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3. NAR: Push ahead to improve our satellite warning and reconnaissance capability.

JFK: More funds for research for military space program (Defense Budget Message)

Improvement of Continental defense and warning systems; supplement BMEWS with development of Midas satellite by adding $60 million in new obligatory authority to 1962 budget to accelerate completion of development phase of Midas program (Defense Budget Message)

(Some Research and Development projects not spelled out in Defense Budget Message but could include work in these fields)

4. NAR: Launch program to protect civilian population against fallout -- thereby further persuading any potential aggressor of our determination to resist blackmail, to survive attack, and to strike back.

JFK: In May 26, 1961 message to Congress, requested tripling of funds for fall-out shelters, warning measures, stockpiles of food and other needs.

Requested transfer of Civil Defense Administration to command of Secretary of Defense

5. NAR: Place substantial part of SAC on air-borne alert until such time as enough mobile missiles are operational.

JFK: In Defense Budget Message proposed:

1) 50% increase in portion of our strategic bomber force on 15-minute ground alert

2) continue present level of indoctrination training flights

3) complete stand-by capacity and materials needed to place 1/8 of entire heavy bomber force on airborne alert at any time

4) reenactment of portion of Defense Appropriation Act which would allow Secretary of Defense, if President deems necessary, to provide for cost of full airborne alert as a deficiency expense approved by Congress.

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6. NAR: Quickly increase our strength in present-generation missiles

**JFK:** Because of substantial increases planned for Polaris and Minuteman missile projects, cancelled last two squadrons in TITAN missile program (Defense Budget Message)

Immediate phase out of subsonic Snark airbreathing long-range missile, now considered obsolete and of marginal military value with ICBM developments (Defense Budget Message)

**Note:** Therefore, decision to acquire very substantial increase in second generation solid-fuel missiles of increased invulnerability enables U.S. to eliminate safely several programs of present general missiles

7. NAR: Dispersal of our retaliatory forces must be speeded.

**JFK:** Proportion of our B-52 and B-47 forces on ground alert should be increased until about 1/2 of total force is on alert. (Defense Budget Message)

Bomb alarm detectors and bomb alarm signals should be installed at key warning and communication points and at all SAC bases. (Defense Budget Message)

Stressed need for improved tactical mobility of Army (May 26, 1961 Message)

8. NAR: Improve ability of SAC to launch its bombers in the warning time available through improved base facilities such as additional runways.

**JFK:** see above

**Note:** No specific mention of increased air runways made.

9. NAR: Increase strength of Army and improve its readiness status.

**JFK:** Directed Secretary of Defense to reorganize and modernize Army's divisional structure, obtain more modern equipment, develop plans for rapid deployment of Army. (May 26, 1961 Message)

(See attached outline of specific JFK requests made in May 26, 1961 speech to Congress)

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10. NAR: Must increase strength of Marine Corps and necessary supporting Naval units.

JFK: Although in Defense Budget Message, asked for only token increase in Marine Corps manpower, in May 26, 1961 speech, requested $60 million to increase Marine Corps strength to 190,000 men. In Defense Budget Message, had requested funds for Navy components.

11. NAR: Modernize our tactical air, land and sea forces in weapons and doctrine

JFK: Modernization of Army and increased flexibility of conventional warfare requested (May 26, 1961 message)

12. NAR: Increase capability for airlift

JFK: Immediate increase in airlift capacity to obtain additional aircraft mobility to assure forces could be moved on moment's notice (State of Union Message, January 30, 1961)

Note: After JFK speech, Pentagon ordered 53 transport planes, including 30 new jets, for delivery as early as June, 1961. Improvements in this area have resulted in 75% increase in modern, long-range airlift capacity of MATS.

13. NAR: Must more closely integrate our military policy with the policies of our allies to achieve a rational division of labor.

JFK: Directed Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially, in cooperation with allies, the orientation of existing forces for conduct of non-nuclear war, para-military operations, and sub-limited or unconventional wars. (May 26, 1961 Message)

Note: JFK Administration constantly has stressed through conversations with NATO allies in particular, a division of labor in the defense field.

14. NAR: Must organize more tightly and rationally the whole Department of Defense to meet the changing military needs.

JFK: Called for reorganization and modernization of Army's divisional structure. (May 26, 1961 Message)

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14. JFK: (Cont.)

Called for improvement in command and control of strategic deterrent, not only in development and installation of new equipment and facilities, but also increased attention to all organizational and procedural arrangements for the President and others concerned. (Defense Budget Message)

Note: McNamara has been reported to be "tightening" command structure. Two Assistant Secretaries of Defense have been eliminated and although many of the specific recommendations of the Symington task force on Reorganization of the Defense Department were not accepted en toto by JFK, various actions are being taken to streamline its functions and command.

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KENNEDY SPEECH TO CONGRESS: MAY 26, 1961

SPECIFIC DEFENSE MEASURES:

1. Endorsed increased emphasis on NATO's conventional strength as well as affirming conviction NATO nuclear deterrent must also be kept strong

a. For this purpose: JFK asked for five Polaris subs to be committed to NATO command

2. Military Assistance Program must be accelerated for local defense purposes.

a. Originally asked for $1.6 billion for military assistance but now not enough as events have proved (Laos, etc.)

b. Now asks Congress to provide total of $1.885 billion in coming fiscal year.

3. Directed Secretary of Defense to reorganize and modernize Army's divisional structure to:

a. increase its non-nuclear fire power

b. improve its tactical mobility in any environment

c. insure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat

d. facilitate its coordination with our major allies

e. provide more modern mechanized divisions in Europe

f. bring their equipment up to date

g. new airborne brigades in both Pacific and Europe

4. Asked for additional $100 million to begin to procure most modern equipment for new Army structure

a. new helicopters

b. new armored personnel carriers

c. new howitzers, et cetera

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5. Directed Secretary of Defense to <u>expand rapidly and substantially</u>
<u>in cooperation with allies</u>, the orientation of <u>existing forces for</u>
<u>conduct of non-nuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sub-limited</u>
<u>or unconventional wars.</u>

6. Asked for <u>increase and reorientation of special forces and</u>
<u>unconventional warfare units.</u>

a. new emphasis must be placed on special skills and languages which are required to work with local population

7. <u>More rapid deployment of Army's highly trained reserve forces.</u>

a. such deployment will allow US to double combat power of
Army in less than two months compared to nearly nine months
heretofore required.

8. Asked Congress for $60 million to increase Marine Corps strength to 190,000 men to enhance their response to limited war emergencies

9. Stated <u>intelligence effort must be reviewed and its coordination</u>
<u>with other elements of policy assured.</u>

10. Asked for increase in Civil Defense protection: not as deterrent to nuclear attack but in case of enemy miscalculation

a. Triple funds for fall-out shelters, warning measures, stockpiles of food and other needs.

b. Transfer Civil Defense Administration to command of Secretary of Defense.

Secretary of Defense.

p. Transfer Civil Defense Administration to command of
assessments of food and other needs.

a. Triple sums for fall-out shelters, warning measures,

to nuclear attack put in case of enemy mobilization.

10. Veto for increase in Civil Defense protection: not as deterrent
with other elements of border security.

9. Stated intelligence effort must be reviewed and its coordination

to 100,000 men to enhance their resistance to limited war emergencies
3. Veto Congress for $60 million to increase Marine Corps strength!

heretofore required.

Armies in less than two months compared to nearly nine months
a. such deployment will allow US to couple combat power of

3. More rapid deployment of Army's highly trained reserve forces.

a. new graduates must be placed onabelief skills and languages

meconventionnel workers musts.

6. Veto for increase and reorientation of special forces and

or meconventionnel forces.

7. Confront of non-military war, paramilitary operations, and imp-limited
in cooperation with allies, the orientation of existing forces for
2. Directed Secretary of Defense to expand submissiveness and subordination

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(November 1960 - March 15, 1961)

# JFK Actions re Defense Organization

## I. Upon election, appointed task force to propose measures for reorganisation of Defense Department

A. Chairman: Senator Stuart Symington
Members: Clark Clifford, Thomas Finletter, Marx Leva, Fowler Hamilton, Roswell Gilpatric
Decision: Unanimous

B. Report of December 5, 1960 recommended sweeping changes (see attached)

1. Although during campaign, JFK had termed Defense Organisation "creaky and outmoded", he refrained from giving report his full endorsement

"...an interesting and constructive study which I know will be carefully analysed by the Congress and incoming Administration..."

2. Secretary of Defense-elect McNamara at his appearance before Armed Services Committee stated that he did not plan to reorganise Pentagon without considerable study (January 17, 1961)

## II. JFK major appointments to Defense Department indicating possible trends of Defense Organization

A. Roswell L. Gilpatric: Deputy Secretary of Defense

1. Member of Symington committee which unanimously recommended sweeping changes in Defense Department Organisation

2. Formerly member of other committees on Defense Reorganisation and known to be advocate of reorganisation to end inter-service rivalry

NB: Besides Rockefeller Brothers Report which he helped prepare, Gilpatric former Under Secretary of Air Force under Truman -- Air Force position generally known to be that of unification of armed services -- whereas the Navy and Army oppose such a move.

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2. immediately assigned by McNamara to relate military worth of various systems and weapons with their total costs -- from beginning research through final delivery to life-time expectancy

Example: McNamara reported having studies made, using cost-accounting methods to determine relative cost of putting ton of nuclear explosives on target by bombers, by missiles, and by Polaris submarines. In this way, would determine which method gives most for money invested.

## III. In State of the Union message, January 30, 1961, JFK ordered Secretary of Defense to reappraise entire defense strategy including efficiency and economy of operation and organization

A. McNamara appointed four committees, headed by civilians, to review Eisenhower budget recommendations as well as strategy

a. **Aim**: not entirely new strategic concept, but rather, budgetary review allowing better correlation of strategic concepts with economic costs.

**End product**: would also suggest methods of better coordination, lessen duplications, and speed-up "decision making" process.

2. Committees included civilian and military personnel of Defense Department as well as representatives of Bureau of Budget

a. Strategic Weapons Systems --- Charles Hitch

b. Limited War Requirements --- Paul Nitze

c. Bases and Installations --- Thomas Morris

d. Research and Development --- Dr. Herbert F. York

**Discussion**: Each of armed forces asked to name man of Colonel's rank to each task force and JCS also attached an officer to each task force. However, JCS did not directly participate as a body or as individuals. ...In sum, each major problem was looked at as a whole, instead of being examined in the compartmented manner that is unavoidable when problems are studied through the eyes of the competing services...

After task forces had made recommendations, McNamara and Gilpatric called in three service Secretaries for their recommendations. Only after the civilian components had decided overall design was JCS asked for its opinion. Such a method of decision allows McNamara to go to the White House with real authors of suggested budget and reorganization plans "...instead of a faceless swarm of members of

committees and co-ordinating boards..." (Joseph Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, March 6, 1961)

3. Findings of 4 committees not revealed to public but specific recommendations assumed to be contained in Kennedy revision of Eisenhower budget as well as in unpublicized moves with Defense Department affecting overall strategy and organisation. JFK stated in news conference, March 1, that studies had included proposals to augment conventional military forces but that no decisions had been reached that would indicate shift in US policy of reliance on nuclear weapons.

B. Other easily McNamara actions affecting organisation of Defense Department

1. Reported going to replace Armed Services Policy Council by including Service Secretaries at regular staff meetings (reported February 10, 1961)

2. Eliminated title of Assistant Secretary of Manpower, Personnel and Reserve (reported February 15, 1961)

--responsibilities for reserves placed directly in offices of the service under-Secretaries rather than as a special interest of an Assistant Secretary

3. Eliminated two Assistant Secretaries (reported February 16, 1961)

a. Health and Medical

b. Properties and Installations

4. Office of Organization and Management Planning established

--mission to cull entire Defense Department for activities that can be unified, streamlined, or eliminated. Headed by Cyrus R. Vance.

5. Information responsibilities on missiles and satellites (both US and Soviet) transferred to NASA (February 12, 1961)

--Eisenhower Administration in November 1960 had made NASA responsible for issuing unclassified information about Soviet satellites

6. Allowed Charles Hitch to publicise his suggestion for new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Programming (March 1, 1961)

IV. First Major Reorganization Move by Kennedy Administration - Transfer to Air Force of Military Space Development

2. Plan under consideration for some time before
deadline issued which Army and Navy knew

3. Special task force on space (Wiesner) recommended that all military space development be put under central control and Air Force natural place for it to be lodged.

**Discussion:** McNamara's shift of space program to Air Force by Executive Directive looked upon by many commentators as first move towards unification of services and a tightening of command to allow more control by President and Secretary of Defense. McNamara's use of an Executive decree looked upon as a way around Congressional rebuff of various suggestions put forth in Symington report.

V. Other Major Changes in Defense Organization Reported to be Under Consideration

A. To strengthen civilian control and centralise authority, McNamara reported in mid-March to be considering following:

1. Merging Strategic Army Corps with Tactical Air Command (both designed for limited war missions)

2. Consolidating intelligence activities of three services

3. Combining personnel activities, such as payrolls and recruiting

B. Some Considered Changes could be put into effect by Executive order without approval of Congress

NB: Congress passed, and JFK signed (April 7, 1961) the Reorganisation Act of 1949 until June 1, 1963. Would authorize President to send to Congress plans to reorganize agencies of Executive Branch. Each reorganization plan would take effect in 60 days, unless disapproved by a simple majority vote of either the House or the Senate. JFK could use this method also to alter Defense Department organization.

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# SUMMARY OF SYMINGTON TASK FORCE MAJOR PROPOSALS ON REORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

1. Strengthen and centralize full defense powers under Secretary of Defense by having all appropriations made to him by Congress rather than to separate agencies and services.

Note: Eisenhower, in his last Defense Budget message (for FY 1962) also recommended Congress appropriate funds to Secretary of Defense to administer but with a substructure of sufficient identification which would retain for Congress its constitutional prerogatives of raising and supporting military forces of the U.S.

2. Creation of a single chairman of a Joint Military Staff presiding over a new Military Advisory Council, composed of senior officers who, on appointment by President, would leave their individual services, never to return.

---in effect, abolish JCS system

3. Abolition of separate departments of Army, Navy and Air Force, and their civilian secretaries, Under-secretaries, and Assistant secretaries.

---in effect, end dual system of civilian control

4. Retention of individual services with responsibility for administration and logistics vested separately in COS Army, COS Naval Operations, and COS Air Force, reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense.

5. Creation of four major unified commands:

1) Strategic Command (react in case US involved in general nuclear war)

2) Tactical Command (react in case US involved in limited war)

3) Defense Command (responsible for US defense)

4) National Guard, Reserves, and Civil Defense Command (for home-front duty in event of war)

6. Creation of two more Under Secretaries of Defense; one for Administration, and one for "weapons system"

7. Establishment in Pentagon for Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control.

8. Creation of three main department-wide "directorates" for

1) engineering and research

2) procurement and production

3) installations

9. Place SAC under Naval officer, Tactical Command under Army officer, Defense Command under Air Force officer.

**NOTE:** Symington envisioned this reorganization might save 20% annually or $8 billion in present $40 billion budget. This saved money could be "plowed back in" to provide stronger defense.

Defense Budget and Programs

I. JFK Specific Directives and Requests and Corresponding Action Taken

A. In State of the Union Message, January 30, 1961, ordered Secretary of Defense to immediately take three steps:

1. Increase airlift capacity by obtaining additional aircraft

Action: a) Pentagon ordered 53 transport planes, including 30 new jets, for delivery June, 1961. Total cost: $170 million. (reported February 7, 1961)

b) Plans announced to build billion-dollar fleet of more than 100 speedy, long-range jet cargo and troop carrying planes. Delivery date, 1965. Estimated cost: $1 billion. (reported March 14, 1961).

2. Step up Polaris submarine program for fiscal year 1961 by using unobligated funds for shipbuilding. Increase starts from 5 to 10.

Action: McNamara allowed to let contracts originally scheduled for fiscal 1962, therefore telescoping 9 months. Instead of having 19 Polaris submarines by 1965 (Eisenhower plan), will have them by early 1964.

3. Accelerate entire missile program

Note: JFK also asked for reappraisal of entire defense strategy (see below) and until that made, emphasis in missile field to be on organization and decision making, i.e. cutting down on duplication and time lags.

Action: a) First great controversy in Defense field caused by McNamara "off-the-cuff" briefing of newsmen in which he reportedly stated studies made since Inauguration of JFK showed tentatively that no "missile gap" exists in favor of USSR. McNamara later denied making such a conclusive statement.

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3. On February 8, 1961, JFK appointed Dean Acheson to head an **advisory group** that would work with the Secretary of State in determining U. S. policy toward NATO. "...This is our central and most important defensive alliance." (JFK news conference)

- **Acheson** reported to believe Atlantic nations in another crisis as severe as the one that preceded the Marshall Plan. He feels that the Executive and Congress should recognize that we have reached a fork in our policy and most begin to move slowly, but nevertheless boldly, toward closer economic and political association with our European allies, even if it means "...limitations on the sovereignty of all concerned." (James Reston, NYT, January 20, 1961)

4. Other Kennedy Appointees' Views on NATO

- **Dean Rusk:** "...The North Atlantic Community is fundamental. It is important we work toward a further consolidation of that community...and within the community, work for more fruitful relationships between that community and other parts of the world" (January 13, 1961, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).

- **Douglas Dillon:** Former position as Under Secretary of State looked upon as one of reasons for appointment by JFK as Secretary of Treasury because he already familiar with problems and could go on dealing with NATO countries in trying to get them to work together and support themselves. (i.e. troop cuts and gold outflow, etc.)

- **Chester Bowles:** Feels Soviets will increase economic warfare for political reasons and West most therefore ban together to counter such moves even if it means national and allied export controls.

- **John J. McCloy:** Reported to be included among 'Acheson group' who feel Administration should be concentrating on unification and strengthening of Atlantic Alliance. "(They) ...believe that the West can meet the combined activities of the Communists only by trying to form the free nations into a much stronger association based on the rule of law, even if this means making a major effort to establish a confederation of the free nations...' (James Reston, NYT, 2/16/61)

(The other group in the Administration opposed to "Acheson group" are urging new efforts to reach at least limited accommodations with the Soviet Union. Members of 'other group' not listed.)

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which indicated U. S. would ask other NATO allies to prepare
plan for sharing more equitably the burdens of common defense
and aid to under-developed nations. Its points were:

a. U. S. deficit over past three years due solely from commitments and actions in the common defense of free world and therefore, balance of payments problem not simply bilateral question between U. S. and Germany but one for all of the allies.

b. Problem especially important because NATO soon to start rebuilding its strength for new tasks and some members in a position to contribute more to common endeavor than others.

c. U. S. prepared to enter into urgent discussions with allies on question of equitable shares in aid to under-developed nations through OECD and for defense through NATO.

### III. JFK Position on NATO Advances Beyond Eisenhower Concept

A. On February 15, 1961, message of JFK read to Permanent Council of NATO meeting in Paris:

1. Stressed importance of achieving common Atlantic policies in fields other than military;

2. Repeated U. S. determination to pay its full share of military and economic cost of alliance but urged view that Allies must bear equitable and probably increasing share of burden;

3. Implied geographical areas thus far outside NATO should be increasingly considered to be of direct concern to the "various instruments" of the Atlantic Community (OECD).

- commentary on above speech stated it implied JFK thinking of "...establishment of a precise formula -- like the present percentage contributions toward supporting NATO's network of supply and communications facilities -- for a division of the burdens of armaments and aid..." (Robert Doty, NYT, 2/16/61)

- Paul Henri Spaak reported delighted with JFK speech and to remark "...Perfect, I have found a successor."

B. JFK sent personal message to Mungad Adenauer on February 9 giving strong assurances of U. S. abiding interest and support for NATO. Message also believed to have stressed U. S. support for concept

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that would in effect, supplant the plan." (Jack Raymond, NYT, March 5, 1961)

2. Representatives at Oslo conference will probably stress dangers to Western security of limited military forays, and guerilla warfare although they will reaffirm U. S. determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

## IV. JFK Sends Personal Representatives to Confer with NATO Leaders

### A. Averill Harriman

1. Charles de Gaulle: March 4: delivered personal message from JFK. No release of substance of talks but understood to cover entire range of differences: "...Notable among these is General de Gaulle's still unsatisfied demand for the establishment of a three-power consultation mechanism among Britain, France and the U. S. to call the signals for Western policy around the globe and not just within the North Atlantic Treaty area."

2. Konrad Adenauer: March 7: Harriman supposedly very firm in stating West Germany must follow through with foreign aid proposals. Adenauer gave Harriman message for JFK stating U. S. should assume vigorous leadership of the Atlantic alliance.

### B. Lyndon Johnson visited Paris on return from Senegal and delivered speech at ceremonies celebrating 10th anniversary of SHAPE (4/6).

1. 'Vigorous and sustained effort' to build up NATO's non-nuclear defensive stressed.

2. Effective NATO nuclear capability needed.

**NB:** left question of endowing NATO with nuclear capacity open and also did not clarify if meant under U. S. leadership control, joint control, or just commitment to back up alliance with U. S. controlled nuclear forces.

3. Listed four objectives in reference to non-military aspects of alliance:

a. higher rate of economic growth in some Atlantic countries;

b. more efficient coordination of economic policies between U. S. and Europe;

c. increased aid to underdeveloped areas;

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a. intensified political cooperation within NATO;

b. concerted aid effort on behalf of less developed countries;

c. strengthening NATO as keystone of Western defense;

d. continued efforts to achieve a general and total peace through general and controlled disarmament.

2. After visit with JFK, traveled to Texas to visit Lyndon Johnson where reportedly made following points:

a. Urgent for all Allies to press ahead quickly with efforts to meet still unattained levels of conventional forces.

b. Alliance must have at its disposal best and most effective weapons including nuclear arms.

c. Bonn may consider accepting U. S. as custodian of all nuclear arms if other allies will agree -- question not who controls but that they have clear and unmistakable guarantees weapons will be used if needed.

d. Process of political and military consultation among allies must be strengthened.

e. Did not favor complicated, multi-national consultation as necessary before nuclear weapons used as might be needed in period of an hour or less.

3. On "Meet the Press" program after meetings with JFK, urged U. S. to exert leadership in NATO as strongest member of Alliance. Admitted such leadership did not fit in with de Gaulle's concept of a tripartite directorate in NATO but Adenauer believes 'directorate' theory impossible.

4. While in Washington, Adenauer sent reply to Khrushchev note suggesting proposals on Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany.

a. By sending reply from Washington, Adenauer reminded Khrushchev that Allied unity was more than phrase.

b. Told Khrushchev major issues he had raised could only be discussed in consultation with other interested parties.

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2. Pleaded for strengthening of conventional armed forces available to NATO.

3. Requested a permanent Council of treaty powers which would review the Alliance's total military situation -- Polaris submarine offer tied to this being done.

4. Stated U. S. would insist on Berlin rights but did not reject outright toleration of possible East German officials stationed at control points on land and water routes into West Berlin.

B. Major developments:

1. Ministers agreed to move ahead with plans for establishment of _ad hoc_ committees for improving confused state of political consultation within the alliance.

a. Committees would keep others advised of policy differences in matters where alliance partners might become involved in embarrassing conflicts.

b. Committees would consist of nations with a direct interest in a given area such as Asia or Africa.

2. Ministers agreed to appoint 3-man mission to study program of mutual economic assistance to Greece and Turkey.

3. Portugal made protest before Conference about unwillingness of some of her NATO allies to support her before the U. N. on the Angola issue.

C. Joint statement and conclusions of conference

1. Resolved to counter the _global_ as well as European challenge of the Soviet-Chinese bloc.

a. Foreign Ministers accepted U. S. contention that there were no longer any peripheral issues in the world content with the Soviet Union and Communist China.

b. U. S. delegation conceded that there were some differences in national involvement.

2. Reasserted their determination to maintain the freedom of West Berlin and its people.

3. Supported U. S. efforts to achieve procedures for disarmament discussions with Soviets as long as U.S. closely consulted

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B. General Louis Morstad, supreme commander of NATO forces

1. Held press conference after conference with Adenauer on April 21. Stated:

a. West German forces must be equipped with atomic arms

b. West German armed forces must be put on an equal footing with other Atlantic allies

c. West German forces must have "the effective weapons"

2. See 3a above.

3. Reportedly told Stikker, "I can and I will defend...(each) individual member" when Stikker discussed crisis within NATO over Angola vote.

VIII. Key Crises Within NATO During January-May 1961

A. Portugal

1. Portugal walked out of General Assembly before vote, 79 to 2, to place Angola question on agenda.

a. Negative votes: Spain and South Africa;

Abstaining votes: Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg;

Positive Votes: (among NATO allies) United States, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Norway, Iceland, Italy plus Soviet, African and Asian blocs.

b. U. S. action based on effort to impress African states U. S. against colonialism.

1) in so doing, raised question in some NATO members' minds that U. S. vote never sure again just because of NATO affiliation.

2) leaders of independent nationalistic movements could never be sure when U. S. would furnish material for their overthrow.

3) aided principal anti-NATO power -- Soviets.

2. Portugal continued criticism of U. S. action at NATO Conference and in other world arenas.