TELCORN

Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger

Sat., Oct. 6, 1973

K: My view on that return unless you have an overriding thing, is until
-- first of all this thing may be over twenty-four hours. Second,
it might be amicably settled and third we should use the President when
it will do him some good. He must avoid looking hysterical. If
it turns bad, we will have to adopt the posture you used in Jordan.
See what I mean?

H: Exactly, I have taken care of it and he has settled down.

K: I will move into the White House when I get back. I will hold a WSAG
meeting there and I will make sure to be reporting to you in detail.

H: That is helpful. You know the game. You know the problem.

K: I know the problem. I am trying to get him involved in a way that
will do the country some good.

H: We may have to come back in any event tomorrow.

K: You may even want to come back tomorrow from my point of view. I
know what his problem is but it is not all that certain to turn out well
that he would want to be the man. It is one thing for him to be directing
the moves and another for him to be in the command post.

H: I agree.

K: By 6:00 tonight we will have a pretty good idea.

H: You can be sure. Tell me what you think and no second guessing here.

K: I know what you are up against. It is not the first one we have been
through together.

H: We are in good shape.

K: Fine.

END

TELCORN

Sec. Gen. Waldheim/ Sec. Kissinger

Sat., Oct. 6, 1973

W: I want to keep you informed of the developments here. Zahed (?) came to see the President and saw him in my presence. He asked him to convene an urgent meeting of the General Assembly. I mentioned this to you that he had already suggested that to me. He came then personally to the President requesting him to convene the meeting. The President reacted as I did. He said it was not technically possible. He cannot do it so quickly. After a lengthy conversation El Zahed agreed to send him a letter which he had prepared and signed in the office of the President and instead of having a special meeting of the GA he asked to circulate this letter. It is a two page letter which accuses the Israelis to have started the aggression and that they had to react and they accused the Israelis for having launched this aggressing along the Egyptian-Syrian border and continues the Israeli's policy of occupation of the Arab territory and the increasing of the utilization of the Arab territories.

K: I guess we will see it eventually.

W: It is an accusation of Israel for not having accepted the UN resolution etc. This is the situation and this letter will be circulated as a GA document on request of El Zahed, and to speak on Monday morning in the GA. He came to my office and told me that he had still no request for any Security Council debate. Is that right? I can imagine they don't want it.

K: We feel there should be a Security Council debate sometime later this afternoon and we will oppose any GA debate of the subject.

W: It is a case for the Security Council.

K: We do not think the GA competent.

W: It has been declined to have a GA meeting. We don't have this problem at least over the weekend. If El-Zahed asks for the floor, the President has to give him the floor. When I asked him, he said he would ask for the floor only when he sees how things develop. I think he wants to see how the military operations develop.

*

2.
Waldheim

Sat, Oct. 6, 1973

K: Yes. We will almost certainly support or call for a Security Council meeting this afternoon.

W: I have been contacted by some of the permanent members. Sir Donald Macklin suggested to convene the Council but I told him the best way is to consult with the other members and I assume he has done it in the meantime. That he contacted you.

K: We will be in touch within about an hour or two and probably then call for a meeting.

W: In my talk with Macklin this morning after talking to you, he told me he has no instructions whatsoever on this subject and that he does not know whether they will do something in this matter. He avoided any discussion of the substance.

K: Good. Mr. Sec. Gen., we will be in the closest touch with you. I am returning to Washington and I will call you from there to establish contact.

W: Thank you. I thought it important for you to know.

K: Very, and extremely helpful. Goodbye and I appreciate your cooperation.

W: Of course. We have gotten a series of cables now from our ceasefire observation groups. One think I wanted to add -- our Chairman there has made an appeal. He says, he has conveyed my appeal to the Governments of Egypt, Israel and Syria to adhere to the ceasefire agreement.

K: Thank you.

W: I wish you a good trip to Washington.

K: Goodbye.

END

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E 01285 8
Date: 6/29/84

DISTRIBUTION:

Telcon 10/6/73 5:45 2:10 p.m.

General Scowcroft -- Ambassador Dobrynin

D: Hello.

S: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Say, you are in your usual place.

S: I am in my usual place.

D: Well, I will call you then. (On the direct line)

S: Hello.

D: I would like to... Henry has just left New York and he is coming to Washington.

S: He has just left and I expect he will be here within an hour and a half.

D: Well, that is all right. I would to bother you in connection with a telegram that I received right now from my government.

S: O.K.

D: I received for the President and for Dr. Kissinger. The text of it is as follows: This is addressed to the President and Secretary of State Kissinger.

"The Soviet leadership got the information about the beginning of military actions in the Middle East at the same time as you got it. We take all possible measures to clarify real state of affairs in that region, since the information from there is of a contradictory nature. We fully share your concern about the conflagration of the situation in that area.

We are considering now as well as you do, possible steps to be taken. We hope soon to contact you again for possible coordination of positions."

This is the message for the President and for Henry.

S: O.K.

D: From my government and I will expect to receive shortly additional *refex* instructions concerning all the questions generated to because there is a meeting in Moscow now and in the highest leadership.

S: Right.

D: A sort of message.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: WW. G. Scott, CC-304

S: I understand.

D: Do you want me to repeat it to you, or you put everything down?

S: I think I have it down.

D: You have it.

S: You dictate very well.

D: Well, thank you very much. I am trying too, but after all we have a
3 star general here.

S and D laugh

D: and an Ambassador plenipotentiary. with extraordinary dictating.
[Laughter]

D: O.K.

S: Oh my, O.K. very good. I'll pass this on and then we hope to hear from
you later on.

D: O.K.

S: Thank you very much.

D: O.K. Goodbye

S: Good bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
E01207

By: MW

Saturday - 10/6/73

2:10 p. m.

Message to President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger from Soviet Government -
Telephoned by Ambassador Dobrynin.

"The Soviet leadership got the information about the beginning of military actions in the Middle East at the same time as you got it. We take all possible measures to clarify real state of affairs in that region, since the information from there is of a contradictory nature. We fully share your concern about the conflagration of the situation in the Middle East. We repeatedly pointed in the past to the dangerous situation in that area.

"We are considering now as well as you do, possible steps to be taken.
We hope soon to contact you again for possible coordination of positions."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAPAS D04
Date: 10/6/73

*

TELCORN

Deputy Secretary Rush - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

3:40 p. m.

R: Set for the 6:30 meeting. I have just talked to White House
security... He thinks there may be some security risk having the
Chiefs of Mission meeting and bringing together all the Ambassadors...

K: Tell the White House, let's just relax about that.

R: When I went to Tehran our own security people were raising hell. because as you know .... went off fine. I think we are making a great mistake if we went for that sort of thing.

K: Of course, I may be kept here by events if things get worse.

R: Still having WSAG meeting at 6:30.

K: Unless you want to come in at 5:30 and I'll tell you what the
strategy is.

R: Fine.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>RECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Author: E 012958</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>DATE: 10/1/73</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

*

TELCON

Ambassador Scali - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

3:45 p. m.

K: I had a sort of nothing response saying we got the information at the same time we contacted them. They would like to coordinate action with them and will contact us. I think we should hold off another hour or so until I can talk to Dobrynin.

S: That's just the opposite of the impression we are getting here. The information here is that Malik is being Security Council.

K: That may be the direction. They don't say coordinate action in the Security Council.

S: Right, and that we know definitely that Egypt doesn't want a Security Council meeting.

K: We are going to call them. I just want to have one more reading from Dobrynin.

S: Risk having a full scale debate on Monday.

K: Which we will oppose. We must make it clear that we are opposing...

S: Even if we oppose it, it will be supported by them... because the Security Council is in session, therefore the Security Council has prior jurisdiction. It will be overturned. We face public ...... complete right that the Arabs will bring big names into the Assembly.

K: In that case we will ... are going to have to... are determined to prove their ....

S: That depends where they want to make propaganda for a far better audience, far better foreign ministers to show up into the breech at the General Assembly. We will be of the Security Council ...... unless they wish to give Israel free reign to make defense......

RE:APPOINTED

AUTHORISED

8/2/73

BY ORDER OF THE
SINAI AGENCY

TELCORN

Dobrynin/sSec. Kissinger

Oct. 6

K: Anatol I have your message. I can't say it is a model of solidity.
It either means you are confused or you are cooperating with them.

D: With whom?

K: The Arabs.

D: Why.

K: What do you think it means. Will you explain it.

D: It was very clear that they do not know exactly what is going on but
from their side they will compare it -- we both will compare together
as for their definite planning we will do that later.

K: How much later? We feel very strongly and let me have your reaction.
The Egyptians want to put in the GAs and we consider this a frivolous
act. We must say if it turns into a GA debate, then we will let it
take its course. We are certain it will turn out to be a military
victory for the Israelis. Then everyone one will come to us. If it
turns nasty we will shut off communications for a while. We feel we
should put it into the SC.

D: Yes.

K: But we have turned it off until we have heard from you. How much
longer should we wait until we heard from you?

D: One hour. They are having a meeting there.

K: I will wait until 5:00 to make a decision. Let me assure you we want
to cooperate with you.

D: That is our answer.

K: That is my impression from your answer. What I said to you
is for the benefit of your friends. No one should think they can diddle
us along.

D: No. No.

RECEIVED
8
Authorised
AM 07/11/81
Date

2
Dobrynin

Oct. 6

K: And have a great propaganda debate on Tuesday, What we are thinking is weill call the SC. We will oppose without condemnation of either .side a .ceasefire and a return to the ceasefire line.

D: That is it.

K: I will send over to you a draft resolution.

D: It is changed?

K: No. Essentially what I told you.

D: Ceasefire and return to the ceasefire line.

K: Yes. I wanted to tell you I like the tone of your reply but I wanted to tell you if this thing drags on to Monday...

D: No. No. No. And if the Israelis win...

K: I have explained to Gen. Scowcroft today means it is only a matter of a few hours. It means a matter of hours.

D: Did I understand you to say a matter of hours.

K: Scoweroft says no more than necessary. If I have not heard from you by 5:00 you will hear from me. Now go back and watch the baseball game.

D: O.K.

K: Fine.

ENC

RECLASSIFIED

Authors: E 012358
Date: 06/24/87
D: AYARA

TELECON

Minister Shalev/Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

4:00 pm

K: How are you ?

S: Hungry.

K: Well that I can appreciate. Can't you get dispensation to eat on a crisis.

S: I have passed it on and they are preparing something.

K: What about the pilots? I hope they are eating.

S: Don't you worry. Special rations for thing of this sort.

K: Do you have anything more for me?

S: I hope I'll have it at some later point. I just have some information based on some phone conversations.

K: Since we talked?

S: Yes... They are slowly pulling them out. two bridgeheads.. we are able to establish. I think the number of planes we downed is about 20 on the Egyptian side and half of that on the Syrian side.

K: OK. In terms of strategy, please pass this on to Mrs. Meir, doesn't go any further, not the whole cabinet.

S: It will... nobody here.

K: You know that the Egyptians have asked for a special meeting of the General Assembly. It will go into a debate on Monday. Our judgment is the General Assembly is a bad forum for you... extremely bad. Officially Waldheim and Benites...in order to make effective we must call a Security Council meeting.

S: Yah.

K: We have had a response from the Soviets about the proposal... they are non-committal at this point. Saying they are studying the matter and they are trying to find out... May use it. Must keep it... ours in which case we will effect hard... 600 for the meeting of the Security Council for some time. Afterwards in order to have platform from which we can operate.

K: I understand... Force Soviets into that. . a position and that is our general strategy. If I have already told the Soviets if the General Assembly turns nasty into a propaganda battlefield, we will become very tough.

S: Yah.

K: I will be glad to have any. . current information, but this is what we have decided to do.

S: I will pass on to Mrs. Meir. I know from earlier conversation Soviet reply was not quite..

K: We don't know exactly what the Soviet reply is..

S: ...

K: What I have told you is the Soviet's reply is friendly at this point but non-committal. We would like some expression as to your strategy.

S: I will pass this on right away.

K: I know they have other things to do in Jerusalem, but if they could give us as frequent as possible a report as to.. help us from looking foolish. When is Dinitz coming back ?

S: Day after tomorrow, or tomorrow, not sure.

K: Keep us closely informed.

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 6/29/87</td></tr><tr><td>Attn:</td></tr></table>

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER __3__ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

DECLASSIFIED

Author: EO 12958
Date: 6/27/94
D: NARA Date: 6/27/94

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

4:25. p.m.

K: Our worst mistake was to throw you out of the Canal zone.

C: And a little late, it was a mistake.

K: Our first mistake was to push you into the Canal zone.

C: What did they do now?

K: I wanted to give you -- and this is for the Prime Minister only --
the general strategy. We hope to work as closely as we did in September
1970.

C: I'm sure we would wish to do that too.

K: Whatever the situation in Copenhagen, it doesn't apply with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean. Let me give you our reading of the situation. We are quite confident that the Arabs started this and we in fact were given assurances, when we transmitted to the Egyptians and Soviets our request not to launch pre-emptive attack. We told them that if Israel launched an attack, we would oppose them publicly.

C: Was this recently?

K: That was during the night, but it was too late to be ... to affect decisions. Once we had the information. Now the ... our assessment of the situation is this: We have approached the Soviets and proposed calling a Security Council meeting and that there be a simple resolution calling for a return to the cease fire lines and a cease fire. We are doing this because that is a neutral type of resolution which requires no condemnation and we suspect within a couple of days, unless our judgment is really off, the Arabs will be on their knees begging us to do this. We want to have a platform of having moved in this direction before that.

C: Before that, yes.

K: If the Soviets support us in this we are home free. If they do not, we will have to move quite drastically to make it clear that the Arabs were the aggressors in this particular instance, and more or less side with the Israelis. The reasons for this -- We are beginning, as you could see from the newspapers, and as I have told you, a series of diplomatic moves in an attempt to make at least some progress and this action depends on being able to convince the Israelis, to make other security guarantees.

CLASSIFIED

Author: E012958
Date: 6/7/73
From: AARAO

SECRET

17-B

Cromer/Idssinger

2.

C: I discussed with...

K: If they are not even prepared to see what we can do, then no guarantees by us will have the slightest significance. If the Soviets don't join us in quieting things down, you have to assume collusion before __________. We are not prepared to take them on. It is in the interest of everybody, including Western Europe, not to run across us in this particular instance.

C: When would the Security Council meet?

K: I have called Dobrynin. We have had already a reply from the Soviets. -- and I will not give anybody else the full flavor of this -- If the General Assembly turns into a propaganda battle, we will be unreachable for the rest of the week. No matter what beautiful speeches are given in New York. We will not then be as easy to deal with as we are now. C the other hand, we are willing to cooperate now to proceed on a neutral line.

C: Sure.

K: We will wait. -- I have given him until 5:00 and we will wait an extra hour until 6:00 this evening, to produce a reply from Moscow. If not, I have been asked by the President to ask Ambassador Scali to call for a Security Council meeting. We will not be condenatory at the meeting unless t__S__oviets turn towards the Arabs. We will be very grateful. If your representative could be instructed to coordinate support.

C: I will get on this right away.

K: Let me know what your representative is instructed to do?

C: Was this completely out of the blue, as it is to me?

K: Oh, yes, the first time -- and this is for your Prime Minister -- we were requesting __________ reports, even called in the Israeli Ambassador __________ they predicted fully defensive preparations. I got a report this morning. They were still maintaining that last night. We received the first confirmation this morning. Then I got on the telephone, gave assurances to everybody...but three hours later it started.

C: You have got friends, like in North VietNam and other parts of the world, they are a little unreliable.

K: In Moscow, you mean?

25x(1)

DECLASSIFIED

E012858

Attn: ANGARA DIO

SECRET

TELECON

Senator Masnfield/Kissinger

October 6, 1973

4:45 pm

K: Refused to communicate. We did... got the Israelis not to launch a preemptive attack, despite our efforts it started at 9:00 and both wit h... now engaged in lining up Soviets to join our approach to call Security Council meeting without condemning either party, return to the status quo ante, formalization of cease-fire.

M: Good, I think that's right.

K: A non-committal reply. Giving them another two hours until 6:00 to see whether they will join us. If no, we will have to go to the Security Council on our own, ask for a cease-fire and status quo ante, we don't want to do that, it will go on Monday into a fight in the General Assembly debates will be... Right now the Arabs are across the Suez Canal. They started with 5 bridgeheads and now are down to 2. By tomorrow evening none, then into Arab position.. have to be an even-handed position. no change in cease-fire lines.

M: Only course is to pursue... work down the middle line.

K: Ask for a simple resolution... hope to get it tonight.

M: Where are you? In New York?

K: No, I returned to Washington to start planning. I will talk to Senator Fulbright later tonight. Out of touch right now. If he thinks it desirable I'll tell him I will be glad to meet with the committee in Executive Session on Tuesday.

M: I suggest you contact George Aiken and Morgan in the House. Incidentally, on my way out yesterday before I came back, I paid a courtesy call on Chio Quang Hua.

K: Isn't that nice.

M: Much better than last time.

K: Didn't you have an impression of more warmth?

M: Oh yes. Much, much better than when I saw Quan Hua.. a couple of weeks ago.

END

TELCOM
Senator Aiken - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

5:00 p.m.

K: I wanted to bring you up to date. We tried to call you earlier but you were on the way back. We received word very early, around 6:00 a. m. that the Israeli's were concerned that an attack was imminent. We got in touch with Egypt, Soviets and the Secretary General of the UN.

A: Yes,

K: We asked the Israelis not to make a pre-emptive move. They agreed. We informed the Arabs of this but war broke out anyway... just not enough time. We are now trying to coordinate action with the Soviets to perhaps get a resolution in the Security Council to return to cease fire line and for a cease fire. The Egyptians don't want ... Security Council, they want ... General Assembly, and that... will turn into a propaganda battle. If we can't get anyone to come along, we will go ahead and call for a cease fire and return to the status quo ante.

A: Are you back in Washington?

K: Yes, Senator. So, the Russians are going to answer us in a couple of hours. I'll let you know what...

A: That will tell the story probably.

K: From the Russian point of view if they go along with an even-handed view, the Arabs will be furious.

A: Can't believe the Russians would do that... wish Scoop would drop his amendment...

K: I can assure you that it doesn't help matters any.

A: Well, it looks like it's up to the big ones now.

K: If we and the Russians can get together that might take care of it.

A: If I can do anything, let me know. I was at the Saudi Arabian Embassy last night, incidentally.

K: I will call in the next couple of hours or first thing in the morning.

A: Apparently this came as a complete surprise. I would have gotten wind of it last night... if...

TELCOM
Ambassador Scali - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

5:10 p.m.

S: Sending you a message on a flash basis but it will take 7 minutes.
Let me read it to you. ... I just finished talking with Security Council
President... feeling now developing among Security Council members
including British that instead of formal meeting there be informal
consultations among.... individual members... the aim of the
consultations would be to produce a piece of paper under McIntyre's
name of the name of the Secretary General which would appeal to
both sides only for a cease fire. I said we would be ..... to return
.... I questioned whether informal sessions of Security Council
would be adequate unless Security Council if formally seized of the
matter might lead to big General Assembly debate..... public attention
focused.... invoke formal session prior to .... could be expected.
MacIntyre said he feels call to parties to return to prior positions
would be ..... automatically voted down.... Malik felt very strongly
should be handled in General Assembly....

.... convene Security Council under Article 9. Call to have Security
Council meeting for US, Israel and Western powers .... expressed
very firm opinion formal Security Council meeting prior to Monday's
General Assembly could not ... legally..., so long as Security
Council session is already seized of it. Nothing could be done to
prevent speakers giving major emphasis to speeches...

..... El Zayyat has said he may address assembly Monday.
Maitland says his government feels it should be ... feasible for the
Security Council meeting to show something is being done. He is
very insistent on the point that return to prior positions... this would
be aimed... to positions of 67 or 48. We are simply

K: Try to end present fighting... anyone wants to return to '48 or '67 absolutely.

S: ... point he made... something should be done today. He felt that
a formal meeting would be far preferable to....

K: I understand. We are getting messages from the Soviets in the next hour.

S: What do I tell the other guests here. ... simple cease fire not adequate. not only in this case What you have outlined still stands?

K: Don't push it, we will have specific instructions in the next hour.

K

Ambassador Dobrynin and General Scowcroft

October 6, 1973 5:45 p.m.

**Dobrynin:** I have a reply from Moscow in connection with the two or three talks with the President on the convocation of the Security Council. Here is a summary:

We have a serious doubt about what kind of results could be achieved by a hasty convocation of the Security Council meeting right now. As far as we know not a single side asked for a convocation of the Security Council from the conflicting parties.

Secondly, the circumstances are not quite clear in a sense that there is not yet clear communications with the conflicting parties. We presume, both we and you, have no circumstance to have good communications with the parties of the conflict to find out what is going on. Under these circumstances, we feel it would be rather undesirable to have the meeting because this meeting would lead to open polemics between yours and ours as is well known our position in the Middle East is known. And our positions wouldn't change for this particular meeting of the Security Council. We would be forced to state our known position and open confrontation with you.

Our position in the Middle East for many years since '67--Israel who occupied Arab lands and victims of aggression, the Arab countries, whose territories are occupied. We don't think this will lead anywhere. We will be forced to say already there are good resolutions in the UN organization. The matter is to fulfill them. We feel it is undesirable to convene the Security Council. At the same time in the complicated and rather dangerous situation,

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAGUS C-0304

TELECON

Minister Eban/Kissinger

October 6, 1973

E: Detailed report..

K: If you could get it to me as soon as possible. If you give it to our people in .... they will make ... copies and they will have it in Damascus before I see it.

E: The Syrian advance fell because of nightfall. A garrison surrounded at ______ (Harmer). No communication with the people in it. We have destroyed 60 tanks. A number of ours are out of action. Syrians have fired X 3 missiles of the frog type, that's.

K: I know what that is.

E: They didn't fall ______ where intended. Fell in a small valley (Mikal). Bombarded the Kibbutz... 10 killed in the North and 30 wounded.

K: How many planes were shot down.

E: I don't know that. On the Egyptian front our position is difficult. Secure a foothold on the eastern bank. Have a bridgehead and during the night will try to pass forces over them. They shot one air to ground missile toward Tel Aviv. One of our aircraft shot it down-- brought it down while still in the air. Brought down about 15 of their helicopters. Lost 3 aircraft on the Egyptian front. 50 killed and 140 wounded.

K: This is the sort of information -- you have no idea of any plans -- offensive..

E: Our Defense Minister said it will take some days but we will restore our position. I have confidence we will restore it.

K: You think we should not be precipitated ... what is your personal view.

E: That is my personal view.

K: of not being precipitate. The ability of our government is not to be precipitate is well tested.

E: There are all degrees of precipitation even when the debate is beginning.

K: Ipm considering whether to go tonight or tomorrow.

E: I would say tomorrow....

END

REDACTED

8/21/73

Anon.

AARWMD Date

TELECON

Haig/Kissinger

October 6, 1973

6:05 p.m.

K: we are considering possible steps we are taking. Dobrynin says we'll hear again in another hour. In New York the Egyptians are against the Security Council meeting. The Soviets are without instructions. The British are getting cold feed. I'll wait til 6 for the Soviets. If we don't get it we call the Security Council.
By tomorrow if we haven't got them to stop it we will be accused of collusion. ... a wild propaganda battle in the GA we will shut off our phones. They had better come to us now. ... Defense wants to turn against the Israelis. At this stage a Israeli-Pakistan situation.

H: Sounds like Clements

K: It's manageable here. Around 6:00 I'll call the Security Council meeting. In New York as I was leaving a microphone was pushed in front of me. I told them the President has instructed me to return to Washington. As a former Deputy of mine... do you agree with this approach?

H: I think that's fine. The only assessments we need to worry is how the Soviets read us.

K: We cannot be soft guys. In this case. It will help us on MFN and,

H: No we can't be soft.

K: You will be kept informed.

H: We'll be here.

<table><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>DTA Date: 01/01/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

K: I haven't seen the text of your message yet. give me your interpretation.
What do you think ... really saying. It will be polemical.

D: My impressions that we don't have information from the Arabs.
Tomorrow will be alright. They find it will be polemical session.
a small unit and on first line you and we will be. They don't like this
idea.

K: What are you saying?

D: None of the participants are asking for the Security Council so what's
really for us to do... then this forced you to say old story about our
position...

K: What we have is a case of a military attack. A difficult position.
a question of negotiation... It is one thing for the Soviet Union to take
a stand in preoiminary negotiation... it is another to take a stand after
hostilities have started... in 3 days you'll be beggin us for it.

E: I understand... our position. In Moscow don't want to become involved
immediately. They will try to get territory back...

K: What are you telling them privately?

D: We don't like this idea.

K: Yet -- if you knew of it why didn't you consult with us.

D: Not a question of that --

K: We told Gromyko what; our intentions to do... we Told...

D: The question is how far do we go or not go. The situation could be
some discussion on our...

K: If there was evacuation on your part.

D: I don't have that information...

K: two conclusions...

D: Just saying we don't like this idea.

K: I would have though in light of questions... you might have given us your view... and we did not inform... ahead of time. If we had you would have every right to complain. We assume there was an evacuation... everything moot on Monday. Then we have to argue in front of 100 people... three points: first, public opinion, secondly Congress, and then the special relationship we thought existed between us. If you tell us in debate on Monday... we understand... you tell us to wait we will have a real donnybrook... do you know what that means? We will have a brawl in the General Assembly. and will then make it insoluable. We've been holding up the Israelis on bombing. I don't know if we can keep this up.

D: That's clear to me.

K: Zayyat has asked for the floor on Monday.

D: All I can tell you is that I will talk to Moscow.

K: I'll talk to Key Biscayne and tell you what we are going to do.
I'll call you back so don't go to Maryland.

END

TELCOM
FonMin Eban - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

6:25 p. m.

E: I have a very detailed report on military situation up to this minute. Perhaps I could give it to you now.

K: All right.

E: In the future, perhaps I could give it to your people instead of...

K: Depends on what people. The important thing is to get it to Washington as quickly as possible. If we could do that it would be a help.

E: Syrian advance has been checked because of the nightfall. Garrison surrounded... (place name) but we do not have a report on what has happened to the people in it. We have no communication from them. We have destroyed 60 Syrian tanks. A number of ours have been put out of action. Haven't been given a number. Syrians have fired three missiles of the "frog" type. They fell ... not where they were intended. They were destined for Nazareth, but fell in a small village called (place name) causing civilian casualties. Also kibbutz (place name). There are 10 killed and 30 wounded.

K: How many planes?

E: We don't have that. On the Egyptian side our base described the position on the Egyptian front as difficult. Have managed... to get a foothold on the Eastern bank in a couple of places. Definitely ... got a bridgehead ... air-to-ground missiles aimed toward Tel Aviv. On of our air craft managed to shoot it down from the air while in flight. We have brought down about 15 of their helicopters full of troops and 10 of their aircraft and we have lost three aircraft on the Egyptian front. On the Egyptian front... losses more drastic... 50 killed 100 wounded. Total 60 killed and 140 wounded on this Yon Kippur day.

K: I understand. You don't have any idea... on plans.

E: Defense Minister said it will take some days but we will... improve position and confident with time we will be able to..... it.

K: Another item. We are considering going to the Security Council... think we should not be too percipitous?

E: I will get a judgment. If it is feasible... but if they enter the

TELCONE
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

6:40 p. m.

S: Security Council now holding meeting... shall we stay where we are?

K: I heard they are not going to call a formal meeting, but have informal consultations. Same position...to be forea cease fire and return to the status wuo ante, and you should not call attention to.....following points:

If we call only for a cease fire, we would be using the UN to sanctify aggression.....can grab territory, ask the UN to call a cease fire and then if the victim.......creates a dangerous precedent.

If the military situation takes a turn and Israeli starts beating
up on the Arabs, it should be kept in mind that we are prepared
to stick, even if ....with the resolution for a status quo ante.

It would be unbecoming for the UN to turn itself into a .....
that is our position and we will maintain it throughout the crises.

As Popper pointed out we did not follow it in '67 but in
'73 we will.

S: We are following it in '73 is the main point.

K: Yes, the main point, but I think we should stay calm and not go around discussing it too much. I will let you know whether we decide to go directly for a Security Council tonight, when we've got more information.

TELCORN
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger

October 6, 1973

H: Just talked to the President. He feels that we possibly should not wait too much longer for the Soviet answer before moving with the resolution.

K: Exactly right. First, though, a Soviet answer is coming in now. Second, my recommendation is to move tonight, whatever is in the answer we move into the Security Council as soon.... We will put forward a call for a cease fire and return to the status quo ante before the fighting started. The reason is we have to do that is we will be rewarding the attacker....once the Israelis start beating up on the Arabs ...israelis grab Arab territory. I feel we must recommend cease fire and return to status quo ante if it gets voted down...best position with the Chinese. Can't have precedents set in which ... can grab territory and then call for a cease fire.

H: Henry, what do you think about our announcing here, first on that thing.

K: That's fine. Just say that the President has instructed Dr. Kissinger to move immediately ....Wait for the Soviet answer. Its coming in now but I will let you make the announcement down there. I'll call you as soon as I have got the answer

TELCORN
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6

K: Here is what we will do. In deference to the message which you have sent us we will not go to the SC to night though it originally was to go at 6:00 o'clock. We will wait for a decision on how to proceed until 9:00 tomorrow.

D: In the morning.

K: Yes. Give you a chance to go to church If you could get me an
answer from Moscow which is a little more specific than this.

D: On what.

K: What exactly are your intentions. My impression is --
I understand you dont want to get into a public disassociation.

D: I will put it quite friendly. We are rather in a difficult position
publicly.

K: If you can give us some indication what you are doing privately.
You and I have handled these things private. We are interested in
the results. We want a ceasefire and status quo ante. I repeat
by Tuesday you will be asking us. It is not a question in which we
are asking for a favor. We are trying to prevent an exacerbation
of our relationship. A situation where in this country and the
Congress will have very serious consequences. If you tell us you are
working with the Egyptians and the Syrians and by Monday morning
this will be over and no further debate is necessary.

If you will tell us that you believe that by Monday morning that
there is in effect a ceasefire and return to the status quo ante.
We don't want this to become a public affairs. Tell us something
we can understand. It will be kept confidential as everything has
been kept between us. I am not asking for you to agree for con-
certed public ation. I am asking you tomorrow morning for a concerted
practical action. That will lead to the result we want. I genuinely
believe and you will tell Gromyko and Brezhnev by Tuesday at the
latest the situation will be a different show. Right, no?

D: I understand.

K: Our reading of the situation is that the Arab attack has been
totally contained that now they are going to be pushed back and
this process will accelerate as the mobilization is completed which
will be no later than Monday morning and after that we will see what we have

*

2

Dobrynin

Oct. 6

seen before. This is our military reading of the situation. We think
if the matter could be wound up tomorrow. The Arabs have proved
their point. They have attacked across the Canal. They can
withdraw on their own and return to the status quo. We can both
enjoy a good SC debate.

D: I don't understand in a political sense what do you think.
What do you want from our point of view our position which is a
principle from the beginning of '67.

K: I know your position.

D: It is not a public debate that I am telling you for use to tell
the Arabs is very difficult. I had rather hear from Moscow but as
I understand our position the difficulties we are now facing is that
Israel the Arabs are trying to regain the lands occupied by
Israel. They have been using that argument to us and for us to
tell them you cannot free your land, it is rediculous.

K: I recognize the situation. I am not saying it is all easy.
We have a different situation. There have not been any raids
on Damascus and Cairo but I would not bet anything on tomorrow.

D: I understand.

K: Is it possible for the Politburo to imagine a complete course
of action which we agree on privately.

D: What course of action do you propose besides SC.

K: A defacto return to the status quo ante a defacto return of the
ceasefire. I have already told the Egyptians that I would make
an effort after the Israeli election. I have told Gromyko I would talk
to him in January. None of this we will do if these pressures
continue.

D: I understand.

K: We have a framework out of which we could crystallize. The
Arabs have now proved their point.

3
Dobrynin

Oct. 6

D: Henry, how could they?

K: You see they are going to lose. It is not a case where we
are asking. Not like India and Pakistan.

D: I understand. The military point of view. I cannot argue
with you. You know the situation better. I am trying to
understand the situation better politically. Million or half a million.

K: What? They have next to nothing.

D: What is the question -- asking them to return somewhere if they have nothing.

K: We have two choices; we can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed out of every territory but before they start heading for Damascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. Probability is that the Arabs can hold on another 24 hours and then going to retret to their capital and wait for winter.

D: I understand what the situation really is. But for us to go to the Arabs and say look here I don't know how many you have one - one or two miles but you have to go back. They say you invite us to give back territory that belongs to us.

K: Can you not say that it was your understanding that an effort
was going to be made for negotiations. They have proved their
point of the urgency in which they see this and this is a good
psychological moment for them to make a generous gesture
rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities.
By Monday evening they will be flown out of there anyway.

D: I understand.

K: This is a new strategy of using the threat of ones own defeat.

D: I know. There are many that could be said. The question is from the practical way. From a practical point of view because they put on us all the cats and dogs. On the Russians because we asked them to give back that land which we have already said....

4
Dobrynin

Oct 6

K: I understand your dilemma.

D: They will say you are in collusion with the US and Israeli.

K: Who will be the first.

D: Cairo. From a man you met. The Russians were in collusion with the US and (unable to understand).

K: If you and we could find a way of settling this now then it would be an overwhelming argument in all of the things we have been going through as to what the practical consequences have been of our relationship.

D: I understand.

K: I think it would overwhelm in one blow all of these things we have been facing. If it goes the other way and Monday you and we are going to be up at the rostrum calling each other names. It will be a disaster.

D: I can assure you we will not be calling the US names. I am not sure what the Israelis will be calling.

K: You know some of the local people cannot always distinguish those two.

D: We will try to put them out of the country on this particular American line. You understand?

K: I understand.

D: This we could take care of.

K: It still would not change the objective condition. The various people who are harrassing you will be more inflamed.

D: I know. That is why I keep returning to the practical thing. You understand.

K: I understand it.

D: They would say you have spoken of liberating. It is impossible for us.

*

5
Dobrynin
Oct 6

K: I think directed against both of us.

D: For us to tell Sadat make a communique.

K: Anatol with all due respect we will face this problem somewhere in the next 48 hours. Suppose you do nothing and we do nothing by Tuesday, or Wednesday at the latest the Arabs will be defeated unless our estimates are wrong. At that point what are we going to do.

D: Did you approach once more the Egyptians.

K: No. You think I should.

D: I think you should. Tell them your estimate. Otherwise it would be such an invitation. You are right and we their friends are saying go back from your own land.

K: I will approach them to night and I will call you after I have talked to them.

D: I think it would be much better. From us, it would look like we are trying to sell them out.

K: We have to leave it at this. We will not go to the SC tonight to give ourselves a chance to think. You think and we will think. Try to get me an expression from Moscow by 9:00 in the morning.

D: Ask for 9:00-6:00 9:00. That is 5:00.

K: Tell them they will have to go to early mass.

D: They would find it strange to have these kind of discussions going on over the weekend.

K: I can imagine what kind of discussion is going on there. I understand the _______ are very happy today.

D: N This is a basic problem. I also understand your ingenuity.

K: If I have any ideas I will call you.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E 012958
Date 10/2/67

6
Dobrynin

Oct 6

D: Not at night. I go to sleep quite early.

K: You are not going to bed now are you.

D: No.

K: What you have to understand is if it turns into a propaganda battle on Monday in the GA, then our only protection is to be extremely tough and to teach the facts of life to people who like to make great speeches and we will see what is more important -- a speech or reality. I will be very brutal. That will be our strategy. We want to get it settled before then at least with an understanding.

D: As from the US no particular attempt from our side.

K: Anatol, in the GA it will be a bloody mess. No body can control it.

D: You are right.

K: It is going to be a blood bath.

D: It is true.

K: Then your allies are going to get up there and you will have to do as well as they.

D: As to speaking about allies I read you were going to build a pipeline.

K: A pipeline.

D: I mean your Asian friends.

K: I am saying the GA will be a mess. Why don't you report to this to Gromyko.

D: You keep in mind what I mentioned to you. About asking them to withdraw from what is theirs.

K: I understand that problem. Maybe there is some formula we can both think about. Let's not let time slip by. I believe the military will rapidly deteriorate and we will be in a mess.

END

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E O 12858
Date: 6/1/87
At: NARA DCS

*

TELECON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 6, 1973

8:20

K. Just talked to the President again. He just wanted me to reaffirm to you personally that he supports everything I have said to you and that..... said that we will wait another 12 hours. I explained your problem. He has no complete idea at the moment. Wait until 9:00 to decide on some position he will take.. May not be public.

D. Public position?

K. That is not decided yet. Whatever he will have to do he will have to do without cooperation with you.

D. Understandable, don't want to understand that... isn't to Moscow decided to do at a .......

K. Not yet decided to do it. Originally decided to do something tonight. Now want to wait to see whether something else can emerge.

D. There are no specific....

K. He just asked me to call you to reaffirm.

D. Thank you, if you have any suggestion I will appreciate, especially in Moscow. They will appreciate. This is really the point.

K. O'k I will call you.

WELL COMMUNICATED

Author: E012858
Date: 09/24/73
D. MARSAS DOR

TELCON

Ambassador Bennet/HAK

October 6, 1973/8:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

B: Yes Mr. Secretary.

K: Were you with Scali at the...

B: Yes I was sir.

K: What happened.

B: We were successful in preventing any statement tonight.

K: Well, did anyone want to make a statement.

B: Yes. The Australian President had a statement already prepared Which would have said that tomorrow that we were consulting for meetings that I have it right here in front. I can read it to you if you like.

K: Yes.

B: The President of the Security Council announced on 6 October that he had consulted urgently the members of Council on the fighting which had broken out in the Middle East that day. Paragraph. On the basis of information so far available the members of the Council had expressed serious concern that the situation which has developed and deplored the fact that hostilities had been resumed in breach of the cease fire. Paragraph The President had been authorized by members of the Council as a first step to ask the Secretary General to call on all sides for an immediate cessation of all military activities and to report promptly to Council members on their response. Paragraph. The members of the Council had authorized these provisional measures in accordance with of the juanta without prejudice to the rights and claims or positions of the parties concerned. John Scali pointed out that this would be quite unacceptable from our side without a withdrawal at the same time that was coequal with the ceasefire from our point of view.

K: Very good.

RECLASSIFIED
Author: E012958
Date: 10/1/73
By: ANGARA

*

B: And the final upshot of it was consultation with the British, French, Austrians and the Australians and the upshot was they agreed on no statement at all and John said that he would hope to have instructions by 10 in the morning.

K: Good. Perfrdct.

B: The Chinese have taken the position that they will not agree to any statement because neither Syria or Egypt has asked for Security Council action.

K: Would they agree to a meeting tomorrow?

B: I suspect they will oppose it but every member has the right to call for it.

K: But that means they'll veto any action.

B: That may well be the result.

K: OK. Bye.

B: We'll be here and John is making his Columbus Day Speech at the Waldorf.

K: No, you tell him he's doing a great job.

B: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

*

TELCORN

Foreign Minister Zayyat

October 6, 1973/8:48 p.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hello

K: Mr. Foreign Minister. How are you?

Z: Fine thank you.

K: I just wanted to touch base with you at the end of a rather hectic and I'm
sure rather trying day for you and for all of us. Let me tell you candidly
what our evaluation is and I'll speak to you in the candor that we always
have. First, I thought we had done rather well in our discussions
yesterday, in establishing a basis of some mutual confidence and I look
forward to seeing you down here and resuming our discussions in November.
Now we are in the difficult situation that if the fighting doesn't get stopped
in a reasonable time events may again get out of control. Now, our
evaluation is that if the fighting goes on the Israelis will probably gain
the upper hand. You know, you can disagree with this but this is our
estimate and therefore when we suggest that we would prefer a ceasefire
plus a restoration of the status quo anti...

Z: Anti what Mr. Kissinger.

K: No anti, before this last round started.

Z: Very strange.

K: I understand your point and we talked about that on Friday but then that
will in time work to the advantage of the Arab side if the evolution is
the way it may be. I just wanted you to know on a personal basis that
if the fortunes of war should go the other way we would not look with
favor on any further Israeli territorial claims. And we would like to
have this thing wound up in a way that does not make it more difficult
to resume what I thought was a beginning of a better possibility for
discussion. I don't have a very concrete proposal and we have tried to
be restrained today in the hope that perhaps something could be developed.

Z: Of course the question of you know when you think about 5,000 Egyptians
killed and then going back to where we were is something out of the
question, in Cairo. If I were in Cairo I would think madness.

K: How many Egyptians killed?

*

Z: I don't know how many people but I don't know how many killed but could be thousands killed.

K: Of course, our impression is that the action was initiated probably by your side this time but we may be wrong.

Z: Even so, but how can you advise anyone after doing this to go back where he was. I mean this is completely unreasonable. And just remember that you were speaking what can we give them since they *ceasefire*. Everything was so good that they started the *cease/ the fact of their* occupation for 7 years 6 years was quite alright because of the ceasefire. I think it better for them and the evolution to find there is a war really and therefore find a solution for it.

K: That I agree with you on completely.

Z: They were so pleased and didn't want to do something because there was a ceasefire. And the ceasefire which was costing us every day that which I spoke to you about. I don't know who began this or how it began but we should move with the best ______ which we have now.

K: Which is what?

Z: I don't know but a position of going back to where we were of course nobody can suggest this to the government but me anyhow but I don't know what other positions are up. I didn't go to the Council because really I ______ to a rough frame. I didn't know what to do in the Council, the Council can have votes with me but with one veto. XXXXX

K: What is your view?

Z: I don't know. Do you have any suggestions. You have been studying this for some time and you know the other people we don't have relation with them.

K: You see our theory is that the other side is going to launch a very strong attack within the next day or two and then we will have another major problem to contend with and we would like to keep the fighting contained as much as possible to give diplomacy an opportunity. I mean you have certainly made your point which you had already made to me eloquently about the intolerable nature of the situation.

Z: The situation is really impossible for us. It has been repeatedly said this is American land. Nobody can ______. Security was assured for Israel by the water canal and therefore how can they leave the security.

*

K: No, I think it was a very effective operation in many ways.

Z: There is no security there. Security is possible only at the acceptance of coexistence.

K: I unfortunately don't have a concrete plan Mr. Foreign Minister but I do believe you have made a very, the events of today, have made a very strong point and now the question is how to go from here to some positive result rather than to an expansion of the war which then could reverse many of the things that have happened.

Z: I would like Cairo.. I would do anything. I don't care very much for war or for all this kind of thing.

K: Look, I really, you convinced me yesterday very much of your serious intent and good will.

Z: In any world how to get peace is the most important thing.

K: I couldn't agree more.

Z: The question now, what can I suggest to go back to establish the ______ of yesterday. I don't think I can even whisper it.

K: Supposing it happens in a day or two anyway.

Z: You know ______ of their occupying Cario because then we have the German ______ or the British ______. I hope that you are not going to help them do that.

K: Certainly not. I told you we will oppose it.

Z: Yes. So I think if there is no extra help from anywhere we can defend what we have to the best of our abilities but there is a point now that this question of security was over-rated and perhaps no protection. We can tell that now and begin asking something, doing something perhaps.

K: That I understnad and from that point of view we now show statesmanship. Something positive could emerge out of all of this. If it's done in some concrete and practical way. That's why I called you know, I don't really know. I just wanted you to know that I'm open for discussion and that we are not lined up in order to create difficulty.

Z: Well I should hope not because it is not good for anyone.

K: But you see this now goes to the General Assembly.

Z: I'm not going to the General Assembly. There is a mistake about that. What I wanted to do is to give the General Assembly the note I gave them today. On Monday I am going to give the ____ again and that's all. We don't want a debate in General Assembly.

K: You do not want a debate.

Z: No.

K: Well, that is a misunderstanding. I thought that you wanted it.

Z: No. I don't want it until November to give you a chance. What I am expecaed to do is to read the letter which I gave to the President today to read it as a statement of what had happened and sit down and hear other speakers of ______ as they wish. Because there was no meeting today I ______ any demand or request for a debate. I know the radio says difference but I hope you look ______. But I didn't ask for a debate and did not even raise the question. If this would help. But this is something ______. Ask them what is going to happen in the spot, this is more important.

K: Now supposing you know we said we were going to give this opportunity. How can we get the fighting stopped now.

Z: I don't really know. You are far away. You can have more cool head, you can tell me what to think and I plan to take a plane tomorrow morning to see the President and then come back. I will do anything because I sincerely believe until the end all wars are going to end by some sort of peace and the peace that we want. For this I think there is understanding, you have said it repeatedly.

K: You explained that to me on Friday.

Z: Yes, and it has been said before you can say clearly, perhaps you cannot say it but this a fact. So if we can have any encouragement of any endorsement of this by America for example you can ____ think clearly that the ____ of all states to preserve rewards for rewards. Something like this. I'm not speaking for myself. I don't know, can you think about it until tomorrow and we will call you again and see what can be done.

K: Let me think about it tonight and I will call you tomorrow.

Z: I think this is a chance for Americans to do something and if you were sincerely, and I'm sure you were, ____ of the ____ of _____. Now is your chance to speak to them both, without the great confidence that

*

TELCOM
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

9:07 p.m. 10/6/73

K: I just called Zayyat to take his temperature, and the guy is in a panic--he says he doesn't insist on having an assembly debate and if I tell him not to have one, he'll cancel it, and all he wanted to do is to read his letter and if I tell him that's no good, he won't do it, and I said why don't you go to the statusquo ante--he said if I proposed that they'd kill me--

S: That's understandable from his point of view.

K: But he said if I had any proposal at all, he would get on the next plane to Cairo, he said, could I say that we stand for the territorial integrity of Egypt, probably not, can we?

S: Well, territorial integrity of Egypt well no, I don't think you should get yourself in that at the moment. You have told him what you can, namely, we're for the restoration of the statusquo ante--

K: No, no, no, no, no. I mean for the ultimate negotiation

S: I know he is referring to the ultimate negotiation and they will interpret that as you having given a commitment in terms of total sovereignty. I think you have to stick to the formulas you have stuck to thus far, namely, reconciling sovereignty and security on the ultimate settlement.

K: Look Joe can you think up, he pleaded with me to give him anything tomorrow morning and I think he is looking for a face-saving thing but you think of something I can say to him

S: Right, that will at least be encouraging

K: If he wants to claim as a new initiative, even if it doesn't mean anything.

S: Just a--yes

K: Just a paragraph. Can you think of?

S: Sure, let me focus on it, I'll come up with something.

K: I'll be back in 45 minutes.

S: At the moment I'm organizing a few of the long-going studies that we need to do as a result of WSAG.

K: What I need you to do is think up that one paragraph

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

10/6/73 9:10 p.m.

K: Hello, I called your ally, El Zayyat

D: Yes, what was his reaction?

K: I think you can keep them.

D: (laughs)

K: Total irrationality, if you want my frank opinion. It was discouraging on one level and encouraging on another.

D: Just beginning to look for the good news.

K: He said he doesn't insist on the debate himself, on Monday and if we tell him not to have it, he won't have one.

D: If we tell him?

K: If I

D: If you tell him

K: Yeh.

D: But you tell him. But you mentioned to him that ______ to have it, I'm sure.

K: I told him I'd call back tomorrow.

D: Why didn't you tell him from the very beginning?

K: I told him I'm against it.

D: But you said that he will do it if you talk to him, so what is he waiting?

K: I want him to think a little bit. I told him I'm against the debate.

D: Why is he waiting then?

E: If you would let me finish, what he wants also is another thing, I told him our assessment was that they would be driven back at least to where they were, he said he cannot propose withdrawal to Cairo, they'd fire him. But he said if I propose anything at all to him, they would be very receptive.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: MW

Date 06-07-73
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D: This I think is what I really--what I tried to tell you in the sense not to just propose withdrawal but to provide them with something.

K: Can you give some thought to some formula overnight?

D: About what kind of things we could propose?

K: Yeh, I don't know myself, if I have an idea, I'll mention it to you.

D: Okay, I will put it this way, Henry, because this is really up to __________, but I would rather if you have a chance by 9:00 to get in touch with Cairo (?) but I will try to do it.

K: Well, or maybe to us.

D: I understand in this case, but either your proposal would like to consult Cairo--not a proposal they wouldn't accept--what really they had in mind--to mention indications outlining their thinking.

K: Yeh.

D: So this kind of thing would be whether he would like some kind of statement from both of us, or mention to them in order to get them set up to say look here, I was then, but I was asked to do on with --I don't know--oil consultations or something along this line, you see.

K: Exactly.

D: He'll understand.

K: That's my impression.

D: This is the point, so to be more precise, do they want really peace because ask if something is unacceptable--it is one thing, or would it be in more general terms this would be good preparation, but at the same time emphasizes once again the urgency of the situation which we told you and they told you.

K: Exactly.

D: So along those lines, I think it is all right.

D: That's the way I think.

D: So, I will put this in to M. scow, but the only thing I'm no sure they will get back by 9:00, but in any case, they will try their best to make a decision--preliminary observation by tomorrow.

K: Exactly.

D: Okay, Henry. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01295
By: WW. CAPTAIN J. O'KISS

TELCONE
Sec.Gen. Waldheim/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

W: I wanted to give you the latest information we got from our observer units. There is fighting in all sectors. The Egyptian ground forces have crossed the Canal in five places. The impression we have is this is really a rather big scale operation and it goes on to say the Syrian forces have crossed lines near and south of Kanetra. This is about the cable we got a few minutes ago.

K: Thank you very much. I appreciate it and we will reciprocate by letting you know anything we learn.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSETER</td></tr><tr><td>Author: EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/24/73</td></tr><tr><td>BY: A.M. KARMA Dote</td></tr></table>