good shape,

HK: So, I'll see you in 10 days or so. We'll get together,

KD: We'll look forward to it.

HK: Marvelous.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority E012958
D/A 6/20/73

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Dan Davidson

6/15/73 12:40 p.m.

HK: Hello, Dan how are you?

DD: All right, when will you have time, I'd still like to see you.

HK: Right, Good. I've been with this Brezhnev visit and other things--

DD: I understand your problems and time schedule. When do you think you might have a few moments?

HK: Let me aim--I have to go to Key Biscayne this afternoon. Let me try --and I've been in Paris.

DD: I know, you have had a rough two weeks.

HK: Incidentally, my own judgment is--looked at from your point of view in so far as I can do that is that the best procedure is to leave matters alone but we are entirely--it is entirely up to you.

DD: What are we talking about?
I'm not doing anything.

HK: No, no, I know.

DD: I would just like to see you for a few minutes.

HK: Let's meet--let's try to meet if the Brezhnev schedule isn't too maden let's try for next week.

DD: Fine.

HK: Can you come in early in the morning, say 8:00 a.m.

DD: Yes.

HK: Let's aim for that.

DD: Right. You have my home number so if you want to reach me to set it up 363-2937.

HK: Okay fine.

DECEMBER 5, 1973

Authority E012858

D#NARAD D9/24/73

TelCon

Richard Valeriani/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 pm, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

V: Hello, how are you.

K: Okay.

V: It's time to talk seriously on the Summit about limiting the shipment of arms to the Middle East. Does that seem possible.

K: Yes, that's what they told you. It's conceivable.

V: Has that come up with you before. It's the first time I've ever mentioned it, and they volunteered it, so it kind of took me by surprise.

K: It hasn't come up in any formal way, no.

V: You wouldn't definitely anticipate it from your point of view.

K: No, but I don't exclude it.

V: Yes. I didn't know whether the famines in Saudi Arabia had something to do with it. Okay, thank you very much.

K: Right.

V: Bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858

Dated NARA Dkt. 6/2/74

TelCon
Marc Childs/Mr. Kissinger

2"55 pm, June 15, 1973

C: Hello, Henry, welcome bakk.

K: Marc, how are you. How are my clients doing.

C: Well, I think they are doing great. I wish I could say the same for the folks back at the ranch. We had a marvelous experience.

K: They checked with me before Chou saw you whether you really were a friend of mine.

C: Did they really. Oh I see you. And they checked with David Bruce, too. They were getting a real bona fide, well I had a 3-1/2 hour talk with him. And he gave me several personal messages for you.

K: Like what, drop dead?

C: No, no. I hope to see you soon and give them to you in detail, but the one was "I hope that he will come here sometime after the middle of the year." And very earnestly. You name, as I say, came up as a friend of the family at least three times. He's a great man really.

K: Isn't he a great man.

C: Oh, he's so amazing. What we hoped, of course it's hardly impossible now that Mr. B is arriving, but hope that you can come in for a quick meal and we could fill you in completely.

K: I'd love to do it but I don't know when I could do it now because I'm going off to Key Biscayne tonight. I'll be back Sunday night. Where will you be Sunday night.

C: We'll be home. If you get in in time give us a call.

K: Can I do that?

C: Would you do it? At the house.

K: Good. Otherwise I'll see you next week I hope sometime.

C: I hope so too. Because he said I want you to tell him that three/of difference that I have with the U.S. and we've got these down pretty---

K: Are they vital ones that I should know before the Brezhnev meeting.

C: No, not before the Brezhnev meeting. Of course you probably saw

CLASSIFIED

Authority ED 12958
DATE NARA Dkt 6/2/73
Dkt 6/2/73

2

what happened. You may not have. You were in Paris perhaps when I wrote--I wrote three articles basically based on my talk with him, none of which had direct quotes, but I expressed his satisfaction that the Soviet attack in his view had been deterred. By diplomatic means, first of all by U.S.-Shanghai communique, by Tanaka, by their own preparations and so on. He spoke about this in great confidence. Well, the Russians reacted in a very extraordinary way. They put out that statement from the Embassy here.

K: Which was unbelievable.

C: Incredible. I've never known them to do that before. In the course of which they said that this is imperialist--they tied it in more or less to my column, you see.

K: Yeah. Fulbright reacted violently to your column too.

C: Did he really. What did he say.

K: I was talking to him, and he accused me of having put Chou En-lai up to saying these things to you. It's a great compliment to me. If I can put him up with things, that's really---

C: That's pretty comic of Bill, isn't it. I sure it must have amused the hell out of Chou, that Russian reaction, and -- because here it's got them smoked out.

K: Exactly.

C: It was a stupid thing for them to do.

K: Idiotic. And it really confirmed the--

C: Of course.

K: Well, I'm glad you had such a good stay, and

C: I'll tell you, I really--we left there with real reluctance.

K: That is the damned atmosphere these guys create. They put you in a sense of exhilaration and--that you don't get in any other country.

C: And a feeling that they are going places. I tell you it was a real--

K: And he was in good physical shape.

C: He looked fine. We met from 11:00 in the evening until 2:30 in the morning

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

DATE 6/2/04

You know, you've done this before.

K: Yeah, I do it every time.

C: He brought up Watergate in the middle of our talks.

K: Oh, really.

C: He said--about Watergate he sort of laughed. And he said what--
why should there be a Watergate, we have much more important
things to talk about. I said I couldn't agree with you more. Then
he said what assurance can you give me that this want happen in
another American (laughter). I said well I can't give you any.

K: It will be done more competently next time.

C: I hope so if it's done at all. Well if you do get back in time Sunday--

K: Otherwise I'll call you early in the week and we'll get at least half an hour.

C: Fine, Henry. Thanks a lot.

K: And you wrote really excellent columns Marc.

C: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARADY 6/2/04

TelCon
Jim Brown/Mr. Kissinger
(NYTimes)

3:50 pm, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

B: Dr. Kissinger thank you for calling sir. You caught me in mid-editoria I'm a little puzzled by your remark at the press conference in Paris as quoted "There is nothing in the communique that commits the U.S. to cease such operations". The question referred to the aerial operations in Cambodia. As I read Article 13 of the communique, which refers back to Article 20 of the January agreement, that article says foreign countries shall put an end to all military activity in Cambodia and Laos. How do you reconcile this.

K: It is perfectly clear that as soon as all other countries stop their military operations and observe Article 20, we of course observe it also.

B: But only when they have already done so. We don't move concurrently.

K: No. Of course we'll do it concurrently as soon as it can be agreed concurrently we will of course do so.

B: As soon as it can be agreed? But isn't that what the communique is all about? It is agreed that they shall put an end to all military activity.

K: That is

B: Maybe I'm naive, but it seems to me

K: You know you are not naive, you are sort of bating me with these questions.

B: If the other side takes the same attitude then we don't get anywhere. equally argue when you stop bombing we'll bring our troops out.

K: Look, if it reaches that point the problem will be solved. And that is a point that strangely enough had not alluded anybody. So--

B: In other words, we are at a stage now of watching to see what they will do.

K: No, we are not in a stage of watching what anybody will do. We are at a stage of working out how this simultaniety and be achieved. And it should be obvious that we are more than eager to stop it if anything like simultaniety can be achieved.

DELEGATED

Authority ED 12958

DATE 6/2/73
ATTN NARA Dts

B: Uh hum. Okay.

K: We will certainly not be the obstacle to stopping it, on the contrary we are making very active efforts.

B: Right. But so far is there any evidence of a let up in their participation there, or

K: I tried to explain in an indirect way some of the difficulties, one of which is that Sihanouk is traveling.

B: Right.

K: And I can only repeat that a major effort is underway to try to bring this precise condition which you --to which you pointed which Article 20 foresees to bring it about, and in that case we will certainly not wait passively until everyone else has done it. There's no question of what we will do.

B: In other words some political movement is what we are looking for.

K: No, we are looking for the implementation; of article 20 to the extent that it requires political movement, we are willing to participate to encourage that too.

B: Okay, I appreciate your calling.

K: Thank you.

B: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12888
Dkt No. 16-1101
P.O. Box 61102

TelCon
Secy. Clements/Mr. Kissinger

4:04 pm, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Henry.

K: Yes, Bill.

C: Tom and I are here in my office, we just tried to contact Carl Albert and he's in the Chair, the House is in session but they are going to go get him, and we are probably going to go over there in just a few minutes.

K: Yes, but be careful what you promise him.

C: We are not going to promise anything I hope. We're just going to talk, and see what he says. We're going to start negotiations. Now John and I are concerned, Henry, that when we go over there and start talking to Carl about the possibilities, and that's what we are really going to talk about, the possibilities of what we might or might not do. It is not clear in my mind, nor Tom's, where we're going with this thing and what kind of time frame we're working to, and what are we trying to accomplish. And we need to have some little fill in here. Can you tell us quickly.

K: Well, we --if you put out a time frame then you are killing the negotiation again.

C: No, just in very general terms.

K: You can tell him if he doesn't let work get out that we think that if we get about 2 months, we can manage it.

C: About two months.

K: Yes, but one month would help.

C: You mentioned Sihanouk.

K: Well, I just can't go into the details of this business.

C: I gotcha.

K: Because I cannot afford to let words get leaked out here.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01289
Dkt No. 6/204

NARA Dkt. 6/204

2

C: But you think that 2 months would give us a real breathing space here and that this would give you the freedom that you need.

K: That's right, but if write into the bill in September, one it doesn't do us any good.

C: Are you prepared to make some kind of a commitment Henry.

K: I'm prepare to tell him privately.

C: That's what I ;mean.

K: That we might stop fighting against it around September 1st.

C: Yeah. We either get it done or we don't get it done by that time.

K: Something like that.

C: Okay, that's all right. Tell me this, and this is just for Tomand me, are

K: I'm reasonably confident.

C: Okay, fine, thank you Henry.

K: Good, bye.

C: Bye.

DECEMBER 9, 1958

Authority EO-12858

Dated: 12/9/58
Mailed: 12/14/58

TelCon

David Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

4:10 pm, June 15, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Henry, hello. I feel so sorry for you.

K: Well, David, I'm so sorry I haven't been able to see you today.

R: Well, I can understand that. I'm off to China a week from today, I will be back here next Thursday but I imagine you'll be with Mr. Kosygin then, will you not.

K: Well, I'll be fairly busy, but why don't we aim for a half hour or an hour next Thursday.

R: If that were possible, it would be just marvelous.

K: Why don't--how early will you be in town.

R: I'll get here whenever--

K: Why don't we have breakfast.

R: All right, perfect, what time.

K: Is a quarter to 8 too early.

R: A quarter to eight will do.

K: In my office

R: In your office on Thursday. That's wonderful. The meeting of Presidents of the Council of the Americas really went very well, I think.

K: I'm delighted. And I know you are going to be at the dinner on Thursday night.

R: Yes, I am. So I'll see you there, but if we can have breakfast at a quarter to eight on Thursday, that would be marvelous.

K: Right. Or would it be easier for you to do it Friday.

R: No, because I'm leaving at 8:30 Friday morning.

Telcon

Professor Graubard/Dr. Kissinger

June 16, 1973; 6:55 p.m.

G: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you?

G: I am well. And you're going off, I am told.

K: In about two minutes.

G: When are you coming back?

K: Sunday night.

G: Can I see you any time? Or is it impossible?

K: Ståve, I'm just. It's impossible to say with the Brezhnev visit.

G: Okay, then...

K: Are you here all week?

G: No, I go to Harrisburg on Tuesday and then am back again on Thursday. I'm here the weekend and then I'll be here next weekend.

K: No, I'm going to California.

G: And you're going to stay there for awhile?

K: Two weeks.

G: Oh, really. Then I came in the wrong period.

K: So how long are you going to be here?

G: Until July 15th.

K: Well, I'll be back before July 15th.

G: Well, you're going for two weeks.

K: I'll be back about July 8th.

DECEMBER 16

Authority E012958

P.O. # 147 NARAD DAE 6/2/73

*

-2-

G: Oh, good, well. And then you'll have a bit more time.

K: Well, I don't know. That doesn't seem to be my fate.

G: Well, but you're well otherwise, I pray.

K: I'm fine.

G: Good.

K: You know, in the period before the Russian visit, I have to stage-manage that whole god-damn thing.

G: Ah, but you sounded yesterday like you were not really, say, very worried, in spite of the newspapers this morning saying you were...

K: It's totally settled. Everything is settled. The newspapers are so god-damned afraid we'll have a success that... I mean when you read the text of what I said and you derived from that that I was down-beat.

G: Well, now. This is one of the things I want to talk to you about. I do want to read the texts of all the things you said, but I don't know how to do it without... you know, Peter Rodman has said I only have to sort of spend some time. But I don't know how much time and where, and all the rest. I'd like to read all of your press conferences.

K: Yes.

G: Okay. Well, is he going to be here during this time?

K: No.

G: So, nobody will be here.

K: Well, somebody will be here.

G: Who do I get in touch with?

K: Well, why don't you check with me before you leave and then I'll know who.

G: OK. Well, when you say with you...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARRATED 6/2/04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
Date: 06/25/73
By: WW

TELCONE

8:16 a.m. - 6/18/73

Dobrynin/Kissinger

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello Henry.

K: Anatol, you have an absolutely irate press secretary here. He is
almost beside himself and he's right.

D: What happened?

K: Your people gave television films to all our networks of Brezhnev's
arrival after we had kept all our

D: Who gave? Our?

K: Your people.

D: Who give it?

K: I don't know whoever took the film, the film has been shown on all
networks as coming from Soviet sources after we kept our own people
away and they are beside themselves.

D: I don't know - really it was completely - it was a problem, no?

K: I guess so, but we are having trouble enough with the networks as
it is so now we are accused of having barred our own press while the
Soviet press

D: What you like me to do now? Really, it was completely unintentional
because I was there and it was somebody make it here without - well,
I could imagine, but what else I could do in order to

K: Well, somebody better deal with Ziegler. I don't give a damn.

D: No, no, no. Now I mean imagine from today he will be only with
Ziegler. Yesterday he discuss the in order to be next
to Ziegler and

K: Well, somebody better apologize to Ziegler, explain to him how it
happened

D: OK. OK. We will do it.

K: And I'll have the list of Congressmen for you.

D: Just a minute, I will put it down here, Henry.

K: I'll have

D: Could you send right away here?

K: I'll have it sent over in a few minutes.

D: It will be better.

D: Then Henry, about yesterday I didn't quite understand your proposal ceremony. You prefer first ceremony and then they have in the morning talks or what.

K: What do you mean?

D: Yesterday you mentioned that tomorrow --

K: Est I will let you know about that at the end of the day--at the end of the morning.

D: At the end of the morning because after it will be too late.

K: Yeh. In fact I will let you know when we are standing out on the lawn,

D: Okay, thank you.

K: Good.

D: Bye.

TELCOM

8:16 a.m. - 6/18/73

Dobrynin/Kleisinger

D: Hello.
K: Anatol.
D: Oh, hello Henry.
K: Anatol, you have an absolutely irate press secretary here. He is almost beside himself and he's right.
D: What happened?
K: Your people gave television films to all our networks of Breshnev's arrival after we had kept all our
D: Who gave? Our?
K: Your people.
D: Who give it?

K: I guess so, but we are having trouble enough with the networks as it is so now we are accused of having barred our own press while the Soviets press

D: What you like me to do now? Really, it was completely unintentional because it was there and it was somebody make it here without - well, I could imagine, but what else I could do in order to

D: OK. OK. We will do it.

DALLAS, TX
Authority E012858
DALLAS NARAD, TX 6/20/73

*

2

K: I'll have

D: It will be better.

M: Then Henry, about yesterday I didn't quite understand your problem and ceremony. You prefer first ceremony and then they have in the morning talks or what.

K: What do you mean?

K: At I will let you know about that at the end of the day--at the end of the morning.

K: Yeah. In fact I will let you know when we are standing out on the lawn,

D: Okay, thank you.

K: Good.

D: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12888

*

TELCORN

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

9:07 a.m. 6/18/73

HK: Bill.

BR: Hi, Henry.

HK: How are you.

BR: Fine, thank you.

HK: Bill, two things, about the program today. We thought that first Brezhnev and the President will be alone for about 15 minutes and that Gromyko, you and I and Dobrynin wait in the Cabinet room and then after about 15 minutes, the four of us go in. And then spend the rest of the morning.

BR: Yeh, that's fine. I don't know what the hell we are going to talk about, do you?

HK: Ah well, this morning it is a tour-of-the-day and Mr. Brezhnev is going to speak first and as far as I can tell he is in such a eurphoric mood--he talked to me for two hours last night, I can't tell you what he said. Mostly his war experiences.

BR: I see. Some time tell me about it, will you?

HK: I can't. Because he didn't say anything. There was not one substantive word. I was supposed to go over the schedule with Dobrynin and just say hello to him.

BR: One of my children's friends had a--came home and told her mother that there had been a speaker at school who talked to them an hour and a half--mother said, what did he talk about--she said I don't know, she didn't say. That's the way you are with Brezhnev.

HK: Now secondly, Bill, we have agreed with them on some SALT principles which Alex Johnson had gone over--we didn't send them to you while you were traveling, but I'll get them--they also aren't very meaningful. Except to say we'll aim for an agreement in '74.

BR: I don't think so.

HK: It is just going to be a separate announcement on it on Thursday.

BR: What about the other one that I talked to Sonnenfeldt about?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated 6/2/84
HHS

*

Page 2

HK: That will be released on Friday.

BR: That is the one -- both of those are awfully touchy with our allies and I told them that we'd try to give them as much advance notice as we--

HK: Well the British and French and Germans have seen the SALT principles and have now seen the other ones, but I want to talk to you about how to handle the consultation on these things this week.

BR: Yeh. I think it is awfully key because the smaller countries are beginning to think that we are just playing with Germany and France and Britain and they voiced some complaint along that score. I think the thing to do is let Rumsfeld handle it

HK: That's what I thought--he's coming back this week and then he can go over and handle it there.

BR: Will he get back in time?

HK: Yes. If we just have him there for one day. The SALT thing is easy because that's--they have been fully briefed on that. But the other one will be complex.

BR: Yeh. I stated in my speech--I laid the foundation for it so we really can't be accused of not putting my notice--the only trouble is they didn't notice it-- but I mean the words are okay.

HK: Yeh, yeh. Well that's important.

BR: Okay, well I'll see you a little later--going to have this thing inside or out?

HK: Outside come hail or--

BR: high water huh? Better wear our coats. Okay on the NATO meeting--it went very well.

HK: I have that impression.

BR: I don't know whether you saw the papers or not.

HK: Yes, I think it went very well.

BR: Okay, see you later.

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:32 a.m. - 6/18/73

K: Hello.

D: Yes.

K: Anatol, one other point. I've read the toast for tonight and I think it's very positive and good. I've only one comment on that third page about third countries.

D: The third page - third countries?

K: Yeh, where you made the other comment so that"some were attempting to cast dispersions on these efforts' - I wonder whether we could avoid criticizing third countries - whether we could just say this in a positive way. . . "nothing that we're doing here is directed at third countries" without polemicizing with them.

D: I see.

K: You see what I mean?

D: I understand, OK.

K: I think that would be very helpful.

D: OK, but I must see if they give it already to the press, I hope not.
I will intercept right now.

K: Good, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FO12058
By N.M.ABA. Date 06/30/73

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissin

9:32 a.m. - 6/18/73

*

K: Hello.

D: Yes.

D: I see.

K: You see what I mean?

D: I understand, OK.

K: Good, thank you.

DECT ASSIGNED
Authority E012858
D# NARA Dkt 6/2/73

TELE CON

Minister Idan/Kissinger

10:23 a.m. - 6/18/73

K: Hello.

I: Good morning.

K: Look, I'm running off to the Brezhnev meeting. I wanted to tell you
first that I've put off a discussion of the subject until Wednesday.

I: Yes.

K: And I think I can probably avoid a discussion of the issues that we
talked about. But just in case we can't, I will send Peter over or
you get together with Peter with a revised set of principles and look
at them. They should be ready within an hour.

I: OK, so if you see him will you tell him to get in touch with me or
should I get in touch with him.

K: I leave it up to you to get in touch with each other.

I: OK, I'll get in touch with him. Thank you very much.

K: OK.

DECT ASSIGNED
Authority E012858
D# 444 NARA Dts 6/18/73

*

TELCONE

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

3:42 p. m., June 18, 1973

J: The subject of your coming ..... Foreign Relations Committee.
K: Yes, Jack.
J: ... And I asked whether they had heard from you and Bill's office
had not up until today but then somebody may be wrong about that.
But in any case that wasn't the essence of our discussion. The essence
was my statement that you would be glad to come up and that I was
authorized to state that.

K: Absolutely.

J: Under the previous conditions.

K: Right.

J: At that point a considerable discussion ensued and the upshot of the discussion -- there was nothing that clandestine about it -- was that they would be glad to receive you on the same conditions but would wish to put on the agenda for this next discussion, whenever it took place, the proposition of when you come again, whether without a formal meeting nonetheless a verbatim record could be kept of what was said by you and by them. That would be the one point of say escalation if you will, of your relation to the Committee. I said I was in no position to say anything about that but that I saw --

K: I thought we were keeping a pretty verbatim already.

J: Well, the report was that about 75% of what was said was down but that it was not a verbatim record. I said that I did not see that upon this invitation we should change the ground rules but that we should put it on the agenda to discuss with you.

K: Well, my inclination is to do it.

J: Well, that's what I rather thought.

K: But I have to check, you know. As far as I am concerned, I'm willing to testify.

J: Well, you don't have to cross that bridge for this meeting.

K: No, no; I mean, to give my own personal views.

J: Of course. But it will be on the agenda if it's agreeable to you and Bill will mention that to you.

K: Why don't I call Bill?

DELEGATES
Authority E012858
DATE 6/29/73
By: KARA DRE

Telcon
Max Frankel/Dr. Kissinger

June 18, 1973; 4:15 p.m.

K: Hello.

F: Hello, Henry.

K: Max, how are you?

F: Fine, how are you?

K: Okay.

F: In the middle of the summit.

K: Yeah. Max, I wanted to make a protest. I think it's really inappropriate and close to McCarthyism to print a picture of me under a book review called The Politics of Lying, in your book review section.

F: That's a fair protest.

K: And I really -- no, I don't have to explain it.

F: No. That's a fair protest, and you're right, and it just whizzed by us, at least by me. And my apologies.

K: Okay.

F: No, you are absolutely right. The crazy thing is I looked at that page just the other day and no reason put two and two together because I had read the review some weeks ago and it didn't register.

K: Okay.

F: I am sorry.

K: Well, I know Max, this isn't your...

F: No, well, no, it's my responsibility.

K: I know it is in a way, but I know it isn't your view and I know it isn't your method.

F: That's right. And it's mindlessness. It's just too much. I'm sorry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01288
Dated 6/2/84
SARA DE

- 2 -

K: In many places. Well, I appreciate your reaction. Good.

F: How are things going?

K: Well, you know, it was just the first meeting and it went as you would expect. I mean it went well, but you can never finally make -- judge the ultimate outcome by the first meeting.

F: Right.

K: But I would think that on the basis of the preparations, I think there won't be any unpleasant surprises.

F: Well, good. I long to see you.

K: Well, I hope to see you. Are you ever coming down?

F: Sure. I'll let you know before I come.

K: Let me know and let's have lunch, and if I should come up I'll let you know.

F: Right.

K: Good, Max.

F: Thank you very much, and I'm sorry.

K: That's all right. Bye.

F: Bye.

DECE ANSIFIED
Authority E012858
D# NARA Dkt 6/27/74

Telcon
Senator Fulbright

June 18, 1973; 5:10 p.m.

K: Mr. Chairman?

F: Yes, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. Jack Javits tells me that he had talked to you about the possibility of my meeting with your committee, if you thought this was a good idea and a good time to do it.

F: Yes. When do you suggest?

K: Well, we'll be going to the West Coast at the end of this week, so we'd have to aim if we wanted to do it this week - we'd have to aim for Thursday. I have to go to a dinner at the Soviet Embassy, so we'd have to...

F: On Thursday?

K: Yes, well, I could do it say around 5:30. Or we could wait until about July 8, when I'm back.

F: Let me say, 5:30 until 7:00?

K: Something like that.

F: You've got to go to dinner at the Soviet Embassy?

K: Yes.

F: Well, let's see, I'm not going there. Why don't we make it 5:00 to 6:30, then?

K: I'd prefer that, if that's agreeable to you.

F: Yeah, I don't think there'll be any votes. Goddam it, I can't tell for sure, you know, Henry.

K: I understand.

F: This time of the year, we just had three votes, and then they go by a day, and there's just no way. In fact, Mike doesn't know when the votes come.

K: Yeah.

F: Well, why don't we shoot for 5 o'clock.

DECEMBER 9, 1973

Authority E012958

DATE 12/9/73

K: Okay.

F: And if we meet over there it... As far as I know the bills that are up are not ones involving my committee, you see. If that's true, then I'm in a hell of a fix. Let's make it 5, until I try to check tomorrow and see what the hell is up. There's only one thing that I've got pending that requires...

K: No, there is no morning that's good for me this week.

F: No morning?

K: No, unless you want...

F: Thursday morning? Would that suit you as well.

K: I could do it for breakfast on Friday morning, or at 8:30 after breakfast, if that's better for you.

F: Well, I'm afraid I couldn't get my colleagues here, you know.

K: At 8:30?

F: It's awful hard to. I know that's very difficult for them to get here. A lot of them live out and they don't get in early.

K: Yeah.

F: And it's hard for them to get here until the traffic eases up. I expect the best opportunity will be 5 o'clock on Thursday.

K: Okay. Let's aim for that. I always can run into unexpected snags with the Brezhnev visit.

F: Yeah, I know. Well if you do, just call us.

K: But it looks clear now.

F: That's in Room 201.

K: Good.

F: And did Jack tell you about our conversation about the discussion of any subsequent meetings this week?

DECLASSIFIED
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SARA Drec

3
---

K: Yes, I will try to get to the President before then.

F: Okay.

K: You know my views on it. I follow the local rules on this. I have no interest.

F: I know. A lot of the local rules have been changed.

K: That's why I think we can probably deal with that.

F: Yeah, I think they ought to be. We've done this long enough now the situation is getting where there's nothing all that sensitive.

K: I tend to agree with you, but I just would like to be correct about it.

F: Well, I just wanted you to know that that's what the discussion was, that that would be one of the matters we want to discuss.

K: Why don't we meet this time under the old rules?

F: That's right. That was the understanding.

K: And then we'll, I'm sure we'll come to an understanding about new rules.

F: That's my understanding. We meet this time under the old rules, but I told him that I thought we ought to review the continuation of this, because I think it's very important we keep records of our meetings.

K: I personally have no objection and I'm practically certain that there won't be any objections here.

F: That's fine. That will be a real step forward if we can do that.

K: They'll be kept on the basis of Executive Sessions.

F: Absolutely.

K: Good.

F: And with the same rules that they wouldn't be out except with your approval.

K: Right. Okay, Mr. Chairman. I admired the way you pursue your salami tactics.

F: I what?

DELEGATED
Authority E012858

Dated 6/2/04

PARKER

TELCONE

Mr. Laird/Mr. Kissinger

6:12 p.m., June 18, 1973

K: Hello.

L: Hello, Henry.

K: Mel, when you were a Cabinet member, I would go on first but now that you're a Junior member of the staff here --

L: Why, Henry, I always go on first. I always have.

K: I just want you to know that.

L: (laughter)

K: I clearly out rank you in seniority.

L: I know you do, it's terrible.

K: I just want to make sure we're being treated with the adequate respect.

L: Right.

K: Mel, on that fund cut-off, the situation, just for your understanding, which you can't repeat, is that the Chinese have promised us that they'd do something which they've never done before. And I can't imagine that they' would commit themselves to saying that they would do something unless they felt they had a chance of bringing it off.

L: Um-humm.

K: Now, in a way the more we can give them to work with, the better it is.

L: Yeah.

K: Can you talk to Mahon to try to get him to hold out as long as possible?

L: I already have and I will again.

K: Could you do that?

L: Sure.

K: Cause I know you have a lot of pull with him.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858
Dated NARA DRE 6/2/78

(June 18, 6:12 pm)

(Laird/Kissinger [contd])

K: Terrific.

L: Yeah. I will be glad to talk to him. The problem involved here is that he was given the understanding that he only needed to go to September 1st, and I told him that that was wrong. But--

K: Well, that's true in a way, if it doesn't look as if we--

L: Yeah, but the President, even if he signed something with a date like that would have to come up and say right flat out publicly that if you needed more time you'd have to ask the Congress for it.

K: You and I know he'll never get it.

L: Yeah, but he doesn't have to let on to that.

K: I'd much rather have it as a gentleman's agreement with Alpert and Mahon that if they put no date in then we'll cut it off by Sept. 1st of 15th or something like that.

L: Well, I'll talk to him again Henry.

K: Because I have to say this, if we don't make it by Sept 1st or 15th, then what we are doing now isn't going to work, and then we are not going to bomb in Cambodia forever.

L: Well, you see, they said they told me the Sept 1 date, so I mean, it's all right to say that, but not given the understanding you go and tell people all over Congress that.

K: Well, I agree with you. Could you look into it for us, Mel.

L: I certainly will Henry. It's tough though, I mean Mahon says it's never been as tough as it is right now.

K: I don't doubt it. And we are having lunch on Thursday.

L: Lunch on Thursday.

K: Good.

L: I'll see you a minute tonight anyway. I thought I'd go to that thing tonight.

K: Okay, well--

L: You'll be tied up with some broad though.

DELEGATED
Authority E012958
DATE NARADY 6/20/98

6:31 pm, June 19, 1973

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, this place is crawling with Russians.

D: Where.

K: Everywhere.

D: You should be sorry. You still in White House.

K: Anatol, have you ever had a chance to check with Gromyko about
taking that reference to the agreement out of the SALT principles.

D: Oh, you mean over there. His impression is the reference in general
terms, don't you think it could be no difference, because it is same as
the agreement in June, but what kind of agreement is not quite, you
could get--

K: Yeah, but your allies will think there's a secret agreement and you
know, we don't make any--

D: Not secret, but maybe they don't know what this is about.

K: Yeah.

D: So, he doesn't think my adaptation was good thing in general. But
for this particular day of Thursday, it could be interpreted for five
hours maybe and a nuclear peaceful, but next day in the morning they
sign it.

concluded

K: You know, we have completed, Anatol, that if the two leaders continue
to go on as they did today, Brezhnev has to stay another week.

D: Well, I agree with you. I think your President have to take more
initiative. You understand what I mean.

K: Of course.

D: Otherwise he's just sitting quietly. I think you are right.

K: Well it was good to--actually the mood is rather favorable on our side.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055
By W.M.aga 0600

TelCom

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:31 pm, June 16, 1973

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatoli, this place is crawling with Russians.

D: Where.

K: Everywhere.

K: Anatoli, have you ever had a chance to check with Gromyko about
taking that reference to the agreement out of the SALT principles.

K: Yeah.

concluded

K: You know, we have understood, Anatoli, that if the two leaders continue
to go on as they did today, Breshnev has to stay another week.

K: Of course.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012858
Dated NARA Doc 6/2/89

2

D: Well, this is the point really, rather the mood, but then I think the more they come to the end of the visit the more quicker they will go over all things.

K: You didn't want to tell us about the SS-9--

D: Well I think maybe later, when we go flying to San Clemente. They will have almost five hours to discuss it.

K: Right.

D: And to discuss where and how to put it.

K: That's what I figured.

D: I think this is the best way. As for tomorrow, then you will propose a meeting because today eat and then they have ________ in the second part of the day.

K: About 3:30.

D: 3:30 is fine, in the Cabinet Room.

K: Yes.

D: From your side, ____________

K: Yes.

D: Okay, so in our case it will take ____________.

K: Yes. If you want to have Alexandrov that's fine with us.

D: That's all right, huh. All right I will take him because --

K: No, you can have Alexandrov.

D: Okay. 3:30 in Cabinet--tomorrow 10:30 Brezhnev is going to meet him I mean to come to

K: No, we'll pick you up.

D: At the Blair house. Okay Henry.

K: The President doesn't know it yet, but he will pick you up.

D: I understand. But the Secretary General?

K: No, I pick you up.

CLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT
Authority E012958

HOTMAIL
Sent 6/2/04

TelCon
Amb. Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 pm, June 18, 1973

K: Hello,

C: Henry, It's nice to hear you, it's an unexpected pleasure.

K: I just saw your notes to Hal Sonnenfeldt. The one thing I'm a little bit--and I understand why you can't say, that you were consulted in advance. On the other hand, one wonders what is the benefit of consulting you in advance, except for getting your views.

C: Well sure, but really the point is this, you are talking about in NATO.

K: No, no, NATO I don't care what you say.

C: Well, but apparently Rumsfelt doesn't know that you have spoken to

K: Not yet, but we can't tell him eventually.

C: If you do that doesn't make any difference, we didn't want to embarrass you.

K: Oh, I see. Because we would on the whole prefer it if you would say yes it was discussed with you in advance.

C: Yes, I get your point.

K: I mean, we don't want to embarrass you but from our point of view because we've after all been fairly meticulous, and we've knocked out a number of articles that you've requested.

C: Yes, but you see there have been times that you've complained with perfectly good reason that we've --

K: No, no, yes, you are absolutely right, and its very meticulous of you. Why don't we assume then that I will tell Rumsfelt that you were told ahead of time.

C: Sure. I think that's perfectly all right. As long as you keep it to Ted Peck and they work it out together.

K: I will make sure that he does not tell anybody ahead of time.

C: That's right. We didn't want to get into a position that you'd be worried that we'd say something that Rumsfeld didn't know and State didn't know and so on.

CLASSIFIED

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2

CK: Right.

C: That's the only problem.

K: Good.

C: Try and keep the edges protected if you know what I mean.

K: I know very well. Rollie, also do you think Burke will be willing to come to the West Coast.

C: I'm sure he will, yeah.

K: Why don't we plan for a week after next.

C: Okay that the week, beginning the 2nd of July isn't it.

K: Right.

C: I'm sure he will and I'll talk with him about it.

K: Good. Thank you Rollie.

C: Thank you. That was the only problem?

K: No, no, I'm not complaining, I was just checking.

C: That's the reason.

K: Look, after ~~David's~~ a day with Brezhnev, paranoia sets in.

C: Well, I'm sure you had a lovely day.

K: Well you can tell your prime minister that Brezhnev is without doubt the most phenominal bore i have ever encountered.

C: Okay, I will.

K: Nothing went on all day but at great intensive length.

C: Oh really. This will go on ;most of the week I guess.

K: I afraid so.

C: Yes, I'm glad to hear the hearings have been called off.

K: That would have been a national disgrace.

DECE ANSIFIED

Authority E012858

PART 1 OF 2 DATED 6/2/78