TELCOM
Len Garment/Secy Kissinger

4/17/74 - 11:23 a.m.

G: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay.

G: They may already be resolved, but I have a fairly strong feeling that it will be helpful to go for the bundle on the aid to --

K: Oh, come on. Look, tell the Israelis to lay off. They know -- they're again going through one of their suicidal periods.

G: Well, that may be, but these have happened only occasionally that I've gotten a very strong sense of their being in that kind of a state.

K: There's no chance of our giving them the whole thing now before Syrian disengagement. I mean, we also have the Arabs to consider. What should we give them $1.5 billion for? I have worked something out with Dinitz which we're going to do this week, and then we'll do the rest afterwards. We've got our Arab position, too, to worry about.

G: Um-humm. You say, why do it? I think it's --

K: I'm telling you, if you want to do something, you tell the Israelis to be helpful on Syria because I'm going to withdraw from the negotiations if they're not going to do it. And then let them see how they can stand the whole world in international forums.

G: Well, can they -- I understand that, Henry, and I've only partially cause to make this presentation --

K: Yeah, but look at our position. Here we are with a war going on on the Golan Heights with no progress whatever on disengagement, you want the President to announce he's giving a $1.5 billion credit to Israel? Do you think the President will approve this? He hasn't even approved $500 million yet.

G: Well, I think he should.

K: Why?

G: Because I think it would be a message of consistency in strength.

K: Well, he will do it --

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Len Garment/Secy Kissinger (cont'd)

2

G: ... some people that are not persuaded by anything because of their own fanaticism and there are others who will get the message that there is some consistency no matter what's going on on the homefront. And I think that the Israelis do have some intuition of a tragic destiny that may be multiplied by their congenital hysteria and I think at this time that kind of resolution of this particular problem would have a great meaning.

K: Well, he will get what I worked out with Dinitz.

G: And that is agreeable . . .

K: This is agreeable with Dinitz.

G: All right. But I wanted you to know the feeling I had based upon some of the discussions against a backdrop of 5 years of intimate requests. This one just seemed very real. And I think that they do need that help and that it would be important . . .

K: But we need a little help too.

G: ... know that. But I think that they --

K: They need help on MFN and we need help on the negotiations.

G: All right. But I don't think you want to have echoes of 1969 and early 70 when there was a great feeling of distrust there about what was happening here. I think that would be very extremely dangerous.

K: No.

G: [Because they have] disarray at this point over in Israel.

K: Well, look, they have gotten everything from us all along and that isn't going to change. It's simply a question of timing. But even that isn't a major problem because he will get the major part.

G: Um-humm.

K: What you should tell him is that it is important that we make some progress on the Syrian disengagement or there's going to be --

G: ... I think they'd be much stronger in their ability to do that if they had a very clear cut and very symbolic vote of support and there's nothing that would be more concrete than this particular decision at this time. . . .

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

April 17, 1974

3:25 p.m.

K: Where do we stand with -- what was I going to say. -- Where
do we stand with the Israeli money.

S: With the Israeli money?

K: Yea, the one billion bucks -- make sure it happens this week.

S: O.K. The paper right now is in your Department. I'll get it over here.

K: Look, it's got to happen this week. I do not give a Goddamn what
those sons of bitches are doing.

S: No problem. I'll have it over here on your desk tomorrow.

K: O.K. What's happening to that Argentine case. I can get -- the
Argentians have agreed to make this deal with me. That if we let
them announce this thing from here tomorrow they will then not press
for an end to sanctions for an end of sanctions against Cuba at the OAS
for which they developed a very cute formula. You see they were
going to introduce a resolution resolved that the sanctions continue.
That would require a 2/3s vote which isn't available. You see rather
than say resolved that they be ended which also required a 2/3s vote,
they were going to say resolved that they continue.

S: I see it and then they would not be able to get the 2/3s vote on it.

K: That's it. Can you talk to Haig. All we are doing is implementing
something he has already approved.

S: We can implement the Argentine one, it is the Canadian one that is the
problem.

K: But talk to Haig. Have I got a chance to see him.

S: Are you prepared to see him this evening.

K: About 6:00

S: Let me try that.

K: Or at least talk to him on the phone.

S: O.K.

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Scowcroft, p.2

K: What's the mood.

S: Not real good, I gather.

K: Were you there with the German.

S: Yes. Oh, he was fine there. Just a little nonsense for about 10 minutes. He was fine with that.

K: O.K. Listen, you know we are getting more request from people he told to come and call on him.

S: I know we are. You know what it was. It was this doggone reception and it was just diplomatic chatter was what it was. But they all took it seriously.

K: What is what you tend to do when you deal with the President of the U.S. O.K.

S: O.K. I will see about 6:00.

K: Tell him I may be at a meeting. And how about Fahmy.

S: Fahmy, I think we are going to be o.k. It may have to be 3:30 rather than 2:30. OK

K: Then I would prefer 4:30 because I will be in the middle of a meeting.

S: O.K. Either 2:30 or 4:30.

K: Let him know then that it is all set. Can we do that.

S: I can't yet.

K: You tell him it is essential. That considering that Sadat has always XXXX seen me.

S: I understand. I just don't think there is a problem, but I don't have a firm commitment yet.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

5:25 PM

K: How are we doing on Fahmy?

S: I can't find out. He has just left talking with the President and he must be with Fred Bissart (phonetic) but he was going to raise...

K: Look, this has got to be there's no choice.

S: I don't think there's any question.

K: Yes, but I've got to tell him to come down. I'll just tell him to come down.

S: I just don't think there's any question about it.

K: I'll just have him and say, OK down how are we doing on this Argentine business.

S: I sent you over...

K: Yes, but I haven't got the time now.

S: OK.

K: I haven't got the time to sign it. I thought you were going to send it in.

S: I thought you were going to call him or talk with him. I'm sorry.

K: Well, I've got an appointment with him, haven't I?

S: No, but he's alone now in the EOB.

K: OK, fine. Let me call him.

S: OK.

END

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TELECON
Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

6:52 PM

L: Yes sir.

K: I must have another text very soon.

L: We're shooting for tonight. I don't know ______ to call.

K: OK. I hope you have understood that thing is a disaster.

L: We got your point.

K: I think we could make some mileage. I would use some of the stuff from ______. What difference does it make. To lap us the same stuff time and time again.

L: OK, I don't think we want to go too much on the ______ too long but we're expanding it.

K: I'd go a little on the ______ because the American press never covered ______. I wouldn't say exactly the same thing.

L: That's a good point. The same is true on the Panama thing, they didn't cover that too much either. So at least it will be fresh to our people. people.

K: That's right. To them you can put in the form of a summary.
OK?

L: Right.

END

Lord - 6:53

K: Win, just make sure I get it by the end of the White House dinner so I can read it again.

L: OK.

K: And have it over at the White House in my office.

L: Fine.

END

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TELECON

Roy Atherton/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

7:10 PM

K: Roy, will you make sure Fahmy is called and told we don't have an
exact time for his meeting with the President tomorrow afternoon, but he
should come on down anyway.

A: Yes sir, he's coming. He's coming by train.

K: OK.

A: In fact, I thought I'd go out to the railroad station.

K: Excellent, very nice.

A: I'll tell him that when I see him.

K: Have we found out who talked to Gwertzman?

A: No sir. I told Joe I haven't since he came back from the Middle East trip.

K: But it has to be someone who was at the meeting.

A: Some ~~of it,~~ it sounds to me, could have come from the parties themselves.
Except the part that Fahmy's upset about. No, I'm ~~puzzled.~~ puzzled. I notice
he wrote the story out of New York. I've checked with my people and I'm
persuaded that none of them have talked -- they don't normally work with this.

K: OK. Well, we'll talk later.

A: Alright, ~~xuxx~~ sir.

K: Thank you.

END

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

8:28 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Yes, hi.

K: I'm sorry to disturb you. We have one matter with this Latin American meeting and the one that's happening at the OAS. As you know, there are a number of American subsidiaries in Argentina and the Argentines have passed a law according to which if they don't sell to Cuba they're going to be nationalized.

N: I see.

K: And you had already approved in February that under those conditions we can make a special exception and we can't really take the position that American companies in Argentina cannot obey Argentine law. If you had approved that and I held up the implementation of it because the Brazilian government at that time was changing and they had some doubts about it, now the Brazilian Government has come to us and have indicated that they favor our going ahead and if we could go ahead within the next day on this then Argentina would not introduce a resolution in Atlanta which would have the effect of lifting the sanctions altogether throughout the Western Hemisphere.

N: It's a dead loser as far as anything here is concerned to indicate any backing down in regard to __ it will raise a hell of a storm.

K: Well, we're not backing down with Cuba. The position we're taking -- we're not lifting any.....

N: Well just don't make any announcement on it, just do it.

K: OK.

N: Just do it very very very quietly. Don't make a big thing out of it.

K: No, we wouldn't announce at it, we'd just let the Argentines do it in a low key way.

N: Alright, fine. OK, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Foreign Minister Fahmy
4/17/74; 10:42 p.m.

F: How are you?

K: Okay, how are you?

F: Hmm -- did you finish your dinner?

K: Just about finished it. Yes.

F: Henry, I wanted to talk to you now before tomorrow about the Security Council.

K: Yes.

F: I am giving you my thoughts only and it is up to you to decide what you want to do. I think it is much better that Scali works hard too that at the very end to not veto or be forced to do so, you know. Because if this is going to take place then it should be a very bad thing to have a bad effect on the Syrian business, you know. This is what I am saying now.

K: Yeh, but if we vote for an anti-Israeli resolution it will also have a terrible effect.

F: Yeh, but you see, I thought that saying -- that he should work very hard and if he can't do it you have to send somebody to help him you know so that at the very end you have a tough resolution that you can support -- especially the Russians would be very happy at this moment you know to prove that they are supporting the Lebanese and you are not supporting them -- and if you can succeed to have a resolution for which you and the Russians support. . .

K: But how can we do that?

F: Either paragraph or so water down to make it a little bit more balanced.

K: Yes.

F: It is not difficult.

K: And will the Lebanese accept it?

F: Oh yes, the Foreign Minister is there and he is ready to do it. I spoke to him and I spoke to Ora -- their representative you know. At any rate my advice is that the best thing is that you will vote for a resolution which is going to be passed. It has to be balanced you know and then for that you will be able to vote for it.

I*

Page 2

Fahmy/Kissinger

4/17/74; 10:42 p.m.

K: Well if it is balanced, we will vote for it.

F: But I mean your people should try to work hard -- even if they need time -- they should work for it. And last if you cannot support it then abstain on it. But the worse thing is to veto it.

K: Yeh.

F: This would ve very -- I mean -- very bad. It won't help even your trip you know.

K: But if we vote for a bad one, it won't help my trip either -- the major problem -- I'm not kidding you. I have not yet got Israeli approval for what we are discussing.

F: I agree, but you see the point -- you see the Russians now are making so much propaganda even in Lebanon itself even inside in these papers you know.

K: Yeh.

F: I don't want you to vote in a way which either embarrasses the Israelis or the Lebanese or the Syrians or you. This is the main point.

K: Okay, I'll look into it the first thing in the morning.

F: Yeh, the best solution is if you can reach an agreement on a resolution which you can support

SAMITIZED

K: Yeh. Yeh.

F: If it is not possible, then have the ______ abstain. To veto any resolution now it will be a calamity.

K: Well let me do my best. I'll have to look at where the resolution stands now.

F: And I will speak to -- I spoke already to the Lebanese FonMin -- Ora the Permanent Representative -- so they are receptive to make it balanced now. But even if they give you information that there was a small group from the non-allied which were -- was invested to conduct the other members, you know. Maybe that they will at the very beginning start with an extreme draft but the French can work on it, the British . . .

K: The French won't work on it.

F: [SAMITIZED] -- and by the way I am not sure about this story but apparently Jobert gave a statement to the LaMonde and he was accusing us directly because of our new relations.

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Page 3

Fahmy/Kissinger

4/17/74; 10:42 p.m.

K: Of what?

F: Our new relations . . .

K: No he didn't do it quite that much . . .

F: I'm checking with our ambassador there.

K: Well I've seen it but it wasn't very good.

F:

SANITIZED

K: We minimized what was done -- he said the Egyptian disengagement wasn't much of an achievement.

F: Yes, but apparently he said that you know the Egyptian government or the Egyptian state must bear the responsibility or something like that, I don't know --

SANITIZED

K: Yeh.

F: So Think about it very seriously.

K: I will think about it and I will do something first thing in the morning. And the appointment with the President was tentatively set for 11:30 in the morning, but frankly I am going to try to move it to the afternoon. Because I have my foreign ministers from Latin America here and I hate to leave them.

F: The Latin Ministers and then me -- now I am jealous.

K: Well you have no reason -- well after what I saw of you and ______ I have to take some alternatives.

F: Okay. But don't put it very late in the afternoon so I want to go back as soon as possible.

K: No, I won't put it beyond 3:00.

F: This will be fine and by the way, please work hard on this draft.

K: I'll do it first thing in the morning.

F: Even if you need to send Sisco incognito like that, it's maybe a good thing.

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TELCOM

4/17/74/10:50 p.m.

Joe Sisco/HAK

K: Hello Joe. Sorry to bother you at home but I've just had a call from Fahmy about this resolution.

S: This is the one in New York?

K: Yes.

S: And what is his comment.

K: He thinks we could get a balanced resolution if we worked on it. And he thinks we should work very hard on it and he'd use his influence.

S: Yes, that's what we asked him to do.
is

K: Because he/just afraid of a veto.

S: Well, lets see where we are in terms of -- how far they got -- I don't have a report from Scali this evening because today was a day of discussions and let's look at it the first thing. They had a balanced resolution with the British but how far they got and what the reaction is we don't have a report yet.

K: You're not going to get me into a position of a ______ with either the Israelis or the Egyptians without my getting a crack at it.

S: Oh, I should say not. I hope you're not going to get into a dustup either way.

K: OK

S: No, we're going to keep you abreast believe me. No I think we look at it in a more ______ where we are. We'll give you a report and see what needs to be done. How did Fahmy feel about it. Just made this expression of you or....

K: I beg your pardon.

S: How did Fahmy feel about the thing. He really thinks we can achieve this.

K: He thinks we can achieve it but he wasn't confident, you know. He thought it was more easily -- you shouldn't -- we shouldn't be confused if the first drafts are very tough.

S: Of course we've already seen one tough draft and we're going to be very patient and if its a long process we are in no hurry.