STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Governor

FOR
RELEASE

Leslie Slate, Press Secretary

Albany 518 GR 4-8418

NYC 212 JU 2-7030

A.M., FRIDAY

OCTOBER 18, 1968

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, an architect of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America during World War II, declared Thursday night that "the next national administration must act immediately to revitalize our relationships and develop closer ties with our long-time friends and neighbors in Latin America."

The Governor spoke at the 294th State Dinner of the Lotos Club, in New York City, held in honor of Galo Plaza Lasso, new Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

Mr. Plaza is a former President of Ecuador, former Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations. The Governor hailed Mr. Plaza as "one of the outstanding international leaders of our time."

"He is a man who has not only served his country in the highest elective office but also has served the Western Hemisphere and the United Nations with great distinction -- a man who holds the confidence of leaders throughout the world," the Governor said.

The Governor outlined four basic guidelines for U.S. policy in its relations with other American republics:

1. "We must," he said, "recognize our common heritage, our long history of friendship and special relationships, and give greater emphasis to our common ideals and aspirations, our common interests, our special problems."

2. "We must strengthen the ties among the American republics and, through consultation, develop common objectives and programs of joint action to achieve those objectives. New OAS machinery, now being ratified, should be fully utilized for periodic consultation on the broader issues of foreign policy including global issues."

3. "We must seek closer cultural and economic ties and make special efforts to increase mutually beneficial trade and commerce. These efforts should include the creation of a Latin American Common Market and new commodity agreements to limit the fluctuations of prices for primary products such as cocoa and sugar. We should also encourage maximum triangular trade between Europe and North and South America."

4. "We must strengthen rather than decrease the program of economic and financial cooperation under the Alliance for Progress. I am concerned at the size and character of the cuts by the Congress in the current appropriations for the Alliance."

Governor Rockefeller also proposed that Canada be encouraged to join the Organization of American States.

"Canada is already a member of various technical bodies of the OAS," Governor Rockefeller pointed out, "and her decision to become a full-fledged member would importantly strengthen the whole inter-American system. While it's up to Canada to take the next step, I think the U.S. should do everything it can to encourage Canada to act in this regard."

-30-

FOR
RELEASE

A.M., FRIDAY

OCTOBER 18, 1968

I am going to divide this paper into the classical three parts. The first will deal with levels of effects of U.S. policy on Latin America. The second will concern the internal situation among the Latin American peoples, and foreign policy inside the Latin American world. And the third will turn to the implications of the Latin American situation for the United States. The problem in dealing with such massive subjects in short scope is in one way the same as dealing with them in an encyclopaedia; that is, there is no escape from organizing on the basis of some theory, or, more specifically, from typologies to show levels of generalization. But I shall try to keep explicit theorizing at a minimum, and instead concentrate on showing probabilistic limits of the relationships under discussion.

## U.S. INFLUENCE

U.S. influence on Latin America varies by time and place; and the places have also varied through time. As a rule of thumb, it may be said that the influence in general has grown consistently heavier through time, starting with the Independence Period (1810-1823) in Latin America, when American effects were largely felt in ideology and law. (The Livingston Code in Guatemala was modelled after the Louisiana Civil Code, for example; many of the early constitutions, such as the still applicable Argentine constitution of 1853, were copied from the American model.) A second rule of thumb is that with the passage of time, the United States has been felt further and further down the South American continent. Even as late as World War II, the American government drew its defense perimeter through Northeast Brazil. Now economic and political as well as military concern includes the entire Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay).

2

The pace of involvement has been increasing; so has the extent of it. For example, immediately before World War II, Great Britain, Germany and Japan outstripped the United States as trading partners with Latin America. For twenty years after the war the U.S. held an almost monopolistic position in Latin American trade. Now, even though the classical partners are returning, the U.S. still holds hemispheric preeminence.

The trade patterns have always been secondary to political interest, however. The few economic statements made above are averages for the Latin American world. When they are corrected for individual country investments, it quickly becomes apparent that our major investments have been in Cuba and Venezuela. The latter country still represents by far the largest single U.S. cluster of interests, centering about oil. In comparison, bananas (in the Caribbean basin) and copper (in Chile and Peru) are relatively insignificant. (But it should not be forgotten that both the United Fruit Company and Anaconda Copper remain among the 100 largest American corporations.) In any event, the evidence is that the economic investments are unevenly distributed, but that the political wash has slowly and surely spread from Mexico and Cuba (subjects of early 19th century expansionist ambitions among certain parts of the U.S. public) down through Central America to the northern tier states of South America, and now embraces the entire continent. Security has traditionally motivated the U.S. more than direct economic interest; certainly economic concerns are there, but they have very often been subsumed to political ends. (The search to recapture the $900,000,000 of U.S. investment in Cuba, for example, is in abeyance, given the at least interim Cold War settlement of the Cuban question.)

[cc]

3

Types of Influence

To these variables of time, place and economic and political influ-
ences, let us add two integrating concepts: types of U.S. influence, and the
groups within the Latin American countries receiving the influences. First,
the types:

(1) The most obvious influence is direct intervention - military or paramilitary. The cases are many: Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Cuba, and certainly many others known, suspected, or unknown. The examples of overt military occupation are, of course, notorious. They have more often than not ended in the implantation of a "safe" dictator with some military or police training (Trujillo, Somoza, etc.) and our eventual withdrawal. Then long periods of despotic rule of a traditional type have usually followed.

It is impossible to know whether the development of such countries as
Honduras, the Dominican Republic, or Nicaragua would have been substantially
different without this kind of intervention. But Panama and Guatemala
certainly have been fundamentally affected, the former in its very existence
and the latter in its present decay into a decade of brutal violence di-
rectly traceable to American actions in assisting the overthrow of the
Arbenz regime in 1954 and in its subsequent support of feckless governments.

In line with what I have said above about unevenness, however, it
should be added that this kind of action is sporadic and even to a certain
extent casual. The 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic, for example,
was "accidental" in the sense that the personalistic combination of Pres.
Johnson, Ambassador Bennett, and Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann
took an action "inevitable" for them, but probably remote for other leaders.
Thus, direct intervention is the influence most susceptible to change.

(2) The second level of effect may be said to be the long-term national interests of the United States as defined through explicit or implicit policy statements. These views tend to build whatever predictability there is into the inter-American system. The best-known example is the Monroe Doctrine. Although its meaning and effectiveness have changed through time, the Doctrine's basic sense is that the U.S. has a special interest in and responsibility for Latin America. This particularity of concern is not necessarily to the exclusion of that of other states, but is considered to override other nations' interests in times of stress.

Another example - implicit this time - stems from our beliefs in a modified capitalistic market system. When translated into the private ownership (but not capitalistic market system) of most of Latin America, American private enterprise tends to become Social Darwinism. Business operating in an ambiance without effective political and social constraint, and equipped with a high capacity to compete, can degenerate into rapacity.

The common result is that American business is looked upon with high suspicion by many Latin Americans simply because of its power relative to that of local institutions and groups. (This statement can be modified by type of enterprise; there is an important difference between reactions to public monopoly and extractive industries, on one hand, and to light industrial and commercial activities on the other.)

The American commitment to a particular type of economic organization defined as "correct" also exemplifies a kind of moralism in our international stance that is highly offensive to other nations. Thus, when the United States cuts off foreign aid to Argentina and Peru (the latter is presently under an interdict) because those governments threaten to cancel oil contracts or to engage in other economic activity of which we disapprove, a strong conflict

5

of values is involved. For the U.S., our motivations stem from conviction
in the "correctness" of our economic beliefs, the sanctity of contract and
private property, and the surety of our virtuous use of power. For the Latin
Americans, they see such action as a violation of their sovereignty in its
most profound sense - that is, as sovereignty somehow reflects the state of
being and becoming of a people.

National interest, thus, should not be seen as a mere military or de-
fensive question. It is that, as well as a desire to see others live as we
do - by our values, with our institutional referents, and our ways of con-
ducting affairs. Clearly this latter view has been denied by some U.S.
leaders; but it has also been expressed in deed as well as word. It is the
rare culture that can prevent itself from seeing others in its own image.
Given the facts of international power, few nations have not attempted to
impose certain elements of their own image on others when able to do so. And
yet, American public demonstrations against the Philippine campaign of T.
Roosevelt, the non-intervention policies of F. D. Roosevelt, and the succeeding
years of Good Neighborism and the Alliance for Progress have all reflected
a counter-desire, the containment of this aspect of American Power. This
dialectic reflects domestically what have in truth been major differences in
the U.S. approach to Latin America.

(3) The third level of influence is the most pervasive, and the least susceptible to control by anyone. It is the cultural influence of a nation that is powerful intellectually and technologically as well as militarily and economically. The most common examples of this weighty influence are linguistic: the "new" Spanish of "parquear," "troque," "breque," "estok," estandard," and so on - meaning, "park," "truck," "brake," "stock," and "standard," as in "standard of living." Much is also made of the movies and TV as contributors

[U]

6

to the "revolution of rising expectations," or what may better be called
"the bedazzlement effect" leading to social paralysis at least as often as
action.

In any event, the influence is much broader than even these types of
examples might indicate. Faulkner and Hemingway and others have contributed
much to a generation of Latin American novelists. The social science ex-
plosion of Latin America is a direct exportation of American theories, models
and techniques. And with it goes much ideology. The training in the U.S.
of Latin American military officers, for example, is specifically designed
to impregnate them with North American ideas of proper civil-military
relations. Counter-insurgency training is also imbued with a political world-
view.

It is in this area of happenings that one much search for some explan-
ation of the widespread grief felt in Latin America on the deaths of
Presidents Roosevelt and Kennedy. The joke references may be illuminating.
There is the hackneyed one, that when the U.S. catches cold Latin America
contracts pneumonia. Or, that Latin Americans are vitally interested in the
present American campaign because they want to know who their next president
will be. What I think is being expressed is that the very posture, the
"psychic" stance if you will, of the United States has an immediate effect
on the choices made in many Latin American polities.

For example, the Dominican intervention, when linked to Vietnam and
certain military policies undertaken in Latin America, as well as the general
tone of the Johnson administration, persuaded many Latin Americans that the
United States welcomes right-wing military movements. Onganía in Argentina
was reportedly bitterly disappointed that the U.S. did not welcome him as
warmly as it did his Brazilian prototypes. And they, in turn, overthrew

Goulart to the obvious satisfaction of the incumbent American ambassador and the State Department. The result of this projection was that the Argentine and Brazilian armies mobilized during the Dominican crisis to intervene in Uruguay and Bolivia in the event the governments of those countries threatened to go leftist. Not all Latin countries react with this sensitivity, however. In general, it may be said that those in which the internal political forces are delicately balanced try to read into American policy the factor that will send the balance in one direction or another. This kind of anticipation is of long standing in Latin America, stemming from the last century, and will be discussed more fully below.

Anticipating American Favor

Some recent examples of attempts to anticipate American favor may help to explain this point. In late 1947, President González Videla of Chile broke the Popular Front that had governed the country since 1938 in anticipation of U.S. approval and assistance. (The approval was forthcoming, but not much assistance.) It is probable that the Castello Branco revolt in Brazil would not have occurred when it did had not President Kennedy been assassinated, an act leading in the first week of Mr. Johnson's presidency to the firing of Teodoro Moscoso and his replacement by Thomas Mann as American Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Center and center-left presidents (such as Leoni of Venezuela and Frei of Chile) vocally complain that they know the U.S. supports them, but they also are certain that if overthrown by a military coup, the U.S. would also support the new military rulers. Their complaint is that adventurist military men are as certain as they of this American stance, and therefore emboldened in their ambitions.

These attitudes of Latin Americans are guesses. Sometimes they

[L]

8

reflect real American policy decisions that must be put in the first of the three categories in this list. But at least as often as not, the hunches are derived from feelings concerning whether the U.S. is in a period of liberalism and international confidence, or in a period of fright suggesting the wisdom of "safe" governments of force in Latin America.

When cultural style and political choice thus interact, conscious choice becomes difficult. Some of the less recognized but still important defeats for American policy in Latin America come from a disjunction between verbal expressions of desire and Latin American perceptions of basic U.S. posture. Thus, American diplomatic pressure against recent military coups in Argentina and Peru, among other countries, were unavailing. The coups came, and indeed the combination of security considerations and the attitudes of American policymakers supported the presumptions of the Latin Americans: their coups were recognized and warm relations quickly established. Opposite events have also occurred. The Good Neighbor Policy and the Kennedy period of the Alliance for Progress strengthened social democratic and Christian Democratic elements in Latin American politics. These shifts in American political posture, contained as they are within the standard spread of our own political occurrences, thus provoke wide swings in Latin American government and help to institutionalize political instability there.

## LATIN AMERICAN INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

A standard sociological way of stratifying Latin American populations is as follows: (1) the Indian populations, outside the stream of national politics entirely; (2) mestizo rural villagers, on the fringes of national consciousness and culture; (3) recent lower class migrants to the cities;

[L]

9

(4) urban industrial lower classes; (5) middle class groups; and (6) upper class groups. A social psychological dimension is then normally added to these caste-class differentiations. The rural villagers and recent migrants are usually classified as "mobilized" but "unintegrated," meaning that they have lost their "folk" culture, but have not as yet taken on the routinized behavior patterns and identifications of a citizen integrated into the national society. The artisan and unionized lowers, the middles, and the uppers are then normally divided into "traditionals" and "moderns." The definitions vary, but I may as well give what I employ:

> A traditional person is ritualist in his reasons for behavior; he views his behavior as universal in effect, or "organic," as having an effect on all else and as being imbued with moral significance; he is resistant to change, for the existing order has moral sanction by definition.

> A modern person is rationalistic in his reasons for deciding on action; he is relativistic in that he assumes his behavior has limited influence, in recognition of institutional and role differentiation; he is anticipatorily self-adjusting to change.

To the class and values breakdowns above may be added groupings of Latin Americans by institutional affiliations relevant to international politics; i.e., parties, pressure groups, interest associations, and so on. Now, if we add these three elements together, we can say something about the effectiveness (the power or class factor), the uses of that power (the value factor), and the customary behavior and institutions adding the style component to public behavior as well as providing the organized means for its expression. Let me simplify what would otherwise be a long and arduous typology by presenting a composite of political party arrays to show how to

10

think of the three elements simultaneously.

Fascists Falangists Corporativists Conservatives

TRADITIONAL SCALE

Left

Right

Fidelistas Trotskyites Communists Socialists Christian-Democrats Radicals Liberals

MODERN SCALE

The leadership of all these parties is upper middle and upper class in status, although the social origins of the leaders often reveal a high order of upward mobility. The leftist groups are strongly influenced by leaders of urban origins; on the right the liberals are also urban. Conservatives, Radicals, and Christian Democrats count important contingents of rural influ- entials among their leaders. Their followers scatter widely. Conservatives rally some rural labor to their banner. Liberals attract lower middle class entrepreneurs and some artisans in search of "stable and honest government". The Radicals, Socialists and Christian Democrats appeal strongly to middle class groups, as do the Socialists. The Communists, Fidelists, and Trotsky- ites are basically middle class parties with some trade union support. The leftist corporativist parties are the most populist of all the parties, appealing to limited middle sectors and to broad parts of the recent migrants to the cities, and semi- and unskilled labor. (Peronismo is an example. For more on this subject, see Gino Germani on the "popular masses" in Latin America.)

Attitudes toward the U.S.

The ideological attitudes of these groups toward the United States are as follows:

All groups on the traditional scale are culturally rejective of the United States, but support anti-Communism and the Cold War. Thus the Minister

[W]

11

of the Interior of the present corporativist Argentine government said soon after taking office, "We reject that Liberal capitalism that leads to a theistic Communism." The point is, of course, that to the eye of a Counter-Reformation man, the Soviet Union and the U.S. must look more alike than different. Thus, we find rejections of capitalism, Protestantism, and Communism in the same breath. Nevertheless, such groups generally support American foreign policy as they define it, and seek alliance with counterpart groups within the U.S.

The Christian Democrats share many of the corporativist views of the Conservatives (from whose midst they historically sprang), but reject present U.S. foreign policy, support a progressive Alliance for Progress view, and in their turn also seek to make common cause with such elements as Kennedy Democrats, for whom they feel a special affinity.

The Liberals - much like Taft Republicans - support American foreign policy as evidenced in its Cold War stance, applaud American industrial culture, and resist competitive American industry and business. These groups, usually strongest among industrialists, often oppose such specific American policies as inflation control, for they see high but not runaway rates of inflation as permitting hidden profit-taking, and thus conducive to development.

Liberals share many points of view with Radicals of the right, and in general the Radical parties even of the left spread between the types of pro-U.S. views of the Liberals and of the Christian Democrats.

The democratic Socialists are profound admirers of American culture but resist the specifics of U.S. foreign policy. The Marxist left sees the U.S. as inevitably imperialist and thus as an ineluctable political enemy. But they, too, admire what they see as the cultural and technological victories of American capitalism and seek a partial emulation. The greatest

12

single difference between Christian Democrats, social democrats in general,
and democratic Socialists on the one hand, and the Marxist left on the other,
is the way they view the susceptibility of the U.S. to pressure and change.
They all see the United States as imperialistic. But the former think imper-
ialism is a policy and not a necessity, while the Marxists think it cultur-
ally determined and unsusceptible to change without social revolution in the
U.S. In practical terms, then, the former seek alliance with the United
States as government, and with sympathetic pressure groups inside the country,
while the latter espouse nationalistic revolution in their own countries as
their only nationalistic defense.

Nationalism is then linked to attitudes toward the U.S. in much more
subtle ways than the workings of simple xenophobia. The Conservatives are
anti-national, in the sense that they reject the supremacy of a secular nation-
state. This view is shared by the left traditionals, but the Conservatives
substitute a nationalism of the right, a clericalist and xenophobic attempt
to return to an idealized medieval state. The modern groups all accept the
idea of the secular supremacy of a nation-state, reject right-wing nationalism,
and then divide on the imperialism question as I have indicated.

Class Power and Internal Schisms

These attitudes when run against power as class expression, and power
as institutionally specific, comprise the minimum paradigm necessary to under-
stand the internal roots of Latin American foreign policy. There is no time
to spell out the full range of relations here, but the description of a few
polar cases may help suggest the limits. In terms of class power, we have at
one end a country like Guatemala, of whose 4,000,000 population perhaps 350,000
form the entire core of what can be called national, participant citizenry -
the civil service, the army, the professionals, the white collar employees,

13

and so forth. The remainder of the population is Indian, illiterate, rural, below 14 years of age, and so on. At the other end, we have Argentina, where perhaps 45 per cent of the population is in middle income and occupation groups, two-thirds are urbanized, 90 per cent are literate, and so forth.
Over half the total population votes in national elections. Naturally, Guatemalan leaders can have few followers, but Argentine leaders have large committed or "available" masses (to use Aron's expression) as followers. In a real sense, then, Guatemalan leaders have license to choose widely among ideologies, but little power to recruit mass defenders. The opposite would seem to be empirically true of the Argentines in situations short of total crisis, when populations may be forced back to their basic social premises.

When these class groups are related to value systems, it becomes apparent that the patterns of conflict are not across class lines, but within them. That is, intra-class conflict as engendered by differing perceptions and thus differing definitions of group interest, describes the lines of political division. Thus, upper class groups fight upper class groups as well as other interest levels. It is in order to explain this phenomenon that one is forced to discuss class and values simultaneously. And then, of course, there should be added the experience of organization, the technology of politics, if you will. This ingredient is the institutional dimension of which we have been speaking. Again, space precludes detail, but in general the Radical parties and the Marxist left are the most professionally organized and impersonal groups. The traditional left corporativists tend to be conspiratorial and badly organized, while the Liberals and Conservatives have small organized pressure groups but generally scorn stable and extended party organization.

What this complex picture implies for American policy is that no

14

country of Latin America has sufficient intra- and inter-class cohesion to
have truly national politics. Nor does any one have a strong institutional
structure that can plaster over class and value conflict. (The only possible
exception to these two generalizations is Cuba, which may well be Latin
America's first nation-state in the fully modern sense of that term.) Thus,
opposition to the United States remains largely at the verbal level, and the
temptation to employ the U.S. as a force in internal political decision looms
large in all countries. To be entirely explicit, Latin America's weak gov-
ernments reflecting internal schism make it possible for political groups to
impute desires and attitudes to the U.S. that can be used to tip the balance
of internal politics one or another way. It is through this mechanism that
the cultural stance of the U.S., mentioned above as the most basic influence
on Latin America, is linked into their internal power constellations. This
articulation of U.S. and Latin relations is what makes the post of American
ambassador such a critical and delicate one in many Latin American countries.

**Types of Current Governments**

The stigmata of schismatic politics are not equally spread among the
Latin American republics, of course. Ideological identifications do tend to
bleed across frontiers, naturally, but in ways tending merely to reinforce
the general "feeling tone" of the continent as it is in the first place re-
lated to more general inter-American pressures. For example, at this moment
the major Latin American countries are being ruled by relatively soft author-
itarian governments: the military, quasi-falangist regimes of Argentina and
Brazil, and the single-party system of Mexico. There are small islands of
Christian and Social Democracy (Chile, Venezuela, Costa Rica, the aspiring
Belaúnde regime of Peru, and so on). The remainder are rather traditional
Latin American authoritarianisms of combined civil-military stripe. The

15

democratic regimes worry that they will be infiltrated by the authoritarian ones, and the latter worry that the former are islands of Communist penetration. But little occurs other than verbal hostility, an occasional attempt to propagandize. There are a few cases of overt action, however: the attempt of Trujillo to assassinate Betancourt, the probably successful attempt in reverse, the death squads exchanged between Somoza of Nicaragua and Figueres of Costa Rica, the mobilization of the Argentine army on the Chilean frontier on the occasion of the last polarized presidential election in Chile, and so on. Nevertheless, these incidents are relatively rare, I repeat, and are not taken into routine consideration in Latin American policymaking.

## International Organizations

The verbal interplay of Latin American international politics naturally reflects upper classes and ideological commitments. Formal and informal organization both are functions of these factors. For example, the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL, the Spanish acronym) reflects a reformist, industrially-oriented, Keynesian approach to economic development. It has been a major factor in promoting the Inter-American Development Bank (of similar ideological persuasion) and the Latin American integration movement. The latter, with headquarters in Buenos Aires, is consciously attempting to link Liberal industrialists, Radical politicians and cooperative leftist trade union leaders toward the end of building a Latin American common market that can also become a political union eventually. The ultimate aim is to generate sufficient power so that Latin America can confront the United States not in enmity, but as equal partner, à la the Western European powers. The Organization of American States, on the contrary, is seen as reflecting those Latin American views of surrender to U.S. suzerainty in the hemisphere, the bastion of Conservatism and what Latins call *entreguismo* - self delivery.

16

The Central American customs union and LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Area - the presumptive germ of eventual political union) are still entirely economic entities. The Central American organization is doing fairly well in the economic sphere, while LAFTA is still struggling to get through the early phases of tariff reduction. In my opinion there is little chance for either to proceed in the near future to full common market status, let alone to any semblance of political union. It is not merely that vested economic interest in Latin America's growing industrial sectors is already far enough advanced to make economic collaboration difficult, but also that there is little experience in intra-Latin diplomatic collaboration except for the most formal variety in UN, ECLA, and OAS. In addition, those international agencies represent international upper class collaboration. The critical task facing Latin America, however, is not extension of markets by lateral international expansion, but vertically by intra-national social growth. The integration of Latin America is no substitute for the internal integration of the Latin American republics.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The politics of crisis has also come to the United States. As in Latin America, the U.S. is now witness to clash among differing Weltanschauungen and differing social strata, inter-institutional conflicts, and resulting personality struggles. Subtly, Latin American styles and heroes have also become part of the American political scene. The hirsute fad may well have begun with Fidel Castro. The cult of Che is widespread among American and European youth. Columbia University student leaders are informing themselves concerning the Latin American university reform of 1918. Black Power advocates find fraternal echoes in Havana as well as Algiers. The persistence of riot scenes in American cities is rare even for Latin America, but it is creating the

17

same kind of discussions about the tension between order and freedom. Among
right and left groups, as a matter of fact, the terms of ideological discourse
have become disturbingly Latin American - as they must, for elements of the
crisis must be the same whenever the total system is put into question.

The parallelisms must obviously not be taken too far, for great gulfs
still exist between such a national society as is the U.S. and most of Latin
America except for the most developed urban regions. What true resemblances
exist, however, are very relevant to American foreign policy. They can assist
us to an understanding of how foreign policy is linked to the *nature* of
national community in its fullest sense. They can also help us to answers if
we are willing to admit the relevance of at least some of the experiences of
others. But whether we consciously will an awareness of the resemblances be-
tween some Latin American happenings and our own circumstances, the nature of
the modern world seems to be that certain groups in the U.S. - of both right
and left - will in any event draw such parallels for themselves, as is already
occurring. The new left is an obvious example of the importance of inter-
national communities. The growth of the international corporation, the exis-
tence of self-identifying hemispheric interest groups already referred to, and
the effects of international military, diplomatic, trade union, business and
other ties must all have their impact on American policy. Benefit may well
flow from a disciplined and intellectually controlled use of these many
channels of access as well as communication.

The Test Tube

And now, at a more prosaic level, let us turn to the more obvious policy
effects of Latin American events. A usual analysis is that Latin America is,
after all, with Africa, the weakest, politically and militarily, of all major
world areas. Certainly events in the Far East and Europe must have more effect

18

on U.S. power than can Latin America in any foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it was the Cuban missile crisis that probably brought the Cold War closest to a warm conclusion. The reason, of course, is not inherent to Cuba, but rather to the perceptions of the antagonistic powers involved, and the uses to which each wished to put the island. The United States has always reacted most sharply when the internal politics of any Latin country threaten to become entangled with Cold War considerations. And yet, it should be noted that the ultimate definition of such involvement rests much less with the Latin country than with the decisions of the United States. That evaluation is probably as true of Cuba as it certainly is true of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. The independent variable in this situation is the United States.

In more benign ways the Latin American can be of extraordinary help to the U.S. in generating adequate development policies for the Third World. The present American dollar crisis and the negative reactions of Congress to foreign aid are not permanent phenomena; the U.S. cannot revert to any classical isolationist formulae. Even should development assistance funds remain at a low ebb for many years, the calls on the U.S. for technical assistance and development advice at macro- as well as micro-social levels will continue. Latin America offers one of the widest ranges of types of human community to be found in any culture area; the range literally spans stone-age cultures to modern urban industrialization. The average level of development of Latin America is "intermediate," but the range of actual phenomena submits all developmental theories to extreme testing for their validity. Latin America should not be thought of as a show-case of development, but it might well be viewed as one of its better designed test tubes.

THE

A BIWEEKLY ANALYSIS OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

October 16, 1968

NIXON'S NEW LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA

Richard Nixon's statement this week on Latin America suggests a much-needed fresh approach to Hemisphere affairs. The Republican presidential candidate comes as close as he reasonably can to a call for a special relationship with Latin America that would completely recast this country's international relations. The foundations are laid for a radically new policy. The nut of the new look is this:

"Our emphasis should be upon trade instead of aid. Proposals deserving full consideration include: a new inter-American fund to assist in the stabilization of prices of Latin American commodities; special assistance to those countries burdened with interest loads on their debts; and a system of tariff preferences for Latin American exports. It is urgent that we help restore forward momentum to the Latin American economies."

If the proposals were adopted, they would give Latin America a tremendous lift. Commodity stabilization is the goal of all developing nations, but developed nations have always refused to go along. Latin America would like a fund for buffer stocks of key commodities and complementary financing in case of a precipitous price fall. To lighten the burden of debt servicing, a mounting problem, Latin America would like subsidized interest rates, or debt rescheduling.

The nettle is special treatment for Latin American exports. If the U.S. gives tariff preferences to Latin America, it would mean abandoning its historic policy of free trade based on the most-favored-nation clause. While sympathetic to Latin American trade aspirations, Hubert Humphrey is said not to be willing to go as far as dropping the most-favored-nation clause.

Latin America has been back and forth on the question. When Thomas Mann became President Johnson's prime policymaker, he raised a trial balloon on tariff preferences. But many Latin Americans objected on the ground that it smacked of a colonial relationship. Washington shelved the proposition.

Later, however, economists, notably Carlos Sanz de Santamaría and Roberto Campos, pushed temporary preferential treatment as an approach to lowering barriers for all developing

nations. The U.S. would hold the same trade concessions to
African and trading nations if their special partners, the
Europeans, would reciprocate with concessions to Latin America.

At the time of the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi, the
U.S. asked Latin America to drop, temporarily and publicly at
least, the request for special treatment. Washington argued that
talk of a regional agreement would prejudice attempts to lower
barriers for developing nations on a global basis. Latin
America agreed.

But UNCTAD failed. Now Latin America again hopes for
a special regional arrangement. Some Hemisphere nations,
primarily Argentina, wish to make sure U.S. tariff preferences
will not endanger trade with Europe. To avoid the possibility
that Europe would raise barriers against Hemisphere imports to
compensate Africa for Latin America's advantage in the rich U.S.
market, a regional agreement would have to be carefully worked
out. Either the trading arrangement would be made on a commodity
by commodity basis, or bilaterally to give individual Latin
American nations a chance to beg off.

Latin American economists would like more details on
the Nixon proposals, but their initial reaction was, of course,
very favorable. Hemisphere nations naturally want both trade
and aid, and prefer that all trade barriers to all developing
nations be lowered by all rich nations. But as a matter of
reality, aid is on the wane, and Europe turns a deaf ear to
giving Latin America equal consideration with its former colonies.

Nixon did not commit himself fully to the proposals; he
just said they deserve "full consideration". Latin Americans,
however, are delighted that the man presently favored to become
the next president of the U.S. would entertain a special
relationship with other Hemisphere nations. The Nixon proposals
represent the basis of the most revolutionary change in inter-
American relations since John Kennedy's call for an Alliance
for Progress.

* * *

BURR, ROBERT N.

1. In order to achieve mutually productive relations with Latin America, the image of each individual Latin American country must be made increasingly distinct so that the people of the U.S. may become aware that those states are not mere instruments for the advancement of U.S. interests but are real nations with legitimate interests of their own -- interests that their citizens must defend and that must be given serious consideration by U.S. policy makers.

2. As a basis for cooperation, the U.S. must develop a substantial mutuality of real interests with Latin American nations.

a. Such mutuality of interests can be best developed in an environment wherein the U.S. maintains sufficient military strength to deter hostile action against any American state from a non-hemisphere force at the same time that Latin American nations establish a community of free and independent democratic states sufficiently strong to resist subversion.

b. The requisite U.S. deterrent power already exists, but the Latin American nations, because large numbers of them are in important respects underdeveloped, do not yet constitute a community of free and independent states.

3. In achieving its policy objectives, the U.S. confronts three interrelated challenges: maintaining hemispheric security pending maturation of an independent and self-sufficient Latin America; helping Latin America to build free, strong, and democratic nations; establishing, meanwhile, satisfactory relations with the countries of Latin America.

4. Two problems connected with security of the U.S. require special attention: military assistance programs and military intervention.

a. Suspension of military assistance to the Latin American nations is not going to end militarism. A program of military assistance can have value for the Latin American nations if it contributes to strengthening orderly governmental processes while depoliticizing the military and does so without placing additional impediments in the way of social, economic and political modernization.

b. At present the OAS is not capable of dealing with the problem of internal subversion, and it appears improbable that the Latin American nations will accept either a collective peacekeeping force or legalization of unilateral U.S. intervention.

5. U.S. policy must consist of an unremitting attempt to build collective security institutions, if unilateral intervention appears necessary before such institutions established, the U.S. should

- 2 -

take extreme care to intervene only in a manner consonant with
the ideals of a community of independent democratic nations.

a. A clear and present danger must exist that can be handled in no other way; other members of the OAS must be consulted or at the very least notified that action is to be taken; and it must be understood that the whole matter will be immediately turned over to the OAS for its judgment as to whether the intervention was justified and for any action it may choose to take.

6. Because it is desirable from the point of view of harmonious inter-American relations for the Latin Americans to be less dependent upon the U.S., independence should be encouraged through:

a. Stimulation of measures tending to provide the Latin American nations with greater wealth and productive capacity, such as the movements for Latin American economic integration and improvement of export trade;

b. reduction of direct U.S. contact with the modernization process through progressively greater multilateralization of economic and technical aid.

7. In as much as the Latin American nations are in a stage of transition, their political systems may go in the direction either authoritarianism or democracy; the U.S. should employ all its resources to persuade those nations to move toward democracy, emphasizing particularly political education for both U.S. citizens and Latin Americans.

8. Several useful instruments are available to the U.S. in pursuing its objectives:

a. The Alliance for Progress should receive strong continued support. At the same time the U.S. should encourage greater Latin American leadership in the Alliance in recognition of the legitimate nationalistic sensibilities of Latin Americans and of the obvious advantage Latin American leaders have in urging upon their countries what is possible within existing frameworks.

b. The OAS must be maintained and made more effective. Pending its transformation and perfection, it should be put to an entirely new use as a formulator of policy. Instead of presenting to the OAS unilaterally designed policies that are fait accomplis, the U.S. should encourage anticipatory policy formulation by the OAS. Placing emphasis on the OAS, however, does not mean playing down the importance of the U.N.

c. In addition, various institutions in the private sector should be given financial support.

M

HERRERA, FELIPE

1. The economic growth and integration of Latin America are necessary. Latin American development is vital so that the U.S. may continue to rely on a partner that is indispensable to it for geopolitical and economic reasons. It is also vital for the Atlantic Community.

2. It is indispensable to give Latin America's process of self-assertion -- realized mainly through its integration -- the facilities and stimulants that the developed world can provide as a means of creating well-being and stability on the continent.

3. There are many ways in which the U.S. can cooperate to aid Latin American integration.

a. Specifically, the U.S. government, by providing funds for basic infrastructure works, can assist Latin American countries to create physical links for their association.

b. In the field of integration, Latin America must still take additional steps to promote regional trade and coordinate monetary policy. Much of this can be accomplished with its own resources. Outside aid, however, can be the leverage for the process. A good example is the Inter-American Development Bank's program to finance capital goods exports by Latin American countries. Another proposal for a Latin American central bank backed by the banking mechanisms of the U.S. could be of extraordinary importance in creating a solid support for this initiative.

4. We must continue to maintain and improve the channels of trade and inter-American investment.

a. We must continue and increase U.S. government aid for the economic and social development of Latin America, principally through multilateral channels.

b. So that Latin American planning may be placed on a regional rather than national basis, and so that such plans may be elaborated with adequate consideration of priorities and permanence, it is necessary that public external aid be committed on longer terms.

5. We must evolve, at least on a temporary basis, a regional preference system that would favor the export of finished and semi-finished Latin American goods to the U.S. market and, at the same time, eliminate the protective tariffs and quotas that inhibit imports of Latin American raw materials.

YJ

QUIGG, PHILIPP

The following might be considered in formulating any policy for Latin America:

1. The U.S. should talk more about responsible and responsive government and less about democracy;

2. The U.S. should try to subordinate its fears of Communism in better proportion to the extent and nature of the threat. Most of the things we can do to fight Communism in Latin America have to be done quietly, and they are being done. But there are limits to what we can accomplish, and sooner or later we will have to be resolute in resisting the gentle blackmail which is posed as, "Help us or else ..." One day, perhaps in Brazil, the second option may have to be taken up. To assume that the alternative must be Communism seems very dubious.

3. We should distinguish more clearly in our own minds between technical and genuinely developmental aid programs. One reason the American people seem dis-illusioned with the rate of economic development in countries we have helped is that they do not know how small a proportion of our total aid has been used for development, how much to balance budgets or unsuccessfully fight inflation.

4. We should avoid giving the impression that we look upon the O.A.S. merely as an instrument for fighting Communism. It has rarely been used effectively on issues of primary interest to the Latin American countries as a means of drawing them more closely together.

5. The U.S. should avoid making a fetish of consistency where circumstances in fact differ. For example, though we must do what we can to discourage military coups, we cannot thereby be put in the position of defending -- simply because they were elected -- venal governments which have wholly defaulted on their minimal responsibilities.

6. We should not let our own need for resoluteness and realism become an excuse for "getting tough" or an unwillingness to discuss and act in areas of friction between us and the Latin American nations -- whether it be the Panama Canal or water disputes with Mexico or the price of coffee.

7. We should give the highest priority in our programs of training, education and exchange to the search for leadership and the cultivation of a sense of individual responsibility for government.

8. We should not expect that the unwarranted abuse we are subjected to from Latin America will cease until the discrepancies between us and them -- in size, power and accomplishment -- have disappeared. It will be a long time.

[Y]

REIDY, JOSEPH W.

The most important U.S. objectives in Latin America are defense of the Americas from hostile attack or internal subversion; development of an inter-American system capable of resolving U.S.-Latin American issues and coordination political, economic, and other matters of mutual interest; and the application of the U.S. public and private resources to Latin American modernization and integration with the modern West.

1. **Defense of the Americas** -- requires not only conventional military preparedness but also positive measures to thwart Communist infiltration and subversion. Development goals cannot be pursued at the necessary pace if Communist subversive activities divert the resources of Latin America and sow the seeds of discord. The continued use of Cuba as a Communist base for subversion and the concerted Communist effort to overthrow the Venezuelan Government attest to the need for vigorous countermeasures.

A. **U.S. Military Assistance Program (USMAP)** -- in Latin America requires continued support. USMAP's recent emphasis on civic action programs in Latin America should help to contribute toward a more positive image for the military program. USMAP should channel support -- given the necessary political decision of OAS -- to help create an inter-American military force capable of responding to hemispheric crises, whether caused by Communist insurgency or violation of the principles covering human rights contained in the OAS Charter.

B. **Exchange of information on Communist Activities** -- should be improved. If multilateral OAS action continues to prove deficient, supplementary limited multilateral or bilateral arrangements should be used more broadly to fill the void.

C. **Effective Action against Castro's Cuba.** The continued existence of a Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible with U.S. and hemispheric security interests. Energetic and effective measures are needed to isolate the Castro regime. A diplomatic, economic, and informational offensive should be continued (with political action as an additional "persuader" if necessary) to convince nations of both NATO and the OAS that the threat represented by Cuba is a threat to the West in general and to the inter-American system in particular.

D. **Reassessment of U.S. Military-Strategic Requirements** -- is an urgent need in view of: the Missile-launching capabilities of Soviet submarines and the new weapons of the space age; inadequate communication facilities linking the Americas; the need for a new sea level canal as an alternative route to the Panama Canal.

- 2 [Y]

## 2. Building an Effective Inter-American System

A. **Increase U.S. knowledge of Latin America.** There is urgent need for a major public-private collaborative effort to increase U.S. knowledge of Latin America Coordinated research programs with greater cross-fertilization of experience and centralization of information would make for a more systematic effort. Research should be focused upon problems of most vital concern to the Americas. The U.S. should give increased support for this type of activity.

B. **Building a stronger cultural bridge.** The magnitude of the problem of creating better understanding of the U.S. in Latin America has been gravely underestimated. Basic and deeply rooted human attitudes must be changed as part of Latin America's modernization process. The U.S. government does not have an organization with either the charter or resources for conducting the psychological engineering required to do this.

C. **Transmitting the knowledge and experience of the modern West.** The U.S. must make more of an effort to transmit its technical know-how. Public-private efforts collaborative efforts must disseminate more effectively the values and techniques of the modern West. Collaborative programs might combine private and public resources to help establish modern universities in key areas of Latin America. The University of the Andes provides a model for such institutions. Greater support to institutions modeled after the U.S. land-grant colleges and to specialized vocation schools is also needed. A more energetic effort to translate selected English-language books and other materials into Spanish and Portugese and to support their wider distribution is also required.

D. **Linking U.S. resources to leadership of Latin America's new elite.** In Latin America the power structure is dominated by relatively few individuals, and in many cases these persons continue to resist the dynamic influence of the West. In most countries, however, an increasing number of persons with leadership potential are emerging to form a highly diverse group, the new elite. It is with this new elite that the U.S. must create a collaborative tie. There should be a program of political action based on the tenet that political maneuver is a fact of life and an essential element of statecraft. In programs of political action the U.S. should undertake activities whereever possible in conjunction with organized elements of Latin America's new elite.

1. Key U.S. officials responsible for the execution of U.S. policy should be trained in the art of political action.

- 3 -

2. Prudent use of U.S. power strongly suggests that the U.S. attempt, whenever possible, to seek channels for joint U.S.-Latin American political action rather than attempt direct action.

## 3. Latin America's Development

### A. Increasing effectiveness of current U.S. public and private activities.

1. More emphasis on the following points of the Alliance for Progress would serve to increase the program's effectiveness:

a. The call in the Charter of Punta del Este for greater productivity should receive more stress. Productivity increases should precede the creation of expanded welfare programs. Greater expenditure for education to improve the knowledge and skills of Latin Americans is a prime task of the Alliance.

b. The national planning and government-to-government approaches of the Alliance must concentrate on harnessing Latin America's private capital resources as well as attracting a greater flow of foreign investment.

c. When the Alliance was proposed it was oversold with a promotional effort that gave undue emphasis to the role of the U.S. in providing capital and insufficient consideration to the need for general Latin American popular participation in a joint, long-range undertaking. This should be changed.

2. U.S. business, an important transmitter of the ideas of the West, must expand current efforts to cultivate in its field representatives greater cultural empathy toward Latin America.

3. U.S. public and private resources must be more effectively combined to exert greater leverage in speeding Latin American development. Presently they lack any form of integrated approach.

### B. Injection of U.S. capital, organizational skills, and technology.

1. Establish an Inter-American Development Corporation (IDAC) as a private U.S. corporate entity through which capital (private and public, U.S. and foreign) might be invested to stimulate the development of key sectors in the Latin American economy.

IDAC

- 4 -

2. Make use of the growing number of senior or retired U.S. consultant talent.

3. Make use of the enormous U.S. scientific research facilities, public and private, which are engaged in many investigations which have relevance to Latin America's problems of development. The allocation of greater resources or the granting of higher priority to certain selected research programs might lead to breakthroughs which would hasten the modernization of Latin America.

### C. Latin American self-help: National Development Corporations.
The U.S. public and private sectors should join in stimulating and assisting in the formation of a series of National Development Corps. Such organizations could combine the civic action programs of the military and the activities of local Peace Corps units. They could harness the energies of the migrants now moving from rural areas to overcrowded urban centers.

### D. Atlantic Triangle Action.

1. As a matter of highest priority, the U.S. should make a major effort to concentrate the resources of the modern West on speeding Latin America's development and the fuller integration into a Triangular Atlantic Community. The formation of European and Latin American organizations, public and private, which share this objective merit encouragement and support. The Development Advisory Committee (DAC) of the OECD might serve as a focal point for coordinating aid from NATO countries.

2. The U.S. should try to shift assistance to Latin America from capital transfusions and "bailout" loans to the healthier economic base of increased commercial interchange. Triangle approach to reduce the obstacles to freer trade and investment should be vigorously pursued. This would necessitate concessions along these general lines:

a. The U.S. should grant increased access to its domestic markets for low-cost, efficient, free-world producers of copper, lead, zinc, petroleum, sugar, wool, beef, and possibly a selected group of semi-manufactured products. The operation of the PL 480 program should be continually assessed to assure that U.S. subsidization of its domestic agricultural sector does not damage other free world economies. The U.S. concessions are predicated on equalizing concession from the other two corners of the Triangle.

[Y]

REIDY, JOSEPH W.

- 2 -

A. **Increase U.S. knowledge of Latin America.** There is urgent need for a major public-private collaborative effort to increase U.S. knowledge of Latin America. Coordinated research programs with greater cross-fertilization of experience and centralization of information would make for a more systematic effort. Research should be focused upon problems of most vital concern to the Americas. The U.S. should give increased support for this type of activity.

C. **Transmitting the knowledge and experience of the modern West.** The U.S. must make more of an effort to transmit its technical know-how. Public-private-efforts, collaborative efforts must disseminate more effectively the values and techniques of the modern West. Collaborative programs might combine private and public resources to help establish modern universities in key areas of Latin America. The University of the Andes provides a model for such institutions. Greater support to institutions modeled after the U.S. land-grant colleges and to specialized vocation schools is also needed. A more energetic effort to translate selected English-language books and other materials into Spanish and Portuguese and to support their wider distribution is also required.

- 3 -

[Y]

- 4 -

M

a. The U.S. should grant increased access to its domestic markets for low-cost, efficient, free-world producers of copper, lead, zinc, petroleum, sugar, wool, beef, and possibly a selected group of semi-manufactured products. The operation of the PL 480 program should be continually assessed to assure that U.S. subsidization of its domestic agricultural sector does not damage other free world economies. The U.S. concessions are predicated on equalizing concessions from the other two corners of the Triangle.

- 5 -

b. The EEC and other European nations should be encouraged to grant freer access to their markets for Latin American exports.

c. Latin Americans must be encouraged to avoid excessive protectionist measures in their common market arrangements, to make more effective use of foreign aid and credits, and to reexamine those portions of their import substitution program which are inconsistent with the rationale of comparative advantage. In addition, Latin America should make energetic efforts to attract foreign private investments by providing adequate inducements and assuring fair treatment.

3. The North Atlantic Powers, preferably by joint action in DAC, should give special attention to the fluctuations which affect the sales of, and income from, certain primary products.

4. North Atlantic and Latin American countries should give urgent attention to the creation of an Atlantic Triangle investors' convention. The framers of such a convention should make a concerted effort to provide acceptable standards for expropriation settlement, capital remittances, and other matters affecting investment in Latin America.

[Y]

Schneider, Ronald M.

1. The Challenge of Revolution. The U.S. should not react negatively each time a popular revolution breaks out in one of the less-developed Latin American states. Since it is likely that the fundamental transformation of society, for which the Alliance for Progress calls, will not come about in all cases through orderly and evolutionary means, we should anticipate that in some countries there will be violent struggles between the defenders of the established order and the exponents of sweeping change.

2. Dealing with the military. The effort to establish a delicate balance between the not easily reconcilable objectives of security and democracy will continue to challenge the resourcefulness of U.S. diplomacy. Where viable political institutions are beginning to evolve, the U.S. should use its influence to dissuade the military from interfering. When they do seize power, the U.S. should work steadily to convince military regimes of the need to concentrate upon building a road back to representative constitutional government.

3. It is in the long-run interest of the U.S. to seek to dissuade Latin American governments from embarking on military expenditures that divert limited resources from socially desirable purposes. Here measures that might strengthen the capacity of the inter-American system to protect its members from any externally aided subversive activity should be considered.

4. Given the influence the Latin American students wield, their attitudes are a matter of U.S. policy concern. This is all the more true in view of the fact that the positions assumed by the politically active student minority are so frequently hostile to U.S. policies. Unfortunately, U.S. programs directed toward Latin American students have frequently missed the mark: they have focused upon making students less political and diverting their energies into "safer" channels.

a. To the extent that efforts sponsored by the U.S. have helped upgrade academic standards in Latin America,

2.

there is no reason to object; but other efforts
have frequently flown in the face of reality.

b. The U.S. should recognize that in Latin America the university graduate is a potential member of his country's political career. U.S. programs aimed at influencing Latin American students should accept their interest in politics as a basic datum, as help universities improve their curricula in social economic and political affairs.

5. Viable systems of government depend on effective grass-roots support as well. Regrettably, such support is lacking in much of Latin America.

a. The idea of spontaneous citizens' groups not directly sponsored by the government, the Church, or some strong interest group has been all but absent from the area. The large number of organizations which in pluralistic and democratic societies seek to translate citizen concern into government action are non-existent.

b. Greater emphasis on grass-roots organizational techniques, combined with renewed stress on agrarian reform and basic education, may prove crucial in convincing Latin America's emerging masses that progress is at last in sight and that democracy can prove responsive to their needs if given the chance.

[7]

- 13 -

The unilateral conception of the Alliance for Progress and the resulting lack of Latin American enthusiasm has been reflected in inappropriate organization.

Finally, the Alliance for Progress has largely ignored the vital importance of the private sector of the economy. Eighty per cent of all production south of the Rio Grande is in private enterprise. (The re-activation of the Inter-American Development Commission which I have already mentioned could do much to restore a proper emphasis to the importance of private investment.)

In view of these shortcomings of the current approach the following proposals seem in order.

5. The United States should call an Inter-American Conference to develop a coherent program and organization for economic and social development in Latin America. The purpose of the Conference would be to establish the goals and to define the concepts for a constructive development program which has the enthusiastic support of those who are seeking development.

While past or present programs should not be abandoned without careful consideration, neither should their existence be a deterrent to real progress.

This Conference should be preceded by extensive planning through consultation. The conclusions of the Conference should reflect the thinking of the group as a whole.

-18-

D. Effective Organization within the U.S. Government for Hemisphere Relations.

If this nation is going to participate effectively in the implementation
of a vision of a Hemisphere of nations working together for their common good,
the United States Government must be organized for the task.

Two specific reorganization steps are required at the federal level:

13. All programs related to the development of a united Hemisphere should be the concern of a new Office of Western Hemisphere Affairs -- an independent agency organized for the specific purpose of serving the future of the Hemisphere.

At the present time the aid program, the information program and
other operating programs for the Hemisphere are handled under separate,
inadequately coordinated agencies. Other programs which are integrated
into global policies -- such as the food programs of the Agriculture
Department -- should be more closely attuned to overall objectives of
the Hemisphere. Similarly, an Office of Western Hemisphere Affairs could
be charged with assisting private institutions, industry, and labor for
joint efforts with their counterparts in Latin America.

14. A new post of Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs should be created to mark the special importance of this Hemisphere relationship and to bring into focus at top policy level our relations with the nations of the hemisphere.

who possess 80 per cent of
the land and resultant
power.

"In a very real way, the Guatemalan army is our army. This army is in the service of corruption. It is in the service of a society in which most people are hungry."

These are serious charges. On close examination, some of them appear to be more emotional than factual.

## Helps Equip Army

It is quite true that the United States helps to train and equip the Guatemalan army. There have been and continue to be U.S. military advisers here. But these advisers have never numbered in "the hundreds," as Father Bonpane claims.

Most responsible observers here probably would also dispute Father Bonpane's contention that Guatemala's Indian masses are "firmly determined that no foreigner is going to overcome them on their land." Extensive travel through the countryside does not turn up the slightest sign of political restlessness or a disposition toward extremist solutions.

Guatemala's peasants seem to share the political apathy of their counterparts in the rest of Latin America. Despite seven years of rebels' wooing, preaching and intimidation they have not given the guerrilla forces any significant support.

And although all the statistics cited by Father Bonpane to illustrate the wretched condition of the peasantry are true, one still gets the impression that Guatemala's Indians are far friendlier, more cheerful and at greater peace with themselves than most Latin rural folk.

## On Target

In at least two important respects, however, the priest's analysis appears to be precisely on target.

One is his warning that Guatemala's small but important and vociferous class of students and intellectuals is becoming increasingly estranged from the ideas that the United States says it would like to see flower in Latin America.

Outside of Fidel Castro's Cuba, there is probably no other country in Latin America where one encounters among young, well-educated people such deep suspicion and outright hatred of the United States.

This intellectual anti-Am-

1954, under first Arevalo and then President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, an attempt was made to bring a far-reaching social and economic revolution to Guatemala.

The Arbenz government, in particular, was both bitterly hostile to U.S. business interests and susceptible to Communist influence. And, in the polarized Cold War atmosphere of the time, this was something that Washington was unprepared to accept—even though Arbenz had overwhelming popular support within Guatemala.

Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who was later to become President, has written in his autobiography that while in exile in El Salvador in 1954 he was visited by a former United Fruit executive and two men who were introduced to him as CIA agents. They asked him to lead a revolt against Arbenz.

## Tells of Terms

In exchange for U.S. help, Ydigoras says he was told, he was expected to favor United Fruit and its railroad subsidiary, destroy the railroad workers' union, end Guatemalan claims against British Honduras and institute a strong-arm government. Ydigoras said he refused.

Shortly afterward, the revolution did come, under the leadership of another dissident army officer, Col. Carlos Castillo Armas. Arbenz was driven into exile (he lives today in Havana); and over the next three years until his assassination in 1957, Castillo Armas carried out precisely the policies that Ydigoras attributed to his American visitors.

## U.S. View Challenged

At the time, the 1954 revolt was considered a triumph for U.S. diplomacy and Washington officialdom (to the embarrassment of present-day policymakers) took a lot of bows over its coup. Even Thomas Mann, who as Under Secretary of State later became the key architect of the Johnson Administration's Latin American policy, once cited Guate-

been that Mendez will be able to establish the supremacy of civilian government and make a start toward reform.

Until now, however, he has been a captive to the need to fight the Castroite guerrilla menace and to the pressures exerted on him by the intransigent right wing. The United States has been able to do little more than wring its hands and go along.

Although Washington wants change, it wants it to come peacefully—through evolutionary rather than revolutionary means," as some U.S. policymakers like to put it.

This means that it feels it has no choice but to continue propping up the Guatemalan army with aid and training—even though the army is a regressive and disruptive force. The official justifications are that a Castroite victory would be even worse for the Guatemalan people than rightist domination, and that U.S. influence can help steer the Guatemalan military toward a more modern and democratic attitude.

To be sure, U.S. influence has resulted in the establishment of a fairly elaborate Civic Action program, designed to enlist the military in helping the peasants with development problem.

## Official Oversights

But the press releases of the U.S. military assistance program do not mention that the army's main method of combating guerrillas was the use of vigilante forces that killed hundreds of innocent people. Nor do they note that the army, until very recently, was a covert backer of Guatemala's many right-wing terrorist organizations.

Some U.S. military advisers privately applaud the brutal side of the fight against the guerrillas because of its "effectiveness." Col. John D. Webber Jr., who in January was assassinated by Communist gunmen, openly used his position as head of the U.S. mili-

apparent squelch
guerrilla menace