DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird
5:35 p.m. 10/14/69

Laird said they have their first inquiries. A newspaper near March AFB has been asking why there are no planes flying. Laird said his suggested direction would be to say that we do not discuss readiness tests. K asked if this would make it worse and it could be held off until tomorrow since he would hate to get the peaceniks worked up about this.

Laird thought it would be ok to tell them tomorrow afternoon that they do not discuss readiness tests. He also mentioned that SAC was getting inquiries.

Laird said the fuel tanks are loaded and they have shut off the purchase of any more gasoline. K asked how long this could be done and Laird thought we should do it for at least aweek.

K asked if State was in this at all. Laird said no but they will be getting inquiries. K said he would tell them to refer all questions to Defense.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger

October 14, 1969 -- 7:05 p.m.

K said he had two things to discuss with R: (1) He said he hoped R understood that in Wednesday's NSC meeting on Latin America, while K will introduce the subject, R will explain it. Since most of them were in the Under Secretaries Committee -- trade, development assitance, and debt rescheduling -- K will take the liberty of stating the basic choices and will recommend to the President that R be called on to explain them. This was agreeable to R.

R said he understood that Samuels will attend the meeting, together with Meyer. This was a decision of the Secretary. K said it hadn't been checked with us; the President always complains about an excessively large State Department group -- he likes a small meeting. K then said he would make a formal request to the President for his okay on their attendance, without letting him know it is a foregone conclusion that they are attending.

(2) K said he has been trying to get the Latin American speech out of the State Secretariat and that someone on his staff had been told that it was being held for the NSC meeting tomorrow. K asked if R were planning to surface it at the meeting. R said he hoped to have a new outline by the meeting time tomorrow; he was not planning to surface it unless it became relevant. K said he thought there would be too many people at the meeting, and the President is sensitive about speeches. The President looks at a speech as a way of making the bureaucracy do something he thinks it should. K said he didn't think it should be brought up at the NSC meeting; he said he had held up making any recommendation on a speech outline until he received R's. After discussion, R said he would deliver the new outline to K when he comes for the NSC meeting, and would have a draft speech to K by cob, Wednesday, 10/15.

K said he was seeing R Thursday and he has one fundamental thing which affects some of our activities to discuss with him. R said, then, he would make it a point to be here; and he will wrack his brains for two days wondering what it is. *

R said speaking of speeches, he thought his people should assemble any thoughts they have for the November 3 speech. K agreed -- and as quickly as possible.

R said he was attending the celebration of General Eisenhower's birthday. K said Reagan is speaking and, to put it kindly, it is not what he or R would give. It is very rough on the Moratorium; coming from us it would be a disaster, but coming from him, people would expect it.

Ids

R's office called back later and said he could not make lunch with K on Thursday; they suggested breakfast on Friday.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4:15 p.m. 10/15/69

Both Rogers and K thought the NSC meeting went well. K read over Rogers' draft and think it is a very good beginning. He planned on giving it to Ray Price to work on it.

Rogers called K re the Vice President's proposed trip. The VP was planning on going to Australia among other places but thought there were reasons why he should not go to the swearing in of the President of the Philippines, Bangkok, Saigon and Vien Tiana(?). Rogers thought that Congress would pick of any little comment he made. Rogers suggested that as alternatives he could go to South Korea, China, Hong Kong, maybe Japan. K thought he should not go to Japan., but thought it would be easier if we could offer him some alternatives although it would be a very sensitive problem to do this. Rogers mentioned Indonesia and K asked what made K think that should be a "not'visit." Rogers said anything we can do there to stimulate interest in America would help. They would be happy to say they had both the President and the Vice President.

K said this should be handled delicately here and he would bring it up with the President.

By NARA, Date 5/21

Telecon
Secretary Laird

10/15/69 5:05 p. m.

L said he needed a little guidance about our posture as far as trade is concerned with Russia and the satellite countries. Back about two months ago they wanted to buy some fairly sophisticated communications equipment to be used as a communications link between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania. L said he took exception to it because of its military aspects over here. K asked if he was talking about transistors, and L answered yes and also other equipment when there is a military consequence. L told them to go slow unless we wanted to get some kind of message or signal. But now they are bearing down on computers. K said he was familiar with the transistor situation, but that does not involve computers. L said now State and Commerce were bearing down on computers, pushing hard on this. L said we've got to have a policy; Data Processing is lobbying on the Hill. The Defense Appropriations Committee was alerted by them that we were holding up. Lipscomb and George started bearing down on what our policy is. Congrol Data thought they were getting support--what they have is anything but support. L asked if the President wanted to go forward even though they may have military significance.

K said the only one the President is interested in is the French deal. K said he would like L's statement on his objections and State's recommendations. L said he would sign the memorandum or have Dave sign it. He said it was hard for Dave to do because his company is dealing in this. K said he would like to see L's statement, as long as L understood that he may get overruled by the President. K said the P has not made a final decision, and asked if L came out against, and the P overruled, would it be an embarrassment to L. When L said no, K said then why don't you put forward your dissent; the P has only heard one side and has not ruled yet.

L said that their draft bill will be passed in the House by one week from Thursday. K said how about that, and they said you didn't even know what you were talking about. L said that three weeks from Thursday the Senate Committee will meet on it. K asked what L's reports were on the Moratorium. L said fairly quiet; K said same here. L said he thought the Hanoi wire was helpful. K said they are all squealing about it, but that means they were hurt.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
McGeorge Bundy

9:00 a.m., 10/16/69

Bundy had a meeting with Lilenthal. L is greatly disturbed because of non-US backing for his program in Vietnam. Bundy did not know the program was that well but that K would be interested in knowing this. L is also having problems with Middenhall(?). They can't get anyone to product $2,000 a month for the program over there. Bundy said he hated to see this one slip through. K said if Bundy had asked him what he thought of Lilenthal, he would have said the thought highly of the program and of L. K asked how he could find out exactly what the problem was. Bundy said there may be someone in State or Aid who could help and maybe K would like to see him also.

K said he would find out by the end of the day. Bundy said L was going on a trip Thursday of next week and thought someone might talk to him before he left.

K said he would see him for 15 minutes and put a staff man on it now to find out what the problem is. He thanked Bundy for calling since these things would never be noticed unless brought to his attention.

By NARA, Dale S/2

Telecon
Sec. Laird

10/16/69 9:45

L said he wanted to check out something--said there were some in-
dications at the State Dept. at a lower level that the President has
decided to make major reductions at the Pentagon, from being able
to take care of Europe and Asia at the same time. They say that
the President has set up a new budget review group, that State is
playing a part in establishing the Defense budget. L said, of course
K knows what this is all about. K said we both know what this is
all about. K said this group was designed to help L, not to hinder
him. L said that Beecher from NYT said he understood the P has
made his decision, and this was confirmed by the staff at the NSC.
K said that was impossible--that his staff doesn't talk to the press.
L said we're going to stone this thing out. L said there will pro-
bably be stories on Thursday, Friday or Saturday indicating that
there is a new budget set up and new guidance being given to the
departments. L asked K what he thought they should do. K said
to say on the part about the NSC review that it deals only with
political implications. L said he thought we should just stone it
out. He said we don't want to deny that decisions have been made,
should probably just say no comment. K said he could say the next
budget will clearly reveal what the decisions are. K said he would
call Richardson to make sure they put the lid on it. L said he
will find out where Beecher got this--Beecher said he had it con-
firmed by NSC. K said we don't see NYT people, even he doesn't
but said he would track it down. L said this was bound to get out,
but he hated to have it come out this week. Both agreed it would
have been better if he could have announced it. K repeated it
couldn't have been confirmed by his staff unless it was Halperin.
L said that Beecher said three reporters were working on this.

K asked L if he could send over some other recommendations that
they talked about the other day. L said he had sent them over this
morning, that they should already be here. L said there was a new
time list that indicated the timing; said he thinks Bob talked to Col.
Haig about it today. K said he appreciated this, and the P was
grateful for the way he handled himself during the difficult period.
K said he liked what L said about Vietnamization on the educational
TV program, said it was very useful to have it come out yesterday.
L said he was shutting off now, that K would have the papers there
today. L ended saying that they have some flights going over Alaska.

By NARA, Dale S/27

Telecon
Herbert Okun

10/16/69 10:10 a.m.

K said in reference to O's memorandum to K, he wanted to tell O that he is outraged. K said he wanted to apologize on behalf of his staff. K said it is unbelievable, and it will never happen again. K said he would appreciate it if O would tell the three foreign service officers who heard this. Asked O to give them his personal apologies.

O said it's incomprehensible. K said he considered it a sign of the good relationship that has been established between NSC and the State Dept. He said in recent months we've been working together for the good of everybody. He said it's from a man who really has very little to do with him, and it just shows that he has no judgement. K said he worries about the areas in which he is called upon for judgement. O said he understood that. O mentioned that he is a former student of K's at Harvard--said he was in the Russian Research Center. K said sometime when he's over at State, he'd like to shake his hand.

K asked O to express his regrets to everyone who heard it. O said he figured it couldn't have been anything but this guy building himself up. K said well it's hard to say whether his staff or the 7th floor at State is the intellectual center. K said that the whole philosophy he has is that we are not competing--said he had enough things to take care of without worrying about doing State's business. O said he knew that. K said please to tell Bob McCloskey that if he (McC) is asked by the press, he is free to express K's outrage.

Telecon
Walt Rostow
1:15 p.m. 10/16/69

Rostow said he was sitting at a distance watching the unfolding mood in the country. He spoke to Col. Haig but wanted to expound on his advice and make it a little stronger to K. Rostow believes there are three things converging here. (1) the simple view that we want to bug out of Vietnam and Asia -- in fact, they do not matter to the U.S. This is a small minority view. (2) what you might call a 'Clifford misinterpretation' that is -- limited troop withdrawals. They are saying we are bugging out in increments. A great many people have view this as the Administrations' policy. They do not know the long history of Vietnamization. They (they meaning this group) don't recall that Westmoreland said we could reduce troops in 1967 and they don't understand the Tet. They don't know if we have plans in case the enemy should come reeling back on some basis. (K said that we did have plans.) What they are saying is a slow bugout. Rostow's son says we should either clobber them or get out fast. Rostow doesn't think this group knows the rationale behind limited withdrawals over a period of time. There is deep confusion. (3) we just ought to go in there with nuclear weapons and get it over with.

Rostow thought an exposition by Nixon which would take these issues and inform the country just what the real meaning of it all is.

K asked if Rostow would write him three or 4 pages that he could use as an outline for the President's speech. R said he would. K asked when R would be down and if he wanted to come at any time, K would pay his way. Rostow said he would be glad to come any time he could help. K thought there were some things he wanted R to look at and would try to work something out to get R here.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Adam Walinsky

10/16/69 5:05 p.m.

W asked K if K had gotten his queery. K said he got it, but it was not
what W had said as far as he understood. W said we've got this awful
fellow Gordon Allott, and not just him but this Agnew, and with this
business we're playing into their hands. How can we carry on a res-
ponsible debate in this country with that kind of thing going on?

W said he had taken great pains to disassociate himself with anything
like that or any kind of personal imputation of people's motives,
especially on the eve of this. K said that W and he would have to
talk sometime soon. W said soon! I agree, maybe this afternoon.

W said he didn't care how it was intended, but the Vice Pres. said it
at the request of the President. K said, as he had said before, that
this is not his department. W said he knew it wasn't, but he had to
ask him, that he considered him a friend, he was sorry to bother
him. K said he didn't consider it. K said, believe me, Adam, this
has bothered him on both sides. W said he wanted to talk with K
quickly, said everybody has been going around about Latin America,
etc. calling everybody a communist. He said the President and the
Vice President were trying to turn a whole generation into that kind
of people. K said the P said he was disavowing that kind of support.

W said what kind of thing is that to say--I was asked to disavow the
support of Hanoi, but I don't have it. He said, they asked everybody
to disavow the support of Hanoi but Adam Walinsky--he's a good guy.

K said he knew W didn't have the support of Hanoi. They agreed that
they have to talk, and W said he'd come by at 7:30 this evening.

By: NARA, Dale S/27

Telecon
Mr. Moynihan
5:30 p.m. 10/16/69

Moynihan has been asked by the President to do a memo on who he might respond to the M-Day. He (M) didn't want to make K's life any harder and asked what initiated the VPs appearance. K said he should ask the President. M considered it a disaster and hoped that K didn't mind him putting it that way. K agreed with M.

M said the kids are saying that Moynihan and Kissinger will never get back to Harvard. They both laughed about that.

By: NARA, Date:

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

10:15 a.m.

10/17/69

Rogers was inquiring whether K was aware of what Laird was going to say in his press statement. K said if he planned it, we did not know anything about it. He(L) said he was going to say something with respect to NSSM 3. He claimed there was a story coming out about force postures -- that we could not defend both Europe and Asia. He was going to say that we considered five different versions. K said this would be o.k. but to fudge it up. The President asked K to call everyone again today and urge them to refrain from discussion Vietnam.

Rogers said he has been trying to follow the directive but would appreciate being let in on the plan if there is any change. K said he didn't think we could afford to play games. He said if he was aware that the President was going to have somebody speak, he would certainly call Rogers about it. Unless the President talked to Laird on his press statement, which he is sure didn't happen, no one was aware. K said Rogers said he would fudge it then and say that we have no interest in keeping armed forces in Vietnam and when the country can handle their defense alone, we will leave. We probably will have to stay for some time but there is no need to mention this. K indicated the President, Thieu and he had said this in several instances.

Rogers also mentioned a statement that someone suggested he use in his press statement that unilateral people would like us to do is take a screw out by using a hammer." K thought that was very good.

R talked to Haldeman on what line should be taken re M-Day. He felt we should try to separate the good from the bad fellows. We could say we have some doubt whether this kind of thing is helpful or not but that we understand why they are doing this. K thought it was a mistake also to group them together. Laird was unhappy about Agnew's speech. He didn't think we should have done that. K agreed and thought a Congressman should have done it. K indicated that one of the moratorium leaders asked to see him. He(Walinsky) was quite disturbed by Agnew's speech. K told him that they wanted purity and we wanted peace. It was a pity the two couldn't be compatible. R said we have to be careful on how we approach the next one. K thought if we ride it out we may get some movement. K didn't see what else they could wait for.

By CCO NARA, Date 3/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11:20 p a.m. 10/17/69

K wanted L to know that a meeting was being held briefly at 11:30 to go over the Symington hearings. K had the impression that State is trying to set Defense up asthe fall guy. L said they are trying to insist on getting Wheeler over there but I don't want him to go. K said those were his feelings and he would support Laird. L said Gen. Blackburn will represent Wheeler. Symington said he sees Sullivan and Sullivan is always braging that he was running the war and now he is trying to put it back to the Joint Chiefs. L said they ought to let him know when they are going to have a meeting. He planned on being at the 11:30 one today.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4:00 p. m. 10/17/69

Rogers saw what Osgood said and planned on going to the President about it. Rogers didn't think K should keep this man on his staff. K said he immediately called the people concerned and apologized. Rogers said that isn't enough. K said he demanded a letter from Osgood apologizing, which he has. Rogers said he didn't like to do it but we have to make an example of a thing like this. It is inexcusable. K said he claims, in his letter, that he had genuinely forgot your name which is absurd and that the other comment was made to an answer to another question which was a comparison to McNamara. K said he would send the letter over and then see how R feels about it. Rogers asked where he was from and K said he is a professor and the Johns Hopkins. Rogers said Francis Wilcox and he have known each other for some time. K said he called McCloskey and Okum and Richardson and told them that this was totally inexcusable. The only question is whether to do it --- K said he would send the letter and see how Rogers feels. K said if he still feels the same, he will do what Rogers wants. They can discuss it on Sunday. K added that it couldn't have happened at worse time since things were going so well.

Rogers
4:20 p. m. 10/17/69

K said he had someone with him when they spoke before and wanted to mention again his outrage. K doesn't really think he meant anything malicious by it. The second remark was not made in reference to Rogers but in reference to strategic questions. The first was a slip and he tried to be funny. He is totally ignorant of the bureaucracy. He is not essential to me other than having so many people leaving. K was saying to Elliot yesterday that the cooperation has never been better, and certainly we did not express his (Ks) feelings. Rogers thought the system was working very well also. K asked if he would read the letter which was on the way over and then let him know how he felt. He would be guided by Rogers feelings.

Rogers said he had worked out the Fulbright situation. He would appear on the 5th and Laird on the 6th. He is going to the Executive session but that wouldn't cover Vietnam.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

4:40 p. m.

10/17/69

Dobrynin said he would like to arrange for a possible meeting in the next few days. He has a message from Moscow regarding their reply on SALT and he would like to deliver it to the President. There may also be some further discussion on Soviet/American relations.

K said he was leaving for Camp David and he would call D from there.
K asked if Dobrynin had requested this through the State Department.
D said no, he has spoken only to K. K said then he xxxxx would keep it
that way. K said when D sees the President there will have to be some
communication, put out. D agreed. K said he assumed that D would
talk to no one else on this. D agreed. D said it would be better if he
knew this evening about the appointment. K said since he didn't have
the schedule, he would do his best.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird

10/18/69 5:15

K started out talking about the AP story about the Roosevelt putting to sea. Want to know if you can help us. K said he had just come back from Camp David, and the President wanted K to tall L that the game plan of which this is a part seems to be working, though L is the only one to know it. K said next week he would give L a little background on it.

L said he was upset about the NYT story this morning. He said there is a front-page story about his taking exception to CW and bacteriological warfare. L said he had sent a little memo to the President in which he outlined why I thought we should go off this line, but he didn't tell anyone else. He said when it comes out like it did this morning, he wonders abour his position. L said he didn't tell anybody in his building. K asked if L thought someone here had leaked it, and asked when L sent it over. L said last week it came over. He said he took certain exceptions but he didn't let anyone know. The memo was strictly for K and the President. K said he didn't know who over here would have leaked it, but he would check into it, would find out who on his staff handled it. K said he didn't see any incentive for letting it out. L said the incentive might be to expose division between himself and the joint chiefs, but K asked why anyone should want to do that. L said well, look at the story. L said he didn't send it out because he figured it was a personal thing. L and K agreed that L ought to be able to have some means of communication between himself and K and the President without it going to State. (The author of the story is a State correspondent--Smith?)

L asked if the President was concerned about the Roosevelt story. K said he doesn't even know about it. K said the President asked him to thank L for the plan. K said it's a little early to tell, but maybe there will be a little payoff.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Senator Symington
10/18/69 5:50 p.m.

Symington said he heard K wanted one of his men in the hearings on Monday. K said he was loaning him to Harlow for the rest of the hearings. S said, well, okay, he won't intimidate the witnesses will he? K said no, and S said he understood K wanted it--said he wanted to be sure they were telling them the facts. K said Harlow wanted someone who knew NSC procedures. S said it would be good to have him; don't let him intimidate the witnesses. K said as far as he was concerned, he didn't need to have anything to do with the witnesses; he's supposed to give Harlow some substantive advice. S said the name given to him was not Harlow but Kissinger, and Kissinger is the man he aims to please. S said when it's over, K might ask him how it went. S said he doesn't see why people should break their backs over problems they don't have anything to do with.

S said they started stuff up north before they started the trail. S said he got a long-letter from the Washington Evening Star talking about the restraints placed on Arbuckle. S said it is best to have it out, then he will work out with K what should or should not come out.

By CCO NARA, Dale 5/27

TELECON

Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger

October 19, 1969 -- 5:30 p.m.

K said, concerning the story in the New York Times concerning CBR, it had to come out of the Defense Department because Laird's memo has not yet reached us. K said he frankly did not know what Laird was talking about earlier because he hadn't seen the memo. Col Haig had been told it would come over yesterday, but as yet, it has not arrived. K even had the NSC log checked in case it went through that channel by mistake (he mentioned that he had issued instructions for everything from Laird to come directly to him). Therefore, the story could not have come out of K's office.

L said he is having his people check on it. It was a two-page memo which he personally wrote; it should have been sent to us already.

K said he wanted L to know that he would take such a leak here very seriously. L said he takes it very seriously. The only place this was discussed was in the Under Secretaries Committee. K repeated that he had never seen it.

L then asked if K had heard what happened at Dave Packard's house yesterday afternoon (10/17). 'They' went to his house, opened -- or broke into -- his government safe, and took everything out of it. K had not heard, and was astounded.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
10:00 a.m. 10/20/69

Rogers was going off to New York to make a speech and wanted to ask K if he would please tell his people and anyone who knew about the unfortunate situation w/Osgood, to please shut up. Evidently a comment that K made to Alex Johnson was picked up by a newspaper writer. K said that comment was totally separate from the Osgood situation. K was just saying something friendly to Johnson. It was a comment that the President mentioned.

Rogers said if we keep talking about this it will make it worse and everyone should just not say anything. In a conversation with the Atty. Gen.,

Rogers said the A. G. thought the man should be fired too. Rogers thinks an issue should be made of this guy. Rogers didn't think K's staff should build him up at the expense of others. K said he told his staff not to build him up; his role is totally different from that of the Cabinet. K said he has not heard that his people have talked about this. The stories that Rogers was yelling at K in front of the President didn't come from K's staff. Rogers said as long as K is going to get rid of him in the next month or so. K said he knew that this man was not malicious and Osgood knows nothing of the bureaucracy.

Rogers said if it looks as though there is a pre-occupation with this incident it is bad. We don't have to talk -- Rogers thinks the President likes everyone.

Rogers asked if K could give some thinking to what Rogers should say about the moratorium in view of what Agnew said.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: CCO NARA, Date: 5/27

Telecon
Attorney General
10:20 a.m. 10/20/69

K said that Rogers has been calling him about the comment that one of his staff members made about Rogers. K said this fellow is a professor who knows nothing of the affairs of the world. He is not the least malicious and is on his planning staff doing planning papers. K felt that Osgood's report of what he says is not as drastic as what Rogers heard and the truth is probably somewhere in between. K said he has now fired three people on the slightest lack of discretion and hesitates in this instance since he feels sure it was not malicious. Rogers said that Mitchell agreed with him that the man should be fired. Mitchell didn't recall discussing it in that vein. He was discussing something a conversation he(M) had with Haldeman about things generally in this vein but the man's name was not a part of that context. Mitchell asked if there were someone who could be considered impartial who could judge this. K said he hadn't investigated that aspect. K said that Osgood was not worldly, he wouldn't know how to plot a bureaucratic ploy anyway and isn't anti-Rogers. M said he didn't know the fellow and really didn't know the background. M said his conversation concerned people trying to build up their obsesses at the expense of Cabinet officers.

K asked M's judgment. M said he didn't know if he could make a judgment since he didn't know the background but if M were in K's position, he said he didn't think he would fire him -- that would be admitting to Rogers' allegations. K said he mentioned this briefly to the President but would hate to have a confrontation on such a stupid thing.

M thought K should let this set for a while and K agreed.