TELCOM

Sec. Packwood/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, November 1, 1973

10:30 a.m.

P: Henry.

K: Yes. How are you?

P: Very good. This will take 30 seconds. When you go to China would it be possible for you as a favor for a constituent of mine to ask you, if it is possible to obtain a certain stamp.

K: Certainly.

P: You are leaving, when? You are going to Europe before going to China?

K: I am leaving on Monday.

P: We will get it in a letter describing the stamp. It may be impossible to get the stamp.

K: If you can get it to me today.

P: I will get it there one way or another.

K: Send it to my office at the State Department. I may not be able to get it.

P: I don't know either, but at least I have made the effort.

END

TELECON
Mr. McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger

November 1, 1973

11:12

K: I think on the Newsweek problem what I would like to do is to take them in on the China leg. We should have an extra seat by then.

M: I think we can work that out. I was hoping to see you briefly before you went back to the White House.

K: Well, I have someone with me right now, why don't you come up and wait and maybe you can ride over to the White House with me.

M: I'll be happy to.

K: There are some things I want to talk to you about.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: Eo 1/30/83</td></tr><tr><td>By: JG 1/10/83</td></tr><tr><td>WAR. Date: 6/10/83</td></tr></table>

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Bourghiba, Jr. of Tunisa
1:30 p.m. 11/1/73

K: How are you?

B: Hello, sir. I want to apologize for intruding like this.

K: That's all right.

B: But I was on my way from Turkey this day and I looked on the papers and I saw your trip which is being prepared and I will be very brief sir, I would like just to make a few points--

K: Yes, but you unfortunately called me out of a meeting and I have to be very brief if you forgive me.

B: Yes, I will be very brief sir. I have seen that your program has overlooked Tunisa.

K: Well, I was sending Secretary Neusome to Tunisa.

B: Yes sir, but if I may just add one word--the personality of President Bourghiba--your overflying Tunisa without stopping would be very badly interpreted.

K: All right, well let me see what I can do.

B: I beg your pardon?

K: Let me see what I can do.

B: You're very kind.

K: And we will be in touch.

B: One suggestion --a one hour stop would be more than anything.

K: All right. At the airport?

B: It would be terrible not stopping.

K: All right, I will see what we can do. And we will be in touch.

B: I'm sorry for intruding.

K: No, I appreciate it and I remember the pleasure of our conversation.

B: Thank you so much. Good night, sir. Thank you.

TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin
Secretary Kissinger
1:35 p. m. 11/1/73

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Oh hell, Henry. Good afternoon. This is I received a telegram from--
in connection with we discussed with the President and ______ you
remember the message of Brezhnev about this same thing--those
people who represent our two and them--

K: Yeh, but we haven't really agreed to it yet.

D: No, no, no. I know. They are answering me to tell you on your
remark. And you have to report back to the President and then
you ask his final answer.

K: Right.

D: So the question really is to tell you they are positively looking to ideas
which you expressed aloud that those people who could be appointed
by both of our governments--Soviet Union and the United States to
look about it--the ceasefire agreement on Israeli-Egypt front were at the
same time represented their ______ of both governments during the
negotiations on Middle East settlement in accordance with agreement which

K: One minute, Anatol. There must be a misunderstanding--we have
never agreed to foreign special representatives to supervise the
ceasefire--it is a UN responsibility.

D: You say that they may come there.

K: I said that we are prepared to appoint the people who would provide the
auspices and who perhaps in the performance of their duties could
do some traveling, but not for the ceasefire--but for the auspices.

D: No for the auspices we appoint a force which is nothing new--

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: N.W. State Dept: Oct 30 1973

K: But the people who are providing the auspices can also do some traveling.

D: Yeh, I understand, but you remember--

K: We have not agreed to a ceasefire--to separate US-USSR ceasefire
supervision Anatol.

D: But it was proposed you were saying that those people could come there --it was this way. We proposed--I'm just trying to recall how it was happened. This proposal would the people be sent there--and you said okay then they go there for a very brief time but then better to have the people then--or maybe it was a good idea you could have then to be represented on the auspices--under the auspices for that settlement. So it was in this way it presented in a proposal and so on.

K: Right.

D: So it is not exactly that you proposed to have auspices--it was to make a proposal on this to send them there and you said it could be developed in a different place. So I could make a reservation from what you said that you want not--

K: So far--Israel--I doubt whether Israel will agree to it, but I have presented it to them.

D: Yeh. That was in connection with your thinking--and as for our possible you remember ----American representative to Tel Aviv--this question could be considered originally when it will be the response of ------- So what will it now be for you really for you to report to the President and when he okays, will be ready immediately or not immediately--we will be ready to discuss in more concrete terms the practical sides of all this--

K: Okay.

D: I don't know how you--I am sure you will discuss problems with Israelis-- but for my own information--could you tell something to us tomorrow let us say?

K: Yes. I hope to get you an answer tomorrow. Assuming we can get the Israelis to agree--one of the maddening things of this situation is that everyday we are being asked five more things we have to get them to agree to.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: M.N. Bar Date 06/04/01

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012957
By: M.W. Natari, S-00341

D: No, is this--for the last days we haven't said anything.

K: No, no you've been more restrained than your Egyptian allies.

D: Egyptians are you know--but on this it really matters that discuss with the President, so we would really like to have a reply.

K: We will reply tomorrow.

D: Okay, but take into consideration this particular answer which you give me right now.

K: Exactly. We'll take it very seriously.

D: And then second, this is from Gromyko saying once again about the composition of this United Nations Force on the Middle East. He is just asking me to tell you--to emphasize once again the importance adopted by the Security Council Resolution principle where fair geographic distribution. Because this described in the telegram saying he really could not give any good---for Waldheim. Waldheim is doing everything what he is told by Scale and of course we are going to press on Scali from now on but they hope that really he will understand the Security Council.

K: Well, I understand we now settled the two-observer question.

D: That is my impression, yes. But now it is about the troops and we are feeling that about Poland, Czechs and Bulgaria.

K: You want all three of them?

D: That was proposed, I don't know all of them or one of them. It's not my business, because I have my own things, but I know Waldheim said

K: But the principle we have tried to follow is that it should be composed of countries that are--have diplomatic relations with both sides.

D: And this is--that you couldn't give up any man from Africa because nobody else is left except South Africa and we couldn't go along those lines really, to be strictly observers, after all its Security Council decision. So I understand your point because they told you so.

K: It's not just what Israelis have told us, but there is a certain elemental fairness to have an emergency force which is supposed to operate between the two sides. But--which is composed to a considerable extent of countries that have broken relations with one of the sides and therefore cannot be--cannot presume to be impartial.

D: Yeh. It is clear, but at the same time it could be done if just accepting what they are telling really--

K: If you had had my talks with the Prime Minister of Israel, you wouldn't suffer from the illusion that we are doing everything they are telling us.

D: No, no.

K: They are accusing of betraying them--

D: I don't know what you are telling but ------the pressure you is very clear. I am sure she could do it along those lines. Public pressure. Really Henry Gromyko asked me to have you look into this matter and --

K: I will look into it.

D: What kind of answer I have to give Gromkyo because now he is pressing me on this

K: I'll have to talk to Scali--I'll call you later this afternoon.

D: Today.

K: Before the end of the day-

D: You report to me huh?

K: Yes.

D: Good, thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By N.W. Police 5-30
October 5, 1965

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

November 1, 1973

3:30

K: I called you to see if you were with any of our allies and
secondly to make sure you are not corrupting any non-aligned.

D: Laughter

K: What I would like to propose to you on this force.. the non-aligned have now proposed Ghana and Yugoslavia and also they have proposed that Canada and Poland should be on the back-up logistics force. We will accept Ghana. We cannot accept Yugoslavia. We can accept Poland and Canada as back-up, so you win two out of three and we recommend Romania instead of Yugoslavia.

D: In this case we will be against Romania.

K: We will be against Yugoslavia.

D: If it comes from the Warsaw pact.. anyway we don't want to put it on this basis. I am just telling you this off the record so to speak.

K: We will accept on Poland for the back-up.

D: What is back-up?

K: For logistics support..

D: Did Poland ask for logistics support?

K: That is my understanding.

D: You understand... was not ...from our side

K: If this compromise is accepted the only outstanding .. is Yugoslavia.

D: I know. I don't have anything specific.

K: I can instruct Scali to do this. I thought you might calm down Malik.

D: I did not know anything about Poland or logistics

K: This is not a new proposal by us. We are accepting an existing proposal. My understanding is the Poland and Canada... is the existing proposal.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By N.W.ala 5-20-73 12:00

- 2 -

D: I understand, but I don't have this information and you are right.. I haven't heard anything. As of now, I will tell Ghana...

K: Ghana, we will accept.

D: In this combination.. not acceptable to us.

K: Why are you so hard on one of your allies?.. member of the Warsaw Pact.

D: On this I know. . . We give you Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria..

K: We have taken Poland.. the Bulgarians will head north against the Turks. That's the only country they can fight....

D: Well, Henry, as for Romania, I would like you to not insist on this.

K: We don't... only insist against Yugoslavia. This is all I have. There is only

D: I could

K: I have . . I told you about Poland.. is a concession. This is a sign of good will.

D: I am asking you..

K: I understand that it is the existing proposal we have up to now refused and are now accepting.

D: Quite all right and the question of as is. You will inform me

K: I am informing you. We will not accept Yugoslavia. We are not against.

D: But, this has nothing to do with Canada and Poland.

K: That was our recommendation for..

D: Let me put it this way. Canada and Poland is support.

K: Yes, but we will not accept to Poland.. another country. We have made a concession with Ghana and Poland.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012052
By N.W. Bureau of
005401

D: As you know, Canada and Poland on logistics. As for Ghana, I don't have anything, but you.. should not mention you're against Yugoslavia. As for Romania, you

K: Yes, but that I don't insist on. Maybe we should drop them both.
....How about Serbia, Montenegro.

D:

K: If you keep it up your allies will ask for Albania.

D: That you will accept.

K: We don't recognize Albania.

D: Neigher do we. I will tell about our Canada and Poland.. on this
you will bring in tomorrow.

K: On the other one, yes.

END

DECLASSIFIED

November 1, 1973

3:30

D: Laughter.

D: If it comes from the Warsaw pact: anyway we don't want to put it on this basis. I am just telling you this off the record so to speak.

D: What is back-up?

K: For logistics support..

K: That is my understanding.

D: You understand... was not ... from our side

<table><tr><td>DK/LASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/1/73</td></tr><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHA. Date 6/1/73</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Anniv. 50 6/10/65</td></tr><tr><td>By: OJARA, Date 6/10/65</td></tr></table>

K: Ghana, we will accept.

K: Why are you so hard on one of your allies?. . member of the Warsaw Pact.

K: We have taken Poland.. the Bulgarians will head to rth against the Turks. That's the only country they can fight....

D: I could

K: I have . I told you about Poland.. is a concession. This is a sign of good will.

D: I am asking you..

D: As you know, Canada and Poland on logistics. As for Ghana, I don't have anything, but you. . should not mention you're against Yugoslavia. As for Romania, you

D:

D: That you will accept.

D: Neither do we. I will tell about our Canada and Poland. . on this
you will bring in tomorrow.

K: On the other one, yes.

END

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>originally</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>RE: 5.23.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>By: CH</td>
      <td>Date: 6/10/64</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELCON
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger

November 1, 1973

4:20 p.m.

S: ...going to talk to Tekoah but I wanted to talk to you before I talk with him. I wanted to ask you whether or not you could conceivably change your mind on Indonesia. They are the most responsible people up here, the most responsible by far.

K: I don't see how we can hold this line. Why don't you talk to the Israelis, but we can't be beaten to death by the UN people while the Israelis are beating us to death, saying we are betraying them and we have so many fish to fry.

S: There will be of necessity about half a dozen vetos ...for special circumstances. Afrikans need representation. If we skip the Indonesians, who are with the peace force in VietNam, and by all standards the most objective of the non-aligned....I can veto until the cows come home.

K: .......wait until you talk to Tekoah.

S: Just isn't going to seell because of .....If you can give me Indonesia because they are by far the most responsible. They have talked about the practical need to get along with both parties. Amb. Sani is the only guy we've gotten any support from, if you skip him and go only withNepal it just isn't going tofly.

S: We are being driven from one impossible position to another by tactical exigencies. It's absurd to have forces one of whose members is opposed to....

S: I can say that we will veto the composition of this force. ...Came up 40 times this morning in what was a violent closed door meeting, Indonesians only ones not in on this.

K: That's going to be our fate on a lot of things.

S: Sure it is but I wonder if there isn't any give on Indonesia, since you know what they are like.

K: When do you have to know?

S: In the next 45 minutes.

K: OK, I'll have Eagleburger call you.

TELECON

Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

November 1, 1973

4:40

K: Brent, I think you ought to put the WSAG back on at 10 tomorrow.

S: I have.

K: Have you had a chance to talk to Dinnitz?

S: I have talked to him and he assures me they understand what a crucial role you play and I said it looked to me from reading Peter Rodman's notes.. and he said I can assure you that's not the way I feel and I will talk to the Prime Minister again.

K: That's not the point. It is what they are up against here.

S: I know. I told him that. I said when you get down to where decisions are made you will be up against... a difficult situation and you have been put there by one individual. He said he knows that. I said it doesn't look like that. He assured me he would talk it over with the Prime Minister.

K: Good. I have to talk with you about how to conduct yourself while I am gone. I am sure the Russians will try something.. to get hold of the President. It is essential they don't get anything I didn't give them.

S: I agree, right.

END

TELCON

Minister Shalev - Secretary Kissinger

November 1, 1973

5:10 p.m.

K: Good idea for me and the Prime Minister to get together. I don't really think we need a confrontation right now.

S: No sir.

K: I think it would ah.... be a good idea if you would.... I would like to propose that you send Yarev over here to meet with me and Sisco and anybody else you want to send. Then, let him report back to the Prime Minister and then if she wants to see me in a calm atmosphere.... I don't think it is helpful.... I heard what she said to the Senators this morning. That is just not helping at all.

S: Mr. Secretary, may I say something.

K: You can say something, but I am just asking you to transmit
......

S: I wasn't present at all her meetings, but I was present to hear what the Prime Minister said to the Senate leadership at about 1:00, she spoke for about an hour and I don't think you would feel the way you do.....

K: Look, I had a call from one of the Senators present urging me to urge the President to ask to get the Foreign Minister over here. He said any further contact between you and the Prime Minister could have disastrous consequences. Now, he is a dear friend of yours. He maintained that he gained that impression from what she said this morning at the meeting and I really think Yarev and I or Yarev and Sisco could work something out and present it to the Prime Minister then bring her tomorrow morning if she still disapproves.

S: Very good, but I would still very much like to know, like you to know what she said. She spoke of the friendly president and.... what you did for Israel in these weeks in sending out the airlift and....

K: Its not a question of gratitude, its a question of tough decisions next week which she cannot do from such a posture.

S: I don't think ...... I will pass it on to Dinitz.

K: I'm not free before 8:00 - 8:30. Will you pass that on to...

TELECON
Ismail Fahmi/Kissinger

November 1, 1973

6:40 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. Foreign Minister.

F. I am sorry to bother you again but I just got two cables here from my President, one discouraging and one hopeful. The first one informs me that today Israeli planes invaded our air space west of Cairo and then they fired on one of our rockets. They fired at that position with a direct rocket, one of your latests. They say it was one of the televised rockets.

K. O'k, I will have to look into that.

F. From a distance of 25 to 10K and then they had a direct hit. This is very serious. The second promising thing is that you remember when you talked about this Monday. I advised the President that we had to do something quiet about it. He responded that only for a week we together get along with things, you know, without infliction on the Egyptian President. On that particular point he is telling me that oil tankers with Liberian flag we let it go through at ______ without any interception from our part. This encourages both of us to try to achieve something substantial before I go back.

K. I appreciate that very much.

F. Now we have two indications, one very disturbing about flying and hitting about the ceasefire, and then there is this second promising one. I leave it up to you. If you can do anything to finalize what we agreed on before I go back to Cairo--

K. I think it will be next to impossible but will give me added incentive.

F. Will you let President Nixon know of these.

K. I will call him immediately in Key Biscayne.

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: 5/8/73
SUBJECT: Cairo: Date 6/10/73
BY: OSH

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

November 1, 1973

7:00 p.m.

D. Good evening, Mr. Secretary.

K. Mr. Ambassador, we have a rather urgent problem on MFN.

D. Yes.

K. I am trying to arrange that the House drop Title 4 altogether, get the Jackson Amendment through in the Senate, and decide in March when it goes to conference which way to play it. The Jewish Community is taking the position that they will tell their congressmen that for their own reasons they decided to drop Title 4. That is not good enough. They must actively help us get it dropped. I urge you actively to do that. You will have them all tonight. I think that if the Prime Minister will say something, not at dinner but---

D. I know what you mean.

K. We cannot drive the Soviets absolutely against the wall on every issue.

D. I didn't have a chance to talk to the Prime Minister about it yet but I will this evening. She will have a chance to see the Jewish leaders tomorrow.

K. Good. Will you let me know? I forgot she will be here tomorrow so she doesn't have to say anything tonight.

D. Yes, she will be here tomorrow and we will probably have another meeting.

K. Good.

D. I will see you tonight.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>50 03-51/04</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CH</td><td>Date</td><td>6/10/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
Secretary General Waldheim - Secretary Kissinger

November 3, 1973

10:15 a.m.

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Good morning, Mr. Secretary of State. Well, before you
are leaving I thought I should talk to you. I think what we got
yesterday is the maximum we could get in the Security Council.

K: Right.

W: I wish to thank you for your cooperation in this regard because
I know how difficult it was. I had a long talk with Mitchell Sharp
and he is coming to see me again at 11:00. We may be able to
settle the matter with the Canadians. The Canadians are quite
ready to do the job. Of course, the main problem we have is the
question of the cease fire lines. I'm sure you are familiar with
it. The Russians and the non-aligned are pressing me very hard
at this time in this regard. I instructed...

K: In what regard, Mr. Secretary General?

W: In regard to pushing the Israelis back to the 22nd lines.

K: Do you know where they were?

W: The Russians and the non-aligned asked me to instruct
______ to put the question directly to Dayan. ________ has requested
Dayan to withdraw to the the 22nd of October lines. Dayan said
immediately it was out of the question but he would forward the
request to the Government. He could not decide it alone. The matter
was left in suspense. The last information I got Dayan said they
would have to wait until Mrs. Meir is back from Washington. This
is what the Russians and non-aligned are pressing for very hard,
....trying very hard, but have to wait for return of Mrs. Meir. I
don't know if you can tell me anything about this matter.

K: We are trying to see how we can work out practical arrangements.
....seem to be totally stymied....for supply of third army. That's
what we are putting emphasis on right now.

W: We are doing our best to be helpful. To carry supplies to the
Third Army. The two military commanders are meeting regularly

2

under UN auspices......... West of the Suez. These meetings
take place in quite a good spirit.

K: Mr. Secretary General, why don't we arrange this, if the
discussions make any progress, I will see you are kept informed.
I realize you are not a free agent, but if one could avoid inflammatory
UN debates it would help very much.

W: Certainly, I have done what I could to avoid this sort of thing.
Most of the acrimonious debates took place in closed meeting.
The confrontation between Malik and Scali took place in a closed
meeting, and the public didn't really know about it.. yesterday
evening.

K: Good, that's very helpful.

W: I'll do my best to avoid such acrimonious confrontations.
All in all things are quite good, the situation in the Security Council.
Especially because the non-aligned countries are very interested
in making progress, and they didn't like at all the acrimonious
remarks of Malik.

K: Mr. Secretary General, very much appreciate your even
handed....

W: All in all things are going very well. I am most grateful
for cooperation from you.

K: I will call you when I get back and will keep you informed
while I'm gone.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator: 50 6/23</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Date: 6/10/65</td></tr></table>

Telcon
Secretary Shultz/HAK

November 2, 1973; 11:41 a.m.

S: (missed first few words) The story is like this. That he (Poehl) is here. The Embassy doesn't know it - on behalf of Brandt and Scheel and Schmidt. And the basic message is that they would like to cooperate with the U.S. in the Middle East, and they don't know...

K: Why do they come to you?

S: They don't know quite how.

K: Well, my question is, what's he doing seeing you if that's what he wants to do?

S: Well, I'm just describing the situation that arose out of Schmidt's call to me. I suppose Schmidt called me because I'm the person he's been dealing with. But at any rate they say that they have a great deal of sympathy for Israel's problem, they would like to be helpful, they don't quite know how. They would like the upper echelons of the Israeli community to know that they want to be helpful, but they feel it would be counterproductive for them in their problems with the Arab if they make it a big public thing. What exactly they would suggest is not clear although they, for example, think they might do it through the Bundesbank in effect make available a line of credit line, say, $200 million, or something like that on a basis where the time of repayment is not a big issue and interest payments could be made, and so forth, and in a sense have that credit flow via the United States to Israel. But that is a specific thing that is an example of an implementation of a general stance. I talked with him some and thanked him and said this is really, you know, not for me particularly. This is Mr. Kissinger's bailiwick and I'll call him and see where we go from there, but it sounds to me as though they are in a way responding to things that you said and they want to get themselves into a posture where Germany is collaborating with the U.S.

K: No, but do they want to talk to me, or do they want me to give you some a message?

S: They want to be in touch with the government here and I'm sure they would like to talk to you, and Poehl is here, he's available to come over there if you'd like to see him and sort of take this over, or if you would like to have some two or three people try to see what kinds of things in the light of this might be thought of, we can do that.

K: Well, that I would like, anyway. Well, let me see whether I can find a minute. I've got about an 18 hour schedule.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>AR. Cate</td><td>6/1/73</td></tr></table>

-2-

S: Yeah, I'm sure you do.

K: And let me see what I can do.

S: My guess is that they came to me 'cause they thought I'd probably be easier to see than you.

K: No, no, look George, I don't have that sort of feeling. I just want to make sure they're not taking a cheap shot so that they can say domestically they made a great effort.

S: It may be that that's what they're doing, and I think you ought to... I believe it's very desirable that you talk to Poehl personally, if you can.

K: I'll do my best and I'll call you this afternoon. Now I had to cancel out of the offset agreement because I've got to do something about the Israelis, but -- out of this offset meeting -- but if you can accept Sonnenfeldt in my stead, we can go ahead with it -- Sonnenfeldt and Casey.

S: I have no trouble with that, as x long as we have you, in effect really represented there.

K: Okay.

S: Now, Casey called me about it and said it was off and should he cancel the whole thing, and I said, well, we've got to have Henry there. So as of now it's canceled, but it can get put back on again. But, can I suggest this to you, Henry - to the extent that what they're really thinking about is some financial proposition, probably Volcker here is the best person to work on it. The foreign policy aspects of this are dominant. I don't know how you might want to position that, but I suppose Sonnenfeldt must know pretty well your thinking on that. If it is possible, it might be worthwhile this morning to put Poehl, Volcker and Sonnenfeldt together and let Poehl say what he has to say to those two.

K: Why don't we do that.

S: And then they can crank around and see what they might think of. And then it comes time when you can see Poehl, why there would be a little more substance to go on.

K: Okay, who don't we do that. I've got the President on the other line.

S: Shall I call Sonnenfeldt and tell him we want to do this?

K: Yes, please.

S: All right. Thank you.

TELCONE

Mr. Flanigan - Secretary Kissinger

November 2, 1973

2:35

F: Thank you for calling. I understand how it came out last night. Now, you are going to be leaving on Monday. Unless effective action is taken to remove from the calendar its going to come up anyway.

K: I have done exactly as I was told. We had it put on the calendar the week of the 12th, which gives us the option of taking it off next week.

F: Yes, but when does the option run out.

K: Tuesday, is what....

F: Thing is you ought to be here for it to be under your name. Its a question of making the decision of taking it off. How do you want us to proceed if you can't be here at that time. If you could do what ....

K: My view is if we cannot get title IV, then delay it.

F: Unless we are absolutely confident the vote will be against title IV, delay it.

K: Of course, George Shultz has a different view.

F: I understand Henry, I just don't want to say we let you down. Would you like to go to the President. He is going to have to weigh in if.

K: I would wish for you to represent my view.

F: I will do so, everybody knows it, possibility you, your view, in a vote, I would give, against Shultz' views and Pierce's views at that point in a majority situation, I'll be perfecty's frank with you, you are going to lose. If you feel very strongly you should go to the President.

K: Then you should go to the President. It's a question of having my views represented.

F: Good, very good.

2.

K: I just don't see how we can load this on the Soviets at this time.

F: Remember, though, an action by the House is not an action by the full Congress or the Senate.

K: Yes but we shouldn't play games, you know once the House has voted it...in order to get us to go along with Title IV will be just as compelling in March. You won't have any luck getting the President to veto that bill.

F: I just hope you understand the broad international repercussions of not having a bill, which is what we would have.

K: I hope that goes to the President.

F: In our negotiations with the Hill, if we can get Ullman of the Ways and Means committee in favor of dropping that title, need a lot of persuasion. If Ullman wanted to see you on Sunday,

K: Peter, I'm at the edge of my physical strength now. I mean I'm working 18 hours a day. I'm going on this trip, and I don't see how I'm going to get through. I must have Sunday.

F: Saturday as well.

K: Absolutely booked for 2/3 of Saturday now. There must be a surcease of this constant pressuring. What can I tell Ullman anyway.

F: I understand Henry, and you are stronger than most. But ...to defer on National Security grounds. And you are extremely persuasive. You did a fantastic job in the Foreign Relations Committee. I agree there is a limited amount of Kissinger to use. If you can't do it, I understand. They wanted to have you before the Committee very much on Monday. I told them you have an impossible schedule. But if the ways and means committee were strongly in favor now.

K: If it has to be, put it to me later in the day. Right now I have to get off the phone.

OK Henry

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator: 5/8/84</td></tr><tr><td>By: J.H. Date: 6/1/84</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

Mr. Jameson - Secretary Kissinger

November 2, 1973

4:00 (approx)

J: How are you?

K: Fine, how are you. How would you like to deal with
Israel for awhile and let me deal with the Saudis?

J: I have been in Europe calling on people and told them
they have got to ah....take this very seriously.

K: I don't want them to get panicky.

J: There's an awful lot of material in the supply system,
and on the water. But it's going to catch up quickly. They
are well aware of it.

K: If we can hold on quietly until I have had a chance to
talk to Saudi Arabia. I'm not sure I can achieve anything.
They are not easy people.....I'm going to be the first Jew
accused of anti-semitism.

J: Well, I'm afraid that's right.

K: My problem is when to apply the pressure. What is now
obtainable will immediately satisfy the Arabs but it doesn't
get us very far down the road, I want to talk to Sadat and
see if we can make a rational plan which can be carried out
over a period of months. If we can get a plan, we can
convince them and turn it over to Faisal.

J: We have got information the Saudis are trying to get off
being the chief confronter of the US.

K: We have to get a political mechanism to let Faisal get
out of the corner he has painted himself into. I think the
best thing you could do is to keep everybody calm.

J: The only country which has moved is Holland. They are
in a terrible bind. Others, although they are aware of the
problem, I'm sure are not going to move within the next
three-four months.

K: If we could, if we could keep people aware and keep
them calm in terms of taking action for another 10 days,
then I will be back here (on the 15th) and if you wanted
to come down with your group we could discuss strategy. I
would brief you on where we stand in relation to Arab nations.
Right now the chances are only 50-50. We are certainly pre-
pared to make a major effort. The only question is whether
the domestic situation in the Arab countries is such that
they could give us 6 months to get it organized, that's our
problem.

TELECON
Scali/Kissinger
November 2, 1973

4:36 p.m.

S. Dobrynin is going to be calling you. Malik called him from my office. He was in to discuss the Poland and Canada observer logistics...He says that is not enough and on the basis of your conversations with Dobrynin Yugoslavia is already being included.

K. That is a lie.

S. I told him that is not so. I have a complete record of the Dobrynin and Kissinger talks. At no point did the Secretary of State even agree to include Yugoslavia. We have left it that Dobrynin would get to you.

K. I never agreed to Yugoslavia and it is impossible to include them.

S. I wanted to tell you just so when he talks to you you make it as emphatic as possible. You have everybody sewed up and he just wanted to get that extra six inches. When he talked to Dobrynin he seemed to calm down a bit, but I am not sure.

K. All right. I will talk to Dobrynin.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Amendment</td></tr><tr><td>By: J.H. Mar. Date 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

November 2, 1973

6:00 p.m.

K: What I wanted to tell you is the best thing you can
do is keep everybody from taking panicky action while
invoking the gravity of the situation. If we can alleviate
the situation on this trip we will know that soon, if we
cannot avoid it, if we can avoid the temptation of these
people buttering up Saudi Arabia, saying the government
is stupid, and that kind of thing.

J: We have a meeting here Monday. I've said the same thing before, but I'll repeat that to them.

K: If they have grave doubts about the government, if
they think we are not doing enough, tell them we will
continue to press, believe me we are doing everything
we can. We have got to organize pressure to face the
onslaught of the Israeli lobby.

J: I will prepare them before they go out.

K: I will talk with absolute frankness with King Faisal.

J: That's what he needs.

K: I will ask him what he would risk by easing the embargo
for 6 months, he can always go back to it if the situation
isn't any better. He can always go back to it.

J: If you could convince him of that, that would be a
major step. I will take the line you suggested and we
will be in touch with your office around the 15th.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By C.A.R. Date 6/1/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

David Landes/Secretary Kissinger

November 2, 1973

6:20

L: I know you are unable to see me tomorrow, but perhaps I can see you when you get back.

K: That definitely. You know I am on a seventeen hour day schedule.

L: I know. I don't know how you do it.

K: ..what concerns you.

L: It is hard to talk about on the phone. Let's say when I went to those countries in 1968, I needed to get into a decompression chamber when I returned before I could ... the impressions I had received and get my perspective. They are really very good, you know.

K: What do you mean?

L: You know, Dale Carnegie's book, on winning friends and influencing people. They are very good.

K: But are you worried I may give something away because I am impressed?

L: It struck me. I think of myself as calm and... but I found them extraordinarily effective. I recognize, as you must, it will be hard... the long haul will be hard.

K:

K: The long haul will be brutal. The only choice the Israelis have is whether they will give us a chance in breaking the deadlock. Weaning the Arabs away from the Soviets ... by having a chance... rather than having a unified Arab bloc against them, with Western Europe, the Japanese, the Soviets and most of the Arabs against us... pushing us into a confrontation in this country. Such a wave of anti-Semitism, they will destroy everything. It is essential for the Jewish Community here and the Israelis to seize on a mutual program.

L: I couldn't agree more. I wanted to talk about that problem, about the kind of assurances that would accompany such a program, palatable and acceptable.

K: Well, look I can't do it at 10:00. May be I'll do it at 12:00.

L: Well, in that case I'll come down.

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

November 2, 1973

7:00 p.m.

D. Sorry I was away when you called me. The Prime Minister was in a meeting with Secretary Schlesinger.

K. How did it go?

D. It was very formal and cordial, nothing of substance. They discussed the military requirements which he said depended on three things - funding, availability, and national policy. That was all. The Prime Minister thanked the United States Government. Mr. Shalev reported your conversation to the Prime Minister and she asked me to phone you and tell you something. I had the occasion to talk to General Scowcroft who related to something one of the senators said. It is absolutely not correct that the Prime Minister does not justify the alert.

K. She just said she didn't know any of the facts. They were in her possession. Senator Stenis came to the White House - and he is not a trouble-maker - to tell me he felt there was a whole series of charges in the Prime Minister's statements. That is her privilege but it doesn't help anything.

D. Of course not. She said just the opposite. That it was a great and important act.

K. I didn't pass it on to the President.

D. It was just a matter of a misunderstanding. She also said it again....The Prime Minister does not feel she can be in a position of having somebody else be required to represent her and would be very happy to talk at any time you called. She doesn't feel--

K. What do you feel we should talk about if we meet?

D. I frankly think the two of you should meet alone.

K. I don't think there is a basis for it. I think there are two possible ways. Either work out something we can do together of if not, we will do the best we can do alone after which we will work unilaterally. We have no choice.

D. I am suggesting myself, in addition to your real problem which are really the problems, there is the misunderstanding itself. In order to reach an understanding for the next week as you call it I think the meeting is needed to understand the peace prospects. I am not here to force a meeting, Mr. Secretary. The Prime Minister cannot allow that others come by....

-2-

K. How about getting Eban over here and we can be meeting at the Foreign Minister level.

D. I can suggest that. If I may, I would rather not repeat the suggestion to her. Unless you want to make it to me formally.

K. Well, what is her schedule?

D. She has a private dinner at our home. Just us. That can be cancelled.

K. I am not free really much before 9:30 or 10:00.

D. How do you suggest that we meet - at Blair House or at the White House or where? I would suggest that you two sit faced together. I think it is better this way.

K. After we sat together last evening, it didn't lead to anything.

D. So I understand from your people. It didn't work.

K. That is an understatement.

D. She had a good talk with the Governor.

K. He told me about it. He came to see me.

D. I felt after the Governor's meeting there are those problems that are genuine and those that are not. I think there is a tremendous amount of misunderstandings. It is not true she has said half the things that were said. I was present....

K. A lot of things happened yesterday before anyone reported anything, starting with the breakfast.

D. That was a moment when she was really concerned about a number of things. But these are not things she is talking and complaining to people about. She is talking to you.

K. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I think we both know what is happening. We can see it in the press and elsewhere but now the practical problem of how to....

D. I know that nothing comes from us that is for sure. Working half....to get the impression there is no pressure. On the practical problem that is my suggestion. I cannot say. If you feel it is better not to meet--

TELECON
Ambassador Kosciusko-Morizet/Kissinger

November 2, 1973

7:15 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

KM. I just received a message from Jobert with papers about this
Copenhagen business. He asked me to convey these directly to you
before you leave. I think it is important.

K. Of course.

KM. It is a good contribution to the importance of the text Tru
discussed and so on. What is the best way?

K. How about 10:00 tomorrow morning?

KM. About 10:00. All right.

K. Can it wait until then?

KM. Of course, of course, I hope I didn't embarrass you this
afternoon.

K. No, I thought you were very constructive.

KM. I didn't want to...but asked acute and pressing questions.

K. I thought you were being very constructive, Mr. Ambassador.

KM. I will see you tomorrow at 10:00 at the State Department.

K. Good. I will look forward to it.

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

November 2, 1973

7:34 p.m.

K. Mr. Ambassador, I will be glad, if it is convenient, to call on her about 10:00 tonight.

D. 10:00, at Blair House.

K. I will bring Sisco and somebody to take notes. I don't know who.

D. You don't want to see her alone?

K. I will be glad to talk to her alone first. It is up to her.

D. I will tell her that.

K. If she wants alonger talk alone, fine. But we have to get it down in some manageable form.

D. She has asked me to call Stenis and some of the others... The record of Stenis is incorrect.

K. That is unimportant and nobody else...I didn't know.

D. She simply did not say it.

K. He had the same impression as somebody else who was at the meeting.

D. About this point?

K. Not about this point. That needles were being stuck into us. That the tone was not friendly. Even if one cannot... the situation is too serious for us to play around like this, for us to argue who said what. A friend of mine from Jerusalem said a campaign was starting in Israel against me.

D. No.

K. Why would he call? I don't care about campaigns. We have very specific problems. We have to do various things, if not by me by somebody else. They will be done, in opposition to Israel or together with Israel. If you think it is easier from postures of hostility then they will have to be done that way.

D. Mr. Secretary, when all the understanding of the matter depends on what has to be done. I don't know what you have in mind.

-2-

K. I have told you.

D. What you have in mind I have a distinctive feeling can be done.

K. I didn't make the toast at the dinner last night.

D. She felt that was a closed meeting.

K. Those of my colleagues that were at the meetings I chaired for three weeks could not believe what they heard. It was astonishing. I changed going to an award dinner I was getting in New York to going to the dinner. I didn't want a collision course.

D. I think that....and I have been doing everything in my power...

K. Let's see where we are on the immediate problem and work out ...Fifteen MEIO ambassadors called on me about the same stories and about our energy situation. Those are facts of life. We can see if we can find common procedures and commence to see if this...If you can get rid of some of your principals in this election we can do better. You have that choice.

D. I don't quite follow you.

K. You can launder your own key people and see if that will <u>what</u> realities as is produced. We haven't made one single proposal on a long-term settlement and no agreements with anyone on long-term settlement. I have told you a hundred times that there was not going to be an American plan. There must be something. Maybe I shouldn't be so honest.

D. That can never be in our relationship. If we take the long-term settlement.

K. My impression is you are so concerned about the long-term settlement you will not take a short-term settlement. Then we meet we will tell her exactly what I believe must be done and we will see if you can do it or not do it. If you will not and you believe it is impossible, we will have to see what the President will decide at that point.

D. Yes.

K. I have intended to develop the absolute minimum that has to be done. We cannot make a settlement with Brezhnev, go to Tel Aviv and come to the brink of war and go over that again in a week over a settlement you agreed with...

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

November 3, 1973

11:35 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Hello Anatoliy. How are you?

D: I'm having a vacation.

K: Vacation?

D: For two or three days its been quiet on the front. I am just trying to use it.

K: I understand our two combattant friends in New York have
settled all their issues.

D: What do you mean, this one? on UN forces? .....I refused to call you. Scali said going to call you and

K: Scali said he was going to call me?

D: Anyway I sent a telegram what we discussed. Scali said no, I sent to Gromyko, Gromyko discussed....in Kissinger's words. I said I don't want to call, yesterday I told Malik. He said no, no, Scali refused to until Kissinger is called. I said I am not going to call Kissinger anymore. He gave me his word...

K: I am glad it came out this way really. Anatoliy, since the President -- we have a long letter for Brezhnev -- didn't want to send just a short one. It gives a general review of our relationship but it says very little about the Middle East. We will send it over this morning. You will see it has very positive, it is a very positive letter on our entire relationship -- how he visualizes its continuation.

D: Is there any answer on proposal me made, specifically the first one about representatives?

K: Let me tell you our view. Hold on a second, --- the President is calling me. I will have to call you back OK?

D: OK.

TELCORN
The President - Secretary Kissinger

November 3, 1973

11:40 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: How are you getting along today?

K: I think these various maniacs are going to work me into a
nervous breakdown. I sat up with Mrs. Meir last night until
2:00. I think we are making some progress with her but whether
enough to satisfy the Arabs I don't know.

N: You are making some progress?

K: Yes, some progress, whether or not, not as dangerous as
the day before.

N: Al told me how rough it was up there.

K: It was brutal, she called yesterday and I refused to meet with
her -- told her to send her representative. That shook her up
a bit.

N: Well, that's the way these things are.

K: Didn't want to pull ...

N: We know it's just a question of ... we are trying to balance
several different parties here -- the Israelis, Egyptians, Syrians,
Russians. Let alone the Europeans yapping at our heels and so on.

K: I think the Egyptians realize they are better off taking what they
can get now. If they force an all out confrontation on the October 22
issue, then we can -- we can't have yet another confrontation three
weeks later on the basic settlement issue.

N: Which is much more important.

K: A lot more important.

N: That's the point to make to them, which you naturally will.

K: Right.

N: It's a very solid point.

2.

K: Can make a very good case ... not just getting off the roads, say non-military supplies on the roads. Egyptians will just move the tanks and other stuff off the roads, give the road up to the Third Army and then they will be trapped ... put the road operation under the UN, will to get off the roads, not willing to get off the cross country access. May be Egypt would be willing to buy this. Willing to put the UN on the roads.

N: Anyway, there's another day before you take off, Monday, right?

K: Drafted a very positive reply to the Soviets in principle. One problem, there's almost no way to do the joint mission which isn't going to lead to another explosion. I really don't see what useful purpose it serves. Israel let the Soviets in, the British and French are screaming their heads off and: US-Soviet mission, I don't see what good can come of it. Egyptians don't particularly want it, Fahmi told me that. After I get back I'll send Rusk or Brownell to the peace talks, with a Moscow first stop. In that context might be willing to have them take the trip.

N: Sound right. Its a good compromise, sending somebody of that importance. Sounds all right. Let's try that. Anything else of importance.

K: The French have come in on other matters. They now have a very constructive approach to the European Declaration thing. Our screaming at them really has had some rather good impact.

N: Henry, as I see it, let's face it, we can't start having Europeans, British taking a ... line on everything we try to do. As Dulles used to say maybe we have to make an agaonizing reappraisal of European views. We are saving their oil, after all, they need it more than we do.

K: No question.

N: OK, well good luck. Call if you need anything.

K: I will call tomorrow. There's a possibility the White House will be able to announce resumption of diplomatic relations within a month. Possibly announce jointly from Cairo and the White House, and we'll upgrade our Interests Section with more senior personnel for a month.

N: All right, Henry.

K: All right, Mr. President.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Annually</td><td>EO 1985-6</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OM</td><td>Date</td><td>6/1/64</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
Hal Saunders - Secretary Kissinger

November 3, 1973

11:50 a.m.

K: Have you seen the Egyptian proposal?

S: Is it the 10 point one?

K: Yes, that's it. Are you doing an analysis.

S: Yes, we are pulling together a complete analysis in addition
to giving you negotiating ideas.

K: I have got to be able to negotiate this thing so I've got to be
able to read it.

S: We've got it just about done. It's being done in parts to kind
of speed things up. ______ has done part, he's done a lot of work
on the first steps.

K: Can you come up with alternatives.

S: ......disengagement phase, period of stabilization of cease fire.

K: We've got that so screwed up at this point even I don't understand
it.

S: Exactly, that's what we're working on, to see if we can come
up with alternatives.

K: My intention in this phase if to sound positive but obfuscate
enough so they can't pin me down, ....

S: We can think in these terms. One thing wrong with it, we need
some kind of negotiation, something for the Israelis.

K: Need to get East Bank and West bank armies exchanged.

S: Right, that could be part of this step.

K: Well, I'm not going to worry about this at this point. Maybe
they could keep second Army, and withdraw the Third Army.

S: I'll have something for you early afternoon.

K: Your view, do they expect me to leave Egypt with a final
settlement.

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION
By: OHARA, Date: 6/10/73

2.

S: No, I don't think so. You could talk them out of that, they've
got to learn that....

K: First we have got to talk them out of the October 22 settlement.

S: That isn't going to be so easy.

K: Even if we turn the roads over to the UN, supposing there is
never a solution to the lines. Why don't we get the roads turned over
to the UN?
t

S: Get them turned over to the UN and start talking about the lines.
Never accept the notion of going back to October 22.

K: And, release the prisoners at that point. The basic point is
that the October 22 lines are important only if you assume Israel
is going to stay on the West Bank a long time. If you assume they
are not going to stay, it doesn't make much difference. If Egypt starts
a Wagnerian fight on the October 22 issue and we use all our credit
getting Israel back to that, then we won't have any credit for the
next round.

S: The position I would take, play the Israelis......

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>originally 10 Nov 1988</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>By: OAKRA, Date 6/1/89</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELCORN

November 3, 1973

12:20 p.m.

K: Sorry, I have been talking to the President, then I had to
make another call. I had a rather lengthy talk with him. First,
we will send over the letter for the General Secretary. Let's
go to the proposal of joint Soviet-American cooperation. Here
is our difficulty. I'm going to be going to Egypt next week. The
purpose envisaged in our understanding has not even started yet,
although we strongly favor it. What we going to do is to send
a senior man as head of the interests Section in Cairo. We have
no hesitation about announcing publicly that he is to work closely
with your Ambassador there on the cease fire agreement.

D: What about cease fire, what is...?

K: Not on cease fire. Work in close cooperation on Security
Council resolution issues.

D: Yes. What is actual situation, as it stands now? What is
Israeli position and what is, as of now? on the Security Council
I mean.

K: As of now we are having a monumental problem with Israel.
You can get that from the newspapers. You can see how they are
beginning to attack me.

D: What is their position, Henry? They want to have exchange...?

K: They want an exchange of prisoners, and they want an exchange of
territories, West Bank for the East Bank.

D: As a whole. Egypt dones't like the idea?

K: The Egyptians don't like it. There is something to be said for
it, but Egypt won't accept it, we're not pressing them.

D: Israelis propose an exchange of prisoners and an exchange
of territories. This is their position?

K: Right. We will get at minimum some arrangement for permanent
supply of the Third Army.

D: The corridor you mean?

K: That's one of the ideas McCloskey mentioned. I'll be goddamned
if I know where he got it, I didn't give it to him, but as it turns

2.

out it is a possibility.

D: I think these issues look, putting aside the resolution, October 22 without telling us, unacceptable...but I don't, might change their minds.

K: Let me finish the bilateral thing and then we'll go back to that.
As soon as we get back I will designate somebody, Dean Rusk or
Herb Brownell.

D: Yes, it should be a big man.

K: ...to represent us in the peace negotiations. We would be prepared to say the first thing he should do is go to Moscow to talk to your people to prepare some action.

D: Did you talk with Rusk or is it just an idea.

K: As a matter of fact, I have been trying to get Rusk on the phone but haven't been able to reach him. Those two people are who we have in mind. I may be able to tell you by the end of the day what reaction I get.

D: When are you leaving?

K: Monday morning at 9:00. To get back to the issues.

D: So where does it stand now?

K: We would like to get Israeli to accept the proposal with withdrawal. We are having monumental task. I sat up with Mrs. Meir until 1:30 last night. And, I can imagine prettier girls to sit up with.

D: Well, sometimes you have to sacrifice....

K: This is where we stand right now.

D: As of now, peace proposal to begin negotiations of exchange prisoners and territories and position is to solve the Israelis business? What is position of Egypt? When I spoke with them yesterday they said no, no, but what about today.

K: Their position is no.

D: Then what is your position?

K: Our position is to try to find some, at least interim, solution but we haven't made a formal proposition yet because we are trying

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author</td><td>50 1985</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OHARA Date 6/1/85</td></tr></table>

to see what we can get through a combination of negotiation and
pressure on the Israelis.

D: As it looks now then, you do not have any decision?

K: The problem is that the Israelis have to have a cabinet meeting
tomorrow. By Monday we hope to have the specifics. We will
communicate them to you.

D: The general situation is what you just mentioned?

K: That is correct.

D: And maybe by Monday you will have more precise information.
Suppose I call you on Monday at 8:00 a.m.

K: Well -- will you be home tomorrow?

D: I would like to go out, but could I call you.

K: What time will you be back in the evening?

D: Around 9:00 p.m.

K: Why don't we have a chat tomorrow evening.

D: Around 9:00 or 10:00, whatever you like.

K: Well, I don't mind coming by the Embassy, say around 9:15.

D: OK. I will be back. 9:15? Tomorrow, not today? Just
want to be sure.

K: Yes.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Origin: 5.03.</td></tr><tr><td>By: O.H. CHABA, Date 6/18/94</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger

4:20 p.m.

S: I wanted to call before I talk with him. I wanted to ask whether
or not you might conceivably change your mind on the Indonesians.
They really are the best people up here. They are the most responsible
by far.

K: I don't see how we can hold this line. Talk to the Israelis, but
we can't be beaten to death by the UN people. The Israelis are
beating us to death, betraying us and we have so many fish to fry.

S: ______ special circumstances. Africans need representation.
Indonesians in Viet Nam by all standards were the most objective
of the non-aligned. They have talked about the practical need to get
along with both parties and Ambassador Sani is the only guy we've
had any support from.

K: We can't drift from one impossible position to another by tactical
exisgencies. Its absurd to have a force, one of who's members is
opposed to the others.

S:x All I can say the votes on the composition of this force was held
more than 40 times this morning.

K: That will be our fate on a lot of things.

S: Sure isn't any give on the Indonesians, since we know what they're
like.

K: When do you have to know?

S: In the next 45 minutes.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td rowspan="2">DECLASSIFIED<br/>Date: 6/10/86<br/>By: AH</td>
    <td>Original</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Amended</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELCORN

Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

November 3, 1973

5:15 p.m.

D: Now we have got everybody so excited we will not be able to
have a rational discussion. But, let's do it in two parts tonight
which we hope will facilitate things. First what you can live with.
You can give us your professional assessment of where that leaves
us, then see how much we can take. -- see what we dan do. We
shouldn't have it in a Wagnerian atmosphere as you mentioned
because the President said he asked her to go back to her cabinet,
or rather Haig did.....

K: That would be nice, but I'm not sure Egypt would accept my
proposition. In fact, I rather doubt it, as long as it's an unacceptable
proposition I wonder if it makes a hell of a lot of difference what
......

D: I will try to put it to her, what we think we can live with, start
with this.

K: And don't tell me you almost have to have Israel on the road
on top of withdrawal.... As we discussed yesterday, Israel holds
both sides of the roads, the UN does the inspecting, you would
therefore see if weapons or.........I mean, what can they hide in
the back of a two ton truck?

D: Well, our military experts say they can do that, their anti-tank
missiles, for instance which they have used so effectively...

K: I'm telling you this suicidal impulse of the Israelis must be
stopped. If you are not willing to open the roads, you will drive us
into more ......if you can turn over the roads, then other things
can be discussed, no chance -- you are not imposing unconditional
surrender, your government is the only one ......

D: Well, this thing should be discussed between you and the
Prime Minister.

K: the proposal of October 22 lines. I think you're wrong but that I
can get into my head. OK. I just wanted to tell you the issues.

D: There is no misunderstanding about you are alone.

K: I understand that, this is not between you and me personally.
If it were between you and me, somebody else could settle it.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Activity 5/25/73</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>By: O.H. CHAIR: Date 6/1/73</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. - Nov. 4, 1973

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Did you get that word off to *Buckinger*?

K: Yes I have, Mr. President.

P: I think that's certainly a good shot to do. It gives us time to think during the day and put our minds to it. Don't be panicked by the New York Times calling for resignation.

K: Mr. President, I don't pay any attention to it.

P: You know, they don't really realize what that would do to the country. Even Jack Knight blasted that today. He said, my god, you know, he's been one of our severest critics but he says can you imagine Carl Albert, Jerry Ford, let alone Carl Albert, talking to Breshnev and Golda Meir and the wiley Chou En Lai? I just let you know we're going to stand firm, old boy.

K: Mr. President, that's what they've wanted since 1969.

P: Yep. Well, this is just four years plus one from November 3rd.

K: I remember it only too well.

P: And then we were about 65, now we're 25. But it's alright.

K: Well, it's gone in both directions and the only thing that can be done is...

P: I know this has been a tough one for you, this week, with all this jabbering and so forth, and I just, if there were some way we could reach you before you get there because you've got so little to take to Sadat, that's the problem.

K: That's the problem. Well, we, what would be even worse if she gave a little bit more and we still couldn't get that because she is so far away from...

P: In any event, the UN airlift is certainly alright as far as I'm concerned.

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger
1:18 p.m. - Nov. 4, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Mr. Secretary, good afternoon. I have heard you talked to the Prime Minister subsequent to our telephone conversation in the morning.

K: Where is she, has she left?

D: No, she's still in the Blair House. And I'm in the Blair House now too. And she wants me to call you and ask you the following question, and the reason she's asking the question is because when she reports to the Cabinet tomorrow she wants to be equipped with as much possibility of explaining to them the situation and then ______ as possible. And what she's asked me to ask you is, suppose we accept your formula on the 22nd of October. In other words that we accept it in principle and we discuss ______ whatever way you fight. And you, yourself, said the night before last that it has a ghost of a chance of being accepted. And suppose it is not accepted by the Egyptians? She asked what are we facing then in this country? I mean she is saying this just so she is able to tell the Cabinet the full implications of either move.

K: Well, that's a good question. I'll call you back in an hour.

D: Alright. That's fine. I'll be here all the time.

K: Good. Thank you.

D: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

TELCOM
Lord Cromer/Kissinger
1:40 p.m. - Nov. 4, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Henry, yes.

K: I have talked to our people on this fleet movement and they say they don't want anything particular from you that isn't entirely technical. What they want is to send an airplane to Diego Garcia to pick up mail.

C: Well, there's no problem about that whatsoever. _________ into something much more than that.

K: Yeah, but their view quite honestly is that you're building it up, and there is nothing there.

C: Really, it was your Defense people that built it up and discussed with my Defense people. They got off the diplomatic net.

K: O.K. By all means see Rush. Rush will urge you to get in touch with Moorer. And Moorer is instructed that if any difficulty at all just to use alternative means.

C: No, there is no difficulty at all. This ______ has all sort of got out of control.

K: Because what they tell me all they want is a facility to pick up mail.

C: We've got that with the greatest of happiness.

K: And the only other thing they might conceivably ask for is if a British fleet shows up is to station some reconnaissance planes in Diego Garcia to follow them.

C: Well, fine. We are doing some refueling too, as you know, but I mean it's all perfectly alright. Well, thank you for letting me know. They are very unhappy, Henry, about the continuing grumblings coming out from here and the lack of confidentiality. You know after our meeting the other day with major ambassadors, which seemed to me to go very well, UPI within two hours had a thing on the tapes saying it had all been very bad tempered and disagreeable, etc.

K: Yeah, but where did that come from? Not us.

-2-

C: They said it came from the State Department, but they were not at the State Department briefing.

K: But that is impossible.

C: Well, this is what happens. And you know when you very kindly said you'd see me before the major ambassadors?

K: Yes.

C: That got out to the press. And it got out before I came to see you. Well, I had a word with Dick Campbell and I said, look, obviously your people have handed it out and just to make sure that we tell the same story, my meeting with the Secretary has nothing to do with the Middle East. And he came back and said, we never put it out. But there are some benevolent influences around.

K: Let me talk to McCloskey about it.

C: I think McCloskey will say they didn't do anything. But there is somebody talking.

K: I don't know why they could have said it was bad-tempered, because I thought in fact the meeting went very well.

C: Well, so did I and that's what we put out. And as a point of fact I think we managed to do our best to kill the UPI story, but the sinister thing about the UPI story is that they were not at the State Department briefing.

K: Well, somebody must have said it to them.

C: Well, somebody must have said it. And I don't think it was one of my colleagues, because my colleagues I think are reasonably happy.

K: No, I think that's right.

C: But, you know, there are some bad things going on.

K: Well, you know that my complaints have been stated. They are not matters that we would pursue and we certainly have only an interest to improve our relationship not to....

C: Well absolutely. But you see the thing that is riling them in London is the failure of the original statute on this security resolution the first weekend. That is thought to have been officially inspired here. In fact, it was to some extent by McCloskey. But we don't think that should have come out to the public at all.

-3-

K: Yeah. I agree with you.

C: I think I have to put the formal point to Rush if I may.

K: Yes, by all means.

C: But between you and I, I think we are equally sinned against.

K: O.K.

C: Don't you?

K: I think so.

C: O.K. Can I give Brent a call later in the day about what the position is on your leaving?

K: Absolutely.

C: Yes, about Mrs. Meir and ...

K: Well, her position is a stalemate. I can tell you that. But we're trying to wear her down.

C: Yeah, well that's the only hope.

K: Yeah.

C: Well thank you for calling me.

K: Right. Bye.

TelCon
General Scowcroft
Ambassador Dobrynin
10:02 a.m. - 11/7/73

D: This is the Ambassador speaking.

S: This is General Scowcroft. Is the Ambassador there?

D: Yes, this is the Ambassador speaking.

S: Oh, how are you today?

D: Thank you very much. How are you?

S: Happy holiday.

D: Thank you very much, very much.

S: What are you doing in the office working?

D: Well I am here not really trying to work, I am just thinking it out. Well when the day will come to arrive you will be in the office when we have a celebration. Still hoping.

S: Still hoping, some day.

D: Yes.

S: I have a message from Henry that he wanted to pass to you for your own information to hold very close until noon. He has reached with the Egyptians in principle for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two of them - our two governments. And at noon today we will announce the following: "The Governments of the United States and of Egypt have agreed in principle to resume diplomatic relations at an early date. The two governments have also agreed that in the meantime the respective interests sections of the two countries will be raised immediately to the Ambassadorial level. The Governmentsof Egypt has named Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal.

D: Ashraf Ghorbal.

S: Ghorbal (General Scowcroft spells the name).

The United States has designated Ambassador Hermann Eilts.
(General Scowcroft spells the name Eilts.)

D: Who is he. I don't know him.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: W. M. King State 00304

- 2 -

S: He is a former Ambassador to Sauda Arabia.

D: Oh, what has he done lately(?)

S: I think he is retired. I don't honestly know. I am not sure.

D: Well, he is pronounced Eilts?

S: Eilts. Yes.

They will take up their posts promptly." That is the end of the announcement and we will make that at noon today.

D: Noon today.

S: But wanted you to know before hand.

D: Thank you very much.

S: OK.

D: Yea, thank you very much and ah - he is still there.

S: He is still there. That is right. He will be there all day today. If I get more information I will call you.

D: __________ and I will call you.

S: Very good.

D: OK.

S: Thank you very much.

D: Thank you very much. bye bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO12058
By: W. M. Stockton, Jr.

TELCORN
Amb. Dobryna/Gen. Scowcroft

12:12 - Nov. 7, 1973

D: Hello.

S: Hello, Mr. Ambassador. How are you?

D: Hello once again.

S: That's right, I'm really making you work.

D: We'll complain to the President.

S: I have some more information for you now.

D: O.K. Thank you very much.

S: We have agreed with President Sadat on a proposal.

D: On what proposal?

S: On a proposal for cease-fire, prisoners, October 22nd line. I'd like to read it to you if I can.

D: O.K. Is it a long one? Short one?

S: It's fairly short.

D: Then may I put it down?

S: Surely.

D: O.K. Read it.

S: Number one. Egypt and Israel agree to observe scrupulously the cease-fire called for by the UN Security Council. Number two. Both sides agree that discussions between them will begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the October 22nd position in the framework of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces. Number three. The town of Susa will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine. All wounded civilians in the town of Susa will be evacuated. Number 4. There shall be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the East Bank. Number 5.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: N.W. Smith, P.E.

-2-

The Israeli check points on the Cairo-Suez road will be replaced by UN check points. At the Suez end of the road an Israeli officer can participate with the UN to supervise the non-military nature of the cargo. Number six. As soon as the UN check points are established, on the Cairo-Suez Road there will be an exchange of all POWs, all prisoners, including the wounded." Now that's the proposal.

D: What do you mean proposal? What have they agreed upon?

S: Well, this is what they agreed upon and Sisco is now on his way to Tel Aviv, to try to get the acquiescence of the Israeli Government.

D: As of now __________, yes?

S: That is correct.

D: Now you're waiting for permission from Tel Aviv.

That is right. Now there's also an oral understanding between the U.S. and Egypt, and it is as follows. It's just a very short sentence.

D: This is in care of you?

S: That's right. And it's as follows: "Egypt undertakes to ease the blockade at Bob El Mundab." That's down at the end of the Red Sea. Now that's just an oral understanding.

D: An oral understanding. I think it's congratulatory -- we are approaching to something.

S: I think it looks encouraging.

D: Yes, definitely.

S: Yeah, I think so.

D: But I think Israel should agree because it's really all their ideas. __________-probably after Israel agrees with it.

S: I would think so, yes.

D: Now you need __________ from them.

S: That's right so I'll let you know as soon as we hear from them.

DECLASSIFIED
10-01-90 10:00 AM

H40100
By: N.A. Gare

TELCOM

November 7, 1973 - 3:30 p.m.

General Scowcroft/Ambassador Debrynia

S: Exactly, that's what we're working on now and exactly.... How long will it be necessary to postpone it, it's hard to say right now. But I want you to know we did it solely in an attempt to turn an unfavorable situation around.

D: I understand. This was my understanding. I think it will go a little easier...the thing to do is to do it quietly, little by little.

S: Well, that's what we thought and some of the ...... people here are not very happy with us.

D: I understand.

S: I wanted to make sure you got the story they way it really happened.

D: I understand. OK. Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12058
By: MM. Nov 5th 1973

TELCOM

November 16, 1973-5:58 p.m.

Amb. Scali/HAK

K: Hello.

S: Hello Henry. John

K: John, how are you.

S: Alright.

K: John I wanted to tell you - I'm back here you know. We had a message today from the Chinese saying that the Soviets are the trouble makers on that resolution and I don't know what the point of the message is except that they are not sure that they can deliver..

S: Christ.

K: And that they must be sure -- and they want to make sure that you and they stay in close touch.

S: We have been working hand and glove like brothers.

K: I know. They are not complaining. They are just explaining what the problem is.

S: Well, you know where that could have come from Henry?

K: Where.

S: From the message that you had Larry deliver.

K: I had Larry deliver what message.

S: Ask Larry to remind you about it. On how the thing had been worked out.

K: Whom.

S: To Dobrynin.

K: Larry didn't deliver any messages to Dobrynin.

S: Well, I think he did.

※

K: OK. Well, I've got to talk to him.

S: Because I think the moment they became aware and I think from that moment on they began trouble making.

K: Yeah. Even if that is so it's water under the bridge.

S: Indeed it is and there is no effort here to second guess an expert on it. But the important point Henry Is that I think that the Chinese here all along have under-estimated the militancy of the Algerians on this and are not yet experienced enough to deal with the Algerians and and Algerians decide that they are going to bring along the hole andathe line with it and it's partly in expedious despite all of the good will and sincerity they have and readiness to stand up for the deal but this presents us with an exceedingly difficult as you may have noted from the last two cables that we have sent because our ______ and particularly the Koreans are dreadfully worried that the Chinese despite their good intent will not be able to deliver.

K: It looks that way now.

S: And we kept reassuring them that well, give the Chinese a chance.

K: In this message the Chinese are blaming it all on the Soviets.

S: Well, I don't doubt that at all. But if it's the Soviets, the Soviets are working very closely with the nonalign namely the Algerians and the rest.

K: No question.

S: And this makes whatever alternative strategy we persue that much more risky because.

K: Well, there was no way the Soviets could not learn about it was there.

S: But that's water over the bridge.

K: Well, how was that.

S: Because this was a deal we had cut very exclusively and secretly with the Chinese. On all sorts of honor that it would not be disclosed to anyone.

K: OK John, I just wanted you to know where the ghing stood.

S: Well, all I can say Henry is I am willing to try any avenue and of course we'll seek any alternative way of pulling this thing out

S: because I do think it is of critical importance.

K: Right I agree with you.

S: But it doesn't surprise me at all that the Russians are trying to screw us on this too.

K: OK.

S: Alright Henry. Welcome back and as I said in my messages to you you did more than any single man had a right to achieve and the world had the right to expect from.

K: Aren't you nice.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 1883</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CH</td><td>Date</td><td>6/18/84</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
General Haig/Sec. Kissinger

11/17/73 8:50 a.m.

HK....... be he said about that oil thing, it is totally contrary to my strategy and just about kills us. And he cannot repeat it, if he makes lifting of oil conditional on progress in the Middle East we are dead.

H: Yeh

HK: My strategy has been and it has worked at least somewhat to tell the Arabs if they want progress, they better lift the oil.

H: Yeh. Exactly.

HK: The other one is exactly what the Arabs are saying to us and it gets us on the slope on which we cannot compete with the Soviets.

H: Yeh. Well I don't know what was said, I wasn't there. I think it was taken a little out of context

HK: No, no. He said as there is progress, we can hope that the oil will be lifted.

H: As it is lifted--

HK: It is now front page in every newspaper.

H: Yeh

HK: And it is exactly what I told Faysal we wouldn't do. Be blackmailed. And that is really terribly serious, Al.

H: Of course it is.

HK: Because we can't deliver fast enough.

H: They sure pulled a ______ since yesterday, didn't they?

K: (laughs) Do you think you could that across to him?

H: Yeh. But they have to ask some questions

K: If the question comes up, he should do it the other way. He should say, we are doing the best we can, for our reasons for the American national interests, but we will not be blackmailed. That the Arabs will pay attention to and if we are blackmailed, it will hurt our capacity to make progress.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 5-25-73</td></tr><tr><td>By: O.H. ARNOLD</td></tr></table>

Page 2

H: Yeh.

K: If he wants to say something useful, that he should say.

H: Yeh, that's a good One. Okay, I'll get him on that Henry.

K: I know you have no other problems, Al, so you go right to that now.

H: Yeh.

K: I know you were wondering what to take up today.

H: (laughs)

K: Okay, you and I will work together in a university.

H: That's right. Although I don't know which one will take me.

K: Listen, they'll take you before they take me.

H: All right, Henry.

K: Bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority 50 193-2</td></tr><tr><td>By: OJ MARA, Date 6/16/64</td></tr></table>

TELCONE
Ambassador Dinitz
Secretary Kissinger

11/17/73 11:12 a.m.

D. ... a mutual friend of ours.

K: Who's that?

D: Joe Alsop

K: I see.

D: And we were speaking of the fantastic effort you have put in the last
few weeks.

K: Right. Well I hope to see you soon. I may have to go to Key Biscayne.
But look I have an urgent immediate problem.

D: Yeh.

K: I have been informed by the Egyptians that they will let those ships
through and that orders have already been issued to that effect, so
--they may ask them to identify themselves but they will let them through.
They told me they have promised only to ease the blockade and what they
probably mean by that is that they should identify themselves.

D: I see.

K: Now, they also said--they said I want to assure you that no ______
incident will happen, but they pleaded with me to avoid Israeli publicity.

D: The publicity business--I don't see any difficulty, but the question of
identification, that is how conversations were concluded, I wasn't
privy to all the details of the Sisco meeting, but is this part of the agree-
ment that the--

K: It is not part of the agreement--they never said specifically what they
would do. In my judgment that we can get ended in a little while. This
is a facesaving device, but I would ask you now for Christsake you have
achieved more than you had any right to given your behavior

D: What was wrong with our behavior this time?

Page 2

K: Not this time? But before.

D: I see.

ruin

K: But for God sake really now don't you think this thing now because I think you've got every demand now that you came here with

D: I'll pass it on to the Prime Minister of course because as I said --do you think it is going to be in regard to the first ship or every ship will have to be identified--or you don't know this.

K: My judgment is that the Egyptians are looking for a facesaving way by which they cannot be accused of lifting the blockade. It's like you putting six roadblocks on the Cairo Suez road and then remove them again. Now they must be given the same privilege as to be as obnoxious as you.

D: Hm huh. ...all blocks when we move them.

K: Well you put about three up one night and then you took them down again and

D: And the UN puts them in

K: Yeh, now all I'm saying my impression is that what the Egyptians are doing is maintaining the general principle, but not the practice --now they resume the practice, I think you should raise holy hell --if they don't resume the practice --they didn't even say they would be asked to identify themselves, they said they may,

D: I'll pass it along right away, Dr. Kissinger. I have a question to ask you. The PM has asked me to have a talk with you as soon as possible with you -- when do you see?

K: Let me find out what I have to do in KeyBiscayne

D: You are leaving today?

K: I don't know yet. As soon as I know that

D: Yeh, because I was scheduled to go to New York tomorrow, but I'll cancel everything if I know that we can meet tomorrow or shall I wait until Monday?

Page 3

K: I just can't be sure--I'll let you know later today. But what I'm really anxious for is the Egyptians have flatly told us they would let the ships through -- that they will or have issued instructions that they may ask the ships to identify themselves and say with the advance information I gave them, they don't anticipate any problem but they hope that the ah--they have great problems with African and Arab friends and so they plead with us to do our best to keep you from avoiding --from publicity--

D: I will mention these two points

K: And on the identification my view is that this is something that cannot be maintained for any length of time, until after--as long as every ship goes through.

D: Hmhuh. Hmhuh. I'll now pass it on and I'll see what I will -- see the reaction of the PM. I hope that, you know, especially if you will realize that it is not a regular practice that is going to take place.

K: Listen, I cannot promise--whether it is a regular practice, all I'm telling you is, I hope you realize the thin ice you are skating on for Christmas and every time we make a proposal to you you can't just say no.

D: We have not said no, Mr. Secretary, I'm just trying to pass information to the PM and hope that everything will be all right.

K: I'm--I mean I thought you might be pleased with this information --it didn't occur to me that it could present a problem in Israel. I may be suffering from a misapprehension here.

D: No, I did not say that it would present a problem--I was just trying to understand

K: What I'm telling you is when I got your message I immediately went to the Egyptians without our strong support for it, they have not agreed to let the ships through to interpret easing (?) that every ship can go through, what I told you was to be moderate, now they haven't even asked for it, now they have said the ships can go through, they may be asked to identify themselves and they didn't even say that will happen and they asked for no publicity--

D: I--maybe there is no problem at all, I'm just saying--I just want to be sure what I am passing you, Mr. Secretary, I didn't know--

K: Well right, It is not a formal Egyptian demand and I have intended to be helpful to you,

D: Well we appreciate it very much. K: Right.

TELCONE
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton

Page 1

11:15 a.m. 11/17/73

K: Al, have you seen this Cherokee from Cairo?

A: Not I haven't

K: About letting the ships through?

A: No, sir.

K: And -- well will you take a look at it. Now I have already told Dinitz they may ask the ships to identify themselves, which of course when I mentioned to Dinitz, was national betrayal of Israeli interests, even though they are letting the ships through and they have already given orders to that effect, so --but we haven't given the suburbs of Cairo this week--they are in a particularly feisty mood

A: Ah huh.

K: So will you do a message to Keating so that you two would transmit this with our strong recommendation that they avoid publicity--

A: That they avoid publicity.

K: Yeh and to say this is another accomplishment

A: Okay

K: Have you seen the other stuff from Fahmi?

A: I haven't seen anything this morning.

K: Where the hell are you?

A: I was in the office, I just dropped by Joe's house to show a few things to him and I'm going right back --but I was there until 1/2 hr ago.

K: Okay, well will you get a look at that, and also is someone drafting that message to Saqquf

A: I'm working on that, yes. So I'll have one on Saqquf and one to Keating.

K: And another one to Fahmi in which he asks for our support to the Israelis on the disengagement in the bilaterals and what you should say is I feel very strongly if we can move in the direction discussed with Sadat much more effectively within the framework of a peace conference.

A: Absolutely. Right.

I*

Page 2

K: And that while we are willing to use our influence we will strongly urge him to stick to the schedule he and I worked out.

A: Yes.

K: Make it a warm letter, can you do all these things?

A: Yes, I will.

K: When will you have them?

A: I'm ah--

K: Because I don't want to be in the office all day--

A: I'll work on them just as fast as I can.

K: What does that mean, that's my question.

A: Within the next couple of hours.

K: Are you coming--

A: I'm coming right back. In fifteen minutes.

TELCON
Amb. McCloskey
Secretary Kissinger
11:30 a.m. 11/17/73

K: How are you?

M: I'm of one piece, thank you sir.
Mr. Secretary I've been looking at your schedule over here and Tuesday it seems to me is very tough for you to have a press conference.

K: Why is that?

M: I gather that your Senate Foreign Relations Committee appearance is on Tuesday morning

K: Yeh

M: And remember we talked about shooting your wad twice in one day

K: Yeh

M: The other thing is that they have the oil executive's on now for the afternoon and that I'm told is immovable.

K: Don't every tell me that is immovable

M: I didn't

K: Some goddamn bureaucrat who has his ego involved that is all it means.

M: (laughs)

K: That's my working definition of immovable.

M: All right your definitions are permitted to apply in this case.
The other alternatives would be Monday or Wednesday -- to insist on
Tuesday would mean to change the -oil

K: What time are the oil executives?

M: 3:00 p.m. (3:00)

K: They will be moved to 5:00 p.m. if I want to hold a press conference.
Don't you tell me that oil executives--

M: I'm not telling you that--I said I was told that

K: By whom?

※

Page 2

M: Just up around your office

K: Yeh, well let's not be sickening about that, if I want to hold a press conference at 3:00, we'll have the oil executives at 4 or 5:00

M: Hm huh. Okay.

K: What do you think of Wednesday for a press conference

M: It's not--

K: Besides that I am not meeting with the Senate ArmServices Committee on Wednesday?

M: That I'm not sure of sir.

K: So I'd be shooting my wad twice in any case.

M: If the Armed Services Committee is on Wednesday
Monday is another possibility--

K: But I may have to go to Key Biscayne on Monday

M: Oh, I see. Should we then count on Tuesday

K: I think it is our only possibility

M: We will start preparations then without any public confirmation

K: Right, if worse comes to worse, we'll shift it to Wednesday or Monday

M: Okay, Thank you sir,

K: Bye.

TELCOM
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Atherton

11/17/73 1:00 p.m.

K: Roy, have you seen these cables to which I referred?

A: I've got replies in the typewriter now.

K: Do you mind if I tell you what I want them to say. I don't want to inter-
fere in any ______ functioning.

A: No, no. (laughing)

K: In every letter to Fahmi, I want first of all some guff that they
can use to make them think they have a special relationship to me.

A: Right.

K: And put in some sentence what a great man I think Sadat is, I mean
not just in those words, Secondly, in fact why not do a letter to Sadat
now that I have returned thanking him for his courtesy and how impressed
I was about his long-range view.

A: All right.

K: Now in these letter--I've got Hal Saunders here--you know he can work
with you too. In this letter in which in effect says we should get the dis-
engagement before the peace conference, you ought to tell him this was
not at all my understanding, that my understanding was the peace conference
would have disengagement was its first topic and that we can make our
influence much more effective in a peace conference, than we by influenc
military discussions at kilometer 101 and that this was exactly my under-
standing of what would happen--hello?

A: Yes, I am here.

K: Moreover, it was our understanding that this was the basis on which we had
only --Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in the first phase--can you do it in a way
though so that if they surface this letter, the Israelis don't go up in arms

A: Yes.

K: You see what I mean?

A: I do.

K: That could be the major thrust and say therefore, I believe we should get
peace conference organized and in that framework we will use our influence

TELCON
Roy Atherton
Secretary Kissinger
11/17/73 2:00 p.m.

A: Yes sir

K: Roy

A: Yes sir

K: Hello?

A: Yes.

K: Why did you say yes sir twice, just once--twice is two often

A: (laughs) I thought you hadn't heard me the first time.

K: Well I thought you were trying to convey you were standing at attention.

A: (laughs)

K: Roy would you make sure the Syrian Deputy Fon Min or if failing that their Perm Rep is invited down here for Tuesday or Wednesday-- Preferably Wednesday.

A: All right.

K: I told Sisco yesterday, but I'm not sure that--

A: I'll check with him.

K: I don't care what Sisco says, he's coming down Tuesday or Wednesday

A: Yes, I just wanted to be sure not to double track if it's already been convened. Just for an office appointment with you.

K: That's right. Just to get them back into the game. And will you collect for me all the indications we have that the Syrians want to talk to us.

A: All right.

K: I think I saw something else in an intelligence report today. Will you do that too please?

A: Yes sir. K: I'll be over in an hour.

TELCON
David Rockefeller

Secretary Kissinger

11/17/73 3:05 p.m.

R: Henry, Welcome back. Why a marvelous job, really.

K: Thank you.

R: You seem to go from one height to another. How you got those people
together I don't know, but it looks as though you have.

K: Well, this is just the beginning.

R: I'm sure. But aren't you optimistic?

K: I think we have a chance now.
I think we have two months to see whether we can get a peace settlement.

R: It will take that long even to discuss it

K: To start it will be possible.

R: I certainly hope you succeed--much closer to that/in the last 7 years.

K: That is true.

R: How did the China part go?

K: Well--extremely well--much better than the press reported which is just
as well. It turned out very well--it's hard to put in writing.

R: That is great. And how did you make out with the blocked funds?

K: I think we will get that solved within a month.

R: Marvelous.

K: The only handup now are two minor legal issues---

R: Henry, I saw that Don Burnham and his group are back--must have been
there when you were, did you see them?

K: They were there just before I was.

R: I see. Sounded from the paper this morning's paper that they have done
pretty well.

K: They are very eager to work closely with us.

Page 2

R: I know you are terribly busy, but I just wanted to say awfully glad you are back.

K: David, you've been a good friend and I understand you'll be here on the 5th or 6th of Dec.

R: Right. This little European group is very much hoping you will be able to join us.

K: What evening is that?

R: I think it was a little later than that--the 10th or 11th. It should be on your calendar.

K: I am still hoping to do it. But I'll see you on one of those days.

R: I can't remember which day it is.

K: Whichever day it is, I look forward to it. And thank you for talking to Fahmi which was very helpful.

R: Good. I liked him.

K: He's a fine man.

R: I do congratulate you.